

Supporting Peace and Stability in Libya



A Compilation of
Existing Analysis on
Challenges and Needs

Supporting Peace and Stability in Libya

A Compilation of
Existing Analysis on
Challenges and Needs



WORLD BANK GROUP

DISCLAIMER: This draft is intended for consultation ONLY and not for citation. The findings, conclusions, and recommendations expressed in the assessment report do not necessarily constitute the views or form recommendations of the authors or of the European Union, United Nations, or World Bank Group, nor do they reflect the views of the governing bodies of these institutions or their member states.

Editor: Lauri S. Scherer, LSF Editorial

Design/layout: Nita Congress

Photos: TheRunoman/Shutterstock.com (cover); Norman Gauss/Shutterstock.com (p. xviii); Rosen Ivanov Iliev/Shutterstock.com (p. 6); lapas77/Shutterstock.com (p. 156); United Nations, Libya Office (p. 166); MrLis/Shutterstock.com (p. 172).

Contents

Abbreviations	v
Preface	ix
Executive Summary	x
Part 1: Scope and Methodology	1
Context	2
Objective and scope	2
Methodology and process	3
Structure of the report	4
Part 2: Overview of the Conflict	7
Context	8
Conflict dynamics	8
Criminal, political, and security actors and the illicit economy	10
Part 3: Sector Analysis	17
Chapter 1: Peace and Reconciliation	18
Social cohesion and reconciliation	18
Security sector	26
Justice	34
Chapter 2: Displacement and Migration	40
Status of migration and main challenges	41
Main interventions and capacity to respond	48
Main needs and priorities as formulated in the literature	51
Core government functions	53
Chapter 3: Governance and Institutions	53
Decentralization and local governance	60
Parastatal institutions and SOEs	66
Accountability, transparency, and citizen engagement	69
Macroeconomic stability	75

Chapter 4: Macroeconomic Stability and Economic Recovery	75
Financial sector	78
Private sector development	82
Key productive sectors	86
Employment	95
Service delivery and municipal services	99
Chapter 5: Infrastructure and Service Delivery	99
Energy	103
Water	107
Transport	112
ICT	115
Housing and land	120
Chapter 6: Social Service and Social Protection	124
Social protection	124
Health	130
Education	135
Chapter 7: Cross-Cutting Issues	141
Human rights	141
Gender	144
Youth	148
Environment	151
Part 4: International Response and Coordination Mechanisms	157
Chapter 8: International Response	158
Support for peace	158
Development aid	159
Humanitarian aid	161
Chapter 9: Coordination Mechanisms	163
Part 5: Conclusion and Next Steps	167
Annexes	173
A: Analytical and Data Gaps	174
B: Interviewees and Their Organizations	191
C: Lead Technical Contributors	193
D: <i>Mantikas</i> and Municipalities	196
E: Map of Libya	199
References	200

Abbreviations

AAAS	Arms and Ammunition Advisory Section
AFD	Agence Française de Développement
AfDB	African Development Bank
AU	African Union
BIT	basic intensive training
bpd	barrels per day
BSC	Bureau of Statistics and Census
BTI	Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index
CBL	Central Bank of Libya
CDCs	Community Day Centers
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CSO	civil society organization
DCC	Distribution Control Center
DCIM	Department for Combating Illegal Migration
DDR	disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development
DHO	district health officer
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DTM	Displacement Tracking Matrix
EEA	European Environment Agency
EGA	Environment General Authority
EITI	Extractives Industries Transparency Initiative
EMIS	Education Management Information System
EO	Executive Office
ETF	European Training Foundation
EU	European Union
EUBAM	European Union Border Assistance Mission
FAA	Financial Audit Agency
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FDI	foreign direct investment
GACI	General Authority of Communications and Informatics
GAWR	General Authority for Water Resources
GCWWW	Company for Water and Waste Water
GDCOL	General Desalination Company for Libya

GDF	Gathering and Departure Facility
GDP	gross domestic product
GECOL	General Electricity Company of Libya
GHG	greenhouse gas
GIS	geographic information system
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Corporation for International Cooperation)
GMRA	Great Man-Made River Project Authority
GMRP	Great Man-Made River Project
GNA	Government of National Accord
GNC	General National Congress
GoL	Government of Libya
GPC	General Planning Council
HH	household
HoR	House of Representatives
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
HRW	Human Rights Watch
HSC	High State Council
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICT	information and communications technology
IDP	internally displaced person
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMR	infant mortality rate
INGO	international nongovernmental organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRC	International Rescue Committee
IRI	International Republican Institute
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISP	Internet service provider
JTCC	Joint Technical Coordination Committee
lcd	liters per capita per day
LESP	Libya Economic Stabilization Program
LFS	labor force survey
LIA	Libyan Investment Authority
LNA	Libyan National Army
LPA	Libyan Political Agreement
LPG	liquified petroleum gas
LPTIC	Libyan Post Telecommunication and Information Technology Company
LTT	Libya Telecom & Technology
LYD	Libyan dinar
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MDTF	multidonor trust funds
MENA	Middle East and North Africa

MEWINA	Monitoring and Evaluation for Water in North Africa
MoCIT	Ministry of Communications and Informatics
MoD	Ministry of Defense
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoHU	Ministry of Housing and Utilities
MoI	Ministry of the Interior
MoJ	Ministry of Justice
MoL	Ministry of Labor
MoLG	Ministry of Local Governance
MoSA	Ministry of Social Affairs
MoT	Ministry of Transportation
MPI	Multidimensional Poverty Index
MSA	Multi-Sectoral Household Needs Assessment
MSME	micro, small, and medium enterprise
MSNA	Multi-Sector Needs Assessment
MWG	Migration Working Group
NFI	nonfood item
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NIN	National Identification Number
NMR	neonatal mortality rate
NOC	National Oil Corporation
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
NSAG	nonstate armed group
NTC	National Transitional Council
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
PC	Presidential Council
PER	Public Expenditure Review
PFM	public financial management
PIM	public investment management
PHC	primary health care
ppm	parts per million
QIP	quick impact project
RBD	Roads and Bridges Department
REAOL	Renewable Energy Authority of Libya
RMNCAH	Reproductive, Maternal, Newborn, Child and Adolescent Health
RPBA	Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment
RRA	Risk and Resilience Assessment
SCI	specialized credit institution
SCLA	Supreme Council for Local Administration

SEIS	Shared Environmental Information System
SFL	Stabilization Facility for Libya
SGBV	sexual and gender-based violence
SJC	Supreme Judicial Council
SME	small and medium enterprise
SOE	state-owned enterprise
SPC	Senior Policy Committee
SSC	Supreme Security Committee
SSF	Social Security Fund
SSR	security sector reform
TVET	technical and vocational education and training
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNICRI	United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSMIL	United Nations Support Mission in Libya
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
U5MR	under-five mortality rate
vpd	vehicles per day
WAC	Warriors Affairs Commission
WASH	water, sanitation, and hygiene
WBG	World Bank Group
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WSS	Water Supply and Sanitation



Preface

Libya is at a critical juncture in its history. Following more than 40 years of autocratic rule by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, the 2011 revolution that led to his overthrow and the subsequent conflict have adversely impacted the lives and livelihoods of the Libyan people. Despite the recent escalation in violence in April 2019, the UN Action Plan signed in September 2017 still represents the best opportunity for peace in Libya. In this context, coordinated support from the international community is essential for stabilization, peace, and recovery. In line with this, the Government of National Accord requested technical support from the European Union, the United Nations, and the World Bank Group in August 2018 to undertake a Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment.

As partners of Libya, the three organizations agreed to undertake a mapping exercise to assess the existing body of analysis and data on the situation and needs in Libya, and to postpone a full Recovery and Peace Building Assessment until conditions in Libya are more conducive.

This report—jointly prepared by the European Union, the United Nations, and the World Bank Group—provides an important contribution to the collective understanding of challenges and needs in Libya. It offers the first holistic compilation of existing analyses and information generated by the international community regarding the situation in Libya, across the full humanitarian-development-peace spectrum and covering 26 sectors and thematic areas. The report remains a preliminary assessment: It does not pass judgment on the quality of the analysis included, nor does it attempt to prioritize and sequence needs.

As the situation on the ground evolves, this report will provide a useful starting point and foundation for future efforts to plug data gaps and promote effective coordination, led by the Libyan authorities.

We renew our collective commitment to support the people and Government of Libya to realize their aspirations and potential, and to accompany the country's progress toward peace and recovery.

Executive Summary

Context

Libya remains in a state of turmoil. Following more than 40 years of autocratic rule by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, the 2011 revolution that led to his overthrow and the subsequent conflict have severely impacted both the country's macro stability as well as the lives and livelihoods of the Libyan people. The gradual fragmentation of political and military groups has complicated attempts at peace and reconciliation and has impacts that extend beyond Libya's internal borders; violence and instability have spilled over into neighboring countries such as Mali, Niger, and Tunisia, helping to create safe havens for radical extremist groups and providing a platform from which to smuggle people and goods into Europe.

The UN Action Plan was signed in September 2017, offering some cautious optimism for Libya. However, recent upticks in conflict have raised concerns that the process is losing momentum. The Action Plan aims to promote reconciliation among the country's main power blocks: the UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA), based in the country's West around the capital, Tripoli; the House of Representatives (HoR), based in the northeastern port city of Tobruk; and the Libyan National Army (LNA) and its aligned militias, in the country's East. The UN-led process still presents the best opportunity for peace in Libya, and the recent setbacks are another reminder of how important it is for the international community to step up and coordinate support for stabilization, peace, and recovery.

To support this endeavor, on August 29, 2018, the GNA requested technical support from the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), and the World Bank Group (WBG) to undertake a Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment (RPBA). In response to this request and recognizing the commitment the three organizations have made in the Joint Declaration to collaboratively respond to such requests, a mapping exercise was initiated to assess the existing body of work and data on the situation and needs in Libya, as basis and evidence base to decide on the scope and utility of an RPBA.¹

¹ Early discussions between the EU, UN, and WBG had indicated that a more incremental process might be required in response to the GNA's request, given Libya's prevailing political and institutional conditions. It was agreed that the mapping exercise would be important for understanding the data and information needs as the basis for identifying entry points for more coordinated support from the EU, UN, and WBG toward peace and recovery. It was also agreed between partners not to develop an RPBA framework at this stage, which is outside the scope of the mapping.

Objective and scope

The objective of the mapping is to compile a comprehensive overview of the existing information and data regarding the status of each sector in Libya and the related institutional setup, needs as formulated in the literature, and ongoing or planned interventions. It takes as its starting point the significant body of analytical and data work carried out by the international community over recent years. The mapping presents existing information and points out discrepancies and gaps but does not judge the accuracy of specific data points in places where information might vary between different data sets. The mapping is intended to inform joint EU-UN-WBG technical and coordination work that could be undertaken in advance of, and as an input into, an upcoming and more structured planning process with the government.

Methodology and process

The exercise began on December 7, 2018, with a kickoff meeting that brought together technical staff from the EU, UN, and WBG to agree on the terms of reference, time frame, and process for the mapping. The tripartite organizations assembled a core technical team to carry out the mapping exercise. The first step of the work was to conduct a preliminary desk-based review of the existing literature and to interview sectoral experts from the three organizations.

Between January 28 and February 7, 2019, the core technical team traveled to Tunis to carry out a series of interviews and consultations. The team used these interviews to refine, clarify, and deepen the information collected through the literature review and to map the existing information and sectoral status. The team also used these discussions to generate an overview of the support currently offered by international donors and development partners and to better understand the systems in place to assure the coordination of international support. The team met with over 70 stakeholders and carried out 33 interviews, including with the EU Delegation, the UN agencies, the WB country team, and a wide range of humanitarian representatives, development experts, peace actors, and bilateral partners.

This report reflects collaboration and input from across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus. As such, it overviews the current conflict dynamics and provides a detailed review of a wide range of sectors associated with peace, security, governance, economic, and social outcomes.

Sectoral analysis and key findings

The mapping analyzes 26 sectors across seven thematic areas. The 26 sectors were identified based on discussions that took place during the technical kickoff meeting. No prioritization or sequencing between sectors has been undertaken: this is outside of the scope of the mapping and would have to be addressed by a future planning exercise. Each sector note lists the key qualitative and quantitative sources, as well as the main data gaps, while an exhaustive list of sources and data sets is provided as an annex to the report. Each sector note also provides a brief sectoral analysis;

outlines the institutional setup; lists the structural challenges; assesses the conflict's impact on the sector; elaborates on the key ongoing or planned interventions by various actors as well as the existing coordination mechanisms at the sector level; and summarizes the needs as described in the existing literature. Importantly, no new recommendations have been formulated, and no attempt to prioritize needs has been carried out as part of this mapping exercise.

While there are a lot of data and analysis available, the mapping diagnosed a lack of coherence among the existing analyses and data and identified a preliminary list of 91 data and analytical gaps. Key reference documents and gaps per sector are captured in table ES-1.

International support and coordination

The international community supports Libya across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus.

The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) is an integrated special political mission that was established on September 16, 2011, by UN Security Council Resolution 2009 (2011) at the request of the Libyan authorities to support the country's new transitional authorities in their post-conflict efforts. Its current mandate is stipulated by the latest UN Security Council Resolution 2486 (2019), which extended UNSMIL's mission through September 15, 2020. By unanimously adopting Resolution 2323 in December 2016, the UN Security Council mandated UNSMIL, in full accordance with the principles of national ownership, to exercise mediation and good offices in implementing the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) and to support the consolidation of the GNA's governance, security, and economic arrangements as well as subsequent phases of the Libyan transition process. In addition to its previous responsibilities, the Security Council requested UNSMIL to support a possible ceasefire. Further support for peace and security is provided by bilateral and multilateral partners.

Partners provide development aid to Libya. The broader group of partners—which includes the African Development Bank (AfDB), the EU, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, various UN agencies, and the World Bank—notably provide support for restoring Libya's macroeconomic stability; public financial management; governance at central and local levels; service delivery in health, education, electricity, and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH); private sector and skills development (particularly for youth and women); and migration.

Humanitarian aid is strategically focused on both access to basic services and protection. The 2019 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) aims to provide and improve safe and dignified access to essential goods and critical public services in synergy with development assistance and to enhance protection and promote adherence to international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and international refugee law.

Development and humanitarian coordination structures are in place. However, these mechanisms are not yet fully effective, and government leadership of coordination systems is still evolving. The overall efficiency of coordination is low, with limited engagement across humanitarian,

Table ES-1 Key Reference Documents and Gaps per Sector

Sector	Key Reference Documents	Key Gaps
Peace and Reconciliation		
Social Cohesion and Reconciliation	2018 Baseline Survey on Reconciliation prepared by Altai Consulting for UNDP; 2017 study on traditional reconciliation processes and mechanisms; 2018 report outlining the preparation phase of the Libyan National Conference.	There is a rich body of up-to-date information and qualitative assessments on the topic.
Security Sector	Documents from UNSMIL; UNDP's 2016 "Security Sector Core Government Functions Assessment of the Ministry of Interior"; studies from think tanks.	There are significant gaps in data and knowledge, including no comprehensive mapping of security sector stakeholders and no granular detail on public expenditures in the sector (only consolidated figures of spending in the sector are available).
Justice	Mapping of legislation related to transitional justice by UNDP; UNSMIL's 2019 report by the Secretary-General; studies from think tanks.	There is a lack of up-to-date data and no comprehensive overview of the justice sector (the recent USAID-funded assessment would potentially fill this gap).
Displacement and Migration		
Displacement and Migration	European Union documents; IOM Displacement Matrix data and reports from 2017 to 2019; UNHCR reports and data from 2017 to 2019; UNSMIL and OHCHR 2018 report on the human rights situation of migrants and refugees; REACH 2018 briefs and surveys.	There is a lack of clarity on private detention centers and on how conflict, migration, and forced displacement interact; limited understanding of how migrants decide whether to stay in Libya, travel on to Europe, or return to their countries of origin, and what differentiates these categories; scant data on the number and conditions of economic migrants within Libya, their skills, and which industries employ them; and a lack of information regarding the availability of basic services and livelihood options for migrants, IDPs, and host communities.
Governance and Institutions		
Core Government Functions	Important body of work produced as part of the WB and IMF technical assistance on PFM and governance (2013–19) and UNDP 2016 core governance assessments.	There is a lack of detailed analysis on the size and composition of public employment, no up-to-date national accounts after 2014, and an absence of basic economic and social data.
Decentralization and Local Governance	The EU's 2017 "Local Governance Case Studies"; UNDP's 2017 "Core Government Functions Assessment"; the WB's 2014 "Institutional Mapping of Service Delivery in Libya"; reports by USAID, UNDP, and CILG-VNG.	There are gaps in information with respect to the political, fiscal, and administrative aspects of decentralization, and very limited information on public financial management at the municipal level.
Parastatal Institutions and SOEs	None found.	There is a significant lack of data and no comprehensive assessment of existing SOEs.
Accountability, Transparency, and Citizen Engagement	Transparency International's 2014 National Integrity System Assessment; BTI's 2018 Country Report; 2015 mapping of civil society organizations and 2017 mapping of media bodies carried out by Altai Consulting; World Governance Indicators.	There are moderate gaps in data, including those related to periodic financial and budget reporting, audits, procurement, and public information disclosures.

Sector	Key Reference Documents	Key Gaps
Macroeconomic Stability and Economic Recovery		
Macroeconomic Stability	2018 and 2019 estimates and forecast from the WB for key macro poverty indicators.	Significant absence of granular data and primary economic data sets.
Financial Sector	Data from the Central Bank of Libya; IMF, WB, EU, and Mercy Corps reports.	Significant data limitations notably in terms of liquidity, capital structure, and risk adjusted portfolio.
Private Sector Development	WB 2015 Simplified Enterprise Survey; preliminary findings of WB 2019 Enterprise Survey; OECD 2016 study on the role of SMEs and 2017 Action Plan for SME Development in Libya; EU 2018 reports on access to finance and private sector development.	There is a lack of countrywide data on the private sector and of background, primary economic data sets.
Key Productive Sectors	WB 2015 Simplified Enterprise Survey; FAO 2018 documents (for agriculture).	There is a lack of quantitative assessments.
Employment	WB 2015 report on labor market dynamics; European Training Foundation 2014 report on the labor market and employment policy; GIZ's 2013 study on education and employability; 2017 Libya Workforce Market Survey Report.	Data have limited accuracy and reliability and are not updated.
Infrastructure		
Service Delivery and Municipal Services	The EU's 2017 "Libyan Local Governance Case Studies"; six UN-Habitat/UNFPA 2018 city profiles; WB, CILG-VNG, UNDP, and REACH reports.	There is a lack of quantitative data (most of the information is based on perceptions, although part of the city profiles are based on the household survey through representative sampling).
Energy	Extensive body of work conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers under its WB contract; 2017–19 WB analysis of LNG/GECOL; 2018 WB analysis of solar energy potential; various USAID reports.	Data are sufficiently up-to-date and offer enough base for planning.
Water	2017 sector brief produced as part of the AfDB-led stocktaking exercise; UNICEF draft water sector analysis, 2018–19; UNICEF, FAO, AFD, MEWINA, and REACH reports.	Data are scattered, fragmented, and lack reliability and comprehensiveness. Data gaps include a lack of appropriate WASH demand patterns.
Transport		Data are limited and very outdated. There is no existing survey of the damage to the transport infrastructure and services and no full network survey.
ICT	TeleGeography GlobalComms Database; Freedom House's 2018 Libya Country Report on Internet freedom; and WB technical studies.	There is very good ICT sector baseline data up to 2014, as well as scattered and fragmented information on recent development. Gaps include a comprehensive assessment of disruption and destruction that has taken place since 2014, as well as information on the use of digital platforms.

Sector	Key Reference Documents	Key Gaps
Housing and Land	Six UN-Habitat/UNFPA 2018 city profiles; the UNHCR 2013 report, “Housing, Land and Property Issues and the Response to Displacement in Libya”; and the REACH 2019 Multi-Sector Needs Assessment (MSNA).	There is an overall lack of nationally representative information as well as of data on urban planning processes after 2011. Damage assessments are only partially available.
Social Services and Social Protection		
Social Protection	GoL and CBL data on subsidy amounts; the WB’s 2015 “Quest for Subsidies” report; OCHA’s 2018 and 2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview.	There is no mapping of social protection mechanisms. Data gaps include information on the adequacy of the social safety net programs, on subsidies and other forms of transfer, and updated poverty surveys.
Health	2016 Service Availability and Readiness Assessment of Public Health Facilities; RMNCAH situation analysis (2016–17).	Data are representative of the situation and allow for good understanding of the health sector. Key gaps include data on nutrition.
Education	2017 sector brief as part of the AfDB-led sectoral assessment; 2012 Nationwide School Assessment; REACH MSNA.	Data are fragmented, unreliable, not comprehensive, and not nationally representative. Gaps include information on employability and skill sets of higher education graduates, vocational training enrollment rates, and standardized assessment data for student achievement as well as of quality of education.
Cross-Cutting Issues		
Human Rights	Recent 2018 reports by UNSMIL, UNHCR, Amnesty International, and HRW.	Quality information is available on the state of human rights violations.
Gender	UN’s 2018 “Libya—Gender Justice and the Law” case study; UN Women’s 2019 “Final Research on the Economic Impact of Conflict on Libyan Women”; the 2013 “Libya Status of Women Survey” by IFES; an HRW 2013 report on women’s rights; the SGBV situation analysis 2018 by UNFPA.	There is a lack of detailed statistics disaggregated by gender and lack of analysis of the demand-side constraints that prevent women from accessing services and starting economic activities.
Youth	UNFPA’s 2018 “Libyan Youth Today: Opportunities and Challenges” report.	There is a lack of detailed statistics disaggregated by age and relatively little data on radicalization.
Environment	The European Environment Agency’s 2015 Libya Country Report; various USAID and FAO technical reports and project documents.	Detailed and updated data on water, air, soil pollution, land degradation, and natural disasters are missing.

development, political, and security actors. A data management system for development aid has been rolled out but is not yet fully utilized. Consequently, comprehensive data on current and planned support is hard to find, as there is no shared strategy for partners' cooperation and support that can guide coordination and align support.

Next steps

Going forward, joint EU-UN-WB technical and coordination work should be undertaken in advance of, and as an input into, an upcoming and more structured planning process with the government. Recommendations include the following:


1. **Present to the government the findings of this mapping study.** As part of this effort, EU-UN-WB management should present the findings of the mapping to the Minister of Planning. Government counterparts at the technical level should be given the opportunity to analyze the mapping study and share additional analytical material and data that has yet to be covered in the mapping. This could be done both at the sector and aggregate level and could be coordinated through the Ministry of Planning.
2. **Further strengthen joint efforts between the international community and Libyans to identify and fill the most critical analytical gaps.** Several gaps have been identified that can only be filled through multisector approaches and an effort to consolidate different methodologies, including to understand broader needs related to institutional capacities, conflict-related damage, service delivery systems, security sector capacities, and broader poverty and vulnerability dynamics. Coordinated efforts to address these, using already existing coordination and dialogue platforms, could offer a good interim step toward compiling all the necessary information required for an eventual planning and prioritization exercise. The mapping study has identified the following international platforms as potential vehicles for further analytical work:
 - **The government** could launch an aid mapping exercise in order to update information on commitments. This effort could be kick-started by the government issuing a letter asking all donors to use the aid management system and provide aid information. This would strengthen government ownership of the database and facilitate data collection.
 - **The UNSMIL** could coordinate efforts to better understand elements under pillar 1 (peace and reconciliation), issues pertaining to security sector capacities and needs, along with an evolving overview of security-related dynamics that would need to be understood and factored in as part of a future planning and prioritization exercise.
 - **The local governance working group and related sectoral efforts** would be a natural conduit of future work to understand the broader governance and institutional challenges and needs, building on the findings outlined under pillar 3.

- **The Restoration of Basic Services working group** could coordinate efforts to more holistically assess service delivery capacities and damages, building on the findings under pillars 5 (infrastructure and service delivery) and 6 (social services and protection).
- **The planned household survey** could be used to generate a better view of poverty and vulnerability at different levels as well as a disaggregated update on access to basic services (pillar 6) and the needs and priorities of the population. This could also be used as one vehicle to supplement International Organization for Migration data on migration- and displacement-related issues covered under pillar 2 and on several of the cross-cutting issues.

An important element going forward would be to ensure Libyan engagement in each of the above platforms. In addition, it will be critical to build a mechanism to allow broader citizen engagement and feedback into these efforts to fill critical analytical gaps.


3. **Revive and strengthen coordination mechanisms to ensure that the above efforts facilitate better information sharing and regular exchanges regarding how to use knowledge to inform decisions.** The process of preparing this mapping study has highlighted the need for a more effective dialogue between the government, the tripartite signatories, and possibly other development partners regarding analysis, planning, and prioritization. While different partners will continue to pursue bilateral research and assessments based on their individual mandates and areas of focus, such a revived coordination framework would ensure that findings could be shared widely and used to forge coherence in decision making and policy dialogue. Experiences from other countries suggest that such coordination should happen at frequent intervals given the fast-moving context in Libya.
4. **Establish a joint risk monitoring and mitigation mechanism.** Based on the shared understanding of challenges and risks that the EU, UN, and WBG have agreed on as part of the 2018 Risk and Resilience Assessment and the 2019 Libya Mapping, a regular joint context risk monitoring should be undertaken and updated frequently to (i) better understand the evolution of the situation on the ground—especially in light of the worsening security situation—and how this impacts international support; (ii) better understand how international support might impact peace and stability; (iii) benefit from the partners' respective comparative advantages in certain policy areas; and (iv) identify possible engagement opportunities to mitigate these risks. The experiences from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia of establishing Joint Risk Management Offices should be further explored as a model for Libya. Going forward, the required capacities as well as the more efficient mechanisms to monitor all over Libya should be determined, aiming for a light joint structure given the limited available resources.





Part 1

Scope and Methodology



Context

Libya remains in a state of turmoil. Following more than 40 years of autocratic rule by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, the 2011 revolution that led to his overthrow and the subsequent conflict have severely impacted both the country's macro stability as well as the lives and livelihoods of the Libyan people. The gradual fragmentation of political and military groups has complicated attempts at peace and reconciliation and has impacts that extend beyond Libya's internal borders; violence and instability have spilled over into neighboring countries such as Mali, Niger, and Tunisia, helping to create safe havens for radical extremist groups and providing a platform from which to smuggle people and goods into Europe.

While the signing of the UN Action Plan in September 2017 had offered some cautious optimism for Libya, recent upticks in conflict have raised concerns that the process is losing momentum. The Action Plan aims to promote reconciliation among the country's main power blocks: the UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA), based in the country's West around the capital, Tripoli; the House of Representatives (HoR), based in the northeastern port city of Tobruk; and the Libyan National Army (LNA) and its aligned militias, in the East. The UN-led peace process still presents the best opportunity for peace in Libya, and the recent setbacks are another reminder of how important it is for the international community to step up and coordinate support for stabilization, peace, and recovery.

To support this, on August 29, 2018, the GNA requested technical support from the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), and the World Bank Group (WBG) to undertake a Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment (RPBA). In response to this request and recognizing the commitment the three organizations have made in the Joint Declaration to collaboratively respond to such requests, a mapping exercise was initiated to assess the existing body of work and data on Libya's situation and needs, as basis and evidence base to decide on the scope and utility of an RPBA.¹

Objective and scope

The overall objective of the mapping has been to compile a comprehensive overview of existing information and data regarding the situation in Libya. It takes as its starting point a previous sectoral assessment undertaken in 2017 of four basic service sectors (health, education, water, and electricity), which was led by the African Development Bank (AfDB) in collaboration with the EU, UN, WBG, and key bilateral partners. It also considers the significant body of analytical and data work carried out by the international community over recent years. The mapping exercise

¹ Early discussions between the EU, UN, and WBG had indicated that a more incremental process might be required in response to the GNA's request, given Libya's prevailing political and institutional conditions. It was agreed that the mapping exercise would be important for understanding the data and information needs as the basis for identifying entry points for more coordinated support from the EU, UN, and WBG toward peace and recovery. It was also agreed between partners not to develop an RPBA framework at this stage, which is outside the scope of the mapping.

presents existing information and points to discrepancies and gaps but does not attempt to analyze the relevance of the data and information that exists, nor does it judge the accuracy of specific data points in places where information might vary between different data sets. The mapping is intended to inform joint EU-UN-WBG technical and coordination work that could be undertaken in advance of, and as an input into, an upcoming and more structured planning process with the government.

Methodology and process

The exercise began with a kickoff meeting on December 7, 2018, which brought together technical staff from the EU, UN, and WB to agree on the terms of reference, time frame, and process for the mapping exercise. The tripartite organizations each nominated focal points for the overall process, and a core technical team was assembled to carry out the mapping exercise. The first step of this work was to conduct a preliminary desk-based review of the existing literature and to interview sectoral experts from the three organizations.

Between January 28 and February 7, 2019, the core technical team of specialists from the EU and WB traveled to Tunis to carry out a series of interviews and consultations. The team used these interviews to refine, clarify, and deepen the information collected through the literature review, and to map the existing information and sectoral status. The team also used these discussions to compile an overview of the support currently offered by international donors and development partners, and to better understand the systems in place to coordinate international support. The team met with over 70 stakeholders and carried out 33 interviews, including with the WB country team, the EU delegation, the UN agencies, and a wide range of humanitarian representatives, development experts, peace actors, and bilateral partners. A full list of interviewees is provided in annex B.

The analysis in this report covers events through March 2019. Consequently, the analysis does not describe the latest phase of the conflict that started in April 2019, nor does it map its impact and resulting challenges and needs.²

The mapping exercise has benefited from multiple rounds of informal and formal review. Following the mission, the team held additional follow-up meetings to finalize the report. Each of the draft sector notes were shared with sectoral experts from the three organizations for their informal review and feedback, and comments were incorporated. The first full draft of the mapping exercise underwent a formal technical review by the EU, UN, and WB. The final report was presented to the tripartite leadership for discussion on the way forward for the RPBA.

This report reflects the need to ensure collaboration and input from across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, as per the RPBA guidance. As such, it overviews the current

²Additional work would be needed to map the impact of the conflict since April 2019 and the additional challenges this is creating. Part 5—Conclusion and Next Steps outlines possible further work.

conflict dynamics and provides a detailed review of a wide range of sectors associated with peace, security, governance, economics, and social outcomes.

It is important to note that the information reflected in the report has been sourced from existing literature on Libya and verified and refined through interviews with key informants and stakeholders. This mapping exercise has not benefited from any original analysis or data collection, nor have the tripartite organizations sought to formulate independent recommendations.

Literature consulted as part of the report spans the period from 2006 to 2019. While most of the analyzed documentation is post-2016, and the overwhelming proportion of documentation is post-revolution, several key pre-revolution studies have been used to describe structural challenges when more recent information was not available. In a fluid political and security environment, the current relevance of each reference document is dependent on sectors, and whether information maintains its relevance is not only a factor of when data was collected. Each sector note outlines the quality of information and data and the time when the main studies were produced or the data were collected. In addition, the reference section at the end of the report lists all sources with dates.

The mapping exercise is intended as a first step toward defining the joint EU, UN, and WBG response to the GNA's request for support in defining a strategy for recovery and peace building in Libya.


Structure of the report

The mapping exercise is organized as follows:

Part 1 introduces the scope and objective of the work and outlines the methodology.

Part 2 provides an overview of the conflict dynamics using a political economy lens. This section draws on and complements the 2018 Libya Risk and Resilience Assessment (RRA) that was conducted jointly by the EU, UN, and WBG.

Part 3 analyzes 26 sectors (see figure 1). The 26 sectors were identified based on discussions that took place during the technical kickoff meeting. No prioritization between sectors has been undertaken, and the order in which the sector notes are listed in the report neither indicates their importance nor a possible sequencing of interventions: this is outside the scope of the mapping and would have to be addressed by a future planning exercise. Each sector note lists the key qualitative and quantitative sources as well as the main data gaps; provides a brief sectoral analysis, outlines the institutional setup, and lists the structural challenges and impact of the conflict on the sector; elaborates on the key ongoing or planned interventions by the various actors and existing coordination mechanisms at the sector level; and sums up needs as described in the existing literature. Importantly, no new recommendations are formulated, and no attempt to prioritize needs has been carried out as part of the mapping exercise.


Figure 1 Mapping Framework

Part 4 outlines the current overall international response to the challenges discussed above. It describes the current strategies and interventions of the EU, UN, and WBG; summarizes official development, humanitarian, and political and security aid flows; and overviews coordination mechanisms across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus.

Part 5 concludes and presents some possible next steps.


The annexes offer a full list of analytical and data gaps organized by sector as well as an annotated literature review by sector.





Part 2

Overview of the Conflict



Context

Following more than 40 years of autocratic rule, Libya has been mired in conflict since the overthrow of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. Libya currently suffers from a complex crisis that affects its politics, security, and economy, which in turn weakens state institutions, damages its economy, facilitates the continued existence of nonstate armed groups (NSAGs), and amplifies ethnic and tribal tensions. In fact, rival authorities continue to compete for power and resources, leading to further fragmentation and dysfunction; this provides a fertile environment for a pervasive illicit economy. The conflict's political economy has evolved from an initial period of intense violence to a highly fragile, protracted conflict that features relatively low levels of violence.¹ A complex network of local conflicts, transnational criminal groups, and interventions by external forces are competing for control over the country's politics, resources, and, above all, the economy.

The instability caused by the illicit economy has ramifications beyond Libya's internal borders, affecting neighboring countries and the European continent. Violence and instability have long spilled over into Mali, Niger, and Tunisia, helping to create safe havens for radical extremist groups and providing a platform from which to smuggle people and goods to Europe. Since 2011, the flow of migrants arriving by boat from Libya has also impacted several EU Member States.

Conflict dynamics

While violence and fatalities have sharply declined since 2012, most of Libya remains highly fragile and insecure. Since the summer of 2014, political power has been split between two rival governments in Tripoli and Tobruk, with the latter having been recognized by the international community before the creation of the Presidential Council (PC), which presides over the GNA and acts as head of state and supreme commander of the Libyan armed forces under the terms of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) (see box 1). The agreement has been unanimously endorsed by the UN Security Council, which welcomed the formation of the PC and recognized that the GNA is the sole legitimate executive government of Libya (UNSC 2015). However, several types of actors compete for power in Libya, including armed groups and militias, city states (particularly in western and southern Libya), tribes (mostly in eastern and southern Libya), and extremist groups.² The vast majority are local, though some engage at the national level to represent the interests of their region or city. Many important actors, particularly outside of the largest cities, also have tribal allegiances.

Since 2011 the conflict's trajectory has featured several phases, leading to a state of protracted conflict that until early 2019 was defined by high levels of fragility and insecurity despite low levels of fatalities. The conflict has severely impacted both the country's macro stability as well as the lives and livelihoods of the Libyan people. Following the revolution's initial violence and

¹The analysis in this report does not include the latest phase of the conflict that started in April 2019.

²For a comprehensive overview, see Toaldo and Fitzgerald 2016.

fighting, the conflict stabilized in 2014 on a high level of fragility marked by low levels of fatalities.³ This type of status quo is typical of protracted conflicts in which involved actors are no longer engaged in regular active fighting even though fragility and insecurity remain high.

The situation changed in 2017, when foreign initiatives and other external factors shifted the power balance and affected the revenue stream of armed groups (USPI 2018). Currently, the UN-backed GNA struggles to exert control over territory held by rival factions, which intensifies geographical and political divisions between the East, West, and South. Extremist and armed groups exploit the turmoil, using the nation as a base for radicalization and organized crime, thus posing a threat to the region and beyond. Tribal violence adds another layer of fragility (Tubiana and Gramizzi 2018).

As of March 2019, most fighting is concentrated around Tripoli and other large cities, as well as in the South, which witnessed a largely unopposed push by the LNA to consolidate the South in Sabha and the El Sharara oil fields (UNSC 2015). The situation is further complicated by the presence of foreign fighters and extremist groups (Zelin 2018; Sizer 2018). Libya's South remains highly vulnerable; conditions are deteriorating rapidly in the region's capital, Sabha, as well as in large surrounding areas (Salamé 2019). These include the increased presence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), insecurity posed by a highly porous southern border, and the presence of foreign mercenaries and criminal groups that target citizens and migrants. The situation has resulted in attacks against southern water pipelines and oil facilities on which the North depends, which has directly affected Libya's slowly recovering economy (Salamé 2019).

As of March 2019, the situation in Tripoli remains highly fragile and exemplifies how actors competing for space within the illicit economy fuel the conflict (Lacher and al-Idrissi 2018). Since the GNA was established in Tripoli in March 2016, local militias have gained control of the Libyan capital and have dominated the government. These militias have grown into sophisticated criminal networks that straddle business, politics, and the administration (Lacher 2018). State resources are now plundered to the benefit of a narrow group of actors, which has led those excluded from the current status quo to build alliances aimed at forcefully altering the balance of power in Tripoli.⁴ Meanwhile, rent seeking and war profiteering continue, as the illicit economy has evolved into a multibillion-dollar business based on smuggling, predation, and extortion (Eaton 2018). Most of the ongoing violence stems from criminal activity and attempts to maintain and expand revenue from smuggling, predation, and extortion. The risk for renewed conflict remains high (Lacher 2018).

³UNSMIL documented 21 civilian casualties—eight deaths and 13 injuries—during hostilities across Libya.

⁴See, for example, UNSC UN2017.

Box 1 Brief Political History and Institutional Setup after the Revolution

In February 2011, civil protests evolved into a widespread uprising against the regime of Gaddafi. The National Transitional Council declared Libya “liberated” and took control in October. A new parliament, the General National Congress (GNC), was elected in November. By the summer of 2012, the struggle for power had become polarized among several regional militia factions, with rivalries developing along ideological, political, and territorial lines. These tensions escalated into violent conflict in 2014.

In June 2014, voters chose a new House of Representatives (HoR), which replaced the GNC with a secular majority. Political instability reached new heights when the GNC, whose term had expired earlier in 2014, refused to recognize the legitimacy of its successor. This effectively fractured the country into competing polities, with the HoR and the Libyan National Army (LNA) in the East and the GNC in the West. Rivalry and duplicate legislative and executive branches created political deadlock, divided national institutions, and exacerbated armed conflict.

After a year and a half of fighting, the UN brokered the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) in December 2015. The parties agreed to form a new unity government—the GNA—led by a Presidential Council and headed by a Prime Minister, Fayez al-Siraj. Although the GNA has been recognized internationally, it has not been able to consolidate political power due to continuing political rivalries. The HoR and the LNA in the East continue to compete for power.

In September 2017, the UN unveiled an Action Plan to push the peace process, which provided for amending the LPA, convening a reconciliation conference, adopting a new constitution, and holding elections. The Libyan National Conference was prepared over 18 months during 2018 and 2019 and planned to take place April 14–16, 2019. It was postponed in early April 2019 because of the military actions that started at the beginning of the same month.

Criminal, political, and security actors and the illicit economy

The lawlessness that followed the 2011 revolution led to a security breakdown and triggered the establishment of local militias to provide security (Lacher 2018). Many of these newly emerging security actors began to engage in criminal activities to cover their operating costs, and some evolved into powerful criminal groups.⁵ Smuggling and other illicit activity morphed over time and institutionalized sources of financing for different armed groups.⁶ By 2014, criminal networks in Libya had grown to a level of maturity that was previously only found among international

⁵The line between armed groups and criminal groups is blurred.

⁶Micallef (2017) has argued that the proliferation of professional criminal groups may be akin to “industrialization.”

drug cartels and criminal organizations.⁷ Within just a few years, Libyan criminal groups had established economic empires—based on controlling smuggling routes, key infrastructure and state institutions, and parts of the banking sector—worth several billion dollars per year.⁸ In less than a decade, the illicit economy has arguably become the primary driver for continuous conflict and is the centerpiece of Libya's political economy.⁹ As a result, the instability and disincentives caused by the illicit economy have undermined efforts to transition toward peace and stability.¹⁰

The illicit economy can be broadly organized into four sectors: smuggling, extortion, state resources, and, to a lesser extent, patronage.¹¹ Criminal groups are involved in a variety of illicit economic activities, which can be defined as (i) the direct sale of commodities and goods through smuggling, including human smuggling and trafficking; (ii) the generation of rents and use of extortion; (iii) predation on state resources; and (iv) external patronage through foreign actors, including states, corporations, and criminal networks (Shaw and Mangan 2014). These four sectors are interconnected regarding actors, logistics, and illicit financial flows, and many illicit activities involve elements of more than one sector.

Disincentives to peace

The size of the illicit economy presents substantial disincentives to negotiating a political settlement to the conflict, as involved actors benefit from instability and weak institutions to ensure their prosperous businesses can continue. Some actors have tried to maximize their position in the illicit economy in advance of any settlement being ordered, yet substantial incentives exist for keeping public institutions weak.¹² This system of disincentives within the illicit economy has become a cause of its persistence, frustrating the reassertion of state authority at local and national levels.

The dynamic is self-reinforcing: The state's inability to provide resources, services, and security strengthens the arguments of locally based individuals and groups that claim they are filling this need (and who often have affiliations with the state). At the same time, the existence of criminal groups undermines the state's ability to fulfill its obligations and enforce its rule. Paradoxically, the increasing sophistication of the illicit economy and the market stability of sorts provided by armed groups are binding Libya together yet simultaneously splitting it apart by undercutting efforts to build a system of joint and inclusive governance.

⁷ See UNSC 2017. For a global comparison, see UNODC 2010 and Lacher 2018.

⁸ See, for example, GOTN 2018.

⁹ The term *illicit economy* here refers to economic activities that are criminal and often violent.

¹⁰ See, for example, El Kamouni-Janssen, Shadeedi, and Ezzeddine 2018; Lacher 2018.

¹¹ External patronage is not fully covered in this note given the lack of publicly available information.

¹² See, for example, Harchaoui 2018.

Links to violence and fragility

As of 2019, the struggle for profits continues to drive violence and human rights abuses.¹³

Armed and criminal groups regularly engage in violent rivalries, and competition to control smuggling routes increasingly contributes to localized conflict, which can easily escalate to other parts of the country. Competition is a root cause of ongoing violence and fragility most notably in the South and West¹⁴ but also in cities, near oil fields and refineries, and along transport corridors and hubs in general. Meanwhile, the growing involvement of armed groups since 2012 has contributed to the development of a violent protection market.¹⁵

By far the most serious human rights abuses occur through human smuggling and trafficking and related illegal detention (Amnesty International 2017). As corruption networks and schemes have become more sophisticated, so too have the activities of armed groups as well as those of former traders and businessmen who collude with bank partners to run letter-of-credit schemes (Zway 2017). Overall, rent seeking, war profiteering, and controlling state resources are arguably the central underlying reasons for continued fighting (Eaton 2018).

Smuggling

Smuggling encompasses human smuggling and trafficking; it also includes the direct transport and sale of commodities such as weapons, drugs, food, and other subsidized goods (El Kamouni-Janssen 2017). The political economy of each type of smuggling is different, as explained below.

Human smuggling

The smuggling and trafficking of humans has become a significant source of revenue for smugglers and armed groups and a core element of Libya's conflict economy (Eaton 2018). Since 2013, Libya has witnessed a major increase in human smuggling in particular, while other forms of smuggling—such as that of fuel and weapons—are also believed to be significant (Shaw and Mangan 2014). Political contestation for control of the Libyan state and the resulting governance dysfunction, combined with limited state enforcement capacity to secure its vast borders and coastline, has produced a conducive environment for smuggling. In some instances, state institutions responsible for preventing smuggling have been implicated in its conduct, according to the UN panel of experts on Libya (Nichols 2018). Libya thus illustrates why it is problematic to tie anti-smuggling policies to weak state institutions.

The best available estimates suggest that Libya's human smuggling sector amounted to at least US\$1.2 billion in 2016 (Eaton 2017). Revenue estimates encompass two principal

¹³See, for example, Lacher 2018.

¹⁴Competition for smuggling routes appears to drive conflicts between the Toubou and Tuareg groups in the southwest and the Toubou and Zway groups in the southeast, among others. See Wehrey 2017.

¹⁵Wehrey 2017. Prior to 2011 most smugglers would not have been armed. Micallef (2017) argues that “the protection market developed by various militias and armed groups around smuggling is a feature of the general resource predation which has come to characterize Libya's socio-political landscape after the revolution.”

elements: crossing the vast terrain of Libya and crossing the Mediterranean Sea by boat. First, fees that migrants paid for overland travel across the desert from the Libyan border to the coast are estimated to have generated between US\$920 million and US\$975 million.¹⁶ Second, migrants paid between US\$250 million and US\$290 million to cross the Mediterranean.¹⁷ These estimates do not include the income generated from extortion, exploitation, abuse, and sexual violence perpetrated against migrants, which provide smugglers and armed groups with further illicit income.¹⁸ A policy of migrant criminalization has further blurred the line between human smuggling and trafficking.¹⁹

Fuel smuggling

Libya boasts the largest proven oil reserves on the African continent, with prerevolution production hitting a high of 1.77 million barrels of oil a day (IMF 2012). Despite the ongoing conflict, oil production continues in many parts of the country. Exports of oil and fuel reached a value of US\$17.2 billion (96.8 percent of total exports) in 2017, a sizable share of which is smuggled.²⁰ Much of Libya's fuel is smuggled outside the country, with larger-scale schemes dominating the regular market (Sy et al. 2017). Fuel is diverted directly from refineries, ports, and warehouses using falsified paperwork (NOC 2016). Remarkably, imports of refined fuel have increased sharply since 2012, reaching nearly US\$5 billion in 2017.²¹ For such schemes to function, access to international criminal networks is required to sell the smuggled fuel (UNSC 201). These criminal networks cooperate with a variety of political actors in a classic case of state capture. Those running fuel smuggling schemes have either been able to place pressure on high levels of power or receive direct support from complicit officials.²² The existence of international fuel smuggling activities involving nearby countries is another indicator of the maturity of Libya's illicit economy.

Cross-border smuggling of refined fuel is well established with neighboring Tunisia, where the official price at the pump is 580 percent above the cost in Libya.²³ Libya's fuel prices

¹⁶ Based on data from the IOM and Altai.

¹⁷ Based on data from UNHCR and Altai.

¹⁸ See, for example, Amnesty International 2015. In April 2017, the IOM reported on "slave market conditions" present in Niger and Libya (IOM 2017b). Likewise, in November 2017, video footage from a CNN report purported to show "bids" from what it described as a "slave auction" (Elbagir et al. 2017).

¹⁹ The substantial risks posed by blurring the concepts of human smuggling and trafficking has been recognized by the EU, UN, and other institutions (see for example UN 2017; GAATW 2011). While trafficking is widely recognized as a violation of human rights, the increasing criminalization of human smuggling can pose life threatening risks to people in need of protection. The smuggling experience of migrants can turn quickly and unexpectedly into a trafficking case. Specifically, when migrants are forced to embark from the Libyan coast on crowded boats, often at gunpoint, they are by definition victims of trafficking (OHCHR 2014).

²⁰ The most common destinations of Libya's exports by value are Europe (82 percent), Asia (12.9 percent), North America (3.1 percent), and Africa (1.3 percent). See Workman 2018.

²¹ Originally reported in UNSC 2017.

²² See, for example, Bhardwaj 2019; Lacher 2018.

²³ Currently the official subsidized rate for fuel in Libya is LYD0.15 (US\$0.11) per liter (for vehicles), and fuel prices in Tunisia cost DT1.8 (US\$0.75) per liter for petrol.

remain heavily subsidized, which has contributed to the vibrant fuel smuggling business. The most common smuggling scheme involves “ghost gasoline stations,” which exist only on paper.²⁴ Loaded fuel trucks are diverted to the border, or fuel is pumped into boats to ship to nearby countries.²⁵ Cross-border fuel smuggling mainly consists of relatively small-scale smugglers crossing the Tunisian border, using modified cars and vans fitted with oversized fuel tanks or series of jerricans. To operate smoothly, the fuel smuggling rings need to pay off border guards and local security forces on both sides of the border, thereby weakening institutions and contributing to fragility (Sy et al. 2017).

Drugs and weapons smuggling

Drug smuggling has increased since 2011; Libya has become a destination and transit zone for hashish, a transit zone for heroin and cocaine, and, increasingly, a market and transit zone for methamphetamines (Shaw and Mangan 2014). While comprehensive assessments of scale and flow are unavailable, several large-scale interceptions point at the scale of the drug smuggling business.²⁶ Since 2011, the use of drugs—particularly prescription-based opioids—has increased in Libya (Calimachi and Tondo 2016). Importantly, drug smuggling has evolved into a major income source for extremist groups, including ISIS, and combatting the drug trade has been identified as a key way to curb such groups’ financing.²⁷

Since 2011, Libya has developed into both a market and transit point for illicit weapons sales, and more recently into a global hub for online arms trading via social media, messaging applications, and the dark web (Jenzen-Jones and McCollum 2017). The 2011 revolution directly resulted in a massive proliferation of arms and munitions, which fueled the rapidly growing illicit economy and helped black market sellers consolidate market power in densely populated areas across Libya, including Tripoli and Misrata.²⁸ Overland weapons smuggling routes from West and East Africa have been in existence for many years. It has been demonstrated that Gaddafi-era arms depots were used extensively in the 2012 Tuareg and Islamist insurgencies in Mali and by other armed actors operating throughout the Sahel region, including small arms and portable air defense systems²⁹

²⁴ In late 2017, a NOC team sent to spot-check 105 petrol stations believed to be receiving regular deliveries of fuel found that 87 of them were nonoperational.

²⁵ Italian police recently announced the findings of an investigation that had tracked at least US\$35 million worth of smuggled low-grade Libyan diesel, allegedly delivered by a Libyan network to petrol stations in Italy and beyond.

²⁶ For example, a boat with 15 metric tons of hashish was intercepted in Libyan waters in April 2013. In 2017 over 18 million tablets of the opioid Tramadol were intercepted at Benghazi’s port. See Eaton 2018.

²⁷ See, for example, Clarke 2017.

²⁸ Firearms are being traded fairly openly in marketplaces in all larger cities as well as in smaller towns near ongoing fighting (Jenzen-Jones and McCollum 2017).

²⁹ Weapons from Libya were also smuggled to Syria, with some arms believed to have reached ISIS forces. Similarly, heavy weaponry such as anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns were smuggled to Darfur. See Eaton 2018.

Extortion

Rent seeking and war profiteering through extortion include a range of illicit activities, including kidnapping for ransom, forceful blockades of oil facilities, and closure of vital infrastructure such as airports. Kidnapping people for ransom is commonplace; between February 2014 and April 2015, more than 600 people were reported to have gone missing in Libya (Eaton 2018). This figure is eclipsed by the number of reported abductions in 2017 in Tripoli alone, where 676 individuals went missing; by the close of the year, only 100 had returned (Eaton 2018). Sometimes kidnappings are related to political, ethnic, familial, or tribal disputes, but often they are simply motivated by profit. The most lucrative schemes, however, consist of colluding with bank officials to submit fraudulent applications for letters of credit to import goods as well as by blackmailing, extorting, or kidnapping members of commercial banks and the Central Bank of Libya (CBL).³⁰ Militias have also turned to other schemes involving credit cards and money transfers, which has led to armed fighting for control over bank branches (Zway 2017).

When it is not possible to smuggle goods, most armed groups are able to generate revenues by taxing the movement of goods through territory under their control. Controlling territory and critical infrastructure such as airports and ports is integral to the logic of conflict in Libya. Airports and ports are particularly valuable as nodes for importing and exporting goods. For example, the 2014 destruction of Tripoli International Airport left Mitiga International Airport as the sole functioning airport near the capital, which has since been the subject of continued conflict and skirmishes.

Predation of state resources

Despite the hyperlocal nature of much of Libya's politics, the system for distributing resources such as oil and gas is highly centralized. In an environment where no actor has an uncontested mandate, competition between rival actors for control of Libya's political center has filtered down through the state bureaucracy, weakening institutions, causing administrative instability, and increasing opportunities for graft. In this context, the three institutions most critical to keeping Libya afloat—the National Oil Corporation (NOC), the CBL, and the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA)—have each been subject to power struggles. Their survival to date must be viewed as a significant success and a key resilience factor that has helped to keep the country together, but not one that should be taken for granted. For example, Central Bank fraud involving false letters of credit has cost the state hundreds of millions since 2011 (Laessing and Shennib 2013).

Similarly, Libya's sovereign wealth fund, the LIA, controls an estimated US\$67 billion in reserves. Organized as a complex consortium of over 550 companies, it reports through five subsidiaries and is hindered by limited capacity and ongoing challenges over its leadership. Substantial losses have been reported due to fraudulent activities involving national and foreign banks (Campbell and Chellel 2016; Economist 2017). Similarly, millions in interest rate and dividend payments

³⁰ As reported by the UN panel of experts on Libya, one of the most prominent militia leaders in Tripoli and his business associates obtained letters of credit for more than US\$20 million by extorting CBL officials in 2015. See UNSC 2016, 199.

related to frozen Gaddafi funds have been wired to disputed accounts held by the LIA.³¹ Lastly, as revealed by financial authorities in Belgium, several unknown Libyan individuals have been receiving millions worth of interest rate payments on frozen assets (Paravicini 2018).

Among the most damaging schemes is the fraudulent use of letters of credit. Such letters are used when importing goods; they provide access to foreign currency at the official import rate for goods into Libya.³² On many occasions, however, the amount of goods procured is smaller than the amount agreed in the letter of credit (or nonexistent), leaving the criminal group with excess dollars that can be sent to partners or shell companies overseas. When the shipment arrives in Libya, bribes ensure that the customs paperwork is falsified to indicate that the correct amount of goods has been delivered. The criminal group has a further opportunity to profit from the transaction by selling the goods at a price closer to that on the black market. In some cases, no goods arrive at all and the criminal group uses the letter of credit to launder money overseas. In 2016, the Libyan Audit Bureau was able to identify more than US\$570 million in fraudulent letters of credit involving 21 banks and 23 companies, half of which are foreign (Libyan Audit Bureau 2017).

³¹ At least €16 billion of the Libyan dictator's assets are held in Belgium (Paravicini 2018).

³² CBL figures indicate that US\$11.2 billion in letters of credit were dispersed in 2017.



Part 3

Sector Analysis



Chapter 1

Peace and Reconciliation

Social cohesion and reconciliation

This section is based on key works such as the Baseline Survey on Reconciliation prepared by Altai Consulting for UNSMIL and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which includes a nationally representative quantitative survey (Altai Consulting 2018), and a study on traditional reconciliation processes and mechanisms (Obeidi 2017). Other important sources include the report outlining the preparation phase of the Libyan National Conference (HD 2018). Also consulted in the preparation of this section were several research papers produced by UNDP that map reconciliation processes, actors, and laws. Based on the main documents and the views expressed by experts interviewed, the team concludes that there is a rich body of up-to-date information and qualitative assessments on the topic. Annex A lists all information and data gaps identified for the sector.

Despite the growth in literature in recent years, many analytical and data gaps remain, such as a lack of clarity on how strong identity affiliations are to armed groups; which social disincentives are at play when youth decide to leave armed groups and smuggling rings to engage in noncriminal activities; and people's perceptions of criminal justice and social justice at the local level and among excluded groups, such as youth, women, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and labor migrants. In addition, only limited quantitative data is available on the capacity of local civil society groups, their affiliations, and how they are perceived by different groups of society (Megerisi 2018).

Status of social cohesion and reconciliation and main challenges

Territorial and social fragmentation

Libya faces multiple challenges related to territorial fragmentation and the reemergence of subnational identities that further social exclusion. Power is primarily held by local elites who have created loyalties and, in most regions, secure their interests by controlling or collaborating with armed militia groups. On a secondary level, tribalism and ethnicity play a limited role in localized conflict and regarding how affiliations between different armed groups are shaped, particularly in rural areas.¹

¹As leading conflict analysts have repeatedly pointed out, the situation in Libya is not a tribal conflict. Such oversimplification risks ignoring the primary drivers of fragility, which are linked to resource capture and war profiteering rather than to political ambitions or tribal grievances. For an overview see, for example, Eaton 2018.

Political parties and civil society organizations (CSOs) remain weak and largely lack clear profiles or mandates.

Society is fractured, and many groups are excluded from public, social, and economic life.

These include large shares of women and youth as well as IDPs, migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. The lack of inclusion in social and political life increases socioeconomic marginalization and remains a fundamental obstacle to a unified Libya. Young people—who represent half of the population—and women face discrimination and constraints to participating in public life and decision making. Although Libya's youth were the mainstay of the revolution, the majority of revolutionaries (thuwwar) remain politically and economically marginalized. This has made them vulnerable to recruitment by militant or jihadist groups. Youth radicalization has further added to Libya's fragility (see the sector note in chapter 7 on youth). The large numbers of economic migrants, IDPs, refugees, and asylum seekers remain targets of exploitation and abuse (Amnesty International 2017).

Libyan women suffer from widespread political, social, and economic exclusion as well as sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV).

They are underrepresented in decision-making processes. Only 10 percent of the constitutional drafting committee members were women; 16 percent of parliamentary members are female; 12 percent of all local councilors are women; and just 38 percent of eligible women voters participated in local elections. Women civil society leaders have become direct targets of militant groups, not only for promoting women's rights but also for generally participating in public debate (see sector note in chapter 7 on gender).

Local, tribal, and family identity

Social bonds are being forged across the country's local identity groups, and today's Libya arguably resembles a nation of city-states shaped by local identities

(Allen et al. 2019; Toaldo and Fitzgerald 2018). During and after the 2011 revolution, groups convened for the purpose of maintaining or developing links at the technical level and being committed to Libya's future. This has enabled networks to form across identity groups, including tribal or spatial identities. Local agreements forged between communities have strengthened local or subregional institutions and created pockets of stability.

The role of tribes differs in urban and rural areas.

In most urban areas, tribal identities only play a secondary role, as personal identities are primarily shaped by political affiliation and local clan and family.² In fact, tribes, subtribes, and other groups have a variety of leadership structures, and rarely function as monolithic blocks due to rapidly changing positions and affiliations between armed groups (Lacher 2016). As a result, only a few groups have developed a consistent identity along tribal terms; rather than stemming from tribal hierarchy, most group identities are shaped by local leaders who are in control of resources. Younger generations largely reject tribal authority. Several new leaders have emerged from among the diaspora; however, these are mostly from prominent families that had fallen out of favor with the Gaddafi regime and are now competing for power in the urban centers. Overall, they do not enjoy significant support among the establishment.

²This section is based on analysis of family, tribe, and leadership identities by El Kamouni-Janssen, Shadeedi, and Ezzeddine 2018.

Tribal alliances play a certain role in localized conflicts in the West and South over control of resources such as oil fields, transit routes, and smuggling networks (Lacher 2016). Currently, local militias—some shaped around tribal identities—administer smaller cities and provinces that are not under control of either the GNA or the competing government in the East. Particularly in Libya’s western mountain region and parts of the southern desert, local leaders have been successful in leveraging tribal and ethnic identities to build up armed groups (El Kamouni-Janssen, Shadeedi, and Ezzeddine 2018). One survey found that local-level conflicts are mostly perceived of in either tribal terms (as in the South), as part of a struggle against Islamist extremists (in the East), or as a combination of competitions between tribes, militias, and cities (especially in the West) (Altai Consulting 2018). Furthermore, it emerged that the resolution of the Misrata-Tawergha conflict—which has resulted in continued displacement of population—was considered key for future national reconciliation efforts (Altai Consulting 2018). Former regime loyalists play a divisive role in Libya. That said, the population strongly desires justice and accountability that is not solely determined by an offender’s relationship to the former regime. Up to 56 percent believe that members of the former regime should be allowed to participate in a future Libyan state, although 74 percent agree that only former regime figures who had not committed any crimes should be allowed to participate in a state-building process (Altai Consulting 2018). The majority of the population surveyed believe that all perceived spoilers and offenders should be held accountable before the law. Furthermore, while the population somewhat understands the need to guarantee temporary amnesty to some people who are perceived of as criminals, this measure is not popular and risks being interpreted as allowing impunity for the sake of reconciliation (Altai Consulting 2018).

Institutional framework

Regarding reconciliation initiatives at the local level, the main official institution is the Ministry of Culture and Civil Society. It undertakes the registration of many of the established tribal regional and national bodies (Obeidi 2017).

