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Intra-Regional Trade in Sub-Saharan Africa

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADB	African Development Bank
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
CACM	Central American Common Market
CET	Common External Tariff
EAC	East African Community
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
FIAS	Foreign Investment Advisory Service
FIAS	Foreign Investment Advisory Service
FOSIDEC	The development fund of CEAO
GATT	General Agreement on tariffs and trade
IOC	Indian Ocean Commission
LAFTA (LAIA)	Latin American Free Trade Association (Latin American Integration Association)
LOC	Letters of Credit
NTB	Non Tariff Barrier
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OGL	Open General Licence
PE	Public Enterprise
PTAFCCI	Preferential Trade Area Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry
QR	Quantitative Restriction
RCA	Revealed Comparative Advantage
RCTD	Road Customs Transit Document
SAC	Structural Adjustment Credit
SACU	Southern Africa Customs Union
SAL	Structural Adjustment Loan
SECAL	Sectoral Adjustment Loan
SITC	Standard International Trade Classification
SSA	Sub Saharan Africa
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNSO	United Nations Statistical Office
WDR	World Development Report

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Executive Summary

Objectives and Background

1. Links to the Long Term Perspective Study. The recently published Bank report Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, A Long Term Perspective Study emphasizes the importance of Regional Cooperation and Economic Integration as a key ingredient for the next generation of development policy in Sub-Saharan Africa. This report concentrates on the trade related aspects of this issue. It is thus able to explore in some detail the key issues that need to be addressed in making the proposed strategy of the Long Term Perspective Study operational.

2. Objectives. In particular, this report proposes an agenda to overcome the obstacles that have contributed to the stagnation at a low level of official intra-Sub-Saharan African trade. While it provides considerable statistical information on and a comprehensive account of the practical (non-tariff) constraints and barriers to intra-Sub-Saharan African trade, its main contribution is to link sustained increases in regional trade to the dismantling of the barriers that limit cross-border investment and labor flows. The report therefore analyzes the conceptual basis and efficiency implications of African economic integration initiatives. It sets out proposals on what needs to be done to overcome constraints limiting regional exchange of both products and factors of production. Making these proposals operational will require further analytical work in areas which the report identifies.

3. Background. The fragmentation of Africa has focussed attention on the benefits of economic integration. In practice, however, despite the rhetoric of African leaders and various attempts at market integration, little progress has been achieved. Thus, official trade among Sub-Saharan African countries has stagnated over the past two decades and amounts to a mere US$4 billion -- only 6 percent of total African trade. This, despite estimates that up to a further US$5 billion of Africa's imports from the rest of the world could be supplied by other African countries that are already exporting similar products outside the region 1/.

4. Various regional organizations in Africa have been trying to achieve this potential and several have approached the Bank for help. The initial requests correctly focused on financing regional investment and on strengthening the payments mechanism amongst regional trading partners.

5. Increased foreign exchange availability from foreign sources in support of chronic deficits is not a sufficient response and it may, in fact, be dangerous as it will increase the likelihood of default. Instead it is necessary to make the deficits sustainable by strengthening the productive capacity of the deficit countries.

6. The Basic Problem. The lack of progress with regional trade liberalization stems mainly from inappropriate macroeconomic policies -- overvalued exchange rates, excessive fiscal deficits, distorted credit allocation, and heavy domestic market protection. These policies have also

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1/ If the potential additional intra-regional exports of $5 billion was achieved this would result in a $10 billion increase in intra-regional trade to $14 billion. Thus, the share of intra-regional trade would treble from 6 to 18 percent.

had an adverse impact on productive investment and hence economic performance in general. At the same time they have spurred the growth in Africa's parallel markets and informal border trade. Thus the prospects for regional integration are closely linked to general economic reform that addresses the macro-economic imbalances.

7. Unfortunately, experience suggests that the required adjustments will be slow. In particular, African governments have found it difficult to restrain fiscal and monetary policy sufficiently to implement an exchange rate policy that keeps the rate at a level which can be sustained without extensive payments restrictions. In turn, the administration of these restrictions seems to be biased against financing cross-border economic activity. In parallel, there is no incentive to trade at official relative prices when one currency is relatively over-valued.

8. Benefits. There may, thus, be significant returns from implementing, during the transition period, second best solutions aimed at relaxing administrative barriers against increased intra-regional activity. Any such measures would be implemented in parallel with ongoing national adjustment programs.

9. African economies are economically small (the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa is no larger than the Netherlands). This implies that attempts to create regional barriers against third parties are doomed to failure. These would make African production even less competitive by encouraging trade diversion (substituting cheap third party imports with expensive regional imports). Instead, the main benefits of regional integration will arise from the restructuring of African economies that is associated with trade creation (the substitution of expensive domestic production with less expensive regional imports).

Analytical issues

10. The report argues that regional initiatives should promote efficient resource allocation and better integration into the world economy. The ultimate objective should be to create conditions which would allow the private sector to freely work, invest and trade across African borders and with relatively low barriers against third parties. Thus a shift is needed by African governments and regional organizations from the concentration on selective tariff cuts to measures that promote factor mobility and support the free movement of goods and services.

11. Instead of relying solely on gradual liberalization of trade with the whole world on a unilateral basis, this approach would strengthen and extend ongoing adjustment efforts by adding another dimension: the liberalization of regional factor and product markets. To compensate for the narrower scope in terms of partners, mutual (regional) liberalization should be extensive and rapid. This may be politically more demanding than current reform programs and capital mobility would be easier to achieve than labor mobility.

12. Nevertheless, support for integration initiatives should not aim at saving so far-failed efforts at regional import substitution behind high barriers against third parties, even though that might be politically more attractive. If extensive mutual regional liberalization (i.e. the minimum reform required for greater integration along efficient lines) is not palatable, it would be preferable to concentrate on national efforts than to get involved with increasing trade discrimination against third parties which would either fail or be detrimental to efficiency.

13. The proposed approach relies on the pressure from a private sector constituency that would benefit from the focus on creating conditions conducive to legalizing and enhancing private cross-border economic activity. This and the voluntary and incremental mutual liberalization advocated could

contribute to increase political commitment by African Governments compared to the weak political support they extend to current efforts.

14. The basic premise of the report is that regional trade liberalization should be an intermediary stage towards general liberalization and this suggests discouraging the formation of Customs Unions 2/. This is because future reform would be harder if lowering external tariffs required several governments to agree, such as in a Customs Union arrangement. Where a Common External Tariff (CET) already exists, as in UDEAC, its limitations will have to be accepted. Fortunately, the UDEAC CET itself does not appear to extend excessive regional preferences. Thus the promotion of efficient regional integration could be achieved while leaving the CET in place, provided all other import taxes and charges are replaced with domestic taxes.

15. Temporary increases in regional preferences are acceptable provided this occurs as part of a general and significant lowering of external protection with an assurance that this increase in regional preference would indeed be temporary. Such increased regional preferences could also be accepted if the resulting discrimination remained reasonable.

16. Closer economic links should be based on existing and potential complementarities and trade flows. In this respect, existing Regional Economic Groupings in SSA, set up for a variety of, sometimes non-economic reasons, are not necessarily optimal. However, given that they exist and given the commitment of the member governments to them, to the extent possible, any new initiatives should work with and through the existing sub-regional organizations. Nevertheless, new initiatives should promote factor mobility and the free movement of goods and services within the group as well as generalized trade liberalization with the rest of the world; they should not aim at reversing the failure to activate customs unions with high barriers against non-members including those on the content.

17. Existing undertakings and agreements by the member states should be the starting point for a regional initiative and should be interpreted as the minimum commitment of member States. In consequence, existing organizations should allow and indeed encourage sub-groups of states to implement more rapid and extensive elimination of trade barriers and obstacles to labor and capital mobility between them, while recognizing that some members would not want to proceed further than already agreed. To support these efforts, donors could assist those individual member States that are prepared to relax controls on cross-border flows of factors of production and goods and services.

18. The report estimates potential trade based on existing formal trade. This Revealed Comparative Advantage methodology implicitly assumes efficiency in current trading patterns whereas in some instances imported inputs may be contributing to negative value added. Thus while the analysis is useful in indicating some orders of magnitude concerning the potential volume of trade that would occur in a liberalized trading regime, given the

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2/ This is not to deny that Regional Integration has benefits that make it worthwhile to pursue as an objective in itself. Lachler (1989) argues that while size is not a substitute for openness, being big and open yields better growth performance than being small and open. This is because economic integration provides more room for internal competition through a larger internal market than could be achieved by uni-lateral liberalization. More importantly, labor and capital mobility within this larger market enhance the prospects of increased productive capacity and efficient use of factor resources. Further, there are also political imperatives that may make integration desirable. The point here is simply that regional trade liberalization should be seen as part of a wider process of lowering barriers against all third parties to avoid costly trade diversion.

extensive distortions, caution is required in judging specific trading opportunities that might be apparent from the data.

19. More work could be done to evaluate areas with actual comparative advantage that would be expected to lead to more regional trade. However, such an exercise is fraught with difficulty and the important message of the analysis is that substantial efficient trade flows would materialize provided distortions to the incentive structure were eliminated. An example of the difficulty of identifying winners and losers is provided by Mauritius. Within a decade it became the third largest exporter of woollen knitwear without a previous tradition of knitting or weaving, with no domestic supply of wool and with no prior expertise in a related industry.

20. In emphasizing the role of private economic agents in bringing about regional integration, the report advocates a new approach that is in line with the objectives of Bank supported adjustment. By establishing pre-set conditions for donor assistance, the proposed approach could be implemented in stages. As private interests respond to emerging regional business opportunities, they can become a local pressure group for further economic reform.

Scope of the report

21. The main purpose of the report is to identify barriers to intra-regional trade. In undertaking the study, it was realized that sustaining increased intra-regional trade requires extensive intra-regional liberalization of factor as well as product markets. This is why a discussion of regional integration is a focal point of the report. Nevertheless, the focus of this discussion has been kept on those aspects of regional integration that are most relevant to promoting increased intra-regional trade. This should not be interpreted as an indication that other aspects of integration or regional cooperation are viewed to be unimportant.

Operational issues

22. Political uncertainties, the need for further study of such key issues as factor mobility and the difficulties in harmonizing policies suggest great caution is required before moving ahead with any actual operation. Harmonization is likely to be particularly problematic since the relevant actions to achieve this -- particularly subsidy policy and the structure of incentives -- tend to be the most contentious issues in most national adjustment programs.

23. Until the political and other issues are better understood it would be wise for outside donors such as the Bank to consult closely with regional organizations and key governments in designing assistance to regional integration. Establishing a framework that countries would decide to adhere to at their own pace may also create operational difficulties that would need to be considered carefully. In some instances there might be actions that can only be taken at the regional level by the group of countries as a whole. In such cases it might therefore be necessary to insist on joint action.

24. The report identifies a range of possible actions going from areas for further studies to specific measures African governments can adopt and including forms of direct support by donors such as in risk sharing with commercial banks or financing of external inputs needed for restructuring of firms in a regional context. It will be helpful to keep this range of options in mind in designing any possible operation, and committed African governments and regional organizations could consider some policy reform even without external assistance.

Next steps

25. This report should be seen as a vehicle to help carry forward a dialogue between the Bank, other donors, African governments and relevant African regional organizations. This process should facilitate the emergence of a consensus on how to advance the cause of efficient regional integration efforts. Indeed, the report itself should be seen mainly as a vehicle to achieve this objective.

26. Much work will also need to be undertaken to obtain a better understanding of key issues and to deal with the various operational questions that need to be resolved before a program of assistance can be designed.

27. It would be wise to encourage all the member States to implement the rapid and extensive liberalization of factor and product markets advocated in the report. This would be fully consistent with provisions of the relevant Treaty to eliminate obstacles to the free intra-regional flow of goods and factors of production. However, given the wide-ranging and politically difficult implications of the proposals, it is possible that only a few governments would initially be able to embark on the suggested strategy.

28. Thus, the process of dialogue and further research will be critical in determining the extent and nature of future Bank responses to the increasing requests from African regional organizations and national Governments for assistance in this area.

I. GENERAL BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

A. Motivation for this study

1.01 The recent economic performance of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has been unsatisfactory. Over the period 1980-1986, average real per capita GNP has declined by 3 percent annually, partly reflecting an average annual decline in recorded exports of 2 percent compounded by increasing debt burdens. In this environment, the shortage of foreign exchange has forced a contraction of recorded imports from US$47 billion in 1980 to an estimated US$29 billion in 1986. To achieve sustained real per capita growth in SSA will require the easing of the foreign exchange constraints. This may involve increased external assistance, including more imaginative forms of debt relief. Nevertheless, without improved economic performance it is difficult to envisage a significant turnaround.

1.02 This is why, in the course of its ongoing policy dialogue with SSA country authorities, the Bank is supporting reforms that will make SSA economies more flexible. Specifically, the Bank has supported the adoption of market determined exchange rates, allocation of foreign exchange based on price signals instead of administrative fiat, the liquidation, privatization and/or rehabilitation of inefficient public enterprises, lower implicit and explicit taxation of export oriented activity, the reduction of barriers to trade and easing of price, profit margin and investment controls. For the purposes of this study, it is assumed that the authorities in SSA will increasingly restructure their economies along these lines. Thus the background assumed is one of a generalized trend towards liberalization even though this may not be uniform across countries or even over time. By the end of 1987, 32 countries in SSA had adopted some form of structural adjustment program with the support of the Bank and 16 countries had accepted the need to liberalize their trade regimes (see Chapter II, Table 3). However, despite these developments and some encouraging progress in countries that have implemented strong reform programs, far more could still be done to improve the outlook for SSA.

1.03 This is why emphasis needs to be given to measures that will strengthen ongoing reform efforts to achieve more rapid and extensive improvements in efficiency. In practice this requires initiatives in many directions (see **Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth** (Landell-Mills, 1989) for details) including the strengthening and deepening of the adjustment process through regional integration and cooperation. While such efforts encompass many areas of activity, trade is a logical starting point as well as a natural focal point. This provides the broad justification for interest in promoting efficient intra-African trade.

1.04 This report investigates the potential gains from dismantling or reducing barriers against such trade, while not losing sight of the benefits of greater outward orientation and integration into the world economy.

1.05 In this respect, it is assumed, as argued by Balassa (1979), that the greatest gains require general trade liberalization since intra-SSA trade is not in itself more valuable than other international trade. Nevertheless, the study will investigate the extent to which, in a context of general liberalization, a greater degree of openness amongst SSA countries may yield significant benefits. This arises from the recognition that African countries, even under the most far reaching liberalization programs being considered, are unwilling and perhaps unable to reduce trade barriers close to the level in industrialized countries, let alone completely dismantle them.

1.06 This is mainly because, even in a distortion free environment, short run costs can not be reduced to world levels for the bulk of existing manufacturing activity in SSA. Indeed, trade liberalization may be frustrated in SSA because it would accelerate the necessary but politically difficult restructuring of a large number of non-viable enterprises, the bulk of which are in the public sector. Liberalization is also inhibited by fear of excessive specialization in primary commodities and the belief that many of the dynamic gains from trade come from industrial exports.

1.07 These considerations underlie the apparent de facto consensus, as revealed in the design of the relevant adjustment operations, that it is reasonable to provide average protection of 40 to 60 percent with tariff rates of 5 to 100 percent, at least in the short to medium term. Such reform thus affords much greater protection than in industrial countries. More importantly, this degree of protection is high enough that there may be some scope for further reductions by pursuing a regional strategy that might result in greater unit cost reductions than achievable at the national level.

1.08 There is a significant trade potential estimated at US$4 to US$5 billion among SSA countries, both on primary and industrial exports. This potential is not realized, at least in part because of market and policy failures which discourage businessmen from identifying lower cost African suppliers to replace higher cost traditional partners. While continuation of commodity aid programs and special bi-lateral arrangements may prevent the full potential from being realized, the orders of magnitude involved suggest a large scope for efficient intra-SSA trade expansion.

1.09 At the same time, there may also be scope for increased intra-regional trade because it may be politically more acceptable to improve efficiency by initially exposing domestic firms to import competition from other African producers instead of world imports. This may result in lower priced products from partners that would limit some expensive domestic production, even though it will not give the full benefit of replacing expensive domestic output with the lowest priced goods on the world market.

1.10 Such considerations justify the speeding of trade liberalization towards other SSA countries. This would reverse the current trend of more rapid liberalization towards trade with non-African countries which arises from biases in the allocation of foreign exchange.

1.11 In the long run there must be an opening up to the discipline of the international market and therefore any regional trade preferences should not be excessive and should be reduced after a clearly specified adaptation period (say 5-10 years), to prevent significant diversion of efficient trade. This means that the eventual aim is to dismantle all non-tariff barriers against external partners and, where relevant, to reduce external tariffs towards the same low level granted to favored African partners.

1.12 To secure the competition needed for the restructuring of African firms through mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures, emphasis should be on generalized regional liberalization including factor flows instead of being limited to trade. Such generalized liberalization is also essential for sustaining increased regional trade by creating opportunities for generating the offsetting workers' remittances and investment flows to sustain the chronic trade deficits that some countries would face in the short and medium term.

1.13 A regional approach may also be valid in the current international climate when the free rider problem may limit future progress in the GATT. The emergence of a single European market in 1992, the US-Canada Free Trade Pact and suggestions for a Free Trade Agreement between the US and Pacific rim countries reflect concern that generalized concessions within the GATT may be harder to achieve now and in the future compared to the past. Indeed, the emergence of large blocs may help mitigate the free rider problem and thus facilitate the movement to ever freer international trade. SSA as a whole has the economic size of a small industrialized country (such as the Netherlands) and so the relevance of a SSA bloc should not be overemphasized. However, to the extent that internal liberalization within SSA facilitates a lowering of external barriers, this reduction in external protection should provide moral arguments for more favorable treatment of African exports including such items as Kenyan cut flowers which face penal tariffs in the US which Colombia, for example, is exempt from.

1.14 Regional liberalization may also be more politically acceptable than unilateral concessions because of the tradeoff with other countries. Further, "binding" reforms though an international treaty will make it harder for opponents to challenge than national legislation.

B. <u>Scope and coverage</u>

1.15 It is hoped that this study will be useful in sharpening attention on key issues in the ongoing dialogue between the Bank, other donors and the relevant country authorities. To achieve this, the focus will be limited to broad issues relevant for SSA as a whole (or the majority of SSA countries). Further, special circumstances that are relevant only to particular countries will tend to be neglected; the expertise for tackling such issues resides with the Country Departments.

1.16 This study does not even attempt to deal with all relevant aspects of trade in SSA. Instead, the study will focus narrowly on the investigation of those barriers, to increased intra-SSA trade, whose removal would significantly improve the growth potential of SSA. This means, for example, that the interesting and important issue of unrecorded trade is largely ignored on the grounds that without extensive field work it is impossible to obtain generalized data that reliably establish the magnitude of such flows and the share of unrecorded trade that arises from lack of harmonization of Government policies compared with that which is forced underground by bad policies. Therefore it is not possible to evaluate how changes in Government policy that affect such trade would contribute to growth. Barad (1988) provides an excellent review of what is known about unrecorded trade in SSA and the December 1988/January 1989 issue of the **Southern African Economist** provides interesting illustrations for Southern Africa.

1.17 Sustainable increases in intra-African trade will require measures that allow all economic agents to freely trade, invest and work across African boundaries. This and various requests by existing SSA groupings for Bank assistance with regional integration efforts suggest the importance of developing a framework for Bank support in this area. The study therefore elaborates an approach that could build on regional integration to strengthen ongoing adjustment efforts and restore growth in SSA. This framework emphasizes measures that would support sustainable and efficient increases in regional exchange, but is not meant to exclude other worthwhile forms of assistance for specific programs such as locust control or financing for regional public sector infrastructure.

1.18 The nature of the data, the time frame for conducting the study and the number of countries in SSA have imposed the necessity to adopt a sampling approach relying on the collection of anecdotal evidence and the formulation of broad hypotheses. It will be up to individual country economists to follow up on the issues raised while using their own judgement as to which issues are the most pertinent for a particular country.

1.19 The study identifies the impediments to trade that would be expected on the basis of resource endowments and the current policy environment. This is done by concentrating on selected products rather than trade as a whole to facilitate drawing general and usable policy recommendations. The study implicitly raises questions regarding distributional issues, the political sustainability and phasing of reforms, fiscal and balance of payments implications of lowering barriers and the required supportive investment and price policies that need to complement trade liberalization. While these issues are critical, especially if reforms are to be implemented and sustained, they can not be adequately dealt with in the framework of the current effort and will need supplementary work, perhaps in the context of a follow-up to the current exercise.

1.20 The analysis covers a large number of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and their recorded trade both with partners in established and active regional arrangements and other SSA countries. The active organizations either consist of the large multinational economic and trade organizations (PTA and ECOWAS --the meaning of the acronyms used here and a brief summary of the activities of these organizations is provided in annex 1) or smaller groups (CEAO, CEPGL, IOC and UDEAC). It also encompasses one multinational arrangement with a narrower agenda for coordination (SADCC) and a small trade organization and river basin development group (MRU). These organizations share a common goal, namely to cooperate for enhancing economic development through trade and investment. The other regional arrangements in SSA, developmental commissions for river basins or lakes, common services for research and/or technical services and financial institutions or monetary arrangements are not directly relevant for our purposes and are therefore neglected (Berg (1989) provides a comprehensive review). The Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) is neglected because of its domination by South Africa which is not considered part of SSA and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) is not dealt with since it is only now becoming effective and therefore has no track record.

C. Outline of the report

1.21 The report is organized into chapters that can stand alone so that the reader may go directly to the issues that are of interest.

1.22 Chapter II explores the rationale for regional integration efforts and proposes an approach consistent with the free trade ideal while taking account of the constraints facing major liberalization efforts. Chapter III summarizes the economic characteristics and the pattern of recorded trade in SSA. The changes that have occurred in trading patterns over the period 1965 (before most groupings were formed) to 1983 are reviewed to provide a background for the ensuing analysis as well as motivating a discussion of the dynamics behind the formation of the various regional groupings and some preliminary observations about the impact of the various regional trade arrangements in SSA. In Chapter IV, the basic trade data is used to evaluate Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) which is then used to select products which are studied more extensively. Chapter V reviews the main barriers against intra-SSA trade for the selected products. This motivates a review, in Chapter VI of possible actions that might be taken to improve intra-regional trade and integration prospects.

II. THE RATIONALE FOR BANK SUPPORT TO INTEGRATION EFFORTS IN SSA

A. Does Regional Integration in SSA Make Economic Sense?

2.01 Regional integration is justified by a variety of reasons that include political considerations and the search for greater security. While these are valid in their own right and may even dominate other considerations, here the concern is over economic benefits.

2.02 Supporting regional integration in SSA is a new area of involvement for the Bank and the approach is still being developed. It is often argued that the benefits from greater intra-African exchange are limited given the similar economic structure based on primary commodity production for export outside the region. However, once the framework is extended to consider the different initial endowments of land and capital (including human capital) the potential benefits are more apparent. Economic integration may offer a means of realizing these benefits by dismantling barriers to the free flow of goods and services, labor and, especially, capital to promote industrial restructuring and allow the emergence of strong African firms through mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures and takeovers across African frontiers.

2.03 This would support ongoing national structural adjustment efforts with special relevance for liberalization of economic policy and the mobilization of the private sector 3/. For example, currency convertibility may be re-established less painfully through a gradual transition to a more realistic exchange rate if this is done collectively rather than individually. Similarly, a reform of investment laws would benefit from being carried out at the regional level.

2.04 Achieving these objectives requires significant reduction in external protection together with the free movement of goods and services that characterizes a Free Trade Area combined with the free flow of factor services that is a feature of a Common Market. A Common External Tariff (CET), that is characteristic of Customs Unions and Common Markets, should not be adopted where none exists so as to facilitate the lowering of external protection. A CET requires joint agreement by several countries for changes and this will needlessly complicate trade liberalization. However, where a CET is already in place, there would be no need to dismantle it unless excessive regional preferences are involved that could significantly divert trade. (Trade diversion occurs when more expensive union partners substitute for less expensive external trade partners as a result of preferences).

2.05 This is particularly true of existing customs unions such as UDEAC. 4/ Instead, the objective should be to emphasize factor mobility while limiting regional preferences by getting agreement to lower the CET where relevant. Care would be required, however, to avoid an increase in intra-union preferences by making its CET effective. In summary, with existing Customs Unions the end objective would be a transformation into a Common market with lower external protection than initially.

2.06 Previous and current attempts to achieve regional integration in SSA identify the need "to adopt a far-reaching regional approach based primarily on collective self-reliance" so as to make Africa less susceptible to "the economic and social crises suffered by the industrial countries" (Lagos Plan of Action, Preamble, article 1). They have therefore emphasized the granting of selective intra-union tariff preferences as a step to a Customs Union and eventually a Common Market with high protective barriers so as to achieve import substituting industrialization.

2.07 In contrast, experience suggests that maximizing the benefits from integration requires the emergence of more flexible economies that are better integrated into the world economy. The emphasis should be on increasing competition within SSA by liberalizing factor and goods and services flows across African boundaries rather than activating so far failed efforts to

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3/ Here we are concerned with integration as a means of enhancing [illegible] regional exchange. The benefits of coordinating public investment and [illegible] joint intervention to fight locusts and riverblindness, for example, are therefore ignored. Berg (1989) reviews such issues in depth.

4/ In any case the preferences accorded by the CET tend to be undermined by other measures.

create customs unions that would grant high external protection against third parties 5/.

2.08 The proposed approach to regional integration is consistent with an outward-oriented strategy that "provides incentives which are neutral between production for the domestic market and exports" (WDR, 1987, page 8). In consequence, the supporters of regional integration in SSA, must reevaluate the argument that the failed policies of import substitution combined with industrial planning reflect problems of small market size rather than wrong policy choices. Experience shows that "the important lesson is that the strongly inward-oriented economies did badly." (WDR, 1987, page 8), a lesson whose validity is not affected by the size of the economy. In the short run there may be similarities between the two approaches, particularly regarding the dismantling of internal barriers that result in regional preferences. But in the approach suggested here, this is only a transitory phenomenon required to achieve broad based general liberalization.

2.09 This is why Customs Unions, with their potential for trade diversion behind a high CET, should not be the primary objective of integration efforts. Inevitably, a regional strategy will give some preference to regional partners, but avoiding Common External Tariffs will limit potential trade diversion and emphasize trade creation (the substitution of expensive domestic production by less expensive partner imports). In the absence of a CET, users of high cost regional imports can be expected to pressure their own national Government for a lowering of the national tariff on those items, thus helping to keep down trade diversion. Such pressure for lowering the common tariff of a customs union is likely to be resisted by the country with the high cost product protected by the high tariff. Where a CET already exists, efforts should be directed to ensure

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5/ Mr. Jaycox has made several speeches emphasizing that "successful economic integration will be contingent on the implementation of policies that elicit the correct response from markets and which will boost regional production and demand. To strengthen that response, policy and institutional frameworks have to be put in place that facilitate the free flow of goods and factors of production within Sub-Saharan Africa." (Speech to SADCC, January 28, 1988, page 5). In the same speech he emphasizes that "the first imperative is for governments of the region to adjust their policy frameworks, to get their economies back on a growth track, make them as efficient and productive as possible, and to liberate the vast entrepreneurial potential of their people...Policy changes such as encouraging realistic exchange rate movements, liberalizing trade, designing price incentives for exports, improving public sector investment strategies and institutions, and increasing private sector activity must go hand-in-hand with specific investments in physical infrastructure and human resource development." (page 1). He laments that up to now "there has been too little effort to get traders, manufacturers, farmers and business people to participate in the process of cooperation and to establish commercial links among themselves. The result of all this? Not nearly enough intra-African trade; markets that are too small; inefficient, unofficial cross-border exchanges; costly excess industrial capacity in many countries; growing dependence on non-African sources for food; and increasing unemployment and poverty." (SADCC speech pages 2-3).

In another speech dealing with economic recovery in SSA, Mr Jaycox notes that "also critical is the harmonization of appropriate policies across national borders. These policies should be aimed at eliciting the correct response from markets and boosting regional production and demand. The World Bank, through its adjustment lending, is helping to facilitate the adoption of such policies and is keen to support further steps that will lead to enhanced regional cooperation." (Keynote address to Inter-agency Task Force on UNPAAERD, February 22-23, 1988).

that the resulting intra-union preferences be limited (if necessary by lowering the CET) to a differential that is not excessive, say no more than 20 percent.

2.10 Given the likely difficulties of later downward movement of the CET, caution is required in activating a CET that actually increases intra-union preferences, even where this is seen as transitory. Temporary increases in regional preferences should only occur as part of a general and significant lowering of external protection. Further, there should be reasonable assurance that the regional preference would indeed be reduced to a differential that is not excessive. It should be recognized that reaching this objective would require considerable external trade liberalization, and would usually involve lower barriers than currently envisaged in uni-lateral national reform programs.

2.11 In 1980 African Heads of State adopted the Lagos Plan of Action that advocated "a far-reaching regional approach based primarily on collective self-reliance" (Preamble, Article 1). In the current climate of adjustment, the objectives of the Lagos Plan need to be interpreted even more broadly: "to achieve the goals of rapid self-reliance and self-sustaining development and economic growth" (Lagos Plan of Action, Preamble, Article 3) requires the emergence of strong African firms able to compete in the world market and this is inconsistent with inefficient activity protected by high barriers. Thus, the spirit of the Lagos Plan is fully consistent with the promotion of extensive regional liberalization as the first step to generalized liberalization.

2.12 Economic integration may offer a powerful means for achieving an outward orientation 6/ in some SSA countries, given the reluctance to freely admit imports and the automatic de-facto monopolies created by the small size of virtually all SSA economies (except for Nigeria and, perhaps, Cameroon). Regional cooperation should result in increased openness (and thus a reduction in protection vis-a vis the rest of the world) on the part of the member countries of the regional union, leading to a reduction in barriers to trade in services and factors of production in addition to trade in goods.

2.13 However, regional liberalization should be more intensive than world wide liberalization, in particular by being extended to factors of production. The two are not incompatible, as demonstrated by the EC, for example. However, regional liberalization should take priority in terms of speed and degree. Such an approach could limit the possibility of increased dependence arising from a uni-lateral liberalization program.

2.14 Thus, the proposed strategy emphasizes extension of the size of <u>all</u> product and factor markets as a means of increasing competition and efficiency, thereby facilitating a lowering of external barriers. This contrasts with traditional approaches that emphasize the extension of the market for <u>selected</u> products to exploit the economies of scale perceived to be necessary for import substitution behind high barriers.

2.15 The economies of scale argument is worth reviewing since it tends to underpin much of the discussion concerning regional integration in SSA. Such arguments usually overlook that economies of scale tend to be more relevant for heavy industry and are irrelevant for agricultural goods and for services such as marketing and transport where significant increases in economic activity could be expected. Freeing agricultural trade is particularly important, both to support national reforms aiming to shift the

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6/ Outward orientation simply means not creating anti-export bias and many countries have achieved this by offsetting some of the anti-export bias of import barriers rather than by totally dismantling such barriers (see WDR, 1987, page 81).

terms of trade in favor of the agricultural sector and to enhance food security by overcoming regulations, administrative problems and transport difficulties that prevent natural variations in output to be used to exchange temporary surpluses and deficits across SSA borders.

2.16 Notwithstanding these criticisms, it has been argued that "for large economies domestic trade may provide scope for adequate specialization, economies of scale, and enough competition to keep managers alert." (WDR, 1987, page 3). In that respect, in Brazil for instance, there is considerable "water in the tariff". However, as also noted by the WDR, "even large economies, if cut off from international trade, would lack stimuli for efficient industrial development." (page 3). This explains why, despite occasional temptation to rely on scale economies for achieving import substituting industrialization, Brazil has tended to have an outward orientation (WDR, 1987, Figure 5.1, page 83).

2.17 In any case, none of the existing SSA sub-regional groupings are large enough to rely on internal trade as can be gauged from the experience of Nigeria which has a larger economic size than any of the groupings in SSA; even SSA as a whole would only achieve the size of Belgium or somewhere in between Indonesia and Korea, all very open and export oriented economies that do not aim at import substitution behind high barriers (see Table 1). Paradoxically, the economies of scale argument would dictate production for the world market, since there is no economic rationale for limiting scale economies to continental borders.

Table 1: Comparative Market Size of SSA Economic Groupings (measured by GDP)

SSA groupings	GDP in 1988 (US$ millions)	Comparable countries in ROW: Industrial	Comparable countries in ROW: LDCs
SSA	149,550	Belgium	Indonesia/Korea
ECOWAS	62,648	N.Z/Denmark	Yugoslavia
Nigeria	29,370	Ireland	Hungary
ECOWAS without Nigeria	33,278	Ireland/NZ	Pakistan
CEAO	21,330	--	Morocco
MRU	4,770	--	Costa Rica
PTA	57,709	N.Z/Denmark	Thailand
SADCC	24,194	Ireland	Singapore
UDEAC	20,508	--	Bangladesh
CEPGL	9,740	--	Ecuador
IOC	5,799	--	Yemen

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Largest African Economies		Largest Non-African LDCs	
SSA	149,550	China	372,320
Nigeria	29,370	Brazil	323,610
Cameroon	12,900	India	237,930
Sudan	11,240	Mexico	176,700
Cote d'Ivoire	7,650	Korea	171,310
Kenya	7,380	Indonesia	83,220
Angola	6,759	Argentina	79,440
Zaire	6,470	South Africa	78,970
Zimbabwe	5,650	Poland	70,490
Ghana	5,230	Turkey	64,360
Senegal	4,980	Venezuela	63,750
Ethiopia	4,950	Yugoslavia	61,710
		Thailand	57,950
Industrial Countries		Algeria	51,900
US	4,847,310	Israel	44,960
Japan	2,843,710	Hong Kong	44,830
Germany	1,201,820	Portugal	41,700
France	949,440	Greece	40,900
Italy	828,850	Philippines	39,210
UK	702,370	Colombia	39,070
Canada	435,860	Malaysia	34,680
Spain	340,320	Egypt	34,330
Australia	245,950	Pakistan	34,050
Netherlands	228,280	Hungary	28,000
Switzerland	184,830	Peru	25,670
Sweden	159,880	Singapore	23,880
Belgium	153,810	Chile	22,080
Austria	127,200	Morocco	21,990
Finland	91,690	Bangladesh	19,320
Norway	91,050	Syria	14,950
Denmark	90,530	Ecuador	10,320
New Zealand	39,800	Tunisia	8,750
Ireland	27,820	Oman	8,150

Source: 1990 WDR, Table 3, pages 182-183 and staff estimates.

2.18 In or out of economic unions, SSA countries, like all small countries, will therefore depend for their growth "upon their ability to trade relatively freely with the rest of the world." (WDR, 1987, page 3). Notwithstanding any dynamic or static gains from regional trade, the most important benefits reside in expanding external trade and regional integration should be supported as a means of achieving greater eventual outward orientation. This is why the focus should be on creating competition in regional factor and product markets as a step to external liberalization.

B. Reconciling Regional Integration with Trade Liberalization

2.19 The need for a regional approach is rooted in the difficulties in pursuing all out liberalization. After eight years of structural adjustment efforts in SSA, progress with liberalization has been slow and accompanied with reversals. In general, trade regimes in SSA remain more restrictive than liberalized with less than half having eliminated all quantitative restrictions (import licensing and/or foreign exchange allocation system) (see Table 2).

Table 2: Classification of SSA Countries According to Trade Restrictions

Country	Fully 1/ Liberalized	Partially 2/ Liberalized	Limited 3/ Liberalization	Limited 4/ Restrictions	Partially 5/ Restricted	Very 6/ Restricted	Others 7/
Benin i/				X			
Botswana	X						
Burkina Faso					X		
Burundi	X						
Cameroon		X					
Cape Verde		X					
Central African Republic			X				
Chad							X
Congo				X			
Cote d'Ivoire					X		
Ethiopia						X	
Gabon				X			
Gambia	X						
Ghana	X						
Guinea	X						
Kenya ii/		X					
Lesotho	X						
Liberia							X
Madagascar		X					
Malawi		X					
Mali		X					
Mauritania				X			
Mauritius		X					
Namibia iii/				X			
Niger				X			
Nigeria iv/				X			
Rwanda						X	
Senegal v/				X			
Sierra Leone		X					
Somalia				X			
Sudan						X	
Tanzania		X					
Togo vi/				X			
Uganda				X			
Zaire				X			
Zambia						X	
Zimbabwe vii/					X		

i/ Benin would be classified as partially liberalized except for import licensing requirements on imports from non-franc zone, non-ACP and non-EEC countries; these are expected to be removed by end-1991.
ii/ Kenya would be classified as "partially liberalized" after July 1991 as QRs will be limited to public health, public security and environment related controls and the average tariff would be less than 70%
iii/ Limited information.
iv/ Commodities such as rice, wheat, vegetable oil, textiles, beer and soft drinks are banned from importation, otherwise Nigeria would be classified as partially liberalized.
v/ Senegal would be classified as partially liberalized except for QRs granted under special conventions.
vi/ Togo would be classified as fully liberalized as of April 1, 1989, except for QRs that are imposed on a short list of goods.
vii/ In the process of eliminating trade restrictions.

1/ Fully liberalized: Absence of QRs (import licensing and/or foreign exchange allocation system) and average tariff of less than 30%.
2/ Partially liberalized: Absence of QRs and average tariff of 30-70%.
3/ Limited liberalization: Absence of QRs and average tariff of over 70% or substantial exceptions with high tariffs.
4/ Limited restrictions: Limited QRs.
5/ Partially restricted: Substantial QRs.
6/ Extensive QRs.
7/ Others: Insufficient information or not fitting into above categories.

2.20 A regional approach may offer a new dimension to supplement the uni-lateral and uncoordinated national efforts of the sort currently being engaged in with World Bank and IMF support. Its bi- or multi-lateral nature may help make reforms more acceptable and "bind" them against reversals by national pressure groups.

2.21 To evaluate this argument it is necessary to understand the adjustment problems facing SSA. According to Nellis (1986) and Steel and Evans (1984), African countries have attempted to industrialize by relying on the public sector to set up operations geared at small national markets. As a result, many public enterprises in Africa are not only inefficient and badly managed but are overdimensioned. "The persistence of capacity underutilization... suggests that a temporary shortage of foreign exchange is not the fundamental problem. The underlying problems are the dependence of production on imported rather than domestically-produced inputs, and excessive growth of production relative to the growth of import capacity--and in many cases relative to the size of the market" (Steel and Evans, 1984, page 55). Under such circumstances privatization and rehabilitation efforts may offer only limited relief from overprotection and the resulting excessive consumption of foreign exchange. Such considerations partly explain the difficulties encountered by African governments in agreeing on the need for and in implementing trade liberalization.

2.22 Steel and Evans (1984) also note that high effective protection encourages new investment, even with unused capacity. In turn, "High cost operation is an inevitable consequence of these problems of capacity underutilization, inadequate infrastructure, declining productivity, and excessive capital intensity. At the same time, incentives to reduce costs have been blunted by high effective protection, import prohibitions, restricted competition, and administered pricing systems that base decisions on actual costs plus a margin. As a result, a large share of industrial production in Africa takes place at costs that are not competitive in terms of world market prices, and it is not uncommon to find some firms that actually use more foreign exchange than they save" (pages 59-60).

2.23 This supports the view of Nellis (1986) that making firms competitive requires competition. However, he notes that in "most African countries internal markets are so small that at least large manufacturing firms frequently acquire automatically a monopolistic or oligopolistic position." (page 44).

2.24 Thus, at least in the short and medium term, gains will not arise from customs unions that create opportunities to trade in a larger market behind continued third party protection; rather benefits would arise from the opportunities to rationalize production across borders through freer factor flows. In turn, larger regional markets may facilitate the adjustment and restructuring that African countries need to undertake as they move to an outward orientation.

2.25 In addition, a regional approach may be politically more acceptable, not only by building on the pan-African sentiment of the continent, but also by reducing the cost of adjustment. In the typical uni-lateral liberalization process, existing firms may need extensive restructuring to compete at world prices (plus some margin of protection). Thus, free importation, may result in short term losses of output and employment, even though over the medium term this will be more than offset by the emergence of new firms and the expansion of restructured enterprises.

2.26 The analysis of Nellis (1986) and Evans and Steel (1984), leads to the expectation that the short term costs of restructuring may be high for the majority of existing firms. If so, this would explain why, on the one hand, African governments seem to be aiming at average protection of 30 to 40 percent compared with less than 10 percent in industrial countries (WDR, 1987, page 136), while, on the other hand, it also explains the difficulties of getting meaningful implementation of even such limited liberalization. For example, in Senegal all QRs have been abolished - except for those that protect entrenched (presumably) inefficient firms! Similarly in Kenya, some items have been moved back and forth across different categories in subsequent trade liberalization episodes. Indeed, the latest trade liberalization initiative, envisages less liberalization than planned in the first such reform at the start of the decade. (Kenya, ISAP, May 24, 1988, P-4819-KE).

2.27 In contrast, a program that liberalizes faster with regional partners may diminish the costs of adjustment by forcing competition first with firms that are of comparable levels of (in)efficiency before exposition to the most efficient firms in the world. This allows a reduction of costs, through mergers, acquisitions and takeovers, that may be significant enough to facilitate survival in the world market. The poor financial condition of many African firms may constrain such restructuring, but an opening of factor and product markets within a program of general liberalization may induce investment that would not be forthcoming in a purely national context. Therefore, restructuring could be facilitated compared to uni-lateral liberalization and, under efficient management possibly from a neighboring country, the restructured firm will have a large enough internal demand to eliminate "wasteful overcapacity". 7/ In addition, the more dynamic firms that survive may takeover some of the plant and equipment of the less efficient firms and keep portions of the workforce and sales network in the neighboring countries, something that does not happen when imports from outside replace domestic production. These benefits will be limited by the tendency of rationalization to lead to a concentration of production at one place, but there may be instances where existing facilities can be recycled to other uses, possibly through intra-firm specialization.

2.28 Finally, it is worth considering the benefits of a multi-lateral approach as a means of "binding" any reform effort. It has been widely reported that the main motivation for Mexico to join the GATT was to provide the defense of an international treaty against powerful domestic pressure groups that could otherwise have forced a reversal of the liberalization effort. Similarly, it may be politically easier to defend trade liberalization proposals as well as resist proposals to roll them back if the Government can argue that it is getting some reciprocal benefits. In some cases the groups that will benefit from concessions from neighbors may act as a counterforce to those arguing against liberalization. This may be especially relevant for countries like Kenya (that is again facing difficulties in implementing its latest liberalization program) and Zimbabwe (that is timidly considering liberalization) that have established firms that could benefit from wider market access.

2.29 It is noteworthy that a similar approach has been advocated for the Central American Common Market (CACM) that until 1980 was the most successful regional grouping, in terms of generating intra-union trade, in the developing world (see Chapter III, Table 4). Thus, it is argued that "even after all reforms have been carried out, some external tariff barriers will still remain, partly to generate Government revenues. Domestic industries would , therefore, still be receiving a certain amount of protection against outside competition, both during the transition, while external trade barriers are being lowered, and afterwards. The removal of intra-regional trade barriers in this context would enable efficiency gains ... Moreover, the reduction in intra-regional trade barriers, as recommended here, would be accompanied by lower extra-regional trade barriers. This

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7/ This is not an argument in favor of import substitution in a large internal market. Given existing widespread underutilization of capacity, a policy of regional liberalization will lead to fewer plants at greater levels of capacity utilization, but this should provide the basis for external trade liberalization rather than used as a justification for continued third party protection.

would also reduce the danger of trade diversion ... These arguments present a case in favor of achieving regional reintegration in the context of an overall free trade environment, but not as an alternative to external trade liberalization since Central America, even if fully integrated, would still be better off by liberalizing trade with the rest of the world." (CODII, LAC & IDD, PPR (1989), pages iv & v).

C. <u>Risks and Limitations of a Regional Approach</u>

2.30 The major risks of this approach are lack of interest by SSA Governments and Regional Organizations or an implementation that results in diverting trade from efficient suppliers because the expected generalized liberalization does not materialize.

2.31 It may be politically difficult for the majority of SSA Governments to implement the extensive liberalization required even on a regional basis. This is why it is essential to accept that different countries are unlikely to be able and willing to liberalize at the same rate. The failure of existing groups largely reflects the unrealistic expectation that it is feasible for many countries to simultaneously agree on major and rapid liberalization, especially when many of them do not have common interests or extensive mutual economic relations. Provided a few countries might be willing to accelerate adjustment through a regional approach, it may be worthwhile to explore this option. The cost of eventual lack of interest is low compared with the alternative of putting financial resources in regional projects that make the situation worse than it would otherwise be, particularly if it retards ongoing or potential adjustment.

2.32 This is why efforts should be redirected from the activation of customs unions or the granting of tariff preferences. Instead, emphasis should be put on the dismantling of non-tariff barriers to the free regional movement of factors of production and goods and services. In eliminating non-tariff barriers against regional partners as a first step to their eventual total elimination, governments would simply be adopting a different form of phasing from the current approach of distinguishing between types of imports exempted from QRs. However, since tariff reform does not aim at zero tariffs, implementing regional tariff cuts would not be equivalent. It is therefore difficult to envisage how the Bank could support African governments in implementing tariff preferences. Bank management could not easily justify to the majority of member governments, including affected ones in Africa, why it urged a sub-set of African countries to discriminate against them in the course of trade liberalization.

2.33 The worst possible scenario would be the activation by existing unions of extensive regional preferences that result in diversion of trade from both African and extra-regional partners to union partners favored by tariff or quota preferences (see Chapter III for details on which unions are most likely to divert trade from other SSA countries) The tariff preferences that have been implemented so far have been modest and it seems unlikely that significant changes will occur for most of the SSA groupings. Therefore it is unlikely that there is much cause for concern in practice. Nevertheless, it would be advisable for African governments to ensure that regional tariff preferences do not become excessive. In any case, as argued in chapter V, tariffs are not a major obstacle to intra-African trade.

2.34 In the case of a grouping that already has a CET, the same approach should be adopted. If, as is often the case, the CET itself is relatively low, then attention should be focussed on tax reform involving the replacement of all other import taxes with non-discriminatory sales or value added taxes. Where the CET extends excessive intra-union preferences, Bank support could be more easily justified if the union were to reduce these.

2.35 From a purely theoretical perspective that ignores social and political costs, the first best solution is likely to be rapid and far-reaching unilateral liberalization with the commensurate exchange rate action. This would involve rapid and extensive restructuring driven by the competition from imports that would channel factors of production to newly profitable activity. Such an approach would supersede any need to specifically encourage regional economic integration.

2.36 Where possible, African governments should adopt such an approach. In practice, however, we are far from a first best situation as can be gauged from Table 3 which summarizes the objectives and achievements of Bank supported trade liberalization efforts in SSA. It is noteworthy that even the Bank's current objectives do not aim at anything close to industrial country level of protection, let alone full liberalization. This is why the regional approach may have practical relevance.

EXPERIENCE AND OBJECTIVES OF BANK-SUPPORTED TRADE LIBERALIZATION EFFORTS IN SSA
CATEGORY 1: LIBERALIZED a/

COUNTRY	ACTION TAKEN: COMPLETE	ACTION TAKEN: INCOMPLETE	ACTION TAKEN: NONE	OBJECTIVE OF THE BANK AVER. RATE OF PROTECTION TARGET AND SPREAD E.T.C.	REASONS FOR INCOMPLETE OR NO ACTION
Burundi		Still QRs on importation of glass bottles, pharmaceutical and textiles. Comment: all these are public enterprises. Agreement to eliminate these by 1990.		Obj.: Reduction of effective protection. Elimination of all QRs. Comment: partly achieved. Nominal effective protection spread 15-45%. Target: 10-35%.	The analytical underpinning supporting the initial proposal is weak. Work is on-going on a new proposal to lower the average nominal rate of protection and achieve target spread of 10-35%.
Ghana	No known QRs on imports and exports (except repatriation requirement).			Obj.: Use of FOREX auction rate for customs valuation. Elimination of all QRs. Comment: for most items, the duty rate is 20-25%. Luxury items attract higher rates.	
Guinea	All QRs have been eliminated.			Obj.: To replace QRs with tariffs not to exceed 100%. Comment: a uniform tariff rate of about 10% is in place now. Only a few luxury items attract a tariff rate of up to 30%. The av. effective rate of protection is only 15% since there is little or no distortions due to tariff rates.	Tariff reform met all the expectations.
Kenya	July 1991 all QRs eliminated except those required for public health, security and environmental reasons. Automatic licenses for almost all tariff categories.	All imports still require licensing.		Obj.: Tariff to replace all QRs and not to exceed 100%. Reduction of av. dispersion. Comment: no import items are currently subject to duty rates in excess of 100%. Range: 0-100% av.=40%. Two studies provide two different estimates of net effective rate of protection. One is 60% and the other is 30%. More work is on-going in this regard.	SAL I and SAL II targets thought to have been too ambitious, given the short timetable. The recent industrial sector adjustment credit program, followed by the export development credit, while retaining similar targets, used a more cautious approach. Liberalization is now being achieved in phases; all QRs will be removed by July 1991, dispersion in tariff rates is being reduced, and two reductions in the average tariff rate of five percentage each were planned; one was completed in June 1990, and the other is due in June 1991.
Madagascar	All QRs on imports and exports have been eliminated.			Obj.: Reduce max. tariff to 80% and a min. of 10%. Reduce av. nominal protection to 35% in 4 years with a dispersion around the av. of 1. Comment: tariff range of 10-80% is achieved. Lending is continuing.	Further work is still required for the reduction of average nominal protection rate, on-going dialogue.

a/ Fully or partially liberalized, per Table 2.

CATEGORY 1: LIBERALIZED (continued)

COUNTRY	ACTION TAKEN: COMPLETE	ACTION TAKEN: INCOMPLETE	ACTION TAKEN: NONE	OBJECTIVE OF THE BANK AVER. RATE OF PROTECTION TARGET AND SPREAD E.T.C.	REASONS FOR INCOMPLETE OR NO ACTION
Malawi	All QRs eliminated with the exception of a small negative list comprising luxury, health, or safety goods.			Obj.: (1) Elimination of all all QRs, with the exception of a small negative list. (2) Reduction in effective protection, particularly lower tariff spread and elimination of domestic surtax suspension. Comment: QRs eliminated and rationalization of trade tax regime being phased in over several years. Current tariff rate is moderate but varied, with an avg eff. protection rate of 36%.	Local business interests are resisting reduction in domestic protection. Further analytical work is also required to identify optimal tariff scenario.
Mauritius	All QRs have been eliminated.			Obj.: Max. tariff 107% Elimination of all QRs. Comment: only few luxury items attract a tariff rate of 107%. Most are much lower. Effective protection rate for import substitution industries is in the range of 30-40%.	
Tanzania	Nearly all QRs have been eliminated. Short negative list on OGL (Open General License). Broad positive list on own-funded imports.			Obj.: Maximum tariff of 60 percent or less with 4 positive rates.	

EXPERIENCE AND OBJECTIVES OF BANK-SUPPORTED TRADE LIBERALIZATION EFFORTS IN SSA
CATEGORY 2: MIXED b/

COUNTRY	ACTION TAKEN: COMPLETE	ACTION TAKEN: INCOMPLETE	ACTION TAKEN: NONE	OBJECTIVE OF THE BANK AVER. RATE OF PROTECTION TARGET AND SPREAD E.T.C.	REASONS FOR INCOMPLETE OR NO ACTION
Congo	QRs exist in importation of 8-9 products. Owned mostly by a powerful industrialist. Importers must buy 80% of their need of these products before they can import 20%.			Obj.: Replace import quotas by tariffs. Replace export and import licensing system. Reduce tariff range from (0-200%) to (40-60%). Comment: QRs removed except in the case of 8-9 products. Export and Import licensing still exists.	Membership in UDEAC affects ability to influence individual tariff. Lobbying effort by a powerful industrialist Ministry of Commerce fear revenue loss.
Namibia				Target effective rate of protection will be in 20-30 percent range on MFN basis.	Bank dialogue is recent. Action is envisaged under renegotiation of South African Customs Union protocols to be initiated through proposed Regional Integration project.
Niger	All QRs have been eliminated except on the importation of petroleum.			Obj.: Dismantling of import licensing and import monopolies. Comment: for 1986 SAL, there was no tariff reform requirement. (1) Trade policy and incentives study completed 1988. No action taken but will be included in SAL II. (II) Recommended trade policy reform to be refined in context of Sahel Trade Policy Study.	
Senegal	All QRs are eliminated except for products produced by firms under special conventions. (Minimum specific duties were however introduced on ±80 products from July 1989.)			Obj.: Completion of tariff reform with a new tariff law. Harmonization of effective protection through tariff. Gradual elimination of QRs. Comment: the new tariff reform is in place. It essentially reduced the effective rate of protection from about 80% to 40%. Harmonization refers to harmonization of effective protection rate for all members of the CEAO union. The special conventions are being renegotiated and no new ones granted.	Some discrimination still exists in the tariff rates because of social goals. Bank, while dissatisfied, is working to prevent misallocation of products among the four different tariff bands. Harmonization is difficult because of different effective protection rates among members of CEAO. Moreover, a true customs union is not expected to emerge. This issue will be looked at again in the Sahel Trade Policy Study.
Somalia	Free access to foreign exchange.	Partial adjustment in tariff reduction with most rates below 60%.	Import licensing formally remained in place but in practice it applies to only limited goods.	Reduce tariff protection below 60%; free access to foreign exchange complete elimination of QRs.	Macro instability/war.

b/ Limited liberalization or limited restriction, per Table 2.

CATEGORY 2: MIXED (continued)

COUNTRY	ACTION TAKEN: COMPLETE	ACTION TAKEN: INCOMPLETE	ACTION TAKEN: NONE	OBJECTIVE OF THE BANK AVER. RATE OF PROTECTION TARGET AND SPREAD E.T.C.	REASONS FOR INCOMPLETE OR NO ACTION
Togo				Fiscal study to raise import duty yields and streamline incentives and protection. Creation of export processing zones.	
Uganda	Export licensing eliminated.	QRs still exist for 7 products. Imports to stop being licensed except for those on a small negative list. Max. tariff now =50%.		Objective of reform is to remove all QRs and move to a tariff regime with 4 levels of tariffs, the maximum being 50%.	QRs used for the 7 items because it is claimed that customs are ineffective and tariffs are not paid.
Zaire	In principle, all QRs have been eliminated (except in one instance for political reasons).			Obj.: 60% max. tariff. 10% min tariff. Target NRP=30% in 4 years. Comment: target not yet achieved.	Revenue problem has delayed implementation. Moreover, the target spread of 10-60% tariff is to be achieved in phases.

EXPERIENCE AND OBJECTIVES OF BANK-SUPPORTED TRADE LIBERALIZATION EFFORTS IN SSA
CATEGORY 3: RESTRICTED c/

COUNTRY	ACTION TAKEN			OBJECTIVE OF THE BANK AVER. RATE OF PROTECTION TARGET AND SPREAD E.T.C.	REASONS FOR INCOMPLETE OR NO ACTION
	COMPLETE	INCOMPLETE	NONE		
Côte d'Ivoire	QRs apply to about a third of total imports, especially on consumer goods (textiles, shoes, food...)			Obj.: Tariff reform (acceptable to the Bank). Target effective rate of protection; 40% for industry and 20% for agriculture across the board. Elimination of all QRs.	QRs reintroduced in 86/87 after trade liberalization in 1985 following a sharp deterioration in terms of trade and important devaluations in neighbor countries. Work on a new trade reform is on-going.
Ethiopia			No actions taken	Ensure private sector access to foreign exchange. Eliminate export/import licensing.	Adjustment program was not agreed to due to excessive fiscal deficit and general political instability.
Sudan		Some multiple exchange rate practices; introduction of own financed schemes.		Adjusting the exchange rate to a realistic level; relaxing import regulations; abolishing export licensing.	Political instability and failure of talks with the IMF.
Zimbabwe		There is a process of trade liberalization.	There is complete foreign exchange allocation.	Obj.: Prepare 4 year tariff reform aimed at establishing 30% max. NRP.	A new government program is being implemented. The bank is supporting through a SAL (soon to be appraised).

c/ Fully or partially restricted, per Table 2.

EXPERIENCE AND OBJECTIVES OF BANK-SUPPORTED TRADE LIBERALIZATION EFFORTS IN SSA

CATEGORY 4: OTHERS d/

COUNTRY	ACTION TAKEN			OBJECTIVE OF THE BANK AVER. RATE OF PROTECTION TARGET AND SPREAD E.T.C.	REASONS FOR INCOMPLETE OR NO ACTION
	COMPLETE	INCOMPLETE	NONE		
Guinea Bissau				Reduce state monopoly on imports; increase stamp tax and customs duties.	

d/ Limited information.

2.37 Nevertheless, the recent study of liberalization experiences summarized by Papageorgiou, Choksi and Michaely (1987) and by Michaely (1988) argues that one-shot liberalization may also be preferable for practical reasons. The study finds that expanding sectors grow fast enough to offset unemployment in the adjusting sectors when liberalization is immediate, while phasing the process provides opportunities for contracting sectors to overturn the reform by providing opportunities to generate political resistance.

2.38 The Papageorgiou review includes no SSA countries, and SSA may not be comparable to other regions concerning the impact of trade liberalization. This is because, as discussed above, in SSA the economic base is so narrow, the distortions so extensive and the supply of investment so constrained, that there may be few sectors or firms that can provide an offset to the general contraction induced by the liberalization. In this regard, even in Nigeria, one of the most diversified and the largest economy in SSA, the experience with liberalization has been that unemployment rises in the short run since the expanding sectors grow from a low base while the contracting sectors involve larger firms (Zanini, 1987 and van Eeghen, 1988).

