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# Combined Project Information Documents / Integrated Safeguards Datasheet (PID/ISDS)

Appraisal Stage | Date Prepared/Updated: 21-Apr-2017 | Report No: PIDISDSA21418



**BASIC INFORMATION**

**A. Basic Project Data**

Country West Bank and Gaza	Project ID P160674	Project Name Social Protection Enhancement Project	Parent Project ID (if any)
Region MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA	Estimated Appraisal Date 10-Apr-2017	Estimated Board Date 20-Jul-2017	Practice Area (Lead) Social Protection & Labor
Lending Instrument Investment Project Financing	Borrower(s) Ministry of Finance and Planning	Implementing Agency Ministry of Social Development	

Proposed Development Objective(s)

The project development objective is to establish a single targeting and referral system to provide cash benefits and services to poor and vulnerable households.

Components

Cash Transfer Program support  
Social Registry  
Case Management System  
Program Management and Monitoring

**Financing (in USD Million)**

Financing Source	Amount
Special Financing	15.00
<b>Total Project Cost</b>	<b>15.00</b>

Environmental Assessment Category

C - Not Required

Decision

The review did authorize the preparation to continue

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Other Decision (as needed)

## B. Introduction and Context

### Country Context

**The Palestinian territories are marked by high vulnerability.** Plagued by conflict and fragility, the population has also seen poverty rates that have fluctuated between a quarter and a third of households living below the national poverty line over the past decade. In Gaza, the poverty rate has reached almost 40% as thousands of households struggle to recover after the most recent outbreak of violence in 2014.

**Poverty, measured by national poverty line, was stagnant in the Palestinian territories, from 2009-2011 following a period of decline over the period 2004-2009.** While poverty declined by almost four percentage points between 2004 and 2009, there was a sharp increase in poverty in 2007. This increase was largely related to political shocks in Gaza, resulting in negative effects of this shock on tax revenues and international aid flows. In 2009, poverty declined to pre-crisis level and remained stagnant until 2011, the latest available data (World Bank, 2011).

**There is a significant spatial disparity in poverty rates, with a large and widening gap in living standards between the West Bank and Gaza.** The level of poverty differs significantly between the West Bank and Gaza, with Gaza being much poorer. In 2004, the poverty headcount in Gaza was 29 percent higher than in the West Bank. By 2007, this gap had expanded exponentially to reach 145 percent. While it declined after 2009, it remained high (over 100 percent), and never returned to pre-crisis levels.

**The productive capacity of the Palestinian economy has been eroded over the years with a significant decline manufacturing and agriculture.** This is a result of a poor business climate mainly driven by restrictions on trade and access to resources. Assuming that current restrictions remain in place and the security situation stays relatively calm, in the medium term, real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth is projected to hover around 3.5 percent.<sup>1</sup> This sluggish growth implies a stagnation in real per capita income and an increase in unemployment. Until there is a permanent peace agreement, the Palestinian economy will continue to perform below its potential, impacting economic and fiscal performance.

**Politics are fraught with uncertainty, and the economic situation remains worrying with recent growth being mainly driven by Gaza reconstruction.** After a period of sustained economic recovery between 2007 and 2011 when annual growth averaged 8 percent, growth decelerated to 6 percent in 2012 due a large drop in foreign aid, eventually reaching 2 percent in 2013. Following the Gaza conflict in 2014, the Palestinian economy entered a recession, with average growth declining to -0.4 percent as the Gaza economy contracted by 15 percent. After the war, reconstruction efforts started to progress and this provided the economy with a boost leading to an increase in real GDP by 3.5 percent in 2015, followed by 5.1 percent in the first three quarters of 2016. Given the high population growth in Palestine, yearly GDP growth levels have not been able to improve living standards as income levels have been almost stagnant. In addition, although total GDP has grown, agriculture – a key driver of inclusive growth – has contracted.

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<sup>1</sup> GDP projections were produced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).