Different bodies active in local reconciliation were formed after the revolution or prior to the fall of the Gaddafi regime. These bodies rely primarily on traditional tribal leaders and include the following:

- **The Council of Elders and Shura.** At the local level, the first reconciliation project was elaborated in 2011, with the National Transitional Council (NTC) setting into motion the establishment of Elders (or Wise Men) and Shura councils to resolve crises. These councils were set up in the various regions, as well as in some urban areas and cities, and were formed along the model of the Social Popular Leaderships of the Gaddafi era (UNDP, n.d.a.). They were elite-based rather than truly representative (UNDP, n.d.a.), and they sometimes coalesced into wider bodies; an example is Libya’s Council of Notables for Reconciliation, which was established in late 2012 and included various members of reconciliation councils from regions and tribes across the country (UNDP, n.d.a.). Other processes established since 2011 include the Local Councils, many of which were born during the 2011 revolution or formed afterward (UNDP, n.d.a.). The first meeting of the Council of Elders and Shura was held in Tobruk in May 2011 and was attended by 500 tribal sheikhs and dignitaries from “liberated” cities and areas.

- **Libya's Council of Elders for Reconciliation.** This group was created in 2015 and includes several former members of Libya's Council of Notables for Reconciliation (UNDP, n.d.a.).
- **Regional area-based councils.** These include the Cyrenaica Council of Wise Men and Notables, the Fezzan Council of Wise Men and Notables, the Jabal Nafusa Council of Wise Men and Notables, and the Council of Wise Men and Notables of Greater Tripoli.
- **Tribal councils for the main tribes.** These often do not require permission from state institutions in terms of their organization and in several cases have been successful in negotiating, for example, local cease-fires (Obeidi 2017).

Structural challenges

The following structural challenges affect reconciliation efforts:

- **Absence of a justice system.** Without an effective judicial system, local-level drivers of exclusion and grievances remain unaddressed (El Kamouni-Janssen, Shadeedi, and Ezzed-dine 2018).
- **Absence of women in local reconciliation processes.** Because of social norms and security concerns, it is considered unacceptable for women to attend consultations, negotiations, or reconciliation events that are regarded as male only (Obeidi 2017). However, women play a role in civil society initiatives and national-level dialogue (Altai Consulting 2018).
- **The lack of significant roles for youth in ongoing reconciliation efforts at local and national levels.** The systematic exclusion of young people is based on implicit discrimination that stems from the perception that they are a source of dispute. Such arguments do not hold when compared to the ongoing resource capture and war profiteering by local leaders and armed groups. Socially, young people are excluded based on norms that provide more voice and decision making to elderly decision makers; for example, in reconciliation councils (Obeidi 2017).
- **A limited role for CSOs in reconciliation processes.** Although many of the CSOs that emerged after 2011 have been involved in promoting peace and reconciliation, only a few have had the same level of influence as traditional peacemakers, mediators, and elders (Altai Consulting 2018).
- **Limited support to municipalities.** The limited emphasis on strengthening elected municipal governments continues to constrain the ability to improve local service delivery, the local economy and jobs, local security, and civil society, with adverse effects on inclusion and social cohesion (Allen et al. 2019).
- **Security as an impediment to civic engagement and reconciliation efforts.** Libya's prevailing environment makes it challenging to take part in civic engagement activities, with 64 percent of respondents surveyed by Altai Consulting stating that the prohibitive political climate had stopped them from being active in their communities (Altai Consulting 2018).

Impact of the conflict

The conflict created further challenges that have impacted social cohesion and complicated reconciliation efforts, although more so at the national than local level. These challenges include the following:

- **The revolution and subsequent conflict created new challenges for traditional reconciliation processes.** Reconciliation processes had to adapt to address new types of violations, such as war crimes and forced displacement, to which these customary reconciliation mechanisms may not entirely be suited. These violations have in turn affected many social values that used to promote and facilitate reconciliation processes between the disputing parties (Obeidi 2017).
- **The proliferation of arms, armed groups, and parallel institutions in state security institutions.** These obstruct the implementation of any reconciliation agreement (Obeidi 2017).
- **The absence of the state.** Especially in terms of security, this is one of the main challenges to reconciliation at both local and national levels (Obeidi 2017).
- **The intervention of external parties.** These interventions are not always conducive to reconciliation, depending on their purpose or modality (Obeidi 2017).
- **Rise of tribal elders as conflict resolution and reconciliation actors.** The escalation of the 2014 conflict and the lack of progress of the state-led political dialogue led tribal elders to play a more prominent role in reconciliation activities (Altai Consulting 2018).
- **Emergence of national and regional councils representing Libyan tribes.** During the revolution, communities formed new local and elders' councils to act as basic units of local governance. Tribes and elders were found to be among the actors that are most trusted by Libyans (Altai Consulting 2018). The formation of these councils created a complex new web of actors and alliances that presented themselves as the true representatives of Libyan society. Such tribal groups have since become a vector of influence and in some cases have been instrumentalized by various interest groups (Altai Consulting 2018).

Main interventions and capacity to respond

Local reconciliation processes

Since 2011, local reconciliation processes have generally followed traditional conflict resolution mechanisms and principles. Local reconciliation is currently conducted in an ad hoc fashion, with the help of local mediators such as tribal elders from an area of conflict or a neighboring tribe acting as third parties, rather than involving local councils, Shura councils, or elders' and notables' councils. That said, most local reconciliation actors seem to be involved in both local- and national-level processes (Obeidi 2017). There were only a few youth-led reconciliation initiatives and collaborative processes. Similarly, civil society initiatives have only in a few instances succeeded in unblocking dialogue statements or opening new channels of communication (Obeidi 2017).

Notable recent local reconciliation processes include the following:

- The El-Obeidat tribe statement (2011), sponsored by the Obeidat tribe with the support of other tribes (Obeidi 2017).
- The NTC Agreement (2011), sponsored by the Chief of Staff of the Libyan Army (Obeidi 2017).
- The Tebu and Tuareg agreement (2014), sponsored by the Social Council of Werfala tribes—Bani Walid and the South (Obeidi 2017).
- The Peacemakers Societal Dialogue Initiative (2015), conceived and implemented by Libyan activists in partnership with local reconciliation committees, was supported by the Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (UNDP, n.d.a.).
- The truce between Zintan and Misrata (2015) (UNDP, n.d.a.).
- The dialogue between Misrata and Warshafana (2015), which was mediated by al-Asaba (UNDP, n.d.a.).
- The agreement between Al-Zawiya and Zintan (2015) (UNDP, n.d.a.).
- The Tebu and Tuareg peace and reconciliation agreement covering Ubari and Sebha (2015), sponsored by the government of Qatar (UNDP, n.d.a.; Obeidi 2017).
- The peaceful coexistence agreement between Qadhadfa and Awlad Suleiman tribes (2016), sponsored by Zintan, Tarhouna, and Suq El Juma tribes (Obeidi 2017).
- The Misrata-Tawergha Agreement (2016), sponsored by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and the PC (Obeidi 2017).
- The Tebu and Awlad Suleiman Tribes Agreement (2017), sponsored by the government of Italy (Obeidi 2017).

These agreements are more akin to crisis management mechanisms than real reconciliation between conflicting parties.

As such, most settlements have not tackled the root causes of local conflicts but instead relied on vague calls for reconciliation without clear mechanisms for how to achieve it. The absence of strong state institutions is one of the main limitations of these agreements, as implementing measures such as reparations and accountability requires state support (Obeidi 2017). The components of a sustainable reconciliation agreement should reflect the restoration of trust, a shared belief in a common path forward, and the state administration of justice and reparations, both financial and symbolic. Justice is strongly associated with reparations, with 64 percent of Libyans agreeing that “payments of reparation” are a defining feature of reconciliation between groups (Altai Consulting 2018). Most Libyans would seem to be unsatisfied with a reparations package that only involved nonfinancial reparations, even though exchanging apologies and acknowledging responsibility was agreed to be important (Altai Consulting 2018).

National reconciliation processes

Numerous peace initiatives were launched after 2011 in an effort to resolve the political crisis. Despite efforts to find consensus and come to a lasting solution, these initiatives failed to hold, in part due to a growing disconnect between initiative negotiators and the population. Efforts to secure a power-sharing deal between elites tended to exclude the population (HD 2018), or they have not been mainstreamed (UNDP, n.d.a.). There was an effort in 2016 to reunify various bodies in a push for national reconciliation. However, this effort has been impeded by several factors, including competition for influence and leadership, the political ambitions of some of the parties, and attempts to co-opt elements of the reconciliation committees (UNDP, n.d.a.). Obeidi (2017) found that reconciliation agreements work fairly well at the social level, especially when they have a strong focus on social issues. However, they are less successful at the national level, where they must address armed conflicts, because this requires the intervention of state institutions or those that have the capacity to intervene to ensure justice, enforce reparations, and supervise the implementation of agreements in areas where armed conflict is still prevalent (Obeidi 2017).

Early efforts at national reconciliation mostly centered on transitional justice and were derailed by conflicting security and political priorities as well as by political competition.

They were also largely limited to Libyan communities living inside Libya and therefore did not address the constituencies that had fled the country (UNDP, n.d.a.). The country's division in 2014 led to the collapse of the transitional process envisioned in 2011–12. These are some of the key national reconciliation initiatives:

- **National Commission for Reconciliation Transitional Justice.** Since 2011, the approach to national reconciliation has mostly featured transitional justice. However, political and security developments, as well as challenges within the justice system, have meant that concrete milestones have been hard to come by (UNDP, n.d.a.).
- **Fact-Finding and Reconciliation Commission.** This was set up in 2012 as a fully independent commission tasked with investigating cases of abuse. Due to the complexity of the situation and the conflicting priorities in the fields of human rights and security, not much was achieved through this body (UNDP, n.d.a.).
- **National Dialogue Preparatory Commission.** Established in August 2013 (UNDP, n.d.a.).
- **Libyan Political Agreement.** This was signed in December 2015 with the goal of building a supportive political framework for national reconciliation. It addresses national reconciliation and transitional justice in various instances (Maghur, n.d.). However, it has yet to implement the bulk of its measures (UNDP, n.d.b.).
- **Co-existence Agreement in Confronting the State Division and Conflict in Libya.** This was agreed upon in June 2016 to allow a 15-day cease-fire in Benghazi, Ajdabiya, and Derna as well as to form a nationwide neutral committee to conduct mediation across the country. The agreement was also meant to secure the safe return of refugees and ensure the rights of the inhabitants of Cyrenaica (UNDP, n.d.a.).

A national conference to include the breadth of Libyan society in the public debate was scheduled to be held in March 2019, and then April 2019, but has been delayed. Still, a series of consultations were held between April and June 2018 in preparation for this conference, including 77 town hall meetings with 8,000 stakeholders. Organizing meetings and consultations throughout Libya and with diaspora groups abroad was intended to provide a space in which Libyans of all ages and backgrounds could interact (HD 2018). Participation was broad and included national elites and local powerbrokers, as well as community leaders and citizens. The effort was run by Humanitarian Dialogue, which hopes that by including as many Libyans as possible, the process and its outcomes will be credible. Events were designed to include specific groups not previously involved in the political process, such as IDPs, women, university students, and those who live in geographically remote locations (HD 2018). The conference was intended to be a precursor to presidential and parliamentary elections this spring, and when it takes place is hoped to end the divisions that have paralyzed the country since 2011.

Main needs and priorities as formulated in the literature

In terms of the population's priorities for national stability, Libyans most frequently rank security (37 percent), followed by national reconciliation (at 27 percent), with forgiveness and justice both coming in as top priorities within the national reconciliation category (at 25 percent each) (Altai Consulting 2018). They also agreed that security would need to be a prerequisite for reconciliation (whether local or national), as no agreement can hold in a security vacuum. Similarly, there is a sense that justice cannot be pursued immediately following an agreement, as the judicial system is currently unable to enforce laws, making the pursuit of justice seem counterproductive (Altai Consulting 2018).

This shows that social cohesion and reconciliation needs are cross-cutting in nature. Provision of quality services and the creation of jobs and livelihood opportunities across the country are important to strengthen social cohesion and reconciliation. Likewise, so is strengthening the security and justice sectors to ensure the state retains a monopoly over the use of force, the enforcement of reconciliation agreements, and fair resolution of disputes. Conversely, social cohesion and reconciliation are enabling factors for economic recovery and job creation.

Period	Needs Include	Sources
Short-term	Provide support to local service delivery, income-generating activities, and civil society to strengthen stability and nonviolent behavior. ^a	Allen et al. 2019; Megerisi 2018
Medium/long-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide technical support, especially training programs on mediation, negotiation, and peace-building mechanisms in local communities. • Support dialogues among the various conflicted parties at the political level. • Adopt a national model of reconciliation based on local actors. The role of the external parties would then be limited to providing technical support such as training, capacity building on mediation, negotiation and conflict resolution, and support to monitor these processes. 	Obeidi 2017

a. Local support would directly reduce exclusion for youth, women, IDPs, migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, and other groups and contribute to building up institutions and promoting noncriminal income-generating activity (Megerisi 2018).

Security sector

This section is based on key reference documents from UNSMIL (UNSMIL, n.d.a.), UNDP (Cole 2016), the European Council on Foreign Relations, the Small Arms Survey,³ and think tanks such as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Wehrey and Cole 2013) and the Middle East Policy Institute (Mattes 2014). The team's assessment, based on the main documents, concludes that there are significant gaps in both international and Libyan data and knowledge, including the absence of a comprehensive mapping of security sector stakeholders undertaken on a rolling basis to take into account constantly shifting actors and alliances, and no granular information on public expenditures in the sector (only consolidated figures of spending in the sector are available). There is also a critical gap in knowledge regarding the linkages between the formal security system and the fragmented system of armed groups and militias that currently operate across the territory. Annex A lists all information and data gaps identified for the sector.

Status of the security sector and main challenges

Many of the security challenges facing Libya today have roots in Gaddafi's deliberate fragmentation of the security apparatus. Gaddafi constructed an "institution-less" regime and weakened the army at the expense of the internal security forces. He frequently changed the chain of command, reassigned institutional responsibilities, undermined the military (following the 1993 aborted coup) (Lacher 2011, via EU, UN, and World Bank 2018), and employed mercenaries from across Africa. All these measures fostered a sense of insecurity and uncertainty and prevented the emergence of an independent security apparatus that could exercise territorial control and maintain monopoly over the use of force.

Since Gaddafi's rule, Libya has experienced escalated violence in 2014, 2017, and most recently in 2019; each flare up has been met with corresponding UN Security Council resolutions. The armed groups that originated in the 2011 revolution expanded due to readily available arms and the security vacuum. Post-Gaddafi, the newly established administration recognized many armed groups⁴ as formal security bodies and in many cases issued them generous salaries in a highly unsuccessful attempt to integrate armed groups into a central security apparatus under civilian authority. The failed approach cemented a hybrid security system, in which weak and nascent formal institutions acted alongside much more powerful informal armed groups that received funding, status, and legal rights from the government. Subsequent attempts by the government to rein in the multiplying militias under a single authority failed, as the government could not mitigate inter-militia rivalries.

As a result, post-revolution Libya has lacked a coherent national security apparatus and instead resembles a complex set of relatively autonomous armed actors that have varying degrees

³ Data from the 2016 Small Arms Survey is from EU, UN, and World Bank 2018.

⁴ Local support would directly reduce exclusion for youth, women, IDPs, migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, and other groups and contribute to building up institutions and promoting noncriminal income-generating activity (Megerisi 2018). OHCHR 2015.

of association with the state and one another. Militias strategically align temporarily with political actors based on political and economic incentives, forcing the competing governments to constantly renegotiate their security relationship even as they attempt to reach settlement amongst themselves (EU, UN, and World Bank 201). The result is that the state does not have a monopoly on security, nor clearly defined constitutional or legal authority over the governance of Libya's security sector (Cole 2016). The multiplicity of actors and allegiances makes it almost impossible to establish a national entity with the capacity to enforce security across the country.

The LPA is considered the foundation of the recent stabilization efforts led by the UN and supported by the international community.⁵ It also provides justification for Libya's internationally recognized government, the GNA. However, the LPA remains somewhat controversial, and four years after its signing, full implementation remains elusive, especially in view of the current escalation of violence. Political divisions between and within the HoR and the High State Council (HSC) remain, and limited progress toward political consensus around the LPA, and toward elections, stalled in early 2019. Overall, there has been little progress to reestablish unified and effective security institutions, a process that has been limited by deep divisions among relevant actors and the continued proliferation and influence of armed groups. Critically, logistical challenges continue to hamper the security activities of the UN and the international community outside of Tripoli.

Institutional framework

In a broad sense, security sector actors compose the Ministry of the Interior (MoI); the acting Minister of Defense (Defense Minister Mr. Serraj); other state bodies, including the ascendant LNA; parastatal security forces; militias subordinate to the ministries; and various armed groups. A typology of armed groups—ranging from full-time military units, hybrid security forces, local and tribal protection forces, to criminal gangs and terrorist groups—is presented in box 2.

Key state security actors include the following:

- **The MoD.** The MoD has not been able to perform its sovereign function of defending the territory. Since 2011 it has not had a unified army under its control. Instead, the territory is secured by various loose army units and militias that operate under the nominal control of various patrons or oppose it. These include the following:
 - The Libyan Armed Forces, under the control of the GNA, is the official army institution. However, it is not very strong or effective and remains highly divided.
 - The LNA is one of the dominant armed force in Libya but should not be regarded as either “national” or as an “army,” with current operations centered around clearing, securing, and consolidating territorial control across Libya with a view to supplanting failed political solutions with a military one.

⁵ The LPA is the result of UN-sponsored negotiations in Morocco between various Libyan stakeholders. It was signed on December 17, 2015, and endorsed by the UN Security Council shortly thereafter.

Period	Needs Include	Sources
Short-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide support to local service delivery, income-generating activities, and civil society to strengthen stability and nonviolent behavior.^a 	Allen et al. 2019; Megerisi 2018
Medium/long-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide technical support, especially training programs on mediation, negotiation, and peace-building mechanisms in local communities. • Support dialogues among the various conflicted parties at the political level. • Adopt a national model of reconciliation based on local actors. The role of the external parties would then be limited to providing technical support such as training, capacity building on mediation, negotiation and conflict resolution, and support to monitor these processes. 	Obeidi 2017

a. Local support would directly reduce exclusion for youth, women, IDPs, migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, and other groups and contribute to building up institutions and promoting noncriminal income-generating activity (Megerisi 2018).

Box 2 Typology of Armed Groups in Libya

- **GNA-affiliated groups.** Various groups are ostensibly aligned with the GNA, including the nascent Presidential guard; some Misratan brigades, particularly its 3rd Force; the Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade; Nawasi; and the Special Deterrence Forces.
- **LNA and LNA-affiliated groups,** particularly the Saiqa forces and a number of tribal armed groups.
- **Zintani brigades,** which have aligned with Haftar in the past but now seem to largely pursue their own interests.
- **Anti-GNA, anti-LNA rejectionists** that often claim a “revolutionary” label—examples include a number of Misratan brigades (Salah Badi’s militia in particular).
- **Islamist/jihadist groups.** These do not compose a coherent coalition and include Seraya Defend Benghazi, Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council, and Ansar al-Sharia.
- **Daesh/IS,** which is distinct from other Islamist/jihadist groups.
- **Tribal groups** such as the Tubu and Tuareg (mostly in the South).
- **Criminal gangs and smugglers.** The names of these groups are unknown, but they are among Libya’s armed groups.

Source: EU, UN, and World Bank 2018.

- Security actors remain highly heterogeneous in terms of capacities or loyalty. The repeated attempts to integrate armed groups into the public security actors, including the police, army, and other state-supported security functions, makes it highly complex to deal appropriately with armed groups.⁶
- **The MoI.** Based on prerevolutionary structures, the organization of the MoI and police are divided into several categories that broadly mirror the policing frameworks used in other Arab countries in the region. The security-related categories comprise the following:
 - Police authorities (*masalih*) include public services such as the National Safety Authority (a “civil defense” or emergency services body); registries such as passports and immigration, the civil registry, and explosives and firearms licensing; and facilities such as the Police Sports League, training centers, and academies.
 - Policing functions are overseen by the General Security Directorate (GSD, *Al-Mudiriyya al-Amniyya al-Aama*), which is analogous to a national police headquarters. Located in Tripoli, the GSD houses the administrations (*idarat*) and technical specializations that support policing functions across the country.
 - In post-revolutionary Libya, new policing entities were grafted onto this structure to support the addition of armed groups (Sawani 2017) to the MoI payroll. This included the Supreme Security Committee (SSC), a police unit from revolutionary brigades that is under either the MoI or MoD (Mattes 2014) and is generally paid for under the MoI (Wehrey and Cole 2013). This unit was founded as an interim organ by the NTC at the MoI in September 2011 in order to gain state control over the mainly independent *thuwwar* brigades (Mattes 2014). In theory, both the Libya Shield and the SSC were supposed to augment the police and the regular army, but they operate with a great deal of autonomy and pursue their own interests (Wehrey and Cole 2013).
 - **Border guards.** These include a suborganization in charge of guarding vital installations.
 - **The Preventive Security Apparatus, a counterintelligence force.** This is headed by the MoI Chief of Staff. A significant minority of the Libya Shield and the SSC have become part of the apparatus (Wehrey and Cole 2013).
 - **The Warriors Affairs Commission (WAC).** Established in 2012 under the Prime Minister, WAC is the key body that interacts with combatants regarding rehabilitation and the reinsertion of demilitarized fighters into the Libyan economy, especially from militias that fought against Gaddafi. It was set up to act as an intermediary body between the demilitarized fighters and other government institutions that could provide support. WAC has established dialogue with Libyan institutions such as the Ministry of Labor (MoL), the MoI, and the MoD as well as international organizations that support disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). It has also started to develop its own programs (ETF 2014).

⁶UNSMIL has developed a complementary approach for dealing with armed groups that aims to overcome current challenges by addressing motives and incentives. The approach focuses on local community protection, criminality, and political ambition.

Structural challenges

Key structural challenges include the following:

- **Legacy of pre- and post-revolutionary arbitrary structures.** The organizational structures of the MoI and police remain heavily influenced by the former regime's legacy of weak institutions, unclear chain of command, lack of respect for the rule of law, and rule by decree. The fact that armed forces and the police have taken a backseat to the Libya Shield, the SSC, and several other paramilitaries (such as the ones outlined in box 2) reflects the arrangement under the previous regime, when the military was undermined and mercenaries were used instead.
- **Lack of resources and capacities.** The MoD, the Office of the Chief of the General Staff, and military governorships suffer from dire administrative deficiencies. Under Gaddafi, they did not have an institutional base or staffing functions. Because of the inadequate framework, the functioning of these institutions is now highly dependent on making deals with various armed groups (Wehrey and Cole 2013).
- **Unclear legislation.** Different governing entities in the country's West and East have introduced competing and contradictory legislation, created new entities, and either reformed or remodeled existing security sector guidelines.

Impact of the conflict

The conflict has significantly impacted the security sector's ability to function. Impediments include the following:

- **Decimation of security services.** Revolutionary backlash decimated Libya's police, particularly its armed tactical police operations, riot police, and armories.
- **Lack of capacities.** The exclusion of many experienced MoI and MoD staff under Law no. 13 on Political and Administrative Isolation has further undermined human capacity within these ministries.
- **Lack of understanding of the roles and mandates of the police versus the army.** While these roles are clear to stakeholders in theory, the problem arises in reality due to blurred roles with substantial overlaps in activities of forces that define themselves as "police" or "army."
- **Proliferation of arms and weapons.** Delivering policing services proved particularly challenging after the country was flooded with weapons (Cole 2016). Contemporary estimates place the number of nonstate weapons in Libya at 22 million, a nearly 25-fold increase over the 2007 estimate of 900,000 (Libya Herald 2017b, via EU, UN, and World Bank 2018). An active online market for Libyan arms has also emerged, feeding conflict in Libya, the region, and beyond.⁷

⁷Data from the 2016 Small Arms Survey is from EU, UN, and World Bank 2018.

- **Difficulty reintegrating ex-combatants.** A lack of overall employment opportunities in which to place demilitarized fighters, as well as a lack of training opportunities adapted to their specific needs, has hindered their ability to get reintegrated (ETF 2014).

Main interventions and capacity to respond

Overall, there is a broad acceptance both in Libya and among the international community that political progress requires an agreement on military unity and legitimate security arrangements within a coherent and effective national security architecture. In this context, UNSMIL has been tasked with providing advice and coordination (see box 3),⁸ while UN Member States are responsible for financing and implementing large-scale security sector reform (SSR) and DDR programming (UNSC 2018).

The Security Institutions Service (SIS) of UNSMIL, in collaboration with the Libyan authorities and in liaison with the international community, plans to support the development of Libya's strategic defense vision when conditions allow. The SIS aims to help the MoD and the Office of the Chief of the General Staff identify and implement practical initiatives in relevant areas, such as readiness, capabilities, training, doctrine, logistics, procurement, and weapons and ammunition management (UNSMIL, n.d.a.).

Key initiatives and support include the following:

- **The 2012–14 SSC Integration Program.** It worked to reintegrate former armed groups into security forces or civilian jobs. The SSC Integration Program was a MoI/SSC initiative centered around a 45-day basic intensive training (BIT) course run by the MoI's training authority as a temporary stopgap. It processed roughly 45 percent of applicants into police training, further education, or civilian appointments within the MoI, while a further 10 percent were referred to other ministries for civilian jobs. However, the remaining 45 percent stalled or objected to the program while retaining their salaried status. The program could not provide adequate options for commanders and politically powerful NSAGs in Tripoli nor prevent other SSC groups from being assigned to police departments without completing the BIT. The uncontrolled absorption of NSAGs has changed the character and force ratio of directorates markedly and differently from region to region (Cole 2016). Efforts to reintegrate ex-combatants have had mixed results. Armed groups or militias during the revolution have been registered in the WAC database, a large proportion of which have returned to work or been integrated into the Libyan security services (50,000). The remainder have specific needs and are eligible for priority vocational training, job placement, or entrepreneurship financing (ETF 2014).
- **DDR.** The UNSMIL Arms and Ammunition Advisory Section (AAAS), which is managed by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), has been in contact with the GNA to

⁸ In light of the overall task, in 2014 UNSMIL strategically decided—and was backed by Member States—to scale down UNSMIL SSR ambitions because of inadequate instruments. In fact, UNSMIL had large SSR resources available until 2014, yet it did not succeed under conditions that were considerably easier than today.

Box 3 UNSMIL's Mandate

The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) is an integrated special political mission that was established on September 16, 2011, by UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2009 (2011) at the request of the Libyan authorities to support the country's transitional authorities in their post-conflict efforts. UNSMIL's mandate was modified and extended by the Security Council in resolutions 2022 (2011), 2040 (2012), 2095 (2013), 2144 (2014), 2238 (2015), 2323 (2016), 2376 (2017), and 2434 (2018). Its current mandate is stipulated by the latest UN Security Council Resolution 2486 (2019), which extended UNSMIL's mission until September 15, 2020. Unanimously adopting Resolution 2323 in December 2016, the Security Council mandated UNSMIL, in full accordance with the principles of national ownership, to exercise mediation and good offices in support of the implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), the consolidation of governance, security, and economic arrangements of the Government of National Accord (GNA), and subsequent phases of the Libyan transition process (UNSMIL, n.d.b.).

Libya's security strategy is a sovereign responsibility, which is supported through the mandated requirement for UNSMIL to articulate a settled approach to security for Libya that will act as a long-term vision within which UN and international community efforts can be coordinated with agreed Libyan needs. The security framework will be complimentary to political requirements as defined by relevant UNSCRs and UNSMIL's mission mandate. It is coherent with the Libya Roadmap announced by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in September 2017, which was further endorsed in November 2018 by high-level stakeholders.¹

UNSMIL's mandate aims to stabilize the political and security situation while also undertaking institutional reform of security structures.² The underlying principle of the security framework is its complementarity, which is informed and guided by the political track. The security framework provides a means for an integrated approach that incorporates efforts from across the security spectrum, including security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). It also includes the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) efforts on explosive remnants of war.

The mandated objectives of UNSMIL remain largely unchanged, while the approach has evolved through several stages:

- **Phase 2011–14:** The UNSMIL mission followed a traditional SSR approach focusing on defense sector reform by assisting the unified government to develop a traditional defense white paper.
- **Phase 2014–15:** Following the renewed outbreak of conflict, the focus shifted to mediation and facilitation of a security dialogue, which resulted in the signing of the LPA in December 2015 (Skhirat process), which included a series of Interim Security Arrangements (ISA) aimed at unifying the security apparatus and increasing civilian oversight.
- **Phase 2016–17:** The LPA was implemented, which supported the installation of the Presidential Council (PC) in Tripoli.³ The approach hardened the divide between the GNA and the Libyan National Army (LNA), while strengthening the position of several recognized armed groups in Tripoli.

Box 3 UNSMIL's Mandate *(continued)*

- **Phase 2017:** A UN Action Plan was launched to unify national security institutions,⁴ while Egypt was facilitating strategic unification talks between the GNA and LNA.
- **Phase 2018:** Under Resolution 2434 (2018), UNSMIL was mandated to “support security and economic dialogue” alongside an inclusive political process. UNSMIL remained focused on Tripoli and negotiated a cease-fire and new security arrangements in September 2018 following clashes.⁵ The temporary security committee was dissolved and replaced with a more inclusive and representative Greater Tripoli Security Committee (GTSP), which was tasked with a very difficult process given the entrenchment of the quasi-state security actors.⁶ Shortly after, the MoI replaced the GTSP with its own funded Tripoli Security Arrangements Plan.
- **Phase 2019:** Against the backdrop of increasing fighting related to the LNA's push to consolidate the South in Sabha and the El Sharara oil fields, UNSMIL continued to advocate for a national conference and elections, as per the established road map toward security, judicial, and political reconciliation. Under Resolution 2486 (2019) and in addition to its previous responsibilities, the Security Council requested UNSMIL to support a possible ceasefire.

¹ An international conference was hosted in Palermo, Italy, in November 2018, bringing together relevant high-level Libyan and international actors. It resulted in an emerging consensus on the required steps for transition. Agreements include the SRSF's plan to postpone elections until spring 2019 and to convene a broad national conference before then. The conference would need to be tied to the draft constitution in some fashion if it is to produce clear principles that are broadly shared across Libya.

² UNSMIL combines a top-down approach with a bottom-up methodology that aims to unify security institutions and strengthen their control over disparate security actors, including armed groups and other local community actors. The political track aims to support the state in recovering from conflict and to strengthen the rule of law and institutions.

³ The LPA was designed to bring about unity, but because none of the main parties agreed to integrate with one another, the mission ended up pursuing a partisan approach that focused on Tripoli and ensured the survival of the GNA.

⁴ On a positive note, the approach led to improved relations between the LNA and UNSMIL.

⁵ The clashes in September 2018 provided the opportunity to create a more inclusive framework that aimed to decrease the influence of armed groups while addressing security of greater Tripoli.

⁶ The GTSP was responsible for ensuring that the armed groups abided by their commitments, including to withdraw from the locations of sovereign institutions and critical infrastructure in Tripoli, as well as to assign the functions of securing the capitol to regular police and military forces.

create an arms and ammunition management capacity within the MoD to rationalize, re-align, and safely store weapons and ammunition in Libya. Very limited progress has been made by the GNA on addressing this issue.⁹

- **Border security.** This area is currently the focus of work through the GNA Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) with several international interlocutors including the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM). The connotations of border security are wider than migration.

Main needs and priorities as formulated in the literature

Period	Needs include	Sources
Short-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unify the police. • Unify the military. • Streamline functions and command authority of the MoD. • Gradually revise the military personnel structure. • Disarm armed groups and reduce proliferation of arms. • Strengthen border security. 	HD 2018; UNSMIL, n.d.b; Shaw and Mangan 2014; Easton 2018; Tubiana and Gramizzi 2018.
Medium/long-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish a political process toward national dialogue and a constitution. • Hold inclusive elections without triggering renewed violence. • Settle an approach to security for Libya. 	El Kamouni-Janssen, Shadeedi, and Ezzeddine 2018; UNSCRs related to UNSMIL mission mandate.

Justice

This section is based on several documents, including the UNDP mapping of legislation related to transitional justice (Maghur, n.d.), the UNSMIL 2019 Report of the Secretary-General (UNSMIL 2019a), and several reports from Transparency International (TI 2014), the United States Institute of Peace (Mangan and Murray 2016), and the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ 2016). Based on the main documents and considering the views expressed by experts interviewed, the team concludes that there is good, recent analysis on the justice sector. A comprehensive overview of the justice sector, its capacities, and challenges is provided by the justice baseline assessment, which has been funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and produced by the American Bar Association (ABA 2018) for the Ministry of Justice (MoJ). However, there is still a lack of up-to-date, comprehensive data. Annex A lists all information and data gaps identified for the sector.

⁹With the permanent return, as part of UNSMIL, in January 2019 of AAAS technical staff to Libya and a greater recognition and willingness within, progress in sensitizing the Libyan leadership continues.

Status of the justice sector and main challenges

Judicial system

The judiciary is the system of courts that interprets and applies the law in the name of the state. As of 2014, 1,200 judges were serving in the judicial system (TI 2014). The court system is composed of four tiers (Courts of First Instance, Summary Courts, Courts of Appeal, and the Supreme Court). Based in Tripoli, the Supreme Court is responsible for cases involving constitutional interpretation; it settles cases related to conflicts of jurisdiction between ordinary and special courts (TI 2014). It is composed of a five-judge panel (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018) and its decisions are binding to every judicial body and institution.

A 2014 document reported that since the revolution, the Supreme Court has been more independent from the executive (TI 2014). However, another source stated that the Supreme Court has been unable to rule over cases that were heard before 2015, due to political divisions (PILPG 2018). Tribal mechanisms and local religious councils operate as courts due to the official courts' inability to operate (ICJ 2016).

Other important institutions include the following:

- **The Judicial Inspections Department**, which is charged with overseeing judicial personnel (including promotion and disciplinary proceedings), monitoring judicial performance, conducting inspections, and completing investigations of alleged misconduct (ABA 2018).
- **The Public Prosecution**, which is responsible for investigating cases and referring them to the courts; each of the courts (for instance, appellate and Supreme Court) has a prosecution service attached. The Prosecutor General has nationwide jurisdiction, while public prosecution offices have regional jurisdiction (ABA 2018). The Prosecutor General is appointed by the General National Congress (GNC) under the 2011 Constitution and by the HoR under the LPA.
- **The Litigation Department**, which represents governmental institutions and bodies in judicial proceedings (ICJ 2016).
- **The Public Law Department**, which was established by law in 1981 to provide free legal advice to those in need.

Prison system

Information on the current number of prisoners, staff, and prisons (official and unofficial ones) is based on estimates. The staff-per-prisoner ratio greatly varies across facilities. As of January 2019, around 6,400 individuals were detained in 26 official facilities operated by the MoJ, of whom more than three-quarters were in pretrial detention. Thousands of additional people were held in prisons controlled by the MoI, the MoD, or armed groups (UNSMIL 2019).

Institutional framework

- **The MoJ** is responsible for promoting the rule of law and transitional justice, and for drafting new laws.
- **The Supreme Judicial Council (SJC)** oversees judicial affairs and establishes the responsibilities of judges, prosecutors, and other members of the judicial bodies. It manages and regulates judges' careers (for example, their training, appointment, discipline, and retirement). The SJC is composed of judges and representatives of the Litigation Department, the Public Legal Defense Department, and the Public Law Department (ICJ 2016).
- **The Legal Department** analyzes draft laws and gives legal advice to public authorities. Its members are appointed by and subordinate to the MoJ.
- **The Judicial Police** is a government agency under the MoJ. It manages the prison system, maintains court security, oversees prisoners' transport to courts, and implements courts' legal decisions. The Judicial Police is divided into branches that operate in the East and West.

The main laws pertaining to the justice sector include the following:

- Law no. 35 of 2012 on Amnesty for Some Crimes and Law no. 38 of 2012 on Some Measures for the Transitional Period, which grant amnesty for actions performed by revolutionaries to promote or protect the revolution, except torture and rape. Such impunity is complicating the process of national reconciliation (PILPG 2018).¹⁰
- Law no. 29 of 2013 on Transitional Justice, which provides for the creation of a fact-finding commission to investigate human rights violations and includes forms of reparations (financial compensation, commemoration, and treatment) for victims, including through a victim's compensation fund. The law also covers the violations committed by the state apparatuses under the former regime. However, the time frame for the law's application is unclear (IREX, n.d.). Furthermore, it is uncertain whether rape, enforced disappearance, and other human rights violations are covered by the law (IREX, n.d.). Finally, Law no. 29 criminalizes the former Gaddafi regime but does not legislate on acts committed by nonstate groups. It could further divide the population by criminalizing the former era and justifying the human rights violations committed on behalf of the revolution (Maghur, n.d.).
- Law no. 13 of 2013 on Political and Administrative Isolation excludes individuals who occupied high-level, national stations under the Gaddafi regime from serving in administrative, judicial, and political positions. The law is thus regarded as punishing individuals based on their political affiliations rather than for their actions (Maghur, n.d.).

¹⁰ However, it is important to note that there is a trade-off between stability and justice in terms of long-term reconciliation, which would require striking a careful balance based on context analysis and national priorities. Countries such as South Africa, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and East Timor all had to make these decisions, but the form of justice, the arrangements, and the scope were very different in each case.

- Law no. 5 of 2005 and its Executive Regulations is the legal framework for managing the prison system. The law contains progressive elements, as it provides specific provisions regarding prisoners' admissions, classification, and treatment. It mentions that inmates have the right to work, receive education, and access medical treatment, but does not include provisions for prisoners' complaints nor for monitoring the prison system. As Law no. 5 is associated with the former regime, many prison leaders and guards are unfamiliar with it or reject it on the basis that it is a "Gaddafi law" (Mangan and Murray 2016; Maghur, n.d.).

Structural challenges

- **Lack of support and financial resources for judges.** The sector suffers from a lack of administrative resources, including clerks, library tools, and advanced computer technology (TI 2014). The exclusion of many experienced judges due to Law no. 13 has further constrained the capacity of the judiciary system (ICJ 2016). A report by Transparency International also calls into question the impartiality of the system, as many judges hold positions in the private sector due to low public sector salaries (TI 2014).
- **No independent judiciary.** Under Gaddafi, the judicial system suffered from corruption and systematic influence from the state. Human Rights Watch (HRW) estimates that the independence of the judiciary is still in jeopardy due to the following factors: (i) the long history of political interference and corruption in the sector; (ii) the absence of financial independence from the MoJ; (iii) the lack of separate provisions in the Constitution for the Supreme Court; and (iv) possible infringement from the legislature. For instance, Law no. 13 was amended to deprive the judiciary's ability to review the constitutionality of the law (TI 2014).
- **Lack of respect for the principle of fair trial and rule of law.** For instance, the Judicial Police of Tripoli stated that 6,400 detainees were held in prisons managed by the MoJ across the country (this does not include the MoD or the MoI), of whom only 25 percent had been sentenced for a crime. The remaining 75 percent are therefore held in precharge or pretrial detention (HRW 2019a).
- **Grievances against the judiciary resulting from unaccountable practices or impunity.** The lifting of judges' immunity for denying justice has been used very infrequently over the past 20 years (just three or four times). Yet arbitrary detentions, torture, and extrajudicial executions were routinely conducted under the Gaddafi regime and were not adjudicated. Therefore, victims of unjust rulings are still waiting for justice to be served, and perpetrators remain in office (Amnesty International 2010). Furthermore, citizens' image of the judicial system is tarnished by judges' lack of accountability and integrity (TI 2014). Other sources, however, point to a high level of confidence in the judiciary compared to other state authorities, with 69 percent of Libyans reporting having confidence in the judiciary, according to a 2018 survey (IFES 2018).
- **Lack of an overall institutional reform strategy for the security and justice sectors.** Without fair and transparent vetting processes and institutional reforms to strengthen the judicial and security sectors, laws will not be respected (Maghur, n.d.). Also, victims and witnesses are not adequately protected.

Impacts of the conflict

- **Growing militia interference in the judicial system since the revolution.** Armed groups and militias affiliated with both governments have proliferated and perpetuated the tradition of impunity. For instance, militias who arbitrarily arrested and detained thousands of suspected pro-Gaddafi loyalists in 2011 later occupied positions within the state. Militias also influence the justice system, specifically lower courts, by repeatedly attacking, kidnapping, and intimidating judges to deter them from arresting armed group members and from releasing pro-Gaddafi officials. Consequently, impunity prevails, and several courts have either stopped adjudicating entirely or operate at a reduced level, creating a backlog of cases. Furthermore, militias and armed groups also run prisons and detention facilities (Mangan and Murray 2016). Finally, hundreds of their members were integrated into the Judicial Police without vetting, which has further compromised the independence of the judiciary, as many remain loyal to their former militias (PILPG 2018).
- **Limited progress on transitional justice.** As a case in point, the fact-finding mission has not yet been established (Maghur, n.d.).
- **The legal framework remains unclear.** This cripples the judicial process and further complicates the advent of a unified transitional justice system. The difficulties of working under two governments has created a chaotic system where several laws have been rescinded in parts of the country but remain in place in others. For instance, the HoR in Tobruk revoked Law no. 13, while the Supreme Court in Tripoli reviewed the law's constitutionality but has not ruled on it (PILPG 2018).
- **A challenged prison system.** Libya's prison system has faced growing challenges since the start of the conflict. Due to the political crisis, spending is minimal, which impacts staff trainings and salaries as well as prisoner conditions (Mangan and Murray 2016). By diverting funds for catering and refurbishment project, militias and armed forces are illicitly profiting from budgets allocated for prisons under their command.¹¹

Main interventions and capacity to respond

The independence of the judiciary is recognized in both the LPA and the 2011 Constitutional Declaration (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018), and several international organizations are providing support for the sector. The American Bar Institution (through specific work funded by USAID) has produced a justice baseline assessment for the MoJ, identifying challenges and formulating recommendations (which the ministry has yet to release). The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) organized a workshop on possible legislative amendments to the Libyan penal code, as part of a project to reform Libya's criminal justice system with the MoJ, the High Judicial Institute, the Supreme Court, the Attorney General's Office, and various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) (UNSMIL 2017). UNSMIL, through the joint project with UNDP on national reconciliation,

¹¹ Based on interviews conducted during the mission.

initially funded by the Peacebuilding Fund, aims to foster local dialogue processes that support transitional justice and reconciliation.

Main needs and priorities as formulated in the literature

Period	Needs include	Sources
Short-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Map the criminal justice sector (for example, key figures and institutions) to identify possible entry points for reforms (Mangan and Murray 2016). • Foster dialogue and collaboration among all institutions and key actors (Judicial Police, prison directors, prosecutors, judges, and so forth) on the rule of law, justice, and transitional justice at local and national levels (UNDP, n.d.b). • Establish a clear screening and prosecution strategy for the release of detainees associated with the conflict and those who are held without a judicial ruling for more than a year. 	Mangan and Murray 2016; UNDP, n.d.b.
Medium/ long-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reform the prison and detention system. • Strengthen data management processing and better monitor the Judicial Police (Mangan and Murray 2016). • Establish a transitional justice process through interim measures (for example, truth commissions, amnesty, local reconciliation agreements) (UNDP, n.d.b). 	Mangan and Murray 2016; UNDP, n.d.b.

Chapter 2

Displacement and Migration

This section is based on an extensive body of work produced by international actors, scholars, and think tanks that reflects the prominence of displacement and migration in the humanitarian, political, and media landscape. The key sources (documents and data) used to produce this note include European Union documents, the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) data and reports (IOM 2017b, 2019), UNHCR data and reports (UNHCR 2019; UNHCR and Altai Consulting 2017), a report by UNSMIL and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on the human rights situation of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers (UNSMIL and OHCHR 2018), Internal Displacement Monitoring Center reports (IDMC 2018), and REACH briefs and surveys (REACH 2018b, 2018a), among others. Based on the main documents and considering the views of experts interviewed, the team concludes that a wealth of information is available on migration, especially on the growing industry of smuggling and trafficking of refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants, as well as on human rights violations,¹ official detention centers run by the Directorate for Combatting Illegal Migration, and IDPs and returnees.

Nevertheless, significant analytical and data gaps remain, such as lack of clarity on how many nonofficial detention centers are run by militia/traffickers and where they are located; lack of comprehensive understanding of how conflict, migration, and forced displacement interact; limited understanding of how migrants decide whether to stay in Libya, travel onwards to Europe, or return to their countries of origin, and what differentiates these categories; lack of data on the number and conditions of economic migrants within Libya, what skills they have, and what industries employ them; and lack of information on the availability of basic services and livelihood options for migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs, and host communities. In addition, many published reports particularly focus on situations faced in detention centers, highlighting the need to further document the serious challenges faced by migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, and IDPs outside of detention centers, and in accessing public services in Libya. The number of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers held in unofficial detention centers is unknown (Global Detention Project 2018). Annex A lists all information and data gaps identified for the sector.

¹From the moment migrants step onto Libyan soil, they become vulnerable to ill treatment, including arbitrary detention, unlawful deprivation of liberty, rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence, slavery and forced labor, extortion and exploitation by both state and nonstate actors, torture, and unlawful killings (UNSMIL and OHCHR 2018).

Status of migration and main challenges

IDPs and returnees

The 2014 conflict in Libya forced about 400,000 people to leave their homes, and the number of IDPs had risen to 500,000 by 2015 (IDMC 2018). This number began to drop off in 2016 and fell to 200,000 by the end of 2017 (IDMC 2018). As of December 2018, Libya hosts over 170,000 IDPs and over 445,000 returnees (IOM 2019). Benghazi has the highest number of both returnees and IDPs (IOM 2019). Returnees are mostly present in northern areas close to the coast (IOM 2019). Ninety-two percent of IDPs were displaced because of the deteriorated security situation. Other reasons include the deterioration of the economy and the lack of basic services. Eighty-four percent of returnees went back to their previous homes. Most returnees arrive in Benghazi, Sirt, and Tripoli. Better security conditions presented the largest pull factor for IDPs in 69 percent of destination communities, with the presence of relatives and social and cultural bonds (52 percent) reported as the second most prevalent pull factor. The availability of basic services served as a pull factor for IDPs in 32 percent of communities, while access to humanitarian assistance accounted for 24 percent. Better access to livelihood opportunities was reported in 39 percent of communities. The primary reported needs of Libya's returnee population were nonfood items (NFI), water and sanitation, and food (IOM 2018b).

Migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers

In 2018, IOM DTM estimated that over 663,000 foreign migrants, refugees,² and asylum seekers³ were present in Libya, an increase of about 6 percent from the previous year. The total includes more than 122,000 potential refugees (18.4 percent)⁴ and 57,285 registered refugees and asylum seekers (8.6 percent), located mostly in Tripoli. Overall, about 70 percent of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers originate from countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and 30 percent from North Africa. Significant hubs of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers are in Misrata and Tripoli in the West, and Sebha in the South (IOM 2019). Prior to the revolution, the number

²A refugee is defined as someone with a "well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion." In addition, and based on the OAU Convention signed and ratified by Libya's government, the term "refugee" shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his or her country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his or her place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his or her country of origin or nationality.

³According to the 1951 Convention and the OAU Convention, an asylum seeker is a general term for a person who has not yet received a decision on his/her claim for refugee status; has not yet submitted an application; is waiting for an asylum decision; or seeks protection claiming they have suffered or fear persecution as described under the 1951 Convention/Protocol and OAU Convention. Not every asylum seeker will ultimately be recognized as a refugee.

⁴Notably, some individuals may have a refugee profile despite not originating from a refugee-producing country.

of migrants in Libya was much higher than is currently the case, with more than 760,000 migrants fleeing the violence during the 2011 crisis.⁵

Migration trends and routes

Although Libya has traditionally relied on migrants to fill labor shortages (see box 4), the 2011 crisis has made migration a larger, complex, multistakeholder, and regional issue. The country has been an attractive destination for refugees and migrants from North Africa and the Middle East since the 1970s. More recently, Libya became a destination for West Africans during the 2000s, with many migrants coming to work in the fields of construction and agriculture, many because of their relatively high skill level. Well before the 2011 uprising, Libya had become a migratory hub for refugees and migrants in the region, as it was considered a relatively safe and economically stable country close to the Middle East and Europe that offered work opportunities, including for undocumented people.

The composition of migrant nationalities changed, with more from Chad, Egypt, Niger, Nigeria, and Sudan, and dramatically less from the State of Palestine, Iraq, and Somalia (see figure 2) (Svoboda 2017; Amnesty International 2017).⁶ Currently up to 20,000 refugees and migrants are being held in detention centers run by the Department for Combating Illegal Migration (DCIM), a division under the MoI established in 2012 to tackle migration flows into Libya. Thousands more are being held in places of captivity run by militias and criminal gangs. In both cases, people are unlawfully⁷ detained in inhuman conditions and subjected to torture and other cruel, degrading treatment or punishment, including sexual violence.


Already long before the revolution, Libya had been both a destination for migration and a departure point for onward migration to Europe. Smugglers and militias had taken advantage of the security vacuum at the borders to smuggle in migrants from the Middle East, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. After the revolution, smuggling and trafficking capacities have grown. Protracted conflict and the absence of an effective state created an enabling environment for the onward journey of migrants. Consequently, there has been a surge in irregular and undocumented migration to Europe and the number of migrants present in Libya shrunk significantly. Migration to Europe has somewhat slowed since 2017, as the Libyan Coast Guard intercepted and returned 19,333 people back to Libya (Svoboda 2017; Amnesty International 2017).

Libya is known as the major gateway for migration to Europe on the so-called “Central Mediterranean Route,” while also acting as a temporary destination for many African migrants in circular migration patterns (ICC 2017). Migrants from West Africa enter Libya mostly through routes leading through Niger or Algeria, while migrants from East Africa mostly arrive from the eastern corridor. These corridors comprise a series of sub routes that vary and change (see figure 3). The numbers of migrants using the route have increased, from 15,000 in 2012 to 163,000 in

⁵The IOM is quoted in ETF 2014.

⁶Libya Migration Note, based on UNDESA and IOM data.

⁷Detentions are considered unlawful by national and international law (Amnesty International 2017).

Figure 2 Countries Sending Migrants to Libya—2010, 2015, and 2017

Source: UNDESA (2010, 2015), IOM(2017)
 N: 2010 = 683,998; 2015= 771,146; 2017=416,556

2015 and 162,000 in 2016, which was the peak of the migration crisis.⁸ However, these figures do not reflect the total number of migrants in Libya. Since 2017, transitory migration to Europe has slowed given funding from the EU to support Libya's coastguard to patrol the Mediterranean (EC 2018c), and with voluntary return.⁹ The number of refugees and asylum seekers landing on Italy's southern shores in the first half of 2018 was down 81 percent from the same period the year before (UNHCR 2018).


Most economic migrants plan to stay in Libya. IOM's data suggests that more than 90 percent leave their country in search of better livelihoods (IOM 2017a). Contrary to mainstream media, fewer than 30 percent plan to go to Europe and around 55 percent plan to remain in Libya. Most of the economic migrants who stay in Libya lack official documentation and are vulnerable to abuse from employers and security personnel. For those seeking to reach Europe, Libya is a predominant launching point—less than 0.1 percent of migrants leaving Libya are Libyan nationals.

Human smuggling and trafficking are a significant source of revenue for smugglers and armed groups and a core element of Libya's conflict economy. The best available estimates suggest that Libya's human smuggling sector amounted to at least US\$1.2 billion in 2016, with about US\$950 million generated from smuggling through Libya and about US\$250 million from

⁸ UNHCR 2018. World Bank calculations based on IOM Migration Data Portal: <https://migrationdataportal.org>.

⁹ While the total number of departures and arrivals to Europe have decreased, overall migration into Libya still remains significant (IOM 2018a, 13).

Figure 3 Migration Routes inside Libya, Preexisting and Emerging Smuggling Hubs



Source: REACH 2019.

crossing the Mediterranean. Revenue estimates encompass two principal elements. First, revenues generated by smugglers and armed groups for overland travel from neighboring states to the Libyan coast is estimated to generate about US\$923.8 million, based on IOM data. Second, revenue from payments made by migrants to cross the Mediterranean is estimated from a computation made by UNHCR and unpublished price data sources to come in at US\$249.1 million. Combining UNHCR and Altai price data indicates similar revenues from crossings of US\$288.5 million.

However, since 2016 the smuggling and trafficking economy has experienced substantial alterations. With militias and armed groups increasingly withdrawing their overt protection of smuggling and trafficking activities and decreasing numbers of migrants arriving to the shores of Europe, smugglers as well as traffickers have turned to alternative sources of income, such as the exploitation and extortion of migrants. These practices provide traffickers and armed groups with further opportunities to derive income. Traffickers use an increasingly diverse array of financial and technological tools to extort more money from migrants during their transit and stay in Libya. News media have reported how traffickers are video streaming the suffering of detained migrants via social media to extort money from their families.¹⁰ Reports cite increases in smuggling costs because of the increasing number of smuggling intermediaries as well as the liquidity and inflation crisis (IOM 2017b). Migrants often face additional abuse, torture, and threats of starvation or death if they fail to satisfy smugglers' demands.

¹⁰ See news reports by Schlanger (2017) and Guilbert (2017) and also UNSMIL and OHCHR (2018).

Institutional framework

Two key national institutions are responsible for managing migration in Libya: the MoI and the MoL. The MoI has three local antennas, covering southern, eastern, and central Libya. Overseen by the MoI, the DCIM is charged with coordinating interventions to prevent and combat illegal migration. The DCIM is also responsible for overseeing official detention centers. The police, whose responsibilities include detecting and apprehending irregular migrants, also report to the MoI. Meanwhile, the MoL is the key ministry responsible for managing legal migration for work.

Other key authorities with responsibilities related to irregular migration include the following:

- **The MoD**, which is responsible for land border surveillance along Libya's land and sea borders.
- **The Land Border Guards**, a military institution under the MoD, is responsible for border surveillance between border crossing points and the physical protection of border crossing points.
- **The Coast Guard and Port Security**, which oversees border control in the open sea, search and rescue, fishery control and pollution at sea, and is increasingly involved in the detection of migrants at sea.
- **The General Administration for Coastal Security**, a law enforcement entity established within the structure of the Libyan MoI, which also performs border surveillance at sea and the rescuing of irregular migrants.¹¹
- **The Customs Administration**, which generally controls movements outside the border crossing points.
- **The judiciary**, in terms of administrative decisions related to expulsion, deportation, and detention, which can in theory be appealed to the courts (IOM 2014).

Since the 2011 conflict, local militias (katibas) have assumed the role of ensuring security in some parts of the country, including controlling migrants and running detention centers. Whereas many centers were previously run by militias, several are now under the control of the MoI, and agreements have been signed to this effect.

Structural challenges

Under the former regime, Libya had a contrasting relationship to migration and asylum (see box 4). In the late 1980s and 1990s, Libya encouraged irregular workers from African and Arab

¹¹ The General Administration for Coastal Security has competence at sea up to 12 nautical miles, and beyond this limit the Libyan Coast Guard and Port Security is responsible (EC 2018a). In practice, however, this lead to an overlap in competencies.

countries to enter; their presence was permitted, but they did not enjoy formal rights (ETF 2014). Structural challenges include the following:

- **Lack of reliable statistics.** Already before the crisis, official statistics on the number of immigrants in Libya were unreliable. According to the European Training Foundation (ETF), statistics were frequently manipulated by the government to support changing political and economic priorities (ETF 2014).
- **Lack of refugee status and asylum system.** Libya has no asylum system, nor has it ratified the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. However, Libya signed and ratified the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention, which referred to the definition of refugee provided in the 1951 Convention, including the extended mandate; it also signed the 1969 African Union (AU) Refugee Convention. Despite the ratification, the GoL does not recognize refugees and refers to them as migrants. In addition, the government does not formally recognize the UNHCR. However, it de facto allows the UNHCR to register nine nationalities, even though neither the registration nor UNHCR documentation protect against arrest, ill treatment, arbitrary detention, and so forth (UNSMIL and OHCHR 2018).
- **Criminalization of irregular presence in the country.** Libya's legal code criminalizes irregular entry into, stay in, or exit from the country with a penalty of imprisonment pending deportation, without any consideration of individual circumstances or needs for protection. Foreign nationals, including survivors of trafficking and refugees, are among those subjected to mandatory and indefinite detention (UNSMIL and OHCHR 2018). People who need protection, especially refugees and asylum seekers, face a legal vacuum in Libya due to the absence of an asylum law. Libya did not sign the 1951 Convention and is not fulfilling its obligations regarding the OAU Convention. In effect, Libya treats any migrant as irregular regardless of the reason for departing the country of origin.

Impact of the conflict

While the protection risks had been serious before the fall of Gaddafi's regime, the scale of human right violations affecting refugees and migrants substantially increased after the revolution (Amnesty International 2017). This was further exacerbated during the period of political instability following the 2014 crisis. At the time, militias were getting increasingly involved in kidnapping, trafficking, and exploitation that affected mainly refugees and migrants from Sub-Saharan countries as well as those from the Horn of Africa (Svoboda 2017).

The large inflows of migrants and refugees have overwhelmed the Libyan immigration authorities, particularly the MoI. Their activities have been limited to "firefighting" or addressing immediate concerns in a reactive way (Svoboda 2017). Libya's 2014 descent into chaos severely hampered the justice system, which is unable to address rampant human rights violations and abuses committed by state and nonstate actors.

The international migration community has been raising concern over the exploitation of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers since 2015, if not earlier.¹² Different factors, such as the country of origin of migrants, seem to make a difference in the level of abuse and exploitation faced. Preliminary evidence shows that migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers from West Africa have a higher likelihood of being exploited by smugglers than do those from North Africa, the Horn of Africa, and western and southern Asia (IOM 2016, 2017). However, it is unclear whether paying more necessarily reduces one's chance of being exploited.

The key impacts in terms of migration include the following:

- **Perceived negative impact on local labor markets and public services.** Host communities see migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers as taking up economic opportunities and overstretching limited basic services (World Bank 2019).
- **Recent attempts to crack down on smuggling and trafficking have strengthened militias, subverting prospects for peace (El Kamouni-Janssen 2017).** Since the summer of 2017, the GNA has enlisted the help of militias to stem the flow of non-Libyan migrants into Europe (Walsh and Horowitz 2017). This has dramatically decreased the volume of migration from Libya into Europe (Frontex 2017), but it has also strengthened Libyan militias and opened up a new avenue for financial gain. Preferential treatment shown to certain armed groups has also exacerbated intra-group rivalries and worsened conflict in some areas (IOM 2017b).
- **Stagnating number of people in official detention despite repatriation.** Since early 2017, over 30,000 migrants have been voluntarily returned with support from the EU, AU, and IOM. While it can be assumed that some migrants will be more willing to return than in the past because of the harsh treatment they receive, the fact that many migrants flee war, violence, persecution, or abject poverty in their countries of origin cannot be ignored. The number of migrants and refugees kept in official detention centers fluctuates, but no persistent decrease in numbers can be observed.
- **Human rights abuses against migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers.** A 2018 report published jointly by UNSMIL and the OHCHR, which covers a 20-month period through August 2018, details a series of violations and human rights abuses committed by a range of state officials, armed groups, smugglers, and traffickers against migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers (OHCHR 2018). These include unlawful killings, torture, arbitrary detention, gang rape, slavery, forced labor, and extortion.

The key impacts in terms of internal displacement include the following:

- **Forced displacement and lack of return solutions.** Since 2011, discrimination against and harassment of tribes and ethnic minorities have increased, especially for those accused of siding with Gaddafi. The Tawergha and the Mashashya (in the Nafusa Mountains) were forcibly

¹² For example, 71 percent of the 2,700 migrants surveyed by the IOM upon arrival in Italy in 2016 said they experienced exploitation and abuse. In April 2017, IOM documented the experiences of two migrants in Niger and Libya. For more details, see IOM 2016.

displaced because they supported or were accused of supporting the Gaddafi regime. These groups have repeatedly been evicted since 2011¹³ and are now unable to return, due to resistance from neighboring communities, local parties, and military groups (GPC 2018; UNHCR 2013). Around 40,000 Tawergha are currently in protracted displacement (Reuters 2018a), and only 180 families had reportedly returned to their place of origin by the end of 2018 (IOM 2019).

- **Lack of access to services for IDPs and returnees.** This notably includes limited availability of health services and medicine in many locations (IOM 2019), as well as destroyed schools (IOM 2018b).

Main interventions and capacity to respond

The GNA has identified migration as among the priorities for international assistance, and has shared this with the Senior Policy Committee (the top-tier coordination mechanism between the GNA and international partners—see chapter 9 on coordination mechanisms for more details).

