WO R L D BA N K O P E RATI O N S EVALUATI O N D E PART M E N T QED The World Bank's Experience with Post Conflict Reconstructilon 2-~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~'- 2'1r~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~4 , %X; ; #w i ABBREVIATIC)NS AND ACRONYMS APL Adaptable Program Loan LIL Learning and Innovation Loan. BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina LLC Learning and Leadership Center BP Bank Procedure MENA Middle East and North Africa CAS Country Assistance Strategy Regional Office CG Consultative Group MIGA Multilateral Investment Guarantee CTF Consultant Trust Fund Agency DAC Development Assistance Committee MOH Ministry of Health (of the OECD) NGO Non-governmental Organization DGF Development Grant Fund NURP Northern Uganda Reconstruction DRF Debt-Reduction Facility Project EAP East Asia and Pacific Regional Office OECD Organization for Economic ECA Europe and Central Asia Regional Office Cooperation and Development ED Executive Director OED Operations Evaluation Depart:ment EDI Economnic Development Institute OD Operational Directive EDUCO Community-managed Schools OP Operational Policy Program (Educaci6n con PCP Post-Conflict Program Participaci6n de la Comunidad) PCR Project Completion Report EERC Emergency Economic Recovery Credit PHRD Policy and Human Resources ERC Economnic Rehabilitation Credit Development Fund ERL Emergency Recovery Loan PIU Project Implementation Unit ERR Program Emergency Reconstruction and PMU Project Management Unit Rehabilitation Program PPAR Project Performance Audit Report ERRP Emergency Reconstruction and PPF Project Preparation Facility Rehabilitation Project RIL Rehabilitation Import Loan ESW Economic and Sector Work SAC Structural Adjustment Credit EU European Union SAL Structural Adjustment Loan FAO UN Food and Agriculture SAS South Asia Regional Office Organization TA Technical Assistance FRM Resour,ze Mobilization Department UN United Nations GDP Gross I)omestic Product UNDP UN Development Programme GP Good P'ractice UNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees ICR Implementation Completion Report UNICEF UN Children's Fund IDB Inter-Aimerican Development Bank UNOHR UN Office of the High Representative IFC International Finance Corporation UNOPS UN Operational Services ILO International Labour Organization USAID United States Agency for International IMF International Monetary Fund Development LAC Latin America and the Caribbean WHO World Health Organization Regional Office WO R L D BANK O PE RAT IO NS EVA L U AT IO N DE PART MEN T O The Wiorld Bank's Ecxperience with Post-Confnlict Reconstruction Alcira Kreimer John Eriksson Robert Muscat Margaret Arnold Colin Scott 1998 The World Bank m Washington, D.C. kN Copyright ©) 1998 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/THE WORLD BANK 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20433, U.S.A. All rights reserved Manufactured in the United States of America First printing June 1998 The opinions expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank or its member governments. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this publication and accepts no responsibility whatsoever for any consequence of their use. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this volume do not imply on the part of the World Bank Group any judgment on the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. The material in this publication is copyrighted. Requests for permission to reproduce portions of it should be sent to the Office of the Publisher at the address shown in the copyright notice above. The World Bank encourages dissemination of its work and will normally give permission promptly and, when the reproduction is for noncommercial purposes, without asking a fee. Permission to copy portions for classroom use is granted through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., Suite 910, 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, Massachusetts 01923, U.S.A. Design: The Magazine Group/Jeff Kibler Photo credits: Curt Carnemark: Cover, p. 3, p. 7, p. 39. Tim Cullen: p. 15, p. 19, p. 23, p. 35, p. 42, p. 49. ISSN 1011-6984 ISBN 0-8213-4290-8 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The World Bank's experience with post-conflict reconstruction/Alcira Kreimer... [et/al.l. p. cm. - (A World Bank operations evaluation study, ISSN 1011-6984) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-8213-4290-8 1. World Bank. 2. Economic assistance-Evaluation. I. Kreimer, Alcira. II. World Bank. III. Series. HG3881.5.W57W6949 1998 332.1'532-dc21 98-36250 CIP 4 Printed on recycled paper. Contents v Acknowledgments vii Foreword, Prefacio, Preface ix Executive Summary, Resumen, Resume Analytique 1 1. Introduction 1 Background and Study Objectives 1 Conceptual Framework 2 Study Scope and Methodology 5 2. Evolution of Bank Policy Markers 5 Operational Policy on Lending for Emergencies 6 Framework Paper for Post-Conflict Reconstruction 6 Board Discussion and Decisions 9 3. Anatomy of the Bank's Post-Conflict Reconstruction Portfolio 9 The Bank's Approach to Post-Conflict Reconstruction 12 The Lending Portfolio 13 Non-lending Services 15 The Cost of Post-Conflict Reconstruction Operations 15 Lessons from Evaluations of Post-Conflict Reconstruction Operations 18 Characteristics of Post-Conflict Countries 21 4. Defining the Bank's Role 21 The Bank's Role in Preventing Conflict and Promoting Sustainable Peace 21 Obstacles to the Peace Objective 22 Economic and Social Factors in (Levels of) Conflict 22 Peace Conditionality 24 Partnership Coordination 24 A Place at the Table 24 The Bank's Role in Aid Coordination 26 Other Aspects of Partnership 27 5. The Bank's Comparative Advantage and Performance 27 Stabilizing and Rebuilding the Economy 28 Fiscal and Structural Economic Reforms 28 Housing Recovery 29 The Problem of Demining 29 Rebuilding Human, Social, and Cultural Capital 30 Social Capital 30 The Role of Women 30 Demobilization 31 Is Land the Lever? 32 Culture is Not a Luxury 33 6. The Folly of Some Conventional Wisdoms 33 Too High a Price for Tax Revenue? 34 Timing and Sequence Are the Keys 34 Consider Political Realities 34 First Things First iii The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction 37 7. The Bank's Institutional Arrangements 37 Country Teams 38 Support and Reinforcement 38 No Universal Pattern 38 Give Teams the Tools 38 Programming, Design, and Implementation 39 Need is Only Part of the Equation 40 Processes Can Become Obstacles 41 Variable Results (PIUs and PMUs) 41 Client and Staff Training and Development 41 Implications for Monitoring and Evaluation 42 Importance of Continuity 42 Through a Different Lens 43 Developing Consistency 44 Returning to "Normal" Operations 45 8. Directions for Future Bank Policy 49 Endnotes 53 Selected Bibliography 57 Annexes 57 Annex 1. Summary of Main Findings of the Case Studies 66 Annex 2. List of Post-Conflict Reconstruction Lending Operations 72 Annex 3. List of People Interviewed for the Study 78 Annex 4. Comparison of PCR/ICR Ratings with PPAR/EVM Ratings 80 Annex 5. IBRD/IDA Lending Commitments by Region (with detail of post-conflict countries) 82 Annex 6. Partnership in Post-Conflict Reconstruction Workshop- Directory of Participants 92 Annex 7. The World Bank's Experience in Post-Conflict Reconstruction/ Management Response 95 Annex 8. Report from CODE/Committee on Development Effectiveness Tables 10 3.1: Summary of World Bank Group Involvement in Post-conflict Reconstruction 13 3.2: IBRD/IDA Commitments to Post-Conflict Countries as a Percentage of the Regional and Global Portfolios (Percent) 16 3.3: Staff Years Dedicated to the Nine Case Study Countries 24 4.1: The Bank's Role and Effectiveness in Coordination and Partner ship 28 5.1: The Bank's Role and Effectiveness in Rebuilding the Economy 29 5.2: The Bank's Role and Effectiveness in Restoring Human, Social, and Cultural Capital Figures 12 3.1: Post-Conflict Lending Operations Approved by Region 14 3.2: Post-Conflict Reconstruction Lending by Sector, 1977-1997 iv Acknowledgments --h's report synthesizes the findings of an assess- Colletta, Laura Cooley, Guy Darlan, Gloria Davis, ment of the Bank's experience with post-conflict Patrice Dufour, Patricia Weiss Fagen, Laura Frigenti, reconstruction. The obj'ective of the assessment Steve Holtzman, Laurens Hoppenbrouwer, Andras is to distill lessons for ongoing and future operations Horvai, Paul Hubbard, Ian Johnson, Markus Kostner, from the Bank's experience in providing assistance for Linda Lowenstein, Katherine Marshall, Mark post-conflict reconstruction. In addition to this sum- Malloch-Brown, Peter Miovic, Chukwuma Obidegwu, mary document, outputs of the study include separate Rory O'Sullivan, Christiaan J. Poortman, Christopher volumes of the case studies. Redfern, Ritva Reinikka, Eluned Roberts-Schweitzer, The report has been prepared by a team led by Geoffrey Shepherd, Nils Tcheyan, Christine Wallich, and Alcira Kreimer and comprising John Eriksson, Robert Thomas A. White. OED also thanks external reviewers Muscat, Margaret Arnold, and Colin Scott. The follow- Mary Anderson, Kenneth Bush, and Niels Dabelstein ing consultants contributed to the country case studies: for their time and helpful comments. OED also thanks Ann Elwan on Bosnia and Herzegovina; Jose Marques Mr. E. Tumusiime-Mutebile, Permanent Secretary/Trea- and Mauricio Silva on El Salvador; and Paul Collier and surer of the Ministry of Finance of Uganda for his thor- Zerubabel Ojoo on Uganda. Caroline Clarke prepared a ough comments on the Uganda case study. The comments review of the portfolio. Gregg Jackson provided assis- from the Committee on Development Effectiveness tance on methodological issues and June Taboroff pre- (CODE) have been reviewed and incorporated. Remain- pared a paper on cultural heritage. William B. Hurlbut ing errors of commission or omission, as well as the con- provided editorial assistance. Helen Watkins provided clusions and recommendations, are those of the authors administrative assistance. and should not be attributed to any of the reviewers. Cooperation and partial funding for the study were The report was produced as part of the OEDPK pub- prvded by the Swiss Agency for Development and lication series by a team under the direction of Elizabeth Cooperation (SD C) as part of the OED/SDC partnership Campbell-Page, consisting of Leo Demesmaker, Tsige program. OED thanks SDC for its generous support. Kagombe, Roshna Kapadia, and Kathy Strauss. Many World Bank staff members contributed valu- able inputs throughout the study, taking the time to be interviewed, offering comments, and reviewing drafts. The assessment team appreciates their thoughtful contri- Director-General, Operations Evaluarion Department: Robert Picciotto butions, and acknowledges the valuable comments pro- Director, Operations Evaluarion Department: Elizabeth McAllister vided by the following staff members: Gordon Appleby, Manager, Sector and Thematic Evaluations: Roger Slade Ana Maria Arriagada, Mark Baird, Ian Bannon, Nat Task Manager: Alcira Kreimer V Foreword FOREWORD PREFACIO PREFACE The attached study is based El estudio que se adjunta esta L'etude ci-jointe se fonde sur un on a review of the Bank's basado en un examen de la car- examen du portefeuille mondial global portfolio; nine country tera del Banco; nueve estudios de - de la Banque, sur neuf etudes de case studies (three field studies casos sobre paises (tres estudios cas de pays (trois sur le terrain et and six desk studies); a litera- sobre el terreno y seis estudios six sur dossier), sur une analyse ture review; and interviews te6ricos), un estudio bibliogra- des publications pertinentes, ainsi with Bank staff, other donors, fico, y entrevistas a funcionarios del que sur des entretiens avec des mem- international agencies, NGOs, and Banco, otros donantes, organismos bres du personnel de la Banque, avec (for field studies) member govern- internacionales, organizaciones no d'autres bailleurs de fonds, organismes ments. The study identifies 18 gubernamentales y (en el caso de los internationaux, ONG, et, pour les etu- countries with 157 Bank-supported estudios sobre el terreno) gobiernos de des sur le terrain, avec les gouverne- post-conflict operations represent- paises miembros. En el estudio se iden- ments des pays membres concernes. ing US$6.2 billion in lending. It tifican 18 paises y 157 operaciones L'etude recense 18 pays oui la Banque reveals that the Bank has a critical sobre situaciones posteriores a un con- apporte son concours a 157 operations role to play in post-conflict recon- flicto respaldadas por el Banco post-conflits, representant un volume struction. The Bank's use of consul- mediante prestamos por un total de de prets de 6,2 milliards de dollars. Elle tative groups has been particularly US$6.200 millones, lo que indica que met en lumiere le r6le crucial que la effective for mobilizing aid la instituci6n cumple una funci6n fun- Banque peut jouer pour aider les pays a resources, including facilitating the damental en la reconstrucci6n de pos- se relever d'un conflit. Les groupes clearing of arrears; seeking a coor- guerra. El recurso del Banco a grupos consultatifs organises par la Banque dinated approach to macroeco- consultivos ha resultado especialmente sont un moyen particulierement effi- nomic issues; and providing infor- eficaz para movilizar recursos de ayuda cace de mobiliser des ressources d'aide, mation on recovery needs and y facilitar la liquidaci6n de pagos atra- et aussi de faciliter le reglement des assistance flows. Two other impor- sados, para encontrar la forma de coor- arrieres, de definir une approche coor- tant contributions are to promote dinar acciones sobre los asuntos donnee des questions macro6conomi- aid coordination and, if invited, to macroecon6micos y para suministrar ques, et de reunir des informations sur advise on the economic develop- informaci6n sobre las necesidades de les besoins de reconstruction et les flux ment dimensions of peace accord recuperaci6n y los flujos de asistencia. d'aide. La Banque peut aussi contri- options. Otros dos aportes importantes son pro- buer utilement a la coordination de The main recommendation mover la coordinaci6n de la ayuda y, si l'aide et, si on le lui demande, au stade emerging from the study is that the se pide asistencia, dar asesoramiento de la negociation des accords de paix, Bank should develop a clear Oper- sobre las dimensiones de los acuerdos elle peut dispenser des conseils sur le ational Policy on post-conflict de paz en terminos del desarrollo volet developpement economique des reconstruction assistance using the econ6mico. options envisag6es. Framework for World Bank La principal recomendaci6n del L'etude recommande avant tout Involvement in Post-Conflict estudio es que el Banco deberia formu- que la Banque se dote d'une politique Reconstruction as a starting point. lar una politica operacional claramente operationnelle sans ambiguite sur l'aide The policy should address readi- definida sobre asistencia para la a ta reconstruction post-conflits, en se ness to provide economic develop- reconstrucci6n despues de los conflic- fondant sur le < Cadre d'action de la ment policy advice during peace tos a partir del documento titulado Banque mondiale pour la reconstruc- negotiations; post-conflict aid coor- Framework for World Bank Involve- tion des pays sortant d'un conflit >. Ce dination; leadership on macroeco- ment in Post-Conflict Reconstruction. nouveau document devrait traiter les nomic and external debt issues in En dicha politica se deberian abordar questions suivantes: aptitude a fournir collaboration with the IMF and aspectos tales como la preparaci6n des conseils sur la politique de develop- key external donors; definition of para dar asesoria sobre politicas de pement economique durant les negocia- priorities in macroeconomic stabi- desarrollo econ6mico durante las nego- tions de paix; coordination de l'aide lization programs, infrastructure ciaciones de paz; coordinaci6n de la post-conflits; pilotage du traitement rebuilding, and restoration of ayuda en la etapa posterior a los con- des questions relatives a la situation vii The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction human and social capital; flictos; liderazgo en cuestiones macroeconomique et a l'endette- selectivity in macroeconomic macroecon6micas y sobre deuda ment exterieur, en collaboration and structural policy condi- externa, en colaboraci6n con el avec le FMI et les principaux tionality; flexibility in pro- - FMI y donantes externos clave; bailleurs de fonds exterieurs ; hi& gramming, design, and imple- determinaci6n de prioridades rarchisation des priorites entre mentation; the division of para los programas de estabiliza- programmes de stabilisation labor between headquarters ci6n macroecon6mica, recons- macroeconomique, reconstruc- and field staff; and the importance trucci6n de infraestructura y restituci6n tion de l'infrastructure et retablisse- of monitoring and evaluation. del capital humano y social; selectivi- ment du capital humain et cles struc- dad en la condicionalidad de politica tures sociales ; s6lectivite de la macroecon6mica y estructural; flexibi- conditionnalite en matiere de politique lidad en las etapas de programaci6n, macroeconomique et structirelle ; sou- disefio y ejecuci6n; divisi6n de funcio- plesse de la programmation, de la nes entre el personal de la sede y el des- conception et de l'execution ; division tacado fuera de la sede, y la importan- du travail entre le siege et le personnel cia del seguimiento y la evaluaci6n. sur le terrain ; et importance du suivi et de 1'evaluation. Robert Picciotto Director-General, Operations Evaluation Department viii Executive Summary EXECUTIVE SUMMARY -' RESUMEN RESUME ANALYTIQUE The explosion of civil con- El estallido de conflictos civiles Lexplosion de troubles civils dans flicts in the post-Cold War . con posterioridad a la guerra fria Ile monde de l'apres- guerre froide a world has tested the World , ha puesto a prueba la capacidad mis a rude epreuve la capacite de la Bank's ability to address del Banco Mundial para hacer - Banque a faire face a des cata- unprecedented devastation of - frente a una devastaci6n sin pre- strophes humaines et sociales d'une human and social capital. cedentes en terminos de capital ampleur sans precedent. Depuis Since 1980, the volume of Bank humano y social. Desde 1980, el volu- 1980, le volume des prets accordes a des lending to post-conflict countries men del financiamiento del Banco a los pays sortant de conflits a augmente de has increased over 800 percent, to paises que salen de un conflicto ha plus de 800 % pour atteindre 6,2 - US$6.2 billion, and touched every aumentado mas del 800%, hasta llegar milliards de dollars, repartis entre toutes region and economic sector. This a US$6.200 millones, y ha beneficiado les regions du monde et tous les secteurs Operations Evaluation Department a todas las regiones y sectores de la economiques. Realis6e par le Departe- (OED) assessment of the Bank's economia. La presente evaluaci6n de la ment de l'evaluation des operations post-conflict reconstruction port- cartera de prestamos del Banco para (OED), la presente etude du portefeuille folio aims to enhance the institu- fines de reconstrucci6n despues de un des projets de reconstruction post-conflit tion's ability to respond more effec- conflicto preparada por el Departa- vise a renforcer l'aptitude de l'institution tively and efficiently to the needs of mento de Evaluaci6n de Operaciones a repondre plus efficacement aux besoins societies rebuilding after conflict. (DEO) tiene por objeto aumentar la des societ6s sortant d'un conflit. Elle exa- The assessment examines Bank capacidad de la instituci6n para aten- mine les principes qui guident les opera- operational policies as they relate der con mayor eficiencia y eficacia a las tions de la Banque dans ce domaine et to post-conflict reconstruction and necesidades de las sociedades que han recommande l'adoption de nouvelles calls for a new policy statement iniciado el proceso de reconstrucci6n directives pour renforcer, clarifier et ame- that will consolidate, clarify and tras un conflicto. En la evaluaci6n se liorer les politiques actuelles. refine existing policies. pasa revista a las polifticas operaciona- Dans cette perspective, l'6tude eva- To accomplish its aim the les del Banco relacionadas con la lue 1'experience r6cente de la Banque et study assesses recent Bank experi- reconstrucci6n despues de los conflic- en tire les lecons au profit des projets en ence in post-conflict reconstruction tos y se propugna una nueva declara- cours et a venir. Cette evaluation repose and extracts lessons for ongoing ci6n de politicas que consolide, aclare y essentiellement sur neuf monographies, and future operations. The core of perfeccione las politicas vigentes. dont trois ont fait l'objet de recherches the assessment consists of nine case Para lograr los objetivos sefiala- sur le terrain (Bosnie-Herzegovine, El studies: three chosen for field study dos, en el estudio se evaluia la experien- Salvador et Ouganda) et six d'etudes (Bosnia and Herzegovina [BiH], El cia reciente del Banco en materia de documentaires (Cambodge, Erythree, Salvador, and Uganda) and six cho- reconstrucci6n despu6s de los conflic- Haiti, Liban, Rwanda et Sri Lanka). sen for desk reviews (Cambodia, tos y se extraen ensefianzas para las Dans tous ces cas, la Banque a joue un Eritrea, Haiti, Lebanon, Rwanda, operaciones en marcha y futuras. La r6le important dans l'action entreprise and Sri Lanka). In all these cases, parte fundamental de la evaluaci6n pour aider ces pays a se relever de the Bank played a significant role comprende nueve estudios de casos: conflits. Ces exemples sont repr6senta- in attempting to assist with post- tres fueron seleccionados para estudios tifs des diverses causes de l'echec ou de conflict reconstruction. They repre- sobre el terreno (Bosnia y Herzegovina, l'effondrement de l'Etat, ainsi que des sent diversity in the causes of state El Salvador y Uganda), y seis para estu- facteurs qui amenent la Banque a inter- failure or collapse as well as in the dios te6ricos (Camboya, Eritrea, Haiti, venir ou a reprendre ses operations. Ils factors that influence initiation or Libano, Rwanda y Sri Lanka). En refletent 6galement la diversite des resumption of Bank operations. todos los casos, el Banco cumpli6 una regions concernees et les differentes The cases also vary in region and importante funci6n de asistencia para phases de l'aide de la Banque. phase of Bank assistance. la reconstrucci6n en situaciones de ese Pour chacune de ces monogra- In conducting the case studies, tipo. Ellos representan la diversidad de phies, on a analyse six grands themes: six key issues were analyzed: (a) the causas del fracaso o desmoronamiento a) les principaux atouts ou avantages Bank's main strengths or compara- del Estado, asi como de los factores comparatifs de la Banque; b) les parte- ix The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction tive advantages; (b) its partner- que influyen en el inicio o reanu- nariats qu'elle a etablis avec ship with other clonors, inter- daci6n de las operaciones del d'autres bailleurs de fonds, orga- national organizations, and Banco. Ademas, los casos analiza- nismes internationaux et ONG; NGOs; (c) its role in recon- - dos corresponden a diferentes - c) son r6le dans l'6laboration des struction strategy and damage regiones y reflejan diversas etapas strategies de reconstruction et and needs assessiment; (d) its de la asistencia de la instituci6n. dans l'evaluation des dommages role in rebuilding the economy En los estudios de casos se et des besoins; d) sor. r6le dans le and institutions of governance; (e) its analizaron seis cuestiones fundamenta- redressement de l'economie et le reta- management of resources and les: a) las principales fortalezas o venta- blissement des institutions gouverne- processes; and (f) its monitoring and jas comparativas del Banco; b) su aso- mentales ; e) sa gestion des ressources et evaluation experience., The study ciaci6n con otros donantes, organismos des processus ; et f) son experience en focused on lesson-learning rather internacionales y organizaciones no matiere de suivi et d'evaluation. On a than accountability for performance. gubernamentales; c) su participaci6n en davantage cherche a tirer les lecons de It examined Bank policies, decision- la estrategia de reconstrucci6n y en la I'action entreprise qu'a porter un juge- making processes, non-lending ser- evaluaci6n de los danios y necesidades; ment sur les resultats. L'exaLmen a porte vices, and scores of operations, d) su participaci6n en la reconstrucci6n sur les politiques de la Banque, les pro- many of them ongoing, making an de la economia y las instituciones de cessus de decision, les services hors pret audit nearly impossible. Although gobierno; e) la gesti6n de los recursos y et la notation des projets, le fait que factors of performance related to procesos, y f) su experiencia en lo que beaucoup sont encore inacheves ren- process are identified, the study is respecta al seguimiento y la evaluaci6n. dant un audit presque impossible. Si not meant to be a process review. El estudio se orient6 mas bien a extraer l'on a identifie les facteurs de perfor- ensefianzas que a dar cuenta de los mance liUs aux processus, le but de l'e- Findings and Recommendations resultados. Se examinaron las politicas tude n'6rtant pas d'evaluer ces processus. Post-conflict reconstruction is a cen- del Banco, los procesos de adopci6n de tral issue for the Bank; it comprises a decisiones en la instituci6n, los servi- Conclusions et recommandations significant portion of the portfolio cios no crediticios y las calificaciones La reconstruction des pays sortant d'un and affects the institution's core de las operaciones, muchas de las cua- conflit occupe une place centrale dans activities. In the past, ,however, the les estan en marcha, por lo que era casi la mission de la Banque. Elle represente Bank has addressed the special needs imposible efectuar una auditoria. Si une part importante de son portefeuille posed by civil conflict on an ad hoc bien se identifican factores de desem- et affecte ses activites essenrtielles. basis. The Board took steps to rem- penio relacionados con los procesos, la Cependant, par le passe, la Banque a edy this in 1997 with its endorse- finalidad del estudio no era evaluar r6pondu aux besoins issus de conflits ment of a policy framework to guide dichos procesos. civils sur une base ad hoc. Le Conseil a its actions in post-conflict situations. cherche a remedier a cette situation en The subsequent creation of the Post- Hallazgos y recomendaciones 1997 en approuvant un cadre d'action Conflict Unit further advanced work La reconstrucci6n despues de los con- general pour guider l'aide de la Banque in this area by creating a focal point flictos es un tema de importancia cen- a la suite de conflits. La cr6ation ulte- for policy development, cross-coun- tral para el Banco; representa una parte ricure de l'Unite post-conflits a permis try learning, and the development of importante de su cartera y afecta las de nouveaux progres en constituant un expertise. Clearly, if the Bank is to actividades basicas de la instituci6n. En point d'ancrage pour l'elaboration de improve the relevance, efficacy, and el pasado, sin embargo, el Banco aten- politiques, 1'6change d'experience d'un efficiency of its support to post-con- dia las necesidades especiales que plan- pays a l'autre et le renforcement des flict countries, it needs to continue in teaban los conflictos civiles seg6n las competences. II est 6vident que si la this direction and adjust the way it circunstancias de cada caso. En 1997, Banque veut am6liorer la pertinence, conducts business to accommodate el Directorio Ejecutivo decidi6 adoptar |'efficacite et l'efficience de I'appui the special needs of countries emerg- medidas para remediar esta situaci6n y apporte aux pays sortant de conflits, ing from conflict. aprob6 un marco de politicas que elle devra continuer dans cette voie et The findings of this study point orientaba sus acciones en las situacio- adapter ses moyens d'action aux to five areas of focus for further nes de posguerra. La creaci6n ulterior besoins particuliers de ces pays. x Executive Summary m improvement: clarifying Bank I de la tJnidad de Situaciones Pos- L'ctude recommande d'axer policy, defining the Bank's teriores a los Conflictos signific6 1 'effort d'am6lioration sur cinq role, sharpening the Bank's un avance en este ambito, al esta- domaines : clarifier la politique comparative advantage and blecerse un centro de coordina- de la Banque, definir son r6le, E performance, considering the g ci6n para formular politicas, preciser son avantage comparatif folly of some conventional aprender de la experiencia de los et renforcer sa performance, wisdoms, and making appro- distintos paises y preparar perso- remettre en cause certaines prati- priate institutional arrangements. nal especializado. Sin lugar a dudas, si ques conventionnelles, et mettre en su prop6sito es dar mayor relevancia al place le dispositif institutionnel Clarify Bank Policy apoyo que brinda a los paises que salen appropric. The Bank currently lacks an ade- de un conflicto y mejorar la eficiencia y quate Operational Policy on assis- eficacia de dicha asistencia, el Banco Clarifier la politique de la Banque tance for post-conflict reconstruc- debe continuar en esa direcci6n y adap- A l'heure actuelle, la Banque n'a pas tion. Policy guidance is now drawn tar la manera en que lleva a cabo sus de politique operationnelle appro- primarily from Operational Policy actividades para atender las necesida- priee pour l'aide a la reconstruction a (OP) 8.5, which was originally des especiales de esos paises. l'issue de conflits. Les directives exis- developed for reconstruction fol- Los hallazgos de este estudio tantes se limitent essentiellement a la lowing natural disasters. Other apuntan a cinco areas que pueden Note de politique operationnelle 8.5 guidance comes from the Frame- seguir mejorandose: aclaraci6n de la (OP 8.5), initialement 6laboree pour work for World Bank Involvement politica del Banco; definici6n del papel I'aide a la reconstruction a la suite de in Post-Conflict Countries of April que le cabe a la instituci6n; determina- catastrophes naturelles. D'autres 1997. The main recommendation ci6n mis precisa de su ventaja compa- indications sont donnees dans le emerging from the study is that the rativa y mejora de su desempefio; document d'avril 1997 << Cadre Bank should revise the Framework reconsideraci6n de ciertos criterios d'action de la Banque mondiale dans and transform it into an Opera- generalmente aceptados que no resul- les situations de conflit ,. La princi- tional Policy, with accompanying tan acertados, y establecimiento de pale recommandation de l'etude est Bank Procedures and Good Prac- mecanismos institucionales apropiados. de reviser ce document et d'en faire tices to guide Bank staff in provid- une Note de politique operationnelle, ing post-conflict reconstruction Aclaraci6n de la politica del Banco en la completant par d'autres Notes assistance. OP8.5 should be revised Actualmente el Banco no tiene una poli- sur les procedures de la Banque (BP) to apply only to natural disasters tica operacional adecuada en materia et sur les pratiques recommandees (as well as unexpected man-made de asistencia para la reconstrucci6n des- (GP) afin de guider le travail des ser- disasters of limited duration that pues de los conflictos. Las orientaciones vices de la Banque. L'OP 8.5 devrait may require such emergency assis- de politica se basan fundamentalmente etre revisce et ne s'appliquer qu'aux tance, such as large-scale industrial en la politica operacional OP8.5, que catastrophes naturelles (ainsi qu'aux accidents). The new OP, BPs, and en un principio se formul6 para la catastrophes imprevues d'origine GPs should address the following reconstrucci6n despues de desastres humaine et d'une duree limitee, cel- issues: naturales. Otras orientaciones provie- les-ci pouvant exiger le mcme type de * readiness to provide eco- nen del documento titulado Framework secours d'urgence, dans le cas par nomic development policy for World Bank Involvement in Post- exemple de graves accidents indus- advice during peace Conflict Countries, de abril de 1997. La triels). Les nouvelles Notes sur la negotiations; recomendaci6n mas importante del politique operationnelle (OP), les * post-conflict aid coordination; estudio es que el Banco deberia revisar procedures (BP) et les pratiques * leadership on macroeco- ese documento y convertirlo en politica recommandees (GP) devraient traiter nomic and external debt operacional. A ello se acompafiarian les questions suivantes issues in collaboration with procedimientos del Banco (BP) y practi- * aptitude a fournir des conseils the IMF and external donors; cas recomendadas (GP) que orientaran sur la politique de developpe- * definition of priorities among a los funcionarios a la hora de prestar ment economique durant les macroeconomic stabilization, asistencia para la reconstrucci6n des- negociations de paix; xi The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction infrastructure re.building, and pues de los conflictos. Se deberia * coordination de l'aide post- restoration of human and revisar la OP8.5, de manera que conflit; social capital; se aplique 6nicamente a los desas- * pilotage du traitement des ques- * macroeconomic and structural tres naturales (asi como a los des- tions relatives a la situation policy conditionality; astres imprevistos y de corta dura- macro6conomique et a l'endet- * flexibility in programming, ci6n causados por la intervenci6n tement ext6rieur, en collabora- design, and implementation; humana que requieran asistencia tion avec le FMI et les bailleurs * institutional arrangements; de emergencia, como los accidentes de fonds exterieurs; * the importance of monitoring industriales de gran magnitud). Las * hierarchisation des priorites and evaluation; and nuevas OP, BP y GP podrian abordar entre stabilisation macroecono- * promoting equitable los siguientes aspectos: mique, reconstruction de l'infras- development. * preparaci6n para dar asesoria tructure, retablissement du capi- The recommendations that fol- sobre politicas de desarrollo eco- tal humain et des structures low provide more detail on the n6mico durante las negociaciones sociales; issues outlined above., and should de paz; * conditionnalite en matiere de be dealt with in the new OP, BPs, * coordinaci6n de la ayuda en la politique macro6conomique et and GPs. etapa posterior a los conflictos; structurelle; * liderazgo en cuestiones macro- * souplesse de la programmation, de Define the Bank's Role econ6micas y sobre la deuda la conception et de l'execution; The Bank has a critical role to play externa, en colaboraci6n con el * dispositifs institutionnels; in the early stages of post-conflict FMI y los donantes externos; * importance du suivi et de l'eva- reconstruction. The Bank can be * determinaci6n de prioridades luation; et valuable in external aid coordina- entre estabilizaci6n macroecon6- * promotion d'un developpement tion, which is specially important in mica, reconstrucci6n de la |quitable. the transition from war to peace. infraestructura y restituci6n del Les recommandations presentees The Bank's use of consultative capital humano y social; ci-apres donnent plus de details sur ces groups has been particularly effec- * condicionalidad de la politica divers elements et devraient etre prises tive for mobilizing resources, includ- macroecon6mica y estructural; en compte dans les nouvelles Notes OP, ing facilitating the clearing of * flexibilidad en las etapas de pro- BP et GP. arrears; seeking a coordinated gramaci6n, disefio y ejecuci6n; approach to macroeconomic issues; * mecanismos institucionales; Definition du role de la Banque and providing information on * importancia del seguimiento y la La Banque a un r6le critique a jouer recovery needs and assistance flows. evaluaci6n, y aux premiers stades de l'effort de Similarly, if invited to partici- * promoci6n del desarrollo con reconstruction post-conflit. Elle peut pate, the Bank has the potential to equidad. contribuer utilement a la coordination make effective contributions to En las recomendaciones que se de l'aide exterieure, qui revet une peace negotiations. Bank advice on presentan mas adelante se describen importance particuliere poor la transi- the economic development dimen- con mas detalle las cuestiones antes tion de la guerre a la paix. Les groupes sions of peace accord options can sefialadas; dichas recomendaciones se consultatifs organises par la Banque help improve economic governance deberian abordar en las nuevas OP, BP sont un moyen particulierement effi- components of peace accords and y GP. cace de mobiliser des ressources, et lay a foundation for more effective aussi de faciliter le reglement des arrie- interpretation and implementation Definici6n del papel del Banco |rs, de d6finir une approche coordon- in the critical first months following El Banco cumple un papel fundamental nee des questions macroeconomiques et agreement. The Bank's participation en las primeras etapas de la reconstruc- de reunir des informations sur les in the peace negotiations in Bosnia ci6n de posguerra. Su participaci6n besoins et les flux d'aide. and Herzegovina and Guatemala puede ser muy valiosa para la coordi- De meme, s'il lui est demande d'y are two examples of its potential to nacion de la ayuda externa, que es participer, la Banque est en mesure de contribute to the peace process. especialmente importante en la transi- contribuer utilement a la negociation Xli Executive Summary Although not the focus of ci6n de la guerra a la paz. El uso des accords de paix. Ses conseils the study, the case studies por parte del Banco de grupos sur le volet d6veloppement econo- revealed several examples in consultivos ha sido especialmente mique des options envisagees which the Bank either did not eficaz para la movilizaci6n de peuvent aider a ameliorer les dis- address emerging distribu- recursos, que incluye facilitar la positions de ces accords relatives tional imbalances or missed a liquidaci6n de pagos atrasados; la l l'organisation de la gestion de significant opportunity to pro- bisqueda de un enfoque coordi- I'economie et ouvrir la voie a une mote equitable development. The nado para abordar las cuestiones meilleure interpretation et a une appli- Bank needs to recognize its poten- macroecon6micas, y el suministro de cation plus efficace pendant les pre- tial to influence the course of pre- informaci6n sobre las necesidades de miers mois critiques de leur mise en conflict events. Although it may recuperaci6n y sobre los flujos de oeuvre. Sa participation a la negocia- not be appropriate for the Bank to asistencia. tion des accords pour la Bosnie-Herze- adopt an OP on conflict prevention Del mismo modo, si lo invitan a govine et le Guatemala temoigne de la (as this may imply crossing the line participar, el Banco tiene la capacidad contribution que la Banque peut into the realm of political issues de contribuir con eficacia a las nego- apporter au processus de paix. which would be inappropriate ciaciones de paz. El asesoramiento del Bien que l'etude n'ait pas et cen- under the Bank's mandate), Good Banco sobre las dimensiones de los tree sur cet aspect, les monographies Practices should be developed that acuerdos de paz en terminos del desa- ont revele plusieurs cas ou la Banque encourage staff to be sensitive to rrollo econ6mico puede ayudar a mejo- n'a pas reagi a l'apparition de d6sequi- predatory and exclusionary behav- rar los componentes de gesti6n econ6- libres dans la r6partition ou n'a pas su ior that adversely affects projects mica de dichos acuerdos y a sentar las exploiter une bonne occasion de pro- and shared development objectives. bases que permitan que su interpreta- mouvoir un developpement equitable. The Bank should raise such con- ci6n y aplicaci6n sean mds eficaces en La Banque doit etre consciente de cerns in its dialogue with the gov- los primeros meses criticos despues de l'influence qu'elle peut exercer sur le ernment and other donors. firmado el acuerdo. La participaci6n cours des evenements avant le declen- del Banco en las negociaciones de paz chement d'un conflit. IL serait peut-etre Sharpen the Bank's Comparative en Bosnia y Herzegovina y en Guate- inappropri6 d'etablir une Note OP Advantage and Performance mala son dos ejemplos de la contribu- (Politique operationnelle) sur la preven- The two areas of strongest Bank ci6n que puede hacer el Banco al pro- tion des conflits (cela pouvant etre performance have been support for ceso de paz. pertbu comme une ing6rence dans le macroeconomic stabilization and Si bien no son el centro de aten- domaine politique contraire au mandat rebuilding physical infrastructure. ci6n del informe, los estudios de casos de la Banque), mais il conviendrait de Supporting the achievement of mostraron varios ejemplos en los que el preparer une Note GP (Pratiques macroeconomic stabilization should Banco no corrigi6 desequilibrios inci- recommandees) pour sensibiliser le per- be one of the Bank's highest and pientes en materia distributiva o des- sonnel aux comportements predateurs earliest priorities in post-conflict sit- aprovech6 una oportunidad impor- et aux pratiques d'exclusion qui por- uations. The macroeconomic issues tante de promover el desarrollo con tent pr6judice aux projets et a la mobi- at stake in post-conflict reconstruc- equidad. El Banco debe reconocer que lisation de toutes les energies au service tion may call for substantial policy tiene el potencial de influir en el curso d'objectifs de developpement com- conditionality. Such conditionality de los acontecimientos que preceden a muns. La Banque devrait inclure cet requires case-by-case analysis, how- un conflicto. Aunque tal vez no sea aspect du probleme parmi les themes ever. Depending on the country procedente que cl Banco adopte una de son dialogue avec les gouvernements implementation capacity and the politica operacional sobre prevenci6n et les autres bailleurs de fonds. political environment, it may not be de conflictos (puesto que ello podria appropriate to introduce wide-rang- implicar una intromisi6n en asuntos Preciser I'avantage comparatif de la ing conditionalities all at once. politicos que, por mandato, no son de Banque et renforcer sa performance The Bank should also be pre- su incumbencia), se deberian formular C'est dans le domaine de la stabilisation pared to support the rebuilding of practicas recomendadas (GP) que alen- macroeconomique et dans celui de la physical infrastructure, with ade- taran al personal del Banco a no pasar rehabilitation des infrastructures physi- xiii The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction quate attention to necessary por alto los comportamientos ques que l'aide de la Banque a policy and institutional abusivos y excluyentes, que afec- abouti aux meilleurs resultats. reforms. Rebuilding infra- tan negativamente a los proyectos Soutenir la stabilisation de la structure often requires de- y a los objetivos comunes en situation macroeconornique mining. Although there are materia de desarrollo. El Banco devrait etre l'une des premieres et strong economic and humani- deberia plantear estas inquietudes des principales priorit6s de la Ban- tarian reasons for demining, en su didlogo con los gobiernos y que pour les pays sortant d'un the main lesson learned from this otros donantes. conflit. Les enjeux macroeconomiques assessment is that the Bank's com- des periodes post-conflit peuvent rendre parative advantage in stand-alone Determinar con mas precision las necessaire une forte conditicnnalite, demining projects is not apparent. ventajas comparativas del Banco y laquelle doit cependant faire l'objet Adherence to the 1997 Operational mejorar su desempeno d'une analyse particuliere, cas par cas. Guidelines on Demining, is critical. Las dos esferas en las que el Banco ha Selon la capacite d'execution du pays et Bank involvement in such activities obtenido los mejores resultados han le contexte politique, il peut ne pas etre should focus primarily on indirect, sido el respaldo a la estabilizaci6n opportun d'imposer simultan6ment de non-clearance activities, such as macroecon6mica y la reconstrucci6n multiples conditions. coordination, information and de la infraestructura fisica. Una de las La Banque devrait aussi etre prete mine awareness, training, and insti- primeras y principales prioridades del |a contribuer a la reconstruction des tution building. Support for mine Banco en las situaciones posteriores a infrastructures physiques, en portant clearance should be always inte- los conflictos deberia ser apoyar la toute l'attention voulue aux indispensa- grated with a specific development estabilizaci6n macroecon6mica. Los bles reformes des politiques et des insti- activity. asuntos macroecon6micos que estan en tutions. La reconstruction de l'infras- The restoration of human and juego en tales situaciones pueden hacer tructure exige souvent des op6rations de social capital has not been a prior- necesario un alto grado de condiciona- ddminage. Bien que de solides raisons ity in Bank post-conflict portfolios. lidad, la que, no obstante, debe anali- |conomiques et humanitaires justifient The case of BiH, where the Bank zarse caso por caso. Dependiendo de la ces travaux, la principale lecon de cette supported early and balanced capacidad de cada pais de aplicar las evaluation est que la Banque ne parait social sector work that produced medidas, y de