

Document of  
The World Bank

Report No: ICR1903

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT  
(IDA-H0900)

ON A

LEARNING AND INNOVATION LOAN

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 1.7 MILLION (US\$ 2.5 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF MALI

FOR A

MALI DEVELOPMENT LEARNING CENTER PROJECT - LIL

April 10, 2012

AFRCP – Capacity Development & Partnerships  
AFCW3  
Africa Region

## CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective June 20, 2011)

Currency Unit = CFA Franc

1.00 = US\$ 0.00218067

US\$ 1.00 = 458.061

FISCAL YEAR

January 01 to December 31

## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AADLC	Association of African Distance Learning Centers
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
DLC	Development Learning Center (GDLN Center)
CFD	<i>Centre de Formation pour le Développement</i> (Mali GDLN Center)
GDLN	Global Development Learning Network
ICR	Implementation Completion Report
IDA	International Development Association
IP	Implementation Performance
ISG	Information Solutions Group
KPI(s)	Key Performance Indicator(s)
LIL	Learning and Innovation Loan
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NCB	National Competitive Bidding
NGO(s)	Non Governmental Organization(s)
NS	National Shopping
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PCU	Project Coordination Unit
PDO	Project Development Objective
PPF	Project Preparation Facility
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PRSC	Poverty Reduction Strategy Credit
SDR	Special Drawing Rights
WBI	World Bank Institute

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Project Team Leader: Marc Jean Yves Lixi  
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**MALI**  
**Development Learning Center Project**

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<b>A. Basic Information</b>			
Country:	Mali	Project Name:	Mali Development Learning Center project - LIL
Project ID:	P082187	L/C/TF Number(s):	IDA-H0900
ICR Date:	03/16/2012	ICR Type:	Core ICR
Lending Instrument:	LIL	Borrower:	GOVERNMENT OF MALI
Original Total Commitment:	XDR 1.70M	Disbursed Amount:	XDR 1.67M
Revised Amount:	XDR 1.67M		
<b>Environmental Category: C</b>			
<b>Implementing Agencies:</b> Ministry of Economy and Finance			
<b>Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:</b> UNDP - PNUD			

<b>B. Key Dates</b>				
Process	Date	Process	Original Date	Revised / Actual Date(s)
Concept Review:	07/24/2003	Effectiveness:	07/15/2005	07/15/2005
Appraisal:	01/30/2004	Restructuring(s):		
Approval:	05/21/2004	Mid-term Review:	06/25/2007	
		Closing:	06/30/2009	05/31/2011

<b>C. Ratings Summary</b>	
<b>C.1 Performance Rating by ICR</b>	
Outcomes:	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome:	High
Bank Performance:	Unsatisfactory
Borrower Performance:	Unsatisfactory

<b>C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)</b>			
Bank	Ratings	Borrower	Ratings
Quality at Entry:	Unsatisfactory	Government:	Unsatisfactory
Quality of Supervision:	Moderately Satisfactory	Implementing Agency/Agencies:	Unsatisfactory
<b>Overall Bank Performance:</b>	Unsatisfactory	<b>Overall Borrower Performance:</b>	Unsatisfactory

<b>C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators</b>			
<b>Implementation Performance</b>	<b>Indicators</b>	<b>QAG Assessments (if any)</b>	<b>Rating</b>
Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	Yes	Quality at Entry (QEA):	None
Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	Yes	Quality of Supervision (QSA):	None
DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:	Moderately Satisfactory		

<b>D. Sector and Theme Codes</b>		
	<b>Original</b>	<b>Actual</b>
<b>Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)</b>		
General public administration sector		50
Vocational training	100	50
<b>Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)</b>		
Administrative and civil service reform		25
Education for the knowledge economy	100	25
Infrastructure services for private sector development		25
Participation and civic engagement		25

<b>E. Bank Staff</b>		
<b>Positions</b>	<b>At ICR</b>	<b>At Approval</b>
Vice President:	Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili	Callisto E. Madavo
Country Director:	Ousmane Diagana	A. David Craig
Sector Manager:	Tijan M. Sallah	Nicolas M. Gorjestani
Project Team Leader:	Susana Carrillo	Marc Jean Yves Lixi
ICR Team Leader:	Susana Carrillo	
ICR Primary Author:	Rosemary M. Cubagee	

## **F. Results Framework Analysis**

### **Project Development Objectives** (from Project Appraisal Document)

The objective of the Project is to test the effectiveness and sustainability of a development learning center as part of a global knowledge-sharing network to strengthen the capacity of public, private and civil society decision makers and implementers to design, plan and manage social and economic development policies.



**Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)**

Not revised.

**(a) PDO Indicator(s)**

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
<b>Indicator 1 :</b>	Number of project directors trained in the DLC, implementing best practice guidelines on managing development projects			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	0	At least 2 new Directors each year		10
Date achieved	01/30/2004	05/24/2004		06/20/2011
Comments (incl. % achievement)	83%			
<b>Indicator 2 :</b>	Number of specific initiatives introduced that impact PRSP implementation in designated areas covered by distance learning			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	0	At least 2 the first year and 3 in each twelve months period thereafter		3
Date achieved	01/30/2004	05/24/2004		06/20/2011
Comments (incl. % achievement)	15%			
<b>Indicator 3 :</b>	Ability to cover operating expenses through fees			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	0	60% of operating expenses to be covered by revenue generation by the 3rd year of the Center operations		0%
Date achieved	01/30/2004	05/24/2004		06/20/2011
Comments (incl. % achievement)	At closing date, the CFD was not yet fully operational and had only organized a few activities which generated very little income			
<b>Indicator 4 :</b>	Number of training institutions using the DLC			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	0	At least 2 new training institutions each year of implementation		2
Date achieved	01/30/2004	05/24/2004		06/20/2011
Comments	17.6%			

(incl. % achievement)				
<b>Indicator 5 :</b>	Number of training sessions held at the DLC			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	0	80 training sessions have been held during the first twelve months of Project Implementation and 120 such sessions in each twelve months period thereafter		22
Date achieved	01/30/2004	05/24/2004		06/20/2011
Comments (incl. % achievement)	27.5%			

**(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)**

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
<b>Indicator 1 :</b>	Number of civil servants trained			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	800 the first year, 1500 the second year, 3000 the third year and 4500 the fourth year		386
Date achieved	01/30/2004	05/24/2004		06/20/2011
Comments (incl. % achievement)	48% - Center was not fully operational at closing date			
<b>Indicator 2 :</b>	Number of private sector, NGO or civil society participants			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	At least 5% the first year, and 5 additional % each year		8%
Date achieved	01/30/2004	05/24/2004		06/20/2011
Comments (incl. % achievement)	The achievement of this IO Indicator exceeds the original target value, although the Center was not fully operational at closing date			
<b>Indicator 3 :</b>	Number and type of training courses offered by the DLC that corresponds to the identified needs of the market study, the national training strategy and projects			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	10 the first year and 2 more every year		9

Date achieved	01/30/2004	05/24/2004		06/20/2011
Comments (incl. % achievement)	90%			


### G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No.	Date ISR Archived	DO	IP	Actual Disbursements (USD millions)
1	11/20/2004	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.00
2	04/08/2005	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	0.00
3	12/01/2005	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	0.18
4	02/14/2006	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	0.51
5	01/09/2007	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	0.60
6	02/20/2007	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	0.64
7	11/27/2007	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	0.87
8	06/13/2008	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	0.87
9	11/30/2008	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	0.94
10	06/30/2009	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	1.09
11	12/31/2009	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	1.62
12	06/29/2010	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	1.86
13	05/03/2011	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	2.44

### H. Restructuring (if any)

Not Applicable

# I. Disbursement Profile



# **1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design**

## **1.1 Context at Appraisal**

A distance learning center (DLC) was a new concept for Mali at appraisal. Despite the presence of local training institutions then, there were no information technology (IT) facilities for allowing the sharing of information and exchanging knowledge with other countries. Moreover, the Government had expressed interest in accessing and delivering training courses that would support capacity development efforts for the civil service and, in particular, the implementation of reforms in areas such as health, local government, legal, and education as well as in functions related to procurement, accounting, service delivery, restructuring, budgeting or performance management.

The distance learning center project was aimed at improving the implementation of the PRSP and related development projects by building the capacity in the public and private sectors, and strengthening the environment for policy reform. It also aimed to help coordinate all local training institutions in regard to the national capacity building policy by making coherent, through the DLC Board, all the courses and learning events offered by local training institutions.

## **1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators**

The original PDO and Key Indicators as per the Development Grant Agreement (Report Number H090 MLI) are as follows:

The main objective of this Learning and Innovation Loan (LIL) was to test the effectiveness and sustainability of a development learning center in Mali as part of a global knowledge-sharing network to strengthen the capacity of public, private and civil society decision makers to design, plan and manage social and economic development policies.

The Key Performance Indicators as per the Grant Agreement (schedule 5) were the following:

1. Number of high level project staff (at least 2 the first year and 3 new each twelve months period thereafter), trained in the Development Learning Center program, implementing best practice guidelines on managing development projects.
2. Number of specific initiatives introduced that impact on the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper implementation in designated areas covered by distance learning (at least 2 the first year and 3 in each twelve month period thereafter)
3. Ability to cover operating expenses through fees (60% of operating expenses to be covered by revenue generation by the 3<sup>rd</sup> year of the Center operations).

4. Number of private or public entities using the DLC (at least 2 new entities each year of implementation).
5. 80 training sessions have been held during the first twelve months of Project Implementation, and 120 each session in each twelve months period.
6. Variance of content offered in the training sessions has covered at least 3 specific sectors during the first twelve months of Project Implementation, and 5 such sectors in each twelve-month period thereafter
7. At least 40% from the first Project Year, 50% from the second Project Year, 60% from the third Project Year, and 70% from the fourth Project Year of the sampled participants have improved knowledge and/or skills as a result of the training.
8. Number and type of courses developed or supplied that correspond to the training needs identified for: (a) civil servants, (b) other participants (at least 30%).

### **1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification**

The original project objectives and the key indicators were not revised over the life of the project, however, the following major adjustments were made: (i) extension of the refinancing date of the Project Preparation Facility (PPF); (ii) Amendment of Development Grant Agreement (DGA) in relations to the Procurement of goods and services; and (iii) extension of the Project closing date (See Section 2.2).

### **1.4 Main Beneficiaries,**

The main target audience for the DLC consists of (i) decision makers and civil servants from the public sector, (ii) the World Bank and (iii) non-public sector development actors such as civil society organizations, private sector, NGOs and community associations. As experience has shown elsewhere, an important segment of the market for the DLC services would come from NGOs, civil society organizations and the private sector.

The training needs for Bank and donor-financed projects covered technical, policy and management areas that could also be supported by the DLC, with the benefit of outreaching a larger audience and decreasing the cost for travel and training abroad. Most World Bank-funded projects in Mali include a capacity development component. However, they are not designed to use distance learning and other services used by the center. Another important role envisaged for the DLC was to promote South-South knowledge exchange.

## 1.5 Original Components

The project has three main components:

- (i) DLC construction and equipment
- (ii) Support of the DLC operations
- (iii) Monitoring and evaluation

**Component 1** aimed at setting-up the institutional, physical and human resources requirements for the DLC

- Construction of facilities for the DLC, including: (a) provision of a videoconference room with at least a 30-person capacity; (b) a computer room outfitted for at least 30 computer stations (with hardware, software and Internet hook-up); (c) a technical and administrative center, including office spaces, a room for trainers and a conference room; and (d) mechanical outfitting such as installation of electrical and telephone wiring.
- Acquisition and installation of DLC technical equipment, including: (a) a very small aperture terminal (VSAT); (b) a satellite communication center, lighting system, video, audio, telecommunications and simultaneous interpretation equipment; (c) office and classroom furniture and a light weight vehicle for the DLC staff.
- Recruitment of DLC staff, including a director, a training coordinator, an information technology officer, an accountant and an administrative assistant.  
The Centre de Formation pour le Développement du Mali (CFD Mali) was established as a Scientific and Technological Public Establishment (Etablissement Public à Caractère Scientifique - EPST). It operates under the authority of the Ministry of Economy.

**Component 2** aimed at supporting the DLC for (i) strengthening its human, financial, operational management and business planning capabilities and (ii) developing, marketing, sourcing and scheduling of its training programs, through the provision of technical advisory services and training.

**Component 3** aimed at setting up a Monitoring and Evaluation system that will assess the impact of the Project.

## 1.6 Revised Components

The project components were not revised

## 1.7 Other significant changes.

The following significant changes were made: On September 20, 2007, the Government requested for an Amendment of the Development Grant Agreement (DGA H090-MLI) in the Government Letter Ref: 301/MEIC-SG. The reason for the request is to allow the project to contract an agency (UNDP) specialized in procurement to procure the technical equipment for the

center (See Table 1 – Summary of Major Events that affected Project Implementation). IDA approved the Government's request and amended the DGA on December 14, 2007. The Government signed on the amendment and it became effective on January 10, 2008 (See Annex 10).

## **2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes**

### **2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry**

Project Preparation: Since the Mali GDLN project is similar to past GDLN operations in other African countries, the project design took into account the lessons learned from these operations. A series of consultations with other donors (UNDP, EU, DANIDA, AFD and GTZ.) and human resources departments within key ministries were carried out by the Task Team during the different phases of the project.

