



CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND DIALOGUE (CRD)
An Affiliate of WSP International

Conflict Analysis
South-Central Somalia

PHASE II

For

CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RECONSTRUCTION TEAM (CPR)
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT, WORLD BANK



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GLOSSARY

All Somali names used in this document (including people and places) are given in Somali, except in direct quotations from texts or in textual references, where the original is given in the English version. The report follows the current practice in the World Bank documents and other reports by the International agencies operating in Somalia.

ACRONYMS

AU	African Union
EU	European Union
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CAF	Conflict Analysis Framework
CRD	Center for Research and Dialogue
CPR	Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FPENS	Formal Private Education Network for Somalia
G8	Group of Eight
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICG	International Crisis Group
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Agency for Development
IPF	IGAD Partner Forum
JVA	Juba Valley Alliance
LAS	League of Arab States
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NRC	National Reconciliation Conference
PTA	Parent Teachers Association
RRA	Rahan-Weyn Resistance Army
SAFE	Somali Association for formal education
SDA	Somali Democratic Alliance
SDM	Somali Democratic Movement
SNA	Somali National Alliance
SNF	Somali National Front
SPM	Somali Patriotic Movement
SRRC	Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council
SSDF	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
TNA	Transitional National Assembly
TNG	Transitional National Government

USC	United Somali Congress
USP	United Somali Party
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nation Development Program
UNDOS	United Nation Development Office for Somalia
UNOSOM	United Nations Operations for Somalia
US	United States
WSP-I	War-torn Societies Project International

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Somalia at Glance

- 1991: On Jan. 26, former President of Somalia “*Siyad Barre*” flees Muqdisho.
- Northwest (now known as Somaliland, former British Protectorate of Somalia) subsequently declares independence on May 18, 1991.
- Jan 29, 1991: *Ali Mahdi Mohamed*, head of one of the USC (United Somali Congress¹) factions appointed President by the National Reconciliation Committee appointed by the ousted president Barre.²
- Mar. 1991: Forces loyal to ex-president (late *Siyad Barre*) stage an unsuccessful attempt to re-take the capital, Muqdisho.
- April 1991: The United Somali Congress (USC) captures the port-city of *Kismaayo*, south Somalia.
- Former President of Djibouti *Hassan Guled Aptidon* organizes and holds 2 consecutive peace and reconciliation efforts in Djibouti attended by 6 political factions.³ Both conferences were on May and July in 1991.
- August 1991: UN re-opens its office in Muqdisho.
- July 1991: Late Gen. *Mohamed Farah Aideed* was appointed as the only legitimate chairman of USC and recognized by his arch rival *Ali Mahdi Mohamed*.
- Sept. 1991: Ex-president (late *Siyad Barre*) militia seized *Baidoa* and its environs. Fighting continues in the south until April 1992 resulting in large population displacements, looting of grain stocks and serious damage to agricultural systems in Somalia’s main farming areas.
- Oct. 18, 1991: *Ali Mahdi Mohamed* was sworn-in as President of Somalia in Muqdisho following the agreement reached in Djibouti, Djibouti by the six Somali political factions: The United Somali Congress (USC), Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), United Somali Party (USP), Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), Somali Democratic Movement (SDM) and Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA)
- Nov 17, 1991: A devastating civil war erupts in Muqdisho between *Ali Mahdi Mohamed* and *Mohamed Farah Aideed* where hundreds of Somalis are killed and many others flee the city seeking refuge in neighboring countries: Kenya and Ethiopia. This is followed by a total state collapse.

¹ United Somali Congress (USC) was established in Rome, Italy 1989 by some prominent “Hawiye” clan leaders.

² USC was split into two factions, one led by Ali Mahdi Mohamed, and the other led by late Gen. Mohamed Farah Aideed – each claiming as the legitimate leader of USC.

³ The six political factions are: USC (United Somali Congress), SSDF (Somali Salvation Democratic Front), SPM (Somali Patriotic Movement), SDA (Somali Democratic Alliance), SDM (Somali Democratic Movement) and USP (United Somali Party).

- Dec. 19, 1991: United Nations General Assembly appeals to all states and relevant inter-governmental and NGOs to continue to extend emergency assistance to Somalia.
- Feb. 12, 1992: Consultations with the Somali faction leaders, mainly from south-central Somalia, held in the UN headquarter in New York, during which they agree to an immediate cease-fire.
- Mar. 3, 1992: Cease-fire brokered by the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General, James Jonah in Muqdisho. Mr. Jonah was later replaced by *Amb. Mohamed Sabnoun*.
- Mar. 17, 1992: The Security Council adopts resolution 746 (1992) supporting the Secretary General's decision to send a technical team to Somalia.
- Mar. 28, 1992: The technical team, in Muqdisho, obtains the agreement of late *Gen. Mohamed Farab Aideed* and *Mr. Ali Mabdi Mohamed* to a possible deployment of 50 United Nations cease-fire observers in Muqdisho (25 on each side of the then divided city of Muqdisho) and of adequate security personnel for humanitarian relief operations.
- Apr. 21, 1992: The Secretary General of the UN recommends to the Security Council for the establishment of United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM), to consist of 50 unarmed military observers to monitor cease-fire in Muqdisho. The Secretary also informs the Council of a Consolidated Inter-Agency 90-days plan of action for emergency humanitarian assistance drawn from the UN agencies, the ICRC and NGOs.
- April 1992: Famine hits southern Somalia. This is followed by the intervention of the US led multi-national forces (*Operation Restore Hope*) to alleviate famine.
- Jan. 4, 1993: 15 faction leaders meeting in Addis Ababa, reach agreement to cease hostility, demobilize their militias, hand-over heavy weapons to a cease-fire monitoring group.
- Mar 1993: Somali Reconciliation Conference held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia attended by 15 armed factions, the 3rd reconciliation conference for Somalia.
- June 1993: Security Council adopt resolution 837 (1993) authorizing UNOSOM II to take all necessary measures against those responsible for the attack on the UN personnel on June 5, 1993.
- June 17, 1993: Rear Admiral Jonathan T. Howe issues a warrant for the arrest of late *Gen. Mohamed Farab Aideed*. This is followed by fierce fighting between the US-led multinational forces in Muqdisho against the militia loyal to late *Gen. Aideed*.

- July 1993: Col. *Abdullahi Yussuf Ahmed*, chairman of SSDF, leaves Mogadishu after failure to attempt to establish a government with late Gen. *Mohamed Farah Aideed*.
- Oct 3, 1993: 18 American Rangers killed and 75 wounded in battle with USC/sna – (SNA: Somali national alliance) militia of late Gen. *Mohamed Farah Aideed*.
- 1994: The Americans ignominiously withdraw their forces. A National Reconciliation Conference between the warring factions of Muqdisho held in Nairobi, Kenya – the 4th reconciliation conference for Somalia.
- Late 1994: An inter-*Habarjidir* armed conflict erupts between forces loyal to late Gen. *Mohamed Farah Aideed* and his ex-financier, *Osman Hassan Ali (Atto)*.

In another development, an inter-clan cease-fire signed in Kismaayo between the then warring factions.
- 1995: UN mission ends and its entire staff evacuated from south-central Somalia.
- Early 1995: Late Gen. *Mohamed Farah Aideed*'s USC/sna captures the city of Baidoa, Bay region.

Mohamed Siyad Barre, former Somali President dies in Lagos, Nigeria.
- 1996: Aug. 1 Gen. *Mohamed Farah Aideed* dies in Muqdisho after sustaining gunshot wounds.

RRA (*Raxan Weyn* Resistance Army)⁴ of the *Digil & Mirifle* clans founded in north *Mogadishu*.
- 1997: RRA captures *Baidoa*, the capital city of *Bay & Bakool* supported by the Ethiopians.

A National Reconciliation Conference was held in Sodare, Ethiopia attended by the armed faction leaders – the 5th of its kind.
- 1998: In Cairo, Egypt – a Somali National Reconciliation Conference held. This is the 6th NRC to fail.⁵

Saudi Arabia bans livestock export on Somalia.⁶
- 1999: Eritrea/Ethiopia conflict develops involving some Somali factions in south-central Somalia.
- 2000: The *Arta* peace conference held in Djibouti takes place where the Transitional National Government (TNG) is established.

⁴ RRA (*raxan Weyn* Resistance Army) represents the *Digil & Mirifle* clans of Bay & Bakoll regions, west of south-central Somalia.

⁵ NRC: National Reconciliation Conference.

⁶ Ban is attributed to the “Rift Valley Disease”.

- 2001: Sept. 11 terror attack on America leads to the freezing of Somalia's largest remittances company *Al-Barakaat*.
- Oct. 2002: Eldoret conference in Kenya invites the Somali faction leaders.
- 2003: Somali Peace Conference moves from Eldoret to Mbagathi
- July 2003: Transitional National Assembly (TNA) sacks Speaker of the House, Mr. *Abdalla Derow Issaq*.
- July 2003: A new Speaker for the House is elected after serious discussion between the MPs. Mr. *Mukhtar Gudow* is elected as the new Speaker of the House.
- August 2003: *Abdikassim Salad Hassan* extends his presidency another 3 years following the end of his tenure. *Abdikassim Salad Hassan* renews his presidency according to the 1960 Constitution.
- Sept. 2003: A number of Somali armed faction leaders leave the Mbagathi peace conference led by *Haji Musse Sudi Yalabow*. The group establishes a coalition of factions under the banner Somali Salvation Council (SSC) in *Bal'ad* district, Middle *Shabelle* region. They enter an agreement with the TNG led by *Abdikassim Salad Hassan*.
- Dec. 2003: A number of notable traditional leaders, supported by some prominent businessmen and women, leave Muqdisho to mediate warring clans in *Galgudud* region, central Somalia: an armed inter-clan conflict in *Herale* village (*Dir* against *Mareban*) on one hand and, the *Murusade vs. Duduble* in *EL-bur* district.
- Jan. 2004: The Somali political faction leaders that left the peace conference (SSC) and the TNG go back to Nairobi to attend a consultative mini-conference organized by IGAD. President Museveni mediates between the armed political faction leaders SRRC, G8, the TNG, SSC and the two-split civil society organizations in Safari park, Nairobi – Kenya.
- Jan. 2004: The armed faction leaders and civil society organizations sign an agreement in the Kenyan government state house witnessed by the Kenyan President and Yaweri Museveni.
- Jan. 2004: A number of the Ethiopian backed SRRC group withdraw from the conference in protest to the agreement signed in the Kenyan government state house.
- Feb. 2004: A number of the Ethiopian backed SRRC leave Nairobi. They establish a new alliance under the banner SNOG.
- April 2004: The Kenyan Foreign Minister, H.E. *David Kalonzo Musyoka*, announces the re-launching of the 3rd phase of the Somali peace conference.

Techniques and methodology used (put in Appendix)

Consultative Meetings

This study was commissioned to compliment the Desk Study of the Conflict Analysis Framework of the World Bank in November 2003. Consultative Meetings were conducted between March 10 – April 20, 2004 in *Beled Weyne, Mogadishu* and *Marka* respectively of the south-central regions of Somalia. The teams that carried-out the study consisted of 2 team leaders and five fieldwork team meetings (5 consultative researchers) and an accompanying security team.

The selected team was trained on the methodologies, tools and techniques for the field consultative meetings. The training took place in CRD/WSP International's office in *Mogadishu* March 3 – 8, 2004. The team was given an extensive briefing about the Desk Study of Conflict Analysis Framework phase 1. The response from the team was positive and inter-active. To enhance the capacity of the team and ensure their understanding about the objectives of the consultative meetings, a one day field-test was carried-out in *Mogadishu* and the field test utilized 2 variables in the consultative meeting: Culture and Tradition of Violence and the Role of Media. The methodology utilized in the field test was the stakeholder analysis and one-to-one interviews. The participants in the field test were 12 randomly selected individuals. The overall field-testing was positive and the feed-back from the field test was incorporated into the design and techniques of the final consultative meetings and its format.

Given the complexity of the exercise, although across all variables, focus group discussion was utilized, a selected number but combined variables were assigned to specific techniques:

One-to-One Interview: Specialized one-on-one interviews with some specific individuals were used to augment the information presented in the Desk Study Report. In many aspects, these selective interviews were used to shed light on the controversial issues such as: Human Rights & Militarization, Access to natural Resources and the Role of Diaspora. In some cases, the interviews were used to explain some inconsistencies in the data available in the Desk Study Report. In other cases, it was simply to put emphasis on some of the issues raised through the other survey tools and/or to highlight historical and other factors that may have an impact on the issues raised.

The reasons the above variables were chosen for this technique is related to the sensitivity of the information and fear of discussing the issue publicly by the interviewees. It was also considered necessary for the recollection of specific events that took place at known time and locations, if possible. This kind of selection enhances the ability of participants to validate the authenticity of the report presented. In order to encourage the interviewee to have confidence and freedom to speak about his/her thought, free space and time was given to express their views about the variables.⁷

⁷ Since the nature of the issue under discussion was very sensitive and may cost the lives of the people involved, names of interviewees are kept anonymous.

Focus Group: In addition to interviews, the consultative fieldwork utilized other research tools such as Focus Groups Discussion to gain an in-depth understanding of the issues under discussion. The goal of these daylong sessions was to allow members of the community, with the most knowledge on the variables i.e. civil society organizations, local authorities, traditional and religious leaders, business groups and women organizations etc. to share their experience with the research team. Unlike the one-on-one interviews, the focus groups discussion was intended to add deeper knowledge on the variables discussed. All variables except the ones utilized in the one-on-one interviews were utilized.

Focus Group Discussions were organized in each of the target regions of south-central Somalia. Focus Group Discussion participants were identified for the consultative meetings based on their unique position in the community and their demonstrated capacity to contribute to the discourse. Experienced researchers facilitated the group discussions. Opinions and suggestions of group participants were recorded on a flip chart, organized into themes and reported back to the session for reconfirmation.

Focus Group Discussions were held in: *Mogadishu, Beled Weyne* and *Marka*. Venues were convenient for all participants in each community in terms of access, transportation, security and facilities. To encourage complete participation by all and ensure maximum use of the time for the group deliberations, meals and refreshments were provided to the participants.

In the process of selecting well informed individuals in the Focus Group, CRD consulted with various institutions: 1) local authorities in the target areas and 2) district commissioners where available, 3) Current and former professors/lecturers 4) religious leaders and well respected personalities. Potential candidates for FGDs were recommended by the above mentioned stakeholders in the community. After the selection was made, based on their background experience and knowledge on the variables to be discussed, CRD gave them an expanded orientation to synthesize the importance of the consultative meetings and its implication in the rebuilding process of Somalia.

Key Informants: This technique was also used in specifically selected variables. The specific variables used for this technique are: Human rights abuses and militarization, quality of leadership, bridging/bonding of social capital (business/private sector and civil society), and employment (Business Development and remittances, and access to productive resources etc.). Individuals interviewed were militia leaders and members of the de facto political factions.

The personalities interviewed have direct stake in the variables discussed. They also have background experience of what went wrong and what happened when. During the discourse, all the individuals used in this technique requested anonymity.

Participatory/Rapid Appraisal techniques: To generate discussion among participants, in the process of consultative meetings, CRD presented a social and resource mapping table illustrating the availability of resources, social groupings, and the past conflict mapping resources. Limited data was presented during the discussion and

later participants were sub-divided into groups where later they came up with additional resources to complete the information required.

Stakeholder Analysis: In all the consultative meetings, stakeholder analysis was utilized. The capacities, interests, influences and importance of all the stakeholders in every variable was addressed and discussed further in detail. Participants in all consultative meetings have shown great deal of interest in the stakeholder analysis. The stakeholder analysis has been an effective method, according to the interests demonstrated by the participants. It facilitated the participants to understand the current social interaction dynamics.

Additional Techniques: CRD audio-visual resources were utilized in most of the consultative meetings. 20 minutes video clips, covering the overall historical lines, were presented. Demonstration of video clips preceded in all the consultative meetings, except the one-on-one and key informants interviews, to stimulate attendants and generate interest in the discussion.

Secondary Consultation: Various UN published reports and other pertinent policy documents on Somalia, periodical academic journals and recent publications have been extensively consulted to assist the analysis. This analysis was further enhanced by the observations of CRD/WSP International researchers in their tour in south-central Somalia.

Profile of the selected regions

The supplementary information presented in the 2nd phase fieldwork Conflict Analysis Framework is gathered from south-central Somalia. Three districts were selected with each district accommodating a distinct number of regions:

Mogadishu is a metropolitan city with an estimated 1.5 million inhabitants, known to be the epicentre of all conflicts in south-central Somalia. The city is the seat of the Transitional National Government (TNG), most of the armed political faction leaders and the hub of most of the business activities. In addition, more than 250,000 are believed to be Internally Displaced People (IDPs) who experience enormous hardships compounded with extreme conditions of destitution. This venue accommodated representatives for the consultative meeting from Middle Shabelle region.

Marka, a coastal town about 90 km south west of *Mogadishu* is also chosen to accommodate representatives for the consultative meeting from *Lower and Middle Juba, Gedo, Bay & Bakool*. The city of *Marka* also remains contested and volatile as the indigenous people in the area are fighting over issues related to land disputes.

Beled Weyne the capital city of the region of *Hiran* has hosted representatives selected from *Galgudud* and south *Mudug* regions.

