



The Roots of Violence and Prospects for Reconciliation

A Case Study of Ethnic Conflict in Central Kalimantan, Indonesia

Claire Q. Smith

CPR

Summary Findings

Following the fall of Suharto in 1998, incidents of ethnic, religious and separatist violence have broken out across Indonesia. This paper seeks to show the way in which cultural, socio-economic and institutional elements combine to produce violent conflict, by exploring the 2001 ethnic conflict in Central Kalimantan and the impact on Madura, East Java. It aims to show that ethnic violence was not inevitable—it was a result of socio-economic marginalization of one group coupled with failed state interventions, in the context of the weakened role and capacity of informal and traditional organizations for managing conflict.

The paper outlines the main explanatory factors for ethnic violence in Central Kalimantan, and argues that they are intrinsically linked to the weakness of formal and informal institutions for managing conflict between different ethnic and religious groups. Formal and traditional mechanisms for mediating inter-group conflict were weakened by two parallel processes: internal migration and the breakdown of authority. The paper also illustrates why the role of culture is nevertheless important to understand ethnic violence in Central Kalimantan.

The paper also examines the Madurese expulsion and their return to Madura. With unemployment of over 90% among the displaced community in Madura, most displaced Madurese hoped to return to Central Kalimantan. Conflicts between the local community and the displaced were triggered by competition over resources and emergency aid for the displaced. The majority of the displaced were unable to integrate in Sampang. Conflict mediation capacity in Sampang was already limited before the displaced arrived, especially with high levels of violent crime, and as a result, local authorities were overstretched in managing local conflicts between the competing groups.

From the Dayak perspective, the scope for reconciliation with the Madurese in Central Kalimantan would depend on the role of the elite Dayak leaders in the region, reconciliation within the Dayak community, the capacity of local mediating mechanisms, and the role of individual mediators.

Several key factors affect the possibility for Madurese to return to Central Kalimantan—government policy on return of displaced Madurese; the role of local mediation mechanisms in conflict mediation and reconciliation between Madurese

groups in Madura; and the role of individual mediators, both from the displaced and the host communities. Informal, non-governmental mediators have had relatively more success at leading inter-ethnic mediation than formal government mediators. However, the role of informal local mediators in bridging inter-group conflicts was constrained when their influence was limited to one particular ethnic or identity group; and when they did not have trust from or legitimacy with the other group(s) involved in the conflict.

There were some notable exceptions to the general rule that formal government institutions had limited success in inter-group reconciliation. Government leaders had more success when they worked through inter-village community forums and development forums with representatives from each community/identity group involved in decision making; and relied on facilitation by trusted community leaders. Local communities and community leaders stressed three factors to prevent violence: (i) representation from each community at decision making meetings or forums and adaptation of local forums to include all groups; (ii) account taken of the post-conflict needs of the local and host communities; and (iii) mediation by trusted community leaders who held authority over each group.

The paper suggests three main challenges. First, recognizing that this type of violence may not be temporary or isolated. A second challenge is the exclusion of the grassroots or community level from mediation and peace brokering. The third challenge is managing the complex issues surrounding competition for natural resources and displacement. Specific project interventions for the Bank within its current and projected project portfolio are suggested. The four project interventions recommended relate specifically to the Bank's community-driven development platform, implemented through the *Kecamatan* Development Project (KDP) and the Support for Poor and Disadvantaged Areas Project (SPADA). More broadly, the recommendations link to the Bank's governance agenda, as articulated in the 2003 CAS. Recommendations for the Government focus on the need to improve local governance, raising standards in the security agencies, and designing more inclusive rather than targeted projects for marginalized communities in conflict areas.

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Acronyms

BPD	<i>Badan Perwakilan Desa</i> - Village Parliament
<i>Brimob</i>	Mobile Police Force
DRPD	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah</i> - Regional (provincial) Parliament
FK	<i>Facilitator Kecamatan</i> - Sub-district facilitator of KDP
FK-4	<i>Forum Komunikasi Korban Kerusakan Kalimantan Tengah</i> - Communication Forum for the Victims of Central Kalimantan Riots
IDP	Internally Displaced People
<i>Kades</i>	<i>kepala desa</i> - Village Head
<i>Kapolres</i>	<i>Kepala Polisi Resort (Kabupaten)</i> - District Police Chief
<i>Kapolsek</i>	<i>Kepala Kepolisian Sektor (kecamatan)</i> - Sub-district Police Chief
KDP	<i>Kecamatan Development Project</i>
<i>Kodim</i>	District Military Officer
<i>Koramil</i>	<i>Komando Rayon Militer</i> - Sub-district Military Officer
LKMD	<i>Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa</i> - Village Development Planning Board
PMI	<i>Palang Merah Indonesia</i> - Indonesian Red Cross
<i>Polres</i>	<i>Kepolisian Resort</i> - District police office
<i>Polsek</i>	<i>Kepolisian Sektor</i> - Sub-district Police Office
PPK	<i>Program Pengembangan KecamatanKecamatan</i> - Development Project
RT	<i>Rukun Tetangga</i> - Sub-hamlet Administrative Unit
RW	<i>Rukun Warga</i> - Village Administrative Unit (several <i>RT</i>)
<i>Sekdes</i>	<i>sekretaris desa</i> - Village Government Secretary
SPADA	Support for Poor and Disadvantaged Areas Project

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Claire Q. Smith
London, January 2005

Foreword

The bulk of research on conflict in developing countries tends to focus on large-scale, highly visible conflict episodes, often framed in terms of ethnic/religious cleavages, poor governance, failed states, or separatist movements. The conceptual frameworks derived from the study of large-scale conflicts, while useful to posit hypotheses and analyze broad implications for development policy, tend to ignore conflict at the local level. The latter may not be as destructive as full-fledged intrastate conflicts, but it can nonetheless exact a heavy human and economic toll on affected regions or, in some cases, turn into larger conflagrations.

This paper presents the results of a qualitative and ethnographic study that researched ethnic conflict in Central Kalimantan, Indonesia. The paper illustrates that ethnic violence in Central Kalimantan between Dayak and Madurese was not an inevitable clash between two different ethnic groups. Understanding the violence that engulfed the province in 2001 requires a deeper understanding of the socio-economic and institutional factors that made the violence possible. The main research sources were individual and group interviews, held over three months of qualitative fieldwork in Central Kalimantan and East Java.

The paper is part of a growing body of Bank work that seeks to gain a better understanding of the evolution of local level conflicts based on the experience in Indonesia. The ultimate aim is to consider the extent to which Bank interventions and projects can assist in reducing the potential and consequences of local conflict, especially in terms of the Bank's growing emphasis on, and support for, community-based development efforts.

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Executive Summary

Following the fall of Suharto in 1998, incidents of ethnic, religious and separatist violence have broken out across Indonesia. The causes of such violence were usually attributable to a combination and escalation of many factors, rather than triggered by one distinct event. This paper seeks to show the way in which cultural, socio-economic and institutional elements work together to produce violent conflict. It does so by exploring in depth the 2001 case of ethnic conflict in Central Kalimantan and the impact of this conflict on Madura, in East Java. Van Klinken (2001) and Bertrand (2004), among others, have explored the political dynamics and elite role behind the ethnic cleansing of Madurese from Central Kalimantan. This paper takes a different angle by focusing on the local rather than macro political dynamics in Central Kalimantan, as well as exploring the impact of displacement on East Java. As such, the paper explores the construction of inter-group relationships at the village and inter-village level both within the district where violence was concentrated in Central Kalimantan, and the district where most of the displaced Madurese were relocated to in Madura, East Java.

One of the main aims of this paper is to show that ethnic violence in Central Kalimantan was not an inevitable clash between two different cultural groups. Instead, the paper argues that the violence was a result of the combined effects of socio-economic marginalization of an indigenous group, with failed state interventions to prevent the build-up of conflict and outbreak of violence. This took place in the context of the weakened role and capacity of informal and traditional organizations for managing conflict. To discuss the conflict between the Dayak and Madurese ethnic groups as a special case of ethnic violence alone—a resurgence of the Dayak headhunting tradition against aggressive Madurese migrants—overlooks the socio-economic and institutional factors that made the violence possible.

Section 2 outlines the main explanatory factors for ethnic violence in Central Kalimantan, and argues that they are intrinsically linked to the weakness of formal and informal institutions for managing conflict between different ethnic and religious groups. In Central Kalimantan, formal and traditional mechanisms for mediating inter-group conflict were weakened by two parallel processes: internal migration and the breakdown of authority. First, the influx of large numbers of spontaneous and state-sponsored migrants from the central Indonesian islands to the outer-lying less densely populated islands left indigenous groups in the minority in many areas. As local demographics shifted, and migrants brought in their own social organization systems, the roles for traditional governance mechanisms were undermined in many regions, particularly in the more urbanized areas where many of the migrants concentrated. But the centrally imposed government structures were also inept at managing inter-group disputes and the local community did not trust them to solve inter-ethnic problems. Under the New Order, these tensions were repressed by force. However, following reform to the centralized and authoritarian government system in the post-New Order era, when community conflicts over land, resources, jobs and other problems broke out, there were few effective and trusted systems in place to broker disagreements between different groups at the local level. Instead, political elites easily appealed to magic, tradition, violence and vigilante justice as solutions to conflict.

This paper also illustrates why the role of culture is nevertheless important for a complete analysis of ethnic violence in Central Kalimantan. While culturally specific factors cannot sufficiently explain the why, when and how of the outbreak of ethnic violence in 2001, they are one of its constituent elements. Exploring cultural factors helps us to understand the specific pattern of violence in the region and why social and economic problems took on an ethnic and cultural coloring. Furthermore, understanding local cultures, and the tensions between them, is important for the design and application of conflict mediation and reconciliation strategies, whether by non-governmental or government agencies.

The Madurese were thus the victims of Dayak social and economic marginalization, without effective means to address these problems through either the formal or informal governance systems. Exploring the role of intermediaries in bridging gaps between different ethnic and identity communities—and helping them to reconcile within themselves as well as with other groups—is the next part of the story. It is at the juncture between a political economy in transition and the local cultural and historical context of conflicts, that conflict mediation organizations, agencies and individuals must operate. These mediators are an essential bridge between scenarios of ethnic violence and ethnic peace.

From the Dayak perspective, there are four factors framing the scope for reconciliation between the Dayak and Madurese groups in Central Kalimantan (these are reviewed in Section 3). First, while the provincial government set out the official position on reconciliation and return, the elite Dayak leaders in the region, who continue to resist return in 2004, heavily influenced their policies. Second, the restoration of peace at the community level was conditioned on psychosocial reconciliation within the Dayak community, who had to reintegrate warriors into their community and deal with post-conflict trauma. This internal Dayak community reconciliation in the region has so far been made possible through religious and traditional mechanisms. Third, the scope for inter-group reconciliation in the region was also determined by the capacity of local mediating mechanisms to handle continued disputes between ethnic groups. Even with the removal of the Madurese, many other migrant groups remain in the region, and Dayak leaders were in the process of asserting Dayak law over these other groups as a way to maintain peace. Finally, the role of individual mediators has also been critical for facilitating inter-group mediation. The contrasting view of displaced Madurese, as well as the position of the East Java government, on reconciliation and return is reviewed in Section 5.

Section 4 examines the context of the Madurese expulsion from Central Kalimantan and their subsequent return to Madura, thus helping to frame the discussion of community needs for, and policies on, reconciliation and return. With an unemployment rate of over 90% among the displaced community in Madura in 2002, most displaced ethnic Madurese hoped to return to their homes in Central Kalimantan. Conflicts between the local community and the displaced also blew up, triggered by competition over limited resources and the provision of emergency aid solely to the displaced. The majority of the displaced were unable to integrate in Sampang as they were viewed as outsiders in competition for limited resources and land. Some of the displaced were born in Central Kalimantan and so did not speak Madurese. Conflict mediation capacity in Sampang was already limited before the displaced arrived, especially with high levels of violent crime in the area. As a result, local authorities were completely overstretched in managing local conflicts between the competing groups.

In Section 5, the perspective of the local Madurese community in Madura (those who had not migrated to other islands, but remained on the island) on reconciliation between the host and displaced communities, and between the displaced and the Dayak in Central Kalimantan, is outlined. This frames their view on return and their hopes for the reintegration of the displaced Madurese to Central Kalimantan. There are several key factors that affect the possibility and scope for return to Central Kalimantan for the displaced Madurese. These are: first, government policy on return of displaced Madurese; second, the role of local mediation mechanisms in conflict mediation and reconciliation between Madurese groups in Madura; and, third, the role of individual mediators, both from the displaced and the host communities. The host community in Madura has also been affected by the conflict, but they are rarely calculated into reconciliation discussions. So far, the displaced have been unable to officially return to Central Kalimantan, as there has been no agreement between the two provincial governments over the scale and timing of return. Some go back unofficially for short visits to check on their property, but many were too afraid to do so. The challenges for both the integration of the displaced community into Madura and mediating any possible return to Central Kalimantan are both enormous.

Section 6 concludes by drawing together the findings from the research in Central Kalimantan and Madura. It is divided into two sections. The first summarizes the roots of ethnic violence in Central Kalimantan between the Dayak and Madurese ethnic groups, discussing the three main factors which created and sustained ethnic conflict between the two groups, culminating in the 2001 outbreak of ethnic violence. The second section then considers the roles and relative strengths of—as well as the prospects for—local level institutions in fostering inter-ethnic reconciliation. Informal, non-governmental mediators have had relatively more success at leading inter-ethnic mediation than formal government mediators. However, the role of informal local mediators in bridging inter-group conflicts was constrained by two key factors: first, when their influence was limited to one particular ethnic or identity group; and, second, when they did not have trust from or legitimacy with the other group(s) involved in the conflict.

There were some notable exceptions to the general rule that formal government institutions had limited success in mediating inter-group reconciliation following outbreaks of conflict. When government leaders worked according to certain principles, they had more success in addressing inter-group problems. These principles were: working through inter-village community forums with representatives from each ethnic community/identity group involved in decision making; working through community development forums with representatives from each community/identity group involved in decision making; facilitation of decision-making by trusted community leaders (whether religious or community leader, traditional leader or other respected figure). All in all, three factors were stressed by local communities and community leaders in both provinces as aiding inter-group problem solving, and helping the prevention of violence between different groups:

- Representation from each community at decision making meetings or forums and adaptation of local forums to enable inclusion of all groups;
- Account taken of the post-conflict needs of the local *and* host communities; and
- Mediation by trusted community leaders who held authority over each group.

In Section 7, the main policy implications of the research findings are suggested. First, the broad adaptive challenges for policy makers are outlined. These are not specific recommendations as such, but instead highlight the three main areas which require re-thinking by policy makers. These issues apply broadly to all agencies working on conflict and in conflict-ridden areas. Second, specific project interventions for the World Bank within the Bank's current and projected project portfolio in Indonesia are suggested. The four project interventions recommended relate specifically to the World Bank's community-driven development platform, implemented currently through the Government's *Kecamatan* Development Project (KDP) and the Support for Poor and Disadvantaged Areas Project (SPADA). More broadly, the recommendations link to the Bank's governance agenda, as articulated in the World Bank's current Country Assistance Strategy for Indonesia (2003). Third, further initiatives relevant to the Government of Indonesia are proposed. These focus on the need to improve government at the local level, raising standards in the security agencies, and designing more inclusive rather than targeted projects for marginalized communities in conflict areas. Fourth, topics for further investigation and analysis are highlighted.

“It’s really hard to kill that many people by hand with swords. I had never seen such intense fighting between ethnic groups. This was the most frightening conflict I have seen anywhere during my time in the army. It was the most frightening because we could not do anything. We were not authorized. We could only watch.”

Sub-district military officer, Sampit, Central Kalimantan

“There were three main causes of the conflict. First, the Dayak were left behind for many years. The government was unjust and unfair toward the Dayak with their development plans. Second, culture. The different habits of the Madurese and Dayak were too much for the Dayak to bear. Third, law. If criminals attacked Dayak people, nothing happened. There was no law and no concern from the police. The conflict was an expression of these many frustrations of the Dayak people.”

Government official, Sampit, Central Kalimantan

“We are desperate to go back to Sampit. There we had a good house, now we live in a hut, with many other people. We lost so many relatives there, but yes, we still want to go back. We try to make a living here, but there is so little work! What can we do? It makes our hearts so heavy.”

Displaced Madurese woman, Sampang, Madura

“The Madurese *pengungsi* (displaced) want to put the past behind them and just go home. They don’t want revenge; they just want to go home peacefully. They have nothing here; they only want to return to their homes.”

Secretary, advocacy organization for the displaced, Sampang, Madura

“The dialogue for return of the displaced and inter-provincial peace was started a long time ago. We’ve debated it long enough. Now we need action. People here are so tired of waiting for the agreements in the peace congress to be made into action. The displaced must go back.”

Government official, Sampang, Madura

THE ROOTS OF VIOLENCE AND THE PROSPECTS FOR RECONCILIATION: A CASE STUDY OF ETHNIC CONFLICT IN CENTRAL KALAMANTAN, INDONESIA

1. INTRODUCTION

In February 2001, a wave of killings by ethnic Dayak against ethnic Madurese spread throughout the province of Central Kalimantan. The attacks were concentrated around the provincial capital of Sampit, but killings were reported through the entire province. These massacres were echoes of previous attacks against ethnic Madurese in West Kalimantan, from 1996-1997 and in 1999. It was even more shocking because it was happening all over again.

After three days of hand-to-hand slaughter, the central government responded to the pleas for help from an overwhelmed provincial government. They sent in the Indonesian special police and armed forces to suppress the conflict. The military and the special police forces then restricted their role to one task—attempting to ensure the passage of the Madurese out of the province.¹

Heavily armed special police units from *Brimob* (the mobile police brigade) guarded trucks of the fleeing Madurese, many of whom had been ordered out of their homes by local government officials. These police forces then fled in the wake of bands of Dayak men, armed only with swords. Hundreds of unarmed Madurese women, children and men, abandoned in the evacuation trucks, were rounded up, taken to nearby playing fields, and killed by swords.

“The week before the conflict we went to the market as normal. But then the rumors started about a war and there was fighting everywhere. Nobody could depend on the police to stop any of it. We could only rely on our husbands to save us. The Javanese police were afraid of the Dayak. They just fled or hid....”

Banjarese migrant, Sampit, Central Kalimantan

Meanwhile, thousands of Madurese families took shelter in the grounds of the district government office while their passage out of the province was arranged. The fence surrounding the makeshift camp was staked with heads of their fellow Madurese, and patrolled by Dayak warriors wielding traditional swords. Conditions were horrific in the camp, with no medical facilities for many severely wounded Madurese.

Other Madurese groups hid in forests, swamps and rivers—many were hiding for over a month. Local Dayak villagers, who hid them from the warriors and took them food, protected some rural Madurese. Others died in their hiding places. Children in the temporary displacement camps on the island of Madura, lying just northeast of the coast of Java, were still traumatized one year after the conflict.

All district health facilities closed on the third day of the violence, overwhelmed by decapitated bodies and with no means to bury them. The smell of blood stretched for over 10 miles for the weeks following the massacres.² It is not known precisely how many Madurese died in the conflict. While official estimates report 431 deaths, unofficial estimates range between 1,500 and 3,000.³ One way to estimate the number of Madurese who were displaced from the province during the conflict is to count the number

¹ The following passages were sourced from individual interviews held in Central Kalimantan in February and October 2002. See also International Crisis Group (2001).

² Interview with public works official, Sampit, Central Kalimantan, February 2002. He drove over ten miles outside Sampit in February 2001 to bury bodies in the weeks following the conflict.

³ The higher figure was reported by civil servants who believed the official figure was a gross underestimate. The lower figure is reached by multiplying the numbers of trucks reported to have carried bodies to mass graves by the number of bodies carried per truck (around 1,000 bodies), in addition to the numbers killed in the site of the worst single massacre in Parenggean sub-district (unknown figure, but up to 500 possible).

of internally displaced Madurese residing in East Java: 165,732, as of March 2002.⁴ This was around one tenth of the pre-conflict provincial population of 1.8 million.⁵

The economic and political impact of the displacement of over 150,000 people in less than a week continues to resonate in both Central Kalimantan and East Java. Hundreds of thousands of displaced ethnic Madurese suddenly needed new homes, new jobs, new schools, new medical facilities and new land. Areas previously free from the impacts of ethnic conflict in East Java, though troubled by other sorts of conflict and violence, were drawn into it overnight.

Box 1.1: The Onset of Violence

On the night of February 20, 2001, a Javanese *Imam* [Muslim cleric] sat on guard on his porch opposite the small white mosque of which he was the head. The call to morning prayers was still many hours away, but the *Imam* could not sleep. He feared for the safety of his neighborhood, a Javanese area of the city of Sampit, Central Kalimantan. In the distance, the *Imam* could hear the shouts of Madurese men in trucks and on motorbikes, driving around the town.

For two days recent Madurese immigrants to Sampit had been parading in the streets declaring on banners and through loudspeakers that Sampit town was now the “Second Sampang”—their home city in Madura, an island east of Java 2,000 miles away. Gangs of Madurese were threatening the indigenous Dayak community and inciting other Muslim ethnic groups—including the Javanese—to join them in overtaking Sampit.

The *Imam* heard a boat docking at the small jetty behind his house, but there was no sound of an engine. He thought it strange to hear a boat so late at night, and without an engine. He then heard heavy footsteps—dozens of half-naked men were marching across the jetty and gathering in the small street between his porch and the mosque. Without street lamps, only the glow of cigarettes lit the group.

The men wore headbands, with dark painted streaks over their faces. Each carried a heavy traditional sword, *mandau*, in a waistband. Each man also wore a red armband—the traditional symbol of war. They were breathing heavily. The *Imam* knew then these were not Dayak men from the city, they had come from far upstream, from the forests in the north of the province.

“Brothers,” said the *Imam*, “Where are you going so late? Stop with me for a while.”

The men were agitated as the *Imam* spoke, but one man nodded his head. As the *Imam* crossed the street to the mosque, a small group followed him. They sat down inside the mosque, and the *Imam* turned to one of the Dayak warriors.

“We are all Javanese here, this is my hamlet and I know everyone here. I promise you that we are at peace with the Dayak people—we are brothers.”

“*Bapak* [father], we are not looking for you. You are safe. This is not a religious war. We have come only for our enemies.”

The *Imam* heard another boat dock at the jetty, and his heart began to pound. He tried to keep his voice calm as he recited a prayer and walked to the doorway. He could smell something strange—alcohol and incense. The men were sweating and some of them were chanting, many gripped their sword belts. The men inside the mosque moved outside.

A hollow thump echoed from the jetty as a third boat docked. More men than the *Imam* could count began to pour down the jetty. The warriors began to sing, and cries like birdcalls rose in unison from the group. They marched away. Rushing down the steps of the mosque, the *Imam* ran to the first house and pounded on the door.

“Stay inside! The Dayak warriors are here! The war has started!”

The *Imam* ran from house to house until everyone in the neighborhood had heard him, and then he ran home, bolting his door behind him, his family inside. In the distance, the smell of burning was strong. Boat after boat of Dayak warriors docked at the jetty throughout the night.

⁴ Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2002). Local government figures in East Java put the figure of ethnic Madurese displaced into their province following the conflict higher, at over 200,000. Displaced Madurese also continue to reside in East and West Kalimantan.

⁵ The provincial population of Central Kalimantan as of 2000 was 1,801,504: Central Bureau of Statistics (2000).

The solution to this ethnic conflict, at least for now, has been the assertion of indigenous Dayak political power and the continued resistance in Central Kalimantan to the return of ethnic Madurese.⁶ Traditional Dayak institutions and laws—long weakened by the centralized government system of the New Order⁷—are in the process of being formalized, and traditional councils are being set up to tackle inter-community problems, creating an unclear legislative environment and tension with positive state-sanctioned law. A series of religious and inter-province peace meetings were held between government and community leaders from Central Kalimantan and East Java. But as of yet, there has been no formal agreement to allow the return of the displaced Madurese, or on the terms of reconciliation between the two groups.

The formalizing of the role of traditional leaders, and the assertion of new local laws, derived from Dayak practices, may help to heal some of the rifts between the indigenous Dayak and remaining migrant ethnic groups in Central Kalimantan, if it is managed well. However, this could also be the source of further tensions between ethnic groups and the marginalization of already disadvantaged groups. Assessing the causes of the conflict, its impact on the local and the displaced populations, the possibilities for reconciliation between the two groups, and the means by which this could be done are the central concerns of the paper.