**The unemployment rate continues to be stubbornly high and has further increased to 27 percent in 2016— with wide regional and notable gender differences.** In Gaza, the unemployment rate reached 42 percent in the first half of 2016, which is more than twice as high as the West Bank at 18 percent. Unemployment amongst the youth (ages 15-29) is particularly high, especially in Gaza where it is 58 percent. At 20 percent, the female labor force participation rate is low compared to the (already low) Middle East and North Africa (MENA) average of 26 percent. Further, skilled women (i.e. holders of tertiary education) are at a major disadvantage, representing 91 percent of unemployed females seeking work and 65 percent of the total unemployed.

**Social and gender norms are important factors that can affect women’s access to economic opportunities.** In addition to the same constraints and societal preferences faced by other women in the region on working outside the home, wide-ranging restrictions on mobility and concerns of safety have made it even more difficult for Palestinian women to work and participate in daily life. As such, boosting shared prosperity has proven to be a challenge in Palestine with the consumption per capita of the bottom forty percent growing at the same rate as that of the rest of the population.

**Despite strong revenues, the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) fiscal situation has remained difficult in 2016 due to a significant drop in donor support.** Public revenues grew by 22 percent in the first three quarters of 2016 mainly due to one-off revenue transfer by the Government of Israel (GoI). This offset the higher than budgeted growth in expenditures driven by unexpected wage increases for teachers and engineers, and led to a 27 percent drop in the deficit in the first three quarters of 2016 (year-on-year). However, in parallel with this strong operating performance, aid to the PA treasury declined by 14 percent, resulting in about a US\$200 million financing gap and further arrears accumulation.

**The external current account deficit (excluding official transfers) widened by 4 percentage points in 2015 to reach 22 percent of GDP.** This was due to an increase in the trade deficit to 41 percent of GDP because of a rise in non-Israeli imports. On the other hand, imports from Israel, the Palestinian territories’ main trading partner, witnessed a decline in 2015 due to lower fuel prices and a growing trend among Palestinian consumers to substitute products imported from Israel by those from other countries. Exports remained low and stagnant at around 18 percent of GDP in 2015.

**The economic outlook remains worrying.** The recent pickup in growth was driven by Gaza reconstruction and is not sustainable given the ongoing constraints to competitiveness. If the current restrictions remain in place and that the security situation stays relatively calm, the real GDP growth rate of the Palestinian economy in 2016 is projected at 3.3 percent: 2.7 percent in the West Bank and 5.5 percent in Gaza. Significant downside risks remain that could significantly worsen the economic outlook: setbacks to the reconstruction process in Gaza are possible and a resumption of armed conflict cannot be ruled out; tensions could erupt again throughout the West Bank; and donor support could further decline.

**Although poverty rates are low by international standards, sustained progress in poverty reduction remains a challenge, as political shocks and episodes of conflict frequently erode welfare gains and increase the risk of the vulnerable falling below the poverty line.** Poverty trends in Gaza are particularly volatile, increasing sharply with each shock, and recovering slowly to pre-crisis levels thereafter (World Bank, 2011). Vulnerability is therefore a major area of concern, as these sharp increases reflect the large share of the population living very close to the poverty line who remain at risk to these shocks.



**Women are particularly vulnerable to cycles of conflict and poverty.** Surveys by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) point to high rates of intimate partner violence (IPV) against women: 29.9 percent of women in West Bank and 51.1 percent of women in Gaza have been exposed to some form of IPV between 2010-2011.<sup>2</sup> Of those who have experienced violence, sixty five percent of the women preferred to stay silent.<sup>3</sup>

#### Sectoral and Institutional Context

**Since 2010, the World Bank has been supporting the government efforts to reduce poverty and improve Social Safety Nets (SSN).** With support from the World Bank, the Palestinian National Cash Transfer Program (CTP) was created in 2010, which merged the EU-funded Special Hardship Case (SHC) and the World Bank-funded Social Safety Net Reform Project (SSNRP), providing cash assistance to about 55,000 poor households. The creation of the CTP at the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) gave the government the opportunity to consolidate, harmonize and further develop social assistance that was mostly provided through a complex web of organizations run by the PA (including at least three ministries), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other external agencies. The companion National Cash Transfer Strategy identified cash transfers as the main social assistance instrument to fight poverty because of their proven track record and the possibility to scale them up quickly and effectively to aid distraught households during crisis situations.