Coverage Area of the consultative meetings

The three cities *Mogadishu*, *Marka* and *Beled Weyne* were chosen as the venues to convene the consultative meetings because of their distinct and diverse characteristics and

proximities to the regions selected. In the original proposal, the port city of *Kismaayo* was included as one of the selected venues for the consultative meetings. Given the nature of the renewed conflict between two clans (the *Habargidir vs. Sheikhal*) in the district of *Jamama*, Lower *Juba* and recent kidnapping of a UN staff – the teams have agreed to replace the city of *Kismaayo* with *Marka* of Lower *Shabelle* region.

To ensure a provision of an adequate reflection of the consultative meetings, the diverse nature of the communities in south-central Somalia, could be found in each of the districts chosen. In addition, the target groups for the consultative meetings i.e. armed militia, IDPs, minorities; economically disadvantaged groups etc. were easily identifiable within each community. The three target areas for the consultative meetings were divided as follows:

Table 1

Target Areas	Consultative meetings	Participants
Muqdisho	3 CMs	50 participants
Marka	3 CMs	20 participants
Beled Weyne	3 CMs	20 participants

The participants in the consultative meetings were selected from various constituencies and social groups. These included teachers, women groups, professional associations, former military officers, armed militia, selected groups from rural communities, representatives from the Transitional National Government (TNG) and the Transitional National Assembly (TNA), regional de facto administrations etc. 20% of the participants were from the women groups.

Data Collection Process

The tools utilized for the consultative meetings were designed and reviewed by CRD/WSP International based on the guidelines given by the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit (CPR) of the World Bank. The consultative meetings used various sources as outlined in the techniques and methodologies above mentioned (see districts in Table 1) with nine consultative meetings in south-central Somalia.

Constraints

In the process of conducting the nine consultative meetings, CRD has encountered following constraints:

Time: Given the enormous geographic area to cover, time assigned for the 2nd phase fieldwork of Conflict Analysis was inadequate. The time assigned placed enormous stress upon the researchers and team leaders. The intent and objective of the report is so enormous that the time accorded for the report to be compiled was short.

Insecurity: Accessibility to various locations particularly the target areas of the consultative meetings posed serious challenges. There are number roadblocks with armed militia in control. Negotiation with multiple faction leaders in the venues for consultative meetings created atmosphere of confusion. The appearance of meeting with one group created unnecessary problems of perception between principal opposing protagonists. Some of the people to be interviewed feared the principal political leaders while at the

same time understanding the enormity of the research and its intended goals. CRD/WSP International utilized its influence and contacts with the target groups and has been successful in enticing the groups to be cooperative and contributive.

Selection: Another problem CRD faced during the selection process was the choices of making selection out of an overwhelming number of professionals, multiple regional administrations etc. For instance, *Mogadishu* has the highest concentration of educated class, war entrepreneurship groups, vibrant economic groups and civil organizations. In other instances, there are areas with limited skilled professional groups.

Substance: Although all the variables address issues of enormous importance, the substance some of them carry was confusing. Information presented to the participants, as a background discussion, was intricate. Although CRD employed the best possible techniques, presenting the variables in a simple format was challenging.

Processing: The information collected from the fieldwork was overwhelming and sometimes redundant. Team leaders and researchers faced serious challenge to convert information gathered into a resourceful, veritable and presentable format. To produce concise and small paragraphs integrated into the report out of a rough 200 pages has been a daunting task

Participants Responses: Given the nature of the variables, some of the participants in the consultative meetings were sometimes emotional that their views were irrelevant to issues in discussion. Most of the participants were resourceful but the time accorded, according to complaints they have raised, was inadequate. They demanded more time. The situation put CRD in a very difficult and uncomfortable position where our engagement created un-necessary expectation among participants.

Resource Mapping

The area known as South Central Somalia stretches from South *Galka'ayo* to *Liboye* town, a border town between Kenya and Somalia. It is bounded by the Indian Ocean on the east, on the north by Northern Mudug in Puntland, on the South by Kenya and on the West by Ethiopia. It consists of 11 regions and 56 districts excluding Banadir region. South Central Somalia covers the largest area of Somalia and is endowed with vast agricultural resources between the only two rivers in the country.

The perennial waters from the two rivers make some of these regions the breadbasket of Somalia. Besides being rich in agricultural resources, the area sustains a large proportion of Somali livestock mainly camel, cattle, goats & sheep. In this part of Somalia, there is thick and, in some areas, impenetrable forest, which is rich in natural resources. Somalia has the longest coast in Africa stretching nearly 3,400 Kilometres – two-thirds of which is situated in south-central Somalia. The area is believed to have vast marine resources that have not been adequately exploited. It is also reported that the area within the two Shabelle regions has deposits of natural gas.⁸

There are heterogeneous groups (clans) in the regions of south-central Somalia that consist of pastoralists, agriculturalists and some distinct ethnic Bantu. Although there are no independent and reliable sources of clan-based census, in many occasions guess estimates were made about clan-based census in the region. The inhabitants of the central regions of Somalia, many argue, belong predominantly, though not exclusively, to the *Hawiye* clan-family. Other clans that also make their home in the central regions include:

- In south Mudug: The Hawiya clans mainly Habargidir (Solayman and Sacad); and the Dir.
- Gal-guduud region: Darod (*Marehan*), Hawiya mainly Habargidir, Abgal, Murusade and Duduble;
- Hiran: Hawiye mainly Hawadle, Ujejen, Badi'adde, Jidle, Jajelle, Gal-je'el, Shidle and Makanne (Bantu);
- Middle Shabelle: Hawiye mainly Abgal, Gal-je'el, Shidle and Makanne (Bantu);
- Banadir region: The city is metropolitan with various clans; important minorities: Rer Hamar and Jareer.
- Lower Shabelle: Digil mainly (Shanta-Alen, Geledi, Begeledi, Tunni, Jiddo, Garre and mixed Bantu, Dir (Biyomal mainly), Rer Hamar and Barawani, Hawiya (Abgal, Habargidir, Murusade);
- Middle Juba: Hawiye (Shikhaal mainly), Darod (Ogaden mainly), Jareer (Bantu);
- Lower Jubba: Darood mainly (Harti, Ogadeen, and Marehan), Hawiye: Gal-je'el, Gir-gir, Warday, Jarer (Bantu) and Bajun;
- Bay & Bakool: Rahan Weyn mainly (Mirifle & Digil),
- Gedo: Daarood (Marehan and Ogaden), Dir (Gadsan), Dagodi, Ajuran, Jareer (Bantu).

⁸ Somalia: Framework for Planning of Long-term Reconstruction and Recovery. A report prepared by multi-donor task-force under the overall coordination of the World Bank.

Census of the Somali population has not been conducted since 1975, but estimates are made based on aggregation of various UNDP/UNPOS data which estimates the population of South Central Somalia at around 5 million people.¹⁹

Conflict Mapping

Region	Main Social Groups/Clans	Resources	Conflicts and disputes
Banadir	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Metropolitan city, mixed Somalis (clans and sub-clans) Hawiye: Abgal, Murusade, Reer Xamar, Habargidir, Jareer (Bantu) and Darod, Dir etc. (<i>The Abgal, Murusade and Reer Hamar claim they are the predominant clans</i>). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National Public Institutions i.e. seaport, airport etc. - Major commercial enterprises i.e. real estate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - property ownership - Control of the capital city - Access to public facilities - Political and land dispute: occupation of non-Hawiye real estate
Lower Shabeelle	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Digil: Geledi, Begeedi, Tunni, Jiddo, Garre, Shanta-alen. - Hawiye: Murusade, Abgal, Wa'dan, Wadallan, Habargidir - Dir: Biyomaal - Reer Xamar, Jareer (Bantu) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Agriculture fertile lands: Banana, Maize, Sugar-cane, horticulture etc. - rich grazing lands and shabelle river - State-owned plantation - Foreign owned plantation i.e. Italian, Libyan, UAE - Private owned plantation - Livestock: Cattle, Camel and Goats & Sheep. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Property & Land dispute - Forceful occupation of public/private property - Political control: pastoral versus indigenous - Sharia Islam versus secular - Access to water resources - Forced labour
Middle Juba	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Jareer (Bantu) - Hawiye: Sheikhal - Darod: Ogaadeen - Digil: Garre and Tunni - Gibil-ad - Makanne - Dir 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Agriculture: Mango, Grape fruits, Maize, Sorghum, sugar-cane - Livestock: Camel, Cattle, Goats & Sheep - State-owned property (major development projects) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Land & Property dispute - Deforestation (charcoal) - Appropriation of private property - Access to the Juba river (water resources) - Political control: Hawiye versus Daarood
Lower Juba	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Daarood: Harti and Ogaadeen - Hawiye: Gaal-jecel, Sheikhal, Giirgiir, Wardaay - Baajuun, Gibil-ad, Jareer 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Agriculture & livestock - State-owned property (major development projects) - Seaport and airport - Water (Sea and River) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Appropriation of private property - Political control: Land, property and leadership (Hawiye versus Daarood, Hawiye versus Hawiye and Daarood versus Daarood, Minorities versus the rest) - Water resources

¹⁹UNDOS/UNDP (1997)

Gedo	- Mirifle/Digil; Daarood: Ogaadeen and Mareexaan; Dir: Gaadsan; Others: Dagodi and Ajuuraan, Gibil-ad	- Agriculture & Livestock - Juba river - State-owned property (development projects)	- Political control: leadership, Raxan Weyn versus Daarood, Daarood versus Daarood and Minorities versus the rest - Water resources - Islamic movements
Bay	- Mirifle/Digil - Gibil-ad - Daarood: Ogaadeen & Mareexaan	- Livestock and Agriculture - State owned development projects	- Land & Property dispute - Severe water shortage - Political leadership: Mirifle versus Mirifle, Daarood versus Mirifle and Mirifle versus Hawiye
Bakool	- Mirifle - Minorities: Gibil-ad - Daarood: Ogaadeen	- Livestock and Agriculture	- Land & Property dispute - Severe water shortage - Political control: leadership contest between Mirifle
Middle Shabeelle	- Hawiye: Abgaal , Gaaljecel and Xawaadle - Makanne and Reer Shabeelle - Minorities: Gibil-ad	- Agriculture & Livestock - Shabeelle river - State owned development projects	- Land & Property dispute - Political leadership: Abgaal versus Abgaal, Abgaal versus the rest - Water resources
Hiiraan	- Hawiye: Xawaadle , Gaaljecel , Jajelle, Jiidle, Ujeejeen, Habargidir, Murusade, Abgaal - Minorities: Jareer , Shiidle , Gibil-ad	- Agriculture & Livestock - Water resources (Shabeele river)	- Access to water - Political leadership: Contest between Hawiye, mainly Xawaadle versus the rest - Land & Property dispute
Galgaduud	- Hawiye: Habargidir (Cayr, Solaymaan & Saruur), abgaal, Murusade and duduble - Daarood: Mareexaan - Dir - Minorities: Midgaan	- Livestock - Fishing	- Access to water - Severe shortage of water - Land dispute between Dir and Mareexaan
South Mudug	- Hawiye: Habargidir (Sacad, Saruur and Solaymaan) and Abgaal - Dir - Sheikhaal	- Livestock - Fishing	- Political leadership: Between Sacad and Daarood Harti, Dir versus Sacad) - Water resources (severe shortage)

Note: The two terms of water shortage and access to water resources are not interchangeable terms. Water shortage means: *Galgudud* and *Mudug* regions there is shortage of water whereas in Lower *Shabelle* and the *Juba* regions, there is water but access to it is very difficult and it often causes conflict.

The commercial plantation farmlands of the Libyan, Italian and UAE still exist as property of these said governments but the plantations are currently occupied by armed militia.

I) Ethnic/Clan Cleavages

Background

The Somali Community is traditionally organized into clans that share culture, language and religion. In general terms, every clan is known for areas it inhabits from which they generate their main source of livelihood. An estimated 59% of the population of Somalia practice nomadic and semi-nomadic culture and agro-pastoralism, whereas 25% practice sedentary agriculture and 23% live in urban settlements (mainly civil servants and business groups). The Somalis are divided into three main groups:

- Pastorals (nomad): They rear livestock for their livelihood. They often move from one place to another in search of good pasture and water.
- Agricultural Communities: They are sedentary, and predominantly live along Shebelle and Juba rivers.
- Agro-pastoral communities (semi-nomad): They inhabit mostly the southern part of the country.

The inhabitants of south-central Somalia are the *Hawiye*, *Darod*, the *Shidle*, *Digil* and *Mirifle*, *Dir*, *Rer Hamar* and *Jareer*.

The clan was traditionally a welfare umbrella but it has now become a reserve army for the factional leaders. By politicizing “clan,” it has lost its value and traditional functioning. Fragmentation of political factions, based on clan, has increased the contest for the leadership within the clan which, accordingly, has added to the intensity of the conflict in Somalia.

Focus Issue analysis

Somali clans are bound together by obligations to pay blood-wealth “*Diya*” and other forms of legal compensation. In times of peace, these obligations tend to enhance clan cohesion but, in times of war and conflicts, the social basis of clan erodes. The responsibility of making the payment of *Diya* does not rest on one individual family. It is made collectively by the whole clan in the event of an accident (death or injuries). A respected traditional leader outlines that traditionally, Somali society, wherever they are, have an inherited legal institution of *Diya* paying mechanisms where when adopted properly tend to reduce all forms of conflicts within the societies. The rate of *Diya* compensation varies from one clan to another depending on the status of the persons involved i.e. person’s age, gender, hierarchy etc. For instance, homicide compensation payment affects the entire clan. In many cases, clans make efforts to discourage homicide committed by clan members.

The inherited traditional cultures of the clan system have eroded during the civil war. In the event of an incident, because the traditional systems of the clan have now disintegrated due to the fragmentation of the traditional structures, the *Diya* compensation forms are now replaced with collective guilt where all members of the clan are guilty. For example, if a clan member commits a crime (murder), the entire clan remains guilty and all of them are subject to retaliation until one among them is killed.

Traditionally, the Somalis are clans and each clan follows an ancestral lineage that extends back to generations as far as ten or more fathers. Every child that is born (he or she) takes the name of the father. The clan structure is more complex that each clan member memorizes the names of his/her ancestors. The Somalis are now divided into

four and half major clans (*Hawiye, Darod, Dir, Raban Wayn* and mixed other smaller clans). Each major clan has its sub-clans and as one unit they tend to believe that they are the majority among other Somali clans. In colloquial terms what unites them is a hollow clan-pride and in conventional means they tend to dominate the social, economic and political structures of the state.

Historically, among the many strengths of the Somali society is its inherited and long-standing social capital. Close-kinship and the networks of the clan often gives special measure of protection, in the form insurance, to those that are able to access such institutions. More importantly, the strength of culture and religion adds to this harmony of social capital.

The Somali people inhabiting the central regions of the country, here termed as pastoralists, have directly inherited the legacy of Somalia's past political grievances, and during the civil war, this legacy could be observed as a cornerstone of the present socio-political conflict in the region. The pastoralists migrated to the southern fertile agricultural lands after 1991, and occupied both the public and private agricultural plantations and other facilities in the agriculturally rich fertile lands of the region. They also occupied the urban cities i.e. public and private buildings and, as a result, have also dominated parts of the economic sector, many of them as employees to the armed patrons of their kinship, and most importantly, for political reasons - as many of the pastoral groups are heavily armed.

In the aftermath of the Somali civil war, in 1991, the traditional unarmed agricultural clans are continuously arming themselves for self-defence and, above all, in response to the threat of the occupying pastoral groups. For example, in the early 1990s, *Bay & Bakool* became the battle ground between the indigenous clans and emigrating pastoralists struggling for political power which led to the devastating famine of 1991/2 where hundreds of thousands of Somalis perished¹⁰. This conflict between the pastoralists and agriculturalists is creating new social relations within and between clans. This new trend is based on new hierarchy of power, new legitimizing ideologies and new forms of clan and regional power structure.¹¹

The legacy of benign neglect by the previous administrations, the lack of investment in the region, lack of adequate public infrastructure i.e. roads and ports, insufficient veterinary measures for the abundant livestock population etc. created massive movement of people from the central region of Somalia to the southern fertile agricultural lands.

¹⁰ Lee Cassenelli and Catherine Pesteman, *'The Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia'* the war behind the war, 2000.

¹¹ On Nov. 15, 2003 an inter-clan warfare erupted in lower shabelle region between two sub-sub-clans "Ayr" against "Sa'ad" fighting over land (that was forcefully confiscated) whose indigenous population were constantly under threat due to armed power struggle between the warring groups.

One of the outstanding inter-clan conflicts that has not been resolved or properly addressed is the 1991/1992 war between late Gen. Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed, the then interim President - whose respective clans have fought over power. Many thousands of Somalis were killed and many more injured. Others left the country. Most of which are refugees in the West. The failure to establish an administration for Mogadishu since 1991 is attributable to the unresolved conflict between the two major clans that fought over the spoils of the country after the overthrow of Siyaad Barre.

... It is true some people accuse us that our clansmen moved to the fertile lands in the south. But did anyone ask why? 30 years of benign neglect by the Somali authorities left our region with no one single development project. It is therefore right that we move to the potentially rich regions...

Militia Leader

The factors that contribute to the escalation of the conflict in the region are the continuation of the elite clans from the central regions, who have dominated previous administrations, whose armed militia are in control of many areas in the southern part of the country, who are again competing for the national leadership. The agriculturist communities in the south strongly believe that justice will never prevail as long as the Somali political positions are occupied mainly by members of the pastoral groups.¹²

There is a mixed perception, at the present, that there are clans that made or are intending to make fortune of an economic empire and power through politics. The clans whose individual members assume power tend to manipulate the national political agenda. For example, former *Mohamed Siyad Barre's* clan manipulated for 21 years the politics of Somalia and, likewise his predecessors and successors.

