Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit Social Development Department Dissemination Notes `Mind the Gap': The World Bank, Humanitarian Action and Development--A Personal Account March 2003 Number 10 Although the World Bank was created to help World Bank levels saw that the institution could rebuild European countries devastated by World well fill a gap between emergency aid and the War II, putting the `R' back in the International onset of development assistance. At the same Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the time certain Bank staff, long in the tooth but full title of the World Bank, has been a case study sufficiently open-minded, were prepared to in institutional change for the multilateral agency, demonstrate that Bank projects could start to bringing it closer in recent years to the operate to good effect on the heels of humanitarian and political arena than many felt humanitarian aid without waiting for the peace to possible or desirable. Encouraged to close the be a matter of recorded history. gap between emergency relief and development, the World Bank has found it's core mission of A critical turning point, early in the World poverty reduction to be very hard to separate Bank presidency of Jim Wolfensohn, was the from the humanitarian enterprise. But what has reconstruction program in Bosnia, where in 1995 this meant in practice and what are the a trust fund was established upstream of Bank implications for the Bank's future work on lending, followed by emergency lending conflict-affected countries? mobilized more rapidly and across a wider range of activities than previously. The Bosnia At the time of the creation of the UN experience had come in the heels of the Bank's Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA), new role in the West Bank and Gaza, where in now the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian 1994 it was asked to administer the multi-donor Affairs (OCHA), no-one working in the relief and Holst Fund. The Bosnia program, however, rehabilitation programs of Liberia, Kurdistan or broke the mould, and formed the basis for a new the former Yugoslavia could be heard to question post-conflict framework which was to become "where is the Bank?" As the premier, wholesaler within three years an operational policy (the of development assistance, better known for the nearest the Bank has to an internal imperative). controversy over structural adjustment, its Following Bosnia were a series of programs in absence was taken for granted. Yet, by the time Rwanda, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, other Balkan that East Timor's struggle for independence burst states, East Timor, DRC and the Greater Great into the world scene, a Bank team was in the Lakes Region, and most recently Afghanistan. vanguard of the recovery wave. Today, for better No one doubts that the next post-conflict or worse, the Bank has a major role in reconstruction challenge would bring similar Afghanistan reconstruction, is looking to major contributions from the Bank. reengage with Sudan, and even has a strategy for constructive engagement with Somalia. And In 1998, mindful that this new direction was one of the authors, at the time of writing, like not without its problems or detractors, the Bank's other Bank staff in recent peace processes, finds quasi-independent evaluation arm, the himself an observer and resource person at the Operations Evaluation Department (OED), took a Cote d'Ivoire peace talks. long hard look at the institution's post-conflict performance. Though it found many unanswered How did this happen, and what difference questions in the transition from conflict to has it made to the international response? The development, and judged the Bank's first is easier to answer, the second more performance uneven, it concluded that the contentious. At a time when people were fretting institution had a definite comparative advantage over the relief to development gap and the need in supporting peace, at least where certain pre- to ensure a continuum--did it exist or could it be requisites and other actors were in place. The achieved?--certain visionaries at senior UN and links between sustainable peace and development--economic stability, good Here, research and events had an unexpected governance, employment generation, access to convergence. The operational policy of 2001, social services and so on--were compelling. In entitled "Development Cooperation and Conflict" addition, the Bank was in a prime position to defined the Bank's approach to conflict-affected support donor coordination and mobilize countries, not just post conflict.1 Although substantial reconstruction funds. avoiding the term conflict prevention, the policy recognized the Bank's role might extend beyond Few in the humanitarian community post-conflict reconstruction to a more proactive disagreed in principle or argued for the Bank to role in conflict-affected and vulnerable countries. withdraw. The Brahimi report was equally It exhorted Bank assistance to "minimize positive about the Bank's contribution. But was potential causes and be sensitive to conflict", the Bank tooled up to do the job, and what about while acknowledging there was much to learn in preventing conflict rather than helping with the this area. clean up? Looking back over a decade, the OED review noted that 16 percent of Bank lending was Then, findings from the Bank's research arm already tied up in post conflict settings so the (DECRG), under Paul Collier, opened up the institution was in too deep to withdraw--now