**The CTP provided the government with a scalable and well-targeted instrument to fight poverty.** The program was later expanded thanks to additional government funds, while both EU and World Bank have maintained their support to the originally agreed 55,000 households. In addition, MoSA sought to further engage with other donors, such as World Food Program (WFP) and United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), to harmonize their targeting tools with CTP targeting to improve the protection of the poor. As a result, the CTP became a full-fledged national social safety net program that provides quarterly payments to about 115,000 beneficiary households through the banking system and the total cost of the Program is about US\$130 million a year. Although the World Bank only finances four percent of the program per year, the World Bank has leveraged its position and effectively used its technical expertise to guide the work of other donors.

**The implementation of the CTP has been supported by a sound Management Information System (MIS).** The MIS network links the 17 district (Muderies) offices in West Bank and Gaza (WBG) to the central level. This system is currently used for the management and administration of the CTP. Information on beneficiary households (e.g., household size, age, assets, health status, and education level) is collected by trained MoSA social workers using a standardized application form and entered into the MIS at the district level. The web-based MIS is updated regularly based on information provided by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) and MoSA social workers. MoSA then uses the poverty-targeting database (one component of the MIS) to identify CTP beneficiaries and to rank households according to their poverty level. This system allows MoSA to obtain real-time information on the number and location of beneficiary households as well as to track households' application and enrollment status, which is then used to inform decision-making related to planning and resource allocation.

**To better coordinate policies to reduce poverty and vulnerability, MoSA became the Ministry of Social Development (MoSD) and a new Social Development Sector Strategy (SDSS) (2017-2022) has been approved.**

<sup>2</sup> Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), Violence Survey in the Palestinian Society 2011. Different forms of intimate partner violence surveyed include economic, social, psychological, sexual and physical. In this case, the intimate partner referred to by the survey is 'husband.'

<sup>3</sup> PCBS. Violence Survey in the Palestinian Society 2011.



In alignment with the recently approved National Policy Agenda (NPA) (2017-2022), the SDSS supports the vision of building a resilient, productive and creative Palestinian society that guarantees a dignified life for all its members, unleashes their potentials and believes in rights, equality, justice, partnership and inclusion. The main objectives of the strategy are poverty reduction, elimination of all forms of social exclusion, violence and vulnerability as well as maintaining the social fabric. Under this new strategic vision, social policies do not only aim to protect the poor and the vulnerable but also help them grow, become independent and contribute to economic development. In this new system, cash would become an instrument of last resort for those who need it the most (the extreme poor) to cover basic needs, while services would be provided to the poor, including the extreme poor, to address social vulnerabilities and promote productive inclusion. This new system is expected to improve the cost-effectiveness of social development programs and services in a fiscally constrained environment.

**Monetary poverty, food insecurity and non-monetary dimensions of poverty (social vulnerabilities) remain high.**

1. Poverty is high and likely to have increased since 2011. In 2011, the latest year for which data is available, 25.8% of Palestinians were poor and many households were just above the poverty line, and thus vulnerable to falling back into poverty. Poverty is significantly lower in the West Bank (17.8%) than in Gaza (38.8%). Although social assistance, and the CTP in particular, have helped, poverty is very much linked to jobs, which is why higher unemployment and reduced incomes since 2011 are likely to have led to increased poverty, particularly in Gaza.
2. Food insecurity remains prevalent, particularly in the Gaza Strip. According to 2014 estimates, 27% of the population (about 1.55 million people) are food insecure, half of whom are classified as "severely food insecure," which can result into malnutrition and anemia. Food insecurity is more prevalent in the Gaza Strip as well as among refugees and female-headed households in the West Bank.
3. Recognizing that poverty is a multidimensional phenomenon that comprises both monetary and non-monetary dimensions (social vulnerabilities related to health, education, housing etc.), the National Poverty Commission was created in 2014/15 to study the adoption of multidimensional poverty measures. A multidimensional poverty methodology has been developed and data is being collected as part of the Palestine Expenditure and Consumption Survey (PECS) 2016-17.