“The current Somali politics is an emulation of the past military regime. We are hostage for 14 years to unscrupulous, corrupt and opportunistic so called political leaders” –

A Mother in Mogadishu

On the other hand, clans that accumulated wealth out of the spoils of the state-collapse are perceived to appropriatr land and mastermind the destruction of natural resources. For example, all the state-owned seaports in south-central Somalia are currently run by armed clans bargaining for political, economic as well as clan hegemony.

In general, the factors that escalate conflict in the ethnic/clan cleavages are: the recruitment of militia, concentration of wealth in specific regions, the misappropriation of wealth and other resources by special clans, the breakdown of the traditional rule of law (*Xeer*) the expended and ever growing income disparity between clans etc.

¹² Focus Group Discussion organized by CRD/WSP in Muqdisho.

The factors that de-escalate conflict are: cross-clan and inter-clan marriages, strengthening the traditional rule of law (*Xeer*) by re-instating the state institutions, joint business ventures etc.

II) Bridging/bonding social capital

Background

The social structure of the Somalis is marked by competition and often armed conflict between clans and sub-clans. For example, when fighting takes place, it tends to spread rapidly through clan family and sub-clans involving members, not only responsible for the conflict, but also those from far kinship. (In many other instances, the same clans that have fought may try to intervene in other warring clans after having resolved their past grievances. At some point, clans intervening in warring groups (clans) may provide moral and financial support to victims of the conflict in an effort to show solidarity. For instance, anthropologist *Lee V. Cassanelli* argues that the common identity of Somalis and their clan structure tended to foster stability and harmony among Somalis. Prof. *Abdi Ismail Samatar* echoes the same notion by suggesting that the Somalis have a system of social control that, in nature, helps societies to maintain stability and cohesion. He claims that lineage system, not only provide security in times of war, but also helps maintain law and order. The Somali clans act together in dealing with conflicts regardless of the issue and the substance. Conflict takes place at least as often between clans and lineages of the same clan family as between segments of different clan families.

To a greater or lesser degree, clans are also units with social, productive, political and military functions. In the rural communities, membership of such units, and support from it, is essential to survival. In addition to the clan structure, new form of associations emerged especially after independence.

In the early days of independence, competition between clans, while establishing temporary bonding networks, became politicized in an effort to enrich themselves through the political establishment of the state. Since the clan structure is in many cases used to defend individual clan members and their property, the then emerging politicians capitalized on the clan sentiments by appealing their respective clans for protection and support in the pursuit of individual political ends.

Within the Somali culture, women have no equal rights with men. They receive no adequate role in the political decision making process because their clans always prefer to be represented by men. In the business ventures, role of women is also limited. In another case, in the Somali tradition, compensation for loss of man's life is measured in camels and is usually worth 100 camels, while the life of a woman is worth half of the man's (or 50 camels).¹³

Focus Issue analysis

Increased cooperation and alliances across clans is being observed in the civil society sector, particularly those engaged in the same sector like peace promotion, education and women issues. Furthermore, the voice and the influence of the civil society are becoming more pronounced in the Somali social and political arena. In other words, the Somali

¹³ The role of Somali Women in post-conflict reconstruction, WSP project 2000.

civil society is becoming a real force to be reckoned with. This can be inferred from the powerful mass rallies and demonstrations organized by the civil society held in Mogadishu and some other parts of south-central Somalia. This again, is a valid demonstration that the civil society has reached a certain maturity that allows them to work together for the common cause of the society.

The civil society is engaged very much to establish mechanisms where they can talk to the faction groups and express their views. Some factions started expressing appreciation of the civil society activities. There are few hardliner faction groups who see the civil society as a potential political threat against their interests. The newly forming public associations or organizations tend to be across clans to work in the local environment and attract a wider public acceptance or trust.

Although the Somali people are divided across clan lineages, extended families and sub-clan relationships, there is movement underway in which people are mobilizing themselves across professional lines and interest groups rather than clan affiliation. At some point, the level of marriage between and across clans has helped reduce the intensity of inter-clan conflict. Somalis in the Diaspora are also bringing in new ideas and thoughts on civic participation through formation of associations.

One of the strengths of the Somali society is the clan support network. Kinship and clan networks provide support and some measure of protection to clan members and institutions. However, many Somalis are unfortunately cut-off from the clan support network. The minorities' groups seldom have the strong clan support network, particularly women groups. Women groups in south-central Somalia has formed a number of associations i.e. advocacy institutions for widows, divorcee, single mothers, human rights etc.

The current mainstream inter-grouping associations in south-central Somalia are political factions, civil society and professional associations. All groups are actually the product of the dynamics of the civil war. The current political associations have their root in the clan based opposition movement policies against the late Somali government. The key noticeable changes and trends in the associations of the armed political factions include:

The Somali civil society which include local NGOs, women and youth organizations, networks, professional associations and educational umbrellas are established across clans. These organizations have established highly successful institutional structures that provide social services throughout south-central Somalia. In addition, these organizations have developed systematic networks among themselves and with other networks in other regions of the country. Over the years, the level of coordination and information sharing has improved. The current civil society organizations have organized public campaigns to promote peace and reconciliation among the Somalis both inside and outside the country. It is widely agreed, throughout south-central Somalia, that the existing vibrant civil society organizations have moved from localized clan based identity to much more broad-based organizations that can operate across clan and geographical boundaries.

The heightened awareness and increased cooperation between the civil society organizations can be observed from the activities these organizations have undertaken:

- 1) The Formal Private Education Network for Somalia (FPENS) and
- 2) The Somali Association for Formal Education (SAFE)

Both organizations support an education network with more than 120,000 students in south-central Somalia and over 2000 teachers from different clan constituents with one common vision and voice. The impact these education networks have upon the communities in the region is immeasurable. The Parent Teachers Association (PTA), in cooperation with the senior administration officers of the education umbrellas, convene periodically to determine how to promote the education standard of the students, participate in the peace rallies organized in cooperation with other civil society members. The solidarity between the education networks with the universities and other professional associations have demonstrated strong bonding and bridging of social capital.

Business groups provide services i.e. telecommunication, airlines industry and the “Hawala” are actively and successfully operating throughout the districts and regions across south-central Somalia and elsewhere. The joint effort between the mixed-constituency-ownership help keep the professional associations together.

The nature of the structures of the professional associations, civil society organizations, education networks and some of the business groups of mixed constituents across clan-lines has helped in the de-escalation of numerous conflicts. To strengthen the de-escalation efforts of the groupings, there is need to address the following issues:

- ✓ Building the capacities of the institutions;
- ✓ Establishing proper coordinating networks and information sharing between groups;
- ✓ Providing a technical support network either through grants or loans;
- ✓ Encouraging IGAD and IGAD Partner Forum (IPF) to accommodate the active professional associations to participate in the Somali peace conferences.

Bridging/Bonding

“Money has no value if you cannot share your fortune with your fellow citizens in times of need. I do not like to make this public, but we – as business community in this town, have collected and contributed USD 25,000 to assist elders to mediate the warring clans in central regions of Somalia. This is not the first time. In the past, those of us with moral responsibility have contributed to various causes in the area of peace-building and education and in the efforts of re-establishing authorities. We admit that some of us (business community) who benefited from the civil war still continue playing negative roles.”

A prominent Somali businessman in Mogadishu

The lack of an attention from the international aid agencies has encouraged a number of professional associations based in south-central Somalia to establish, across clan lines, various professional associations. In an effort to sustain their businesses, these associations have tried to fight against the spread of criminality especially in the areas they operate. Many armed groups attending at the roadblocks were employed by some of the telecommunication companies thus removing potential killing machine from the streets.

Factors that contribute to escalation of conflict, in this variable, are very minimal. In the event of conflict, when bonding between clans is used to an extreme measure, it may escalate conflict. But on the other hand, the factors that contribute to the de-escalation of the conflict and that need strengthening are:

- Encouraging merger of business opportunities.
- Encouraging the association between clans in the establishment of political parties i.e. multi-party political organizations.
- Strengthening the positive role of media by establishing the engagement of public dialogue, inter-clan meetings etc.

III) Weak Governance and Political institutions (Equity, Stability and Quality of Leadership)

Background

Historically, Somalia has always been a one-nationality state. The Somali people shared one ethnic identity and are predominantly pastoralists. After nearly a century of colonial rule, Somalia embraced the concept of modern state, as did all other post-independence African countries. Although most of the practices of a modern state were an alien concept to the Somalis, the founding fathers, among the political elite of the time, attempted to inculcate this new phenomenon in the Somali political culture and life. Constitution-based democracy that enshrined respect for human rights, a multiparty political system, and respect for the rule of law became the priorities at independence on 1st July, 1960 with all the attendant institutions that went along with these objectives.

Unfortunately, not all of the Somali political elite demonstrated the vision and capacity of the founding fathers of the then young state. The rich social and cultural heritage in the Somali traditional institutions were not properly improved and invested in the new governing institutions, but rather excessively exploited by the politicians for reasons on top of the national interests¹⁴. Corruption, nepotism, clan affiliation and other behaviours were introduced into the system of governance. The historical predatory state apparatus, the misuses and the abuses of state power and the lingering mistrust and prejudice among clans and communities created endless competition over the top leadership of the state. Participants in the consultative meetings seem to agree that governance institutions, whether national or local, are occupied by a fellow kin. An interviewed former member of the Somali national parliament of 1968-69 concurs that government institutions such

¹⁴ CRD/WSP International, Country Note: Path to Recovery, 2004 (to be released spring 2004). Most of the former politicians, from 1960-1990, are the current wealthy individuals compared to average Somali citizens. There are considerable number of non-politicians who are wealthy but known to have been supported by former politicians indirectly. There is wide public perception that any politician who doesn't stockpile wealth in the interest of his clan no longer commands respect among his average clan members.

as ministries employed personnel from the close kinship of the clan of the minister.¹⁵ This type of political thinking in south-central Somalia has created a breeding ground for the fragmentation and multiplication of political actors.¹⁶

Consequently, the military took control on 21 Oct. 1969 and it remained in power for more than two decades, accelerating the decomposition of the political institutions through the exploitation of the clan structures. One of the factors that contributed to the lack of stability of political institutions is the lack of good leadership. In the post-state collapse of Somalia, leadership is a highly politicized phenomenon (not special to Somalia), in which the competition for scarce resources (political and economic) and other divergent interests have assumed a political dimension. The present leaders make effort in a narrowly defined political agenda based on manipulating clan sentiments and self interests. Almost all the current political leaders, contending for national leadership, attendants pointed out, have no political experience other than the war entrepreneurship.

Focus Issue Analysis

The sudden and total collapse of the previously centralized institutions of government precipitated a process of fragmentation into fiefdoms controlled by clan-based warring factions competing for the leadership of the state. Ever since the major civil war ended in 1992, there has been sporadic low-intensity fighting between clan-based rival factions throughout Somalia, particularly in the south-central region. Most of the present conflicts are based on power struggle between various armed groups.

Over the years, there have been a number of attempts made to establish regional or local administrations in many parts of southern and central Somalia. Among these failed attempts include the establishment of a regional administration for Banadir (Muqdisho). Also the Islamic Shari'a Courts have attempted to establish law enforcement institutions in different parts of south central Somalia. The Southwest State of Somalia, another attempt at regional administration by the *Raban Weyn* Resistance Army (RRA), the *Juba Valley Alliance* (JVA), *Middle Shabelle* Regional Authority, etc. all ended in failure. Despite these failures, there are still few de facto regional administrations active in south central Somalia which lack legitimacy, popular mandate, or track record of service provision and basic governance according to the participants in most focus discussion groups. These nominal administrative structures have excluded the representation of the minorities. In the Juba Valley de facto administration, for example, the political representation of the traditional *Harti* and *Ogaden* Darod clans, on one hand, and the *Hawiye* and *Jareer* clans in the region, on the other, now all of them a minority is neglected.¹⁷

In Lower *Shabelle* region, handpicked representatives from the indigenous local clans were appointed by the TNG. This appointment, without consultation with the local indigenous communities, was resented by the local people. This kind of false representation in the region, according to interviews with local farming groups, has often

¹⁵ Former MP of the Somali National Parliament.

¹⁶ Attendants in the consultative meetings have all raised concern about the attitude of the Somali political exponents, their quest for power, opportunistic behavior and shortage of patriotism.

¹⁷ Loose alliance of the *Darod* clans, defeated by the United Somali Congress (USC) *Hawiye* groups, succeeded capturing and controlling the Juba Valley region, an economically rich region. The *Harti* and *Ogaden Darod* clans, allied under the banner of the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), and the SSDF, led by Gen. *Mohamed Said Hersi (Morgan)* and late Gen. *Aden Gabiyon*, backed by Col. *Abdullabi Yussuf* from the *Harti*-dominated region of Puntland, are now fighting the *Marehan* armed faction of the Juba Valley Alliance, backed and supported by the *Habargidir-Eyr* sub-clan

times created conflict between the indigenous groups against the new administration in the region.

In south-central Somalia what could be called a governance institution is only the Transitional National Government (TNG) of Somalia established in Arta, Djibouti on August 2000. The rest are de facto armed opposition groups who 'do not control any more than few km if any at all'.¹⁸ The TNG itself, although it has a parliament and a cabinet, controls no more than limited areas. The constant shifting political alliances in the region has created an unpleasant political struggle between the armed factions of the region. The current existing de facto administrations have serious internal rifts based on the inequity of the fragile governance structures and poor political leadership.¹⁹ Leaders use clans as a tool in the immediate context by making unrealistic and false promises that the clan will be redeemed and clan members elevated to higher positions in future governing structures. A lieutenant of Muqdisho based faction leader that was interviewed points out that the reason he is in the Somali peace process in Mbagathi, Kenya is to get a political position to gain access to state resources. When politicians fail to deliver these impractical promises, they are not held accountable, but instead foment an environment conducive for clashes between clans. In southern and central Somalia, the so-called political leaders have been ineffective and lack charisma.²⁰

The politicized mistrust between the clan and the state gave way for the multiplication of armed groups engineered by the clan-based political factions. For example, in July 1991, says an interviewed former lecturer in one of the consultative meetings held in south-central Somalia, only six factions attended the first Djibouti conference - right after the collapse of the former military government. In March 1993, two years after the first reconciliation conference held in Djibouti, 15 factions attended the UN-sponsored Addis Ababa peace conference. In 1997, the Cairo conference was attended by 20 factions. The current Mbagathi peace process for Somalia is not different from the previous conferences, with more factions attending the process. More than 80% of the current political factions attending the Somali reconciliation conference are from south-central Somalia.²¹

The dominant armed clans in south-central Somalia have been fighting since 1991 over the country's leadership. They form temporary but fragile alliances along clan lines to undermine perceived opposition groups. Some of the attendants in the Focus Group Discussion have raised concern over the speedy fragmentation within the armed factions which is another form consolidation of power between the armed groups. The current newly formed Somali Salvation Council (SSC) established in Bal'ad district, Middle Shabelle on Sept. 2003 is formed with full intent to undermine the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) backed by the Ethiopian government. On the other hand, a splinter from the SRRC has recently established a breakaway group in Jowhar district, Middle Shabelle region.

¹⁸ ICG report no. 59, negotiating a Blue Print for Peace – March 6, 2003.

¹⁹ A paper presented by Dr. Ahmed Farah Yussuf between 13-15 Dec. 2000 at an African Conflicts, their management, resolution and post conflict reconstruction conference held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. A paper entitled: *Resolution of the Somali Conflict: "top-down" national reconciliation versus local reconciliation process.*

²⁰ An interview with a traditional leader by CRD (March 2004)

²¹ Focus Group Discussion held in Muqdisho April (2004)

“I was a senior officer in the ranks of the Somali Army stationed in Goldogob district of the central regions of Somalia. To illustrate the in-equity in the governing and political institutions, I witnessed the process that led to the erosion of public trust in the very governance institutions that I sworn to protect. I recall a junior inspector under my command being elevated to captain within a short period of time. The same officer was stationed back to my area of command where he (the Captain) became my superior officer. I am not surprised why the governing institutions of Somalia have collapsed”.

An ex - Brig. General in Beled Weyne, Hiran region.

Efforts to re-establish governance institutions in south-central Somalia after the collapse of the state in 1991 was attempted by various international bodies but ended in failure. The most notable attempt was made, according to the focus group discussions, by UNOSOM II mandated by the UN Security Council. In other words, the United Nations Operation for Somalia (UNOSOM II) was instructed to provide assistance to local governing structures, namely district and regional councils as well as the justice system.²² The governing structures established by UNOSOM failed due to lack of public consultation and support from the armed faction groups. The leadership established by UNOSOM has been in conflict since 1993 with the armed faction leaders. An elder from *Wanle Weyn* district of lower *Shabelle* region says, “The people in the area live in a conflict situation between the district commissioners appointed by UNOSOM II and others later appointed by the armed faction since 1993.”

The frustration that followed the failure of UNOSOM II, its subsequent departure from Somalia, and the previous attempts by local actors (which also ended in disarray) prompted the emergence of Islamic Shari’a authorities in many parts of south-central Somalia particularly in *Luq*, *Beled Weyne*, Lower *Shabelle*, *Mogadishu* and Middle *Shabelle* regions. Although the administrations established by the Islamic Shari’a did not last long, many provided much needed rule of law and improved local security at some level.²³ Many regions in south-central Somalia see the re-establishment of the Islamic Shari’a courts as a viable option for governance today. An Islamic Sharia law cleric, who was actively involved in the establishment of the sharia courts in north Muqdisho in 1995, says two factors have contributed to the lack of sustainability of the Islamic sharia courts: 1) Clerics have become heavily involved in politics more than addressing security issues which was the initial main objective of the courts and 2) External pressures misinterpreted the objectives of the establishment of the sharia courts.

