Document of The World Bank Report No. T-6996-DJI TECHNICAL ANNEXES REPUBLIC OF DJIBOUTI TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT TO SUPPORT ECONOMIC REFORM PROJECT December 18, 1996 CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS as of September 30, 1996 Currency Unit Djibouti Franc (FDJ) US$1.00 = 177 FDJ FDJ100 = US$0.0056 US$1.00 = SDR1.4362 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS DINAS - Bureau of Statistics EC - European Community ENAP - Ecole nationale d'administration publique IA - Institutional Assessment INAP - Institut national d'administration publique MFNE - Ministry of Finance and National Economy MPSAR Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform OED - Operations Evaluation Department PEMU - Public Enterprise Monitoring Unit SAP - Structural Adjustment Program SAP-ISC - Structural Adjustment Program Interministerial Steering Committee SMC - Structural Adjustment Program Monitoring Cell TA - Technical Assistance UNDP - United Nations Development Program Government Fiscal Year January 1 - December 31 Vice President: Callisto Madavo, AFR Country Director: Harold Wackman, AFC05 Technical Manager: Roger Sullivan, AFTII Task Team Leader Denyse Morin, AFTII TABLE OF CONTENT SECTION A ............................................... 1 PROJECT DESCRIPTION ............................................... 1 Background ............................................... 1 Overall and Institutional Framework ............................................... 2 Project Objectives ............................................... 5 Project Components ............................................... 6 Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) Monitoring .................................... 6 Institutional Reform ............................................... 9 Public Enterprise Reform and Privatization (PE) ..................................... 12 Armed Forces Demobilization ............................................... 15 Conditions of Credit ............................................... 16 Risks ............................................... 17 SECTIONB ............................................... 17 PROJECT ADMINISTRATION AND IMLEMENTATION .................................. ............. 17 Project Coordination ............................................... 17 Project Administration ............................................... 18 Reporting, Monitoring and Accountability ............................................... 19 Procurement ............................................... 20 Disbursements ............................................... 21 Accounts and Audits ............................................... 21 Mid-Term Review ............................................... 22 Development of Local Capacity ............................................... 22 ANNEXES Schedule 1 Gantt Chart Schedule 2 Training Plan Schedule 3 Detailed Project Costs Attachment 1 Work Breakdown Structure and Logical Framework Analysis Attachment 2 List of Public Enterprises Attachment 3 Organizational Project Chart Attachment 4 SAP/ISC Members Attachment 5 Performance Monitoring Indicators REPUBLIC OF DJIBOUTI TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT TO SUPPORT ECONOMIC REFORM PROJECT SECTION A PROJECT DESCRIPTION Background 1. Djibouti's economy is very vulnerable due to its lack of diversity. As it has no known natural resources, permanent waterways, nor a significant manufacturing base, and considering its limited agricultural potential, the economy rests solely on the following four pillars: (a) Strategic location of its port used as: (i) a re-exporting center; (ii) supply center for transiting freighters; and (iii) a French naval base; (b) French military base of approximately 2,300 soldiers; (c) French budgetary support including the presence of a large number of French cooperants throughout the country; and (d) Stability of the Djiboutian Franc (FDJ) which enabled the development of banking activities and regional-type insurance. 2. These pillars gave birth to large state-owned enterprises (port, airport, railway, water, electricity and telecommunications); private enterprises related to transit activities (import and export) and to a large, resident French community; and a public service of approximately 8,000 positions. The GNP per inhabitant (US$770) puts Djibouti among the middle-income countries whereas its social indicators place it among the least developed countries: life expectancy of 50 years, literacy rate of 40 percent, women's mortality rate of 740 per 100,000 and unemployment estimated between 40 and 70 percent. 3. Since independence, the combination of these factors and persistent regional instability fostered a public management framework lacking rigor. As long as the external environment remained unchanged, serious financial repercussions were subdued. In 1992, the situation started to deteriorate. 2 Overall and Institutional Framework 4. In recent years, Djibouti's economic and financial performance has been suffering from three external shocks: (a) The regional political situation greatly improved over the past three years affecting adversely the port's activities: (i) reduced level of humanitarian and military assistance to Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea; and (ii) the re- opening of the ports of Assab (Eritrea) and Berbera (Somalia) increasing the competition for Djibouti (tariffs, services, efficiency, etc.); (b) The domestic armed conflict (1991-1994) and an important influx of about 100,000 refugees (to a country with a population of 600,000) from neighboring countries have required government to boost considerably its military expenditures. More than 8,500 soldiers and police who remain to be demobilized represent a wage bill of approximately FDJ 3.2 billion in 1995. With material costs, the total armed forces charge represented 15 percent of total domestic revenues; and (c) Reduction in budgetary transfers and French presence: direct budgetary transfers, particularly from France, at about US$50-60 million per year since independence, fell to US$43 million in 1993, US$24 million in 1994, and US$27 million in 1995. In addition, there will be a substantial reduction in the number of French coop6rants and military personnel by 1997 and this does not exclude possible further reductions by the end of the decade. 5. The decrease in revenues from external assistance, and declining port activities coupled with a major increase in military spending have completely unbalanced the State's accounts. It has also exposed the weaknesses of Djibouti's public sector management and engendered perverse economic behavior. The wage bill reached 82 percent of domestic revenues in 1995 and government's deficit decreased from US$112 million in 1992 to US$58 million in 1995. By 1995, the deficit was essentially limited by the Government's capacity to accumulate arrears, as the Government had largely depleted the cash position of the more liquid public enterprises. With suppliers increasingly demanding payment in advance, purchases of materials fell and the Government had begun accumulating arrears on civil servant salaries. In 1992, the government financed the deficit through: arrears to suppliers (1 percent), domestic borrowing (40 percent) and external financing (59 percent, of which 88 percent were grants). In 1995 the situation had shifted dramatically: arrears to suppliers increased to 24 percent, domestic borrowing was at 13 per cent and external financing reached 65 percent of which 75 percent were grants. The stock of arrears which accumulated between 1992 and 1995 is estimated at US$44 million. A more recent study (June 1996) indicates that the total amount due by the State to public enterprises only is about US$73 million. 6. In 1995, the fiscal situation continued to be critical and expenditures remained high owing to the weight of the wage bill. The adverse effects of these factors have been 3 compounded by an inadequate domestic policy response, deep-seated structural weaknesses and cost rigidities. In the short term, it is essential that public finances be stabilized. With fiscal receipts already relatively high and domestic borders essentially uncontrollable, much of the deficit reduction effort must focus on the expenditure side. 7. Policy discussions with the IMF were held with the understanding that, in the absence of prompt and forceful adjustment and reform efforts backed by adequate external financing, Djibouti faced further contraction of economic activity, unsustainable fiscal and external imbalances, disorderly expenditure compression, and a further accumulation of domestic and external arrears. The Djiboutian authorities' adjustment program is predicated on regaining control of the fiscal situation in the short run and implementing far-reaching, medium-term reforms to address the deeply embedded structural problems of the economy. The medium-term strategy aims at returning the country to a more stable macroeconomic environment while creating the conditions for the resumption of sustained growth and employment, external payments viability, and poverty alleviation. The key elements of the strategy are: (i) substantial financial policy-tightening with an emphasis on prompt budgetary adjustment and restructuring; (ii) continued full adherence to the principle of the present currency board arrangement; (iii) maintenance of a restriction-free exchange and trade regime and prudent external debt policy; (iv) comprehensive structural reforms to promote competitiveness and enhance the supply responsiveness of the economy; (v) adequate concessional external financing to support the adjustment and reform effort; and (vi) technical assistance to address the weakness of the macroeconomic database and strengthen administrative and institutional capacity. 8. The IMF and the Government have agreed on the content of a formal arrangement. The stand-by agreement will continue for fourteen months starting April 1996 for an amount of 4.6 million SDR, equivalent to approximately 40 percent of Djibouti's allocation to the IMF. The agreement stipulates that two reviews are planned: (1) end of November 1996; and (2) end of February 1997. In addition to rationalization of public expenditures, the program is ambitious and includes the following areas: (a) Economic Management Capacity. There is a need to continue reinforcing fiscal management and the capacity to analyze, formulate, execute, and monitor macroeconomic policies. To achieve meaningful progress in this area, the authorities established the Structural Adjustment Program Monitoring Cell (SMC) to monitor the implementation of the adjustment policies and to act as the executing agency of the Structural Adjustment Program Interministerial Steering Committee (SAP-ISC). It commenced operations in November 1995, albeit with a small staff. (b) Public Enterprise (PE) Reform. The PEs are operating within a complex institutional and legal framework characterized by a lack of coordination with the parent ministries. The present legal regime includes constraining and rigid labor laws which make it very difficult for the PEs to operate. The State interferes with day-to-day operations (tariffs fixed by the State, staff hiring, determination of salaries, etc.) of the PEs thus disrupting operating conditions. In addition, owing to the severe financial crisis, the 4 Government of Djibouti does not pay its debts to the concerned PEs; the State's arrears to the PEs after cross-debt compensation was FDJ 13 billion as of December 1995. It used PE revenues to finance directly its own budget and has forced some well-performing enterprises to fund others in difficulty. The consequences have been: (i) weak technical performance (poor services, high tariffs, low productivity, and high personnel costs); (ii) variable financial performances, depending on the enterprise; (iii) a critical financial structure (balance sheet); and (iv) considerable debts that some cannot reimburse. Many of these PEs have weak management and are plagued with some of the following problems: (i) they do not deliver acceptable levels of service to clients; (ii) they conduct activities that do not correspond with their original mandate; (iii) their accounts are not up- to-date (some of them since 1992); (iv) they do not fulfill their income tax obligations to the fiscal administration; and (v) they invest or borrow without Government's approval. (c) Public Service Reform. The implementation of this reform aims at ensuring a leaner and more efficient administration over the medium term. However, little has been documented about the root causes of the public service's problems. Djiboutian public servants are among the highest paid in sub-Saharan Africa. In 1995, the wage bill was approximately 82 per cent of its domestic revenues. The public service, overstaffed, is composed of similar numbers of older, under-educated public servants and younger French-university graduates with little practical experience. In addition, there is a relatively large number of foreign technical assistants, essentially French. As a result, government employment has been viewed as a sinecure with Government as the employer of first resort for all university graduates regardless of their areas of study. They receive no specific training upon entering the service. In 1995, the Center for Administrative Training was changed to the Institut national d'administration publique (INAP), reflecting Government's recognition of the need to modernize and strengthen its public service. The INAP is attached to the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform (MPSAR). The director and trainers are public servants belonging to various ministries and enterprises. They received training at the Ecole nationale d'administration publique (ENAP) in Canada as part of a modest twinning arrangement, nearly completed, and financed by Canada. (d) Armed Forces Demobilization Program. The Government assigns a high priority to this measure which it sees as a means to reduce the overall level of expenditure, and also to modify its structure by releasing resources that could be redirected toward the provision of essential social services. The program has been under discussion with IDA since mid-1995 and is presently being finalized. It will cover the demobilization of about 8,500 defense and security personnel over an 18-24 month period. To finance this program, the Djiboutian authorities have requested IDA to help find the financial support which will determine the pace of the demobilization. 5 However, should donors not provide sufficient assistance, the authorities have indicated their firm commitment to pursue the program on their own at a pace which will accord with the rather meager resources available. (e) Social Safety Net Provisions. The authorities emphasized the need for a safety net to mitigate the impact of adjustment on the most vulnerable segments of the population, particularly given that many social indicators are already low, and because of the projected effect of the planned retrenchment of armed forces and security personnel. The French Cooperation and UNDP have indicated that they will support labor- intensive and income-generating interventions to assist with rehabilitation and reconstruction activities. IDA is investigating the provision of assistance through a social fund-type project. 