Section 2 of the paper first explores the immediate process and chronology of the conflict, including the triggers and organization of the violence. This section then focuses on contemporary relations between the Dayak and Madurese ethnic groups in Central Kalimantan in the period leading up to the conflict through examining the cultural, social and economic dynamics between the two groups, looking in particular at the origins of the perception of the Madurese as a special threat to the Dayak way of life. The following three questions are explored in this section:

- What underlying cultural, social or economic factors promoted conflict between ethnic groups in the region?
- Why were the Madurese alone targeted by the indigenous Dayak, rather than the many other immigrant groups?
- Which government, security and informal institutions broke down, and in what ways, enabling mass communal violence?

Section 2 shows how the construction of the Dayak-Madurese relationship in rural areas was quite different to that in urban areas; this helps explain why Madurese in some rural areas were protected during the conflict. This section then summarizes the main demographic, social and economic impacts of the conflict on the region.

Section 3 analyzes the range of local mediating institutions in Central Kalimantan and the framework this sets for possible reconciliation following the conflict. The ways in which some Dayak and Madurese groups coexisted peacefully—even during and following the violence—in certain rural areas provides an indication of the grounds for potential reconciliation between the two groups, albeit on a small scale at the local level. This section focuses on reconciliation from the Dayak perspective.

Section 4 focuses on the impact of the conflict on both the displaced and the host Madurese communities in Madura, East Java. The impact of the conflict was felt hundreds of miles from Central Kalimantan, as Madura rapidly became host to around 150,000 displaced people. Yet the subsequent impact on the

⁶ Ethnic conflict in this paper captures conflicts between ethnic identity groups, including ascriptive (birth based) and cultural identity groups, but not conflicts between religious groups. This is narrower use of the term ‘ethnic’ conflict than is generally used in the literature—see, for example, Horowitz (2001) and Bertrand (2004). See Annex B for further discussion.

⁷ Village Law 5/1979 centralized and standardized village level government. This reinforced a lack of downward accountability, and enforced the marginalization or co-option of traditional leadership within the official village government system. See also Antlov (2001), Evers (2000), and Guggenheim (2003).

region of the arrival of the displaced has rarely been told. This section also reflects on the social and economic causes of migration from Madura, as well as locating Madurese culture within the island's context, in order to aid our understanding of the roots of ethnic violence in Central Kalimantan.

Section 5 focuses on the scope for return of these displaced Madurese, examining the political and legal difficulties surrounding both their return to Central Kalimantan and their integration into the host Madura communities. This section also discusses local-level conflict resolution and inter-group reconciliation mechanisms in Madura, which may aid the integration of those who cannot return. Finally, this section assesses the broader prospects for reconciliation between the two provinces and the main peace initiatives organized by the Indonesian government. Section 6 summarizes the key arguments of the paper and Section 7 outlines the main policy implications and recommendations following from this conflict analysis.

2. ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN CENTRAL KALIMANTAN

2.1 The Process of Ethnic Violence

Smaller incidents of violence spiraled rapidly into wide scale mob violence during the early months of 2001 in Central Kalimantan. On February 17, 2001, a group of Dayak, the relatives of a man who had been murdered the previous December in a gambling incident by a Madurese group, attacked and killed four Madurese men whom they suspected of having killed their relative. The day after the murder, Madurese gangs responded with force. In the first wave of wider mob violence, a gang of Madurese burned the houses of the Dayak group who had attacked the day before. Twelve Dayak houses were quickly burned down and 14 Dayak were killed. From this point, confusion spread and some Dayak groups started to fight back, some went into hiding, and others fled.

"In my experience the Madurese are tough and hardworking. They came here as migrants so they had to work hard. But they are also very defensive if anyone attacks them and very loyal to their friends. They will give their life for that. They always seek revenge if anyone hurts them. There is no forgiveness."

Dayak community leader, Sampit, Central Kalimantan

Within just one day the Madurese had taken control of Sampit, they rampaged in trucks, waving flags, and crying, "*This is the Second Sampang*", referring to the district capital of Sampang District on Madura. Some informants reported that the Madurese tried to incite other ethnic groups to join them in taking over Sampit. The Sampit-based Dayak called for help from remote areas on radio-phones, ordinarily used for logging communications. On February 19, two days after the Dayak group had killed the original Madurese murder suspect, the first wave of Dayak warriors from remote upstream villages arrived in boats. They began to spread rumors that more warriors were following behind in order to instill fear into the Madurese community.

"When the fighting started we knew it was serious because so many people started evacuating. It happened very fast. I called all the tokoh-tokoh (community leaders) in my area, and I told them to start evacuating people from their houses as well. The religious council in Banjarmasin (the capital of South Kalimantan province) advised me to leave immediately, but I did not want to leave my people behind."

Protestant Dayak priest, Sampit, Central Kalimantan

In rural areas, where most of the Dayak warriors came from, villagers began to prepare for war around three days before the warriors invaded Sampit.⁸ Dayak warriors reported seeing eagles, the symbolic

⁸ This was the same day that the Dayak took revenge on the Madurese they suspected of having killed their relative. But if the rural warriors started preparing for a war on the same day that the Dayak first attacked the Madurese in Sampit city, the common claim that the conflict was "spontaneous" does not make sense. The rapid preparation time for war at the village level implies coordinated organization from Dayak leaders at the district and provincial levels. Some witnesses to the conflict, now living in

embodiment of the Dayak warrior and a traditional sign of war, flying toward Sampit in the days leading up to the violence. This encouraged Dayak elders to mobilize for war as the eagles led them south, toward Sampit and the Madurese, rather than fleeing away to the North. Dayak elders also reported receiving instructions from their ancestors during traditional ceremonies to organize their warriors to take up arms against the Madurese attackers. Meetings took place in a sacred spot near the provincial capital, Palangkaraya, at which the Dayak elders called on community leaders to take action; the message was then spread to the rural Dayak areas, mainly via logging radios.⁹

On February 20, the first wave of prepared Dayak warriors arrived on the river, following a highly-organized recruitment of warrior candidates. Around 500 men, broken into smaller combat groups - all of whom had taken part in the spiritual selection and preparation ceremonies - swarmed into Sampit and began to round up Madurese and kill them with *mandau* (traditional Dayak swords). At this point, the advantage swung in favor of the Dayak. By then, most civilians—from all ethnic groups, not only the Madurese and Dayak—were in hiding or trying to evacuate. Over the next few days, the killing spread to more remote areas as bands of fleeing Madurese were rounded up and killed by Dayak warriors. Many Dayak villagers reported that as the warriors came by, they hid local Madurese in their villages, or tried to escort them to the evacuation boats waiting at Sampit’s port. Some Dayak were also killed in rural areas as they attempted to protect their neighbors from the warriors; others were forced to hand over Madurese whom they were protecting under threat from the Dayak warriors.

Table 1.1: Triggers of Ethnic Violence in Central Kalimantan: Dayak vs. Madurese Ethnic Groups

Triggers and Dates	Actors
1. Gambling incident where one Dayak is killed with impunity by Madurese criminals. December 2000.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Urban Madurese gangs ▪ Urban and rural Dayak groups ▪ Community leaders ▪ Government (sub-district and district levels) ▪ Police ▪ <i>Brimob</i> (special police forces) ▪ Military
2. Violent retaliations by each side. Arming by both sides. Limited police action. January – February 2001.	
3. Dayak group attacks and kills Madurese. February 17, 2001.	
4. Madurese burn down Dayak homes and kill a number of Dayak. February 18, 2001.	
5. Armed Madurese overtake main town. February 19, 2001.	
6. Urban Dayak radioed rural Dayak for armed support. February 19, 2001.	
7. Armed Dayak invaded Sampit. February 20, 2001.	

Urban Dayak appealed to rural Dayak for “protection of the homeland”. The structures of belief and social organization which bound some, though not all, of the rural Dayak community, meant that when violence was enacted it was highly organized and efficient. Violence took on a form of honor killing, justified as a way to retain their land against the ‘foreign’ enemy. However, before the Sampit conflict, there does not seem to have been a strong tradition of violence in the Dayak community. It was not seen as an acceptable way of resolving common disputes, whether among themselves, or with others, among either rural or urban Dayak. The general sense from informants was that violence was not acceptable unless in the “self-defense” of the community. This was exactly how the “war” in Sampit in 2001 was constructed by the traditional and community leaders as they called for warriors to fight from the rural and urban Dayak communities. But there is also another angle on the conflict from the Dayak perspective. Some rural Dayak were unwilling to participate in the war while their village was caught up in the panic of the conflict. The case in Box 2.1 illustrates how village elites viewed the conflict—and what should be done about it—very differently to other villagers.

shelter in Madura, reported seeing trucks and bulldozers ferrying Dayak warriors, and destroying Madurese houses, in the days following the conflict. Public works officials reported that getting hold of a number of large vehicles like this would have required prior political or financial organization. However, these reports could not be confirmed in Central Kalimantan during this study.

⁹ Interviews in Palangkaraya and Sampit cities, and rural areas of East Kotawaringin district, February 2002.

2.2 The Roots of Ethnic Violence

2.2.1 Cultural Background to Ethnic Conflict

“The Dayak, who had a well-preserved reputation as head-hunters until Dutch colonialists outlawed the practice in the late 19th Century, were far from defeated (by the Madurese). According to the head of the Association of East Kalimantan Dayaks...the word Dayak comes from the Dutch word dayaker, meaning a wild community. What happened next was a full-blown unbridled ethnic war.” (The Jakarta Post, June 2001.¹⁰)

The causes of the massacres in 2001 in Central Kalimantan were widely reported in the Indonesian press as a resurgence of headhunting practices among the indigenous Dayak people. However, by the end of the 19th century, headhunting as a form of warfare was no longer a common practice among the Dayak of Central Kalimantan. At the *Tumbang Anoi* Peace Meeting in 1894, convened by the Dutch as part of their efforts to colonize the Dayak, attended and supported by important Dayak traditional leaders in the Dutch areas of Borneo, headhunting and warfare among the Dayak were abolished.¹¹ While there have been occasional and sporadic incidents of headhunting in Central Kalimantan since that time, it was not until the Sampit conflict in 2001 that it was again used as a method of warfare. Other traditions, based on appeals to magic and other spiritual powers, were also reignited as terror methods and used against Madurese groups during the conflict. Understanding Dayak warfare traditions, as well as the particular cultural differences between the Dayak and Madurese groups, helps to unravel elements of the conflict, and explains why certain social and economic problems took on an ethnic coloring. But cultural traditions do not explain the underlying causes that led to the conflict, nor why only one ethnic group in particular was targeted. These issues will be explored further on.

The outbreak of ethnic violence in Central Kalimantan must be set in the context of centuries of migration to the region, as well as the special political history of the region.¹² The history of relations between different Dayak communities and outsiders dates back to the New Order regime’s transmigration period, before that, to the Dutch colonial period, and even to prior periods of migration (King 1993). The diversity of migration patterns and external influences has led to a highly complex system of ethnicity and cultures on Borneo.

“Dayak people are hard to put into categories. Their home, Borneo, has been a crossroads of racial and cultural influences stemming from all directions—Sumatra and southern Indochina on the West; Java on the South, Philippines and China to the North; Celebes on the East. A great many languages and dialects are spoken. As a result, classification can be confusing. “Dayak” in common Indonesian usage refers to non-Muslim indigenous people of Borneo.” (Fisher 2001, p. 5)

Among the 200 or more Dayak tribes found in Borneo, the “Ngaju Dayak” is the largest of these groups. They live mainly in Central Kalimantan, one of the four Indonesian provinces on the island of Borneo, shared with Malaysia and Brunei (Paddock 2001, cited in Fisher 2001). The other major Dayak group in Central Kalimantan are the Manyan Dayak. According to interviews with Dayak academics at the University of Palangkaraya, in Central Kalimantan, the Manyan and Ngaju Dayak groups were

¹⁰ Kanis Dursin, “Peace remains elusive as ever”, The Jakarta Post, June 28, 2001.

¹¹ Interview with Kumpiady Widen, Senior Lecturer in Anthropology, Palangkaraya University, Central Kalimantan, February 2001.

¹² On migration from the central Indonesian islands under the Dutch see de Jonge et al. (1995). See Bertrand (2004, p. 53), on the political history of Central Kalimantan. The province split from South Kalimantan in 1957 under a decree from Sukarno. This was considered by the Dayak as the establishment of a special Dayak “homeland”, independent of other ethnic groups, notably the Banjarese.

historically divided by the major rivers in the province. Manyan Dayak tend to be more progressive in terms of education, but have roughly the same socio-economic status as Ngaju Dayak.¹³ While different Dayak communities in Central Kalimantan speak a number of dialects, most dialects are commonly understood across communities.

“The behavior of the Javanese population is different to the Madurese. Javanese adapt to the environment where they live. So did the other newcomers. But the Madurese who lived here, lived just as they do in Madura. They do not adapt to Dayak culture at all. We cannot accept this.”

Dayak community leader, Palangkaraya, Central Kalimantan

Box 2.1: Central Kalimantan’s Unwilling Dayak Warriors

In one village, six hours upstream by boat from Kasongan, a river town in Central Kalimantan, the village head described the powerful spirit messages told him to select nine warriors to fight in Sampit. All nine warriors returned alive and unharmed thanks to the power of the traditional *Kaharingan* religious ceremonies, which the village head and the traditional leaders had organized. The village head said, “The whole village hates Madurese and we can never be reconciled with them, they must not return and we cannot live with them again.”

The village parliament representative had a slightly different story, but maintained that he too had fought in the war: “Only three men from the village were warriors. I was one of them. But I fought in Palangkaraya because the conflict was already over in Sampit. We had to fight, it was our duty to protect our people.”

The *tokoh-tokoh masyarakat* (village community leaders), some of the *tokoh-tokoh adat* (traditional leaders) and *tokoh-tokoh Kaharingan* (traditional religious elders) had another story to tell. One *tokoh adat* reported how he heard about the conflict in Sampit by radio and radio phones, “It was on the radio phones we use to communicate with the logging dealers, we got messages on the same day as the war started, that was on February 18.”

But it was not until the following day that the villagers heard from friends in another village nearby: the Dayak in Sampit were asking for help from the villagers upstream. Another village leader said, “We were so worried, but none of us wanted to go to fight because we all wanted to defend our own families, and to stay to protect our village. We all decided it was better to stay and protect ourselves here.”

One young man, the son of the village school’s principal, added, “Maybe one villager fought in Sampit, but we’re not sure. The village parliament head tried to fight in Palangkaraya...but he got there too late...the conflict was already over. I saw him in the crowds, but he wasn’t fighting, he was there just like I was, to see what was going on.” Most villagers agreed—the village was not directly involved in the conflict. Mostly, they were all frightened that the war would reach the village and their families would be hurt. They stayed at home to try to protect themselves.

Language was one of the main markers of difference between the Ngaju Dayak communities and the Madurese migrants in Central Kalimantan, although this distinction was exaggerated following the conflict. Urban Dayak in Sampit and those in the surrounding rural areas reported that most immigrants to the region had at least a basic understanding of their Dayak languages, and so did some of the rural Madurese communities. In some rural areas long-term Madurese migrants were fluent in local Dayak dialects, and some Madurese communities continued to live there in very small numbers even in 2002.¹⁴

However, many urban Madurese indeed did not speak local Dayak dialects—especially the most recent immigrants, many of whom were not living full-time in the province, but moved back and forth to Madura. This linguistic and communal separateness between locals and the newer Madurese was seen by the Dayak community as an important marker that the Madurese (as a whole) had no interest in integrating into Dayak communities. That these immigrants insisted on preserving their own Madurese language and traditions, and did not adapt to Dayak ways, was used as one of the justifications for their

¹³ The two groups usually put forth separate candidates for elected government positions, and the Governor and Vice-Governorships are usually shared between the two Dayak groups (interview with K. Widen, Palangkaraya, February 2002).

¹⁴ Dayak villagers interviewed for this study talked about the Madurese as a group who refused to learn Dayak languages, even while recognizing that Madurese in their own village could speak the local Dayak language.

expulsion.¹⁵ The behavior of these few urban Madurese thus colored the perception of the group as a whole in Dayak eyes. Hence, the Dayak community's historic tolerance of immigrant groups has now shifted to a tolerance only extended to those groups which show a willingness to integrate, or at the least, who will not openly offend Dayak custom.

"Traditionally, Dayak are very welcoming to outsiders. Dayak are not inhuman, they are open to strangers. But there was a long accumulation of bad behavior by the Madurese. They do not want to assimilate. They always bring their pure Madurese culture and don't respect the Dayak culture. Dayak were offended by Madurese behavior. It was a time-bomb waiting to go off."
Government Official, Palangkaraya, Central Kalimantan

Non-Madurese migrant groups in Central Kalimantan generally viewed the Dayak as open to outsiders, provided newcomers adjusted to certain norms of social behavior.¹⁶ The older migrant communities had inter-married with Dayak in many areas and spoke *Bahasa* Indonesia (the national Indonesian language) rather than Madurese. In contrast, the new migrants based themselves mostly in Sampit, and kept to their own Madurese communities. Over the five years preceding the conflict, tension increased between the Dayak and Madurese communities as new waves of migrants and temporary migrants from Madura were flooding in. Temporary migrants based themselves in both Madura and Central Kalimantan in the years preceding the conflict, trading between the two provinces. Following the conflict, this group faced less integration problems in Madura—not only did they speak Madurese fluently, they never completely left their homes or families on Madura. This is in direct contrast to the older migrant communities who lost most of their familial and linguistic ties with Madura. It was these new migrants whom Dayak blamed for rising crime prior to the conflict.¹⁷

The control of the informal sector of the economy in urban areas by Madurese also appeared to have hampered their integration with the other migrant and Dayak groups. Informants in Central Kalimantan said that the way Madurese ran the markets in urban areas led to a fear of the Madurese, further marginalizing them from the rest of the community.

"The Dayak are lucky now the Madurese have left—without them we can live peacefully. Before the conflict there was always a fear about the Madurese. Every day in the market, which was dominated by them, people felt afraid. Now we have no fear to go to the market, to take a taxi, to carry out our business. Even though the economy has gone down and economic growth has slowed since the conflict, even with this result, we are still better off because now we are safe."
Dayak elder, Palangkaraya, Central Kalimantan

However, the lack of Madurese integration with the local Dayak community in urban areas was quite different to the situation in many rural areas, where Madurese had learned the local language, and inter-married with locals. In some of these rural areas, the Madurese were protected by indigenous locals during the conflict. An economics lecturer from the University of Palangkaraya, in Central Kalimantan, said, "In some areas of Central Kalimantan the Madurese were assimilated for a long time. In those areas the Madurese and Dayak have lived together, side by side, for a long time. They have stayed together, even now. The Madurese in those areas did not flee the conflict because the local community protected them."¹⁸ These Madurese were the only ones Dayak leaders reported they would accept back into the province.

Different value systems were in greatest contrast between the two main conflicting ethnic groups in the public sphere in urban areas. In rural areas, the differences were less obvious as the immigrant groups—

¹⁵ Many of the displaced Madurese—especially the older migrants and their children, who were born in Central Kalimantan—cannot in fact speak Madurese. The older group of migrants had problems adapting to life in Madura as, among other problems, they did not have local language skills.

¹⁶ This was reported by informants from different ethnic groups in and around Sampit, Central Kalimantan, February 2002.

¹⁷ It was not possible to obtain crime statistics disaggregated by ethnic group from the police in Central Kalimantan.

¹⁸ Interview held in Palangkaraya, February 2002.

including the Madurese—were much smaller and the communities were far more integrated. Late Madurese immigrants to the province played a dominant role in the informal urban economy in the years immediately preceding the conflict, in ways which frustrated and alienated Dayak groups; there, the two groups frequently came into everyday contact in antagonist rather than constructive ways. While the value systems of other migrant groups also differed from the Dayak system, their differences were not expressed so openly. These groups, who had also benefited socially and economically from migration to the region, were viewed by the Dayak community as less obviously ‘different’ in their behavior. Further, the other migrants did not dominate the informal sector of the economy. On both counts, non-Madurese migrants less obviously contravened traditional Dayak values and came into much less contact with the Dayak community. The Javanese, for example, were not seen as directly threatening to the Dayak, and neither were the other long established migrant groups, mainly Chinese and Banjarese migrants.¹⁹ Recent Madurese migrants were seen as explicit troublemakers and were held responsible for thefts and criminal actions against Dayak in the years preceding the conflict. Hence, the lack of cultural integration between Dayak and Madurese ethnic groups in the urban areas, and the relative acceptance of other ethnic groups, was one of the major contributing factors to the targeting of Madurese groups by the Dayak during the violence.

The form the violence took and the ways in which the Dayak responded to Madurese provocation during the conflict can also be explained in part by cultural factors. Dayak leaders drew on a traditional fighting and hunting tradition which had only survived in the rural areas. They repackaged traditional ceremonies and fighting methods for modern warfare against the Madurese, who they viewed as a deadly threat to the Dayak homeland and culture. Traditionally, headhunting was used against other groups as a means to gain status and respect and to control territory. Victor King writes, “Certainly headhunting was part of inter-group feuding and warfare, territorial expansion and competition for resources. In that sense, one might argue that it was an expression of political relations between groups.” (King 1993) The Dayak felt they had lost status in relation to most migrant communities, but it was the urban Madurese migrants who appeared to directly threaten their right to live peacefully and with prosperity in their own homeland. Thus traditional leaders reinvented the warfare tradition against the Madurese enemy as a way for the Dayak community to assert and regain power.

2.2.2 Socio-Economic Factors Behind Ethnic Conflict

“I am very concerned for the economic situation of the Dayak people. The Dayak were left behind the migrant people by the government. Most Dayak are poor and live in the remote areas. Someone needs to think about them. But the government ignored them for too long. The conflict built up because of this”

Secretary of traditional Dayak organization, Sampit, Central Kalimantan

Two overarching socio-economic factors lay behind the 2001 ethnic conflict in Central Kalimantan and the frustrations felt by the Dayak: loss of Dayak land and the subsequent breakdown of the traditional land management system; and the relative deprivation of Dayak compared to other ethnic groups. These two factors are closely linked to the cultural factors raised in the previous section, as the distinction between Dayak and non-Dayak occupations began to take on an ethnic coloring.

“Land is a basic element of life in any society. If land rights are not protected and land administration is chaotic, tension and disputes over land will erupt. If dispute resolution mechanisms do not function, courts are not trusted, then such disputes will broaden into social unrest and even violence. The arbitrary and non-transparent management and

¹⁹ The conflict dynamics between ethnic groups in the region appears now to be changing, as Javanese migrants on plantations are excluded from government benefits policies, which only indigenous villagers are entitled to. These Javanese villagers now see Dayak villagers as threatening their livelihood and tensions have risen between the two groups. Personal communication with S. Woodhouse, Jakarta, August 2004.

administration of land in Indonesia in the past has aggravated this potential for large scale discontent. Now, as central government powers weaken and people and communities gain political leverage the potential for such conflicts may well increase.” (Evers 2002)

Land is of great significance to Dayak people, as perhaps to all traditional forest dwellers. The literal meaning of ‘Ngaju’ Dayak is “upstream”, reflecting their origins in the upriver forests of Central Kalimantan (Rousseau 1990, cited in Fisher 2001, p. 6). In the twentieth century, in search of farmland to practice their traditional swidden agriculture, many Dayak groups migrated downstream. Many still live upriver, although most Dayak in these areas now practice logging as their main source of income.²⁰ As the Dayak moved downstream, toward Sampit, the major town in the central district of East Kotawaringin, they came into increasing contact with migrants from the central Indonesian islands.

“Migration from Java, Madura and Bali to the Sampit area began in the mid 1930s with the push of crowding on those already-dense islands and the pull of Dutch-managed plantations and early forest industries in Kalimantan. Madurese came spontaneously as Sampit’s early urban economy started to create jobs in petty trade and commerce.”(Fisher 2001, pp. 9-10)

The Dayak began to feel squeezed by outsiders, both literally, with the loss of their lands and therefore access to natural resources, and symbolically, with the loss of their own traditional land ecology system, closely tied to their traditional *Kaharingan* religion.²¹ The plantations and loggers—both legal and illegal workers—limited the availability of land, thus marginalizing the Dayak in what they viewed as their homeland province. Plantation companies also preferred to hire migrant workers rather than local Dayak, as they were more skilled and more willing to take on the work. This exacerbated Dayak resentment and feelings of inferiority compared to migrant communities.