2.39 The case of Nigeria is also relevant in emphasizing that significant economic benefits cannot arise simply from extensive economic integration. None of the economic groupings (including ECOWAS without Nigeria) has as large and unified a market, total factor mobility, harmonized investment and tax codes and common external tariff, to the same extent as Nigeria (viewed as an economic unit). The poor economic performance of Nigeria reinforces earlier arguments concerning the importance of generalized liberalization to secure major economic benefits. Integration is only a useful means to that end.

2.40 The Papageorgiou findings notwithstanding, it is unrealistic to expect most SSA Governments to adopt immediate and extensive trade liberalization. It is this view together with the substantial progress still possible that leads to a pragmatic view that regional liberalization may yield more lasting and worthwhile results in some cases where extensive uni-lateral liberalization is resisted.

2.41 The Bank emphasis on regional cooperation is designed to strengthen current adjustment efforts in SSA and therefore should not be formulated as an alternative to programs at the national level. In particular, for the strategy to be effective, regional efforts will need to offset the smaller number of partners affected with a bolder and faster dismantling of barriers than envisaged in current national programs. Ideally, it will involve <u>complete</u> liberalization of trade <u>and</u> capital flows as well as full labor mobility with regional partners. At the very least all non-tariff trade barriers should be removed and firms from any partner country within the group should be treated as domestic firms rather than as foreign firms, with provision for the free flow of inputs and dividends across the national boundaries within the group.

2.42 The integration effort must also be placed within the framework of a general process of liberalization to avoid diverting efficient trade with industrialized countries and other developing countries (including those in SSA not in the arrangement) in favor of relatively less efficient regional partners favored mainly by high common external protection. At the same time, it is important to note that the traditional arguments about trade creation versus trade diversion assume perfect information and competitive markets. The reality in SSA is that because of policy and market failures there may be a potential for <u>efficient</u> trade switching to less expensive African exporters from costlier traditional suppliers (see Chapter V for more detail. In Chapter III this potential is estimated at between US$4 and US$5 billion). There is also an unrealized trade potential in agricultural commodities that is hindered by national regulations on both the export and import side.

2.43 The harmonization of policies is also important. A significant share of unofficial trade is the result of differences in Government policies that result in inefficient supplying of certain markets; for example, Gambian smuggling of rice to Senegal arises from the attempts of the Senegalese to maintain above world market prices while the Gambians have a liberalized trade regime. Similarly, the Zambian subsidy on sugar encourages smuggling to Zaire. Harmonization of policies to eliminate such flows will also have to be an important element of any integration strategy.

2.44 It is also worth emphasizing that while economists have always agreed on the benefits of free trade, in practice no economic development experiment, including that of the NICs has ever involved systematic and extensive free trade. Movement to freer trade is indeed usually follows the attainment of a certain level of industrial development. Thus, the issue of the rate and scope of external trade liberalization should be seen in a practical context of movement towards a system that is more open and less biased against exports.

D. Achieving Success Where the Regional Groupings Have Failed

2.45 Berg (1989) argues convincingly that the likelihood of creating successful customs unions is low and that the expected benefits are small. Instead he suggests that a functional approach based on specific objectives (e.g fighting river blindness) would be more fruitful. Both conclusions should be endorsed while noting that his suggested approach is fully consistent with the proposals outlined here that call for small sub-groups of countries to mutually agree on extensive liberalization of factor and goods and services movements 8/. The expectation should be that, especially initially, only a minority of countries would be willing to go down this path. However, for that minority it would, unlike the activation of customs unions, provide an additional tool to deepen and strengthen ongoing adjustment efforts.

2.46 Successful implementation of the integration strategy described above requires accepting the existing broad parameters already agreed by African Governments. At the same time, nothing significant can be achieved by sticking to the current approach based on a consensus system which results in going no faster than the slowest performer. To make matters worse, superimposed on this weak structure is a lack of commitment to implement decisions that are not seen as of immediate benefit. Chapter 6 of an early draft of the Long Term Perspectives Study and Berg (1989) provide detailed information on the difficulties encountered. For current purposes it suffices to suggest that new approaches are required that will be inspired by the broad strategies and goals of existing groupings but have an incentive structure for reform that is more flexible along the lines suggested above. More precise suggestions are made in Chapter VI.

III. ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS AND POLICY OF INTEGRATED AREAS

A. Present status of SSA arrangements

3.01 The seven arrangements covered in this study aim at industrial cooperation and trade liberalization in one form or another. Their objectives are generally consistent with the endorsement of collective

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8/ The emphasis here is on measures relevant to increasing trade and facilitating greater outward orientation. This is not inconsistent with support for specific regional projects or initiatives along the lines suggested by Berg.

self-reliance by the Lagos Plan of Action in April 1980, even though most of them predated it. A list of these organizations and national members as well as the date of their formation is in Annex 1. Chapter 6 of the sub-zero draft of the Long Term Perspectives Study provides an excellent account of the history of these unions and why, except for the CEAO (Economic Community of West Africa), they have not achieved their main objectives. Therefore, it will not be productive to repeat the same type of analysis here. Instead, the emphasis in this chapter is placed on describing some of the economic characteristics of the unions and the pattern of recorded trade within the unions and with other African countries. While much of this chapter is descriptive in nature, the information does provide some insight into some of the elements required for successful integration and the appropriateness of various unions in view of existing patterns of recorded trade.

3.02 Although the treaties of six of these organizations envisage an across-the-board, high level form of integration, none of them have so far achieved this objective. The most ambitious are UDEAC, CEPGL, ECOWAS and CEAO, a sub-region of ECOWAS (Acronyms and membership are detailed in the Annex). Most countries lowered some internal trade barriers, usually some tariffs, but failed to reach consensus on the Common External Tariff or the elimination of most binding non-tariff barriers. Capital and labor mobility have in general not been secured in practice, even where there is a formal commitment. The major exception is the CEAO which is the only union to have achieved substantial labor mobility. Significantly, the CEAO is also the most successful grouping in terms of intra-union trade. The MRU is a smaller organization aiming to form a customs union. A less ambitious organization but a large one is the PTA: a preferential trade area started in 1984. The SADCC, launched in Lusaka in April 1980, gives priority to transport and communications and food security. Insofar as it aims at industrial cooperation, it does envisage growing trade on narrow lines of production covered by industrial planning. Recently, however, SADCC has developed an interest in liberalizing internal trade within the group.

3.03 In the description that follows, the analysis is based on recorded trade flows. Some countries are not included for lack of information (for example the SSA members of the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU)--Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) and the trade that is recorded is not always reliable. In addition, the importance of unrecorded trade varies significantly from country to country. To avoid needless repetition, no reference is made below to the fact that the analysis is based on partial information, a factor that should always be borne in mind.

B. Economic Characteristics and Performance

3.04 Introduction. To evaluate the performance of the existing groupings in SSA it is useful to consider the experience in other regions of the world. Table 4 summarizes some basic indicators for the Central American Common Market (CACM), the Andean Pact, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA), the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) and the European Community (EC6 for the initial membership of 6 countries and EC9 for the enlargement to 9 members; information for the current 12 member community was not readily available).

3.05 It is striking that the groupings in SSA have experienced the greatest degree of opening up of all unions. This is all the more remarkable given the rhetoric of self-reliance and de-linking from the world trading system that underlies much of the official justification for such groupings (see Chapter II). 9/ Both the share of regional trade and intra-union trade creation in SSA are generally lower than in other regions except for the Andean pact with its ill-fated attempts to take industrial planning to extremes through proposed sharing out of component industries.

3.06 It would appear that the opening up of the African groupings is more a reflection of the failure to achieve extensive and efficient import substituting industrialization than of explicit policy decisions. In turn, this probably reflects the inappropriateness of such a strategy given the small market size of all the SSA groupings (see Chapter II, Table 1). It is noteworthy that the CACM achieved large increases in regional trade, that made it the most successful union in the developing world measured in terms of intra-union trade creation, by effectively pursuing an import substitution strategy. However, the gains were based on production of consumer goods at prices exceeding those on the world market. The inputs for this production were financed by buoyant commodity export receipts.

9/ It should be noted that the heavy dependence on export commodity production, the increases of import prices, especially of fuels, and the increased reliance on food imports have importantly contributed to this result. It is also true, that in some cases import substitution requires imported inputs to produce output with negative value added at world prices. Nevertheless, regardless of such explanations this increased dependence on the world economy serves to emphasize the folly of autarchic policies for Africa.

Table 4. Basic Indicators for Selected Economic and Trade Groups
(In percent)

Group	Share of Regional Trade 1/	Degree of Openness (Trade/GDP) 1/	Net Trade Gains (Change in Degree of Openness) 2/	Crude Trade Creation 3/	Trade Diversion (-) or Gains (+) with non-Partners	GDP US$ bils 1986	GDP Averg. An. 1965-80	GDP Growth Rts 1980-86	POP (mils) mid-1986	GDP p.c. (US$)	Distribution of GDP in % Agr 1986	Distribution of GDP in % Ind 1986	Distribution of GDP in % Manufa 1986	Area (thousands of square kms)
Outside SSA														
CACM	23	43	8	8	--	22	4.6	-	24	914	23	27	19	423
EC12 4/	50	46	-4	1	-5	3771	4.0	5.2	323	11675	6	35	18	2256
EC9	50	48	13	7	6	3057	3.7	1.5	264	11629	5	37	20	1527
EC6	42	31	3	5	-2	2508	3.8	1.2	198	12645	3	36	24	1169
EFTA	24	36	-1	2	-3	475	3.5	2.3	32	15047	5	38	23	1236
ASEAN	14	58	13	1	12	192	7.8	3.5	295	652	18	33	22	3064
ANDEAN P'ACT	6	41	9	1	8	120	5.6	-	83	1458	16	33	19	4719
LAFTA	11	15	-6	--	-6	550	5.3	0.1	351	1566	15	35	22	19311
In SSA														
CEAO	9	57	31	3	28	18	4.1	0.7	47	379	37	22	13	4444
ECOWAS	6	33	30	2	28	78	6.3	-1.8	179	436	40	26	9	6093
PTA	7	41	18	1	17	33	3.9	2.1	146	227	40	22	14	4973
UDEAC	2	42	35	1	34	18	5.9	6.2	23	805	19	36	5	1708
MRU	1	42	35	1	34	4	3.3	0.2	12	346	41	23	3	429
CEPGL	--	47	11	--	11	9	2.4	1.3	43	208	35	31	14	2399
IOC	3	42	na	na	na	7	na	2.5	13	517	na	na	na	562

1/ Data is for 1983.

2/ For SSA, calculations are based on difference between 1965 and 1983. For other groupings, various dates are used corresponding to a period before and after the union became effective.

3/ Here trade creation/diversion is measured as the change in trade relative to GDP. A more precise measure should take account of production and demand in a well specified model (see Corado and De Melo (1986). Note that Net Trade Gains (column 4) = Crude Trade Creation (column 5) + Trade Diversion (-) or Gains with non-Partners (column 6). Crude Trade Creation is the change in the share of regional trade in GDP following the creation of the Union.

4/ Data for EC12 countries (1988) from World Development Report 1990.

Note: The European Community is denoted by EC6 for the initial membership of six countries EC9, for the enlargement to nine members and EC12 for the current 12 member community.

Sources: Wonacott and Lutz (1988), COMTRADE (A UNSO Database) and staff estimates.

When commodity prices collapsed in the late 1970s and foreign financing became unavailable in the early 1980s, the earlier gains were reversed (see CODII, LAC & IDD, PPR (1989)).

3.07 All the groupings increased their degree of openness (trade expressed as a percent of GDP) except for LAFTA, with its emphasis on import substitution and EFTA that lost important members to the EC. Outside SSA, all organizations except for ASEAN and the Andean pact generated more internal than external trade while in SSA the reverse is true. In the case of ASEAN this result is not surprising given the negligible emphasis placed on intra-union trade liberalization. Despite this, the share of regional trade within ASEAN is relatively high, while ASEAN also displays the greatest degree of openness. Similarly, the CEAO is both the most open group in SSA and the one with the largest share of intra-regional trade. This suggests that regional exchange may be favored by openness instead of requiring external barriers (also see paragraph 3.55 (e)).

3.08 This quick comparison suggests that unions in Africa have been less successful than those elsewhere, except for the Andean Pact which failed through overemphasis on industrial planning. Surprisingly, African unions have witnessed more external than internal trade generation and have moved from being relatively closed in the 1960s to about the same degree of openness as unions in other parts of the world. In evaluating the performance of the SSA unions, it will be useful to remember this background.

3.09 <u>ECOWAS</u>. With 16 members this is the grouping in SSA with the largest GDP ($63 billion). Its population of 190 million leaves it with a per capita income of US$330 (see Table 5). The organization was established in 1975 and regroups the relatively well integrated economies of the Communaute Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO) with the other countries of West Africa. Despite many revisions in the target date for achieving a single internal market, agreed decisions to liberalize internal trade and factor flows have not been implemented. As a result intra-ECOWAS trade has stagnated and the overall share of 6 percent mainly reflects the 10 percent intra-regional trade within the CEAO. The protocol on free movement of labor is not implemented in practice. When Nigeria benefitted from its oil boom, there was some degree of labor mobility involving inflows into Nigeria. When recession hit, Nigeria expelled other ECOWAS nationals.

3.10 In an attempt to overcome past inaction, at the 1990 summit, a decision was taken to implement a Monetary Cooperation Program that would lead to Monetary Union. While the three year timetable envisaged is unrealistic, the emphasis on the elimination of cross-border trade and investment barriers as a first step is consistent with the strategy proposed in this report (see Chapter VI) and offers a pragmatic approach that could reverse past inaction. The ECOWAS Secretariat has commissioned a study that would propose concrete actions for removing existing obstacles to the free flow of goods, services and investment within the ECOWAS region. It is expected that the results would be ready in time for submission to the next ECOWAS summit in mid-1991. This would then set the stage for ECOWAS to implement the measures at the national level.

3.11 ECOWAS contains Nigeria, Africa's largest economy (GDP of US$29 billion as well as several of its smallest, Cape Verde, Gambia and Guinea Bissau (GDP of about US$0.2 billion). It includes the Sahelian countries which depend heavily on agriculture and some of the more industrialized economies in SSA such as Senegal, Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire (19, 18 and 16 percent of GDP from manufacturing, respectively). The population varies from one third of a million in Cape Verde to 110 million in Nigeria while per capita income ranges from US$190 in Guinea Bissau to US$711 in Senegal.

3.12 ECOWAS countries as a group have registered the worst growth performance of all the groupings and, ironically, performance was better before the creation of the union--annual growth declined from 3.5 percent between 1965 and 1980 to 1.2 percent from 1980 to 1988.

3.13 With a market size comparable to Yugoslavia and somewhat smaller than Denmark (see Chapter II, Table 1), ECOWAS is the only grouping in SSA where the economies of scale argument might appear justified (see Chapter I).

3.14 Over the period 1965 to 1983, the degree of openness of ECOWAS increased by 30 percentage points (Table 4). The creation of ECOWAS does not seem to have led to trade diversion, since all but 2 percentage points of this increase is accounted for by greater trade with non-ECOWAS partners. Total trade flows increased by nine-fold for ECOWAS as a group. The share of trade with SSA rose almost twice as fast as overall trade over this period, with intra-union trade increasing slightly faster than this (see Table 6). Within ECOWAS, the exchanges between CEAO and other ECOWAS members rose slightly less rapidly than for ECOWAS as a whole while trade between the MRU and other ECOWAS members rose twice as fast. Overall, the creation of ECOWAS seems to have had a negligible impact in increasing the share of regional exchange.

TABLE 1: BASIC INDICATORS

Country	GDP US$mils 1988	GDP Av.An.Grth Rts(%) 1965-80	GDP Av.An.Grth Rts(%) 1980-88	POP (mils) 1988	GDP pc (US$) 1988	Structure of prod (1988) Shares in GDP (%) Agr	Ind	Manufac	Degree of openness (E+M)/GDP	Area (thousands square kms)
PTA	57,709	4.2	2.1	207.2	279	36	22	13	47%	10,424
** Angola	6,759	..	..	9.5	713	21	10	3	57%	1,277
Burundi	960	5.6	4.3	5.1	188	56	15	10	30%	28
#* Comoros	194	..	..	0.4	440	..	..	..	39%	2
Djibouti	..	..	..	..	..	13	37	..	..	23
Ethiopia	4,950	2.7	1.4	47.4	106	42	17	12	30%	1,222
Kenya	7,380	6.4	4.2	22.4	329	31	20	12	41%	583
Lesotho	330	5.7	2.9	1.7	194	21	28	13	..	30
Malawi	1,080	5.6	2.6	8.0	135	37	18	..	66%	119
Mauritius	1,600	5.2	5.7	1.1	1,455	13	33	25	139%	2
Mozambique	1,100	..	-2.8	14.9	74	62	20	..	74%	802
** Namibia	1,900	..	..	1.7	1,118	13	37	..	69%	824
Rwanda	2,310	4.9	2.1	6.7	345	38	22	15	21%	26
Somalia	970	3.4	3.2	5.9	164	65	9	5	42%	638
Sudan	11,240	3.8	2.5	23.8	472	33	15	8	15%	2,506
Swaziland	595	..	..	0.7	810	..	..	..	..	17
Tanzania	2,740	3.7	2.0	24.7	111	66	7	4	57%	945
Uganda	3,950	0.8	1.4	16.2	244	72	7	6	21%	236
Zambia	4,000	1.9	0.7	7.6	526	14	43	25	49%	753
Zimbabwe	5,650	5.0	2.7	9.3	608	11	43	31	52%	391
ECOWAS	62,648	3.5	1.2	189.6	330	38	23	9	45%	6,129
CEAO	21,330	2.9	2.4	48.3	442	37	21	11	49%	4,444
Benin	1,710	2.1	2.4	4.4	389	40	13	6	37%	113
Burkina Faso	1,750	3.5	5.5	8.5	206	39	43	15	54%	274
Cote d'Ivoire	7,650	6.8	2.2	11.2	683	36	25	16	51%	323
Mali	1,940	3.9	3.2	8.0	243	49	12	5	40%	1,240
Mauritania	900	2.0	1.6	1.9	474	38	21	..	87%	1,031
Niger	2,400	0.3	-1.2	7.3	329	36	23	9	33%	1,267
Senegal	4,980	2.0	3.3	7.0	711	22	29	19	38%	196
MRU	4,770	3.3	0.6	11.7	408	38	24	4	45%	429
** Guinea	2,540	3.8	2.9	5.4	470	30	32	5	41%	246
** Liberia	960	3.3	-1.3	2.4	400	37	28	5	72%	111
Sierra Leone	1,270	2.8	0.2	3.9	326	46	12	3	21%	72
OTHER ECOWAS	36,548	4.3	0.5	129.6	282	39	24	12	41%	1,256
#* Cape Verde	245	..	..	0.4	680	..	..	..	25%	4
#* Gambia	164	..	..	0.8	200	..	..	..	55%	11
Ghana	5,230	1.4	2.1	14.0	374	49	16	10	38%	239
#* Guinea Bissau	179	..	..	0.9	190	..	..	..	29%	36
Nigeria	29,370	6.9	-1.1	110.1	267	34	36	18	47%	924
Togo	1,360	4.5	0.5	3.4	400	34	21	8	55%	57
UDEAC	20,508	5.9	6.2	23.0	890	29	28	11	48%	3,020
Cameroon	12,900	5.1	5.4	11.2	1,152	26	30	13	24%	475
Central African Rep.	1,080	2.6	2.1	2.9	372	44	12	8	34%	623
#* Equatorial Guinea	138	..	..	0.3	410	..	..	..	39%	26
Congo, People's Rep.	2,150	5.9	4.0	2.1	1,024	15	30	8	71%	342
#Chad	920	..	3.9	5.4	170	47	18	15	56%	1,284
Gabon	3,320	9.5	-0.2	1.1	3,018	11	51	..	66%	268
CEPGL	9,740	4.0	2.8	45.2	215	42	24	11	38%	2,399
Burundi	960	5.6	4.3	5.1	188	56	15	10	30%	28
Rwanda	2,310	4.9	2.1	6.7	345	38	22	15	21%	26
Zaire	6,470	1.6	1.9	33.4	194	31	34	7	64%	2,345
SADCC	24,194	5.2	2.4	77.6	312	29	28	14	69%	4,934
Angola	6,759	..	..	9.5	713	21	10	3	57%	1,277
Botswana	1,940	14.3	11.4	1.2	1,617	3	55	5	126%	600
Lesotho	330	5.7	2.9	1.7	194	21	28	13	..	30
Malawi	1,080	5.6	2.6	8.0	135	37	18	..	66%	119
Mozambique	1,100	..	-2.8	14.9	74	62	20	..	74%	802
Swaziland	595	..	..	0.7	810	..	..	..	..	17
Tanzania	2,740	3.7	2.0	24.7	111	66	7	4	57%	945
Zambia	4,000	1.9	0.7	7.6	526	14	43	25	49%	753
Zimbabwe	5,650	5.0	2.7	9.3	608	11	43	31	52%	391
IOC	5,799	3.5	3.2	13.1	443	27	25	25	71%	593
#* Comoros	194	..	..	0.4	440	..	..	..	39%	2
Madagascar	1,880	1.8	0.6	10.9	172	41	16		35%	587
Mauritius	1,600	5.2	5.7	1.1	1,455	13	33	25	139%	2
** Reunion	1,866	..	..	0.6	3,240	..	..	..	..	2
* Seychelles	258	..	..	0.1	3,800	..	..	..	..	0

Sources : World Development Report 1990, World Bank Atlas 1988, IMF Direction of Trade Statistics 1987, and staff estimates
* GNP reported instead of GDP; ** staff estimates of GDP, # Exports and imports from IMF Direction of Trade Statistics.

3.15 In 1983, Intra-Ecowas trade accounted for 91 percent of the African trade of ECOWAS members and most of the remainder was with UDEAC (see Table 7). Thus ECOWAS treated as a whole appears to be a coherent union whose activation into a customs union would divert little African trade from non-members, although liberalizing trade with the UDEAC countries would be beneficial. For ECOWAS as a whole, intra-African trade only accounted for 6 percent of its total trade. Nevertheless this average masks a wide dispersion ranging at one extreme between less than one percent and 4 percent for Cape Verde, Nigeria and Liberia and at the other extreme from 23 to 33 percent for Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali. Indeed, the average level of intra-SSA trade is unduly influenced by the low share for Nigeria which has a big weight because of its size. Except for the three countries at the bottom of the scale listed above and Gambia, Ghana and Guinea Bissau, the intra-SSA trade of all the 10 other ECOWAS members accounts for at least 10 percent of the total trade and 7 members have shares of 20 percent or more.

3.16 It would appear that while ECOWAS has not generated much new regional trade, an important part of the trade of many of its members has been with other SSA countries, even though this is masked in the overall numbers by the dominant position of some of the large economies that have little regional trade, specifically Nigeria and Ghana. As an illustration, if the median were used instead of the mean, this would give an average share of about 11 percent for SSA trade of ECOWAS instead of 6 percent.

3.17 ECOWAS as a whole displays a degree of openness of 45%, close to the median of 41%. Mauritania is the most open economy (trade is 87 percent of GDP) and Cape Verde is the most closed (trade is 25 percent of GDP).

TABLE - TRADE GROWTH IN SUB SAHARAN AFRICA : 1968-1983

(Growth of trade with SSA countries expressed as a ratio of growth of total trade with SSA; growth of trade with SSA as a ratio of growth of total trade. Eg growth of Burundi's trade with Kenya is 1.34 times growth of its trade with SSA. Growth of Burundi's trade with SSA is 2.7 times growth of its trade with World.)

PTA	BURUNDI	COMOROS	DJIBOUTI	ETHIOPIA	KENYA	MALAWI	MAURITIU	RWANDA	SOMALIA	TANZANIA	UGANDA	ZAMBIA	ZIMBABWE	PTA
PTA														0.99
BURUNDI	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.53	ERR	ERR	-0.05	ERR	ERR	-0.09	ERR	ERR	9.47
COMOROS	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
DJIBOUTI	ERR	ERR	ERR	24.12	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	134.45
ETHIOPIA	ERR	ERR	0.97	ERR	0.76	ERR	-0.23	ERR	-1.43	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	11.61
KENYA	1.34	ERR	ERR	2.29	ERR	2.73	1.02	7.88	ERR	ERR	ERR	-18.72	-10.62	21.01
LESOTHO	..	..		.		..		..	.		.			
MALAWI	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.12	ERR	1.14	ERR	ERR	0.82	ERR	-37.69	-1.58	0.55
MAURITIUS	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.09	0.13	3.33	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.03	ERR	1.59	-61.98	2.32
RWANDA	-0.06	ERR	ERR	ERR	3.16	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.32	-0.09	ERR	ERR	6.93
SOMALIA	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.10	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.59
SWAZILAND	..					.					..			
TANZANIA	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	18.40	-0.21	0.79	ERR	ERR	ERR	-36.13	ERR	17.65
UGANDA	-0.08	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.08	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	20.62
ZAMBIA	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.18	8.96	-0.13	ERR	ERR	0.38	ERR	ERR	3.79	-0.13
ZIMBABWE	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.06	0.20	2.71	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	2.03	ERR	-0.21
ECOWAS														3.13
CEAO														3.49
BENIN	ERR	-0.11	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.03	ERR	ERR	ERR	190.77
BURKINA F	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
IVORY COA	-0.07	ERR	ERR	ERR	26.29	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	15.96	ERR	-28.22	ERR	20.84
MALI	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.03	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.50
MAURITANI	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
NIGER	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
SENEGAL	ERR	-0.11	ERR	ERR	-0.03	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.09	2.48	5.95	-0.40
MRU														0.40
GUINEA	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
LIBERIA	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	2.13	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	1.63
SIERRA LE	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.51	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.31
OTHER ECOWAS														4.51
CAPE VERD	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
GAMBIA	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	16.47	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	11.44
GHANA	-0.08	ERR	ERR	0.13	31.10	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	1.68	0.00	2.42	5.54	11.06
GUINEA-BI	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
NIGERIA	-0.08	ERR	ERR	0.13	0.65	ERR	ERR	ERR	-1.43	ERR	-0.09	3.19	5.95	0.94
TOGO	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.43	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	5.95	12.34
UDEAC														51.55
CAMEROON	ERR	ERR	ERR	5.83	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	244.89
CENTRAL A	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
CHAD	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
CONGO	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
GABON	ERR	ERR	0.00	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.99	ERR	ERR	ERR	25.05
EQUATORIA	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
CEPGL														1.98
BURUNDI	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.53	ERR	ERR	-0.05	ERR	ERR	-0.09	ERR	ERR	9.47
RWANDA	-0.05	ERR	ERR	ERR	3.16	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.32	-0.09	ERR	ERR	6.93
ZAIRE	0.18	ERR	ERR	-0.10	0.33	21.38	ERR	-0.08	ERR	0.03	-0.09	3.19	5.95	-0.18
OTHER SSA														2.62
ANGOLA	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.28	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	5.95	-0.62
BOTSWANA														
MADAGASCA	ERR	-0.07	0.00	ERR	0.03	-0.62	0.14	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	5.95	0.86
MOZAMBIQU	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	3.57	2.04	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	3.19	-27.63	2.92
SAO TOME	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
SEYCHELLE	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
SUDAN	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
AGGREGATES														
SSA	2.70	0.32	3.17	2.44	2.22	0.27	0.87	0.84	0.38	2.17	2.99	-0.46	-0.09	0.55
WORLD	4.98	27.35	[illegible]	4.07	13.47	[illegible]	4.41	18.66	1.92	13.72	3.91	0.69	1.86	3.48

[illegible]

TABLE - TRADE GROWTH IN SUB SAHARAN AFRICA 1965-1983 (CONT'D)

	ECOWAS : CEAO								ECOWAS : MRU				OTHER ECOWAS							
	BENIN	BURKINA	COTE D'IV	MALI	MAURITANI	NIGER	SENEGAL	CEAO	GUINEA	LIBERIA	SIERRA L	MRU	CAPE VERD	GAMBIA	GHANA	GUIN-BIS	NIGERIA	TOGO	OTHER ECO	ECOWAS
PTA								0.40	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.05	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.38	0.3[illegible]
BURUNDI	ERR	ERR	-0.03	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.05	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.11	ERR	-0.03	ERR	-0.04	-0.0[illegible]
COMOROS	-0.12	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.09	0.36	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.36
DJIBOUTI	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
ETHIOPIA	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.15	ERR	0.04	ERR	0.08	0.3[illegible]
KENYA	ERR	ERR	31.20	-0.08	ERR	ERR	-0.09	0.25	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	102.44	ERR	0.61	ERR	4.76	2.56
LESOTHO																				
MALAWI	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.08	-0.04	0.04	ERR	1.45	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.02	0.90	0.2[illegible]
MAURITIUS	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
RWANDA	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
SOMALIA	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.08	ERR	0.04	0.2[illegible]
SWAZILAND																				
TANZANIA	-0.12	ERR	18.82	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	24.31	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	6.60	ERR	ERR	ERR	17.21	23.0[illegible]
UGANDA	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.09	0.30	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.00	ERR	-0.03	ERR	-0.02	0.0[illegible]
ZAMBIA	[illegible]	ERR	0.35	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.07	0.14	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.08	ERR	-0.03	ERR	-0.04	-0.0[illegible]
ZIMBABWE	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.09	0.35	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.10	ERR	-0.08	-0.03	-0.04	0.1[illegible]
ECOWAS								1.15				2.43							1.04	1.16
CEAO								0.80				5.13							1.58	1.64
BENIN	ERR	15.25	0.22	ERR	8.66	0.29	0.16	0.27	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	1.17	ERR	0.43	0.01	0.56	0.48
BURKINA F	10.24	ERR	0.39	0.08	ERR	0.28	0.25	0.43	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.05	ERR	2.08	10.30	0.10	0.31
IVORY COA	0.66	1.76	ERR	4.18	63.28	0.61	0.55	0.84	224.58	4.86	3.77	14.61	ERR	ERR	66.43	ERR	3.38	3.24	7.58	1.48
MALI	ERR	0.17	2.69	ERR	-0.04	0.40	5.87	1.83	-0.11	1.84	ERR	2.99	ERR	ERR	-0.11	ERR	-0.03	ERR	-0.04	0.9[illegible]
MAURITANI	21.41	ERR	57.67	-0.06	ERR	ERR	17.62	11.18	ERR	-0.03	ERR	-0.07	ERR	ERR	-0.11	ERR	-0.03	ERR	6.45	7.[illegible]
NIGER	1.12	1.51	0.79	0.81	ERR	ERR	0.47	0.78	ERR	ERR	-0.06	0.18	ERR	ERR	-0.07	ERR	4.75	1.16	3.06	1.6[illegible]
SENEGAL	0.21	0.49	0.24	3.92	7.00	0.16	ERR	0.58	26.01	0.08	0.14	4.3[illegible]	ERR	1.66	0.47	ERR	6.84	0.41	3.91	0.9[illegible]
MRU								6.64				1.08							1.62	2.1[illegible]
GUINEA	ERR	ERR	82.69	-0.06	ERR	ERR	22.25	14.12	ERR	3.20	ERR	8.81	ERR	ERR	0.11	ERR	-0.03	3.46	0.93	11.[illegible]
LIBERIA	ERR	ERR	7.11	4.18	-0.04	ERR	0.29	6.29	12.72	ERR	0.63	1.06	ERR	ERR	6.27	ERR	1.80	ERR	2.95	2.[illegible]
SIERRA LE	ERR	ERR	2.64	ERR	ERR	-0.03	0.23	0.18	ERR	0.29	ERR	0.78	ERR	0.00	0.02	ERR	1.39	ERR	1.50	1.4[illegible]
OTHER ECOWAS								2.20				2.50							0.41	1.[illegible]
CAPE VERD	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
GAMBIA	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	2.29	2.16	ERR	ERR	0.00	0.00	ERR	ERR	0.13	ERR	-0.03	ERR	0.04	0.7[illegible]
GHANA	1.27	0.08	20.33	-0.06	-0.04	-0.02	0.40	0.62	0.11	1.54	0.01	0.63	ERR	0.08	ERR	ERR	-0.02	1.53	0.30	0.4[illegible]
GUINEA BI	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.03	ERR	-0.04	338.1[illegible]
NIGERIA	4.23	14.04	6.08	-0.06	-0.04	5.52	23.93	7.74	-0.11	1.86	3.10	3.65	ERR	-0.07	-0.07	-0.02	ERR	2.99	0.12	2.54
TOGO	0.04	65.67	3.90	ERR	ERR	1.08	1.14	1.05	11.32	ERR	ERR	22.70	ERR	ERR	5.09	ERR	2.39	ERR	2.35	1.66
UDEAC								0.63				0.33							1.97	0.61
CAMEROON	0.00	40.07	1.23	0.10	0.82	0.96	0.76	0.90	0.55	ERR	ERR	0.35	ERR	ERR	0.06	ERR	1.51	0.01	2.10	0.5[illegible]
CENTRAL A	ERR	ERR	0.16	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.09	0.10	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.11	-0.02	ERR	-0.03	0.00	0.0[illegible]
CHAD	ERR	ERR	0.05	ERR	ERR	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.11	-0.02	-0.03	ERR	-0.04	-0.0[illegible]
CONGO	1.70	ERR	0.31	0.25	-0.03	ERR	1.42	0.20	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.11	ERR	0.48	2.52	1.28	0.1[illegible]
GABON	0.20	-0.18	1.58	ERR	0.05	-0.03	0.06	0.91	ERR	-0.01	-0.05	-0.08	ERR	ERR	-0.11	ERR	32.66	0.36	20.12	1.4[illegible]
EQUATORIA	-0.12	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.10	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04	0.0[illegible]
CEPGL								0.16				-0.04							0.14	0.1[illegible]
BURUNDI	ERR	ERR	-0.03	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.06	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.11	ERR	-0.03	ERR	-0.04	-0.0[illegible]
RWANDA	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
ZAIRE	ERR	ERR	0.56	-0.06	-0.04	-0.03	6.59	0.24	ERR	-0.01	ERR	-0.04	ERR	ERR	-0.06	-0.02	-0.03	81.83	0.14	0.1[illegible]
OTHER SSA								-0.01				ERR							-0.03	-0.01
ANGOLA	ERR	ERR	6.28	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	9.61	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.03	ERR	-0.03	1.[illegible]
BOTSWANA																				
MADAGASCA	-0.12	-0.18	-0.04	-0.06	ERR	-0.03	-0.09	-0.08	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.03	ERR	-0.04	-0.0[illegible]
MOZAMBIQU	ERR	ERR	2.77	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	11.55	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.06	ERR	-0.03	ERR	-0.03	0.5[illegible]
SAO TOME	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
SEYCHELLE	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
SUDAN	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
AGGREGATES																				
SSA	1.05	0.76	3.83	2.13	6.39	2.45	2.95	2.71	0.84	10.87	34.62	4.83	ERR	3.23	2.69	9.28	2.24	4.09	1.85	1.97
WORLD	7.95	7.35	6.58	7.62	4.28	13.31	3.67	6.08	11.10	3.40	0.49	3.07	ERR	4.62	3.38	4.39	16.98	7.43	12.37	9.1[illegible]

TABLE 6 - TRADE GROWTH IN SUB SAHARAN AFRICA 1965-1983 (CONT'D)

	UDEAC							CEPGL				OTHER SSA							
	CAMEROON	CENTR AF	CHAD	CONGO	GABON	EQ GUINEA	UDEAC	BURUNDI	RWANDA	ZAIRE	CEPGL	ANGOLA	MADAGASCA	MOZAMBIQ	SAO TOME	SEYCHELLE	SUDAN	OTHER SSA	SSA
PTA	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	7.58	ERR	ERR	ERR	1.36	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	4.95	0.32
BURUNDI	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.05	26.21	0.30	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	1.98
COMOROS	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	1.87	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.59	1.47
DJIBOUTI	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.05	ERR	0.08	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.00	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	1440.93	41.31
ETHIOPIA	4.65	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	1.58	ERR	ERR	12.49	-0.35	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	1.67
KENYA	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	1.34	7.88	123.35	14.22	ERR	-2.51	43.79	ERR	ERR	ERR	17.34	5.03
LESOTHO																			
MALAWI	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	352.14	64.99	ERR	2.58	1.10	ERR	ERR	ERR	2.71	0.22
MAURITIUS	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	45.23	-1.65	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	1.89	0.65
RWANDA	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.05	ERR	12.49	0.27	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	2.02
SOMALIA	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.12
SWAZILAND																			
TANZANIA	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	1.37	ERR	2.44	ERR	0.79	11.66	3.36	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	4.99
UGANDA	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.08	0.08	12.49	-0.36	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	1.97
ZAMBIA	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	12.49	0.12	ERR	ERR	-0.41	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.97	-0.05
ZIMBABWE	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	12.49	-0.05	45.23	3.15	1.90	ERR	ERR	ERR	4.10	-0.03
ECOWAS							0.86				1.07							-0.10	3.04
CEAO							0.80				0.94							-0.08	2.76
BENIN	0.00	ERR	ERR	2.04	0.08	0.12	0.04	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	3.15	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.99	1.40
BURKINA F	10.80	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.05	ERR	13.11	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	3.11	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	6.55	0.94
IVORY COA	2.58	0.59	0.12	1.14	1.79	ERR	2.23	0.07	ERR	175.14	1.66	-7139.29	3.03	28.59	ERR	ERR	ERR	1.92	4.24
MALI	0.14	ERR	ERR	0.68	ERR	ERR	7.31	ERR	ERR	12.49	-0.36	ERR	3.15	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.99	2.73
MAURITANI	1.87	ERR	ERR	-0.14	0.06	ERR	0.05	ERR	ERR	12.49	-0.36	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	4.59
NIGER	2.61	ERR	-0.06	ERR	-0.04	ERR	0.23	ERR	ERR	12.49	0.00	ERR	3.15	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.89	5.48
SENEGAL	0.71	0.15	0.01	2.23	0.03	ERR	0.27	ERR	ERR	-891.96	26.04	ERR	2.95	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.93	1.82
MRU							0.38				-0.20							ERR	2.49
GUINEA	0.43	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.40	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	1.56
LIBERIA	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.02	ERR	0.47	ERR	ERR	6.81	-0.20	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	6.20
SIERRA LE	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.04	ERR	0.07	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	2.85
OTHER ECOWAS							3.49				1.13							-0.75	3.84
CAPE VERD	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
GAMBIA	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	2.51
GHANA	0.05	0.14	-0.09	-0.14	-0.06	ERR	-0.05	0.08	ERR	6.24	-0.32	ERR	ERR	-0.22	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.38	1.53
GUINEA BI	ERR	0.14	0.09	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.08	ERR	ERR	12.49	-0.36	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	6.82
NIGERIA	4.79	ERR	-0.09	2.65	57.39	0.12	4.15	0.08	ERR	12.49	-0.36	45.23	3.15	-0.41	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.99	6.37
TOGO	0.03	0.14	ERR	11.07	0.50	0.12	0.52	ERR	ERR	-30999.9	905.19	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	5.09
UDEAC							1.36				1.91							7.74	2.16
CAMEROON	ERR	2.69	2.40	2.88	0.55	3.99	1.36	ERR	ERR	1.92	0.07	ERR	2.97	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.93	2.01
CENTRAL A	1.55	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	1.44	ERR	ERR	12.49	-0.36	45.23	3.15	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.99	1.16
CHAD	2.29	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	2.12	ERR	ERR	12.49	-0.36	ERR	3.15	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.99	1.92
CONGO	1.66	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	1.57	ERR	ERR	-186.89	5.49	45.18	-3.15	8.34	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.66	1.16
GABON	0.99	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.12	0.92	ERR	ERR	-319.32	9.32	ERR	2.89	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	76.89	3.61
EQUATORIA	2.71	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.05	ERR	1.93	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	1.37
CEPGL							0.40				0.18							0.99	0.46
BURUNDI	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.05	26.21	0.30	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	1.98
RWANDA	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.05	ERR	12.49	-0.27	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	2.02
ZAIRE	-0.01	0.14	-0.09	2.17	1.19	ERR	0.40	0.18	0.08	ERR	0.43	45.23	ERR	-0.41	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.99	-0.01
OTHER SSA							0.60				-0.36							-0.93	0.17
ANGOLA	ERR	0.14	ERR	-0.14	ERR	ERR	0.73	ERR	ERR	12.49	-0.36	ERR	3.15	-0.41	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.99	0.00
BOTSWANA																			
MADAGASCA	0.08	0.14	0.09	0.14	-0.04	ERR	-0.07	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	45.23	ERR	64.73	ERR	ERR	ERR	117.52	-0.05
MOZAMBIQU	ERR	ERR	ERR	2.24	ERR	ERR	1.20	ERR	ERR	12.49	-0.36	45.23	-498.22	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	-0.93	0.41
SAO TOME	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
SEYCHELLE	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
SUDAN	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR	ERR
AGGREGATES																			
SSA	1.30	3.21	3.79	0.48	1.54	0.45	1.25	2.70	0.64	-0.05	1.33	0.00	-0.16	1.28	ERR	ERR	ERR	0.29	0.93
WORLD	9.19	2.15	3.01	14.41	14.02	18.19	10.31	4.36	18.66	1.48	2.06	5.14	2.02	1.90	ERR	ERR	ERR	3.45	6.38

Source: COMTRADE (A UNSO Database)
ERR indicates no data for 1965

TABLE 7 - TRADE FLOWS IN SUB SAHARAN AFRICA - 1983

(Trade with SSA countries expressed as a % of total trade with SSA, trade with SSA, ROW, & Industrialized countries as a % of total trade; total trade in millions of US$. Eg. Burundi's trade with Kenya is 32.2% of its trade with SSA and Burundi's trade with SSA is 12.92% of its total trade.)

PTA	BURUNDI	COMOROS	DJIBOUTI	ETHIOPIA	KENYA	MALAWI	MAURITIUS	RWANDA	SOMALIA	TANZANIA	UGANDA	ZAMBIA	ZIMBABWE	PTA
PTA														85.92%
BURUNDI	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	4.56%	3.69%	0.00%	0.54%	0.63%	8.04%	0.00%	15.60%	3.91%	4.03%
COMOROS	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.39%	0.00%	7.11%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.27%
DJIBOUTI	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	67.83%	0.59%	0.03%	0.02%	0.00%	5.28%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	3.14%
ETHIOPIA	0.00%	0.00%	88.24%	0.00%	3.64%	0.13%	0.14%	0.01%	0.00%	0.61%	0.00%	0.02%	0.00%	4.12%
KENYA	32.20%	42.92%	5.45%	25.97%	0.00%	1.88%	59.31%	92.80%	63.43%	23.18%	90.98%	5.19%	1.59%	25.27%
LESOTHO														
MALAWI	6.50%	0.00%	0.06%	0.20%	0.40%	0.00%	0.78%	0.00%	0.58%	1.66%	0.00%	20.11%	24.81%	5.31%
MAURITIUS	0.00%	50.85%	0.01%	0.06%	3.90%	0.24%	0.00%	0.00%	9.62%	0.04%	0.00%	0.01%	2.20%	1.67%
RWANDA	0.92%	0.00%	0.00%	0.02%	22.28%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	7.75%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	7.42%
SOMALIA	0.03%	0.00%	0.35%	0.00%	0.45%	0.02%	1.04%	0.00%	0.00%	0.45%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.20%
SWAZILAND														
TANZANIA	11.63%	0.00%	0.00%	0.89%	4.71%	1.60%	0.12%	6.56%	12.94%	0.00%	8.96%	10.99%	0.48%	4.81%
UGANDA	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	38.62%	0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	18.72%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	13.13%
ZAMBIA	30.59%	0.00%	0.00%	0.04%	1.44%	26.41%	0.05%	0.00%	0.00%	15.04%	0.00%	0.00%	32.11%	8.46%
ZIMBABWE	11.08%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.64%	47.06%	13.43%	0.00%	0.00%	0.95%	0.00%	46.36%	0.00%	8.09%
ECOWAS														3.31%
CEAO														1.10%
BENIN	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.06%	0.81%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.07%
BURKINA F	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.04%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%
IVORY COA	0.05%	1.91%	0.00%	0.03%	0.25%	1.35%	1.07%	0.00%	0.00%	2.23%	0.00%	1.21%	4.07%	0.99%
MALI	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
MAURITANI	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
NIGER	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
SENEGAL	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.06%	0.00%	0.02%	0.06%	0.00%	0.00%	0.27%	0.00%	0.06%	0.00%	0.03%
MRU														0.22%
GUINEA	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.96%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.06%
LIBERIA	0.00%	0.28%	0.00%	0.02%	0.01%	1.63%	0.08%	0.00%	0.13%	0.01%	0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	0.12%
SIERRA LE	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.47%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.13%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.04%
OTHER ECOWAS														1.99%
CAPE VERD	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
GAMBIA	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	4.03%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.26%
GHANA	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.02%	3.85%	0.00%	0.30%	0.00%	0.09%	0.08%	0.00%	0.04%	0.02%	1.21%
GUINEA-BI	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
NIGERIA	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.03%	0.87%	1.10%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.54%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.38%
TOGO	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.41%	0.10%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.13%
UDEAC														0.33%
CAMEROON	0.02%	0.00%	0.00%	0.13%	0.10%	0.13%	0.03%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.05%
CENTRAL A	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
CHAD	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.08%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
CONGO	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	0.01%	1.09%	0.35%	0.05%	0.00%	0.08%	0.00%	0.39%	0.00%	0.12%
GABON	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.02%	1.24%	0.06%	0.00%	0.00%	1.09%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.16%
EQUATORIA	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
CEPGL														12.76%
BURUNDI	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	4.56%	3.69%	0.00%	0.54%	0.63%	8.04%	0.00%	15.60%	3.91%	4.03%
RWANDA	0.92%	0.00%	0.00%	0.02%	22.28%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	7.75%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	7.42%
ZAIRE	8.07%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.50%	0.88%	0.04%	0.00%	0.00%	1.93%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.31%
OTHER SSA														6.55%
ANGOLA	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
BOTSWANA														
MADAGASCA	0.00%	4.05%	0.00%	0.01%	0.38%	0.00%	7.28%	0.03%	1.03%	4.09%	0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	0.54%
MOZAMBIQU	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.19%	3.09%	4.41%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	3.21%	0.00%	0.00%	30.56%	5.34%
SAO TOME	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
SEYCHELLE	0.00%	0.00%	4.29%	0.00%	0.99%	0.11%	8.65%	0.00%	0.00%	0.11%	0.00%	0.00%	0.25%	0.67%
SUDAN	0.00%	0.00%	1.60%	2.41%	5.78%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	6.31%	9.78%	0.05%	0.00%	0.00%	2.58%
AGGREGATES														
SSA	12.92%	4.52%	14.24%	3.20%	12.60%	11.98%	2.51%	20.54%	0.82%	4.84%	19.64%	5.78%	6.51%	8.48%
ROW	87.08%	95.48%	85.76%	96.80%	87.40%	88.02%	97.49%	79.46%	99.18%	95.16%	80.36%	94.22%	93.49%	91.52%
INDUSTR	51.38%	86.14%	51.25%	59.63%	55.23%	54.94%	69.38%	63.37%	39.44%	68.79%	69.24%	60.71%	57.87%	59.97%
WORLD	345	64	238	1375	2444	555	822	367	271	1319	679	1512	1937	11978

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TABLE 7 - TRADE FLOWS IN SUB SAHARAN AFRICA : 1983 (CONT'D)

	ECOWAS:CEAO								ECOWAS:MRU				OTHER ECOWAS							
	BENIN	BURKINA	COTE D'IV	MALI	MAURITANIA	NIGER	SENEGAL	CEAO	GUINEA	LIBERIA	SIERRAL	MRU	CAPE VERD	GAMBIA	GHANA	GUIN-BIS	NIGERIA	TOGO	OTHER ECO	ECOWAS
PTA								0.72%				1.20%							2.20%	1.27%
BURUNDI	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
COMOROS	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.02%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
DJIBOUTI	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
ETHIOPIA	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
KENYA	0.36%	0.12%	0.12%	0.00%	0.02%	0.00%	0.00%	0.07%	0.00%	0.06%	0.01%	0.02%	0.00%	0.02%	6.61%	0.00%	0.48%	0.96%	1.76%	0.65%
LESOTHO																				
MALAWI	1.00%	0.00%	0.19%	0.30%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.12%	0.93%	2.12%	0.49%	1.11%	0.00%	18.95%	0.00%	0.00%	0.13%	0.06%	0.38%	0.28%
MAURITIUS	0.00%	0.00%	0.03%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	0.02%	0.00%	0.03%	0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	0.01%	0.03%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	0.01%
RWANDA	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
SOMALIA	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
SWAZILAND																				
TANZANIA	0.00%	0.00%	0.21%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.06%	0.10%	0.00%	0.02%	0.13%	0.05%	0.00%	0.00%	0.03%	0.00%	0.06%	0.30%	0.04%	0.08%
UGANDA	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
ZAMBIA	0.00%	0.00%	0.16%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.02%	0.07%	0.00%	0.02%	0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	0.02%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.04%
ZIMBABWE	0.00%	0.00%	0.75%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.33%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.20%
ECOWAS								93.78%				76.85%							90.20%	91.34%
CEAO								51.41%				29.60%							65.48%	54.76%
BENIN	0.00%	0.45%	0.65%	0.14%	0.34%	2.28%	1.30%	0.89%	0.00%	0.36%	0.00%	0.10%	18.79%	0.00%	0.30%	0.00%	6.08%	1.87%	4.18%	1.98%
BURKINA F	0.81%	0.00%	10.04%	3.10%	0.00%	1.42%	1.33%	5.23%	0.05%	0.00%	0.00%	0.02%	0.00%	0.00%	3.41%	0.00%	0.59%	3.77%	1.61%	3.61%
IVORY COA	8.27%	70.97%	0.00%	84.93%	40.69%	18.09%	23.06%	19.33%	9.06%	49.72%	0.20%	17.26%	0.00%	22.61%	56.04%	7.03%	25.14%	19.76%	30.38%	23.01%
MALI	0.39%	4.78%	14.15%	0.00%	0.00%	0.86%	13.73%	9.37%	0.00%	7.00%	0.00%	1.94%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.32%	0.05%	6.62%
MAURITANI	0.34%	0.00%	3.19%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	8.97%	3.18%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	3.02%	0.44%	2.01%
NIGER	8.65%	2.97%	6.35%	0.89%	0.00%	0.00%	2.50%	3.44%	0.00%	0.04%	0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	0.27%	0.00%	25.06%	2.99%	16.31%	7.66%
SENEGAL	7.33%	4.16%	10.17%	27.80%	60.47%	5.73%	0.00%	9.96%	26.34%	0.14%	1.07%	10.27%	58.47%	54.28%	0.47%	92.92%	16.28%	4.43%	12.51%	10.87%
MRU								3.54%				11.22%							7.26%	5.36%
GUINEA	0.00%	0.03%	0.91%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	6.02%	1.59%	0.00%	6.28%	0.54%	1.93%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.08%	0.01%	1.06%
LIBERIA	0.35%	0.00%	3.71%	2.40%	0.00%	0.01%	0.02%	1.90%	4.66%	0.00%	10.56%	5.42%	0.23%	0.23%	1.08%	0.03%	1.43%	0.17%	1.14%	1.88%
SIERRA LE	0.00%	0.00%	0.02%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.23%	0.05%	0.50%	13.28%	0.00%	3.87%	0.00%	2.59%	0.11%	0.02%	9.57%	0.00%	6.10%	2.41%
OTHER ECOWAS								38.83%				36.03%							17.46%	31.24%
CAPE VERD	0.15%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.08%	0.02%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%
GAMBIA	0.00%	0.00%	0.47%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.54%	0.71%	0.00%	0.06%	0.57%	0.22%	0.00%	0.00%	0.10%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.02%	0.43%
GHANA	1.02%	6.46%	15.00%	0.01%	0.00%	0.24%	0.29%	7.19%	0.01%	3.85%	0.32%	1.18%	0.00%	1.31%	0.00%	0.00%	0.41%	41.55%	8.33%	6.47%
GUINEA BI	0.00%	0.00%	0.06%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.88%	0.40%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.23%
NIGERIA	65.73%	3.55%	21.21%	0.00%	0.00%	71.49%	31.14%	27.40%	0.00%	16.10%	86.08%	34.45%	0.00%	0.00%	1.29%	0.00%	0.00%	18.53%	2.66%	19.33%
TOGO	4.86%	5.18%	3.84%	0.28%	7.50%	1.96%	1.95%	3.12%	0.15%	0.45%	0.00%	0.18%	0.00%	0.00%	30.17%	0.00%	3.81%	0.00%	8.45%	4.76%
UDEAC								4.94%				21.89%							7.04%	6.85%
CAMEROON	0.31%	0.70%	1.67%	0.01%	0.52%	0.11%	2.02%	1.23%	58.30%	0.18%	0.00%	21.87%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	4.09%	0.07%	2.60%	3.14%
CENTRAL A	0.00%	0.00%	0.06%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.21%	0.07%	0.00%	0.02%	0.00%	0.01%	17.87%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	0.04%
CHAD	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.04%	0.02%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%
CONGO	0.23%	0.00%	0.62%	0.00%	0.14%	0.00%	1.32%	0.50%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	0.02%	0.23%	0.05%	0.31%
GABON	0.31%	0.00%	8.46%	0.13%	0.26%	0.00%	0.98%	3.12%	0.00%	0.02%	0.02%	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	6.84%	0.45%	4.39%	3.34%
EQUATORIA	0.00%	0.00%	0.02%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%
CEPGL								0.11%				0.00%							0.54%	0.26%
BURUNDI	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
RWANDA	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
ZAIRE	0.09%	0.00%	0.17%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.17%	0.11%	0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	1.16%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	3.73%	0.54%	0.25%
OTHER SSA								0.44%				0.06%							0.01%	0.26%
ANGOLA	0.00%	0.00%	0.77%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.34%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.93%	0.00%	0.02%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	0.20%
BOTSWANA																				
MADAGASCA	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	0.04%	0.00%	0.11%	0.03%	0.00%	0.17%	0.00%	0.05%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.02%
MOZAMBIQU	0.00%	0.62%	0.06%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.06%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.04%
SAO TOME	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.02%	0.00%	0.01%	2.56%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
SEYCHELLE	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
SUDAN	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
AGGREGATES																				
SSA	11.72%	25.90%	15.76%	33.41%	10.30%	22.51%	18.87%	17.85%	10.03%	3.63%	19.89%	7.62%	0.84%	8.96%	6.00%	9.45%	2.13%	19.65%	2.94%	6.26%
[illegible]	88.29%	74.10%	84.24%	66.59%	89.70%	77.49%	81.13%	82.15%	89.97%	96.37%	80.11%	92.38%	99.16%	91.04%	94.00%	90.55%	97.87%	80.35%	97.06%	93.74%
[illegible]	53.71%	57.25%	70.54%	58.47%	79.64%	62.87%	65.46%	67.26%	78.93%	71.30%	71.27%	73.47%	36.18%	70.81%	74.64%	53.67%	81.43%	53.20%	79.96%	76.99%
[illegible]	456	374	4345	447	521	900	1880	8843	608	1408	323	2419	51	158	3064	65	27134	677	31140	42201

TABLE 7 - TRADE FLOWS IN SUB SAHARAN AFRICA : 1983 (CONT'D)

	UDEAC							CEPGL				OTHER SSA						
	CAMEROON	CENTR AF	CHAD	CONGO	GABON	EQ.GUINEA	UDEAC	BURUNDI	RWANDA	ZAIRE	CEPGL	ANGOLA	MADAGASCA	MOZAMBIQ	SAO TOME	SEYCHEL	SUDAN	SSA
PTA							0.92%				87.68%						76.02%	24.38%
BURUNDI	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.54%	12.94%	2.71%	0.00%	0.03%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.07%	1.07%
COMOROS	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.79%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.07%
DJIBOUTI	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.02%	0.00%	0.00%	21.29%	1.97%	0.81%
ETHIOPIA	0.04%	0.00%	0.12%	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	0.03%	0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	0.08%	1.72%	0.00%	0.00%	3.86%	1.06%
KENYA	0.19%	0.05%	0.00%	0.07%	0.06%	0.00%	0.11%	32.20%	92.80%	28.30%	62.41%	0.01%	18.35%	17.36%	0.00%	45.71%	65.97%	7.56%
LESOTHO																		
MALAWI	0.05%	0.00%	0.00%	2.33%	0.64%	0.00%	0.45%	5.[illegible]0%	0.00%	2.10%	2.05%	0.00%	0.03%	5.24%	0.00%	1.08%	0.01%	1.60%
MAURITIUS	0.00%	0.00%	0.70%	0.23%	0.01%	0.00%	0.03%	0.00%	0.00%	0.03%	0.01%	0.00%	22.98%	0.00%	0.00%	26.22%	0.00%	0.50%
RWANDA	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.13%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	0.92%	0.00%	0.00%	0.28%	0.00%	0.34%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.81%
SOMALIA	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.03%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	0.35%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.61%	0.05%
SWAZILAND																		
TANZANIA	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.18%	0.55%	0.00%	0.21%	11.53%	5.56%	4.43%	7.66%	0.00%	39.86%	3.66%	0.00%	1.00%	22.69%	1.53%
UGANDA	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.25%	3.20%
ZAMBIA	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.09%	0.00%	0.00%	0.09%	30.59%	0.00%	0.00%	9.22%	0.00%	0.18%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	2.10%
ZIMBABWE	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	11.06%	0.00%	0.00%	3.34%	0.00%	0.00%	68.87%	0.00%	4.65%	0.00%	3.03%
ECOWAS							49.60%				4.56%						0.01%	63.44%
CEAO							20.88%				1.19%						44.41%	37.04%
BENIN	0.10%	0.00%	0.00%	0.39%	0.13%	0.00%	0.12%	0.00%	0.00%	0.18%	0.03%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.28%
BURKINA F	0.41%	0.04%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.19%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.02%	1.07%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.33%
IVORY COA	6.95%	3.97%	0.34%	11.39%	34.49%	11.22%	18.39%	0.05%	0.00%	4.22%	0.81%	3[illegible].57%	1.12%	0.63%	19.00%	0.00%	0.27%	16.44%
MALI	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	0.02%	0.61%	0.00%	0.18%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	3.58%
MAURITANI	0.17%	0.00%	0.00%	0.25%	0.11%	0.00%	0.14%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.37%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.29%
NIGER	0.14%	0.00%	0.02%	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	0.07%	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	4.86%
SENEGAL	3.71%	5.58%	0.43%	12.84%	2.31%	0.07%	3.79%	0.00%	0.00%	1.82%	0.34%	0.00%	5.12%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	7.25%
MRU							11.07%				0.00%						0.00%	4.43%
GUINEA	24.39%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	11.03%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.86%
LIBERIA	0.06%	0.09%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	0.14%	0.03%	0.00%	0.00%	0.02%	0.00%	0.00%	1.36%	0.00%	10.00%	0.00%	0.01%	1.23%
SIERRA LE	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.54%
OTHER ECOWAS							17.66%				3.37%						0.12%	21.97%
CAPE VERD	0.00%	0.69%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.02%	0.00%	0.00%	0.02%	0.00%	0.02%	0.00%	0.00%	11.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%
GAMBIA	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.34%
GHANA	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.02%	0.00%	0.26%	0.00%	0.04%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	4.40%
GUINEA-BI	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.15%
NIGERIA	14.33%	0.00%	0.00%	0.43%	30.84%	0.00%	17.38%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	13.87%
TOGO	0.06%	0.00%	0.01%	0.99%	0.47%	0.00%	0.28%	0.00%	0.00%	17.87%	3.38%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	3.20%
UDEAC							44.10%				5.31%						0.00%	8.76%
CAMEROON	0.00%	89.56%	98.95%	43.54%	21.60%	88.57%	21.99%	0.02%	0.00%	0.08%	0.02%	0.00%	0.06%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	3.96%
CENTRAL A	6.07%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	2.75%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.27%
CHAD	17.53%	0.00%	0.00%	0.12%	0.00%	0.00%	7.94%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.70%
CONGO	8.23%	0.04%	0.12%	0.00%	0.15%	0.00%	3.78%	0.00%	0.05%	27.29%	5.16%	0.01%	0.09%	0.56%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	0.75%
GABON	16.79%	0.00%	0.00%	0.62%	0.00%	0.00%	7.85%	0.00%	0.00%	0.67%	0.13%	80.96%	0.17%	0.00%	80.00%	0.00%	0.00%	3.08%
EQUATORIA	0.77%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.35%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.03%
CEPGL						0.00%	2.15%				5.42%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	11.67%	3.55%
BURUNDI	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.54%	12.94%	2.71%	0.00%	0.05%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.07%
RWANDA	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.13%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	0.92%	0.00%	0.00%	0.28%	0.00%	0.34%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.81%
ZAIRE	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	24.33%	0.15%	0.00%	2.[illegible]4%	8.07%	0.00%	0.00%	2.43%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.67%
OTHER SSA						0.00%	3.24%				0.02%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.03%	2.10%
ANGOLA	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	7.91%	0.00%	2.78%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	4.35%	0.40%
BOTSWANA																		
MADAGASCA	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.02%	0.01%	0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	0.03%	0.00%	0.02%	0.00%	0.00%	0.85%	0.00%	0.01%	0.09%	0.16%
MOZAMBIQU	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	[illegible].00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.09%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	7.29%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.34%
SAO TOME	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.06%	0.00%	0.02%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
SEYCHELLE	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.02%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.16%
SUDAN	0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	7.20%	0.37%	0.03%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.84%
AGGREGATES																		
SSA	5.35%	6.91%	13.36%	1.76%	4.75%	3.24%	4.59%	12.92%	20.54%	1.48%	5.72%	0.67%	0.88%	6.36%	0.59%	5.56%	1.04%	5.87%
ROW	94.65%	93.09%	86.64%	98.24%	95.25%	96.76%	95.41%	87.08%	79.46%	98.52%	94.28%	99.33%	99.12%	93.64%	99.42%	94.44%	98.96%	94.13%
INDUSTR	89.86%	89.70%	77.41%	94.82%	81.77%	34.09%	87.87%	51.38%	63.37%	84.05%	78.75%	85.37%	75.58%	36.83%	60.86%	58.70%	35.80%	73.73%
WORLD	3085	162	219	1776	2702	44	7944	345	367	1872	2584	2481	744	880	17	123	2646	70930

Source: COMTRADE (A UNSO database)

3.18 PTA. The PTA is the counterpart of ECOWAS in the Eastern and Southern part of Africa and has the largest membership (19) and population (207 million) of all the SSA groupings. The PTA was established in 1981 to promote the development of its member states by creating a single internal market, undertaking regional development projects and programs, and encouraging cooperation in all fields of economic activity. Seventeen of twenty initially eligible Eastern and Southern African countries have joined (Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe) as have Namibia and Sudan (not in the initial group of 20). The application of Zaire (also not in the initial group of 20) is being favorably considered 10/. It is the second largest union with a GDP of US$33 billion (see Table 5), somewhat larger than New Zealand and comparable to Thailand (see Chapter 1, Table 1). Thus its market size is insufficient to provide scope for an efficient import substitution strategy dependent on economies of scale.

