Report No. 15132-AR Argentina Cordoba - Public Sector Assessment: Proposals for Reform (In Two Volumes) Volume II: Annexes May 15, 1996 Country Operations Unit II Country Department I Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office Document of the World Bank: CORDOBA PUBLIC SECTOR ASSESSMENT: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM ANNEX CONTENTS 1. Cordoba Public Expenditure Review 2. Education Sector 3. Social Welfare Programs 4. Health 5. Public Sector Reforn: Infrastructure and Public Works 6. Provincial Power Sector and EPEC 7. Public Administration 8. Municipal Finance and Intergovernmental Relations in Cordoba 9. Financial Condition and Prospects of Cordoba's Two Public Banks 10. Evaluation and Prospects of Cordoba's Social Security System 11. Cordoba's Tax Structure ANNEX 1 CORDOBA PUBLIC E)PENDITURE REVIEW 1. An overview of Cordoba's Public Expenditures Background 1. Cordoba spent 2.5 billion pesos in 1994. Over half went towards the social sectors (education and culture 28%; health 16%; social welfare 7%). Security and justice together accounted for almost 20%; and municipalities for 13% (see Table 1). In terms of an economic classification, personnel accounted for fully half of total expenditures. Transfers, composed largely of transfers to municipalities under coparticipation agreements and subsidies to private education, accounted for another 23%. By contrast, capital expenditures were only 12% of total spending (see Table 2). With the fiscal crisis, new investments have largely been limited to donor- funded projects. 2. Gross provincial budgetary expenditures increased in real terms by about 1,015 million or 102% between 1990-1994. Netting out expenditures which were transferred to the provincial budget lowers the increase to 89%. 1 On a functional basis, expenditures from 1990-94 increased most rapidly in social welfare2 (218%), justice (188%), fiscal administration (13 1%), and health (1 15%) (see Table 1). Interestingly, total public resources devoted to the education sector have not increased rapidly. While provincial educational expenditures increased 75% over this period, part of this increase reflects the transfer of federal education to the provincial budget. Once the federal transfer for servicios nacionales transferidos is netted out, the increase falls to only 48%. Expenditures on infrastructure (development) have hardly increased. On an economic basis, personnel expenditures increased by only 74%, while capital expenditures increased by over 170% (see Table 2). 1 If we net out the federal education transfer (servicios nacionales transferidos) of 111.8 million and the 51.6 million FONAVI transfer from 1994 expenditures (see below), the increase drops to 89%. Water supply (EPOS) was also transferred to the provincial budget as part of DIPAS, the merger of EPOS w-ith DPH (irrigation), starting in 1993. At the time of the transfer, EPOS accounted for 64.4 million pesos. However, what was previously EPOS has substantially shrunk since then. Indeed, total 1994 expenditures for DIPAS as a whole was 57.9 million. The percentage split in recurrent expenditures between EPOS and DPH in 1993 was 77%:23%. Assuming the same percentagc split in 1994 implies that ex-EPOS expenditures were 44.6 million in 1994. Netting this last figure out of total 1994 expenditures would further lower the 1990-1994 expenditure increase to 85%. 2 The growth in provincial expenditures on social welfare is actually 353%. However, thc transfer of FONAVI to the provincial budget must be netted out to obtain the real increase in resources flowing to that sector. ANNEX I -2 - Where Did the Funds Go? 3. The above percentage changes, however, do not provide a clear indication of where the increase in expenditures went since they are obviously starting from wholly different bases which could already be distorted. A more revealing picture can be obtained from Table 4 which provides a breakdown of the distribution of where the provincial expenditure increase went by ministry and category. In terms of economic classification, the bulk of the 1015 million increase went towards personnel (44%) and transfers (26%). Most of the increase in personnel expenses was on permanent (33%) rather than non-permanent staff(9%). Where the funds unfortunately did not go was towards non-wage operations. Expenditures on bienes de consumo hardly increased during this rapid overall expenditure growth. For example, while overall spending by the Ministries of Education and Health increased by 23 1 and 109 million from 1990-94, spending on bienes de consumo only roes by 0.1 and 2.3 million, respectively. This expenditure imbalance has manifested itself in the current situation of hospitals without medicine and technical schools with no training equipment. 4. In terms of ministerial classification, the bulk went to Economy and Finance (28%) for interest and transfer payments (to municipalities), followed by Education and Culture (23%), which spent it largely on salaries and transfers (subsidies to private education). However, as mentioned earlier, much of the latter was funded from federal sources. Desarollo Social accounted for about 10% of the expenditure increase, which it spent largely on trabajos publicos (e.g., housing programs) and transfers. By contrast, Justice received roughly the same amount (9%), but spent it all on salaries. The above figures indicate where significant increases in inputs to the public sector occurred. In many cases, it is not clear what Cordoba obtained from these increased expenditures by way of outcomes. For example, while real health expenditures Cexcluding saneamiento ambienta!) increased by 72% from 1990-93, the number of patients treated did not change. 2. A Diagnosis of Cordoba's Public Expenditures Guiding Principles: Where Should Cordoba be Spending? 5. In this time of extremely scarce public resources, it is particularly crucial that expenditures motivated on efficiency grounds not substitute for or crowd out private provision; expenditures motivated on equity grounds directly benefit the poorest segments of society; and expenditures be evaluated with regard to the sectoral outcomes that they generate. 6. Public expenditures can be motivated either on grounds of improving efficiency or equity. On efWiciency grounds, govemment intervention should be motivated by some underlying source of market failure, e.g., correcting externalities or providing public goods. The government should not provide goods or services which the private sector would otherwise provide. The presence of market failure, alone, however, is not sufficient to warrant public provision. There may exist other policy instruments (e.g., regulatory, tax, or subsidy instruments) which could improve efficiency short of outright provision. Even when there is a rationale for government financing (e.g., through loans or subsidies) because of credit or insurance market failures, for example, ANNEX I -3 - there may not be a rationale for public provision of goods and services. This distinction between between the role of the public sector in financing v. provision will be particularly important in the ensuing sectoral analyses. 7. On equity grounds, public expenditures should be motivated by a clear incidence on poverty alleviation. Many expenditures may be motivated on equity grounds, but may largely benefit the reasonably well-off and have a limited impact on poverty alleviation. Lastly, once their rationale has been established, public expenditures should be evaluated based upon their outcomes (e.g., percentage of population served in infrastructure, number of patients treated in health, educational outcomes) rather than on their inputs (e.g., number of staff, hospitals, or schools). Evaluating Cordoba 's Public Expenditures Against These Principles 8. Broadly speaking, Cordoba appears to be spending largely on public rather than private goods. With the notable exception of the provincial banks, there is no large public enterprise sector which receives transfers from the provincial budget, including EPEC. In infrastructure, there has been a significant devolvement of responsibility away from provincial authorities (e.g., private contracting of maintenance in roads; municipal and private participation in water). In education, the high proportion of private school students and the provision of subsidies to private schools translate into a reasonable approximation of a system of private provision with public financing. One possible exception is in health, where much is spent on hospitals, a largely private good. 9. However, the equity impact of public expenditures needs to be improved The ex- Ministry of Social Development has over 100 social welfare programs which lack clear selection criteria of beneficiaries and at best have an uncertain incidence on poverty. The FONAVI and FOVICOR housing programs are heavily subsidized but are not oriented towards the poor. Health expenditures are oriented towards free curative care in hospitals, including expensive al/a complejidad services not primarily used by the poor. 10. Furthermore, Cordoba has been spending very inefficiently. This suggests that substantial expenditure reductions can be achieved wilhout significant loss of outcomes in certain areas. Examples of gross technical inefficiency abound. In health, productivity levels in the public hospitals (as measured by monthly consultations per doctor) were about a quarter of those in private hospitals. In education, the use of substitute teachers (because of absenteeism and other reasons) is about five times higher in public than private schools. II. Expenditures on non-wage operations and maintenance, however, have been inadequate and will need to be increased Personnel expenditures have crowded out non-wage current expenditures, which typically have a far higher impact on outcomes. This expenditure imbalance has led to problems in all the sectors reviewed: hospitals lack medicine with which to treat patients; schools have outdated and inadequate materials; roads, water, and electricity have had inadequate maintenance. ANINIEX I -4- Health 12. The Ministerio de Salud (MdS, 1994 expenditures 301.9 million) maintains a province- wide, vertically linked network of health care facilities which includes health posts and dispensaries, "neighbourhood" hospitals, sub-regional hospitals, and regional general and specialized hospitals. These facilities provide a wide range of preventive, outpatient, and inpatient curative services free of charge. While sector indicators compare favorably to other provinces and countries, health services are lower quality, inefficient and with a poorer equity incidence than necessary. 13. The mixing of the role of the government as both provider and financer of health has led to structural problems in the sector. Expenditures have been extremely technically ineff-icient because it is difficult for the public sector to efficiently manage health care facilities. As an example, the provision of services is 2.4 per person per day in the public hospital examined v. 2.4 per person per houir in the private hospital examined. The true productivity is almost certainly worse than the above production numbers indicate because health professionals may be overproviding certain services: the length of stay in the public system is three times as long as in the private sector. Furthermore, expenditures have had a poor equity impact because (i) the poor are segregated into low quality care with no other options; and (ii) in its role as the supplier of last resort, the govemment ends up providing expensive alta complejidad services for free. The latter have low effectiveness in promoting health, are not primarily used by the poor, and should be paid for through insurance mechanisms. The poor equity impact has been exacerbated as a result of the fiscal crisis. The imbalance between wage and non-wage operating expenditures has meant that patients who cannot afford to bring their own drugs for treatment have been turned away because the public hospitals lack drugs. Expenditure Recommendations 14. The following near-term measures could yield savings on the order of 67.4-82.4 million (plus an additional 34 million if all pre-schools were transferred to the municipalities and an additional 7-8 million if subsidies to private schools were tied to students and private class sizes increased in response). (1) Better management of personnel --e.g., eliminating of ghost workers and double salaries, reducing use of substitutes--could yield substantial savings. In 1994, substitutes as a share of permanent positions were 4-5 times higher in public than priate schools. Since sickness and pregnancy rates are likely to be similar, this difference is largely attributable to better private management practices. If the public sector had performed at private sector levels in their use of substitutes, this alone could have yielded savings on the order of 25-40 million. (2) Eliminating one in ten of non-school level positions in the MEC is unlikely to significantly jeopardize outcomes and would yield 4.4 million. (3) Reducing funding for the MIEC's ancillary programs (e.g., scientific-technological, cultural, adult education) by 20% could save about 10 million. (4) Raising school fees at the secondary and higher levels-equivalent to 15% of those paid within the private sector should raise about 5 million. (5) Another 23 million could be saved by reducing school-level personnel without any drastic increases in student-teacher ratios (10 million from eliminating the vice-director position, 13 million from increasing average class size by 10% and reducing the number of maestros de grado). ANNEX I -5- 15. Several other measures could result in additional budgetary savings but were not included in the above figures. First, tying the subsidies to students rather than school personnel would be less distortionary and provide incentives to raise student/teacher ratios. Such a consolidation of the same number of students into fewer classes could save the MiEC 7.6 million in transfers at the primary level alone. However, this savings figure is somewhat speculative and unlikely to be ralized in the near-term. Second, the MiEC's pilot program of transferring 19 pre-schools to municipalities would save less than I million from the provincial budget. While a transfer of all pre-schools could yield about 34 million, the absorptive and administrative capacities of municipalities encourages caution. 16. Expenditures on non-wage operations should be increased. Increasing expenditures on bienes de consumo and servicios no personiales by 32 million would only bring these expenditures to 5% of 1994 MEC expenditures, as compared to an OECD figure of 36%. In doing so, Cordoba should ensure that it optimizes federal financing potentially available under the Plan Social Educativo, a national compensatory program to provide books, educational materials, and teacher training to poor regions. Using just a per capita measure, the plan should allocate 10.6 million pesos to Cordoba. 17. Improving quality over the longer-term will require sWlitching expenditures towards non- personnel operating expenditures and financing key investments. Increasing student-teacher ratios at the primary level alone could free up substantial resources. If Cordoba achieved student- teacher ratios equivalent to those of Chile (25), slightly below the LAC average of 26, the net savings to the system would be about 70 million in the public sector alone. Strategies to achieve these savings will require a reconsideration of the current model for school staffing.3 Education 18. Education falls under the purview of the Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC; 1994 expenditures 637.1 million). Cordoba has an extensive educational system of pre-primary to higher and secondary schools which includes participation by the Federal, provincial, and municipal governments as well as a very significant subsidized private school sector.4 Cordoba's student-teacher ratios are 17 and 12 at the primary and secondary levels compare well with with national averages (18 and 7) but remain far below in international comparators (26 and 19 in Latin America; 27 and 19 in East Asia; 22 and 15 in the U.K.). While Cordoba's sectoral indicators--in terms of coverage and enrollment rates, national achievement test scores, and primary repetition rates--compare favorably with national figures, there remains significant scope to increase the efficiency and quality of educational services. To illustrate, raising the ratio of teaching to non-teaching staff were raised from 4:1 to 6:1 would save about 15.6 million, of which 10 million could be obtained from the elimination of the vice-director position cited above. Another option is consolidating classes and reducing the number of maestros de grado. Universities are financed by the federal government. ANNEX 1 -6 - 19. Technical efficiency has declined. Overall cost per student (total spending on education divided by the number of students enrolled) increased at an annual average of 12% since 1990. This outpaced the increase in each of the education sub-sectors (primary 9.7%; secondary -1.0%; higher 8.6%) suggesting that the largest growth occured in areas not directly related to the delivery of education (e.g., cultural activities, ministerial overhead). Increases in real wages probably accounted for some of this increase. While the number of personnel increased by an annual average of 4% between 1993 and 1995, the wage bill rose has risen much faster. Average wages rose 19% in real terms between 1994 and 1995.5 20. The substantial imbalance between personnel and non-wage operating expenses is likely to have eroded the quality of education. Of the Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC) budget, effectively 95% goes to personnel expenses (73% are own personnel expenses and 22% are transfers to private institutions to fin-ance teacher and administrative salaries). Of the scant 3% going towards non-personnel operating expenses, almost all goes to non-personnel services--e.g., transportation and utilities--resulting in virtually no financing of equipment, educational materials, and other inputs. However, most studies indicate that it is precisely these types of expenditures-- rather than personnel and class size--which are the most effective determinants of effective learning.6 By comparison, OECD countries spend 55% on personnel and 36% on non-personnel operating expenditures. 21. Cordoba has in place an educational system which approximates public financing with private provision. About 90% of private schools receive public subsidies and account for over 20% and 40% of primary and secondary students. A total of 150 million pesos was budgeted in 1995 for subsidies to private schools. While the subsidy is currently tied to the number of school personnel rather than students and therefore distortionary, it is worth noting that the subsidy per student in private schools is lower than the cost per student in public schools (463 v. 618 in primary; 1,088-1,292 v. 928-1,367 in secondary). Public provision has a worse fiscal impact than public financing. However, once private school fees are added, the total per student cost is higher in the private than public sector. Social Welfare Programs 22. The ex-Ministry of Social Development (MSD; 1994 expenditures 165 million) accounts for the lion's share of govemment spending in social welfare programs. Almost half of the ministry's budget is financed from transfers from federal programs, e.g., PROSONU (child nutrition) and PROSOCO (social welfare). At the end of 1994, the MSD had over 100 programs largely carried out under the broad categories of general social assistance (about 30% of the budget; transfers to individuals and institutions for a broad range of purposes, e.g., food aid, purchase of medicines, rental assistance) and community and family promotion (20%; support for 5 However, the budget figures may understate the number of people hired, and hence inflate increases in real wages. 6 See, for example, World Bank (1995). Priorities and Strategiesfor Edutcation and Hanushek, E. (1995) "Interpreting Recent Research on Schooling in Developing Countries." WVorld Bank Research Observer, vol. 10, no. 2. ANNEX 1 -7 - the Provincial Council for the Protection of Minors, CPPM, and assistance programs for the elderly, handicapped, etc.).7 About half of the funds went to institutions and about 44% to individuals. The average individual subsidy was 1,414, which represents about 18% of per capita GPP. The program of individual subsidies was unmonitored in terms of the discretion in choosing recipients and benefit levels. Institutional subsidies (to NGOs and municipalities) were also unmonitored. 23. While many of the MSD programs appear to address legitimate social needs, the equity impact of expenditures is at best uncertain because of (i) the absence of clear criteria for beneficiary selection; (ii) the lack of reliable information on the type and number of beneficiaries and the level and impact of benefits delivered; and (iii) the dispersion of programs. 24. PAICOR (Programa de Asisiencia In?iegral de Cordoba; 55 mil]ion 1994 budget), a provincial school lunch program under the Ministry of Coordination, currently reaches 130,000 children or about 1/3 of the primary school population. Beneficiaries are selected at the school level. Parents decide whether to register their children in the program, and teachers determine which children are enrolled. While PAICOR appears to have a reasonable equity impact based upon geographical targeting (poorer departments have a higher share of students enrolled in PAICOR), it appears to be run rather inefficiently. While 48% of its budget went to food rations, almost the same amount (46%) went to personnel expenses. Expenditure Recommendations 25. The government has already made significant advances in recent months to rationalize its social program expenditures. While staff was cut from 2,414 to 1,932 when the MSD was s-ubsumed within the Ministry of Institutional Affairs as the Secretariat of Social Development (SDS), personnel remains excessive. Reducing the use of substitute teachers in the CPPM and excess administrative personnel should save on the order of 14 million. The danger of misuse and the difficulties in efficiently screening and monitoring the individual subsidy program call for its termination. Individuals with urgent needs can instead be directed to on-going programs and institutions. Eliminating these transfers would save 21 million off 1994 budget levels.8 A bottom- up assessment of PAICOR suggests that the same service could be provided for about 47 million, saving 8 million off 1994 budget levels, with about 12 (rather than about 25) million going to personnel. 7 Housing programs previously accounted for the remaining 50%, but havc been transferred elsewhere and discussed below. 8 It is worth noting that the individual subsidy program was shut down in thc second half of 1995, saving 11 million, at virtually no public outcry. ANNEX I -8 - Roads 26. The Direccion Provinicial de Vialidad (DPV, 1994 expenditures 64 million) administers, maintains, and improves nearly 60,000 km of provincial road. Of these, the vast majority (82%) are earth roads with less than 100 vehicles per day; 12% are unpaved roads with between 100-500 vehicles per day; and 6% are paved with generally more than 300 vehicles per day. While conditions of Cordoba's paved road system are only slightly inferior to those of other provinces, the situation of the unpaved network is somewhat less satisfactory. 27. Compared to the road directorates of Buenos Aires, Misiones, and Santa Fe, Cordoba ranks best on virtually all performance indicators, e.g., spending per km of provincial road, length of network, staffing efficiency (staff per 1000 km is 7, compared to 54 and I ll for Buenos Aires and Santa Fe). DPV had 402 employees as of October 1995, down 30% from a year earlier, and intends to reduce staffing further to 340. 28. The road system closely approximates public financing with private provision. One of the reasons for Cordoba's efficiency is its high use of private contractors for construction and maintenance. Most maintenance on the unpaved network is carried out by 220 conisorcios camineros managed by the residents of the area served. Expenditure Recommendations 29. Cordoba already has in place a very efficient road management system. In view of the impending transfer of national roads and the beginning deterioration of the quality of its existing network, it would be undesirable to cut resources and staffing further in 1996.9 Indeed, increasing the contribution to maintenance by the consorcios by 3 million to reach the level of previous years would be desirable. 30. The scope for further cost recovery appears limited. The contracts between the DPV and the consorcios already specify a local contribution of 20%. Toll collection is difficult on many provincial roads because of low traffic volumes. Even on the two pilot toll roads, collection costs and VAT consume about 30% and 20% of toll revenues, respectively. Water, Sewerage, and Irrigation 31. The Direccion Provincial de Aguay San7eamienito (DfPAS; 1994 expenditures 57.9 million; net deficit 15.5 million) is responsible for water management, including the operation of the provincial water supply, sewerage, and irrigation systems. While access to piped water supply is above the national average (84% of Cordoba's population in built-up areas in 1991 had water supplied through house connections, compared to a national average of 72%), sewerage 9 As part of the reform of the administration of the national road sector, a net transfer of about 10,000 km of national highways to the provinces is expected by mid-1996. This could increase Cordoba's paved network by more than 10%. ANNEX I -9- connections are particularly deficient (18% in Cordoba, compared to an already very low national average of 38% and a Latin American average of 53%). Virtually all public sewerage has already been transferred to the municipal level. 32. Cordoba's staffing per 1,000 water customers in 1992 was near the average of comparable Argentine provinces. Despite abysmal cost recovery (a collection rate in water of 60%, compared to over 90% for Buenos Aires, Mendoza, and Santa Fe; and less than 10% cost recovery in irrigation), DIPAS' operating deficit has now been virtually eliminated, apparently at the cost of inadequate maintenance and depreciation. The estimated backlog of rehabilitation and similar works is estimated at 120 million. Expenditure Recommendations 33. A far greater effort needs to be made in improving collections. In principle, DIPAS could collect about 60 million per year more than today, including 28 million for unpaid water bills; 4 million from an estimated 30,000 unregistered water connections; 15-20 million for unregistered private wells; and 3-6 million from EPEC for hydro-generation fees. The theoretical total of accumulated back payments due DIPAS is 139 million, covering unregistered services plus 60 million in accumulated unpaid water bills. While obviously difficult to collect, a more concerted collection effort is certainly called for in this time of fiscal crisis. In irrigation, improving the pricing structure could provide some savings since less than 10% of the cost of providing bulk water is recovered from user charges. 34. It is estimated that a restructuring of DIPAS could reduce personnel costs by about 15-20 million (about 490 redundant staff in water and 230 in irrigation). Several other particular expenditure items bear investigating. VAT payments to the federal government for payments niot received amount to 6 million per year. Furthermore, it is not clear why the provincial bank demands a service fee of 8.2% for receiving water payments (over 3 million per year), especially when it only charges the Housing Institute (IPV) 1.7% for receiving rent payments. Paying the IPV rate would save another 2 million. 35. Of the 368,000 water connections which still remain with DIPAS rather than the municipalities, 327,000 are part of the Cordoba city system which is to be privatized. However, urgent reforms should not be postponed pending privatization since it is likely that a government entity remain responsible for the city water supply until at least 1997. While tender documents for the privatization were issued in 1994, legal objections were raised by the private consortia submitting bids and the matter is currently under review in the courts. ANNEX I _ _ ~~~~~~- 10- Housing 36. The Instituto Provincial de la Vivienda (IPV; 1994 expenditures 76.3 million) administers several housing programs in Cordoba, which are funded primarily through the federal FONAVI program (51.5 million). The housing programs are heavily subsidized and charge a uniform interest rate of 8.7%, compared to commercial mortgage interest rates of about 18%. 10 Despite their high subsidy component, the housing programs have terrible incidence and primarily benefit the middle class: 79% of the loans go to households with a monthly income of over $560. The outstanding loan portfolio is 721 million. Expenditure Recommendations 37. IPV's record of loan repayment is abysmal and desperately needs improvement. 29% of its clients are behind by more than 45% of billings; another 15% by 25-40%. Only 34% are up- to-date with their payments (behind by less than 10%). The accumulated total of overdue repayments is about 50 million. Increases in loan repayments can help reduce the provincial contribution to the IPV budget, which was 9.2 million (6 million from the budget and 3.2 from FOVIS, the provincial vehicle tax) in 1994. 3. Expenditure Allocations 38. The macroeconomic projections indicate that an expenditure reduction of about 270 million from 1994 levels is required to close the fiscal gap. Where should these cuts fall? From an economic classification standpoint, as a first approximation it appears preferable that the reduction fall on personnel expenses given the extreme imbalances between personnel v. non- personnel expenditures discovered in virtually every sector evaluated. As discussed elsewhere, the preferred scenario for reducing personnel expenditures combines a 13.6% average salary reduction with a 8.6% employment reduction. Since the salary reduction is based on pay scale rather than sector or ministry, where should the employment reduction take place? 10 IPV has an annual construction program of over 60 million. Taking this as the annual "steady state" flow of new loans suggests implicit annual subsidies of 5.6 million. ANNEX I 39. The mission evaluated the health, education, social welfare, and infrastructure sectors. Together with the PAICOR program under the Ministry of Coordination, the ministries corresponding to these sectors accounted for 54% of 1994 expenditures. For these areas, Table 5 summarizes the near term expenditure recommendations by type and sector. Expenditure "quick fixes" (type I) alone, which include improved cost recovery and elimination of some subsidies (notably individual subsidies under the SDS), can yield substantial savings on the order of 55 million without any reduction in personnel. Relatively conservative estimates were used to arrive at the numbers presented in Table 5. For example, only 10% of the estimated annual uncollected or unbilled amount of 60 million in water is assumed to be collected; housing loan repayments are assumed to increase only by 10%. Furthermore, no recovery of the stock of accumulated back payments in water (139 million) or housing (50 million) is included in these figures. The potential for improved cost recovery and collections is very large and warrants further scrutiny. 40. Ancillary reductions (type II) include reductions in administrative personnel, cutbacks in ancillary programs, and especially reduced use of substitutes (e.g., in education). These would save over 60 million. Reductions among line staff (e.g., in hospitals and schools; type III) could save another 75 million. However, there is also a significant need for increases in non-wage operations in several sectors, which total 54 million. Undertaking these additional expenditures would reduce net savings from 191 to 137 million. 41. Provincial budgetary savings on roughly 91 million from transferring health and education services to municipalities are not included in the above figures. I I The govemment should be extremely wary about trying to resolve the expenditure crisis by relying excessively on tranferring services to the municipalities. While this may ease provincial budget pressures in the near-term, this may only postpone needed efficiency improvements and create the beginnings of an impeding fiscal crisis at the municipal level in the future. 42. An 8.6% employment reduction translates roughly (at average wages) into a 110 million reduction in 1994 personnel expenses. The personnel expenditure reductions in Table 5 alone total approximately 136 million.12 However, from the standpoint of intersectoral allocation, it is completely unwarranted to let the brunt of the adjustment fall only on these sectors, especially there are likely to be significant expenditure savings in the sectors not evaluated. The government estimates that the planned transfer of health facilities to thc municipalities could save around 90 million from the provincial budget. A pilot transfer of prc-schools wNould save less than one million. 12 Type II and type III reductions (136 million) are virtuallv all personnel. ANNEX I - 12 - 43. Again, the key criterion should be the outcomes foregone from any expenditure reduction. As a first approximation, the ancillary (type II) reductions are likely to have a lesser impact on outcomes since they consist largely of expenditure savings from retrenching overhead and administrative staff and more efficient use of substitute teachers. Limiting the first round of personnel reductions to this type of reduction in the evaluated sectors would imply a target reduction of [49.1] million in the remaining, unevaluated sectors, which represents a reduction of only 4.2% of total 1994 expenditures among these other ministries. If ancillary reductions in these other sectors are insufficient to meet this target, then attention should be again focused on the direct line personnel reductions (type III) cited in the evaluated sectors. 44. While an in-depth analysis of the other sectors is difficult and time-consuming, the distribution of the 1990-1994 provincial expenditure increase presented in Table 4 may be a useful starting point. The table indicates where significant increases in inputs occurred. For example, there were large increases in personnel expenditures at the Ministries of Justice and Govermment. If outputs and outcomes (appropriately defined) did not increase or improve with increased inputs, then it is reasonable to expect that they will not deteriorate significantly with decreased inputs. 45. The above personnel expenditure reductions do not take into account the increased savings from the expenditure quick fixes. However, these additional savings should be allocated towards critical non-wage operating expenditures, rather than used to mitigate personnel reductions which may be desirable for long-term efficiency reasons. ANNEX 1 - 13 - LONG-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS 46. Over the long-term in each of the sectors, the government should continue to pursue the guiding principles laid out in the diagnosis of Cordoba's public expenditures: (1) Provide public rather thani private goods and services. In the infrastructure sectors, the government should privatize the Cordoba city water system and EPEC in electricity. (2) Separate out the role of government as provider v. financer of public goods. In roads, this has already been accomplished to a noteworthy degree. In education, a sound basis for this has been established with the provision of public subsidies to private schools. Basing educational subsidies on the number of students rather than school personnel would be an important step towards moving further in this direction. In health, the government should finance health insurance rather than provide free curative care in public hospitals. In health and education, where there is a large private sector co-existing alongside the public sector, separating financing and provision would also help ensure that public provision does not crowd out private provision. Providing financing--be it through health insurance or educational subsidies--would allow patients and students to "vote with their feet" about hospital and school performance. Both public and private facilites would be subject to a market test which should improve efficiency. If the former were inadequate, they would naturally and endogenously shrink. (3) Subsidized, equity-motivated interventions shotuld have a clear benefit onl the poorest segments of society. Targeting, screening and evaluation mechanisms should be established for all social programs, including housing as well as those under the SDS. Health 47. Providing health insurance rather than free care in public hospitals would solve the three structural problems in the sector cited earlier and should yield long-term savings of 61 to 150 million. (1) Low quality: with patients with mobile dollars, the provider has more incentive to be attentive and responsive. (2) Hospital management: the government is relieved of the onerous task of micro-managing hospitals and health centers. The government would instead choose and manage the payment scheme. (3) Alta complejidad: Setting up a system of financing specific activities will facilitate decisions about which services are and are not covered. It will also stop private insurers from pushing the costs from beneficiaries who require these expensive treatments onto the public sector. ANNEX 1 - 14 - Education 48. Strategies to increase the efficiency and quality of educational services include (I) effective control over wage bill and personnel. Immediate investments in computers and technical assistance to modernize personnel administration should be a high priority. (2) Increasing student teacher ratios to a minimum which still guarantees relative quality. This will require school consolidation, provision for student transportation, and reorienting personnel towards classroom rather than non-classroom positions. A necessary first step is to analyze on a school-by-school basis the unit costs associated with the provision of services. (3) Reorienting sector expenditures to favor educational services at the school-level rather than MEC overhead. This should translate into greater school-level control over resources and increased attention to non-personnel inputs to educational quality. (4) Achievement of greater equity in the system whereby richer students pay more than the poor and greater levels of public subsidies are applied to basic than higher levels (e.g., adult training, fine arts schools). (5) Increasing the quality and relevance of education by modernizing curricula and educational materials. Over the longer-term, increasing student- teacher ratios at the primary level alone to those of Chile (25), slightly below the LAC average of 26, could save 70 million in the public sector alone. Social Welfare 49. Elements of a strategy for social programs include (1) anticipating increased needs for social assistance due to the crisis. Select key programs to protect, such as PAICOR, which provides both basic nutrition and creates incentives to stay in school. (2) Optimizing resources from Federal social programs, e.g., PROSONU and PROSOCO, which will continue to be an important source of financing of core social programs. (3) Establishing targeting, screening, and evaluation mechanisms for all social programs. An initial ranking of cost per beneficiary of the various social programs is necessary to build a priority setting system. This should be complemented with the establishment of selection criteria for screening potential beneficiaries. (4) Review the program methodology and internal costs of PAICOR. (5) Consolidate SDS programs to key groups and areas of action to heighten impacts. (6) Evaluate elements of a social safety net, including the coordination of on-going programs in various sectors, monitoring of the poverty situation, identification of key vulnerable groups, and leveraging of resources for basic elements of the safety net. Roads 50. Cordoba already has in place a very efficient road management system. Increasing maintenance expenditures will be important to arrest the beginning deterioration of its road network. ANN'EX 1 - 15 - Water,Sewerage, and Irrigation 51. While the privatization of the Cordoba city system should be pursued, urgent reforms should not be postponed pending privatization since it is likely that a government entity remain responsible for the city water supply until at least 1997. It is recommended that a program be devised to register all water customers and collect as much as possible of the outstanding payments. Because of DIPAS' past record in non-collection and because surveys will be required to identify unregistered wells and water connections, it would be most effective to define this program with the assistance of an outside firm. It would also be useful to undertake a management and technical audit of DIPAS to restructure it and improve its efficiency. In irrigation, the pricing structure needs to be re-evaluated since less than 10% of the cost of providing bulk water is recovered from user charges. 52. While sewerage is under municipal purview and off the provincial budget, it is worth noting that an investment of 250-300 million would be required to provide sewerage connections for just half of the population living in Cordoba's built-up areas, which would still be below the Latin American average of 53%. Housing 53. Given the large subsidy component of its loans, IPV should ensure that its housing program directly benefit the low rather than middle-income population. Otherwise, the program should be run on a commercial, unsubsidized basis.13 IPV is now elaborating new standards, and outside expertise on the financial, management, and planning aspects of low-income settlements sJhould be provided. IPV should also significantly improve the abysmal loan repayment record An upgrading of IPV's data processing capabilities to improve its billings and collections should be given high priority in view of the potentially high payback.14 Over the long term, the goal should be to make IPV a self-sustaining agency which does not require any contribution from the provincial budget, especially in view of the regular, annual federal FONAVI transfer that it receives. 13 The terms of the loans it provides are under provincial and not federal purview. 14 IPV has defined a S 100,000 upgrading program which in principlc should be eligible for funding under the World Bank-supported Provincial Development Project. -16 - ANNEX 2 EDUCATION SECTOR 1. Cordoba has an extensive educational system which includes participation by the Federal, provincial and municipal governments as well as private schools. In general, Cordoba has better coverage and enrollment rates than the average for Argentina, and is approaching its goal of ensuring nine years of universal education. To achieve these ends, spending levels are substantial, including significant support from the provincial budget to private sector schools. The fiscal crisis facing the province in 1995 threatens to undermine sector achievements in terms of quality and coverage unless gains can be made in the efficiency of expenditures and reallocations made toward priority areas. This chapter reviews the situation in the education sector in Cordoba and provides recommendations on short-term strategies for addressing the fiscal crisis as well as suggested elements of a medium-term strategy for the sector. A. Analysis of the Education Sector in Cordoba Leading up to the Crisis Coverage 2. The table below shows the overall distribution of students by level since 1989, excluding students enrolled at universities in Cordoba, which remain under the tutelage of the Federal Government'. Cordoba: Total Enrollment by Level 700000 'i . ... i' .i .; . ....;,t-" '-' . ....... '. " ',''-' 'l.:''. i' '''E ' . . " ; 0'i i.!,'.....' " T . '-' ', ",'. ' i 'l' - '; 600000 500000 : :- :-: -::::: E:5 ::::::::-:: erdr : 7:::X :: : .n 400000- = _1 E3~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Higher 5300000 _C yecondary z _ _ _ - la ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Pnmary 200000 - _ llll-l1 Pre-Primary 100000 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 3. At the pre-primary level, almost half of all four-year-olds and over 90 percent of all five- year-olds attend pre-school. The absolute number of students has grown by about 4 percent per year over the last ten years. As shown in the table below, seventy-two percent of pre-primary students attend provincial public schools, twenty-two percent attend private schools, with the remaining six percent evenly divided between Federal and municipally financed pre-schools. This review does not include information pertaining to thesc universities since they are not financed by the provincial government. - 17 - ANNEX 2 4. At the primary level, where the bulk of the student population is concentrated, coverage has been universal for over two decades. With a gross enrollment rate of 98 percent and a net enrollment rate of 96 percent, the system is one of the more efficient in terms of student flows for Argentina which has a national average of 115 percent and 90 percent, respectively, and compares favorably with OECD countries. Enrollments have decreased slightly over the last five years, which may be caused by some combination of improvements in the repetition rate, slight contraction of coverage in the more remote areas of the province, or eventually, shifts in the age structure of the population. The projections of the future are for slightly decreasing primary school population. In terms of service providers, the distribution is almost the same as that of pre-primary, with about three-quarters enrolled in provincial public schools. In addition to the standard primary schools, there are about 80 special education schools serving approximately 5,541 students with learning disabilities (2 percent of the primary school population), as well as 7,700 adults enrolled in primary education programs. 5. At the secondary level, gross and net enrollment rates are 75 and 64 percent, respectively, slightly above the national averages of 74 percent and 56 percent. Although far below OECD levels (over 80 percent for net enrollment rates), Cordoba is well above the LAC average for gross secondary enrollment of 48 percent and the average of 54 percent for countries of comparable income levels. The secondary system is diversified into tracks: general (or bachillerato), commercial, technical and agricultural. Forty-four percent of students are enrolled in the commercial track, followed by 29 percent in the technical track, 22 percent in the bachillerato and 4 percent in agricultural studies. In addition to the 160,000 students enrolled in secondary schools, about 13,000 are enrolled in special secondary school courses for adults. 6. Expansion of absolute enrollment has been most significant at the secondary level, although the actual figures are greatly influenced by the transfer of Federally-financed secondary schools to the provincial government starting in 1993. In total, 29,000 public school students and 46,000 private-subsidized students were transferred in 1993, effectively doubling the number of secondary students under the provincial government. With this transfer, over 40 percent of all secondary students in Cordoba are now attending private, subsidized schools, almost twice the national average in 1991. -18 - ANNEX 2 Cordoba: 1994 Enrollment by Type of School 100% 7.7 ..... 1 o .S...., , i -. T ... , !,, ........ ,#: ,,ti;,......... f :i; ..... . .. _ E :- ........... . ....... ... ........i S . 0%~~~~~~~ . ;..., . -... :. -.f. .. '_''-fV0-;t:.. :0.........?tt : 0- 60% - ^. .0.: _ . -- . i :- $ - _ : t: :: -: -; : - ...:. .... 50% - - -}- _ E00 ;-;; li -t-0 NMunicipal . . _ ,.. E,,..:: _ %:T:i ........... ... .. .................- . :..- f.... 7. i 40% -0 ; Q t;t _ 0; 00ttt0t0t i; r Federal 20% U 1|1 1 l Provinecial 70% Pre- Primary Secondary Higher/No Primary n-Univ 7. Higher education financed at the provincial level covers about 9,300 students distributed among disciplines as follows: over 60 percent are enrolled in teacher training courses, with the remainder in social sciences, technical training, and other areas such as nursing and police academies. Average annual growth rate of enrollment over the last six years has been approximately seven percent. Educational Quality and EfEMciency 8. Educational Achievement. Overall, Cordoba ranks fairly highly in academic achievement compared with other provinces, reflecting in part the better socio-economic standing of the population. Based on results of the 1994 national academic achievement tests which cover language and math at the primary and secondary levels, Cordoba ranked fifth and sixth among provinces in primary level language and math, and eighth and ninth in secondary level language and math. The table below presents the 1994 test scores. Of note, Cordoba is slightly above the national average score at the primary level and slightly below at the secondary level. Within the province, private schools sampled scored well above the Cordoba and national averages. Public schools scored below these averages, with the wedge between public and private schools highest at the primary level. Primary schools in urban areas outperformed only slightly their rural counterparts. Nonetheless, these results disguise a wide disparity between individual schools, as shown in the gap between the highest and lowest scores for each subject. -19 - ANNEX 2 Cordoba - National Achievement Test Scores 1994 100.00% 90.00% 80.00% - 70.00% i Natl Avg 60.00% : Cordoba Avg PrimaryC- Primary Secondary Secondary Language Math - - Math Language 9. Internal Effciency. The efficiency of the system in terms of student flows is quite good at the primary level. Estimates of repetition rates suggest that overall rates have dropped by half over the last ten years, from about 8 percent in the early 1980's to 4 percent at present, and well below the LAC average of 14 percent. The significant fall in the repetition rate for first graders from 18 to 10 percent may be due in large part to the expansion of access to pre-school over the last ten years, particularly in the rural areas where the percentage of children entering first grade who had attended pre-school rose from 19 percent in 1982 to 74 percent in 1994. Most students who enter first grade eventually complete the primary cycle, with the low wvedge between the net and gross enrollment rates reflecting the gains in reducing repetition. 10. The system is less efficient at the secondary level, a situation which is a major concern for educational policy in Argentina in general. While estimates vary, about 50 percent of students who enter secondary school drop-out before competing the five year cycle, with the highest rate of drop-outs occurring in the first years of secondary school Private schools tend to have better results, but still exceed forty percent. Public technical secondary schools have the highest drop- out rate at about 60 percent for the 1987/91 cohort. Repetition rates range from about 15 percent to one percent depending on the type of school and year in the cycle, again with the highest rates in the initial years of the cycle. This situation is cause for concern on two fronts. First, as secondary school is often the last stage before entering the labor market, labor market skill levels and individuals' earnings potential are thwarted. As an economic efficiency issue, this situation causes a "lumping" effect in the first years of the secondary cycle, followed by thinning class size in the upper years, which does not lend itself to optimizing on infrastructure and personnel. 11. Student/Teacher Ratios. As a measure of an efficient use of its teaching force, student/teacher ratios are quite low in Argentina in general, and while Cordoba is slightly "better" than national averages, the configuration of the system is relatively high cost. Annex I provides comparative data on student teacher ratios2. To summarize, Cordoba's primary level student/teacher ratio of 17 is slightly lower than the national average. The average for LAG and East Asia are 26 and 27, while Cordoda's ratio is nearer to the US rate of 16. Within the primary 2 Please note that student teachcr ratios are not equivalent to class size since there arc personnel classified as teaching staff who do not perform classroom functions (directors, vice-directors, librarians, etc.). - 20 - ANNEX2 subsector, the highest student/teacher ratios are found in municipal schools due to the concentration of these schools in densely-populated marginal urban neighborhoods, while the private sector has the lowest ratios. As the private schools are almost exclusively concentrated in urban areas, the low student-teacher ratios may account for some of the differences in quality and test scores between the public and private primary schools. 12. Student/teacher ratios fall at the secondary and higher education levels, to 12 and 9, respectively'. These low averages disguise large variations between the overcrowded initial years of secondary and the upper levels, though disaggregated estimates are not available. Again, Cordoba is better than the national average of 7 at the secondary level, but well below international comparators which range from 15-16 for Chile, the US and UK to 19 for the LAC and East Asia averages. Evolution of Spending on Education 13. Overall Levels. Provincial government spending on education is significant. The 1995 budget of the education sector as a whole (including cultural activities) totaled 807 million pesos, or about 30 percent of the provincial budget. The share of education in the provincial budget has hovered between 28-33 percent over the last ten years. This is equivalent to 3.4 percent of the Gross Provincial Product, above the average for Argentina where education spending by the provinces amounts to 2.5 percent of GDP and total education spending 3.12 percent of GDP in 1992. In comparison, educational expenditures as a share of GNP are about 4 percent for LAC and 5.2 percent in OECD countries. Within the education sector, 40 percent is spent on primary education, 30 percent on secondary, 27 percent on activities not specifically linked to a level, 2 percent on cultural activities and only 1 percent on higher education. The low amount on higher education is a function of the Federal responsibility for financing universities, with the provinces retaining relatively lower-cost non-university higher education such as teacher training programs. 14. Distribution of MEC Budget. Within this envelope, the Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC) accounts for 89 percent, or 715.6 million pesos. Within the MEC budget, personnel expenses account for 73 percent, transfers to private institutions 22 percent (to finance teachers and administrative salaries); non-wage operating expenses account for three percent and investment less than two percent.4 With effectively 95 percent of the budget going to personnel expenses in one form or another, Cordoba runs the risk of an erosion in the quality of the educational services provided. Moreover, of the scant three percent of non-personnel operating expenses, almost all goes to non-personnel services including transportation, utilities, and communications, leaving almost no financing of equipment, educational materials and other inputs. In comparison, OECD countries spend about 9 percent of the education budget on investment, 55 percent on personnel and 36 percent on non-personnel operating expenditures. Although overall spending levels are significant in Cordoba, the pattern of spending, with Estimates of student/teacher ratios at the secondary level are less precise due to the large number of part-time teachers and the payment by 'horas catedras'. 4 This understates total investment in education since many of the education infrastructure works are carried out by the Ministry of Public Works, particulary for foreign-financed projects. This report does not cover the school construction and rehabilitation carried out under the Minsitry of Pubic Works, including: (i) the US$ 12.3 million slated for school rehabilitation to be financed by the IDB/IRD through the Provincial Reform Loan; the majority of which appears oriented to the larger schools in the capital; (ii) new construction, rehabilitation and expansion fianaiced with provincial funds, and (iii) works carried out through Federal-level programs such as the Plan Educativo Social. In 1995, the MPW allocated 2.5 million pesos to primary education, 3.2 million to secondary, and 0.2 million to other education/culture related physical investments. - 21 - ANNEX 2 personnel crowding out all other expenditures, not only affects quality of education, it tends to erode the productivity of the personnel employed. 15. How have educational expenditures evolved over time? Annex 2 presents the real growth in the education budget over the last six years. Since 1990, average annual growth of expenditures in real terms has been about 14 percent. The highest rates have been for "unspecified" expenditures, which given the budget nomenclature, are difficult to identify. Cultural expenditures have also grown dramatically, albeit off a fairly low base. Real spending on primary education has seen the lowest rate of increase at 6.6 percent. The 22.2 percent average annual increase in secondary education reflects, in part, higher enrollment growth rates and the absorption of the Federal schools within the provincial budget. 16. To achieve a more accurate picture of the evolution of spending on educational services, the table below traces the increase in real cost per student per level over the same years in order to net out the effect of expanding enrollments. Cost per student has increased at an annual average of 8.6 percent since 1990. As presented in Annex 1, the student/teacher ratio at the primary level has fallen by about 10 percent since 1990, driving the increases in per student cost at this level. At the secondary level, per student costs have fallen slightly since 1990, with the changes during the intervening years largely a statistical artifact of absorbing budgets and enrollments from the Federal transferred schools. In line with the findings in Annex 3, overall spending on education (total spending on education divided by the number of students enrolled) at an average of 12 percent has grown faster than any of the education subsectors. In other words, the largest growth in real spending has occurred outside of the services directly related to the delivery of education. These include cultural activities, scientific and technological programs, MEC overhead, and the like. 17. What has driven the increasing unit costs of the system? There are a number of possible factors involved: (i) the enrollment base is shifting increasingly to secondary education, which has higher unit costs, (ii) the MEC has expanded its range of actions, taking on new programs and activities not directly related to enrollment levels; (iii) the hiring of personnel has outrun the real needs of the system; and (iv) real wages have risen. The relative weight of each factor is difficult to assess due to the lack of detailed information and the poor quality of statistics that do exist, particularly on personnel and wages. . s.s . ...... . .. . ..... ..... . (in constant 1991 pesos) Yrly. Ave. 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1990 - 1994 Primary 287 397 427 492 535 551 Secondary 777 1155 1115 1211 643 1109 Higher 578 691 764 912 980 927 Total 439 621 674 893 922 919 Annual growth 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Primary 38.5% 7.5% 15.1% 8.9% 3.0% 9.7% Secondary 48.5% -3.4% 8.6% -46.9% 72.4% -1.0% Higher 19.6% 10.6% 19.3% 7.4% -5.3% 8.6% Total 41.4% 8.5% 32.5% 3.3% -0.4% 12.0% - 22 - ANNEX 2 18. To attempt some level of analysis regarding (iii) and (iv), Annex 3 presents the personnel structure of the MEC over the last three years. The bulk of all employees are teachers, followed by general service personnel (mainly school level staff such as janitors, guardians etc.) and administrative positions. The number of personnel, not including teaching hours, increased by an annual average of 4 percent between 1993 and 1995. The wage bill has risen much higher. Between 1994 and 1995, average wages rose 19 percent in real terms. Annex 3 also presents a disaggregated look at the growth of average wages by area of education and MEC administration. The wide variation in the figures reveals the largest increases in areas outside of the programs related to delivery of educational services. Although the evidence does suggest significant increases in real wages, the quality of the data limits the strength of conclusions that can be drawn. In some cases, the budget figures may understate the number of people hired, and hence inflate increases in real wages. 19. The lions' share of personnel expenditures go to teachers' salaries, the regulations for which are established by the Estatuto Docente. The teachers' salary scales establish a base salary upon which a number of additional payments are factored in. These include: education level, seniority pay, hierarchy, overtime, family allowances, payments for training and educational materials, premiums for hardship posts, and productivity bonuses. On average, the base salary accounts for only about 40 percent of the gross salary. On top of this, the MEC must contribute an additional 26.5 percent in employer payments related to pensions and insurance. While teachers were exempt from the wage cuts imposed by the Emergency Law, they did receive a 20 percent temporary reduction in the salary amount linked to seniority. The complexity of the salary system makes analysis of real wages difficult. It appears that automatic raises for seniority, as well as the expansion of 'pseudo-wage' benefits above the base wage, have driven increasing costs to a greater degree than adjustments in the base wage levels. The Role of the Private Sector 20. Expansion of private sector coverage has been based largely on public sector financing. The Ministry of Education provides financing for personnel to the non-profit private sector schools, of which about 80 percent are administered by the Catholic Church. The subsidy system functions based on a sliding scale depending on the level of school fees charged. Although the statutes limit the amount of the school fee allowable per level of subsidy, in practice many private schools find ways of levying additional charges to supplement school resources while maximizing the subsidy from the Government. Teachers are paid the same and the same standards for number of teachers and administrative positions per size of school apply. A separate MEC department supervises the private system at all levels. 21. A total of 150 million pesos was budgeted in 1995 for subsidies to private schools, over half of which was allocated to the secondary level. Only about ten percent of the private sector functions without any subsidies from the state. Of those schools that receive subsidies, 93 percent receive the maximum amount of subsidy allowable (100 percent of the value of teachers' salaries). As presented in the table below, the per student subsidy to private schools is less than the per student cost of public education. This is due to the fact that the subsidy only covers certain positions within a given school, and not the entire complement of school personnel. If an estimate of private school fees is added, the total per student cost of public schools is higher at all levels than that of public schools. This higher cost is associated with higher quality of services, both in - 23 - ANNEX 2 terms of the range of educational programs available, lower class size and better school management (lower use of substitute teachers, less days lost due to strikes, etc.). Cordoba - Estimate of Differential Subsidy Levels in Public and Private Sectors (in 1994 current pesos) Estimated Amount of School Fees Total Cost Per Total Cost Per Public Subsidy to Charged in Student in Student in Public Level . Private Schools Private Schools* Private Schools Schools Primary 463 230 693 618 Secondary 1,088 - 1,292 360 1,448 - 1,652 928 - 1,367 Nti Transferred 1,026 1,314 Higher 1,332 487 1,819 1,504 Special. - 2,507 329 2,836 2,708 * These figures are rough estimates based on the distribution of schools within ranges of school fees. In addition, they tend to underestimate actual private contributions through various charges not labeled as general school fees. For instance, in one school visited, additional charges amounted to 65 percent over the general fee level. B. Policy Options for Savings in the Education Sector in the Context of the Fiscal Crisis 22. There is a general consensus that the overall level of spending on education is sufficient to deliver educational services of a reasonable quality to the over 600,000 students enrolled in the system. The 1995 fiscal crisis has exacerbated the already apparent trend towards sacrifices in quality. Over time, the wage bill has crowded out almost all other expenditures on education. In the face of fiscal contraction, the Government will be hard-pressed to find ways of preserving its overall policy goals of guaranteeing access and a minimum of quality for at least nine years of basic schooling. This section explores the following options available to the Government to increase efficiency of expenditures while protecting overall sector goals: (i) improved personnel management, (ii) consolidation of Ministry structures and functions, (iii) revisions of subsidies to private schools, (iv) identification of other sources of financing, and (v) revisions to wage policies. Improved Personnel Management 23. A significant portion of the wage bill is lost to 'unproductive' uses, in part due to the lack of effective control systems. Examples include: (a) teachers that have accumulated excess teaching slots (either 'cargos' or 'horas caledras'); (b) outdated personnel information, leading to either 'ghost teachers' or unclaimed payments returned to the Ministry of Economy but recorded as educational disbursements; (c) heavy use of substitute teachers, generated by, in certain cases, excessive granting of various types of special arrangements (licencias, comisiones, lareas pasivas, jubilacion provisional, etc.); and (d) recourse to non-permanent 'contracted' staff. At the time of this review, information on (a) and (b) was not sufficient to permit an estimate of the financial savings available from the cleaning of these phenomena from the payroll. - 24 - ANNEX 2 24. Regarding substitutes ('suplentes'), data indicate significant potential for efficiency gains. In most instances (although not always), hiring substitutes results in two salaries being paid for delivering the same service. The table below compares the rate of substitute positions per permanent positions for public versus private schools in 1994 and 1995. In all cases, private schools used substitute positions less than public schools. This difference is largely attributed to better management practices in the private sector, since other factors like sickness and pregnancy rates should be similar. With the onset of the fiscal crisis in 1995, the use of substitute positions decreased notably in both the public and private sectors as the Ministry of Education sought greater control over the granting of these positions. Substitutes as a Share of Permanent Positions Teachers 1994 1995 Pre-Primary Private 10.0% 2.7% Public 37.6% 23.4% Primary Private 5.7% 0.4% Public 28.6% 17.7% Secondary Private 3.6% 3.3% Public 15.7% 7.5% Directors, primary Private 5.5% 3.6% Public 20.3% 15.9% Special Ed. Teachers Private 8.2% 1.7% Public 15.4% 6.6% Total positions Private 6.8% 2.7% (cargos) Public 21.4% 13.9% Total teaching hours Private 3.8% 3.5% (horas catedras) Public 15.6% 7.5% 25. To estimate the potential savings from better management of substitute positions, 1994 is taken as a 'normal' year and the substitute rate within the private sector as a reasonable efficiency target. Using these parameters, if the public sector had performed at private sector levels in 1994, a maximum potential savings would have been about 44 million pesos, based on the calculations presented in Annex 4. Since not all substitute positions represent payment of double salaries for the same task, the actual savings would have been less. For instance, in reviewing a sample of almost three thousand positions which would have generated substitutes, including 'inactive duty', sick leave, maternity leave, promotions, relocations, provisional retirement, temporary reassignments, and the like, 45 percent would have generated two salaries, 10 percent would not have, and the remaining 45 percent is unclear. Therefore, a more accurate estimate of potential savings is in the 25 - 40 million pesos range, or about 4 - 7 percent of the total MEC 1994 budget. 26. Regarding contracted staff, as of the end of 1994, there were approximately 120 such positions within the MEC, which represents a relatively small share of total contracted staff as well as total personnel of the MEC. The overall government policy of not renewing contracts would result in about 850,000 pesos in savings for the MEC. However, it is worth noting that many of the contracted staff fill important functions, such as computer operators, the elimination of which would have an adverse effect on MEC functions. Consolidation of Ministry Structures and Functions - 25 - ANNEX 2 27. At the beginning of 1995, the Ministry of Education was comprised of six secretariats and subsecretariats and about fifteen separate departments. The new administration has moved to consolidate the MEC structure, reducing the number of subsecretaries and departments. While this move has provided greater focus and control over MEC activities, without a corresponding elimination of redundant positions arising out of consolidation, the financial savings appear to have been minimal. 28. Is the Ministry of Education overstaffed? This question can be broken down into two: Are there too many people for the functions proscribed? And, are there too many low-priority activities that have generated additional personnel? Regarding the first question, there are clear indications of overstaffing at a number of levels. In terms of teaching staff, the low student/teacher ratios point to a more structural issue of average class size, staffing patterns and practices within schools, and the physical configuration of schools, particularly in low-density rural areas. To give a comparison of the overall size of the teaching force, about 4.4 percent of the labor force in Cordoba are teachers, excluding the university level, according to the 1991 National Census of Teachers. The OECD average for teaching staff as a percentage of the labor force is 3.1 percent including higher education and 2.6 percent counting only primary and secondary levels. 29. Because personnel structures differ significantly between countries, it is not possible to characterize the relative distribution of teaching to non-teaching staff. In Cordoba, 82 percent of the MEC staff are in 'teaching' positions (including school directors and other technical school level staff), 11 percent are in general services, and the remaining 7 percent fill the technical, administrative and managerial functions of the MEC. While general services appear high, in fact looking at the primary level alone, the ratio of general service staff (janitors, guardians, etc.) per public school is about 1.4 and at the secondary level 1.7 per school. There may be some overstaffing in the various school-level non-classroom "teaching" personnel (directors, vice- directors, section chiefs, etc.) which net of general services averages about 2.2 staff per primary school and 5 staff per secondary school. At the central MEC level, there has been an increase in technical level staff, typical of such ministries where the career path is out of the classroom into school management positions and then into MEC technical functions. It is not possible to say With any accuracy how many MEC staff are either redundant, underemployed or engaged in low priority tasks. However, for the sake of argument, assuming just one in ten of the non-school level positions could be eliminated without significantly jeopardizing the M1EC's ability to function (a fairly safe assumption), this would be the equivalent of 230 positions, or an annual budget savings to the MEC of 4.4 million pesos. 30. As of 1995, there were over fifty program areas being carried out under the Ministry of Education. These programs range from the pre-primary, primary, secondary, and higher educational services, to myriad smaller-scale endeavors such as support to scientific-technological development, special education services, activities around the arts.and culture, library development, pilot computer education programs, in-service teacher training, in-school health promotion, non-formal education, labor market training and so forth. Of the total MEC budget of 715 million pesos for 1995, over ninety percent, or 649 million pesos, was allocated to direct educational services and supporting programs at the pre-school, primary, secondary and higher levels including transfers to private schools, adult and physical education. Of the remaining 66 million pesos, 31 million pesos was earmarked for activities directly under the Minister's Office - 26 - ANNEX 2 including the financial and administrative operations of the Ministry (of which 10 million pesos is for capital investments and 12 million pesos for non-personnel services), about 17 million pesos was allocated to cultural and artistic activities, 11 million pesos to activities related to promoting science and technology, and about 7 million pesos to planning, curricular and educational administration functions. 31. There has been little evaluation of the impact and effectiveness of many of the ancillary programs carried out by the MEC. Annual budgets and work programs are developed primarily based on historical activities. In addition, since 1993, the MEC has inherited a number of on- going programs from the Federal level, including a doubling of the expenditures on adult education programs. While not possible within the time constraints of this review, an assessment of these programs will be necessary within the fiscal constraints facing the Government in the upcoming year. Some of these programs are not the highest priority and/or impact and could be scaled-back or eliminated (permanently or temporarily) in the face of budget constraints. 32. Possible candidates include parts of the 11 million pesos for scientific-technological programs, some of which finances subsidies to promote innovative projects carried out by the private sector, the operation of an Advanced Technology Center and several non-formal training courses, seminars, scholarships and various events. The 16.3 million pesos in the 1995 budget for adult education also warrants review. About 31,000 adults participate in formal and non-formal courses in primary and secondary education as well as labor market training. Unit costs per student rose by over 30 percent between 1994 and 1995. Student teacher ratios are generally low, for instance on average about 14 students per teacher for adult primary education, particularly in the programs transferred from the Federal level. And the impact on labor market outcomes of the recipients of the non-formal labor training programs is not clear. In addition, while there is no clear methodology for assessing the merits of public investments in the cultural area (maintenance of historical patrimony, support to symphonies, ballet, drama and other events, promotion of Cordoba's culture), the amounts are not insignificant at 17 million pesos for 1995. Diversification of funding sources for cultural activities, including greater municipal support, is worth exploring. Overall, the potential savings depends on the will of the MEC to cut programs. If programs were reduced by 20 percent (not including capital investments), the overall savings would be about 10 million pesos or about two percent of the MEC budget. Subsidies to Private Schools 33. In the 1995 budget, subsidies to private schools totaled about 150 million pesos. Exploring potential budget savings from a reduction in subsidies to the private sector is tricky. At first glance, it would appear attractive to scale back these subsidies since there are immediate savings which could be realized, to be compensated by a greater share of contribution from the private sector. For instance, if the province selected positions which were no longer eligible for financing or reworked the sliding scale to elicit greater private contributions, it is assumed that school fees would have to be raised or certain types of services now financed by fees reduced (i.e., language, religious or computer courses). The danger lies in the potential response to increased school fees, particularly given the current economic crisis. Since the elasticity of demand for private schooling is not known, a rise in school fees may cause parents to switch their children to public schools, where the unit costs to the public sector are even higher, thereby exacerbating the budget situation (or reducing public school quality through overcrowding). - 27 - ANNEX 2 34. Is there a way to rework the subsidy to make it more efficient and better targeted? The present sliding scale in which almost all schools receive 100 percent subsidy serves no targeting purpose other than to suppress the incentive for raising school fees in the private sector (at least the official fees). In addition, the subsidy level is tied to the number of personnel of the school and not directly to the number of students. For instance, a private school with average class size of 15 gets the same absolute level of subsidy as one with class size of 25. There is no incentive to raise student/teacher ratio, and private schools can exclude students to maintain smaller class size. 35. One option to adjust the incentives is for the subsidy to be conceptually attached to the student and not the teacher. A minimum class size would be established where the per student subsidy would be sufficient to cover the teachers' salary (plus a coefficient for other personnel). If the subsidy were attached to the student, a smaller class would require a greater level of private subsidy (i.e., parents that wanted smaller class size would have to pay for it). To trace the possible effects of such a reworking of the subsidy, the MEC would have to determine a target student/teacher ratio. The current weighted average of pre-school and primary level student teacher ratios in the private sector is 19 (see Annex 1). The public sector is slightly less at 18, while the municipal and Federal student/teacher ratios are significantly higher. To illustrate potential savings, we will assume a target student/teacher ratio of 23 for the pre-school and primary levels together, a reasonable level given its almost exclusively urban presence. 36. Annex 5 includes the calculations of impacts depending on three different scenarios, under each of which the primary level public subsidy per student would fall from 463 pesos to 382 pesos. Under the first scenario, the private sector would consolidate the same number of total students into fewer classes, resulting in a net of 7.6 million pesos in MEC transfers. Under the second scenario, the private schools choose to retain the previous student teacher ratios, and raise fees to cover the 7.6 million pesos shortfall, equivalent to an increase of about 20 percent over current fee levels. Under the third scenario, the private schools keep the same number of classes and teachers but attract more students to come up with the target student/teacher ratio. Enrollment in private primary schools would increase by 21 percent given the same budget transfer. Since there is full enrollment in the primary sector at present, students would shift from public to private. The theoretical savings to the public sector is equivalent to 12.3 million pesos, assuming that there would be an equivalent reduction in the public sector teaching force.' 37. What could be expected in practice is a differentiation in the private sector market, with some schools opting to raise fees and others increasing class size. Moreover, there are many private schools that would feel no effects, particularly those private schools which tend to be quite crowded already. Anecdotal evidence would suggest these tend to serve more populous low- income neighborhoods. Therefore the effects of such a policy would likely be progressive, with a greater contribution extracted from the private sector willing to pay for the premium of lower class size. In addition, since the subsidy would be made in a lump-sum per enrollment levels and not via teachers' salaries, private schools would be free to use the resources as they prefer, while the MEC would cease to incur the administrative costs of running the personnel system of the private schools. Such a system would require three regulatory aspects: (i) accurate monitoring of student enrollments to avoid exaggeration, (ii) deregulation of the amounts private schools are It should be ntoed that these calculations apply only to the pre-school and primary levels. Potential savings arc much greater at the secondary level due the higher unit costs and absolute levels of support to the private sector. However, the calculation of per student subsidies would require a cleaning of the data resulting from the Federal transfers and a more detailed treatment of horas catedras which is beyond the scope of this report. - 28 - ANNEX 2 allowed to charge (delinking or rescaling of subsidy with fee levels), (iii) definition of the 'free- standing' private sector to preclude its support; and (iv) regulations to avoid poorer students being pushed out the private system due to escalating school fees; for instance a minimum percentage of 'scholarship' students in each school, to be financed with internal cross-subsidies. Diversify Sources of Sector Financing 38. A further option would be to seek out and optimize other sources of sector financing. Three are worth exploring: (i) raise school fees, (ii) decentralize schools to the municipalities, and (iii) optimize resources coming from the Federal level. Regarding school fees, at present education is free at all levels in Cordoba. This is not to say that there is not significant private spending even within the public system. As the state has retreated from financing anything but the salaries of personnel within schools, purchases of educational materials, school supplies and the like must be generated by the families of students, as well as the individual expenses related to purchase of books, transport to school, uniforms etc. Nonetheless, it is difficult to justify no school fees, particularly at the upper levels of education, in a province with the per capita income levels of Cordoba. Any potential revenue generated from school fees should remain as part of the school budget to address critical needs defined by the schools themselves. Since the MEC currently spends virtually nothing on school-level materials, there would be no direct budget savings from these measures. However, applied as such, minimum school fees may be the only way in the short run to attempt to reverse the decline in educational quality. How much could be raised? If school fees equivalent to 15 percent of those paid within the private sector were applied to secondary and higher education (48 and 73 per student), the amount collected would be approximately 4.5 million pesos and 0.5 million pesos respectively, or roughly 16,000 pesos per secondary school and 10,000 pesos per higher education institute, which could be applied to supplementing school libraries, computer programs, lab equipment, etc. 39. Decentralization of education services offers the immediate attraction of passing expenditures along to municipal governments. Much in the way the Federal government transferred secondary education to the provinces, the current discussion centers on the feasibility of transferring pre-school and, eventually, primary education to the municipal level. The provincial government is exploring a pilot for 1996 of transferring 19 stand-alone pre-schools. Without the actual enrollment and staffing figures, an accurate estimate of budget savings is not possible. Using global figures for cost per student and average school size (645 x 70 x 19), savings would be under I million pesos'. An eventual transfer of all pre-schools would save, using the same methodology, about 34 million pesos. However, there are a number of issues involved in such a transfer, the two most important of which are the equity implications of variations in absorptive capacity of municipalities and the administrative difficulties inherent in pre-schools that are physically integrated with primary schools (the majority). 40. A brief comment on optimization of Federal financing available to the province. The Plan Social Educativo, a national compensatory program to provide books, educational materials and teacher training to primary schools in poor regions, allocated 126 million pesos in 1995 and 97 million pesos in 1995. The Plan's budget for 1996 is anticipated at around 122.7 million pesos. If the primary motivation for this transfer is budget savings in 1996, it is worth comapring the effects of transfer of some of the cultural programs to the municipal level: program 350 - support to regional orchestras, choirs, thcater groups and museums (3 million pesos); program 354 - cultural and artistic promotion ( 11.9 million pesos), prooram 355 - preservation of cultural patrimony (0.3 million pesos). - 29 - ANNEX 2 This review was not able to locate data on how much of the overall program was being spent in Cordoba. Using just a per capita measure, the Plan would allocate 8.7 percent of its resources to Cordoba, or 10.6 million pesos in 1996, equivalent to about S5 percent of the investment budget of the MiEC in 1995. Given the significance of the amounts, Cordoba should optimize (as well as maximize) to the extent possible the resources from this program. About 167 primary schools have received Plan Social support in Cordoba, representing approximately 12 percent of all public primary schools. Forty percent of these have been in the capital area, where 10 percent of the public primary schools and 34 percent of the public primary students reside. Targeting could be improved to ensure that the poorest students and regions benefit from this support Summary of Short-Term Options 41. Barring the discovery a significant number of double salaries, ghost teachers and other anomalies, the range of savings available to the MEC in the short-term are relatively limited. In terms of "quick fixes" which would have no significant impact on sector objectives and would not require personnel retrenchments of permanent positions (A, B, C and G in the table below), potential savings represent between 26.7 and 41.7 million pesos, or from 4 - 7 percent of the MEC's 1995 budget. Adding measures which imply a reduction in permanent positions and the scaling back of non-priority programs would probably result in about 14 million pesos in additional savings (D and E below) or about 2 percent of the 1995 MEC budget ' To summarize, applying all measures including quick fixes, better personnel management, retrenchment of redundant staff and non-priority programs, and pilot decentralization, as difficult as these measures would be, would only reduce the MEC's budget by 10 percent at most, and not all of this would represent net savings to the provincial government due to severance and retirement payments. If further cuts are necessary, reductions in wages, decreasing the number of school- level personnel, or deeper cuts in lower-priority programs, and eventually investments, would be the only remaining options. 