Dayak communities felt increasingly marginalized from their traditional lands during the transformation of much of the region to a commercial plantation and logging system. Claiming traditional land rights under the New Order regime had been difficult. While the Basic Agrarian Law (Act No. 5/1960) recognized *adat* (traditional) ownership of land, implementation of the law was poor and *de facto* recognized titled land only. This left big tracts of traditional lands open for exploitation and acquisition by the government, who then dished out sections to concessionaires with the right connections.

“The forest land is the holy land of the traditional people in Kalimantan. The trouble is that if you don’t have a certificate for the land then the government will take it. If the community fights for their land, they fulfill their obligations under adat [traditional customary law]—but then they end up contradicting the government law. The Dayak community then ends up with a conflict within themselves.”

Economics Lecturer, Palangkaraya University, Central Kalimantan

By 2001 Dayak villagers in Central Kalimantan had not yet taken action to reclaim land from companies and the government, unlike in parts of East Kalimantan where Dayak groups had started to do so.²² However, Central Kalimantan Dayak communities were beginning to sense that their rights as indigenous Dayak to traditional land were going to be enshrined in new local regulations. Many Dayak interviewed

²⁰ On the two field research trips to upriver areas of Central Kalimantan in 2002, each rural Dayak household visited in those areas, in a number of villages spread out along the main river system, relied on logging as their major source of income. Most of this logging was illegal.

²¹ *Kaharingan* refers the traditional religion of the Dayak groups in Central Kalimantan. Categorized under the New Order regime as ‘Hindu-Kaharingan’ in order to fit the five official religions, it in fact bears no relation to Hinduism and is based in local animist traditions.

²² On the positive impact of *de facto* decentralization on traditional land claims by Dayak groups in East Kalimantan, see Rhee (2001).

in Central Kalimantan in 2002 were “*Tunggu perda*” (“Waiting for local regulations (in the district parliament) to be passed”), implying that they were waiting for new regulations which would grant them renewed access to their traditional lands. The drafting of incoming local regulations, which the Dayak hoped would be in their favor, was then also affected by the conflict.

Many Dayak felt powerless about the loss of their lands prior to the 2001 conflict, but since the conflict, and the successful expulsion of the Madurese, some Dayak reported that they felt a new position of power in relation to the local government and claiming their traditional land rights. This was especially the case in the urban areas where the Dayak community had been in the minority prior to the conflict. The dual impact of the prospect of local land law reform and victory in the ethnic conflict created a new sense of Dayak political power.

Aside from the land problems, Dayak community leaders reported that prior to the conflict they felt it was only the migrant groups who benefited from public social and economic resources of the province. They felt excluded from government development programs and health, education and other public services, which tended to be concentrated in the urban areas, where most of the migrant groups had settled. The sense of exclusion in the Dayak community had caused a build-up of resentment against both the government and migrant groups. Dayak officials in the government and Dayak social organizations viewed the conflict as a step by the Dayak to gain recognition by the government and assert political power.

“I want the Dayak to be free from poverty. The Dayak of Central Kalimantan have natural resources, but all the resources are taken by the outsiders. The Dayak are uneducated because they were not treated fairly by the government. The Dayak suffer from many illnesses—but they do not have access to enough health facilities. We want fairness in our social situation. We don’t want a high position; we just don’t want any more discrimination against us.”

Civil Servant, Sampit, Central Kalimantan

As the Dayak community felt increasingly dislocated from their traditional livelihoods in the years leading up to the conflict, they did not believe the government tried to help them recover from this loss. There was a strong sense in both urban and rural areas of the province that the Dayak community had been forgotten by the government. According to Dayak villagers and leaders, the government had failed to provide public services to the remote rural communities. Many Dayak also believed that the government only helped migrant communities, who were more adept at working in the extraction and plantation businesses. Thus, not only the state but also the private sector appeared to favor outsiders over local people.

“It is very complicated in the remote areas, the teachers have no capacity and the numbers of teachers are very low compared to the population. It’s the same with the medical services. Following the conflict hundreds of Dayak moved to the city. Because the Madurese are gone they think they can find jobs here now. The economic gap between the ethnic groups is crucial to understand the roots of the conflict.”

Civil Servant, Sampit, Central Kalimantan

By 2001, the Madurese ethnic group had thus come to symbolize all the problems faced by the Dayak during the years of transmigration and spontaneous migration to the region. As Bertrand has argued, “The Madurese in West and Central Kalimantan represented a group that had progressed under New Order policies. They became targets of what Donald Horowitz has called, an “accumulation of direct and displaced aggression.” (Bertrand 2004, p. 55) The displacement of the Dayak from their traditional livelihoods, as well as the gradual loss of their traditional system of social organization, compounded a sense of social jealousy and economic deprivation in comparison to the migrant communities. The Dayak chose not to target the richer minority groups (such as the more prosperous Chinese or Javanese communities), but the group perceived as posing the greatest threat to their survival and way of life. The

Madurese were the dominant ethnic group in the informal sector, and Madurese made up the majority of the most newly arrived and most poorly integrated migrants to the region. The Madurese also had IKAMA, which Dayak leaders viewed as a powerful and united lobbying group, indeed perhaps responsible for the criminal impunity enjoyed by the Madurese.²³ Furthermore, the Madurese were senior in the military and a Madurese had formerly been head of the regional parliament (DRPD, or *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah*). Thus, in both political and economic terms, the Madurese appeared more threatening to Dayak interests than the other groups.

Paradoxically, some Madurese were protected by Dayak villagers during the conflict. In rural areas, Madurese and Dayak groups were more closely integrated—through inter-marriage, and a long history of living and working next to each other. In these rural communities close inter-group relations, community integration and mutual respect between the two communities acted as restraint mechanisms when violence broke out. As a local minority in remote rural areas, Madurese migrants and their families were quietly absorbed into the local culture and social system. In contrast, in the urban areas, the two communities existed almost completely separately—except for unfortunate and often confrontational meetings in markets and in the ports. It was due to a lack of such integration in the urban areas that it was relatively easy for the Dayak to target the urban Madurese as a threat and to remove them without complaint from other ethnic groups. Rumors of threatening behavior from the urban Madurese population, however, circulated for many years in the rural Dayak community. When urban Dayak called on rural Dayak to defend them, rural Dayak responded rapidly, having no social ties or connections with the urban Madurese community who posed a threat. Meanwhile, many protected the Madurese living within their own communities.

2.2.3 The Failure of Institutional Mechanisms to Prevent Violence

“Alive or dead, we must fight the Madurese until the final blood. We cannot lay our hopes on the government apparatus to protect us. We must always suspect the Madurese.” *Dayak elder, Sampit, Central Kalimantan*

This section presents three types of institutional weaknesses that promoted the opportunity for ethnic violence by failing to channel peacefully the ethnic conflict built up between the Dayak and Madurese communities. Institutional weaknesses helped to solidify the differences between ethnic groups in the region and meant non-violent mediated solutions to the conflict failed. The three main institutional factors were:— first, failed policing prior to and during the outbreak of violence; second, lack of trust in government mediating institutions; and, third, weak traditional mediating structures for managing conflicts between different ethnic groups.

The first institutional failure, and perhaps the most serious, was that police forces in the province failed to prevent violence between the different ethnic groups. The police failed to effectively tackle crime, thus allowing impunity to flourish. Furthermore, when conflicts broke out, they did not intervene as a third-party mediator. The Dayak community reported that although crime by the Madurese community was a problem for several decades before 2001, it had worsened during the five years prior to the violence. Certain officials and some prominent Dayak leaders held the view that the police were not inherently biased toward the Madurese and against the Dayak, but had been influenced by corrupt payments. In other words, they were biased toward whoever paid the most: and this happened to be the Madurese group. Dayaks were also underrepresented on the police force and many locally posted police staff could not speak local Dayak languages, thus exacerbating the divide between the police and the local Dayak community.

²³ IKAMA is reportedly a Madurese community organization, which provides social and economic support to community members. However, it was not mentioned in interviews with displaced and host Madurese communities in Madura, but only in interviews with Dayak community leaders in Sampit, Central Kalimantan, February 2002.

"The warriors in the conflict should not be arrested or tried. They are a sort of hero to the villagers. The warriors fought for Dayak rights and against threats from outside. Dayak love peace, but if their pride is denied, they will choose war as an honorable solution. The situation was like a balloon before the conflict, it blew up and blew up. Both with the logging and the gold mining, Madurese took the products and hurt the Dayak. This happened so often...but the police did nothing about it."
Government official, Sampit, Central Kalimantan

The discord between high levels of crime by Madurese and the failure by the police to make arrests and hold trials against suspected criminals apparently led to the *Kasongan Agreement* in 1985, named after the town where the agreement was signed. The agreement, apparently between representatives of both the Madurese and Dayak communities, proposed that if crime and violence against the Dayak community by Madurese migrants continued, the entire Madurese community would have to leave the province. All senior Dayak leaders interviewed for this study referred to the *Kasongan Agreement* as a direct justification for the forced departure of the Madurese. The document itself is unavailable.²⁴ Village communities had a limited understanding of the details of the document, but some believed it legitimated Dayak actions against the Madurese during the conflict.²⁵

"The Madurese had been stealing from and threatening the Dayak long before the conflict broke out in 2001. In 1985 we held a peace meeting in Kasongan after a long series of conflicts between Dayak and Madurese. The Kasongan meeting was meant to stop any more conflict. At the meeting representatives from both sides were there. The Madurese representative who signed the agreement was a Major from the army. He was the district military representative at the time. He was also the head of the local parliament. Most importantly, he was the community leader of the Madurese. At the signing of the Agreement there were four Madurese representatives, including the Major, and four or maybe six Dayak leaders. The most significant part of the agreement was this: if the Madurese continued to murder Dayak people, they would all have to leave the region. As the highest Madurese leader had signed the agreement, we [the Dayak] believed they would abide by this rule. The Major wanted the murders to stop as much as we did."
Dayak Elder, witness to the Kasongan Agreement. Palangkaraya, Central Kalimantan

Tension further increased between the Dayak and Madurese communities between 1996 and 2001, with the arrival of new waves of migrants and temporary migrants from Madura.²⁶ Many Dayak villagers also reported that local government and law enforcement agencies did not respond to criminal attacks by the Madurese against the Dayak community.²⁷ When a Dayak man was murdered at the gambling venue close to Sampit in December 2000 by a group of Madurese men, rumors immediately spread of anticipated retaliations. Informants in urban areas around Sampit reported that the open arming and preparation for violence began to take place on both sides right after the gambling incident. No police action appeared to have been taken against the suspects involved in the gambling incident or to prevent the inevitable rumors from escalating.

²⁴ No informant interviewed for this study could identify where the original document of the *Kasongan Agreement* was stored. Whether legend or actual law, Dayak leaders believed this document justified their actions against the Madurese.

²⁵ There was no indication from the displaced Madurese community interviewed in Madura that they had ever agreed to the terms of the *Kasongan Agreement* - or that they had heard about it.

²⁶ Temporary migrants based themselves in Madura and Central Kalimantan, traveling and trading between the two provinces.

²⁷ Many informants reported that the Madurese were the worst criminal offenders prior to the conflict, but this could not be verified through official police data.

"The murders of Dayak people by the Madurese continued long after the Kasongan Peace Agreement. No punishments from the government and no legal process ever took place. The Madurese community said later that they had never seen the agreement. Perhaps the Madurese thought they would lose their identity if they agreed to the terms. It seems that by trial and error they tested Dayak to see if we were serious about the terms. They carried on being criminals and the police never stopped them. By the time of the Sampit conflict, it was time for us to take action against the Madurese outsiders who continued to attack us, with nobody ever doing anything about it. Going to war was the only way to resolve the problem."

Dayak Elder, witness to the Kasongan Agreement. Palangkaraya, Central Kalimantan

The response of the military to the outbreak of open conflict was also completely ineffective, but not because the local military were not trained to handle such a problem. Local level military forces were restricted to their barracks and were authorized only to assist evacuation. Inhabitants around outer *kelurahan* (urban villages) in Sampit said sub-district military barracks were one of the few safe havens for shelter. The role of the local military could have been much greater in preventing the violence, not only because of their experience and training in repressing conflicts elsewhere in Indonesia—residents around Sampit reported that local military officers were often approached to mediate and resolve local conflicts in the past. Officers at local military offices (*Koramil*) around Sampit also had detailed records of every violent incident at the sub-district level, which they closely monitored and reported on when events were serious, but they could not officially respond to these incidents because it was not in their jurisdiction.

"It was very frustrating. We are trained to handle situations like this, but we had to sit and watch from our military station. All we could do was shelter refugees. We could have isolated the fighters and cut them off from each other. But we were ordered not to intervene. There was nothing I could do."

Sub-district military chief, Sampit, Central Kalimantan

So while the police were designated to handle the security situation by the district and provincial governments, their main objective during the violence was solely to protect those trying to evacuate. Too late, they asked for military back-up to block off access to Sampit. Even this task was too much for the combined efforts of the security forces. Even where the police were stationed to prevent further warriors coming in from the rural areas, the warriors managed to slip through.

"On the first and second day the Madurese dominated the town, but on the third day the Dayak took over from the rivers. First the warriors tried to pass over the big bridge north of Sampit, but this was blocked by the police. So they landed by river, 87 Dayak warriors arrived in the first wave from the rivers. The army and the police could not believe this would happen, they were very unprepared. The police and the army tried to protect the river banks then, which meant they left the bridge open. And then more Dayak, second waves, swarmed over the bridge. It was out of control."

Protestant priest,, Sampit, Central Kalimantan

In Sampit, a protected area for Madurese was set up around the district government office. In rural areas the lack of security forces, and the failure of those who were stationed there to act effectively, meant local Madurese were even more vulnerable. In Parenggean sub-district, three hours drive from Sampit, *Brimob* troops—the mobile police force sent in from Jakarta specifically to assist the evacuation of the Madurese—fled upon the arrival of local brigades of Dayak warriors. Over three trucks of Madurese evacuees were murdered in one incident following the departure of the *Brimob* brigades.²⁸ Hundreds more Madurese were then killed in the days following that event. Local government officials—some of whom were Dayak themselves—attempted to bargain with the Dayak warriors, with minimal police back-up, in order to let the Madurese evacuees travel to safety. Unfortunately they failed.

"We found around 500 Madurese hiding in the forests around the town. The Dayak warriors came back to get them. We tried to bargain for them, but they said no. There was only me and ten police left here—and they were afraid. I had the support of local Dayak, but the warriors were from another kecamatan (sub-district). We could not reach an

²⁸ Interviews in Parenggean sub-district, Central Kalimantan, February 2002.

agreement.... It was terrible.... Finally we had to surrender the Madurese we had sheltered to the Dayak warriors. I had to bury all the bodies myself.”
Sub-district civil servant, Central Kalimantan

In a final blow to the provision of effective security, military and police forces exchanged fire during the conflict.²⁹ Worse still, a new district police chief was assigned on the second day of the conflict. The new chief arrived unprepared for the scale of the violence and unfamiliar with the environment, facing a police force lacking adequate intelligence due to low Dayak language ability and a limited presence on the ground. To finish it off, military and police officers were reported to have extorted money from fleeing Madurese as they attempted to board the evacuation boats.³⁰ The official provision of security had been a disaster

“The Dayak people had already stamped all government apparatuses as bad before the conflict. The Dayak community could not find a good person who they could ask for help for their problems. The Governor, the Bupati (district head), the Camat (sub-district head), the Lurah (village head), the police, the army: they were all unfair and dishonest figures for the community.”
Elder Dayak villager, Sampit, Central Kalimantan

The second factor which added to formal institutional weakness in preventing the conflict was a lack of trust in local government from the Dayak and other ethnic communities. This lack of trust meant that when government officials tried to intervene to prevent conflict at the village level, they often failed. The formal government conflict-mediating institutions were also limited by a lack of support from higher levels of government.

“Before and during the conflict, it is said that Pak Camat (the sub-district head), Lurah (village head) and Koramil (sub-district military), had already persuaded the community not to participate in the conflict and not to be influenced by rumors. But the community still took their own decision and disobeyed the government’s advice.”
Sub-district civil servant, Sampit, Central Kalimantan

Many villagers reported that their village governments had not been able to tackle their problems and they lost trust in government officials to help them. Village governments in rural areas of the province had very low capacity to manage local problems. This was due to the combined effect of a highly centralized government system, whereby every decision had to go through the village head to higher government officials, often many hours away by river and road, and the isolation of many rural villages from public services.

“We have no success in our village because of the domination of the village head. We cannot move on, everything has slowed down and it’s getting worse. It’s just macet (blocked) over the last six years, before and after the Madurese left. There is nothing but conflict here - between the village leaders from the old government and now the village parliament here. It’s impossible to resolve the problems on our own, but who can help us?”
Dayak villager, Central Kalimantan

The third institutional factor contributing to the conflict was the weakness of informal or traditional mediation mechanisms. Before the biggest waves of migration from the islands of central Indonesia in the latter half of the twentieth century and the impact of centralized government on community power structures, traditional Dayak rule systems had played an important role in governing communities. Some of these mechanisms remained active in the more remote areas of the province, such as in the upstream forests, where a complex system of *adat* (traditional law)-based rules and sanctions controlled crime and mediated disputes. These systems continued to restrain and manage a range of tensions within communities following the conflict, but only in the majority Dayak villages in rural areas. Partly as a result of the success of ‘traditional’ Dayak (rather than governmental) methods in solving the Madurese problem through expulsion, many Dayak leaders planned to assert Dayak traditional laws and Dayak

²⁹ Interview in Sampit, Central Kalimantan, February 2002. See also, ICG (2001).

³⁰ Interviews in Sampit, Central Kalimantan, February 2002; and in Sampang district, Madura, June 2002.

authority across the province and apply it to all resident ethnic groups, whether migrant or indigenous communities.

"For the last 40 years, hukum adat (traditional customary law) was weakened by the domination of the national law. Sometimes the national law contradicts traditional law, but we are Dayak and we have to follow traditional law first. It is our first law that we must follow and our community must be guided by it."

Economics Lecturer, Palangkaraya University, Central Kalimantan

The role of traditional (*adat*) mediating institutions in the Dayak community had been long undermined by the imposition of the centralized government system under Suharto. Under the New Order, government administrative structures overrode all other forms of social organization across Indonesia. This was carried out through the implementation of the Village Laws in the late 1970s which made administrative village and other units of government uniform across the country, disempowering many local communities who lived according to tradition and custom. While traditional mediating and dispute resolution mechanisms were not officially outlawed, their power was substantially marginalized.³¹ For many rural Dayak communities, this tension between national and traditional or customary law, had diminished local understanding of and respect for traditional rules.

"Now, the damang (traditional Dayak leader) implements adat (traditional customary law) at the kecamatan (sub-district) and village levels. For example, if there is a conflict in one village he must diagnose the problem according to adat rules. Then he can determine the proper fine and punishment. But when the police want to implement national law, for example to arrest a thief, this might contradict adat. There are more problems when migrants do not obey adat. This confusion causes many problems for Dayak people."

Dayak community leader, Central Kalimantan

The confusion for Dayak villagers between the proper applications of traditional or positive law to community problems was less pronounced in urbanized areas of East Kotawaringin district. Here, a functioning traditional system was largely absent, rather than in conflict with any other system. Nevertheless, the application of different systems of law to the same problem had aggrieved Dayak leaders in the urban areas as well; they believed that Dayak codes of behavior should be applied to all groups, and to all problems, but, prior to the conflict, they did not have the power to enforce it.

Several forms of institutional breakdown therefore contributed to the explosion of ethnic conflict, adding to the cultural, social and economic problems already described. There was an almost total breakdown of trust between the Dayak community and state institutions responsible for law and order. The Dayak community also did not trust local government authorities to mediate problems between Dayak and Madurese³². Criminals had impunity and the Madurese were seen as the worst culprits. The failure by the state to address crime led to a build-up of fear and frustration within the Dayak community, which was eventually targeted against the Madurese group. The Madurese became a scapegoat for the range of social, economic and criminal problems in the region.

Previous attempts by both Madurese and Dayak community leaders to broker inter-group problems had failed. The 1985 *Kasongan* Agreement between the Dayak and Madurese appears not have represented the Madurese side effectively. At the least, there was very little awareness of this agreement and the conditions it apparently set upon those Madurese who stayed in the region after 1985. The failure of this peace agreement meant that Dayak elders no longer trusted the Madurese leaders to restrain their community from crime against the Dayak. There was therefore no competent or trusted institution capable of mediating the conflict between both communities. When community tensions rose, and the Madurese began to take over Sampit, no effective systems were in place to mediate between the two

³¹ See Evers (2000), Fisher (2001), and Guggenheim (2003).

³² See Table 3.1 for a complete summary of mediation mechanisms in the region.

groups at any level. Spiritual and magical powers, and traditional warfare methods, were seen as the only effective solution to the ‘Madurese’ problem by Dayak leaders. When the violence finally broke out, a lethal combination of institutional failures to intervene and the failure by the authorities to arrest the ringleaders made massacres possible.

2.3 The Local Impact of Ethnic Violence

Ethnic violence in Central Kalimantan had demographic, economic and social impacts; these hit East Kotawaringin district most deeply.³³ Demographically, the province was radically changed after the conflict. Around 150,000 Madurese from Central Kalimantan were evacuated, some to temporary camps in South and West Kalimantan, but the majority was shipped to the island of Madura, off the coast of East Java.³⁴ As noted earlier, the provincial government officially estimated that 431 people died in the district of East Kotawaringin, but unofficially civil servants reported much higher fatality rates of around 3,000 dead.

In the year following the conflict, there was a dramatic economic downturn. The downturn fell hardest on Sampit, where over 40% of the population had been evacuated or killed, but it was also felt across the rural areas.³⁵ Trade, consumption and production all dropped, according to small business holders in Sampit. Most traders and port workers, and the majority of the informal economic sector, had been Madurese. Unemployment also rose following the conflict, according to local sources.³⁶ The economic impact of the departure of the Madurese coincided with a government crackdown on illegal logging. While there were signs that the crackdown was short-lived, local residents reported that trade declined due to the departure of the mercantile Madurese as well as those involved with illegal logging.³⁷ The provincial economy later upturned, with a 20% increase in the value of exports from February to March 2002. This was caused by increasing demand for several wood commodities, among other factors.³⁸ Later on in 2002, it appeared that Dayak and other ethnic groups had begun to fill the jobs Madurese had formerly held.

According to the local police, theft fell by around 30% following the departure of the Madurese.³⁹ Simultaneously, the district police in Sampit recorded an approximate 30% increase in violent crime, which they believed was due to the combination of rising unemployment and post-conflict trauma. The police also linked this change in behavior to increased alcoholism among Dayak men, particularly among young men. Young Dayak men had also begun to carry weapons after the conflict. Before the conflict it had not been common in the Dayak community to carry weapons—in fact, this had been a Madurese trait, rather than a Dayak habit. This reinterpretation of cultural identity among Dayak men concerned many female informants, who reported that following the conflict, men started carrying weapons on a daily basis.⁴⁰ Trauma was also reported among children.

The urban areas of Central Kalimantan suffered the worst impacts of the conflict. Around Sampit, deaths and injuries were highest, many houses were burned down, major roads and public infrastructure was destroyed. Yet the majority of Dayak who fought came from the more remote rural areas. While the

³³ This was the largest district in Central Kalimantan. In 2003, the district was sub-divided into three new districts.

³⁴ Many Madurese were unofficial and illegal residents in Central Kalimantan and many of the displaced fled not to recorded displacement camps in Madura, but to other locations, so the real figures of displaced Madurese are likely to be even higher.

³⁵ Interview with local business owners, Sampit, Central Kalimantan, February 2002.

³⁶ Interview with local government officials, Sampit, Central Kalimantan, February 2002.

³⁷ In November 2001, according to one World Bank mission report, logging boats were blocked on the rivers; by February 2001, during the field research for this study, the logging boats were moving freely again.

³⁸ *Suara Pembaruan*, Jakarta, June 20, 2002.

³⁹ Interview with district police officer, Sampit, Central Kalimantan, February 2002.

⁴⁰ Exploring this sensitive issue would have required far greater time than was possible during the fieldwork for this study.

explicit exposure to violence was much higher in urban areas—many rural villagers did not witness the violence—those who had conducted the killings returned to their remote villages, far upstream.⁴¹ Trauma from exposure to and participation in the violence has therefore taken on different forms between rural and urban areas of Central Kalimantan. The different experiences of the conflict frames different possibilities for reconciliation for the Dayak community. This issue is explored in the following section.