9. This adjustment program with the IMF requires that the authorities have the knowledge and capacity to handle very specialized areas of reform. While there are a few academically qualified young technicians, they have very little practical experience in economic management and no experience and limited capacity in piloting and implementing a program of economic reform. The Government of Djibouti requested IDA's assistance to implement the structural reforms required by their program with the IMF. They recognize the challenge and acknowledge that they need support to guide them through the process. They also indicated that they wish to increase awareness of the adjustment program, both internally and externally, and hope to enlist support from all levels of their public society which is already experiencing the consequences of economic decline. They recognize the need to formalize a communication strategy and action plan to help create the conditions for the economic reform program to be well understood and endorsed. 10. The donors have expressed their interest in IDA coordinating external efforts related to technical assistance in order to avoid duplication, and ensure a consistent approach among themselves. France, the European Community and UNDP have been fully involved in project preparation and the dialogue will be maintained during project supervision. Close coordination of the efforts of all donors will be crucial to guarantee the provision of complementary expertise and approaches, and to achieve maximum benefits of the technical assistance (TA) to the Djiboutian administration. In particular, in light of the importance of French TA, it will be essential to ensure that all TA is fully integrated by the Djiboutian authorities in canying out their reform agenda. Joint supervision missions are envisaged. Project Objectives 11. The Government's goal is to implement economic reforms between 1996 and 2000 thus creating a stable macroeconomic environment that will lead to economic growth and employment, a sound external account and poverty alleviation. The project objective is to assist the Government implement successfully its economic reform program. More specifically, the project will support Government's decision-making related to macroeconomic reforms and its policy framework. This will be done by providing the 6 expertise necessary to assist with policy formulation and related reforms, and supporting close monitoring of the reform program's implementation. 12. Given domestic capacity limitation, the project will require a significant level of expatriate TA. The project is designed to provide immediate implementation support to the Government of Djibouti to permit effective execution of its adjustment program. Without this support, the economic reform program will almost certainly fail given the limited local capacity. However, the project's success is intimately linked to the success of the overall reform program. The project will facilitate but cannot guarantee successful implementation of the program. While the project will focus on filling the expertise gaps needed for successful implementation of the program, it is expected that, over time, it will lead to improved local capacity. Project Components 13. The logical framework analyses for the four project components are included as Attachment 1. They provide a complete synthesis of the project beginning with the Government's goal, continuing to the inputs and critical assumptions for each component to achieve its objective and assist the Government to reach its goal, and spelling out performance indicators against which to monitor progress. Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) Monitoring 14. Background. The execution of the reform agenda is the responsibility of the SAP Inter-Ministerial Committee (SAP-ISC) headed by the Minister of Finance and encompassing thirteen ministries and agencies'. Its role is to formulate, for Cabinet's approval, recommendations and proposals for economic reform. The SMC is the executing agency of the SAP-ISC and the interface with the technical ministries and the Bretton Woods institutions. The SMC, created in November 1995, is located in the MFNE. A team of young technicians was selected for this group which is led by an international macroeconomic adviser (from West Africa) and a national counterpart. The adviser was brought in by the Government of Djibouti to help prepare the reform agenda because Djibouti has no experience with structural adjustment and did not possess locally the expertise necessary to formulate and then implement the program. For internal strategic reasons, the Government chose to nominate the macroeconomic adviser as the SMC coordinator. It is envisaged that the national counterpart will assume these responsibilities after understudying the coordinator. Therefore, one of the coordinator's important responsibilities will be to ensure that the national counterpart acquires the expertise and skills to assume the position on or about September 1997. In the context of the project, the coordinator will provide IDA with a training plan and a schedule to transfer responsibilities gradually to the counterpart. The SMC's responsibilities include the analysis and monitoring of the following elements: (i) performance criteria and objectives (revenues, expenditures, money supply, credit, arrears and balance of payments); (ii) adherence to budget (monitoring of commitments, contracts and ISee Attachment 4. 7 payments); (iii) effects on the wage bill of the demobilization program and public service adjustment; (iv) internal and external debt; (v) PE reform and privatization; and (vi) liberalized labor policies2. The success of the reform agenda will necessitate strong support from Djiboutians at all levels of society: political, administrative, public and private enterprises, interest groups and other segments of the population. This will only be possible if each party understands the nature of the reform, its objectives and the measures envisaged. Given the urgency and severity of the planned reforms, the SMC is to propose a communications strategy and an action plan that is intended to enlist the support of all actors for the changes. 15. Objectives. This component will support government's decision-making on macroeconomic reforms by assisting the SMC to monitor economic indicators, analyze economic progress and the impact of specific reforms, recommend reforms and programs, and implement a communications plan. 16. Description and Role of the TA (a) Macroeconomic Adviser. The component will provide the services of an international long-term adviser responsible as the SMC coordinator to: (i) elaborate a monitoring framework for the SAP and ensure that the SMC obtains the necessary data on the economy; (ii) ensure that the reforms are implemented according to the monitoring indicators; (iii) contract short- term expertise, provided by the project, to undertake specialized studies and analysis and formulate recommendations to the SAP-ISC; (iv) oversee the preparation of the communications strategy, its translation into an action plan and its implementation; (v) oversee the implementation of all other project's components--PE reform, institutional reform and demobilization--and proper administration of the project's resources; (vi) provide secretariat services to the SAP-ISC; and (vii) ensure proper training--on-the-job, formal--of the national counterpart to ensure a gradual transfer of responsibilities. (b) Communication Specialists. A short-term international communication specialist will be hired to help prepare the communications strategy. The first task of the specialist will be to propose Terms of Reference for and to participate in the recruitment of a long-term local communication adviser. With the assistance of the short-term specialist, the local communication adviser will participate in the preparation of the strategy and action plan. The strategy will aim at mobilizing public opinion; improving the dialogue among the key actors responsible for the implementation of the SAP; informing the public society on the details, benefits of the reforms and actions to protect vulnerable groups; and ensuring regular circulation of news, information and explanations on the SAP. The national adviser will be responsible to implement the communication strategy. Some of the tasks will include to: (i) elaborate an action plan; (ii) prepare periodic, 2 To be supported by French technical assistance. 8 written communications on the SAP; (iii) inform the ministries of progress made with SAP implementation; and (iv) organize seminars and workshops for various target groups (within and outside government). Short-term technical experts. Short-term technical-expert assistance in areas directly linked to the execution of the reform program would be provided to conduct studies and provide recommendations related to salary and benefits systems; procurement; public finance structure; public expenditure control, and areas associated with improved public management. The consultants will be asked to give short training sessions aimed at creating awareness of such core economic policy instruments as public expenditure and investment, and taxation to manage the economic reform. Executives will be trained in change management; professional staff will be exposed to the utilization of macroeconomic tools. 17. TA Delivery Mode. The TA will be of two kinds: (i) long-term; and (ii) short- term. The use of a long-term macroeconomic adviser is seen as essential because Djibouti is embarking on its first structural adjustment program with the IMF. This adviser, already in place, has previous experience of implementing a SAP in Africa. It is important that the Djiboutian authorities benefit from the day-to-day association with him and he, in turn, will train firstly a national counterpart but also other staff in the SMC to perform their tasks. The short-term expertise, either local or international, will be used to undertake studies and to provide on-the-job training in areas related to the SAP. As it is impossible to foresee all the needs presently, the following is a list of possible TA that will need to be adjusted to take into account requirements that will emerge during implementation. Breakdown ofpotential TA International - SAP macroeconomic 36 person/months - Procurement techniques 1.5 person/months - Communication strategy 1 person/month - Project management and monitoring 3 person/months - Budget rationalization 8 person/months - Collection of statistical data 4 person/months - Elaboration of balance of payments 4 person/months - Commercial bank audits 1 person/month - SAP elaboration, monitoring, coordination 0.5 person/month Local - Communication 36 person/months - Pay and Benefit Systems 2 person/months - Procurement for public goods 2 person/months - Credit policy and development financing 2 person/months - Public finance structure 2 person/months - Public finance control 2 person/months 9 18. Training. Both the SAP Monitoring component and the PE Reform and Privatization component will initiate professional staff of the SMC and the PEMU to techniques and tools related to the functions they have to perform. Professional staff from ministries concerned with the SAP will also benefit from the condensed training sessions that will be organized in the context of the short-term expertise provided for studies and analyses. They will take place in Djibouti and will aim at increasing awareness in areas related to the management of the reform and the improvement of the utilization of macroeconomic tools. Thus staff will be exposed to seasoned professionals and their techniques. Whenever a short-term expert is hired to undertake a specific study, he will be assigned, if appropriate, a local staff member who will benefit from this close association. The consultants' Terms of Reference will clearly spell out this responsibility to transfer knowledge and skills. Study tours to other countries of Africa would be considered on a case-by-case basis provided that clear objectives are spelled out for the beneficiaries and that they aim at comparing experience with similar environments. List of possible training sessions and seminars3: - Change management and seminars for decision makers; - Structural adjustment program; - Budget and accounting for Treasury; - Limited overseas seminars for senior public servants (statistics, revenue and others). Institutional Reform 19. Background. Several actions have been taken by the Djiboutian authorities over the last few years to improve their institutional framework: i) a new Constitution instituting multipartism was adopted in 1992; ii) a Supreme Court was established in 1993 and the penal code was revised in 1995; iii) a law on communication and freedom of the press was adopted in 1993; and iv) a peace accord was signed with the rebel forces in 1994. However, over the medium term, the Government will need to further the institutional framework reforms if it wishes to achieve a permanent reduction of its wage bill. The Government hopes to achieve this objective through armed forces demobilization and a public service reform that will include a review of the wage policy of the public sector. To effect this permanent reduction in a way that will minimize the social impact, the Government launched a survey in October 1995 to determine the number of personnel covered by the budget in order to identify those employees that do not correspond to their budgetary positions and thence assessed the extent of the cash allowances illegally granted. This audit will be supplemented by a separate verification to be undertaken by the Treasury at the time of salary payments, sometime over the next few months. Part of the reason for the increasing share of the wage bill is the salary costs associated with the 3A World Bank procurement and disbursement seminar will also be held. 10 mobilization effort in 1992. Out of a total wage bill of FDJ 20.6 billion in 1995, some FDJ 3.2 billion consisted of the salary costs of the mobilized soldiers. However, even taking these extra costs into account, the wage bill still remains exceptionally high. The total wage bill (including salaries and benefits) in 1995 was FDJ 16 billion, or 20 percent of the Djiboutian GDP. It is reflective of relatively high salaries rather than an exceptionally large number of public servants. In 1993, the total number of public servant posts was approximately 8,000 implying that each received an equivalent of US$11,450 per year. Given that GDP per capita is US$770, it means that the average public servant received fourteen times the Djiboutian GDP per capita. This level of salaries reflects both a high base salary but, equally importantly, a wide array of special benefits. The Djibouti public servant may receive special indemnities related to his type of work, his status, as well as for housing and transportation. 