The failure of the TNG and the lack of progress in the current peace process in Kenya may propel the clans in the regions of southern and central Somalia to attempt to re-establish their own governing structures involving a more narrow geographical scope. For example, participants of *Hiran* region in the *Beled Weyne* consultative meeting asserted that the establishment of local/regional administrations may lead to inter-clan conflicts although the situation may become more aggravated in regions with single clan groups; while participants from *Bay & Bakool* regions affirmed that the establishment of a regional governance structures is the best option that can save them from inter-clan

²² Elizabeth M. Cousens and Chetan Kumar, Peace Building as Politics: *Cultivating Peace in a Fragile Society* 2001.

²³ Mark Huband, *Warriors of the Profit: The struggle for Islam – 1998*.

conflicts with other major clans.²⁴ Although much of these dynamics are undeniably true, it could be, in the future, a recipe for an economic disaster and may also escalate further fragmentation within the region. The failure to establish a governance structure in south-central Somalia -- due to the proliferation and abundance of weapons, lack of a winner, the systematic growth of the war economy, clan hegemony, etc. -- will haunt the efforts of both local and international actors for many years to come.²⁵

Given the importance of decentralization for many Somalis in the peace process in Mbagathi, Kenya, the nature of a Somali state (Unitary, Federal or Con-Federal) and the number of administrative regions are questions of extreme sensitivity. For decades, Somalis have debated over the form of government that would be best suited to the unique social and political status of the Somali people. Some have argued for the return of a strong central government to maintain security. Others have pressed for a federal state which empowers the regions and promotes unity through recognition of the diversity of the clan structures and regions. A third group espouses a con-federal approach, which would bring together Somalia and Somaliland in a one state solution with two highly autonomous administrative units.²⁶ The designation of administrative regions is also highly contentious, as it is assumed this will tip the balance of power towards one clan or another depending on the number of regions awarded to particular clans.²⁷

“I am bound to support the clan faction leader I am genealogically related to in a number of reasons; one reason I support him is because of clan pride, another reason is that he provides protection for myself and property. This situation leaves me no alternative but to support him. This close artificial affinity cannot be translated as if I have an objective loyalty to the armed clan leader.” A prominent Somali businesswoman in Mogadishu.

The de facto political leaders are privileged above other equally important actors in most of the Somali peace processes by the sponsors of the peace processes.²⁸ This has elevated their position in the Somali society, particularly within their clans and sub-clans. The economic interest of the armed business groups is mainly focused on controlling the national economic infrastructure (seaports and airports) as well as the unregulated public service delivery systems. The illegitimacy of according unmerited elevation undercuts all meaningful attempts at establishing widely accepted and consensually agreed governance structures and political institutions, both at the local and national levels.

Somalia, in general, and south-central in particular, has a history of evolving political instability. The current armed political factions are the main political protagonists in south-central Somalia whose primary interest is focused on extending their power base

²⁴ People of Bay & Bakool region believe they are culturally and linguistically distinct from other Somali clans. The people in these two regions, given the limited regional boundary and their close clan affinity are better suited to remain safe from other Somali clans.

²⁵ Interview with a civil society member in Beled Weyne, Hiran region by CRD on March (2004)

²⁶ The issue of governance structures is a heated debate in the Somali Peace Process in Mbagathi, Kenya.

²⁷ ICG report: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State, 2002.

²⁸ A Focus Group Discussion held in Muqdisho on April (2004) by CRD.

beyond the clan boundaries through shifting alliances with other factions in the region. This type of narrow interest and its propagation is linked with other secondary interests that are prerequisites for the realization of their primary interest. Managing the grey area (the overlap) between the interests (political power, institutional dominance of one clan/ethnic group over the other) amalgamated with hidden opportunistic interests creates a contentious environment that has many times triggered conflict.

All political groups in south-central Somalia (the multiple armed factions) and the TNG represent highly localized clan politics and the existing political leaderships is never held accountable for their failures by their clans or by the citizens in the region in general.²⁹ Consequently, clans became the facilitating element of rampant corruption, culture of impunity and inciting conflict for political and/or economic reasons.

There are armed and unarmed Islamist groups very active in south-central Somalia. Following the successive failures of the de facto administrations in the region, the Islamist groups mostly deliver badly needed services such as security, health, education, micro financing etc, to the society. The eventual political interest of these groups, agree many participants in the consultative meetings, is the establishment of a future Islamic state in Somalia. Given their prominent role in the service delivery, these groups tend to influence the political dynamics on the ground through appealing moral Islamic principles.

As an ICG recent report released on May 4, 2004 indicates, the Islamist groups are apparently winning popular support. *“Somalia’s Islamist has demonstrated a far greater sense of social responsibility and so far openness to democratic principles and practice than any other faction leader deliberating the formation of a future government. Al-Islab, the largest and most influential of the southern Islamist organizations, provides leadership and support for several prominent professional associations and educational institutions in Muqdisho.”*

Over the years, since 1991, no active political organization (including the current TNG and armed faction leaders) has succeeded in transforming itself into a stable political institution in south-central Somalia. Since 1997, there are loosely interlinked clusters of civil society organizations that have established a network with which they serve the wellbeing of ordinary people through the provision of services and empowerment of society economically, socially, and politically.³⁰ (See variable – Bridging/Bonding).

Factors that Escalate the Conflict

The factors that contribute to the escalation of the conflict in the region, according to the focus group discussions can be identified as:

- ✓ The polarization of the political factions;
- ✓ The complete lack of serious reconciliation efforts and consensus among the major political contenders;
- ✓ The ever-expanding war-economy;
- ✓ The lack of positive cooperation between the front-line states neighbouring Somalia;

²⁹ Interview with a prominent civil society leader in Muqdisho March (2004)

³⁰ A one-on-one interview conducted by CRD in Marka, Lower Shabelle region (March (2004)

- ✓ The failure to control the dangers emanating from the weapons proliferation into the region through the porous border; and
- ✓ The absence of direct participation and influence of the traditional leaders and the vibrant civil society members in the national peace process.

What contributes most to the escalation of conflict over the establishment of governance structures and its equity, according to many participants in the consultative meetings, could be attributed to the historical fact that Somali citizens fear the governing structures. The Somali citizens, it has been observed in many instances, perceive state as a predatory structure that abuses the powers endowed upon the political leaders and the resources. Ken Menkhaus further elaborates how this dynamic affects the lack of governance structures in southern and central Somalia:

“In fact, a case can be made that attempts to revive a central state structure have actually exacerbated armed conflicts. State-building and peace-building are, in this view, two separate and in some respects mutually antagonistic enterprises in Somalia. This is so because the revival of a state structure is viewed in Somali quarters as a zero-sum game, creating winners and losers in a game with potentially very high stakes. Groups (i.e., clans) which gain control over a central government will use it to accrue economic resources at the expense of others and to wield the law, patronage politics, and a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence to dominate the rest. This is the only experience of the central state Somalis have ever known, and tends to produce conflict and risk-aversion rather than compromise whenever an effort is made to negotiate the establishment of a national government. The spate of armed clashes which in 2002 rendered south-central Somalia more insecure and inaccessible than at any time in the past ten years was partially linked to political jockeying in anticipation of the IGAD peace talks. It is not the existence of a functioning and effective central government which produces conflict, but rather the process of state-building in a context of state collapse which appears to consistently exacerbate instability and armed conflict in Somalia. (Menkhaus, Ken 2003, p.3):

Another important factor that escalates the conflict in the region is the failure of the armed groups and/or the TNG to exercise authority by overcoming the ever expanding culture of impunity, where the armed militia under their control or the free-lancing groups, kill at will and walk free in the streets of the cities in the region. A member of the women organizations in Muqdisho, attending one of the consultative meetings recalls the failure of all the political leaders, who claim to control territories, to capture or bring to justice perpetrators of crimes committed in areas under their jurisdiction. This culture flourished in south central Somalia where more than decade old lawlessness plagued the formation of equitable governance structures.

The factors that also contributed to the increase of conflict are the militarization of politics in south central Somalia. The fundamental nature of militarizing politics, according to an interview with a retired military officer, held by all armed factions in the region is that by building up stocks of weapons, one wields power. The militarization of the armed groups and the practice of corruption, misappropriation of funds, nepotism, etc. is one of the main stumbling blocks that impede the formation of stable political institutions in the region.³¹

³¹ The concept of militarization refers to establishing a political faction that is armed with the intent to take power (for further detail please see variable E – Human Rights and Militarization)

Factors that de-escalate the conflict

The conflict over the governance institutions and its equity can be de-escalated through:

- ✓ The social engagement of dialogue where conflict management/resolution mechanisms are first established, to defuse tensions and facilitate the formation of widely accepted governance structures.
- ✓ Reconciling the warring factions by bringing them on a round table brokered by elite local and international actors while simultaneously initiating a process of grass-root political development, i.e. national dialogue and engaging a broader section of the society in the rebuilding process of the national institutions.
- ✓ Raising public awareness and capacity of the political actors towards democratization, power sharing mechanisms, constitutional review programs, and principles and approaches of decentralization etc. in order to devise equitable democratic political institutions.
- ✓ Impose targeted sanctions against the political factions or groups that obstruct implementation of agreements reached by the majority of groups attending a widely represented reconciliation conference.
- ✓ The establishment of an agreeable disarmament, demobilization and re-integration program where feasible with the support of the traditional leaders and civil society members.

IV) Access to Natural Resources

Background

South-central Somalia is known to have vast natural resources. It contains the best agricultural land in the country, enormous number of livestock, an excellent grazing land, vast unexplored ocean resources, unexplored deposit of minerals and two main rivers (the *Juba* and *Shabelle*). It is also widely believed, though not yet substantiated, that the area is rich in natural gas and oil. This region also contains the most densely populated districts in the whole of Somalia.

The fertile agricultural lands in south-central Somalia are either rain-fed or watered by the two rivers, the *Juba* and *Shabeelle*. Since the collapse of the state and the ensuing inter-clan civil wars, there have been no development projects in the region of south-central Somalia. All the former development projects i.e. agriculture, livestock, fishery or mineral resources have been ransacked completely by armed marauding militia loyal either to the political leaders or for their own economic interests. There is serious deforestation process going on across the regions of Lower *Shabeelle*, *Middle and Lower Juba*, *Bay & Bakool*. The subsequent indiscriminate logging of trees and other natural vegetation, in these regions, has decimated the precious resources resulting in the uncontrollable deforestation and fast growing soil erosion of the lands.³² The effect of this damage could prove beyond repair and, may continue unabated, until a central government for Somalia is established.

³² Focus Group Discussion held in Marka, Lower Shabelle by CRD on March (2004)

The central regions of Somalia, especially: *Galguduud* and *Mudug*; southwest *Bay & Bakool* and *Gedo* –all suffer from serious water shortage agrees a former consultant to UN agencies attending one of the consultative meetings held in Mogadishu. These regions are known to have the highest livestock population throughout Somalia and shortage of water has been always the primary source of the inter-clan conflict. The land is semi-arid and people in the region and their livestock are always in search of water points.

Focus Issue Analysis

Natural resource competition has also been a conflict driver throughout Somalia's history. Because of its predominantly pastoral history, jockeying over access to pasture and water sources has long been a tradition that has resulted in demographic changes and power transfers. As Somalia has become more urbanized, this dynamic has diminished, no longer being the main source of competition and conflict in south-central Somalia today.

Nevertheless, water and pasture remain important points of contention among competing communities in the region. This is particularly true along the *Shabelle* and *Juba* Rivers, where some of the most vicious fights and clan clearing has occurred in all of region.

In the case of export commodities, a whole new set of landlords have come to inhabit the Lower *Shabelle* region as a result of the banana export industry. When the nature of human rights violations eventually came to light in the late 1990s, the European Union ended its preferential quotas for Somali bananas and this lucrative export market came to an end. However, the damage was done, and a whole new pattern of demography exists in the region today.³³

Livestock remains the most lucrative export commodity in south-central Somalia, and this has led to conflict over the main export marketing routes, as well as the most reliable pasture and water points. The Central regions have been most affected by this phenomenon, particularly where sub-clans of the *Hawiye* border each other, or where *Hawiye* communities border those of the *Darod*.

A new development along the *Shabelle* River promises to lay the foundation for future inter-state conflict. Ethiopia is developing dams along the river in Region Five in order to enhance opportunities for settled agriculture in the *Ogaden*, particularly in cotton cultivation.³⁴ However, such water development is likely to radically diminish the water available downstream on the *Shabelle* in south-central Somalia, particularly in Lower *Shabelle*, where populations are heavily dependent on receding waters of the river for primary cultivation. If the riverbed dries up due to an increase in water use in Ethiopia, massive population movements will result, and possibly conflict between communities as well as between future governments in Addis Ababa and Muqdisho. Such a development,

³³ UNDP/World Bank socio-economic Assessment of south-central Somalia. Report commissioned by UNDP/World bank conducted by CRD, January 2004. Report to be released Spring 2004.

³⁴ Somali Center for Water and Environment, 2003.

absent the formation of a central government in Somalia, is unlikely to be prevented at this stage.³⁵

In south-central Somalia, the clans are the primary stakeholders in nearly every focus issue, and natural resource competition is no exception. Conflict over resources is organized around clans and sub-clans throughout the country. At this juncture, clan or sub-clan mobilizers are usually businessmen-cum-warlords who see an opportunity to use military superiority to displace another group from an economically appealing target. This involves pasture land, water points, and agricultural land primarily dedicated to high value export crops.

The *Habargidir* sub-clans of the *Hawiye* have been the primary forces for natural resource-driven conflict and displacement. The *Ayr*, *Sa'ad*, and *Sulayman* sub-sub-clans of the *Habargidir* and the other nominal Sub-sub-clans of the *Hawiye*; and the *Mareban* of the *Darod* clan have been the most aggressive in pursuing new landlord-tenant arrangements in the *Juba* and *Shabelle* River valleys. The processes by which they have come to occupy these territories have been violent and demonstrate a depth of clan chauvinism perhaps not before seen expressed in Somalia.³⁶ The domination of minority clans has reached new depths, with reports in the 1990s emerging of slave-like conditions among indigenous populations along the banks of the *Shabelle* River.³⁷

Authorities other than militia leaders have not demonstrated much interest in major efforts to wrest control of natural resources away from other groups in a violent manner. The possibilities for retribution and shifting clan alliances are unstable and dangerous. Unless well-armed, the consequences of starting down the path of violent expropriation of neighbouring assets are uncertain, and the risks grave.

The factors that contribute to the escalation of conflict, according to comments raised in the focus group discussions, are the diminished opportunities for profitable investment and reduced livelihood opportunities that make violent conquest of natural resource bases a more viable option in a cost calculation than it may have been previously. With no external investment, little donor assistance, no regulation of capital flows or banking system, and no state infrastructure, most opportunities for legal, legitimate profitable commerce have disappeared.

This has led to an environment, absent the rule of law, of survival of the fittest. That means that whoever holds the biggest arsenal often can dictate patterns of exploitation of natural resources. This return to a pre-colonial economy of conquest is contrasted with romanticized visions of Somalia today as a free capitalist zone with unfettered economic activity.³⁸

³⁵ Interview with the Director of Somali Center for Water and Environment based in Muqdisho, Somalia and Sweden.

³⁶ Focus Group Discussion held in Beled Weyne, Hiran on March (2004)

³⁷ Focus Group Discussion in Muqdisho on March 2004.

³⁸ Major international news outlets, who have recently visited the region (south-central Somalia), reported the new economic dynamics but have failed to note the underlining socio-economic hardships caused by the flourishing business entrepreneurship in the region.

The elements that contribute to the de-escalation of conflict can be attributed to the very poverty of economic opportunity as a factor in putting on the brakes for some resource-driven conflicts. As profits have decreased, and money-making opportunities have diminished, the ability for warlords to buy the level of weaponry they sustained during the 1990s is growing thinner.³⁹ This means that very cold calculations of affordability must be made before any militia or faction embarks on an attempted conquest or attack on a neighbouring group. A small-scale version of mutually assured destruction has put a damper on the low-to-medium-intensity conflict that marked the 1990s.

This trend toward de-escalation could be strengthened, if the UN Security Council were to place targeted sanctions against the warlords that continue to undermine the peace process and to control the perpetuation of the arms flow into the region.⁴⁰

V) Employment (Business Development and Remittances) and Access to Productive Resources

Background

Prior to the collapse of the Somali state, the country's major employment source was the national government. Most state-owned institutions were concentrated in south-central Somalia. Development projects funded by international aid agencies and international financial institutions were also concentrated in the south. With the collapse of the state, the greatest impact of unemployment is felt in south-central Somalia. The prolonged civil war has engendered a decade long economic recession, whose impact has been profound for all sectors of the economy, although particularly in the area of employment.⁴¹ The destruction of both social institutions and physical infrastructure during the war, compounded by recurrent droughts and food insecurity in most parts of the region, has produced significant crisis.