**C. Proposed Development Objective(s)**

**Note to Task Teams:** The PDO has been pre-populated from the datasheet for the first time for your convenience. Please keep it up to date whenever it is changed in the datasheet.

Development Objective(s) (From PAD)

The project development objective is: (i) to support the implementation of the new Social Development Strategy to mitigate poverty and vulnerability, (ii) by providing cash assistance to a subset of extremely poor households who are covered by the Cash Transfer Program, and (iii) to develop a Social Registry for improved coverage and targeting of social programs, and (iv) piloting a Case Management System to provide complementary services to address social vulnerabilities and promote productive inclusion.



### Key Results

The project will benefit 5,000 extreme poor households living in both West Bank and Gaza through the project's support of the CTP. 150,000 poor and vulnerable households will benefit through increased access to social protection programs in both the West Bank and Gaza. The program will support MoSD program administrators to better monitor performance, identify potential beneficiaries for social programs, formulate coherent social policies, and foster coordination and information exchange with other sector ministries and social programs; while reducing targeting errors, leakages, and fraud. The project will also benefit about 15,000 extreme poor households currently benefiting from the cash transfer program from Hebron, Nablus, Tulkarm, Ramallah, Jerusalem, Yatta and Tubas governorates through the case management system. These services are expected to be particularly beneficial to women by, for example, supporting female employment/entrepreneurship and addressing domestic violence.

### D. Project Description

The proposed project builds on the successful experience of CTP and support the new SDSS to develop a platform for delivering cash transfers and services to the poor and vulnerable to reduce multi-dimensional poverty and promote productive inclusion. The project will help develop the two key building blocks of this platform, the SR and the CMS, and contribute to the delivery of cash transfers and services to the extreme poor. Development partners have expressed strong interest in contributing to this platform, which builds in part on the experience from the EU-funded case management pilot. The project consists of three components: (1) Cash Transfer Support; (2) Social Registry; (3) Case Management System; (4) Program Management and Monitoring.

Cash Transfer Program support: This component will finance cash transfers of about 5,000 households in the West Bank and Gaza, representing 4% of the total of the CTP.

The proposed component builds on the achievements of the CTP and on the collaboration between the World Bank, the EU and the PA to continue supporting cash transfer for extreme-poor households. The specific objectives of this component are:

1. In the short-term: support the mitigation of poverty and vulnerability of the targeted extreme poor households by smoothing and increasing consumption, particularly of food (quantity and quality of meals).
2. In the medium/long-term: support the protection and growth of human capital of targeted children from extreme-poor households, complemented by support services identified through the CMS to be developed under Component 3.

This component will finance eight quarterly cash payments to extreme-poor households, aiming at increasing and smoothing their food consumption as well as improving their ability to cope with shocks. The provision of timely, predictable, regular and adequately-sized transfers to households classified as extreme poor will support both objectives. Timely transfers will ensure achievement of program objectives, smoothing and increasing consumption, as well as protecting assets. Timely and predictable transfers' help households make the best use of the money by enabling them to plan and invest in the future, particularly in the human capital of their children. And the provision of regular transfers over a two-year period can also help the household acquire productive and agricultural assets.

Social Registry: This component will provide technical and financial support to (i) develop, feed, and update the Social Registry inclusion and information system (architecture, software, hardware, operation manuals, and





household registration, among others); (ii) establish a legal framework for it as functional entry point for social programs; and (iii) assure the transition of beneficiaries of CTP and other programs into the SR.

The current Palestinian National Cash Transfer Program (CTP) has a robust information system to support its management and implementation. The features presented in this system are those of what the literature refers to as Beneficiary Registry Information System, henceforth Beneficiary Registry or BR.

As this project aims to support implementation of the MoSD Social Development Sector Strategy (2017-2022), this Beneficiary Registry (BR) must be enhanced beyond its current coverage/objective/functions to expand current social assistance to all extreme poor and vulnerable population, promoting inclusion and access to social policies.

This component will have two objectives. First, it will support the transition of the current BR to a Social Registry (SR) to provide a “gateway” for anyone (individuals, families) to be considered for inclusion in one or more social programs based on an assessment of their needs and conditions. Second, it will increase coverage of the extreme poor and vulnerable by expanding the caseload from about 115,000 CTP beneficiaries to 150,000 potential beneficiaries of social programs.