20. The Government's public administration reform will need to address these issues within a broad redefinition of the role of the state, and a review of present administrative structures and procedures. Top-priority should be given to reinforcing commitment to the reform program by enhancing the coordination and participation of all ministries. In this context, a first step is for the Djiboutian authorities to clarify further their vision of an institutional reform and the means to attain their objective of reducing the wage bill and improve efficiency of the public service. In this context, they agreed with IDA to carry out an Institutional Assessment (IA) to study institutional issues further. This diagnosis is based on a participatory and consensus-building approach to assist the authorities in analyzing problems to determine their root causes and effects. This will help them to pinpoint where best to concentrate reform efforts. The action plan resulting from this assessment is key to determining well-defined objectives and clear priority actions of reform. This could serve as a starting point to rationalize the public administration and reform the public service. Service delivery surveys aimed at collecting the population's views of government services will be an integral part of the diagnosis. It is hoped that this participatory process will allow Government to endorse the results of the assessment and prepare a rational and feasible strategy for the reform. The component would be implemented in stages with conditions to fulfill prior to moving to the next stage. The first stage includes: (i) training senior public servants and some members of the civil society in change management and techniques related to public administration reform; and (ii) conducting the institutional assessment and formulating an action plan; and (iii) approval by Government of the action plan. Contingent upon approval of the action plan, a second stage would be initiated to: i) implement areas of the action plan related more directly to improving economic management; and ii) assist Government to mobilize resources for other areas of the institutional reform requiring external support. The authorities will set up an IA coordinating committee headed by a coordinator who will be responsible, with IDA's assistance, to carry out this assessment. 21. Objectives. The main objective of the institutional reform component is to assist the Government to formulate its strategy to reduce the wage bill and rationalize the public service. It could pave the way to a more comprehensive reform of the public administration. I1 22. Role of the TA. First stage: The IA's participatory approach helps participants to understand the relationship between their own environment and economic management, and to perceive the relationship and dependencies among the various elements of public administration. During the IA process, TA will be used to train Djiboutians how to conduct such assessments and to "learn-by-doing" specific tasks and activities. Short-term experts will conduct service delivery surveys, training Djiboutians in the process. In addition, short-term experts would be utilized for urgent, immediate tasks such as studying the salary-and-benefits structure. Second stage: In relation to the action plan, TA could be used to conduct specific rationalization studies, surveys, workshops, training and, possibly, study tours. A probable intervention would be the strengthening of the Institut national d'administration publique (INAP) de Djibouti through a twinning arrangement. INAP is the only local institution with a mandate to train senior public servants in all areas of public sector management. It is relatively new and has only benefited from modest support so far. It is anticipated that short-term expertise would also be needed to study such areas as: management information requirements, budgetary processes, and others to be identified by the IA. 23. TA DeliveryMode. Short-term expertise that will include capacity-building activities enabling Djiboutians to conduct specific activities will be provided. The IA will include international and national facilitators and surveyors. Short-term experts will work closely with the IA coordinating committee to prepare questionnaires and provide guidance on how to conduct the surveys. They will also identify target groups for the assessment and participate in the organization and conduct of an initial workshop to explain the assessment process. They will analyze the information collected and assist the coordinating committee to prepare for the final workshop, summarize recommendations and translate them into an action plan for Government approval. 24. Breakdown of the TA and Training. It is also foreseen that, under this component, senior government managers and other representatives from the private sector and civil society (approximately 10) will participate in a reform management training program (eight-week duration) at ENAP, Canada. The Government had already initiated discussions with ENAP prior to project preparation and asked for IDA's assistance to pursue this training in the context of the institutional reform. The selected group of leaders will benefit from an exposure to change management and reform techniques/tools. By helping to bestow ownership of the reform process upon senior Djiboutian public servants and other leaders, it is foreseen that this training will help the reform to advance. The first training session at ENAP will take place prior to the conduct of the IA; it is foreseen that this group will be the leaders of the institutional reform. UNDP has agreed to contribute to the financing (parallel) of this training. National and international trainers will be contracted to provide training that might be identified by the IA in areas related to economic management and general administration. As much as possible, the project will use the INAP of Djibouti for facilitation during the assessment, and for training related to follow-up activities. The latter could be done with the assistance of international institutions in areas where INAP has not yet developed local expertise. 12 Breakdown of possible TA International - Institutional assessment 4 person/months - Review of the public administration structure 8 person/months - Twinning arrangement with 24 person/months an international institution - Management Information Systems 2 person/months - Studies for other ministries (Justice, Labor, etc.) 6 person/months Local - Institutional assessment 6 person/months - Review of the public administration structure 8 person/months - Twinning arrangement for INAP 36 person/months - Other training and TA4 6 person/months Public Enterprise Reform and Privatization (PE) 25. Background. The Government of Djibouti decided to implement voluntary reform centered on more autonomous PEs and state divestiture. The list of PEs is presented in Attachment 2. The Government's Memorandum of Economic Policies to the IMF in March 1996 states that such reform: ".. .will contribute to an orderly implementation of the reform plan. The latter envisages the following actions: (i) all public enterprises will be subject to normal commercial laws as of May 31, 1996; (ii) the law on privatization will be revised, to facilitate opening the capital of public enterprises to the private sector; and (iii) an inventory of cross-debts between public enterprises and the State will be completed by the end of April 1996, when settlement by compensation will take place and an action plan established to regularize the remaining debts; and (iv) three enterprises are scheduled for divestiture to be completed by the end of March 1996, and another by the end of November 1996." 26. The PE reform embraces all sectors of the Djiboutian economy at the microeconomic level. The MFNE coordinates the overall structural reform, but parent ministries will also be involved in PE reform. The Government realizes that there is an urgent need to make the PEs more efficient by restoring their capacity for self-financing and by allowing private sector participation in their capital. To this end, a PE Monitoring Unit (PEMU) was created, in the MFNE, to centralize the financial oversight of the PE sector. In light of Djibouti's limited experience with structural adjustment programs, including PE reform, it was decided the PEMU would report to the SMC coordinator. 4 Resulting from the assessment and identified by the action plan. 13 27. Government Strategy for PE Reform. To address the problems of the PE sector, the Government's policy includes the following objectives and actions: (a) Institutional and Legal FrameworkReform. The Government intends to set up a legal framework and PE statutes making PEs' management more independent. This will be achieved through law reform and the implementation of a modern privatization law. (b) State and PEfinancial adjustment. Cross-debts will be identified and settled. The PEs will benefit from improved budgetary procedures such as the monitoring of Government's consumption of utilities' services. A plan to reduce the consumption of electricity, water and telephone by the State will be put in place. (c) Portfolio Management. The program seeks to improve policy formulation and decisions concerning PEs through a reliable information system and relevant data. The same accounting system will be put in place for all PEs and an effective management information system will be developed. (d) PE Performance Improvement. The Government intends that the PEs will contribute more to the country's economic development. This will be achieved through better delivery of services, improved financial results and by giving more autonomy to the PEs by way, for example, of management contracts. (e) State Divestiture. The Government wishes to withdraw from less important enterprises and either let the private sector manage them or liquidate them, when appropriate. 28. Objectives. This component will support Government's decision-making and effort on public enterprise reform by providing highly specialized expertise and assistance for limited, targeted strengthening of the PEMU. 29. Description and role of the TA. Considering that Djibouti's qualified people are few in number, two types of TA are envisaged for this component--general for the PEMU and highly specialized for the PE reform as such. As it appears impossible to find locally the highly-qualified, experienced people required to lead the PE reform process, the Government decided to staff the PEMU with younger officers, appropriately skilled academically, but with little experience. The TA and training for the PEMU staff will focus on providing them with the savoir-faire and techniques to manage the PE reform program. It will aim at developing management and monitoring skills in all areas related to the PE reform process and the management of enterprises. It will target the PEMU, technical ministries' staff and, whenever appropriate, PE staff. However, the Government and IDA recognize that the PEMU officers will need a substantial amount of specialized TA to perform the more technical tasks related to: (i) institutional and legal reform: identification of reforms and formulation of recommendations for an improved framework; (ii) financial adjustment of the PE sector: analysis of cross-debts and proposals for settlements; (iii) improvement in the management of the State's portfolio: 14 recommendations for a reliable management information system based on dependable data and related to a uniform accounting plan for all the PEs; (iv) improvement of PEs' performance: financial and accounting audits of all PEs, identification of performance indicators and the means to achieve them; and (v) State's divestiture: identification of PEs, analysis and proposals. 30. TA Delivery Mode. The direct assistance to the PEMU will include the services of an international expert who will visit Djibouti periodically to provide coaching-and- guidance services to the PEMU and technical ministries and PEs' staff. The second type (specialized assistance), will provide highly specialized expertise for studies and tasks necessary for the Government to make decisions on the reform of enterprises and divestiture. The "general assistance" TA will be intensive during the first eighteen months, but will be reduced gradually until the end of the project. The specialized expertise will be provided selectively, on a case-by-case basis, linked to the Government PE reform program and with terms of reference tailored to each assignment. Breakdown of the TA Capacity Building - support to PEMU 7 person/months - training (PEMU and ministries) 3.5 person/months Specialized expertise - institutional and legal reform 4.25 person/months - financial adjustment 1 person/month - PE portfolio management 3 person/months - PE performance improvement 36 person/months - Divestiture 4 person/months 31. Training. It is envisioned that approximately 15 staff (PEMU, technical ministries and PEs) will be trained for the PE reform component. Short, intensive seminars, to be delivered in Djibouti, will aim at imparting know-how in areas related to the management of reform and the improvement of PE performance. The training sessions will be followed by practical assignments, of approximately two weeks, under the supervision of the experts recruited for specific assignments. List ofpossible seminars: Commercial law; PE-reform methodology including financial analysis and related computer applications, diagnosis and financial recovery of enterprises; * Contracting and monitoring; * Enterprise valuation and privatization, and associated software; * Accounting Plan (1982); and 15 Study tours, mainly to other African countries: comparing PE reforms in a similar environment. Armed Forces Demobilization 32. Background. The Government has already financed the demobilization of approximately 4,000 soldiers using its own resources. It needs financial assistance to demobilize the remaining 8,500. To assist with the development of the armed forces demobilization program, IDA sent last October, at the Government's request, a demobilization expert to Djibouti to discuss the elements of this program with the authorities. Another short-term demobilization expert visited in April 1996 to help with the development of the program's institutional and administrative arrangements. More recently, in July, IDA provided a short-term consultant to guide the final drafting of a document presenting the government's demobilization program. IDA has agreed to facilitate resource mobilization once the document has been transmitted to potential financiers. Donors' financial support will only be forthcoming when they are confident that transparent administrative and financial arrangements are in place. The demobilization of the armed forces is a critical element of the structural adjustment program. The Government reiterated its willingness to implement a demobilization program with donors'assistance. However, it is understood that if the external resources were not forthcoming it would proceed with its own meager resources; and at a pace reflecting the available resources. In this case, IDA would still assist with the administration of the program, including provision of TA and training, provided that the program is satisfactory. 