Use of PPF: A PPF of US\$ 180,000 was used to fund various types of preparatory activities, such as, contracting of the project management to an Agetip Agency, including architecture and civil engineering consultancy services, the setting up of a financial management system, the development of a manual of management procedures and a manual of administrative and accounting procedures for the Center, a study visit to Mauritania and Senegal for the architect and the project coordinator, and the operating cost of the PCU. Project preparation, although adequate, lack of capacity on the Government' side affected project implementation as shown in the following sections.

Project Design: the PDOs as stated in the PAD were broad, ambitious and unrealistic, which affected the implementation of the project. There is also some inconsistency between the PDOs stated in the PAD and in the Credit Agreement and the same is true for the performance indicators. The project team had difficulties translating these PDOs into intermediate and concrete short-term outcomes.

- a) There is little evidence to suggest that a proper assessment was carried out to determine the readiness and capacity of the Government and the institutional environment to implement the project. The establishment and management of a GDLN center requires specific expertise in areas related to IT, distance education and marketing. Also, the PAD does not give any indication of how the expected outcomes could be integrated/ and or mainstreamed into policy reform processes.
- b) The majority of the performance indicators were unrealistic and broad. There were no short term, medium term and long term performance indicators. In addition, even though the indicators were quantitative, they were very difficult to measure and, most importantly, not appropriate to assess the overall impact of the project on capacity development and on institutional strengthening as stated in the overall objective of the project. Considering the weak institutional environment and limited human capacity both at the public and private sector levels, performance indicators should have been designed accordingly through a participatory process with clear responsibilities assigned. Critical assumptions made were general and do not reflect overall local challenges.
- c) Although it was a LIL, the project lacked an M&E framework, even though an M&E was proposed in component 3 of the project. Given that LILs are by nature



- pilot projects to test new approaches, M&E is critical to assess the success of pilot projects and draw on lessons for future operations, including scaling up prospects. A few concrete objectives and indicators of success should have been defined so as to allow building a knowledge base for future similar operations. The “one size fits all” approach should have been avoided. It is also questionable if a LIL is the right instrument for the establishment of GDLN centers.
- d) The project design was based on the model developed during the GDLN Program Pilot Phase (2000-2002). Although at the time of project appraisal, the successes and failures of ongoing GDLN projects were not yet known, the Task Team consulted operational GDLN center staff in Senegal and Mauritania for suggestions. These were included in the design of Components 1 and 2. However, more attention should have been given to local constraints and potential risks such as the lack of basic infrastructure for water, electricity and information technology in the project site.

## **2.2 Implementation**

Several issues directly affected the Project implementation which resulted in a five-year delay in implementation

- (i) Unrealistic implementation schedule. Failure to schedule sufficient time for start-up activities. The project implementation schedule was unrealistic; there was not enough set-up time between the construction of the center and the operation of the center. Also, the lack of existing basic infrastructure such as water and electricity at the project site was not taken into consideration in the implementation schedule.
- (ii) Unforeseen technical difficulties– There were unanticipated difficulties in the technology transition from the Information Solutions Group (ISG) to private connectivity service providers of GDLN Centers in Africa. There was a twenty four months delay in selection of a new operator after IDA’s ISG decided not to continue supporting GDLN centers in Africa, and transfer of services had to be made to the Association of African Distance Learning Centers (AADLC).
- (iii) Selection of staff, contractors and consultants - Changes in the institutional anchor and the coordination team resulting in high turnover. Political interference on the Government’s side resulted in a lack of transparency in selection of staff. The Local construction firm (AGETIP) selected for component 1- construction of the center was overloaded with too much work and was not able to comply with the agreed deadline. This resulted in completing the construction of center in sixteen months instead of the nine months envisioned during the project preparation. This aspect was not properly taken into account by the Task Team.

- (iv) Non-compliance of procurement rules. Procurement administration issues with UNDP Mali, which was contracted to procure technical equipment for the DLC, also resulted in delays in operation of the center. It took 24 months for IDA to reimburse UNDP which was contracted to procure the technical equipment for the center due to non-compliance by UNDP of IDA procurement rules.
- (v) Unexpected socio-political tension and the global economic crisis. The socio-political tension in neighboring Cote d'Ivoire, and global economic crisis resulted in cost overrun of construction materials of component 1 of the project. During the Ivory Coast crisis most cargo transportation was almost on halt affecting the cost of construction materials.
- (vi) Changes in institutional anchor of the GDLN program at the World Bank- Caused disruptions and affected the quality of monitoring of project activities and restructuring as required. The project was for several months managed by a WBI Program Officer, as an acting TTL, rather than a staff from the Africa region, where the project was hosted.
- (vii) Lack of Attention from the Task Team to support for Content Development -There was no preparation in terms of developing content for the use of the center and the groundwork required to mainstream distance learning and knowledge sharing into the Bank's operations in Mali.

In addition to the above, project implementation was also affected by the Government's lack of response and cumbersome administrative procedures due largely to limited capacity. (i) The Project Coordination Unit (PCU) was moved from the Ministry of Finance (MoF) to the Ministry of Economics (MoE) where there was limited capacity to implement the project<sup>1</sup>; (ii) Project Preparation Financing (PPF) date was extended three times; (iii) the Grant Agreement was amended twice; (iv) and the project closing date was extended twice (See Table 1- Summary of Major Events that affected Project Implementation).

- I. In October 12, 2004 the Government requested for an Extension of the refinancing date of the PPF from October 17, 2004 to January 17, 2005 (Government Letter ref: No. 03283/MEF-SG dated October 12, 2004). No records of approval date found in the IDA file.
- II. On June 22, 2004, the Government requested for the Second time an Extension of the refinancing date of the PPF from June 30, 2004 to October 17, 2004 (Government Letter ref: No. 01932/MEF-SG). According to the Government, several changes in the project coordination location slowed down the project preparation and the PPF set up.

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<sup>1</sup> The PCU was eventually disbanded and the DLC Director was appointed as project coordinator.

III. On June 28, 2004, IDA approved for the Second time an Extension of the PPF from June 30, 2004 to October 17, 2004. IDA's rationale for approving the second extension of the PPF as indicated in the Memorandum dated June 28, 2004 are:

“Given the very tight implementation schedule, the set-up of an acceptable Financial Management System, the recruitment of an external auditor as well as other consultations necessary for the effectiveness of the Development Grant Agreement (DGA) has already started and will be completed within the next three months. We expect the DGA to become effective on October 17, 2004)”.

IV. On April 15, 2005, the Government requested for the third time an Extension of the refinancing date for the PPF and the project effective date from April 17, 2005 to July 18, 2005 – (Government Letter Ref: No. 1287/MEF-SG). On April 25, 2005, IDA approved for the third time the extension date of the PPF and the effective date to July 18, 2005. The reasons indicated in the IDA memorandum dated April 19, 2005 for approving the Government's request are:

- i. The project Coordination Unit was relocated from the Ministry of Economy and Finance to the Direction of Debt and Investment. At this new location, the Project Coordination Unit did not have sufficient resources to meet the project preparation deadlines.
- ii. Three months into implementation, the Ministry of Economy and Finance decided to appoint a new Project Coordinator. The capacity of this new Team was unfortunately weak and the process of selection of the auditor and the consultant for the Manual of Procedure had to be redone.

V. On September 14, 2007, the Government requested for a reallocation of the project funds (Government Letter ref. No. 0906/MEF-SG) due to a cost escalation, due to a force majeure—the Cote d'Ivoire crisis and the exchange rate depreciation) . According to the Government, the reallocation was needed for Category 1 (Civil Works), 3 (Consultant Services) and 6 (Refinancing of PPF). Accordingly, “the continuous socio-political tensions in the neighboring Cote d'Ivoire as well as the fall of the dollar exchange rate against the Euro (and thus the FCFA) had significantly increased the cost of construction. Therefore, the initial allocation on category 1 as assessed during the project appraisal was not sufficient to cover the funding of component 1 activities”.

VI. IDA approved the reallocation of the project funds in a letter dated October 29, 2007 based on the following reasons as per IDA's Memorandum of November 13, 2007):

- i. The project will benefit from the experience of the other GDLN Centers in Sub-Saharan Africa;
- ii. The project is expected to generate rapidly more revenues than planned during the appraisal therefore, consulting services may not cost as much as expected;
- iii. The Government's request is to reallocate funds from Category 3 (Consultant Services) and the undisbursed amount from Category 6 (Refinancing of PPF) to finance the additional construction costs.

- VII. On September 20, 2007<sup>2</sup> - the Government requested for an Amendment of the Development Grant Agreement (DGA H090-MLI) in the Government Letter No. Ref: 301/MEIC-SG. IDA approved the Government request to amend the DGA on December 14, 2007 and amended the DGA. The Government signed on the above amendment and it became effective on January 10, 2008 (See Annex 10).
- VIII. On February 10, 2009, the Government requested for a first extension of the project/Grant closing date for 36 months (Government Letter Ref: No.535/MEIC-S.G). The main issues raised in the IDA Memorandum dated April 13, 2009 to approve the Government's request for extension of the closing date are: "The project is facing a major implementation delay. This delay is due to several factors including:
- i. The high standards set for construction of the Center. The GDLN technical standards are particularly complex and uncommon in Mali. But these demanding technical requirements are necessary to ensure the best quality of the GDLN service delivery linked to content from throughout the world;
  - ii. The Mali Development Learning Center project was initially anchored in the Ministry of Finance. Further to the governmental reshuffle that took place in April 2008, it was decided to move the project to the Ministry of Economics and Trade. A new project coordinator was appointed by the Minister of Economics late August 2008. This change delayed the project execution;
  - iii. The technology transition that is being implemented to give the GDLN its full and necessary autonomy also slowed down the project execution; and
  - iv. The actual cost of construction far exceeded the provisions in the PAD. This is due to external factors such as the global economic crisis during the period 2008 – 2010.

On June 25, 2009 the request for extension of the closing date was approved for 23months from July 1, 2009 to May 31, 2011. *(Please insert the dates; they are missing)*. IDA's rationales for approving the extension of the closing date as per the Memorandum dated June 23, 2009 are:

- i. Given the current status of the project implementation, an early closing of the project would result in the immediate closing of the Center and would leave the Government with a building designed for GDLN and non-operational.
- ii. The last ISR (November 2008) rates the IP MS and PDO MU, indicating that both will be upgraded to MS if the implementation remains on track.
- iii. The recent update on the implementation progress shows that the positive trend mentioned in the last ISR is confirmed and thus both PDO and IP rating can be upgraded to MS.
- iv. The attached Action Plan aims to bring the performance of the DLC operations to a satisfactory level (based on our experience in other AFR countries) by June 30, 2010
- v. Given the importance of capacity-building aspects in the current CAS, an extension of the project closing date will give the project sufficient time to benefit from the capacity enhancement focus in Mali and thus rapidly improve its performance".

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<sup>2</sup> Dates don't seem to match events of reallocation of funds on October 29, 07 and the request for Amendment of DGA on September 29, 07

Table: 1- Summary of Major Events that affected Project Implementation

<i>Date</i>	<i>Major Issue</i>	<i>IDA Action/date</i>
	<i>Institutional– Issues PPF Extension</i>	
October 12, 2004	First Government request for the extension of refinancing date of the Project Preparation Facility from October 2004 to January 17, 2005 (Government Letter Ref: No.03283/MEF-SG)	Not available
June 22, 2004	Government requested for the second time extension of refinancing date of the Project Preparation Facility (PPF) from June 30, 2004 to October 17, 2004. (Government Letter Ref: No. 01932/MEF-SG)	Approved June 28, 2004
April 15, 2005,	Government requested for the third time an Extension of the refinancing date for the Project Preparation Facility (PPF) and the Effectiveness Date (ED) from April 17, 2005 to July 18, 2005 – (Government Letter Ref: No. 1287/MEF-SG).	IDA approved the third on April 25, 2005
	<i>Reallocation of funds</i>	
September 14, 2007	Government requested for a reallocation of the project funds (Government Letter ref. No. 0906/MEF-SG)	Reallocation was approved on October 29, 2007
	<i>DGA Amendment</i>	
September 20, 2007	Government requested for an Amendment of the Development Grant Agreement (DGA H090-MLI) in the Government Letter No. Ref: 301/MEIC-SG.	IDA approved the amendment on December 14, 2007.
	Contract with AGETIP – Component 1 – construction of the center	
2008	Procurement Contract with UNDP – for Procurement of technical equipment delayed for 24 months.	
February 10, 2009,	Government requested for a <u>First Extension</u> of the project closing date for 36 months (Government Letter dated February 10, 2009)).	IDA Extended the closing date by 23 months, from July 1, 2009 to March 31, 2011 in IDA letter to the Government dated June 25, 2009
	<i>Re-assignment of the project to AFRCP at the closing of the project</i>	
November 2, 2011	A request was made by the Capacity Development Unit of AFR to extend the submission date of the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) due to the new procedure for submission of ICRs.	The delivery date was approved and extended from November 30, 2011 to March 2012.

### 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

During the construction phase of the center (2004-2009), the project did not have an M&E expert. As mentioned above, the project design includes M&E - component 3 of

the project: which aimed at setting up a Monitoring and Evaluation system that will assess the impact of the Project (Par. 1.5). Due to the aforementioned delays, analyzing the outcome indicators did not take effect until 2010. Had an M&E been set-up, at the beginning, when the project was launched, monitoring and evaluating the construction of the center and the procurement of the technical equipment issues mentioned above, would have provided information and important lessons for this LIL project.