7 If all infrastructure investments were curtailed for 1996, an additional 10 mullion pesos or 1.4 perccnt of thc 1995 budget could be saved, although such a move risks quality and, to a lesser degree, access to educational services -30- ANNEX 2 Summary of Strategies in the Short-Term Range of 1996 Savings Savings? Observations A. Clean-up payroll - eliminate double salaries, ????? Yes ghosts B. Better control over Yes use of substitute teachers 25 - 40 million C. Eliminate contracted Yes Need to preserve certain key personnel 0.8 million functions D. Eliminate low priority Possible Little net savings to government, need programs (cut by 20%) 10 million change in employment policy E. Reduce overhead Possible No net savings to government, need personnel by 10% 4.4 million change in employment policy F. Revise basis for ???? Possible Need change in legal framework private school subsidies G. Municipalize pre- Yes Equity/ absorptive capacity schools (19) 0.9 million considerations D. Medium-Term Strategies for the Education Sector 42. The short-term measures will help to increase the efficiency of the education system. However, certain trade-offs in terms of a medium-term strategy to increase quality are inherent in some of the options. For instance, an eventual reduction in teachers wages may, over the medium-term, create a disincentive to attracting qualified candidates and exacerbate the tendency of teachers to maximize teaching hours over schools (the so-called 'taxi teachers'). Moreover, in atight budget situation, it will be extremely difficult to undertake expenditure switching towards non-personnel operating expenditures or the financing of key investments which will improve quality over the longer-term. Therefore, the short-term options available to the government of Cordoba should be compatible with the medium-term strategies necessary to meet sector objectives. Over the medium-term, strategies to increase the efficiency and quality of educational services include: 43. Increase student/teacher ratios to a minimum wvhich still guarantees relative quality. The structure of the educational system in Cordoba, and indeed in Argentina as a whole, is very high cost in terms of the relation between service providers (i.e., teachers and other sector personnel) and the number of people they serve. The most important element of a strategy to make Cordoba's education system more efficient over the medium-term will be to increase the overall student-teacher ratios. This will require school consolidation and provision for student transportation in certain areas, as well as rethinking the personnel structure at the school level to favor teaching positions in the classroom over non-classroom positions. A necessary first step will be to analyze on a school-by-school basis the unit costs associated with the provision of services. A simple cross-reference of enrollment per school with the monthly wage bill associated with that school would permit the MEC to detect which schools are the most expensive on a per student basis. Local solutions can be taken to bring these schools in line with sector targets. In some cases, the cause may be too few students, such as in isolated rural schools, in others it may be too many teachers due to a lack of effective personnel control. Potential solutions will differ - @'1 - ANNEX 2 from each school. Annex 6 presents some initial estimates of the economic impacts of raising student teacher/ratios looking only at the primary education system. In the base case scenario, if Cordoba achieved student/teacher ratios equivalent to those of Chile (25), slightly below the LAC average of 26, the net savings to the system would be about 70 million pesos in the public sector alone, with an additional 10.5 million pesos in savings if this rate were achieved in the private sector as well. The strategies to achieve these savings will require micro-level planning and a reconsideration of the current model of school staffing.' 44. Effective control over wvage bill and personnel. To achieve this end greater transparency in the personnel structure and wage calculations will be required along with the modernization of personnel administration. Immediate investments in computers and technical assistance to modernize personnel administration should be a high priority for the Ministry in 1996. 45. Reorient sector expenditures tojfavor educational services at the school-level and less to protect the interests of the 'educational establishment'. MEC overhead should be made as efficient as possible, including an orientation to programs which support improved quality of the learning environment. This should translate into greater school-level control over resources and increased attention to the non-personnel inputs to educational quality. This also implies protecting essential investments in physical rehabilitation and upgrading of schools. The MEC should seek a medium-term target of 10 percent for non-personnel operational expenditures. This would allow for the purchase of essential inputs and the equipping of classrooms, especially at the secondary level, with modern technologies and teaching materials. 46. Achievement of greater equity in the system, whereby richer students pay more for educational services than do the poor and greater levels of public subsidies are applied to basic education over the higher levels (including adult labor market training, fine arts schools, etc.). In a context of budget constraints unlike any Cordoba has faced in the past, these cross-subsidies ivill be necessary to ensure that access and quality do not erode. 47. Increasing the quality and relevance of education, especially at the secondary level, including modernizing curriculum content and educational materials in line with a rapidly changing global economy. Implementation of the new structure and curriculum of secondary education will be an important element in increasing the internal efficiency of the system while boosting the quality of Cordoba's labor market in the coming years. To illustrate, if the ratio of teaching to non-teaching staff in schools were raised from the current 4:1 to 6:1, the savings would amount to about 15.6 million pesos, eliminating the position of vice-director alone would save about 10 million pesos. Other options include increasing classroom size. If classrooms were consolidated to achieve a 10 percent increase in average class size, 13 million pesos would be saved in reducing the numbcr of macstros dc grado (not ilcludinig similar reductions in other associated teachers). -32 - ANNEX 2 Pre-school 191 I I - Urban 20A , . i -Rural 18 . Primary 171 181 26! 251 161 221 27 - Urban - Public 18 I - Urban Private 19 Ii - Rural Public 1 3 I I i - Rural Private 14 I i Secondary 12 71 191 18 16 15j 19 -Fed. Trans '94 8 i | I i Higher 91 7 1 I Special Ed (Primary) 3j i _ _ - Public 31 I i_i - Private 41; I II _ _ _ _ _I _ _ _ i I i _ _ _ _ Disaggregated Pre-School and Primary Levels since 1989 1 1 Pre-School 1989: 19901 1991 1992 19931 National 231 211 19 191 231 Municipal _ 291 271 3 331 291 Provincial Public 201 201 21 201 201 Private 21 221 211 201 171 Total | 211 211 211j 201 191 Primary i i i I i National _ 21! 201 171 201 201 Municipal i 27 251 271 27 271 Provincial Public 1s, 181 181 17 i 17 Private 23: 201 201 201 19 Total i 201 191 181 181 171 tMEbt1otitk i>{t.;Z4&Z1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 3,453,616 4,931,223 6,164,190 8,075,774 10,490 996 11,219,921 14,300,435 Priwy:Et$4m. 128,286,934 1 77,286,546 190,785,333 218,961,775 235,352,669 245,332,943 242,586,285 47,398,927 74,378,891 79,274,081 92,219,501 101,585,470 178,362,259 181,619,871 3,887,401 5,429,725 6,264,273 7,689,656 8,446,012 8,637,219 8,805,791 43,253,756 __60,196,096 72,067,586 146,321,054 203,173,981 121,577,623 163,254,427 'g'~"' 2 " ||| 226,280,635 322,222,481 354,555,463 473,267,761 559,049,128 565,129,966 61015665808 Annual 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 ,growth 42.8% 25.0% 31.0% 29.9% 6.9% 27.5% 38.2% 7.6% 14.8% 7.5% 4.2% -1.1% ____________ 56.9% 6.6% 16.3% 10.2% 75.6% 1.8% ____________ 39.7% 15.4% 22.8% 9.8% 2.3% 2.0% 39.2% 19.7% 103.0% 38.9% .40.2% 34.3%- 42.4% 10.0% 33.5% 18.1% 1.1% 8.0%- Average Average ______ Annual 89-95 Annual 90-95_ 27.2% 24.1% _ ____________ 1. % 6.6% _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 27.9% - 22.1% 15.3% 10.4% _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 32.5% 31.1 %__ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 18.9% 14.2% ,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ x C~~u$rdJME~~~~~ ~~ 340 535 5,778,431 10,801 533 7,865,474 177 14,112307 383 22633 211,057,673 9,325 22677 258855,777 14,15 10,916 17.1% iesrg''.th1 __ 387 7510 _ 85,286,163 1 137 _1_35 _ _ 79 _5 0 0 14,049 1 3 3 j5 18.3% 389 7-60 9, _6 8 1,7 86 1i27'~3 9 760~ 1 1 398, 91 1-4999 14,343 _126% 390 282 2,387,012 8,465 282 3;057,948 10,844 10,370 22.5% 359 5 29,922 5,984 5 53,690 10,738 10,269 71.6% . .dii?IhhoiL ? = 376 76 1,125,160 14,805 76 1,161,524 15,283 14,615 -1.31% fr?erdj?~ . -. ..> .......378 199 2,159,293 10,851 199 2,196,552 11,038 10,556 2.7% .:re~MEC =nft~ '~ ____ 1 5_ 41 7,405,481 13,689 _ 539 10,407,324 19,309 18,465 34.9% Su>Cu>'.tzr>t.§ .. ... -?$' '-___2 __ 586 9,791,771 16,710 586 12,943,260 22,087 2`1,122 -26.4% ____, -."4-d.-PÆDW 3 274 4,507,392 16,450 274 3,982,337 14,534 13,899 -15.5% - ZcEtuc.4a. i. - r ; >- 4 - _ ....................33262 382,127,992 1 ,488 33124 458,416,137 13,839 i3,235 15.2% SLi$j- dtiiin-- >;\?' - - - - - - - - -5 43 16,651,483 387,244 42 35,362,541 841,965 805,171 107.9% 6 59- 1,220,625 20,689 58 1,383,413 23,852 22,810 10.3% i~~,~,, ______ __ __ ____ . ____ __ _- _- ____ _ ___ _4-_ __ s totaIM.- "' EG-i.i<: 34765 421,704,744 12,130 34623 522 495 ,012 15 091 14,431 ____ i9,D% 'includes horas catedras translated into cargos at 30= 1. to__ ___ _ _- - ___ total wage bill 18.5% Not including horas catedras _ _ Year 1 5 6 9 13 15 24 36 37 3B _39 40 41 Total _ > 1993 __ ....17 15 136 137 26126 58 32 150 161 1 8 j__ _ 8278 3729 31863 _ 1994 __ 18 - _ 1 137 137_ 28556 ___ 54 32__ 150 __149 _ 215 969 - 3B8 _ 3941 34765 ___ 1995 17 16 137 137_ 28405 54 3 32 _ 153 49 -' 216 967 386 3954 34623 m Av Yrly Grwt 0.0%/e _ _.3% _ 0.4% 0.0% 4 4% -3.4% 00% 1.0% _.37% 10.0% 7.3% 19.4% _ 3.0% _ 4.3% Q 1 = Top managemesnt; 5 = Directors; 6 = Higher level staff, 9 = music staff, 13 = teachers 15 computer operators ___________ 4=gnasrc 24 = cabinet personnel;- 36 = arts personnel: 37 = other professional; 38 = technical staff; 39 =other administrative; 40 = school assistants; 41 = general services ____ -35 - ANNEX 2 Scenario= If public sector 1994 had private rates 1994 With MEC Total wage Wage bill Savings Savings 'Aportes' Teachers Subst./mo. at private rate / mo. / year (+26.5%) Total Primary $1,347,356 $270,112 $1,077,244 $14,004,170 $17,715,275 Secondary $573,643 $130,054 $443,589 $5,766,652 $7,294,815 Pre-Primary $243,389 $64,722 $178,667 $2,322,668 $2,938,175 Directors, $607,355 $163,241 $444,114 $5,773,478 $7,303,449 primary Special Ed. $256,822 $136,588 $120,234 $1,563,039 $1,977,244 $37,228,959 Total $3,253,465 $1,031,847 $2,221,618 $28,881,033 $36,534,506 Positions Total $635,834 $153,495 $482,339 $6,270,409 $7,932,067 $44,466,574 Teaching ,Hours Calculation for Rew rking of Private Subsidy .Annex 6 tot student tot sub S s/t current sub per stu. # teach cost per cl ss ._, scenario l prim/pro_ 94839 43917950 19 463.078335 4991.533564 8798.488 adjust class s ,z 94839 36279993 23 382.542973 4123.434783 8798.488 equalize cost per class at high class size _ lbudget savings 7637957 - # classes 868.0987813 _ consolidates same number of students into fewer classes, savings on teachers salaries scenario2 [;pre - __I_ _ I 9I I private keeps size, raises fees total 7637957 per student 80.5353626 p___ _ parents would have o pay 7.6 million to return class size to previous level same bdtsvin s % increase 0.21052632 P P Y - P __ scenario 3 1prim/pre private attracts more students 114805 3 43917950 2_ 382.542973 8798.488 _ _ _. _ __- _ _ (holds absi. subsidy same) I flilled existing class private enroll would increase by 0.21052807 theoretical savings to public sector 12339156.1 . _ . . . .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I. ,,i t#b ,,*Ed - ImoL;-- Ra* --J gdn~ J ;F RaU; ;- Rub _ ; ftgoc _____________ _______ __________ _ ___ _ ____ _ ____ ____________________ personnel 1994 public p cost per student docente pers cost stud/teach student pre+primary 342890 19944 211,057,673 17 615.5258917 base scenario 342890 13715.6 145.145,538 25 423.3005876 snt = 25 -31.2% -31.2% savings = 65,912,135 _ _ _ scenario 1 = compress ____________ _______ non-teaching staff (e.g. eliminate vice-director) 342890 18981 200,866.711 18 would be higher since v-dir. wage is higher than av. wge (-963) 4.8% -4.8% savings = 10,190,962 maestro de grado _ scenario 2 = 53604 18381 29 _ consolidate 289286 11785 25 _ classrooms if 10 percent increase in class size = 53604 1671 32 289286 10714 27 ____________12385 _ _ _ _ _ net reduction savings savings 1238 6% 13,105,963 would be slightly less due to less than av. wage scenario 3 342890 16328 172.792,308 21 reach half of -18.1% - 18.1% ___ = base case .__ savings = 38,265,365 scenario 4 = 342890 18473 195,490,794 19 would be higher since v-dir. wage is higher than av. wge increase ratio of -7.4% -7.4% 7 teaching to i non-teaching savings = 15.566,879 inschool staff from 4:1 to 6:1 -38 - ANNEX 3 SOCIAL WELFARE PROGRAMS A. Background on Social Programs Leading Up to the 1995 Fiscal Crisis 1. This section reviews programs oriented to social assistance to vulnerable groups -- the elderly, handicapped, children, and the poor in general. As such, the section will focus on two main areas; the programs under the ex-Ministry of Social Development (now the Secretariat of Social Development under the newly-created Ministry of Institutional Affairs); and the school lunch program (PAICOR) currently under the Ministry of Coordination. After reviewing program goals, spending patterns and efficiency, and targeting, the chapter provides recommendations on short- term strategies for addressing the fiscal crisis as well as suggested elements of a medium-term strategy for the government of Cordoba in constructing a social safety net. 2. Evolution of Spending on Social Programs. Spending on social programs has risen dramatically in the 1990s. Budget allocations for all social welfare (bienestar social)programs, including social security', housing and urban development, social assistance, sports and recreation and unspecified social programs, virtually doubled in real terms on ani annual basis between 1989 and 1995, as shown in Annex 1. While in 1989, these programs accounted for about 7 percent of all social sector spending (social welfare, education, health) and 3 percent of the provincial budget, by 1995 this had grown to 15 percent of social sector allocations and 8 percent ofthe total budget.2 Much of this increase is due to large increases in financing available for housing, mostly coming through the decentralization of FONAVI3. Even net of housing expenditures, the average annual real increase in expenditures on social welfare was about 50 percent, the fastest growing area of social sector spending over the last six years. This rapid expansion appears to have been largely supply-driven. As increased co-participation and other transferred resources became available to the province, spending ballooned. New social programs were designed and others expanded, with weak criteria for the selection of beneficiaries and little monitoring of impacts. 3. Social Development. The ex-Ministry of Social Development (MSD) accounts for the lion's share (96 percent) of the government spending in social welfare programs. Under the consolidation of the government structure carried out by the new administration, the Ministry was transformed into a Secretariat of Social Development (SDS) of the Ministry of Institutional Affairs and the housing programs were transferred to the Ministry of Economy. Annex 2 presents a breakdown of the Ministry's budgets for 1994 and 1995, which grew from 165 million pesos inl994 to 203 million in 1995. A significant portion of the Ministry budget does not come from the general provincial budget. Almost half of the 1995 budget was to be financed from transfers from Federal programs such as FONAVI (housing - 67 million pesos), PROSONU (child nutrition - 8 million pesos), PROSOCO (social welfare - 14 million pesos), the now-defunct PROSOL (social welfare - 8 million pesos), and ASOMA (food aid). In addition, the Banco Social is required by These include relatively small expenditures related to education/outreach activities of the social security system, not direct system payments. As a functional budget category, PAICOR is classified as an educational expenditure and hence not included in these figures. Since housing is being reviewed under the infrastructure chapter, this chapter xvill make only passing reference to these expenditures in the context of the overall social development budget. - 39 - ANNEX 3 law to transfer half of its net profits. Although 26 milllion pesos was anticipated for 1995, to date none has been received due to the financial crisis facing the bank.4 4. Besides housing, the principal programs of the Ministry include5: * General social assistance, accounting for about one-third of the budget (69.3 million pesos). This area is comprised largely of transfers (or direct subsidies) to individuals and institutions (NGOs, municipalities) for a broad range of purposes, including support for food aid and community feeding programs, purchase of medicines and other health needs, rental assistance, family emergencies and other genera] welfare activities. * Community and Family Promotion, accounting for 20 percent of the budget (3 8.5 million pesos). The largest subprogram supports the operations of the Provincial Council for the Protection of Minors (CPPM), which together with the Justice system identifies and cares for orphans, juvenile delinquents, street children, adoptions, foster care and the like. At present there are about 3,000 wards of the state. This area also includes assistance programs for the elderly, handicapped, youth, and day care recipients as well as community development-type activities oriented to squatter neighborhoods. * Support to Cooperatives, accounting for 2 percent of the budget (3.4 million pesos) provides education and training as well as direct support and loans to cooperatives (multuales). - Sport and Recreation, accounting for I percent of the budget (1.9 million pesos), includes a wide variety of activities to promote sports and recreation, such as sponsorship of sports schools, training programs, competitions and sports leagues. 5. Reviewing the budget by expenditure category, the 1995 breakdown was as follows: 44 percent investment, 30 percent transfers, 18 percent personnel, 6 percent non-personnel services and 2 percent materials (see Annex 2). However, these figures are influenced significantly by the large-scale investments in the housing area. If housing is netted out, the distribution of expenditures is as follows: 53 percent transfers, 28 percent personnel, 9 percent non-personnel services, 6 percent investment and 3 percent materials. Within personnel, at the end of 1994 there were 2,414 staff of MSD, of which 1,341 were permanent positions, 211 were contsratados, 708 were teachers working in the juvenile and youth protection system, 106 day workers and 48 substitutes (suplentes). In general, the amount dedicated to personnel absords an inordinate amount of the budget. 6. As of the end of 1994, the Ministry of Social Development had over 100 programs being carried out under the broad program categories above. This dispersion of program effort makes effective monitoring of program impacts even more difficult. Annex 3 presents information on the transfers made by the MSD, both individual and institutional over 1993-94. Slightly over half of the funds went to institutions, with about 44 percent to individuals. The average subsidy amount in 1994 was 1,414 pesos for individuals and 8,868 for institutions6. Over the two years reviewed, the allocation among purposes of these transfers varied slightly. In 1994, one-quarter of all transfers 4 The MSD also acts as an administrator of thirty percent of the profits of the Provincial Lottery. While the Banco Social receives this money, the bank has contracted the MSD to identify and channel stipends to beneficiaries (15% for elderly and handicapped and 15% for children). These are off-budget expenditures made on behalf of the Banco Social and currently average about 1.5 million pesos per month.. 5 The housing programs accounted for almost half of the MSD's budget of 168 million pesos in 1994 and 203 million pesos in 1995 and will not be treated here. 6 The level of average individual transfer is approximately 18 percent of per capita GPP. - 40 - ANNEX 3 went to family and youth programs, followed by social emergencies, housing and the elderly as the major focus areas. The large program of individual subsidies was, in effect, an unmonitored slush fund in terms of the range of discretion it had in choosing recipients and benefit levels. Subsidies to institutions, such as NGOs and municipalities supported feeding and social welfare programs they executed. While probably having a more reasonable impact, little monitoring and supervision of these grants was carried out. 7. While many of the MSD programs appear to address legitimate social needs, criteria for beneficiary selection are not clear. In addition, there is no consolidated and reliable information on the number, type and location of beneficiaries nor the level and impact of actual benefits delivered. Therefore, it is impossible to trace out the effectiveness and targeting incidence of the expenditures carried out through the MSD. 8. PAICOR. PAICOR (Programa de Asistencia bItegral de Cordoba) was created in 1984 under the Ministry of Coordination to provide nutritional support to at-risk populations, initially targeted to school children and in 1988 expanded to include the elderly. The program serves to attract and keep children in school and improves their ability to function effectively in the classroom. PAICOR finances two types of school feeding activities: a cooked meal program and rations of milk and biscuits. Beneficiaries are selected at the school level. Parents decide whether they wish to register their children in the program7. The teachers determine, with the help of a social worker if necessary, which children are enrolled. In most cases the hot lunch is prepared in the school by personnel paid by PAICOR (cook and server) as well as a PAICOR agent to promote and supervise the program. 9. The total PAICOR budget for 1995 was originally approved at 75 million pesos, up from 55 million in 1994. Typically, 48 percent was allocated to the cost of food rations, 46 percent to personnel and the remaining six percent to other operating expenses. Almost 90 percent of the wage bill was spent on non-permanent personnel, primarily the school level staff and PAICOR agents involved in the purchase, preparation and delivery of the rations. Out of approximately 5,000 employees at the end of 1994, about 200 were permanent staff carrying out functions at the central level. 10. Under its school feeding program, PAICOR currently reaches 130,000 children, or about one-third of the primary school population of Cordoba. This translates into about 3.5 million cooked lunches and 4.2 million rations of milk per month, with unit costs of 0.78 pesos and 0.20 pesos per ration, respectively. Annex 4 shows the evolution of monthly rations over the last ten years, revealing a fairly constant level of clientele since 1989, with a peak in service delivery occurring in 1993. To determine the accurary of PAICOR in targeting needy children, in the absence of information on individual beneficiaries (or household survey data on social service recipients), geographical targeting can be assessed. The table below uses the Unmet Basic Needs Index by the departmental level in Corodoba and compares this proxy poverty indicator with the percentage of total departmental primary and pre-school school students who receive PAICOR. Based on this indicator, the targeting at the departmental level looks quite good, with a consistent picture of greater relative coverage in the poorer departments. However, since a few departments It is worth pointing out that there is a public information campaign alerting parents to the program and that only those that really need it should apply. -41 - ANNEX 3 show over 100 percent of the students receiving PAICOR, monitoring of where the rations are going bears review. Targeting Performance of PAICOR Among Departments in Cordoba 140% _ _ 120% - -... i 0 40% - - - - U)20% , 0% __ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ __ __ I _________. ..... _____-_____ --:: 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 Share of Households With Unmet Basic Needs B. Short-Term Options in Response to the 1995 Fiscal Crisis 11. Social Development. The Government has already made significant advances in recent months to rationalize and reduce waste in its expenditures on social programs. As mentioned, the Ministry of Social Development was subsumed within the Ministry of Institutional Affiars. The structure was consolidated and staff was cut from 2,414 to 1,932 through elimination of day workers, and reduction in the number of suplentes and contratados. More importantly, the newly- created SDS has moved to eliminate the indiivdual subsidy program, cutting 11 million pesos in the second semester of 1995.8 Institutional subsidies are to be reviewed on a case-by -case basis. In total, these revisions have decreased the 1995 budget expected to be executed by 56 percent, from 113 million pesos (net of housing) to 64 million pesos. According to SDS managers, they have managed to maintain service delivery levels in its feeding programs for day care and community centers, largely due to the use of the Federal funds transferred for these purposes. 12. Is there scope for greater efficiency? Several strategies are availabale in the short-term. First, personnel remains excessive. Of the 1,932 staff, 233 are substitutes, most of whom are temporarily replacing teachers within the CPPM (the substitute rate alone for CPPM teachers is about 24 percent). If substitute rates were reduced to a reasonable level, say 5 percent (see education chapter), the number of suplentes would fall from 233 to 100. Contratados could be further reduced, if not eliminated completely (say, leaving 15 essential contracted positions, down from 165). In addition, with the reduction in the subsidy program and the merging of the Interestingly enough there was virtually no public outcry from the elimination of these subsidies, although some institutions, especially NGOs, have voiced their concern abouL sustaining programs. - 42 - ANNEX 3 institutional structure there is an excess of administrative personnel on the order of 50 percent. Adding up these potential efficiency gains, the personnel budget for the SDS would come to about 14 million pesos (or roughly 60 percent of 1994 personnel expenditures net of housing). 13. In terms of the transfers the SDS carries out, the individual subsidy program should be eliminated. The dangers of misuse, the creation of entitlements which tend to continue over the years, as well the difficulty in efficiently screening and monitoring this type of social program call for its termination. Individuals with urgent social needs should be directed to on-going programs and institutions better able to identify vulnerable beneficiaries and structure serious programs around those needs. Eliminating these transfers would reduce the budget of SDS by about 21 million pesos from the 1994 budget levels. With the savings in personnel and individual transfers as well as a moratorium on loans to cooperatives (1.5 million pesos), the resulting budget of the SDS would be about 58 million pesos, down from the 1994 level of 90 million pesos (net of housing). 14. PAICOR. PAICOR has made similar moves to reduce the share of its overhead costs. PAICOR has reduced staff from about 5,000 to 3,600 primarily through the elimination of the contracted PAICOR agent positions, as well as cancellation of other contracted employees, retirements (over 100) and transfers. Without the PAICOR agents at the local level, more responsibilities have been turned over to the school directors, with a greater participation of volunteer mothers as assistants in the operations of the program within the school. 15. As with the SDS, there is still evidence of overstaffing at these levels. Considering that the number of schools with comedores is 1,394 according to PAICOR data, if they retain the current in-school personnel structure of one cook and one server/helper, the total number of school-level contracted personnel necessary would be 2,788, or about 9.6 million pesos (see Annex 5 for detailed calculations). To determine a reasonable level of overhead above the service delivery level, it is useful to look at other school feeding programs. While international comparators are not available, experience of the World Food Program in other Latin American countries has shown administrative overhead of about five percent on larger-scale school feeding programs (delivery of pre-packaged rations). If one assumes such a ratio for the central level expenditures (just counting non-school level personnel of PAICOR), the budget structure of the agency would look like the following, without altering the number of children served or the basic service delivery model: in the base scenario (which assumes reported levels of schools attended and weighted salary levels for in- school personnel), the total budget of PAICOR would 47 million pesos. At this level 30 million pesos would go for purchase of food rations9, about 12 million for total personnel, and 5 million for non-personnel services. This would bring down the share of personnel costs from the past levels of almost one-half to about one-quarter. Even relaxing assumptions about wage levels and number of schools reached, personnel costs would remain within about one-third of program costs. C. Medium-Term Strategies for Social Programs 16. In the short-term, the first actions to take in the face of the fiscal crisis are to reduce share of overhead costs of social programs so they can either reach the same number with less money or In this simulation, the cost of the food part of the budget was estimated at 25 million pesos, compared with 23.4 million in the 1994 budget and 35.9 million in 1995. Since the difference in number of rations served in 1994 and projected for 1995 is less than 2 percent, it is not clear wvhy the budget in 1995 for rations was increased by over 50 percent. Therefore, the 25 million peso figure was selected in lieu of better information. - 43 - ANNEX 3 increase coverage within a given budget constraint, while at the same time eliminate activities which are deemed to be low priority or minimal impact. Over the medium-term, Cordoba needs to prioritize social programs in the face of the changing social situation in the province. Elements of this medium-term strategy include: * Anticipate increased needs for social assistance due to the crisis. Select key programs to protect, such as PAICOR, which has the advantage of providing both basic nutrition (and indirectly family income support) while creating incentives for children to stay in school. Types of at-risk populations may change due to crisis, and may increasingly include the "new poor" in addition to the structural poor, with a different set of critical social problems; * Optimize the resources coming from Federal-level social programs (e.g. nutrition and community support through PROSONU and PROSOCO), which have averaged about 25 million pesos in the past (net of housing) and will continue to be an important source of additional financing of core social programs, * Establish targeting, screening and evaluation mechanisms for all social programs. Better and more systematic information on participants and benefits of social programs is essential to being able to carry out evaluations of program effectiveness. In the immediate future, an initial ranking of cost per beneficiary of the various social programs of the SDS is a necessary first step to begin to build some sort of priority setting system which allows transparent choices to be made.'° This should be complemented with establishment of selection criteria for screeening potential beneficiaries, including the geographical location of community programs to ensure that the most vulnerable groups are reached. A further element in ensuring effectiveness is to highlight 'social auditing' of program impacts. Focus interviews of beneficiaries and external evaluations will reveal program strengths and weaknesses at the service level itself. * For PAICOR specifically, review of program methodology and internal costs is warranted in order to ensure maximum impact over the medium-term. The scope of this review did not permit a detailed analysis of cost savings potential inthe cost of rations themselves. Nor was the optimal mix of the higher cost hot-lunch and the lower cost milk and biscuit rations assessed. Since the bulk of the personnel costs (as well as about 80 percent of the food costs) are associated with the hot-lunch program, the model should be evaluated to determine whther there should be greater differentiation among schools which receive either or both types of services (i.e., schools with either minimum poverty level and/or minimum number of studnets would warrant the hot lunch). Differential effects of the two types in terms of attendance, classroom performance and other indicators can help guide these decisions. * For the SDS specifically, consolidate programs to key groups and reduce areas of action in order to heighten impacts. In addition, the SDS should undertake a revision of its contracts wvith municipalities and NGOs in terms of the number of beneficiaries, unit costs, types of services, targeting criteria, all the while preserving the principal that the provincial Government finances, supervised and ensures the quality of these programs executed by others. This will allow for flexibility, reduce bureaucracy and limit the temptation to turn program resources into employment generation for provincial employees. '° For instance, with so much money, the SDS could finance one house construction, day carc for 40 childrcn, 100 food rations to the elderly, etc. - 44 - ANNEX 3 * Evaluate elements of a social safety net, including the coordination of on-going programs in various sectors, monitoring of poverty situation, identification of key vulnerable groups, and leveraging of resources for basic elements of the safety net. The Government should establish the ability to monitor what is happening to poverty and welfare levels and to what extent its social safety net is effective. 198919.4% 14.9% 492.0 149.7% 94.%-40 l223.098 2 21,398 3392617 382,347 418.949 657,343 387,697 glz 14 ~~~~~~~.74,15 203(7-76 2,372,6797 3, 525,371 5431, 2796,38934 68,091,774 1 299,3 Avea 3 __8__631__ 432962 843_245 _965048 1166764_10 971130 21lT0|ffi|0 l}}0}|t000*,}424,071,862 30,267,338 38,438,942 48,943,383 131,620,401 136,727,365 160,251,926_ AnnuaAnnal 19-9059119 1993____ 1994 1995 "a' b ~~~A- growth -01.3% 53___4__ 12___6__ 9._____ 56.9%-41.0 482.4% 15.% 8.% 44.8 1.2 1.8 4.3943 25.1%_ 41_4 28_6_29_6 48.1 %382608 29 47601 44.4 % 27___9_8_14_ _2_9 __ 6_ _ 0__ 30.742% __149_ _ __7___ __ 42__8_ __ 4_ _ 0__ 2574.3% 168_9_ 3_9__17_2_ Average~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~10 -AJ a ~ ~~~~~~ 26,804,272 3,995,061 5,411,317 16,680,076 717,818 1,175,484 16.2% . ~~~~~~~~~2,992,005 _ 348,334 20,746,87 _ 1,856,674 _221,668 357,667 1 7O/ _igassZ{<|&; <> _ ~3.563,400 47,968,00 0 _ _5,459,500 135,900 422,000 32.4% X0W:ig > >s.S> N.<; .5SM2 ......... cf-s.x 33777 6,520,162 5,977,920 23,282,640 1,019,406 574,649 18.4% fittg ic5&sS;2;faf&cacfsf s9at3 > 3,947,940 l1,310,000 17 --- - _ m ~~~~~~~12,182,700 4,326,300 1,530,000 -7 89,0 0 4525,00 416,500 _9.0% li§eeii59ffffcsf;ffcf sa9i|89,397,850 5,350,000 82,318,400 1,729,450 44.0% |I inclues suppor to the t raining and oprtoso cooperatives (of whic i17 millio pesos In direct loan s in 1996) __ .M.P_ , _ ___ _____ _ _ __ , __.___ __ -Tr~~ ... ... Family and Youth 3,718_ 10,660,373 _ 2,867 _ 24.5% __1 ;483 4,796,864 3,235 111% o/ Elderly ______ 1.324 4,718,654 3,564 10.9%/ 722 3,884,841 5,381 90%oi ____________ 1,374 1,850,575 1,;347 4.3% 999 983,949 985 2 3% Education 333 629,556 1,891 1.4% 800 1,080,615 1,351 2.5% Social Emergency 3,095 7,861,054 2,540 18.1 % 3,493 9,577,094 2,742 22.2% HSandicapped 1,237 1,227,122 992 2.8% 338 426,871 1,263 1.0% Youth_______ 638 654,876 _1,026 1.5% 140 285,209 2,037 0.7% Institutional Support 270 2,126,394 7,876 4.9% 89 396,142 4,451 0.9% Social Policy Coord 500 2,595,490 5,191 6.0% 947 2,187,974 2,310 5.1% Other_______ 138 430,121 3,117 1.0% 30 4,069,154 135,638 9.4% individual 13,372 18,904,932 1,414 43.5%/ 10,020 18.761,456 1,872 ___43.4% Institutional 2,765 24,521,203 8,868 56.5% 3,042 24,419,993 8,028 56.6% IM_________________ 16,137 43,426,135 2,691 100.0% 13,062 43,181,449 3,306 100.0% Number of Rations per Month co . ....... . . . . . . . .. . . . .... . . _ ......... . 30 00:.,-,,l.,~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~.. .a. '...:.,'. ...,, ..t'! .0T-; ..........it0:' 11~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. ..... IZe ..1 . .. .... t 'T '' . .... ..''; '' . '-00i- Xi! ;;' V - H -D 0j . . . . , ....... 7~~~~~ _ £ -0.ff !t f l-00 - -E--00iX0 XiNN -0-g Sf -Z: rs~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~... ... . . . ............ ..... n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.. SS ....... .. . . . . . .. . . . . .. ...... ..; £~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~... .....~8b 1994 share 1995 share personnel 26826791 49% 34427226 46% perm 1877785 3% 2047533 3 .___ nonDerm 22651225 41% 29956161 40% other pers 2297781 4% _ 2423532 3% food 23400500 42% _ _ 35932200 48% services 4952344 9% 4774900 6% 55179635 75134326 100% pre now need. non perm 4800 schools 1394 note 1994 bud et states 1654 if true perrn 200 cook/server 2788 cost 3308 cost 5000 3600 *av wage 3449 9615812 3449 11409292 assume working off 1994: counts 5000-3600 as 18% of wage bill (accord'ng to PAICOR directo r) ._______{ .av wage = 1018'26826791)/(5000-3600) . __ _. _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _I_ _ _ More efficient structure al higher estimate of av wage for non-permanent (5.000 pesos) at 1394 schools at 1654 schools %Scen 1 %Scen 2 Scen 3 Scen 4 % Scen 3 % Scen 4 personnel 26% 28% 32% 36% - perm 2,336,353 2,430,747 2,563,942 2,700,784 7 nonperm 9,615;812 11.409,292 `13,940.000 16,540,000 ood 30,000000 30,000, 000 64% _ 62% 30. 000-000 30 000 000 59%O 56% ________6________ ________6 services 4,774,900 4,774,900 10% 10% 4,774,900 4 774900 9% _ total 46.727,065 48.614,939 100% 100% 51,278,842 54,015,684 100% 100% . I. 1394 sch -1654 sch 44.390,712 46,184,192 95% 95% 48,714,900 51,314,900 . , 'estimated at 5 percent of total pro am costs ' this is gross average wage, which would overstate the wage of school-level staff - 50 - ANNEX 4 HEALTH 1. The goals in the health sector are two-fold, to improve the health status of the population and to ensure equitable access for all to health care services. While these goals seem simple and obvious, how the Government of the Province of Cordoba can best allocate its efforts to promote these goals within the system of health care provision is necessarily complex. This section first puts forth an framework for analyzing the role of the government in the sector, then examines what is presently being done, and then examines options for more cost-effective health care in the short and long-run. The Role of the Government 2. The efforts and expenditures of the GPC have to be understood in the context of the national arrangements for health care services and their evolution. In Argentina the vast majority of health care services are provided by professionals working entirely within the private sector while financed primarily through mandated quasi public (the "obras sociales") or public sources (the obra social of the social security system (Plan de Atencion Medica Integral-PAMI)). The obras sociales (including PAMI) account for 51 percent of all expenditures. However, the distinction between private provision and public (and quasi- public) financing is not absolute, as the private sector alsofinances a fair amount of services both through out of pocket payments (which represent about 28 percent of all health expenditures) and through health insurance, either of the traditional fee for service type or provider linked financing arrangements, the pre-pagas which cover an estimated 3 million people nationwide. The GPC, like all provinces, also provides health services to the population not covered. 3. There are four reasons why public actions through the government are thought to be necessary in the market for health care services. First, and most importantly, is equity. There is some level of health care services that nearly every society feels it is unjust to deny a person, regardless of their ability or willingness to pay. Second, some health sector activities prevent (e.g. vaccinations) or cure (TB treatment) infectious diseases for which individuals impose costs on the rest of society. Third, as technology has expanded the costliness of some curative services health insurance has become an important part of health care financing, but with the attendant well-known problems of all insurance markets, that those most likely to have insurance claims are most willing to pay (known as "adverse selection") and that once insured, individuals have too little incentive to control the amount or cost of claims (known as "moral hazard"). Finally, since doctors provide services based on specialized knowledge they can create excess demand for their services when acting as agents for the patients. While this "agency" problem is ubiquitous in market for professional or skilled services (e.g. auto mechanics, lawyers), it is exacerbated when the cost of the services are not borne directly by the consumer but by a third party, such as an insurer or taxpayer. - 51 - ANNEX 4 4. As the provincial governmnent chooses it strategy in the health care sector it is important that the actions taken be as narrowly focused as possible on the particular problem that is being addressed. What the Government of the Province of Cordoba Has Been Doing 5. The GPC through the Ministerio de Salud (MoS) maintains a province-wide, vertically linked network of health care facilities which includes health posts and dispensaries, "neighborhood" hospitals, sub-regional hospitals, and regional general and specialized (e.g. mental health) hospitals. These facilities provide a wide range of preventive, outpatient, and inpatient curative services free of services. This system has had positive benefits. The level of health indicators in the province is reasonable compared to other provinces and countries (see table H. 1) and access to services is universal. The level of inpatients per thousand "covered" population compare favorably with OECD countries. However, the system does have its intrinsic problems of management, which creates services at higher costs and lower quality than is necessary. 6. There is a widespread sentiment that the public sector is oversized and inefficient. The production and productivity of hospitals is very difficult to measure as the inputs and outputs of different specific procedures are so different. A heart surgery and an X-ray are both a single health service, but with obviously different implications about the types and time of staff required. Therefore the figures below should be taken as merely illustrative, but the available figures do seem to illustrate massive levels of inefficiency. 7. If one adds together the all the health services provided and then divides by the total equipo de salud employees of the public health system, it appears that the labor productivity in the provision of services is 2.9 services per person per ay in the system as a whole and 2.4 per person per day in the specific public hospital examined. While it is difficult to have an exact comparison of what that number could be, it is noteworthy that in the private hospital examined the consultations per doctor per month was 88, while in the public hospital it was less than a fourth as high, 19 per month per doctor. Similarly, in the private hospital, in the time that doctors devoted to consultations they did 2.4 consultations per hour. While this is not a fair comparison to the 2.9 services per day as the mix of activities is different, it is difficult to believe that average productivity could not be several times higher than it is presently. 8. But the true productivity is almost certainly even worse than the production numbers suggest as health professionals may be overproviding certain services. For instance, the length of stay in the public system is three times as long as the private sector, and well above international norms. Also, it is possible that these long lengths of stay combined with little attention to cost control leads to excessive levels of tests and other services. If we assume that 70 percent of x-rays and laboratory tests are accounted for by inpatients the public hospital has over 30 lab tests per patient and almost seven X-rays. What if each by -52 - ANNEX 4 eliminating unnecessary services inpatient only stayed 5.4 days, had 1.5 X-rays and 5 lab tests (and these assumed efficiency levels are arbitrary)? Then the measured level of productivity per person would fall from 2.9 per person to less than two services per person per day. Table 1: Indicators of productivity in the public sector health services system, with some comparisons with a private hospital. Public Examples of specific System hospitals A public |A private Labor productivity Total health services per equipo de salud per day2 2.9 2.4 Service per day, at "efficient" levels3 1.9 1.2 Consultations per doctor per hour 2.4 Consultations per doctor (I) per month 19.6 88.1 Average length of stay 17 15.2 5.4 X-rays per inpatient' 3.6 6.6 Laboratory Tests per inpatient' 16.5 33.5 Notes: 1) Assuming that inpatients account for 70 percent of these services. 2) Total health services adds together: consultations, patient days, dentist visits, lab tests, X-rays (and for the public hospital other services, such as therapy sessions). The work-year is assumed to have 260 days. 3) Assuming that the length of stay was reduced to 5.4, and that there were 1.5 X-rays per inpatient, and 5 laboratory tests per. 4) This is just counting for those hours devoted to consultations. 9. While there are likely too many health personnel in the public system relative to the level of treatments, payment levels are also very low. But, as illustrated below where costs are compared, the combination of large staffs at low wages but low efficiency does not appear to be low cost care. 10. The public hospitals were, even in the best of times, of lower quality than the private system. The system of direct provision by the public sector as an insurance for the poor creates of two-tier system in terms of quality of service rather than in financing and magnitude of service as the poor have nowhere else to go. The best indicator of the quality is that even though services were absolutely free the level of utilization by those with any other option was very low. 11. As will be outlined in more detail below, the problems with the health care system have not been a lack of money. It is not merely the devotion of greater and greater - 53 - ANNEX 4 expenditures to health that signals a commitment to the goals of promoting health as it is not so much how much is spent that matters for producing good outcomes, but how well the money is spent. Looking for avenues to change the health care system should not look to cut back on health, but rather how to get better health for less expenditures. This is not a retreat from a commitment to the recipients of health care, but may be a retreat from a commitment to subsidize health care providers. Things the Government has Done and Can Do in the Short Run Emergency Measures 12. The fiscal crisis has caused the budgets of all ministries to be cut back tremendously. Each ministry has adopted a particular method of coping with those cutbacks. Since the severity of the crisis and the timing of assuming control could not have been foreseen, it is not a criticism to point out that most of the emergency measures are neither sustainable ways of cutting expenditures nor are conducive to maintaining or improving efficiency. 13. Arrears to suppliers. One way hospitals have been coping with the reduced budgetary allocations to their caja chica, which was the amount allocated to hospitals for their expenditures, is by running arrears to their suppliers. Hospitals are relying on the good will, and expectations of future business, or suppliers to run up arrears. This obviously only postpones the current budget problem and creates problems for the future as these arrears will need to be repaid. 14. Scaling back services. Most health facilities have responded to the emergency measures and budget cuts by scaling back on services to only those immediately necessary (urgent and emergency surgeries, etc). While this does save on current expenses, since the cut back on services has not been a rationalization of services to ever be provided, it constitutes a backlog of postponed services as a "health arrears." This is not sustainable and will create pressures for additional future services. 15. Cutting non-wage expenditures. A third type of emergency measure is the cutting back on non-wage expenditures. Health care facilities have had their budgets drastically reduced and are in short supply of nearly everything. Some health care unites are relying on their associated cooperadora to raise funds for non-wage expenditures formerly covered by the caja chica. The cooperadoras are encouraging users (and others) to make donations that are funneled to the institution for consumables. Short-Run Measures 16. Transfer services to municipal level. The GPC has apparently taken the decision to decentralize all health care facilities in the network of the level of complexity of - 54 - ANNEX 4 the neighborhood hospitals down to municipalities. This decentralization has two advantages. First, according to the analysis done by the GPC this will reduce the MoS budget by 30 percent. Of course, it does so merely by shifting the costs to the municipalities. Second, by moving the locus of management and decision making closer to the users of the system it will potentially make the operation of the system more efficient and responsive. Instead of municipalities being dependent on (and the beneficiaries of) decisions made at the provincial level it will be up to them to decide on what types and level or service to provide. 17. Experience with other systems points up that decentralization also carries certain risks. First, by breaking up the vertical network of the chain of referrals it may encourage "vertical bypassing" by users, a widespread phenomena in other Latin America countries. That is, if the municipal clinics and health posts are not well-run and if a referral from the lower level facilities is not necessary to receive treatment at the next most complex level, then users will simply go directly to the higher level (and more expensive) facility. This reduces the potential cost savings by shifting demand back onto the provincial facilities. Second, many of the preventive health care services that are most deserving of public support (e.g. vaccinations, information campaigns about health practices) are those least amenable to cost recovery. Although the programs that administer many of these services will remain provincial it will take special effort to ensure that the decentralization does not have the perverse effect of cutting spending and attention to preventive and simple curative services while maintaining hospital services. Third, the capacity of the municipalities to manage these facilities without creating an additional layer of bureaucracy will be an important consideration. 18. Recover cost of services where due from others. There are three groups which receive services at public hospitals whose costs are not the intrinsic responsibility of the province and for whom cost recovery from the public hospitals makes sense: * affiliates of obras who receive services from the public hospitals in any case, * those who receive emergency treatment from an accident the costs of which ought to be covered by insurance or a program for the protection of workers, * citizens of other provinces. 19. A critical question for the budgetary implications of cost recovery is what fraction of visits to public hospitals are from the uninsured population. I could only uncover three sources to create an estimate, each of which has its problems. The first is the fraction of births in Cordoba that happen in the public hospitals, the average over the 1987-94 period was 37.4 percent of all births. I do not know of any province by province estimates of the uninsured, so we are forced to assume a similar fraction for Cordoba as for the nation as a whole of between 27 and 30 percent (this is obviously before the recent increase in unemployment rates). However, one complication of this calculation is that the same socioeconomic conditions that give rise to being uninsured (more rural, poorer, less - 55 - ANNEX 4 educated) are also typically correlates of higher fertility. However, we have no direct information on the link between insurance and fertility, so I examine the implications of a variety of assumptions. The range of values in table 2 is between 0 and 28 percent of births in public hospitals are due to the insured, however a more reasonable range is probably 10 to 20 percent. Table 2: Estimates of the fraction of births in public hospitals from the insured public hospitals as a fraction of all births, 1987-94 If the fertility rate of the uninsured relative to the insured population is assumed to be: the same 25 percent higher 50 percent higher If the fraction of the 27 .284 .162 .053 population assumed percent to be uninsured is: 30 .204 .075 0 percent Notes: The calculation is based on the fraction of all births observed in public hospitals over the 1987-1994 period of 37.4 percent. 20. A second technique for estimating the fraction of visits due to uninsured is to rely on the estimate from the Encuesta de Salud that 5 percent of obra affiliates who were hospitalized in the last year used a public hospital. Again, this is not entirely determinative of the fraction of visits due to those with obras (or other private insurance), as they may or may not have higher rates of hospital utilization. Table 3 shows that depending on what is assumed about utilization and the fraction uninsured the 5 percent figure implies that between 10 and 16 percent of all hospital visits were generated by the population with health - 56 - ANNEX 4 Table 3: Estimates of the fraction of visits to public hospitals generate by the insured population. If the hospital utilization rate of the insured relative to the uninsured population is assumed to be: 20 the same 20 percent higher percent lower If the fraction of the 27 .108 .135 .162 population assumed percent to be uninsured is: 30 .104 .13 .156 percent Notes: The calculation is based on the fraction of all births observed in public hospitals over the 1987-1994 period of 37.4 percent. 21. The final way of estimating the fraction of hospital services used by those with obras or other insurance coverage would be from an actual estimate based on billings from the hospital. However, only two of the public hospitals in Cordoba have any system of billing at all, and these systems are new, and perhaps somewhat unreliable as there is no registration system that allows a cross checking of patient's own reports of their coverage and the patient's have no incentive to report accurately. If what is of interest in is the possibility of fee recovery then these estimates, even if under reports of actual usage may be useful for estimating recoverable usage. From table 4 we see that with its efforts to identify those in the hospital who had some other coverage the hospital billed in 1994 a total of 757,934 pesos and collected 399,560 pesos. While these sums are substantial even the billed sum represents less than 5 percent of the budget and the collected sum only a little more than 2 percent. Since the one hospital accounts for about seven percent of all inpatients in the system a simple extrapolation of a similar effort extended with similar results (although they would likely be smaller as most of the system involves activities of lower complexity and hence lower likelihood of use of the public system) this might result in total billings of 10 million pesos (but collections likely to be smaller, on the order of 5 million pesos). Table 4: Billings and collections of a public hospital, in pesos 1994 1995 Billed Collected Ratio Billed Collected PAMI 246837 113897 46% 116399 37872 33% IPAM 174078 170558 98% 88577 45209 51% A otras obras sociales, seguros, 337019 115105 34% 210143 15492 7% trabajo y transito Total 757934 399560 53% 415119 98573 24% % of (estimated) hospital budget 4.2% 2.2% _ ttl X -ti - 58 - ANNEX 4 22. There are two reasons why this figure of the total to be recovered is low, even though from the above estimates it is likely that at least 10 percent or more of hospital services go to those with some type of coverage. First, is that perhaps not all covered individuals those using public hospital services are being identified. But in the absence of some registration system it is hard to see how this fraction identified can be increased so this is a short-run constraint. The second reason why the collected total is so low is more serious, which is that the hospital can only bill the obras and insurers are the rates per service established in the nomenclador. The fees listed in the nomenclador are widely perceived to be wildly out of line with actual costs (public or private), a structural issue with the health care system that we return to below. Even if the public hospitals were operating efficiently and even if they were collecting from all (not just obra) patients for all services if they were forced to bill at nomenclador rates, it is unlikely it would be anywhere close to covering costs. But, nevertheless, when assessing the potential revenue gains from billing for services in the short-run it must be factored in that the obras are legally obligated to pay only the nomenclador rates and this does place a constraint on the amounts potentially recoverable. 23. Charge a minimum fee (with a waiver) for all services. Currently hospitals and health centers are associated with a cooperadora, which is a private organization affiliated with the health center. As part of a reaction to the current crisis in which the health centers and hospitals are receiving smaller budget allocations for inputs many appear to be using the cooperadoras to encourage patients to donate some fee for the services they receive. One way of raising at least modest amounts is to institute a system of charging at least some nominal fee for services, but which can be waived if the person cannot afford it, so that no one is denied care because of an inability to pay. That is, the government can remain committed to the ideal that no one will be denied health care because they are unable to pay while changing the expectation from all will receive services free, unless they donate, to all will pay for services, unless they are unable. Moreover, the fee may be only instituted for some services while excluding others (like vaccinations). Since there are 5.8 million services (consultations, lab test, and x-rays) performed per year even a charge of 1.3 pesos per service (equivalent to the bus fare to come and go) even if 40 percent of the services were excluded (either due to inability to pay or by service) would generate 4.5 million pesos, and a flat fee of 2 pesos per service when only 20 percent of services were excluded would generate 9.3 million pesos. 24. Reduce the wage bill. Since the wage bill is the largest fraction of the budget and since the non-wage components of the budget need to rise in order to provide effective services, there is no way to cut the budget significantly in the near term without cutting the wage bill. The indications of the "over-dimensioning" of the system suggest that there might be ways to reduce the staff without affecting the quality of service. There are three ways of doing this: control over suplentes and contratatos, elimination of "ghost" workers, and increased stringency over contractual compliance. - 59 - ANNEX 4 25. The fraction of the wage bill of the MoS that went to other that permanent personnel exploded from less than 20 percent of the wage bill to 44 percent of the wage bill in 1994. If the ratio of non-permanent and "other" personnel costs to permanent personnel was at 1990 levels in 1994 the wage savings would have been 34 million pesos. That is not to say that laying off all contratatos is the solution, as in many cases the contratatos have been brought in precisely because the permanent employees we unproductive. Solving the more structural problems of productivity will be necessary. 26. Two other imediate mechanisms for reducing the wage bill would be an empoyee census in which all employees need to present themselves personally for payment. In many cases there are a considerable number of staff who have moved or died but who continue to receive payment. A more serious measure would be to require exact compliance with the days and hours of service specified in the public sector contract. It is the opinion of some that if personnel were actually required to be on hand for 35 hours a week this would generate a substantial number of resignations. There is a danger of losing the best personnel through resignations this way as for more senior personnel the payment is far too little if they actually worked that many hours, but separate contracts that compensate doctors for specific services or admissions arrangements with contracted compensation on a utilization basis could be arranged so as to not lose doctors with specialized services. 27. Consolidation of services. If the hospitals do become more efficient the dimensions of the over capacity of the system will become even more obvious. One possibility is to consolidate facilities and close some entirely. While the closing of facilities is always difficult, one could take advantage of the opening of any new facilities to combine operations. Options for the Long-Run 28. Three major structural problems with the current approach to satisfying the government's commitment to universal provision of health care through the direct provision are: * the poor are segregated into low quality care with no other options, * the public sector finds it difficult to implement efficient management of health care facilities, * by becoming the supplier of last resort to the uninsured poor, the public sector by default also becomes the supplier of last resort of all curative services for free, including services of alta complejidad to those that are otherwise insured. This is a major problem because these services are expensive, of low effectiveness in promoting health, are not primarily used by the poor, and, when justified by private willingness to pay, ought to be paid for through insurance mechanisms rather than provided out of government budgets. - 60 - ANNEX 4 29. A medium term plan that addresses each of those problems is to separate out the functions the GPC wishes to play in the health sector institutionally. That is, separate the financine of health care services to the uninsured from the administration of the provision of services. This could be done in any number of ways, and what follows is a schematic description of one possible route. 30. Provision of health insurancefor the uninsured. How much would it cost the GPC to provide health services to all of the uninsured in the province? Let us assume for now that the number of uninsured in Cordoba is roughly equal to the national estimate of the indigent uninsured of 30 percent of the population (which is also roughly consistent with the usage figures given above). To calculate the total cost one needs to estimate what it would cost per person and what revenues per person from such an insurance scheme could be expected to be. 31. Table 5 gives several estimates of the cost per person of supplying a reasonably complete package of health services. What is reassuring is the relatively narrow range of the estimates of the cost per person per month of providing health care and that these costs are well within the range of the current MoS budget. 32. There however, problems with each of the estimates, which should be mentioned briefly. While the IPAM cost per affiliate is a solid estimate, it should be acknowledged that many feel one reason the costs of IPAM can be so low is that because of its status as the largest obra in the province it has managed to adhere to the nomenclador payments, while other obras have had to agree to pay more. This also means that IPAM affiliates are likely being pressured by providers to provide extra payments for services, so that the expenditures by IPAM per affiliate may well understate the total health care expenditures per affiliate by excluding those payments. However, these problems apparently extend to the average obra, whose spending is nearly equal to that of IPAM, although the other obras apparently achieve lower costs by either cutting special deals with providers, by not providing services, or by forcing affiliates into unofficial payments. The price of one pre-paga cited explicitly excludes alta complejidad, which of course can be a substantial component of medical costs, but does raise the question of the what services the insurance package would include. Excluding a number of alta complejidad services from an insurance package, or placing strict and objective limitations on circumstances in which they can be used, would likely lead to significant cost reductions at very little impact on health outcomes and so will be an important part of any real implementation of an insurance program. -61 - ANNEX 4 Table 5: Various estimates of the cost per person of supplying a package of health services in the Province of Cordoba. Source of cost figures: Cost per person per month Obras The 1994 average cost per affiliate of IPAM 23.6 National average obra monthly income per beneficiary 23 (1994) Floor of obra spending per beneficiary ANSSAL could have 18 provided in 1994 with its authorized budget Pre-pagas Price per person a high quality pre-paga would charge to 22 cover a large population Current (1995) price of a the "medium" package of 26.6 currently marketed pre-paga per person for a family of three (has co-payments for drugs and excludes alta complejidad) _ - Other Cost of a "basic package" calculated by Ministry of 20 Economy covering most health services (some co-payments and excluding most alta complejidad treatments). Ministry of Health budget for health care activities divided 25.6 by 30 percent of the population. Notes: 33. The cost per person of the equivalent of insurance coverage that would provide a similar bundle of services as is now provided by the public network of facilities is only one element of calculating the cost, as once the system is moved to an insurance base one can also factor in revenues. Even though the uninsured remain uninsured because they are outside the network of formal employment does not mean that some charges for insurance coverage are not practicable and indeed charges are only fair, as everyone in the formal system is forced to pay for their own insurance coverage it does not make sense that someone of equivalent, or even slightly lower, income should pay nothing at all. While perhaps making poor people pay something for health insurance coverage has an element of inequity, the inequity of making some poor people simply because they have formal sector - 62 - ANNEX 4 jobs and while other non-poor do not pay is also inequitable. That said, while setting up a presumptive payment the GPC will obviously retain the principle that no one will be denied insurance coverage because of an inability to pay. How much could such a system of insurance payments hope to recover? 34. The calculation of possible obviously remains entirely hypothetical, but if we assume that the average household income level of the 30 percent of the population uninsured is just at the poverty line so that average income of a family of three would be 330 per month (which is also about the observed average wage for the bottom 30th percentile). Also assume that to enroll families were expected to contribute either 3 or 6 percent of their income (3 percent is the same amount as those with formal sector work while 6 is together with the contribution of the employer, as if self-employed)'. But also assume that either due to inability to collect or exemption of those deep in poverty a certain fraction is uncollected. Table 6 provides a range of possible total payments. Table 6: Possible revenue mobilization from mandatory (with exemptions) health insurance payment, in millions of pesos Fraction exempted or uncollected: Contribution as a 0 25 percent 50 percent fraction of wage 3 percent 34.3 25.7 17.2 6 percent 68.6 51.5 34.3 35. The results of tables 5 and 6 can be brought together to calculate the net financial cost to the GPC of financing a complete package of health care services to every uninsured provincial citizen. The figures are based on a range of assumptions about the collection rate and the cost per person. This raises a subtle point about the incidence of employer mandated contributions. If in fact the employer reduces the money wage paid to the worker one for one with the mandated contributions in equilibrium then the full incidence of the employer contribution falls on the worker in whether self-employed or employed by another. -63 - ANNEX 4 Table 7: Net financial cost of providing health care to all the uninsured in Cordoba, in millions of pesos. Cost per person covered 18 25 Fraction 0 152 224 exempted/not collected from 3 percent of wages 50 169 241 insurance payment Notes: Ministry of Health Budget (comprometido) in 1994 : 301.9 million. 36. With substantially less than the government is paying now to maintain its network of health care facilities each uninsured person in Cordoba could be provided with insurance that would provide the same quality of health case (potentially from the same providers) as is enjoyed by most citizens currently. Although this particular form of insurance provision with contracting out of services is simply an illustration of one course of action, it is worth reviewing how is would deal with the major problems facing the sector; low quality, hospital management, cost escalation. 37. Low quality. The low quality of provision is built into the system since those without insurance are locked into a single provider. This provides little incentive for the provider to be attentive to patients demands and little option for the patients. If revenues are going to be mobilized to pay for insurance whereas formerly the services were provided, nominally, for free this will be an important angle to stress. The poor are not going to be asked to pay more for the same, but some for better. 38. Hospital management. A transition for financing of services will relieve the government itself of the onerous task of the micro-management of hospitals and health centers. There are intrinsic difficulties in managing complex health care services within the public sector. The process of creating autonomous hospitals, accountable for costs and quality of provision, will be easier when an arms length relationship can be established and especially when patients with mobile dollars can vote about hospital performance with their feet. Several steps in creating autonomous hospitals, an option that is already under discussion in connection with hospital reform, are a matter of course once the reimbursement flows to hospitals based on patients. 39. However even though the public sector would not have to directly manage hospitals, it would have to choose and manage the payment scheme. Just as in Argentina, health care systems around the world are undergoing rapid changes in the structure of - 64 - ANNEX 4 payments for health care when confronted by the almost unlimited scope for cost escalation inherent in a fee for service arrangement based on third party payment. Instead of fee for service, the GPC could arrange for capitation contracts with groups of providers (public or private or mixed) or for reimbursement based on conditions rather than treatments. While making these payment contractual arrangements are complex, they are just as complex now in the current system of operating hospitals, just hidden and non-transparent. 40. The course and meaning of decentralization to the municipalities would also change. Presumably there is not reason why the municipalities cannot share with the province in the cost of providing the health insurance to their own uninsured (for instance, in the same proportion of their current post-decentralization share of costs of operating the facilities). Whether or not the municipalities own and operate the health facilities or not would become irrelevant from the provincial view. In the long-run health care services to any municipal resident could be provided by the municipality, by private providers, by the provincial facilities, by the facilities of another municipality. 41. Alta complejidad. Setting up a system of the financing of specific activities will facilitate decisions about what services are and are not covered and under what circumstances. These are very difficult decisions to make as a health care system and when facilities exist to provide them it is almost irresistible to introduce ad hoc discretionary procedures into the decisions about the distribution of these procedures. 42. Another important advantage will be separating out the provision of public services to the poor as a backstop means of financing of basic health care and, what currently happens, the use of public facilities as a backstop for the public provision of expensive treatments. That is, many of the obras and private plans may not be able or willing to provide alta complejidad treatments, which allows them to operate at low cost, while pushing the costs from their beneficiaries who require these treatments onto the public sector. There is a real need to the rationalization of the system of a secondary insurance market for very expensive treatments, but there is no reason why this kind of secondary insurance cannot pay its own way, rather than being implicitly subsidized by the public sector. 43. This broad brush outline of a medium term strategy that separates the financing from provision is of course meant as illustrative. There are any number of other alternative proposals, but it may be critically important to use the occasion of a crisis of the present system to focus on creating a new approach that addresses the key problems of the current public system while also keeping in mind the cost-escalation dangers of any (including private) system of third party payment. -65 - ANNEX 5 CORDOBA PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM INFRASTRUCTURE AND PUBLIC WORKS 1. The construction and maintenance of most provincial infrastructure is under the direct control of the Ministry of Economy and Finance. These functions, which used to be handled by the Ministries of Social Development (for housing) and Public Works, were merged in July 1995 into the Secretariat of Housing, Public Works and Services of the Finance Ministry. 2. The staffing of the Secretariat has declined substantially from the levels of half a year ago, and further reductions are planned for the coming months. As of October 1995, the number of personnel was as follows: Road and Highway Directorate 402 Water and Irrigation Directorate 1,528 Architectural Directorate 300 Housing Institute 250 Other 120 3. In addition to the approximately 2,600 persons engaged in the above services, the provincial electricity company (EPEC) employs about 4,000 persons. EPEC is the only autonomous public enterprise under the administrative control of the Secretariat of Housing, Public Works and Services. - I. Roads And Highways 4. The Road and Highway Directorate (Direcci6n Provincial de Vialidad - DPV) was established in 1985 to administer, maintain and improve nearly 60,000 km of provincial roads. The vast majority of these (82%) are earth roads with less than 100 vehicles per day, 12% are unpaved roads serving between 100 and 500 vehicles per day, and 6% are paved roads with generally more than 300 vehicles per day. Current Relationship Between Expenditures and Outcomes 5. Table 1 compares DPV's productivity with that of three other provincial road directorates. C6rdoba ranks best on virtually all performance indicators. Three aspects are particularly noteworthy: (a) C6rdoba's spending is much lower per km of provincial road and, together with Santa Fe, lower when related to the number of registered motor vehicles; (b) its road staffing levels are much lower than those of the other provinces; and (c) C6rdoba's provincial road network is surprisingly long when compared to the provinces of Buenos Aires and Santa Fe. - 66 - ANNEX 5 Table 1: ProductivitY of Provincial Road Directorates C6rdoba Bs. As. iMisiones Santa Fe Km of provincial roads 59,476 36,146 27,008 12,948 Nr. of motor vehicles (1991) 507,325 2.221,040 77,635 592,126 Population in 1991 (million) 2.76 12.58 0.79 2.80 Road spending (1994 - $ million) 64 187 40 61 Number of DPV staff 402 1956 733 1432 Km of roads per 1000 population 22 3 34 5 Staff per 1000 km of road 7 54 27 111 Staff per million motor vehicles 7 881 9442 2418 Staff per million $ spent/year 10 18 23 S1000 spent/year per km of road 79 5.2 1.5 4.7 S spent/year per motor vehicle 2 846 515 103 6 1.1 126 SOURCES: Staff Appraisal Report (draft) for Argentina Provincial Roads Project, World Bank, August 1995; and mission estimates. 6. Road Expenditures: Nationwide, the provincial governments' total expenditures on roads have increased from about $480 million in 1991 to about $980 million in 1994, whereas the spending in C6rdoba remained fairly constant at $60 to $70 million, with a drop to $50 million in 1995. Road expenditures generally represent about 5% of the provinces' total public expenditures. However, some provinces, such as Entre Rios, Misiones and Santa Cruz, allocate as much as 10% of their revenues expenditures to roads; C6rdoba is at the other extreme with less than 3 %. Nationwide, capital and recurrent expenditures by provincial governments average about $5,000/km per year, compared to $1,100 for C6rdoba. 7. Staffirg: DPV had 402 employees in October 1995; of these, 115 were engaged in force- account work. This represents a 30% reduction from 571 persons (193 force-account) a year earlier, or a 39% reduction from the 660 persons working for DPV in 1991. Nevertheless, DPV intends to reduce its total staffing further to 340 by end-95, barely more than half of its labor force four years earlier. As road rehabilitation and construction is likely to increase with the help of IDB and World Bank loans, DPV intends to make more use of engineering consultants to supervise these works, rather than using in-house staff as in the past. 8. Length of C6rdoba's Road System: The above table shows that the provincial road network is five to seven times longer in C6rdoba than in Buenos Aires and Santa Fe provinces, when compared to the population served. There are two major reasons for this: The entire territory of some other provinces is subdivided into counties ("partidos") which are responsible for the tertiary roads in their area, whereas the jurisdiction of next lower tier in C6rdoba province ("municipios") extends only little beyond the built-up areas of towns - 67 - ANNEX 5 and villages. The tertiary road system between those villages thus must be administered by the province. C6rdoba's rural settlements consist primarily of relatively small farms, whereas other provinces have more large-scale land holdings, which themselves contain part of the tertiary road system. 9. The classification and length of C6rdoba's provincial road network are plausible. There is certainly no evidence that the network might be overextended, considering that C6rdoba is more efficient in expenditure and staffing terms (related to population and registered motor vehicles) than the other provinces. 10. Condition of C6rdoba's Roads: In early 1995, the eight provinces of Buenos Aires, Chaco, C6rdoba, Corrientes, La Pampa, Misiones, Neuquen and Santa Fe carried out surveys to collect data on network conditions, specifically surface roughness and surface defects. Table 2 shows that the conditions of C6rdoba's paved road system are slightly inferior to those of the other provinces, where nearly 90% of the paved roads are in good or fair condition. The situation on the unpaved network is somewhat less satisfactory, as most of the maintenance efforts have usually been directed towards the heavier trafficked portions of the road system: 15%, 68%, and 17% are respectively in good, fair and bad condition in the provinces of Chaco, Corrientes, La Pampa, Misiones, Neuquen and Santa Fe; no data are available for C6rdoba, but it is expected that its unpaved roads are on the average in worse conditions than is the case in the other provinces. There is thus some evidence that the quality of C6rdoba's road network is beginning to deteriorate, reflecting perhaps the decline of road expenditures during the last two years. Table 2: Maintenance Condition of Provincial Paved Roads Condition IRI * Bs.As. C6rdoba Santa Fe Global ** Good < 3 51 48 42 55 Fair 3-4 37 30 45 31 Poor 4-6 12 15 13 11 Very poor > 6 0 7 0 3 * International Roughness Index ** Provinces of Buenos Aires, Chaco, C6rdoba, Corrientes, La Pampa, Misiones, Neuquen, and Santa Fe SOURCE: Staff Appraisal Report (draft) for Argentina Provincial Roads Project, World Bank, August 1995. 11. The DPV has most of its construction works performed out by private contractors, including periodic and routine maintenance on the paved network. Most maintenance on the unpaved network is carried out by about 220 consorcios camineros, which are managed by residents of the area served. A small force-account capacity (115 persons, down from 230 in end- 1991) has been retained to handle emergency works and some routine maintenance. Long-term Vision on Road Expenditures -68 - ANNEX 5 12. The national Government initiated in 1992 a broad reformn of the administration of the road subsector, aiming to gradually decentralize responsibilities for administering the national network and the related financing. The reform program encompasses (a) the concessioning of heavily trafficked highways to private firms, (b) a reclassification of the networks, with a view to limiting the national network to the main inter-provincial and international connections, and to transferring highways of predominantly local interest to provincial jurisdictions; (c) the delegation of a gradually increasing proportion of the responsibilities for the national network to DPVs' (d) the strengthening of DPVs' technical and management capabilities, in particular for the efficient maintenance of the provincial and delegated national highway networks; (e) the reorganization of the National Highway Department, strengthening its strategic planning, normative, supervision and technology transfer functions, and gradually downsizing its operational functions; and (f) the gradual redistribution of road user charge revenues to provinces. 13. Substantial progress has already been made under the reformn progranm. Studies were undertaken to prepare for the reclassification of the networks, which is now expected to be concluded by mid-1996. At this stage, it is expected that the reclassification will result in a net transfer of about 10,000 km of national highways to the provinces; this could increase Cordoba's paved road network (3,641 km) by more than 10 percent. 14. The World Bank's assistance strategy in the transport sector is now focused on the effective implementation of the highway subsector reform, including the delegation of some national roads to the provinces. Through the proposed Provincial Roads Project, the Bank would aim to ensure efficient resource allocation and use by the highway departments of eight provinces (including C6rdoba) and to strengthen the DPVs' key technical and management systems to prepare and implement efficient road expenditure programs. Near-term Options to Contain Road Expenditures 15. Following expenditure programs of $65 million in 1992, $85 million in 1993 and $64 million in 1994, C6rdoba budgeted $82.6 million in 1995 for its road and highway activities. This year's fiscal crisis made it necessary to drastically reduce the road program. Table 3 shows that total expenditures for 1995 are now expected to reach $49 million, 59 percent of the original budget. - 69 - ANNEX 5 Table 3: Road and Highway Expenditures by DPV (million $): 1993 1994 1995 1995 1996 actual actual budget estim. budget Personnel Costs - Force Account 2.2 3.0 2.1 5.0 - Other 6.9 7.3 7.1 3.0 9.1 10.3 8.1 9.2 8.0 Other Expenditures -Consorcios Camineros 30.0 16.1 15.7 13.6 - Maint. of Paved Roads 11.2 9.7 3.4 15.3 - Road Improvements 13.8 11.9 11.7 10.9 - Equipment 5.0 5.0 0.3 - Works funded by Nation 17.5 9.0 0.2 IDB 2.6 13.8 World Bank 36.2 - Miscellaneous 3.7 2.0 1.4 2.7 76.2 53.7 74.5 39.8 93.0 Total 85.3 64.0 82.6 49.0 101.0 SOURCES: Mission estimates, based on data provided by DPV. 16. One factor behind the projected increase in highway spending is the re-activation of contracts with construction firms, which had been stopped earlier this year due to nonpayment by the province. As many of the works were half-completed, the Government decided to renegotiate some contracts, thereby also avoiding the need to make substantial compensation payments to those firms. Another major factor are highway loans by IDB and the World Bank which would bring much-needed funds to arrest the beginning deterioration of the road network. 