In response, the Migration Working Group (MWG) was established in November 2017 as part of the Coordination Framework for International Technical Cooperation.¹⁴ The MWG's objective is to advise on the strategic direction of the country's migration management as well as its legal and policy framework. Specifically, it aims to serve as a coordination platform for programming and resources on migration in Libya. The MWG further aims to support the harmonization of migration policies across various government entities in cooperation with the international community.

Many partners are engaged in managing the migration crisis. This notably includes the following:

- **The EU**, which has mobilized €182 million for several migration programs: (i) managing mixed migration flows in Libya by expanding protection space and supporting local socioeconomic development (€90 million); (ii) border management (€46.3 million); (iii) protection and resilience of IDPs (€5.9 million); and (iv) Voluntary Humanitarian Returns (with the AU) and reintegration into their home countries (€19.8 million). These initiatives are being implemented through various UN agencies, such as UNHCR, IOM, UNDP, and UNICEF, as well as the German Corporation for International Cooperation (GIZ) and a variety of international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) and local CSOs.
- **The IOM**, which tracks migrants, IDPs, and returnees, implements Voluntary Humanitarian Returns programs, and provides NFIs.

¹³For instance, in August 2018, UNSMIL issued a statement condemning the eviction of 2,000 Tawergha IDPs from a camp in Libya (UNSMIL 2018a).

¹⁴The MWG meets about every two months. However, due to the current security situation, no meeting was held between December 2018 and April 2019.

- IOM has tracked migrants, IDPs, and returnees in Libya since the end of 2015 through its global programming tool, DTM, which is primarily used to track displaced population in a country.¹⁵
- IOM conducts regular protection monitoring in detention centers managed by the DCIM.
- In coordination with other UN agencies, the EU, and the AU, the IOM operates a Voluntary Humanitarian Returns program and has assisted the return of more than 22,000 individuals since May 2017. To date, the program has supported the return of more than 40,000 migrants since its launch in 2016.
- IOM provides assistance to migrants who have been rescued at sea and provides emergency food, critical health care, and psychosocial counseling. In addition, IOM also provides NFIs for internally displaced people as well as for migrants at detention centers and holding facilities where it has been granted access (IOM n.d.).
- **UNHCR**, which is leading the coordination of protection activities and co-leads the Migrant and Refugee Platform with the IOM and the International Rescue Committee (IRC).¹⁶
 - UNHCR provides humanitarian assistance to IDPs and returnees, including basic assistance such as NFIs and cash-based interventions. In 2018, UNHCR distributed NFIs to more than 74,332 IDPs and returnees, and cash to over 1,800 families. All UNHCR activities are implemented with a systematic approach to protection mainstreaming including age, gender, and diversity mainstreaming.
 - UNHCR implements more than 155 quick impact projects (QIPs) throughout Libya, including in Benghazi and the eastern region, with the active participation of host communities and IDPs, and in consultation with national and local authorities.¹⁷ During 2018 and 2019, QIPs have so far benefited an estimated 8,500 IDPs, returnees, and members of host communities in Libya.
 - UNHCR and implementing partners provide primary health care and psychosocial support in Community Day Centers (CDCs). In 2018 and 2019, the program provided over 34,500 medical consultations and medical referrals to public and private hospitals.¹⁸

¹⁵The IDP and returnee numbers are close to accurate because of the nature of the population, but the migrant numbers reported in DTM are usually an underestimation because tracking migrants, often in transit, is challenging. With some confidence, DTM probably tracks around 60 percent of the migrants in Libya at any given point in time.

¹⁶The platform aims to provide policy guidance and coordinate advocacy efforts to the humanitarian community to improve the situation of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers in Libya.

¹⁷QIPs are small, rapidly implemented projects intended to help create conditions for peaceful coexistence between those displaced and their hosting communities, and to strengthen their resilience. They include supporting municipalities, hospitals, and schools by providing water pumps, school desks, medical equipment, generators and waste management items.

¹⁸Counseling is also provided for survivors of SGBV, victims of trafficking, and persons with specific needs, including unaccompanied children.

- UNHCR distributed cash assistance to over 4,070 refugees living in Tripoli through the implementing partner CESVI in 2018 and 2019.
- UNHCR identifies, registers, and assists persons in need of international protection through phone hotlines; three CDCs in Tripoli; and outreach visits to communities. More than 15,000 individuals have registered with UNHCR at the CDCs in 2018 and 2019, while a total of 56,643 refugees and asylum seekers are registered with UNHCR. In detention centers, UNHCR has registered more than 3,100 individuals. Registration procedures have supported the submission of 1,064 individuals for direct resettlement to third countries.
- Since December 2018, UNHCR has implemented a Gathering and Departure Facility (GDF) in Tripoli for detained refugees and migrants in urgent need of international protection. The facility is primarily financed through a Union Trust Fund project signed by the EU Commission with UNHCR (UNSMIL 2019c).¹⁹ In 2018 and 2019, so far 2,897 refugees were released from detention, including over 2,300 who were evacuated out of Libya.²⁰
- UNHCR also provides humanitarian assistance to refugees and migrants in Benghazi, including those in detention centers.²¹ In 2018, UNHCR provided 1,047 medical consultations in eastern detention centers and transferred 198 refugees and asylum seekers from detention centers to Tripoli for processing and resettlement.
- UNHCR provides emergency humanitarian assistance at disembarkation points and identifies and provides protection to persons of concern.²²
- UNHCR oversees evacuation and resettlements (not voluntary repatriation). Between November 2017 and March 2019, UNHCR registered 57,285 refugees, and 3,300 persons have been evacuated.
- **UNICEF** leads the coordination of the WASH and education humanitarian working groups and participates in the protection working group. It provides the following support as part of the Resilience Building program for vulnerable children in Libya, including host communities, migrant and refugee children (€11 million):

¹⁹The GDF is the first of its kind in the country and is intended to bring vulnerable refugees to a safe environment while solutions—including resettlement, family reunification, voluntary repatriation, or evacuation to other emergency facilities—are sought. The facility is managed by UNHCR, its partner LibAid, and the Libyan Ministry of Interior.

²⁰Since November 2017, UNHCR evacuated 3,016 refugees and asylum seekers out of Libya, including 2,332 to the Emergency Transit Mechanism in Niger, 415 to Italy, and 269 to the Emergency Transit Centre in Romania.

²¹UNHCR estimates there are 234 individuals in eastern detention centers, including 82 persons of concern to UNHCR. In these detention centers, UNHCR and its partners provide core relief items and medical assistance, screen persons of concern, and advocate for release from detention as well as for initiatives that reduce the risk of SGBV.

²²For example, UNHCR provides primary health care and hygiene kits.

- UNICEF provides basic and safe humanitarian WASH services for host communities in collective centers and IDP camps, IDPs living in collective centers, returnees with damaged infrastructure, and refugees and migrants wherever needs arise.
- UNICEF facilitates access to quality education for vulnerable children, including a large proportion of migrant and refugee children, considering the different needs of children based on age, gender, and diversity.
- UNICEF provides support to the most vulnerable children, including children with disabilities and child survivors of SGBV, through integrated case management and individual services to restore dignity and prevent further distress.
- **UNDP** undertakes socioeconomic resilience activities and rehabilitation of basic social service infrastructure, notably schools, that benefit host communities, IDPs and returnees, and migrants, as part of the UNDP Resilience Program and the SFL.
- **Other actors** have also participated in the following activities:
 - Rwanda has announced that it is willing to host up to 30,000 African migrants stranded in Libya (Cowell 2017; BBC News 2017).
 - The World Health Organization (WHO) has an ongoing project to strengthen disease surveillance in the migrant population.²³
 - Various UN agencies (IOM and UNHCR and their partners) and INGOs (such as MSF, DRC, CESVI) run mobile clinics in detention centers throughout the country (World Bank 2019). Medical complaints are mostly related to tuberculosis, scabies and fleas, and nutritional deficiencies. The lack of WASH facilities and drinking water and the overall bad conditions of these detention centers contribute to the poor health conditions of many of the migrants.

Main needs and priorities as formulated in the literature

Needs for migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers; IDPs and returnees; and host communities are many. Needs are particularly acute for the most vulnerable groups, which include IDPs living in informal settlements and IDPs unable to return to their homes, the displaced Tawergha community, vulnerable refugees and migrants in or transiting through Libya, young migrants and refugees, and refugees and migrants in detention centers.

²³Medical complaints are mostly related to lice, scabies, and fleas; nutritional deficiencies; and the lack of safe drinking water.

Period	Needs include	Sources
Short-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Needs in detention centers: provide regular and enough food, provide life-saving protection assistance, and conduct protection risk monitoring and assessment, in particular for the vulnerable detainees such as SGBV survivors, victims of trafficking and children, provide protection services such as psychological, legal and family tracing, ensure safe water and sanitation facilities, and deliver a minimum package of primary health care services. • Needs for IDPs and returnees: provide support to IDPs and support to safe, dignified, and voluntary returns, including assistance in food, WASH, shelter and NFI, protection, cash assistance, and functional public services. • Needs in schools: train education staff in child protection and SGBV referral mechanisms and existing services, provide psychological support for pupils, rehabilitate gender-sensitive WASH facilities in schools, provide meals in schools in the most severely affected areas; and provide services such as protection and nonformal education in community centers. This will also benefit IDPs', migrants', refugees', and asylums seekers' children attending schools. • Needs in health facilities: improve sanitation systems and availability of clean water in health facilities, prevent and treat waterborne diseases, provide mental health and psychosocial support at the clinical and community level, and improve clinical care for SGBV survivors. This will also benefit IDPs', migrants', refugees', and asylums seekers' children attending schools. 	OCHA 2018b; IOM 2019.
Medium/long-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide durable solutions to displacement, including ensuring social cohesion between host and displaced communities, and offering support to rebuild communities and reestablish income-generating and livelihood opportunities. • Improve migration framework in the medium and long term. 	OCHA 2018b; IOM 2014.

Chapter 3

Governance and Institutions

Core government functions

Information in this section is largely drawn from an extensive body of work produced as part of WB and IMF technical assistance to the sector.¹ Other sources include an assessment of core government functions that was carried out by UNDP (UNDP 2016), a 2014 survey of the Libyan labor market and employment policy carried out by the ETF (ETF 2014), estimates of the size and composition of public employment in WB and UNDP reports (World Bank 2015; UNDP 2017c), and the Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (BTI) 2018 country report (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018). Based on the main documents and considering the views expressed by experts interviewed, the team's assessment is that there are notable gaps in the data regarding core government functions in Libya. In many cases, data is outdated, fragmented, or discontinuous, and significant discrepancies exist between various sources. Data gaps relate to a lack of detailed analysis on the size and composition of public employment, no up-to-date national accounts after 2014, and an absence of basic economic and social data through which to evaluate economic performance and public service delivery. Annex A lists all information and data gaps identified for the sector.

Status of core government functions and main challenges

Public administration

Civil service

As of 2016, about 25 percent of the Libyan population was employed by the public sector, reaching a total of 1.8 million civil servants (of which 500,000 are thought to be ghost workers) (UNDP 2016). In 2012, public sector workers made up 83 percent of the Libyan labor force, and 94 percent of them have indefinite duration contracts (UNDP 2016). As a result, the share of the public wage bill in GDP stands at a record 59.7 percent (UNDP 2016). The male-to-female ratio is

¹World Bank information includes the following 2013 reports (hereafter referred to as World Bank 2013): Libya—Accounting Concepts, Principles and Policies; (Government of Libya) Revising the Government of Libya's Budget Classification Structure (BCS), Chart of Accounts (CoA), and Management Information System Options (Near-term) for Treasury Management and Financial Reporting; (Government of Libya, Ministry of Finance) Spending Unit Payment Process; and Government of Libya Terms of Reference for a System Requirement Study (SRS) and Request for Proposal (RFP) Documentation for Acquisition of an Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS). Other sources include Schiavo-Campo et al. 2014; World Bank 2016; and technical assistance from IMF.

thought to be 70:30 among public sector employees (UNDP 2016). A number of returnees have also entered into public administration by way of short-term contracts (UNDP 2016). In addition to wages, public sector workers receive a sliding-scale pension, heavy subsidies to cover household costs of living, and a food stipend (ETF 2014).

The inflated public administration has become strenuous on the fiscal purse, and the weight of the public sector hinders the state's ability to function properly. Training opportunities are limited, and the funds are lacking to pay for capacity development (Crown Agents 2018). There is a large gap in technical capacity resulting from the mass exodus of senior-level public sector employees. Government agencies are overstaffed but civil servants have limited skills, and there are significantly more administrative than professional staff (UNDP 2016). Law no. 13 of May 2013 on Political and Administrative Isolation has also denied any senior-level employee of the Gaddafi regime the right to participate in future public and political engagement (UNDP 2016). Public service recruitment is highly politicized and has become more so with each post-2011 government; replacements are largely appointed rather than subjected to a selection process. Furthermore, human resources are not based on performance, which makes it difficult to increase capacity within the public sector (UN ESCWA and World Bank 2015), while the salary scale makes it unattractive to accept greater responsibilities and discourages high achievers from advancing within the system (UNDP 2016). As a result, nepotism and patronage are commonplace in the public sector (UNDP 2016), and there is limited protection from political interference.

Although the public administration is perceived as ineffective and opaque, it does have existing capacity—including educated civil servants who are motivated to design and implement reforms of the Libyan public administration. This can be leveraged as a source of resilience through the reconstruction process (EU, UN, and World Bank 2018).

Center of government

Libya's public administration is suffering from a vacuum of effective governance and leadership at the central level and needs to be built from the bottom up. The previous regime did not manage public resources or make policy decisions based on the concepts of information and performance, which has made policy processes confusing and arbitrary. The use and sharing of information for policy are extremely limited; the process is constrained by data availability and the inherited organizational "culture." The flow of information on policy issues and decisions across the office of the Prime Minister, the rest of its cabinet, and other government agencies is still extremely limited, and many decisions are not made based on reliable and regularly collected data, which undermines the government's ability to effectively and transparently manage public resources.

Public financial management (PFM)

Budget preparation and planning

The process of budget formulation is fragmented and guided by a bottom-up incremental approach, especially with regards to recurrent spending. It is characterized by a short-term horizon, with little reference to longer-term policies and objectives. Analysis of the GNA's budget shows it is skewed toward recurrent expenditure, and the subsidies and transfers framework are inefficient. The preparation of two parallel budgets create management, implementation, and

monitoring capacity gaps that hinder the provision of basic services to the population. The budget classification also does not follow internationally recognized acceptable standards (World Bank 2013).

Weaknesses in the budget preparation process include the lack of a coherent macro-economic framework and medium-term budgetary perspective, little guidance to agencies regarding how to prepare budget submissions, and inconsistent coverage of spending units across budget chapters. The short-term focus does not enable sectoral line ministries to present and align spending plans with national priorities. There is lack of clarity on how to strengthen the alignment of resources to national objectives and improve operational efficiency in the use of funds. Although the coverage of the budget appears adequate, its presentation lacks transparency, as it fails to provide information regarding the assumptions used to formulate the budget, in particular oil price and production volume (World Bank 2013).

Budget execution and reporting

The PFM systems are weak and uncertain, crippled by the existence of two governments. Key challenges related to budget execution and reporting include the following:

- **Treasury management.** Libya does not have a single treasury account, and cash resources are disbursed through numerous bank accounts. The cash management function remains underdeveloped and cash flow forecasts are not routinely prepared.
- **Financial reporting.** The accounting system is based on manual single entry and remains weak, with substantial delays in the production of annual accounts. Cash receipts and payments are recorded manually in cash books against respective budget chapters (World Bank 2013). The lack of a mechanism to record and account for payment arrears further undermines the efficiency and transparency of the Libyan PFM system (IMF 2013c).
- **Internal audit and external oversight.** Following the revolution, in 2012, the GNC tried to strengthen the National Audit Bureau and introduced a National Anti-Corruption Commission, but with negligible results (World Bank 2013).
- **Procurement.** There are significant levels of corruption and lack of transparency in Libyan procurement practices.

Public investment management (PIM)

Although Libya's development budget has traditionally been large, the efficiency of expenditure and integrity of processes has been low. In 2007, the actual/budgeted execution ratio for capital expenditures rose to 92 percent, well above the 74 percent seen in 2004 (WB 2009). Between 2008 and 2010, government investment expenditure averaged about LYD20 billion, equivalent to about half of total government expenditure and about 20 percent of GDP (IMF 2013c). Weaknesses in PIM prior to the revolution, and through 2018–19, included the lack of sector policies to guide investment decisions; weak and unenforced public investment procedures; proliferation of contracts leading to uncoordinated execution of investment projects; arbitrary allocations; and a large proportion of contracts on a sole source basis (Schiavo-Campo et al. 2014). This is reflected in the assessment of the PIM system undertaken in 2014 using the World Bank's

“drill-down” indicator, with ratings ranging from D, indicating nonexistent elements of the PIM system, to a highest of C-, which still indicates severely substandard performance (Schiavo-Campo et al. 2014).

Revenue mobilization and management

The tax administration is characterized by poor capacity to collect revenues and a weak culture of compliance. According to a 2014 capacity analysis conducted by the IMF, revenue collection performance is low by regional standards for several reasons, including the absence of a comprehensive compliance strategy, outdated and redundant procedures, and lack of strategic and operational plans.² As a result, tax revenue levels in Libya are low and there are multiple loopholes in the tax code. The Ministry of Finance (MoF) does not analyze the tax system or estimate tax expenditures or the tax gap.³ Such work would help identify options for revenue mobilization and diversification. The tax administration’s poor performance is reflected in the Doing Business—Paying Taxes indicator, where Libya is ranked 128th out of 190 countries (down from position 116 out of 189 in 2014) (WBG 2018, 2013).

Customs revenue has fallen in recent years and is below the prevailing rate in comparable countries. Following the revolution, customs revenue declined to LYD265 million in 2011, from LYD1.34 billion the year before. This decline continued through 2018.⁴ The drop in revenues can be attributed to changes in tax policy, the security situation, and inefficiencies in the customs system.⁵ It is likely that the customs revenue collection will not cover the costs of customs administration. This weak performance is reflected in the Doing Business—Trading across Borders indicator, where Libya is ranked 128th out of 190 countries (up from position 143 out of 189 in 2014) (WBG 2018, 2013).

Public finances in Libya are heavily dependent on volatile hydrocarbon earnings. Almost the entire public budget is financed by oil revenues (95 percent) (TI 2015). Despite the importance of petroleum revenue for the fiscal position, and the need to increase tax revenue, there is no Revenue Policy Unit (RPU) in the MoF responsible for revenue policy design or for analyzing the fiscal regime for the petroleum sector.⁶ The LIA was established in 2006 to manage oil revenues and diversify sources of national income; however, it is not integrated into the fiscal framework. Currently, the LIA lacks a clear definition of objectives and rules governing the accumulation, management, and use of its resources.

Institutional framework

The public administration is chaotic at both the central and local level; this situation is compounded by the existence of an internationally recognized government in Tripoli with a set of

²Technical assistance from IMF and World Bank.

³Technical assistance from IMF and World Bank.

⁴Technical assistance from IMF.

⁵Technical assistance from IMF.

⁶Technical assistance from IMF.

ministries and agencies, and a second, now “unrecognized” government and parallel set of ministries and other structures in the East. As of 2018, the constitution is still being debated (Crown Agents 2018), along with matching governance bodies.

Public employment service functions are performed by the MoL and a network of 72 labor offices across Libya (ETF 2014). Weaknesses in the public employment service are compounded by the fact that the ministry maintains no modern labor market information system (ETF 2014). The Manpower and Capacity Building Authority is currently the only agency with such oversight. The National Institute of Administration is charged with training members of the civil service, followed by the Institute of Planning, but neither are very effective. Law no. 12 on labor relations governs public employment and covers all employment relations, including partnerships, contract employees, and the civil service. The General Planning Council and the MoL have both drafted a separate civil service law that has not been approved by either of the two rival legislatures.

Governance structures at the central ministries and at the local level vary in size, have overlapping mandates, lack quality control, and do not follow due process. Before the 2014 crisis, the government had a public procurement system that was relatively opaque (UN ESCWA and World Bank 2015). The Financial Audit Agency (FAA) is the external auditor of all public entities and audits the final budgetary accounts. Delays in preparing the final accounts by the MoF and their audit by the FAA contribute to the PFM system’s lack of transparency. The FAA’s involvement in ex ante control of expenditure also potentially undermines its independence.

Structural challenges

- **Deep-seated political divisions and territorial political polarization.** Fragmentation of the country’s institutions has affected the performance of each body and resulted in power struggles. This has fostered deep mistrust among actors.
- **Parallel systems and informal institutions.** The political arrangements that are a legacy of the pre-2011 political settlement have enabled the creation of parallel political positions at the local level, wherein on the one hand there are formal offices, ministries, and agencies, and on the other are informal institutional structures operated by the real brokers of power and rents (UNDP 2016). This has contributed to ineffective policy making.
- **Lack of coordinated decision making.** The opaque and centralized decision-making system of the previous regime has led to the creation of a cadre of civil servants with limited capacities and skills to design and implement policies based on solid data and exchange of information (UN ESCWA and World Bank 2015). Relatedly, there are significant coordination and communication bottlenecks across key institutions (UNDP 2017b).
- **Limited human resource capacity.** Employees of public and private agencies generally lack professional qualifications, which hampers efficacy and increases risks of mismanagement and inefficient use of finances (TI 2014). The lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities is a further challenge to efficiency, while training opportunities are limited and lack funding.

- **Overreliance on oil revenues for financing.** The fact that the economy has been funded almost exclusively through oil revenues (as opposed to via taxes) has left an “accountability gap” between the public sector and the population, creating opportunities for nonstate actors. Disruptions in oil exports also put the country’s key source of financing at risk.

Impact of the conflict

- **Collapse of administrative structures.** Since 2014, administrative structures have collapsed due to cycles of violence between the two rival governments (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018). The power struggle between the HoR and the GNC is reflected in the public sector’s ongoing politicization. The mass exodus of senior public sector employees during the conflict has resulted in a large technical capacity gap (UNDP 2016).
- **Public investment “overhang.”** Many government investment projects were launched but not completed before the onset of the revolution, contributing to a public investment “overhang” of a total face value of about LYD154 billion (almost US\$100 billion). The long interruption and the physical damage associated with the revolution has also affected project costs and partially degraded the works that have been completed (Schiavo-Campo et al. 2014).
- **Cash shortages impact the expenditure chain.** Cash shortages have culminated in the inability to meet the needs of budget spending and imports.

Main interventions and capacity to respond

The GNA has published a vision paper that recommends establishing a comprehensive strategy to assess state institutions, build transparent and accountable institutions, and reform the public administration (UNDP 2016). The office of the Prime Minister has recently established the Higher Committee for Transparency, which will be responsible for enforcing transparency, accountability, and good governance in budgeting and public expenditure, public sector employment and management, public sector procurement, e-Government, regulatory policy development, and corporate governance.

Partners have provided technical assistance in PFM, macro fiscal transparency and analysis, and governance reforms with the aim of:

- **Strengthening the process of budget formulation and classification.** The WB, with assistance from the IMF, has engaged in quarterly budget discussions over the past several years. The March 2018 discussions led to the submission of a unified Libyan Fiscal and Monetary Policy budget submission by the government. These technical discussions have delved into developing a near-to-medium term budget framework that could ensure sustainable fiscal policies.
- **Addressing challenges related to the lack of unified budget.** The WB, together with the IMF, will continue existing technical assistance to build consolidated policy-driven budgets.

To address the administrative fragmentation, the WB has brought policy makers from various sides together, which has laid the groundwork for institutional reintegration through the budget. The WB will continue to work with the IMF to help strengthen capacity in the MoF, the Ministry of Planning, and the CBL for fiscal, PFM, and macroeconomic policy making and implementation. The WB and IMF will provide support on subsidy reform to address fiscal pressure. In addition, the WB will conduct capacity building for macroeconomic modeling.

- **Addressing the underdeveloped cash management function.** The WB will support building PFM accountability systems by developing a new budget coding structure and implementing an appropriate financial management system. The WB will also support an effective cash management process and make progress toward establishing a single treasury account.
- **Addressing challenges related to the procurement system.** The WB will focus on building civil servants' knowledge regarding the basic principles of transparent and effective procurement systems. Activities will be implemented jointly by the WB team in collaboration with experts from national statistical agencies (for example, Eurostat) and possibly other organizations.
- **Strengthening internal audit and external oversight.** The WB will support the National Accounting Bureau (Auditor General) to strengthen the technical skills of its staff and improve the accountability aspects of the policy process.
- **Strengthening national accounts.** The WB will support the Bureau of Statistics in developing the necessary skills to collect and analyze economic and social data.
- **Supporting improved Human Resource Management.** Several efforts have been supported by partners in recent years to strengthen management capacities across the civil service through dedicated trainings on improving management skills for middle and senior level managerial line ministry staff (for example, the MoI, MoL, and MoJ). The EU provided leadership trainings to several ministries through the PAF/NIAS project to increase capacities in the public sector. The WB team will continue to deliver technical training on managing human resources transparently and fairly within the public administration in general and within selected ministries (that is, the MoL, MoF, Ministry of Planning) and oversight agencies (Supreme Audit Institution).
- **Supporting the center of government.** The WB will support the development and implementation of the workplan for the Higher Committee through targeted technical assistance with the objective of improving transparency and accountability in Libya. In addition, support will be provided to the Prime Minister's Office to improve leadership skills, coordinate policy, and institute an effective and inclusive policy process.

Main needs and priorities as formulated in the literature

Period	Needs include	Sources
Short-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthen the links and collaboration between the work on institutional strengthening and programs on statistical capacity building. • Build civil servants' capacity and knowledge on the basic principles of transparent and effective procurement systems. • Improve interinstitutional management and coordination mechanisms. • Tighten financial controls and manage fiscal spending pressures. • Bring current expenditures under control. • Install an interim basic PFM system in the MoF until a more detailed system requirement study can be completed. • Implement programs for the introduction of a small-scale management information system at the MoF that links treasury, accounts, and budget departments. • Prepare the primary elements of public investment guidelines as well as guidelines for dealing with the buildup of legacy infrastructure projects (Schiavo-Campo et al. 2014). • Enhance financial controls. 	World Bank 2013; Schiavo-Campo et al. 2014; IMF 2013b.
Medium/long-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improve tax revenues by extending the tax base to the nonhydrocarbon sector. • Overhaul the customs administration to improve the enforcement of tax regulations. • Continue PFM and PIM reforms. • Launch a civil service reform to reduce the size of the public sector. • Revamp the Libyan budget law to allow ministries to routinely acquit on actual disbursements to help fully account for funds. • Introduce a modified budget coding structure. • Draft a code of conduct for the civil service. • Develop the internal audit function. 	World Bank 2013; Schiavo-Campo et al. 2014; IMF 2013b.

Decentralization and local governance

This section is based on a large body of work produced on decentralization and local governance. Key sources are the EU's 2017 "Libyan Local Governance Case Studies" of the cities of Zwara, Suq Aljumaa, Zliten, Misrata, Benghazi, and Albayda produced by the EU (EUD 2017), the 2017 "Core Government Functions Assessment" drafted by UNDP, which focuses on issues and priorities for local governance (UNDP 2017c), and the "Institutional Mapping of Service Delivery in Libya" performed by the WB in 2014 (World Bank 2014). Other sources include laws and decrees, project documents, and reports by

USAID, UNDP (UNDP 2015), and CILG-VNG (CILG-VNG 2017a, 2017b). Based on the main documents and considering the views expressed by experts interviewed, the team concludes that while the key sources provide precise qualitative information on the roles of a few municipalities in Libya, there are remaining analytical gaps with respect to the political, fiscal, and administrative aspects of decentralization. Moreover, there is very limited information on PFM at the municipal level, notably in terms of treasury, procurement, and audit functions. Annex A lists all information and data gaps identified for the sector.

Status of decentralization and local governance and main challenges

Libya's prolonged conflict and weak public administration have adversely impacted the relationship between the central public administration and subnational governments. Because of the ongoing political upheaval, many regions and municipalities have de facto organically decentralized and learned to govern themselves. Further complicating these issues are Libya's weak governance and public administration capacity, which undermines the functioning of the government and the delivery of basic services. At the same time, the emergence of competing public administrations has led public institutions to have unclear or overlapping mandates, which creates multiple challenges that are particularly felt at the local level.

Basic service delivery, particularly at the local level, has substantially deteriorated over the past several years; physical infrastructure has degraded and public administration systems have rapidly eroded (see sector note in chapter 5 on service delivery and municipal services). At the decentralized level, service delivery challenges are further exacerbated along gender lines, with significant differences in access and outcomes in key social services (see sector note in chapter 7 on gender). Decentralization initiatives would have to be underpinned by a better understanding of the related political, fiscal, and administrative dimensions—as well as the linkages and overlaps between them. Although decentralization can have a positive impact in terms of bringing governance and services closer to citizens, its effect on Libya's economic development, fiscal sustainability, macroeconomic stability, employment, public finance management, wealth distribution, and regional disparities has not yet been systematically analyzed.

Institutional framework

Under Gaddafi's regime, Libya was highly centralized. Following the revolution, Law no. 59 Concerning the Local Administration System was passed by the National Transitional Council in 2012. The Executive Regulation of Law no. 59⁷ and Cabinet Decree no. 130 of 2013 issuing the executive regulation of Law no. 59⁸ officially established a new local government structure composed of provinces, municipalities, localities, central government deconcentrated units called Executive

⁷Executive Regulation of Law No. (59) of 2012 on the Local Administration System attached to Cabinet Decree No. (130) of 2013.

⁸Cabinet Decree No. (130) of 2013 issuing the executive regulation of Law No. (59) of 2012 on the local administration system.

Offices (EOs), and specialized committees of provinces. As such, provincial councils are tasked with the province's oversight, guidance, control, and follow-up of administrative and financial affairs. They are also responsible for the general oversight of municipal activities and the various utilities and activities that by law fall under the province's jurisdiction. Notably, provincial councils should assume functions related to municipal council projects within the province when these cannot be handled by such councils.⁹

For their part, under Law no. 59, municipalities should generally oversee enforcing municipal regulations and establishing and managing public utilities related to an array of sectors, including urban planning, health and social affairs, water utilities, lighting, sanitation, roads, public hygiene, gardens, public markets and recreational areas, and construction permits. Municipalities should particularly be responsible for the following functions: civil registry affairs; regulating the municipal guard, local markets, and slaughterhouses; issuing local permits; monitoring the environment and public health; and establishing and managing small business incubators. In addition, the law calls for creating a Regional Planning Council and a Supreme Council for Local Administration (SCLA). The latter should coordinate national and subnational levels of governance under the Ministry of Local Governance (MoLG). Finally, the Executive Regulation of Law no. 59 provides additional information on topics such as the general competences of EOs, the administrative relation between decentralized and deconcentrated units, and the duties and compositions of Shura councils and provincial councils.¹⁰

Despite being included in the legislation, provinces, the SCLA, and the Regional Planning Council have yet to be established (UNDP 2017, 8). Until provinces are established, Law no. 59 of 2013 stipulates that municipalities are granted provincial responsibilities.¹¹ However, Law no. 59 was designed with the intention that regions (or Governates) would act as an intermediate form of government, which should provide for EOs. As a consequence, and due to the absence of associated secondary legislation and the existence of conflicting legal guidelines (EUD 2017; UNDP 2017), the MoLG, other ministries (such as Planning, Finance, and Public Works) and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) retain their control over the municipalities (UNDP 2017c, 20). EOs are present in municipalities, usually collect the local taxes, and control municipalities' budgets and decisions, including through a veto right (UNDP 2017c, 20). Consequently, services such as water, electricity, and waste collection remain under the financial and executive control of national ministries (EUD 2017, 12).

Law no. 59 defines how municipalities can generate and receive funding. The different sources of municipal revenue include own source (for example, rents, incomes from municipal investment), shared revenue (such as custom duties and transit fees), fiscal transfers from the central government, and other sources (for example, fines from the sale of confiscated assets) (UNDP 2017c, 53). However, the legal provisions and implementing rules and regulations to implement Law no. 59

⁹ Executive Regulation of Law No. (59) of 2012 on the Local Administration System attached to Cabinet Decree No. (130) of 2013.

¹⁰ Article 25 of Law No. 59.

¹¹ General National Congress Libya, Law No. (9) of 2013 amending Law No. (59) of 2012 concerning the Local Administration System.

are not in place, and even if they were, there are several concerns rising from the law itself. These include the fact that only the population criterion is considered for elaborating the amount of state transfers to each municipality, which favors smaller, rural municipalities over larger urban ones (UNDP 2017c, 27); and that state transfers do not include funds for capital projects, which limits municipalities' investment capacity.¹²

Structural challenges

- **Poor intergovernmental coordination.** The government and national ministries have been regarded as reluctant to transfer functions and financial resources to municipalities.¹³ Yet there are recent indications that this position may change. The PC announced far-reaching plans to roll out pilots to transfer competencies to two specific municipalities, while the MoLG has also divulged plans to launch pilots for primary health care and waste management devolution in six municipalities. In addition, the MoLG provides minimal support to municipalities, largely because the MoLG budget is itself based on the budget projections of governorates (which have not yet been founded) and would be informed by municipality budget projects. Before the conflict, municipalities (shaabiyat) received little support from the MoLG; since the conflict, municipalities have received almost no support.
- **Limited financial resources and fiscal decentralization.** Fiscal resources available to municipalities remain low, centrally controlled, and unfairly distributed among localities, to sustain their empowerment as called for by Law no. 59 (UNDP 2017c, 21). At the same time, municipalities' ability to generate revenue is limited.
- **Ill-defined municipal structure and weak human resources capacities.** Most municipalities (especially new ones) lack administrative structures to adequately deliver services (UNDP 2017c, 21). Municipal administrations often lack experienced staff, because staffing is based more on patronage than merit (UNDP 2017c, 21). In addition, there is an unequal distribution of the workforce; some municipalities have an oversized workforce, but others lack staff (UNDP 2015, 5). Finally, there is a lack of clarity on municipalities' boundaries, leading to difficulties in planning and implementation that can lead to contestations with mayors.
- **Weak participation.** Women, youth, and ethnic minorities are not equally represented in the decision-making process (UNDP 2017c, 33), despite legal provisions to ensure at least one seat for women and one seat for veterans who were disabled in the revolution. For instance, according to the 2015 UNDP survey, although the 18–30 age group represents 32 percent of the Libyan population, among the sample of municipalities surveyed, this group accounts

¹² Additional bodies exist at the local level. Law no. 51 sets up Shura councils, whose function is to advise the municipal council on matters related to local governance (with no voting rights). Furthermore, parallel political and security bodies exist (for example, the Social Council in Bani Waleed, Higher Social Councils in Ubari, the Military Council in Misrata), which can play a significant role in resolving local disputes and ensuring local justice. Finally, localities that host many IDPs often have local crisis committees, gathering different local stakeholders (for example, CSOs, NGOs, EOs, armed groups, municipality officials) to coordinate the humanitarian response (UNDP 2017c).

¹³ Contrary to the main trend, certain recent events, such as the dissolution of the Higher Committee for Municipal Strategies in 2014, point toward centralization, according to UNDP (2017c, 21).

for only 20 percent of municipal employees and 20 percent of council members (UNDP 2017c, 33). Nevertheless, municipalities were seen as the most legitimate local actor for representing constituents (except in Ubari and Sebha, where tribal figures are predominant) (CISR 2016, 19) and demand for participating in local public meetings remains high.

Impact of the conflict

- **Poor intergovernmental coordination.** Governmental divides and the lack of a national vision for decentralization complicate authorities' ability to legislate and regulate (CISR 2016, 19). For instance, the plethora of decrees promulgated in 2014 and 2015 on municipalities' internal organization has created confusion and disparities in the ways municipalities apply legal texts, procedures, and regulations (CILG-VNG 2017b). Similarly, the lack of security has impeded the ability of staff to travel and worsened communication between the central government and the regions (CILG-VNG 2017b, 26).
- **Limited financial resources and fiscal decentralization.** It is likely that the severe economic crisis has caused fiscal resources available to municipalities to plummet since 2014. As a result, municipalities may try to find alternative sources of funding (for example, some municipalities tax companies located on their territory, without the approval or knowledge of central authorities). Some might even collect taxes from illicit activities occurring on their territory.
- **Threat to municipalities' legitimacy and democratic functioning.** Amid the conflict, some municipalities have become militarized: for example, nine elected mayors were removed by the LNA and replaced by mayors appointed by the military (UNDP 2017c, 14). Also, local-level power vacuums have in some instances contributed to the emergence of parallel bodies. These bodies can have a stabilizing effect on communities (for instance, the Social Council in Bani Waleed, the Higher Social Councils in Ubari, or the Military Council in Misrata) (World Bank 2018c) when they cooperate with municipal councils (such as by signing social charters) and can help reconcile neighboring communities (by signing peace charters). However, they can also undermine a municipality's legitimacy by competing with it and threatening its independence.

Main interventions and capacity to respond

Several international actors—such as the Stabilization Facility for Libya (SFL), managed by UNDP, as well as the EU, CILG-VNG, GIZ, USAID, Italy, and the WB—are involved in the sector:

- EU support to municipalities (through many implementers) focuses on restoring public services (rehabilitating key health/education infrastructure; restoring public spaces) as well as building administrative capacities within the municipal councils (including for planning, budgeting, management, and so on). In selected pilot municipalities, EU support has contributed to local economic development (support to vocational training centers, small and medium enterprises), while in others, one-stop shops for municipal services (permits, civil registry) have been established. EU-financed programs are currently active in 49 different municipalities across Libya.

- The SFL aims to provide tangible “quick-wins” and implements projects at the local level, such as rehabilitating critical infrastructure and restoring services. It does so in close collaboration with local governing institutions.
- UNDP supports activities to increase civic education and voter turnout, in preparation of local elections, as part of its support to the Central Commission for Municipal Council Elections (UNDP 2019). Through its capacity strengthening initiative, UNDP provides technical assistance intended to strengthen the national government’s capacities and develop institutions for improved service delivery at national and local levels.
- GIZ activities aim to foster the decentralization process by dialoging with key national players (for example, sectoral ministries, national entities, SOEs, municipalities, the private sector, CSOs) to agree on a form of local decentralization. GIZ also supports municipalities through small-scale service delivery projects and offering capacity building to local councils, municipalities, and some ministries (such as the MoLG).
- Italy supports service delivery in Tripoli and other municipalities through QIPs. It also plans capacity-building activities for 24 municipalities.
- CILG-VNG activities aim to improve the management of selected municipalities, improve municipalities’ service delivery efforts, and ensure that civil society is capacitated to better interact with and contribute to municipal councils’ work.
- Through the Libya Economic Stabilization Program (LESP), USAID works to improve 24 municipalities’ PFM, including by creating a Municipal Budget Planning and Monitoring Unit within the MoLG. The LESP also works to improve service delivery through medium-term strategic plans in primary health care and solid waste management. USAID has also funded an International Republican Institute (IRI) survey on elections, service delivery, and citizens’ perceptions at the municipal level.
- The WB supports improving local administration and service delivery by providing technical assistance on fiscal, administrative, and political decentralization, including support for (i) aggregate expenditure analysis; (ii) revenue assignment analysis to achieve vertical balance (at least for the larger regions); and (iii) guidance on intergovernmental transfers. With respect to the political dimensions of decentralization, support will be provided to introduce a system that can support effective, accountable, and transparent delivery of services to citizens. Finally, support will be provided to implement the existing decentralization law and improve the capacity of the MoLG.
- IOM is planning to map municipal boundaries using a geographic information system (GIS) at the request of the MoLG.

The many partners active in the sector are coordinating with government in the local governance sub-working group chaired by the MoLG and cochaired by the German Embassy.¹⁴

¹⁴This sub-working group is one of the two sub-working groups under the governance working group chaired by the Ministry of Planning and cochaired by UNDP.

Main needs and priorities as formulated in the literature

Period	Needs include	Sources
Short-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Facilitate “good” local revenues to allow municipalities to fulfill their duties and deter them from seeking revenues generated from parallel activities (UNDP 2017c). Train municipal staff on local PFM (Such as budgeting or elaborating viable tax plans) and overall governance at the municipal level. Encourage the cooperation of civil society and municipal councils (EUD 2017, 6) . Improve the dialogue and coordination between municipalities and with the government, including through an e-government system, (EUD 2017, 16) a national municipal council forum, and an interministerial committee on municipal empowerment (UNDP 2017, 39). Clarify the distribution of roles and resources between central and local levels, (An interministerial coordination could help clarify the roles UNDP 2017c, 38) including by harmonizing legislation (UNDP 2017c, 36). 	EUD 2017; UNDP 2017c.
Medium/long-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identify a local government strategy/vision. 	MoLG, Ministry of Planning, MoF, and local governments.

Parastatal institutions and SOEs

There is very limited information and literature on which to base this section. The key sources were interviews with stakeholders and Transparency International’s National Integrity System Assessment (TI 2014). A further source is the 2015 Simplified Enterprise Survey and Private Sector Mapping exercise carried out by the WB. Based on the main documents and considering the views expressed by experts interviewed, the team’s assessment is that there is a dearth of data and information related to parastatal institutions and SOEs. Currently, there is no comprehensive assessment of existing SOEs (either before the revolution or currently) to indicate how many are currently in existence, their repartition per sector, their size, capitalization, or associated detail. Annex A lists all information and data gaps identified for the sector.

Status of the main parastatal institutions and SOEs

The nationalization of major companies in the 1960s, as well as Law no. 4 of 1978 about confiscation, led the government to take direct control over production. This played a central role in orienting capital and labor away from the private sector and profoundly modified the country’s economic and social structure. The government owns numerous enterprises in the following sectors: electricity, transportation, communication, agriculture, construction, financial services, manufacturing, mining, gas, and water (TI 2014). Despite reforms to improve conditions for private-sector

activity prior to the conflict, the private sector still only accounts for between 4 and 15 percent of GDP (Calice et al. 2015).

A few SOEs, such as the General Electricity Company of Libya (GECOL) and the National Oil Corporation (NOC), serve as the primary sources of Libyan economic activity. Several SOEs also have some de facto authority over the sectors in which they operate; for instance, as a sectoral planning authority. The NOC dominates Libya's oil industry and, along with a number of smaller subsidiaries, accounts for more than 70 percent of the country's oil output. The NOC and the CBL are two institutions that have demonstrated a stabilizing influence during and in the wake of conflict in Libya; as such, they are among the country's few unifying forces and an important resilience factor going forward.¹⁵

Other key SOEs and parastatals include the following:

- **Water sector** (see sector note in chapter 5 on water for more details):
 - **Company for Water and Waste Water (GCWWW).**¹⁶ Responsible for water supply and distribution, wastewater treatment, and sanitation.
 - **General Desalination Company for Libya (GDCOL).** Plans, develops, operates, and maintains desalination plants.
 - **General Authority for Water Resources (GAWR).** The national body for assessment, planning, and management of water resources.
 - **Great Man-Made River Project Authority (GMRA).** Responsible for groundwater exploitation and its transport from the southern well fields to the coastal area.
- **Electricity sector** (see sector note in chapter 5 on electricity for more details):
 - **GECOL.** Handles the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity as well as planning, development, operations, maintenance, and dispatch of the power system.
- **Information and communications technology (ICT) sector** (see sector note in chapter 5 on ICT for more details):
 - **Libyan Post, Telecommunication and Information Technology Company (LPTIC).** This a holding company for all state-owned companies operating in the ICT sector. Companies that fall under the LPTIC's jurisdiction include fixed-line incumbent Hatif Libya, wireless

¹⁵Interviews with stakeholders, Tunis, Tunisia, January 28–February 7, 2019.

¹⁶The GCWWW acts as a public authority and is financed by subsidies from the state (which are just enough to cover operational costs), tariffs paid by citizens, and loans. The water supplied and managed by GCWWW is implemented through a national plan, though there are eight regional services that implement specific regional needs.

network operators Libyana and Almadar Aljaded, Internet service provider (ISP) Libya Telecom & Technology (LTT), and broadcaster/VSAT operator Aljeel Aljaded.¹⁷

- **Mobile telephone subsector.** In this space are Almadar Aljaded, Libyana, and LibyaPhone Mobile. Almadar Aljaded and Libyana are fully owned by LPTIC, while LibyaPhone Mobile is owned by the state-owned LTT.
- **In the Internet sector,** LTT is the country's dominant ISP and also acts as the de facto arbitrator for its broadband sector.
- **Hatif Libya.** In the fixed-line telephone sector, Hatif Libya is currently responsible for providing fixed-line voice telephone service.
- **Media sector:**
 - Jamhuriya Broadcasting Corporation.

Institutional framework

Limited data exists on the SOE sector's institutional framework. However, the office of the Prime Minister has recently established the Higher Committee for Transparency, which is tasked with providing strategic direction, guidance, support, and oversight to establish a culture of transparency, accountability, and good governance in the public sector and in the management of SOEs.

Structural challenges

- **Profitability and governance.** SOEs that operate at a loss risk impacting the public budget; there is also the risk of corruption and embezzlement from these industries. Further challenges to governance include conflicts of interest and poor management.
- **Crowding out of the private sector.** Private companies suffer from unfair competition from public enterprises active in the same sector that have a larger access to foreign currency and at a better rate (Calice et al. 2015), or enjoy more political clout, giving them favored access to public procurement and markets.
- **Fiscal risk.** SOEs are likely to represent large contingent liabilities and would require the government to step in if and when one was to fail.

Impact of the conflict

- **Security.** The current insecurity has had an impact on the operating environment of the SOEs. (for more details, see chapter 4, Private Sector Development).

¹⁷ Data in this section is from the GlobalComms Database, TeleGeography, Washington, DC, <https://www2.telegeography.com>.

- **Political fragmentation.** Fragmentation of the country's institutions has affected the performance of SOEs and in some cases triggered a power struggle. That said, the NOC and GECOL have successfully resisted pressure and continue to supply services.
- **Financial viability and performance.** Hundreds of SOEs are estimated¹⁸ to have collapsed and are probably out of business, but their facilities and assets still exist—though it is likely that only their land has maintained effective value.

Main interventions and capacity to respond

In December 2016, the Tripoli-based CBL, the Audit Bureau, the NOC, the PC/GNA, and international mediators agreed on a temporary financial arrangement. Partners have made technical assistance, including on reforms, available to various utilities (see sector notes in chapter 5 on water, energy, and ICT for more information). No comprehensive road map for SOE reform has been found.

Main needs and priorities as formulated in the literature

No comprehensive articulation in terms of short- or medium/long-term needs have been identified in the literature. SOEs that have collapsed could be privatized to take advantage of their remaining assets and generate jobs.¹⁹

Accountability, transparency, and citizen engagement

This section relies on a number of key sources, notably Transparency International's National Integrity System Assessment (TI 2014), the BTI 2018 country report (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018), a 2015 mapping of civil society organizations, carried out by Altai Consulting for SJD (Altai 2015), and a 2017 mapping of media bodies, also carried out by Altai Consulting for UNDP (Altai 2017). This section also draws extensively from the body of work produced as part of the World Bank technical assistance to the governance sector (World Bank 2013, 2016). Based on the main documents and considering the views expressed by experts interviewed, the team's assessment is that there are moderate gaps in the data regarding accountability, transparency, and citizen engagement in Libya. Annex A lists all information and data gaps identified for the sector.

¹⁸ Based on interviews conducted during the mission.

¹⁹ Based on interviews conducted during the mission.

Status of public accountability, transparency, and citizen engagement and main challenges

Public accountability

This is weak in Libya, and key institutions perform poorly in relation to their role in combating corruption (TI 2014). Libya is perceived to be among the most corrupt countries in the world—and is ranked 170th out of 180 countries on the 2018 Transparency International Corruptions Perceptions Index (TI 2018). According to the Global Corruption Barometer, 48 percent of Libyans perceive public officials and civil servants to be either corrupt or extremely corrupt. Along with the police, the health and oil sectors are perceived to be the most corrupt institutions in the country (TI 2014). On the other hand, of all the formal institutions, Libyans have most confidence in judicial bodies, according to a survey carried out on behalf of USAID (with 68 percent of those surveyed expressing confidence in the judiciary, and 61 percent in the Supreme Court) (IFES 2018). The private sector fares better, with only 31 percent of Libyans believing it to be extremely corrupt or corrupt (see sector note in this chapter on core government functions for more detail on nepotism and patronage in the public service) (TI 2014). The 2014 World Values Survey showed that Libyans do not trust their government (32 percent of respondents expressed trust and 38 percent not very much or none). The same report showed that almost 50 percent of respondents have little or no trust in the civil service.

Integrity

A 2014 report by Transparency International found that the Libyan integrity system is in extremely poor state, with most institutions, laws, and regulations either outdated or only very recently implemented (TI 2014). The MoF does not regularly publish details on the fiscal regime for the oil sector or regular bulletins on petroleum, tax, nontax revenue collections (UN ESCA and World Bank 2015), and Libya does not participate in international initiatives such as the Extractives Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) (TI 2014); it also lacks a “Publish What You Pay” coalition (TI 201).

Citizen engagement

In terms of citizen engagement, participation is not structured, consultation processes are nonbinding, and social accountability is weak. Freedom of expression has also come under attack in Libya; reporters and bloggers have been assassinated and abducted, and the press is intimidated (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018). Between 2012 and 2017, all World Governance Indicators have significantly declined, including those measuring rule of law, voice and accountability, and control of corruption. Libyans can connect freely to the Internet and have access to a broad range of national and international television channels and local radio stations (Altai 2017). Libyans primarily draw on satellite television and the Internet for information, followed by radio (Altai 2017). The youth turn to social media for news and information, while Facebook is the preferred source of information for this demographic on updates regarding the country (Altai 2017).

Transparency and accountability

In the wake of the 2011 revolution, active and vocal CSOs have emerged across the country (World Bank 2013). Along with the media, they have succeeded in putting some critical questions on the public agenda and made demands for transparency and accountability (World Bank 2013). The rise of citizen activism and emergence of associations has helped to build networks across the country and facilitated grassroots dialogue on the constitution (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018). However, CSOs are new and generally weak in capacity; their community is fragmented, and many are often affiliated with different political actors (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018). Organizations run by Libyans outside of Libya—such as Lawyers for Justice in Libya, which is based in London—play a role in reaching out to CSOs in Libya and engaging them to address the crisis.

CSOs that have continued to operate during the conflict and its aftermath have provided an element of resilience through their flexibility and expertise. CSOs in Libya are also often closely connected with more informal structures and community networks, which means they may be able to function where conditions would otherwise not allow for more formal operations (EU, UN, and World Bank 2018).

Institutional framework

Key institutions—the judiciary, law enforcement agencies, anti-corruption agencies, and businesses—perform very poorly in relation to their role in combatting corruption (TI 2014). Following the revolution, in 2012, the GNC tried to strengthen the National Audit Bureau and introduced a National Anti-Corruption Commission, but with negligible results. The founding legislation for the National Anti-Corruption Commission declares it to be completely independent. In reality, however, there have been accusations of interference with the work of the parliamentary committee, which is responsible for supervising this body (TI 2014). The National Anti-Corruption Commission has 200 employees and an annual budget of US\$20 million, but is perceived to be ineffective, and no impact has been recorded (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018). In addition, there is an entity subsumed under the MoF that also works on anti-corruption issues (TI 2014). As with the commission, this entity is not transparent (TI 2014).

The Administrative Control Authority was established in 2013 and is designed to increase transparency of the activities of the various entities that fall under its jurisdiction (CILG-VNG 2017a). With regard to assets declaration and management, Libya boasts a relatively strong legislative framework, but one that remains limited in terms of implementation.

The National Audit Bureau acts as an oversight mechanism and is increasingly critical of the executive. It is showing progress and has been able to put some key issues with relation to spending and integrity on the public agenda (TI 2014). It plays an important role with regard to oversight of the executive and legislature, and has contributed to holding the public sector accountable (TI 2014). It is the only oversight mechanism that itself adheres to the principles of transparency and accountability (TI 2014). The introduction of a National Identification Number (NIN) was designed to further combat corruption by assigning a unique number to each individual that aims to ensure transfers and payments go to the right person (TI 2014).

Libya does not have access to an information law or a freedom of information act (TI 2014), and there is no culture of information disclosure in the country. Freedom of opinion, communication, and the press are guaranteed by Libya's Draft Constitutional Charter, released by the Libyan Transitional National Council in September 2011 (TI 2014). Several repressive Gaddafi-era laws remain on the books due to the absence of significant legal reforms in the country. These include measures carrying harsh punishments for those who publish content deemed offensive or threatening to Islam. Their vague wording means that these laws can be applied to any form of speech (Freedom House 2018). The GNC passed an amendment to the criminal code, but no guarantees for freedom of expression were provided (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018). Laws on freedom of association have yet to be adopted, which leaves CSOs in Libya without a clear legal framework (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018).

Structural challenges

The key structural challenges are as follows:

- **Inaccessible, absent, or outdated legal frameworks.** Lack of regulation and the lack of a national framework governing the media are the key challenges impeding the establishment of a trusted and professional media landscape (Altai 2017). Lack of clarity over institutional roles and functions, lines of command, and authority and accountability further complicate efforts for greater clarity.
- **Duplication of administrations and authorities.** The duplication of governments and administrations at both the national and local level in the current political climate has made securing approvals "extremely complicated" (Altai 2015). It has also forced some CSOs to "choose sides" (Altai 2015).
- **Legacies of corruption and patronage.** The country's oil wealth has enabled a system of patronage to flourish, to the detriment of effective government functioning. The lack of standards for transparency in the management of public funds at the state budget, government ministries budget, and affiliated institutions facilitates corruption (LOOPS 2016).
- **Limited understanding of the role of CSOs.** There is limited awareness of CSOs' role and mandate as well as varying perceptions of the nature of civil society in Libya (Altai 2015). There is also limited experience with organizing and implementing activities (Altai 2015). The concept of civil society is new in Libya, as this space has historically been occupied by INGOs, with limited opportunity for local capacity development.
- **Limited human resource capacity.** There are a number of CSOs in Libya that focus on transparency and accountability—but they face limited capacity in project management and communication expertise. The low levels of professionalism pose a further challenge to CSO operations, while lack of office space and resources continues to hamper operations (Altai 2015). The media sector is dominated by poorly trained professionals who are subject to manipulation and pressure from powerful actors (Altai 2017).

- **Security challenges.** CSOs and media actors focusing on issues deemed sensitive face security threats, as do their representatives—which makes it very difficult for them to carry out capacity-building activities. Security challenges also preclude authorities from addressing the main causes of corruption (TI 2014).

Impact of the conflict

- **Proliferation of CSOs.** In the period during and immediately after the revolution, around 250 new organizations were established; that number had grown to about 1,900 active organizations by 2015 (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018). The upheaval gave civil society a stronger voice in Libya and has seen greater calls for the government to be more transparent and accountable (UN ESCWA and World Bank 2015).
- **Threats and attacks against activists and CSOs.** Although the revolution has opened up space for voice and expression, the resulting insecurity has also driven away scores of journalists, activists, and CSOs and forced them to operate from abroad (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018). The breakdown of the rule of law and the growing influence of militias have led to a rise in attacks on journalists and activists. Since the increase in fighting in 2014, many CSOs have restricted their scope of work to activities with a low public profile and that court less controversy (Altai 2015). Among the CSOs that are still active, many have switched their areas of focus toward crisis response rather than pure development, to reflect the current context (Altai 2015).
- **Restrictive operating environment for CSOs and media networks.** Some media networks were also shuttered due to political pressure, threats, and lack of funding (Altai 2017). Lack of funding and a difficult operating environment has also meant that “countless” CSOs that were created in the post-Gaddafi period are now dormant, although they continue to maintain a network for volunteers (Altai 2015). The few remaining CSOs that receive funding from international bodies are not trusted by some in the population, while those that have been able to continue operations without foreign funding benefit from member contributions (Altai 2015).
- **Crackdown on freedom of expression.** The critical security situation and failure to sustain momentum on the constitutional drafting process has seen freedom of expression come under attack. Court sentences and violence have curtailed some of the freedom of expression won following the revolution (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018).
- **Push for a new social contract.** Since the fall of the Gaddafi regime, there has been an increased popular demand for a state built on democratic principles, good governance, and respect for human rights as well as a focus on reforming the public administration. This comes even though corruption is entrenched, a culture of secrecy remains, and a lack involvement in decision making (TI 2015).

Main interventions and capacity to respond

Libya signed the United Nations Convention Against Corruption in 2003 and ratified it in 2005. Efforts to combat corruption in the private sector include the introduction of legislation that excludes companies involved in certain illegal activities from conducting business in Libya (TI 2014).

Development partners and donors are undertaking efforts to build the capacity of CSOs in Libya. However, these efforts seem to be unconnected from one another. They include the following:

- The WB will support the development and implementation of the workplan for the Higher Committee for Transparency through targeted technical assistance with the objective of improving transparency and accountability in Libya.
- Recently, the Libyan Assets Recovery and Management Office (LARMO) was established with support from the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI); questions around the mandate of this institution remain unsolved, as both the CBL and the Prosecutor General also have (partial) mandates for asset recovery.
- The UK plans capacity-building support to Libyan CSOs with a specific focus on women's interests to support women in addressing the gender-based barriers they face and to increase the space for women to engage at the national, local, and community levels.

Main needs and priorities as formulated in the literature

Period	Needs include	Sources
Short-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop the capacity of and provide ongoing support to CSOs. • Help Libyan CSOs learn how to develop and conduct activities relating to advocacy and monitoring while minimizing personal risk. • Support training and capacity building of media professionals. • Support training on digital security to bloggers, social media activists, and citizen journalists. • Identify the mechanisms and practices that are most effective and compatible with local cultural traditions and practices. • Establish a legal framework that would enhance the ability of CSOs and media to operate independently. 	Altai Consulting 2015, 2017.
Medium/long-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Build CSOs' media capacity and support efforts for effective and inclusive community media. • Address the institutional gap between the quality of public institutions and their capacity to efficiently deliver services and respond to the needs of citizens. • Ensure mandatory registration of media outlets and require them to declare their funding sources. • Establish protection laws for journalists and media personnel. • Establish a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy. • Reform the justice sector. • Improve transparency in the public sector. 	Altai Consulting 2015, 2017; TI 2014; World Bank 2009; LOOPS 2016.

Macroeconomic Stability and Economic Recovery

Macroeconomic stability

This section relies on estimates and forecasts from the World Bank for key macro poverty indicators. Other key documents for this section include the World Bank's "Libya Economic Outlook" (World Bank 2018d) and the 2013 IMF "Article IV Consultation" (IMF 2013). Based on the main documents and considering the views expressed by experts interviewed, the team concludes that there is sufficient data to compute reliable estimates, but there is a lack of background, primary economic data sets, and the overall quality of data is weak due to the Bureau of Statistics's limited statistical capacity. Annex A lists all information and data gaps identified for the sector.

Status of the macroeconomic situation and main challenges

Libya is a rentier economic state, with major dependence on oil revenues to finance the state budget. This dependence contributes to the manifestation of "Dutch disease" symptoms, including an over-valued official exchange rate, weak economic diversification, economic dominance of the public sector, high dependence on imports, economic recession, high unemployment, and high inflation. Recent oil production recovery has not yet translated into overall economic recovery, while inflation and scarcity of basic goods is adversely impacting the population and non-oil economic sectors. Nevertheless, Libya is richly endowed with assets that could finance and support economic recovery, pending a resolution of political and security issues.

GDP

The 2011 revolution led to a 62 percent contraction of the economy. Following the resumption of oil production in 2012, non-oil sectors experienced sustained growth until 2014, boosted by trade and real estate activities, which benefited from a relaxation of previously restrictive building laws, and increased wages, which had a positive impact on consumption (Calice et al. 2015). Following the worsening security situation in 2014, Libya experienced recession. Subsequently, improved political and security arrangements reached during the second half of 2017 allowed Libya to more than double its production of oil and to register record growth (up 26.7 percent), but this dynamic has not been sustained in 2018, as oil production stagnated around 1 million barrels per day (bpd) over the first five months before abruptly dropping to only 0.7 million bpd in June following the attack on and temporary control of the oil fields and terminals in the East by militias. At the end of

2018, this resulted in a real GDP per capita at 58 percent of its 2010 level (World Bank 2018d). Table 1 outlines key economic indicators for Libya.