In 2010, when the center became operational, the DLC designed a basic M&E tool, using an Excel program for compiling basic data of activities in DLC. The ICR Team's evaluation of this database revealed that the database was just a list of items without any system for monitoring and evaluating of the DLC operations. The ICR Team concluded that, there was no M&E in place at DLC at the close of the project in 2011.

#### **2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance**

The project is rated category C and no safeguard policy was triggered. CFD Mali is located in a small building located in a developing urban area called ACI 2000 which is expected to host most of the new government buildings and a number of high level training institutions.

#### **2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase**

For future operations, according to the Government, it would like to partner with international organizations and other institutions in the country in order to promote the use of CFD facilities. Such partnership would also help to make progress towards the MDGs. The Government also requested assistance from IDA to build a multimedia hall for face-to-face training in CFD.

For the moment, IDA has no immediate plan or a Road Map on how to use CFD facilities. However, the ICR team feels it is important for IDA to step in and help the Government recruit a trainer to train the current CFD staff on how to run the center, and also help in establishing an M&E system

### **3. Assessment of Outcomes**

#### **3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation**

In 1999, the Global Development Learning Network (GDLN) was established as a technology and connectivity provider for training and capacity building of development practitioners. With the development of technological and connectivity capacity, the GDLN's comparative advantage now lies in the international expertise developed across the network, the convening power of the GDLN affiliates worldwide, the design and delivery of learning events, the dissemination of good practices in development topics and the facilitation of South-South knowledge exchanges among peers.

Although the PDOs as defined in the PAD were vague and too ambitious, DLC is relevant today as it was when the project was launched in 2004. The Mali Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) during project preparation and the current CAS (Report No. 41745-ML)<sup>3</sup> include explicit reference to “*increase connection to the world through ICT and telecommunication; build capacity of local administration and support community development to address rural-urban migration.*” As mentioned above (par.2.1), project design would have greatly benefited from a more realistic assessment of existing infrastructure at the project site; local institutional and human capacities; an M&E framework; and stronger ownership by local stakeholders.

### **3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives<sup>4</sup>**

Despite five years delays (par.2.2), the DLC has achieved some of the Project’s Development Objectives. During the period (2010-2011), when the center became operational, CFD Mali offered 40 video based learning conferences and face-to-face training courses to local officials from both public and private sectors. These capacity building programs, addressed development issues such as: Human Resources and Organizational Management; Budget Management; Development and Leadership Training; Social & Cultural Economics; Procurement and Corruption Auditing; Public Administration; Project Management and etc. (See Annex 10, Table 2 for a more detail list of courses offered).

Also, learning events reached over 1,320 participants in the form of structured training programs, action learning activities, South-South knowledge exchanges or regional policy dialogues. Of these participants, 28 percent and 18 percent were female during the periods 2010 and 2011 respectively, an achievement not envisioned during project preparation and not targeted in the outcome indicators or in the PAD (See Table 3 below).

Table: 2– CFD Mali Learning Events 2010 to 2011 – Participants per sector

Year	Number of Participants	Public Sector		Private Sector	
		Number	%	Number	%
2010	334	298	89	36	11
2011	987	888	90	99	10
Total	1321	1186	90	135	10

Sources: Government. \*Note: There are inconsistencies in the DLC data.  
See Annex 7 Government report

Table: 3 Participants in CFD Learning Events by Gender

Year	Total Number of participants	Male	Female
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<sup>3</sup> Report Number 41745-ML

<sup>4</sup> It should be noted that, at close of project, CFD does not have an M&E Expert and there is no database on its operations. There are inconsistencies in CFD data that was submitted for the preparation of this ICR. Due to these inconsistencies, the ICR team feels it is inappropriate to do a quantitative analysis of the project output. Therefore, all figures and numbers in this report should be treated with caution.

		Number	%	Number	%
2010	334	242	72	92	28
2011	987	806	82	181	18
Total	1321	1048	79	273	21

Source: Government. Note: There are discrepancies in Government data due to lack of M&E in the CFD (See Annex 7 Government report).

To a certain extent, the project has also strengthened Public-Private Partnership through learning events that convened representatives from both the public and private sectors, while simultaneously contributing to the popularization of information technology and Internet-based learning in the country. In addition, the learning events also generated income for the center in the form of user fees which, at the close of the project covered over 60 percent of the operating costs (See Annex 2, Table 2). Staff salaries were also derived from the CFD's user fees indicating sustainability of the center. Finally, above all, one of the major benefits of CFD in addition to capacity building, is that the center's operations generate employment and income - offering jobs to local and regional professionals.

### 3.3 Efficiency

The DLC is cost-effective. According to the Government, the above courses (Par. 3.2), if translated into training abroad or imports of international trainers, would have cost the Government from US\$6,051 to US\$18,155<sup>5</sup> per head, in tuition alone, for a week's training per a course. A similar training in the CFD Mali is only \$889 per head. This cost saving is one of the major objectives of the CFD Mali. Also since most of the learning events offered by CFD are usually shared by at least three other centers in Francophone Africa (Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal), the savings in cost of training in CFD would be significantly lower for the Government as the center becomes popular in the country and attendance increases.

### 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

Despite being cost effective, the CFD's PDOs are vague and unrealistic (2.1). They should have been better focused, less ambitious and defined more measurable indicators in the PAD. There was limited attention paid to the engagement of local stakeholders (learning/knowledge institutions) beyond the government, leading to limited sustainability and impact. However, the spirit of these PDOs is still relevant given the need for efficient capacity-building tools in Mali. Although the DLC is cost effective (Par. 3.3), the achievement of the PDOs is rated unsatisfactory for the reasons described

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<sup>5</sup> Government estimated cost for external training, from US\$6,051 to US\$18,155



in Section 2.3 – lack of M&E; and project output by components – mixed results (Annex 2).

### **3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts**

#### **(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development**

Although gender aspects were not indicated in the outcome indicators in the PAD, female participation in the learning process in CFD was 21 percent compared to 79 percent for male participants during the periods 2010 and 2011(See Table 3 below). The gender balance in the learning events is low with respect to the professional environment in Mali, where the female labor force represents around 45 percent of the total labor force. On the other hand, the center has been operational for only two years and it is likely that female participation will increase in the coming years.

#### **(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening**

After the project became effective in July 15, 2005, CFD was moved from the Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of Economics following the Government's reshuffle within the ministries. The reason for moving CFD was to provide the project with a more appropriate institutional anchor. Also, as detailed in the PAD, the success of the project would rely: (i) upon building the institutional capacity of the DLC to establish an effective, efficient, relevant, and sustainable center which would impact on building capacity; (ii) on sorting out the institutional challenges for the project include building the capacity of project management, establishing practical means with Government to support implementation of the public service training strategy, establishing an effective and well represented Board (consisting of private sector, government and civil society representatives).

On building the institutional capacity of the DLC, only 50 percent of DLC staffing positions were filled at the close of the project (see Annex 2, Table 2). The positions of M&E, Training Coordinator, Sales and Marketing Specialist, and Financial specialist/accountant positions were vacant. Also, there was no evidence suggesting that DLC staff received training on how to run the center (Par. See Annex 2). Therefore, as of the date of this ICR, the capacity at the DLC is not up to the standard of IDA's requirements at such centers (See Annex 10, IDA's TOR for DLC suggested to Government).

On the other hand, the face-to-face and video training sessions mentioned in Section 3.2 on the capacity building programs of: Human Resources and Organizational Management; Budget Management; Development and Leadership Training; Social & Cultural Economics; Procurement and Corruption Auditing; Public Administration and Project Management offered by CFD to the public and the private sectors, NGOs and the civil society, this has somewhat developed and enhanced the capacity of those who participated in the training programs at the institutional level. Although this achievement is not significant at this point in time, since it was only two years when the DLC became operational, the project has made a change by developing a new concept for staff training at lower costs; and has also strengthened the capacity of the institutions of those who participated in the DLC training programs.

**(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)**

As mentioned above, gender participation was not an objective of the project. However, in its two years of operation, female participation increased from 82 in 2010 to 181 in 2011 (Par. 3.5 (a)). Also, promoting face-to-face training was not an objective of the project. Nevertheless, in addition to the typical GDLN event involving using distance learning tools, the CFD offered about twenty five face-to-face learning events during the period 2010 - 2011 – (Par. 3.2). Furthermore, the center’s facilities are also used for exchange of fora, teleconferences, meetings and conferences by various institutions across the country.

**3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops**

Due to the project delays, beneficiary survey was not conducted. However, according to the Government feedback, participants expressed a high rate of satisfaction in the use of the CFD. Also, according to the Government, responses to a few questionnaires completed by the participants registered outcomes that are highly satisfactory. The ICR team, however, did not conduct a field visit to verify this rating.

**4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome**

Rating: High

The lack of capacity, political interferences in staff appointments, reshuffling within the ministries, frequent re-assignment of decision makers, and lack of salary incentives (low salary) for qualified professionals may jeopardize the sustainability of the project over the coming years. In addition to this, lack of Government budgetary contribution to supplement the center’s operations, hiring of qualified personnel such as, a Sale and Marketing Expert and an M&E Expert, and a Training coordinator would jeopardize the sustainability of the center. Although, the center generates income from participants training, and renting out of the conference rooms, there is no financial data<sup>6</sup> to assess the profit and loss of the center. In summary, the Mali DLC has not yet put in place proper management procedures.

At the close of the project, CFD did not have: (i) an established database system; (ii) an M&E expert; (iii) Financial Expert/Accountant; (v) a Training Coordinator; and (iv) a bilingual staff as per the requirement for DLCs. Unless the above positions are filled, the sustainability of the center is unlikely. Therefore the Risk to Development Outcomes is rated high.

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<sup>6</sup> There are no reliable financial database in the CFD

## 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

### 5.1 Bank Performance

#### (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

Rating: Unsatisfactory

The Bank's lending performance is *unsatisfactory*. The choice of a LIL as the funding instrument for this operation allowed to fast-track its implementation but the design of the project should have paid more attention to the institutional context and realities. The assumptions on the prospects of a GDLN center were mostly based on lessons learned in countries with a more favorable basic infrastructure in their project sites and a moderate technical and professional capacity. In addition, the construction of a new center was carried out without a proper assessment of existing learning institutions and the options of upgrading their facilities to allow for the use of "blended learning tools".

Also, as noted in Par.2.2, the project had serious challenges from the beginning: (i) the extension of the PPF closing date three times due to re-assignment of the project coordination unit to another ministry; and (ii) the lack of the required capacity to implement the project in the new ministry. It seems IDA did not do enough ground work before launching the project. In addition to design flaws, mentioned in par.2.1, there are irregularities in the project's internal filing system (See Par. 2.2; Table 1, and Footnotes). There were no supporting documents to support some of the important events during project implementation in the project files.

#### (b) Quality of Supervision

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

The Bank's supervision is *moderately satisfactory*. The supervision team maintained a constant contact with the project and also organized regular missions with a detailed report after each mission. These reports show that the team made strong recommendations to address aspects that were critical to the success of the project (Par. 2.1, Table 1): (i) extension of PPF refinancing date and the project effective date; (ii) reallocation of project funds; and (iii) amendment of the Grant Agreement. On several occasions, the team took the initiative of setting up meetings between the CFEM and other development partners such as the UNDP, AFD, DANIDA, GTZ, EU, and IMF. However, the team failed to take a drastic action to suspend the project when it realized: (i) lack of Government ownership; (ii) lack of capacity in the new ministry to implement the project; and (iii) political interference on the Government part in staff selection to run the center.

#### (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance

Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

Because the supervision aide memoires, implementation status reports (ISRs) and back-to-office reports did not recommend to management to suspend the project; in addition to the major events as indicated in Table 1 above, the overall Bank Performance is rated *moderately unsatisfactory*. See Annex 2 for additional justification for the overall rating of the project.

## **5.2 Borrower Performance**

### **(a) Government Performance**

Rating: Unsatisfactory

The Government performance is rated *unsatisfactory*. The Government of Mali had requested a Grant from IDA in the amount of US\$2.50 million for its new concept for DLC in order to access and deliver training courses that would support capacity development efforts for the civil service for implementation of reforms such as health, local government, legal, education, procurement, accounting, service delivery, restructuring, budgeting or performance management. At project appraisal, the contribution from the Government amounted to US\$0.25 million in addition to office space and staff salaries during the construction phase of the project; and local sources of funds amounted to US\$0.75 million making the estimated total funding of the project US\$3.50 million. The Government did not follow in IDA's rules and regulations on selection of staff. For these reasons and others indicated above, the Governments' performance is rated unsatisfactory.

### **(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance**

Rating: Unsatisfactory

The Ministry of Economics (MoE) is the implementation agency for the CFD. As mentioned in Par. 2.2, MoE did not have the technical know-how and capacity to implement the project which resulted in delays and other issues as raised above.

### **(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance**

Rating: Unsatisfactory

At the end of the project's implementation, the lack of capacity on the Government's part seriously affected project outcomes. In all, only component 1 – construction of the DLC was fully implemented but with delays. Component 2 - support DLC to: (i) strengthen its human, financial, operational management and business planning capabilities and (ii) to develop, marketing, sourcing and scheduling of its training programs, through the provision of technical advisory services and training, was partially implemented – through the training programs offered by CFD. Component 3 to set-up monitoring and evaluation system was not implemented. Therefore, the overall borrower performance is rated *unsatisfactory*.

## **6. Lessons Learned**

The lessons learned from the project can be divided into the following: (A) Project design (B) Implementation history; and (C) lessons from both the Government and Bank's performance.