it global debate on the economic causes and had to get it right. consequences of conflict. For an institution packed with economists, there had been While a small, post-conflict unit located in the surprisingly scant economic analysis or center and comprised mainly of ex UN and NGO explanation of conflict in the Bank. Bank staff (`poachers turned gamekeepers' for those economists were inclined to think of conflict as an suspicious of Bank intervention in this area) exogenous shock, akin to a natural disaster or an pushed the agenda as hard as it could, the real adverse swing in the terms of trade--something changes became apparent in the Bank's bad and unfortunate that happened from time to Regions, where operations and country relations time and which was either `not our problem' or are managed. Funding, analysis and expertise `there was nothing much we could do about it'. started flowing toward demobilization and reintegration programs, land mine clearance, Collier's research re-affirmed the links people- and community-centered rehabilitation between conflict and poverty, confirming the rather than just infrastructure, the special needs everyday observations of humanitarian agencies, of child soldiers, and a broader focus on good but also added new insights some of which were governance. As one NGO commentator dryly put not new for the humanitarian community--for it, "so the Bank has discovered peace". But what example that the temptation from having lootable it had really discovered was that in practice post natural resources (alluvial diamonds for example) conflict was where you were trying to get to, but and swelling numbers of unemployed youth, not always the starting point. greatly heightens the risks of conflict. Other findings were more controversial and sparked a Five years on from the OED study it is neither lively debate which became known as the `greed rhetoric nor an exaggeration to say that post- versus grievance' debate. The main point of conflict reconstruction has been mainstreamed in contention centered around whether this was an Bank operations. The Bank still has much to excessively `economicist' approach that ignored learn about post-conflict reconstruction and it genuine grievances and the broader discourse could always do with greater speed and on causation, a discourse that tended to be nimbleness in environments that cry out for a dominated by political scientists. Irrespective of quick response, but the processes and mind sets the outcome of the debate, it is clear that Collier's to learn from post-conflict experience and to try work changed the nature of the discussion on to respond quicker are in place and well conflict and forced most of us to at least question established within the bureaucracy. the prevailing discourse on grievance as the driver for civil wars. As the Bank's post-conflict reconstruction agenda took hold, and with the costs, complexity, risks and visibility of recovery operations running 1Operational Policy 2.30 Development Cooperation and so high, attention then turned to prevention. Conflict approved by the World Bank's Board of Executive Directors in January 2001. The raging debate on whether Collier's relatively short time, and without creating new research had mistakenly downplayed political instruments or bureaucratic responses, the work and social aspects of conflict was overtaken by of the task force brought a more nuanced the events of September 11, 2001. The proximity approach to the focus on good governance, of the attacks had a palpable personal effect on policy reform and service provision in Bank staff and prompted a genuine soul- circumstances of chronic instability, or `zero- searching and re-examination of the core Bank generation' reforms in the institutional jargon. In mission. President Wolfensohn was quick to essence, it articulated the need for some form of articulate what most people felt--that the poverty engagement, even if at a very low level, that mission was more important than ever. It wasn't could offer some, even dim, possibility of policy that poverty led to terrorism--the poor are not the reforms and change. This, some humanitarian enemy--but a sense that `failed states' offered workers and analysts had been seeking for years fertile soil on which terrorism could thrive. as a complement to their work. Although small scale terrorists can lurk in the shadows of any society, September 11 showed Taking its cue from the operational policy, that large scale terrorism needs territory outside research findings--notably that post conflict the control of a reputable government. People countries had a 50 percent chance of recurring then wondered aloud, "should we have been conflict during the first five years after the onset absent from Afghanistan for so long, was there of peace--and evolving international practice, the anything we could have done differently?" Post Conflict Unit had already been renamed the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit. Now September 11 also roughly coincided with piloting conflict analysis in vulnerable countries, another important round of research and ensuing the Unit continues to be the main central point of policy discussion, which came to be known as contact with the humanitarian community and the `aid effectiveness' debate. In a nutshell, it administers the Post Conflict Fund. This fund argued based on careful research, that aid was kick starts the Bank's re-engagement with effective but only when recipient countries conflict-affected countries through grants to adopted good policies and nurtured good