Table 1 Macro Poverty Outlook Indicators

	2013	2014	2015e	2016e	2017e	2018f	2019f	2020f	2021f
Real GDP growth, at constant market prices	-13.6	-24.0	-8.9	-2.8	26.7	7.8	4.0	6.0	1.3
Inflation (Consumer Price Index)	2.6	2.4	9.8	25.9	28.4	9.3	10.0	10.0	10.0
Current account balance (% of GDP)	0.0	-46.1	-33.1	-18.0	2.5	1.2	3.1	3.0	2.8
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)	-4.0	-43.3	-80.9	-81.2	-34.5	12.7	3.5	2.7	2.7

Source: World Bank 2018e.

Note: e = estimate, f = forecast. Annual percent change unless otherwise indicated.

Fiscal policy and external account

Expenditure inefficiencies have been keeping the fiscal and current account in a fragile stance, resulting in continual pressure on foreign reserves. However, thanks to the unbudgeted proceeds from the new fee on hard currency transactions instituted in September 2018, public finances ran a surplus that year (3.9 percent of GDP), the first after five years of high deficits. However, public finances remain unsustainable. This is due to (i) a rising wage bill amounting to 41.3 percent of GDP, induced by both salary increases to keep up with inflation and additional hiring, which in turn are linked to pressure on the public payroll as a stabilizing instrument in a context of multifactorial conflict; and (ii) subsidies, which remain high (12.2 percent of GDP) given the complex political economy that delays the system's much needed reform. The balance of payments also remains unsustainable despite the small surplus (1.7 percent of GDP) registered in 2018 thanks to higher oil revenues and low imports. The latter have been contained by the high fee (183 percent) instituted on hard currency transactions and the CBL's control of access to foreign exchange (World Bank 2018d). As a result, foreign reserves dropped to around US\$80 billion in 2018, down from US\$124 billion in 2012.

Monetary policy

The effectiveness of monetary policy remains limited. Cash shortages rise due to an increase in foreign currency demand and reduction in foreign exchange revenues from oil. The official exchange rate of the Libyan dinar (LYD) against the U.S. dollar lost around 82.5 percent of its value in the parallel market in 2017 due to weak macroeconomic fundamentals as well as to the foreign exchange restrictions implemented by the CBL to limit the amounts of hard currencies residents can purchase. At the same time, the official exchange rate was maintained stable around its Special Drawing Right (SDR) peg (LYD1.39/US\$) (World Bank 2017a). The parallel exchange rate premium is reflected in the prices of many products, including essential food and medicine. Conversely, this creates vast rent opportunities for those able to access dollars at the official rate and to petroleum products at official prices, then selling them back at the parallel price. To fight speculation and smuggling, and hence reduce parallel markets premiums, the government instituted a fee (183 percent) on hard currency transactions in the summer of 2018.

Inflation

Although declining, inflation remains high, reflecting market disruptions due to supply shortages of goods and services along with still very active parallel foreign exchange markets. The consumer price index increased by 9.3 percent in 2018 (compared to 28.4 percent in 2017). The cumulative inflation over the last four years has adversely affected Libyan households who lost more than half of their purchasing power. This has almost certainly pushed more Libyans into poverty and hardship and worsened inequality (World Bank 2018d).

Macroeconomic challenges

Libya suffers from several macroeconomic challenges:

- The pegged exchange rate offers a pragmatic policy anchor supported by ample reserves, in an environment marked by uncertainty and volatile oil revenues (IMF 2013c). However, it is sustainable only if fiscal policy is supportive. Given the hydrocarbon dependency, fiscal policy threatens macroeconomic stability, as they lead to a deterioration in the external position, an appreciation of the real exchange rate, and overvaluation of the currency.
- Fiscal revenue and the economic situation are extremely dependent on oil production and international oil prices (the former because of the security situation and the constant threat of attacks on oil infrastructure).
- The divided government precludes the possibility of formulating and implementing fundamental economic policies for the country. The annual budget preparation is characterized by a short-term horizon with little reference to longer-term policies and objectives, while Libya's public finances are heavily dependent on volatile hydrocarbon earnings.
- The LIA is not integrated into the fiscal framework. Currently, the LIA lacks a clear definition of its objectives and the rules governing the accumulation, management, and use of its resources.

Main interventions and capacity to respond

The CBL has limited success in fulfilling its core mandate of managing the currency, money supply, and interest rates, and overseeing the commercial banks. This is compounded by the CBL's division into two competing central banks in the West and East. Nevertheless, the fact that the CBL has been able to keep operating during the conflict and its aftermath represents an important source of resilience in the fragmented country.

The IMF and World Bank work closely to assist Libya on macroeconomic stability, including by offering joint technical assistance and advice on budget consolidation, macroeconomic stabilization, and the liquidity crisis. There is a division of labor in some areas, with the IMF leading on devaluation and the World Bank on subsidy reforms and safety nets.

Main needs and priorities as formulated in the literature

Period	Needs include	Sources
Short-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Restoring peace and bringing oil production fully online is essential for macroeconomic stability. In the immediate and short term, this would have to be underpinned by the following actions: Bring current expenditures under control. Improve governance of the financial sector. 	World Bank 2018c.
Medium/long-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Broader and deeper structural reforms will be required to stabilize the macroeconomic framework and diversify the economy to stimulate private job growth and improve the well-being of the population. The main policies to this end include the following: Develop a rule-based, medium-term fiscal framework. Integrate LIA into the fiscal framework and ensure it functions as a savings fund for future generations as well as a stabilization fund to better manage oil price cycles (IMF 2013c). Reform the subsidy system and accompany subsidy reform with an adequate cash transfer scheme to protect poor households. Adapt the size the public sector to fit needs and missions. Reform the tax system. Consolidate the financial sector, promote the development and diversification of the private sector, and improve the business environment. Rebuild damaged infrastructure and restore public services (World Bank 2018d; World Bank 2017). 	World Bank 2018c; IMF 2013c.

Financial sector

This section relies on data from the Central Bank of Libya. The CBL produces monthly updates containing information such as data on banks and their capital structure. There is significant data on letters of credit and bank solvency. Other key documents consulted include the 2013 IMF “Article IV Consultation” (IMF 2013c), an IMF report on challenges and opportunities after the Revolution (IMF 2012), an OECD study on the role of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Libya’s reconstruction (OECD 2016), the OECD’s Action Plan for SME Development in Libya (OECD 2017), an EU study on ways to improve access to finance for SMEs (EU 2018), and a Mercy Corps report on the impact of the liquidity crisis on SMEs and livelihoods (Zway 2017). Based on the main documents and considering the views expressed by experts interviewed, the team concludes that sectoral data is only partially available and there are significant data limitations, notably in terms of liquidity, capital structure, and risk-adjusted portfolio. Annex A lists all information and data gaps identified for the sector.

Status of the financial sector

Libya's financial sector is small and underdeveloped. The volume of domestic credit to the private sector and the volume of credit provided by the banking sector represent a small share of Libya's GDP. In 2014, domestic credit to the private sector was only 27 percent of GDP, up from 9.3 percent in 2010, but still very low compared to the average of 37 percent of GDP in the developing Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries and 150 percent of GDP in high-income OECD countries (OECD 2016). The five largest commercial banks were fully owned by the CBL before 2007. Subsequently, Libya undertook financial sector reform, which included partial privatization and the involvement of foreign partners in several Libyan banks. Nonetheless, a large share of the banking system remains under the control of the government, and state-owned specialized credit institutions play a considerable role in the sector (IMF 2012).

Before the revolution, the performance of the banking sector improved: nonperforming loans declined to 17.2 percent (from 35.5 percent in 2004), and the regulatory capital ratio increased to 17.3 percent (compared to 10.4 percent in 2004) (IMF 2012).

Institutional framework

The main institutions active in the sector include the following:

- The CBL oversees and regulates the banking sector, but also owns banks and sits on the board of other banks. It is currently divided into two CBL public administrations (one in Tripoli and one in Albayda).
- As of February 2018, the Libyan banking system included 4 state-owned specialized financial institutions, 17 commercial banks, and 5 newly created Islamic banks (EU 2018), but was dominated by 5 state-owned commercial banks (Calice et al. 2015), which accounted for 90 percent of the deposit base (OECD 2016). Commercial banks account for 81 percent of the total assets in the financial sector (OECD 2016).

Structural challenges

The financial sector suffers from a lack of adequate lending opportunities in nonhydrocarbon sectors of the economy. Specific structural challenges include the following:

- **Competition from specialized credit institutions (SCIs) tasked with implementing social programs.** As of 2010, SCIs accounted for over 65 percent of credit (IMF 2013c).
- **Weak linkages between the financial system and the real economy.** Lending to the private sector was only 9.5 percent of GDP in 2010 (compared to 21.8 percent in 2000) (IMF 2013c). In addition, the share of credit to the private sector in total banking assets declined from over 40 percent to 13.5 percent (IMF 2013c). Reduced bank lending to the private sector is expected to have had a detrimental impact on economic activity.

- **Difficulty assessing borrowers.** The underdeveloped domestic credit infrastructure makes it challenging for financial institutions to assess borrowers. The existing credit bureau has limited capacity and cannot perform its credit information and rating role sufficiently. Compounded by a high number of nonperforming loans and lack of skilled staff, this prompts banks to be prudent in their lending, limiting access to credit for micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs.)
- **Banned interest in financial transactions.** Law no. 1 of 2013 bans interest-based banking services, reducing incentives for banks to lend. Without operational Islamic finance institutions and instruments in place—notably the lack of detailed directives and processes, this significantly reduces lending and constrains private sector investment (IMF 2013c).
- **Absence of microcredit.** Despite the donor-funded initiatives (UK) to develop microcredit products, there is no microcredit legislation or institution, which constrains MSME development.
- **Underdeveloped, unconventional financing tools.** The absence of other unconventional forms of financing, such as venture capital, mezzanine finance, equity finance, crowdfunding, constrains the development of MSMEs and especially start-ups.

Impact of the conflict

There is an ongoing liquidity crisis resulting from macroeconomic instability and loss of confidence in the banking system. The banking sector remains illiquid despite a sharp increase in money supply, from LDY66.7 billion at the end of 2014 to LDY122.1 billion at the end of September 2018 (CBL 2018), as currency circulating outside the banking system continued to rise. Economic agents have been holding increasing amounts of cash, representing 52.8 percent of GDP at the end of September 2018 (compared to 8 percent of GDP in 2010). As a result, the currency in circulation outside banks increased by 16.9 percent by the end of September 2018 (year-on-year) and has doubled over the last three years (World Bank 2017a). This reflects a general sentiment that banks lack liquidity and may be unable to meet their obligation to depositors. This reflects an incipient monetary crisis and de facto dollarization, which is adversely affecting the population, except for connected businesses and criminal networks (World Bank 2019).

On top of worsening the fiscal deficit and aggravating inflation, rent-seeking schemes that exploit the gap between official and black-market exchange rates have aggravated the security situation and operating environment for the banking sector. Letter-of-credit schemes have been particularly lucrative, with militias taking their share either through partners within banks or by blackmailing, extorting, or kidnapping members of commercial banks and the CBL.¹ Militias have also turned to other schemes involving credit cards and money transfers, which has led to armed fighting for control over bank branches (Zway 2017).

¹ As reported by the UN panel of experts on Libya, one of the most prominent militia leaders in Tripoli and his business associates obtained letters of credit for more than US\$20 million by extorting CBL officials in 2015. See UNSC 2016, 199.

Main interventions and capacity to respond

The fragmentation of the CBL is hindering much needed reforms of the banking system.

The CBL has taken steps toward developing a dual system of conventional and Islamic banks. CBL management favors continuing with the dual system despite intense political pressure to adopt a Sharia-compliant system (IMF 2013c).

A few commercial banks and financial service providers have worked out new payment methods, such as electronic payments and travelers' check, to help alleviate the impact of the cash shortage (Zway 2017).

The World Bank is carrying out a diagnostic of and providing capacity building to the banking sector as well as providing technical assistance to develop a strategic plan to implement the Islamic Finance Strategy.

The EU currently funds two projects implemented by Expertise France that, among others thing, focus on improving access to finance. The project "Support to Libya for Economic Integration, Diversification and Sustainable Employment" has provided technical assistance and restructuring advice to the National Guarantee Fund, undertaken a feasibility study for micro-finance products, and designed a credit mediation unit embedded in the Ministry of Economy. The recently launched "EU for Private Sector in Libya" (EC 2018b) will provide capacity building to Libyan commercial banks, technical assistance for the restructuring of the Libyan credit bureau, and design a venture capital fund.

Main needs and priorities as formulated in the literature

Period	Needs include	Sources
Short-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop Sharia-compliant liquidity management instruments 	IMF 2013c.
Medium/ long-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improve the legal framework. • Streamline the insolvency regime. • Enhance competition in the banking sector. • Reduce the role of state-owned commercial banks and specialized credit institutions. • Improve the credit information system to enable banks to better assess credit risk. • Enhance regulatory and supervisory capacity. • Align the AML/CFT Law with international standards and devote resources to its implementation (IMF 2013c). 	IMF 2013c; OECD 2016, 2017.

Private sector development

This section is based on Bureau of Statistics data from before the revolution as well as World Bank and World Economic Forum indicators (WBG 2018; WEF 2010). Key documents consulted include the World Bank 2015 Simplified Enterprise Survey (Calice et al. 2015), the preliminary findings of the World Bank 2019 Enterprise Survey (World Bank, forthcoming), the OECD study on the role of SMEs in Libya's reconstruction (OECD 2016), an EU report on access to finance and private sector development (EuropeAid 2018), and the 2012 IMF report on challenges and opportunities after the revolution (IMF 2012). Based on the main documents and considering the views expressed by experts interviewed, the team concludes that there is a critical gap in up-to-date, countrywide data on the private sector, and a significant absence of primary economic data sets. For instance, there are widely diverging estimates for the share of the private sector as a percentage of GDP in the literature reviewed. Annex A lists all information and data gaps identified for the sector.

Status of the private sector

The nationalization of major companies in the 1960s, as well as Law no. 4 of 1978 about confiscation, led the government to take direct control over production. This played a central role in orienting capital and labor away from the private sector, and profoundly modifying the economic and social structure (ETF 2014). A 2011 survey demonstrated that support for government playing a strong role in the economy and the private sector was still high, with 72 percent of respondents stating it was "very important" (IRI 2011).

As a legacy of this state-dominated economy, as well as the poor regulatory environment, cronyism, and oil-dependent growth, the private sector is nascent and uncompetitive (ETF 2014). Estimates put the size of the private sector at between 4 percent and 15 percent of GDP (Calice et al. 2015), a figure that is impossible to verify in the absence of national accounts, and also explained by the lack of clear overview of the number and size of SOEs still in activity. It comprises a small number of formal private and foreign companies, and a larger number of MSMEs, a majority of which are informal and relatively unsophisticated. There is no officially accepted definition of an MSME in Libya. In 2006, the General Planning Council (GPC) proposed defining small enterprises as those that employ not more than 25 workers and have invested capital of not more than LYD2.5 million and defining medium enterprises as those that have 26–50 workers with invested capital of between LYD2.6 million and LYD5 million (€1.7 million and €3.3 million). However, this definition does not include micro enterprises, very often start-ups, which are much more vulnerable to market failures than SMEs (OECD 2016). According to the 2006 Business Census, there was a total of 117,828 enterprises, excluding the agricultural sector.² Many entrepreneurs are such by default, either because they are waiting for a job in the public sector or because they are supplementing the income from their public sector job (Porter 2007). The private sector is estimated to employ around 350,000 people (World Bank 2012), representing only 15 percent of the workforce. A very small share of companies export products and services, which reflects the lack of quality manufactured

²Libyan Bureau of Statistics figures from 2006 were reported in World Bank 2011.

production in Libya, and most concentrate on sectors serving local consumption such as retail. Most companies exclusively rely on their own capital, with only 2 percent of firms having a loan or a credit line (Calice et al. 2015).

Institutional framework

Prior to the conflict, Libya modernized its legal framework to improve conditions for private sector activity. Through 2010, 22 new laws were passed to make wide-ranging changes to a series of activities, including commerce, customs, income tax, the stock market, labor, communication, and land registry (IMF 2012). However, the current legal framework is unclear; there are multiple constitutions that lack clarity on which applies, and a new constitution is being drafted. Application decrees, guidelines, and operational procedures are to a large extent missing.

The main institutions active in the sector include the following:

- **Ministry of Economy.** The SME Division of the Ministry of Economy oversees private sector development.
- **Libya Enterprise.** This is the government's delivery body for enterprise and private sector development. It operates five SME investment funds, four Enterprise Centers, and three Business Incubators throughout Libya (DFID 2014).
- **Libya Local Investment and Development Fund.** This fund supports economic diversification and SME development.
- **Chambers of Commerce.** The Union of Chambers of Commerce provides oversight to local Chambers of Commerce in each city. The Union reports to the Ministry of Economy, with the Ministry of Economy appointing one-third of the Boards of the Chambers. Chambers have the mandate to support investment and advocate for business. Although Chambers are active in business registrations, their staff capacity is usually low, and they undertake very limited lobbying activities and data collection about the local economy (DFID 2014).
- **Business associations.** Sectoral business associations have limited presence and activity.

Structural challenges

The main structural bottlenecks preventing private sector development are the following:

- **Poor regulatory environment, policy instability, corruption, and a lack of an entrepreneurship ecosystem.** This prevents competition and impedes the development of MSMEs (WEF 2010). This is reflected in Libya's low ranking on international indicators of competitiveness and governance. Libya is ranked 186th out of 190 countries on the World Bank's Doing Business indicator (WBG 2018), and in the bottom 10 on measures of financial market development, innovation, labor market efficiency, business sophistication, and goods market efficiency (IMF 2012).

- **Insufficient government-to-business services (WEF 2010).** Almost 50 percent of companies mention weak transportation, electricity, and Internet service as major constraints to their operations. The absence of industrial zones and refrigeration facilities in ports is also problematic.
- **Informal sector.** Small firms particularly suffer from the unfair competition against informal businesses, which do not pay taxes. In 2007, Libya's informal sector was estimated at approximately 31 percent of GDP (OECD 2016), comparatively much higher than other MENA region countries.
- **Skills mismatch.** Despite high literacy rates, employers have trouble finding motivated Libyan jobseekers who possess the skills required on the job market. The absence of business schools to train entrepreneurs is particularly problematic.
- **Access to land.** Uncertainty around land legislation and the absence of a land registry constrain access to land and prevent its use as collateral to access loans.

Impact of the conflict

The political and security crises have dealt a major blow to firms, disorganizing their operations, closing factories, and causing job losses, and increasing the militias' involvement in the private sector. The conflict-induced collapse of the economy and the lack of confidence in the banking system has generated a liquidity crisis. As many as 97 percent of firms reported in 2018 that the crisis directly impacted their business, which is up from 77 percent in 2014 (World Bank, forthcoming). Due to their relatively larger assets and focus on production, companies active in the manufacturing and real estate sectors were more affected than businesses active in services or retail. Enterprises in the cities of Tripoli, Benghazi, and in the South were relatively more affected than those in the central and eastern regions (Calice et al. 2015). The conflict has placed the following specific constraints on the private sector (Calice et al. 2015):

- **Reduced revenues** due to both lower demand and reduced production capacity. Firms reported an average decrease in revenue of about 60 percent.
- **Work stoppages and problems with staff.** The security situation caused foreign staff to leave and prevented local staff from reaching their workplace.
- **Damaged and destroyed infrastructure, and lost production capital.** Companies in the real estate sector suffered 50 percent more damage than enterprises in other sectors, and 30 percent of companies had to move their offices or production sites due to the crisis.
- **Disruption to the supply chain** marked by difficulties accessing imported goods, raw materials, and petrol, mainly due to the disturbance of transport networks, but also due to the need to resort to letters of credit, which are limited and not transparently distributed. There has also been disruption to distribution chains, markets, and trade networks.

- **Lack of access to finance and foreign currency.** The liquidity crisis is compounding difficulties to access credit. Only 2 percent of firms had a loan or credit in 2015, compared with 52 percent in Lebanon (2009) and 32 percent in Morocco (2012). Credit to the economy declined by 7 percent by end of June 2017 (year-on-year) (World Bank 2017a). Lack of access to foreign currency is particularly critical, adversely affecting imports of inputs on which firms are dependent, with 78 percent of businesses stating that they had faced significant difficulties accessing foreign currency since the conflict started. Compounded by high inflation and restrictions to imports, this is increasing the cost of production.
- **Decrease in investment.** Investment is estimated to have decreased by 40 percent compared to the precrisis level, a logical outcome given the uncertain context.

When compared to the period before the revolution, new constraints to growth have emerged: 78 percent of businesses mentioned political instability as a new severe or major constraint; 66 percent of business owners named crimes and theft as a severe or major constraint (compared to 22 percent before the revolution); 42 percent mentioned transport and telecommunications (compared to 18 percent); 78 percent mentioned corruption (compared to 44 percent) and 82 percent named macroeconomic uncertainty (compared to 55 percent) (World Bank 2015).

Conflict also created new opportunities. Often, public employees who are not being paid have started small-scale private businesses (restaurants, retail, and so forth). Entrepreneurship has increased among women and youth, with young entrepreneurs engaging in innovative business activities such as developing online payment mobile applications. Post-crisis expectations are high: 78 percent of companies believe the end of crisis will trigger significant growth. Over the next two years, 78 percent of firms plan to increase production, 49 percent plan to increase investment, 41 percent plan to increase employment, and 31 percent expect to increase exports (World Bank 2019).

Main interventions and capacity to respond

The GNA has limited capacity to take economic measures. Changing legislation is extremely challenging and long. There is little incentive for the government to prioritize measures to develop the private sector, as oil exports already provide abundant revenues, and the risks of changes to the status quo are high (for instance, going against the economic interests of militias). Also, the ministries' staff are not sufficiently trained or well versed in private sector development.

The EU funds several technical assistance projects and surveys in the field of private sector development, implemented by Expertise France, UNDP, and GIZ. In 2018 Pragma Corporation completed a USAID-funded company-level assistance program. The World Bank is currently finalizing a mapping of the private sector.

Main needs and priorities as formulated in the literature

Libya has significant potential to diversify into tourism and trade given its many archaeological sites, favorable climate, and proximity to European markets (IMF 2012). Interviews with

the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Planning in 2013 (ETF 2014) outlined the sectors that policy makers consider most important for the future: (i) construction; (ii) petrochemical industries; (iii) renewable energy; (iv) agriculture and food processing; (v) maritime sector; (vi) air transportation and maintenance; and (vii) tourism.

Period	Needs include	Sources
Short/ medium/ long-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Initiate a results-based and action-oriented public-private dialogue mechanism (World Bank 2019). • Develop and implement investment-friendly policies, including a national SME strategy. • Improve the quality of business support services and institutions (chambers of commerce, incubators, training centers, business associations, and so forth). • Promote a culture of entrepreneurship in Libyan society. • Simplify the process of registering a business and obtaining licenses and permits. • Reopen one-stop shops and trade help desks to facilitate business-state transactions. • Raise awareness of the importance of women's role as entrepreneurs. • Integrate business studies and entrepreneurship as a component of the education system at all levels. • Enable MSMEs' access to finance through microfinance and SME financing with a special provision for women and youth. • Develop suppliers' linkage program with a focus on youth and women in partnership with lead private sector firms (World Bank, forthcoming). • Enforce a robust system of property rights and contract enforcement. • Restore deteriorated basic infrastructure (transport, electricity, ICT, and so forth), with investment targeting bottlenecks to economic development and leveraging guarantee schemes to attract private sector investment (IMF 2012; World Bank, forthcoming). 	World Bank, forthcoming; IMF 2012; OECD 2016, 2017.

Key productive sectors

The oil section is mostly based on macroeconomic reports produced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), while the industry and services section is based on the World Bank 2015 Simplified Enterprise Survey and Private Sector Mapping (Calice et al. 2015), and research from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (OECD 2016). The team's assessment concludes that this document gives a fairly good overview of the key non-oil productive sectors. The World Bank 2018 Private Sector Mapping (results not yet released) should give a much more precise overview of the sectors. For the agriculture sector, an overview of the literature consulted is given below.

Status of key productive sectors

This section presents facts and data on key productive sectors, notably the size of the sector, the structure of the market and competition, and the situation in terms of finance and international exposure. A more detailed section is dedicated to agriculture, which reflects its important contribution to livelihoods despite its modest share of GDP.

Oil sector

Oil production dominates the Libyan economy, accounting for more than 70 percent of GDP, more than 95 percent of exports, and approximately 90 percent of government revenue (IMF 2012),³ while employing only 2 percent of the Libyan workforce, as it is a highly capital-intensive industry (ETF 2014). With 3.5 percent of the world's proven crude oil reserves, Libya occupies an important position in the international energy market. Before the revolution, it produced 1.77 million bpd of crude oil (equivalent to 2 percent of global output) and close to 0.2 million barrel of oil equivalent of natural gas (IMF 2012). However, due to the strong decline in oil production between 2012 and 2016, the sector accounted for only 33 percent of GDP on average. Production has rebounded, and in 2018 reached around 1 million bpd over the first five months before abruptly dropping to only 0.7 million bpd in June.

The NOC dominates Libya's oil industry and accounts for about 70 percent of the country's oil output. It has kept operating effectively across the country, despite security disruptions from time to time around oil fields. It wants to drive oil production from 1 million barrels a day to up to 2.1 million by 2021, but the current conflict puts that objective into doubt (Wintour 2019b). The lack of funds for maintenance, inability to access the fields due to insecurity, and lack of investment also hamper the NOC from consolidating production levels.

Industry and services

Nonhydrocarbon economic activity was growing at a brisk pace before the revolution, but it still accounts for no more than 30 percent of GDP and a negligible part of exports (IMF 2012). The sectors described below are important for the private sector. Table 2 gives an overview of the share of the private sector in these economic sectors.

Retail and wholesale trade

Background and size of sector. Estimated US\$3.7 billion value in 2014; this is the most dynamic private sector. The 2014 conflict has greatly affected the value of imports (for example, Libyan imports from the United States decreased by 38 percent in 2014 compared to the same period in 2013). Although the conflict has affected trade, it is one of the most resilient sectors due to Libyans' heavy consumption patterns (for instance, 28 percent of firms in the trading sector reported they were not directly impacted by the crisis).

³ Although this has been the case for years, this has changed in the last year with the imposing of the fees on foreign exchange transactions, which is estimated to have generated LYD8 billion or 12.6 percent of GDP estimated for 2018 (World Bank 2019).

Table 2 Share of the Private Sector in Key Productive Sectors

Sector	% Private sector in total value
Trade	90
Transportation/shipping	60
Construction	65
Real Estate	45
Building materials manufacturing	80
Food manufacturing	80
Private health care	100
Private education	100
Accommodation and catering services	50
Finance	10

Source: Calice et al. 2015.

Structure of the market and competition. Trading companies are small in terms of staff but generate relatively high revenues. Retail is mainly composed of individual informal traders. Private supermarkets and grocery stores are also flourishing.

Finance and international exposure. Trading companies are the least likely to take out loans or credit. International exposure is greater for wholesalers than for retailers, as the former are required to purchase imported goods in foreign currency (US dollars or euros mostly) but are paid almost exclusively in LYDs.

Transportation/shipping

Background and size of the sector. Estimated US\$0.4 billion value in 2014. Libya still imports 70 percent of the goods it consumes; therefore, the sector is significant for the private economy, but it does not provide many employment opportunities. In 2012–13, growth was driven by the following needs: reconstruction material, consumption goods, and medical and electric equipment.

Structure of the market and competition. The sector is highly concentrated on the coast (for example, Misrata's port represented 60–70 percent of the country's total exports in 2013). New entrants arrived in the shipping industry following the revolution but with the renewed conflict in 2014, the industry concentrates around a few players.

Finance and international exposure. Most companies are self-financed, and the sector's performance is very dependent on the fluctuation of input prices and availability of external currency.

Construction

Background and size of the sector. Estimated US\$1.1 billion value in 2014, and 2 percent of GDP (2012). The total value of the sector was divided by six in 2011, due to the cancellation of large public contracts. The sector has the highest percentage of medium and large enterprises (46 percent of construction firms have 20 employees or more).

Structure of the market and competition. Lost 25 percent of its value in 2014. Most of the contracts negotiated are granted to international companies. Competition has dropped more than in other sectors (for instance, 59 percent of construction companies reported a decrease in the number of competitors).

Finance and international exposure. International exposure depends on the type of contract signed and the size of the company. Financing involves investors, loans, and state equity for large projects and self-financing for SMEs.

Real estate

Background and size of the sector. Estimated US\$3.8 billion value in 2014, and 7 percent of GDP (2012). While it represented the biggest sector after oil prior to the revolution, it was reported that the sector decreased by 30 percent in 2014.

Structure of the market and competition. The market is highly concentrated between international real estate developers and public-private partnerships with a mix of capital. Large companies have 300 staff on average.

Finance and international exposure. International exposure is moderate, and financing involves investors, loans, and state equity for large projects and self-financing for SMEs.

Building materials manufacturing

Background and size of the sector. Estimated US\$0.2 billion value in 2014. It is one of the two main industrial activities in Libya. However, enterprises have trouble obtaining the supply of raw materials because shipments are blocked at ports, and a 50–70 percent decrease in the sector was reported in 2014. Now, needs in the sector are mostly covered by SMEs, but production of building material is still insufficient to meet the demand.

Structure of the market and competition. The sector faces domestic competition from state-owned factories that can procure raw materials at lower prices thanks to better foreign currency rates obtained from the government. The sector relies on domestic demand while being tied to foreign suppliers for technical equipment and specific raw materials.

Finance and international exposure. Composed of state equity for large enterprises and self-financing for SMEs. The needs for foreign currency are high to pay international suppliers.

Food and beverage manufacturing

Background and size of the sector. Estimated US\$0.4–0.8 billion value in 2014. The conflict severely impacted the sector, due to rising prices in raw materials and additional cost in power generators (68 percent of food processing firms reported a decrease in sales).

Structure of the market and competition. It is composed of both large national champions and smaller pastry and flour manufacturers. Only 30 percent of enterprises reported a decrease in competition.

Finance and international exposure. The sector is capital-intensive, with SMEs having access to finance thanks to banks' trust in the sector. However, most of them prefer to use self-financing methods.

Private health

Background and size of the sector. Estimated US\$0.14 billion value in 2014. It is mostly public, although private health growth was recorded in 2014.

Structure of the market and competition. Competition is strong, with only a 25 percent decrease in the number of competitors being reported. It is one of the most labor-intensive areas in the private sector (for example, 30–50 employees needed for an average medical center and 100 for bigger ones).

Finance and international exposure. Libyan businesses mostly finance the sector, and dependence on foreign currency is high to pay for medical equipment and imported medicine.

Private education

Background and size of the sector. Estimated US\$0.13 billion value in 2014. Although the public sector is still dominant, since the revolution there has been rapid growth of private institutions, although this growth contracted in 2014 due to insecurity.

Structure of the market and competition. Regional competition is high, especially as students can benefit from state scholarships to study abroad. About 60 percent of facilities are small, 30 percent are medium, and facilities count on average 20 staff per center.

Finance and international exposure. Self-financing is the main source of financing used, and international exposure is low.

Accommodation and catering services

Background and size of the sector. Estimated US\$0.1 billion value in 2014. The system has been heavily impacted by the crisis (for instance, accommodation and catering firms reported an 81 percent decrease in revenues).

Structure of the market and competition. About 76 percent of companies reported a decrease in the number of competitors.

Finance and international exposure. Access to finance is limited for small cafés and restaurants and is deemed higher for hotels. The sector does not suffer too much from the lack of currency thanks to the presence of foreign clients and revenues, and costs are paid in LYD.

Main needs and priorities as formulated in the literature

The OECD has carried out a significant analytical work in the post-revolution period to assess the strengths and weaknesses of economic sectors, their attractiveness in terms of size and foreign direct investment (FDI), and their impact on job creation (see table 3) (OECD 2016). Although the economic environment both inside and outside Libya are very fluid and would require this type of analysis to be frequently updated, it constitutes a valuable input for future prioritization of economic sectors as part of an economic strategy for Libya.

Table 3 Attractiveness of Economic Sectors

Sector attractiveness					Country benefits	
Sectors/sub sectors	Industry size	Export size	FDI attraction	Labor capital intensity	Alignment with national strategy	Impact on job creation
Services						
ICT	L	L	L	L	M	M
Transit trade (ports, shipping, marine services)	M	M	L	M	M	M
Tourism (and value chain)	L	M	M	M	H	H
Transportation	L	L	M	M	H	M
Education and training	M	L	M	H	H	H
Health services	M	M	H	M	M	M
Financial services	H	L	H	M	H	M
Industry and mining						
Agri-business (including food processing)	M	M	H	M	M	M
Renewable energies	L	M	H	M	M	M
Construction materials and infrastructure	H	L	H	H	M	H
Petrochemicals	H	H	H	M	H	L
Recycling	L	L	M	M	L	M

Source: OECD 2013.

Note: participants graded variables high (H), medium (M), and low (L) for each sub-sector.

Agriculture

This section is mostly based on the 2018 Agriculture and Rural Livelihoods Needs Assessment carried out by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (FAO 2018a). Other key sources include the 2018 REACH Multi-Sector Needs Assessment (MSNA) (REACH 2019), and a report on agribusiness development (Heemskerk and Koopmanschap 2012). Based on the main documents and considering the views expressed by experts interviewed, the team concludes that the information available gives a good overview of the sector's challenges and opportunities. Nevertheless, there is a lack of quantitative assessments to provide more reliable information, such as a recent assessment of the spread of pests, or the number and characteristics of seasonal migrants in the agricultural sector. Annex A lists all information and data gaps identified for the sector.

Agricultural activities

Agriculture is not a major economic sector in Libya. The percentage of agriculture in the GDP was less than 3 percent in 2011 (FAO and WFP 2011), and in 2018 it made up less than 1 percent of Libya's Gross Value Added.⁴ Before the revolution, around 80 percent of Libya's food was imported (FAO and WFP 2011). Furthermore, agriculture provides employment for only 6 percent of the workforce, with higher percentages of up to 20 percent observed in rural areas.⁵

However, agriculture represents an important source of secondary livelihood activity for Libyans. In 2018, 22.2 percent of Libyan households (HHs) reported being engaged in some form of agricultural production such as crop farming, gardening, raising livestock, or fishing (REACH 2019, 3), but with important regional differences (see figure 4). Many households consume the food they produce (92 percent), only 8 percent rely on agriculture as their sole source of income, while 49 percent both consume and sell what they produce (FAO 2018c).


The conflict might have severely impacted the agricultural sector. Since 2014, 7.4 percent of Libyan households reported giving up on their agricultural activities (REACH 2019, 3). In 2018, HHs reported that the main impacts of the crisis on crop production and gardening were power cuts (35.4 percent) and inability to access or afford seeds (20.1 percent), fuels/tools/machinery (19.1 percent), labor (16.1 percent), and water resources (14.7 percent) (REACH 2019, 3).

Main institutions

The Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Marine Wealth was reestablished in 2006. As of 2014, its organizational structure had not yet been set up and it appears as if the institution was unable to carry out functions related to agricultural planning, statistics, policy design, implementation, and monitoring (FAO 2011, 3). In 2014 the ministry was downgraded to the level of a bureau chaired by a steering committee. In February 2019 it was named the Ministry of Agriculture,

⁴Data in this section are from UN data (database), "Libya," United Nations Statistics Division, New York, <http://data.un.org/en/iso/ly.html>.

⁵The mantikas that are most engaged in agricultural activities are Wadi Ashati (61 percent) and Sebha (56 percent) (FAO 2018c).

Figure 4 Proportion of Households Engaged in Agriculture

Source: FAO 2018a.

Livestock, and Marine Wealth. There are three main public agricultural research institutions: the Agricultural Research Center, the National Center of Animal Health, and the Marine Biology Research Centers (GFRAS 2013).

Structural challenges

The following structural challenges characterize Libya's agricultural sector:

- **A difficult stock of natural resources coupled with poor agricultural practices.** About 90 percent of Libya is desert, and rainfall is scarce. Only half of Libya's arable land developed for irrigation (470,000 hectares) was irrigated prior to the revolution. The additional irrigable land that could have increased the agricultural production relied on groundwater, which was already scarce and salty along the coastal region as well as in many other regions (FAO 2018c). The Great Man-Made River project was supposed to be used for irrigation, but priority shifted to providing drinking water to urban areas (FAO and WFP 2011). Finally, the excessive irrigation of the land through groundwater coupled with low annual precipitation has led to salinity problems, which has contributed to seawater infiltration (Heemskerk and Koopmanschap 2012).
- **A poor enabling environment for private sector-driven agribusiness development.** Family farm holdings are scattered and fragmented, with 90 percent of smallholders having less than 20 hectares (Heemskerk and Koopmanschap 2012). In 2011, access to land was the top-rated constraint for private sector operation and growth (Heemskerk and Koopmanschap 2012), along with difficulty obtaining loans.

- **A heavily subsidized sector.** Prior to the revolution, the agricultural sector was heavily subsidized, which limited its competitiveness (Heemskerck and Koopmanschap 2012).
- **Desertification.** Desertification has a major impact on agricultural lands, in addition to the increased urbanization of agricultural lands.
- **Spread of animal diseases and plant pests.** These can spread due to the absence of control, prevention, and treatment programs.
- **Absence and/or high prices of important agricultural inputs.** Seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, feeds, machinery, and technology are very expensive or unavailable on the market, impairing agricultural productivity.

Impact of the conflict

- **Decrease in foreign labor force and increase in labor force wage.** Libya has long relied on foreign workers in agricultural activities, but in 2011, thousands of migrants fled the country (FAO 2018a). Currently, the number of foreign workers remains lower than before the revolution, due to the prevailing insecurity. Consequently, the sector suffers from a lack of labor supply. Additionally, the low value of the Libyan dinar combined with the shortage of labor supply is likely to drive wages up, challenging local farmers' ability to pay their workers (FAO 2018a).
- **Lack of investments and infrastructure maintenance in the agricultural sector.** For instance, many government-run farms are in disrepair, although they accounted for thousands of hectares before the revolution. In addition, militias have deliberately targeted infrastructure, which, combined with the lack of maintenance and rehabilitation in the water and electricity sectors, as well as the lack of transportation methods, has crippled the agricultural sector (FAO 2018a).
- **Increases in the price of seeds, fertilizers, and livestock feed as a result of the liquidity crisis and the absence of government regulations and subsidies since the revolution.** The absence of control has allowed businessmen to sell lower quality seeds on the black market at higher prices (FAO 2018a). Furthermore, Libya's reliance on imported food, including for livestock, and the depreciation of the currency have led animal feed prices to rise (FAO 2018a).
- **Deterioration of the security situation is hindering fishing, livestock, and farming activities (FAO 2018a).**
- **Negative coping mechanisms.** Although no precise figure is available, some cases of child labor in cropping activities were reported, such as in Benghazi district (FAO 2018a). Due to increasing seed prices, farmers now favor lower quality seeds, which reduce crop quantity and productivity. Furthermore, because of the increasing price of livestock food, it was reported that in Murzuq district, breeders now shift from purchasing commercial fodders to crop residuals (FAO 2018a).

Main interventions and capacity to respond

Few international actors are present in the agricultural sector. The FAO is involved in capacity building with the Ministry of Agriculture (FAO 2017, 2018b) and in different thematic areas, such as increasing crop productivity and promoting the sustainable management of natural resources.

Main needs and priorities as formulated in the literature

Period	Needs Include	Source
Short/ medium/ long-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improve farmers' living conditions and productivity by: • Enhancing agricultural resilience (including boosting agricultural productivity), improving food security, and promoting capacity building and local entrepreneurship. • Protecting the environment through water and soil conservation initiatives and rehabilitating the infrastructure (specifically groundwater wells, irrigation systems, and fishing landing sites). • Actions should target both resident and migrant communities (FAO 2018a, 4). 	FAO 2018a.

Employment

This section is based on various international data sources on labor, including from the International Labour Organization (ILO) UN, WB, and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Key documents consulted include the World Bank 2015 report on labor market dynamics (Elgazzar et al. 2015), the 2014 ETF report on the labor market and employment policy (ETF 2014), the GIZ 2013 study on education and employability (GIZ 2013), and the 2017 Libya Workforce Market Survey report. Based on the main documents and considering the views expressed by experts interviewed, the team concludes that all have issues relating to limited accuracy, reliability, and updating (ETF 2014). Accurate and reliable labor market data are not provided by the limited Libyan labor market information system. Statistics have not been officially updated since the revolution, and there is no exhaustive countrywide labor force survey conducted in the country. Annex A lists all information and data gaps identified for the sector.

Status of employment and the job market

Labor force participation rates vary significantly by gender and were estimated at 48 percent for males in 2016 (down from 77 percent before the revolution) and 28 percent for females (compared to 30 percent before the revolution).⁶ Unemployment in 2015, was estimated at 19

⁶Data from this section are from the Key Indicators of the Labor Market (database), International Labour Organization, Geneva, https://www.ilo.org/ilostat/faces/ilostat-home/home?_adf.ctrl-state=17rf2biboi_4&_afLoop=387582105572546#!; and the World Development Indicators (database), World Bank, Washington, DC, <https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-development-indicators>.

percent (UNFPA and UNESCO 2017). Unemployment is higher for women (26 percent) as well as for youth (48 percent) and female youth (62 percent). Youth participation in economic activity declined from 72 percent in 2012 to 48 percent in 2015 (UNFPA and UNESCO 2017).

Government employs up to 85 percent of all salaried Libyans in the 1.9 million-strong Libyan labor force (IMF 2013c). The private sector employs only 4 percent, and the rest are self-employed (including informal self-employment, which is estimated to account for 40–60 percent of total employment). Wages in the public sector are low, so many public sector workers seek additional sources of income. Many public employees have more than one job in the public sector, and a significant number continue to draw a salary while not actually going to work. Wages are supplemented by benefits, including pensions and hefty subsidies to cover the costs of housing, food, fuel, electricity, and so on. Women are employed almost entirely in the public sector (97 percent), relative to 70 percent of men (Elgazzar et al. 2015). At the same time, women tend to earn 12 percent less than men.

Institutional framework

The main institutions active in the sector are the following:

- **Ministry of Labor and Rehabilitation.** The Ministry has undergone various reorganizations in the past few years. While its principal mandate is to match labor supply and demand, the ministry mainly focuses on issuing work permits for foreign workers and managing human resources across government.
- **WAC.** This is the primary body in charge of reinserting demilitarized combatants. It was set up to act as an intermediary body between the demilitarized fighters and other governmental institutions that could provide support, but has started to develop its own programs.
- **Ministry of Economy.** The ministry oversees the National Program for Small and Medium Enterprises, which aims to promote entrepreneurship, develop employability skills, establish business incubators, and prepare feasibility studies for projects and secure their funding.
- **National Board for Technical and Vocational Education.** Situated within the Ministry of Higher Education, the National Board oversees technical and vocational education and training (TVET).
- **Trade unions.** The National Federation of Unions is the only union permitted. Foreign workers are not allowed to form unions.

Structural challenges

Severe structural challenges impact the labor market, including the following (ETF 2014):

- **Distortion from the public sector.** The extremely high level of public employment has shaped the attitude of Libyans' toward work as well as their expectations for employment. This has had detrimental effects on job creation, including (i) queuing for public sector jobs

that offer secure wages and generous nonwage benefits, and low working hours, despite dwindling job opportunities; (ii) pursuing higher degrees needed to land a public sector job instead of investing in the type of education and skills (including TVET) required by the private sector; and (iii) fostering negative attitudes toward manual work or demanding positions in the private sector, both of which were largely filled by foreigners before the crisis.

- **Increased population growth.** Libya is characterized by sustained population growth (approximately 2.9 percent according to the 2000 and 2006 censuses) (ETF 2014) and an increase in the growth of the labor force due to high numbers of young new entrants. This worsens unemployment when seen in the light of the diminishing role of the state as employer and economic actor, and the inability or unwillingness of Libyans to compete with foreign workers for private sector jobs.
- **High inflows of immigrant labor.** There were an estimated two million foreign workers in 2011, most of whom were illegal; a majority fled after 2011, and about 700,000 are estimated to remain (IOM, n.d.). Despite legislative bias in favor of Libyan workers, employers tend to prefer foreign workers at all skill levels because of their higher productivity and better training.
- **Skills gaps and mismatches.** There is an important mismatch between skills provided by the education system and labor market needs. This is reflected by the significant unemployment rate among university graduates, who have little knowledge of the work market and its demands. Conversely, 30 percent of firms are unable to find workers with enough skills (World Bank 2011). TVET is not sufficiently coordinated with the needs of the labor market and tends to be shunned in favor of desk jobs.⁷
- **Large share of jobs in the informal sector.** The informal sector is characterized by low productivity, but its low barriers to entry enable it to offer employment opportunities for a large part of the population, especially those who have low skills or educational attainment.
- **Weak public employment services.** The Ministry of Labor and Rehabilitation is unable to provide labor market measures such as career counseling and relevant job training. Labor market information and statistics are rarely collected nor provided to employers or job seekers in a timely manner, and trends in the private sector labor market are not analyzed.
- **Inconsistent and incoherent legislative framework.** Laws issued in the 1970s and 1980s are still in force but contradicted by more recent laws.

Impact of the conflict

With the steep decline of the non-oil economy, unemployment has risen sharply, and many private sector jobs have been lost. Many young males (approximately 300,000), a large proportion of whom were previously unemployed, joined armed groups or militias during the revolution.

⁷For instance, construction, trade, and tourism enterprises reported using between 60 and 70 percent foreign workers, with Libyans only accepting and holding key positions such as managers, accountants, and engineers (Altai Consulting 2013).

Of these, 215,000 were registered in the WAC database, many have returned to work, and approximately 50,000 have been integrated into the Libyan security services. The remainder have specific needs, and as such are eligible for priority vocational training, job placement, or entrepreneurship financing. However, there are a lack of overall employment opportunities for demilitarized fighters and few training opportunities adapted to their specific needs.⁸

Main interventions and capacity to respond

The Ministry of Labor and Rehabilitation has low capacity to perform labor market analysis and fulfill its role of matching job demand and supply.

Main needs and priorities as formulated in the literature

Period	Needs include	Sources
Short-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Promote private sector job creation and support youth who are neither in education, employment, or training (World Bank 2017a). Develop a human resources strategy and review the education system to achieve a better match between the skills acquired in formal education and the requirements of the labor market (ETF 2014). 	World Bank 2017; ETF 2014.
Medium/long-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improve the business environment to unlock private sector job creation. Reform the public administration (with the aim of offering comparable benefits for both public and private sector jobs). Perform a review of labor laws, rights, and organizations, and explore opportunities for flexible labor market legislation. Put in place a labor market information system, ensuring there is close collaboration between the Bureau of Statistics and the MoL. Reduce the gap between skills supply and demand, notably by developing internship programs; enhance the partnership between public employment services and the private sector; and take actions to change how Libyans regard TVET and manual work. 	ETF 2014.

⁸ ETF 2014.

Chapter 5

Infrastructure and Service Delivery

Service delivery and municipal services

Key sources for this section include the 2017 “Libyan Local Governance Case Studies” of the cities of Zwara, Suq Aljumaa, Zliten, Misrata, Benghazi, and Albayda produced by the EU (EUD 2017), the six city profiles of Alkufra, Benghazi, Janzour, Sebha, Sirt, and Ubari developed by UN-Habitat and UNFPA (UN-Habitat and UNFPA 2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 2018d, 2018e, and 2018f), the “Institutional Mapping of Service Delivery in Libya” performed by the World Bank in 2014 (World Bank 2014), the “Evaluation of Local Service Organization in the Libyan Municipalities” produced by CILG-VNG (CILG-VNG, n.d.a.), the “Rapid Diagnostic on the Situation of Local Governance and Local Development in Libya” prepared by UNDP (UNDP 2015), and the REACH MSNA (REACH 2019). Based on the main documents and considering the views expressed by experts interviewed, the team concludes that there is plenty of valuable information at the municipal level. However, most of the information is based on perceptions instead of quantitative data, and it is difficult to compare the available data due to methodological differences (qualitative versus mixed methods, city versus mantika level). Annex A lists all information and data gaps identified for the sector.

Status of service delivery and municipal services and main challenges

Access to services includes those related to education, health, water and sanitation, energy, transport, housing, and so on. Subsequent sections of the desk review analyze these services from a sectoral perspective, while this section describes those services that are more clearly under the direct responsibility of municipalities (waste management, water and sanitation, urban planning, civil registries, public gardens, public lighting) (EUD 2017), as well as other services delivered by the central government or SOEs from a municipal perspective (exploring how service delivery works at the municipal level, and how the municipality contributes to its delivery).

Access to services

Libyans’ access to public services greatly varies across the country and is intertwined with several factors, such as (i) deficiencies in public facilities and services left over from the Gaddafi era; (ii) municipalities’ (in)ability to raise local taxes and coordinate with other local and national

actors; (iii) municipalities' experience with local governance before 2011 (shaabiyat) or the role they played during the revolution; and (iv) the impact of the conflict on public services. Table 4 details the factors affecting municipalities' service delivery performances and outlines regional and municipal differences.¹

Institutional framework

Law no. 59 provides a set of new prerogatives to municipalities (see sector note on decentralization and local governance for more). Yet service delivery in Libya remains very centralized.

In 10 municipalities² surveyed by UNDP in 2015, ministries and SOEs delivered most services, except for community infrastructure, for which municipalities were deemed responsible (UNDP 2015, 27). In 2016, an IRI survey conducted in 13 different municipalities³ indicated that municipal councils only take the lead in civil registration and public sanitation (CISR 2016). As for other areas such as transportation, urban development or planning, and housing, Libyans predominantly reported not receiving these services (respectively 44 percent, 52 percent, and 50 percent). In 2017, the EU delegation to Libya presented the work of six municipalities⁴ and highlighted that some provide additional services beyond civil registration and public sanitation on an ad hoc basis (EUD 2017). The MoLG, sectoral ministries, and national utilities remain de facto in charge of service delivery (see sector note on decentralization and local governance), although there are indications that services have stopped being provided in some areas.

Structural challenges

Appropriate levels of service delivery have always been a challenge in the Libyan context:

- **Municipalities' capacities.** Municipalities that were created after 2011 tend to have weaker administrative structures and less constructive relationships with central authorities than municipalities that existed prior to 2011, such as Tripoli, Benghazi, or Sebha.
- **Deficiencies in public facilities and services dating back to the Gaddafi era.** Some municipalities already had markedly worse access to energy, water, and sanitation services.
- **Community infrastructure, public parks, roads, and gardens maintenance.** In the 10 municipalities surveyed in 2015, UNDP described community infrastructure as weak to moderate and parks and garden maintenance as fair. According to CILG-VNG, the Second Generation Planning (1980–2000) was not applied. Therefore, between 30 and 50 percent of the roads in Libya are not paved and about two-thirds of urban areas involved in the planning are not connected to the road network (CILG-VNG, n.d.a.).

¹For more information, see the reports from EUD 2017 and UNDP 2017c.

²Sebha (S), Sabratha (W), Tobruk (E), Tripoli (W), Ejdabia (E), Benghazi (E), Azzintan (W), Suq Aljumaa (W), Ghiryan (W), and Ghadamis (S/W).

³Tripoli Center (W), Suq Aljumaa (W), Tajoura (W), Abu Salim (W), Misrata (E), Sabratha (W), Benghazi (E), Albayda (E), Sebha (S), Ubari (S), Weddan (E), Ghiryan (W), and Shahat (E).

⁴Suq Aljumaa (W), Albayda (E), Benghazi (E), Misrata (E), Zwara (W), and Zliten (E).

Table 4 Factors Explaining Differences in Municipalities' Ability to Deliver Services

Factor	Description
Deficiencies in public facilities and services left over from the Gaddafi era (UNDP 2017c)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Differences in access to energy, water, and sanitation services between the South, West, and East.
The local balance of power (EUD 2017); for example, Shura Councils, Military Councils, Neighborhood Councils, Council of Wise Men, and other tribal groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Parallel institutions are important in the South (tribal structures) and in the East (army and affiliated security services control the municipality). Parallel institutions can play a determining role in the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The stability (for example, Misrata, Zliten, Ubari, and Zwara) or instability of the area (local dispute mechanisms and security). The municipality's ability or inability (for example, Ubari) to deliver services (depending on relations with parallel institutions).
Physical destruction and arrival of new populations due to the conflict; for example, destruction of public infrastructure, service delivery interruptions, looting of equipment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Damaged cities: Sirt, Tripoli, Derna, Benghazi, Misrata Influx of populations require municipalities' response (such as hosting IDPs) and further strain public resources (for example, Sebha, Janzour, Benghazi)
Municipal councils' ability to cooperate with social actors (EUD 2017) and with central authorities (EU, UN, and World Bank 2018) CSOs, community media, social activists, and experts and local businessmen can enhance service quality and responsiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Vibrant civil society in Zwara, Suq Aljumaa, Misrata, and Albayda Apparition of mayors on radio in Albayda and Zwara Local businessmen partnership with local authorities in Zliten
Municipalities' ability to raise taxes and attract support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Some municipal councils are able to informally raise local taxes: for example, Zwara (crossing fee), Zliten (tax from company), Albayda (local taxes) Others attract most available external support, (funding or technical) (EUD 2017). Those that receive support from humanitarian (for example, ACTED, MSF, or IRCR) and/or development (for example, CILG-CIL-VNG, HD, KAS, UNDP, GIZ, and Chemonic) agencies include Albayda, Suq Aljumaa, Benghazi, Misrata, Sebha (S) and Sirt (E), Bani Waleed (W), Ubari (S), Kikkla (W)
Municipalities' capacities (UNDP 2017c); for instance, former <i>Shaabiyat</i> or <i>baladiyat</i> have more experience, better relationships with central ministries, administrative structure and/or are more staffed than newly created ones	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Some municipalities have experience in local governance before 2011: for example, Tripoli, Benghazi, Misrata, Zliten, Albayda, Sebha, Suq Aljumaa. Others played an important role during the revolution: for example, Benghazi, Misrata

- Water, sewage, and sanitation.** Libya's water and sewage network suffers from deficiencies. Due to a lack of planning, the water network is unequally distributed across Libya (100 percent coverage in major cities compared to 13 percent in smaller towns like Nalut, and scant coverage in areas adjacent to rural and urban areas) (CILG-VNG, n.d.a.). Due to a lack of maintenance and poor design, sewage and sanitation networks were also described as faulty. For instance, in Benghazi, sewage water often spills into the streets or is discharged into the nearby lake, and the network does not cover most residential areas (UN-Habitat and UNFPA 2018b, 71). Tobruk's sole water treatment plant was deficient before 2011 (Libya Herald 2017c). Finally, Ubari city's sanitation network is overstrained, which leads to recurrent breakages (DRC 2016) (see sector note on water for a more detailed description of that sector's challenges).

- **Waste collection and management.** Waste collection and management is of poor quality, because (i) service companies' productivity is low due to overstaffing; (ii) cost recovery is weak, as many users do not pay for waste collection; although waste management is based on the user payment principle; (iii) garbage is not placed in containers; and (iv) landfills are poorly operated; the waste is not recycled, reused, or incinerated (World Bank 2016, 9), and medical, industrial, and household waste is not separated (CoR ARLEM 2017).

Impact of the conflict

- **Community infrastructure, public parks, roads, and gardens maintenance.** In several areas, municipalities' equipment and public infrastructure have been damaged by the conflict (in Sirt [UN-Habitat and UNFPA 2018e], Benghazi, Tripoli [REACH 2019, 2017a], Derna). Looting and acts of vandalism have also been committed (Janjour). (UN-Habitat and UNFPA 2018c). Due to lack of funding, Misrata and Benghazi are unable to rebuild the damaged infrastructure (EUD 2017) and have halted maintenance and construction of new facilities (such as the university complex and football stadiums in Misrata) (EUD 2017). Yet in other areas, municipalities are able to provide some services. Suq Aljumaa and Albayda municipalities provided infrastructure maintenance. Suq Aljumaa also paved some roads.⁵
- **Water, sewage, and sanitation.** Sewage and wastewater problems have increased because of the conflict (CoR ARLEM 2017). In the week prior to the 2018 MSNA data collection, the top five mantikas in which Libyan households reported never receiving water from the public network were Al Jabal Al Gharbi, Azzawya, and Tripoli (in the West), and Tobruk and Almarj (in the East).⁶ Furthermore, a 2017 UNICEF assessment indicates that water was contaminated in schools, especially in the West.⁷
- **Waste collection and management.** Waste collection and management have worsened since the start of the conflict (CoR ARLEM 2017). In 2018, unsafe waste practices were prevalent, as 23.3 percent of Libyans reported leaving waste in road or other places not designated for waste disposal,⁸ while 16.7 percent reported burying or burning it. The latter practice was mostly reported in Azzawya (in the West), Murzuq (in the South), and Derna and Sirt (in the East).⁹

⁵ Zliten and Zwara's municipal councils also helped providing electricity to their cities (EUD 2017).

⁶ Respectively, 65.8 percent, 52.0 percent, 40.4 percent, 39.7 percent, and 28.8 percent. The top three mantikas in which Libyans reported rarely (1–3 days) receiving water from the public network were Aljufra (W), Tobruk (E), and Sirt (E) (REACH 2019).

⁷ Presence of coliform and specific findings of fecally derived *E. coli* (UNICEF 2017a, 33).

⁸ The top 5 mantikas in which Libyans reported this practice were Derna (E), Wadi Ashshati (W/S), Sebha (S), Benghazi (E), and Al Jabal Al Akhdar (E) (REACH 2019).

⁹ The other practices reported include the following: about a quarter of Libyans (25.5 percent) reported that the municipality, a waste management service (private or public authority), or another authority collected the waste, and almost half of Libyans (47.4 percent) reported leaving their waste in a public space designated for waste disposal, to be collected later. (REACH 2019).

Main interventions and capacity to respond

The Stabilization Facility for Libya (SFL), a multidonor instrument managed by UNDP, supports quick fixes such as rehabilitating service facilities to improve basic service delivery.¹⁰

Different humanitarian and development organizations¹¹ and bilateral partners¹² provide support to local governance and for facility rehabilitation. However, international support is limited to just a few municipalities mainly in the country's West. Several organizations also conducted needs and municipality performance assessments (for example, UN-Habitat/UNFPA, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, IRI funded by USAID, Altai). In 2015 and 2016, the World Bank conducted a workshop with government officials and several municipalities on service delivery and wrote guidelines regarding the devolution of solid waste management, which can be useful for further engagement.

Main needs and priorities as formulated in the literature

Period	Needs include	Sources
Short-term	No needs identified in the literature reviewed.	
Medium/long-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthen the capacity of municipalities and the private sector to collect and recycle waste and repair the electrical and sewage networks and damaged infrastructure. Clarify the division of roles and responsibilities between the different layers of government and with the various service providers at the local level. Create a subnational development planning system to better coordinate service provision (World Bank 2014). 	See UN-Habitat and UNFPA city profiles; World Bank 2014.

Energy

This section is based on an extensive body of work conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers (under a World Bank contract) and other consultancies for the World Bank in 2017–18, as part of the World Bank technical assistance to the sector.¹³ It comprises summary reports and background technical documents organized according to (i) sector performance and structural sector reform; (ii) fuel availability and opportunities for cost reduction; (iii) institutional development and improving the performance of GECOL; and (iv) renewable energy development. The key sources also include inputs from the USAID-funded Libya Economic Stabilization Project, and the REACH MSNA (on impact of the conflict) (REACH 2019). Based on the main documents and considering the views expressed by experts interviewed, the team concludes that electricity sector data are up to date and offer a sufficient base for planning. Nevertheless, there are a few sectoral data gaps, such

¹⁰ Cities covered were Benghazi (E), Kikkla (W), Sebha (S), Sirt (E), Bani Waleed (W), and Ubari (S).

¹¹ For example, CoR, Chemonics, CILG-VNG, GIZ, UNHCR, CIL/ACTED, ICRC, and DRC.

¹² For instance, Italy supports garbage collection in Tripoli (Libya Observer, May 2018).

¹³ The World Bank's 2014–18 Libya Electricity Sector Technical Assistance Project.

as a lack of granularity in information relative to power supply and power cuts across the year and country, broken down by cities. Annex A lists all information and data gaps identified for the sector.

Status of energy production and distribution and main challenges

Energy sources

Libya's total primary energy consumption is entirely based on fossil fuels. While 20 years ago 100 percent of electricity came from light and heavy fuel oil, gas has progressively substituted these in the power generation mix (in 2017, 53.7 percent of electricity was produced using natural gas). Switching to cheap gas has helped reduce the cost of energy (-56 percent) and increase efficiency (+19 percent) (World Bank and PwC 2017).