las condiciones politicas, pas avoir d'avantage comparatif dans ce some promising reports, appears to puede no ser recomendable introducir domaine si le projet consiste uniquement be an exception. Although comple- de una sola vez condicionalidades de en travaux de d6minage. Il est d'une tion reports in social sector post- amplio alcance. importance critique de respecter les conflict reconstruction are still rela- El Banco tambien deberia estar pre- Directives operationnelles sur le demi- tively few, it seems that most parado para apoyar la reconstrucci6n de nage, publiees en 1997. La participation results of Bank efforts in these sec- la infraestructura fisica, prestando la de la Banque devrait viser essentielle- tors have been modest. Uganda debida atenci6n a las reformas institucio- ment non pas l'enlevement des mines, operations produced tnsatisfactory nales y de politica que scan necesarias. mais une aide indirecte (coordination, results, and modest results are evi- En muchos casos, para poder reconstruir information et sensibilisation, formation, dent so far in the restoration of la infraestructura es necesario remover renforcement des institutions, etc.) L'aide social and human capital in Eritrea, minas. Si bien existen fuertes razones apportre aux travaux de deminage Haiti, and Rwanda. The El Sal- econ6micas y humanitarias para el des- devrait toujours etre int6gr&e a une acti- vador Basic Education Moderniza- minado, la principal ensefianza de esta vite specifique de developpernent. tion Project has been a rare excep- evaluaci6n es que no es evidente que el La restauration du capital tion producing encouraging results Banco tenga una ventaja comparativa en humain et du potentiel associatif n'a in the social sectors. The participa- proyectos aut6nomos de remoci6n de pas e6 l'une des priorites des projets de tory nature of the program has minas. Es fundamental adherirse a las la Banque dans les pays sortant d'un contributed to consensus-building directrices operacionales sobre remoci6n conflit. Le cas de la Bosnie-Herzego- and the sustainability of the peace de minas (Operational Guidelines on vine, pays pour lequel la Banque a tres process. Partnerships with other Demining), emitidas en 1997. La partici- vite apporte son soutien a des travaux international and bilateral agencies paci6n del Banco en esta esfera deberfa sur les secteurs sociaux qui ont abouti xiv Executive Summary and with NGOs that have a centrarse fundamentalmente en a des rapports prometteurs, solid record in the restoration actividades indirectas que no ten- - parait constituer une exception. of human and social capital gan que ver con el desminado - Bien que relativement peu des should be promoted. In pro- mismo, como coordinaci6n, infor- projets destines a ces secteurs viding further support for maci6n y sensibilizaci6n sobre el aient deja donne lieu a la prepa- demobilization and reintegra- tema, capacitaci6n y fortaleci- ration de rapports de fin d'ex6cu- tion of ex-combatants, the miento institucional. El respaldo a tion, il semble que les r6sultats Bank should strengthen the capac- las actividades de desminado deberia des operations de la Banque aient gene- ity it has acquired and incorporate estar siempre integrado a una actividad ralement et limites. En Ouganda, les the relevant experience of other especifica de desarrollo. resultats n'ont pas et satisfaisants et, a agencies. Considering the potential La restituci6n del capital humano ce stade, on ne constate guere de pro- importance of demobilization in y social no ha sido una de las priorida- gres dans le r6tablissement du capital future Bank programs, further des en la cartera del Banco relacionada humain et du potentiel associatif en research on the subject is con situaciones posteriores a los con- Erythree, en Haiti et au Rwanda. Le warranted. flictos. La excepci6n parece ser el caso projet de modernisation de l'enseigne- The Bank has done little to de Bosnia y Herzegovina, en que el ment de base en El Salvador est l'un incorporate gender issues in its Banco proporcion6 financiamiento des rares cas oui l'on rekve des resultats post-conflict portfolio. Only in BiH para la realizaci6n de estudios iniciales encourageants dans les secteurs did the Bank make a specific opera- y equilibrados de los sectores sociales sociaux. Le caractere participatif du tional effort to address the particu- que dieron como resultado algunos programme a contribu6 a la formation lar needs of women. Reconstruction informes prometedores. Todavia son d'un consensus et a la viabilite du pro- efforts must consider the possible relativamente escasos los informes de cessus de paix. II convient d'encourager economic difficulties faced by terminaci6n de proyectos de recons- 1'etablissement de partenariats avec women in post-conflict situations, trucci6n de posguerra relacionados con d'autres institutions internationales et and should also examine the role of los sectores sociales, pero al parecer la bilaterales et avec les ONG qui ont une women in rebuilding social capital. mayoria de los resultados de los esfuer- solide experience de la restauration du Analysis can also identify unequal zos del Banco en esos sectores han sido capital humain et associatif. Lorsqu'elle power relations underlying social moderados. Las operaciones realizadas soutiendra de nouveaux projets d'aide organizations to ensure that women en Uganda no fueron satisfactorias y a la demobilisation et a la reinsertion are not further marginalized by hasta ahora se observan resultados des anciens combattants, la Banque reconstruction interventions. moderados en la restituci6n del capital devrait renforcer les moyens dont elle social y humano en Eritrea, Haiti y s'est dotee et prendre en compte l'expe- Consider the Folly of Some Rwanda. El proyecto de modernizaci6n rience d'autres institutions. L'impor- Conventional Wisdoms de la educaci6n basica de El Salvador tance que pourraient avoir les opera- The devastation of human, social ha sido una excepci6n poco comuin que tions de demobilisation dans les and physical capital often found at ha dado resultados alentadores en los programmes futurs de la Banque justi- the beginning of a post-conflict sectores sociales. El caricter participa- fie de nouvelles recherches sur ce sujet. period, and the particular provi- tivo del programa ha contribuido a la La Banque n'a guere cherche a sions of a peace agreement, may formaci6n de consenso y a la sostenibi- prendre en compte la problematique require that some conventional lidad de proceso de paz. Deberian hommes-femmes dans ses projets pour wisdoms of development practice fomentarse las alianzas con otros orga- les pays sortant de conflits. Elle ne s'est be set aside for a time. For exam- nismos internacionales y bilaterales y expressement attachee a repondre aux ple, the Uganda case study finds con organizaciones no gubernamenta- besoins particuliers des femmes que that owing to a history of preda- les que gocen de un s6lido historial en dans le cas de la Bosnie-Herzegovine. II tory government tax policy during materia de restituci6n del capital doit etre tenu compte dans l'effort de the conflict periods, pressure by the humano y social. Para apoyar aun mis reconstruction des difficultes economi- Fund and Bank on tax effort (often la desmovilizaci6n y la reintegraci6n de ques auxquelles les femmes peuvent se included in a standard stabilization los ex combatientes, el Banco deberia trouver confront&s dans les situations package) has had a chilling effect consolidar la capacidad ya adquirida e post-conflit, de meme que de la contri- xv The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction on private investment, driving incorporar la experiencia de otros bution qu'elles pourraient appor- economic activity into subsis- organismos. Teniendo en cuenta ter a la reconstitution du poten- tence, or along vvith investable la importancia que podria tener - tiel associatif. Ce travail d'analyse funds, abroad. I'he Cambodia la desmovilizaci6n en los progra- permettra aussi d'identifier les case study finds that the Bank mas del Banco en el futuro, se inegalites de la repartition des has continued to push for justifica realizar nuevas investiga- pouvoirs inh6rente aux structures downsizing the civil service ciones sobre este tema. sociales, de maniere a eviter que when the political coalition El Banco no ha desplegado les operations de reconstruction arrangement under the peace muchos esfuerzos por incorporar las n accentuent encore la marginalisation accords was based in part on rais- cuestiones relativas al genero en la car- des femmes. ing the size of the civil service to tera de proyectos sobre situaciones pos- absorb large numbers of the incom- teriores a los conflictos. Solamente en Remettre en cause certaines pratiques ing parties' functionaries. The Bosnia y Herzegovina el Banco llev6 a conventionnelles Bank's position was not politically cabo una operaci6n especifica para La situation dans laquelle se trouvent realistic from the outset. For atender las necesidades particulares de souvent les pays qui viennent de sortir human capital development, a con- las mujeres. En los esfuerzos de recons- d'un conflit - pertes humaines, des- ventional wisdom among donors is trucci6n se deben tener en cuenta las agregation du tissu social et destruction to focus on primary education. But posibles dificultades econ6micas de las des infrastructures - et les conditions in a country where conflict has mujeres en ese tipo de situaciones, y se particulieres de l'accord de paix peu- eradicated education systems, as in deberia examinar su papel en la recons- vent imposer de renoncer provisoire- Rwanda, a case can be made for trucci6n del capital social. En los anali- ment a certaines pratiques de develop- donor assistance (not necessarily sis se pueden identificar tambien las pement conventionnelles. Par exemple, from the Bank) to the secondary desigualdades en las relaciones de 1'etude sur l'Ouganda montre qu'en and tertiary education levels. poder que existen en las organizaciones raison du caractere abusif de la politi- sociales, a fin de garantizar que las que fiscale appliquee par le gouverne- Make Appropriate Institutional mujeres no queden mas marginadas ment pendant le conflit, 1'effort fiscal Arrangements como consecuencia de las intervencio- demande a ce pays par le Fonds et la Senior management must give high nes de reconstrucci6n. Banque (comme c'est souvent le cas priority to staffing and structuring dans les programmes standard de stabi- post-conflict country teams. The Reconsideracion de ciertos criterios lisation) a deprime l'investissement country director must have a man- generalmente aceptados que no prive, poussant les agents economiques date to give the country substantial resultan acertados | passer a des activit6s de subsistance if not full-time attention. Resident La devastaci6n del capital humano, ou a transferer leurs activit6s, de meme representatives need sufficient social y fisico que suele encontrarse al que leurs capitaux, a l'etranger. L'&ude authority to make a wide range of comienzo del periodo de posguerra y sur le Cambodge montre que la Banque programming and implementation las disposiciones particulares de los a recommand6 avec insistance une decisions in the field. Despite the acuerdos de paz pueden exigir que se r6duction des effectifs de la fonction high up-front costs, adequately- dejen de lado por algun tiempo ciertos publique, alors que la coalition politi- staffed resident missions are a pre- criterios generalmente aceptados sobre que issue des accords de paix ctait fon- condition for successlful Bank inter- las practicas relativas al desarrollo. Por dee en partie sur l'elargissement de la vention in post-conflict situations. ejemplo, en el estudio de Uganda se fonction publique pour absorber un The circumstances of those coun- observa que, debido a la politica tribu- grand nombre des fonctionnaires des tries, including weakened govern- taria de caracter abusivo que se habia partis membres de la coalition. Dcs le ment capacity and rapidly changing aplicado hist6ricamente durante los depart, la position de la Banque man- conditions, require heightened sup- periodos de conflicto, la presi6n ejer- quait de realisme politique. En ce qui port from the Bank. cida por el Fondo y el Banco en esta concerne la valorisation du capital Flexibility and speed are para- materia (a menudo inserta en un con- humain, la pratique habituelle des mount in the programming, design, junto estandar de medidas de estabili- bailleurs de fonds est de donner la and implementation of Bank post- zaci6n) ha resultado en el congela- priorite a l'enseignement primaire. xvi Executive Summary conflict reconstruction efforts. miento de la inversi6n privada. Mais, dans les pays dont les syste- Standard Bank procurement Ante tal situaci6n, la actividad mes educatifs ont et complte- and disbursement processes econ6mica ha llegado a niveles de ment detruits par un conflit, have often created stumbling - subsistencia o ha sido desplazada comme au Rwanda, il peut etre blocks to post-conflict recov- del pais, junto con los fondos dis- justifie que l'aide des donateurs ery. The Bank should make . ponibles para inversi6n. En el (pas necessairement celle de la greater use of preparation and estudio sobre Camboya se Banque) aille a l'enseignement piloting funds, mechanisms for observa que el Banco ha seguido insis- secondaire et sup6rieur. rapid procurement and disburse- tiendo en que se reduzca la administra- ment, and training in-country enti- ci6n piblica, en circunstancia que el Mettre en place le cadre institutionnel ties responsible for procurement. arreglo de coalici6n politica en el approprie To implement post-conflict marco de los acuerdos de paz se La direction doit attacher une impor- operations satisfactorily, the Bank basaba, en parte, en el aumento del tance prioritaire a la composition et a la must be prepared to allocate suffi- tamaino de la administraci6n piublica structure des equipes charg6es des pays cient administrative budget para absorber a un gran numero de sortant de conflits. Le chef de l'equipe resources for adequate monitoring. funcionarios de los partidos. Desde un doit pouvoir consacrer au pays dont il The overall Bank portfolio in a comienzo la posici6n del Banco fue est responsable la majorite sinon la post-conflict country should peri- politicamente poco realista. En lo que totalite de son temps. Les repr6sentants odically be assessed for relevance, respecta al desarrollo del capital r6sidents doivent etre dot6s de pouvoirs that is, its contribution to sustain- humano, un criterio tradicional entre suffisants pour pouvoir prendre sur le able peace and development. Pro- los donantes es concentrarse en la edu- terrain toute une gamme de decisions ject-by-project assessments often caci6n primaria. Sin embargo, en los de programmation et d'ex6cution. do not provide the broader picture, paises donde los conflictos han erradi- Meme si, au depart, cela doit entrainer although multisectoral or adjust- cado los sistemas de ensefianza, como de grosses depenses, il est indispensable ment operations should certainly en el caso de Rwanda, puede justifi- que les missions residentes soient dotees be assessed on their contribution to carse que la asistencia de los donantes d'un personnel suffisant pour assurer le the larger objective. The study (no necesariamente del Banco) se des- succes des interventions post-conflit de revealed that delays as long as a tine a los niveles secundario y terciario la Banque. L'etat dans lequel se trou- year or more have reduced the use- de la educaci6n. vent ces pays, du fait notamment de fulness of post-conflict completion I'affaiblissement des moyens d'action reports. Post-conflict operations Establecer mecanismos institucionales des pouvoirs publics et de l'evolution completion reports should be com- adecuados rapide de leur situation, justifie une pleted in a timely manner. In view Los directivos superiores deben asignar intensification de l'aide de la Banque. of the need for such information in una alta prioridad a la dotaci6n de per- Flexibilite et rapidit6 sont d'une often highly volatile post-conflict sonal y la estructura de los equipos que importance capitale aux stades de la settings, the interval between pro- trabajen en paises que salen de un con- programmation, de la conception et de ject closing and completion reports flicto. En el mandato del director a 1'execution des operations de recons- should be sharply reduced, with cargo del pais se debe contemplar que truction. Les procedures standard de la appropriate streamlining of the este destine gran parte del tiempo, o se Banque en matiere de passation des process. OED should develop dedique exclusivamente, a dicho pais. march6s et de decaissement ont souvent guidelines on how to apply evalua- Los representantes residentes deben fait obstacle aux efforts de redresse- tion criteria with greater sensitivity tener suficientes facultades para tomar ment. La Banque devrait faire une plus to the post-conflict political and diversas decisiones sobre programaci6n grande place a la preparation et a la economic environment when con- y ejecuci6n en el terreno. A pesar del mise en place de fonds pilotes, a la ducting completion reports. elevado nivel de los costos iniciales, es creation de mecanismes propres a acce- indispensable que las misiones residen- lerer la passation des marches et le Conclusion tes cuenten con el personal necesario decaissement de son aide, et a la forma- Societies emerging from conflict para asegurar que las intervenciones tion des responsables nationaux de la face daunting reconstruction chal- del Banco en situaciones posteriores a passation des march6s. xvii The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction lenges. The Banlk is firmly un conflicto sean exitosas. Dadas Pour mener a bomne fin les committed to assisting these las circunstancias de esos paises, operations post-conflit, la Banque societies, and has much to donde la capacidad del gobierno doit etre prete a porter les res- offer. Its greatest strengths lie L se ha visto debilitada y las condi- sources budgetaires allouees aux in supporting macroeconomic ciones cambian rdpidamente, se activites de suivi a un niveau suf- stabilization, rebuilding physi- requiere un mayor respaldo del fisant pour assurer un,e supervi- cal infrastructure, mobilizing Banco. sion adequate. Elle devrait perio- resources, and coordinating aid. In La flexibilidad y la rapidez son diquement evaluer l'ensemble de son other areas, such as rebuilding dos condiciones sumamente importan- portefeuille pour chacun des pays sor- human and social capital, the tes en la programaci6n, el disefio y la tant de conflits pour juger (le sa perti- Bank's support can be improved. ejecuci6n de los programas del Banco nence, c'est-A-dire de sa contribution a New partnerships with other agen- sobre reconstrucci6n de posguerra. Los une paix et a un developpement dura- cies should be promoted. The Bank procesos estdndar de adquisiciones y bles. Souvent, lorsque les projets sont can more fully support the peace desembolsos que sigue el Banco a consid6r6s independamment les uns des process by advising peace negotia- menudo han creado obstaculos para la autres, on ne peut pas se faire une id6e tions on the economic development recuperaci6n en esas situaciones. El de la situation globale, quoique ce soit implications of peace accord Banco deberia utilizar en mayor normalement indispensable dans le cas options and, later, by implementing medida fondos para la preparaci6n y des operations d'ajustement et des pro- policy conditionalities that ease the realizaci6n de proyectos piloto, ademds jets multisectoriels. L'etude montre que implementation of peace accords. de mecanismos para desembolsos rdpi- les rapports de fin d'execution pr6par6s The post-conflict context implies dos y adquisiciones expeditas, y dar pour les operations post-conflit ont other requirements for Bank assis- capacitaci6n a las entidades nacionales perdu de leur utilit6 pour avoir ete pre- tance such as the need for proactive responsables de las adquisiciones. pares avec un ou deux ans de retard. involvement of senior management Para llevar a cabo con exito las Ces rapports devraient etre etablis aussi in key decisions; strong commit- operaciones de reconstrucci6n en pafses rapidement que possible. Etant donne ment by country directors and que salen de un conflicto, el Banco l'interet de ces informations pour les teams; resident missions with ade- debe estar preparado para asignar sufi- pays sortant de conflits dont la situa- quate staffing and decisionmaking cientes recursos del presupuesto admi- tion est souvent trcs instable, il authority; timely evaluation and nistrativo a fin de asegurar un segui- convient de reduire fortement l'inter- monitoring; and analytic and eval- miento adecuado. Deberia evaluarse valle qui s'6coule entre la cl6ture du uation work that is sensitive to the peri6dicamente la totalidad de la car- projet et la presentation du rapport de potential for Bank operations to tera del Banco relacionada con cada fin d'ex6cution en apportant les modifi- increase or decrease the tensions pais en esa situaci6n para determinar si cations appropriees au processus. that lead to conflict. Bank |sta es pertinente, es decir, si efectiva- L'ODE devrait claborer des directives processes should be adapted so that mente esta contribuyendo a una paz sur le mode d'utilisation des criteres the programming, design, and duradera y al desarrollo sostenible. Las d'6valuation de sorte que l'environne- implementation of Bank recon- evaluaciones de cada proyecto por ment politique et economiclue des pays struction assistance remain timely separado a menudo no muestran el sortant de conflits soit mieux pris en and flexible in the face of urgent panorama mas amplio, y ciertamente compte lors de la preparation des rap- needs and volatile circumstances deberian evaluarse las operaciones mul- ports de fin d'execution. typically found in post-conflict set- tisectoriales o de ajuste para determi- tings. The recent creation of the nar su aporte al objetivo de mas amplio Post-Conflict Unit, the Post-Con- alcance. El estudio mostr6 que debido flict Program, and the adaptable a atrasos de hasta un afio o dos en lending instruments are significant algunos informes de terminaci6n de steps in this direction. Finally, the operaciones sobre reconstrucci6n de Framework for World Bank posguerra, 6stos han perdido utilidad. Involvement in Post- Conflict Ese tipo de informes deberian termi- Reconstruction should be revised narse a tiempo. Puesto que la informa- xviii Executive Summary to constitute an Operational ci6n que contienen es muy nece- Policy statement that consoli- saria en lugares en los que las dates, clarifies, and refines g condiciones suelen ser muy ines- existing policy guidance for g tables, se deberia reducir conside- support to post-conflict rablemente el intervalo entre el reconstruction. cierre del proyecto y la finaliza- ci6n de los informes de termina- ci6n, mediante la debida racionaliza- ci6n del proceso. El DEO deberia preparar directrices sobre la manera de aplicar los criterios de evaluaci6n durante la preparaci6n de los informes de terminaci6n, de manera de tener mas en cuenta las condiciones politicas y econ6micas en los paises que salen de un conflicto. xix Introduction ne does not have to spend long in Bosnia, or Gaza or the lakes district in Africa to know that without economic hope we will not have peace. Without equity we will not have global stability. Without a better sense of social justice our cities will not be safe and our societies will not be stable. Without inclusion, too many of us will be condemned to live separate, armed and frightened lives. James D. Wolfensohn, address to the 1997 World Bank Annual Meetings, Hong Kong, September 23, 1997 Background and Study Objectives rience relevant to ongoing and future post-conflict From Bretton Woods to the present day, the World Bank reconstruction operations. The study focused on lesson- has taken up the task of post-conflict reconstruction. learning rather than accountability for performance. It Some of the first loans the Bank made helped rebuild examined Bank decisionmaking processes, non-lending European countries leveled by World War II. That era services, and scores of operations, many of which are saw the Bank concentrating on providing physical capi- ongoing, making an audit nearly impossible. Although tal. Today's challenge is quite different. The end of the the study identifies factors of performance related to Cold War and burgeoning civil conflicts in the 1990s processes, it is not a process review. A recent draft paper have tested the ability of the entire international commu- being prepared for the OECD/DAC to be issued as nity to address unprecedented devastation of human and guidelines on evaluating humanitarian assistance pro- social capital. In this climate, President Wolfensohn has grams states that "Evaluations of humanitarian assis- raised Bank assistance to countries emerging from con- tance programmes should be seen as a contribution to a flict to a high priority. He has named inclusion the key dialogue about program performance, and not as a development challenge of our time.1 Civil conflict, the 'judgment from above."'2 In a similar fashion, this study most violent manifestation of exclusion, is near the apex aims to contribute to the dialogue on the Bank's ability of that challenge. to respond more effectively and efficiently to the needs In view of both the high risk and high potential of societies rebuilding after conflict. It also provides rec- returns entailed by an expanded role for the Bank in ommendations for clarification and refinement of Bank post-conflict reconstruction, the Bank's Board of Execu- policy in this area. tive Directors (EDs) called on OED to assess recent and ongoing Bank experience. OED's review, documented in Conceptual Framework this report, aims to enhance the Bank's ability to Post-conflict reconstruction, like other development dis- respond more effectively and efficiently to the needs of ciplines, has unique concepts that require some explana- societies rebuilding after conflict. The study's main tion. The starting point for this study is a recent Bank objective was to identify lessons from recent Bank expe- paper, A Framework for World Bank Involvement in 1 The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction Post-Conflict Reconstruction (April 1997). That report Complex emergencies present difficult issues for the identifies a "conflict country" as one that has recently timing, nature, and scale of donor response. Recent experienced widespread violence, or where a main pre- Bank-funded post-conflict reconstruction assistance has occupation of the state is armed warfare, where the state encompassed a much wider range of activities than that has failed, or where a significant part of the population provided in the post-Second World War years or for is engaged in armed struggle with the state. A November recovery from natural disasters. The Bank's assistance 1995 paper prepared for a Bank task force describes all has had two overall objectives: to facilitate the transition these as "failed states" and argues that external agencies from war to sustainable peace and to support the need to understand the varying histories and nature of resumption of economic and social development. Thus, "failure" processes. IThrough such understanding it may while post-conflict reconstruction, like post-natural dis- be possible to draw lessons applicable to situations aster reconstruction, typically involves the repair and where the pre-conditions for state failure exist, but reconstruction of physical infrastructure, it also entails a where preventive policies are still possible.3 The paper number of interventions aimed at rebuilding institutions. identifies five categories of socio-political emergencies Those interventions have included jump-starting the and argues that the requirements for effective post-con- economy, reconstructing the framework for governance, flict reconstruction may vary between categories.4 Those rebuilding and maintaining key social infrastructure, categories are as follows: and planning for financial normalization. Thie Bank has a) stable states with disorderly transfers of power also provided targeted assistance to displaced persons but with bu-eaucratic/governance continuity and vulnerable groups and addressed unique needs aris- (Thailand 1932-1992); ing from complex emergencies, including demining and b) peaceful dissolution into successor states demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants. In (Malaysia/Singapore, 1964); contrast to post-disaster reconstruction, post-conflict c) state failure due to predatory or ineffectual gov- reconstruction assistance often operates arnid tension ernance (Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, between key actors within the country, which influences Uganda, Zaire); relations among involved international parties as well. d) state erosion or failure due to ethnic/regional con- flict (Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Burma, Congo, Study Scope and Methodology Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Lebanon, Rwanda, Sri Case studies of nine diverse country experiences form Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, former Yugoslavia, the core of this assessment. After consultations with the including Bosnia and Herzegovina); and Board, the Regional Departments, and Bank manage- e) state failure due to ideological conflict (Angola, ment, three countries were selected for field study Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique). (Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador, and Uganda) and In the early 1990s, donors and agencies often used six were selected for desk reviews (Cambodia, Eritrea, the term "continuum" to describe the relationship Haiti, Lebanon, Rwanda, and Sri Lanka). In each coun- between conflict, relief, reconstruction, and develop- try the Bank significantly assisted post-conflict recon- ment. The prevalence of discontinuities in post-conflict struction. The countries are diverse in the causes of state situations, however, has put this label in increasing disfa- failure or collapse as well as in the factors that influence vor. More suggestive of the reality of recent conflict and initiation or resumption of Bank operations.7 post-conflict situations is "complex emergency," the term The assessment team reviewed a substantial volume used by the UNDP and by the recently published multi- of Bank documents for each case study country and con- donor evaluation of the Rwanda emergency.5 Complex ducted extensive interviews with Bank staff (including emergencies, though they have multiple causes, are essen- government officials for the field studies). The team also tially political in nature and entail violent conflict. They consulted with other donors and NGOs in WVashington, typically include a breakdown of limits, institutions, and New York, and Geneva (and in the field study coun- governance, widespread suffering and massive popula- tries), reviewed Bank and non-Bank literature on post- tion displacement, and they often require a range of conflict reconstruction, and reviewed the Bank's global responses from the international community. A complex portfolio. A selected list of documents reviewed and a emergency tends to be dynamic, characterized by rapid list of persons interviewed are contained in the bibliog- changes that are difficult to predict.6 raphy and Annex 3, respectively. 2 Int oductiou o~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ nl o d u, c t-i o n Urban structures in Lebanon The key issues addressed by the assessment are (a) interviews conducted for the case studies and for the the timing and scope of the Bank's role, including ques- consultations with other donors and NGOs. tions about its comparative advantage; (b) its partner- The report continues with an analysis of the Bank's ship and coordination with other donors, international policy markers on post-conflict reconstruction assis- organizations, and NGOs; (c) the Bank's contribution to tance in Chapter 2, followed by an anatomy of the damage and needs assessments and to reconstruction Bank's post-conflict portfolio in Chapter 3. The main strategies; (d) its role in rebuilding institutions; (e) Bank findings of the study and their implications are pre- instruments and processes; and (f) implications for mon- sented in Chapters 4 through 7. Chapter 8 concludes the itoring and evaluation. From these issues a set of report by recommending future directions for Bank pol- detailed questions, included in a November 1996 Design icy on post-conflict reconstruction. Paper for the assessment, were developed to guide the 3 Evolution of Bank Pol'icy M4arkers he Bank's operational policy on lending for emergencies contains elements of recon- struction policy. These elements focus on emergencies caused by natural disasters, however, and are inadequate for post-conflict reconstruction operations. The Frame- work paper and recent discussion and decisions of the Board regarding operations in post-con- flict countries contain more appropriate markers for policy, but these do not constitute a con- solidated policy statement. Operational Policy on Lending for Emergencies from the government and the Bank. The OP defines an Increased emergency recovery activity in the 1970s and emergency as "an extraordinary event of limited dura- 1980s, particularly in response to natural disasters, tion such as a war, civil disturbance, or natural disas- prompted the Bank to adopt reconstruction guidelines in ter." To facilitate rapid response the policy discourages 1984 that encouraged natural disaster prevention and the application of conditionality to emergency opera- mitigation in post-disaster activities (Operational Note tions unless "directly linked to the cause of the emer- 10.07). In October 1988 the Board approved "Lending gency." While it indicates that "to the extent possible, by the Bank for Emergencies," a policy paper based on normal procurement and disbursement rules should the 1984 guidelines. Although the paper alluded to civil apply," it also provides for "special flexibility in the war, it did not go far in exploring the differences case of emergency loans." between reconstruction after natural disasters and after Recent conflicts have typically been more complex conflicts.1 The guidelines were then transformed in 1989 than the OP 8.5 characterization. These conflicts have into Operational Directive 8.50 (0D8.50), "Emergency often been protracted rather than limited in duration Recovery Assistance," which similarly emphasized and have torn the country's social fabric and emergency recovery after natural disasters. In August destroyed its physical and human capital. While 1995, without any major conceptual changes, 0D8.5 regional tensions and political ideologies with roots in became Operational Policy 8.5 (OP 8.5). the Cold War era have figured in some conflicts, intra- Thus, the existing operational policy derives largely border issues in which economic, political, ethnic, and from the need to respond to urgent financing needs for religious factors are intertwined, have been particu- post-natural disaster reconstruction. The basic princi- larly divisive. Among the countries that have experi- ples governing these documents are general and say that enced conflicts with some or all of these characteris- the Bank should finance productive activities and tics are El Salvador, Haiti, Lebanon, Mozambique, investment rather than relief and consumption. They Nicaragua, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Uganda- focus on emergencies that seriously dislocate a borrow- all recipients of Bank Emergency Recovery Loans and ing member's economy and call for a quick response Credits (ERL/Cs). 5 The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction Framework Paper for Plost-conflict Reconstruction stakeholders in the reconstruction process as In the post-Cold War era, much of the Bank's post-con- early as possible. flict reconstruction work has responded ad hoc to bor- 3. The Bank should clearly understand how its rowers' needs. As Chapter 3 documents, these needs activities will affect and take over from emer- have grown considerably in recent years, and operations gency operations. This will help avoid negative in countries emergingr from conflict have increased as a patterns that could jeopardize later reconstruc- proportion of the Bank's portfolio. In response, the tion and development activities. Bank issued its Framework in April 1997 to guide its 4. Aid coordination should begin with the earliest involvement in post-conflict reconstruction. efforts at reconstruction. The Bank should be The Framework, developed in consultation with part of a rigorous management of the interna- Bank operational staff, Executive Directors, and a broad tional community's role. circle of international actors, including UN agencies, 5. The Bank should develop new operat]ional guide- nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and represen- lines that include emergency lending procedures tatives of concerned governments, outlines a five-stage specifically designed for post-conflict situations. process for Bank involvement: 6. The newer areas of operation for -the Bank- 1. Preparation of a watching brief in countries in demobilization, reintegration, and demining- conflict where the Bank has no active portfolio. should be further supported and developed. This is used to track developments and build a 7. Flexible funding is necessary for early reconstruc- knowledge base to facilitate effective and timely tion activities. Bank interventions once the conflict has moved The Framework emphasizes that country teams, as toward resolution. the first line in post-conflict activities, must have assured 2. Preparation of a transitional support strategy as resources for the watching brief, planning and assess- soon as resolution is in sight. Bank staff would ment, and early phases of reconstruction. As recom- collaborate with the government and other part- mended by the Framework and endorsed by the Board, ners to prepare a national recovery program as an a post-conflict unit has been established to consolidate initial step toward a more comprehensive, full- the Bank's learning on reconstruction issues., to support scale reconstruction program. The strategy would staff in developing and implementing reconstruction include a clear statement of risks, strategies for strategies, and act as a focal point for partnership with entry and exit, and details on how the overall other members of the international community. proposal would be financed. 3. Early reconstruction activities, starting as soon as Board Discussion and Decisions field conditions allow. These would be small- The Framework reflects much of the current thinking of scale operations that would not follow normal the Bank's EDs and its senior management, but further Bank preparation procedures, such as urgent clarification of policy is needed. To shed more light on repair of vital infrastructure, urgent demining, or emerging policy issues, this study reviewed transcripts of microcredit activities. recent meetings of the Bank's EDs. This review revealed 4. Post-conflict reconstruction under emergency some patterns in Board decisions that have guided the procedures, including larger-scale operations Bank's actions and found an evolution of thinking on such as physical reconstruction, economic recov- policy issues. While the Board's discussions of post-con- ery, institution building, and social reintegration. flict reconstruction have consolidated several areas of 5. A return to normal operations. consensus, they have also raised several issues on which The Framework also makes several operational agreement has proved elusive. recommendations: Relief versus reconstruction. The Board is quite 1. The Bank shculd establish or reinforce its field clear that it is not in the Bank's mandate to provide relief presence in post-conflict countries to monitor, assistance. The Articles of Agreement say that the pur- coordinate, and respond to changes inherent in pose of the Bank is to "assist in the reconstruction and post-conflict situations. development of territories of members by facilitating the 2. The Bank needs to forge key partnerships with investment of capital for productive purposes..." (Arti- UN agencies, other donors, NGOs, and other cle I.i). Other agencies have a comparative advantage in 6 Evolution of Bank Policy Markers providing relief, and while the Bank's work may cor- 8 cussing the Framework, plement their efforts, it is not to overlap them. The one ED noted that the Board also recognizes the difficulty of drawing the line Bank has no exit strategy in between relief work and reconstruction. Documentation case hostilities resume. on the Bank's assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina Although the Framework (BiH) says that it is following a two-track strategy, the - does not detail what might first being support to "selected immediate assistance comprise an exit strategy, it programs"2 through the Trust notes that one must be The framework is Fund established for BiH. Some included in the Transitional thebass fr acomponents of these emergency - Support Strategy (para. the basis for a operations may be considered / 47). During 1991 discus- fully developed relief, for example, replenishing - sions on Bank involvement operational policy books and educational materials in Angola, some Board under the Emergency Education members expressed deep Reconstruction Project. During discussions on the Man in Yemen Republic concern over the high risk Framework, Board members agreed that this issue needs the Bank was taking: confi- to be tackled. While some believed that the Framework dence that the proposed interventions would work was justifies relief, others suggested that such activities help only marginal. Noting that the Board has little to do close the gap between relief and reconstruction (by pro- with a project after it is approved, one member asked viding resources to keep educational and medical sys- what the Board could do about problems that arise dur- tems operational in order to maintain human capital).3 ing the implementation and supervision of projects. The Aid coordination. Most Board members agree that Framework says that the Board will be kept informed at the Bank can play a large role in aid coordination, per- intervals about the assessment of risks and the steps haps not leading in every case, but at least facilitating being taken by management in this regard. the process. The Bank's involvement should seek to The Bank's comparative advantage. Board mem- relate assistance to the requirements of economic bers unanimously agree that the Bank should focus on reforms. By necessity, in some countries other agencies activities in which it has a comparative advantage and should lead in aid coordination. In Angola and Cambo- avoid overlapping with the activities of other agencies. A dia, for example, the Bank has been absent for long peri- traditional area of strength for the Bank has been the ods and lacks solid knowledge of the country. In such rebuilding of physical infrastructure. Board members cases the Bank should be more sensitive and learn from also agree that macroeconomic management and policy the experience of other institutions. As recommended in issues are comparative advantages for the Bank. But the Framework, the Bank should maintain a watching some hesitate to declare a comparative advantage for the brief in conflict countries where it is not active. Bank in newer areas, such as demining, demobilization Flexibility and speed. These are essential to post- and reintegration of ex-combatants, and dealing with conflict reconstruction. The Bank needs to be able to displaced populations. The Angola peace accords, for respond quickly to situations that are often complex and example, called for demobilizing 150,000 troops. In a in flux. Board discussions have pointed out that the 1991 discussion of the issue, some Board members ques- lending program also needs to be flexible to respond to tioned whether the Bank would be able to respond to the risks being taken. In Angola, for example, Bank those needs. If not, they recommended that the Bank strategy in 1991 was called a "lending framework" that pursue the issue through aid coordination and assist would be revised in response to the government. other agencies with it. Since that time, the Bank's demo- Rwanda has been noted by the Board as an example bilization activities have increased. As no other agency where the Bank was not flexible. has yet systematically addressed the issue, the Bank may Risk. The Framework proposes a component on have created a comparative advantage for itself. Regard- risk management that has been welcomed by the Board. ing reintegration of displaced populations, some Board The risks and rate of return in post-conflict countries are members have expressed concerns that the Bank may be volatile and a return of hostilities could wipe out mil- overlapping with UN agencies. One Board member lions of dollars of Bank work overnight. While dis- stated that job creation may deserve further elaboration 7 The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction in the Framework, since it is one of the most important work says that planning the countries' financial normal- contributions the Banak can make. Also mentioned in ization is crucial. It says that while solutions will depend Board discussions is demining, another area in which the on a variety of factors, including the size of the arrears Bank has tried to create comparative advantage. and the amount of support from the international donor Lending instruments/financing post-conflict recon- community to assist with financing, normalization may struction. Although Board members concede that speed take a long time. At the same time, it notes that the pres- and flexibility are crucial for post-conflict operations, ence of arrears does not preclude other post-conflict they disagree on how financing can best allow for speed reconstruction assistance from the Bank, such as the and flexibility. Financing was by far the most contentious mobilization of assistance from donor countries or other issue during meetings on the Framework paper, and sev- non-lending activities (para. 33). eral times it was left to be decided later. Some supported Preventing conflict. The Framework reflects the the establishment of a post-conflict trust fund or Devel- view of many EDs that the Bank can help prevent con- opment Grant Facility for use by countries where tradi- flict by supporting activities that are intended to miti- tional lending was not immediately available. This would gate tensions in at-risk countries. Other EDs have urged avoid the time loss incurred by doing it case-by-case and caution in this area, saying that the Bank must not stray could attract additional resources. Others opposed the beyond its mandate into political matters. The Frame- trust fund idea and raised concerns that supply would work takes these views into account and says that, first create demand and raise expectations that the Bank and foremost, Bank activities should "do no harm" and, could not meet. Some argued that the Bank's strength lies further, "when requested to do so by a member, the in the rigor of its approach, based on ensuring that funds Bank should consider supporting government attempts are used to the best advantage; if it was decided that to promote activities which ameliorate conditions which grants were more appropriate than loans or credits, then may lead to conflict".... the Bank may not be the right institution for the activi- Timing of Bank re-entry. Views vary regarding the ties. In support of this view, it was suggested that if exist- most appropriate timing for the Bank to start operations ing lending vehicles were not adequate, then new instru- in post-conflict countries. EDs noted that the general ments could be created case-by-case. Some were presumption had been that the Bank should not start concerned that going beyond IDA could create equity operations until hostilities and related political tensions problems and mainstream what should be extraordinary (such as border closures) had completely ceased or been assistance for post-conflict activities. BiH and the West resolved. Recent decisions suggest a tendency toward Bank and Gaza may have set precedents for the estab- earlier involvement, however. Angola, El Salvador, and lishment of trust funds for post-conflict reconstruction Sri Lanka are examples where the Bank became involved activities. The final report of the Framework does not before the hostilities completely ceased.5 The first Struc- provide much detail on budgetary arrangements and tural Adjustment Loan (SAL) for El Salvador was financing instruments for post-conflict reconstruction, approved about a year before the peace accords were indicating that this issue warrants further discussion. signed, but the Board and staff considered that the peace Arrears. Related to the issue of financing, Board negotiations were going well. In Sri Lanka and Angola, members have also expressed differing views on how to peace accords had recently been signed, and Board deal with the arrears of countries emerging from con- members requested assurance that the hostilities had flict. The majority of countries in arrears to the Bank are indeed virtually ended. It was agreed that the Bank countries in conflict.4 Some EDs consider it necessary to would be taking a calculated risk in these countries, but have a flexible attitude toward helping countries deal that it was one that outweighed the risk of waiting until with arrears to the Bank and that arrears should not be the strife had completely ended. Another example is the an impediment to pcst-conflict reconstruction lending. West Bank and Gaza, where border closures with Israel Others hold that it shiould be an extraordinary decision have devastated the Palestinian economy because of lost to provide resources to member countries in arrears, and jobs and restricted flows of materials. While an end to urge a more cautious attitude. The Framework tries to the closures required a political solution, the Bank accommodate both views, while not making any specific decided that it was too dangerous to wait when imme- proposals. As arrears are a common and significant diate steps could restore confidence, create employment, problem of countries emerging from conflict, the Frame- and regenerate demand. 