### **A. Project design**

First, on the design front, the first lesson learned is that design of a DLC or GDLN center is context specific. Rushing in to judgment that if it works for some countries in the region it should also work in Mali, is not an appropriate strategy to launch a new

innovative project. The designed team should have studied the Malian context more to determine if such an intervention will work adequately.

Secondly, another lesson learned is that the design team should be technically strong. For this particular project, there were no technical experts with the know-how required to participate with the Bank team during the design phase of the project (or there were not identified by the project team). For this reason, it seems, the Government of Mali, (GOM) put all its trust on the Bank team to design the project. A more careful assessment on the conditions on the ground should have been carried out and considered during the design phase of the project. The DLC is a new concept and a complex project for the country to undertake.

Thirdly, a lesson learned in design is to gauge government readiness before embarking on such a project. The government of Mali was not technically ready for DLC. A possible solution would have been the involvement of a private operator or a Public Private Partnership. The Bank team should have considered a simpler but at the same time useful equipment to allow institutions in Mali to access distance learning, rather than a loan simply to construct infrastructure without a proper assessment of the real need for it. Supporting existing training institutions to upgrade their capacity to access information and participate in knowledge sharing would have provided greater impact.

#### B. Implementation History - IDA

Fourthly, a lesson learned is that there should be an adequate M&E in place for such projects and Bank task management should be more hands-on in providing direction and solutions on implementation bottlenecks.. Despite awareness among Bank task management of the Government's capacity to implement such a complex project, there was no continuous evaluation of the project during implementation. For instance, the project team did a good job, by noting and seeking management approval seven times (par.2.2, Table 1) to revert or change the course of the project implementation. But task management did not take action to advise the team. It seems the project team was left to take its course of action.

- a) Recommendations and Suggestions. Management could have assigned ISG expert to be based in the country office to work with the Government in implementing the project.
- b) For sustainability purposes of the project, technical Assistances could have been assigned to CFD to work with the Government to bring operations of the center to an acceptable standard.
- c) For future projects, well designed capacity development indicators and the setting up of M&E systems could be included as conditions for approving new projects.

### C. Implementation History - Government

Fifthly, a lesson learned is that the Bank should not agree to proceeding with a project for which government readiness and capacity to implement was gauged as weak. The Government of Mali took on a project that it was not technically prepared to manage. Even during implementation, there was limited engagement from the government side in terms of measuring implementation of the project as well as overall impact.

## 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners

### (a) Borrower/implementing agencies: None

(b) **Co-financiers.** UNDP contributed the equivalent of US\$200,000 in financing of: study tours to other DLCs in the region, training, workshops, conferences and salaries of CFD staffs. UNDP also recruited a Technical Expert from Canada during the first two years into project implementation as a Director of the CFD. However, according to UNDP and the Government, the director left just after one year due to a salary dispute with the Government.

### (c) Other partners and stakeholders

N/A

## Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

### (a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Components	Appraisal Estimate (XDR millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (XDR millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
DLC FACILITIES	1.02	1.78	173
SUPPORT TO DLC'S OPERATIONS	1.22	0.67	55
MONITORING, EVALUATION AND AUDIT OF PROJECT ACTIVITIES	0.14	0.0	0.0
<b>Total Baseline Cost</b>	2.38	2.45	229

The total amount of the project was estimated at \$3.5 million during Appraisal. This included \$2.5 million from the IDA Grant, and \$1 million from revenues that the DLC was expected to generate during its four years of operations, and also from counterpart funding on some contracts. Unfortunately, due to the late implementation of the project and other factors, the DLC could not generate as much revenues as expected. So, looking at the disbursement tables in other implementation documents, and converting everything into XDR, using the rate as of January 2004 in the first column (US\$ 1.471), and the rate

as of today<sup>7</sup> in the second column (US\$ 1.531), we can establish that the project has disbursed around XDR 1.28 million from the IDA Grant and received XDR 0.491 million from the national counterpart funds for Component 1 (DLC Facilities). This makes a total of XDR 1.771 million for Component 1, equivalent to 173% of the amount at Appraisal. For component 2, the project benefitted from the IDA Grant (XDR 0.384 million), counterpart funding (XDR 0.025 million), UNDP funding (XDR 0.13 million), and generated revenues (XDR 0.135 million). This makes a total of XDR 0.674 million for Component 2, equivalent to 55% of the Appraisal estimate.

So overall, the total amount of the project at appraisal was estimated to XDR 2.38 million, and the total amount actually spent on the project by all sources of funding is equivalent to XDR 2.445 million. We notice that Component 1 cost much more than appraised for the reasons described in the ICR. Component 2 benefitted from many sources of financing but failed to generate the expected revenues, mainly because of time constraints. Component 3 was not implemented as indicated below in annex 2.

## **Annex 2. Outputs by Component**

Projected Output Indicators vs. Actual Output (See Table 4 below): Due to the delays as indicated in par.2.2, the key performance indicators in measuring the project outcome did not take effect until 2010 when DLC became operational. According to the Government's report, between the periods 2010 and 2011, DLC trained about 1,180 people in both the public and the private sectors in over 30 training courses and VC's. The ICR team requested confirmation and further clarification on this date, but to date, the team has not receive a replay from the DLC management. The private sector, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and civil society accessing the center grew by 11 percent from 2010 to 2011. The number of people using (utilization rate) DLC also grew from 65 percent to 113 percent from 2010 to 2011. In line with the above, cost recovery, the percentage of the operating costs that is covered by user fees, grew from 6 to 52 percent from 2010 to 2011 (See Table 3 below).

Analyzing the Output Indicators: The market study that was conducted during project preparation projected the following in the PAD:

- A. The number of civil servants needing training in the center will increase by about 50 percent from the first year into the fourth year when the center becomes fully operational.
  - At the close of the project, the actual number of civil servants that were trained in both video conference and face-to-face increased from 298 in 2010 to 888<sup>8</sup> in 2011, an increase over 200 percent (See Graph A).

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<sup>7</sup> April 10, 2012.

<sup>8</sup> The ICR team is waiting for further details on this data.

Therefore, it is likely that in 2012 and beyond, civil servants, trained in the center will increase.

- B. The number of private sector, NGOs or civil society participants would increase five percent annually.
- At the close of the project, the private sector, NGO and civil society participants increased by ten percent from 2010 to 2011 (See graph B).
- C. The number and type of training courses offered by DLC that would correspond to the identified needs of the market study, the national training strategy and the project, would increase two percent annually.
- At the close of the project, however, the percentage increase was from 17 to 29 percent from 2010 – 2011. An increase of over 100 percent (See Graph C).
- D. Cost recovery, the percentage of operating costs that would be covered by user fees will increase 20 percent annually to 100 percent at the close of the project in 2009.
- At the close of the project in 2011, DLC operating costs that were covered by user fees increased from 6 to 52 percent from 2010 to 2011, an indication that in the near future, user fees could cover operational costs making the center financially viable (See Graph D).
- E. DLC utilization rate, the percentage of customers' that would be attracted to the center would increase to 62 at the close of the project in 2009.<sup>9</sup>
- At the close of the project, the utilization rate increased from 65 to 113 percent from 2010 to 2011, a 100 percent more than the initial estimate (See Graph E).

Output by Project Components: Output by project components are presented below:

**Component 1 – Construction and equipment of the Distance Learning Center**

This component is rated marginally unsatisfactory

The construction is of high quality and the equipment is perfectly adequate to carry out the mission of DLC. The design of the building benefited from the experience of other

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<sup>9</sup> 2009 was the original closing date of the project



GDLN centers and took into account the lessons learned from the DLCs in Mauritania and Senegal.

However, the global economic crisis resulted in a cost over-run of over 102 percent for Civil Works; and over 126 percent for equipment as shown below in Table 1. In addition, as mentioned before, the delivery of this component was delayed by: (i) 24 months, due to the technology transfer from ISG to GDLN in Africa; (ii) 6 months, AGETIP in completing the construction of center; and (iii) 12 months, procurement misappropriation between UNDP and IDA (Section 2.2).

Table: 1 – Category of expenditure

Category	Designation	Amount Allocated (SDR)	Amount Disbursed (SDR)	%
1	Works	560,000	571,447.94	102.04
2	Equipment	490,000	621,537.07	126.84
3	Audit & Consultants	310,000	95,559.63	30.83
4	Training and Travel	70,000	77,320.98	110.46
5A	Operating cost 1 <sup>st</sup> year	70,000	217,410.08	310.59
5B	Operating cost 2nd year	70,000	90,356.97	129.08
5C	Operating cost 3rd year	70,000	-	0.0
5D	Operating cost 4th year	30,000	-	0.0
6	PPF	500	212.18	42.44
7	Unallocated	29,500	-	0.0
	Total			

## **Component 2 – Support for Distance Learning Center**

This component is rated Unsatisfactory

The component was partially implemented. The only achievement under this component is, Distance Learning Center (CFD) was established as a Mali public body with a scientific vocation (Etablissement Public à Caractère Scientifique - EPST) overseen by the Ministry of Economics. It is a legal entity governed by a Board comprising representatives from the Government, academic institutions, private sectors and civil society.

At the close of the project in May 31, 2011, CFD operations covered only 52 percent of its operating costs, less than the projection in the PAD of 100 percent on the original closing date of June 30, 2009. However, the utilization rate was 113 percent, more than the projection in the PAD of 62 percent at the original closing date on June 30, 2009 (See Graphs B and E below).

CFD operating cost from 2005 – 2010 are presented below. In 2010 – 2011, average user fee was about US\$ 105.00; other services such as renting of space and etc. amounted to US\$2185.00. According to the Director, the average monthly use of CFD by a typical mid-level professional or a student in 2010-2011 was 23 hours per month; and during the same period, user fees covered 6 percent and 52 percent of the operating costs.

Table: 2- Operating Cost 2005 - 2010

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Operating cost							35,613,660
Renting & Maintenance of SAT/special connection							
Center staff	2,668,000	7,196,000	7,104,000	7,334,540	1,6243,590	42,328,188	19,844,384
Office equipment, cleaning, maintenance and insurance		2,286,000	4,002,000	16,583,600	27,631,794	31,001,209	12,289,113
Fuel and lubricant		3,198,000	2,527,500	2,577,000	4,065,000	5,486,800	6,352,060
Water and electricity							7,503,964
Other variables							
Telephone and internet fees	881,898	1,187,559	2,063,820	2,232,560	1,730,260	3,842,680	939,000
Miscellaneous expenditure, travel and unforeseen expenses	1,653,879	17,592,628	4,784,588	5,121,019	14,557,364	29,362,065	43,305,658
Investments							
Consulting and training services	6,240,00	22,320,227	34,916,494	1,401,540	13,598,569	49,477,999	19,053,341
Construction and equipment	70,130,000	135,730,586	42,395,928	82,596,298	25,500,000	26,472,500	31,941,712
Grand total	81,773,777	189,511,000	97,794,330	117,846,550	103,326,577	187,971,440	176,842,892
Turnover	0	0	0	0	0	12,159,300	91,611,825

Source: Government date – \*Note: there are inconsistencies in the government data, the figures don't add up.

DLC is staffed by: Managing Director; Financial and Administrative Officer; Information Technology Specialist (IT), and Executive Assistant (See Table below). At the close of the project, there were no Financial Specialist/Accountant, Monitoring and Evaluation Expert (M&E) and a Training Coordinator in DLC. Also, there was no evidence suggesting staff appointments and/or qualifications followed IDA's Terms of Reference rules and regulations for a DLC.

Table: 3 - DLC Staff list

Position	Status	Qualification
Managing Director * <sup>10</sup>	Filled	Diplôme de l'ENSUP (Math), DEA en Informatique (Intelligence Artificielle), DEA en gestion
Financial and Administrative Officer	Filled	Maitrise en gestion
Information Technology Specialist (IT)	Filled	Ingénieur Informaticien
Financial Specialist/Accountant	Vacant	
Monitoring and Evaluation Expert	Vacant	
Training Coordinator	Vacant	

Source: Government – Director of CFD.



### **Component 3 – Monitoring and Evaluation of the Distance Learning Center**



This component was not implemented. At the close of the project, there was no M&E expert in the DLC. The lack of implementation of this component affected the overall outcome of the project. This component is rated highly unsatisfactory.


Table: 4– Projected Outcome vs. Actual Outcome Indicators

Indicator	Year1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	Year 6
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
1. Number of Civil Servants Trained both Video Conference and Face-to-Face						
Projected value	800	1500	3000	4500	n.p.	n.p.
Actual value	0	0	0	0	298	888
Number of Private, NGO, Civil Society Trained					36	99
Projected value						
Actual value					36	99
2. Number of Private Sector, NGO or civil society participants						
Projected Value	5%	10%	15%	20%	25%	n.p.
Actual Value	0%	0%	0%	0%	11%	10%
3. Number and type of training courses offered by DLC that correspond to the identified needs of the market study, the national training strategy and projects for both video and face to face						
Projected Value	10	12	14	16	18	n.p.
Actual Value					17	29
4. Cost recovery at least X% of the operating costs						
Projected Value	20%	40%	60%	80%	100%	n.p.
Actual Value					6%	52%
5. Total utilization rate from 2010 - 2011 both video conference, face to face						
Projected Value	20%	45%	62%	n.p.	n.p.	n.p.
Actual Value					65%	113%

n.p = Not projected. Source: Government's DLC







### **Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis**

According to the PAD, the project was expected to demonstrate an economically viable method of delivering training as compared to the current and expensive practice of sending officials abroad for specialized training or the import of international trainers. In addition, more people are expected to gain access to training in a wider variety of fields leading to a more effective use of government funds.