Energy infrastructure

For a peak demand of nearly 7,500 MW, GECOL provides only about 5,300 MW of peak supply, despite having an installed nameplate power generation capacity of more than 9,500 MW (World Bank 2018f). As a consequence, Libya is currently facing power outages of up to 10 hours per day (depending on the season). GECOL has some 26 power stations containing 85 generating units of various sizes, technologies, and ages distributed around Libya, with the majority along Libya's Mediterranean coastline (World Bank and PwC 2017). Capacity remains heavily underutilized (only 54 percent availability) because nearly 1,200 MW is suspended due to major maintenance issues and cannibalization of parts, while another 2,000 MW remains unavailable due to poor maintenance, inadequate supply of natural gas, and other power system deficiencies (World Bank 2018f). Fully operated by GECOL,¹⁴ the electricity transmission system is strong and has been able to supply almost all load centers in the past few years despite significant damages. It is composed of a 400 kV backbone and 220 kV main grid that totals 16,000 km of transmission lines and provides power to more than 1.2 million customers mostly concentrated in Tripoli.

Access to electricity

Libya is a fully electrified country, with 98.5 percent of the population having access to electricity (99.1 percent in urban areas and 96.4 percent in rural areas) (World Bank 2017b). The density of consumption is concentrated in Tripoli as well as in western and central regions. Libya has the highest per capita consumption in North Africa, incentivized by lack of a cost-reflective and progressive tariff framework, and the demand for electricity is still increasing.

Institutional framework

The main institutions active in the sector are as follows:

¹⁴In addition to GECOL, another nine companies (mostly controlled by GECOL) are involved in the sector (as service providers).

- **Ministry and regulation authority.** After the 2011 revolution, the GNC established a Ministry of Electricity and Renewable Energy but dissolved it in 2016. An energy authority was established in the East, but it has neither jurisdiction nor geographical reach over the West, where most of the consumption and generation are concentrated. Hence, there is no official regulatory authority in place in the West, and energy markets are run by the NOC and GECOL.
- **GECOL.** This stated-owned enterprise oversees running the power system. It is responsible not only for generating, transmitting, and distributing electricity, but also for the planning, development, operations, maintenance, and dispatch of the power system.
- **NOC.** This stated-owned enterprise oversees oil and gas operations within the country (see sector note on key productive sectors for more information).
- **Renewable Energy Authority of Libya (REAOL).** REAOL is a governmental agency established in 2007 with no regulatory powers. Its main objective is to promote renewable energy in Libya, but it has no ability to instruct or enforce. None of Libyan electricity currently comes from renewable energy sources.

Structural challenges

The following structural challenges are affecting the energy sector (World Bank 2018e):

- **Inadequate availability of natural gas for plants.** Consequently, plants are run on imported oil products, which damage installations designed for using gas and increase costs (US\$400 million/year are lost on procuring fuel alone).¹⁵ The efficiency of old, conventional power plants is typically low. They function on fuels that could otherwise be exported, but as fuels remained subsidized at fixed prices—well below market levels—incentives remain high to run power plants on fuels.
- **Large, potentially suboptimal project commitments.** Despite significant underutilization of existing capacity, Libya continues to invest heavily in new projects that add up to more than 5,000 MW of new capacity. These projects are potentially cost suboptimal, unnecessary due to low demand growth, and their completion poses significant challenges.
- **Poor commercial performance.** Libya's power sector incurs an economic subsidy of nearly LYD4 billion each year—across fuel subsidies (LYD2 billion) and commercial losses (LYD2 billion). Electricity distribution recovers less than 10 percent of the cost of supply, mainly due to low tariffs, high commercial losses (theft or unbilled consumption), and poor collection. The sector is also burdened by excess manpower (GECOL has more than 45,000 employees).

¹⁵This amount would likely increase to US\$1.6 billion upon the commissioning of new power plants with a total capacity of about 2300 MW by 2020.

- **Weak governance.** Currently, energy sector reform programs are on hold, and there is an overlap in the role and mission of the different entities. In the absence of a sector ministry and an independent regulator, sector governance and accountability remain weak.
- **Opportunity to tap renewable energy resources.** Libya's large, high-quality wind and solar energy potential is currently unexploited. Renewable energy projects could be an engine of economic diversification, and fuels could be exported (or their import avoided) to obtain higher economic return and strengthen fiscal as well as trade balance.

Impact of the conflict

- **Insecurity and political instability.** The situation on the ground has led to a loss of some infrastructure assets, a fall in the performance of the power network, and a severe shortage in power generation capacity, causing long power cuts in many parts of the country, especially during the summer and winter peak load periods. This negatively impacts service provision in areas such as water, health services, schools, ICT, and municipal service delivery. Service providers seem to rely on generators as an alternative, albeit much more expensive source of electricity.¹⁶
- **Insecurity.** Military clashes between factions as well as acts of vandalism and theft have led to repeated assault on GECOL assets and staff, a large increase in theft, especially of conductors and electrical equipment, and a significant decline in GECOL's ability to carry out maintenance activities. Also, fuel sources to power plants have been repeatedly cut off.
- **Overdue maintenance.** There was no widespread destruction of power generation capacity. However, when destruction occurred, functionality was restored with minimal maintenance, and routine maintenance has ceased altogether. Due to limitations on GECOL's ability to carry out major maintenance and overhaul of the power generating units, the power output of many units has been reduced to well below nameplate capacity. This is also because many equipment suppliers do not permit their personnel to travel to Libya due to insecurity.
- **Substantial damages to the distribution network.** Overall, lines, substations, and cables have been affected, causing inefficiency in grid operation and management. This led whole regions to be isolated until GECOL could repair the damaged infrastructure. In some cases, repairs took several months or even years, with severe and long-lasting damages in areas such as Benghazi and southern Libya.
- **Damages to Control Centers.** During the events of 2011, the National Control Center in Sirt was put out of service. Distribution Control Center (DCC) buildings and equipment were also damaged in several areas. The Tripoli DCC was almost completely commissioned, but work again came to a stop during the 2014 crisis.

¹⁶ Lack of data on use per sector.

Main interventions and capacity to respond

The energy sector has relatively strong institutions that were less affected by the conflict than those in other sectors. GECOL, NOC, and REAOL are unified across the country, and work with both governments. They retain organizational capacity and in-house expert capacity.¹⁷ GECOL mainly focuses on maintaining service delivery, and the remarkable work of GECOL's many employees has prevented the power network from collapsing. Despite the difficult operating environment, GECOL commissioned 14 new generating units between 2012 and August 2017, adding 2,295 MW to the installed capacity (World Bank and PwC 2017). GECOL has also contracted out for several billion dollars from Siemens, General Electric, and over private sector providers for establishing five new power stations at 400 MW per plant. REAOL has developed short- and long-term plans to achieve 10 percent of renewable energy supply by 2025 (USAID 2017).

Development partners' support is focused on (i) providing short-term assistance—in particular, UNDP is providing off-grid support to hospitals; and (ii) supporting government to plan the sector's reform. The World Bank and USAID have proposed reform road maps.

Main needs and priorities as formulated in the literature

Period	Needs Include	Sources
Short-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Restore the population's access to electricity, especially for the displaced, returnees, and host communities in the most affected areas. 	REACH 2019.
Medium/long-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Adopt structural reforms in the electricity sector by adopting a "three-wave" approach; draft a new electricity act and set up a regulatory cell. Conduct performance improvement and institutional strengthening at GECOL. Make fuel more available for the generation of electricity. Develop renewable energy. 	See documents related to World Bank's 2014–18 Libya Electricity Sector Technical Assistance Project.

Water

This section builds upon the 2017 sector brief produced as part of the AfDB-led stocktaking exercise. UNICEF has conducted and presented a draft water sector analysis for 2018–19, which covers water sector demand analysis; potential medium- and long-term infrastructure requirements; and governance requirements. Key sources include studies produced by UNICEF (WASH situation in schools; in southern Libya) (UNICEF 2017a), FAO (groundwater management) (FAO 2009), French Development Agency (diagnosis of the GCWW) (AFD 2012), MEWINA (CEDARE 2014), the 2009 WB Public Expenditure Review (PER) (World Bank 2009), and the REACH MSNA (on impact of the conflict) (REACH 2018e). Based on the main documents and considering the views

¹⁷ Interview with WB energy experts.

expressed by experts interviewed, the team concludes that there are major gaps in data regarding water sector infrastructures, governance, human capital, and expenditures. Much of the data may have been collected, but is scattered, fragmented, and discontinuous. Generally, the data lack reliability and comprehensiveness. As updating data on the state of infrastructure is extremely difficult due to the armed conflict (AfDB 2017), most reports reflect desk-based assumptions. Data gaps include a lack of accurate studies on water demand patterns—notably because there is no water database—and up to date infrastructure assessment, valuation, and registration. Annex A lists all information and data gaps identified for the sector.

Status of WASH services and main challenges

Water sources

Libya has the fifth highest level of water scarcity of all countries in the world,¹⁸ yet has the largest fossil water reserves. Groundwater accounts for more than 95 percent of the total water supply, surface water for 3 percent, and desalination and wastewater reuse for about 1 percent each (Jagerskog 2017). Very deep fossil aquifers in the South provide roughly two-thirds of extracted groundwater, while coastal aquifers recharged by rainfall provide the remaining third.

Water consumption and infrastructure

For 2012, total annual consumption was estimated at 5,830 million m³ (Mm³) (83 percent for agriculture, 5 percent for industry, and 12 percent for urban and domestic use) (CEDARE 2014). Annual sustainable withdrawals are estimated to be just 4,400 Mm³ (World Bank 2009), including 3,700 Mm³ of nonrenewable fossil groundwater and just 700 Mm³ of renewable groundwater and surface water.¹⁹ The main infrastructure providing water include:

- **The Great Man-Made River Project (GMRP).** This was created in 1953 to obtain freshwater trapped in aquifers under the Libyan desert. 1,300 deep wells were built, and more than 2,820 km of concrete pipes connect the well fields in the South to the coast. Originally, the project was conceived to support irrigation, but it also started supplying urban water in the 1990s (AFD 2012).
- **Desalination plants.** Libya has also developed a program that features 8 desalination treatment plants that use sea water and are spread almost evenly along the Mediterranean coast, and 16 that use brackish underground water. The average unit cost of desalinated water is very high: US\$2.69/m³,²⁰ compared to an average cost of US\$0.43/m³ for the GMRP (World Bank 2009). Other sources consider desalinated water to be 10 times more expensive than groundwater extraction from the GMRP (AFD 2012). Desalination plants serve mostly coastal areas, some of which are served exclusively by this source (AFD 2012).

¹⁸ Water scarcity is defined as an available annual water supply below 1,000 m³ per person (UN-Water, n.d.).

¹⁹ FAO 2009. This correlates to a large extent with the yearly recharge of coastal aquifers, which are overexploited as the yearly uptake is 1,500 Mm³.

²⁰ Ashour and Ghurbal 2004. Other sources quote a lower cost of 0.76 US\$/m³ (CEDARE 2014).

- **Water distribution networks.** The total length of the water distribution network is 15,997 km (AFD 2012).
- **Wastewater treatment infrastructure.** There are 75 wastewater treatment plants but only 10 are operational (UNICEF 2017b).

Access to WASH

According to the WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply and Sanitation (WSS) (2008), 54.4 percent of the total population had a piped water connection (54.2 percent for urban and 54.9 percent for rural residents), while 33.5 percent were supplied by private wells (35.8 percent for urban and 26.9 percent for rural residents). If well water is safe to drink, access to improved water was 87.9 percent (90 percent for urban and 81.8 percent for rural residents). National data indicate that all of Libya's 254 urban communities, which encompass 90 percent of the total population, are served by public water supply networks. GCWWW data is slightly different, with the connection rate to piped water at 64 percent (AFD 2012).

Access to sanitation was much lower, with an estimated coverage of 17 percent nationally, though with wide variations across regions—30 percent in Greater Tripoli and 27 percent in Benghazi, compared to 5 percent in Wadi Hayat and Wadi Shati (World Bank 2009). GCWWW data is different, with coverage estimated at 40 percent (AFD 2012).

Access to and quality of WASH have declined since the conflict, with only 51.6 percent of the nondisplaced population having access to the public water supply network and 23.9 percent to a protected well. Access to piped water is better for IDPs (61.7 percent) and returnees (71.8 percent). The situation is worse in the South, with 47.2 percent of the population in Alkufra and 46.2 percent in Murzuq reporting they are unable to obtain enough drinking water. Water quality is also problematic, with 25.4 percent of HHs needing to use water filters, 5.3 percent needing to boil water (43.7 percent in Sirt), and 55.5 percent resorting to bottled water for drinking (REACH 2019).

Institutional framework

The main institutions active in the sector include the following:

- **GCWWW.** This public entity is in charge of water supply from any source (ground, surface, desalination) and its distribution as well as wastewater treatment and sanitation.
- **GDCOL.** Plans, develops, operates, and maintains desalination plants²¹ and sells the resulting bulk water to the GCWWW.
- **GAWR.** The national body for assessment, planning, and management of water resources.

²¹The GCWWW acts as a public authority and is financed by subsidies from the State (which are just enough to cover operational costs), tariffs paid by citizens, and loans. The water supply managed by GCWWW is implemented through a national plan, though there are eight regional services that implement specific regional needs (REACH 2019).

- **GMRA.** This SOE is responsible for the GMRP as well as for groundwater exploitation and its transport from the southern well fields to the coastal area. It also sells its water in bulk to the GCWWW.

Structural challenges

The WASH sector faces the following structural challenges:

- **Overconsumption for irrigation and poor management of water sources in agriculture.** Water use in the agricultural sector is characterized by loose control over extraction for use in private farming, inefficient irrigation, and allocation of scarce water to crops such as cereals that are low value-added as well as water intensive (World Bank 2009).
- **High water consumption for domestic use.** Libyan consumption is 250 liters per capita per day (lcd), whereas averages in Algeria, Tunisia, and Jordan are about 150 lcd.²² As of 2012, Tripoli was even reported to be using 650 lcd. Loss in urban systems is reported to exceed 50 percent due to leakages.
- **Low tariffs.** Tariffs do not enable cost recovery—for instance, desalinated water is sold at US\$0.02/m³ whereas the average cost is US\$0.76/m³—and thus incentivize waste. Billing is irregular and fees are not collected due to the lack of an enforcement system (CEDARE 2014).
- **Wastewater not significantly reused.** Treatment involved only 11 percent of the total volume of urban consumption in the best of times, and a significant proportion of treated effluent continues to be discharged into the Mediterranean Sea (World Bank 2009). Field estimates indicate that current treatment is even lower and very minimal, and most of the treatment plants are full of sewage and just a path to the sea.²³ The bulk of wastewater is not collected and pollutes ground- and seawater.
- **Dropping water tables and seawater intrusion.** Due to unsustainable levels of extraction, water tables in coastal areas have continuously dropped, and seawater intrusion has increased.
- **Water infrastructure is in a critical state.** This is due to age, massive leakage in all parts of the system, illegal connections, unstable supply patterns, uncontrolled migration to urban areas, and poor maintenance.
- **Water services are inadequate, both in coverage and quality.** The safety of the water supply is a major concern. A 2007 study by the National Consulting Bureau showed that a majority of settlements had above standard levels of total dissolved solids, nitrate, and fluoride.

²²Interview with UNICEF, January–February 2019; AFD 2012.

²³Interview with UNICEF, January–February 2019.

Impact of conflict

Starting from an already low pre-conflict level of maintenance, infrastructure functionality and water services have gradually declined due to armed conflict; they are now approaching critical “collapse” levels. Water supply lines have been left idle for extended periods of time, denying major urban centers potable water. Several wastewater treatment plants remain out of service, and the functioning ones are not working at full capacity. Desalination plants are experiencing serious shortages of chemicals in addition to not receiving major overhauls, and thus are also not working at full capacity. This not only produces less water but also negatively affects the infrastructure. Water institutions are facing problems of poor management, lack of maintenance personnel,²⁴ lack of sufficient cash flows for basic needs (spare parts, fuel, chemicals for desalinization) and lack of electricity to run water pumps and desalinization and treatment plants.

Main interventions and capacity to respond

A committee to restructure the GCWWW has been established on behalf of the Ministry of Utilities, but there have not been any national or regional plans implemented. Humanitarian agencies (UNICEF) or NGOs (International Committee of the Red Cross) are supplying some spare parts and chemicals to run water and desalinization plants.

Main needs and priorities as formulated in the literature

Period	Needs Include	Sources
Short-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Purchase chemicals to operate the eight desalination plants. • Make financial resources more available and purchase critical parts and generators for GCWWW and GMRA. • Conduct initial work to reduce leakages. 	UNICEF 2018/2019; AfDB 2017.
Medium/long-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Update the National Water and Wastewater Strategy. • Build the water database and carry out an infrastructure assessment. • Review, revise, and implement appropriate water tariffs and billing. • Restructure sector institutional and legal framework with a focus on effective coordination. • Rehabilitate the water infrastructure as appropriate (much of which is approaching design life). • Improve water service access for urban and rural households, with attention to those not connected to the network. • Use agricultural water more efficiently by enhancing crop productivity and using drip irrigation where appropriate. 	UNICEF 2018/2019; World Bank 2009; FAO 2011.

²⁴ Most maintenance personnel were foreigners and left due to the conflict.

Transport

This section is mostly based on the transport chapter of the World Bank's 2009 PER (World Bank 2009) and on the 2017 terms of reference for the study of the National Transport Master Plan (MoT 2017). Based on the main documents and considering the views expressed by experts interviewed, the team concludes that road sector and air sector data are limited and very outdated. There is no existing survey of the damage or assessment of the status of the transport infrastructure and services, and no full network survey. Annex A lists all information and data gaps identified for the sector.

Status of the transport sector and infrastructure and main challenges

Transport infrastructure

Road. The length of the paved urban road network is extensive but not documented. In the absence of a full network survey, the total length of Libya's paved road network could be estimated at about 25,599 km (2006), of which 14,439 km constitute the primary network. The main international corridors connecting Libya to other countries are the coastal (West-East) roads linking Tunisia to Egypt (Trans-Maghrebian motorway), and the North-South ones linking Libya to the Sahel countries. The secondary road network is estimated at 4,200 km, and there are 6,960 km of paved agricultural roads. The unpaved network is about 3,000 km long. There is also a network of seasonal tracks of about 50,000 km. The highway network is classified into four main roadway types: expressways, main arteries, secondary roads, and agricultural tracks. The road network density is considered satisfactory and adequate to meet the country's needs. Because a large part of the country's territory is arid, Libya's road network density is low, at about 17.6 km/1,000 sq. km, compared to 40 km/1,000 sq. km for Algeria and 32 km/1,000 sq. km for Tunisia (World Bank 2009).

Rail. There is no operational railway system.

Air. There are three main airports including the one in Tripoli, which was destroyed during the conflict, while the ones in Benghazi and Mitiga are still functional. Another 20 airports exist with paved runways of more than 3,000 meters. The status of the air infrastructure and operations' safety and security are unknown.

Transportation industry

Libyan vehicle fleet. The last updated data is from 2008. At that time the Libyan vehicle fleet was growing at a very high rate. The fleet of vehicles was estimated at 1.9 million, of which almost 80 percent were light vehicles (cars, taxis, pickups, and vans) and slightly more than 20 percent were trucks and buses. This corresponds to 310 vehicles per 1,000 inhabitants, a motorization rate 2 times higher than in Tunisia and 2.5 times higher than in Algeria in 2008. The very high annual increase in vehicle ownership observed before the conflict (20 percent annually for light vehicles) was due to incentives such as lower import duties aimed at decreasing the age of the vehicle fleet

and efforts to promote private modes of transport. Therefore, the fleet was relatively new before the conflict, with good mechanical performance (World Bank 2009).

Traffic demand and growth rates. There are no systematic surveys of road traffic. However, specific classified traffic counts are conducted for new roads as part of feasibility studies, such as was undertaken in 2006 for the Trans-Maghrebian motorway. The maximum average daily traffic was estimated to be 50,000 vehicles per day (vpd) close to Tripoli, 30,000 vpd close to Benghazi city, and between 1,000 vpd and 3,000 vpd on important intercity roads crossing the proposed alignment of the motorway. This would mean that traffic volumes are relatively low outside urban areas, and well within the capacity of paved single carriageway roads with two lanes. The growth rate of traffic outside urban areas is expected to be consistent with past increases in Libya's fuel consumption (5.3 percent per year for gasoline and 4.3 percent for diesel over the eight years prior to 2008) (World Bank 2009).

Institutional framework

Under Gaddafi, road sector management was affected by frequent administrative and institutional changes. Until 2011, the General People's Committee for Transport and Communication (GPCT) was the central secretariat in charge of transportation and transport infrastructure, with several public agencies and transport corporations under its control, including the Roads and Bridges Department (RBD). RBD oversaw the road sector, including the planning, programming, budgeting, and implementation of road investments. However, responsibility for the management of road assets, including maintenance expenditures, remained unclear. Currently, the transport industry is managed by the Ministry of Transportation (MoT) in the GNA government.

Structural challenges

The literature mainly focuses on the challenges of the road sector since it is the main means of transportation. Despite a significant increase in road investments in the 1990s, there were deficiencies in the capacity and quality of Libyan's highway network caused by underinvesting in new roads and significant maintenance neglect (World Bank 2009). The main structural challenges to the transport sector include the following:

- **Low budget share.** The transport sector's share of budget has been historically low.
- **Large road maintenance backlog.** The extent of this backlog is unknown because road condition surveys have not been systematically conducted in the past. If deferred for too long, maintenance work must be addressed by rehabilitating and reconstructing large segments of the paved network. Over the past few decades, millions of dollars' worth of road infrastructure may have been lost due to inadequate maintenance. Ultimately, roads in bad condition raise the cost of road transport for both people and freight.
- **The road sector cost recovery ratio is low.** Libya does not have a system for tolling road traffic to partially recover road investment costs. License fees for commercial and private vehicles are low. Customs duties on imported merchandise, which were 35 percent, were abolished in August 2005 and replaced by a 4 percent "port services charge" that must be paid by importers

for all products, including cars, vans, taxis, and pickup trucks with less than two-liter engines, which cannot be considered a road use charge. At the same time, relevant departments were unable to provide accounts of user charges collected on an annual basis (World Bank 2009).

- **Gasoline and diesel used for transport are heavily subsidized.** The level of subsidy amounted to US\$3.9 billion, or 14.5 percent of GDP in 2017.²⁵
- **Limited control of overloading.** The trucking industry benefits from very low road use charges that are unrelated to distance traveled or to truck or axle loads. This situation is compounded by the very low overloading penalties imposed. There has been very little control of axle loads in the absence of permanent weigh stations or mobile scales. This policy entices truckers to overload.
- **Accident rates are high on Libya's road network.** Road accidents reported by traffic police are relatively well documented, and statistics show that the number of accidents per year is about 12,000, with about 1,800 fatalities (2004). Accidents increased by 30 percent from 1998 to about 2004, while the vehicle fleet increased by a factor of 7 over the same period, which amounts to a decrease in fatality rates and would bring it in line with regional rates (World Bank 2009).

Impact of conflict

No reliable data exist that quantify the impact of conflict on the transport infrastructure.

A significant number of projects have been shut down since the conflict, across various transport subsectors; in particular in ports, airports (at least eight airport projects in Tripoli, Benghazi, Sebha, Ghat, Tobrouk, Kofra, and Martouba have been suspended) and railway-roads projects. The accumulation of contractual problems as a result of multifaceted disruptions that have occurred since 2011 make it challenging to resume these projects (MoT 2017).

Transportation of goods and persons (urban and/or regional) has been disrupted, both in terms of quality and effectiveness. The weaknesses of public transport have been exacerbated since 2011 and public operators have suffered setbacks, which accounts for the emergence of individual transport and the development of a fragmented private transport sector at the expense of public transport (MoT 2017).

Main interventions and capacity to respond

The workload of the Roads Administration was of concern before the revolution and work was not efficiently outsourced. There is no current assessment of the capacity of the GNA's Ministry of Transport. The Ministry of Transport has requested assistance from the World

²⁵ Data in this section are from the World Energy Outlook 2018 (database), "Fossil Fuel Subsidies," International Energy Agency, Paris, (accessed January 16, 2019), <https://www.iea.org/weo/energysubsidies/>.

Bank to develop a comprehensive strategic transport plan for the whole country and specifically targeted toward land, air, and marine transportation.²⁶

Main needs and priorities as formulated in the literature

Period	Needs include	Source
Short-term	No needs identified in the literature reviewed.	
Medium/ long-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase road budgets significantly in the medium term. • Give priority to maintaining and rehabilitating assets. • Implement an effective Road Asset Management system. • Prepare a road master plan to guide investment decisions (this is in line with the Ministry of Transport's recent request to the World Bank) • Prioritize investments on traffic justifications and economic returns. • Review legislation on and enforcement of axle load limits. • Increase private sector participation in the road sector. 	World Bank 2009

ICT

The key sources for this section include several recent technical studies produced as part of WB technical assistance to government regarding the potential to privatize the ICT sector and regional connectivity; the TeleGeography GlobalComms Database;²⁷ and Freedom House's 2018 Libya Country Report on Internet freedom (Freedom House 2018). Based on the main documents and considering the views expressed by experts interviewed, the team concludes that there is very good ICT sector baseline data up to 2014 as well as scattered and fragmented information on recent development. Gaps include a comprehensive assessment of disruption and destruction that has taken place since 2014, along with information on the use of digital platforms. Annex A lists all information and data gaps identified for the sector.

Status of the ICT sector and main challenges

Access to ICT services

Penetration rates of ICT services are some of the highest in Africa and have been regularly increasing since the revolution. There are over 9 million wireless (mobile phone) subscribers (as of September 2018), up from 8.7 million in 2012,²⁸ which is equivalent to a population penetration rate of 139.7 percent, compared with an 84 percent average in Africa (September 2018); 910,000

²⁶ Official request from the Libyan Ministry of Transport to the World Bank, March 8, 2017.

²⁷ See the GlobalComms Database, TeleGeography, Washington, DC, <https://www.telegeography.com/products/globalcomms/data/country-profiles/af/libya/country-overview.html>.

²⁸ 3G subscribers grew from 1.5 million in 2012 to 2.5 million in 2017.

broadband (Internet) subscribers (September 2018), up from 228,700 in 2012, which is equivalent to a 83.2 percent household penetration rate, compared with a 7.8 percent average in Africa;²⁹ and 1.625 million fixed-line³⁰ subscribers (2017), up from 864,000 in 2012, which is equivalent to a 150.4 percent household penetration rate, compared with a 9.2 percent average in Africa.³¹

ICT infrastructure

Internet. Fiber-optic cables are the backbone of the information and data highways that form the Internet and allow broadband connectivity. The status of infrastructure is as follows:

- The international connectivity with a combined capacity in excess of 4 terabytes per second, 3 submarine cables, and 2 terrestrial cross-border connections appears sufficient. In terms of regional connectivity, Libya is interconnected to Tunisia and Algeria via a point-to-point link, while Egypt is currently only interconnected by a microwave radio link, as a few kilometers of fiber-optic cables are still missing.³² In addition, the electricity transmission grid infrastructure has cross-border fiber-optic connections with Tunisia and Egypt, and could potentially offer competition (Gelvanovska, Rogy, and Rossotto 2014).
- Libya also has a well-developed national connectivity, with a substantial national broadband fiber-optic network. On top of the sector SOE (LPTIC and Hatif) networks, various utilities such as oil, water, and electricity have deployed fiber-optic infrastructure for their own operations that could be leveraged for broadband connectivity (Gelvanovska, Rogy, and Rossotto 2014).

Wireless and fixed-line telephony infrastructure. The status of the infrastructure is as follows:³³

- **Mobile infrastructure.** Each of the three incumbent mobile telephony operators (Libyana, Almadar Aljaded, and LibyaPhone Mobile) has its own network. Libyana in particular has invested heavily in expanding and upgrading its mobile infrastructure.
- **Fixed-line telephony.** State-owned Hatif's network comprises a public switched telephone network and a more modern fixed wireless network, with a capacity of 1.2 million subscribers.

²⁹ Other sources say that broadband was introduced in 2007, although the number of fixed broadband subscriptions declined every year between 2010 and 2015, when it stood at just under one subscription per every 100 inhabitants. The rate ticked up slightly in 2016, at 2.68 subscriptions per 100 inhabitants (ITU 2015, 2017).

³⁰ Public switched telephone network (PSTN) + Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP).

³¹ Data in this section are from the GlobalComms Database, TeleGeography, Washington, DC, <https://www2.telegeography.com>.

³² Completing this link would have a tremendous impact on facilitating data exchange between Libya and Egypt as well as improving the quality and resilience of regional connectivity between North Africa and Gulf countries.

³³ Data in this section are from the GlobalComms Database, TeleGeography, Washington, DC, <https://www2.telegeography.com>.

Institutional framework and market structure

The Ministry of Communications and Informatics (MoCIT), also known as the General Authority for Communications and Informatics) oversees Libya's telecommunications and information technology sector. The ministry runs the sector through the LPTIC and the General Authority of Communications and Informatics (GACI). GACI is nominally responsible for policy making and regulations. LPTIC is a holding company for all state-owned companies operating in the ICT sector. Companies that fall under the LPTIC's jurisdiction (as of January 2018) include fixed-line incumbent Hatif Libya, wireless network operators Libyana and Almadar Aljaded, the ISP LTT, and broadcaster/VSAT operator Aljeel Aljaded.³⁴

The main operators include the following:

- **Mobile telephony.** Almadar Aljaded and Libyana shared a duopoly on the wireless communications arena until January 2011, when MVNO LibyaPhone Mobile was launched. Almadar Aljaded and Libyana are fully owned by LPTIC, while LibyaPhone Mobile is owned by the state-owned LTT. Libyana has a 72.4 percent market share (as of September 2017) due to its more advanced network and cheaper rates.³⁵
- **Internet.** State-owned LTT is the country's dominant ISP and acts as the de facto arbitrator for its broadband sector. LTT provides Internet services across the country via dial-up, ADSL, VSAT, FTTH, and WiMAX technologies. As of January 2018, a total of 73 ISPs and VSAT operators had been licensed to provide services, but LTT remains the only one with an international gateway license, underlining its integral role within the sector.³⁶
- **Fixed-line telephony.** State-owned Hatif Libya is currently responsible for providing fixed-line voice telephony.³⁷

Structural challenges

The following structural challenges affect the ICT sector:

- **Broadband Internet's high prices and low speed.** Mobile broadband download speed is 4.52 Mbps, compared to 8.16 in Algeria, 18.61 in Tunisia, and a global average of 22.61. Fixed broadband download speed is 7.1 Mbps, compared to a global average of 45.07 (World Bank 2018a).
- **Suboptimal investment in backbone infrastructure.** The very large quantity of fiber-optic backbone in the desert (especially for oil companies and the GMRP) are not tapped to their full potential, which could be achieved through increased regional integration.

³⁴ Data in this section are from the GlobalComms Database, TeleGeography, Washington, DC, <https://www2.telegeography.com>.

³⁵ Data in this section are from the GlobalComms Database, TeleGeography, Washington, DC, <https://www2.telegeography.com>. On-net voice calls cost LYD0.06 per minute, but calls to rival cell company Almadar users cost LYD0.09 per minute. Libyana also offers 3G video calling to its customers, at a price of LYD0.30 per minute.

³⁶ Data in this section are from the GlobalComms Database, TeleGeography, Washington, DC, <https://www2.telegeography.com>.

³⁷ Data in this section are from the GlobalComms Database, TeleGeography, Washington, DC, <https://www2.telegeography.com>.

- **Lack of investment in local access (“last-mile” connectivity).** Although Libya has heavily invested in the backbone network, this is not the case for “last-mile” connectivity; little investment has taken place in local loops (World Bank 2018a).
- **Lack of competition.** There is a monopoly on international access, as Libya International Telecom Company, a subsidiary of LPTIC, has a monopoly on international Internet gateways (Gelvanovska, Rogy, and Rossotto 2014). In addition, the ICT market is highly concentrated.
- **Internet network prone to failure.** The Internet network is very centralized, with little redundancy and low resilience in case of failure of key installations.

Impact of the conflict

Since 2011, the conflict has frequently interrupted telecommunications and Internet services, with electricity outages and physical damage to infrastructure limiting connectivity.³⁸

More than US\$1 billion worth of telecom infrastructure has been destroyed according to estimates, including 20 percent of the country’s cell sites and towers (Calice et al. 2015). Coercion by armed groups, unauthorized construction, sabotage, and theft of ICT equipment impair services, as reflected by the following examples: (i) in July 2016, armed protesters stormed the Tripoli offices of the mobile phone companies LTT and Libyana, demanding that operators shut down cell service to the entire city of Misrata (Libya Herald 2016); and (ii) large areas of southern Libya were cut off from their LTT-provided mobile and Internet connections in February 2017 after the theft of copper and other infrastructure equipment (Libya Herald 2017a).

However, it is worth noting that despite the conflict, the number of users and networks have continued to expand since 2011, and the quality of service for those who can access the Internet has recently improved due to new service offerings (Freedom House 2018). Also, in June 2017, mobile and landline service was restored in Sirt after militants from ISIS were driven from the coastal town.

Main interventions and capacity to respond

In 2014, the MoCIT appointed a committee to draft a new Telecommunication Act to set standards for the sector and replace the existing regulations surrounding ICTs. The act, which has been drafted but not yet implemented (BuddeComm 2019), also aims to create an independent Telecommunication Regulatory Authority to oversee the industry (MoCIT, n.d.). Additionally, authorities sought assistance from the International Telecommunications Union to develop the regulatory framework.

LPTIC, which had splintered into factions loyal to rival governments during the conflict, was formally reunified in early 2018. In March 2018, it announced that it would consolidate its six nonmobile subsidiaries into a single telecommunications company, the National Telecoms Company, which will be responsible for operating and maintaining infrastructure (LPTIC 2018).

³⁸ Data in this section are from the GlobalComms Database, TeleGeography, Washington, DC, <https://www2.telegeography.com>.

LPTIC also announced several new ICT infrastructure projects to improve connectivity and access to services worth US\$1.7 billion (Reuters 2018b), including the following:

- The signature of a US\$80 million contract with the Saudi Arabia-based company Arabsat for the provision of satellite backup services (Reuters 2018b).
- The Ericsson and Nokia Networks were contracted to establish a national mobile broadband network.
- Alcatel-Lucent signed a contract with the LITC to build a subsea cable system to link Tripoli and Benghazi (Freedom House 2018).

On the other hand, the implementation status of the second phase of the Next Generation Network Project (NGNP) (9,752 km, notably to connect Libya to Sudan and Niger, US\$150 million) is unclear, as is its potential resumption. Started in 2008, the NGPN aims to implement 24,000 km of fiber optic infrastructure across the country and to secure international access via seven international gateways (MoCIT 2013). However, there is still no consensus between the rival governments on how to rebuild infrastructure on a national scale.

Service providers have maintained a good capacity to provide service and innovate, as underscored by the increase in users and the following new products:

- In 2017, Libyana launched a trial 4G LTE mobile network in the cities of Tripoli, Zawiya, Sabha, and Misrata.
- Competitor Almadar Aljaded launched a 3.5G DC-HSPA+ network in August 2017, initially covering Tripoli and Benghazi, while also launching in the city of Marj the following month.³⁹
- Hatif Libya prepared to expand fixed wireless service in western Libya.
- The CBL launched a mobile payment service.

Main needs and priorities as formulated in the literature

Period	Needs include	Sources
Short-term	No needs identified in the literature reviewed.	
Medium/long-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Invest more in local Internet access (“last-mile connectivity”). ● Improve competition, and review legislation and regulations to counter oligopolies. ● Review legislation and regulations to support the migration of business models toward broadband investment (World Bank 2018a) ● Consider regional integration when reviewing legislation and regulations (Gelvanovska, Rogy, and Rossotto 2014) 	World Bank 2018a; Gelvanovska, Rogy, and Rossotto 2014.

³⁹ Data in this section are from the GlobalComms Database, TeleGeography, Washington, DC, <https://www2.telegeography.com>.

Housing and land

This section relies on the six profiles of Alkufra, Benghazi, Janzour, Sebha, Sirt, and Ubari (UN-Habitat and UNFPA 2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 2018d, 2018e, and 2018f) developed by UN-Habitat and UNFPA, which provide good information on urban planning, housing, and destruction in these cities. Other sources notably include the UNHCR “Housing, Land and Property Issues and the Response to Displacement in Libya” report (UNHCR 2013), the IOM DTM (returnees and IDPs) (IOM 2019), and the REACH MSNA (on impact of the conflict) (REACH 2019). Based on the main documents and considering the views expressed by experts interviewed, the team concludes that there is a lack of overall nationally representative information on the housing and land sector, and a major gap in data pertaining to urban planning processes post-2011. Also, damage assessments are only partially available. More granularity at the district and municipal level is needed to assess damage in locations heavily impacted by conflict. Annex A lists all information and data gaps identified for the sector.

Status of housing and land sector and main challenges

Access to housing

The majority of Libyan households live in a house or apartment (98.6 percent) (REACH 2019, 2). Libyans’ access to housing and the challenges they face in relation to it (occupancy status, evictions, damages, and so forth) vary greatly according to their displacement status, to which social or ethnic group they belong, and their location. For instance, only a quarter of IDPs own their accommodation compared to more than three-quarters of nondisplaced and returnee HHs (83.6 and 83.2 percent, respectively) (REACH 2019). With rental prices rising (OCHA 2018a, 44), IDPs are more likely to be evicted from their housing⁴⁰ than are nondisplaced and returnee HHs. However, in 2018, returnees were the most exposed to living in damaged shelters; 61 percent reported living in damaged shelters (37.2 percent in lightly damaged, 19.3 percent in medium damaged, 3.4 percent in heavily damaged, and 1.1 percent in totally destroyed shelters) (REACH 2019, 2). In addition, ethnic groups such as the Tawergha⁴¹ face specific housing challenges because of their alleged or effective support to the Gaddafi regime.

Institutional framework

- The Housing and Infrastructure Board, which is part of the Ministry of Housing and Utilities (MoHU), is the state’s housing building entity. In addition, EOs of line ministries and state agencies present in municipalities can include a housing division (UNDP 2017c, 10).

⁴⁰ Some 7.2 percent of households reported having been evicted from their house in the six months prior to data collection, and an additional 3.3 percent were threatened with eviction (REACH 2019, 2).

⁴¹ The Tawergha were predominantly living in the Tawergha town, which is located near Misrata in the West.

- The Urban Planning Agency analyzes and proposes solutions for the various urban policies, including housing and land use, and plans and develops urban and master plans. It reports to the Prime Minister's Office.
- Municipalities ensure the implementation of these plans at the local level (EUD 2017, 12).

Structural challenges

The following structural challenges affect the housing sector:

- **Injustice has been created by the redistribution of properties (Law no. 4 of 1978 and Law no. 123 of 1970).** On behalf of social justice, the Gaddafi regime used Law no. 4 to redistribute landlords' properties. This transferred land ownership from landlords to tenants of houses, and landlords did not receive compensation (Ibrahim and Otto 2017, iv). The measure greatly affected the country's property system, with a quarter of the country's population subject to the law.⁴² Furthermore, under, Law no. 123, some tribes lost their land to the benefit of other tribes, which acquired land grants and preferential access to public infrastructures and utilities in exchange for their loyalty to the regime.
- **Poor urban and housing planning.** Several urban master plans were elaborated, but the third one (2005–11) was never implemented (UN-Habitat and UNFPA 2018b). Authorities struggled to plan in a way that optimized the location of viable economic activities, social facilities, and infrastructure with the growing urban population (UN-Habitat 2006). With increasing demand for public housing in the early 2000s, the state started a housing program, but it was poorly designed and implemented due to corruption (Shawesh 2016, 13). In addition, there is conflicting legislation regarding the entities in charge of urban planning, which limits municipalities' ability to adequately plan. Law no. 3 of 2001 allocates the preparation and adoption of urban plans to the Central Authority, while Law no. 59 devolves it to municipalities. Furthermore, coordination between the Service of Urban Planning and municipalities is weak (CILG-VNG, n.d.b.). Finally, most municipalities are significantly short on technical staff and lack tools and mechanisms for urban planning (CILG-VNG, n.d.b.).

Impact of the conflict

- **Housing damage.** Housing damage differs by geographic area at both the mantika and city level. Specific districts are more destroyed than others, as in the cases of Benina and Qnfoda in Benghazi.⁴³ The 2018 REACH MSNA offers four main observations: (i) three out of the top four mantikas with the highest cumulative percentage of HHs that reported living in light, medium, heavy, or destroyed shelters are located in the West;⁴⁴ (ii) mantikas

⁴²UNHCR (2013, 4) and Sulaim Ibrahim state that around 56,000 to 75,000 properties were subjected to Law no. 4.

⁴³NRC 2018. Benina and Qnfodah have about a quarter of their population in dwellings with substantial or severe damage; in Benghazi-Al Jadida this damage accounts for 11 percent of households, which is much less, but the area is much more populated. UN-Habitat city profiling also show that specific areas are more damaged than others.

⁴⁴West: Aljara (63 percent), Sirt (62.9 percent), and Zwara (61.7 percent); East: Alkufra (62.7 percent).

with significant damage are concentrated in a few areas (eight mantikas and one city). In particular, the battle of Sirt has left the city in ruins, with most buildings and infrastructure damaged. The intense conflict of 2011 and the siege of the city by ISIS have severely to completely damaged 32 percent of the buildings and public facilities (UN-Habitat and UNFPA 2018e); (iii) Alkufra in the East and Sirt in the West have the highest percentage of HHs that report living in destroyed shelters (12.9 percent and 7.3 percent, respectively); and (iv) a description of the level of damage within a single mantika. For instance, Al Jabal Al Akhdar in the East has the fifth highest percentage of HHs that report living in an undamaged house; yet the percentage of HHs that report living in destroyed houses is the third highest (5.7 percent).

- **Displacement and return patterns.** The insecurity, lack of basic services, and destruction of properties led to displacement in several areas (for example, Sebha and Misrata baladiyas) (IOM 2019). At the same time, increased security in other areas contributes to the progressive return of a share of the population (such as Tripoli baladiya). Finally, important displacement and return patterns are observed in both Benghazi and Sirt baladiyas (IOM 2019). Due to the conflict, municipal councils have hosted IDPs in public buildings or unoccupied ones.
- **Forced displacement and lack of return solutions.** The conflict led to the deliberate displacement of population groups based on political affiliation. For instance, the Mashashya (in the Nafusa Mountains) and the Tawergha were displaced in 2011 because they supported or were accused of supporting the Gaddafi regime. These groups have been repeatedly evicted since 2011⁴⁵ and are now unable to return, due to resistance from neighboring communities, local parties, and military groups (GPC 2018 and UNHCR 2013). Around 40,000 Tawergha are currently in protracted displacement (Reuters 2018a).
- **Discontinuation of permit issuance.** The practice of issuing licenses to construct and/or register property seems to have stopped with the 2011 revolution (UN-Habitat and UNFPA 2018d), which has led to the exponential growth of informal settlements.⁴⁶
- **Property disputes.** Since the end of the Gaddafi regime, property disputes have increased tremendously; former owners demand their property back, while other owners ask to be significantly compensated—sometimes for more (Shawesh 2016, 30) than what they received in previous compensation initiatives.⁴⁷
- **Political division.** This has aggravated the situation, as the divided institutions have been unable to adjudicate property disputes. For instance, the GNC drafted laws to nullify Laws

⁴⁵ For instance, in August 2018 the UNSMIL issued a statement condemning the eviction of 2,000 Tawergha IDPs from a camp in Libya (UNSMIL 2018a).

⁴⁶ UN-Habitat explains that while the dwelling is informal from a registry perspective, it does not mean that the house is not connected to water, electricity, sewage, and so forth. (UN-Habitat and UNFPA 2018e).

⁴⁷ In 2006 Gaddafi tried to resolve the disputes by creating Law no. 4 and a committee to compensate some families, but the committee faced resistance (UNHCR 2013).

no. 4 and 123 retrospectively, but its mandate had already expired by then. The HoR later published an official document stating that Law no. 123 still prevails.

Main interventions and capacity to respond

Some political efforts have been made to recognize and manage land and property rights.

As such, the draft Constitution of April 2016 (article 197) explicitly refers to property grievances. Although Law no. 29 of 2013 on transitional justice did not comprehensively address how real property disputes can be resolved, it established a Fact-Finding and Reconciliation Commission tasked with dealing with human rights violations, including propriety grievances.⁴⁸

Humanitarian agencies such as the Libyan Red Crescent Society, Mercy Corps, UNHCR, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), and the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) are producing research on housing

and delivering assistance such as shelter kits or NFIs to displaced populations, with UNHCR also supporting the issue through QIPs, including shelter programs. Libaid, a Benghazi-based, quasi-governmental organization delivers humanitarian assistance to displaced populations. UN-Habitat is implementing an institutional development and capacity-building program that aims to strengthen the technical capacities of the Urban Planning Agency urban specialists and a few municipalities (Benghazi, Ubari, al-Kufra, Sabha, Sirt, and Janzour) in urban planning and development (UNSMIL 2019b).

Main needs and priorities as formulated in the literature

Period	Needs include	Sources
Short-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support the quick reconstruction of housing (UNHCR 2013) • Collect evidence of property documents (UNHCR 2013) • Integrate informal settlements into urban plans (CILG-VNG, n.d.b.) • Improve security of tenure for vulnerable groups (UNHCR 2013) • Prepare for various reconstruction challenges, including the lack of labor, the poor quality and high costs of available materials, and the difficulty of accessing liquidity (NRC 2018) 	UNHCR 2013; CILG-VNG, n.d.b.; see the UN-Habitat and UNFPA city profiles.
Medium/long-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clarify the vision and responsibilities for urban planning in the legislative and institutional framework (CILG-VNG, n.d.b.) • Guarantee property remedies for the displaced and marginalized communities (UNHCR 2013) • Ensure that land and property issues are effectively addressed within the transitional justice process (UNHCR 2013) • Improve the coordination mechanisms between the municipality and EOs in all municipal activities (CILG-VNG, n.d.b.) 	UNHCR 2013; CILG-VNG, n.d.b.; see the UN-Habitat and UNFPA city profiles.

⁴⁸ As of July 2017, the FFRC was still awaiting the appointment of its board (Ibrahim and Otto 2017).

Chapter 6

Social Service and Social Protection

Social protection

This section draws on a number of key sources, notably the health component of the 2018 REACH MSNA (REACH 2019), the 2019 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) (OCHA 2018b), and the Humanitarian Needs Overview by the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (OCHA 2019). Sources for the subsidy amounts are the GoL and the CBL. Other sources include a research paper produced by the World Bank in 2015 on subsidy reform in Libya (Araar, Choueiri, and Verme 2015), the IMF's Staff Report for the 2013 Article IV Consultation (IMF 2013c), and the IMF's 2013 Note on Subsidy Reform in Libya (IMF 2013a). Based on the main documents and considering the views expressed by experts interviewed, the team concludes that there are major gaps in the data regarding social protection in Libya. Generally, the data lacks reliability and comprehensiveness, and contains discrepancies. Data gaps include information on the adequacy of social safety net programs, on subsidies and other forms of transfer, and updated poverty surveys. Also, there is no overall assessment of the risks to the social protection sector or mitigation measures in terms of (i) mandates, policies, and regulations; (ii) individual programs; and (iii) delivery systems. Annex A lists all information and data gaps identified for the sector.

Status of poverty and human development and main challenges

Available data show that 9.1 percent of the population in 20 municipalities is multidimensionally poor. The Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) using the data from the 2016 Multi-Sectoral Household Needs Assessment (MSA) also shows that chronic disease, dependency, and unemployment are the indicators that contribute most to poverty.¹ There is a great deal of regional variation, with Ubari and Zintan—the poorest municipalities among those measured—significantly poorer than the least poor municipality (Alkufra). Accounting for population density, Abou Salim has a greater number of poor than the other two municipalities that were sampled. A further disaggregation finds that IDPs are poorer than residents, with a poverty rate of 25.9 percent among IDPs and 8.7 percent for residents. IDPs are significantly poorer in all municipalities covered, with higher levels of deprivation in every indicator.

¹ Data in this section are from Table 6: Multidimensional Poverty Index: Developing Countries of the Human Development Reports (database), United Nations Development Programme, New York, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/MPI>.

Table 5 Repartition of Subsidies (millions of Libyan dinars)

Subsidies	2016	2017
Tripoli Government	5,841.0	5,970.0
Drugs	430.4	350.0
Fuels	3,986.0	4,200.0
Electricity	780.0	780.0
Water and sewage	204.0	230.0
Solid waste	399.9	410.0
Food	0.0	0.0
Discrepancies	40.7	0.0
Baida Government	481.0	412.6
Total subsidies	6,322.0	6,382.6

Source: GOL and CBL

Approximately 823,000 people are in need of humanitarian assistance (11 percent of the population) (OCHA 2018b), of which 552,000 are targeted by the HRP. Of those targeted by the HRP, 58 percent are Libyans (IDPs, returnees, nondisplaced, and host communities) and 42 percent migrants and refugees (OCHA 2018b). The majority of those in need are found in highly populated urban areas in the West and East; however, those with the most critical and severe needs are in the southern mantikas of Murzuq, Sebha, and Alkufra, and in the coastal mantika of Sirt. The most pressing humanitarian needs are protection, health and cash, and livelihoods.

An estimated 12 percent of households are food insecure, while the majority (70 percent) are marginally food secure; 19 percent are food secure (REACH 2019). There is sharp variation in level of food insecurity by mantika. More than 30 percent of people are food insecure in the southern mantikas of Murzuq and Aljufra and in the western mantikas of Zwara and Tripoli (WFP 2018b). Alkufra reported having the highest percentage of food-insecure households (WFP 2018b). In six out of the seven mantikas assessed both in 2017 and 2018, an overall deterioration of the food security situation was noted. Specifically, in Tripoli, the proportion of households with poor and borderline food consumption doubled in a year and the severity of negative food coping mechanisms also increased. Food insecurity is affecting displaced, returnees, and nondisplaced Libyans in similar ways.

Households rely on several livelihood strategies to meet their basic needs. These include dipping into savings, borrowing money, purchasing on credit, cutting back on some daily meals, selling nonproductive assets, and reducing nonfood related expenses, particularly in relation to health and education (WFP 2018a; OCHA 2019). Specifically, 52 percent of households reported spending their savings to buy food, 35 percent reported borrowing money to buy food, and 35 percent reported purchasing food on credit. In addition, 22 percent of Libyan households reduced spending on education and health and 19 percent reported having sold household assets.

IDPs are the most food-insecure group among the population, with 16 percent of IDP households classified as such (WFP 2018b). In addition to those already food insecure, a further 62 percent of all IDP households risk slipping into food insecurity (OCHA 2018a). Food needs are most severe in Sirt and Zwara (in the West) and critical in some of the eastern and southern mantikas, including Aljufra, Alkufra, Murzuq, Sebha, and Ubari (OCHA 2018a). Food insecurity is high in these mantikas, and people are increasingly reliant on negative coping strategies (OCHA 2018a).

Status of the social protection system and main challenges

Social protection mechanisms largely take the form of consumer subsidies. There are limited or no social protection mechanisms—such as cash transfers for the most vulnerable—while pensions mainly benefit former public sector workers. Consumer subsidies are very important for subsistence, but also put a very heavy burden on the state budget. The 2013 budget presented an increase of 4.3 percent in subsidies and transfers, including a fund for cash transfers. Government spending on subsidies increased from 8.5 percent of GDP in 2010 to 11 percent in 2012 and 12.2 percent in 2018 (World Bank 2018d). In 2018, subsidies and transfers were estimated at LYD8.06 billion and make up about 19 percent of current expenditure and about 17.3 percent of overall expenditure (up from LYD6.38 billion in 2017).² The majority of these will continue to go toward fuel subsidies, followed by electricity subsidies, pharmaceuticals, and others (see table 5). Gasoline and electricity take up more than 90 percent of household energy consumption and the same share of government spending on subsidies (Araar, Choueiri, and Verme 2015). The existing subsidy system can skew incentives in a number of ways, including leading to higher than desirable fuel and electricity consumption, while low retail prices for gasoline motivate smuggling, which means that subsidies end up benefiting consumers and middlemen in neighboring countries (IMF 2013a).

Institutional framework

- **Current subsidy mechanisms.** Subsidies are regulated by a compensation fund that determines prices with the objective of keeping essential consumption items affordable and protecting consumers from major global price shocks (Araar, Choueiri, and Verme 2015).
- Food subsidies are administered under a system of individual quotas regulated by the Ministry of Economy. They are progressive and pro-poor. Subsidized food products are made available in fixed per capita quantities at cooperatives throughout the country, except for subsidized flour, which is directly distributed to bakeries. Quotas are identical for all individuals and have remained unchanged for more than a decade (Araar, Choueiri, and Verme 2015). Food price subsidies are large and are equivalent to 2 percent of GDP (IMF 2013c), up from 1.1 percent of GDP in 2010 (Araar, Choueiri, and Verme 2015). Food subsidies have increased in recent years, from under LYD172 million in 2001 to over LYD2 billion in 2012 (Araar, Choueiri, and Verme 2015). Households allocate about 9.3 percent (LYD1.2 billion) of their total expenditure on subsidized food products, and food subsidies

² National Accounts data are from the Government of Libya and Central Bank of Libya, with World Bank estimates of missing data.

save households about 10 percent of their annual overall expenditure (Araar, Choueiri, and Verme 2015). Eliminating such subsidies would impact both poverty and inequality. Flour, sugar, rice, semolina, and vegetable oil represent the majority of the government's cost for food subsidies. This describes the pre-2016 situation. According to government, since 2016, food is no longer subsidized, although it is estimated that the Food Compensation Fund makes small and periodic spending on food subsidies that are not recorded in chapter 4 of the budget.³

- Energy subsidies were introduced in 1971 and are administered by the NOC under the authority of the Ministry of Oil. Energy products are universally subsidized at rates that exceed 85 percent of the products' market value (Araar, Choueiri, and Verme 2015), with gasoline prices among the lowest in the world (IMF 2013c). At LYD4.98 billion in 2017, the vast majority of subsidies (83 percent) go to energy subsidies, broken down into fuel subsidies (LYD4.2 billion or 70 percent of total subsidies) and electricity subsidies (LYD780 million or 13 percent of total subsidies).⁴ Energy subsidies save households about 26 percent of their overall annual expenditure—and their elimination would significantly impact poverty and inequality (Araar, Choueiri, and Verme 2015). Subsidized products include gasoline, diesel, liquified petroleum gas (LPG), kerosene, and electricity (Araar, Choueiri, and Verme 2015). Energy subsidies are regressive or pro-rich (Araar, Choueiri, and Verme 2015).
- **Existing social protection funds/mechanisms.** There are currently two schemes in existence, although it is unclear if they are operational. These include (i) the Libyan Social and Economic Development Fund (which gets its financing and pays dividends from Libya's Sovereign Wealth Fund; and (ii) the Libya Social Solidarity Fund, held under the Ministry of Social Affairs, which appears to primarily provide categorical cash transfers and in-kind support to identified vulnerable groups. These programs are not tested. That said, the public service acts as a form of social protection mechanism and in the decades prior to the revolution, the government inflated the public sector to provide Libyans with financial support and benefits (OCHA 2019). A significant proportion of the population are also expected to continue to depend on their children in their old age, instead of on social security, with the burden often placed on daughters and other women in the family (OCHA 2019).
- **Pensions for civil servants.** The Libya Social Security Fund (SSF) covers 75 percent of the labor force (reflecting the fact that the public sector is the chief employer in Libya) and pays benefits equivalent to 1.4 percent of GDP. The SSF provides a basic pension and various cash assistance benefits for all categories of workers and finances health services. Under a separate law, the SSF manages the pension scheme for the military. Financially, the SSF is unsustainable and it is likely to have accumulated a substantial implicit pension debt that risks its fiscal sustainability.⁵

³Based on interviews conducted during the mission.

⁴National Accounts. GoL and CBL.

⁵For more information, see the SSF website at <http://ssf.ly/?p=10>.

- **Humanitarian aid (food and cash transfers) from international and local organizations.** Local-level actors—especially municipalities—have sought to fill gaps left by the central public administration, often through collaborative solutions with civil society, the private sector, and community leaders. The two main sources of food assistance are reportedly international and local organizations (REACH 2019). Looking ahead, a third of households have indicated that they would like to receive assistance in cash or by voucher and another 23 percent have said they would like to receive assistance in mixed modality in-kind and cash. Nine percent of households prefer to receive assistance in-kind (REACH 2019).

Structural challenges

The key challenges in relation to social protection are as follows:

- **Inefficient targeting of the populations most in need.** A third (35 percent) of subsidies do not reach their target households, despite food subsidies being relatively progressive (Araar, Choueiri, and Verme 2015). The difference is explained by leaks, including waste from the illegal resale of subsidized items outside the quota system. This would support a move to replace them with cash transfers.
- **Abuse of the system.** Significant leakage and abuse are believed to occur (Araar, Choueiri, and Verme 2015). Individuals need to be members of cooperatives to shop there. There are no centralized membership records or other mechanisms to control double dipping. Authorities estimate that the total number of cooperative members in the country exceeds the population size, which suggests that abuses of the cooperative system are widespread (Araar, Choueiri, and Verme 2015).
- **Role of subsidies in smuggling/cross-border trade.** The economic distortions involved in the fuel subsidy include smuggling across the border, in particular in the country's South, into neighboring countries. The government has estimated that fuel smuggling costs the economy close to US\$750 million annually (Al Bawaba 2018). The illicit fuel trade is lucrative and helps to prop up an informal economy in the country's lagging regions. These subsidized goods act as a safety net for local communities and trading networks in the Sahel by further supporting smuggling networks.
- **Heavy reliance on subsidized commodities.** While essential for macroeconomic and budgetary sustainability, the social impact of a subsidy reform could be devastating for the poorer segments of the population. Subsidy reforms are politically complex and economically costly for the population. Eliminating food subsidies would reduce household expenditures by about 10 percent and double the poverty rate, while saving the equivalent of about 2 percent of the government budget (Araar, Choueiri, and Verme 2015). Eliminating energy subsidies will have a similar effect on household welfare, but a larger effect on poverty, while government savings would be almost 4 percent of the budget (Araar, Choueiri, and Verme 2015).

Impact of the conflict

- **Ongoing deterioration of the economic situation.** Inflation, the devaluation of the Libyan dinar on the black market, and cash shortages have all further reduced the population's purchasing power and worsened vulnerabilities. The increase in the cost of living has meant less purchasing power for ordinary Libyans. The liquidity crisis makes it challenging for citizens to access cash from bank accounts (into which government salaries are deposited), while an average of 36 percent of households in Wadi Ashshati, Ubari, and Sebha have reported that households cannot access cash (REACH 2019).
- **Protracted displacement, disruption to markets, and lower food commodity production.** These have all amplified the challenge of food insecurity and decreased the availability and affordability of fuel, water and sanitation, electricity, and medical supplies. Livelihoods and access to basic social services have been affected by the conflict, exposing the most vulnerable groups to a high risk of inadequate food consumption and forcing people to adopt negative coping strategies.
- **Dwindling agricultural production.** The conflict has impacted agricultural production. Food imports have dwindled due to limited port access and road blockages, both of which have greatly impacted food prices and hindered the most vulnerable households' access to food. The price of many staple food items, including rice and wheat flour, increased by up to 200 percent compared to pre-conflict levels (WFP 2018a).

Main interventions and capacity to respond

The government issued a decree to reform the subsidy system in 2014 but could only partially implement it due to political conflict (World Bank 2018b). A decree was issued, and food subsidies were eliminated. Although there have been plans to lift subsidies since 2012, implementation on energy subsidies has stalled due to lack of unity and political consensus. The authorities are planning to move from price subsidies to cash transfers, supported by a request from the GNC for a report on reform modalities from the Ministry of Economy, Finance, and Planning. This was due by August 2013 (IMF 2013c).

In January 2017, the Committee for Hydrocarbon Subsidies at the Ministry of Planning completed a study on reforming hydrocarbon subsidies (World Bank 2018b). The study showed that total subsidies were about LYD53.7 billion between 2012 and 2015, of which LYD39.4 billion were for hydrocarbons (around 73 percent of total subsidies) (World Bank 2018b). The study recommended the urgent removal of fuel subsidies while implementing a compensatory cash transfer program. Specifically, it recommended gradually reducing subsidies to gasoline, diesel, and cooking gas, while implementing a universal cash compensation transfer of LYD130 per month (World Bank 2018b).

