

Alagados

The Story of Integrated Slum Upgrading in *Salvador* (Bahia), Brazil

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Cities Alliance

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Cities Without Slums

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The Cities Alliance Secretariat
1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A.
Tel. (+1 202) 473-9233
Email: info@citiesalliance.org
www.citiesalliance.org

Cities Alliance - Brazil
Caixa Postal 26.657
05116-970 São Paulo-SP, Brasil
Tel. (+55 11) 3474-9449

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Cities Alliance
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Cities Alliance

William Cobbett, Manager
Mark Hildebrand, Manager, 1999–2005

Task Manager of PATS, World Bank

Ivo Imparato, Senior Urban Specialist

Production Coordination

Giorgio Romano Schutte, Project-Manager, Cities Alliance Brazil
Mariana Kara José, Urban Specialist

Editor

Mariana Kara José

Content Review

Ivo Imparato and Kevin Milroy

Contributors

Alex Abiko, Tereza Herling, Francesco Villarosa, Fabrizio Pellicelli,
Benedetta Fontana and Regianne Bertolassi

Portuguese revision and publishing

Renato Rovai, Publisher Brasil Editora
Maurício Ayer

English translation

John Penney

Production Coordinator, English

Chii Akporji

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1818 H Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20433, U.S.A.
<http://www.citiesalliance.org/index.html>

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The Bahia Project was one of the first activities undertaken by the Cities Alliance, following its formation in 1999. It all started in the *Alagados*, a well-known slum in the Brazilian city of *Salvador*, when the state of Bahia partnered with the Cities Alliance, the World Bank, and the government of Italy to make a real difference in the lives of the slum dwellers in *Alagados*. With the help of the State of Bahia Urban Development Company (CONDER) and the Association of Volunteers in International Service (AVSI), an Italian non-governmental organisation (NGO), public participation improved, as did dialogue between the community and the public authorities. These were the positive outcomes, produced by a process of arguments and compromises, mistakes and corrections, and learning. Always learning.

The real success of *Alagados* is how a slum upgrading project influenced not only the surrounding community, and then the city, but also had a significant influence on slum upgrading policies in the state of Bahia, one of Brazil's poorest. The Technical and Social Support Project (PATS) ran from 2001 to 2006, and facilitated a US\$80-million project, including a World Bank loan and, subsequently, a second Cities Alliance grant, again with the support of the Italian government.

At the end of the project, its steering committee saw the need to document and disseminate the experience of working in *Alagados*, and to produce a useful publication for others seeking to solve similar slum upgrading problems. We hope that this will be more than a final report, and that it will provide inspiration and hope to similar initiatives elsewhere.

The real lessons of *Alagados*, and the state of Bahia are those of partnership and consistency. The slum dwellers and their organisations were the real actors, and the essential keys to progress. The consistent support of the government of Italy, the flexibility and the skills displayed by the public authorities, the presence of AVSI in the community, and the political maturity shown by all parties provided the support that the slum dwellers needed.



William Cobbett

Manager

Cities Alliance

Many studies point to long-term involvement by government agencies as key to the success of urban upgrading interventions. Often mentioned, also, is the need for integrated projects that incorporate the dimension of human development; this would be done, by adding targeted social programs to the package of basic infrastructure, services, and housing improvements providing the backbone to any slum upgrading intervention. Last but not least, local resident participation in project decisions is seen as a precondition for success.

In spite of the wide consensus that prevails among specialists, these conditions for success are not that frequently met in practice. Few serious practitioners doubt the importance of long-term engagement, resident participation, and human development; yet few projects make adequate provisions for all three of these aspects, and an almost exclusive focus on infrastructure and housing is still the norm. As a result, the effects and sustainability of slum upgrading projects are frequently jeopardised.

The slums on stilts located in *Alagados* and *Novos Alagados* are poor and precarious neighborhoods of *Salvador*, the capital of Bahia. Their upgrading is a good example of a really integrated and long-term process of slum upgrading. Beginning in the early 1990s, a growing flow of government investments has dramatically improved the conditions of these settlements, in an effort that still continues today.

I have had the privilege of supporting the process in *Salvador* from the beginning, in various capacities. In 1992, with the Italian government's Development Co-operation program, I appraised the financing request submitted by the NGO AVSI for their first project at *Novos Alagados*, and I supervised the project in its initial stages. Some years later, with the UN-Habitat program, I was able to showcase the project's integrated, participatory, and pro-poor approach at the UN Habitat II Conference, held in Istanbul in 1996.

Starting in 2000, I took part in the preparation and supervision of the World Bank's Technical and Social Support Project (PATS), until its completion in 2006; this was in the context of the partnership between the government of Bahia, the Cities Alliance, the government of Italy, and the World Bank. I am currently the World Bank's task manager for the Bahia Poor Urban Areas Integrated Development Project (*Dias Melhores*), which is replicating the experience acquired in *Alagados* and *Novos Alagados* in other parts of *Salvador* and in Bahia's largest cities.

The state of Bahia has the undeniable merit of having transformed the upgrading of its cities' slum settlements into a policy that not only transcends political cycles but also receives an important amount of funding over the long term. Such geographic targeting of public spending entails fighting urban poverty with direct and large-scale investments in the poor urban areas themselves at both the economic and social levels; such action ensures direct benefits to the poor and avoids the focus on higher income brackets that has traditionally plagued much of social and housing spending in Latin American countries. It also acknowledges the prevalence of urban poverty and the limitations of trickle-down poverty reduction strategies focused only on economic growth.

This is particularly important where inequality is the most serious of challenges, as in Brazil. The Brazilian federal government, having recognised the value of this integrated and participatory approach, has announced unprecedented investments in slum upgrading within the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC). The experience matured by Bahia will certainly help ensure that the integrated and participatory approach prevails. Over and above the importance this experience has had for me in professional terms, I find the human dimension even more relevant. I have valued sharing the difficulties and achievements with the staff of CONDER and of AVSI, with colleagues in development aid organisations and the governments of Bahia and Brazil, and, more importantly, with the local residents who work for their communities. I salute the people from *Novos Alagados* and *Alagados* who had the faith and above all the patience to engage in the difficult and intricate process of a development project financed by external sources. Leaders and Citizens with a capital C like Lurdinha, Seu Raimundo, Dona Nazid, Guerra, and many others. To them, my heartfelt thanks, in the hope that they are as convinced as I am, looking at their communities now, that the results were well worth all the effort.



Ivo Imparato

wTask Team Leader

World Bank



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Conder (Bahia)

The Cities Alliance was created in 1999 as a global coalition of cities and their development partners committed to scaling up successful approaches to urban poverty reduction. By promoting the positive effects of urbanisation, the Alliance supports learning between cities, as well as between cities and governments, international development agencies and financial institutions.

The Cities Alliance mainly focuses on providing technical assistance for projects to upgrade slums. In this respect, the Alliance approved in 2001, the project known as the PATS (Technical and Social Support Project) with the support of the Italian government and the World Bank. The Association of Volunteers in International Cooperation (AVSI), the Italian non-government organisation (NGO) for cooperation, was responsible for executing this project; it sought to combat urban poverty through an area-based integrated and participatory approach. As the successor to projects previously undertaken in *Alagados*, one of Brazil's largest slums, the scope of the PATS was extended to include the macro-area of *Ribeira/Cobre* in the city of *Salvador* (Bahia).

The aim of the present publication is to provide a little more information about this project. Chapter 1 aims to give a general idea of the social and geographical situation of the area where the project is being taken forward. It also seeks to draw attention to pre-PATS development initiatives in *Alagados* where thousands of people living in virtually total poverty and highly insalubrious conditions, occupied stilt shacks perched over stretches of fetid water. These conditions in *Alagados* have become known throughout Brazil and the world as a symbol of the housing and social problems facing many large cities in developing countries. At the beginning of the 1990s, the very first slum upgrading project to incorporate effective participation by slum dwellers themselves got under way in this particular area of *Salvador*. At that time a framework agreement had already been drawn up with AVSI, which had just completed a successful project in Brazil known as the *Alvorada* Project in the city of *Belo Horizonte* (state of Minas Gerais).

Chapter 2 outlines the general objectives of the PATS project and its modus operandi. It also contains an explanation of how the various working partnerships have progressed over the past few years. The framework agreement signed between the Bahia state government, Cities Alliance, and the Italian government actually originated in 1999. PATS emerged from this as a means of boosting support for the *Ribeira Azul* poverty reduction programme as it extended the earlier *Alagados* projects to the area of *Ribeira/Cobre*. This programme was targeted primarily at dealing more widely with poverty in one of the most poverty-stricken areas of the *Salvador* metropolitan region. It was specifically aimed at improving living conditions for the poorest residents of the area: the people inhabiting the precarious waterside stilt shacks. The intervention brought together a series of urban upgrading and environmental rehabilitation works; it involved the demolition of the stilt houses



and the resettlement of whole families who had previously lived in them. The project also involved human development initiatives and substantial efforts to improve housing overall, together with the building and upgrading of a number of community amenities. A key to the methodology employed by the PATS intervention was formal recognition and strengthening of the seventy local residents' associations active in the area.

Chapter 3 summarises the direct results of the project. It refers to the main achievements of the physical and social interventions and to the encouragement of a genuine participatory process in the formulation of an overarching vision. The chapter then deals with the environmental question, the introduction of a monitoring and evaluation system, and the project's success in scaling up the scope of the intervention.

Chapter 4 presents the challenges and lessons learned in the spheres of community participation, shared management, and the building of an international partnership. This chapter also refers to the prospects for sustaining the intervention. It goes on to describe the problems encountered over the following: regularisation of land ownership, the dilemma of cost recovery, controversy over the different types of housing, the need to prevent invasion of newly recovered land; such problems culminated in the requirement to make properly urbanised land available at low cost and to establish partnerships for the operation and maintenance of the newly-installed infrastructure. Finally, this chapter addresses what is probably the most crucial of all the challenges: the contribution of the project intervention to local economic development by helping to generate employment and income for the people living in the very poorest areas.

Many individuals associated with the various partner institutions and communities involved made strenuous efforts to ensure the success of this project. We should like to acknowledge the contribution made especially by Loredana Stalteri, of the Italian government's cooperation program, who was present from the very beginning of the *Ribeira Azul* project. Loredana closely and enthusiastically followed its development and was instrumental in putting together the framework agreement that formed the basis of the intervention.

A new project is currently under way that is intended to scale up the intervention to the state level, in close cooperation with the World Bank. This new project will benefit from a World Bank loan (*Dias Melhores*) signed in 2006 and from the recently negotiated funding to be provided by the Brazilian federal government under the PAC (Growth Acceleration Programme); both sources of funding are to be directed to slum upgrading. The excellent prospects for continuing the project in this way effectively transform the original initiative into an on-going public policy process. With the introduction of ever stronger framework agreements with different partners, the project can now be regarded as a significant achievement that amply fulfills the overall mission and objectives of the Cities Alliance.



Context and Background

Stilt house (*palafita*) in Salvador (Bahia). Photo: Jefferson Vieira

According to recent studies, over three billion people, accounting for roughly 50 percent of the world's population, currently live in urban areas. A third of these survive in precarious settlements lacking proper infrastructure. In some capital cities of Latin America over 50 percent of the inhabitants live in such conditions, as for example in *Bogotá* (Colombia), *Caracas* (Venezuela), and *Quito* (Ecuador).

In Brazil the situation is not greatly different from that encountered in neighbouring Latin American countries. For example, in the state capitals of Bahia (*Salvador*) and Pernambuco (*Recife*), over half of the population lacks even the minimum requirements associated with decent housing. According to a survey published by the Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE), which is responsible for supplying official data and information on Brazil, all the Brazilian cities with over five hundred thousand inhabitants contained irregularly occupied areas in 2001. These are areas such as *Alagados* that have been invaded and built up informally by homeless people. The same survey indicated that 24.3 percent of all the municipalities in Brazil contained such informal urban areas known as "irregular subdivisions." Of these, 22.4 percent contained *favelas* (slums) and 8.9 percent contained *cortiços* (slum tenements).

The situation can be explained mainly as a result of the substantial internal migration of the population that has taken place over the last fifty years. Together with the entrenched income inequality of Brazil and the lack of formal sector low-income housing supply, this full scale migration has led to the emergence of belts of urban poverty on the fringes, or peripheral areas, of the country's larger cities. Migrants have generally been forced to set up homes in areas that are unsuitable for human occupancy; such migrants are now victims of extreme social vulnerability.

This situation has deteriorated further as the result of high inflation and economic stagnation arising from the various economic crises experienced by Brazil over the past thirty years. In 1970, for example, around 1 percent of the population of the *São Paulo* municipal area lived in *favelas*, while in 2000 the number of *favela*-dwellers had risen to around 11 percent. The situation was similarly alarming in other Brazilian state capitals. In 2002, people living in *favelas* and precarious settlements accounted for approximately 20 percent of the entire population of *Rio de Janeiro*, 20 percent of that of *Belo Horizonte* and 30 percent of *Salvador* (Bahia).



Photo: Jefferson Vieira

1.1. Bahia and the city of *Salvador*

The state of Bahia is the fifth largest in Brazil, occupying five hundred and sixty-five thousand square kilometers — 6.7 percent of the country's overall territory. The estimated population of the state in 2006 was 13.95 million, representing 7.5 percent of the total population of Brazil (IBGE and the National Survey of Household Sampling — PNAD), and Bahia was responsible for about 4.5 percent of Brazilian GDP.¹

Bahia contains significant environmental wealth, possessing twenty-four thousand square kilometers of ecological reserves, protected areas, parks, green belts, botanical gardens, and other important natural features. The Atlantic coast of the state is the longest in the entire country, with almost a thousand kilometers of beaches which, with the tourism-oriented service sector of the state, account for 45.5 percent of the its GDP.

The fast pace of urban growth witnessed over the last few decades in Bahia has resulted in significant population concentrations in cities that are considered large or medium-sized. At the same time, significant growth has occurred in the metropolitan region of *Salvador* (MRS), where at present about one-third of the total urban population of the state is located. The MRS comprises ten municipalities, including the capital, and in 2006 had a population estimated at around 3.4 million, according to the Brazilian Institute of Statistics and Geography and the National Survey of Household Sampling (IBGE/PNAD). The average growth rate of the population of the MRS between 1980 and 1991 was 3.10 percent per annum, while over the same period average estimated demographic growth in Brazil's metropolitan regions as a whole stood at 1.88 percent.

Of the economically active population, over half of the households in the region received the equivalent of less than two minimum wages² between 1992 and 2002.

1. www.sei.ba.gov.br

2. Minimum wage: R\$415, equivalent to US\$210, October 2008.





Salvador

Salvador, the state capital of Bahia, is Brazil's third largest city after *São Paulo* and *Rio de Janeiro*, with an estimated population of 2,7 million (IBGE/PNAD, 2006). Covering an area of 707km², *Salvador* was one of the fastest growing urban areas in Brazil during the latter half of the 20th century. Founded by the Portuguese in 1549, the city served as the political and administrative centre of the country for over two hundred years. It was also Latin America's main port and the main hub of economic development in Brazil's Northeast region.