Despite the absence of a central government, economic activities have proceeded in most parts of Somalia with considerable resilience. Some of the economic recovery was facilitated by remittances from the Diaspora. Together with the Somali people's entrepreneurial resilience in the face of hardships, a wholly informal, yet nonetheless vibrant economy is emerging out of the vestiges of a 14-year civil war. Besides the export of live animals to the Gulf States, two new sectors have also acted as engines of the current Somali economy: the remittance sector and the competitively priced telecommunications sector. The absence of centralized authority and the shortage of international aid have not impeded the creation of employment opportunities by business-oriented groups, no matter how small.

³⁹ A one-on-one interview with a former military officer in Muqdisho on March (2204)

⁴⁰ ICG report: Biting The Somali Bullet, May 4, (2004)

⁴¹ A report commissioned by the UNDP/World Bank Macro-economic analysis of south-central Somalia, conducted by CRD/WSP International – January 2004.

Focus Issue analysis

Most of these employment opportunities for Somalis are concentrated in the urban centres of south-central Somalia, primarily in “Mogadishu, Marka, Beled Weyne and Kismaayo”. The population density of these cities, compared to other cities in south-central Somalia, is very high. Although the city of Baidoa is not an exception to population density, the intensity of the armed conflict between the supporters of the “Rahan Weyn Resistance Army” (RRA) has led to the withdrawal of some major private companies from the region.

Some of the regions, even in the absence of governance, enjoy a substantial enough level of economic activity to generate employment. Contrary to the popular belief that economic investment is determined by the level of stability in an area, a number of cities across south-central Somalia with a history of instability have attracted substantial investment from Somalis in the Diaspora and some local business groups. For example, the airline industry, telecommunication services, light industries, education networks, to mention a few, operate in areas of instability such as Mogadishu.⁴²

Localized political conflicts and proxy wars transpire in areas like Mogadishu; however, the interests of armed conflicts are far less powerful than before. Warfare is no longer an “instrument of the profit-making-business” The armed conflict in south-central Somalia has been relatively unsophisticated since 1995. Many of the clashes are politically motivated and serve only the interests of a few. On many occasions, the conditions in the region make it possible for few to incite armed clashes. However, in most cases, conflicts in south-central Somalia are based on political struggle between the armed factions. On the other hand, there has never been serious armed confrontation between the business groups. Because of their common economic interests, the business groups are more united against the armed faction leaders. The business groups, according to participants in the focus group discussions, have concern over the type of political decisions, the future form of governance and constitutional regulations that the political faction leaders may impose on the business groups in the event an authority emerges from the current peace process in Kenya.

Recent CRD report on the socio-economic assessment further elaborates:

“War-economy Entrepreneurship: One of the striking features and outcome of the prolonged civil war and the absence of a national government is the formation of a new socio-economic class in the Somali society. New social, political and economic interest groups have formed to defend their interests together. Many former rural people have now settled in the cities and are unlikely to go back to rural life. Women have transformed themselves into new social class that provide support to their families. New breed of business groups have established themselves in major cities and dominate many business activities. Another common practice, since 1995, also inherited as legacy of the civil war, is the misappropriation of private and public properties i.e. houses, state buildings looted by armed groups. Muqdisho city is provided with electricity by groups that have misappropriated former public generators. After fourteen years of war, the newly emerged Somali business elite are not willing to renounce the

⁴² The new US Dollars 10 million Coca-cola plant recently built in Muqdisho is a good example of how Somalis are investing millions of dollars in conflict-stricken areas. The Manager, Mr. Abdirazak, while speaking to Fortune magazine, said that Somalia’s future peace will be contributed to by the plant itself as one of the business ventures for peace.

privileges accorded to them by the civil war, nor do they contribute to the social services delivery. These are elites who are mostly heavily armed and are in position to demand further privileges in the Somalia post-war society. The new business groups in the region have developed a variety of different businesses. The endless strife of the Somali people prevented the formation of a state with regulative institutions. The war-economy groups want to maintain the status quo (their economic strategies and systems). Families of the new socio-economic class enjoy relatively good standards of living; their children attend schools and enjoy adequate access to the basic social services.

CRD socio economic assessment report, May (2004)

Since the collapse of the Somali state, remittances have become a major source of income for many Somalis. Remittances to Somalia are estimated, by different sources, to be between 800 million – 1 billion U.S. dollars annually.⁴³ The remittance industry has created an expanded employment source for many Somalis. In the absence of banking institutions, the “*Hawala*” companies have enabled many investors to credibly move large volumes of money from one area to another, with virtually no security hindrances.

The remittances play a crucial role in sustaining Somalia’s fragile economy. In addition to providing monthly remittances for household needs, it also is a critical source of investment funds for larger trading companies. In recent years, remittances activities have channelled large volumes of money for investment purposes. Remittances industry also provides limited banking services mainly in the form of savings.

The introduction of satellite phone companies into the region 1994-2004 has greatly helped the increase and efficiency of the remittance companies. The increasing cooperation between the telecommunications sector and remittances has created employment opportunities for many Somalis in the region. In many instances, this industry reduces potential conflicts that could have emerged in some regions because of the opportunities it creates. Remittances provide economic support to many Somalis, especially those in the urban areas, rural communities receive very little.

“Given the lack of banking institutions in the region, if there were not “*Hawala*” businesses, I doubt we would have been to run our businesses. I also doubt if we would have had the relative security we have today.”

Housewife in Beled Weyne (2004).

⁴³ Considering the confidential nature of money transfers and the secrecy with which financial brokers or “*Hawala*” operate in their business dealings, these figures reflect quite vividly the lack of reliable data that is available. In the absence of a national accounting system, financial data has been drawn from a variety of sources, including an article that appeared in *The Economist*, (date of publication and page number?) which states that 11,000 Somali immigrants in Denmark are said to have sent approximately US\$ 8.4 Million to Somalia over a nine-month period.

The farming communities suffer dual hardship; 1) they receive little remittance 2) they have no adequate access to their farming practices due to the insecurity situation in the region. The dual hardship has caused severe shortage of employment opportunities in their respective areas. This has forced many of them to migrate to urban centres in search of employment.

While the small scale farmers have abandoned farming, the expropriation of productive assets by powerful armed clans has created profound insecurity for legitimate landowners. Moreover, those who take over the assets have no farming skills, nor do they possess the will-power and tenacity to farm. This situation has led to a reduction of the overall production scales; in turn, creating poverty in the rural communities. Many internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the Bantu communities have suffered a long history of discrimination and land dispossession. They have been exposed to serious human rights abuses. Most importantly, the best cultivable farming land is situated in the south and most of it is under occupation by the armed militias of other Somali clans. This, coupled with inadequate farming machinery and other technology, reduces the productive capacity of the region. Possible employment opportunities in the fertile agricultural lands are hindered by the combination of multiple complications, as has been mentioned.

Telecommunications, airline industry, overseeing of seaports and airports, remittance companies, education network and water and electricity companies, create employment opportunities. Another important stakeholder that creates employment as easily as it obstructs are armed political faction leaders. The interests of armed leaders are to create their own business ventures for profit making, exclusive employment opportunities for their clan, contribute occasionally to peace-building and reconciliation efforts, and sometimes incite inter-clan conflict.

VI) Militarization & Human Rights

Background

During the period of military rule in Somalia (1969-1991), thousands of citizens were persecuted, forced into exile, murdered and tortured. The official lists compiled by human rights organisations report thousands of cases of torture throughout Somalia, particularly in the south-central region, where most state security institutions were located. Torture was employed extensively in detention centres under the previous government of Somalia.

Unfortunately, the relatives of victims of human rights abuses have never received justice for their grievances. The government officers that committed these atrocities are currently among the armed political faction leaders attending the reconciliation conferences for Somalia.⁴⁴ Since the outbreak of the civil war (from 1991-2004), there

⁴⁴ One-on-one interview, Marka March (2004)

have been no indications that the perpetrators of human rights abuses will be brought to justice.

In south-central Somalia, a permanent state of lawlessness and criminality has become the norm of the day. Young, armed freelance groups have taken advantage of the protracted state collapse by constantly terrorizing defenceless civilians. The civil war, perpetuated by armed political factions, has left behind permanent emotional scars. The traditional Somali respect for human life and dignity has been sharply compromised by the years of turmoil. Positive social values that had been sanctioned by time-tested kinship ties, both those based on morality, as well as those founded in Islamic principles, have all but been eroded.⁴⁵

Marauding armed gangs have inflicted macabre acts of killing, torture and rape on innocent civilians. These acts reached frenzy at the height of the civil war. As the war has subsided, violations have continued, albeit to a lesser degree, however, new forms of human rights violations, previously unknown, have, emerged in south-central Somalia. Kidnapping is one of the worst among them.⁴⁶

The collapse of the strong Somali Army and its numerous abandoned arms depots created a huge supply of weapons that the decade long civil war could not exhaust. This enormous supply of weapons went into the hands of masses creating a militarized society. Weapons markets flourished in Mogadishu and elsewhere in Somalia and particularly in the south-central regions where the major military weapons depot were situated. The neighbouring countries also provided their share of supply especially after the collapse of subsequent national peace processes.

Although wars subsided and their intensity abated, weapons are in abundant supply in south-central Somalia. Much of these weapons have been transferred into the hands of businessman, who unlike the warlords, are driven by business ventures rather than military clout. This fact established crosscutting network that dampened the vigour of polarization among the clan.

Focus Issue Analysis

The irony is that those who committed human rights abuse, employed armed militias and exploited and manipulated inter-clan warfare for their own political ends in south-central Somalia, are considered to be the legitimate political leaders of Somalia by international actors. Violence committed in the past by individuals and through institutions must be linked to current human rights violations, even if motives for committing them are significantly different. In south-central Somalia, there are a high number of casualties from politically motivated violence.⁴⁷

In some extreme cases, the violators of present-day human rights are the same senior government officers from the former military regime who were responsible for past

⁴⁵ CRD Zonal Report: Path to Recovery to be released in the spring 2004.

⁴⁶ Menkhaus, Ken, “*Protracted State Collapse in Somalia: A Rediagnosis* – Review of Africa Political Economy (2003)”

⁴⁷ Interview by CRD with Human Rights advocates in Muqdisho, March 2004.

violations.⁴⁸ The link between these perpetrators and their past human rights violations seems to have been ignored by both the countries in the region and by international actors providing aid to Somalia. There are officers who are known to have committed atrocities in the 1970s and 1990s sitting in the national reconciliation conferences, vying for political positions in the future Somali government.⁴⁹ This scenario clearly illustrates the inability of local and international actors to address human rights abuses. The consequences are a perpetuation of the cycle of violence, where victims themselves are now becoming perpetrators of further acts of violence.

Human Rights

“We live under constant nightmares. Our own fellow citizens are threatening us daily. We cannot go to our farms. If one is lucky enough to farm, your product will be confiscated and your life threatened. I witnessed the killing of my husband, shot dead in front of my own eyes. Life is cheap that the culture of impunity prevails daily.”

A peasant single mother

One of the legacies of the civil war has been the huge displacement of people from one region to another. Many Somalis were forced to leave their birth places because of their clan affiliation, while others were ejected from their homelands or property by other Somali citizens who wanted their property. This is especially true of the farmland areas of lower and middle *Shabelle* and the middle and lower Juba regions of south-central Somalia.⁵⁰ Somali minority clans in the south-central regions became the primary victims of human rights abuses with the outbreak of the *Mogadishu* popular uprising in 1991. The lawlessness and anarchy inside the region will continue to provide breeding ground for further human rights violations of great proportions until a new national authority for Somalia emerges.

The most common crimes and human rights abuses committed can be categorized into the following:

- 1) The assassination of political rivals, business competitors or those with whom there is a clan vendetta. This has been very common in south-central Somalia mainly Muqdisho where a number of prominent Somalis, such as doctors, engineers, teachers, and military officers, have been killed. Many expatriates have also been murdered.
- 2) The kidnapping of innocent civilians for a multitude of reasons, including demands for ransom, vendettas and extortion.
- 3) Car-hijacking is a very common criminal act in the major cities like *Mogadishu*, *Kismaayo*, and *Gaalkayo*.
- 4) Road-block
- 5) Rape.

⁴⁸ Interview conducted by CRD on April (2004) in Muqdisho.

⁴⁹ Interview with an attendant in the peace process in Mbagathi, Kenya, April (2004)

⁵⁰ Interview by CRD with ismail Jimale Human Rights Center in Muqdisho, April (2004)

The endless cycle of human rights abuses is widely believed to have been contributed by the high level of militarization among average citizens. The flooding of the market with small arms, for which business groups and neighbouring countries can be held responsible, further aggravated the security situation and human rights abuses. The potent combination of state repression and insurrectionary struggle has resulted in high levels of militarization inside Somalia, especially the south-central region.⁵¹ Youth armed militia have borne the brunt of state violence.

Most of the human rights violations are perpetuated by armed militia groups. These groups can be divided into five:

1. *FACTIONAL MILITIA*

The category of factional militia includes remnants of the former military regime. Many others are recruits from within the clan of the faction leader. This group possesses large amount of weaponry and stockpiles of ammunition.

2. *BUSINESS MILITIA*

These business groups who previously stood alongside their respective clans during the civil war established joint armed groups to defend their business interests.

3. *ISLAMIC SHARIA MILITIA*

The emergences of the Islamic Sharia courts have their own armed groups. They more discipline and organized compared to other groups.

4. *FREELANCE ARMED GROUPS*

These are not associated with the armed factions or business groups. These are the most disorganized and notorious of all the armed groups. They kill, loot, kidnap or destroy with impunity. Sometimes they are hired to do dirty business for others by any of the above mentioned categories.

5. *PRIVATE SECURITY GUARDS*

These are groups hired as security guards by both private citizens and local and international organizations. Usually they are less harmful although occasionally they create trouble if their employment is terminated for any reason.

The biggest arms market in south-central Somalia is *Mogadishu*. Different kinds of weapons are imported, according to an interview with arms dealers in *Mogadishu*, from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Yemen, Djibouti and Libya by the different political armed groups and some prominent businessmen. The major arms dealers operate secretly and in most cases it is difficult to obtain proper data. The *Bakaaraha* market distributes the weapons shipments to different other markets in Muqdisho i.e. *Arjantina* and *Suk-Ba'ad*. Weapons

⁵¹ Interview by CRD with former senior military officer, April (2004)

shipments are consigned to other parts of south-central Somalia by local Somali brokers.⁵²

It is worth of quotation of the UN arms Embargo: “*The arms market in Somalia is supplied by both external and internal sources, and to most Somalis, there is little distinction between these markets. This is largely because arms, ammunition and cash are completely interchangeable. Warlords and individual militia members frequently sell; access arms and ammunitions to local markets to raise money for purchase of other goods such as food and Qat – and other warlords often buy these same arms and ammunition when expecting combat.*”

The biggest threat to security and human rights in south-central Somalia is the proliferation of weapons. Weapons are imported into Somalia by businessmen, for profiteering, and by regional powers who wish to arm certain faction leaders for political reasons (Report of the Panel of Experts Embargo on Somalia pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1425(2002). Two-thirds of the military bases and garrisons were established in south-central Somalia prior to the war, and all the Somali Army’s arsenal has found its way into the hands of civilians in the region, in one way or another.

“The opposition groups used their own clans as their organizing base, creating armed, clan-based proto-political organizations such as the Somali National Movement (SNM for the northern Issaq clans), the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF for the Majerteen, Darod clan), the United Somali Congress (USC for the Hawiye clan), the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM for the Ogaden, Darod clan) and so forth. At the present, there are 26 such clan-based political factions.” (Ricardo Rene Laremont 2002:172)

Most of the civilian population in current possession of weapons are the *Hawiye* dominant clans in south-central Somalia. The *Hawiye* armed groups, under the banner of USC, waged war against the *Darod* clans until they were forced to seek refuge in neighbouring countries. The inter-clan war between the *Hawiya* and the *Darod* clans was initiated in 1991, and later, the *Habargidir Hawiye* fought against and occupied the land of the *Rahan Weyn* clans of *Bay & Bakool*. The homes of the *Rahan Weyn* were destroyed and their agricultural products pillaged. This was later referred to as the Triangle of Death (City of Death). The abundance of weapons and strong sense of mistrust among clans within the *Hawiye* and others led to the 1991-3 inter-*Hawiye* armed conflict, the most devastating civil war in the Somali history.

The key actors in the militarization process and human rights violations are:

- 1) Political Faction Leaders: Militarization serves the aims of political recognition and clan superiority. The stockpiling of weapons by the faction leaders forces the unarmed majority to remain submissive to the demands of the political leaders.
- 2) Armed Business Groups: To protect their business interests throughout the south-central regions, businessman recruits armed, clan-based militia.
- 3) Regional/Central Authority: The TNG, although it has its own loyal armed militia obtains support from some of the armed business groups.

⁵² UN Arms Embargo Panel: Report of the panel of experts on Somalia pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution No. 1425 (2002)

4) Islamic Sharia Courts: Following the collapse of the Somalia government, Islamic clerics organized efforts to control and govern areas throughout Somalia, including *Mogadishu*, *Luq (Gedo)*, *Kismaayo* (Lower Juba) and the *Beled Weyne, Hiiraan* region.

Factors that escalate human rights abuses and the expansion of militarization are: the absence of an accountable authority, the lack of structured institutions for law reinforcement, absence of strong advocacy groups, and lack of judicial authorities that have power to hold responsible the perpetrators of human rights abuses. Given the situation in south-central Somalia, there is no authority that has the ability to contain human rights abuses and the expansion of militarization, according to a number of interviews.