3.19 The PTA is a Union of contrasts and potential complementarities that suggests good prospects for economic specialization. It is the second poorest Union (just ahead of the CEPGL) with a per capita income of US$279, with variations from US$74 in Mozambique--the lowest in SSA--to US$1,455 in Mauritius--fifth from the top in SSA (Table 5). The population varies from less than 1/2 a million in the Comoros to over 47 million in Ethiopia while GDP ranges from less than US$0.2 billion in Comoros to US$11 billion in Sudan. Together, the top 3 economies account for less than half the total for the group, so the fear of domination by one country is less pronounced than in the case of ECOWAS. Similarly, the PTA contains the top three manufacturers of SSA as well as the five that depend most on agriculture.

3.20 The growth performance of the PTA countries over the period 1965-80 of 4.2 percent a year on average was significantly below the 4.8 percent recorded by SSA as a whole, but in contrast, over the period 1980-88 the PTA grew by 2 percent a year on average while SSA stagnated.

3.21 Over the period 1965 to 1983, before the union was effective, its degree of openness increased by 18 percentage points (Table 4) with virtual all the trade gains concentrated outside the PTA. Trade flows for PTA countries taken as a group increased more than three fold. The share of trade with SSA fell over this period with intra-PTA trade rising in line with the growth of trade with SSA as a whole (see Table 6). In 1983, 86 percent of the African trade of PTA countries taken as a group was with PTA partners and therefore, as in the case of ECOWAS, this suggests that diversion of trade with non-PTA SSA countries is likely to be small in case of effective activation of the Union (Table 7).

3.22 Trade with SSA accounts for 8 percent of overall trade of the PTA countries treated as a group, thus implying that intra-PTA trade is equivalent to 7 percent of total trade. However, as in the case of other Unions, this masks country to country variation. Thus between 1 and 3 percent of the total trade of Somalia, Mauritius and Ethiopia is with SSA at one extreme while at the other end, about 20 percent of the trade of Uganda and Rwanda is with SSA partners. The median share of SSA trade is 7 percent, slightly lower than the mean. Unlike the case of ECOWAS, the divergences are much less marked between countries. Indeed, for all but 5 countries the variation in the share of SSA trade is between 5 and 14 percent.

10/ Mozambique joined in 1989 and Angola, Namibia and Sudan in 1990. The trade analysis in this section, based on data before that time, is therefore limited to the other 15 members.

3.23 The PTA has a degree of openness of 47% and varies from 15 percent in Sudan--the most closed economy of SSA--to 139 percent in Mauritius--the most open economy of SSA. Most PTA countries have a degree of openness that is bunched between 30 and 57 percent.

3.24 Like ECOWAS, the PTA has postponed deadlines for implementing various intra-union liberalization decisions and has not achieved significant integration. The main focus of internal liberalization has been tariff preferences and the removal of non-tariff barriers for a limited list of products. A regional Clearinghouse and a PTA Trade and Development Bank for financing regional projects and trade have been established. The PTA Trade and Development Bank is located in Bujumbura, Burundi, far from the centers of economic and financial activity of the PTA. Recently, it has begun lending. On the trade side, the PTA Bank is trying to find ways of sharing risk with commercial banks to induce a resumption of credit lines and it has secured an arrangement with a Scandinavian Bank and with Citibank for opening letters of credit (LCs) in PTA members where international banks are normally reluctant to lend because of sovereign risk. In addition, the agreement with Citibank envisages lending for trade, particularly pre-export financing. Some pre-export financing operations in Ethiopia are credited with an expansion of leather exports. In contrast, the investment portfolio may eventually end up with problems even though up to now such lending has been limited to a few loans in Zambia and Uganda. However, there is a danger that political pressure will induce financing of public enterprises engaged in inefficient import substitution.

3.25 The PTA Clearinghouse, operated by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe in Harare, has also achieved significant progress in increasing the amount of intra-regional trade it handled from SDRs 86 million (9 percent of intra-PTA trade) in 1984 to SDRs 284 million (57 percent of intra-PTA trade) in 1989. Further, the percentage of transactions settled in hard currency has dropped from 88 percent to 48 percent over the same period. However, the level of intra-regional trade over this period has almost halved (from about SDR 1 billion to less than SDR 0.5 billion), largely reflecting the tightening of NTBs that tend to affect regional trade more severely than trade with the rest of the world 11/.

3.26 The PTA has, nevertheless, achieved significant progress, particularly in the area of trade facilitation and trade financing. It has undertaken activities for promoting co-operation in the field of trade and customs. These have embraced the establishment of the Common List of Commodities to be granted preferential treatment when traded between Member States, the publication by the Member States of PTA tariff rates in respect of the commodities in the Common List, formula for the progressive reduction and eventual elimination of customs duties on goods traded among the Member States, establishment of a time-table for the relaxation and eventual elimination of non-tariff barriers to intra-PTA trade, simplification of trade documents and procedures, removal of non-physical barriers to the free movement of cross-border traffic, establishment of a trade information center, undertaking of demand and supply surveys, holding of buyer/seller meetings and trade fairs and the establishment of a PTA Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry.

3.27 The PTA is making a substantial effort to achieve its objectives as reflected in the considerable honesty in discussing difficulties in implementing past decisions and the realism displayed at the latest meeting, in November 1990, towards the initial proposals of the Secretariat for immediate Monetary Union which were turned into a pragmatic

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11/ In part, this is because bi-lateral donors tend to provide lines of credit that favor imports from their country. In addition, officials administering import controls tend to favor imports from outside the region which are regarded as more essential (see Chapter V, paragraphs 5.48-5.52).

program to improve economic links. Other encouraging measures include: (i) a three year program for phasing out import licensing for goods on the common list starting on January 1, 1992; (ii) proposals for developing a Monetary Harmonization Program including setting up a Monetary and Financial Cooperation Committee (MFCC) composed of technical experts from Central Banks and Ministries of Finance. The MFCC met in February 1991 to prepare a timetable of medium term actions, the first step of which will be to find means of removing Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) and freeing cross-border investment flows; (iii) adoption of draft proposals for a legal framework allowing the setting up of Multinational Industrial Enterprises (MIEs) within the PTA -- MIEs can be private, public or mixed enterprises and would be able to operate and invest more freely than foreign enterprises; (iv) understanding on expansion of the PTA Trade Information Network (TINET) and measures to make the private sector more aware of the facility; (v) agreement to implement a Customs Guarantee arrangement for PTA Transit Traffic; and (vi) adoption of suggested improvements to the Yellow Card Scheme (for PTA road transport insurance) and of a framework to expand intra-PTA air traffic rights.

28 Nevertheless, the PTA has found it hard to convince its members to act decisively to deal with the intra-regional barriers to trade and factor flows, particularly NTBs 12/. In part this is because, when left to itself, the PTA has to reflect the lowest common denominator; this limits the pace of progress and results in too much emphasis on interventionism by the State (e.g the proposals to set up multi-national public enterprises while national governments are trying to privatize; or the reluctance to let MIEs operate without government controls). Despite this, there is an increasing realization of the need to rely on private initiative, as evidenced by the rejection of a proposal to set up a Commercial Bank, the efforts to increase private sector use of TINET and attempts to facilitate transit and intra-PTA road insurance.

3.29 SADCC. The intra-regional trade performance of SADCC will not be covered since trade promotion is not one of its major objectives and since all nine SADCC members except for Botswana have joined the PTA. SADCC was set up to facilitate the coordination, with the help of donors, of measures that would reduce dependence on South Africa.

3.30 With a GDP of $24 billion, the group a slightly larger market size than UDEAC and the CEAO with a GDP of US$17 billion but its population of 78 million is 3 times as large as that of the UDEAC and half again as large than that of the CEAO (Table 5). Its per capita income level is therefore US$312.

3.31 CEAO. The CEAO is the only grouping in Sub-Saharan Africa to have achieved a reasonable degree of economic integration as evidenced by both trade creation and share of intra-union trade. This has been facilitated by (1) a (common) convertible currency -- the CFA Franc -- that is used by all the member countries (except for Mauritania, which interestingly has the lowest share of intra-union trade); (2) substantial intra-union factor mobility (both labor and capital); and (3) a workable compensation agreement -- that supported the initial stages of integration

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12/ Except for granting tariff preferences on a limited range of products. These preferences are in turn nullified by the maintenance of NTBs.

although in current circumstances the compensation mechanism is starting to act as a brake against further integration 13/.

3.32 The CEAO countries are all members of ECOWAS and the continued existence of the CEAO (and the MRU, discussed below) has tended to complicate ECOWAS liberalization. At the same time, the grouping is a response to the fear of domination by Nigeria which has a GDP one third larger than that of the CEAO as a whole while its population is twice that of the CEAO (Table 5). Except for extremes of Burkina Faso and Senegal, with a per capita income level of US$206 and US$711, respectively, the per capita income distribution is bunched between US$339 and US$685, the smallest variation for any of the large groups (excluding those with only three members).

3.33 Population distribution also tends to be relatively uniform varying between 7 and 8 1/2 million except for the extremes of Mauritania (2 million) and Cote d'Ivoire (11 million) and 4 million in Benin.

3.34 The economic performance of the CEAO countries has been close to the average for SSA as a whole. Over the period 1965 to 1980 the group did slightly less well than ECOWAS as a whole but this was reversed between 1980 and 1986. Furthermore, while in the initial period only Cote d'Ivoire put in a performance above the average for SSA, in the later period, all but Niger performed substantially better than average.

3.35 Despite the small differences in income, the Union is characterized by significant differences in economic specialization. Thus, it includes the fourth and fifth most industrialized SSA economies (Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire, respectively) as well as the sixth most dependent on agriculture (Mali).

3.36 Over the period 1965 to 1983, trade flows for the CEAO countries treated as a group increased by more than 6 times (Table 6). The share of SSA in total trade increased over this period although intra-CEAO trade rose slightly more slowly than the overall share with SSA. The main beneficiary of this increased trade flow was the non-CEAO component of ECOWAS. In 1983, 51 percent of the African trade of the CEAO countries was with CEAO partners and 42 percent with non-CEAO ECOWAS partners (Table 7). Further, of its total trade, 18 percent was with SSA countries so that intra-CEAO trade accounted for more than 9 percent of total trade, the highest for all the groupings.

3.37 Despite the high level of intra-CEAO trade, the important share of trade with non-CEAO ECOWAS partners suggests that attempts to erect barriers around the CEAO would risk diverting important levels of trade from African, particularly ECOWAS, countries that are not CEAO members.

3.38 The CEAO countries taken as a group have a degree of openness of 57%, the highest for all the Unions in SSA. Further, the lowest degree of openness of 37% is the same level as the average around which most countries are bunched for other unions.

13/ Since there is a widespread view that the main obstacle to integration is currency inconvertibility (hence the adoption of Monetary Cooperation programs by both ECOWAS and PTA), it is useful to note that the UDEAC countries also share the CFA Franc as their currency but have the lowest intra-union trade creation and share of intra-union trade of all the major SSA economic groupings (see below). This suggests that convertibility is not in itself the source of the good performance of the group. In addition to convertibility, the CEAO is also the only union with significant labor mobility and has the most effective compensation mechanism. It is likely that it is the combination of these three elements that accounts for the success of the Union.

3.39 The CEAO has achieved a high degree of integration. Except for Mauritania, all its members also belong to UMOA (West African Monetary Union) and thus share a common central bank and have a common currency, whose convertibility is backed by France. Financial capital and labor are generally mobile within the union and there is a mechanism for compensating weaker states through regional projects funded by FOSIDEC, the Solidarity Fund of the union to which the stronger members, Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal are net contributors. A selected list of industrial products benefits from intra-union preferences while nearly all raw materials are traded on a duty free basis within the community.

3.40 UDEAC. It is ironical that the two unions that do not face the foreign exchange constraints blamed by many for poor regional trade performance should be at opposite ends in terms of trade creation and the share of recorded trade flows within the Union. UDEAC, unlike CEAO, has limited labor mobility and this may account in large part for the relative difference in performance. It is not possible to make a definitive link between labor mobility and importance of regional trade; nevertheless it is likely that with labor mobility countries with a regional trade deficit would be in a position to finance this through the export of labor. Indeed it is alleged that within the CEAO this happens in the form, for example, of Mali and Burkina Faso exporting labor to Cote d'Ivoire in exchange for manufactures.

3.41 The UDEAC has been characterized by dissension on the sharing of benefits which has resulted in the withdrawal of Chad at certain points. In recent years the Union has added Equatorial Guinea as a member. The Union is characterized by the most extreme differentiation in wealth of all the Unions. It includes Gabon, the third wealthiest SSA country, at one end with a per capita GDP of US$3 010 and Chad at the other end with a per capita income of $170, one of the lowest in SSA. (see Table 5).

3.42 With a population of 23 million and a GDP of US$21 billion, UDEAC has by far the highest per capita GDP of all the unions, namely US$890 (Table 5). It is also, the smallest of the major trade groupings (excluding the MRU and the CEPGL which each have only 3 members). Its economic size is similar to that of Bangladesh and about three quarters the size of Ireland, the smallest industrialized country (Chapter II, Table 1).

3.43 The economies of the union vary in size from one of the smallest in SSA (Equatorial Guinea with a GDP of about US$0.1 billion, to the second largest (Cameroon with a GDP of US$13 billion (Table 5).

3.44 The difference in economic size is reflected in the population distribution across the member countries with Cameroon accounting for half the total. Similarly, Cameroon is one of the more heavily industrialized economies in SSA while Chad and Equatorial Guinea have amongst the highest dependence on agriculture of all the SSA economies. Congo and Gabon rely largely on mineral resources for their income.

3.45 Over the period 1965 to 1983 the UDEAC countries treated as a whole made the largest gains of all the SSA unions in net trade gains. Despite this and despite being the only formal Customs Union in SSA, intra-union trade creation was no more than 1 percent (Table 4). Over this period the members of the union increased their trade flows by a factor of 10 (Table 6) while their trade with SSA rose between one and a half and three times faster than this rate, except for Congo and Equatorial Guinea for which the increase in African trade volume was only half the overall increase. All the members of UDEAC increased their trade with Cameroon at a considerably faster pace than the overall increase in trade with SSA countries as a whole. Except for the trade between Gabon and Equatorial Guinea which collapsed, the trade between the other members of the UDEAC either remained virtually non-existent or showed increases from a base of zero.

3.46 The above analysis suggests that the Union has been successful in increasing the share of intra-union trade as a share of trade with SSA as a whole. Further, it suggests that the biggest gainer was Cameroon. Nevertheless, such increases were from a low base and in 1983 intra-UDEAC trade accounted for less than 44 percent of the total African trade of the Union (Table 7), the lowest for all the major unions. Further, the overall share of African trade was less than 5 percent of total trade thus implying that intra-union trade accounted for about 2 percent of total trade, by far the lowest for any union in SSA.

3.47 Interestingly, the largest share of UDEAC trade with Africa was with ECOWAS and this amounted to almost 50 percent of the total African trade of the union, more than trade within UDEAC. Further, only 40 percent of this was with the CEAO countries that utilize the CFA Franc like the UDEAC members.

3.48 As in other unions, the aggregate picture is distorted by the dominant position of the most important members. Thus, Cameroon and Gabon, which account for almost three quarters of the trade of the union, recorded 48 and 22 percent, respectively, of their African trade as being with UDEAC partners. CAR, Chad and Equatorial Guinea, by virtue of having Cameroon as their major SSA trading partner, achieve intra-UDEAC shares of African trade of about 90 percent or more. Nevertheless, given that there is virtually no exchange except with Cameroon and that ECOWAS accounts for more of the African trade of the union than the partners in the group, it would seem potentially costly in terms of intra-SSA trade to activate the Union. This point is reinforce by noting that:

(a) over 65 percent of the African trade of Gabon is with Nigeria and Ivory Coast;

(b) Zaire, Senegal and Ivory Coast account for almost half the African trade of Congo; and

(c) Guinea, Ivory Coast and Nigeria account for 45 percent of the African trade of Cameroon.

3.49 Indeed, except for all using the same CFA Franc currency, the logic for the existence of UDEAC is probably the weakest of all the major unions and may explain the ambivalence of many of its members to continued participation in the club. Under the auspices of the UNECA and inspired by the Lagos plan of action, the UDEAC countries are also members of a so far non-functional counterpart to ECOWAS and the PTA (the Economic Community of Central African States, ECCAS). However, the above analysis suggests that given existing trade patterns a more productive arrangement would be the liberalization of trade between ECOWAS and UDEAC.

3.50 The UDEAC countries display an average degree of openness of 42% when considered as a whole (see Table 5). However, this fails to reflect the relatively closed Cameroon economy which is offset at the union level by the openness of Congo and Gabon, largely reflecting their dependence on mineral exports.

3.51 Like the CEAO, the members of UDEAC also benefit from a common central bank and the same convertible currency, the CFA Franc. UDEAC is also the only union in SSA to have established a Common External Tariff (CET). However, the effectiveness of the CET is undermined by the ability of individual countries to set different tax rates on products traded within the union. Financial capital is relatively free of restrictions within the union but there is very little official labor mobility.

3.52 IOC. The IOC is an association of the islands of the Western Indian Ocean that was founded in 1982 by Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles to promote regional cooperation. In 1986 the Comoros and France

(Reunion) 14/ joined the group which set up a small Secretariat in April 1989. The membership of France makes this the only grouping with both developing and industrialized members and also limits the scope and objectives of the organization. Its main objective has been to facilitate regional exchange and it has concentrated its efforts on computerization and harmonization of tariff codes.

3.53 The IOC had been considering steps to multi-lateralize bi-lateral payments and clearing arrangements between Madagascar and Mauritius and Mauritius and Reunion. However, the recent changes in exchange rate policy and trade liberalization in Madagascar have made this unnecessary.

3.54 The short period of existence of the IOC precludes analysis of changes in intra-regional trade which accounted for only 3 percent of the total trade of the group in 1983 (see Table 4). The IOC has emphasized the role of private enterprise in bringing about increased regional economic activity. Thus, in 1988 the IOC set up a Federation of Chambers of Commerce and in November 1989 a meeting of businessmen in food processing industries was organized. The grouping would like to promote industrial cooperation that would center on cross-border investment into Madagascar. It is working on a charter that would automatically grant any regional firm access to the market in any other IOC country. IOC firms would be treated as any national firm; for example a Malagasy firm would be entitled to operate in Mauritius without the need to formally incorporate there and would be treated as any comparable Mauritian firm.

3.55 CEPGL and MRU. These two Unions will be treated together very briefly because neither of them has much economic justification. Both are made up of three countries. The CEPGL consists of the former Belgian colonies in Central Africa (Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi) and the MRU resulted from the personal relationship between the Presidents of Sierra Leone and Liberia. Guinea joined recently giving it some extra impetus since the current Presidents of the founding members no longer entertain as close a relationship as their predecessors.

3.56 Both unions are very open with large gains in trade concentrated on external partners and only insignificant intra-union trade creation (Table 4). Further, only 5 and 11 percent of the African trade of the CEPGL and MRU, respectively, is with union partners demonstrating clearly the irrelevance of these groups (Table 6). The MRU in fact is part of ECOWAS with which its members undertake three quarters of their African trade. Similarly, 88 percent of the African trade of the CEPGL is with the PTA, of which Burundi and Rwanda are also members in addition to their membership of the CEPGL. It is interesting to note that Zaire, which is not a member of any active union except for the CEPGL, has about 45 percent of its African trade with the PTA and 28 percent with the UDEAC, almost all of it with the Congo. This suggests that Zaire is a potential big loser if either the PTA or UDEAC would erect significant enough barriers to divert trade to union partners.

C. General Comments

3.57 The major themes which emerge from this quick overview of the economic characteristics and performance of the existing Unions can be summarized as follows:

(a) The only relatively successful union, the CEAO, is characterized by currency convertibility and capital mobility, features shared only by UDEAC, which has been one of the least successful. The CEAO is also the only union with significant labor mobility. Thus it would appear that currency convertibilty and capital mobility

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14/ Reunion island is an overseas Department of France.

may be necessary for success but are not sufficient. Similarly, it would appear that it may be necessary to implement extensive labor mobility to achieve successful integration and enhanced intra-union trade.

(b) The erection of a common external tariff around any of the major unions is likely to lead to some diversion of recorded African trade, in addition to diverting trade from the rest of the world (ROW). This is most serious in the case of UDEAC and would also be an issue in the case of the CEAO.

(c) Except for the CEAO, none of the Unions has been particularly successful in creating intra-union trade or achieving a large overall share of intra-union trade. At the same time it is a myth that recorded intra-African trade is always low. 15/ The global figure tends to be distorted by the fact that of the top 10 largest economies in SSA, only Cote d'Ivoire and Kenya have shares of intra-SSA trade above 6 1/2 percent. Indeed, 17 out of 39 SSA countries for which data was available, had more than 10 percent of their recorded trade with SSA partners. Further, 7 of these countries achieved a share of at least 20 percent. These figures also raise the interesting question whether most of the unrecorded trade in SSA is connected with the largest economies.

(d) The smallest unions, the MRU and CEPGL have little relevance for the promotion of intra-African trade and unless a compelling case can be made for other functions, it is unlikely that their continued existence could be justified.

(e) There may be a positive relationship between degree of openness and the share of intra-regional trade. This would fit in with the observations of ITC based on work in the Caribbean. However, while this appears to be true in comparing the performance of the different Unions, there is an opposite tendency observed at country level as observed in Table 8. The countries in Table 8 are ranked by share of trade with SSA and the degree of openness is calculated for the top, middle and bottom third. This suggests an inverse relationship between the degree of openness and the share of SSA. It is possible that this reflects the tendency for the landlocked countries (which tend to be more closed) to register more important shares of intra-regional trade.

(f) Most of the countries with substantial shares of intra-SSA trade are located in West Africa. (None of the Southern African countries has a share of intra-African trade exceeding 10 percent) and in (East and Central Africa except for Rwanda and Uganda all the countries have less than 15 percent of their trade accounted for by regional partners). It is possible that currency convertibility explains part of these variations since the ten West African nations with more than a ten percent share of intra-African trade are all members of the Franc Zone except for Sierra Leone,

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15/ This is not to deny that in general intra-African trade is lower than in Asia or Latin America. However, notwithstanding the possible distortions from re-exports to landlocked countries, one third of SSA countries achieve recorded trade with their neighbors that is not out of line with experience in other parts of the developing world.

TABLE 8 : INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE AND DEGREE OF OPENNESS

Country	Trade with SSA as a share of Total trade	Degree of openness	Landlocked	Average degree of openness (13 countries)
MALI	33.4%	40%	Landlocked	41%
BURKINA	25.9%	54%	Landlocked	
NIGER	22.5%	33%	Landlocked	
RWANDA	20.5%	21%	Landlocked	
SIERRA LEONE	19.9%	21%		
TOGO	19.7%	55%		
UGANDA	19.6%	21%	Landlocked	
SENEGAL	18.9%	38%		
CONGO	17.6%	71%		
COTE D'IVOIRE	15.8%	51%		
CHAD	13.4%	56%	Landlocked	
BURUNDI	12.9%	30%	Landlocked	
KENYA	12.6%	41%		
MALAWI	12.0%	66%	Landlocked	49%
BENIN	11.7%	37%		
MAURITANIA	10.3%	87%		
GUINEA	10.0%	41%		
GUIN-BISSAU	9.5%	29%		
GAMBIA	9.0%	55%		
CENTR.AFRICAN R	6.9%	34%	Landlocked	
ZIMBABWE	6.5%	52%	Landlocked	
MOZAMBIQUE	6.4%	74%		
GHANA	6.0%	38%		
ZAMBIA	5.8%	49%	Landlocked	
CAMEROON	5.4%	24%		50%
TANZANIA	4.8%	57%		
GABON	4.8%	66%		
COMOROS	4.5%	39%		
LIBERIA	3.6%	72%		
EQ.GUINEA	3.2%	39%		
ETHIOPIA	3.2%	30%		
MAURITIUS	2.5%	139%		
NIGERIA	2.1%	47%		
ZAIRE	1.5%	64%		
SUDAN	1.0%	15%		
MADAGASCAR	0.9%	35%		
CAPE VERDE	0.8%	25%		
SOMALIA	0.8%	42%		

Sources: COMTRADE (A UNSO Database), World Development Report 1988
Data not available for Djibouti, Angola, Sao Tome, Seychelles, Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland.

Mauritania and Guinea. Further, Mauritania and Guinea have the lowest intra-African trade of this set.

(g) The countries which are landlocked are those with the largest shares of regional trade (Table 8). Of the 11 landlocked countries for which data are available, all but three have at least a 12 percent regional trade share. While this is consistent with what might be expected, it is also possible that re-exports by neighbors might be inappropriately classified as exports from these countries and thus artificially inflate the recorded share of regional trade for these countries. Zimbabwe, Zambia and the Central African Republic have unusually low shares of regional trade for landlocked countries, possibly suggesting large unrecorded trade flows. This is especially true for Zambia which has a very open economy.

(h) Since 1965, the SSA countries have strongly increased their openness, consistent with the development philosophy of the Bank and despite contrary rhetoric regarding the justification for these unions. The progress in this respect should be reinforced and great care is required in formulating any program of support for these organizations to ensure continued integration in the world economy, especially where customs unions are concerned.

IV. METHODOLOGY

A. Description of data

4.01 The data used in this study are taken from COMTRADE, a United Nations Statistical Office (UNSO) trade database. In principle, all trade is recorded as an export by one country and an import by another, so that every commodity is recorded twice (imports are reported at CIF prices and exports at FOB prices). In practice, however, it was found that imports are recorded more extensively than exports. Very often, a commodity is recorded as an import by one country, but is not recorded on the export side at all. Hence, for the purposes of this study, exports have been expressed as the dual of imports. In other words, the imports of Benin from Ghana, for instance, have been expressed as the exports of Ghana to Benin.

4.02 Commodities in COMTRADE are classified by the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), available at 5 levels of disaggregation. The highest level of disaggregation (5 Digit) is no doubt the most valuable, but data at this level are very poor. Trade reported at the 2 Digit level is not necessarily desegregated at the 5 Digit level, with the result that the latter suffers from large gaps. Most of the initial analysis, therefore, has been done with 2 Digit data, with a view to gaining a broad perspective of the situation. Having grasped these orders of magnitude, the analysis is then narrowed down to the 5 Digit level, to identify actual commodities for a few countries where data is available. It is important to bear in mind, though, that since 2 Digit categories are very broad, crossflows within a category are not reflected. Consider, for instance, the 2 Digit category, textile yarn and fabrics. A country may import yarn and export fabric, implying that it has a comparative advantage in the latter; however, this fact may not come through in the 2 Digit analysis.

4.03 The data are far from satisfactory. Many SSA countries report only sporadically and a few not at all. Besides, substantial amounts of African trade go unrecorded. Most available numbers are therefore, an underestimation of actual trade. At the same time, even though re-exports are supposed to be reported separately, this is often not done so that re-exports may be included in reported export values. In view of these shortcomings, it is necessary to exercise great caution while interpreting the results. Nevertheless, some data, if carefully used, is better than no data and this is the premise adopted here. Berg (1985) discusses comprehensively the limitations and problems with African trade data and compares COMTRADE with IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. For our purposes the IMF data generally are not helpful as they only report aggregate flows with no information on the commodity composition of trade.

4.04 The analysis is done with export and import data for 41 countries in sub-saharan Africa over the period 1981-85. Trade is measured in US$. Petroleum and related products have been kept out of the analysis.

B. <u>Revealed Comparative Advantage</u>

4.05 Ideally, it would have been useful to examine the imports and exports of every country in SSA at the 5 digit level and determine overlapping products. However, the deficiencies of the data and the magnitude of this task warranted a process of product selection so that only a relevant subset of commodities need be examined. This was done using a subjective and a more objective method.

4.06 The subjective method involved identifying products which were exported to the Rest of the World (ROW i.e all the countries except for those in SSA) by any African country and rejecting any product that did not account for at least 1 percent of the exports of any one country. 16/ In addition, exports that seemed rather peculiar, like aircraft engines (possibly representing re-exports) were rejected. However, this task had to be performed at the 4-digit level, given the poor quality of data at the 5-digit level and to make the task manageable. To avoid the problems of averaging over such a large initial data set, 1983 was selected as the latest year for which data were generally available. The selected products were checked to eliminate all those that were not imported by at least one SSA country from the ROW.

4.07 The more objective method used the concept of **Revealed Comparative Advantage** (RCA). A product displays a Revealed Comparative Advantage if it is more heavily traded than average. Two versions of Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA1 & RCA2) were calculated.

(a) RCA1, as developed by Balassa, is formulated as follows:

$$RCA_{ik} = \frac{(E_{ik} - M_{ik} / E_{ik} + M_{ik})}{(\sum_k E_{ik} - \sum_k M_{ik} / \sum_k E_{ik} + \sum_k M_{ik})} - 1$$

where E : Exports
M : Imports
i : country
k : product

The expression in parentheses is multiplied by -1 if there is a deficit in the trade balance.

A positive RCA value indicates that country i has a revealed comparative advantage in trading product k. Similarly, a negative RCA value points to a disadvantage. Stated simply, RCA1 measures the net trade of a country in a particular product, as a ratio of its total trade.

16/ The subjective method is only subjective to the extent that the cut-off was arbitrarily chosen. The one percent cutoff may appear too low. However, given the dominance of commodity exports and given that non-traditional exports, which may have a low base, often have the most growth potential, it seemed worth erring on the low side. This may, however, result in overstating the potential trade. However, the ITC using a similar method of "matching products" reports much larger estimates for potential trade (see Subregional Trade Potential in Africa South of the Sahara, Roelofsen, 1989).

4.08 RCA1 is calculated for three separate groups -the trade union, sub-saharan africa and the world. At the narrowest level, $RCA1_{ik}$ (union) indicates that compared to the other countries in the union, country i has the greatest advantage in trading product k. RCA1 (SSA) helps determine if a country has a revealed comparative advantage within sub-saharan Africa, and RCA (world) determines the same with respect to the world. In all three groups, the normalization term is common for countries within a trade union so that the RCA values are comparable among the countries of a union, but not between unions.

4.09 In each case, RCA coefficients were calculated first for each country and then aggregated for all countries belonging to a trade union. This indicates whether the union as a whole has a comparative advantage.

(b) RCA2 is based on exports only (unlike RCA1 which is based on net trade). The formulation is as follows :

$$RCA2_{ik} = \frac{(E_{ik}/W_{ik})}{(\Sigma E_{ik}/\Sigma W_{ik})} - 1$$

k k

where E_{ik} : Country i's exports of good k to the world.
W_{ik} : Total exports of good k in the world.

As in RCA1, a positive value indicates a revealed comparative advantage. The emphasis here is on efficiency in world markets - a positive value for RCA2 means that country i has an advantage in exporting product k to the world. The focus has shifted from union performance to the performance of an individual country in the world. The argument underlying this view is that if trade among African countries is to increase, they must be competitive in world markets.

RCA1 almost always picks up more products than RCA2. Besides, the use of net trade in the definition cancels out the possible effects of re-exports. If a country imports a product only for re-export, then it can not be said to have a comparative advantage in that product. However, under the RCA2 definition, the product shows a positive RCA, which gives the wrong signal. The RCA1 definition, on the other hand, will correctly rule out the above product, since it involves the measurement of net trade rather than just exports.

Despite these advantages, RCA1 seems to suffer from a major weakness. When trade is balanced, or very nearly so, as in the case of Sierra Leone, the use of RCA1 results in inordinately large numbers. Similarly, a very large surplus or deficit leads to very small numbers as in Zaire. RCA2 was developed chiefly to counter this problem. In addition, RCA2 is more easily computable, a practically relevant factor when considering the immense amount of data to be processed. In general, RCA1 seemed preferable for the 2 Digit analysis, given the importance of eliminating offsetting imports at this broad level of aggregation. In contrast, at the 5 Digit level, RCA2 can be more reliably used, given the lower level of disaggregation and hence lower likelihood of problems with offsetting imports.

4.10 A word of caution about the relevance of RCA for policy : RCA has no direct bearing on determining either potential growth areas or true comparative advantage. Given existing resource endowments, tax and subsidization policy and any other policy induced distortions, it measures items which are more heavily traded than average. Thus, for example, even though the EC is an inefficient sugar producer with a production cost more than twice that of efficient producers such as Brazil, the EC sugar subsidization policy leads to an RCA in sugar for the Community.

C. Other Measures

4.11 A few more measures and indices were also developed to analyze other aspects of trade in Sub Saharan Africa. Given the shortage of information on intra-African trade this analysis could be useful for country economists and others who want to look at specific aspects of regional trade. However the specific data can be neglected without losing the sense of this report. In consequence, the complete analysis and presentation of detailed RCA results have been reported in a technical annex that is available on request. This includes the categories of products selected by the two RCA measures at the 2 Digit level for 41 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa and the results of the RCA2 analysis done on 5 Digit data for selected countries. Here we summarize the major findings.

D. General Results

4.12 The RCA results at the 5 digit level were used as the basis for selecting products for which barriers were the most evident and upon which attention could be focussed in field work to determine the main barriers (as reported in Chapter V). The more subjective method was used to identify the potential trade between SSA countries. Potential trade is defined as the value of imports currently coming from the ROW and for which at least one SSA country is making significant exports (at least one percent of its exports) to the ROW.

4.13 The potential trade thus estimated should not be interpreted as the amount of trade that would be realized if all current barriers (as discussed in Chapter V) were eliminated. There may be problems of supply; for example, total exports of Palm Oil to the ROW represent only 8 percent of imports from the ROW and it is not clear that SSA exporters would be able to satisfy total demand (see Table 9). There may also be problems of geography or transport, that would make it more economical for the main importers to keep purchasing outside the region. For example, the PTA is the main exporter of Bovine meat while ECOWAS is the main importer. There may be issues of differences in quality that can not be determined at the 4-digit level. Thus the Toys and Indoor Games exported by the PTA may be totally different from those imported by ECOWAS. Finally, there may be special bi-lateral trading arrangements which sustain exports even when the price may not be competitive with current suppliers outside SSA, as may be the case for sugar or rice.

4.14 Nevertheless the estimated potential of US$4 to US$5 billion (16 percent of total exports) is large enough to warrant further exploration of the reasons why this potential is not exploited (Table 9). The RCA analysis, suggests a lower trade potential of US$1.6 billion, about 16 percent of the net exports of SSA for these same commodities (see Table 10). This figure represents the amount of imports from the rest of the world for which some SSA country has an RCA at the 2 Digit level. The estimate is only one third that given by the subjective method, partly because the RCA approach has focussed on a narrower subset: those goods that tend to be traded more heavily than average. Even so, the RCA based estimate needs to be treated with caution since the analysis has had to be performed at the 2 digit level. It is therefore possible that the African exports to the ROW do not correspond to imports from the ROW within the same SITC category (e.g textiles may include different types of material, some of which is imported and others exported).

4.15 Despite all the qualifications the data belie the typical view that there are few products that could be traded between SSA countries. Further, these results provide some prima faciae evidence for the possibility of **efficient** trade switching (as opposed to trade diversion). It would be up to the relevant country teams to investigate the actual potential from the theoretical potential identified here. To help with this, the appendix includes a comprehensive listing by country and by product of all potential exports and imports at the four digit level. AFTTF would be able, if requested, to refine this analysis at the 5 Digit level for selected countries (subject to the important proviso that the data at the 5 Digit level are adequate for the relevant country). However, given the extensive distortions in SSA, caution is required in assuming that specific trading opportunities that are identified in the RCA or subjective analysis, would indeed materialize in a distortion free environment.

TABLE 9 : POTENTIAL TRADE OF SSA : 1983

(In millions of US$)

		PTA	ECOWAS	CEAO	MRU	OTHER ECO	UDEAC	CEPGL	OTHER SSA	SSA
Food and live animals										
0012 SHEEP AND GOATS,LIVE	1 Imports		29			29				29
0012 SHEEP AND GOATS,LIVE	2 Exports	1								1
0019 LIVE ANIMALS FR FOOD NES	1 Imports	1	1			1				2
0019 LIVE ANIMALS FR FOOD NES	2 Exports								50	50
0111 BOVINE MEAT FRESH,FROZEN	1 Imports	8	45	12	1	32	22	1	16	92
0111 BOVINE MEAT FRESH,FROZEN	2 Exports	10							2	12
0149 OTH PREPARD,PRESRVD MEAT	1 Imports	3	14	3	2	8	8	1	15	48
0149 OTH PREPARD,PRESRVD MEAT	2 Exports	13							1	13
0341 FISH FRSH,CHLLD,EX FILLT	1 Imports		32	30		2				34
0341 FISH FRSH,CHLLD,EX FILLT	2 Exports	1	33	11		22			1	35
0342 FISH FROZEN,EXCL FILLETS	1 Imports	2	174	10	5	159	1	3		180
0342 FISH FROZEN,EXCL FILLETS	2 Exports		27	22		5	0		1	28
0343 FISH FILLETS,FRESH,CHLLD	1 Imports		37			37	2			40
0343 FISH FILLETS,FRESH,CHLLD	2 Exports	3	5	5			0			8
0350 FISH SALTED,DRIED,SMOKED	1 Imports	4	163	1		162	11	3	5	187
0350 FISH SALTED,DRIED,SMOKED	2 Exports	1	2	1		1			1	4
0360 SHELL FISH FRESH,FROZEN	1 Imports	1	4	4			1			6
0360 SHELL FISH FRESH,FROZEN	2 Exports	5	136	115	12	9	13		56	211
0371 FISH PREPARD,PRESRVD NES	1 Imports	4	101	6	5	90	14	3	24	146
0371 FISH PREPARD,PRESRVD NES	2 Exports	7	108	104		4				115
0411 DURUM WHEAT UNMILLED	1 Imports	10	2	2				2		14
0411 DURUM WHEAT UNMILLED	2 Exports								4	4
0412 OTHER WHEAT ETC UNMILLED	1 Imports	94	157	88	5	64	42	7	48	348
0412 OTHER WHEAT ETC UNMILLED	2 Exports								2	2
0421 RICE IN HUSK OR HUSKED	1 Imports	6	14	3		10	10			31
0421 RICE IN HUSK OR HUSKED	2 Exports	1						1		1
0440 MAIZE UNMILLED	1 Imports	16	96	2	1	93	2	1	32	147
0440 MAIZE UNMILLED	2 Exports	36							2	38
0459 OTHER CEREALS UNMILLED	1 Imports	2	27	22		5	2		4	35
0459 OTHER CEREALS UNMILLED	2 Exports								3	4
0542 LEGUMINOUS VEGETBLES DRY	1 Imports	7	3	1		2			28	38
0542 LEGUMINOUS VEGETBLES DRY	2 Exports	32							4	36
0545 OTHER FRESH VEGETABLES	1 Imports	2	20	12	3	6	8		1	30
0545 OTHER FRESH VEGETABLES	2 Exports	21	9	8			2			33
0548 EDIBLE VEG NES FRESH,DRY	1 Imports	5	11	2		9	2			17
0548 EDIBLE VEG NES FRESH,DRY	2 Exports								12	12
0573 BANANA,PLANTAIN,FRSH,DRY	1 Imports		1	1						2
0573 BANANA,PLANTAIN,FRSH,DRY	2 Exports	18	36	36			22			76
0577 NUTS EDIBLE,FRESH,DRIED	1 Imports		7	5		2			1	9
0577 NUTS EDIBLE,FRESH,DRIED	2 Exports	33	11	9		2			19	63
0579 FRUIT FRESH OR DRIED NES	1 Imports	2	2	2					1	5
0579 FRUIT FRESH OR DRIED NES	2 Exports	5	77	76		1	2		2	87
0585 FRUIT OR VEGETABLE JUICE	1 Imports	2	5	1	1	3	1		1	9
0585 FRUIT OR VEGETABLE JUICE	2 Exports	8	2	2						9
0589 FRUIT PREPRD,PRESRVD,NES	1 Imports	1	2	1		1	1		2	6
0589 FRUIT PREPRD,PRESRVD,NES	2 Exports	40	11	11					1	51
0611 RAW BEET AND CANE SUGAR	1 Imports		8	8		1		1		9
0611 RAW BEET AND CANE SUGAR	2 Exports	254	6	6			5		38	303
0612 REFINED SUGAR ETC	1 Imports	15	498	25	9	463	5	8	5	531
0612 REFINED SUGAR ETC	2 Exports	32	13	13					19	64
0615 MOLASSES	1 Imports	1								2
0615 MOLASSES	2 Exports	11	8	8					19	38
0711 COFFEE GREEN,ROASTED,SUB	1 Imports	6	4	3		1	1		7	18
0711 COFFEE GREEN,ROASTED,SUB	2 Exports	1140	660	546	66	47	271	313	165	2297
0712 COFFEE EXTRACTS,ESSENCES	1 Imports		30	13	1	16				31
0712 COFFEE EXTRACTS,ESSENCES	2 Exports	1	22	22						24
0723 COCOA BUTTER AND PASTE	1 Imports	1		0					2	2
0723 COCOA BUTTER AND PASTE	2 Exports		163	85		78	23			187
0730 CHOCOLATE AND PRODUCTS	1 Imports	1	7	2		5	1		1	11
0730 CHOCOLATE AND PRODUCTS	2 Exports		16	16						16
0741 TEA	1 Imports	5	11	3	1	6	1		35	50
0741 TEA	2 Exports	269	2	1				4	16	289
0751 PEPPER AND PIMENTO	1 Imports		1						1	2
0751 PEPPER AND PIMENTO	2 Exports	2	1	1					3	6
0752 SPICES,EX PEPPER,PIMENTO	1 Imports	2	2	1		2			1	6
0752 SPICES,EX PEPPER,PIMENTO	2 Exports	34	1		1	1			87	123
0813 OILCAKE AND OTH RESIDUES	1 Imports	13	12	1		11	1			26
0813 OILCAKE AND OTH RESIDUES	2 Exports	14	67	59		7	3	2	25	111
0814 MEAT OR FISH MEAL FODDER	1 Imports	2	7	0		7			1	11
0814 MEAT OR FISH MEAL FODDER	2 Exports	1	2	2						3
Beverages and tobacco										
1211 TOBACCO,NOT STRIPPED	1 Imports	1	20	10	1	9	6		1	28
1211 TOBACCO,NOT STRIPPED	2 Exports	99					11		4	114
1212 TOBACCO STRIPPED OR PART	1 Imports	3	14	11		3	1		1	18
1212 TOBACCO STRIPPED OR PART	2 Exports	203					1			204
1213 TOBACCO REFUSE	1 Imports	2	1			1	1	2		4
1213 TOBACCO REFUSE	2 Exports	5					3			9
1223 OTH MANUFACTURED TOBACCO	1 Imports	5	2	1				5	3	10
1223 OTH MANUFACTURED TOBACCO	2 Exports	11	2		2					12

Crude material excl fuel

TABLE 9 : POTENTIAL TRADE OF SSA , 1983 (cont'd)

(In millions of US$)

		PTA	ECOWAS	CEAO	MRU	OTHER ECO	UDEAC	CEPGL	OTHER SSA	SSA
2221 GROUNDNUTS,GREEN	1 Imports								6	7
2221 GROUNDNUTS,GREEN	2 Exports	1	32	9		24			9	43
2225 SESAME SEEDS	1 Imports	1							2	3
2225 SESAME SEEDS	2 Exports	1	3	3					29	33
2238 OIL SEEDS AND FRUITS NES	1 Imports		1			1			1	1
2238 OIL SEEDS AND FRUITS NES	2 Exports	2	26	15	1	8	1			29
2320 NATURAL RUBBER,GUMS	1 Imports	15							13	32
2320 NATURAL RUBBER,GUMS	2 Exports		123	28	75	20	15	12		150
2472 SAW-,VENEER-LOGS NON-CON	1 Imports		1	1						2
2472 SAW-,VENEER-LOGS NON-CON	2 Exports		317	263	45	9	256	12	1	586
2479 PITPROPS,POLES,PILING,ETC	1 Imports	1	2	1		1			1	4
2479 PITPROPS,POLES,PILING,ETC	2 Exports		37	15	21	1	16			53
2483 LUMBER SHAPED NON-CONIFR	1 Imports	4	4	3		1			3	11
2483 LUMBER SHAPED NON-CONIFR	2 Exports	1	100	84	3	13	35	5	1	141
2631 RAW COTTON,EXCL LINTERS	1 Imports	4	64	1		63			4	72
2631 RAW COTTON,EXCL LINTERS	2 Exports	120	227	207		20	91	2	202	639
2654 SISAL,AGAVE FIBRES,WASTE	1 Imports		1	1						1
2654 SISAL,AGAVE FIBRES,WASTE	2 Exports	30							9	39
2713 NAT CALCM PHOSPHATES ETC	1 Imports	1	5			5				6
2713 NAT CALCM PHOSPHATES ETC	2 Exports		127	59		69				127
2782 REFRACTORY MINERALS NES	1 Imports	1	7	1	3	3	2		2	11
2782 REFRACTORY MINERALS NES	2 Exports		6	6					8	14
2784 ASBESTOS CRDE,SMPLY WRKD	1 Imports	1	17			16			1	19
2784 ASBESTOS CRDE,SMPLY WRKD	2 Exports	49	2	2					1	52
2815 IRON ORE NOT AGGLOMERATD	1 Imports		7			7				7
2815 IRON ORE NOT AGGLOMERATD	2 Exports	1	463	156	307					464
2873 ALUMINIUM ORES,ALUMINA	1 Imports		170			170				170
2873 ALUMINIUM ORES,ALUMINA	2 Exports		382		380	2	1			383
2881 METALIFEROUS NONFER WSTE	1 Imports	2								2
2881 METALIFEROUS NONFER WSTE	2 Exports	16	2			1	1	1		19
2922 NAT GUMS,RESINS,LACS,ETC	1 Imports	1	1							2
2922 NAT GUMS,RESINS,LACS,ETC	2 Exports	3	4	2		2			66	73
2924 VEG USED IN PHARMACY ETC	1 Imports	13							2	15
2924 VEG USED IN PHARMACY ETC	2 Exports	5	2	2		1	3	6	5	20
2925 SEEDS,ETC FOR PLANTING	1 Imports	3	5	1		4	1		3	13
2925 SEEDS,ETC FOR PLANTING	2 Exports	5							1	6
2926 LIVE PLANTS,BULBS,ETC	1 Imports		1							1
2926 LIVE PLANTS,BULBS,ETC	2 Exports	1	4	3		1		1		6
2929 OTH CRUDE VEG MATERIALS	1 Imports	3	8	1		6	2		1	14
2929 OTH CRUDE VEG MATERIALS	2 Exports	17	1		1		2	1	2	22
Animal, veg.oil, fat										
4234 GROUNDNUT(PEANUT) OIL	1 Imports		1			1	1			2
4234 GROUNDNUT(PEANUT) OIL	2 Exports		112	104		8			4	117
4242 PALM OIL	1 Imports	67	131	10		120			18	216
4242 PALM OIL	2 Exports		14	10	3		2	1	1	17
4243 COCONUT (COPRA) OIL	1 Imports	1	1			1			13	15
4243 COCONUT (COPRA) OIL	2 Exports		15	15						16
4244 PALM KERNEL OIL	1 Imports		4			4			31	35
4244 PALM KERNEL OIL	2 Exports		27	12		15		8		34
4249 FIXED VEGETABLE OILS NES	1 Imports	1	4	1	1	2	6		1	13
4249 FIXED VEGETABLE OILS NES	2 Exports		4	4					2	7
Chemicals										
5121 ACYCLIC ALCOHOLS,DERIVS	1 Imports	4	14	3		10	2		2	27
5121 ACYCLIC ALCOHOLS,DERIVS	2 Exports	1	5	3		2				6
5145 AMINE-FUNCTION COMPOUNDS	1 Imports	1	4	1		3			1	6
5145 AMINE-FUNCTION COMPOUNDS	2 Exports									0
5232 OTH MTL CMPD OF INRG ACD	1 Imports	14	173	5		167	2	1	4	194
5232 OTH MTL CMPD OF INRG ACD	2 Exports	11								11
5241 RADIOACTIVE ELEMENTS ETC	1 Imports						2			3
5241 RADIOACTIVE ELEMENTS ETC	2 Exports		233	233			68			301
5322 DYE,TANN EXTRCTS,TANNINS	1 Imports								1	1
5322 DYE,TANN EXTRCTS,TANNINS	2 Exports	7	1	1						7
5413 ANTIBIOTICS IN BULK	1 Imports	7	5			4				12
5413 ANTIBIOTICS IN BULK	2 Exports									0
5414 VEG ALKALOIDS AND DERIVS	1 Imports		2			2				[illegible]
5414 VEG ALKALOIDS AND DERIVS	2 Exports							8		8
5513 ESSENTL OIL,RESINOID,ETC	1 Imports	2	2			2			1	5
5513 ESSENTL OIL,RESINOID ETC	2 Exports	3	2	2					4	9
5622 CHEM PHOSPHATIC FERTILZR	1 Imports	17	8			5	1			24
5622 CHEM PHOSPHATIC FERTILZR	2 Exports		7	6						7
Basic manufactures										
6114 LEATHR BOVINE NES,EQUINE	1 Imports	1	3	1		2			1	4
6114 LEATHR BOVINE NES,EQUINE	2 Exports	12							2	15
6341 VENEER SHEETS	1 Imports	1	1			1				3
6341 VENEER SHEETS	2 Exports		20	16		4	34	3		57
6342 PLYWOOD OF WOOD SHEETS	1 Imports	4	26	5	1	19		1	1	31
6342 PLYWOOD OF WOOD SHEETS	2 Exports						23	1		24
6412 PRINTG WRITING PAPER NES	1 Imports	18	65	11	2	53	9	2	8	10[illegible]
6412 PRINTG,WRITING PAPER NES	2 Exports									0
6513 COTTON YARN	1 Imports	15	39	6		33	1	1	1	57
6513 COTTON YARN	2 Exports	2	2	2					3	7

TABLE 9 POTENTIAL TRADE OF SSA 1983 (cont'd)

(In millions of US$)

		PTA	ECOWAS	CEAO	MRU	OTHER ECO	UDEAC	CEPGL	OTHER SSA	SSA
6514 SYN FIB YRN,BULK,MONOFIL	1 Imports	17	63	4		58	2	2	5	88
6514 SYN FIB YRN,BULK,MONOFIL	2 Exports	6								6
6521 GREY WOVEN COTTON FABRIC	1 Imports	11	28	19	3	4	22		2	61
6521 GREY WOVEN COTTON FABRIC	2 Exports	6	11	11			7	1	19	43
6575 CORDAGE AND MANUFACTURES	1 Imports	5	21	3	1	17	2	1	10	39
6575 CORDAGE AND MANUFACTURES	2 Exports	14								14
6612 CEMENT	1 Imports	14	298	34	9	253	6	5	11	328
6612 CEMENT	2 Exports	22								22
6672 DIAMONDS NONINDUST,UNSET	1 Imports	3								3
6672 DIAMONDS NONINDUST,UNSET	2 Exports	23	180	33	107	40	69	140		400
6673 PREC-,SEMI-PR STONES NES	1 Imports	2	2	1		1				4
6673 PREC-,SEMI-PR STONES NES	2 Exports	25	1					1	2	28
6716 FERRO-ALLOYS	1 Imports	1	4			4			2	8
6716 FERRO-ALLOYS	2 Exports	113							3	115
6725 IRN,STL BLOOMS,SLABS,ETC	1 Imports	5	22	1		21	2			30
6725 IRN,STL BLOOMS,SLABS,ETC	2 Exports	14							22	36
6731 IRON,STEEL WIRE ROD	1 Imports	8	20	5		15	2		2	31
6731 IRON,STEEL WIRE ROD	2 Exports								7	7
6744 IRN,STL HVY PLATE,ROLLED	1 Imports	6	14	2	4	8	9	2	4	33
6744 IRN,STL HVY PLATE,ROLLED	2 Exports								2	2
6745 IRN,STL MED PLATE,ROLLED	1 Imports	4	7	1		6			1	13
6745 IRN,STL MED PLATE,ROLLED	2 Exports								3	3
6746 IRN,STL THIN PLATE,ROLLD	1 Imports	54	187	11		154	3	13	17	243
6746 IRN,STL THIN PLATE,ROLLD	2 Exports								10	10
6749 OTH IRN,STL PLATES,SHEET	1 Imports	22	48	14	3	28	4	8	7	78
6749 OTH IRN,STL PLATES,SHEET	2 Exports								1	1
6811 SILVER UNWRO,PARTLY WRKD	1 Imports		1							1
6811 SILVER UNWRO,PARTLY WRKD	2 Exports	10								10
6841 ALUMINIUM,ALLOYS,UNWRGHT	1 Imports	1	15			15				17
6841 ALUMINIUM,ALLOYS,UNWRGHT	2 Exports		109			109	67		[illegible]	178
6861 ZINC,ALLOYS UNWROUGHT	1 Imports	12	20	2		18	1		[illegible]	33
6861 ZINC,ALLOYS UNWROUGHT	2 Exports	22	2			2		33	[illegible]	57
Misc manufactures										
8423 -- TROUSERS,BREECHES ETC	1 Imports	2	10	1		8	1	[illegible]	[illegible]	15
8423 -- TROUSERS,BREECHES ETC	2 Exports	3	6	6		0				9
8424 -- JACKETS,BLAZERS ETC	1 Imports	1	[illegible]			1				2
8424 -- JACKETS,BLAZERS ETC	2 Exports	2								2
8435 -- BLOUSES	1 Imports		[illegible]	4		3	1	2	[illegible]	10
8435 -- BLOUSES	2 Exports	4				0				4
8441 -- MENS SHIRTS	1 Imports	4	17	1		16	3	[illegible]	[illegible]	26
8441 -- MENS SHIRTS	2 Exports	9				0				9
8451 -- JERSEYS PULLOVERS ETC	1 Imports	1	5	1		4				6
8451 -- JERSEYS PULLOVERS ETC	2 Exports	53								54
8459 -- OTHER CLTHG ACCESRYS	1 Imports	1	12	2	1	9	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
8459 -- OTHER CLTHG ACCESRYS	2 Exports	1				0				1
8462 -- OF COTTON NON ELASTIC	1 Imports	1	6	2		5	2			10
8462 -- OF COTTON NON ELASTIC	2 Exports	10	1			0				11
8472 -- KNITTED	1 Imports	1	2	1		1	1		1	4
8472 -- KNITTED	2 Exports	4				0				4
8481 LEATHER CLOTHES,ACCESSOR	1 Imports		3	1		2	1		1	5
8481 LEATHER CLOTHES,ACCESSOR	2 Exports	3				0				3
8748 ELEC MEAS,CONTRL EQU NES	1 Imports	25	82	17	1	64	22	2	19	149
8748 ELEC MEAS,CONTRL EQU NES	2 Exports	6	5	3		2	1		1	13
8842 SPECTACLES AND FRAMES	1 Imports	2	4	1		3			1	8
8842 SPECTACLES AND FRAMES	2 Exports	3								3
8851 WATCHES,MOVEMENTS,CASES	1 Imports	3	23	2	1	20	2	2	2	32
8851 WATCHES,MOVEMENTS,CASES	2 Exports	5				0				5
8942 TOYS,INDOOR GAMES	1 Imports	2	12	3	1	7	3	[illegible]	2	20
8942 TOYS,INDOOR GAMES	2 Exports	2								2
9999 Total Imports	1 Imports	649	3245	473	72	2700	267	83	444	4643
9999 Total Exports	2 Exports	2962	4036	2480	1026	531	1048	559	957	9384

Sources: COMTRADE and staff estimates

1/ The import figure represents the potential demand that could be satisfied by African exporters instead of suppliers from outside Africa.