From the end of the 18th century, when Brazil's capital was transferred to *Rio de Janeiro* (in 1763), *Salvador* entered a long period of political and economic decline. The city began to resume its economic importance only in the mid-20th century when oil was discovered in the outlying suburb of *Lobato* in 1949. Discovery of oil boosted *Salvador's* economy and that of the entire area of the *Recôncavo da Bahia de Todos os Santos* (the area fronting the Bay of All Saints). As a result, in a little over ten years (1950 to 1960) the city's population doubled and *Salvador* has since experienced the most rapid rates of urban growth of the entire country. Meanwhile, *Salvador* rapidly became the northeast's flagship in the process of modern industrialisation, which initially had taken root in the Centre South part of Brazil.

From just over four hundred thousand inhabitants in the early 1950s, the city of *Salvador* grew to around one million during the 1970s, and by 2007 the population stood at 2.75 million. (See Table 1).

Table 1

SALVADOR (BAHIA): DEMOGRAPHIC GROWTH

Year	Population (000s)
1955	445
1970	1,007
1980	1,502
1991	2,075
2000	2,443
2006	2,714

Source: IBGE, 2007

During the 1970s, along with rapid demographic growth, the city underwent a series of economic, administrative, and social changes. Substantial new roads were built and the CAB, the Bahia Administrative Centre (*Centro Administrativo da Bahia*), a state government complex, was built in the northern area of the city. Meanwhile, the industrial district, which was previously located on the *Itapagipe* Peninsula, was re-established in the municipalities of *Camaçari* and *Aratu*, integrating the COPEC (*Camaçari* Petrochemical Complex), and the CIA (*Aratu* Industrial Centre). Both government and industrial initiatives helped to improve connectivity between the capital and the surrounding metropolitan region.

The city's burgeoning economic development led to the emergence of new middle- and upper-class residential districts. They developed partly to meet the demand for housing by professional staff relocating to Bahia from other states (particularly from *São Paulo* and *Rio de Janeiro*); they also came in to existence to accommodate a new local middle-class emerging to staff the new industries. These new neighbourhoods were generally located in the vicinity of the Atlantic coast toward the northeast of the city. At the same time, *Salvador's* lower income "popular" neighbourhoods, housing non-professional ordinary workers, migrants, and the unemployed, tended to grow in the cheaper areas at some distance from the city centre.

It is estimated that about one-third of the population of the *Salvador* municipality lives in *favelas* on land belonging to others and seriously lacking in essential public services. In addition to the substantial numbers of people living in *favelas* and other precarious settlements, the metropolitan region of *Salvador* is notable for the highest rate of unemployment in the country. According to the latest Employment and Unemployment Survey (PED), 22.3 percent of the economically active population of the MRS was effectively unemployed in December 2006; this contrasts with the 15.2 percent national unemployment average.

Salvador has a quantitative³ housing shortage of around one hundred thousand new homes, of which eighty-two thousand are needed for people in the under three minimum wages income bracket at present share accommodation or live in rented or borrowed rooms, improvised accommodation, and/or shacks. Overall, the situation is worse. The city has a qualitative⁴ housing deficit of around four hundred thousand homes needed by people living in unsuitable physical circumstances in settlements that lack rudimentary infrastructure. In 2005, *Salvador* had a total number of 934,626 households.

3. The quantitative housing deficit/shortage according to the *Salvador* Urban Development Master Plan– PDDU/2004 - based on the João Pinheiro Foundation methodology.

4. The qualitative housing deficit/shortage according to the methodology designed by Angela Gordilho-Souza (2000).



1.2 .The Alagados in Salvador

Photo: Geraldo Melo



*Every day / the morning sun shines down on them and presents
them with a challenge / It brings them from sleep into a world
they do not want / Stilt houses, jetties, everything in tatters / all
suffering the same agonies /And the City / which on its postcards
stretches its arms out wide /But with its fists closed in real life
Denies opportunities / and shows the hard face of evil.*

Alagados, Trenchtown, Favela da Maré /

Hope does not come from the sea / it comes from the TV aerials

The art of living on faith / But, these people ask, faith in what? ⁵

(Herbert Viana, Bi Ribeiro, João Barone)

5. Todo dia / O sol da manhã vem e lhes desafia / Traz do sonho pro mundo / Quem já não o queria / Palafitas, trapiches, farrapos / Filhos da mesma agonia / E a cidade,
/ Que tem braços abertos num cartão postal / Com os punhos fechados da vida real / Lhes nega oportunidades / Mostra a face dura do mal / Alagados, Trenchtown,
Favela da Maré / A esperança não vem do mar / Vem das antenas de TV / A arte de viver da fé / Só não se sabe fé em quê (Brazilian popular music)

The district known as *Alagados* is notorious as one of the worst areas in Brazil from an urban and environmental point of view. It is located in the *Subúrbio Ferroviário* (Railway Suburb) looking over the Bay of All Saints, in the *Enseada dos Tainheiros* inlet on the *Itapagipe* Peninsula. The development of this area of the city is closely linked to the occupation process which took place on the *Itapagipe* Peninsula at an earlier stage of industrialisation and the emergence of the *Subúrbio Ferroviário* to service it.


Alagados itself bore the brunt of a first land invasion by homeless and low-income people during the second half of the 1940s when the housing crisis in the city of *Salvador* was beginning to get out of hand. The first of these invasions, known as the “*Corta-Braço*”, took place in 1946 in the *Liberdade* neighbourhood; this was followed in due course by the occupation of the entire *Alagados* mangrove swamp area in the lower part of the city.

The occupation of the *Alagados* involved the consolidation of a number of different informal settlements over different periods and at various stages of development and infrastructure provision. Subsequent “invasions” over the years went on to transform the area into a densely occupied neighbourhood. In 1970, the IBGE census estimated a total population of eighty thousand in the *Alagados* area.⁶

The peninsula originally consisted of small fishing villages and summer houses owned by wealthy families from *Salvador*. The area was virtually uninhabited until 1864, prior to which occupation had been restricted to the coastline.

With the beginning of industrialisation in *Salvador* and the building of factories, warehouses, and dockyards in the area from the late 19th century, occupation of the *Itapagipe* Peninsula got seriously under way. During this period significant changes in the type of occupation of the area took place, as dwellings were constructed for workers in the emerging industrial sector. With the building of the first stretch of the *Calçada-Aratu* railroad and the various stations along the peninsula from 1869 onwards, the first incursions began into the mangrove swamps towards the southern end of the peninsula. In 1910, the area underwent further significant change with the closing of the *Jequitaia* Canal and increased population densification.

Enseada dos Tainheiros, Salvador, 1930



Source: Salvador City Hall

6. GEPAB/ASSEC, 1973 apud Carvalho, 2002, p. 23.



Source: Salvador City Hall

The building of the railroad heralded an industrial and commercial boost to the area and attracted a significant influx of migrant workers. Between 1948 and 1950, the numbers of the latter had grown substantially and the *Alagados* mangrove swamps began to be occupied along the *Enseada dos Tainheiros*; thousands of families built shacks over the water, given the lack of building space on “dry land” (*terra firme*). At the same time, the area had become the repository for some of the city’s garbage which, when embedded in landfills, created extra space for even more invasions. As early as 1959, the area was described in the following terms:

“These neighbourhoods are called ‘invasions’; they are inhuman places with people living as best they can; the neighbourhood which attracts most attention is the one built over the mangrove swamps filled with garbage and rubble on the Itapagipe peninsula”. (Santos apud Gordilho-Souza, 2000, p. 115)



Up to the 1950s the *Alagados* area possessed two main advantages: it held out the possibility of employment in the *Itapagipe* industrial centre and, at the same time, offered cheap commercially unviable land. Since the area was not actually “*terra firme*,” no land owners came forward to block the invasions. Thus, building stilt houses along and over the waterline appeared unlikely to present the risk of violent retaliation and eviction by landowners — as was the case with the invasions on dry land. As such, the inhabitants were not subject to rental payments or transport costs and had easy access to fish and other products from the sea (to supplement their incomes and dietary requirements). This meant that to a certain extent the risks involved in living in stilt houses over the water were outweighed by the advantages. Living in the *Alagados* was described by some of the inhabitants as a positive process through which they could gradually improve their quality of life regardless of the many difficulties.

The shacks were first constructed on the wet areas between the tide mark and the muddy banks of the mangrove swamps, while a few were actually erected on dry land. They consisted of stilt houses built with plywood, corrugated iron sheets, plastic, cardboard, or any other material that could be used for building some kind of rudimentary dwelling. In due course, new types of housing were erected in the area, as residents created their own “*terra firme*” with landfills, using building rubble mixed with mud brought down from the nearby hills. Better building materials gradually began to be used such as stone, cement, and cement blocks. However, a substantial number of precarious dwellings continued to occupy the wet areas.

Occupation of the mangrove swamps and wet areas brought changes to the underlying soil structure mainly by weakening the equilibrium of the local ecosystem. One result of constant land filling was that the island of *Santa Luzia* almost disappeared in the 1950s, thereby effectively becoming part of the *Itapagipe* Peninsula.

During the 1960s various factors combined to further degrade the local socio-economic scenario; these included the gradual decline of the railroad as a result of increased road traffic, the transfer of the existing local bus station which reduced easy access of residents to public transport, and finally the closure of industries in the *Itapagipe* area.

The establishment of industries centers in nearby municipalities, as the *Aratu* Industrial Centre and the *Camaçari* Petrochemical Complex, as well as the construction of several new avenues has determined a significant change from the 1970s onward in the pattern of occupation of the city space. With the arrival of people coming from rural areas attracted by burgeoning industrialisation, these newly industrialised areas on the fringes of the city began to be heavily populated. However, it was notable that the benefits of Bahia's modernising phase failed to filter down to people actually residing in the areas and life on the periphery as a result became increasingly precarious.

Access to jobs and infrastructure has been a central element of the occupation process of the *Alagados* over the years. Initially the establishment of industries in the *Itapagipe* area stimulated the area's occupation; in later years, however, the reduction of employment opportunities in the *Alagados*, together with substantial migration into the city and the headlong rush by the poorer population to occupy the newly industrialized periphery, produced the situation that confronts us today. At present the population of the *Alagados* is very poor and survives generally in precarious conditions, especially in respect of infrastructure and basic sanitation. Expansion of the *Alagados* area resulting from a long series of land invasions over a period of more than fifty years effectively has led to the emergence of the largest conglomeration of stilt houses in the whole of Brazil.

During the 1990s, the situation in the *Alagados* area deteriorated further. The massive expansion of the outlying districts (*subúrbios*) and the wholesale occupation of the *Enseada do Cabrito* (which later became known as *Novos Alagados*) by stilt houses has caused the *Ilha do Rato* (Rat Island) to become linked to the *Itapagipe* Peninsula by lines of stilt houses built over the sea.

Thousands of people in the area live unhealthy lives in virtually total poverty in stilt houses perched over fetid water. This situation has made *Alagados* into one of Brazil's most notorious slums and to a great extent serves to highlight the worst housing and social problems of large Brazilian cities.





Photo: Jefferson Vieira



1.3. Tackling poverty in the *Alagados* area

in the late 1960s, the government undertook the first initiatives aimed at bringing effective change to the *Alagados* area. At this time the area's population stood at around 70,000.

Table 2

ALAGADOS: DEMOGRAPHIC GROWTH

Years	Population	Anual growth (%)
1960	8,875	-
1965	21,500	19.4
1967	64,500	27.0
1970	78,009	6.5
1973	85,829	3.34

Source: GEPAB/ASSEC apud Carvalho, 2002, p. 93

In the 1960s the Bahia state government set up a commission to deal with the problems of the *Alagados*. This commission comprised representatives of the state government, the municipal government, and local community-based institutions (although in practice the participation of the latter was extremely limited). The recommendations submitted by the commission led to a new aerial photo survey of the area in 1968 and the preparation of the *Alagados* Recovery Plan (*Plano de Recuperação dos Alagados*) in 1969 (GEPAB/ASSEC apud Carvalho, 2002, p. 119). In the event, however, the plan was not acted upon due to a shortage of funds.⁷

1946

Invasion of the *Alagados*

1973

First government intervention in the *Alagados*, *Enseada dos Tainheiros*

1976

Invasion of the *Novos Alagados*, *Enseada do Cabrito*

1984

Conclusion of the intervention in the *Alagados*


7. This plan resulted in the establishment in 1970 of an Executive Commission for the *Alagados* Recovery Plan (CEPRAL). This lasted for only two years.



The first project actually undertaken by the government in the *Alagados* area was planned and executed between 1973 and 1984, during which period the population in the area had increased to over eighty-five thousand. In 1972, the state government approached the federal government for funding (see Box 1), and in 1973, an agreement was signed between the National Housing Bank (BNH) and the *Salvador* municipal government covering the formulation of an investment programme in the hope of improving housing conditions for the local population.

In 1973 GEPAB, the *Alagados* Bahia Study Group (*Grupo de Estudos para os Alagados da Bahia*), started work on boosting production of the necessary basic inputs and preparing an urban development plan for the area (Carvalho, 2002, p. 125).⁸ The plan was in line with the national scheme to provide popular housing and used long-term bonds as a financial basis.⁹ Execution of the activities proposed under this plan was the responsibility of AMESA (*Alagados Melhoramentos S.A.*), a mixed capital firm established for the purpose by the state government. The proposed plan constituted a major physical urban development aimed at upgrading the slum by eradicating all the stilt houses, remaking the unsuitable landfills, and introducing infrastructural amenities such as drainage, basic sanitation, and road surfacing (Carvalho, 2002, p. 87). As a result, all the stilt houses were replaced by newly constructed homes on the levelled areas.

In the mid-1980s, the *Salvador* press published a series of articles commemorating the definitive removal of all the *Alagados* stilt houses which had for over forty years served to inspire the work of photographers, painters, writers, musicians, and film producers.



8. The *Alagados* Urban Development Plan received financial resources from the federal government through the National Housing Bank (BNH) on a grant basis. This was a pioneering initiative, since the then BNH possessed no mandate to become involved in the upgrading of *favelas*.

9. The proposal to upgrade housing by means of mortgage finance and a series of credit lines for purchases of building materials by residents, both schemes funded by the BNH, turned out to be unsuited to the poorest, given that the households with incomes of under three minimum wages were unable to qualify for such loans.



Novos Alagados invasion, Enseada do Cabrito, 1984; on the top, Alagados after intervention

However, although this intervention succeeded in achieving its aim of eradicating the stilt houses, a few years later, in 1986, the entire area was nevertheless the target of a new spate of invasions. By the beginning of the 1990s the area had once again become an enormous precarious stilt house settlement protruding even further into the Bay of All Saints, far beyond the area which had previously been occupied by the old stilt houses. Thus, in the space of less than fifteen years, the area had reverted to the same situation as in the early 1970s.