8 Anatomny of the Bank's Post- Conict Reconstruction Portfolio very post-conflict country is unique and no one formula can respond to all reconstruc- tion needs. The World Bank uses a broad array of mechanisms to support the transition to peace and the resumption of economic and social development. Its lending operations comprise macroeconomic and sectoral adjustment reforms, direct investment, and technical assis- tance in support of reconstruction. Non-lending services include damage and needs assessment, economic and sector work, country assistance strategies, and aid coordination. A review of the portfolio reveals that the Bank uses conventional lending resources. This chapter describes these different instruments more often than quick-disbursing ones approaches and the Bank's global post-conflict recon- designed for emergencies to support reconstruction, and struction portfolio. that reconstruction efforts are often framed as traditional The assessment team identified 34 countries as post- Bank work. There is not a well established pattern show- conflict. Table 3.1 summarizes Bank Group support to ing whether post-conflict reconstruction activities come these countries. Before analyzing the support strategies, at a higher cost than "normal" operations, as indicated it is worth noting that compiling a list of Bank opera- by the amount of staff time required to support them. tions and other activities that support post-conflict reconstruction was an arduous task, because of the dif- The Bank's Approach to Post-Conflict Reconstruction ficulty of defining "post-conflict," as well as the classifi- The Bank's support of post-conflict reconstruction has cation of Bank programs. Drawing a line between con- taken a variety of forms ranging from comprehensive flict and post-conflict is not easy. The apparent closure packages of lending and non-lending services, through points to conflict, such as peace agreements or elections, more modest but strategic support, to a focus on specific rarely signal the clear beginning of a definable post-con- aspects of recovery such as economic stabilization or flict reconstruction period. Rather, there is a period of transition to a market economy. Lending operations transition where peace must still be consolidated and address a range of needs common to post-conflict situa- ground laid before sustainable recovery can begin. Even tions such as jump-starting the economy, resettlement among the countries with identified Bank-financed and investment in war-affected regions, repair of war- "post-conflict reconstruction" operations, about half damaged infrastructure, reform of a nonfunctioning or are experiencing ongoing conflict. corrupt civil service and public administration, and tar- Distinguishing post-conflict reconstruction opera- geted programs for veterans and vulnerable groups such tions from "normal" operations can also be a compli- as widows and children. Non-lending services help cated matter. To identify such operations, the assessment define broad recovery and reconstruction strategies and team looked for an explicit objective like "supporting assist in mobilizing and coordinating international the transition to peace and the resumption of economic 9 The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction TABLE 3.1: SUMMARY OF WORLD BANK GROUP INVOLVEMENT IN POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION W.OANCREDIT V--OLUME TRUST IFC TRUST COUNTRY i- S$Millions) FUNDS FUNDS DRF EDI IFC MIGA AFR Angola 2 228.8 * Burundi 14.6 Eritrea 42.5 Ethiopia 391.3 * - - Liberia Mozambique 220 * - * * Namibia Rwanda 228 Sierra Leone Somalia South Africa - Sudan M Uganda 23044 F.AP -.- Cambodia 237.1 * Lao PDR 53.2 Myanmar SAS Afghanistan Sri Lanka 78 * - - * ECA Azerbaijan Bosnia and Herzegovina 357.6 * * Croatia 248 Cyprus Georgia Russian Federation - * Tajikistan 69.7 MENA Algeria Iraq Lebanon 538.9 * West Bank and Gaza 135 - Yemen ;* - LAC El Salvador 451.5 * * Guatemala * . Haiti 276.4 * - Nicaragua 277 * * Note: The dollar amounts are based on approved post-conflict reconstruction related projects, as of December 15, 1997. "DRF" is Debt Reduction Facility. and social development." However, some documents for linkage to conflict. Their post-conflict reconstruction operations dealing with potentially conflict-relevant objectives may be overlooked, downplayed, or simply issues (such as poverty alleviation and decentralization) not made explicit in the project documentation. Projects completely avoided referring to conflict, or if they did, may be framed as poverty alleviation programs, public did so in a way that obscured rather than elucidated a sector management, or decentralization projects, yet 10 Anatomy of the Bank's Post-Conflict Reconstruction Portfolio they benefit war-affected areas and groups, reform cor- geared to meet post-conflict reconstruction objectives, rupt and partisan public sector agencies, and build the but the level of engagement was neither as comprehen- foundations for civil participation-all of which can be sive nor as significant as in BiH and Uganda. In many important reconstruction priorities. cases, modifying the existing portfolio was an important Moreover, the Bank's reconstruction projects are not element of the Bank's strategy. In Mozambique, chang- easily identified by lending instrument. Most post-con- ing the Bank-supported health, education, and human flict reconstruction operations might readily be expected resources projects contributed to the reconstruction to be Emergency Recovery Loans effort. In Rwanda, more than US$100 million of undis- D (ERLs) as they are designed "to bursed funds from nine existing projects were reallo- i ost-ConfliCt restore assets and productivity cated to finance activities under the government's Emer- or in transition? immediately after a major emer- gency Recovery Program. gency (war, civil disturbance, or The Bank has treated some post-conflict countries natural disaster) that seriously disrupts the country's as countries in transition to market economies-Algeria, economy."1 However, little more than a handful of the Azerbaijan, Georgia, Laos, Nicaragua, and Tajikistan post-conflict operations identified for the study used are some obvious examples. Political instability, social ERLs or other quick-disbursing instruments such as unrest, and violent conflict may be understood as inher- Rehabilitation Import Loans (RILs). With these con- ent difficulties of an economic transition, or as largely cepts explained, we can turn to a discussion of patterns exogenous results of historical conditions of poverty, of Bank support for post-conflict reconstruction. inequity, and other social disparities.2 Nicaragua is illus- Two states-Bosnia and Herzegovina and Uganda- trative: After the 1990 elections, the new government received comprehensive reconstruction support from the immediately embarked on a stabilization and adjust- Bank. In BiH, the Bank helped start the reconstruction ment effort to reverse the effects of a decade of central effort in 1996 without waiting for financial normaliza- planning. The Bank supported the move to a market tion and membership in the Bank. Sixteen emergency economy with a $110 million economic recovery credit projects for the country have addressed all major infra- in 1991. Less than a year later, the Bank supported a structure and social sectors. They also incorporate a social investment fund "to maintain social cohesion dur- focus on employment-generation and support institu- ing the period of economic adjustment,"3 and a second tional development. In addition, the Bank has provided economic recovery credit and social investment fund assistance for normalization of the country's financial loan followed in 1994. relationship with the international community, including In countries where internal conflict is drawing near clearing of arrears and Bank membership; development a close, or where tensions have abated enough to gener- and implementation of a medium-term assistance strat- ate optimism and encourage action, the Bank has been egy to support the government's systemic reform pro- engaged in planning next steps with the government. In gram; and continuation of support to the country's over- Azerbaijan, for example, as a permanent peace settle- all reconstruction program. ment is expected soon, the Bank is visibly gearing-up. A The Bank's involvement in Uganda's reconstruction resident mission was established in Baku in September was particularly comprehensive. Since the National 1995, and Bank support has concentrated on economic Resistance Movement Government took power in Janu- stabilization and structural reform-clearly with the ary 1986, the Bank has coordinated closely with inter- objective of supporting the country's move to a market national donors to support the country's reconstruction economy, but also with an eye to post-conflict recon- effort. In the first five years after the conflict struction. Both the government and the Bank plan to (1987-1992), the Bank supported approximately 25 assess the war damage and reconstruction needs only lending operations amounting to more than US$1 bil- after the peace settlement can ensure safe access to the lion. It has provided financing for an economic recovery affected areas of the country. In the meantime, Bank eco- credit and a series of sectoral investment and reform nomic and social sector work has begun some analysis programs (agriculture, education, health, railways, to inform the reconstruction. telecommunication) aimed at rehabilitating key eco- In Sri Lanka, the Bank has indicated readiness to sup- nomic and social infrastructure affected by the war, port a comprehensive reconstruction effort in the north- In other countries, Bank lending was explicitly east, following peace accords and with the expectation 11 The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstructioni that it will be a major player in assessing reconstruction the Bank has lent to post-conflict countries since 1980, 56 needs, providing policy advice, and coordinating donor percent, or US$3.5 billion, has gone to the Africa (AFR) assistance.4 In Somalia, where fighting has continued region. The next largest share has gone to the Latin Amer- despite a cease-fire and international presence, the Bank ica and Caribbean (LAC) region, which received just over has taken a similar stance, indicating its interest in sup- 16 percent. The Europe and Central Asia (ECA) and Mid- porting reconstruction once political stability is restored. dle East and North Africa (MENA) regions have received nearly equal shares, about 11 percent each, and the East The Lending Portfolio Asia and Pacific (EAP) region received 4.5 percent. The The Bank has undertaken a variety of lending operations South Asia (SAS) region received the smallest portion, just in countries emerging from conflict. Of the 34 countries over 1 percent, consisting entirely of the Emergency identified by the stucly as post-conflict, 18 had lending Reconstruction loan to Sri Lanka in 1988 following the operations supporting recovery. In these countries, the mid-1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accords. Bank undertook 157 reconstruction projects amounting to Over the years, lending commitments to post-con- more than US$6.2 billion (see complete list in Annex 2). flict countries have grown as a percentage of the Bank's overall portfolio. As Table 3.2 indicates, overall lending Lending by Region to post-conflict countries comprises over 16 percent of Since 1980 the volurmie of Bank lending to post-conflict IBRD's and IDA's lending commitments for fiscal year countries has increased over 800 percent.5 As shown in 1998. In several regions, such as ECA and MENA, lend- Figure 3.1, the most significant increase came in the first ing to post-conflict countries makes up nearly half the half of the 1990s, when the majority of funds went to regional portfolio. In AFR, post-conflict lending makes African countries (mainly Uganda). Of the US$6.2 billion up close to a third of commitments. FIGURE 3.1: POST-CONFLICT LENDING OPERATIONS APPROVED BY REGION 1000 - 900 800 700 LAC ,, 600 - _ 11 l , = MENA 500 400 - ECA 300 _? 200 EAP SAS s g _ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~AFR 100 - I I I I I I I 1980 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 Fiscal Year 12 Anatomy of the Bank's Post-Conflict Reconstruction Portfolio TABLE 3.2: IBRD/IDA COMMITMENTS TO POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE REGIONAL AND GLOBAL PORTFOLIOS (PERCENT) 198, 1~~~~103 ~ .13505 1986 009 23 0.1.429 1983 2.5~~183 1 .76221 1989 1.30 E 0,00 E C 1990 02 .2094 1.14217 1991 ~~~~~0,9 950.78 23 Note: Percentages are based on IBRD/IDA lending Commitments provided by rhe Planning and Budget Department. Complete tables with lending amounts are in Annex 5. Lending by Sector Non-lending Services )ver the past 20 years, the Bank's post-conflict recon- The Bank's non-lending services-including economic strucrion lending projects have covered every sector. Of and sector work (ESW), aid mobilization and coordina- the US$6.2 billion in lending volume, the largest por- tion, technical assistance (often Trust Fund-supported), tion, 32.68 percent, supported "multisector" projects. training, research, and evaluation-are an important These include central balance transfers to stabilize the part of the post-conflict reconstruction effort. They help macroeconomic situation, technical assistance loans, address the special challenges faced by countries embark- and general emergency reconstruction or recovery proj- ing on post-conflict reconstruction, providing support to ects (usually ERLs) that have several economic and governments in important policy areas, as well as to the social components and are designed to provide rapid Bank in its specific post-conflict lending activities. assistance for the most pressing needs. Of the nearly ESW includes analyses of country macroeconomic US$2 billion in multisector lending, more than half was frameworks, economic sectors, and specific issues such in structural adjustment loans or credits for budget sup- as poverty, private sector investment, and public expen- port. The "multisector" sector also includes the de- ditures. In post-conflict countries, ESW has been used to mining project implemented in Bosnia and Herzegovina. identify reconstruction priorities, assess poverty and vul- Nearly 10 percent of the US$6.2 billion financed agri- nerability for targeting program benefits, support proj- culture projects, and 9 percent supported transportation ect preparation, and understand macroeconomic issues. projects (mainly highway reconstruction). The urban ESW has also supported the aid coordination process by development sector received 8.5 percent of post-conflict informing international donors of needs, mobilizing reconstruction assistance, the largest of these loans their support for reconstruction efforts, and keeping being US$175 million for the reconstruction of Beirut. them abreast of progress. Population, health, and nutrition received 7.4 percent of Smooth aid coordination is particularly important the lending amount, and electric power and other energy in post-conflict situations, because of the massive, received 6.6 percent. Other sectors received smaller urgent needs and the presence of many donors eager to amounts of support, as shown in Figure 3.2. provide support, each with its own agenda. In many 13 The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction FIGURE 3.2: POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION LENDING BY SECTOR, 1977-1997 (Total lending volume: US$6.2 billion) 9.75% 4.26% Agriculture Education 4.20%657 Water supply and sanitation Electric power and other energy 8.46%207 Urban developmentagement 9. 09% 50/3 Transpordtation Finance 1.33%103 Telecommunications Indstoy 4.47%006 Social sector Mining 4.51% 3.8 Public sector managemenancD Multiseto 7.4 1%007 Population, health and nutrition oil ar gas post-conflict countries, the government lacks the capac- ance has been critical to the resumption of Bank opera- ity to coordinate donor assistance. The Bank can assist tions in BiH, Cambodia, Haiti, and Rwanda. In BiH, a by providing a framework for mobilizing donor special Trust Fund in the amount of US$1i0 million and resources, ensuring realistic and common expectations another one set up by the Netherlands were key to fund- regarding aid on the pouders rength-d ing the first few reconstruction proje.ects. ening the government's aid coordination capacity. The The Development Grant Facility (DGF) has recently Bank led or assisted in aid coordination in nearly all the approved US$8 million for fiscal year 1998 for a Post- case study countries. Chapter 4 explores the range and conflict Program (PCP). The Program will finance early depth of that experienace, reconstruction activities more rapidly than typical Bank Trust Funds are also important to supporting recon- operations, making the Bank more flexible in responding struction efforts. For many of the countries reviewed, to urgent reconstruction needs. The PCP has established reconstruction-related support is a sizable portion of the a Program Committee, which includes Bank staff as well country's total Trust Fund activity. About 20 countries as external experts from UN agencies, NGOsi, and other received post-conflict reconstruction support from Trust technical experts who periodically meet to consider pro- Funds: 14 devoted more than a third of their Trust Fund posals for post-conflict development efforts. The com- resources to post-conflict reconstruction (eight devoted mittee will contribute to the selection of implementing more than 80 percent). All nine case study countries agencies or researchers to enhance knowledge and carry received Trust Fund support for operations related to out such activities as watching briefs, transitional sup- post-conflict lending and non-lending services. While port strategies, and early reconstruction activities. cofinancing accounts for the largest use of post-conflict The Bank's training facility, the Economic Develop- Trust Fund support in most of the nine countries ment Institute (EDI), has recently begun to address post- (including BiH and UJganda), other uses, such as techni- conflict reconstruction priorities. An examination of cal assistance and pre-investment support, have been EDI's work programs for fiscal years 1991-1995 found significant in BiH, Cambodia, El Salvador, Lebanon, no obvious post-conflict reconstruction activities. In and Uganda. The use of Trust Funds for arrears clear- 1996 and 1997, however, learning activities on such top- 14 Anatomy of the Bank's Post-Conflict Reconstruction Portfolio ics as civil service reform, integrity, accountability and Ten had been audited by OED. Most of the Bank's expe- transparency, the role of NGOs, and social funds rience in evaluating post-conflict reconstruction opera- emerged for post-conflict countries. In 1996 EDI articu- tions comes from Uganda (35 out of 65 projects). lated a Social Dislocation program that addresses the The completion reports rated performance of the special challenges of post-conflict reconstruction. At an evaluated operations as follows: 66 percent had "satis- October 1996 Social Dislocation Seminar in Washington, factory" or better outcomes; 43 percent were considered D.C., country representatives from Angola, Cambodia, to be "sustainable"; and 23 percent had "substantial" Guatemala, Mozambique, and Uganda met NGOs, the institutional development impact. This is a slightly UN, and the Bank to discuss approaches to rebuilding poorer performance record than for the overall Bank after conflict. Ongoing activities for fiscal year 1998 portfolio, according to the Annual Review of Evaluation include workshops addressing such issues as conflict res- Results 1995. For the 1995 Review cohort of 264 oper- olution (to take place in BiH), municipal capacity build- ations, 68 percent had "satisfactory" or better out- ing (in Guatemala and Rwanda), and reintegration (in comes; 46 percent were considered likely to be "sustain- Angola). Plans are also under way to prepare training able;" and 27 percent had a "substantial" institutional materials on lessons learned in post-conflict Mozam- development impact. The 1995 Review also notes that bique, as well as a training program for Bank staff on "War and civil strife are significant factors in the out- post-conflict issues to be conducted jointly with the Post- comes of the 1995 cohort. If the analysis excludes all conflict Unit and the Learning and Leadership Center. The Cost of Post-Conflict Reconstruction Operations It is tempting to assume that post-conflict reconstruction operations cost more in staff time than "normal opera- tions," as they may need more support for complicated aid coordination or demanding project supervision in a fragile context. However, it is difficult to assert this assumption with any certainty. A review of aggregate staff years dedicated to support Bank activities (including lending, supervision, ESW, country program support, technical assistance, aid coordination, and network and other country support), certainly shows a noticeable jump in staff time during the immediate post-conflict years for the nine case study countries (see Table 3.3). This is particularly evident for BiH, Cambodia, El Sal- vador, Eritrea, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, and Uganda. In Haiti, ESW spiked in 1991 with President Aristide's elec- tion then dropped-off after he was ousted. In many cases, the number of staff years is significantly higher than the average for the region. However, the difficulty in attributing this to the post-conflict context is indicated by the large number of staff years in such places as Ethiopia, Haiti, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, and former Yugoslavia, where the Bank was working before the out- break of conflict and before arrival at a peace settlement. Lessons from Evaluations of Post-Conflict Reconstruction Operations Of 65 completed post-conflict reconstruction operations in 15 countries, 52 had Project Completion Reports _ (PCRs) or Implementation Completion Reports (ICRs). Muslim woman in Sarejevo suburb, Bosnia 15 ~. TABLE 3.3: STAFF YEARS DEDICATED TO THE NINE CASE STUDY COUNTRIES 4 FISCAL -1998 YEAR: 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 19~94 1995 1996 1997 IREVISED0 AFR Total '605.6 611.5 K5809 583.8 k"659.2 559.8 i,61 1.0 620.7 654.4 607.9 615.1 553.6 :59. Region Average 11.2 11.3 10.8 10.8 ..12.2 10.4 11.3 11.5 12.1 11.3 11.4 10.3 1. Eritrea 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30 6.0 8.7 6.3 7.1 (Ethiopia) '.21,3 20.4 12.9 19.2 18.6 17.9 .16.9 23.8 25.2 19.7 1:9.7 23.7 ` 27.7 Rwaoda 16.4 10~~~~~I I.5 J 13 .1 16. v . 16.8 13.8 ._16.3 12.7 13.31 8.9 8.-0. 23 Uganda 117 1. 86 18.0 275 26.5 28.0 265 28A4 30.9 30.9 27.2 7 ,30.4 EAP Total "177.0 268.2 4 286.3 i304.2 291.1 ',321.0 340.9 K342.4 339.7 ,.339.0 327/.4 .432.3 Region Average 9.6 9.2 7 98 9.9 10.5 10.0 11.1 11.8 11.8 11.7 11.7 1.3 ,. 1.5 Cambodia 0.0 0.0 .'00 010.1 0.1 2,5 2.5 5.2 97 120 10.3 8.8 LAC Total ~ :301.9 319.1 332.5 354.8 "'369,2 367.0 390.9 424.9 430.9 403.0 K 377.5 329.5 313.7 Region Average 7.5 8.0 8.3 8.9 9.2 92 98 10.6 V10.8 10.1 :9.4 82 ' . El Salvador 3.0 3.7 1.9 2.8 3.6 5.9 7.3 10.4 9.8 10.1 9,4 10.0 6.5 Haiti .1 7.3 5.8 7.7 9.8 9.8 .31 1.2 1.6 52 2 7.89 SAS Total K264.5 269.8 ~.'351.4 400.9 501.4 430.2 470.6 473.8 .473.0 386.4 377.1 381.3 C403.5 Region Average '24.0 24.5 , '31.9 36.4 45.6 39.1 42.8 43.1 .43.0 35.1 K 43 34.7 K3.7 Sri Lanka 18.0 17.7 20.3 16.5 191.3 23.8 21.9 27.9 25.5 22.1 '24.9 24.5 :_25.8 ECA Total 130 105.0 10. 59 195 100 "0. 0. 422 468.6 478 464.4 $4, Region Average 2.5 2.3 ~.2.3 2.1 ,2.6 3.7 4.5 8.9 10.5 10.2 10.2 10.1 7:11.0 BiH 0.0 0.0 .0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 '. .0 0.0 0.0 1.4 26,7 32.1 25.2 (former Yugoslavia) 25.7 19.5 ' 23.2 20.7 '.22.2 23.9 7.8 4.2 '. .6 0.7 .01 0.2 '0.0 Total for MENA (',471.1 181.9 "'186.6 196.3 ~..205.6 189.1 >`215.1 221.5 !('215.8 208.8 1,1.`199.6 187.8 16. Region Average -5.5 5.9 ,6.0 6.3 6.6 6.1 6.9 7.1 7.0 6.7 6.4 6.1 6.4 Lebanon 0.3 0.0 '0.1 0.0 .>0.0 0.4 3.8 8.1 13,7 15.4 11.5 9.6 .`12.3 BiH: 1995 cease-fire and Dayton/Paris Accords; Cambodia: 1993 UN-sponsored elections ending two decades of war; El Salvador: 1992 Peace Treaty and 1994 elections; Eritrea: 1992 post-coniflict reconstruction lending and 1993 Indepenldence; Haiti: 1991 President Aristide elected and ousted, and 1994 return; Lebanon: 1990 end civil war; Rwanda: 1993 peace accords and 1994 massive violence; Sri Lanka: 1987 India/Sri Lanka agreement, 1988 Emergency Recon- struction Project; and Uganda: 1986 Obote deposed, rebels win, and 1994 multiparty democracy. Source: World Bank, Planning and Budget Department Anatomy of the Bank's Post-Conflict Reconstruction Portfolio projects with substantial negative effects resulting from Avoiding unrealistic expectations. The realization war and civil strife, the outcome rating for the cohort that the process of rehabilitation is complex and lengthy would climb to 73% satisfactory from 68%" (pp. 8-9). often comes too late in the project process. Thus, expec- The ratings of the 21 operations completed before the tations are unrealistic, and good intentions cluster too first phase of intensive conflict in Rwanda, October 1990, many components under one umbrella. Although timely stand in marked contrast to the ratings of the 12 opera- and relevant, the project objectives in Uganda's Program tions completed during and after the conflict. Over 60 for the Alleviation of Poverty and Social Costs of percent of outcome ratings in the former group were "sat- Adjustment (PAPSCA), were numerous and unpriori- isfactory," however, over 80 percent in the latter group tized. So many components covering such a wide spec- were "unsatisfactory." While it was impossible to predict trum of subjects under the same program created exces- from these results that genocide was about to occur in the sive complexity. second quarter of 1994,6 the results do reflect the acceler- Simplicity. Although their performance was rated ated deterioration in the socioeconomic environment and "satisfactory" overall, the completion reports for two El in governance occurring in Rwanda in the early 1990s. Salvador operations contain some lessons indicating a The project evaluation documents identify several need for relatively uncomplicated approaches in imme- important lessons for consideration in the design and diate post-conflict projects. The first Structural Adjust- implementation of post-conflict reconstruction opera- ment Loan (SAL I, L3293) contained three pilot nutri- tions. They include the importance of (i) establishing a tion efforts that required management-intensive dialogue; (ii) preserving flexibility; (iii) avoiding unreal- supervision to address implementation problems. While istic expectations; (iv) maintaining simplicity; (v) keep- two of the three pilots ended in success, the ICR sur- ing procurement and disbursement procedures consis- mised that a separate investment project might have tent with the post-conflict context; (vi) ensuring been a more appropriate vehicle for implementing a consistency in Bank programs; (vii) supporting priority nutrition program. This opinion was echoed by a staff areas; and (viii) promoting government ownership. member overseeing the SAL at the time. In fact, consid- Establishing a dialogue. Uganda's First Reconstruc- eration had been given to including the nutrition pilots tion Credit (C0983) sheds light on the importance of in the Social Sector Rehabilitation Project (SSRP, opening an avenue for discussion of recovery policy. L3348), but they were included in the SAL to give the Although the direct impact of the credit was limited, it loan an explicit social component. One element of sec- provided a valuable opportunity to initiate a dialogue on ond-tranche conditionality for SAL I called for the a wide range of economic policies and management deci- divestiture of agricultural marketing entities. Implemen- sions that has been carried forward into subsequent oper- tation of this measure was delayed by stiff political ations and economic and sector work (PPAR, para. 54). opposition and resistance from employee groups. One Preserving flexibility. The more unsettled a coun- Bank staff member involved at the time questioned the try's institutional environment and the more uncertain wisdom of including these privatization efforts in the the prospects that project benefits will be sustainable, first SAL. A lesson drawn by the draft ICR for the SSRP the more flexibility needs to be built into the project is that even where there is a high level of commitment to design, that is, the more the project needs to have a the project, when institutional capacity is low, projects "process" rather than a "blueprint" design. In Uganda's need to be relatively uncomplicated, and additional TA III, project designers realized that they could not pre- capacity should be ensured through pre-project and con- dict the form and timing of every contingency that might tinuing technical assistance and training of project staff. arise. They thus adopted a flexible project design that Keeping procurement and disbursement procedures incorporated both "blueprint" and "process" elements consistent with the post-conflict context. Disbursements with emphasis on the latter. Several components were for Uganda's First Economic Recovery Credit were much deliberately left underdesigned at appraisal. This con- slower than had been hoped. Despite the urgent need to cern was echoed by the PCR for the Sri Lanka Emer- obtain foreign exchange, the Bank emphasized the need gency Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Project (ERRP, to restore discipline to the foreign exchange allocation C1883). A PCR lesson learned was to keep initial design and procurement procedures that had been destroyed simple and build in flexibility to make midcourse cor- during the previous regime. This decision made it very rections as circumstances warrant (para. 16). unlikely that the goal of rapid disbursement could be 17 The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction achieved (PPAR, p. 15, para. 43). In PAPSCA, cumber- system, competing with the requirements of project some procurement and disbursement procedures led to implementation. Also underestimated were the very sig- untimely delivery of goods and replenishment of funds. nificant scope of the rehabilitation works and the Project management and disbursement were highly cen- requirements of the transmission and distribution net- tralized, and construction materials were packaged into works in Kampala. Efforts to strengthen the capacity of larger contracts and procured through international the Uganda Electricity Board (UEB) lagged behind competitive bidding (ICB). In some cases, it took 18 efforts to support the Ministry of Economy and Plan- months after credit effectiveness for communities to ning. The project did not achieve its objective (to receive materials. In the Sri Lanka ERRP, a significant improve the board's financial performance and opera- impediment to implementation was the weak mandate of tional efficiency) and the UEB continues to face severe the National Reconstruction Steering Committee to financial difficulties. adopt streamlined and expeditious procurement proce- Government ownership. A Special Emergency Assis- dures. The PCR presents as a key lesson learned the need tance Grant of US$20 million was provided for emer- to establish more effective institutional arrangements for gency rehabilitation in Rwanda shortly after the new project implementation and monitoring in future emer- government assumed power in the summer of 1994. A gency assistance operations. The PCR points to the more 1996 ICR has assessed the performance of this grant in successful experience of the IDA-supported Emergency generally positive terms, largely because implementation Recovery Project in Jordan, where a high-level govern- was carried out expeditiously and effectively by four UN ment task force had a mandate to make quick procure- specialized agencies (UNICEF, UNHCR, FAO, and ment decisions and issue directions to implementation WHO). However, the ICR extracts a lesson that the units (PCR, paras. 14-15). Chapter 7 discusses the issue Bank should keep the government involved in and of procurement and disbursement in more detail. informed about grants. This, according to the ICR, Ensuring consistency in Bank programs. Project "avoids possible unhappiness by the government at experience in Uganda's Public Enterprises Project (PEP) being 'bypassed' by a grant, and sets a more secure and the Enterprise Development Project (EDP) under- foundation on which to build future collaboration lines the need for better coordination of the Bank's between the government and the Bank" (ICR, para. 41; country assistance strategy. The PEP was approved in June 18, 1996). The issue of government ownership is 1988 and closed in 1995. Its objective was to strengthen potentially of particular concern in the case of grants, as the government's capacity to sustain economic recovery the government may have no financial stake in the out- by increasing productivity and output in public enter- come of a grant-funded activity (unless it has made its prises. The EDP, approved three years before PEP own budgetary contribution). closed, emphasized support for a parastatal reform and divestiture program with a goal of divesting 85 percent Characteristics of Post-Conflict Countries of all parastatals by the end of 1997. PEP's emphasis on Finally, project documentation shows that conflicts are restructuring parastatals was at odds with the objective different everywhere and require tailor-made ap- of parallel adjustment programs, which aimed to impose proaches. They differ among other things in duration, hard budget constraints on the operations of parastatals intensity and scope of destruction, the relative military and to divest most of them. The approval of EDP three and political strength of the opponents, and the degree years before the planned closing of PEP created substan- to which the middle and upper classes are affected by tial confusion (PPAR, para. 10). the hostilities. Supporting priority areas. Power is a priority area The nine cases in this study confirmed the diversity in post-conflict recovery. The Second Power Project, of conflict countries. Ethnic or regional tensions were approved in 1985, was the Bank's first operation in proximate causes in BiH, Eritrea, Lebanoti, Rwanda, Uganda's energy sector in more than 20 years. It took and Sri Lanka. These divisions have typically been eight years from project signing to credit closure, com- aggravated for political ends by exclusionary govern- pared with an original estimate of five years. The proj- ment policies. Ideological extremism played a role in ect's design underestimated the impact of the unstable Cambodia and El Salvador, with a long legacy of situation and the nee(ds faced by the implementing agen- inequality and exclusion also contributing to the El Sal- cies in ensuring day-to-day operation of the power vador conflict. Governance that was predatory in 18 Anatomy of the Bank's Post-Conflict Reconstruction Portfolio Trucks between Tuzia and Sarejevo, Bosnia extracting resources and ineffectual in providing basic peak; BiH and Lebanon plunged even more, to 27 per- services contributed significantly to the Haiti and cent and 24 percent, respectively.8 And it has taken time Uganda crises. for these economies to get back to where they were: the The extent of destruction also varied among the case most recent data for Rwanda (1996) and Lebanon study countries. Statistics cannot begin to capture the (1995) put them at only about 65 percent of their pre- human suffering, the destruction, and the setback to conflict peaks. Moreover, it is one thing to recover lost economic and social progress wrought by civil conflict. ground: it is another to recover growth forgone. Conflict Available information on population displaced and has exacted a major opportunity cost even in countries killed by conflict conveys the extent of suffering along where post-conflict growth has brought the economy to two dimensions. Among the nine case study countries, a level above that achieved before conflict, as in El Sal- the range is from 6 percent displaced in Haiti to close to vador. The same is true for Sri Lanka, a country still 60 percent in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and from about afflicted by regional conflict and where growth has been 2 percent killed in El Salvador to 24 percent in Cambo- sustained, but at a slower rate than might have been dia.7 No country, however, comes close to Rwanda in expected in the absence of conflict.9 intensity: during three months in 1994, the monthly dis- With this information on the recipients of post-con- placement rate was 11 percent, and monthly fatalities flict reconstruction aid, and some general background were over 4 percent. on the Bank's global portfolio to assist the reconstruc- The economies of conflict countries can plummet to tion process, the following chapters now turn to a more less than half their pre-conflict peaks. GDP in Rwanda detailed discussion of the Bank's role and performance in 1994, for example, was 46 percent of its pre-conflict in this area. 19 Defining the Bank's Role bile the Bank may be unable to prevent conflict, it has the potential to influence the course of pre-conflict events. The Bank should study the relationships v ~~between sociopolitical and economic circumstances in situations of potential con- flict. The Bank's analytic work and monitoring should be sensitive to predatory and exclusion- ary behavior that adversely affects projects and shared development objectives. It should raise such concerns in its dialogue with the government and other donors. A central objective of Bank programs is to foster often at the root of civil conflict. But without peace, sustained development. In post-conflict countries, sus- development is impossible. tamned peace is essential to this goal. If invited, the Bank The centrality of the peace objective implies an should be an active adviser to peace negotiations to important corollary: the Bank must thoroughly grasp inform the parties of the economic development impli- the political framework. To be relevant and effective, the cations of alternative peace agreement provisions. Bnmutndradthtfmeoksinei is a The weakened capacity of government often found major determinant of the prospects for sustained peace. in post-conflict settings magnifies the need for an effec- The political framework has two related but distin- tive external aid coordination role. The Bank should guishable components: the domestic politics of the post- participate in post-conflict aid coordination at an early conflict country and the explicit or tacit framework set stage. Effective coordination arrangements require by the international community. active internal and external involvement by Bank senior management. A resident mission is particularly impor- Obstacles to the Peace Objective tant for effective coordination at the sectoral and imple- While the Bank is acutely aware of the international mentation levels. political framework within which it operates, its grasp of the domestic political frameworks in the post-conflict The Bank's Role in Preventing Conflict and Promoting countries where it works has been uneven. One obstacle Sustainable Peace has been the Bank's absence from several countries dur- A central objective of the Bank's programs is to foster ing the period leading up to conflict. For example, Bank sustained development. In post-conflict countries, sus- lending to the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) tamned peace is essential to sustained development, was suspended as SFRY began to break-up in mid-1991 Broad-based development, important in its own right, and it remained suspended during the conflict. In El Sal- also contributes to sustainable peace. The Bank's anti- vador, because of the conflict and political instability, no poverty focus implies a concern with income disparities new Bank-financed operation was approved between and exclusion of population groups-two conditions June 1979 and October 1987. Because conflict broke 21 The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction out soon after Cambodia joined the Bank in 1968, there as arising from the capture and inimical use of the state were no Bank credits or other activities until after the so that governance is no longer exercised with equal peace