2/ The export figure gives some idea of current export supply for those commodities where there is a potential for exports to other SSA countries in replacement of outside suppliers.

TABLE 10: TRADE POTENTIAL IN SSA : 1983

SITC 2D COMMODITIES	IMPORTS OF SSA FRM ROW (POTENTIAL TRADE) (US $'000)	NET EXPORTS OF SSA TO ROW	SSA: POTENTIAL AS A % OF NET EXPORTS
00 LIVE ANIMALS FOR FOOD	25378	220595	11.5%
05 VEGETABLES AND FRUIT	201557	221175	91.1%
07 COFFEE,TEA,COCOA,SPICE	71249	4224455	1.7%
08 FEEDING STUFF FOR ANIM	76647	69639	110.1%
12 TOBACCO AND MANUFACTUR	152515	217394	70.2%
21 HIDES,SKINS,FURS UNDRS	282	158063	0.2%
22 OIL SEEDS,OLEAGINOUS F	8972	577566	1.6%
23 RUBBER CRUDE,SYNTHETIC	54672	102341	53.4%
24 CORK AND WOOD	27628	820421	3.4%
26 TEXTILE FIBRES,WASTES	236911	503075	47.1%
27 CRUDE FERTLZR,MINRLS N	170907	112838	151.5%
28 METALLIFEROUS ORES,SCR	182343	1152903	15.8%
29 CRUDE ANIMAL,VEG MAT N	45854	310956	14.7%
61 LEATHER,DRESSED FUR,ET	30742	11888	258.6%
63 WOOD,CORK MANUFACTRS N	97064	14655	662.3%
68 NON-FERROUS METALS	222416	1401687	15.9%
	1605137	10119651	15.9%

Sources : COMTRADE (A UNSO database)

4.16 Despite the earlier provisions, it would seem reasonable to use the RCA and subjective method estimates of trade potential to obtain a range of likely potential trade. If realized potential were limited to the US$ 1.6 billion indicated by the RCA method, this would represent a 6 percentage points increase in exports. If the full potential indicated by the subjective analysis were realized, the share of SSA intra-regional exports would increase from about 5 percent to 20 percent of the total (see Table 11). This would imply a share comparable to that in other parts of the world (see Table 4). Interestingly, this would also replicate the achievement of the CACM which went from about 5 percent intra-regional trade, the current level for SSA, to 23 percent.

Table 11: SSA Trade Flows and the Share of Intra-Regional Trade, 1983

(In billions of US $)

	Exports	Imports	Trade 1/
Actuals in 1983			
Total	30	41	71
Intra-Regional	2	2	4
Rest of the World	28	39	67
Potential additional Intra-regional Trade 2/	5	5	10
1983 Actuals modified to reflect potential 2/			
Total	35	41	76
Intra-Regional	7	7	14
Rest of the World	28	34	62
Memorandum items	(In percent of total trade)		
Actuals in 1983			
Intra-Regional	7	5	6
Potential additional Intra-regional trade 2/	16	12	14
1983 Actuals modified to reflect potential 2/			
Intra-Regional	20	17	18

Sources: COMTRADE and staff estimates.
1/ Trade = Exports + Imports
2/ Assuming the full potential of the subjective method is realized.

4.17 The other major results can be summarized as follows:

(a) As might be expected, most countries of Sub-Saharan Africa show a comparative advantage in commodities, metal ores and other crude products. The most widely exported products are coffee, sugar, tobacco and wood.

(b) Despite the predominance of commodity exports, some countries do show positive RCA results for manufactures. Zaire shows a revealed comparative advantage in exporting cement, Cameroon and Cote d'Ivoire reflect an advantage in woven cotton cloth, Congo exports winches, hunting equipment and jewelry. Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria both export cargo vessels. Nigeria also exports leather, photo film and gas turbines. Some of these results suggest that the RCA results probably reflect re-exports. The subjective approach also reveals interesting potential not only in such basic manufactures as textiles that might be expected, but also for Spectacles and

Frames; Watches, Movements, Cases; and Toys, Indoor Games. There is also potential in treated metals and cement.

(c) Of the five countries examined at the 5 Digit level - Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Congo, Nigeria and Zaire - the products with an RCA are mainly exported to the industrialized world. Meanwhile, other African countries import the same products from industrialized countries. This result suggests that there is potential for the countries of sub-saharan Africa to increase trade amongst themselves. Indeed, this is the main purpose of the RCA analysis : to find products which one would expect to be traded intra regionally and to find out from traders and producers in SSA, why such trade does not indeed take place. This issue forms the main focus of the next chapter.

(d) Finally, a word about the levels of disaggregation. The 2 Digit analysis was carried out initially to provide certain orders of magnitude, under the assumption that the product selection done at this level would not differ significantly from the 5 Digit analysis. This is indeed borne out by the RCA results for the 5 countries mentioned above at the 5 Digit level.

V. THE MAJOR CONSTRAINTS ON INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE EXPANSION

A. Introduction

5.01 Regional trade in SSA is inhibited by a combination of natural barriers (such as distance), market imperfections (for example lack of information) and policy failures. It is useful to categorize the policy failures into bureaucratic weaknesses (like unclear direction to relevant agencies) which require mainly technical solutions and political obstacles (such as unwillingness to expose domestic activity to partner competition) that require policy decisions which may be harder to get agreement on. Such categorization helps to focus on the type of action that is required to overcome the relevant obstacles, even though the distinction between different types of barriers is not always clear cut and market failures, in particular, often arise from policy intervention.

5.02 Broadly, natural barriers may constitute constraints which have to be accepted (like long distances) but where intervention can reduce costs. Government, with donor support, would undertake infrastructure projects which are justified by traditional cost-benefit analysis (such as building railway lines). In principle, such intervention would be along the lines of ongoing national efforts and the regional dimension mainly involves a difference of scope.

5.03 Market imperfections justify Government intervention, unless the capacity to correct the failure is so weak that the resulting bureaucratic failure worsens the problem. Often intervention will mean changes in Government policy to create a better enabling environment. External donors probably would have a role in providing technical assistance, advice and financing, for example to cover risk that the private markets may not be willing to bear.

5.04 Bureaucratic failures essentially require Governments to improve their performance, and again external technical assistance and advice could be useful although the need for financial assistance would be limited. In general, the political obstacles revolve round short term costs that block long term benefits and arise from distributional issues concerning the ability of losers to block changes despite the overall positive net benefits.

5.05 It would be desirable to rank the constraints according to how badly they inhibit SSA trade. Unfortunately there is no established methodology for such an exercise and the relevance of different obstacles differs across countries. In addition, regional exchange is limited by so many constraints that different policymakers or analysts emphasize different problems. Given the difficulties of such objective assessment, much needless argument tends to arise from a confusing necessary and sufficient action. For example, intra-trade in the CEAO and UDEAC countries is respectively about 9 and 2 percent, even though neither grouping faces the foreign exchange shortage that is usually blamed as the major constraint on intra-African trade.

5.06 This illustrates the futility of one-dimensional approaches. Indeed, significant increases in regional trade are unlikely unless several major constraints are simultaneously dealt with, or at a minimum tackled in sequence within a short period of time. In what follows, no distinction will, therefore, be made between necessary and sufficient conditions. Instead the discussion will focus on the relevance of various perceived constraints and how and by whom these constraints could be relaxed. Nevertheless, to guide policy action, it is useful to indicate the relative importance of major barriers. In the absence of an established methodology this will inevitably be somewhat arbitrary, but even a subjective ordering should be helpful in focussing policy discussion.

5.07 The major constraint consists of restrictive foreign exchange licencing and other quantitative restrictions, that arise either to support overvalued exchange rates or to extend protection to uncompetitive industry. The next set of problems arises from the high levels of non-commercial risk and obstacles facing the private sector, particularly certain of its components that are less politically acceptable because of their ethnic or racial origin. Following this is likely to be the cost of information gathering and the rents arising from various restrictions. The impact of complex rules and regulations would probably not be very serious if action were taken on all other fronts. Infrastructure is often cited as a major problem, but is likely to be a constraining factor only after substantial increases in recorded trade occur rather than being an obstacle to initial expansion.

5.08 It is noteworthy that many of the important blockages could be relaxed through changes in government policy that do not necessarily require external financial support. This is especially true of the most important reform: the creation of an economic environment which uses market clearing prices to signal economic agents how to allocate factors of production and how to organize distribution. This may involve innovative second best approaches, but without market clearing prices no lasting gains can be expected even if all other constraints are eliminated. It is also important to note that certain countries are likely to face chronic deficits in intra-African trade and this is why trade expansion needs to be linked with more generalized factor mobility so as to create opportunities for offsetting flows of capital and workers' remittances.

B. <u>Natural Constraints</u>

5.09 Population density in Africa is low while its distribution is uneven, thus raising the costs of marketing and distribution of products. For developing countries as a whole, the density is 53 per square kilometer and in industrial countries it is 24, while in SSA the density is only 20 per square kilometer. Further, while in the industrial countries 55 percent of the population lives in cities, only 42 percent of the population does so in SSA. Finally, the income of SSA is the lowest of all the regions. Its per capita level is US$370 compared with US$610 for all developing countries and its GDP accounts for about 7 percent of that of all developing countries and is equivalent to less than 2 percent of that of the industrialized countries. Thus it has been estimated (by MEDIA, the agency responsible for promoting external trade and investment in Mauritius) that it costs almost 4 times as much to promote sales in SSA than in industrialized markets.

5.10 SSA contains more landlocked countries than any other region and has the largest proportion of small States. Infrastructure is often deficient and many internal regions of even coastal countries are inadequately linked to the rest of the country. This is also true for regions within the same country but separated by another country (Casamance in Senegal and Gambia) or countries within the same grouping separated by a non-member (Cote d'Ivoire and Benin, in CEAO). The extensive seaboard provides opportunities for maritime transportation that are not adequately exploited, partly because of poor harbour facilities that adversely affect the profitability of African shipping lines. These constraints are reflected in the story of a Nigerian businessman who spent three months trying to find a ship to transport aluminum circles from Douala in Cameroon to Lagos, cities separated by a one hour flight. Such problems can be compounded by Government requirements to haul a certain amount of shipment using public enterprises.

5.11 It is often alleged that inadequate communications facilities, especially telephone and telex links, hinder intra-African trade. However, preliminary findings suggest that other inefficiencies are more to blame than the physical facilities.

5.12 In the short run it is not possible to offset infrastructural problems. However, the Bank and other donors are continuing their support to African governments to improve infrastructure. This will help to reduce the costs of transport and communications and thus encourage more trade. At the same time, justifying the costs of some infrastructural projects may require action that will increase the flow of goods and policies that will make users pay for maintenance and project costs. The most stark example of this is provided by one of the few concrete achievements of the Mano River Union: a bridge over the river which is hardly used because of restrictions on both sides of the borders that the bridge spans. Another example is the TAZARA railway linking Zambia with Tanzania which carries little traffic while extensive informal trade occurs at market clearing prices using other more expensive channels of transport. The message is that expensive infrastructure can not lead trade. Further, there is evidence that while recorded intra-SSA trade is stagnating, unrecorded trade is growing (see Barad (1988)), which suggests that infrastructure is not a binding constraint on official trade expansion.

5.13 It is possible that most current efforts are geared mainly to national systems and that emphasis is on maintenance rather than expansion and that more needs to be done regionally. A better picture should emerge following the completion of several ongoing studies. These include: the Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Program which is expected to produce research papers, case studies and guidelines for dissemination at workshops/seminars over the period to 1991; the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Strategy Review to be completed in September 1989 and an evaluation of the Macro-economic and Regional Implications of Urban-Rural linkages that is expected to be ready in October 1989. The Sahel and Great Lakes Corridors Studies which were completed in 1988 have already outlined specific areas for action such as the re-establishment of block trains and studies of such issues as funding of maintenance expenditure, load regulations and user charges.

C. Market Failures

5.14 In discussing market failures it will often be apparent that the failures arise from the policy regime. However the distinction made between market and policy failures is that the former arise when market incentives, given the policy environment, are insufficient to generate the socially desired level of output and services. In turn, the latter relate more to inefficiencies directly arising from bad policies. Thus, often, the most effective resolution of market failures will involve changes in policy as opposed to counteracting government intervention.

1. Trade Finance Facilities

5.15 Commercial Banks are unwilling to expose themselves to sovereign risk in SSA. Prior to 1986 the major international banks provided revolving credit lines of between US$5 to US$40 million to cover payments against Letters of Credit (LOCs) for periods of up to 1 year. Since then, these facilities have been suspended out of fear that the foreign exchange needed to repay drawings on these lines would not be released by the relevant Central Banks. In any case these facilities tended to be used to finance trade with industrialized countries and their reinstitution without provision for intra-regional trade cover would not necessarily help increase regional exchange.

5.16 The lack of cover for LOCs requires cash settlement before transactions can be effected and this reduces trade volumes. The provision of trade financing facilities by industrialized countries to finance imports from their manufacturers worsens this problem by creating a preference for industrialized country exports even where equivalent goods are available at competitive prices from neighboring countries. Indeed it discourages the search for such goods (see C.2). One such example consists of US cotton exports to Zaire despite neighboring countries exporting cotton.

5.17 The shortage of foreign exchange, which appears to be serious and arises essentially from inadequate exchange rates should not be confused with domestic currency credit availability, which in itself is only a problem where Governments crowd out credit (see D.ii.1).

5.18 The first best solution requires pricing foreign exchange at a market clearing price. This has the further advantage that African goods would become more attractive not only in each individual country but also in the region as a whole (and indeed on the world market). Most African Governments have been unwilling to do this and recent signs of flexibility still do not go far enough. Indeed, in some of the countries (such as Uganda, Zaire and Zambia) that had been willing to move to market based rates, there have been reversals.

5.19 In the absence of willingness to adopt market clearing exchange rates and with continued ties by donors between financing and exports, there may be a case for providing offsetting lines of credit to finance <u>efficient</u> intra-African trade. The established private commercial banks operating in SSA are willing to provide lines of credit provided they do not have to cover the sovereign risk related to the shortage of foreign exchange. There is therefore a potential for the Bank to provide a combination of foreign exchange or guarantee against the non-provision of foreign exchange by Central Banks.

5.20 The most practical scenario would be an agreement to share the risks with the Bank (possibly through MIGA) taking sovereign risk (given its comparative advantage arising from its leverage on national governments) and commercial banks taking the commercial risk (given their comparative advantage in this area). There is scope for joint action with the African Development Bank (ADB) in this area.

2. Informational Inadequacies

5.21 African importers and exporters often do not know about each other. In part this reflects the tendency to maintain established relationships, usually with firms in the former colonial metropolis, unless there are external pressures for change. This bias is reinforced by credit lines from donors (see section C.1 above) and the readily available trade information on export and import sources in industrialized countries through the NIMEXE and COMPASS systems. In contrast it is difficult to find any centralized information on suppliers or purchasers in SSA. For example, in Cape Verde there was no awareness that Cameroon could substitute for Portugal as a source of aluminum discs for making cooking utensils. Similarly, many businessmen in Nigeria have no official trade experience with neighboring countries even though unofficial trade with these countries is widespread.

5.22 The problem arises mainly because the cost of gathering information and creating and updating a centralized data base is high while recovery of the cost is complicated by a free rider problem. Further, given the extensive restrictions on SSA trade (discussed in section D.i.3-5 and D.ii.2), the risk is high that even after identifying African partners suitable for trade, such transactions will not take place. This tends to discourage the allocation of resources to find alternative suppliers within SSA.

5.23 In this regard it is noteworthy that ITC sponsored buyer/seller meetings have generated US$77.4 million of proforma invoices in the course of 4 events between January 1987 and March 1988; a fifth buyer/seller meeting took place in February 1989 and resulted in business negotiations worth US$5.5 million. At the same time, restrictive import licencing seems to have hampered the execution of these contracts. On the anecdotal level, a Zimbabwean firm that wanted to import US$50,000 of light bulbs from Mauritius was only granted licenses for US$4,000; more broadly, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe has only set aside Zim$60 million for PTA imports compared to Zim$115 million of orders by Zimbabwean firms at the March 1988, Harare buyer/seller meeting.

3. Absence of Uniform Standards

5.24 Regional trade is complicated by the absence of uniform standards and specifications. At the simplest level this includes the failure to universally use the metric system. More complicated, is the preparation of products according to accepted specifications. Users and manufacturers in different countries have divergent needs and without concerted action it is difficult to get firms to produce according to norms that are acceptable to the bulk of economic agents.

5.25 Meanwhile, it may be more attractive to purchase from non-African sources where it is easier to verify product specification. In this regard, the participants at the 1988 ITC sponsored buyer/seller meeting in Harare specifically recommended that "the PTA Protocol on Standardization and Quality Control be implemented as a matter of urgency to ensure minimum quality levels of goods moving in intra-PTA trade and to protect PTA markets from sub-standard imports." Views on quality are reinforced by the poor quality of most output in the initial stage of production even if substantial improvements occur with experience. Nigerian manufacturers of construction materials, cosmetics and textiles allege that this is a problem in exporting to neighboring countries. It is noteworthy that such fears prevent a Nigerian bicycle firm from exporting directly to neighboring countries. Instead it exports to the UK which in turn re-exports to ECOWAS countries.

5.26 Remedying this problem should not be excessively hard if the governments are brought together, possibly by outside donors, and asked to agree on a harmonization program and timetable. To avoid needless discussions and given the importance of trade links with the EC, there should be prior agreement that the metric system and other EC wide guidelines should be the appropriate objective. At the same time, the use of standards should not be a means of keeping African exports out. For example an Ivorian firm alleges that Senegal uses stricter standards than in Europe as a means of keeping out Ivorian processed foods.

4. Reliability

5.27 African businessmen are often seen by their peers as unreliable and this perception is often justified. The bureaucratic inefficiencies and physical problems, that make it hard to respect schedules, tend to be accommodated by protected national markets. However, it discourages intra-

African trade. In the short run it may be difficult to resolve this problem, although liberalization would be expected to force firms to find means of counteracting the unfavorable production conditions at the risk of losing market share to imports. PTA businessmen meeting at the ITC organized Harare buyer/seller meeting urged that "the business community take the necessary steps to improve their practices, particularly in the field of communications, and follow up on business contacts and enquiries... (and) make every effort to deliver according to agreed terms and conditions in order to enhance confidence in the PTA business community." At the same time, unless physical and regulatory problems are solved this will be difficult to achieve.

5.28 There may be a role for technical assistance, perhaps through the Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS) recently set up by IFC and MIGA to advise governments on how to attract foreign private investment. Further, various donors might be induced to finance training seminars and/or exchange visits that would provide a more professional approach to securing and maintaining international contracts. Regional institutions such as the Eastern and Southern Africa Trade Promotion and Training Centre in Nairobi, Kenya or the Abidjan Trade Centre in Cote d'Ivoire could play a constructive role in this regard.

5. Monopolies

5.29 In SSA, state trading companies are often the only alternative to monopolistic private entrepreneurs. Thus the competitive drive to find the least cost supplier is absent. In such a situation, established trade relations, which tend to be with non-SSA firms, continue at the expense of diversification that might favor more regional exchange. This is compounded by the approach of some foreign companies that create monopolistic niches by locating in each country under agreement to be sheltered from imports. This prevents the creation of a larger regional market where imports and other firms can compete with the established supplier. Sometimes ethnic minorities may also act in an uncompetitive manner.

5.30 Where monopolies arise out of a narrow base of traders it may be difficult to remedy this situation without the state intervening by providing competition. Creation of public enterprises for such reasons are rare but the Ghana National Trading Corporation was set up to compete with foreign trading firms and thus break their oligopolistic power (Ayub and Hegstad, 1986, page 60). In such cases, care needs to be exercised in setting out conditions of operation of the state enterprise to avoid the excesses that have drained resources into the state sector across SSA. In practice it may be necessary to envisage reforms of existing control mechanisms along the lines pursued by the Bank in various PE restructuring programs (see IDD, PPR (1989 for details).

5.31 Where monopolies are sustained by government action there is scope for increasing competition. While it is beyond the brief of this paper to investigate such issues in depth, other ongoing work in the Bank suggests that the informal sector provides plenty of opportunities for introducing competition. (See Azam (1988), Mac Gaffey (1988) and the forthcoming **Long Term Perspectives Study**). An issues paper is being prepared by the TD on the Underground Economy and the Urban-Rural linkages study should also be helpful. Meanwhile, **Jean Marie Cour** of AFTIN has extensive experience in this area). Indeed, it appears that unrecorded activity tends to limit the excesses of private monopolists and imposes a heavy burden on inefficient public enterprises.

5.32 Donors could contribute by encouraging the creation of mechanisms that would provide financing of activity by new entrants, particularly those currently in the informal sector. This may have to be pursued by cooperation with NGOs or other socially based organizations that have a capacity to marshall resources and impose peer pressure to ensure repayments. More information on how to proceed should emerge from the studies referred to above.

6. Infrastructure

5.33 Private firms are sometimes in a position to build infrastructure that will facilitate trade but are prevented from doing so because it is difficult to collect user fees. An example of what can be achieved is provided by the experience of Agency Maritime International Zambia Ltd. Upon getting the relevant assurances on cost recovery, the firm built facilities at Mpulungu to resolve problems related to the shipping of heavy and bulky materials such as cement and steel over Lake Tanganyika between Zambia and Burundi.

5.34 There are also cases where existing facilities can be turned over for maintenance and operation to the private sector. In Guinea, for example in replacement of government operations in Conakry harbor, there now are five stevedoring companies competing for business; transit, storage and handling functions are being handled by private companies while cleaning and maintenance of port infrastructure is being contracted out. (Guinea: Transport Sector Appraisal Report, May 1987, #6787). Similarly, the airport is being managed by a joint venture with a foreign partner. Gabon and Togo are making similar arrangements for running their airports. In Guinea-Bissau the government has sold off its air traffic rights to a foreign airline while in Niger the ailing national carrier is being replaced by a mixed company. In the Kivu region of Zaire, there is some evidence that the private sector is contributing to the maintenance of infrastructure, especially roads, in the face of insufficient public spending (Regional Development of Kivu, First Draft of the Report, September 1, 1987, pages 64 to 69).

5.35 These examples notwithstanding, very little has been done in SSA, even in comparison with other regions. Governments, with support from the Bank could investigate ways in which provision of relevant guarantees relating to cost recovery would enable more private involvement in creating and maintaining the relevant infrastructure for facilitating trade flows. So far the Bank has done little formal work in this area specifically geared to SSA even though **Asif Faiz** of PPR has conducted a more general review (see, for example, World Bank (1988) for efforts in the road sector). In the Africa Region, **Jean Marie Lantran** (AFTIN) has been investigating this issue for some time and it would be useful to ask AFTIN to prepare an issues paper that might make some concrete proposals for Bank intervention in this area.

7. Appraisals of Large Projects

5.36 Identification and appraisal for large projects, especially in heavy industry, costs a lot. Further, the smaller the market, the greater the risk that appraisal will indicate that the proposed investment is not profitable. This discourages the private sector from undertaking such evaluations. Instead such projects tend to be left to the public sector with a resulting tendency to underestimate commercial risk and emphasis on prestigious ventures.

5.37 IFC and the Bank, working with national governments, have a possible role in carrying out such appraisals, possibly financed by SPPFs or other appropriate mechanisms. The objective should be to provide a subsidized service to private industry to evaluate, at its request, various projects that depend on large market size. It would also be desirable, as part of this process, to identify existing international firms that could participate in the appraisal and eventual project construction and operation. Such appraisals should concentrate on schemes which are unprofitable in a small national market but where a regional market may reduce unit costs to world prices. These would provide concrete pressure points for pointing out foregone gains from denying regional partners free market access. Such schemes may also provide appropriate vehicles for cross-border investment and the emergence of strong African based multi-national enterprise.

8. Financing for Trade Fairs

5.38 The experience of ITC in bringing buyers and sellers together is encouraging and would suggest thac the private sector in SSA could be convinced of the positive payoff to contributing to such activities, perhaps in the form of a permanent fair location. In practice, such a development is blocked by the free-rider problem as well as the risk that government action will not permit trade to occur even where willing buyer and seller are identified, as discussed in section C.2 above.

5.39 The economic benefits of a permanent fair should be appraised on the basis of various options for cost recovery from the private sector. To the extent that there are positive net benefits, consideration could be given to financing such an undertaking. Important issues to be resolved include whether the public or private sector should operate the facilities and if national or supra-national authorities should be given charge. It would also have to be established if a permanent fair is more cost effective than a rotation from site to site.

5.40 ITC has recently initiated project activities, similar to those organized for the PTA, in ECOWAS and in selected countries of ECCAS. Additional funding is required to develop those projects into full-scale and broad based intra-regional trade promotion activities. If permanent facilities are not justified, consideration should be given to increase the financing available to ITC to allow it to organize more contacts between businessmen.

9. Clash between Market Incentives and Regulations

5.41 The PTA, ECOWAS and ECCAS have each set up a clearinghouse mechanism to economize on the use of foreign exchange in intra-union trade. (ECCAS is not yet functional but its Clearinghouse is a successor to the Zaire-UDEAC one). Yet no attention is paid to providing financial inducements to economic agents to use that channel. Indeed, it is alleged that in the PTA and ECCAS the commercial banks, who finance and channel the bulk of trade transactions, are given an incentive to discourage their clients from using the clearinghouse since they get a lower commission for such transactions. Similarly, in countries with export retention schemes and/or export compensation schemes, there is a financial incentive to generate hard currency as opposed to using clearinghouse facilities.

5.42 Governments and supra-national institutions responsible for regional trade need to be encouraged to think about incentives that will induce private agents to use facilities designed to promote regional exchange. It is often apparent in discussing with officials that they tend to think as central planners and believe that administrative fiat is sufficient to obtain desired results. The Bank in its ongoing dialogue with country authorities needs to persevere in the general message that without the appropriate incentive structure, it is unlikely that private agents will behave as desired by policy makers.

D. Policy Failures

(i) Bureaucratic Weaknesses

1. Multiplicity of Targets

5.43 The economic groupings in SSA, have very broad objectives of fostering cooperation and development in all fields of economic activity. Regional integration involves a broad range of activities in the social and cultural fields as well as the economic. In consequence there has been a tendency for various organizations to attempt to move on many fronts at the same time. The PTA Treaty, for example, has twelve protocols dealing with matters ranging from tariff and non-tariff barriers to the creation of infrastructure, the development of agriculture and industry and the standardization of products. Given the limited resources and the difficult tasks these face, best results could be expected from a narrower focus on key issues with the greatest multiplier effect on the integration process. This would allow concentration on the essential but politically tough policy reforms required to create a unified market for goods and factor services. In contrast, ECOWAS has got involved, through the ECOWAS Fund, in infrastructure development, has set up various West African federations (Universities, Youth Organizations and Trade Unions) and even organized sporting events, all while deadline after deadline for internal liberalization pass without significant action and while some of the gains in labor mobility are occasionally reversed.

5.44 SADCC is the economic grouping that tends to be most highly praised in SSA, largely because it has a small secretariat, works through national governments and has a concrete and limited agenda. The other economic groupings (and any new efforts at regional integration) should be based on the same principles. It may be more fruitful to discuss and implement one protocol at a time instead of trying to work ineffectively on a dozen fronts. In the case of the trade organizations that are the primary focus of this paper, they should concentrate their efforts on eliminating the barriers that prevent Africans from working, investing and trading across the borders of the continent.

2. Complexity of Rules and Regulations

5.45 The rules and regulations are needlessly complex, reflecting an attempt to accommodate the special interests of each member country. For example, rather than eliminating tariffs (a simple and easily understood measure) or granting a straight preference (less radical but still simple), the typical approach is to agree on a restricted list of eligible items. In addition, even after establishing that it is dealing with a Common List item, the firm has to determine which preference category the good qualifies for (varying, in the case of the PTA, for example, from 10 percent to 70 percent within 6 groups and 10 categories). To complicate matters even further, a firm needs to demonstrate that it qualifies under the rules of origin for 30 percent, 60 percent or 100 percent preferential treatment depending on its local equity holding. The rules of origin also create major obstacles within ECOWAS, in particular between the CEAO and Nigeria.

5.46 When combined with their timidity, the costs of obtaining such preferences can outweigh the benefits, especially since the real obstacles are the procedures that need to be satisfied rather than tariffs. In contrast, the EC market is accessible with much less paperwork, clearer requirements and lower tariffs than in union partners. The benefits are further reduced when the problems of admission are taken into account. It has been estimated by the ITC that up to 70 administrative steps are involved in legally moving goods across African borders. In Zaire, for example, there are 39 administrative steps necessary for exports and 30 for imports. These steps include multiple controls, signatures and validations, licenses and authorizations from various services of different administrations. The use of mercurial values and import surcharges and other restrictions on imports further raises the cost of trading across African frontiers even when official tariffs are reduced.

5.47 The Bank, the EC and other donors could provide technical assistance to simplify bureaucratic procedures and introduce more automaticity and recording mainly for statistical rather than control purposes. Ongoing and past support by the Bank for national adjustment programs form a useful basis for extending advice to interested Governments.

3. Administration of Licencing Arrangements

5.48 The administration of licencing arrangements tends to be biased against intra-regional trade, partly because of an unwritten but prevalent attitude that imports from outside the region tend to be "essential" while those from SSA can be substituted by home production. This bias is worsened by the provision of lines of credit by foreign donors that can only be used to import from their country (see section C.1 above).

5.49 A dramatic demonstration of this bias is provided by the results of the cancellation in 1984 of the open general import licence agreement between Malawi and Zimbabwe when they both adhered to the PTA. Zimbabwe imports from Malawi fell by US$10.5 million from an average of US$14 million over the previous 5 years. In contrast, imports from Botswana, with which a similar agreement was maintained because it did not join the PTA, remained at around US$35 million. So the import licencing regime brought the curious result that joining a trade enhancing grouping actually eliminated an export market for Malawi. (Also see section C.2 above).

5.50 It is noteworthy that the Report of the Twelfth Meeting of the PTA Council of Ministers recognizes that "restrictive import licensing seemed to be a major problem to intra-PTA trade." (Page 8). The businessmen of the region have also identified this as a serious obstacle and called on the governments of the PTA countries for "the liberalization of the licensing policy and practices for imports from PTA countries be expeditiously implemented in accordance with the articles of the PTA Treaty and the decisions of the PTA policy organs."

5.51 Since 1987 ITC has assisted the PTA in the organization of five buyer/seller meetings (see para 5.23) and two trade fairs. The fairs took place in Nairobi (1986) and Lusaka (1988) and business worth US$160 million and US$100 million respectively was negotiated at these events. ITC would be happy to further discuss with the Bank the scope for expanding these and other subregional trade promotion activities with the direct participation of the business community in SSA. To the extent that licencing reflects a shortage of foreign exchange, resolving the problem lies in finding a more realistic exchange rate and adopting a policy of allocating foreign exchange by relying on market signals. However, even within the current context it should be possible to improve the situation by explicitly favoring partner nations in the allocation of foreign exchange to offset some of the existing biases arising from foreign financed credit lines. Zimbabwe has responded to criticism by introducing an allocation specifically for the PTA and has gradually increased the amount from Zim$10 million in 1984 to Zim$60 million in 1988. However, it would appear that such moves do not go far enough when compared to the Zim$115 million of pro forma invoices to Zimbabwe importers issued at the last buyer/seller meeting in Harare. A more liberal arrangement for the issuance of import licenses for partner imports could be justified if the Clearinghouse extended its role to create a facility to allow private agents to freely trade local currencies (see Goreux (1988) for some suggestions).

5.52 To circumvent the biases in the allocation of import licenses it would be important to try to establish an Open General Licence (OGL) system for partner imports. In this respect a good model would be provided by the Open General Import Licence agreement between Zimbabwe and Botswana originating in the 1956 agreement between the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland. To the extent that the exchange rate remains significantly overvalued, the OGL could apply until a certain level of foreign exchange had been expended rather than requiring the issuance of licenses for all imports. Further, the allocation of the freely issued licenses should reflect some elements of market pricing to avoid small latecomers being excluded from the line. The Liberalized Import Regime adopted by Madagascar in 1986 and currently being considered by Somalia offers one possible approach.

4. Administration of Control Procedures

5.53 There is poor coordination between the government agencies negotiating the reduction of impediments to regional trade and the implementing agencies that have to implement the decisions that are intended to simplify procedures. Thus the Harare Buyer/Seller meeting asked that the "PTA Secretariat impress upon Governments to introduce without delay, at the operational and administrative levels those measures which have been agreed upon for the facilitation of intra-PTA transit transport like the yellow insurance card and the Road Customs Transit Document (RCTD)" (ITC, Harare Buyer/Seller Meeting, page 4).

5.54 This reflects the experience of several transporters who were faced by puzzled customs officials concerning the use of the RCTD, intended to replace all other documentation for within PTA movement of goods. It has been reported that at some customs posts, the RCTD is now accepted <u>in addition</u> to all the usual documents! The meeting also urged that "Government licencing authorities refrain from insisting on Certificates of Origin at the time applications for import permits are submitted and that certifying authorities, as designated by national Governments are respected in accordance with the relevant Protocol of the PTA Treaty" (ITC, Harare Buyer/Seller Meeting, page 5).

5.55 Similarly it is reported that customs officers at the Togo/Ghana border systematically unload and check goods "for security reasons", notwithstanding the agreements for free movement within ECOWAS.

5.56 Governments need to be urged to ensure that decisions taken at higher level are passed on down the ranks, especially to the remote posts far removed from the capital. The secretariats of the existing regional trade organizations could devote special efforts to assist national authorities in disseminating appropriate information "down the ranks" and could be empowered to help in moving relevant information in this manner.

(ii) Political Obstacles

5.57 The following sections will document the various political obstacles without suggesting particular action that could overcome them. This is because by their nature they are likely to be more problematic to overcome than the other barriers discussed above. Instead, Chapter VI summarizes issues that need to be dealt with to achieve an increase in official regional trade and makes suggestions for possible intervention by the Bank to facilitate this.

1. Inappropriate Macro-economic Policies

5.58 The most serious obstacles to recorded intra-regional trade arise from unintended effects of inappropriate macro-economic policies. Overvaluation of exchange rates and inappropriate credit policies are at the core of many problems limiting trade.

5.59 The exchange rate is important both as a price signal and because of the resultant shortage of foreign exchange when the rate is overvalued. It is impossible to price (at official exchange rates) the exports from the country with the greater overvaluation, even though at parallel rates trade would (and often does) occur.

5.60 As an example, consider a situation where the official rates are at parity with the US$ but where in country A the parallel rate is 2 units to the US$ and in country B it is 4 units to the US$. Assume that an exporter in country B is prepared to trade for at least 4 units of his domestic currency while the importer in country A is willing to pay up to 2 units of country A currency. At parallel rates, they would fix the price at 1 US$, but at official rates the exporter requires at least 4 US$. In contrast the importer is not willing to pay more than US$2. So trade can only take place when it is transacted outside official channels.

5.61 The counterpart of this argument is that imports from country B obtain a larger exchange rate subsidy than the implicit tax on country A exports and therefore overvaluation should encourage trade in the opposite direction i.e imports into the country with the more overvalued rate. In practice, however, with no incentive for official exports from the country with the relatively more overvalued exchange rate, the necessary foreign exchange to support such activity is unlikely to be available on a sustained basis. Instead imports are restricted by use of licencing requirements. Therefore the overvaluation tends to limit overall trade rather than just exports from the country with the more overvalued exchange rate.

5.62 The general shortage of foreign exchange associated with overvaluation results in the need to ration foreign exchange. This leads to the biases against regional imports discussed in section D.i.3 above and is also illustrated by Zairian and Nigerian exporters preference to sell outside the Clearing arrangement so as to receive foreign exchange. It also inhibits investment that is essential to produce the tradeable goods required to pay for imports. In turn, this complicates the sharing of benefits since incentives to induce a shift of economic activity to the weaker economies cannot operate if production and dividends are not realistically priced when converted to the currency of the investor.

5.63 The overvaluation of the exchange rate is probably the single most important inhibition to increased trade. However, as explained earlier, it is not sufficient to have sensible exchange rate policies. UDEAC, despite using convertible currency, has much less intra-regional trade than other groupings where foreign exchange shortages are an important problem.

5.64 Credit policies can be problematic when inefficient sectors absorb an excessive share and the resulting rationing crowds out productive activity. Unfortunately no detailed data are available to show the share of total credit going to finance trade in general and regional trade in particular. On the basis of anecdotal evidence in discussions with businessmen and bankers, however, when credit is tight there appears to be a bias against providing credit to finance regional transactions so that these have to be financed using cash resources.

2. Unwillingness to Significantly Dismantle Barriers

5.65 The experience of trade groupings in SSA demonstrates the strong resistance against significant reduction of trade barriers. This reflects similar difficulties in other regions. For example, in July 1988 CARICOM failed to agree on the implementation of previously agreed measures that would have virtually eliminated all trade barriers within the region. Similarly, ASEAN has found it difficult to agree on mutual dismantling of trade barriers and has tended to concentrate on security issues (Meyanathan, 1988). ASEAN also provides a useful lesson on the dangers of a gradualist item by item negotiation for the reduction of regional trade barriers: in the limited list of liberalized items one finds snow ploughs and nuclear reactors. This experience needs to be contrasted with that of the CACM which experienced a five fold increase in trade by adopting the opposite approach of liberalizing trade in everything except for a limited list. The limited liberalization approach provides too much time for pressure groups to resist an opening up in the areas where the greatest amount of trade creation could be expected. In consequence the benefits of acting where agreement is reached (on items such as snow ploughs) is so small that there is little incentive for implementation.

5.66 In SSA, ECOWAS has consistently failed to implement decisions concerning trade liberalization. No action has followed the 1983 agreement by the ECOWAS heads of state on a liberalization scheme. Indeed in recent tariff reforms in Nigeria and Ghana, no account was taken of the agreement to initially freeze and then lower tariffs to ECOWAS members. Thus the ECOWAS secretariat notes that "despite the impressive number of agreements reached and decisions taken regarding the harmonization of Customs documents, the adoption of common procedures, and the program for deregulating non-manufactured crude goods, traditional handicrafts and industrial products, the Economic Community of West African States has not made tangible progress in practical terms." (ECOWAS Annual Report, 1985/86, page 14).

5.67 In the UDEAC, "instead of a common external tariff, the Union embodies a multiplicity of import tariffs... Contrary to the initial objective of guaranteeing free movement of products within the Union, the taxe unique as implemented today amounts to an import duty that provides additional protection to members and contradicts the principle of free trade within the Union." (Samen, 1988, page 11).

5.68 Similarly, "since 1983 the Policy Organs of the PTA have been taking a number of decisions aimed at liberalizing and facilitating intra-PTA trade. However, the majority of important decisions have not yet been implemented by most of the member States. As a result, five years after the PTA was established, there is virtually no preferential trade in the subregion." (PTA, 88-0184, May, 1988, page 1).

5.69 The other groupings in SSA reflect similar reluctance to open up their economies to their neighbors. Some Government officials argue that liberalization that does not lead to equal benefits to all can not be tolerated. This in turn means that it is difficult to liberalize since the whole purpose is to generate adjustment which by its nature must be expected to have a differential impact. This is especially true in the short run, before the pressure from increased competition can lead to an environment more conducive to economic growth. There are also strong interest groups that are threatened by liberalization that would expose inefficient import substitution to foreign competition. "Africa's domestic private manufacturers are fewer and less powerful than Latin America's. The real pressures for import substitution policies have come from civil servants, politicians , and military men. These often justify opposition to trade liberalization in the name of nationalism and the need to be modern and industrialize. But they benefit especially from non-tariff barriers such as import quotas and licenses which allow them to make profits from illegal sales and/or to increase their power" (Bienen, 1987, page 3). Such considerations explain in part why in Senegal, for example, chocolate imports from Cote d'Ivoire are discouraged by using mercurial prices and tough health standards; there are bans or high taxes on the import of palm oil in Niger, Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire and cotton in Nigeria and why Mali limits the issuance of import licenses for regional imports, all despite their contradiction of the principles of ECOWAS and the CEAO.

3. Barriers Outside the Region are Lower than Within

5.70 It is well known that African countries have much higher tariff and non-tariff barriers than industrialized countries. For example, the average tariff facing developing country finished and semifinished manufactures ranges from just under 7 percent in the EC and Japan to just under 9 percen in the US (WDR, 1987, page 136) while in SSA the equivalent figure is 18 percent. This figure reflects extensive exemptions that may often require side payments. The theoretical average tariff is 35 percent. Unfortunately, no data could be obtained for the trade weighted theoretical tariff which is more relevant for determining the extent of exemptions. Given that there are more tariff lines at the low end of the scale, one could expect the straight average to be downward biased, but there is an offset arising from the lower level of recorded imports at the high end of the tariff.

5.71 Similarly, according to UNCTAD data, the range of NTBs in SSA is much larger than in industrialized countries where most goods trade freely except for textiles and agricultural products (WDR, 1987, Chapter 8). NTBs in SSA also tend to be much more variable in scope and extent so that the effective protection fluctuates significantly from year to year. This mainly reflects decisions concerning the allocation of import licenses and/or foreign exchange authorizations. The variability is further enhanced by foreign exchange retention and export compensation schemes that partially compensate for exchange rate overvaluation.

5.72 Higher barriers in SSA than in industrialized countries do not in themselves account for low shares of regional trade since all imports into SSA face the same high barriers. However, UNCTAD and ITC argue, on the basis of their experience in the Caribbean, that there is a strong relationship between the level of trade and the share of regional trade. This reflects the low marginal costs of finding new markets once economic policy encourages a more open trading system that orients domestic activity to traded goods. It is plausible to expect that as trade barriers are reduced, unrealized potential in regional trade would be exploited as part of a general expansion in trade.

4. Barriers to Cross-border Investment

5.73 SSA countries have extensive restrictions on the capital account as documented by the IMF annual review of exchange and trade restrictions. Further, hardly any emphasis is given to a liberalization of capital flows in any of the structural adjustment programs supported by the Bank and the IMF in SSA, on the correct logic that, to avoid unsustainable capital outflows, appropriate economic policies and a liberalization of the current account are a necessary precondition.

5.74 Under current circumstances it is difficult for trade to lead to investment for production in the importing country. It is also difficult to rationalize production through takeovers, mergers and acquisitions and this sustains high costs that require extensive protection from imports. Foreign firms also often face different regulatory and tax frameworks from those confronted by domestic firms.

5.75 The problem partly involves reluctance on the part of Central Banks to provide foreign exchange for cross-border investment when they are unsure that a reverse flow of dividends will follow. For example, there is much potential for rehabilitation of firms in Mozambique that Zimbabwean entrepreneurs, for example, are interested in taking over from the Mozambique Government. Yet the few acquisitions that have taken place by Zimbabwean firms have required using externally available foreign exchange given the reluctance of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe to authorize such transactions.

5.76 Central Banks in SSA seem unwilling to 'lose' capital to other SSA countries, and in the process block the natural evolution from exports to investment and further trade expansion by denying funds for investment.

5. Fears of Economic Domination

5.77 In all Unions in SSA, the fear of economic domination retards integration. ECOWAS is particularly handicapped by this since Nigeria accounts for more than half the population and GDP of the grouping. This is also a problem in UDEAC with fear of Cameroon obtaining most of the benefits reinforced by the pattern of intra-UDEAC trade (see Chapter III). The fear of falling behind is also a constraint, even where there is more balance, as in the PTA where Ethiopia has the largest population, Zimbabwe the largest manufacturing sector, Kenya the largest GDP and Mauritius the highest per capita income. The authorities in some countries argue that it is necessary not only to achieve an absolute increase in wealth but that their relative income should not deteriorate.

5.78 This approach is incompatible with the adjustment and economic specialization that joining a Union is geared to achieve and accounts for much of the lack of progress in significantly dismantling barriers. Such problems are worsened when factor mobility is limited. It is significant that the CEAO which has a much higher degree of labor mobility than the UDEAC, also has much more recorded trade.

6. Concentration on Fund Raising Rather Than Problem Solving

5.79 Berg (1987) notes that there is little commitment to regional organizations by the governments that set them up. Indeed, the proliferation of such organizations in Africa reflects the view that there is little fiscal cost and that these organizations can mobilize external resources.

5.80 In SSA, the regional trade organizations are not exempt from these pressures and the Bank has recently been approached by the PTA, the CEAO and ECOWAS (through the ECOWASFUND) to finance various activities ranging from regional projects to providing trade financing and taking a share of capital in some institutions. The ECOWASFUND has also tried to obtain donor support for its headquarters building.

5.81 In Africa skilled labor is scarce and the diversion of attention of officials involved in reducing barriers to fund raising reduces their effectiveness in achieving the primary purpose that the Union is supposed to achieve.

7. Compensation of Relative Losers

5.82 Integration has been retarded by the belief that this should lead to balanced growth with an equal share of industry in each member or at a minimum financial compensation to the less successful members. UDEAC has experienced the temporary withdrawal of Chad because it felt it was being inadequately compensated. The CEAO seems to have worked better than most Unions partly because Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal were willing to shoulder an extra burden. Indeed, CEAO has performed less well since the recent economic crisis in Cote d'Ivoire that led to a reduction in its willingness to subsidize the poorer members and a search is now underway for a new compensation formula.

5.83 In the EC, national income per capita varies from US$2,250 in Portugal to US$12,600 in Denmark while manufacturing accounts from 18 percent of output in the Netherlands to 32 percent in the Federal Republic of Germany. Even amongst the original six members who have had most time to equalize their position, income per capita ranges from US$8,550 to almost 50 percent more in the richest country.

5.84 Regional and state by state variations in industrialization and income are significant even in the US which has a single economy. Thus, the share of output arising from manufacturing varies from 3 percent to 26 percent with significant variation between these extremes around a mean for the whole country of 15 percent. More surprisingly, even after accounting for Federal redistribution, per capita disposable income is twice as large in the wealthiest state compared with the poorest.

5.85 Unlike the groupings in Africa (except perhaps for the CEAO) labor and capital can move relatively freely in the EC and even more so in the US, but even this is insufficient to equalize incomes levels. Regions which are more exposed to trade tend to have the highest income levels. In groupings which are more restrictive, regarding factor mobility, it would be expected that the variation would be even greater.

5.86 Furthermore, the main economic rationale for integration is that it will lead to better resource use and allocation and therefore economic specialization with a concentration of industry and benefits should be expected, as is observed even within individual industrialized countries.

5.87 Attempts to redress this "uneven" pattern of development would be expected to result in trading off increases in general welfare for the sake of less inequality: in the extreme it would suggest limiting industrialization and incomes to the level of the least fortunate country.

5.88 It seems reasonable to conclude that successful economic integration will increase the economic specialization of each country compared to the no union case. While it is not clear if an economic union, once in equilibrium, would reduce the initial relative income gap, it is reasonable to hypothesis that substantial income inequality, reflecting differences in resource endowments, will persist even in the steady state. Further, the less factor mobility prevails, the greater the likely income disparities. It is also likely, especially with continued restrictions on factor movements, that in the short run the income disparities would grow for some sub-set of countries, just as income inequality initially increases with development.

5.89 One reason for lack of progress in achieving intra-union liberalization is that the relative "gainers" are unable to compensate the relative "losers" sufficiently unless they give up virtually all their gains. In any case, as is evident from the consequences of the break up of the East African Community (EAC), the weaker countries do not necessarily improve their relative position outside the union while they do forego some growth when on their own.

5.90 Thus in the heyday of the community, from 1966 to 1973 Kenya was growing 1 1/2 and 2 1/3 times as fast as Tanzania and Uganda, respectively. In the period of breakup, from 1976 to 1979 Uganda experienced negative growth while Tanzania could only manage less than half the growth of Kenya. After adjustment to the breakup, in the period 1980 to 1986, Kenya grew almost 4 times as fast as Tanzania and almost 5 times as fast as Uganda. However, the absolute performance of Kenya relative to other African countries seems also to have suffered from the breakup. Thus from 1966 to 1973 Kenya was growing twice as fast as all SSA countries while from 1976 to 1979 this was reduced to only one and half times the average. Kenya does seem to have recovered, however, since it has achieved a 3.4 percent growth rate from 1980 to 1986 while on average SSA has stagnated.

5.91 Economic performance is the result of complex interactions and special circumstances other than the breakup of the EAC may explain some of these variations. However, it does seem that the strongest economy recovered better from the breakup.

5.92 From an economic perspective, calls for compensation amount to paying the weaker countries to do something that is in their own interest.

Nevertheless, the experience to date shows that from a political perspective an effective compensation mechanism may be required to keep intra-union barriers down.

8. Unwillingness to Rely on the Private Sector

5.93 The Governments of many SSA countries are unwilling to rely on the private sector to achieve regional cooperation and economic integration. This reflects general attitudes to the private sector that emphasis the role of the public sector. In part this reflects the political unacceptability of relative enrichment of the more economically dynamic ethnic and/or tribal groups. Nellis (1986, page 13) notes that "most of (the) commercial agricultural and manufacturing base (that) existed was in the hands of aliens...This created deep resentments and sparked calls for controls and nationalization. In many countries across the region, one often encountered - and still encounters - attitudes which cannot be termed expressions of a coherent socialist position, but which nonetheless reveal a strong strain of anti-capitalism, a pronounced mistrust of the market and the profit motive."

5.94 This has led to the creation of public sector institutions and a desire to regulate private exchange across national borders. For example, rather than working out arrangements to induce existing development and commercial banks to finance regional projects and regional trade, the PTA chose to set up a PTA Bank. Even where there is legitimate scope for government intervention, as in the case of the PTA Clearinghouse, insufficient attention is paid to devising incentives that would induce the use of the facilities and excessive efforts are put in devising regulations.

5.95 The PTA appears to be ready to respond to the private sector. The PTAFCCI (Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry) attempts to influence government policy to the PTA through its national members and the exchange of views between Ministers and businessmen is an important part of PTA trade fairs. Nevertheless, the PTA, like ECOWAS, places ownership restrictions on firms that can qualify for preferential trade. This is a major point of contention between CEAO members of ECOWAS, particularly Cote d'Ivoire, and other members of ECOWAS, particularly Nigeria. It is also noteworthy that in the case of ECOWAS the private sector set up a bank (ECO-Bank) to finance regional trade instead of the public sector.

9. Insufficient Willingness to Promote Institutions such as the Clearinghouse

5.96 There is insufficient effort to designing incentives that would induce the private sector to use official channels for facilitating trade, as mentioned in D.ii.8 above. The PTA Clearing House is handling transactions equivalent to about 60 percent of the trade between the countries despite the intention that it should handle not only all the trade but also the service payments. The West Africa Clearinghouse of ECOWAS handled an average of 23 percent of transactions in its first six years but defaults and payments imbalances have driven this figure down to 9 percent in the most recent five year period. The ECCAS Clearinghouse is also experiencing similar problems in attracting transactions.

5.97 Too much reliance is placed on administrative decisions or on collective goodwill without figuring out if desired objectives at the regional and national level coincide with private interest at the transaction level. Again, the pricing of transactions tends to be ignored.

10. Unwillingness to Open Up to Non-residents and Ethnic Minorities the Opportunities to Trade

5.98 The whole purpose of economic Unions is to make investment, including by foreigners and ethnic minorities, more attractive by providing a wider market. Restricting access to the wider market and discouraging investors at a time of net disinvestment by private capital makes no sense. Business confidence needs to be restored if SSA is to reverse current economic decline. This will require encouraging the ethnic minorities to participate more fully as part of a process of attracting foreigners. Without this neither regional integration nor integration into the world economy can succeed. Where there are legitimate concerns regarding uncompetitive practices, these have to be dealt with through effective government intervention and regulation, but this should not be used as a pretext to limit investment when SSA growth is suffering from a lack of investment.

VI. THE WAY AHEAD

A. What could be done

6.01 Securing an increase in efficient recorded regional trade will require action on several fronts simultaneously. It is likely that some increase in observed regional trade would occur from a combination of measures dealing with the market and bureaucratic failures and easing the impact of the natural constraints discussed in Chapter V. Nevertheless, this increase is unlikely to be significant without a resolution of the political problems. Most of the constraints could be dealt with by the national governments on a bi- or multi-lateral basis, within or outside the framework of existing organizations and without donor financial support. To justify external support, action on the political barriers will therefore be a pre-condition.

6.02 The experience to date suggests that some countries will have chronic trade deficits with their regional partners. Financing such deficits when the exchange rate is at an inappropriate level is not a sustainable policy and indeed contributed to the decline of the Central American Common Market which had generated the largest amount of internal trade of all unions in the developing world (see CODII, LAC & IDD, PPR (1989)). This is why increasing regional trade must be associated with the liberalization of capital and labor flows so that trade deficits can be at least partially offset with investment inflows or worker's remittances. 17/

6.03 National and donor resources should be channelled where they have a direct impact on facilitating such liberalization instead of providing financing to keep regional organizations active. 18/ National governments need to concentrate on policy actions that will create the pre-

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17/ A full offset or, more usefully, a sustainable regional deficit will require exchange rate adjustment. Regional trade which will remain a small part of total trade need not be in balance provided the overall balance of payments situation is strong enough to support regional deficits. Nevertheless, liberalizing non-trade current account and capital flows will contribute to make any given deficit level more sustainable.

18/ As argued by Berg (1989), donors should also encourage cooperation in specific areas such as fighting river blindness. Here, we ignore such issues and concentrate on actions that are most relevant to increased regional exchange. Also, it is not being suggested that financing be withheld from existing regional organizations. Rather, the point concerns the use of additional resources.

conditions for increased regional exchange identified in Chapter V. Donors could support such efforts through technical assistance and by underwriting risk sharing schemes in addition to the continued financing of relevant infrastructure. There may also be a case for program lending to finance purchases outside SSA that may be required to sustain regional activity by private economic agents.