Not only did this happen after the public works in *Alagados* were completed, Even while they were under way in *Alagados*, from 1977 onwards, a new invasion began to get underway a little further to the north — on the banks of the inlet known as (also fronting the Bay of All Saints). This new mass occupation took over the area that had been levelled for the construction of a new main road and eventually spread over onto the estuary of the Cobre River. The new settlement became known as *Novos Alagados* (New *Alagados*) in view of its remarkable physical and social similarity with the previous area (*Alagados*).

In short, the intervention designed to improve conditions in the old *Alagados* served to demonstrate the limits of the approach that had been used: It had been basically focused on the provision of infrastructure and housing but without any real involvement in the process by the local community. It was also apparent that efforts to prevent further invasions resulting from increasing demographic pressures were needed.

From 1984 onwards, certain modifications were made to the institutional organisation of the bodies responsible for housing improvements in the state, but this resulted in little practical progress in the housing sector. In early 1984, the Bahia state government broadened the area under the responsibility of AMESA, subsequently re-registered as HAMESA (*Habituação Melhoramentos S.A.*). The latter was liquidated in 1999 and its projects were reallocated to CONDER, the *Salvador* Metropolitan Region Development Company (*Companhia de Desenvolvimento da Região Metropolitana de Salvador*), which was renamed the Bahia State Urban Development Company, with activities covering the whole state.¹⁰

10. CONDER was set up as a public enterprise in 1974 at the same time as the Metropolitan Region of *Salvador* (MRS). Its basic remit was to undertake integrated planning of economic and social development, infrastructure, and land use in the metropolitan area. CONDER was initially linked to the State Secretariat for Planning, Science, and Technology and later became part of the State of Bahia Urban Development Secretariat (SEDUR), established in 2003.

Brazil's national policy: the Housing Financing System

The federal government launched its National Housing Policy in 1964 and in the same year, established the Housing Financial System (SFH) and the National Housing Bank (BNH) with the aim of helping people to acquire their own homes. Theoretically the objective of the SFH was to help low-income sectors of the population to purchase their own homes by providing specific credit lines. However, the proposed system was based on a measure of borrower creditworthiness which effectively ruled out participation by substantial sectors of the population in informal employment and on extremely low incomes. The latter included slum dwellers and people living in precarious settlements.


Aware of these drawbacks, the federal government went on to launch special housing programmes focused on people earning less than three minimum wages, thus officially admitting for the first time that the housing shortage could be tackled by upgrading the urban environment of poor and degraded areas. This new approach by government bodies in the 1970s proved to be a watershed in Brazil's housing policy. It was in stark contrast to previous policy which prescribed the wholesale removal of slums and the rehousing of slum dwellers in public housing units built in fringe areas of cities.

The first projects to benefit from this new approach to the housing problem, involving investments in already existing precarious settlements, were the *Alagados* in *Salvador* and the *Favela da Maré* in *Rio de Janeiro* (Gordilho-Souza, 2000, p. 49).

The 1970s saw a huge increase in the number of slums in Brazil's largest cities. Despite the various programmes designed to tackle the issue on a nationwide basis, studies indicated that the majority of the poor population (living on under three minimum wages) effectively remained outside the system and were forced to resort to "informal" methods such as invading and occupying land illegally. In short, only 33.6 percent of the housing funded by the BNH between 1964 and 1986 was built specifically for poorer people and less than 6 percent of the housing finance available was invested in the alternative programmes set up from 1975 onwards, designed for people earning between one and three minimum wages (*idem*, p. 48–50).

The federal government finally decided in 1986 to suppress the BNH and its functions were taken over by the Federal Mortgage Bank (CAIXA).

Now, twenty years later, it is still estimated that about two-thirds of the circa 1,100,000 new urban households formed each year in Brazil are forced to go for an informal housing alternative, in spite of progress made since 2003 in targeting federal housing subsidies.



New public interventions in the housing sector

From the time the BNH was taken out of commission (in 1986) to the early 1990s a number of changes were made at federal level to housing policy guidelines. They occurred with the dismantling of the SFH and against a background of re-democratisation and the emergence of the new responsibilities awarded to the municipalities under the 1988 federal constitution. In this context, a series of decentralised public housing initiatives was prepared, reflecting the reduced flow of federal funds available for underpinning a workable national housing policy (Gordilho-Souza, 2000, p.338). It was not until the mid-1990s that federal government investments in the housing sector began once again to come on-stream. This occurred through the Federal Mortgage Bank (CAIXA), when it was made the financial agent responsible for investing central government resources for public interventions in the housing sector. The new programmes included plans for producing new housing units as well as for improving the housing conditions of existing consolidated precarious settlements.

After a number of years of inactivity the Bahia state government began again to play a role in the housing sector (in the 1990s), spurred by the renewed flow of federal funds (idem, p. 343).¹¹ This new upsurge of state government activity, aimed at producing more public housing, was a watershed in the whole question of public housing projects in *Salvador* — particularly, from 1996 onwards, with the launching of the *Viver Melhor* programme.

Other key factors related to the resumption of state government activity in *Salvador's* public housing sector included a substantial increase in demands by the community for better housing conditions. In tandem with these demands came the emergence of better organised local movements. This change of posture by communities increasingly determined to claim their rights was closely related to the re-democratisation effort in Brazil which had resulted in the promulgation of the new federal constitution of 1988 following the end of the military dictatorship (1985).¹² During the later 1980s, the pro-housing movements, opposed to large-scale evictions of squatters from invaded lands, gained strength in a number of Brazilian cities such as *Belo Horizonte* and *Recife*.

11. In the case of *Salvador*, it is clear that the substantial rise in public funding from 1996 onwards, with the establishment of the *Programa Viver Melhor*, was closely linked to the resurgence of central government investments through the Federal Mortgage Bank (CAIXA), based on the financing schemes of the *Pró-Moradia* and *Habitar Brasil* programmes (Gordilho-Souza, 2000, p. 349).

12. The 1988 federal constitution introduced for the first time the principle of the “social function” of property. This principle was given concrete application only thirteen years later by the Statute of the Cities (Federal Law No. 10.257/2001), which paved the way for a new stage in Brazil's urban policy with its acknowledgement of the existence of the so-called “informal city”.

One example of this was the appearance at the end of the 1980s of FABS, the Federation of Neighbourhood Associations (*Federação de Associações de Bairros*), which made it its business to press the authorities to tackle the on-going crisis in the housing sector. The MDF, the Movement for the Defence of Slum Dwellers (*Movimento de Defesa dos Favelados*) also emerged at around the same time. This was a nationwide, more radically minded movement, which played an important role in a number of public demonstrations in *Salvador*. In the early 1990s, these and similar movements in the city tended to keep a low profile; however, they renewed their activities in the latter part of the decade, taking their cue from the new central government initiatives targeted at the housing sector. Towards the end of the 1990s the Bahia Popular Housing Union (*União por Moradia Popular da Bahia*) was formed by communities anxious to secure political support from the municipal council and other civic bodies and calling for negotiations with the state government to amend the original projects.

The first interventions consisted basically of proposals for the full-scale removal to other areas of people occupying invaded lands; later, the rejuvenated profile of the popular movements and the continuing robust demands put forward by the communities resulted in conceptual modifications to a number of specific intervention proposals. Proposals were submitted recommending that most of the original occupations should be retained and should benefit from the construction of sanitary amenities and infrastructure improvements; It was suggested that only the dwellings that were extremely precarious or in risk situations should be subject to removal and/or replacement.

In some areas, participation by the communities themselves contributed to a number of specific urban development interventions, with marked improvements in living conditions (Gordilho-Souza, 2000, p. 355). However, initiatives involving popular participation, incorporated in the project designs from the beginning, were few: most projects involved small firms of architects and engineers known as technical assessorias from the design stage onwards, regardless of the views of the community. Even in cases where community participation was taken into account at the design stage, this was generally restricted to public presentation of the projects in advance of their execution. At the technical design stage little input was forthcoming as the result of discussions with the involved communities, although the experience of the later intervention in *Novos Alagados* (idem, p. 356 and discussed below), in which the Italian cooperation organisation, AVSI, played a fundamental role, demonstrated the obvious benefits of such exchanges. This particular approach was extended to a larger scale intervention, benefiting from the support of the Cities Alliance, throughout the *Alagados* area: the *Ribeira Azul* Programme, which more widely introduced the practice of integrating community and technical approaches in 1999. Details of the *Novos Alagados* and *Ribeira Azul* interventions are provided below.

The Novos Alagados Project


The first experiment in slum upgrading in *Salvador* involving the effective participation of the slum inhabitants themselves was in the *Novos Alagados* area; it, resulted from works executed on the initiative of the AVSI Foundation, the Italian international cooperation organisation (see Box 2), with the support of the Archdiocese of *Salvador*. A number of community associations were already active in this area, particularly the *1º de Maio* Neighbourhood Society, which had looked to the AVSI Foundation for support in developing a joint project. AVSI had just completed a highly successful undertaking in *Belo Horizonte* with the *Alvorada* project, which was awarded a prize at the United Nations HABITAT II Conference in Istanbul, 1996.

AVSI began its social action in the *Novos Alagados* community in 1993, with the financial support of the Italian government. The work started with a series of initiatives focused more on the social development of the population than on straightforward urban upgrading. Activities were developed in areas such as health, education, child welfare, and youth outreach; they included, in addition, the customary improvements in the areas of infrastructure, housing, and the construction of new dwellings for resettling families from risk areas — in this case families living in the stilt houses.

Efforts undertaken in conjunction with members of the community led to the formulation of an urban development plan for the area that, on the initiative of AVSI, was subsequently submitted to the public authorities. This resulted in its incorporation by the Bahia State Government through the good offices of CONDER and eventually its insertion into the Metropolitan Project (*Projeto Metropolitano*), the beneficiary of World Bank funding at the time.¹³ AVSI was also able to contribute with its own financial resources to the construction of social amenities and to providing technical support, in addition to the actions funded by the Italian government.

The intervention area encompassed two settlements — *Novos Alagados I* and *Novos Alagados II* and implementation was planned in two stages. An agreement already existed between the Bahia state government, AVSI, and the Archdiocese of *Salvador* (through the Dom Avelar Brandão Vilela Foundation) in partnership with the *1º de Maio* Society. However, the project did not effectively commence until 1995. This came to be known as the “*Novos Alagados Environmental Recovery and Social Promotion Project*” (*Projeto de Recuperação Ambiental e Promoção Social de Novos Alagados*).

13. In addition to its incorporation in the Metropolitan Project, which aimed to improve sanitation and environmental aspects of the degraded areas existing within the Metropolitan Region of *Salvador*, the *Novos Alagados* project also received state government funding through the *Programa Viver Melhor*. This programme included specific urban upgrading initiatives in the metropolitan region as well as in a number of municipalities throughout the state.



Novos Alagados Project



Around the same time the socio-economic survey carried out in *Novos Alagados* revealed the existence of an extremely poor population of around fifteen thousand inhabitants, 34 percent of whom were living in stilt houses and 66 percent on dry land (Bahia, s.d. [1]).

The *Novos Alagados* project introduced a poverty reduction methodology that was simultaneously integrated and participatory and which combined physical improvements with substantial investment in social projects. The design stage of the project was formulated in accordance with three basic principles:

- *environmental recovery of the estuary of the Cobre River and the Enseada do Cabrito;*
- *basic sanitation works, construction of new houses, and improvements to existing dwellings;*
- *strengthening community and civic (i.e. pro-citizenship) organisation.*

The basic concept behind the introduction of an integrated set of physical and social actions was to endow the area with physical and environmental improvements as well as to provide community development assistance in line with accepted precepts of sustainable development. In the event seven specific programmes were drawn up to include the following: (i) to create new subdivisions for relocating people currently living in stilt houses; (ii) to undertake works to improve and strengthen the existing landfill and restore environmental quality; (iii) to provide urban upgrading, infrastructure and basic sanitation works; (iv) to generate employment and income; (v) to introduce a workforce training programme; (vi) to provide housing/sanitary improvements and land tenure regularisation; and, finally, (vii) to provide environmental education.

However, the main innovation introduced by the *Novos Alagados* project carried out jointly by AVSI and CONDER was the acceptance by the public authorities of the enhanced level of involvement by the slum population itself. Channels were opened for the inhabitants to put their case to the authorities. In effect people were finally able to express their own opinions and seek information about the project while contributing useful information and data of their own. The exchange served to help define priority targets and activities.

This form of participation involved identifying, involving, and strengthening the existing community-based associations in the area, which took on the role of partners and players throughout the entire process, rather than passive onlookers. This approach was essential for encouraging the population to commit to the project. It was clear from previous experiences that, in the absence of such commitment, the population and the local community bodies were not in a position to assume responsibility for the project over the longer term; they would not be able to absorb the benefits achieved, care for the new infrastructure and amenities, or generally follow up the social work initiated under the project. Previous experiences also showed that people without such involvement had been prone to leave upgraded areas: selling their homes and undertaking land invasions elsewhere.



Novos Alagados, Enseada do Cabrito, during intervention, 1999

Under the new scheme, all the activities were shaped on the basis of consistent interaction and contact between AVSI, the community-based associations, and CONDER staff. In this way a new approach was pioneered for this type of intervention involving action focused not solely on infrastructure but on the residents themselves.

Discussions took place between members of the community and AVSI and CONDER staff during which local people were able to keep abreast of progress on the civil works, volunteer their own opinions, and at the same time provide useful information input for the development of the works. The Social Action Plan emerged from these discussions and was implemented with the direct involvement of community leaders in *Novos Alagados*. The essence of this plan was to foster initiatives that would make it possible for the inhabitants to stay in touch with every phase of project execution, make contributions to decision making, and participate in activities designed to improve the area.


The second stage of the *Novos Alagados* project commenced in 1998. It was underpinned with part of the World Bank financing resources under the Municipal Administration and Urban Infrastructure Development Programme (PRODUR) and with private funds provided by AVSI. During this stage, AVSI undertook socio-economic studies aimed at establishing a baseline for the following: monitoring the interventions; implementing the urban upgrading technical designs; managing the community social and environmental development plan; and planning for resettling 523 families living in stilt houses in the area.

As from 1996, the Bahia state government had executed a number of other targeted urban development interventions in the *Alagados* area through the *Viver Melhor* Programme funded by the federal government. The urban development interventions included the areas of *Mudança*, *Mangueira*, *Baixa do Caranguejo*, *Joanes Centro-Oeste*, *Baixa do Petróleo*, *Massaranduba*, and *Uruguai*. Similarly, they were later incorporated in the expanded approach to integrated participatory urban development, which is detailed in the rest of the document.