To achieve the first objective, the SR will build on the current BR. The SR will capitalize on the existing infrastructure (technical and operational). A modular SR will be developed for supporting registration and determination of potential eligibility for any social program targeted to the poor and vulnerable. The SR will support improvements in the current citizen interface - for example via mobile teams, at local offices, or via digital service windows – and help to establish clear legal and institutional arrangements, including the designation of MoSD as the “host agency” for developing and operating the SR. This component will also support the development of the regulatory frameworks needed to ensure proper utilization and sustainability of the SR, particularly when it comes to the protection of personal data.

To achieve the second objective, the component will finance home visits to 150,000 households across the territory. More specifically it will finance:

1. the recertification of the current case load of 112,000 CTP households once the CTP targeting strategy is aligned with the new poverty measurement based on PECS 2016/17
2. the addition of new cases that would be identified either by social workers as part of the component 3 CMS activities or by a household demand at the Muderia offices
3. the incorporation of households that are receiving benefits from other donor programs (but not from CTP), as a result of donors joining the common gateway for social programs, and
4. the distribution of cards with unique household ID numbers and expiration date for SR enrolment. The estimated cost of each home visit for recertification/new enrollment is US\$ 6 (six dollars). And the estimated cost of the card is of US\$ 1 (one dollar).
5. This component will also include technical assistance for (i) the preparation of the SR operations manual and the SR architecture; and (ii) the setting up of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) procedures and improvement of the overall grievance and redress mechanism system (GRMS) for both SR, CTP and CMS.

Because of the development of the SR, MoSD program administrators will benefit from enhanced ability to monitor performance, identify potential beneficiaries for social programs, formulate coherent social policies,





and foster coordination and information exchange with other sector ministries and social programs. The SR is also expected to improve governance, efficiency, and equity of social spending while reducing targeting errors, leakages, and fraud.

Case Management System: This component will finance the development and implementation in selected areas of a case management system (CMS). Following international best practices, the CMS will initially target extreme poor households through home visits by social workers, as those households are in greater need and less likely to seek support by themselves. However, the CMS can also be used to support other poor and vulnerable households who seek assistance through MoSD local offices (Muderias).

MoSD currently employs around 300 social workers as civil servants. Social workers conduct visits to CTP beneficiary households, but mostly to collect and verify CTP eligibility information. Social workers spend most of their time on the administration of benefits, rather than on actual social work. Social workers operate through Muderias, which in most cases do not have adequate supporting infrastructure for social workers and supervisors to perform their tasks. The most important constraints cited by Muderias are transportation, office space and IT equipment as well as efficient use of their time which is mostly spent on data collection. Muderias receive very limited funding from MoSD for operating costs.

The CMS will be piloted in the seven governorates covered by phase 1 and phase 2 of the ongoing EU-funded social protection TA project: Phase I (Hebron, Nablus, Jerusalem); Phase II (Tulkarm, Ramallah, Yatta and Tubas). A mapping and assessment of social services has already been conducted in Hebron, Nablus, and Jerusalem. And Joint Planning Groups (JPGs) have been established in these three governorates. JPGs include representatives from Muderias, service providers (public and private) and private sector in their corporate social responsibility role. The idea behind these JPGs is to create a partnership at the local level to improve the access to and quality of services for the poor and vulnerable. The TA project also supports the development of tools to assess the needs of households and the quality of services, particularly for people with severe disabilities. These seven Governorates currently include 15,119 CTP beneficiary households classified as extreme poor (the total CTP caseload in these regions is 25,615 households) and 160 social workers. The majority of social workers are trained as social workers through graduate, post-graduate and diploma degrees

The CMS will make use of the SR (starting with the CTP BR) to reach out to the extreme poor through home-visits by social workers in order to assess needs and conditions, identify opportunities and support services, provide counseling services and monitor progress. Through home visits, social worker will also try to identify other extreme-poor households not currently covered by CTP, thus helping to build the social registry. The CMS will also serve other poor and vulnerable households that seek support directly through Muderias. The CMS will include home visits by social workers and referrals to locally available services.