33. Objectives. To assist the Government of Djibouti achieve a permanent reduction in its wage bill by providing the expertise, means and administrative support necessary for the Government to demobilize about 8,500 soldiers. 34. Description and Role of the TA. The TA will increase the possibility of the demobilization being carried out effectively. It will involve short-term expertise for the elaboration of (i) a predischarge orientation (PDO) program for soldiers; (ii) a management information system on ex-soldiers; and (iii) financial control procedures. This component will also provide administrative support to the Demobilization Unit, located in the President's Office, which is implementing this program under the oversight of the SMC. In addition, short-term expertise will be required to provide external auditing services; and an independent evaluation of the program's implementation and impact, one month after the end of the program. 35. TA DeliveryMode. Short-term TA will provide the expertise necessary to facilitate the execution of the demobilization program. Depending on financial support from donors, the exercise could be completed in approximately 18-24 months. Capacity building will occur in the process but is not this component's main objective. The predischarge orientation will be undertaken by specialized staff who will be trained on-the- job by a competent NGO during the first month of demobilization. It is envisaged that veterans who have already been demobilized could be hired to provide the PDO. External audits will be frequent (every two months) to ensure the proper utilization of a fairly large 16 budget (total program cost estimated at $16 million) to be managed by the Demobilization Unit. Breakdown of the TA Short-term expertise - Design/implementation of the PDO 4 person/months - Design/implementation of MIS 4 person/months - Design of financial procedures 2.5 person/months - External auditing 11 person/months - Evaluation 2 person/months 36. Training. Specialized training will be offered locally for a total of 3.5 months. Its main purpose will be to ensure that local staff are able to implement effectively the demobilization program. The areas include: - Program objectives, benefits and implementation; - Operation of the management information system; - Provision of counseling, information and referral services; - Conduct of the predischarge orientation sessions; and - Financial administration and control. Conditions of Credit 37. Board Negotiations. The credit was negotiated upon the Government's approval of a ministerial decision modifying the organization and composition of the SMC, appointing civil servant to each position (8 professionals) and filling two administrative positions to be financed by the credit (an administrator and an accountant). In addition, the Government confirmed that its contribution to the project has been included in the budget submission for the 1997 financial year. At negotiations, the Government gave assurances that the counterpart funds for the first year of the project (equivalent to $223,000) would available in January 1997. 38. Conditionsfor Board Presentation. The government submitted an action plan to report on its external debt and new commitments for 1994-1995. 39. Other Actions/Areas agreed. The Government agreed to establish at the beginning of the project a Coordinating Committee to be headed by a national coordinator to conduct the institutional assessment. It also agreed to the use of a mid-term review after fifteen months of project implementation. 17 Risks 40. It must be recognized that the project will be implemented in a high risk environment. The success of the project is tied directly to the implementation of the overall reform program. In this regard, the Government of Djibouti is only just embarking on these reforms and its determination to sustain implementation is not yet clear. The IME mid-term review (December 1996) will assess progress made in the agreed program. Any delay or backtracking in the Government's response to the SAP will affect project implementation and reduce its chances of success. The capacity and willingness of Djiboutian institutions to adapt to necessary reforms are variables which might also limit success. An unwillingness of the Government to take difficult decisions is also an important risk that would have an impact on the overall economic reform program and not solely on the project. The demobilization of the armed forces is a key element of the economic reform program. Should the Government be unable to find external financing, this component would be implemented over a longer period of time with Government's own limited resources. Regular reviews by the IMF of the implementation of the SAP, IDA's close supervision of the project, and a continuation of close collaboration between the two institutions to monitor Government's execution of and adherence to the agreed reform program and project timetable will be crucial. 41. In spite of these real risks, IDA support for this project is warranted. IDA has concluded that without the project there is little chance that the structural adjustment program can be implemented successfully. The project interventions are designed to provide the Djiboutian authorities with a structure that is appropriate considering its capacity shortcomings. This project is seen as the first step in a long-term endeavor to help the Government improve gradually its capacity to manage the economy. SECTION B PROJECT ADMINISTRATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 42. Project support will be channeled through the SMC which is the executing agency for the SAP Intermninisterial Steering Committee (SAP-ISC). The role of the SAP-ISC is to make recommendations and provide proposals to the Government related to the structural reforms. As its executing agency, the Terms of Reference of the SMC are identical to the SAP-ISC's mandate. In this context, the proposed project identifies itself with the SMC and will support reforms relevant to other ministries (institutional and demobilization) and directorates within the MFNE through the SMC structure. The SMC's organizational chart is presented in Attachment 3. Project Coordination 43. The SAP-ISC, composed of thirteen ministries and agencies (see Attachment 4), is responsible for implementing the SAP; and is headed by the Minister of Finance. It will 18 also constitute the project steering committee. The SAP-ISC will review project implementation periodically just as it follows implementation of the SAP. The purpose of these reviews will be to assess project implementation against performance monitoring indicators5 with a view to reducing TA needs within three years. The SAP-ISC will also approve the annual work plans prepared by the SMC with its correspondents in the Ministry of Public Service (Institutional Reform Component) and the President's Office (Armed Forces Demobilization Component) and the PEs and their parent ministries (PE Reform and Privatization Component). Project Administration 44. The SMC coordinator will control and manage all resources (local communication adviser, PEMU staff, personnel for the analysis, coordination, administration and accounting) including the project's inputs. Thus, he will ensure that the SMC executes its mandate (to produce outputs; meet deadlines, control quality adequately). To ensure efficient coordination, each member of the SAP-ISC will identify within its organization a responsible manager who will liaise with the SMC. The Project will enable the SMC to mobilize specialized expertise when necessary. In addition, the SMC will receive expert assistance in procurement and program/financial management through TA envisaged at the initial stage of the project. The SMC will have adequate administrative staff (administrator and accountant) to handle the administrative aspects of (i) recruitment and employment of the experts; (ii) procurement of goods and services; (iii) preparation and presentation of withdrawal applications for the credit proceeds; (iv) periodic reporting to IDA; and (v) preparation of yearly work plans. The SMC coordinator will liaise with IDA concerning issues or problems related to project administration. 45. In addition to annual work plans, the SMC will prepare progress reports for the SAP- ISC. It will be responsible for the monitoring and financial control of all components of the project, including financial audits. The SMC will prepare financial and administrative management systems and procedures conforming to IDA directives and guidelines. In addition, it will be responsible for all procurement of and contracting for project goods and services. The SMC will provide administrative support for all project components. 46. For an interim period of approximately one year of the project, the SMC coordinator will be the international macroeconomic adviser. He is seconded by a national counterpart who will take over the coordinator's responsibilities at the end of the interim period. Therefore, the two individuals will have the same job description except that the international macroeconomic adviser will also be charged to ensure the transfer of knowledge and skills to his national counterpart. However, as accountability cannot be shared, it is understood that, inasmuch as the international macroeconomic expert is the SMC coordinator, and as long as the decree has not been modified, the counterpart will work under the supervision of the SMC coordinator. Once the transfer is effected, the See Attachment 5. 19 SMC coordinator will be a Djiboutian national and the international expert will assume an advisory role. 47. All the component units will be provided with modest office equipment and supplies, and incremental operating expenses (95%), whilst public servants' salaries, offices, normal operating expenses and 5 percent of incremental operating expenses will be part of the Government's contribution to the project. 48. Project sustainability will be enhanced by a simple project design and the channeling of all activities through the SMC. Performance monitoring indicators, (see Attachment 5) established during appraisal and confirmed at negotiations, will enable the Djiboutian authorities and IDA to identify clearly both achievements, and work remaining to be done to reach project objectives. They will also enable the Djiboutian authorities and IDA to maintain their dialogue on the pertinence of the planned interventions, and to adjust them if necessary to reflect prevailing conditions in Djibouti. Close coordination by the SMC of the contributions of other donors, under parallel arrangements, will be crucial to maximize the benefits of the TA to the Djiboutian administration. In addition, supervision missions will provide the framework to continue the dialogue with the donors on the status of their TA interventions. The overall project will be subject to a mid-term review after fifteen months to provide for changes in component objectives, management, inputs, and performance monitoring indicators, if necessary. 49. To assist with project management, implementation and administration, the Government of Djibouti will utilize the Project Implementation Plan6. This document contains TORs for specialized TA already identified, the project implementation schedule, budgets and administrative procedures relating to the use of and access to funds as discussed and agreed with IDA. Reporting, Monitoring and Accountability 50. The SMC will submit quarterly reports on project implementation to the SAP-ISC and IDA, summarizing progress achieved, budget status, difficulties encountered, and changes and adjustments to be made. The SAP-ISC will meet periodically to review progress, make decisions and assign responsibilities for any follow-up action which might be needed. The agenda and minutes of these meetings will be prepared by the SMC coordinator, and transmitted to IDA to assist with supervision. 6 6First draft was prepared by members of the SMC and of the IDA mission during project appraisal and completed prior to Board presentation. 20 Procurement 51. Procurement under the credit as summarized in Schedule 3 would cover the net-of- tax cost of regular non-civil service and consultant personnel, studies, training, and goods and vehicles for technical assistance. The logistical and support services, and goods and vehicles element would facilitate the functioning of the SMC office and other units and amount to US$0.5 million, of which about US$0.4 million would be procured through international competitive bidding (ICB) procedures acceptable to IDA. All procurement packages with an estimated cost of more than $50,000 would be procured using ICB procedures, and Standard Bidding Documents, according to IDA Guidelines. International Shopping Procedures would be used for all procurement of goods below this ICB threshold. Goods estimated to cost less than $10,000 per contract, up to an aggregate amount of $30,000 may be procured using local shopping procedures. Vehicles and computers required for start-up of operations may be purchased from UNDP Inter- Agency Procurement Service (IAPSO), with IDA's prior agreement. The regular non-civil service personnel funded by the credit would be recruited locally. It is expected that local recruitment will be limited to staff who are not specialists or experts and are readily available in Djibouti. 52. The estimated cost of consultant services, studies and training is about US$5.0 million of which about US$4.8 million will be funded by IDA. Terms of reference were prepared by the SMC for each consultancy contract and will be subject to IDA's prior review; terms of reference will be required for the recruitment of (i) qualified individuals against positions (mostly advisory but some line positions); (ii) long- or short-term consultants (firms or individuals) to prepare studies, action plans and similar products (including, for example, advising on the performance contracts, legal frameworks, valuation and divestiture); and (iii) consultants to assist in preparing PEs for privatization or liquidation and in restructuring PEs retained in state ownership. All recruitment of individual consultants and consulting firms will be carried out competitively using advertising, as appropriate. IDA will prior review all budgets, terms of reference, short lists, selection procedures, letters of invitation, proposals, evaluation reports and contracts. Prior IDA review shall also apply to: (i) single-source selection of consulting firms, (ii) assignments of a critical nature, as reasonably determined by the Association, (iii) amendments to contracts for the employment of consulting firms raising the contract value to $50,000 equivalent or above, or (iv) amendments to contracts for the employment of individual consultants raising the contract value to $25,000 equivalent or above. No IDA prior review will be required for: (i) contracts for the employment of consulting firms estimated to cost less than $50,000 equivalent each or (ii) contracts for the employment of individual consultants estimated to cost less than $25,000 equivalent each. A more detailed breakdown of procurement categories to be financed by IDA, including methods of procurement, is shown in Table 1 below. 