Since the approach based on greater interaction with the community had proved such a positive experience with *Novos Alagados* it was decided to adapt this methodology to take forward a larger scale integrated intervention. This paved the way for the introduction of an urban poverty reduction programme embracing the entire area of the *Cabrito* and *Tainheiros* inlets in the Bay of All Saints; the area included all the *Alagados* communities and took account of the various actions planned for the *Novos Alagados* second stage.

The new programme, launched in 1999, was known as the “*Ribeira Azul* Urban Poverty Reduction Programme.” The principal aim of the new programme was to employ an integrated approach to poverty reduction in the area by coordinating the various initiatives already underway; the plan was to boost the development potential of the area by capturing and assembling resources across the board and encouraging a heightened degree of synergy between the different interventions. In this way It would be possible to cover existing gaps and in the process to achieve better results.

The *Ribeira Azul* programme was very much in line with the international movement dedicated to fighting urban poverty which eventually led to creation of the Cities Alliance and launching of the “Cities without Slums” Action Plan. The new *Ribeira Azul* project, described in the next chapter, was strictly in keeping with the objectives set forth by the Cities Alliance, with the strong support of the World Bank and the Italian government; those objectives are to contribute to reducing urban poverty throughout the world through large-scale integrated development projects designed to upgrade precarious settlements.



The AVSI Foundation

The AVSI Foundation is a non-profit NGO founded in 1972. Today the foundation is involved in around one hundred development cooperation projects in thirty-five countries around the world.

AVSI has been recognised since 1973 by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a non-governmental organisation (NGO) involved in international cooperation.

AVSI's mission is to support human development in developing countries, focusing attention on education and on promoting the dignity of human beings in every way possible.

Twenty-seven NGOs and associations have joined AVSI in an informal development-related network. Of these bodies, seventeen are located in developing countries, especially countries in the southern hemisphere. In Brazil, AVSI works in close partnership with a Brazilian NGO called CDM (Cooperation for Human Development and Housing) which shares with AVSI a similar approach and operates in similar areas of activity.

AVSI began its work in Brazil with the support of the Italian cooperation programme in 1985, starting with programmes for the reduction of urban poverty in the municipality of *Belo Horizonte*.

In the city of *Salvador, Bahia*, AVSI's involvement began in 1992 when it undertook interventions in the area of *Novos Alagados*. AVSI is still present in that area, where it continues to support and manage, with its own resources, a number of key initiatives targeted at education, health, and professional training for children, adolescents, and families living in the area.

In 2001, AVSI took on the role of executor, responsible for technical and financial management, of the Technical and Social Support Project (PATS) for the *Ribeira Azul* Programme; this program received support from the Cities Alliance and the Italian government. AVSI also contributed with its own resources to the development of the *Ribeira Azul* area, mobilizing around US\$3 million in addition to the PATS initiatives. During the implementation of the PATS, the CDM executed jointly with AVSI a number of strategic social actions focused on the development of the area.

At present AVSI continues to be active in providing its technical and methodological assistance to the government of Bahia by collaborating with the state government's integrated urban development activities. AVSI also continues to provide support for local social projects and associations and for works linked to these activities.

The Technical and Social Support Project for the *Ribeira Azul* Programme



Photo: Jefferson Vieira

2.1 Building a partnership

The relationship between the Bahia state government, Cities Alliance, and the Italian government effectively began in 1999 when first contacts were made with the stated aim of undertaking interventions in the *Alagados* area. This led in 2001 to the establishment of a formal partnership between the three bodies to work on the formulation of a joint initiative aimed at tackling urban poverty in the city of *Salvador* as a whole.

In April 2000, representatives of the Italian foreign ministry, the Cities Alliance, the World Bank and UN-HABITAT visited *Salvador* to assess the possibility of providing financial support and technical assistance to the interventions that had been proposed for the *Alagados* area; discussion was included of how the various initiatives would be taken forward in practice. Following this visit, the Bahia state government drew up a proposal for financing the Technical and Social Support Project (PATS). This was submitted to the Italian cooperation programme and Cities Alliance, with the support of the *Salvador* municipal government.

When the project was approved at the end of 2000 it was decided that the World Bank would be responsible for technical supervision, while AVSI would be in charge of execution of the planned interventions under the guidance of the Bahia state government, and would benefit from general supervision provided by the Cities Alliance.¹⁴ In December 2000, a technical and financial cooperation agreement was signed between the Bahia state government and AVSI which paved the way for the methodology employed in *Novos Alagados* to be extended to other neighbourhoods in the area. The project was given the name of the Technical and Social Support Project (PATS) to the Urban Poverty Reduction Programme in the *Ribeira Azul* Area.



List of all the partner involved in the programme

14. In addition to the Core Fund which is used by the Cities Alliance for donations of up to US\$500,000, the Alliance also manages Non-Core Funds, originating with one of its members. These are directly targeted at specific activities, countries, or regions, as was the case with the Trust Fund for the slum upgrading project in the *Alagados* area. The US\$5.7 million in technical assistance-related funds made available by the Italian government for the Alliance made this into one of the Cities Alliance's biggest projects in the world and in turn justified the establishment of a Cities Alliance office in Brazil, headquartered in the University of *São Paulo* (USP) on the basis of a partnership forged with the Civil Construction Department of the USP Polytechnic School.

2.2 The Urban Poverty Reduction Programme in the Ribeira Azul Area

Source: Conder, February, 2000



View of the Ribeira Azul Programme area, highlighting the Physical Intervention Perimeter (PIF) and the Social Intervention Perimeter (PIS)

— Physical Intervention Perimeter (PIF) — Social Intervention Perimeter (PIS)

The Urban Poverty Reduction Programme in the *Ribeira Azul* Area took its cue from the previous *Novos Alagados* scheme. The basic aim of the programme was to make a substantive contribution to tackling poverty in one of the poorest regions of the Metropolitan Region of *Salvador* (MRS).

The planned interventions encompassed a total area of four square kilometers covering the communities of *Alagados I*, *Alagados II*, *Alagados V*, *Alagados VI*, *Baixa do Caranguejo*, *Joanes Centro-Oeste*, *Mangueira*, *Mudança*, *Plataforma*, *Novos Alagados* and part of the districts of *Massaranduba* and *Uruguai*. The proposed activities concerned a mangrove swamp area containing a large number of untitled and irregular dwellings. The entire area was heavily polluted with industrial and household waste and had the worst social indicators of the entire city. Meanwhile, people living there had extremely limited access to even the most basic public services and infrastructure. At the time the interventions got underway around three thousand, five hundred families inhabited the stilt houses and shacks perched precariously over the wet areas of the two inlets — the *Enseada do Cabrito* and the *Enseada dos Tainheiros*.

The general objective of the *Ribeira Azul* Programme was to tackle the question of reducing urban poverty, with the specific aim of improving the quality of life of around one hundred and fifty thousand people living in the area (approximately forty thousand families). The planned activities included the following:

- urban development and environmental recovery works;
- total removal of the stilted houses and the construction of new houses to resettle the families who lived in them;
- housing improvements in general;
- construction and repair of community amenities and equipment;
- human development projects.

The intervention area consisted of two well-defined “perimeters”: a smaller area that received both physical improvements and social initiatives, was identified as the Physical Intervention Perimeter (PIF); a larger area was to be known as the Social Intervention Perimeter (PIS). Although physical interventions were not planned for the latter area, residents there would nevertheless benefit from the programme’s social actions.

Included among the infrastructure actions were works related to the following: access to main roads, storm water drainage, water supply, basic sanitation, and solid waste collection. Within the social services area, initiatives were to be undertaken in the following areas: health, education, provision of day-care centres, food and nutritional aid and support for young people and children at risk, professional skills training and income generation based on the provision of support for local cooperatives. Plans were also drawn up to improve existing dwellings and to construct new housing units for resettling the families moved from the risk areas. Finally, efforts were set in train to help people to acquire official title to their land and properties.

Eradication of the stilt houses and the subsequent resettlement of residents following construction of the infill were accompanied by the construction of a seafront pathway to serve both as access to people’s homes and as a sort of leisure space. This “*pista de borda*” was also useful, together with watchful efforts by the residents of the area, for identifying and inhibiting further incursions by squatters into the area.



Avsli/Conder

View of Boiadeiro during intervention(left) and after, with the bayfront road built



Conder (Bahia)

2.3 The Technical and Social Support Project (PATS):

An integrated approach to urban development and slum upgrading



Avsi

The *Ribeira Azul* Programme was based upon the *Novos Alagados* scheme, whose major priority was to involve the local population while introducing a range of social services and simultaneously implementing improvements to the physical environment. To scale up a project for an area of fifteen thousand residents to one with one hundred and fifty thousand residents while using the same methodology as the one employed in *Novos Alagados* was clearly a significant challenge. The first step was to bring the methodology used in *Novos Alagados* into line with the requirements of the new intervention. This called for the introduction of a series of complex institutional and financial arrangements.¹⁵

The purpose of PATS — the Technical and Social Support Project — was to ensure that stakeholders in the *Ribeira Azul* Programme were fully aware of the benefits of applying to its execution identical precepts to those used in *Novos Alagados*. Thus, the same “integrated participatory and area-based” methodology could be used to advantage. The project was to be an integrated scheme because it aimed to incorporate all the physical and social aspects of the intervention; and it was participatory because the stakeholders involved in the process were to be accepted and regarded as active participants in the planning and tracking of the progress of the works. Finally, the new project was an area-based initiative because it aimed to reflect the importance of the combination of the totality of factors at play in an area or neighbourhood.

The technical assistance initiatives drew upon specific objectives such as urban upgrading and property tenure regularisation, social and economic development, and the boosting of the existing institutional capacity to deal with large-scale poverty reduction and urban upgrading programmes.

The PATS was implemented over a period of approximately five years, between 2001 and 2006.¹⁶ Around US\$70 million was spent on the group of interventions executed in the *Ribeira Azul* area, of which US\$5.7 million were provided by the Italian government to PATS through the Cities Alliance.

15. The financing of all the planned activities required the use of different funding sources, each of which has specific conditions and rules attached to its use: from the state government itself, from the World Bank, from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) through the *Habitar Brasil* programme and from the federal government through the Federal Mortgage Bank (CAIXA).

16. The Technical and Social Support Project, which was initially planned to last for three years was extended in the light of a series of different factors, the most important of these being the considerable increase of resources made available in local currency following the devaluation of the Brazilian currency vis-à-vis the US dollar, which effectively increased the invested value by 76 percent.

Data secured from a socio-economic survey carried out by AVSI in 2000 — involving families resident in the *Novos Alagados II* area — revealed a highly precarious situation in the area:

Data secured from a socio-economic survey carried out by AVSI in 2000 - involving families resident in the *Novos Alagados II* area - revealed a highly precarious situation in the area:

- 45 percent of the total economically active population had no income at all;
- 59 percent of the population had a monthly total household income of under half of a minimum wage (equivalent to US\$45);
- 13 percent of the households on “dry land” had no bathroom facilities and 64% had only rudimentary sanitary installations;
- 21 percent of the school age population had dropped out of school and 71% had an age-grade mismatch.

This AVSI survey was to serve in effect as a good basis for monitoring and evaluating the initiatives undertaken in subsequent years; this was because the data assembled from the *Novos Alagados II* neighbourhood were considered to be fairly representative of the entire *Ribeira Azul* area.

The activities carried out under the technical support project consisted of the following components:¹⁷

1. **Setting up of the Project Management Unit (UGP) and the provision of technical support to the coordination unit of the *Ribeira Azul* Programme;**
2. **Provision of technical support for the preparation of the Overall Intervention Plan (*Plano Global*), to incorporate all the relevant physical and social plans;**
3. **Support for government initiatives in the housing area;**
4. **Undertaking strategic social actions and the creation and management of social amenities in the *Ribeira Azul* area;**
5. **Adaptation, systematisation, and dissemination of the intervention methodology applied in *Novos Alagados*;**
6. **Training in urban planning to be provided for public employees;**
7. **Using studies to assist in the preparation of a wide-ranging urban upgrading programme for all the municipalities in the Salvador Metropolitan Region. This paved the way for the “Bahia Poor Urban Areas Integrated Development Project — *Dias Melhores*”¹⁸ (*Programa de Urbanização e Desenvolvimento Integral de Áreas Carentes - Dias Melhores*) to be executed in *Salvador* and seven other cities across Bahia. ww**



17. Pats also covered supervisory and monitoring activities by the World Bank and involved the AVSI head offices in Italy.

18. In 2007, the new state government changed the name of the project from *Viver Melhor II* to *Dias Melhores*.



AVSI



Information bulletins of PATS

At the commencement of PATS activities, a UGP (see Box 3) was set up, comprising a mixed team of professional staff members belonging to CONDER and AVSI. This team was charged with drawing up a systematic list of all the activities under way in the areas encompassed by the *Ribeira Azul* Programme, with a view to integrating them into the new project. The team was, in addition, responsible for identifying the architectural and engineering projects that were likely to be needed to complement the other physical actions; these would be in response to the prospective application of resources from different funding sources. The survey led to the preparation of an overall plan, with guidelines set out as a series of specific products. The latter included engineering and architectural designs, housing improvement and design projects targeted at new housing construction, plans for property regularisation, environmental and urban studies, plus a monitoring and evaluation plan (see Annex 1).

PATS effectively provided the formal basis for collaboration between CONDER and AVSI. It did this by setting forth the details of joint technical and methodological responsibilities and the various specific competencies to be employed during intervention phases. CONDER became primarily responsible for urban upgrading and managing housing improvement, while receiving technical and methodological support from AVSI. The latter assumed responsibility for the social actions considered necessary to bring the groups of physical interventions into line with the on-the-ground “real” living conditions of the beneficiary population. Early on, the two project partners set up a field office to improve and bolster relations with the various associations active in the area; but above all, its purpose was to keep the community in touch with the progress of the public works. This office was jointly staffed and managed by the two project partners, CONDER and AVSI.

In the housing area, PATS implemented and financed a number of the initiatives planned under the housing improvement plan and the plan for new houses construction. This involved construction of the following:

- **191 new houses (103 in Novos Alagados and 88 in Joanes Azul); and**
- **101 home improvements in Novos Alagados.**

During execution of the above works, PATS team supported a selection process involving local building firms and cooperatives. Training courses for these bodies were also organised to assist them in preparing and submitting proposals in public bidding processes. A further PATS initiative involved assisting local building firms and cooperatives to upgrade their in-house skills; this would put them in a better position to improve their work in civil construction.

In the area of targeted community economic and social development, a number of strategic programmes and initiatives were prepared; these were designed to tackle problems associated with education, health, family welfare, income generation, sports and recreation (see Annex 2). A key social action undertaken by PATS in this respect was to involve and strengthen existing local associations. The activities included offering assistance to existing associations in applying for official operating permits. PATS also supported training courses in administrative regularisation and the provision of managerial and technical support; this would be linked closely to the design and submission of socially oriented projects. The social projects certainly benefited from PATS assistance in both funding submissions and from direct financial support; the latter was given to build and/or upgrade the various community premises, social facilities, and other amenities run by the associations (see Annex 3).