3. SCOPE FOR RECONCILIATION: THE DAYAK PERSPECTIVE

3.1 Local Government and Elite Policy on Reconciliation and Return

“We cannot allow the Madurese to return at once, they have to come back step by step and not directly. The central government acts as the facilitator of discussions between the authorities in East Java and Central Kalimantan. But we know the most important thing is to prepare local people for the Madurese return. Right now we are still pendinginan (in the ‘cooling down’ process). Only when people have cooled down can we think about implementing any inter-provincial agreements on return.” *Provincial government official, Palangkaraya, Central Kalimantan*

Central government policy on internally displaced people (IDPs) in Indonesia is framed by a three-part plan to “return, empower or resettle” IDPs by the end of 2003.⁴² However, because the central and Central Kalimantan provincial government fear reigniting the conflict, any official return of displaced Madurese remains unlikely.⁴³ The provincial government has, however, set up various forums to consider the conditions for Madurese return to the province. At an inter-provincial reconciliation meeting in February 2002, a four-part agreement was drawn up between the governors of the four provinces of Kalimantan, the governor of East Java and representatives of the central government from Jakarta. In the provincial government’s plan in Central Kalimantan, only four types of Madurese would be allowed to return:

- those who held positions in local government;
- those who were married to Dayak;
- those who held permanent jobs in the province; and
- those who had a “good character”.⁴⁴

This plan largely overlaps with the position of the most prominent Dayak advocacy group, the Dayak and Central Kalimantan Representatives Association (LMMDD-KT), who wield substantial power in the regional parliament (DRPD).⁴⁵ It also corresponds to the position of other Dayak elites.

“We have three conditions for the return of the Madurese to this province. The community is so afraid of them coming back - there needs to be some sort of guarantee. First, they must be from a mixed family with Dayak. Second, they must have lived in Central Kalimantan for more than 20 years. Third, their return must be guaranteed by their neighbors that they are good Madurese people. If there is no guarantee, they should not come back. I made a statement to the provincial parliament on this. If these conditions are not met, and the Madurese come back, there will be another conflict. The Dayak will not wait for the police or army to protect them, they will fight for themselves.” *Dayak Elder, Palangkaraya, Central Kalimantan*

⁴¹ This was verified through multiple informant interviews in rural and urban areas. Both Dayak and other ethnic groups reported that Dayak warriors were not local to Sampit and had traveled from remote areas.

⁴² Central government policy on internally displaced persons (IDPs) was extended from a deadline of end-2002 to end-2003. If no durable solutions were found by the end of 2003, the government planned to re-categorize internally displaced (IDPs) as “poor people” in 2004. Source: UN Indonesia Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Jakarta, October 28, 2003.

⁴³ Official return is as unlikely in 2005 as it was in 2002.

⁴⁴ Interview with provincial government officials, Palangkaraya, Central Kalimantan, February 2002.

⁴⁵ This organization was the largest and most influential non-governmental Dayak organization in Central Kalimantan. Bertrand (2004, p. 58) argues that the LMMDD-KT and other Dayak elites had made political gains by, “tapping into the cumulated frustrations of the marginalized Dayak.”

The provincial government's policy was to provide no information to the local level on any plan for Madurese return, in order, they said, to avoid stirring things up. A parallel (though implicit) policy meant the gathering of local-level intelligence was also avoided. For example, provincial government officials were unaware that in some areas of the province small Madurese communities had been protected during the conflict and continued to live in the region; nor were they aware that Dayak villagers in some areas were already rearming in preparation for returning Madurese. Provincial officials expressed 'hope' that Dayak villagers were healing from the trauma of the conflict; but there was no specific plan to enable them to do so. No extra police forces or security plans had been arranged to prepare for potential return of the Madurese, which elite community members correctly interpreted to mean there was no real intention for an officially mediated Madurese return.

At the district level of government, some local initiatives for peace-building and reconciliation were initiated following the conflict. These included an inter-religious meeting facilitated by the office of the *Bupati* (the head of district government) in Sampit. However, for most decisions the district government chose to wait for provincial level instructions before they proceeded to implement any further local plans; this had limited the steps made toward local level reconciliation.⁴⁶ At the sub-district government level, unlike at higher levels of government, officials were aware of community fears that the conflict would return. They had also made proposals on means to enable their communities to recover, such as organizing inter-village forums to discuss post-conflict recovery. However, because this level of local government had received very little to almost no information about the provincial government's policy on return and reconciliation, they were unable to arrange such meetings. This confusion between the different levels of government on the official policy on return of the displaced Madurese meant that no clear policy on reconciliation was developed.

3.2 Scope for Internal Community Reconciliation

After the evacuation of the Madurese, there were two main resources for reconciliation available to the local community in Central Kalimantan: religious and traditional practices. The exposure to violence in Sampit and the surrounding urban areas prompted different church groups to foster community-level reconciliation activities; local mosques also held prayer sessions. In rural areas, a different set of problems revolved around the reintegration of the warriors back into normal life.

Some Protestant church leaders wanted to expand reconciliation work to other religious groups, but they did not have the financial resources or the broader community commitment required to do so. Other religious institutions, including local mosques, were fearful of expanding their healing activities beyond their own religious community because it seemed too political. They said they did not want to disturb the post-conflict "balance". The role of religious organizations in reconciliation was therefore confined within each religious community.

One year after the conflict, some members of the rural Dayak community were nervous about the potential return of the Madurese for revenge. They were also worried about a spiritual imbalance within their own community after the violence. Traditional ceremonies were one of the main ways through which the rural Dayak warriors were able to lay down their arms and return to their villages in peace. Many Dayak elders were convinced another war would take place if Madurese returned before the traditional ritual ceremonies took place and the ancestors were appeased. In one small multi-ethnic town in the north of the province, Dayak elders held traditional ceremonies to enable the local community to return to peace. Most new Madurese migrants had fled the town following the conflicts, but a few

⁴⁶ The building block of the decentralization framework, as outlined in Law 22/1999, is the district level of government. All authorities of government, except those reserved for central and political control, are now devolved to the district level. See GTZ (2003).

Madurese households remained near the town, protected by the local Dayak community. The Madurese were not involved in the traditional post-conflict ceremonies.

In areas where villagers had been warriors in the conflict, at least two traditional post-conflict ceremonies took place. The first ceremony was aimed at thanking the ancestors for protecting the village during the conflict; the second was held to welcome the returning warriors home and to thank the ancestors for protecting the warriors from harm during the war. These traditional ceremonies for protection are known as *manyanggar* ceremonies.⁴⁷ In some villages, special ceremonies were also held whereby Madurese heads were stored in *patahu*, small spirit houses. In one village, the enactment of a final cleansing ceremony managed to establish the belief, at least among the elders in the community, that conflict with the Madurese would never be repeated.

"We have appeased the ancestors properly by making sacrifices and because everyone in the village contributed money or rice. We thanked the ancestors for protecting our village. Now that we have done this, finally, conflict will not come back to our land."
Village elder, Central Kalimantan

The role and importance of the ritual post-conflict ceremonies in fostering recovery and reconciliation varied widely across rural communities. In some areas where such ceremonies had taken place, one year after the conflict villagers were producing weapons in preparation for Madurese revenge. The male members of one family, traditional gun and sword makers, who had been warriors in the conflict, joined in with the protection ceremonies organized by the elders when they returned from Sampit. These villagers were rearming themselves and had set up a successful small business making traditional swords and guns for other villagers who were also preparing for the moment the Madurese returned. Even though they had not heard of any planned return, they suspected the Madurese would seek revenge. These warrior families participated in the traditional village ceremonies out of respect for the elders, rather than because they believed it would protect them from revenge attacks and further conflict. The role of traditional ceremonies for reconciliation was therefore limited, even in those remote rural communities where the majority of villagers were Dayak and the traditional leaders still wielded some authority.

"We have a lot of orders at the moment from this village and from other villages nearby for traditional guns. People are preparing themselves in case there is another war against the Madurese, in case they come back."
Eldest son, family of traditional gun-makers, Central Kalimantan

3.3 Scope for Inter-Group Reconciliation

Table 3.1 lays out the full range of conflict mediation mechanisms identified in the region.⁴⁸ The issues covered by each mechanism were those identified during the study in relation to conflict mediation, rather than the roles which the organization is officially (or unofficially) assigned to perform.⁴⁹ The role of local government, the security sector and traditional authorities in mediating conflict between ethnic groups has already been discussed. Following the table, the roles and limitations on the two sets of institutions that specifically mediated inter-group reconciliation in the post-conflict period at the local level are reviewed: the newly established traditional councils and inter-village development project planning meetings.

⁴⁷ Thanks to A. Samson Kabar for this point.

⁴⁸ The mediation mechanisms are arranged by the level at which they operate, which corresponds to the levels of government administration in the Indonesian governance system.

⁴⁹ For example, the village parliament, established by law 22/1999 to officially replace the LMD, is officially a broad-based village parliament with multiple roles, but this table only summarizes the role of the BPD in conflict mediation.

Table 3.1: Summary of Mediating Mechanisms in Central Kalimantan

Level	Mediation mechanism	Issues covered	Effectiveness
Sub-village	Community and religious group meetings	Thefts Social support	Highly effective—but only for solving problems <i>within</i> the community group as did not function <i>across</i> groups.
Village	Community based consensual meetings (“ <i>Musyawahah</i> ”)	Social and economic issues	Limited effect in solving inter-community problems—no dialogue between ethnic groups at meetings.
	Village government. Two mechanisms: (i) Village head and administrative apparatus (ii) Village parliament (BPD)	Social and economic issues Criminal problems Development issues	Conflicts between village head & parliament members where the village head was dominant limited success of government mechanisms. Elite-dominated village parliaments not trusted by villagers to solve problems.
	Traditional meetings (“ <i>Forum Adat</i> ”)	Family problems Solutions to crime	Not trusted by all villagers: diminished role overall for traditional leaders. However, traditional leaders had the power to assert authority and decisions on certain issues, so could implement action when it was within their mandate.
Sub-district	Newly established traditional councils (“ <i>Majelis Adat</i> ”)	Crime prevention Reconciliation Conflict resolution	Not yet established at time of research but potentially effective in bringing <i>different</i> ethnic groups together to solve common problems.
	Local development planning meetings (<i>KDP</i> forums)	Post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction	Success was dependent on strength of facilitators and community support. Successful for short-term reconciliation between groups in rural areas.
	Military and Police	Crime Violent conflict Social problems	Lack of trust by community in police. Military respected as mediators at the community level, but now have limited role.
District	District government forums	Conflict resolution Post-conflict reconciliation	Ineffective at village level and in all rural areas: No communication to or participation by grassroots level in the forums.
	Military and police	Crime Violent conflict	Lack of trust in police response to crime and violent conflict from community. Military role limited.
Provincial	Government organized inter-provincial forums between Central Kalimantan and East Java	Conflict resolution Post-conflict reconciliation	Ineffective at village level and in all rural areas: No communication to or participation by community level leaders or representatives in decision-making at these forums

Following the conflict, one of the main forums for inter-group conflict mediation proposed by local government and traditional leaders in East Kotawaringin district was a revised form of traditional councils (*majelis adat*). A key concern for Dayak community leaders was ensuring that other ethnic groups would follow Dayak customs, as well as ensuring that the government would prevent crime by other groups against Dayak. For Dayak leaders, further conflicts would be prevented by ensuring that their own community laws were officially applied to all ethnic groups in the province. These traditional laws were already institutionalized in the Dayak community through the *damang* system, but did not extend to control non-Dayak groups before the conflict.⁵⁰ The *damang* system is not uniform, and varies in influence and strength from sub-district to sub-district across Central Kalimantan, posing several problems for uniform application of Dayak customary law through official channels.

“Everyone in the Dayak community obeys and appreciates adat (traditional law). No one can escape it; it is our tradition, our heritage. If we revitalize adat to solve conflicts - from simple fights, to murder, to land conflicts—we can find a solution to tensions in the community. Other ethnic groups can and should follow Dayak adat too. Village leaders will inform migrants that Dayak adat law applies and if they accept it, then the migrant can stay. Dayak adat will bind the whole community together.”
Dayak community leader, Palangkaraya, Central Kalimantan

⁵⁰ In Ngaju Dayak dialect, traditional Dayak leaders are known as *damang*; in Indonesian the spelling is sometimes *demang*.

The proposed inter-ethnic forums were based on traditional Dayak council systems, but would be adapted to encompass certain (although not all) other ethnic and religious group practices. It was not likely that Madurese leaders would be represented on these councils, which would also pose problems if large numbers of Madurese were ever to return. In Parenggean sub-district, to the northwest of Sampit city, a sub-district government official had proposed adaptations to the traditional Dayak councils in order to include other local ethnic groups in their meetings. For example, an important part of Dayak community meetings traditionally involved slaughtering a pig; the 'adapted' councils would slaughter a chicken instead. This change was proposed in order to include the local Muslim communities, some of whom were Dayak, but most of whom were migrants. These sorts of adaptations to the traditional forums were seen as critical by some local leaders to enable the participation of non-Dayak groups and those Dayak who no longer followed traditional customs.

"Revitalizing adat (traditional law) is a way for all villages to avoid conflict. The government seems to agree with this, but they intervene in the wrong way."

Economics Lecturer, Palangkaraya University, Central Kalimantan

The local government, in cooperation with Dayak elders, had in certain cases opened up the possibility of mandating an official role for traditional leaders and traditional councils in order to solve inter-ethnic group problems. Rather than creating completely new conflict mediation institutions, the local government of East Kotawaringin district planned to formalize and adapt the role traditional leaders already played within the Dayak community.⁵¹ The provincial and district governments later passed local regulations to strengthen the position of such traditional councils in order to revitalize customary law in the region. Despite the positive steps these local leaders had made toward reconciliation and the prevention of future inter-group violence, some Dayak elders disagreed with government interference.

"After the Sampit conflict, the government wanted to strengthen the role of adat (traditional law), and the damang (traditional Dayak leader) in order to hold the community together. The government knows they have to do this because the community is still so angry. But the bupati (district head) wants to keep power over approval and selection of the damang—while the people want to elect him directly. This is a bad situation because the district government can intervene and appoint damang who they like, rather than one the community wants. How can that hold the community together? The bupati is not directly elected by the people and so he should not choose who represents them, especially in relation to traditional law."

Head of Dayak non-governmental organization, Palangkaraya, Central Kalimantan

At the district level, the government began to open up new roles and to authorize new decision-making powers for traditional Dayak leaders and institutions in 2002. At the time it was unclear exactly how other ethnic groups would respond to the new systems the government was proposing. Tensions between the more hard-line Dayak leaders (who wanted to keep the councils along strict Dayak lines) and the moderates (who were willing to adapt the councils to include other ethnic groups) were emerging on the design of the inter-group councils; it was unclear how these inter-Dayak disputes would be resolved.

⁵¹ In early 2002, some local government officials were unable to formalize their proposals because they were waiting for decisions to be made at the district level on how the new councils could be structured.

The other local mechanisms for inter-group mediation identified in the region were inter-village and intra-village development project planning meetings. Two cases were identified in the rural areas of Central Kalimantan where local development project meetings played a role in rebuilding local inter-group relations: both of these forums were part of the *Kecamatan* Development Project (KDP).⁵² The forums were successful in bridging inter-group problems because they had included representatives from almost all local ethnic groups in the meetings.⁵³ These two cases show that given certain incentives structures, and with support from local government, inter-ethnic decision-making in favor of local Madurese communities, as well as peaceful resolutions to problems surrounding the departure of Madurese, were possible at the local level. Although few, these cases were striking given the anti-Madurese rhetoric surrounding these villages.

Box 3.1: The Impact of Madurese Evacuation on a Local Development Project

“The KDP funds were dispersed two weeks before the conflict started in early February 2001. Of all the proposals over the sub-district there was only one from a Madurese group, from a village that was mostly Madurese and Javanese. Just after they got the first disbursement, the head of the Madurese *kelompok* (economic group) stole the money and bought a motorbike. He later had to flee because of the conflict, so did all the Madurese, but he left the bike behind. The husband of one Madurese woman in the group guaranteed that he would pay back the money after she had left. But he was poor so all he could do was turn over the bike to the village leaders.”

“In the *musyawarah* (community decision-making meeting) there was a consensus to hold another village meeting. We needed to have a special session to work out what the village should do about all the problems caused by the conflict. In particular, we had to deal with the KDP loans which must be re-paid, even though the Madurese borrowers from our village were gone. ...The village decided that the motorbike should be sold at a *lelang* (auction) at the next UDKP forum (sub-district KDP meeting). So at the sub-district we held a special session to auction the bike. The money went to the village, who then used that money as if it was the original loan money. In this way we solved the problem together as a community. There has not been any more conflict about the repayments of money loaned by the Madurese who fled.”

KDP financial officer, Parenggean sub-district, Central Kalimantan

In the first case, in Parenggean sub-district (Box 3.1), a remote rural area with a high mix of ethnic minorities, problems had emerged following the evacuation of Madurese during the conflict. Villagers decided to hold a series of *musyawarah* (consensus-based village meetings) to include all local ethnic groups in order to resolve the problem. Local project staff from KDP helped to facilitate these meetings, acting as brokers between different members of the community. The second case was identified in a village in the far north of East Kotawaringin district. Despite the active involvement of many villagers in the violence against Madurese in Sampit in 2001, villagers had decided to fund sheltered Madurese households in their village through the KDP project.

Box 3.2: Community Allocation of Local Development Funds to Poor Madurese

In Samba Teweh village, around six hours upriver from Kasongan, four Madurese families received economic funding from the KDP project after the conflict. Fellow villagers said the Madurese were the poorest families in the area and deserved the project funding. The project verification team from the *kecamatan* level agreed with the village proposal and at the village decision-making meeting also recommended that the Madurese villagers got the funding. At the same meeting, a consensus of villagers finally approved the Madurese project. This village plan contradicted the strong anti-Madurese views of village leaders in neighboring villages and the commonly-held view that Madurese would never be welcomed back or protected.

⁵² KDP is a government-run, World Bank funded community-driven development project at the village level. See Guggenheim (2003) and KDP Annual Report (2002) for further details.

⁵³ In 2002 it was still not possible for sheltered Madurese to appear publicly in village meetings for fear of attack. Members of other ethnic groups represented Madurese people at KDP meetings.

The Madurese community in Samba Teweh (Box 3.2) had quietly remained in the area throughout the conflict, protected by the local Dayak community from other Dayak warriors. This case illustrates the distinction made by rural communities between Madurese who had long been integrated within their villages, and were accepted by villagers and village leaders, and the recent Madurese migrants in the urban areas around Sampit.

3.4 Capacity of Individual Mediators

To analyze the potential for reconciliation between ethnic groups in Central Kalimantan, it is also important to assess the individual actors who can potentially lever change and mediate conflicts between different groups. Table 3.2 maps out the range of individual mediators identified in the region. The mediators who were most active in attempting to bring together different ethnic groups were local government officials and traditional leaders. Their results at doing so were mixed.

Table 3.2: Summary of Individual Mediators in Central Kalimantan

Mediator	Level	Effectiveness of Mediator
Social and religious community leaders	Hamlet Village Sub-district	Good access to the community and also highly trusted. Not all willing to tackle inter-group problems
Traditional (<i>adat</i>) leaders	Village Sub-district	Good access to most of the Dayak community, but biased against Madurese.
KDP facilitators	Village Sub-district District	Successful mediators, striking balance between impartiality while being linked to the community. However, some were also active in the conflict. Their role also limited by project responsibilities and the project timeframe.
Leaders of non-governmental Dayak advocacy groups	Sub-district District Province	Mediated successfully on behalf of Dayak community with the government, but could not work as inter-ethnic group mediators as too partial to Dayak side.
Military and Police officers	Sub-district District	Military officers respected as inter-group mediators at the community level Community had limited trust in police capacity to solve inter-group problems.
Local government officials	Sub-district District	Highly dependent on the strength of the individual. Those who were already working as mediators were successful. In general, not close enough to the community and therefore not trusted.

In general, local mediators faced problems in bridging inter-group conflicts as their influence tended to be limited to their particular ethnic group. Local government officials had a better chance for mediating between groups as they were seen as more neutral than community leaders, but few officials took up this opportunity. There were a few exceptional examples, such as one *camat* (head of sub-district level government) in remote area of East Kotawaringin district, who attempted to protect Madurese from Dayak warriors through face-to-face mediation. The inter-ethnic mediation forum the official attempted to set up after the conflict was described earlier. He failed in both attempts due to a lack of higher-level government and security support. His case highlights that local officials can play an active role in mediating inter-group conflict, but they need security back-up and government support in violent situations to succeed.

Traditional leaders were limited as inter-group mediators because they were embedded within one ethnic group, did not hold authority over other ethnic groups, and wanted to assert their own solutions to inter-group problems, rather than mediating between the interests of both groups. The potential for traditional leaders to work as mediators would be much greater as members of an inter-ethnic council, where they would collectively represent different groups. Strong group facilitators and strong incentives for participation in inter-ethnic forums are also necessary to ensure different groups cooperate. These two factors explain why the village-level KDP forums managed to have some success in bringing different ethnic groups together to solve collective problems in non-violent ways. In these forums, ethnic

minorities were not seen as a threat to be removed, but a marginalized group to be supported by the wider community.

4. THE DISPLACEMENT TO MADURA

4.1 Background to Madurese Migration and Displacement

Poverty was the driving force behind migration of the Madurese to Central Kalimantan. Around one third of a million people populate Sampang district, out of a province of over 30 million people.⁵⁴ Sampang is historically the poorest district on Madura, and it remains so due to a combination of constant water shortages and unfertile land. Over the latter half of the twentieth century many Madurese from Sampang, and the other districts on Madura, migrated around Indonesia, in search of better land, more government services and greater economic opportunities. Out of around 11 million Madurese people in Indonesia, fewer than three million live on the island.⁵⁵ Central Kalimantan became a popular destination for Madurese over the latter half of the twentieth century, with many migrated from Sampang district.

People began moving away from Madura in the 1930s, pushed by poverty on Madura, and pulled by the early industries and plantations in Kalimantan. Some later followed the New Order government's planned transmigration programs, but many more migrated spontaneously.⁵⁶ The Madurese were attracted to the opening urban economy in Sampit. Many of the displaced had formerly been successful foremen in logging companies, construction workers, harbor workers and market traders. A few Madurese interviewed in Central Kalimantan, those who had stayed on following the conflict because of local protection, were farmers, but the majority of those interviewed were urban dwellers from around Sampit.

"Imagine that the Madurese gangsters can behave like that, always rioting and aggressive, in another land, like Kalimantan, where they are the guests. Try to imagine, then, how they can behave when they are in their homeland. It is an uncontrollable situation here."
Javanese military officer, Sampang, Madura

The cultural differences between Madurese migrant and Dayak indigenous communities were exaggerated by the size of the Madurese group in the urban areas around Sampit. As individual families or smaller groups, living in the rural areas, the Madurese migrants had managed to integrate far more successfully. Lack of integration in the urban areas, combined Madurese cultural traits, based on the culture of *carok*, meant the Madurese appeared as a dominant and aggressive group to the local Dayak. As such, they became easy targets for the Dayak to mobilize against during the conflict, without other ethnic groups intervening.

The Madurese have a reputation as a tough people with a tendency to fight and seek violent revenge following a dispute. Defending the honor of a family member through taking violent revenge is a dominant feature of Madurese social organization, known in Madura as *carok*. The concept of *carok* is one of the binding rules of behavior within Madurese society; it describes an act of revenge using a sickle, the traditional Madurese farming implement and weapon. Smith describes *carok* as, "the premeditated settling of scores that targets a perceived wrongdoer, with no compunction about attacking from behind."⁵⁷ In Central Kalimantan *carok* culture appeared to have been an active part of the life of urban Madurese. When Madurese in Sampit were murdered by a group of Dayak, following the gambling incident described earlier, the response followed the Madurese *carok* code. A group of Madurese avenged the death of their fellow Madurese by attacking other Dayak. This set off a chain of revenge

⁵⁴ Interview with district government, Sampang, Madura, June 2002.

⁵⁵ Fisher (2001, p. 21).

⁵⁶ The World Bank supported the transmigration program in Indonesia from 1978 to 1990, but did not sponsor settlements in Central Kalimantan. See Fisher (2001, p. 10).

⁵⁷ Glenn Smith cited in Human Rights Watch (1997).

attacks, culminating in the inter-ethnic communal riots. Even though the same code of conduct was not reported among Madurese from the more remote and rural areas, they were victims of the same stereotype.