settlement. responsibility toward and participation of the aggrieved Another obstacle was that, until recent years, the parties. In Sri Lanka, for example, donors may have Bank's analytical work in some cases gave limited atten- missed a significant opportunity to promote equitable tion to distributional and regional imbalances, ethnic participation through the huge Mahaweli power, irriga- tensions, policies of exclusion and predation, and other tion, and resettlement scheme. In Rwanda, considered to issues that feed the political events leading to a crisis. be a relatively successful development case in the 1980s, This may have resulted in missed opportunities to pro- donors neither assessed nor addressed the distributional mote equitable and inclusive development. One positive imbalances that were emerging and that fed the political example of Bank flexibility and understanding early in events leading up to the ethnic crisis. In Haiti in 1986, the post-conflict situation was Eritrea after its war of international assistance failed to make the most of a secession from Ethiopia. Since Eritrea was part of window of opportunity following the end of the Duva- Ethiopia, the Bank had no feasible role before 1991. The lier era to promote equitable economic growth and Bank's response appears to have been timely and innov- democratic change. ative, mainly because of the determination of an enlight- It cannot be known if more active efforts to shape ened vice-president prepared to take risks. economic policies and programs, or more politically- aware advice or requirements, would have reduced these Economic and Social Factors in (Levels of) Conflict destructive intergroup tensions and succeeded in the face The Board has clearly stated that peacemaking and of other conflict factors. Nevertheless, opportunities to peacekeeping fall under the mandate of the UN and are make such efforts in areas of normal Bank involvement not responsibilities of the Bank. Nevertheless, the eco- should not be missed. The Bank has recognized that cor- nomic and social problems normally within the Bank's ruption can negate its contributions, providing grounds mandate may be among the factors leading up to con- for reconsideration of the Bank's program.' The effects flict or the resumpticn of conflict. In such circumstances of the conflicts studied-including vast population dis- the Bank may be able to help reduce tensions, thereby location and suffering, economic disruption, and enhancing prospects for conflict avoidance. Deliberate destruction of infrastructure-greatly exceed the nega- attention should be paid to ensuring that international tive effects on the economic environment commonly development efforts do not exacerbate such tensions in observed from corruption. The implication is clear that countries at risk. economic and distributional policies and programs that Of the nine case study countries, six were experi- can avoid a slide into conflict within deeply divided soci- encing economic stagnation or severe economic stress in eties should be pursued. the years leading up to conflict (BiH, Cambodia, El Sal- vador, Eritrea, Haiti, and Uganda). In only three cases Peace Conditionality do economic tensions between conflicting groups appear A number of external observers and critics of the Bank, to have contributed only marginally (or not at all) to including some sources and persons consulted for this internal conflict compared with the effects of political study, have urged the Bank to condition disbursements (or regional) circumstances (Cambodia, Eritrea, and on compliance with peace agreements and governance Lebanon). In five cases (BiH, El Salvador, Haiti, criteria. One country where critics have argued for con- Rwanda, and Sri Lanka), economic and distributional ditionality deriving from peace agreements is El Sal- issues were important factors leading up to conflict. vador. The Bretton Woods institutions, they argue, While the Bank was not playing a significant pre-conflict should have insisted on "peace conditionality" in sup- role in all the cases, it was active in several. port of specific programs mandated by the peace Drawing a line in these conflicts between the realm accords. While Bank and Fund resources and their con- of (economic) issues appropriate for Bank attention and ditioned assistance on tax reform at least indirectly sup- those (political) inappropriate under the Bank's mandate ported the accords, some argue that (i) domestic is difficult. The parties to these conflicts typically have resource mobilization and expenditure reallocation from justified resorting to violence by claiming a threat to the military in favor of the social sectors could have been their fundamental inrerests. Such threats have been seen pursued through conditionality more aggressively than it 29 Defining the Bank's Role Remains of old bridge in Mostar, Bosnia was; and that (ii) the Bank could have conditioned its part of any Bank operation is reconstructing the bricks assistance on specified progress in implementing such and mortar; the hard-but more essential-part is key accords-mandated programs as land acquisition for restoring the institutional base, human capital, and soci- ex-combatants and reform of the justice and law etal bases of a post-conflict society." enforcement system (even if it did not provide direct Policy conditionality requires case-by-case analysis. financial support for these programs).2 Depending on social and physical conditions, it may not In view of the fragility of immediate post-conflict be appropriate to introduce wide-ranging conditionali- settings, the Bank's initial response has typically been to ties all at once. While the immediate post-conflict period provide one or more emergency credits or loans to such can be a window of opportunity to pursue some policy countries. These instruments fall under Operational reforms, especially those essential to macroeconomic Directive 8.50, "Lending by the Bank for Emergencies," stability, the Rwanda case exemplifies the need to exer- which discourages the application of conditionality to cise caution in pursuing an ambitious policy reform emergency operations unless "directly linked to the agenda soon after a major social collapse. Thus, loan cause of the emergency" (para. 39). Considering the and grant agreements in post-conflict countries, as in experience in BiH and Cambodia, however, a case can other countries, should contain provisions essential to be made for attaching what might be called "policy and accomplishing the development objectives of recovery economic conditionality" to emergency operations. In operations. However, in Uganda, the Fund and the Bank the words of the former director for BiH, policy condi- emphasized increased tax effort that, considering the tionality is essential because "conflict destroys institu- country's history of predatory tax policy, may well have tions and policies, as well as bricks and mortar. The easy depressed private investment. 23 The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction Partnership Coordination status. The former Bank director for BiH notes that the It is also important that the Bank work with other willingness of diplomatic partners to have the Bank at donors and partners in the reconstruction process to the table should not be taken for granted, and that the bring about agreement on the need for policy change Bank must and should work hard to earn its seat. Had and the means to implement change. This could be the Bank played a more formal role in the negotiations something as simple as getting partners to agree on leading up to the El Salvador Peace Accords of January allowing monetization of food aid or aid-in-kind to sup- 1992, a clearer, more realistic picture of the costs of the plement devastated budgets, reintroducing partial cost- various provisions might have emerged earlier. However, recovery for war-damaged public services, and similar some observers argue that injection of such considera- measures. tions would have inhibited reaching an agreement. The The Bank has extremely valuable contributions to BiH negotiations illustrate how political considerations make to peace negotiations and international consultative can override economic ones. In that case the Bank was groups. One contribution is to advise on the economic invited and participated in negotiations on technical development dimensions of peace accord options. Because issues at Dayton but found that technical considerations peace accords lay down an economic scenario, the Bank, of efficiency in economic governance could not prevail if invited to participate, should have a seat at the table.3 over strictly political negotiability. As the former direc- During the TN's 18-month governance mandate follow- tor for BiH notes, however, "The economic aspects of ing the Cambodian settlement, international (and Bank) the settlement were the best that could be agreed to at staff were hamstrung in their economic rehabilitation that time, if they were to be politically acceptable to the efforts by an overriding interpretation of the settlement's parties." Yet, a frank, experience-based examination of language that narrcwly restricted reconstruction until options and possible consequences may improve eco- elections had produced a new government. In BiH, the nomic governance components of peace accords and lay accords called for a complex and fragile fiscal structure a foundation for more effective or cooperative interpre- highly dependent for its viability on willing cooperation tation and implementation in the critical first months of among parties just emerging from warfare. In such cases, carrying out the agreements. Bank participation in peace the provisions for economic reconstruction might be negotiations in Guatemala provides another example of designed to enhance the recovery if the parties have full its potential contribution to the peace process. benefit of the Bank's advice and experience on the possi- ble economic development consequences of alternative The Bank's Role in Aid Coordination approaches to implernenting peace agreement provisions. There are typically many donors present in a post-con- flict situation, each with its own agenda. To respond A Place at the Table effectively to the massive and urgent needs, they must While the Bank is not a party to peace negotiations, it work in partnership. The weakened capacity of govern- could provide such advice if it had more than observer ment often found in post-conflict settings magnifies the TABLE 4.1: THE BANK'S ROLE AND EFFECTIVENESS IN COORDINATION AND PARTNERSHIP CAM- FL E ERI- SRI BODIA 4LAOR TREA HAITI LEBANON R DA LANKA _UGANDA Peace negotiations - - - - nla - Mobilize resources 1' ' t 1 I i Jointly prepare assessments and strategies 1 T 1 - I 4 I I Sectoral and - in-country coordination T- - T 1 1 1' Note: T means the Bank played a role and was generally effective; t means the Bank played a role and was not effective;- means the Bank played no role. The table is meant to provide a general idea of the Bank's involvement in the activities listed, and cannot reflect the nuances between cases regarding the extent of the Bank's role or its performance. See Annex 1 for sum- maries of the case studies. 24 Defining the Bank's Role need for an external aid coordination role. Assuming tion in damage and needs assessments in post-conflict this task does not necessarily imply leadership of the countries has facilitated the Bank's subsequent involve- process, but it will probably call for leadership on ment in developing reconstruction macroeconomic and external debt issues, strengthening strategies and in aid coordination. policy dialogue and policy reform, and mobilizing This has required an assessment of Factors for resources. Most of the key actors in the nine case study socioeconomic needs and the socio- successful countries have expressed (in one way or another) a pref- political context as well as of physi- coordination erence for Bank assistance in aid coordination, particu- cal damage. Scholarly expertise and larly for a Bank-convened consultative group. Some of participatory poverty assessments the benefits they perceive from an active Bank role were not employed to the extent that would have been include the quality of its analytical and advisory ser- desirable, however. vices, its unique relationship and access to the IMF, its The resource mobilization function of aid coordina- credibility in the eyes of the donor community, and tion may lead to cofinancing of operations. This is par- related to the last two benefits, its potential to mobilize ticularly desirable for general program assistance for funds from other sources. Table 4.1 summarizes the balance of payments and budget support, for which con- Bank's role in coordination and partnership efforts for ditions and tranches must be synchronized. Budget sup- the nine case study countries. port counterpart generation is often urgent for pressing The Bank's use of consultative groups (CGs) has post-conflict local currency needs, that is, non-tradable been particularly effective for mobilizing aid resources, goods and services the government can only obtain from including facilitating the clearing of arrears, seeking a the local market (such as salaries of teachers and med- coordinated approach to macroeconomic issues, and ical personnel). The Bank had difficulty mobilizing ade- providing information on needs and assistance flows. It quate cofinancing for budget support in BiH, Cambo- helped enormously to have the Bank's leadership role dia, El Salvador, and Rwanda. Although the specific clearly defined and mandated by key members of the circumstances in each case were different, a common international community, as well as being strongly factor was continuing ambivalence on the part of some backed by top Bank management, as in BiH after the donors toward the government, either about its commit- Dayton Accords. Even in the absence of such a designa- ment to peace accords or about its accountability and tion, it is important to have a clear request from the gov- legitimacy. Cofinancing of program assistance for post- ernment early, as in El Salvador, Eritrea, Haiti, and Sri conflict countries thus presents a special challenge for Lanka. Also valuable, as was the case for BiH, Cambo- the Bank. Partnerships are key to effective aid coordina- dia, Sri Lanka, and Uganda, is a consensus among gov- tion. It is critical to establish at the outset of the recov- ernment and main donors about the policy framework ery process not only what each partner will do but also that must be put in place for a sustainable recovery and the areas in which the Bank cannot intervene or where it reconstruction effort. In El Salvador, holding a CG meet- does not have a comparative advantage. ing before the peace accords were signed contributed to Another challenging aspect of coordination for the the effectiveness of coordination. It was also important Bank has been at the in-country and sectoral levels. Mis- that the government gave priority to donor coordination understandings and differences can arise with other and endorsed the Bank's role. donors with substantial resources (such as the EU in One area where a coordinated, joint approach BiH), those who have had a long-standing coordination among donors is particularly desirable is in the under- role (such as the UNDP in Rwanda), or those with both taking of damage and needs assessments, as illustrated (such as the EU, IDB, and UNDP in Haiti). The case of by the experiences of BiH, Haiti, and Sri Lanka. A joint BiH demonstrates the importance of partnerships to the effort in this area is more efficient and can help set the reconstruction process. The Bank, along with the other stage for effective coordination and cooperation main donors in BiH, participates in a sector task force between donors and government when implementing for each sector, and co-chairs one task force on eco- post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Assistance for nomic policy with the IME All the task forces are under preparing a national reconstruction plan should also be the guidance of the Economic Task Force, chaired by the coordinated to avoid the imposition of unnecessary bur- Office of the High Representative. The sector task forces dens on the government. Early leadership or participa- are credited with success in information-sharing within 25 The World Bank's Espertence with Post-Conflict Reconstruction sectors, and with sorne success in avoiding discord and national and local, and its relationships with civil soci- overlap among donors. However, success in carrying out ety in general.4 A strong resident mission has facilitated fully coordinated programs on the ground has been lim- these relationships, with the BiH mission and its NGO ited, and experience has varied by sector. liaison officer providing the best example. The Bank is The absence of a resident mission, or a delay in seen as an effective bridge between the government and establishing a mission with the continuous engagement NGOs in BiH. The Bank's rather rough, but. improving of a resident representative, has hindered the Bank's abil- relationship with Salvadoran NGOs could arguably ity to coordinate effectively in Cambodia, Eritrea, Haiti, have been more harmonious sooner had there been a Lebanon, and Rwanda. Lack of clear agreement at the resident mission. outset on division of labor, particularly with the UNDP, Despite the presence of a resident mission, the Bank both at headquarters and in the field, can hamper effec- has been criticized by NGOs and some UN sources for tive coordination, as it did in post-conflict Rwanda. its coordination and partnership role in Uganda. Some Finally, an important element is the quality of the held that the Bank's leadership had focused the develop- individuals who are expected to take the lead in aid ment community on macroeconomic reforms at the coordination for the Bank. At the apex, senior staff, expense of poverty alleviation programs. In addition, such as the country cdepartment director, are crucial in the Bank was criticized for employing a "standard eco- recruiting other donors and mobilizing their support. nomic model approach" to coordination rather than This was unquestionably the case for the series of post- adopting a specialized post-conflict approach. NGOs conflict CG meetings for BiH and El Salvador. The qual- also said that the rhetoric of partnership and participa- ity and leadership style of the resident representative is tion "was moving faster than the reality," and indicated also critical to the effectiveness of the Bank's role in aid the need for greater dissemination of information on coordination at the country level. Bank activities. The Bank improved this shortcoming through its well-used public information center in the Other Aspects of Partnership Bank resident mission. But this passive resource was not Related to the presence of a resident mission is the qual- matched by any parallel information strategy addressing ity of the Bank's coordination with NGOs, both inter- the Ugandan public. 26 The Bank's Comparative Advantage and Performnance upporting the achievement of macroeconomic stabilization is an area of comparative advan- tage for the Bank and should be one of its highest priorities in post-conflict situations. The pursuit of other economic reforms should continue incrementally, taking into account the country's historical and current policy and institutional enabling environment. Rebuilding physical infrastructure is another area of strength, and the Bank should support such activities with atten- tion to necessary policy and institutional reforms. Bank support for demining should remain consistent with the Operational Guidelines and focus on funds to cover general import needs. Together with the awareness and training activities. Support for mine Fund, the Bank has supported policy reforms aimed at clearance should be integrated with a specific develop- bringing greater macroeconomic stability in each of the ment activity. case study countries. An important indicator of macro- The Bank's performance in restoring human and economic stability is the current rate of inflation. In a social capital has been uneven. The Bank should help majority of the nine cases, the monetary and fiscal sta- post-conflict countries develop cost-effective strategies to bilization packages the Bretton Woods institutions nego- restore human and social capital, using demand- and tiated with the governments of the countries have been community-driven approaches. In providing further sup- essential to reducing the rate of inflation in the post-con- port for demobilization and reintegration of ex-combat- flict period. ants, the Bank should strengthen the capacity it has While a substantial reduction in the rate of inflation acquired and incorporate the relevant experience of other is an important indication of macroeconomic stability it agencies. The Bank should give gender issues a higher is unfortunately not a guarantee of stability. The case of priority in post-conflict countries and support gender- Lebanon is instructive. The inflation of consumer prices specific interventions in the economic and social sectors. has come down from an annual average of 164 percent during the 1986-1990 conflict period to 6.8 percent in Stabilizing and Rebuilding the Economy 1994. As a recent analysis points out, however, Lebanon Moving to macroeconomic stability as soon as possible has been incurring very large fiscal deficits, with a nega- in a post-conflict setting is crucial to economic recovery. tive balance between current revenues and expenditures The Bank is widely perceived to have a comparative running between 9 and 11 percent of GDP between advantage in this area. The case studies confirmed that 1994 and 1996, and a negative balance between overall on the grounds of relevance, efficacy, and efficiency, sta- revenues and expenditures running between 18 and 20 bilizing the economy is the area of strongest Bank per- percent of GDP for the same period. The analysis argues formance in post-conflict reconstruction. Typically, the that the large inflows of external private and public Bank has been the only significant source of program resources that have permitted these deficits cannot be 27 The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction sustained. Therefore, future macroeconomic stability is or rigid bureaucracies. This has led to the canceling or in jeopardy unless public saving can be increased restructuring of operations, and to a search for alterna- (through a combination of increasing revenues and tive approaches to such functions as research, extension, reducing expenditures).1 and service and input delivery, relying more on the pri- Of course, the best plans to achieve macroeconomic vate sector and NGOs. The performance of operations stability will not produce the intended results if the that have assisted intermediary organizations in support agreed policy measures are not implemented. Sri Lanka of microenterprise and other participatory local devel- is an example. Persistent high defense expenditures opment efforts has been mixed. The record has been rel- required in the face of continued conflict and poor per- atively satisfactory in BiH and Rwanda and less satis- formance on other policy reform fronts combined to factory in Uganda. make price stability an elusive goal. Housing Recovery Fiscal and Structural Economic Reforms Housing recovery is an important component of rebuild- The Bank's performance in supporting fiscal and other ing physical infrastructure because it helps with the rapid structural economic reforms, such as privatization and restoration of social and economic life. Rebuilding hous- tax policy, has been mixed. As discussed in the next ing raises issues of land acquisition and tenure, construc- chapter, the Bank's pursuit of such reforms in post-con- tion materials, and technological choices for reconstruc- flict settings has not always been appropriate or timely. tion. Cost recovery is another issue, as project designers The Bank's assistance for rebuilding physical infra- must decide whether to provide subsidies and. whether to structure, including the policy and institutional aspects, direct them to lower-income families or to those who sus- has been another strong area of performance. But the tained the most damage. In some cases the situation is Bank has not pursued it consistently. The Bank's further complicated by dramatic changes in the demo- approach to assisting basic production sectors, such as graphic distribution of the population. In BiH, the war agriculture and industry, has been for the most part indi- resulted in an exodus of refugees to other countries and rect, concentrating on policy and institutional enabling massive internal population shifts. The Bank-financed environments and on infrastructure.2 Operations Emergency Housing Repair project (with a total project intended to strengthen public sector entities in agricul- cost of US$50 million) aims at assisting the restoration of ture in El Salvador and Rwanda encountered protracted common areas and weatherproofing the fabric of public problems in attempting to work with weak, inefficient, sector housing to avoid further deterioration. Given the TABLE 5.1: THE BANK'S ROLE AND EFFECTIVENESS IN REBUILDING THE ECONOMY CAM- ,-L ERI- SRI BIH BODIA SALYhDOR TREA HAITI LEBANON RWANDA LANKA -UGANDA Stabilizing and rebuilding the economy ' f 1 - 1 11 1' Other reforms ' : 'P - - 4 - I n/a ' Physical infrastructure :. ' 'P 1 ' - fP - -. ': Productive sectors -- 'P - 1 'P 'P 'P 1, 'P t4b Demining &" 4 - Note: 'P means the Bank played a role and was effective; 1 means the Bank played a role and was not effective; - means the Bank played no role. The table is meant to provide a general idea of the Bank's involvement in the activities listed, and cannot reflect the nuances between cases regarding the extent of the Bank's role or its performance. See Annex 1 for summaries of the case studies. a. The Bank has made substantial efforts to improve forestry management in Cambodia, although up to now these have been unsuccessful. In promoting the rule of law, Bank efforts have been insufficient and defective. See the Cambodia case study for greater detail. b. In Uganda, the Bank's TA and sugar projects had significant impact, and the agricultural project was a crucial reform, enabling the dismantling of the monopoly of the Coffee Marketing Board. The Bank project in the power sector, however, came too late and was insufficiently focused on institutional reform. See the Uganda case study for details. 28 The Bank's Comparative Advantage and Performance emergency nature of the project and the limited financial from this assessment is that Bank involvement should circumstances of both households and local institutions, focus primarily on indirect, non-clearance activities, concessionary financing was deemed justifiable. The such as coordination, information and mine awareness, costs of repairing the common parts of buildings will be training, and institution build- recovered over a long period reflected in gradually rising ing. Consistent with the Febru- rents. ary 1997 Bank Operational Putting a value In Sri Lanka, housing has been extensively damaged Guidelines on Demining, sup- on human capital by explosions (aerial bombs, mortars, and ground deto- port for landmine clearance is a recent nations), fire, and mechanical razing by bulldozers. The should be provided always as an development shelter component of the ERR Project financed by the integral part of a specific devel- P Bank (US$29 million) complemented a shelter program opment activity (e.g., road con- implemented by the government and assisted by bilat- struction). The BiH and Croatia projects should be eral agencies, NGOs, and UNHCR. The Bank-financed audited upon completion to confirm these preliminary component included loans for up to 20 years, with inter- findings. est rates of 6, 4, and 2 percent, according to household income. The funds were on-lent through three financial Rebuilding Human, Social, and Cultural Capital intermediaries using their standard loan-processing pro- Investment in human capital, including education and cedures. The ICR for the project found that the shelter health spending, is an important component of post- component was among the more successful, in contrast conflict work. Violent conflict can extinguish the human to the public infrastructure components of the project, resources of a country as people are killed, maimed, or which were delayed, destroyed, or hard to monitor displaced in large numbers. Human capital services are because of continuing violence and insecurity. typically the first to be disrupted by conflict. Education, health, and community services stop, bringing the real- The Problem of Demining ization of human potential to a halt. Schools, hospitals, Demining is unique to post-conflict situations and clinics, and community centers are destroyed, as is the essential for rehabilitation and recovery. To restart eco- government's capacity to administer services. Conflict nomic life, land must be made available for human also creates new vulnerable groups, such as the unem- activity through the removal of mines and the suspicion ployed, ex-combatants, women-headed households, of mines. Identifying and removing landmines requires children, and the disabled, who are legitimate beneficia- considerable resources and can take decades.2 The Bank ries of reconstruction aid for socioeconomic as much as has supported self-standing demining operations in BiH humanitarian reasons. The restoration and development and Croatia. This experience has raised concerns regard- of human capital in the post-conflict phase is essential to ing the danger, expense, and quality of landmine clear- establishing a base for rebuilding the economy. Table 5.2 ance. Although there are strong economic and humani- summarizes the Bank's role in restoring human, social, tarian reasons for demining, the main lesson learned and cultural capital in the nine case study countries. TABLE 5.2: THE BANK'S ROLE AND EFFECTIVENESS IN RESTORING HUMAN, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL CAPITAL ;~~~OI gal ORTEA LEBA NON LA\NKA Cualturlcaia Notes: T means the Bank played a role and was effective; l means the Bank played a role and was not effective, -means the Bank played no role. The table is meant to provide a general idea of the Bank's involvement in the activities listed, and cannot reflect the nuances between cases regarding the extent of the Bank's role or its performance. See Annex 6 for summaries of the case studies. 29 The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction Human capital or social sector work was not gener- "vulnerable group" in post-conflict settings, the potential ally a priority in Bank post-conflict projects or in its eco- of women as strong community leaders who can facili- nomic and sector work, both of which concentrated ini- tate the rebuilding of social capital may be overlooked.4 tially on macroecornomic, sector, and infrastructure Reconstruction efforts must consider the possible pro- work. BiH appears to be an exception, with an early and ductive difficulties faced by women in post-conflict situ- balanced inclusion of social sector work (4 of 16 proj- ations (e.g., lack of labor at critical times in the agricul- ects, including a specific war victims rehabilitation proj- tural season), since in some post-conflict countries a third ect) producing some promising reports. Although com- or more of the working-age men have been killed and pletion reports and audits in social sector post-conflict women are the productive base for restarting the econ- reconstruction are still relatively few, it seems that omy. Only in BiH has the Bank made a specific opera- results of Bank efforts in these sectors have been modest, tional effort to address the particular needs of women. with a few excepticns. Uganda operations produced Although for the most part Bank projects in BiH unsatisfactory results, notwithstanding some effort to have not separately targeted women, project design prioritize health, education, and economic support to takes into account the particular needs of women and the rural poor and vulnerable groups. Poor social indi- the existing programs to help address those needs. cators persist in other post-conflict countries such as Women are among the beneficiaries of the Emergency Eritrea, Haiti, and Rwanda, despite recognition that the Demobilization and Reintegration Project, the Emer- workforce was potentially a major asset. gency Recovery Project, and the War Victims Rehabili- The El Salvador Basic Education Modernization tation Project. Displaced women were one of three tar- Project has been a rare exception to modest or poor per- get groups for the pilot phase of the Local Initiatives formance in the social sectors. The project builds on a Project, which supports microcredit programs. An eval- Bank-supported EDIJCO pilot project and employs a uation of the pilot project reveals that the average loan community-managed approach initiated during the con- size for this group was 700 DM; 228 loans had been dis- flict by communities themselves. The participatory bursed; 185 jobs had been created; and repayment rates nature of the El Salvador program has contributed to were 100 percent for the groups (and 88 percent on an consensus-building and the sustainability of the peace individual basis).5 The project appears to have worked process. Strong government and Bank commitment have remarkably well and is perceived to be successful by also been important for performance and the achieve- beneficiaries, NGOs, other donors, and government ment of objectives. The Eritrean Community Develop- officials because of its reliance on local organizations ment Fund, although small-scale, is another good exam- and its success in reaching beneficiaries. ple of a participatory approach to post-conflict recovery. Finally, in planning post-conflict reconstruction efforts, analysis should be used to identify unequal Social Capital power relations underlying social organizations to Inherent in violent civil conflict is the destruction of ensure that women are not further marginalized by relief social capital, particutlarly institutions of governance and and reconstruction interventions.6 The Bank has raised civil society and such basic attitudes and behaviors as the issue of limited women's property rights in its dia- trust and participation. While the severity of this prob- logue with the government in Rwanda and it plans gen- lem in post-conflict countries is increasingly recognized, der-specific interventions as part of its 1998-2000 neither the Bank nor any other international donor has (CAS) program strategy.7 an obvious comparative advantage in this area. Analyses undertaken in the Bank and elsewhere have identified Demobilization some key components of good governance and vigorous The related activities of demobilization, reinsertion, and civil society. These components include transparency, reintegration of ex-combatants into the civilian economy accountability, the ruile of law, and the professions. Sev- and society can be important to economic recovery and eral recent Bank-supported pilots (as in BiH) and EDI sustained peace. Bank-supported efforts in this area have efforts (as in Uganda) show promise in these areas. expanded in the 1990s and the Bank has played a leader- ship role through the analysis of its experience in Africa.8 The Role of Women The experience of the Bank and other donors has gener- The role of women in rebuilding social capital should ated several lessons and produced some unresolved issues. also be examined and capitalized on. Often considered a For example, when the parties to peace accords are not 30 The Bank's Comnparative Advantage and Performance Repairing buildings in Sarejevo, Bosnia fully committed, one side or the other can manipulate the Is Land the Lever? process. An approach narrowly targeted on ex-combat- The Uganda experience also demonstrates that the avail- ants, as opposed to an area or countrywide approach, can ability of land is an important determinant of successful create resentment among local populations. reinsertion and reintegration of ex-combatants. Land is Demobilization can also sometimes be premature, not a guarantee of success, however, as illustrated by El particularly where a continuing threat to national secu- Salvador, where a substantial number of ex-combatants rity exists, as may have been the case in Uganda. How- provided land under the accord-mandated Land Trans- ever, as Colletta notes, "if the alternative to demobiliza- fer Program abandoned their land for a variety of rea- tion is a militarized state, an army of underpaid and sons, including poor land quality, lack of supporting ser- marauding soldiers, and a government budget dedicated vices and credit, and lack of aptitude and interest. The to 'defense,' the risk of DRP (demobilization and reinte- Bank has acquired some expertise in public sector down- gration program) failure due to rapidly changing cir- sizing programs that can be applied to demobilization cumstances is well worth taking, even if information on efforts. Training schemes have had a mixed record in macrosecurity is limited, or if this information is not the both areas. Care must be taken to consider the special most encouraging. Many governments and donors needs of the soldiers to be demobilized-they may come agree. Hence, further research on security, demobiliza- from rural areas, have little or no education, and tion, and reintegration issues seems warranted."9 increasingly they are mere children.10 31 The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction Culture is Not a Luxurly egy for the West Bank and Gaza, where the Bank is sup- What is the justification for assisting in the protection porting the establishment of a cultural resource manage- and conservation of cultural heritage in situations of ment program. This includes the preparation of policies, complex emergencies? Applying scarce resources to con- legislation, and guidelines; development of a cultural serving cultural heritage in a post-conflict situation may resources review and approval system for development seem frivolous at first glance. However, cultural heritage plans linked to land use planning and the environmental has the power to inspire hope and remind people of their assessment process; design of a budget and accounting creativity. Its destruction is a decisive way to assert pri- system; preparation of an inventory of cultural sites; macy and control and can become a symbol of the bru- coordination mechanisms with planning authorities, tality and insanity of war. So sensitive are cultural her- municipal governments, and other agencies; and prepa- itage sites that they can become flashpoints in ethnic and ration of a work plan. Also included is training in cul- civil conflicts. The bombing of Bosnia's Mostar bridge tural heritage management, which will allow the Pales- and the 1992 attack on the mosque in Ayodha, India, tinians to make informed decisions on the protection and demonstrate the potential of acts aimed at cultural her- management of their resources. This is viewed as integral itage to ignite tense situations. In attempting to re-estab- to the transition from war to sustainable peace and as a lish civil society in the face of ethnic rivalries, protecting prerequisite for economic and social development. By cultural heritage is one of the tasks requiring attention force of example, the Bank can exert considerable influ- in any assistance strategy. ence in defining programs for post-conflict rebuilding Although the Bank has carried out a number of proj- that ensure the retention of cultural heritage and can ects with cultural heritage conservation components, it allocate sufficient resources to do so. The Bank needs to has little experience doing so in post-conflict situations. consider also the need to build the human resources nec- One recent effort is a component of the assistance strat- essary to carry out needed conservation works. 32 The Folly of Somle Conventional Wisdomns he devastation of human, social, and physical capital often found at the beginning of a post-conflict period, and the particular provisions of a peace agreement, may require that some "conventional wisdoms" of development experience and practice be set aside for a time. Many "conventional wisdoms" of development of the conditions and distortions peculiar to the learned over the past several decades also apply in post- post-conflict environment.... Policies to spur the conflict settings. Among these are the importance of rel- private sector's recovery should therefore avoid evance, client ownership, beneficiary participation, the overly aggressive increases in taxation and policy and institutional environments, including a posi- should stress the early sequencing of investment- tive enabling environment for the private sector, and sensitive reforms, including the preservation of cost-effectiveness. But some characteristics of post-con- low inflation, the sale or restitution of expropri- flict settings-fragility of the political environment, ated housing stock, and restraint in revenue col- skittishness of private investment, concentration of lection ... The sequencing of standard economic wealth and access to resources, thinness of financial policy reform and of governance measures also sector markets, and severely reduced governance capac- needs to be tailored to avoid threatening the sus- ity-make some "conventional wisdoms" not applica- tainability of peace agreements and to take ble, at least not in the short run. These characteristics, account of the typically severe distortions in of course, also exist to varying degrees in non-conflict economic conditions. (World Bank, World countries. However, they seem to have been particularly Development Report 1997 :161) prevalent and severe in the majority of the nine case study countries. Too High a Price for Tax Revenue? The 1997 World Development Report recognizes For example, tax policy, important for stabilization and the special circumstances of post-conflict countries in its public finance, has been considerably more controversial observation that: than stabilization measures employing the instruments Although the elements of a post-conflict stabi- of monetary policy. In some of the nine countries, Bank lization and recovery program may differ little and Fund insistence on rapid increase in tax effort (ratio from programs applied elsewhere, there are of tax revenues to GDP) may well have been counter- grounds for caution and for examining the com- productive, constraining growth of the economy and the ponents of the standard policy package in light size of the tax base. In others, the Bank may not have 33 The World Bank's Experlence with Post-Conflict Reconstruction pursued increased tax effort vigorously enough. In the privatization, need to be conducive to success. The Cam- former category, the Uganda case study finds that owing bodia study finds that the Bank continued to push for to a history of predatory government tax policy during downsizing the civil service when the political coalition the conflict periods, pressure by the Fund and Bank on arrangement under the peace accords was based in part tax effort has had a chilling effect on private investment, on raising the size of the civil service to absorb large driving economic activity into subsistence, or, along numbers of the incoming parties' functionaries. The with investable funds, abroad.1 To make matters worse, Bank's position, in the view of some observers, was not the marginal benefit of tax effort in Uganda has been politically realistic from the outset. minimal, given the low capacity to expand cost-effective There was a tendency in some post-conflict situa- public sector programs. The reverse case, where pressure tions to give high priority to immediate and widespread on tax effort may not have been enough, is illustrated by privatization. While there is much in the histories of the El Salvador. countries studied to support the priority given to priva- tization of state enterprises, this does not necessarily Timing and Sequence Are the Keys imply that sweeping and total privatization should be The impact of early measures to liberalize and restruc- among the first reforms undertaken. As the Cambodia ture post-conflict economies has also been mixed. In and Haiti case studies show, the norms of behavior of most cases, liberalization of the exchange rate has been the private sector and the degree of corruption and an early and successful reform. However, other mea- cronyism within or between the private and public sec- sures, such as sharp reductions in tariffs, liberalization tors may be such that privatization may well not of interest rates, elirnination of subsidies, civil service enhance the prospects for sustained, equitable develop- reform, and sweeping privatization have been more con- ment, and may even make them worse. troversial in post-conflict countries, including those examined in this assessment. The issue has not been one First Things First of unalterable opposition, but of timing and sequence. The first priority in post-conflict situations should be to Because vested interest groups that would normally raise examine the overall enabling environments that govern stiff opposition are in a weakened condition in post-con- the behavior of broad sectors in the political economy. flict settings, it can be argued that early reform action is In doing so, the counterfactual must also be considered. more feasible. However, the political environment in In BiH, the former director notes that the Bank did go which a new post-conflict government finds itself may ahead with implementing privatization efforts since the still be very fragile and unstable, limiting its ability to alternatives-an unjust and illegal spontaneous privati- win acceptance of a reform program that goes beyond zation undertaken by the winning economic groups and stabilization. This has been the case in most of the case war profiteers, or the immobilization of assets that study countries. could be used to generate activity-were even worse. The typically weak implementation capacity of the The Bank's experience suggests an additional cau- new government is another reason for approaching such tion concerning privatization in post-conflict situations. reforms slowly and incrementally. Private investment The government must have adequate capacity to plan, may be very sensitive to attempts to offset declines in implement, and oversee the process. In addition, the tariff revenues by aggressive efforts to expand sharply state enterprise(s) to be privatized must be sound direct taxes on investment and business income and enough to attract private investors or managers. The assets. For all these reasons, criticisms arose from inside experience of Rwanda suggests that the Bank pushed and outside the Bank that too much emphasis was put privatization of the major utility before the government on a rapid pace of reforms in Haiti, Rwanda, and had the requisite knowledge and capability to proceed, Uganda, as opposed to concentrating on maintaining and before the management and operation of the utility low inflation and a convertible currency, and approach- itself were sufficiently strengthened to attract a private ing other reforms more incrementally. sector management contract, let alone investors. The Bank has recently modified its approach and is provid- Consider Political Realities ing technical assistance to strengthen the management The environments for other specific reforms, often part structure and systems of the utility before attempting of adjustment programs, such as civil service reform and again to attract private management. 