Program Management and Monitoring: This component will ensure that the team of MoSD is operational and implements the project in conformity with the Legal Agreement, the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) and the project OM.

## **E. Implementation**

### **Institutional and Implementation Arrangements**

The MoSD will be responsible for project implementation through the existing CTP management unit. Since 2010, the MoSD's manages the CTP program by setting a program management unit within the MoSD that



oversees project implementation. This management unit works in close relationship with the MoSD's technical and implementation units. The management unit, composed by one PMU director, CTP and CMS field coordinators, Administrative & logistics assistant, M&E Specialist, Procurement Specialists and Financial Management Specialist, will be in charge of the overall coordination of project activities and the day-to-day management of the project, including all fiduciary aspects and project monitoring and reporting. It will report to the Minister of Social Development and will ensure the coordination across donors and technical committees. The management will be composed of civil servants from various departments of the MoSD and will be strengthened by specialized consultants to support some activities.

As the leading agency for the implementation of the single gateway approach for social assistance approved by the Council of Ministers in January 2017, MoSD will be responsible for ensuring coordination among various agencies providing social programs to effectively implement the SR and CMS.

The Ministry of Finance and Planning (MoFP) will continue to play an active role in project implementation. The MoFP will manage the Bank's designated account (DA) and closely coordinate with the Bank of Palestine to make payments to beneficiary households. The MoFP will also ensure that the necessary counterpart funds are allocated annually for this project.

Two technical committees, one for SR and one for CMS, are to be established no later than 3 months of project effectiveness (dated covenant). The technical committees are composed of representatives from the MoSD, representatives of other sectoral ministries and donors. Their tasks include

1. discussion of activities for the design and implementation of the technical components of the project
2. setting up a framework and guidelines with technical tools for their implementation
3. ensuring coordination and coherence of activities undertaken under the various project components, and
4. review and evaluation of studies and consultancies.

Implementation support will be provided by the Bank throughout the lifetime of the project. Support will include regular supervision missions and a detailed midterm review mission about two years after project effectiveness. The midterm review mission will, among other things, analyze progress toward achieving the main result indicators and determine where adjustments are needed.

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#### **F. Project location and Salient physical characteristics relevant to the safeguard analysis (if known)**

West Bank and Gaza

#### **G. Environmental and Social Safeguards Specialists on the Team**



**SAFEGUARD POLICIES THAT MIGHT APPLY**

Safeguard Policies	Triggered?	Explanation (Optional)
Environmental Assessment OP/BP 4.01	No	<p>It is expected that the project will not have adverse social or environmental impacts because of the nature, scale, and scope of these activities.</p> <p>The cash transfer has no adverse social nor environmental impact as it is designed and being implemented by MosD. Targeting approach does not discriminate against any population, and a grievance and complaints mechanism is in place to mitigate any social risk.</p> <p>The Social Registry and Case Management System have no adverse social nor environmental impact as it is designed because the project will promote knowledge activities to better inform population on how to benefit from those system, with support of the local social workers.</p> <p>Therefore, the project activities are expected to have positive impacts to increase households resilience and productivity productivity, while promoting knowledge activities to better inform population on how to better benefit from the investments.</p> <p>From an environmental perspective there is no need to develop a specific safeguard instrument because this project is likely to have no adverse environmental impacts and can be classified as Category C.</p>
Natural Habitats OP/BP 4.04	No	
Forests OP/BP 4.36	No	
Pest Management OP 4.09	No	
Physical Cultural Resources OP/BP 4.11	No	
Indigenous Peoples OP/BP 4.10	No	
Involuntary Resettlement OP/BP 4.12	No	
Safety of Dams OP/BP 4.37	No	



Projects on International Waterways OP/BP 7.50	No
Projects in Disputed Areas OP/BP 7.60	No

## KEY SAFEGUARD POLICY ISSUES AND THEIR MANAGEMENT

### A. Summary of Key Safeguard Issues

1. Describe any safeguard issues and impacts associated with the proposed project. Identify and describe any potential large scale, significant and/or irreversible impacts:

The project aims to improve the service delivery system for social policies through the development and establishment of a Social Registry and of a Case management System. The establishment of both systems shall help the government achieve the objective of better assisting households that face multiple vulnerabilities. Clearer assessment of needs and conditions should improve access to poorer and needier segments of the populations, while reducing targeting errors and wastage of resources associated to fraud and errors. The project finance activities will support the development of those foundational information systems that would help covering and servicing a large share of the population once in place. The project encompasses establishment of policy, legal, regulatory framework for the Social Registry and capacity building activities to improve social workers skills, but none of proposed activities will include construction or present social risks that would trigger OP 4.10 - Indigenous Peoples or OP 4.12 - Involuntary Resettlement.

2. Describe any potential indirect and/or long term impacts due to anticipated future activities in the project area:

The proposed activities will not have effects on the country's environment, forests, and other natural resources and will not finance the building or rehabilitation of facilities.

3. Describe any project alternatives (if relevant) considered to help avoid or minimize adverse impacts.

Although social safeguards are not triggered, the enhancement of the grievance redress system as part of the service delivery system will be supported in order to address population' queries and complaints about the project components within a binding time frame. In addition, a communications campaign will be financed to inform population about project activities.

4. Describe measures taken by the borrower to address safeguard policy issues. Provide an assessment of borrower capacity to plan and implement the measures described.

The enhancement of the grievance redress system was piloted by the Ministry of Social Development, and the pilot has shown that the grievance redress system is already functional and several of its aspects are included in the current information system even though several improvements, which are to be financed by this project, will be implemented to make it more effective. The training activities related to the grievance redress system will be do to build capacity within MoSD employees working on complaints handling. Therefore, the pilot main recommendations will be used to improve the system and address any safeguard policy issues.

5. Identify the key stakeholders and describe the mechanisms for consultation and disclosure on safeguard policies, with an emphasis on potentially affected people.

The Ministry of Social Development and donors are main stakeholders, and any safeguard issue will be done in



consultation with the technical teams that will be in place for supporting project implementation and disclosure to the public by the MoSD communications team.

## **B. Disclosure Requirements**

## **C. Compliance Monitoring Indicators at the Corporate Level (to be filled in when the ISDS is finalized by the project decision meeting)**

### **The World Bank Policy on Disclosure of Information**

Have relevant safeguard policies documents been sent to the World Bank's Infoshop?

NA

Have relevant documents been disclosed in-country in a public place in a form and language that are understandable and accessible to project-affected groups and local NGOs?

Yes

### **All Safeguard Policies**

Have satisfactory calendar, budget and clear institutional responsibilities been prepared for the implementation of measures related to safeguard policies?

NA

Have costs related to safeguard policy measures been included in the project cost?

NA

Does the Monitoring and Evaluation system of the project include the monitoring of safeguard impacts and measures related to safeguard policies?

NA

Have satisfactory implementation arrangements been agreed with the borrower and the same been adequately reflected in the project legal documents?

Yes

## **CONTACT POINT**

### **World Bank**

Samira Ahmed Hillis  
Program Leader



Cristobal Ridao-Cano  
Lead Economist

Phillippe George Pereira Guimaraes Leite  
Senior Social Protection Economist

**Borrower/Client/Recipient**

Ministry of Finance and Planning  
Laila Sbeih  
Director General  
mofirdg@palnet.com

**Implementing Agencies**

Ministry of Social Development  
Daoud Deek  
Assistant Deputy Minister  
ddeek1964@gmail.com

**FOR MORE INFORMATION CONTACT**

The World Bank  
1818 H Street, NW  
Washington, D.C. 20433  
Telephone: (202) 473-1000  
Web: <http://www.worldbank.org/projects>

**APPROVAL**

Task Team Leader(s):	Samira Ahmed Hillis Cristobal Ridao-Cano Phillippe George Pereira Guimaraes Leite
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**Approved By**

Safeguards Advisor:	Brandon Enrique Carter	20-Mar-2017
Practice Manager/Manager:	Cem Mete	20-Mar-2017
Country Director:	Ranjana Mukherjee	25-Apr-2017



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