The factors that could de-escalate human rights abuses and expansion of militarization are: the establishment of a strong and credible governance institution with law reinforcement agencies, raising the capacities of the civil society through the arrangements of workshops and seminars, advocacy through media, addressing and holding culpable the obstructers of the implementation of the peace processes, ensuring the effective implementation of the findings and recommendation of the Panel of Experts of the UN arms Embargo on Somalia.

VII) Culture and Tradition of Violence

Background

Somalis have traditionally engaged in periodic inter-clan conflict, particularly in pastoral areas. During the armed conflict, the use of traditional conventional weapons was very common. Today, however, violence in south-central Somalia has reached at an unprecedented proportion. It has changed in nature, scale, and dimension, due to a number of factors, including: the proliferation of automatic weapons, factionalism, and interference from external actors, high youth unemployment, increased demand for and decreased productivity of land, desiccation of the land over time, and erosion of the traditional Somali values.

Violence is south-central Somalia's key constraint to human development. It affects economic growth, productivity and development. In the past decade, the scale and intensity of violence in the region has gone from generalised pattern of violence to limited conflict – although, as limited it is, it affects the lives of most citizens.⁵³

The current violence in south-central Somalia can be categorized into the following:

- 1) Structural violence/Control over resources that involves the systematic perpetuation of violence by armed faction leaders and business groups;
- 2) Inter-clan violence that is deeply rooted in traditional conflicts over grazing lands and access to other scarce resources, such as water;
- 3) Individual and group violence hastened by a lack of employment opportunities and the inaccessibility to other resources; and

⁵³ UNDP - Human Development Report, 2002.

- 4) External Actors (neighbouring states in the region) who have turned Somalia into a political theatre of their own internal and/or intra-political conflicts. For example, the spill-over of the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea armed some of Somalia's south-central based armed factions.

Since the end of its war with Ethiopia in 1978, Somalia has witnessed regular armed conflict. At the onset of the expansion of the armed opposition, clan-based groups that formed against the former military regime of *Mohamed Siyaad Barre* have further precipitated the conflict, gradually pushing it out of control until it has become a very destructive and widespread violence.

A culture of impunity and criminality has had a severe impact on the fabric of Somali society since the collapse of the state of Somalia. The present culture of violence is orchestrated by free-roaming armed groups, who kill at will and appropriate both public and private property as they desire. Containment and deterrence of these organized criminals has been attempted on many occasions by both traditional and religious authorities, such as *Islamic Sharia* courts and neighbourhood watch groups without great success.⁵⁴ In addition, civil society organizations have tried to collaborate with traditional authorities in a concerted effort to avert the dangers posed by organized criminal acts.⁵⁵

Focus Issue Analysis

During the civil war, most of the clan-based armed factions recruited their militia from their respective clans. Armed faction leaders, such as the United Somali Congress (USC – of the *Hawiye*), the Somali Patriotic Front (SPM – of the *Ogaadeen/Daarood*), and “*Raxan Weyn*” - the Resistance Army (RRA – of the *Digil & Mirifle in Bay & Bakool*), recruited the nomadic armed boys from the rural areas of south-central Somalia to major urban centres. The reason of recruiting and arming the nomadic boys is because they are believed to be good fighters, as pointed out by some of the attendants in the focus group discussions. The collapse of the state, coupled with the disintegration of the judiciary system, provided easy access to more weapons for the armed nomadic youth.

“The availability of weapons and its use in our communities is a major problem that contributes to a number of killings and human rights abuses. Each year, hundreds of in-combatants are murdered”

Mr. Ken Menkhaus tries to point out, not only has violence become localised, but its nature has dramatically changed.

⁵⁴ In the absence of judicial organs, law re-enforcing agencies have begun to develop. In Mogadishu, for example, a local neighbourhood watch has been established by local people to curb the ever-expanding violence in the city.

⁵⁵ A Focus Group Discussion held in Muqdisho by CRD, April (2004)

Not only has the severity of warfare in Somalia changed since 1991-92; the nature of armed conflicts has changed over time as well. In the early 1990s, armed conflicts were mainly inter-clan in nature, pitting large lineage groups against one another. Initially, this meant warfare between the largest clan-families in the south – the Darood versus Hawiye. These wars were characterized by sweeping and fast-moving campaigns across much of southern Somalia from the outskirts of Mogadishu to the Kenyan border.⁵⁶

There are a number of interest groups that have perpetuated the continuation of violence since 1991. The two major groups are the political armed faction leaders and the war-economy group. These two groups benefit from and promote armed conflicts whenever it is in their best interests. The political armed leaders foment armed crisis to force political recognition and establish a power base. Sometimes, they instigate conflict and violence to divert attention when they are weakened or have not got sufficient food and money for their militiamen.

Among the profiteers of the war-economy are business groups. Some have, after taking advantage of the state collapse, built their empires into quasi-legitimate commercial enterprises. Many others nurture localized conflict to remain engaged in sinister commercial activities, such as the export of metal scrap, female livestock and charcoal, among others. On other occasions, sporadic armed conflicts are triggered by robbery, theft, road blocks and other criminal acts.

The current armed militia in south-central Somalia do not wish to re-establish a Somali state nor reactivate the rule of law. None of the armed faction leaders is genuinely interested or militarily capable of gaining full control of a particular region. The motivation for continuing violence is not the vision of a new state, but rather the paralysis of it and its regulating institutions. Only a persistent paralysis guarantees the conservation of the armed leaders' position as a new ruling elite or a formidable military force within the region. To end conflict is to end their very existence. Any attempt to challenge this vision will inevitably produce violence.⁵⁷

Continuing the present culture of violence provides not only a military victory over opposing forces, but also the elimination of the enemy. Only the existence and maintenance of an “enemy” who endangered (or at least could endanger) the security of their clans provided the various faction leaders with necessary legitimization and thus guaranteed their continued existence.

Factors of escalation

As indicated in the preceding paragraphs, the culture of violence runs deep in south-central Somalia. Some of the factors that contribute to the escalation of the culture of violence can be cited as:

⁵⁶ Menkhause, Ken (2003). “Protracted State-collapse in Somalia: Rediagnosis” Review of African Political Economy, page number?

⁵⁷ Focus Group Discussion organized by CRD/WSP on April 2004 in Muqdisho.

- ✓ The absence of a legitimate central or de-centralized authority in the region.
- ✓ The lack of law re-enforcement agencies and regulatory financial institutions.

The possible de-escalating factors could be:

- ✓ Raising the awareness of the people by engaging the civil society organizations, traditional leaders through the media and other communication sources.
- ✓ Developing strategies of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed youth with alternative incentives for youth in the form of skills training that could enable them to sustain themselves productively in their communities.

VIII) Role of the Media

Background

Prior to the civil war, Somalia was under a repressive military regime that came to power on October 21, 1969 through a coup de tat, after suspending the constitutional parliamentary democracy the country adopted right after independence on July 1, 1960.

Somalis are known culturally to be an oral society. They are very much attached to news reports. People through south-central Somalia regularly listen radio broadcasts. They read daily, weekly and biweekly newsletters which is a main source of information publicly. People give careful consideration to special broadcasts that mainly focus on issues that affect their lives. It is part of the Somali culture to remain informed about the current local and international situations. Listening to the ever changing events across the region and the world at large is a habit to all Somalis of different ages. They carefully listen and follow world affairs and reports on politics and social conflicts. At the end of every news report, people gather and discuss the news reports. For example, at 5:30 pm East African time, when the BBC Somali service is on the air, all the tea shops will be filled to capacity. Soon after the end of a news report, the people listening to the news will have different versions of the same news interpreted and manipulated to reflect one's biases.

At the start of the civil war in Somalia, and the subsequent disintegration of the government institutions, the Somalis, tired of decades long media censorship and heavy handed military controlled regime, broke new ground by establishing privately owned radios and newspapers. However, instead of promoting peace, the media became mouthpieces for the clan-based warlords who resorted to fighting each other for power. The media propaganda created polarization and reinforced mythmaking that emphasized the arguments of the clan leaders they represented, while defiling and dismissing the arguments of the opposing warlords. The media is one of the tools exploited by the warlords to fuel the civil war that has been raging for the last 14 years.

The media positioned itself, at the onset of its inception, to adapt to the prevailing situations in south-central Somalia and particularly in the area of Mogadishu. With people giving more interest to the media, it evolved and became less bent on war propaganda. More community-oriented programs to target different population groups emerged; airtime for issues of great interest to peace and education increased.

Focus Issue Analysis:

The media in south-central Somalia can be placed into six categories:

- media owned by the political factions (mainly radio);
- media owned by the Transitional National Government (TNG) – both radio and news paper;
- media owned by some of the business groups;
- external funded media outlets;
- internet based websites in the form of radio and electronic wire news reporting and
- private printing media mainly news letters.

Most of the current media outlets, no matter who they are owned by, disseminate special social, political and/or economic agenda. Some are specialized in slow growing profit making advertisement services. In some rare cases, when approached by the peace activists, they provide listeners with programs such as the advocacy for peace, education and other public services. There are special media outlets established by external actors whose main purpose is to broadcast specific programs that target specific constituents.

The internet and websites, which is a new but another form of media outlets, often disseminate clan based information. These sites are based abroad and are controlled and managed by the Somalis in the Diaspora. The numerous four page newsletters are another source of news and information for many people in the region and particularly Muqdisho. For example, in Muqdisho alone, there are nearly a dozen locally produced news letters. Most of the information and the reporting format these newsletters carry are tabloid in style. Because of the cheaper price and the simplicity of its structures, it has substantial readership in the region.

Media is a double-edged sword. Its link to conflict depends on how it is used. It can be both a tool for escalation and de-escalation of conflict. Although there were positive trends towards maturity; lack of professionalism makes it unpredictable and inconsistent. In general, media seems to have abandoned the warmongering attitude it employed in the early days of the civil war. But there is no organizational capacity in place to guarantee that the positive trends will not be reversed. The media did not take the lead; it just followed the public opinion. When the public got tired of unwarranted deaths, they simply cut the ties with the warlords and stopped fighting. And the media followed suit.⁵⁸

Due to the prevailing lawlessness in the region, the environment is not yet ripe for wider freedom of speech across the region. Guns are awash in the bigger cities like *Muqdisho*, *Kismayo*, *Baidoa*, *Beled Weyne* etc. Warlords have divided south-central Somalia into clan fiefdoms which makes media vulnerable to the pressures of the warlords, lives of reporters difficult and the operations of the media outlets limited. Yet media groups continue to operate in such a difficult environment.

Compounded by prolonged civil conflict, exacerbated by lack of regulatory agencies and coupled with the open free market, the current media in south-central Somalia, according to a number of participants in the focus group discussions, continue to be burdened with number of problems. Many radio outlets, for example, perceive that their role is to

⁵⁸ Focus Discussion Group in Muqdisho, April (2004)

promote their clan interests. Many of them encourage myth-making and clan stereotypes. But in some respects, media in south-central Somalia is at one point influential as a social force and, in many other occasions, it furtively serves the interest of the owners' clan affiliates.

In 2002, an inter-clan erupted in north Muqdisho involving two sub-clans from the Abgal community. Heavy weaponry was used indiscriminately. A number of innocent civilians were killed in the war between the two sub-clans. A reporter from one of the local media outlets was reporting live from the area where the fighting took place. In his probably uncensored report, he reported that one of the two sub-clans was pushed back suffering heavy casualty. The reporter continued suggesting in his report that unless the clan received a timely logistical re-enforcement, they are bound to be crushed indefinitely.

This uncensored report appealed to the sentiments of the listeners from the defeated clan. The report generated escalation of the conflict where the emotional appeal has attracted logistic re-enforcements. As a result, many more civilians were killed, many others injured during the inter-clan conflict.

The public desire in south-central Somalia, especially the urban towns, to listen to neutral and balanced programs is imperative, especially at this time of serious social conflicts. News headlines that often focused on threat, accusations and sensational confrontations have generated anger and frustration between conflicting clans with an inevitable demand for retaliation, as was the case in *Bay & Bakool*, where shortly after the clash between the Hawiye and RRR, *Hamiye* occupying forces in the region were expelled.⁵⁹ On many occasions, the most emotional angry voices have been highlighted where leaders willingness to intervene in conflicts were frustrated.

On the other hand, media in south-central Somalia has also played an instrumental role in conflict prevention and resolution, created a neutral political space where communities exchange comments and views and advocated for the respect of human rights. In general, the media in the region played a vital role in the peace processes. During the peace process in Arta, Djibouti, media influenced the strategy and behaviour of the participants in the conference. It created open debates and forums among the participants in the peace process and between participants and people throughout the region.

The major media outlets in Muqdisho have established daily programs in 2000 where people were informed about the status of the national reconciliation conference held in

⁵⁹ In 1997, while the Hawiye sub-clan Habargidir was fighting the RRA Digil & Mirifle clans in Bay region, southwest Somalia, both clans were utilizing radio facilities to send misleading information leading to the death of many innocent civilians.

Arta, Djibouti. In the early days of the peace process in *Arta*, Djibouti, media in cooperation with the civil society members organized rallies in support of the peace process until the final outcome of the reconciliation conference. Shortly after the formation of the TNG, much of the attention of the media was commercialized. Compounded with lack of inter-clan ownership, the influence of the media, had in the process, diminished gradually as well as in its importance.⁶⁰ The wider listeners in south-central Somalia now perceive media as a tool whose air services could be commercialized for the purpose of its owners, or that of their clans.

The factors that escalate conflict in media are: lack of professionalism by journalists which sometimes ignite violence, disseminates message of intolerance and misinformation that is taken advantage by conflict interested groups. The journalistic ethics, regulatory institutions and proper training, have on many occasions worsened biases and been based on stories. This fact coupled with Somali's political consciousness and wary nature, news in Somalia, at times creates violence and unwarranted unrest. In a society polarized by on-going conflicts, clan biases in news media takes many forms and is also reflected in the ownership of the media.

On the other hand, the factors the contribute to the de-escalation of conflict are: the establishment of code of ethics by the authorities in the area, the provision of training, creation of an over-sight body that oversees the implementation of the code of conduct etc.

IX) Regional Conflict within south-central Somalia

Background

Competition among regions, which often overlaps with clan competition, is a driving force in the history of conflict in Somalia in general and south-central Somalia in particular. Differences between interests in southern, central, north-eastern and north-western Somalia are often large, and produce competition and conflict. Rivalries between urban and rural interests have also been a major factor in fuelling conflict, particularly in the aftermath of the collapse of the *Siad Barre* regime. The movement of people and communities, the dispute over land and property, and port and trade issues have also reinforced inter-regional problems which have ensured the continuation of conflict and state collapse in Somalia.

Focus Issue Analysis

The over centralization of the Somali state in the post-colonial era created resentment and insurrections throughout the 1970s and 1980s culminating in the forceful overthrow of the *Barre* regime. It is still difficult to form a workable coalition government to rebuild a state in Somalia. The situation in general is without parallel globally and the worse of it is in the south-central regions of the former state of Somalia.

⁶⁰ All media outlets in south-central Somalia are owned by sub-clans. Also, the so-called share-holding ownership of the media is itself single-clan based. This notion of ownership mystifies further all forms of broadcast.

Since the collapse of the state, regional competition has intersected with clan competition to ensure that no reconciliation process is successful. During the 1990s, Somalia experienced a painful process of clan clearing, in which dominant clans reasserted or asserted control over key regions or infrastructure in order to maintain a foothold in a strategic area, in preparation for the expected but not yet realized central government. Now that the active civil war is largely over, these clan and regional movements have begun to stabilize, but they maintain situations of occupation and dominance that are inherently unstable. This element remains yet unresolved.⁶¹ The case is true in the Lower Shabelle, Middle and Lower Juba regions of south Somalia where strategic control over the area by clans that migrated from the central regions has been active since 1991.

These changes in demographic and settlement patterns have fed negatively into peace-making efforts. This is particularly the case in the continuing contest over clan formulas and representation. There is a long-running dispute over representation in the various peace initiatives and how representation in governing institutions would ultimately be determined. The degree to which the state will be decentralized and subject to federal arrangements is also a factor in encouraging continuing rivalry and regional dispute.⁶²

Urban/rural divides provide a particular virulent aspect to civil conflict over the past decade and a half. Pastoral populations from the *Hawiye* clan were rallied by late General *Mohamed farah Aideed* and others to provide the vanguard of assaults on *Muqdisho* and other urban centres, building on the resentment felt by these communities over the concentration of resources by certain sub-clans of the *Darod* in *Muqdisho*, *Kismaayo* and other urban centres during the period of *Siad Barre's* rule.⁶³

The movement of people is also an inherently destabilizing factor. Because of the clan clearing operations, and the movement of clan-and-region-based armies during the active civil war, many communities were uprooted, and remain, in effect, homeless. These factors then intersect with the massive turnover in property ownership, which has never been resolved by any of the peace initiatives or traditional inter-communal mechanisms. These thorns remain in the side of many communities that feel that their land has been occupied by outsiders. This will be an issue that drives future conflict and puts Somali peace making ventures at risk.⁶⁴

Trade is also fundamental to the reality and perception of regional imbalances which fuel conflict. Port issues, according to the attendants in the consultative meetings held in *Muqdisho*, are intimately intertwined with trade. It is felt by most major sub-clans that it is crucial to have access to major trade routes and major ports for economic survival and prosperity. Therefore, conflict is often driven by these considerations, as has been seen in Lower *Shabelle/Marka*, Lower *Juba/Kismaayo*, and *Banadir/Mogadishu*, etc.