21 Table 1. Amounts and Methods of Procurement (US$'000) Procurement Category ICB NIS Other Grand Total 1. Cons./TA/Studies - - 3,251.00 3,251.00 - - (3,251.00) (3,251.00) 2. Training - - 1,698 1,698 - - (1,548) (1,548) 3. Equipment & Vehicles 285.50 160 - 445 (285) (160) - (445) 4. Operating Cost - 36 1,908 1,944 - (36) (1,239) (1,275) Total Project Cost 285 196 6,857 7,338 (285) (196) (6,038) (6,519) IDA Contributions are in brackets Disbursements 53. Disbursements under the credit will be made against 100% of expenditures for consultant services and external (both local and overseas) training, goods, and services (net of taxes and duties). IDA will finance 95% of incremental operating costs except incremental local staff costs which IDA will finance 100% (net of taxes and duties. The Government has provided IDA with documentation indicating that the procurement will be exempt from duties and taxes. The Government will finance 100% of the cost of in- house training of staff, and office facilities and support services for the consultants. Disbursements for training7 and any contract below the equivalent of US$50,000 will be made on the basis of Statement of Expenditures (SOEs), and provisions for advance payment of per diem, travel and fees will be made under the credit. In order to facilitate access to project funds for numerous small payments, a special account equivalent to US$0.8 million8 will be opened at the Banque Nationale de Djibouti. The expected completion date of the project is December 31, 1999, and the credit closing date will be June 30, 2000. A Project Preparation Facility (PPF) of US$400,000 had been provided and all amounts disbursed from this PPF will be become part of the IDA credit when it becomes effective. Accounts and Audits 54. The Ministry of Finance and National Economy (MFNE) will be responsible for ensuring that accounts for all expenditures funded under the credit, are prepared regularly and kept up-to-date by the SMC. The project accounts will be maintained in accordance with sound and internationally recognized accounting principles and practices satisfactory to IDA. The MFNE will provide interim and annual financial statements to reflect the 7Documentation for travel and training overseas must be submitted to IDA for review. sOnly US$0.3 will be advanced until an action plan has been submitted and approved by IDA. 22 financial performance and position of the project. It will also appoint an accountant to ensure that project accounts are properly maintained. The appointment of the accountant was confirmed during negotiations. Project accounts will be audited annually by independent external auditors, including an audit of SOEs. The audit reports of such scope and in such detail as IDA shall reasonably request would be submitted to the Association no later than six months following the end of the Government's fiscal year. The auditor's report will include a statement on the adequacy or otherwise of the accounting system and internal controls, the reliability of statements of expenditures as a basis for loan disbursement, and compliance with financial covenants. Mid-Term Review 55. Given the lack of experience of the Djiboutian administration to implement an IDA project, and considering the lessons learned from a previous simnilar credit (1982), a mid- term review will take place 15 months after implementation commences. Development of Local Capacity 56. In the project design, the Government of Djibouti and IDA paid special attention to elements of capacity building. Considering the scope of the SAP to be implemented, and its urgency, it is understood that capacity building will only be achieved on a modest scale. Nevertheless, a high priority has been given to incorporating, whenever possible, activities that will contribute to enhanced local skills. The SMC, as an institution, will develop its capacity through the experience of project implementation. It will acquire basic project management abilities as well as the knowledge and skills required to implement a SAP. The national counterpart to the SMC coordinator will be targeted for additional training. Special attention will be paid to ensure that short-term experts' contracts contain an element of skill-transfer responsibilities in their Terms of Reference. This will apply to all project components. Schedule I Page I of 4 0, N ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I C S~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~* F- ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ -d 0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0 z~ ~~~~~ 5 -D 0~~~~~~~~~~~ U~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ E~~~~~~~ E (A 0 0 0~~~~~~~~~~~ U---~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~L a-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 00 .- I -: II.~~~~~~~~~~~0 d) CLU2 ( E~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Z ~ ~ c I 2 a,aa-a : c to . CL co- - '( ( C 0Z., *2 0 2'(A ,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ a a - 0 -~~~~~~~~~~~:sC ~~ 2 (A a~~-4.4 (A di di C -(A~~~~~~~~~~~~L DJIBOUTI - PROJET O'AT POUR APPUYER REFORME ECONOMIQUE (PATARE) 10 Task Name Qtr 4 Qtr I Qtr 2 197Ot198Qr Qtr2 1999 3 Qtr 4 I tr I 36 1.2.2.1ltableau bord mensuel I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I i i I I I 73 1.2.2.2 Synth6se tendanceslimpa I IIIIIIIIIII 86 12.2.3 rapport annuel 90 1.2.3 6tudes/propositions I 91 ~~~~~1.2.3.1 idenlification des besoins 92 1.2.3.2 realisation des 6tudes y 93 1.2.3.2.1 finances publiques 107 1.2.3.2.2 gestionlsuivi proj. 115 1.2.3.2.3 autres 6tudes/form. 121 1.2.4 secretariat CPS-PAS E 122 1.2.5 communications 123 1.2.5.1 plan/strat6gie 124 1.2.5.2 niveau politiquejII 128 1.2.5.3 niveau administration II IIIIII III 142 11.2.5.4 niveau soc!6td civileIIIIIII 150 1.2.5.5 coordination bailleurs fond i 164 1.2.6 gestion IIt 165 1.2.6.1 systimeslproc6duresI II 170 1.2.6.2 passation march6s *** *fl l* 111 190 1.2.6.3 planification 3I ~194 1.2.6.4 suivi et contr8leI I IIIIIIII II en Task Summary v v Rolled Up ProgressI Project: DJIBOUTI - PROJET D'AT P 4 Date: 10/23/96 Progress Rolled Up Task Milestone Rolled Up Milestone <~ DJIBOUTI - PROJET D'AT POUR APPUYER REFORME ECONOMIQUE (PATARE) 1997 1998 1999 ID Task Name Qtr4 Qtr 1 Qtr2 Qtr3 Qtr4 Qtr 1 Qtr2 Qtr3 Qtr4 A Qtr 1 Qtr2 Qtr3 Qtr4 Qtr 1 208 1.2.6.5rapportageprogris I I I I I I I _i2 22 1.2.6.6 audits annuels .l 226 ~~~~~1.2.6.7 revue de mi-parcours . ' .V _227 1.3 Reforme EP. __ 228 1.3.1 expertise technique. _.. 229 1 3.1 1 cadre jundique/insttut. 1.3.1.2 assainissement fin. 234 1 3 1 2 4 etude dettes croisces 235 1.3.1.3 amel. gest. portefeuille 239 1.3.1.3.4 etude ordre exp co 240 1.3.1.4 performances des EP__ 241 1.3.1.4.1 analyses financi&re 246 1.3.1.4.2 diagnostic/plan redr 251 = 1.3.1.4.3 suivi plan redresse 256 1.3.1.4.4 etudes budgets pre 260 1.3.1.4.5 audits comptables 264 1.3.1.5 desengagement Etat , _ 277 1.3.2 renforcement suivi reforme 278 1.3.2.1 Formation de l'USREP * * 284 1.3.2.2 formabon comptables EP 285 1.3.2.3 AT (transfert savoir-faire) * et e Task Summary Rolled Up Progress n Project: DJIBOUTI - PROJET D'AT P Date: 10/23/96 Progress Rolled Up Task Milestone Rolled Up Milestone 0 DJIBOUTI - PROJET O'AT POUR APPUYER REFORME ECONOMIQUE (PATARE) _______ I ~~1997 ]1998 I1999 ID Task Name ____ _ Qtr 4 tr Qr2 t3 Qtr 4 Qtri I Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr4 Otri1 Qtr 2 1Otr 3 Qtr 4 Otr 1 2-9 3 1.3.3 communication 2i94 1.4 Appuli I a demobilisationII 295 1.4.1 mise en oeuvreII 2-96 1.4.1 1 recrutement personnel 297 1 4.1.2 formnation gen. personnel 298 ~ ~~ -1-.4.1.3- programme d'orentation 299 ~~~~1 ~41.4 sy~st6me gestion -informatmon 300 1 .4.1.5 proo6d.financi6resI contr6le 301 ~~~~~1.4.1.6 demobilisationII 302 1.4.1.7 informiation/conseil _____________________ i303 ~ 1.4.2 ~suivi de la imise en oeuvreI 30O4 1.4.2.1 audits externes * * ******* ** 31 9 1 .4.3 communicationIIIIIII 327 ~~~1.4.4 evaluation irdepenclante fbe Task Summary v' Rolled Up Progress Project: DJIBOUTI - PROJET O'AT P PrgesRl Date: 10/23/96 PrgesRled Up Task Milestone Rolled Up Milestone0K Schedule 2 Page 1 of 3 REPUBLIC OF DJIBOUTI TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT TO SUPPORT ECONOMIC REFORM TRAINING PLAN 1. The need for more general management and implementation skills as well as technical skills is well recognized in Djibouti. The project will help address these shortfalls through the provision of technical expertise that will be involved in all four project components. The Terms of Reference for each technical expert will specify the requirement to transfer skills, and to provide short courses, if appropriate during the course of their assignment. Such skill-transfer and training should help create awareness, modify perceptions and, hopefully, change behaviors. The training's main objective will be to initiate professional staff to techniques and tools related specifically to the functions they have to perform in the context of Djibouti's economic reform program. Although specific topics for training have been identified in the description of each project component, general management, finance and accounting, procurement and computing skills will also be included. It is foreseen that, generally, the training will take place in Djibouti or on the African continent, except for Bank-, EDI- or IMF-related training which will be provided to a few, selected individuals. 2. The training of the national counterpart who will head the SMC in approximately a year will merit special attention. A specific training plan, to be submitted to IDA prior to credit effectiveness by the macroeconomic adviser, will include targets for monitoring and assessing progress towards transferring responsibilities to the national counterpart. Sources of training 3. For the SAP Monitoring Component, trainees will come from the thirteen ministries and agencies composing the SAP-ISC. The SMC coordinator, in collaboration with a liaison officer in each ministry, will be responsible for identifying potential candidates. 4. Regarding the Institutional Reform Component, the training is divided in two stages reflecting the component's activities. For the first stage, two groups of trainees will be identified: (i) the future leaders of the reform will come mainly from those ministries to be involved heavily in the future institutional reform but will also include representatives from the private sector and civil society; they will be mainly senior managers who can advance the reform process. It is envisaged that they will be selected from the Ministry of Public Service and Institutional Reform, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Labor, the President's and Prime Minister's Offices, and, possibly, the INAP, the Chamber of Commerce and civil society; and, (ii) other public servants, to receive on-the-job training to conduct the surveys required by the IA will come from the thirteen ministries forming the SAP-ISC. The second stage of the component will be determined by the outcome of the IA. Therefore, it is difficult to be specific about the training activities which will emerge. Some elements have been provided in the component's description but they remain to be confirmed. Trainees will probably come from the main ministries to be involved in the reform but are likely to also involve the private sector and local leaders. Given Schedule 2 Page 2 of 3 that the INAP is the only institution with the mandate to train public servants in all areas of public administration, some training interventions would aim to strengthen it. 5. Apropos of the PE Reform and Privatization Component, trainees will come firstly from the PEMU and the technical ministries overseeing the public enterprises. In addition, it is foreseen that staff from the public enterprises themselves could benefit from the training, e.g., the accountants to be trained to use the 1982 accounting plan, which is to be standardized for all PEs. 6. The Armed Forces Demobilization Component will include training of the administrative staff of the Demobilization Unit. It has not yet been decided from whence the staff will be selected, although some of the present public servants who are already part of the Demobilization Technical Unit would benefit from the training. Additional staff, hired locally, will be trained to manage the demobilization program. Training Mode 7. Training will be provided locally and regionally. Depending on the project component concerned, it could be on-the-job training, or if a greater number of participants is involved, it will take the form of seminars and workshops. Two other types of interventions are envisaged--study tours and a twinning arrangement. The study tours in other African countries would be associated with three of the components: SAP monitoring, PE Reform and Privatization, and Armed Forces Demobilization. The twinning arrangement would be initiated in the second phase of the Institutional Reform component, i.e., if an action plan for institutional reform is approved. It would seek to reinforce the capacity of the INAP as a only local institution mandated to provide training for the entire Djiboutian administration. INAP was paired with ENAP (Canada) and this limited twinning arrangement, funded by Canada, appears to have been successful. The twinning arrangement under the IDA credit would aim to transfer managerial, financial and technical skills and systems. INAP would continue to benefit from concrete examples and practical applications of the principles and procedures that it wants to put into effect in its own operations by being twinned with a relevant international institution. Responsibilities 8. The SMC will be responsible for all project implementation, including the training elements. It is intended that a training needs-assessment will be conducted by a local consultant or the INAP to confirm areas identified by the authorities during project preparation. Training will be provided mainly in the context of short-term technical assistance. The experts visiting Djibouti will be responsible for designing and delivering the training activities related to their specialties. Whenever possible, the INAP will be used to provide training in areas where it has already developed some competence. 