34 The Folly of Some Conventional Wisdoms Remnants of war, Bosnia Privatization of agricultural marketing entities was focus on primary education and health care. But in a a second tranche condition, one of a wide range of con- country where conflict has eradicated education and ditionalities for the first structural adjustment operation health systems, as in Rwanda, a case can be made for (SAL I) in El Salvador. The Implementation Completion donor assistance (not necessarily from the Bank) to Report (ICR) for the project points out that implemen- the secondary and tertiary education levels and for tation of this measure, while ultimately carried out, was hospitals. Another rationale for attention to sec- delayed by stiff political and labor opposition. Whether ondary education is to enhance employment opportu- this condition should have been part of this first SAL, nities for young ex-combatants who left primary approved in 1991 during a critical period while peace school to take up arms. These considerations have accords were still being negotiated, is questionable. 2 influenced government and Bank thinking and opera- For human capital development, conventional tions in education in El Salvador and Rwanda and in wisdom among donors, including the Bank, advocates health in BiH. 35 The Bank's Inst'itutilonal Arrangem-ients he case studies reveal the great importance of management decisions regarding the staffing and structuring of post-conflict country teams and the programming, design, -A-and implementation of operations. The country director must have a mandate to give the country substantial if not full-time attention and resident representatives need sufficient authority to make a wide range of programming and implementation decisions in the field. Despite the high up-front costs, well-staffed resident missions are a pre-condition for successful Bank intervention in post-conflict situations. Early post-conflict situations require timely and volatile post-conflict settings, the Bank should sharply flexible programming, design, and implementation, reduce the interval between project closing and comple- From the initial base of a well-prepared damage and tion report, with appropriate streamlining of the needs assessment, the Bank should refine its strategy process. ICRs and audits must apply evaluation criteria over the few years that follow through a series of work- with greater sensitivity to the post-conflict political and shops and policy notes. A full GAS can be prepared economic environments. when time and resources permit. Expeditious prepara- The organizational, resource allocation, procedural, tion, piloting and bridging funds, and loan instruments and staffing decisions made by the Bank's management should be resourced at sufficient levels to enable the and Board have important consequences for Bank effec- Bank to be effective earlier in post-conflict situations. tiveness in assisting post-conflict reconstruction. Experi- Mechanisms for rapid procurement and disbursement ence should inform those decisions. The findings of this should be devised for post-conflict situations, consistent assessment cover several aspects of the Bank's institu- with sound practice. The recently established Post-con- tional arrangements for post-conflict reconstruction. flict Unit requires the capacity to analyze a wide range of issues, as well as the continuing attention and occa- Country Teams sional active involvement of senior Bank management. The staffing of country and resident teams is one of the Effective implementation of post-conflict operations most important sets of decisions that Bank management requires intensive monitoring, and the Bank must be makes for a post-conflict country. Strong commitment prepared to allocate sufficient administrative budget and consistent support from the highest levels of head- resources for this task. Monitoring efforts should also quarters management and a country director with a man- draw on external expertise about a post-conflict country date to give substantial, or even full-time, attention to the and make better use of ESW, which should include Ion- country also affect performance, as illustrated in both the gitudinal household and community studies. Consider- BiH and El Salvador cases. Attention to speed and qual- ing the need for completion information in often highly ity by the country director for BiH and the high commit- 37 The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction ment of staff was important in meeting the compressed the unprecedented nature of the tragedy that befell timetable for project processing. A comfortable adminis- Rwanda, management decisions regarding staffing were trative budget was also extremely helpful. The country particularly critical during the first two years after the director for El Salvador during the period immediately genocide of mid-1994. Extensive Bank experience, ide- preceding the peace accords played a critical role in get- ally in the Africa region and with post-conflict countries, ting the CG process off the ground and mobilizing sup- should have been an important criterion for the initial port from other, often reluctant, donors, as well as ably core country team. This was not the case for a couple of leading a dedicated and effective country team. team positions. Paradoxically, extensive experience in Rwanda was not necessarily a good thing. Assigning Support and Reinforcement previous task managers to the same projects was not The circumstances of post-conflict countries, including always wise, particularly when knowing what had hap- weak government capacities and rapidly changing con- pened to previous counterparts adversely affected moti- ditions, require greater on-the-ground implementation vation and the ability to forge effective working rela- and monitoring support from the Bank. The absence of tionships with new counterparts. In contrast, the resident missions and specialized staff has limited the assignment of BiH staff with experience in former effectiveness of operations in Cambodia, Eritrea, Haiti, Yugoslavia contributed positively to effectiveness. This and Lebanon.' The speed and responsiveness of the BiH was true in the physical infrastructure sectors, where program demonstrate the advantages of a strong resi- staff familiarity with the sector was instrumental to the dent mission headed by an able resident representative success of emergency infrastructure projects, and even with considerable Bank experience and stature, and more so on fiscal, financial, trade, and macroeconomic staffed with an experienced task manager for each oper- issues. ation, as well as other staff dedicated to such functions as NGO liaison and external relations. In addition, each Give Teams the Tools BiH resident task manager is supported by a counterpart All country cases demonstrated that successful imple- task manager in Washington. Of course, not every post- mentation depends upon effective partnerships with a conflict portfolio approaches the magnitude, complex- number of in-country agencies. However, substantial ity, and international visibility of the BiH program. powers were not regularly delegated to country and res- Nonetheless, the contrast between the amply endowed ident teams; this prompted complaints from partners BiH resident mission and those of other case study coun- about decisions having to be referred back to higher lev- tries is striking. Rwanda, Sri Lanka, and Uganda have els in Washington with inevitable delays. For example, had one resident representative drawn from headquar- inadequate awareness of the post-conflict context by ters (augmented by an additional headquarters profes- headquarters staff led to unrealistic provisions for pro- sional staff member in the case of the latter two mis- curement and disbursement in the Northern Uganda sions). These have been supplemented by varying Reconstruction Project (NIURP). BiH has been an excep- numbers of local professional and support staff.2 These tion on this point. There, the combination of significant observations should not be interpreted as downgrading delegation of authority and strong staff support enabled the role of local staff, who are invaluable at several lev- the resident representative to establish good working els. But the BiH experience does show what a well- relationships with a wide range of groups-bilateral staffed mission can accomplish. donors, UN agencies, changing government institutions at several levels, NGOs, and the UNOHR. The resident No Universal Pattern representative in Sri Lanka has had significant delega- As reconstruction is a multidisciplinary task, country tion of authority and, pursuant to current policy in the and resident teams need to reflect the range of skills South Asia Region of the Bank, has recently been desig- required, and managers need the vision to integrate nated country director, with the accompanying budget those disciplines. Task managers in the case study coun- authority. tries did not always have easy access to multidisciplinary skills or have post-conflict experience themselves. Dis- Programming, Design, and Implementation continuity in staffing some positions in both Rwanda The first stage in programming Bank country operations and Eritrea seriously impeded Bank performance. Given typically involves developing a CAS. In an emergency 38 The Bank's Institutional Arrangements Refugee camp, Guatemala situation, however, a trade-off is required between the "vision" document using a series of meetings and semi- need for speed and the legitimate desire for a systematic, nars with economists and government officials as an well-prepared CAS. For some of the countries studied, a input for refining the document and disseminating its GAS was developed several years after the Bank re- key conclusions. BiH officials have indicated that this engaged in the country. The key initial "strategy docu- approach was very successful in directing the attention ments" were a damage and needs assessment and a of decisionmakers toward key issues. The soundness of national reconstruction plan, which provided the frame- this approach rests heavily on the quality of the initial work for the first emergency operation(s). This is an damage and needs assessment and recovery strategy, appropriate approach that does not unnecessarily bur- which therefore merit the commitment of adequate den the country team (or the government) with staff- resources and Bank management attention. More intensive GAS preparation and approval efforts during emphasis should be placed on the staff skills and train- the critical early post-conflict stage. In such cases, the ing required to strengthen the process of damage and GAS could become a process rather than a product. needs assessment. Using the initial documents as points of departure, this process could consist of a series of additional smaller Need is Only Part of the Equation papers and workshops dealing with selected policy Setting country assistance levels in the early stages of issues and involving relevant government officials. The post-conflict reconstruction can be problematic because process could culminate with a more substantial docu- the demonstrated policy performance of a new govern- ment that would take into account the outcomes of the ment may not justify the levels of assistance implied by workshops but that would largely be prepared by the need alone. During discussion of the Rwanda CAS Con- Bank. For example, the Bank and the EU prepared a BiH cept Paper, a substantial gap became apparent between 39 The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction the three-year assistance level proposed by the country post-conflict reconstruction (such as reintegration).3 A team and that implied by the performance and need cri- new lending instrument, the Learning and Innovation teria developed by FRM (Resource Mobilization Loan (LIL), provides a modest (up to US$5 million), Department). The country team argued that a post-con- speedy management-approved loan, available where flict program shoulcL not be judged by the same criteria either (i) institutional capacity needs building; (ii) pilot- as one in a "normal" country. Instead, more weight ing a new idea would be helpful; or (iii) uncertainty should be given to need and its assessment of probable exists about technical or contextual issues concerning a performance of the government, based on early evidence project. These factors were prevalent in the case studies. of performance and commitment. The team also pointed Another new instrument, the Adaptable Program Loan out that even apart- from the extraordinary levels of (APL), designed for use at the other end of the lending assistance now being provided to BiH, the Bank had spectrum, might be used to bridge the gap between loans departed in the past from what performance criteria in a reconstruction program. The Bank's experience in alone would have justified in the case of the substantial long-standing reconstruction programs such as Uganda, initial level of assistance provided for post-conflict where recovery may take two decades or more, indicates Mozambique. The response from FRM was essentially the need for consecutive projects addressing continuing that (i) the FRM criteria were not in force when assis- issues. APLs could be useful in ensuring continuity. tance to post-conflict Mozambique was initiated and (ii) the criteria should not be weakened, but performance Processes Can Become Obstacles should be reviewed sannually and corresponding adjust- Standard Bank procurement and disbursement processes ments in levels made. have often created stumbling blocks to post-conflict The volatile and fast-changing circumstances of recovery.4 Cumbersome procedures leading to the post-conflict countries demand a high degree of flexibil- untimely delivery of goods and tardy replenishment of ity and speed in design and implementation. As noted in funds were the norm in many of the studied countries, Chapter 3, preparation and piloting funds (such as despite the emphasis in OP 8.50 on the neecl for stream- PHRD, CTF, and PNF) are critical to early reconstruc- lined procedures. Project management and disbursement tion work. While the existing trust funds are oversub- tended to be highly centralized, with implementing agen- scribed, the PPF (Project Preparation Facility) consti- cies having no independent access to funds. The experi- tutes an advance only on a reasonably well defined ence in many situations requiring decentralized delivery project with a detailed project concept document. In of goods points to the need for flexible procurement Eritrea, staff recommended a more flexible kind of facil- arrangements in community-based projects, especially ity. Piloting funds might also have been usefully when end-users contribute to the project costs. The situ- employed during the time it took to bring emergency ation was particularly problematic in Uganda, where dis- operations from iclentification to effectiveness-ten bursements for several operations were slower than months in Sri Lanka and two years in Lebanon. Evalua- expected, partly owing to unforeseen political changes, tions confirmed that post-conflict projects need a but also because the procurement procedures chosen for "process" rather than "blueprint" design. the credits were not conducive to rapid disbursement. In Recent Bank initiatives will help address these prob- the First Economic Recovery Credit, disbursements were lems. A Post-Conflict Program (PCP) has been estab- much slower than the three to four months estimated by lished under the Development Grant Facility with initial Bank staff. Despite the urgent need to obtain foreign funding in fiscal year 1998 of US$8 million. The PCP exchange, the Bank emphasized the need to restore disci- will finance activities relating to the Bank's involvement pline to the foreign exchange allocation and procurement through the early preparatory stages of post-conflict procedures destroyed during the previous regime. This reconstruction. Although individual investments will be decision made it very unlikely that the goal of rapid dis- relatively small, the PCP is intended to leverage the bursement could be achieved. enhancement of Ban]k understanding of the post-conflict Rapid disbursement of a program loan is normally situation; preparing a strategy for early intervention achieved by separating procurement and disbursement where existing Bank instruments cannot be accessed; procedures; that is, the proceeds of the loan or credit and developing best practices to help the Bank and other should be used to reimburse the costs of imports procured agencies design inte:rventions in new areas relevant to under previously approved contracts. In the Uganda oper- 40 The Bank's Institutional Arrangements ations, however, disbursements were made against goods special assistance, which it should have had from the procured under new contracts. Even under favorable cir- start through increased field presence. cumstances it takes many months from the time an In several countries, special implementation units importer applies for a foreign exchange allocation until were the main source of monitoring and therefore key to imports arrive and the foreign exchange is reimbursed. In assisting Bank supervision visits. In many cases, however, the Rwanda Emergency Recovery Credit, misunderstand- such monitoring consisted more of enumeration than of ings over procedures for selecting a procurement agency objective assessment. In at least two cases (Eritrea ERL for public sector imports led to a one-year delay of a por- and Uganda NURP) it required a change of task manager tion of the credit and eventual conversion to entirely pri- to introduce new implementation procedures. Some vate sector imports. Use of a pre-qualified list of procure- lessons may be forthcoming from the current Quality ment agents might have avoided the problem. Assurance Group study on project supervision, which Typically, weak post-conflict administrations have will include some post-conflict projects. The BiH case difficulty managing Bank procurement and disbursement highlighted the issue of continuing PMUs/PIUs beyond procedures, a burden that is often multiplied by the dif- project completion. With the next phase of reconstruc- ferent demands of various donors. This was apparent in tion shifting to policy reform, these units should not nec- Eritrea, Haiti, and Uganda, where ministerial capacity essarily become permanent fixtures in ministries. should have been strengthened before taking on complex post-conflict projects. Harmonization of donor require- Client and Staff Training and Development ments would be a substantial improvement for such min- Post-conflict countries need staff development and par- istries. In general, country cases indicated the value of allel client training. The assessment team found that procurement training in advance, and increased in-coun- understanding among Bank staff of the circumstances of try presence by Bank experts to assist (although as post-conflict countries and appreciation of their impli- Eritrea demonstrated, insertion of a procurement expert cations for Bank operations-lending and non-lend- in-country was no guarantee of success). The success of ing-is very uneven. Thus, there is a clear need for implementing the BiH emergency program has been expanded staff development activities, which could use- attributable in part to simplification of procurement pro- fully be accompanied by parallel or joint client training. cedures, including higher thresholds for international Such efforts have until recently been relatively insignifi- bidding and reduced bid submission times. cant and ad hoc in nature. The establishment of the Knowledge Network on War-to-Peace Transition and Variable Results (PlUs and PMUs) the efforts of the network to promote and develop train- Special project implementation/management units ing activities, along with those of EDI and the Learning (PIUs/PMUs) were commonly used in the case study and Leadership Center (LLC), should help strengthen countries to implement emergency and other post-con- staff and client capacity. flict projects. Such units provide a number of functions: How the Bank resolves the issues identified in this monitoring progress, facilitating supervision, and above assessment will have implications for long-established all, coordinating, but with widely varying effectiveness. ways of doing business in the Bank. A number of issues In BiH, locally-staffed PIUs managed Bank projects in are cross-cutting and involve areas of strong Bank com- different sectors providing a coordinating vehicle for parative advantage, such as strengthening the macroeco- other donors, and overcoming fears about government nomic framework and coordination with other donors involvement slowing implementation. Not all arrange- and international agencies. It is therefore essential that ments were so satisfactory. In Lebanon, the powerful the recently established Post-Conflict Unit acquire the Council for Development and Reconstruction, while staff capacity to analyze and raise this range of issues. In providing an effective counterpart for the Bank, was view of these considerations, the continuing attention effectively a super-ministry with far-reaching powers and, on occasion, active involvement of senior Bank that had to be divested to normal ministries. In the management will be required. Northern Uganda Reconstruction Project (NURP), a proliferation of sub-PIUs in each ministry reduced the Implications for Monitoring and Evaluation flow of funds to activities in the field. In Eritrea, the Previous sections have discussed some of the unique cir- PMU began with inadequate capacity and had to receive cumstances of post-conflict settings and their implica- 41 The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction post-conflict years in Rwanda, resulted in less effective monitoring and ensuing implementation problems. In contrast, monitoring has been considerably more inten- sive and consequently effective in BiH. Importance of Continuity 1 i | | !t F 9 | 1 ~~~~~Monitoring also involves the development of knowledge about the socioeconomic and political dynamniCS of the - l i i post-conflict country. A long hiatus in the Bank's engagement with a country, as in Cambodia, seriously Ii6 -erodes its knowledge of the country. Even short con- flicts, such as the three months of genocide in Rwanda, may produce large discontinuities between the pre- and post-conflict societies, economic prospects, and forms of governance. A knowledge base can be developed by sys- tematically drawing on knowledge and expertise about the country from the academic community, other gov- - ernmental bodies, and NGOs, both outside and inside the country. This has not been done to the extent desir- able. In particular, the Bank has yet to support efforts in Cambodia to undertake integrated longitucinal studies at the household level of socioeconomic rehabilitation and recovery trends and problems. The information such studies could provide would be valuable for opera- tional design, monitoring, and evaluation-and it would help develop independent local social science research capacity. Through a Different Lens While the Bank's evaluation process has identified certain lessons to remember when designing and implementing Muslim women, Sorazade, Bosnia post-conflict reconstruction operations, a comparison of completion reports with Project Performance Audit tions for the design and implementation of operations. Reports (PPARs) reveals that the latter have not always These considerations also have implications for moni- considered the post-conflict context when determining toring and evaluation. the success of projects. Annex 4 compares the ratings of The post-conflict context requires that operations PCRs/ICRs with audits and evaluation memoranda (brief receive more intensive monitoring to ensure the contin- memoranda prepared by OED after reviewing an ICR). ued relevance-as well as effectiveness and efficiency- The examples discussed here are all taken from Uganda, of the portfolio. Cotntry implementation capacity and because PPARs on post-conflict reconstruction opera- knowledge of World Bank procedures may be especially tions have been completed only for that country. weak, or political fragility may require daily attention to The PCR for Uganda's First Reconstruction Credit keep projects on track (as in BiH). The effectiveness of (C0983) rated the project as satisfactory, noting that Bank monitoring in the nine case study countries has given the post-conflict situation, the implementation of varied. Findings indiicate that monitoring needs to be agreed policy and institutional reforms was satisfactory much closer and more frequent than can effectively be and the economic impacts were generally positive. The managed without a well-staffed resident mission. For report recognized that an unrealistic timeline for imple- example, lack of a resident mission in Cambodia and mentation was set, and it discussed problems with the Haiti, and inadequate field presence during the first two procurement process. It also recognized that the project 42 The Bank's Institutional Arrangements was not designed as a comprehensive reform package forced an erroneous diagnosis of the recovery problem but, rather, as an emergency response to assist with that led to serious problems in fiscal policy. urgent reconstruction imports. Despite the implementa- The two audits thus had in common a time frame for tion delays, the policy reforms supported by the credit a postwar recovery that was unrealistic but which would (devaluation was the only condition) helped to create have been appropriate for a stabilization and liberaliza- an environment favorable to economic growth. The tion program in a peacetime economy. They consequently credit also contributed to the Bank's knowledge of treated the fiscal deficit as a major problem rather than as Uganda's economy, allowed Bank staff to develop good a response to the Ugandan post-conflict conditions. Iron- relationships with the government, and laid a founda- ically, the much-heralded Uganda economic recovery, tion for the follow-up Reconstruction II and III projects already spread over a decade (and only approximately (pp. 28-32). When the PPAR was prepared a year later, halfway back to the prewar Ugandan economy) was it recognized that the credit was an initial contribution financed by credits rated unsatisfactory and marginally to the reconstruction process and had benefits that were unsatisfactory. not easily quantifiable. The PPAR focused mainly on procurement process problems and disbursement delays Developing Consistency and consequently downgraded the project rating to A review of two ICRs on post-1994 lending in Haiti sug- unsatisfactory. gests a potential inconsistency in Bank evaluation of The audit of the first Economic Recovery Credit post-conflict operations and indicates the limitations of (C 1844) also lowered the PCR rating from satisfactory to project-by-project evaluations in such circumstances. unsatisfactory, citing the importance of seeking a rapid The ICR on the Emergency Economic Recovery Credit increase in tax revenue to offset a decline in aid. As men- (EERC) gives the project a highly satisfactory rating tioned in Chapter 6, the Uganda case study found several according to the emergency context. Such projects, it problems with this conventional wisdom. First, the pre- notes, should have well-defined objectives focused on diction of a decline in aid was immediate needs, and a simple streamlined design. By 1=. few inaccurate: the net aid flow to contrast, the ICR on the Seventh Transport Project elatively few Uganda substantially increased in makes only muted reference to the conflict, the main reports are subsequent years and shows no cause of its largely unsatisfactory outcome, and misses prepared on signs of diminishing. Second, the an opportunity to provide a useful lesson. Both ICRs time. This is a audit analyzed the ERC as if it had focus on project achievements against stated objectives. been a standard stabilization Subsequent Bank judgment on the overall reconstruction long-standing problem and failed to appreciate program (conceding little progress on improving infra- problem. the distinctive features of a post- structure, social services, or the well-being of Haitians5) war recovery. The case study causes one to question the value of a highly satisfactory argues that the time frame for fiscal recovery in a post- project in an unsatisfactory program. Ironically, the ICR war environment should be determined by the need to on EERC noted this contradiction, yet it still gave the restore the taxable base of the economy. This, in turn, project a highly satisfactory rating. depends on such factors as the extent to which economic A recent DANIDA/DAC workshop6 on evaluating activity has retreated into subsistence and on the degree humanitarian assistance underscored the complexities of to which previous government revenue-raising policies evaluating post-conflict reconstruction efforts. In its have been predatory. In Uganda both conditions applied, review of good practice in evaluating humanitarian which implies the need for a prolonged period of low assistance, the workshop discussed how to measure per- taxation. The attempt to raise tax receipts rapidly can formance when evaluating assistance. While conven- actually delay the attainment of sustainability. In addi- tional criteria such as efficiency, effectiveness, impact, tion, donors tend to be pre-disposed to accept that large sustainability, and relevance of objectives were dis- aid-financed fiscal deficits must be reduced as rapidly as cussed, it was noted that during preparation of the Joint possible, and that failure to do so reflects reluctance of a Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, four government to make the requisite "tax effort." The case "new" criteria were added.7 study found that the endorsement in the PPAR of the * Connectedness-the need to ensure that short- Fund and Bank emphasis on increasing tax effort rein- term emergency activities are carried out in a con- 43 The World Bank's Ex-perience xvwth Post-Conflict Reconstr-ction text that takes longer-term and interconnected operations identified by the assessment team issued com- problems into account. pletion reports within the six-month interval (another * Coherence-the need to ensure that the activities six projects closed on or after August 30, 1997, so were of the international community are carried out still within the interval). The amount of time to issue with an effective division of labor among actors, completion reports ranged from six months to more maximizing the comparative advantages of each. than nine years, with the average being 18 months. To * Coverage-the need to reach major population address this and the other issues discussed above, OED groups facing life-threatening suffering wherever should develop guidance for staff on the conduct of they are, providing them with assistance and pro- ICRs and PPARs. tection proportionate to their need and devoid of extraneous poLitical agendas. Returning to "Normal" Operations * Appropriateness-the need to tailor humanitarian Assuming the success of a post-conflict reconstruction activities to local needs, increasing ownership, effort, the justification for such Bank operational fea- accountability, and cost-effectiveness accordingly. tures as: special procedures (e.g., for emergency opera- Although the workshop did not reach consensus on tions, procurement); addressing conflict-related issues in the use of new criteria to measure performance, the par- strategy and program documents; and for a larger-than- ticipants agreed that this is a critical issue for future normal resident mission will diminish over time. How- evaluations and that the DAC group will continue ever, how long it takes a country to achieve a relative exploring the topic. While perhaps not entirely applica- state of normalcy is a difficult question to answer. The ble to reconstruction efforts ("connectedness" replaced assessment team grappled with this question during its "sustainability," as many humanitarian aid interven- research, for example, debating whether to consider all tions are not intended to be sustainable), the new crite- assistance to Uganda as "post-conflict." The speed of ria do take into account some aspects unique to the post- the return to normalcy and the benchmarks for evaluat- conflict context that warrant consideration for future ing progress are not very well-developed, nor is there Bank evaluations of reconstruction efforts. much available relevant guidance.9 Possible indications A final issue for evaluation of post-conflict recon- of this transition include: (1) macroeconomic stability struction operations is timing. Considering the profound and its probable sustainability; (2) recovery of private economic and social changes that occur in post-conflict sector confidence, as measured by the investment ratio; countries, timely completion of post-conflict operation and (3) the effectiveness with which institutional completion reports is a necessity, particularly for earlier arrangements and the political system are coping with reconstruction operations. Even for "normal" opera- the tensions, schisms and behaviors that lay behind the tions, the Bank's Operational Manual states that ICRs conflicts. The Post-Conflict Unit should examine this should be issued no longer than six months after the issue and explore the development of indicators to deter- closing date.8 However, only nine (plus one in draft mine when the "post-conflict" period ends and "nor- form) of the 65 completed post-conflict reconstruction malcy" begins. 44 Directions for Future Bank Policy ost-conflict reconstruction is not a peripheral issue; it affects the Bank's core activities. If the Bank is to improve the relevance, efficacy, and efficiency of its support to post-conflict countries, it needs to adjust the way it conducts business to accommodate the special needs of countries emerging from conflict. The April 1997 Framework for World Bank Involve- ment in Post-Conflict Reconstruction provides some guidance under which such assistance may be provided, but it does not constitute a firm policy statement. Thus, the study recommends that the Framework be revised and transformed into an Opera- The main conclusion of this study is that the Bank tional Policy. The revised Framework should address needs to revise its current policy guidance in A Frame- how the Bank designs its policy dialogue with a post- work for World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict conflict country and how it assesses its performance. It Reconstruction, and transform it into an Operational should deal with the way the Bank develops a CAS, how Policy statement.1 The Post-Conflict Unit should handle it prepares and implements operations, and how it mon- this task, modifying the Framework to take into account itors and evaluates programs in countries recovering the finding of this assessment, and developing statements from conflict. of Bank Policy (BPs) and Good Practices (GPs) to guide Since 1980 the volume of Bank lending to post-con- staff in providing such assistance. OP 8.5 should be flict countries has increased over 800 percent, with the revised to apply only to disasters that are unexpected and most significant increase occurring in the first half of the of limited duration such as natural disasters, or man- 1990s. The substantial growth of the post-conflict portfo- made ones (e.g., large-scale industrial accidents). The OP, lio and the regional and sectoral allocations are discussed BPs, and GPs should address the following issues: in Chapter 3. OP 8.5, the policy currently used for post- * advice on the economic development implications conflict reconstruction, focuses mainly on events of short of peace accord options; duration, such as earthquakes, floods or hurricanes, - post-conflict aid coordination; which do not affect institutions and which require a rapid * definition of priorities among macroeconomic sta- response to rebuild physical infrastructure. Civil conflicts, bilization, infrastructure rebuilding, and restora- on the other hand, are of protracted duration and they tion of human and social capital; destroy the social fabric of a country. Their causes typi- * macroeconomic and structural policy conditionality; cally go back in time and result in situations that require * flexibility in programming, design, and implemen- long-term development efforts. Furthermore, unlike nat- tation; ural disasters, civil conflicts require major efforts in deal- * institutional arrangements; ing with institutional frameworks and macroeconomic * monitoring and evaluation; and conditions. * promoting equitable development. 45 The World Bank's Experiencc with Post-Conflict Reconstruction Peace negotiations. To the extent possible, and if of ex-combatants, the Bank should strengthen the invited, the Bank should be an active adviser to peace capacity it has acquired and incorporate the relevant negotiations rather thian an observer. The main purpose experience of other agencies.2 would be to make the parties aware of the implications Conditionality. While a natural disaster response for economic development, including economic benefits requires policy conditionality aimed only at reducing the and costs, of alternatives being considered by relevant potential impacts of future disasters (as indicated in parties during peace negotiations. The Bank played this OP8.5), the macroeconomic issues at stake in post-con- role at the Dayton Accords negotiations for Bosnia and flict reconstruction call for more substantial policy condi- Herzegovina, and in Guatemala. tionality. The new OP should include such ccnditionality Early and active role in post-conflict aid coordina- but also indicate that its use requires a case-by-case analy- tion. This does not necessarily imply leadership of the sis. Depending on country implementation capacity and process, but it will probably call for leadership on the political environment, it may not be appropriate to macroeconomic and external debt issues, strengthening introduce wide-ranging conditionalities all at once. While policy dialogue ancd policy reform, and mobilizing the immediate post-conflict period can be a window of resources. The new BPs and GPs on post-conflict recon- opportunity to pursue policy reforms, especially those struction should reflect that effective coordination essential to macroeconomic stability, caution should be arrangements require active internal and external exercised in pursuing an ambitious reform agenda soon involvement by Bank senior management and a well- after a major social collapse. Thus, loan and grant agree- staffed resident mission to ensure effective coordination ments in post-conflict as in other countries should contain at the sectoral and implementation levels. provisions essential to accomplishing the development Priorities. Supporting the achievement of macroeco- objectives of recovery operations. In Uganda, the Fund nomic stabilization should be one of the Bank's highest and the Bank emphasized increased tax effort that, in and earliest priorities in post-conflict situations. The view of the country's history of predatory tax policy, may pursuit of other economic reforms should be well have depressed private investment. approached incrementally, taking into account the coun- Flexibility. Early post-conflict situations require try's historical context and current policy and institu- timely and flexible programming, design, and imple- tional enabling environment. The Bank should also be mentation. The new BPs and GPs should direct country prepared to support the rebuilding of physical infra- departments to make greater use of preparation and structure, with adeqaate attention to necessary policy piloting funds, and "action research" projects. Expedi- and institutional reforms. To participate effectively in tious preparation, piloting and bridging funcds, and loan those areas, the Post-Conflict Unit, in cooperation with instruments (such as the new PCP, LIL, and APL) should EDI and the LLC, should undertake training geared to be resourced at sufficient levels to enable the Bank to be strengthening Bank capacity to lead damage and needs effective earlier in post-conflict situations. From the ini- assessments that employ the most effective means of tial base of a well-prepared damage and needs assess- generating needs information and draw on scholarly ment, the Bank's reconstruction strategy should be expertise on the sociopolitical environment. In defining refined over the following months and years through a priorities, adherence to existing relevant guidelines, such series of incremental efforts, such as workshops and pol- as the 1997 Operational Guidelines on Demining, is crit- icy notes. A full CAS can be prepared when time, capac- ical. Thus, support for mine clearance should be always ity, and resources permit. Mechanisms for rapid pro- integrated with a specific development activity. The curement and disbursement should be (levised for Bank should help post-conflict countries develop cost- post-conflict situations, consistent with sound practice. effective strategies to restore human and social capital, The Bank's institutional arrangements. The new especially in education and health. Early sector work GPs should reflect that senior management must give and better use of social analysis is recommended to high priority to staffing and structuring post-conflict improve project design. As the social sectors have not country teams. The country director must have a man- been an area of strong performance for the Bank, part- date to give the country substantial if not full-time atten- nerships with other agencies better placed to help restore tion and resident representatives need sufficient author- human and social capital should be pursued. In provid- ity to make a wide range of programming and ing further support for demobilization and reintegration implementation decisions in the field. Despite the high 46 Directions for Future Bank Policv School children in Zenica, Bosnia up-front costs, adequately-staffed resident missions are a objectives. The Post-Conflict Unit, in consultation with pre-condition for successful Bank intervention in post- OED, should support the development of performance conflict situations. indicators for assessing the contribution of the overall Monitoring and evaluation. To implement post- country portfolio to sustainable peace and development conflict operations satisfactorily, the Bank must be pre- in a post-conflict setting. In view of the need for com- pared to allocate sufficient administrative budget pletion information in often highly volatile post-conflict resources for adequate monitoring. Monitoring and settings, country departments should ensure that com- evaluation should be accompanied by an ESW program pletion reports for post-conflict operations are com- that includes household and community studies, prefer- pleted promptly. This matter should be brought to the ably longitudinal ones that address human and social attention of the Bank-wide task force currently review- capital issues as well as income-generation needs and ing the ICR process. The new BPs should sharply reduce constraints. The overall Bank portfolio in a post-conflict the interval between project closing and completion country should be periodically assessed for relevance, report. Finally, OED should develop guidelines in con- that is, its contribution to sustainable peace and devel- sultation with the Post-Conflict Unit on how to apply opment. While under normal circumstances a Country evaluation criteria with greater sensitivity to the post- Portfolio Performance Review is conducted every 12 to conflict political and economic environment when con- 18 months, in post-conflict countries the overall portfo- ducting completion reports. These guidelines should be lio should be assessed at least every 12 months. Project- illustrated in the new GPs. by-project assessments often do not provide the broader Promoting equitable development. The case studies picture, although multisectoral or adjustment operations revealed several examples in which the Bank either did should certainly be assessed on their contribution to the not address emerging distributional imbalances or missed larger objective. Initial investments should be assessed a significant opportunity to promote equitable develop- on how they contribute to long-term reconstruction ment (see Chapter 4). While the Bank may be unable to 47 The World Bank's Experience wvith Post-Conflict Reconstruction prevent conflict, it needs to recognize its potential to to be sensitive to predatory and exclusionary behavior influence the course of pre-conflict events. Although it that adversely affects projects and shared development may not be appropriate for the Bank to adopt an Opera- objectives. The Bank should raise such concerns in its tional Policy on conflict prevention (as this may imply dialogue with the government and other donors. The crossing the line in some cases into the realm of political Bank should support and pursue economic and distribu- issues that are inappropriate under the Bank's mandate), tional policies and programs that can avoid a slide into Good Practices should be developed that encourage staff conflict within deeply divided societies. 