The Cash and Market Working Group for Libya was established in August 2016 and is co-led by UNHCR and Mercy Corps; its goal is to deliver cash assistance across Libya to highly vulnerable families and individuals. Support also comes from the World Food Programme (WFP) to provide food rations to UNHCR, in coordination with the Inter-Sectorial Committee. Humanitarian aid is

often delivered through CSOs working directly with international aid providers, without engaging with local authorities in some instances. Nevertheless, municipalities reported regular coordination and collaboration with CSOs for providing humanitarian assistance, which can represent a base upon which service delivery can be coordinated between these local stakeholders in the future.

Main needs and priorities as formulated in the literature

Period	Needs include	Sources
Short-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct a preliminary assessment of the current system of essential service provision and identify immediate gaps and needs as well the implications of reforms. • Implement social protection measures to protect the most vulnerable groups. • Streamline general subsidies. • Provide immediate assistance to at-risk populations and rapid response in-kind food assistance to those recently displaced as well as to returnees and refugees. • Provide food support to the nondisplaced. • Provide support to small-scale farmers to restore fisheries production. • Ensure the emergency provision of essential agricultural inputs. 	IMF 2013b; Araar, Choueiri, and Verme (WB) 2015.
Medium/long-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support the gradual recovery and strengthening of national safety net systems. • Improve data availability regarding food insecurity and populations most susceptible to becoming insecure should the conflict worsen. 	WFP 2018b; OCHA 2018b, 2019.

Health

This section draws heavily on the 2016 Service Availability and Readiness Assessment of Public Health Facilities carried out by the EU, the Ministry of Health (MoH), and the WHO (EU, MoH, and WHO 2017). Other key sources include the 2018 REACH MSNA (REACH 2019), a 2017 health sector brief prepared by the WHO (WHO 2017), the 2009 PER carried out by the World Bank (World Bank 2009), and the WHO's Global Health Observatory.⁶ Based on the main documents and considering the views expressed by experts interviewed, the team concludes that the data is representative of the situation and allows for a good understanding of Libya's health sector. Data gaps include the lack of disaggregated data by rural and urban areas, the lack of availability on data regarding nutrition, and the absence of a cross-sectoral humanitarian vulnerability matrix. Annex A lists all information and data gaps identified for the sector.

⁶ Data in this section are from the Libya statistics summary in the Global Health Observatory (database), WHO, Geneva (accessed January 15, 2019), <http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.country.country-LBY>.

Status of the health sector and main challenges

Access to and quality of health care

The Libyan health system comprises universal public provision funded through general governmental revenues. Equitable access to primary and secondary care is legislated for all regardless of one's ability to pay. In 2007, the entire population, both in urban and in rural areas, were living near health facilities. Following the conflict, this is no longer the case for all households (World Bank 2009; EU, MoH, and WHO 2017). According to a REACH assessment conducted in November 2018, one-quarter of all households have unmet health needs⁷ as a result of closed or damaged health facilities, lack of funds, and the limited availability of medical staff and supplies (REACH 2019). Currently, health services are provided through a mix of public and private providers, with some traditional medicine also being prescribed (EU, MoH, and WHO 2017).

Overall, the health care delivery system operates on three levels: the first consists of 1,355 (EU, MoH, and WHO 2017) primary health care (PHC) facilities broken into PHC units,⁸ which provide curative and preventive services for 5,000 to 10,000 citizens; PHC centers,⁹ which provide a greater variety of services than PHC units and serve from 10,000 to 26,000 citizens; and polyclinics, which are staffed by specialized physicians and contain laboratories, radiological services, and a pharmacy and serve approximately 50,000 to 60,000 citizens, as well as an additional 204 other facilities such as dental clinics and tuberculosis centers. The second level is composed of 75 general hospitals in rural and urban areas where care is provided to those referred from the first level. The third level comprises 22 tertiary care specialized hospitals and medical centers (EU, MoH, and WHO 2017).

At present, almost all levels of health services are decentralized, except for hospitals and specialized centers. In terms of the private sector, in 2015 Libya had 157 private inpatient facilities with an inpatient capacity of 2,812 beds. The private sector also consists of 503 outpatient clinics, 302 dental clinics, 2,254 pharmacies, and 426 laboratories (EU, MoH, and WHO 2017). Most private facilities are located in Tripoli, Benghazi, Aljara, and Misrata (EU, MoH, and WHO 2017).

⁷See REACH 2019. The list of health needs is defined as the percentage of HHs with an ill family member who did not go to a health facility; the percentage of HHs facing challenges accessing health facilities due to damaged/destroyed health facilities; no available health facilities that can accept new patients; a lack of money to pay for care; a lack of medical staff in general; a lack of medical supplies; the percentage of HHs reporting more than one hour by car to nearest health service provider; the percentage of HHs with a woman who gave birth in the last two years, consulted by an uncertified midwife, nurse, relatives/friends, or no one; the percentage of HHs with a family member diagnosed with a chronic disease, clinical mental disorder, or physical disability with no access to medicines/health care.

⁸The services provided by PHC units include the following: manual health care; neonatal, child, and school health and vaccination; early diagnosis of infectious diseases and implementation of local control measures; health promotion through education; registration and follow-up of chronic diseases; curative services for cases coming to the unit; nutrition awareness; water-quality monitoring and sending samples for testing; and monitoring environmental health at community level.

⁹The services provided by PHC centers include the following: maternal and child health care, curative medical and dental services for walk-in patients and those referred from affiliated PHC units; measures to mitigate and control infectious and endemic diseases; regulation of vaccination services; health promotion through education; nutrition awareness; supervision of school health responsibilities in the area; monitoring environmental health; and health supervision of factories and shops in the area.

In terms of infrastructure, electricity was available in 100 percent of hospitals as of 2016, with 96 percent of facilities reliant on the central supply; clean water was available in 86 percent of hospitals and 83 percent had access to vehicles. The availability of communications equipment was more limited, with 36 percent of hospitals having access to e-mail/Internet (EU, MoH, and WHO 2017).

Key health indicators

Average life expectancy has decreased since the onset of the conflict in 2011. In 2016, life expectancy was at 72 years (EU, MoH, and WHO 2017), compared to 75 years in 2011 (EU, MoH, and WHO 2017). In 2015, both infant mortality rates (IMRs) and under-five mortality rates (U5MRs) were lower in Libya than in most MENA countries, at 11.4 and 13.3 per 1,000 live births, respectively.¹⁰ In 2015, the neonatal mortality rate (NMR) for Libya was 7 per 1,000 live births. By comparison, in 2007, the IMR and U5MR were 18 and 21 per 1,000 live births respectively, and NMR was 10.7 per 1,000 live births (World Bank 2009). Regarding the maternal mortality ratio, in 2015, the ratio was 9 deaths per 100,000 live births. By comparison, in 2007, the maternal mortality ratio was estimated at 27 per 100,000 live births.

Institutional framework

The health care system underwent a decentralization in 2000 when the central body (Secretariat of Health) was dismantled in favor of the district level. In 2003, the Authority of Healthcare Planning was established, and the General Health Inspector was appointed at the central level to supervise the district Secretariats of Health, which had no executive authority. A recentralization in 2006 saw the reestablishment of the Secretariat of Health, which supervises the central institutions and the secretariats of health at the district level.

In the current context, health care remains centralized in the MoH, which was established in 2011. The MoH heads up an extensive central organizational structure and is administratively responsible for all 16 directorates, the departments under each directorate, and the five offices. At the district level, the district health officer (DHO) is responsible for providing comprehensive health care through primary health care centers.

Structural challenges

The health care sector faces the following structural challenges:

- **Fragmentation at all levels.** There is clear fragmentation of efforts from the financial, institutional, and service delivery side. The absence of a clear action plan or strategy means that multiple stakeholders work in a siloed manner, with no evident coordination.
- **Hospital-centric approach.** Hospital staff are used inefficiently for nonemergency consultations as the first point of contact, rather than the PHC system, and patients pay a higher cost in hospitals for these basic services.

¹⁰ Data in this section are from the Libya statistics summary in the Global Health Observatory (database), WHO, Geneva (accessed January 15, 2019), <http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.country.country-LBY>.

- **Gaps in the medical supply chain management.** These include the absence of drug legislation and regulation; unclear roles and responsibilities; outdated licensing, registration, and pricing procedures; poorly regulated procurement and storage of medication; insufficient capacity of the National Center for Disease Control (NCDC) to monitor and control the medical supply chain (WHO 2017).
- **Weak institutional capacity.** This particularly extends to policy development, strategic planning, program management, monitoring, forecasting, and evidence-based decision making.
- **Weak routine surveillance systems.** Surveillance systems for diseases such as polio, tuberculosis, and other infectious diseases are not integrated.¹¹
- **Unregulated operators.** A growing concern is the mushrooming of private sector and unregulated operators (WHO 2017).

Impact of the conflict

The lack of security and supply interruptions have led to the severe shortage of medicines, medical supplies, and vaccines, and left an estimated 1.1 million people without access to life-saving health care services (OCHA 2018a). Limited access to health service providers and conflict-related concerns such as psychological trauma (from which 64 percent of the surveyed population reportedly suffers) and physical injuries (33 percent of surveyed population) impact the population. Health issues are overwhelmingly concentrated in southern Libya, where nearly one half of all households in Wadi Ashshati, Murzuq, Sebha, and Alkufra required assistance (REACH 2019; WHO 2017).

The conflict has also highlighted regional disparities in health care. For one, the bulk of the health care workforce is concentrated in the country's West, where most of the population is also located. In the East, where almost 20 percent of the population is located, a substantial section of the health care infrastructure is damaged. Finally, the South has limited access to health care facilities, medication, and personnel, and therefore damage to facilities has not been as extensive.

Conflict has impacted the health care system in the following ways:

- **Health care services and facilities are inaccessible.** In 2016, 19 percent of health care facilities and hospitals were closed as a factor of maintenance (51 percent of the 308 closed facilities), followed by inaccessibility due to conflict (20 percent), damage (19 percent), and occupation by other parties (11 percent) (EU, MoH, and WHO 2017).
- **There is a severe shortage of medicines, medical supplies, and vaccines.** In 2015, the WHO reported that most of the medical warehouses in the East were destroyed or located in hard-to-access, conflict-affected areas. The essential medicines availability index developed by WHO found that the highest availability of medicines is in hospitals (41 percent),

¹¹ Interview with WHO, January–February 2019.

followed by warehouses (13 percent), and is lowest for PHC facilities (10 percent) (EU, MoH, and WHO 2017).

- **Foreign health care workers have left the country.** The health sector has been unable to replace the foreign health care workers (doctors, nurses) who have departed, mainly due to the conflict. Ongoing insecurity and associated hospital and health facility closures have further restricted access to health care professionals in Sirt and Benghazi districts.¹² Nevertheless, Al Betnan, Al Jabal Al Gharbi, Wadi Al Haya, Murzuq, and Ghat provinces have all achieved health workforce densities of over 100 health workers per 10,000 population (more than four times the WHO target), with Murzuq district having a reported health workforce density that is 15 times higher than the target (EU, MoH, and WHO 2017).

Main interventions and capacity to respond

In 2016, the MoH, with assistance from the WHO, developed a National Plan to reform the health care system; yet it awaits full implementation. With technical assistance from the WHO, the MoH is currently developing a health strategy and contingency plans and developing a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework for the strategy. Also, a 4W (mapping of who does what, where, and when) is produced monthly to track interventions.¹³ The district health information system has been rolled out as a pilot in a few facilities, but it still awaits implementation throughout the country.

In December 2018, the MoH has endorsed the five-year Reproductive, Maternal, Newborn, Child and Adolescent Health (RMNCAH) strategy for Libya (2019–23) supported by UNFPA, UNICEF, and WHO. A technical steering committee is being established to oversee the roll out of the strategy. A multiyear health program (2019–21), funded by the EU, looks at improving specific health programs and elements: blood transfusion services and maternal and child health, nursing and midwifery, mental health, and noncommunicable diseases. This program is implemented by Expertise France, UNFPA, IRC, Handicap International, Première Urgence Internationale, and NEBRAS. The EU has also commissioned IRC to continue the roll out of the Libyan Health System Strengthening program. An Essential Package of Health Services at PHC level was developed in 2018 with support from GIZ and is being tested in six primary health care facilities with Department for International Development (DFID) and WHO support.

A humanitarian health sector coordination group is functioning under the joint leadership of the MoH and WHO with five working groups: mental health and psychological support services (led by IOM and Handicap International), migration health (IOM), tuberculosis (UNHCR), nutrition (UNICEF), and reproductive health (UNFPA).

¹²Core health care professionals include physicians, nonphysician clinicians, clinical officers, registered nurses, and midwives.

¹³Interview with WHO, January–February 2019.

Main needs and priorities as formulated in the literature

Period	Needs Include	Sources
Short-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthen the PHC network. • Increase financing and capacity building. • Adopt a robust and coordinated approach to address urgent health needs and priorities at the national level. • Increase access to financing to make it easier to purchase medicines. • Train national staff to replace foreign health care workers, with a focus on specialists, and ensure continuous presence of health workforce in hospitals • Improve health information systems. 	EU, MoH, and WHO 2017; WHO 2017.
Medium/long-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct regular performance assessments and set up systems to produce comprehensive health system indicators. • Better coordinate and rationalize primary, secondary, and tertiary health care services. • Develop pharmaceutical reimbursement and a pricing strategy based on evidence of quality, clinical, and cost effectiveness. • Improve and implement standard operating procedures or guidelines for health care practices. • Improve health care governance with a special focus on hospitals. • Strengthen leadership and governance of MoH to enhance commitment, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of the RMNCAH strategy nationwide. • Strengthen the health system along the continuum of care to provide lifesaving interventions and preventive measures. • Ensure preparedness and readiness for a timely, organized, and safe RMNCAH emergency response according to the needs. • Strengthen health system capacity to provide quality RMNCAH services. 	EU, MoH, and WHO 2017; MoH et al. 2018.

Education

This section builds on the 2017 sector brief produced by UNICEF as part of the AfDB-led stock-taking exercise (UNICEF 2018a). The key sources include the 2012 Nationwide School Assessment carried out by the Ministry of Education (MoE) and UNICEF (MoE and UNICEF 2012), the 2018 REACH MSNA for Education (REACH 2019), the 2009 PER by the World Bank (2009), and the 2013 UNICEF, MoE, and EU report on teacher development (UNICEF, MoE, and EU 2017). Based on the main documents and considering the views expressed by experts interviewed, the team concludes that there are major gaps in data that hinder a complete understanding of Libya's education sector. Much of the data may have been collected, but it is scattered, fragmented, and discontinuous. Generally, the data lack reliability and comprehensiveness; it is not nationally representative and is outdated. Specific data gaps include information on employability

and skillset of higher education graduates, vocational training enrollment rates, and the absence of standardized assessment for student achievement as well as of quality of education. Also missing is a solid assessment of the impact of conflict on the education sector. Annex A lists all information and data gaps identified for the sector.

Status of the education sector and main challenges

Access to and quality of education

Prior to the conflict in 2011, Libya had one of the highest school enrollment rates in the MENA region. As of 2007, Libya had achieved universal enrollment in primary education, almost universal enrollment in secondary (81 percent), with the rate of enrollment for tertiary education at 38 percent.¹⁴ The adult literacy rate stood at 91 percent countrywide during the same period, with no significant gender disparity (in secondary and tertiary education, girls outnumbered boys by 10 percentage points) (World Bank 2009). This was underpinned by a very high level of spending on education (7 percent of GDP in 2007).¹⁵

Education in Libya is free and compulsory from the primary school level through to the first three years of secondary school. Measures have been introduced to ensure that provision extends to nomadic people and those in hard-to-reach areas; for instance, through mobile classrooms. However, participation for these categories is not compulsory, which has resulted in low rates across the country. The latest available data for participation in preschool education suggests a gross enrollment rate of 9 percent in 2006, against a regional average of 23 percent (UNESCO 2011).

Migrant and refugee children are often denied access to education within the national educational system and rarely attend school alongside Libyan children. This particularly applies to non-Arabic speakers from Sub-Saharan Africa. Some vulnerable groups (such as the Tawergha) are denied access to education because of discrimination. Available data reveals that out of 61,882 school-age migrant and refugee children registered in the country, 52,682 need support to access education services (OCHA 2019).

Because of the ongoing conflict and insecurity, schooling—and therefore teaching and learning—took several years to resume en masse. The future impact of condensing the duration of schooling for the affected cohorts on learning and quality education outcomes needs to be better understood. Although the human, physical, and financial resources devoted to the education sector has been high, there is currently a lack of reliable data and little systematic attention devoted to measuring the sector's performance.

¹⁴ Not including enrollment in the private sector of higher education and students abroad.

¹⁵ World Bank 2009. This is higher than the highest percentage for OECD countries, which is 8.4 percent for Denmark.

Institutional framework

The Libyan education system is subdivided across five levels: (i) preschool education; (ii) basic education (primary and lower secondary education); (iii) intermediary education (upper secondary education); (iv) university education (universities, higher institutes, and technical and vocational centers); and (v) advanced studies (masters and PhDs).

In 2008, prior to the revolution, three ministries shared responsibility for the education sector: the Ministry of General Education; the Ministry of Manpower, Training and Employment;¹⁶ and the Ministry of Higher Education. The education sector has undergone several decentralization and centralization attempts, which has meant that ministries were created and eliminated during the 1990s and 2000s. An attempt to decentralize the education system in the late 1990s gave the overall responsibility for recruiting teachers and staff and constructing schools to municipalities (*baladiya* or *muhafaza*). This resulted in poorly coordinated education policy and inefficient management, notably in terms of uncontrolled hiring of staff. These problems prompted a recentralization in 2006.

The current delivery of education at all levels is managed by the two MoEs. The MoE based in Tripoli only has direct management of and oversight over the country's West, while a competing MoE based in Benghazi oversees the East (World Bank 2009). Jurisdiction over the South remains in flux. Primary, secondary, and higher education (university), as well as preschool education, fall directly under the MoE and are managed by different departments. Technical and vocational education is managed by the National Board of Technical and Vocational Education, which is affiliated with the MoE (UNICEF 2018b). At the local level, each municipality has an education directorate and a head of education that coordinates with the central MoE. In addition, the Municipal Councils (which report directly to the MoLG) also have an elected member to further the educational agenda. This represents a coordination gap. Furthermore, it means that the MoLG plays an indirect role in the sector and is sometimes used as an entry point for interventions at the municipal level.

Structural challenges

The quality of education and fragmented investments are among the biggest structural challenges facing the education sector. Challenges include:

- **Oversupply of teachers.** Recruitment of teachers has exceeded the needs of the sector, as the profession has been used to absorb unemployment. Libya has 200,000 teachers on the payroll, with poor conditions of service and scant professional development opportunities (UNICEF, MoE, and EU 2017). There is also a wide dispersion of student-teacher ratio and student-administrative staff ratio, by region. As of 2012, the student-teacher ratio was one of the lowest in the world at 6:1 (UNICEF, MoE, and EU 2017), with even lower ratios in Zwara (2.7:1), Zawiya (3.1:1), and Aljifara (3.2:1) provinces (MoE and UNICEF 2012). Student-teacher ratios in rural areas are similar to those in urban areas, which indicates that teacher distribution does not take into account the real needs of schools (World Bank 2009).

¹⁶ It is important to note that vocational training did not have its own ministry until 2008; prior to that, it was under the Ministry of Education.

- **Poor external and internal quality assurance arrangements.** This has contributed to inadequate teaching and learning practices.
- **Insufficient early childhood development programming.** Libya has few kindergartens and nurseries for early childhood development and has few requirements for the professional caregivers and teachers in charge of the institutions that do exist. This has resulted in the sector's neglect and underfunding.
- **Fragmented process of school construction.** There is great variation in infrastructure standards in schools per baladiya or muhafaza. Some schools have less than 25 pupils per classroom and others have more than 55. This reflects the absence of a master plan in school construction since the late 1990s, with schools often built without a rational analysis of needs, and with little respect for norms and standards. The proliferation of small schools (7 percent of primary schools have fewer than 5 students) means that while distances and travel times are reduced both in urban and rural regions (World Bank 2009), unit costs go up, both in terms of investment and operation.
- **Suboptimal curriculum development.** There is a mismatch between the school curriculum and the teacher education curriculum, which focuses almost exclusively on subject study. The focus on a specific subject study in a teacher education largely determines the nature of the curriculum provision in the school. There is a tendency also to seek external ideas for a ready-made solution to the curriculum issue. For instance, rather than develop a new curriculum for mathematics and science inside Libya, textbooks were imported from Singapore and introduced with limited contextualization. Teachers' negative reactions to this curriculum may reflect the message this intervention sends to them—that they cannot be trusted to and are incapable of developing the curriculum (UNICEF, MoE, and EU 2017).
- **Focus on traditional teaching methods.** Traditional teaching and learning approaches dominate practices found in Libyan schools. Students are relatively “passive” in learning, and teachers tend to adopt a “transmission” mode in which they transmit knowledge that the students should then learn. Teaching and learning materials are limited, and white/blackboard presentations dominate. There is an absence of standardized measures to assess the quality of education and/or student achievement.

Impact of the conflict

According to data collected in 2016 from the MoE in Libya's East and West, the total number of schools affected by the crisis is 558 (just over 10 percent of all schools to varying levels). Of these, 30 schools have been completely damaged, 477 are partially damaged, and 51 accommodate IDPs, affecting an estimated 279,000 children (UNICEF, MoE, and EU 2017). Most damaged schools are in the East. As per 2018 IOM DTM data, the impact of conflict and displacements continue to negatively affect education facilities: 202 schools were reported to be partially damaged, 20 schools were used as shelters for IDPs, and 47 schools have been fully destroyed (IOM 2019).

Conflict has also impacted enrollment rates. According to the 2016 UNFPA household survey, school enrollment for students who are 6–14 years old rebounded to 96.7 percent (96.3 percent for boys and 97.1 percent for girls) due to appropriate catch-up strategies (UNICEF 2018a). However, the November 2018 REACH MSNA shows a decrease in enrollment rates, to 86.8 percent for school-age children. The region with the highest percentage of children not enrolled in school is Azzawya (west coastal region), where 40 percent of children do not attend school. Other regions located in the South, such as Ubari and Murzuq, also have a significant percentage of children not enrolled in school (26.6 percent and 24.1 percent, respectively) (REACH 2019).

These are the major challenges stemming from the conflict:

- **Existing political divisions.** Libya has more than one MoE, but only one is recognized by the UN. Divisions between the two MoEs have impeded the establishment of one unified Education Management Information System (EMIS). Consequently, nationally representative sector data is missing.
- **Limited capacity of national partners and heavy red tape burden.** Denial of access for many INGOs in conflict-affected areas and high turnover of decision makers are major challenges for timely delivery of education services. INGOs registered in Tripoli also have to register in Benghazi in order to continue to operate. A new authority was introduced in 2018 with branches in the East and the West of the country to oversee CSOs and INGOs. It reported directly to the Prime Minister's Council. This authority was intended to have a database of all approved CSOs; however, it has added new layers of bureaucracy as it is charged with reviewing and approving registrations and is tasked with providing technical oversight to CSOs.
- **Cash liquidity issues.** This has caused an increase in prices of basic household items, compromising the ability of the most vulnerable population such as IDPs and returnees to access to basic items, including education supplies.

Main interventions and capacity to respond

Libya has two main coordination mechanisms for education:

- At the humanitarian level, there is the Education Sector Working Group (ESWG), which is co-led by UNICEF and the NRC. Its primary objective is to provide a coherent and coordinated education plan that focuses on emergency and strategic linkages to resilience building and recovery.
- At the development level, there is the Basic and Social Services Working Group, of which education is a subgroup. Since its establishment in 2015 the group has been chaired by the MoE and cochaired by UNICEF. Key stakeholders convene to plan, coordinate, and ensure that interventions are aligned with the MoE's strategy.

However, the MoE has limited capacity to respond due to the unavailability of reliable, nationally representative data for planning and policy. A new EMIS was created and piloted by

UNICEF in 2016 and 2017, but it only had a 40 percent data collection rate, and mainly in the West. A phase 2 EMIS will be launched shortly and will aim to expand coverage. In addition, the lack of coordination between MoE departments and other bodies fails to ensure a coherent approach to sector governance, service delivery, and development.

Main needs and priorities as formulated in the literature

Period	Needs include	Sources
Short-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Remove unexploded ordnance from schools. • Rehabilitate or build new schools, focusing first on those that have sustained heavy damage or are operating out of a temporary location. • Recruit trained or specialized staff, particularly medical and psychological support staff. • Deliver new educational and recreational materials to schools lacking such provisions. • Reintegrate internally displaced children into the school system. 	MoE and UNICEF 2012.
Medium/long-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improve the school environment, notably by adopting quality criteria and standards for the design and construction of schools; increase access to safe drinking water; improve sanitation facilities; and maintain and replace furniture and equipment. • Improve the quality of education, notably by reviewing the educational system and developing a broad, relevant, and inclusive curriculum supported by a comprehensive student assessment system and practices. • Empower teachers by introducing performance-based incentives and developing pre- and in-service teacher training programs. • Promote early childhood development. • Enhance the quality of data around the education sector. 	UNICEF, MoE, and EU 2017.

Chapter 7

Cross-Cutting Issues

Human rights

Key sources for this section include recent reports produced by UNSMIL (2018b), UNHCR (2018), Amnesty International (2018a, 2018b), and HRW (2018). Based on the main documents and considering the views expressed by experts interviewed, the team concludes that there is quality information available on the state of current abuses committed by militias and armed groups. Data gaps include a lack of quantitative data broken down by type of human rights violation and population category. Annex A lists all information and data gaps identified for the sector.¹

Status of human rights and main challenges

Institutional framework

Although Libya has ratified different UN treaty bodies—for example, the Committee against Torture and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)—it has not signed all the optional protocols. Libya has also not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention (HRW 2006a), and only individuals originating from seven refugee-producing countries can register with UNHCR as persons of concern. UNHCR determines refugees' status because there is no national asylum system in place for doing so. Also, Law no. 6 of 1987 and Law no. 19 of 2010 criminalize foreigners' irregular stay (Amnesty International 2018b).

Although Libya's 2011 Constitutional Declaration guarantees equality for all, other domestic laws contain problematic elements. The 2011 Constitutional Declaration stipulates equal rights and equality for all before the law, as well as equal opportunities and political and civic rights, without discrimination based on language, religion, sect, wealth, sex, descent, political view, social status, or regional, family, or tribal affiliation (U.K. Home Office 2016). It also guarantees freedom of movement, and a 2012 law allows freedom of assembly (Freedom House 2018). Yet the penal code criminalizes certain activities linked to the peaceful exercise of freedom of expression and association. Libya's penal code also mentions the death penalty in more than 30 articles, including for acts of speech and association (HRW 2018).

¹Information pertaining to the judicial system and women's rights can be found in the respective sector notes of this report.

Structural challenges

- **Death penalty.** While the death penalty was legal under Gaddafi's regime, an unknown number of people have been sentenced to death since 2010 (HRW 2018).
- **Discrimination against specific minority groups.** Despite the claims made in the 2011 Constitutional Declaration, ethnic minorities in Libya have long faced rights restrictions, societal discrimination, and violence. For instance, speaking Amazigh in public and teaching Amazigh's culture were forbidden (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018), and Berber activists were tortured and imprisoned by the regime (Graff 2011; MA 2015). Furthermore, in 2010, OHCHR published a report disclosing Libya's ethnic cleansing of the Tebu (Kohl 2014). Currently, a number of Tebu and Tuareg communities in the South are effectively stateless. They do not have national identity numbers, which limits their access to employment and social services.² According to some estimates, around 14,000 Tuareg do not hold citizenship or official papers.
- **Lack of protection of foreigners.** The criminalization of the entry and stay of irregular migrants puts them at acute risk of being detained for irregular stay and does not protect them against abuses at the workplace or in everyday life (also see the sector note in chapter 2 on migration) (REACH 2017b).
- **Discrimination against women.** Women and girls are arbitrarily detained for "moral crimes" such as engaging in consensual sexual relations outside of marriage (also see the sector note in chapter 7 on gender).

Impact of the conflict

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has stated that multiple actors in Libya, including state institutions, are committing serious violations that, in many cases, amount to war crimes (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018).

- **Limited freedom of movement.** Government and militia checkpoints across the country restrict travel possibilities and affect Libyans' access to health care, education, and employment.
- **Limited religious freedom.** Since 2011, religious minorities such as Sufis, Ibadis, and Christians have suffered from attacks committed by different militias and ISIS fighters. Several religious sites were destroyed, such as the Zawiyat Sheikha Radiya and Sidi Abu Gharara, two historic Sufi mosques in Tripoli (HRW 2019a).
- **Limited freedom of expression and of association.** Human rights advocates, journalists, and media professionals are subject to harassment, attack, and forced disappearance by armed groups and militias that are aligned with both governments.

²Data in this section are from "Libya: Tuareg" in the World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples (database), Minority Rights Group International, London, <https://minorityrights.org/minorities/tuareg-3/>.

- **Harassment and discrimination against minority groups.** Since 2011, discrimination against and harassment of tribes and ethnic minorities have increased, especially against those accused of siding with Gaddafi. For example, the Tawergha were forcibly displaced in 2011 and are currently unable to return due to resistance from neighboring communities, local parties, and military groups (GPC 2018; UNHCR 2013).
- **Serious human rights violations against migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers.** These groups are subject to widespread and systematic human rights violations at the hands of the Libyan Coast Guard, smugglers and traffickers, and armed groups, both inside detention centers and along their route. Conditions in detention centers are horrific and migrants are victims of widespread abuse (Amnesty International 2018a). Migrants on the move in Libya also encounter extortions and forced labor (for more information on these issues see chapter 2) (Amnesty International 2018a; UNHCR 2018).
- **Unlawful killings and detention, attacks on civilians, tortures and forced disappearances.** Since the 2011 uprising and the renewed conflict in 2014, armed groups and militias attacked civilians in densely populated areas (Amnesty International 2018a). In addition, militias linked with different government authorities in both the East and the West, as well as criminal gangs, have kidnapped or forcibly disappeared an undetermined number of people (including children) (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018) for ransom, political gain, and extortion with impunity (Amnesty International 2018a).

Main interventions and capacity to respond

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has the mandate to investigate crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide that have been committed in Libya since January 15, 2011.

As such, the ICC issued arrest warrants for Muammar Gaddafi and his inner circle, such as his son, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, and Abdullah Al-Senussi, director of the military intelligence in Libya (CICC, n.d.) and as of November 2017, the latter had been unable to extradite any suspects (UNSMIL 2018b).

Main needs and priorities as formulated in the literature

Period	Needs include	Sources
Short/medium/long-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure that those detained are protected from torture and ill treatment; decriminalize irregular stay; repeal and review all laws that limit the freedom of expression, association and assembly; and establish a moratorium on executions (Amnesty International 2015) • Investigate allegations of torture, rape, and sexual violence, and any other crimes (Amnesty International 2018b) • The ICC prosecutor should consider whether possible war crimes and crimes against humanity have been committed against the Tawergha community (HRW 2019b; Libyan Express 2019) 	HRW 2019b; Amnesty International 2015, 2018b.

Gender

This section is based on several key and recent documents, such as the UNDP/UN Women/UNFPA/ESCWA “Libya—Gender Justice and the Law” case study (UNDP et al. 2018), recent UN Women research on the economic impact of conflict on women (UN Women and Altai Consulting 2019), the 2013 “Libya Status of Women Survey” by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) (Abdul-Latif 2013), and an HRW report on women’s rights (HRW 2013). Based on the main documents and considering the views expressed by experts interviewed, the team concludes that there is relatively up-to-date information on the legal framework regarding women’s rights. Main data gaps include a lack of detailed statistics disaggregated by gender and a lack of analysis of the demand-side constraints preventing women from accessing services and starting economic activities. Annex A lists all information and data gaps identified for the sector.

Women’s social, economic, and political status and main challenges

Prior to the revolution, Freedom House described Libyan society as having “extremely conservative patriarchal traditions and tribal culture, which continue to foster gender discrimination” (U.K. Home Office 2018), and in 2011, the UN Human Rights Council reported “entrenched discriminatory norms” (U.K. Home Office 2018) against women within Libyan culture.

Consequently, women’s participation in the political and economic spheres has remained limited. In 2018, the female labor force accounted for only 24.55 percent of the total labor force.³ In 2013, the IFES survey (Abdul-Latif 2013) disclosed that more women were economically active in urban (44 percent) than rural areas (32 percent) and more women worked for pay in the East (45 percent) and the West (43 percent) than in the central region and the South (30 percent). A recent UN Women/Altai survey shows that women tend to be more employed in the public sector (24 percent more likely than surveyed men), as it allows for more flexibility to carry out familial responsibilities. Employed women mainly work in the education (40 percent of employed women) and health sectors (15 percent), due to stereotypes regarding women’s role in society (UN Women and Altai Consulting 2019). As for wages, the gap between men and women was significant, with 57 percent of men with a university degree or higher earning LYD701 or more against 38 percent of women with the same qualifications (IFES 2013). Access to land ownership is allowed, but limited; only 12 percent of women owned land in 2013.⁴

The 2013 IFES survey reported discrepancies in access to primary education between men and women, with women almost five times more likely to have had no formal education or incomplete primary education (14 percent) than their male counterparts (3 percent) (Abdul-Latif 2013).

³ Data for the female labor force are from the DataBank (database), World Bank, Washington, DC, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sl.tlf.totl.fe.zs>.

⁴ For more information, see the Spring Forward for Women Programme (database), UN Women, New York, <https://spring-forward.unwomen.org/en/countries/libya>.

However, gender parity was reached in higher education (32 percent of women had a university education or higher, compared with 33 percent of men).

Women’s political participation has been limited, although women display some interest in politics, especially in the East. Between 1969 and 2006, only three ministers were women (El-Gamaty 2018). After the revolution, women have occupied just 16.5 percent of GNC seats (UNDP 2017a). However, the 2013 IFES survey revealed that over 71 percent of women interviewed reported being interested in matters of politics and government, and 66 percent voted in the 2012 general elections (Abdul-Latif 2013). Additionally, although only 20 percent of surveyed women were currently engaged in civic or political activities (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018), 46 percent of women in the East reported taking part in activities to express their views (Abdul-Latif 2013).

Institutional framework

A set of international and national laws protect women’s rights. Libya ratified the CEDAW in 1989, with reservations made for articles 2 and 16 that relate to inheritance, marriage, divorce, and child custody. Libya ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention in 2004, and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (UN Women 2015). The Interim Libyan Constitution stipulates that all Libyans are equal before the law. Also, most of the 2010 labor relations law promotes gender equality (for example, the right to equal pay for the same work). Furthermore, article 11 of the LPA states that the GNA should create a Women Support and Empowerment Unit under the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, thereby giving visibility to women’s rights (UNDP et al. 2018).

Yet several domestic legal provisions—specifically criminal and personal status laws—are either ambiguous or detrimental to women’s protection and gender equality. The most harmful laws are the following:⁵

- **Nationality law.** Women do not have the same rights as men regarding passing nationality to their child or to a foreign spouse.
- **Criminal laws.** Libya does not have domestic violence legislation and does not criminalize marital rape. The law allows for a reduced imprisonment for honor crimes if the woman had engaged in adultery and exonerates a rapist if he marries his victim.
- **Family code/personal status.** Sharia rules of inheritance apply, with daughters inheriting half the share that sons receive; meanwhile, the family law permits polygamy.
- **Labor laws.** The 2010 labor relations law forbids women from occupying jobs that are “unfamiliar to their nature as women” (UNDP et al. 2018).

⁵The following paragraph is based on UNDP et al. 2018.

Structural challenges

- **Societal and cultural norms on gender roles.** They determine and limit women's participation and empowerment in the social, economic, and political spheres. Even when women and men have equal rights, women face strong societal barriers. For instance, it is socially unacceptable for an unmarried or divorced woman to live on her own. Women often face pressure from their family to avoid working in jobs that require them to mix with men, which limits their employment opportunities (UN Women 2015). Women themselves seem to have internalized their gender roles and dependence on a male guardianship, as 64 percent of women interviewed for a 2017 USAID/IFES survey strongly disagreed with the following statement: "Women should be free to leave their house without permission" (USAID and IFES 2017).
- **SGBV and sexual harassment.** These seem to be relatively accepted by society (U.K. Home Office 2018). Limited services are available for survivors of sexual violence across Libya. Also, the existence of state-run social rehabilitation facilities for women and female youth suspected of transgressing moral codes tend to punish victims of sexual violence and constitutes a serious violation of their human rights. HRW reported that many of these women and female youth are in fact detained against their will, and no mechanism exists through which to challenge their detention (HRW 2006b; 2006 UNDP et al. 2018). In the 2017 USAID/IFES survey, 54 percent of men answered that violence against women was always or sometimes justified if the woman went out without telling her husband (USAID and IFES 2017). Finally, data suggests that a low percentage of women reported visiting a gynecologist in 2013. This suggests that there is a lack of awareness and even stigma surrounding women's reproductive health, especially for unmarried women (Abdul-Latif 2013).

Impact of the conflict

The impacts of the conflict on women's lives and rights are multiple:

- **Armed groups threaten women's current presence in politics and civil society.** Women played a significant role in the overthrow of Gaddafi and in the initial steps of the political transition (HRW 2013), which allowed them to assert their presence in the new political sphere. However, since 2014, militias and armed groups have repeatedly targeted women activists, bloggers, and journalists using physical assault, abduction, sexual violence, slurs, and intimidation tactics (Amnesty International 2018c), as a response to their criticisms of corruption and militias' predatory activities. Furthermore, the spread of religious extremist groups has resulted in the promoting of very conservative ideas regarding women's role and participation in society (Amnesty International 2018c; El-Gamaty 2018).
- **Increased threats and instances of SGBV.** With the breakdown of the rule of law, many abuses have been committed on all sides. The inability of Libyan authorities to conduct investigations and prosecute wrongdoers has fostered a culture of impunity, which has fueled SGBV against women (U.K. Home Office 2018; UNDP et al. 2018).
- **Limited freedom of movement.** In eastern Libya, Decree no. 6 of 2017 restricted women under the age of 60 from traveling abroad without a legal male guardian. Following calls from

civil society for its removal, the decree was replaced by Decree no. 7, which stipulated that no Libyan male or female between the age of 18 and 45 can travel without security approval. However, no procedure specified what criteria would be used to grant or deny the security check (Amnesty International 2018a).

- **Negative impact on women's economic status.** While there is a lack of documentation on this issue, according to the BTI, Libya's poor economic situation is expected to have disproportionately affected already economically marginalized groups such as youth and women (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018).

Main interventions and capacity to respond

In the HoR elections, 15 percent of total seats were reserved for women, 10 percent in the Constitution Drafting Assembly, and a quota ensures that at least one of the municipal council members should be a woman (UNDP 2017a). Also, Decree no. 119 recognizes victims of conflict-related sexual violence as war victims and provides victims' families with compensation as well as psychosocial and rehabilitation services. However, the decree remains unexecuted (PILPG 2018).

There are local organizations active on women's empowerment and protection, such as the Libyan Women Forum, the Libyan Women's Platform for Peace, and the Citizenship Forum for Democracy and Human Development (PILPG 2018). In 2013–14, 12 percent of CSOs surveyed by UNDP identified themselves as working on issues that pertain to women. However, when looking at these CSOs' area of work, only 28 percent said they engage in activities that foster women's empowerment and gender equality (UNICEF and UNDP 2015). Furthermore, the number of CSOs still active on women's rights is unclear, especially since militias are threatening civil society organizations.

Government capacities to address SGBV are limited. The MoH does not have specific policies, structures, institutional capacity, and resources to address SGBV, and the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) does not have a strategy or an action plan for prevention and response to SGBV in the social sector. The MoH and public health facilities do not have records on SGBV-related incidents nor a system to collect SGBV information. This is reflected in very limited service delivery: the health sector provides only clinical services for rape survivors, while necessary drugs, medical equipment and tests, and emergency contraceptives are extremely limited; most police and justice SGBV essential services are lacking, including referrals for shelters and legal aid, and economic enablement and livelihood opportunities for survivors are scant.

International organizations active in the sector include UNDP, UN Women, UNFPA, and UNSMIL, which works on women's electoral and political representation. The humanitarian protection working group contains a sub-working group on SGBV cochaired by UNFPA. Taboos surrounding the recognition of SGBV limit assistance in this area. Also, SGBV services are largely dependent on humanitarian funds that are extremely limited, thereby diminishing the capacity and scope of work of SGBV service providers. Sheltering services are currently unavailable, and humanitarian social services are not available in 10 geographical areas.

Main needs and priorities as formulated in the literature

Period	Needs include	Sources
Short-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collect more gender disaggregated data and conduct a nationally representative poverty assessment through the Bureau of Statistics (UN Women and Altai Consulting 2019) • Remove the reservations made to CEDAW and amend the penal code regarding violence against women (HRW 2013) • Formulate a comprehensive SGBV working strategy and a costed plan for gradual establishment of specialized SGBV services. • Undertake gradual enhancements and expansion of current clinical management of rape survivors (CMR) services and resources as a priority to roll out the CMR protocol, reinforce CMR service delivery, psychological support, and forensic medicine in health facilities at national level. • Assess status of police SGBV services and explore feasibility of implementing a women and children protection unit for multisectoral SGBV services. 	<p>UN Women and Altai Consulting 2019; HRW 2013; UNDP et al. 2018.</p> <p>UNFPA 2018b.</p>
Medium/long-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Build the capacity of female candidates (HRW 2013) • Fight stereotypes about women's role in society through an education campaign; train members of the judiciary and police to better deal with cases of sexual violence; and promote women's self-employment, including improved access to credit and entrepreneurial training (UN Women and Altai Consulting 2019). • Develop a national strategy for combating all forms of SGBV in Libya. • Reinforce capacities on SGBV response. • Reinforce MoSA capacity and role as the lead ministry of the SGBV sub-sector and enhance NGOs capacity to support the ministry's efforts. • Roll out innovative SGBV prevention approaches geared at behavior change. • Reoperationalize shelters and develop a strategy and guidelines for safe sheltering services for protection of victims/survivors of SGBV and at-risk groups without discrimination. • Revise policy and services of Social Rehabilitation Centers in line with SGBV guiding principles and human rights, coupled with necessary assessment of staff capacity and readiness to provide services. • Reinforce economic enablement and livelihood skills programs for victims/survivors. 	<p>UN Women and Altai Consulting 2019; HRW 2013; UNDP et al. 2018; UNFPA 2018b.</p>

Youth

This section is mostly based on the UNFPA 2018 report describing opportunities and challenges for youth (UNFPA 2018a). Other sources include the 2018 BTI and the IFES/USAID “Public Opinion in Libya 2017” survey. Based on the main documents and considering the views expressed by experts interviewed, the team concludes that the UNFPA desk review assessment provides qualitative information on young people’s political and economic status in Libya. Main

data gaps include a lack of detailed statistics disaggregated by age and relatively little data on radicalization. Annex A lists all information and data gaps identified for the sector.

Status of youth and main challenges

There is no agreed upon, officially sanctioned age range for youth in Libya. The age of legal majority and voting is 18 (Youth Policy 2014). One-third of the total current population is between 15 and 34 (UNFPA 2018a). Key facts and trends include the following:

- **Educational status.** The illiteracy rate dropped from 14.6 percent in 2004 and 9.7 percent in 2013 to 1.4 percent in 2016 among young people between 15 and 29 (UNFPA 2018a).
- **Health status.** Available data shows that despite recent events, young people's psychological and basic health conditions do not widely differ from pre-conflict conditions (UNFPA 2018a). However, some regions, such as Janzour, have very high rates of depression (14.3 percent for youth between 15 and 34, compared to a national average of 1.8 percent; this rises to 25.6 percent for young men between 25 and 34), pointing to regional differences (UNFPA 2018a).
- **Political and civic participation.** Youths' participation in political activities, such as voting, running for office, registering with a political party, campaign for elections, and expressing opinions, remain low. Only 28 percent of people between 18 and 29 registered to vote in the 2014 legislative elections (compared to 42 percent at the national level) (UNFPA 2018a). In 2017, 51 percent of respondents between 18 and 29 years of age were registered as voters, against 70 percent or more for those ages 40 and older (USAID and IFES 2017, 1). Furthermore, there are few organizations or youth organizations that deal with youth issues—these composed just 3.2 percent of the total number of organizations registered with the Civil Society Commission in 2016 (UNFPA 2018a). Despite these low participation rates, in 2015, 54 percent of the youth interviewed (ages 15–29) expressed their interest in politics (UNFPA 2018a). Finally, it seems like young people are also more likely to participate in informal political processes (for example, participate in lobbying activities, protests, or campaign activities) than in formal organizations (UNFPA 2018a).
- **Economic participation.** Although Libyan youth account for half of the active population, the available data suggest high rates of unemployment or underemployment among this group. According to the General Information Authority, youth employment decreased from 72.3 percent in 2012 to 48.6 percent in 2015 (UNFPA 2018a). This figure is almost twice as high as the national average. Unemployment rates are especially significant among graduates (UNFPA 2018a).
- **Female youth are especially economically and politically marginalized.** About 11 percent of male youth participated in the 2012 parliament elections compared to 2.2 percent of female youth (UNFPA 2018a). Furthermore, unemployment is widespread among girls (67.9 percent) compared to 40.9 percent of males ages 15–24, and respectively 32.8 percent compared to 23.8 percent for the 25–34 age group (UNFPA 2018a).

Institutional framework

Libya's draft Constitution calls for young people's empowerment. Article 33 stipulates, "The State shall prepare the appropriate environment to develop adolescents and youth, provide ways to increase their capacities, and support their effectiveness in national life. The State shall open up opportunities for them to work, participate in development, and benefit from various sciences and human cultures as well as enable them to participate in political, social, and economic life with a spirit of citizenship and responsibility" (UNFPA 2018a).

The Ministry of Youth and Sports is responsible for youth affairs. In 2012, it was allocated LYD138 million (US\$110 million). It is unclear what proportion of the total budget was spent on youth affairs, and little information is available on the ministry's activities and influence (Youth Policy 2014).

Structural challenges

- **Lack of democratic institutions.** This did not help promote values of freedom and participation in politics among youth (UNFPA 2018a).
- **Mismatch between young people's skills and firms' expectations.** This contributes to youth unemployment (see sector note in chapter 4 on employment).

Impacts of the conflict

- **Reduced confidence in political institutions.** Libyans express having lower confidence in their political institutions, and disappointment is higher among the youth, whose aspirations after the 2011 revolution were unmet (UNFPA 2018a).
- **Negative impact on labor market.** The deteriorated economic situation has negatively impacted the labor market, especially for already marginalized groups such as women and youth (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018).
- **Insecurity.** Based on young people's testimonies, insecurity restricts youth activities, which in turn leads to frustration, and impacts their psychological health (UNFPA 2018a).
- **Radicalization.** Many young Libyans may have joined radical groups, although no precise information on youth radicalization is publicly available. The dashed hopes of the Arab Spring, the difficult economic environment, along with jihadists' speeches against corruption and the abuses of the judiciary and police have lured disenfranchised youth toward extremist groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda in Syria, Iraq, and Libya (Wehrey 2017). In the National Consultation on Youth, Peace, and Security in 2017, Libyan participants mentioned that extremist groups use the Internet and social media to attract young people to their cause (UNFPA 2018a).

Main interventions and capacities to respond

The Libyan Youth Forum is a coalition between the Libyan Youth Movement, Libya Hurra Live Stream, and the Libyan Link. The Libyan Youth Forum coordinates the efforts of youth groups and makes recommendations about youth (Youth Policy 2014). It is unclear whether it is still active. UNFPA, in collaboration with the UN system, organized the National Consultation on Youth, Peace, and Security in 2017 as well as 45 focus group discussions with 329 young people from seven cities across Libya,⁶ to discuss the challenges they face and ways to resolve them (UNFPA 2018a).

Main needs and priorities as formulated in the literature

Period	Needs include	Sources
Short-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Measures that target the most vulnerable youth and graduates. • Provide security in all youth spaces (schools, youth clubs, cultural centers). 	UNFPA 2018a.
Medium/long-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promote youths' participation in public and political affairs. • Structurally reform the economic, educational, and reskilling/upskilling system as a whole. 	UNFPA 2018a.

Environment

Key documents used for this section include the European Environment Agency (EEA) 2015 Libya Country Report (Nait 2015, 16), a 2013 report by the Environment General Authority, Tripoli, describing the need to transition to environmental sustainability (Goodland 2013), and various technical report and project documents from USAID and FAO. Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions data come from international databases (Muntean et al. 2018). Based on the main documents and considering the views expressed by experts interviewed, the team concludes that there is enough information to get a general overview of challenges and needs, but that detailed and updated data on water, air, and soil pollution, land degradation, and disasters is missing. Annex A lists all information and data gaps identified for the sector.

Status of the environment and main challenges

Libya's surface area is about 1.757 million sq. km. The country has around 5.3 million inhabitants, 85 percent of whom live on the coast, where the weather is influenced by the Mediterranean Sea and there is about 400 mm of annual precipitation. The Sahara Desert accounts for around 90 percent of the territory (Nait 2015).

⁶ Tripoli, Jalu, Zwara, Sebha, Misrata, Ghiryan, and Benghazi.

Water and soil pollution

A recent UNICEF study showed that water in schools was contaminated. Out of the surveyed schools, 10 percent had E. coli bacteria present (UNICEF 2017a, 33). Moreover, it was reported that salinity levels in water increased from 150 parts per million (ppm) to over 5,000 ppm from 1950 to 1990 (FAO 2016).

The uncontrolled mining of groundwater for agricultural purposes has resulted in seawater intrusion (Park, White, and Bridges 2017). Consequently, irrigation with saline groundwater led to soil salination in locations such as the Jefara plains. Soil salination resulted in increasing irrigation needs and decreasing crop returns (FAO 2016). Finally, the discharge of sewage water in Libya's coastal waters has led to an increase in phosphorus and nitrogen in the ecosystem, although eutrophication is not yet widespread (Hamouda 2018).

Greenhouse gas emissions and climate change

Prior to the revolution, Libya's GHG emissions grew at an average of 2.4 percent per year over a 20-year period. Pre-2011, the bulk of emissions originated from crude oil and natural gas production (81.9 percent) (USAID 2017). Since the revolution, no information has been available on GHG emissions, but some exists on CO₂ emissions. Libya's CO₂ emissions are high and have not significantly decreased since the revolution. In 2010, Libya's total fossil CO₂ emissions were 61.58 Mt against 57.58 Mt in 2017, making it the 54th highest CO₂ emitter in 2017 (out of 208 countries assessed by EDGAR). Libya's emissions per capita were 9.98 Mt in 2010 against 9.03 Mt in 2017, which made it the 28th highest CO₂ emitter per capita in 2017 (out of 208 countries) (Muntean et al. 2018).

Climate change impacts have not been systematically assessed in Libya and expected trends are based on projections. In the upcoming decades, rainfall could plummet while temperatures increase, which could make food production more difficult. Also, a substantial rise in the Mediterranean Sea could lead to flooding (Nait 2015, 16).

Land degradation and desertification

Libya suffers from significant land degradation and desertification. Only 1 percent of its land is arable, and 95 percent is desert (USAID 2013). Land degradation and desertification are due to urbanization, salinization, climate change, and the overexploitation of water resources and natural vegetation (USAID 2013).

Natural disasters

Very little information is available on this topic. Based on INFORM, the European Commission IASC database (USAID 2013), Libya's top three natural hazards in 2018 were tsunamis (7.3/10), earthquakes, (5.4/10) and droughts (5.0/10) (IACS 2019). Although the physical exposure to flood was only rated 2.6, flooding was reported as recurrent in some areas, such as in Benghazi (ACTED 2018). The lack of coping capacity was reported as a high risk factor, with an institutional score of 8.6/10. This reflects the government's limited ability to effectively deal with disaster, while no information was available on disaster risk reduction programs (IACS 2019).

Institutional framework

Libya is signatory to several environmental conventions such as the **Barcelona Convention, the protocol for the protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution from Land-Based Sources and Activities, or the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Nait 2015)**. Law no. 15 of 2003 constitutes the main piece of legislation in the field and provides for the establishment of a general policy as well as plans to protect the environment (Nait 2019).

Several institutions are in charge of monitoring and implementing environmentally sound policies:

- **The Environment General Authority (EGA)** is a semiautonomous body that reports directly to the office of the Prime Minister. At the national level, this advisory body is in charge of formulating a comprehensive environmental policy and integrated planning. At the regional level, seven branches are responsible for implementing the national environmental policy. The EGA is also in charge of studies and awareness campaigns on the protection and conservation of natural resources, and it grants authorizations to industries whose activities could possibly have detrimental effects on the environment (Nait 2015).
- **The National Centre of Statistics and Documentation** has recently started to collect and publish data on the environment and is affiliated with the Ministry of Planning (Nait 2015).
- **The MoLG** is responsible for drinking water quality, wastewater treatment and its reuse in agriculture, and for solid waste collection (Nait 2015).
- **At the municipal level, environmental protection units** are in charge of adequately treating and reusing wastewater, disposing of solid waste and recycling it, and other related issues (also see the sector notes in chapter 5 on energy and water) (Nait 2015).
- **The Ministry of Agriculture, Animal, and Marine Wealth** oversees agricultural activities and land use. Land containing oil reserves falls under the purview of the Ministry of Oil. Therefore, there is no sole ministry in charge of land management.
- **Different institutions work and produce data on marine protection**, such as the Marine Biology Research Center, the Ports and Maritime Transport Authority, and the General Authority for Marine Wealth (Nait 2019).

Structural challenges

The main hurdles to successfully enforcing and controlling environmental legislation include the following:

- **A dearth of detailed and up-to-date information on environmental challenges.** This is linked to poor interinstitutional coordination and cooperation. For instance, many institutions work on marine protection, but their lack of cooperation results in fragmented data that is not publicly available (Nait 2019).

- **Lack of any knowledge management system or technology transfer strategy (Nait 2015).**
- **Human and financial resources are lacking.**
- **Poor environmental awareness and environmental behavior (Nait 2019).** Despite Gaddafi's efforts to combat desertification, the government did not set up any national strategy or incentives for environmentally sound consumption (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018).
- **Lack of incentives framework.** Since there is no pollution monitoring system in place, the fines levied on polluters do not reflect an industry's emission levels and thus do not serve as a deterrent (Nait 2015).

Impact of the conflict

Water, air, and soil pollution. Militias have targeted oil and water infrastructure since 2011 (ICG 2018). The extent of oil spills due to the conflict is unknown. Considering that oil represents a central component of the conflict's dynamics, spills are likely to be quite high (ICG 2018). Furthermore, cases of illegal water drilling have been reported, such as in Tripoli in 2017, which exhausts underground water resources. The extent to which individuals drill water illegally is unknown (Lewis 2017). Libya's waste management system has worsened since the start of the conflict (CoR ARLEM 2017), and the important volumes of conflict waste might have added to the environmental pressure (Ali and Ezeah 2017). According to WHO, the degradation of the waste management system could pose health risks to the population, such as that of infection and injury (WHO 2015).

Natural disasters. It is likely that the lack of maintenance and rehabilitation of the water treatment network and facilities since the start of the conflict will increase the impacts of floods. For instance, in 2018, the floods in Benghazi caused significant damage, which were mainly due to the poor drainage system and the city's unmaintained network (ACTED 2018).

Main interventions and capacity to respond

The National Strategy for Integrated Water Resources Management (2000–25) is the main document on water quality deterioration. Although the strategy led to a National Program for Water Supply and Sanitation (which aimed to provide all Libyans with safe access to water and sanitation), the program is not yet operational (USAID 2013).

As of March 2015, the EGA had started formulating a national strategy for solid and hazardous waste management and capacity-building programs for awareness raising and policy development. The EGA had also worked on reinforcing environmental monitoring systems (for example, by creating laboratories) and developing a national system of public-private partnerships to mobilize resources for environmental management (Nait 2015). The EGA has also set up a database for information about the discharge of industrial and municipal wastewater into the sea (Nait 2019).

International actors such as the EU are also active in environment preservation. The ENI SEIS II South program aims to reduce marine pollution in the Mediterranean through the establishment of a Shared Environmental Information System (SEIS).

Main needs and priorities as formulated in the literature

Period	Needs Include	Source
Short-term	No needs identified in the literature reviewed.	
Medium/ long-term	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Establish the polluter pays principle for air pollution.• Invest funds in regions with high levels of pollution.• Deliver trainings and capacity building in quality assurance and quality control (Nait 2019).	EEA 2015.





Part 4

International Response and Coordination Mechanisms



Chapter 8

International Response

Support for peace

UNSMIL is an integrated special political mission. It was established on September 16, 2011, by UN Security Council Resolution 2009 (2011) at the request of the Libyan authorities to support the country's new transitional authorities in their post-conflict efforts. Its current mandate is stipulated by the latest UN Security Council Resolution 2486 (2019), which extended UNSMIL's mission through September 15, 2020 (UNSMIL, n.d.b.).

The Security Council mandated UNSMIL (see box 3), in full accordance with the principles of national ownership, to exercise mediation and good offices in support of the LPA's implementation; and to support the consolidation of governance, security, and economic arrangements of the GNA and subsequent phases of the Libyan transition process. Furthermore, UNSMIL, within operational and security constraints, should support key Libyan institutions and provide, upon request, essential services and humanitarian assistance. Among other mandated functions, UNSMIL is tasked with monitoring and reporting on human rights; offering support to secure uncontrolled arms and counter their proliferation; and coordinating international assistance and providing advice and assistance to efforts led by the GNA to stabilize post-conflict zones, including those liberated from ISIS (UNSMIL, n.d.b.). In addition to its previous responsibilities, the Security Council requested UNSMIL to support a possible ceasefire.

Partners also provide technical assistance and capacity building to improve security. Activities range from mapping conflict dynamics and security actors to addressing explosive hazards and raising awareness on the risk of small arms and weapons. Some activities target the empowerment of women in communities affected by the conflict. Support to customs in terms of organization, management, and tools addressing trafficking is also being provided.

International assistance to protect human rights focuses on building capacity in state institutions and empowering CSOs as agents of change. Switzerland has supported the establishment of a human rights platform for archiving human rights violations. The United States has provided support to activists and CSOs for self-protection and has facilitated reporting of incidents as well as mapping and analysis of incidents around the freedom of expression.

Development aid

In terms of strategy, partners are aligning and coordinating activities. The broader group of partners, which includes the AfDB, the EU, France, Germany, Italy, the UK, UN agencies, and the World Bank, have already been coordinating their support through a Joint Partner Task Force, which was convened in August 2017. The key partners agreed that peace and stability are global and regional public goods, and that restoring the macroeconomic framework is critical to stabilization. Given the urgency of the situation, they also agreed to work together in the development and humanitarian nexus (see next section on coordination mechanisms) to consolidate peace and stability with an emphasis on supporting governance, private and financial sector development, and basic services. Four basic services sectors were identified for immediate action: health, education, electricity, and water and sanitation.¹ UNICEF is taking the lead in education, while the WHO, the AfDB, and the World Bank are taking the lead in health, water and sanitation, and electricity, respectively.

The UN system is a main partner in Libya and has developed its strategy for engagement for the next two years, the UN Strategic Framework for Libya 2019–20. The key priorities are governance and rule of law, economic recovery and growth, and basic services. The UN Strategic Framework stresses the need to foster coordination between the development, humanitarian, political, and security dimensions to avoid fragmentation and to maximize synergies.

A data management system for development aid is in place. Funded by the United Kingdom in 2017 and housed at the Ministry of Planning, it is a full-fledged online information system. Key donors, such as the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom, regularly provide data. However, given a lack of sufficient ownership of the system by the government, there is little pressure on lagging donors to update their information, which compromises the system's overall quality of financial data. Also, initiatives by the Ministry of Planning to extend the system to government projects pose technical problems and risk creating tension with line ministries.

Consequently, current international commitments to Libya are unknown. The latest aid data collection campaign was undertaken in July 2018, and there has not been a comprehensive mapping of aid flows since then. Data extraction undertaken in November 2018 gives the latest overall picture of aid commitments available.² Interviews with key donors point to the fact that these numbers are now outdated.

¹A stocktaking exercise was conducted on these four sectors in 2017. The literature review and mapping exercise is building upon this and is updating the information for these sectors.