9. A more systematic training approach will be followed for the PEMU. An international expert-trainer will be hired to visit Djibouti periodically and mandated specifically to strengthen the capacity of the PEMU. He will assure that the PEMU staff acquire management and monitoring skills in all areas related to PE reform and privatization and the management of enterprises. Initially he will use the training plan developed during project preparation, then adapt it to the current situation, visiting Djibouti periodically to provide coaching-and-guidance Schedule 2 Page 3 of 3 services. The PEMU staff, in collaboration with the expert, will prepare a work plan to implement between the expert's periodic visits. In subsequent visits the expert will help resolve any problem faced by the PEMU. 10. The project's Gantt chart presented in Schedule 1 gives an overview of all the activities that will require technical assistance and which thus will contain training elements. However, there is a clear requirement for flexibility and the adaptation of training to changing conditions as the project progresses. 11. Considering the scope of the task the Djiboutians have embarked upon with the implementation of the SAP, and in light of their currently limited capacity, it is fair to have limited expectations. Nonetheless, it is envisaged that the training opportunities will provide some of the skills and knowledge needed by Djiboutian public servants to operate in this new environment such as setting objectives, planning strategically and developing performance measures. Djiboutian managers will have acquired budgeting and monitoring techniques and other areas of expertise related to economic reform. Schedule 3 Page 1 of 2 DJIBOUTI TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT ECONOMIC REFORM PROJECT Detailed Project Costs (US$ '000) Description 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) Monitoring Component Consultants, Technical Assistance & Studies: Budget Rationalization - 50.04 25.02 - 75.05 Collection of Statistical Data - 29.73 14.87 - 44.60 Commercial Bank Audits - - 184.91 - 184.91 Communication Strategy/Coms. Spec. - 27.80 27.80 27.80 83.39 Credit Policy & Dev. Financing - 14.18 - - 14.18 Elaboration of Balance of Payments - 29.73 14.87 - 44.60 Mid Term Review - CAPAS - - 38.07 - 38.07 Pay & Benefit Systems - 14.18 - - 14.18 Procurement of Public Goods - 14.18 - - 14.18 Procurement Techniques - 29.73 14.87 - 44.60 Project Mgt. & Monitoring - 21.03 10.51 - 31.54 Public Finance Control - 14.18 - - 14.18 Public Finance Structure - 14.18 - - 14.18 SAP Elaboration, Monitoring & Coord. - 14.14 - - 14.14 SAP Macroeconomic Expert - 110.40 110.40 55.20 276.00 Training Needs Assessment - 7.09 - - 7.09 Training, Study Tours and Workshops: Budget & Acctg. for Treasury - 11.18 22.35 - 33.53 Change Mgt. & Seminars for Decision Makers - 127.43 86.45 86.45 300.34 Limited Overseas Seminars - 9.04 78.91 166.76 254.71 Seeminars on Structural Adj. - 25.42 16.85 15.61 57.88 World Bank Proc. & Disb. - 1.24 1.24 - 2.48 Office Equipment & Vehicles 70.42 85.87 2.47 1.24 160.00 Operating Cost 90.40 180.80 180.80 180.80 632.80 Sub-total 160.82 831.57 830.39 533.86 2,356.64 Public Enterprise (PE) Reform & Privatization Program Consultants, Technical Assistance & Studies: Divestiture - 60.00 - - 60.00 Financial Adjustment - BDD - 30.00 20.00 - 50.00 Financial Adjustment - CNR - 40.00 - - 40.00 Financial Adjustment - CPS - 40.00 - - 40.00 Financial Adjustment - Djibouti Airport - 30.00 20.00 20.00 70.00 Financial Adjustment - Electricite de Djibouti - 40.00 20.00 - 60.00 Financial Adjustment - EPH - 20.00 20.00 20.00 60.00 Financial Adjustment - IN - 20.00 - - 20.00 Financial Adjustment - ONAC - 20.00 - - 20.00 Financial Adjustment - ONED - 20.00 20.00 20.00 60.00 Financial Adjustment - Pharm. de - 15.00 - - 15.00 l'Independance Schedule 3 Page 2 of 2 Description 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total Financial Adjustment - Postes et Telecoms - 40.00 20.00 20.00 80.00 Financial Adjustment - SID - 40.00 - - 40.00 Financial Adjustment - SMI - 40.00 - - 40.00 Financial Adjustment -STID - 20.00 20.00 20.00 60.00 Financial Adjustnent TA - 30.00 - - 30.00 Institutional & Legal Reform - 110.00 15.00 - 125.00 PE Performance Improvement - 297.40 198.80 58.80 555.00 PE Portfolio Mgt. - 90.00 - - 90.00 Training for Institutional Development 20.00 65.00 65.00 - 150.00 Office Equipment 70.00 - - - 70.00 Operating Cost 76.93 153.86 153.86 153.86 538.50 Sub-total 166.93 1,221.26 572.66 312.66 2,273.50 Support for Institutional Reform Consultants, Technical Assistance & Studies: IA and Service Delivery Survey - 90.00 - - 90.00 Mgt. Information Systems - 10.00 90.00 - 100.00 Review of Public Adm. Structure - - 224.44 - 224.44 Studies for other Ministries (Justice, Labor, etc.) - 50.63 210.63 - 261.25 Training, Study Tours and Workshops: Change Mgt. Training - 52 156 - 208.00 Other Training & TA - - 18 - 18.00 Review of Public Adm. Structure - 48.75 101.25 - 150.00 Training & Capacity Bldg. - 81.61 313.21 103.36 498.19 Office Equipment - 116.13 - - 116.13 Sub-total - 449.11 1,113.53 103.36 1,666.00 Support to the Armed Forces Demobilization Program Consultants, Technical Assistance & Studies: Design of Financial Procedures - 15.00 - - 15.00 Design/Impl. of MIS - 12.00 - - 12.00 Design/lmpl. of the PDO - 38.00 - - 38.00 Evaluation - - - 24.00 24.00 External Audits - 16.80 19.60 19.60 56.00 Training & Capacity Bldg./Demobilization - 24.90 - - 24.90 Office Equipment 10.70 40.36 - - 51.06 Vehicles - 48.00 - - 48.00 Operating Cost 38.96 244.72 244.72 244.72 773.11 Sub-total 49.66 439.78 264.32 288.32 1,042.07 GRAND TOTAL 377.41 2,941.72 2,780.89 1,238.19 7,338.22 Structure globale des travaux du projet |Cellule d'appui |au PAS Reforme du cadre Secretariat Reforme des Appui a la demo- institutionnel suivi-Analy | entreprises bilisation, | 100 PAS |200 publiques 300 400 Diagnostique Cadre de suivi Expertise Mise en oeuvre _ IEA - _ et donn6es techniqu 110 |210 310 410 Plan d'action Analyse Renforcement Suivi de la - Tendan institutionnel mise en 120 Impact 220 320 oeuvre 420 Appui r6 formes Ltudes/ Propo- Commu nica- Communica- H4oo u130 sitions - tions 33043 1230 F - Communica- Secretariat tions , CPS-PAS e 140 Liaisons 240 Communica- -tions 250 Gestion 0 rt 260 em -4 I PROJET D'ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE POUR APPUYER LA REFORME ECONOMIQUE Sommaire Indicateurs objectivement verifiables Moyens de verification Suppositions critiques Objectif du gouvernement: Mettre en oeuvre des reformes -Taux de croissance reel du PIB de 3% Rapports du FMI Volonte du gouvernement de prendre les economiques au cours de la periode 1996- I'an A compter de 1997. decisions difficles et de mettre en oeuvre 2000 visant a creer un environnement Rapports de la CAPAS les reformes requises. macro-economique stable permettant le - Le deficit des comptes exterieurs (hors retour de la croissance economique et de dons) passe de 17.9% du PIB en 1995 A La formation brute de capital fixe passe 1'emploi, I'quilibre des comptes 12.5% en 2000. de 12% du PIB en 1995 A 16% en 2000 exterieurs ainsi que le soulagement de la (Reprise des investis-sements des grandes pauvrete. -En l'an 2000, les reserves exterieures de entreprises publiques (electricite, eau, Djibouti correspondent A une couverture port, aeroport et telecom.) et reprise des des besoins equivalant a 5.7 mois (4.8 investis-sements prives en telecom, mois en 1995), sans arrieres interieurs ou banques et assurances. exterieurs. Elimination des arrieres et dettes croisees - Maintien du taux d'inflation A 3% entre fin 1996. 1996-1999. L'epargne nationale brute passe de 4% du -Reduction du deficit fiscal (hors dons) de PIB en 1995 A 10% en 2000. 13.4% du PIB A 1.1 % en 1999. Reforme des politiques, pratiques et -Maintien de la politique monetaire. performance fiscales. Reforme des entreprises publiques men6e A terme. Demobilisation de 9000militaires avant la mi- 1998. Reforme de l'administration publique et reduction de la masse salariale (hors militaires) D et' o - PROJET D'ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE POUR APPUYER LA REFORME ECONOMIQUE Sommaire Indicateurs objectivement verifiables Moyens de verification Suppositions critiques But du projet Appuyer la prise de decision par le -Suivi de performance, analyses d'impact Rapport de mission du - Reunions mensuelles (au moins) du gouvernement en ce qui touche Ics et de tendances. Task manager Comite de Pilotage du PAS. reformcs macro-economiques et le cadre -Analyse et propositions de reformes et de Rapport du FMI des politiques et programme qui les sous- politiques. Rapports de la CAPAS -La CAPAS est dotee du personnel tendent en faisant un suivi rapproche de -Conception et mise en oeuvre d'une (suivi de reformes et de la minimum identifie a l'organigramme de la I'evolution des reformes et en mobilisant strategie de communications et de demobilisation) cellule dans le plan de gestion du projet Ics ressources et l'expertise necessaires sensibilisation pour faciliter les reformes. d'appui sous financement de la Banque pour aider a formuler des politiques et Mondiale. reformes appropriees. -Peu ou pas de rotation du personnel de la Extrants CAPAS au cours de ia periode 1996- -Plan d'action 1999. Plan d'action et strategie de reforme -Etudes et plans d'actions institutionnelle (ST-100) complementaires -Recrutement d'cxpertise ponctuelle nationale et internationale de qualite. -Secretariat du comite de pilotag-Tableau Suivi, analyse et propositions de reformes de bord et propositions de politiques. -Coordonnateur de la CAPAS exerce un et de politiques economiques (ST-200) r6le de direction au sein de la cellule et assure que les ressources de la cellule ont Propositions de reformes des entreprises -Audits un programme de travail et le realise. publiques (ST-300) -Plan de redressement -Modific.du cadre 1egal/institutionnel -Collaboration efficace avec les Appui a la demobilisation (ST-400) -Support logistique et administratif differentes organisations susceptibles de fournir l'information. Intrants -Au besoin, saisie et resolution de tout problemes de collaboration avec ces organisation par le CPS-PAS. Ressources humaines, equipement et financires Voir budget -Capacite a trouver et mobiliser de 1'expertise qualifiee et disponible en temps voulu. t Co _ m Composante Appui i la reforme institutionnelle Description Impact (Indicateurs Moyens de verification Hypotheses critiques (risques) objectivement verifiables) But du Gouvernement: -Une reduction du deficit de 1.8 % -Criteres de performance du FMI. -Volonte du gouvemement de A moyen-terme, atteindre une du PIB en 1998. -Rapports de mission du FMI. prendre des decisions difficiles reduction permanente de la masse -Controle du personnel complete -Rapports de mission de suivi de afin de mettre en oeuvre le plan salariale en menant une r6forme avant octobre 1996 et stabilisation la Banque mondiale. d'action decoulant du DEI. de la fonction publique afin d'en A 10,032 personnes (excluant les -Rapports du comite de pilotage -Efforts d'ajustement structurel arriver A une fonction publique anciens combattants). du PAS. continuent. proportionnee aux besoins, motive -Plan d'action approuve avant le -Rapport d'enquete sur et efficcace. 30 aout 1997 pour une r6forme 1'enumeration des fonctionnaires. administrative. -Plan d'action endosse officiellement par le GDD. Objectifs du projet: Aider le gouvemement a identifier -Propositions de "rationalisation" -Rapport de l'atelier final du DCI. -Receptivite des autorites au sa strategie pour reduire le cout de des salaires et benefices -Rapport de la Commission processus et aux resultats. la masse salariale dans les completee pendant le ler trimestre nationale au Comite de pilotage. -Volonte de changement. depenses publiques ainsi que pour apres la mise en vigueur du projet -Rapport de propositions faites au -Ouverture A la critique. rationaliser l'organisation et le (janv.-mars 1997). gouvernement concemant les fonctionnement de -Plan d'action formule par la salaires et benefices. I'administration publique en Commission nationale de la fonction de priorites A definir et de reforme finalise en juin 1997. contraintes a preciser. -Moyennant l'approbation du plan d'action, mise en oeuvre de certaines recommandations A _partir de septembre 1997. Resultats: -Diagnostic du cadre institutionnel -Atelier sur les resultats du DEI en -Enquete sur tous les benefices -Volonte des autorites de mener le (DCI) (incluant les enquetes de mai 1997. re,us par tout le personnel couvert DCI. prestations de services et de -Stage a 1'ENAP complete avec par le budget. -Participation active des gouvemance). succes, i.e., les hauts- -Rapports d'etudes diverses ministeres et de la societe civile. -Hauts-fonctionnaires formes pour fonctionnairesjouent un r6le menees par des conseillers. -Bonne coordination assuree par s mener la reforme institutionnelle. actifs dans cette composante du la CAPAS. -Revue de la politique salariale de projet complete le 30 juin 1997. Description Impact (Indicateurs Moyens de verification Hypotheses critiques (risques) objectivement verifiables) la fonction publique. -Comite de coordination et -Etude sur les benefices des commission nationale formes et fonctionnaires. operationnels dticijanvier 1997. -Autres etudes et formation reliees -Contenu des enquetes planifie au plan d'action d6fini lors du pour le debut de 1997. DCI. -Renforcement de l'INAP possible. Intrants': Voir budget -Recrutement de conseillers -Accord de projet signe. competents. -Expertise ponctuelle (inclut -Contrats de conseillers signes. -personnel identifie pour communication) -Passation des marches. participer a l'exercice. -Formation -Rapports annuels d'audit. -bonne strategie de -Equipement -Rapports trimestriels communication. -Fonctionnement d'avancement du projet. x5 rt ~r-t Inclut le DEI, formation A Quebec et une somme non allouee qui sera disponible seulement si le plan d'action est approuve par le GDD (voir budget provisoire de la oC composante) .t 4.2.1 Cadre logique ST-200: Secretariat, Suivi et Analyse du PAS (CAPAS) Sommaire Indicateurs Objective-ment Moyens de Suppositions critiques Vefifiables verification Objectif du gouvernement: Mettre en oeuvre des reformes -Taux de croissance reel du PIB de 3% Rapports du FMI Volonte du gouvernement de prendre tes decisions difticles et de economiques au cours de la periode I'an a compter de 1997. mettre en oeuvre les reformes requises 1996-2000 visant a creer un Rapports du CAPAS environnement macro-economique stable - Le deficit des comptes exterieurs (hors La formation brute de capital fixe passe de 102% du PIB en 1995 permettant le retour de la croissance dons) passe de 17.9% du PIB en 1995 a a 16% en 2000 (Reprise des investis-sements des -randes economique et de 1'emploi, 1'equilibre des 12.5% en 2000. entreprises publiques (electricite, eau. port, aeroport et telecom ) comptes exterieurs ainsi que le et reprise des investis-sements prives en telecom. banques et soulagement de la pauvrete -En I'an 2000, les reserves exterieures de assurances. Djibouti correspondent a une couverture des besoins equivalant a 5.7 mois (4 8 Elimination des arrieres ct dettes croisees fin 1996. n,ots en 1995), sans arrieres interieUis OLI exterieurs. L'eparone nationale brute passe de 4% do i'lB eni 1995 a 100o eii 2000 - Maintien du taux d'inflation a 3 .U entre 1996-1999. Reforme des politiques, pratiques