17. Resources: The resources for managing the provincial road system come from three main sources: (a) loans by IDB and the World Bank; (b) the provincial government budget; and (c) revenues from petroleum product taxation collected by the national Government, a portion of which is earmarked for road expenditures. For 1995, the share in the fuel tax revenues earmarked for provincial roads is estimated at $313 million nationwide, and $27 million for C6rdoba. In order to receive these funds, the provincial governments must allocate at least an equal amount from their general revenue to road expenditures. - 70 - ANNEX 5 Incentives for Effective Cost Control 18. As in most Argentine provinces, there is scope for the paving of earth and gravel roads to reduce the high cost of maintenance of high-traffic unpaved roads. This was considered for the proposed World Bank project which, however, will concentrate its efforts on the rehabilitation and periodic maintenance of existing paved roads that have deteriorated to unacceptable levels. The Bank's project will also support the strengthening of DPV to improve its capacity for efficient resource allocation and cost control. 19. As indicated above, the C6rdoba Road and Highway Directorate outranks the other Argentine provinces with regard to virtually all indicators measuring performance efficiency. Its current staff level of 402 is 30% below the level at the at the end of 1994, when C6rdoba had already a higher staffing efficiency than the other provinces. DPV intends to reduce this further to 340 by end-1995. It does not seem desirable for DPV to cut personnel further in 1996, as insufficient staffing could become counterproductive if inadequate attention paid to road maintenance in the implementation of the internationally funded road rehabilitation program. 20. One of the reasons for C6rdoba's high efficiency is its system of consorcios camineros, mentioned before, which is an unusually effective way of maintaining the extensive unpaved network. These roads consortia grew out of agricultural cooperatives and were formalized in the 1970s. The approximately 220 consortia (with a total of about 800 workers) represent local residents who elect a Board of Directors and, through daily use of the local roads, exert an effective control over the work performance of each consortium. The contracts between DPV and the consortiums specify a local contribution of 20% to the costs of road maintenance. For 1996, the province has budgeted $13.6 million for its 80% share to this aspect of road maintenance -- an expenditure which seems highly justified. The budgeted amount could actually be increased by about $3 million to reach the level of recent years' expenditures. 21. The province is taking another initiative to reduce its obligations with regard to road funding. Provincial Routes 6 and 13, two paved roads with a total length of 389 kin, are being transferred to groups of municipalities for maintenance, with the right to charge tolls. It will be interesting to monitor this innovative approach to the management of major provincial roads. At this stage, it would appear toll collection could not be replicated on many provincial roads, because the generally low traffic volumes: Even on the two pilot roads, the costs of actual toll collection are estimated to consume about 30% of toll revenues. The tolls also include an additional 21% of Value Added Tax; thus less than 50% of the monies collected from drivers will be available for road maintenance. H. Water Supply, Sewerage And Irrigation. 22. The Water and Sewerage Directorate (Direcci6n Provincial de Agua y Saneamiento - DIPAS) is responsible for water management in the Province, including the operation of the provincial water supply, sewerage and irrigation systems. It was established in 1992 through the merger of the Water Directorate (Direcci6n Provincial de Hidrauilica - DPH) with the Sewerage - 71- ANNEX 5 Company (Empresa Provincial de Obras Sanitarias - EPOS). It has 1528 employees and receives most of its income from water tariffs and additional user charges such as irrigation water fees. 23. Water Supply and Sewerage: While access to piped water supply is above the national average, the Province is deficient with regard to sewerage connections. Partly to address this problem, virtually all public sewerage has been transferred in the last six years to the municipal level, including 100,000 connections in C6rdoba City and 31,000 in the rest of the Province. Following a similar policy, 69,000 water connections have been transferred to various municipalities, but 368,000 registered water supply customers are still being served by DIPAS. This includes 327,000 customers of the C6rdoba City system which is to be privatized. 24. Irrigation: DIPAS is also providing water to 27 irrigation systems feeding 71,000 hectares of agricultural land. Most of these systems have been transferred to irrigation consortia who are now responsible for their operation and maintenance and therefore receive a 75 percent discount on their water fees. However, bulk water production and distribution remains DIPAS' responsibility, and it appears that less than 10 percent of the cost for providing bulk water is being recovered from user charges. Current Relationship Between Expenditures and Outcomes 25. Table 4 gives the results of a financial comparison that was carried out for several water supply operations in Argentina. It indicates that C6rdoba's 1992 deficit amounted to an average of $32 for each person whose home was served by piped water supply. The provincial water supply operation thus received substantially higher government subsidies than any of the other comparable provinces. As shown further below, the DIPAS operating deficit has now been virtually eliminated, although apparently at the cost of inadequate maintenance and depreciation. Tender documents for the privatization of the C6rdoba City water supply system wvere issued in October 1994. The technical proposals were opened in earlv 1995, but legal objections wcre subsequently raised by the private consortia submitting bids; the matter is currently under review by the legal authorities. - 72 - ANNEX 5 Table 4: Provincial Water Supply and Sewerage Finances in 1992 (million $): Cordoba Bs.As. Mendoza Santa Fe Expenditures - Personnel 32.9 30.9 17.8 22.8 - Other 75.7 42.5 23.5 23.1 Income - Billings 57.4 62.5 32.3 49.8 - Other Income - 10.9 18.0 - - Actual Collections 42.9 56.0 29.5 47.9 Net Income (Deficit) (65.7) (17.4) (11.8) 2.0 - per person served ($) (32) (6) (12) 1 SOURCE: Argentina Water Supply and Sewerage Sector Note, World Bank, August 1994. 26. Staffing: At present, 1043 persons are employed in the ex-EPOS division which is responsible for 368,000 piped water connections. The resulting ratio of 2.8 employees for every 1000 connections has thus declined from 3.3 in 1991. Table 5 compares employment levels for all operations, including water supply services provided by municipalities and cooperatives. With 1.9 employees for every 1000 persons receiving piped water supply at their homes, C6rdoba's staffing in 1992 was near the average of comparable Argentine provinces. Table 5: Water Supply and Sewerage Staff in Selected Provinces (1992): C6rdoba Bs.As.i Mendoza Santa Fe Number of Employees: - Provincial 1366 3105 1143 1711 - Municipal 690 3082 - 920 - Cooperatives 1902 762 96 900 Total 3958 6949 1239 3531 Persons (1000) with Water Supply 2057 2786 1054 1875 Staff per 1000 Water Customers 1.9 2.5 1.2 1.9 * Excludes municipalities of Greater Buenos Aires. SOURCE: Argentina Water Supply and Sewerage Sector Note, World Bank, August 1994. 27. Operating Costs and Revenues: As shown later, it is expected that DIPAS will recover its 1995 working costs from user charges. However, this assumes no allocation for depreciation nor - 73 - ANNEX 5 financial return on its assets. Moreover, little has been invested in past years on periodic maintenance and systems expansion. The accumulated backlog of rehabilitation and similar works has been estimated at $120 million. Nevertheless, C6rdoba's water consumers are charged more than those of other Provinces and, in too many cases, do not pay their bills. 28. The average water billing per person served has remained static since 1992, when it was calculated at $28 per year. The comparative values for other provinces were $22 for Buenos Aires, $27 for Santa.Fe and $31 for Mendoza. C6rdoba's collection rate (75 per cent of water bills paid in 1992, a rate that according to DIPAS has now declined to 60 per cent) compared unfavorably with those of the other three big Provinces where it was generally better than 90 per cent or higher. DIPAS estimates that the accumulated backlog of unpaid water bills exceeds $60 million. 29. Access to Water Supply and Sewerage: Table 6 shows that 84 per cent of C6rdoba's 1991 population living in built-up areas had their water supplied through house connections, compared to the national average of 72 per cent. However, only 18 per cent were connected to sewerage systems, compared to the national average of 38 per cent (itself lower than other countries of similar income). Table 6: Access to Water Supply and Sewerage (% of urban population served): Homes with Water Supply Homes with Sewer Conn. 1980 1991 1980 1991 Greater Bs. Aires * 65 70 52 51 Bs.As. Province ** 63 67 7 38 C6rdoba 71 84 9 18 Mendoza 86 90 42 47 Santa Fe 62 74 26 30 Argentina 72 38 Bolivia 58 37 Brazil 86 46 Chile 98 81 Mexico 80 63 Paraguay 42 25 Uruguay 95 . . 14 * Federal Capital plus 13 municipalities, representing the coverage of the private water concession. ** Excludes municipalities of Greater Buenos Aires. SOURCE:Argenfina Water Supply and Sewerage Sector Note, World Bank, August 1994. 30. In the Americas, only Uruguay and Haiti had fewer sewerage connections per capita than the Province of C6rdoba. The municipality of C6rdoba is carrying out an ambitious program to extend the sewer system, and it is estimated that the province-wide connection rate may now approach 30 per cent -- still low but much better than four years ago. - 74 - ANNEX S Long-term Vision on Expenditures for Water Supply and Sewerage: 31. As in the case of some other Argentina provinces, inefficient management has led to a lack of resources for the maintenance and rehabilitation of existing facilities. C6rdoba has thus been disinvesting in the water and sanitation field, even though it already provides a lower level of water supply and (particularly) sewerage services than the Latin American average. An investment of $250-$300 million would be required to provide sewerage connections for just half of the population living in C6rdoba's built-up areas -- a coverage that would still be below the Latin American average (53 per cent in 1990-92). 32. The World Bank's Water Supply and Sewerage Sector Note (1994) states that "water and waste water investments generally range between 0.6 and 1.5 per cent of GDP for higher middle income countries". Applied to the Province of C6rdoba, this would translate into an annual investment need of over $100 million in water supply and sewerage. 33. Transfer of Operations: Virtually all sewerage operations have already been transferred to the municipalities, who are likely to be more effective in expanding the sewer networks than the province was. It is planned to also transfer the remaining water supply operations to the municipalities; the city of Cordoba services are to be concessioned to a private operator similar in concept to recent privatizations in Buenos Aires and Corrientes. 34. Privatization: Water supply operations would be concessioned to a private company who would assume full responsibility for the entire water supply system, including the commercial and technical operations and maintenance of all the components, and the financing and irnplementation of the investments necessary to achieve service targets as specified in the contract. At the end of the concession period, intended to be 30 years, all capital works would revert to the government. In general, the privatization process as described here takes about two or more years to be completed. The experience with the first two utilities that have been privatized is described in the following paragraphs. 35. Corrientes: Similar to other provinces, the provision of water and sewerage services used to be mainly the responsibility of a provincial agency requiring Government subsidies. International consultants drafted the bidding documents for a 30-year concession. Development plans were also prepared for an investment estimated at $75 million. Water and sewerage tariffs were raised and, after almost two years of preparation the Province transferred, in September 1991, the responsibility for providing water and sewerage services to a consortium of Argentine firms. 36. The bidding process to award the concession contract was done in two stages. In the first stage, firms were prequalified based on their technical and financial capabilities. In the second stage, the prequalified firms presented their economic proposal based on a coefficient representing a percentage of the existing tariff. By 1994, water service coverage had increased from 59 to 71 of households, and sewerage coverage from 30 to 37 per cent. Metered water connections had - 75 - ANNEX 5 increased from an insignificant level to 68,600 meters, and the number of staff had decreased from 5.7 to 2.9 persons per 1000 water connections. 37. Buenos Aires: In May 1993, a 30-year concession to provide water and sewerage services in the Metropolitan Buenos Aires area was awarded to Aguas Argentinas (AA), a consortium led by the Compagnie Lyonnaise des Eaux-Dumez (France). Five firms were prequalified prior to the bidding process which consisted of two phases in which the financial proposals of only those bidders who passed the technical evaluation were considered. Following evaluation of the technical proposals, the concession was awarded to the bidder who offered to charge the lowest water rate. 38. After one year of operation, it could be observed that (a) summer water rationing had been eliminated for the first time in many years, due to additional production obtained by improving operating efficiency, (b) an existing sewage treatrnent plant had started operation for the first time, (c) relations with consumers had improved as time required for repairs was reduced to less than 48 hours, and (d) about 40,000 water meters had been installed to large non-residential consumers. Moreover, the labor force was drastically reduced from an initial 8000 to about 3500 employees. 39. C6rdoba: Tenders for concessioning the C6rdoba city water supply were issued in October 1994. The technical proposals were opened in early 1995, but injunctions were imrnediately placed by the bidders; the matter is currently under review by the legal authorities. A new bidding process will likely be necessary. Even if the legal situation were to be clarified by early 1996, which is not certain at all, the issuance of new tender documents and subsequent evaluation of bids will be a lengthy process. Another option would be the transfer of the current operation to the municipality who would then become responsible for its privatization. However, a government entity will likely remain responsible for the city water supply until at least 1997, and the urgent reforms necessary should not be postponed until the system has been privatized. Near-termn Options to Contain DIPAS Expenditures: 40. Table 7 summarizes incomes and expenditures for DIPAS over the past three years and indicates substantial annual deficits. While these seem to be decreasing from 1993 to 1995, this financial "improvement" appears to be primarily due to the absence of depreciation allowances and inadequate maintenance of the existing facilities. As the Government's fiscal constraints made it difficult to cover even the reduced deficits, DIPAS ceased to make the social payments for its staff, only about 80 per cent of its personnel costs have actually been paid out; over $8 million of the $38.1 million in personnel payments estimated for 1995 would thus be retained and help in covering the projected $11. 1 million shortfall in collected revenues. - 76 - ANNEX 5 Table 7: Income and Expenditures of DIPAS (million $): 1993 1994 1995 1995 1996 actual actual budget estim. budget Personnel Costs - Water Supply 31.0 - Irrigation 5.2 36.2 36.5 34.2 38.1 Other Current Expendt's -Water Supply 11.7 - Irrigation 7.4 19.1 11.4 19.5 7.8 Capital Investments 18.7 10.0 8.0 8.8 26.5 Depreciation and Misc. 10.9 - 2.0 - TOTAL EXPENDITURES 84.9 57.9 63.7 54.7 Billings - Water Supply 70.5 70.5 70.5 - Irrigation & other 2.9 3.3 4.1 Collection - Water Supply 41.9 38.9 52.1 42.3 - Irrigation & other 6.0 3.5 8.3 1.3 TOTAL COLLECTION 47.9 42.4 61.4 43.6 NET INCOME (DEFICIT) (37.0) (15.5) (2.3) (11.1) SOURCES: Mission estimates, based on data provided by DIPAS. 41. As over 60 per cent of DIPAS' recurrent expenditures (83 per cent in 1995) are for personnel, it is the staffing area which has the greatest potential for cost reductions. It is estimated that the Cordoba City water supply could function with 500 employees, and another 50 would be needed for the few remaining operations in provincial towns. Thus, about 493 staff would be redundant from a strictly economic point of view. It is further estimated that the number of ex- DPH staff could be reduced from 485 to about 250, after restructuring the irrigation and the other water management functions of DIPAS. The combined reduction in personnel costs could thus 2 amount to $15-20 million per year. 42. While no recent audits were available to the mission, some of the reported expenditures seem unfair or unnecessary. For example, it is not clear why the provincial Bank demands a service fee of 8.2 per cent (over $3 million per year) for receiving the payments from water 2 An important consideration in any personnel reduction program would have to be the typc of staff to bc declared redundant. There may in fact be a shortage of skilled field staff (workers to fix broken ducts, for example), while at the same time there could be an oversupply of administrative office staff. - 77 - ANNEX 5 customers, when it charges the Housing Institute only 1.7 per cent for rent payments. Also, while DIPAS has to pay Value Added Tax for all of its billings, it apparently is not refunded the VAT for the large amount of billings that are never collected. It is estimated that the VAT payments to the central Government, for payments not received from water customers, amounts to about $6 million per year. 43. Considering DIPAS' abysmal collection rate of 60 per cent, it is surprising that it has not undertaken stronger efforts to have its bills paid. Table 8 summarizes the various payments that the Government could collect without changing regulations or tariffs. Table 8: Approximation of Water-Related Payments not Currently Collected (nillion $): Annual Payments Accum. Total Not Received of Back Payments Piped Water Supply - Unpaid Water Bills 28 60 - Unregistered Conn's (c. clandestinas) 4 12 - Expired Connections (c. vencidas) 9 - Unregistered Building Extensions 3 10 Other - Fees for wells (perforaciones) 15-20 20 - Irrigation Payments 3 7 - Water Right Payments 5 21 TOTAL 58-63 t39 NOTE: The above amounts are based on verbal statements, supported by some written statistics, which were provided to the mission. They need to be verified on the basis of a more detailed review of existing records, complemented by field surveys. 44. According to current regulations, DIPAS could collect about $60 million per year more than today: $28 million for water supply bills which are not paid at present; $4 million for an estimated 30,000 unregistered water connections; $3 million for water customers whose bills are based on rates calculated many years ago but who have extended their building in the meantime; $15-20 million for an estimated 10,000 private wells which require payments for the use of ground water; $3 million for underbilled or unpaid irrigation charges; and $3-6 million from EPEC (hydro- generation fees). 45. The theoretical total of accumulated back payments due to DIPAS is $139 million, covering various unregistered services plus the $60 million for unpaid water supply bills. While some of these back payments would need to be proven and others might be difficult to collect, a concerted effort should be made to recover as much as possible of that total. Not only would this bring much-needed resources to DIPAS and the provincial treasury, it would also arrest the evident trend towards increasing neglect to pay the water bills. - 78 - ANNEX 5 46. It is recommended that a program be devised to register all water customers and collect as much as possible of the outstanding payments. Because of DIPAS past record in non-collection of water charges, and as surveys will be required to identify the wells and water connections which are not registered at present, it would be most effective to define this program with the assistance of an outside firm. The costs of the technical assistance appear to be eligible for funding under the World Bank loan for the Provincial Development Project. It would also be useful to undertake urgently a technical and management audit of DIPAS to restructure it and improve its efficiency. III. Government Buildings 47. The Architectural Directorate (Direcci6n Provincial de Arquitectura - DPA) is the agent responsible for the construction and renovation of buildings, including schools, hospitals and other health units, police stations and administrative buidings. It has about 300 employees engaged in the design and supervision of such projects which are contracted to private construction firns. Upon completion, the works are transferred to the client such as the provincial Education or Health Ministries. ARCHITECTURAL DIRECTORATE Current Relationship Between Expenditures and Outcomes: Long-term Vision on Road Expenditures: Near-term Options to Contain Road Expenditures: Incentives for Better Cost Control: HOUSING INSTITUTE Current Relationship Between Expenditures and Outcomes: Long-term Vision on Road Expenditures: Near-term Options to Contain Road Expenditures: Incentives for Better Cost Control: - 79 - ANNEX 6 I. OVERVIEW Institutional Role and Structure 1. The Empresa Provincial de Energia de Cordoba (EPEC), created in 1953, is the main entity responsible for generation, transmission, and retail distribution of electricity in the Province of Cordoba. EPEC is also responsible for planning, coordination, and supervision of the provincial power sector. Additionally, EPEC performns the role of a regulatory agency, proposes electricity price adjustments to the provincial government, and provides advice to the provincial government on authorizations for new concessions of power public services. On paper, EPEC advises the Secretariat of Public Housing, Works, and Service (SPHWS), which is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance on energy policies and coordinates sector planning. EPEC reports to the SPHWS. 2. As a provincial institution, EPEC is subject to all the administrative procedures applying to. Its annual budget is approved by the provincial congress. Legal procedures on procurement and budget allocations are controlled ex-post by the Provincial Auditing Agency (Tribunal de Cuentas). Financial statements are audited by the provincial General Accounting Office (Contaduria General de la Provincia). EPEC's three-member board of directors is appointed by the provincial government. On paper, the board is assisted by a three-member consulting council also appointed by the government, with one member nominated by the union, one by the cooperatives, and the other by the utility. Currently, EPEC is managed by an intervenor, who has been entrusted with the same power as EPEC's board. 3. There are 198 electric cooperatives serving about 250,000 customers. These cooperatives are subject to tax and accounting laws. The cooperatives also provide also other utility services to their associates, including potable water and sewerage, gas, rural and urban communication, and roads. Electricity prices and investment plans are subject to EPEC's review before approval by the government. Additionally, two independent power producers, with an installed capacity of about 95 MW, sell energy to EPEC through long-term contracts. Power Facilities, Electricity Supply, and Market 4. In 1994, EPEC's total installed capacity was 789 MW (see Attachment 1), with 610 MW (77%) conventional thermal plants and 179 MW (23%) hydro. Thermal installed capacity is composed of: 345 MW turbogas, 249 MW steam power plants, and 16 MW diesel. About 33% of the installed thermal capacity is out of service due to lack of maintenance and needs to be rehabilitated, and 21 % is under repair. In the last two years, given that most of EPEC's thermal generation units are in poor operational condition, with high specific consumption (over 3,000 kcal/kWh), high operating and maintenance costs (about US$95/MWh), and requiring important maintenance works or rehabilitation, EPEC has increasingly relied on power energy purchased from the Wholesale Electric Market (WEM). Additionally, hydro production depends on water - 80 - ANNEX 6 available, which is primarily destined to potable and irrigation services. In 1994, energy supplied by the WEM was 2,417 MWh (62%), compared to 942 MWh (26%) in 1992. EPEC produced 1,507 MWh (38%) compared to 2,671 (74%) in 1992. 5. The degree of electrification in the province Tabl EPE METTUCrURG is similar to the rest of the country (95%), which is . aind 1694 high compared to the average of 70% for Latin American countries. In 1994, total sales amounted to 3,170 GWh, representing an annual electricity consumption of about 1,103 kWh per capita, which is low compared with the South American average of 1470 kWh/year. During 1980-94, the average annual growth rate of electricity sales was 10.1 % per year, but it decreased by 3.3% during the last three years, mainly due to the combined effect of recession and reduced consumption by large industrial customers. During the period 1980-94, the market structure has changed, except for residential customers, as shown in Figure 1. Sales to residential customers have been maintained at 26%; sales to Cooperatives increased from 20% in 1980 to 29% in 1994, but sales to large industrial, general, and other (government agencies, street lighting, and water services) customers have decreased from 34%, 12%, and 8%, to 29%, 10%, and 6%, respectively. Currently, the cooperatives buy bulk electricity from EPEC. 6. EPEC'S 132-KV transmission system is interconnected to the 500-kV National Interconnected System (NIS). This allows EPEC to buy electricity from the WEM, and consequently to take advantage of the competitive environment created by the national regulatory system (Attachment #1). EPEC's transmission system consists of 132 kV, 1,383 km long and 66 kV, 2,732 km long, which also interconnects the distribution system of the 9 geographical zones around the province with EPEC's own generating plants. There are about 4,282 km of medium voltage (33 kV and 13.2 kV) distribution lines connecting the transmission system with the load centers. Performance of EPEC 7. Staffing. EPEC is overstaffed. In 1994, labor productivity indicator, measured as customers per employee, was very low, i.e.: 4,032 employees serving about 580,000 connections, or 143 connections per employee. This figure is significantly below the average for private distribution utilities in Latin American countries (ranging between 250 and 400). About 55% of the staff is concentrated in commercialization and administrative activities. To reach a satisfactory productivity indicator, EPEC's staff would need to be reduced by 40%. As a result of a retirement program implemented in the last few years, EPEC's staff decreased by 3% p.a. since 1990. As shown in Figure 2 and 3, a new retirement program based on aging should only be implemented within five more years, as there are no employees of retirement age. Staffing and recruiting policies are subject to civil service regulation. Staffing and - 81 - ANNEX 6 recruiting rules are based on agreements signed between ri * 1 EPEC and the unions (Sindicato de Luz y Fuerza de a Cordoba, Regional Luz y Fuerza de Villa Marta y de Rio Cuarto). These agreements establish, inter alia, the following rules: (i) employees can not be fired without ..... .....If unions agreement; (ii) employees with physical disability .........,.. ....,. should be incorporated as regular staff, but not assigned to any specific job; (iii) EPEC should replenish the .l . .. . . . vacancies within 30 days; (iv) the union participates in EPEC's decision-making; and (v) salary and grades are a A._,.,;_M. . LI based on seniority. A study carried out in December 1991, showed that wages of professionals and ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~,e Fj, tiPti SWFF managers were lower than the private sector (ranging from 55 % for junior master engineers and managers "no to 100% for senior master engineers), and were about . . . the same for the administrative and other officials. . ....... . Social charges amounts to about 75 % of total salaries . .. and wages. EPEC's authorities expect labor no: .. i ..... .......................................... productivity to continue improving onfly by freezing the hiring of new staff, and eliminating the vacancies .l by attrition. 1||||t a * . 10 u 4 * so w as B. so X. as 441 1.A X 8. n,, *4, £LECtTRICT LOt Losses. Electricity A. .................................................................. losses have n ......... increased to . from 17 % Is.. - ........~ Z...... ... ......................... .. of energy .. .......................................................................... supplied to 4. EL C 1_................ .................. ......... ................. system in e .....non* 1 984 to 22 % in 1990, and then decreased to 19.6%' in 1994, as shown in Figure #4 and Table #1. Based on studies carried out by EPEC, electricity losses are mainly due to non-technical losses at low voltage (10.7%). Technical losses at high level voltage are mainly due to inadequacies of the transmission system to receive energy from the WEM. It is estimated that the high non-technical losses at distribution level result from illegal consumption, inefficient mechanisms for metering, and inadequate commercial and customer-related procedures. 1. compared to Costa Rica (11 %), Chile and Belize (14%), Bolivia (16%) - 82 - ANNEX 6 Table #1: Electricity Losses in 1994 Energy supplied at (GWh): Energy Losses at High Percentage billed (GWh) Voltage (GWh) - high voltage 3924.0 399.7 301.8 7.7 - medium voltage 3222.5 1250.5 106.6 3.3 - low voltage 1865.4 1506.3 359.1 19.3 Energy supplied to| 1 EPEC | 924.0 | 3156.5 767.5 J 19.6 9. Operational Performance. EPEC is modernizing some operational activities aimed at improving the technical procedures and strengthening its distribution and commercialization activities. Under Bank loan 1761-AR, the Bank assisted EPEC, among other power utilities in the country, to review its planning procedures, distribution and commercial activities, and quality of service, and then propose recommendations to improve its operational activities. As a result of this effort, EPEC: (a) uses advanced computer models to design the transmission expansion plan based on efficient economic cost; (b) maintains an on-line computer model of the transmission and distribution configuration for planning purposes; (c) is implementing a commercial management information system. A new billing system is under implementation; the billing period (from metering to delivery the bill) is expected to be reduced to seven working days from over 45 days. Quality of service, except for electricity losses (para. 8), measured as number (17) and time (43 minutes) of interruption per customer are among the best for Latin American countries2. EPEC also improved its data processing. Payroll and budget (based on the government accounting system) are processed by the main frame computer. EPEC has a well-developed management control system for the investment program. Some ancillary services (maintenance of some distribution systems, cleaning, and tree pruning) are carried out through service contracts. A new organizational structure would be put in place by the Intervenor. Although EPEC has implemented some operational improvement, EPEC lacks a corporate budget and corresponding budget control, financial projections models, a management information system, and a well structured training plan. Its current accounting system does not facilitate the separation of fixed assets in generation, transmission, and distribution activities in an effective way. Electricity Pricing 10. The present electricity price is about 12% higher than the economic cost, which is defined as the cost of purchased power (generation plus transmission cost of the WEM) plus the value added of the distribution service. As shown in Figure 5, after a decreasing trend during 1980-92, electricity prices have steadily increased in real terms. Currently, the average price 2. Compared to similar program implemented by UTE (Uruguay) in 1992. number (27) and time (I hour 45 minutes) of interruption of electricity per customer. - 83 - ANNEX 6 charged to final customers, excluding taxes3, is 10.6 F *5 EVOLUtION OF ELECTRICITY PRICE $cents/kWh, which is high compared to other PERIOD tUO-I4 countries4. Although prices are set on accounting l basis and political considerations, EPEC implemented 2_., a satisfactory methodology to set electricity prices based on economic cost, which was developed with the assistance of consultants. Attachment #1, para. 7, summarizes the methodology used to set prices. 0N Oft M4 lz 10 NWo VW " s.aaa. M2 ....,. . Om . 11. Table #2 shows the current average electricity _ c-W , price for each category of customer expressed in U$/MWh compared to the target price based on economic cost: Table #2: Electricity price as compared to economic cost (USS/MWh) Category Number Energy Target Current Differ. of Sold price price (%) Customers (GWh) (*) Residential 519 858.2 156.9 166.6 5.8 General 62 319.3 148.5 200.0 25.8 Large customers 1134 1,008.8 55.7 63.1 11.7 Cooperatives 198 939.4 48.6 49.9 2.6 Government 2,629 43.5 139.4 193.0 27.7 agencies water service 442 16.0 137.2 172.5 20.5 street light 2,659 106.3 129.5 166.9 22.4 Others 4,278 29.7 145.1 194.2 25.3 Total 592 3,321.2 93.4 106.0 11.9 *) Calculated as target price divided by current price. 3. Taxes on electricity price include 21% VAT. 10% charged by municipalicies for streec lighting. and 1.2% collected by EPEC to finance EMSA and Santa Cniz. On average, the amount of taxes is similar to that applied in Jujuy and Santa Fe. 4. EPEC Chile Costa Rica residential 16.6 11.8 6 Commercial 20.0 9.9 10.3 - 84 - ANNEX 6 Investment and Expansion plan 12. During the last four years, EPEC has invested less than is required by load growth. Although, it is common that the proposed investment program is always overestimated, in the case of EPEC the difference between the proposed and actual investment proposed is substantial for the period 1991-94, as shown in Table #3. EPEC's investment program during the last 4 years, does not include capital expenditures for the rehabilitation of its generating power plants, as it results more economical to purchase energy from WEM at $30/MWh, compared to the operation cost of the thermal power plants ($95/MWh). In 1994, EPEC's investment program amounted to US$28.6 million (expressed in September 1995 prices), of which about US$ 12 million (42%) was investment in buildings for administrative offices and warehouses. Investment for transmission and subtransmission was 24 % %, distribution 32 % %, and generation 2%. The investment program designed by EPEC for the period 1995-99 is about US$90 million p.a., which includes mainly transmission projects (45%), and distribution projects (26%). It also includes the rehabilitation of a hydro power plant (36MW) estimated at $45 million. Attachment #2 shows the investment program required for interconnecting the NIS with EPEC's transmission system, amounting to US$46 million. Table #3: Actual investment during 1991-94 (in September 1995 S NMillion) Year Proposed Actual ( executed 1991 83.6 3.7 4.4 1992 93.8 8.1 8.6 1993 60.3 29.1 48.3 1994 68.3 28.6 41.9 1995 1/ 104.2 30.7 29.5 1/ In 1995, it includes investment up to September 1995. Finances 13. Past Financial Performance. EPEC's financial performance shows a decreasing trend over the last four years (see Attachment #3). Due to high operating cost, EPEC has been unable to produce reasonable rates of return on assets (ROR) and operating margin, and has not contribute to the financing of its investment needs. In 1993 and 1994, its ROR was 0.6% and 3.0%, respectively, and its operating margin was 0.5% and 2.7%, respectively. Accounts receivable absorbed a large component of the working capital. During the period 1991-93, it had a increasing trend from 81 days of billing to 119. In 1994, accounts receivable amounted to about US$ 74 million, representing 80 days of billing. Most of this amount is owed to EPEC by municipalities and provincial government agencies, with arrears equivalent to about two - 85 - ANNEX 6 years. Arrears from cooperatives are equivalent to 85 days of billing. During the period 1991- 94, EPEC has been obliged to maintain large deposits in provincial banks (Banco de la Provincia and Banco Social). In 1994, EPEC maintained about $162 million in deposits in both banks, equivalent to 24% of total assets, which explains the low level of investment carried out by EPEC during the last four years (para. 12). EPEC is unable to use freely this money, thus reducing EPEC's ability to carry out its investment program as envisaged. Despite this, EPEC's debt equity ratio has remained at a satisfactory level (about 8/92) and its debt service coverage ratio has been over 3. II. MAIN SECTORAL AND POLICY ISSUES 14. The main issues of the power sector are: (a) lack of definition of the role of the State in the power sector as regulator and operator; (b) lack of autonomy and accountability of EPEC; (c) a highly politicized approach to set electricity price; and (d) inadequate financial resources to support investment. Legal and Regulatory Framework 15. The existing legal and regulatory framework coupled with EPEC's current organization and performance do not permit a systematic improvement of the efficiency of the sector without a serious and sustained effort towards substantial reforms. Government intervention, political interference, agreements with the unions, and some financial constraints have reduced the efficiency and productivity of EPEC significantly. The overall efficiency of the power sector is poor, characterized by EPEC's dual role as regulator and operator, inadequate corporate autonomy, and inadequate pricing policies. Electricity prices and investments proposed by the cooperatives are primarily revised by EPEC and then submitted to the provincial government for approval, rather than more independet provincial officers. 16. The current legal framework does not permit a transparent private participation in the sector. Recently, the government has approved a contract with two of the EPEC's unions and three cooperatives for repairing, operating and maintaining 307 MW thermal plants (composed by 4 steam power plants (216 MVA) and 3 turbogas -91 MVA). The government decision on granting concession of the power thernal plant for 20 years was not based on (international or local) competitive bidding process, and the supply contract's conditions jeopardize EPEC's economic performance, as EPEC is obliged to buy power during the next 10 years at an electricity price (about US$36/MWh), which is higher than the spot electricity price existing in the WEM. EPEC's Autonomy, Management, and Accountability 17. EPEC is an integral part of the provincial Government and fully subject to the same bureaucratic controls and restrictions as governrnent agencies. To a great extent the current problems of EPEC are linked to its organization and legal framework. The existing public model presents serious limitations that affects EPEC efficiency and effective management. - 86 - ANNEX 6 Auto-regulation and lack of autonomy that have generally inhibited corporate dynamics, overstaffing and agreements with the union that do not allow productivity improvement, originate inefficiencies. EPEC also lacks a comprehensive action plan to reduce electricity losses. Accounting, financial, and budget system, and internal control are also inadequate, as they do not follow corporate principles. Electricity Prices 18. Electricity prices have been higher than the economic during the last four years. EPEC's by-laws provides for prices to be set according to accounting system, with an 8.0 percent rate of return on operating assets, but it has been lower than 3%. EPEC's by-laws entitles the provincial government to approve retail electricity prices, based on proposals made by EPEC. In practice, prices are set, based on political considerations, to cover cash flow requirements at a higher level than economic cost. Consumers are classified according to their economic activities, while voltage levels, time of day, and load factors are ignored. Additionally, it exists cross-subsidies within a category of customers and among categories, with the consequent inefficiency. The price thus fails to send appropriate signals about cost of electricity and penalizes (in relative terms) those consumers whose use patterns are better for the system. Currently, EPEC has lost about 15 % of its large industrial customers, who prefer to buy electricity from the WEM at lower prices. There is a potential risk that EPEC continues losing customers, as the National Secretary of Energy issued a resolution allowing industrial and commercial customer with an installed capacity of 100 kVA to buy energy from the WEM, early this year. EPEC has 133 customers with an installed capacity equal or higher than 100 kVA (but lower than 1000 kVA) with a annual consumption of 121 GWh. Financing and Investment 19. Although EPEC has a well develop planning procedure for defining the expansion of the transmission system, EPEC's investment program includes a large amount of projects based on political and social considerations. Investment in transmission and distribution has been delayed due to the lacks of adequate financing and to the cumbersome process approve a contract for executing a investment project, which takes about 210 days. For this reason, there is a tendency to purchase equipment and materials more than required. In particular, the construction of a new interconnection with the NIS at 500 kV has been postponed for about two years. Investment has been mainly financed with the depreciation fund. The rehabilitation and repowering of the F. Simon hydro plant is not based on economic costs, but on political decision. III. PROPOSED REFORMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 20. Conceptually, the government could attempt the correction of serious operational shortcomings of EPEC that undermine its efficiency, profitability, and ultimately its survivability. However, there are serious doubts about the public sector's political degrees of - 87 - ANNEX 6 freedom (intrinsic to all provincial governments) to bring about this trasformation. Therefore, it is recommended that the government proceed immediately with plans for the privatization of the company. 21. In preparation for privatization, EPEC should not lose time in improving its efficiency and performance. This requires changes in policies, regulatory and institutional framework to enable them to operate on a commercial basis in a competitive environment where accountability is ensured. Taxes on output, labor, prices of inputs, tax treatment of debt service should be identical to their private counterparts. The system of government supervision should be ex post control of results and managerial performance. 22. Given the importance to the economy of the energy sector and particularly of the power sector, the provincial government should revise its policy to: (a) redefine the role of the State in the power sector, clearly separate its policy/regulatory role from its role as owner of power public utility; (b) recognize that electricity prices should reflect economic costs; (c) transform the government-owned utilities into commercially oriented enterprises; (d) assure the financial autonomy of the power utilities; and (e) eliminate the restriction by means of which distribution of electricity is reserved to the provincial government, allowing the participation of private investors in the sector at different segment of the business. Institutional and Regulatory Framework 23. The provincial electricity law requires modification. The provincial government should establish an independent regulatory agency, free from political considerations, aimed at: (a) establishing its role in concession granting, pricing, approval of expansion plans, and controlling the quality of service; (b) establishing rules for price setting based on economic principles and clear mechanism for their adjustments; (c) establishing clear rules regarding the right of private investors to obtain reasonable returns on their investments at the different segments of electric industry (generation, transmission, and distribution, and commercialization levels). In particular, review and control of electricity prices adjustment and investment proposal, currently executed by EPEC, should be transferred to the regulatory agency. The creation of a Regulatory agency at the highest level of the Government, with functions to regulate other sub-sectors, should be considered. This agency should be free from political considerations with tenure staggered to provide continuity during national and provincial elections and ensure impartial decision-making. It is recommended that the government request technical assistance for developing and implementing the required reforms. 24. A prime obstacle for efficient resource allocation is the regulation of labor market, as they restrict EPEC from adjusting their labor force to changing market conditions. The government should reform EPEC's labor stability and wage structure, particularly the long list of benefits should be revised. The existing cumbersome procurement procedures, set up for the public sector, should be also rationalized and modified, which must be followed by the power utilities. Finally, the government should establish clear rules of the game for the use of water by hydro power plants to facilitates the economic operation of hydro power generation. - 88 - ANNEX 6 Electricity Prices 25. The Government should establish a stable and efficient pricing setting based on the economic cost of supply to final customers. and implement the electricity price study already completed by EPEC with the assistance of consultants. Doing so would greatly reduce the distortion caused by cross-subsidies. It would also promote energy conservation by sending consumers the right price signals, and thus make future investments more manageable in financial terms. The basis for setting electricity prices should be changed from accounting to economic principles. A draft rule for calculating and setting electricity tariff has already been prepared by consultants, which is in line with the price principles established in the national electricity law and it is acceptable to the Bank. EPEC's Restructuring 26. The government should revise EPEC's by-laws, and adapt them to new regulatory framework. EPEC requires streamlining to make its organizational structure more efficient and responsive to the needs of its clients. EPEC should be restructured as a corporation with the right to sell its majority shares. New by-laws should define precisely the duties and obligations of the directors versus the line managers. The board of directors should be entrusted with financial autonomy and accountability. The budgetary decisions should be placed in their hands acting on recommendations of the management. The government should refrain from detailed capital expenditure and expenses examination of EPEC budget. This should be excluded from the consolidated government budget except for eventual transfers from EPEC to central government which require government approval. EPEC should be permitted to have equal access to financial markets, free to bank where it wishes, and not be used as financial agents of the government. EPEC should have the right to manage its own liquidity nd capital reserves. A distribution company should be created, establishing clear rules to govern the commercial transactions between EPEC and the cooperatives and power producers, and strengthening its financial and managerial capabilities. Also generating activities should be divided into thermal and hydro power generating corporations that could be open to competition for generation activities or privatized. 27. The Government also should define an efficiency improvement plan aimed at: (a) providing EPEC with the required autonomy to operate as commercial oriented institution; (b) improving management by liberating appointments from political interference and establishing a system of performance indicators for EPEC with clearly identified financial and technical targets; (c) relieving the power sector of the existing highly bureaucratic procurement and contracting procedures, and reviewing the existing labor legislation affecting the sector; and (d) enriching management incentives. The government should also improve EPEC's productivity, by ensuring the corresponding staffing reductions through providing retirement incentives for personnel, and transferring some activities to the private sector by sub-contracting. 28. EPEC meanwhile also needs to cut its costs in order to achieve better economic and financial equilibrium. In addition to reducing the number of employees, EPEC should: (a) reduce - 89 - ANNEX 6 technical losses at high voltage by speeding up the interconnection with the national interconnected system at 500 kV and reinforcing the 132 kV and 66 kV transmission systems, based on the studies carried out by EPEC; (b) reduce non-technical losses at low voltage through the preparation and implementation of a comprehensive action plan; (c) deter investments which are not economically justified. On this regard, the repowering of the F. Simon hydro power plant should be disregarded, and investment on general works (construction of administrative buildings and warehouses) and the acquisition of equipment not directly related to project in execution should be reduced. Adequately and promptly investment decision-making process on transmission system should optimize EPEC's technical operation, reducing economic cost and system reliability. Additionally, the obligation of maintaining large amount of money in Bank deposit should be released. Moreover, if the government implement above recommendations in an orderly manner, EPEC's finances would satisfactory improve, thus reducing the need to maintain such amount of money in EPEC's accounts. 29. EPEC's expansion plan should be revised. The investment decision-making should be compatible with the province's development strategy and should be based on economic grounds. Investment proposals should be ranked according to their economic rates of return. Rural electrification projects should be clearly spelled out. Project evaluation should emphasize contribution to growth as measured by economic and social rates of return. The tendency to order equipment and materials more than it is required should be eliminated. 30. The Government should consider creating a separate transmission and distribution company, followed by definition of clear rules to govern commercial transactions between EPEC and the cooperatives and power producers and large customers. It would be desirable to examine the creation of two generating corporations (for thermal and hydro power generation), all sold through an international competitive bidding process. New legislation for the electricity sector (consistent with the national regulatory system) is considered a key condition to attract greater private sector participation. - 90 - ANNEX 6 Attachment 1 The National Regulatory Power Sector Framework 1. In January 1992, Argentina defined a new regulatory framework by law #24055 (Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electricity law). The law aims at: (a) setting the rules of the game for the Government, power utilities, and customers in the electricity, including pricing policies and participation of private investors in the sector; and (b) creating a regulatory body (Ente Nacional Regulador de la Electricidad - ENRE), which controls the compliance with the regulations and sets transmission and distribution electricity prices. The power sector activities were divided into separated generating, transmission, dispatching, and distribution companies. 2. The power market. It consists of: (a) a long-term market, in which participate producers, transmitters, distributors, and large industrial customers, which freely negotiate supply contracts of electricity; and (b) a short-term market, in which distributors buy power or energy in a spot market, i.e. on an hourly or daily basis at different price than negotiated in the long-term market. Industrial customers may participate in this market with a minimum demand regulated by the ENRE final customers market composed by distributors (sellers) and their final customers. The distributors are entitled to seek the means to satisfy power demand in their concession area. The shared use of the transmission systems is a part of the competition at the generation level. The use of third party lines for transmission is subject to payment of toll fees. A new corporate entity, the Compafia Administradora del Mercado Mayorista Electrico S.A. (CAMMESA), is responsible for dispatching energy to the national bulk power market and coordinating the operation of the national Interconnected System. CAMMESA ensures the economic use of generation facilities and preserves the reliability of the electric system's service. 3. Electricity prices. The Government policy on electricity pricing is in line with the overall country policy of letting market forces establish prices of goods and services. The bulk power market is composed of: a free market, in which producers and customers can freely negotiate the price of supply, and a spot market, in which the energy not committed in the free market is sold at the short-term marginal cost including a margin for the estimated non-served energy. Distributors must calculate their estimated firm power purchases from the grid, and may make contracts with specific producers or the system for certain amounts of the requirements, or the distributor's requirement may be purchased from the system on a spot basis. Transmission prices are based on the following parameters: energy transmitted, connection charges, and transmission capacity charges. The price to final customers (retail price) is determined by ENRE for EDESUR, EDENOR, and EDELAP (successors of SEGBA) and for those provincial utilities which adhere to the centrally regulated system. The provinces, which choose not to adhere to the system, will maintain their autonomy in setting the prices to final customers. The retail prices set by the ENRE include the value added of the distribution service, plus the cost of purchased power and provide for a fair return on investment. - 91 - ANNEX 6 4. The Federal Electricity Council (CFE). CFE is composed by representatives of the Secretary of energy, the national utilities and provincial authorities. The CFE is responsible for: (a) advising the national and provincial governments on all subjects related to the power sector, including investment priorities, concessions, and electricity prices; (b) coordinating power sector planning and submitting it to the government's approval; (c) proposing modification to the Electricity Law; and administering a National Power Energy Fund. The CFE also provides a general forum for discussion between the federal and provincial authorities, which may include guidance for privatization strategies at the provincial level. 5. National Power Energv (NPE) Fund. A surcharge of 2.4 pesos (about US$2.4) per MWh over the basic price paid by distributors and large customers goes into a NPE fund, 60% of which is used to compensate pricing mechanism to provincial final customers, while the remaining 40% funds investment program. 6. The National Secretary of Energv (SE). The SE is responsible for: (a) overall energy planning; (b) granting of concession for exploration and exploitation of petroleum and gas field and for electricity power supply; (c) pricing policies; and (d) policies for energy conservation and development of new resources of energy. The Under Secretariat of Electricity holds shares in CAMMESA and is head of the CFE, and is responsible for actually proposing sector policies to the SE for approval. EPEC's Electricity Prices Applied to Final Customers 7. EPEC adhered to Articles #40 to #49 of the national law #24,065, which establish the criteria for setting electricity prices at distribution level. EPEC calculates a target price as the sum of: (a) the economic cost of production and transmission at 500 kV, which is equivalent to the price of energy purchased by EPEC; (b) the value added of EPEC transmission (132 kV) and subtransmission (66 kV) system (VAT); and (c) the valued added of the distribution service (VAD) of an efficient utility. The VAT includes the cost of transmission losses plus the operating and maintenance (O&M) cost and the annuity of the investment cost of the transmission and subtransmission systems, valued at the replacement cost of an efficient transmission system. The VAD includes the annuity of the investment cost and the O&M cost of an efficient distribution company. This is a satisfactory approach to the long-run marginal cost at distribution level. In this case, it has assumed that non-technical losses at distribution level would be 3.5%. O&M were calculated assuming 2,600 employees. - 92 - ANNEX 6 PRIVATIZATION OF PROVINCIAL DISTRIBUTION POWER UTILITIES 8. So far, five power provincial distribution power utilities have been privatized (Table ..), and two (EDECAT and ERSE) are under international bidding process. The provincial governments have adhered to the national regulatory framework, and to the tariff structure. Table 1: distribution utilities privatized Province/uWility Energy sales Customers Comment (GWh) ('000) Formosa 199 62 90% of shares were privatized in EDEFOR 1.9.95 (S8.4 million) La Rioja 272 52 90% of shares were privatized in EDELAR 1.9.95 ($13.7 million) San Luis 489 78 100% of shares were privatized EDESAL in 3.3.95 ($18.5 million) Santiago del Estero 279 105 90% of shares were privatized in EDESE 1.4.95 ($15.7 million) Tucuman 838 225 90% of shares were privatized in EDET 6.9.95 (S47.8 million) -93 - ANNEX 6 Attachment 2 EPEC's MAIN INVESTMENT PROGRAM FOR THE PERIOD 1996-1999 The proposed investment program includes, among others the following projects: Investment related with the interconnection of EPEC's 132 kV transmission system with the 500 kV national interconnected system. Priority Transmission projects for the period 1995-2001 Description Total cost Comments US$ Million 132 kV transmission lines: 9.69 * A. Cabral-Villa Maria II TT.L., 20 km; * It would be included in the 1997 budget; * Arroyito- San Francisco, 90 km; * included in 1995 and 1996 budget. * Malvinas- E.P. Este 1, 28 km * included in 1995 and 1996 budget. Reactive compensation equipment, 11 MVAr; 0.39 * included in 95 and 96 budget 132 kV transmission lines: 10.57 * Malvinas-E.P. Rodriguez del busto 1, 53 km * included in 1995 and 1996 budget * Rio IV-Villa Mercedes II * forecast to be commissioned in 1998 25 MVA power transformers, 500/132 kV, 0.80 * forecast to be commissioned in 1998 located in Colonia Caroya 300 MVA power transformers, 500/132 kV, 6.36 * included in 1995 and 1996 budget located in Malvinas Argentinas Reactive Compensation, 2 MVAr 0.39 * included in 1995 and 1996 budget 132 kV Transmission lines 14.98 * San Francisco-Brinkman, 66 km * included in 95 and 96 budget * Other lines, 131 km * forecast to be commissioned in 2001 (USS9.12 million) 257 MVA power transformers, 132/66 kV 3.20 * two units to be located in Brinkman and isla * included in 95 and 96 budget Verde; * two units to be located in Bell Ville and Rio + forecast to be commissioned in 2001 tercero I Reactive Compensation, 1 MVAr 0.14 * forecast to be commissioned in 2001 Total investment for period 1995-2001 46.52 - 94 - ANNEX 6 Attachment 3 EPEC'S FINANCE ASSUMPTION FOR EPEC FINANCIAL PROJECTIONS General 1. Financial projections used in the base case for period 1996-1999 have been prepared by EPEC, with the assistance of the mission, in current prices and are expressed in $ million. 2. The main assumptions are the following: 3. Inflation. 3% per year starting in 1996. 4. Energy Sales. Energy sales are based on demand projection prepared by the mission. It considered the following sales growth per year: (3.0%) residential, (2.0%) general, (0.1%) large customers, (2.%) cooperatives, and (1.7%) others. It also includes a reduction of power losses from 19% in 1996 to 16% in 1999 over net power energy supplied to EPEC's transmission system. Energy sold (GWh) 1996 1997 1998 1999 Residential 883 927 965 994 General 320 333 343 350 Large Customers 935 955 965 966 Cooperatives 957 1001 1036 1062 Others 192 200 205 208 Total 3287 3415 3514 3580 5. Electricity price. Electricity prices are maintained in real terms. They also are adjusted with a decreasing trend to reach target prices based on economic cost in 1999. Residential price was reduced by 1.5% p.a., General (7.2%), Large Customers (3.1%), cooperatives (0.7%), and others ( 6.6%). 6. Energy sold to WEM. Own generation was maintained constant at 706 GWh (554 Gwh hydro and 152 Gwh thermal). It was assumed that this generation is sold to the WEM at 43.6 $/Mwh. -95 - ANNEX 6 Energy sold to WEM (GWh) Annually from 1996 to 1999 Thermal 152 Hydro 554 Total 706 7. Energy Purchased. Total energy required by EPEC is bought to the WEM. It was assumed that EPEC buys electricity to the MEM at 37.4 $/kWh. A charge of 2.4 $/MWh was added, which goes to the electrification funds (law #24065, Art #70). E Energy purchased to WEM 1996 1997 1998 1999 GWh 4059 4115 4184 4262 8. Other Operating revenues. This mainly includes connections and penalties for re- connections. For 1995, it was assumed as the average for the period 1992-1994. From 1996 on, it was maintained in real termns. 9. Personnel Cost. It was assumed a reduction from 3859 in 1995 to 3283 in 1999. It considers that Pilar, Villa maria, and Gral Levalle thermal plants will be given in concession early 1996. From 1997 on, it was assumed a 1.7% reduction p.a., plus the retirement of about 150 employees in 1999. Number of 1996 1997 1998 1999 employees l Production 492 480 472 427 General 155 142 135 122 Distribution 875 860 848 799 Commercialization 1195 1180 1164 1107 Administration 897 892 875 828 Total 3614 3554 3494 3283 - 96 - ANNEX 6 10. Fuel Costs. They are based on the existing prices of gas (0.095 S/m3, gas oil (.0186 $/lt), and fuel oil (0. 14 $/kg), which are maintained constant in real terms during the period. 11. Taxes. EPEC is subject to income tax, which is calculated as 33% of net income. 12. Investment program. Investment for transmission and distribution are based on the investment plan prepared by EPEC. The most important project included in the program are the interconnection of EPEC transmission system with the NIS and the acquisition of telecontrol and tecommand equipment for improving operation reliability. Current investment also includes the rehabilitation and repowering of the F. Simon hydro power plant (36 MW) 13. Financing of investment program. It assumes that the repowering of F. Simon hydro -power plant will be financed by a 45.0 million Spaniard loan. Telecontrol project is financed by a $8.5 million loan. 14. Accounts Receivable. It was projected with a decreasing trend from 80 days of billings in 1996 to 60 days of billings in 1999. -97- ANNEX 7 CORDOBA PUBLIC EXPENDITURE MISSION: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION I. Introduction 1. This note summarizes the public administration findings of the Cordoba Public Sector Reform mission of October 1995. The mission's objective was to assist the newly elected Governor of the Province of Cordoba in assessing public sector performance in the midst of a deep financial crisis which is taking place in the context of national economic difficulties. Deficit spending in excess of S400 million for the last two years underscores the need to examine personnel expenditures of the public administration which have been a major source of fiscal imbalance. This report thus focuses on personnel aspects of the present fiscal crisis, but it also offers observations about structural problems in the public service that will need to be resolved in the medium term to improve administrative performance. 1. Diagnosis The Context 2. With the recent devolution from national to provincial level of responsibilities for service provision in key sectors such as health, education, security, water and sanitation, Argentine provincial governments assume a much larger functional portfolio -- but without matching financial or institutional capacity. A provincial fiscal management crisis, characterized by undercollection of taxes, weak budgeting mechanisms, insolvent provincial banks, and poor administrative controls on staffing is taking place in the midst of a national economic crisis. Government policy is calling for wage reductions in both private and public sectors as part of an overall adjustment in relative prices. Unemployment has hovered in double digits. 3. The Cordoba case exemplifies many of these elements. Its financial situation deteriorated in the last few years, resulting in average deficits of nearly 20 percent of current expenditures. Both the previous and current provincial (opposition) governments' rejection of the national Pacto Fiscal - which would have assured access to the minimum guaranteed revenue from the federal government- hasn't helped. After violent worker protests against back salary payments in provincial bonds, the former govemor stepped down six months early, and the new governor- elect launched an emergency plan in the face of the mounting fiscal crisis. The plan included arrangements to use Certificates of Cancellation of Debt for past-due and partial current payments to public servants, (among others), as well as a 30 percent wage bill reduction through a 40 percent cut in working hours for public employees. These and other measures are in force only through the end of calendar 1995. Although the estimated savings are calculated at $450 million, the financing gap is likely to remain large, necessitating significant cuts in expenditures. An inevitable target must be personnel expenditures, which account for half of provincial government total spending. The critical problem is howv to reduce personnel costs in the short-run without overly compromising medium-term prospects for performance-oriented administrative development Teachers and police were excepted, though their seniority payments were reduced, in addition to other cost-containment measures. -98- ANNEX 7 -- much needed in light of the new requirements placed upon provincial government for provision of social services. The Problem Wage Bill Issues 4. By various measures, Cordoba's personnel expenditures are seriously out of balance. The provincial wage bill has climbed steadily in real terms since 1989 (Table 1), increasing by 141% by 1994. At that point, based on 1995 projections, staff spending appears to have begun a decline (by about 7%) due largely due to the imposition of the 40% reduction in working hours for most public administration staff through the Emergency Lawv 8472 of July 1995. This measure is estimated to have reduced the wage bill by 30% for the Julv-December 1995 period. In addition, other emergency measures reducing seniority benefits, eliminating overtime, suppressing approximately 4399 vacant posts through Decree 1372 of October 1995, and elimination of a still- unclear number of non-permanent staff, should contribute to wage bill reductions for the next fewv months. Despite the apparent reversal in the upwvard wvage trend, however, personnel expenditures have continued to represent over half of all spending in Cordoba. From a high of 57.2% in 1990, the wage bill still comprised 50.2% of total expenditures in 1994. Although a rising wage bill often corresponds to a crowding out of current spending on goods and services, this trend is only faintly detectable in Cordoba where goods and services as a percentage of total expenditures are dowvn from 12 to 9.9% for the 1987-1994 period. But perhaps the most dramatic imbalance is between wages and total revenues. The former consumed over 60% of the latter in 1994. Approximately 78% of personnel expenditures are on permanent staff, 15% go for non- permanent staff. The remaining 7% are spent on "other personnel expenditures" which include temporary labor for specific tasks across ministries. Quite possibly, the aggregate of these categories understates the wage bill by some degree, as some "informal" public employment may be hidden in other budget categories, as discussed shortly. Personnel spending on Education and Culture account for 38% of the total wage bill. Health personnel expenditures make up another 15%, and the Ministry of Economy and Finance accounts for 16% of personnel spending. Employment 5. Employment figures for Cordoba's public administration are subject to considerable uncertainty. Until the results of a recently undertaken census are available, agreement can be assured only wvith regard to the rough, overall dimensions of government. The census is reportedly 85% complete, mainly lacking data for education, but census findings have not yet been analyzed. Apparently using partial results from this census, however, the General Directorate for Personnel estimates the total number of public servants to number 87,205. The overwhelming portion consists of executive branch employees (93%) with legislative and judicial branch employees representing 2% and 5% respectively. Broken down somewhat differently, total public administration employment can be divided into the central administration, which accounts for 86% of employment, provincial banks and the pension fund, comprising another 9% of functionaries, and the state enterprises, which make up 5% of total provincial government employment. 6. Permanent employees account for 91% of this total. These estimates assess non- permanent staff to comprise 9%, or about 7891 employees. Non-permanent staff are categorized as contracted staff (5%) and temporary (4%). (Figure 1) The former are employed for fixed terms which may be renewed indefinitely. The latter are employed for specific tasks or projects. In -99- ANNEX 7 theory, their employment terminates when the activity ends, but, in practice, many temporarv staff have been employed for periods of a decade or more. Approximately 3705 temporary staff are employed by PAICOR, the school feeding program (this represents a decrease of 1800 employees during the last year.) Non-permanent staff contribute to social security and the government pension plan, but they usually do not become vested to receive the latter, as their tenure is, in principle, too short. It would appear that government estimates of individual sector employment are low. For example, where the DGP numbers for education appear to include only official slots, assessed at 27,975, we calculate the number to be significantly higher. The discrepancv is mainly due to the difficulties in discriminating between actual teachers and full-timc teacher-equivalents, based on teaching hours. The latter account for a large portion of secondary school employment. By calculating together the number of actual slots (mainly for primary teachers) and teacher full- time equivalents based on teaching hours in addition to substitute and short-term teachers (suplentes and interinos), the number could arguably be estimated in the neighborhood of 44,666. This revision would, in turn, bring the total number of administration employees up to 103,896 and could increase the number of non-permanent staff by an unknown number- 7. In either the high or low scenario, education is the largest employer in the public administration, accounting for between 40 and 45% of personnel. At 14,190, health employment is the second highest, constituting 20% of Cordoba's public employment. The next largest employer is the Govemment Ministry, comprising about 14,721 employees or roughly 21% of the public administration. 8. It is possible that even the higher current employment estimates may be undercounting employees who are hired through a variety of non-transparent mechanisms. Anecdotal reports suggest that staff may be hired through blanket contracts for services with firms or cooperatives without indicating the exact number or identity of sub-contracted employees. In addition, staff may be hired in student intemships that are lumped into task rather than emplo ment categories in the budget. Even the use of "subsidios", abandoned through the Emergency Law, wvas a source of hidden employment by the Ministrv of Social Development, according to one source. This so called "black" employment may be more or less remunerative than "whitc" employment, depending on the circumstances. 9. Estimates of trends over the last several years in provincial government employment must rely on figures for occupied positions supplied by the General Directorate of Personnel, as no other time series data were available. These figures suggest that permanent employment grew between 1989 and 1993 by about just over 5%, but then began to decrease between 1993 and 1994 by 6%. The main source of the overall increase in employment was the transfer of service responsibilities from the national level, namely education. This transfer of functions accounted for over 3000 posts in 1993 and nearly 2800 in 1994. In addition, slightly over 1200 (Ex-E.P.O.S.) posts appear in the budget in 1993 and again in 1994. Security also maintained its growth in 1994, increasing by about 500 posts. The main source of the very minor decline in permanent employment in 1994 appears to have been in the "other" category, including services for higher- ranking officials, art and music, airforce, printers and the Court of Accounts. Bctween 1989 and 1993, the increase in non-permanent posts was more dramatic, groing by over 45%. Reductions of nearly 7% between 1993 and 1994 may have begun a downward trend, however. -100- ANNEX 7 Assessing Redundancv 10. Without a more precise notion of the dimensions of public employment, it is difficult to assess the appropriateness of present employment parameters. Although w-e knowv employment is too high from a fiscal perspective, how can we know xvhether and by how much the public administration is over-sized the from a functional standpoint? Comparisons xxith other provinces are of limited utility. While the province of Santa Fe has roughlv the same population (2,798,422 to Cordoba's 2,766,683) and only slightly lower public administration emplovment (80,258 for 1994) than Cordoba's (assuming the official figures), the lack of serious adjustment in other provincial governments makes it difficult to establish appropriate standards. Certainly, if the Bank estimate of Cordoba's employment is correct, even by provincial Argentine standards, Cordoba appears over-dimensioned. 11. Global comparisons may be more appropriate, but there then arises a comparability problem: it is difficult to compare different types and levels of governments, reflecting different kinds of jurisdictions and different scopes and functions.. Costa Rica has roughly the population equivalent of Cordoba wvith a public sector employment percentage of population of about 6. 14%. Using official figures, Cordoba's public employment is at half that level, at betwveen 3.1% and 3.8% of population. On the other hand, this is about three times as high as the U.S. central administration, which is approximately 1.24%.2 12. A more complete understanding of staffing Within individual sectors could yield a more fine-tuned appreciation of the overall level of redundancies in Cordoba's administration. While considerably more work remains to be done on a sector-by-sector basis to assess the nature and degree of staffing surplus, initial estimates can be gleaned from anecdotal reports. For example, redundancy levels in the state enterprises EPEC and DIPAS are estimated by the firms' owsn directorship to be as high as 40% - 50%. For the latter, the elimination of 500 staff from the water management department's full complement of 1043 wvould not adverselv affect operations, DIPAs director assessed. In the Health sector, World Bank analysis suggests that restructuring yielding very substantial staffing reductions would still not cut into fat. While by no means scientific, these estimates may at least be suggestive of the level of functional overstaffing the government must confront in various sectors. Interim Measuires 13. So far, the government has undertaken or proposed a series of measures to reduce employment or streamline government -- but at the margins. A consolidation of ministries from 11 to 6 reduced the employment structures at the top of the hierarchy, but it is not clear that staff were shed as a result. Elimination of overtime payments and contracted employment, and unfilled posts are acts intended to reduce employment and wvage bill costs. While the actual savings achieved by these measures are not known, it is unlikely that they will be sufficient to stem the tide against fiscal insolvency. Moreover, staff reductions that focus on contracted labor mav serve to remove just those employees who are the most capable or may select younger wvorkers disproportionately. By any available estimates of staffing levels in government, non-permanent staff are a relatively 2 Jose Sulbradt, "El Tamano del Sector Publico en America Latina.- Tablc, -1; Paper presented at the XIX Meeting of the Latin American Center for Administrative Development, Guatemala, 1989; and Barbara Nunberg, "Managing the Civil Service," World Bank Discussion Paper No. 204, Figure 3, Washington, D.C., 1995. -101- ANNEX 7 small proportion of government, bv government estimates as lowv as 9%. It seems unlikely that attacking this surplus employment problem without addressing the overstaffing of the permanent staff could result in the necessarv diminution of the wage bill through employment measures. To have the needed fiscal impact, permanent staff would likely need to be laid off or retired. Remuineration Issues 14. By dividing the total wage bill for 1994 (1279.6 million pesos) by total government figures for public administration employment (87,205) and again by 13 months, the average remuneration for provincial public servants is 1128 pesos per month.3 Using the alternative figure of 103,896 public servants, the average becomes slightly lower at 947 pesos per month. These figures are more or less in line with other estimates of average public provincial salaries in Cordoba. The (national) Ministry of Interior estimates average provincial public sector wages to be approximately 1085 per month and Cordoba's public sector Nvage to be about 1318. One published figure calculated lower estimates, with the average provincial Cordoba government salary to be around 891 pesos per month, about 1.26 times the average of all the provincial public sectors taken as a whole (771 pesos per month.)4 15. Both the 947 peso figure and certainly the higher 1128 peso figure exceed private sector averages for selected industries in Cordoba for roughlv the same period.5 The average for these sectors -- which included automobile manufacturing, cement, television, supermarket, construction and banking, was approximately 658 pesos per month.5 That public sector wage averages exceed those of the private sector may be a significant factor in determining the correct level for public sector wages. Indeed, the national government's recent calls for a downward adjustment (of between 10% and 15% across the country) in the price of non-tradeable goods and services --which have remained too high due to the structure of the convertibility program--may have been heeded faster in the private rather than the public sector. While more extreme than the national policy calls for, Cordoba's emergency measures to cut working hours and thereby average wages by 30% may turn out to have constituted the first step toward this downwvard correction in public wage levels, although maintaining wages at this low level may prove unsustainable and unwise. 16. In any case, there are problems in using average *vage levels to determine immediate across-the-board salary reductions or to deternine wage structures for the medium term. Averages do not reveal much about specific occupational remuneration. It is possible that at lower skill levels, the public sector pays better, due in part to strong public sector union bargaining. But this is very hard to detect due to the degree of dispersion from one salary scale to another across the public administration. For example, grade one, the loxvest grade level in the 3 All salary figures are gross amounts, not deducting various employee charges and contributions (amounting to about 40% of total remuneration.) 4 Novedades Economicas, April/May 1995, p. 36. This lower figure for the public administration as a whole is itself about tmice the average pay as shown in the official salary scale of the General Administration cadre, which amounts to about 438 per month. The difference could be explained by the inclusion in the wage bill of overtime hours and other non-salary payments as well as the sharp differentials between the general wage scale and those of higher-paying sectors of the overall public administration. There are as many as 22 separate wage scales and conditions of service for various cadres, each governed by a separate legal charter. These scales both reward different occupations differently as well as remunerate the same generic jobs differently. 5 Private sector and public sector data come from around March 1995. 6 Source: Padron de Asalariados Inscriptos, D.G.I. -102- ANNEX7 general administration, pays 335 pesos per month, whereas the bottom level post in the Justice Ministry pays 428.89 per month. In any case, these figures seem unrealistic, given the high public sector wage averages discussed above, and given the relatively flat salary structure of the public administration. While these structures varv by service, ratios of top to bottom salaries tend to be in the range of 6:1. 17. Trying to compare pay for actual jobs betveen private and public sectors is also extremely difficult without a benchmark job survey to ensure real comparability between posts. Anecdotal reports suggest that higher level professionals and managers receive somewhat higher wvages in the provincial private sector, especially for small, national firms (in the area of 4000 - 5000 pesos in the private sector as opposed to 2000-3000 for similar managerial functions in the public administration). But large multinationals may pay top executives as much as 9000 or 10,000 pesos per month. Thus, cutting wages at the bottom echelons of the public administration might be appropriate, in light of pnrvate relativities, but cutting managerial wages might hinder government's ability to compete with the private sector for professional talent. To the extent that wages are falling and may continue to fall in the private sector, reductions in public administration salaries may be less damaging than would be the case in most countnres, where salary reduction often serves to further erode real pav' in the context of inflation and where pay cuts are undertaken as an alternative rather than a complement to employment reduction. But if the relativities betwveen private and public salaries are different for different skill levels, across-the-board cuts may be insufficiently targeted for optimal results. From the very partial available data, it would appear that cutting lower administrative levels more than higher ones wvould be a more appropriate policy than a cut which leaves a compressed and distorted structure essentially intact. Structural Problems 18. The fiscal issues discussed above are the most urgent for Cordoba in the very short-term, but there are some related structural problems in the public administration that need to be addressed in order to begin the process of building efficient and effective governmcnt. Perhaps most pressing is the need to create a credible, functional personnel management system. This would consist of a computerized personnel management information system linking personnel records into the payroll and budget function. This system would require an accurate data base of all public servants which can be updated and monitored on an ongoing basis. Although this data base could, in principle, be established through the government's current civil service census exercise, usually it is best to have a computerized personnel information management system in place into which census data can be fed before they become outdated --- wvhich can happen very quickly. Currently, all personnel records are kept manually, and direct links with the budget are not in place. Without accurate data on the number, profile, job responsibilities, and remuneration of public servants, even short-term reforms could be derailed. Indeed, not only vould it be difficult to make rational employment reductions With any certainty about *vhere and who needed to be cut, but these employment cuts could be reversed through re-hiring if tight controls are not installed. 19. Another issue in need of immediate attention for the short and medium term is the remuneration system. Salaries and conditions of service for different services in Cordoba's public administration are dispersed and governed by a confusing array of arcane legislation. While a certain degree of differentiation may be desirable, particularly if it is responding to market forces, pay discrepancies for similar jobs within the central administration in Cordoba have created chaos and resentment. Such discrepancies also make coordinated wage policy extremely difficult. -103- ANNEX 7 Similarly, the proliferation of non-wage allowances and benefits, none of which are related to performance, undermine transparency and complicate the task of rationalizing or adjusting public service pay. An overhaul of the salary system, preferably in the context of changes in the overall incentive structures of provincial government (as discussed below), is very much needed. 20. Even if the size of the public administration were rcduced and the salaries rationalized, the incentives to perform tasks effectively are mainly lacking in the current administrative system. Merit-based mechanisms of several types are needed. For example, although the current recruitment system is based on educational credentials, it mainly operates according to personal affinities and political patronage. The introduction of a competitive selection process, built around a merit-based entrance exam, would raise the professional level of those cadres who are inducted into government. In addition, at present, there is no performance evaluation system. Although an evaluation system did exist under the military regime, it was closely associated with the political abuses of that era and was therefore discarded by the democratic administration. Some type of fair, results-oriented assessment process is nonetheless necessary to begin to tie pay and promotion to performance criteria. Currently, a combination of senioritv, clientelism, politics, and, to a lesser degree, ability determines career advancement in government. 