As shown above (par.3.3), CFD is cost-effective. According to the government, the cost of sending officials abroad or imports of international trainers would have cost the Government an equivalent of US\$6,051 to US\$18,155 per head. A similar training in CFD is only \$889 per head<sup>11</sup>. Also, since most of the learning events offered by CFD are usually shared by at least three other centers in Francophone Africa (Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal), the savings in cost of training in CFD is much higher for the Government. In addition, as the center becomes popular in the country, it is likely that attendance will increase resulting in cost saving for the Government for staff training and capacity enhancement.

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<sup>11</sup> Figures based on Government calculation.

#### Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

##### (a) Task Team members

Names	Title	Unit	Responsibility/ Specialty
<b>Lending</b>			
<b>Supervision/ICR</b>			
Rosemary M. Cubagee	Consultant, ICR Primary Author	AFRCP	
Nestor Coffi	Country Manager	AFMNE	
Zie Ibrahima Coulibaly	Senior Infrastructure Speciali	AFTUW	
Mahine Diop	Senior Municipal Engineer	AFTUW	
Maimouna Mbow Fam	Sr Financial Management Specia	AFTFM	
Moustapha Ould El Bechir	Senior Procurement Specialist	AFTPC	
Laurent Porte	Program Officer	WBIKE	
Rokhayatou Sarr Samb	Procurement Specialist	AFTPC	
Aoua Toure Sow	Program Assistant	AFCW3	
Cheick Traore	Senior Procurement Specialist	AFTPC	

##### (b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)	
	No. of staff weeks	USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)
<b>Lending</b>		
FY04	3	11.49
<b>Total:</b>	3	11.49
<b>Supervision/ICR</b>		
FY05	7	29.87
FY06	7	30.37
FY07	7	33.05
FY08	7	31.44
FY11		5.00
FY12	7	30.00
<b>Total:</b>	37	159.73

#### Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results

Beneficiary survey was not conducted

#### Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results

Stakeholder workshop was not held

## **Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR**

Below is the Government's evaluation report of the project. A translated English version is in the project files.

### **PROJET DE CENTRE DE FORMATION POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT DU MALI (CFD)**

**N° du DON : MLI H0900 du 17 juin 2004**

# **RAPPORT D'ACHEVEMENT**


*Décembre 2011*

**Centre de Formation pour  
Le Développement (CFD)  
Mali**

### **FICHE PROJET**

- 1. Intitulé du projet :** Centre de Formation pour le Développement (CFD) Mali.  
**N° du crédit :** MLI H 0900 du 24 juin 2004 ;  
**N° d'identification du projet :** P082187
- 2. Ministère de tutelle :** Ministère chargé de l'Economie ;
- 3. Organigramme**





**4. Montant du projet :** Le Gouvernement du Mali a bénéficié auprès de la banque mondiale d'un Don pour la création d'un Centre de Formation à Distance afin d'aider le pays dans sa politique de renforcement des capacités. C'est ainsi qu'un accord de Don pour un montant de **1.700.000 DTS** (Droit de Tirages Spéciaux) (*soit 2 500 000 \$ US*) a été signé par l'Ambassadeur de la république du Mali auprès des Etats-Unis son Excellence Abdoulaye DIOP, représentant le Ministre de l'Economie et des Finances le 17 Juin 2004.

**5. Plan de financement :** Le projet est financé de façon dégressive pour la part du financement Banque Mondiale :

- 80% la première année ;
- 60% la deuxième année ;
- 40% la troisième année;
- 20% la quatrième année.

**6. Date estimative d'entrée en vigueur du Don :** La date estimative d'entrée en vigueur du Don est le 30 juin 2004. L'accord de Don a été signé le 17 juin 2004. L'absence de cadre juridique concernant la création d'ONG a contraint l'équipe du projet à modifier les arrangements institutionnels. Ceci et le fait que le premier coordinateur soit très occupé ont amené l'entrée en vigueur du Don au 15 juillet 2005.

**7. Date prévisionnelle de clôture du projet :** La date prévisionnelle de clôture du projet est le 30 juin 2009. Suite aux retards accusés par l'avenant au marché de construction du Centre, de la non reconduction du contrat de CIBER, de la migration technologique par l'exécution du dernier lot d'équipements (marché confié au PNUD), la date de clôture a été prorogée et effective au 31 mai 2011. Le projet a bénéficié d'une période de grâce de 4 mois (jusqu'au 30 septembre 2011) pour les décaissements.

## **8. Durée initiale du projet : 5 ans.**

### **Introduction**

Le Gouvernement du Mali a bénéficié auprès de la banque mondiale d'un Don pour la création d'un Centre de Formation à Distance afin d'aider le pays dans sa politique de renforcement des capacités. C'est ainsi qu'un accord de Don pour un montant de 1.700.000 DTS (Droit de Tirages Spéciaux) a été signé par l'Ambassadeur de la république du Mali auprès des Etats-Unis son Excellence Abdoulaye DIOP, représentant le Ministre de l'Economie et des Finances le 17 Juin 2004. L'objectif de l'accord de Don est de rendre opérationnel le Centre durant la phase de projet. A cet titre le projet doit s'atteler à construire les locaux devant abriter le centre, à équiper le centre en mobilier et matériel pédagogique, à réaliser les installations techniques et à rendre le centre fonctionnel.

Le projet a connu son démarrage effectif en juillet 2005. Le retard accusé pour le démarrage du projet est en partie dû au remplissage de certaines conditions définies dans l'accord de Don. A cela d'autres retards qui ont failli hypothéquer l'exécution du Centre ont été connus. Il s'agit entre autre du retard pris pour la signature de l'avenant relatif à la construction du bâtiment, au non renouvellement du contrat de la Banque avec CIBER, à la migration technologique, au retard pris par l'acquisition du dernier lot d'équipements. Depuis près d'une année le Centre a commencé timidement ses activités tout en attendant d'installer ses équipements audio-vidéo.

Le rapport d'achèvement que nous produisons couvre la période 2005-2011 d'existence du projet CFD. Il est structuré autour des points suivants:

- le contexte de la création du Centre,
- les objectifs clés et les indicateurs de performance,
- les résultats obtenus,
- l'évaluation des résultats,
- l'évaluation des risques majeurs sur le développement des résultats,
- les performances du Centre et de la Banque Mondiale,
- les leçons apprises, et
- les perspectives

### **1. Contexte du projet**

Le Mali s'est engagée dès le début des années 1990 dans un renouveau sans précédent de la gouvernance publique, nécessitant une réforme en profondeur de l'administration publique. Par ailleurs l'analyse de l'exécution du Cadre d'Appui Stratégique (CAS) de la Banque mondiale pour la période 1999 – 2003 montre que la faiblesse des capacités est l'une des principales contrainte qui empêchent de produire un impact sur le développement au Mali. En 2003, une politique de développement institutionnel (PDI) ayant pour objectif de rendre pérenne la constitution d'une administration de service public qui place l'utilisateur au centre des affaires publiques a été adopté par le gouvernement du Mali. Le PDI s'articule autour de six (6) axes stratégiques qui sont :

- La réorganisation de l'Etat central et le renforcement de la gestion publique ;
- L'amélioration des process, méthodes et procédures de gestions des affaires publiques ;
- Le renforcement de la déconcentration ;
- La consolidation de la décentralisation ;
- La valorisation et le renforcement des capacités des ressources humaines ;
- La communication et les relations avec les usagers.

Le gouvernement, conscient que ces axes ne peuvent être réalisés qu'avec des ressources humaines de qualité, a placé la gestion des ressources humaines au cœur même de son processus de développement institutionnel et une politique nationale des agents de l'Etat a été élaborée. En effet pour mieux concevoir, élaborer, mettre en œuvre, suivre et évaluer des stratégies, politiques, programmes et projets de développement et réduire la pauvreté, le pays doit disposer de cadres bien formés et régulièrement mis à niveau. Cependant le coût des formations, surtout à l'extérieur du pays, est très élevé. Ce qui entraîne souvent le non respect des différents plans et programmes de formation, initiés par l'administration et les entreprises.

C'est dans ce cadre que le Gouvernement de la République du Mali et l'Association Internationale de Développement (IDA) ayant à cœur de contribuer à résoudre ce problème, ont conclu le 17 juin 2004, l'accord de don IDA N° H090-MLI d'un montant de 1,7 million de DTS (soit 2,5 million de dollars US) relatif au financement partiel du projet de Centre de Formation pour le Développement (CFD).

Le Centre est un Etablissement Public à Caractère Scientifique (EPST) sous la tutelle du Ministère chargé de l'Economie et vise le renforcement de capacité des responsables et décideurs des secteurs publics et privés dans la conception, la planification et la gestion de politiques de développement, à travers l'accès à une formation et à des connaissances de haut niveau qu'offre l'enseignement à distance utilisant les technologies de l'information et de la communication. Le Centre a aussi pour mission la valorisation de l'expertise locale et l'organisation de fora d'échanges entre acteurs impliqués dans les politiques de développement de différents pays.

### **1.1 Evaluation du contexte**

La volonté politique et les conditions économiques étaient favorables à la création du Centre qui doit bénéficier de l'expérience des Centres GDLN du Sénégal, du Benin, de la Côte d'Ivoire, de la Mauritanie et du Burkina Faso. Cependant le choix du Statut et de l'encrage institutionnel prendra plus de temps que prévu.

### **1.2 Rappel des objectifs du projet et les indicateurs clés de performance**

L'objectif de l'accord de Don est de rendre opérationnel le Centre durant la phase de projet. A cet titre le projet doit s'atteler à construire les locaux devant abriter le centre, à équiper le centre en mobilier et matériel pédagogique, à réaliser les installations techniques, à recruter le personnel et à rendre le centre fonctionnel. Le Centre une fois

opérationnel doit bénéficier d'un accompagnement de 4 à 5 afin qu'il assure son autonomie financière.

L'apprentissage revêtira la forme d'une expérience menée à titre pilote afin de documenter l'impact et la viabilité du Centre. Les fonctionnaires seront les plus nombreux à suivre des formations au Centre afin de contribuer à l'amélioration de la gestion des affaires publiques et renforcer la mise en œuvre du cadre stratégique de lutte contre la pauvreté. Le succès du Centre sera évalué au regard d'indicateurs clés de performance tels que la viabilité financière, la pertinence de la formation et l'application des aptitudes acquises.

Les différents indicateurs clés peuvent être classés sous les indicateurs sectoriels, les indicateurs de résultats d'impact et les indicateurs de résultats.

### **1.3 Avis sur les objectifs**

Les objectifs assignés au projet sont pertinents et d'actualité. Le Centre bénéficie d'une technologie haut de Gamme qui lui permet de se positionner comme leader de l'enseignement à distance. Aussi l'appartenance aux réseaux GDLN et AACED lui donne beaucoup plus de facilité d'accès aux connaissances de haut niveau à un prix concurrentiel. Le Centre, pour sa viabilité, doit bénéficier d'un appui conséquent de l'Etat qui doit fortement l'utiliser pour renforcer les capacités des acteurs impliqués dans la mise en œuvre de ses politiques et programmes de développement.

### **1.4 Les principaux bénéficiaires**

Les grands bénéficiaires du Centre sont les cadres du public, du privé et de la société civile qui conçoivent, planifient, mettent en œuvre, suivent et évaluent nos politiques et programmes de développement. Il s'agit entre autre des :

- hauts fonctionnaires de l'Etat,
- cadres du secteur privé et de la société civile,
- PTF
- personnels des projets de développement,
- cadres impliqués dans l'amélioration de la gestion des finances publiques,
- professionnels de la formation,
- ONG,
- communicateurs.

Cependant toute personne intéressée par les thèmes et activités proposés peut participer aux formations.

## **5 Les composantes du projet**

Le projet a trois composantes principales :

*i) La composante construction et équipement du Centre :*

Elle indique les ressources institutionnelles, matérielles et humaines requises pour le Centre. Elle est mise en œuvre par l'Unité de Coordination de Projet.

Le coût de cette composante est de 1,50 millions \$ US dont 1,20 millions \$ US financé par la Banque mondiale.

*ii) Le composant appui opérationnel :*

Elle consiste à rendre le Centre opérationnel, à établir sa viabilité et à mettre en place son programme de formation. Elle est mise en œuvre par le Centre. Le coût de cette composante est de 1,80 millions \$ US dont 1,15 millions \$ US financé par la Banque mondiale.

*iii) La composante suivi et évaluation :*

Elle est gérée par le Conseil du Centre avec la collaboration de la Direction du Centre. Le coût de cette composante est de 0,20 millions \$ US dont 0,15 millions \$ US financé par la Banque mondiale.

Le montant de l'accord de Don de la Banque mondiale de 1 700 000 DTS (2 500 000 \$ US) est réparti sur cinq (5) catégories de dépenses :

## **2. Les Principaux facteurs affectant la mise en œuvre et les résultats**

### **2.1 La préparation, la conception et la qualité du projet au démarrage**

Après des négociations en 2002, une mission de la Banque mondiale a eu lieu du 28 janvier au 1<sup>er</sup> février 2003 pour l'identification du projet. Des recommandations de cette mission on peut retenir :

- Le projet doit être sous la tutelle d'un ministère multisectoriel, « transversal » et si possible à haute visibilité ;
- Le CFD sera une entité juridique assurant l'autonomie et l'existence juridique du CFD et disposant d'un Conseil d'Administration ou Conseil de Gestion associant des partenaires publics et privés ;
- Le recrutement d'un comptable par appel à candidature.