48 ENDNOTES Chapter 1 5. In Sri Lanka, the Bank has been involved in other parts of 1. Address to the 1997 World Bank Annual Meetings, Hong the country throughout the entire conflict. It got involved in the Kong, September 23, 1997. conflict zones in 1987 when it looked as if peace would prevail 2. Overseas Development Institute, Humanitarian Policy Pro- but, in fact, conflict periodically escalated during the next three gramme. Good Practice Review: Evaluating Humanitarian Assis- years and returned on a larger scale in 1990. tance Programmes. London: December 24, 1997 (draft). 3. Robert Muscat, "The World Bank's Role in Conflict Pre- vention and Post-conflict Reconstruction," internal World Bank Chapter 3 paper, prepared for the Task Force on Failed States, November 27, 1. World Bank, The Blue Book. The Planning and Budgeting 1995. Another study uses the term "collapsed states," which are Department. (Washington: July 1995), p. 8. defined as "situation[s] where the structure, authority (legitimate 2. There are, of course, a number of transitions, particularly power), law, and political order have fallen apart and must be in the "northern tier" of Central and Eastern Europe countries, reconstituted in some form, old or new." See I. William Zartman, that have been relatively free of such difficulties. "Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse," in Col- 3. World Bank, Implementation Completion Report. Repub- lapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate lic of Nicaragua. Social Investment Fund Project (Credit 2434- Authority, edited by 1. William Zarrman (Boulder and London: NI). Report No. 16428. Washington: March 28, 1997, p. i. Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1975), p. 1. 4. The Bank financed an Emergency Reconstruction and 4. Muscat, op. cit., para. 2.9. Rehabilitation Project (C1883) in 1988 that only partly achieved 5. Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, its objectives, mainly because of the full-scale resumption of hos- "The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons tilities by 1990. from the Rwanda Experience," published by the Steering Com- 5. The 800 percent is based on the lending volume by fiscal mittee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to year of the 157 post-conflict reconstruction operations identified Rwanda, March 1996. by the assessment team (listed in Annex 2). It includes amounts for 6. The Committee on Development Effectiveness noted the Rwanda that were reallocated from "normal" operations for post- importance of analyzing conflicts from a regional approach and conflict reconstruction. assessing the spill-over effects of conflict on neighboring countries. 6. Another reason these results would have limited ex ante 7. These factors are based on those suggested in the previ- "predictive value" is that the PCRs/ICRs for 6 of the 12 opera- ously cited paper by Robert Muscat. An annex of the Muscat tions were issued after the April-July 1994 genocide. However, the paper delineates four factors determining the scope for continuing implementation periods for these 6 operations were concentrated or resuming Bank operations in countries emerging from conflict. during the early 1990s. See the Rwanda case study in Annex 1. These are: (i) relative absence of internal conflict; (ii) legitimate 7. The Cambodia figure is based on recent estimates of the and effective civil authority; (iii) freedom from large debt; and (iv) "Cambodia Genocide Project" that about 1.7 million people were sufficient international interest for conflict resolution. The nine killed during the Khmer Rouge period, from 1975 to 1979. case study countries represent a mix in such factors, but none was Reported in Susan Cook, "Documenting Genocide: Cambodia's so problematic for most factors that the Bank ruled out active Lessons for Rwanda," paper presented at the Meetings of the involvement. American Anthropological Association, Washington, D.C., November 21, 1997 (New Haven: Yale University, 1997). Chapter 2 8. These declines are believed to overstate the actual drop in 1. Christine Wallich, in a comment on a previous draft of the economic activity because the share of unrecorded activity is prob- assessment's overall report, observed that "the current procedures ably greater during conflict. Nonetheless, these figures undoubt- (which eschew policy conditionality) seem much more applicable edly reflect unprecedented declines in overall productive activity, to rebuilding after an earthquake in a stable policy environment as well as massive changes in the structure of economic activity. (where policies may be quite fine) than they do to post-conflict, 9. Although conflict was not the only factor accounting for where institutions have been destroyed." (E-mail of January 5, slower, or negative, growth during the conflict periods in these 1998, from Christine Wallich to Roger Slade.) countries, it was certainly a directly and indirectly contributing 2. MOP for Emergency Electric Power Reconstruction factor. It will take decades of sustained rapid growth in El Sal- Project (Report No. P-6804), para. 8. vador and Sri Lanka to bring the economy to where it might have 3. A Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post- been had it continued growing at the same pace as during the Conflict Reconstruction, April 25, 1997, para. 34. 5-to-10 years before the conflict, and even longer if the impact of 4. As of July 19, 1996, Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia, Somalia, population growth on per capita income is considered. Sudan, Yugoslavia, and Zaire had arrears to IBRD and IDA total- ing US$1740.50 million. BiH's arrears were cleared as of June 14, Chapter 4 1996, through refinancing by the Bank and remains in non-accrual 1. See World Bank, "Guidelines to Staff on Anticorruption status ("A Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-Con- Report," Memorandum from Joanne Salop, September 15, 1997, flict Reconstruction," Annex 3). para. 13. On September 2, 1997, the Bank's Board of Directors 49 The World Bank's E:sperience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction discussed a report, Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The increased tax effort to offset declining aid does not turn out to be Role of the World Bank, prepared by the Poverty Reduction and valid in this case ( an argument used by the Bank and Fund). Economic Management Network (PREM). The "Guidelines to 2. These concerns are consistent with the three conditions for Staff" drew from the Anticorruption Report and the 1997 World reform readiness delineated in a Bank study of global privatization Development Report: The State in a Changing World. experience, Bureaucrats in Business: The Economics and Politics 2. See James Boyce, ed., Economic Policy for Building Peace: of Governmental Ownership, a World Bank Policy Research The Lessons of El Salvador, Chapter 13, "Conclusions and Rec- Report (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). ommendations." Boulder and London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, The three conditions, based on both theoretical considerations and 1996, pp. 280-81. empirical evidence, are (i) reform must be politically desirable to 3. The Committee on Development Effectiveness emphasized leaders and their constituencies; (ii) reform must be politically fea- two principles for a potential Bank participation in peace negotia- sible; and (iii) the government must be able to promise credibly to tions: (i) such participation should be result of a specific invitation; stick to the reform in the future. Ibid., p. 233. (ii) the Bank should not be involved in discussions concerning the political dimensions of peace negotiations. 4. The Committee on Development Effectiveness underlined Chapter 7 the importance of partnerships in bringing about a flexible and 1. El Salvador has never had a Bank resident mission, and it pragmatic response to post-conflict situations. is uncertain whether one was needed during the earlhT post-conflict years. Staff involved at the time believe that the relative proximity Chapter 5 of El Salvador to Bank headquarters and good travel connections to Washington made a resident mission unnecessary. Some staff 1. Daniela Gressani and John Page, "Reconstruction Efforts believe that not having a resident mission even facilitated the in Lebanon and West Bank Gaza: Challenges for Macroeconomic Bank's role as "honest broker" in the critical stage of early aid Management," preliminary draft, paper prepared for the Confer- mobilization and coordination. Others, including some Salvado- ence on Globalization and the Middle East and North Africa, ran interlocutors and other Bank staff, believe the Bank would sponsored by the Institut du Monde Arabe and the World Bank, have developed more constructive early relationships with local March 14, 1997, Paris. NGOs and civil society if it had established a resident mission in 2. The Committee on Development Effectiveness noted the the early 1990s. important linkages between infrastructure reconstruction and job 2. The Sri Lanka resident mission has in recent years sub- creation and the relevance of both in post-conflict situations. stantially expanded the number of local professional staff and the 3. OECD, DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Develop- Rwanda mission plans in fiscal year 1998 to add one expatriate ment Co-operation, Paris, 1997, p. 14. consultant and two local staff. 4. See Katarina Toll, "Needs and Potential," in DHA News, 3. See World Bank, Development Grant Facility: A Proposal, No. 22, April/May 1997, p. 19. R97-1 85, (Washington: attached to Memorandum from Vice Pres- 5. World Bank, Bosnia and Herzegovina Local Initiatives ident and Secretary to Executive Directors, July 29, 1997). Project. Pilot Phase Evaluation Report. May 1997. 4. This study reviewed and discusses the procurement and 6. OECD, op cit., p. 31. disbursement procedures now in place. The Bank is currently 7. The CODE strongly supported providing additional reforming these procedures. emphasis to gender issues in post-conflict reconstruction. 5. World Bank, Haiti. Consultative Group Meeting. Report 8. Documented in Colletta, et al, The Transition from War to to the Executive Directors, Report No. SecM97-299, (Washing- Peace. Directions in Development; and Case Studies in the Transi- ton: April 21, 1997), p. 1. tion from War to Peace: The Demobilization and Reintegration of 6. The Workshop on Best Practice in the Elvaluation of Ex-combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia, and Uganda. World Bank Humanitarian Assistance was organized by DANIDA and DAC. It Discussion Paper No. 3.31. Both Washington, DC: World Bank, was held in Copenhagen on January 27, 1998. 1996. 7. The new criteria were borrowed from a paper by Larry 9. Internal memo from Nat Colletta, January 20, 1998. Minear, The International Relief System: A Critical Review, avail- 10. A recent UN study by Graca Machel, The Impact of able from Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies Armed Conflict on Children, reports that over the past 30 years, (http://www.brown.edu). government and rebel arrnies around the world have recruited tens 8. World Bank, Operational Manual: Good Practices, of thousands of children, most of them adolescents under 18 but "Implementation Completion Reporting," GP 13.55 (Washington: also children aged 10 and younger. April 1994), p. 4. A Bank-wide task force is currently reviewing the ICR process overall and is expected to make recommendations Chapter 6 on this matter 1. In contrast to the situation in Lebanon, described in the 9. The Bank Framework paper briefly mentions a "Stage previous chapter substantial public capital inflows in the form of Five: Return to Normal Operations," but defines it in vague terms previous chaptr, sustarialpblicapitainflwsinthefrmof as a stage "when the emergency phase is over and operations are aid can be expected for Uganda for a number of years. Thus, once more carried our under normal lending procedures, and the 50 Endnotes consciousness of conflict begins to wane ...... It is also worth not- policy should highlight the importance of restoring social capital ing that most of the operations reviewed for this study were car- and of addressing gender issues in reconstruction. ried out under normal Bank lending procedures. 2. The CODE noted the important role that Executive Direc- tors can play early in post-conflict situations in discussing infor- mation with staff. They also emphasized the catalystic role played Chapter 8 by one Executive Director, Ms. Eveline Herkens of the Nether- 1. The CODE endorsed this recommendation and noted the lands, in promoting the Bank's involvement in the reconstruction need for a new policy on post-conflict reconstruction. The new program for Bosnia and Herzegovina. 51 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Anderson, Mary B. Do No Harm: Supporting Local tion of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, March Capacities for Peace Through Aid, Collaborative for 1996. Development Action, Boston: 1996. Galtung, Johan. Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Azam, Jean-Paul, David Bevan, Paul Collier, Stefan Der- Conflict, Development and Civilization. Oslo: Inter- con, Jan Gunning, and Sanjay Pradhan. Some Eco- national Peace Research Institute, 1996. nomic Consequences of the Transition from Civil Gressani, Daniela and John Page. "Reconstruction War to Peace. Policy Research Working Paper No. Efforts in Lebanon and West Bank Gaza: Challenges 1392. Washington, DC: World Bank, 1994. for Macroeconomic Management," preliminary draft Ball, Nicole. Making Peace Work: The Role of the Inter- paper prepared for the Conference on Globalization national Development Community, Washington: DC, and the Middle East and North Africa, sponsored by 1996. the Institut du Monde Arabe and the World Bank, Boyce, James (ed.). Economic Policy for Building Peace: March 14, 1997, Paris. The Lessons of El Salvador. Boulder and London: Holtzman, Steven. "Post-Conflict Reconstruction," Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1996. Work In Progress Paper, Washington, DC: World Brown, Michael E. (ed.) The International Dimensions Bank, 1995. of Internal Conflict: CSIA Studies in International International Monetary Fund. International Financial Security, No. 10, Cambridge: MIT, 1996. Statistics. various annual editions. Colletta, Nat, Markus Kostner and Ingo Wiederhofer. Fund Involvement in Post-Conflict Countries. The Transition from War to Peace. Directions in Washington: confidential draft, August 15, 1995. Development. Washington, DC: World Bank, 1996. Jean, Francois and Jean-Christophe Rufin (eds.). _ Case Studies in the Transition from War to Peace: Economie des guerres civiles, Paris: Fondation pour The Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combat- les Etudes de Defense, 1996. ants in Ethiopia, Namibia, and Uganda. World Bank Krishna Kumar, et al. "Rebuilding Post-war Rwanda," Discussion Paper No. 331. Washington, DC: World Study 4 in The International Response to Conflict Bank, 1996. and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience. Collier, Paul. "On the Economic Consequences of Civil Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emer- War," August 1996. gency Assistance to Rwanda, March 1996. Collier, Paul, and Anika Hoeffler. "On Economic Causes Lautze, Sue. "Lives Versus Livelihoods: How to Foster of Civil War," Oxford: Centre for the Study of Self-sufficiency and Productivity of Disaster Victims," African Economies, September 1996. Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance, Occasional Cook, Susan. "Documenting Genocide: Cambodia's Paper No. 1, March 1966. Lessons for Rwanda," paper presented at the Meet- Lautze, Sue and John Hammock. "Coping with Crisis; ings of the American Anthropological Association, Coping with Aid: Capacity Building, Coping Mecha- Washington, DC, November 21, 1997. New Haven: nisms and Dependency, Linking Relief and Develop- Yale University, 1997. ment," UNDHA, December 1966. Cuny, EC. and V. Tanner. "Working with Communities Macrae, Joanna, Anthony B. Zwi, and Lucy Gilson. "A to Reduce Levels of Conflict: Spot Reconstruction, Triple Burden for Health Sector Reform: Post-Conflict Disaster Prevention and Management," Vol. 4, No. 1, Rehabilitation in Uganda," Social Science Medicine, 1995. Vol. 42, No. 7, 1996, pp. 1095-1108. Donini, Antonio. "The Policies of Mercy: UN Coordi- Mahling Clark, Kimberly. "Fostering a Farewell to nation in Afghanistan, Mozambique, and Rwanda," Arms: Preliminary Lessons Learned in the Demobi- Occasional Paper #22, Providence: Thomas J. Watson lization and Reintegration of Combatants," Washing- Institute for International Studies, 1996. ton, DC: USAID, Center for Development Informa- Duffield, Mark. "Complex Emergencies and the Crisis tion and Evaluation, 1996. of Developmentalism," IDS Bulletin, Vol. 25, No. 4, "The Demobilization and Reintegration of Sol- October 1994. diers: Perspectives from USAID," Africa Today, 42 Eriksson, John, et al. "The International Response to (1-2). Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Marshall, Katherine. "Emerging from Conflict: What Experience." Steering Committee of the Joint Evalua- Roles for International Development Finance Institu- 53 The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction tions?" Developmnent Discussion Paper No. 587. Toll, Katarina. "Needs and Potential," in 1)HA News, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Harvard Insti- No. 22, April/May 1997. p. 19. tute for International Development, June, 1997. UN General Assembly. "Supplement to an Agenda for "A Special Partnership: UNHCR and the World Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary General on the Bank." Draft, April 1997. Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Maxwell, Simon, anti Margaret Buchanan-Smith (eds.). Nations," A/50/60, S/1995/1, January 1995. Linking Relief and Development, IDS Bulletin, Vol. "Strengthening the Coordination of Hamanitarian 25, No. 4, October 1994. and Disaster Relief," A/51/172, E/1996/77. Minear, Larry. The International Relief System: A Criti- UNDP. "Building Bridges Between Relief and Develop- cal Review, available from Thomas J. Watson Jr. Insti- ment, A Compendium of the UNDP Record in Crisis tute for International Studies (http://www.brown.edu). Countries," UNDP Emergency Response Division, Minear, Larry and Thomas G. Weiss, Mercy Under Fire: 1996. War and the Global Humanitarian Community. Boul- UNICEE The Impact of Armed Conflict cn Children. der: Westview, 1995. New York: United Nations, 1996. Muscat, Robert. Conflict and Reconstruction: Roles for USAID. "Office of Transition Initiatives: The First Two the World Bank, inpublished paper for OED, World Years," A Report to Congress, May 1996. Bank, November 1995. Uvin, Peter. "Development, Aid and Conflict. Reflec- OECD. "Draft Policy Orientations: The Special Challenges tions Starting from the Case of Rwanda," Discussion of Assistance in Crisis and Recovery-Working Group Paper for UNDHA, July 1, 1996. II," DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Develop- World Bank. Action Plan for Education Lending: Edu- ment Cooperation, DCD(96)10, August 30, 1996. cation in Countries Emerging from Conflict. Draft OECD/DAC. DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Strategy Paper. Washington, DC: October 1997. Development Cooperation. Paris: 1997. "Guidelines to Staff on Anticorruption Report," Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development, Memorandum from Joanne Salop, September 15, Draft Policy Orientations: Linking Development Co- 1997. operation to Conflict Prevention, Working Group 1, Development Grant Facility: A Proposal, R97-185, September 6, 1996. Washington: attached to Memorandum from Vice Omaar, Rakiya, and Alex DeWaal. "Humanitarianism President and Secretary to Executive Directors, July Unbound? Curren,t Dilemmas Facing Multi-mandate 29, 1997. Relief Operations in Political Emergencies," Discus- Memorandum ... on a Country Assistance Strat- sion Paper No. 5 African Rights, November 1994. egy ... for Bosnia and Herzegovina, July 31, 1997. Overseas Development Institute, Humanitarian Policy _ Office Memorandum from Xavier Devictor to Hans Programme. Good Practice Review: Evaluating J. Apitz, "Lessons Learned from the Implementation Humanitarian Assistance Programmes. London: of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Emergency Landmines December 24, 1997 (draft). Clearance Project," June 20, 1997. Prendergast, John and Colin Scott. "Aid with Integrity." _ Memorandum ... on a Proposed Credit ... to the Occasional Paper No. 2. Washington, DC: OFDA/ Rwandese Republic for an Emergency Reintegration USAID, March 1996. and Recovery Credit, June 11, 1997. Rama, Martin. Efficient Public Sector Downsizing. Pol- Cambodia Country Economic Report, June 1997. icy Research Working Paper No. 1840. Washington, Bosnia and Herzegovina Local Initiatives Project. DC: World Bank, November 1997. Pilot Phase Evaluation Report. Washington, DC: Randel, Judith and lony German, (eds.). The Reality of May 1997. Aid: An Independent Review of International Aid. Haiti. Consultative Group Meeting. Report to the Earthscan, 1996. Executive Directors, Report No. SecM97-299, Wash- Srivastava, Ramesh. Reintegrating Demobilized Com- ington, DC: April 21, 1997. batants: A Report Exploring Options and Strategies A Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post- for Training-related Interventions, Vocational Train- Conflict Reconstruction, Washington, DC: April 1997. ing Management: Studies. Geneva: International _ Implementation Completion Report. Republic of Labour Office, 1994. Nicaragua. Social Investment Fund Project (Credit 54 Selected Bibliography 2434-NI). Report No. 16428. Washington, DC: erating Project for Refugee Areas, and Third Income- March 28, 1997. generating Project for Refugee Areas. Report No. The Strategic Compact: Renewing the Bank's 15862, Operations Evaluation Department, Washing- Effectiveness to Fight Poverty, Washington, DC: Feb- ton, DC: June 28, 1996. ruary 13, 1997. The Blue Book. The Planning and Budgeting Operational Memorandum from Robert Hindle to Department. Washington, DC: July 1995. Staff Recipients of the Operational Manual, "Demi- Bureaucrats in Business: The Economics and Poli- ning: Operational Guidelines for Financing Land tics of Governmental Ownership, a World Bank Pol- Mine Clearance," February 7, 1997. icy Research Report. Oxford and New York: Oxford Poverty Reduction and Economic Management University Press, 1995. Network (PREM). Helping Countries Combat Cor- _ Operational Manual: Good Practices, "Implemen- ruption: The Role of the World Bank. Washington, tation Completion Reporting," GP 13.55. Washing- DC: 1997. ton, DC: April 1994. 1997 World Development Report: The State in a _ Operational Manual, Operational Directive 14.30, Changing World. Washington, DC: 1997. "Aid Coordination Groups." Washington: March Operations Evaluation Department, The Evalua- 1989 (updated March 1994). tion of Economic and Sector Work: A Review, Wash- World Bank and EU. The Economic Vision and Near- ington, DC: November 1996. term Tasks Towards Sustainable Recovery and Memorandum ... on a Proposed Credit ... to Bosnia Growth, Washington, DC: November 1996. and Herzegovina for an Emergency Electric Power Zartman, I. William, (ed.). Collapsed States: The Disin- Reconstruction Project. Report No. P-6804, July 10, tegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority. 1996. Boulder and London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, _ Pakistan Impact Evaluation Report: Income-gener- 1975. ating Project for Refugee Areas, Second Income-gen- 55 ANNEXES ANNEX 1. SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS OF THE CASE STUDIES The nine case study countries are markedly diverse in restoring macroeconomic stability was highly satisfac- socioeconomic characteristics, duration and intensity of tory: in promoting structural reform (liberalization) it conflict, and resulting reconstruction needs. The Bank's was marginally satisfactory. The Bank's role in rebuild- approach to reconstruction of these countries can be ing economic sectors ranged from marginally satisfac- considered equally diverse, ranging from comprehensive tory to satisfactory; in promoting the recovery of social support of all major sectors coupled with non-lending sectors, Bank performance ranged from unsatisfactory services such as damage and needs assessment and aid to highly satisfactory; and in aid coordination it was coordination; to more modest, strategic lending focusing uneven. The staffing and management of country teams on fewer areas; to efforts concentrating on economic and resident missions ranged widely from unsatisfactory stabilization. The results of these efforts have been to highly satisfactory. The following is a summary of uneven. The Bank's performance across the nine cases in findings from each of the cases. Bosnia and Herzegovina The Bank's response to post-conflict needs in Bosnia and ect processing. The resident representative was impor- Herzegovina (BiH) was early and comprehensive. Its tant in the process. His ability to deal with differing per- role in reconstruction and economic recovery is per- spectives and work with all involved parties in the reso- ceived to have been successful by BiH authorities, other lution of issues is very much appreciated by the donors, NGOs, and beneficiaries. The OED evaluation government, donors and other agencies. team agrees with this assessment. The Bank's non-lend- The OED mission found that the benefits of Bank- ing activities, including providing a framework for assisted projects to date are being felt throughout the reconstruction and guidance to donors are appreciated. Federation, and are increasingly reaching Republika Srp- There is widespread recognition that Bank-supported ska. The range of benefits has been delivered quickly to projects were implemented quickly. Other elements of a diverse set of beneficiaries, while involving stakehold- success include: a wide dispersion of benefits, both geo- ers and building local implementation capacity. At this graphically and to a broad range of beneficiaries; stage the projects cannot be evaluated for sustainability involvement of stakeholders; an early and balanced or institutional development. Several factors contributed inclusion of social sector projects to rebuild human cap- to success in the implementation phase, including early ital; and a contribution to local implementation capac- establishment of a resident mission, streamlined project ity. BiH authorities particularly appreciated the sense of processing and procurement procedures, sector diversifi- ownership afforded them by Bank projects. cation, pilot projects and project preparation, local own- The peace implementation agenda dictated a com- ership, and widespread participation. pressed timetable for launching the reconstruction pro- Of particular importance for the reconstruction gram. The Bank was able to adhere to this timetable work of donors, especially for the World Bank, are the because of the availability of planning resources; support provisions for fiscal strategy built into the Dayton from the Netherlands' ED; strong and visible support accords. The BiH experience demonstrates the impor- from the Bank's President; the Bank taking the lead role tance of incorporating into a peace accord, to the extent in coordinating the planning work; its coordination with possible, economic management provisions more likely other actors; and superb staff quality and dedication. to enhance than obstruct the economic recovery process. In addition to speed, the special attention given to Despite Dayton's built-in obstacles to effective economic the program within the Bank contributed to the overall governance (and the continuing political tensions), the quality of the program. A highly skilled country director first year and a half of peace have seen substantial eco- was appointed solely for BiH. Her commitment to the nomic recovery. The Bank has been central in the mobi- process, attention to speed, and quality of work was lization and application of external resources critical to important in meeting the compressed timetable for proj- this recovery. 57 The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction Cambodia The Bank assumed a different task in the reconstruction to the donors, yet the Bank's own strategy neglects this efforts of Cambodia, which may be understandable after area. Unlike the first Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), a 20-year absence from the country. As one of many the current CAS makes no mention of education, even agencies and donors contributing to the recovery, the under the high-lending scenario. Bank staff have not vet Bank appropriately participated in a division of func- developed a project concept that would put education tions and subjects, and played a more limited role in aid into the pipeline before 1999-a major omission in Cam- coordination. Lending assistance has mainly focused on bodia's circumstances. A project on disease control and budget support and macroeconomic stability, leaving prevention is just beginning implementation. numerous areas for the lead attention of other donors. Regarding civil service reform, it is unfortunate that In some important economic areas, however, the Bank has continued to put downsizing at the center greater attention by the Bank might have produced more of the problems of administrative capacity. The installa- satisfactory outcomes. For example, as a revenue-gener- tion of a reduction process early in the life of the coali- ator and export-earning sector in the long run, rubber tion arrangement-which was based on raising the size should be more important than the forestry sector, and of the civil service in order to absorb large numbers of would seem to merit Bank/Fund attention at least as vig- the incoming parties' functionaries-was never politi- orous as that accorded to forestry. The Bank assumed cally realistic and was quickly recognized as such by that rubber sector reform could be brought about by the some observers. This is only one example of several bilateral donor that took responsibility for that sector. problems where the Bank did not correctly judge the After several years, the donor's substantial efforts have political feasibility of the policies being urged upon the not succeeded. Another example is the neglect of the authorities. Ministry of Commerce, despite the Ministry's impor- A final area of Bank deficiency is failure to establish tance for external trade, domestic commerce, and Cam- a resident mission. The dual track coordination system bodia's impending entry into ASEAN. that evolved-the Bank externally coordinating the Human capital development is another area deserv- donors at the level of resource mobilization and overall ing of more attention. To achieve good performance on strategy, and UNDP coordinating locally-had insuffi- macroeconomic balances, the authorities underfunded cient interaction and left much to be desired. A Bank res- social capital recovery and the maintenance of economic ident mission could have improved the interface infrastructure. The Bank could have done more to nego- between the tracks and promoted better sequencing and tiate a commitment to macroeconomic recovery strategies operation of local sector groups. Several staff members that do not consign social capital recovery to the status of of the country team believe that Bank design and imple- mere policy residuals. The Bank has placed deserved mentation work would have been carried out more effi- emphasis on human resource development in its reports ciently if a resident mission had been established. 58 Annexes El Salvador The Bank's assistance to El Salvador focused mainly on reconstruction was indispensable. The holding of a CG macroeconomic reform, but included projects address- meeting before the peace accords were signed and the ing the health and education sectors to improve the commitment of experienced and capable Bank leader- country's poor social indicators. Bank assistance was ship to the process contributed significantly to the effec- critical to laying a sound macroeconomic foundation for tiveness of coordination. It was important that the an impressive economic recovery during the first half of GOES gave priority to donor coordination and endorsed the 1990s, as well as for mobilizing international eco- the Bank's supportive role. nomic support. While the Bank lagged behind several In the social sectors, the Bank seized a window of other donors in the volume of its post-conflict assis- opportunity in supporting EDUCO, the community self- tance, its leadership of a series of four CG meetings managed education initiative of the government. This between 1991 and 1995 made a vital contribution to expanding initiative promises to correct and reverse post-conflict reconstruction and economic recovery. Sev- some basic deficiencies in the pre-conflict educational eral high-quality lending operations and non-lending system of El Salvador. The EDUCO experience provides services made significant contributions. However, no a good example of post-conflict support not being lim- effort, with or without donor support, has yet shown ited to reconstruction but entailing a redirection of any real promise for reversing a serious socioeconomic development. However, the Bank's experience in provid- legacy of the conflict: violent crime, or "microinsecu- ing support to the health sector in El Salvador during the rity," of epidemic proportions. early post-conflict years has been mixed, and has not yet By establishing effective working relationships with led to a full follow-on project. the government a couple of years before the peace A high degree of capability, experience and continu- accords, the Bank was able to provide timely macroeco- ity combined to develop an effective Bank country team nomic assistance and coordination support to El Sal- in the crucial years just before and after the El Salvador vador's reconstruction program. The timing of the peace accords. This team made a critical contribution to Bank's re-entry in El Salvador was propitious albeit not the Bank's performance in a tense environment. For a entirely intentional. Without the earthquake disaster, the country as close to Bank headquarters in Washington as pre-peace accords relationships between the govern- El Salvador, it was not essential to have a resident mis- ment, the private think-tank, FUSADES, and the Bank sion during the reconstruction period. The Bank may might not have developed as expeditiously and produc- have been better able to play its lead role in aid coordi- tively as they did. nation and as interlocutor between the government and Early operations, including the two SALs, and the donors without a resident presence in El Salvador. How- Social Sector Rehabilitation Project were well-timed. In ever, opinion is not unanimous on this point. A number this the Bank pursued comparative advantages in policy of interlocutors, as well as Bank staff, believe the Bank's and institutional reform in its programming. The donor image and relationships with civil society and other coordination role played by the Bank just before the donors would be enhanced by its establishment of a res- peace accords and in the first few years of post-conflict ident mission. 59 The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction Eritrea Following its prolonged war of secession from Ethiopia, merits investigation beyond the limits of a desk review. It Eritrea had the makings of a promising "reconstruction seems that the government wanted a Bank loan, on its client" for the Bank, with a victorious and motivated own terms, and was wary about conditionalities linked administration leading a united nation into post-conflict to economic measures to which it was not fully commit- recovery with ample international commitment. The ted. Only follow-up with the government itself will clar- Bank, through a flexible adaptation of procedures, pre- ify these client perceptions and apprehensions. pared and approved an emergency recovery project in Second, considerations of economy of scale have advance of the country's membership. This innovative limited any comparative advantage for the Bank. Gov- engagement of the Bank was very successful, but the ernment-donor relations and lending operations proba- subsequent retreat into a more traditional operation bly necessitated more field presence, but for one ERL mode caused those early gains to be lost. Progress has this was not considered viable. The Bank made the most been slow, with delayed implementation of the emer- of early engagement, but like the rest of the donor com- gency project, a disappointing Consultative Group meet- munity found it hard to sustain work with an ambiva- ing and a number of subsequent projects being dropped, lent government, and turned to more rewarding clients. reflecting continuing difficulties between the govern- The Bank should have invested more up-front resources, ment and donors and a lack of shared vision on the as a form of risk capital, both in products and staff field development of the country. Renewed military-political presence to build government capacity and confidence in tension with Ethiopia and Sudan may yet threaten some developing the overall reconstruction program. Greater of the gains that have been made. investment in "hand-holding" with the government With no project implementation completion reports through the first five years of reconstruction (as the or audits, and future activities under discussion, findings Bank has done with the Eritrean Community Develop- must be tentative at this stage. Nevertheless, some lessons ment Fund) might now be reaping greater rewards. are already emerging. First, the style of conducting oper- Finally, if the reconstruction period is understood as ations with a suspicious and inexperienced post-conflict a decade or more of activity, measures to restore human government was as important as the content of the oper- capital, which may not appear a priority to fledgling ations. The Eritrean government has clearly been cir- post-conflict governments, will need incremental sup- cumspect about Bank involvement. They have rejected port and long-term commitment. Although the Bank has the second Recovery and Rehabilitation Project and a never had a mandate from the Eritrean government to number of other sectoral loan projects. Technical assis- address human capital issues comprehensively, it should tance was taken up with little enthusiasm or commit- provide the government with cogent advice on the pri- ment. As an implicit client comment on Bank services this ority of such investments. 60 Annexes Haiti Haiti illustrates well the difficulties of working in deep- nate every sector. In fact, it expected the IDB to take rooted conflict where there is no simple war-to-peace more of a leadership role. The 1996 CAS appears to linear progression. Though never an all-out civil war, the have consolidated a wider role for the Bank and a 1991-1994 crisis in Haiti exhibited all the signs of a broader perspective. However, the CAS was still tenta- complex emergency, including political, social, and eco- tive on Bank involvement, stating an intention to con- nomic collapse. Once the political and security condi- tinue its role "selectively as an integral part of a large- tions permitted the return of the international develop- scale international effort." ment community, efforts were designed not so much to Given the number of agencies involved and the polit- reconstruct Haiti, but to restore growth forgone in the ical context, coordination presented a difficult and com- embargo years. plex task for all institutions. The Bank had little presence Since returning in 1994, the Bank's commitment to to perform an early, in-country coordination role, but Haiti has increased, but its performance has received has nevertheless mobilized and coordinated external mixed reviews. The Bank planned for an early return donor resources, and CGs have identified sectoral through preparatory work in 1993, and following the responsibilities. The CG meetings have been innovative restoration of democratic government in 1994, swiftly and responsive to the overall needs of government, bene- prepared and implemented an emergency economic ficiaries and donors. The participatory CG of April 1997 recovery credit. Further measures were slower to develop. presents a model for other post-conflict programs. Three suspended projects were revived, and five more In-country, operational and sector-by-sector coordi- were approved. Implementation of projects has been gen- nation of activities has proved difficult for the govern- erally slow and problematic. With only two completion ment and the donors, who have found problems in shift- reports, findings on post-conflict lending activity are pro- ing from a geographical to sectoral division of labor. visional. Overall, developmental prospects are still in the Effective partnership with the many NGOs at work in balance. Lack of progress in reform measures could dis- Haiti is critical, but has also proved difficult. Overall, the courage further investment, reduce donor support and Bank has been drawn into an expanded coordination jeopardize both political and economic recovery. role, possibly contrary to its original wishes, but it now The Bank was clearly not a nimble or knowledge- performs this role willingly and competently. able institution in this volatile developmental context, A critical aspect of this coordination role is communi- and was dependent on other agencies in the interna- cation about the program to the public. Strong communi- tional system to conduct early reconstruction activities. cation programs with outreach activities to NGOs, parlia- Comparative advantage for the Bank was more in its mentarians and other main stakeholders, and good media potential to mobilize resources and skills from Washing- relations are integral to politically sensitive recovery pro- ton, than in any short-term impact from a minimal field grams. This was lacking in earlier Bank activities, and the presence. In this context, the Bank grew into the coordi- rectification achieved by the April 1997 CG should con- nation role, rather than assuming an overall leadership tinue. As the chair of the CG, the Bank needs to maintain role from the start. The Bank did not strategize the ini- the delicate balance between messages of optimism and the tial, overall reconstruction program, nor did it coordi- negative potential of unmet expectations. 