Extractive Industries and Sustainable Development
An Evaluation of World Bank Group Experience

(In Four Volumes) Volume II: World Bank Experience

July 29, 2003

Operations Evaluation Department
### Abbreviations and Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAA</td>
<td>analytical and advisory activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFR</td>
<td>Africa Region</td>
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<td>ASM</td>
<td>artisanal and small-scale mining</td>
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<td>CAE</td>
<td>Country Assistance Evaluation</td>
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<td>CAS</td>
<td>Country Assistance Strategy</td>
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<td>CDP</td>
<td>Community Development Program</td>
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<td>EAP</td>
<td>East Asia and the Pacific Region</td>
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<td>ECA</td>
<td>Europe and Central Asia Region</td>
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<td>EIR</td>
<td>Extractive Industries Review</td>
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<td>EMP</td>
<td>Environmental Management Plan</td>
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<td>ERL</td>
<td>Emergency Rehabilitation Loan</td>
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<td>ERR</td>
<td>economic rate of return</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>gross domestic product</td>
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<td>GEF</td>
<td>Global Environment Facility</td>
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<td>GHG</td>
<td>greenhouse gas</td>
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<td>GPG</td>
<td>Global Products Group</td>
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<td>ICR</td>
<td>Implementation Completion Report</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IP</td>
<td>Inspection Panel</td>
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<td>IPAP</td>
<td>Indigenous People’s Action Plan</td>
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<td>IPDP</td>
<td>Indigenous Peoples’ Development Plan</td>
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<td>LAC</td>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean Region</td>
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<td>MNA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa Region</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
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<td>NPV</td>
<td>net present value</td>
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<td>OD</td>
<td>Operational Directive (World Bank)</td>
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<td>OP</td>
<td>Operational Policy (World Bank)</td>
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<td>PPAR</td>
<td>Project Performance Assessment Report</td>
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<td>PSD</td>
<td>private sector development</td>
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<td>PSR</td>
<td>Project Supervision Report</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Production-Sharing Contract</td>
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<td>SAL</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Loan</td>
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<td>SAR</td>
<td>Staff Appraisal Report</td>
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<td>SAS</td>
<td>South Asia Region</td>
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<td>SECAL</td>
<td>Sectoral Adjustment Loan</td>
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<td>SIL</td>
<td>Specific Investment Loan</td>
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<td>SSM</td>
<td>small-scale mining</td>
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<td>TA</td>
<td>technical assistance</td>
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<td>TAL</td>
<td>Technical Assistance Loan</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>WBG</td>
<td>World Bank Group</td>
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### Definitions

**Extractive industries** for this review include oil, gas, and mining of minerals and metals. Mining for construction materials, including cement production and quarries, is not included, nor are indirect investments through financial intermediaries.

**Sustainable development** meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. This requires sound environmental and social performance and economic efficiency. Given that fiscal revenues constitute a major source of net benefits (beyond the project financiers) obtained from the extraction of mineral resources, the interests of future generations can be protected through the efficient utilization of these revenues for people in the host country.

**Revenue management** refers to the collection, distribution, and utilization of government revenues.

The **World Bank Group** includes IDA, IBRD, IFC, and MIGA. In this report, the combination of IDA and IBRD is referred to as the World Bank or “the Bank.” The evaluation units of the WBG are the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) of the Bank, the Operations Evaluation Group (OEG) of IFC, and the Operations Evaluation Unit (OEU) of MIGA. These units are independent of WBG management and report to the WBG’s Board through the Director-General, Operations Evaluation.

**Resource-rich** and **EI-dependent** are used interchangeably in this report to refer to developing countries whose average annual export value of oil, gas, or mineral products exceeds 15 percent of total exports. This standard has been chosen with reference to the WBG’s Poverty Reduction Sourcebook, which states: “A country’s mining sector can play an important role in poverty reduction strategies if the approximate share of the mining sector is... greater than 10–25 percent of export earnings...” For a list of countries meeting this criterion, see Annex B.