Le coordinateur du projet est un fonctionnaire qui en plus du projet continue à exécuter ses tâches habituelles et n'a pas participer à la conception du projet, ce qui est un des éléments ayant contribué au démarrage tardif du projet.

### **2.2 La mise en œuvre**

Après la signature de l'accord de Don en juin 2004, il a fallu attendre plus d'une année (juillet 2005) pour que le projet démarre réellement. Les discussions sur l'ancrage institutionnel et le statut du Centre ont pris plus de temps que prévu. La mise en œuvre a été exceptionnellement longue et le CFD attend encore son dernier lot d'équipements. En effet le projet de Centre de Formation pour le Développement du Mali (CFD - P082187) a accumulé un retard de près de cinq (5) ans dans sa mise en œuvre. Ce retard a été provoqué par trois principaux facteurs :

(i) un retard d'une année dû principalement au changement d'ancrage institutionnel du projet et au changement d'équipe de coordination, auquel se sont ajoutés des retards sur les travaux;

(ii) un retard de près de 24 mois dû à la transition technologique du programme GDLN en Afrique.

Entre fin 2007 et 2009, l'Association africaine des Centres d'Enseignement à Distance (AACED/AADLC: association qui fédère et coordonne l'ensemble des Centres GDLN africains) s'est engagée dans un processus de migration vers un nouvel opérateur pour la connectivité, l'installation et la maintenance des Centres GDLN en Afrique. Ces services étaient jusqu'en mars 2009 fournis par la Banque mondiale (ISG et son partenaire Cyber).

Le Centre GDLN du Mali est le premier à avoir été mis en place dans le cadre de ce nouvel arrangement et il a été affecté par les délais nécessaires à l'opérationnalisation de cette solution. De plus, les équipements techniques (station VSAT, réseau informatique, système de visioconférence et d'interprétation, systèmes audio et vidéo, équipements bureautiques, etc.) étaient auparavant acquis par la Banque mondiale au nom des Centres.

Le projet GDLN du Mali a donc dû attendre l'identification du nouvel opérateur pour pouvoir acheter sa station terrestre VSAT et son système de vidéoconférence. Il a également dû identifier et contracter d'autres fournisseurs pour l'acquisition des autres équipements. Le tout dernier lot d'équipements (systèmes audio-vidéo et d'interprétation simultanée) qui permettra au CFD d'être totalement opérationnel a été installé et intégré en novembre 2011.

(iii) Un retard de près de 24 mois d'une part au temps mis pour rembourser le PNUD (relativement à un certain nombre de marchés dont l'exécution avait été confiée au PNUD. Ces marchés avaient été exécutés et le PNUD avait payé les factures pour se faire rembourser après) et d'autre part au non respect des procédures de la Banque mondiale par le PNUD, qui était chargé de piloter la passation du dernier marché d'équipements techniques du Centre.

Le Centre a commencé timidement ses activités de formation à partir de juillet 2010 avec une hausse remarquable de ses activités à partir de avril 2011, tout en attendant son dernier lot d'équipements pour être totalement opérationnel.

### **2.3 Le statut et l'ancrage institutionnel**

Le CFD a été créé par l'ordonnance n° 08-010/P-RM DU 3 OCT 2008 ratifiée par la LOI N°08-049/ du 26 DEC 2008 comme un Etablissement Public à Caractère Scientifique sous la tutelle du Ministère chargé de l'Economie. Le décret n° 08-651/P-RM du 27 OCT 2008 fixe l'organisation et les modalités de fonctionnement du Centre.

La gestion quotidienne du Centre est placée sous l'autorité du Directeur. Le Conseil d'Administration composé d'administrateurs du public, du privé et de la société civile se réunit une fois par an (mais peut tenir une réunion extraordinaire à tout moment) pour définir les grandes orientations du Centre. Le Comité scientifique qui se réunit deux fois l'an donne son avis sur les questions relatives à l'organisation et la mise en œuvre des programmes de formation à distance, le plan de formation et les résultats des formations. En conséquence du très grand retard pris pour l'opérationnalisation du Centre, ces

organes n'ont pas pleinement fonctionné. Le Centre a cependant bénéficié de différentes missions de supervision de la Banque mondiale. L'audit annuel des comptes et les rapports de suivi financier permettent également d'obtenir des éléments d'évaluation de la gestion à la fin de chaque exercice budgétaire.

#### **2.4 La prévision de la suite du projet :**

Le statut du Centre, son ancrage institutionnel et les besoins énormes en renforcement des capacités sont entre autres des éléments qui présagent une viabilité du Centre au-delà de la phase projet. Le Centre a certes pris un grand retard dû globalement aux raisons évoquées plus haut mais le projet bénéficie de sa pertinence et de la volonté politique des plus hautes autorités orientés vers le développement et la réduction de la pauvreté. Ce qui passent obligatoirement par des cadres compétents et régulièrement mis à niveau, toute chose qui est un sous-bassement certain pour une existence solide et durable du Centre après la phase projet. Le CFD aura besoin d'un appui substantiel de l'Etat malien pour atteindre rapidement son autonomie financière et assurer sa pérennité.

### **3. Evaluation des résultats**

#### **3.1 Pertinence et réalisation des objectifs, la conception et la mise en œuvre**

La problématique du renforcement des capacités, le coût élevé des formations à l'extérieur montre à suffisance la pertinence des objectifs du projet. Le délai pris par la phase projet a été très longue mais les attentes du Centre grandissent chaque jour, ce qui laisse entrevoir un renforcement de sa mission. Les objectifs ne sont certes pas réalisés à souhait mais le Centre prendra très certainement et rapidement sa vitesse de fonctionnement pour assurer son autonomie et accomplir sa mission avec succès.

Notons aussi le fait que le coordinateur du projet n'a pas participé à sa conception fait partie des éléments fort qui rendu difficile sa mise en œuvre.

#### **3.2 Les résultats obtenus après 1 ans d'opérationnalisation**

##### ***3.2.1 Au plan des activités***

Le grand retard accusé a fait que le CFD n'a pu mener des activités réelles de formation que pour moins d'une année et cela avec des équipements incomplets à une période où les différents centres homologues ont presque arrêté leurs activités suite à la très mauvaise qualité de la bande passante après la migration technologique. Les différentes formations ont portés sur les thèmes suivants : *le leadership ; le suivi et évaluation ; Organisation, Gestion et Pilotage sur objectif des budgets ; Organisation et gestion des ressources humaines ; Audit des marchés publics et la corruption dans les passations de marché, Audit organisationnelle de l'Administration publique ; Relations économiques Internationales ; Contrôle de gestion dans l'Administration publique ; etc. . .*

Notons cependant que de juin 2010 à décembre 2011 le CFD a reçu 1321 auditeurs dont 90% du public et 10% du secteur privé et de la société civile. Les hommes représentent

79% et les femmes 21%. En fait ces tendances s'expliquent par l'environnement caractérisé d'un secteur privé formel qui n'est pas très présent avec des opérateurs économiques qui ne sont pas toujours des produits de l'école. Nous constatons que de plus en plus les femmes participent aux activités du Centre. Le taux de remplissage de la salle visioconférence est de 53 % (soit 23 % en 2010 et 68 % en 2011). Ce faible taux de remplissage est en partie du au fait que la salle ne pouvait recevoir le maximum de sa capacité car les équipements audio-vidéo étaient attendus.

Les facilités du CFD sont aussi utilisées pour les échanges (fora d'échanges, téléconférences, réunions par VC etc..) entre cadres de différents pays. A ce niveau le CFD a initié et organisé un forum sur « *La sécurité juridique dans l'exercice du contrôle fiscal : le rôle du comptable comme levier dans l'amélioration de la gestion des finances publiques* », qui a vu les cadres du Mali, du Bénin, de la Mauritanie et du Sénégal échanger et partager leurs idées. Le CFD a initié la conférence sur « *LA problématique sécuritaire en Afrique de l'Ouest : armes légères, drogue et terrorisme* ». Cette conférence qui s'est tenue le 17 septembre 2011 sous la coprésidence de 3 ministres du Mali a permis aux membres du gouvernement, aux parlementaires aux PTF, aux différentes personnes ressources du Mali, du Benin ; du Burkina Faso, de la Côte d'Ivoire, de Madagascar et de la Mauritanie de partager leurs différents points de vues et observations.

**Tableau2: Modes d'évènements**

	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011(Janvier-Décembre)</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Visioconférence</b>	7	14	<b>21</b>
<b>Présentiel</b>	10	15	<b>25</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>46</b>

**Tableau3 : Participants selon les évènements**

<b>Année</b>	<b>Nbre de Participants</b>	<b>Visioconférence</b>		<b>Présentiel</b>	
		<i>Nbre</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Nbre</i>	<i>%</i>
<b>2010</b>	334	48	14 %	286	86 %
<b>2011</b>	987	237	24 %	750	76 %
<b>Total</b>	<b>1321</b>	<b>285</b>	<b>22 %</b>	<b>1036</b>	<b>78 %</b>

**Tableau4 : Participants selon le genre**



Année	Nbre de Participants	Hommes		Femmes	
		Nbre	%	Nbre	%
2010	334	242	72 %	92	28 %
2011	987	806	82 %	181	18 %
<b>Total</b>	<b>1321</b>	<b>1048</b>	<b>79 %</b>	<b>273</b>	<b>21 %</b>

**Tableau5 : Participants selon le secteur d'activité**

Année	Nbre de Participants	Secteur Public		Secteur Privé	
		Nbre	%	Nbre	%
2010	334	298	89 %	36	11 %
2011	987	888	90 %	99	10 %
<b>Total</b>	<b>1321</b>	<b>1186</b>	<b>90 %</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>10 %</b>

**Tableau6 : Taux de remplissage de la salle visioconférence (capacité de la salle 30 places)**

Années	Nombre d'Activités VC	Nbre Théorique Participants	Total Participants	Taux de Remplissage (%)	Nombre total d'activités (VC et Présent)	Nbre théorique de participants	Total Participants	Taux de remplissage (%)
2010	7	210	48	23 %	17	510	334	65%
2011	14	420	237	68 %	29	870	987	113%
<b>Total</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>630</b>	<b>285</b>	<b>53 %</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>1380</b>	<b>1321</b>	<b>96%</b>

### ***3.2.2 Au plan administratif et financier***

#### **Les ressources humaines**

Le Centre fonctionne avec un effectif de cinq (5) agents-clé. Il s'agit du Directeur, du Responsable Administratif et Financier (RAF), du Coordinateur de la Formation (CF), de l'Ingénieur IT et de l'Assistant de Direction. Le personnel d'appui est constitué du

chauffeur et du coursier. Le RAF a été recruté dès au démarrage du projet et le reste du personnel en 2009 pour une durée déterminée d'un an renouvelable.

Après l'achat du véhicule utilitaire (en mai 2011), un deuxième a été recruté. Le Centre recevant un appui du budget national, un comptable public vient d'y être affecté par l'Etat, ce qui amène l'effectif total des agents à neuf (9).

### **Les ressources financières**

Le Centre de Formation pour le Développement a bénéficié de quatre types de ressources :

- les fonds propres,
- le don de la Banque Mondiale,
- l'appui du PNUD,
- Les subventions de l'Etat.

### **Les ressources propres**

Le CFD a exécuté timidement ses activités de formation pendant le dernier semestre de l'année 2010 et l'année 2011. Ces activités comprennent les formations par visioconférence, les formations en présentiel et les locations de salles. Le montant reçu de ces activités est **de 103 771 125 FCFA** (dont 12 159 300 FCFA en 2010 et 91 611 825 FCFA en 2011).

L'accroissement de ces ressources propres demande un marketing de bon niveau et offensif, que l'Etat alloue un budget consistant au CFD pour la formation des cadres du public, la diversification des activités du CFD en cherchant des sponsors pour les fora et les conférences portant sur des thèmes d'actualité et sensibles du développement. Les formations doivent être données par des formateurs de très haut niveau qui comblent totalement les espérances des participants.

### ***L'appui de la Banque Mondiale***

Le montant du crédit **de la Banque mondiale** est de 1700 000 DTS (1 135 803 650 FCFA). Le montant des dépenses à la clôture est de 1 673 844,85 DTS, toute catégorie confondue, soit un taux de décaissement de **98,46%**. Le solde du crédit est de 26 155,15 DTS. Le crédit devrait couvrir les frais d'installation et une période de fonctionnement de quatre ans. Le grand retard pris pour l'opérationnalisation du Centre (ce qui a été évoqué plus haut dans la mise en œuvre) a entraîné des dépassements de montants alloués à certaines catégories, quand certaines catégories n'ont pu être exécutées.

**Tableau7 : Données relatives au décaissement du Don par catégorie**

Catégorie	Désignation	Montant Alloué (en DTS)	Montant Décaissé (en DTS)	Pourcentage (%)
1	Travaux	560 000	571 447,94	102,04
2	Fournitures	490 000	621 537,07	126,84
3	Consultants Audit	310 000	95 559,63	30,83
4	Formation et voyages	70 000	77 320,98	110,46
5A	Fonctionnement 1ere Année	70 000	217 410,08	310,59
5B	Fonctionnement 2ème Année	70 000	90 356,97	129,08
5C	Fonctionnement 3ème Année	70 000		0,00
5D	Fonctionnement 4ème Année	30 000		0,00
6	PPF	500	212,18	42,44
7	Non Alloué	29 500	-	0,00
	<b>Total</b>	<b>1 700 000</b>	<b>1 673 844,85</b>	<b>98,46</b>

***Les subventions de l'Etat du Mali***

Le CFD étant un Etablissement Public à caractère scientifique a bénéficié au titre des fonds de contrepartie 238 000 000 FCFA dont 212 900 000 FCFA ont été payé. Le CFD a aussi bénéficié au titre de l'exercice budgétaire 2011 d'une dotation de 111 723 000 FCFA dont 38 860 000 FCFA au titre du PAGAM II. Pour l'achat de son dernier lot d'équipements (les équipements audio-vidéo) le CFD a reçu de l'Etat malien 185 802 647 FCFA. Ce qui fait un montant total de 535 525 647 FCFA dont 500 425 647 FCFA payé.