²As per the November 2018 extraction, international commitments to Libya total US\$384 million. This is based on data collected in July 2018 and compiled in November 2018, as there has not been a comprehensive mapping of aid flows since then. These numbers do not include humanitarian aid. The EU and United States account for almost half of the international commitment. International commitments for peace support (for peace, political, and security activities and processes) total US\$94.7 million. The breakdown of international assistance by area shows an emphasis on economic recovery as well as governance, which represent 51 percent of the total amount. Although critical, restoring basic services accounts for only 13 percent of the total funding. Recent numbers are available for the EU and gives clear evidence that the latest overall

Activities related to economic recovery aim primarily to (i) stabilize the macroeconomic framework; (ii) support the development of an effective PFM system; (iii) strengthen the financial sector; (iv) promote the development of the private sector; and (v) support job creation and develop social protection policies. Main support for economic recovery comes from the EU and Germany (75.4 percent). In addition to strengthening the PFM system at national and local government levels, the EU is also financing activities that aim to develop the private sector and create jobs, including by building youths' capacity for entrepreneurship, developing coworking spaces, and improving access to SME finance. Germany is primarily supporting the creation of jobs for youth through start-ups. Together these activities captured 79.4 percent of the total international commitment of US\$75.7 million.

Partners provide support to the government to strengthen governance. The United States, Germany, and the EU, together with other bilaterals, provide US\$122 million. Assistance focuses on political stability, security, and strengthening government institutions at the national and local levels. For political stability, partners support mediation and national dialogues for political reconciliation, the constitutional drafting process, and the establishment of a democratic and transparent electoral process. Partners also provide the GNA with strategic and communication expertise and capacity building for local CSOs as well as for youth and women to strengthen their political participation.

To improve the government's capacity to deliver public services, at the national level, activities aim to strengthen the capacity of the state in terms of institutional reintegration and execution of core government functions. At the local level, partners support targeted municipalities to develop a participatory approach in defining and addressing local communities' needs for basic services.

Although severely impacted by the conflict, basic services such as health, education, electricity, and, to a lesser degree water and the environment, receive less funding from partners, with a total financing of US\$49.7 million. Health and education sectors receive 90 percent of the funding. Main contributors are the EU, Italy, and WHO.

Partners' activities in the health sector aim to address urgent needs and strengthen the national health system. Partners' support focuses on primary, mental, emergency, and trauma care in conflict-affected areas as well as the procurement of medical equipment, kits, and medicines. Support to the national health system covers improvement of (i) the health information system; (ii) supply chain management; (iii) allocation of human resources; and (iv) health financing. Other activities aim to support national programs such as the development of national strategies for mental, reproductive, maternal, newborn, child, and adolescent health.

Most of partners' support to the education sector aims to improve the resilience of children and youth. This includes offering life skills training, monitoring tools, and addressing the issue of out-of-school children as well as providing psychosocial services. Other partner activities target

mapping is outdated. As of April 2019, the total amounts of EU assistance across all sectors amounts to €365 million for development cooperation and migration, and €10 million for the humanitarian response.

tertiary education by improving networking among domestic universities and with universities in Europe.

The energy sector has received international technical assistance to develop overall strategies. The technical assistance provided by the World Bank and USAID are activities that address electricity sector weaknesses and the potential to develop renewable energy. USAID is contributing to improving the institutional framework through support for the restructuring of GECOL and establishing an energy regulator. The EU is working to develop human resources by supporting the creation of a master's course in energy management.

The water sector is suffering from structural weaknesses and the impact of the conflict, and it receives support through a package of activities that aim to improve the resilience of vulnerable groups by providing WASH services. The AfDB is supporting a sector assessment that will lead to the development of a national strategy for the sector.

In addition to empowering the political participation of youth and women at the national and local levels, partners have supported their socioeconomic resilience and active role in Libyan society. Activities promoting youth as actors of positive change focus on their access to nonformal education, livelihood and entrepreneurship programs, recreational and cultural services, and on enhancing the capacity of youth associations and NGOs to play a greater role in conflict resolution and peace building. Women have received training on socioeconomic empowerment, particularly in Tripoli and Benghazi.

With migrants heading to Europe via the Mediterranean, many partners are engaged in this area. The EU has mobilized €182 million to support voluntary repatriation, protect displaced communities, and stabilize local host communities. Italy is supporting the Transit and Departure Facility in Tripoli. It has also been working with the Libyan coast guard to limit Mediterranean crossings. Doctors without Borders is running mobile clinics in detention centers around Tripoli. IOM is tracking migrants, providing support in detention centers, and supporting voluntary repatriations to multiple countries of origin.

Humanitarian aid

Current international commitments for humanitarian aid total US\$16 million as of April 2019. The 2019 HRP is requiring US\$202 million, down from US\$313 million in 2018, and is currently funded to 8 percent. The 2018 HRP was funded to 25.6 percent, receiving US\$80 million. These numbers reflect the fact that Libya doesn't experience a full-fledged humanitarian crisis, but instead experiences pockets of needs. On the other hand, there is a health crisis as well as a protection crisis that particularly affects refugees, migrants, and IDPs.

The 2019 HRP has a strategic focus on both access to basic services and protection (OCHA 2018b). The first strategic objective is to provide and improve safe and dignified access to essential goods and critical public services in synergy with sustainable development assistance. The second

strategic objective is to enhance protection and promote adherence to international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and international refugee law.

Under the first strategic objective, the humanitarian community will assist the most severely affected people in need by providing food, water, sanitation, hygiene materials, NFIs, and cash, and by supporting both the delivery of and access to safe primary and secondary health care and education. Humanitarian aid will complement development and stabilization assistance that involves rehabilitating basic services facilities such as medical centers, schools, and water and sewerage systems.

Under the second strategic objective, humanitarian partners aim to prevent and mitigate protection risks and respond to protection needs by working with communities and local authorities to create a protective environment in which international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and international refugee law is promoted and followed, and critical protection assistance is made available to the most needy and vulnerable in Libya.

Chapter 9

Coordination Mechanisms

Coordination is important to maximize the impact of international support but is challenging due to the operating context in Libya. Donors are spread between different locations, notably Tripoli and Tunis, and security concerns in Tripoli constrains movement. Also, different policy agendas are sometimes contrary to each other (for example, political versus development or humanitarian). This is likely to continue in the absence of a shared strategy that can be used to align and coordinate.

Multiple coordination structures exist in the humanitarian, development, and security fields, including those led by the government and among partners. They aim to reduce duplication in activities, foster collaboration, and ensure national ownership over interventions. While the official working groups are very encompassing on paper, many of them have not been activated; for those that have been initiated, discussions are primarily focused on information sharing and not yet about strategy development and alignment.¹ Solid coordination across the nexus is also yet to be achieved, with little to connect the political, security, development, and humanitarian dimensions.²

Development and peace partners are coordinating with the GNA through the Coordination Framework for International Technical Cooperation, a three-tiered coordination mechanism set up by the government. The mechanism was legalized by Decree 1454 (see annex D).³ The first tier is the Senior Policy Committee (SPC), which is chaired by the President of the Presidential Council and cochaired by UNSMIL, with the participation of the Ministries of Planning, Foreign Affairs, Local Governance, and Finance, as well as ambassadors of the international community. Its key functions are to supervise the coordination of international assistance, oversee top-level decision making in line with GNA priorities and needs, and supervise the proper distribution of international assistance funding across sectors, following recommendations formulated by the Joint Technical Coordination Committee (JTCC).

¹Interviews with stakeholders, Tunis, Tunisia, January–February 2019.

²A nexus initiative has been launched by the UN to explore options for better alignment across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus. This process aims to establish a set of shared objectives that the different policy communities can align behind. It is a pilot that has a limited scope (finding selective collective outcomes) in a specific area (Sebha), and it is not comparable in size, scale, and depth to an RPBA.

³Decree 1454 was released on October 29, 2018.

At the technical level, partners are coordinating in the JTCC (second tier of the coordination mechanism) and in sectoral working groups (third tier of the coordination mechanism). The JTCC is chaired by the Ministry of Planning and cochaired by UNSMIL. The JTCC provides technical advice on coordinating international assistance to the SPC, provides strategic guidance, works toward avoiding overlap in international assistance, and oversees six working groups, which are as follows: (i) Economic Recovery and Infrastructure;⁴ (ii) Restoration of Basic Services;⁵ (iii) Governance;⁶ (iv) Migration;⁷ (v) Airports, Seaports, and Border Management;⁸ and (vi) Human Rights, Justice, and Rule of Law,⁹ each of which is cochaired by a line ministry and a development partner. The groups are tasked with developing sector work plans and identifying needs and gaps. However, development coordination is not very effective yet; meetings are infrequent, if the working group or subgroup is even activated at all. Securing national ownership remains a challenge, due to serious material and capacity constraints as well as a risk-averse administrative culture that does not foster decision making. Line ministries are also reluctant to coordinate, as opposed to working directly with development partners.¹⁰ Also, the coordination as part of multidonor trust funds (MDTF)—such as the Stabilization Facility for Libya managed by UNDP or the Strengthening Policy, PFM Institutions, and Building Governance MDTF managed by the WB—works well.

The National Committee for Coordination of International Technical Cooperation was established in early 2019 to support the Coordination Framework for International Technical Cooperation. Placed under the chairmanship of the Director of Technical Cooperation Office at the Ministry of Planning, its mission is to represent Libya as a counterpart to the international community; develop a national support management policy; manage coordination of policies, prioritization, and oversight of cooperation programs with a view toward harmonizing external support with national priorities, in cooperation with the JTCC; and define a set of rules for categorizing support programs and identifying and selecting priority projects aligned with national objectives.

Humanitarian coordination is based on a sector approach closely following the cluster system. These include Education; Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene; Food Security; Health; Protection (including the SGBV, Child Protection, and Mine Action subsectors); Shelter/NFIs; Logistics; and Emergency Telecommunication. In addition, to support the humanitarian response, two working groups on Cash and Access, and a platform for refugees and migration have been established. The humanitarian coordination is overseen by the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), bringing

⁴The working group is chaired by the Ministry of Economy and cochaired by the World Bank. The working group is activated, but the energy, agriculture, and job creation sub-working groups are not yet activated.

⁵The working group is chaired by the National Economic and Social Development Board and cochaired by UNICEF. The working group and the sub-working groups on education, health, and WASH are activated.

⁶The working group is chaired by the Ministry of Planning and cochaired by UNDP. The working group and the sub-working groups on local governance and public financial management are activated.

⁷The working group is chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and cochaired by IOM. The working group is not yet activated.

⁸The working group is not yet activated.

⁹The working group is chaired by the Ministry of Justice and cochaired by UNHCR. The working group is not yet activated.

¹⁰Interviews with stakeholders, Tunis, Tunisia, January–February 2019.

together UN humanitarian agencies, international INGOs, the ICRC, and representatives from the donor community (the two latter as observers). The HCT convenes monthly while the Inter-Sector Coordination Group (ISCG) meets fortnightly. An Area-Based Coordination mechanism has already been established in Benghazi for humanitarian partners working in the East, while such a mechanism is also under preparation for Sebha for partners working in the South. In the event of emergencies during the immediate response phase, the humanitarian community manages an Emergency Operations Group (EOG) that coordinates sectors and brings together all relevant humanitarian partners. The EOG remains in place until the response has reached a level of stability, whereby the ISCG will be able to resume and manage the continuation of the response in a more sustained manner. Coordination with Libyan counterparts is also established through the Ministry of State for Displaced Affairs, bringing together national and international humanitarian stakeholders. The members meet monthly, unless there is an onset emergency, in which case the members turn the forum into an Emergency Cell Group that convenes every second day. Finally, humanitarian donors have also set up a coordination group, which notably includes ECHO, Switzerland, Germany, DFID, and the US.


There are several well-functioning coordination groups in the security and political sectors.¹¹

These include a group focusing on mine action, roundtable discussion groups convened by the EUBAM around criminal justice and law enforcement, regular meetings on SSR, and coordination around elections.

Several strategic processes are being run in parallel and offer scope for alignment. These include the National Conference driven by the UN, which was planned to take place April 14–16, 2019, but has been postponed because of the military action that started at the beginning of April. The National Conference aims to achieve agreement on a national agenda for reconciliation and to lay out the path to elections. It also includes ongoing initiatives that focus on socioeconomic dialogue or visioning exercises. There may be scope to better align these processes behind agreed objectives to leverage their full potential.


¹¹ Interviews with stakeholders, Tunis, Tunisia, January–February 2019.





Part 5

Conclusion and Next Steps



This mapping report has compiled available data and information regarding challenges, needs, and current interventions in Libya. The assessment has covered a wide range of topics across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, associated with peace, security, governance, economic, and social sectors.

The objective of this report was to present an overview of available analysis and information as it relates to challenges, needs and priorities. It has highlighted that a rich body of work exists across most of the sectors covered, mostly produced by international partners, primarily based on available government data. Similarly, the review provides an overview of the different coordination platforms that have been put in place, covering the development and humanitarian sectors, with a view to promote more coherence and alignment of international support within and across these sectors.

During the process, the team has reviewed a diverse body of work on Libya, both in terms of coverage, scope, and methodology. While this report has stopped short of passing judgement or analyzing the relevance of the material, several overall critical issues have emerged during the review that are of importance to the efficiency of support for Libya, including:

- There is a lack of coherence in the existing data and analyses and significant gaps exist. Among a list of 91 identified gaps (see annex B), are some that would require substantial upgrading to allow for more coherent sector planning and engagement going forward (some of the gaps are listed below).
- Existing development and humanitarian coordination structures need to be strengthened and utilized more efficiently. Coordination mechanisms have yet to meet their full potential, and the overall efficiency of coordination is low. There is also a need to further emphasize strategic coordination across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, as a starting point for more effective definition of sector strategies, coordination and information-sharing.
- Related to this, while a draft vision 2030 has been produced after the revolution, the government has yet to provide enough guidance on strategic priorities and how international support can best support national objectives. Currently, there are no national strategic priorities and no sectoral priorities in most sectors. The result has been that international partners have investments in sector specific analysis but very little attention to an overall strategic framework that can make interventions across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus more effective and promote coherence across assessments and data collection efforts.

Given the significant number of data gaps identified, there is a need to define criteria that can guide further analytical efforts. This would ensure that future investments focus on the most critical gaps that would allow international support to be effective in addressing key drivers of the conflict and contribute to restoring people's lives and livelihoods. Criteria for deciding which gaps to address as a priority could include one or more of the following:

- Is the gap directly relevant to tackle root causes of the conflict?

- Is the gap a bottleneck for future planning that could draw economy of scale from involving several sectors?
- Would data collection undertaken to fill the gap provide a baseline that can be leveraged to inform several related analytical pieces?
- Would the complementary value-added of the EU, UN, and WB advocate for joint work as opposed to analysis by one of the institutions only?
- Is the gap in a sector jointly identified by the three institutions as key?

Based on these criteria, the following key analytical and data gaps have been identified.

Addressing these gaps would be a major input for any planning exercise going forward. Drawing on the long list of 91 gaps (see annex B), a select list of gaps that constitute key bottlenecks and constrain further analysis is as follows:

- 2019 aid data collection campaign, using the LCMIS platform (to update aid commitments last collected in July 2018)
- Joint risk monitoring
- Rolling mapping of the political economy at all levels, including a mapping of the following actors: (i) political and security actors, their alliances, and funding flows; (ii) actors involved in the decentralization process, the service delivery at the local level, and their incentives; (iii) actors involved in the subsidy reform process
- Mapping of security sector stakeholders
- Clarity on existing Libyan assets and missing assets
- Mapping of state-owned enterprises and parastatals (regulatory authorities and so forth)
- Understanding spending flows of the CBL and government
- Mapping of service delivery and social protection mechanisms
- Mapping of the current public administration establishment and wage bill, including a focus on decentralized governance structures

International experience points to the significant savings that can be made by cross-sector data collection and analysis. This would have significant advantages, such as making the best use of limited resources, providing cross-sectoral data sets that can enable analysis in several sectors or across topics, and boosting cross-sectoral coordination. Methods that could be employed include (i) damage assessment, using remote sensing technology such as satellite imagery to better understand damage and need; (ii) poverty and vulnerability surveys, a mixed method including remote data collection, phone surveys, social media monitoring, and face-to-face meetings to generate a better understanding of poverty, vulnerability, and service delivery access at the local level, along

with the perceptions and priorities of the surveyed people, and; (iii) governance and institutions assessment, looking at cross-institutional service delivery capacities and constraints at both central and local levels (possibly combined with municipal-level validation through (i) and (ii) above.

Going forward, joint EU-UN-WB technical and coordination work should be undertaken in advance of, and as an input into, an upcoming and more structured planning process with Government. Recommendations include:

1. **Present to the government the findings of this mapping study.** As part of this effort, EU-UN-WB management should present the findings of the mapping to the Minister of Planning. Government counterparts at the technical level should be given the opportunity to analyze the mapping study and share additional analytical material and data that has yet to be covered in the mapping. This could be done both at the sector and aggregate level and could be coordinated through the Ministry of Planning.
2. **Further strengthen joint efforts between the international community and Libyans to identify and fill the most critical analytical gaps.** Several gaps have been identified that can only be filled through multisector approaches and an effort to consolidate different methodologies, including to understand broader needs related to institutional capacities, conflict-related damage, service delivery systems, security sector capacities, and broader poverty and vulnerability dynamics. Coordinated efforts to address these, using already existing coordination and dialogue platforms, could offer a good interim step toward compiling all the necessary information required for an eventual planning and prioritization exercise. The mapping study has identified the following international platforms as potential vehicles for further analytical work:
 - **Government** could launch an aid mapping exercise to update information on commitments. This effort could be kick-started by the government issuing a letter asking all donors to use the aid management system and provide aid information. This would strengthen government ownership of the database and facilitate data collection.
 - **The UNSMIL** could coordinate efforts to better understand elements under pillar 1 (peace and reconciliation), issues pertaining to security sector capacities and needs, along with an evolving overview of security related dynamics that would need to be understood and factored in as part of a future planning and prioritization exercise.
 - **The local governance working group and related sectoral efforts** would be a natural conduit of future work to understand the broader governance and institutional challenges and needs, building on the findings outlined under pillar 3.
 - **The Restoration of Basic Services working group** could coordinate efforts to more holistically assess service delivery capacities and damages, building on the findings under pillars 5 (infrastructure and service delivery) and 6 (social services and protection).
 - **The planned household survey** could be used to generate a better view of poverty and vulnerability at different levels as well as a disaggregated update on access to basic

services (pillar 6), and the needs and priorities of the population. This could also be used as one vehicle to supplement IOM data on migration and displacement related issues covered under pillar 2, and on several of the cross-cutting issues.

An important element going forward would be to ensure Libyan engagement in each of the above platforms. In addition, it will be critical to build a mechanism to allow broader citizen engagement and feedback into these efforts to fill critical analytical gaps.

3. **Revive and strengthen coordination mechanisms to ensure that the above efforts facilitate better information sharing and regular exchanges regarding how to use knowledge to inform decisions.** The process of preparing this mapping study has highlighted the need for a more effective dialogue between the government, the tripartite signatories, and possibly other development partners regarding analysis, planning and prioritization. While different partners will continue to pursue bilateral research and assessments based on their individual mandates and areas of focus, such a revived coordination framework would ensure that findings can be shared widely and used to forge coherence in decision making and policy dialogue. Experiences from other countries suggest that such coordination should happen at frequent intervals given the fast-moving context in Libya.
4. **Establish a joint risk monitoring and mitigation mechanism.** Based on the shared understanding of challenges and risks that the EU, UN, and WBG have agreed on as part of the 2018 Risk and Resilience Assessment and the 2019 Libya Mapping, a regular joint context risk monitoring should be undertaken and updated frequently to (i) better understand the evolution of the situation on the ground – especially in light of the worsening security situation – and how this impacts international support; (ii) better understand how international support might impact peace and stability (iii) benefit from the partners’ respective comparative advantages in certain policy areas; and (iv) identify possible engagement opportunities to mitigate these risks. The experiences from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia of establishing Joint Risk Management Offices should be further explored as a model for Libya. Going forward, the required capacities as well as the more efficient mechanisms to monitor all over Libya should be determined, aiming for a light joint structure given the limited available resources.





Annexes



Annex A

Analytical and Data Gaps

This list of analytical and data gaps is based primarily on gaps identified by experts interviewed during the mission or who contributed to the informal review process. In some instances, the core team also added analytical gaps. The list includes (i) data gaps: primary data collection, surveys, and so forth, and (ii) analytical gaps: studies, analysis, reports, and more. Except for a few overall data gaps such as the census, each data gap is assigned to a primary sector, with related sectors mentioned in another column.

Name of survey/ study	Date of latest survey	Conducted by	Planning challenge of lack of data/ information	Sector		Planned or ongoing data gathering	Gap mentioned by
				Primary	Other		
Census	2006 (updated in 2012 and 2017 based on assumptions)	Bureau of Statistics and Census (BSC)	Population figures are outdated and have not been updated since 2012. Everything after 2012 is based on projections. Disaggregation between Libyans vs. non-Libyans would also be needed.	01. All sectors / overall			OCHA, GIZ
General lack of information on the East and South of the country due to an insecure operating environment and challenges related to access.			There is limited data across the board in Libya, but this is accentuated for the South and the East of the country, where access is even more restricted due to the security conditions and for the South, lack of infrastructure. This compounds the situation of limited understanding and knowledge of dynamics across the country and makes it difficult to establish a common baseline.	01. All sectors / overall			WFP, UNICEF, DG ECHO, UNDP

Name of survey/study	Date of latest survey	Conducted by	Planning challenge of lack of data/information	Sector		Planned or ongoing data gathering	Gap mentioned by
				Primary	Other		
Political economy dynamics across Libya			A comprehensive mapping of the political economy at all levels in Libya is missing in part because this information changes very rapidly and would need to be regularly updated. The fluid situation means that any mapping is usually out of date within months, and a further constraint is the challenge of access to key personnel and information. This data would help to better understand the factions in play, their connections to the economy, allegiances and alliances, funding flows, and dynamics that need to be managed to help propel a trajectory to peace and stability	01. All sectors / overall			REACH
Data disaggregated by gender and youth	2016	UNFPA	Little is known on the particular situation, needs, concerns, and data with regards to the youth. Data overall is not disaggregated by youth—or gender—leaving a major gap in terms of understanding the particular needs, wishes, constraints, skills, challenges, education levels, skillset, and dynamics of the youth demographic. Available information includes the following: -UNFPA survey: a module on youth is included with three areas analyzed: 1) How do they spend their free time? 2) Mental health and how they deal with it, and 3) Main challenges they are facing. -WB Libya labor market dynamics paid attention to youth.	01. All sectors / overall	Youth / gender		UNDP
Impact of IDP inflow on service delivery and host communities	nil (new)		Better understanding and a comprehensive mapping and assessment of the concentration of IDPs and their impact on service delivery (access to service delivery—education, health, and so forth) would help to better anticipate and aid planning to meet their specific needs, while also understanding how this inflow impacts the host community and their access to and quality of services.	01. All sectors / overall	Education / health / water and sanitation / service delivery and municipal services / displacement and migration / housing and land		REACH
Vulnerability matrix			There is not yet a shared (by humanitarian agencies) vulnerability matrix to assess vulnerable people. This makes the definition of beneficiaries difficult and can lead to inconsistencies across sectors.	01. All sectors / overall	All humanitarian sectors / social protection and poverty	Cash and Market working group is currently developing the shared vulnerability matrix.	Cash and Market working group
Updated mapping of aid flows	July 2018		The last mapping of aid flows was undertaken in July 2018.	01. All sectors / overall			EU

Name of survey/study	Date of latest survey	Conducted by	Planning challenge of lack of data/information	Sector		Planned or ongoing data gathering	Gap mentioned by
				Primary	Other		
Models of reconciliation			There is no detailed analysis on the models of reconciliation that could apply to Libya, and an analysis of the technical support for mediation, negotiation and peace-building mechanisms that would be required for successful implementation of reconciliation initiatives.	02. Social cohesion and reconciliation			EU
Linkages between identity affiliations and armed groups			There is a lack of clarity on how strong identity affiliations are to armed groups.	02. Social cohesion and reconciliation			WB
Social disincentives to leaving armed groups			There is a lack of clarity on which social disincentives are at play when youth decide to leave armed groups and smuggling rings to engage in noncriminal activities.	02. Social cohesion and reconciliation			WB
Perception of justice at local level by excluded groups			There is a lack of data on the perceptions of criminal justice and social justice at local level and among excluded groups, such as youth, women, IDPs, and labor migrants.	02. Social cohesion and reconciliation			WB
Public expenditure review of the security sector	nil (new)		A PER would provide some clarity as to who is currently on the Ministry of Defense payroll, and what is being financed. This is currently a major gap in the data.	03. Security sector	Core government functions	UNSMIL is apparently doing some (preliminary) work on this	EU
Combatants or extremists detained in detention centers	nil (new)		There is a lack of clear data on the number and identity of alleged combatants/extremists held in prisons, and unclear information as to their actual affiliation and identity to be able to reconcile the various claims in circulation.	03. Security sector	Justice		EU
Mapping of militias and armed groups stakeholders	nil (new)		There is no comprehensive understanding and mapping of security sector stakeholders (security services, militias, and more) to better understand their numbers, affiliations, allegiances, sources of funding, ability to provide security, location, and other data. Existing information is rapidly outdated due to the fluid situation on the ground and needs to be regularly updated. This information is also likely to be sensitive and elusive to come by.	03. Security sector	Social cohesion and reconciliation	UNSMIL has started carrying out such a mapping (according to the EU).	EU
Status of Libyan financial assets and account of missing assets	nil (new)		As part of the push for greater transparency and accountability, to aid national reconciliation processes, and to support the PFM efforts in place, greater clarity on existing Libyan assets and details on the assets that have gone missing and/or their status would be useful. Methodological issues remain (pre-2012—are these really stolen assets? Post-2012—what assets are we talking about?)	04. Justice	Macroeconomic stability / core government functions	UNICRI regional project on this topic (EU funded).	EU

Name of survey/study	Date of latest survey	Conducted by	Planning challenge of lack of data/information	Sector		Planned or ongoing data gathering	Gap mentioned by
				Primary	Other		
Assessment of the justice sector			Currently, there is no comprehensive overview in place of the justice sector, its capacities, challenges, and so forth. Including no detailed data on the number of judges, active courts in Libya, backlog of cases, and breakdown of data by region.	04. Justice		American Bar Institution (USAID funding) have produced a justice baseline assessment for the MoJ, identifying challenges and formulating recommendations. Sign-off of MoJ required for dissemination.	UK, USAID
Information on and dynamics around economic migrants within Libya	nil (new)		There is a lack of data on the number and conditions of economic migrants within Libya, especially in urban areas (no survey on their number; localization; poverty levels; access to services; what industries employ them, what skills they have, and work conditions). Need for disaggregation between longtime migrants in Libya, circular migrants, transitory migrants; and adults vs children.	05. Displacement and migration	All sectors / overall (humanitarian needs) / private sector and jobs / Service delivery	REACH to conduct MSNA for migrants in 2019.	OCHA, IOM, UNDP, World Bank
Seasonal migration and agriculture (study to better understand dynamics)	nil (new)		No clear information on seasonal migrants working in the agriculture sector, especially in the South (no survey on their number, localization, poverty levels, access to services, work conditions).	05. Displacement and migration	Key productive sectors / private sector and jobs / service delivery		IOM
Limited information on detention centers in Libya, and detainees.	nil (new)		There is little data on detention facilities in Libya—particularly the private, unofficial ones run by smugglers—in terms of numbers, who runs them, where they are located, their links to militia groups and other criminal gangs, facilities, security, and so forth; concurrently, there is little information on detainees in terms of demographics, gender, nationality, and status.	05. Displacement and migration	Human rights / justice		EU
Protection needs of migrants, IDPs, and refugees (need for further data)	nil (new)		There is a lack of information on the specific protection needs of migrants unaccompanied and separated children and transitory migrants. There is also a lack of data and limitations re access in relation to vulnerable Libyans' protection needs such as documentation, rights to land (IDPs, returnees), including due to the sensitivity of the topic for the population.	05. Displacement and migration	All sectors / overall (humanitarian needs) / housing and land	REACH to conduct three area-based assessments in Libya in 2019 and SDR to publish on protection and shelter.	EU, DG ECHO, and REACH
Availability of basic services and livelihood options for migrants and IDPs	nil (new)		There is limited information on the availability of basic services and livelihood options for migrants (that are not in detention centers), IDPs, returnees and host communities.	05. Displacement and migration			
Linkages between migration, forced displacement and conflict	nil (new)		There is a lack of detailed understanding of how conflict, migration, and forced displacement interact.	05. Displacement and migration	Security sector		World Bank

Name of survey/study	Date of latest survey	Conducted by	Planning challenge of lack of data/information	Sector		Planned or ongoing data gathering	Gap mentioned by
				Primary	Other		
Analysis of options and motivations for migrants currently in Libya	nil (new)		There is a limited understanding of how migrants decide whether to stay in Libya, travel onwards to Europe, or return to their countries of origin, and what differentiates these categories.	05. Displacement and migration			World Bank
Analysis of the tax system, tax expenditures and tax gap			The MoF does not carry out analysis of the tax system nor estimates of tax expenditures or the tax gap. This would help to identify options for revenue mobilization and diversification.	06. Core government functions	Macroeconomic stability		Core team
Status on stopped investment projects			Many government investment projects had been launched but not completed before the onset of the revolution. Detailed data on these projects should be collected, as the basis for the assessment of completion costs, and the cost-benefit analysis of each project would be necessary to justify the allocation needed to complete it (IMF 2013c).	06. Core government functions	Infrastructure		Core team
Civil Service (administrative) Legal and Institutional Analysis			No accurate data on the size and composition of public employment and what data does exist is full of discrepancies.	06. Core government functions			World Bank
Government Establishment (size and structure) Analysis	2012	Bureau of Statistics and Census	No accurate data on the size and composition of public employment and what data does exist is full of discrepancies. There is limited understanding of the current composition of the public sector workforce (The latest available data goes back to the LFS 2012). This has changed since the revolution and takes up the bulk of the budget.	06. Core government functions			World Bank
Wage Bill Analysis			No accurate data on the size and composition of public employment and what data does exist is full of discrepancies. Audit Report 2015 estimates government salaries but this is thought to be lower than the actual number of people receiving salaries. The most reliable data comes from the MoF that uses the NIN, but this also suffers from data issues.	06. Core government functions			World Bank
National accounts after 2014			No national accounts after 2014. Therefore, Libyan institutions lack even basic economic and social data to have a good understanding of the performance of the economy and the gaps in public services delivery to devise the needed policies and measures to address the urgent needs of the population.	06. Core government functions	Macroeconomic stability	The World Bank will support the Bureau of Statistics in developing the necessary skills to collect and analyze economic and social data. This TA notably aims to have national accounts audited and published	World Bank

Name of survey/study	Date of latest survey	Conducted by	Planning challenge of lack of data/information	Sector		Planned or ongoing data gathering	Gap mentioned by
				Primary	Other		
Consumer Price Index			No precise measure of inflation. o Libyan institutions lack even basic economic and social data to have a good understanding of the performance of the economy and the gaps in public services delivery to devise the needed policies and measures to address the urgent needs of the population.	06. Core government functions		The World Bank will build capacity to conduct household surveys and develop a consumer Price Index, which will be used to calculate inflation.	World Bank
Administrative boundaries of municipalities (lack of clarity over their delineation)	nil (new)		No clarity on municipal boundaries (at least 3 different list, and clear boundaries for only about 40 municipalities). Different ministries and organizations use different boundaries, leading to difficulty for municipalities to govern and to divergent data, number of populations, needs; impedes comparability; and can lead to contestations with mayors.	07. Local governance	Service delivery and municipal services / water and sanitation / education / health / housing and land	IOM planning to map municipal boundaries using GIS at the request of the Ministry of Local Government.	OCHA and IOM
Evaluation of the existing legal and institutional environment on decentralization			For the Political Aspects of Decentralization	07. Local governance		This potential analysis would drill down deeper into the existing legal framework surrounding decentralization to provide a better understanding of the legal provisions for the transfer of competencies and the establishment of local government. Taking a political economy perspective, this analysis would likewise integrate findings of the stakeholder network analysis (described below) to highlight the interests and incentives of key interest groups, which may influence the overall decentralization reforms currently underway as well as those needed for the future.	World Bank

Name of survey/study	Date of latest survey	Conducted by	Planning challenge of lack of data/information	Sector		Planned or ongoing data gathering	Gap mentioned by
				Primary	Other		
Stakeholder maps and network analysis on decentralization			For the Political Aspects of Decentralization	07. Local governance		This more comprehensive stakeholder analysis would provide a greater understanding of the larger political economy dynamics, including (i) mapping stakeholders involved in the proposed decentralization reform process, consisting of government (for example, central, local, and regional), civil society, and the private sector; (ii) understanding the interests and incentives of various actors to either support or detract from the decentralization process, including the role of political parties, political factions, ethnic/tribal groups, and vulnerable/marginalized groups (such as women, immigrants, youth); and (iii) identify key issues, challenges, and constraints, which can be addressed in an accompanying change management strategy.	World Bank
Assessment of demand side conditions, including citizen needs and satisfaction with local service delivery			For the Political Aspects of Decentralization	07. Local governance	Service delivery, education, health, WASH, electricity, gender	While rolling out citizen engagement initiatives (for example, budget transparency initiatives, participatory budgeting processes, and so forth) may be premature in Libya, this subtask would lay the ground work for such future activities by deploying selective citizen surveys and/or focus groups in pilot districts focused on quality and access of public services. This module would build on the work by UNICEF, UNFPA, GIZ, and USAID, where appropriate, to illuminate key challenges that may impede access to some citizen—including quality, price, and timeliness—as well as survey what citizen feedback/redress mechanisms currently exist. Subsequently, the findings could be used to inform pilot initiatives in the future.	World Bank

Name of survey/study	Date of latest survey	Conducted by	Planning challenge of lack of data/information	Sector		Planned or ongoing data gathering	Gap mentioned by
				Primary	Other		
Analysis of Political Economy Challenges at the decentralization/local governance level			For the Political Aspects of Decentralization	07. Local governance		Drawing on the related analytics, this additional study would build on, and include, the significant work by the Bank's Health, Social Sector, and Energy GP to contextualize the specific political economy dynamics identified in terms of service delivery at the sectoral level. Activities would seek to build on this existing knowledge base and help to include a governance lens on key sectoral challenges.	World Bank
High-Level Expenditure Analysis			For the Fiscal Aspects of Decentralization	07. Local governance		This study would build upon previous work to engage in a high-level expenditure analysis tracking detailed flows at national/subnational levels, including an assessment of the relative aggregate expenditure responsibilities across levels of government. In addition, this review would distinguish between resources that simply pass through a subnational budget and the existence of meaningful resource allocation choice. The outcome of the analysis will be to inform subsequent technical assistance provided for fiscal decentralization as well as to inform the work on strengthening procurement processes.	World Bank
Revenue Analysis			For the Fiscal Aspects of Decentralization	07. Local governance		Building upon the work of other international organizations (such as USAID/GIZ) this analysis would be extended to a more detailed assessment of the assignment across revenue sources, including the degree of central versus subnational revenue control; the effect of demographic, geographic, economic and institutional characteristics on the appropriateness of revenue sources; the existence of prevailing administrative models; fiscal architecture; benefit approach; administration and compliance costs; tax exporting; tax sharing; horizontal disparities; revenue adequacy; and so on.	World Bank

Name of survey/study	Date of latest survey	Conducted by	Planning challenge of lack of data/information	Sector		Planned or ongoing data gathering	Gap mentioned by
				Primary	Other		
Analysis of Transfer System & Flow of Funds to Municipalities			For the Fiscal Aspects of Decentralization	07. Local governance	Core government functions	This analysis would assess the need for, and status of, transfers; the degree to which basic objectives are achieved; and the existing structure's economic incentive effects. This review would likewise assess the flow of funds mechanisms both for investment and for operations and maintenance. In the future, such analysis can be tailored to some pilot municipalities, taking advantage of current field activities where relevant, to support integration of planning and public finance functions.	World Bank
Analysis of legal and institutional framework for administrative aspects of decentralization			For the Administrative Aspects of Decentralization	07. Local governance		This analysis would seek to fill key analytical gaps and update information with respect to the legal and institutional framework governing the civil service, both at a federal level and at a subnational level. Such a "gap" analysis would look at the laws and regulations that define public employment (for example, who is considered a civil servant?), regulate public employment (hiring, movement, salaries, and so forth), govern performance and career progression for public employees, and provide guidelines on revolving doors, income disclosure, and rotation of public employees in high-risk positions. At the institutional level, the analysis would seek to assemble a list and description of the ministries currently in place in Tripoli and description of their basic functions/responsibilities with a view to developing a ministerial organizational chart, that shows linkages between the national and subnational levels. Further work in this area might include piloting the development of indicative job descriptions in selected agencies in pilot/priority sectors.	World Bank

Name of survey/ study	Date of latest survey	Conduct- ed by	Planning challenge of lack of data/ information	Sector		Planned or ongoing data gathering	Gap men- tioned by
				Primary	Other		
Analysis of govern- ment es- tablishment size and structure (section on local gov- ernment)			For the Administrative Aspects of Decentralization	07. Local gov- ernance	Core gov- ernment functions	This analysis would seek to fill key analytical gaps and update information with respect to the distribution of human resources both vertically within ministries as well as horizontally across sectors. Such an analysis would try to provide clarity on the total size of the public administration (number of employees), number of pub- lic employees by ministries, number of public employees by level/grade (with the definition of each grade), number of public employees by age brackets, number of public employees by gender, number of public employees working in local govern- ments, number of full-time and part-time employees, number of SOE employees, and the trend for the size of public employees over the past five years (if possible per ministry). Such an ex- ercise would be to provide a better understanding of staffing levels and grades at the subnational level to en- sure proper resource distri- bution for service delivery.	World Bank
Analysis of wage bill structure and dis- tribution (section on local gov- ernment)			For the Administrative Aspects of Decentralization	07. Local gov- ernance	Core gov- ernment functions	Once more details are known about the size and distribution of the govern- ment establishment and HR distribution, additional analysis can be provided with respect to the wage bill. Such an analysis would build upon the data that is already provided in the cur- rent budget process (that is, the annual budget number for each ministry, execution rate), and include additional information on the pay scale for different levels of public employees/ categories, wage bill as a percentage of GDP and percentage of total expenditure, and average government wage; data on recruitment trends/growth rate over past five years; information on nonmonetary benefits (for example, trans- portation, free meals, hous- ing allowance, and so on) and expected future benefits (such as pensions), and the highest salary and lowest salary on central government main salary scale to calculate compression ratio.	World Bank

Name of survey/study	Date of latest survey	Conducted by	Planning challenge of lack of data/information	Sector		Planned or ongoing data gathering	Gap mentioned by
				Primary	Other		
Mapping of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and parastatals			Despite the major role SOEs and parastatals play in the economy, there is not in place a mapping to comprehensively understand the interrelation, status, size, numbers, sectors of activity, positioning, influence, levels of productivity, role, and so forth of SOEs and parastatals. Currently there is only in place a partial understanding of the major SOEs—NOC as well as electricity, water, ICT SOEs. No information on impact of the conflict (whether SOEs are still existing and functioning; de facto privatization/seized by militias). (Simplified firm survey conducted in 2015 by WB only has minimal information on SOEs.)	08. SOEs and parastatals	Private sector and jobs / key productive sectors / core government functions	World Bank finalizing mapping of private sector (could have some information on SOEs and parastatals).	EU
Mapping of civil society organizations	?		There is a lack of comprehensive knowledge and mapping of Libyan CSOs relating to their numbers, locations, expertise, capacities, funding, independence, range of activities, and so forth.	09. Accountability, transparency and citizen engagement		The 2015 UNICEF-UNDP CSO mapping provide useful preliminary information.	EU and Swiss Embassy
National accounts after 2014	2014	Bureau of Statistics and Census	No national accounts after 2014. Therefore, Libyan institutions lack even basic economic and social data to have a good understanding of the performance of the economy and the gaps in public services delivery to devise the needed policies and measures to address the urgent needs of the population.	10. Macroeconomic stability	Private sector and jobs / key productive sectors / core government functions	WB has been providing TA to BSC and government to produce up-to-date national accounts, but there is still some catching up to do.	World Bank
Spending flows of the Central Bank of Libya (CBL)			There is currently limited visibility around the spending flows from the CBL. How much is spent, where it goes, to whom, and to what end is unknown. This information is important not only for macroeconomic stability but also for peace and reconciliation initiatives as access to and control of resources is a key driver of conflict.	10. Macroeconomic stability	Social cohesion and reconciliation / core government functions	Ongoing audit of CBL by UNSMIL may partially address this. Due to the sensitivity of the issue, the audit is more of a "light review" than a thorough audit. Second, most of the purchase orders are known.	Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
Labor force survey (LFS)	2013	Bureau of Statistics and Census	There is a gap in terms of labor data that cover both Libyans as well as migrants' workers and map their skills and the gaps. Data for recent years are not available but estimates could be obtained from ILO website. LFS conducted in 2012 and 2013 by BSC. 2012 detailed results and 2013 summary report publicly available on BSC website in Arabic.	11. Private sector and jobs	Education / key productive sectors / displacement and migration	IOM is planning to carry out 2 labor market study in 2 municipalities of the South. A workforce market survey has been conducted in 2017 for Benghazi, Misrata, Sabha, and Tripoli by the WB.	EU, IOM
Employability of higher education graduates	2012	Bureau of Statistics and Census of Libya	No recent in-depth analysis of employability of higher education graduates Available source of data: LFS 2012. Employment and unemployment by education level. UNFPA 2016 is also another source of information.	11. Private sector and jobs	Education		World Bank

Name of survey/study	Date of latest survey	Conducted by	Planning challenge of lack of data/information	Sector		Planned or ongoing data gathering	Gap mentioned by
				Primary	Other		
Private sector employment trends			The current labor market information system does not contain the data sets needed to build indicators or conduct research and analysis. No effort is made to survey or understand private sector employment trends (ETF Libyan Labor Market).	11. Private sector and jobs			Core team
Assessment of pests in agriculture			No recent assessment of pests' threats and distribution impacting agriculture sector (for instance, date production in the South).	12. Key productive sectors	Agriculture		IOM
Assessment of migrants active in the agriculture sector			There is no up-to-date data on the current role, number and characteristics of foreign migrants and seasonal migrants active in the agricultural sector, especially in the South.	12. Key productive sectors	Agriculture		Core team
Stakeholder maps and analysis on agriculture			There is no comprehensive assessment and mapping of actors (SOEs, private sector and agribusiness initiatives, CSOs and NGOs) active in the agriculture sector.	12. Key productive sectors	Agriculture		Core team
Comprehensive mapping of the delivery of services across Libya	2016	UNFPA	There is currently no systematic mapping of service delivery across Libya—both municipal and nonmunicipal—as well as at the mantika level. This is an important knowledge gap that would benefit from comprehensive mapping at granular level—for instance, to capture detail relating to public lighting infrastructure, public parks and community infrastructure, and sewage and sanitation systems. Available information include the UNFPA MSNA 2016 survey which included a module on access to Social/Public services is included in UNFPA HH MSNA survey (Primary Health Facility, Primary school, closest public administration), question on solid waste management is also included in another module. However, the UNFPA MSNA 2016 survey covered only 20 municipalities from 22 mantikas.	13. Service delivery and municipal services	Water and sanitation / health / education	A second round of the MSNA survey was conducted in 2018 by UNFPA.	World Bank
Granular assessment of power supply and power cuts	2016 2018	UNFPA WB	No comprehensive mapping of power supply and power cuts across the year and country, and information broken down by cities. UNFPA HH MSNA 2016 has questions on Electricity cuts. The survey is covering 20 municipalities out of 22 mantikas should provide some insight on disparities among regions.	14. Energy			World Bank
Coping strategy of households for power cuts			No survey on means used by households to cope with power cuts (use of generators; cut back on consumption).	14. Energy			World Bank

Name of survey/study	Date of latest survey	Conducted by	Planning challenge of lack of data/information	Sector		Planned or ongoing data gathering	Gap mentioned by
				Primary	Other		
Analysis of low willingness to pay for utilities			No survey on reasons for low willingness to pay for service (energy and water utility).	14. Energy	Water and sanitation / service delivery and municipal services		World Bank
Water demand patterns			No accurate studies on water demand patterns.	15. Water and sanitation			World Bank
Assessment of water infrastructure			No water infrastructure assessment, valuation, and registration.	15. Water and sanitation			World Bank
Quality of water	? (but seems like pre-2011)		No information on water treatment (percentage of wastewater treated, by region) and quality of water per region.	15. Water and sanitation			UNICEF
Rapid assessment of transport infrastructure and services			No survey of the damage and assessment of the status of the transport infrastructure and services.	16. Transport			World Bank
Transport network survey			No network survey.	16. Transport			World Bank
Regular road condition surveys			No regular, ongoing road condition surveys.	16. Transport			World Bank
Information on transport accidents			No comprehensive statistical information on accidents.	16. Transport			World Bank
Rapid assessment of ICT infrastructure and services			No information on disruption and destruction to ICT network and services which took place since 2014.	17. ICT			World Bank
Use of digital platforms			No detailed data on use of digital platforms. (Is the population on social media? Using online payments?)	17. ICT			World Bank
Access to ICT services by regions and cities			Lack of granularity on subregional differences or city-by-city access rates to ICT (this information would be useful but is not essential to plan for the sector recovery and development).	17. ICT			World Bank
Complete mapping of informal settlements	nil (new)		There is a gap in terms of a comprehensive mapping of informal settlements—for instance, the number, locations, facilities, services, conditions, inhabitants, population, and so forth.	18. Housing and land			UN-Habitat

Name of survey/ study	Date of latest survey	Conducted by	Planning challenge of lack of data/ information	Sector		Planned or ongoing data gathering	Gap mentioned by
				Primary	Other		
Complete and up-to-date urban master plans	pre-revolution		The urban master plans were last updated before the revolution—and as such are considerably out of date and would need a complete update to be of use for planning purposes.	18. Housing and land	Service delivery and municipal services / water and sanitation / energy / transport		UN-Habitat
Assessment of housing, land, and property (HLP) issues	2012	UNHCR	There is a gap in terms of a comprehensive assessment of the legislative aspects of housing, land, and property, for instance, the alignment of laws, contestations related to land, a mapping of disputed land, and so forth.	18. Housing and land	Justice / service delivery and municipal services / local governance	Currently UNHCR/NRC are writing a report on HLP issues.	UN-Habitat, Shelter and NFIs working group
City or district damage assessments	2018	UNHABITAT	Damage assessments are only partially available and more detail at the city and district and municipal level is needed to assess damage in locations heavily impacted by conflict Available information: UN-Habitat conducted in collaboration with UN-FPA (EU funded) a rapid city profile for six municipalities in Libya (Alkufra, Sebha, and Ubari in the South, Janzour in Tripoli region, Sirt and Benghazi).	18. Housing and land	Service delivery and municipal services / transport / energy / water and sanitation / ICT / health / education		World Bank
Flood risk assessment			There is need for a comprehensive mapping of zones threatened by flooding to aid contingency planning.	18. Housing and land	Water and sanitation / environment		UNICEF
Mapping of social protection mechanisms (including subsidies)	nil (new)		Despite the heavy reliance of the population on subsidies across the country, there is no comprehensive mapping in place of social protection mechanisms. There is little understanding of how subsidies work, who benefits from them, and how subsidies contribute to the informal smuggling economy. Likewise, there is little understanding of how social protection mechanisms such as social safety nets or contributive/noncontributive pension mechanisms function and complement the subsidies, and who the beneficiaries are.	19. Social protection and poverty	Core government functions / macro-economic stability	-EU to launch a study on "mapping social protection mechanisms" -WB in collaboration with WFP will map social safety net mechanisms available in Libya (discussion to move forward and operationalize the mapping is currently held) -Libya Forum to possibly conduct a study on this topic.	EU, Cash and Market working group and Swiss Embassy, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
Overall coping mechanisms of population—and particularly in relation to the liquidity crisis	2016	UNFPA	Knowledge relating to the coping mechanisms of the population is scant due to challenges in collecting and validating this information. A gap is therefore in having a qualitative assessment to better understand the coping mechanism of Libyan population in terms of adaptation to the cash crunch and liquidity crisis—and in particular in relation to women. (However, a very detailed module should be covering this area in the UNFPA HH MSNA 2017.)	19. Social protection and poverty	Private sector and jobs (include financial sector) / all sectors / overall (humanitarian needs)		REACH

Name of survey/study	Date of latest survey	Conducted by	Planning challenge of lack of data/information	Sector		Planned or ongoing data gathering	Gap mentioned by
				Primary	Other		
Data related to remittances and inflows		Central Bank of Libya	There is at present very little accurate data around remittances, inflows, population of the diaspora, earnings, the beneficiaries, the way in which these funds are used, and what proportion of a family's income they represent, and how critical they are as a coping mechanism. However, Balance of Payments (CBL, latest publicly available 2016) provide aggregate data on Remittances: 0 LYD inflows). So, no remittances through official channels. Libyans are opening bank accounts outside Libya for their international transfers (Tunisia as an example about which I am aware) as a response to the liquidity crisis and to benefit from black market exchange rate.	19. Social protection and poverty	Private sector and jobs (include financial sector)		German Embassy, IOM
Mapping of multiple civil registration systems, and their alignment/overlaps			Multiple civil registration systems are in place without alignment or validation. There is no comprehensive mapping of these multiple civil registration systems, their alignment/overlaps, and the challenges they create for unregistered people to access services.	19. Social protection and poverty	Core government functions / education / health		UN Women
Database of vulnerable people			No comprehensive database of vulnerable people (Ministry of Social Affairs does not have a database; several Ministries have partial databases).	19. Social protection and poverty	All sectors / overall (humanitarian sectors)	Protection working group is currently working with Ministry of Social Affairs to develop database.	Protection working group
Health data disaggregated by urban/rural			There is limited data broken down by urban versus rural areas. (WHO determined in 2017 that there is no clear-cut distinction between rural and urban areas in Libya, concluding that analysis cannot be done at this level.)	20. Health	Health		World Bank
Assessment/data on nutrition			Data on nutrition, especially in IDP settlement where the nutrition status is likely to be poor.	20. Health			WHO
Demand/supply side assessment of skills required in the labor market	2015	World Bank	Rapid assessment has been conducted from both demand and supply sides (Libya Labor Market Dynamics conducted by WB in 2014 and published in July 2015). An in-depth assessment could provide more insights and helps shape education/TVET strategy that would support matching both demand and supply sides of labor market in Libya.	21. Education	Private sector and jobs / key productive sectors		IOM
Status of education sector in the East			No precise assessment of status of education sector in the East, beyond destruction of infrastructure.	21. Education			UNICEF
Enrollment rates in vocational training			No information on enrollment rates in vocational training.	21. Education	Private sector and jobs		World Bank

Name of survey/study	Date of latest survey	Conducted by	Planning challenge of lack of data/information	Sector		Planned or ongoing data gathering	Gap mentioned by
				Primary	Other		
Standardized assessments of student achievement			Absence of standardized assessments of student achievement.	21. Education			World Bank
Standardized measures of the quality of education			Absence of standardized measures of the quality of education.	21. Education			World Bank
Overview of the undocumented population	nil (new)		There is currently no precise understanding in place of the number of undocumented people, especially in the South (mainly Tuareg and Tebu), and their characteristics and particular needs. There is little knowledge on who they are, what documentation they have, their access to support and coping mechanisms, access to services and ability to secure this access without documentation. This demographic has become even more invisible following the introduction of national numbers in 2015.	22. Human rights	Service delivery and municipal services / water and sanitation / education / health / housing and land		REACH, Cash Working Group
Data on human rights violations			There is only limited data on the number of victims of different crimes and human right violations across the country since 2011.	22. Human rights	Justice		Core team
Demand-side constraints on access to services for women (deepen the knowledge base)			There is a gap in terms of greater understanding of the demand-side constraints that affect women in particular. Needs and provision of services are largely determined without the benefit of this knowledge—and will therefore be imperfectly targeted and inefficient. The unique considerations and constraints that women face need to be better understood and accounted for, such as security, mobility, family relations, and the economy of care.	23. Gender	Education / health / social protection and poverty / private sector and jobs / local governance		UN Women
Share of national budget dedicated to women			No assessment has been carried out to understand the share of the budget that goes to areas of focus or subsectors focusing on women ("track the money").	23. Gender			UN Women
Data on gender-based violence and domestic violence			No precise data or statistics on SGBV, domestic violence since 2011.	23. Gender			Core team
Assessment of women's presence in political institutions and economic sectors			No precise data or statistics on women's presence in political institutions, business activities since 2011 and evolutions of women's economic and political status since 2011.	23. Gender			Core team

Name of survey/study	Date of latest survey	Conducted by	Planning challenge of lack of data/information	Sector		Planned or ongoing data gathering	Gap mentioned by
				Primary	Other		
Data on youth radicalization			No precise data on number and characteristics of radicalized youth.	24. Youth			Core team
Assessment of the impact of the conflict on the environment			There is no assessment of the impact of the conflict on the environment.	25. Environment			Core team
Data on coastal, air and soil pollution, and land degradation and desertification			There is a lack of updated and precise data on coastal, air and soil pollution, and land degradation and desertification.	25. Environment			Core team
Mapping of laws, planning instruments and stakeholders on the environment, climate change and disaster risk management			There is no up-to-date mapping of laws, planning instruments and stakeholders active on the environment, climate change, and disaster risk management.	25. Environment			Core team

Annex B

Interviewees and Their Organizations

No.	Organization	Contact (experts met in bold)	Day	Time
1	WBG	Michael Schaeffer , Country Manager	Jan. 28	8:30–9 am
2	Libya Economic Stabilization Project	Ed Elrahal, Imad Saed , Lead on Electricity component	Jan. 28	9–10 am
3	UN-Habitat	Asma Charfeddine , Program Associate (Focal point for Desk Review)	Jan. 28	11–12 am
4	WFP	Jean-Baptiste Paquier, Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping Officer; Yukinori Hibi , Head of Program (Focal point for Desk Review)	Jan. 28	2–3 pm
	Humanitarian clusters – Food Security	Mohamed Alansi (FAO); Shaker Allozi (WFP) , Coordinator/co-coordinator	Jan. 28	2–3 pm
5	Humanitarian clusters – Cash and Market	Erick Gerstner (UNHCR), Coordinator/co-coordinator; Mustafa Hadeed (Mercy Corps)	Jan. 28	4–5 pm
6	EU	Key team coordinating from EUD side: Antonis Tsamoulis , Mary Horvers, Tom Hockley	Jan. 29	9:30–11 am
7		Migration section	Jan. 29	12–1 pm
8		Political Section and EU Liaison and Planning Office (military cell): Sebastien , Head of Political Section; Marc Paternotte , Counter-Terrorism and Security Advisor; Cdr. Francisco Martinez Vazquez , Analyst, EU Liaison & Planning Cell	Jan. 29	2–3:30 pm
9		DG ECHO	Jan. 29	3:30–4:30 pm
10		REACH	Ayah Alzayat	Jan. 30
11	German Embassy	Nathanael Willi , Political Officer / Stabilization; Julius Klüpfel , First Secretary- Political Officer / Migration / Humanitarian Assistance	Jan. 30	10:30–11:30 am
12	Italy	Flavio Lovisolo , Head of Cooperation, Regional Office of Italian Agency for Development Cooperation in Tunisia, Libya, Morocco and Mauritania; Francesco Zatta , Liaison Programme Officer - Desk; Tommaso Antonelli , Libya	Jan. 30	2–3 pm
13	UK/DFID	Ellie Gunningham , Head of Programs; Asma Akremi , Economic Program Officer	Jan. 30	4–5 pm
14	Swiss Cooperation	Romain Darbellay, Jonas Geith , Head of Cooperation; Semya Ayoubi, Human Security Advisor for Libya; Basem Tulti , Program Officer	Jan. 31	9–10 am
15	Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue	Félix Tusa , Project Officer	Jan. 31	10:30–11:30 am
16	UN	Firas Akkad	Jan. 31	12:30–2 pm
17	OCHA	Omar Al Daher , Information Management Office (Focal point for Desk Review); Agnese Spiazzi, Humanitarian Affairs Officer	Jan. 31	4–5 pm

No.	Organization	Contact (experts met in bold)	Day	Time
18	UNICEF	Suad Nabhan, Youth Officer (Focal point for Desk Review)	Feb. 1	9–10:30 am
	Humanitarian clusters – Education	Hind Omer (UNICEF) , Hollyn Romeyn (NRC), Coordinator/co-coordinator		
	Humanitarian clusters – WASH	Cathal O'Connor (UNICEF) , Eltahaen Salem (Alemdad) Asif Mahmood (UNICEF) , Coordinator/co-coordinator		
19	UN Women	Begona Lasagabaster , Country Representative (Focal point for Desk Review); Saskia Bine, Project Assistant	Feb. 1	4:15–5:15 pm
20	IOM	Matthew Huber , Program Manager (Focal point for Desk Review); Antonio Salanga, IOM representative in Tripoli; Othman Belbeisi, Chief of Mission; Ewa Naqvi, Direct Assistance Program Manager	Feb. 4	9–10:30 am
21	UNDP	Mohammed Salih, Program Coordinator (Focal point for Desk Review); Mercedes San Roman , Program Analyst (Focal point for Desk Review)	Feb. 4	11:30 am–12:30 pm
22	Humanitarian clusters – Migrant and refugee platform	Amanuel Mehari (IOM) , Matt Huber (IOM), Philippe Sacher (UNHCR), Coordinator/co-coordinator	Feb. 4	2–3:30 pm
	Humanitarian clusters – Protection	Yasin Abbas (UNHCR) , Davide Caliandro (CESVI), Paola Franchi (UNICEF) , Ken Otieno (UNFPA), Coordinator/co-coordinator		
	Humanitarian clusters – Shelter and NFIs	Julien Peschmann (UNHCR) , Miguel Gomez (NRC), Coordinator/co-coordinator		
23	USAID	Clinton White , Country Director; Sara Werth , Democracy and Governance Office; Ananta K. Hans , Director; Heath Kalmbach, Democracy and Governance Advisor; Ryan D Steffenhagen	Feb. 4	4:30–5:30 pm
24	AfDB	Yasmine Eita , Principal Country Program Officer; Belgacem Ben Sassi, Chief Water & Sanitation Engineer; Kaouther Abderrahim-Ben Salah , Country Economist	Feb. 5	11 am–12 pm
25	GIZ	Matthias Giegerich, Country Director GIZ Tunisia and Libya; Manfred van Eckert, Director GIZ Libya Program (support to Municipalities); Rani Daoud , Deputy Head of program “Support to Municipalities in Libya”; Matthias Bartels , Head of program “Socio-Economic Dialogue Process in Libya”; Amal Kammoun, Bureau Tunis	Feb. 5	2–3 pm
26	Humanitarian clusters – Energy Telecommunication	Pastor Lovo (WFP) , Coordinator/co-coordinator	Feb. 6	9–10 am
27	UN mission – UNSMIL	Matthew Brubacher (Tanaz Khambatta) , Strategic Planning Officer (Focal point for Desk Review)	Feb. 6	10–11 am
28	Altai Consulting	Laurentina Cizza	Feb. 6	11 am–12 pm
29	UNHCR	Fatima Eldiasti , Senior Field Coordinator (Focal point for Desk Review); Maurizio Galata; Lucie Gagne, Field Safety Advisor; Julien Peschmann, Assistant Chief of Mission-Protection; Roda Ismael Aden, Assistant Program Officer/Shelter Coordinator; Philippe Sacher, Protection Officer (SGBV+CP)	Feb. 6	12-1 pm
30	Expertise France	Alexandre Chatillon-Mounier , Director; Mohamed Ahmed Alaswad , Deputy - Team Leader - Head of Office; Yosra Ben Nagi, Microfinance Project Manager	Feb. 6	2–3 pm
31	German Embassy	Sabine Brickenkamp , Head of Development Cooperation	Feb. 6	4–5 pm
32	UN Nexus – UN	James Nunan , Nexus Consultant	Feb. 7	11:30 am–12:30 pm
33	WHO	Syed Jaffar Hussain , Representative and Head of Mission (Focal point for Desk Review)	Feb. 7	12:30–2 pm
	Humanitarian clusters – Health	Hussein Hassen (WHO) , Coordinator/co-coordinator		
34	FAO	Mohamed Al-Ansi	March 4	9–10 pm