In addition, PATS was able to provide funding for ten social projects developed and executed by the local associations themselves, which benefited about six hundred residents of the area. Selected from a group of forty-six proposals, these project activities included sports, adult literacy classes, assistance for elderly people, reinforcement of learning skills, and income generation (see Annex 4). Four of the ten projects submitted were already being implemented by the entities concerned prior to the provision of PATS financial support. The remaining six projects were implemented for the first time. All benefited from technical assistance and specific follow-up support in processing statements of account.

A series of public events were organised to disseminate information to the communities, as well as to the technical teams and public sector practitioners on the activities taken forward under the social development plan. These events included workshops and meetings with local associations and technical teams that focused on issues concerning both the programme and the social development plan. In addition, training workshops were organised to update the knowledge skills of the "social" teams, and a number of presentations were made for the benefit of partner organisations. Finally, information bulletins were periodically published with news of the various PATS initiatives undertaken in the social development area, and a video team recorded and disseminated project activities at community venues following a regular schedule.



Grucon
Social skills building work
with elderly people




Cammpi
Digital inclusion



Cabrcultura
Learning skills reinforcement



Santa Cruz
Judo and capoeira



A new scaling-up

Among the specific objectives of PATS was to help prepare a more wide-ranging programme enabling the area-based integrated and participatory methodology to be applied to other precarious settlements in the metropolitan region of *Salvador*. This proposal materialised in due course in the form of a project designed to benefit a number of geographically dispersed municipalities within the state of Bahia that were selected on the basis of social, economic, and geographic criteria.

In order to execute the new project, called the “Bahia Poor Urban Areas Integrated Development Project — *Dias Melhores*,” the state government applied for a World Bank loan, approved in late 2005. It is worth recalling that the World Bank had already participated in the execution of PATS and the *Ribeira Azul* Programme from the beginning by providing technical supervision as part of the project financed by the Cities Alliance. World Bank funds were also used for infrastructure and housing works in the area (which were part of the *Metropolitano* and PRODUR projects).



The institutional arrangement of PATS

BOX 3

The following institutional arrangement was established for activities involving coordination and supervision of the project: a UGP, a Tripartite Steering Committee and a general consultative committee.

The UGP comprised a multidisciplinary team consisting of thirty-five members of the staffs of AVSI and CONDER coordinated by a representative of each of these bodies. The UGP undertook the following main functions within its remit: the technical and methodological coordination of the entire *Ribeira Azul* Programme, the provision of technical support for the preparation of the necessary architecture and engineering designs, the provision of support for underpinning government actions in the housing area, the execution of strategic social actions, methodology systematization and dissemination, and the preparation of studies prior the introduction of an expanded programme. The establishment of the UGP contributed significantly to project implementation and was particularly valuable for ensuring the consistency, efficiency, and transparency of resource administration.

A Tripartite Steering Committee comprised one representative from each of the three partner bodies: the government of the state of Bahia, the Italian foreign ministry and the Cities Alliance. In addition, representatives of AVSI and the World Bank responsible for the technical and financial supervision of PATS were always represented on this committee. The main function of the committee was to evaluate the progress of PATS activities, to approve the annual financial and activity reports (as well as the operative plans for subsequent periods), and to intervene at critical times during execution of the project. The Tripartite Steering Committee met annually and proved to be especially useful for endowing resource management with greater effectiveness and transparency; it also served as a permanent link between the government of Bahia and international partner institutions. The Tripartite Committee held seven meetings altogether. The close relationship established between the cooperating partners contributed greatly to the approval of a planned state-run programme with much wider scope to be financed through a World Bank loan. It also paved the way for the award of a second donation from Cities Alliance, with resources again provided by the Italian government, to support the development of the new programme. The two projects just mentioned are at present in progress and are not addressed by the present paper.

A Consultative Committee comprised members of the tripartite committee, including AVSI and CONDER, a representative of the *Salvador* City Hall (PMS), and initially five community representatives. The Consultative Committee came into being as the result of the need to ensure direct participation by community representatives at the decision-making stages of the projects. The meetings between the representatives and the programme financiers were held at the same time as the meetings of the tripartite committee in order to discuss a range of issues related to the progress of the various interventions and to provide guidance and information which proved invaluable for project coordination. This form of participation during the first two years of the project contributed to the establishment of a new format, with opportunities provided for all the bodies registered in the project (amounting to around seventy) to participate. The consultative committee was in due course relieved of its duties because of the success with which all the involved entities benefited from direct and regular contact with the UGP; this arose through their transparent and constructive participation in the discussions about the development of the PATS.



Conder (Bahia)

Results and achievements of PATS

The PATS played an important role during implementation of the *Ribeira Azul* Programme, making a valuable contribution through the many relevant social projects. PATS contribution to infrastructure works funded by the state government was in the form of AVSI participation, through the UGP, as follows: in the general coordination of the programme, the preparation of infrastructure plans, studies and technical designs and, in particular, the forging of good relationships with the local communities and other partners.

Results of the urban upgrading actions

undertaken with the support of PATS

BOX 4

- 1,268 stilt houses removed;
 - 984 families transferred to new homes in the area;
 - 373 starter homes built (191 with direct PATS financing);
 - 221 homes improved (101 with direct PATS financing);
 - 52,643m² of mangrove swamp area restored or preserved;
- Transfer of 3.1km² of the federal government-owned part of the *Ribeira Azul* area to the Bahia state government for handing over to residents;
- 17km of streets paved;
 - In addition to the above: new access ways built, drainage infrastructure installed, clean water and wastewater (sewerage) amenities provided, landfill rehabilitated, seafront pathway constructed, and garbage collection facilities provided.

Regarding the basic infrastructure improvements, Table 3 below provides an idea of the improvements in the provision of ordinary public services between 2000 and 2006 (the *Ribeira Azul* works were concluded in 2006). The figure for water connections is lower than that for the sewerage connections because many households still use informal connections to the water supply mains, a problem which is being gradually addressed.

View of Enseada do Cabrito

Tabela 3

NOVOS ALAGADOS: ORDINARY PUBLIC SERVICES

Service	2000	2006
Garbage collection	50%	80%
Connection to water network	37%	71%
Connection to electricity system	72%	88%
Connection to sewerage network	21%	84%
Homes without sanitary facilities	31%	3%

Source: PATS Results Evaluation Report, 2006

As far as social actions were concerned, social projects were undertaken in the areas of health, education, day-care centre provision, food aid provision, youth outreach, and child welfare (for young people and children at risk), job training, and support for income generating activities through local cooperative organisations. Particular emphasis was placed on actions targeted at the area's women, such as the construction of two workshops for housing the seamstresses' cooperative in *Novos Alagados* and the Cooks, Candy & Cake Makers Association in the *Uruguai* neighbourhood. A number of other initiatives were also undertaken such as the financing of a project organised by a local association aimed at training local women to make costume jewellery, training day-care centre monitors in childcare techniques, and the establishment of training workshops as part of a further project designed to tackle child malnutrition. The workshops - basically concerned with teaching mothers how to care for their children - also provided encouragement for breast-feeding and advice on improving family relationships.

One of the key PATS innovations was the decision to strengthen approximately seventy associations already active in the region (see Annex V). The many strengthening actions undertaken under PATS served to benefit all the communities playing an active role in the *Ribeira Azul* Programme. Benefits accruing to the associations included the following: enhanced quality at the planning and execution stages of interventions resulting from community participation in the relevant meetings; the construction and upgrading of community amenities/equipment; and, finally, training and personal confidence-building for association members.

During the execution of the project, three hundred community meetings were held. In addition, seven thousand, five hundred individuals received specific attention from on-call social workers.

Boxes 5, 6, and 7 below summarise three different perspectives on the services provided.



1996. Before: bay polluted and occupied by stilt houses



1998. During the intervention: stilt houses removed and beginning of environmental recovery



2003. After: families resettled, bayfront road built and mangrove swamp restored

Conder (Bahia)



The Instituto Cabricultura

BOX 5 A personal view



Raimilton Carvalho

The *Instituto Cabricultura* operates in the *Enseada do Cabrito*, specifically in *Novos Alagados*, undertaking artistic activities with a socio-educational focus. Through cultural, dance, and *capoeira* workshops, a community library, and a school preparatory (*pre-vestibular*) course, the institute addresses subjects such as citizenship, respect for other people, racial questions, and so forth — all topics which do not normally form part of the school curriculum.

According to Raimilton Conceição de Carvalho, the general coordinator of the Institute, his eight staff members deal with 180 adults (and children over seven years of age). Until the time the institute was established, the founder members operated on a freelance and ad hoc basis, teaching classes in football, drama, English language and so forth. However, once the institute was established, these activities were expanded and became fully integrated into the life of the community.

The PATS was instrumental in helping the founder members of the *Instituto Cabricultura* to regularise and register the organisation with the relevant authorities. Members of the Institute still participated in training courses on administration, accounting, and finance, as well as being involved in project formulation.

For Raimilton, the programme enabled all the people involved in the institute to gain a better understanding of the kind of role that they could most usefully play within the community. He enthuses: “We began to get involved in other activities in addition to the ones that were already running; and we were able to encourage a higher level of popular mobilisation resulting from the residents’ increased familiarity with their rights and responsibilities; and as a result of improved contact with other institutions we were also able to provide a significant boost to our activities.”

An important step forward in this respect was the establishment of a partnership with SEBRAE to progress the income-generation project for seamstresses; under this plan, the institute was able to purchase forty-eight industrial sewing machines — one for each woman attending the workshop. For 2008, a partnership has been planned between the institute and the State of Bahia Secretariat for Urban Development (SEDUR) to run a *pre-vestibular* course for fifty people.

Regardless of the initiatives already undertaken and the existence of other projects in the pipeline, one of the big challenges remaining is to secure further financial support. “Normally government support in terms of cash goes to larger institutions,” says Raimilton. One solution to this problem has been to form an alliance between the Institute and other bodies active in the sector such as the Movement for Popular Culture in the Suburbs, which receives financial assistance from PETROBRÁS.

“For us, the best way of obtaining support has been to organise ourselves in a kind of network,” says Raimilton. This is one of the main advantages of the PATS, which has helped to forge integration between different groups in the area — the kind of integration that did not exist previously in *Novos Alagados*. According to Raimilton: “We are now more aware of the importance of working together rather than merely as individuals.”

The Black Union and Awareness Group of Bahia (GRUCON)

For over twenty-one years the GRUCON has been working in the lower area of *Massaranduba* in *Alagados* to build awareness and self-confidence among the black population living there. The basic formula has involved carrying out socio-cultural activities under the supervision and guidance of ten volunteers for a total of two hundred and fifty people, including children, adolescents, and senior citizens. These activities mainly concern dancing, music, and *capoeira*.

According to Iracema Cristina da Cruz Ferreira, a member of GRUCON, the first time that the group received external financial support was through the good offices of the PATS. This enabled the group to run a literacy course for thirty local adults living in the area. In 2005, GRUCON was asked to collaborate with the AVSI foundation and the State of Bahia Urban Development Company (CONDER) in a survey to identify the needs of the population. This also involved officially registering residents in the area.

Together with other bodies in the area, the members of GRUCON have also benefited from training courses in technical consultancy funded by the PATS. Furthermore, members have received administrative training in the areas of accounting, activity regularisation, records updating, and project formulation and documentation.

"We still have great difficulty obtaining public funds since the authorities make many demands" says Alirio Silva Conceição, also a member of GRUCON. It would appear that this disadvantage limits the opportunity for the group to secure the required resources. "The result is that public money normally goes to larger entities. And where external funding bodies are concerned, the funds tend to dry up sooner or later." Alirio also claims that the government should provide support for GRUCON to help the group make applications for resources.

At present GRUCON has its own meeting place and has succeeded in forming partnerships with other institutions involved in PATS activities. Moreover, the group recently signed agreements to undertake two projects. Other projects have been prepared and await funds prior to being executed.

Alirio's criticism stems from the fact that the absence of public resources for his and similar groups appears to be the result of a lack of acknowledgement by the public authorities of the work done by organisations such as GRUCON. According to Iracema Cristina da Cruz Ferreira: "The local organisations are closely linked to members of the community and once the projects are on a proper financial footing they are more likely to achieve good results than any direct action undertaken by the government itself."

Alirio points to cases where training courses run by the groups have had beneficial results; these include people trained in the group who have found good jobs elsewhere. Examples of residents joining the private sector and increasing their incomes after membership in the group proves that the PATS has fulfilled one of its objectives — to promote human development. As a further measure of the project's success, a number of young people who have benefited from the group have later returned to work with GRUCON.



AVSI



Iracema Cristina C. Ferreira
Alirio Silva Conceição

The Paróquia de São Brás Social Action (ASPASB)



Adenilza Rosário Cruz
Ana Néri Góes da Silva

The *Boiadeiro* Centre for Sport and Professional Education (CEDEP) and the *Kilombo Kioiô* Community Centre are two important social amenities in *Novos Alagados* whose activities have been coordinated by the ASPASB for the past forty-three years.

The *Kilombo Kioiô* was established in 1999 following a series of meetings between local associations involved in removing the stilt houses from North *Alagados*. The centre runs a number of activities including the provision of advice for mothers of all ages with children of up to nine years old and with no family income. Courses in handicrafts, painting, child-care, and family planning are provided. A literacy course has also been mounted with PATS support for 180 adults living in the community.

“Most of the mothers who did the literacy course are still studying,” says one of the members of the ASPASB, Adenilza Rosário Cruz. “There are plenty of education schemes for children and adolescents but without education for their mothers these activities tend to get nowhere”.

According to Ana Néri Góes da Silva, also from the ASPASB, the small building occupied by the *Kilombo Kioiô* Centre ruled out an increase in the scope and number of activities. Responding to a request from the community, the PATS was able to finance the repair and extension of the centre by increasing its capacity from 150 to five hundred and fifty people. New reception booths were built together with toilets, a reception area, and a large room for hosting courses and workshops.

Through the PATS, the ASPASB also benefited from a technical consultancy to help with obtaining updated official registration of the body. ASPASB also participated in a number of PATS-inspired training courses on administrative and financial management, social project preparation, and fundraising techniques etc.



The main social objectives of PATS included job and income generation actions through training courses and support for local cooperatives (selective waste collection, dressmakers, cake-makers, civil construction, fishermen). Activities included job skills training courses, teacher training, and technical and financial support provided for community schools and cooperatives. Teacher training initially benefited from an agreement with the National Industrial Apprenticeship Service (SENAI), resulting in three hundred and thirty individuals attending the courses. Subsequently, PATS provided a specific centre to provide training courses in building maintenance. The cooperatives established by the students of the various property maintenance courses received technical advice and follow-up during the first eighteen months of their existence.