61 The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction Lebanon Judging the Bank's performance in the reconstruction of ing brief during the conflict period might have helped the Lebanon depends on which yardstick is chosen: whether Bank engage more speedily and effectively with the over- an expanded reconstruction role might have achieved all recovery program and other international agencies. more, or how the more circumscribed role was actually The Bank's coordination role although valuable was carried out. Two areas of strength stand out: (i) the partially constrained in-country by institutional atti- Bank's ability to mobilize resources and legitimize the tudes characterized by caution and lack of openness international donor community in the eyes of the gov- with partners. The Bank's role in damage and needs ernment; and (ii) the Bank's expertise in helping to cre- assessment was clearly valued by other reconstruction ate an appropriate macroeconomic framework. A third agencies, some of whom would like to have seen the potential area of advantage, coordination, has only par- Bank extend this knowledge into a more assertive coor- tially been fulfilled. The Bank's role in damage assess- dination role. Concern with executing Bank programs ment, although valued, appears to have been limited and may have limited the degree to which the Bank could the Bank's own documents report underestimation of lead a common reconstruction strategy. The absence of damage. Speed of response was not a Bank strength, at a resident mission probably constrained an expanded least in relation to so-called emergency lending. coordination role in-country. Measured by the more modest objectives of infra- Six years after re-entry, there has been no systematic structural repairs, economic stabilization, rebuilding independent evaluation of the Bank's performance in institutional capacity and the alleviation of social hard- Lebanon. Regarding project management, there is a ship and poverty, the Bank has recorded progress on all wealth of lessons to be learned from the operations of the but the last goal. The Bank's overall role has thus been Council for Development and Reconstruction and sectoral limited by a narrow understanding of reconstruction- implementation units. These operations should be exam- albeit reflecting government's priorities-concentrating ined by future ICRs and PARs which should take account on physical infrastructure within the wider recovery of the special post-conflict context in which the Bank oper- process seen as the realm of the private sector. A watch- ated, and not judge by traditional evaluation criteria. Rwanda The tragedy that befell Rwanda during three months in and other brutalities. While the international commu- 1994 is beyond comprehension and unprecedented. nity did not respond to prevent the genocide-even Although Bank staff and management were aware of though plans for it had been reported-it responded discriminatory and opportunistic behaviors, the written impressively to the aftermath. The Bank responded record contains little evidence or analysis of such factors quickly in August 1994 with one of its rare Emergency in Rwanda during the seventies and eighties. The Bank Assistance Grants. did not identify and question increasing ethnic discrimi- Implemented through four UN agencies, the Grant natory and exclusionary practices but, at least in the was both relevant and timely, as well as relatively effec- Mutara Projects, it rewarded with a follow-on project tive and efficient. But implementation suffered from such practices as the diversion of project benefits to the insufficient initial awareness on the part of the agencies politically-favored groups that exerted the discrimina- of the lack of capacity in government and civil society as tion. In this respect, the Bank was no better or worse a result of the war and genocide. Inadequate engage- than other donors assisting Rwanda during this period. ment of the new government in the Grant's planning and By the early nineties., however, violence and corruption implementation led to misunderstandings and resulted became increasingly obvious. By 1993 the Bank began in the Grant not making the positive con-ribution to scaling-back assistance, although even then not expect- Bank-government relationships that it might have. In ing the genocide unleashed in April 1994. More than fact, the government was not made aware of Bank sup- half of the population of 7-to-8 million were directly port for the Grant until mid-way through the 19-month affected as a result of death, displacement, injury, rape implementation period. 62 Annexes Subsequent post-conflict reconstruction efforts by Although Bank policy on emergency assistance recog- the Bank, including an Emergency Recovery Credit and nizes that emergency situations such as in Rwanda are not restructuring of the previous project portfolio, although conducive to major macroeconomic or sector policy relevant to Rwanda's needs, encountered problems that changes, structural reforms can also be embodied in delayed their effectiveness and implementation. The projects. This was the case with Bank-funded energy and Bank did not take adequately into account the new gov- telecommunications projects in Rwanda. The timing of ernment's lack of capacity and the need to work inten- post-conflict restructuring attempts at privatization in sively with it to build mutual confidence and to ensure these projects can be questioned. Restructuring can pro- full understanding of Bank requirements and proce- vide a window of opportunity to raise such issues, but the dures. In the selection of a procurement agency for the pace of action must take into account the political-eco- 1995 Emergency Recovery Credit, a greater effort by the nomic environment and the state of counterpart readiness Bank to make sure that their Rwandan counterparts and capacity to undertake measures such as privatization, understood Bank procurement procedures might have which are often difficult, complex and politically contro- avoided an impasse. versial. After initial restructuring efforts, which were Implementation problems also stemmed from less marked by differences and tensions over the privatization than optimal staffing assignments in both headquarters issue, the Bank and the government have agreed on a and the field. Work on Rwanda required staff with pre- more incremental approach to privatization. vious experience in the Bank, preferably in Sub-Saharan Government capacity in the Ministries of Education Africa or another post-conflict country. However, staff and Health remains weak. Health is in a relatively bet- with experience in Rwanda were not necessarily the best ter position, partly owing to timely assistance from candidates to re-assign to Rwanda because of the trau- WHO in the two years following the genocide. NGOs matic impact that the genocide had on these staff. And have played a major role in re-establishing rural health lack of continuity, both in the Kigali and Washington clinics. UNICEF provided vital emergency assistance teams, impaired the important implementation monitor- immediately after the genocide, and most primary ing responsibility role that resident mission staff should schools are now in operation. The sub-grants from the fulfill. Special Emergency Assistance Grant to UNHCR, The absence (until January 1995) and then intermit- UNICEF and WHO provided significant help in the ini- tent presence (until June 1996) of a resident representa- tial rehabilitation of the health and education sectors. tive hampered the Bank in playing as active a role in aid Recovery of the secondary system, weak to begin with, coordination as it might have at the beginning of the has been much slower and quality at all levels is typically post-conflict period. Bank-UNDP relationships have very low. This reflects in particular the extreme shortage been strained, especially in Kigali. A division of labor of qualified teachers, few of whom have an education has recently taken place, with the Bank, at the govern- beyond the primary level. At the government's request, ment's request, leading aid coordination on macro- the AFR region has undertaken a study of post-conflict economic matters. experience in trying to restore education. 63 The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction Sri Lanka Owing to the largely localized nature of the conflict, and The presence of a resident mission (now called a in contrast to many post-conflict situations, in Sri Lanka "field office") in Sri Lanka greatly facilitated the Bank's there was no hiatus in the Bank's program or in the pres- role in efforts related to post-conflict reconstruction and ence of its resident mission during the 1983-87 period of the possibility of post-conflict reconstruction. The recent intense conflict. This facilitated the Bank's prompt expansion of field office staff and the relocation of the response to the government's request for assistance in mid- country director position from headquarters to the field August 1987, two weeks after the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord office are timely in view of the need for in-country was signed. The Bank moved quickly to help prepare the capacity to support and monitor a new reconstruction Emergency Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Program effort, including the government's sweeping devolution and to help mobilize resources from other donors in sup- initiatives currently being considered by Parliament. port of the balance of the Program. However, the Bank's Effective reconstruction assistance requires a clear financial contributiorn to the overall program, the ERR understanding of the roles of local bodies, including Project, did not become effective until mid-June 1988, governmental bodies and NGOs. This was deficient in some 10 months after the need for it had been identified. Sri Lanka, on the parts of both the government and the In the meantime, two planting seasons had elapsed, and an Bank. On the government's side, there was delay in pro- opportunity had been lost to deliver benefits that could mulgating Provincial Councils. For its part, the Bank have enhanced popular support for the Accord. could have insisted on the involvement of local NGOs Bank efforts in providing assistance for infrastruc- and community-based organizations in the design and ture resulted in little sustainable accomplishment in Sri implementation of the ERR project. The volatile security Lanka owing to sabotage and re-destruction of much of situation, especially in the North, re-erupted into full- what had been restored. Assistance provided directly to scale conflict in 1990. households had a more lasting effect. 64 Annexes Uganda Bank involvement in the reconstruction efforts of Regarding Bank processes and institutional arrange- Uganda has been particularly comprehensive. In the first ments, project design did not fully reflect the need, given five years after the conflict (1987-1992), the Bank sup- Uganda's unsettled institutional environment, for a flex- ported approximately 25 lending operations amounting ible, process-oriented project design. This was particu- to more than US$1 billion, and closely coordinated with larly evident in the social sectors, where the Education international donors. The Bank's role was key in and Health Ministries were too weak to accommodate strengthening the Ministry of Finance and the Central spending, and where supervening events like decentral- Bank, removing the monopoly of the Coffee Board, ization and renewed conflict changed priorities. Changes assisting in sugar rehabilitation, and rebuilding roads. in key resident mission staff, task managers and govern- Despite good performance in reforming and rebuild- ment staff were inevitably disruptive at times. Bank staff ing the economy, Bank involvement could have been were not generally familiar with working in conflict improved in several respects: insufficient attention to countries nor with the international relief and rehabili- consensus building; excessive use of conditionalities; and tation system. Staff resources and time were mainly con- most important, a seriously dysfunctional emphasis on centrated in Kampala. This led to little understanding of raising taxation. The Bank did not always fulfill its and contact with international and local NGOs. potential comparative advantage, for example, in the A final shortcoming of Bank projects was that, power sector, a key element in recovery. Nor did it fully where they were not sequential, many were too short to convert its coordination role into creating an overall address the projected length of recovery. At least two strategy for reconstruction, or a sector-by-sector plan. different time-tables in post-war recovery are well-man- The Bank's performance was relatively poor in social ifested in Uganda. The first is the real-time duration of sectors, particularly in strengthening health and education the recovery process, which typically requires at least institutions. Investment in the social sectors was often two decades of sustained effort, with the risk of war a premature, implemented through weak Ministries and recurrent reality. The second time-table is set by donor with little forethought given to the nature of the services considerations, which may be guided by different objec- the Bank was trying to support. The post-conflict period tives, and may become manifest through programs required major health sector reforms: these fell short of which do not necessarily consider the very long recovery needs. Education investment was equally disappointing, process. Government has to observe both timetables, with only an estimated 37 percent of funds reaching weighing the political expediencies of short-term mea- schools. Too much dependence was placed on the existing sures to provide security and boost confidence against bureaucracy, and not enough use made of NGOs. the needs for longer-term recovery. 65 ANNEX 2: LIST OF POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION LENDING OPERATIONS L/C APPROVAL AMOUNT LENDING CLOSING COUNTRY PROJECT NAME NUMBER DATE (US$M) INSTRUMENT SECTOR DATE CASE STUDY COUNTRIES Bosnia and Herzegovina Lending volume by sector: Emtergency Recovery Projeci 2/29f1 45 ERL MY Agriculture: 20.0 Emergency Transport 3/29/96 35 ERL TH Dcrnining: 7.5 Reconatn Education: 17.0 Emergency Fanrm Reconstructi 4/96 20 E. L AA Health: 25.0 Water, Sanitation and Solid 4/8/96 20 ERL WW Industry: 10.0 Waste Urgnt Works Multi-sector: 135.0 Enmergency District Heating Sf14/96 20 ERL PI Power: 55.6 War Vctitn&Rehabilitation C2896 6128196 10 ERL HY 12/31/98 Social sector: 17.5 Emergey Education C2897 6/28/96 10 ERL EY 9/,30f98 Tfransport: 35.0 Reconstruction Urban: 15.0 Emergency Housig Repair C2902 730/96 15 EL. UH 6/30/98 Water: 20.0 Emergency Eelcric Power C2903 7/30/96 35.6 EEL. PP 1:31198 Reconstruction Total lending: 357.6 Emergency Puhlic Works and C2904 7/30/96 10 EERL SY 1131199 Employment Emergny Laadmines Clearamce C2905 7/30/96 7.5 EEL MM 12131198 Emergency Demobi zation and C2906 7/30M 7.5 EL, S5 3119s Reintegration aniion ssstanct CreditI C2914 9/5196 90 SAL MY 12(31/96 Enmrgency Industrial Resitt CN0010 12/1396 10 St IR 123103 J,ocal Initiaies CN0020 12/13/96 7 S5E EP 63/0/9 Essential HIospital Servicers CN0030 12/13/96 15 ERL HB 63/00 Cambodia Lending volume by sector: Emergency Rehabilitation C2550 1/13/94 62.7 RIL MY 12/31/96 Agriculture: 27.0 Technical Assistance C2664 12/6/94 17 TAL ME 6/30/01 Health: 30.4 Social Fund Project C2739 618195 20 SIT. SF 12/31/99 Multi-sector: 119.7 Economic Rehabilitation Credit C2781 9/28/95 40 SAL ME 6/30/97 Power: 40.0 Phbom Penh Power C2782 9/28195 40 SIL PD 12/31/99 Social Fund: 20.0 Rchabilitation Disease Control and I-lealth 12/24/96 30.4 SIL HT 3/31/02 Total lending: 237.1 Agricultural Productivity 2/28/97 27 SIL AY 6/30/02 Improvement ANNEX 2: (CONTINUED) Environment: 50.0 1.2i Health: 26.0 UI L3576 AM40NA EultiSelvaor: 4. Poer:in 76.0m bysetr: V,N L3646 75 ME as Agriculture: 40.0 ~~~~~L334826H Publtic-sector: 4. managemenit 26.5 vaL3982 ~.50 ~ a,VM Total lending: 451.5 34 E a ~~~~~~~~~~~~24 BB ~~ ~~~ea~~~ii~~~ a ~~~ s~~~ ~ ~ ~ 58 ES Eritrea Lending volume by sector: pr C2478 1249>25 - R.MY, SF ~ 1 Multi-sector: 25.0 t Social sector: 17.5 m r petC2823 - 17.5 SLSA K>23A Total lending: 42.5 Haiti s~a ~ ~ . Lendilsg volume by sector: 5~ ~C2670 40 MY 55 Agriculture: 21.5 Health: 28.2 C2691 s t Industry: 11.4 Multi-sector: 40.0 ,.i C2765 50 S Power: 24.0 ~~~~~~~C2205 11.3 SA Social sector: 61.3 C2085 ~, 28.2 > HB Traiisport: 70.0 .~C1756 20 TH ~ Water: 20.0 s,~ C2052 1 20 a s) T 55 C2053 24 15PD ~ 5 ~~~ ~C2071 11.4 Ts~ 5 R 5 C2920 21.5 AR Total lending: 276.4 . l< si I C71 ANNEX 2: (CONTINUED) L/C APPROVAL AMOUNT LENDING . CLOSING COUNTRY PROJECT NAME NUMBER DATE, (US$M) INSTRUMENT SECTOR DTE CASE STUDY COUNTRIES Lebanon Lending volume by scctor: BEmtrgncy/ Reeonstrctitaand L3562 314193 175 ERL UY 1213119 Agriculture: 88.2 Refsbitt.tion Environment: 55.0 lirigation1Rehabilitatin and L3769 .129194 57.2 ASIL .. ./AI11 Health: 85.7 Mdeizati... Public sector TARe.ve ;E nh L3770 . /29/94 19.9 SIL BF 3MM10 management: 39.9 anI Fiscal Managm'ent: t. Transport: 42.0 Ffr,ltlSt ebabil L3829 12/20/.4 35.7 S R-B H2B310 Urban Solid Waste/En roes L3899 ,16195 55 SIt VP 1/3t development: 175.0 Managemet. Water: 53.1 Adiniitrat6ivRefaibAitam L3930 . 95 20 ' $L" BA 6P0199 Supplemlnental Toan for ERRP L35621 51..:S 96 50 ' HB N/A Total lending: 538.9 ,National Roads L4065 7/11/96 42 SIt TH 6130103 7 Ag l nfrauce L4092 9121% 31 St AY 6/30103 Coastal. Polluti'o' .,£8/97 53.1 SIL, WS 0/02 Rwanda Lending volume by sector: Emergency Recovery Credit C2678 1/31/95 50 ERL SY 9/30/97 Education: 22.3 Private Sector Development C2541 9/9/93 12.7* SIL FS 6/30/99 Finance: 12.7 Food Security and Social Action C2388 2/5/91 17.7" SIL SA 12/31/98 Health: 19.7 Edtucation Sector C2227 4/9/91 22.3* SIM EE 9/30/98 Multi-sector: 56.0 First Population C2272 6119191 19.7* SIL HT 12/31/99 Power: 25.4 Sectoral and Pre-investment C1796 5/14/91 6* TAL MV 10/31/97 Public sector Studies management: 3.4 Energy Sector C2456 2/9/93 25.4* SIL PD 12/31/98 Social sector: 67.7 Public Enterprise Reform C2113 3/27/90 3.4* SIL BR 4/15/96 Telecommunications: 8.4 Second Conmunications Project C2189 12/11/90 8.4* Sim CC 12/31/98 Transport: 34.0 Transport Sector Project C2136 5121290 34* SiM TT 12/31/98 Water: 3.8 Water Supply C1783 4128/87 3.8 * SIL WR 6/30/98 Emergency Reintegration and C2969 6/25/97 50 ERL ME 12/31/98 Total lending: 228.0 Recovery * reallocated amount Sri Lanka Lending volumc by sector: Emergency Reco , niction C1883 '315/88 78 ,ERL, MY 6/30/94 Multi-sector: 78.0 Total lending: 78.0 ANNEX 2: (CONTINUED) COUNTRY IlJ1TNMNUMBER ~ A ~(US$M) 1SR E1' SECTOR A CASE STUDY COUNTRIES1 Uganda Lending volume by sector: Rei rnioCrC0983 2119/ 81011 72.5MYi / Agriculture: 331.1 T if rneC1077 1!08BB1 / Education): 106.6 r py/ ~~CiO /17 1 9 U Environment: 23.9 oha B n iu2C1228 - 1/23.9 L-- N103/ Finance: 100.0 -e ionrit1~ C1252 / /70ALM6105 Health: 165.5 bfi/pC1328 2/483 - 66.1 ~ E A-~ / Mining: 3.9 £uaoI C1329 4!32 EP1 I Multi-sector: 770.0 Ths eec Ti 6~i C1367 57/322 CC-- 3/ Oil and gas: 4. W Power: 153.8 0 4aAitcC434 12/351.3 7 AW BB /0 Public sector i4 y1C'1445 038I51.3 7 H--1 management 217.6 R OS 1toii ~ ':- C1474 5/I50 .;ik MFE/0 Telecommunications: t 4 ~4Sn~ C15107// 2 8 Wu 931 74.3 Rh tn~7 ~ :9 LA 3/ Transport: 150.0 AgsatrlD netC1539 9/81 AA Urban development: (A Il 99.9 ~ p j ~C1560 28.8 PH 1/19 Water: 139.3 r Bpt 1 1? ~~~~~~~ ~C1561 ~ ~ L/4.5 AGI ~ 1t/ ~~K 7>. ~~ C1803 %W2/716.7 S.TH2/19 Total lending: 2304.4 o y V A ~ .7 C1824 >~1/.1 3 SWAT 2 oson~inke~i ~r< rc77i C1844 /565AlME /0[ ~~A~~h fit ~ II C1869 ~ %r1/2/ 9.3 AD 22/ o ¾ LI - ~~~~~C1893 -- t 824.9-AN V es ~~~feaIth ~~C1934 /42.5 LHB C19511318TLM1/ $ ~~~~C1962 ~ / 5A.B J sonPV... ~~C1965 U 2SE- C1986 ~ 197 W61 o niao11 ~~~~C1991 / 23U C ~ ooxni R~vei~ 11C2087 - -221015AL7 - M 9 -- C2088 ~ 1 ~ 2 B93 Wa ~~fl 1i77 ~ C2124060SW Li 0?- :777777:727 C2176 //02 1AL6 )7 A-1.CO~~~~4I C2190 30115 A rdN~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~E lid, ~~~~~C2206 ~ 91i. 2. M// ~~ - - - ~~~C2268 125 P 3/ 8 Cl ~~~~~C2314[2-125AM Enter De~~ rn C2315 1/96. X I1/ 0 1 ~~~~C2362 71.2 ~U A ~~~~o I ~~~C2446 72~7~22225 AR 230 C' ->~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ C) ANNEX 2: (CONTINUED) L/C APPROVAL AMOUNT LENDING CLOSING COUNTRY PROJECT NAME NUMBER DATE (US$M) INSTRUMlENT SECTOR .DATE CASE STUDY COUNTRIES Transport Rehabilitaton 3/24194 75 SIL TH 12/31/00 Primary Education and 5/13/93 52.6 SiL EP 6/00 TeahertTraining, Small Towns Water 3117/94 42.3 S Wu 1231 .nancial Sector Adjusment M203 100 SAD FF 6/30/97 Credit Sexualy-rransmnited) Diseas 4J12/94 50 SItL HT 12/3V00 Ecqoomic Recovery,S9ppkemental - 1.7 SAL ME N/A ERG It S pplemetal: 4/2. /9 25 AL ME N/A SAC II ./ 16194 80 SAL ME 3/28/9 District 14eaIth 217/95 45 .SIT HB ¶2/3i/02 .FC I SFA. 12/18/8 12.8 . SAL ME N/A Enomie and Financial 8/4/92 29 TAL. BI 6130)" Management htan~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Insititnal Capacity-building 6M115 36.4 TAL BI 12/31A) G Cotton Secor Devepmenrt .51 0194 14 SAL AQ . 1l2/19 Enviroiertal Maamew ct 9/14/95 11.8 SAL VI - 30/01 SACE .11 6/67 125 SAL MY 6/30/99 Agricukura Extenion 9/29/92 15.8 - SIL AE 6/30/ Private Sector Competitiveness 1214/95 12.3 S1R. II,BR :6130101 Agricukltal Setor Manageraent 4/196 17.9 SAL AG 12/31/ Lake Victoria Fnvironmet 7/30/96 12.1 SIb VM 12/3110 Other AFR Angola Infrastructure Rehabilitation C2289 7/16/91 37.7 TAL TT 6/30/98 Engineering Lobito/Benguela Urban C2326 1/7/92 45.6 SIM US 9/30/98 Environment Rehabilitation Education I C2375 6/2/92 27.1 SIL EP 9/30/97 Power Sector Rehabilitation C2385 6/11/92 33.5 Sim PY, ZZ 6/30/98 Transport Recovery C2420 9/3192 41 SJl. TW 6/30/97 Healtlh C2490 5111/93 19.9 TAL HB 12/31/98 Social Action C2802 12/21/95 24 SIL SF, I IY, WY 12/31/00 Burundi Emergency Asistance Program> C2668 12/15/94 14.6 SIL MY /31196 Ethiopia Emergency Recovery and C2351 3/31/92 141.3 ERL MY 9/30/97 Reconstruction SAC I C2526 6/29/93 250 SAL ME 9/30/96 Mozambique Rural Rehabilitation C2479 3/30/93 20 SAL AD 12/3119S Second Economic Recovery C2628 6/16/94 200 SAD FF 8/30/97 Program ANNEX 2: (CONTINUED) LIC APROVAL AMOUNT PNCL COUNTRY PRJcANUMBER DJ ~ (SM NRMN ETRDT CASE STUDY COUNTRIES Other EAP'm!g Lao, PDR AiutiJ ealiaonid C0760 12778. J Al 11 HtBhwa fmpro m~n~ - C2218 3/ 5LTH6 69 Other ECA Croatia L7018U 7 L3843 40 HB ~~ ~as~ L3869 80 TH Tajikistan ntt~Bu n c1 - C28610 516 5T BI 3/0 Agri ul tnlReco e~ hOC29170 1295 0 R.AA Q/7 Q o ty IL s~w~on C2946 40/714.7 $LSE6110 Other MENA ~~-~ West Banik and Gaza 20M T26057 f40 J,T W T26065 20 H T26056 25 w OtherLA Nicaragua UkRenarc.C0965 1//0722 UU [0/ md IR J~~a I ann ~ C2028 12830 EIIR 11 ~offi Reo~r Credt C2302 9/69110 ALME2/1 tt~ (ISE} C2434 1 225 SF, HN 11 Econo e 4th ~~~~C2631 1/460 DME 4 f7 S 1/i~dI eat tEumiA C2767 7/I30 2~S ~~SA 4/ TOTAL PROJECTS: The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction ANNEX 3. LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED FOR THE STUDY World Bank Eritrea Bosnia and Herzegovina Fakhruddin Ahmed Hans J. Apitz Subhash Dhingra Wei Ding Laura Frigenti Andras Horvai Woldai Futur Zlatko Hurtic Ejaz Ghani Baelhdaj Merghoub Stephen O'Brien Madalene O'Donnell Lee Roberts Pedro Rodriguez Haiti Barbara Santos T. Anderson White Mary Sheehan Wendeline De Zan Christine Wallich Stefan Fluckiger BiH Resident Missioni Luc Moreau Claudio Domenis Alice Morton Patrice Dufour Axel Peuker Sarah Forster jamil Salmi Mirjana Karahasanovic Lebanon Michael Koch Alastair McKechnie Zorica Lesic Michel Pommier Saumya Mitra Karen Rasmussen Rory O'Sullivan Lars Rasmusson Marie-Theres Schurrer Ezzedin Shamsedin, Adviser to Executive Director Ilona Szemzo Enn Vasur World Bawk Na-w Yora Office Fatmir Zeneli Judy Grayson, Liaison Officer Cambodia Alfredo Sfeir-Younis, Special Representative to the UN Christopher Chamberlain, EA1HR Rwanda Enrique Crousillat, EAlIN Francisco da Guy Darlan, EAcCO Aguirre-Sacasa Jessica Einhorn, EXC JIe Chevaie Mustapha El-Erian, LEGEA Michel Devaux* Bernard Funck, EC3C1 jel Denu Koji Kuroda, EAIIN Jean Doyeng Christopher Redfern, EAlAE Lida English Blake Ratner, consultant Paulseman David Steedman, ASTHR ChuisumarObidegwu Michael Ward, IECDD Jean-Lous Sarbis Michael Sarris El Salvador Richard Senou Ana-Maria Arriagada Nils Tcheyan Ian Bannon Ulrich Thumm Michael Baxter, (by phone) R. Venkateswaran Nancy Cooke, ECA (f ormerly LAC) *Interviewed in 1995 in connection with research for the Joint Evalu- Luis Derbez, SAS (formerly LAC) ation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, op. cit. No longer with the Madalena Dos Santos Bank, Mr. Aguirre-Sacasa was Director in 1993 and 1994 of the Gloria Grandolini Region Country Department that included Rwanda, and Mr. Devaux Ulrich Lachler, LAC (Mexico; by phone) was Country Economist for Rwanda from September, 1992, to Cora Shaw August, 1995. Sally Zeijlon 72 Annexes Sri Lanka LAC Pedro Alba Annika Tornqvist J. Roberto Bentjerodt Arnold Clift* Geneva Consultations lain Christie IDNDR Chandra Godivitarne Phillippe Boulle, Director Arnaud Guinard Terry jeggle, Senior Officer Paul Isenman Sarwar Lateef International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) Linda Lowenstein Rudolph von Bernuth, Executive Director Manuel Penalver International Federation of Red Cross and Red Menahem Prywes Crescent Societies (IFRC) David Thomas Peter Rees, Desk Officer for Former Yugoslavia George West Peter Walker, Director, Disaster Policy and Lorene Yap Methodology Roberto Zagha *Retired from World Bank. Mr. Clift was Country Operations Divi- Permanent Mission of the Netherlands to the sion Chief covering Sri Lanka, 1987-1989. Mr. Thomas was Resident Office of the UN Representative in Colombo, 1978-82. Eveline Herfkens, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the Office of the Uganda United Nations (former ED representing BiH to Marc Baird the Bank) John Clark Sabine Cornelius Swiss Directorate for Development Cooperation and Randolph Harris Development Aid (SDC), Berne Yitzhak Kamhi Urs Herren, Program Officer, Development Policy and Petter Langseth Research Division Ritva Reinikka Stephan Nellen, Minister, Deputy Assistant Director John Riverson General SDC, Cooperation with Eastern Europe and Iraj Talai the CIS Gaiv Tata Jurg Zumstein, Program Coordinator for the Horn of AFTU2 Africa, Division of Humanitarian Aid Alberto Harth United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs DEC ~~~~~~~~~~(DHA) DEC Martin Griffiths, Director Sunita Kikeri Paul Hebert, Senior Humanitarian Affairs Officer Martin Rama Deborah Saidy, Secretary to the Inter-Agency Standing EAPVP Committee Katherine Marshall UNHCR EDI Harriet Bengstsson, Americas Bureau Gordon Appleby Jeff Crisp, Centre for Documentation and Research Peter Miovic Raymond Hall, Head, Inter-Organizations Affairs and Patricia Weiss Fagen Secretariat Services Post-conflict Unit Larbi Mebtouche, Head, Reintegration and Self-Reliance Betty Oyella Bigombe E. Morris Nat Colletta N. Morris Steven Holtzman Kazu Nagasaha, Asia Bureau HDNED Morten Pristed, Associate Economist Eluned Roberts-Schweitzer Ms. Rianawati, Asia Bureau Constantin Sokoloff, Senior Officer, Inspection and Evaluation 73 The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction UNOPS UN Office of Internal Oversight Christophe Bouvier, Chief, Rehabilitation and Social France Owarish, Chief Sustainability Unit UNOPS Tomas Paquete, Senior Adviser U Ps Alfredo Lazarte Hovvle, ILO Bisrat Aklilu, Deputy Executive Director Reinhart Helmke, Executive Director War-torn Societies Project Matthias Stiefel, Director gosv . a and liarzogav'iRa Fia' Mt FViss> ihew Yok Consullalums Presidency Kasim Begic, Adviser to the Chairman of the DHA Presidency for Economic Issues Antonio Donini, Lessons Learned Unit Council of Ministers Susan Lantze, Consultant John Rogge, Chief, P'olicy and Analysis Division Neven Tomic, Deputy Chairman DPA Ministry of Foreign Affairs Alvaro de Soto, Assistant Under-Secretary-General Aziz Hadzimuratovic, Head of Department for vardou dane ot,sittUd-erayG rlReconstruction and International Assistance MAndou Kaner Alida Sofic, Adviser Anita Mathur Hiroko Miyamura Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations Shigeru Mochida Mirsad Kikanovic, Special Adviser to the Minister Alex Mtsouka Berina Selimovic Mehmedbasic, Assistant Minister Zdeslaw Nicinshi Ivica Miodrag, Adviser Victor Poliakov Central Bank Vladimir Shagoda Serge Robert, Governor Dettef Wilke Kasim Omicevic, Deputy Governor DPKO Office of the President of Republika Srpska Christopher Cloeman, Policy and Analysis Unit Rajko Tomas, Adviser to the President of Republika Leonard Kapungu, Head, Lessons Learned Unit Elizabeth Linden-Mayer, Assistant for Africa to the Srpska for Economic Issues Under-Secretary-General Mass Media Masimba Tafirenyika, Lessons Learned Unit Senada Mavric Shashi Tharoor, Special Assistant to the Under- OHR Secretary-General Victor Massena UNDP Egbert Gerkin Hugh Cholmendeley, Consultant UN Frank O'Donnell, Deputy Director, Emergency Alexander Ivanko Response Division Pierre-Francois Pirlot UNHCR Kathy Walker, UNHCR Soren Jessen Petersen Bill Thomas, Logistics Officer, UNHCR UNICEF SFOR Kate Alley, Office of Evaluation, Policy and Planning Terry Carter, Liaison Officer David S. Bassiouni, Senior Policy Adviser EBRD Nigel Fisher, Director, Office of Emergency Programs Zsuzsanna Hargitai, Deputy Resident Representative Tom Franklin Sawon Hong, Senior Programme Officer, Evaluation USAID Office Michael Stievater, Office of Transition Initiatives Ian Hopwood, Chief., Evaluation Office NGOs Angela Raven Robert-Is Dianne Cullinane, Liaison Officer, Soros Fotndation Nora Yaler George Devendorf, Country Director, ICVA Elizabeth Hughes, Program Officer, WorldVision 74 Annexes Jim Kelly, Country Director, CRS Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced Jennie McCann, Deputy Director, Programs, International Studies International Rescue Committee Frederick Brown Klaus Mock, Adviser, German Advisory Office Naranhkiri Tith Catiba Rekic, Programme Director, Plavi Most USAID Goran Todorovic, Head of Office, Care International Uae . Ramiza Velic, Project Manager, Plavi Most James Vermllion Bill Warnock, Country Director, WorldVision El Salvador Field Mission International Crisis Group CARE (international NGO) Hrair Balian, Director Christopher Bennett, Deputy Director Jose Ignacio Claros, Technical Assistance Manager Blagaj FRENTE (FMLN) Opposition Party Blandzar Dzevad, Director, Fish FarmRuben Zamora, National Assembly Candidate Handzar Dzevad, Director, Fish Farm (candidate for President in 1994) Jablanica FUNDE (research and advocacy NGO) Resad Malovic Alfonso Goitia, Executive Director Project Implementation Units Roberto Rubio, Research Director Nikola Duric, Housing Project FUSADES (private development think tank and Zorica Milos, War Victims Rehabilitation consulting firm) Mehmedalija Si'aric, Sarajevogas Eduardo Nufiez, Chief Executive Director Zlatko Zvirac, Housing Project Jaime Acosta, Assistant Director, Economic Social French Embassy Studies Pierre Boedoz Mauricio Gonzalez Orellana, Economist International Management Group German Embassy Kevin Mannion, Director Christian Much, Commercial Attache Bruno Silvestrini, Head of Office, Mostar Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) Dino Bicciato, Manager Director Designate Fadrique Otero, Acting Representative Chamber of Economy of BiH Marcelo J. Valenzuelo, Sectoral Specialist Mensur Smajlovic, President Fernando Manoel Costa, Coordinator for El Salvador Izet Starcevic, Secretary Land Bank Jozo Soric, DirectorLadBn Ek SropriveDa of BiH Jose Ernesto Mancia Salinas, Director Elektropriveda of BIH Reas Maolovic, Manager Ministry of Education EC Abigail Castro de Perez, Vice Minister Anna Maria Corazza Martini Roberto Moran Argueta, Director, International David Hardman Cooperation Projects Office Charles Palant Ministry of External Relations Patrick Renaud Hector Gonzalez Urrutia, Undersecretary of Coordination and Planning Cambodia Rina Costellanos de Jarquin, Director, External Far East Economic Review Cooperation Programs Nate Thayer Ministry of Finance International Human Rights Law Group Manuel Enrique Hinds, Minister Laura McGrew Ministry of Planning (merged with Ministry of Finance International Monetary Fund in 1995) Scott Brown Mirna Lievano de Marques, former Minister 1989-95 Jose Marques, Consultant Evelyn Jacir de Lovo 75 The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction PRISMA (local NGO for research on environment and Rwanda development) Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island Herman Rosa, Senior Researcher Peter Uvin, Department of Sociology RCS (radio station devoted to dialogue on political- US Agency for International Development economic developments) Richard McCall, Chief of Staff Salvador Samayoa, Elxecutive Director (former peace negotiator for FMLN) Uganda Reld l.ssioo Sacdel (local NGO for local development and training) British High Commission (ODA) Mauricio Silva, Executive Director (Ministry of Petra Byrde, First Secretary (Aid) Planning 1979-80) Social Housing Funcl CARE Francisco Bertrand Galindo, President Nick Ritchie, Country Director Central Bank FreDy justiniano, Principal Adviser Louis Austin Kasekende, Director, Research and Policy Fredy Justiniano, Principal Adviser Charles Kikonyogo, Governor Rene Hernandez, Program Officer DANIDA USAID DanIDa Ken R. Ellis, Acting Mission Director Daniel S. Iga, Program Officer Tully R. Cornic, Adviser European Union Mary C. Ott, Chief, Economic Growth Office John Croswaithe, Counselor (Economics) Peter F. Krantsover, Planning and Programming Office Marja Laine Richard McCall, Chief-of-Staff Luwero (field visit) Charles Costello, Director, Democracy Center (El ChaLrman, District Council Salvador Mission Director 1993-94) District Inspector of Education Kathleen Smith, Country Officer for El Salvador District Planning Officer Other Ministry of Education Gabriel Sirn, Consultant (former Director of ECLAC, Noreda Kiremire, Deputy Director, PIU Mexico City) Rainer Steckhan, Director General, Loans, Social Patrick Makumbi, Director, Project Implementation Development Fund Council of Europe, Paris (phone Unit interview; former Country Department Director, LAC, Ministry of Finance World Bank) E. Tumusiime-Mutebile, Permanent Secretary NURP Haiti,NR Ernest Oloya, Coordinator Interamerican Foundation Margaret Ajju Bob McGuire Oxfam Washington Office on Latin America Antony Burdon, Country Representative Hugh Byrne Palissa (field visit) Other Chairman of the Council Nancy Taylor (Consualtant for UNDP and IDB on Masaba Justine, RCV's Office governance issues) G. Kayongo, Chief Administrator Omaido Enoch, DTLO Lehanon Mr. Shaine, Chairman, Education Committee United Nations Parliament Senior UN staff were interviewed who requested Hon. Norbert Mao anonymity. Prime Minister's Office Peter Uchanda, Permanent Secretary 76 Save the Children Fund (UK) UNICEF Richard Mawer, Field Director Kathleen Cravero, Representative SNV (Holland) Keith Wright, Chief, CCA Program Evelyn Nyakoojo, Program Officer USAID Ugandan Red Cross Patrick Fine Peter Oryema, Secretary General WorldVision Uganda Veterans Assistance Board Moses Dombo, Policy Advocacy Capt. Francis Apiko (Rt.), Program Manager Edward Mubirau, Program Officer Maj. Gen. Emilio Mondo (Rt.), Executive Secretary UNDP Lawrence Nkooto Bategeka, National Program Officer Eugene Owusu, Resident Economist 77 The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction ANNEX 4: COMPARISON OF PCR/ICR RATINGS WITH PPAR/EVM RATINGS PROJECT NAME/OBJECTIVES RA-INGS: PCR/ICR e' PAR/EVM El Salvador: SAL I (L3293) . .. Support the government's 1989-1994 Economic and 'acomc: Satisfactory '0.0 0.00.00 Ethiopia u.0 75.0 3QO 27.0 150 166.0 47.5s, 91.0 Liberia 1109.0 455 15.3 II7.(E00 Mozambique 0.0 0.0 (I.000 . 45. 00 20.0 Namnibia 00.020. 04 i .0 00 0.0 Rwanda '10 225 49 3. 00 1. :59 36.5 Sierra Leone 25 30.5 5. 0. 1 005, . Somalia 480 102 1. 23.0 3t5 20.6 34.3 48.7 South Africa 0.0 0. Ž0. , 0.0 0.0 0.0 Sudan £170.0 73.0 5~6.0, 130.0 914, 37.5 62.6- 47.0 Uganda 772. 5 17.0 ibO9>0 124.0 130 71.9 0.0 31.0 Total AFR post-conflict 326.0 293.2 322.6' 391.4 ~404.6 395.3 26641 286.5 %of Africa lending :2j.0 16.18 17.91 21.82 ¶708 2.7 3.0 136 %of overall lending 2.4 23 .8 2.70 '2.61' 27 ,3 16 East Asia And Pacific 2,529.9 2,413.4 2,823.4 3,800.6 3,356.7 3,132.9 3,595.2 3,363.4 Cambodia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Lao People's Democratic Republic 13.4 0.0 1506.2 0.0 0.0 3.9- 25.8 Myanmar 160.0 55.0 100.0 92.0 54.7 32.3 30.0 14.0 Total EAP post-conflict 173.4 55.0 1150 98.2 54.7 32.3 33.9 39.8 % of EAP lending 6.6 2.28 4.07 2.58 1.63 1.03 0.94 1.18 % of overall lending :1.51 0.45 0.88 0.68 0.35 ~ 0.22 0.10.23 South Asia 2,27,5 2,476.2 3,0Ž4. 2,887.2 2_645.9 3,26.8 3610 3,965.4 Afghanistan Ca ~~~~0.0 0.0 0.0 .0.0 . 0.0 0.0 0.0 AfghLanisan 151.5s 167.0 187 32.0 67.1 134.0 85.0 70.6 Total SAS post-conflict 515 167.0 128. 32.0 `67.1 134.0 8531 70.6 % of SAS lending 6.5 6.74 '4.26 1.11 1,4 3.80 2-36 1.78 % of overall lending 1.2 1.36 0.9 0.22 03Ž 0.93 0.52 0.40 Europe And Central Asia 1,422.0 1,537.0 1,319.1 1,621.7 1,600.5 1,388.7 1,412.5 1,529.4 Azerbaijan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Bosnia-Herzegovina 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0. 0.0 0.0 0.0 Croatia :0_0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Cyprus 16.0 14.0 12.2 26.2 43.8 7.0 20.0 0.0 Georgia ~0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Russian Federation 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Tajikistan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Total ECA post-conflict 16.0 14.0 12.2 26.2 43.8 7.0 20.0 0.0 % of ECA lending 1.13 0.91 0.92 1.62 2.74 0.50 1.42 0.00 % of overall lending 0.1 0.11 0.09 0.18 0.28 0.05 0.12 0.00 Middle East And North Africa 1,02.7 898.8 1,06.0 913.9 1,5'253 i 1,040.5 8923 1,566.2 Algeria 100 110.0 0.0 0.0 480 2.000 464.0 Iraq 2. . 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Lebanon 2-0.0 0.0 0AO 0.0 o.0. .0 0.0 0.0 West Bank and Gaza >041 . . . 0.0 0.001 0.0 Yemen, Republic of 56,7 65.0 61.5 71.1 73.4 42.1 46.4 55.2 Total MENA post-conflict 1767 175.0 615 71.1 491.4 304.1 46.4 519.2 Hof MENA lending 1.6 19.47 5.80 7.78 322 2.3 5.20 33.15 Hof overall lending 4.54 1.42 0.7 0.9 :34 .1 A 2.94 Latin America and Caribbean 2,684.0 3,153.2 2,9897.9 3,459.6 3,025.6 i 3,698.2 4,771.2 5,152.0 El Salvador 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Guatemala 17.0 0.0 0.0 18.5 50.0 44.6 81.0 23.0 Haiti 0,0 21.2 1MG 56.0 19.1 32.1 0.0 63.0 Nicaragua 52.0 38.7 16.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Total LAC post-conflict 69.0 59.9 34.0 74.5 69.1 76.7 81.0 86.0 H of LAG lending 2.7 1.90 1.14 2.15 2.28 2.07 1,70 1.67 H of overall lending 0.60 0.49 0.26 0.51 0.45 0.53 0.50 0.49 Total lending to post-conflict countries 912.6 764.1 97. 9.4 ¶3. 49.4 324 1,002.1 Hof overall lending 75 622 51479 3 .2660 3.26 5.67 s0 An ne xe s 219.06 6.122.98550.095 225219100.0 0.0 23~~~.0 0.0 0.0. 54.1 22.8 13. 3 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0.2 89.0 0.0 05.06 0.0 0.0 . 000 199.0 69.1 1~~~~~223.8 82.0 137.1 78.0 53.3 90.4 34.4 33.6 51.9 145.7 ~~~~~26.67 15.16 19.55 0.0 0~~~.37 813.8830 890.00 00. 10 0.0 023.0 57.4 41 5.5 047 4.0 13 5.0 192 48.0 00 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 . 141< 5.5 276 4.0 2231 5.0 81L * 52 40 105.41 18.30 099. 90.99 3464099. .4 025 020 80.23 0250 05574 456805 3645.8 3,41.2 19300.7 2,01. 0.0 ~~~~~0.0 . 000 0.30 1.9958,9 .469 0.30 0025 0.20 00 00 80.85 0j~ 3.55 40 600 0 3,04.0 00 400 2 3,05.0 2k011976 0.0 0.00 0 0.0 28100 _230 >p0 003 30 216 001 390.0 00. 0 6300 008 000.0 0.18 3.. 5. 030 13 .0 13 130.046 20 741.3 01 ,1.302 000 0 0.0 01 0.0 01.0 34762 0.0 2. 30.0 . 170.0 ~f41 204.2 ,AI0 2,19786 4 0.00 K 0.13 *I 57 92.09 1211 1 4.0 201.6 180.2 1097.1 914 8 3410 43.0 2430.0 1,331.0 897150 000000 0.6200 5430. ,7002,4. 23702 0.00 0.78 35.6~~~46. 421.78 35083 26 791 24.53 43.09 38291 5,2~i4.0 5,421 3.0 5,36.70 6. 6,16.50~ 467 6,106. 8943'S 45607 500 0 101.0 0 0.0 7§5> 0.0 <> .20. 4 2 615 00. 00 0 140.0 90.4 9. 00 40. 5 23. 60.0 046 0. 41 54.3 91 46.3 ~~~~0. 0.0 70 35 2i 0 200 79 00 07 3355 4~ 33 09~6 3002 105 5 24.932 7 213.95 162.7 <~5&18335 4 6.9 181 239 22 146. g 7 2.68 46.29 49 049 .90.55 230.90< 0.72 > 10.70 ~ 3 1,405.0 1,622.4 ~ § 3,130.3 I3,072.2 3,304.4 81 The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction ANNEX 6. PARTNERSHIIP IN POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION WORKSHOP/ DUBROVNIK, CROATIA, JUNE 23-24, 1998 Operations Evaluation Department, World Bank * Reconstruction programs are multisectoral, and Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) the disciplines required for reconstruction will Post-Conflict Unit, World Bank vary from case to case. Reconstruction partner- ships need to maintain a balance of the necessary disciplines for each case. * An important issue for the international system is Conceptual Framework and Workshop Goals how it can move from the "lowest common OED's assessment of The World Bank's Experience in denominator" of coordination to the 'highest Post-Conflict Reconstruction extracts lessons for ongo- common factor.' There is clearly a need for an ing and future efforts of Bank assistance to post-conflict integrated framework, within which the recon- reconstruction. An important finding of the study was struction agencies can apply their comparative that effective coordination and partnerships with all advantages. Such a framework would have to actors in the reconstruction process are key to the effi- correspond to the realist interests of the interna- ciency and effectiveness of reconstruction efforts. In this tional system. context, and as part of the methodology of the OED study, a workshop was jointly sponsored by OED, the Panel 2. Links between Relief and Development Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), The second panel focused on how the stages of relief, and the Bank's Post-Conflict Unit. The workshop reconstruction, and sustainable development inter-relate focused on issues of partnership in post-conflict coun- and affect one another; and how effective partnerships tries and how donors, multilateral institutions, interna- can facilitate the transition between stages. Discussion tional agencies, NGOs, and other stakeholders can bet- centered on the nature of post-conflict reconstruction, rer coordinate their efforts to address the challenges and its practical relationship with emergency or relief faced by countries emerging from conflict. In connection activities. Major points include: with the OED study, a related aim of the workshop was * There is confusion over terminology, but this to share the findings of the study, and to discuss the role reflects some real conceptual and operational of the Bank as an effective partner in providing recon- issues, often reinforced through separation of struction assistance. budget lines. * The term "post-conflict" is somewhat ambiguous, Workshop Proceedings and post-conflict reconstruction involves both The workshop discussed the theme of partnership in the dynamics of relief and the substance of connection with several different issues, over two days, development. June 23 and 24, 1998, in Dubrovnik, Croatia. The for- * The outstanding issue is how to reach a frame- mat consisted of six panels; the main focus and conclu- work where all the tools in the toolbox can be sions of each one follow below. used in appropriate combinations. Panel 1: Governance and Conflict Resolution Panel 3. Rebuilding the Economy This panel discussed promoting equitable development This session presented lessons from the OED study on and preventing conflict. The group discussion focused the Bank's contribution to rebuilding post-conflict on the intersection between political and economic economies, an area regarded as its traditional strength. objectives, and in particular, the degree to which eco- The main conclusions are as follows: nomic interventions can serve the political ends needed * The International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to secure peace as a basis for reconstruction. Main con- should have a seat at the peace negotiations table clusions of the sessions include the following: to advise on the economic consequences of spe- There is a need for reconstruction agencies to cific provisions of peace accords. confront and engage the politics of the context in * In restoring or creating sound macroeconomic which they are working, without overstepping frameworks, the post-conflict period rmay present their mandates. useful opportunities for reform. However, there 82 Annexes may be a folly in automatically applying conven- Panel 5. Post-Conflict Indicators and Evaluation tional wisdoms; the value of each measure should Panelists presented examples of meta-evaluation and the be careful considered in each individual case. benefits of evaluating the entire international response * Likewise, in restoring or building economic sec- (as opposed to individual project or agency responses) to tors, the Bank (or any reconstruction agency) post-conflict programs. The need for different indicators should think through the implications of ortho- to normal development operations was also discussed. dox interventions. These may risk producing out- Indicators of return to normalcy might include invest- comes that are as inequitable as the situation they ment and trade growth, school attendance, IDP numbers were trying to remedy. and returns, the functioning of judiciaries and a number * The IFIs should be prepared to negotiate hard of other proxy measures. Main conclusions of the ses- with governments, who are not the only stake- sion include: holders in countries emerging from conflict. W Where resources are tight, a premium should be * There is some evidence that microcredit schemes placed on joint or inter-agency evaluations. are productive and can be administered effectively * Considerable work was required on factoring in in post-conflict societies. They are good at stimu- beneficiary assessment of post-conflict programs. lating small-scale enterprises, and in particular, * A post-conflict situation presents an opportunity can assist women who tend to suffer dispropor- to redirect development strategy so as to more tionately in conflicts. effectively address the root causes of conflict, such as poverty and inequitable access to oppor- Panel 4. Rebuilding Human and Social Capital tunities and resources. The loss of human and social capital, although often unmeasured, is at the core of destruction wrought by Panel 6. Building Partnerships civil conflict, and its restoration is critical to the overall There was a consensus that building partnerships within recovery. The main discussion points for this session are the international and national response is critical to as follows: achieving policy coherence and program complementar- * The philosophies and methods of restoring ity. The Bank's new Post-Conflict Unit was presented as human and social capital are various, still being one locus of forging partnerships, with specific opportu- tested, and coincide with mainstream debates nities through a post-conflict fund, and working groups about the nature and efficacy of development on training, tools for assessment, best practice studies and assistance. improved information systems. The UN system is also e There are some useful indications of progress working on improved partnerships, with UNOPS being through social funds, particularly in addressing one clear example. NGOs, international and national, gender issues, although they may have limitations present a major source of partnerships, particularly for in scope (numbers reached) and timing (speed of implementation of projects, although the large numbers implementation). and cultural variety of organizations at times pose a chal- * It was felt that the Bank should make social sec- lenge. The main conclusions of this session are: tor support a priority of post-conflict activity, a Building partnerships is an essential, yet time- notwithstanding its uneven performance evi- consuming and painstaking process. denced in the case studies of the OED report. * Future operations will have to seek the optimum * A major issue for post-conflict operations is permutations of partners, mindful that post- where to prioritize scarce resources in social sec- conflict governments may have weak capacity tor initiatives where existing service provision is to carry out a coordination function. weak and sustainability of services questionable. 