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Acknowledgments

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1. Introduction

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

1.1 In resource-abundant countries, the extractive industries should be expected to play a major role in support of sustainable development. They can be an important source of government revenues and foreign exchange, and generate employment in otherwise economically neglected areas. They can attract investment for local and national infrastructure, and provide countries with opportunities to strengthen their institutional and administrative capacities. But these same industries also provide opportunities for rent-seeking that can hinder the conversion of EI revenues into sustainable development. Paradoxically, over the past three decades, resource-abundant developing countries have experienced poor economic performance in higher proportion than resource-poor developing countries. The factors that lead to underperformance have been extensively studied but are not fully understood, nor is the design of appropriate strategies for dealing with them (see Box 1.1, next page).

1.2 The World Bank helps its client countries develop their mineral resources through a variety of lending and non-lending activities in the extractive industries. Lending assistance is provided through specific investment loans, technical assistance, and structural adjustment loans. Non-lending activities consist of a variety of advisory and analytical activities, including sector-related economic and other studies, workshops and conferences, and training. The focus of the Bank’s involvement has evolved over four decades, beginning with an emphasis on production and exploration in the 1960s and 1970s, proceeding to commercialization of state enterprises in the 1980s and private sector development in the 1990s, and to a more inclusive approach involving civil society, local governments, and the private sector in recent years.

1.3 The involvement of the Bank and the World Bank Group (WBG) in the extractive industries has come under increased scrutiny in recent years from several sections of civil society. Some are concerned that the extractive industries exact a heavy toll on the environment, with the poorest citizens paying the highest price, and they have put the spotlight on the treatment of local populations, especially where a project involves involuntary resettlement. Others have been concerned with issues of poor governance and failure to effectively use rents to support sustained economic development. At the Annual Meetings in 2000, some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) presented the WBG with a request asking it to stop supporting the extractive industries because, in their view, the adverse environmental, social, and governance impacts outweigh whatever economic and social benefits may accrue to the domestic economy and the poor from the extractive industries.

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2. Ross 2001. However, it is important to note that while the issue of "whether or not mining usually promotes economic development remains unresolved, there is widespread agreement that rich mineral deposits provide developing countries with opportunities, which in some instances have been used wisely to promote development, and in other instances have been misused, hurting development" (Davis and Tilton, 2001).
Box 1.1: The “Paradox of Plenty”

In recent decades, many resource-abundant developing countries have experienced significantly lower rates of growth than resource-poor developing economies. This phenomenon is often accompanied by poor governance and lack of transparency in managing El revenues, and significant negative environmental and social impacts. This phenomenon is often referred to as the “paradox of plenty”.

Figure 1.1: Slower Economic Growth with Greater El Dependence

$\text{Source: World Bank: World Development Indicators}$

Economists and social scientists (among them, Gelb 1988, Sachs and Warner 1995, Auty 2000, and Isham 2002) have proposed several explanations for the phenomenon and strategies to deal with it, but no single model yet synthesizes the interplay of institutional, social, and political factors that is behind the observed paradox.** The emerging consensus is that the underperformance of resource-abundant developing countries, to the extent that it is the result of institutional and policy failure, is not inevitable. Overall, while the technical requirements for managing volatile and exhaustible revenue flows and other impacts such as the so-called Dutch disease, and devoting them to sustainable development are well understood, creating good governance appears to be at the heart of the institutional and policy changes needed to improve fiscal management, mitigate negative environmental and social impacts, and maximize benefits from the development of extractive industries.

Another perspective on this debate is that “the appropriate public policy question is not should we or should we not promote mining in the developing countries, but rather where should we encourage it and how can we ensure that it contributes as much as possible to economic development and poverty alleviation” (Davis and Tilton 2001).

* This relationship, which is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level ($t$-statistic $= -2.39$), illustrates a conclusion that is widely accepted in the literature. No claim is made that El dependence is the sole determinant of a country's economic growth. When non-borrower countries are included in the regression, the slope is also statistically significant ($t$-statistic $= -2.82$), and steeper ($-0.038$ vs. $-0.032$).