Annex C

Lead Technical Contributors

Table C.1 Core Coordination Technical Team

Name	Organization
Antonis Tsamoulis	EU
Mary Horvers	EU
Firas Akkad	UN
Asbjorn Wee	WB
Salim Rouhana	WB
Michael Jelenci	WB
Neelam Verjee	WB
Silvio Giroud	WB
Meline Fulda	WB

Table C.2 Lead Sectoral Contributors and Reviewers

No.	Sector	Name	Organization	
0	Conflict dynamics	Tobias Lechtenfeld	WB	SURR
		John A. Symons	UN	UNSMIL
1	Social cohesion and reconciliation	Tobias Lechtenfeld	WB	SURR
		John A. Symons	UN	UNSMIL
2	Security sector	Tobias Lechtenfeld	WB	SURR
		John A. Symons	UN	UNSMIL
3	Justice	Mercedes San Roman	UN	UNDP
		Rawhi Afaghani	UN	UNDP
		Mary Horvers	EU	

No.	Sector	Name	Organization	
4	Displacement and migration	Tobias Lechtenfeld	WB	SURR
		Lucia Santuccione	EU	
		Matthew Huber	UN	IOM
		Amanuel Mehari	UN	IOM
		Fatima Eldiasti	UN	UNHCR
5	Core government functions	Michael Jelenic	WB	Governance
6	Decentralization and local governance	Michael Jelenic	WB	Governance
		Mary Horvers	EU	
7	Parastatal institutions and SOEs	x		
8	Accountability, transparency, and citizen engagement	Michael Jelenic	WB	Governance
		Mary Horvers	EU	
9	Macroeconomic stability	Khalid El Massnaoui	WB	MTI
10	Financial sector	Khalid El Massnaoui	WB	MTI
11	Private sector development	Antonis Tsamoulis	EU	
12	Key productive sectors	Antonis Tsamoulis	EU	
		Mohamed Al-Ansi	UN	FAO
13	Employment	x		
14	Service delivery and municipal services	Salim Rouhana	WB	SURR
15	Energy	Mikul Bhatia	WB	Energy
		Therese Eva Ferlund	WB	Energy
16	Water	Iyad Rammal	WB	Water
		Cathal O'Connor	UN	UNICEF
		Asif Mahmood	UN	UNICEF
17	Transport	Marc Navelet	WB	Transport
18	ICT	Carlo Maria Rossotto	WB	ICT
		Pastor Lovo	UN	WFP
19	Housing and land	Salim Rouhana	WB	SURR
		Asma Charfeddine	UN	UN-Habitat
		Julien Peschmann	UN	UNHCR

No.	Sector	Name	Organization	
20	Social protection	Surat Nsour	WB	Social Protection
		Vasco Molini	WB	Poverty
		Yukinoro Hibi	UN	WFP
		Shaker Allozi	UN	WFP
21	Health	Syed Jaffar Hussain	UN	WHO
		Hussein Hassen	UN	WHO
		Hafedh Ben Miled	UN	UNFPA
		Moustafa Abdalla	WB	Health
		Mary Horvers	EU	
22	Education	Hind Omer	UN	UNICEF
		Suad Nabhan	UN	UNICEF
		Igor Kheyfets	WB	Education
		Sharham Paksima	WB	Education
23	Human rights	Yasin Abbas	UN	UNHCR
		Paola Franchi	UN	UNICEF
24	Gender	Begona Lasagabaster	UN	UN Women
		Hafedh Ben Miled	UN	UNFPA
25	Youth	Hafedh Ben Miled	UN	UNFPA
26	Environment	x		

Annex D

Mantikas and Municipalities

Region	Mantika	Municipality	Longitude	Latitude
East	Derna	Umm arrazam	23.00875473	32.53174591
East	Derna	Derna	22.63831902	32.75938034
East	Derna	Alqubba	22.24175262	32.76305771
East	Derna	Alqayqab	22.02384949	32.72473526
East	Derna	Labriq	21.99778175	32.78652954
East	Almarj	Jardas Alabeed	20.98692703	32.30273819
East	Almarj	Almarj	20.8338356	32.48571396
East	Almarj	Assahel	21.2527771	32.56194305
East	Benghazi	Alabyar	20.59450912	32.18964386
East	Benghazi	Toukra	20.57222176	32.53222275
East	Benghazi	Suloug	20.25039482	31.66748047
East	Benghazi	Benghazi	20.06700325	32.11707687
East	Benghazi	Gemienis	20.01579857	31.6567421
East	Tobruk	Emsaed	25.04850197	31.61353111
East	Tobruk	Bir Alashhab	24.66401672	31.88667297
East	Tobruk	Tobruk	23.96001434	32.07743073
East	Ejdabia	Ejkherra	21.64989853	29.2962532
East	Ejdabia	Jalu	21.54822159	29.03311539
East	Ejdabia	Aujala	21.29750061	29.14027786
East	Ejdabia	Ejdabia	20.22332573	30.75500298
East	Ejdabia	Marada	19.20439529	29.22137642
East	Ejdabia	Albrayga	19.57386017	30.40624046
East	Al Jabal Al Akhdar	Shahhat	21.86968422	32.80821609
East	Al Jabal Al Akhdar	Albayda	21.74166679	32.76638794
East	Alkufra	Alkufra	23.29319191	24.19876862
East	Alkufra	Tazirbu	21.06247711	25.67994499
West	Sirt	Khaleej Assidra	18.34929276	30.63199425

Region	Mantika	Municipality	Longitude	Latitude
West	Sirt	Hrawa	17.28013802	31.05425072
West	Sirt	Sirt	16.58893585	31.20531464
West	Nalut	Ghadamis	9.490065575	30.12584114
West	Nalut	Alharaba	11.54361057	31.77388954
West	Nalut	Kabaw	11.3406477	31.84633636
West	Nalut	Alhawamid	11.16223526	31.97549629
West	Nalut	Nalut	10.98298264	31.86422729
West	Nalut	Wazin	10.66978455	31.94564629
West	Nalut	Daraj	10.45873547	30.16394997
West	Nalut	Baten Aljabal	11.53674603	32.01739883
West	Almargeb	Alkhums	14.26801014	32.65218353
West	Almargeb	Msallata	14.0417366	32.57992172
West	Almargeb	Qasr Akhyar	13.8461113	32.69666672
West	Almargeb	Garabolli	13.71279526	32.74272919
West	Almargeb	Tarhuna	13.63314724	32.43404007
West	Tripoli	Suq Aljumaa	13.25520897	32.87503052
West	Tripoli	Tajoura	13.35254765	32.88344574
West	Tripoli	Ain Zara	13.26972198	32.8133316
West	Tripoli	Tripoli	13.17779255	32.8966713
West	Tripoli	Abusliem	13.16764164	32.8517952
West	Tripoli	Hai Alandalus	13.12825108	32.875103
West	Aljfara	Sidi Assayeh	13.25361061	32.56111145
West	Aljfara	Suq Alkhamees	13.21977806	32.52766418
West	Aljfara	Qasr Bin Ghasheer	13.18280125	32.68175125
West	Aljfara	Espeaa	13.17680168	32.5369873
West	Aljfara	Swani Bin Adam	13.06725311	32.71252441
West	Aljfara	Janzour	13.02606678	32.82559204
West	Aljfara	Al Aziziya	13.0176239	32.5330925
West	Aljfara	Al Maya	12.88527775	32.79186249
West	Aljfara	Azzahra	12.87246418	32.677948
West	Azzawya	Azzawya	12.72647858	32.76264191
West	Azzawya	Surman	12.57262039	32.75759888
West	Azzawya	Gharb Azzawya	12.62616444	32.76715851
West	Azzawya	Janoub Azzawya	12.56972218	32.3125
West	Misrata	Misrata	15.07973671	32.26193237
West	Misrata	Zliten	14.56564045	32.46756363
West	Misrata	Abu Qurayn	15.25415134	31.44605446

Region	Mantika	Municipality	Longitude	Latitude
West	Misrata	Bani Waleed	13.99505138	31.75696945
West	Zwara	Al Ajaylat	12.37750244	32.75801468
West	Zwara	Sabratha	12.48580551	32.79216766
West	Zwara	Zwara	12.08063793	32.93278122
West	Zwara	Aljmail	12.05955887	32.85338593
West	Zwara	Rigdaleen	11.9867239	32.88710403
West	Zwara	Ziltun	11.86628819	32.94591522
West	Al Jabal Al Gharbi	Nesma	13.32844162	31.39193344
West	Al Jabal Al Gharbi	Azzintan	12.24836159	31.93036079
West	Al Jabal Al Gharbi	Alasabaa	12.86666679	32.03333282
West	Al Jabal Al Gharbi	Al Qalaa	12.56104469	32.04825974
West	Al Jabal Al Gharbi	Yefren	12.52765083	32.06383896
West	Al Jabal Al Gharbi	Ghiryen	13.02114487	32.1715889
West	Al Jabal Al Gharbi	Kikkla	12.69415665	32.06934357
West	Al Jabal Al Gharbi	Arrajban	12.09135818	31.94033432
West	Al Jabal Al Gharbi	Jadu	12.02609062	31.95304298
West	Al Jabal Al Gharbi	Arrhaibat	11.88961601	31.76254463
West	Al Jabal Al Gharbi	Arrayayna	12.34564209	31.99522018
West	Al Jabal Al Gharbi	Ashshgega	12.81697559	31.65002632
West	Al Jabal Al Gharbi	Ashshwayrif	14.25994396	29.97871399
West	Al Jabal Al Gharbi	Thaher Aljabal	12.55160809	32.01273727
South	Aljufra	Aljufra	16.14140511	29.16147232
South	Wadi Ashshati	Brak	14.27214432	27.55163002
South	Wadi Ashshati	Edri	13.05079269	27.44365883
South	Wadi Ashshati	Algurdha Ashshati	13.96969509	27.48309517
South	Sebha	Sebha	14.43169308	27.03315353
South	Sebha	Albawanees	14.90360737	27.26704979
South	Ubari	Bint Bayya	13.65322685	26.64380836
South	Ubari	Alghrayfa	13.00994873	26.52588654
South	Ubari	Ubari	12.76941872	26.58970451
South	Ghat	Ghat	10.17971706	24.96262932
South	Murzuq	Alsharguiya	14.90355492	26.14285088
South	Murzuq	Algatroun	14.53148365	24.88885117
South	Murzuq	Taraghin	14.43088818	25.93709946
South	Murzuq	Murzuq	13.9197197	25.91408539
South	Murzuq	Wadi Etba	13.55670643	26.09427834

Annex E

Map of Libya



References

- ABA (American Bar Association). 2018. "Libya Judicial Baseline Study." Presentation, ABA, Chicago.
- Abdul-Latif, R. 2013. *Libya Status of Women Survey 2011*. Washington, DC: International Foundation for Electoral Systems. https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/libya_status_of_women_survey_report_final2_2.pdf.
- ACTED. 2018. *Rapid Needs Assessment—Benghazi*. Benghazi: ACTED.
- AFD (Agence Française de Développement). 2012. *Preliminary Diagnosis of the General Company for Water and Waste Water (GCWWW) Libya*. Preliminary version—final report. Paris: AFD.
- AfDB (African Development Bank). 2017. "Water Sector Brief Stocktaking Exercise, Libya." Unpublished, AfDB, Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire.
- Al Bawaba. 2018. "Libya Postpones Fuel Subsidies to Be Phased Out by the End of This Year." October 7. <https://www.albawaba.com/ar/-----1196292>.
- Ali, A., and C. Ezeah. 2017. "Framework for Management of Post Conflict-Waste in Libya." *European Scientific Journal* 13 (5). <http://dx.doi.org/10.19044/esj.2017.v13n5p32>.
- Allen, J.R., H. Amr, D.L. Byman, V. Felbab-Brown, J. Feltman, A. Friend, J. Fritz, et al. 2019. *Empowered Decentralization: A City-Based Strategy for Rebuilding Libya*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. <https://www.brookings.edu/research/empowered-decentralization-a-city-based-strategy-for-rebuilding-libya/>.
- Altai Consulting. 2013. *Key Informant Interviews with Businessmen in Benghazi and Misrata in July 2013*. Paris: Altai Consulting
- . 2015. *Libya Civil Society Mapping*. Paris: Altai Consulting. <http://www.altaiconsulting.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Libya-Civil-Society-Mapping-Altai-Consulting-SJD-PUBLIC-.pdf>.
- . 2017. *Libyans: A Media Mapping Research Survey*. Paris: Altai Consulting.
- . 2018. *National Reconciliation in Libya: A Baseline Survey*. Final Report. Paris: Altai Consulting.
- Amnesty International. 2010. "Libya of Tomorrow": What Hope for Human Rights? London: Amnesty International. <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/40000/mde190072010en.pdf>.
- . 2015. *Libya: Human Rights Abuses Continue as Country Descends into Chaos*. London: Amnesty International. <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE1900032015ENGLISH.pdf>.
- . 2017. *Libya's Dark Web of Collusion: Abuses against Europe-Bound Refugees*. London: Amnesty International. <https://www.amnesty.de/sites/default/files/2017-12/Amnesty-Bericht-Libyen-EU-Migrationskooperation-Dez2017.pdf>.

- . 2018a. "Libya." In *Amnesty International Report 2017/18: The State of the World's Human Rights*, 240–44. London: Amnesty International. <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/POL1067002018ENGLISH.PDF>.
- . 2018b. *Libya: EU's Patchwork Policy Has Failed to Protect the Human Rights of Refugees and Migrants*. London: Amnesty International. <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE1993912018ENGLISH.pdf>.
- . 2018c. *Silenced Voices: Libyan Women Human Rights Defenders under Attack*. New York: HRW. <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE1986572018ENGLISH.pdf>.
- Araar, A., N. Choueiri, and P. Verme. 2015. "The Quest for Subsidy Reforms in Libya." Policy Research Working Paper 7225, World Bank Group, Washington, DC. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/21673>.
- Ashour, M.M., and S.M. Ghurbal. 2004. "Economics of Seawater Desalination in Libya." *Desalination* 165 (August): 215–18. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.desal.2004.06.024>.
- BBC News. 2017. "Rwanda Offers Refuge to Enslaved Libya Migrants." November 23. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42095629>.
- Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2018. *BTI 2018 Country Report—Libya*. Gütersloh, Germany: Bertelsmann Stiftung. https://www.bti-project.org/fileadmin/files/BTI/Downloads/Reports/2018/pdf/BTI_2018_Libya.pdf.
- Bhardwaj, G. 2019. "The Middle East's Shifting Energy Politics." Chatham House, February 15. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/middle-east-s-shifting-energy-politics>.
- BuddeComm. 2019. *Libya—Telecoms, Mobile and Broadband—Statistics and Analysis*. Sydney: BuddeComm. <https://www.budde.com.au/Research/Libya-Telecoms-Mobile-and-Broadband-Statistics-and-Analyses>.
- Calice, P., T. Benattia, A. Carriere, and E. Davin. 2015. *Simplified Enterprise Survey and Private Sector Mapping: Libya 2015*. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/910341468191332846/Simplified-enterprise-survey-and-private-sector-mapping-Libya-2015>.
- Callimachi, R., and L. Tondo. 2016. "Scaling Up a Drug Trade, Straight Through ISIS Turf." *New York Times*, September 13. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/14/world/europe/italy-morocco-isis-drug-trade.html?_r=0.
- Campbell, M., and K. Chellel. 2016. "Hot Mess: How Goldman Sachs Lost \$1.2 Billion of Libya's Money." *Bloomberg Businessweek*, October 14. <https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-goldman-sachs-libya/>.
- CARIM (Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration). 2011. *CARIM Migration Profile: Libya*. http://carim-south.eu/carim/public/migrationprofiles/MP_Libya_EN.pdf.
- CBL (Central Bank of Libya). 2018. "Monetary Survey." Unpublished, CBL, Tripoli.
- CEDARE (Center for Environment and Development for the Arab Region and Europe). 2014. *Libya Water Sector M&E Rapid Assessment Report*. Monitoring & Evaluation for Water in North Africa Project. Cairo: CEDARE. <http://web.cedare.org/wp-content/uploads/2005/05/Libya-Water-Sector-Monitoring-and-Evaluation-Rapid-Assessment-Report.pdf>.
- CICC (Coalition for the International Criminal Court). n.d. "Libya." <http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/country/libya>.
- CILG-VNG. 2017a. *Evaluation Report on Transparency and Accountability in the Local Administration in Libya*. Tunis, Tunisia: CILG-VNG.
- . 2017b. *Report on the Municipal Organization in Libya*. Tunis, Tunisia: CILG-VNG.

- . n.d.a. "Evaluation of Local Service Organization in the Libyan Municipalities." Tunis, Tunisia: CILG-VNG.
- . n.d.b.
- CISR (Center for Insights in Survey Research). 2016. *Libyan Municipal Council Research*. Washington, DC: IRI. https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/iri_libya_municipal_councils_presentation.pdf.
- Clarke, C.P. 2017. "ISIS Is So Desperate It's Turning to the Drug Trade." The RAND Blog, July 25. <https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/07/isis-is-so-desperate-its-turning-to-the-drug-trade.html>.
- Cole, P. 2016. *Security Sector Core Government Functions Assessment of the Ministry of Interior in Libya*. New York: UNDP.
- CoR (European Committee of the Regions) ARLEM (Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly). 2017. "Field Workshop for the Kick-Off of Pilot Organic Waste Compost Areas Project in 6 Libyan Driving Municipalities." Brussels: CoR ARLEM.
- Cowell, A. 2017. "Rwanda Offers to Host African Migrants Stranded in Libya." *New York Times*, November 23. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/23/world/africa/rwanda-libya-migrants.html>.
- Crown Agents. 2018. *Developing Libyan Public Administration: Lessons Learned from the PAF II Project*. European Commission. Brussels: European Commission.
- DFID (Department for International Development). 2014. *Libya Private Sector Development Institutions*. Project 203620, Annual Review. London: DFID.
- Die Zeit. 2019. "Libya: 'These Gangs Don't Care If They Smuggle Gasoline or People.'" March 5. <https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2019-02/libyen-oelproduktion-benzin-kriminalitaet-mustafa-sanalla-mineraloelgesellschaft-english>.
- DRC (Danish Refugee Council). 2016. *WASH Situation in Ubari Municipality, Southern Libya*. https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/assessments/wash_situation_report-drc-ubari.pdf.
- Eaton, T. 2017. "An Impediment to Peace: Libya's Lucrative and Destabilizing War Economy." *War on the Rocks*, June 15. <https://warontherocks.com/2017/06/an-impediment-to-peace-libyas-lucrative-and-destabilizing-war-economy/>.
- . 2018. *Libya's War Economy: Predation, Profiteering and State Weakness*. London: Chatham House.
- EC (European Commission). 2018a. "Action Document for EU Trust Fund to Be Used for the Decisions of the Operational Committee of December 2018." <https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/t05-eutf-noa-ly-07.pdf>.
- . 2018b. *Commission Implementing Decision of 10.12.2018 on the Special Measure in Favour of Libya for 2018*. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/c_2018_8257_libya_sm_2018.pdf.
- . 2018c. "EU Cooperation on Migration in Libya." <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/eutf-noa-libya.pdf>.
- Economist*. 2017. "Société Générale Settles Dispute with Libyan Sovereign Fund." May 5. <http://www.eiu.com/industry/article/285397612/societe-generale-settles-dispute-with-libyan-sovereign-fund/2017-05-05>.
- EEA (European Environment Agency). 2015. *ENPI-SEIS Project Country Report—Libya*. Copenhagen: EEA.
- Elbagir, N., R. Razek, A. Platt, and B. Jones. 2017. "People for Sale: Where Lives Are Auctioned for \$400." CNN, November 14. <https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/14/africa/libya-migrant-auctions/index.html>.

- El-Gamaty, G. 2018. "Real Progress in Libya Depends on Women's Empowerment." *New Arab*, April 30. <https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2018/4/30/real-progress-in-libya-depends-on-womens-empowerment>.
- Elgazzar, H., A.R. Lahga, M.B.N. Quota, F.U. Rother, and L. Hargreaves. 2015. *Labor Market Dynamics in Libya: Reintegration for Recovery*. A World Bank Study. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/967931468189558835/Labor-market-dynamics-in-Libya-reintegration-for-recovery>.
- El Kamouni-Janssen, F. 2017. "Only God Can Stop the Smugglers": *Understanding Human Smuggling Networks in Libya*. The Hague, Netherlands: Clingendael Institute. https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/only_god_can_stop_the_smugglers.pdf.
- El Kamouni-Janssen, F., H. Shadeedi, and N. Ezzeddine. 2018. *Local Security Governance in Libya: Perceptions of Security and Protection in a Fragmented Country*. The Hague, Netherlands: Clingendael Institute. https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2018/diversity_security_Libya/executive-summary/.
- ETF (European Training Foundation). 2014. *Labour Market and Employment Policy in Libya*. Torino, Italy: ETF. https://www.etf.europa.eu/sites/default/files/m/01BE9A2F283BC6B2C1257D1E0041161A_Employment%20policies_Libya.pdf.
- EU (European Union). 2018. *Identifying Action to Improve Access to Finance for SMEs and Private Sector Development in Libya, Final Report*. Brussels: EU.
- EU, MoH (Ministry of Health), and WHO (World Health Organization). 2017. *Service Availability and Readiness Assessment (SARA) of Public Health Facilities in Libya, 2017*. Brussels: EU; Tripoli: MoH; and Geneva: WHO. http://www.emro.who.int/images/stories/libya/SARA_3_Service_Availability_and_Readiness_Assessment_final.pdf
- EU, UN (United Nations), and World Bank. 2018. *Libya Risk and Resilience Assessment*. Unpublished.
- EUD (European Union Delegation to Libya). 2017. *Libyan Local Governance Case Studies*. Tunis, Tunisia: EUD.
- EuropeAid. 2018. *Identifying Action to Improve Access to Finance for SMEs and Private Sector Development in Libya*. Brussels: European Commission.
- FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization). 2009. *Groundwater Management in Libya: Draft Synthesis Report*. Rome: FAO. http://www.groundwatergovernance.org/fileadmin/user_upload/groundwatergovernance/docs/Country_studies/Libya_Synthesis_Report_Final_Groundwater_Management.pdf.
- . 2011. *FAO Achievements in Libya*. Rome: FAO. <http://www.fao.org/3/a-ba0018e.pdf>.
- . 2016. "Libya." http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries_regions/LBY/.
- . 2017. "FAO Partners with Libya to Boost the Country's National Capacities in the Agricultural Sector." August 10. <http://www.fao.org/neareast/news/view/en/c/1028232/>.
- . 2018a. *Agriculture and Rural Livelihoods Needs Assessment—Libya*. Rome: FAO.
- . 2018b. "FAO Organizes a Training Workshop for the Libyan Ministry of Agriculture." December 31. <http://www.fao.org/neareast/news/view/en/c/1177590/>.
- . 2018c. *The Impact of the Crisis in Libya on Agriculture: Key Findings from the 2018 Multi-Sector Needs Assessment*. Unpublished, FAO, Rome.
- FAO and WFP (World Food Programme). 2011. "Food Security in Libya—an Overview." Working Paper, WFP, Rome.
- Freedom House. 2018. *Freedom on the Net 2018: Libya*. Washington, DC: Freedom House. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2018/libya>.

- Frontex. 2017. "Frontex publishes Risk Analysis for 2017." Press Release, February 15. <https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-publishes-risk-analysis-for-2017-CpJiC8>.
- GAATW (Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women) 2011. Smuggling and Trafficking: Rights and intersections: https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/smuggling_and_trafficking_rights_and_intersections_1.pdf
- Gelvanovska, N., M. Rogy, and C.M. Rossotto. 2014. *Broadband Networks in the Middle East and North Africa: Accelerating High-Speed Internet Access*. Washington, DC: World Bank. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/16680>.
- GFRAS (Global Forum for Rural Advisory Services). 2013. "Libya." September. <http://www.g-fras.org/en/world-wide-extension-study/africa/northern-africa/libya.html#extension-providers>.
- GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit). 2013. *Libya—Building the Future with Youth: Challenges for Education and Employability*. Bonn, Germany: GIZ.
- Global Detention Project. 2018. "Libya Immigration Detention." <https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/africa/Libya>.
- Goodland, R.J.A. 2013. *Libya: The Urgent Transition to Environmental Sustainability*. Tripoli: Environmental General Authority.
- GOTN (Government of the Netherlands). 2018. "Dutch Initiative: UN Sanctions against Human Traffickers." July 6. <https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2018/06/07/dutch-initiative-un-sanctions-against-human-traffickers-in-libya>.
- GPC (Global Protection Cluster). 2018. *Libya: Protection-Situation Overview, January–February 2018*. Geneva: GPC. [http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/assets/files/lby_protection_situation-overview-jan-feb-2018\(1\).pdf](http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/assets/files/lby_protection_situation-overview-jan-feb-2018(1).pdf).
- Graff, P. 2011. "Berber Culture Reborn in Libya Revolt." Reuters, July 11. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-berber/berber-culture-reborn-in-libya-revolt-idUSTRE76A4PD20110711>.
- Guilbert, K. 2017. "Libya Smugglers Broadcast Abuse of African Migrants on Social Media to Demand Ransoms." Reuters, June 5. <https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKBN1961TP-OZATP>.
- Hamouda, M. 2018. "Presentation of the Proposed Monitoring Programs of Libyans Marine Environment." Paper presented at the ENI SEIS II South In-Country Support to Libya—National Workshop to Identify Libyan Priority Indicators to Assess the State of Marine Environment, Alexandria, Egypt, September 11–12.
- Harchaoui, J. 2018. "Haftar's Ailing Narrative." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 16. <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/76372>.
- HD (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue). 2018. *The Libyan National Conference Process: Final Report*. Geneva: HD. https://www.hdcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Libyan-NCP-Report_English_web.pdf.
- Heemskerk, W., and E. Koopmanschap. 2012. *Agribusiness Development in Libya: A Fact-Finding Mission*. Wageningen, Netherlands: Centre for Development Innovation. <http://edepot.wur.nl/245485>.
- HRW (Human Rights Watch). 2006a. *Libya and International Human Rights Law*. New York: HRW.
- . 2006b. *Libya: A Threat to Society?* New York: HRW.
- . 2013. *A Revolution for All: Women's Rights in the New Libya*. New York: HRW. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/libya0513_brochure_LOWRES_0.pdf.

- . 2018. "Libya." In *World Report 2018: Events of 2017*, 343–51. New York: HRW. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/201801world_report_web.pdf.
- . 2019a. "Libya." In *World Report 2019: Events of 2018*, 357–65. New York: HRW. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/hrw_world_report_2019.pdf.
- . 2019b. "Libya: Civilians under Threat from Militias." January 17. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/01/17/libya-civilians-under-threat-militias>.
- IACS (Inter-Agency Standing Committee of the European Commission). 2019. "Libya." INFORM Country Risk Profile. http://www.inform-index.org/Portals/0/Inform/2019/country_profiles/LBY.pdf.
- Ibrahim, S., and J.M. Otto. 2017. *Resolving Real Property Disputes in Post-Gaddafi Libya, in the Context of Transitional Justice: Final Report of a Libyan-Dutch Collaborative Research Project*. Leiden, Netherlands: Van Vollenhoven Institute for Law, Governance and Society, Leiden University. <https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/rechtsgeleerdheid/instituut-voor-metajuridica/resolving-real-property-disputes-in-post-ghadaffi-libya.pdf>.
- ICC. 2017.
- ICG (International Crisis Group). 2018. *After the Showdown in Libya's Oil Crescent*. Middle East and North Africa Report 189. <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/189-after-the-showdown-in-libyas-oil-crescent.pdf>.
- ICJ (International Commission of Jurists). 2016. *Challenges for the Libyan Judiciary: Ensuring the Independence, Accountability and Gender Equality*. Geneva: ICJ. <https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Libya-Challenges-the-Judiciary-Publications-Reports-Thematic-report-2016-ENG.pdf>.
- IDMC (International Displacement Monitoring Centre). 2018. *The Ripple Effect: Economic Impacts of Internal Displacement*. Geneva: IDMC. http://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/20180608-idmc-economic-impacts-intro_0.pdf.
- IFES (International Foundation for Electoral Systems). 2013. *Libya Status of Women Survey 2013*. Washington, DC: IFES.
- . 2018. *IFES Survey on Voters' Intent: Libya a Nationwide Survey Exploring Public Opinion of the Political Situation in Libya and Voter Intentions to Participate in Future Elections*. Washington, DC: USAID. https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/ifes_2018_survey_on_voters_intent_libya.pdf.
- IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2012. "Libya beyond the Revolution: Challenges and Opportunities." Departmental Paper 12/03, IMF, Washington, DC.
- . 2013a. *Libya: Selected Issues*. Country Report 13/151. Washington, DC: IMF. <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13151.pdf>.
- . 2013b. *Libya: Technical Assistance Report—Public Financial Management Reform Priorities in the New Environment*. Country Report 13/36. Washington, DC: IMF.
- . 2013c. *Libya: 2013 Article IV Consultation*. Country Report 13/150. Washington, DC: IMF.
- IOM (International Organization for Migration). 2014. *Assessment of Priorities for the Development of Libya's Migration Policy: A Strategic Vision*. Geneva: IOM. https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/libya_rapid_assessment.pdf.
- . 2016. *Analysis: Flow Monitoring Surveys: The Human Trafficking and Other Exploitative Practices Prevalence Indication Survey*. Grand-Saconnex, Switzerland: IOM. http://migration.iom.int/docs/Analysis_-_Flow_Monitoring_and_Human_Trafficking_Surveys_in_the_Mediterranean_and_Beyond_-_6%20October_2016.pdf.

- . 2017a. *Displacement Tracking Matrix: Libya's Migrant Report, Round 12, July–August 2017*. Grand-Saconnex, Switzerland: IOM.
- . 2017b. *Flow Monitoring Surveys: The Human Trafficking and Other Exploitative Practices Indication Survey Analysis on Adult and Children on the Mediterranean Routes Compared*. Grand-Saconnex, Switzerland: IOM. https://migration.iom.int/docs/Analysis_Flow_Monitoring_and_Human_Trafficking_Surveys_in_the_Mediterranean_and_Beyond_adults_children.pdf.
- . 2018a. *Displacement Tracking Matrix: Libya's Migrant Report, Round 21, July–August 2018*. Grand-Saconnex, Switzerland: IOM. <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/DTM%20Libya%20Round%2021%20Migrant%20Report%20%28July-August%202018%29.pdf>.
- . 2018b. *Displacement Tracking Matrix: Libya's Migrant Report, Round 22, September–October 2018*. Grand-Saconnex, Switzerland: IOM. <https://migration.iom.int/reports/libya-%E2%80%94-migrant-report-22-sep-oct-2018?close=true>.
- . 2019. *Displacement Tracking Matrix: Libya's Migrant Report, Round 23, November–December 2018*. Grand-Saconnex, Switzerland: IOM. <https://migration.iom.int/reports/libya-%E2%80%94-migrant-report-23-nov-dec-2018>.
- . n.d. "Libya." <https://www.iom.int/countries/libya>. Accessed March 3, 2019.
- IREX (International Research & Exchanges Board). n.d. *Advancing Transitional Justice in Conflict-Affected Contexts: A Case Study for Libya*. Washington, DC: IREX. <https://www.irex.org/sites/default/files/pdf/case-study-libya-transitional-justice-conflict.pdf>.
- IRI (International Republican Institute). 2011. "Survey." Washington, DC: IRI.
- ITU (International Telecommunication Union). 2015. "Fixed (Wired-) Broadband Subscriptions." Geneva: ITU.
- . 2017. "Fixed (Wired-) Broadband Subscriptions." Geneva: ITU.
- Jagerskog, A. 2017. "Water Sector." PowerPoint presentation, World Bank, Washington, DC.
- Jenzen-Jones, N.R., and I. McCollum. 2017. "Web Trafficking: Analysing the Online Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Libya." Working Paper 26, Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva. <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/F-Working-papers/SAS-SANA-WP26-Libya-web-trafficking.pdf>.
- Kohl, I. 2014. "Libya's 'Major Minorities.' Berber, Tuareg and Tebu: Multiple Narratives of Citizenship, Language and Border Control." *Middle East Critique* 23 (4): 423–38. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2014.970384>.
- Lacher, W. 2011. "Families, Tribes and Cities in the Libyan Revolution." *Middle East Policy Council* 18 (4): 140–54. <http://www.mepec.org/families-tribes-and-cities-libyan-revolution>.
- . 2016. "Libya's Local Elites and the Politics of Alliance Building." *Mediterranean Politics* 21 (1): 64–85. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2015.1081451>.
- . 2018. "Tripoli's Militia Cartel: How Ill-Conceived Stabilisation Blocks Political Progress, and Risks Renewed War." SWP Comment 20, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin. https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2018C20_lac.pdf.
- Lacher, W., and A. al-Idrissi. 2018. "Capital of Militias: Tripoli's Armed Groups Capture the Libyan State." Briefing Paper, Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva. <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-SANA-BP-Tripoli-armed-groups.pdf>.

- Laessing, U., and G. Shennib. 2013. "Central Bank Falls Victim to Libya's Rampant Crime, Anarchy." Reuters, October 29. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-chaos/central-bank-falls-victim-to-libyas-rampant-crime-anarchy-idUSBRE99S0X320131029>.
- Lewis, A. 2017. "Libya: Residents in Tripoli Drill through Pavements in Desperate Bid to Find Water." *Independent*, October 28. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/libyans-dig-water-well-test-for-tripoli-residents-a8024646.html>.
- Libya Herald*. 2016. "Suq Al-Juma Protestors Take Over Libyana Phone HQ, Demand Mobile Services to Misrata Be Cut." July 12. <https://www.libyaherald.com/2016/07/12/suq-al-juma-protestors-take-over-libyana-phone-hq-demand-mobile-service-to-misrata-be-cut/>.
- . 2017a. "Copper Thieves Cut-Off Mobiles and Internet in the South." February 27. <https://www.libyaherald.com/2017/02/27/copper-thieves-cut-off-mobiles-and-internet-in-the-south/>.
- . 2017b. "UNICEF and the Disarming of Libyan Children." July 14. <https://www.libyaherald.com/2017/07/14/unicef-and-the-disarming-of-libyan-children>.
- . 2017c. "Tobruk Water Crisis Said to Be Imminent." September 17. <https://www.libyaherald.com/2017/09/17/tobruk-water-crisis-said-to-be-imminent/>.
- Libyan Audit Bureau. 2016. "2016 Report." <http://audit.gov.ly/home/pdf/LABR-2016.pdf>.
- Libyan Express. 2019. "Human Rights Watch Says Return of Tawergha Displaced Population in Libya Still Faces Hindrances." January 24. <https://www.libyanexpress.com/human-rights-watch-says-return-of-tawergha-displaced-population-in-libya-still-faces-hindrances/>.
- LOOPS (Libyan Organization of Policies & Strategies). 2016. *Financial Corruption in the Libyan Economy*. Tripoli: LOOPS. <http://loopsresearch.org/media/images/photo80s3tszrl3.pdf>.
- LPTIC (Libyan Post, Telecommunication & IT Holding Company). 2018. "LPTIC Holds Annual General Assembly Meetings for All of Its Libyan Operating Subsidiaries for the First Time since 2014." February 3. <http://www.lptic.net/media/press-releases/2018/lptic-holds-annual-general-assembly-meetings-for-all-of-its-libyan-operating-subsidiaries-for-the-first-time-since-2014/>.
- MA (Mediterranean Affairs). 2015. "Ethnic Minorities, the Main Challenge for the Libyan Stabilization." June 5. <http://mediterraneanaffairs.com/ethnic-minorities-the-main-challenge-for-the-libyan-stabilization/>.
- Maghur, A. n.d. "Mapping of National Legislations Related to Transitional Justice and National Reconciliation in Libya." Unpublished analytical study, United Nations Development Programme, New York.
- Mangan, F., and R. Murray. 2016. *Prisons and Detention in Libya*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace. <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW119-Prisons-and-Detention-in-Libya.pdf>.
- Mattes, H. 2014. "Rebuilding the National Security Forces in Libya. Middle East Policy Council." *Middle East Policy* 21 (1). <https://www.mepc.org/rebuilding-national-security-forces-libya>.
- Megerisi, T. 2018. *Order from Chaos: Stabilizing Libya the Local Way*. London: European Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR_265_Order_from_chaos_stabilising_libya_the_local_way_T_Megerisi.pdf.
- Micallef, M. 2017. *The Human Conveyor Belt: Trends in Human Trafficking and Smuggling in Post-Revolution Libya*. Geneva: Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime. <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/GI-Human-Conveyor-Belt-Human-Smuggling-Libya-2017-.pdf>.
- MoCIT (Ministry of Communications and Informatics). 2013. *ICT Broadband Infrastructure in Libya Status and Regional Project*. Tripoli: MoCIT.

- . n.d. *Libyan National Frequency Plan*. Accessed July 10, 2015. http://cim.gov.ly/uploads/LNFP_PC_english.pdf.
- MoE (Ministry of Education) and UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund). 2012. *Nationwide School Assessment 2012*. Tripoli: MoE. https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/assessments/libya_nationwide-en_final.pdf.
- MoH (Ministry of Health), UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund), UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), and WHO (World Health Organization). 2018. *Strategic Plan for Reproductive, Maternal, Newborn, Child and Adolescent Health in Libya 2019–2023*. Tripoli: MOH.
- MoT (Ministry of Transport). 2017. *Terms of Reference for the Study of the National Transport Master Plan by 2045*. Tripoli: MoT.
- Muntean, M., D. Guizzardi, E. Schaaf, M. Crippa, E. Solazzo, J.G.J. Olivier, and E. Vignati. 2018. *Fossil CO₂ Emissions of All World Countries—2018 Report*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. <http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/overview.php?v=booklet2018>.
- Nait, S. 2015. *ENPI-SEIS Project Country Report—Libya*. Copenhagen: European Environment Agency. https://ceobs.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Country_report-Libya-March2015.pdf.
- . 2019. *ENI SEIS II South InCountry Support Libya National Workshop Identification of Libyan Priority Indicators to Assess the State of Coastal and Marine Environment: Summary Report*. Copenhagen: European Environment Agency.
- Nichols, M. 2018. "Human Smugglers in Libya Have Links to Security Services: U.N. Report." Reuters, February 7. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-libya-un/human-smugglers-in-libya-have-links-to-security-services-u-n-report-idUSKBN1FR3BQ>.
- NOC (National Oil Corporation). 2016. "National Oil Corporation Statement Regarding Hydrocarbons Smuggling Operations." February 14. <http://noc.ly/index.php/en/new-4/1321-national-oil-corporation-statement-regarding-hydrocarbonssmuggling-operations>.
- NRC (Norwegian Refugee Council). 2018. *Benghazi Assessment on Housing, Tenure Arrangements and Civil Documentation*. Oslo: NRC. https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/assessments/nrc_benghazi_housing_assessment_report_march2018.pdf.
- Obeidi, A. 2017. "Local Reconciliation in Libya: An Exploratory Study on Traditional Reconciliation Processes and Mechanisms since 2011." Working Paper, United Nations Development Programme, New York.
- OCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). 2018a. *2018 Libya Humanitarian Needs Overview: December 2017*. New York: OCHA. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2018_LBY_HNO_Final%20v2.1.pdf.
- . 2018b. *2019 Humanitarian Response Plan (January–December 2019)*. New York: OCHA. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2019_LBY_HRP-FINAL.pdf.
- . 2019. *2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview (October 2018)*. New York: OCHA. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2019_lby_hno_draftv1.1.pdf.
- OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 2013. *Joint OECD/Libya Mission, Mission Report, Tripoli, September 8–12*. Paris: OECD.
- . 2016. *SMEs in Libya's Reconstruction: Preparing for a Post-Conflict Economy*. Paris: OECD. https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/smes-in-libya-s-reconstruction_9789264264205-en#page1.
- . 2017. "Libya Short-Term Action Plan for SME Development." Output of the SME Development Strategy for Libya project. Paris: OECD.

- OHCHR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights). 2014. Human Rights and Human Trafficking: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FS36_en.pdf
- . 2015.
- . 2018. “Migrants and Refugees Crossing Libya Subjected to ‘Unimaginable Horrors’—UN.” December 20. <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24037&LangID=E>.
- Paravicini, G. 2018. “Millions Flow from Gaddafi’s ‘Frozen Funds’ to Unknown Beneficiaries.” Politico, February 8. <https://www.politico.eu/article/muammar-gaddafi-frozen-funds-belgium-unknown-beneficiaries/>.
- Park, D., D.L. White, and W. Bridges. 2017. “Modelling Soil Degradation in Libya.” *Journal of Natural Sciences Research* 7 (24): 30–40.
- PILPG (Public International Law & Policy Group). 2018. “Libya.” Washington, DC: PILPG.
- Porter, M.E. 2007. *National Economic Strategy: Libya’s Moment for Action*. Cambridge, MA: Monitor Company Group. https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/2007-0222_Libya_NES_d569857c-b6a5-4a99-bc70-ed0fc8b344b6.pdf.
- REACH. 2017a. *Derna Rapid Situation Overview: Libya, 15 November 2017*. Geneva: REACH.
- . 2017b. *Refugees and Migrants’ Access to Resources, Housing and Healthcare in Libya: Key Challenges and Coping Mechanism*. Geneva: REACH. http://www.reachresourcecentre.info/system/files/resource-documents/reach_lby_report_merf_december_2017_0.pdf.
- . 2018a. *Access to Cash and the Impact of the Liquidity Crisis on Refugees and Migrants in Libya*. Geneva: REACH. http://www.reachresourcecentre.info/system/files/resource-documents/reach_lby_brief_refugees_and_migrants_access_to_cash_june2018.pdf.
- . 2018b. *Mixed Migration Routes and Dynamics in Libya: The Impact of EU Migration Measures on Mixed Migration in Libya*. Geneva: REACH. http://www.reachresourcecentre.info/system/files/resource-documents/reach_lyb_so_mixed_migration_routes_and_dynamics_in_libya.pdf.
- . 2018c. *Tripoli: Joint Rapid Situation Overview: Libya, 21 September 2018*. Geneva: REACH. http://www.reachresourcecentre.info/system/files/resource-documents/reach_lby_situationoverview_ra_tripoli_sep2018.pdf.
- . 2019. *Libya: 2018 Multi-Sector Needs Assessment*. Geneva: REACH. http://www.reachresourcecentre.info/system/files/resource-documents/reach_lby_report_msa_february_2019_final_0.pdf.
- Reuters. 2018a. “Residents Halted from Returning to Libyan Ghost Town.” February 1. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-tawergha/residents-halted-from-returning-to-libyan-ghost-town-idUSKBN1FL6HO>.
- . 2018b. “Interview—Reunited, Libya Telecom Starts \$1.7 Billion Work Plan.” March 23. <https://www.reuters.com/article/libya-telecoms-idAFL8N1R53JC>.
- Salamé, G. 2019. “Remarks of Special Representative for the UN Secretary General Mr. Ghassan Salamé to the United Nations Security Council on the Situation in Libya.” United Nations Support Mission in Libya, January 18. <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/srsg-salame-briefing-unsc-libya-18-january-2018-english.pdf>.
- Sawani, Y.M. 2017. “Security Sector Reform, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Militias: The Challenges for State Building in Libya.” *Contemporary Arab Affairs* 10 (2): 171–86. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17550912.2017.1297564>.
- Schiavo-Campo, S., W.E. Ashur, M.G. Schaeffer, and D. Tommasi. 2014. *Libya—Managing Public Investment after the Revolution: Background, Activities, Results and Proposals*.

- Washington, DC: World Bank Group. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/693551468188664276/Libya-Managing-public-investment-after-the-revolution-background-activities-results-and-proposals>.
- Schlanger, Z. 2017. "The UN Wants Facebook to Fix Its Human Trafficking Problem." Quartz, September 28. <https://qz.com/1089835/facebook-and-whatsapp-gives-migrant-smugglers-a-platform-according-to-the-un/>.
- Shaw, M., and F. Mangan. 2014. *Illicit Trafficking and Libya's Transition: Profits and Losses*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.
- Shawesh, E.M. 2016. "Libyan Policy in the Field of Public Housing." *International Journal of Research Studies in Science, Engineering and Technology* 3 (10): 11–16. <http://ijrsset.org/pdfs/v3-i10/2.pdf>.
- Sizer, L. 2017. "Libya's Terrorism Challenge: Assessing the Salafi-Jihadi Threat." Policy Paper 2017-1, Middle East Institute, Washington, DC. https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/PP1_Sizer_LibyaCT_web.pdf.
- Svoboda, E. 2015. *Migration in Libya: Transit Zone or Final Destination?* London: Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute. <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/10466.pdf>.
- Sy, A., M. ElAbassi, V.D.P. Tsoungui Belinga, M.H. Bchir, H. Zitouna, C.Z. Djiofack, J. Antonio, et al. 2017. Tunisia—Impact of the Libya Crisis on the Tunisian Economy. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/517981490766125612/Tunisia-Impact-of-the-Libya-crisis-on-the-Tunisian-economy>.
- TI (Transparency International). 2014. *National Integrity System Assessment: Libya*. Berlin: TI.
- . 2015. "Libya: Transparency to Build Trust." Working Paper, TI, Berlin.
- . 2018. "Libya." <https://www.transparency.org/country/LBY>.
- Toaldo, M. and M. Fitzgerald. 2016. *A Quick Guide to Libya's Main Players*. London: European Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.ecfr.eu/mena/mapping_libya_conflict.
- Tubiana, J., and C. Gramizzi. 2018. *Lost in Trans-Nation: Tubu and Other Armed Groups and Smugglers along Libya's Southern Border*. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies. <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/U-Reports/SAS-SANA-Report-Lost-in-Trans-nation.pdf>.
- U.K. (United Kingdom) Home Office. 2016. *Country Information and Guidance: Libya: Ethnic Minority Groups*. Version 2.0. London: U.K. Home Office. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5853db384.html>.
- . 2018. *Country Policy and Information Note Libya: Women*. Version 2.0. London: U.K. Home Office. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/677541/Libya_-_Women_-_CPIN_-_v2_0.pdf.
- UN (United Nations). 2017. Global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration - Co-facilitators' summary: https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/sites/default/files/ts5_co-facilitators_summary.pdf
- UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2015. *Rapid Diagnostic on the Situation of Local Governance and Local Development in Libya*. New York: UNDP. [https://www.undp.org/content/dam/libya/docs/UNDP%20Libya%20Rapid%20Diagnostic%20of%20Local%20Governance%20-%20Synthesis%20Report%20\(Final%20Version\).pdf](https://www.undp.org/content/dam/libya/docs/UNDP%20Libya%20Rapid%20Diagnostic%20of%20Local%20Governance%20-%20Synthesis%20Report%20(Final%20Version).pdf).
- . 2016. *Core Government Functions Assessment—Critical Emerging Issues and Priorities for (Re)Building Government Employment and Public Administration Institutions in Libya*. New York: UNDP.
- . 2017a. "AMEL (Hope): Advancing Libyan Women's Participation During the Transition." Project Document. <https://www.undp.org/content/dam/libya/docs/Signed%20AMEL%20project%20document.pdf>.

- . 2017b. “Core Government Functions: Concept Note for (Re)Building Institutional Resilience in Libya: Strengthening the Functionality of the PC/GNA Executive Office.” Working draft, UNDP, New York.
- . 2017c. *Core Government Functions Assessment—Critical Emerging Issues and Priorities for Local Governance in Libya*. New York: UNDP.
- . 2019. “Support to the Central Commission for Municipal Council Elections.” <http://www.ly.undp.org/content/libya/en/home/projects/Central-Committee-for-Municipal-Elections.html>.
- . n.d.a. “Mapping of Existing Reconciliation Initiatives in Libya—Lessons Learned, Actors, Challenges and Way Forward.” Unpublished, UNDP, New York.
- . n.d.b. “Towards National Reconciliation in Libya.” <http://www.ly.undp.org/content/libya/en/home/projects/Toward-National-Reconciliation-in-Libya.html>.
- UNDP, UN Women (United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women), UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund), and ESCWA (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for West Asia). 2018. *Libya: Gender Justice & The Law*. New York: UNDP. <http://www2.unwomen.org/-/media/field%20office%20arab%20states/attachments/publications/2018/gender%20justices%20and%20the%20law%20in%20the%20arab%20region/country%20assessments/libya%20country%20assessment%20-%20english.pdf?la=en&vs=4403>.
- UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization). 2011. *The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education*. Education for All Global Monitoring Report. Paris: UNESCO. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/A6A39B9E03FAC7F885257846005CB226-Full_report.pdf.
- UN ESCWA (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for West Asia) and World Bank. 2015. *Libya’s Socio-Economic and PFM Challenges and Opportunities*. Beirut: UN ESCWA; Washington, DC: World Bank. https://www.unescwa.org/sites/www.unescwa.org/files/page_attachments/libyas_socio_economic_and_pfm_challenges_and_opportunities.pdf.
- UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund). 2018a. *The Libyan Youth Today: Opportunities and Challenges*. New York: UNFPA. <https://libya.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/The%20Libya%20youth%20today%2C%20opportunities%20and%20challenges.pdf>.
- . 2018b. “Review of Health, Justice and Police, and Social Essential Services for Women and Girls, Victims/Survivors of Violence in the Arab States—Interagency Gender-Based Violence Action Plan.” Unpublished, UNFPA, New York.
- UNFPA and UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization). 2017. *National Consultation about Youth Peace and Security—Libya Case*. New York: UNFPA. <https://www.youth4peace.info/system/files/2017-10/2017%20-%20Report%20-%20Libya%20National%20Consultation%20on%20Youth%2C%20Peace%20%26%20Security.pdf>.
- UN-Habitat (United Nations Human Settlements Programme). 2006. *Libya Urban Planning Agency Newsletter 1* (September).
- UN-Habitat and UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund). 2018a. *City Profile of Al-Kufra, Libya*. Nairobi: UN-Habitat.
- . 2018b. *City Profile of Benghazi, Libya*. Nairobi: UN-Habitat.
- . 2018c. *City Profile of Janzour, Libya*. Nairobi: UN-Habitat.
- . 2018d. *City Profile of Sebha, Libya*. Nairobi: UN-Habitat.
- . 2018e. *City Profile of Sirte, Libya—Rapid City Profiling and Monitoring System*. Nairobi: UN-Habitat.
- . 2018f. *City Profile of Ubari, Libya*. Nairobi: UN-Habitat.

- UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). 2013. *Housing, Land and Property Issues and the Response to Displacement in Libya*. Geneva: UNHCR.
- . 2018. *Desperate Journeys: Refugees and Migrants Arriving in Europe and at Europe's Borders*. Geneva: UNHCR. <https://www.unhcr.org/desperatejourneys>.
- . 2019. *UNHCR Libya Response in 2018–2019*. Geneva: UNHCR.
- UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) and Altai Consulting. 2017. *Mixed Migration Trends in Libya: Changing Dynamics and Protection Challenges*. Geneva: UNHCR. <http://www.altaiconsulting.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/LIB-HCR-MAS-Final-Report.pdf>.
- UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund). 2017a. *Assessment of Water Quality, Sanitation and Hygiene in Libyan Schools*. New York: UNICEF. https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/assessments/libya_assessment_of_water_quality_english.pdf.
- . 2017b. *Service Providers Workshop*. Final report. New York: UNICEF.
- . 2018a. *Education Sector Brief: Stocktaking Exercise, Libya*. New York: UNICEF.
- . 2018b. "Mapping of the TVET System in Libya and Transitional Strategic Document 2018–2021." Draft v3, UNICEF, New York.
- UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), MoE (Ministry of Education), and EU (European Union). 2017. *Towards a Strategy for Teacher Development in Libya*. Conducted in 2013/14 and updated in 2017. New York: UNICEF.
- UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund) and UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2015. *Libyan CSO Mapping: Comparative Highlights*. New York: UNICEF and UNDP. https://www.undp.org/content/dam/libya/docs/LIBYAN%20CSO%20MAPPING%20%20Comparative%20Highlights_ang.pdf.
- UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime). 2010. *The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment*. Vienna: UNODC. http://www.unodc.org/res/cld/bibliography/the-globalization-of-crime-a-transnational-organized-crime-threat-assessment_html/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pdf.
- UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2015. "Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2259 (2015), Security Council Welcomes Signing of Libyan Political Agreement on New Government for Strife-Torn Country." December 23. <https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12185.doc.htm>.
- . 2016. *Final Report of the Panel of Experts in Accordance with Paragraph 24 (D) of Resolution 2213 (2015)*. <https://www.undocs.org/S/2016/209>.
- . 2017. *Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Libya Established Pursuant to Resolution 1973 (2011)*. S/2017/466. New York: UNSC.
- . 2018. *Resolution 2324*. United Nations Security Council Resolutions, September 13. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2434>.
- UNSMIL (United Nations Support Mission in Libya). 2017. "Supporting the Reform of Criminal Justice in Libya to Advance Stabilization and Rule of Law." April 28. <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/supporting-reform-criminal-justice-libya-advance-stabilization-and-rule-law>.
- . 2018a. "UN Statement on Forced Eviction of Tawergha IDPs." August 10. <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/un-statement-forced-eviction-tawergha-idps>
- . 2018b. *Report of the Secretary-General*. August 24. <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/supporting-reform-criminal-justice-libya-advance-stabilization-and-rule-law>.

- . 2019a. *Report of the Secretary-General*. January 7. https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/sg_report_on_unsmil_s_2019_19e.pdf.
- . 2019b. "Eighteen Urban Planning Specialists Trained on Geographic Information System." January 9. <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/eighteen-urban-planning-specialists-trained-geo-information-system>.
- . 2019c. "First Evacuation from Libya of 2019 Brings 130 Refugees to Safety." January 29. <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/first-evacuation-libya-2019-brings-130-refugees-safety>.
- . n.d.a. "Defence." <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/defence>.
- . n.d.b. "Mandate." Accessed March 10, 2019. <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/mandate>.
- UNSMIL (United Nations Support Mission in Libya) and OHCHR (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights). 2018. *Desperate and Dangerous: Report on the Human Right Situation of Migrants, Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Libya*. Tunis, Tunisia: UNSMIL. <https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/LY/LibyaMigrationReport.pdf>.
- UN-Water (United Nations Water). n.d. "Water Scarcity." Accessed March 15, 2019. <http://www.unwater.org/water-facts/scarcity/#>.
- UN Women (United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women). 2015. "Spring Forward for Women Programme: Libya." <https://spring-forward.unwomen.org/en/countries/libya>.
- UN Women (United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women) and Altai Consulting. 2019. "Final Research on the Economic Impact of Conflict on Libyan Women." New York: UN Women.
- USAID (United States Agency for International Development). 2013. "Libya." LandLinks Country Profile. <https://www.land-links.org/country-profile/libya/>.
- . 2017. *Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Libya*. Washington, DC: USAID. https://www.climatelinks.org/sites/default/files/asset/document/2017_USAID_GEMS_GHG%20Emissions%20Factsheet_Libya.pdf.
- USAID (United States Agency for International Development) and IFES (International Foundation for Electoral Systems). 2017. *Public Opinion in Libya*. Washington, DC: USAID; Arlington, VA: IFES. https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/public_opinion_in_libya_2017_english.pdf.
- USPI (United States Institute of Peace). 2018. "The Current Situation in Libya: A USIP Fact Sheet." April 5. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/04/current-situation-libya>.
- Walsh, D., and J. Horowitz. 2017. "Italy, Going It Alone, Stalls the Flow of Migrants. But at What Cost?" *New York Times*, September 17, 2017. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/17/world/europe/italy-libya-migrant-crisis.html>.
- WBG (World Bank Group). 2013. *Doing Business 2014 Economy Profile: Libya*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- . 2018. *Doing Business Economy Profile 2019: Libya*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- WEF (World Economic Forum). 2010. *Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011*. Geneva: WEF. http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2010-11.pdf.
- Wehrey, F. 2017. *The Challenge of Violent Extremism in North Africa: The Case of Libya*. Testimony before U.S. House Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Fred_Testimony3292017.pdf.
- Wehrey, F., and P. Cole. 2013. *Building Libya's Security Sector*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/building_libya_security.pdf.

- WFP (World Food Programme). 2018a. "Libya Country Brief." Rome, WFP. <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2018%2010%20Libya%20Country%20Brief%20October.pdf>
- . 2018b. *Libya MSNA 2018: Food Security*. Rome: WFP. https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000102636/download/?_ga=2.24107134.557203677.1556920481-472197506.1556815628
- WHO (World Health Organization). 2015. *Humanitarian Crisis in Libya: Public Health Risk Assessment and Interventions*. Geneva: WHO. https://www.who.int/hac/crises/lby/libya_phra_may2015.pdf.
- . 2017. "Health Sector Brief, Stocktaking Exercise Libya." Geneva: WHO.
- Wintour, P. 2017. "ICC's Investigation of Libya War Crimes in Dock Even Before Male Rape Cases." *Guardian*, November 4. <https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/nov/04/icc-investigation-libya-war-crimes-male-rape-court-hague-trial>.
- . 2019a. "Libya: Reconciliation Conference Delay Could Fuel Military Solution." *Guardian*, January 18. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/18/libya-reconciliation-conference-delay-could-fuel-military-solution>.
- . 2019b. "Conflict Erupts for Control of Libya's Largest Oil Field." *Guardian*, February 8. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/08/conflict-erupts-for-control-of-libyas-largest-oil-field>.
- Workman, D. 2018. "Libya's Top 10 Exports." WTEEx, July 5. <http://www.worldstopexports.com/libyas-top-10-exports/>.
- World Bank. 2009. *Main Report*. Vol. 2 of *Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: A Public Expenditure Review*. Public Expenditure Review (PER). Washington, DC: World Bank. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/627191468055513565/Main-report>.
- . 2011. "Libya Investment Climate: Enhancing Private Sector Performance for Diversification and Employment." Unpublished, World Bank, Washington, DC.
- . 2012. *Rapid Assessment of the Libyan Labor Market*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- . 2014. *Libya LY-LCNA-Public Services Delivery Cluster: Institutional Mapping of Local Service Delivery in Libya*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- . 2015. *Labor Market Dynamics in Libya: Reintegration for Recovery*. Washington, DC: World Bank. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/967931468189558835/Labor-market-dynamics-in-Libya-reintegration-for-recovery>.
- . 2016. *PFM Training Program for Libyan Public Officials Libyan Public Financial Management Project*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- . 2017a. "Libya Economic Monitoring Note." Washington, DC: World Bank.
- . 2017b. *Libya—Supporting Electricity Sector Reform: Task B—Consultancy Services: Final Report—Fuel Availability and Opportunities for Cost Reduction*. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/817671527059474577/Libya-Supporting-electricity-sector-reform-task-B-consultancy-services-final-report-fuel-availability-and-opportunities-for-cost-reduction>.
- . 2018a. *Digital Infrastructure in MENA: High Speed Internet and the Digital Economy*. MENA Chief Economist Series. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- . 2018b. "Engagement Note on Subsidy Reforms." Unpublished, World Bank, Washington, DC.
- . 2018c. "Governance, Institutional Capacity and Service Delivery at the Local-Level in Libya." Unpublished background note, World Bank, Washington, DC.

- . 2018d. *Libya Economic Outlook—October 2018*. MENA Economic Outlook Brief. Washington, DC: World Bank Group.
- . 2018e. “Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment Global Practice.” Macro poverty estimates (unpublished). World Bank, Washington, DC.
- . 2018f. “Summary Note on the Energy Sector in Libya.” Unpublished, World Bank, Washington, DC.
- . 2019. *Libya—Country Engagement Note for the Period 2019–2021*. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/750661550977483586/Libya-Country-Engagement-Note-for-the-Period-2019-2021>.
- . Forthcoming. *Enterprise Survey and Private Sector Mapping*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- World Bank and PwC (PricewaterhouseCoopers). 2017. *Task C: Institutional Development and performance improvement of GECOL*. London: PwC. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/693071527060298889/pdf/01-Task-C-Strategy-for-Institutional-Development-of-GECOL-Report.pdf>.
- Youth Policy. 2014. “Factsheet: Libya.” Berlin: Youth Policy. <http://www.youthpolicy.org/pdfs/factsheets/libya.pdf>.
- Zelin, A.Y. 2018. “The Others: Foreign Fighters in Libya.” Policy Notes 45, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, DC. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/PolicyNote45-Zelin.pdf>.
- Zway, S.A. 2017. *Libya’s Shadow Economy*. Portland, OR: Mercy Corps. https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/Mercy%20Corps_Libya%20Shadow%20Economy.pdf.