**Tableau8 : Situation de recouvrement des fonds de contrepartie**

<b>Années</b>	<b>Mandat (en CFA)</b>	<b>Montant payé</b>	<b>Reliquat à payer</b>
2005	23 000 000	23 000 000	-
2006	95 000 000	95 000 000	-
2007	20 000 000	-	20 000 000
2008	20 000 000	19 700 000	300 000
2009	20 000 000	15 200 000	4 800 000
2010	40 000 000	40 000 000	-
2011	20 000 000	20 000 000	-
<b>Sous Total</b>	<b>238 000 000</b>	<b>212 900 000</b>	<b>25 100 000</b>
Exercice Budget 2011	111 723 000		
Coût Equipements audio-vidéo	185 802 647		
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>535 525 647</b>		

### ***L'appui du PNUD***

La contribution du PNUD est de 200 000 \$US. Cette contribution a permis entre autre de (d'):

- payer le salaire du directeur,
- effectuer les voyages d'études à Dakar et à Cotonou,
- former le RAF en passation des marchés 2ème niveau à Tunis,
- financer la participation du CFD aux réunions annuelles de l'AACED à Dakar (2009) et à la conférence eLearning Africa 2009,
- financer la participation du CFD à des ateliers de formations organisés par le CREN.

### **4. Evaluation de l'exécution du projet :**

Pour cause de facteurs, pour la plus part externes (voire la mise en œuvre), le projet a connu un très grand retard dans son exécution. Ce retard pris a causé une différence remarquable entre les coûts estimés des activités et les coûts réels au moment d'exécution de l'activité. Les montants alloués à certaines catégories ont été largement dépassés pendant que d'autres n'ont pu être exécuté. Cela peut amener à penser à une évaluation négative du projet. Cependant la problématique de renforcement des capacités est toujours des plus préoccupantes donnant ainsi au projet toute sa légitimité. C'est ainsi des activités de formation en présentiel et par VC ont été exécutées, et ont été très appréciées par les participants. Les fora d'échanges et les conférences par VC ont aussi été hautement appréciés par les participants. Les participants aux activités sont d'une très bonne qualité (Ministres, Députés, Directeurs, Conseillers techniques, etc...). Ceci nous a amené à fonder le marketing du Centre sur la qualité des activités, la qualité des participants et la qualité des services du CFD.

Notons cependant que la mobilisation des publics cibles est lente et difficile, et surtout en-deçà des attentes. Par ailleurs, les structures, lorsqu'ils obtiennent un financement pour les formations, préfèrent les faire dans des lieux où les participants peuvent bénéficier de perdîmes. A cela il faut ajouter le fait que les cadres préfèrent des formations à l'extérieur, ce qui leur permet de visiter de nouvelles villes et de décrocher momentanément pour se reposer.

## **5. Evaluation des performances de la Banque et de l'Emprunteur**

### **5.1 Performances de la Banque**

Globalement les performances de la Banque mondiale sont satisfaisantes. Cela peut s'expliquer par le taux global de décaissement et la prorogation de la date de clôture après le retard accusé du en partie à des causes externes. Le fait de programmer l'installation du Centre du Nigéria après celui de Madagascar pendant que le Mali attendait CIBER a été l'une des causes les plus importantes du retard accusé. Suite à cela, l'équipe de direction n'a ménagé d'intelligence et de temps pour trouver une solution alternative, le contrat de CIBER n'ayant plus été renouveler par la Banque. Il faut cependant noter que le retard est aussi en partie causé par une certaine lourdeur se manifestant par des procédures longues ou mal maitrisées, particulièrement au niveau de la passation des marchés. Le long temps pris pour valider l'avenant relatif au poste mémoire eau et électricité de la composante « Bâtiment » en est une illustration.

#### ***5.1.1 Dans la qualité de service au démarrage***

Il y a eu une très bonne collaboration entre l'équipe de la Banque et les autorités locales, illustré par l'aide mémoire de la mission d'identification du projet. L'appui du TTL a été remarquable pour la mise en place de l'équipe du projet et le démarrage des activités.

#### ***5.1.2 Qualité de la supervision***

L'équipe de la Banque dans le cadre de sa supervision a toujours apporté un plus au projet. Cette supervision s'est faite à travers les visites sur le terrain, les échanges par courriel, et les échanges pendant les réunions régionales de l'ACED. Nous déplorons cependant l'absence de TTL pendant près de six (6) mois de la dernière année du projet (période la plus critique), ce qui a négativement contribuer sur le nombre de formations et des participants et du coup a prolongé les délais pour l'autonomie financière.

#### ***5.1.3 Justification du niveau de performance de la Banque***

Quand bien même l'exécution du projet prenait du retard, la Banque n'a jamais cessé d'apporter son appui. L'unité de coordination du projet a bénéficié d'un appui remarquable de la Banque pour renforcer ses compétences particulièrement en procédures des passations des marchés de la Banque mondiale. Le taux de décaissement est appréciable malgré les difficultés rencontrées pour l'exécution du projet.

## **5.2 Performances de l'emprunteur**

De façon générale et au-delà du retard accusé dans l'exécution de ce projet, l'emprunteur par ses différents appuis et ses prises de décisions pour trouver des solutions alternatives suite à des blocages a une performance qu'on peut qualifier d'appréciable.

### ***5.2.1 Performance du Gouvernement***

La performance de l'Etat est salubre si on se réfère aux différentes subventions (voir tableau 8). L'appui de l'Etat pour l'acquisition du dernier lot d'équipements est très remarquable et est un témoignage de l'engagement de l'Etat à soutenir le projet.

### ***5.2.2 Performance de l'Agence d'exécution***

La Direction du Centre malgré le retard accusé, n'a jamais ignoré la pertinence du projet et n'a ménagé aucun effort pour son exécution. Avec des équipements incomplets la direction a fait preuve d'engagement proactif pour la tenue des VC de manière satisfaisante. La conviction et l'engagement de la Direction sont les causes principales des résultats obtenus dans l'environnement que nous avons décrit plus haut. Les activités tenues, leur qualité, la qualité des participants, le plaidoyer auprès de l'Etat pour son appui sont autant de points remarquables notant la performance de l'Agent d'exécution.

### ***5.2.3 Justification du niveau de performance de l'emprunteur***

Les différents appuis, la reconnaissance de la pertinence du Centre et la volonté d'accompagner le CFD afin qu'il assure son autonomie financière le plus rapidement possible justifient à suffisance le niveau de performance de l'Etat.

Le retard accusé nous amène à réfléchir sur ce qui aurait dû être fait pour l'éviter. Il est important que les coordinateurs et les responsables administratifs des projets soient recrutés bien avant afin qu'ils puissent participer à la conception même du projet et du coup s'approprier du projet. Il est utile de mener des réflexions pour l'acceptation, par la Banque mondiale, des procédures de passation des marchés de certaines institutions fiables sinon améliorer les procédures nationales afin qu'elles puissent être utilisées.

Face au désir de formations des cadres à l'extérieur et du paiement des perdèmes, pour que le Centre puisse assurer de façon performante sa mission, il doit bénéficier de fonds qu'il doit utiliser pour renforcer les capacités des différents acteurs impliqués dans nos politiques et programme de développement.

Nous vivons dans un monde global où les échanges entre cadres de différents pays peuvent apporter beaucoup dans le changement positif de mentalité et de comportement, d'où la nécessité d'accroître les fora d'échange et les conférences par VC.

Le Centre doit s'assurer d'offrir des activités de qualité offertes par des institutions reconnues de qualité pour son image, ce qui est déterminant pour la réussite de sa mission.

## **7. Les Difficultés**

Le CFD n'ayant été que timidement opérationnel pendant une année, les principales difficultés sont celles déclinées dans la mise en œuvre et qui ont eu comme conséquence le retard pris. A cela il faut ajouter les difficultés relatives aux formations à l'extérieur et au perdîmes. Le retrait de la Banque étant effectif juste après un an de timide activités va certainement confronter le Centre à d'autres difficultés que nous espérons seront atténuées par l'appui de l'Etat.

Notons aussi que malgré nos multiples sollicitations et la qualité des activités de formation du CFD, nous ne sentons pas la participation des personnels des projets financés par les PTF, la banque mondiale y compris. Cette attitude assimilable à celle des cadres du public préférant les formations à l'extérieur.

Les coûts relatifs à la Bande passante sont très élevés depuis la migration technologique. Aussi depuis cette migration les Centre francophones de l'ACCED font moins (ou pas du tout) des cours communs. A ce niveau nous sommes en train de nous investir fortement pour relancer nos activités en commun afin de réduire les coûts de formation tout en augmentant la qualité.

Il y a aussi les paramètres de promotion personnelle qui ne motivent pas beaucoup les compétences. Des mesures doivent être prises pour réinstaller une véritable culture de la formation.

## **8. Perspectives pour le Centre**

Les perspectives pour le Centre c'est a priori d'assurer rapidement son autonomie financière. Le Centre doit assurer sa pérennité et montrer sa viabilité et son utilité pour accompagner le gouvernement dans sa politique de réduction de la pauvreté et d'atteinte des objectifs du millénium. Il faut pour cela avoir des partenaires internationalement reconnus pour la grande qualité de leurs prestations, d'où la nécessité de continuer à chercher des partenariats avec des institutions de qualité.

Afin d'éviter de déplacer les ordinateurs de la salle multimédia lors des cours ne nécessitant des ordinateurs, il est pertinent de construire une nouvelle salle qui peut être cloisonnée pour avoir trois à quatre petites salles, pour les formations en présentiel sans ordinateur et d'autres type d'ateliers.

Face au coût élevé de la Bande passante, l'AACED a décidé de voir les opportunités qu'offre la fibre optique. Si c'est concluant (*qualité et coût*) le CFD se tournera vers la connexion par fibre optique.

Le Mali est un pays très vaste, il faut dès maintenant penser à des antennes du CFD dans les provinces. L'installation de ces antennes se fera après une étude sérieuse et approfondie car il ne sert à rien de créer des antennes qui ne seront pas viables.

## **Conclusion**

Le CFD est le premier centre de l'Association AACED à être installé après la migration technologique et la rupture du contrat de la Banque mondiale avec CIBER. Ce qui explique en grande partie les problèmes rencontrés par le projet. Après une année de timide exécution de ses activités, on peut retenir que la pertinence du projet est indéniable et est encore d'actualité. Pour la pérennité et la viabilité du CFD, en l'absence de l'appui de la Banque, il est important que le Centre bénéficie de l'accompagnement du gouvernement.

Il est important que les activités du Centre dans le réseau soient renforcées. En fait le réseau est ce qui fait la différence entre un Centre GDLN et n'importe quel autre Centre d'Enseignement à Distance. Pour assurer pleinement avec efficacité sa mission, le Centre doit conserver sa spécificité qui fait qu'il n'est pas une Université, ni un centre de formation comme les autres d'où son ancrage sous la tutelle du Ministère chargé de l'Economie hautement apprécié.

Il est très important que le Centre continue à s'appuyer sur des consultants de haut niveau pour distiller une formation de qualité et assurer le renforcement des capacités des acteurs impliqués dans les politiques et programmes de développement. Pour cela le Centre doit bénéficier de ressources conséquentes pour sa mission.

La phase projet est certes finie, mais le Centre doit continuer à entretenir avec la Banque mondiale en particulier et les PTF en général une très bonne relation partenariale pour améliorer la qualité des ressources humaines.



**Annex 8. Comments of Co financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders**

None

**Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents**

Project Appraisal Document

Development Grant Agreement

Supervision Reports and Aid Memoirs

Implementation Status Reports

Government's Evaluation Report (English version)

Repport d' Achevement (French version)

## **Annex 10. Amendment of the Development Grant Agreement**

On September 20, 2007, the Government requested for an Amendment of the Development Grant Agreement (DGA H090-MLI) in the Government Letter No. Ref: 301/MEIC-SG. IDA approved the Government request to amend the DGA on December 14, 2007 and amended the DGA as follows:

New paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 are added under Part C of Section 1 of Schedule 3 o the Agreement to read as following:

4. “Direct Contracting

Goods and works which Association agrees meet the requirements for Direct Contracting may be procured in accordance with the provision of paragraph 3.7 of the Procurement Guidelines.

5. Procurement from United Nations Agencies

Goods may be procured directly from United Nations Agencies in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 3.1 and 3.9 of the Procurement Guidelines.

6. Procurement Agents

A Procurement Agent may be selected to manager procurement for the Project, in accordance with the provision of paragraphs 3.10 of the Procurement Guidelines.”

Paragraph 4 of Part C of Section II of Schedule 3 to the Agreement is amended to read as following:

4. Single Source Selection

Services for tasks in circumstances which meet the requirements of the paragraph 3.10 of the Consultant Guidelines for Single Source Selection, may, with the Association’s prior agreement, be procured in accordance with the provisions of the paragraphs 3.8 through 3.11 of the Consultant Guidelines.”