6.04 There is a growing feeling in SSA that current efforts at regional integration have not proceeded as rapidly as hoped for. Thus the Organization of African Unity states that "Five years after the adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos, very little progress has been achieved in the implementation of the Plan and the Act" (OAU, 1985). This is why the regional organizations are increasingly turning to the Bank and other donors for support. Thus the Bank has received specific requests from PTA, ECOWAS, CEAO, UDEAC and SADCC. There is thus a need for African governments, regional organizations and donors to develop a framework for responding to such requests in a manner supportive of the basic objectives of integration and of national adjustment efforts. This framework should build on the desire of Africans for cooperation and the increasing, though by no means universal realization in Africa that new approaches are needed.

6.05 Specific details and problems have to be resolved in a more concrete context, such as the proposed regional SAL with UDEAC and possible Bank operations with the CEAO and PTA/SADCC. Nevertheless a general framework is required to ensure that integration contributes to improve growth prospects in SSA by strengthening and deepening ongoing national adjustment efforts. It is in this context that the following suggestions should be seen as a first step towards achieving a consensus on the critical elements.

B. Main Elements of a New Approach

6.06 Regional integration should provide an additional means of moving groups of African countries towards overall economic liberalization by improving conditions for a more active role by private agents across the frontiers of Africa. The approach needs to be consistent with and promote liberalization efforts at the national level and not set back programs that any individual country may want to undertake on its own.

6.07 In view of the strong interests that resist liberalization, it may be difficult, especially initially, to find many SSA countries that are willing or able to embark on such a course. This is especially true if the strategy adopted is aimed at strengthening and deepening the adjustment process by making it possible to liberalize the economy more rapidly and/or more extensively. There might, therefore, be a temptation to focus on the relatively easier issues concerning the rationalization of existing tariffs and, especially, the granting of regional tariff preferences. This would be unfortunate as the main justification for donors to support African requests would be to provide national authorities with the necessary leverage (arising from technical expertise and financial resources) to overcome political obstacles that would not otherwise be removed and which hinder economic progress.

6.08 Closer economic links should be based on existing and potential complementarities and trade flows. In this respect, existing Regional Economic Groupings in SSA, set up for a variety of, sometimes non-economic, reasons, are not necessarily optimal. This is especially true of the smaller ones (see Chapter III). However, given that they exist and given the commitment of the member governments to them, it is not useful to question their existence.

6.09 Instead, to the extent possible, any new initiatives should work with and through the existing sub-regional organizations, in particular ECOWAS, PTA, UDEAC and SADCC. Any arrangements for ECOWAS would automatically cover CEAO and MRU countries which are all members of ECOWAS. In turn, if the ECCAS does become active, it may present a more attractive vehicle for Central African countries than UDEAC given the membership of Zaire and the bridge to the PTA provided by Burundi and Rwanda. Nevertheless, new initiatives should promote factor mobility and the free movement of goods and services within the group as well as generalized trade liberalization with the rest of the world; they should not aim at reversing the failure to activate customs unions with high barriers against non-members including those on the continent.

6.10 This means that specific provision will have to be made for inter-union liberalization and to avoid excluding non-member African trading partners that may have more liberal trading arrangements and/or have extensive trade relations with some group members, such as Botswana and Zimbabwe in the context of the PTA and Zaire and Congo in the case of UDEAC. This is why it is importa. to establish a structure that is open to all SSA countries but where each is .llowed to proceed at its own pace. Also it may be preferable (and practically it will be easier) for a few committed countries to voluntarily agree on far-reaching mutual liberalization rather than for these countries to wait for action by a large disparate collection.

6.11 To reconcile these elements, it is proposed that the starting point should be the existing undertakings and agreements by the member states. To date these have generally amounted to little more than declarations of intent to reduce tariffs. It would be desirable to encourage all the member States to implement mutual liberalization rapidly and in unison. However, there may be difficulties for some members to proceed faster than already agreed. Therefore, existing organizations should allow and indeed encourage sub-groups of states to implement more rapid and extensive elimination of trade barriers and obstacles to labor and capital mobility between them, while recognizing that some members would not want to proceed further than already agreed. To support these efforts, donors could assist those individual member States that are prepared to relax controls on cross-border flows of factors of production and goods and services.

6.12 There are many possible options that could be pursued by donors and African governments and regional organizations. Indeed, many of these will not be mutually exclusive and different forms of intervention will be more effective in different circumstances. One approach that would be operationally consistent with the objectives suggested above would be to establish a blueprint defining the various steps that would eventually result in a regional agreement on the free movement of goods and services and factors of production while achieving a generalized lowering of barriers against imports from third parties. This blueprint could be turned into **predetermined** Articles of Agreement which would be structured so that, following voluntary negotiations between them, SSA Governments could select which the sequence of clauses to adhere to on a reciprocal basis at any given time. 19/ Preparing these Articles will require discussions involving key national governments, organization secretariats and interested donors.

6.13 Donors, including the Bank, would have to ensure that the Articles of Agreement are consistent with their objectives if they are to provide financial support to encourage implementation of the various liberalization measures to be defined by the Articles. Once this is done, however, any negotiations would involve only SSA governments on a bi-or multi-lateral

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19/ To avoid the danger of establishing a "crazy quilt" of preferences, the proposed Articles will have to envisage a clear sequence of steps leading to the free flow of factors and products amongst participating countries. It should also be envisaged that the agreements will gradually be multi-lateralized, as the number of bi-lateral deals achieving a given level of liberalization increases.

basis to decide which liberalization measures to implement at any given time. Indeed, where genuine mutual self-interest is involved, there may be no need for donor involvement, even though donors can facilitate the process by providing resources to get the process going. The blueprint is already more or less defined by the steps envisaged in the Lagos Plan of Action and reflected in the various treaties setting up the existing sub-groupings.

6.14 No country would be required to agree on any of the measures envisaged in the Articles of Agreement and in exchange the States wanting to proceed only at the pace envisaged in current agreements would agree not to veto more extensive or rapid measures of liberalization amongst others; for example the liberal trading and investment agreement between Malawi and Zimbabwe could be reactivated under such a scheme.

C. Consistency with the Aims of the Existing Regional Groupings

6.15 The groupings usually acknowledge, as in the case of the PTA, that "unless simultaneously with the reduction and eventual elimination of tariffs, non-tariff barriers are also eliminated, the effort of eliminating tariffs can be easily nullified" (PTA 88-017, page 4). Therefore, it would be consistent with the agreed objectives to concentrate efforts on eliminating non-tariff obstacles to trade.

6.16 Similarly, the proposed emphasis on factor mobility is fully consistent with the broad objectives of the major economic groupings in SSA that see the current agreements "as a first step towards the establishment of a Common Market and eventually of an Economic Community ... to promote co-operation and development in all fields of economic activity particularly in the fields of trade, customs, industry, transport, communications, agriculture, natural resources and monetary affairs with the aim of raising the standard of living of its peoples, of fostering closer relations among its Member States, and to contribute to the progress and development of the African continent." (PTA Treaty, Chapter 2).

6.17 The major area of divergence concerns the granting of regional preferences. The objective of existing unions is to pursue import substituting industrialization behind high barriers against third parties, while the Bank would argue for a lowering of external barriers. Fortunately, in practice regional preferences to date have been few and generally insignificant. Further, given the increasing emphasis on adjustment programs by African governments, it does not seem difficult to envisage a new consensus where the previous objectives of high Common External Protection could be de-emphasized.

D. Consistency with Ongoing Bank Efforts

6.18 The Bank is supporting the efforts of SSA countries geared to the elimination of economic distortions and greater integration into the World Trading System. Amongst other measures, this involves:

(a) greater reliance on market clearing prices for the allocation of resources, including foreign exchange;

(b) efforts geared at rationalizing and reducing effective protection through tariff reform coupled with the elimination of quantitative restrictions; and

(c) measures designed to increase private sector economic activity.

6.19 The main elements required to ensure that a regional operation reinforces these actions will be summarized here based on the more extensive discussion in Chapter II.

6.20 Any proposed operation should be formulated to provide another channel for those that may be unable to move far or fast on their own and not be articulated as an alternative to current efforts at the national level. In particular, for the strategy to be effective, regional efforts will need to offset the smaller number of partners affected with a bolder and faster dismantling of barriers than envisaged in current national programs. Ideally, it will involve complete non-tariff liberalization of trade and capital flows as well as full labor mobility with regional partners.

6.21 At the very least all non-tariff trade barriers should be removed and firms from any partner country within the group should be treated as domestic firms rather than as foreign firms, with provision for the free flow of inputs and dividends across the national boundaries within the group. Freer market access and greater factor mobility is needed to attract the foreign private investment that is sorely lacking in the region. Therefore, current discrimination in the preferences according to ownership of firms or according to the nature of the traded good or service must end, at least for those countries to benefit from Bank financial assistance. Where there are legitimate concerns over uncompetitive behavior, this must be dealt with by appropriate regulation without excluding potentially dynamic actors from contributing to increased regional economic activity.

6.22 Securing trade and investment flows that contribute to lasting growth will involve, amongst other measures, establishing some market clearing price mechanism for regional activity whenever it is not possible to move the exchange rate sufficiently to sustain a non-restrictive payments system. It will therefore be an important pre-requisite to allow free pricing of all transactions by the private sector including the principle of free trading of regional currencies against each other.

6.23 The value of the regional approach lies in its potential to immediately bring competition to firms that would otherwise be sheltered because of the extremely small market size of all African economies (except for Nigeria and possibly Cameroon). But limited competition from neighbors only makes sense if it is a step on the way to more open competition from the Rest of the World.

E. Some General Modalities

6.24 It is too early to be specific about the tranching of reforms, but the main elements to be embodied in any Articles of Agreement would involve the following:

(a) the implementation of non-tariff liberalization measures already agreed to by the member 20/;

(b) recognition that not all countries would be able and willing to liberalize at the same rate and therefore allowing those that want to move faster to do so without being subject to the veto of those not wishing to proceed further than existing agreements;

(c) treating any regional currency (of a participant in the proposed scheme) as domestic currency for purposes of exchange control and therefore allowing any such currency to be freely held and disposed of within the participating member States on the understanding that such funds can not be used to request foreign exchange from any participating Central Bank;

(d) the creation of a "second window" at the relevant Clearinghouse where private agents, acting through their commercial bank, can

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20/ Donor support for tariff discrimination against non-members would be hard to justify and in any case tariffs are not the major problem in generating official intra-African trade.

freely trade the currencies of participating members against each other;

(e) abolition of all import and export restrictions for intra-group trade carried out through the second window and therefore not necessitating foreign exchange from the Central Bank;

(f) the abolition of exchange controls for all intra-group investment undertaken through the second window and provision for the free repatriation of dividends through the same mechanism;

(g) adoption of legislation and regulations that would treat any firm operating in the participating member States, regardless of ownership, as a national firm in any participating country that it operates in through the second window. This implies repeal of ownership and other eligibility requirements;

(h) implementing, on a phased basis, mobility for skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled labor;

(i) agreement to limit intra-group preferences to an effective protection differential of no more than, say 20 percent at the end of, say, five years 21/;

(j) extending preferences to all goods and services instead of a restricted common list.

F. Compensation

6.25 Evidence from the US and the EC suggests that the creation of larger economic units results in increased specialization with significant dispersion of per capita income to be expected. An issue for research, is whether income dispersion is actually increased through integration and if the outcome is dependent on the degree of factor mobility.

6.26 African integration efforts tend to want to go against this reality: they aim at sharing industrialization "fairly" and equalizing per capita income. Efforts at industrial planning have failed not only in SSA but also elsewhere, most spectacularly in the Andean Pact. Other compensation mechanisms have been unsatisfactory, probably reflecting the conflict between these policies and natural economic forces.

6.27 The purpose of integration should be to improve resource allocation and this will raise absolute incomes. Relative incomes of some partners may diverge and certainly the emergence of a few poles of industrialization should be expected. Any set of countries pursuing regional integration will have to accept this as a starting point.

6.28 This is not to say that there is no room for compensation mechanisms. However, the primary objective of compensation should be to equalize benefits to private economic agents rather than to national Governments. This can best be achieved by extending employment and investment opportunities and opening up goods and services markets in the more advanced countries to those from the economically weaker ones. Nevertheless, since successful regional integration will depend on the assent of Governments, there will also have to be workable means of transferring compensation between governments. In implementing any such

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21/ Any tariff preferences should be reasonable, and no particular significance should be attached to the suggested 20 percent. The main point is that tariff differentials have to be limited, preferably by lowering the external tariff rates.

scheme, it will be essential to avoid negating the benefits that should accrue to the private sector.

6.29 Compensation schemes should move away from the existing pattern in SSA with emphasis on the financing of supposedly 'regional' projects in the poorer countries. In practice, it has been hard to find viable regional projects that could not have been financed by donors such as the World Bank or the ADB. The danger is that funds specifically set aside for regional projects could be spent for political reasons on schemes with a low or even negative rate of return. There is also a danger that such funds would finance plant and equipment that would be incompatible with a rational deployment of resources from a regional perspective.

6.30 A more attractive option would be a direct transfer to the budget of the weaker economies, on the model of the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU). SACU shares revenues with deliberate over-compensation to the weaker members and this seems to be a useful path to follow. Similarly, in the US, economic specialization has not created excessive tensions largely because it is accepted that solidarity requires the provision of resources to the poorer parts of the nation to allow them to support similar levels of public services as in the wealthier parts of the country.

6.31 SACU shares trade taxes. To avoid conflicts between external trade liberalization and fiscal revenue, it may be preferable to share total revenue or sales taxes (on the model of the EC which shares VAT receipts). This also has the advantage of moving from a "mercantilistic" view of compensation for losses of income arising from tariff concessions to a more broad based view of the benefits of integration and the need to maintain regional solidarity. This is even more relevant in the sort of framework advocated here which emphasizes increased competition and factor mobility instead of tariff concessions to partners while maintaining high barriers against third parties.

6.32 African governments should avoid reliance on donors to finance compensation schemes to discourage countries from participating mainly to benefit from foreign aid and to ensure that the mechanism is sustainable. This should not preclude donors from financing regional projects or infrastructure, but such financing should be provided on the merit of the projects and not as a means of providing compensation. With budgets remaining severely constrained for the foreseeable future, the temptation to renege on regional responsibilities may be difficult to resist. This suggests some urgency in devising a mechanism with some automacity in the transfers to weaker states.

G. <u>The nature of possible Bank intervention</u>

6.33 Intervention along the proposed lines would be a new undertaking for the Bank and raises questions regarding the most practical approach to adopt. The most straightforward way of proceeding would be to make lines of credit available to individual governments as part of a project with a regional grouping, such as the proposed UDEAC SAL. Under the sort of scheme envisaged, there would be no need for providing foreign exchange to finance intra-group trade or investment since regional currencies could be freely held and exchanged by the private sector through the proposed "second window". However, in line with achieving the objective of encouraging factor mobility and achieving the rationalization of industry through mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures, there is room for providing foreign exchange that would be used for inputs and machinery that has to be imported from outside the region by joint ventures or in the context of regional operations of regionally based firms.

6.34 The financing of the regional currency component of such schemes would be through legalizing the second window and the foreign currency component would be by donors such as the Bank. There would, therefore, be no justification for requiring import licenses or inhibiting the outflow of investment funds to other participating regional partners, and so full liberalization of exchange controls could be justified for such undertakings.

6.35 This approach has the merit that it reinforces the liberalization being undertaken under structural adjustment programs while not requiring complicated new types of lending arrangements involving many partners since each country would be responsible for the drawing down of the line of credit that benefits firms resident within its borders. It also has the advantage that conditionality would be predetermined and that countries would freely, according to what is politically feasible, decide how far and fast they would want to proceed. This avoids the pitfalls of requiring joint agreement by several governments simultaneously which risks either getting bogged down or just limiting progress by all to the rate of the slowest. Finally, it solves the problem that some SSA countries qualify for IDA credits while others would benefit from IBRD loans.

6.36 An alternative approach would be to lend to regional financial institutions and the Bank has actually received requests to help activate the government created PTA Bank; to support FOSIDEC (the development fund of CEAO), to finance the ECOWASFUND and to participate, through IFC, in the expansion of the privately owned ECO-Bank serving ECOWAS. The advantages of acceding to such requests reside, on the one hand, in the precedents for the Bank to lend to regional development banks and, on the other hand, the liability would be held by one well identified agent. However there are offsetting disadvantages that suggest that this avenue should be avoided.

6.37 The agreement to set up such financial institutions typically results from pressure by the weaker states to have a mechanism where they could secure some direct benefits in the form of projects. This raises questions of susceptibility to political pressure to undertake projects that neither the World Bank nor ADB find justified and that other donors will not finance.

6.38 The most important objection, however, arises from questioning if public money should be used to support such institutions. These institutions could, as just outlined, duplicate the role of the Bank and the ADB or might duplicate the role of the commercial banks in financing trade and investment or in the limit would duplicate the role of national Development Finance Institutions.

6.39 The strongest case for such institutions arises from the reluctance of commercial banks to finance cross-border operations that reflects real risks that Central Banks may not release foreign exchange at the requisite time. Resolving this problem is crucial and should be addressed in the course of either a regional integration project or through other Bank operations. However, unless it can be shown that existing institutions cannot perform the required tasks, the creation of new institutions should be discouraged.

6.40 It would be more effective and less costly to encourage national Governments to reform their financial sector to allow private commercial banks to compete and to set up an arrangement for the public sector to carry sovereign risk while the commercial banks evaluate and carry commercial risk. Such a partnership in risk sharing would allow financing of trade and investment with limited additional resources required from donors.

6.41 In this respect, there is no compelling case to favor institutions such as the ECO-Bank, just because they want to specialize in serving a regional group 22/ Instead, efforts should be directed at all the established commercial banks, some of whom have approached the ADB concerning risk sharing.

6.42 Some regional financial institutions in SSA, such as BOAD (West Africa Development Bank) do have a positive track record and are certainly worth supporting. However, BOAD has been successful because it has operated on sound financial principles and not because of its regional vocation. Thus, for example, less than 16 percent of its loans have been for regional projects. The experience of BOAD highlights the dangers of directing financial institutions to specifically lend for regional projects. The key message is that financial support should be extended where it will improve efficiency and resource allocation and not according to the vocation of the institution to serve regional needs. If institutions exist or emerge that appear able to do this while also specializing on regional projects, they should certainly be supported by national governments and donors. However, there is no compelling reason to channel scarce resources into creating regional public sector financial institutions where none exist and where existing private and public entities could be enticed or allowed to served the regional market.

H. Coordination with other efforts

6.43 The ADB is actively seeking ways to promote economic integration in Africa, a mission which is part of its mandate. In this context the ADB has undertaken or financed regional studies, financed multinational projects and provided lines of credit to regional financial institutions. More recently, the ADB has sought to promote regional integration by spearheading the creation of Africa wide institutions in the field of housing, insurance and consultancy services and has been considering various options for increasing intra-regional exchange, including the possible creation of an Export-Import Bank. Thus there should be interest and likely areas for cooperation and possibly co-financing with the Bank.

6.44 The EC under its Lome agreement has made provision for financial support to regional integration efforts in Africa and funds earmarked under Lome III have not been fully used up, partly for lack of suitable projects. Preliminary informal contacts with the EC suggest room for joint efforts including, possibly, co-financing.

6.45 The ITC has been actively involved in identifying the trade potential in the region and bringing buyers and sellers together. They have helped organize 4 trade fair since 1987 that have generated US $ 70 million of pro-forma invoices. Actual trade has been constrained by restrictive import licencing and difficulties at the firm level in meeting contracts, although no detailed information is available. There is scope for cooperating with ITC, perhaps by participating in the financing or organization of more frequent contacts between businessmen.

6.46 USAID has been actively seeking to find ways to enhance regional cooperation, especially in Southern Africa. They have abandoned a proposal to set up a regional export revolving fund (of the type operating in Zimbabwe with great success and set up with Bank support), on the grounds that the need for this reflects bad exchange rate policies whose continuance would not allow the fund to revolve. Unlike national schemes such as the one in Zimbabwe, a regional fund would earn non-convertible currencies while supplying convertible foreign currency. It is therefore likely that USAID could be induced to support a regional operation that is well conceived and obtains significant policy reforms that allow private agents to invest and

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22/ The initiative by private businessmen to set up the ECO-Bank should be welcomed. But there is no compelling reason to single it out just because it intends to serve all of ECOWAS.

trade freely. This is even more likely if the discrimination against foreign ownership is ended.

6.47 It may be possible to convince donors supportive of such efforts to make special provisions to grant, in the context of international bids, a certain cost preference to regional undertakings based in participating countries. Further, donors and the Bank could also undertake, in parallel with the changes proposed earlier, to provide technical assistance and other aid to enable regional groupings to formulate sectoral strategies dependent on a regional approach. This may be most relevant for food security and infrastructure but could also be based on production and distribution of specific goods and services, such as fertilizer and transport services, for example.

6.48 The Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS) set up by IFC and MIGA, has been trying to find ways to make SSA more attractive to foreign investment. Its efforts have tended to be focussed on the PTA/SADCC countries and in this context Martin Hartigan has formulated a SPURT proposal that has been informally circulated. SPURT diverges from the current proposals mainly in its view that liquidity is required to allow trade and investment by covering deficit positions, at least in the short term. Adoption of the second window eliminates the need for financing since it shifts the liabilities onto private agents who can sell these off at a market clearing price. Nevertheless there seems to be plenty of scope for coordinating these efforts with the proposed Bank approach.

I. Next steps

6.49 The most important task ahead is to evaluate potential interest and benefit from current thinking in SSA concerning new approaches to achieve efficient economic integration. Donor interest in developing and supporting such initiatives would also need to be more carefully assessed. To the extent that sufficient interest exists to justify an eventual Bank operation, it will become critical to undertake further research of several key issues raised by this report.

(a) Understanding of the restraints to factor mobility and how harmonization of non-tariff barriers would impact on trade flows is crucial, given their importance in the scenario outlined by the report.

(b) Regional preferences could only be justified as intermediate steps to generalized liberalization. It will, therefore, be necessary to devise mechanisms that ensure any Bank support to regional integration does lead to generalized liberalization.

(c) Compensation may be a key issue for the political feasibility of any regional effort. It will be important to study how various compensation mechanisms have been implemented and their strong and weak points.

(d) Understanding unrecorded trade better could be helpful in designing an eventual Bank operation. Given the high costs involved, it may be most productive to concentrate on specific countries and sectors that would be chosen on the basis of possible Bank intervention.

(e) The institutional, as well as the practical, aspects of the payments arrangements needed to sustain interregional liberalization seem to require further exploration. In particular, it may be necessary to get the support of the IMF whose "primary responsibility" in this area has just been reaffirmed.

(f) It needs to be determined whether there is any evidence that commercial banks are not providing adequate pre- and post-export credit for African exporters. If this is the case, there may be large benefits from repairing the market failures and it would be useful to investigate the possibility of sponsoring the refinancing of commercial banks' export pre-financing and lines of supplier and buyer credit or the insurance thereof.

Annex 1

Active Regional Integration Organizations in Africa

ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States (16 members - 15 initial but Cape Verde split from Guinea-Bissau). (Also known as CEDEAO - Communaute Economique des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest).
Founded: 1975
Benin, Burkina, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra-Leone and Togo. (Integrates the CEAO members and MRU members and Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Togo).

PTA - Preferential Trade Area (16).
Formed: 1982. Started 1984 (July 1)
Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe

CEAO - Communaute Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (7)
Founded: 1972. Established: 1974
Benin, Burkina, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal

IOC - Indian Ocean Commission (5)
Founded: 1964. Established: 1966
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Chad and Equatorial Guinea.

UDEAC - Union Douaniere et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale (4)
Founded: 1964. Established: 1966
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Chad and Equatorial Guinea

CEPGL - Communaute Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs (3).
Founded: 1976
Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire

MRU - Mano River Union (also known as Union du Fleuve Mano) (3).
Founded: 1973. Established 1974
Guinea, Liberia and Sierra-Leone
Guinea only joined in 1980

IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF SSA COUNTRIES TO ROW

Food and live animals

	0012 SHEL	0012 SHEL	0019 LIVE	0019 LIVE	0111 BOVI	0111 BOVI	0149 OTH	0149 OTH	0341 FISH	0341 FISH	0342 FISH	0342 FISH	0343 FISH	0343 FISH	0350 FISH	0350 FISH	0360 SHEL	0360 SHEL	0371 FISH	0371 FISH	0411 DURU	0411 DURU
	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports
PTA	203	591	518		8373	6013	3084	12770	432	731	8134	301	434	2844	4006	1166	1292	4016	3477	7130	10443	
BURUNDI					10		131		6	108	9				271		28	2	134			
COMOROS					150		38			1					44	9	4		414			
DJIBOUTI	142				5466		672		4		14		433		68	• 40	704	301	180			
ETHIOPIA							64	3632			8				17		3		158			
KENYA	21						6	4221	8	304		301		12	11	300		1000	130	2	9063	
MALAWI			6				8		17	115					21		25		300			
MAURITIUS	30				2641		1090	3	9	171	2114	100	1	660	1700	411	200	180	2070	7107	57	
RWANDA	13						16		10						101		8		26			
SOMALIA		691			4	10	7							2274	6	86		2040	12		407	
TANZANIA			7		68		233		4	44					430	300		816	58	3		
UGANDA			506		150		717												300		77	
ZAMBIA							163		6	30					478		30	8	132			
ZIMBABWE	7					6008	36	6014	367		1				500		37	7	10			
ECOWAS	29221		1404	1	45086	188	18731	1	83347	32801	174296	27341	37800	4660	168265	1760	3000	180467	101136	107714	1844	
CEAO	271		3		11066	181	3464	1	30826	10620	9717	22600		4663	756	806	3606	115487	6713	103576	'826	
BENIN	250				190		128		5						9		6	1000	86			
BURKINA F					4		718		40						40		7		600		41	
IVORY COA			3		11112		1008		27173	1340		11664			167	18	260	1027	3000	52660	2	
MALI					49		375		8	6					40	91	18		110			
MAURITANIE					40		22			5294	186	5450		4018	801	14	25	51088	66	107	1703	
NIGER	12				297		492		30	1					10		41	60	100			
SENEGAL					163	106	736	1	3071	3079	9681	5786		600	84	307	3216	31341	1211	50613		
MRU					620		1784		27	27	5607	30	5		289	72	24	11030	5007		10	
GUINEA					316		366		26		7	30			7	4	10	420	404			
LIBERIA					406		1221		2	32	2601		5		275	60	4	3601	3306		10	
SIERRA LE					27		190			4	2020				1		1	7081	1216			
OTHER E	28080		1401	1	32375	87	8473		8400	22184	160066	4600	37378		168804	1180	200	9190	98814	4144		
CAPE VERD						87	137			636	8	1040			30			300		710		
GAMBIA					12		216					30			6	1088	60	747	1020			
GHANA	40		30	1	17975		2361		150	20690	18021	2602			3777	321		1061	5600	3405		
GUINEA BI					45		170				13	36			34			1771	214			
NIGERIA	28004		1452		12432		6090		966	82'	141906	27	37378		158048	30	217	4670	80482	20		
TOGO	90				1911		491		1381		1107				438	8		30				
UDEAC	7				22136		8012		276		736	276	1900	13	16078	4	141	13463	14286		417	
CAMEROON					1062		2701		230		720		1900		1008	4	41	2630	3008			
CENTRAL A					14		82		27						18		118		67			
CHAD							50								2		5		1474		416	
CONGO					4160		3317								6677		26		4023			
GABON	2				10741		1770					276			2006		466	10867	3253		1	
EQUATORIA					162		84		10		16		9	13 N.A.				300	516			
CEPGL	13				1194		550		340	476	2002	•			4781	1	90	2	2707		1606	
BURUNDI					10		131		5	108	9				271		28	2	134			
RWANDA	13						15		10						101		2		26			
ZAIRE					1184		453		322	368	2000				4190	1	66		2630		1606	
OTHER S				49010	15741	2280	15069	619	121	707	27	1233	4	209	5001	953	108	58180	34430			3606
ANGOLA					14717		2031		3		21	30	4	7	2006		18		10074			
MADAGASCA						2270	172	619						6		132	1	32280	15			
MOZAMBIQU					394	30	491		113	8	4	1			2134	230		23871	8663			3606
SAO TOME							56												87			
SEYCHELLE					450		367			594		1102		800	2	20	40		14			
SUDAN				49010	171		213		5	10	5	12			80	660	43		1606			
SSA	29426	591	2002	49020	92495	12281	40296	15391	33906	34604	180117	29129	80760	7863	187946	8885	8004	216906	148414	114824	14311	3606

* Column headings are SITC codes. Products corresponding to SITC codes are listed at the end of the table. Read vertically for exporters and importers of a particular product.

	Importe	Exporte	Importe	Exporte	Importe	Exporte	Importe	Exporte	Importe	Exporte	Importe	Exporte	Importe	Exporte	Importe	Exporte	Importe	Exporte	Importe	Exporte	Importe	Exporte
PTA	1040		4190	696	3560	170664	479	30002	1109		661	500	507	40046		600	135		2876	15007	702	2680
BURUNDI			4			1000						8										
COMOROS	6		58								11											
DJIBOUTI	34		284								7		6						9		132	386
ETHIOPIA	1		386		3300	3784	284		6		144		2						2867		272	1284
KENYA				40		104		30013	42		378		600				127			300	244	3
MALAWI			173	65					9			4		814							10	
MAURITIUS	131		1019				9		30		190					888	2			64	21	
RWANDA			6		1				13		7										60	
SOMALIA	4		208		284			28			17											1141
TANZANIA	865		5	600		40675		10087	1010		30	4					2			70	22	331
UGANDA	14		6	21		9744	2				28			88			4				6	1
ZAMBIA			2	30	1	750	187				30	1	7	348						8136	36	
ZIMBABWE			1220	1		50085						350		40850						7102	30	
ECOWAS	1963	26814	4382	99608	84204	[illegible]	806		4934	127184	8600	5445	16780	2867	7848	463096	170128	381717	47	1800	619	3084
CEAO	617	15266	3446	83600	1016	[illegible]	808			50640	800	5420	470	2867	1	156301	140		2	380	86	1666
BENIN			17	40		15214					32								2			
BURKINA F			2		9	40800					43			2867							3	40
IVORY COA	269	15266		63642	6	75786	415				506	4	6		1					80	24	23
MALI			298		420	10640					36						7				5	506
MAURITANI			1410		16	60	7				22					166201					11	6
NIGER	60		360		560	186	5			720	67	1									8	81
SENEGAL	180		1362	7	25	28676	376			57042	66	5617	470				130			219	26	820
MRU	60	20606	130	2204		128					2040		6			307004		380000		166	56	
GUINEA			130	11		128					2							351436		17		
LIBERIA	60	20606		2936							2008		8			290000				140	54	
SIERRA LE				267												6818		10000			1	
OTHER E	1277	662	600	13604	63160	10019	3		4934	60616	3040	32	16872	16	7844		160077	1604	46	1132	470	2319
CAPE VERD			8																		1	
GAMBIA	40	7	26			1200						17	19	10								
GHANA		948	115	12267	10006						307		131				100728	1604		34	31	
GUINEA-BI	10		157	16																		
NIGERIA	1216		216	221	44702	122	1		4934		3041	6	16130		7844		230		46	1077	446	2319
TOGO			176			18446	2			60616										11		
UDEAC	1	15014	47	24604	66	91176	30		168		1002	17	47				66	1800		777	30	7
CAMEROON	3	4182		22670	67	34120	10		156		207		48							744	7	7
CENTRAL A		28		2062		11634							2									
CHAD			47		3	40412															6	
CONGO		1200		8036	17		5				591	16	2				96				54	
GABON		10442		600	9		13		12		1118		1							33	2	
EQUATORIA				338							1	9						1800				
CEPGL	9		14	5332	1	1603			84		16	3	61				27			751	30	
BURUNDI			4			1605						3										
RWANDA			6		1				13		7										10	
ZAIRE	9		4	5332					61		8		61				27			751	10	
OTHER S	566	10	2742	872	4160	201666	9	8701			1864	7637	1426	1200	9	15	84			15	466	66296
ANGOLA			14		30			432			960	16	1200								56	
MADAGASCA				4	2001	96		7190			84	7431			9		73				8	5
MOZAMBIQU		10	2644	860	98	21247	8	1070			166	101		1200		16	11			11	164	6
SAO TOME																						
SEYCHELLE																						
SUDAN	166		64		146	180217					346		87							4	230	66206
SSA	3606	42730	11273	141202	72050	639085	1316	30762	6362	127184	10915	13666	10029	86803	7854	664224	170466	383023	2422	10037	1915	73272

									Animal, veg oil, fat										Chemicals			
	2924 VEG Imports	2924 VEG Exports	2926 SEED Imports	2926 SEED Exports	2926 LIVE Imports	2928 LIVE Exports	2929 ORN Imports	2929 ORN Exports	4234 GROU Imports	4234 GROU Exports	4242 PALM Imports	4242 PALM Exports	4243 COCO Imports	4243 COCO Exports	4244 PALM Imports	4244 PALM Exports	4249 FIXE Imports	4249 FIXE Exports	5121 ACYC Imports	5121 ACYC Exports	5145 AMIN Imports	5145 AMIN Exports
PTA	13114	4749	3423	4606	250	1406	3660	16829	143		66961		118'		26		646	180	4164	790	806	
BURUNDI		206				70			60		130						15		63			
COMOROS	2	2	73			16			26		4		6		8		1		21			
DJIBOUTI	12719		26		8	1			44								200		132			
ETHIOPIA	42	140	244	3022	26	.	290	32			300		1071				12		157		49	
KENYA	163	2726	433	801	140	416	886	14416	1		63679				8		22	66	1740	300	481	
MALAWI	1		80	1	3		76						16				46	76	181	237		
MAURITIUS	136		101	1	10	9	119				3862		16		11		11		129	67	108	
RWANDA		918	140		2	807	106	608	7				23				30		20			
SOMALIA	4		72				12						22		6				1	307		
TANZANIA	30	764	1106	63			193	1617	6								15		209		106	
UGANDA			236				3	132					3				86		45		16	
ZAMBIA	1		646		7		698												191		27	
ZIMBABWE	16	3	256	.67	46		264										6		1225		75	
ECOWAS	621	2255	4044	131	641	4304	7036	1361	1063	112000	130620	18746	718	18490	8049	26980	4307	4420	13634	4804	3730	
CEAO	116	1607	3086	130	144	3438	1114	117	236	104366	10448	10420	19	18490	116	11864	1211	4413	2651	2848	674	
BENIN	3		8				84		17		240	643			9	6204	1	674	77			
BURKINA F		64	62		1		46				7						342	607	61		39	
IVORY CST	72	1606	221	120	26	3438	303	81	1		3	9701		18490		6660	140	3041	1297	3087	296	
MALI		3	60		6		11		5	609	721	1			8		2	370	16		3	
MAURITANI			9						132		726				11		602		32			
NIGER	2		176		11		632	86	80	9	4700				98		11		632		101	
SENEGAL	28	26	644	1	91		78	N A		103741	3040	1	16				26	12	637	661	62	
MRU	3	60	122		16	88	371	963	73		120	3332				194	1148		404		16	
GUINEA		8	92			1	4		30		83	830				102	10		12			
LIBERIA	3		23		10	37	120	17	1		37	3406				12	701		441		16	
SIERRA LE		84	7				247	946	34			8					334		21			
OTHER E	303	506	3601	1	487	743	6360	201	746	7644	119987	6	690		8731	14032	2033	7	10399	2154	3160	
CAPE VERD			3						33										10			
GAMBIA	9		9				18		3	7644	240						8		2			
GHANA		494	2844		487		1728	287	621		630		198		2870		1247		5367		642	
GUINEA-BI			8				3	N A											8		125	
NIGERIA	292	5	826	1			4693	14	109		110603	6	306		1042	13702	767		2891	2156	2449	
TOGO	2	13	2			743	16	N A			196				10	1160	18	7	121		4	
UDEAC	215	3904	1126		100	7	1972	1723	800	243	14	2146			104	406	6243		2173	60	350	
CAMEROON	27	3900	170		21	7	1464	1723	20	243	8	2140				406	6		1433		157	
CENTRAL A			15		14		30		15		10						24		22			
CHAD	166	2	2				64		24						104		1		19	67	1	
CONGO	11		15		8		267		342								1006		326		15	
GABON	11		923		67		90		479		1						4407		369		117	
EQUATORIA								N A											4	1		
CEPGL	3	6212	160		26	868	380	886	97		140	670	23			8196	96		237	249	160	
BURUNDI		206				70			60		130						15		63			
RWANDA		918	140		2	807	106	608	7				23				30		20			
ZAIRE	5	5086	20		23	1	156	238	30		2	670				8196	44		154	249	160	
OTHER S	1660	4661	3126	772	130	86	1344	1680	96	4400	18181	776	12700	75	31176	68	1437	1000	1874	9	660	171
ANGOLA	6		1003		80		602		62		71						29		482		174	
MADAGASCA	120	1784	31	11	5	84	197	631	4		230	776		78		68	8		1066		25	
MOZAMBIQU	453	24	1063		23		447	1076	26	772	18181		11377		30002		299	63	127	9	347	
SAO TOME		4	4		19		14	N A											12			100
SEYCHELLE		3	77		1		120	N A									1032		4			71
SUDAN	1000	2764	366	781	2	1	36	43	3	3607	2726		1223		104		80	1095	191		172	
SSA	15416	19559	12595	6607	1154	5708	13814	21704	2209	116720	218477	17261	14680	18465	86184	36722	12750	6636	21098	3920	6113	170

Annex

0412 OTHE0412 OTHE0421 RICE0421 RICE0440 MAIZ0440 MAIZ0459 OTHE0459 OTHE0542 LEGU0542 LEGU0545 OTHE0545 OTHE0548 EDIB0548 EDIB0578 BANA0578 BANA0577 NUTS0577 NUTS0579 FRUI0579 FRUI0585 FRUI0585 FRUI

	Importa	Exporta	Importa	Exporta	Importa	Exporta	Importa	Exporta	Importa	Exporta	Importa	Exporta	Importa	Exporta	Importa	Exporta	Importa	Exporta	Importa	Exporta	Importa	Exporta
PTA	00187		6369	1470	15449	36360	3101	322	6719	31948	1078	31471	4688	167	298	17742	428	33008	2034	5470	1732	7698
BURUNDI	2431			1426							2						1		16	3	4	
COMOROS	4351				129				32		96			8			3	16	1		12	
DJIBOUTI			553		74		842		1062	27	917		46		30		14		861		122	
ETHIOPIA	67802		3		1701		7	7	58	6581	44	370	332		170		2	40	264	38	741	
KENYA	4103		3417	3		9407	1141	318	168	17036	1	20941	1046	19		80	31	6908	13	4967	270	7620
MALAWI			37						17	1013		8		31			3	100		2	41	
MAURITIUS	5		13		4142		8		3125	1	636	107	181	81			222	2	403	41	482	
RWANDA									101		2	2	110						5			
SOMALIA			324		3079		116		480		7		5			17880	4	38	221	6	30	
TANZANIA	2085		769		7701		347		117	6330	8	1	285	4		1	5	26600	261	4	11	
UGANDA	1748				668				1854		54	4	81	1		12				237	44	
ZAMBIA	4907		1249						14		2	29	190	8			17		9	61	7	
ZIMBABWE	11728		4			30961	8			109			2254				123			123		78
ECOWAS	186558	39	13659		96142	4	27116	27	3020	101	20874	8530	10707	186	1448	30083	7186	11288	2290	76016	4485	1848
CEAO	37677	30	3328		2184	4	21721	30	814	9	11069	8489	1520	30	1448	35760	4072	9067	1886	75863	1216	1304
BENIN	6113		2531		183		33		1		29	8	228					124	11	65	39	
BURKINA F	5326		769		8	4	2800		96		11	2862	678				4		44	1180	20	
IVORY COA	36381		20		762		8		158		8447	49	308	30	1	35760	144	8018	719	67876	273	1477
MALI	4053				1168		2727	18	48		8	834	60		300		2229		9	2644	31	
MAURITANI	7412				6		1120		17		1064		51		46		16		206	4	66	4
NIGER	148	30			19		619		6		100	4	178		6		2804	8	407		161	23
SENEGAL	20047				2		14267	11	408	9	3000	4751	49		1106		276	18	808	2023	616	
MRU	4048		54		647		17		189		2081	19	18	2			104	8	222	404	709	
GUINEA			17		16		18		4		170	12		2			13		2	424	53	
LIBERIA	3892		57		114				98		1168		18				77		198	8	858	
SIERRA LE	1253				530		2		29		1098						14	6	22	84	101	
OTHER E	84033		10277		93316		5576	1	2070	92	5678	40	9188	128		268	2079	2178	103	704	2760	41
CAPE VERD	994				2306				333		31					346			1	9	65	
GAMBIA							75		4		151	1	18				338	46		61	84	14
GHANA	45431		100		73173		2070		1120		632	6	220	8			4	14	60	636	278	
GUINEA-BIS A			5		3171		24		16		198		8				4	1002			7	
NIGERIA	13253		1690		12742		2206	1	470	92	4882	21	8007	133		1	1007	131	96	3	2320	27
TOGO	4398		8426		1028		174		129		61	21	18			10	61		27	60	56	
UDEAC	41871		10061		2180		1750	8	218	7	5780	2502	1848	8		21780	98		842	2198	1117	1
CAMEROON	32701		2		1389		1034	8	124		685	2379	1097	8		21782	32		123	2064	193	
CENTRAL A	74								9		34	[illegible]	16				2		24	4	16	
CHAD	678		2720		606		722		11		8								5		5	
CONGO	1042		3782		2		3		22		508	1	143			7	15		66	121	402	
GABON	6679		4043		173				52	7	4668		600				61		141	9	814	
EQUATORIAL A			4								4										3	1
CEPGL	6000		172	1426	1297				180		804	18	800		18		30		30	13	60	
BURUNDI	2432			1426							2						1		16	3	4	
RWANDA									101		2	2	110						5			
ZAIRE	4467		172		1297				29		282	14	98		18		29		9	10	56	
OTHER S	42077	1964	318		31824	1613	4360	3206	27730	4113	1164	103	72	11069	1	291	646	18000	872	2348	994	2
ANGOLA	14584		13		15618	3	1377		15106	29	428			2			244		240	1	204	
MADAGASCA	3419						8		1	3794		108	12			301	1	800		1182	20	
MOZAMBIQU	22104	1964	204		16229	1516	7978		8637	290	341		28	3			5	17770	43	11	19	2
SAO TOME					30				106		1							27		3		
SEYCHELLE					37				145		276		2						44		204	
SUDAN	638		102		610		5	3206	8836		818		30	11064	1		600		748	1181	367	
SSA	346017	2003	7569	1470	144792	37085	36422	3641	37718	36180	79620	32800	17273	12198	1780	75706	8666	62934	8264	86042	8585	9146

0580 FRUI0600 FRUI0611 RAW 0611 RAW 0612 REF 0612 REF 0616 MOLA0615 MOLA0711 COFF0711 COFF0712 COFF0712 COFF0720 COCO0720 COCO0720 CHOC0730 CHOC0741 TEA 0741 TEA 0751 PEPP0751 PEPP0752 SPIC0752 SPIC

	Importe	Exporte	Importe	Exporte	Importe	Exporte	Importe	Exporte	Importe	Exporte	Importe	Exporte	Importe	Exporte	Importe	Exporte	Importe	Exporte	Importe	Exporte	Importe	Exporte
PTA	822	30000	179	256072	14026	33010	1408	11300	6658	1140201	842	1366	610		1841		4012	300101	316	1670	2347	24707
BURUNDI	1		126		2657					73266					166		1	220	80		2	
COMOROS	2		34		374				0	157	4				80		20		2	1	27	14006
DJIBOUTI	104		1		6000		1100		1100		78				171		1246		0		100	
ETHIOPIA	273				42			1066	2640	230001	8				80		1675	10	117	91	130	874
KENYA	10	30070			613	1067		2466	2	260047	8	63	400		10		200	105070	20	1201	84	141
MALAWI		141		8618	7	142			241	3534	10		20		66		4	20700		90	124	14
MAURITIUS	306	47		230700	1	17267		8016	813	71	5				700		21	6000	20	67	1001	34
RWANDA	9				1000				81	79130		130			40		73	2600	4	0	11	6
SOMALIA	6	21			800			840	117		8				6		402				66	
TANZANIA	19	6		3600	1021			868	21	150202	5	1175			11		2	10480	2	20	27	10462
UGANDA	3				264		886		300	320432	226	18			22		120	404		9	32	0
ZAMBIA				13043					400	66					2		300	86	19		63	141
ZIMBABWE		1	0	10020		12004				15400					7		741	4000			214	20
ECOWAS	2167	11010	8426	5254	496371	1040	137	8830	8700	500305	29600	22136	12	155440	6615	15001	10730	1720	867	642	2264	1310
CEAO	1300	11060	7037	4354	24072	13468		8830	3006	547017	17636	22081	12	86486	1706	43702	3616	1417	343	746	549	60
BENIN	3				634				10	4776	29				87		3		1		121	
BURKINA F	9	6			4				31		106				10		974		3	42	7	
IVORY CST	236	10036	1	4354	3706	13467		8782	58	541041	406	21942	8	85184	600	15700	935	2	76	10	151	66
MALI	31	11			7720				106		1605	78			106		335		11	61	8	
MAURITANIA	79	32	66		7834	1		8	43		319				62		21	1418	18		7	
NIGER	227	34			2377				304		1619			1	271		32		7	5	23	3
SENEGAL	602		7776		8007			4676	2600		9102		10		679	0	220		232	827	232	
[illegible]	122		13		8070		2		286	55770	714				212		600	310	49	10	160	707
GHANA	26				2614				180	7260	806				80		12	210	2	10		67
LIBERIA	80		12		3660		1		14	22546	102				90		427		47		144	
SIERRA LE	14				2712				8	33012	17				68		260				16	640
[illegible] E	717		376		463422	1	126		610	46702	18260	118		70865	4687	30	7806	0	306	87	1956	622
CAPE VERD	16				847				109		30				42		3		31		17	
GAMBIA	26				11300				22		84	107		90	162		196			8		
GUINEA	114		16		11834		120		276	2797	286	0		20000	606	30	637		10	21	243	
GUINEA-BI	3				172				65	34	1				5							
NIGERIA	400		561		430414	1	3		180	4676	18000			40120	2051		6060		102	60	1746	822
TOGO	40								8	40086	51				41		10	0	4		49	
UDEAC	600		230	5301	5414			400	1128	270020	496		6	20000	670		1214	11	56	206	222	131
CAMEROON	106		12	620	60				20	227062	218		8	20000	100		102	1	5	110	31	120
CENTRAL A	5				717				4	20076	14		2		40		4			67	2	
CHAD	2		101		150				20		6				9		800					3
CONGO	264		40	4640	4400			400	900	6300	60				102		62		1		65	
GABON	226				15				107	3064	100				600		116		36		124	
EQUATORIA	1				30				1	500					0			16		2		
CEPGL	34	0	327		4022				60	312054	5	126			300		104	4406	60	124	36	60
BURUNDI	1		126		2687					73268					166		1	220	86		2	
RWANDA	9				1000				81	79130		136			40		79	2600	4	8	11	6
ZAIRE	64	9	202		307				17	160480	5	1			210		30	1701	5	118	42	61
OTHER E	1712	560	7	26031	4672	19109	19	19430	6065	165287	127		1666		1472		32084	16310	1220	3405	1356	87200
ANGOLA	1644		5		251				87	43729	16		1606		377		161		40		106	
MADAGASCA	7			3660	3400	6700		1170	6	120410	4				14		6	266	1	3456	3	86417
MOZAMBIQUE	30	642		4304	29	12310		11726	2076	1084	9		1		104		667	15010	20		7	11
SAO TOME					200					111				N A			2			23		
SEYCHELLE	49		1	26000	210				130		70				200				71		104	201
SUDAN	82	60	1		204		19	6537	2664		19				867		32040	42	1042	3	1043	
SSA	8546	51432	9243	302530	521280	64379	1650	30400	17775	2367703	20606	33006	3400	160040	10000	18000	49060	380046	2207	6316	6261	122027

Annex

	Beverages and tobacco												Crude material excl fuel									
	0813 ALCO	0813 ALCO	0814 MEAT	0814 MEAT	1211 TOBA	1211 TOBA	1212 TOBA	1212 TOBA	1213 TOBA	1213 TOBA	1200 OTH	1200 OTH	2221 GROU	2221 GROU	2228 OERA	2228 OERA	3300 OIL	3300 OIL	3800 NATU	3800 NATU	2472 SAW-	2472 SAW-
	Importe	Exporte	Importe	Exporte	Importe	Exporte	Importe	Exporte	Importe	Exporte	Importe	Exporte	Importe	Exporte	Importe	Exporte	Importe	Exporte	Importe	Exporte	Importe	Exporte
PTA	12921	14241	2406	624	890	98774	2900	200176	1962	5104	5510	10510	457	1204	500	800	80	2174	10090	100	220	111
BURUNDI		37							1015		N.A.			20								
COMORES											N.A.										1	7
DJIBOUTI	361		90								2		100		517		24		20			
ETHIOPIA	1677	820		604	110		66				148					400	1	1772	2000			
KENYA	520	1320	620		13						12	11		6		130	7	306	3071			6
MALAWI			176			26205		82000		2020	0	7406		1150					47	13		
MAURITIUS	1346		602		5		540				1		20		6		6		347	170	286	
RWANDA	4								82		4000											
SOMALIA	1	.					108				201		13				2				8	
TANZANIA	2	4410	640			3204		10234		720	[illegible]	602						6	3700		2	76
UGANDA		716				370		120		90	2					50					1	
ZAMBIA	370					10106		4004		50		640							2004			
ZIMBABWE	422				750	30000	2240	100478	204	2260	34	1012	300	101					4007			22
ECOWAS	11070	64016	6066	2000	19071	407	12637	56	1200		1022	1016	400	20400	37	2000	600	20066	200	122004	1216	317074
CEAO	1030	50387	73	2000	6700	25	10000	50	76		670		464	6720	25	2000	106	10310	144	27000	1176	262200
BENIN	23	2260	5		4044						71			12					27	26	4	
BURKINA F	4	2531					600		2		2					2000	2	12213				2
IVORY COA	923	11176					9046		87		476		60			40	6	1000	17	27002		262120
MALI	43	2490			43	26					272			16		20				22	9	
MAURITANI	26		12		1213								26									1074
NIGER		340	4		2630			56			7		570	105	50		60	10		10	22	
SENEGAL	17	40424	82	2000	1226		420		17		62			4007				3120	100		1120	45
MRU		274			1222	206	200		27		400	1516		1	1	0	2	1244		74700	6	44402
GUINEA		..			1222	.			27		146			1				316			6	4140
LIBERIA						20					810					0	2			74700		40534
SIERRA LE		120				204	200				24	1040			1			1000				
OTHER E	10042	7206	6700		6006	46	2006		1106		240		20	25700		0	667	6672	60	20407	26	9142
CAPE VERD	64																				0	
GAMBIA		1200			2670		125				12			10000								3
GHANA	1025	61	604		942		2400		66		81		20				5	66	46			8077
GUINEA-BISSAU			60		37									2066			4	667				143
NIGERIA	8706	5322	2041		6146	2	70		1521		167					0	467	5271	14	20407	20	115
TOGO	2	514	0		171	44					56						68	2276				4
UDEAC	743	2700	112		6006	10000	601	570	1006	2202	506	19	2	1				601	16	14706	9	254694
CAMEROON	246	1202	66		2511	0264	715	426	1004	2271	160	19		1				601		14662		75399
CENTRAL A					196	1220	106	161	2	11	96									70		4701
CHAD		1277	12								21		2								9	
CONGO		80	15		1077	204					5								8	70		43330
GABON	467										117								12	2		124430
EQUATORIAL A											9											6706
CEPGL	792	1047	26		210	12	4		1007		4082		17	20			2		7	11726		11619
BURUNDI		37							1015					20								
RWANDA	1								82		4000											
ZAIRE	205	1040	31		710	12	4						17				2		7	11729		11619
OTHER S	200	75250	1220		936	4200	1027	400		60	3120		5716	6720	1042	29075	611	70	12006	26	101	1403
ANGOLA	206		2				206						1320						275			5
MADAGASCA		302			922	2040		90			60			100				4		4		
MOZAMBIQU		414	1070			1100	471	280		60	5		4406		1042	844	611		10096			1200
SAO TOME			36															66	2			110
SEYCHELLE											46		21							28		
SUDAN		24562	127		14		251				2005			6020		25720			2514	3	101	
SSA	25012	130077	10723	2713	27601	114266	10471	204220	4237	6506	10464	12136	6670	42608	2000	82040	1226	20000	31606	140822	1664	104002

Annex 3

	Basic manufactures																					
	5232 STM	5232 STM	5241 RADI	5241 RADI	5322 DYE	5322 DYE	5413 ANTI	5413 ANTI	5414 VEG	5414 VEG	5515 ESSE	5515 ESSE	5922 CHEM	5922 CHEM	6114 LEAT	6114 LEAT	6341 VENE	6341 VENE	6342 PLYW	6342 PLYW	6412 PRIN	6412 PRIN
	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports
PTA	13030	11050	210		473	6780	5550		198	315	1801	3021	10951	1	584	11050	1120	19	5765	12	18734	37
BURUNDI	183						18			78	5		30		4	55			92		436	
COMOROS	9						136				2	2700						16	45		37	
DJIBOUTI	36				8						7				4		1		72		73	
ETHIOPIA	470		4		285		532				62	2	6010			1581	384		604		1581	
KENYA	5580	11050	160		90	4517	4500		62		580	181	2075			6000	4		270	12	1865	
MALAWI	1360										236		5417				87		71		4085	
MAURITIUS	810		1		47		704		17		80		1461	1	380	1			1287		1162	
RWANDA	141						76		2	237	380		51		6		70		647		735	
SOMALIA	588				7		2									118	8		44		170	
TANZANIA	4060		27		8	1408	600		18		18	48			1	1047	81		490		2346	27
UGANDA	123						73				6				80		2		35		998	
ZAMBIA	284		16			108	2		52		118				77						1267	
ZIMBABWE			2			888	135		38		178				8	1307	807	4	2		1866	
ECOWAS	173144	47	311	232640	205	887	4048	183	2246		2077	2206	5630	6646	3805	129	1434	39130	35790	387	66376	47
CEAO	6063	21	64	232640	141	810	374		87		207	2075	462	6400	606	55	60	16102	6300	196	10723	17
BENIN	306	21			4		40				22				30		1		300		720	
BURKINA F	702				4						1		40		30				41		72	
IVORY COA	2347		30		16	400	97		8		67	2048	2		587			16108	22	196	6406	
MALI	94		4		9		74				20	24	300		7	66	37		404		249	17
MAURITANI	30					30	35				76		30		74				376		96	
NIGER	1974		8	232640	46		90				10	8			14		12		716		734	
SENEGAL	821		22		66		30		9		90		10	6420					3866		3361	
MRU	436	30			36	5	338		1		176	130	170		36	8	30	11	1715	6	1634	
GUINEA	14	30					11					130	51		36	8	3	11	471		1208	
LIBERIA	220					8	316		1		113		7				22		491		344	
SIERRA LE	183				36		4				43		158						253	6	67	
OTHER E	166666	3	147		132		4136	180	2667		1804		4907	150	1844	30	1306	2667	10815	122	53019	30
CAPE VERD	11						2								30		2		5		100	
GAMBIA	13		10				32				5								30		118	
GHANA	11280	2			13		740		66		56		66		306			8804	516	100	7414	
GUINEA-BI								180							1		2		60		34	
NIGERIA	154846		137		194		3384		2306		1800		4017		1512	50	1351	40	10420	22	44618	30
TOGO	536						76		3		37		2	150	60		4		942		730	
UDEAC	2476		1902	60190	31		61		116		165	58	882		184	484	333	34000	220	22662	6444	
CAMEROON	1235		1900		16						48		816		158	484	11	12416	129	6764	6546	
CENTRAL A					1		19				6	30						770	6	224	122	
CHAD	12						16				56								11		41	
CONGO	722		3		7		29		67		10		16		34		2	17471	[illegible]	66	964	
GABON	506		31	60190	3		8				0		406				216	3007	38	15500	1230	
EQUATORIA	1				4				19				8					447	2			
CEPGL	818		2		7		240		7	8006	298		97		18	56	72	2786	662	820	2263	
BURUNDI	183						18			78	5		30		4	55			92		436	
RWANDA	141						76		2	237	380		51		6		70		647		735	
ZAIRE	494		2		7		249		5	7691	20		7		8		2	2786	23	820	1092	
OTHER S	4260	36	70		681	191	306		264		832	8735	836		985	3033	177		1303		7617	67
ANGOLA	970		15		37				4		43				813		33		114		3023	4
MADAGASCA	207	36	28		641	44	154		191		19	8768	263		92	1016	96				71	
MOZAMBIQU	1610					147	2				12						1		223		606	
SAO TOME	11						4		1				4									37
SEYCHELLE											1	1	3						593		290	
SUDAN	1302		26		3		126		66		757	1	75			217	49		363		3038	46
SSA	3?1313	11133	2506	300867	1497	7468	12299	183	2967	8007	4906	6044	22664	6647	4405	14686	2977	60948	51026	23821	101472	140