** Analysis in the 1960s focused on how to manage the macroeconomic impacts of resource export income, which raised domestic prices and made other exports less competitive internationally (so-called Dutch Disease). More recent analysis emphasizes poor use of fiscal revenues from resources.

1.4 In response to these concerns, the independent evaluation units of the World Bank Group have prepared evaluations of the extractive industries activities supported by the WBG. Concurrently, WBG management launched the Extractive Industries Review to better understand stake-

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4. The Operations Evaluation Department (OED) of the World Bank (IBRD and IDA), the Operations Evaluation Group (OEG) of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Operations Evaluation Unit (OEU) of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Association (MIGA).

5. The Extractive Industries Review (EIR) is headed by Dr. Emil Salim, former Minister of Environment for Indonesia. Additional information on the EIR can be found at www.eireview.org.
holder views and advise the Bank on its role in the sector. While the evaluations have consulted with the EIR, they constitute a separate exercise that has been conducted independently. This volume reports on the Operations Evaluation Department evaluation of the World Bank’s experience.

STUDY OBJECTIVE AND PROCESS

1.5 This evaluation assesses the effectiveness of the World Bank in enhancing the sustainable development contribution of the extractive industries, and distills lessons from experience to inform the Bank’s formulation of its future role in the sector. The evaluation design is based on the widely supported view that the main elements of a strategy to address the underperformance of many resource-abundant countries will be sound fiscal policies, rigorous mitigation of negative environmental and social impacts, and good governance.6 Thus, the evaluation focuses on assessing economic effects, environmental and social effects, and governance issues associated with the Bank’s interventions in the sector:

- **Economic Effects**
  - Improving the generation of fiscal revenues from the development of extractive industries
  - Promoting the distribution and expenditure of the revenues in support of sustainable development and poverty reduction
  - Strengthening the framework for managing the volatility and exhaustibility of fiscal revenues from extractive industries
  - Ensuring the adequacy of provisions for legal entitlements and compensation for negative impacts

- **Environmental and Social Effects**
  - Mitigating the adverse environmental impacts and enhancing positive impacts
  - Mitigating the adverse social impacts, including those associated with resettlement and closure of existing facilities, and contributing to social objectives

- **Governance**
  - Improving the institutional and policy framework
  - Strengthening governance processes

EVALUATION CRITERIA

1.6 At the project level, this study evaluates the effectiveness of Bank-supported EI projects based on an assessment of their outcome, sustainability, and institutional development impact.7 At the country level, the Bank’s effectiveness is evaluated based on an assessment of the overall coherence, level of effort, and results of its assistance to resource-abundant countries for enhancing the contribution of the extractive industries to sustainable development.

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7. See Annex C for an explanation of OED’s project ratings scale.
EVALUATION PROCESS

1.7 The evaluation has been carried out in two phases. Phase I consisted of a review of the portfolio of World Bank extractive industry projects (referred to as the Portfolio Review hereafter), supplemented by a review of Country Assistance Strategies (CASs) and a literature survey. The Portfolio Review covered all 76 Bank-supported projects in the EI sectors that were approved since fiscal 1993—48 "closed" or completed projects, and 28 "active" or ongoing projects. The list of projects reviewed is in Annex A.

1.8 Phase II built upon the findings from Phase I and consisted of:

- Three Thematic Studies of the Bank’s EI portfolio: (i) revenue management, (ii) safeguards implementation, and (iii) governance (referred to hereafter as the Revenue Study, Safeguards Study, and Governance Study, respectively)
- Five Country Case Studies (CCS) for Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Kazakhstan, and Papua New Guinea (PNG)
- Seven recent Project Performance Assessment Reports (PPARs)
- Two Surveys: (i) of task managers of active EI and EI-related projects and Country Economists of resource-abundant countries, and (ii) of participants of the EIR’s Regional Stakeholder Workshops.

STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

1.9 Following this introduction, Chapter 2 outlines the evolution of Bank involvement in the EI sectors and characterizes the EI portfolio and its performance. Chapter 3 reviews the economic benefits of Bank projects. Chapter 4 assesses the extent to which the Bank’s portfolio implemented its environmental and social safeguard policies and addressed issues of environmental capacity building and mine closure. Chapter 5 discusses the Bank’s efforts to improve the gen-

8. The Approach Paper and other supporting documents for this evaluation study are available on the Internet (www.ifc.org/oeg/EIEvaluation/evaluation.html).
9. The portfolio of projects chosen for review by this study consists of all extractive industries projects approved during or after FY 1993, the first full financial year after the WBG adopted revised safeguard policies. A total of 76 projects were reviewed, comprising 48 completed (oil & gas: 24; mining: 24) and 28 active projects (oil & gas: 15; mining: 13). Detailed discussion and statistical tables on the main characteristics of the project portfolio are provided in the background paper "Review of the Portfolio of World Bank Extractive Industry Projects."
10. See Annex D for the complete list of background papers.
11. The five countries were chosen based on the relative importance of extractive industries in their economies, the intensity of Bank assistance they received, and for regional diversity.
12. The staff survey questionnaire was sent to 95 WBG staff involved in extractive industries projects and countries (WB: 51, IFC: 33, MIGA: 12) and responses were received from 69% (WB: 51%, IFC: 91%, MIGA: 83%).
13. The stakeholder survey questionnaire was distributed to 292 participants of the EIR’s LAC, ECA, and AFR regional stakeholder workshops, and the response rate has been 26% (Rio: 25%; Budapest: 30%; Maputo: 24%). The EIR designed the regional workshops to be representative of WBG stakeholders. The participants represented governments: 25%, industry: 21%, civil society: 30%, the WB: 11%, and Others (academia, other multilateral organizations etc.): 13%. Survey respondents represented government: 41%, industry: 21%, civil society: 25%, the WB: 4%, and others: 9%.
eration, management, and utilization of fiscal revenues from resource extraction. Chapter 6 reviews the Bank’s approach to governance issues in EI-dependent countries. Chapter 7 presents the recommendations.
2. World Bank’s EI Role and Portfolio

2.1 The World Bank’s role in extractive industries has evolved from mainly supporting exploration and production activities (1960s to the early 1980s), to sector policy reform and commercialization of state-owned enterprises (1980s), and to a greater emphasis on capacity building and private sector development (1990s). Also in the 1990s, the Bank began to assist transition economies to maintain production levels, rehabilitate or close uneconomical facilities, and attract foreign equity to their extractive industries sectors. Since the mid-1990s, the Bank’s approach to extractive industries has been evolving toward addressing social, environmental, mine closure, revenue management, and sustainable development issues in a more holistic manner. It has also increased its collaboration with civil society, local governments, and the private sector.

2.2 The Bank’s EI portfolio from the 1980s to the present illustrates the most recent shifts in its role. Between the 1980s and the 1990s, the Bank’s overall lending to the EI sector decreased marginally in absolute terms and significantly relative to the Bank’s overall lending. Lending for oil and gas fell considerably, while lending for mining rose sharply. Over the same period, the quality of EI project outcomes has been better than for the Bank as a whole, while the mining sector improved over the oil & gas sector during the 1990s.

THE BANK’S EVOLVING POLICY AND ROLE IN THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES

2.3 1960s to the early 1980s: During this period, the Bank assisted public sector investment efforts to enhance productive capacity in both the oil & gas and mining sectors. This trend accelerated in the oil & gas sector when the Bank established an Energy Department in part to support lending for oil & gas operations after the second oil shock of 1979. Specifically, the Bank established a program to attract private financing into oil & gas exploration in countries that lacked resources to develop national petroleum industries.

2.4 1980s: The Bank shifted its focus in the 1980s toward supporting sector policy reform and the commercialization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Later in the decade the Bank pursued sector reform and liberalization and developed a framework for private investment, leading to active promotion of private investment, such as for developing exploration data. In 1984, the Bank issued policy guidelines for oil & gas (OMS 3.82).14

2.5 The guidelines under OMS 3.82 provided for the Bank to assist borrower countries to (a) design and implement effective energy policies; (b) design and implement effective investment plans and sound policies for exploration, development, and use of petroleum; (c) mobilize the domestic and external financial resources required; and (d) develop local capacity to conduct petroleum operations and to provide petroleum service efficiently and competitively. The guidelines also suggested that the Bank promote exploration only where no significant exploration was taking place.