21. Finally, but most fundamentally, the scope, objectives and general organization of provincial government in Cordoba need to be examined both in light of the likely continuation of fiscal pressures as well as in the interest of designing a more modem organizational approach to new functional requirements being placed on the state. New advances being utilized worldwide in decentralizing managerial responsibilities to lower administrative levels, technological innovations that reduce labor requirements, and creative outsourcing of selected government functions should be considered as potential avenues to streamlining government while making it more effective and client-responsive. Without this more fundamental approach to government reform. addressing the near-term fiscal crisis is unlikely to lead to meaningful improvements in government performance. Reform Constraints Constitutional Constraints 22. Reduction of staffing in the public administration could be constrained by several factors. One is, for permanent staff, the apparent7 guarantee to job security through Article 13-A of the Provincial Constitution. The article states that stability of employment cannot be removed Nvithout cause, mainly defined by labor law in terms of personal dereliction of duties or ethical infractions. The potential to define reasonable "cause" in terms of emergency government streamlining appears to be worth exploring, however. It is not clear as to wvhether this would rule out the application of the mechanism of "disponibilidad" which allows government to dismiss employees with the provision of a six-month grace period, during which they may receive some compensation but are not in service. If they can locate another position in government during this period, they will be retained, if not, they are legally dismissed. This instrument provides the means to government to reduce cadres, but it requires that government enforce its provisions. The article states the following: "A la estabilidad en los emplcos publicos de carrera, no pudiendo ser separados del cargo sin sumario previo, quo se funde cn causa legal * sin garantizarse el derecho de defensa. Toda cesancia que contravenga lo antes expresado, sera nula, con la reparacion pertinente. Al escalafon en la carerra administrativa." -104- ANNEX 7 Cost Constraints: Indemnization and the Pension F-und Dilemma 23. Government is also constrained by the costs of indemnifying laid-off workers. The legal stipulation for most services is that dismissed workers receive one month's salarv for every year of service. These costs might be financed through liquidation of assets through privatization. If Government were to contemplate a targeted, voluntary retirement plan, the costs might need to be even higher, as incentives to leave public service in the context of an uncertain private sector labor market and high unemployment would need to be that much greater than statutorv obligations. 24. A major constraint in any downsizing program derives from the fiscal imbalance in the provincial government pension fund. Currently in deficit, the pension fund depends upon contributions from "active" public servants (at a rate of 14.5% of basic salary) to finance benefits for "passive" public service pensioners, who receive benefits amounting to between 82% and 85% of the salary of the last year of active employment. In principle, laying off older workers will increase the pension burden to unsustainable levels. Laying off younger workers, even without additional older retirees, wvill shrink the group of active contributors, thus also increasing the pension burden unsustainably. Using a partial sample of the public administration,8 Figure 2 suggests that about 20 percent of the public administration is above age 50. Table 2 assumes an early retirement program for staff above age 55. Calculating the increased pension cost, the savings in active salary costs, and the loss in active contributions, this scenario predicts a deficit of over 13 million pesos for year-one. Assuming that the age, salarv and seniority structure of the excluded employment cadres are roughly similar to the available sample, it seems unlikely that their inclusion would significantly alter the nature of the outcome of this scenario. Political Pressures and Union Opposition 25. Lmplicitly, of course, perhaps the more powerful constraint is the political pressure to maintain high public employment in light of vocal labor opposition to reduction in employment or benefits and in light of a high unemployment rate in the provincial economy at large. Initial discussions with representatives of the SEP (Sindicato de Empleados Publicos) -- the main public sector employees union-- reveal some strong policy preferences but also some flexibility. The union is not inalterably opposed to staff reductions among permanent staff, raising the possibility of the application of the mechanism of "disponibilidad" for those employees whose functions might be deemed redundant. But SEP made the point that before decisions about employment cuts could be made, a better grasp of the actual numbers and location of the present cadres of public servants was necessary. The union did not have full confidence in the current census exercise, but it believed it to be better than nothing, given the reigning chaos in civil service employment data. SEP representatives also appeared to understand the inevitabilty of lower salaries, although it was not clear that the effective level of a 30% reduction instituted through the Emergency Law would be easily accepted over the longer term. The most audible grievance was the call for a more transparent remuneration system. They underscored their desire for equal pay for equal work (as established in the Provincial Constitution) across different services in the public administration and a consolidation of allowances into the basic salary. And they appeared to seek a morc collaborative negotiation process, whereby the union would be consulted by government before The sample includes approximately 38, 000 employees from the Central Administration, Police, Judicial Seriice, and Legislative staff. It excludes provincial bank staff, teachers and EPEC personnel. -105- ANNEX 7 taking policy actions to achieve optimal solutions. Although a consultative mechanism exists in principle, in practice, it has not been fullv utilized, they contend. Reform Options 26. Given the enormous weight of personnel expenditures in the budget, closing the fiscal gap in Cordoba will necessarily require a reduction in salary spending. In order to reduce the overall deficit of 629 million pesos projected for 1996, personnel spending wNill have to be reduced to 1010 million pesos in 1996, representing a reduction of approximately, 21% or 269 million pesos from 1994 levels. The question is, how can this be achieved'? Table 3 showvs some optional reduction scenarios for salary and/or employment reduction, showing both the gross savings as well as the savings net of severance pay-outs.9 The scenarios make clear that employment cuts reap fewer net savings than salary reduction due to the cost of severance. Indeed, the lowest savings occur in scenario 3 which proposes only employment cuts (across-the-board) of 20%. But these are assumed to be a one-time cost to be borne in 1996. Various scenanra assume salary cuts of 10%, in line vith the probable need for such adjustment at the national level. Scenarios I and 5 actually showv a gross savings that will close the budgetary gap. While the net savings for all options presented do not fully reduce the personnel spending deficit, it is expected that severance can be financed through one-time liquidation of assets. Thus, the expenditure reductions focus on the gross effect of the various scenarios. 27. From the various options explored, it would be more desirable to target both pav and employment cuts more specificallv. Since there is some evidence that higher level staff are less well remunerated than are lower skill levels in relation to the private sector, for example, it would make sense to target pay cuts to the lower echelons of the public administration in order to decompress \\ages (even kno'wing the obvious political costs.) Similarly, a reviewv of the salary structure of the public administration (shown in figure 3) suggests that the number of higher and higher-middle level staff may be inordinately large, wVith too many managers for too few subordinates. Thus, employment cuts focused more closely on reduction of these surpluses would contribute towxard a more balanced administrative structure that more closely resembled a pyramidd. 28. Wage and employment cuts proposed in scenario 5 showv one option for closing the budgetary gap with this more targeted approach. This approach would decompress the public administration wvage structure through larger wage reductions at the bottom and lower-middle of the scale (at around 17%). Higher level staff would receive proportionally lower pav cuts, in the range of 13%. On average, this scenario implies wage reductions of 13.7%. In this scenario, employment cuts would be made across the service, but wvould also target those groups Nvith the largest employment numbers. The large pockets of employment appear (in figure 3) in the salary ranges of 450, 800, and 2000 pesos. These groups w ould be reduced by 20%., with the aim of Table 3 is based on actuarial data from the Pension Fund for the-Administracion Central, Policia, Poder Judicial and the Poder Legislativo. In addition, it assumes an age and salary profile for education staff similar to the Administracion Central characteristics. The total current personnel cxpenditure figure does not include items such as debt service that are counted in the total *age bill, but simply represents total remuneration. Assumptions for the cost of retrenchment amount to severance payments of one month for each year of servicc. Seniority was assumed to roughly correlate with age. - 1 06- ANNEX 7 reconstructing the salary grid into a pyramidal structure, %vith a lower manager to staff ratio. Overall, the cuts in employment would amount to 8.6% Other Steps * This short-term approach to salarv and employment rationalization should be supported by three steps to prevent the erosion of the quality of the public administration cadres -- particularly at the professional level. One is a comparator pay survey to determine the real relativities with the private sector. This could be carried out quickly and would provide precise information about particular jobs and skill levels. The second step is to introduce a targeted pay cut on the basis of this survey. This might well involve cutting salaries at lower levels more than at higher echelons to reflect more accurately the private sector comparators. The third step would be to finance a study with recommendations for an overhaul of the current salary system with an eye toward the creation of a rationalized, transparent, monetized salary structure. Consideration should be given either to consolidating diverse remuneration structures and laws, or, alternatively, ultimately to devolving financial autonomy and responsibility for salary policy to individual services. This would operate through a running cost ceiling imposed on each ministry or service, forcing hard choices about numbers and types of employees on individual managers. * While a dowvnsizing program might solve the redundancy problem in the public administration, it will likely, as discussed earlier, enlarge the deficit of the public employees' pension fund. It is recommended that that fund be reformed or that it be devolved to the national level for reform in that context. Without such action, efforts to downsize the public administration wvill be perpetually undermined by the pension burden. * Although it would appear that the government's intention is to cut contracted and temporary employees to meet this employment reduction requirement, this strategy may prove problematic. First, it is not clear that non-permanent employment is large enough to cover the shortfall. Second, cutting non-permanent employment may remove better qualified cadres and leave less qualified ones in the ranks of the permanent staff. In order to avoid making cuts in the lean meat while leaving the fat in place, Government should carry out functional staffing audits immediately to determine the number and type of staff that are most dispensable. Given the time constraints, it would make sense to focus these audits on education, health and the government ministries to identify staffing surplus there. * Various emergency measures now in force should be extended. Thesc include the suspension of overtime hours, the restriction of the teaching hours to full-time equivalent, and the suspension of individual subsidies paid by the Ministry of Social Development. In addition, the government might want to consider institutionalizing the staggered work week (perhaps augmenting the number of hours so that everyone serves a four day week) but then reducing salaries accordingly (i.e. beyond the 10% decrease). This would release some individuals to "daylight" in other activities, possibly preparing them ultimately for separation from the public service. In addition, it is unlikely to detract from overall productivity, and, it might enhance it. * Government should undertake immediately to complete the public administration census and install a computerized personnel information management link-up with the budget. Special -107- ANNEX 7 care should be given to designing monitoring mechanisms to ensure that public employment -- either through contractual hirings or permanent recruitment-- not creep up again. Indeed, a forward staffing plan to reduce the overall size of the public administration over the next five years should be developed. This could be based on not fully replacing retiring staff, for example, or hiring mainly on a contractual basis in the immediate future. * An administrative modernization program should be launched. This would involve the design and overhaul of recruitment, promotion, pay, and evaluation systems. The objective would be to introduce performance incentives into administrative practice. * A serious and practical analysis of the role of government and new mechanisms for curtailing the scope of public administration activities should be undertaken with actionable proposals to streamline and modernize the administration. Sheeti TABLE 1 CORDOBA PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT REAL EXPENDITURES 1989-1995 Personal 1989 % Change 1990 % Chanae 1991 % Change 1992 % Change 1993 % Change 1994 % Change 1995 % Change Expendilure s as a % of Total Expenditure 53.4 57.2 54.8 53.5 50.1 50.3 52.8 Goods & Services as a % of Total Expenditurel 12.0 11.6 11.0 9.6 1 '.11.2 9.9___. .9 __......11.1 ___.... -109- ANNEX 7 TABLE2 PENSION IVPLICATIONS OF EARLY RETIREMENT OPTIONS Poacnal Teafi mbto MuHo TOM Admin Inoen Puis EPOS y V dt 14.147 24.517 311.U4 Maqttcas 504 310 814 Po" Lgmwvo 110 6 lie Pohag 12.76t4 1.400 14.184 Taot 27.525 26.2St S3.758 Gam on Pona HomM9 TO Ad,wumraon Pu EPOS y Vtoddd 228.057.700 254.369.200 4A2.92JW00 t _agid 32.370.000 1 .204.000 50.574,000 Pod.r L4gniomva 5.7Xt.000 20l.000 6.021.000 Pdic 154.7£1.250 14.S74.800 169.756.050 TOW 420.941.950 288.336.000 709.277..90 Ahl. Bn.o on Gaa de P.nsl n1t*, Mm4o Tow Adnwioaamn Pubis= EPOS y V_tided 34.081.3S0 22.2t8.650 5£.331.0t0 MA111dom 4.485.000 1.235.000 5.720.000 Podew Leola 1.45S.000 0 1.4S4.X0 Pdes 1.797.900 244.400 2.042.3m TodA 43.800.250 23.74S.050 67.549.300 % d Ga1 on P ruen 10.4 8.2 9.5 Tnratiornato t S.gugamd Socdo al Srspm@ Adniiniaaon Pub EPOS y Voldoda 30.652.14a 18.9S.203 49.51.350 Mag-red*$ 3.812.250 1.049.75 4.662.000 Pod" Lgnia1eio 1.27.600 0 1.237.600 Pa~ .I,528.215 207.740 1.7335.3 Tota 37,230.213 20.1a6.693 57.416.S05 Ahwn Now de Trnsha Adn_nsacon PubLAm EPOS y VWidtd 5.40S,20t 3.340,448 8.749.650 Mt _muao 6750 185250 &85.000 Por Logudtdvo 218.400 0 218.400 PI 269.85 36.680 306.345 TOW 6.570.031 3,512.35t 0.13t35I %del G-tsonPon Na 1.6 1.2 1.4 Po49d an tI nwngo an on" A*_mmn Pubb EPOS y VW*dd 12.441.16t 7.83.029 20.124.195 Idoadoo 1.5.47,325 426.075 1.972.400 Poof Logbela 502.320 0 50.320 Pelic S620.276 , 84.316 704.584 Toad 15.111.008 8.183.422 23.304.509 RmA_do Nato A_nwuan Pubia E?POS y Viold *7.03t1,963 -4.342.582 .11.3754s5 tosw-- -8474.575 .240.825 .1 15.400 Po" L"g.ouvo *283.20 0 *253.220 P .350591 -47.65 .390.249 Toat 4.541.049 -4.631.065 .13.172.114 -110- ANNEX 7 Table 3 Simulated Personnel Expenditure Cuts Basic Information Current expenditure in personnel 1.279,645463 Current number of personnel 81,772 Implicit average salary 1,204 Private sector average salary 658 Scenario 1: Cut 10% in salaries and 12% in employment Expenditure in personnel 1,010.945.509 Gross saving 268.699,954 Cost 126.540,168 Net saving 142.159.786 Cut in personnel 9.993 Average salary 1.083 % of reduction in expenditure -21.0 % of reduction in average salary -10.0 Scenario 2: Selected empiovment cuts (20%(450),20%(800),25%i2000) and 10% wages Expenditure in personnel 1,061.999,424 Gross saving 217,646,039 Cost 82.360,020 Net saving 135,286.019 Cut in personnel 7,103 Average salary 1,094 % of reduction in expenditure -17.0 % of reduction in average salary -9.1 Scenario 3: Selected cuts (20% in employment) Expenditure in personnel 1.023.716,370 Gross saving 255.929,093 Cost 207.182,543 Net saving 48,746.550 Cut in personnel 16,354 Average salary 1,204 % of reduction in expenditure -20.0 % of reduction in average salary 0.0 Scenario 4: Selected wage cuts (15% w. unt 700.10% w. u/t 2000. 5% rest) and 10% in emolovnent Expenditure in personnel 1.034,496,678 Gross saving 245148.785 cost 103,540,399 Net saving 141,608,386 Cut in personnel 8,177 Average salary 1,081 % of reduction in expenditure -19.2 % of reduction in average salary -10.2 Scenario 6: Selected cuts in employment (20% in 450 800 20001 Selected cuts in wades 1/ Expenditure in personnel 1.008,389,876 Gross saving 271,255.587 Cost 82.360.020 Net saving 188,895,567 Cut in personnel 7,103 Average salary 1,039 % of reduction in expenditure -21.2 % of reduction in average salary 13.7 % of reduction in employrnent 8 i1 17% for 400 to 700; 16% for 800 to 1100; 13% for 1200 to 3000. 10% others. -111- ANNEX 7 FIGURE 1 GRAFICO N0 2 PERSONAL POR SITUACION DE REVISTA Contratado Transitorio 5% 4% P ermnanerTte 910/ FIGURE 2 I)istribuicioni pot claidcs dcl Sector Plliblico .0080 0..0 0.00 Cl ° ° °°0 0 l \0 0 X 00 0 Edades -1 13- ANNEX 7 QOOOIPC -I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. -~~~~~~~~~~~~ _I. _. ........_ O&L c-I ~~~~~~~~~L. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~D 0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0 LU 0 0: 0 0 . --' . . . ... 0. . 0 0 0 F .. >\ .... .... . . ,_ S11 ... ..... ol <: , e~..".' .':. '. 009l z ;gSi+, : .... ,..,i,,L- ...... 0 -,, ,. ., , ,, , ,.- ." . sOO = . i .i .-. . - ..... , - . :. ... -114- ANNEX 8 MUNICIPAL FINANCE AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN CORDOBA. 1. An analysis of municipal government finance and intergovernmental relations is an essential part of the C6rdoba provincial government's assessment for three main reasons: (1) transfers to municipal government account for about 15 percent of provincial govenmment expenditures; (2) a balanced alignment of public expenditure responsibilities and revenues across levels is necessary for achieving fiscal balance at each level of government; and (3) municipalities provide crucial public services like local street maintenance, fire control, sewerage disposal, and solid waste disposal. As a result, the effective and efficient delivery of public services in the province depends upon a clear and rational definition of the expenditure responsibilities of each level of government, an assignment of taxing powers at each level of government that minimizes -- as much as possible -- administrative costs and market distortions, and a system of intergovernmental transfers that assure vertical balance (alignment of total revenues and expenditures across levels of government) and horizontal balance (some degree of equity across municipalities in terms of financial ability to provide services). 2. International experts on fiscal federalism generally agree that expenditure assipnment should follow the principle of allowing local governments to address inherently local problems, that is, those problems which have little spillover effects on neighboring local jurisdictions. A good, simple example of this principle is a system of urban roads which are maintained by the muncipal government rather than the provincial government. National defense is often cited as an example of a public good which should clearly be the responsibility of the federal level of government: it is difficult to implement a system of defense which protects only selected provinces. With some types of public goods and some social problems (e.g., externalities), it is sometimes more difficult to define the appropriate roles of each level of government. Certain types of industrial pollution affect only the population living near the source, while other types -- for example, effluents emitted into a river -- may impact neighboring jurisdictions downstream. In the latter case, a higher level of government (or an association of local governments) may need to take action if the problem is to be resolved. 3. The assignment of taxing powers should follow a number of general criteria: (1) the financing needs implied by the division of expenditure responsibilities, (2) the alignment of tax payer and beneficiary of public services, (3) efficiency in administration (there may be economies of scale in the administration of some tax instruments); and (4) the mobility of the tax base (mobile local tax bases (e.g., personal income) may migrate to neighboring jurisdictions). Governments make a judgment as to which of these criteria are most urgent, given that usually they cannot all be met with a given division of taxing powers. For example, criterion (2), the alignment of tax payer and beneficiary, may be sacrificed in the name of administrative efficiency by centralizing tax collection of a particular tax instrument at the higher level of government, if there are signficant economies of scale in administering that particular tax. There are also issues as to which -115- ANNEX8 level administers, ie. collects, the tax and which level sets the rate and determines the base. Local governments may avoid the problem of a migrating, mobile tax base, if the provincial or national government sets a uniform rate, and uniform basis for defining the tax base. 4. Given limited data on municipal governments, and the large number of municipalities in C6rdoba (247), we will not be able to analyze all of the subtleties of these policy issues; however, we will be able to identify the most salient distortions in the current system of intergovernmental relations within the province. In addition, we can provide the analytical framework and identify the information requirements for fine-tuning this system. In the short run, the muncipalities are suffering from the general decline in economic activity in the province, and in the country as a whole; however, our evidence suggests that, due to more prudent fiscal management in recent years, the muncipalities are not facing the severe financial crisis that has struck the provincial government. In the long run, the efficient delivery of public services in the province depends upon refining the division of responsibilities, and refining the tax-transfer system. 5. This annex is organized as follows. First we will provide a description of the current assignment of expenditure responsibilities in both legal terms and actual expenditures. Secondly, we will examine the assignment of tax instruments at the municipal level, and the current system of provincial to municipal transfers. Then we will examine the resulting vertical balance of expenditure-revenues across the levels of government and the system of provincial-municipal transfers. This section will be followed by a presentation of the executed budgets of 8 municipalities of varying size, from both richer and poorer areas of C6rdoba over the 1992-1994 period. In this section, we will also analyze the horizontal balance across municipalities of the system of fiscal federalism within the Province. Following this section, we will discuss the evolution of municipal revenues and expenditures across the 1992-1994 period. Then we will estimate the fiscal impacts of various proposal for decentralizing provincial expenditure responsibilities to the municipal level. Finally, we will conclude with a discussion of the policy implications of our analysis and preliminary policy recommendations. A. Assignment of Expenditure Responsibilities 6. Legal Foundations. Provincial constitutions determine the role of local governments in Argentina. Provinces are free to determine the type of legal designations for local governments and the fiscal relations between the provincial and local level, with virtually no interference from the federal government. In C6rdoba, municipalities are politically, administratively, economically, financially and institutionally autonomous, they are independent in the exercise of their duties, within the dictates of the provincial Constitution and subsequent provincial law.' Municipalities are those localities with a minimum of 2000 people, and those towns with less than 2000 people are designated "comunas." Municipalities and "comunas" establish their own organizational charters, adhering to the following Constitutional guidelines: democratic-republican representation X C6rdoba Constitution of 1987, Article 180. -116 - ANNEX 8 in the local government, the establishment of a Tribunal of Accounts, the right of voter initiatives and referenda, and the recognition of neighborhood commissions as part of local govemance. The Constitution states that regular law should establishe the process for fixing the territorial limits of municipalities. The Constitution also allows for the Provincial government to delegate police authority to municipalities via regular legislation. 7. Expenditure Responsibilities: the Constitution. The Constitution provides a long list of "inherent attributes" of the municipal jurisdiction. Although they may differ from the actual activities of municipal government, it is useful to know what activities are specifically mentioned in the Constitution to have an idea of the Constitutional mandates and limitations of local government activity. The responsiblities presented in the Constitution (Article 186) are: (1) to govern and to administer local public interests for the common good; (2) to judge, politically, the municipal authorities, (3) to create and determine the financial-economic resources, formulate budgets, realize and control expenditures; (4) to administer and dispose of the goods that compose the municipal stock of wealth; (5) to appoint and remove municipal workers, with the guarantee of an "admninistrative career" and job "stability," and (6) to realize public works and provide public services by itself, or through private intermediaries. 8. Item (7) of article 186 provides a long list of more specific areas of municipal govemment activity: (a) sanitation; (b) health and health centers, (c) hygiene and public morality; (d) the handicapped and homeless, (e) cemeteries and funeral services; (f) building plans; (g) road and plaza construction; (h) design and esthetics (eg. parks, etc.); (i) urban traffic and public transportation; (j) the use of streets and areas underground, (k) regulation of construction; (l) protection of the environment, (m) livestock slaughter and preparation for market; (n) supply of products in the marketplace in the best possible quality and price; (o) preparation and sale of foodstuffs; (p) creation and development of institutions of intellectual culture and teaching establishments regulated by the applicable laws in this area; (p) tourism; (q) services of pensions, social assistance, and banking. Article 186 also calls for municipal action in several other areas, like establishing a regime for public expropriation of property (for the public good) and urban planning. Item 8 calls for municipalities to promote cultural and artistic activities. Item 12 calls for local govemments to periodically publish a report on local government finances and activities. Finally, the Constitution grants the authority for the municipal governments to exercise any function delegated by the Provincial or Federal Government, and to exercise any other function not prohibited by the Constitution. 9. Expenditure Assignment in Practice. In practice, the types of expenditures undertaken by municipal governments vary widely across municipalities in C6rdoba, depending upon the size of the municipality, the level of economic development, or the particular needs of the community. Several services are provided by all municipalities: local road construction, maintenance, and traffic control; public assistance to the poor and indigent; emergency fire response; cemeteries and funeral services; urban land use; local parks, plazas, and public spaces, and solid waste collection (often contracted out to a private company). Some municipalities have a small, local hospital, clinic or health post. -117- ANNEX8 The municipality of the provincial capital has a system of 38 local schools in poor neighborhoods; however, it is the only municipality with its own schools. Many municipalities have begun to take partial responsibility for local water supply, and virtually all municipalities are responsible for sewerage disposal, as part of a decentralization program initiated in the early 1990s. In addition, some municipalities develop public housing projects (with financial assistance from the Province). Some of the other items mentioned in the Constitution, like preparation and sale of foodstuffs, have never become part of municipal expenditure programs; however, some rural municipalities do have publicly owned and operated livestock slaughterhouses. B. The Assignment of Tax Instruments at the Municipal Level of Government. 10. The Constitution. The C6rdoba Constitution grants general tax authority to municipal governments, so long as the local taxes implemented conform with constitutional principles of taxation and harmonization with provincial and federal tax structures. More specifically, the Constitution mentions that municipalities may implement all forms of fees, public prices, charges, and fines. 11. Principle Instruments in Use. The two most important taxes in use at the municipal level are the local property tax, and a tax on commerce, industry, and services. The property evaluation is based primarily on the size of the property, or the market value of the property in more advanced muncipalities, and the rate is set by the muncipality. The tax on commerce, industry, and services in many municipalities is administered as an additional property tax on commercial or professional establishments, in that it is levied on the basis of the size of the establishment. In the capital of C6rdoba, it is administered on the basis of sales, so it becomes like a second Gross Receipts Tax (Inigresos Bruttos). Another important tax for local governments is the automobile tax. It is considered a transfer in all the municipalities, except the provincial capital, although in many cases, it is actually collected by the muncipal government. The automobile tax is a provincial tax, in that its rate and method of valuation of the base are set by provincial law. Automobile owners have the option of paying the tax at the muncipal tax office or at the provincial Bank of C6rdoba. In the case of the former, the municipality keeps its share and transfers the rest to the province; in the case of the latter, the province collects the tax through the Bank of C6rdoba and sends the municipality its share. The split is 48% provincial and 52% municipal, with the muncipality of origin receiving the proceeds. 12. In many smaller municipalities, fees collection can be as important as the above mentioned tax revenues, with fees taking on a variety of forms: cemetery fees, fees on property improvements, fees on electrical safety inspections, etc. For example, in the small muncipality of Alicia, the total revenues from cemetery fees and electrical inspections in 1994 were almost as high as the revenues from the tax on comerce/industry/services. 13. Access to Credit. It should be noted here that the Constitution specifically states that municipalities may contract debt to finance public works or to convert existing debt; however, there are some restrictions. First, the Constitution states that debtor -118- ANNEX 8 municipalities must set aside an "amortization fund," which can only be used for future amortization payments. In addition, the Constitution also states that indebtedness levels should not reach the point where a municipality's debt service exceeds 20 percent of revenues in any given year. C. Transfers from the Provincial to Municipal Level 14. Constitutional Basis. The C6rdoba Constitution calls for provincial revenue sharing or "coparticipation" with the municipalities, and it also states that municipalities should receive a share of provincial receipts from federal revenue sharing (coparticipation). The Constitution also states that the municipal share of coparticipation should not be less than 20 percent; however, it does not specify which taxes should be "coparticipated". Subsequent revenue sharing law established that 20 percent of the provincial property tax, 20 percent of the provincial gross sales tax, and 20 percent of the provincial receipts from federal "coparticipation" would be automatically transferred to municipal governments. (Note that the province receives other transfers from the federal level which are not part of the "coparticipation" program.) The 20 percent share of these two taxes and the federal coparticipation amounted to about 15 percent of total provincial revenues from all sources in 1994. This total pie is first divided as follows: 78.75 % Municipalities 2.63 % Neighborhood Commisions Primary Distribution 1.75 % Executive Branch Program of Assistance 4.37 % Municipal Investment Fund 12.50 % Fund for Financing Provincial Decentralization (discretionary grants) 15. The Executive Branch (Poder Ejecutivo) Program of Assistance (about $5-6 million in 1994) finances special programs of assistance for municipalities suffering from particular short-term difficulties. The Municipal Investment Fund and the Decentralization Fund (FOFINDES) are both discretionary grants programs for specific investments. For FOFINDES, the maximum percentage share of this fund that any single municipality can receive is determined by that muncipality's secondary distribution share of the general municipality coparticipation (as outlined below). 16. The secondary distribution of the 78.75 percent of coparticipation to the municipalities is divided to three parts, or Funds, as outlined below: -119 - ANNEX 8 62% Population 28% Equal Parts Fund 1. 65% ---------------- 5% Inversely Proportional to Population Growth 5% Directly Proportional to Automobile Tax Revenues Directly Proportional to Fund 2. 20%----------------- 100% Commerce/Industry/Service Tax Directly Proportional to Fund 3. 15%----------------- 100% Personnel Expenditures 17. Starting from the third fund, the most distortionary aspect of the revenue sharing program is apparent. Fund 3 effectively lowers the cost of hiring additional municipal employees relative to other expenditure categories. Fund 2 involves a sensible criterion in that it encourages local tax effort for one of the most important municipal taxes. The same point can be made for the last criterion of Fund I (proportionality to automobile tax revenues). The population growth criterion of Fund 1 is an attempt to compensate rural areas that have suffered from large outmigration in recent years. The fixed parts criterion, at 28% of Fund I or 18% of the total, provides a large potential benefit to small municipalities, and could actually encourage the creation of new municipalities. Another important issue related to the revenue sharing formula is the lack of any poverty indicators as criteria for distribution across muncipalities. We will discuss recommendations for reforming this system in the concluding section. The final coefficients were fixed in law, based on the above indicators, in 1991. (For more discussion of the revenue-sharing system, see Annex (Libonati).) D. Revenue and Expenditure Balance at the Municipal Level 18. overall Balance. We have aggregate data for all the muncipalities in C6rdoba only up to 1992. The overall balance over the period 1989-1992, oscillating widely between surplus and deficits, provides us with a view on the potential volatility of muncipal finances. The figures for 1992, however, reveal a solid financial footing for the aggregate municipal govemment level at the start of the economic boom. We will see below, in the analysis of eight very different municipalities, that the trend across municipalities was to keep expenditure growth below revenue growth over the 1992-1994 boom period, in contrast to what occured at the provincial level. Of the six municipalities for which we have data for 1992-1994, on average, total revenues grew by 41 percent from 1992 to 1994 (in nominal terms), while total expenditures grew by 40 percent. Meanwhile, at the provincial level, total revenues grew by 27 percent from 1992 to 1994, while total expenditures increased by 42 percent. Based on this evidence, we have reason to believe that the aggregate municipal level maintained a better fiscal position than the provincial - 120 - ANNEX 8 government over the 1992-1994 period 2 In 1992, we see below that the aggregate muncipal level finished the year with a surplus of 2% of total revenues. This figure contrasts with the provincial level's overall deficit of 7.5% of total revenues in 1992. Table 1: Aggregate Data for Consolidated Nlunicipal Public Scctor in C6rdoba 1989 to 1992 (Pesos'000)* 1989 1990 1991 1992 Revenues 280187 284144 389584 680453 Current 266758 282404 387989 649534 From Municipal Sources 138487 146617 203386 351022 Tax Revenues 110790 118056 169552 273797 Non-tax Revenues 27697 28561 33834 77225 Transfers 128271 135787 184603 298512 Capital Revenues 13429 1740 1595 30919 Expenditures 247402 325338 447686 666442 Current 191288 258878 357072 524114 Personnel 126212 173610 236825 337974 Other 65076 85268 120247 186140 Capital 56114 66460 90614 142328 .................................................................................................................................................................................................... Current Savings 75470 23526 30917 125420 Overall Balance 32785 -41194 -58102 14011 Overall Balance/ 12% -14% -15% 2% Total Revenues Source: Ministry of the Economy (federai); Secretariat of Provincial Fiscal Relations * 1989 and 1990 data convcrted to 1991 pesos, 1991 and 1992 data in current pesos 19. Division of Expenditures Across Levels of Government. Over the 1991 to 1992 period, the division of total expenditures between the municipal and provincial level was approximately 30%-70% (that is, netting out provincial to municipal transfers from the total expenditures of the provincial government). Using the 1992 base and projecting expenditure growth of the provincial capital (40 % of the population of C6rdoba), we arrive at a similar division of 30-70 for the 1993-1994 period as well, as we can see in Table 2 below. It is interesting to note the gradual decentralization implied by a comparison of the 1989 expenditure shares and the 1994 estimated expenditure shares. Municipal governments have engaged in a greater share of expenditures since 1991, as compared to 1989. 2 It should be noted that the municipalities studied are among those 52 municipalities that have submitted proposals for project financing under the Bank-financed Municipal Development Projects I and II. As a result, there may be a bias in the sample towards municipalities with a better fiscal position than average; ie., those municipalities with a high expectation of qualifying for the Municipalities project financing. -121- ANNEX 8 Table 2: C6rdoba Public Sector--Expenditures by Lc%cl of Government 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Provincial 707 895 1082 1523 2084 2222 Municipal 247 325 447 666 862 988 Total 954 1220 1529 2190 2946 3210 Provincial/Municipal shares of general governmcnt cxpcnditurcs: Provincial 74% 73% 71% 70% 71% 69% Municipal 26% 27% 29% 30% 29% 31% Sources: Muncipal data through 1992 from Secretaria de Hacienda (National); Provincial data from Budgetary exercises; Staff Estimates for 1993, 1994 municipal figures. 20. Often in federalist systems, there is a mismatch between the division of expenditure responsiblities and the division of tax revenues across levels of government. This situation often arises as economies of scale in tax administration provide the rationale for centralizing tax collection at the higher level of government. In Argentina, for example, the central government collects 74% of the tax revenues and conducts 42% of the total expenditures (net of transfers), while the provincial level collects 20% of the taxes and conducts 47% of the expenditures.3 Intergovernmental transfers serve the purpose of correcting (even if imperfectly) this vertical imbalance. 21. Division of Revenues Across Levels of Government in Cordoba. Cordoba provides an interesting contrast to the typical mismatch of expenditures and revenues, and the resolution of this mismatch through intergovernmental transfers. In Table 3 below, we begin in column one by comparing the provincial/muncipal shares of own source current revenues: both tax revenues and non-tax revenues. Notice that this distribution across levels of government is already closely in line with the distribution of expenditures calculated in Table 2. Column two adds capital revenues (excluding, of course, borrowing), and the percentage distribution in column 2 reflects the division of the cumulative own source revenues, both current and capital revenues. Column 3 adds the impact of federal to provincial transfers, and federal to municipal direct transfers, the latter of which are very small. The percentage distribution across levels in column 3 shows what the division of revenues would be if there were no provincial to municipal transfers. Column 4 adds the impact of "coparticipation" with the municipalities of federal-to- provincial transfers (ie., the sharing of those revenues the province receives from the federal government in the form of federal-provincial revenue sharing4); and Column 5 adds the impact of "coparticipation" of provincial own tax revenues with the muncipalities. In this way, we finally arrive at the division of net revenues across levels of government in Cordoba: 68% to the provincial level and 32% to the municipal level. This calculation is 3 These figures are for 1988, as reported in Hacia una iVueva Organizaci6n del Fedleralisino Fiscal en la Argentina, Fundacion de Investigaciones Econ6micas Latinoamericanas (FIEL), 1993. 4 Note that the province receives federal transfers included in column 3, like FEDEI and FONAVI, which are not shared with the municipalities - 122 - ANNEX 8 for 1992, the most recent year we have data for the aggregate muncipal level (rather than using the projected aggregate figures for 1993 and 1994 that are used in Table 2.) Table 3: Cordoba--Shares of Revenues in 1992 Current Million Pesos Transfer of Provincial Own Own Current Capital Federal Transfers Federal-Prov'l Tax Copart. Revenues Revenues to Province* copart. to Muni's to Municipios Net Revenues Municipal 351 31 10 174 113 Provincial 702 17 1020 -174 -113 Cumulative Municipal 3 51 382 392 566 679 679 Provincial 702 719 1739 1565 1452 1452 Total 1053 1101 2131 2131 2131 2131 ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................ ..................... Cumulative % Shares as We Add Across Categories Municipal 33% 35% 18% 27% 32% 32% Provincial 67% 65% 82% 73% 68% 68% Sources: Staff calculations based on Provincial Executed Budgets, Dircctorate of Fiscal Coordination w-ith the Provinces *Includes some federal "Aportes" which are not coparticipated with the municipios. 22. We saw in Table 2 that the division of expenditure responsibilities in 1992 was 70% provincial and 30% municipal. Since this division of expenditures does not exactly match the division of net revenues, one should recall that there is one more source of funds (which the provincial level has greater access to): borrowing. Recall that in 1992, the provincial level ran an overall deficit of 7.5 percent of total revenues, while the muncipal level experienced a 2 percent surplus. 23. The first striking feature of Table 3 above is that one starts and finishes with roughly the same distribution of revenues across levels of government, and that distribution is fairly well matched with the distribution of expenditures across levels of government. One could set up a system whereby there is zero coparticipation of provincial tax revenues with the municipal level, but there is a more even division of the inflow of transfers from the federal level, and still achieve vertical balance. The table below illustrates this point: -123- ANNEX8 Table 4: Cordoba-Alternative Transfer Schemc: 1992 Current Million Pesos Transfer of Owvn Current Capital Federal Transfers Federal-Prov'l Revenues Revenues to Province* copart. to Muni's Net Revenues Municipal 351 31 10 255 Provincial 702 17 1020 -255 Cumulative Municipal 351 382 392 647 647 Provincial 702 719 1739 1484 1484 Total 1053 1101 2131 2131 2131 mulative % Shares as We Add Across Categories Municipal 33% 35% 18% 30% 30% Provincial 67% 65% 82% 70% 70% 24. The example above shows how a matching of revenues shares with expenditure shares can be achieved without any coparticipation of provincial tax revenues. In addition, there are other arguments for having each level of government depend more directly upon their own source revenues for financing expenditures, in terms of increasing the correspondence of tax payer and public service beneficiary (see Annex_, Libonati). Given that the shares of own source revenues are already fairly closely in balance with expenditures, transfers really are needed only to divide up the inflow of federal transfers. E. Revenues and Expenditures in Eight Municipalities in 1994. 25. Eight muncipalities were selected from a sample of 52 municipalities which responded this year to the provincial government's request for financial data as part of the Municipalities I loan. The first group of three were selected on the basis of having been analyzed in a previous work on municipal finance in the late 1980s, with the idea that a diverse group had been chosen for that study.5 Additional municipalities were selected on the basis of attempting to diversify the population and geographic location of the municipalities, as well as the availability of data for more than one year. 26. On the next page is a summary table of revenues and expenditures of the eight municipalities in 1994, all in pesos per capita. The table also presents data on total population in each municipality and the percentage of households with "Unsatisfied Basic Needs"6 in the Department to which each municipality belongs. (Note: The "Department" is not a governmentaladministrative unit, but rather a political unit for determining representation in the provincial senate.) L. Del Bo, "Las Finanzas Locales en la Pro%incia de C&doba," Doctoral Thcsis, the National University of C6rdoba, 1989. 6 "Unsatisfied Basic Needs" -- as defined by the national statistics agency -- data from C6rdoba en Cifras. Table 5: Comparison of Municipal Executed Budgcts-1994 Pesos per Capita Alicia Alta Gracia Bell Ville Carlos Paz Rio Tercero C6rdoba Dein Funes El Arafiado Revenues 639 325 377 513 313 320 238 881 Current 602 264 326 495 268 320 236 814 Tax Revenues 99 131 147 332 129 224 69 133 Property Tax 36 31 43 120 32 54 22 22 Ind./Comnnercc/Scrvicc tax 17 0 32 57 30 76 14 13 Other 46 100 71 155 67 95 33 98 Non-tax Revenues 29 13 23 26 27 9 11 5 Transfers 475 121 157 137 112 87 155 675 Coparticipation* 188 71 89 85 71 75 70 327 Sharc of Prov'l Auto tax 34 30 41 44 27 0 12 28 FOFINDES 36 7 9 0 12 12 9 43 Other Aportes 217 13 18 8 2 0 64 277 Capital Revenues 2 0 5 2 1 0 3 7 Otlher "Unclassified" Revenue 36 60 46 16 44 0 0 60 Expenditures 677 334 363 501 303 315 237 887 Curreint 322 234 265 415 205 236 210 611 Personncl 202 150 177 254 134 158 92 301 Goods & Services 72 42 43 133 60 76 45 163 Iltercst on Dcbt 0 5 10 0 0 1 4 29 Other 48 38 36 29 12 1 68 118 Capital 320 43 52 60 56 79 27 233 Unclassified Expenditures 35 57 45 26 41 0 0 44 Current Savings 280 30 61 80 63 84 26 203 Overall Balancc -38 -9 14 11 10 5 1 -6 00 Table 5 (continued) Socioeconomic Indicators Alicia Alta Gracia Bell Ville Carlos Paz Rio Tercero C6rdoba Dein Funes El Arafiado Population 2418 37131 29651 40692 42646 1179067 18511 1133 Department San Justo Santa Maria Union Punilla Terccro Arriba Cordoba lschilin San Justo Unsatisricd Basic Nceds % of households lacking: I indicator 6.3 11.6 6.9 9.5 5.8 8.9 16.2 6.3 2 indicators 0.6 2.1 0.8 1.4 0.5 1.5 2.8 0.6 3 indicators 0 0.2 0 0.1 0 0.1 0.3 0 I or more indicators 6.9 13.9 7.7 11 6.3 10.5 19.3 6.9 Indicators: I indicator group is based on ability to support thc houseliold; a second indicator group is based on the basic construction of the home, a third indicator group is based on access to sanitation; and a fotini idicator group is based on cducaitional le el. Unsatisried basic needs statistics are for the Department, not (he municipality * Includes paymenits from previous years paid in only this Near Sources: Expenditures and Revenies from municipal balances on file at Coordinating Unit, ExIernally-financed projects, Govcrnment of C6rdoba, populationi data ftoni Coordinating Unit, Socioeconotnic data frotl (C(irdoha en (Cifi-as Data organlized by calegory by Bank stalr on miissioni. 00 - 126 - ANNEX8 27. Revenues Per Capita. One of the first striking features in table 5 is the large difference in revenues per capita across municipalities. In particular, two of the smaller municipalities -- Alicia and El Arafiado -- from relatively "low pQverty" departments, have higher per capita revenues than the other municipalities. More specifically, they have much higher revenues per capita than Dean Funes, which is located in one of the poorer departments in the province. In general, we have three moderate population municipalities -- Alta Gracia, Bell Ville and Rio Tercero -- which along with the provincial capital, all have per capita revenues in the range of 3 13-377. These municipalities are from different parts of the province and are located in departments with a fairly high variation in the percentage of househoulds with unsatisfied basic needs. Of the four remaining municipalities, there are two small municipalities (Alicia and El Arahado mentioned above) with high per capita revenues, largely due to high per capita levels of coparticipation and other transfers. Then there is Villa Carlos Paz, which is located in Punilla, a department in a mountainous region with a relatively high percentage of households with unsatisfied basic needs, however, it is also a department with many vacation homes. This tax base allows Carlos Paz to collect more than twice the property tax revenues per capita than the provincial capital. Finally, as mentioned above, there is Dean Funes, from the poor northem department of Ischilin, with low tax revenues per capita and not enough transfers to bring its revenues per capita up to the level of the other municipalities. 28. Main Tax Instruments. The two main tax instruments, the property tax and the tax on industry/commerce/services, make up about half of all tax revenues in most of the municipalities. (Note that the definition between "other taxes" and non-tax revenues may be blurred in terms of when a fee or user charge is considered a tax or a non-tax instrument.) In some of the smaller municipalities, the automobile tax (counted as a transfer in most cases, but often reall a local tax) is as important as the property tax or the industry/commerce/services tax. In the capital of C6rdoba, the automobile tax is counted as a municipal own-source revenue instrument, however, it generates only about 7.5 percent of total revenues, while the property tax is more than twice that level, and the industry/commerce/services tax is more than three times that level. User charges, or taxes that are similar to user charges like the levy on cemeteries and funeral services, make up a major share of own source revenues in smaller municipalities. 29. Transfers per Capita. Transfers average 48 percent of total revenues in our sample, but with this share ranging from 27% to 77%. There are some unusual patterns in the way transfers are distributed across our sample of municipalities. Compare, for example, Alta Gracia and Bell Ville in 1994. Year: 1994 Alta Gracia Bell Ville Total Coparticipation 2,644,222 2,628,436 Population 37,131 29,65t1 Coparticipation per Capita 71 89 Unsatisfied Basic Needs Share (%) 13.9 7.7 Tax Revenues per Capita 131 147 Overall Balance -344,734 412,317 -127- ANNEX8 30. We see above that, although Alta Gracia has 25 percent more people than Bell Ville, the two municipalities receive almost the identical amount of total coparaticipation from the provincial government. Alta Gracia's lower tax revenues per capita could be due to the fact that it is located in a departmnent with a higher rate of "unsatisfied basic needs" than Bell Ville. Not surprisingly, the final result is a surplus in Bell Ville's balance of overall revenues and expenditures, while Alta Gracia suffered from an almost equally large deficit. Just as an illustrative example, suppose Alta Gracia had received $300,000 more in coparticipation, and Bell Ville had received S300,000 less in coparticipation. Then, assuming Alta Gracia would not spend the additional resources, Alta Gracia's deficit could have been virtually eliminated, and Bell Ville would have still maintained a surplus, as we can see in the calculation below: 1994 Hypothetical Situation Alta Gracia Bell Ville Total Coparticipation 2,944,222 2.328,436 Coparticipation per Capita 79 79 Overall Balance 44,734 112,317 3 1. Another interesting comparison is the financial situation of Alicia and El Arafnado. They are both in the department of San Justo, a department with a relatively low level of "unsatisfied basic needs." Below are a few selected finanical indicators from Table 5: All in Per Capita terms: Alicia El Arafiado Tax + Non-tax Revenues 128 138 Coparticipation 188 327 Other "Aportes" 217 277 Capital Expenditures 320 233 Personnel Expenditures 202 301 Current Savings (per capita) 280 203 Overall Balance (per capita) -38 -6 32 Notice that El Arahiado (With a population of 1,133) receives much more coparticipation per capita than Alicia (with a population of 2,418), or any other municipality in our sample. They both generate a similar amount of per capita own source current revenues. With their high levels of transfers and reasonably good own revenue generation, they were able to accumulate large current savings per capita in 1994, but still not large enough savings to finance their relatively large per capita capital expenditures. The high per capita capital expenditures may be due to economies of scale in the delivery of local services resulting from the existence of significant fixed costs (e.g., sewerage disposal or water supply).7 It is interesting, though, that these two small communities had access to additional transfers (other "aportes"), perhaps as provincial political leaders attempted to compensate smaller communities for their difficulties in financing large fixed costs of provinding services. The coparticipation formula, however, already compensates these communties through the existence of a large "fixed parts" coefficient used in calculating the final coefficient (see section C of this annex). With its high level of total 7For example, in its 1993 budget, Alicia allocated approximately $500,000 to an aqueduct project (about $200 per capita), which was financed by a specific transfer ("aporte"). -128- ANNEX8 transfers per capita, El Aranado is able to finance personnel expenditures per capita that were signficantly higher than any other municipality in our sample (see table 5). 33. One final comment on the revenues side: the case of Dean Funes shows us the implications of the lack of a poverty indicator in the provincial coparticipation formula. Dean Funes received the same, or slightly lower, per capita level of coparticipation as the capital C6rdoba, Rio Tercero, and Bell Ville, and Dean Funes received significantly less coparticipation per capita than the rest of the municipalities. The result is that this municipality, located in a department with unsatisfied basic needs that soar above the other departments in our sample, had the lowest level of total revenues per capita in 1994 -- 24 percent lower than the second lowest municipality. 34. Expenditures: Economic Categories. Table 6 on page 16 presents the percentage share of the various revenue and expenditure categories. Turning to the expenditure side, we see in our sample a relatively low share of personnel expenditures, ranging from 30 % in Alicia to 51 % in Villa Carlos Paz, and averaging 43 % of total expenditures. It is interesting to note that in a dissertation in the late eighties8, three municipalities included in our sample -- Alta Gracia, Bell Ville, Rio Tercero -- all had much higher shares of personnel expenditures during the 1984-1987 period then over the 1992-1994 period. These three had average personnel shares of 68%, 65%, and 70%, respectively over the 1984-1987 period, while over the 1992-1994 period they had average shares of 51%, 49%, and 44% (Rio Tercero--data for 1994 only). Also, if we look at the aggregate data presented in table 1, we see that from 1989 to 1992, the personnel share of expenditures was a steady 51 percent of total expenditures. So, it appears that the relatively low share of personnel expenditures is a fairly recent phenomenon in C6rdoba's municipalities. 35. We also see a variable, but relatively high, share of capital expenditures in our sample of municipalities. Capital expenditures' share of total expenditures ranges from 12% in Bell Ville to 47% in Alicia, and averages 21% across our sample. Two specific examples can shed some light on the fiscal impact of capital investments: (1) Alicia's 1993 aqueduct project of approximately $500,000 represented 27 percent of Alicia's total expenditures that year; and (2) Villa Carlos Paz's bridge project of $800,000 in 1994 represented only 4 percent of Carlos Paz's total expenditures that year. 'Del Bo, op cit. Table 6: % Shares of Categories of Revenues and Expenditures-1994 Alicia Alta Gracia Bell Ville Carlos Paz Rio Terccro Cordoba Dean Funcs El Aranado Rcvcnucs 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% Currcnt 94% 81% 87% 97% 86% 100% 99% 92% Tax Rcvenucs 15% 40% 39% 65% 41% 70% 29% 15% Property Tax 6% 9% 11% 23% 10% 17% 9% 3% Ind./Comnicrce/Servicc tax 3% 0% 9% 11% 10% 24% 6% 1% Back Taxes 1% 8% 10% 20% 9% N/A 10% 0% Olher 6% 23% 9% 10% 12% 30% 4% 11% Non-tax Revenues 4% 4% 6% 5% 9% 3% 5% 1% Transfers 74% 37% 42% 27% 36% 27% 65% 77% Coparticipation"* 29% 22% 24% 17% 23% 23% 29% 37% Share or Prov'l Auto tax** 5% 9% 11% 9% 9% 0% 5% 3% FOFINDES 6% 2% 2% 0% 4% 4% 4% 5% Other Aportes 34% 4% 5% 2% 1% 0% 27% 31% Capital Revenues 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% Other "Unclassified' Revenue 6% 19% 12% 3% 14% 0% 0% 7% Expenditures 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% Currcinl 48% 70% 73% 83% 68% 75% 88% 69% Pcrsonncl 3t9e 45% 49% 51% 44% 50% 39% 34% Goods & Scrviccs 11% 12% 12% 26% 20% 24% 19% 18% Inicrest on Debt 0% 1% 3% 0% 0% 0% 2% 3% Other 7% 11% 10% 6% 4% 0% 29% 13% Capital 47% 13% 14% 12% 19% 25% 12% 26% Unclassified Expenditures 5% 17% 12% 5% 14% 0% 0% 5% ................ ........................................ . .... . ..... . ...~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -130- ANNEX8 36. Expenditures in the Municipality of C6rdoba: a more detailed view. The municipality of the capital of C6rdoba represents 42% of the province's population and 38% of expenditures by municipal governments.9 It is worthwhile, then, to examine the functional distribution of expenditures, to the extent that this information is available. Below is a table with the breakdown of expenditures by functional Secretariat. Table 7: Municipality of Cordoba--Functional Secretariats' Shares of Expenditures, 1992-1994 1992 1993 1994 Executive Department 3.3% 3.0% 3.4% Secrctariat of Governmcnt 11.3% 10.8% 10.4% Secretariat of Economics and Finance 14.1% 13.8% 10.9% Secretariat of Urban Development 22.6% 27.3% 30.7% Secretariat of Public Services 18.6% 16.9% 16.6% Secretariat of Public Health 15.2% 13.9% 13.7% General Secretariat 4.3% 3.5% 3.9% Justice (Tribunals, Deliberative Council) 6.6% 7.0% 7.1% Secretariat of Neighborhood 4.0% 3.9% 3.3% Participation & Human Development 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 37. The Secretariat of Government oversees the 38 public schools in poor neighborhoods that are administered by the muncipal government. These are the only municipal level schools in the province of C6rdoba. The Secretariat of Urban Development administers the local road system and the sewer system. It is interesting to note that this secretariat's share of expenditures has increased over the last few years, perhaps as the municipal government has responded to the poor access to sewerage in the city (see Annex on infrastructure, G. Menckoff). Recall that sewerage services were decentralized from the provincial to the municipal level in 1991. The Secretariat of Public Services oversees the solid waste collection service (in the process of privatization) and public transportation (already privatized). In the health sector, the Municipality runs 57 clinics (dispensarios) in the periphery of the city. 38. Impact of the Crisis: Municipality of C6rdoba. The Municipality of C6rdoba began 1995 with a budget that projected only a 2.7% nominal growth in total expenditures. Given the general economic slowdown of the country, and the provincial government financial crisis and its impact on the local economy, it is possible that actual expenditures will have to be cut below those levels. Cumulative 1995 own source revenues of the Municipality, in September, were running 13% below the September 1994 cumulative level, and revenues from other jurisdictions (ie., transfers) were about 17% below the September 1994 level. One factor that has helped the Municipality through the crisis period is the $34 million in accumulated surpluses over the last three years. The 9 Population based on 1991 census, and expenditures based on 1992 data from Municipality of C6rdoba and 1992 aggregate data from the federal government's Directorate for Fiscal Coordination with the Provinces. -131- ANNEX 8 only gross borrowing in the 1992-1994 budgetary exercises were credits from the World Bank financed Municipal Development projects ($7 million), and total amortizations over the 1992-1994 period were only $4 million. In addition, as of August, the Municipality had secured another $3 million in credits from the Municipal Development Project. These additional resources, especially the accumulated surpluses, should provide a signficant financial buffer for the Municipality. 39. The largest immediate concern is the impact of the provincial government's CECOR issues'°. All of the provincial-municipal transfers (25% of revenues) that the Municipality is receiving are in the form of CECORs, and a little over half of the municipal own tax revenues are currently being paid in CECOR. The result is that approximately 65% of total municipal revenues are currently in CECOR. In response to this situation, the municipal government recently passed an emergency law allowing it to pay up to 25% of municipal employees' salaries in CECOR. One newspaper reported that opposition parties complained that the emergency measure was unnecessary. One group cited the presence of $25 million in municipal bank deposits to justify its opposition to the law, and another group claimed that revenues were still staying ahead of expenditures." In any case, a reduction in the value of the CECOR over the next two months could either force the municipal government to decimate its accumulated savings, or even force it to begin to accumulate arrears in some of its expenditure obligations, as the end-of-the-year salary bonuses approach. 40. The crisis has probably had a similar impact on other municipalities. Many municipalities experienced surpluses in recent years, giving them some financial buffers for facing the crisis. The CECOR issue is a potential problem for all the municipalities, in that all provincial to municipal transfers are being paid in CECOR, and these tranfers constitute an even higher share of revenues for the muncipalities in the "interior." In addition, a significant share of the provincial money supply is now in the form of CECOR, thus, it is likely that a significant share of municipal tax revenues are being paid in CECOR. One factor which has helped the municipalities through the crisis is that the 20% of federal- provincial coparticipation that is transferred to municipalities is calculated on the basis of gross federal-provincial coparticipation, that is, without netting out the large debt amortization payments that have been withheld from the federal-provincial payments in recent months. 41. Municipal Debt to IPAM. IPAM is the health insurance program for provincial and municipal employees. The only major "debt crisis" we have discovered in our brief survey of municipal finance is municpal government debt to IPAM; however, it appears to be more of a crisis from IPAM's point of view than from the municipal governments' point of view. The list of debtor municipalities does not include the Municipality of the capital. The total amount owed to IPAM by all municipalities is $17.9 million'2, or about 1.7% of (estimated) aggregate municipal revenues in 1994 (see Table 2). Debts to IPAM 10 See chapter I for a description of the CECOR bond. 1 Comercio & Justicia, C6rdoba, October 25, 1995, page 5. 12Comercio & Justicia, C6rdoba, October 12, 1995, page 4. -132- ANNEX 8 do not always imply that the municipalities in question do not possess the resources to pay. Other governmental entities have routinely accumulated debts to IPAMI: the provincial treasury owes about $ 100 million; the provincial pension fund owves $67 million; and the provincial water department owes about $6 million. The largest municipal debtor to IPAM, in absolute terms, happens to be in our sample of muncipalities: Villa Carlos Paz. Carlos Paz owes just over $2 million, or 10% of the municipality's 1994 total revenues. In this case, it appears that the municipality may not have the resources to pay off this debt. Our data indicate that Carlos Paz suffered from a deficit of $4.9 million in 1993 (when it probably ran up this debt to IPAM), and accumulated surpluses of only $84,000 and $467,000 in 1992 and 1994 respectively. F. Evolution of Revenues and Expenditures in 6 Municipalities: 1992 to 1994 42. Of the eight municipalities originally chosen, historical data over the 1992 to 1994 period were available for only six of the eight. Table 8 below presents the evolution of the categories of revenues and expenditures for these six municipalities. The percentages are 1992 to 1994 total percentage change in nominal terms. Recall that inflation over the period was approximately 9.3% (taking the average of the consumer price index and the wholesale price index and using the average level of this index in 1992 and 1994). On the revenue side, we see that transfers, on average across the 6 municipalities, did not grow as fast as municipal own tax and non-tax revenues. Also, in most cases, total revenues grew faster than total expenditures, with the notable exceptions of the capital C6rdoba, and El Arafiado. The municipality of C6rdoba, however, started the period with a S 19 million overall surplus in 1992, equal to 7% of total revenues, so that the differential in growth rates over the 1992-1994 period did not result in a deficit in 1994. In fact, the Municipality of C6rdoba experienced an overall surplus of 1.5% of total revenues in 1994. The other municipality with higher expenditure growth than revenue grovth, El Arafiado, happens to be the municipality (in this sample) with the highest share of transfers as a percentage of total revenues. Perhaps the fact that the El Arafiado government essentially was spending "other people's money" provided part of the disincentive for fiscal discipline over the period. 43. On the expenditure side, personnel expenditures increased at a faster rate than inflation, but not nearly as fast as total expenditures. Goods and services increased at about the same rate as personnel expenditures. Interest and "other" expenditures (mostly transfers to individuals or firms) grew at enormously fast rates, but were starting from very small bases, especially interest payments. More significant was the increase in capital expenditures, which more than doubled on average, even in real terms. Tabic 8: % Change in Budgcts 1992 (o 1994 Alta Gracia Bell Ville Carlos Paz Cordoba Dean Funes El Aranado Avg. RevenuCs 34% 40% 55% 40% 44% 33% 41% Current 36% 41% 51% 40% 53% 35% 43% Tax Rcvenues 50% 34% 53% 48% 40% 56% 47% Propcrty Tax 11% 20% 49% 42% 45% -1% 28% Ind./Comniercc/Scrvice tax -100% 42% 85% 87% 51% 42% 35% Back Taxes* 123% 18% 145% N/A 47% -100% 47% OtherTaxes 106% 77% -18% 30% 10% 93% 50% Non-tax Revenues -28% 66% 233% 91% 98% -81% 63% Transfcrs 34% 46% 32% 19% 57% 38% 38% Coparticipation"* 11% 30% -1% 18% 18% 24% 17% Sharc orProvl Auto tax*** 95% 46% 170% N/A 26% 17% 71% FOFINDES 0%Io 39% ()% 27%X -21% 47% 15% Other Aportcs**** 23% 251% 209% N/A 248% 62% 159% Capital Revenucs 0% 39% -41% N/A 1% 37% 7% Other "Unclassified" Revenue 26% 34% 12047% N/A -100% 10% 2403% Expenditures 31% 30% 52% 48% 42% 37% 40% Current 21% 28% 34% 32% 53% 26% 32'Y0 Personncl 9% 20% 26% 32%OX 8% 31% 21%'o Goods & Scrvices 6% 2% 25% 32% 56% -7% 19% Interest on Debt 72% 1022% -100% 24% -44% N/A 195% Othcr 156% 105%/ 807%Ro 36% 326% 48% 246% Capital 351% 46% 209% 131% 32% 93% 144% "Unclassified" Expenditurcs 11% 25% N/A N/A -100% 5% -15% 00 - 134 - ANNEX 8 44. Another way of viewing the change in expenditures is to calculate the total amount of additional expenditures undertaken in 1994 as compared to 1992, and examine which shares of this pie were used for which categories of expenditures. Of course, some of the increased expenditures can be financed by shifts in resources from one category to another. Table 9 gives us some indication of how the additional real expenditures were allocated across categories. For example, in Alta Gracia, 98% of the increased expenditures were spent on capital goods/public works (59%) and "other" expenditures (39%) -- transfers to individuals and public and private agencies. ' The capital of Cordoba had a fairly balanced mix in how it used the additional $97.7 million: one-third was used for additional personnel expenditures, sixteen percent was used for additional goods and services, and fifty percent was used to purchase additional capital goods and finance public works. Table 9: Additional Real Expcnditures in 1994, Relative to 1992 (1994 pesos and % Shares) Alta Gracia Bell Ville Carlos Paz Cordoba Dean Funes El Aranado Average Expenditures 2,073,480 1,732,493 5,747,042 97,60S,222 1,022.412 203,904 18,064,592 Current 39% 67% 54% 50% 108% 45% 61% Personnel 0% 28% 24% 33% -2% 27% 19% Goods & Services -2% -5% 12% 16% 25% -16% 5% Interest on Debt 3% 16% 0% 0% -6% 16% 5% Other 39% 29% 18% 0% 92% 17% 32% Capital 59% 23% 27% 50% 9% 56% 37% "Unclassified" 2% 10% 19% 0% -17% -1% 2% Expenditures G. Fiscal Impact of Various Decentralization Scenarios. 45. As mentioned earlier, sewerage disposal and much of water supply have been decentralized from the provincial to the municipal level in recent years. The government of Cordoba has initiated a program of decentralizing health posts and neighborhood hospitals to the municipal level, and pre-school to primary education to the municipal level. In this section, we will not discuss the logic of decentralization, but rather we will simply evaluate the potential fiscal impact of these proposals, given recent expenditure levels by the Province for providing these services. 46. Education. In 1994, the provincial government spent $637 million on education and culture. Bank staff estimate (see Annex ) that the provincial government could save about $34 million by decentralizing pre-school education to the municipal level. This figure represents only 3 percent of total municipal expenditures, and these expenditures could probably be absorbed by many municipal budgets. Decentralizing all primary education, however, would imply a savings to the province, and additional expenditures for the municipalities of about $276 million (based on 1994 expenditures). This figure represents about 28 percent of aggregate municipal expenditures. The difficulty of providing services to small, rural municipalities already exists, and many rural schools have 13 Depending upon the quality of the accounting, there may be some payments for services mixed in hcrc. - 135 - ANNEX 8 only one building and one or two instructors for all grades. This situation is not likely to change after decentralization, unless local governments decide to devote more local resources to education. 47. Health. In 1994, the provincial government spent $295 million on health care. The govemment of C6rdoba estimates that decentralizing the services of neighborhood hospitals and health posts to the municipalities would save 30 percent of this budget, or $89 million. Assuming no efficiency savings in the sector at the municipal level, this decentralization proposal would imply increased municipal expenditures equal to 9 percent of 1994 aggregate municipal expenditures. (It should be noted that the capital of C6rdoba already administers 57 clinics (dispensarios).) 48. Total Impact on Balance of Expenditures across Levels of Government. Table 10 below presents the change in the 1994 balance of expenditures across levels of government from the possible decentralization experiments discussed above. We see that the pre-school education decentralization could possibly be absorbed, with little aggregate fiscal impact. Also, the decentralization of simple service hospitals and health posts might not unduly overburden municipal budgets, especially if they can become effective at cost recovery. Decentralization of all primary education is the area that casts the largest possible impact, implying the need for a fairly dramatic realignment of the tax-transfer system if the municipalities are to finance their new responsibilities. Table 10: Impact of Decentralization on the Balance of Expenditures across Levcis of Government. w/ Decentralization of just: 1994 base Pre-School All Primarn Health Posts Both Actual 19941 Education Education /Simplc Hospitalsl Sectors* Provincial 2222 2188 1946 2133 1857 Municipal 988 1022 1264 1077 1353 Total 3210 3210 3210 3210 3210 Provincial/Municipal shares of general government expenditures: Provincial 69% 68% 61% 66% 58% Municipal 31% 32% 39% 34% 42% Sources: C6rdoba 1994 Budget Exercisc, Staff Calculations.Primary Education implies prc-shcool and elementary education. Simple hospitals are hospitales vecinales, "neighborhood" hospitals.*"Both Sectors" implies decentralization of all primary education and health posts/simple hospitals. 49. Increased expenditures at the municipal level would have to be financed by the following options: (1) user fees (in the case of health, and perhaps education), (2) higher local tax revenues; (3) increased provincial to municipal transfers; (4) economies by the muncipal governments, either through increased efficiency in the newly decentralized sectors, or in other categories of expenditures; or (5) some combination of the above three. Alternative (4) depends upon how much efficiency gains in a sector might be achieved through decentralizaiton and how much inefficiency there is in municipal service delivery in other sectors, both questions which we have not been able to answer given the limited data available. It is unlikely, however, that there is enough "fat" at the municipal level to finance a full decentralization of primary education, much less a decentralization of -136- ANNEX8 primary education and and basic health. Some realignment of the tax-transfer system would be necessary, given the limited viability of cost recovery in the education sector. Decentralization would also place a premium on reforming the system of intergovernmental transfers, so as to assure that services to the poor in poorer regions of the province do not suffer a dramatic fall in quality. H. Concluding Comments and Policy Recommendations. 50. In this concluding section, we will restate the main empirical observations with respect to municipal finance and intergovernmental relations in the province. Then we will present several short term and long term policy recommendations for improving the system of intergovernmental relations, thus improving the efficiency of public service delivery of the overall public sector of C6rdoba. Empirical Observations 51. Overall Fiscal Balance. Based on available evidence, we have reason to believe that the aggregate municipal level maintained a better fiscal position than the provincial government over the 1992-1994 period. 14 In 1992, we see below that the aggregate muncipal level finished the year with a surplus of 2% of total revenues. This figure contrasts with the provincial level's overall deficit of 7.5% of total revenues in 1992. Of the six municipalities for which we have data for 1992-1994, on average, total revenues grew by 41 percent from 1992 to 1994 (in nominal terrns), while total expenditures grew by 40 percent. Meanwhile, at the provincial level, total revenues grew by 27 percent from 1992 to 1994, while total expenditures increased by 42 percent. The largest municipality is the municipality of the capital,C6rdoba, representing 42% of the province's population and 38% of expenditures by municipal governments. The municipality of C6rdoba accumulated surpluses totaling $34 million over the 1992-1994 period. The only significant "debt crisis" at the municipal level appears to be arrears in payments to IPAM; however, the total amount owed to IPAM by all municipalities is $ 17.9 million, representing only 1.7% of (estimated) aggregate municipal revenues in 1994 (see Table 2). 52. Impact of the 1995 Crisis. Many municipalities experienced surpluses in recent years, giving them financial buffers for facing the crisis. The CECOR issue is a potential problem for all the municipalities, in that all provincial to municipal transfers are being paid in CECOR, and these tranfers constitute an even higher share of revenues for the muncipalities in the "interior." In addition, a significant share of the provincial money supply is now in the form of CECOR; thus, it is likely that a significant share of municipal tax revenues are being paid in CECOR (about half of the Municipality of C6rdoba's own source revenues are currently collected in CECOR). Due to the economic crisis, the 14 It should be noted that the municipalities studied are among those 52 municipalities that have submitted proposals for project financing under the Bank-financed Municipal Development Projects I and II. As a result, there may be a bias in the sample towards municipalities with a better fiscal position than average; ic., those municipalities with a high expectation of qualifying for the Municipalities project financing. - 137 - ANNEX 8 Municipality of C6rdoba's cumulative own source revenues, as of September, were down 13 percent from the September 1994 level. 53. Municipal Expenditures Assignment. Over the 1991 to 1994 period, the division of total expenditures between the municipal and provincial level was approximately 30% municipal and 70% provincial (that is, netting out provincial to municipal transfers from the total expenditures of the provincial government). The municipalities are responsible for: solid waste disposal; sewerage; much of the water supply; urban road construction and maintenace; local traffic control; local parks and public areas; fire control; cemeteries and funeral services; and part of the assistance to the poor, elderly and handicapped. Composition. We see in our sample a relatively low share of personnel expenditures, ranging from 30 % in Alicia to 51 % in Villa Carlos Paz, and averaging 43 % of total expenditures. We also see a variable, but relatively high, share of capital expenditures in our sample of municipalities. Capital expenditures' share of total expenditures ranges from 12% in Bell Ville to 47% in Alicia, and averages 21% across our sample. Evolution. On the expenditure side, from 1992 to 1994, personnel expenditures increased at a faster rate than inflation, but not nearly as fast as total expenditures; as a result, personnel exenditures fell from an average of 52% to an average of 43% of total expenditures, in our sample of municipalities. Goods and services increased at about the same rate as personnel expenditures. Interest and "other" expenditures (mostly transfers to individuals or firms) grew at enormously fast rates, but were starting from very small bases, especially interest payments. More significant was the increase in capital expenditures, which more than doubled on average, even in real terms. 54. Another way of viewing the change in expenditures is to calculate the total amount of additional expenditures undertaken in 1994 as compared to 1992, and examine which shares of this pie were used for which categories of expenditures. Of course, some of the increased expenditures can be financed by shifts in resources from one category to another. Table 9 gives us some indication of how the additional real expenditures were allocated across categories. For example, the capital of C6rdoba had a fairly balanced mix in how it used the additional $97.7 million: one-third was used for additional personnel expenditures, sixteen percent was used for additional goods and services, and fifty percent was used to purchase additional capital goods and finance public works. 55. Municipal Revenues: Assignment of tax instruments. Main instruments are essentially duplicates of provincial instruments: property tax and gross receipts tax (called the industry/commerce/services tax at the municipal level). Composition of Revenues. The share of transfers, in our sample, varies from 27% to 77%, and averages 48%. In medium to large municipalities, the property tax and the municipal industry/commerce/services tax make up a majority of municipal tax revenues (48% on average across all municipalities in our sample). In small municipalities, various fees like cemetery fees and electrical inspection fees are more important. Evolution of Revenues. Own source revenues grew faster than transfers, in our sample, over the 1992-1994 period (nominal growth rates: tax revenues 47%, non-tax revenues 63%, transfers 38%). Overall revenues grew by about 30 % in real terms over 1992-1994, slightly faster than overall expenditures. -138 - ANNEX 8 56. Transfers: Vertical Balance. The first striking feature of Table 3 on page 9 is that one starts and finishes with roughly the same distribution of revenues across levels of government, and that distribution is fairly well matched with the distribution of expenditures across levels of government. One could set up a system whereby there is zero coparticipation of provincial tax revenues with the municipal level, but there is a more even division of the inflow of transfers from the federal level, and still achieve vertical balance. In terms of vertical balance, provincial-municipal transfers are needed only to pass a share of federal-provincial coparticipation down to municipal level, as displayed in the example in Table 4. In addition, there are other arguments for having each level of government depend more directly upon their own source revenues for financing expenditures, in terms of increasing the correspondence of tax payer and public service beneficiary (see Annex_, Libonati.) 57. Horizontal Balance. From our limited sample, we evaluated two obvious examples of failures in achieving horizontal balance across municipalities. In the case of Alta Gracia and Bell Ville, a reallocation of coparticipation so that each municipality would receive the same coparticipation per capita gives the following result: Alta Gracia's large 1994 deficit would have been virtually eliminated, and Bell Ville would have still maintained a surplus. It is difficult to justify why these two municipalities actually received very different per capita levels of coparticipation. Another comparison we made was to compare the small municipalities of El Aranado and Alicia to the rest of the sample. These two municipalities had extraordinarily high capital expenditures per capita, and as a share of total expenditures, possibly due to the higher per capita costs of making capital investments in small communities. The coparticipation formula compensates these communities through the existence of a large "fixed parts" coefficient used in calculating the distribution of coparticipation across municipalties (see section C of this annex). It is interesting, though, that these two small communities had access to additional transfers (other "aportes"), perhaps as provincial political leaders attempted to compensate smaller communities for their difficulties in financing large fixed costs of provinding services. In other words, they seem to be compensated twice, especially in the case of El Arafiado. As a result, El Arafiado was able to finance much higher personnel expenditures per capita than the other municipalities in our sample. One final empirical observation regarding transfers: the case of Dean Funes shows us the implications of the lack of a poverty indicator in the provincial coparticipation formula. Despite being located in a much poorer part of the province, Dean Funes received the same, or slightly lower, per capita level of coparticipation as the capital C6rdoba, Rio Tercero, and Bell Ville, and significantly less coparticipation per capita than the remaining municipalities in our sample. 58. Transparency. The general coparticipation coefficients for distributing resources across municipalities is a weighted average of three intermediate coefficients -- the first of which is itself a weighted average of four individual indicators (population, equal parts, inverse of population growth, and automobile tax revenues). This complicated system makes it difficult for municipal governments to understand the transfer system and evaluate its fairness. In addition, there are three different programs of discretionary grants -139 - ANNEX 8 (executive branch program of assistance, municipal investment fund, and the decentralization fund (FOFINDES)) also complicating the system. Finally, there is not a regular system for reporting the fiscal situation of municipal governments, so that neither residents nor the provincial governments have regular, up-to-date, information on relative fiscal performance. 