



1. Project Data:		Date Posted : 10/28/2004	
PROJ ID: P057007		Appraisal	Actual
Project Name: Ug El Nino Emerg Rd Rep	Project Costs (US\$M)	30	16.2
Country: Uganda	Loan/Credit (US\$M)	27.6	6.5
Sector(s): Board: TR - Roads and highways (100%)	Cofinancing (US\$M)	2.4	9.7
L/C Number: C3064			
	Board Approval (FY)		98
Partners involved : DFID	Closing Date	07/31/2001	01/31/2004

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2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

The objective of the project was to assist the Government of Uganda (GOU) in its efforts to restore and rehabilitate key roads and bridges severely damaged by the heavy rains associated with the El Nino weather pattern, which affected Uganda in 1997 and in early 1998.

b. Components

1. Repair of Damaged Road Sections (Appraisal: US\$8.5 million. Actual: US\$0). Repair of about 350 km of road sections including repair and replacement of pipe culverts;
2. Rehabilitation and Regravelling of Atiak - Moyo Road (Appraisal: US\$9.0 million. Actual: US\$0). Rehabilitate and repave about 92 km of gravel road, repair five bridges and construct two ferry landings . (This component had originally been appraised as part of the NURP in 1994 - contracted works had commenced but were suspended for security reasons.)
3. Repair and Replacement of Box Culverts and about 120 Bridges (Appraisal: US\$4.5 million. Actual US\$2.78 million.) Replace box culverts and bridges; and repair damaged bridges including the protection of bridge abutments, pier foundations, slopes and wing walls;
4. Procure Piped Culverts and Bridge Sections (Appraisal: US\$3.7 million. Actual: US\$2.55 million.) The acquisition of sections of: (i) about 500 linear meters of temporary bridges, (ii) about 8000 linear meters of piped culverts, and (iii) gabions to enhance the borrower's capacity for rapid response in repairing roads and bridges damaged by similar future emergency; and
5. Engineering Studies and Construction Supervision (Appraisal: US\$1.9 million. Actual: US\$2.55 million). Provide technical advisory services for the preparations of engineering studies and tender documents, and the supervision of civil works under (i), (ii) and (iii) components of the Project.

c. Comments on Project Cost, Financing and Dates

Due to initial implementation delays the project components were reworked and components 1 and 2 were dropped from Bank financing. This reduced the project cost from US\$30 million to US\$16.2 million and the loan amount from US\$27.6 million to US\$6.5 million. The delays were due to i) limited number of dedicated staff assigned to project tasks; ii) a tax dispute; iii) procurement problems; and iv) insecurity in Northern Uganda . These delays led to the extension of the credit closing date by two and a half years to January 31, 2004.

3. Achievement of Relevant Objectives:

The overall objective of restoring road and bridge infrastructure damaged by El Nino floods was substantially met, but not quite as originally conceived and with some delay .

Component 1: Completed, but was financed by the GOU at a cost of US\$7.1 million rather than the Bank because of delays from staffing, contracting problems, and a new withholding tax policy .

Component 2: Not completed during this project due to delays mainly caused by insecurity in the North where the road was located. It has been transferred to a new transportation project, Road Development Program Phase 3.

Component 3: Originally appraised to repair 120 bridges, upon implementation, 150 were found needing repair. However, when the project was reworked, they decided to use the money from this component to build 6 major bridges and 3 culverts, because the delay had forced them to find other funding (GOU and DFID) for the bridge repairs that needed immediate attention .

Component 4: Satisfactorily completed. The credit financed 7,950 meters of metal pipe culverts, 15 compact panel

bridges, and gabions (1700 mattresses and 2200 boxes).

Component 5: Satisfactorily completed except that supervision for 2 components was financed by the GOU due to the delays.

4. Significant Outcomes/Impacts:

- Although not completed with Bank funds due to delays, more than 1,800 km of road sections were repaired, rather than the 350 km planned at appraisal.
- The ERR for the bridge building components exceeded expectations, reaching 143% rather than the 80% estimated at appraisal.
- Once the project was reworked and assigned to the Road Agency Formation Unit, implementation went well .

5. Significant Shortcomings (including non-compliance with safeguard policies):

- The project was prepared in a month, because of its emergency nature . However it is unclear why, if there was such urgency, the project was not pursued through OP 8.50 (Emergency Recovery Assistance) which would have helped with many of the delays subsequently experienced .
- There were a number of obstacles which caused delays that might have been foreseen by the Bank or Borrower during preparation:
 - The impact the new tax law would have on consultant payments;
 - The closure of the Greenland Bank by the Bank of Uganda, resulting in the freezing of the project account;
 - Lack of implementation capacity. There were a limited number of staff charged with project implementation in the beginning. Government created a task force to manage the project, which was headed by the Commissioner for Works. However, because the emergency was underestimated and staffing was inadequate, the team was overwhelmed, as they had to attend to other emergencies within their remit .
- The Atiak-Moyo road component was not a direct consequence of El Nino and was risky due to insecurity in that area. It should have been left out.
- It would have been justified to revise the project earlier, since the project went well after the components were reworked.
- The government's contracting system did not follow Bank procurement guidelines, so the Bank's supervision team found it difficult to identify eligible expenditures to be reimbursed out of the Credit proceeds .

6. Ratings :	ICR	OED Review	Reason for Disagreement /Comments
Outcome :	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	
Institutional Dev .:	Modest	Modest	
Sustainability :	Likely	Likely	
Bank Performance :	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	As the ICR acknowledges, appraisal and preparation were not adequate. See Section 5, Significant Shortcomings, above.
Borrower Perf .:	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	
Quality of ICR :		Satisfactory	

NOTE: ICR rating values flagged with '*' don't comply with OP/BP 13.55, but are listed for completeness.

7. Lessons of Broad Applicability:

- A project with the clear objective of alleviating the effects of natural disaster should focus only on issues related to the emergency situation. The inclusion of the Atiak - Moyo road, located in the north of the country where security condition was uncertain, was a distraction for both the Government and the Bank project implementation teams and should not have been included in this emergency project .
- Procurement requirements in an emergency situation should be clear . If the project needs to disburse quickly and the project is disaster-related, it should be an Emergency Reconstruction Loan . The bank should be sure the government understands the guidelines before the project begins .
- The Bank should as a general rule identify the risks of disaster prone developing countries and help the governments of these countries to develop institutional arrangements for coping with recurrent disasters .

8. Assessment Recommended? Yes No

9. Comments on Quality of ICR:

The ICR is satisfactory overall, but an explanation of why the project was not done as an Emergency Reconstruction Loan was needed and would have been instructive .