83 The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction Directory of Participants Margaret Arnold World Bank Howard Adelman 1818 H Street, N.W. Professor Washington, DC 20433 York University Tel.: 202-473-1378 64 Welles Hill Ave. Fax: 202-522-3123 Toronto, Ontario E-mail: M5R 3A8 Canada Tel.: 416-533-5012 Ms. Arnold has been working since November 1996 in Fax: 416-533-3144 the World Bank's Operations Evaluation Department as a E-mail: research analyst and writer on the OED assessment of The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Recon- Howard Adelman has been a Professor of Philosophy at struction. Before joining OED, she worked in the Urban York University in Toronto since 1966. He was the Development Division as Coordinator of the Bank's par- founder and Director of the Centre for Refugee Studies ticipation in the Second UN Conference on Human Set- and editor of Canacla's periodical on refugees, Refuge tlements (Habitat II) and Program Officer for the joint until 1993. He has served in many university positions, World Bank/UNDP Urban Management Programme. including Acting Dean of Atkinson College and two Prior to joining the World Bank, she worked in the non- terms as Director of the graduate program in philosophy profit sector on health and education issues. She has a at York University. In 1996-97, he headed the research Masters degree in International Communication from the unit on Prevention/Early Warning at York University. American University's School of International Service. Currently, he hosts a new TV show, Israel Today, edits the new electronic journal, Contemporary International Christopher Bennett Issues and directs a research team on the study of the Director humanitarian intervention in Zaire in 1996. He has been International Crisis Group the recipient of numerous awards and grants and has Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina authored and edited 18 monographs, edited books and Tel.: +387 71-200-447 special editions of journals, as well as 31 chapters in Fax: +387 71-200-448 edited books and 45 articles in refereed journals. He has E-mail: written extensively on the Middle East, humanitarian intervention, membership rights, ethics, refugee policy Christopher Bennett directs the expanded Balkans Pro- and early warning. His two most recent co-edited vol- ject for the International Crisis Group (ICG). ICG is a umes were: (1) Immigration and Refugee Policy: Aus- multinational, non-governmental organization chaired tralia and Canada Compared, University of Melbourne by Senator George Mitchell. It was foundecl in 1995 to Press and University of Toronto Press, (2) African reinforce the capacity and resolve of the international Refugees, Westview Press. In 1996, his study, co- community to head-off crises before they develop into authored with AstriSuhrke, Early Warning and Conflict full-blown disasters and has operations in Europe, Management: the Genocide in Rwanda, DANIDA, Africa and Asia. Mr. Bennett was a journalist in the for- Copenhagen, was published. His co-edited book with mer Yugoslavia before the outbreak of war in June 1991 Astri Suhrke, The Path of a Genocide: the Rwanda Cri- and remained in the Balkans covering the conflict for the sis from Uganda to Zaire is due for publication in the first 14 months of fighting. He has taught Yugoslav his- fall by Transaction Books. tory at London University and is also author of the book Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse. 84 Annexes John Borton worked for two years (1978-1980) in Brazil with the Humanitarian Policy Group French bilateral cooperation. From 1980 to 1989 he Overseas Development Institute worked with the FAO, first in Brazil (1980-1983), then Portland House in China (1983-1985), and finally in Mexico, Stag Place Guatemala, and Belize from 1985-1989. From London SW1E 5DP UK 1989-1995 he managed the UNDP/OPS Central Amer- Tel: +44 (0)171 393 1614 ica refugee and reintegration program in New York. Fax: +44 (0)171 393 1699 Since 1996, he has been the Chief of the Rehabilitation E-mail: and Social Sustainability Unit in Geneva. He has carried Website: http://www.oneworld.org/odi out missions to Albania, Bosnia, Cambodia, Croatia, six Central American countries, Haiti, Mozambique, Soma- John Borton trained in Geography and Agricultural Eco- lia, Ukraine (Crimea), and Sudan. nomics and then worked as a Planning Officer in the Ministry of Local Government and Lands in Botswana James Boyce from 1980-83. In 1982, with the start of a prolonged Professor, Department of Economics drought in Botswana he became the Planning Officer for University of Massachusetts the National Drought Relief Programme based in the Amherst, MA 01003 Food Resources Department. After a short period as USA assistant to the Chief Agricultural Economist in the UK Tel.: 413-545-3815 Overseas Development Administration, he joined the Fax: 413-545-2921 London-based International Disaster Institute in 1985 E-mail: which subsequently joined with the Oversea Develop- ment Institute where John became a Research Fellow. James K. Boyce is professor of economics at the Univer- Since 1985 he has worked continuously on research, sity of Massachusetts, Amherst. He is the editor of Eco- evaluation and policy studies of disasters and humani- nomic Policy for Building Peace: The Lessons of El Sal- tarian programmes. In 1993 he founded the Relief and vador (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), an outcome of Rehabilitation Network (RRN). During 1995 and early the Adjustment Toward Peace project which he coordi- 1996 he was Team Leader of Study 3 'Humanitarian Aid nated on behalf of the United Nations Development Pro- and Effects' of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assis- gramme. He is the author of The Philippines: The Polit- tance to Rwanda. In 1997 he established the Active ical Economy of Growth and Impoverishment in the Learning Network on Accountability and Performance Marcos Era (London: Macmillan, 1993), Agrarian in Humanitarian Assistance (ALNAP) and currently Impasse in Bengal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, heads the ALNAP Secretariat. He is a Council member 1987), and co-author of A Quiet Violence: View from a and Trustee of Oxfam GB, a Council member of the UK Bangladesh Village (London: Zed, 1983). He is cur- Disasters Emergency Committee and a member of the rently studying the role of international financial institu- International Advisory Panel of the British Red Cross. tions in post-conflict transitions, funded by the Peace and International Cooperation Programme of the John J. Christophe Bouvier D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. Chief, Rehabilitation and Social Sustainability Unit (RESS) United Nations Office for Project Services 11-13, chemin des Anemones 1219 Geneva, Switzerland Tel.: +41 22-979-9384 Fax: +41 22-979-9062 E-mail: Mr. Bouvier has a degree in rural economy/sociology from the Institut National Agronomique of Paris. He 85 The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction Louisa Chan he is currently Senior Policy Research Officer. His publi- World Health Organization cations include Refugees: The Dynamics of Displacement CH-1211 Geneva 27 Switzerland (Zed Books, 1986), The State of the World's Refugees: In Tel.: +41 (22) 791-2111 Search of Solutions (OUP, 1995) and The State of the Fax: +41 (22) 791-4844 World's Refugees: A Humanitarian Agenda (OUP, 1997). E-mail: One of his primary interests is the return and reintegra- tion of displaced populations, and in this context he has Dr. Chan is a graduate of the University of California Fac- completed studies of UNHCR operations in Cambodia, ulty of Medicine, and the London School of Hygiene and Iraq, Mozambique, Nicaragua and other countries. Tropical Medicine. From 1987, she undertook several field health missions in war-affected countries as clinician, Niels Dabelstein project manager and health coordinator on behalf of the Head, Evaluation Unit International Committee of the Red Cross, and the World DANIDA Health Organization in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herze- 2 Asiatisk Plads govina, Cambodia, Ethiopia, and Haiti. Since 1994, she DK-1448 Copenhagen K, Denmark has worked in the WQHO Emergency and Humanitarian Tel.: +45 33-92-00-39 Action Division. She has designed and managed emer- Fax: +45 33-92-04-93 gency and post-emergency programs in Africa (Angola, E-mail: Great Lakes, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone) and Europe (Albania, Caucasus, CIS/NIS, former Yugoslavia). Niels Dabelstein holds a masters degree in development She currently represents the organization in humanitarian economics from the Copenhagen School of Economics forums and policy debates. Dr. Chan is particularly inter- and Business Administration. Since 1988 he has headed ested in the linkages between relief and development, and Danida's Evaluation Secretariat. During 1994-1996 he the challenges of institutional change. led the international Joint Evaluation of Emergency assis- tance to Rwanda and has since been active in national and Nat Colletta international humanitarian forums promoting improved Manager, Post-Conflict Unit standards and accountability in humanitarian assistance. The World Bank In December 1996 he chaired the VOICE/ECHO Forum 1818 H Street, N.W. on Ethics in Humanitarian Aid. He has worked for Washington, DC 20433 UNIDO in Indonesia, DANIDA in India and at the World Tel.: 202-458-8435 Bank in Washington. He is currently chairman of Fax: 202-522-3123 OECD/DAC Working Party on Aid Evaluation. E-mail: Sean Deely Jeff Crisp International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Senior Policy Research Officer Societies (IFRC) UNHCR 17, chemin des Crets Geneva, Switzerland Petit Saconnex - Geneva Tel.: +41 (22) 739-8810 Tel.: +41 (22) 730-4222 Fax: +41 (22) 739-7367 Fax: +41 (22) 733-0395 E-mail: Sean Deely is a Masters student at the Post-war Recov- Mr. Crisp gained a PhD in Political Science and African ery and Development Unit (PRDU) at York University. Studies at the University of Birmingham in the UK. After During the past five years he has worked in the field for working with the British Refugee Council and the Inde- the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Cres- pendent Commission on International Humanitarian cent Societies in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Issues, he joined UNHICR, where he has held positions in Tanzania. He is currently conducting research on Inter- the Public Information Section, Central Evaluation Sec- national Federation operations in post-conflict situa- tion and Centre for Documentation and Research, where tions for his Masters dissertation. 86 Annexes Patrice Dufour She holds a Ph.D from the University of California at Senior External Affairs Counsellor Berkeley and graduate degrees from the Centre for The World Bank Urban Research in Paris and the University of Buenos H. Kresevljakovica 19 Aires. 71000 Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina Tel.: +387 (71) 440-293 Krishna Kumar Fax: +387 (71) 440-108 PPC/CDIE/POA E-mail: United States Agency for International Development Washington, DC 20523-1802 John Eriksson Tel.: 202-712-5072 The World Bank Fax: 202-216-3124 1818 H Street, N.W. E-mail: Washington, DC 20433 Tel.: 202-458-8435 Dr. Kumar is a senior social scientist and the team leader Fax: 202-522-3123 for the democracy and humanitarian assistance sectors E-mail: at the Center for Development Information and Evalua- tion in the US Agency for International Development. John Eriksson was Director of the USAID Center for He is currently directing a series of cross-national evalu- Development Information and Evaluation in Washing- ation studies on the political rehabilitation of war-torn ton as well as Director of the USAID Field Mission in societies. Before joining USAID in 1985, Dr. Kumar Thailand. After his retirement from USAID in 1995, he directed a program of studies and research on transna- has consulted for the Operations Evaluation Depart- tional economic cooperation at the East West Center in ments of the African Development Bank and the World Hawaii. Earlier he taught at Michigan State University. Bank. In the latter capacity he participated in the OED He has extensively consulted with international organi- assessment of The World Bank's Experience with Post- zations such as the World Bank, the International Fund Conflict Reconstruction and prepared the case studies for International Development, the UN Center on on El Salvador, Rwanda and Sri Lanka. He was the pri- Transnational Corporations and the World Food Pro- mary author of the "Synthesis Report" for the Joint gram. Dr. Kumar has written or edited ten books on Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda. evaluation research, economic development and the political rehabilitation of war-torn societies. His latest Alcira Kreimer book (ed.) "Post-Conflict Elections, Democratization The World Bank and International Assistance" (Lynne Reinner Publica- 1818 H Street, N.W. tions) will be out in June 1998. He has extensively pub- Washington, DC 20433 lished in a wide range of professional journals and writ- Tel.: 202-473-3205 ten numerous monographs and reports. Fax: 202-522-3123 E-mail: Alcira Kreimer is a Principal Evaluation Officer with the Operations Evaluation Department of the World Bank. She has been with the World Bank since 1983, where, she has worked on project evaluation, policy develop- ment and operations. She is the author of several Bank reports and evaluations on post-conflict reconstruction, the environment, urban development, and reconstruc- tion after natural disasters. Before joining the Bank she was a staff officer at the National Research Council- National Academy of Sciences, and was a faculty mem- ber at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). 87 The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction Helena Laakso Robert Muscat Evaluator 2357 S. Queen Street Evaluation Unit Arlington, VA 22202 DG VIII Tel.: 703-685-8669 European Commission Fax: 703-685-0663 Rue de la Lai 200 E-mail: 1049 Brussels, Belgium Tel.: +32 (2) 299-2497 Robert J. Muscat is an economist and Executive Direc- Fax: +32 (2) 299-2912 tor of the Institute for Policy Reform in Washington, E-mail: DC. He has been a visiting scholar at the East Asian Institute of Columbia University, Economic Advisor to Ms. Laakso receivecL her Masters degree in Political Sci- the Thai Government's development planning agency, ence from the University of Vaasa, Finland in 1988. Undersecretary for Economics in the Malaysian Trea- From 1990-1994 she was program officer for UNFPA in sury, and Program Policy Director in UNDP. In USAID New York and then Niamey, Niger. From 1994-1996 he has held positions in missions in Brazil, Kenya, and she was assistant to the UNDP Resident Representative Thailand. He served as the India desk officer in in Moroni, the Conmoros. She is currently an evaluation USAID/Washington, and was the agency's Chief Econo- officer in the Evaluation Unit of DG VIII Development, mist from 1972 to 1975. He has written and consulted European Commission, where she is responsible for for the World Bank, various UN agencies, the Harvard evaluation of rehabilitation and post-conflict actions in Program on Refugee Trauma, and other organizations. African, Caribbean and the Pacific states. He has authored books and articles on Cambodia, Thai- land, technical assistance, nutrition, and other subjects. Vincent Lacour In recent years his work has focused on problems of 73 rue Alexandre Nereau post-conflict reconstruction. 91120 Palaiseau, France Tel.: +33 (1) 4322-3800 Stephan Nellen Fax: +33 (1) 4322-4800 Minister, Deputy Assistant Director General SDC E-mail: Cooperation with Eastern Europe and the CIS Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation Mr. Lacour has 25 years of development experience in Effingerstrasse 77 the infrastructure and housing sectors of which seven CH-3003 Berne Switzerland years were with the World Bank. In 1996 and 1997 he Tel.: +41 (31) 322-4403 was Deputy General Manager of IMG in Bosnia and Fax +41 (31) 324-1696 Herzegovina. An inter-governmental organization, IMG E-mail: was instrumental in putting together the $5 billion reconstruction program for which it now assumes field Mr. Nellen has a degree in economics and business coordination. Mr. Lacour devised the methodologies administration from the University of Berne/Switzer- and set up the field coordination mechanisms in close land. He joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1976 partnership with UN agencies, the World Bank, NGOs as a diplomatic training officer and spent his training and the Bosnian government. His other post-conflict years in Berne, Geneva and Rome. In 1978 he became reconstruction experience includes the joint Israeli-Jor- Deputy Chief of Mission at the Swiss Embassy in danian infrastructure rehabilitation program. In January Lagos/Nigeria. In 1981 he was transferred to New 1998, he was asked with his partner Jacques Vaysse to Delhi/India as the head of the economic andU commercial review the institutional framework and to set up the department at the Swiss Embassy. From 1984 to 1986 he planning methods for the reconstruction program in was the deputy spokesman of the Swiss Ministry of For- Azerbaijan. Mr. Lacour is a civil engineer and an urban eign Affairs. In 1986 he was seconded to the Swiss planner by training. Agency for Development and Cooperation as diplomatic advisor to the Division for Development Policy, Plan- ning and Multilateral Cooperation. In 1989 he joined 88 Annexes the Swiss Embassy in Washington as Financial Coun- years of experience in emergency and development activ- selor and Deputy Head of the Economic and Financial ities with the Italian government cooperation. As an Department, in charge of, among other, entities, the official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, she held sev- Bretton Woods Institutions. From 1989 to 1991 he was, eral positions in African and Balkan countries. From in addition to his main task, Alternate Director for 1992 to 1996 she was in charge of emergency and reha- Cyprus, the Netherlands and Switzerland in MIGA. In bilitation activities in the former Yugoslavia. Since 1996 1993 he was transferred to Lisbon/Portugal as Deputy she has been the head of government cooperation in Chief of Mission at the Swiss Embassy. In 1995 he was BiH, based in the Italian Embassy in Sarajevo. Ms. seconded again to the Swiss Agency for Development Paolini is a civil engineer, an architect and a journalist. and Cooperation as Deputy Assistant Director General and Deputy Head of the Division for Cooperation with Paul Peter Eastern Europe and the CIS. Division Chief, South-East Europe Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation Zerubabel Ogom Ojoo Effingerstrasse 77 Director CH-3003 Berne Switzerland Management Systems and Economic Consultants Tel.: +41 (31) 322-4416 P.O. Box 8424 Fax: +41 (31) 324-1696 Kampala, Uganda E-mail: Tel.: +256-41-236682 Fax: +256-41-530721 Mr. Peter has a Masters degree in Rural Engineering E-mail: from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich. From 1974 to 1977 he was an Assistant Lec- Mr. Ojoo is an economist. He is currently Director of turer at the Department of Civil Engineering of the Uni- Management Systems and Economic Consultants, a con- versity of Dar es Salaam. From 1998 to 1986 he headed sulting firm specializing in development and management. a unit of specialists in rural development in a consultant firm in Basle, conducting missions to Africa and Asia Rory O'Sullivan with emphasis on rural infrastructure. He joined the Resident Representative Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) The World Bank in 1987 as senior program officer for infrastructure pro- H. Kresevljakovica 19 jects in Africa. In 1990 he became Head of the Water 71000 Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Infrastructure Service of SDC where he was in Tel.: +387 (71) 440-293 charge of the Swiss contributions to the UNDP/World Fax: +387 (71) 440-108 Bank Water and Sanitation Programs, the Sub-Saharan E-mail: Africa Transport Program, the Water and Sanitation Collaborative Council and the International Forum for Margherita Paolini Rural Transport and Development. He held advisory Head of Italian Government Cooperation in Bosnia and positions in the governing bodies of these programs and Herzegovina participated in a number of mid-term reviews and Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs appraisal missions of projects co-financed with the Italian Embassy Sarajevo World Bank and IDA. Since the end of 1995 he has been Cekalusa 39 Division Chief for South Eastern Europe responsible for Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina technical cooperation of SDC. He is a member of the Tel.: +387 (71) 208-414 steering board of the Swiss special program for the assis- Fax: +387 (71) 667-227 tance to the voluntary return of refugees to Bosnia and E-mail: Herzegovina and is currently preparing possible Swiss contributions to support return in Croatia. Margherita Paolini has worked with the Italian National Oil Company in Africa and the Middle East. She has 15 89 The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction Christiaan Poortman Robert Scharf Country Director, Bosnia and Herzegovina Task Force Coordinator The World Bank Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 1818 H Street, N.W. 2, rue Andre-Pascal Washington, DC 20433 75016 Paris Cedex 16, France Tel.: 202-473-3011 Tel.: +33 (1) 45 24 90 27 E-mail: Fax: +33 (1) 45 24 19 96 E-mail: Alessandro Rubino PM-Partnership and Emergency Assistance Unit Robert Scharf is responsible for security and develop- World Health Organization ment issues in the Development Co-operation Direc- Via E Crispi, No 10 torate of the OECD. In this capacity, he coordinates the Rome, Italy work of a special OECD/DAC Task Force, charged with Tel.: +39 (06) 487-7538 or 487-7550 formulating recommendations for improving policies in Fax: +39 (06) 487-7599 conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Mr. Scharf served E-mail: as one of the editors, and principal contributors to the DAC Policy Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Develop- Dr. Rubino received his degree in medicine and surgery ment Co-operation (OECD 1998), and was responsible from the University of Napoli, and a specialization in for the OECD response to the Multi-Donor Evaluation general surgery frorn the University of Bologna. From of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda. Before this, he 1981-1985, he served as Government Medical Officer worked on aid issues in the OECD Centre for the Co- in Zimbabwe. In 19'86 and 1987, he was Coordinator operation with the Economies in Transition, and on for the Italian Medical Team in Makalle, Ethiopia for trade interests in the US Department of Commerce. He the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Technical Coop- received an MA in Conflict Analysis from the University eration Department. From 1987-1991, he was Medical of Kent at Canterbury (UK) in 1994. Officer responsible for the countries in the African Region and part of the Asian Region with WHO. In Colin Scott 1991, he coordinated the Italian Medical Health Coop- The World Bank eration Programme in Jamaica. From 1992-1996 he 1818 H Street, N.W. served as Coordinator for the Technical Unit of the Ital- Washington, DC 20433 ian Cooperation attached to the Embassy of Italy in Tel.: 202-473-6884 Harare. Since 1996 he has been Program Manager of E-mail: Italian-funded projects, Partnerships in Health and Emergency Assistance at WHO. He is a member of the Colin Scott has been working over the last two years in Italian Society for Tropical Medicine, the Italian Med- the World Bank on post-conflict issues and operations, ical Council, the Zimbabwean Medical Council and the and is currently located in the Bank's Post-Conflict Unit. Ethiopian Medical Council. Previously, he was an independent consultant in develop- ment policy and communications, having spent a number of years working in NGOs and local government. 90 Annexes Gabriel Siri Bill Warnock 5518 Westbard Avenue Country Director Bethesda, MD 20816 World Vision/Bosnia and Herzegovina Tel.: 301-215-7886 Muvekita 2/III E-mail: sylvania. His work experience includes a number of assignments related to post-conflict situations. In 1980, Mr. Warnock has a BA in European Studies from the Uni- he led a World Bank mission to Nicaragua following the versity of Colorado/Boulder-East, a Masters in Interna- overthrow of the Somoza regime. As head of the Sub- tional Affairs from Columbia University, and a Dip.S.M. headquarters of the UN Economic Commission for Latin from Trinity College, Bristol. From 1966 to 1978 he America and the Caribbean in Mexico City, he supervised worked with the Institute of International Education in a number of studies and maintained a close dialogue with New York. Since 1980, he has served World Vision in var- high level authorities in countries in natural disaster and ious posts: from 1980-1986 he was the Director of Evalu- post-conflict situations (Haiti, El Salvador, Nicaragua, ation for World Vision International; from 1987-1996 he and Guatemala). As a consultant for the World Bank, he was the Country Representative for World has assisted in the design and appraisal of a social invest- Vision/Jerusalem; and since 1997 he has been the Country ment fund in Angola. In 1997, he prepared a study for Director of World Vision/Bosnia and Herzegovina. Mr. the IDB on a strategy for reducing poverty in four Central Warnock is also currently the Chair of the Liaison Com- American countries, three of them in post-conflict situa- mittee of the NGO Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina. tions. In March 1988 (with USAID) he advised the gov- ernment of Indonesia on the rationality of establishing a Takako Yasukawa social investment fund in that country. Technical Officer World Health Organization Roger Slade EHAIWHO Manager, Sector and Thematic Evaluation CH-1211 Geneva 27 Switzerland Operations Evaluation Department Tel.: +41 (22) 791-2903 The World Bank Fax: +41 (22) 791-4844 1818 H Street, N.W. E-mail: Washington, DC 20433 Tel.: 202-458-1293 Dr. Yasukawa has been working for eight years with the Fax: 202-522-3123 World Health Organization (WHO), at headquarters and E-mail: in the field, in the emergency program (Emergency Pre- paredness and Response, Rehabilitation and Reconstruc- tion of the Post-war Countries) which has involved plan- ning, managing, monitoring and evaluating of the emergency programs as well as policy setting. Joining WHO, Dr. Yasukawa worked as a pediatrician and a public health officer for seven years in Japan. Dr. Yasukawa is currently responsible for interagency coop- eration and a project on the post-conflict health inter- ventions at WHO, developing policies and strategies for post-conflict health interventions, and working on the design and monitoring of case studies of countries in post-conflict transition. 91 The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction ANNEX 7. THE WORLD BANK'S EXPERIENCE IN POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION/MANAGEMENT RESPONSE iRecommendations Management Response 1. Based on its accumulated experience and Board The paper prepared by staff entitled, "A Frame- deliberations, the Bank should transform its current work for World Bank involvement in Post-Conflict policy guidance, A Framework for World Bank Reconstruction" was endorsed by the Executive Involvement in Post-Conflict Reconstruction into Directors in May 1997 and represents the Bank's an Operational Policy (OP) statement. It should policy on post-conflict reconstruction. We agree develop a stand alone BP setting out Bank proce- that a new OP/BP/GP should be initiated which dures applicable to the internal processing of post- transforms this policy document into a more con- conflict assistance. The provision of post-conflict cise set of guidelines. The purpose of a new assistance should not be handled under OP 8.50 OP/BP/GP will be to articulate this policy within the which should be recast to apply only to natural dis- existing Operational Handbook in a form which asters (as well as man-made disasters of an unex- provides detailed guidance for operations and clear pected and limited duration, such as large scale instructions to staff working in post-conflict situa- industrial accidents). The revised BP/GP should tions. Decisions regarding how best to amend OP highlight the priority of human and social capital 8.50 to take account of post-conflict emergency pro- restoration; the complexities related to reintegrating cedures will take place within the process of drafting ex-combatants into society; the risk of misguided the new OP on post-conflict work. application of operational policies designed for con- ditions of normalcy; the need to restrict Bank lend- ing to areas where it has a comparative advantage (e.g., with respect to demining); and the advantages of a flexible set of lending instruments and partner- ships to meet diverse situations. 2. While a case-by-case approach will continue to We agree with the issues to be covered which, again, dominate Bank post-conflict work, the new policy would be distilled from the existing framework should address the following issues: paper. In addition, we would add the following issues which are detailed in the framework: integrat- (a) Readiness to provide economic policy advice ing displaced persons (as well as demobilized ex- during peace negotiations. combatants) into society; and methodologies for inte- grating conflict analysis into development activities. (b) Coordination of aid. We endorse OED's recommendations regarding the adjustments to procurement, disbursement, and audit- (c) Leadership on macroeconomic and external debt ing procedures to permit a rapid, flexible, and effec- issues in collaboration with the IMF and key tive response in countries emerging from conflict. The external donors. framework paper already notes that new guiclelines could include "streamlined procedures for procure- (d) Capacity to support and guide damage and ment, audit, disbursement and other matters." needs assessments covering physical and institu- We also endorse the role and function of the Bank tional needs and drawing on suitable expertise. in providing technical advice to peace negotiations in areas related to development within the context already set out in the framework paper which notes: 92 Annexes (e) Selectivity in macroeconomic and structural g "Peace treaties and their execution require coordi- policy conditionality. nation with reconstruction and economic stabiliza- tion measures to underpin their objectives. The (f) Flexibility in programming, design, and imple- Bank s expertise can be critical contributing a recon- mentation. struction and development perspective and provid- ing practical advice on immediate matters such as (g) The division of labor between headquarters and the implications for economic governance, budgets, field staff. economic incentives, and so on of proposed govern- ment structures, taxation arrangements, and demili- (h) The importance of monitoring and evaluation. tarization and demobilization arrangements. D 3 DA critical area relates to the question of funding D post-conflict reconstruction, both in terms of D resources for programs in the field and for Bank overheads to adequately perform the various func- DD tions detailed in the OED evaluation. The new Post-Conflict Fund (PCF) procedures also need review to make them more responsive to staff needs. 3. Bank Procedures should emphasize the following: (a) Country Departments facing post-conflict recon- We concur with the greater use of preparation and struction should make greater use of preparation piloting funds, which is already occurring with three and piloting funds, mechanisms for rapid pro- early LILs approved for community-based recon- curement and disbursements, and training in- struction in Rwanda, Angola, and Colombia. Mech- country entities responsible for procurement. anisms for rapid and flexible procurement are also being adapted from earlier social fund approaches, and lessons from Bank experience in Bosnia and Gaza-West Bank should be further elaborated. (b) Country departments should allocate adequate We support the emphasis on monitoring with resources for monitoring. While under normal shorter intervals for CPPR's in post-conflict coun- circumstances a Country Portfolio Performance tries. We also support a focus on the overall con- Review is conducted every 12 to 18 months, in tribution of the portfolio to sustainable peace and post-conflict countries the overall portfolio development. We have models for this in Bosnia should be assessed at least every 12 months for and Guatemala where the Bank provided advice to -0 its relevance, that is, its contribution to sustain- the peace deliberations and our portfolio is closely M able peace and development. linked to the implementation of the peace accords. (c) Country departments should make sure that We agree that the completion reports need to be completion reports for post-conflict operations prepared in a more timely fashion in post-conflict are completed promptly. The standards for such countries and that the appropriate vehicle for work should be tackled by the Bank-wide task addressing this issue is the Bank-wide task force force that is currently reviewing the ICR currently reviewing the ICR process. process. We would add to the above list, that there is a need 93 The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction for increased social and economic analysis within the CAS and ESW on the interaction between conflict and development, a point which is stressed in the framework paper. Here, work is required to identify key indicators and measures of conflict, and rnethods to assess the potential impact of country strategy and portfolio on peace and sustainable development. 4. The Good Practice (GP) statement or handbook In addition, the GP should provide more detailed should illustrate: guidance to staff on good practice in operationaliz- ing the stages of Bank involvement set out in the (a) high quality damage and needs assessments and framework paper, e.g., watching briefs, trans[tional their linkages to the definition of judicious support strategies and early pilot reconstruction, and reconstruction strategies; explore in more detail the types of activities and best practice in each of these stages. Particularly iimpor- (b) examples of efficient and effective implementa- tant is guidance for staff on strategies for design and tion; and implementation of "watching briefs," which repre- sent a relatively new area of Bank activity. (c) examples of timely and participatory implemen- Treatment within the GP of the various innova- tation completion reports. tive sources of quick financing for post-conflict work would also be useful, with examples of the use of IDF, PCF, INFODEV, ad hoc grants from surplus, and the potential role of adaptable lending instruments and LILs. 5. The Post-Conflict Unit, in cooperation with the The Post-Conflict Unit has been involved in training LLC and EDI should undertake training geared to in this area with LLC and EDI for the past year. EDI strengthening the Bank's and partners' capacity to sponsored a multi-agency colloquium on reconstruc- lead damage and needs assessments and to define tion in Washington in 1997, and several groupware an efficient and equitable reconstruction strategy. sessions and a technical consultation have been undertaken to ascertain training needs of staff in various sectors. A conference bringing together a host of key international actors on post-conflict reconstruction was held in cooperation with the Carter Center last Fall. A major Bank-sponsored European meeting on post-conflict reconstruction is planned for April 20-21 in Paris. The PCU ill part- nership with the Africa region is planning work- shops in Southern-Central Africa in September 1998 and West Africa later. There is also a plan to develop training for officials of post-conflict govern- ments to enhance their ability to work with external agencies, international NGOs, and civil society. 94 Annexes ANNEX 8. REPORT FROM CODE/ COMMITTEE ON DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Bank Involvement in Peace Accords Reconstruction The Committee noted the report's recommendation and On June 10, 1998, the Committee on Development Management's support for the Bank's involvement in Effectiveness (CODE) reviewed a report prepared by peace negotiations when invited by all parties to a con- the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) entitled, flict. The Committee remained skeptical that the Bank, The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict if involved, could refrain from getting involved in polit- Reconstruction (SecM98-395), and the draft Manage- ical issues. However, members agreed that the Bank ment Response. Members welcomed the reports and could play a useful role in coordinating aid. This, in fact, generally endorsed their findings and conclusions, while was an area where the Bank's involvement has been noting that the factual record in the case studies was highly valued by its partners. incomplete in some instances. The Committee also noted that virtually all the recommendations set out in Bank Involvement in Conflict Prevention the OED report are already present in the Framework The Committee was generally supportive of Management's for World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict Recon- effort in this area. It looks forward to the upcoming study struction prepared by staff, and endorsed by the Board on pre-conflict to be done by OED. In this connection, the over a year ago. Speakers stressed that the Bank needed Committee referred to a section in the OED report which to proceed sensitively and flexibly in post-conflict situ- mentioned the Colombia CAS as an example where vio- ations with active involvement of the Board, especially lence reduction was included as a key development objec- the Executive Director concerned. They also empha- tive. The Committee was interested to know how Manage- sized that it was time for the Bank to formulate an oper- ment planned to achieve that objective in Colombia. ational policy that will guide staff in responding to post-conflict situations. Flexibility, Field Presence, Monitoring and Funding The Committee supported the report's recommendation Highlighted below are some of the issues raised dur- for a strong field presence, flexibility and monitoring, ing the Committee's meeting: given the often weak government capacity in post-con- flict countries. However, the Committee was cognizant Priorities and Bank's Comparative Advantage in Post- of the cost related to this initiative. While the net income Conflict Situations: debate underscores the overall constraints on the Bank's The OED report identified macroeconomic stabiliza- resources, members raised the issue of whether funding tion and aid coordination as the Bank's comparative for Post-Conflict activities should be considered outside advantages. Speakers indicated that the Bank should the ambit of the DGF, given sensitivities about the latter give more priority to issues of demobilization and the and questions about the relevance of its criteria. need for quick action to rebuild social and human cap- ital, as well as infrastructure development over the Post-Conflict Unit more conventional aspects of structural reform in post- The Committee raised the appropriateness of including conflict countries. the newly established unit under the DGF umbrella as an issue for further discussion, perhaps in the context of the Demining first annual review of the DGF. The Committee concurred with OED's recommenda- tions which supports landmine clearance in the context Operational Policy of a specific development activity, and is consistent with The Committee welcomed Management's proposal to the February 1997 Bank Operational Guidelines on re-evaluate the Bank's policy instruments with regard to Demining. Members also indicated their agreement with post-conflict situations, and develop a new Operational Management's recommendation that an evaluation be Policy which would provide detailed instructions and done on demining in partnership with the UN and other best practice guidance to staff working in post-conflict agencies. The Committee asked that OED study the countries. Members felt it was timely for the Bank to issue further and apprise it of the findings. undertake this given the difference between natural and 95 The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction manmade disaster reconstruction. The Committee stressed that CODE and the Board should review the policy in draft. Surendra Singh Chairman, CODE 96 OPERATIONS EVALUATIONS DEPARTMENT PUBLICATIONS The Operations Evaluations Department (OED), an The World Bank InfoShop serves walk-in customers independent evaluation unit reporting to the World only. 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E-mail: pic@worldbank.org Fax number: (202) 522-1500 Telephone number: (202) 458-5454 OED STUDY SERIES Evaluation and Development: The Institutional Dimension (1998) 1997 Annual Review of Development Effectiveness (1998) India: The Dairy Revolution (1998) The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction (1998) Financial Sector Reform: A Review of World Bank Assistance (1998) Rebuilding the Mozambique Economy: Assessment of a Development Partnership (1998) Agricultural Extension and Research: Achievements and Problems in National Systems (1997) Fiscal Management in Adjustment Lending (1997) Reforming Agriculture: The World Bank Goes to Market (1997) Paddy Irrigation and Water Management in Southeast Asia (1997) 1995 Evaluation Results (1997) Zambia Country Assistance Review: Turning an Economy Around (1997) The Aga Khan Rural Support Program: A Third Evaluation (1996) Lending for Electric Power in Sub-Saharan Africa (1996) Industrial Restructuring: World Bank Experience, Future Challenges (1996) Social Dimensions of Adjustment: World Bank Experience, 1980-93 (1996) 1994 Evaluation Results (1996) Ghana Country Assistance Review: A Study in Development Effectiveness (1995) Evaluation and Development: Proceedings of the 1994 World Bank Conference (1995) Developing Industrial Technology: Lessons for Policy and Practice (1995) The World Bank and Irrigation (1995) 1993 Evaluation Results (1995) Structural and Sectoral Adjustment: World Bank Experience, 1980-92 (1995) Gender Issues in World Bank Lending (1995) The World Bank's Role in Human Resource Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Education, Training, and Technical Assistance (1994) 1992 Evaluation Results (1994) New Lessons from Old Projects: The Workings of Rural Development in Northeast Brazil (1993; contains summaries in French, Portuguese and Spanish) World Bank Approaches to the Environment in Brazil (1993; contains summaries in French, Portuguese, and Spanish) Trade Policy Reforms under Adjustment Programs (1992) World Bank Support for Industrialization in Korea, India, and Indonesia (1992) Population and the World Bank: Implications from Eight Case Studies (1992) The Aga Khan Rural Support Program in Pakistan: Second Interim Evaluation (1990) A;I-1 (I t Irlz qp \ t')) IMt I:III,"' I Y.I\ Vl(II l >10A\ I StSt- c I )I\ .N\2V(1K1l0.\ P tit l9 I ' '\\ I I S I SI M N V U a -1 l AM 3 H 1 JwwU