59. Decentralization: Fiscal Impact Health. The government of C6rdoba estimates that decentralizing the services of neighborhood hospitals and health posts to the municipalities would save 30 percent of this budget, or $89 million. Assuming no efficiency savings in the sector at the municipal level, this decentralization proposal would imply increased municipal expenditures equal to 9 percent of 1994 aggregate municipal expenditures. Education. Bank staff estimate (see Annex X that the provincial government could save about $34 million by decentralizing pre-school education to the municipal level. This figure represents only 3 percent of total municipal expenditures, and these expenditures could probably be absorbed by many municipal budgets. Decentralizing all primary education, however, would imply a savings to the province, and additional expenditures for the municipalities of about $276 million (based on 1994 expenditures). This figure represents about 28 percent of aggregate municipal expenditures. Policy Recommendations: Short Rzun * Transfers. Simplify transfer formula by taking the following measures: (1) Join the three Funds (Fondos) into one, based on the same formula. (2) Eliminate the distortionary criterion of giving higher transfers to municipalities with higher wage bills (Fondo 3). (3) Reduce equal parts criterion of Fondo I to 15% or less. The resulting system, in the short run, would not be dramatically different from the current system. The new formula would be based: 50% on population, 15% Equal Parts, 5% on the inverse of municipal population growth, 10% proportional to tax effort in automobile tax, 20 % proportional to tax effort in the commerce/industry/services tax. -140 - ANNEX 8 * Discretionary Transfers. Consolidate FOFINDES into the general, formula-driven coparticipation. Municipal Investment Fund grants should be used for only clear cases of hardship in financing capital investments in small municipalities, or perhaps it, too, should be consolidated into the general formula-driven coparticipation fund. Executive Branch Program of Assistance could be reduced, and used only as a revolving fund for emergency financing, e.g., natural disasters like floods or droughts. Funding from the Municipal Investment Fund or Executive Branch Program of Assistance should be in the form of loans not grants. * Taxes. Coordination between province and municipalities needs to be increased in order to improve administrative efficiency. * Municipal Expenditures/Decentralization. Improve data base and understanding of municipal finance, and the variations across municipalities. This is the only way to fully understand the implications of various decentralization programs. Evaluate municipal response to decentralization of sewerage and water services. Have municipalities met the challenge? Has there been a great variation across municipalities in their response? Economies of scale problems for smaller municipalites should be dealt with via consolidation (cooperation) between municipalites; or perhaps through access to long term credits (fiduciary fund or external financing). Long Run * Taxes/Transfers. Re-allocate tax assignment to the level of government that is most effective in collecting that tax, which could be the municipalities in the case of property tax and gross receipts tax. If municipalities can collect more efficiently, then there would be revenue-sharing from municipalities to the province, and not the other way around. (See Annex _ on tax system.) * Transfers. If assignment of tax instruments not changed, and the current arrangement continues, eliminate the inclusion of provincial tax revenues in the pool of coparticipation resources. In other words "coparticipate" only those provincial revenues that are received from federal to provincial transfers. The coparticipation formula would include a measure of fiscal effort (30% weight), population (50% weight), and poverty measure (20% weight). The fiscal effort should be measure not just based on the per capita level of revenues, but based on the per capita level relative to a measure of the tax base, given there is a high degree of variation in the value of the tax base across municipalities. Before deciding on a final formula, however, the formula should be "tested" by examining the budgetary impact of the new formula on a wide variety of municipalities. Information on municipal budgets are being improved currently by the C6rdoba coordinating unit for the Provinces I, II projects; however, an additional effort to improve the collection and analysis of -141- ANNEX8 this data would be necessary for a successful reform of the transfer system. One idea is to make a fixed percent of the coparticipation for a given year conditional on municipalties' reporting the results of the previous year's budgetary execution, so that the provincial government would receive this basic information on a regular basis. * Decentralization. Health provision should be private; financing of health should be either a provincial or federal responsibility. Education could be decentralized, but most important innovation would be that greater administrative control should be given to the school level. Education financing can be both municipal and provincial. Educational standards should be set at the federal and/or provincial level. (See annexes on health and education sectors.) The total fiscal impact of decentralizing all both sectors (or even just education alone) would imply a dramatic realignment of the balance of expenditures across levels of government (see Table 10), requiring an equally dramatic adjustment in the tax/transfer system. (See Health and Education annexes.) - 142 - AiNNEX 9 FINANCIAL CONDITION AND PROSPECTS OF CORDOBA'S TWO PUBLIC BANKS I. Introduction 1. Cordoba's banking system consists of two banks owned by the provincial goverrunent (i.e., Banco de la Provincia de Cordoba and Banco Social de Cordoba) and a number of private banks with headquarters in Cordoba, most prominent of which are Banco del Suquia and Banco Israelita de Cordoba. In addition, federal-owned government banks and many of the leading private banks and cooperative banks have opened branches in the province. The only aggregate figures on the size of Cordoba's banking system relate to the quarterly data on deposits and net loans published by Banco Central de la Republica Argentina (BCRA). Available figures indicate that until the late 1994 crisis, which has engulfed a number of Latin American countries, Cordoba's banking system had been groving at a faster rate than that of the Argentine system as a whole. 2. Between 1992 and 1994, aggregate deposits and aggregate net loans of Cordoba's banking system increased by 85% and 94% respectively. The corresponding increases for the Argentine banking system were 76% for deposits and 58% for net loans. Consequently, Cordoba's market share increased during the two-year interval, from 6.5% to 6.8% for deposits, and from 7.0% to 8.5% for net loans (see Table I below). Table 1 Relative Importance of the Banking System in Cordoba Province in the Argentine Banking System (in millions of pesos) Ratio of net loans to Deposits Net loans' deposits (%) Argentine banking system December 1992 25,359 33,539 132.3 September 1993 37,563 42,063 112.0 December 1994 44,504 53,054 119.2 June 1995 40,058 52,488 131.0 Cordoba banking system December 1992 1,647 2,342 142.2 September 1993 2,299 3,047 132.5 December 1994 3,050 4,533 148.6 June 1995 2,521 4,117 163.3 Share of Cordoba (%) December 1992 6.5 7.0 September 1993 6.1 7.2 December 1994 6.8 8.5 June 1995 6.3 7.8 Figures relate to principal only. Source: Banco Central de la Republica Argentina, Boletin Estadistico (July 1993, January 1994, April 1995 and June 1995). -143- ANNEX9 3. Data in Table 1 also indicate that Cordoba's ratio of net loans to deposits has been consistently higher than that of the system as a whole, reflecting Cordoba's heavy reliance on outside funding. For example, at the end of 1994, Cordoba's ratio of net loans to deposits stood at 149%, as compared to 119% for the Argentine banking system. 4. Cordoba's banking system has been adversely affected by the 1994 Latin American banking crisis. During the first half of 1995, aggregate deposits of Cordoba's banking system decreased by 529 million pesos, or by 17.3%, as compared to an 10.0% decrease for the Argentine banking system. Similarly, aggregate net loans of Cordoba's banking system decreased by 9.2%, as compared to a decrease of 1. 1% for the Argentine banking system. As a result, Cordoba's market shares have declined and its reliance on outside funding has increased. Thus, as the end of June 1995, Cordoba's banking system accounted for 6.3% of total customer deposits and for 7.8% of total net loans, while its ratio of net loans to deposits jumped to 163%, as compared to 131% for the Argentine banking system. (See Table 1.) 5. Public sector banks play a prominent role in Cordoba's banking system. As shown in Table 2 below, at the end of 1994, the two banks owned by the provincial government accounted for roughly 45% of aggregate deposits and 47% of net loans. In addition, other public sector banks (i.e., federal government-owned banks and other provincial government-owned banks) accounted for roughly 9% of aggregate deposits and 14% of aggregate net loans. Consequently, public sector banks as a group accounted at the end of 1994 for 54% of deposits and 61% of net loans. In the afermath of the banking crisis, the public banks' market shares declined. Nevertheless, the two banks owned by the provincial government combined still accounted as of the end of June 1995 for about 38% of aggregate deposits and 42% of net loans. Table 2 Relative Importance of the Two Public Banks in Cordoba's Banking System (in millions of pesos) End 1994 End June 1995 Deposits Net Loans Deposits Net Loans Cordoba banking system 3,050 4,533 2,521 4,117 Banco de la Provincia de Cordoba 1,036 1,427 759 1,189 Banco Social de Cordoba 324 706 187 533 Total 1,360 2,133 946 1,722 Share of two public banks (%) 44.6 47.1 37.5 41.8 Source: Based on Table 1 and accounts of BPC and BSC. - 144 - ANNEX 9 7. The remainder of this note is devoted to an analysis of the special features, financial conditions and prospects of the two banks owned by the provincial government. Section II deals with Banco de la Provincia de Cordoba (BPC), while section III deals with Banco Social de Cordoba (BSC). Conclusions and recommendations are presented in section IV. H. Banco de la Provincia de Cordoba (BPC) 8. A scrutiny of the financial statements of BPC relating to the years 1993-95 reveals the following pertinent features and trends: * Contraction of activities in 1995 * Decrease in liquidity position * Prominent role of provincial government as net debtor * Excessive open foreign currency position * Poor quality of loan portfolio * Inadequacy of shareholders' equity * Increase in interest spread * Operational inefficiency * Deterioration in financial condition Contraction of Activities in 1995 8. The changes in the key balance sheet components of BPC during the past two to three years have been in line with the trends observed in the banking systems of both Cordoba province and the country as a whole. In the aftermath of the banking crisis, BPC is experiencing a year of contraction, after several years of rapid expansion. As shown in Table 3 below, BPC's total assets decreased by 15.8% during the first half of 1995, after having increased by 29.1% in 1994. This contraction was the result of the significant decrease in the level of deposits. During the first half of 1995, BPC's deposits decreased by 26.7%, to drop to 759 million pesos, a full 1 1% below the level reached at the end of 1993. -145- ANNEX9 Decrease in Liquidity Position 9. As a result of the marked decrease in deposits, BPC has experienced acute liquidity problems. In fact, despite the significant relaxation of the minimum reserve requirements, BPC has been consistently unable to meet the new requirements set by BCRA. This is explained by the evolution of the ratio of net loans to deposits. Since net loans decreased by oniy 16.7% during the first half of 1995, as compared to a decrease of 26.7% in deposits, BPC's ratio of net loans to deposits increased from 137.7% at the end of 1994 to 156.6% by the end of June 1995. Put differently, the decrease in deposits during the first half of 1995 exceeded the decrease in net loans by 39 million pesos. In addition, net liabilities from financial intermediation decreased by 130 million pesos during the same interval. This "leakage" was financed mainly by the decrease in BPC's most liquid assets. As reflected by the data in Table 3, the item "cash and banks" decreased by 128 million pesos during the first half of 1995 Table 3 Evolution of Key Balance Sheet Components of Banco de la Provincia de Cordoba (in millions of pesos, as of end year/month) 1993 1994 June 1995 Assets 1,554 2,006 1,689 Cash and banks 200 165 37 Net loans 1,086 1,427 1,189 Deposits 855 1,036 759 Net liabilities from financial intermediation 342 500 370 Shareholders' equity 182 193 190 Ratio of net loans to deposits (%) 127.1 137.7 156.6 Source: Banco de la Provincia de Cordoba. The detailed balance sheet is presented in Table Al. Prominent Role of Provincial Government as Net Debtor 10. The provincial government has in recent years been making use of BPC as a vehicle for financing its budgetary deficits. As shown in Table 4 below, the public sector's net borrowings from BPC increased by 308 million pesos during 1994, to reach the level of 467 million pesos at year end. In this context it should be noted that the figures published by BPC indicate a substantially lower level of public sector borrowing than the above, since BPC considers the portfolio of unpaid taxes that it was requested to purchase from the provincial government with recourse as loans to the private sector. It is more appropriate to consider this operation, whose balance stood at the end of 1994 at 280 million pesos (equivalent to 17.8% of BPC's outstanding gross loan portfolio), as an overdraft facility to the provincial government. If this had been done, loans to the public sector would have totaled about 725 million pesos at the end of 1994, equivalent to 46.2% of BPC's gross loan portfolio (see Table A2). -146 - ANNEX 9 11. Even with the reported decrease in public sector borrowing from BPC during the first half of 1995, gross borrowings of the public sector still accounted for 45.4% of BPC's outstanding gross loan portfolio at the end of June, while net public sector borrowings amounted to 398 million pesos, more than 2.1 times BPC's equity. (See Table 4.) The new provincial govemment has already formulated a plan to eliminate its indebtedness to BPC within a two-year period. Such a target would be difficult to achieve, given the government's precarious fiscal situation. Nevertheless, it is reported that by early September 1995, the provincial government had already reduced the level of its debt to BPC by 49 million pesos. Table 4 Evolution of the Public Sector's Net Indebtedness to Banco de la Provincia de Cordoba (in millions of pesos, as of end year/month) 1993 1994 June 1995 Peso operations Borrowings from BPC1 259 667 498 Deposits with BPC 224 198 176 Net borrowings 65 469 322 Foreign currency operations Borrowings from BPC 147 58 141 Deposits with BPC 53 60 65 Net borrowings 94 -2 76 All currencies Borrowings from BPC 436 725 639 Deposits with BPC 277 258 241 Net borrowings 159 467 398 Figures include the portfolio of unpaid taxes that was sold by the provincial govemment to BPC with recourse, which BPC considers as loans to the private sector. These taxes amounted to 235 million pesos at the end of 1993, 280 million pesos as the end of 1994, and to 292 million pesos at the end of June 1995. Source: Derived from tables A2 and A3 - 147 - ANNEX 9 Excessive Open Foreign Currency Position 12. At the end of 1993, BPC's foreign currency assets and liabilities were almost matched, with net foreign currency liabilities amounting to the equivalent of only four million pesos. During 1994 the mismatch became significant, with net foreign currency liabilities amounting at year-end to the equivalent of 176 million pesos, or to about 92% of shareholders' equity. This excessive mismatch was the result partly of an increase of the equivalent of 97 million pesos in foreign currency-denominated deposits, and partly due to a substantial decrease in foreign currency liquid assets (i.e., cash and banks) coupled with a 9% decrease in foreign currency-denominated loans. 13. Although the mismatch decreased substantially during the first half of 1995, at the end of June it still amounted to the equivalent of 93 million pesos, or to 49% of shareholders' equity. This open foreign currency exposure is in violation of BCRA guidelines, which limit the amount of a bank's net foreign currency liabilities to 25% of its adjusted shareholders' equity. Data in Table 5 below also reflect the gradual "dollarization" of the Argentine economy. At the end of June 1995, more than 52% of BPC's liabilities were denominated in foreign currency, as compared to less than 42% at the end of 1994. Table 5 Extent of Currency Mismatch of Banco de la Provincia de Cordoba (in millions of pesos, as of end year/month) 1993 1994 June 1995 Foreign currency assets 536 581 690 % of total assets 34.5 29.0 40.9 Foreign currency liabilities 540 758 783 % of total liabilities 39.4 41.8 52.3 Net foreign currency liabilities 4 177 93 Source: Banco de la Provincia de Cordoba Poor Quality of Loan Portfolio 14. The quality of BPC's loan portfolio is poor. According to management's classification of gross credits risks (defined to include gross loans to customers, credits to other financial institutions, leasing and off-balance sheet exposures), the proportion of nonperforming credits (narrowly defined to exclude performing loans wvith potential risk)', increased from less than 16% at the end of 1994 to about 21% by the end of June 1995. The ratios shown in Table 6 below give a misleading picture about the quality of BPC's Nonperforming credits is here defined to include problematic credits, borrowers with a high risk of insolvency and irrecoverable (loss) credits. - 148 - ANNEX 9 loan portfolio, in view of the relatively large exposure to the public sector, which is considered risk-free. If one were to exclude BPC's exposure to the public sector, the proportion of nonperforming credits would approach or even exceed the level of 30%. 15. In analyzing the quality of BPC's credit risks, a distinction should be made between the performance of the commercial loan portfolio and that of the consumer and housing loan portfolio. As reflected by the data in Table 7, according to BPC's management, the proportion of nonperforming loans is much higher in the case of the commercial portfolio than for consumer and housing loans. At the end of June 1995, nonperforming commercial loans accounted for 29.0% of gross commercial risks, while delinquent consumer and housing loans accounted for only 6.3% of the outstanding portfolio. In addition, commercial loans are much less secured by preferred guarantees2 than other types of lending. At the end of June 1995, less than 15% of the outstanding commercial loan portfolio was backed by preferred guarantees, as compared to about 52% for the consumer and housing loans. Table 6 Poor Loan Portfolio Quality and Inadequacy of Equity of Banco de la Provincia de Cordoba (in millions of pesos, as of end year/month) 1993 1994 June 1995 Gross credits' 1,345 1,751 1,685 Nonperforming credits 239 278 353 Loan loss provisions 114 148 224 Shareholders' equity 182 193 190 Ratios (%) Nonperforming credits/gross credits 17.8 15.9 20.9 Provisions/gross credits 8.5 8.5 13.3 Provisions/nonperforming credits 47.7 53.2 63.5 Open credit exposure2/equity 68.7 67.4 67.9 I Includes off-balance sheet exposures. 2 Open credit exposure is defined as the difference between non- performing credits and loan loss provisions. Source: Ratios are derived from figures in Table Al. The nonperformning credit series is obtained from Banco Central de la Republica Argentina, Estados Contables de Las Entitades Financieras (December 1993, December 1994, June 19951 2 These include real estate and chattel mortgages, and government (or bank) guarantees. -149 - ANNEX 9 16. Although BPC has in recent months increased substantially the level of its loan loss provisions, which at the end of June 1995 stood at 224 million pesos (equivalent to 63.5% of management's estimate of nonperforning credits), these remain insufficient to meet actual and latent loan losses. This assertion is confirmed by the on-going loan inspection being undertaken by BCRA staff. Provisional and partial results pertaining to 79 large commercial debtor accounts (with a combined outstanding debt as of end June 1995 of 254.7 million pesos, or 23.5% of BPC's gross commercial risks) indicate that 73% of the amount of loans reviewed is nonperforming, as compared to BPC's estimate of 61%. This necessitates, as is shown in Table 8 below, additional provisions of the order of 34.3 million pesos. In addition, the BCRA inspection has uncovered unrecognized losses of 8.6 million pesos, due to the overstatement of amounts due from a number of clients. 17. The BCRA inspection covers a sample of 101 large commercial loans (including loans to the public sector), which accounted for 60.2% of BPC's gross commercial risks at the end of June 1995. It is safe to assume that when BCRA's inspection is completed, the shortfall in provisions will turn out to be substantially larger than 34.3 million pesos, despite the claim by BPC's management that loan recovenres improved significantly during the third quarter of 1995. One factor that the BCRA staff will verify is the possible overestimation of collateral given by debtors. If overestimation of real guarantees is confirmed, additional provisions would have to be allocated. Table 7 Classification of Gross Credit Risks' of Banco de la Provincia de Cordoba (in thousands of pesos, as of end June 1995) With Without Preferred Preferred Guarantees Guarantees Total Commercial Loans Normal 58,599 667,755 726,354 Potential risk 18,862 24,670 43,532 Problematic 14,813 47,522 62,335 High risk of insolvency 52,113 119,114 171,227 Loss 17,788 63,661 81,449 Total 162,175 922,722 1,084,897 Consumer and Housing Loans Normal 309,176 211,428 520,604 Potential risk - 41,606 41,606 Problematic - 15.871 15,871 High risk of insolvency - 9.435 9,435 Loss - 12,349 12,349 Total 309,176 290,689 599,865 ' Gross credit risks include gross loans to customers, credits to other financial institutions, leasing and off-balance sheet risks (i.e., guarantees given). Source: Banco Central de la Republica Argentina, Supenintendencia de Entidades Financieras y Cambiarias, Estados Contables de Las Entidades Financeras (June 1995) -150- ANNEX 9 Table 8 Partial Provisional Results of the Inspection of the Commercial Loan Portfolio of Banco de la Provincia de Cordoba (in thousands of pesos) Classi- Number of Accounts Credits Outstanding Loan Loss Provisions fication BPC Inspection BPC Inspection BPC Inspection 1 21 10 82,385 56,125 152 577 2 8 6 16,959 9,866 1,123 474 3 4 9 15,630 23,688 5,223 5,589 4 30 15 105,676 60,145 64,791 44,075 5 16 39 34,074 96,325 32,830 87,726 Total' 79 79 254,724 246,149 104,119 138,441 'The inspection currently being undertaken by the staff of BCRA covers a sample of 101 large commercial loans, whose outstanding balances at the end of June amounted to 653.2 million pesos, equivalent to 60.2% of BPC's commercial loan portfolio. Source: Derived from provisional figures supplied by BCRA's inspection team. Inadequacy of Shareholders' Equity 18. In the wake of the 1 1.6 million pesos loss recorded during the first half of 1995, BPC's equity decreased despite an upward adjustment to the capital stock of 7.5 million pesos. Consequently, at the end of June 1995, BPC's equity stood at 190 million pesos. This gives a ratio of equity to assets (unweighted) of 11.2%, which implies a much higher ratio of equity to risk-weighted assets, well above the minimum requirement of 11.5%. However, given the magnitude of the expected shortfall in loan loss provisions, BPC's equity will be found clearly inadequate once the BCRA inspection is completed. The extent of BPC's capital deficiency would become more acute, if BPC is forced to pay in full the penalties imposed by BCRA. These penalties, which are only partially provisioned for, are the result of BPC's failure to meet the minimum reserve requirements and of its numerous violations of prudential regulations, including the limit on single borrower exposure (i.e. its excessive lending to the provincial government). 19. One indicator of the inadequacy of BPC's equity is the ratio of its open credit exposure (defined as the difference between nonperforming credits and provisions for losses) to equity. As indicated in Table 6, BPC's ratio has ranged during the past three years from 67% to 69%, a level well above the norm for privately owned Argentine banks. Increase in Interest Spread 20. The main elements of BPC's income statement for 1994 and the first half of 1995 are presented in Table 9 below. The figures show that the average interest spread increased substantially in 1995. This is reflected by the increase in the ratio of net interest -151- ANNEX 9 income to average total assets (ATA) from 6.7% in 1994 to an annualized figure of 9.7% during the first half of 1995. This increase is explained by the significant increase in the interest rate structures following the banking crisis, and by BPC's pricing policy with respect to its transactions with the provincial government. The currency mismatch mentioned earlier (paras 12-13) had a positive impact on net interest income. But the main reason for the increase in BPC's net interest income was the high interest rates that BPC charged (i.e. 55% per annum) on its peso-denominated loans to the public sector, which accounted on the average for 85% of its total lending to the public sector during the first half of 1995. The high interest spread on BPC's peso lending is in fact a subsidy, the amount of which cannot be quantified precisely without a detailed analysis of all of BPC's dealings with the provincial government. Operational Inefficiency 21. The ratio of BPC's operating expenses to average total assets has been of the order of 9.3%, which is a multiple of the ratios observed in developed banking systems, and considerably higher than the ratios recorded by the most efficient Argentine banks. The main cause for this inefficiency is the relatively high staff expenses, which accounted in 1994-95 for 72% of total operating expenses. This is explained by BPC's relatively low level of average assets per employee (i.e. 440,000 pesos in 1995), coupled with the relatively high average staff costs (i.e. 29,650 pesos per annum per employee in 1995). - 152- ANNEX 9 Table 9 Income Statement of Banco de la Provincia de Cordoba As a % of In thousands average of pesos total assets' First Half First Half ' 1994 1995 1994 1995 Interest income 263,641 186,950 14.81 20.24 Interest expense 143,715 97,371 8.07 10.54 Net interest income 119,926 89,579 6.74 9.70 Net commission income 72,320 31,423 4.06 3.40 Other income 49,613 58,312 2.79 6.31 Operating income 241,859 179,314 13.59 19.41 Staff expenses 120,287 62,209 6.76 6.73 Occupancy expenses 36,679 18,619 2.06 2.02 Other operating expenses 9,259 4,973 0.52 0.54 Operating expenses 166,225 85,801 9.34 9.29 Other expenses3 20,802 19,604 1.17 2.12 Provisions for losses 38,393 77,191 2.16 8.36 Depreciation expenses 7,753 3,766 0.43 0.41 Monetary correction (net) 3,687 3,268 0.21 0.35 Other expenses 70,635 103,829 3.97 11.24 Profit before tax 4,999 (10,316) 0.28 (1.12) Income taxes 4,350 1,250 0.24 0.13 Profit after tax 649 (11,566) 0.04 (1.25) 1 Computed as the arithmetic mean of two successive end year/period figures. Average total assets amounted to 1,790.4 million pesos for 1994 and to 1,847.5 million pesos for the first half of 1995. 2 Annualized percentages. 3Consisting mainly of penalties levied by the Banco Central de la Republica Argentina (BCRA). Source: Banco de la Provincia de Cordoba. -153- ANNEX9 Deterioration in Financial Condition 22. Despite the high operating expenses, BPC would have generated profits during the first half of 1995, were it not for the poor quality of its loan portfolio. As a result of the application of the new loan classification and provisioning guidelines imposed by BCRA, BPC took new loan loss provisions of 77 million pesos during the first half of 1995. This amount is equivalent to almost 8.4% of BPC's average total assets and to 86% of its net interest income. Consequently, BPC recorded a loss of 11.6 million pesos, as compared to an after tax profit of 0.6 million pesos in 1994. Losses for the whole of 1995 could be sizable, if BPC's management heeds BCRA's expected advice of beefing up its loan loss provisions. Another factor that could result in higher losses for BPC is the provincial government's request (made in September) to BPC to lower the interest rate charged on its peso-denominated loans. III. Banco Social de Cordoba (BSC) 23. A review of the financial statements of BSC for the year 1993-95, which are presented in the annex (tables A6 and A7), reveals the following features and trends: * Significant reduction in deposits * Role of public sector as net creditor * Maintenance of net foreign currency assets * Very poor quality of loan portfolio * Potential insolvency * Importance of non-banking income * Increasing operating banking losses Significant Reduction in Deposits 24. During the first nine months of 1995, BSC's deposits decreased by almost 46%, reflecting the public's lack of confidence in the institution. This significant reduction in deposits did not, however, cause serious liquidity problems, since the reduction in the outstanding loan portfolio more than offset the decrease in deposits. As shown in Table 10 below, BSC's most liquid assets (i.e. cash and banks) increased by 12 million pesos in 1995, and its net liabilities from financial intermediation decreased by 67 million pesos. This positive development was partially offset by BSC's borrowing from BCRA, which stood at 29 million pesos at the end of September 1995. -154 - ANNEX 9 Table 10 Evolution of Key Balance Sheet Components of Banco Social de Cordoba (in million of pesos, as of end year/month) 1993 1994 September 1995 Assets 718 897 579 Cash and banks 46 30 42 Net loans 547 706 441 Deposits 267 324 176 Net liabilities from financial intermediation 146 233 166 Due to BCRA -- -- 29 Ratio of net loans to deposits (%) 205.1 218.0 251.3 Source: Banco Social de Cordoba. 25. Although BSC has so far managed to resolve its liquidity problems (by borrowing from BCRA and from Banco de la Nacion), the future is less encouraging. BSC's ratio of net loans to deposits is becoming increasingly unhealthy. At the end of 1993, the ratio stood at 205%. By the end of September 1995, the ratio had risen to 251%. Given the extremely poor quality of the loan portfolio, BSC will almost certainly suffer from an acute liquidity crunch, unless the recent trend in deposit withdrawal is reversed. Role of Public Sector as Net Creditor 26. At the end of September 1995, public sector deposits (about 119 million pesos) accounted for more than two-thirds of BSC's total deposits. Furthermore, BSC's lending to the public sector declined from 95 million pesos at the end of 1994 to less than 28 million pesos at the end of September. Consequently, the public sector, particularly the provincial government, is a net creditor at BSC, unlike its net debtor position at BPC. Maintenance of Net Foreign Currency Assets 27. BSC also differs with BPC with respect to its currency mismatch. Whereas BPC's net foreign currency liabilities are significant, BSC has consistently reported net foreign currency assets. At the end of 1994, when 44% of assets were denominated in foreign currency, the amount of net foreign currency assets held by BSC amounted to the equivalent of 19 million pesos, as compared to 41 million pesos a year earlier. Unaudited figures indicate that the excess of foreign currency assets over foreign currency liabilities increased during 1995. This tends to decrease net interest income, given the current significant difference in yields between peso-denominated assets and foreign currency- denominated ones. -155 - ANNEX 9 Very Poor Quality of Loans 28. The quality of BSC's loan portfolio, 95% of which is extended to the private sector, is extremely poor. As shown in Table I 1, the ratio of nonperforming credits to gross credits increased from 20% at the end of 1993 to over 57% by the end of September 1995. To a large extent this is a reflection of the more stringent loan classification guidelines adopted in 1995, rather than of the deterioration in the economic environment. Nevertheless, the increase in the average lending rate in 1995 resulted in an increase in the number of delinquent borrowers. Table 1 1 Poor Loan Portfolio Quality and Inadequacy of Equity of Banco Social de Cordoba (in million of pesos, as of end year/month) 1993 1994 September 1995 Gross credits' 671 903 697 Nonperforming credits 134 284 399 Loan loss provisions 47 106 204 Shareholders' equity 202 230 142 Ratios (%) Nonperforrning credits/gross credits 19.9 31.5 57.2 Provisions/gross credits 7.0 11.8 29.2 Provisions / nonperforming credits 35.0 37.4 51.1 Open credit exposure 2/equity 43.0 77.5 137.5 t Includes off-balance sheet exposures. 2 Open credit exposure is defined as the difference between nonperforming credits and loan loss provisions. Source. Banco Social de Cordoba 29. The classification of BSC's gross credit risks as of end September 1995 is presented in Table 12 below. The figures indicate that nonperforming credits accounted for 64% of the commercial loans (68% for the small loans), and for 42% of consumer loans, giving an overall ratio of 57%. Data in Table 12 also show that only a fraction of BSC's outstanding credits are secured with preferred guarantees. At the end of September 1995, this ratio stood at 24% for commercial loans and 30% for consumer loans. These ratios imply that BSC's potential loan losses are extremely high. 30. The inspection of BSC currently being undertaken by the staff of BCRA shows not only that the quality of the loan portfolio is even worse than implied by the figures in Table 12, but also that the value of the preferred guarantees offered by the clients is overstated. The sample of 270 loans includes all the large commercial loans. The provisional results of the first 1 0 commercial loans covered, which accounted for 47% of BSC's entire commercial loan portfolio as of end June 1995, imply that 92% of the commercial loan portfolio is nonperforming. Consequently, the provisions taken by BSC's management, which stood at 204 million pesos as of end September 1995, are grossly inadequate. The - 156 - ANNEX 9 1 10 commercial loans reviewed alone would require additional provisions of almost 61 million pesos. It is worth noting in this context that the BCRA inspection has revealed an overstatement in the value of preferred guarantees offered by clients of 50%, as indicated in Table 13. Table 12 Classification of Gross Credit Risks' of Banco Social de Cordoba (in millions of pesos, as of end September 1995) With Without Preferred Preferred Guarantees Guarantees Total Commercial Loans Normal 10,815 83,841 94,656 Potential risk 18,525 40,268 58,793 Problematic 22,868 51,278 74,146 High risk of insolvency 47,957 131,292 179,249 Loss 820 7,164 7,984 Total 100,985 313,843 414,828 Consumer and Housing Loans Normal 27,816 75,774 103,590 Potential risk 6,190 11,776 17,966 Problematic 18,294 24.400 42,694 High risk of insolvency 9,212 26,715 35,927 Loss 1,571 8,354 9,925 Total 63,083 147,019 210,102 Small Commercial Loans Normal 5,977 11,091 17,068 Potential risk 1,617 4,535 6,152 Problematic 2,359 5,524 7,883 High risk of insolvency 5,213 16,600 21.813 Loss 2,981 15,937 18,918 Total 18,147 53,687 71,834 l Gross credit risks include gross loans to customers, credits to other financial institutions, leasing and off-balance sheet risks (i.e. guarantees given). Source: Banco Social de Cordoba Potential Insolvency 31. According to published financial statements, BSC appears to be adequately capitalized with an equity of about 142 million pesos at the end of September 1995. The evolution of the ratio of open credit exposure to equity, however, leads to a different conclusion. In fact, during the first nine months of 1995, the ratio increased from 78% to about 138% (see Table I 1 above), implying that BSC is inadequately capitalized. When account is taken of the shortfall in provisions, BSC may even be found to be close to becoming technically insolvent. -157- ANNEX 9 Table 13 Partial Provisional Results of the Inspection of the Commercial Loan Portfolio of Banco Social de Cordoba (in thousands of pesos) Classi- Credits Outstanding Preferred Guarantees Loan Loss Provisions fication BSC Inspection BSC Inspection BSC Inspection 1 83,505 6,096 2,623 - 217 22 2 53,370 12,581 16,349 524 2,297 619 3 29,279 81,091 12,234 8,649 6,672 8,209 4 70,216 62,284 44,572 21,001 34,697 27,090 5 8,994 86,053 1,338 21,128 8,234 76,898 Total' 245,364 248,105 77,116 51,302 52,117 112,838 1 The inspection currently being undertaken by the staff of BCRA covers a sample of 270 loans including the bulk of the commercial loan portfolio. The 110 commercial loans covered to date amounted to 254.4 million pesos, which was equivalent to 47.2% of BSC's entire commercial loan portfolio as of the end of June 1995. Source: Figures supplied by BCRA's inspection team. Importance of Non-banking Income 32. The income statement of BSC for the year 1994 and the first nine months of 1995 is reproduced in the annex (Table A7). It shows that during the period January-September 1995, BSC incurred a loss of 99 million pesos as compared to an after tax profit of 12.2 million pesos in 1994. These results are misleading, since they include sizable net revenues from non-banking operations (i.e. lottery and other games). These operations generated net revenues of more than 66 million pesos in 1994, and of almost 27 million pesos during the first nine months of 1995. Increasing Operating Banking Losses 33. In order to obtain relevant operating ratios, BSC's income statements were adjusted by removing all non-banking expenses and revenues. As shown in Table 14 below, BSC's banking operations resulted in a loss of 54 million pesos in 1994 and of almost 126 million pesos during the first nine months of 1995. These losses were wholly due to the significant net loan loss provisions taken, which amounted to 77 million pesos in 1994 and to almost 129 million during the first nine months of 1995. - 158 - AiNNEX 9 Table 14 Adjusted Income Statement of Banco Social de Cordoba' (in thousands of pesos) Jan-Sept2 1994 1995 Net interest income3 73,963 46,325 Net commission income 7,113 5,204 Other income 24,134 3,667 Operating income 105,210 55,196 Operating expenses 62,629 38,187 Other expenses 3,636 4,990 Net provisions for losses 76,859 128,607 Depreciation expenses 1,111 1,091 Monetary correction (net) 12,175 7,907 Other expenses 93,781 142,595 Profit before tax (51,200) (125,586) Tax provision 3,000 - Profit after tax (54,200) (125,586) 1 Income and expenses relating to lottery and games activities are excluded. 2 Provisional figures. 3 Since the lottery and other games generate profit, they contribute to interest income. This effect, however, has not been taken into account. Source: Data derived from information supplied by the management of Banco Social de Cordoba. 34. The elements of the cost of intermediation of BSC are shown in Table 15 below. The deteriorating quality of the loan portfolio and the currency mismatch impacted negatively on net interest income. Consequently, despite the increase in the interest rate structure, the ratio of net interest income to average total assets (ATA) decreased from 9.2% in 1994 to 8.4 % during the first nine months of 1995. Non-interest income also declined, from 3.9% of ATA in 1994 to only 1.6% in 1995. Consequently, operating income as a percentage of ATA declined significantly, from 13.0% in 1994 to less than 10.0% in 1995. This was only partially offset by the decrease in operating expenses, from 7.8% in 1994 to 6.9% in 1995. -159 - ANNEX 9 Table 15 Elements of the Cost of Intermediation of Banco Social de Cordoba (in percentage of average total assets') Jan-Sept' 1994 1995 Interest income 19.04 17.55 Interest expense 9.88 9.18 Net interest income 9.16 8.37 Other income 3.87 1.60 Operating income 13.03 9.97 Operating expenses 7.76 6.90 Net provision for losses 9.52 23.23 Other expenses 2.09 2.52 Profit before tax (6.34) (22.68) Income taxes 0.37 0.00 Profit after tax (6.71) (22.68) 1 Computed as the arithmetic mean of two successive end year/period. Average total assets amounted to 807.6 million pesos for 1994, and 738.2 million pesos for the first nine months of 1995. 2 Annualized figures. Source: Based on tables A6 and 14. IV. Conclusion and Recommendations 35. The financial positions of the two banks owned by the provincial government have deteriorated in 1995. The main cause for the losses incurred this year is the poor quality of the banks' loan portfolios. Partial and provisional results of inspections of the two banks currently being undertaken by the staff of BCRA show that, in the case of BPC, 73% of the commercial loan portfolio is nonperforming, while in the case of BSC the percentage of nonperforming commercial loans might be as high as 92%. 36. Although both banks have substantially increased their loan loss provisions, current levels are judged inadequate to meet the banks' actual and latent loan losses. The required additional provisions will reduce BPC's capitalization ratio below the minimum required level of 11.5%, and might render BSC technically insolvent. -160 - ANNEX 9 37. The future prospects of the two banks differ markedly. BPC is a full-fledged commercial bank with a branch network of 175 branches and a staff of about 4,200 persons. It is the leading bank in the province in terms of assets, equity and deposits but its real importance to the financial system is much smaller that these statistics suggest. It can be conceived as two separate banks; the first caters to the private sector, while the second acts as the provincial government's bank. BPC has experienced problems in both functions. The one-third decrease in private sector deposits during the first half of 1995 was only fractionally offset by the decrease in the level of lending to the private sector, due to the relatively high percentage of nonperforming loans. BPC's liquidity squeeze was magnified by the inability of the provincial government to repay its loans. This resulted in BPC's non compliance with the reserve requirements, the shortfall reaching at times the level of 80 million pesos. 38. In another sense, BPC's dealings with the provincial government have boosted its income. This relates to its peso-denominated loans, which have been carrying interest rates comparable to those levied on private borrowers. The high interest spread earned on loans extended to the provincial government should be viewed as a significant subsidy that the government can ill afford. It is, therefore, recommended that the government's dependence on BPC's financing be terminated as quickly as possible, thereby converting BPC into a traditional commercially-oriented bank. Such a step would clarify BPC's true financial position, and at the same time, facilitate the task of its partial or full privatization. 39. BSC is an institution with multiple goals, but does not play a major role in the province's banking system proper. With a branch network of 23 branches and a staff of about 1,700 persons, BSC accounts for less than 7% of total deposits in the province and about 10% of total net loans. In the aftermath of the banking crisis, BSC experienced a run on its deposits, which resulted in substantial borrowing from Banco de la Nacion (100 million pesos) and from BCRA (29 million pesos). Because of BSC's deteriorating liquidity position, the provincial government has assumed the responsibility to repay the outstanding debt (75 million pesos) to Banco de la Nacion. Furthermore, at the end of September 1995, public sector deposits accounted for 68% of BSC's total deposits, while the decreasing private sector deposits accounted for barely 14% of BSC's loans to the private sector. 40. The imbalance between the loans to and deposits from the private sector is rendered extreme by BSC's low loan collection rate. The very poor quality of BSC's loan portfolio is confirmed by the results of the drive launched in mid-July to restructure BSC's loan portfolio. Even though BSC offered to reduce its lending rate from 24% to 12%- 15% per annum, less than 5% of outstanding loans were in fact restructured -161- ANNEX 9 41. Without the steady income from the lottery and the other games, which amounted to 66 million pesos in 1994 and to 27 million pesos during the first nine months of 1995, BSC's liquidity problems would have been much more acute and its equity would have been already wiped out. Given the provincial government's precarious fiscal situation and the relatively unimportant banking role played by BSC, the liquidation of BSC is recommended. Such an action would have an extremely positive and immediate cash flow impact on the government's budget, without affecting the delivery of banking services in the province. -162 - ANNEX 9 Annex Contents Table Page Al Aggregate Balance Sheet of Banco de la Provincia de Cordoba ............................... 21 A2 Sectoral Breakdown of Gross Loan of Banco de la Provincia de Cordoba ............... 22 A3 Breakdown of Deposits of Banco de la Provincia de Cordoba by Sector and by Currency .................................................... 23 A4 Breakdown of Deposits of Banco de la Provincia de Cordoba by Maturity and by Currency .................................................... 24 A5 Currency Breakdown of Net Interest Income and of Provisions for Losses of Banco de la Provincia de Cordoba .................................................... 25 A6 Balance Sheet of Banco Social de Cordoba .................................................... 26 A7 Income Statement of Banco Social de Cordoba ................................................... 27 - 163 - Table Al Aggregate Balance Sheet of Banco de la Provincia de Cordoba (in thousands of pesos, as of end year/month) 1993 1994 June 795 ASSETS Cash and banks 199,609 164,568 36,906 Public securities 16,363 20,690 1,099 Gross loans 1,196,866 1,569,652 1,407,584 Less: provisions 110,703 142,918 218,863 Net loans 1,086,163 1,426,734 1,188,721 Receivables from financial intermediation 76,159 183,106 252,864 Less: provisions 1,069 1,069 1,069 Net receivables 75,090 182,037 251,795 Lease financing - 7,231 6,988 Investments in other companies 852 8,332 9,208 Other credits (gross) 17,527 42,956 56,685 Less: provisions 1,900 4,342 4,342 Other credits (nct) 15,627 38,614 52,343 Fixed assets (net) 91,335 88,148 91,371 Other assets' 23,105 21,081 22,201 Intangible assets2 12,681 9,873 8,307 Inter-branch accounts 33,645 38,910 19,839 Total assets 1,554,470 2,006,218 1,688,778 LIABILITIES Deposits 854,624 1,036,105 759,177 Due to BCRA 49,953 26,952 40,175 Liabilities from financial interTnediation3 417,202 681,942 621,586 Other liabilities 40,214 44,027 70,120 Provisions 3,273 1,948 1,051 Inter-branch accounts 7,201 22,438 6,988 Total liabilities 1,372,467 1,813,412 1,499,097 SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY Capital stock 47,560 47,560 47,560 Adjustments to capital stock 114,900 124,450 132,033 Reserves 17,117 18,365 19,459 Unappropriated earnings 2,426 2,431 (9,371) Total shareholders' equity 182,003 192,806 189,681 Total liabilities + shareholders' equity 1,554,470 2,006,218 1,688,778 CONTINGENT LIABILITIES Unutilized credits 283,326 37,601 30,584 Guarantees given 43,820 25,298 43,899 Rediscounts 884 1,009 81,758 ' Consisting mainly of assets acquired in lieu of loan repayment. 2 Consisting of severance pay being anortized, as approved by BCRA. 3 Including borTowings from BCRA backed by securities. Amounts increased from 39.9 million pesos at the end of 1993 to 128.7 million pesos by the end of 1994, beforc decreasing to 102.4 million pesos by the end of June 1995. Source: Banco de la Provincia de Cordoba. - 164 - Table A2 Sectoral Breakdown of Gross Loans of Banco de la Provincia de Cordoba (in thousands of pesos, as of end year/month) 1993 1994 June'95 Peso loans Public sector' 289,317 666,666 497,606 Private sector 486,812 501,862 417,033 Financial sector 28,781 30,093 32,314 Subtotal 804,910 1,198,621 946,953 Foreign currency loans Public sector 146,713 58,326 141,334 Private sector 210,923 275,896 300,770 Financial sector 34,320 36,809 18,527 Subtotal 391,956 371,031 460,631 All currencies Public sector 436,030 724,992 638,940 Private sector 697,735 777,758 717,803 Financial sector 63,101 66,902 50,841 Total gross loans 1,196,866 1,569,652 1,407,584 Including the portfolio of unpaid taxes that was sold by the provincial government to BCP with recourse. These taxes amounted to 235.0 million pesos at the end of 1993, 279.9 million pesos at the end of 1994, and 292.3 million pesos at the end of June 1995. Source: Banco de la Provincia de Cordoba. Table A3 Breakdown of Deposits of Banco de la Provincia de Cordoba By Sector and by Currency (in thousands of pesos, as of end year/month) 1993 1994 June'95 Peso deposits Public sector 224,257 197,681 176,436 Private sector 372,861 486,166 298,117 Financial sector 6,561 4,116 4,015 Subtotal 603,679 687,963 478,568 Foreign currency deposits Public sector 53,294 60,167 64,707 Private sector 197,651 287,975 215,902 Financial sector - Subtotal 250,945 348,142 280,609 All currencies Public sector 277,551 257,848 241,143 Private sector 570,512 774,141 514,019 Financial sector 6,561 4,116 4,015 Total deposits 854,624 1,036,105 759,177 Source: Banco de la Provincia de Cordoba. -165- ANNEX 9 Table A4 Breakdown of Deposits of Banco de la Provincia de Cordoba By Maturity and by Currency (in millions of pesos, as of end year/month) 1994 June '95 Peso deposits On demand 358.4 275.7 30-59 days 259.7 167.5 60-89 days 36.1 14.3 90 days or more 33.8 21.1 Total 688.0 478.6 Foreign currency deposits On demand 41.7 20.6 39-59 days 219.4 204.7 60-89 days 40.8 32.1 90 days or more 46.2 23.4 Total 348.1 280.8 Source: Banco de la Provincia de Cordoba. Table A5 Currency Breakdown of Net Interest Income and of Provisions for Losses of Banco de la Provincia de Cordoba First half 1994 1995 Interest income Pesos 202,629 146,945 Foreign currency 61,012 40,005 Total 263,641 186,950 Interest expense Pesos 83,273 51,913 Foreign currency 60,442 45,458 Total 143,715 97,371 Net interest income Pesos 119,356 95,032 Foreign currency 570 (5,453) Total 119,926 89,579 Provisions for losses Pesos 30,670 59,259 Foreign currency 2,581 17,927 Total 33,251 77,186 Source: Banco de la Provincia de Cordoba. -166 - ANNEX 9 Table A6 Balance Sheet of Banco Social de Cordoba (in thousands of pesos, as of end year/month) 1993 1994 Sept '95 ASSETS Cash and banks 46,152 29,617 41,672 Public securities 18,038 4,968 1,983 Gross loans 594,295 811,937 630,013 Less: provisions 46,949 105,500 189,056 Net loans 547,346 706,437 440,957 Receivables from financial intermediation 49,213 84,792 38,935 Less: provisions - 882 14,527 Net receivables 49,213 83,910 24,408 Investments in other companies 11,210 7,581 7,747 Other credits 10,202 16,343 10,183 Fixed assets (net) 22,603 27,897 29,720 Other assets 10,701 12,485 12,408 Inter-branch accounts 2,579 7,904 10,245 Total assets 718,044 897,142 579,323 LIABILITIES Deposits 266,806 324,044 175,524 Due to BCRA 207 140 28,992 Liabilities from financial intermediation 194,746 316,384 189,986 Other liabilities 42,844 17,864 26,684 Provisions 9,461 3,198 6,876 Inter-branch accounts 1,924 5,952 9,598 Total liabilities 515,988 667,582 437,660 SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY Capital stock 16,059 40,332 40,332 Adjustments to capital stock 78,239 85,175 91,156 Reserves 65,335 88,147 92,338 Unappropriated earnings (loss) 42,423 15,906 (82,163) Total shareholders' equity 202,056 229,560 141,663 Total liabilities + shareholders' equity 718,044 897,142 579,323 CONTINGENT LIABILITIES Unutilized credits 1,313 1,150 169 Guarantees given 40,563 32,065 65,226 Provisional figures. Source: Banco Social de Cordoba - 167 - ANNEX 9 Table A7 Income Statement of Banco Social de Cordoba (in thousands of pesos) Jan-Sept 1994 1995' Interest income 153,756 97,165 Interest expense 79,793 50,840 Net interest income2 73,963 46,325 Net commission income 7,113 5,204 Other income3 142,995 72,402 Operating income 224,071 123,931 Staff expenses 63,532 48,753 Occupancy expenses 8,759 5,336 Other operating expenses 22,795 10,887 Operating expenses3 95,086 64,976 Other expenses3 23,636 20,294 Net provisions for losses 76,859 128,607 Depreciation expenses 1,111 1,091 Monetary correction (net) 12,175 7,907 Other expenses 113,781 157,899 Profit before tax 15,204 (98,944) Income taxes 3,000 Profit after tax 12,204 (98,944) 1 Provisional figures. 2 Including penalty interest levied on borrowers and imposed by BCRA. 3 The items "other income," "operating expenses' and "other expenses" are greatly affected by the lottery and other games run by BCRA. Source: Banco de la Provincia de Cordoba. -168- ANNEX10 EVALUACION DE LA SITUACION ACTUAL Y PERSPECTIVAS DEL REGIMEN PREVISIONAL DE LA PROVINCIA DE CORDOBA (EVALUACION AND PROSPECTS OF CORDOBA'S SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM) INFORME EJECUTIVO 1. Conceptualmente el regimen previsional de la provincia de C6rdoba esta organizado como un sistema de reparto con garantia estatal de afiliaci6n obligatoria y sustitutivo del regimen nacional, en el cual, las tasas de aporte vigentes son sustancialmente mayores a las vigentes para el regimen previsional nacional: 14.5% la tasa de aporte personal y 20% la tasa de aporte patronal. Existen regimenes diferenciales, de los cuales el principal es el policial y penitenciario, que tienen tasas de aporte superiores a la del regimen general, a pesar de lo cual no llegan a financiar los beneficios comparativamente mayores. 2. El beneficio de jubilaci6n ordinaria se calcula como el 82% del ultimo salario percibido, cuando el cargo haya sido desempeiiado por un periodo mayor de 12 meses (o el promedio de los ultimos 3 anios de lo contrario), lo que hace que el regimen sea uno de los mas ventajosos para el afiliado en todo el pais. El regimen nacional establece una base de calculo de las prestaciones igual al promedio de los ultimos 10 anios. Ademas en este ultimo promedio se consideran las remuneraciones a sus valores hist6ricos sin actualizaci6n alguna, mientras que en el caso de C6rdoba se consideran el valor de los cargos. 3. Esto hace que las prestaciones sean m6viles automaticamente ante cambios en las remuneraciones de los cargos que las determinan, hecho desventajoso financieramente para la Caja y que deriv6 en el pasado en que se otorgaran aumentos salariales mediante sumas no remunerativas sobre las cuales no se calculan aportes personales ni patronales. 4. Como en todo sistema de reparto, la evoluci6n de la relaci6n aportantes/beneficiarios es esencial, ya que constituye uno de los pilares fundamentales para su viabilidad financiera de largo plazo. Cuando existen edades tempranas de retiro y poblaciones activas que tienden a estancarse surgen importantes desequilibrios financieros. En la medida que se experimente un deterioro de la relaci6n activos/pasivos el sostenimiento del sistema se tornan imposible. En C6rdoba, la relaci6n activos/pasivos -169- ANNEX 10 para 1995 es 2.2 (I en el caso del regimen de policia y penitenciaria y 2.5 para el personal civil), con lo que queda claro que con esta relaci6n el sistema no se autofinancia. 5. El sistema previsional de la provincia de C6rdoba muestra un deficit estimado para el afio 1995 igual a $70.3 millones, considerando exclusivamente los ingresos por aportes y contribuciones y los pagos de prestaciones jubilatorias, retiros y pensiones. El deficit total de la Caja (incluyendo otros ingresos y otros gastos) se estima en consecuencia, en $90.4 n-iillones. Cabe destacar, que el 72.8% del deficit previsional corresponde al regimen previsional policial y penitenciario. 6. A fin de proponer reformas al sistema se efectuaron diferentes Proyecciones que se detallan a continuaci6n. 7. Proyecci6n sin reforma: se analiz6 la evoluci6n del regimen bajo el regimen vigente, manteniendo constante el numero de activos hasta el ano 2000 y a partir de alli incrementandolo en la tasa de crecimiento de la poblaci6n de la Provincia y el salario real constante hasta esa fecha y a partir de alli incrementandolo de forma tal que la masa salarial crece a una tasa del 4.5% real anual. Bajo estos supuestos, el deficit del sistema es permanentemente creciente llegando a ser equivalente al 20% de los egresos previsionales hacia el aho 2010, comparado con el 10% de 1995. 8. Escenario 1: se consider6 solamente un incremento en la edad jubilatoria del personal no policial (a 65 aeos para los hombres y 60 las mujeres), y s consider6 como base para el calculo de la jubilaci6n el promedio de las remuneraciones percibidas en los ultimos 120 meses, a valores corrientes del momento de percepci6n. 9. Escenario 2: en este caso, a los supuestos incluidos en la alternativa I se agrega un incremento en cinco anos de la edad jubilatoria policial. 10. Escenario 3: en este caso se consider6 el escenario sin reforma pero efectuando una reducci6n adicional de personal (basicamente personal al que le faltan mas de 5 afios para obtener el beneficio de jubilaci6n) de un 5% para el anio 1996, del 3% para el 97 y del 2% para el 98. 11. Escenario 4: para esta proyecci6n a los supuestos expuestos en el escenario 3 se adicion6 una reducci6n del 10% en los salarios de los activos para el afno 1996. En base a ello, se efectuaron dos proyecciones diferentes: * Escenario 4.1: dado que los haberes estan vinculados a los salarios de los cargos, al reducir los salarios, se reducen las pasividades en igual magnitud. * Escenario 4.2: en este caso se consider6 que no se modifican los haberes de los pasivos actuales, pero que si se reducen para quienes se jubilan luego de la reducci6n salarial. -170- ANNEX 10 12. Escenario 5: por ultimo se analiz6 el cambio de regimen por uno de identicas caracteristicas del Sistema Integral de Jubilaciones y Pensiones Nacional, garantizando a los actualesjubilados el respeto por los derechos adquiridos. A los activos actuales del sistema, se les reconoce los anos de aporte al regimen provincial a traves de la Prestaci6n Compensatoria otorgada por el nuevo sistema. Cabe destacar que la tasa de aporte se reduce a la vigente en el sistema nacional. En este caso el deficit calculado representa o bien el monto que debe financiar la Naci6n en caso de que la caja sea transferida al SIJP o bien el deficit financiero que enfrentara la provincia en caso de organizarlo ella. 13. En la Proyecci6n sin Reforma, y en los Escenarios 1 y 2, se supuso que la poblaci6n permanecia constante hasta el aiio 2000 y a partir de alli crecia a la tasa de crecimiento de la poblaci6n de la provincia. En los Escenarios 3 y 4 luego de la reducci6n de personal se supuso se efectuaron los mismos supuestos sobre la poblaci6n activa. En todos los casos, el salario real fue mantenido constante hasta el 2000, creciendo desde el aino 2001 de forma que la masa salarial se incremente a una tasa del 4.5% real anual. 14. A continuaci6n se muestran los resultados de las estimaciones, tanto sobre el Deficit Previsional como sobre el Deficit Total. Deficit Previsional En millones de pesos 1995 1996 2005 2019 Proyecci6n sin Reforma 70.3 97.7 156.6 358.0 Escenario 1 70.3 80.7 (11.5) (33.6) Escenario 2 70.3 79.7 (26.7) (84.0) Escenario 3 70.3 133.4 218.6 366.2 Escenario 4.1 70.3 120.1 196.8 329.5 Escenario 4.2 70.3 188.7 257.8 372.3 Altemativa 5(*) 70.3 318.2 247.6 29.3 (*) Deficit del sistema de reparto mas regimen policial y penitenciario -171- ANNEX 10 Wficit Total En millones de pesos 1995 1996 2005 2019 Proyecci6n sin Reforma 90.4 116.8 183.3 410.9 Escenario 1 90.4 88.7 (9.4) (20.4) Escenario 2 90.4 87.8 (19.8) (72.0) Escenario 3 90.4 142.5 231.1 388.2 Escenario 4.1 90.4 128.2 208.0 349.4 Escenario 4.2 90.4 198.5 270.5 393.2 Escenario 5(*) 90.4 329.8 258.2 37.7 (*) Deficit del sistema de reparto mnas regimen policial y penitenciario. Recomendaciones 15. En base a los analisis realizados, se estima que la situaci6n mas conveniente para la provincia adhiera al SIJP transfiriendo la Caja de Previsi6n a la Naci6n, ya que en ese caso la provincia no debe enfrentar ningun deficit previsional. 16. En caso de no resultar viable esta alternativa, se recomiendan las siguientes reformas: * Elevaci6n de la edad de jubilaci6n a 65 afios para los hombres y 60 para las mujeres. * Aumento de la edad de retiro para el personal policial a 60 anios * Modificaci6n de la base de calculo para la jubilaci6n. La misma deberia ser el promedio de las remuneraciones percibidas en los iltimos 120 meses, a valores corrientes del momento de percepci6n. 17. Las proyecciones del regimen con estas estimaciones corresponden a el Escenarios 2. -172- ANNEX 10 1. REGIMEN PREVISIONAL ACTUAL Y REFORiMAS RECIENTES 1.1. INTRODUCCION 18. Las caracteristicas del regimen previsional de la provincia de C6rdoba estan determinadas esencialmente por la Ley provincial n° 8024, vigente desde el 1° de febrero de 1991. Esta ley ha sido recientemente reformada por el Decreto n° 1046 del 19 de julio de 1995 y por la Ley de Emergencia Provincial (T.O. Decreto 1056/95 de las leyes provinciales n° 8472 y 8482). 19. Los individuos comprendidos obligatoriamente en el regimen que la legislaci6n mencionada establece son; * El personal de la administraci6n publica provincial en sus tres Poderes. * Los funcionarios, empleados y agentes de las Municipalidades y Comunas. * El personal docente de los institutos privados adscriptos a la ensenianza oficial, subvencionados total o parcialmente por la provincia o las Municipalidades, pudiendo incorporarse al regimen los docentes de establecimientos privados no subvencionados pero adscriptos a la enseiianza oficial, previo convenio con los organismos nacionales correspondientes. * El personal que preste servicios en Instituciones o Empresas del Estado provincial, Municipal, Comunal o mixtas, con participaci6n mayoritaria del Estado, dentro o fuera del territorio provincial. * Los afiliados con licencia gremial por ejercer cargos electivos en sus organizaciones sindicales, sin goce de remuneraciones y previo convenio con los organismos respectivos. 20. Tambien la ley establece regimenes diferenciales especiales para el personal con estado policial y penitenciario, los Magistrados del Poder Judicial, los bailarines del Ballet Oficial y el personal de vuelo de la Direcci6n Provincial de Aeronautica. 21. A su vez, deja facultado al Poder Ejecutivo (mediando acuerdo del Legislativo) a incorporar al regimen, a nuevos sectores previo convenio con los organismos correspondientes. 22. El organismo administrador del sistema previsional, es ia Caja de Jubilaciones, Pensiones y Retiros de C6rdoba, creada por Ley provincial n° 5317 del 28/12/197 1, como una entidad descentralizada y autarquica, con personalidad juridica e individualidad financiera. -173- ANNEX 10 23. Los recursos con que la Caja cuenta para cubrir el pago de los beneficios que otorga el sistema son, * Los aportes personales y las contribuciones patronales indicados en el cuadro No 1, * Los aportes personales optativos de beneficiarios de la Caja para casos especiales previstos en la legislaci6n, * Los recursos que sean afectados por Leyes especiales nacionales o provinciales, * Las donaciones y legados que se hagan a la Caja, * Los rendimientos financieros y otras rentas provenientes de activos fisicos o financieros pertenecientes a la Caja, * Intereses, multas y recargos. 24. Ademas, el gobierno se obliga expresamente en la legislaci6n vieente a garantizar el financiamiento de los deiicits, para asegurar el pago en termino de las prestaciones, proveyendo asi al sistema previsional de un fuerte respaldo estatal. CUADRO N° I TASAS DE APORTE AL SISTEMA ..-porle Aporte Personal Patronal REGIMEN GENERAL 14.50 % 20.00 % JUBILADOS Y PENSIONADOS (I)' 5.00% 0.00% REGIMENES DIFERENCIALES PERSONAL QUE SE DESEMPEINA EN AMBIENTES INSALUBRES, ACTIVIDADES PENOSAS, RIESGOSAS, O DETERMINANTES DE VEJEZ O AGOTAMIENTO PREMATURO (2) 14.50 % 22.00 % PERSONAL DE LA ENSENANZA INICIAL, PRIMARIA, MEDIA, ESPECIAL Y SUPERIOR. PERSONAL DEL CONSEJO PROVINCIAL DE PROTECCION AL MENOR DEPENDIENTE DEL GOBIERNO DE LA PROVINCIA; Y PERSONAL DOCENTE DE INST.PRIVADOS ADS.A ENSENANZA OFICIAL SUBVENCIONADOS POR LA PROVINCIA, 0 DE LOS NO SUBVENCIONADOS PREVIO CONVENIO 14.50 % 22.00 % PERSONAL CON ESTADO POLICIAL Y PENITENCIARIO DE LA PROVINCIA 7.00 % 123.00 % MAGISTRADOS DEL PODER JUDICIAL (3) 17.00 % 22.00 % BAILARINES DEL BALLET OFICIAL DE LA PROVINCIA 16.00 % 22.00 % PERSONAL DE VUJELO DE LA DIRECCION DE AERONAUTICA DE LA PROVINCIA (4) 17.00 % 22.00 % (1) La Ley de Emergencia Provincial estableci6 un aporte personal extraordinario mensual para los jubilados y pcnsionados dcl 5% de sus haberes, quedando exceptuados de ese aporte los bencficiarios de haberes hasta 400S y aquellos que por la aplicaci6n del tope sobre sus prestaciones, sufran un descuento superior a ese aporte extraordinario. (2) La calificaci6n dc estos seTvicios es efectuada por el Poder Ejecutivo Provincial, con participaci6n de la Caja y de Ia Asociaci6n Gremial respectiva, y debe ser ratificada por ley. (3) Vocal del Tribunal Superior de Justicia, Vocal de Cimara, luez de Primera Instancia, Fiscal General, Fiscal dc Cara, Agente Fiscal, Asesor, Procurador del Trabajo, Secrctario, Relatorcs de Sala del Tribunal Superior de Justicia y Relator dc Fiscalia General. (4) Pilotos y Copilotos. FUENTE: LEY PROVINCIAL N' 8024. -174- ANNEX 10 25. La Ley de Emergencia Provincial, dictada en raz6n de la situaci6n deficitaria de la Caja de previsi6n, ademas del aporte extraordinario destacado en el cuadro n° I , dispuso en cuanto atane a la evoluci6n financiera de aquella lo siguiente: * Establecer un tope para todos los salarios (remuneracion bruta excluidas la bonificaci6n por antiguedad y las asignaciones familiares) igual al sueldo del cargo del Gobernador de la Provincia conformado por la asignacion basica mas la responsabilidad jerarquica (lo que ocurra con los salarios tiene relevancia dado que es determinante tanto de los recursos de la Caja como de las prestaciones ya que estas como se indicara mas adelante estan ligadas al salario en actividad), * Establecer en consecuencia un tope a las prestaciones previsionales, fijandose un haber maximo de jubilaci6n del 82% del tope salarial antes mencionado, * Establecer un haber maximo de pensi6n igual al 75% del haber maximo jubilatorio, * Autorizar a reducir la jornada laboral hasta un 40% y las remuneraciones hasta un 30%, * Determinar que las bonificaciones, adicionales o aquellas remuneraciones adicionales que reconozcan la antiguedad se abonaran hasta el maximo de 30 anos siendo el maximo reconocible un 2% por afno (se exceptua al personal docente para quien el descuento no puede superar un 20% de la remuneraci6n que le hubiere correspondido percibir), * Suspender la jubilaci6n ordinaria reducida desde el I' de octubre de 1995 y durante la vigencia de la Emergencia Provincial. 26. Volviendo al regimen de la Ley n° 8024, los porcentajes son aplicables sobre el total de las remuneraciones liquidadas por todo concepto (excepto viaticos, indemnizaciones y asignaciones familiares). Ademas, por disposici6n expresa de la ley, los aportes patronales se podran incrementar de acuerdo a las necesidades del sistema, fortaleciendose asi la garantia estatal que la ley otorga al regimen que consagra. El incremento de los aportes personales en cambio, requiere previo acuerdo del Poder Legislativo. 27. Otras fuentes de ingreso son el importe del primer mes de sueldo percibido por el personal que ingrese como afiliado al regimen, deducible en seis cuotas mensuales, y la diferencia de sueldo por ascenso del primer mes de aumento. -175- ANNEX 10 28. Los beneficios otorgados por el sistema son; * Jubilaci6n ordinaria, * Jubilaci6n ordinaria reducida (suspendida por la Emergencia Provincial desde el 1° de octubre de 1995), * Jubilaci6n por edad avanzada, * Jubilaci6n por invalidez, * Retiro para el personal con estado policial o penitenciario, * Jubilaci6n extraordinaria para bailarines del Ballet Oficial de la Provincia, * Jubilaci6n para el personal de Vuelo de la Direcci6n Provincial de Aeronautica, * Pensi6n, Pensi6n por Indigencia, * Asignaciones familiares a pasivos cuando corresponda. -176- ANNEX 10 CUADRO N- 2 BENEFICIO DE TUBILACION REQUISITOS DE ERAD Y ANOS DE SERVICIO Edad bruma Al Retiro (I) Anos de Hombrcs \Iuleres Servicto TUBILACION ORDINARIA - REGIMEN GENTERAL 62 59 30 (2) ,- PERSONAL QUE SE DESENIPENA EN .XVBIRNTRES INSALLBRES. ACTIVIDADES PENOSAS. RIESGOSAS. 0 DETHRJMINANTES DE VEfEZ O DE AGOTAIMIENTO PREMATURO 59 56 25 (3) -- PERSONAL DE LA ENSENANZA INICIAL, PREINARLA, MEDIA. ESPECIAL Y SUPERIOR PERSONAL DEL CONSEIO PROVINCIAL DE PROTECCION AL MENOR DEPPEND IEN? TE DEL GOB IERNO DE LA PROVINCIA, Y PERSONAL DOCENTE DE INST PRIVADOS ADS A ENSENANZA OFICIAL SLBVENCIONADOS POR LA PROVINCIA, O DE LOS NO SUB VENCIONADOS PREVIO CONVENIO 57 54 25 (4) JUBILACION ORDINARIA REDUCIDA (SUSPElNDIDA) 59 a 61 56 a 68 30 (7) RUBILACION POR EDAD AVANZADA 69 69 10 (5) JUBILACION PARA MINI.USVALIDOS (6) 49 49 20 PERSONAL CON ESTADO POLICIAL Y PENITENCIARIO -- RETIRO VOLUNTARIO * PERSONAL SU'PERIOR NO E.XISTE NO EXISTE 25(8) * PERSONAL SUBALTERNO NO EXISTE NO EXISTE 22(8) -- RETIRO OBLIGATORIO POR LIMITS DE EDAD Y ANOS DE SERVICIOS * OFICIAL SUPERIOR 58 56 30(8) * OFICIAL IEFE 55 53 30(S) * OFICIAL SUTBALTERNO 53 51 30(8) * SUBOFICIAL SUlPERIOR 55 53 25(S) SUIBOFICIAL SLBALTERNO Y TROPA 53 51 25(8) - RETIRO OBLIGATORIO POR INCAPAC[DAD (9) NO EXISTE NO EXISTE NO EXISTE -- RETIRO OBLIGATORIO POR RAZONES DE SERVICIO NO EX.ISTE NO EXISTE (I5 (8) -- RETIRO JEFF 0 SUBJEFE DE POLICIA, 0 DIRECTOR 0 SUBDLRECTOR DEL SERVICIO PENITENCIARIO. QUE SEAN RESPECTIVAMNfENTE COMISARIOS GENERALES DE LA POLICIA DE LA PCIA 0 INSPECTORES GENERALES DEL SERVICIO PENITENCLARIO NO EXISTE NO EXISTE NO E.ISTE (I 1) BAILARINES DEL BA.NLLET OFICIAL DE LA PROVINCIA 40 40 20 (10) PERSONAL DE VUEI.O DE LA DIRECCION DE AERONAI,TICA DE LA PROVI\CIA 50 50 30 FUENTE LE'Y PROVINC[AL N '8024 Y DECKLTO PROVINCIAL N 1046i95. NOTAS AL CUADRO N 2 (i) Ten,endo ci afilhado como mirmmo 10 anos de servicios con aporcs. podri compcnsar el exceso de edad con la falita de sermicos. a raz6n dae 2.hQosldcsdid exccdente ror cada I ano de servicios faltantes Personal con estado nolicial o ncnitenciacro solo es cecivcco en caso de ret-n obbligaono por limite de edad y arios de servicros Pilotos v Corilotos de la Direccisn de Acroniutica de la Provinc a an ano de servicios adicronal por cada 400 Ks de vuelo, pero ei total bonificado no puede exceder el 50% del tiernpo de servicios computado (2) Los afiliados con 25 anos de aponre, lenen la opcron de abonar un cargo por los aportes personales que lcs resten para completar los 30 ainos de aporne exigidos para acceder a lajubilaci6n ordinaria. El EsLado provincial se compromece a abonar a la Caja los apornes que correspondan al computo de scevicios ad- honorem y de otros servicros prestados por los que no se hubieran tnbutado aportes. (3)20 aros continuos o discontinuos deberin scr scrvicios de la naturalcza dcscnpta (4) 20 anos dircctamcnte al frente de alumnos Adernis. a los docentes del Consejo Provincial da Proteccion al Menor v a los docentes da escuelas especiales de discapacitados que se dcsemepeien con alwrumos a cargo, se les podri computar I ario y 1/4 por cada ario de servicio prestado. y se ]cs podri reducir en I mes y 1I2 por cada anio de servicao la edad exigida para lajubilaci6n ordinana Los Docentes con cargos directivos se jubilan con 59 aros de edad lns hombres y 56 las mujeres (5) Por lo mcnos 5 arios durante los 8 anos irnedwatamente antenores al cese de la actividad (6) [nvalrdez ccriificada por autorndad sanitaria oficial mayor del 33% dae su capacidad laborativa Para accedcr al bencio cl indclrduo tiene que haber trabajado como minusvilido un minumo de 10 aros bajo ci regimen de la Caja (7) Tiene que cumplir con ci requisito de servicios dc la ordinana aunque se exigen 20 afios de apoare ciectivos como minimo a la Caja (8) Computabics a parnir de los 17 arios de edad Los servicios ciriles en rclaci6n de dependencia (no sc computan sersicios autanoamos) con anteriotdad a tomar estado policial o peniLenc=ano, se computarin nuando sc acredien 25 aruos para ci personal supenrn. 22 aiios pan cI personal subaltemo. 20 alos por retiro por incapacidad, o, 10 anos en caso de habcr prestado servicios bajo regimenes policiales o penitencianos nacionales o de oaras provincias (9) Disminucion del 66% o mis en la capacidad laborativa o fancional del afiliado (10) Se podrin computar servicios de igual naturalcza prcsrados en otra junsdiccian con un rninimo de 10 aros de servicios baja ci presente regimen (I I) Se retira con ci 85°o con 22 anos de servicLo Ese porcentaje se reduce en un 4% por cada ario quc faile para compIctar los 22 aaos 29. Las edades minimas destacadas en el cuadro n° 2 incorporan los cuatro anlos adicionales dispuestos por el Decreto Provincial n° 1046 del 19 de julio de 1995. En efecto dicho decreto dispuso un incremento en 4 anos para ambos sexos de todas las edades para acceder a los beneficios jubilatorios, con la sola excepci6n del personal con Estado Policial y Penitenciario de la Provincia que mantuvo los requisitos originales de edad destacados en la Ley n° 8024. -177- ANNEX 10 30. Para poder gozar del beneficio de jubilaci6n o de retiro, el interesado debe cesar en toda actividad en relaci6n de dependencia, correspondiendo en caso contrario la suspensi6n de aquel, salvo excepciones previstas en la legislacion', o aquellas determinadas por el Poder Ejecutivo (donde debera mediar la reducci6n de las prestaciones)2. 31. El beneficio de iubilaci6n por invalidez, puede ser adquirido sin requisitos de edad ni de antiguedad en el servicio . Se considera "invalidez total" a aquella que produce una disminuci6n del 66% de la capacidad laborativa del afiliado. La "invalidez transitoria" no da derecho a acceder a beneficio alguno. Ademas, el beneficio de "jubilaci6n por invalidez" se extingue con el desempenio de cualquier actividad en forma autonoma (que exija capacidades similares a las de la funci6n o cargo en el cual el agente fue declarado inhabil) o de cualquier actividad en relaci6n de dependencia. 32. Los individuos que hayan cesado en la actividad antes de alcanzar la edad minima podrAn acceder al beneficio de jubilacion al alcanzar dicha edad si; - Acreditan 30 ahios de servicios con aportes efectivos a la Caja Provincial, y/o * Re6nen los requisitos de aportes, habiendo cesado dentro de los 2 anios inmediatamente anteriores al momento de alcanzar la edad minima. * En cuanto al derecho de pensi6n en caso de muerte, es un beneficio derivado que es dejado por los jubilados que fallecen o por los afiliados activos4, cualquiera sea su antiguedad en el servicio. Los beneficiarios del derecho seran * Viuda (y conviviente), * Viudo incapacitado para el trabajo o con 58 afios cumplidos a la fecha del fallecimiento de la causante, El goce de jubtlaci6n ordinria es compatible con el desempeilo de cargos docenten o dc investigac6n. El socc del retiro policial o penitenciario, es compatible con cagos docentes en untitutos de Ensdianza y Capackitci6n. El gocc dc la jubtlact6n docentc es compauble con el rcinrcso a contiuiidad en cl desempefto de dicha actividad Todos estos cargo, desempcllados al mimM aiempo quc es percibida la jubilaci6n, deben se cma fier del knbito de la Caja. o sea. no aIcanzados por el regimen previsional provincial Mediante cl reingjreso en ta actividad. -n nd-v;duo puede reaJustar o tansformar su benefico mediantc ci computo de los nuevos servicios, slempre que alcancen un rinimo de tres anos con aporTes Si la incapscidad se dicta dentro de los 2 anos de expirada la relaci6n laboral, para que el individuo pueda acceder a una jubilaci6n por invalidez deben scr areditados al mcnos 10 an'on de aporne o aportes por no menos de la mitad del tiempo truncurmdo entre la edad de 1I aos y &quilla curplida a ls fecha de cesact6n. Taobihn cl derecho a pensi6n podri ner derivado de afiliados no ativos, con 30 aiios de servicios computables por la Caja o que hubiere dejgdo de apcrar a Ia Caja rentindole como maimo 2 afos para alcanzar la edad minima de retaro (art. 46 de la Ley Provincial N' 8024). -178- ANNEX 10 * Hijos e hijas solteros; nietos, nietas, hermanos y hermanas solteros, huerfanos de padre y madre a cargo del causante; hasta los 18 anios de edad5, * Hijas y hermanas solteras que hayan convivido con el causante a su cargo durante los 10 anios anteriores al deceso, que a ese momento tengan cumplidos los 50 a-nos y que no gocen de beneficio previsional alguno, * Los padres, incapacitados para el trabajo y a cargo del causante a la fecha del deceso. 33. La acumulaci6n de haberes de pensi6n se puede realizar hasta un maximo de 3 pensiones minimas, y en caso de que alguna de las dos pensiones acumulables supere esa cifra, el beneficiario debera optar por la que mas le convenga. Ademas, es acumulable el goce de lajubilaci6n o retiro con la pensi6n y tambien el de dos pensiones, no pudiendo ser acumuladas mas de dos prestaciones6. 34. La legislaci6n preve adicionalmente el otorgamiento de pensi6n por indigencia a las personas que; * Hayan aportado a la Caja Provincial por un periodo no menor de 5 anios. * Hayan cumplido los 70 anios de edad. * No cuenten con recursos propios. * No gocen de otra prestaci6n previsional o no contributiva. * Tengan un minimo de 5 aflos de residencia en la provincia. 35. El cilculo para determinar los haberes de jubilaci6n y pensi6n, debe respetar las modalidades descriptas en el cuadro n° 3. 5 Si aa mr_eitandos daspuece el requisito de edad, y si crsan estudios. se extiende a los 23 aios. 6 Ou eorm b~I Caja dt Iubilaciornes. PDesujones y iRetixos de Cordoba. -179- ANNEX 10 CUADRO No. 3 DETERNaNACION DE HABERES DE JUBILACION Y' PENSION (I) TIPO DERIVADO HABER DE JUBILACION HABER DE PENSION JUBILACION 82% m6vil de ls remuncraci6n mensual del cargo desempehiado a la fecha t 75% del habnrjubilatorio del ORDINARIA (2) Y del cese. causante. (100% el primer aAo) JUBULACION POR Si el iltimo cargo se desempeni6 menos de 12 meses, o si ese cargo no) INVALIDEZ guardare adecuada relaci6n con los desempehtados en la carrera del afiliado: 82% movil del promedio actualizado de remuneraciones de los 3 alos anteriores al cese. En caso de percibir remuneraciones variables(3), se agregari al haber anterior calculado en base a la remuneraci6n regular, el 82% del promedio de los ultimos 5 alos de esas remuneraciones actualizadas-(4) En caso de acumulaci6n de cargos, se aplicarin las disposicioncs anteriores al cargo mas conveniente, agregindose el 5% del haber derivado del otro cargo por cada arlo acumulado hasta alcanzar el haber ordinario correspondiente (5). Con 30 ahlos de servicios con aortes (20 correspondientes al regimen de la caja), si cl individuo desempen6 un cargo de mayorjerarquia en la adrninistraci6n provincial o municipal durante dos altos coridos o cinco altemados, se tomari como base de cilculo la remuneraci6n actualizada de dicho cargo (6). Afiliados que hayan tenido o tengan cargos electivos (7) con desempeino durante dos aitos corridos o cinco alternados y que cumplimenten requisitos de edad, altos de serv. y aporles del regimen general (8). podrin optar por que se tome como base la remuneraci6n actualizada de dicho cargo. JUBILACION Idem jubilacion ordinaria menos un 5% por cada anto o fracci6n 75% del haber jubilatorio del ORDINARIA mayor de 6 meses que le faltare para alcanzar la edad causante. (100% el primer aflo) REDUCIDA minima (con 6 meses o menos se deduce el 5%). (SUSPENDIDA) Si mantiene el aporte personal incrementado en un 4% todo calculado sobre el haberjubilatorio, al llegar a la edad minima pasaria a cobrar la jubilaci6n ordinaria JUBILACION POR 60% de la jubilaci6n ordinaria, con bonificaci6n del 2% por cada 75% del haber jubilatorio del EDAD AVANZADA alo de servicio que exceda de 15 altos, no pudiendo superar el haber causante. (100% el primer aito) dejubilacion ordinaria. PENSION POR 75% del haberjubilatorio que le MUERTE EN hubiere correspondido al ETAPA ACTIVA causante. (100% el primer alto) PENSION POR 50% del haber minnmo INDIGENCIA de jubilaci6n vigente PERSONAL CON ESTADO POLICIAL 0 PENITENCIARIO (9) RETIRO 8 5% m6vil de la ultima remuneraci6n mensual. afectada por escala FALLECI!MACTO DE decreciente por diferencia (deficiencia) entre los ahlos de sernicio SERVICIO efecivos, y el minimo requerido por el 'retiro obligatorio por 85% de retribuci6n delcargo al limite de edad y altos de servicio". momento de baja, o corgo post- mortem. RETIRO POR INCAPACIDAD (FISICA 0 PSIQUICA) POR ACTO DE 85% m6vil de la rnmuneraci6n del cargo al momento de la baja (o del FALLECINI. OTRA CAUSA SERVICIO cargo al que fuere promovido por razones de servicio meritorio). 75% del retiro quc gozaba o Ic hubiere correspondido al causante ( 10). POR OTRA CAUSA 4% de la remunnraci6n del cargo por cada ahlo de servicio DURANTE EL computable (no inferior al 45% ni superior al 100% de DESENeE9O DEL dicha renmuneraci6n). CARGO -180- ANNEX 10 TIPO DERIVADO HABER DE JUBILACION HABER DE PENSION RETIRO OBLIGATORIO (AL CESAR SUS FUNCIONES) COMISARIO GENERAL DE LA POLICIA DE LA PROVINCIA 0 INSPECTOR GENERAL DEL SERVICIO PENITENCIARIO CON CARGO DE JEFE 0 SUBJEFEDE POLICIA 0 DIRECTOR 0 SUBDIRECTOR DEL SERVICIO PENITENCIARIO 85% m6vil de la ultima remuneraci6n (un 4% menos por cada adio que faltare hasta llegar a la edad minima de retiro. pero no puede ser menor al 45% de dicha remuneraci6n) MAGISTRADOS Y 82% dc la remuneraci6n dcl individuo en actividad sin limites miximos. 75% del haber del FUNCIONARIOS causante (I 00%, I erao). P.JUDICIAL BAILARINES DEL 62% de la remuneraci6n actual del cargo al cese en las 75% del haber del causante. BALLET OFICIAL condiciones y modalidades del regimen general. (2% adicional (100% el primer aio). por cada ailo de servicios excedente hasta alcanzar el porcentaje de jubilacion ordinaria). PERSONAL DE 82% de la remuneraci6n actual del cargo al cese en las 75% del haber del causante. VUELO DE LA condiciones y modalidades del regimen general. (100% el primer ado). DIRECCION DE AERONAUTICA DE LA PCIA FUENTE: LEY PROVINCIAL N' 8024. NOTAS AL CUADRO N- 3 (I) El haber minimo de jubilaci6n. retiro a pensi6n no podra ser inferior al 82% del sueldo minimo de la Adminisuraci6n Central provincial en la rana de personal de servicios generales. (2) El haber de jubilaci6n ordinaria se bonificari con un 1% adicional por cada afio dc scrvicios con anones aue exceda del minimo (3) Todas aquellas que no constituyen sueldo o sueido anual complementario. como honorarios.comisiones gratificaciones, refngeno. sumas no remunerraivas, jomnales panicipaci6n en utilicdades, suplementos adicionales, horas eCXtras, fondo de estimulo. y otras retribuciones. (4) En caso que las remuneraciones variables no se perciban en concurrencia con un sucldo. cI haber asi calculado scri el unico que perciba ci individuo at retiro. (5) Para ei caso de acumulaci6n de cargos. es necesario que cl agente los haya desemperiado en forma simultinea duraite 3 anios continuos y discontinuos dentro de los uiltimos 5 aros de servicios. (6) En ce caso de los docentcs podrin optar tarnbien por el periodo que tuvicron mayor cancidad de horas-citedra entre los 2 anios corridos ultimos a 5 afios altemnados. (7) En el Poder Ejecutivo o en el Legislativo de la Pcia., Vocales del Superior Tnbunal de lusticia, Fiscal General de la Pcia.. Ministros, Secretaios Ministros. Secretario Gnenral de la Gobemaci6n. Secretario de Estado con dependencia directa del Poder Ejecutivo y Fiscal dc Estado. (8) Con 10 arias de aporte a Ia Caja provincial pudiendo abonar un cargo para completarlos (9) El retiro seri bonificado con on 1% adicional por cada anio de servicios quc exceda del minimo. Ademas. las prestaciones no estan sujetas a limite rnixirno alguno. (10) Si falleciere estando en actividad, cualquiera fuera su antiguedad en ci servicio, el haber dc pensi6n dcnvari dcl correspondiente al retiro obligatorio por incapacidad. 36. La Constituci6n Provincial de 1987, en las normas relativas al regimen previsional provincial, establece que: * El Estado Provincial debe garantizar el funcionamiento de un regimen de seguridad social basado en los principios de solidaridad contributiva, equidad distributiva, accesibilidad, integralidad e irrenunciabilidad de beneficios y prestaciones. Ademas, los organismos de la seguridad social deben tener autonomia y ser administrados por los interesados con participaci6n del Estado y en coordinaci6n con el Gobierno Federal (art. 55). * El Estado Provincial, en el ambito de su competencia, debe asegurar jubilaciones y pensiones m6viles, irreductibles y proporcionales a la remuneraci6n del trabajador en actividad. El regimen previsional debe ser uniforme y equitativo y debe procurar la coordinaci6n con otros sistemas previsionales (art. 57). -181- ANNEX 10 * Al Poder Legislativo le corresponde dictar una Ley General de Jubilaciones, Retiros y Pensiones, en base a un descuento obligatorio sobre los haberes para todos los cargos. La Ley s6lo puede ser reformada con un intervalo minimo de 8 anios y en ningun caso puede acordarjubilaciones, pensiones o dadivas que importen un privilegio que difiera del regimen general (art. 110 inc. 17). 37. Con respecto a esta ultima disposici6n, toda reforma sustancial de la legislaci6n previsional debera esperar hasta el afio 1999 cuando se cumplan los 8 afios que establece la Constituci6n Provincial desde la sanci6n de la Ley n° 8024. 1.2. ELEMENTOS PARA EL DIAGNOSTICO 38. Conceptualmente el regimen previsional de la provincia de C6rdoba esta organizado como un sistema de reparto con garantia estatal de afiliaci6n obligatoria y sustitutivo del regimen nacional. 39. Como es caracteristico de un sistema de reparto, la Caja previsional provincial basa su funcionamiento en un contrato implicito de transferencia intergeneracional entre la generaci6n de los activos (aportantes) y la de los pasivos (beneficiarios). Por este contrato, los individuos activos se comprometen a aportar una proporci6n de sus remuneraciones para el sostenimiento de los pasivos, en la seguridad de que al momento de enfrentar su retiro, ellos seran los que resultaran sostenidos. El Gobierno Provincial por su parte contribuye al reparto al ser gravado el empleo por un impuesto de afectaci6n especifica, el aporte patronal. 40. No hay acumulaci6n de fondos, ni existe titularidad alguna sobre los aportes realizados, predominando un "criterio de caja" para la administraci6n de los recursos previsionales. La acreditaci6n de aportes se hace a los efectos de acceder al goce del derecho a ser sostenido por la generaci6n de aportantes, pero los beneficios a los cuales se accede con el retiro no se relacionan con lo que eventualmente cada aportante habria podido acumular si su aporte hubiera sido capitalizado. Por el contrario, las pasividades son una proporci6n del salario cobrado por el activo en la iultima etapa de su carrera laboral, luego de una cantidad determinada de anios de aportes, sin importar la magnitud de los salarios sobre los cuales se habia aportado en el pasado, y por ende, sin importar la cuantia de los aportes realizados efectivamente al regimen previsional. 41. De hecho el regimen de reciprocidad jubilatoria obliga al regimen previsional provincial a otorgar un beneficio con s6lo 10 anios de aporte a la Caja, justificandose los 20 afios restantes con aportes a otro regimen previsional (en el ANEXO I se describen con mayor detalle las caracteristicas del regimen de reciprocidad jubilatoria y su reforma reciente). 