Box 4.1: The Arrival of the Displaced Madurese

Around 150,000 Madurese from Central Kalimantan were shipped by the government to the island of Madura, lying to the northeast of East Java. The local government provided some of the displaced with temporary shelter and food, but in most areas government shelters were erected nine months after the arrival of the displaced. There was also no provision of emergency services by the government or local non-governmental organizations to the host community to help them cope with the arrival of so many frightened and exhausted people.

One year after the arrival of the displaced, local villagers were still feeling the strain. One villager said, “We feel tired and hopeless about the future if the *pengungsi* (displaced people) stay here—we have taken in ten of them into our house. They are members of our family, so we had to take them. But they left our village many years ago for Kalimantan. We wish they would go back. That is their home now.”

One of the main sources of tension between the displaced and host communities was over the provision of emergency rice, targeted solely toward the displaced population. Many local villagers already suffered from rice shortages for over six months of the year. One woman said, “We are as poor as the *pengungsi* from Kalimantan. Why don’t we get free rice too?”

One village head decided to redistribute a proportion of the emergency rice meant for the displaced community to the local Madurese. He said, “Many people in my village are poor and they need free rice too. If we only gave it to the *pengungsi*, there would be a lot of problems. I also do this because it is fairer. Most of the *pengungsi* are living with local families.”

Local government officials had no information on the long term plan for the displaced so could not make effective plans for longer term security for the displaced. One local government official said, “It’s like having your distant cousin to stay. For a while it’s good and you feed them and look after them. But then you want your house back for your own family after a while, it’s so crowded and you cannot afford to feed them anymore. It just goes on and on, they have to go back, but no one can tell us when.”

4.2 The Arrival of the Displaced

According to the district government, 88,501 displaced Madurese arrived in Sampang in the space of a week.⁵⁸ By 2002, one year after the conflict, the displaced community were living in more than 140 villages over 12 sub-districts (*kecamatan*) across the district. It would have been difficult for any Indonesian district to absorb almost 90,000 homeless and traumatized people within a week, but it was especially difficult for the poor and crime-ridden Sampang community. As a result of the large influx of displaced, and the ineffective government management of the resettlement program, many local conflicts broke out and inter-community as well as state-community relations were tense.

Following the arrival of the displaced Madurese, two international non-governmental organizations—the International Medical Corps and World Vision—provided emergency water systems to host communities.⁵⁹ World Vision opened temporary emergency health clinics, open both to the displaced and to their host communities. One channel of emergency rice was provided by the World Food Program, and distributed by the PMI (Indonesian Red Cross) directly to the displaced, with the assistance, but not direct involvement, of local government officials. The PMI set up distribution points from where the displaced collected rice on certain days. The other main channel was through the local government authorities. This rice was distributed through village heads to the displaced located in their villages. The PMI channel

⁵⁸ Interview with district government officials, Sampang, Madura, East Java, June 2002.

⁵⁹ *Pengungsi* is used interchangeably in the Indonesian language to describe both refugees who have crossed international borders and those internally displaced within Indonesia.

appeared less corrupt than the government channel for rice distribution, but it had triggered greater resentment from the host community, as the rice was directly distributed to the displaced.

Table 4.1: Triggers of Inter-Group Conflict In Sampang, Madura

Type of Conflict	Sub-type	Triggers/Proximate Causes	Actors
Communal inter-group conflict	Displaced vs. host Madurese groups	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Arrival of displaced in February 2001. 2. Arrival of aid (rice, water and building materials) targeted only at the incoming migrants. 3. Distribution of aid by local government and NGOs. Tensions between communities over rice and water supply to IDP community. 4. Increasing intensity of disputes as rice supplies diminished and crime levels rose. 5. Tensions rose over presence and duration of stay of IDPs as date for return was moved backwards. 	Displaced Madurese Host community Religious leaders (<i>kyai</i>) Community leaders Non-governmental advocacy organization for displaced (FK-4) International organizations (World Vision, World Food Program) Indonesian Red Cross (NGO) Village and sub-district government officials District government Provincial government Police Military

"Once every two weeks we see the trucks come in with the free rice for the pengungsi (displaced people), but we don't get any of it. Perhaps the village head keeps it and sells it. It is very good rice, much better than we can grow here. We don't understand why we don't get any free rice when we are poor too." *Farmer, Sampang, Madura*

One village head in a Sampang village, host to thousands of displaced, claimed he had shared the emergency aid between the host and displaced communities in order to minimize potential conflict between the two groups.

"I share the emergency rice to the local community and not just to the pengungsi (internally displaced people). I divide the rice up according to who is the poorest. I do this because I want to avoid conflicts between the two groups." *Village head, Sampang, Madura*

Villagers in the poorest hamlet in this particular village reported that in fact they had never received any of the emergency rice.

"We never received any free rice. Perhaps the village head kept it? There are already so many problems here with thieves and not enough water for our crops. Poor people here need free rice too. There are so many thieves in this village. Every week cows get stolen. It is very hard to make a living." *Farmer, Sampang, Madura*

Many host families were already living at subsistence standards or below when the displaced arrived.⁶⁰ Local women identified water shortages, difficulty in accessing water sources and the price of rice as their main livelihood problems. Host communities reported that at first they were willing to support the displaced, but were increasingly frustrated by the lack of support from the local government. In mid-2002, official support to the displaced community had also begun to dry up. Police identified rising levels of crime in Sampang, and correlated this to increased problems in the displaced community as their access to rice was running low. Villagers were worried that the theft of cows would increase if the emergency rice ran out. The fear of rising crime among the displaced against the host community added to inter-group tensions.

⁶⁰ Villagers interviewed in the poorer hamlets reported that they did not produce enough rice to eat for at least half of the year. During the other half of the year, they borrowed money in order to buy food.

"In Sampit I was a foreman at a mill and my wife ran a busy restaurant, our children went to good schools. Here I am a stone breaker. There is no other sort of work. Look at this, I am ashamed. It is shameful to me and my family to live like this."
Displaced man, Sampang, Madura

Apart from direct intra- and inter-family relationships between the displaced and their host families, or those who had employment with a local business, there was little interaction between host and displaced Madurese communities. Many of the displaced were settled into temporary camps well removed from the main centers of villages and small towns, in remote areas where land was available for the shelters built by the government or host community. This lack of constructive interaction meant there were many tensions between the two groups. The Madurese hosts believed the displaced considered themselves superior to local Madurese. Part of this perception was due to the higher education levels of the displaced when compared to the local population. Many displaced had been to senior high school, whereas it is unusual for most children to get beyond primary level education in Sampang. Many of the displaced, especially the children, were also unable to speak Madurese fluently as they had grown up entirely in Central Kalimantan, where they learned Indonesian in school. This separated the displaced from the local children and caused further group separation. While most displaced expressed a sense of shame at being a heavy burden on the local community, they also expressed frustration at the severe drop in living standards they faced in Madura, not only in terms of employment, but the quality of and access to food and education.

With an unemployment rate of over 90% among the displaced Madurese, most of them hoped to return to their homes and a better livelihood in Central Kalimantan.⁶¹ Almost all the displaced interviewed reported that they wanted to return to their land, homes and "better life" in Central Kalimantan. This result was repeated even more strongly in the findings of a survey by FK-4, the main IDP advocacy organization in Sampang district, who claimed that 99% of the displaced they had surveyed wanted to return.⁶²

The arrival of tens of thousands of displaced Madurese into Sampang upset an already fragile economic structure with the sudden increase in competition over very limited resources. Distribution of rice to the displaced community was certainly one of the main sources of tension between the two communities. The District Police Headquarters in Sampang were responsible for overall security in the region. Officers at the headquarters identified a rise in crime of 15-20% since the arrival of the displaced.⁶³ According to their records, all of the main sources of crime had increased, including murder, cow theft and motorbike theft. They also indicated there had been a rise in the murder rate due to increased social tensions between the displaced and local community, and between displaced groups. Throwing 90,000 displaced people into the mix did not help state-community relations.

A high level of crime violence permeated Sampang before the arrival of the displaced, putting already overstretched security forces well over their limit. The island of Madura is notorious on East Java for gangster violence and inter-gang fighting.⁶⁴ Police identified four main triggers for violence in the region: fights between rival gangs; incidents of theft; gambling; and village head elections. According to the Sampang police, the most dangerous times of year were during the election periods for village heads. This was due to the large amounts of money involved in gambling on election results by gangs, rival candidates and villagers. Police also identified local *carok* culture as a major contributing factor to many forms of violence between groups in Sampang. One sub-district police chief, responsible for security in over 20 villages and with 10,000 displaced people in his sub-district, complained that his office was

⁶¹ Interview with leaders from the Communication Forum for the Victims of the Central Kalimantan Riots (*Forum Komunikasi Korban Kerusakan Kalimantan Tengah*, known locally as FK-4), the main advocacy organization for the displaced community, Sampang District, Madura, June 2002.

⁶² Interview with FK-4 representatives, Sampang, Madura, June 2002.

⁶³ Interview with district police officers, Sampang, Madura, June 2002.

⁶⁴ See Diprose (2004) on gang and other forms of violence on Madura.

understaffed and under-financed for the size of the population they administered. Due to the combination of resource constraints and local “character”, police officers claimed they worked through local village institutions—including village heads, religious leaders and community leaders—in order to monitor conflicts and ‘maintain’ security.

The district and sub-district military reported two further restrictions on fighting crime. First, the security forces were limited in what they could do to tackle the high levels of crime and violence because the gangster system operated at all levels of society, with links right up to district government. Second, due to the *carok* culture of revenge, victims of violence and crime were afraid to speak out and report crimes to official law enforcement agencies.⁶⁵ Villagers, however, contradicted the police and military’s assessment.

“If someone’s cow is stolen, sometimes we’ll go to the kepala RT (head of the hamlet) and he’ll go to the kepala desa (village head) to report it. But usually we prefer to organize things ourselves. There is no point to go to the police because he’ll get bribed by the thief and then release him. If there are a lot of us, we can catch the thief, and we burn him. If they steal one chicken or one cow, they are still a thief, so they’ll still deserve to die. But we can’t catch all of the thieves, they are too clever. Thieves are usually from another place, not from our village. They have help from someone inside who gets a commission. That’s how it works. There is nothing we can do about it.”

Villager, Sampang, Madura

Villagers in one of the poorer hamlets visited during the field research, reported that over 150 cows had been stolen from a neighboring village in the previous year. They said that this level of theft was not unusual in their community: in their hamlet alone an average of three cows per month were stolen by thieves. In another village one family had been prompted to sell all their cows when one had been stolen because they suspected the thief would come back. They had not reported the problem to the police or the village government.

“There is no point to tell the kepala desa (village head) about theft, he won’t do anything. And there is no point to tell the police either. They never act. So when one of our cows was stolen, we sold all our other cows. Better to have the money than nothing at all. But now we have nothing left to make a living. It makes us feel very insecure.”

Villager, Sampang, Madura

Villagers said they did not report problems to the police because corruption made it pointless, rather than because local culture constrained them from reporting crime. Sampang villagers identified the theft of cows and motorbikes as their main security problem. Vigilantism was the general mechanism used by communities to tackle the high levels of theft.⁶⁶ Echoing the view of villagers in Central Kalimantan, no villager expressed trust in the police system. Villagers preferred to deal with criminals using their own vigilante methods, which, to them, had a higher success rate of stopping theft.⁶⁷

Given the weakness of the formal security agencies, it was up to non-state mechanisms to prevent further violence. As both the displaced and the local population practiced the same branch of Islam, local Muslim leaders (the *kyai*), who had authority over the local population, also held authority over the newcomers. This factor helped to minimize social and economic tensions between the two groups as the *kyai* could mediate between them. Furthermore, it meant conflict between host and displaced communities had not escalated to the levels it did in other areas of Indonesia, where large numbers of displaced people from different religious backgrounds flowed into host communities, such as in Central Sulawesi (see Li 2002). Islamic leaders therefore acted as an internal restraining mechanism on conflict between the two groups.

⁶⁵ Interviews with sub-district and district police officers, Sampang, Madura, June 2002.

⁶⁶ Vigilantism in Madura is a distinctive act from *carok* revenge-seeking actions. Both trends of behavior are common in Madura, but it was *carok* culture which relates to Madurese actions during the ethnic conflict in Central Kalimantan.

⁶⁷ See Diprose (2004) on common Madurese methods for resolving crime.

The local gang and crime networks also acted as an informal security system in Sampang. The gang leaders played a dual role, controlling criminal activity and organizing solutions to conflict, intervening to prevent violent conflict between groups when necessary. The gang leaders were the second most powerful form of social control and organization after the *kyai*. In fact, in many areas they wielded even greater power than the *kyai*. The role of these two institutions and the other local mechanisms for conflict mediation are discussed further in Section 5.

5. RETURN OR INTEGRATE: THE MADURESE PERSPECTIVE

5.1 Government Policy on Return of the Displaced Madurese

Aside from the policy issues reviewed in Section 3—including central government policy on displaced people in Indonesia; the attitude of the provincial and district governments; and the policies of the main Dayak organizations in Central Kalimantan—two other areas of government policy framed the possibilities for return for the displaced Madurese. These were: one, the contradictory concepts of the right to residency and return held by the government; and two, the outcomes of a series of inter-provincial peace congresses.

In order to explain the problems behind the rights to residency held by the government, it is first necessary to outline the view of the different communities involved.⁶⁸ The displaced Madurese were presented with a difficult position regarding their lack of official residency papers for Central Kalimantan when they arrived in Madura. A few migrants had possessed local residency cards in Central Kalimantan, but many of them had been informal and therefore unregistered migrants. Any Madurese without these cards had no formal claim to residency in Central Kalimantan. According to the district government in Sampang, only the displaced that had retained their Central Kalimantan-based Indonesian identity cards would be able to officially return. Given the panic with which most displaced fled Central Kalimantan, even those who originally possessed identity papers or land certificates did not have time to gather them before fleeing.

In 2002, those displaced without identity cards were listed under a complicated *pengungsi* registration system listed by household (known as *kartu keluarga*, or family card). The system was run by sub-district heads, village heads and the district government, with identification information also being held by PMI for their rice distribution records. Many displaced had no other form of identification but this temporary family registration card.⁶⁹ Those displaced who did not have the correct paperwork were very concerned about what this might mean for them when they returned to Central Kalimantan. But the legal problems of identification were just the surface of the problem.

Contradictory concepts of ‘home’ and ‘residency’ were held by the displaced Madurese, their Madurese host communities, and the Dayak communities in Central Kalimantan who had forced them to leave. Most displaced Madurese in Sampang spoke of their wish to return to their “homeland”, by which they meant Central Kalimantan. Most local Madurese said they wished the *pengungsi* (displaced) would “go back to where they came from,” by which they also meant Central Kalimantan.⁷⁰ There was also a subtle but crucial difference between the notion of *pendatang*, “migrants” and *tamu*, “temporary guests”. Long-term migrant Madurese to Central Kalimantan, the *pendatang* group, had a right to claim the place as

⁶⁸ Recovery from trauma among the displaced community is also an essential component of reconciliation, but, during the field research in 2002, displaced families showed visible signs of distress and so this issue was not pursued while interviewing local informants.

⁶⁹ See Woodhouse (2004) on the importance of and difficulty in getting the correct government paperwork in Indonesia.

⁷⁰ Both groups used the term *tempat asal* when they referred to Central Kalimantan. The term implies a sense of home referring to location, and not *tempat asli*, which refers to a group’s ethnic homeland. In Central Kalimantan, Dayak said it was fair that the Madurese migrants had returned to their ethnic homeland, using the term *tempat asli*.

their home (at least before the conflict, and potentially still afterwards). But the Dayak in Central Kalimantan and the displaced Madurese in Madura disagreed on this point.

According to local Dayak, temporary guests, or *tamu* - which implies migrants visiting for short-term periods - did not have the right to make the claim to a home in Central Kalimantan. Most Madurese who were displaced to Madura said it was the *tamu* Madurese (the short-term and recent migrants), but not the long-term migrants who had acted as the main provocateurs during the conflict. Long-term migrants believed they had a right to call Central Kalimantan their home. However, even the long-term Madurese migrants to Central Kalimantan were viewed by the Dayak as temporary “guests” in their homeland. By this, they meant that Madurese could never claim to be “indigenous” (*asli*). As such, according to the Dayak community, the Madurese should never hold equivalent status to the indigenous community regarding rights to residency in the region.

Only two senior figures interviewed during the study made the argument that as Indonesian citizens, and according to the Indonesian constitution, the displaced Madurese had the right to live anywhere in the country, and therefore had the right of return to Central Kalimantan.⁷¹ One of them was the most senior Madurese *kyai* (Islamic religious leader) in Sampang, then an advisor to the Vice-President. The other was an official from the provincial government of East Java in Surabaya. These informants were the only ones to argue that it was a misnomer to categorize the displaced Madurese as *pengungsi*, or “refugees”. They argued that it was the legal responsibility of the central government to organize the safe return of the displaced Madurese to Central Kalimantan, which had been their home. However, it does not appear that the legal and political concepts of the right to residency in Indonesia will be clarified for the Madurese in the near future.⁷²

The second factor influencing government policy on return was the outcome of four provincial, district and local level peace congresses (Table 5.1). Most local government officials from the district and sub-district levels and the displaced community leaders in Madura believed that the main result of the three peace congresses held in East Java, over the period 2001-2002, had been a firm commitment to the return of displaced, although no date had been confirmed. This was clearly in conflict with the perception held by the provincial and district governments as well as the Dayak community organizations in Central Kalimantan. One of the major challenges facing any institution aiming to mediate between the two governments and the different communities impacted by the conflict is the commitment to return. No displaced person interviewed during this research project was aware of the conditions—outlined in Section 3—which the Central Kalimantan government and regional Dayak elders had set for their return. The government strategy on both sides was one of silence, with the aim of avoiding further conflict. The provincial government in East Java asserted that steps toward return must be taken slowly and with consultation on all levels. As one local official said, “Return cannot be a rushed process if further conflict is to be avoided in Kalimantan.”⁷³

While the need to take the process of return slowly is clear, especially given the sensitivity of the situation in Central Kalimantan, one of the main problems with the peace congresses is that villagers knew so little about them. Some of the displaced were aware that there had been a series of peace congresses between the East Java and Central Kalimantan governments. But they understood the results of the congresses to have been a commitment from both governments to assist the return of the displaced to Central Kalimantan. This perception was worryingly out of line with the actual outcome of the congress, which set no clear commitment to a date for return. Given the potential dangers of return to a hostile Dayak

⁷¹ This was out of a full range of government officials and senior community figures interviewed at all levels in both provinces.

⁷² This labeling of “them” and “us” in Indonesia is a disturbing indication of a lack of mutual respect and tolerance for minority groups, especially migrants, within a community.

⁷³ Provincial government official, Surabaya, East Java

community, the displaced wanted guaranteed security to enable their return. The secrecy surrounding the peace meetings prevented those at the local level from knowing any concrete details about what had been decided, meaning that misinformation on return policy was rife. The rumors served only to make the displaced feel even more insecure about their future. This situation did not bode well for hopes of peaceful reconciliation, either with their host community, or with the Dayak in Central Kalimantan.

Table 5.1: The Series of Inter-Provincial Peace Congresses, 2001-02.⁷⁴

Name of Congress	Location	Participants
Dayak Community Congress, or KRKT (<i>Kongres Rakyat Kalteng</i>)	Sampit, East Kotawaringin District, Central Kalimantan.	Dayak-only reconciliation forum, organized by the <i>Bupati</i> (district head) of Sampit
IDP (Internally Displaced Persons) Congress/Large Consensual Community Meeting (<i>Musyawahar Besar</i>)	Ketapang sub-district, Sampang District, Madura, East Java	Attended by all the district heads (<i>Bupati</i>) from Central Kalimantan and Sampang, as well as FK-4, the main advocacy organization for the displaced in Madura.
Malang Congress	Malang, East Java	Attended by all the Governors from the four provinces of Kalimantan and East Java, as well as important community leaders from Madura, the displaced and the Central Kalimantan communities. (Held in March 2002)
Follow up Peace Congress (<i>Gema Perdamaian</i>)	Ketapang sub-district, Sampang District, Madura, East Java	Meeting initiated by FK-4 for the displaced and host Madurese community leaders and <i>Bupati</i> from all locations. Aim of the meeting (for FK-4) to push forward the agenda for return.

5.2 Inter-Group Mediation Mechanisms in Madura

The full range of mediating institutions in Madura is summarized in Table 5.2; but this section focuses on the main inter-group mediation mechanisms identified at the local level. These included the formal government and security sector, which were rather weak; gang networks and Islamic religious institutions played a much stronger mediation role. Other mediators at the local level included a locally based advocacy organization, the Communication Forum for the Victims of the Central Kalimantan Riots (FK-4), and local development project facilitators from the government's *Kecamatan* Development Project (KDP), who had also brokered conflicts between different community groups.

The problems identified in Central Kalimantan that limited the role of village government as a channel for conflict resolution, such as lack of trust between the community and local government, were even worse in Madura. Village heads in Sampang retained positions they had held for decades and were tightly interconnected to the gang networks.⁷⁵ Village head elections in Sampang were seen by villagers and government officials as a lottery between different *preman* (gang leaders or thugs), rather than open-elections for locally representative government. Village head elections were also viewed as the most volatile time in the community. Military and police officers reported that village head elections were the peak time for violence and crime due to the central role of gambling and extortion in the election process. As a result, both elite and ordinary villagers tended not to trust the village government. One police officer in a rural sub-district reported, "Only gangsters and gangster alumni want to run for village head elections here".⁷⁶

Local-level KDP facilitators also identified village head elections as the most difficult and stressful time to carry out development planning work. This was due to the high levels of gang activity and violence concentrated around the announcement of the election results. These project facilitators, tasked with

⁷⁴ Dates for the peace congresses were disputed and have therefore not been included.

⁷⁵ Two village heads and almost all hamlet heads interviewed had held their posts, unchallenged, for over 20 years.

⁷⁶ Interview with sub-district police officer, Sampang district, Madura, June 2002.

bringing the community and government officials together to decide on project activities, said they had to constantly communicate with and work through the gangs in order to enable a village development project to take place in a given village.⁷⁷ Similar fear of the *preman* (gangsters) and corruption in Sampang district meant that villagers were disillusioned with the entire system of village government.

Formal institutional capacity to manage, prevent or resolve conflict was therefore extremely weak; it only worked where it was backed up by the gang networks. The gang system played a much stronger role in social and political organization at the local level. When village heads held the balance of power, they acted as local feudal warlords, with close links to local gang and criminal networks. The only situation where local government officials held respected positions in the community was when they were connected to local criminal gangs or Islamic leaders.⁷⁸ Official state security institutions were also weak and were viewed by the local community as pervasively corrupt. In turn, the police felt they had little control over the local community, who they found “hot-headed” and easily prone to violence. The police were also massively under-equipped in terms of transport and staffing in relation to the high density of the local population. The consistent failure of police to arrest suspected criminals meant villagers did not rely on the police to solve their problems for them, instead relying on vigilante justice to deal with criminals. Overall, state institutions had a very limited role in brokering community disputes and resolving problems at the local level.

Table 5.2: Summary of Mediation Mechanisms in Madura, East Java

Level	Mechanism	Issues covered	Effectiveness
Sub-village	Religious leaders (<i>kyai</i>)	Thefts Social support	Most successful mediators of conflict and most revered means often called in to resolve inter-group conflicts.
Village	Community based consensual meetings (“ <i>Musyawahah</i> ”)	Social and economic issues	Limited effect in solving inter-community problems; no dialogue between groups at meetings
	Village government (No BPD established in 2002.)	Social and economic issues Criminal problems Development issues	Village government’s role was marginalized by that of the Islamic institutions and the role of the gang networks
	Gang leaders (known locally as <i>preman</i> or <i>bajingan</i>)	Social and economic issues Criminal problems Inter-village conflicts	Gang leaders often—though not always—used threat of force or violence to resolve problems, and were usually successful; also involved as mediators. Second most powerful mediating institution after the Islamic leaders
Sub-district	Development planning meetings (KDP forums)	Inter-group problem solving	Success was dependent on the support of religious and community leaders
	Military and Police	Crime Social problems	Lack of trust by community in police to solve problems
	Non-governmental advocacy organizations	Socio-economic issues for the displaced community Advocates on return	Played important role within the displaced community, but had limited impact on government responses. Also had limited role with the host community
District	District government	Emergency aid to the displaced Return	District government removed from community level. Officials involved in inter-provincial peace processes, but limited information available on the outcome.
	Military and police	Crime Violent conflict	Numbers of criminal cases overwhelmed district police. Military role limited

⁷⁷ At a minimum, KDP project facilitators reported that they never confronted the gangs directly when they interfered in a project, or else they risked the whole project, as well as to ensure their own personal safety.