Results of the Economic and Social Development actions

undertaken by PATS

BOX 8

- 73 community organisations strengthened
- 13 social amenities/equipments built or repaired
- 1,339 social agents trained
- 306 individuals trained in job skills training courses
- 240 individuals from the community involved in repair jobs or new construction works
- 79 playschool teachers benefited from child education course
- 562 young people took advantage of sports and recreation schemes
- 50 social projects carried out in the fields of education, family welfare, health, employment and income and environmental education
- 28 social programmes given the new or upgraded premises
- 60 individuals benefited from the programme for tackling child malnutrition
- 68 young people found jobs in the employment market
- 7 cooperatives established and training provided in clothes-making, small-scale commercial fishing, foodstuff production and civil construction

A survey carried out between 2004 and 2005¹⁹ of the residents of *Novos Alagados II* (this area was fairly representative of the activities of the programme as a whole) revealed a series of positive and negative points regarding both infrastructure and social actions. In respect of the positive impacts of the infrastructure investments, the survey drew attention to the following: pollution reduction and the subsequent expansion of the mangrove vegetation, fewer health problems resulting from better environmental conditions, more leisure facilities, improved access to public transport, and a perceived reduction of street crime and urban violence as a whole. The residents attributed progress on the latter to the opening of new access ways, resulting in better mobility for everyone concerned, including the police (leading to a perception of lower crime rates as a result of increased police activity).

19. World Bank. Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA). This document, under its full title of "Integrated urban upgrading for the poor: the experience of *Ribeira Azul*, Brazil" was prepared by a World Bank team led by Judy Baker. The English-language version can be found on the Cities Alliance website (www.citiesalliance.org).



Conder (Bahia)

The residents had a very positive view of the social programmes, praising overall improvements in quality of life, in areas such as public safety, health and diet, and the expansion of educational and training opportunities for children and adolescents. Residents also drew attention to the presence of educators in the community and the job opportunities resulting from the activities of the cooperatives. All in all, residents averred that the programmes had contributed significantly to bolstering the self-confidence of the area and its people.

The main complaints presented by the community concerned the new houses built for resettling the people who previously had lived in the stilt shacks.²⁰ Most criticism was aimed at the small size of the new dwellings, between 20 and 40 square meters - regardless of the fact that they were larger than the old stilt house - and the lack of prospects for expanding the houses either vertically or laterally. Although the resettlement projects had been widely discussed with the community, the residents nevertheless did not seem to realise that remaining in the same densely populated area, where new landfills were technically challenging and expensive, constrained options in terms of the housing units that could be built. *Ribeira Azul* communities expressed a strong desire to remain in the same area, and the government complied. Very few families chose to move elsewhere, and the scarcity of land in and around *Ribeira Azul* precluded the larger lots, with freedom to build, that the resettled would have preferred.



Conder (Bahia)

The survey also recorded complaints such as the poor quality of the building materials used for the new houses and the infrastructure works, and about the quality of some public services, particularly solid waste collection.

The main achievements identified in the project are presented in the following chapter.

20. As an alternative to the offer of resettlement, the stilt house dwellers were presented with the option of adequate cash compensation to enable them to move from the risk area. An overwhelming majority chose to be resettled within the *Ribeira Azul* area.



Conder (Bahia)

3.1 Physical and social actions in an integrated approach

Slum upgrading projects in Brazil have generally used less than 4 percent of total project funds for social actions. In the *Ribeira Azul* Programme, the proportion of funds earmarked for social actions amounted to around 10 percent of total investment. This was expanded in the *Dias Melhores* programme that will cover the entire state of Bahia. Prepared with the assistance of PATS, this new programme earmarked 25 percent of total planned investments for actions in the social area.

This significant increase was made possible thanks to the *Novos Alagados*, *Ribeira Azul* and PATS experiences, with substantial input from AVSI. The presence of a non-governmental organisation working directly with the community and tackling the many issues faced by local residents effectively paved the way for the introduction of a series of social actions such as crèches, maternal and child health, nutrition, employment and income opportunities, crime and violence prevention, improved educational quality, etc.

The partnership forged between the Bahia state government, AVSI, and the communities, consolidated within the context of the *Ribeira Azul* Programme, resulted in the inclusion at the project execution stage of a range of actions to tackle the remaining social issues of keenest concern to the community. The impact of the intervention was thus greater than if the actions had been confined to infrastructure and housing alone, which was not an uncommon practice in previous interventions. This experience and the understanding of the importance of establishing partnerships made it possible to build an urban development programme for the poorer areas of Bahia on a larger scale, including substantial investment in a wide range of social actions. The key achievement of this integrated approach was that the targets of project interventions were individuals and families rather than merely infrastructure and housing construction.



Avisi

3.2 Participatory action

For a genuine and substantial participatory process to progress, and to encourage effective dialogue, efforts were required to overcome the traditional gap between the two parties concerned — the state government and the various community organisations. From the point of view of the residents' movements this implied setting aside the traditional stance of such movements (as "complainants" or "plaintiffs"); they had to consider adopting a more pro-active stand to reflect more accurately their wider responsibilities within the communities. From the government's viewpoint, it was now essential to accept the active involvement of the local community in the process. Therefore, the existence of a third-party intermediary was seen to be of vital importance for the following reasons: to interact with the community, to be a catalyst for the communities' demands, and to be capable of systematically identifying and suggesting how the government could best tackle the demands presented.

In interventions in precarious settlements involving entire communities, such as the *Alagados* of *Salvador*, the needs and requirements of the communities are generally not presented objectively, clearly, and concisely. Poverty in the *favelas* is multifaceted and in official discussions residents tend to overwhelm the public authority representatives with a surfeit of problems. The approach of the project should not necessarily be to try and resolve at once all the issues presented by the communities. In this respect, the discussion process is improved by the participation of a third-party acting as mediator. The mediator can organise the many demands and requests of the residents and suggest which government departments should be charged with responding to some of the questions raised. As a result, an important channel of trust and confidence can be established between the communities (anxious to pursue their rights) and the government.

3.3 An integrated view based on a locality-focused approach

Government authorities often experience difficulties in targeting project investments. As a result, many initiatives fail to act effectively on the poorest parts of the population. Projects targeted at a specific poor area such as the *Alagados*, a precarious stilt settlement in a risk area, ensure that quality of life improvements reach the poorest segments of the population. In short, area-based actions help target social investments appropriately.



3.4 The environment

It is worth noting that in addition to involving the resident population, the *Ribeira Azul* Programme has also established (as part of the local improvement agenda) new urban environmental standards. These affect not only the project intervention area but also adjacent areas. In the interventions undertaken in the 1970s and 1980s this issue was not on the agenda: the main concern was to focus on physical and infrastructural improvements.

The *Alagados* area is environmentally fragile and it is now understood that the environmental effects of the interventions are of major concern. However, evidence from earlier actions already exists, of the resurgence of the important mangrove swamps and related ecosystems in the bay following the removal of the stilt houses in the first phase of slum clearance in *Alagados*; sanitation improvements can also be seen to have resulted in an end to careless disposal of trash and sewage.

*The recovery of the mangrove swamp in the Enseada dos Cabritos in Novos Alagados is particularly interesting because, in contrast to other localities, it is taking place in an urban area. The natural environment of the mangrove swamp rapidly deteriorated once shacks had been constructed over it, but with the withdrawal of the stilt houses, the ecological equilibrium of the ecosystem has been re-established.*²¹

Among the socio-environmental actions carried out by PATS, it is worth mentioning the support given to the selective waste collection cooperatives through the following: training courses on recycling, environmental and health education, and awareness campaigns directed both at the general population and public officials regarding the importance of preserving the urban environment. A number of educational activities were also organised for children attending government schools.

Between 2004 and 2005, PATS also funded the preparation of a plan for the environmental management and preservation of the *Cobre Basin (Plano de Ordenamento Urbanístico e Preservação Ambiental da Bacia do Cobre)*. This area included the *Cobre/São Bartolomeu Environmental Preservation Area (APA)*, abutting on the intervention polygon of the programme; the plan aimed at ensuring its sustainable use. The proposed actions presented in this plan resulted in the inclusion of the *São Bartolomeu Park* in the intervention area of the *Dias Melhores* programme.



Conder (Bahia)

21. Jornal da Bahia, Salvador, November 2003. Maria de Fátima Cardoso, coordinator of social actions within the *Ribeira Azul* programme.

The actions leading to the recovery of the mangrove swamp, which commenced in 2000, included the replanting of native species; this was done so that in due course the recovery of the bay's fisheries could represent a sustainable source of income and food for members of the community. The replanting activity involved the participation of twenty-six youngsters from the community aged between fourteen and eighteen; they were especially recruited and trained for this purpose by technicians from the Foundation for the Development of Small-Scale Fishing Communities (FUNDIPESCA).

The environmental benefits can also be felt by the difference in colour and smell of the water in the *Enseada dos Cabritos*.

A significant remaining challenge is to tackle pollution originating in other areas. Notwithstanding the significant investments in wastewater collection that have been made in *Salvador*, the sewage generated by some of the neighbouring communities still flows into the sea, polluting the bay on the edge of which the people of *Ribeira Azul* live. Long-term sustainability calls for an improved systemic approach to environmental management, with clearly defined institutional responsibilities. This will require forging and maintaining close links between the precepts of environmental management and the operation and maintenance of the relevant infrastructure. In cities like *Salvador*, investments in specific areas are not always sufficient to guarantee significant environmental improvements for the city as a whole.



View of *Enseada do Cabrito* and *São Bartolomeu Park*, before (left) and after, with the mangrove swamp restored

Conder (Bahia)

3.5 Introduction of a Monitoring and Evaluation System

Soon after project implementation got underway, a monitoring and evaluation plan was prepared with the aim of strengthening project tracking activities and evaluating the experiences and lessons that could be used for improving project development. At the end of the project, a results evaluation study²² was presented, prepared by Professor Giuseppe Folloni of the University of Trent (Italy). This analysis was based on the group of indicators defined in the implementation plan, on the guidelines provided by the monitoring and evaluation system, and on data supplied by AVSI and CONDER. Information provided by the contractors that executed the urban development works was also used in the analysis, as were surveys done on local community and residents' associations.

The monitoring and evaluation (M&E) actions of the project were vital for ensuring the transparency of the entire process and also for tracking on-going stakeholder activities. This M&E mechanism contributed to the building of a relationship of trust among the partners, and in particular with the community itself. This Interrelationship involved regular presentation of data and accounts of the results achieved during the project execution phase. The objective analysis of data flowing from the activities under way was also vital in building staff knowledge and, eventually, for the preparation of a larger scale project based on the main lessons learned.

During the *Dias Melhores* preparation stage and the preparation of the loan submission in 2004 and 2005, the World Bank undertook a Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA). The aim of the analysis was to assess the effect of the changes that had taken place following the investments made under the *Ribeira Azul* Programme and PATS, and the implications of these changes for future scaling up. This World Bank analysis was based on work done in the *Novos Alagados II* area, including by the *Ribeira Azul* Programme, between 1999 and 2004. The area was chosen because it presented a wide spectrum of physical, economic, and social interventions. The analysis employed a number of methodological approaches including focus group discussions with the community, in-depth interviews related to the various issues, and scrutiny of technical and financial data concerning the various interventions. The study found that in general the impact of the programme on the community and on the personal lives of the interviewees was widely acknowledged by the residents themselves.

22. Available in English, Italian and Portuguese.

3.6 Scaling up

In 2006, the loan agreement with the World Bank (prepared with PATS support) for the Bahia Poor Urban Areas Integrated Development Project (*Projeto de Desenvolvimento Integrado em Áreas Urbanas Carentes do Estado da Bahia — Dias Melhores*) was signed. This project represents a new scaling up phase involving other municipalities of the state of Bahia and using the same integrated and participatory approach that was employed first in *Novos Alagados* and later in the *Ribeira Azul* Programme. Also in 2006, a new state governor was elected. The new government, after familiarising itself with the project and discussing it with the various communities, gave the go-ahead for the works with the various partners to continue.

During the preparation of the *Dias Melhores* plans already in the final stage of PATS implementation, the Italian government made known its intention to grant, together with Cities Alliance, a new donation to the government of Bahia. This donation resulted in technical support being made available for the implementation of the new programme via the new Technical and Methodological Assistance Project (PAT). It should make it possible for the successful partnership established between the Bahia state government and its international partners (the Italian government, the Cities Alliance, the World Bank and AVSI), consolidated during PATS implementation phase, to be further strengthened.



In early 2007, the federal government launched on a nationwide basis its Accelerated Growth Programme (PAC); it includes a specific component for slum upgrading, with substantial funding allocations made for this purpose. With this new resource environment, and the lessons learned with the integrated and participatory approach used in the *Alagados* area, the recently-begun PAT should be able to make a major contribution; It will be in a position to provide support to the government for its interventions in other areas as well as in those selected under *Dias Melhores*.

The Challenges

4.1 Lessons learned

Conder (Bahia)

Community participation

Participation by the beneficiaries in the design and implementation of the project was a key to its success. During PATS implementation the main protagonists were the community associations themselves. These associations are totally aware of the real “on-the-ground” position of the communities they serve and know all about local needs and potential. Furthermore, the associations are directly engaged with providing services to the community, reflecting responsible attitudes and a commitment to improving the areas where they are active. Permanent contact between the community-based representatives and project beneficiaries serves to bolster the interaction between the project and families and groups of residents. The project demonstrated that in order for participation through the associations to function correctly an adequate level of technical assistance staff time was called for.

In the course of PATS implementation, the above resulted in the growth of social capital. In simple terms, this meant the resources (information, contact, support) that became available as the result of establishing a network of relationships among individuals living within a community organised on the basis of community associations. Previously, little real contact had developed between associations, which tended to go about their business in isolation from one another. However, with the advent of PATS, these associations began to liaise among themselves and, inter alia, to gain access to already structured social movements and to participate more fully at the broader political and economic level. The concrete result of increased social capital was better access to funding — essential not only for ensuring the continuity of service provision to the community by the associations but also for the material survival of the associations themselves.



Avsi



Shared management

The shared coordination and management of the programme between a government body (CONDER) and a non-governmental organisation (AVSI) — combining the urban development experience of CONDER with the social and integrated methodology pursued by AVSI — contributed to the emergence of a different approach to problems. This partnership resulted in a degree of continuity and flexibility with respect to decisions taken at government level, in contrast to previous experiences in which residents' associations had to deal directly with the government without a sympathetic intermediary.

“The presence of an NGO throughout the entire process, with the dual role of agent of persuasion and as an intermediary vis-à-vis the public authority, contributed to scaling up the overall quality of the project.” (Gordilho-Souza, 2000, p. 359)

The *Alagados* experience showed that the existence of a specialised team in the intervention area, working together with the community, is a key requirement for the success of this kind of project.

An international partnership

The partnership between international organisations such as the World Bank, the Italian Government Development Aid Programme and the Cities Alliance created an environment of cooperation between the partners, the financiers, and the team responsible for project execution. The existence of this partnership, which brought in various useful inputs gathered from worldwide experience, helped the project to be established and implemented on a sound basis.