42. Todo esto plantea problemas de equidad puesto que a contribuciones diferentes en el tiempo dos individuos pueden acceder al mismo beneficio por el hecho de jubilarse por la misma categoria (se rompe la regla de equidad que propone "tratamiento desigual para -182- ANNEX 10 desiguales"). El individuo activo entonces, tiene un fuerte incentivo para lograr una fuerte recategorizaci6n al final de su etapa laboral ya que su haber de retiro sera determinado a partir de sus iiltimas remuneraciones sin importar la trayectoria de sus aportes. 43. AdemAs, debido a que todo deficit es cubierto mediante transferencias del Tesoro Provincial, la solidaridad intergeneracional en la que se basa el sistema se amplia. En efecto, no s6lo los afiliados provinciales sostienen solidariamente a los pasivos de la Caja de la provincia, sino que el resto de los habitantes de la provincia (a traves de los impuestos provinciales) y del pais en su conjunto (a traves de los recursos coparticipados) contribuyen indirectamente al sostenimiento de los pasivos provinciales tambien. 44. La "solidaridad" que se le asigna como caracteristica al sistema de reparto no es mas que un esquema redistributivo donde el monto de los recursos a recibir por cada beneficiario en funci6n de esa redistribuci6n es determinado arbitrariamente por la legislaci6n con muy discutibles criterios de equidad. 45. En cuanto a las caracteristicas propias del sistema de acuerdo a las disposiciones de la legislaci6n vigente se pueden realizar las siguientes observaciones: * Las tasas de aporte tanto personal como patronal son sustancialmente mayores a las vigentes para el regimen previsional nacional. * Los problemas de financiamiento del reparto han derivado en la obligaci6n de realizar un aporte de emergencia para los individuos pasivos, viendose distorsionada asi la funci6n misma de todo sistema previsional, que debe financiar con los aportes del periodo activo las prestaciones a recibir en el periodo pasivo. * Los afiliados pertenecientes a regimenes diferenciales que establece la legislaci6n, de los cuales el principal es el policial y penitenciario dada la magnitud de la poblaci6n afiliada involucrada, aportan comparativamente mas que los afiliados del regimen general. Sin embargo, esos aportes adicionales no alcanzan para financiar los beneficios comparativamente mayores. La posibilidad de retirarse con s6lo 15 afnos de servicio con el 50% del salario para el personal superior y 55% para suboficiales y tropa, obteniendose asi una prestaci6n vitalicia es imposible de financiar a las tasas actuales de aporte, teniendo en cuenta que ese individuo al alcanzar su prestaci6n puede tener entre 35 y 40 afios de edad. * El hecho que las prestaciones sean determinadas en base al Iltimo salario percibido cuando el cargo haya sido desempehado por un periodo mayor de 12 meses (o el promedio de los ultimos 3 anios de lo contrario) hace que el regimen sea uno de los mas ventajosos para el afiliado en todo el pais. El regimen nacional establece una base de calculo de las prestaciones igual al promedio de los ultimos 10 afnos. Ademas en este ultimo promedio se -183- ANNEX 10 consideran las remuneraciones a sus valores hist6ricos sin actualizaci6n alguna, mientras que en el caso de C6rdoba se consideran cargos. Esto es, la base de calculo al momento de deteminar la prestaci6n toma las remuneraciones de todos los cargos en que revist6 el afiliado. Es asi como en todo promedio aun cuando se tome el mismo numero de aflos, el promedio de cargos supera al promedio de los valores hist6ricos. * Las prestaciones son m6viles automaticamente ante cambios en las remuneraciones de los cargos que las determinan, hecho desventajoso financieramente para la Caja y que deriv6 en el pasado en que se otorgaran aumentos salariales mediante sumas no remunerativas sobre las cuales no se calculan aportes personales ni patronales. * Rige un sistema de reciprocidad jubilatoria, que permite el otorgamiento de beneficios con s6lo 10 anos de aporte a la Caja. El sistema de reciprocidad exige la transferencia de aportes a valores hist6ricos, pero ellas dificilmente se realizan. El funcionamiento de este sistema ha sido hist6ricamente absolutamente deficiente, y por ende es una fuente importante de desequilibrio financiero para la Caja. * La relaci6n aportantes/beneficiarios es esencial en todo sistema de reparto, ya que constituye uno de los pilares de su viabilidad financiera de largo plazo. Esta relaci6n, cuando existen edades tempranas de retiro y poblaciones activas que tienden a estancarse provoca importantes desequilibrios financieros. Todo plan de racionalizaci6n de personal de la administraci6n publica provincial tendra un efecto perjudicial de corto plazo al reducir abruptamente los aportes y contribuciones al sistema. Los beneficios son de mediano y largo plazo, y se traducen en un crecimiento menor de las pensiones, de las prestaciones por invalidez y de las jubilaciones. * Las edades minimas de retiro, que fueran en el curso de 1995 aumentadas en 4 anios, aun se encuentran por debajo de las edades vigentes para el sistema previsional nacional. Edades bajas de retiro se traducen en poblaciones de pasivos comparativamente j6venes. * Los beneficiarios de pensi6n son mas numerosos que los establecidos por la legislaci6n nacional. * Las prestaciones por invalidez son aprobadas por juntas medicas estables de la misma Caja, cuando lo aconsejable es que funcionen juntas medicas regionales con criterios comunes (BAREMO unificado). * El sistema admite la acumulaci6n de prestaciones, hecho que tambien distorsiona el sentido y la funci6n misma del sistema previsional. -184- ANNEX 10 46. En la medida que en todo sistema de reparto del tipo que funciona en la provincia de C6rdoba, experimenta un deterioro de la relacion demografica de sostenimiento del sistema (relaci6n aportantes/ beneficiarios) se tornan crecientemente necesarias medidas tales como: * Elevaci6n de las edades minimas de retiro. * Aumento de los requerimientos de servicios con aportes para acceder a las prestaciones. * Mayores restricciones en el otorgamiento de los beneficios (en particular los que correspondan por invalidez). * Reducci6n en el porcentaje a pagar del salario al cese, en el calculo del haber de retiro. * Inclusi6n de mas ahos en la base de calculo del salario al cese. * Aumento de las tasas de aporte. * Reducci6n de gastos administrativos. 47. S6lo tienen un efecto inmediato el aumento de las tasas de aporte y la disminuci6n de los gastos administrativos, ya que en el resto de los casos, en la medida que no sean afectados los derechos ya adquiridos, s6lo tienen efecto en el mediano y largo plazo. 48. De no tener lugar algunas de estas medidas correctivas, deberan aumentar las transferencias del Tesoro provincial hacia el sistema, ya sea a traves de transferencias en si o de mayores aportes patronales, los cuales segun la legislaci6n vigente no requieren previo acuerdo del Poder Legislativo provincial para ser incrementados. 2. SITUACION ACTUAL Y PERSPECTIVAS EN UN ESCENARIO DE REFERENCIA 49. El cuadro n° 4 muestra la situaci6n actual y la proyecci6n financiera y demografica del sistema previsional de la provincia de C6rdoba, hasta el anio 2019. La primer columna representa la evoluci6n de los activos, cuyo numero en la proyecci6n de referencia se supone constante hasta el anio 2000, creciendo desde entonces a la tasa de crecimiento de la poblaci6n de la Provincia. 50. El salario real fue mantenido constante hasta el 2000, creciendo desde el afio 2001 de forma que la masa salarial se incremente a una tasa del 4.5% real anual. -185- ANNEX 10 51. En toda la proyecci6n se mantuvo el aporte adicional establecido para los pasivos, mientras que el retiro incorpora el ultimo aumento en cuatro anios de las edades minimas jubilatorias. 52. Se tom6 como afno base de las proyecciones a 1995, para el cual se cont6 con informaci6n completa de activos, pasivos, aportes y pagos de prestaciones hasta el mes de abril. 53. Al respecto se debe destacar que los aportes tanto personales como patronales se consideraron por la suma devengada y no la efectivamente ingresada a la Caja. Las diferencias son considerables ya que en el primer cuatrimestre del afno s6lo fue ingresado a la Caja un 55.24% de los aportes devengados, incumpliendose con el 44.76% de los aportes obligatorios. 54. A partir de agosto de 1995 se introducen las reformas de la Ley de Emergencia Econ6mica, considerandose una reducci6n en el empleo no permanente de un 22%. 55. El deficit previsional que se observa en el cuadro n° 4 igual a $70.3 millones, considera exclusivamente los ingresos por aportes y contribuciones y los pagos de prestaciones jubilatorias, retiros y pensiones. El deficit final de la Caja se obtiene considerando los Otros Ingresos (como intereses, rentas y utilidades) y los Otros Egresos (esencialmente gastos administrativos). 56. La suma estimada de Otros Ingresos para 1995 fue de $ 11.3 millones, mientras que los Otros Egresos fueron estimados en $31.4 millones. Esto hace que los gastos administrativos representen un 4% de las prestaciones, porcentaje superior al 3% observado en 1994. El Deficit Total de la Caja para 1995 se estima en consecuencia, en $90.4 millones. 57. En las proyecciones se muestra el deficit previsional (Cuadros 4, 5 y 6), componente principal del deficit total y determinante de su tendencia. En los cuadros que muestran la totalidad del sistema (regimen no policial mas policia y penitenciaria) tambien se incluye el deficit total para cuya estimaci6n se supuso que tanto los otros gastos como los otros ingresos son proporcionales a los gastos por prestaciones y los ingresos por aportes respectivamente. CUADRO 4 PROYECCIONES SIN REFORMA REGIMEN PREVISIONAL DE LA PROVINCIA DE CORDOBA T OTAL DEL PERSONAL PUBLICO EVOLUCION DEMOGRAFICA SISTEMA DE REPARTO (MILLONES DE PESOS) A PARTIR DE LOS A PARTIR DE LOS INGRESOS A PASIVOS ACTUALES PASIVOS ACTUALES TOTALES POBLACIONALE RELACION POR APORTES EGRESOS OEFICIT N ACTIVOS ACTUALES JUBILADOS ACTUALES PENSIO- ACTIVOS/ _____RE______E 0 JUBILA- PENSIO- JUBILA- PENSIO- NADOS JUBILA- PENSIO- PASIVOS PERSO- PATRO- JUBILA- PEN- PREVISI- EN ° DE ACTIVOS DOS NADOS DOS NADOS ACTUALES ACTIVO DOS NADOS NALES NALES CIONES SIONES NAL EGRESO TOTAL 1995 127,915 0 0 43,869 0 14.410 127,915 43,869 14,410 2.1949 273.88 356.62 564.13 136.67 70.30 10 03% 90.41 1996 127,915 1,348 0 42,484 782 13,805 127,915 43,832 14,587 2.1896 275.19 330.39 564.26 139.01 9769 13.39% 116.82 1997 127,915 2,662 9 41,122 1,497 13,229 127,915 43,783 14,735 2.1859 27521 330.39 563.51 14014 98.05 1393% 11714 1998 127,915 3,942 30 39,761 2,170 12,632 127,915 43,703 14,832 2.1853 275.19 330.39 562.31 141.00 97.73 13.90% 116.76 1999 127,915 5,189 62 38,396 2,806 12,063 127,915 43,585 14,932 2.1859 275.24 330.39 566.50 137.67 98.55 13 99% 117.79 2000 127,915 7.419 105 37,024 3.406 10,546 127,915 44,443 14,057 2.1866 280.79 336.91 58524 13512 10267 1425% 12266 2001 129,881 9,648 176 35,642 3,970 10,024 129,881 45,290 14,171 2.1843 293.47 352 07 613 53 140.13 108 13 14.35% 129 12 2002 131,858 11,812 277 34,251 4,498 9,510 131,858 46,062 14,284 2.1850 306.66 367.92 642.04 145.33 11280 1433% 13478 2003 133,838 13,911 405 32.852 4,988 9,003 133,838 46,762 14,397 2.1884 32040 384.47 670.80 150.73 116.67 1420% 139.63 2004 135,815 15,946 560 31,446 5,439 8.506 135.815 47,392 14.506 2.1942 335.36 401.77 712.90 156.49 132.26 15.21% 156.84 2005 137,782 19,934 782 30,034 5,851 8,019 137,782 49,968 14,652 2.1322 351.42 419.85 765.19 162.73 156.64 16.88% 183.33 2006 139,742 22,654 1.039 28,618 6,221 7,543 139,742 51,272 14,803 2.1149 36764 438.75 80B.36 169.34 171.31 17.52% 199.64 2007 141,700 25,294 1.332 27,200 6.550 7,079 141,700 52,493 14,960 2.1007 384.53 458.49 852.32 176.29 185.59 18.04% 215.56 00 2008 143,649 27,853 1.658 25,782 6,835 6,628 143,649 53,635 15,122 2.0892 402.12 479.12 897.15 183.60 199.50 18 46% 231 14 2009 145,584 30,335 2,018 24,369 7,077 6,191 145.584 54,704 15,286 2.0B01 420 59 500.68 945.31 191.46 215.50 18.96% 248.94 2010 147,500 33,062 2,451 22,964 7,273 5,769 147,500 56,026 15,493 20624 439.99 523.21 997.44 200.01 234.24 19.56% 26966 2011 149,398 35,677 2.922 21,570 7,423 5,363 149,398 57,247 15,708 2.0478 460.20 546.76 1,050.44 20905 252.53 20.05% 28995 2012 151,280 38,185 3,432 20,191 7,524 4,973 151,280 58,376 15.929 2.0359 481.19 571.36 1,103.47 218.39 269.30 20.37% 30869 2013 153,445 40,589 3,977 18,832 7,576 4,599 153,445 59,421 16,152 2.0304 503.11 597.07 1,158.30 228.36 286.47 20 66% 327.86 2014 154,989 42,892 4,558 17,497 7,578 4,241 154,989 60,389 16.377 2.0190 525.96 623.94 1,214.13 239.22 303.44 20.88% 346.90 2015 156,810 44,899 5,1.87 16,193 7,530 3,902 156,810 61,092 16,618 2.0179 549.59 652.02 1,267.48 250.47 316.34 2084% 361.69 2016 158,601 46,787 5,849 14,922 7.431 3.580 158,601 61,710 16,860 2.0186 57421 681.36 1,321.71 262.29 32843 20.73% 37568 2017 160,363 48,559 6,540 13,692 7,283 3,276 160,363 62,251 17,099 2.0209 599.86 712.02 1,376.88 274.65 339.65 20.57% 388.81 2018 162,106 50.214 7,257 12.507 7,087 2,992 162,106 62,720 17,336 2.0249 626.59 744.06 1,432.99 287.56 349.89 20.34% 400.98 2019 163,839 51,753 7,996 11,372 6,847 2,725 163,839 63.124 17,569 2.0304 654.39 777.54 1,488.41 301.48 357.96 20.00% 410.90 0 CUADRO 5 REGIMEN PREVISIONAL DE LA PROVINCIA DE CORDOBA PERSONAL TOTAL EXCEPTO PERSONAL POLICIAL Y PENITENCIARIO EVOLUCION DEMOGRAFICA SISTEMA DE REPARTO (MILLONES DE PESOS) A PARTIR DE LOS A PARTIR DE LOS INGRESOS EGRESOS DEFICIT A PASIVOS ACTUALES PASIVOS ACTUALES TOTALES POBLACIONALES RELACION POR APORTES N ACTIVOS ACTUALES JUBILADOS ACTUALES PENSIO- ACTIVOS/ O JUBILA- PENSIO- JUBILA- PENSIO- NADOS JUBILA- PENSIO- PASIVOS PERSO- PATRO- JUBILA- PEN- PREVI- EN % DE ACTIVOS DOS NADOS DOS NADOS ACTUALES ACTIVOS DOS NADOS NALES NALES CIONES SIONES SIONAL EGRESOS 1995 116,381 0 0 36.259 0 10,559 116,381 36,259 10.559 2.4858 245.30 321 26 478 45 107.24 19.12 3 26% 1996 116,381 1.269 0 35.106 599 10,100 116,381 36,375 10,699 2.4723 24348 29516 48059 10916 51.11 867% 1997 1168381 2.505 8 33,974 1,140 9.659 116.381 36,478 10,807 2.4612 24357 29516 481.57 11000 5285 893% 1998 116,381 3.709 24 32,843 1.647 9,197 116,381 36,552 10,868 2.4542 24363 295.16 482.14 11059 5394 910% 1999 116.381 4.882 48 31,709 2,122 8,763 116.381 36,591 10,933 2.4489 243.78 295.16 48817 10764 56.86 954% 2000 116,381 7.049 79 30,569 2,568 7,565 116,381 37,618 10,212 2.4332 248.86 300 99 507.57 105.23 62 95 10.27% 2001 118,170 9,160 132 29.419 2.983 7.174 118.170 38.579 10.289 2.4182 26024 314.53 534.95 10907 6925 10 75% 2002 119.969 11.209 209 28.261 3.367 6,789 119,969 39.471 10,365 2 4073 27208 32869 562.61 11306 7490 11 09% 2003 121,770 13,197 309 27.096 3,721 6,411 121,770 40,293 10.441 2 4002 284 41 343.48 590.57 117.19 7988 11 29% 2004 123,569 15,124 432 25.924 4,041 6,041 123.569 41,048 10,514 2.3965 297.84 358 93 630 70 121 50 95 43 12 69% 2005 125,358 18.798 579 24,747 4,330 5,680 125,358 43,544 10,588 2 3158 312 25 375.08 680.08 12609 118.84 14.74% 2006 127,142 21,313 771 23,564 4,585 5,327 127,142 44,876 10,682 2.2884 326 78 391 96 721.09 131.04 133.39 15.65% 2007 128,923 23,754 990 22,378 4,805 4,984 128,923 46,133 10,780 2.2653 341.92 409.60 762.91 136 25 147 64 16.42% 2008 130,696 26,123 1,236 21,193 4,991 4,652 130.696 47,316 10,880 2.2458 357.69 428.03 805.61 141.72 161.60 17.06% 2009 132,457 28.420 1,509 20,011 5,142 4,332 132,457 48,431 10,983 2.2294 374.20 447.30 850.68 147.47 176.66 17.70% 2010 134,200 30,828 1,808 18,835 5,256 4,025 134,200 49,663 11,088 2.2090 391.49 467.42 89857 153.56 193.22 18.36% 2011 135,926 33,147 2.140 17,667 5.333 3,729 135,926 50,814 11,201 2.1918 409.50 488.46 947.43 160.02 20949 18.92% 2012 137,639 35,378 2,502 16,511 5,371 3,447 137,639 51,889 11,319 2.1775 42822 510.44 996.43 166.70 224.47 19.30% 2013 139,609 37,519 2.893 15,372 5,370 3,178 139,609 52,891 11,441 2.1701 447.77 533.41 1,047.14 173.83 239.80 1964% 2014 141,014 39,571 3,312 14,253 5,330 2,922 141,014 53,824 11,564 2.1566 46812 55741 1,09834 181 56 25437 1987% 2015 142,670 41,298 3.758 13,160 5,250 2,680 142,670 54,458 11,688 2.1569 489.12 582.50 1,146.73 189.49 264.60 19.80% 2016 144,300 42,924 4,232 12,096 5,131 2,451 144,300 55,020 11.814 2.1591 511 00 608.71 1,195.97 197.83 274.08 1966% 2017 145,903 44,449 4,729 11,067 4,973 2,237 145.903 55.515 11,940 2.1630 533.80 636.10 1,246.09 206.55 282.73 19.46% 2018 147,489 45,870 5,248 10,077 4,780 2,037 147.489 55,947 12,065 2.1686 557.58 664.72 1,297.06 215.66 290.43 19 20% 2019 149,065 47,188 5,786 9,131 4,552 1,850 149,065 56,319 12,188 2.1759 582.16 694.64 1,345.91 225 15 294.26 18.73% 0 CLIADRO 6 REGIMEN PREVISIONAL DE LA PROVINCIA DE CORDOBA PERSONAL POUCUL Y PENITENCIARIO DE LA PROVINCLA EVOLUCION DEMOGRAFICA SISTEMA DE REPARTO (MILLONES DE PESOS) A PARTIR DE LOS A PARTIR DE LOS INGRESOS EGRESOS DEFICIT A PASIVOS ACTUALES PASIVOS ACTUALES TOTALES POSLACIONALES RELACION POR APORTES A ACTIVOS ACTUALES JUBILADOS ACTUALES PENSIO- __ ACTIVOS/ 0 JUBILA- PENSIO- JUBILA. PENSIO- NADOS JUBILA- PENSIO- PASIVOS PERSO- PATRO- JUBILA- PEN- PREVI- EN % DE ACTIVOS DOS NADOS DOS NADOS ACTUALE ACTIVOS DOS NADOS NALES NALES CIONES SIONES SIONAL EGRESOS 1995 11,534 0 0 7,610 0 3,851 11,534 7,610 3,851 1.0064 28.58 35.36 85.68 29.43 51.18 44.46% 1996 11,534 79 0 7.378 183 3,705 11.534 7,458 3.888 1.0166 31.71 35.23 83.67 29.85 46.57 41.03% 1997 11.534 157 1 7,148 357 3,570 11,534 7,305 3.927 1.0269 31.64 35.23 81.93 30.14 45.20 40.33% 1998 11,534 233 6 6,917 523 3,435 11,534 7,150 3.964 1.0378 31.57 35.23 80.17 30.41 43.79 39.60% 1999 11,534 308 15 6.687 684 3,301 11.534 6.994 3.999 1.0492 31.46 35.23 78.34 30.04 41.69 38.47% 2000 11.534 370 26 6,455 838 2,981 11,534 6,625 3.845 1.0810 31.93 35.92 77.68 29.89 39.71 36.92% 2001 11.711 488 44 6.223 987 2,851 11.711 6,710 3,882 1.1056 33.23 37.54 78.58 31.06 38.87 35.45% 2002 11.890 602 68 5.990 1.131 2.721 11,890 6.592 3,919 1.1311 34.58 39.23 79.43 32.28 37.90 33.92% 2003 12,068 714 96 5,756 1,268 2.592 12,068 6.469 3,956 1.1576 35.99 41.00 80.24 33.54 36.79 32.34% 2004 12.246 822 129 5,522 1,398 2.465 12,248 6,344 3,992 1.1849 37.52 42.84 82.20 34.99 36.83 31.43% 2005 12.424 1.136 203 5.288 1,521 2,340 12.424 6.424 4.063 1.1846 39.18 44.77 85.11 36.64 37.80 31.05% 2006 12.600 1.342 269 5,054 1,637 2.216 12,600 6,396 4.121 1.1981 40.86 46.78 87.27 38.30 37.92 30.20% 2007 12.777 1.539 342 4,821 1,744 2.095 12,777 6.360 4,181 1.2121 42.61 48.89 89.41 40.04 37.95 29.32% 2008 12,953 1,730 422 4.589 1.844 1.976 12.953 6,319 4.242 1.2265 44.43 51.09 91.55 41.88 37.91 28.41% 2009 13.127 1.915 509 4,358 1,935 1,859 13,127 6,274 4,303 1.2412 46.39 53.39 94.63 43.99 38.84 28.02% 2 2010 13.300 2.234 643 4,130 2,017 1,745 13.300 6.364 4,405 1.2351 48.50 55.79 98.87 46.44 41.02 28.23% 0 2011 13,471 2.529 783 3,903 2,090 1,634 13,471 6.433 4,507 1.2314 50.69 58.30 103.01 49.02 43.04 28.31% 2012 13,641 2.807 930 3,680 2.154 1.526 13,641 6,487 4.609 1.2293 52.97 60.92 107.04 51.69 44.84 28.25% 2013 13.836 3,070 1.084 3,460 2,206 1,421 13,836 6.530 4,712 1.2308 55.34 6366 111.15 54.52 46.67 28.17% 2014 13,975 3,321 1.245 3,244 2,249 1.320 13,975 6,565 4,813 1.2282 57.85 66.53 115.79 57.65 49.07 28.29% 2015 14.139 3,601 1,429 3,033 2.280 1.222 14,139 6,634 4,930 1.2227 60.47 69.52 120.75 60.98 51.74 28.47% 2016 14.301 3,863 1,617 2.826 2,300 1,128 14,301 6,690 5,046 1.2186 63.21 72.65 125.74 64.46 54.35 28.57% 2017 14.460 4.110 1.811 2.625 2,310 1,039 14,460 6.736 5,159 1.2156 66.06 75.92 130.79 68.11 56.92 28.62% 2018 14.617 - 4,344 2,008 2,430 2.308 955 14.617 6.774 5,271 1.2136 69.03 79.34 135.92 71.91 59.46 28.61% 2019 14,773 4.564 2,210 2.241 2,295 875 14,773 6,805 5,380 1.2124 72.22 82.91 142.50 76.33 63.70 29.11% 0 -189- ANNEX 10 58. La poblaci6n fue desagregada en dos grupos demograficos como muestran los cuadros no 5 y 6. * Pension por Indigencia el personal con estado policial y penitenciario, * el resto del personal. 59. Esto se hizo en primer lugar para destacar que $ 19.12 millones del deficit previsional (27%) corresponden exclusivamente al regimen previsional policial y penitenciario; y en segundo lugar, para mostrar por separado las proyecciones para dichos grupos que por presentar diferentes edades de retiro y tasas de aporte tornan significativa la desagregaci6n. 3. ANALISIS DE SENSIBILIDAD DEL ESCENARIO DE REFERENCtA 60. Fueron analizados cuatro escenarios alternativos para estudiar la sensibilidad de los resultados a cambios en los elementos determinantes de la proyecci6n de referencia. 3.1 EDADES JUBILATORIAS Y BASE DE CALCULO DE LAS PRESTACIONES 61. El primer ejercicio de sensibilidad considera un incremento en la edad jubilatoria del personal no policial llevandola a 65 anios para los hombres y 60 las mujeres, manteniendose el requisito de 30 anos de servicios con aportes pero exigiendose que todos los afios sean efectivamente aportados a la Caja provincial 62. Adicionalmente fue flexibilizada la base de calculo de las prestaciones Se consider6 tomar como base el promedio de las remuneraciones percibidas en los ultimos 120 meses efectivamente aportados a la Caja, a valores corrientes del momento de percepcion. 63. El retiro policial fue mantenido con las rnismas caracteristicas de la proyecci6n de referencia, asi como la hip6tesis de evolucion del salario real y del personal a partir del anio 2001. 64. Los resultados son expuestos en el cuadro n° 7 para el total del personal, en el cuadro n° 8 para el personal no policial, y en el cuadro n° 9 para el personal policial. 65. La mejora en la evoluci6n del deficit previsional es marcada, tornandose en superavit desde el afio 2003. 66. En el afio 1996 el deficit aumenta con respecto a 1995, como consecuencia de los cambios producidos desde el mes de agosto de este ultimo anio, en particular la baja de salarios y la caida en el total del personal no permanente. -190- ANNEX 10 67. Las altas de nuevos beneficianros se reducen en forma marcada con respecto a la soluci6n de referencia debido al incremento de las edades minimas jubilatorias. 3.2. ESCENARIO ANTERIOR MAS AUMENTO DE EDAD JUBILATORIA POLICIAL 68. El segundo ejercicio de sensibilidad (Cuadros 10, I I y 12) agrega al anterior un incremento en cinco afios de la edad jubilatoria policial. Esto hace que el deficit creciente observado en la proyecci6n de referencia, cambie a un deficit con una leve tendencia decreciente En consecuencia se observa una nueva mejora en el de.ficit previsional total proyectado. 3.3. AJUSTE EN EL NUMERO TOTAL DE ACTIVOS APORTANTES 69. A partir del escenario de referencia, con todas las caracteristicas que para el mismo se sehialaran, se consider6 aqui una reducci6n de personal adicional de un 5% para el afio 1996, del 3% para el 97 y del 2% para el 98, manteniendose constante desde entonces para crecer nuevamente desde el 2001 de forma que la masa salarial crezca al 4.5% real anual (Cuadros 13, 14 y 15) 70. Se supuso que el personal que se retira son individuos a quienes les falta mas de 5 afios para alcanzar su jubilaci6n ordinaria. En consecuencia durante los primeros afios no hay cambios significativos en las altas de dichos beneficios, aunque si crecen a menor ritmo las pensiones y los beneficios por incapacidad. Sin embargo todos estos son factores que representan beneficios de mediano y largo plazo para la evoluci6n financiera de la Caja. 3.4. AJUSTE EN EL NUMERO TOTAL DE ACTIVOS APORTANTES Y REDUCCION DE SALARIOS 71. A los mismos supuestos del escenario anterior (punto 3.3) se adicion6 una reducci6n del salario real en la administraci6n provincial del 10%. 72. En este caso se efectuaron dos ejercicios que difieren en el supuesto de si se ajustan los haberes a los salarios de los cargos o no. 73. En primer lugar se supuso que ante una rebaja del 10% en los salarios, las prestaciones de los pasividades actuales se reducen en igual magnitud. De ser asi, el deficit previsional se reduce en 10% respecto al escenario descripto en el punto 3.3., aunque siguen manteniendo la misma relaci6n en relaci6n a los egresos previsionales (Cuadros 16, 17 y 18). CUADRO 7 REGIMEN PREVISIONAL DE LA PROVINCLA DE CORDOBA TOTAL DEL PERSONAL PUBLICO EVOLUCION DEMOGRAFICA SISTEMA DE REPARTO (MILLONES DE PESOS) A PARTIR DE LOS A PARTIR DE LOS INGRESOS A PASIVOS ACTUALES PASIVOS ACTUALES TOTAL ES POBLACIONALES RELACION POR APORTES EGRESOS DEFICIT ACTIVOS ACTUALES JUBILADOS ACTUALES PENSIO- ACTIVOS/ . 0 JUBILA- PENSIO- JUBILA- PENSIO- NADOS JUBILA- PENSIO- PASIVOS PERSO- PATRO- JUBILA- PEN- PREVI- EN % DE ACTIVOS DOS NADOS DOS NADOS ACTUALES ACTIVOS DOS NADOS NALES NALES CIONES SIONES SIONAL EGRESO TOTAL 1995 127,915 0 0 43.869 0 14,410 127.915 43,869 14.410 2 1949 273 88 356 62 564.13 136 67 70 30 10 03% 90.41 1996 127.915 403 0 42.484 782 13,J05 127.915 42.887 14.587 22258 27430 33039 546.37 13899 8068 11 77% 8874 1997 127.915 792 4 41,122 1.497 13,229 127.915 41,914 14.730 2.2582 273 64 330 39 532.39 139 78 68 14 10 14% 75 88 1998 127.915 1,168 18 39,761 2.170 12,632 127.915 40.928 14,820 2.2945 272 96 330 39 518.29 140.26 55 20 8 38% 62 62 1999 127.915 1.530 39 38.396 2.806 12.063 127.915 39,926 14.909 2.3327 272.40 330 39 510 78 136 54 44 54 6 88% 51.68 2000 127.915 3.044 67 37.024 3,406 10.546 127.915 40,068 14,019 2.3650 277 27 336 91 516 41 133 59 35 82 5.51% 42.86 2001 129.881 4.273 124 35.642 3.970 10,024 129.881 39.915 14,119 2 4037 289 08 352.07 527.96 138 08 24 88 3 74% 31 91 2002 131.858 5.459 201 34,251 4.498 9,510 131.858 39.709 14,209 2.4455 301.38 367.92 539.12 142.63 12 46 1 83% 19.47 2003 133.838 6.601 298 32.852 4.988 9,003 133.838 39.453 14.290 2.4904 314 18 384 47 549.92 147.26 (1.48) -0.21% 5 47 2004 135.815 7.702 414 31.446 5,439 8.506 135.815 39,148 14.360 2 5382 327 79 401.77 565.96 152.09 (11.52) -1.60% -4.51 2005 137.782 9.650 586 30.034 5.851 8.019 137.782 39.684 14.456 2 5449 342.30 419 85 588 35 157 20 (16 61) -2.23% -9.40 2006 139.742 11.426 776 28.618 6.221 7.543 139.742 40,044 14.540 25601 357.36 438.75 609.79 16245 (23 87) -309% -16.50 2007 141,700 13.133 997 27,200 6,550 7.079 141,700 40.333 14,626 2 5783 373 04 458.49 63102 167.93 (32 58) -4 08% -25 08 2008 143.649 14.772 1.250 25,782 6.835 6,628 143,649 40.554 14,713 25992 38937 479.12 65206 17365 (42 78) -5 18% -35 16 2009 145.584 16.346 1.532 24.369 7.077 6,191 145.584 40.715 14,800 2.6224 40679 50068 68099 17978 (46 70) -5.43% -38.79 2010 147.500 18.946 1.884 22.964 7,273 5,769 147.500 41.910 14,926 2 5952 425 46 523 21 720 31 186 44 (41 92) -4 62% -33.48 2011 149.398 21,432 2.274 21.570 7,423 5.363 149.398 43.002 15,060 2.5731 444 89 546.76 759 80 193 49 (38.35) -4 02% -29 40 2012 151.280 23.811 2.702 20.191 7.524 4.973 151.280 44,002 15,199 25553 46508 571.36 79886 20075 (3683) -368% -2738 2013 153.445 26.085 3,168 18,832 7.576 4.599 153,445 44.916 15,343 2.5464 486.14 597 07 838.79 208.51 (35.92) -3.43% -25 98 2014 154.989 28.256 3.669 17.497 7.578 4.241 154.989 45.753 15.488 2.5308 508.25 623.94 88208 217.00 (33.11) -3.01% -2262 2015 156.810 30.537 4.219 16,193 7.530 3.902 156,810 46,730 15,650 2.5138 531.35 652.02 927.26 225.77 (30.34) -2.63% -19 26 2016 158.601 32.695 4.802 14.922 7.431 3.580 158,601 47.617 15,813 2.5004 555 41 681.36 972 91 234.97 (28.88) -2.39% -17 24 2017 160.363 34.732 5.416 13,692 7.283 3.276 160.363 48.423 15,975 2.490 580 47 712 02 1,019.10 244.58 (28.81) -2.28% -16.60 2018 162,106 36.647 6.058 12,507 7.087 2,992 162,106 49,153 16.137 2.4828 606.59 744.06 1.065.83 254.61 (30.20) -2.29% -17 45 2019 1_38_39 38442 6,724 11,372 6,847 12,725 163,839 49,814 16,296 2.4783 633 78 777 54 1.112.19 265.50 (33.62) -2.44% -20.35 0 CUADRO A REGN PREVSNAL DE LA PROVNCIA DE CORDOBA PERSONAL TOTAL EXCEPTO PERSONAL POUCIAL Y PENITENCIARIO EVOLUCION DEMOGRAFICA SISTEMA DE REPARTO lLLONE DE PESOS) A PARTIR DE LOS A PARTIR DE LOS INGRESOS EGRESOS DEFICIT A PASPJOS ACTLALES PASIVOS ACTUALES TOTALES POBLACIONALE RELACION POR APORTES N ACTIVOS ACTUALES JUBILADOS ACTUALES PENSIO- ACTIVOSI 0 JUBILA- PENSIO- JUBILA- PENSIO- NADOS JUBILA- PENSIO- PASIVOS PERSO- PATRO- JUBILA- PEN| PREVI- EN % DE _ ACTIVOS DOS NADOS DOS NADOS ACTUALES ACTIVOS DOS NADOS NALES NALES CIONES SIONES SIONAL EGRESO 1995 116.381 0 0 36.259 0 10.559 116.381 36,259 10,559 2.4858 245.30 321.26 478.45 107.24 19.12 3.26% 1996 116.381 324 0 35.106 599 10.100 116,381 35,430 10.699 2.5230 242.58 295.16 462.70 109.14 34 10 5.96% 1997 116,381 635 3 33.974 1.140 9.659 116.381 34.609 10.802 2.5628 24200 295.16 450.46 10964 22.94 4.10% 1998 116.381 935 12 32.843 1.647 9.197 116.381 33.778 10,856 2.6075 241.39 295.16 438.11 109.85 11.42 2.08% 1999 116.381 1.222 25 31,709 2.122 8.763 116.381 32.932 10,910 2.6546 240 94 295 16 432.44 106.51 2.85 0 53% 2000 116.381 2.674 42 30.569 2.568 7.565 116.381 33.243 10.174 2.6805 245.34 300.99 438.73 103.70 (3.89) -0.72% 2001 118.170 3.785 80 29,419 2.983 7.174 118.170 33.204 10.236 2.7203 255.86 314.53 449.38 107.01 (13.99) -2.52% 2002 119,969 4.856 133 28.261 3,367 6,789 119,969 33,118 10.290 2.7638 26680 328.69 459.70 110.35 (25.44) -446% 2003 121.770 5.888 202 27.096 3.721 6.411 121.770 32,984 10.334 2.8111 278.19 34348 469.68 113.72 (3827) -6.56% 2004 123.569 6.880 286 25.924 4.041 6.041 123.569 32.805 10.368 2.8622 290.27 358.93 483.76 117.10 (48.34) -8.05% 2005 125.358 8.514 383 24.747 4,330 5.680 125.358 33.260 10.393 2.8717 303.13 375.08 503.24 120.56 (54.41) -8.72% 2006 127.142 10.085 507 23.564 4.585 5.327 127.142 33,648 10.419 2.8852 316.51 391.96 522.53 124.15 (61.79) -9.56% 2007 128,923 11.594 655 22.378 4,805 4,984 128.923 33.972 10.445 2.9025 330.44 409.60 541.61 127.89 (70 54) -10.54% 2008 130.696 13.042 828 21.193 4,991 4,652 130.696 34.235 10.472 2.9234 344.94 428.03 560 52 131.77 (80.69) -11.65% 2009 132.457 14.430 1,023 20.011 S.142 4.332 132.45? 34.441 10.497 2.9475 360.40 447.30 586.36 135.79 (85.54) -11.85% 2010 134.200 16,712 1,241 18.835 5.256 4.025 134.200 35.546 10.521 2 9131 37695 467.42 621.44 140.00 (82 94) -10.89% 2011 135.926 18.903 1,491 17.667 5.333 3.729 135.926 36.570 10.553 2.8845 394 20 488.46 656.79 144.47 (81 39) -10.16% 2012 137.639 21.004 1.773 16.511 5,371 3.447 131.639 37,515 10,590 2.8612 412 11 510 44 691.83 149 06 (81 66) -9 71% 2013 139.609 23.015 2.084 15.372 5.370 3.178 139.609 38.386 10.631 2.8481 430.80 533.41 727.64 153.98 (82.59) -9.37% 2014 141.014 24.935 2.423 14.253 5.330 2.922 141.014 39.188 10.675 2.8280 450.41 557.41 766.29 159.34 (82.18) -8 88% 2015 142.670 26.936 2,790 13.160 5.250 2.680 142.670 40.096 10,719 2.8076 470.87 582 50 806.51 164.79 (82.08) -8.45% 2016 144.300 28.832 3.185 12.096 5.131 2,451 144.300 40.928 10.767 2.7914 492.20 608.71 847.17 170.50 (83.23) -8.18% 2017 145.903 30.621 3.605 11.067 4.973 2.237 145.903 41.688 10,816 2.7789 51441 636.10 888.31 176.48 (85 72) -805% 2018 147.489 32,303 4.050 10.077 4.780 2.037 147.489 42.380 10.866 2.7700 537.56 664.72 929.91 182.71 (89 67) -8 06% 2019 i49,065 33,878 4,514 9,131 4,552 1,B50 149.065 43.008 10,916 2.7643 561.56 694 64 969.69 189.18 (97.32) -8.40% C CUADRO 9 REGIMEN PREVISIONAL DE LA PROVINCLA DE CORDOBA PERSONAL POLICAL Y PENITENCIARIO DE LA PROVINCIA _ ______ EVOLUCION DEMOGRAFICA SISTEMA DE REPARTO (MILLONES DE PESOS) A PARTIR DE LOS A PARTIR DE LOS INGRESOS EGRESOS DEFICIT A PASIVOS ACTUALES PASNVOS ACTUALES TOTALES POBLACIONALE RELACION POR APORTES N ACTIVOS ACTUALES JUBILADOS ACTUALES PENSIO- ACTIVOS/ 0 JUBILA- PENSIO- JUBILA- PENSIO- NADOS JUBILA- PENSIO- PASIVOS PERSO- PATRO- JUBILA- PEN- PREVI- EN % DE ACTIVOS DOS NADOS DOS NADOS ACTUALES ACTIVOS DOS NADOS NALES NALES CIONES SIONES SIONAL EGRESO 1995 11.534 0 0 7.610 0 3.851 11.534 7,610 3,851 1 0064 28.58 35.36 85.68 29.43 51.18 44.46% 1996 11.534 79 0 7.378 183 3,705 11.534 7.458 3,888 1.0166 31.71 35.23 83.67 29.85 4657 4103% 1997 11,534 157 1 7.148 357 3,570 11,534 7,305 3,927 1.0269 3164 3523 8193 30.14 45.20 40.33% 1998 11.534 233 6 6,917 523 3.435 11.534 7.150 3.964 1.0378 31.57 35.23 80.17 30.41 43.79 39.60% 1999 11.534 308 IS 8.687 684 3.301 11,534 6,994 3,999 1.0492 31.46 35.23 78.34 30.04 41.69 38 47% 2000 11.534 370 26 8.455 838 2.981 11,534 6,825 3,845 1.0810 31.93 35.92 77.68 29 89 39.71 36 92% 2001 11.711 488 44 6.223 987 2.851 11.711 6.710 3.882 1.1056 3323 37 54 78 58 3106 38.87 35.45% 2002 11.890 602 68 5,990 1.131 2,721 11.890 6.592 3.919 1.1311 3458 39.23 79.43 32.28 37.90 3392% 2003 12.068 714 98 5.756 1.268 2.592 12.068 6,469 3.956 1.1576 35.99 41.00 80.24 33.54 36.79 32.34% 2004 12.246 822 129 5.522 1,398 2.465 12,246 6.344 3,992 1.1849 37.52 42.84 82.20 34 99 36 83 31.43% 2005 12.424 1.136 203 5.288 1.521 2.340 12.424 6,424 4,063 1.1846 39.18 44.77 85.11 3664 3780 31.05% 2006 12,600 t.342 269 5.054 1.637 2.216 12.600 6.396 4,121 1.1981 40.86 46.78 87.27 38 30 37 92 30.20% 2007 12.777 1.539 342 4.821 1.744 2.095 12.777 6.360 4.181 1.2121 42.61 48.89 89.41 40.04 37.95 29.32% 2008 12,953 1.730 422 4.589 1.844 1.976 12.953 6,319 4,242 1.2265 44.43 51.09 91.55 41 88 37.91 28.41% 2009 13.127 1.915 509 4.358 1.935 1.859 13.127 6.274 4,303 1.2412 46.39 53.39 94.63 4399 38.84 28.02% 2010 13,300 2.234 643 4,130 2,017 1,745 13,300 6.364 4.405 1.2351 4850 55.79 98.87 4644 41.02 28.23% 2011 13.471 2.529 783 3.903 2.090 1,634 13.471 6.433 4,507 1.2314 50.69 58.30 103.01 49.02 43.04 28.31% 2012 13.641 2,807 930 3.680 2,154 1.526 13.641 6,487 4,609 1.2293 52.97 60.92 107.04 51.69 44.84 28.25% 2013 13,836 3.070 1.084 3.460 2.206 1.421 13,836 6.530 4.712 1.2308 55.34 63.66 111.15 5452 4667 2817% 2014 13.975 3.321 1.245 3,244 2,249 1.320 13,975 6,565 4.813 1.2282 57 85 66 53 115 79 57.65 49.07 28 29% 2015 14.139 3.601 1.429 3,033 2,280 1,222 14.139 6,634 4.930 1.2227 6047 69.52 120.75 60.98 51.74 2847% 2016 14.301 3.863 1,617 2.826 2.300 1,128 14,301 6,690 5,046 1.2186 63.21 72.65 125.74 64.46 54 35 28.57% 2017 14.460 4.110 1.811 2.625 2,310 1,039 14.460 6.736 5,159 1.2156 66.06 75.92 130.79 68.11 5692 28.62% 2018 14,617 4,344 2.008 2.430 2,308 955 14.617 6,774 5,271 1.2136 69.03 79.34 135.92 7191 5946 2861% 2019 14,773 4,564 2,210 2.241 2,295 875 14,773 6,805 5,380 1.2124 72.22 82.91 142.50 7633 6370 29.11% C CUADRO 10 REGIWEN PREVISIONAL DE LA PROVINCIA DE CORDOBA TOTAL DEL PERSONAL PUBLICO _ EVOLUCION DEMOGRAFICA SISTEMA DE REPARTO (MILLONES DE PESOS) _ . . . _ . A PARTIR DE LOS A PARTIR DE LOS INGRESOS A PASIVOS ACTUALES PASIVOS ACTUALES TOTALES PO8LACIONALES RELACION POR APORTES EGRESOS DEFICIT ACTIVOS ACTUALES JUBILADOS ACTUALES PENSIO- ACTIVOSI O JUBILA- PENSIO- JUBILA- PENSIO- NADOS JUBILA- PENSIO- PASIVOS PERSO- PATRO- JUBILA- PEN- PREVI- EN % DE ACTIVOS DOS NADOS DOS NADOS ACTUALES ACTIVO DOS NADOS NALES MALES CIONES SIONES SIONAL EGRESO TOTAL t995 127.915 0 0 43.869 0 14.410 127.915 43.869 14.410 2.1949 273.88 356.62 564.13 136.67 70.30 10.03% 90.41 1996 127,915 344 0 42.484 782 13,805 127.915 42,828 14.587 2.2279 274.25 330.39 545.41 138.99 79.76 11.65% 87.80 1997 127,915 675 3 41,122 1.497 13,229 127.915 41.797 14.729 2.2629 273.56 330.39 530.77 139.76 66.58 9.93% 74.29 1998 127,915 993 12 39.761 2,170 12.632 127,915 40.754 14.814 2.3019 272.84 330.39 516.03 140.20 53.00 8.08% 60.35 1999 127,915 1,299 26 38.396 2.806 12.063 127.915 39.695 14.896 2.3432 272.26 330.39 508.17 136.41 41.93 6.51% 49.01 2000 127.915 2,814 44 37.024 3,406 10.546 127.915 39.838 13.996 2.3761 277.11 336.91 513.49 133.35 32.82 5.07% 39.78 2001 129,881 3.987 83 35.642 3.970 10,024 129,881 39,629 14.078 2.4184 288.88 352.07 524.29 137.68 21.01 3.17% 27.95 2002 131,858 5.117 139 34.251 4,498 9.510 131.858 39,368 14.147 2.4639 301.13 367.92 534,68 142.04 7.67 1.13% 14.56 2003 133,838 6.206 212 32.852 4.988 9,003 133.838 39.058 14.203 2.5129 313.88 384.47 544.67 146.42 (7.25) -1.05% -0.45 2004 135,815 7.254 299 31.446 5.439 8,506 135,815 38.700 14.245 2.5652 327.39 401.77 559.19 150.83 (19.15) -2.70% -12.33 2005 137.782 9,028 403 30.034 5,851 8.019 137.782 39.063 14.273 2.5833 341.77 419.85 579.59 155.32 (26.71) -3.63% -19.76 2006 139.742 10.719 534 28,618 6.221 7,543 139,742 39.337 14,298 2.6054 356.73 438.75 599.63 159.96 (35.89) -4.72% -28.83 2007 141,700 12.345 693 27.200 6,550 7.079 141.700 39,545 14.321 26306 372.30 458.49 619.41 164.75 (46.63) -5.95% -39.49 2008 143.649 13.906 877 25.782 6.835 6,628 143,649 39,688 14.340 2 6588 388.52 479.12 638.98 169.67 (58.99) -7.29% -51.79 2009 145,584 15.403 1,087 24,369 7.077 6,191 145,584 39,772 14.355 2.6897 405.80 500.68 666.33 174.74 (65 41) -7.78% -57.98 2010 147,500 17.923 1,321 22,964 7,273 5.769 147.500 40,887 14.364 2.6696 424.32 523.21 704.05 180.02 (63.46) -7.18% -55.58 2011 149.398 20,345 1.592 21.570 7.423 5.363 149.398 41,915 14,378 2.6539 443.61 546.76 742.08 185.57 (62.71) -6.76% -54.38 2012 151.280 22.670 1,899 20,191 7.524 4.973 151.280 42,862 14,396 2.6421 463.65 571.36 779.76 191.21 (64.03) -6.59% -55 28 2013 153.445 24.898 2.240 18.832 7,576 4.599 153.445 43.730 14.415 2.6390 484.55 597.07 818.32 197.22 (66.08) -6.51% -56.92 2014 154.989 27,028 2,613 17.497 7.578 4,241 154,989 44.525 14.433 2.6288 506.50 623.94 860.33 203.73 (66.38) -6 24% -56.74 2015 156.810 29.285 3.018 16.193 7,530 3,902 156,810 45.478 14.449 2.6167 529.43 652.02 904.42 210.29 (66.74) -5.99% -56.59 2016 158.601 31.427 3,457 14.922 7.431 3,580 158.601 46,349 14,468 2.6078 553.32 681.36 949.06 217.16 (68.46) -5.87% -57.83 2017 160.363 33,453 3,929 13,692 7,283 3.276 160,363 47,145 14,488 2.6019 578.22 712.02 994.28 224.33 (71.63) -5.88% -60.52 2018 162,106 35.362 4,430 12.507 7,087 2.992 162.106 47,869 14,509 2.5988 604.16 744.06 1,040.08 231.78 (76.36) -6.00% -64.79 2019 I163839 37,155 4.957 11,372 6,847 2,725 163,839 48,526 14,530 2.5983 631.12 777.54 1,085.15 239.50 (84.02) -6.34% -72.03 C CUAORO 11 REGIMEN PREVISIONAL DE LA PROVINCIA DE CORDO8A PERSONAL TOTAL EXCEPTO PERSONAL POLICIAL Y PENITENCIARIO ____________ EVOLUCION DEMOGR AFICA SISTEMA DE REPARTO (MILLON S OE PESOSI A PARTIR DE LOS A PARTIR DE LOS INGRESOS EGRESOS DEFICIT A PASIVOS ACTUALE PASIVOS ACTUALES TOTALES PO8LACIONALES RELACION POR APORTES N ACTIVOS ACTUALEES JUB8LADOS ACTUALES PENSIO- ACTIVOSI 0 JUBILA- PENSIO- JUBILA- PENSIO- NADOS JUBILA. PENSIO- PASIVOS PERSO- PATRO. JUBILA- PEN. PREVI- EN % DE ACTIVOS DOS NADOS DOS NADOS ACTUALES ACTIVO DOS NADOS NALES NALES CIONES SIONES SIONAL EGRESOS 1995 116,381 0 0 36.259 0 10,559 116,381 36,259 10,559 24858 24530 32126 47845 10724 1912 326% 1996 116,381 324 0 35.106 599 10,100 116.381 35,430 10.699 2 5230 242 58 295 16 462 70 10914 34 10 5 96% 1997 116.381 635 3 33,974 1.140 9,659 116,381 34,609 10,802 25628 24200 29516 45046 10964 2294 410% 1998 116,381 935 12 32,843 1,647 9,197 116,381 33,778 10,856 2 6075 241 39 295 16 438 11 109 85 11 42 2 08% 1999 116,381 1.222 25 31,709 2,122 8,763 116,381 32,932 10,910 26546 24094 29516 43244 10651 285 053% 2000 116.381 2,674 42 30.569 2.568 7,565 116,381 33,243 10,174 26805 24534 30099 43873 10370 (389) *072% 2001 118,170 3,785 80 29.419 2,983 7,174 118,170 33,204 10,236 27203 25586 31453 44938 10701 (1399) 252% 2002 119.969 4,856 133 28,261 3.367 6,789 119,969 33,118 10,290 2 7638 266 80 328 69 459 70 110 35 (25 44) -4 46% 2003 121.770 5,888 202 27.096 3,721 6,411 121,770 32.984 10,334 28111 27819 34348 46968 11372 (38 27) -656% 2004 123.569 6,880 286 25,924 4.041 6,041 123,569 32,805 10,368 28622 29027 35893 48376 117 10 (48 34) -805% 2005 125.358 8,514 383 24,747 4,330 5,680 125,358 33,260 10,393 2 8717 30313 375 08 503 24 120 56 (54 41) -8 72% 2006 127,142 10,085 507 23,564 4,585 5.327 127,142 33,648 10,419 2 8852 316 51 391 96 522 53 124 15 (61 79) .9 56% 2007 128.923 11,594 655 22,378 4,805 4,984 128,923 33,972 10,445 2 9025 330 44 409 60 541 61 127 89 (70 54) .10 54% 2008 130,696 13,042 828 21,193 4,991 4,652 130,696 34,235 10,472 29234 34494 42803 56052 131 77 (80 69) -11 65% 2009 132.457 14,430 1,023 20.011 5,142 4,332 132,457 34,441 10,497 29475 36040 447 30 58636 13579 (85 54) -11 85% 2010 134,200 16,712 1,241 18,835 5,256 4,025 134,200 35,546 10,521 29131 37695 46742 62144 14000 (82 94) -10 89% 2011 135,926 18,903 1,491 17,667 5,333 3,729 135,926 36,570 10,553 2 8845 394 20 488 46 656 79 144 47 (81 39) *1016% 2012 137,639 21,004 1,773 16.511 5,371 3,447 137,639 37,515 10,590 28612 41211 51044 69183 14906 (8166) -971% 2013 139,609 23,015 2,084 15.372 5,370 3,178 139,609 38,386 10,631 28481 43080 53341 72764 15398 (82 59) .937% 2014 141,014 24,935 2.423 14,253 5,330 2.922 141,014 39,188 10,675 2 8280 450 41 557 41 766 29 159 34 (82 18) -8 88% 2015 142,670 26,936 2,790 13,160 5,250 2.680 142,670 40.096 10,719 2 8076 470 87 582 50 806 51 164 79 (82 08) -8 45% 2016 144,300 28,832 3,185 12,096 5,131 2,451 144,300 40,928 10,767 2 7914 492 20 608 71 847 17 170 50 (83 23) -8 18% 2017 145,903 30.621 3,605 11,067 4,973 2.237 145,903 41,688 10.816 2 7789 514 41 636 10 888 31 176 48 (85 72) .8 05% 2018 147,489 32.303 4,050 10,077 4,780 2.037 147,489 42,380 10.866 2 7700 537 56 664 72 929 91 182 71 (89 67) .8 06% 2019 149 065 33,878 4,514 9,131 4 552 1,850 149,065 43,008 10,916 2 7643 56156 694 64 969 69 189 18 (97 32( -840% 0 CUADRO 12 REGMEN PREVISIONAL DE LA PROV1NCIA OE CORDOBA PERSONAL POLICIAL Y PENITENCIARIO EVOLUCION DEMOGRPAFICA SISTEMA DE REPARTO (MILLONESi DE PESOS) A PARTIR DE LOS A PARTIR DE LOS INGRESOS EGRESOS DEFICIT A PASIVOS ACTUALES PASIVOS ACTUALES TOTALES POBLACIONALE RELACION POR APORTES ACTIVOS ACTUALES JUBILADOS ACTUALES PENSIO- ACTIVOSI ____ O IJUBILA- PENSIO- JUBILA- PENSIO- NADOS JUBILA- PENSIO- PASIVOS PERSO- PATRO- JUBILA- PEN- PREVI- EN % DE ACTIVOS DOS NADOS DOS NADOS ACTUALES ACTIVOS DOS NADOS NALES NALES CIONES SIONES SIONAL EGRESOS 1995 11.534 0 0 7.610 0 3,851 11,534 7.610 3,851 1.0064 28.58 35.36 85.68 29.43 51.18 44.46% 1996 11.534 20 0 7.378 183 3,705 11.534 7,399 3.888 1.0219 31.67 35.23 82.71 29.85 45.66 40.57% 1997 11,534 40 0 7,148 357 3.570 11.534 7.188 3.927 1.0377 31.56 35.23 80.32 30.12 43.65 39.52% 1998 11.534 59 1 6.917 523 3,435 11.534 6.976 3.958 1.0548 31.45 35.23 77.92 30.34 41.58 38.41% 1999 11.534 77 1 6.687 684 3.301 11,534 6.764 3.985 1.0730 31.32 35.23 75.73 29.90 39.09 37.00% 2000 11.534 140 2 6.455 838 2.981 11.534 6,595 3,821 1.1073 31.77 35.92 74.76 29.65 36.71 35.16% 2001 11.711 202 4 6,223 987 2,851 11,711 6.424 3,842 1.1408 33.03 37.54 74.91 30.66 35.01 33.16% 2002 11,890 261 6 5.990 1,131 2,721 11,890 6.250 3,858 1.1762 34.33 39.23 74.99 31.68 33.11 31.04% 2003 12.068 318 10 5.756 1.268 2,592 12.068 6,074 3.869 1.2137 35.69 41.00 74.99 32.70 31.02 28.80% 2004 12.246 374 14 5.522 1,398 2,465 12.246 5.898 3.877 1.2531 37.12 42.84 75.43 33.73 29.20 26.75% 2005 12.424 515 19 5.288 1,521 2,340 12,424 5,803 3,880 1.2831 38.64 44.77 76.35 34.76 27.70 24.93% 2006 12,600 635 27 5.054 1,637 2,216 12,600 5.689 3,880 1.3168 40.22 46.78 77.10 35.81 25.90 22.94% 2007 12.777 751 37 4,821 1,744 2,095 12,777 5,572 3,876 1.3523 41.87 48.89 77.80 36.86 23.90 20.85% 2008 12.953 864 49 4.589 1,844 1.976 12.953 5,453 3,869 1.3896 43.58 51.09 78.46 37.91 21.70 18.65% 2009 13.127 973 63 4,358 1.935 1,859 13.127 5,331 3,857 1.4287 45.41 53.39 79.96 38.96 20.13 16.93% 2010 13,300 1,211 80 4,130 2.017 1.745 13.300 5,341 3.842 1.4483 47.37 55.79 82.61 40.02 19.47 15.88% 2011 13.471 1,442 101 3,903 2,090 1.634 13,471 5,346 3,825 1.4689 49.41 58.30 85.29 41.10 18.68 14.78% 2012 13.641 1.666 126 3,680 2,154 1.526 13.641 5,347 3,806 1.4904 51.53 60.92 87.94 42.15 17.63 13.55% 2013 13,836 1,883 156 3,460 2,206 1.421 13,836 5,343 3,783 1.5160 53 75 63.66 90.69 43.24 16.51 12 33% 2014 13,975 2,093 190 3,244 2,249 1,320 13,975 5,337 3,758 1.5366 56 09 66.53 94 04 44.38 15 80 11.41% 2015 14.139 2,348 228 3,033 2,280 1.222 14.139 5,382 3.730 1.5519 58 56 69 52 97.91 45 50 15 34 10 69% 2016 14,301 2,595 273 2,826 2,300 1,128 14.301 5,421 3.701 1.5677 61.13 72.65 101.89 46.66 14.77 9.94% 2017 14,460 2,832 324 2,625 2.310 1.039 14.460 5,457 3,672 1.5839 63.81 75.92 105.97 47.85 14.09 9.16% 2018 14,617 3,059 380 2,430 2,308 955 14,617 5,489 3,643 1.6006 66.60 79.34 110.17 4907 13.30 8.35% 2019 14,773 3,277 443 2,241 2,295 875 14,773 5,518 3,614 1.6179 69.57 82.91 115.46 50.32 13.30 8.03% 0 CUADRO 13 REGIAEN PREVISIONAL DE LA PROVINCIA DE COROBA TOTAL DEL PERSONAL PLIALCO _ EVOLUCION DEMOGRAFICA SISTEMA DE REPARTO (MILL NES DE PESOS) A_ A RPATIR DE LOS A PARTIR DE LOS INGRESOS A PASfVOS ACTUALES PASIVOS ACTUALES TOTALES POBLACIONALES RELACION POR APORTES EGRESOS DEFICIT I ACTIVOS ACTUALES JUESILADOS ACTUALES PENSIO- ACTIVOSI 0 JUSILA- PENSIO "JUILA- PENSIO- NADOS JUBILA- PENSIO- PASIVOS PERSO- PATRO- JUSILA- PEN- PREVI- EN % DE ACTrVOS DOS NADOS DOS NADOS ACTUALES ACTIVOS DOS NADOS NALES NALES CIONES SIONES SIONAL EGRESOS TOTAL 1995 127.915 0 0 43,869 0 14.410 127.915 43,869 14.410 2 1949 27388 35662 564 13 13667 7030 1003% 7836 1996 121.519 1.348 0 42.484 782 13.805 121,519 43.832 14.587 2 0801 260 15 309 68 564 26 139 01 133 44 18 97% 142 47 1997 117.873 2,662 9 41.122 ,497 13.229 I17.873 43783 14.735 20143 25441 30175 56351 14014 14749 2096% 15674 1998 115.516 3.942 30 39.761 2.170 12 632 115.516 43.703 14.832 19735 251 93 298 36 562 31 141 00 153 02 2176% 162 35 1999 115.516 5.189 62 38.396 2.806 12.063 115.516 43.585 14.932 19740 25197 29836 56650 13767 15384 2185% 16319 2000 1I5,516 7.419 105 37.024 3.406 10546 115.516 44.443 14,057 19747 25705 30425 58497 13512 15879 2205% 16837 2001 117.292 9.602 176 35.642 3.970 10.024 117.292 45.243 14.171 19741 268 62 317 95 612 50 140 12 16605 22 06% 176 07 2002 119.0?? 11.698 275 34.251 4.498 9.510 119.077 45.949 14.283 19770 28065 33225 63991 14531 17232 2195% 18276 2003 120.865 13.710 401 32.852 4.988 9.003 I20.865 46.562 14,393 1 9829 293 14 347 20 667 23 150 67 177 56 21 71% 188 40 2004 122.651 15.639 552 31.446 5.439 8.506 122.651 47.085 14.498 19916 30678 36283 70722 156:37 19399 2246% 20553 2005 124.427 19.454 767 30.034 5.851 8 019 124.427 49.489 14.637 1 9404 321 42 379 16 756 68 162 52 21862 2378% 231 10 2006 126.197 22.001 1.014 28.618 6.221 7.543 126.197 50.618 14.778 1 9297 336 14 396 22 796 70 168 98 233 32 24 16% 246 48 2007 127.965 24.442 1.293 27.200 6,550 7.079 127,965 51.641 14.922 1 9224 351 44 414 05 836 93 175 74 247 19 24 41% 261 02 2008 129.725 26.782 1,602 25.782 6.835 6.628 129.725 52.563 15.066 1 9182 367 36 432 68 877 47 182 80 260 23 24 54% 274 73 2009 131,473 29.022 1.940 24,369 7.077 6,191 131.473 53.391 15.208 1 9165 384 04 452 15 920 60 190 33 274 74 24 73% 289 97 2010 133.203 31.472 2,344 22.964 7.273 5.769 133.203 54.436 15.387 1 9077 401 54 472 50 966 89 198 44 291 29 25 00% 307 32 2011 134.916 33.789 2.782 21,570 7.423 5.363 134.916 55.359 15.568 19022 41973 493 76 1.013 35 20693 306 79 2514% 32360 2012 136.616 35.981 3.250 20,191 7.524 4973 136.616 56.172 15.747 18996 43860 51598 1,05914 21560 32017 2512% 33772 2013 138.571 38.051 3.747 18.832 7,576 4.599 138.571 56.883 15.922 1 9033 458 27 539 20 1.105 94 224 76 333 23 25 04% 351 54 2014 139.966 40.003 4.272 17.497 7.578 4.241 139.966 57.501 16.092 1 9019 478 74 563 46 1.152 99 234 63 345 42 24 89% 364 48 2015 141.610 41.659 4.837 16.193 7.530 3.902 141.610 57.852 16.268 19105 49987 58882 1.19699 244 71 35302 2449% 37273 2016 143.227 43.187 5.426 14.922 7.431 3.580 143.227 58.109 i6.437 1 9213 521 84 615 32 1.241 11 255 14 359 10 24 00% 379 45 2017 144,819 44.5s8 6.035 13.692 7,283 3.276 144.819 58.280 16.595 1 9341 544 71 643 00 1.285 38 265 90 363 56 23 44% 384 53 2018 146,393 45.866 6.662 12,507 7,087 2.992 146.393 58.373 16.741 1 9490 568 50 671 94 1.329 78 276 95 366 28 22 80% 387 84 2019 147,958 47,023 7,302 11.372 6 847 2725 147,958 58,395 16,874 19657 59321 70218 137286 28869 36615 2204% 38826 0 CUADRO 14 REGIMEN PREVISIONAL DE LA PROVINCIA DE CORDOBA PERSONAL TOTAL EXCEPTO PERSONAL POLICIAL Y PENITENCIARIO EVOLUCION DEMOGRAIFICA SISTEMA DE REPARTO (MILLONES DE PESOS) A PARTIR DE LOS A PARTIR DE LOS INGRESOS EGRESOS DEFICIT A PASIVOS ACTUALES PASIVOS ACTUALES TOTALES POBLACIONALES RELACION POR APORTES N ACTIVOS ACTUALES JUBILADOS ACTUALES PENSIO- ACTIVOS/ 0 JUBILA- PENSIO. JUBILA- PENSIO- NADOS JUBILA- PENSIO- PASIVOS PERSO- PATRO- JUBILA- PEN- PREVI- EN % DE ACTIVOS DOS NADOS DOS NADOS ACTUALES ACTIVOS DOS NADOS NALES NALES CIONES SIONES SIONAL EGRESO 1995 116,381 0 0 36.259 0 10,559 116,381 36.259 10.559 2 4858 24530 321.26 478.45 107.24 1912 326% 1996 110.562 1.269 0 35 106 599 10.100 110,562 36.375 10,699 2 3487 230 07 276 66 480 59 109 16 83 03 14 08% 1997 107,245 2.505 8 33.974 1.140 9.659 107.245 36.478 10,807 2 2680 225 02 269 57 481 57 110 00 96 98 16 39% 1998 105,100 3,709 24 32,843 1,647 9,197 105.100 36,552 10.868 22163 22289 26655 48214 11059 10329 1743% 1999 105,100 4,882 48 31,709 2,122 8,763 105,100 36.591 10,933 2 2115 223 04 266 55 48817 107 64 106 21 1783% 2000 105,100 7.049 79 30,569 2,568 7,565 105,100 37,618 10,212 2.1974 227 69 271 81 507.31 10523 113 03 18.45% 2001 106.716 9,116 132 29,419 2,983 7,174 106,716 38,535 10,289 21857 23808 28404 533.96 10906 12090 1880% 2002 108,340 11,101 208 28.261 3,367 6,789 108,340 39,363 10,364 21787 24888 29683 56058 11304 12791 1899% 2003 109.967 13'006 306 27,096 3,721 6,411 109.967 40,102 10,438 21758 26010 31018 587.15 11714 13402 1903% 2004 111,591 14,833 426 25,924 4,041 6,041 111,591 40,757 10,508 2 1767 272 34 324 14 625.29 121 40 150 22 20 12% 2005 113,207 18,345 568 24,747 4,330 5,680 113,207 43,092 10,577 2 1094 285 47 338 73 672 01 125 92 173 73 21 77% 2006 114,818 20,698 752 23,564 4,585 5,327 114,818 44,261 10,664 2 0905 29867 353.97 710 04 130 76 188 16 22 38% 2007 116.426 22.955 961 22,378 4.805 4,984 116.426 45,333 10,751 20759 31239 36990 74835 13581 201 88 2283% 2008 118,028 25,118 1,195 21,193 4,991 4,652 118.028 46,311 10.838 2 0653 32665 386 54 786 99 14108 214 88 2315% 2009 119,618 27,189 1,450 20,011 5,142 4.332 119.618 47,200 10,924 20580 34155 40394 82737 14657 22845 2346% 2010 121,192 29,345 1,730 18,835 5,256 4,025 121,192 48,180 11,010 2 0475 35714 422 12 869 87 152 33 242 94 23 77% 2011 122,751 31.394 2,037 17,667 5.333 3.729 122.751 49,060 11,098 2 0405 373 36 441 11 912 68 158 37 25658 2396% 2012 124.298 33,336 2,369 16,511 5.371 3,447 124,298 49,847 11,187 2 0365 390 17 460 96 954 99 164 53 268 38 2397% 2013 126,076 35,173 2,726 15,372 5,370 3.178 126,076 50,545 11,273 20395 40770 48171 99828 17103 27991 2394% 2014 127,345 36,906 3.105 14,253 5,330 2.922 127,345 51,159 11,356 20370 42592 50338 1.04141 17800 29010 2379% 2015 128,841 38,318 3.505 13,160 5,250 2,680 128,841 51,478 11,434 20479 44469 52603 1,081 26 18502 29556 2334% 2016 130,313 39,621 3,926 12,096 5,131 2,451 130,313 51,717 11.508 2 0611 464 21 549 71 1,121 26 192 29 299 63 22 81% 2017 131,761 40,814 4,364 11.067 4,973 2.237 131,761 51,881 11,575 2 0764 484 53 574 44 1,16144 199 76 302 23 22 20% 2018 133,193 41,899 4.818 10.077 4,780 2,037 133,193 51,975 11,634 20939 50567 60029 1,20175 20743 30322 2152% 2019 134616 42876 5,284 9131 4,552 1,850 134,616 52,006 11,686 21135 52754 62731 1,23951 21527 29993 2062% 0 CLADRO 15 REGAEN PREVSONAL DE LA PROVINCIA DE COROBA PERSONAL POLCKAL Y PENTENCIARIO DE LA PROVINCLA EVOLUCION DEMOGRAFICA SISTEMA DE REPARTO (MILLONE DE PESOS) A PAR TR DE LOS A PARTIR DE LOS iNGRESOS EGRESOS DEFK2T A PASVOS ACTUALES PASNVOS ACTUALES TOTALES POBLACIONALES RELACON POR APORTES A ACTVOS ACTUALES AUEILADOS ACTUALES PENSIO- ACTWOSI 0 JUBILA. PENSKO- JUBILA- PENSJO. NADOS JUBLA. PENSKO- PASIVOS PERSO. PATRO. JU8ILA- PEN- PREVI- EN % DE ACTIVOS DOS NADOS DOS NADOS ACTUALES CTIVOS DOS NADOS NALES NALES CIONES SIONES SIONAL EGRESOS 1995 11.534 0 0 7.610 0 3.851 11.534 7.610 3.851 1 0064 2858 3536 8568 2943 51 18 4446% 1996 10.957 79 0 7,378 183 3.705 10,957 7.458 3.888 09658 3008 3302 8367 2985 5041 4441% 1997 10.629 157 1 7.148 357 3570 10.629 7.305 3.927 09463 2938 3217 8193 3014 5051 4507% 1998 10.416 233 6 6.917 523 3.435 10.416 7.150 3.964 09372 2904 3181 8017 3041 4973 4497% 1999 10.416 308 15 6.687 684 3.301 10,416 6.994 3.999 0 9475 28 93 31 81 78 34 30 04 47 63 43 95% 2000 10.416 370 26 6.455 838 2.981 10.416 6.825 3.845 0 9762 2936 3244 7767 2989 4576 4254% 2001 10.576 485 44 6.223 987 2,851 10.576 6.708 3.882 09987 3054 3390 7853 31 06 4515 41 20% 2002 20.737 596 68 5,990 1.131 2.721 10.737 6.586 3.9i9 10221 3177 3543 7933 3227 4441 3980% 2003 20.898 703 95 5,756 2.268 2.592 20.898 6.459 3.955 10465 3304 3702 8008 3353 4354 3833% 2004 11.059 806 227 5.522 1.398 2.465 11.059 6.328 3.990 10719 3444 3869 8193 3497 4377 3744% 2005 11.220 1.109 299 5.288 1.521 2.340 11.220 6.397 4.059 10730 3595 4043 8468 3659 4490 3702% 2006 11,379 1.303 262 5.054 1.637 2.216 i1.379 6.357 4,115 10866 3747 4225 8666 3822 4516 3616% 2007 11.539 1.487 332 4,821 12744 2,095 11.539 6,308 4.171 11011 3906 4415 8858 3993 4531 3525% 2008 11.697 1.664 408 4.589 1.844 1.976 22.697 6.252 4.227 11162 4071 4614 9047 4172 4534 3430% 2009 11,855 1.832 489 4,358 1.935 1.859 11.855 6,191 4.283 11328 4248 4821 9322 4376 4628 3379% 2020 12,021 2.127 615 4.130 2.017 2.745 12.011 6,256 4,377 21295 4439 5038 9702 4611 4835 3378% 2021 12.265 2.396 745 3.903 2.090 2,634 12.165 6.299 4.469 22298 4638 5265 10067 4856 5022 3365% 2022 12.319 2,645 881 3.680 2.154 1.526 12.319 6,325 4.560 22317 48 43 55 02 104 15 52 08 52 78 33 36% 2013 12.495 2.878 1.021 3.460 2.206 1.421 12.495 6.338 4.6.49 11372 5056 5749 20765 5373 5332 3304% 2014 12.621 3,097 1,167 3,244 2.249 1.320 12,621 6.342 4,735 12394 5282 6008 12 58 5663 5531 3288% 2015 12,769 3.341 1,332 3.033 2.280 1.222 12.769 6.374 4.834 11393 5518 6278 11574 5969 5747 3276% 2016 12.915 3.566 2.500 2.826 2.300 12.28 22.915 6.392 4.929 11408 5763 6561 11985 628 5947 3255% 2017 13.058 3.774 2,671 2.625 2.310 1,039 13.058 6.399 5.020 12435 6028 6856 12394 6613 6233 32 27% 2028 I3.200 3.968 1.844 2,430 2.308 955 23.200 6.398 5.106 21475 6283 7165 12803 6952 6306 3192% 2019 13341 4247 2.018 2,241 2295 875 13,341 6,388 5,289 11524 6568 7487 13335 7342 6622 3203% C CUADRO IS REGIMEN PREVIStONAL DE LA PROVINCIA DE CORDOaA TOTAL DEL PERSONAL PUBLsO EVOLUCION DEMOGRAFICA SISTEMA DE REPARTO (MILLONES DE PESOSI A PARTIR DE LOS A PARTIR DE LOS INGRESOS A PASIVOS ACTUALES PASIVOS ACTUALES TOTALES POBLACIONALES RELACION POR APORTES EGRESOS DEFICIT N ACTIVOS ACTUALES JIUBILADOS ACTUALES PENSIO- ACTIVOSd 0 JUBILA- PENSIO- JUBILA- PENSIO- NADOS JUBILA- PENSIO- PASIVOS PERSO- PATRO- JUBILA- PEN- PREVI- EN % DE ACTIVOS DOS NADOS DOS NADOS ACTUALES ACTIVOS DOS NADOS NALES NALES CIONES SIONES SIONAL EGRESOS TOTAL 1995 127,915 0 0 43,869 0 14,410 127,915 43.869 14.410 2 1949 27388 35662 554.13 136.67 70.30 10.03% 78.36 1996 121.519 1.348 0 42,484 782 13.805 121,519 43.832 14.587 20801 23413 27871 50783 12511 12010 1897% 128.23 1997 117.873 2.662 9 41.122 1,497 13.229 117,873 43,783 14,735 20143 22896 27157 50718 12613 13274 2096% 14107 1998 115.516 3.942 30 39.761 2.170 12.632 115.516 43.703 14,832 19735 22674 26853 50608 12690 13772 2176% 14611 1999 115.516 5.189 62 38.396 2.806 12,063 115.516 43.585 14.932 19740 22677 26853 50985 12390 13846 2185% 14687 2000 115.516 7,419 to5 37,024 3.406 10.546 115.516 44.443 14.057 19747 23134 27383 52648 12161 14291 22 05% 15154 2001 117.292 9.602 176 35.642 3.970 10.024 II7.292 45.243 14.171 19741 24176 28615 55125 12611 14945 2206% 15846 2002 119.077 11.698 275 34.251 4 498 9.510 119.077 45.949 14.283 1 9770 252 58 299 03 575 92 130 78 155 09 21 95% 164 48 2003 120.865 13.710 401 32.852 4.988 9.003 120.865 46.562 14 393 I 9829 263 83 312 48 600 1 135 61 159 80 2171% 169 56 2004 122.651 15.639 552 31.446 5.439 8.506 122.651 47.085 14.498 19916 276 10 326 55 63650 140 73 17459 2246% 184 98 2005 124.427 19,454 767 30.034 5.851 8.019 124.427 49.489 14.637 1 9404 289 28 341 24 681 02 146 26 196 76 2378% 207 99 2006 126,197 22.001 1.014 28.618 6.221 7.543 126.197 50.618 14.778 19297 30253 35660 71703 15208 20999 2416% 22183 2007 127.965 24.442 1.293 27.200 6.550 7.079 127.965 51.641 14.922 1 9224 316 30 372 64 753 24 158 17 222 47 24 41% 234 92 2008 129.725 26.782 1.602 25.782 6.835 6.628 129.725 52.563 15,066 I 9182 330 62 389 41 789 72 164 52 234 20 24 54% 247 26 2009 131,473 29022 1.940 24.369 7.077 6.191 131.473 53.391 15,208 19165 34563 40694 82854 171.30 24726 24 73% 26097 2010 133.203 31.472 2.344 22.964 7.273 5.769 133.203 54.436 15.387 19077 361 39 42525 87020 17859 262.16 2500% 27659 2011 134.916 33.789 2.782 21.570 7.423 5.363 134,916 55.359 15.568 19022 37776 44438 91202 18624 27611 2514% 291 24 2012 136.616 35.981 3.250 20.191 7.524 4,973 136,616 56.172 15.747 18996 39474 46438 95323 19404 28815 2512% 30395 2013 138.571 38.051 3.747 18.832 7.576 4.599 i38.571 56,883 .5.922 19033 412 44 485 28 995 34 202 28 299 91 25 04% 316 38 2014 139.966 40.003 4.272 17.497 7.578 4.241 139.966 57,501 16.092 19019 43087 50712 1.03769 211 7 31088 24 89% 32803 2015 141.610 41.659 4.837 16.193 7.530 3.902 141.610 57.852 16.268 19105 44988 52994 1.07729 22024 31772 2449% 33546 2016 143.227 43.187 5,426 14,922 7.431 3,580 143.227 58,619 16.437 19213 46966 55378 1,11700 22963 32319 2400% 34150 2017 144.819 44.588 6.035 13.692 7.283 3.276 144,819 58,280 16.595 19341 49024 57870 1.15684 23931 32720 2344% 34607 2018 146,393 45.866 6,662 12.507 7.087 2.992 146.393 58.373 16.741 19490 51165 60475 1,19680 24925 32966 2280% 34906 2019 147 958 47 023 7,302 11,372 6,847 2,725 1 47,958 58,395 16,874 19657 533 89 631 96 1,235 57 259 82 329 54 2204% 349 43 0 CUADRO 17 REGIMEN PREVISIONAL DE LA PROVINCIA DE CORDOEA PERSONAL TOTAL EXCEPTO PERSONAL POLICtAL Y PENITENCLARIO EVOLUCION DEMOGRAFICA SISTEMA DE REPARTO (MILLONE DE PESOS) A PARTIR DE LOS A PARTIR DE LOS INGRESOS EGRESOS DEFICIT A PASIVOS ACTUALES PASIVOS ACTUALES TOTALES PO8LACIONALES RELACION POR APORTES N ACTIVOS ACTUALES JUSILADOS ACTUALES PENSIO ACTrVOSOS/ 0 JUBILA- PENSIO- JUBILA- PENSIO- NADOS JUBILA- PENSIO- PASIVOS PERSO- PATRO- JUBILA- PEN- PREVI. EN % DE ACTIVOS DOS NADOS DOS NADOS ACTUALES ACTIVOS DOS NADOS NALES NALES CIONES SIONES SIONAL EGRESOS 1995 116.381 0 0 36,259 0 10.559 1 16,382 36.259 10.559 2 4858 245 30 321 26 478 45 107 24 19 2 3 26% 1996 110.562 1.269 0 35.106 599 10.100 110.562 36375 10.699 23487 20706 24899 43253 9825 7472 1408% 1997 107,245 2.505 8 33:974 1 140 9659 107.245 36.478 10.807 2 2680 20252 24262 43342 9900 8728 1639% 1998 105.100 3.709 24 32.843 I 647 9.197 105.100 36552 10.868 22163 20060 23990 43392 9953 9296 17 43% 1999 105.100 4.882 48 31.709 2.122 8.763 105,100 36,591 10.933 22115 20073 23990 43935 9687 9559 1783% 2000 105.100 7,049 79 30.569 2 568 7.565 105,100 37.618 10,212 2 1974 204 92 244 63 456 58 94 71 101 73 1845% 2001 106.716 9.116 132 29.419 2.983 7,174 106,716 38,535 10,289 21857 21428 25564 48057 9816 10881 ,860% 2002 108.340 11.101 208 28.261 3.367 6.789 108.340 39,363 10.364 21787 22399 26714 50452 101 73 11512 1899-A 2003 109.967 13.006 306 27.096 3.721 6.411 109.967 40.102 10.438 2 1758 23409 279 17 52844 10543 12061 1903% 2004 111.591 14,833 426 25.924 4.041 6.041 111,591 40.757 10.508 21767 24510 29173 56276 10926 13519 2012% 2005 113.207 18.345 568 24.747 4330 5.680 I13.207 43.092 10.577 21094 25693 30486 60481 11333 15636 2177% 2006 114818 20698 752 23564 4.585 5.327 114.818 44.261 10.664 20905 26880 31857 63904 11768 16934 2238% 2007 116.426 22.955 961 22.378 4.805 4.984 116.426 45.333 10.751 20759 28115 33291 67352 12223 18169 2283% 2008 118.028 25,118 1.195 21.193 4.991 4.652 118.028 46.311 10.838 20653 29398 34789 70829 12697 19339 2315% 2009 119.618 27.189 1.450 20.011 5.142 4.332 119.618 47,200 10.924 20580 30740 36355 74463 1319? 20561 2346% 2010 121,192 29345 1.730 18.835 5.256 4.025 121,192 48.180 II 010 20475 32143 37991 7828B 13710 21865 2377% 2011 122.151 31 394 2.037 17.667 5 333 3.729 122.751 49.060 11 098 2 0405 336 02 397 00 821 41 14253 230 92 23 96% 2012 124298 33.336 2369 16511 5371 3.447 124.298 49847 12.187 20365 35116 41487 85949 14807 24155 2391% 2013 126.076 35.173 2.726 15.312 5.370 3.278 126.078 50545 11.273 20395 36693 43353 89848 15393 25192 2394% 2014 127.345 36,908 3.105 14.253 5.330 2.922 127.345 51.159 11.356 20370 38333 45304 93727 16020 26109 2379% 2015 128.841 36.318 3.505 13,160 5.250 2.680 128.841 5t.478 i12434 20479 40022 47343 97313 16652 26600 2334% 2016 130,313 39.621 3.926 12,096 5.13f 2.451 230.313 52,717 11.508 20611 41779 49474 1,00914 17306 26967 2281% 2017 131.761 40.814 4.364 11.067 4973 2,237 131.761 52.881 21.575 20764 43608 51700 1.04529 17979 27201 2220% 2018 133.193 41.899 4,818 20,077 4.780 2.037 133.193 51.975 11.634 20939 45510 54026 1.08158 18669 27290 2152% 2029 234,616 42,876 5,284 9,131 4,552 1,850 134,616 52,006 11,686 21135 47478 56457 121555 19374 26994 2062% 0 CUADRO 17 REGIAEN PREVISIONAL DE LA PRO%nNCUk DE CORDOBA PERSONAL TOTAL EXCEPTO PERSONAL POLICIAL Y PENITENCIARIO EVOLLCION DEMOGRAFICA S_ | 9TEMA DE REPARTO (MILLONES DE PESOS) A PARTIR DE LOS A PARTS DE LOS INGRESOS EGRESOS DEFIClT A PASNVOS ACTUALES PASIVOS ACTUALES TOTALES POOLACIONALES RELACION POR APORTES N ACTIVOS ACTUALES JU88ADOSACTUALES PENSIO- ACTNVOS9 0 JUEJLA- PENSIO- JUBILA- PENSIO- NAOOS JUB4LA- PENSIO- PASIVOS PERSO. PATRO- JUBILA- PtN- PRLVI. iN % DE ACTIVOS DOS NADOS DOS NADOS ACTUALES ACTIVOS DOS NAOOS NALES NALES CIONES SIONES SKONAL EGRESOS 1995 116.381 0 0 36.259 0 10.559 116.381 36.259 10.559 24858 24530 321.26 47845 107.24 19.12 3.26% 1996 110.562 1.269 0 35.106 599 10.100 1)0,562 36.375 10.699 2 3487 207 06 248 99 432 53 98 25 74 72 14 08% 1997 107 245 2 505 8 33.974 1.140 9.659 107.245 36.478 10.807 2 2680 202 52 242 82 433 42 99 00 87 28 16 39% 1998 105W100 3.709 24 32.843 1.647 9.197 105.100 36.552 10.868 2 2163 200 60 239 90 433 92 99 53 92 96 1743% 1999 105,100 4882 48 31.709 2.122 8.763 i05.100 36.591 10.933 22115 20073 23990 43935 9687 9559 1783% 2000 105 100 7.049 79 30.569 2.568 7.565 105.100 37.618 10.212 2 1974 20492 244 63 456 58 94 71 101 73 18 45% 2001 106.716 9.116 132 29.419 2.983 7.174 106.716 38.535 10.289 2 1857 214 28 255 64 480 57 98 16 10881 18 80% 2002 108.340 11.101 208 28.261 3.367 6,789 108.340 39.363 10.364 21787 22399 26714 50452 10173 11512 1899% 2003 109.967 13.006 306 27.096 3.721 6.411 109.967 40.102 10.438 21758 23409 27917 52844 10543 12061 1903% 2004 II.591 14.833 426 25.924 4.041 6.041 111.591 40.757 10.508 21767 24510 29173 56276 10926 13519 20 12% 2005 113.207 18.345 568 24.747 4.330 5.680 113.207 43.092 10.577 2 1094 25693 304 86 604 81 113 33 156 36 21 77% 2006 114.816 20.698 752 23.564 4.585 5.327 114.818 44,261 10.664 2 0905 268 80 318 57 639 04 117 68 169 34 22 38% 2007 116.426 22.955 961 22.378 4.805 4.984 116.426 45.333 10.751 20759 281 15 33291 67352 12223 181 69 2283% 2008 118.028 25.118 1.195 21.193 4.991 4.652 118.028 46.311 10.838 20653 29398 34789 70829 12697 19339 2315% 2W09 119,618 27.189 1.450 20.011 5.142 4.332 119.618 47,200 10.924 2 0580 307 40 363 55 744 63 131 92 205 61 2346% 2010 121.192 29.345 1.730 18.835 5.256 4.025 121.192 48.180 11,010 2 0475 321 43 379 91 782 88 13710 218 65 23 77% 2011 122.751 31.394 2.037 17.667 5.333 3.729 122.751 49.060 11.098 20405 33602 39700 82141 14253 23092 2396% 2012 124.298 33.336 2.369 16.511 5.371 3,447 124,298 49,847 1 1.87 20365 35) 16 41487 85949 14807 24155 23 97% 2013 126.076 35.173 2.726 15.372 5.370 3.178 126.076 50.545 11,273 2 0395 366 93 433 53 898 46 153 93 25 92 23 94% 2014 127.345 36 906 3.105 14.253 5.330 2.922 127.345 51.159 11.356 2 0370 383 33 453 04 937 27 160 20 261 09 2379% 2015 128.841 38.318 3.505 13,160 5.250 2.680 128.841 51,478 11.434 2 0479 400 22 473 43 973 13 166 52 266 00 23 34% 20)6 130.313 39,621 3.926 12.096 5.131 2.451 130.313 51,717 11.508 20611 41779 49474 100914 17306 26967 2281% 20)7 131.761 40.814 4.364 11,067 4,973 2.237 131.761 51.881 11.575 20764 43608 517.00 1,04529 17979 27201 2220% 2018 133.193 41,899 4.818 10.077 4.780 2.037 133,193 51,975 11634 20939 45510 54026 1.08158 18669 27290 2152% 2019 134616 42876 5284 9)131 4,552 1850 134616 52.006 11086 21135 47478 56457 1.11555 19374 26994 2062% 0 CUADRO 18 REGIMEN PREVISIONAL DE LA PROVINCIA DE CORDO0A PERSONAL POLICIAL Y PENITENCIARIO DE LA PROVINCIA _ ____ EVOLUCION DEMOGRAFICA SISTEMA DE REPARTO (MILLONES DE PESOS A PARTIR OE LOS A PARTIR DE LOS INGRESOS EGRESOS DEFICIT A PASIVOS ACTUALES PASIVOS ACTUALES TOTALES POBLACIONALES RELACION POR APORTES N ACTIVOS ACTUALES JUBILADOS ACTUALES PENSIO- ACTIVOS/ _ _- 0 JUBILA- PENSIO- JUBILA- PENSIO- NADOS JUBILA- PENSIO- PASIVOS PERSO- PATRO- JUBILA- PEN PREVI EN % DE ACTIVOS DOS NADOS DOS NADOS ACTUALES ACTIVO DOS NADOS NALES NALES CIONES SIONES SIONAL EGRESOS 1995 11,534 0 0 7,610 0 3,851 11,534 7,610 3.851 1 0064 28 58 35 36 8568 29 43 51 18 44 466% 1996 10,957 79 0 7.378 183 3,705 10,957 7,458 3.888 0 9658 27 07 29 72 75 30 26 86 45 37 44 41% 1997 10.629 157 1 7,148 357 3.570 10,629 7.305 3.927 0 9463 26 45 28 96 73 74 27 12 45 46 45 07% 1998 10,416 233 6 6,917 523 3,435 10,416 7,150 3.964 0 9372 26 14 28 63 72 16 27 37 44 76 44 97% 1999 10.416 308 15 6,687 684 3,301 10,416 6.994 3.999 0 9475 26 04 28 63 70 50 27 03 42 87 43 95% 2000 10. 416 370 26 6,455 838 2,981 10.416 6,825 3,845 0 9762 26 42 2920 69 90 26 90 41 18 4254% 2001 10.576 485 44 6,223 987 2.851 10,576 6,708 3,882 0 9987 27 48 30 51 70 68 27 95 40 64 41 20% 2002 10,737 596 68 5.990 1.131 2.721 10,737 6,586 3.919 1 0221 28 59 31a88 71 40 29 05 39 97 39 80% 2003 10,898 703 95 5,756 1,268 2,592 10,898 6,459 3.955 1 0465 29 74 33 32 72 07 30 18 3919 3833% 2004 11,059 806 127 5,522 1,398 2,465 11.059 6,328 3,990 10719 31 00 34 82 73 74 31 47 39 39 37 44% 2005 11,220 1,109 199 5,288 1,521 2,340 11.220 6,397 4,059 10730 3235 3639 7621 3293 4041 3702% 2006 11,379 1,303 262 5,054 1,637 2,216 11.379 6,357 4,115 10866 3372 3802 7799 3440 4064 3616% 2007 11.539 1,487 332 4,821 1,744 2,095 11.539 6,308 4,171 11011 3515 3973 7972 3594 4078 3525% 2008 11,697 1,664 408 4,589 1,844 1,976 11,697 6.252 4.227 11162 3664 4152 8142 3755 4081 3430% 2009 11,855 1,832 489 4.358 1,935 1,859 11,855 6,191 4,283 11318 38 24 43 39 83 90 39 38 41 66 33 79% 2010 12,011 2,127 615 4,130 2.017 1,745 12,011 6,256 4,377 1.1295 3996 4534 8732 41 50 4352 3378% 2011 12,165 2,398 745 3.903 2,090 1.634 12,165 6,299 4,469 11298 41 74 4738 90 61 43 71 45 19 3365% 2012 12,319 2.645 881 3,680 2,154 1.526 12,319 6,325 4,560 11317 4358 4952 9374 4597 4661 3336% 2013 12.495 2,878 1,021 3,460 2,206 1,421 12,495 6.338 4.649 11372 45 51 51 74 96 89 48 35 47 99 3304% 2014 12,621 3.097 1,167 3,244 2,249 1.320 12,621 6,342 4.735 11394 47 54 54 07 100 42 50 97 49 78 32 88% 2015 12,769 3,341 1,332 3,033 2,280 1,222 12.769 6,374 4,834 11393 49 66 56 51 104 16 53 72 51 72 32 76% 2016 12.915 3,566 1,500 2.826 2,300 1,128 12.915 6.392 4.929 11408 5187 5905 10786 5657 5352 3255% 2017 13,058 3,774 1,671 2,625 2,310 1,039 13,058 6.399 5,020 11435 54 16 6171 111 55 59 52 5520 32 27% 2018 13,200 3,968 1,844 2,430 2,308 955 13,200 6,398 5.106 11475 5655 6448 11523 6257 5676 3192% 2019 13341 4147 2018 2,241 2 875 11524 59 11 67 38 120 02 6608 _5960 3203% 0 -204- ANNEX 10 74. En segundo lugar se supuso que no es posible reducir los haberes a los beneficiarios actuales, pero si a quienes sejubilan luego de la reducci6n salarial. En este caso, dado que se supone que se respetan los haberes de los pasivos actuales, en los primeros anos de la proyecci6n pero los ingresos por aportes se reducen en igual magnitud de los salarios, el deficit crece fuertemente en los primeros anos de la proyecci6n (Cuadros 19, 20 y 21)- 4. TRANSFERENCIA AL SISTEMA INTEGRADO DE JUBILACIONES Y PENSIONES: COSTOS PARA EL ESTADO NACIONAL 4.1. REFORMA PREVISIONAL Y ADHESION DE LOS REGIMENES PROVINCIALES 75. El 13 de octubre de 1993 fue promulgada la ley n° 24241, por la cual fue creado el Sistema Integrado de Jubilaciones y Pensiones (SIJP), el que progresivamente reemplazara al Regimen Previsional Nacional actual (creado por las leyes no 18037 y 18038). 76. El SIJP se sustenta sobre tres pilares: 1. un pilar constituido por un regimen previsional publico obligatorio de reparto; 2. un pilar obligatorio de capitalizaci6n privada de aportes y 3. un pilar optativo tambien de capitalizacion de aportes. Asimismo, continuara en vigencia paralelamente un sistema especial de reparto publico por el que, los individuos que asi lo prefieran, deberan optar expresamente. 77. Los individuos que hayan expresado su opci6n por el Sistema de Reparto Publico, recibiran al momento de su retiro una prestaci6n compuesta de tres haberes (a) Prestaci6n Basica Universal (PBU): Se calcula como 2.5 veces el Aporte Medio Previsional Obligatorio (AMPO) y aumenta en un 1% por cada anio adicional de aporte por encima de los 30 anios y hasta los 45 anios- (b) Prestaci6n Compensatoria (PC): Reconoce lo aportado a] regimen previsional vigente antes de la reforma. Se calcula como el 1.5 % por ano de aporte realizado al anterior sistema previsional (el vigente hasta el momento en que empiece a funcionar plenamente el SIJP), hasta un maximo de 35 anios. Se calcula sobre el promedio de remuneraciones sujetas a aportes de los 120 meses aportados inmediatamente anteriores al cese de los servicios. El limite maximo de esta prestaci6n es, por ende, el 52.5% de la citada remuneraci6n. Ademas esta prestaci6n tiene un mrnximo de un AMPO por cada afio de servicios computables. El costo fiscal de esta prestaci6n desaparece en el largo plazo. CUADRO 19 REG?AEN PREVISIONAL DE LA PROVINCIA DE CORDOBA TOTAL DEL PERSONAL PUBEICO .__=_ EVOLUCION DEMOGRAFICA SISTEMA DE REPARTO (MILL NES DE PESOS) A PARTIR DE LOS A PARTIR DE LOS INGRESOS A PASIVOS ACTUAL PASIVOS ACTUALE TOTALES POBLACIONALE RELACIO POR APORTES EGRESOS DEFICIT N ACTNVOS ACTUAL JUBILADOS ACTUA PENSIO. ACTIVOS/ 0 JUBILA- PENSIO- JUBILA- PENSIO- NADOS JUBILA- PENSIO- PASIVOS PERSO- PATRO- JUBILA- PEN- PREVI- EN % DE ACTIVO DOS NADOS DOS NADOS ACTUALE ACTIVO DOS NADOS NALES NALES CIONES SIONES SIONAL EGRESO TOTAL 1995 127,915 0 0 43.869 0 14.410 127.915 43.869 14.410 2.1949 27388 35662 564.13 136.67 70.30 10.03% 90.40 1996 121,519 1.348 0 42,484 782 13.805 121.519 43.832 14.587 2 0801 23413 278 71 562 49 139 01 188 66 26.89% 198.50 1997 117,873 2.662 9 41,122 1,497 13.229 117,873 43.783 14.735 20143 22896 27157 56002 140.13 19962 2851% 20961 1998 115,516 3,942 30 39,761 2.170 12.632 115.516 43.703 14,832 1.9735 22674 26853 557.16 14097 202.87 29.06% 21289 1999 115.516 5.189 62 38,396 2.806 12,063 115,516 43.585 14,932 1 9740 226.77 268.53 55965 137.61 201.96 28.96% 211.96 2000 115,516 7,419 105 37,024 3.406 10,546 115.516 44.443 14,057 1.9747 23134 27383 57505 13502 204.89 28.86% 215.07 2001 117.292 9,602 176 35.642 3.970 10,024 117.292 45,243 14,171 19741 241.76 28615 59930 13995 21134 2859% 221.90 2002 119.077 11.698 275 34.251 4.498 9.510 119.077 45.949 14.283 19170 25258 29903 62338 14503 21680 2821% 22774 2003 120,865 13.710 401 32,852 4,988 9,003 120,865 46,562 14.393 1 9829 26383 31248 647.31 15025 221.25 27.74% 23255 2004 122.651 15,639 552 31,446 5,439 8,506 122,651 47.085 14.498 1.9916 276.10 326 55 683.42 155.77 236 54 28.19% 248.48 2005 124.427 19.454 767 30,034 5.851 8,019 124,427 49.489 14.637 1.9404 289 28 341 24 726.61 161.66 257.75 29.02% 270.50 2006 126,197 22.001 1.014 28,618 6,221 7,543 126,197 50,618 14,778 1 9297 30253 35660 761.72 167.82 270.41 29.09% 28376 2007 127.965 24,442 1 293 27.200 6,550 7,079 127.965 51.641 14,922 1.9224 316 30 372 64 796 95 174 21 282.22 29.06% 296.17 2008 129.725 26.782 1.602 25,782 6.835 6,628 129.725 52.563 15,066 1 9182 33062 389.41 832.37 180.84 293.18 28.94% 307.71 2009 131,473 29.022 1,940 24,369 7,077 6,191 131,473 53,391 15,208 1.9165 345 63 406 94 870.18 187.88 305.49 2887% 320.65 2010 133.203 31.472 2,344 22.964 7.273 5.769 133,203 54.436 15.387 1.9077 361 39 425.25 91061 195.40 319.38 28.88% 33523 2011 134,916 33,789 2.782 21.570 7.423 5,363 134,916 55.359 15.568 1.9022 377 76 444.38 951.12 203.22 332.19 28.78% 348.72 2012 136,616 35.981 3.250 20.191 7.524 4,973 136.616 56,172 15.747 1.8996 394.74 464.38 99092 211.13 342.93 28.53% 360.10 2013 138,571 38,051 3.747 18.832 7.576 4,599 138,571 56,883 15,922 1.9033 412.44 485 28 1,031.58 219.44 353.31 2824% 371.12 2014 139.966 40.003 4.272 17.497 7.578 4.241 139,966 57,501 16,092 1 9019 430 87 507 12 1.072 41 228.37 362.80 27.89% 381.25 2015 141,610 41,659 4,837 16,193 7.530 3.902 141.610 57,852 16,268 1.9105 44988 52994 1.11044 23740 36802 2730% 387.02 2016 143.227 43.187 5.426 14.922 7.431 3.580 143,227 58.109 16,437 1 9213 469 66 553 78 1.148.52 246.67 371 75 26.65% 391.28 2017 144.819 44,588 6,035 13.692 7.283 3,276 144.819 58.280 16.595 1 9341 490 24 578.70 1.186.70 256.16 373.92 25.92% 393.96 2018 146,393 45,866 6,662 12,507 7,087 2,992 146.393 5,373 16,741 1.9490 51165 604.75 1,224.97 265.85 374.41 25.11% 394.94 2019 147,958 47,023 7,302 11,372 6,847 2,725 147.958 58.395 16,874 1.9657 533 89 631.96 11262.01 276.10 372.26 24.20% 393.22 CUADRO 20 REGIMEN PREVISIOUAL DE LA PROVWICA DE CORDOBA PERSONAL TOTAL EXCEPTO PERSONAL POLICIAL Y PENITENCLARIO EVOLUCION DEMOGRAFICA S1STEMA DE REPARTO (MILLONES DE PESOS) A PARTIR DE LOS A PARTIR DE LOS INGRESOS EGRESOS DEFtCT A PASMOS ACTLUALES PAShVOS ACTUALES TOTALES POBLACKONALES RELACION POR APORTES N ACTIVOS ACTUALES JUBILADOSACTUALES PENSIO- ACTIVOSI 0 JUBILA- PENSIO- JUBILA. PENSK> NADOS JUBILA- PENSIO- PASIVOS PERSO- PATRO- JUBILA- PEN- PREVIA EN % DE ACTIVOS DOS NADOS DOS NADOS ACTUALES ACTtVOS DOS NADOS NALES NALES CIONES SIONES SIONAL EGRESOS 1995 116.381 0 0 36,259 0 10,559 116.381 36.259 10.559 2 4858 245 30 321 26 478 45 107 24 19 12 3 26% 1996 110.562 1.269 0 35.106 599 10.100 110,562 36.375 10.699 2 3487 207 06 248 99 478 91 109 16 132 02 14 08% 1997 107.245 2.505 8 33.974 1.140 9.659 107.245 36.478 10.807 22680 20252 24262 47827 11000 14313 1639% 1998 105.100 3.709 24 32.843 1.647 9.197 105. 100 36.552 10.868 2 2163 200 60 239 90 477 24 110 57 147 32 17 43% 1999 105.100 4.882 48 31.709 2.122 8.763 105.100 36.591 10.933 2 2115 200 73 239 90 481 65 10759 148 61 17 83% 2000 105.100 7.049 79 30.569 2.568 7.565 105.100 37.618 10.212 2 1974 20492 24463 49780 10515 15339 1845% 2001 106.716 9,116 132 29.419 2.983 7,174 106.716 38.535 10.289 21857 21428 25564 52133 10892 16034 1880% 2002 108.340 11.101 208 28.261 3.367 6.789 108.340 39.363 10.364 2 1787 22399 267 14 54477 11281 16644 1899% 2003 109.967 13.006 306 27.096 3.721 6.411 109.967 40.102 10.438 2 1758 23409 27917 56811 11680 17166 19 03% 2004 111.591 14.833 426 25.924 4.041 6.041 111.591 40,757 10.508 2 1767 245 10 29173 60254 12091 18662 2012% 2005 113.207 18.345 568 24.747 4.330 5.680 113.207 43.092 10.577 21094 25693 30486 64340 12525 20686 2177% 2006 114.818 20.698 752 23.564 4.585 5.327 1 14.818 44.261 10.664 2 0905 268 80 318 57 676 84 129 84 219 30 22 38% 2007 116.426 22.955 961 22.378 4805 4.984 116.426 45.333 10.751 20759 281 15 33291 71046 13460 23100 2283% 200D 118.028 25.118 1,195 21.193 4.991 4.652 118.028 46.311 10.838 20653 29398 34789 74431 13953 24196 2315% 2009 119.618 27.189 1.450 20.011 5.142 4.332 119.618 47.200 10.924 20580 30740 36355 77971 14463 25340 2346% 2010 121.192 29,345 1.730 18.835 5.256 4.025 121.192 48.180 11.010 20475 32143 37991 81689 14994 26549 2377% 2011 122.751 31.394 2.037 17.667 5.333 3.729 t22.751 49.060 11.098 20405 33602 39700 85428 15546 27672 23 96% 2012 124.298 33.336 2.369 16511 5.371 3.447 124,298 49.847 11.187 20365 35116 41487 89113 16104 28615 2397% 2013 126.076 35.173 2,726 15.372 5.370 3.178 126.076 50.545 11.273 20395 36693 43353 92882 16690 29525 2394% 2014 127.345 36.906 3,105 14.253 5.330 2.922 127.345 51,159 11.356 20370 38333 45304 96628 17313 30304 2379% C 2015 128.841 38.318 3.505 13.160 5.250 2.680 128.841 51.478 11.434 20479 40022 47343 100077 17935 30647 2334% 2016 130.313 39.621 3.926 12.096 5.131 2451 130.313 51.717 11.508 20611 41779 49474 103536 18573 30856 2281% 2017 131.761 40.814 4.364 11.067 4.973 2.231 131.761 51.881 11,575 20764 43608 51700 107007 19223 30922 2220% 2018 133.193 41.899 4.818 10.077 4.780 2.037 133.193 51.975 11.634 20939 45510 54026 110488 19884 30835 2152% 2019 134,616 42,876 S,284 9,131 4,552 1,850 134,616 52,006 11,686 2 1135 47478 56457 113732 20553 30349 2062% C CUADRO 21 REGIMEN PREVISIONAL DE LA PROVINCIA DE CORDOBA PERSONAL POLICIAL Y PENITENCIARIO DE LA PROVINCIA EVOLUCION DEMOGRAFICA SISTEMA DE REPARTO (MILLONES DE PESOS) A PARTIR DE LOS A PARTIR DE LOS INGRESOS EGRESOS DEFICIT A PASIVOS ACTUALES PASIVOS ACTUALES TOTALES POBLACIONALES RELACION POR APORTES N ACTIVOS ACTUALES JUBILADOS ACTUALES PENS S IO ACTIVOS/ 0 JUBILA- PENSIO- JUBILA- PENSIO- NADOS JUBILA- PENSIO. PASIVOS PERSO. PATRO. JUBILA- PEN- PREVI- EN % DE ACTIVOS DOS NADOS DOS NADOS ACTUALES ACTIVO DOS NADOS NALES NALES CIONES SIONES SIONAL EGRESOS 1995 11.534 0 0 7,610 0 3,851 11.534 7.610 3,851 1 0064 28 58 35 36 85 68 29 43 51 18 44 46% 1996 10,957 79 0 7,378 183 3,705 10,957 7,458 3,886 0 9658 27 07 29 72 83 58 29 85 56 64 4993% 1997 10,629 157 1 7.148 357 3.570 10,629 7.305 3.927 0 9463 26 45 28 96 81 76 30 14 56 49 50 49% 1998 10.416 233 6 6.917 523 3,435 10,416 7,150 3.964 0 9372 26 14 2863 79 91 30 41 55 55 50 35% 1999 10.416 308 15 6.687 684 3,301 10,416 6.994 3.999 0 9475 26 04 28 63 77 99 30 03 5335 49 39% 2000 10,416 370 26 6.455 838 2.981 10.416 6.825 3.845 0 9762 26 42 29 20 77 25 2987 5150 48 08% 2001 10.576 485 44 6.223 987 2.851 10,576 6.708 3,882 0 9987 27 48 30 51 77 96 31 03 50 99 46 79% 2002 10.737 596 68 5,990 1.131 2.721 10.737 6.586 3,919 1 0221 28 59 31 88 78 62 32 22 50 36 45 44% 2003 10,898 703 95 5,756 1.268 2,592 10,898 6,459 3,955 1 0465 29 74 33 32 79 20 33 45 49 59 44 02% 2004 11,059 806 127 5.522 1,398 2,465 11,059 6.328 3.990 1 0719 31 00 3482 80 89 34 86 49 93 43 14% 2005 11.220 1,109 199 5.288 1.521 2.340 11.220 6.397 4,059 10730 3235 3639 8321 3641 5089 4254% 2006 11.379 1,303 262 5,054 1.637 2.216 11,379 6,357 4.115 10866 3372 3802 8488 3798 51 11 4160% 2007 11.539 1.487 332 4.821 1.744 2,095 11,539 6.308 4.171 1 1011 3515 39 73 86 49 39 61 5122 40 62% 2008 11,697 1.664 408 4.589 1,844 1,976 11.697 6.252 4,227 1 1162 3664 4152 8806 4131 5122 3959% -1 2009 11,855 1.832 489 4.358 1.935 1,859 11.855 6.191 4,283 1 1318 3824 4339 9046 4326 5209 3896% 2010 12.011 2.127 615 4,130 2,017 1.745 12.011 6.256 4.377 1 1295 3996 4534 9373 4546 5389 38 72% 2011 12,165 2.396 745 3,903 2,090 1,634 12,165 6,299 4.469 1 1298 41 74 4738 9685 4775 5548 3837% 2012 12,319 2,645 881 3,680 2,154 1.526 12,319 6,325 4,560 1 1317 4358 4952 9980 5009 5679 37 89% 2013 12.495 2,878 1.021 3.460 2,206 1,421 12.495 6.338 4,649 1 1372 4551 51 74 102 77 52 55 58 06 37 38% 2014 12.621 3.097 1,167 3.244 2.249 1.320 12,621 6.342 4.735 1 1394 4754 5407 10613 5524 5976 3703% 2015 12.769 3.341 1,332 3,033 2.280 1,222 12.769 6.374 4,834 1 1393 49 66 56 51 109 67 5804 61 55 36 70% 2016 12,915 3,566 1,500 2.826 2.300 1.128 12.915 6.392 4.929 1 1408 51 87 59 05 113 16 6094 6319 36 29% 2017 13,058 3,774 1,671 2,625 2,310 1,039 13,058 6,399 5,020 1 1435 5416 61 71 11663 6393 6470 3583% 2018 13,200 3.968 1,844 2,430 2,308 955 13,200 6,398 5,106 1 1475 5655 64.48 12009 6701 6606 3531% 2019 13,341 4,147 2,018 2,241 2,295 875 t13341 6,388 5,189 1 1524 5911 6738 12469 7056 6876 3522% C -208- ANNEX 10 (c) Prestaci6n Anual por Permanencia (PAP): Reconoce los aportes realizados al nuevo SIJP, en el caso particular que el afiliado hubiera optado por el sistema de reparto. Se calcula como el 0.85 % aplicado sobre la misma base que la PC, reconociendose hasta un maximo de 35 anios de aportes. Tambien tiene un maximo de un AMEPO por cada anio de servicios computables, y por su disefno, puede alcanzar como maximo un 29.75 % del promedio de los ultimos 120 meses con aportes de remuneraci6n. 78. Se observa que una variable de importancia para el cAlculo de las prestaciones que otorgara el nuevo sistema, es el Aporte Medio Previsional Obligatorio (AIvIPO) el cual calcula como el total de los aportes personales realizados dividido por el total de aportantes. 79. Los afiliados activos que queden comprendidos en el Regimen Previsional Privado, al momento de su retiro accederan a una prestaci6n dividida tambien en tres haberes: (a) Prestacion Basica Universal (PBU): Calculada de la misma forma que antes fuera descripta. (b) Prestaci6n Compensatoria (PC): Calculada tambien de la misma forma que antes fuera descripta. (c) Haber de Capitalizaci6n (HC): Calculado a partir del monto que haya acumulado cada individuo en su Cuenta de Capitalizaci6n Individual (CCI). 80. Para administrarlas CCI se crean las Administradoras de Fondos de Jubilaciones y Pensiones (AFYP). La libertad de elecci6n de la AFJP es total, pudiendo el individuo que asi lo deseare, cambiarse de AFJP con un minimo de cuatro meses de permanencia en la que abandona y no realizando mAs de dos cambios por ano calendario. 81. A la CCI correspondiente al afiliado activo es destinada una parte de su aporte personal equivalente al II % de su remuneraci6n (sujeta a aportes). Esto es asi ya que la AFJP descuenta del aporte personal total una parte que cubre su Comisi6n, mAs el costo de un seguro colectivo que debe contratar para el conjunto de los afiliados cuya CCI administre, para cubrir la contingencia de invalidez o muerte en etapa activa. 82. A su vez el afiliado, al momento de su retiro, tiene tres opciones para obtener su Haber de Capitalizacion: -209- ANNEX 10 1) Obtener una Renta Vitalicia Previsional, 83. En este caso al momento del retiro el individuo debe transferir su fondo de capitalizaci6n acumulado en la AFJP a una Compania de Seg;uros de Retiro, la cual se encarga de abonar mensualmente una Renta de caracter vitalicio fijada al momento en que se determina la prestaci6n inicial, manteniendo constante su poder adquisitivo. Esta elecci6n no deja herencia. Es decir, la Compafia no devuelve lo que el beneficiario y sus derechohabientes no hayan consumido del fondo de capitalizaci6n. En caso de una sobrevida prolongada del individuo luego de su retiro, tampoco la Companiia hace cargos por lo que se pueda consumir en exceso del citado fondo. En consecuencia, al fijar la prestaci6n mediante la utilizaci6n de una tabla de mortalidad que en general es intensiva en vida, y al no dejar herencia, la Companiia de Seguros de Retiro se cubre por la eventual sobrevida de los individuos. 2) Obtener un Retiro Programado, 84. Es otorgado y administrado por la misma AFJP y se calcula como una suma de poder adquisitivo constante deterrninada anualmente a detraer del fondo de capitalizaci6n mensualmente, comparando el fondo acumulado con el valor actual actuarial de pagarle una prestaci6n al beneficiario y la correspondiente a sus derechohabientes hasta su deceso. Esta elecci6n deja herencia. Esto es asi porque no es un seguro, ya que no asegura renta alguna. La prestaci6n siempre depende del remanente que tenga el individuo en su CCI, y ademas varia con las modificaciones en el valor de ese fondo y con el valor actual actuarial citado, que es diferente a medida que transcurre el tiempo. En el caso de esta prestaci6n, la AFJP descuenta una comisi6n de administraci6n. 3) Obtener un Retiro Fraccionario 85. Es otorgado por la misma AFJP y se accede a 6l cuando la prestaci6n inicial es inferior al 50% de la maxima PBU. En este caso el haber a retirar del fondo de capitalizaci6n individual es igual al 50% de la maxima PBU, el cual se cobra hasta el momento en que se agota el fondo o se mueren el beneficiario y sus derechohabientes. La AFJP en este caso no descuenta comisi6n alguna. 86. Las fuentes de financiamiento del sistema de reparto, que se encarga del pago de las PBU, las PC, las PAP, y las prestaciones por invalidez y muerte en etapa activa de los individuos que hayan optado por el sistema de reparto, son: * El aporte patronal igual al 16% de las remuneraciones sujetas a aporte de los afiliados tanto al sistema de reparto publico como al sistema privado de capitalizaci6n. * El aporte personal del 11% exclusivamente de los individuos que hayan optado por el sistema de reparto publico. -210- ANNEX 10 87. Se debe tener en cuenta que el afiliado, al entrar en vigencia el nuevo regimen, debera hacer explicita su opci6n por recibir su prestacion unicamente del sistema de reparto, o recibirla del reparto puiblico y de la capitalizaci6n. Esto es, el individuo respectivamente, debera optar por recibir al momento de su retiro una PBU mas una PC mas una PAP, las tres provenientes del regimen de reparto publico; o , en caso contrario, recibir las dos primeras prestaciones del reparto publico, y en lugar de la PAP, cobrar del sector privado (representado por las AFJP) un Haber de Capitalizaci6n (HC). 88. La ley n° 24241 establece tambien un aumento de las edades de retiro a 60 anios para las mujeres y 65 aflos para los hombres. 89. En cuanto concierne a los regimenes previsionales provinciales, el articulo 2 inciso a.4. establece que estan obligatoriamente comprendidas en el SIJP las personas fisicas mayores de 18 anios que se desempenien como "...funcionarios, empleados y agentes civiles dependientes de los gobiernos y municipalidades provinciales, a condici6n que previamente las autoridades respectivas adhieran al SIJP, mediante convenio con el Poder Eeecutivo Nacional." 90. El Pacto Fiscal, fue la herramienta elegida por el Gobierno Nacional para promover la adhesi6n de las provincias al SIJP. Dicha adhesi6n es estrictamente voluntaria y sujeta a la aprobaci6n de las correspondientes legislaturas provinciales. 91. Dentro del marco de los programas de reforma de los Sectores Publicos Provinciales, y respondiendo a la iniciativa del Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, fue propuesto a las provincias la firma de un pacto denominado "Pacto Federal para el Empleo, la Producci6n y el Crecimiento". 92. De todas sus disposiciones y en lo que atahie a la organizaci6n de la Previsi6n Social en la Argentina, el inciso 60 apartado segundo propone la transferencia de las Cajas de Jubilaciones y Pensiones provinciales al Sistema Integrado, al establecer que el Gobierno Nacional se obliga a: " Aceptar la transferencia al Sistema Nacional de Previsi6n Social de las Cajas de Jubilaciones y Pensiones Provinciales - con exclusi6n de las de Profesionales que prevee el articulo 56 de la ley n° 18038 (t.o. 1980) -, en el caso de las Provincias que adhieran al nuevo Regimen Previsional que sancione la Nacion, respetando los derechos adquiridos de los actuales jubilados y pensionados provinciales. Para el caso que con posterioridad a la fecha del presente, alguna Provincia modificara su legislaci6n en materia de jubilaciones y pensiones, el mayor costo que pudiera resultar de dichas modificaciones estara a cargo exclusivo de dicha Provincia. Esta transferencia se instrumentara a traves de convenios particulares con cada jurisdicci6n provincial interesada, los que deberan suscribirse en un plazo de 90 dias a partir de la sanci6n de la Ley Provincial respectiva". 93. Esta transferencia implica la convergencia gradual de los sistemas previsionales provinciales al Sistema Integrado, siendo necesaria la coordinaci6n de sus estructuras administrativas, cuidando que el proceso de transici6n sea equitativo y eficiente. -211- ANNEX 10 4.2. TRANSFERENCIA DEL REGIMEN PREVISIONAL PROVINCIAL A LA NACION 94. La transferencia de los regimenes previsionales provinciales al Sistema Integrado exige tener en cuenta la situaci6n particular de los beneficiarios y de los aportantes en transici6n. 95. Los beneficiarios en transici6n son aquellos a quienes el cambio de sistema los encuentra recibiendo una prestaci6n, ya sea jubilaci6n o pensi6n. Los activos en transicion por otro lado, son aquellos que habiendo realizado algun aporte al regimen previsional provincial anterior, no alcanzaron los requisitos minimos exigidos por aquel para acceder a alguna prestaci6n previsional, por lo que quedan automaticamente comprendidos en las disposiciones al respecto del Sistema Integrado. 96. En consecuencia, la transferencia debe garantizar para los beneficiarios en transici6n, el respeto por los derechos adquiridos, esto es, les debe garantizar que seguiran cobrando sus prestaciones de acuerdo a las normas de movilidad de la ley por la cual dichas prestaciones les fueron otorgadas. 97. En el caso de los activos en transici6n, se les deben reconocer los afios de aporte realizados al regimen previsional provincial antes vigente. Este reconocimiento se verificaria a traves de la Prestaci6n Compensatoria otorgada por el nuevo sistema, como parte de la prestaci6n al retiro. 