et performance fiscales. -Reduction du deficit fiscal (hors dons) Reforme des entreprises publiques menee a terme dc 13 4%,'o du PI3 a I 1% en 1999 Demobilisation de 9000militaires avant la mi-199S -Maintien de la politique monetaire. Reforme de lIadinifistration publique ct reduction de la Imease salariale (hors miliiaires) _rt 0 Sonimaire Indicateurs Objective-menit Moyens de Suppositions critiques Velifiables verification But du projet Appuver la prise de dceision par le -Tableau de bord (indicateurs de suivi CopiC des documenits - Reunions mensuelles (au moins) do Comite de Pilotage du PAS. gouvernement en ce qui touche les rapproche l'evolution de l'economie et produits par la reformes macro-cconomiques et le cadre des rformies) mensuel fourni aux CAPAS -L-a CAPAS est dotee du personnel minimum identitie a des politiques et programme qui les sous- memilbres do CPS-PAS et aux aLitiCs 'organigeamme de la cellule dans le plan de gestion du projer tendent en faisant on soivi rapproche de intervenants. Rapports paiodiqUes d'appui sous financement de la B[anque Mondiale. I'evolution des refonnes et en mobilisan: -Analyse trimestrielle (et de soivi du "Task les ressources et 1'expertise necessaires recommandations le cas echeant) de manager" de la Banqoc -Peu ou pas de rotation du personnel de la CAI'AS aL cours de la pour aider a toninuler des politiques et I'evolution de l'cconomie et des retormes Mondiale. periodc 1996-1999. reforines approprices. par rapport aux objectifs de la politique a moven terme ( I 996-2000) do Rapport trimilestriels -Recruterment d'expertise ponctuelle nationale et internatnonale de goovernement fourni aux membrbes do d'avancement des qualite. CPS-PAS et aux autres intervenants. travaux de la C'AI'AS -Analyses ponctoelles sur l'impact de soumis a la Banque -Coordonnateur de la CAPAS exerce un role de direction an scin refonmes specifiques et propositions de Mondiale par lc de la cellule et assure que les ressources de la cellule orit un decisions. coordonateur de la programme de travail et le realise. - Propositions de reformes de politiques CAPAS. et programmes ainsi que de decisions specifiques a prendre dans ce cadre foumies aux membres du CPS-PAS (e.g. reformes entreprises. clainie recettes et depenses etc). -Mise en eouvre d'un plan de communications et sensibilisation pour faciliter 'identification, 'adoption et la mise e*n ocuvre des chan-enents. Extranits: - Modeles proposes (contenu, format ct Cadre de suivi et collecte des donnees periodicitc: mensuelle. trimestrielle et Rapports pcriodiques Approbation du cadre de suivi par le CPS-PAS. p> (ST-210) annuelle) par la CAI'AS poor de la CAPAS. approbation par le comite de pilotage finn Conceptioti du cadre de soivi des octobre 1996. ocX reformnes (S 1-21 11 ) Sommaire Indicateurs Objective-ment Moyens de Suppositions critiques Wfifiables verification Collecte et traitement des indicateurs de -Identification, collecte et traitement Rapport de mission du -Statisticien ou economiste mis a la disposition de la CAPAS ou suivi (ST-212) statistique et informatique des donnees "Task manager" de la recrute par cetne derniere. conformement au cadre de suivi Banque Mondiale. developpe en ST-21 1. -Collaboration efficace avec les differentes organisations susceptibles de foiurniir l'infornnlation. -Au besoin, saisie et resolution de tout problemes de collaboration avec ces organisation par le CPS-PAS. Analyse/synthese (ST-220) Tableau de bord mensuel (ST-221) -Tableau de bord mensuel de l'economie, Rapports de la -Disponibilite des donnees requises (ST-212) produit le 20 du mois et couvrant le mois CAPAS precedent. Note synthese (ST-222) - Note produite 45 jours apresla fin du trimestre (voir ST-21 1). Rapport annuel (ST-223) - Rapport sur l'evolution des reformes produit 60 joursapres la fin de l'ann6e fiscale (voir ST-21 1). Etudes et recomandations (ST-230) Compte-rendudes Identification des besoins d'etudes et -Propositions formulees au CPS-PAS par reunions du CPS-PAS -Propositions acceptees par le CAPAS d'analyse complementairesen fonction de la CAPAS ou directement par le CPS- 1'evolution des differentes reforrnes et des PAS. recommandations decoulant de l'analyse de l'environnement institutionnel(ST- -Preparation des termesde reference par 231) la CAPAS ou en collaborationavec elle. -Documentations et -Approbation des TDR par le president dossiers internes du Realisation des etudes et analyses (ST- du CPS-PAS et, le cas echeant, la Banque CAPAS > 232) Mondiale selon les proceduresen vigueur. -Approbation par le president du CPS-PAS n -Non objection de la Banque Mondiale Sommaire Indicateurs Objective-ment Moyens de Suppositions critiques Vefiflables verification -Mobilisation de lexpertise par la -Contrats -Capacite a trouver et mobiliser de lexpertise qualifiee et CAPAS. disponible en temps voulu. -Realisation du/des mandat(s) par le ou les experts(s). -Suivi et reception de l'etudc par la CAPAS en collaboration avec les autres organismes impliques le cas echeant. Exploitation de etudes et analyses (ST- -Le cas echeant, dissemination de l'etude -Volonte des membres du CPS-PAS de disseminer 233) par la CAPAS aux intervenants clefs. l'infon-nation. -Preparation (ou coordination de la preparation) des recommandations et de -Cooperation des autres intervenants decision de mise ne oeuvre par la CAPAS pour le CPS-PAS. Le cas echeant, appui a la mise en oeuvre des recommandations. Le suivi par la CAPAS de la mise en oeuvre est inclu dans l'extrant de niveau ST-220. Secretariat du CPS-PAS (ST-240) -Convocations et ordres du jour des Rapports de la reunions dont un des items permanents CAPAS -Volonte des membres du CPS-PAS a se reunir sera le suivi des decisions/recommandations anterieures Rapport de suivi du du comite. "Task manager` de la -Fourniture de la documentation requise Banque Mondiale aux membres du comite. -Compte-rendus des reunions du comite prepares et achemnines aux membres et > Ort autres intervenants interesses DQ r or ..- - Sommaire Indicateurs Objective-ment Moyens de Suppositions critiques Vefifiables verification Communications/liaisons (ST-250) Strat6gie/plan de communuication (ST- -Preparation par la CAPAS (assit&c Rapports pcriodiques -Adoption de la strategie par le CPS-PAS 251) d'expertise ponctuelle internationale) et de la CAPAS adoption par le CPS-PAS d'une strategie et d'un plan de communication pour faciliter l'identificationet la mise en oeuvre des reformes avant la fin dec. 1996. Communications aux "politiques" (ST- -Seminaires, publications, presentations, -Possibilite de recruter un conseiller local competent 252) formations aux membres du cabinet, de -Maintien de la volonte politique d'ouverture et de transparence I'assemblee nationale ou du cabinet presidentiel pour faciliter l'identification de resistances aux changements et la diminution de ces resistances. -Seminaires, publications, presentations. Idem Communications au sein du MFEN formations au personnel de la CAPAS. (ST-253) des autres services du MFEN pour faciliter l'identification de resistances aux changements et la diminution de ces resistances. Seminaires, publications, presentations, Idem Communications avec les autres formations au personnel des autres ministeres (ST-254) ministeres pour faciliter lidentification de resistances aux changetnents et la diminution de ces resistances. Ort o00 '5 o0 Sommaire Indicateurs Objective-ment Moyens de Suppositions critiques Vefifiables verification Communications avec les intervenants -Seminaires, publications, presentations, Idem de la societe civile (ST-255) formations aux diverses composantes de la societe civile (secteur prive, entreprises publiques, groupes constitues, population etc) pour faciliter l'identification de resistances aux changements et la diminution de ces Liaison/coordination avec les resistances. bailleursde fonds (ST-256) Idem -Dissemination des tableaux de bord mensuels, analyse trimestrielle de conjoncture et rapport annuel. Idem -Coordination avec les differents bailleurs de fonds pour assurer qu'il n'y a pas de dedoublement des efforts quant aux etudes et analyses envisagees (discussion des TDR). -Perception des bailleurs de fonds quant A l'evolution des reformes. Intrants: Rapports annuels Personnel: d'audit Expertise ponctuelle: Mission de Equipement: supervision de la Fonctionnement: . Banque Mondiale Divers: Voir budget Accord de credit Total: (voir le budget pour details) Plan de mise en oeuvre du projet CAPAS, Djibouti, ebauche no 2, 30 juin 1996 Page 35 Hrt Appui au suivi de la reforme des entreprises publiques Impact (Indicateurs de succes) Moyens de verification Hypothese critiques (risques) But du Gouvernement: -Les dettes croisees accumulees entre le -Budget de l'Etat. -Opposition politique aux changements Rationaliser le secteur parapublic et gouve-nement et les entreprisesjusqu'au -Decrets d'application. de la loi 91. ameliorer la contribution des EP au 3 1/12/95 auront ete apurees d'ici le -Contrat-plans signes. -Opposition des dirigeants des EP au developpement economique par des 31/12/98. -Decrets politiques. changement de statu juridique. reformes qui leur permettront de realiser -Aucune nouvelle dette croisee (de plus -Bilans financiers des entreprises -Impossibilite pour le gouvernement de des performances techniques et de 3 mois) ne sera permise entre le publiques. regler ses dettes envers les entreprises financieres satisfaisantes et desengager gouvemement et les entreprise -Decrets de reorganisation. publiques et celle-ci entre elles. I'Etat d'activites qui seront mieux gerees publiques et entre les entreprises -Decrets promulgues Manque de ressources financieres pour par le secteur prive. publiques a partir de 1/1/99. -Rapports annuels de contr6le. regler ce problme. -Le cadre institutionnel etjuridique des -Contrats de privatisation ou de -non-approbation des entreprises publiques aura ete modifie liquidation signes. recommandations des rapports selon les decisions prises par le -Loi modifiee promulguee. d'experts. gouvernement, base sur les -Statuts des entreprises publiques. -Manque de volonte politique pour recommandations d'un expert -Liste reclassifiant les entreprises effectuer les changements -Les decisions sur le changement de publiques. instituitionnels. statut des entreprises publiques seront prises au 31/3/97, base sur les audits et les etudes juridiques. -Approbation et choix de strategie de redressement et de gestions de entreprises publiques -Une serie d'indicateurs de performance adoptees par le gouvernement et chaque entreprise publique conformrment aux diagnostics et plans de developpement. Objectifs du projet: -Rapports d'experts. -Comite de pilotage joue le r6le Supporter la prise de decision du -Qualite et "timeliness" des -Seminaires de sensibilisation. critique de diriger la CAPAS. gouvernement en ce qui a trait A la recommandations fournies au Comite de -Preparation de recommandations -Pas de changement des membres de reforme des entreprises publiques par la pilotage. par la CAPAS pour le Comite de l'USREP pour la duree du projet. fourniture d'expertise technique, appui A -Sensibilisation des divers parties pilotage. -Les rapports des experts sont d'une la communication et un appui restreint impliquees dans la prise de decision: -Rapports d'avancement du projet. qualite permettant au gouvernement au renforcement des capacites de l'Unite autorites gouvernementales, le -Aide-memoire des missions de d'avoir confiance de prendre ses G de suivi de la r6forme (USREP). personnel des entreprises publiques, le supervision de la Banque. decisions. secteur prive et les consommateurs. -Rapport de revue de mi-parcours _ 0 : Impact (Indicateurs de succes) Moyens de verification Hypothese critiques (risques) (mid-term review). Resultats: -Rapports techniques et d'audits -La CAPAS ne suit pas d'assez pres la Expertise technique: compltes. reforme des entreprises publiques. Reforme cadre juridique des EP -Proposition de reformes de la loi 91 -Rapports de la CAPAS au comite -L'assistance technique specialis6e -Identification et formulation de completees et transmise au comite de de pilotage. n'est pas fournie dans les delais prevus. reforme du cadre juridique et pilotage par le CAPAS avant le 31 -Proces-verbaux des reunions du -mauvaise selection de l'assistance institutionnel. decembre 1996. comite de pilotage. technique. Dettes croisees -Proposition pour la reforme des statuts -Rapports mensuels d'activites de -manque de coordination USREP et --Analyse des dettes croisees/plan de des EP completee et transmise au I'USREP. ministeres techniques. reglement. comite de pilotage par la CAPAS avant -Rapports annuels des resultats -opposition des dirigeants ou du Amelioration de la gestion du la fin de mars 1997. (quantifies) de la reforme. personnel des EP aux plans de portefeuille -Recommandations par la CAPAS sur le redressement et aux objectifs de -Systeme d'information fiable a jour rapport des dettes croisees transmises au performance. grace a une base de donnees fiables sur comite de pilotage avant le 31/07/96. les EP alimentee par des donnees -Recommandations de la CAPAS au presentees avec I'application d'un plan comite de pilotage concemant comptable uniformise (1982). I'application generalisee du plan Amdlioration des performances des EP comptable de 1982 d'ici dec. 1997. -Audits financiers et comptables de -Suivi de la presentation des etats chaque entreprise publique et comptables dans les delais 1egaux par identification d'objectifs de performance notification du non-respect d'ici dec. et mesures pour les atteindre. 