As Prof. *Abdi Ismail Samatar* argues, in his book (*The African State*), the people in the inter-riverine areas have legitimate fear from the Pastoral communities more than any

⁶¹ Focus Group Discussion held by CRD in *Muqdisho* on April (2004)

⁶² WSP unpublished report "A Dialogue for Peace," 2003.

⁶³ An interview by CRD with an attendant in one of the consultative meetings held in *Muqdisho* in March (2004)

⁶⁴ CRD/WSP International focus group discussion in *Marka* April 2004.

other part of the country. “*The people in the inter-riverine paid the heaviest human and material cost that coincided with the crumbling of the Somali national institutions and the savage wars over the ashes left behind*”. The question Prof. *Abdi I. Samatar* poses is why was the rest of the Somali society were so unconcerned and silent about the killings and destruction of the least belligerent yet perhaps the most productive of the population. With this in mind, many Somalis ask themselves how the people in the inter-riverine areas could trust the people that perpetuated their untold suffering to lead them politically.⁶⁵

Regional imbalances as a factor in conflict, according to a number of individuals that attended in the consultative meetings held in Muqdisho on April (2004), can be fuelled from the outside as well. Ethiopia has focused much of its assistance on specific armed factions in south-central Somalia that are strategic to its interests. Ethiopia has created alliances at various times with:

- the SNF, a *Darod* militia in *Gedo* region which fought alongside Ethiopian forces to defeat *Al-Ittibad Al-Islami* elements in 1996/7;
- factions of the RRA, a *Rabanweyn* military/political group in *Bay & Bakool* which acted as a buffer to perceived hostile interests in *Muqdisho*;
- factions of the USC such as *Hussein Aidid's* militia which opposed the TNG;
- various *Abgal* factions led at times by *Haji Mussa Sudi* and *Mohamed Dheere*, also aimed at undermining the TNG;
- faction led by Gen. *Mohamed Said Herzi (Morgan)* dominated by *Majerteen* and *Ogadeen Darod* clans, who's also an ally of the Ethiopian backed SRRC active in Lower Juba.

The key actors in the arena of regional imbalances are the militias of the various competing sub-clans. The *Hawiye* have a number of actors and militias that are relevant in this regard. There are numerous *Habargidir*, *Murusade*, and the *Abgal* sub-clans that have militias, control areas, and continuously struggle to expand their economic influence and jurisdiction. Their control of *Mogadishu*, Lower *Shabelle*, and significant parts of Lower Juba mean that they are in control of the nerve centre of south-central Somali political economy.

There are numerous *Darod* militias and actors of the *Majerten/Harti* militias and political actors who are in control of the northeast state of *Puntland*, with some competition between within the *Harti* and *Ortole*, *Lelkase* etc. The same groups (*Harti*) are also in contest over control of territory (south Mudug) against the *Hawiye (Habargidir)* on one hand, while the (*Harti*) are also in a political contest with the other *Darod* sub-clans (*Mareban* and *Ogaden*) and the *Hawiye (Habargidir)* in Lower Juba. The latter dynamic is also found in parts of the central regions as well, such as south *Mudug* between the *Hart/Majerten* against the *Habargidir/Sa'ad* and *Habargidir/Sulayman*. Similar contest exist between the *Mareban/Darod* against the *Dir* in *Galguduud* region, central Somalia.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ The Somali people in the northwest (now Somaliland) have serious complaints about how the people in the region suffered under the brutal dictatorship of Siyaad Barre whose forces bombarded the city of Hargeisa with the rest of the Somali people silent and watching passively. However, a number of elite Somalilanders were part of the ruling clique then unlike the people in the inter-riverine regions.

⁶⁶ This is a controversial assertion in diplomatic circles, but is persuasive especially in explaining the serious armed clashes in Puntland and Baidoa in 2002. In both cases, conflicts were at root efforts by rival political leaders to assert primacy over territory and leadership positions in order to insure a place at the table in Eldoret. Even UN reports to the Security Council, which are normally purged of any politically sensitive statements, have acknowledged that preparations for the Eldoret peace process set in motion

The *Isaaq* clan is in control of the administration in Somaliland, but it remains in some dispute with the neighbouring state of Puntland over bordering territories, all delineated by sub-clan control. In the pursuit of the unity of Somalia by the current Puntland state of Somalia versus the aim for cessation of Somaliland from the rest of Somalia, the southerners may support Puntland's aspirations of Somalia's unity.⁶⁷ On the other hand, the *Rahan Weyn* sub-clan militias (*Digil & Mirifle*) have fought for control of administrative centres in both *Bay & Bakool* regions. Also, a contest exists between the *Biyomaal/Dir* against the *Digil* in *Lower Shabeelle* region. Over the control of *Gedo* region, a contest exists between the *Marehan/Darod* clan against the *Mirifle* of the *Rahan Weyn* clan-militia. There have also been recent clashes between the *Sheikhal/Hawiye* clan in Middle Juba against the *Ayr/Habargidirs* from the central region of Somalia.⁶⁸

Minority groups pepper the landscape in a number of regions throughout Somalia. In some places, according to many participants in the consultative meetings held across south-central Somalia, they were the hardest hit during the active period of the civil war, having no clan-based defences and being trampled by armies moving backward and forward across Somalia during the first two years after *Barre's* departure especially the *Bantu, Gibil ad*, and the *Digil* communities in *Marka, Barava, Qorioley, Jilib* and *Bur-Hakaba* in south and southwest Somalia.

Some of these locations are controlled by clan-based militias. Others have tried to establish a more formal administration i.e. the attempted failure of setting up a rudimentary administration in southwest state of Somalia by the *Rahan Weyn* Resistance Army (RRA) of the *Digil and Mirifle* clans on April 2002 in *Baidoa, Bay* region

The factors that contribute to escalation of the conflict, says a civil society member attending in one of the consultative meetings organized by CRD, is the intense competition between clans for current economic spoils and future political opportunities. This guarantees that regional rivalries will remain a significant conflict driver over the coming decade. Bitterness over perceived and real losses over the past fourteen years since the collapse of the state, and further disagreement over unresolved grievances lingering from the *Barre* era, fuels present and future contests for territory and influence.

intense political jockeying between rival groups in places like Mogadishu and in some cases led to bloodshed. See UN (2002a) Para 6, and UN (2002d) Para. 28, 32. See also International Crisis Group reports at www.crisisweb.org

⁶⁷ Interview with one of the ministers of the TNG (March 2004)

⁶⁸ Interview with a traditional leader by CRD from Middle Juba on March (2004)

“As an old man, I never thought a Somali would conquer another Somali by force. The indigenous people of the region are occupied by other Somalis from other regions. Peace in Somalia is way far as long as people from other regions intend to dominate minorities in other regions.”

An elder from Afgoi district.

Control over towns and cities for political and economic reasons have been another element contributing to the escalation of the conflict over the past fourteen years. Struggles for control of *Mogadishu*, *Kismaayo*, *Baidoa*, *Bossaso*, *Luuq* and other towns and cities have marked some of the most intense fighting seen in Somalia’s history.⁶⁹

Ongoing disputes over property and territory will ensure that any peace agreement signed will only see the beginning of the political process determining legitimate authority. Many areas are perceived, according to a former civil servant interviewed, to be occupied territories, such as *Mogadishu*, *Kismaayo*, parts of the *Juba* and *Shabelle* Valleys, and other regions. The continuing perception of domination and occupation ensures that escalation will occur whenever there appears to be a process legitimizing the status quo of territorial control by opposing armed clans.

Finally, issues of control of ports and airports, two of the most reliable money-makers in Somalia, will remain points of escalation between regional groups focused on making money and positioning for future political benefits.

The factors that contribute to the de-escalation of the conflict are, in some ways, since the mid-1990s:

- a. The realisation of few successful major changes in areas of control and occupation by organizing grass-roots consultations between the traditional elders, religious leaders and civil society members in the region.
- b. Armed faction leaders being convinced by traditional leaders that the de facto status quo between regional clan militias would not allow expansion of areas of control, because few actually have the resources or firepower to accomplish such an objective.

⁶⁹ Galkaayo, central region of Somalia, remains virtually divided due to inter-clan hegemony related to political control. Similarly, in Bay & Bakool, there is competition over who controls which city – two armed groups are fighting over the spoils of the cities in the region.

- c. Ensuring that issues of occupation, property disputes and other points of contention will be addressed through a specific process rooted in the rule of law.

X) International Influences

Background

Somalia has constantly been buffeted by external forces, and has itself been a continuing source of instability for its neighbours. Somalia has unsuccessfully challenged the borders it inherited at independence, thus making it a major contagion for regional instability. Furthermore, its location along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden shipping lanes ensure that the contest for influence has not been limited to the immediate region, but have made Somalia a chessboard for larger strategic jockeying throughout the last century.

Somalia is a member of both the African Union (former OAU) and the League of Arab States (LAS). The dual membership of Somalia, in these organizations, makes it a country extremely influenced by the member states of these organizations. On one hand, among the LAS, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have strong historical ties based on cultural and religious affinity with strong influence in the Somali politics and social activities for so many years and will continue to have similar influences in the future. More than 50% of the foreign aid to Somalia, according to sources in the focus group discussions, is paid by the LAS much of it in the form of grant since independence.⁷⁰ On the other hand, some members in the AU, especially Ethiopia that borders Somalia have influence too because of fear from the influences of the LAS member states.

Nearly USD 800m of Somalia's trade exchange, which the Somali business community used to spend in Europe, has shifted since 1990 to Dubai, the United Arab Emirates making Somalia its 3rd largest trade partner among League of Arab States and No. 1 in the entire African continent..⁷¹ The presence of many Somali refugees inside Ethiopia that fled from Somalia's civil wars, the large Somali/Ethiopian community in the area and the open border movements between both countries forces Ethiopia to exert strong influence in Somalia. However, Somalia is pulled apart by the contending political and economic influences from both giant organizations.

Focus Issue Analysis

Because of its geographic position bordering Ethiopia, and its historical and cultural affinity with Egypt, the contest for influence in Somalia among regional states has remained intense. Colonial and Cold War politics left Somalia in general and south-central Somalia in particular vulnerable to be used as a proxy for geostrategic purposes.

⁷⁰ The TNG was given economic assistance by the LAS all of it as a grant. Similarly, the Arab League Summit in Beirut 2001 pledged over USD 400m. A source from a representative level meeting held 5/5/2002 In Beirut, Lebanon. Meeting was a follow-up of the framework of implementing Beirut Summit resolution no. 230/b.

⁷¹ Source Dubai Chamber of Commerce 2002.

Since the collapse of the state in 1990, there has been a string of unsuccessful efforts at peace-making and state reconstruction by neighbouring states, all of which were undercut by regional rivalries. When an Ethiopian process in 1996 looked promising, Egypt undercut the effort by hosting its own rival peace conference, throwing the entire enterprise into disarray. When Djibouti cobbled together a government in 2000, Ethiopia undercut it quickly by forming a coalition of warlords that opposed the government's efforts to establish authority. This is just the tip of the iceberg.⁷²

The current peace process, sponsored by the regional organization IGAD and hosted by Kenya, is equally beset by regional rivalries. In 2002 and 2003, fierce competition between the Transitional National Government (TNG) backed by Djibouti and a number of Arab states and the Somali Reconciliation & Reconstruction Council (SRRC) backed by Ethiopia left the peace process hanging by a thread. Nevertheless, Kenya remained committed to the process and kept many of the actors engaged, albeit not enthusiastically.⁷³

However, after some hope surrounding the signing of a framework agreement in late January 2004, Ethiopian-backed participants renounced their signatures and threw the conference into uncertainty. The competition continues, as does the process. As long as the regional divisions are not addressed, little possibility exists for the Somali participants, many of whom act as proxies or retain some loyalty to neighbouring states, to conclude and implement a successful peace deal.

Another contentious element to the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia dates back to 1950s, when a large scale *Shabelle* Development Scheme was planned in Ethiopia. The waters from the highlands of Ethiopia are used by Ethiopia as a source of weapon. Ethiopia has, since 1991, gone into a process of developing water resources. Taking advantage of Somalia's deep political crisis, Ethiopia started building large dams on the *Shabelle* River.⁷⁴ This gives Ethiopia a leverage to control rivers downstream towards Somalia thus escalating conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia. The shortage of water supply to the agriculturally fertile lands in south-central Somalia has created conflict between the Somali clans in the region.

Potential disputes could arise over the shared rivers between Somalia and Ethiopia which may further aggravate political instability in the region. This could be a result of competition over the utilization of scarce water in the rivers. The current disturbing historical relations between the two basin countries may lead to international conflict, shifting then the problem from water sharing to national security.⁷⁵

The disengagement of the U.S. and EU, and the weakness of the UN, Arab League and African Union have allowed these regional rivalries to trample reconciliation efforts in

⁷² An observer commented in one of the World Bank sponsored consultative meetings held in Beled Weyne, Hiran region – central Somalia.

⁷³ Ahmed I. Samatar and Abdi Ismail Samatar, Somali Reconciliation: Editorial Note, *Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies*, Vol.3, 2003.

⁷⁴ Interview with the Director of the Somali Centre for water and Environment based in Somalia and Sweden.

⁷⁵ CRD/WSP International Focus Group Discussion, April 2004.

Somalia. Only the re-engagement of extra-regional actors, particularly the U.S., could help heal regional rifts sufficiently to allow a genuine peace process to emerge in Somalia.⁷⁶

Throughout the consultative meetings, participants have raised a number of suggestions on the re-engagement of the international actors on Somalia, some of which are as follows:

First, the re-engagement on the part of the U.S., EU, UN, Arab League and AU would have to be very specific and targeted toward specific objectives. The extra-regional actors would have to focus on bringing together the region around one principal objective in the pursuit of state reconstruction, in which national security interests of the various external actors are taken into account. This could involve shuttle diplomacy or conferencing.

Second, the UN Security Council, led by the U.S. and European members, would have to create a mechanism to enforce the arms embargo, which is being routinely flouted by the regional actors, particularly Ethiopia. As long as weapons can continue to pour into the country, the potential for state reconstruction is minimized.

Third, the U.S., EU, UN, Arab League and AU need to step up their involvement in pursuit of a peace deal in Somalia. IGAD needs to be reinforced and supported by these external actors to create the necessary leverage on the warlords and others to come to an agreement.

Fourth, the U.S. Government's foreign policy of containment and deterrence on Somalia (Marine Forces deployed in Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti and the Indian Ocean); the Ethiopian government's hand-in-hand policy with the US against global terrorism; and the so-called partnership of the US Intelligence networks with some of the recalcitrant warlords in south-central Somalia – have all but escalated tension in the region.⁷⁷

Fifth, the continuous accommodation of the armed faction leaders by the international actors and failure to hold them accountable to the crimes against humanity they have perpetrated over the years has proven to be a major obstacle of finding peace in south-central Somalia and, Somalia, at large.

There are many external actors vying for influence in Somalia. An incomplete list follows.

A) Arab governments

Led by Egypt, Arab states have largely remained unified in their support for the colonial borders of Somalia. Any processes that appeared to support the development of regional entities has been strongly opposed by Cairo and its allies, such as the Ethiopian “building blocks” strategy which sought to build a state on the basis of strong regional administrations, from the periphery to the centre. Egypt and other key Arab states have by and large focused their engagement on the capital of *Muqdisho*, favouring those that would be in the centre and espousing the need for the return of a strong central state.

⁷⁶ ICG Report: A Blue Print for Peace, 2003.

⁷⁷ CRD/WSP International research field trip findings, March 2002.

Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and other governments provided substantial support to the TNG in that regard. They all would like to see the establishment of a central authority in *Mogadishu* that could act as a counter to the government in Addis Ababa. The majority of the Somali people, with the exception of some regional administrations that emerged after the collapse of the state of Somalia, support the notion that Somalia should have a strong central authority

A number of Gulf governments have provided large amounts of social assistance through Islamic charities, in the absence of a central government for Somalia, some of which have attempted to promote a brand sector of the *Wahhabist* or *Salafist* agenda. The appeal of this ideology has been limited in Somalia, and the organizations that most closely espoused these views, such as *Al-Itihad al-Islamiya*, has largely disappeared from the scene. The *Al-Itihad Al-Islami* group were active militarily in south-central Somalia such as *Mogadishu*, Lower *Shabelle*, *Gedo*, Lower and Middle *Juba*.

B) Ethiopia

The country that can bring to bear the most influence in Somalia is Ethiopia, by virtue of its alliances inside Somalia, its strong army, and willingness to cross the border in pursuit of its own interests. Ethiopia's role in Somalia is a complex one, driven by numerous competing agendas. During the late 1990s, its regional building blocks approach became the accepted approach by many putative peace makers some of whom have worked for the international community. But its heavy-handed military tactics made it look much more like a spoiler during the last few years, particularly in the aftermath of the establishment of the TNG in *Arta*, Djibouti on August 2000.⁷⁸

Ethiopia's agenda is driven by self-defined security concerns. These have been brought into much sharper relief since September 11th, as Addis has defined this threat in terms of international terrorism. It has focused its attention, and that of its Western supporters such as the U.S. and UK, on the links between local groups like *Al-Itihad al-Islamiya*, which has a presence on both sides of the Ethio-Somali border, and international groups such as *Al-Qaeda*. This focus allowed Ethiopia to have an internationally sanctioned rationale for its strong opposition to the TNG, which it accused of having Islamist influences. Addis has also linked the extensive social activities of *Al-Islah* with that of *Al-Itihad*, further confusing the picture.