98. Se debe destacar que en su articulo 20, la ley n° 24241, excluye de las personas obligadas a incorporarse al Sistema Integrado de Jubilaciones y Pensiones, al personal militar de las fuerzas armadas, a] personal militarizado o con estado nolicial de las fuerzas de seguridad v woliciales y al personal civil de las fuerzas armadas y de las fuerzas de seguridad y policiales. En consecuencia, las proyecciones demogrificas y financieras de la transici6n no incluyen al personal del regimen policial, el que se supone que no es transferido por la provincia. 99. Tanto el costo que debe afrontar el reparto publico por el pago de las jubilaciones y pensiones de los beneficiarios actuales, como el que surge de los pagos en concepto de P.C., son los costos propios del proceso de transici6n. 100. A ellos se agregan la P.B.U., la P.A.P. y el costo de la invalidez y muerte en etapa activa que haya quedado a cargo del Estado (individuos que optaron por el reparto), conformando en conjunto el costo fiscal del nuevo sistema. 101. En el presente informe los egresos se corresponden con esas partidas, por lo cual no se consideran los gastos administrativos, ni los egresos de otro tipo (Cuadro 22). -212- ANNEX 10 - ---------- -- t2- -----------° ------R°------ .2 _ 3 2 . . . . . . .e. . . . . . .- o ..r~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~o ,4. lii,,, _ _ o - ----- a ---- a 0 - aoo~ ~~~ --- --- z 2 *RI o dQ I- - i. * 2 C - - -, ,:: f ii - 2- j'o0~~een*4ooi °o -SRse - voS- < yn:_wori_n3. °-o -~ goo a.2 - - 2, E5i _--§- -_' 1.;U~~~~- -213- ANNEX 10 102. En cuanto a los ingresos, se consideran exclusivamente los provenientes de los aportes personales y contribuciones patronales recaudados sobre las remuneraciones sujetas a aporte de los cotizantes al SIJP. 103. Para el calculo del desequilibrio financiero provocado por la reforma previsional, se analiz6 la evoluci6n de los ingresos por aportes y contribuciones y los egresos por pago de prestaciones. Al respecto hay que destacar que las tasas de aporte personal y contribuci6n patronal pasan a ser respectivamente I I % y 16 % para el total del personal afectado por dicha reforma. En consecuencia, dejan de ser las tasas actuales. En el caso de los aportes personales s6lo se computan los de aquellos individuos que optan por el nuevo sistema de reparto, dado que los aportes personales de quienes adhieren a la capitalizaci6n tienen como destino las Cuentas de Capitalizacion Individual (CCI). 104. En el caso de los egresos se consideraron: (a) Los que surgen de las prestaciones del actual sistema de reparto que van disminuyendo en el tiempo a medida que estos pasivos desaparecen. (b) Los que corresponden al nuevo sistema de reparto publico que incluyen PBU, PC y PAP. (c) Los correspondientes al sistema de capitalizaci6n que solo incluyen la PBU y la PC. 105. La reducci6n en las tasas de aporte genera un incremento marcado del deficit del sistema en el primer aino de la proyeccion que decrece lentamente a medida que va desapareciendo el viejo sistema de reparto, que es la principal carga financiera que tiene que tomar a su cargo el Estado Nacional. 106. La transferencia al Sistema Integrado de Jubilaciones y Pensiones, plantea la necesidad de determinar: * Las deudas del Estado provincial con la Caja previsional y viceversa, particularmente en lo que se refiere a sentencias judiciales y libramientos no efectivizados de aportes y contribuciones retenidos. * Las deudas de los afiliados con la Caja previsional y viceversa, como cargos por aportes no ingresados o deudas por movilidades aun no reconocidas ni reclamadas por la via administrativa correspondiente. * Las deudas por tramites administrativos pendientes de resolucion, ya sea por demora en la via administrativa misma o porque hayan sido remitidos a la justicia. -214- ANNEX 10 Los montos implicados por los juicios pendientes de resoluci6n y por las sentencias en proceso de ser ejecutadas. En ocasiones, en algunas provincias por leyes anteriores fue reducido el porcentaje a pagar de las remuneraciones en actividad tanto para los beneficiarios de entonces como para los nuevos beneficios. Esto por lo general ha generado juicioscon fallos en contra de las Cajas previsionales. 107. Es importante destacar las implicancias de la movilidad de las prestaciones en los regimenes previsionales provinciales. Recuerdese que las prestaciones estan ligadas a las remuneraciones de categorias o escalafones activos, de forma que cualquier ajuste salarial impacta inmediatamente en las prestaciones previsionales. 108. Sin embargo, esta no es la unica via por la cual se ajustan las prestaciones, ya que, cuando se producen recategorizaciones de funciones, los pasivos "son ascendidos" como si estuvieran aun en actividad. 109. El mecanismo opera de la siguiente forma: Supongamos que el individuo A se jubil6 como Director del Departamento YY con una categoria 26, Si se produce una reestructuraci6n o recategorizaci6n de fiinciones y la funci6n de Director del Departamento YY pasa a ser categoria 27, entonces el pasivo que se habia jubilado por la categoria 26 puede realizar un reclamo administrativo que le permita ligar su prestaci6n a la categoria 27 (lo cual en los hechos es un ascenso), ya que en actividad el habia desempeiiado la funci6n de Director del Departamento YY. Este procedimiento administrativo, que conforma un aspecto mas de la movilidad de las prestaciones en los regimenes previsionales provinciales se denomina "Homologaci6n de Cargo o Funci6n". 110. Actualmente, los reclamos por via administrativa por homologaciones de cargos o funciones, generan fuertes deudas a las Cajas previsionales provinciales, los cuales usualmente deben pagar significativas retroactividades. -215- ANNEX 10 ANEXO I LA RECIPROCIDAD JUBILATORIA 111. El Regimen de Reciprocidad Jubilatoria comenz6 con el decreto-ley nacional n° 9316 del afio 1946, que establecia la obligatoriedad de que se hicieran reconocimientos de servicios en otras cajas jubilatorias distintas de aquella en la que se solicitaba la prestaci6n, a la vez que se establecia un requisito minimo de cinco (5) ahios de servicios con aportes a una Caja determinada para que la misma adquiriera el rol de Caja Otorgante. En funci6n del citado decreto, la/las Cajas que hubieran recibido aportes por el mismo agente, debian transferirlos junto con las contribuciones patronales- a la Caja Otorgante ajustandolos a raz6n de un 4% anual. 112. El regimen sufri6 sucesivas modificaciones en el tiempo, que dieron por resultado crecientes inequidades. A modo de ejemplo, perdio vigencia el ajuste de los aportes transferidos. Ademas, a los efectos del reconocimiento de servicios, han sido aceptados como documentaci6n probatoria medios tales como pruebas exclusivamente testimoniales o informaci6n de servicios expedida por jueces de paz o letrados, para periodos con deficiencias o inexistencia de registro de aportes. Tambien se acept6 la presentaci6n de declaraci6n jurada para el caso de actividades aut6nomas anteriores a 1958. 113. La ley nacional n° 18037 establece con respecto al regimen de reciprocidad en su articulo 80, que podra ser Caja Otorgante a elecci6n del beneficiario, "cualquiera de las comprendidas en el regimen de reciprocidad jubilatoria en cuyo regimen acredite como minimo diez afios continuos o discontinuos con aportes"..., o aquella a la que corresponda el mayor tiempo de aportes "si el afiliado no acreditare en el regimen de ninguna caja el minimo (requerido)...". 114. Por otra parte, el articulo 81 especifica que: "El reconocimiento de servicios no estara sujeto a las transferencias establecidas por el decreto-ley n° 93 16/46. Lo dispuesto precedentemente se aplica tambien a las transferencias que no se hubieran efectuado a la fecha de vigencia de la presente ley... La demora en las transferencias por parte de las cajas o institutos que reconozcan servicios, cuando aquellas correspondan, no sera obstaculo para el otorgamiento y liquidaci6n de las prestaciones." Este articulo, como es facil observar, perjudic6 notoriamente a las Cajas Otorgantes en beneficio de las Cajas Reconocedoras de Servicios, las cuales en general eran las Cajas Nacionales de Previsi6n, resultando mayormente perjudicadas las Cajas Previsionales Provinciales. La norma dio fin entonces a la obligatoriedad de las transferencias. Asi, aun cuando las transferencias hubieren sido realizadas, los montos a transferir habrian sido calculados a valores hist6ricos por cuanto la norma no menciona ninguna clausula de ajuste. 115. 116. La ley de reforma previsional n° 24241 por la cual se creo el Sistema Integrado de Jubilaciones y Pensiones, dispuso una nueva modificaci6n en el regimen de reciprocidad jubilatoria. 117. Al derogar las leyes n° 18037 y 18038, dej6 sin efecto los articulos 80 y 81 a que se hace referencia mas arriba, modificandolos y estableciendo que: -2 16- ANNEX 10 (a) Sera organismo otorgante de la prestacion cualquiera de los comprendidos en el sistema de reciprocidad en cuyo regimen se acredite haber prestado mayor cantidad de anios de servicios con aportes"... (el afiliado podra optar por el organismo otorgante cuando se igualen la cantidad de afnos de servicios con aportes a diferentes cajas). (b) "... Las Cajas reconocedoras de servicios deberan transferir a la Caja del organismo otorgante de la prestaci6n los aportes previsionales, contribuciones patronales y las sustitutivas de estas ultimas si las hubiera. Deben considerarse incluidos en la transferencia que se establece por la presente, los cargos que adeude el beneficiario, correspondientes a los servicios reconocidos, a efectos de su amortizaci6n ante la caja otorgante". 118. En consecuencia, se elimina el requisito de 10 ahos de aporte para ser Caja Otorgante, lo cual mejora la situaci6n de los regimenes provinciales con respecto a la ley n° 18037. Ademas, explicita taxativamente la obligatoriedad de las transferencias de aportes, lo que significa tambien una mejora sustancial con referencia a la legislaci6n anterior. Sin embargo, no es clara la legislaci6n en cuanto a la forma en que se deben realizar las transferencias, ni el ajuste que deban registrar las mismas. La ley n° 24241 establece que: "... La transferencia debera efectuarse en moneda de curso legal en forma mensual y de acuerdo al procedimiento que determine la reglamentaci6n." . Debe remarcarse que subsiste la figura de caja otorgante, contra la alternativa del prorrateo de beneficios con multiples cajas otorgantes que es propuesto alternativamente por algunas provincias, el cual seria un mecanismo mas dificil de administrar pero mas equitativo que el propuesto en la ultima reforma previsional. - 217 - ANNEX I1 ESTRUCTURA IMPOSITIVA DEL GOBIERNO DE LA PROVINCIA DE CORDOBA (Cordoba's Tax Structure) I. ESTRUCTURA IMPOSITIVA DEL GOBIERNO PROVINCIAL 1.1. Composicion de los ingresos tribularios. 1. La provincia de C6rdoba legisla, recauda y fiscaliza tres impuestos importantes: Ingresos Brutos, Inmobiliario (urbano y rural) y Sellos. 2. El impuesto sobre los Automotores, que en el ordenamiento de potestad es tributarias propio del sistema federal argentino generalmente es asignado a las provincias, en el caso de C6rdoba ha sido descentralizado a los municipios en los aspectos de recaudaci6n y fiscalizaci6n, siendo estos quienes coparticipan a la provincia (coparticipaci6n inversa) parte del producido del impuesto (40 %). La provincia se ha reservado la facultad de fijar anualmente, en la Ley Impositiva, las valuaciones, escalas y alicuotas que deben utilizar los municipios a efectos de liquidar el impuesto a los automotores. 3. A excepcion de los mencionados y de un impuesto menor sobre las actividades hipicas, la provincia no cuenta con otros recursos tributarios significativos. En particular no existen impuestos provinciales especificos sobre la transferencia de combustibles, gas yio energia electrica, ni gravamenes sobre los dep6sitos en entidades financieras o a los debitos bancarios. 4. Cabe mencionar la presencia de nurnerosas "tasas retributivas de servicios" que te6ricamente constituyen cargas al usuario por servicios de distinta naturaleza que bnrndan la Administraci6n Publica y el Poder Judicial provinciales. Estos recursos No Tributarios representan en promedio el 12% de los ingresos corrientes propios de C6rdoba. 5. El conjunto de impuestos mencionados (incluida la coparticipaci6n sobre Automotores) produjeron ingresos por $ 903.7 millones en el anio 1994, en un 56% provenientes de Ingresos Brutos, 30% de Inrobiliario y 10%/o por via de SeUlos. Por el monto de sus recursos tributarios propios, C6rboba y Santa Fe son la tercer mayor jurisdicci6n despues de la Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires y de la provincia de Buenos Aires. Sin embargo en terminos de presi6n tributaria per capita, con $ 266 ocupan el segundo lugar, siendo superadas solamente por la Capital Federal ($ 782)1. Esta presi6n tributaria per capita duplica a la existente en el conjunto de las provincias argentinas si se excluyen a las jurisdicciones "avanzadas" (Capital Federal, Buenos Aires, Mendoza, C6rdoba y Santa Fe). (Ver cuadros I. 1, I.2. y 1.3.) 1 La comparacidn con la MCBA debe manejarse con cuidado porque en el resto de las jurisdicciones existenr tributos municipales que recaen sobre las mismas bases imponibies que Los gravarnenes innmobiliario e ingresos brutos -218- ANNEX II Cuadro 1. I RECURSOS TRIBUTARIOS PROVINCLALES INGRESOS BRUTOS (miles de $) 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 MCBA 665575 543336 616305 751436 11S4218 1515023 BUENOS ARES 655888 450355 561623 769000 1290469 1533495 CORDOBA 217044 150171 166519 211340 354658 418099 503118 MENDOZA 57375 44412 45223 92300 166671 209724 SANTA FE 181733 162204 170764 223060 347042 406975 RESTO 388158 281647 351804 463565 713884 836690 TOTAL 2165773 1632125 1912238 2510701 4056942 4920006 INMOBILLAI_ O (miles de S) 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 MCBA 204117 159870 264308 319752 382638 373061 BUENOS AIRES 404859 414801 432018 412000 460839 487922 CORDOBA 83785 56842 106531 116400 209580 215542 269348 MENDOZA 21345 11424 17128 25900 32061 38097 SANTAFE 101362 49412 88544 116441 151768 149041 RESTO 91095 61794 95152 102471 139685 155143 TOTAL 906563 754143 1003681 1092964 1376571 1418806 AUTOMOTORES (miles de $) 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 MCBA 87649 54163 139383 160830 211462 248010 BUENOS AIRES 170935 177772 216009 235000 290925 383074 CORDOBA 515 0 0 0 3943 37161 41324 MENDOZA 18082 13997 17991 21500 31051 37887 SANTA FE 50742 28108 12649 6695 6659 6396 RESTO 43048 26079 39568 49448 66955 74553 TOTAL 370971 300119 425600 473473 610995 787081 ........................................... .................................................................................................................................................................................................... SELLOS (miles de $) 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 MCBA 0 0 0 0 0 0 BUENOS AIRES 156092 118514 144006 209000 322493 399040 CORDOBA 40002 22402 30427 46250 71273 83730 89876 NMENDOZA 23181 19072 19482 34600 51357 55579 SANTA FE 66294 36013 41110 92141 137750 179750 RESTO 95182 66000 81458 131499 205578 257357 TOTAL 380751 262001 316483 513490 788451 975456 ............................................................................................................ ................................................................................................................................... OTROS (miles de S) 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 MCBA 16395 4618 52663 8778 36847 188274 BUENOS AIRES 26177 23703 86404 25000 378724 387524 CORDOBA 54 225 636 3700 57 54 59 MENDOZA 9656 5405 1423 3500 6113 9076 SANTA FE 3259 2858 3162 5737 4288 7661 RESTO 65382 37075 40180 47573 90807 91351 TOTAL 120923 73884 184468 94288 516836 683940 ............................................................. ...................................... ................................................... ..................................................................................... RECURSOS TRIBUTARIOS PROPIOS (miles de $) 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 MCBA 973736 761987 1072659 1240796 1815165 2324368 BUENOS AIRES 1413951 1185145 1440060 1650000 2743450 3191055 CORDOBA 341400 229640 304113 377690 639511 754586 903725 MENDOZA 129639 94310 101247 177800 287253 350363 SANTA FE 403390 278595 316229 444074 647507 749823 RESTO 682865 472595 608162 794556 1216909 1415094 TOTAL 3944981 3022272 3842470 4684916 7349795 8785289 9555800 -219- ANNEX 11 Cuadro 1.2 RECURSOS TRIBUTARIOS PROVINCIALES INGRESOS BRUTOS-Particip.% Recaud. Total 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 MCBA 6824% 71.3% 57.5% 60.6% 65.2% 65.2% BUENOSAIRES 46 4% 38.0% 39.0% 46.6% 47.0% 48.1% CORDOBA 63.6% 65.4% 54.8% 56.0% 55.5% 55.4% M[ENDOZA 44.3% 47.1% 44.7% 51.9% 58.0% 59.9% SANTA FE 45.1% 58.2% 54.0% 50.2% 53.6% 54.3% RESTO 56.8% 59.6% 57.8% 58.3% 58.7% 59.1% TOTAL 54.9% 54.0% 49.8% 53.6% 55.2% 56.0% ....................................................... R... cca... ud..... Total.................................................................................................. AITMOTOIREO-Particip.% Recaud. Total 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 MCBA 21.0% 21.0% 24.6% 25.8% 21.1% 16.0% BUENOS AIRES 28.6% 15.0% 15.0% 25.0% 16.8% 15.3% CORDOBA 24.5% 24.8% 35.0% 30.8% 32.8% 28.6% MENDOZA 16.5% 12.1% 16.9% 14.6% 11.2% 10.9% SANTA FE 25.1% 17.7% 28.0% 26.2% 23.4% 19.9% RESTO 13.3% 13.1% 15.6% 12.9% 11.5% 11.0% TOTAL 23.0% 25.0% 26.1% 23.3% 18.7% 16.1% ...... .... 0...... ... R...E....... P'.......... cip................ ...ud"............... otal........................................................................................... AUTLOMTRS-Particip.% Recaud. Total 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 MCBA 9.0% 7.1% 13.0% 13.0% 11.6% 10.7% BUENOS AIRES 12.1% 15.0% 15.0% 14.2% 10.6% 12.0% CORDOBA 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 4.9% MENDOZA 13.9% 14.8% 17.8% 12.1% 10.8% 10.8% SANTA FE 12.6% 12.1% 4.0% 1.5% 1.0% 0.9% RESTO 6.3% 5.5% 6.5% 6.2% 515% 5.3% TOTAL 9.4% 9.9% 11.1% 11.1% 8.3% 9.0% SELLOS-Particip.% Recaud. Total 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 MCBA 0.0% 0.6% 4-9% 0.7% 2.0% 8.°% BUENOS AIRES I1.0% 10.0% 10.0% 12.7% 11.8% 12.5% CORDOBA 11.7% 9.8% 10.0% 12.2% 11.1% 0I.0% MENDOZA 17.9% 20.2% 19.2% 19.5% 17.9% 15.9% SANTA FE 16.4% 12.9% 13.0% 20.7% 21.3% 24.0% RESTO 13.9% 14.0% 13.4% 16.5% 16.9% 18.2% TOTAL 9.7% 8.7% 8.2% 11.0% 10.7% 11.l% ............................................................................................................................................................................... OTROS-Particip.% Rec-aud. Total 1988 1989 l1990 1991 1992 1993 MCBA I1.7% 0.6% 4.9% 0.7% 2.0% 8.1% B[EENOS AIRES 1.9% 2.0% 6.0% 1.5% 13.8% 12.1% CORDOBA 0.0% 0. 1% 0.2% 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% MENDOZA 7.4% 5.7% 1.4% 2.0% 2.1% 2.6% SANTA FE 0.8% 1.0% 1.0% 1.3% 0.7% 1.0% RESTO 9.6% 7.8% 6.6% 6.0% 7.5% 6.5% TOTAL 3.1l% 2.4% 4.8% 2.0% 7.0%/ 7.8% - 220 - ANNEX 1I Cuadro 1.3 RECURSOS TRIBUTARIOS PROVINC[ALES INGRESOS BRUTOS-Recaudacion per capita 1988 1989 1990 1991 1 992 1993 1994 MCBA 225.2 183.7 208.1 253.4 398.9 509.7 0.0 BUENOSAIRES 54.2 36.7 45.2 61.1 101.1 118.5 0.0 CORDOBA 81.5 55.7 60.9 76.4 126.6 147.4 175.1 MENDOZA 42.5 32.4 32.5 65.3 116.2 144.0 0.0 SANTA FE 67.2 59.3 61.7 79.7 122.6 142.1 0.0 RESTO 41.0 29.1 35.6 46.0 69.4 79.7 0.0 TOTAL 69.3 51.5 59.5 77.0 122.6 146.6 0.0 INMOBII.ARIO-Recaudacion per capita 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 MCBA 69.1 54.0 89.2 107.8 128.9 125.5 0.0 BUENOS AIRES 33.5 33.8 34.8 32.7 36.1 37.7 0.0 CORDOBA 31.4 21.1 39.0 42.1 74.8 76.0 93.8 MENDOZA 15.8 8.3 12.3 18.3 22.4 26.2 0.0 SANTAFE 37.5 18.1 32.0 41.6 53.6 52.1 0.0 RESTO 9.6 6.4 9.6 10.2 13.6 14.8 0.0 TOTAL 29.0 23.8 31.2 33.5 41.6 42.3 0.0 .............................................................................:.............................................. .............................................................................. ...................................... AUTOMOTORES-Recaudacion per capita 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 MCBA 29.7 18.3 47.1 54.2 71.2 83.4 0.0 BUENOSAIRES 14.1 14.5 17.4 18.7 22.8 29.6 0.0 CORDOBA 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 13.1 14.4 MENDOZA 13.4 10.2 12.9 15.2 21.7 26.0 0.0 SANTA FE 18.8 10.3 4.6 2.4 2.4 2.2 0.0 RESTO 4.5 2.7 4.0 4.9 6.5 7.1 0.0 TOTAL 11.9 9.5 13.2 14.5 18.5 23.4 0.0 SELLOS-Recaudacion per capita 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 MCBA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 BUENOS AIRES 12.9 9.7 11.6 16.6 25.3 30.8 0.0 CORDOBA 15.0 8.3 11.1 16.7 25.4 29.5 31.3 MENDOZA 17.2 13.9 14.0 24.5 35.8 38.2 0.0 SANTA FE 24.5 13.2 14.9 32.9 48.7 62.8 0.0 RESTO 10.1 6.8 8.3 13.0 20.0 24.5 0.0 TOTAL 12.2 8.3 9.8 15.7 23.8 29.1 0.0 OTROS-Recaudacion per capita 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 MCBA 5.5 1.6 17.8 3.0 12.4 63.3 0.0 BUENOS AIRES 2.2 1.9 7.0 2.0 29.7 30.0 0.0 CORDOBA 0.0 0.1 0.2 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 MENDOZA 7.2 3.9 1.0 2.5 4.3 6.2 0.0 SANTA FE 1.2 1.0 1.1 2.1 1.5 2.7 0.0 RESTO 6.9 3.8 4.1 4.7 8.8 8.7 0.0 TOTAL 3.9 2.3 5.7 2.9 15.6 20.4 0.0 ...... ................. .............. .. ....................... ....................................................................... ....................... RECURSOS TRIBUTARIOS PROPIOS-Recaudacion per capita 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 MCBA 329.5 257.6 362.2 418.4 611.4 782.0 0.0 BUENOS AIRES 116.8 96.6 115.9 131.0 214.9 246.7 0.0 CORDOBA 128.1 85.1 111.3 136.5 228.3 266.0 314.6 MENDOZA 96.1 68.8 72.8 125.9 200.3 240.6 0.0 SANTAFE 149.2 101.9 114.3 158.7 228.7 261.9 0.0 RESTO 72.1 48.9 61.6 78.8 118.3 134.7 0.0 TOTAL 126.3 95.4 119.5 143.6 222.1 261.7 280.6 -221 - ANNEX 1 I 6. Cabe notar que comparativamente al resto de las provincias grandes, tanto Cordoba como Santa Fe han descentralizado el impuesto Automotor, pero mientras C6rdoba opt6 por compensar la merma de recursos impositivos propios via una mayor presi6n tributaria inmobiliaria (de hecho en terminos per capita s6lo la Capital Federal recauda mas que C6rdoba), Santa Fe ha utilizado un instrumento mas distorsivo como es el impuesto de Sellos. 7. Entre las provincias grandes C6rdoba fue la que expeniment6 la mayor contraccion de la recaudacion tributaria propia en el ano 1989 (-32.7% respecto a 1988) Sin embargo con postenronrdad y hasta 1993 sus ingresos propios crecieron por encima del resto de la jurisdicciones ricas de forma tal que para el periodo 1993-1988 C6rdoba y Mendoza son las provincias grandes con mayor tasa de crecimiento en sus recursos tributarios propios: 35% y 38% anual respectivamente contra el 31.5% del conjunto de provincias (excluidas las grandes) y el 30.5% para el total de las jurisdicciones provinciales. 8. La contrapartida de este proceso fue el crecimiento sostenido de los recursos propios como proporci6n de los ingresos correntes totales. En 1989 esta relacion apenas superaba el 30% en C6rdoba,sin embargo a partir de 1990 con el fortalecimiento de la recaudacion propia aumenta fuertemente este indicador de "autonomia financiera" que pasa al 50.2% en 1994, siendo superado solamente por los correspondientes a MCBA (92.9%) y Buenos Aires (54.8%) y comparandose muy favorablemente con la media de 30.7% del conjunto de las provincias argentinas. II. PRINCIPALES IMPUESTOS PROVINCIALES H. 1. Impuesto sobre los ingresos brutos. 1.1. Consideraciones Generales 9. El Impuesto sobre los Ingresos Brutos tiene un origen mas que centenario en los impuestos provinciales de "patentes fijas" que recaian sobre el ejercicio de actividades comerciales y de las profesiones y oficios. Si bien se aplicaban cuotas fijas, ellas eran diferenciadas por actividad y en general eran significativamente menores para las actividades tipicamente rurales. Desde el inicio las autoridades provinciales hicieron un uso intenso de estos impuestos con fines de promoci6n econ6mica de ciertas actividades, a las que declaraban exentas de la imposicion en cuestion. 10. En los comienzos del presente siglo el impuesto pasa a estructurarse sobre la base de un cargo fijo por actividad mas un porcentaje sobre el "capital ( 1 giro" (definido como el importe de las ventas realizadas en los 12 meses anteriores a la declaraci6n) que progresivamente pasa a ser el principal componente y a diferenciarse bajo la denominaci6n de "impuesto sobre el comercio e industria". 11. Hasta la decada de los 40 el Impuesto sobre el Comercio e Industria coexiste con gravamenes simnilares sobre productos especificos (alcoholes, tabaco, seguros, productos agricolas). 12. Finalmente estos diversos impuestos se unifican en el impuesto a las Actividades Lucrativas que gravaba el ejercicio de cualquier comercio, industria, profesi6n, oficio, negocio o actividad lucrativa habitual, en forma proporcional al monto anual de ingresos brutos y con tasas que - 222 - ANNEX I I originalmente fueron del orden del 4 por rnil para Ilegar posteriormente hasta el 1.2 %, y con algunas alicuotas diferenciales (en mas o en menos) para ciertas actividades. 13. En el aho 1975, y como consecuencia de la introducci6n a nivel nacional del Impuesto al Valor Agregado, se derogan los impuestos provinciales a las Actividades Lucrativas, permitiendose que en sustituci6n las provincias introdujeran un Impuesto de Patentes cuya base imponible no podia definirse en terminos de ventas sino de parametros de tipo fisico. 14. El fracaso de esta politica Ileva a la reintroducci6n ya en 1976 del impuesto a las Actividades Lucrativas que pasa a denominarse Ingresos Brutos. 15. En 1980 el Gobierno Nacional dicta a las provincias pautas para uniformar los impuestos a los Ingresos Brutos. Se diferencia la alicuota, que hasta ese momento tendia a ser uniforrme y superior al 2% (excepto para el sector agropecuario a] que se le daba un tratamiento mas favorable), segun etapas del proceso productivo: I % para la producci6n primaria 1.5 % para las actividades productoras de bienes en general 2.5 % para las actividades comerciales y de servicios 16. Se mantienen una senre de tratarnientos diferenciales con tasas que podian oscilar entre el 2% y el 15%. 17. En agosto de 1993 a traves del Pacto Fiscal para el Empleo, la Producci6n y el Crecimiento la Naci6n propuso modificar el impuesto a los Ingresos Brutos a traves de eximir del mismo a las siguientes actividades: a. producci6n primaria b. prestaciones financieras c. compafiias de capitalizaci6n y ahorro y emisi6n de valores hipotecarios, las Administradoras de Fondos de Jubilaciones y Pensiones y compaiiias de Seguros. d. compraventa de divisas e. producci6n de bienes (industria manufacturera), excepto por las ventas a consumidores finales. f prestaciones de servicios de electricidad, agua y gas, excepto a usuarios residenciales. g. construcci6n de inmuebles. 18. Se especific6 que las exenciones no comprendian a todas las actividades hidrocarburiferas y sus servicios complementarios, y que las provincias tendrian libertad para implementar el acuerdo a condici6n de que las modificaciones estuvieran completadas antes del 30 de junio de 1995. - 223 - ANNEX 11 1.2. Estructura del impuesto a los ineresos brutos en Ia provincia de C6rdoba. 19 Hecho imponible. Los ingresos brutos provenientes del ejercicio habitual y a titulo oneroso en jurisdicci6n de la provincia de C6rdoba del comercio, industria, profesi6n, oficio, negocio, locaciones de bienes, obras o servicios o de cualquier otra actividad a titulo oneroso cualquiera sea la naturaleza del sujeto que la preste, incluidas las sociedades cooperativas, y el lugar donde se realice (puertos, espacios ferroviarios, aeropuertos, edificios y lugares de dominio publico y privado, terminales de transporte) 20. La ley especifica que constituyen hechos imponibles la comercializaci6n de productos que entren en la provincia por cualquier medio; la intermediacion que implica la percepci6n de comisiones, bonificaciones y porcentajes; las operaciones de pr6stamos de dinero y dep6sitos a plazo fijo y el ejercicio de profesiones liberales. 21. Base Imponible. Salvo excepciones previstas en la Ley, esta dada por los ingresos brutos devengados durante el periodo fiscal por el ejercicio de la actividad gravada. Por ingreso bruto se considera al valor o monto total (en valores monetarios, en especies o en servicios) devengado en concepto de venta de bienes, remuneraciones totales obtenidas por los servicios, la retribuci6n por la actividad ejercida, los intereses obtenidos por prestamos de dinero o plazos de financiaci6n o, en general, el de las operaciones realizadas. 22. En el caso particular de las entidades financieras, la base imponible esta dada por la diferencia entre el total del haber de las cuentas de resultados y los intereses pasivos. 23 Para las entidades de capitalizaci6n y ahorro y de ahorro y prestamo (excepto para la vivienda) constituyen base imponible la parte de las primas que se destinen a cubrir gastos generales, al pago de dividendos, distribuci6n de utilidades etc.asi como las sumas originadas en locaciones de inmuebles y venta de valores mobiliarios y de cualquier otra inversi6n de sus reservas. 24. Para las entidades de seguro y reaseguro son base imponible las primas de seguros directas y de reaseguros activos, netas de anulaciones, las participaciones en el resultado de los contratos de reaseguro pasivo y todo otro ingreso proveniente de la actividad financiera. De este monto se deducen las sumas devengadas por primas de reaseguros pasivos,y los siniestros netos de recupero de terceros y salvatajes y de la parte a cargo del reasegurador. 25 Existen asimismo disposiciones especificas para el c6mputo de la base imponible de otros sectores (consignatarios de hacienda, comercializaci6n de combustibles, tabaco, cigarrillos, productos agricolo-ganaderos etc.). 26. Ingresos no computables. No integran la base imponible el debito fiscal del IVA (para los contribuyentes inscriptos en este gravamen); los reintegros de capital en las operaciones de prestamos; Jos subsidios y subvenciones que otorgue el estado (nacional, provincial y municipal); los ingresos provenientes de las exportaciones; las sumas percibidas por los exportadores en concepto de reintegros y reembolsos acordados por la Naci6n. -224- ANNEX 1 27. Deducciones. Son deducidos de la base imponible los Impuestos Internos el impuesto sobre Combustibles; los descuentos y bonificaciones acordados, las sumas aportadas por contribuyentes del impuesto para programas de capacitaci6n aprobados por los organismos competentes del gobierno provincial;, los creditos incobrables. 28. Exenciones subjetivas. Estan exentos por ley del pago del impuesto los estados nacional, provinciales y municipales; las fundaciones, colegios profesionales, asociaciones civiles o religiosas que no persigan fines de lucro y destinen sus ingresos exclusivamente a los objetivos estatutarios (la exenci6n no incluye a los colegios y asociaciones con personeria gremial); las bolsas de comercio, las asociaciones mutuales; servicios de radiodifusi6n televisi6n y agencias de noticias, establecimientos educativos privados y los dedicados a ensenanza de discapacitados, las cooperativas de trabajo. 29. Exenciones objetivas. Hay un conjunto de actividades declaradas exentas a los efectos del impuesto. Entre las de mayor significaci6n figuran: el trabajo personal ejecutado bajo relaci6n de dependencia; toda operaci6n de compra venta que involucre a titulos, bonos etc. emitidos por la naci6n, las provinclas y municiplos., la actividad de edici6n de libros, revistas etc asi como los ingresos provenientes de la locaci6n de espacios publicitarios; la prestaci6n de servicios de agua potable y riego, el suministro de energia electrica a empresas agropecuarias, mineras, industriales; el transporte ylo la compraventa de energia electrica en el mercado electrico mayorista, intereses por dep6sitos a plazo fijo; operaciones de compra venta de divisas, las operaciones comprendidas en el decreto 937/93 del Poder Ejecutivo Nacional. 30. Contribuyentes. Son contribuyentes del impuesto las personas fisicas, las personas juridicas de caracter publico y privado y demas entes que obtengan ingresos brutos derivados de una actividad gravada. La persona o entidad que abona sumas de dinero o interviene en el ejercicio de una actividad gravada puede tener que actuar como agente de retenci6n y/o percepci6n y/o recaudaci6n e informaci6n cuando asi lo establezca el Poder Ejecutivo Provincial 31. Alicuotas. El impuesto tradicionalmente se ha estructurado en base a una tasa general de 2.5% y a tasas diferenciales de 1% para el sector primario, de 1. 5% para las actividades manufactureras, de 2.5% para el sector servicios (incluidos el comercio mayorista y minorista) y algunos tratamientos especificos para actividades con tasas que podian oscilar entre el 3% y mas del 10% . Asimismo la ley contempla la existencia de un impuesto minimo anual (para la gran mayoria de las actividades resulta de $ 2100) excepto para los casos en que rige el tratamiento de tasa cero en cuyo caso no hay obLigaci6n de pago rninimo. 32. La ley tributaria de C6rdoba correspondiente a 1994 (ley 8345) fij6 una estructura de tasas que comenz6 a incorporar pautas del Pacto Fiscal, principalmente en cuanto al tratamiento de algunas actividades industriales, y con el objetivo de acceder a los beneficios del decreto nacional 2609 de rebaja de aportes patronales (de hasta el 60% para algunos departamentos provinciales). Lo actuado por C6rdoba en este periodo es basicamente similar a lo realizado por las otras dos jurisdicciones mayores, Buenos Aires y Santa Fe. 33. En concreto, consisti6 en fijar la tasa general en el 3.5% y las alicuotas especiales por actividad segun la siguiente estructura: -225 - ANNEX 11 actividades primarias 0.5 % actividades industriales ' 1.5 % construcci6n 2.5 % electricidad gas y agua (2) 2.5 % comercio al por mayor (3) comercio por menor (4) (5) 2.5 % restaurantes y hoteles 3.5 % transporte almacenamiento y comunicaciones (6) 3.5 % servicios prestados al publico 3.5 % servicios prestados a empresas (7) 3.5 % servicios de esparcimiento (s) 3.5 % servicios personales y de los hogares (9).5 % servicios financieros y otros (10) 4.0 % locaci6n bienes inmuebles 3.5 % (')Excepto industrializaci6n de combustibles liquidos y gas natural gravada al 0.25%. (2) En el caso de consumos residenciales la tasa es de 4.5%. (3) La comercializaci6n de tabaco, cigarrillos, biletes de loteria al 5%. (4) La comercializaci6n de cigarnillos, tabaco y otras actividades tienen tasas mayores, que varian entre el 5% y el 7% segumn la actividad. (5)Agroquirnicos y fertilizantes al 's" (6) Agencias de turismo y comisiones por intermediaci6n 7%. ') Publicidad 7% (S)Para ciertas actividades hay tasas diferenciales del 4.5% (9)Hay ciertas actividades gravadas con tasas diferenciales del 2.5%, 5% y 7%. °°) Entidades de seguro y reaseguro 5% 34. Sobre esta estructura y para contemplar parcialmente las exigencias del Pacto Fiscal se otorga tratamiento de tasa cero desde comienzos de 1994 a 25 actividades industriales (detalladas en la columna A del cuadro II). 35. El criterio seguido inicialmente fue el de otorgar tasa cero a algunas actividades industriales sujetas a competencia internacional y/o proveedoras de insumos para la actividad productiva. Por decreto 543 de marzo de 1994 se estableci6 un cronograma de rebajas impositivas adicionales que preveia: a. Ia ampliaci6n del tratamiento de tasa cero a 49 actividades industriales (de los sectores de alimentos, bebidas y tabaco; tewtil, prendas de vestir e industria del cuero; papelero; fabricaci6n sustancias quimicas ; productos metalicos, maquinaria y equipo) a partir de julio de 1994 (columna B del cuadro II). b. Ia extensi6n de la tasa cero a partir de enero de 1995 a las actividades primarias; la incorporaci6n a la tasa cero de otras 53 actividades industriales (sector alimentos; industria de la madera; quirnicos; minerales no metalicos excepto derivados de petr6leo y carb6n; - 226 - ANNEX 1 1 productos metalicos, maquinaria y equipo) y la reduccion del 2.5 % al 1% para el suministro de gas a empresas industriales y para la generaci6n elecrica (ver columna C cuadro II). c. una nueva extensi6n de la tasa cero a partir de julio de 1995 a 47 posiciones industriales adicionales y al sector construcci6n (columna C del cuadro II). 36. Excepto el aumento de la tasa general al 3.5%, estas sucesivas reducciones de la imposici6n en Ingresos Brutos a los sectores primario, manufacturero y construcci6n fueron decididas sin disponer incrementos compensadores adicionales en la presi6n tributaria sobre el resto de sectores gravados con alicuotas especiales (basicamente comercio y servicios). Las unicas limiitaciones fijadas para acceder al beneficio de la reducci6n impositiva se relacionaron con tres factores, a saber: * el contribuyente benefiario debia tener planta fabril en actividad en la provincia de C6rdoba. * debia estar en condiciones de hacer uso de la rebaja de aportes patronales dispuesta por el decreto nacional 2609/93. - no mantener deuda en las posiciones del impuesto a los Ingresos Brutos. 37. Con la sanci6n de la ley de Emergencia Econ6mica, Financiera y Previsional Provincial (ley 8472 y modificatoria 8482) de julio de 1995 este cuadro de situaci6n sufre una profunda alteraci6n: a) las actividades primarias pasan a estar gravadas al 0.7% b) las actividades industriales al 1% o 1.5 % segun los casos. c) la construcci6n al 3% y al 2.5% segun las actividades especificas. d) se fija en el 10% la alicuota para el suministro de electricidad, gas y agua a consumidores residenciales. e) se fija en 10% la alicuota aplicable a las comunicaciones. 1.3. Efectos econ6micos del impuesto sobre los Inzresos Brutos. 38. En la literatura se menciona a los impuestos a las ventas en cascada como instrumentos impositivos ineficientes en comparaci6n con otras alternativas de imposicion como el IVA o el impuesto monofasico sobre ventas finales. 39. Desde el punto de vista de la asignaci6n de recursos los inconvenientes de la imposici6n en cascada se relacionan con: Alteracion de los precios relaivos 40. El impuesto a las ventas en cascada aumenta el precio relativo final de los bienes que agregan valor en etapas tempranas versus aquellos que incorporan valor en las etapas finales de la cadena de producci6n y distribuci6n. Contrafiamente un IVA generalizado a todos los bienes y servicios no altera la estructura de precios relativos y es equivalente a un impuesto monofasico uniforme sobre todas las ventas finales. - 227 - ANNEX 11 41. La distorsi6n en los precios relativos ocasionada por ingresos brutos tiende a ser baja si la tasa es moderada, aun cuando la estructura de valor agregado sea muy asimetrica entre los bienes considerados, pero aumenta en proporcion directa al aumento de la tasa y del grado de asimetria en la incorporaci6n de valor agregado en cada etapa de producci6n y distribuci6n que presenten los bienes considerados. 42. Este punto puede tener cierta relevancia si la alternativa que se opone a ingresos brutos es un IVA con numerosas exenciones, o con tasas diferentes seguin tipo de bienes, pues en tal caso tambien se alterarian los precios relativos de los bienes y en forma mis marcada por cuanto para obtener una misma recaudaci6n la tasa de IVA seria superior a la de ingresos brutos. * Nimero de etapas deproducci6ny distribucidn. 43. Cuanto mayor sea el numero de etapas de producci6n y distribuci6n que recorre un bien en relaci6n a otro, mis se encarece en terminos relativos por la presencia de un gravamen en cascada. La distorsi6n se potencia si la estructura de valor agregado es asimetrica y cuanto mayor es la tasa impositiva. * Integracion verricaL 44. El punto antes mencionado Ileva a considerar una de las objeciones graves que se le hacen a la imposici6n en cascada desde el punto de vista de la eficiencia econ6mica. Ella consiste en que favorece la integraci6n vertical de la producci6n y distribuci6n para asi convertir en intemas a la empresa una serie de transacciones que de permanecer como extemas originarian carga impositiva. El ahorro de impuestos origina una organizaci6n no eficiente de los negocios. Esta circunstancia no puede presentarse con un WA o con ventas minoristas. a Efectos sobre el comercia. 45. Con impuestos a las ventas en cascada resulta operativamente imposible aplicar el "principio de destino" en el tratamiento de los bienes, especialmente en el comercio exterior, porque su caracter acumulativo impide determinar el componente impositivo que se va acumulando en sucesivas etapas a los efectos de reintegrar el mismo en el caso de las exportaciones. Esta distorsi6n no es eliminada por la exenci6n dispuesta en ingresos brutos para las exportaciones, puesto que el problema radica en el impuesto pagado en etapas anteriores e incorporado en los insumos de los bienes exportables (2). De la misma manera no puede ponerse en un pie de igualdad impositiva a las importaciones con los sustitutos producidos localmente, por cuanto nuevamente no se tiene constancia del componente impositivo acumulativo incorporado en el precio de estos ultimos. Por el contrario el IVA se adapta naturalmente a la aplicaci6n del principio de destino. 2 En parte para compensar cste sesgo anti-exportador de ingresos brutos (y de orros impucstos indirectos nacionales) cl gobierno nacional dtiLiza un sistema de reintegros (no computabiks en cl impuesto a las galiancias nacional ni en cl propio ingresos brutos provincial) calculados como un porcentaje dcl valor FOB de los bienes neto de las importaciones directas. Esta probabimente constituye una sobreestimacijn del efecbo cascada de los impuestos aludidos, porque cl efecto acumulativo de la imposicidn y cl sobre costofiscal sdlo puede existir para insunos no trarnsables. -228 - ANNEX 1 1 * Efectos sobre la inversidn. 46. En esta area tambien existe una clara ventaja del IVA por cuanto a traves del mismo es posible desgravar en forma automatica (IVA consumo) o bien progresivamente en el tiempo (IVA ingreso) la inversi6n. El impuesto a los ingresos brutos grava por el contranro tanto el gasto de consumo como de inversi6n y estrictarnente realiza una doble imposici6n de este ultimo, porque grava al productor del bien de inversi6n cuando procede a su venta y luego grava a quien utiliza el bien de capital para producir bienes de consumo sin permitirle deducir de la base gravable la adquisicion ni la depreciaci6n del bien de capital en cuesti6n. * Aspectos distributivos. 47. Se ha sostenido que ingresos brutos es potencialmente mas regresivo que un IVA consumo porque los bienes que incorporan valor en etapas tempranas y tienen baja elasticidad ingreso (con lo que constituyen una parte mas significativa en los presupuestos de las familias de bajos ingresos) son los que resultan encarecidos en te6rminos relativos por la imposicion en cascada. -229 - AiNNEX I I CUADRO 11 Cronograma de rebajas de tasas de Ingresos Brutos A B C D ENE94 JUL94 ENE95 JUL95 AGOS95 ACTIVIDADES PRIMAPIAS 11000 0.5% 0.0% 0.7% 12000 0.5% 0.0% 0.7% 13000 0.5% 0.0% 0.7% 14000 0.5% 0.0% 0.7% 21000 0.5% 0.0% 0.7% 22000 0.5% 0.0% 0.7% 23000 0.5% 0.0% 0.7% 24000 0.5% 0.0% 0.7% 29000 0.5% 0.0% 0.7% INDUSTRIAS 31000 1.5% 31111 0.0% 1.0% 31112 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 31113 0.0% 1.0% 31120 0.0% 1.0% 31129 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 31131 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 31132 0.0% 1.0% 31140 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 31151 0.0% 1.0% 31152 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 31153 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 31161 0.0% 1.0% 31162 0.0% 1.0% 31163 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 31164 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 31171 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 31172 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 31173 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 31174 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 31180 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 31190 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 31192 1.5% 1.0% 31211 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 31212 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 31213 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 31214 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 31215 0.0% 1.0% 31219 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 31220 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 31311 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 31312 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 31321 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% -230- ANNEX II CUADRO 11 (Conti nuaci6n) Cronograma de rebajas de tasas dc Ingresos Brutos A B C D ENE94 JUL94 ENE95 JUL95 AGOS95 31322 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 31330 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 31340 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 31401 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 31402 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 31403 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 32000 1.5% 32111 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 32112 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 32113 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 32114 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 32115 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 32116 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 32119 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 32121 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 32122 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 32123 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 32124 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 32129 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 32131 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 32132 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 32133 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 32140 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 32150 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 32190 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 32201 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 32202 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 32203 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 32204 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 32209 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 32311 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 32312 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 32320 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 32331 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 32332 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 32339 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 32401 0.0% 1.0% 32402 0.0% 1.0% 32403 0.0% 1.0% 32405 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 33000 1.5% 33111 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 33112 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 33113 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 33114 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% - 231- ANNEX I I CUADRO 11 (Continuaci6n) Cronograma de rebajas dc tasas de Ingresos Brutos A B C D ENE94 JUL94 ENE95 JUL95 AGOS95 33120 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 33191 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 33192 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 33199 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 33201 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 33202 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 34000 1.5% 34111 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 34112 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 34120 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 34190 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 34202 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 34203 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 35000 1.5% 35119 0.0% 1.0% 35120 0.0% 1.0% 35131 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 35132 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 35400 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 35210 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 35221 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 35222 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 35231 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 35232 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 35233 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 35291 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 35292 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 35293 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 35299 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 35511 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 35512 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 35590 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 35600 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 36000 1.5% 36001 0.3% 36100 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 36201 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 36202 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 36911 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 36912 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 36913 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 36921 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 36922 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 36923 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 36991 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% -232- ANNEX 11 CUADRO II (Continuaci6n) Cronograma de rebajas de tasas de Ingresos Brutos A B C D ENE94 JUL94 ENE95 JUL95 AGOS95 36992 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 36993 0.0% 1.0% 36999 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 37000 1.5% 37100 0.0% 1.0% 37200 0.0% 1.0% 38000 1.5% 38110 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 38120 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 38131 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 38132 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 38133 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 38134 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 38191 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 38192 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 38193 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 38194 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 38199 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 38210 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 38221 0.0% 1.0% 38230 0.0% 1.0% 38240 0.0% 1.0% 38251 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 38252 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 38291 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 38292 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 38293 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 38294 0.0% 1.0% 38299 1.5% 0.0% 38311 0.0% 1.0% 38321 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 38322 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 38330 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 38391 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 38392 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 38393 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 38399 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 38410 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 38420 0.0% 1.0% 38431 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 38432 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 38433 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 38434 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 38440 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 38435 0.0% 1.0% - 233 - ANNEX I 1 CUADRO 11 (Continuaci6n) Cronograma de rebajas de tasas dc Ingresos Brutos A B C D ENE94 JUL94 ENE95 JUL95 AGOS95 38450 0.0% 1.0% 38490 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 38491 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 38510 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 38520 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% 38530 1.5% 0.0% 1.0% OTRAS MANUFACTURAS 39000 1.5% 39010 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 39020 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 39030 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 39091 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 39092 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 39093 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 39099 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% CONSTRUCCION 40000 2.5% 3.0% 40001 2.5% 0.0% 2.5% 40002 2.5% 0.0% 2.5% 40003 2.5% 0.0%/0 2.5% ELECTRICIDAD, GAS Y AGUA 51000 2.5% 52000 2.0% 53000 4.5% 10.0% 54000 2.5% 1.0% COMERCIO Y SERVICIOS COM. POR MAYOR 61100 2.5% 61200 2.5% 61201 5.0% 61300 2.5% 61400 2.5% 61500 2.5% 61501 0.3% 61502 1.0% 61503 2.5% 61600 2.5% 61700 2.5% 61800 2.5% 61900 2.5% 61901 5.0% 61902 5.0% 61903 5.0% 61904 1.0% -234- ANNEX 11 CUADRO II (Continuaci6n) Cronograma de rebajas de tasas de Ingresos Brutos A B C D ENE94 JUL94 ENE95 JUL95 AGOS95 COM.POR MENOR VTA. AL PUBLICO DE COMB. Y GAS NATURAL 62100 3.5% 62101 6.0% 62200 3.5% 62300 3.5% 62400 3.5% 62500 3.5% 62600 3.5% 62700 3.5% 62800 3.3% 62900 3.5% 62901 5.0% 4.1% 62902 7.0% 62903 5.0% 62904 1.0% RESTAURANTES Y HOTELES 63100 3.5% 63200 3.5% 63201 10.0% TRANSPORTE, ALMAC Y COMUNIC. 71100 3.5% 71101 2.5% 71200 3.5% 71300 3.5% 71400 3.5% 71401 7.0% 71402 4.5% 72000 3.5% 73000 3.5% 10.0% SERVICIOS AL PUBLICO 82100 3.5% 82200 3.5% 82300 3.5% 82400 3.5% 82500 3.5% 82900 3.5% 82901 3.5% SERVICIOS A EMPRESAS 83100 3.5% 83200 3.5% 83300 3.5% 83400 3.5% 83900 3.5% -235- ANNEX II CUADRO II (Continuaci6n) Cronogramna de rebajas de tasas de Ingresos Brutos A B C D ENE94 JUL94 ENE95 JUL95 AGOS95 83901 7.0% 83902 3.5% 83903 3.5% SERV DE ESPARCIMIENTO 84100 3.5% 84200 3.5% 84300 4.5% 5.0% 84900 3.5% 84901 10.0% 84902 7.0% SERV.PERSONALES 85100 3.5% 85101 3.5% 85200 3.5% 85300 3.5% 85301 7.0% 4.1% 85302 5.0% 85303 2.5% SERV.FINANCIEROS 91001 4.0% 91002 4.0% 91003 4.0% 91004 4.0% 91005 4.0% 91006 2.0% 92000 5.0% LOCACION BIENES INMUEBLES 93000 3.5% - 236 - ANNEX 11 1.4. Sustituci6n de Inzresos Brutos. 48. El Acuerdo Fiscal para el Empleo, la Producci6n y el Crecimiento de agosto de 1993 fij6 un plazo de tres afios para la sustituci6n de los impuestos provinciales a los ingresos brutos por un impuesto general al consumo. 49. Las razones para la sustituci6n radican en las distorsiones que origina la imposici6n en cascada sobre las ventas que inducen una integraci6n vertical de los negocios ineficiente desde el punto de vista econ6mico y restan competitividad a los bienes comerciados, importables y exportables. Se mencionaron como causas adicionales las de mejorar las recaudaciones provinciales, la administraci6n de los impuestos y el control de la evasion. 1.4.1 Propuesta de sustituci6n del Gobierno Nacional 50. El gobiemo nacional originalmente propici6 que la sustituci6n se realizara mediante la instauraci6n de un impuesto a las ventas minoristas de jurisdicci6n provincial. 51. Si bien en la actualidad esta postura se mantendria en lo esencial, la instrumentaci6n de esta imposici6n no se efectuaria a traves de un impuesto monofasico como es un impuesto puro sobre las ventas minoristas, sino por medio del mantenimiento del hecho imponible del actual impuesto a los ingresos brutos y una serie de adecuaciones del mismo para asimilarlo a un impuesto sobre el consumo. 52. Basicamente se introducirian camnbios a ingresos brutos para excluir en tanto hechos gravables a todos aquellos ingresos "derivados de ventas de bienes o servicios realizadas a otros sujetos del impuesto", arbitrio mediante el cual se pretende que queden sometidos a imposici6n solamente los ingresos por ventas a consumidores finales. 53. Los contribuyentes serian los mismos que los del actual impuesto a los ingresos brutos con la siguiente salvedad: quedan como contribuyentes aquellos inscriptos actuales que realizan ventas de bienes y servicios finales, los inscriptos que vendan a otros inscriptos solamente actuarian como agentes de retencion. 54. Se plantean problemas con la residencia de los inscriptos, distinguiendose entre: a) inscriptos con actividad en jurisdicci6n unica (aquellos con ventas a consumidores finales o a otros inscriptos con residencia en la misma jurisdicci6n). b) inscriptos con actividad en m6ltiples jurisdicciones (sus ventas, en forma total o parcial, se realizan a consumidores finales o a inscriptos residentes en otras jurisdicciones distintas de la que es residencia del vendedor). 55. En la propuesta de la Naci6n los inscriptos de jurisdicci6n unica figurarian en el padr6n impositivo de su jurisdicci6n de residencia y a ella ingresarian la totalidad de su impuesto determinado asi como de las percepciones que efectuien. 56- Los inscriptos de jurisdicci6n multiple pertenecerian a un padr6n especiai que administraria un organismo interjurisdiccional como la Comisi6n Arbitral de Impuestos por ejemplo. -237- ANNEX 11 57. Las retenciones o percepciones entre inscriptos se efectuarian con un sistema de creditos y debitos semejante al de IVA que seTia normado por la Nacion y al que adheririan las provincias. 58. La asignaci6n jurisdiccional de la recaudaci6n no presenta problemas en el caso de los inscriptos de jurisdicci6n unica, pero en el caso de inscnrptos de jurisdiccion multiple surge la necesidad de instrumentar mecanismos de compensaci6n entre las provincias (cajas compensadoras). En este aspecto para los contribuyentes de jurisdicci6n multiple habria tres opciones: 1) que ingresaran toda la recaudaci6n (sea la originada en ventas a consumidores finales como la proveniente de percepciones a otros inscriptos) en una cuenta comun de todas las provincias. 2) que atribuyan la recaudaci6n por ventas a consumidores finales a la jurisdicci6n de residencia de estos ultimos, las retenciones a inscriptos de "jurisdicci6n unica" a la jurisdicci6n de residencia de los mismos y, por 1ltimo, las percepciones a otros inscriptos de "jurisdicci6n multiple" a una cuenta comun de todas las provincias. 3) que la totalidad de la recaudaci6n y de las percepciones se asignaran a la jurisdicci6n de residencia del comprador. 59. Cualquiera fiera el metodo elegido las recaudaciones por ventas y percepciones efectuadas por inscriptos de jun'sdicci6n mrnltiple deberian ser objeto de una redistribuci6n entre las provincias, a efectos de la cual la propuesta nacional menciona tres criterios: a) una parte de esta recaudac ion se asignaria a cada provincia con prorrateadores semej'antes a los del actual Convenio Multilateral, que combinan criterios de destino (lugar en que se efectua el consumo) con consideraciones de origen (lugar en el que se efectua la produccion). b) otra parte en funci6n del consumo estimado de cada provincia. c) una tercera por un criterio compensador para aquellas provincias que pierdan recaudaci6n respecto a su situaci6n actual en ingresos brutos. 60. Numerosas provincias han ajustado sus impuestos a los ingresos brutos para ir asimilandolos a impuestos sobre las ventas finales, fijando en cero la tasa para los sectores primarios y manufactureros e incrementando las tasas en comercio y servicios, pero restringiendo este beneficio para los contrbuyentes de jurisdicci6n unica o en el caso de contribuyentes de jurisdicci6n multiple s6lo a aquellos que tienen establecimiento productivo en actividad radicado en la provincia que otorga la reducci6n de tasa. 61. Sin embargo el esquema propuesto por la Naci6n para armonizar el futuro impuesto al consumo y resolver el tratamiento de los flujos comerciales interjun'sdiccionales (contribuyentes de jurisdicci6n multiple) no ha sido aceptado aun, en particular por las provincias de mayor tamafio que plantean objeciones referidas a: - 238 - ANNEX 11 * el esquema limita la autonomia tributaria provincial por cuanto todo el esquema de percepciones seria legislado por la Naci6n. * Ia aparici6n de una Cuenta Comun Interprovincial a la que confluiria la recaudaci6n generada por los flujos comerciales interjurisdiccionales y cuyo producido no seria devuelto en forma estnrcta a la jurisdicci6n de destino (aquella en que se produce el consumo final del bien o servicio) sino usando criterios que s6lo parcialmente reflejan tal circunstancia y que por ser fijados administrativamente pueden sufrir cambios dificilmente previsibles. 62. Resulta necesario que en particular las provincias grandes impulsen una definici6n en torno a cual sera al esquema de sustituci6n de ingresos brutos. 63. De lo contrario el esquema en curso, que implica el mantenimiento de los impuestos a los Ingresos Brutos pero con tasa cero para los sectores intermedios conducira a la vigencia de hecho de cuasi irnpuestos a las ventas minoristas provinciales, es decir a impuestos que percuten en una sola etapa (de mas costosa fiscalizacion por estar sumamente atomizada), que carecen de una cadena de oposici6n de intereses y son por lo tanto mas vulnerables a la evasi6n y cuyas tasas dificilmente puedan hubicarse por debajo del 5% o 6% si es que se pretende mantener el producido recaudatorio de los irnpuestos tradicionales a los ingresos brutos. Sin embargo estos gravemenes dejan en una situaci6n de grave confulsi6n el tratamiento impositivo de los contribuyentes de jurisdiccion multiple, a los que no se les extiende el beneficio de la tasa cero a menos que cuenten con establecimiento en cada provincia. 1. 4.2. Otras opciones de sustitucion 64. Se han planteado opciones al modelo de sustituci6n de Ingresos Brutos propiciado por la Naci6n, y cabe mencionar al menos tres de ellas: a. Ia alternativa disefiada por la Universidad Nacional de La Plata para el Ministerio de Economia de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, consistente en un IVA provincial basado en criterio de destino y con sistema de pago diferido (con similitudes respecto al sistema vigente en la Uni6n Europea desde enero de 1993 ). b. Ia altemativa disefiada en el contexto del proyecto "Apoyo a la Reforma Impositiva en la Provincia de Buenos Aires" consistente en un Impuesto a las Ventas Mayoristas y Minoristas y a los Servicios. c. una propuesta desarrollada por la Direcci6n de Asesoria Fiscal del Ministerio de Economia y Finanzas de C6rdoba para implementar un sistema de percepciones consistente con un Impuesto a las Ventas al Por Menor que evita los defectos que se le senialan al sistema de retenciones propugnado por la Nacion. - 239 - ANNEX 11 65. Se comentan brevemente las principales caracteristicas de estas alternativas 1.4.2.1. IVA provincial 66. La imposici6n general al consumo organizada en base al IVA ofrece ventajas netas en relaci6n a la variante "Ventas Minoristas" (IVM) en particular por su menor vulnerabilidad a las conductas de evasi6n impositiva y a las eventuales debilidades de los organismos de recaudaci6n para realizar una fiscalizaci6n eficiente del cumplimiento impositivo. 67. Las ventajas de IVA quedan en cierta medida reveladas en la circunstancia de que la propia propuesta de la Naci6n antes comentada, consiste basicamente en transformar una imposici6n "monofAsica" como es el IVM en un tipo de imposici6n "plurifasica" a la manera del IVA, mediante la introducci6n de mecanismos de retenci6n en orden a concentrar la recaudaci6n en etapas anteriores a la propiamente minorista y asi disminuir los riesgos de evasi6n y los mayores costos de fiscalizaci6n inherentes a esta forma de imposici6n general al consumo. 68. Por definici6n la imposici6n al consumo estA basada en el principio de destino. En contraposici6n al principio de origen, el de destino permite conjugar una mayor autonomia fiscal provincial (expresada en la posibilidad de que cada jurisdicci6n tenga libertad para fijar su alicuota impositiva), con la neutralidad en terminos de su efecto sobre las decisiones de localizaci6n de las actividades productivas. 69. Las tareas de coordinaci6n interprovincial asociadas a la instrumentaci6n de un IVA provincial basado en el principio de destino tienen que ver, fundamentalmente, con la necesidad de uniformar la base imponible del IVA entre todas las jurisdicciones y evitar que cada jurisdicci6n pueda unilateralmente establecer sus propias exenciones sobre bienes y/o servicios, o, eventualmente, tratanientos distintos o preferenciales para determinados sectores productivos. Esta unifornidad es requerida para preservar la neutralidad del gravamen sobre la estructura de precios relativos y sobre las decisiones de localizaci6n territorial de las actividades, y para minimizar la actividad de evasi6n. 70. La instrumentaci6n de un IVA provincial basado en destino no requiere de la realizaci6n de ajustes tributarios de frontera, imposibles de implementar en el contexto de una organizaci6n federal. El recientemente implementado sistema de armonizaci6n de los IVA nacionales de los paises de la Comunidad Econ6mica Europea, en base al mecanismo de "pago diferido" es una prueba concluyente al respecto y ofrece un ejemplo vAlido para organizar la imposici6n general al consumo en el caso de una organizacion politica federal como la argentina. 71. Adicionalmente, la coordinaci6n en base al mecanismo de "pago diferido" no requiere de la implementaci6n de "caj'as compensadoras interprovinciales" para la reasignaci6n de la recaudaci6n entre provincias exportadoras netas y provincias importadoras netas porque el tratamiento a tasa cero del comercio interprovincial impide que las provincias de origen recauden impuestos que pertenecen a la jurisdicci6n de destino en que se produce el consumo final. 72. Tomando como referencia estas conclusiones se propone la sustituci6n del actual Impuesto a los Ingresos Brutos de jurisdiccion provincial, en base a aplicar el Impuesto a] Valor Agregado como unica modalidad de imposici6n general al consumo. - 240 - ANNEX 11 73. A estos efectos, coexistirian el actual IVA legislado y fiscalizado por el Gobierno Federal con Impuestos a] Valor Agregado Provinciales que tendran identica base imponible que el IVA nacional y respecto a la cual las autoridades provinciales no podran otorgar exenciones de nimnguna naturaleza (en la practica la potestad en cuanto al tratarniento de la base imponible serA exclusiva de la Naci6n). 74. La restricci6n anterior equivale a descartar la posibilidad de que las provincias puedan per se fijar tasa diferenciales por sectores, actividades y/o productos en lo que se refiere a los IVA provinciales. Por definici6n, el IVA continuara siendo un impuesto con una sola tasa general (tanto a nivel nacional cormo en el caso de cada provincial) y el uCnico apartamiento que se admnitirA sera el tratamiento "tasa cero" dispensado a las exportaciones a terceros paises y a las ventas interjurisdiccionales entre contribuyentes inscriptos, (segCin la mecAnica que luego se ilustra), y que no es otra que la aplicaci6n del esquema de "pago diferido" al que se hiciera referencia. 75. Sin embargo, las provincias tendran plena potestad en lo que se refiere a! nivel de la alicuota -Ženeral de sus respectivos IVA provinciaies, la cual podran establecer en los niveles que estimen pertinentes dadas sus necesidades fiscales. 76. Los IVA provinciales obedeceran al principio de destino en lo referido al tratarniento de los flujos comerciales interjurisdiccionales de bienes y servicios. El problema de gravar las compras provenientes de otras provincias y desgravar las ventas efectuadas a otras provincias (para garantizar que la imposici6n recaiga efectivamente sobre el consumo) se resolverA con el mecanismo citado de "pago diferido", que transfiere dichos ajustes impositivos compensadores a la contabilidad del contribuyente 77. Segun este mecanismo, el responsable inscripto de una jurisdicci6n que realiza ventas a un responsable inscripto de otrajurisdicci6n podra, en la medida en que este uiltrimo se identifique como tal y exhiba su numero de identificaci6n tributaria junrsdiccional, extender el tratamiento de tasa cero a la venta interjurisdiccional en cuesti6n, y reclarnar y obtener de su propio fisco la devoluci6n de los creditos fiscales por el IVA pagado sobre los insumos gravados que hubiera utilizado en la producci6n del bien o servicio objeto de la venta interjurisdiccional. 78. El comprador (contribuyente inscripto) de la jurisdicci6n de destino no contarA con credito fiscal sobre su compra interjurisdiccional y debera cargar la tasa de IVA provincial propia de su provincia de residencia si efectua la reventa a contribuyentes inscriptos de su misma jun'sdicci6n o a compradores finales no inscriptos. Si la reventa se efectuara a contribuyentes inscriptos de una tercera jurisdicci6n nuevamente entraria en acci6n el tratamiento de tasa cero. En definitiva, este arbitrio deterrnina que los flujos interjurisdiccionales terminen finalmente pagando la tasa de IVA provincial vigente en la provincia de destino en que se efectuia el consumo final. 79. La propuesta en caso de ser aplicada en el contexto argentino tiene, ciertas caracteristicas ventajosas aclictionales ci las ya senaladas de neutralidad y autonomia fiscal provincial. Entre ellas cabe mencionar las si=uientes: a) La coexistencia del IVA nacional e IVA provinciales con una misma base imponible (generalizada) determina que la interrupci6n de las cadenas de credito d6bito fiscal que se produce en el caso de los flujos comerciales interprovinciales (por el tratarniento de tasa cero) se circunscriba exclusivamente al IVA provincial. Dicha suspensi6n nunca -241- ANNEX I I tiene lugar a los efectos del IVA nacional con lo cual la cadena de oposici6n de intereses permanece intacta e induce el cumplimiento voluntario y facilita el control fiscal por cruce de informacion de compras y ventas. b) Ambos impuestos recaen sobre los mismos contribuyentes, poseedores de la misma clave de identificaci6n tributaria a la que s6lo habra que adicionarle la identificaci6n de la jurisdicci6n de residencia. Se genera un doble mecanismo de control, que opera a traves de: una coordinaci6n horizontal entre las administraciones tributarias provinciales que intercambiaran informaci6n sobre los contribuyentes inscriptos que realizan operaciones interjurisdiccionales; una coordinaci6n vertical entre la administraci6n tributaria nacional y cada una de las adm=inistraciones provinciales, en base a la estricta proporcionalidad que deberA existir entre la recaudaci6n del fisco nacional y la de los fiscos provinciales en el caso de los contribuyentes que no realizan operaciones interjurisdiccionales, y para complementar la informaci6n sobre las operaciones de los contribuyentes que realizan operaciones interjurisdiccionales c) La recaudaci6n provincial fluye automaticamente a la jurisdicci6n de destino en virtud del funcionamiento del mecanismo de "pago diferido", sin necesidad de compensaciones pecunarias ('cAmaras compensadoras') entre provincias lo que vuelve mAs sencillo y transparente el funcionamiento del IVA provincial d) el tratamiento de los fl ujos comerciales con terceros paises (importaciones y exportaciones) no requiere de ningiun tipo de soluci6n especial en oposici6n a lo que ocurriria si se aplicaran otros sistemas de ajuste compensatorio (como el sistema de credito fiscal) y aun con la variante impositiva que propunga la Nacion. 80. En efecto, puesto que las ventas entre provincias quedan gravadas a tasa cero, no existe necesidad de proceder a realizar compensaciones o asignar responsabilidades de devoluci6n de creditos fiscales sobre insumos gravados entre las diferentes provincias por las que pudo transitar, en sus distintas etapas de fabricaci6n y distribuci6n aquel bien que en definitiva termina siendo exportado a un tercer pais. De hecho la mercancia exportada no tiene incorporado IVA provincial alguno y solamente habra un componente de IVA nacional que continuarA siendo reintegrado por el fisco federal. 81. En el caso de las importaciones a la entrada al pais s6lo se cargarA, como en la actualidad, el IVA nacional, y el primer IVA provincial se cargarA una vez que se produzca la primer venta intema del bien en cuesti6n y segun la tasa vigente en la jurisdicci6n en que la misma tenga lugar. - 242 - ANNEX 11 1.4.22. Impuesto A Las Ventas Manoristas, Mfinoristas v Senicios 82. La propuesta que se describe sinteticamente a continuaci6n responde al intento de disefiar una altemativa instrumentable en el corto plazo, que no sea inconsistente con alternativas mas eficaces de imposiic6n general al consumo que requieren sin embargo de mas tiempo por sus requenmientos de coordinaci6n entre las provincias y la Naci6n; que paralelamente permita evitar el riesgo de fuertes reducciones de los recursos propios de las provincias a que puede dar lugar el cronograrna de reducci6n de tasas de Ingresos Brutos previsto en el Pacto Fiscal 83. Por definici6n se trata entonces de una altemativa sub6ptima, en varios aspectos, pero factible y que presenta similitudes con un tributo vigente en los Paises Bajos en el periodo previo a la adopci6n del IVA. 84. El tributo sugerido es un Impuesto a las Ventas Mayoristas y Minoristas y a los Servicios (IVMM) que gravaria las siguientes operaciones: - las ventas mayoristas (de mayoristas "propiamente dichos", industrials y productores primarios) efectuadas a comerciantes minoristas, con una alicuota reducida (1 al 1,5%), - todas las ventas minoristas a una alicuota unica que podria diferir de una provincia a otra (podria ser de 3,5 a 4%, de acuerdo al resultado de las simulaciones, en el caso de la Provincia de Buenos Aires), - las locaciones y prestaciones de servicios, con las excepciones que establece el Pacto Fiscal II, a la misma alicuota que las ventas minoristas (3,5 a 4%), - las ventas directas de mayoristas, industria y actividades primarias a consumidores finales, y las importaciones directas de estos (con una alicuota estimada para la Provincia de Buenos Aires en 6%, de modo consistente con las sefialadas precedentemente). 85. La base imponible estaria constituida por los ingresos brutos provenientes de las operaciones gravadas. 86. Los bienes de capital podrian ser exceptuados, aunque ello es de dificil instrumentacion y fiscalizaci6n.. 87. Seria deseable ademas -aunque no indispensable- que la alicuota para las ventas a minoristas fuese uniforme para todas las jurisdicciones. Esto aseguraria razonable neutralidad y escasa acumulaci6n del impuesto, y facilitaria ademAs su administraci6n, tanto para los contribuyentes respectivos -en su mayor parte, de jurisdicci6n multiple- como para los organismos tributarios provinciales. 88. Un sistema monoetapico de agentes de percepci6n nominados seria instrumentado para asegurar parte de la recaudaci6n minorista en la fase de distribuci6n inmediata anterior (mayorista, industrial y/ primaria). La Aduana Nacional tambien efectuaria percepciones por las importaciones directas de bienes de consumo por parte de consumidores finales (por el monto total del impuesto, a - 243 - ANNEX I I una tasa del 6% en el ejemplo presentado). Se trata de un sistema de agentes mas acotado y administrable que el sugerido por el proyecto de sustituci6n del gobierno nacional. 89. Las decisiones acerca de su normativa permanecerian bajo completo control de cada provincia y un convenio Multilateral deberia establecerse para una adecuada armonizacion interjurisdiccional. 90. La recaudaci6n del tributo, asi como la de las percepciones (y retenciones) serian total responsabilidad de las administraciones tributarias provinciales, sin requerirse de un Ente interjurisdiccional ni "Cuentas Unicas" para su recaudacion y la posterior redistribuci6n de recursos. 91. Otras diferencias del IV%M respecto de la propuesta del Gobierno Nacional, serian las siguientes: - se requeriria de una alicuota minorista y de servicios mas baja para sustituir al Ingresos Brutos; - mantendria gravadas operaciones mayoristas de contribuyentes de gran envergadura y buen cumpLirniento fiscal; - al presumirse que todas las ventas minoristas son efectuadas a consumidores finales se evitaria la erosi6n de la base del impuesto; - al ser gravados de modo generalizado los servicios (con las excepciones convenidas en el Pacto Fiscal) se facilita la adopci6n de una alicuota mas baja, - su estructura facilita la administraci6n y el control de sistemas de agentes de percepci6n de alcance razonable, sin generarse excesiva dependencia respecto de los mismos (se acota su vulnerabilidad). 92. Las ventajas en potencial recaudatorio del IVMI resultan confirmadas por las simulaciones efectuadas para la Provincia de Buenos Aries (sobre la base de datos acerca del potencial de recaudaci6n de 1992): - El IVM aportaria una recaudaci6n maxima potencial 23% inferior a la del actual Ingresos Brutos IIB, a la alicuota sugerida del 3,5% mientras que IVMM alcanzaria el 97% del potencial de IIB con alicuotas de 1% ("mayorista"), 3,5% ("minorista" y "servicios") y 4,5% ("directa a consumidor final"). - El peso de las percepciones -en terminos absolutos y respecto del total del impuesto potencial- seria menor en el IVMM; alcanzaria el 30% del total de la recaudaci6n, contra 50% en el IVM. 93. En sintesis, el IVMM permitiria plena sustituci6n de recursos, con alicuotas minoristas y de servicios razonablemente bajas y minimos efectos sobre neutralidad y competitividad. Su administraci6n y control serian, ademAs, mas accesibles para las provincias, que no cederian atribuciones propias. - 244 - ANNEX 11 1. 4.2.3. Propuesta de un sistema de percepciOn para un Inpuesto a las Ventas Minoristas 94. Esta propuesta hace enfasis en la dificultad de asegurar niveles aceptables de recaudaci6n con un impuesto a las ventas minoristas si se pretende percibirlo directamente de los sujetos pasivos del impuesto. 95. De alli que sea necesario que la administraci6n tnrbutaria instrumente sistemas de recaudaci6n que hagan posible el ingreso del gravamen antes de que se produzca la transacci6n final mediante pagos a cuenta y percepciones en etapas antenrores a la venta mmnorista. 96. Pero este sistema de percepciones, ademas de contar con un disenio eficaz en orden a asegurar el cierre del circuito entre las percepciones descontadas por los contribuyentes en sus declaraciones juradas y las efectivamente ingresadas por los agentes de percepci6n, tiene que evitar los inconvenientes en la asignaci6n de las bases tributanras entre fiscos que presenta la alternativa de la Naci6n, es decir debe respetar automaticamente la naturaleza del impuesto al consumo en la atribuci6n de las percepciones sobre transacciones interjurisdiccionales. 97. La propuesta consiste en instrumentar un sistema centralizado -y de amplia cobertura- de percepciones que podria funcionar conjuntamente o no, con otro aplicable exclusivamente a nivel local y en el que se designarian como agentes de percepci6n, conforme al lugar al que corresponda el domicilio fiscal del responsable, a quienes se dedican a la producci6n de bienes y a un numero significativo de los sujetos intervinientes en el proceso de comercializacion. 98. Un sistema asi concebido requiere la constituci6n de un Organismo Coordinador entre las provincias y supone la conformaci6n de un Fondo Interjurisdiccional que a traves de la estructura bancaria, y operando independientemente de los sistema provinciales de recaudaci6n, se constituye con la masa de recursos depositados por los agentes de percepci6n y que en definitiva habran de ser transferidos a cada fisco conforme su propio reclamo. 99. La cuesti6n relevante es que el derecho de cada jun'sdicci6n provincial sobre los recursos del Fondo queda determinado por el monto en que sus propios contribuyentes -vendedores al por menor- acrediten haber sido objeto de percepciones (por sus compras) y en consecuencia hubieren podido deducir de sus obLigaciones tributarias. 100. Los sistemas de compensaci6n entre fiscos como metodos de coordinaci6n aplicable a los impuestos a los consumos en las economias integradas responden a un principio similar: el fisco que debi6 reconocer a sus contribuyentes creditos fiscales por ingresos efectuados a otro, tiene el derecho a reclamarle la transferencia de los fondos correspondientes. 101. La diferencia con el sistema propuesto es que en este, los flujos de informaci6n son en principio mas regulares y de cierta automaticidad ya que se originan en el proceso de pago normal de los contribuyentes. 102. Este sistema no tendria demasiada viabilidad con los instrumentos que habitualmente son utilizados, tanto sea en el caso de las retenciones o percepciones de los impuestos nacionales como los que aplican los otros niveles que conforman la organizaci6n federal de gobierno. - 245 - ANNEX 11 103. Es por ello que se propone la utilizacion de un comprobante de percepci6n que, atento a sus caracteristicas y poder de cancelaci6n de obligaciones tributarias, tanto sea por impuestos o percepciones efectuadas, podria asimilarse a un "Cheque Fiscal" (CHF) 104. Este seria en consecuencia el documento en el que constaria la percepci6n practicada, que emitiria el agente de percepci6n a nombre del sujeto percibido y que se respalda en los fondos depositados por aquel en el sistema, que de ese modo operaria como una verdadera camara compensadora en la que cada fisco provincial tiene una cuenta con d6bitos por los "cheques fiscales" que sus agentes de percepci6n hubieran emitido y creditos por los que recibiera en dep6sito. Los bancos se comportarian como las cajas depositarias de los fondos en cadajurisdiccian. 105. Deternminada la obligaci6n tributaria de un contribuyente, o agente de percepci6n, a quien se le hubiere practicado a su vez percepciones, este procedera al pago de tal obligaci6n mediante el correspondiente dep6sito de medios de pago habituales y/o cheques fiscales que tuviera a su orden en su poder. 106. Asimismo el responsable deberia efectuar en el momento del dep6sito la correspondiente imputaci6n segun se aplique a cancelar impuestos o percepciones. 107. En consecuencia el Cheque Fiscal concebido del modo propuesto tendria en poder de un responsable dos destinos a) cancelar impuestos b) ingresar percepciones efectuadas 108. En el segundo caso se trata de un agente de percepci6n que a su vez fue percibido. Cuando el cheque fiscal imputado a percepciones ingresa al sistema, una vez procesado y efectuados los controles debe ser anulado ya que no genera derechos de la jurisdicci6n receptora sobre el Fondo. Ello en raz6n de que las percepciones en si mismas no pertenecen a ningun fisco sino hasta el momento en que debieron reconocerse como credito contra impuesto definitivo. 109. En consecuencia, en el otro caso, es decir cuando el cheque fiscal es utiizado ante el Organismo Recaudador provincial para la cancelaci6n de impuestos, se constituye en el instrumento que respalda el reclamo ante el Fondo, por parte del fisco provincial receptor. 110. Instrumentado de esta manera, el sistema Ileva implicito un claro mecanismo de incentivo a los fiscos a recuperar los comprobantes que van a respaldar sus reclamos al Fondo, o dicho de otro modo, se premia el esfuerzo fiscal propio, alternativa que cualquier otra forma de distribuci6n de fondos muy dificilmente contemple. 111. Los cheques serian provistos por el Organismo Recaudador de la jurisdicci6n del contribuyente, conteniendo todos los datos de identificaci6n del agente, impresos con los formatos y caracteres y contemplando las mismas estrictas normas de seguridad que se utilizan en el caso de los instrumentos de pago bancarios. - 246 - ANNEX 11 112. Las chequeras habilitadas entregadas por el organismo de recaudaci6n provincial deberan ser informadas regularmente al Organismo Coordinador a los efectos del posterior control de los cheques fiscales que ingresen al sistema. 113. Los agentes de percepci6n titulares de chequeras fiscales deberian informnar con la frecuencia que se establezca el detalle de los cheques emitidos precisando todos los datos consignados en el instrumento. 114. Cuando un cheque entre al sistema y se procese, podra controlarse que se corresponda con el dep6sito de la percepci6n por parte del Agente. Del mismo modo, se hace posible controlar que el contribuyente no se impute percepciones no practicadas realmente. 115. Por otro lado, se podria dirigir la acci6n de fiscalizaci6n hacia aquellos contribuyentes a quienes se les hubieran extendido cheques y que transcurrido un deteriiinado plazo, no los presentaren en cancelaci6n de sus obligaciones tributarias. 116. Deberian definirse otros aspectos que hacen a la puesta en practica de un sistema en particular el relativo al momento en que corresponde practicar la percepci6n. La realidad indica que existen ventajas para la Administracion en definir la emisi6n de la factura (que documenta la operaci6n) como el momento en que nace la obligaci6n de percibir. 117. La soluci6n altemativa de hacer exigible la percepci6n en el momento del efectivo cobro de la operacion contemplaria mas ajustadamente la situaci6n financiera del vendedor (y soslayaria en cierta medida la cuesti6n de las ventas incobrables) pero dificultaria sobremanera el proceso de control como asi tambien requeriria normas precisas para su imputaci6n por parte del sujeto percibido. 118. Otro aspecto que quiza requiera una definici6n en merito a la necesidad de reducir la cantidad de comprobantes y simplificar la tarea de los agentes se refiere al tratamiento de las pequefhas operaciones de compra efectuadas por minoristas, que probablemente resulten muy frecuentes en ciertas actividade<. 119. En tales casos, la soluci6n de eximir de la obligaci6n de percibir cuando la operaci6n no supere cierto limite parece razonable. 1.4.2.4. Resumen 120. Como resumen cabe enfatizar que el proceso de 'ajuste" de Ingresos Brutos para asimilarlo a una imposici6n al consumo final, tal y como se viene desarrollando ofrece riesgos ciertos tanto en terminos de perdida de recaudaci6n (en un contexto de mayor estrechez fiscal que el existente en 1993) como de generaci6n de nuevos tipos de ineficiencias e inequidades asociados a la discriminaci6n que en los hechos vienen sufriendo los contribuyentes del Comercio Multilateral para obtener el tratamiento de tasa cero (o de tasa disminuida) en las jurisdicciones en los que no tienen residencia fiscal. En definitiva estos problemas derivan de la no resoluci6n (entre otros aspectos) del tratamiento de los flujos interjurisdiccionales. En otros t6rminos, no existe un acuerdo acerca del modelo de imposici6n al consumo hacia el que se evoluciona. - 247 - ANNEX 11 121. El siguiente cuadro II compara las tres altemativas que han generado mayor discusi6n: el impuesto a las ventas rminoristas propuesto por la naci6n (IVM); el IVA provincial y el impuesto a las ventas mayoristas y minoristas (IVMM) desde el punto de vista de 6 criterios u objetivos que aparecen como deseables desde la 6ptica provincial: - el potencial recaudatorio de la variante elegida y su capacidad de expandir el autofinanciamiento provincial; - los requerimientos de administraci6n y control que implican las diversas alternativas, - el fortalecimiento (o no) de la autonomia tributaria provincial; - la neutralidad (en terminos asignativos) de las variantes; - los requerimientos de tiempo asociados a la implementaci6n; - los requerimientos de coordinaci6n entre fiscos provinciales (coordinaci6n horizontal) y con la DGI (coordinaci6n vertical) que involucran. 122. Si bien no se evalua en el cuadro la variante de imposici6n a ventas minoristas con sistema de percepciones instrumentado con "cheques fiscales" se entiende que la misma puede ser una altemativa promisoria que deberia ser explorada con detalle. -248- ANNEX 11 Cuadro III Ventajas x Desventajas de [as Altemativas OBJETIVOS IV'I IVA PROVINCIAL IVSIM * %IIY LIMEITADA PARA * OFRECE ELMAYOR * SUPERA PARCIALMIENTE LAS ALICUOT.