⁷⁸ As village government reform had yet to be implemented in Sampang district, it was not possible to determine any effects of the new village parliament system, introduced in the 2001 decentralization laws, on village governance. See Antlov (2001).

Along with the gang networks, Islamic religious institutions held the most important role in social organization and inter-group mediation in Sampang, namely *kyai* (religious leaders and teachers) and *madrasah* (Islamic schools). Islamic leaders in Madura hold far more power in the community than official government figures and set the ground rules for local social, educational and political activities. These Islamic teachers and leaders figure from the village up to the district level. At the district level, they are known as *kyai besar* (senior Islamic leaders) and they wield substantial political power over the district government. The most senior *kyai* are often linked to political figures in Jakarta. Their networks stretch across Madura into East and Central Java and the role of *kyai* was critical in conflict mediation between different Madurese groups in Sampang.⁷⁹ A number of *Kyai Besar* were also present during the inter-provincial peace congresses held between the provincial governments of East Java and Central Kalimantan. The senior *kyai* were key players in brokering negotiations with the Central Kalimantan provincial government over the framework for return of the Madurese.

The main non-governmental group representing the Madurese displaced community was a locally based advocacy organization, known as FK-4. The role of FK-4 was mostly to provide a voice for the displaced community in the peace congresses and to remain a constant advocator for return. FK-4 leaders explained that at first there had been a clash between the hard-liners and the moderates in the Madurese community, immediately following their resettlement to Madura. The issue of revenge was the main point of conflict within the displaced community during their first months in Sampang. But an initially hard-line group, advocating violent revenge against the Dayak, had not managed to gain support from the majority of the displaced community. By mid-2002, there was no sign in any of the displacement camps of a hard-line group advocating for revenge against the Dayak. The secretary of FK-4 reported, “The Madurese *pengungsi* (displaced) want to put the past behind them and just go home. They don’t want revenge; they just want to go home peacefully. They have nothing here; they only want to return to their homes.”

Heated debates between the displaced group’s community leaders also took place on the issue of whether or not to accept the Dayak demand for an apology for the conflict. This demand had come out of the Dayak-only peace congress in Sampit, the first peace congress, held in Central Kalimantan for the Dayak community. At the next meeting, the *Musyawahah Besar* (large consensual communal meeting), held in Sampang district and organized by and for the displaced community, an agreement was apparently reached whereby the Madurese displaced would formally apologize to the Dayak for the conflict. Dayak leaders and government members from across Kalimantan were invited to that meeting. The results of this meeting were not known in the displaced community or by officials in either province, adding to the secrecy surrounding the outcome of the peace congresses.

Community forums organized by local KDP facilitators were the other mediation mechanism bridging gaps between different groups within the Madurese community. These facilitators worked through gang, religious and community leaders to manage conflicts at the community level (Boxes 5.1 and 5.2), highlighting how important it is for conflict mediators to work through informal institutions in order to be effective. Informal mediation institutions in Sampang—and elsewhere in Madura— are a key ingredient for conflict mediation, but are often overlooked by government and non-governmental agencies and projects working in the region.

⁷⁹ For more on the role of the *kyai* in conflict mediation in Madura, see Clark (2004) and Diprose (2004).

Box 5.1: Conflict Mediation through Islamic Leaders

In Sampang, gang leaders hold great power at the local level, and other sorts of leaders are loathe to intervene if a problem or conflict emerges related to a gang. One female *kecamatan* (sub-district) development project facilitator from KDP in Sampang said that working with the community was sometimes difficult because the *preman* (local gangsters) could become quickly angry with her. This usually happened if the gang leaders' proposals over which development projects to finance were rejected in KDP decision-making meetings.

The method the facilitator used in order to deal with the problem was approaching the village head and religious leaders first, before any decision meetings were held. Then, if the religious and village government leaders led the meetings, and if local religious leaders also supported it, she found that making project decisions and solving problems related to the projects was usually possible. She could not lead the meetings on her own if she wanted the community to be involved, and if she wanted to avoid problems with the gang leaders. This was because she did not have a position of authority and respect in the community, as she was an outsider. By helping to organize the meetings, and having the meetings run by the religious and government leaders, she had found a way around confrontation with gang leaders. "Even the gang leaders respect the Islamic leaders in meetings", she said, "Working through them is the best way to solve problems".

The KDP forums in Sampang, which are used to determine which community projects will be financed, had been limited to the local community and excluded the displaced community. According to project facilitators, the host community believed KDP funds should only be used for locals and not for the "temporary residents", i.e., the displaced community. This meant that any problems with the displaced community could not be addressed through the village conflict resolution forums. Local Madurese felt they had such few resources and such little government support in general, except through the occasional provision of cheap "rice for the poor", that they carefully guarded any extra government funds and projects. The KDP funds were one of the few government projects targeted specifically at poor local Madurese – rather than the displaced - and they wanted to keep it that way. KDP project facilitators reported that the only forum where the displaced community could try to resolve their problems, and any tension with the host Madurese community, was through weekly Islamic prayer meetings.

Box 5.2: A New Local-Conflict Resolution Forum

Sub-district project facilitators for KDP in Sampang had found that the normal series of project meetings, which were designed nationally in order to set up village development projects, were insufficient in their region. This was due to the high level of local conflicts which made community relations—and thus community meetings—highly volatile. The facilitators had established "Village level development planning meetings to resolve conflict" (*Musbangdes Resolusi Konflik*) as a way of helping the community resolve conflicts related to village problems. The main conflicts villagers faced were over village head elections and decisions over local development projects. By working through local community and religious leaders, the project facilitators had found that conflicts could generally be resolved. But they had to work through the informal community leaders before any solutions could be found.

5.3 If not Return, Integration?

The main requirement of inter-group mediators in Madura is to aid peaceful transactions between host and displaced groups in Madura. It remains difficult for those living in the displaced camps in Sampang to integrate socially and economically into the local community without mediation from local leaders who are trusted by both sides. As there had been no consultation with the local community over the allocation of aid, great social resentment has built up toward the displaced from the host community over this aid and the extra burdens the host community faced upon arrival of the displaced without any government support. A system needs to be in place whereby host communities can help choose which development resources should go to the displaced community, rather than being bypassed in this process. Such steps via local mediators would help to minimize current levels of inter-group conflict. Table 5.3 ranks local mediators in Madura by order of their success in mediating inter-group conflicts.

Table 5.3: Summary of Local Mediators in Sampang, Madura

Rank	Mediator	Level of operation	Effectiveness
1	Religious leaders	Hamlet Village Sub-district District	Most successful mediators of conflict from village to district levels. As the most trusted local level institution, and the most revered, this meant they are generally called in to resolve serious conflicts.
2	Gang leaders (known locally as <i>preman</i> or <i>bajingan</i>)	Village Sub-district	After religious leaders, the most powerful leaders in the region. Gang leaders often use threat of force or violence to resolve problems, and are usually successful; however they are also involved as mediators in non-violent forums.
3	KDP project facilitators	Village Sub-district	Successful when they work through local leaders; reported that they needed stronger support from higher levels in the project. The facilitators offer strong incentives to enable different groups to come together as the concrete result will be a development project.
4	Displaced Madurese advocacy group (FK-4)	Sub-district District Province	Goal is to return IDP community to Kalimantan, and as a result pay less attention to local disputes. Attempted to mediate conflicts between IDP and host communities—limited success in approaching host community. Scope for greater involvement with inter-provincial and inter-ethnic meetings, but limited in access to higher levels of government.
5	Local government – Village administration	Village	Some success at intra-village and inter-village conflict mediation, but only when working in cooperation with local religious leaders and local gang leaders.
6	Police and Military	Village Sub-district District	Police were unsuccessful mediators, perceived as corrupt by all sides. Military had better success as “background” figures with a reputation for monitoring security, but not actively involved.

The most powerful local mediators identified at the local level in Sampang, Madura, were the religious authorities and gang leaders. In contrast, government officials were weak inter-group mediators; they only effective if working through one of these two other institutions. The police also had a very limited role in effective inter-group mediation. As in Central Kalimantan, this was largely due to a lack of trust in the police to solve problems. Further research by the World Bank has identified the same conclusions in other districts of Madura.⁸⁰ Any action taken to mediate conflicts or resolve problems between different groups resulting from official or informal integration of the displaced therefore must involve informal institutions, as the experience of the local KDP facilitators demonstrated.

The mediation role of the local advocacy organization for the displaced, FK-4, was limited as their primary goal was to facilitate return, rather than integration. For them, assisting integration lowered the prospects for return, but, in theory, they could potentially play a positive role in assisting integration and representing the displaced community to the local government, as return is still so unlikely. However, the potential for FK-4, like other advocacy groups based within one identity-community was of course limited through representing one group alone. Religious leaders, often representative across identity groups, therefore played a much stronger role in inter-group mediation.

The mediation role of sub-district development project facilitators from the *Kecamatan Development Project* was similar to their role in Central Kalimantan; they were successful insofar as they worked through local community leaders. However, in Madura the facilitators had far less success in getting the most marginalized groups—in this case the displaced community—involved in inter-group decision making. This was due to the fact that the host community believed the displaced already received enough assistance through the emergency rice and water programs from the government and international organizations.

⁸⁰ See Clark (2003) and Diprose (2004).

It is impossible to imagine the displaced Madurese returning peacefully to Central Kalimantan without special security provision and the guarantee of safe return from Dayak authority figures. As this is unforthcoming from both the government and Dayak leaders, the majority of displaced Madurese are most likely to remain in Madura. While some Madurese have attempted to return in small numbers, mostly to sell land and visit relatives, they have been repelled by similar acts of violence to those in 2001.⁸¹ For the displaced to return at all would require very careful mediation at all levels between community leaders, the government, the security sector and above all the local Dayak community; but there is no prospect for this to happen in the near future, if at all. After this assessment of the low prospects for official return for the displaced Madurese to Central Kalimantan, and the review of the prospects for reconciliation between different Dayak groups and the displaced Madurese in Section 3, the following section summarizes the main arguments in the paper. First, the roots of ethnic violence are reviewed. Second, the importance of a community based model for recovery and reconciliation is outlined. Third, the constraint on reconciliation of government policy on Madurese return is assessed, which leads into policy recommendations.

6. CONCLUSION

6.1 The Roots of Ethnic Violence

"We cannot just apply repressive policies of force in such a conflict situation. We need to be pre-emptive and preventative in our tactics. To do this we need to understand the local culture. Conflict for Dayak people is not just about fighting—it means something more spiritual. This is not an easy thing to understand, but we have to try."

Police officer, East Kotawaringin District, Central Kalimantan

Understanding culture helps to unravel (though it cannot fully explain) the reasons the Dayak explicitly targeted the Madurese, rather than another ethnic group in the province. Culture also matters because it helps to explain the form the violence took between the Dayak and Madurese groups in Central Kalimantan. Aside from the 2001 incident in Central Kalimantan, the only other contemporary incidents of large-scale communal violence in Kalimantan were also targeted against Madurese migrants. In West Kalimantan, in two waves of conflict toward the end of the Suharto area from 1996-1997, communal violence broke out between Dayak and Madurese groups, resulting in the displacement of over 20,000 Madurese and the deaths of around 500.⁸² In 1999, again in West Kalimantan, violence broke out between both ethnic Malay and Dayak groups against the Madurese. This second conflict resulted in a reported 186 deaths and over 26,000 displaced Madurese.⁸³ What was it about the Madurese group in Kalimantan that meant they were repeatedly targeted in communal clashes?

Stereotypical views on the warlike nature and violent traditions of the Dayak and Madurese groups are held across Indonesia, in particular in relation to the Madurese community.⁸⁴ These cultural stereotypes are overstated, and should not be used as an explanation for communal violence between the two groups. Such stereotypes emphasize the inevitability of the violence between two "warlike" ethnic groups, thereby excusing the failure of the official state organs responsible for preventing violent conflict and preserving the post-conflict power balance.⁸⁵ Yet even so, we cannot ignore the ways traditions of

⁸¹ Interviews in Palangkaraya and Kasongan, Central Kalimantan, November 2002.

⁸² Human Rights Watch (1997), and Bertrand (2004, pp. 47-8).

⁸³ International Crisis Group (2001a).

⁸⁴ Indeed, these stereotypes of the Madurese date back to—if not originate from—colonial times. In 1912, *De Java Post*, reported: "...the Madurese who natively are pirates, a race of robbers that loves to fight both man and waves." (cited in van Dijk et al. 1995, p.17). See also Pramoedya Ananta Toer's novel, *This Earth of Mankind* (1996), set in the Dutch colonial period, for a stereotypical Madurese character – loyal, brave and always ready to fight.

⁸⁵ De Jonge discusses the construction of the Madurese stereotype by the Dutch and the Javanese in the colonial era as a means to legitimate the existing power imbalances (van Dijk et al. 1995, pp. 9-22).

violence have played a role in the construction of the modern cultural identities of both groups, although in different ways.⁸⁶

In Central Kalimantan, headhunting raids against enemy groups by Dayak warriors on such a scale have not been physically enacted for decades, but the traditions survived in the memory of Dayak elders and community leaders in both rural and urban areas. The tradition was reignited (and reinvented) among the rural Dayak when the urban Dayak community raised the alarm of a Madurese attack in Sampit in early 2001. For young Dayak men, who had never fought in a headhunting war before, traveling bearing their traditional swords after the conflict demonstrates a new found pride in being a Dayak. It also shows that their group identity, and the markers of this identity, had been reconfigured by the conflict. Prior to the conflict these young men had only used swords to hunt animals, not people.

The Madurese also held strong attachments to a particular form of violent culture, related to revenge, honor and pride, known as *carok*. This cultural tradition - argued both the displaced Madurese in Madura who had fought in the conflict and their Dayak counterparts in Central Kalimantan - required Madurese men to respond to threats against their community and their honor with revenge attacks.⁸⁷ But the rural Madurese migrants—long settled in the region, inter-married with Dayak families; speaking Dayak at home—were not only absent from the gambling dens where the Dayak and Madurese clashed, they had no interest in violent ‘revenge’ attacks on Sampit Dayak, let alone intentions of taking over the urban areas of Central Kalimantan in order to control the region.

The behavior of certain urban Madurese groups had offended other ethnic groups in Central Kalimantan, particularly their Dayak ‘hosts’. Members of many ethnic groups in Central Kalimantan were affronted by what they saw as Madurese arrogance and aggression toward non-Madurese communities. They were also collectively frustrated by the lack of constraints applied by senior Madurese community and religious leaders to the behavior of certain recent immigrants and traders from Madura. Whereas older Madurese migrants had integrated in rural areas of Central Kalimantan, urban migrants, especially the most recent, had not. The occupational niche held by many Madurese in Sampit had taken on an ethnic coloring. Madurese traders, *bejak* (motorcycle taxi) drivers and hawkers at the markets and in the port appeared threatening, aggressive and dishonest to the other ethnic groups. Madurese across the region—even those unthreatening small rural communities—suffered the consequences of the urban Madurese stereotype. These factors led to a collective frustration with the Madurese, meaning few were protected when the Dayak finally launched their February 2001 attack.

However, we should not take these cultural explanations for violence too far. They do not alone explain the massacre or the timing of the violence, we must also account for the other contributing factors to the conflict’s escalation. Cultural differences between the other ethnic groups and the Dayak also existed, but ethnic violence did not break out between them. Furthermore, cultural differences had caused tensions between the Dayak and Madurese for decades in Central Kalimantan, but violence between the two groups did not come to a head until early 2001. It was the combined effect of extreme cultural differences between the Madurese migrant and Dayak indigenous communities along with other background factors that made a massacre possible. While cultural factors played a central role in cementing the divides between the two ethnic groups at war, socio-economic factors set up the structural disparities between ethnic groups, and institutional factors transformed incidents of ethnic conflict into a scenario of ethnic violence.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ On the development of violence as part of Madurese culture dating from the failure of 19th Century administrators to provide security on the island, see de Jonge, in van Dijk et al. (1995, pp. 19-20). On the origins of headhunting among the Dayak, as part of inter-group warfare, territorial expansion and competition for resources, as well as its spiritual origins, see King (2003, pp. 237-40).

⁸⁷ See Clark (2004) and Diprose (2004) for case studies of violent conflicts involving *carok* culture in Madura.

⁸⁸ See Annex B for a discussion of the distinction between ethnic ‘conflict’ and ethnic ‘violence’.

During Dutch rule, Central Kalimantan was exploited for its natural resources through the establishment of plantation and logging businesses. These were greatly expanded during the Suharto era, with the organization of massive forestry and land concessions to business partners of the regime.⁸⁹ During the 1960s, large areas of land were also parceled out by the government to trans-migrant groups from the central Indonesian islands of Java, Madura and Bali, who along with spontaneous migrants, took over land and jobs at the expense of the indigenous communities. From 1970 to 1999, forest land had declined in Central Kalimantan from 84% of the total land area to around 56%. By 2001, socio-economic disparities between rural indigenous and urban migrant groups in Central Kalimantan were high (Bertrand 2004, p. 57). The loss of their indigenous lands and forest access contributed to this divide.

Indigenous groups also faced employment disadvantages under the New Order regime. Migrants had the relevant skills for new jobs in manual labor, on plantations, in factories, and in expanding mining and fishing industries. Migrants also tended to be willing to take these jobs on at lower salary levels than locals demanded. As one Dayak economics lecturer commented, “Dayak people admit that immigrants from places like Java and Madura are willing to work harder for lower wages than Dayak people are. This has been a real problem for the Dayak community because we have lost jobs to the migrants.”⁹⁰ The distancing of indigenous people from employment opportunities further added to resentments from the local community toward migrant groups in general.

Population pressures on natural resources and employment opportunities widened the gap between local and migrant ethnic groups. In the remote rural areas of Central Kalimantan, small groups of migrants lived within indigenous villages. Economic competition over natural resources and employment opportunities was less acute in these remote rural communities, where the Dayak remained in the majority. There, migrant communities had been absorbed in small numbers and accepted into the local community through inter-marriage. As conflict between the Dayak and the Madurese broke out in rural areas, fellow Dayak villagers from Dayak warriors protected some Madurese communities.

By contrast, in the urban areas of Central Kalimantan, migrant communities lived within their own groups, spoke only their own languages and were far less integrated with the indigenous community. During the conflict, the spontaneous protection of Madurese by Dayak villagers in some rural areas was absent in and around the urban areas. This was not only due to greater population and economic pressures in these areas. There was also very little institutionalized civic (or community) interaction between the two groups. Only informal daily interactions took place, at the market, or on the streets, which served to further antagonize inter-group relations in urban areas.⁹¹ Throughout the conflict, urban Madurese were immediately seen as a threat to be eliminated or ignored, rather than as fellow community members to be protected. As a result, ethnic groups were socially divided from each other across the region. This lack of informal and formal inter-ethnic bonds in the urban areas, combined with the absence of formal state protection from violence, contributed to the rapid descent of ethnic conflict into ethnic violence.⁹²

Another social factor contributing to the large scale and rapid organization of ethnic violence in Central Kalimantan was the role of traditional and community-based Dayak organizations. While traditional Dayak organizations had been weakened under the New Order’s centralized government regime, they still played an important role in bonding parts of the Dayak community in areas of religious, spiritual and

⁸⁹ The New Order government distributed long term logging concessions to business partners across much of Central and West Kalimantan through Forest Law No. 5 (1967). See Bertrand (2004, p. 55).

⁹⁰ Interview, Lecturer, Economics Faculty, Palangkaraya University, Central Kalimantan, February 2002.

⁹¹ A wider research study to assess the comparative impact of different forms of civic interaction between groups and its effect on levels of inter-group conflict has been carried out in Indonesia by the World Bank (see Barron et al. 2003).

⁹² See Varshney (2002a) on the importance of informal inter-ethnic ties in constraining Hindu-Muslim conflict in India.

political life. Newer Dayak social organizations also played an advocacy role for Dayak interests in the urban areas, and were linked to some of the rural organizations. During the rapid mobilization of warriors in preparation for war against the Madurese, organized by Dayak traditional and community leaders, it was evident that intra-ethnic ties between different Dayak groups were strong. These intra-ethnic communication networks enabled Dayak leaders to mobilize rapidly across vast distances, between urban and rural areas, using the logging radios, among other more traditional means of communication.

Thus, socio-economic disparities between the different ethnic groups took on an ethnic form in Central Kalimantan. In such structurally and culturally divided environments, strong inter-ethnic mediating institutions were needed to prevent ethnic conflicts from becoming violent. However, formal government bodies were incapable of providing these bonds and preventing violence. Furthermore, traditional and community-based conflict mediating institutions were also weak at managing inter-group problems.

Following the transition to democracy in Indonesia, the police became the principle government agency responsible for managing civilian conflicts in Indonesia. Across Central Kalimantan, the police were seen as totally corrupt, incapable of preventing crime, violence or even fights. Villagers from different ethnic groups had no positive experience of successful police intervention to solve a crime, and as crime was one of the main triggers for inter-group conflict the results were catastrophic. Many Dayak community members suspected the police of having been paid to protect Madurese criminals from arrest, prosecution and full criminal trials. As trust in the police had completely broken down by 2001, the Dayak, when faced with Madurese aggression, took the law into their own hands.

If the police were incapable of preventing inter-ethnic violence, how did the local government fare? Villagers reported that prior to the conflict, in the late 1990s, village government officials were ineffective at solving community problems, and certainly lacked the power to manage the continuing problem with the Madurese. This background of malfunctioning village government provided fertile ground for traditional elders and community leaders—who were sometimes also village heads, though not always—to assert control and arrange a violent solution to local problems with Madurese. In 1999 the precedent for expulsion was set in some villages in the north of East Kotawaringin district. Here, Dayak villagers took up arms against local Madurese and expelled them from their sub-district, following repeated criminal incidents that were unsolved by the local police and local government. These villages were more hard-line against Madurese than other parts of the province, having already expelled most of their local Madurese population, and formed one of the centers for the recruitment of Dayak warriors in 2001.⁹³ Once again, local government had failed to prevent the build-up of the conflict.

The reform of village government structures began in Central Kalimantan—as elsewhere—with the introduction of the new village parliament system. By 2002, in the post-conflict phase, these new democratic village government bodies were clashing with the older village government institutions. Village government leaders and parliamentarians were caught up in leadership and power battles and could not tackle post-conflict problems in their communities, such as reconciling the returned warriors, or dealing with problems caused by the departure of local Madurese, such as the downturn in the local economy. While the new village parliaments had not yet gained the trust of the community as dispute brokers, the older institutions lacked such trust altogether. The realms of jurisdiction between the old and new bodies of village government were also unclear. Villagers did not know which government body had the authority to solve which problem. Thus villagers in Central Kalimantan were not confident in their village government's ability to solve their problems.⁹⁴ To make matters worse, local level government

⁹³ In some villages in this area, small pockets of Madurese migrants had survived both conflicts and remained, as elsewhere in the province, hidden and protected by local Dayak from marauding outsiders.

⁹⁴ The contest for power at the village level between different government bodies might eventually widen the access of villagers to local government and play an important role in deepening the democratic process at the local level. However, at the time of

did not have effective institutional backup from higher levels of government when community problems were beyond the capacity of local level officials.⁹⁵

It was only when village government leaders subverted official channels and developed their own forums to solve inter-group problems that they had managed to resolve inter-group conflicts. Some village leaders in Central Kalimantan attempted to do this through adapting traditional Dayak village and inter-village forums to manage contemporary problems. They attempted to redesign local forums to make them more accessible to non-Dayak by insisting on the inclusion of leaders of all ethnic groups in the decision-making meetings. Yet, even then, these inter-group forums were constrained by a lack of higher level support (unforthcoming in 2002) from the district government.