2.6 Early 1990s: In keeping with OMS 3.82, in the 1990s, the Bank supported private provision of services in the extractive industries, and encouraged new direct private investment. This

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trend was strengthened as Central and Eastern European countries began their transition in the early 1990s. The Bank supported this shift by providing technical assistance and advisory services for the modification of legislative, institutional, and taxation regimes to accommodate and attract foreign equity investment in the extractive industries. The Bank’s attention more explicitly shifted to creating an enabling environment for the private sector (thus changing the role of the government from owner-operator to regulator), privatization, mine closure, and industry restructuring as outlined in the 1992 Africa Technical Department Paper, *Strategy for African Mining*.\(^\text{15}\) Thus, as countries moved from public to private ownership and extractive resource exploitation, the Bank moved away from direct lending for production-related projects, and shifted much of its effort to supporting initiatives that would bolster private sector growth.

2.7 The late 1980s and early 1990s also witnessed rising public concern about environmental degradation and social inequity. A Bank Operational Directive on environmental assessment (OD 4.01) was issued in 1989 and revised as a more comprehensive policy for environmental and social impacts, adopted in 1991. This was converted to Operational Policy (OP) 4.01 in 1999 which covers all projects except for structural adjustment loans.

2.8 Operational Policy 4.01 is particularly important for the EI sectors due to their potential for negative environmental and social impacts. The objective of the policy is to ensure that projects are environmentally and socially sustainable by preventing, mitigating, or compensating for potential adverse impacts. Under the policy, the environmental assessment of projects should take into account the natural environment (air, water, and land); human health and safety; social aspects (involuntary settlement, indigenous peoples, and cultural property); and transboundary and global environmental impacts.

2.9 The formulation and implementation of safeguard policies, which have been widely accepted and emulated outside the Bank, illustrates how the Bank can play a convening role and have influence beyond the implementation of projects (see Box 2.1).

2.10 *Mid- and Late-1990s:* The mid-1990s saw the Bank take a more inclusive approach to its developmental operations and begin to emphasize the need for external partnerships connecting government, the private sector, and civil society in the design and implementation of socially and environmentally sensitive projects. In the latter part of the 1990s, there was an increased focus on reform and deregulation programs in an effort to further good governance as a central element in the improvement of country economic performance. In 1998, growing management concern about environmental and social impacts led to the creation of the Bank’s safeguards policy framework, which combined the environmental assessment policy with nine other "do no harm" policies.\(^\text{16}\) This was followed by the establishment of an enhanced safeguards compliance system in 1999, a concerted effort to implement the policies, which had previously been more flexibly interpreted as "guidelines."

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Box 2.1: Channeling the Bank’s Convening Power for Sustainable Development of the Extractive Industries Sectors

The Bank, often in collaboration with other organizations, has helped bring together various stakeholders in the extractive industries sectors to address issues at the national, regional, and global levels. This convening power is prized because the Bank has access to all stakeholders, broad development experience, and ongoing involvement with project investments and technical assistance in the sector.

In the oil & gas sector, the Bank has collaborated with the Government of Norway in a major Global Gas Flaring Reduction Initiative, which was the subject of a 2002 conference in Oslo that hosted representatives of industry, government, the research community, and NGOs. An international training program, Good Governance in a Global Economy — Oil and Gas Policy and Regulation, held in Calgary, Canada, September 2002 in collaboration with the Canadian Petroleum Institute and the IFC, again brought together senior government and industry representatives.