-\S PRAC'ICABLES; POTENCIAL. LIMEITACIONES DEL V\E' AL A.-XU CON AMIPLIO SISTEMIA DE GRAVAR. AGENTEES DE RECAUDACION * TODAS LA VENTAS * POCO FUFJTRO, POR CRITERIO MEINORISTAS DE GRAVAR SERVICIOS POR 1. POTENCIAL EXCEPCION. * BASE GENERAL[ZAD - * LAS MIAYORISTAS RECAUDATORIO Y INCLUYEN'DO TODOS LOS INDUSTRIALES Y PRmARIAS, MIAYOR * EL SISTEMIA DE CERTIFICADOS SERVICIOS. EFECTUADAS A MINORISTAS Y AUTOFTNANCIAMIENTO 'LICUA" LA BASE DE VENTAS CONSUMIDORES. SINORISTAS * LOS SERVICIOS, CON LAS * SE CEDEN RECURSOS A UNA EXCEPCIONES DEL PACTO. *CUENTA UNICA" NO DEVOLUriVA * NO SE REQUIERE "CUENTA LNICA". * NO SE REQUIERE CENTRALIZACION Y REDISTRIBUCION DE RECAUDACION * DIFICL AUN CON UN AŽIPUO * SIN PROBLEMAS PARA LOS * SEAS FACIL QUE EL IV,l SISTEMA DE PERCEPCIONES CONTRIBUYENTES. PORQUE: DEBIDO A QUE CONCENTRAN LAS OBLIGACIONES * NECESIDAD DE CAMBIOS *SE SMANTIENEN TRIBUTARIAS EN LOS IMPORTANTES EN LAS DPR, GRAVADOS SECTORES SEC1'ORES ELAS EVASORES PARA ASEGURAR: DE GRANDES 2. REQUERIMIENTOS DE * CONTROL CRUZADO Y CONTRIBUYENTES ADMINISTRACION Y * EL SISTEMA DE PERCEPCIONES CON DGI * EL SISTEMA DE CONTROL ES COMPLEJO Y DIFICaL DE * DEVOLUCION DE PERCEPCIONES ES MAS .AD.\UNISTRAR CREDrTOS A SENCILLO Y CON\RIBU-YENTES Y CONTROLABLE, * TAMBIEN PARECE SER EXPORTABLES ADE.MAS DE NIENOS VULNERABLE, POR * DEVOLUC[ON DE V'ULNERABLE CONCENTRAR EN EXCESO LA CREDITOS A RECAUDACION. CONTRIBUYENTES Y LNTORTABILES * IMIPLICA CEDER FACULTADES * SEPIERDELIBERTADACERC.A * SE CONSERVA LIBERTAD DE LA BASE (IDENTICA A LA SOBRE BASE Y ALICUOTAS. * NORNIATIVAS (PERDIDA DE DEL IVA NACIONAL), PERO SE (aUN'QUE RESULTA UBERTAD PARA FLIJAR BASES Y CONSERVA PARA FIJAR CONVENIENTE QUE LA ALICUOTAS) ALICUOTA \.tLICUOl'A ".MAYORISTA" SEA UN\IFOR.SIE). * ADSIINISTRA-TIIVAS (UN ENTE * SE RETIENE EL CONTROL DE CENTRALIZADO, EN ATL SERIA LA ADMINIS TRA%CION. CON * SE RETIENE EL CONTROL DE RESPONSABLE POR SMAS DEL FUERTE COORDINACION LA AD.MI NISTRAC[ON, CON 50% DE LA RECAUTDACION). SE NECESARLA CON OTR.AS I[N\I%0 ESFUERZO DE DILLYE LOS ESTMULOS PARA PROVINCLAS Y DGI. COORDINACION SMEJORAR LAS DPR * ALCAINZA EN C LE RTAX IEDI DA * COMIPLETAMENTE NEUTRAL Y * MIENOS NEUTRAL QUE EL IVM A BIENES ENTERMEDIOS Y DE SIN EFECTO SOBRE Y CON UN EFECTO MARGINAL CAPITAL. Y EXPORTACIONES EXPORTACIONES, SI SOBRE EXPORTACIONES. 4. NEUTLRAUDAD Y (POR COSTOS [ND[RECTOS). RESUTL.ASE ADMINISTRRABLE COMSPETITVlIDAD LA DEVOLLCION DE CRED[TOS LOS EFECTOS ACUMULACION Y * SIENOR EFICACLA QUE UN' rVA PIRAMIDACION SE REDUCEN SUSTANCEALMENTE RESPECTO DE !INGRESOS BRUTOS. 5. TEMPO PARA EL * MINIMO, SI OBTUVEESE * EXTENSO, POR LA NECESIDAD * .MIN[MO DISENO E CONSENSO POL[TICO DE PREPARAR A LAS DPR Y IMPLEMENTACION \_ASEGURAR COORDINACION 6. COORDINACION * TALCOMO FUE DISENADO. * REQUEERE AMPLEA * IEQUIERE.MINIMA HORIZONTAL Y EX1GE MUCHA COORDINACION COORDINACION, I IORIZONTAL COORDINACION. VERTICAL HORIZONTAL Y VERTICAL y VERTICAL (CENTRALIZACEON DE DECISEONES. EN EL ENATI) _ - 249 - ANNEX 11 Il.2. Impuesto Inmobiliario 2.1. Estructura dlel Impuesto Inmobiliario en Ia Provincia de Creloha 123. Hecho Imponible. Se configura por el solo hecho del dominio o posesi6n a titulo de dueno o por la mera tenencia (otorgada por autoridad publica) de los inrnuebles. 124. En C6rdoba el impuesto inmobiliario se estructura por los siguientes conceptos: 1. Basico que surge de aplicar sobre la base imponible las alicuotas que anualmente determina la ley impositiva. 2. Adicional restnrngido a las propiedades rurales y que surge de aplicar las alicuotas que fija la ley impositiva anual a una base imponible dada por la suma de las bases impanibles de las propiedades rurales atribuibles a un mismo contribuyente. 125. Base Imponible. Se conforma con la valuaci6n de cada inmueble determinada por la ley de catastro, multiplicada por coeficientes de actualizaci6n que fija la ley impositiva anual. Por esta via se establecen ademas los impuestos minimos a pagar por cada inmueble. 126. Exenciones. Pueden agruparse en tres categorias: por el caracter del titular (inmuebles propiedad del estado nacional, provincial o municipal, de la Iglesia Catolica y estados extranjeros); por el destino dado al inmueble (los destinados al culto de las religiones, los cedidos gratuitamente para el funcionarniento de escuelas, hospitales etc), por arnbos factores. Entre las incorporadas en este iiltimo grupo cabe mencionar las que benefician a los inmuebles destinados a vivienda unica de jubilados o pensionados cuyos ingresos no superen en mas del 100 % al haber jubilatorio o pensi6n minima que abone la Caja de Ju bilaciones de C6rdoba y a los inmuebles que sean propiedad unica del titular, que sirvan como vivienda permanente y cuya valuaci6n sea inferior a un monto que anualmente fija la ley impositiva (para el ejercicio 1995 es de $4000 en el caso de inmuebles edificados y de $800 para inmuebles baldios). 127. Determinaci6n del impuesto. El inmobiliario basico es un gravamen de tipo "cedular". La n6mina de propiedades (y propietarios) consta en el sistema catastral parcelario de la provincia y el impuesto es determinado por la Direcci6n de Rentas que emite las liquidaciones para su pago. Sin embargo el impuesto inmnobiliario adicional se percibe sobre la base de declaraciones juradas del contribuyente. La Direcci6n General puede liquidar y exigir pagos a cuenta del inmobiliario adicional. -250- ANNEX 11 Alicuotas. La ley impositiva de 1995 fija las siguientes alicuotas: a.impuesto inmobiliario basico .inmuebles urbanos edificados base im onible fijo mas sobre el mas de hasta excedente de S $ $ % 5 0 15000 0 1.30 0 15000 35000 195 1.35 15000 35000 60000 465 1.40 35000 60000 100000 815 1.50 60000 10000 150000 1415 1.60 100000 150000 y mas 2215 1.70 150000 .inmuebles urbanos baldios base imp onible fijo mas sobre el m,s de hasta excedente de ................. ,.................. ........... ........................ ............................ ..................... ............................. $ $ $ %$ 0 5000 0 2.00 0 5000 10000 100 2.10 5000 10000 20000 2.05 2.20 10000 20000 40000 425 2.30 20000 4000 y mas 885 2.40 40000 Se fijan asimismo montos minimos de impuesto inmobiliario basico en los siguientes niveles: .inmuebles urbanos edificados $ 112 .inrmuebles urbanos baldios1 1 S 72 .inmuebles urbanos baldios[2] $ 60 inmuebles urbanos baldios131 $ 50 .inmuebles rurales $ 102 para los ubicados en las 5 ciudades principales [21 para los ubicados en 6 ciudades intermedias [3] los ubicados en las restantes ciudades. b. Impuesto inmobiliario adicional base imp onible fijo mas sobre el m's de hasta ' ' excedente de ......................I............. ............................. ......................... ............................. ........................................... $ $ $ %$ 500000 750000 500 0.2 500000 750000 1300000 1000 0.3 750000 1300000 2000000 2650 0.4 1300000 2000000 5000000 5450 0.6 2000000 5000000 y mAs 23450 0.9 5000000 -251- ANNEX 11 128. La ley de catastro provincial (ley 5057) fija la obligaci6n a la Direcci6n General de Catastro de efectuar revaluos peri6dicos generales de las parcelas inmobiliarias urbanas. Estos revaluos determinan valuaciones que tienen vigencia durante un lapso no mayor a 10 anos, en cuyo transcurso son ajustados anualmente segun los coeficientes que se determinan en las leyes impositivas anuales. El ultimo revaluo general urbano efectuado en C6rdoba data del anio 1987. Sin embargo en 1992 se realiz6 un revaluo parcial (abarc6 19 poblaciones) que deriv6 en importantes ajustes de las valuaciones catastrales que a su vez permitieron una significativa disminuci6n de las alicuotas impositivas a partir de 1994 sin que se resintiera la recaudaci6n. En este sentido los 6 tramos de las alicuotas para los inmuebles urbanos edificados que hasta 1993 fLieron 1.5%, 1.6%, 1.7%, 1.8%, 1,9% y 2% pasaron a oscilar entre 1.3% y 1.7% segiun ilustran los cuadros anteriores, mientras que para inmuebles urbanos baldios las tasas por tramos que eran del 3%, 3.3%, 3.4%, 3.6%, 3.9% y 4% pasaron a variar entre el 2% y el 2.4% y la alicuota de los inmuebles rurales del 3.5% fue reducida al actual 1.2% . Por su parte las alicuotas del inmobiliario adicional se redujeron a la mitad (por tramo eran del 0.4%, 0.6%, 0.9%, 1.2%, 1.5% y 1.8%). 129. La presi6n tributaria a cuenta del inmobiliario en C6rdoba resulta elevada para los estandares del pais, por cuanto las valuaciones catastrales tenderian a aproximarse a los valores de mercado (el problema catastral mas que desactualizaci6n de valuaciones es de falta de registraci6n de mejoras, es decir de subestimaci6n de la cantidad de metros de construcci6n) y las tasas aplicadas por la provincia tradicionalmente se han situado entre las mans elevadas. Tengase al respecto en cuenta que las provincias que han firmado el Pacto Fiscal se han comprometido a establecer valuaciones catastrales no superiores al 80 % del valor venal, una alicuota promedio en el inmobiliario urbano no superior al 1.5% , y no mayor al 1.2 % en el inmobiiario rural (esta es la tasa vigente en C6rdoba pero la provincia aplica un adicional a los duefios de mas de una propiedad rural). 2.2. Efectos Econotmicos del Impuesto Inmobiliario 130. El impuesto inmobiliario rural en tanto impuesto porcentual fijo sobre el valor de la tierra no distorsiona la asignaci6n de recursos ni desde el punto de vista de la intensidad de factores ni en cuanto a la utilizaci6n de tierras menos fertiles o mas alejadas de los mercados. 13 1. El impuesto inmobiliario urbano sobre viviendas puede imponerse sobre el valor del terreno, sobre el valor del edificio construido o sobre ambos valores simultAneamente, este es el sistema empleado en C6rdoba. 132. La carga del impuesto sobre el valor total se reparte entre el propietario y el inquilino segun las elasticidades de oferta y demanda de viviendas en alquiler; a largo plazo y en ausencia de controles de alquileres, como la elasticidad precio de la demanda es relativamente. baja en relaci6n a la de la oferta, gran parte de la carga del impuesto es de esperar que termine recayendo sobre los inquilinos a traves de un aumento real de los alquileres pagados. La parte que incida en los propietarios, a su vez, se distribuye entre los duefios de los terrenos y los duenos de los edificios. A largo plazo estos ultimos pueden eludir la carga del impuesto trasladando sus capitales a otros usos altemativos. En carnbio, los propietarios de la tierra que no tienen opci6n altemativa de uso para la misma poseen una renta que puede ser absorbida por el impuesto. -252- ANNEX 11 133. Un impuesto inmobiliario sobre el valor del terreno unicamente (lotes baldios y terrenos edificados pero computando el valor de la tierra sin mejoras) tiene un efecto neutro en terminos de asignaci6n de recursos, tanto en lo referente a la intensidad del uso de la tierra (altura de los edificios, relaci6n entre metros cuadrados construidos y metros cuadrados del terreno, calidad de la construcci6n, etc.) como al patr6n espacial de utilizaci6n de la tierra. 134. Un impuesto inrmobiliario sobre el valor del edificio unicamente, a corto plazo disminuye la cuasi renta de los edificios existentes; pero los nuevos edificios seran construidos con una menor relaci6n entre edificios y tierra, reduciendo la renta de esta ultima. A largo plazo la reducci6n del ritmo de expansi6n de la construcci6n llevara a un aumento del alquiler y si el rismo no compensa totalmente al impuesto, se mantendra cierta reducci6n de la intensidad de uso de edificios por unidad de tierra, con lo que parte del impuesto sobre el edificio recaera sobre los propietarios de la tierra. 135. En la medida en que la carga del impuesto sobre viviendas recaiga en los usuarios (inquilinos o propietarios que habitan su propia vivienda), el mismo es regresivo si la elasticidad-ingreso de la demanda de viviendas es inferior a la unidad, y la carga puede ser relevante debido a la importancia de los gastos en vivienda dentro del presupuesto familiar. Ello otorga sustento a esquemas de desgravaci6n impositiva (total o parcial) para contribuyentes de menores ingresos como los que existen en el caso de C6rdoba. 136. La presencia de este tipo de exenciones (o minimos no imponibles) permite sugerir la conveniencia de hacer un uso mas intenso de los mismos a cambio de eliminar (o morigerar) la progresividad de las alicuotas. Esto por una parte facilitaria la administraci6n y control del impuesto pero fundamentalmente permitiria contemplar la circunstancia de que la propiedad inmobiliaria es s6lo una manifestaci6n de riqueza y no una medida de la riqueza neta de las personas, de alli que la progresividad de tasas no tenga suficiente asidero en terminos del principio tributario de capacidad de pago en el caso de este impuesto. 137. Este aspecto no es trivial desde el punto de vista del federalismo fiscal por cuanto una defensa del impuesto inmobiliario progresivo como "impuesto redistributivo a la riqueza" podria levar en ultima instancia a propugnar su centralizaci6n en un nivel de gobiemo superior, en mejores condiciones de establecer gravamenes sobre la riqueza neta de las personas. 138. Tampoco la proporcionalidad de las tasas significa regresividad del gravamen, al menos desde el punto de vista de la "naturaleza distributiva" del inmobiliario. En efecto, aun admitiendo que la incidencia de un inmobiliario urbano proporcional puede ser regresiva (en el sentido de que se traslada "hacia adelante" a los inquilinos y la elasticidad ingreso de los gastos en vivienda es inferior a la unidad) ello no necesariamente implica que el "mercado" de los gastos en vivienda este dominado por los sectores de menores ingresos. Es decir, el que el gasto en alquiler sea una parte significativa del presupuesto de las fanilias de bajos ingresos (incidencia regresiva) no equivale a decir que el gasto en alquileres de las familias de bajos ingresos representan la proporci6n mayoritaria del gasto total en el mercado de alquileres. 139. De hecho si este no es el caso, un impuesto inmobiliario proporcional puede ser distributivamente progresivo. - 253 - ANNEX I I 140. La imposici6n a los terrenos baldios, que existe en el caso de C6rdoba, persigue la reducci6n de la especulaci6n en el mercado de tierras urbanas y estimnular la construcci6n de viviendas. 141. La imposici6n de la tierra urbana excluyendo las mejoras o edificaciones es equivalente a un subsidio diferencial a las construcciones, que por lo tanto tendra como efecto un aumento de dichas inversiones. Alternativamente podria gravarse con una alicuota mavor el valor del terreno (incluso del edificado) en relaci6n a la tasa aplicable al valor de la edificacion. 142. Cabe senalar que los inmuebles urbanos empresariales (industriales, comerciales, financieros, etc.) reciben un trato impositivo similar al de las viViendas Es posible plantear la posibilidad de un tratamiento diferenciado, ya que los efectos economicos del impuesto sobre ambos tipos de inmuebles urbanos son diferentes. El impuesto inmobiliario sobre inmuebles urbanos empresariales, si es aplicado unicamente sobre el valor del terreno, con alicuotas similares para cada uso altemativo del suelo urbano, seria neutro en terminos de asignaci6n de recursos y absorberia la renta recibida por los propietarios del suelo. En cambio, un impuesto inmobiiario sobre el valor edificado, a corto plazo (e incluso a largo plazo en caso de existencia de cierta elasticidad de ta demanda de los productos) puede alterar el patr6n de tipo de uso e intensidad de utiLizaci6n de la tierra urbana. En cuanto a distribuci6n del ingreso, la parte de la carga del impuesto que se traslade al precio de los productos en general no tendra un sesgo regresivo, en tanto la par-te que incida sobre los propietarios de los terrenos sera progresiva. 143. Los efectos de los impuestos inmobiliarios se circunscriben, salvo casos excepcionales, al Area en la cual estAn localizados los inmuebles, caracteristica que los convierte en gravamenes generalmente reservados a los gobiernos locales (provinciales o municipales)3. Si bien el impuesto inmobiliario carece de flexibilidad automatica respecto a las variaciones ciclicas de la economia, ello no es un obstaculo para su asignaci6n a los gobiernos locales que no son responsables de la fumnci6n estabilizaci6n. 144. Otra justificaci6n del impuesto inmobiliario esta dada por el principio del beneficio que esta asociado al resultado conocido como "capitalizaci6n" de los ser'vicios publicos en el precio de la propiedad inmueble: los bienes y servicios que provee el gobierno impactan sobre el valor de la propiedad inmueble y de alli surge como natural que el duenio que se beneficia contribuya al financiamiento de dichas gastos. Sin embargo no todos los gastos del gobierno se capitalizan por igual en el valor de la propiedad ni se distribuyen uniformemente entre todos los inmuebles. 145. La fundamentaci6n del inmobiliario en el principio del beneficio brinda un argumento en favor de la descentralizaci6n del impuesto hacia los gobiemos municipales, que son los encargados de realizar los gastos que mas rapida y plenamente se capitalizan en el valor de la Vivienda. En segunda instancia podia propender a que los municipios en vez de usar un impuesto inmobiliario tradicional, lo sustituyan por tasas retributivas de servicios. Sin embargo el uso de ta.as retributivas de servicios tiene un limite claro cuando parte del gasto local es realizado en bienes publicos (de naturaleza local). Por lo tanto desde una perspectiva de mediano plazo y considerando que existen posibilidades de descentralizaci6n de gastos publicos y cuasipublicos hoy responsabilidad del gobierno provincial hacia los gobiemos municipales, resulta consistente propiciar la transferencia de la potestad tributaria 3En la ArgentinA salvo alguwws anios de ligencia de impuestos naciorales de etnergenciak el inapuesto inmnobiliario ha sido considerado sin discusidn como un tributo tipicamenteproiincial - 254 - ANNEX I I provincial en materia de impuesto inmobiliario a los municipios, y el que estos lo empleen para financiar la provisi6n de bienes publicos locales. 146. En resumen, el aspecto mas relevante para las cuestiones de federalismo lo constituye el hecho de que el impuesto inmobiliario aparece como un tributo especialmente idoneo para un manejo por los gobiemos locales. Ello se refuerza cuanto mas se invoque el principio del beneficio. Las caracteristicas de exclusividad territorial, de baja elusi6n por abandono o corrimiento de la base hacia otra jurisdicci6n, y de relativamente baja intensidad de competencia tributaria interjurisdiccional que posee el impuesto, tornan adecuada su administracion por los gobiemos municipales. Asimismo, dado que la capitalizaci6n que sustenta el principio del beneficio es mas sensible a gastos de naturaleza localizada, existira una clara asociaci6n entre la descentralizaci6n del impuesto inrobi]iario y la asignacion descentralizada del gasto. II.3. Impuesto a los Sellos 3.1. Consideraciones Cenerales 147. Ante la descentralizaci6n realizada por la provincia del impuesto Automotor, Sellos ha pasado a ser la tercer fuente tributaria en importancia con que cuenta la provincia, aunque la participacion relativa de sellos en su recaudaci6n propia total es apenas superior al 1 O %/, coamcidiendo con la que se registra en la provincia de Buenos Aires, y sustancialmente inferior al de otras provincias grandes como Mendoza y Santa Fe, asi como a la participaci6n de sellos en la recaudaci6n propia del resto de las provincias argentinas excluidas las cinco mayores. 148. Este tributo surge como una amalgama de diversos impuestos y tasas vigentes en muchos casos al menos desde el siglo XVII. Su denominaci6n esta asociada a la forina de pago, aunque modemamente no es la unica ni la mas importante. 149. Hecho imponible. Esta dado por todos los actos, contratos y operaciones de caracter oneroso instrumentados que se realicen en el territorio de la provincia (incluidos los formalizados por correspondencia). El impuesto no meramente grava contratos, sino tambien operaciones no reflejadas en contratos, especificamente las operaciones monetarias que representen entregas o recepciones de dinero que devenguen interes y efectuadas por entidades financieras asi como las operaciones realizadas a traves de tarjetas de creditoJ. 150. Quedan comprendidos en el impuesto todos los contratos y operaciones que aunque no se formalicen en la provincia, tengan efecto en su territorio. 151. Los impuestos establecidos son independientes entre si, y deben ser pagados aun cuando varias causas de gravamen esten presentes en el mismo acto gravado. 4A modo de ejemplo se enumeran los principales hechos imponibles por la ley de SeUos: fransminio,n de donunio de inmuebles, contratos de compra venta de autoniotores usados, cesion de creditos hipotecarios y acciones o derechios, permulas, contrattos de locacion o sublocacidn de inmuebles, contratos de constituciwn de sociedaki comnerciales, cesiorn de cuotas sociales, aunuento del capital socidario y de aportev en especie, disolZuidn y liquidaci4n de sociedader, contralos de venta de sociedades comerciales e industriales, autorizaciones bancarias para girar en descubierto y para adeauiros en caenta corriente y para cualquier tipo de credito no instrumentado, para toda operacidnfuaanciera instrumentada que iunplique otorgamiento de credito, contraros de mutuo con garantia hipotecaria, contratos de renta vixaiicia, contratos de concesidn, contratos de prorisidn o sumunistro a reparticiones publicas, operaciones realizadas a traves de tarjetas de credito etc -255 - ANNEX 11 152. Las pr6rrogas o renovaciones de los actos, contratos u operaciones gravados constituyen nuevos hiechos imponibles. 153. Base impoanible. Esta dada por el valor nominal de los instrumentos gravados. 154. Contribuyentes y responsables. Las partes intervinientes en los actos, contratos y operaciones gravados son contribuyentes solidariamente responsables del total del impuesto. En general este se divide en partes iguales, aunque hay casos, como los contratos de prendas, pagares, reconocimniento de deudas en que estA enteramente a cargo del deudor. Exenciones. Hay dos tipos de exenciones: a) las basadas en la indole de las partes intervinientes. Aqui se incluyen al Estado (nacional, provincial y municipal), fundaciones y asociaciones sin fines de lucro, los servicios de radiodifusi6n y televisi6n, las cooperativas de vivienda y los partidos politicos. b) las exenciones objetivas basadas en la indole de los contratos y que abarcan a medio centenar de actos, contratos y operaciones. Alicuotas. 155. Existe la siguiente estructura de tasas proporcionales que se aplica segun tipo de operaci6n o contrato de que se trate: * 2 por mil para operaciones de compraventa al contado de bienes primarios * 3 por mil contratos de obras publicas. * 3.5 por mil en operaciones de compraventa a termino de bienes primarios. * 3 por mil operaciones de capitalizaci6n, ahorro para fines determinados etc. * 5 por mil giros y transferencias de fondos (excepto los intemos a los bancos). * 6 por mi contratos de compraventa de bienes muebles, fianzas y garantias personales, ta 'etas de credito, contratos de locaci6n de servicios y obras, constituci6n, pr6rroga y disoluci6n de sociedades, etc. * 10 por mil contratos de transferencia de establecimientos comerciales, industriales, cesiones de derechos y acciones, contratos de rentas vitalicias, autorizaciones giro en descubierto letras de cambio, pagares etc. * 30 por mil contratos de compravente de inmuebles, permutas de inmuebles etc. 156. Para ciertos hechos imponibles la ley establece cuotas fijas. 157. Las operaciones de seguro, capitalizaci6n y creditos reciprocos pagan el 5 por mil sobre el monto de la prima mAs recargos administrativos. 158. Cabe mencionar que el Pacto Federal preveia la derogaci6n del impuesto de Sellos antes del 30 de junio de 1995, comenzando por la inmediata derogaci6n de las tasas que recaen sobre las operatorias financieras y de seguros. - 256 - ANNEX I I 3.2. Efectos Economicos del Impuesto de Sellos. 159. Siendo este un impuesto de tipo formal que recae sobre el instrumento juridico mas que sobre el contenido econ6mico de la operaci6n, y dada la diversidad de operaciones gravadas y de las tasas impositivas, resulta conveniente realizar alguin tipo de ordenamiento de los hechos imponibles En este sentido se opta por el siguiente: a. sobre inmuebles . a la transferencia . sobre las locaciones b. sobre otros activos . transferencia de automotores v yenta de establecimientos industriales o comerciales . constituci6n de sociedades c. sobre bienes v servicios . bienes y servicios . compraventa l Iocaciones o operaciones financieras . juegos de azar 160. La parte mas significativa de la recaudaci6n de Sellos proviene de la imposici6n de las operaciones vinculadas con inrnuebles. Si todos los inmuebles tuvieran la misma rotaci6n el impuesto de Sellos seria asimilable a una sobre tasa del impuesto inmobiliario, en los hechos actua como una sobretasa rnAs alta sobre los inmuebles de mayor rotaci6n. Una circunstancia analoga se plantea con la imposici6n sobre la compra venta de automotores. 161. Los impuestos de sellos que actian en el caso de ventas de establecimientos comerciales e industriales y en la constituci6n de sociedades constituyen un desestimulo importante a las transferencias, fusiones y absorciones empresarias asi como a la entrada de nuevas firmas a la actividad, en especial en los sectores donde prevalecen firmas de menor tamaho. 162. En particular en el caso de las tasas que inciden sobre las ventas de bienes su efecto puede asimilarse al de ingresos brutos en tanto generan imposici6n en cascada. Esta circunstancia se agrava por las numerosas y en cierto sentido erraticas exenciones que consagra la ley de sellos. En el caso de los contratos de compraventa de productos agropecuarios el impuesto actuia plenamente como un sucedaneo de ingresos brutos, y resulta altamente contradictorio su mantenimiento cuando en forma paralela se elimina o disminuye la tasa de ingresos brutos para las actividades pnrmarias. 163. En el caso de la aplicaci6n de Sellos a las operaciones financieras el mismo actua como elemento que amplia el spread entre las tasas activas y pasivas de interes. 164. Puede concluirse que Sellos constituye una forTna arcaica de imposici6n que encarece y dificulta las transacciones, la organizacion y reorganizaci6n de sociedades,y la intermediacion - 257 - ANNEX 11 financiera. Existen multiplicidad y heterogeneidad de hechos imponibles, diferencias de alicuotas entre distintos actos gravados y paralelamente una muy amplia lista de exenciones. Es deseable la elirninaci6n del gravamen incluso si deben efectuarse ajustes de tasas y/o valuaciones en ingresos brutos, inmobiliario y automotores a efectos de que la provincia no experimente perdida recaudatoria alguna. 11. 4. Impuesto a los Automotores 165. Segun fuera comentado anteriormente, en C6rdoba los aspectos de recaudaci6n y fiscalizaci6n del impuesto a los Automotores son responsabilidad de los municipios, encargandose la provincia de legislar el gravamen y establecer anualmente las tasas del impuesto en la ley impositiva. 166. Cabe consignar que historicamente el origen de este tributo en numerosas provincias es precisamente municipal y s6lo posteriormente, en los ahos 40, se transforma en impuesto provincial Wunco. Asirnismo en sus origenes la base imponible del tributo estuvo generalmente dada por el peso de los vehiculos por entenderse que el mismo era indice apropiado del desgaste del camino que producian los vehiculos. Ello parece demostrar que el gravamen tendi6 a ser fundamentado en el principio del beneficio mas que en el principio de capacidad de pago exteriorizada por esta manifestaci6n parcial de nqueza. 167. Hacia los anos 60 las escalas que conforman el tributo pasaron a estar determinadas no solamente por el peso sino por la antiguedad de los vehiculos y cada vez mas se fue debilitando la conexi6n de este gravamen con el principio del beneficio. 168. Hecho imponible. Esta dado por la radicaci6n del vehiculo en la provincia de C6rdoba. Salvo prueba en contrario el c6digo tributario establece que es considerado como radicado en la provincia todo vehiculo que pertenezca a persona con residencia en C6rdoba. 169. Contribuyentes. Los responsables del impuesto son los titulares de los vehiculos. 170. Prohibici6n. Queda prohibido a los municipios de la provincia establecer otro tributo, cualquiera fuere su denominacion, que afecte a los vehiculos automotores. 171. Base imponible. El c6digo tributario es ambiguo por cuanto enumera como bases factibles de ser gravadas el peso de los vehiculos, su valor, la antiguedad, la cilindrada y el tipo de carga (personas o carga). En definitiva la fijaci6n de la base pasa a efectuarse en la ley impositiva anual provincial. La ley vigente (8446) usa los siguientes criterios: a) para los vehiculos automotores posteriores a 1980 la base imponible esta dada por el valor del vehiculo (establecido en tablas confeccionadas por el Ministerio de Economia provincial). La tasa impositiva es 2.5%. b) para los vehiculos anteriores a 1980 se fijan importes minimos por tipo de vehiculos (autom6viles, camiones, colectivos etc.). c) en el caso de las motos y motocicletas se establecen montos de impuesto relacionados directamente con el modelo (anio) y la cilindrada, y con una disminuci6n del 20% de tales montos si se trata de vehiculos de producci6n nacional. -258 - ANNEX 1 I 172. Pago. Cada municipio es libre de establecer la forma de pago (cantidad de cuotas) segiin sus necesidades. 173. Exenciones. Las exenciones subjetivas abarcan a los vehiculos del estado (nacional, provincial y municipal), y a los que sean propiedad de lisiados, diplomaticos y partidos politicos. Las exenciones objetivas abarcan a la maquinaria vial y a los modelos anteriores a 1970. 174. El esquema de descentralizaci6n de Automotores vigente en la provincia podria incluso profundizarse, aunque tal circunstancia deberia estar ligada a la reformulaci6n de la coparticipaci6n municipal y/o a la descentralizaci6n de otras responsabilidades de gasto hacia los municipios. 175. En cualquier caso una mayor descentralizaci6n de Automotores abarcaria el dotar a los municipios de autonomia para fijar bases imponibles y tasas. En la practica no parecen existir argumentos convincentes para que estos aspectos tengan que ser uniformes. En todo caso el argumento de mayor consistencia, relacionado con el peligro de guerras tributarias entre los municipios, tiende a interpretar a Automotores como un gravamen basado en el principio de capacidad de pago, cuando en realidad se trata de un instrumento sumamente flexible que puede ser empleado por los gobiemos locales (a condici6n de contar con libertad de disenio del mismo) desde una 6ptica fundada en el principio del beneficio para recuperar costos de infraestructura vial, para el tratamiento e intemaiizaci6n de costos de congesti6n etc. 1. 5 Otros Impuestos Provinciales 176. Existe un conjunto de otros gravainenes provinciales y de tasas que se detallan a continuaci6n: (a) Impueto a las Actividades del Turf. Son contribuyentes los propietarios de caballos de carrera (pagan un derecho de inscripci6n) y los apostadores. (b) Impuesto a las Loterias y Juegos de Azar. Son contribuyentes los apostadores y los vendedores actuian como agentes de retenci6n. (c) Tasa Retributivas de Servicios. Cabe mencionar las siguientes: * Servicios generales. Se abonan montos fijos por certificados de inscripci6n en las profesiones liberales, perrnisos de riego y uso de aguas, interposici6n de recursos administrativos, por presentaci6n de informes ante autoridades publicas provinciales etc, totalizando 13 tipos de tasas . * Por ejercicio del poder de policia provincial. Tasas por las guias de transito para transporte de ganado y cueros. * Tasas por servicios policiales ( 30 tipos de tasas). * Tasas de la Direcci6n de Investigaciones(6 tipos de tasas). * Tasas de Registro Civil de la personas (25 variedades de tasas). * Tasas de la Inspecci6n General de Sociedades Juridicas ( 47 variedades de tasas segun tipo de tramite o solicitud). * Tasas del Tribunal de Calificaciones Notarial. (9 variedades de tasas). - 259 - ANNEX 11 * Tasas de la Direcci6n General de Catastro (aplica 51 tasas diferentes). * Tasas de la Direcci6n General de Rentas ( 9 tipos). * Tasas del Registro General de la Provincia ( 15 tipos). * Direcci6n General de Transportes , cobra una tasa del 5% sobre los ingresos brutos de las empresas que realicen servicios de transporte en el la provincia. * Direcci6n de Agua. Cobra tasas por fiscalizaci6n de la actividad nautica. * Registro Provincial de Constructores ( 11 clases de tasas). * Secretaria de Ciencia y Tecnologia. * Ministerio de Salud ( 67 vaniedades de tasas segun tipo de prestaci6n o tranite). * Direcci6n Provincial de Mineria ( 39 tasas). * Tribunal Minero cobra el 3% sobre el monto de la demanda. * Direcci6n de Comercio Exterior. * Direcci6n de Comercio Interior * Secretaria de Turismo. * Direcci6n de Estadisticas y Censos. * Direcci6n de Producci6n Animal ( unas 150 tasas y precios diferentes). * Direcci6n de Areas Naturales (46 variedades de tasas). * Ministerio de Trabajo ( 8 tasas distintas). * Direcci6n de Informatica Juridica. * Tasas de Justicia 177. Este frondoso esquema de tasas tiene como correlato un sistema de asignaci6n especifica de los recursos generados a los diversos organismos y reparticiones autorizados a cobrarlas. 178. El esquema en su globalidad deberia ser objeto de una revisi6n tendiente a su simplificaci6n, a la eliminaci6n de procedimientos y tramites o actuaciones que no reportan un servicio genuino a la comunidad y constituyen verdaderos impuestos carentes de apropiada justificacion doctrinaria, y a generar procesos de costeo eficientes de los servicios genuinos que brinda el estado y puede recuperar por medio de cargas al usuario o beneficiario de los mismos. III. BREVE REFERENCIA A LOS TRIBUTOS MUNICIPALES5 Las principales fuentes de ingresos municipales estan dadas por: II) 1. Contribucion Sobre Inmuebles 179. Estan sujetos a este tributo todos los inmuebles ubicados parcial o totalmente en el ejido municipal, y en zonas directa o indirectamente beneficiadas por cualquiera de los siguientes servicios municipales: barrido y limpieza, higienizaci6n, conservaci6n y mantenimiento de calles, suministro de agua potable, limpieza y conservaci6n de plazas y espacios verdes, inspecci6n de baldios, conservaci6n de arboles, nomenclatura parcelaria o por cualquier otro servicio municipal no retribuido por medio de una contribuci6n especial. 3 Sc emplea como referencia para el andlisis al caso de Cdrdoba CapitaL - 260 - ANNEX II Los responsables del gravamen son los titulares del dominio. 180. Base imponible.Esta dada por la valuaci6n del inmueble establecida por las direcciones de catastro municipales. Como excepcion a esta disposici6n ciertas empresas estatales provinciales (Energia, Agua) y nacionales (Ferrocarriles Argentinos) tnrbutan segun alicuta reducida aplicada a los metros lineales de frente de sus respectivas propiedades. La Direcci6n Municipal de Catastro Municipal efectua revaluos catastrales integrales cada 4 afios. Estas valuaciones catastrales pueden ser ajustadas anualmente por ordenanza municipal en base al uso de coeficientes que pueden diferenciarse por distritos y zonas. 181. Valuaci6n. Las valuaciones de inmuebles en todos los casos son un valor integrado por el valor de la tierra mAs el de las mejoras. Para la valuaci6n de las mejoras se tienen en cuenta la superficie cubierta, la categoria y edad de la construcci6n, y criterios del Departamento Ejecutivo Municipal. 182. La valuaci6n de la tierra depende de la ubicaci6n del predio, de la cantidad de metros lineales de frente y fondo, y de la superficie del predio. El c6digo municipal detalla un procedimiento de puntaje para establecer la categoria de las mejoras que se dividen en 4 categorias. 183. Alicuotas. La tasa general para inmuebles de las categorias I y 2 es del 3.3 por mil, y para las categorias 3 y 4 del 2.3 por mil. A estas tasas generales se les adicionan tasas diferenciales por zona que pueden oscilar desde un minimo de 1.3 por mil a un maximo de 5.4 por mil. 184. Los terrenos baldios son gravados mas fuiertemente, con una tasa general del 4 por mil y tasas diferenciales segun ubicaci6n del 10 por mil y hasta el 30 por mil. 185. En un contexto como el que se propone en este documento de descentralizaci6n tributaria a los municipios y supresion del sistema actual de coparticipaci6n municipal, la transferencia a los municipios del actual impuesto inmobiliario provincial deberia contemplar la eliminaci6n de esta contribuci6n municipal sobre inmuebles o bien su adaptaci6n para convertirla en una genuina tasa contributiva. -261 - ANNEX 11 III.2. Contribucion Sobre La Actividad Comercial, Industrial tie Senricio. 186. Hecho imponible. Esta dado por el ejercicio a titulo oneroso de cualquier actividad comercial, industrial y de servicios. 187. Base imponible. Los ingresos brutos devengados en el periodo fiscal. Alicuotas. La estructura es la siguiente: actividades primarias 5 por mil actividades industriales 5 u 8 por mil construcci6n 5 por mil electricidad 5 por mil comercios mayoristas 3/5/7/8 o 10 por mil comercios minoristas 5/6/7/8/10 o 15 por mil entidades financieras 8 por mil seguros 8 por rmil locaci6n inmuebles 8 por mi transporte 5/6 u 8 por muil dep6sito y almacenamiento 6 por mil comunicaciones 6 por mil servicios al publico 5 por mul servicios a empresas 8/10/11 o 15 por mil servicios esparcimiento 6/8/11/13/14/15 o 30 por mul servicios de reparaci6n 6 por mil servicios prestados por el estadoa'1 cinemat6grafos 13 por mi 'llelectricidad $ 8.32 cada 10000 kw. gas $ 8.32 cada 10000 m3 bancos $ 43.2 por empleado 188. Como se aprecia este gravamen replica a nivel municipal el Impuesto a los Ingresos Brutos provincial, con todos los inconvenientes e ineficiencias propios de la imposicion en cascada y niveles significativos en las tasas, de hecho en muchos casos mayores que las que aplican a las mismas actividades las provincias que han adherido al Pacto Fiscal. Incluso existe una fuerte presi6n sobre actividades como la financiera y de seguros. 189. Un proceso de descentralizaci6n tributaria hacia los municipios deberia exigir como contrapartida la pronta modificaci6n de la estructura de este gravamen municipal en particular, orientandolo hacia un impuesto local puro sobre las ventas minoristas a tasas moderadas. -262 - ANNEX I I III.3 Contribucion sobre Ocupaci6n o Utilizacion de Espacios fie Dominino Puiblico. 190. El hecho imponible lo constituye la ocupaci6n o utilizaci6n de subsuelo, superficie o espacio aereo del dominio puiblico municipal. Se aplican tasas de monto fijo. III.4. Contribucioon Sobre Cementerios. 191. En rigor se trata de numerosas tasas que remuneran distintos tipos de servicios referidos a las inhumaciones asi como el uso de terrenos, panteones, nichos etc. III. 5 Contribuci6n sobre Construccion de Obras. 192. La existencia de estos derechos, con una definici6n de base imponible que los convierte en verdaderos impuestos al capital, induce a la no declaraci6n de las mejoras que se introducen a las propiedades, perjudicando la recaudaci6n de la contribuci6n municipal sobre inmuebles y del propio inmobiliario provincial. Una alternativa seria la supresi6n directa de esta tasa o la fijaci6n de valores muy moderados para la misma. IV. ASIGNACION DE POTESTADES TRIBUTARIAS ENTRE LA PROVINCIA Y LOS MUNICIPIOS. COPARTICIPACION MUNICIPAL IV 1.Asignaci6n de potestades tributarias provincia-ntunicipio 193. La Constituci6n Provincial reconoce la autonomia municipal politica, administrativa, econ6mica, financiera e institucional. 194. En el articulo 188 de la C.P. se enuncian las fuentes de recursos municipales: . los impuestos que aut6nomamente establezca el municipio a condici6n de que ejerza tal potestad sin colisionar con principios constitucionales de tributaci6n (proporcionalidad de las cargas y no confiscatoriedad) y en manera arm6nica respecto del regimen tributario federal y provincial. . los precios puiblicos municipales (tasas, derechos, contribuciones por mejoras, patentes), las multas y los ingresos de capital provenientes de la disposici6n, explotaci6n o administraci6n del patrimonio municipal. . los ingresos provenientes de la coparticipacion municipal. 195. Las potestades tributarias que la C.P. reconoce a los municipios en los hechos estan limitadas por las disposiciones de la Ley Convenio 23548 de Coparticipaci6n Federal de Impuestos que en su Parte II art. 9 obliga a las provincias, a sus organismos administrativos y municipios a no aplicar gravamnenes locales analogos a los nacionales comprendidos en dicha ley convenio. 196. Sin embargo no existen limitantes legales efectivos respecto a las potestades tributarias municipales cuando ellas colisionan con tributos provinciales, particularmente en el caso de impuestos -263- ANNEX II inmobiliarios. Las nticas restricciones significativas son las del articulo 9 de la ley de coparticipaci6n municipal que preven la suspensi6n de la coparticipaci6n municipal a aquellos municipios que establezcan tributos que afecten al Convenio Multilateral o fij en la Contribuci6n sobre la Actividad Comercial, Industrial y de Servicios por encima de los niveles de 1985 (0.5%). 197. En relaci6n a las potestades tributarias Provincia-Municipio en la mayoria de las provincias argentinas rige un sistema segun el cual el gobiemo provincial legisla, recauda y fiscaliza los siguientes impuestos: Ingresos Brutos, Inmobiliario, Patentes Automotor y Sellos, coparticipando la recaudaci6n de los tres primeramente mencionados con sus municipios y en menos ocasiones el producido del impuesto de Sellos. 198. Por su parte los municipios cobran tasas y contribuciones que en la practica adquieren la caracteristica de impuestos sobre la propiedad inmobiliaria y sobre el giro de los negocios dando lugar a una doble imposici6n respecto al Inrmobiliario y a Ingresos Brutos provinciales. 199. Este esquema reconoce apartamientos de distinta intensidad, no solamente relacionados con el porcentaje de coparticipaci6n que la provincia reconoce a los municipios sino directamente con la asignaci6n de las facultades tributarias. 200. La diferencia mas notoria se da en la provincia de Chubut que ha descentralizado plenamente a los municipios el impuesto a las Patentes Automotor, el impuesto Inmobiliario Urbano e Ingresos Brutos (excepto en lo que son contribuyentes del Convenio Multilateral, es decir con actividad comercial no circunscripta a la provincia). 201. C6rdoba tambien se aparta del patr6n usual, aunque en forma menos marcada que Chubut, al haber descentralizado la recaudaci6n y fiscalizaci6n de Patentes Automotor en los municipios e invertido el esquema de coparticipaci6n de este tributo, puesto que es el nivel inferior (municipios) quien transfiere parte de la recaudaci6n (40%) al nivel superior (provincia). Sin embargo el gravamen continiua siendo legislado por la provincia, que es la encargada de fijar la base imponible y las alicuotas. 202. En consecuencia dada la asignaci6n de potestades tributarias provincia-municipio vigente en C6rdoba, es de presumir que esta jurisdicci6n sea una de las de mayor descentralizaci6n tributaria. Esta circunstancia explica parcialmente que en C6rdoba los recursos municipales propios representen en promedio el 55% de los recursos municipales corrientes totales mientras que en la mayoria de las jurisdicciones este cociente en general oscila en el 4045% lV 2. Coparticipacidn Impositiva MunicipaL 2.1. Distribucion Primaria 2.1.1. Masa cogarticipable 203. La Constituci6n Provincial fija taxativamente (art. 188) un limite inferior (20%) a los recursos que deben recibir los municipios provenientes de la coparticipaci6n de impuestos provinciales y federales, pero no determina la composici6n de la "masa" coparticipable en el caso de los tributos provinciales. - 264 - ANNEX I I 204. Es la "Ley de Coparticipaci6n Impositiva de Municipios y Comisiones Vecinales" (Ley 7535 y modificatorias 7644 y 7850) la que determina en su art. I que dicha masa coparticipable se compone con: . el 20 % del impuesto sobre los Ingresos Brutos . el 20 % del impuesto Inmobiliario Basico y Adicional. el 20 % de los impuestos nacionales sujetos al regimen de coparticipaci6n federal de impuestos. 205. En el siguiente cuadro se observa que salvo el caso de Neuquen y el ya mencionado de Chubut, son pocas las jurisdicciones que presentan coeficientes de apropiaci6n para la formaci6n de la masa coparticipable superiores a los de C6rdoba (circunstancia que se haria mas marcada si se ponderaran los coeficientes por el peso cuantitativo de cada una de las fuentes tributarias) en especial para el caso de los recursos de coparticipaci6n federal. Cabe mencionar que entre las provincias grandes C6rdoba y Santa Fe aparecen con las apropiaciones para la masa coparticipable mas favorables a los municipios asi como con un nivel superior de descentralizaci6n tributaTia. Cuadro I PORCENTAJES LEGALES DE APROPRACION DE LA MASA COPARlICIPABLE POR IMPUESTO PROVINCIA CAP. FED ING. INMOBIL. INMOBIL. AUTOMOT. SELLOS REGALIAS BRUTOS URBANO RURAL BSAIRES. 14.4 14.4 14.4 14.4 14.4 14.4 CATAMARCA 8.51 28.0 10.0 10.0 71.0 0.0 CORDOBA 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 60.0 0.0 CORRIENTES 10.0 10.0 100.0 10.0 100.0 10.0 CHACO 15.5 15.5 0.0 0.0 15.5 0.0 - CHUBUT 10.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 16.0 ENTRE RIOS 15 0 30.0 24.0 24.0 60.0 0.0 - FORMOSA 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 - JUltY 5.5 33.0 20.0 20.0 100.0 0.0 - LAPAMPA 10.71 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 21 0 - LA RIOJA 10.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 0 0 - MENDOZA 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.0 70.0 14.0 12.0 MISIONES 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 - NEUQUEN 20.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 0.0 0.0 12.0 RIONEGRO 10.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 0.0 10.0 SALTA 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 100.0 15.0 - SAN JUAN SAN LUIS 8.0 0.0 16.0 16.0 50.0 0.0 - SANTA CRUZ 11.0 40.0 100.0 0.0 100 0 40.0 7.0 SANTA FE 13.43 8 0 50.0 50.0 90.0 0.0 - SGO.ESTERO 16.83 25.0 25.0 25.0 40.0 25.0 TUCUMAN 16.49 0.0 12.0 12.0 85.0 0.0 - PROMEDIOS 12.78 25.6 32.63 18.83 56.70 7.78 11.40 NOTAS: BS.AIRES rgimen vigente en 1994. IUJUY reintvigenteen 1984 SAN JUAN regimnen vigente en 1992 con sumas fijas sin porcentajes RIO NEGRO rgimen vigernc en 1994 con una cluisula de garantia La recaudacion por encima de la garantizada sc coparticipa a]I t0 RESTO regrmrees %igntes en 1992. AUTONMOTORES se lo incluye como masa coparticipable aun cuando en varias procias ha sido tramnsfrido a los municipios. - 265 - ANNEX 11 206. Resulta util comparar el coeficiente efectivo de distribucion primaria vigente en C6rdoba con el del conjunto de provincias argentinas y realizar igual comparaci6n entre el cociente del gasto municipal respecto al gasto consolidado (provincia mas municipios). Para ello se ponderan los coeficientes legales contenidos en el cuadro anterior por las respectivas recaudaciones. 207. El cuadro 2 muestra que C6rdoba posee un coeficiente de distribucion primaria efectivo de 21.9% de la masa coparticipable (incorporando a la misma el impuesto automotor que es recaudado por los mumcipios) cuando para el conjunto de las jurisdicciones tal coeficiente es de 16.17 % . Paralelamente el gasto municipal es equivalente en C6rdoba al 29.63 % del gasto consolidado provincial y municipal cuando en el conjunto de las provincias este porcentaje es del 21.8 % . Cuadro 2 Total Pcias Cordoba Coeficientes Distribuci6n Pnrmana Tributos Provinciales 22.35 23.83 Coparticipaci6n Federal 12.76 20.00 Coeficiente Conjunto 16.17 21.90 Gasto Municipal: 21.80 29.63 (Gasto Municipal mnAs Gasto Provincial) 2.1.2. Distribucion 2.1.3. Pre-coparticipaciones. 208. La masa coparticipable no se distfibuye en forma total y directa entre los municipios, porque existen cuatro apropiaciones (o pre-coparticipaciones) con finalidades diversas: (a) el 2.63% de la masa coparticipable se apropia para ser distribuido entre la Comisiones Vecinales que hubieren estado constituidas como tales al momento de entrar en vigencia la Ley de coparticipaci6n municipal (o del recalculo de los coeficientes de distribuci6n secundaiia segun la metodologia que ella fija). (b) el 1.75% se apropia para integrar un Fondo que el Ejecutivo Provincial afecta a: ILotorgar participaci6n en los recursos coparticipables a las municipalidades y comisiones vecinales que se formen con posterioridad a la vigencia de la Ley de coparticipaci6n municipal (o al ultimo recalculo de sus coeficientes secundafios), en cuyo caso reciben una cuota parte igual a la del municipio o comisi6n vecinal con menor indice de participaci6n y, 2.asistir financieramente a las municipalidades y comisiones vecinales con dificultades financieras. Finalizado el ejercicio anual y si los recursos de este fondo no se hubieren empleado en su totalidad, el excedente debe distribuirse entre las municipalidades (90%) y las comisiones vecinales (10%) segun los coeficientes de distribuci6n secundaria de la ley. - 266 - ANNEX 11 (c) el 4.37% se apropia para la constituci6n de un Fondo de Inversi6n Municipal que financia gastos de inversi6n y asistencia tecnica a los municipios que presenten proyectos a una unidad ejecutora constituida a tal efecto y encargada de administrar el prestamo del BIRF para municipalidades. (d). el 12.5% se apropia para constituir el Fondo de Financiamiento de la Descentralizaci6n Provincial que cubre el gasto que ocasione a las municipalidades, comunas o comisiones vecinales la transferencia de funciones y realizaci6n de determinadas obras. Si al fin del ejercicio existen excedentes se distribuyen entre los municipios (9O0%) y las comunas y comisiones (10%) segun los criterios de distribuci6n secundaria que fija la ley. 209. Este sistema de pre-coparticipaciones ha tendido a ampliarse. Mientras en 1987 (ley de Coparticipaci6n 7535) se restringia al 5% de la masa coparticipable, destinado a las comisiones vecinales existentes (3%) y a las nuevas (2%), en 1988 (ley 7644) pasa a representar el 10°/o con la incorporaci6n del Fondo de Inversi6n Municipal y en 1990 (ley 7850) llega al 21.25% que rige en la actualidad (incorporaci6n del Fondo para el financiamiento de la Descentralizaci6n Municipal). 210. Cabe revisar la conveniencia de mantener los componentes b. c. y d. del sistema de precoparticipaciones antes resumido. 211. En particular el componente b. incentiva, al garantizar financiamiento, la aparici6n de nuevas comisiones vecinales y municipios. Resulta aconsejable la eliminaci6n de este componente. 212. El componente c. da lugar a apropiaciones generales de la masa coparticipable para financiar proyectos especificos que no involucran a la totalidad de los municipios; no contemplan la descentralizaci6n de funciones basicas mayoritariamente a cargo del gobiemo provincial (educaci6n y salud) y cuyos beneficios presumiblemente tienen un ambito territorial de impacto que excede la jurisdicci6n municipal-; no implican acciones generales de asistencia tecnica y fortalecimniento institucional para el conjunto de las municipalidades. Se trata de programas y proyectos especificos que generan beneficios claramente apropiables por el municipio y sus habitantes. 213. Adicionalmente si bien el mecanismo de asignaci6n del Fondo de Inversi6n Municipal opera en base a criterios tecnicos, de hecho es probable que las condicionalidades para el acceso al programa (basicamente referidas a la situaci6n financiera de los municipios y su capacidad de endeudamiento) sean cumplidas en mayor medida por los municipios mas ricos, que a su vez cuentan con mayor informaci6n y mejores aptitudes institucionales para generar proyectos aptos para obtener este tipo de financiamiento. Se sugiere la eliminacion del componente c. 214. En el caso del componente d. (Fondo para el Financiamiento de la Descentralizaci6n Provincial) en la practica el mismo actua como en mecanismo que difiere la percepci6n del 12.5% de los fondos de coparticipaci6n por parte de los municipios y en mayor medida a aquellos que no los apliquen al financiamiento de determinadas obras. Este condicionamiento es debil por cuanto ningun municipio puede obtener una participaci6n en los recursos del fondo superior a su coeficiente de distribuci6n secundaria y este le es reconocido (aunque mas tardiamente) tambien a los municipios que no firman convenios de descentralizaci6n. Por otra parte no existe un proceso - 267 - ANNEX I I de evaluaci6n costo beneficio de los proyectos que financia este fondo ni un seguimiento eficaz del desenvolvimiento de los convenios. Se sugiere la eliminacion del componente d. 215. La desaparici6n de los componentes b. c. y d. libera 18.62 puntos porcentuales de la masa coparticipable de los que se pueden asignar 0.37 a las Comisiones Vecinales y 18.25 a los municipios, quedando las participaciones relativas de estos entes en el 3% y el 97% respectivamente de la masa coparticipable. Asimismo en lo referido a la apropiaci6n a las Comisiones Vecinales se sugiere que la distribuci6n sea en proporci6n a la poblaci6n eliminado el sistema actual (50% partes iguales y 500/a en proporci6n al presupuesto). 2.1.3. Transferencias Automaticas a los Municipios. 216. El 78.75 % de la masa coparticipable es distribuida en la actualidad en forrna quincenal por el Banco de la Provincia de C6rdoba al conjunto de municipalidades constituidas como tales al comienzo de la vigencia de la ley de coparticipaci6n o del recalculo de los indices de participacion segun fija esta ley. 217. La distribuci6n secundaria de estos recursos se realiza seguin el siguiente esquema: a. el 65% se distribuye en base a 4 criterios 62% en proporci6n a la poblaci6n 28% en partes iguales 5% entre los municipios con crecimiento de la poblaci6n igual o inferior al crecimiento promedio de la poblaci6n provincial. Entre los municipios beneficiados la distribuci6n es inversamente proporcional a su crecimiento demografico respecto al promedio provincial. 5% en proporci6n directa a la eficiencia recaudadora del municipio en el impuesto a los automotores. b- el 20% en proporci6n directa a la participaci6n de cada municipio en la recaudaci6n total de la Contribuci6n sobre la Actividad Industrial, Comercial y de Servicios. c. el 15% restante se distribuye en proporci6n a los gastos de personal. 218. Se sugiere en el corto plazo eliminar la distribuci6n en base a los gastos en personal e incorporar el 15% en el prorrateador a. - 268 - ANNEX I1 219. En el corto plazo la coparticipacion impositiva sugerida quedaria conformada de la siguiente manera: masa coparticipable 20% Inmobiliario 20% Ingresos Brutos 20% Imp.Coparticip. Nac. distribuci6n primaria 97% Municipios 3% Comisiones Vecinales distribuci6n secundaria Municipios 49.6% Poblacion 22.4% Partes Iguales 4.0% Inversa al Crecimiento de la Poblacion 4.0% Proporcional Recaudaci6n Automotores 20.0% Proporcional Recaudaci6n Comercio,lndustria y Servicios. Comnisiones Vecinales Proporcional a la poblaci6n 220. Este seria un regimen transitorio que como tal s6lo pretende eliminar prorrateadores que inducen el exceso de gasto de los municipios (los ligados al gasto en personal y al tamafio del presupuesto) y no alterar excesivamente la distribuci6n secundaria hoy vigente. 221. Como sistema permanente se propone avanzar en el sentido de profundizar la descentralizaci6n tributaria, la eliminaci6n de la coparticipaci6n impositiva e introducci6n de un sistema acotado de transferencias fijas igualadoras de capacidades fiscales para los municipios menos desarrollados segun el esquema que se expone a continuaci6n. V. PROPUESTA DE MEDIANO PLAZO PARA ORGANIZAR LAS RELACIONES FINANCIERAS PROVINCIA-MUNICIPIOS 222. Avanzar en el proceso de descentralizacion tributaria hacia los municipios y replantear la naturaleza del regimen de transferencias a los municipios. 223. Este regimen deberia dejar de ser un sistema por el cual la Provincia y los Municipios comparten ingresos tributarios para transformarse en uno donde las transferencias sirvan para la igualacion territorial de la oferta de una "canasta basica" de bienes publicos locales. Este nuevo regimen de transferencias, de hecho cuantitativamente inferior al hoy vigente, asumiria el caricter explicito de subsidio regional orientado a reforzar las fuentes tributarias propias de los municipios con bases tributarias relativamente debiles y-o costos mas elevados de provisi6n de los servicios. 224. Asi definido el cambio en el regimen de transferencias adquiere independencia de las modificaciones en la asignaci6n de responsabiidades de gasto entre el gobiemo provincial y los municipales. Aun cuando estas no se modifiquen simultaneamente con la descentralizaci6n tributaria, esta filtima podria desarrollarse porque, dependiendo de la profundidad de la descentralizaci6n - 269 - ANNEX I 1 impositiva (y de las tasas que fijen los municipios para los impuestos transferidos) se producira un aumento de los recursos propios municipales y una consecuente dissminuci6n del monto actual de transferencias provincia]es hacia municipios. 225. En esencia el nuevo sistema incrementaria fuertemente el grado de correspondencia fiscal a nivel de los gobiernos locales tendiendo a hacerlo pleno para los municipios con mayor base econ6mica propia y reservando el uso de transferencias solamente para las jurisdicciones mas pobres, y, dentro de ciertos mrnrgenes acotados, para aquellos que presenten costos de provisi6n de servicios mayores, para que estas ultimas puedan satisfacer un cierto nivel basico de servicios con una presi6n tributaria propia similar a la de los municipios rmas desarrollados. 226. La calidad de subsidio explicito que asumen las transferencias de la provincia al municipio hace conveniente que pasen a tener la forma de creditos presupuestarios plurianuales de monto determinado. Se trata de transferencias de monto fijo y caracter no condicionado (transferencias de nivelaci6n o igualaci6n de capacidad fiscal). 227. La distribuci6n de este monto fijo entre el subconjunto de municipios beneficiarios pasa a depender de tres factores: a. Ia intensidad de la demanda local por los servicios provistos por el municipio. b. de factores que generan costos diferenciales de provisi6n. c. de la capacidad del municipio para abastecer esa demanda a un precio (presi6n tributaria local) similar al del resto de jurisdicciones, es decir del valor real de la base imponible local. 228. La distribucion puede en consecuencia basarse en indicadores de estos tres factores tales como: poblaci6n como indicador de la intensidad de la demanda; densidad demografica del ejido municipal como indicador de diferenciales de costo (a menor densidad mayores costos) e indicadores de riqueza y de actividad o producto bruto como medida de la capacidad tributaria propia. 229. Vale recordar que la distribuci6n secundaria de ]a ley de coparticipaci6n federal 20221 que rigi6 entre 1973 y 1984 se basaba en estos tres indicadores: poblaci6n (65%), inversa de la base imponible (25%) y dispersi6n demogriifica (10%). 230. El proceso de descentralizaci6n tributaria deberia contemplar la transferencia plena a nivel municipal del impuesto a los Automotores (hoy en dia recaudado y fiscalizado por los municipios pero coparticipado por la provincia en un 40%) y del impuesto inmobiliario urbano y rural. 231. Desde el punto de vista de los gobiernos locales el manejo del impuesto inmobiliario no debe provocar la sustituci6n de la tasa retributiva de servicios que hoy perciben sino la adecuaci6n de esta ultima para que sea una carga genuina al usuario y no un impuesto encubierto. 232. El excesivo enfasis en la uniforrnidad territorial de las tasas del impuesto inmobiliario (presente en el "Pacto Fiscal" para el caso de los impuestos inmobiliarios provinciales) no tiene demasiado justificativo desde la perspectiva del federalismo fiscal dada la inmovilidad de la base imponible y la capitalizaci6n de los impuestos diferenciales en el valor de la propiedad. Por otra parte la uniformidad - 270 - ANNEX 1 1 de alicuotas es siempre mas te6rica que real en la medida en que es facil eludirla por ajustes en las valuaciones catastrales. 233. La experiencia recogida en las visitas al municipio de C6rdoba, a la Direccion de Rentas Provincial y al Catastro Provincial indican que es superior la administraci6n y fiscalizaci6n municipal de las tasas asimilables a los impuestos provinciales sobre Ingresos Brutos e Inmobilianro que la que cumple la Provincia respecto a estos gravamenes. Ello se refleja en los mejores indices de cumplimiento en el pago de las tasas municipales. VI. ADMINISTRACION TRIBUTARIA 1. Direcci6n General De Rentas. Funciones y Estructura 234. La Direcci6n General de Rentas tiene por objeto procurar los recursos provinciales en formna eficaz. Su estructura administrativa (Ver organigrama adjunto) se halla conformada de la siguiente manera: AREAS FUNCIONALES MISIONES Direcci6n General Procurar los recursos Tributanos Subdireccion Provinciales en forma ceficiente Subdireocion Facilitar y controlar cl cumplimiento de los deberes formales y sustanciales por parte de los contribuventes y responsables en el ambito geografico de su competencia Subdirecci6n de Promover, mediantc la gesti6n extrajudicial y Recaudacion Judicial judicial, el ingreso dc los tributos adeudados en el ambito geografico dc su competencia Subdireccion del Facilitar y controlar el cumplimiento de los Interior deberes formales y sustanciales por parte de los contribuyentes y responsables en el ambito geografico de su competencia. Sudirecci6n de Crear una adecuada conducta tributaria y determinar Fiscalizacion el exacto cumplimiento de sus obligaciones por los contribuyentes N responsables en todo cl ambito de la Provincia y demas jurisdicciones Departanmento Procurar que los programas dc administraci6n Tributaria Adrninistrativo esten provistos de los medios humanos, materiales v financieros adecuados, efcctuar los procesos operativos -271- ANNEX 11 235. La divisi6n institucional de la Direcci6n General de Rentas Provincial se asienta en Delegaciones, instaladas en las 18 ciudades mas importantes del territorio. Ademas cuenta con 10 Receptorias, 9 en el interior provincial y una en la Provincia de Santa Fe (Rosario). 236. El Organismo no posee autonomia administrativa y/o financiera. El Director General autoriza el gasto conforrne lo preceptuado por las siguientes leyes: Presupuesto, de Ejecuci6n del Presupuesto y de Contabilidad. 237. Asimismo el Ministro de Econornia y Finanzas fija a traves de Resoluciones, los montos autorizados a gastar por cada repartici6n de sus dependencias (Caja Chica). 238. En cuanto a la organizaci6n funcional de esta repartici6n, la misma esta plasmada en el manual de misiones y funciones en base a la estructura organica aprobada por Decreto N° 755 del afio 1981 modificada por Decreto N° 3822/91. 239. Los procesos administrativos no se encuentran instrumentados por escrito ni se cuenta con cursogramnas o circuitos de informaci6n. 240. No existen programas de capacitaci6n ni adiestramiento especifico de los Recursos Humanos de la D.G.R. 241. S61o el Area de Sistemas se la capacita respecto de las actualizaciones del Software de Base (nuevas versiones) . 2. Personal 242. El cuadro 1 resume la asignaci6n de personal por areas funcionales, discriminando la situaci6n de revista del mismo (personal planta permanente, contratado y pasantes). _______ ______ ______ C uadro I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ SECTOR P.PERM. cbNTRATo PASANTES TOTAL Direcci6n General 57 3 14 74 Recaudaci6n Judicial 26 3 11 40 Interior 27 1 24 52 Delegaciones 109 48 0 157 Administrativo 38 2 0 40 Recaudaci6n 119 24 57 200 Fiscalizaci6n 107 52 5 164 Totales 483 133 I11 727 243. El cuadro 2 contiene el detalle del personal asignado a las delegaciones del interior de la provincia, y los cuadros 3 y 4 detallan la asignaci6n del personal en los dos sectores claves de la Direcci6n de Rentas, el area de recaudaci6n (cuadro 3) y el area de fiscalizaci6n (cuadro 4). - 272 - ANNEX 1 1 Cuadro 2 Asignaci6n del Personal Subdirecci6n del Personal Delegaciones P. Pernm. Contalo Total Arroyito 2 3 5 Bell Vile 6 4 11 Buenos Aires 4 1 5 Canals 3 3 6 Carlos Paz 6 1 7 Cosquin 7 7 Cruz del Eje 5 1 6 Dean Funes 5 1 6 Huinca Renanco 4 3 7 LaCarlota 5 1 6 Labolaye 5 1 6 Marcos JuArez 6 5 11 Rio Cuarto 10 8 18 Rio Tercero 7 2 9 San Francisco 4 9 13 Villa Maria 3 3 Villa Dolores 9 1 10 Villa Maria 13 13 Mina Clavero (Rec.) 2 2 Las Varillas (Rec.) 2 2 Calamuchita (Rec.) I I Morteros (Rec.) 2 2 Cap. del Monte (Rec.) I I La Falda (Rec.) I I Corral dc Bustos (Rec.) 1 1 TOTAL 109 48 157 - 273 - ANNEX I1 Cuadro 2 Asignaci6n del Personal Subdirecci6n del Personal Delegaciones P. Pern. Contrato Total Arro)ito 2 3 5 Bel Vile 6 4 11 Buenos Aires 4 1 5 Canals 3 3 6 Carlos Paz 6 1 7 Cosquin 7 7 Cruz del Eje 5 1 6 Dean Funes 5 1 6 Huinca Renanco 4 3 7 La Carlota 5 1 6 Laboulaye 5 1 6 Marcos JuArez 6 5 11 Rio Cuarto 10 8 18 Rio Tercero 7 2 9 San Francisco 4 9 13 Villa Maria 3 3 Villa Dolores 9 1 10 VillaMaria 13 13 Mina Clavero (Rec.) 2 2 Las Varilas (Rec.) 2 2 Calamuchita (Rec.) I I Morteros (Rec.) 2 2 Cap. del Monte (Rec.) I 1 La Falda (Rec.) I I Corral de Bustos (Rec.) I I TOTAL 109 48 157 - 274 - ANNEX I 1 Cuadro 3 Asignacion Personal Subdirecci6n del Personal Sector P.Penn. Contrato Pasantes Total Subdirecci6n I I Ingresos Brutos 20 2 10 32 Grandes Contribuyentes 9 18 1 28 Convenio Multilateral 6 4 10 Colegio Escribanos 4 1 5 SeUos 10 1 II Agentes Retenci6n 7 1 4 12 Impuestos 3 1 4 Resolutivo 7 7 14 Extrajudicial 11 5 16 Control Deuda 5 1 7 13 Pago en cuotas 16 3 19 Recep. y Asesoramiento 8 12 20 Compens. y Acreditaciones 4 3 7 Exenciones 7 7 C.P.C. I 0 1 TOTAL 119 24 57 200 Cuadro 4 Asignaci6n de Personal Subdiremci6n de Ffiscalizacion Sector P. Penn. Contrato Pasantcs Total Subdirecci6n I I Sellos 11 4 15 Lnformaci6n y Revisi6n 20 15 35 Inspecci6n General 29 11 40 Grandes Contribuyentes 19 5 24 Agentes Retenci6n 16 8 24 Resolutivo 10 5 15 Buenos Aires 1 9 10 TOTAL 107 52 5 164 - 275 - ANNEX 11 244. La estructura de recursos humanos de la Direcci6n General de Rentas esta afectada por problemas de dimensionamiento, de mala distribuci6n funcional, falta de profesionalizaci6n y carencias de formaci6n gerencial. 245. La repartici6n no cuenta con regimen salarial aut6nomo. Existe un regimen de incentivaci6n "ADICIONAL FONDO ESTIMUJLO", establecido por la Ley N° 6845, para el personal que presta servicios efectivos en la Direcci6n General, el que no puede exceder el TRES POR NIIL (3%) sobre lo recaudado en cada periodo fiscal en concepto de Impuesto sobre los Ingresos Brutos, Inmobiliario y de Sellos. De dicho porcentaje el 75% se distribuye en partes iguales entre todos los agentes que tienen derecho al mismo y el 25% restante en funci6n al basico de cada uno. La liquidaci6n y el pago se efectuia mensuatmente de acuerdo a las estimaciones de recaudaci6n, aunque no puede superar para cada agente el CINCUENTA POR CIENTO (50%) de la Asignaci6n Basica del Cargo. 246. Este regimen de incentivos que presenta obvios defectos de disefio ha de ser derogado por las autoridades, no previendose sustituto alguno. 247. La distribuci6n de la planta de personal muestra la situaci6n de debilidad que afecta al area de fiscalizaci6n en particular. Esta es una circunstancia que tiende a reiterarse en la generalidad de las provincias y resulta necesanio corregir. DISTRIBUCION FUNCIONA.XL DE LA PLANrTA DGI RENTAS CORDOBA ENTRE RIOS Recaudaci6n 34 % 41.2 % SI) Fiscalizacion 36 % 22.6 % 16% Resto 30 % 36.2 % SI) 3. Dimension de la Direccion de Rentas 248. Un indicador que puede utilizarse para medir el costo de la recaudaci6n tributaria es el que relaciona la recaudaci6n con el gasto de la agencia encargada de tal funci6n. En Cordoba el presupuesto de la Direcci6n de Rentas representa el 1,8% de la recaudaci6n tributaria provincial propia. AS O RECAUDACION PRESUPUESTO PORCENITAJE PROVINCIAL PROPIA D.G.R. MILES S [II (MILES)[2I [21/ [11 1993 754585 13654 1.81% 1994 903725 16612 1.84% 249. No se cuenta con informaci6n sobre otras direcciones de rentas provinciales a efectos de realizar comparaciones, sin embargo el costo de la recaudaci6n tributaria de C6rdoba resulta inferior al - 276 - ANNEX I I de la recaudaci6n tributaria nacional, que se sitiia en el 2,73% para 1993 y en el 2,02% en 1994 (computando solamente el presupuesto de la Direcci6n General Impositiva). No obstante ambos porcentajes son elevados en terminos de estandares internacionales, que muestran que el costo de la recaudaci6n deberia ubicarse en el entomo del 1%. 250. Otro indicador interesante es el de recaudacion tributaria por agente del ente encargado de tal funci6n. El siguiente cuadro compara la recaudaci6n por agente de la Direcci6n de Rentas de C6rdoba con el caso de la Direcci6n General Impositiva Nacional y con dos provincias una de ellas de tamafio intermedio (Entre Rios) y otra pequefia (Misiones). ANO 1993 A|N,'O 1994 AGENTES DEL ENTE RECAUDACION POR AGENTES DEL ENTE RECAUDACION POR RECAUDADOR AGENTE RECAUDADOR AGENTE _ILES S MILES S CORDOBA 704 1072 727 1243 DGI NACIONAL 21829 1245 20136 2074 ENTRE RIOS 480 426 480 629 MISIONETS 240 325 245 384 4. El Equipamiento Computacionaly de Comunicaciones. 251. La modalidad de posesi6n del equipamiento es contrataci6n-alquiler, con una duraci6n del contrato de 6 (seis) aeos. 252. La incorporaci6n del equipamiento informatico se llev6 a acabo en 1988, habiendose efectuado una ampliaci6n al mismo en 1991. Los impuestos que se encuentran parcialmente informatizados son: Impuesto Inmobiliario 253. El sistema actual estA desarrollado en lenguajes COBOL/CISC bajo Base de Datos DLI Oa mas antigua de las bases jerarquicas), considerablemente rigida ante necesidades de modificaci6n. Este sistema de informaci6n esta centralizado en el equipo de la Direcci6n de Procesamiento Electr6nico de Datos (D.P.E.D.), existiendo por ende dependencia tecnol6gica de esa Direcci6n. El nucleo central del sistema fue desarrollado en 1978 y 1980. 254. El mismo no permite el cruce de informaci6n de pagos y liquidaci6n del impuesto; la cancelaci6n se efectiua por periodo sin tenerse en cuenta los montos. No constitye un proceso apto para detectar incumplimiento impositivo. 255. Este sistema esta relacionado con el Registro General de la Provincia -quien es responsable de la Titularidad de Dominio- y la Direcci6n General de Catastro de la Provincia -que administra las unidades parcelarias-. - 277 - ANNEX 11 256. Respecto a las claves de acceso, para ingresar al sistema se requiere el tipeo de la identificaci6n del area que maneja el sistema, cada operador tiene su identificaci6n con acceso a ciertos procesos y restricciones a otros. Estas claves pueden ser cambiadas a pedido del usuario, en fiinci6n de las necesidades. Esto se hace por nota a la D.P.E.D. por lo cual, la o las personas encargadas de realizar esta modificaci6n, toman conocimiento de las mismas. Los procesos que se realizan para este impuesto son: a) Emisi6n general de comprobantes de pago. b) Emisi6n a pedido de comprobantes de pagos. c) Planes de pago en Cuotas. d) Liquidaciones de deuda atrasada a pedido. e) Liquidaciones de deuda para gesti6n judicial cuya selecci6n se realiza en forma discrecional f) Se emiten intimaciones g) Cambio de domicilios sin documentaci6n respaldatoria en linea sobre un archivo secundario. h) Emisi6n de informes notoriales yjudiciales. No se encuentran desarrollados los siguientes sistemas: - Sistema de Cuenta Corriente - Sistema de Informaci6n de Gesti6n que permita efectuar diagn6sticos y orientar la fiscalizaci6n - No es posible analizar la historia de los datos catastrales por lo que no se realizan analisis retroactivos de los ahos no prescriptos. - Sistema de Loteadores: s6lo contiene informaci6n bAsica (Declaraciones Juradas), es decir que no tiene desarrollo de la informaci6n referente a acreditaci6n de pagos. - Sistema de Retroactividades: el desarrollo estA incompleto y no tiene conectividad con la base principal, lo que provoca el reingreso de la informaci6n por redigitaci6n, entre otras la de pagos. Sistema de Gesti6n Extrajudicial y Judicial: no se ha desarrollado la informatizaci6n de las etapas administrativas ni del seguiniento de las mismas. Sistema de Impuesto Inmobiliario Adicional; s6lo contiene informaci6n bAsica (Declaraciones Juradas), sin conformar una base de datos. - 278 - ANNEX 11 Imnuesto sobre los Ineresos Brutos 257. El desarrollo de la informatizaci6n de este impuesto comenz6 en 1988. 258. Se administran contribuyentes Locales, contribuyentes de Convenio Multilateral y Agentes de Retenci6n. Los sistemas desarrollados abarcan: - Altas Bajas y Modificaciones (en tiempo real) Registro de Pagos por periodos no prescriptos Inicio de los juicios (en forma discrecional) y seguimiento de los mismos. La liquidaci6n de deudas en gesti6n judicial no se encuentra desarrollada. - EnEmisi6n de comprobantes a pedido y en el caso de financiaci6n, emisiones generales. - Emisi6n de intimaciones. - Emisi6n de Informes por contribuyentes en donde constan los datos basicos del mismo y la informaci6n resumen de pagos, facilidades y periodos reclamados. Los datos contenidos en la base de datos abarcan: a) Identificaci6n de la sede del negocio, actividad que desarrolla, situaci6n actual del mismo. b) Domicilios adicionales que pueda fijar el contribuyente en Convenio Multilateral -con sede en otra Jurisdiccion-. c) Informaci6n de deuda determinada o presunta por periodo y concepto a reclamar (s6lo de los que se encuentran en proceso de analisis). d) Regimen y vigencia de exenciones para el contribuyente. e) Que otras figuras asume el contribuyentes respecto de la D.G.R. (Ej.: Agente de Retenci6n y su numero, Contribuyente por Declaraci6n Jurada para el Impuesto de Sellos, etc.) f) Contribuyente dado de baja. g) Historia del regimen de pago adoptado por el contribuyente (unicamente cuando cambia el originalmente declarado). h) Relaci6n con otros organismos recaudadores o de informaci6n, en los cuales el contribuyente se halle inscripto. - 279 - ANNEX I1 i) Registro de pagos para el contribuyente por anio con la totalidad de pagos que ha realizado (abarca periodos no prescriptos). j) Nombre de los responsables de sociedades legaimente constituidas y nombre de los integrantes en sociedades de hecho. Existen aspectos fundamentales que no se han desarrollado: Sistema de Declaraciones Juradas: los datos de las Declaraciones Juradas no se encuentran cargados, faltando la implementaci6n del recalculo y control de las mismas. Sistema de Liquidaci6n de Deuda, periodos incluidos en la misma (informaci6n discriminada de los importes por accesorios) y forma de pago. El desarrollo no se halla completo, faltando la implementacion de liquidaciones para gesti6n judicial y para casos especificos, como contribuyentes con cambios de regimen de pago. Contribuyentes con Gesti6n Judicial iniciada: Control y seguimiento. Se carece de este desarrollo. Sistema de pago en Cuotas: datos de la presentaci6n de plan de facilidades de pago para el contribuyente. El mismo no cuenta con el seguimiento ante incumplimientos hasta llegar a su cobro o caducidad. Sistema de Cuenta Coriente: no se posee. 259. Los pagos de los impuestos ingresan a traves de las rendiciones de las instituciones bancarias. Para el control de las mismas se ha desarrollado la Base de Datos RENDICIONES. 260. Las rendiciones se efectuan en forma diaria y se presentan en la D.G.R. a traves de soportes magneticos, para su incorporaci6n a la base, lo que permite la correcci6n de los comprobantes con informaci6n err6nea y como resultado de estos procesos, se obtiene el listado de comisiones bancafias pagadas mensualmente para su registraci6n por contaduria General y Tribunal de Cuentas. En este sistema se efectua: - Conciliaci6n diaria con cada uno de los bancos adheridos a la percepci6n de Impuestos Provinciales. - Conciliaci6n a nivel de lotes y comprobantes. - Determinaci6n de comisiones bancarias. - Extracci6n de informaci6n para cancelaci6n en el sistema de Impuesto sobre los Ingresos Brutos. - 280 - ANNEX 11 Generaci6n de cinta de Pagos para remisi6n a la Direcci6n de Procesamiento Electr6nico de Datos a efectos de su cancelaci6n en el Sistema de Impuesto Inmobiliario. Estadistica de recaudaci6n con la creaci6n de subtotales para Rendiciones Bancarias, que permite discriminar en los distintos items componentes, el total recaudado. Ciertos servicios la D.G.R los contrata con terceros, tal el caso de: Impresi6n, armado y distribuci6n de emisi6n general de chequeras de pagos de Impuesto sobre los Ingresos Brutos. Digitaci6n de comprobantes de pago que no ingresen por soportes magneticos debido a errores. 261. Las comunicaciones con las DELEGACIONES y las RECEPTORIAS se efectua por el sistema puerta a puerta. 262. Con las delegaciones Rio Cuarto, Villa Maria, San Francisco, Villa Carlos Paz y Capital Federal, existe un sistema de teleproceso via ARPAC utilizado solamente para Impuesto Inmobiliario. 263 Debe tenerse en cuenta que la D.G.R. se encuentra descentralizada en diferentes Distritos (Capital y 18 Delegaciones del Interior y 10 Receptorias) que son generadoras de informaci6n que, ante las carencias en el area de informatica y comunicaciones, es transcripta en forma manual al "formulario de novedad" o bien la documentaci6n original, para ser postenrormente giradas por un sistema puerta a puerta el Departamento Interior (en DGR de Cordoba Capital), la que controlada y clasificada es ingresada a las respectivas Bases de Datos o enviada a la D.P.E.D., segiun corresponda. 264. Asimismo los aspectos de Seguridad presentan notonras falencias. 265. El ambiente de seguridad l6gica es inadecuado y/o incompleto lo cual pone al sistema informatico en un estado de alto riesgo, con debilidades tales como: Usuarios l6gicos con acceso compartido, clave uinica para toda una divisi6n, etc. 266. Estas fallas redundan en falta de confidencialidad de la inforrnaci6n. 267. La confiabilidad de la informaci6n se ve reducida por inexistencia de adecuados controles de validaci6n, uso de c6digos de bloqueo que tienen manejo discrecional, falta de periodicidad en la depuraci6n de programas y datos e inexistencia de un adecuado control de gesti6n. De hecho no existe informaci6n gerencial. 268. Los sistemas no son flexibles, no permiten consultas no programadas y rapidas para el usuario ni generan un sistema de estadisticas apropiado. 269. El Sistema de Impuesto sobre los Ingresos Brutos existente es compatible con los de otros organismos de recaudaci6n perrmitiendo el intercambio de informaci6n a traves de la C.U.I.T. aunque esta facilidad no es utilizada por no estar incorporada en la base de datos de los demas impuestos -281- ANNEX II administrados por la D.G.R.. Asimismo estan previstas las otras figuras que asume el contribuyente respecto a la D.G.R. (Ejemplo. Agentes de Retenci6n y su numero, contnrbuyentes por Declaraci6n Jurada para el Impuesto de Sellos, etc.). 270. El sistema de Impuesto Inmobiliario no perrmite intercambio de informaci6n. Aspectos de la funcion fiscalizacion 271. Las debilidades informaticas del organismo y el escaso peso institucional del area de 5iscalizaci6n se aunan determninando que este sea un sector con carencias graves. 272. Otros factores que inciden negativamente sobre el cumplirmiento tributario voluntario de los contribuyentes y dificultan las tareas de fiscalizaci6on tienen que ver con la frecuente aplicaci6n de regimenes especiales de pago y moratoria impositivas y con la debilidad de las acciones de fiscalizacion del cumplimiento de quienes se acogen a estos beneficios. En los hechos no existen procesos sistematicos de intimacion para la falta de pago de las cuotas atrasadas en el caso de los planes de facilidades de pago, lo que implica una "confesi6n publica" de la debilidad del organismo que necesariamente tiende a relajar la conducta tributaria del contribuyente. No transcienden las sanciones previstas en el C6digo Tributario para los contribuyentes y/o responsables incumplidores y de hecho tampoco se aplican. 273. Tampoco es eficaz la acci6n de Recaudaci6n Judicial. BAsicamente por la incapacidad de la D.G.R. de establecer con rapidez y confiabilidad el estado de deuda de los contribuyentes. 274. En resumen los aspectos relacionados con la calidad, cantidad y oportunidad de la informaci6n presentan serias falencias para el uso confiable de los mismos en la auditoria impositiva 275. Los sistemas de informaci6n del Impuesto Sobre los Ingresos Brutos son incompletos existiendo desconocimiento real en cuanto a la estimaci6n de la potencialidad de contribuyentes que debieran estar inscriptos. 276. No se cuenta con un registro de contribuyentes dinanico y suficiente que permita extraer del mismo la informaci6n requerida para cumplimentar cada una de las actividades de la administraci6n, en particular las referidas a la fiscalizaci6n del cumplimiento. 277. La informaci6n no es producida en la forma y tiempos requeridos, por lo tanto no es posible concebir un eficaz control de las obligaciones sobre esta base. 278. No se efectuan controles de las retenciones declaradas por los contribuyentes, con las declaradas y pagadas por los agentes de retenci6n. 279. No existen calculos sobre la evasi6n en el Impuesto Sobre los Ingresos Brutos, por carecerse de datos para su elaboraci6n. 280. La fiscalizaci6n no se efectuia en base a datos objetivos provenientes de informaci6n contenida en las declaraciones juradas (como ser niveles de ingresos hist6ricos, niveles de ingreso por actividad - 282 - ANNEX I I econ6mica), o informaci6n cruzada con otros organismos (D.G.I, consumo electrico, etc.) En realidad no existen planes anuales de inspecciones. 281. El unico programa establecido es la visita a agentes de retencion. La selecci6n de contribuyentes se realiza tomando en cuenta: pedidos de otros organi'smos del estado provincial, por rubros de actividad econ6mica, por dispersi6n geografica y por tipo de responsables. 282. No existe tampoco un sistema automatizado que maneje la historia de las fiscalizaciones por contribuyentes, ni un sistema automatizado de seguimiento de la fiscalizaci6n. Deberia establecerse un sistema automatizado de carga de auditorias a cada fiscalizador, que controle y deje evidencia sobre tiempos de cada tarea, resultados de cada auditoria, etc. 283. En las delegaciones no existen areas de fiscalizaci6n. No existen manuales de procedirrientos especificos de auditorias. que homogeinicen el accionar de los fiscalizadores, reduzcan tiempos, y eviten requerimientos excesivos a los contribuyentes. 284. Solo esporAdicamente se han celebrado convenios con otros entes para la realizaci6n de fiscalizaciones conjuntas, no habiendose implementado ning6n tipo de controles fronterizos de ingresos y egresos de productos y/o prestaciones de servicios en el caso de Ingresos Brutos. 285. En el caso del Impuesto Inmobiliario, no existe control sobre lo efectivamente pagado por los contribuyentes, registrandose los pagos a valor hist6rico, no constando el ingreso de recargos y actualizaciones. 286. En cuanto a la recaudaci6n bancaria, los bancos adheridos al sistema de recaudaci6n reciben los pagos de los contnrbuyentes y graban en medios magneticos los datos registrados en las boletas de pagos. No graban los datos contenidos en las Declaraciones Juradas. 287. No se controla al Banco de la Provincia de C6rdoba en el cumplimiento de los plazos establecidos en el convenio para dep6sito de los fondos. No se controla (concilia) lo efectivamente depositado por los bancos adheridos, con lo ingresado al Tesoro Provincial. 288. La Divisi6n Recaudaci6n Bancaria envia al Departamento Analisis y programaci6n las cintas o diskettes entregada por los bancos para su conversi6n y validaci6n sin efectuar una activaci6n sistemAtica de los rechazos. 289. No se utiliza la CUIT para la identificaci6n del contribuyente, y en general no se cruza informaci6n con otros entes. 290. No se genera informaci6n programada para el control de gesti6n de recaudaci6n. 291. El cuadro siguiente resume alguna informaci6n sobre las actividades de fiscalizaci6n desarrollados por el organismo entre 1992-95 que ilustran la debilidad del accionar de la auditoria tributaria. -283 - ANNEX I1 Actividades v Resultados de Fiscalizaci6n 1992 1993 1994 1995 1. 1. Verificaciones Rapidas 860 4500 6569 1.2. Diferencias Determinadas S 12.286.475 S 37.501.487 S 19.445.123 2. 1. Resoluciones Dictadas s/d 86 43 1.2. Montos Reclamados S 14.273.735 S 10.669.577 S 8.157.525 Contribuyentes Ingresos Brutos 134.848 154.878 181.082 188.420 Inmobiliario N° Cuentas 1.244.978 1.257.083 1.301.534 1.250.328 Sellos (Cont. c/DDJJ) 700 700 700 700 1.380.526 1.412.661 1.483.316 2.922.764 5. Otras Consideraciones 292. Cabe por ultimo seinalar que esta en etapa de adjudicaci6n un Proyecto de Reforma Integral de la Direcci6n General de Rentas Provincial por medio del cual se procura el logro de los siguientes objetivos. a) Reestructuraci6n organizacional y de los procesos administrativos. - Descentralizaci6n operativa de la Administraci6n Tributaria. - Centralizaci6n normativa y de fiscalizacion. - Sistema de controles fronterizos - Reforma legislativa que acompanie los objetivos del Organismo - Servicio Administrativo Independiente. b) Recursos Humanos Redefinici6n de polifticas de personal * Sistema de incentivos y premios * Regimen laboral especial de acuerdo a las necesidades operativas. * Sistema de Retiro Voluntario * Sistema de Liquidaci6n de Haberes Cambio de cultura administrativa Capacitaci6n del personal. -284- ANNEX 11 c) Sistema de Informaci6n Integrado. Equipamiento computacional y de comunicaciones - Sistema de captura de datos y generaci6n de informaci6n de delegaciones y municipios. * Sistema de Mesa de Entradas * Sistema de Recaudaci6n * Sistema de Plan de Pagos * Sistema de Apremios Sistema de control de Administraci6n Central hacia las delegaciones y municipios. * Sistema de Mesa de Entradas * Sistema de Recaudacion * Sistema de Plan de Pagos * Sistema de Fiscalizaci6n * Sistema de Apremios Automatizaci6n de funciones y tareas. d) Padr6n de Contribuyentes. Programa de Reempadronamiento general Sistema de Actualizaci6n y Mantenimiento de Bases de Datos. - Mecanismo de Resguardo e) Comunicaci6n Social Programa de Capacitaci6n publica Programa de Informaci6n sobre Gesti6n de Fiscalizaci6n Programa de Campafias Motivacionales y Coercitivas 293. Este proyecto se complementa con otros programas en particular el de mejora de la Direcci6n General de Catastro en curso desde 1994. 294. En el caso de la Direcci6n de Catastro, la complementaci6n se basa en la actualizaci6n de la infornmaci6n catastral lo que permitiri la incorporaci6n de aproximadamente 34 millones de metros cuadrados de superficie cubierta no registrada que equivale a un incremento de 60 a 80 millones de pesos anuales en la recaudacion del impuesto inmobiliario. -285- ANNEX II 295. No existen estimaciones sobre el efecto que tendrA sobre la recaudaci6n el proyecto de mejorarniento de la Direcci6n de Rentas Provincial, al posibilitar el mejor control y fiscalizaci6n de los tributos a su cargo. 296. Sin embargo las serias falencias en el funcionamiento del organismo, especialmente en lo relacionado con su capacidad de generar y procesar informaci6n en cantidad y calidad suficiente como para permnitir una fiscalizaci6n eficaz ilevan a presumir que en plazos cortos, y mediando un desenvolvirniento exitoso del programa de reforma mencionado, podrian producirse aumentos sostenidos de la recaudacion propia provincial, adicionales a los que reportara el mejoramiento del catastro provincial. JIMAGING Report No: 15132 AR Type: SR