Sustainability of the intervention

With respect to the sustainability of urban upgrading, it is vital to highlight the need for greater involvement by the utility companies charged with managing public services and by the municipal secretariats that maintain and provide urban services. Regardless of the fact that the *Salvador* municipal government theoretically formed part of PATS institutional framework, it failed to become engaged in concrete terms. It remained for CONDER to undertake the role of sole public interlocutor vis-à-vis the communities. One further point: with regard to residents undertaking home improvements in the upgraded areas, it is important to emphasise (drawing on similar experiences) that this question is partly associated with security of tenure; this is an issue which requires careful and detail-oriented work for progress to be achieved at scale.

4.2 Challenges to scaling up

The PATS experience highlighted a series of challenges facing the formulation of new projects for scaling up urban poverty interventions. Some of the challenges identified at the last meeting of the Tripartite Steering Committee, held in 2006, and during the preparation phase for the *Dias Melhores* programme and PAT are described below.

Ensuring community participation

Scaling up the project to have impact on a larger number of communities and municipalities involves addressing a number of key differences from the *Alagados* area. They require adjustment before the same integrated and participatory methodology employed in the *Alagados* area can be repeated. For example, pre-project, the *Alagados* area contained several thriving community associations working on different aspects of social and economic development together with the residents. However, this is not necessarily the case in other municipalities or communities in *Salvador*. In a number of areas financial resources will probably be needed for training local leaders and groups to ensure participation by their communities.

Another point to be highlighted is the participation of AVSI, a non-governmental organisation that has substantial experience of social action, community mobilisation, and participation. The involvement of this type of NGO is important given that it can serve as a mediator in the whole process by facilitating the often conflict-ridden dialogue between public authorities and residents.



Land Tenure Regularisation

The goals set by the project were generally achieved, the main exception being the question of property regularisation. In the course of the interventions in the *Alagados* area, a few modest channels were opened in this direction, which resulted in some minor achievements — but concrete sustainable progress proved elusive. Security of tenure is a major problem for people living in precarious settlements in Brazil. The City Statute (*Estatuto das Cidades*), a federal law introduced in 2001, is an important step in the right direction. It introduced the principle of the social function of property and set forth a series of legal instruments targeted at sustainable land and property regularisation. Since its establishment in 2003 the Ministry of the Cities has taken a leading role in developing a national property regularisation policy, which is also supported by the Cities Alliance. This policy is based on wide-ranging discussions between state and municipal authorities and the various social sectors comprised in the National Council of Cities (*Conselho Nacional das Cidades*).²³

Cost recovery

Interviews carried out in a number of areas of *Ribeira Azul*²⁴ indicate that there is substantial resistance among residents to paying even a fraction of the cost of their new houses and to footing the related utility bills. At least two factors are involved which need to be taken into better account in future projects. The first involves the need for projects to provide economic opportunities for the population living in the area; such opportunities are a vital precondition to introducing necessary fiscal instruments for securing cost recovery in the urban development and housing sector. The second point concerns the need to establish a clear proposal for subsidies and cost recovery that can only emerge from a straightforward, frank dialogue with the population itself. This dialogue needs to ensure a degree of coherence between, (i) the government's capacity for subsidy delivery and revenue collection on the one hand, and (ii) the payment capacity possessed by the residents on the other. Experiences elsewhere in Brazil indicate that non-compliance with established payment mechanisms is often tolerated by public authorities. The result is to undermine the relationship of trust between the population and the public administration while serving as a disincentive to those willing and able to comply with payment rules.

23. The draft Law on Territorial Responsibility (to deal with land subdivision and property and land regularisation) is currently being discussed by the Federal Congress. This protracted process has intensified markedly since the approval of the City Statute in 2001. The current legal framework for land subdivision in Brazil, which is widely seen as conducive to informal development, has proven remarkably difficult to modify.

24. AVSI: Assessment of the *Alagados IV* and *V* Community Organization, Environmental & Health Education and Employment & Income Generation Project, March 2006.

A link is often created between the process of obtaining formal property title and partial cost recovery. In many cases, revenue collection mechanisms link the legalisation of property title to discharge of the debt incurred. However, these mechanisms are frequently ineffective, since residents in the improved areas tend to acquire and sell their homes on the basis of informal contracts.²⁵ On the other hand, while the investments made by the authorities in the area certainly contribute to inspiring confidence in security of tenure, the absence of formal documentation may serve as a disincentive to residents willing to invest in improving their own homes. Managing such a complex system is far from simple in the best of cases, and impossible without the creation of a long term strategy incorporating transparent rules, which in turn depends on clear political decisions.



Conder/Avsi

Types of housing

The PATS experience showed that improved dialogue is needed for defining the types of resettlement housing provided, taking into account the constraints of available land vis-à-vis the numbers of beneficiary residents.

Residents' demands for larger houses and reduced housing density conflict with the strategic decision to resettle all the families in the same area from which they were removed (with the objective of maintaining the fabric of social and community relationships). Although this issue was brought up in the many meetings with the community, the residents robustly rejected the idea of resettlement in other areas. The resulting need for a high-density solution led to the choice of a type of housing which received hostile criticism from residents on account of, (i) the small size of the housing units, (ii) potentially overcrowded conditions and (iii) the lack of any possibility of building extensions onto the units. A further complaint concerned the quality of the materials used, which also led to residents' dissatisfaction with their new homes.

This entire question revolves around cultural rather than purely technical considerations. Moving families from stilt shacks to more stable homes created expectations that additional improvements would be provided. Further dialogue would have been needed to persuade the residents of the new homes to accept their shared responsibilities.

Also, housing projects need to be designed to provide opportunities for residents to be able to expand their homes if they so wish.

25. Cf. Notarbartolo di Villarosa F., *Dias Melhores - PSIA - Consultancy on sustainability issues*. In the case of the *Ribeira Azul* programme, the government planned to charge the communities for these services an amount compatible with their income levels. 80 percent of the costs of construction and housing improvement were to be subsidised; the remaining 20 percent were subject to payment by the beneficiaries over a period of sixty to one hundred and twenty months. Despite these conditions, the cost-recovery efforts failed, as in many other similar schemes. The amount of subsidy was calculated by CONDER on the basis of the capacity of beneficiaries of the scheme to make and keep up payments. In effect the monthly instalment was planned not to exceed the equivalent of 10 percent of a minimum salary.

Supplying low-cost land: preventing new invasions

The formal supply of land and housing in Brazil is heavily restricted due in particular to the existing structure of laws and regulations. National and local norms establish highly restrictive rules with regard to zoning and land use, land-parcelling, lot sizes, housing density, and construction standards. These regulations result in the cost of serviced land and housing being totally prohibitive for the construction of low income dwellings. On the other hand, demographic pressures and demands for housing in urban areas continue. Since there is no formal supply of affordable serviced land, the solution for poor urban families requiring housing (around seven hundred thousand new households per year in Brazil's cities) is usually informal: land invasions, purchasing clandestine lots, or the further densification of existing informal settlements.

To date, the experience of the intervention in the *Alagados* area has been successful to the extent that it has impeded new land invasions in the area covered by the programme. It is believed that this can be attributed to the vigilance of a mobilised local community — which has undertaken a watching brief in the area, with the support of a state team — and to physical interventions that were undertaken specifically to prevent further invasions. These interventions include, for example, the construction of a bay front road (*pista de borda*) between the settled area and the sea, which effectively blocked the construction of new stilt houses. It is also worth highlighting the reduced turnover of residents within the community, contributing to the general stability of the area.²⁶

26. A survey undertaken by CONDER and AVSI indicated that a relatively small number of residents of *Araçás*, one of the complexes constructed for resettling people in the *Ribeira Azul* area (17 percent out of a sample two hundred and eighty), sold their houses and moved elsewhere. However, this data only included formal transactions and therefore failed to reveal exactly how many homes were sold on the informal market. Despite problems in this respect, the turnover of residents has, according to field workers, proved in reality to be very low. By contrast, in other *favelas* that have undergone improvements in the city of *Salvador* the picture is different. For example, in the *Silvio Leal* slum in the *Pau da Lima* region resident turnover was approximately 75 percent after the urban upgrading works were carried out. This number would appear to be a truer reflection of the slum housing mobility situation in *Salvador* (PSIA, 2005, p. 21).





A more systematic approach will be needed to carry out a larger scale project. One public policy worth considering is the provision of land with a progressive (gradual) endowment of basic urban services for the poorest residents. In the case of *Salvador*, the availability of appropriate public land for this purpose is a limiting factor and it would be necessary to establish partnerships with other municipalities in the metropolitan region and the private sector in order to generate a suitable supply of land. This alternative could provide a viable solution for preventing new invasions, as it would absorb some of the new demand for housing. A process of gradual urbanisation over several stages would also serve to keep costs relatively low. The state, as well as the municipalities, would obviously play a key role in identifying suitable land. A similar approach adopted throughout the state could provide housing alternatives for migrants, as well as help tackle the demand generated by the demographic growth of the cities themselves.

Partnerships for operating and maintaining the new infrastructure

One of the challenges faced in the interventions carried out in the *Alagados* area was the limited involvement of the *Salvador* municipal government in the operation and maintenance of the improvements undertaken in the community. In Brazil, responsibility for the operation and maintenance of urban services (garbage collection, street surfacing and public areas maintenance, storm drainage, and the operation and maintenance of water and sanitation services) falls on the local municipal authorities and third party public utility concessionaires. The sustainability of public services obviously depends on the involvement of these bodies from the beginning in any project in order to ensure proper operation and maintenance of the infrastructure.

On the other hand, the community has a role in pressuring the public authorities to carry out their proper functions and to adopt a different approach vis-à-vis the public services offered. In the case of *Alagados*, the various education activities contributed to residents becoming more familiar with specific services. One positive example was a reduction in the amount of trash thrown into the bay and onto local public spaces.

Overall, involvement of the partners, especially public service providers and the communities themselves in the preparation and execution of the project has many of the anticipated advantages. It generates a feeling of ownership and responsibility with respect to the benefits generated by the project, as well as a desire to maintain such benefits over the longer term.



Local Economic Development

Placing increased emphasis on individuals and creating opportunities for individuals to exercise proper citizenship means confronting the major challenges involved in generating employment and income in a sustainable, socially inclusive way. Local economic development (LED) as a public policy should not be seen as contrary to national macroeconomic or industrial policies, but rather as a complement to them — in effect as one way of establishing the appropriate conditions for developing such policies and for realising their potential at the local level. Many inspiring examples of LED exist in Brazil, such as: professional skills courses for workers (unemployed or not); support for the establishment of cooperatives, including encouragement for opening up new markets (government purchases and the so-called “solidarity” economy); support for small and middle sized enterprises; small firm “incubator” initiatives; provision of microcredit; support and strengthening of local economic clusters, industrial districts and technological parks; active policies for attracting productive investment earmarked for specific areas; first employment projects; complementary secondary education courses; fiscal incentives to encourage specific economic activities; and labour exchange job centre facilities (*Centros Públicos de Emprego, Trabalho, e Renda*). Directing policies such as these to areas subject to slum upgrading requires the mobilisation of different bodies at the three levels of government and the establishment of a specific coordination unit. While positive experiences do exist, many efforts such as those mentioned above have achieved little given the difficulties of long-term sustainability and unfavourable cost-benefit ratios. This is often due to the absence of a broader-based strategy involving and mobilising the entire group of economic, social, and political stakeholders.

PATS experience revealed the problems of confining this topic to the context of the project itself. The cooperatives that were established or strengthened in the course of PATS (dressmakers, cake-makers, civil construction, fishermen) tended to be critical of the activities in which they were involved for not producing sufficient income or genuine work



opportunities, especially following the conclusion of the project. The cooperatives which benefited most were those that already existed before receiving additional assistance under the project.

These less-than-positive assessments arose from the fact that actions undertaken failed to resolve a number of issues related to longer-term economic prospects (financial advances, employment generation, increasing the number of cooperative members, etc). In order to bring training activities and support for cooperative activities into line with the need for economic sustainability, it will be necessary first to identify the appropriate instruments for this purpose. The example of the construction cooperatives is useful in this respect. These cooperatives, contracted to undertake minor housing improvement works, operated during the entire duration of the project. However, once the project had come to an end, it was discovered that the construction cooperatives were still not well enough structured to enable them to compete in the wider market.

This experience emphasises the need to base future action on a detailed diagnosis of the specific employment attractions of the area as well as on existing job opportunities. This diagnosis would be used to draw up a more consistent local development strategy as well as to identify links between possible local economic clusters and existing citywide productive chains.

The first challenge is to establish a common space that can be shared by players currently working in isolation (officials from different levels of government, the private sector, non-governmental organisations, aid agencies, etc.) to discuss and work on local economic development. To ensure credibility and to benefit from available support, LED pilot projects need to be established as quickly as possible. This is one of the principal tasks facing the *Dias Melhores* Programme.