In the mining sector the Bank co-sponsored with the Government of Papua New Guinea the Conference on Mining and the Community for Asian and Pacific Nations in Madang, in September of 2002. The event, in which other Asian mining countries took part, is widely seen as having had an important impact on the awareness of social and community issues in Papua New Guinea and in the region. A similar event, Mining and the Community, was held for Latin American nations in Quito, Ecuador, in 1998. In May 1995, the Bank hosted in Washington an International Roundtable on Artisanal Mining that brought together representatives from different parts of the world. In March 2001, the Bank launched the Communities and Small-Scale Mining Initiative along with other multilateral institutions, to improve coordination between miners, communities, donors, governments, and other stakeholders. Another significant event was a roundtable focused on foreign investment and mining development in Western China. The conference, Attracting Private Mining Investment, was organized jointly with the ASEAN Federation of Mining Associations, the Malaysian Chamber of Mines and the Metal Mining Agency of Japan and met in Urumqi, China, in October 2000.


b. For details see www.casmsite.org.

Source: World Bank

2.11 New priorities began to emerge for sustainable mining, regional and local economic development through private investment in mining, and community development. The evolution in the Bank’s mining strategy was presented in two World Bank Technical Papers, World Bank Group Assistance for Minerals Sector Development and Reform in Member Countries and A Mining Strategy for Latin America and the Caribbean. The new priorities were documented in various partnerships, publications, conferences, and workshops on community issues, mine closure, revenue management, and sustainable development supported by the World Bank Mining Division between 1997 and 2002.

2.12 In the late 1990s, it became clear that despite efforts to coordinate over the years, IFC and the Bank have not capitalized enough on synergies between transactions and policy work. To more closely integrate WBG activities and advisory work in the extractive industries, the oil & gas and mining units of the Bank and IFC were reconstituted as joint Bank-IFC Global Product Groups.


18. Van Der Veen et al. 1996.
2.13 **Energy Business Renewal Strategy, 2001:** The most recent re-thinking of the Bank’s role in the energy sector is reflected in the Energy Business Renewal Strategy (EBRS), which was presented to the Board in 2001. The EBRS recognizes a declining demand for traditional IBRD/IDA products in the energy sector and shifts the focus to the WBG’s priorities — including poverty alleviation — and comparative advantages: addressing poverty, macro-governance, and the environment; supporting reform and regulation to help support competitive energy markets; facilitating the transfer of knowledge among developing countries; and catalyzing investment in non-investment rated countries. The EBRS aims to facilitate access to modern fuels, create objective and transparent regulatory mechanisms, and catalyze private investments. It continues the Bank’s emphasis on closing loss-making mines and oil refineries; promoting clean transport fuels and switching from coal to gas; and facilitating environmentally sustainable exploration, production, and distribution of oil, gas, and coal. Reducing gas flaring and facilitating carbon trading and joint investments to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are also priorities under the new strategy (see Box 2.2).

**Box 2.2: Climate Change: The WBG’s Approach**

It is increasingly recognized that the adverse effects of climate change, especially through burning of fossil fuels, can produce changes in precipitation patterns and rise in sea levels that can potentially pose major developmental challenges for developing nations. Hence, the WBG supports its client countries in (a) mitigating the adverse impacts of climate change, (b) reducing vulnerability and improving adaptation, and (c) building capacity for both a and b. Successful support requires policy dialogue, integrated planning and generation, and dissemination of knowledge backed by investment lending.

The WBG’s approach to mitigating the effects of and vulnerability to climate change is laid out in *Fuel for Thought* (World Bank 2000), which highlights appropriate policy for improving energy efficiency and the use of clean technologies and fuels. Further, the WBG seeks to leverage external resources, particularly the Global Environment Facility (GEF), as well as new instruments such as the Prototype Carbon Fund, Community Development Carbon Fund, Bio-Carbon Fund, and private sector resources within the framework of the Kyoto Protocol. In terms of capacity building the WBG helps clients through methodological, technical, and investment work to develop market mechanisms, sectoral and national plans, and international cooperation.