Traditional mechanisms for resolving inter-group conflict prior to the violence were also inadequate. While traditional and community leaders were not perceived as being corrupt, unlike the police, and were more accessible than local government, they were still not completely trusted to solve local problems. The traditional leaders implement customary law, which many members of the community no longer understand or follow. As one Dayak academic said, “At the moment the community feels very confused. They don’t completely trust *adat* (traditional law) because it has been so eroded by time. But they also don’t believe the police will help them. They really don’t know who will solve their conflicts or help them to solve their problems.”⁹⁶

The strength and role of traditional institutions across Indonesia has been weakened by the centralizing and standardizing nature of the New Order regime.⁹⁷ The movement of different ethnic groups to once remote indigenous areas, through migration and displacement, has also changed the nature of local society. Traditional institutions no longer reflect the social, economic or even cultural make-up of the communities within which they were situated. Furthermore, as traditional organizations were designed to functioned within the Dayak ethnic group alone, this had restricted their ability to mediate problems with other ethnic groups before the conflict. Many young Dayak women reported that the traditional system also no longer held relevance to their lives—the trauma they faced after the conflict, as well as the other social problems, related to healthcare and education, which, to them, were more pressing than the traditional ceremonies. Instead, many younger, more modernized Dayak rely on the mosques or churches to provide them with solace and support.

Religious organizations and leaders were also weak at inter-group mediation, working on community reconciliation from within their own community, rather than across different religious communities. Still other informal inter-group mediators, such as development project facilitators, did not have the authority or the capacity to manage widespread communal violence. All they could do was help ferry people to safety during the violence, but they could not intervene.⁹⁸

this field research study in Central Kalimantan, the conflicts between the village parliament and village government were putting villagers off democratic government, rather than encouraging them to trust in the new democratic bodies and procedures.

⁹⁵ Following the enactment of the decentralization laws—Laws 22 and 25/99 became effective in 2001—village complaints about government services should officially be taken to the district level. The sub-district level was rendered effectively powerless under the new government system. However, the sub-district government was still seen by rural villagers in Central Kalimantan as the next port of call for official problem solving after the village level; the district government was simply too formal and too remote for villagers to consider approaching it. Hence villagers became trapped in cyclical problems; they only felt able to approach the sub-district level of government, which was officially powerless to solve their problems; at the same time the district level had not yet investigated village level problems in the areas visited during this field research. No wonder villagers were less than enthusiastic about local democracy.

⁹⁶ Interview with Economics Lecturer, Palangkaraya University, Central Kalimantan, February 2002.

⁹⁷ See Evers (2001), and Guggenheim (2003).

⁹⁸ Interviews with KDP project staff in Central Kalimantan, February and October, 2002.

When deep cultural and socio-economic differences divide ethnic communities, small sparks fuel big conflicts. The combination of weak formal government institutions and traditional institutions that historically only linked communities *within* their own ethnic group, meant there was an almost complete absence of inter-ethnic mediators in Central Kalimantan. When community leaders attempted to mediate inter-ethnic conflict in the past, they faced huge problems of enforcement and legitimacy when doing so, such as during the 1985 *Kasongan* Peace Agreement between the Dayak and Madurese communities. Dayak community leaders believed the agreement was the final stage in an attempt to prevent further problems between the Dayak and the Madurese in the region, but the agreement was not enforced informally (by the Madurese community leaders) or formally (by the government agencies). Perhaps because of the failure of inter-the *Kasongan* agreement, no other inter-ethnic agreement was even attempted when tensions rose again between the two groups in the late 1990s and into late 2000.

In the wake of conflict in Central Kalimantan, several key constraints frame the possibilities of recovery and reconciliation, including the practical difficulties of guaranteeing security, and the weakness of formal institutions for providing effective mediation. In the following section, an alternative model of inter-ethnic reconciliation is proposed for the region, based on economic and social recovery for the grassroots.

6.2. Community Based Recovery and Reconciliation

"Each person has to reconcile themselves within themselves. Both Madurese and Dayak need spiritual reconciliation. If the people who saw these terrible things can reconcile themselves within themselves, then they can reconcile with others. But if the government forced the community here to accept Madurese back, there will be a second conflict. Healing will take time."
Protestant Dayak priest, Sampit, Central Kalimantan

Inter-ethnic reconciliation in the context of Central Kalimantan and Madura, and perhaps elsewhere in Indonesia, needs to be conceptualized differently to the standard "top-down" models proposed for post-authoritarian regimes elsewhere.⁹⁹ In Indonesia, the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998 did not bring about the complete overthrow of the political elite, the military and many officials retained political power. While the system of government has indeed changed, political players at the national level have not. Post-regime political leaders are not from a different end of the political spectrum, nor from a different racial, ethnic or class background. As such, the ruling elite of the new government does not feel compelled to bring the former regime to justice in the way the new democratic governments of Chile, South Africa, or East Timor did. Neither has the mass population encouraged them to. Indonesia also lacks the "revolutionary solidarity" of the populations of Chile, South Africa or East Timor.¹⁰⁰ Communal violence at the regional level has not spurred national movements for political change and social justice in the way that it did in the former Yugoslavia, for example. The nature of political transition in Indonesia is therefore fundamentally different to the situations in other post-authoritarian states.

There are two main reasons for proposing an alternative model of inter-ethnic reconciliation. One is practical; the other is conceptual. On the practical side, state-led national or local level reconciliation is not immediately feasible. Formal institutions are too weak at the local level to provide effective mechanisms for reconciliation: law enforcement mechanisms are corrupt; local government is in transition. Neither of these government bodies is therefore capable of leading inter-ethnic reconciliation.

⁹⁹ Reconciliation models since the end of the Second World War have been conceived within one of two legal frameworks. The first model is that of a criminal tribunal—such as the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia. The second is that of a hearings process—such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for South Africa. Both models address human rights violations by the state and criminal justice for civilians. The goal of both models is to address crimes of the past in order to achieve peace in the future. Both models focus on top-down reconciliation led by state agencies.

¹⁰⁰ Thanks to Scott Guggenheim for this observation.

Table 6.1: Comparative Mediation Strengths of Local Organizations

Type of organization	Mediator	Location	Conflict issue	Comparative strengths
Non-governmental or informal organization	Traditional (<i>adat</i>) forums and leaders	Central Kalimantan	Land conflicts Inter-group conflicts, crime and other community problems	Limited success. Restricted representation to one ethnic group. Emerging role. In process of being formalized by district government. Currently constrained by low levels of trust across the Dayak community. Low levels of representation from other ethnic groups.
	Islamic forums and Muslim leaders (<i>kya</i>)	Madura, East Java	Inter-group conflicts, crime and other community problems	Highly successful role in mediating community level conflicts. Respected and trusted across different groups. Very strong religious leaders who play chief role in conflict mediation.
	Other grassroots level religious and ethnic community groups	Central Kalimantan	All conflict related issues and community problems—but only those within one ethnic or community group	Successful at community level, but limited beyond particular ethnic or religious group. Did not tackle inter-group problems. Greater potential to do so.
	Non-governmental advocacy organizations	Central Kalimantan	Advocates for Dayak community	High level political influence, but little relevance to and removed from grassroots community.
		Madura, East Java	Advocates for displaced Madurese community from Central Kalimantan	Some political influence at higher levels, for example on negotiations for return. Close connections to grassroots of displaced community.
Informal security/criminal organizations	Madura, East Java	Mediation role mainly focused on crime related issues. Also role in mediating other community problems.	Successful role in mediating community level conflicts. Respected, trusted and feared across different groups. Use violence and/or threat of violence to solve many problems (but not all).	
Governmental or formal body	Village government: Village officials and village parliament	Central Kalimantan	All conflict types and community problems	Constrained by in-fighting, lack of trust and respect from community and lack of initiative.
		Madura, East Java		When active, they were successful at bringing village leaders together to resolve conflicts and prevent inter-village violence as could be 'neutral' and had authority.
	<i>Kecamatan</i> Development Project: Village and sub-district forums	Central Kalimantan	Inter-group development project funding.	Successful at inter-group problem solving in Madura—when local leaders supported the process.
		Madura, East Java	Violent conflict against people and property (all regions) Reconstruction post-conflict	Successful at inter-ethnic problem solving in Central Kalimantan at sub-district level (no small feat given political climate)
Military and police	Central Kalimantan	Village level disputes	On the whole, military had greater levels of trust from the community, but only played a limited role.	
	Madura, East Java	Inter-village disputes	Police had no trust and no history of success in resolving inter-group disputes at village or inter-village levels.	

To summarize, from Table 6.1, informal, non-governmental mediators have had relatively more success at leading inter-ethnic mediation than formal government mediators. However, the role of informal local mediators in bridging inter-group conflicts was constrained by the following factors:

- When their influence was limited to one particular ethnic or identity group; and

- When they did not have trust from or legitimacy with the other group(s) involved in the conflict.

There were some notable exceptions to the general rule that formal government institutions had limited success in mediating inter-group reconciliation. Government leaders had more success in addressing inter-group problems when they used the following principles:

- Working through inter-village community forums with representatives from each ethnic community/identity group involved in decision making;
- Working through community development forums with representatives from each community/identity group involved in decision making; and
- Facilitation of decision-making by trusted and respected community leaders (whether religious or community leader, traditional leader or other respected figure).

Overall, three factors were identified by local communities and community leaders as essential for creating an environment where inter-group problems could be solved more successfully. In turn, this aided the prevention of violence between groups. The factors were:

- Representation from each community at decision making meetings or forums, and adaptation of local forums to enable inclusion of all groups;
- Accounting for post-conflict needs of the local and host communities; and
- Mediation by trusted community leaders who hold authority over each group.

To do so, they would require support from informal institutions and/or from local community leaders, as well as radical local government reform, which may only come slowly. On the conceptual side, a model of reconciliation based on economic and social recovery for the grassroots is what communities themselves have demanded.¹⁰¹ In both Central Kalimantan and Madura, villagers said that their first priority following the ethnic violence was socio-economic recovery, rather than legal or state-led reconciliation. This is not to say that the communities of both Central Kalimantan and Madura do not deserve formal justice, but that in the current political, legal and institutional context of Indonesia such justice is not forthcoming. Investing in an immediate recovery model, focused on economic and social justice, would better serve the interests of local communities for now, and could possibly build bridges between groups for the future.

Grassroots social and economic recovery can take many forms. It may involve rebuilding houses, or funding a minority group's proposal for a small loan, as in some of the villages in Central Kalimantan. It may also involve setting up a community forum to solve collective problems, as in Madura. Some of the problems faced by communities in the aftermath of ethnic violence and displacement were economic, such as the reconstruction of buildings or roads; some were social, such as pacifying the antagonized group who were demanding revenge; some were a combination of both. But whichever form of recovery was needed, the first step to recovery in all cases was the availability of a mediator (whether an individual or a forum). This mediator enabled different groups to come together to solve collective community problems. Community recovery therefore requires some form of mediating bridge across divided social groups. In all the positive examples of inter-ethnic mediation or problem-solving identified in this paper, local level institutions played a key role in the mediation process. Their role was most positive when they enabled collective problem solving. Table 6.1 maps out the comparative mediation strengths of local level institutions identified in the study.

Despite all their weaknesses, community-based institutions had greater success at managing local conflict between groups than those of government leaders. Ethnic conflict is an unpredictable and complex event,

¹⁰¹ National government policy on community reconciliation inevitably dictates the possibilities for the grassroots level. The problems of government policy are considered in the final section of this chapter.

intimately connected to the local situation. As a result of this complexity, rigid and centralized systems of government had not managed to control volatile situations. Local institutions and local leaders possessed a degree of what James Scott calls ‘metis’, “The ability and experience necessary to influence the outcome of a particular instance”. (Scott 1998, p. 318) ‘Metis’ refers to the realm of locally learned practical knowledge, or local ‘know-how’. Local leaders, working through local institutions, applied such knowledge and understanding when trying to find solutions to complex problems. This local knowledge gives them a much better chance of formulating the correct response to communal violence than formal technocratic knowledge ever will. Realizing ways to build upon local knowledge for community reconciliation is one of the critical tasks for policy makers in conflict areas.¹⁰²

An important caveat must be applied here. While local leaders and informal local institutions may have the local knowledge needed to reconcile groups, they can also assert their power in ways that are inappropriate for a modern democracy. Examples are when they exclude women, ethnic minorities and disadvantaged groups from decision-making. They may also sanctify the use of violence as a way to solve inter-group problems. These findings of this study have stressed the importance of representation for successful inter-group conflict mediation. The use of violence obviously cannot be sanctioned as a tool for reconciliation, nor can the exclusion of one or more ethnic groups. But it is at the juncture between the roles of local knowledge and experience in building systems of conflict mediation, and the application of general democratic principles of conduct, that community recovery can take place. The trick for enabling true reconciliation between ethnic groups will be to find this balance.

6.3 Government Policy on Madurese Return

The final constraint on the prospects for community-based reconciliation to consider here is central and regional government policy on return of the displaced Madurese to their former homes. Government policy on return frames the prospects for community recovery and reconciliation in both Central Kalimantan and Madura. The main problem with government policy on this issue is that it is unclear. Furthermore, where there has been government action, there has been an almost complete lack of grassroots consultation and participation in the peace-making process. The lack of information provided to the community level has fostered rumor and fear, both preconditions for further conflict.

A good example of the extent to which communication between the government and community had broken down was the stark difference in viewpoints on the peace process between communities and local officials in Central Kalimantan and Madura. In Madura, most local government officials and displaced community leaders believed that the main result of the three peace congresses held in East Java had been a firm commitment from the government for displaced Madurese to return. No community leader in Madura was aware of the conditions that had been set on Madurese return in Central Kalimantan. Meanwhile, in Central Kalimantan, local officials and community leaders believed the outcome of the inter-regional peace processes was a firm commitment to the principle that only certain Madurese would ever be able to return, conditions which had been set by Dayak leaders. The secrecy surrounding the real outcome of the peace congresses and broader government policy on return meant neither side was clear about their future prospects. Rumors and misinformation were rife and the situation did not bode well for hopes of peaceful reconciliation.

Perhaps one of the reasons for government secrecy on the prospects for official Madurese return was the likelihood that this will never take place. It appeared that the national level of government had a strict policy of not providing information out of genuine fear that any information provided to the community level would trigger further conflict. They had a point. If their policy was to abandon prospects for return, they faced mutiny from the East Javanese and Madurese side. If their policy was to facilitate return, they

¹⁰² These ideas are explored further in Barron et al. (2004).

faced mutiny from the Dayak side. Given the history of Dayak rebellion, the latter was obviously to be avoided. But while the deliberate lack of information on return might temporarily pacify the situation in Central Kalimantan, it curtails the possibility of reconciliation between the displaced community and their new hosts in Madura.

Furthermore, the contradictions between the different concepts of, and rights to, residency play out in tragic ways for the ethnic Madurese from Central Kalimantan. However their rights are actually captured by national positive law, no one can practically assert these rights. Migrant Madurese were evacuated to the place perceived by the regional government and Dayak leaders of Central Kalimantan as their “ethnic homeland”. Meanwhile, in Madura, the displaced are classed as “temporary visitors” with no means to achieve full residency rights in what may eventually become their permanent home. Without full residential rights they cannot support themselves as they lack jobs, access to public services, and land. They are thus dependent on the provision of food and shelter from local government and non-governmental organizations, frustrating the local community who are also very poor. Central government policy limits the possibility of reconciliation between groups by making it practically impossible for those displaced by ethnic conflict to survive in the long term. Such a policy can only fuel further tensions, conflicts, and potentially violence, between continually divided ethnic groups. Following these conclusions on the constraints on and possibilities for inter-ethnic reconciliation and local recovery, the next section discusses the policy areas that must be addressed in order to rectify the situation in both Central Kalimantan and Madura. First, overall policy challenges are considered; second, specific World Bank policy adaptations are suggested; and, third, recommendations are made for the Government of Indonesia. Finally, areas for further research are highlighted.

7. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Overall Policy Challenges

One of the main findings of this study is that, in Central Kalimantan, conflicts between ethnic communities divided by cultural, social and economic differences became violent when the institutional mechanisms for mediating and preventing group conflict were weak, corrupt and unrepresentative. This is a systemic problem relating to institutional and government reform, as well as widespread socio-economic disparities between groups that led to the exclusion of indigenous and vulnerable groups. The broad challenges these problems pose for policy makers relate not only to rebalancing socio-economic disparities and rebuilding weak institutions, but also to the way conflict is conceptualized in Indonesia, and therefore, to the way in which it is managed.

The first challenge for development agencies, including the World Bank, is to reconsider the idea that inter-group violence is a temporary social or political phenomenon confined to certain regions. A systemic and deeply rooted problem of conflict between groups has been viewed as a temporary problem specific only to certain regions and certain moments in time, when the biggest outbreaks of violence occur. This viewpoint means the causes and costs of violence are not properly accounted for, as it does not look into the deeper historical mechanisms behind conflict, nor the ongoing impacts of violence after the conflict has broken out. Investments in development programs already made are also put in danger because they have not been formulated to deal with outbreaks of conflict, despite great vulnerabilities to the impacts of conflict in areas not generally perceived as ‘conflict’ areas, such as Madura in East Java.¹⁰³ This results in flawed development programming because a systemic problem related to socio-economic inequalities and weak mediating institutions is viewed as a special sort of ‘ethnic’ problem. When such clashes break out and spill over into other regions, development programs in these areas are also not designed to cope with and respond to conflict situations. Furthermore, when conflicts turn violent,

¹⁰³ Barron and Madden’s (2004) study on violence in Lampung expands on these points.

development projects must be suspended because those projects were not designed to function in conflict-ridden environments, not to protect project staff.

"I am very worried about a conflict exploding again. It is important to empower the human resources of the remote Dayak community so they are not so vulnerable to rumors. Education for the community is especially important for this."
Civil servant, Sampit, Central Kalimantan

A second key challenge for policy makers is the exclusion of the grassroots or community level from conflict mediation, reconciliation and peace-brokering processes in Indonesia. This makes for weak policies, as it is the grassroots level that is impacted most by, and often actively involved in, ethnically divided violence. The community level has not only been excluded from the negotiations between East Java and Central Kalimantan on the issue of the displaced Madurese. In Indonesia more generally, peace talks tend to take place only at the most senior levels of government with top political, military and religious leaders. This applies to the Aceh peace talks in 2003 and the series of Malino peace talks on the conflicts in Central Sulawesi and Maluku in 2002. While much has been made of the successes of the peace-brokering process at Malino I and II, it remains to be seen whether these agreements have been fully socialized or accepted at the community level. Certainly, there has been no strategic planning for securing the backing of the communities impacted by and involved in the conflict. Recent resurgences of inter-religious violence in Ambon would point to the flaws in the peace talks negotiated at Malino II.

Peace agreements that exclude grassroots participation do not tend to last because the very communities affected by these peace agreements have been excluded from drawing them up. As such, no awareness of these agreements filters to the community level. This means that the community level tends not to have agreed to the reconciliation conditions (if any were actually made), as was the case with the Central Kalimantan-East Java peace talks. Ihsan Malik, a conflict resolution facilitator involved in the BakuBae people's peace movement in Maluku, an area very badly impacted by inter-group violence, commented on the failure of the Malino II peace agreements:

*"Resistance was (however) predictable because of the manner in which Malino II was imposed. Official statements have made it look like it's the law that anyone who disagrees with it will have to face up to authorities. The agreement was signed after only a few days of talks between the conflicting groups. Disagreement started to brew up in the days after the agreement was signed."*¹⁰⁴

Without genuine participation of the communities impacted by and participating in conflict, reconciliation and conflict resolution initiatives cannot secure peace. This requires a rethinking for top level policy makers in how to foster community reconciliation. Working directly with the community level, through local leaders and community groups, in conjunction with a coherent government policy, could offer a range of opportunities for brokering peace and human security following outbreaks of ethnic violence and other sorts of conflict.

The lack of equitable natural resource and land management are two further (and perhaps the most complex) factors behind inter-group (both ethnic and religious) violence in Indonesia.¹⁰⁵ These problems operate in at least two spheres. First, these problems operate in areas where the indigenous live and migrant groups, government agencies and private companies have subsequently taken over land and access to natural resources, as in Central Kalimantan. Second, they operate in areas where local communities who already faced conflict over access to natural resources or land have been affected by the arrival of displaced communities from other areas of ethnic conflict, as in Madura. This situation leads to

¹⁰⁴ *The Jakarta Post*, April 6, 2002, p.5

¹⁰⁵ See Annex B for definitions of ethnic and religious violence.

subsequent challenges over local ownership and access to natural resources between groups and needs to be managed very carefully. Each sphere probably requires a separate set of policies to address reconciliation and conflict management in that area.¹⁰⁶ The differences between these two types of conflict over natural resources and their relationship to ethnic conflict will only be highlighted here.

In the first scenario, the main challenge for policy makers is to manage the tense relationship between the exploitation and management of natural resources on the one hand, and the subsequent impact on the poorest sectors of indigenous groups on the other. Indigenous groups may be dependent on income from natural resources; they may also demand access to traditional lands which they lost under previous regimes but which are now occupied by migrant communities. Setting policy within this context is incredibly complex and requires detailed analysis of the histories of land management in those regions, and the livelihood of each affected group.

In the second scenario, displacement caused by ethnic conflict is a key problem, but local histories of land and natural resource conflict must also be accounted for. In Central Maluku, Ellen has identified tensions over land and natural resources that long preceded the religious conflict concentrated in Ambon in 2000.¹⁰⁷ Land conflicts dating back to the Dutch Wars at the end of the 17th Century had simmered along for centuries. These were then brought to the surface and made worse by contemporary inter-ethnic conflict, which caused the wide-scale displacement of villagers into new areas. As villagers were displaced to new areas, two problems emerged: first, problems relating to short-term resource scarcity; second, problems relating to long-term land security. Both of these sorts of problems have triggered further resource conflicts in areas that already had lots of land conflicts. The same process has occurred in Madura, when the displaced from the conflict in Central Kalimantan arrived into already natural resource-poor areas. Supporting further research on the relationship between land and resource conflicts and the causes and levels of ethnic conflict would aid more effective policymaking.¹⁰⁸

7.2 Recommendations for World Bank Project Interventions

The World Bank could make several constructive contributions towards aiding the reduction of ethnic violence in rural areas of Indonesia.¹⁰⁹ The World Bank is best positioned to take action through the community-driven development platform. This can be done, first, through continuing to support the *Kecamatan* Development Project (KDP) as well as through the proposed Support for Poor and Disadvantaged Areas (SPADA) Project.¹¹⁰ The conclusion presented here supports a reconciliation model based on inter-group problem solving and community recovery at the local level. Supporting community-driven development projects entails support to both of these ends. The overall community-based model of KDP is an ideal vehicle for supporting community recovery and reconciliation; but certain features of the project need tweaking in order to cope better with inter-group conflict management. There are four areas where adjustments could be made.

First, project facilitators need greater technical support and require more careful recruitment policies in conflict-ridden areas. Facilitators who may end up assisting inter-group mediation need to have both authority and trust from the community. We have already seen that the KDP forums have been used as venues for solving small scale, local-level conflicts. However, younger or inexperienced project facilitators were sometimes unable to cope with the more complex and volatile situations. Other

¹⁰⁶ For greater detail on the issues of natural resource management and conflict, see International Crisis Group (2001b), and McCarthy (2001).

¹⁰⁷ Roy Ellen, University of Canterbury, British Council, Jakarta, Indonesia, August 27, 2003.

¹⁰⁸ Soeryo Adiwibowo, Centre for Environmental Research (Bogor), British Council, Jakarta, Indonesia, August 27, 2003.

¹⁰⁹ Because World Bank projects in Indonesia are also Indonesian Government projects, these recommendations equally apply to the Government.

¹¹⁰ At the time of writing the project was under preparation with the Government of Indonesia.

facilitators had also been actors in the conflict, meaning their neutral mediation role was compromised. There is also room for further training of current facilitators in mediation skills. The selection of facilitators with experience in conflict environments could also be targeted for conflict-ridden areas. Further, more senior project facilitators could be selected for working in the most difficult areas, or at least to act as technical back up to younger facilitators working at the community level. Several young female facilitators in Madura were working hard to support conflict mediation in difficult conditions, but said they needed more technical support in doing so from their regional and central managers. With these four adjustments, project facilitators should be much better placed to mediate inter-group conflicts at the local level.

Second, the project rules need to be adjusted in conflict areas. Some inter-group activities to help reconciliation between communities have already been developed at the local level through KDP. However, these initiatives broke project rules because they supported allocation of funds for the reconstruction of private buildings.¹¹¹ Amending project rules for conflict areas, or making them more flexible, could help support such inter-group reconciliation activities, rather than restrict them. Other activities could include allocating funds to support inter-community economic projects that build practical ties between different social and ethnic groups. At the moment there is no special target set for inter-group projects, but this might be one way to aid inter-group activities.