Plans, design projects, surveys etc undertaken by the Programme Management Unit (UGP)

Funded by PATS:

- Social and environmental development plans for each area of intervention
- Monitoring and evaluation plan (preparation and execution)
- Housing improvement plan (preparation and execution)
- Plan for the construction of new houses (preparation and execution)
- Property regularisation plan
- Draft design for the bay front road (*Pista de Borda*)
- Rehabilitation of an urban square (preparation and execution)
- Urban design and environmental preservation plan of the Cobre Basin (*Bacia do Cobre*)
- Detailed engineering and architectural designs for *Alagados VI* and *Mangueira*

Funded by the Government:

- Architectural and engineering designs for *Alagados III*
- Architectural and engineering designs for the *Joanes Azul* area for resettling 180 families removed from stilt houses
- Social and Environmental Development Plan for the *Alagados III* community
- Engineering designs for the *Joanes Azul* bay front road
- Plan for the resettlement of families living in the *São Bartolomeu* Park area
- Housing improvement plan during the first phase of *Novos Alagados*, called “housing improvements for dwellings that remained in a critical situation with the implementation of the project”
- Expropriation of the SESI area for the resettlement of families removed from the stilt houses and preparation of architectural and engineering designs related to the area

Main social projects undertaken within the context of PATS

	Projects	Executing agency	Beneficiaries
1.	Social support for <i>Alagados III</i> Project for Community Participation, Environmental and Health Education	CDM	2.189 people
2.	Support for the <i>Alagados III</i> Waste Recycling, Plastic Processing and Environmental Protection Project — CAMAPET. Purchase of a waste collection truck.		
3.	Support for the Integrated Percussion Education School — EEPI. Donation of uniforms and transport.		30 children
4.	Support for the <i>Alagados</i> Philharmonic Orchestra — FANPOSSANDI. Donation of uniforms and musical instruments.		80 people
5.	Support for the <i>Novos Alagados</i> Family Guidance Centre (COF)	CDM	
6.	Support for the <i>Canta Novos Alagados</i> Choir Project		106 children
7.	Development of the <i>Projeto Educando</i> — “Support for Young People in Conflict with the Law in the <i>Ribeira Azul</i> Area”	CDM	12 youths
8.	Support for the establishment of the <i>Mangueira</i> Construction Workers Cooperative — COOTRACIV	OCEB	22 people
9.	Health care and combating child malnutrition activities in <i>Novos Alagados</i>	CDM	60 children
10.	Training and administrative support for local associations	SEBRAE	50 associations
11.	Training and administrative support for local associations	SEBRAE	34 firms
12.	Training and administrative support for cooperatives	SEBRAE	7 cooperatives
13.	Training in cooperativism and dressmaking for the women of <i>Alagados</i>	PANGEA	20 people
14.	Support for the establishment of a Family Guidance Centre in a community health centre in <i>Alagados</i>	CDM	
15.	Upgrading course in building maintenance	SENAI	65 people
16.	Formation course in construction work — <i>Novos Alagados</i>	OAF	46 youths
17.	Formation course in fishing and cooperativism activities: support for the Bay of All Saints Fishing Cooperative — COOPEBAS	AQUIPESCA / OCEB	28 people
18.	Training course for day-care teacher/monitor	João Paulo II Day Care	79 people
19.	Training in recycling techniques: <i>Reciclar e Criar Vida</i> Project	Depósito Sta. Maria	25 youths
20.	Support for the establishment and methodological follow up for local entities	CDM	148 people (43 entities)
21.	Support for the Health and Environmental Education Project	CAMA	7.081 people
22.	Sport project in <i>Novos Alagados</i>	OAF	563 children and adolescents
23.	Recovery of the mangrove swamp in <i>Novos Alagados</i> .	FUNDIPESCA	30 people
24.	Assistance for securing operating permits	CDM	50 associations
25.	Assistance for projects preparation and resources captation	FLEM	31 associations
26.	Support for the <i>Feira de Palafitas</i> (Stilt Houses Fair)		700 people

Community equipment/amenities

One of the Prerequisites for undertaking civil construction works to be funded by PATS was that at least 80% of the workforce should consist of local labour. In due course around 240 workers from the community were involved from six cooperatives and a number of local firms.

	Equipment/amenities	Beneficiaries
1.	Extensions to the <i>Boiadeiro</i> Sports and Professional Training Centre (CEDEP) and the construction of a sports pitch. CEDEP provides skills training courses for youth in property and building maintenance. In addition, it hosts a sport development programme for hundreds of the area's children and youth. (<i>Novos Alagados</i>).	
2.	Purchase, repair, and expansion of building for use as premises of the Plataforma Community Dressmakers Cooperative — COOPERCONFEC. (<i>Novos Alagados</i>)	40 members
3.	Construction of the ADOCCI Community Kitchen (the <i>Itapagipe</i> Sweet Makers, Cooks and Cakemakers Association). (<i>Uruguai</i>)	15 members
4.	Construction of the Mons. Luigi Giussani Day-Care Centre. (<i>Joanes</i>)	200 children
5.	Renovation/expansion of the <i>Núcleo Habitacional Joanes Leste</i> Residents' Association Day-Care Centre. (<i>Uruguai</i>)	290 children
6.	Renovation/expansion of the <i>Associação dos Artesãos dos Alagados de Salvador</i> Day-Care Centre. (<i>Alagados IV</i>)	96 children
7.	Renovation/expansion of the <i>Canto da Paz</i> Day-Care Centre. (<i>Uruguai</i>)	415 children
8.	Renovation/expansion of the <i>Erês/ São Bartolomeu</i> Day-Care — <i>Clube das Mães dos Novos Alagados Heroínas do Lar</i> . (<i>Novos Alagados</i>)	260 children
9.	Renovation/expansion of the <i>Kilombo Kioiô</i> Community Day Care. (<i>Novos Alagados</i>)	550 people
10.	Repairs and expansion of the Fish Market (<i>Mercado de Peixe</i>) in <i>Novos Alagados</i> — HQ of the Bay of All Saints Fishing Co-operative - COOPESBAS. (<i>Novos Alagados</i>)	42 members
11.	Repairs to the football pitches of the <i>Nova Primavera</i> and <i>Araçás</i> Settlements. (<i>Novos Alagados</i>)	
12.	Rehabilitation of the <i>Praça do Largo do Metron</i> — <i>Santa Luzia</i> Complex (<i>Uruguai</i>)	

Projects run by local associations funded by PATS

As part of the activities undertaken by PATS, funds were allocated to strengthening actions developed by local bodies through the provision of support for the implementation of specific projects. Ten projects were selected for this type of funding:

	Projects	Entity	Objective	Beneficiaries
1.	Education for peace project	GEDEN	Literacy classes based on study sessions and the organisation of cultural activities for young people and adults living in the <i>São João de Plataforma</i> community (160 hours)	35 youths and adults
2.	Adult literacy course	ASPASB	Adult literacy course for mothers of families residing in <i>Novos Alagados</i>	53 adults
3.	Education and art for confidence building	GRUCON	Literacy training for adults through a pedagogical approach including awareness and 'social skills building' work with elderly people resident in <i>Massaranduba</i> (bio-dance and music therapy)	51 adults and elderly people
4.	Educating for a better future	<i>Frutos de Mãe</i> Community Day-Care and School	Information technology training, ensuring access to computer services for the community as a whole, while encouraging young people to stay at school.	49 people
5.	ABCDigital	CAMMPI	Basic literacy for computer operation and information technology courses for the representatives of local organisations (40 hours)	67 people
6.	<i>Show de Bola</i>	Free Association of <i>Mangueira</i> Residents	Sports, recreational, educational, training, cultural and artistic activities for children and adolescents resident in the communities of <i>Mangueira</i> and <i>Baixa do Petróleo/Massaranduba</i>	154 children and adolescents
7.	Leap to the Future Project	<i>Pingo do Saber</i> Community Day Care and School	Learning skills reinforcement project for children and adolescents between seven and 14 years of age resident in the <i>São Bartolomeu</i> community (320 hours)	60 children and adolescents
8.	Educart Project - Education reinforcement and theatre	<i>Instituto Cabricultura</i>	Education reinforcement course for children (240 hours) and learning skills upgrading through the use of theatre presentations for adolescents (120 hours) from the <i>Novos Alagados</i> community schools.	86 children and adolescents
9.	<i>Capoeira</i> and Judo: a project to tackle social exclusion	<i>Santa Cruz</i> Charity and Sporting Society	Technical and practical training for skills required for <i>capoeira</i> and judo for youths between 13 and 21 years old living on the <i>Itapagipe</i> Peninsula	97 youths
10.	Young citizens programme	<i>Uruguai</i> Mothers and Friends Group	Classes for presenting information on sexual and reproductive health issues, notions of citizenship, and income generation activities through theatrical performances, for female adolescents (i.e., aged between 13 and 18) living in the <i>Uruguai</i> community	29 youths

Entity

- 1 *Ação Social da Paróquia de São Brás (ASPASB)*
- 2 *Associação Beneficente Democratas dos Alagados de Itapagipe*
- 3 *Associação Beneficente 7 de Setembro*
- 4 *Associação Beneficente Cultural Caminhando com Jesus do Jardim Lobato*
- 5 *Associação Beneficente Educação, Arte e Cidadania (ABEAC)*
- 6 *Associação Beneficente Recreativa e Cultural João Paulo II*
- 7 *Associação Beneficente Recreativa e Cultural PAOLL*
- 8 *Associação Comunitária Flor da Primavera*
- 9 *Associação Cristo a Verdade que Liberta*
- 10 *Associação das Doceiras, Cozinheiras e Confeiteiras de Itapagipe (ADOCCI)*
- 11 *Associação de Assistência e Promoção Humana dos Lares de Alagados*
- 12 *Associação de Moradores da Invasão Dom Avelar*
- 13 *Associação de Moradores da Rua Antônio Bonfim do Lobato*
- 14 *Associação de Moradores da Vila Ruy Barbos*
- 15 *Associação de Moradores do Conjunto Habitacional Joanes Leste*
- 16 *Associação de Moradores do Conjunto Santa Luzia*
- 17 *Associação de Moradores e Amigos de Itapagipe*
- 18 *Associação de Moradores Unidos do Lobato*
- 19 *Associação dos Artesãos de Alagados de Salvador*
- 20 *Associação dos Barraqueiros do Parque São Bartolomeu*
- 21 *Associação dos Comerciantes de Itapagipe (ACIA)*
- 22 *Associação Filhos do Sol Nascente*
- 23 *Associação Livre dos Moradores de Mangueira*
- 24 *Associação Massabielle*
- 25 *Associação Recreativa e Cultural Duque e AIZ*
- 26 *Associação SILOÉ*
- 27 *Associação Tenda de Olorum*
- 28 *Associação Unidos dos Araças*
- 29 *Centro Comunitário da Igreja Batista de Itapagipe*
- 30 *Centro de Apoio ao Menor e Adolescente Carente (CEAMAC)*
- 31 *Centro de Arte e Meio Ambiente (CAMA)*
- 32 *Centro de Educação Desportiva e Profissionalizante (CEDEP)*

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- 33 *Centro Educativo João Paulo II*
 - 34 *Centro Espírita Rede Vivo*
 - 35 *Clube de Crianças e Idosos Lírio Branco*
 - 36 *Clube de Mães Carentes do Aterro Tia Cici*
 - 37 *Clube de Mães de Novos Alagados as Heroínas do Lar*
 - 38 *Comissão de Articulação e Mobilização dos Moradores da Península de Itapagipe (CAMMPI)*
 - 39 *Comunidade Verbo da Vida*
 - 40 *Co-operativa de Confeção da Comunidade de Plataforma (COOPERCONFEC)*
 - 41 *Co-operativa de Habitação, Produção e Serviço dos Moradores de Novos Alagados (COMONAL)*
 - 42 *Co-operativa dos Trabalhadores na Construção Civil, Manutenção e Reforma Prediais (COOPREDI)*
 - 43 *Creche e Escola Comunitária Cantinho da Criança Feliz*
 - 44 *Creche e Escola Comunitária Pingo do Saber*
 - 45 *Creche e Orfanato Criança Feliz*
 - 46 *Creche e Orfanato Minha Vó Flor*
 - 47 *Creche Escola Comunitária Frutos de Mães*
 - 48 *Creche João Paulo II*
 - 49 *Escola Comunitária Clube de Mães Carentes do Jardim Cruzeiro*
 - 50 *Grupo Cultural Bagunção*
 - 51 *Grupo Cultural Face Oculta*
 - 52 *Grupo Cultural Itapagipe Canta*
 - 53 *Grupo Cultural Outra Metade*
 - 54 *Grupo de Mães e Amigos do Uruguai*
 - 55 *Grupo de União e Consciência Negra da Bahia (GRUCON)*
 - 56 *Grupo Espírita Jesus de Nazaré (GEDEN)*
 - 57 *Instituto Cabricultura de Educação, Arte, Cultura e Meio Ambiente*
 - 58 *Ispac – Assessoria ao Movimento Popular*
 - 59 *Liga Desportiva do Boiadeiro*
 - 60 *Sociedade 28 de Agosto*
 - 61 *Sociedade Beneficente Desportiva Santa Cruz*
 - 62 *Sociedade Beneficente e Cultural da Baixa do Petróleo*
 - 63 *Sociedade Beneficente e Cultural Loteamento Planalto Real*
 - 64 *Sociedade Beneficente São Jorge*

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ACIA	Association of Traders from Itapagipe
ABEAC	Giving Association for Education, Art and Citizenship
ADOCCI	Itapagipe Sweet Makers, Cooks and Cakemakers Association
AMESA	Alagados Upgrading S.A.
APA	Environmental Preservation Area
AQUIPESCA	Support Program for the Development of Aquaculture and Fisheries in the Northeast Region
ASPASB	Paróquia de São Brás Social Action
BNDES	National Economic and Social Development Bank
BNH	National Housing Bank
CAB	Bahia Administrative Centre
CAIXA	Federal Mortgage Bank
CAMA	Art and Environment Centre
CAMAPET	Waste Recycling, Plastic Processing, and Environmental Protection Project
CAMMPI	Committee for liaison and mobilization of residents of the Itapagipe Peninsula
CDM	Cooperation for Human Development and Housing
CEAMAC	Support Centre for Careless Children and Adolescents
CEDEP	The Boiadeiro Centre for Sport and Professional Education
CEPRAL	Executive Commission for the Alagados Recovery Plan
CIA	Aratu Industrial Centre
COF	Family Guidance Centre
COMONAL	Cooperative for Housing, Production and Services of the residents of Novos Alagados
CONDER	State of Bahia Urban Development Company
COPEC	Camaçari Petrochemical Complex
COOPEBAS	Bay of All Saints Fishing Cooperative
COOPERCONFEC	Cooperative for sewing of the Community of Plataforma
COOPRED	Cooperative of Construction Workers, Building Renewal and Maintenance
COOTRACIV	Mangueira Construction Workers Cooperative
EEPI	Integrated Percussion Education School
FANPOSSANDI	Integrated Percussion Education School
FABS	Federation of Neighbourhood Associations
FUNDIPESCA	Foundation for the Development of Small Scale Fishing Communities
FLEM	Foundation Luís Eduardo Magalhães
GEDEN	Jesus de Nazaré Spiritist Group
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEPAB	Alagados Bahia Study Group
GRUCON	Black Union and Awareness Group of Bahia
HAMESA	Habitação Melhoramentos SA

IBGE	Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
LED	Local economic development
MAE	Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MDF	Movement for the Defence of Slum Dwellers
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MRS	Metropolitan Region of Salvador
NGO	Non governmental Organisation
OAF	Organization of Fraternal Aid
OCEB	Cooperatives' Organization of the State of Bahia
ONU	Habitat – United Nations Habitat and Human Settlements Programme
PAC	Accelerated Growth Programme
PAT	Technical and Methodological Assistance Project
PATS	Technical and Social Support Project
PANGEA	Centre for Socio-environmental Studies
PATS	Technical and Social Support Project
PETROBRAS	Petróleo Brasileiro S.A.
PDDU	Urban Development Master Plan
PED	Employment and Unemployment Survey
PIB	Gross Domestic Product
PIF	Physical Intervention Perimeter
PIS	Social Intervention Perimeter
PMS	Salvador City Hall
PNAD	National Survey of Household Sampling
PSIA	Poverty and Social Impact Analysis
PRODUR	Municipal Administration and Urban Infrastructure Development Programme
SEBRAE	Brazilian Service of Support for Micro and Small Enterprises
SEDUR	State of Bahia Urban Development Secretariat
SEI	Bahia Social and Economic Studies Superintendence
SENAI	National Industrial Apprenticeship Service
SEPLAN	State of Bahia Urban Development Secretariat
SEPLAN	State of Bahia Planning Secretariat
SESI	Industry Social Service
SFH	Housing Financial System
UGP	Project Management Unit
UTP	Project Technical Unit
USP	University of São Paulo