The self-defined security concerns of Ethiopia, although contested by many Somalis, is safeguarded within the Somali border, especially in the south-central regions, by hand picked armed faction leaders despised by the majority of the Somalis. The SRRC armed political faction leaders are the prototype of the Ethiopian government.⁷⁹

Prof. *Ahmed Ismail Samatar* discusses: “More-over and most disturbingly, in 1999 the southern regions of Somalia became pawns in a ranging confrontation between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Various factions were allying themselves and, as a result, being armed by these two states”. *Ahmed Ismail Samatar (2002): p. 237*

⁷⁸ See UN arms Embargo Panel report (2003)

⁷⁹ A forum organized by CRD in Muqdisho attended by senior military personnel of the former Somali government.

C) Djibouti

Djibouti is part of the League of Arab States, but it also has more direct interests in Ethiopia. The majority of its population – including its president – is Somali. Although involved throughout the period of state collapse, the ascension of *Ismail Omar Guelle* to the presidency marked a new assertiveness, culminating in the hosting of the *Carta* peace conference which resulted in the formation of the TNG. Djibouti worked with other Arab states to try to consolidate support for the TNG, which had the additional objective of undermining the legitimacy of the authorities in Somaliland in the northwest. Djibouti has maintained somewhat competitive relations with Ethiopia over Somali policy since the formation of the TNG and throughout the subsequent IGAD peace process.

D) Eritrea

At the time of its vote for independence, Eritrean authorities offered to send a large contingent of forces to help stabilize Somalia as part of UNOSOM, an offer that was not taken up by the UN. Eritrea remained largely disengaged throughout the 1990s, but when its war with Ethiopia erupted, Eritrea began to provide support to anti Ethiopian groups based in Somalia, including the *Ogaden* National Liberation Front and the Oromo Liberation Front through a south-central Somalia based armed faction, the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/sna). Eritrea also supported the TNG as a means of countering Addis Ababa.⁸⁰

E) Kenya

Kenya has been beset by Somali refugees since the time of the early 90s civil war. These refugee populations have had an impact on the deterioration of security in Kenya. Kenya has also been hit twice by international terrorism in 1998 and 2002, the organization for which is alleged to have taken place partly in Somalia. Kenya has remained non-aligned in the conflict in Somalia over the past decade and a half, and has taken the lead in the peace process sponsored by IGAD.

F) United States

The U.S. has had a long and checkered history in Somalia, emerging as a Cold War patron in 1977 on the side of the *Siad Barre* regime, intervening militarily in 1992 to ensure the delivery of food aid, deciding to take on one rogue faction led by late General *Mohamed Farah Aideed* during a later stage of the intervention, losing 18 soldiers in one encounter in October 1993 and deciding to withdraw as a result, completely disengaging during the ensuing ten years in the search for peace in the country and reengaging only in pursuit of the narrow interest of monitoring and snatching international terrorist figures associated with *Al-Qaeda* or *Al-Ittibad*.⁸¹

The US government provides limited logistical and financial support to a number of armed political faction leaders based in south-central Somalia to monitor and snatch, if possible, potential *Al-Qaeda* or *Al-Ittibad* supporters according to interviews with

⁸⁰ ICG report: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State, March 2002.

⁸¹ Interview with external actors by CRD in Muqdisho (April 2004)

potential personalities in *Mogadishu*. Despite this legacy, Somalis throughout the country believe the U.S. could be a catalyst for the successful conclusion of a peace agreement and the reconstruction of a central government in Somalia.

The US government has contributed significant humanitarian assistance to Somalia. The year 2002 alone, the US government, through USAID, has contributed over US Dollars 30 million to Somalia.⁸² This aid package was intended to assist in the sectors like education, food security and rural development, governance, health and nutrition, water and sanitation infrastructure. The US government also contributes to the current on-going peace process for Somalia in Mbagathi, Kenya.

G) European Union

The EU has focused on economic support and assistance to the peace-making efforts in Somalia during the period of state collapse. Its role is not seen as fundamental as that of the U.S., but rather as a supplementary actor that can contribute to the solution in the country. Italy is the EU country member that has remained most engaged in Somalia, but its colonial legacy and uneven involvement have left Somalis suspicious of its intentions. The UK and some Scandinavian countries have also been involved peripherally, mostly through development initiatives and occasional involvement in the peace process.

The factors that can contribute to the de-escalation of conflict is the involvement of external actors and the continuing hope of Somalis throughout the country that they can play a major role in peace-building in the country. In other words, there remains an expectation of positive external engagement, and a willingness to accept that engagement as a fundamental ingredient in peace-making efforts.

Another force for potential de-escalation is commercial investment by external actors. As the warlord elements have eroded in authority over time, the vacuum has been filled by business interests throughout Somalia. Their interest largely is in more stability, with the exception of those involved in drug dealing and the provision of security. Therefore, the promise of additional commercial investment could play a catalytic role in driving efforts towards peace in Somalia at this juncture.

The continuous recalcitrance of the armed political faction leaders and their failure to reach an agreement, as pointed-out by civil society members attending the consultative meetings, should not be allowed to hold hostage all the Somali people. The policy of the donor agencies of only dealing with governments must change by engaging new strategic relationship with the credible professional associations of Somalia.

An interview with an ICG senior staff suggests that efforts focused on strengthening a more constructive extra-regional engagement should be led by civil society, particularly NGOs and the business community. There needs to be a more unified voice in spelling out exactly what kind of international engagement could be more useful and productive in Somalia. Somali organizations need to make that clear, and not leave the ground to warlords whose interests may be in the continuing instability and lawlessness of the country. This argument needs particularly to be advanced by Somali organizations with

⁸² USAID Annual report (2002).

respect to both the peace process and to counter-terrorism efforts, both of which are reinforcing the very elements in the country that are responsible for its demise.

The factors that contribute to the escalation of the conflict are that the regional actors have been a force for instability and destabilization in Somalia since the collapse of the state. Supporting the armed factions and the undermining of any possible forward progress in the reconciliation processes has ensured that Somalia's low level civil conflict continues. The principal fault lines have involved Ethiopia, at times with Egypt and Djibouti, and at other times with Eritrea. These rivalries have sparked conflict on the ground in *Gedo*, the *Juba Valley*, *Muqdisho*, *Hiiraan*, and *Bay & Bakool*. Peace conference after peace conference has collapsed as a result of these rivalries.

XI) Role of Diaspora

Background

There is growing number of Somalis living in the Diaspora from North America to Europe and from Africa to Far East Asia. There are no accurate statistics about the Somalis in the Diaspora but it is estimated to be roughly at around 1-1.5 million. Many of them are a life-line to a large number of Somalis because they send much needed remittances. This huge Diaspora group has influenced the political dynamics inside south-central Somalia and the intensity of conflicts across the region.. Many more have invested in businesses in many parts of the region.

As the number of Somalis in the Diaspora grew, with new waves of recent immigrants joining, politics abroad mirrors polarizations at home. Individual Somalis outside the country have been deeply involved on all sides of the south-central Somalia political conflicts. The Diaspora continues to provide a large proportion of the finance and propaganda which underpins current Somali politics and economic transformation. This has also impact on the countries in the region.

The mass migration of Somalis to Western countries during and after the civil war years has also strengthened their Islamic values. After arriving in these highly modernized countries, many Somalis in the Diaspora have experienced profound cultural challenges arising mainly from Western rationalism, consumerism, and pop culture. Incapable of coping with the daily realities, many sought refuge in their belief system.

Focus Issue Analysis

The Somalis in the Diaspora have direct impact on the local political, social and economic dynamics especially in the south-central regions. Their impact can be summarised in different dimensions.

1) Every major business outlet outside Somalia controlled by some elite businessmen and women in the Diaspora has branches in the major urban cities of the region. Control of the in-and-out-flow of hard currency through the remittances companies; import/export of trade; importation of illicit businesses i.e. weapons, drugs, expired commodities etc. is under the grip of the business groups in the Diaspora.

2) The continuation of the armed clashes, as well as the maintenance and consolidation of the monopoly of businesses, demand immense economic resources. Armament and ammunition has to be provided and clan-militia to be paid in order to protect their war-economy interests. The first concern of the war-economy groups, who have links with their patrons in the Diaspora, is to build a material base which would enable them to finance their drive for domination“(CORM 1994: 216).

3) The external inflow of cash maintains, at some point, the resurgence of sporadic armed clashes in south-central Somalia. The cash flow takes shape in different forms:

- Some of the remittances from the Diaspora community contribute to the escalation of conflicts in the region.
- The armed faction leaders, funded by external business community, are keen to stake a claim over the control of some of the fertile agricultural lands in south Somalia.
- The business groups in the Diaspora have, in collaboration with local business groups, printed large volumes of forfeited money and flooded the markets across the region, creating a disturbing economic inflation.
- Consignment of armaments and weapons brought by the business groups of the Diaspora in the form cash liquidation.

4) A number of Somali business groups have bases in the Middle East, Europe or Far East. The largest concentration of this group is in the oil rich Arab Gulf countries. They in fact control the engine of the Somali economy. The growth of their number and their economic power base in these regions and the demographic mobility in recent years cannot be separated from their influence in the internal dynamics of south-central Somalia.

The Diaspora has also contributed positively.. Some business groups in the Diaspora have heavily invested in the region in different forms. For instance, the telecommunication sector has provided communities the ability to communicate with their kin throughout the world. The communication between communities has, in many occasions, facilitated in the de-escalation of conflicts in the region. Communication between people through the telecommunication network has also reduced the level of myth-making and gossip among clans that once led to armed inter-clan conflicts. The network has provided communities the opportunity to listen and talk to each other and, listening to different sources injected levels of trust among people.

Across south-central regions in Somalia, business groups from the Diaspora have established media outlets that play a vital role in the de-escalation of conflicts – although, at times, depending how it is used, it escalates conflicts.

Another dimension is the remittances sent by individual groups from the Diaspora. There are visible signs of economic investment and business ideas from the Diaspora throughout much of south-central Somalia. These include setting-up of a modern public library in Beled Weyne, Hiiraan region; mobilising communities to take ownership of their own public services in Dhuusa-mareeb, Galguduud region; building hotels in different districts; establishment of private clinics in Muqdisho; building media outlets etc.. The Somali Diaspora made its mark on these communities. Such investments have provided good sources of employment opportunities and thus reduced the intensity of inter-clan conflicts.

The Somalis in the Diaspora are getting integrated into a new culture whose negative effects, in terms of culture, is increasingly growing without many of them noticing. Although the effects of the culture of the people they live with are still evolutionary and gradually increasing, the impact of that culture has both negative and positive impacts on the Somalis in the Diaspora. The positive values they will acquire include learning the principles of democracy including freedom of expression, tolerance, principles of governance, respect of human rights, the respect of the rule of law etc. They will also get the opportunity of attending higher learning institutions. Attendants in the focus group discussions held across the region have pointed out that there is likelihood that some of the Somalis in the Diaspora would, upon their return, contribute positively to the rebuilding process of Somalia by sharing with the local communities about their experiences.⁸³

The adherence to Islamic values among Somalis is mixed. On the one hand, it has deepened people's attachment to the faith, and, on the other, weakened it. Many Somalis travelled overseas spending significant number of years in Arab countries. During their sojourn, some of them did not only learn the language but attended and graduated from higher-learning Islamic institutions, such as the Islamic University of Mecca, Al-Azhar, and Um-Durman Universities. Although it is hard to measure people's internal dispositions, it is safe to assume that a significant number of these graduates had inculcated Islam in new ways. Upon their return to Somalia, they have created an atmosphere of misconception in contrast to the majority of the Somalis known to follow moderate Islamic beliefs. There is noticeable difference in the knowledge of Islam between the traditional Suffism and the new breed of Islamists from the Diaspora especially from Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Sudan.

Somalis are adamantly respecting their Islamic values and traditionally it is a way of life every Somali family pursues rationally. Traditionally, Somalis are Sunni Muslims following mainly the Islamic orders of *Suffism* i.e., *Qadiria*, *Salabia* and *Ahmedia*. The latest wave of Somalis going to the Diaspora have brought to Somalia new Islamic sects and religious orders. In addition, the Somalis from the Diaspora, some of them with radical Islamist ideology, have politicized the moderate Islamist groups causing them to break up into a number of religio-political associations, such as *Al-Itihad*, *Al-Islah*, *Al-Tabliiq*, *Al-Akbwan*, *Al-Hijra Wal-Takfir*, *Wababia* etc. Although long term effect is unknown, these politicized religious groups from the Diaspora have increased social dissension among Somalis and created an atmosphere of suspicion among various religious sectors in south-central Somalia and the outside world, particularly the West. In this way, the new culture of Somalis in the Diaspora has adversely affected the Somali inherited moderate sect. The number of Islamic organizations across south-central Somalia has, since 1991 increased dramatically. Most of these Islamic organizations are scattered in Muqdisho, the two Shabelle regions, Middle and Lower Juba region. These are areas whose conflict is proportionally high and the possibility for a future conflict is equally high. The forms of conflicts in the region may change, from inter-clan conflicts to a possible religious conflict.

⁸³ Seven cabinet members in the Transitional National Government based in Muqdisho are Somalis living in the Diaspora.

Focus Issues Links

All the selected variables for south-central Somalia have, in one way or another, link with the other variables with minor exceptions of the External Influence and the Role of Media. Given the current political dynamics and the nature of the societal relationships, combined with the external influence, makes the variables chosen for the region inter-linked with each other.

<u>Var</u>	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X	XI
I			X	X	X	X				X	
		Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak
		Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med
II	X		X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X
	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak
	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med
III	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak
	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med
IV	X	X	X		X	X	X		X		X
	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak
	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med
V	X	X	X	X			X		X		X
	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak
	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med
VI	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	
	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak
	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med
VII	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	
	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak
	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med
VIII	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	
	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak
	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med
IX	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	
	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak
	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med
X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	
	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak
	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med
XI	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	
	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak
	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med

VII	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak
	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med
	High	High	High	High	High	High	High	High	High	High	High
VIII		X				X	X				
	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak
	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med
	High	High	High	High	High	High	High	High	High	High	High
IX	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	
	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak
	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med
	High	High	High	High	High	High	High	High	High	High	High
X			X	X		X	X		X		
	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak
	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med
	High	High	High	High	High	High	High	High	High	High	High
XI		X				X	X		X		
	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak
	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med
	High	High	High	High	High	High	High	High	High	High	High

VARIABLES

- I. Ethnic/Clan Cleavage
- II. Bridging/Bonding of social capital
- III. Weak Governance and political institutions (equity, stability and quality of leadership)
- IV. Access to natural resources
- V. Employment and access to productive resources
- VI. Human rights and militarization
- VII. Culture of violence
- VIII. Role of media
- IX. Regional Conflict
- X. International Influences

CONCLUSION

This study attempts to highlight the key factors influencing conflict in south-central Somalia. The 11 variables selected from an initial examination of the Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF) formed a basis to analyze the conflict dynamics in the region more closely. The fieldwork sheds light on the conflict situation in the area. It focuses on the developments of south-central Somalia.

The current conflict is not only a product of the past 14 year old civil war. The variables i.e. Culture of Violence, Equity of Political Institutions and its stability traces back the history of what went wrong. These variables look back into the incidents of what happened since the collapse of the central government of Somalia in 1991. It shed light on the situation in the south-central regions which remain tense & volatile. The report has detailed the historical background of the conflict and the way in which grievances motivated inter-clan wars which have relatively subsided since.

External actors have always dominated the Somali politics since independence in 1960. The interest of the regional players, particularly the neighbouring countries, intensified with the collapse of the state institutions. The factors that contribute to the escalation of the conflict are: regional actors who have been a force for instability and destabilization in the region; international influences that support armed factions, which are undermining possible progress brokered during various reconciliation processes. The study revisited the stumbling blocks for peace in south-central Somalia. Some of the neighbouring countries are inclined to hostile interferences. The principal fault lines have involved Ethiopia, at times with Egypt and Djibouti, and at other times with Eritrea. These rivalries have sparked conflict on the ground in *Gedo*, the *Juba Valley*, *Muqdisho*, *Hiraan*, and *Bay & Bakool*. All efforts towards peace have collapsed as a result of the rivalries between the external actors.

Competition among regions often overlaps with inter-clan competition. However, the driving force in the history of conflict in Somalia is the competition between clans over resources and power. The three most volatile regions in south-central Somalia are Lower *Juba*, Middle *Juba* and Lower *Shabelle* because of the abundance of natural resources. The historical grievances over resources have always been an element of contention. The differences between interests in southern, central, north-eastern and north-western Somalia are often large, and produce competition and conflict. Regional rivalry will remain a significant force of conflict over the coming decade.

Other variables, including Role of Media, Access to Natural Resources, Human Rights and Militarization, Employment and Access to Productive Resources, and other variables discussed in this report identified the factors that escalate conflicts, much of which predict a forlorn future. The variables also show the Somalis' resilience to cope with violent conflicts and their ability to influence the de-escalation of it. It is therefore important that the World Bank, other developmental organizations and donor agencies carefully examine opportunities to develop and design timely strategic interventions through which these resilience could be strengthened.

The report paints out an overall bleak picture of a society in deep and continued crisis. However, in the very analysis of these problems, the Conflict Analysis Framework conducted by the World Bank depicts possible interventions in the economic and infrastructure development and improved security in some areas. In many ways, the conflict analysis has demonstrated, through extensive fieldwork, that there is a basis for hope and the beginnings of solutions which many professional associations are inspiring in the absence of a government.

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