Third, the scope of local development projects should be widened. The scope of community development projects needs to be broadened beyond those that are specifically economic and infrastructure based. If a community conceives a project to reduce violence that is based on a non-economic activity, such as a cultural or faith-based project, these sorts of proposals should be considered as equally important to community recovery. At the moment there are few incentives for villagers to charge development funds toward cultural or social activities at the cost of infrastructure projects, even when members of the community who are victims of violence would welcome the former. For example, in Central Kalimantan, villagers expressed the need for therapeutic community activities and support groups, but they did not want to do so at the cost of current community development funds, which they need for physical infrastructure and economic projects.

Fourth, further measures are needed to ensure the safety of project staff. Project policy changes are needed at the sub-district, district and provincial level to ensure the safety of those working in conflict-ridden areas that are involved directly as mediators of conflict. At the time of the field research, no specific protection mechanisms against the dangers of working in conflict areas were built into projects for staff members. Many project staff said they felt vulnerable during outbreaks of conflicts. They often had to rely on informal security groups or gangs for protection. Some senior project facilitators reported that they had no back up from central management during outbreaks of ethnic violence; neither had they received extra funds to cope with the problem.¹¹² Appropriate protection or evacuation mechanisms for facilitators should be developed.

Inter-village and intra-village forums through KDP are invaluable because in an institutional environment where inter-group mediation is limited, they can provide a neutral forum for the resolution of inter-group problems. KDP forums can also draw on local knowledge bases and involve local leaders—these are two essential features for successful inter-group mediation. Local development forums also build trust between the community and the government—government officials are finally seen to be taking action for community problems. As weak institutions are one of the main foundations for ethnic conflict in

¹¹¹ Reported in interviews in Lampung province, January 2002.

¹¹² In one area district level project staff had used their own funds to ferry their staff members out of the central conflict area. They had then housed these local project staff in their own home for the duration of the conflict. During this time, they had received no technical or financial support from the Jakarta project offices.

Indonesia, and the transition to a new government regime has triggered even further conflict, rebuilding the community-state relationship through successful government projects is a key step toward reduction of violence. With the four specific project adjustments suggested above, continued support of community-driven development projects by the World Bank may be one of the best strategies for working toward the reduction of ethnic violence in Indonesia, in combination with the further recommendations below.

7.3 Recommendations to the Government of Indonesia

Beyond the specific project interventions outlined above, there are four other key areas where government action is required. **First, the Government needs to address the lack of trust from the community toward local government and between different levels of government.** There were few coordinated efforts and clear channels of support between the village, sub-district and district levels of government in conflict-ridden areas. The decentralization process had exaggerated this situation, because channels between different levels of government were in transition at the time of research (at least in Central Kalimantan). Lower administrative levels of government in remote areas were unclear as to what the new system of government meant and how it might benefit them. Those officials who had the initiative to set up inter-group projects, or who had ideas for reducing conflict in their community, were isolated from higher levels of support to do so. This was unfortunate because local-level initiatives are often the best way to reduce local conflicts. Government monitoring from the district level could help to build trust between different levels of government, if it done in a supportive way. Furthermore, district governments could invite village and sub-district government officials to the district to discuss common problems, share ideas on solutions to ethnic conflict, and to design common strategies to cope with them. This would also be useful in areas where conflicts are driven by factors beyond the local level and where the conflicts are more widely spread.

Second, higher levels of government need to communicate their policies on conflict to the local level. Conflicts and tensions between groups at the community level are exacerbated by lack of information on government policy, thus fuelling rumors and misinformation. In the context of provincial and district level conflict mediation or reconciliation, it would be useful if the government supported information dissemination to impacted communities. This could easily be done through the government hierarchy. Further, for effective reconciliation to take place, higher levels of government need to visit the grassroots level in order to understand the local situation. Those officials in provincial and district offices rarely left them and had little idea what the impacts of conflict had been in rural areas. Designing district-wide reconciliation plans would be hopeless without extensive consultation with the affected communities.¹¹³

Third, the Government needs to urgently address corruption within the security and law enforcement agencies. If the police are to fulfill their official role as the main agency responsible for managing local conflicts, they need to have the trust and authority to do so. However, if the police continue to respond to crime in corrupt ways, the community will never trust them to mediate conflicts. Certain conflict triggers, such as repeated criminal action, also require action from the legal sector. At the moment, many communities are not aware of their legal right to protection from crime, and remain incredibly vulnerable to violent crime. Using the legal system as a venue for justice was an alien concept to the communities researched in this study. As such, vigilante justice has taken the place of official justice.¹¹⁴

Fourth, marginalized groups should be included in rather than targeted by emergency aid projects. The Government needs to put a system in place whereby development or emergency assistance funds for

¹¹³ The Bank could also extend support to this sort of exercise on its field supervision missions. While the Bank already does this to some degree, it could perhaps extend this activity to focus on officials who have never traveled within their own region.

¹¹⁴ See World Bank (2004) on proposals for supporting village justice.

populations displaced by conflict are shared by both host and displaced communities. Targeting aid toward the displaced community fuels inter-group tensions and resentments. Collective decision-making between host and community groups over emergency funds would help to reduce tensions between the two groups. The process of inter-group negotiation on the allocation of local funds within a community can also help to build bridges between divided groups. It is not only displaced communities, but also other marginalized or minority groups within a community that would benefit from this. Using inter-community KDP mechanisms, or similar forums, would enable inclusion of minority groups.

7.4 Areas for Further Research

The evolution of local conflict mediation mechanisms through the new decentralization laws should be followed closely by agencies working in conflict-ridden regions. In each area, local regulations on conflict are emerging at the district level. It would be useful for development policy makers if this process was tracked and comparisons made of the successes of new (or reinvented) forums for resolving conflict. Extending research from the local level to higher levels of government administration and political actors at the district, provincial and central levels, would also build a much stronger understanding of the dynamics of conflict during government reform; as would reaching down from macro-level studies of conflict to the local level. Such research could also explore the scope for extending government monitoring and complaints mechanisms from the village to the district level, and from local to central government.

Further cross-regional work would also be valuable to see whether the analysis and conclusions offered here apply to other regions of Indonesia. The Bank has already sponsored ongoing research into the causes and impacts of conflict in East Java and East Nusa Tenggara, and the role of the KDP project in managing local level conflicts.¹¹⁵ If this research could be expanded to areas that have experienced higher levels or different forms of conflict, such as Central Sulawesi, Maluku, West Papua or Aceh, this would contribute to a deeper and broader understanding of the processes of conflict and reconciliation in Indonesia. Such research can only benefit more effective policy making for conflict-ridden communities in Indonesia, and, potentially, elsewhere.

¹¹⁵ See Barron et al. (2003) for the research project methodology.

Annex 1: Research Methodology

The research was based on qualitative and ethnographic fieldwork. The overall goal was to employ a form of empathy to the analysis of ethnic violence by attempting to, “understand the meaning of actions and interactions from the members’ own point of view.” (Eckstein 1975, cited in King et al. 1994) The main reason for using an ethnographic approach was the sensitivity of the subject matter. In order to approach discussions on the roots and process of violence it was necessary to build trust with informants and to devote extensive time and a high degree of flexibility to the interview process. To this end, the main research sources were individual and group based interviews, held over three months of qualitative fieldwork in Central Kalimantan and East Java (see Table A.1).¹¹⁶ Research topic guides were developed along with field-testing of interview methods in East Nusa Tenggara, West Java and Lampung provinces between November and December 2001. These three provinces were selected for their comparative diversity of culture, religion, ethnicity, socio-economic levels, infrastructure coverage and demographics. Each region also had reported incidents of communal violence.

Table A.1: Provincial and District Research Sites

Province	District
Central Kalimantan	East Kotawaringin
East Java (Madura)	Sampang

Initial selection of provincial research sites and informants was intentional as Central Kalimantan was the site of the 2001 ethnic massacre. The region had received almost no humanitarian aid following the conflict from the international donor community, despite the high levels of death, injury and trauma reported, as well as very little research interest. One year after the conflict, little was known about how communities were coping. East Kotawaringin district was selected because it was then the largest district (it has since been subdivided into three separate administrative districts), and both rural and urban communities were involved in the violence in this area. Madura in East Java was selected because many of the ethnic Madurese in Central Kalimantan originated from this island (although some were also born in Central Kalimantan). It was also where the majority of survivors were deported to by the government. Sampang district was selected because it received the highest number of internally-displaced people, and because it was the location where many Madurese had originally migrated from. Sampang is the poorest and most arid district on the island.

A cross-section of informants was selected for the research study, from the provincial to the village levels. The majority of interviews took place at the village level, but substantial time was also spent at the sub-district and district levels. Both urban and rural villages were selected within districts to compare the experiences and perceptions of both urban and rural residents. A cross-section of informants was interviewed for the study from within government agencies, local authority figures and experts, local *Kecamatan* Development project (KDP) staff and ordinary citizens (see Table A.2). Three sub-districts were visited in Sampang district, Madura. In Central Kalimantan five sub-district sites were visited, varying from those over three days river travel from the provincial capital, to those four hours by road from Sampit. Four to six weeks were spent in each provincial research site in early 2002. Repeated research missions were made to Madura, East Java, and Central Kalimantan later in 2002, in order to verify information. Between two to five days were allowed for each rural village research site, depending on the impact of the conflict and the remoteness of the research site. Sometimes only one day was allocated to urban village sites due to the proximity of those communities to each other.

¹¹⁶ The bulk of the fieldwork took place between January and June 2002, but continued sporadically up to August 2003.

Due to the nature of the subject matter, the majority of interviews were in-depth and open-ended. Some interviews were by necessity informal, for example with gang leaders and youth. Others were more formal and semi-structured, for example with government officials and academics. At the village level, focus group discussions with a particular target group were also held. In each village, focus groups discussions were held with a group of women, village elders or community leaders, and a group of farmers in order to achieve a degree of consistency across the different research sites.

Table A.2: Research Informant List

Level of Informant	Type of Informant				
	Government	KDP project staff	Authority figures, leaders, representatives	Ordinary citizens	Village groups
Central	Ministry of Home Affairs – KDP Project Leader	National Management Consultants			
Provincial	Government official in Governors office Officials from Social and Political Affairs office	Provincial Management Consultants	Academics NGO staff Journalists		
District	District head Parliament members Officials from Land, Statistics, Health, Education, Public Works, Social and Political Affairs Military chief Police chief	District Management Consultants	NGO staff		
Sub-district	Sub-district head Military chief Police chief	Sub-district project staff: Sub-district facilitator, financial management unit, monitoring teams			
Village	Village head Village parliament head Members of village parliament Heads of neighborhood units (RT/RW)	Village facilitator(s) TPK (activities management team) TTD (technical assistance team)	<i>Healthcare</i> Village midwife Traditional healer <i>Education</i> Teacher(s) Head teacher Parent-teacher association members <i>Informal Security</i> Members of village security teams Gang members <i>Religious/traditional leaders</i> Muslim clerics Priests Traditional leaders Village Elders	<i>Women</i> Elite/educated women Poor women Female headed-households <i>Men</i> Land owners Non-land owners Unemployed men	<i>Economic groups:</i> e.g., savings and loans groups Religious groups e.g., prayer groups <i>Political groups:</i> e.g., mass organizations <i>Production groups:</i> e.g., weaving collectives

Annex 2: Definitions and Concepts

Definitions

As there is some controversy in the contemporary literature on how ethnicity and conflict should be defined; this section briefly defines the key terms used in the paper. ‘Ethnic’ conflict in this paper captures conflicts between ethnic identity groups. This definition is broad enough to include ascriptive (birth-based) and cultural (or identity) groups, but does not include conflicts between religious groups. This is a more narrow definition of the term ‘ethnic’ than that used in contemporary literature on ethnic conflict. In Horowitz’s (2000) and Varshney’s (2002a) work on ethnic conflict, for example, religious conflicts are included under a broad category of ethnic conflicts.

There are several reasons for why this paper uses a narrower definition of ethnic conflict. In Indonesia there are different support bases across the country for religious groups than those mobilized by more strictly defined ‘ethnic’ groups. This difference affects the ways groups organize and access popular support and funding for their particular cause.. ‘Religious’ conflicts frequently take place in different political context than ‘ethnic’ conflicts. This is not just the case in Indonesia, but also in the global context. Furthermore, while in many situations religious and ethnic identities map onto each other, and the two may necessarily blur, in Central Kalimantan this was not the case. Therefore, in order to simplify the research design, the study focused only on the conflict between ‘ethnic’ identity groups in Central Kalimantan.

The definition of ‘ethnic’ conflict in the paper corresponds to the literature by excluding groups based on political affiliations, or social or economic class based groups. The paper recognizes that ethnic or religious groupings can lead to class or divisions, and class and ethnic group divisions frequently reflect each other. However, as the main cleavage was ‘ethnic’ rather than class-based, the study focused on this social divide. The study is not new in finding that elements of other forms of conflict, for example over land and resources, feed into and drive ‘ethnically’ based conflict.

The term ‘ethnic conflict’ also needs clarification. In conflict analysis, as Varshney (2001; 2002a) has pointed out, we need to be careful not to conflate the definitions of ethnic violence with ethnic conflict. Ethnic conflict may exist, but it does not always lead to violence. It was the failure of the official institutionalized channels for conflict mediation in Central Kalimantan that contributed to an environment where ethnic violence was possible.

“In any ethnically plural society that allows free expression of political demands, some ethnic conflict is more or less inevitable, but it may not necessarily lead to violence. When there are different ethnic groups that are free to organize, there are likely to be conflicts over resources, identity, patronage, and policies.... The real issue is whether ethnic conflict is violent or waged via the polity’s institutionalized channels.” (Varshney 2001)

A final caveat on definitions: the pursuit of self-governance for certain groups, which so often leads to ethnic conflict, must also be examined carefully, before the causes of these conflicts are classified as ‘ethnically’ based. As Lederach explains:

“Most current wars are intrastate affairs. The primary issues of contention concern governance and often involve the pursuit of autonomy or self-governance for certain regions or groups. At least half of the current wars have to do with the redefinition of

territory, state formation, or control of the state.... It is more accurate (...) to name these "identity conflicts" rather than ethnic conflicts, given that there is nothing innately ethnic about them. Rather, it is often the failure of governing structures to address fundamental needs, provide space for participation in decisions, and ensure an equitable distribution of resources that makes identification with a group so attractive and salient in a given setting." (Lederach 1997, p. 8)

Taking Lederach's warning to heart, the use of the term 'ethnic conflict' in this paper does not imply that the *causes* of those conflicts are necessarily ethnic. It refers only to the fact that the conflict was manifested between ethnic groups.

Analytical Framework

Many forms of violent conflict are found in contemporary Indonesia. They vary from political separatism, to inter-ethnic warfare; from conflicts over land and resources, to fights between communities and private companies, non-governmental organizations, the state, or a combination of all three. Many of them are wrongly classified as 'horizontal violence.'¹¹⁷ During the research on ethnically based violence in Central Kalimantan, it was necessary to consider other forms of conflict and violence that had a direct effect on and close relationship to ethnic violence. Resource conflicts and vigilante responses to criminal problems, which may not originally have had an ethnic basis, took on an ethnic coloring over time.

Organizing conflict into a typology can be a first step toward understanding the mechanisms behind conflict. It also enables cross-conflict comparison. While it is best to organize conflict typologies along one discriminating variable, it is surprising how rarely this is done. In many typologies more than one variable is mixed up within a list of apparently discriminatory conflict types. Conflict typologies often confuse the underlying motives behind a conflict with the form of organization the conflict takes, for example by categorizing land conflict and banditry as separate types of conflict, when the motivations and the way people organize may be similar in both cases. This kind of mixed typology makes it hard to separate the motivations behind a conflict from the way actors may organize and position themselves during the conflict itself.

There are at least four key variables along which it might make sense for a conflict typology to be organized.¹¹⁸ This list is not exhaustive, but it includes some of the main characteristics of conflict a conflict analyst would need to account for. This study used the third variable: social organization of groups in conflict. Social organization was one of the key themes in ethnic conflict in Central Kalimantan and the other forms of conflict identified in Madura, East Java.

- Intention—what the actors in the conflict are fighting about
For example: land, access to natural resources, revenge
- Outcome—what is the form of chaos that ensues from the conflict
For example: peaceful resolution, destruction of property, injuries, and deaths
- Organization—forms of social organization in the conflict
For example: banditry, mafias, ethnic groups
- Political—relationship of the conflict to the form or nature of the state
For example: separatist movement, Islamicist movement

At a preliminary stage of analysis, it may not be useful to organize conflicts into types according to their cause. Different sorts of conflict can be driven by the same cause, but their impacts may be very

¹¹⁷ See van Klinken (2001, p.1), where he criticizes the use of this term in defining ethnic conflicts in Indonesia.

¹¹⁸ Thanks to Scott Guggenheim for this suggestion.

different. There may also be too many simultaneous causes to make it possible to organize conflicts into coherent groups.¹¹⁹ It may be more useful to identify conflict by its main characteristics, for example by the main trigger for the conflict, or the way in which violence was organized. It is also sometimes possible to arrange conflict typologies by intention, but this method was not useful for looking at Central Kalimantan due to the fact that the intention of the conflict was sometimes contradictory within the same groups involved in the conflict. The political nature of the conflicts also varied within the same ethnic groups, making it hard to pin that variable down. This may be a useful variable for analyzing other conflicts in Indonesia, for example conflicts involving separatist movements.

Literature Review

There are roughly three main strands in the literature to explain ethnic conflict.¹²⁰ One strand is essentially institutional in nature;¹²¹ one view concentrates on economic incentives and structures;¹²² and a third perspective focuses on culture.¹²³ The explanation for ethnic violence in this paper drew on useful elements from all of them, rather than using a strictly cultural, institutional or structural analysis. The paper explored how cultural, socio-economic and institutional variables came into play within a particular region. When all three factors were aligned such that cultural divides were acute, socio-economic disparities were deep and institutional mechanisms to manage conflict failed, this was the point when ethnic conflict turned into ethnic violence.

In particular, while culture was an important explanatory variable for ethnic conflict, the paper aimed to demonstrate that it could not be used as the sole explanation for violence. The sociological theory of Barrington Moore Jr. (1967) was particularly helpful in understanding the reasons why cultural variables cannot be used as an explanatory tool for ethnic violence when applied independently of other factors. Moore explains that values cannot be taken as the starting point of sociological explanation for a given problem as this “makes it very difficult to understand the obvious fact that values change in response to circumstance.” (Moore 1967, p. 486) Using cultural explanations without accounting for structural, institutional or other factors, disguises the complexity of the underlying tensions between groups.

The many different people who were interviewed for this study also pointed to a combination of factors as having driven the violence, rather than cultural factors alone. The problem then was to sort through the many causes all the informants had given for ethnic violence to understand how and why it was possible. Moore argues, “The problem is to determine out of what past and present activities such an outlook arises and maintains itself.” (Moore 1967, p. 486) Moore further argues that in order to explain behavior—in this case the act of violence against another group—we need to understand the dynamics of history and social change, not just the values that groups hold at a certain point in time; otherwise, we fall into a circular trap.

“Culture, or tradition—to use a less technical term—is not something that exists outside of or independently of individual human beings living together in society. They are

¹¹⁹ See also Barron and Madden (2004) on typologizing violence in Lampung.

¹²⁰ For a more substantial literature review, see Barron et al (2004).

¹²¹ Welsh (2003) has put together a useful summary of transitional and institutional perspectives on violence in Indonesia. See also Varshney’s work on India (2002a) where he focuses on the role of informal institutions in managing ethnic conflict.

¹²² For an economic incentives argument see Collier et al. (2001). On structural differences as a mechanism for driving conflict, see Tilly (1999) and Stewart (2002), who both emphasize the economic basis of conflict, but argue that it is inequality between groups which is the important variable.

¹²³ For the primordialist viewpoint, see Huntington (1993). Other accounts of cultural motivations for conflict are found in Kaplan (1997). Ross (1993) argues that psycho-cultural tendencies within a community or society shape the intensity of conflict in a given location. Wolf (1999) concentrates on the role that elites play in creating (and sustaining) conceptions of the self and the group.

abstractions by an observer, based on the observation of certain similarities in the way groups of people behave, either in certain situations or over time, or both. Even though one can often make accurate predictions about the way groups and individuals will behave over short periods of time on the basis of such abstractions, as such they do not explain behavior. To explain behavior in terms of cultural values is to engage in circular reasoning.” (Moore 1967, p. 487)

While cultural differences exacerbated socio-economic differences between the Dayak and migrant Madurese population, the different groups had existed side-by side for some time. The cultures of violence within each group only drove ethnic violence at a certain point. The two groups were not constantly enacting violence against each other, even though there had been consistent tensions between the two groups.

It was the combination of underlying socio-economic disparities, institutional weakness and the almost total absence of inter-group mediators, which explained why ethnic violence came to the fore at a certain point. Such an argument recognizes the importance of culture, but does not use it as the sole means for explaining social phenomena. As Moore writes:

“We cannot do without some conception of how people perceive the world and what they do or do not want to do about what they see. To detach this conception from the way people reach it, to take it out of its historical context and raise to the status of an independent causal factor in its own right, means that the supposedly impartial investigator succumbs to the justifications that ruling groups generally offer for their most brutal conduct.” (Moore 1967, p. 487)

Glossary

<i>Adat</i>	Traditional or customary law (as in <i>hukum adat</i> , traditional law)
<i>Antara</i>	Between (as in <i>forum antara desa</i> , forum between villages)
<i>Arisan</i>	Savings and loans group
<i>Autonomi</i>	Autonomy (as in <i>autonomi daerah</i> , regional autonomy)
<i>Bahasa</i>	Language
<i>Bajingan</i>	Roughly but not quite equivalent to a mafia leader or group. While in other parts of Indonesia this term can be used in a derogatory way, in Madura, East Java, <i>bajingan</i> are informal leaders, as well as a criminal network. They act as a local security mechanism with leadership and problem solving roles in the community.
<i>Besar</i>	Large, or big
<i>Bupati</i>	District, or regency, head
<i>Carok</i>	Revenge-seeking (refers to both an action against another person and a culture of Pride in Madura, East Java)
<i>Clurit</i>	Sickle (used in farming, but also a traditional weapon in Madura, East Java)
<i>Daerah</i>	Region
<i>Damang</i>	Traditional Dayak leader in Central Kalimantan (Ngaju Dayak dialect)
<i>Desa</i>	Village
<i>Dusun</i>	Hamlet (sub-village)
<i>Hukum</i>	Law
<i>Imam</i>	Muslim cleric
<i>Kabupaten</i>	District or Regency
<i>Kaharingan</i>	Traditional Dayak religion
<i>Kecamatan</i>	Sub-district administrative unit, usually comprised of around 12 villages (usually more villages than 12 in Java, and less off-Java)
<i>Kades</i>	Abbreviation for <i>kepala desa</i> (village head)
<i>Kepala Desa</i>	Village head
<i>Kerusahan</i>	Violence
<i>Klebun (Kleybun)</i>	Village head (Madurese: used in Madura, East Java)
<i>Komunikasi</i>	Communication
<i>Konflik</i>	Conflict
<i>Kongres</i>	Congress
<i>Korban</i>	Victim
<i>Krismon</i>	Monetary Crisis (referring to the 1997 financial crisis in Indonesia)
<i>Kyai</i>	Muslim cleric and community leader in East Java
<i>Majelis Adat</i>	Traditional Leaders Council (in Central Kalimantan)

<i>Masyarakat</i>	Community
<i>Manyanggar</i>	Traditional Dayak ceremonies to ask for protection from the ancestors
<i>Musyawaharah</i>	Consensual community decision-making meeting
<i>Order Baru</i>	New Order (as in New Order Government)
<i>Pak</i>	From <i>Bapak</i> , meaning father
<i>Paska</i>	Post (as in <i>paska-konflik</i> , post-conflict)
<i>Patahu</i>	Small Dayak spirit houses (where the heads of enemies are stored)
<i>Pendinginan</i>	“Cooling-down process” (referring to post-conflict situations)
<i>Pengungsi</i>	Refugee, also used to refer to internally displaced people in Indonesia
<i>Pembangunan</i>	Development
<i>Perdamaian</i>	Peace-making (as in <i>Kongres Perdamaian</i> , peace-making congress)
<i>Tim</i>	Team
<i>Tingkat</i>	Level
<i>Tokoh-tokoh</i>	Community leaders (see also <i>tokoh masyarakat</i>)

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