*Source: World Bank*

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**OVERVIEW OF THE 1980s AND 1990s PROJECTS**

2.14 **Lending for oil & gas decreased while mining increased:** Between the 1980s and 1990s, the overall amount of Bank lending to the EI sectors declined by 6 percent (Figure 2.1). However, this overall decline masks a difference between the two sectors: lending for the oil & gas sector fell by 34 percent, while it rose sharply by 63 percent for the mining sector. During the same period the EI sectors’ share of the Bank’s entire portfolio declined from 4 percent of lending to 2 percent.

2.15 **Outcome:** Overall EI project outcome ratings were higher than the Bank-wide average during the 1980s and 1990s, though they fell somewhat for oil & gas and rose sharply for mining.

19. The outcome rating denotes the extent to which the project’s major relevant objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently.
projects. EI projects with outcomes rated “moderately satisfactory” or better rose slightly (77 percent to 78 percent). The percentage dropped for oil & gas projects (84 percent to 71 percent), and rose significantly for mining projects (55 percent to 86 percent). Taken together, these outcomes are better than for the Bank as a whole, for which the comparable ratios rose from 65 percent in the 1980s to 75 percent in the 1990s.

2.16 **Institutional Development Impact:** The institutional development impact\(^\text{20}\) for all EI projects improved between the 1980s and 1990s, declined somewhat for oil & gas, and rose appreciably for mining projects. The institutional development impact of all EI projects — in terms of percentage of projects that were rated “substantial” or better — rose from 38 percent to 50 percent between 1980s\(^\text{21}\) and 1990s. The oil & gas sector saw moderate decline (43 percent to 38 percent), while the mining sector showed considerable improvement (24 percent to 64 percent) over the same period. Taken together, these ratings are higher than the average for all Bank projects, which rose from 30 percent in the 1980s to 43 percent in the 1990s.

2.17 **Sustainability:** The sustainability\(^\text{22}\) of project benefits saw very large gains in both the oil & gas and mining sectors. The sustainability of outcomes — in terms of the percentage of projects for which the rating was “likely” or better — improved from 39 percent to 72 percent for all EI projects between the 1980s and 1990s with gains in both oil & gas (44 percent to 75 percent).

\(^{20}\) The institutional development impact denotes the extent to which a project improved the ability of a country or region to make more efficient, equitable, and sustainable use of its human, financial, and natural resources.

\(^{21}\) For projects completed during 1980–86 only 53 percent were rated for institutional development impact under the older performance ratings. They are therefore excluded from this comparison.

\(^{22}\) The sustainability rating denotes the resilience to risk of the project’s net benefit flows over time.
and mining (28 percent to 68 percent). Overall, these ratings improved at a much faster rate than the Bank-wide average, which rose from 44 percent in the 1980s, to 56 percent in the 1990s.

**Highlights of the Portfolio of Projects Under Review: FY93–FY02**

2.18 The Portfolio Review covered all 76 EI projects approved during the period fiscal 1993–2002. This portfolio consists of 48 completed projects (oil & gas: 24; mining: 24) and 28 active projects (oil & gas: 15; mining: 13). This section describes the main characteristics of this portfolio.

2.19 The transitional economies of the Europe and Central Asia Region accounted for the largest share of lending: For completed projects in both oil & gas and mining sectors, the Europe and Central Asia (ECA) region received the major share of lending (Figure 2.5). The East Asia and Pacific (EAP) region accounted for the next largest share of oil & gas lending and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) with the next largest share of mining lending.

![Figure 2.5: The Europe and Central Asia Region Accounted for the Largest Share of Lending in Both Sectors](image)

2.20 The most common project objectives reflected some of the similarities between the two sectors: Analysis of the objectives (each project could have more than one) of the projects identified a few similarities and many differences between the two sectors. Among the similarities, for both oil & gas and mining projects, institutional development, PSD, and environmental management were among the leading objectives.

2.21 But the remaining objectives tended to differ across the two sectors and between completed (older) and ongoing (more recent) projects. For completed oil & gas projects the next most frequent objectives included pipeline construction, policy reform, production, and social objectives in that order. For active projects, the other objectives were production, pipeline construction, and social issues in descending order. For completed mining projects, other objectives in decreasing frequency were rehabilitation/closure of mines, social issues, production, and ar-

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23. For this review, the EI portfolio includes projects that are not primarily classified under the oil & gas or mining sector headings of the Bank’s classification system but nevertheless contain significant EI-related components.