governments and a wide spectrum of UN and institutions. When they did not, aid was a waste NGO relief and rehabilitation agencies. While of tax payers' money. This debate carried post-September 11 concerns muted critics who important policy implications for the donor previously detected `mission creep' in the Bank's community. It implied that donors should be conflict agenda, so the Bank's conflict unit more selective in allocating aid, rewarding the continued to translate the reality of `no good performers and, in the extreme, totally development without peace' into operational cutting off the bad performers--a `tough love' possibilities for Bank assistance and approach. While the case for stricter allocations partnerships. of aid based on performance was persuasive and becoming accepted, there was also a sense of As the complexities of conflict prevention and unease about setting adrift the bad performers, its causes unfold, new issues emerge for the where a large number of the poor people live Bank to ponder. What should be the type and and, through no fault of their own, suffer the level of assistance in poor performing or conflict- consequences of incompetent and kleptocratic vulnerable countries? How to deal with moral governments. September 11 added a new hazard questions in these cases? What do we dimension by painfully showing that the problems do when the conflict is raging, and if we stay of poor performing countries would not always be engaged, aren't we complicit? Is the `do no harm' contained within their own borders. approach enough, or should the Bank be far more proactive in conflict prevention? And what The Bank's considered response to the do we mean by conflict prevention anyway? How convergence of September 11 and the outcome should the Bank align its operations and of the `aid effectiveness' debate was to set up a performance-based lending to human rights task force to take a fresh look at its approach to considerations and what definition of human countries across a broad spectrum of poor rights should it use? performance and vulnerability, now known as `low-income countries under stress' (LICUS). In a How do we distinguish bad performers from CPR Dissemination Notes those that are merely suffering from the aftershocks of the conflict and will likely make a full recovery? Since aid is a zero-sum game, No.1 (March 2002): Rebuilding the Civil Service in a how do we provide extra assistance to those Post-Conflict Setting: Key Lessons of Experience, by recovering from conflict without punishing those Robert P. Beschel Jr. that through a combination of good policies, institutions and good luck, managed to steer No.2 (April 2002): Aid, Policy and Growth in Post Conflict Countries, by Paul Collier. clear of conflict? Who takes over financing when emergency funds run out? How does the Bank No. 3 (May 2002): Child Soldiers: Prevention, work with donors, or partner with smaller Demobilization and Reintegration, Beth Verney. humanitarian and development agencies, without crowding out the market or impeding their speed No.4 (June 2002): The Structure of Rebel and flexibility? Like Tolstoy' unhappy families, Organizations: Implications for Post-Conflict does the uniqueness of each conflict and its Reconstruction, by Jeremy Weinstein. attendant emergency, preclude a preplanned division of labor or does it boil down to committed No. 5 (October 2002): The Conflict Analysis implementation on a case by case approach? Framework (CAF): Identifying Conflict-related Obstacles to Development, by Shonali Sardesai and Per Wam. Although we have come a long way in recent years, we cannot yet claim to be smoothly No. 6 (November 2002): Colombia: Development and operating as a vital cog in the much-sought Peace in the Magdalena Medio Region, by Jairo humanitarian-development continuum. But, the Arboleda and Elsie Garfield. process of institutional adaptation inside the organization, the Bank's willingness to learn from No. 7 (December 2002): Conflict and Labor Markets in its own experience and the convergence of Manufacturing: The Case of Eritrea, by Africa Private external factors, has greatly contributed to a Sector Group. narrowing of the gap. At the same time, as the No. 8 (January 2003): The Social and Economic Costs World Bank continuously adapts and evolves, the of Armed Conflict in El Salvador, by Humberto Lopez. process is throwing up new questions and issues, which will pose additional challenges in No. 9 (February 2003): Aid, Policy and Peace: the years to come. Reducing the Risks of Civil Conflict, by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. CPR Unit No. 10 (March 2003): `Mind the Gap': The World Bank, Humanitarian Action and Development--A Personal Account, by Colin Scott and Ian Bannon. This Note was written by Colin Scott and Ian Bannon, both in the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction (CPR) Unit. This note series is intended to disseminate good practice and key findings on conflict prevention and reconstruction, as well as to generate debate inside and outside the Bank on issues related to conflict and development. The series is edited by the CPR Unit in the Social Development Department of the Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Network of the World Bank. The views expressed in these notes are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the World Bank Group, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. CPR Dissemination Notes are distributed widely to Bank staff and are also available on the CPR website (http://www.worldbank.org/conflict).