	6613 COTT	6613 COTT	6614 SWN	6614 SWN	6621 GREY	6621 GREY	6676 CARD	6676 CARD	6612 CEME	6612 CEME	6672 DIAM	6672 DIAM	6673 FRAC	6673 FRAC	6716 FERR	6716 FERR	6735 SRN,	6735 SRN,	6781 SRN	6781 SRN	6744 SRN,	6744 SRN,
	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports
PTA	14050	1028	17256	5700	11204	5606	5413	14238	13539	22100	2737	27514	1070	26866	1207	112876	8353	14778	7502	220	6741	
BURUNDI	316		1318		4	114	140					10266	26		4				11		41	
COMOROS	47		26		30		334		1590						1							
DJIBOUTI	3				456		15		346					86							10	
ETHIOPIA	1300		3225		537		222		150		14		16	17	77		906		1120		1167	
KENYA			1466	30	86		604	176	294	21760		59		11006	218		2166		6606		2807	
MALAWI	573		300		9	4010	260		71													
MAURITIUS	5736	1	3702	5770	150		136	1	3190		2550	3705		4			2280		17		334	
RWANDA	91		77	N A			17		4705		10								4		200	
SOMALIA	66				2		110		1416						30				165		21	
TANZANIA	430	934	3712		111	600	357	14066	904		105	5405		686	678		2		643		501	
UGANDA	721		212		2046		344		1801		2		4						[illegible]		52	
ZAMBIA	1206		1674		262	12	670		16	349	26	2232	417	9970		67		2774			1366	
ZIMBABWE	4276	998	2344		7406	267	2270		0		67	266	740	2622		112876		11200		220		
ECOWAS	20102	2296	62810	2	26022	10706	81276	2	266773	11	206	170604	2261	676	4002	20	22266		10707		14070	
CEAO	5636	2200	4267	2	10238	10760	3020	1	33607	2	206	22326	1072	20	168	20	1172		4642		2240	
BENIN	454		14		312		154		1418			80			1				64		47	
BURKINA F	436		3		1477	2	46		97						8						264	
IVORY COA	1054	2007	2926		6306	10760	736		140277		1	81073	26		110		112		2044		723	
MALI	2533		16		20		44		11130		27	2020	608	10	10				6		61	
MAURITANIE	24		4	2	1167		224		2096		72	127	70		26	11	0		269		61	
NIGER	13		14		2549		100		4223	2	106		87			10	1061		663		630	
SENEGAL	294	222	1301		6403	6	1728	1	4563			27	107	9	26				1462		572	
MRU	471		63		2001		906		9421		1	406607	26	346	44		20		401		4758	
GUINEA	26		10		14		99		3373			7406	26	80	41				26		156	
LIBERIA	200		11		2649		219		4406		2	67564		218	8		50		331		3078	
SIERRA LE	144		24		18		400		1563			31020							24		124	
OTHER E	27946	6	10406		2690		17241	1	302748	9		39662	1160	204	4105		21069		14614		7573	
CAPE VERDE	77		2		87		23		606										3		63	
GAMBIA	142	N.A.			296		141		770	0		5260	1	30							26	
GHANA	4661	2	664		1543		9631		56365			81906		6	140		4				701	
GUINEA-BI	61		1		120		31		263			120									6	
NIGERIA	20066	4	87620		530		7626		194671				1172	161	4010		20002		14600		6634	
TOGO		N A			1106			1				1004	16	67	18		66				30	
UDEAC	706	84	1071		21807	6616	2278		6660		63	66661	190	9	287	20	2462		1887		8574	41
CAMEROON	372	84	1961		54	6604	808				20	0			46		2447		1887		1464	41
CENTRAL A	2		10		75		33		3			22704	101		3	20					79	
CHAD	20				12420	631	134		66		29										14	
CONGO	262				6262		374		3610			26600		0	14						4156	
GABON	110				2906		691		1662			30	5		206		0				2024	
EQUATORIA	1						41		302		4						7				38	
CEPGL	602		2060		374	994	694		4800		40	129600	84	560	62				13		1515	
BURUNDI	316		1318		4	114	140					10266	26		4				11		41	
RWANDA	91		77				17		4705		10								4		200	
ZAIRE	306		673		370	780	537		96		20	129136	0	566	56				10		1294	
OTHER S	1446	3119	4790		1041	10064	9940	220	10750	12		6	0	1694	1000	2611	77	22412	1807	6694	3705	2298
ANGOLA	760		1917		614		2047		2686	3		6	6	200	1517		47		1184		1730	
MADAGASCA	60		1956		50	10064	464	220	4394				1	666	20	23					1310	
MOZAMBIQU	184		678		0		683		11	1				568	47	2400		22412	6	6694	130	2298
SAO TOME							5		163													
SEYCHELLE	60				13		96		667					11					23			
SUDAN	683	3119	240		1148		4645		3039	8			2	5			30		422		625	
SSA	56670	7421	87511	6801	60044	42902	36440	14462	326108	22124	3036	390724	4162	30107	7807	118944	30166	86487	30001	6914	33466	2339

Misc manufactures

	[illegible]		[illegible]		[illegible]		[illegible]		[illegible]		[illegible]		[illegible]		[illegible]		[illegible]		[illegible]		[illegible]	
	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports
PTA	3687		54082	18	31881		88	9808	1814	68	11868	22046	2008	3408	898	2188	434	2884	3670	9248	647	53396
BURUNDI	30		314		3049								34				176				90	
COMOROS	14		8		712		1						12		0		6		34		7	7
DJIBOUTI	2		9		898		4				2		527	8	88		18		426		100	4
ETHIOPIA	86		17429		4176		5		203		2136		326		303		36	17	191		48	
KENYA	1751		16712		1677		2		734		3200	13	110	20	18	6	3	84	32		7	8
MALAWI	133		3300	18	1567		1		73		34		45					10	70			
MAURITIUS	176		701		408		30	1			96		30	3372	7	2130	44	3020	11	9243	34	63132
RWANDA	80		9143		3356								131		140		20		158		179	
SOMALIA	123		62		849					50	6		99		8				74		6	
TANZANIA	835		2776		3380		1		806		3807	3068	40		15				15		3	
UGANDA	79		43		464						364		304	13	28		67		480		102	
ZAMBIA	800		3484		304		5	9804				19070	38		9		73		47		41	
ZIMBABWE							31				1910		362	165			58	118	3033	2	11	245
ECOWAS	7001	14	188944		44774		408	18	18180	109262	20271	2162	10020	6864	901	6	7081	67	17302	56	4733	120
CEAO	988	14	10626		13024		331		7		1784		1220	6606	107		3760	4	1371	13	1156	100
BENIN	29		97		1108		2						288		46		86		670		91	
BURKINA F	83		811		2751								8		18		1	1	28	2	49	
IVORY COA	268		6430		419		181		8		1688		130	6800	74		71				556	27
MALI	60	14	727		2339		13						116		88		13	1	175		45	
MAURITANI	47		50		423		3						8		1		13	9	69	11	57	60
NIGER	158		150		807		4						71		8		3492		141		186	2
SENEGAL	817		2244		5677		180		4		81		726	8	0		86		300		172	3
MRU	288		127		2549			2			8		336	22	22	9	369	80	367	33	71	20
GUINEA	52		54		251								80		9		5		31		21	
LIBERIA	24		61		1607			1			2		151	22	30	9	363	80	333	33	44	28
SIERRA LE	170		12		611			1			0		5				1		3		6	
OTHER E	5081		158791		28401		307	12	18180	109262	10447	2153	8486	87	708		2002	4	15604	0	2505	
CAPE VERD	6		9		3								9						4		10	
GAMBIA	22		10		1709								74	9			8		59	6	13	
GHANA	168		663		1744		9		1294	109262			1880	28	491		840		7208		890	
GUINEA-BI	6		26		38						1		108				10		53		55	
NIGERIA	3653		168166		24609		27[illegible]	12	13690		10304	2163	6774		300		1946	4	7967		2701	
TOGO	70		517		159				1		143		140		2		104		195		32	
UDEAC	480		3894		4008		110		373	64844	703		948	1	118		862		3670		477	
CAMEROON	441		3660		3733		70		373	64680	701		800	1	118		780		1644		418	
CENTRAL A	14		10		67		3						22		2		71		74		23	
CHAD	10		4		54								2		8		0		8			
CONGO							3		1	14	8								607			
GABON							26												300			
EQUATORIA	28		20		146								28				4		60		34	
CEPGL	461		10942	54	6308		166	88				32612	1319		284		1712		1284		433	
BURUNDI	30		314		3049								34				176				90	
RWANDA	80		9143		3356								131		140		20		158		179	
ZAIRE	371		1485	54	1002		156	88				32612	1154		108		1517		1008		148	
OTHER S	1144	3180	17402	6874	6565	1090	180		74	603	700	652	1360	3	190		610	28	1002	7	163	1
ANGOLA	895		9217		468	6	131		7				600		0		144		345		54	
MADAGASCA					4667		9							1				28	2	1		
MOZAMBIQU	101	3180	250	6874	220	1092	10			603		514	298		170		243		266		60	
SAO TOME					10				20				8		3		2		84		11	
SEYCHELLE					275									2						1		1
SUDAN	348		7027		962				47		700	130	344		16		90		305		34	
SSA	12780	3194	242608	9944	78015	1090	1107	9703	18791	176487	33278	67363	15464	9182	2102	2144	10431	3044	28654	9307	6166	53525

Annex

0459 -- 00459 -- 00462 -- 00462 -- 00472 -- 00473 -- 00481 LEAT0481 LEAT0740 ELEC0740 ELEC0842 ELEC0842 SPECA001 MATC005' MATC0042 TOVU0040 TOVUTotal ImpTotal Exporte

	Importa	Exporta	Importa	Exporta	Importa	Exporta	Importa	Exporta	Importa	Exporta	Importa	Exporta	Importa	Exporta	Importa	Exporta	Importa	Exporta
PTA	1221	743	1056	10840	773	8696	898	3681	34087	6308	1861	9966	3379	4804	1082	2892	649046	2081510
BURUNDI	264		112				28		809				124		88	1	16160	87800
COMOROS	18		24		4	12	4		169	1			18		84		8808	17088
DJIBOUTI	294	136	260	8641	126		9		164	1	42		509		128		42140	7428
ETHIOPIA	73		41	129	129		86		2526	647	164	1	102		68	21	146446	266226
KENYA	25		9	4	17		106		1049	2009	289		279	2	266	89	151748	674888
MALAWI		1			287		42		202	170	36				71		22267	179261
MAURITIUS	4	409		2860	89	8688	22	2676	619	75	244	2988	899	4647	687	2180	50780	860662
RWANDA	25	11	210		71		7		764	147	22	23	68	3	28	12	29247	84701
SOMALIA	22		18				3	1	279	8	10		15		18		9780	24044
TANZANIA	169		76	172	2		67		6781	761	26		140		22		84266	241660
UGANDA	114		229		86		7		618	220	9		321		70		17015	330178
ZAMBIA	172		62		24		84		2753	1300	130		49		308		29618	92178
ZIMBABWE	40	107	6	53	46		0	2	8034	966	604		1100	2	404	72	62760	496762
ECOWAS	11849	136	8466	808	1873	0	2066	186	61100	5186	4421	57	22990	87	12086	83	2244088	4086483
CEAO	1098	20	1504	422	663		686	12	17412	2066	290	57	2066	48	3002	22	473288	2479630
BENIN	142		180	7	27		10		327	60	8		260		133		21728	20601
BURKINA F	31	1	77		28		24	1	366	3	65		68	8	110		21044	64476
IVORY COA	1280	87	436	221	330		313		6708	862	489		406	68	1988	1	156066	1488165
MALI	84		276		28		28	0	647	87	6		171		110	11	44084	61500
MAURITANI	31		45	16	26		18		467	6	18	54	45		11	5	81268	286150
NIGER	14		87		47		72		2224	3	22		242		218		41190	284408
SENEGAL	314	1	432	179	186		102	2	6298	2484	347	8	860		648	5	145048	264082
MRU	565	10	62		20		148	170	752	272	70		865		1381	3	71614	1088634
GUINEA	11		30		4		73		866	26	8		282		308		13671	208418
LIBERIA	540	11			23		66	170	346	320	66		170		1266	2	41778	520008
SIERRA LE	6	0	23		2		1		12	0	2		21		12	1	16168	108817
OTHER E	9180	77	4000	63	1180	0	2220	3	63743	1940	3482		20851	10	7846	20	2700084	531210
CAPE VERD	32		46		18		3		45	3	1		8		48	12	8470	2860
GAMBIA	20		198		16		12		60	18			128		86		20886	28821
GHANA	6462		746		480		66		4362	72	400		687		768	20	682430	228400
GUINEA-BI	33		17		12				296	10	1		17		28		6036	8700
NIGERIA	2463	71	3670	63	660		2121	3	38466	1830	2087		10444	14	6804	2	2118128	114867
TOGO	170	6	220		20	0	26		446	2	18		104	5	68		27134	188494
UDEAC	716		2300		723	7	812		32362	648	412		2440	6	2101	5	266026	1047020
CAMEROON	561				465		315		6044	636	281		2066	6	808	2	101966	843088
CENTRAL A	21		10		12		10		81		21		18		61	1	2908	91077
CHAD	2		46		2	4			348		4		30		7		21200	47406
CONGO			641		82		207		3666	66	23		286		681		60119	117800
GABON			1564		150	3	170		12203	247	87		122		1867	2	78690	287500
EQUATORIA	131		28		14		2		52		7		6		7		2044	9819
CEPGL	310	11	400		114		81		8100	308	68	22	1672	28	508	20	83372	666806
BURUNDI	264		112				28		809				124		88	1	16150	87500
RWANDA	25	11	210		71		7		764	147	22	23	68	3	28	12	29247	84701
ZAIRE	319		187		43		46		1027	138	88		1200	28	307	16	37066	663088
OTHER S	648		456		300		801	18	19016	803	1216		1648	19	2808	9	443803	966866
ANGOLA	73		280		428		76		5060	75	480		250		949		146426	44845
MADAGASCA	0		1		6		10		2290	24	90		22		72	3	33462	311675
MOZAMBIQU	432		47		133		687		5703	70	267		606	19	849		184700	175204
SAO TOME									0				1		30		1013	481
SEYCHELLE										187	21		119		201	6	6147	29707
SUDAN	156		127		24		78	13	4673	443	370		286		508		97037	294904
SSA	14574	878	10424	10754	4003	3711	8016	2880	148090	13302	7676	8013	21766	4788	19677	2286	4842671	6386698

SITC COMMODITY CODES

TOTAL	ALL COMMODITIES	R2	0001	0430	BARLEY UNMILLED	R2	0081
0	FOOD AND LIVE ANIMALS	R2	0002	044	MAIZE UNMILLED	R2	0082
00	LIVE ANIMALS FOR FOOD	R2	0003	0440	MAIZE UNMILLED	R2	0083
001	LIVE ANIMALS FOR FOOD	R2	0004	045	CEREALS NES UNMILLED	R2	0084
0011	BOVINE SPECIES,LIVE	R2	0005	0451	RYE UNMILLED	R2	0085
00111	-- PURE BRED FR BREEDING	R2	0006	0452	OATS UNMILLED	R2	0086
00119	-- OTHR THAN FR BREEDING	R2	0007	0459	OTHER CEREALS UNMILLED	R2	0087
0012	SHEEP AND GOATS,LIVE	R2	0008	04591	MILLET UNMILLED	R2	0088
00121	SHEEP LIVE	R2	0009	04592	SORGHUM UNMILLED	R2	0089
00122	GOATS,LIVE	R2	0010	04599	OTH CEREALS UNMILLED NES	R2	0090
0013	SWINE,LIVE	R2	0011	046	WHEAT ETC MEAL OR FLOUR	R2	0091
0014	LIVE POULTRY	R2	0012	0460	WHEAT ETC MEAL OR FLOUR	R2	0092
00141	LIVE POULTRY LESS 185 GR	R2	0013	04601	FLOUR OF WHEAT OR MESLIN	R2	0093
00149	LIVE POULTRY OVER 185 GR	R2	0014	04602	MEAL,GROATS OF WHEAT ETC	R2	0094
0015	EQUINE SPECIES,LIVE	R2	0015	047	OTHER CEREAL MEALS,FLOUR	R2	0095
0019	LIVE ANIMALS FR FOOD NES	R2	0016	0470	OTHER CEREAL MEALS,FLOUR	R2	0096
01	MEAT AND PREPARATIONS	R2	0017	04701	CEREAL FLOUR(NON-WHEAT)	R2	0097
011	MEAT FRESH,CHILLD,FROZEN	R2	0018	04702	MEAL OR GROATS NON-WHEAT	R2	0098
0111	BOVINE MEAT FRESH,FROZEN	R2	0019	048	CEREAL ETC PREPARATIONS	R2	0099
01111	BOVINE MEAT WITH BONE IN	R2	0020	0481	PREPD BREAKFAST FOOD ETC	R2	0100
01112	BOVINE MEAT BONELESS	R2	0021	04811	CEREAL FLAKED,ROLLED,ETC	R2	0101
0112	MUTTON ETC FRSH,CHLD,FRN	R2	0022	04812	CEREAL ROASTED,PUFFED	R2	0102
0113	PIG MEAT FRESH,CHLD,FRZN	R2	0023	0482	MALT INCLUDING FLOUR	R2	0103
0114	POULTRY FRESH CHLLD,FRZN	R2	0024	0483	MACARONI,SPAGHETTI ETC	R2	0104
0115	HORSE MEAT FRSH,CHLD,FRN	R2	0025	0484	BAKERY PROD,COMMU WAFERS	R2	0105
0116	EDIBLE OFFAL FRESH,CH,FR	R2	0026	04841	BREAD,BISCUIT COM WAFERS	R2	0106
0118	MEAT NES FRESH,CHLD,FRZN	R2	0027	04842	PASTRY,BSCUITS,CAKES ETC	R2	0107
01181	POULTRY LIVER FRESH,ETC	R2	0028	0488	OTH CEREAL PREPS,MALT EX	R2	0108
01189	OTHER MEAT NES FRESH,ETC	R2	0029	05	VEGETABLES AND FRUIT	R2	0109
012	MEAT DRIED,SALTED,SMOKED	R2	0030	054	VEG ETC FRSH,SMPLY PRSVD	R2	0110
0121	PIG MEAT DRIED,SLTD,SMKD	R2	0031	0541	POTATOES FRSH EXCL SWEET	R2	0111
0129	MEAT NES DRIED SLTD SMKD	R2	0032	0542	LEGUMINOUS VEGETBLES DRY	R2	0112
014	MEAT PREPD PRSVD NES ETC	R2	0033	0544	TOMATOES FRESH	R2	0113
0141	MEAT,FISH EXTRCTS,JUICES	R2	0034	0545	OTHER FRESH VEGETABLES	R2	0114
0142	SAUSAGES INCLDING TINNED	R2	0035	05451	ALLIACEOUS VEGTBLS,FRESH	R2	0115
0149	OTH PREPARD PRESRVD MEAT	R2	0036	05459	FRESH VEGETABLES NES	R2	0116
02	DAIRY PRODCTS,BIRDS EGGS	R2	0037	0546	VEGETABLES SIMPLY PRESVD	R2	0117
022	MILK AND CREAM	R2	0038	05461	VEGETABLES,FROZEN	R2	0118
0223	MILK AND CREAM FRESH	R2	0039	05462	VEG PRSVD UNFRZN UNTINND	R2	0119
0224	MILK,CREAM PRESERVED ETC	R2	0040	0548	EDIBLE VEG NES FRESH,DRY	R2	0120
02241	WHEY	R2	0041	05481	ROOTS,TUBERS FRESH,DRY	R2	0121
02242	MILK DRY 1.5% FAT OR LES	R2	0042	05482	SUGAR BEET FRSH DRY,CANE	R2	0122
02243	MILK DRY OVER 1.5% FAT	R2	0043	05484	HOP CONES AND LUPULIN	R2	0123
02249	MILK(EX DRY) PRSVD,SWEET	R2	0044	05488	VEG PRODTS NES FRESH,DRY	R2	0124
023	BUTTER	R2	0045	056	VEGTBLES ETC PRSVD PREPD	R2	0125
0230	BUTTER	R2	0046	0561	VEG DRIED EXC LEGUMINOUS	R2	0126
024	CHEESE AND CURD	R2	0047	0564	FLOUR ETC OF FRUIT,VEGET	R2	0127
0240	CHEESE AND CURD	R2	0048	05643	POTATO FLOUR,MEAL,FLAKES	R2	0128
025	EGGS,BIRDS,FRESH,PRSRVD	R2	0049	05645	TAPIOCA,SAGO,ETC	R2	0129
0251	-- IN SHELL	R2	0050	05649	FLOURS OF OTH VEG,FRUITS	R2	0130
0252	-- NOT IN SHELL	R2	0051	0565	VEGTBLES PRSVD,PREPD NES	R2	0131
03	FISH AND PREPARATIONS	R2	0052	05651	VEGTBLS,FRUIT IN VINEGAR	R2	0132
034	FISH FRESH,CHILLED,FROZN	R2	0053	05659	OTH VEG PRESVD,PREPD NES	R2	0133
0341	FISH FRSH,CHLLD,EX FILLT	R2	0054	057	FRUIT NUTS,FRESH,DRIED	R2	0134
0342	FISH FROZEN,EXCL FILLETS	R2	0055	0571	ORANGES,TANGERINES ETC	R2	0135
0343	FISH FILLETS,FRESH,CHLLD	R2	0056	05711	ORANGES,FRESH OR DRIED	R2	0136
0344	FISH FILLETS,FROZEN	R2	0057	05712	TANGERINES ETC,FRSH,DRY	R2	0137
035	FISH SALTED,DRIED,SMOKED	R2	0058	0572	LEMONS,GRAPEFRUIT ETC	R2	0138
0350	FISH SALTED,DRIED,SMOKED	R2	0059	05721	LEMONS,LIMES,FRESH,DRIED	R2	0139
03501	FISH MEAL FIT FOR FOOD	R2	0060	05722	GRAPEFRUITS,FRESH,DRIED	R2	0140
03502	COD(NOT IN FILLETS)DRIED	R2	0061	05729	CITRUS NES,FRESH,DRIED	R2	0141
03503	FISH(EX COD)DRIED,SALTED	R2	0062	0573	BANANA,PLANTAIN,FRSH,DRY	R2	0142
03504	FISH SMOKED	R2	0063	0574	APPLES FRESH	R2	0143
036	SHELL FISH FRESH,FROZEN	R2	0064	0575	GRAPES FRESH OR DRIED	R2	0144
0360	SHELL FISH FRESH,FROZEN	R2	0065	05751	GRAPES FRESH	R2	0145
037	FISH ETC PREPD,PRSVD NES	R2	0066	05752	GRAPES DRIED(RAISINS)	R2	0146
0371	FISH PREPARD,PRESRVD NES	R2	0067	0576	FIGS,FRESH OR DRIED	R2	0147
0372	SHELL FISH PREPRD,PRESVD	R2	0068	0577	NUTS EDIBLE,FRESH,DRIED	R2	0148
04	CEREALS AND PREPARATIONS	R2	0069	05771	COCONUTS FRESH OR DRIED	R2	0149
041	WHEAT ETC UNMILLED	R2	0070	05772	BRAZIL NUTS,FRESH,DRIED	R2	0150
0411	DURUM WHEAT UNMILLED	R2	0071	05773	CASHEW NUTS,FRESH,DRIED	R2	0151
0412	OTHER WHEAT ETC UNMILLED	R2	0072	05774	ALMONDS FRESH OR DRIED	R2	0152
042	RICE	R2	0073	05775	HAZELNUTS,FRESH OR DRIED	R2	0153
0421	RICE IN HUSK OR HUSKED	R2	0074	05779	NUTS EDIBLE FRSH DRY NES	R2	0154
04211	RICE IN THE HUSK	R2	0075	0579	FRUIT FRESH OR DRIED NES	R2	0155
04212	RICE HUSKED	R2	0076	05792	PEARS,QUINCES FRESH	R2	0156
0422	RICE SEMI-MILLED,MILLED	R2	0077	05793	STONE FRUIT FRESH NES	R2	0157
04221	RICE MILLED UNBROKEN	R2	0078	05794	BERRIES FRESH	R2	0158
04222	RICE BROKEN	R2	0079	05795	PINEAPPLES,FRESH,DRIED	R2	0159
043	BARLEY UNMILLED	R2	0080	05796	DATES FRESH OR DRIED	R2	0160

05797	OTH TROP FRUIT FRESH.DRY	R2	0161	08141	MEAT MEAL FODDER	R2	0241
05798	OTHER FRESH FRUIT	R2	0162	08142	FISH MEAL FODDER	R2	0242
05799	OTHER DRIED FRUIT	R2	0163	0819	FOOD WASTE AND FEED NES	R2	0243
058	FRUIT PRESERVED.PREPARED	R2	0164	08192	COCOA WASTES	R2	0244
0582	FRUIT PRESERVED BY SUGAR	R2	0165	08193	BEET-PULP BAGASSE ETC	R2	0245
0583	FRUIT JAMS.JELLIES ETC	R2	0166	08194	WINE LEES ARGOL	R2	0246
0585	FRUIT OR VEGETABLE JUICE	R2	0167	08199	FODDER NES INCL SWEETNED	R2	0247
05851	ORANGE JUICE	R2	0168	09	MISC EDIBLE PRODUCTS	R2	0248
05852	GRAPEFRUIT JUICE	R2	0169	091	MARGARINE AND SHORTENING	R2	0249
05853	OTHER CITRUS FRUIT JUICE	R2	0170	0913	PIG POULTRY FAT RENDERED	R2	0250
05854	PINEAPPLE JUICE	R2	0171	0914	MARGARINE.EDIBLE FAT NES	R2	0251
05855	TOMATO JUICE	R2	0172	09141	MARGARINE	R2	0252
05857	JUICE OF OTHER FRUIT.VEG	R2	0173	09149	OTH PREPARED EDIBLE FATS	R2	0253
05858	MIXTURES OF DIFF JUICES	R2	0174	098	EDIBLE PRODCTS.PREPS NES	R2	0254
0586	FRUIT TEMPORARILY PRESVD	R2	0175	0980	EDIBLE PRODCTS.PREPS NES	R2	0255
05861	FRUIT.FRZN WITHOUT SUGAR	R2	0176	09801	HOMOGENZD COMPOSITE FOOD	R2	0256
05862	FRUIT.FROZEN WITH SUGAR	R2	0177	09802	TEA.ETC EXTRACT.ESSENCE	R2	0257
05863	FRUIT TEMP PRSVD UNFROZN	R2	0178	09803	MUSTARD PREPD OR FLOUR	R2	0258
05864	FRUIT PEEL.TRS.FRZN.PRSD	R2	0179	09804	SAUCES MIXED SEASONINGS	R2	0259
0589	FRUIT PREPRD.PRESRVD.NES	R2	0180	09805	SOUPS AND BROTHS	R2	0260
05891	NUTS ROASTD(INCL PEANUT)	R2	0181	09806	YEASTS.BAKING POWDERS	R2	0261
05899	FRUIT NUTS NES.PRESERVED	R2	0182	09807	VINEGAR AND SUBSTITUTES	R2	0262
06	SUGAR AND PREPS.HONEY	R2	0183	09808	EDIBLE ANIML PRODCTS NES	R2	0263
061	SUGAR AND HONEY	R2	0184	09809	MISC FOOD PREPRTIONS NES	R2	0264
0611	RAW BEET AND CANE SUGAR	R2	0185	1	BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO	R2	0265
0612	REFINED SUGAR ETC	R2	0186	11	BEVERAGES	R2	0266
0615	MOLASSES	R2	0187	111	NON-ALCOHL BEVERAGES NES	R2	0267
0616	NATURAL HONEY	R2	0188	1110	NON-ALCOHL BEVERAGES NES	R2	0268
0619	SUGARS AND SYRUPS NES	R2	0189	11101	WATERS.ICE AND SNOW	R2	0269
062	SUGAR PREPS NON-CHOCLATE	R2	0190	11102	FLAVORED WATERS NON-ALCO	R2	0270
0620	SUGAR PREPS NON-CHOCLATE	R2	0191	112	ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES	R2	0271
07	COFFEE TEA.COCOA SPICES	R2	0192	1121	WINE OF FRESH GRAPES ETC	R2	0272
071	COFFEE AND SUBSTITUTES	R2	0193	11211	GRAPE MUST	R2	0273
0711	COFFEE GREEN.ROASTED SUB	R2	0194	11212	WINE OF FRESH GRAPES	R2	0274
07111	COFFEE GREEN.HUSKS.SKINS	R2	0195	11213	VERMOUTHS ETC	R2	0275
07112	COFFEE ROASTED	R2	0196	1122	CIDER.PERRY.MEAD ETC	R2	0276
07113	COFFEE SUBST INCL COFFEE	R2	0197	1123	BEER.ALE.STOUT.PORTER	R2	0277
0712	COFFEE EXTRACTS ESSENCES	R2	0198	1124	DISTILLED ALCOHOLIC BEVS	R2	0278
072	COCOA	R2	0199	11241	WHISKY	R2	0279
0721	COCOA BEANS RAW ROASTED	R2	0200	11242	DISTILLD WINE.GRAPE MARC	R2	0280
0722	COCOA POWDER.UNSWEETENED	R2	0201	11249	OTH ALCOHOLC BEVS.CMPNDS	R2	0281
0723	COCOA BUTTER AND PASTE	R2	0202	12	TOBACCO AND MANUFACTURES	R2	0282
07231	COCOA PASTE	R2	0203	121	TOBACCO UNMNFCTRD.REFUSE	R2	0283
07232	COCOA BUTTER	R2	0204	1211	TOBACCO.NOT STRIPPED	R2	0284
073	CHOCOLATE AND PRODUCTS	R2	0205	12111	-- VIRGI TYPE.FLUE-CURED	R2	0285
0730	CHOCOLATE AND PRODUCTS	R2	0206	12119	-- OTHER TYPES	R2	0286
074	TEA AND MATE	R2	0207	1212	TOBACCO STRIPPED OR PART	R2	0287
0741	TEA	R2	0208	12121	-- VIRGI TYPE.FLUE-CURED	R2	0288
0742	MATE	R2	0209	12129	-- OTHER TYPES	R2	0289
075	SPICES	R2	0210	1213	TOBACCO REFUSE	R2	0290
0751	PEPPER AND PIMENTO	R2	0211	122	TOBACCO.MANUFACTURED	R2	0291
0752	SPICES EX PEPPER.PIMENTO	R2	0212	1221	CIGARS.CHEROOTS.ETC	R2	0292
07521	VANILLA	R2	0213	1222	CIGARETTES	R2	0293
07522	CINNAMON.ETC	R2	0214	1223	OTH MANUFACTURED TOBACCO	R2	0294
07523	CLOVES	R2	0215	2	CRUDE MATERLS.EXCL FUELS	R2	0295
07524	NUTMEG MACE.CARDAMONS	R2	0216	21	HIDES.SKINS.FURS UNDRSSD	R2	0296
07525	SEEDS OF ANISE.CUMIN.ETC	R2	0217	211	HIDES.SKINS EXC FURS.RAW	R2	0297
07526	GINGER(EXCEPT IN SWEET)	R2	0218	2111	BOVINE.EQUINE HIDES.RAW	R2	0298
07528	OTHER SPICES.THYME ETC	R2	0219	2112	CALF AND KIP SKINS.RAW	R2	0299
08	FEEDING STUFF FOR ANIMAL	R2	0220	2114	GOAT AND KID SKINS.RAW	R2	0300
081	FEEDING STUFF FOR ANIMAL	R2	0221	2116	SHEEP SKIN COMMON W/WOOL	R2	0301
0811	HAY FODDER GREEN.DRY	R2	0222	2117	SHEEP SKIN WITHOUT WOOL	R2	0302
08111	CEREAL STRAW ETC UNPREPD	R2	0223	2119	SKIN NES.WASTE.USED LTHR	R2	0303
08112	FODDER ROOTS.HAY ETC	R2	0224	21191	WASTE AND USED LEATHER	R2	0304
08119	FODDER OF VEG ORIGIN NES	R2	0225	21199	HIDES AND SKINS NES.RAW	R2	0305
0812	BRAN POLLARD SHARPS ETC	R2	0226	212	FURSKINS.RAW	R2	0306
08121	BRAN ETC MAIZE OR RICE	R2	0227	2120	FURSKINS.RAW	R2	0307
08122	BRAN ETC OTHER CEREALS	R2	0228	21201	MINK SKINS.RAW	R2	0308
08123	BRAN ETC LEGUMINOUS VEG	R2	0229	21209	OTHER FURSKINS RAW	R2	0309
0813	OILCAKE AND OTH RESIDUES	R2	0230	22	OIL SEEDS.OLEAGINOUS FRT	R2	0310
08131	-- OF SOYA BEANS	R2	0231	222	SEEDS FOR'SOFT'FIXED OIL	R2	0311
08132	-- OF GROUNDNUTS	R2	0232	2221	GROUNDNUTS.GREEN	R2	0312
08133	-- OF COTTON SEEDS	R2	0233	2222	SOYA BEANS	R2	0313
08134	-- OF LINSEED	R2	0234	2223	COTTON SEEDS	R2	0314
08135	-- OF SUNFLOWER SEEDS	R2	0235	2224	SUNFLOWER SEEDS	R2	0315
08136	-- OF RAPE OR COLZA SEED	R2	0236	2225	SESAME SEEDS	R2	0316
08137	-- OF COCONUT(COPRA)	R2	0237	2226	RAPE AND COLZA SEEDS	R2	0317
08138	-- OF PALM NUTS KERNELS	R2	0238	223	SEEDS FOR OTH FIXED OILS	R2	0318
08139	-- OF OTH OIL SEEDS ETC	R2	0239	2231	COPRA	R2	0319
0814	MEAT OR FISH MEAL FODDER	R2	0240	2232	PALM NUTS AND KERNELS	R2	0320

2234	LINSEED	R2	0321
2235	CASTOR OIL SEEDS	R2	0322
2238	OIL SEEDS AND FRUITS NES	R2	0323
2239	OIL SEED FLOUR AND MEAL	R2	0324
23	RUBBER CRUDE.SYNTHETIC	R2	0325
232	NATURAL RUBBER.GUMS	R2	0326
2320	NATURAL RUBBER.GUMS	R2	0327
23201	NATURAL RUBBER LATEX	R2	0328
23202	OTHER NATURAL RUBBER	R2	0329
23203	BALATA.GUTTA-PERCHA.GUMS	R2	0330
233	RUBBER.SYNTHTIC.RECLAIMD	R2	0331
2331	RUBBER SYNTHETIC.LATEX	R2	0332
23311	POLYBUTADI-STYRENE.LATEX	R2	0333
23312	OTH RUBBER SYNTHTC.LATEX	R2	0334
23313	POLYBUTADIENE RUBBER(BR)	R2	0335
23314	POLYCHLOROBUTADIENE(CR)	R2	0336
23315	POLYBUTADIENE-STYRN(SBR)	R2	0337
23316	BUTYL RUBBER(IIR)	R2	0338
23319	OTH SYNTH RUBBER.FACTICE	R2	0339
2332	RCLMD.SCRAP UNHARDND RUB	R2	0340
23321	RECLAIMED RUBBER	R2	0341
23322	SCRAP UNHARDENED RUBBER	R2	0342
24	CORK AND WOOD	R2	0343
244	CORK.NATURAL.RAW.WASTE	R2	0344
2440	CORK.NATURAL.RAW.WASTE	R2	0345
24401	CORK UNWORKED WASTE	R2	0346
24402	CORK SIMPLY WORKED	R2	0347
245	FUEL WOOD AND CHARCOAL	R2	0348
2450	FUEL WOOD AND CHARCOAL	R2	0349
24501	FUEL WOOD IN LOGS.ETC	R2	0350
24502	WOOD CHARCOAL	R2	0351
246	PULPWOOD CHIPS.WOODWASTE	R2	0352
2460	PULPWOOD CHIPS.WOODWASTE	R2	0353
24601	PULPWOOD ROUGH OR SPLIT	R2	0354
24602	PULPWOOD CHIPS.PARTICLES	R2	0355
24603	WOOD WASTE(INCL SAWDUST)	R2	0356
247	OTH WOOD ROUGH.SQUARED	R2	0357
2471	SAW-.VENEER-LOGS CONIFER	R2	0358
24711	-- IN THE ROUGH	R2	0359
24712	-- RGHLY OR HALF SQUARED	R2	0360
2472	SAW-.VENEER-LOGS NON-CON	R2	0361
24721	-- IN THE ROUGH	R2	0362
24722	-- RGHLY OR HALF SQUARED	R2	0363
2479	PTPROPS POLES.PILING.ETC	R2	0364
248	WOOD SHAPED.SLEEPERS	R2	0365
2481	RAILWAY SLEEPERS.TIES	R2	0366
2482	LUMBER SHAPED CONIFER	R2	0367
24821	LUMBER SAWN ETC CONIFER	R2	0368
24822	LUMBER PLANED ETC CONIFR	R2	0369
2483	LUMBER SHAPED NON-CONIFR	R2	0370
24831	LUMBER SAWN ETC NON-CON	R2	0371
24832	LUMBER PLANED ETC NONCON	R2	0372
25	PULP AND WASTE PAPER	R2	0373
251	PULP AND WASTE PAPER	R2	0374
2511	WASTE PAPER.PPRBOARD ETC	R2	0375
2512	MECHANICAL WOOD PULP	R2	0376
2516	CHEM WOOD PULP DISSOLVNG	R2	0377
2517	SODA.SULPHATE WOOD PULP	R2	0378
25171	-- UNBLEACHED	R2	0379
25172	-- BLEACHED.NONDISSOLVNG	R2	0380
2518	SULPHITE WOOD PULP	R2	0381
25181	-- UNBLEACHED	R2	0382
25182	-- BLEACHED.NONDISSOLVNG	R2	0383
2519	OTHER CELLULOSIC PULPS	R2	0384
25191	SEMI-CHEMICAL WOOD PULP	R2	0385
25192	PULP OTHR THAN WOOD PULP	R2	0386
26	TEXTILE FIBRES.WASTES OF	R2	0387
261	SILK	R2	0388
2613	RAW SILK NOT THROWN	R2	0389
2614	SILK WORM COCOONS.WASTE	R2	0390
26141	SILK WORM COCOONS	R2	0391
26142	SILK COCOON WASTE.ETC	R2	0392
263	COTTON	R2	0393
2631	RAW COTTON EXCL LINTERS	R2	0394
2632	COTTON LINTERS	R2	0395
2633	COTTON WASTE.UNCOMBED	R2	0396
2634	COTTON CARDED OR COMBED	R2	0397
264	JUTE.OTH TEX BAST FIBRES	R2	0398
2640	JUTE OTH TEX BAST FIBRES	R2	0399
265	VEG FIBRE.EXCL COTN JUTE	R2	0400
2651	FLAX.RAMIE.TOW AND WASTE	R2	0401
26511	FLAX RAW OR RETTED	R2	0402
26512	FLAX.BROKEN.SCUTCHED ETC	R2	0403
26513	FLAX TOW.WASTE ETC	R2	0404
26514	RAMIE.NOILS.WASTE.ETC	R2	0405
2652	TRUE HEMP TOW.WASTE ETC	R2	0406
2654	SISAL.AGAVE FIBRES.WASTE	R2	0407
2655	MANILA FIBRE.TOW WASTE	R2	0408
2659	VEG TEXT FIBRE.WASTE.NES	R2	0409
26591	COIR FIBRE.WASTE.ETC	R2	0410
26599	OTH VEG TEXT FIBRE.WASTE	R2	0411
266	SYNTHETIC FIBRES TO SPIN	R2	0412
2665	DISCN SYNTH FIBRE UNCMBD	R2	0413
26651	-- POLYAMIDE	R2	0414
26652	-- POLYESTER	R2	0415
26653	-- ACRYLIC	R2	0416
26659	-- OTHER	R2	0417
2666	CONTIN FILAMNT TOW SYNTH	R2	0418
26661	-- OF POLYAMIDE FIBRES	R2	0419
26662	-- OF POLYESTER FIBRES	R2	0420
26663	-- OF ACRYLIC FIBRES	R2	0421
26669	-- OF OTH SYNTHTC FIBRES	R2	0422
2667	DISCON SYNTH FIBRE COMBD	R2	0423
26671	-- POLYAMIDE	R2	0424
26672	-- POLYESTER	R2	0425
26673	-- ACRYLIC	R2	0426
26679	-- OTHER	R2	0427
267	OTHER MAN-MADE FIBRES	R2	0428
2671	REGENERATD FIBRE TO SPIN	R2	0429
26711	DISCN REGEN FIBRE UNCMBD	R2	0430
26712	CONTIN FILAMNT TOW REGEN	R2	0431
26713	DISCON REGEN FIBRE COMBD	R2	0432
2672	WASTE OF MAN-MADE FIBRES	R2	0433
26721	-- SYNTHETIC	R2	0434
26722	-- REGENERATED	R2	0435
268	WOOL AND ANIMAL HAIR	R2	0436
2681	WOOL GREASY.FLEECE-WSHED	R2	0437
2682	WOOL DEGREASED.UNCOMBED	R2	0438
2683	FINE ANIMAL HAIR.UNCOMBD	R2	0439
2685	COARSE HAIR UNCOMBED	R2	0440
26851	HORSEHAIR UNCOMBED.WASTE	R2	0441
26859	COARSE HAIR NES UNCOMBED	R2	0442
2686	WASTE OF WOOL.HAIR NES	R2	0443
26861	-- NOT PULLD OR GARNETTD	R2	0444
26862	-- PULLED OR GARNETTED	R2	0445
2687	WOOL OR HAIR COMBED ETC	R2	0446
269	WASTE OF TEXTILE FABRICS	R2	0447
2690	WASTE OF TEXTILE FABRICS	R2	0448
26901	BULK TEXT WSTE.OLD CLTHG	R2	0449
26902	RAGS.WASTE CORDAGE ETC	R2	0450
27	CRUDE FERTLZR.MINRLS NES	R2	0451
271	FERTILIZERS.CRUDE	R2	0452
2711	ANIMAL.VEG FERTLZR.CRUDE	R2	0453
2712	NATURAL SODIUM NITRATE	R2	0454
2713	NAT CALCM PHOSPHATES ETC	R2	0455
27131	-- UNGROUND	R2	0456
27132	-- GROUND	R2	0457
2714	NTRL POTASSIC SALTS.CRDE	R2	0458
273	STONE.SAND AND GRAVEL	R2	0459
2731	BLDG.DIMENSION STONE	R2	0460
27311	SLATE.ROUGHLY WORKED	R2	0461
27312	MARBLE.ETC BLDG STONE	R2	0462
27313	GRANITE.SANDSTONE.ETC	R2	0463
2732	CALCAREOUS STONE	R2	0464
27322	CALCAREOUS STONE NES	R2	0465
27323	GYPSUM AND ANHYDRITE	R2	0466
27324	CALCINED GYPSUM PLASTERS	R2	0467
2733	SAND.EXCL METAL-BEARING	R2	0468
2734	GRAVEL.CRUSHED STONE.ETC	R2	0469
274	SULPHUR.UNRSTD IRN PYRTE	R2	0470
2741	SULPHUR EX SULP IN 52215	R2	0471
2742	IRON PYRITES UNROASTED	R2	0472
277	NATURAL ABRASIVES NES	R2	0473
2771	INDUSTRIAL DIAMONDS	R2	0474
2772	NATURAL ABRASIVES NES	R2	0475
27721	DUST AND POWDER OF GEMS	R2	0476
27722	OTHER NAT ABRASIVES NES	R2	0477
278	OTHER CRUDE MINERALS	R2	0478
2782	REFRACTORY MINERALS NES	R2	0479
27821	CLAY ETC	R2	0480

27822	NATURAL GRAPHITE	R2	0481	292	CRUDE VEG MATERIALS NES	R2	0561
27823	DOLOMITE	R2	0482	2922	NAT GUMS RESINS LACS ETC	R2	0562
27824	MAGNESITE	R2	0483	2923	VEG PLAITING MATERIALS	R2	0563
2783	COMMON SALT ETC	R2	0484	2924	VEG USED IN PHARMACY ETC	R2	0564
2784	ASBESTOS CRDE SMPLY WRKD	R2	0485	2925	SEEDS ETC FOR PLANTING	R2	0565
2785	QUARTZ MICA FELSPAR ETC	R2	0486	2926	LIVE PLANTS BULBS ETC	R2	0566
27851	NATURAL QUARTZ QUARTZITE	R2	0487	29261	BULBS TUBERS CORMS ETC	R2	0567
27852	MICA MICA WASTE	R2	0488	29269	LIVE PLANTS NES	R2	0568
27853	CRYOLITE CHIOLITE NTRL	R2	0489	2927	CUT FLOWERS FOLIAGE	R2	0569
27854	FELSPAR FLOURSPAR ETC	R2	0490	29271	CUT FLOWERS	R2	0570
2786	SLAG.SCALINGS.DROSS.ETC	R2	0491	29272	CUT FOLIAGE	R2	0571
27861	SLAG ETC FRM IRON STL MF	R2	0492	2929	OTH CRUDE VEG MATERIALS	R2	0572
27862	SLAG.ASH.NES(INCL KELP)	R2	0493	29291	VEGETABLE SAPS.EXTRACTS	R2	0573
2789	MINERALS CRUDE NES	R2	0494	29292	VEGET PADDING MATERIALS	R2	0574
27891	CHALK	R2	0495	29293	VEG BRUSH.BROOM MATERIAL	R2	0575
27892	NAT BARIUM SULPHATE.CARB	R2	0496	29299	OTH CRD VEG MATERIAL NES	R2	0576
27893	TALC.NATURAL STEATITE	R2	0497	3	MINERAL FUELS ETC	R2	0577
27894	CRUDE NATURAL BORATES	R2	0498	32	COAL.COKE AND BRIQUETTES	R2	0578
27895	SILICEOUS EARTHS.ETC	R2	0499	322	COAL.LIGNITE AND PEAT	R2	0579
27896	NATURAL ASPHALT.BITUMEN	R2	0500	3221	ANTHRACITE.NOT AGGLOMRTD	R2	0580
27899	MINERAL SUBSTANCES NES	R2	0501	3222	OTH COAL.NOT AGGLOMERATD	R2	0581
28	METALLIFEROUS ORES.SCRAP	R2	0502	3223	LIGNITE.NOT AGGLOMERATED	R2	0582
281	IRON ORE CONCENTRATES	R2	0503	3224	PEAT.NOT AGGLOMERATED	R2	0583
2814	ROASTED IRON PYRITES	R2	0504	323	BRIQUETTE COKE.SEMI-COKE	R2	0584
2815	IRON ORE NOT AGGLOMERATD	R2	0505	3231	BRIQUETTES.OVOIDS ETC	R2	0585
2816	IRON ORE AGGLOMERATES	R2	0506	32311	BRIQUETTES OF COAL	R2	0586
282	IRON AND STEEL SCRAP	R2	0507	32312	LIGNITE.AGGLOMERATED	R2	0587
2820	IRON AND STEEL SCRAP	R2	0508	32313	PEAT.AGGLOMERATED	R2	0588
28201	-- OF PIG OR CAST IRON	R2	0509	3232	COKE.SEMI-COKE.RTRT CRBN	R2	0589
28202	-- OF ALLOY STEEL	R2	0510	32321	COKE OF COAL.RETORT CRBN	R2	0590
28209	-- OF OTHR IRON OR STEEL	R2	0511	32322	COKE OF LIGNITE.PEAT	R2	0591
286	URANIUM.THORIUM ORE.CONC	R2	0512	33	PETROLEUM AND PRODUCTS	R2	0592
2860	URANIUM THORIUM ORE.CONC	R2	0513	333	CRUDE PETROLEUM	R2	0593
287	BASE METAL ORES.CONC NES	R2	0514	3330	CRUDE PETROLEUM	R2	0594
2871	CPR ORE ETC.INC CEMNT CP	R2	0515	334	PETROLEUM PRODUCTS.REFIN	R2	0595
28711	COPPER ORES.EXCL MATTE	R2	0516	3341	GASOLINE.OTH LIGHT OILS	R2	0596
28712	COPPER MATTE.CEMENT	R2	0517	33411	MOTOR.AVIATION SPIRIT	R2	0597
2872	NICKEL ORES.CONCENTRATES	R2	0518	33412	SPIRIT TYPE JET FUEL	R2	0598
28721	NICKEL ORES.EXCL MATTE	R2	0519	33419	OTH LIGHT PETROLEUM OILS	R2	0599
28722	NICKEL MATTE.SINTERS.ETC	R2	0520	3342	KEROSENE.OTH MEDIUM OILS	R2	0600
2873	ALUMINIUM ORES.ALUMINA	R2	0521	33421	KEROSENE INCL JET FUEL	R2	0601
28731	ALUMINIUM ORE.CONCNTRATE	R2	0522	33429	OTH MEDIUM PETROLEUM OIL	R2	0602
28732	ALUMINA(ALUMINIUM OXIDE)	R2	0523	3343	GAS OILS	R2	0603
2874	LEAD ORES.CONCENTRATES	R2	0524	3344	FUEL OILS.NES	R2	0604
2875	ZINC ORES.CONCENTRATES	R2	0525	3345	LUBS PETROLEUM OILS NES	R2	0605
2876	TIN ORES.CONCENTRATES	R2	0526	33451	LUBS (HIGH PTRLM CONTNT)	R2	0606
2877	MANGANESE ORE.CONCENTRTE	R2	0527	33452	LUBS (LOW PETRLM CONTNT)	R2	0607
2879	OTH NONFER ORE.CONCNTRTE	R2	0528	335	RESIDUAL PETRLM PROD NES	R2	0608
28791	CHROMIUM ORE CONCENTRATE	R2	0529	3351	PETRLM JELLY.MINERAL WAX	R2	0609
28792	TUNGSTEN ORE CONCENTRATE	R2	0530	33511	PETROLATUM	R2	0610
28793	VANADIUM.MOLYBD ETC ORES	R2	0531	33512	MINERAL WAXES	R2	0611
28799	OTH NONFER ORE CONC NES	R2	0532	3352	MINERAL TARS AND PRODCTS	R2	0612
288	NON-FERROUS METAL SCRAP	R2	0533	33521	MINERAL TAR	R2	0613
2881	METALIFEROUS NONFER WSTE	R2	0534	33522	BENZOLE	R2	0614
2882	OTH NONFER MTL SCRAP NES	R2	0535	33523	TOLUOLE	R2	0615
28821	COPPER WASTE AND SCRAP	R2	0536	33524	XYLOLE	R2	0616
28822	NICKEL WASTE AND SCRAP	R2	0537	33525	OILS.OTH PRODUCTS NES	R2	0617
28823	ALUMINIUM WSTE AND SCRAP	R2	0538	3353	MIN TAR PITCH.PITCH COKE	R2	0618
28824	LEAD WASTE AND SCRAP	R2	0539	33531	PITCH FROM MINERAL TARS	R2	0619
28825	ZINC WASTE AND SCRAP	R2	0540	33532	PITCH COKE	R2	0620
28826	TIN WASTE AND SCRAP	R2	0541	3354	PETROLM BITUMEN.COKE NES	R2	0621
289	PREC MTAL ORES.WASTE NES	R2	0542	33541	PETROLEUM BITUMEN	R2	0622
2890	PREC MTAL ORES.WASTE NES	R2	0543	33542	PETROLEUM COKE	R2	0623
28901	PRECIOUS METAL ORES CONC	R2	0544	33543	BITUMINOUS MIXTURES ETC	R2	0624
28902	PRECIOUS MTL SCRPS WSTES	R2	0545	34	GAS.NATURAL AND MANUFCTD	R2	0625
29	CRUDE ANIMAL.VEG MAT NES	R2	0546	341	GAS.NATURAL AND MANUFCTD	R2	0626
291	CRUDE ANIMAL MTRIALS NES	R2	0547	3413	PETROLM GASES.LIQUEFIED	R2	0627
2911	BONES.IVORY HORNS ETC	R2	0548	34131	LIQUEFIED PROPANE.BUTANE	R2	0628
29111	BONE.HORN-CORE AND WASTE	R2	0549	34139	OTH HYDROCARBON GAS LQFD	R2	0629
29115	CORAL.SHELL AND WASTE	R2	0550	3414	GAS NATURAL.GASEOUS STAT	R2	0630
29116	IVORY.TORTOISE-SHELL ETC	R2	0551	3415	GAS MANUFACTURED	R2	0631
2919	OTH ANIMAL MATERIALS NES	R2	0552	35	ELECTRIC ENERGY	R2	0632
29191	HUMAN HAIR.UNWORKED ETC	R2	0553	351	ELECTRIC ENERGY	R2	0633
29192	BRUSH-MAKING HAIR ETC	R2	0554	3510	ELECTRIC ENERGY	R2	0634
29193	GUT BLADDERS.ETC NONFISH	R2	0555	4	ANIMAL.VEGETABLE OIL.FAT	R2	0635
29194	FISH WASTE	R2	0556	41	ANIMAL OILS AND FATS	R2	0636
29195	BIRDS SKINS FEATHERS ETC	R2	0557	411	ANIMAL OILS AND FATS	R2	0637
29197	NATURAL SPONGES	R2	0558	4111	OILS OF FISH WHALES ETC	R2	0638
29198	AMBERGRIS.CIVET.MUSK ETC	R2	0559	41111	FISH LIVER OIL	R2	0639
29199	ANIMAL PRODUCTS NES	R2	0560	41112	OTHER FISH OILS AND FATS	R2	0640