A new paragraph 3 is added to Schedule 4 of the Agreement to read as follows, and paragraphs 3 to 9 are re-numbered 4 to 10.

3. Implementation Agreement.

The Recipient shall maintain at all times during implementation of the Project an implementation agreement with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), under terms and conditions satisfactory to the Bank, including, inter alia, the obligation of UNDP to support the Recipient in carrying out the following tasks: (i) implementation support; (ii)

procurement services; and (iii) strengthening the capacity of the Recipient for Project administration and management.”

The Government signed on the above amendment and it became effective on January 10, 2008.

Table 1- DLC Video-based Learning and Face-to-Face Professional Training Courses – 2010 -2011

	Video Conference		Training Courses
1	Organisation, gestion, formation des ressources humaines au sein d'organismes, publics ou privés, pilotés sur objectifs	1	Logistique des transports
2	Organisation, gestion, pilotage sur objectifs des budgets au sein d'organismes, publics ou privés (budget Training)	2	Formations sur le modèle budgétaire à moyen termes (CBMT)
3	Le Pilotage sur objectifs de politiques et de Programmes de Développement	3	Formation des assistants de directions
4	Formation en Leadership sur les Frontières en politique de développement	4	Méthodologie à la capitalisation
5	Comment élaborer et mettre en œuvre un Programme Communal de Développement Economique, Social et Culturel orienté sur les	5	Formation sur la Réforme des Marchés Publiques
6	Audit des Marchés Publics et de la corruption dans les Marchés Publics,	6	Formation en suivi-évaluation sur les PTI/BSI (
7	Audit organisationnel de l'Administration Publique	7	Gestion d'Entreprise pour dirigeant
8	Contrôle de Gestion dans l'Administration Publique Project Management	8	La Gestion de Projets
9	Les Fondements de la GAR	9	Procédures de passation des marchés
10	Planification, Mise en œuvre et Gestion du Changement	10	Atelier de Formation sur l'Analyse des programmes avec la Direction des Finances et du Matériel
11	Relations Economiques Internationales (avec examen pour l'obtention du Certificat)	11	Formation en techniques professionnelles de production, de conservation et de commercialisation des produits alimentaires.
12	China DAC Infrastructures (Forum of exchange)	12	Suivi et évaluation dans le contexte de la GAR
13	La sécurité juridique dans l'exercice du contrôle fiscal, le rôle du comptable comme levier dans l'amélioration de la gestion des finances publiques (forum d'échange initié par le CFD du Mali entre cadres maliens et leurs homologues du Bénin, de la Côte d'Ivoire, du Sénégal et de la Mauritanie).	13	Renforcement des capacités organisationnelles et managériales des PNIP
14	Conférence sur « la problématique sécuritaire et gouvernance en Afrique de l'Ouest : Armes légères, drogues et terrorisme » (Conférence initié par le CFD du Mali sous la coprésidence de 3 ministres : le Ministre de l'Economie et des Finances, le Ministres des affaires étrangères et de la coopération internationale et le ministre de la sécurité intérieure et la protection civile. A cette conférence ont participé par VC les cadres du Bénin, du Burkina Faso, de la Côte d'Ivoire et Madagascar)	14	Le cadre macroéconomique de la Direction nationale du plan et du développement
15	Atelier d'échange et de Formation avec l'institut TERI(Inde), dans le cadre de l'énergie solaire avec	15	Santé et environnement

	l'idée d'offrir la lumière sur un millier de vie en Afrique.		
16	Atelier d'échange et de Formation avec AUSAID (Australie) sur la gestion des eaux pluviales.	15	Budgétisation axée sur les résultats
		16	Actions transnationales destinées à améliorer les conditions socio-économiques et le développement de la société civile en Afrique de l'Ouest.
		17	Suivi et évaluation dans le contexte de la GAR.
		18	Formation sur une migration numérique d'ici 2015 (avec le RAPAF : Réseau de l'Audiovisuel Public de l'Afrique Francophone)

Source: Government – Director of CFD

## **DLC Staff - Terms of Reference – recommended to the Government**

### **DIRECTOR**

The Director has overall responsibility for administering, managing and operating the Development Learning Center so that it evolves into a self-sustaining Center within a period of three (3) to five (5) years. This individual will be responsible for providing leadership within the Center and the community in the area of Development Learning and be an agent for change. The Director will report to a Board of Directors who will provide overall guidance and support to the Development Learning Center.

The role of the Director will be:

- to provide leadership and direction to a small staff,
- to manage the operation of the Center,
- to facilitate the team dynamics in a flat organizational structure,
- to establish a transparent and accountable financial management system,
- to provide a business development function with a long term sustainability focus,
- to provide strategic direction and guidance to the Center, and
- to engage the community as a strategic partner in the DLC.

The specific responsibilities of the Director will include but are not limited to:

- developing an awareness of the clients training needs,
- maintaining a training schedule that provides Development Learning courses and seminars that fulfil these needs chosen from among GDLC courses, other providers and custom produced courses
- managing the learner support system,
- liaising with senior government and World Bank officials,
- marketing and promoting the DLC and its specific learning events to potential clients,
- generating sufficient activity in courses, seminars, and workshops that will justify an income sufficient to pay for network access, staff cost and, maintenance and amortization of equipment,
- fundraising and working with donors,
- providing a quality assurance function in the operation of the Center,
- preparing an annual business plan for the Center, and
- preparing an annual report

The Director will have the following skills and qualifications:

- a higher degree,
- an entrepreneurial spirit,
- a significant experience in management,
- a good command of English and of the primary language of the site's country.
- a working knowledge of communication and marketing tools,
- excellent communication and interpersonal skills,
- an ability to work in a highly fluid environment,

- an understanding of the role and an ability to act as an agent for change,
- a team builder

## **TRAINING COORDINATOR**

The Training Coordinator is responsible for the management of all training events and activities that happen in the Center. This primarily consists of learner support and the facilitation of courses and seminars. As a member of the DLC team, this person will also assist the Manager in briefing potential clients on benefits from an educational perspective.

The role of the Training Coordinator will be:

- to act as a resource in the area of design and development of educational programs,
- to train new users and instructors,
- to facilitate videoconference and computer conferences, and
- to assess new software that will be used to facilitate learning opportunities in the Center particularly in the multimedia computer labs.

The specific responsibilities of the Training Coordinator will include:

- acting as the primary contact person with participants in courses and seminars,
- coordinating course offerings with the course providers and the WBI,
- supervising the registration of participants,
- ensuring the proper distribution of all course materials,
- facilitating the delivery of courses to the Center by introducing participants to the technology (in association with the IT staff),
- moderating discussion groups during local activities,
- encouraging the interaction by e-mail, fax, and voice,
- facilitating the production of courses from the Center by assisting local experts in the design of their courses,
- training local instructors in the use of technology and on facilitation and mentoring skills to be used in Development delivery,
- assisting in the production of learning materials and slides,
- assessing new courseware from the perspective of application to Development Learning, and
- participating in and managing local evaluation activities.

The Training Coordinator will have the following qualifications and skills:

- a higher degree and optimally a qualification in education, teacher training or educational technology,
- a skilled and experienced adult educator,
- a self motivator,
- excellent communication and interpersonal skills,
- an ability to work as a team member in a highly fluid environment,
- a familiarity with basic computer software e.g. word processing, spreadsheets
- proficiency in establishing web sites and managing page content in collaboration with the technician, and
- knowledge of spoken English and the local language (written and spoken) is essential.

## **IT OFFICER OR TECHNICIAN**

The information technology staff is responsible for supporting the Development Learning Center's technology infrastructure. As a member of the DLC team, this person will also take part in briefing potential clients on benefits from a technology perspective.

The role of the technician will be:

- to maintain and support NT and Lotus Notes client-server environment (40+ PCs), and administrate NT/Notes activities (e.g. user names and login activity, services, regular maintenance and backup procedures, network printer connectivity, file services and IP connectivity),
- to conduct regular maintenance and troubleshooting on existing office and communication technology equipment (videoconference units, monitors) and maintain a trouble log,
- to participate in the design, installation, configuration and activation of new technology and communication services at the Development Learning Center,
- to maintain an up-to-date inventory of office equipment and software,
- to provide expert advice and guidance to Development Learning clients on hardware and software, and
- to establish a credible relationship with local telecom providers and equipment vendors.

The specific responsibilities of the technician will include:

- assisting with hardware and software procurement and maintenance, evaluating local technology vendors, ensuring adherence to existing standards,
- providing proper security of equipment and data by ensuring that equipment is either locked or secured in place, and any data coming from outside agencies is thoroughly screened for viruses before being introduced in Development Learning Center,
- establishing regular contact with the other Development Learning Center IT staff for the purpose of sharing experiences and best practices,
- remaining abreast of the latest IT developments by maintaining regular contacts with outside vendors, and
- assessing new hardware and software from the perspective of application to Development Learning.

The technician will have the following primary skills and qualifications:

- a higher degree, preferably in Computer Science, and two years relevant experience in the computer industry (preferably in a networked environment), or two years training in a polytechnic institute in electronics with extensive experience in the telecommunications or networking environment,
- superior analytical and problem solving skills,
- five years minimum experience with PC hardware and software support, including extensive knowledge of configuration and repair issues. Experience should include support of notebook computers and PC Card accessories for notebooks,
- high proficiency in the use Windows NT, Lotus Notes, Word, Excel, PowerPoint, and anti-virus software,
- proficiency in establishing and maintaining web sites and managing page content in collaboration with the training coordinator,
- working knowledge of client server technology and general network connectivity and maintenance issues (e.g. servers, hubs, routers, Ethernet cabling),



- experience with network administration highly desirable,
- working knowledge of telecommunications equipment and software (e.g. PABX telephone configuration, and modems),
- working knowledge of video conferencing equipment (experience with PictureTel systems highly desirable),
- a basic understanding of satellite technology (e.g. current uses and practices), and
- knowledge of spoken English and the local language (written and spoken) is essential.

The technician should have the following additional skills:

- a self-starter with the ability to apply knowledge and expertise to deliver high quality work and to self-manage work program,
- an ability to work as a team member in a highly fluid environment and to develop technology solutions that encourage the use of collaborative computing,
- a demonstrated ability to assist end-users in learning standard software applications through demonstrations, written guides, etc.

## **FINANCIAL SPECIALIST/ACCOUNTANT**

The detailed job description of the Finance Manager shall be as follows:

### **JOB DESCRIPTION**

- Ensuring that there is proper maintenance of financial information under generally accepted accounting principles to provide a basis for adequate financial control and timely preparation of audited accounts
- Producing within agreed time frames and in standard formats Financial Monitoring Reports, monthly management accounts and related supporting reports
- Assisting the project coordinator in the preparation of quarterly and annual reports for presentation to the steering Committee and other interested parties by providing the required financial data for decision making.
- Evaluating project financial performance against projected the Government and Donor funding obligations for the determination of expenditure priorities and the timely replenishment of funds.
- Reviewing and evaluating internal control and check systems, procedures and methods.
- Recommending and subsequently implementing in conjunction with relevant agencies, improved methods of maintaining project financial accounts in order to meet project changing needs.
- Controlling internal disbursement of all funds to ensure that the government and IDA's standing instructions are adhered to, thereby safeguarding project interests against fraud, thefts.
- Ensuring proper disbursement of funds in order to facilitate timely availability of funds for operational and administrative purposes.

- *[for new projects: Participating in the design of a simple accounting system that produces timely, accurate information for the project according to a chart of accounts to be determined.]*
- *[Supervising the consultant to be engaged for the design of the system.]*
- Designing acceptable Financial Monitoring Reports for clearance by the Bank.
- Controlling the quality of withdrawal applications by ensuring that there is sufficient supporting documentation and the expenditures being paid for are in line with the DCA.
- Production of Expenditure returns to Treasury every tenth of the following month.

## **REPORTING RELATIONSHIP**

The financial manager will report to the *[Project Manager/Project Coordinator]*, who will be responsible for evaluating performance and recommending whether to confirm renewal provisions in the financial manager's contract.

## **MINIMUM QUALIFICATIONS**

The finance manager should have, at a minimum, professional certification as a qualified accountant from an institution such as ACCA, CIMA, or the equivalent, plus 3 years professional experience as an accountant. Demonstrable experience of having worked for externally-funded projects (bilateral or multi-lateral) would be highly desirable, but not required.

## **PERFORMANCE CRITERIA <sup>12</sup>**

Financial Management Reports (FMRs) satisfactory to Bank produced by July 31, Oct 31, Jan 31, and April 30 each year  
 Monthly bank account reconciliations produced and accounts in balance  
 Financial statements produced by August 15 each year (ready for auditing)  
 Auditor contracted (or NAO audit team confirmed) by July 31 each year  
 Withdrawal rejection rate did not exceed [5%? 10%] of value of applications  
 Expenditure returns submitted to Treasury by the 10<sup>th</sup> of each month  
 Etc.

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<sup>12</sup> Basis for annual contract renewal

# MALI

## DEVELOPMENT LEARNING CENTER PROJECT - LIL

### CENTRE DE FORMATION POUR LE DÉVELOPPEMENT - LIL

- CENTER LOCATION
- MAIN CITIES AND TOWNS
- PROVINCE CAPITALS
- NATIONAL CAPITAL
- MAIN ROADS
- RAILROADS
- REGION BOUNDARIES
- INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES



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