1997. Desengagement de l'Etat -Recommandations au comite de -Identification et appui au programme pilotage concernant la normalisation des de desengagement. procedures budgetaires dans les EP et instauration de contr6le de gestion d'ici dec. 1997. -Quatre cadres ayant requ une formation de courte duree au droit des societes, -Developpement des capacites de methodologie de la reforme des lI'USREP: entreprises publiques, contr6le de -Formations specialisees pour les cadres gestion et base de donnees, contrats- > de l'Unite et des ministeres et plans des EP, techniques d'evaluation et entreprises publiques. privatisation. - a. -Voyage d'etude. -Comptables des EP formes au plan w__ 0 r-. Impact (Indicateurs de succes) Moyens de verification Hypothese critiques (risques) -Appui general A lUnite comptable de 1982, -Cadres ayant re,u de l'assistance -L'Unite conservera 4 cadres qualifies technique d'appoint (preparation de pendant toute la duree du projet. TDR des etudes, controle des -L'expertise technique aura aussi une consultants extemes, exploitation des expertise pedagogique. rapports, etc (Juil.96-Mai 97). -Rapports d'evaluation de la -Instances gouvemementales mieux formation re,ue. informees et pretes A collaborer A la -Rapports des cadres sur le voyage reforme. d'etudes en Afrique. -Public infornm du programme de -Rapports de l'expert relativement a reforrnes du gouvemement. ses missions d'appui general. -Rapports periodiques de l'USREP. -Brochures. Seminaires. Bulletins Communication: periodiques d'information. -Publications sur la reforme des Couverture mediatique et annonce entreprises publiques. de desengagement ou changements -Communications intra- importants dans le secteur des gouvernementales et extra- entreprises publiques gouvemementales. Intrants: -L'USREP sera equipee de moyens -Consultants -Contrats de consultants. materiels pour fonctionner -Formation (USREP et autres -Rapports de formation. efficacement et ils lui seront beneficiaires) Voir budget detaille du projet -Publications et seminaires exclusivement alloues. -Equipement -Bons de commande et autres preuves d'achat. Po rt ro o ! Demobilisation des anciens combattants Description Impact (Indicateurs Moyens de verification Hypotheses critiques (risques) objectivement verifiables) But du Gouvernement: Reduire -Une reduction du deficit de 1.8 % -Crit&res de performance du FMI. -Financement disponibles des en permanence la masse salariale du PIB en 1998. -Rapports de mission du FMI. bailleurs de fonds. et de ce fait degager des -Demobilisation de 9086 soldats -Audits du Programme de -Sans assistance des bailleurs de ressources A affecter aux secteur pour la fin de 1998. demobilisation. fonds, le Gouvernement allouera sociaux prioritaires. -Rapports de mission de suivi de les fonds necessaires du budget la Banque mondiale. pour effectuer lui-meme a un -Rapports periodiques du PDAC A rythme plus lent la la CAPAS. demobilisation. Les moyens mis a la disposition du bureau du PDAC sont utilises pour demobiliser les 9086 soldats. Objectif du Projet: Foumir les -Bureau de la demobilisation -Audits a tous les deux mois des -Programme de demobilisation outils et I'appui administratif etabli avec des procedures fonds d6penses par le programme. des anciens combattants (PDAC) necessaire pour que le financieres bien detaill6es. -Rapports de mission de suivi de decrit en detail dans un document Gouvernement demobilise les -Programme d'orientation des I'IDA. et acceptable a l'IDA. Entre forces armees avec ou sans l'aide anciens combattants mis en -Rapports periodiques du PDAC a autres, ce document decrira les des bailleurs de fonds. oeuvre. la CAPAS. objectifs et les cibles du -Systeme de gestion de -Rapport de levaluation programme ainsi que les moyens l'information permettant de tracer independante. d'y parvenir et confirmera le les mouvements des anciens nombre de soldats A d6mobiliser combattants demobilises. ainsi que leur prime de depart. -Procedures detaillees dans le PDAC seront transparentes et efficaces et gen6reront la participation des bailleurs de fonds. -Le Gouvemement est engage A mettre en oeuvre le PDAC de fa,on efficace et transparente avec ou sans aide exterieure. t PQ rr o . Impact (Indicateurs de succes) Moyens de verification Hypothese critiques (risques) -Appui general A l'Unite comptable de 1982, -Cadres ayant recu de l'assistance -L'Unite conservera 4 cadres qualifies technique d'appoint (preparation de pendant toute la duree du projet. TDR des etudes, contr6le des -L'expertise technique aura aussi une consultants extemes, exploitation des expertise pedagogique. rapports, etc (Juil.96-Mai 97). -Rapports d'evaluation de la -Instances gouvernementales mieux formation recue. informees et pretes A collaborer A la -Rapports des cadres sur le voyage reforme. d'etudes en Afrique. -Public informe du programme de -Rapports de l'expert relativement A reformes du gouvernement. ses missions d'appui general. -Rapports periodiques de l'USREP. -Brochures. Seminaires. Bulletins Communication: periodiques d'information. -Publications sur la reforme des Couverture mediatique et annonce entreprises publiques. de desengagement ou changements -Communications intra- importants dans le secteur des gouvemementales et extra- entreprises publiques gouvemementales. Intrants: -L'USREP sera equipee de moyens -Consultants -Contrats de consultants. materiels pour fonctionner -Formation (USREP et autres -Rapports de formation. efficacement et ils lui seront beneficiaires) Voir budget detaille du projet -Publications et seminaires exclusivement alloues. -Equipement -Bons de commande et autres preuves d'achat. > 0 O o u H_ r Demobilisation des anciens combattants Description Impact (Indicateurs Moyens de verification Hypotheses critiques (risques) objectivement v6rifiables) But du Gouvernement: Reduire -Une reduction du deficit de 1.8 % -Criteres de performance du FMI. -Financement disponibles des en permanence la masse salariale du PIB en 1998. -Rapports de mission du FMI. bailleurs de fonds. et de ce fait degager des -Demobilisation de 9086 soldats -Audits du Programme de -Sans assistance des bailleurs de ressources a affecter aux secteur pour la fin de 1998. demobilisation. fonds, le Gouvemement allouera sociaux prioritaires. -Rapports de mission de suivi de les fonds necessaires du budget la Banque mondiale. pour effectuer lui-meme a un -Rapports periodiques du PDAC A rythme plus lent la la CAPAS. demobilisation. Les moyens mis A la disposition du bureau du PDAC sont utilises pour demobiliser les 9086 soldats. Objectif du Projet: Fournir les -Bureau de la d6mobilisation -Audits A tous les deux mois des -Programme de demobilisation outils et l'appui administratif etabli avec des procedures fonds depenses par le programme. des anciens combattants (PDAC) necessaire pour que le financieres bien detaillees. -Rapports de mission de suivi de decrit en detail dans un document Gouvemement demobilise les -Programme d'orientation des l'IDA. et acceptable A l'IDA. Entre forces armees avec ou sans l'aide anciens combattants mis en -Rapports periodiques du PDAC A autres, ce document decrira les des bailleurs de fonds. oeuvre. la CAPAS. objectifs et les cibles du -Systeme de gestion de -Rapport de l'evaluation programme ainsi que les moyens l'information permettant de tracer independante. d'y parvenir et confirmera le les mouvements des anciens nombre de soldats a demobiliser combattants demobilises. ainsi que leur prime de depart. -Procedures detaillees dans le PDAC seront transparentes et efficaces et genereront la participation des bailleurs de fonds. -Le Gouvemement est engage A mettre en oeuvre le PDAC de fa,on efficace et transparente avec ou sans aide exterieure. eQ rr m~ r Description Impact (Indicateurs Moyens de verification Hypotheses critiques (risques) objectivement verifiables) Activites: -Personnel du PDAC formes d'ici -Rapports de fin de mission des -L'auditeur independant aura -Mise en oeuvre du programme de fevrier 1997. consultants. acces a toute l'information demobilisation des anciens -Programme d'orientation avant -Manuels de formation. necessaire pour completer ses combattants (PDAC). demobilisation (POAD) concu et -Manuel de procedures audits a tous les deux mois. -Suivi du PDAC formation completee d'ici fevrier financieres. -Les operations du bureau du -Evaluation independante du 1997. -Rapports de mission de suivi de PDAC seront bien etablies et PDAC. -Systeme de gestion de la Banque mondiale. fonctionneront de facon l'information (SGI) conqu et -Rapports d'audits a tous les deux transparente et sans interference. formation completee d'ici fevrier mois. -Le personnel suivra a la lettre les 1997. -Rapports periodiques du bureau procedures financieres a la lettre. -Procedures de contr6le financier du PDAC a la CAPAS. -Le POAD sera mis en oeuvre conSues d'ici fevrier 1997. -Rapport d'evaluation de la conformement a la conception qui -Audits externes demarrent a composante. en a et faite. partir d'avril 1997 a tous les deux mois pour la duree du PDAC. -Suivi periodique des missions de l'IDA. -Evaluation completee en janvier 1999 ou un mois apres la fin du PDAC. Intrants: Voir budget -Assistance technique de courte -Contrats signes pour les -Disponibilite de l'expertise duree. consultants d'ici la fin decembre technique requise. -Formation. 1996. -Le Gouvernement alloue les -Materiel de bureau et vehicules. -Contrat signe pour les services fonds necessaires pour la -Cofits de fonctionnement d'audit independants avant le ler demobilisation et egalement supplementaires. mars 1997. foumit tel que prevu sa -Communication -Equipement achete d'ici la fin de contribution au projet. -Contribution du Gouvemement. decembre 1996. -Personnel (fonctionnaires et non- -Personnel du PDAC embauche fonctionnaires) identifie ou d'ici la fin de decembre 1996. embauche pour la mise en oeuvre n M0 t Description Impact (Indicateurs Moyens de verification Hypotheses critiques (risques) objectivement verifiables) -Publications et articles publies du programme. sur le PDAC. -Le Gouvemement fait part de sa strategie de mise en oeuvre: -avec participation des bailleurs de fonds; et -sans participation des bailleurs de fonds. t: Attachment 2 Page 1 of I Liste des Entreprises Publiques a Djibouti EPPA (Etablissements Publics Productifs Autonomes) AID: aeroport international de Djibouti CDE: chemin de fer Djibouto-Ethiopien EDD: electricite de Djibouti OPT: office des postes et telecommunications ONED: office national des eaux de Djibouti PAID: port autonome international de Djibouti SE (Societes d'Etat) LDJ: laiterie de Djibouti PI: pharmacie de l'independance SEET: societe d'exploitation des eaux de Tadjourah SAB: societe des aliments du betail SHED: socidte hoteliere de Djibouti EPAC (Etablissements Publics Administratifs et Culturels) CMR: caisse militaire de retraite CPS: caisse de prestations sociales EPH: dtablissement public des hydrocarbures IN: imprimerie nationale ISERT: centre de recherches ONAC: office national d'approvisionnement et de commercialisation ONARC: ONTA: office du tourisme P.P: palais du peuple SMI: service medical inter entreprises S.N: stade national Etablissements Financiers BDD: banque de developpement de Djibouti SID: societe inunobiliere de Djibouti Attachment 3 Page 1 of 2 Cellule d'appui a I'ajustement structurel (juin 1996-aouit 1997) Coordinateur* Homologue Secretaire Conseiller* |Local Communiation | Secretaire Aur pesne de l l | ~~~~~~soutien (si necessaire)| Suivi/Analyse |Rforme des EP Administration* PAS Macroeconomiste Conseiller en Comptable* Statisticien gestion Secteur Sociaux Conseiller en gestion Conseiller en gestion * Personnel finance par le projet Attachment 3 Page 2 of 2 Cellule d'appui a I'ajustement structurel (Sept. 1997 - dec. 1999) Coordinateur* Homologue Secretaire Conseiller* PAS Secretaire Conseiller* l l | ~~~~~Local communication| Suivi/Analyse Reforme des EP Administration* PAS Macro6conomiste Conseiller en Comptable* Statisticien gestion Secteur Sociaux Conseiller en gestion Conseiller en gestion * Personnel financ6 par le projet Attachment 4 Page 1 of 1 Compositon du Comite de pilotage du programme d'ajustement structurel Ministre des finances et de 1'economie nationale Ministre de l'industrie Ministre de la defense Ministre des transports Ministre du commerce Ministre des affaires etrangeres Ministre de la justice Ministre de la fonction publique Ministrre du travail Ministre de l'interieur Gouverneur de la Banque de Djibouti Secretaire general du gouvemement Representant de la Presidence (Chef et Directeur du Cabinet) Attachment 5 Page 1 of 2 TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR ECONOMIC REFORM PROJECT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS SUMMARY Principal activities Results Performance indicators Deadline Institutional reform: To Participants' consensus Action plan formulated by June 1997 perform an institutional on an action plan for the the National Committee for assessment (IA). civil service reform the Reform and transmitted to the SAP -Steering Committee Institutional reform: To Prioritized interventions Action plan approved by August 1997 translate the action plan for IDA and other the SAP -Steering into a specific course of stakeholders according Committee actions with responsible to the agreed-upon ministries and resources Action Plan identified Structural adjustment Performance reports Data collected and Monthly program monitoring: (monitoring indicators processed (statistics and To design a reform for economic progress data processing) in framework and to collect and reform) provided to accordance with the data the SAP -Steering developed monitoring Committee framework Structural adjustment Improved analysis of * Performance report Monthly program monitoring: economic progress and produced on the 20th of reform in relation to each month for the To analyze data and long-term political preceding month. synthesize data related to objectives (1996-2000) * Summary note on 45 days after the the structural adjustment economic progress end of each program quarter . Report on reform Monthly progress Structural adjustment National counterpart SMC managed by the September 1997 program monitoring: To gradually assumes national counterpart with train the national management of SMC the international expert as counterpart advisor Structural adjustment Better understanding of . Approved strategy and March 1997 program monitoring: To SAP and economic communication plan. carry out communication reform generally within * Seminars, publications, Periodically after activities the government and civil presentations and training strategy's society (political, administrative, approval institutional and civil (quarterly) or as society stakeholders) needed Demobilization: To carry About 8,500 . Orientation program February 1997 out demobilization demobilized military designed, and training program staff at the end of the completed program . Management information February 1997 system and financial Attachment 5 Page 2 of 2 Principal activities Results Performance indicators Deadline management procedures in place Positive external audit Every two carried out months PE Reform: Institutional and legal Status of PEs revised January 1997 to reform the PE's legal framework approved framework PE Reform: Cross-debts settled Recommendations on the January 1997 To prepare payment plan cross-debt report are for cross-debts analyzed and transmitted to the SAP -Steering Committee for decision PE Reform: * Reliable and up-to- * Recommendations on the December 1997 To manage better the PE date information enforcement of the chart portfolio system through a of accounts for 1982 for database on PEs all PEs * Standardized chart of * Monitoring the December 1997 accounts (1982) submission of financial statements within the legal deadlines by notification of delinquency PE Reform: Action plan proposals Financial and accounting December 1997 To improve the presented to the Steering audit of every public performance of the PEs Committee enterprise, recommendations for performance goals and prescribed measures to obtain them PE Reform: State-owned enterprises * Liquidation or evaluation December 1997 To sell off or liquidate sold or liquidated studies completed some PEs * Proposals to the Steering Committee on the companies to be privatized or liquidated .BRD 23069R R- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~2~30' O3P0O REPUBLIC I 11 T, ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~OF - ER TihA '- 0 RPIICYEMEN (' -. -~~ $ OF to>O- 0 YEMEN - 0< ~~~~~~~~~~ERITREA Bt lMea ETY CP.A t, Aa o' ' SOMsoALIA "' 'h, W,,- 1, k- / O0-, ' oCKa Th.e Woo d B. 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