41113	MARINE MAMMALS OILS,FATS	R2	0641
4113	ANIMAL OILS,FATS,GREASES	R2	0642
41131	PIG,POULTRY FAT UNRENDRD	R2	0643
41132	FATS OF BOVINE,SHEEP ETC	R2	0644
41133	LARD STEARIN AND OIL,ETC	R2	0645
41134	WOOL GREASE,ETC	R2	0646
41135	ANIMAL OILS,FATS NES	R2	0647
42	FIXED VEGETABLE OIL,FAT	R2	0648
423	FIXED VEG OILS,SOFT	R2	0649
4232	SOYA BEAN OIL	R2	0650
4233	COTTON SEED OIL	R2	0651
4234	GROUNDNUT(PEANUT) OIL	R2	0652
4235	OLIVE OIL	R2	0653
4236	SUNFLOWER SEED OIL	R2	0654
4239	OTH FIXED VEG OILS,SOFT	R2	0655
42391	RAPE,COLZA,MUSTARD OILS	R2	0656
42392	SESAME OIL	R2	0657
424	FIXED VEG OIL NONSOFT	R2	0658
4241	LINSEED OIL	R2	0659
4242	PALM OIL	R2	0660
4243	COCONUT (COPRA) OIL	R2	0661
4244	PALM KERNEL OIL	R2	0662
4245	CASTOR OIL	R2	0663
4249	FIXED VEGETABLE OILS NES	R2	0664
43	PROCESD ANML VEG OIL,ETC	R2	0665
431	PROCESD ANML VEG OIL,ETC	R2	0666
4311	PROCESD ANML VEG OIL NES	R2	0667
4312	HYDROGENATED OIL,FAT	R2	0668
4313	FATTY ACIDS ETC,DEGRAS	R2	0669
43131	FATTY ACIDS,ACID OILS	R2	0670
43133	RESIDUES OF TREATING FAT	R2	0671
4314	ANIMAL,VEGETABLE WAXES	R2	0672
43143	VEGETABLE WAXES	R2	0673
43144	INSECT WAXES,SPERMACETI	R2	0674
5	CHEMICALS,RELATED PRODS	R2	0675
51	ORGANIC CHEMICALS	R2	0676
511	HYDROCARBONS NES,DERIVS	R2	0677
5111	ACYCLIC HYDROCARBONS	R2	0678
51111	ETHYLENE	R2	0679
51112	PROPYLENE	R2	0680
51113	BUTYLENES,BUTADIENES ETC	R2	0681
51119	OTH ACYCLIC HYDROCARBONS	R2	0682
5112	CYCLIC HYDROCARBONS	R2	0683
51121	CYCLOHEXANE	R2	0684
51122	BENZENE,CHEMICALLY PURE	R2	0685
51123	TOLUENE,CHEMICALLY PURE	R2	0686
51124	XYLENES,CHEMICALLY PURE	R2	0687
51125	STYRENE	R2	0688
51126	ETHYLBENZENE	R2	0689
51129	OTH CYCLIC HYDROCARBONS	R2	0690
5113	HALOG DERIV OF HYDROCARB	R2	0691
51131	VINYL CHLORIDE	R2	0692
51132	TRICHLOROETHYLENE	R2	0693
51133	TETRACHLOROETHYLENE	R2	0694
51139	OTH HALOG HYDRCARB DERIV	R2	0695
5114	HYDROCARB DERIV NONHALOG	R2	0696
512	ALCOHOLS,PHENOLS ETC	R2	0697
5121	ACYCLIC ALCOHOLS,DERIVS	R2	0698
51211	METHYL ALCOHOL(METHANOL)	R2	0699
51212	PROPANOLS	R2	0700
51213	BUTYL ALCOHOLS(BUTANOLS)	R2	0701
51214	OCTYL ALCOHOLS(OCTANOLS)	R2	702
51215	ETHYLENE GLYCOL(ETHNOLS)	R2	0703
51216	ETHYL ALC,DENATRD SPIRIT	R2	0704
51217	FAT.Y ALCOHOLS	R2	0705
51218	GLYCEROL,GLYCEROL LYES	R2	0706
51219	ACYCLIC ALCOH NES DERIVS	R2	0707
5122	CYCLIC ALCOHOLS,DERIVATS	R2	0708
5123	PHENOLS,PHEN ALCS,DERIVS	R2	0709
51234	PHENOL PURE,ITS SALTS	R2	0710
51235	CRESOLS,NES,THEIR SALTS	R2	0711
51236	OTH PHENOLS AND PHEN-ALC	R2	0712
51237	DERIVATVS OF PHENOL ETC	R2	0713
513	ORGANIC ACIDS ETC	R2	0714
5137	MONOACIDS AND DERIVATIVS	R2	0715
51371	ACETIC ACID ITS SALTS	R2	0716
51372	ESTERS OF ACETIC ACID	R2	0717
51373	METHACRYLIC ACID ETC	R2	0718
51379	OTH MONOACIDS ETC DERIVS	R2	0719
5138	POLYACIDS AND DERIVATIVS	R2	0720
51381	MALEIC ANHYDRIDE	R2	0721
51382	PHTHALIC ANHYDRIDE	R2	0722
51383	DIOCTYL ORTHOPHTHALATES	R2	0723
51384	TEREPHTHALIC ACID ESTERS	R2	0724
51389	OTH POLYACIDS ETC DERIVS	R2	0725
5139	OXY-FNCT ACIDS,DERIVATVS	R2	0726
514	NITROGEN-FNCTN COMPOUNDS	R2	0727
5145	AMINE-FUNCTION COMPOUNDS	R2	0728
5146	OXYGEN-FNCT AMINO-CMPNDS	R2	0729
5147	AMIDE-FNCT CMPD,EXC UREA	R2	0730
5148	OTH NITROGN-FNCTN CMPNDS	R2	0731
51481	QUAT AMMONIUM SALTS,ETC	R2	0732
51482	IMIDE-,IMIDE-FNCT CMPNDS	R2	0733
51483	ACRYLONITRILE	F2	0734
51484	OTH NITRILE-FNCTN CMPNDS	R2	0735
51485	DIAZO-,AZO-,AZOXY-CMPNDS	R2	0736
51486	HYDRAZINE ETC ORG DERIVS	R2	0737
51489	NITROGEN-FNCT CMPNDS NES	R2	0738
515	ORG-INORG COMPOUNDS ETC	R2	0739
5154	ORGANO-SULPHUR COMPOUNDS	R2	0740
5155	OTH ORG-INORG COMPOUNDS	R2	0 41
51551	ORGANO-MERCURY COMPOUNDS	R2	0742
51559	ORG-INORG COMPOUNDS NES	R2	0743
5156	HETEROCYCLIC CMPDS ETC	R2	0744
51561	LACTAMS	R2	0745
51569	OTH HETEROCYC CMPDS,ETC	R2	0746
5157	SULPHONAMIDES,ETC	R2	0747
51571	SULPHONAMIDES	R3	0748
51572	SULTONES AND SULTAMS	R2	0749
516	OTHER ORGANIC CHEMICALS	R2	0750
5161	ETHERS,EPOXIDES,ACETALS	R2	0751
51611	ETHERS,ETHER-ALCOHOL,ETC	R2	0752
51612	ACETALS,HEMIACETALS,ETC	R2	0753
51613	ETHYLENE OXIDE(OXIRANE)	R2	0754
51614	PROPYLENE OXIDE	R2	0755
51619	OTHER EPOXIDES ETC	R2	0756
5162	ALDEHYDE ETC FNCT CMPNDS	R2	0757
51621	OXYGEN-FUNCTION ALDEHYDE	R2	0758
51622	OXY-FNCT ALDEHYDE DERIVS	R2	0759
51623	ACETONE	R2	0760
51624	ETHYL METHYL KETONE	R2	0761
51629	OTHER KETONES ETC,DERIVS	R2	0762
5163	INORGAN ESTERS,SALTS,ETC	R2	0763
51631	PHOSPHORIC ESTERS,ETC	R2	0764
51639	OTH INORGANIC ESTERS ETC	R2	0765
5169	ORGANIC CHEMICALS,NES	R2	0766
51691	ENZYMES	R2	0767
51692	SUGARS,CHEM PURE ETC,NES	R2	0768
51699	OTH ORGANIC CHEMICLS NES	R2	0769
52	INORGANIC CHEMICALS	R2	0770
522	INOG ELEMNTS,OXIDES,ETC	R2	0771
5221	CHEMICAL ELEMENTS	R2	0772
52211	GASES,EXCL HALOGENS	R2	0773
52212	METALLOIDS NES	R2	0774
52213	CHLORINE	R2	0775
52214	FLUORINE,BROMINE,IODINE	R2	0776
52215	SULPHUR,PURIFIED	R2	0777
52216	MERCURY	R2	0778
52217	ALKALI,RARE EARTH METALS	R2	0779
52218	CARBON(INC CARBON BLACK)	R2	0780
5222	INORGANIC ACIDS ETC	R2	0781
52221	HYDROCHLORIC ACID ETC	R2	0782
52222	SULPHURIC ACID;OLEUM	R2	0783
52223	NITRIC,SULPHONITRIC ACID	R2	0784
52224	PHOSPHORIC ACIDS ETC	R2	0785
52225	BORIC OXIDE AND ACID	R2	0786
52229	OTH INORGANIC ACIDS ETC	R2	0787
5223	HALGN SULPHR CMPD NONMET	R2	0788
52231	HALOGEN CMPNDS NON-METAL	R2	0789
52232	SULPHUR CMPNDS NON-METAL	R2	0790
5224	METALLIC OXIDES	R2	0791
52241	ZINC OXIDE PEROXIDE	R2	0792
52242	CHROMIUM OXIDE HYDROXIDE	R2	0793
52243	MANGANESE OXIDES	R2	0794
52244	IRON OXIDES,HYDROXIDES	R2	0795
52245	COBALT OXIDES,HYDROXIDES	R2	0796
52246	TITANIUM OXIDES	R2	0797
52247	LEAD OXIDES	R2	0798
5225	INORGANIC BASES ETC NES	R2	0799
52251	AMMONIA,ANHYDROUS ETC	R2	0800

52252	CAUSTIC SODA SOLID	R2	0801	54158	OTHR HORMONES DERIVS ETC	R2	0881
52253	CAUSTIC SODA IN SOLUTION	R2	0802	5416	GLYCOSIDES GLANDS SERA	R2	0882
52254	CAUSTIC POTASH ETC	R2	0803	54161	GLYCOSIDES AND DERIVATVS	R2	0883
52255	OXIDES ETC OF MG SR BA	R2	0804	54162	GLANDS ETC AND EXTRACTS	R2	0884
52256	ALUMINIUM HYDROXIDE	R2	0805	54164	ANTISERA MICROBIAL VCCNS	R2	0885
52257	ARTIFICIAL CORUNDUM	R2	0806	54165	TOXINS MICROBIAL CLTURES	R2	0886
52258	OTH OXIDES BASES ETC NES	R2	0807	5417	MEDICAMENTS	R2	0887
523	OTHR INORGANIC CHEMICALS	R2	0808	54171	-- CONTAINNG ANTIBIOTICS	R2	0888
5231	METAL CMPD OF INORG ACID	R2	0809	54172	-- CONTAINING HORMONES	R2	0889
52311	FLOURIDES ETC	R2	0810	54173	-- CONTAINING ALKALOIDS	R2	0890
52312	CHLORIDES OXYCHLORIDES	R2	0811	54179	-- CONTNG OTH SUBSTANCES	R2	0891
52313	CHLORITES HYPOCHLORITES	R2	0812	5419	PHARMACEUTICAL GOODS NES	R2	0892
52314	CHLORATES PERCHLORATES	R2	0813	54191	BANDAGES PREPARED ETC	R2	0893
52315	SULPHIDES POLYSULPHIDES	R2	0814	54199	OTH PHARMACEUTICAL GOODS	R2	0894
52316	DITHIONITE SULPHOXYLATES	R2	0815	55	PERFUME CLEANING ECT PRD	R2	0895
52317	SULPHITES THIOSULPHATES	R2	0816	551	ESSENTL OIL PERFUME ETC	R2	0896
52318	SODIUM SULPHATE ETC	R2	0817	5513	ESSENTL OIL RESINOID ETC	R2	0897
52319	OTH SULPHATES PERSLPHTES	R2	0818	5514	MIXED PERFUME SUBSTANCES	R2	0898
5232	OTH MTL CMPD OF INRG ACD	R2	0819	553	PERFUMERY COSMETICS ETC	R2	0899
52321	NITRITES AND NITRATES	R2	0820	5530	PERFUMERY COSMETICS ETC	R2	0900
52322	PHOSPHITES PHOSPHATES	R2	0821	554	SOAP CLEANSING ETC PREPS	R2	0901
52323	NEUTRAL SODIUM CARBONATE	R2	0822	5541	SOAPS	R2	0902
52324	CARBONATE PERCBONATE NES	R2	0823	5542	WASHING PREPARATIONS ETC	R2	0903
52325	CYANIDES COMPLEX CYANIDE	R2	0824	5543	POLISHES CREAMS ETC	R2	0904
52326	FULMINATES CYANATES ETC	R2	0825	56	FERTILIZERS MANUFACTURED	R2	0905
52327	SILICATES	R2	0826	562	FERTILIZERS MANUFACTURED	R2	0906
52328	BORATES AND PERBORATES	R2	0827	5621	CHEM NITROGENOUS FERTLZR	R2	0907
52329	SALTS OF INORG ACIDS NES	R2	0828	56211	AMMONIUM NITRATE	R2	0908
5233	METALLIC ACID SALTS ETC	R2	0829	56212	AMMONIUM SULPHONITRATE	R2	0909
52331	SALTS OF METALLIC ACIDS	R2	0830	56213	AMMONIUM SULPHATE	R2	0910
52332	ALL PRECIOUS METAL CMPDS	R2	0831	56214	CALCIUM NITRATE NES ETC	R2	0911
5239	INORG CHEM PRODUCTS NES	R2	0832	56215	CALCIUM CYANAMIDE ETC	R2	0912
52391	HYDROGEN PEROXIDE	R2	0833	56216	UREA	R2	0913
52392	PHOSPHIDES	R2	0834	56219	CHEM NITROGEN FRTLZR NES	R2	0914
52393	CALCIUM CARBIDE	R2	0835	5622	CHEM PHOSPHATIC FERTILZR	R2	0915
52394	CARBIDES EXCL CALCIUM	R2	0836	56221	BASIC SLAG (THOMAS SLAG)	R2	0916
52395	HYDRIDES NITRIDES ETC	R2	0837	56222	SUPERPHOSPHATES	R2	0917
52399	OTH INORG COMPOUNDS NES	R2	0838	56229	CHEM PHOSPH FERTILZR NES	R2	0918
524	RADIOACTIVE ETC MATERIAL	R2	0839	5623	CHEM POTASSIC FERTILIZER	R2	0919
5241	RADIOACTIVE ELEMENTS ETC	R2	0840	56231	POTASSIUM CHLORIDE	R2	0920
5249	OTH RADIOACTIVE ETC MTLS	R2	0841	56232	POTASSIUM SULPHATE NES	R2	0921
52491	STABLE ISOTOPES ETC	R2	0842	56239	CHEM POTASSIC FRTLZR NES	R2	0922
52492	OTH CHEMS ASSOC RADIOACT	R2	0843	5629	FERTILIZERS NES	R2	0923
53	DYES TANNING COLOUR PROD	R2	0844	56291	NIT-PHOS-POT FERTLZR NES	R2	0924
531	SYNT DYE NAT INDGO LAKES	R2	0845	56292	NITROG-PHOS FERTILZR NES	R2	0925
5311	SYNTHIC ORGNIC DYESTUFFS	R2	0846	56293	NITROG-POTAS FERTLZR NES	R2	0926
5312	SYNTH LUMIN INDGO LAKES	R2	0847	56299	OTHER FERTILIZERS NES	R2	0927
53121	SYN ORG LUMIN ETC INDGO	R2	0848	57	EXPLOSIVES PYROTECH PROD	R2	0928
53122	COLOUR LAKES	R2	0849	572	EXPLOSIVES PYROTECH PROD	R2	0929
532	DYES NES TANNING PROD	R2	0850	5721	PREPARED EXPLOSIVES	R2	0930
5322	DYE TANN EXTRCTS TANNINS	R2	0851	57211	PROPELLENT POWDERS	R2	0931
53221	VEG TANN EXTRCTS TANNINS	R2	0852	57212	PREPARED EXPLOSIVES NES	R2	0932
53222	DYEING EXTRCTS VEG ANIMAL	R2	0853	5722	FUSES PRIMERS DETONATORS	R2	0933
5323	SYNTHETC TANNING PRODCTS	R2	0854	5723	PYROTECHNIC ARTICLES	R2	0934
533	PIGMENTS PAINTS ETC	R2	0855	58	PLASTIC MATERIALS ETC	R2	0935
5331	COLOURING MATERIAL NES	R2	0856	582	PRD OF CONDENSATION ETC	R2	0936
5332	PRINTING INKS	R2	0857	5821	PHENOPLASTS	R2	0937
5334	VARNISHES DISTEMPERS ETC	R2	0858	58211	-- IN PRIMARY FORMS	R2	0938
53341	WATER-THINNED PAINTS	R2	0859	58212	-- PLATES FILM STRIP ETC	R2	0939
53342	OTH PAINTS VARNISHES ETC	R2	0860	58219	-- OTHER FORMS INC WASTE	R2	0940
53343	PIGMNTS IN PAINT ENAMEL	R2	0861	5822	AMINOPLASTS	R2	0941
53344	DISTEMPERS DYES NES ETC	R2	0862	58221	-- IN PRIMARY FORMS	R2	0942
5335	GLAZES DRIERS PUTTY ETC	R2	0863	58222	-- PLATES FILM STRIP ETC	R2	0943
53351	PREPRD PIGMENT GLAZE ETC	R2	0864	58229	OTHER FORMS INC WASTE	R2	0944
53352	ARTISTS COLOURS	R2	0865	5823	ALKYDS OTHER POLYESTERS	R2	0945
53353	PREPARED DRIERS	R2	0866	58231	-- IN PRIMARY FORMS	R2	0946
53354	GLAZERS PUTTY OTH FILLNG	R2	0867	58232	-- PLATES FILM STRIP ETC	R2	0947
54	MEDICINAL PHARM PRODUCTS	R2	0868	58239	-- OTHER FORMS INC WASTE	R2	0948
541	MEDICINAL PHARM PRODUCTS	R2	0869	5824	POLYAMIDES	R2	0949
5411	PROVITAMINS AND VITAMINS	R2	0870	58241	-- IN PRIMARY FORMS	R2	0950
5413	ANTIBIOTICS IN BULK	R2	0871	58242	-- PLATES FILM STRIP ETC	R2	0951
54131	PENICILLINS AND DERIVTVS	R2	0872	58249	-- OTHER FORMS INC WASTE	R2	0952
54132	STREPTOMYCINS AND DERIVS	R2	0873	5825	POLYURETHANES	R2	0953
54133	TETRACYCLINES AND DERIVS	R2	0874	58251	-- IN PRIMARY FORMS	R2	0954
54139	OTHER ANTIBIOTICS	R2	0875	58259	-- OTHER FORMS INC WASTE	R2	0955
5414	VEG ALKALOIDS AND DERIVS	R2	0876	5826	EPOXIDE RESINS	R2	0956
5415	HORMONES NAT SYN IN BULK	R2	0877	58261	-- IN PRIMARY FORMS	R2	0957
54151	INSULIN	R2	0878	58269	-- OTHER FORMS INC WASTE	R2	0958
54152	PITUITARY SIMILR HORMONE	R2	0879	5827	SILICONES	R2	0959
54153	ADRENAL CORTICAL HORMONE	R2	0880	5828	ION EXCH CONDEN ETC TYPE	R2	0960

5829	OTH CONDENSATION ETC PROD	R2	0961
583	POLYMERIZATION ETC PRODS	R2	0962
5831	POLYETHYLENE	R2	0963
58311	-- IN PRIMARY FORMS	R2	0964
58312	-- MONOFIL.TUBES.ETC	R2	0965
58313	-- PLATES.FILM.STRIP.ETC	R2	0966
58319	-- WASTE AND SCRAP	R2	0967
5832	POLYPROPYLENE	R2	0968
58321	-- IN PRIMARY FORMS	R2	0969
58322	-- PLATES.FILM.STRIP.ETC	R2	0970
58329	-- OTHER FORMS.INC WASTE	R2	0971
5833	POLYSTYRENE.ITS COPOLYMR	R2	0972
58331	-- IN PRIMARY FORMS	R2	0973
58332	-- MONOFIL.TUBES.ETC	R2	0974
58333	-- PLATES.FILM.STRIP.ETC	R2	0975
58339	-- WASTE AND SCRAP	R2	0976
5834	POLYVINYL CHLORIDE	R2	0977
58341	-- IN PRIMARY FORMS	R2	0978
58342	-- MONOFIL.TUBES.ETC	R2	0979
58343	-- PLATES.FILM.STRIP.ETC	R2	0980
58349	-- WASTE AND SCRAP	R2	0981
5835	VYNIL CHLOR.ACET COPOLYM	R2	0982
58351	-- IN PRIMARY FORMS	R2	0983
58352	-- MONOFIL.TUBES.ETC	R2	0984
58353	-- PLATES.FILM.ETC.NES	R2	0985
58359	-- WASTE AND SCRAP	R2	0986
5836	ACRYLIC POLYMERS.ETC	R2	0987
58361	-- IN PRIMARY FORMS	R2	0988
58362	-- PLATES.FILM.STRIP.ETC	R2	0989
58369	-- OTHER FORMS.INC WASTE	R2	0990
5837	POLYVINYL ACETATE	R2	0991
5838	ION EXCH POLYMR ETC TYPE	R2	0992
5839	OTH POLYMRZTION ETC PROD	R2	0993
584	CELLULOSE DERIVATIVS ETC	R2	0994
5841	REGENERATED CELLULOSE	R2	0995
5842	CELLULOSE NITRATES	R2	0996
58421	-- NON-PLASTICIZED	R2	0997
58422	-- PLASTICIZED	R2	0998
5843	CELLULOSE ACETATES	R2	0999
58431	-- NON-PLASTICIZED	R2	1000
58432	-- PLASTICIZED	R2	1001
5849	OTH CELL DERIV.VULC FBRE	R2	1002
58491	OTH CELL DERIVS.NON-PLAS	R2	1003
58492	OTH CELL DERIVS.PLASTIZD	R2	1004
58493	VULCANIZED FIBRE	R2	1005
585	PLASTIC MATERIAL NES	R2	1006
5851	MODIFIED NATL RESINS ETC	R2	1007
5852	OTH ART PLASTIC MATS NES	R2	1008
58521	HARDENED PROTEINS	R2	1009
58522	ALGINIC ACID.SALTS.ESTRS	R2	1010
58529	OTH HIGH POLYMRS ETC.NES	R2	1011
59	CHEMICAL MATERIALS NES	R2	1012
591	PESTICIDES.DISINFECTANTS	R2	1013
5911	INSECTICIDES.FOR RETAIL	R2	1014
5912	FUNGICIDES.FOR RETAIL	R2	1015
5913	HERBICIDES.FOR RETAIL	R2	1016
5914	DESINFECTANTS.ETC.FR RET	R2	1017
59141	DISINFECTANTS FOR RETAIL	R2	1018
59149	RAT POISONS ETC FR RTAIL	R2	1019
592	STARCH.INULIN.GLUTEN.ETC	R2	1020
5921	STARCH.INULIN.GLUTEN	R2	1021
59211	STARCHES.INULIN	R2	1022
59212	WHEAT GLUTEN.DRY OR NOT	R2	1023
5922	ALBUMINOIDAL SUBTS.GLUES	R2	1024
59221	CASEIN AND DERIVATVS.ETC	R2	1025
59222	ALBUMINS AND DERIVTS.ETC	R2	1026
59223	GELATIN AND DERIVATS.ETC	R2	1027
59224	PROTEIN AND DERIVATS.ETC	R2	1028
59225	DEXTRIN.STARCH GLUES ETC	R2	1029
59229	PREPARED GLUES NES.ETC	R2	1030
598	MISCEL CHEM PRODUCTS NES	R2	1031
5981	CHEMCLS FROM WOOD RESIN	R2	1032
59811	TALL OIL	R2	1033
59812	CONCENTRATD SULPHITE LYE	R2	1034
59813	SPIRTS OF TURPENTINE ETC	R2	1035
59814	ROSIN RESIN ACIDS.ETC	R2	1036
59819	WOOD TAR.VEG PITCH ETC	R2	1037
5982	ANTI-KNOCK PREPARTNS ETC	R2	1038
5983	ORGANIC CHEM PRODCTS NES	R2	1039
59831	ARTIFICIAL.ETC WAXES	R2	1040
59832	ARTIFICIAL ETC GRAPHITE	R2	1041
59833	PREP RUBBER ACCELERATORS	R2	1042
5989	CHEM PRODUCTS PREPS NES	R2	1043
59891	PREPD GLAZINGS DRESSINGS	R2	1044
59892	ACTIVTED NAT MINRL PROD	R2	1045
59893	CULTURE MEDIA PREPARED	R2	1046
59894	FIRE EXTINGUISHR CHARGES	R2	1047
59895	MODELLING COMPOUNDS	R2	1048
59896	FLUXES.ETC	R2	1049
59897	VARNISH SOLVENTS.THINNRS	R2	1050
59898	COMPOUND CATALYSTS	R2	1051
59899	OTH CHEM PRODS.PREPS.NES	R2	1052
6	BASIC MANUFACTURES	R2	1053
61	LEATHER.DRESSED FUR.ETC	R2	1054
611	LEATHER	R2	1055
6112	LEATHER ARTIFICL.RECONST	R2	1056
6113	CALF LEATHER	R2	1057
6114	LEATHR BOVINE NES.EQUINE	R2	1058
6115	LEATHER FROM SHEEP LAMBS	R2	1059
6116	LEATHER OF OTH HIDE.SKIN	R2	1060
61161	LEATHER FROM GOAT.KID	R2	1061
61169	LEATHER NES	R2	1062
6118	LEATHER SPECIALLY FINSHD	R2	1063
61181	CHAMOIS-DRESSED LEATHER	R2	1064
61183	LEATHER PATENT.METALIZED	R2	1065
612	LEATHER ETC MANUFACTURES	R2	1066
6121	LEATHER BELTING ETC	R2	1067
6122	HARNESS-MAKERS GOODS	R2	1068
6123	PREPRD PARTS OF FOOTWEAR	R2	1069
6129	LEATHER MANUFACTURES NES	R2	1070
613	FUR SKINS TANNED.DRESSED	R2	1071
6130	FUR SKINS TANNED.DRESSED	R2	1072
62	RUBBER MANUFACTURES NES	R2	1073
621	MATERIALS OF RUBBER	R2	1074
6210	MATERIALS OF RUBBER	R2	1075
62101	SHEETS ETC RUBBER UNVULC	R2	1076
62102	RUBBER UNVULCANZD.SHAPED	R2	1077
62103	VULC RUBBER THREAD.CORD	R2	1078
62104	UNHARD VULC RUBBER.BASIC	R2	1079
62105	UNHARD VULC RUBBER TUBES	R2	1080
62106	HRDND RUBBER SMPLY FORMD	R2	1081
625	RUBBER TYRES.TUBES	R2	1082
6251	TYRES NEW FOR MOTOR CARS	R2	1083
6252	TYRES.NEW.BUS OR LORRY	R2	1084
6253	TYRES NEW FOR AIRCRAFT	R2	1085
6254	TYRES.NEW.MTR OR BICYCLE	R2	1086
6259	OTH TYRES.TYRE CASES.ETC	R2	1087
62591	INNER TUBES	R2	1088
62599	TYRES NES.TYRE CASES.ETC	R2	1089
628	RUBBER ARTICLES NES	R2	1090
6281	HYGIENIC UNHRDND RUBBER	R2	1091
6282	RUBBER BELTING.VULC RUB	R2	1092
6289	OTH RUBBER ARTICLES NES	R2	1093
62891	UNHARD RUBBER PRODS NES	R2	1094
62899	HARDND RUBBER PRODS NES	R2	1095
63	WOOD.CORK MANUFACTRS NES	R2	1096
633	CORK MANUFACTURES	R2	1097
6330	CORK MANUFACTURES	R2	1098
63301	NATURAL CORK ARTICLES	R2	1099
63302	AGGLOMERATED CORK.ARTS O	R2	1100
634	VENEERS.PLYWOOD.ETC	R2	1101
6341	VENEER SHEETS	R2	1102
6342	PLYWOOD OF WOOD SHEETS	R2	1103
6343	IMPROVED.RECONSTIT WOOD	R2	1104
63431	IMPROVED WOOD	R2	1105
63432	RECONSTITUTED WOOD	R2	1106
6344	WOOD-BASED PANELS NES	R2	1107
63441	BLCKBOARD.LAMINBOARD.ETC	R2	1108
63442	INLAID WOOD.MARQUETRY	R2	1109
63443	CELLULAR WOOD PANELS	R2	1110
6348	WOOD SIMPLY SHAPED NES	R2	1111
63481	HOOPWOOD.SPLIT POLES ETC	R2	1112
63482	WOODEN BEADINGS.MOULDNGS	R2	1113
63483	WOOD WOOL AND FLOUR	R2	1114
635	WOOD MANUFACTURES NES	R2	1115
6351	BOXES.CASES.CRATES.ETC	R2	1116
6352	COOPRAGE PROD.INC STAVES	R2	1117
6353	BUILDERS WOODWRK PREFABS	R2	1118
6354	WOOD MNFTRS DOMESTIC ETC	R2	1119
63541	WOOD PICTURE ETC FRAMES	R2	1120

63542	WOOD HOUSEHOLD UTENSILS	R2	1121
63549	WOOD MFRS DOMESTIC NES	R2	1122
6359	OTHER WOOD MANUFACTURES	R2	1123
63591	TOOLS, HANDLES ETC WOOD	R2	1124
63592	SPOOLS, BOBBINS ETC WOOD	R2	1125
63599	OTHER WOOD ARTICLES NES	R2	1126
64	PAPER, PAPERBOARD AND MFR	R2	1127
641	PAPER AND PAPERBOARD	R2	1128
6411	NEWSPRINT	R2	1129
6412	PRINTG, WRITING PAPER NES	R2	1130
64121	-- UNCOATED	R2	1131
64122	-- COATED IMPREGNATD ETC	R2	1132
6413	KRAFT PAPER, PAPERBOARD	R2	1133
64131	KRAFT LINER IN BULK	R2	1134
64132	SACK KRAFT PAPER IN BULK	R2	1135
64139	KRAFT PAPER PAPERBD NES	R2	1136
6415	PAPER, PAPERBRD BULK, NES	R2	1137
64151	SEMI-CHEM FLUTING PAPER	R2	1138
64152	SULPHITE WRAP PAPER BULK	R2	1139
64153	GREASEPROOF ETC PAPER	R2	1140
64159	OTHER PAPER ETC, BULK NES	R2	1141
6416	FIBREBOARD OF WOOD ETC	R2	1142
64161	--COMPRESSED(HARDBOARD)	R2	1143
64162	--NON COMP, INSULATNG BRD	R2	1144
6417	CORRUGATED PAPER ETC BLK	R2	1145
64171	KRAFT PAPER CREPED ETC	R2	1146
64172	CREPED HSHOLD PAPER ETC	R2	1147
64173	OTHER CREPED ETC PAPER	R2	1148
64174	PAPER ETC CORRUGATED ETC	R2	1149
6418	COATED ETC PAPER NES BLK	R2	1150
64181	PLASTIC COATED PAPER ETC	R2	1151
64182	TARRED ETC PAPER, PAPERBD	R2	1152
64189	COATED PAPER ETC NES	R2	1153
6419	CONVERTED PAPER ETC NES	R2	1154
64192	COMPOSITE PAPER ETC BULK	R2	1155
64196	PAPER PULP FILTERBLOCKS	R2	1156
64197	WALLPAPER, LINCRUSTA ETC	R2	1157
642	PAPER, ETC, PRECUT, ARTS OF	R2	1158
6421	PAPER ETC CONTAINERS	R2	1159
6422	CORRESPONDENCE STATIONRY	R2	1160
6423	EXERCISE BOOKS ETC	R2	1161
6424	PAPER ETC CT TO SIZE NES	R2	1162
64241	CIGARETTE PAPER PRECUT	R2	1163
64242	COPYING PAPER CT TO SIZE	R2	1164
64243	TOILET PAPER CUT TO SIZE	R2	1165
64244	GUMMED PAPER STRIP ROLLS	R2	1166
64249	OTH PAPER CT TO SIZE NES	R2	1167
6428	PAPER ETC ARTICLES NES	R2	1168
64281	SPOOLS ETC OF PAPER ETC	R2	1169
64282	PUNCHED CARD MACH CARDS	R2	1170
64283	PAPER DISHES CUPS ETC	R2	1171
64284	PAPER TISSUES TOWELS ETC	R2	1172
64285	PAPER ETC DIAPERS ETC	R2	1173
64289	OTHER ARTICLES OF PAPER	R2	1174
65	TEXTILE YARN, FABRICS ETC	R2	1175
651	TEXTILE YARN	R2	1176
6511	SILK YARN	R2	1177
65111	SILK YARN NON WASTE, BULK	R2	1178
65116	SILK WASTE YARN IN BULK	R2	1179
65117	SILK YARN FOR RETAIL ETC	R2	1180
6512	WOOL, HAIR YARN, INCL TOPS	R2	1181
65121	WOOL TOPS	R2	1182
65122	CARDED WOOL YARN IN BULK	R2	1183
65123	COMBED WOOL YARN IN BULK	R2	1184
65124	YARN OF FINE ANIMAL HAIR	R2	1185
65125	HORSEHAIR ETC YARN BULK	R2	1186
65126	WOOL ETC YARN AT RETAIL	R2	1187
65127	CARDED WOOL BLENDED YARN	R2	1188
65128	COMBED WOOL BLENDED YARN	R2	1189
65129	WOOL ETC BLEND YARN RETL	R2	1190
6513	COTTON YARN	R2	1191
65131	-- 14 KM/KG OR LESS	R2	1192
65132	-- + 14 TO 40 KM/KG	R2	1193
65133	-- + 40 BUT UNDR 80KM/KG	R2	1194
65134	-- 80 KM/KG OR MORE	R2	1195
65135	-- PUT UP FOR RETAIL	R2	1196
6514	SYN FIB YRN BULK MONOFIL	R2	1197
65141	-- TEXTRD CONT PLMDE	R2	1198
65142	-- NONTXT ETC CONT PLMDE	R2	1199
65143	-- OTH NONTXT CONT PLMDE	R2	1200
65144	-- TEXTRD CONT PLSTR	R2	1201
65145	-- NONTXT ETC CONT PLSTR	R2	1202
65146	-- OTH NONTXT CONT PLSTR	R2	1203
65147	-- OF OTH CONT SYN FIBRE	R2	1204
65148	-- OF DISCONT SYN FIBRES	R2	1205
65149	SYNTH FIBRE MONOFIL ETC	R2	1206
6515	YARN OF 6514 FOR RETAIL	R2	1207
65151	-- OF CONTINUOUS FIBRES	R2	1208
65152	-- OF DISCONTIN FIBRES	R2	1209
6516	DISCON SYN FIB BLEND YRN	R2	1210
65166	DISCON SYN FIB/COTTN YRN	R2	1211
65167	DISCON SYN FIB/WOOL YARN	R2	1212
65168	OTH DISC SYN BLEND YARN	R2	1213
65169	YARN OF 6516 FOR RETAIL	R2	1214
6517	REGEN FIBRE YARN, MONOFIL	R2	1215
65171	CONT VISCOSE RAYON YARN	R2	1216
65172	CONT ACETATE FIBRE YARN	R2	1217
65173	OTH CONT REGEN FIBRE YRN	R2	1218
65174	DISCON REGEN FIBRE YARN	R2	1219
65175	DISC REGEN FIB/COTTN YRN	R2	1220
65176	DISC REGEN FIB/WOOL YARN	R2	1221
65177	OTH DISC REGN BLEND YARN	R2	1222
65178	REGEN FIBRE MONOFIL ETC	R2	1223
6518	YARN OF 6517 FOR RETAIL	R2	1224
65181	-- OF CONTINUOUS FIBRES	R2	1225
65182	-- OF DISCONTIN FIBRES	R2	1226
6519	TEXTILE FIBRE YARN NES	R2	1227
65191	METALLIZED TEXTILE YARN	R2	1228
65195	YARN OF GLASS FIBRE	R2	1229
65196	FLAX, RAMIE YARN IN BULK	R2	1230
65197	FLAX, RAMIE YARN, RETAIL	R2	1231
65198	YARN OF FIBRES OF 264 0	R2	1232
65199	VEG FIBRE YARN NES ETC	R2	1233
652	COTTON FABRICS, WOVEN	R2	1234
6521	GREY WOVEN COTTON FABRIC	R2	1235
65211	GREY COTTON GAUZE	R2	1236
65212	UNBLCHD COTTON TERRY FAB	R2	1237
65214	GREY WOVEN COTTON NES	R2	1238
65215	GREY WOVN COTN BLEND NES	R2	1239
6522	WOVEN COTTON BLEACHD, ETC	R2	1240
65221	COTTON GAUZE BLEACHD, ETC	R2	1241
65222	BLCHD COTTON TERRY FABRC	R2	1242
65223	PILE ETC COTTON FABRICS	R2	1243
65224	BLCHED COTTON FABRIC NES	R2	1244
65225	BLCHD COTN BLEND FAB NES	R2	1245
653	WOVN MAN-MADE FIB FABRIC	R2	1246
6531	CONT SYNT WEAVES NONPILE	R2	1247
65314	CONT SYN TYRE CORD FABRC	R2	1248
65315	CONT SYN TXTL FABRIC NES	R2	1249
65316	CONT SYN BLEND FABRC NES	R2	1250
6532	DISC SYN TXTL FABRIC NES	R2	1251
6534	DISC SYN BLEND FABRC NES	R2	1252
65341	-- WITH COTTON FIBRES	R2	1253
65342	-- WITH WOOL, FINE HAIR	R2	1254
65343	-- W/CONT MAN-MADE FIBRE	R2	1255
65349	-- W/TEXTILE FIBRES NES	R2	1256
6535	CONT REGN WEAVES NONPILE	R2	1257
65354	CONT REGEN TYRE CORD FAB	R2	1258
65355	CONT REGN TXTL FABRC NES	R2	1259
65356	CONT REG BLEND FABRC NES	R2	1260
6536	DISC REGN TXTL FABRC NES	R2	1261
6538	DISC REG BLEND FABRC NES	R2	1262
65381	-- WITH COTTON FIBRES	R2	1263
65382	-- WITH WOOL, FINE HAIR	R2	1264
65383	-- W/CONT MAN-MADE FIBRE	R2	1265
65389	-- W/TEXTILE FIBRES NES	R2	1266
6539	MAN-MADE PILE ETC FABRIC	R2	1267
65397	-- SYNTHETIC	R2	1268
65398	-- REGENERATED	R2	1269
654	OTH WOVEN TEXTILE FABRIC	R2	1270
6541	SILK FABRICS WOVEN	R2	1271
6542	WOVEN WOOL, HAIR NONPILE	R2	1272
65421	-- OF CARD WOOL, FINE HR	R2	1273
65422	-- OF COMB WOOL, FINE HR	R2	1274
6543	WOVEN WOOL ETC W/FAB NES	R2	1275
65431	-- W/CONT SYNTHTC FIBRES	R2	1276
65432	-- W/DISC SYNTHTC FIBRES	R2	1277
65433	-- W/OTH TEXT FIBRES NES	R2	1278
65434	PILE ETC FABRICS, WOOL	R2	1279
6544	WOVEN FLAX RAMIE FABRICS	R2	1280

6545	WEAVES OF FIBRES OF 2640	R2	1281
6546	GLASS FIBRE FABRIC	R2	1282
6549	WOVEN FABRICS NES	R2	1283
65491	WEAVES OF METALLIZD YARN	R2	1284
65492	COARSE HAIR WOVEN FABRIC	R2	1285
65496	VEG TXTL FABRIC NES ETC	R2	1286
65499	PILE.CHENILLE FABRIC NES	R2	1287
655	KNITTED ETC FABRICS	R2	1288
6551	KNIT ETC SYNTH FAB NONEL	R2	1289
6552	OTHER KNIT ETC FAB NONEL	R2	1290
65521	-- OF WOOL OR FINE HAIR	R2	1291
65522	-- OF COTTON	R2	1292
65523	-- OF REGENERATED FIBRES	R2	1293
65529	-- OF OTHER FIBRES	R2	1294
6553	KNIT ETC FABRIC.ELASTIC	R2	1295
656	LACE.RIBBONS.TULLE.ETC	R2	1296
6560	LACE.RIBBONS.TULLE.ETC	R2	1297
65601	NARROW FABRICS NES	R2	1298
65602	WOVEN LABELS ETC NES	R2	1299
65603	TAPES ETC NOT ELASTIC	R2	1300
65604	NET FABRICS.PLAIN	R2	1301
65605	NET FABRICS NES.LACE	R2	1302
65606	EMBROIDERY	R2	1303
657	SPECIAL TEXTILE ETC PROD	R2	1304
6571	FELT AND ARTICLES NES	R2	1305
6572	BONDED FIBRE TEXTLS NES	R2	1306
6573	COATED ETC TEXTILES NES	R2	1307
65731	GUM ETC COATED TEXTILES	R2	1308
65732	PLASTIC COATED TEXTILES	R2	1309
65733	RUBBERIZED TEXT NOT KNIT	R2	1310
65739	OTH COATED TEXTILES ETC	R2	1311
6574	ELASTIC FAB ETC NOT KNIT	R2	1312
6575	CORDAGE AND MANUFACTURES	R2	1313
65751	CORDAGE.CABLE.ROPE.TWINE	R2	1314
65752	NETTING OF ROPE.TWINE	R2	1315
65759	ARTICLES OF CORDAGE NES	R2	1316
6576	HAT BODIES	R2	1317
65761	WOOL.FUR FELT HAT BODIES	R2	1318
65762	HAT BODIES NES	R2	1319
6577	TEXTILES FOR MACHINERY	R2	1320
65771	TEXTILE WADDING NES ETC	R2	1321
65772	TEXTILE WICKS ETC	R2	1322
65773	TEXTLS FOR MACHINES NES	R2	1323
6579	SPECL TEXTILE PRODS NES	R2	1324
65791	TEXTILE HOSEPIPING ETC	R2	1325
65792	MACHINERY BELTS ETC TEXT	R2	1326
658	TEXTILE ARTICLES NES	R2	1327
6581	BAGS SACKS OF TEXTILES	R2	1328
6582	MADE-UP CANVAS GOODS	R2	1329
65821	-- OF COTTON	R2	1330
65829	-- OTHER THAN OF COTTON	R2	1331
6583	BLANKETS ETC NON ELECTRC	R2	1332
65831	-- OF WOOL OR FINE HAIR	R2	1333
65832	-- OF COTTON	R2	1334
65833	-- OF SYNTHETIC FIBRES	R2	1335
65839	-- OF OTHER FIBRES	R2	1336
6584	LINENS ETC	R2	1337
65841	BED LINEN OF COTTON	R2	1338
65842	BED LINEN OF OTHR FIBRES	R2	1339
65843	TABLE LINEN OF COTTON	R2	1340
65844	TABLE LINEN OF OTH FIBRE	R2	1341
65845	OTHER LINEN OF COTTON	R2	1342
65846	OTHER LINEN OF OTH FIBRE	R2	1343
65848	OTH FURN ARTIC OF COTTON	R2	1344
65849	OTH FURN ART OF OTH FIBR	R2	1345
6589	OTH TEXTILE ARTICLES NES	R2	1346
65891	TAPESTRIES HAND-MADE ETC	R2	1347
65898	KNITTED ETC ARTICLES NES	R2	1348
65899	OTH TEXTILE PRODUCTS.NES	R2	1349
659	FLOOR COVERINGS.ETC	R2	1350
6591	LINOLEUM.FLOOR COVERINGS	R2	1351
65911	FLOOR COVER OF PAPER ETC	R2	1352
65912	LINOLEUM ETC TXTLE BASED	R2	1353
6592	CARPETS ETC KNOTTED	R2	1354
65921	-- OF WOOL OR FINE HAIR	R2	1355
65929	-- OF OTHER TEXTILE MTLS	R2	1356
6593	KELEM.SCHUMACKS ETC RUGS	R2	1357
6594	WOOL CARPETS ETC NES	R2	1358
65941	-- TUFTED	R2	1359
65942	-- WOVEN	R2	1360
65949	-- OTHR THAN KNOTTED ETC	R2	1361
6595	MAN-MADE TXTL CARPTS NES	R2	1362
65951	-- TUFTED	R2	1363
65952	-- WOVEN	R2	1364
65959	-- OTHR THAN KNOTTED ETC	R2	1365
6596	OTH TXTL CARPETS ETC NES	R2	1366
65961	-- TUFTED	R2	1367
65962	-- OTHR THAN KNOTTED ETC	R2	1368
65963	FLOOR COVERINGS OF FELTS	R2	1369
6597	PLAITS.PLAITED PRODUCTS	R2	1370
66	NONMETAL MINERAL MFS NES	R2	1371
661	LIME CEMENT BLDG PRODS	R2	1372
6611	LIME.QUICK.SLKD.HYDRAULC	R2	1373
6612	CEMENT	R2	1374
6613	BUILDING STONE ETC WORKD	R2	1375
66131	FLAGSTONES ETC.NAT STONE	R2	1376
66132	BUILDING STONE WORKED	R2	1377
66133	SLATE.WORKED.ARTICLES OF	R2	1378
6618	MNRL BLDG PRD UNFIRD NES	R2	1379
66181	ASPHALT ETC PRODUCTS	R2	1380
66182	MIXED VEG-MNRL BLDG PROD	R2	1381
66183	ASBESTOS-.FIBRE-CMNT PRD	R2	1382
662	CLAY.REFRACTORY BLDG PRD	R2	1383
6623	REFRACTORY BUILDING PROD	R2	1384
66231	SILICEOUS EARTHS.BRICKS	R2	1385
66232	REFRACTORY BRICK NES	R2	1386
66233	REFRACTORY CEMENT.MORTAR	R2	1387
6624	BRICKS ETC NONREFRACTORY	R2	1388
66241	BUILDING BRICKS	R2	1389
66242	ROOFNG TILES ETC.CERAMIC	R2	1390
66243	PIPING ETC.CERAMIC	R2	1391
66244	UNGLAZD CERAMC SETTS ETC	R2	1392
66245	GLAZED CERAMIC SETTS ETC	R2	1393
663	MINERAL MANUFCTURES NES	R2	1394
6631	GRINDING STONES ETC	R2	1395
6632	ABRASIVE CLOTHS ETC	R2	1396
6633	MINRL MFS NES NONCERAMIC	R2	1397
66331	ARTICLES OF PLASTER	R2	1398
66332	CEMENT.ARTFCL STONE PROD	R2	1399
66333	MICA.WORKED.ARTICLES OF	R2	1400
66339	OTH MINRL MFS NONCERAMIC	R2	1401
6635	MINRL INSULATNG PROD NES	R2	1402
6637	REFRACTORY WARE NONBLDG	R2	1403
6638	ASBESTOS.FRICTION MATRLS	R2	1404
66381	ASBESTOS MFS NONFRICTION	R2	1405
66382	FRICTION MATERIALS	R2	1406
6639	CERAMIC ARTICLES NES	R2	1407
66391	CERAMC APPARAT NONRFRACT	R2	1408
66392	OTH CERAMIC ARTICLES NES	R2	1409
664	GLASS	R2	1410
6641	GLASS NONOPTICAL.PLAIN	R2	1411
66414	GLASS IN MASS NONOPTICAL	R2	1412
66415	GLASS NES RODS ETC UNWKD	R2	1413
6642	OPTICAL GLASS UNWRKD ETC	R2	1414
6643	DRAWN.BLOWN GLASS UNWRKD	R2	1415
6644	GLASS SURFACE-GROUND ETC	R2	1416
6645	CAST.ROLLED GLASS UNWRKD	R2	1417
6646	GLASS CONSTRUCTION PRODS	R2	1418
6647	SAFETY GLASS CUT OR NOT	R2	1419
6648	SHEET GLASS METAL-COATED	R2	1420
6649	GLASS NES	R2	1421
66491	GLASS IN SHAPES	R2	1422
66492	LAMP ETC ENVELOPES GLASS	R2	1423
66493	CLOCK.WATCH GLASSES ETC	R2	1424
66494	GLASS FIBRE AND PRODUCTS	R2	1425
665	GLASSWARE	R2	1426
6651	BOTTLES ETC OF GLASS	R2	1427
66511	GLASS BOTTLES ETC NONVAC	R2	1428
66512	INNERS FOR VACUUM VESSEL	R2	1429
6652	HOUSEHLD.HOTEL ETC GLASS	R2	1430
6658	GLASS ARTICLES NES	R2	1431
66581	LABORATORY ETC GLASS	R2	1432
66582	GLASS ORNAMENTS NES	R2	1433
66589	OTHER GLASS ARTICLES NES	R2	1434
666	POTTERY	R2	1435
6664	PORCELN.CHINA HOUSE WARE	R2	1436
6665	COARSE CERAMIC HOUSEWARE	R2	1437
6666	CERAMIC ORNAMENTS ETC	R2	1438
667	PEARL.PREC-.SEMI-P STONE	R2	1439
6671	PEARLS UNSET.UNSTRUNG	R2	1440

6672	DIAMONDS NONINDUST UNSET	R2	1441
66721	-- ROUGH UNSORTED	R2	1442
66722	-- SRTD ROUGH SIMPLY WKD	R2	1443
66729	-- CUT ETC NOT SET	R2	1444
6673	PREC-,SEMI-PR STONES NES	R2	1445
6674	SYNTH PREC- SEMI-P STONE	R2	1446
67	IRON AND STEEL	R2	1447
671	PIG IRON ETC	R2	1448
6712	PIG IRN,SPIEGELEISEN ETC	R2	1449
6713	IRON STL POWDER SHOT ETC	R2	1450
67131	IRON STL SHOT GRIT ETC	R2	1451
67132	IRON,STEEL POWDERS	R2	1452
67133	SPONGE IRON OR STEEL	R2	1453
6716	FERRO-ALLOYS	R2	1454
67161	FERRO-MANGANESE	R2	1455
67162	FERRO-SILICON	R2	1456
67169	OTHER FERRO-ALLOYS	R2	1457
672	IRON,STEEL PRIMARY FORMS	R2	1458
6724	IRN STL INGOTS LUMPS ETC	R2	1459
67241	IRON,SIMPLE STEEL INGOTS	R2	1460
67242	HIGH CARBON STEEL INGOTS	R2	1461
67243	STNLESS STEEL ETC INGOTS	R2	1462
67244	OTHER ALLOY STEEL INGOTS	R2	1463
67245	IRN,STL BLOCKS,LUMPS ETC	R2	1464
6725	IRN,STL BLOOMS,SLABS,ETC	R2	1465
67251	IRN SMPLE STL BLOOMS ETC	R2	1466
67252	HIGH CARB STL BLOOMS ETC	R2	1467
67254	STNLS STL ETC BLOOMS ETC	R2	1468
67255	OTH ALLOY STL BLOOMS ETC	R2	1469
6727	IRN STL COIL FR REROLLNG	R2	1470
67271	IRON SIMPLE STEEL COILS	R2	1471
67272	HIGH CARBON STEEL COILS	R2	1472
67274	STNLESS STEEL ETC COILS	R2	1473
67275	OTHER ALLOY STEEL COILS	R2	1474
673	IRON,STEEL SHAPES ETC	R2	1475
6731	IRON,STEEL WIRE ROD	R2	1476
67311	IRON,SIMPLE STL WIRE ROD	R2	1477
67312	HIGH CARBON STL WIRE ROD	R2	1478
67314	STNLESS STL ETC WIRE ROD	R2	1479
67315	OTHER ALLOY STL WIRE ROD	R2	1480
6732	IRON,STEEL BARS ETC	R2	1481
67322	-- OF HIGH CARBON STEEL	R2	1482
67324	-- OF STAINLESS ETC STL	R2	1483
67325	-- OF OTHER ALLOY STEEL	R2	1484
67326	-- OTHER,HOT-ROLLED ETC	R2	1485
67327	-- OTHER,FORGED,ETC	R2	1486
6733	IRON,STEEL PROFILES ETC	R2	1487
67331	SMALL U,I,H SECTIONS ETC	R2	1488
67332	LARGE U,I,H SECTIONS ETC	R2	1489
67333	OTH PRFILES HOTROLLD ETC	R2	1490
67334	OTH PRFILES COLDFRMD ETC	R2	1491
67335	OTH IRN SMPL STL PRFILES	R2	1492
67336	IRN SMPL STL SHEET PILNG	R2	1493
67337	HIGH CARBON STL PROFILES	R2	1494
67338	STNLESS STL ETC PROFILES	R2	1495
67339	OTHER ALLOY STL PROFILES	R2	1496
674	IRN STL UNIV PLATE,SHEET	R2	1497
6741	IRON OR STEEL UNIVERSALS	R2	1498
67414	IRN,SMPL STL UNIVERSALS	R2	1499
67415	HIGH CARB,ALLOY STL UNIV	R2	1500
6744	IRN,STL HVY PLATE ROLLED	R2	1501
67441	-- OF IRON OR SIMPLE STL	R2	1502
67442	-- OF HIGH CARBON STEEL	R2	1503
67443	-- OF STAINLESS ETC STL	R2	1504
67444	-- OF OTHER ALLOY STEEL	R2	1505
6745	IRN STL MED PLATE ROLLED	R2	1506
67451	-- OF IRON OR SIMPLE STL	R2	1507
67452	-- OF HIGH CARBON STEEL	R2	1508
67453	-- OF STAINLESS ETC STL	R2	1509
67454	-- OF OTHER ALLOY STEEL	R2	1510
6746	IRN,STL THIN PLATE,ROLLD	R2	1511
67461	-- OF IRON OR SIMPLE STL	R2	1512
67462	-- OF HIGH CARBON STEEL	R2	1513
67463	-- OF STAINLESS ETC STL	R2	1514
67464	-- OF OTHER ALLOY STEEL	R2	1515
6747	TINNED PLATES SHEETS	R2	1516
6749	OTH IRN,STL PLATES SHEET	R2	1517
67491	-- OF IRON OR SIMPLE STL	R2	1518
67492	-- OF HIGH CARBON STEEL	R2	1519
67493	-- OF STAINLESS ETC STL	R2	1520
67494	-- OF OTHER ALLOY STEEL	R2	1521
675	IRON STEEL HOOP STRIP	R2	1522
6750	IRON STEEL HOOP STRIP	R2	1523
67501	--OF IRON OR SIMPLE STL	R2	1524
67502	--OF HIGH CARBON STEEL	R2	1525
67504	--OF STAINLESS ETC STL	R2	1526
67505	--OF OTHER ALLOY STEEL	R2	1527
676	RAILWY RAILS ETC IRN STL	R2	1528
6760	RAILWY RAILS ETC IRN STL	R2	1529
67601	RAILWAY RAILS IRN,STL	R2	1530
67602	RY TRACK EQU NES IRN STL	R2	1531
677	IRN STL WIRE (EXCL W ROD	R2	1532
6770	IRN STL WIRE (EXCL W ROD	R2	1533
67701	--OF IRON OR SIMPLE STL	R2	1534
67702	--OF HIGH CARBON STEEL	R2	1535
67704	--OF STAINLESS ETC STL	R2	1536
67705	--OF OTHER ALLOY STEEL	R2	1537
678	IRON STL TUBES,PIPES ETC	R2	1538
6781	CAST IRON TUBES PIPES	R2	1539
6782	IRON,STL SEAMLESS TUBES	R2	1540
6783	IRON,STL TUBES,PIPES NES	R2	1541
6784	STL HIGHPRESSURE CONDUIT	R2	1542
6785	IRON,STEEL TUBE FITTINGS	R2	1543
679	IRN STL CASTINGS UNWORKD	R2	1544
6793	IRON,STL FORGINGS ROUGH	R2	1545
6794	IRON STL CASTINGS ROUGH	R2	1546
67941	IRON CASTINGS ROUGH	R2	1547
67942	STEEL CASTINGS ROUGH	R2	1548
68	NON-FERROUS METALS	R2	1549
681	SILVER,PLATINUM ETC	R2	1550
6811	SILVER UNWKD PARTLY WRKD	R2	1551
68112	ROLLED SILVER	R2	1552
68113	SILVER UNWROUGHT	R2	1553
68114	SILVER SEMI-MANUFACTURED	R2	1554
6812	METALS OF PLATINUM GROUP	R2	1555
68122	ROLLED PLATINUM ETC	R2	1556
68123	PLATINUM,ALLOYS UNWRGHT	R2	1557
68124	OTH PLAT GRP METAL UNWRT	R2	1558
68125	PLAT GRP METALS SEMI-MFD	R2	1559
682	COPPER EXC CEMENT COPPER	R2	1560
6821	COPPER NES,ALLOYS UNWRT	R2	1561
68211	COPPER UNREF EXC CEMENT	R2	1562
68212	COPPER REFINED	R2	1563
68213	MASTER ALLOY OF COPPER	R2	1564
6822	COPPER,ALLOYS WORKED	R2	1565
68221	COPPER BARS WIRE ETC	R2	1566
68222	COPPER PLATE SHEET STRIP	R2	1567
68223	COPPER FOIL	R2	1568
68224	COPPER POWDERS FLAKES	R2	1569
68225	COPPER TUBES,PIPES ETC	R2	1570
68226	COPPER TUBE FITTINGS	R2	1571
683	NICKEL	R2	1572
6831	NICKEL,ALLOYS UNWROUGHT	R2	1573
6832	NICKEL,ALLOYS WORKED	R2	1574
68321	NICKEL BARS WIRE ETC	R2	1575
68322	NICKEL SHEET,POWDER FOIL	R2	1576
68323	NICKEL TUBE,PIPE ETC	R2	1577
68324	NICKEL ELECTROPLAT ANODES	R2	1578
684	ALUMINIUM	R2	1579
6841	ALUMINIUM,ALLOYS UNWRGHT	R2	1580
6842	ALUMINIUM,ALLOYS WORKED	R2	1581
68421	ALUMINIUM BARS WIRE ETC	R2	1582
68422	ALUMNUM PLATE SHEET STRIP	R2	1583
68423	ALUMINIUM FOIL	R2	1584
68424	ALUMINIUM POWDERS FLAKES	R2	1585
68425	ALUMINIUM TUBES ETC	R2	1586
68426	ALUMINIUM TUBE FITTINGS	R2	1587
685	LEAD	R2	1588
6851	LEAD,ALLOYS UNWROUGHT	R2	1589
68511	UNREFINED LEAD	R2	1590
68512	REF LEAD(EXC ALLOY)UNWRT	R2	1591
68517	LEAD ALLOYS UNWROUGHT	R2	1592
6852	LEAD,ALLOYS WORKED	R2	1593
68521	LEAD BARS WIRE ETC	R2	1594
68522	LEAD PLATE SHEET STRIP	R2	1595
68523	LEAD FOIL POWDER FLAKES	R2	1596
68524	LEAD TUBES FITTINGS ETC	R2	1597
686	ZINC	R2	1598
6861	ZINC,ALLOYS UNWROUGHT	R2	1599
6863	ZINC,ALLOYS WKD INC DUST	R2	1600

68631	ZINC BARS,RODS,WIRE ETC	R2	1601
68632	ZINC SHEETS,STRIP,FOIL	R2	1602
68633	ZINC POWDERS,DUST,FLAKES	R2	1603
68634	ZINC TUBES,FITTINGS ETC	R2	1604
687	TIN	R2	1605
6871	TIN,ALLOYS UNWROUGHT	R2	1606
6872	TIN,ALLOYS WORKED	R2	1607
68721	TIN BARS,RODS,WIRE ETC	R2	1608
68722	TIN SHEET,PLATE,STRIP	R2	1609
68723	TIN FOIL,POWDER,FLAKES	R2	1610
68724	TIN TUBES,FITTINGS,ETC	R2	1611
688	URANIUM,THORIUM,ALLOYS	R2	1612
6880	URANIUM,THORIUM,ALLOYS	R2	1613
689	NON-FER BASE METALS NES	R2	1614
6891	TUNGST,MOLYB,TANTAL,MAGN	R2	1615
68911	TUNGSTEN UNWROUGHT,WASTE	R2	1616
68912	MOLYBDENUM UNWRGHT,WASTE	R2	1617
68913	TANTALUM UNWROUGHT,WASTE	R2	1618
68914	MAGNESIUM WASTE,SCRAP	R2	1619
68915	MAGNESIUM UNWROUGHT	R2	1620
6899	BASE METALS NES,CERMETS	R2	1621
68991	BERYLLIUM UNWRGHT,WASTE	R2	1622
68999	.ASE MTL NES UNWRT WASTE	R2	1623
69	METAL MANUFACTURES NES	R2	1624
691	STRUCTURES AND PARTS NES	R2	1625
6911	STRUCTURES,PARTS IRN STL	R2	1626
6912	STRUCTURES,PARTS ALUMNM	R2	1627
692	METAL TANKS,BOXES ETC	R2	1628
6921	METAL STORAGE TANKS ETC	R2	1629
69211	STEEL STORAGE TANKS ETC	R2	1630
69213	ALUMNM STORAGE TANKS ETC	R2	1631
6924	MTL TRANSPORT BOXES ETC	R2	1632
69241	STL TRANSPORT BOXES ETC	R2	1633
69242	ALUMNM TRNSPRT BOXES ETC	R2	1634
69243	IRON COMP GAS CYLINDERS	R2	1635
69244	ALUMNM COMP GAS CYLINDRS	R2	1636
693	WIRE PRODUCTS NON ELECTR	R2	1637
6931	WIRE CABLES,ROPES ETC	R2	1638
69311	-- OF IRON AND STEEL	R2	1639
69312	-- OF COPPER	R2	1640
69313	-- OF ALUMINIUM	R2	1641
6932	IRON,STEEL FENCING WIRE	R2	1642
6935	METAL FENCING,GAUZE,ETC	R2	1643
69351	-- OF IRON OR STEEL	R2	1644
69352	-- OF COPPER	R2	1645
694	STL,COPPR NAILS,NUTS,ETC	R2	1646
6940	STL,COPPR NAILS,NUTS ETC	R2	1647
69401	IRON,STEEL NAILS ETC	R2	1648
69402	IRN,STL NUTS,BOLTS,ETC	R2	1649
69403	COPPER NAILS,BOLTS,ETC	R2	1650
695	TOOLS	R2	1651
6951	HAND TOOLS,AGRIC,FOREST	R2	1652
6953	OTHER HAND TOOLS	R2	1653
69531	HAND SAWS AND BLADES	R2	1654
69532	WRENCHES AND SPANNERS	R2	1655
69533	FILES AND RASPS	R2	1656
69534	PLIERS,PINCERS,SNIPS,ETC	R2	1657
69539	HAND TOOLS ETC NES	R2	1658
6954	BLADES,TIPS,ETC FR TOOLS	R2	1659
69541	PARTS TO INSERT IN TOOLS	R2	1660
69542	CUTTING BLADES FOR MACHS	R2	1661
69543	CARBIDE TOOL TIPS ETC	R2	1662
696	CUTLERY	R2	1663
6960	CUTLERY	R2	1664
69603	RAZORS RAZOR BLADES	R2	1665
69604	SCISSORS SCISSOR BLADES	R2	1666
69605	CLIPPERS CLEAVERS,ETC	R2	1667
69606	TABLEWARE	R2	1668
69607	BASE MTL CUTLERY HANDLES	R2	1669
69608	KNIVES AND BLADES NES	R2	1670
697	BASE MTL HOUSEHOLD EQUIP	R2	1671
6973	DMSTC HEATG,COOKG APPRTS	R2	1672
69731	IRN STL DOM COOKG APPRTS	R2	1673
69732	IRN,STL DOM HEATG APPRTS	R2	1674
69733	PTS NES OF APPAR OF 6973	R2	1675
69734	COPPER DOMSTC STOVES ETC	R2	1676
69735	DMSTC WATERHEATRS NONELE	R2	1677
6974	BASE MTL DMSTC ARTIC NES	R2	1678
69741	-- OF IRON OR STEEL	R2	1679
69742	-- OF COPPER	R2	1680
69743	-- OF ALUMINIUM	R2	1681
6975	BASE MTL INDR SANIT WARE	R2	1682
69751	-- OF IRON OR STEEL	R2	1683
69752	-- OF COPPER	R2	1684
69753	-- OF ALUMINIUM	R2	1685
6978	BASE MTL HOUSE EQUIP NES	R2	1686
69781	DOMSTC FOOD MACH NONELEC	R2	1687
69782	BASE MTL DECOR ARTICLES	R2	1688
699	OTHER METAL MANUFACTURES	R2	1689
6991	LOCKSMITHS WARES,ETC	R2	1690
69911	LOCKS,KEYS AND PARTS	R2	1691
69912	BASE METAL SAFES ETC	R2	1692
69913	BASE MTL DOOR,ETC FITTNG	R2	1693
6992	IRON,STL CHAIN AND PARTS	R2	1694
6993	PINS,HOOKS,EYES,ETC	R2	1695
69931	PINS,NEEDLES,ETC	R2	1696
69932	IRON,STEEL HAIRPINS,ETC	R2	1697
69933	BASE METL HOOKS,EYES ETC	R2	1698
6994	SPRINGS AND LEAVES	R2	1699
69941	IRON,STEEL SPRINGS,ETC	R2	1700
69942	COPPER SPRINGS,LEAVES	R2	1701
6996	BASE MTL MISC ARTICLES	R2	1702
69961	BASE MTL FLEXIBLE TUBING	R2	1703
69962	BASE MTL BELLS NON-ELECT	R2	1704
69963	BASE METAL STOPPERS,ETC	R2	1705
69964	BASE MTL NAME ETC PLATES	R2	1706
69965	BASE MTL SOLDERING RODS	R2	1707
6997	IRON,STEEL ARTICLES NES	R2	1708
69971	IRON,STEEL ANCHORS,PARTS	R2	1709
69979	IRN,STL MANUFACTURES NES	R2	1710
6998	MFRS NES OF CPR,NIKL,ETC	R2	1711
69981	COPPER MANUFACTURES NES	R2	1712
69982	NICKEL MANUFACTURES NES	R2	1713
69983	ALUMINIUM MANUFACTS NES	R2	1714
69984	LEAD MANUFACTURES NES	R2	1715
69985	ZINC MANUFACTURES NES	R2	1716
69986	TIN MANUFACTURES NES	R2	1717
6999	OTH BASE MTLS MNFTRS ETC	R2	1718
69991	TUNGSTEN WRGHT,MFRS NES	R2	1719
69992	MOLYBDENM WRGHT,MFRS NES	R2	1720
69993	TANTALUM WRGHT,MFRS NES	R2	1721
69994	MAGNESIUM WRGHT,MFRS NES	R2	1722
69995	BERYLLIUM WRGHT,MFRS NES	R2	1723
69999	BASE MTLS NES WRGHT,MFRS	R2	1724
7	MACHINES,TRANSPORT EQUIP	R2	1725
71	POWER GENERATING EQUIPMNT	R2	1726
711	STEAM BOILERS & AUX PLNT	R2	1727
7111	STEAM BOILERS ETC	R2	1728
7112	AUXILIARY BOILER PLANT	R2	1729
7119	PTS NES OF APP OF 711	R2	1730
71191	PTS NES OF BOILERS	R2	1731
71199	PTS NES OF AUX BOIL PLNT	R2	1732
712	STEAM ENGINES,TURBINES	R2	1733
7126	STEAM POWER UNITS,ENGINS	R2	1734
7129	STM ENGINE ETC PARTS NES	R2	1735
713	INTRNL COMBUS PSTN ENGIN	R2	1736
7131	-- FOR AIRCRAFT AND PRTS	R2	1737
71311	---- AIRCRAFT	R2	1738
71319	---- PART NES OF 71311	R2	1739
7132	-- FOR MOTOR VEHICLES	R2	1740
7133	-- FOR MARINE PROPULSION	R2	1741
71331	---- OUTBOARD	R2	1742
71332	---- OTHER THAN OUTBOARD	R2	1743
7138	-- ENGINES,NES	R2	1744
7139	-- PARTS,NES	R2	1745
714	ENGINES AND MOTORS NES	R2	1746
7144	REACTION ENGINES	R2	1747
7148	GAS TURBINES NES	R2	1748
71481	TURBO-PROPELLERS	R2	1749
71488	OTHER GAS TURBINES NES	R2	1750
7149	PRTS OF ENGINE,MOTOR NES	R2	1751
71491	PARTS NES OF 7144,71481	R2	1752
71499	PARTS NES OF 71488,71888	R2	1753
716	ROTATING ELECTRIC PLANT	R2	1754
7161	DC MOTORS AND GENERATORS	R3	1755
7162	AC MTRS,GENRTS,GEN SETS	R2	1756
71621	AC MTRS,INC UNIVRSL MTRS	R2	1757
71622	AC GENERATORS	R2	1758
71623	GEN SETS WITH PISTN ENGN	R2	1759
7163	ROTARY CONVERTERS	R2	1760

7169	PTS NES OF ROT ELEC PLNT	R2	1761
718	OTH POWER GENERATG MACHY	R2	1762
7187	NUCLEAR REACTORS PTS NES	R2	1763
7188	WIND WATER ETC ENGINES	R2	1764
71881	WATER TURBINES	R2	1765
71882	OTH HYDRAULIC ENGNS MTRS	R2	1766
71888	OTHER ENGINES MOTORS NES	R2	1767
71889	PARTS NES OF 71881,71882	R2	1768
72	MACHS FOR SPCL INDUSTRYS	R2	1769
721	AGRIC MACHY EXC TRACTORS	R2	1770
7211	CULTIVATING MACHINERY	R2	1771
72111	PLOUGHS	R2	1772
72112	SEEDERS,PLANTERS ETC	R2	1773
72113	CULTIVATORS,WEEDERS ETC	R2	1774
72118	OTH AGRIC,HORTIC MACHNRY	R2	1775
72119	PTS NES OF MACHY OF 7211	R2	1776
7212	HARVESTING ETC MACHINES	R2	1777
72121	LAWN MOWERS	R2	1778
72122	COMBINE HARVESTR-THRESHR	R2	1779
72123	OTH HARVSTER,MOWRS BALER	R2	1780
72124	AGRIC CLEAN,GRADING MACH	R2	1781
72129	PTS NES OF MACHY OF 7212	R2	1782
7213	DAIRY MACHINERY NES	R2	1783
72131	MILKING MACHINES	R2	1784
72138	OTH DAIRY MACHINERY NES	R2	1785
72139	PTS NES OF MACHY OF 7213	R2	1786
7219	AGRICULTURE MACHINES NES	R2	1787
72191	WINE-MAKING ETC MACHNERY	R2	1788
72197	OTH AGRIC ETC MACHINERY	R2	1789
72198	PTS NES OF MCHY OF 72191	R2	1790
72199	PTS NES OF MCHY OF 72197	R2	1791
722	TRACTORS NON-ROAD	R2	1792
7223	TRACK-LAYING TRACTORS	R2	1793
7224	WHEELED TRACTORS NES	R2	1794
723	CIVIL ENGNEERG EQUIP ETC	R2	1795
7233	MECHANICAL ROAD ROLLERS	R2	1796
7234	CONST MINING MACHNRY NES	R2	1797
72341	SELF-PROPELLD DOZERS,ETC	R2	1798
72342	SELF-PROP SHOVELS,EXCAV	R2	1799
72343	SLFPRP CONST ETC MCH NES	R2	1800
72344	BORING,SINKING MACHINERY	R2	1801
72345	PILE DRIVERS,ETC	R2	1802
72346	OTH CONST MINING MCH NES	R2	1803
72348	PUBLIC WORKS MACHNRY NES	R2	1804
7239	CONSTR ETC MACHY PTS NES	R2	1805
724	TEXTILE,LEATHER MACHNRY	R2	1806
7243	SEWING MACHS,NEEDLES ETC	R2	1807
72431	SEWING MACHINES	R2	1808
72439	SEW MCH NEEDLES,FURN ETC	R2	1809
7244	SPINNING EXTRDNG,ETC MCH	R2	1810
72441	TEXTILE EXTRUDING MACHS	R2	1811
72442	FIBRE PROCESSNG MACH NES	R2	1812
72443	SPINNING,REELING,ETC MCH	R2	1813
72449	PTS NES OF MACHS OF 7244	R2	1814
7245	WEAVING,FELT MFG,ETC MCH	R2	1815
72451	WEAVING MACHINES (LOOMS)	R2	1816
72452	KNITTING MACHINES	R2	1817
72453	GIMPING,WARPING ETC MCHS	R2	1818
72454	FELT MFG,FINISHING MACHS	R2	1819
7246	AUXIL TXTL MCH,PARTS NES	R2	1820
72461	MACHY AUXIL TO 72451/53	R2	1821
72469	LOOM,KNT MCH ETC PTS NES	R2	1822
7247	TEXTILE MACHINERY NES	R2	1823
72471	INDUST LDRY WASHING MCHS	R2	1824
72472	DRY-CLEANING MACHINES	R2	1825
72473	INDUST DRYING MACHNS NES	R2	1826
72474	OTH TEXTILE MACHNERY NES	R2	1827
72479	TEXTILE MACHINRY PTS NES	R2	1828
7248	SKIN LEATHER WORKNG MACH	R2	1829
725	PAPER ETC MILL MACHINERY	R2	1830
7251	PAPER,PULP MAKING MACHRY	R2	1831
72511	CELLULOSE PULP MFG MACHY	R2	1832
72512	PAPER ETC MAKING ETC MCH	R2	1833
7252	PAPER ETC PRODCT MF MACH	R2	1834
7259	PTS NES OF MACHS OF 725	R2	1835
72591	PTS NES OF MACHS OF 7251	R2	1836
72599	PTS NES OF MACHS OF 7252	R2	1837
726	PRINTG,BKBINDG MACHY PTS	R2	1838
7263	TYPESET MCH ETC,TYPE ETC	R2	1839
72631	TYPE SET,FOUND ETC MACHY	R2	1840
72632	PRINTING TYPE PLATES ETC	R2	1841
7264	PRINTING PRESSES	R2	1842
72641	ROTARY PRINTING PRESSES	R2	1843
72642	PLATEN PRINTING PRESSES	R2	1844
7267	OTH PRINTG & ANCILL MACH	R2	1845
72671	PRINTING MACHINERY NES	R2	1846
72672	MACH ANCILLARY TO PRINTG	R2	1847
7268	BOOKBINDING MACHRY PARTS	R2	1848
72681	BOOKBINDING MACHINERY	R2	1849
72689	PTS NES OF BOOKBIND MCHS	R2	1850
7269	PTS NES OF MCH OF 7263/7	R2	1851
72691	PTS NES OF MCHS OF 72631	R2	1852
72699	PRINTING MACHY PARTS NES	R2	1853
727	FOOD MACHRY NON-DOMESTIC	R2	1854
7271	GRAIN WORKING MCHY,PARTS	R2	1855
72711	GRAIN ETC MILLING MACHRY	R2	1856
72719	PTS NES OF MCHY OF 72711	R2	1857
7272	OTH FOOD PROC MCHY,PARTS	R2	1858
72721	ANIMAL,VEGET OIL ,FAT MCH	R2	1859
72722	FOOD-PROCESSING MACH NES	R2	1860
72729	PTS NES OF MCHY OF 72722	R2	1861
728	OTH MACHY FOR SPCL INDUS	R2	1862
7281	MACH-TOOLS FR SPCL INDUS	R2	1863
72811	MACH-TOOLS TO WRK MINRLS	R2	1864
72812	MACH-TOOLS TO WORK WOOD	R2	1865
72819	PTS NES OF TOOLS OF 7281	R2	1866
7283	OTHR MINERAL WORKG MACHY	R2	1867
72831	MINRAL SORTING ETC MACHY	R2	1868
72832	MINRL CRUSHING ETC MACHY	R2	1869
72833	MNRL MIXING,KNEADING MCH	R2	1870
72834	MINRL MOULDING ETC MACHY	R2	1871
72839	PTS NES OF MACHY OF 7283	R2	1872
7284	MACHY FOR SPCL INDUS NES	R2	1873
72841	GLASS-WORKING MACHINERY	R2	1874
72842	RUBBER,PLASTICS WRKG MCH	R2	1875
72843	TOBACCO WORKING MACH NES	R2	1876
72844	WOOD TREATING MACHNS NES	R2	1877
72845	MTL ETC TREATNG MACH NES	R2	1878
72846	OTH MCHY WITH INDIV FNCT	R2	1879
72849	PTS OF MACHS OF 7284 ETC	R2	1880
73	METALWORKING MACHINERY	R2	1881
736	MACHINE TOOLS FOR METAL	R2	1882
7361	METAL CUTTING MACH-TOOLS	R2	1883
73611	ULTRASNC ETC MTLWKG MCHS	R2	1884
73612	GEAR-CUTTING MACHINES	R2	1885
73613	LATHES,METALWORKING	R2	1886
73614	REAMING ETC MCHS MTLWRKG	R2	1887
73615	DRILLING ETC MCH MTLWRKG	R2	1888
73616	SAWING MACHS,METALWORKNG	R2	1889
73617	PLANING MACHS,MTLWORKING	R2	1890
73618	TAPPING,SCREW-CUTTNG MCH	R2	1891
73619	OTH MTL CUTTNG MCH-TOOLS	R2	1892
7362	METAL FORMING MACH-TOOLS	R2	1893
73621	FORGING ETC MCHS,MTLWRKG	R2	1894
73622	BENDING ETC MCHS,MTLWRKG	R2	1895
73623	SHEARING ETC MCH,MTLWRKG	R2	1896
73628	OTH METALWORKING PRESSES	R2	1897
7367	OTH METALWRKG MACH-TOOLS	R2	1898
7368	WORK,TOOL HOLDERS ETC	R2	1899
7369	PTS NES OF TOOLS OF 736	R2	1900
737	METALWORKING MACHNRY NES	R2	1901
7371	FOUNDRY EQUIPMNT,PTS NES	R2	1902
73711	FOUNDRY EQUIPMENT NES	R2	1903
73719	PTS NES OF MCHY OF 73711	R2	1904
7372	ROLLING MILLS AND ROLLS	R2	1905
73721	ROLLING MILLS	R2	1906
73729	ROLL-MILL PTS NES, ROLLS	R2	1907
7373	WELDING,BRAZING,ETC MCHS	R2	1908
73731	GAS OPERATED WELDERS ETC	R2	1909
73732	ELECTRIC WELDERS,ETC	R2	1910
74	GENRL INDUSTRL MACHY NES	R2	1911
741	HEATING,COOLING EQUIPMNT	R2	1912
7411	GAS GENERATORS	R2	1913
7412	BURNERS,MECH STOKERS ETC	R2	1914
7413	INDUST FURNACES ETC PRTS	R2	1915
74131	INDUS FURNACES ETC ELCTR	R2	1916
74132	INDUST FURNACES NONELECT	R2	1917
7414	NONDOM REFRIG EQUIPT,PTS	R2	1918
74141	REFRIG EQUIP NONDOMESTIC	R2	1919
74149	PTS NES OF REFRIG EQUIPT	R2	1920

7415	AIR-CONDITIONING MACHNRY	R2	1921
7416	HEATING COOLING EQU NES	R2	1922
742	PUMPS FOR LIQUIDS ETC	R2	1923
7421	RECIPROCATING PUMPS NES	R2	1924
7422	CENTRIFUGAL PUMPS NES	R2	1925
7423	ROTARY PUMPS NES	R2	1926
7428	OTHER PUMPS FOR LIQUIDS	R2	1927
74281	GARAGE-TYPE FUEL PUMPS	R2	1928
74288	PUMPS FR LIQUIDS NES ETC	R2	1929
7429	PTS NES OF PUMPS OF 742	R2	1930
743	PUMPS NES,CENTRFUGES ETC	R2	1931
7431	PUMPS FOR GASES ETC	R2	1932
7432	PUMP,COMPRESSOR PRTS NES	R2	1933
7433	FREE-PSTN GEN FR GAS TUR	R2	1934
7434	FANS,BLOWERS,ETC PARTS	R2	1935
7435	CENTRIFUGES	R2	1936
7436	GAS,LIQUID FILTERS ETC	R2	1937
7439	PTS NES OF APP OF 7435,6	R2	1938
744	MECHANICAL HANDLING EQU	R2	1939
7441	FORK LIFT TRCKS,ETC PTS	R2	1940
74411	FORK LIFT TRUCKS ETC	R2	1941
74419	PTS NES OF VEHC OF 74411	R2	1942
7442	LIFTING,LOADING MACH NES	R2	1943
74421	PULLEY TACKLE WINCHS ETC	R2	1944
74422	SHIP DERRICKS CRANES ETC	R2	1945
74423	PNEUMATIC ELEVATORS ETC	R2	1946
74424	LIFTS AND SKIP HOISTS	R2	1947
74425	ESCALATOR,MOVNG PAVEMENT	R2	1948
74428	OTH HANDLING ETC MCH NES	R2	1949
7449	PTS NES OF MACHY OF 7442	R2	1950
745	NONELEC MACHY TOOLS NES	R2	1951
7451	POWER TOOLS NONELEC, PTS	R2	1952
74511	POWER HAND TOOLS NONELEC	R2	1953
74519	PTS NES OF TOOL OF 74511	R2	1954
7452	OTH NONELEC MCHS PTS NES	R2	1955
74521	CALENDERING MACHINES ETC	R2	1956
74522	PACKAGNG,FILLING,ETC MCH	R2	1957
74523	PACKING ETC MCHY PTS NES	R2	1958
74524	AUTOMATIC VENDING MACHS	R2	1959
74525	WEIGHING MACHINERY	R2	1960
74526	WEIGHNG MACH WTS PTS NES	R2	1961
74527	SPRAYING MACHINERY	R2	1962
749	NONELEC MACH PTS,ACC NES	R2	1963
7491	BALL,ROLLER,L,C BEARINGS	R2	1964
7492	COCKS VALVES ETC NES	R2	1965
7493	SHAFT CRANK PULLEY ETC	R2	1966
7499	OTH NONELEC MCHY PTS NES	R2	1967
74991	FOUNDRY MOULDS ETC NES	R2	1968
74992	METAL-PLASTIC GASKETS	R2	1969
74999	MACH PARTS NONELEC NES	R2	1970
75	OFFICE MACHNES ADP EQUIP	R2	1971
751	OFFICE MACHINES	R2	1972
7511	TYPEWRITERS,CHEQUE-WRTRS	R2	1973
75111	ELEC TYPEWRITERS,NORMAL	R2	1974
75112	NONELEC TYPEWRTRS,NORMAL	R2	1975
75118	TYPEWRTRS NES,CHEQUEWRTR	R2	1976
7512	CALCULATNG,ACCTG,ETC MCH	R2	1977
75121	CALCULATING MACHINES	R2	1978
75122	ACCOUNTING MACHINES	R2	1979
75123	CASH REGISTERS	R2	1980
75128	POSTAGE-FRANKING ETC MCH	R2	1981
7518	OFFICE MACHINES NES	R2	1982
75181	DUPLICAT MCH,HECTO,STNCL	R2	1983
75182	PHOTO THERMOCOPY APPARAT	R2	1984
75188	OTHR OFFICE MACHINES NES	R2	1985
752	AUTOMTIC DATA PROC EQUIP	R2	1986
7521	ANALOG HYBRID COMPUTERS	R2	1987
7522	DIGITAL COMPUTERS	R2	1988
7523	DIGITL CENTRL PROCESSORS	R2	1989
7524	DIGITL CENTRL STOR UNITS	R2	1990
7525	ADP PERIPHERAL UNITS	R2	1991
7528	OFF-LINE DATA PROC EQUIP	R2	1992
759	OFFICE,ADP MCH PTS,ACCES	R2	1993
7591	OFFICE MACHINE PARTS NES	R2	1994
75911	TYPEWRTR PTS,ACCES NES	R2	1995
75915	OTH OFF MCH PTS ACC NES	R2	1996
75919	COPY MACH PRTS,ACCES NES	R2	1997
7599	ACCTG ETC,ADD MCH PTS,AC	R2	1998
76	TELECOMM SOUND EQUIPMENT	R2	1999
761	TELEVISION RECEIVERS	R2	2000
7611	COLOUR TV RECEIVERS	R2	200
7612	MONOCHROME TV RECEIVERS	R2	20
762	RADIO BROADCAST RECEIVRS	R2	20.
7621	MTR VEHC RADIO RECEIVERS	R2	2004
7622	PORTABLE RADIO RECEIVERS	R2	2005
7628	OTHER RADIO RECEIVERS	R2	2006
763	SOUND RECORDRS PHONOGRPH	R2	2007
7631	ELECTRIC GRAMOPHONES ETC	R2	2008
76311	COIN-OP ELEC GRAMOPHONES	R2	2009
76319	OTH ELEC GRAMOPHONES ETC	R2	2010
7638	OTHR SOUND APPARATUS ETC	R2	2011
76381	MAGNTIC TV IMAGE,SND APP	R2	2012
76389	DICTATING MACHINES ETC	R2	2013
764	TELECOM EQPT PTS,ACC NES	R2	2014
7641	LINE TELEPHONE,ETC EQUIP	R2	2015
7642	MICROPH,LOUDSPKR,AMPLIFR	R2	2016
7643	TV,RADIO TRANSMITTRS ETC	R2	2017
7648	TELECOMM EQUIPMENT NES	R2	2018
76481	RADIOTELEPHONE ETC RCVRS	R2	2019
76482	TELEVISION CAMERAS	R2	2020
76483	RADAR APPARATUS ETC	R2	2021
7649	PTS NES OF EQUIPMNT OF 76	R2	2022
76491	PTS NES OF APPAR OF 7641	R2	2023
76492	PTS NES OF EQUIP OF 7642	R2	2024
76493	TELECOMM EQUIPMNT PTS NES	R2	2025
76499	PARTS ETC OF SOUND EQUIP	R2	2026
77	ELECTRIC MACHNRY NES ETC	R2	2027
771	ELECTRIC POWER MACHY NES	R2	2028
7711	TRANSFORMERS,ELECTRICAL	R2	2029
77111	LIQUID DIELEC TRANSFRMRS	R2	2030
77118	OTHER ELEC TRANSFORMERS	R2	2031
7712	OTH ELEC POWER MACHY NES	R2	2032
77121	STATIC CONVERTERS ETC	R2	2033
77122	INDUCTORS	R2	2034
77129	ELEC POWER MACHY PTS NES	R2	2035
772	SWITCHGEAR ETC,PARTS NES	R2	2036
7721	SWITCHGEAR ETC	R2	20
7722	PRINTED CIRCUITS,PTS NES	R2	20
7723	FIXED,VARIABLE RESISTORS	R2	20
773	ELECTR DISTRIBUTING MACH	R2	2040
7731	INSULATED WIRE,CABLE	R2	2041
7732	ELECTRC INSULATING EQUIP	R2	2042
77321	ELECT INSULATED CONDUIT	R2	2043
77322	GLASS ELECTRC INSULATORS	R2	2044
77323	CERAMIC ELECT INSULATORS	R2	2045
77324	OTHER ELECTRC INSULATORS	R2	2046
77325	GLASS ELEC INSUL FIT NES	R2	2047
77326	CERAM ELEC INSUL FIT NES	R2	2048
77327	OTH ELEC INSUL FITTG NES	R2	2049
774	ELECTRO-MEDCL,XRAY EQUIP	R2	2050
7741	ELECTRO-MEDICAL EQUIPMNT	R2	2051
7742	X-RAY APPARATUS	R2	2052
775	HOUSEHOLD TYPE EQUIP NES	R2	2053
7751	HOUSEHOLD LDRY EQUIP NES	R2	2054
77511	DOMESTIC WASHING MACHNES	R2	2055
77512	DOMESTIC DRYING MACH NES	R2	2056
7752	DOM REFRIGERATRS,FREEZRS	R2	2057
77521	DOMESTIC REFRIGERATORS	R2	2058
77522	DOMESTIC DEEP-FREEZERS	R2	2059
7753	DOMSTC DISHWASHING MACHS	R2	2060
7754	ELECTRIC SHAVERS,CLIPPRS	R2	2061
7757	DOMESTIC ELECTRC EQU NES	R2	2062
77571	DOM ELEC VAC CLEANRS ETC	R2	2063
77572	DOM ELEC ROOM FANS ETC	R2	2064
77573	DOM ELEC FOOD MIXERS ETC	R2	2065
77578	OTH DOMSTC ELEC APPL ETC	R2	2066
77579	PTS NES OF EQUIP OF 7757	R2	2067
7758	ELECTRO-THERMIC APPL NES	R2	2068
77581	ELEC WATER ETC HEATERS	R2	2069
77582	ELEC SOIL,SPACE HEATERS	R2	2070
77583	ELEC HAIR DRESSING APPAR	R2	2071
77584	ELECTRIC SMOOTHING IRONS	R2	2072
77585	ELECTRIC BLANKETS	R2	2073
77586	ELECTROTHERM DOM APP NES	R2	20
77587	NONCARB ELEC HEATG RESIS	R2	20
77589	ELECTRTHRMC APPL PTS NES	R2	2076
776	TRANSISTORS,VALVES ETC	R2	20
7761	TV PICTURE TUBES	R2	2078
7762	OTH ELECTRONIC TUBES ETC	R2	2079
7763	DIODES,TRANSISTORS ETC	R2	2080

7764	ELECTRONIC MICROCIRCUITS	R2	2081
7768	ELCTRNC COMP PTS CRYSTLS	R2	2082
77681	PIEZO-ELEC CRYSTALS MNTD	R2	2083
77689	ELECTRNIC COMPON PTS NES	R2	2084
778	ELECTRICAL MACHINERY NES	R2	2085
7781	BATTERIES ACCUMULATORS	R2	2086
77811	PRIMARY BATTERIES CELLS	R2	2087
77812	ELECTRIC ACCUMULATORS	R2	2088
77819	ELEC ACCUMULATOR PTS NES	R2	2089
7782	ELECTRIC LAMPS BULBS	R2	2090
77821	ELEC FILAMENT LAMPS NES	R2	2091
77822	ELEC DISCHARGE LAMPS NES	R2	2092
77824	ULTRAVIOLET ARC.ETC LMPS	R2	2093
77829	PTS NES OF LAMPS OF 7782	R2	2094
7783	AUTOMOTIVE ELECTR EQUIP	R2	2095
77831	IGNITION STARTING EQUIP	R2	2096
77832	ELECT VEHICLE LGHTNG EQU	R2	2097
7784	ELECTRO-MECH HAND TOOLS	R2	2098
7788	OTH ELEC MACHY.EQUIP NES	R2	2099
77881	ELECTRO-MAGNETS ETC	R2	2100
77882	ELEC TRAFFIC CONTROL EQU	R2	2101
77883	ELEC SIGNALLING EQU NES	R2	2102
77884	ELECTRICAL CONDENSERS	R2	2103
77885	PARTICLE ACCELERATORS	R2	2104
77886	OTH ELEC MACHINERY NES	R2	2105
77887	ELECTRICAL CARBONS	R2	2106
77888	ELEC MACHINERY PARTS NES	R2	2107
78	ROAD VEHICLES	R2	2108
781	PASS MOTOR VEH EXC BUSES	R2	2109
7810	PASS MOTOR VEH EXC BUSES	R2	2110
782	LORRIES SPCL MTR VEH NES	R2	2111
7821	LORRIES TRUCKS	R2	2112
7822	SPECIAL MOTOR VEHCLS NES	R2	2113
783	ROAD MOTOR VEHICLES NES	R2	2114
7831	BUSES	R2	2115
7832	TRACTORS FOR TR-TRAILERS	R2	2116
784	MOTOR VEH PRTS ACCES NES	R2	2117
7841	MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS	R2	2118
7842	MOTOR VEHICLE BODIES	R2	2119
7849	OTHER MOTOR VEHCL PARTS	R2	2120
785	CYCLES ETC MOTRZD OR NOT	R2	2121
7851	MOTORCYCLES ETC	R2	2122
7852	BICYCLES.ETC NON-MOTOR	R2	2123
7853	INVAL CARR CYCLE ETC PTS	R2	2124
78531	INVALID CARRIAGES	R2	2125
78539	PARTS ACCES NES OF 785	R2	2126
786	TRAILERS NONMOTR VEH NES	R2	2127
7861	TRAILERS TRANSP CONTAINR	R2	2128
78611	HOUSING CAMPING TRAILERS	R2	2129
78612	OTHER TRAILERS	R2	2130
78613	CONTAINERS INC ROAD-RAIL	R2	2131
7868	OTH NONMOTR VEHICLES ETC	R2	2132
78681	OTH NONMOTORIZED VEHCLS	R2	2133
78689	PTS NES OF TRAILERS ETC	R2	2134
79	OTHR TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT	R2	2135
791	RAILWAY VEHICLES	R2	2136
7911	ELEC LOCOS NON-SELF-GEN	R2	2137
7912	OTH RAIL LOCOMOTIVES ETC	R2	2138
7913	MECHAN-PROPELLED RY CARS	R2	2139
7914	PASSENGER CARS NOT POWRD	R2	2140
7915	FRT MAINT CARS NOT POWRD	R2	2141
79151	RY SERV CARS NOT POWERED	R2	2142
79152	RAILWAY FREIGHT CARS NES	R2	2143
7919	RY TRACK FIXT ETC PARTS	R2	2144
79191	RY TRACK FIXTURES ETC	R2	2145
79199	PARTS NES OF 7911-7915	R2	2146
792	AIRCRAFT	R2	2147
7921	HELICOPTERS	R2	2148
7922	AIRCRFT NES 2000KG OR LS	R2	2149
7923	AIRCRFT NES 2001-15000KG	R2	2150
7924	AIRCRFT NES OVER 15000KG.	R2	2151
7928	AIRCRAFT NES ASSOC EQUIP	R2	2152
79281	GLIDERS KITES ROTOCHUTES	R2	2153
79282	BALLOONS ETC	R2	2154
79283	AIRCRAFT LAUNCHERS ETC	R2	2155
7929	PARTS OF AIRCRAFT OF 792	R2	2156
793	SHIPS AND BOATS	R2	2157
7931	WARSHIPS	R2	2158
7932	SHIPS AND BOATS NON-WAR	R2	2159
79321	YACHTS SPORTS VESSLS ETC	R2	2160
79322	TANKERS OF ALL KINDS	R2	2161
79323	OTHER CARGO VESSELS	R2	2162
79324	FISHING VESSELS ETC	R2	2163
79328	OTHER SHIPS AND BOATS	R2	2164
7933	VESSELS FOR BREAKING UP	R2	2165
7938	SHIPS AND BOATS NES	R2	2166
79381	TUGS	R2	2167
79382	SPECIAL PURPOSE VESSELS	R2	2168
79383	FLOATING STRUCTURES NES	R2	2169
8	MISC MANUFACTURED GOODS	R2	2170
81	PLUMBG.HEATNG.LGHTNG EQU	R2	2171
812	PLUMBG.HEATNG.LGHTNG EQU	R2	2172
8121	CENTRAL HEATING EQUIPMNT	R2	2173
8122	CERAMIC PLUMBNG FIXTURES	R2	2174
8124	LIGHTING EQUIPMENT	R2	2175
81241	LIGHTING ETC GLASSWARE	R2	2176
81242	LAMPS.FITTINGS BASE METL	R2	2177
81243	PORTABLE BATTERY LAMPS	R2	2178
82	FURNITURE.PARTS THEREOF	R2	2179
821	FURNITURE.PARTS THEREOF	R2	2180
8211	CHAIRS.SEATS AND PARTS	R2	2181
82111	CHAIRS AND OTHER SEATS	R2	2182
82119	PTS NES OF CHAIRS ETC	R2	2183
8212	MED FURN.STUFFD FURNSHGS	R2	2184
82121	MEDICAL FURNITURE.PARTS	R2	2185
82122	MATTRESSES ETC	R2	2186
8219	FURNITURE AND PARTS NES	R2	2187
82191	METAL FURNITURE NES	R2	2188
82192	WOOD FURNITURE NES	R2	2189
82199	OTHR FURN.FURN PARTS NES	R2	2190
83	TRAVEL GOODS.HANDBAGS	R2	2191
831	TRAVEL GOODS.HANDBAGS	R2	2192
8310	TRAVEL GOODS.HANDBAGS	R2	2193
83101	HANDBAGS NES	R2	2194
83102	TRAVEL GDS.TOILET-CASES	R2	2195
83103	SATCHELS AND BRIEF-CASES	R2	2196
83109	OTHER TRAVEL BAGS.CASES	R2	2197
84	CLOTHING AND ACCESSORIES	R2	2198
842	MENS OUTERWEAR NOT KNIT	R2	2199
8421	-- OVERCOATS.OTHER COATS	R2	2200
84211	---- OF WOOL.FINE HAIR	R2	2201
84219	---- OF OTHER FIBRES	R2	2202
8422	-- SUITS	R2	2203
84221	---- OF WOOL.FINE HAIR	R2	2204
84222	---- OF COTTON	R2	2205
84223	---- OF MAN-MADE FIBRES	R2	2206
84229	---- OF OTHER FIBRES	R2	2207
8423	-- TROUSERS.BREECHES ETC	R2	2208
84231	---- OF WOOL.FINE HAIR	R2	2209
84232	---- OF COTTON	R2	2210
84233	---- OF MAN-MADE FIBRES	R2	2211
84239	---- OF OTHER FIBRES	R2	2212
8424	-- JACKETS.BLAZERS ETC	R2	2213
84241	---- OF WOOL.FINE HAIR	R2	2214
84242	---- OF COTTON	R2	2215
84243	---- OF MAN-MADE FIBRES	R2	2216
84249	---- OF OTHER FIBRES	R2	2217
8429	-- OTHER OUTER GARMENTS	R2	2218
84291	---- WATERPROOF	R2	2219
84292	---- OF WOOL.FINE HAIR	R2	2220
84293	---- OF COTTON	R2	2221
84294	---- OF MAN-MADE FIBRES	R2	2222
84299	---- OF OTHER FIBRES	R2	2223
843	WOMENS OUTERWEAR NONKNIT	R2	2224
8431	-- COATS AND JACKETS	R2	2225
84311	---- OF WOOL FINE HAIR	R2	2226
84312	---- OF COTTON	R2	2227
84313	---- OF MAN-MADE FIBRES	R2	2228
84319	---- OF OTHER FIBRES	R2	2229
8432	-- SUITS AND COSTUMES	R2	2230
84321	---- OF WOOL.FINE HAIR	R2	2231
84322	---- OF COTTON	R2	2232
84323	---- OF MAN-MADE FIBRES	R2	2233
84329	---- OF OTHER FIBRES	R2	2234
8433	-- DRESSES	R2	2235
84331	---- OF WOOL.FINE HAIR	R2	2236
84332	---- OF COTTON	R2	2237
84333	---- OF MAN-MADE FIBRES	R2	2238
84339	---- OF OTHER FIBRES	R2	2239
8434	-- SKIRTS	R2	2240

84341	---- OF WOOL, FINE HAIR	R2	2241
84342	---- OF COTTON	R2	2242
84343	---- OF MAN-MADE FIBRES	R2	2243
84349	---- OF OTHER FIBRES	R2	2244
8435	-- BLOUSES	R2	2245
84351	---- OF COTTON	R2	2246
84352	---- OF MAN-MADE FIBRES	R2	2247
84359	---- OF OTHER FIBRES	R2	2248
8439	-- OTHER OUTER GARMENTS	R2	2249
84391	---- WATERPROOF	R2	2250
84392	---- OF WOOL, FINE HAIR	R2	2251
84393	---- OF COTTON	R2	2252
84394	---- OF MAN-MADE FIBRES	R2	2253
84399	---- OF OTHER FIBRES	R2	2254
844	UNDER GARMENTS NOT KNIT	R2	2255
8441	-- MENS SHIRTS	R2	2256
84411	---- OF COTTON	R2	2257
84412	---- OF SYNTHETIC FIBRES	R2	2258
84419	---- OF OTHER FIBRES	R2	2259
8442	-- MENS, OTHR THAN SHIRTS	R2	2260
84421	---- OF COTTON	R2	2261
84422	---- OF SYNTHETIC FIBRES	R2	2262
84429	---- OF OTHER FIBRES	R2	2263
8443	-- WOMENS	R2	2264
84431	-- OF COTTON	R2	2265
84432	-- OF SYNTHETIC FIBRES	R2	2266
84439	-- OF OTHER FIBRES	R2	2267
845	OUTERWEAR KNIT NONELASTC	R2	2268
8451	-- JERSEYS, PULLOVERS ETC	R2	2269
84511	---- OF WOOL, FINE HAIR	R2	2270
84512	---- OF COTTON	R2	2271
84513	---- OF SYNTHETIC FIBRES	R2	2272
84514	---- OF REGENERTD FIBRES	R2	2273
84519	---- OF OTHER FIBRES	R2	2274
8452	-- WOMENS DRESSES ETC	R2	2275
84521	---- OF WOOL, FINE HAIR	R2	2276
84522	---- OF COTTON	R2	2277
84523	---- OF SYNTHETIC FIBRES	R2	2278
84524	---- OF REGENERTD FIBRES	R2	2279
84529	---- OF OTHER FIBRES	R2	2280
8459	-- OTHER, CLTHG ACCESRYS	R2	2281
84591	---- OF WOOL, FINE HAIR	R2	2282
84592	---- OF COTTON	R2	2283
84593	---- OF SYNTHETIC FIBRES	R2	2284
84594	---- OF REGENERTD FIBRES	R2	2285
84599	---- OF OTHER FIBRES	R2	2286
846	UNDER GARMENTS KNITTED	R2	2287
8461	-- OF WOOL ETC NONELASTC	R2	2288
84611	---- PANTY HOSE (TIGHTS)	R2	2289
84619	---- OTHER	R2	2290
8462	-- OF COTTON NON ELASTIC	R2	2291
84621	---- MENS SHIRTS	R2	2292
84629	---- OTHER	R2	2293
8463	-- OF SYNTH FBR NONELAST	R2	2294
84631	---- PANTY HOSE (TIGHTS)	R2	2295
84632	---- MENS SHIRTS	R2	2296
84633	---- MENS NES	R2	2297
84634	---- WOMENS NES	R2	2298
8464	-- OF OTH FIBRE NONELAST	R2	2299
84641	---- OF REGENERTD FIBRES	R2	2300
84649	---- OF FIBRES NES	R2	2301
8465	CORSETS, GARTERS, ETC	R2	2302
84651	BRASSIERES	R2	2303
84652	CORSETS, BRACES ETC	R2	2304
847	TEXTILE CLTHNG ACCES NES	R2	2305
8471	-- NOT KNITTED	R2	2306
84711	---- HANDKERCHIEFS	R2	2307
84712	---- SHAWLS, VEILS ETC	R2	2308
84713	---- TIES, CRAVATS, ETC	R2	2309
84714	---- GLOVES, SOCKS, ETC	R2	2310
84719	---- MADE UP ACCES NES	R2	2311
8472	-- KNITTED	R2	2312
84721	---- GLOVES, ETC NONELAST	R2	2313
84722	---- SOCKS, ETC NONELASTC	R2	2314
84723	---- ARTICLES NES ELASTC	R2	2315
848	NONTXTL CLTHG ACCES, HATS	R2	2316
8481	LEATHER CLOTHES ACCESSOR	R2	2317
8482	PLAS RUBBR CLOTHES ACCES	R2	2318
84821	-- OF ARTIF PLASTIC MATR	R2	2319
84822	-- OF UNHRDND VULC RUBBR	R2	2320
8483	FUR ETC CLOTHES PRODUCTS	R2	2321
84831	ARTICLES OF FURSKIN NES	R2	232
84832	ARTIFCL FUR, ARTICLES OF	R2	232
8484	HEADGEAR	R2	2324
84841	HEADGEAR OF FELT	R2	2325
84842	HEADGEAR PLAITED	R2	2326
84843	HEADGEAR TEXTILE NONFELT	R2	2327
84848	HEAD-BANDS, LININGS, ETC	R2	2328
84849	OTHER HEADGEAR	R2	2329
85	FOOTWEAR	R2	2330
851	FOOTWEAR	R2	2331
8510	FOOTWEAR	R2	2332
85101	FOOTWEAR RUBBER, PLASTIC	R2	2333
85102	FOOTWEAR LEATHER	R2	2334
85103	SHOES WOOD-, CORK-SOLED	R2	2335
85104	FOOTWEAR NES	R2	2336
85105	GAITERS, LEGGINGS, ETC	R2	2337
87	PRECISION INSTRUMNTS NES	R2	2338
871	OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS	R2	2339
8710	OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS	R2	2340
87101	TELESCOPE, MONO-BINOCULAR	R2	2341
87102	ASTRONOMICAL INSTR NES	R2	2342
87103	ELECTRON, ETC DIFFRCTN AP	R2	2343
87104	MICROSCOPES CMPND OPTICL	R2	2344
87109	OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS NES	R2	2345
872	MEDICAL INSTRUMENTS NES	R2	2346
8720	MEDICAL INSTRUMENTS NES	R2	2347
87201	DENTAL INSTRUMENTS	R2	2348
87202	OTH MEDICAL INSTRUMENTS	R2	2349
87203	MECHANO-THERAPY APPARAT	R2	2350
873	METERS AND COUNTERS NES	R2	2351
8731	GAS SUPPLY METERS ETC	R2	2352
8732	COUNTING DEVICES NONELEC	R2	2353
874	MEASURING, CONTROLNG INSTR	R2	2354
8741	SURVEYING INSTRUMENTS	R2	2355
87411	NAVIG INSTR NONELEC ETC	R2	2356
87412	SURVEY INSTR ETC NONELEC	R2	2357
8742	MEASUR, DRAW ETC INST, PTS	R2	235
87421	MEASURING, DRAWNG ETC INST	R2	235
87429	PTS NES OF INST OF 87421	R2	2360
8743	GAS, LIQUID CONTROL INSTR	R2	2361
8744	INSTR NON-MECH, NON-ELECT	R2	2362
8745	MEAS, CONTRL, SCI INST NES	R2	2363
87451	BALANCES NON-ELECTRIC	R2	2364
87452	INSTRMNTS ETC FR DEMONST	R2	2365
87453	MECHANCL TESTING APPARAT	R2	2366
87454	THERMOMETERS, HYDROM ETC	R2	2367
8748	ELEC MEAS, CONTRL EQU NES	R2	2368
87481	ELECTRONIC REGULATORS	R2	2369
87482	RADIOACTIVTY COUNTRS ETC	R2	2370
87483	OTH ELCTRNC MEAS ETC EQU	R2	2371
87484	ELECTROMECHNCAL REGULATR	R2	2372
87489	ELEC MEASUR ETC INST NES	R2	2373
8749	INSTR PARTS, ACCESSORIES	R2	2374
88	PHOTO EQU, OPTICL GDS ETC	R2	2375
881	PHOTO APPARAT, EQUIPT NES	R2	2376
8811	CAMERAS STILL, FLASH APP	R2	2377
88111	STILL CAMERAS	R2	2378
88112	PHOTO FLASHLIGHT APPARAT	R2	2379
88119	PTS NES OF APPAR OF 8811	R2	2380
8812	CINEMA CAMERAS, PROJ, ETC	R2	2381
88121	-- FOR FILM UNDER 16MM	R2	2382
88122	-- FOR FILM 16MM AND OVR	R2	2383
88129	PTS NES OF APPAR OF 8812	R2	2384
8813	OTH PHOTO, CINE EQUIP NES	R2	2385
88131	PROJECTORS NONCINEMA, ETC	R2	2386
88139	PHOTO, CINE LAB EQUIP NES	R2	2387
882	PHOTO, CINEMA SUPPLIES	R2	2388
8821	CHEM PHOTO GOODS, RETAIL	R2	2389
8822	PHOTO FILM EXC DEV CINMA	R2	2390
88221	PHOTO FILM FLAT UNEXPOSD	R2	2391
88222	PHOTO FILM ROLL UNEXPOSD	R2	2392
88223	PHOTO SENSITZD CLOTH ETC	R2	2393
88224	PHOTO FILM EXPOSD UNDEVD	R2	239
88225	STILL PHOTO FILM DEVLOPD	R2	23!
883	DEVELOPED CINEMA FILM	R2	2396
8830	DEVELOPED CINEMA FILM	R2	2397
884	OPTICAL GOODS NES	R2	2398
8841	OPTICAL ELEMENTS	R2	2399
88411	OPTICAL ELMNTS UNMOUNTED	R2	2400

88412	OPTICAL ELEMENTS MOUNTED	R2	2401
8842	SPECTACLES AND FRAMES	R2	2402
88421	SPECTACLE FRAMES	R2	2403
88422	SPECTACLES ETC	R2	2404
885	WATCHES AND CLOCKS	R2	2405
8851	WATCHES,MOVEMENTS,CASES	R2	2406
88511	WATCHES	R2	2407
88512	CLOCKS WITH WATCH MVMNTS	R2	2408
88513	WATCH MOVEMENTS ASSEMBLD	R2	2409
88514	WATCH CASES CASE PARTS	R2	2410
8852	CLOCKS,CLOCK WATCH PARTS	R2	2411
88521	INSTR PANEL CLOCKS,ETC	R2	2412
88522	CLOCKS NES	R2	2413
88523	TIME-CLOCKS ETC	R2	2414
88524	TIME SWITCHES	R2	2415
88525	CLOCK MOVEMENTS,ASSEMBLD	R2	2416
88526	CLOCK CASES,CASE PARTS	R2	2417
88529	CLOCK WATCH PARTS NES	R2	2418
89	MISC MANUFCTRD GOODS NES	R2	2419
892	PRINTED MATTER	R2	2420
8921	PRINTED BOOKS,GLOBES,ETC	R2	2421
89211	PRINTED BOOKS,PAMPHLETS	R2	2422
89212	CHILDRNS PICTURE ETC BKS	R2	2423
89213	MAPS,CHARTS GLOBES,ETC	R2	2424
8922	NEWSPAPERS,PERIODICALS	R2	2425
8924	PICTURE POSTCARDS ETC	R2	2426
89241	DECALCOMANIAS	R2	2427
89242	PICTRE PST- GREETNG-CRDS	R2	2428
8928	PRINTED MATTER NES	R2	2429
89281	LABELS PAPER PAPERBOARD	R2	2430
89282	PLANS,ETC NOT PRINTED	R2	2431
89283	UNISSUED BANKNOTES ETC	R2	2432
89284	CALENDARS ON PAPER	R2	2433
89285	PRINTED MANUSCRIPT MUSIC	R2	2434
89286	TRADE ADV MATRL,CATALOGS	R2	2435
89289	OTHER PRINTED MATTER	R2	2436
893	ARTICLES OF PLASTIC NES	R2	2437
8931	PLSTC PACKG CONTNRS LIDS	R2	2438
8932	PLSTC SANITRY,TOILET ART	R2	2439
8933	PLASTIC ORNAMENTS	R2	2440
8935	PLASTC ELEC LIGHT ARTICL	R2	2441
8939	MISC PLASTIC ARTICLES	R2	2442
89391	PVC FLOORING TILES ETC	R2	2443
89392	PVC,PVAC FLOOR TILES ETC	R2	2444
89393	PLASTIC BLINDS ETC	R2	2445
89394	PLASTC OFFICE,SCHOOL SUP	R2	2446
89399	OTHR PLASTC ARTICLES NES	R2	2447
894	TOYS,SPORTING GOODS,ETC	R2	2448
8941	BABY CARRIAGES, PTS NES	R2	2449
8942	TOYS INDOOR GAMES	R2	2450
89421	LARGE SIZE WHEELED TOYS	R2	2451
89422	DOLLS	R2	2452
89423	TOYS NES	R2	2453
89424	INDOOR GAME EQUIPMENT	R2	2454
89425	XMAS DECORATIONS ETC	R2	2455
8946	NON-MILITARY ARMS,AMMO	R2	2456
89461	NON-MILITARY FIREARMS	R2	2457
89462	AIRGUNS,TRUNCHEONS,ETC	R2	2458
89463	HUNTNG,SPORTNG AMMUNTION	R2	2459
8947	OTH SPORT GDS,FAIR AMUSM	R2	2460
89471	HUNTING,SPORTING EQUIP	R2	2461
89472	OTH OUTDOOR SPORT GOODS	R2	2462
89473	AMUSEMENTS ETC FOR FAIRS	R2	2463
895	OFFICE SUPPLIES NES	R2	2464
8951	BASE MTL OFFICE SUPPLIES	R2	2465
89511	BSE MTL FILING CABNT ETC	R2	2466
89512	SMALL STATIONERY BSE MTL	R2	2467
8952	PENS PENCILS FOUNTN PENS	R2	2468
89521	FOUNTAIN PENS ETC	R2	2469
89522	PEN NIBS,NIB POINTS	R2	2470
89523	PENCILS,CRAYONS,ETC	R2	2471
8959	OTHER OFFICE SUPPLIES	R2	2472
89591	INK EXCL PRINTING INK	R2	2473
89592	SLATES FOR WRITING	R2	2474
89593	HAND DATE ETC STAMPS	R2	2475
89594	TYPEWRTR RIBBON INK PADS	R2	2476
89595	SEALING WAX COPYNG PASTE	R2	2477
896	WORKS OF ART ETC	R2	2478
8960	WORKS OF ART ETC	R2	2479
89601	HAND PAINTINGS ETC	R2	2480
89602	ORIGINAL PRINTS ETC	R2	2481
89603	ORIGINAL SCULPTURE ETC	R2	2482
89604	STAMPS FOR PHILATELY	R2	2483
89605	COINS NATURE COLLECTIONS	R2	2484
89606	ANTIQUES NES	R2	2485
897	GOLD,SILVER WARE JEWELRY	R2	2486
8972	IMITATION JEWELLERY	R2	2487
8973	PREC JEWLRY GLD-SILVWARE	R2	2488
89731	PRECIOUS METAL JEWELLERY	R2	2489
89732	GOLD SILVER,ETC WARE	R2	2490
89733	JEWELLERY NES	R2	2491
8974	PREC MTL INDUS,LAB EQUIP	R2	2492
898	MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS,PRTS	R2	2493
8981	PIANOS,OTH STRING INSTRU	R2	2494
89811	KEYBOARD STRING MUS INST	R2	2495
89819	STRING MUS INST NONKEYBD	R2	2496
8982	MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS NES	R2	2497
89821	PIPE AND REED ORGANS	R2	2498
89822	ACCORDIONS,INC MOUTH ORG	R2	2499
89823	WIND MUSICL INSTR NES	R2	2500
89824	PERCUSSION MUSICAL INSTR	R2	2501
89825	ELECTRICAL MUSICAL INSTR	R2	2502
89829	MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS NES	R2	2503
8983	SOUND RECRDNG TAPE,DISCS	R2	2504
89831	PREPD SND RECORDNG MEDIA	R2	2505
89832	RECORDED DISCS TAPES ETC	R2	2506
8989	MUSICAL INSTR PRTS,ACCES	R2	2507
899	OTHER MANUFACTURED GOODS	R2	2508
8991	CARVED,MOULDED GOODS	R2	2509
89911	GOODS OF ANML CARVNG MTL	R2	2510
89919	MOULDED,CARVED GOODS NES	R2	2511
8993	COMBUSTIBLE PRODUCTS ETC	R2	2512
89931	CANDLES,TAPERS,ETC	R2	2513
89932	MATCHES	R2	2514
89934	MECHANICAL ETC LIGHTERS	R2	2515
89935	SMOKING PIPES AND PARTS	R2	2516
89939	COMBUSTIBLE PRODUCTS NES	R2	2517
8994	UMBRELLAS,CANES ETC	R2	2518
89941	UMBRELLAS,SUNSHADES	R2	2519
89942	CANES,RIDING-CROPS,ETC	R2	2520
89949	PARTS OF 89941 89942	R2	2521
8996	HEARING,ORTHOPAEDIC AIDS	R2	2522
89961	HEARING AIDS	R2	2523
89962	ORTHOPAEDIC ETC GOODS	R2	2524
8997	BASKETWORK,BROOMS ETC	R2	2525
89971	BASKETWORK ETC	R2	2526
89972	BRUSHES BROOMS MOPS ETC	R2	2527
8998	SMALLWARES,TOILETRYS ETC	R2	2528
89981	HAND SIEVES RIDDLES	R2	2529
89982	POWDER-PUFFS,ETC	R2	2530
89983	BUTTONS,STUDS,ETC	R2	2531
89984	SLIDE FASTENERS,PARTS	R2	2532
89985	COMBS,HAIR-SLIDES,ETC	R2	2533
89986	SCENT ETC TOILET SPRAYS	R2	2534
89987	TAILORS DUMMIES,ETC	R2	2535
8999	OTHER MANUF GOODS NES	R2	2536
89991	ARTICLES OF GUT,ETC	R2	2537
89992	FEATHER GOODS NES	R2	2538
89993	ARTIFICIAL FLOWERS ETC	R2	2539
89994	HUMAN HAIR WORKED	R2	2540
89995	WIGS,FALSE BEARDS,ETC	R2	2541
89997	VACUUM FLASKS,ETC	R2	2542
89998	PARACHUTES,PRTS,ACCES OF	R2	2543
9	GOODS NOT CLASSD BY KIND	R2	2544
91	MAIL NOT CLASSED BY KIND	R2	2545
911	MAIL NOT CLASSED BY KIND	R2	2546
9110	MAIL NOT CLASSED BY KIND	R2	2547
93	SPECIAL TRANSACTIONS	R2	2548
931	SPECIAL TRANSACTIONS	R2	2549
9310	SPECIAL TRANSACTIONS	R2	2550
94	ZOO ANIMALS,PETS	R2	2551
941	ZOO ANIMALS,PETS	R2	2552
9410	ZOO ANIMALS,PETS	R2	2553
95	WAR FIREARMS,AMMUNITION	R2	2554
951	WAR FIREARMS,AMMUNITION	R2	2555
9510	WAR FIREARMS AMMUNITION	R2	2556
95101	ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES	R2	2557
95102	MILITARY FIREARMS NES	R2	2558
95104	SIDEARMS AND PARTS NES	R2	2559
95105	REVOLVERS,PISTOLS	R2	2560

95106	AMMUNITION NES	R2	2561
95109	PARTS OF ARMS NES	R2	2562
96	COIN NONGOLD,NONCURRENT	R2	2563
961	COIN NONGOLD,NONCURRENT	R2	2564
9610	COIN NONGOLD,NONCURRENT	R2	2565
97	GOLD,NON MONETARY NES	R2	2566
971	GOLD,NON MONETARY NES	R2	2567
9710	GOLD,NON MONETARY NES	R2	2568
97101	NONMON GLD UNWRT,SEMIMFD	R2	2569
97102	ROLLED GLD UNWKD,SEMIMFD	R2	2570
97103	GOLD SWEEPINGS,WASTE ETC	R2	2571

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