24. A more detailed discussion on the Bank’s changing role, portfolio objectives, and quality of lending for the extractive industries is the “Review of the Portfolio of World Bank Extractive Industry Projects.”
artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM). For active mining projects, the other objectives were social issues and policy reform — production did not figure at all.

2.22 The importance of the environmental assessment policy is apparent in the high percentage of projects in categories A and B: Among oil & gas projects, approximately 33 percent of all active and completed projects came under Category A of the Bank’s environmental assessment policy (OD/OP 4.01). For Category B the corresponding percentages were 25 and 13. For mining projects, only 20 percent of the completed projects and none of the active projects came under Category A. In addition, 50 percent of completed and 30 percent of active mining projects came under Category B.

2.23 Project performance ratings have been better than average: The Bank’s portfolio of completed EI projects has generally performed well in all three categories used by OED: outcome, sustainability, and institutional development impact. Of the completed oil & gas projects, outcome was rated “moderately satisfactory” or better for 71 percent, sustainability was rated “likely” or better for 73 percent, and institutional development impact was rated “substantial” or better for 37 percent. Of the completed mining projects, outcome was rated “moderately satisfactory” or better for 86 percent, sustainability was rated “likely” or better for 68 percent, and institutional development impact was rated “substantial” or better for 64 percent of the projects.

2.24 The portfolio of active projects has also been performing well according to supervision reports. All active oil & gas projects had development outcome ratings of “satisfactory” or better, and no adverse issues were reported regarding compliance with the Bank’s safeguard policies. All active mining projects had ongoing development outcome ratings of “satisfactory” or better, and only one project reported less than satisfactory compliance with a provision under the Bank’s safeguards policies. It should be noted however, that these self-assessments of active projects have not been validated by OED.

25. Under WB’s OP 4.01 for Environmental Assessment, Category A projects are those that are likely to have adverse environmental and social impacts that are sensitive, diverse, or unprecedented; Category B projects are those with adverse impacts on human populations or environmentally important areas; Category C is a residual category.

26. See Annex C for an explanation of OED’s project ratings scale.
3. Economic Benefits from Bank Projects

3.1 Extractive industries have the potential to make a major contribution to the development of resource abundant countries by transforming their mineral wealth into sustainable development. Thus, the rationale for Bank projects is based on the expectation that they will support the country’s development goals, and this expectation is underpinned by an economic appraisal intended to ensure that the objectives have been appropriately chosen and that the project is the least-cost way of attaining the stated objectives.27 The discounted present value of the net benefits (NPV), the economic rate of return (ERR), or where the benefits cannot be measured in monetary terms, a cost-effectiveness criterion are the indicators of choice for making this determination. Following completion of the project, an ex-post recalculation of the economic rate of return or the cost-effectiveness criterion is expected to determine whether the project produced the expected benefits in an efficient manner.28 This Chapter discusses the available information on the extent and sources of the economic benefits drawing from the Portfolio Review of the Bank’s extractive industries projects.

REPORTING OF ECONOMIC BENEFITS

3.2 The Implementation Completion Reports (ICRs) are an integral part of the Bank’s knowledge management and accountability reporting system, and are intended to document and evaluate the outcomes and impacts of the project, including their economic benefits. As summarized in Table 3.1, the Portfolio Review found that, out of the 44 completed projects, ICRs of 17 (mostly investment loans) had re-estimates of ERRs and NPVs, and an additional 13 ICRs (mostly of technical assistance and sectoral adjustment loans) featured at least some ex-post quantification and valuation of the benefits.29 This is consistent with the relative simplicity of attributing and quantifying the costs and benefits of investment projects compared to other types of projects. Nevertheless, given the issues that have been raised about the economic contribution of extractive industries projects, a greater effort to increase the documentation and analysis of economic benefits would be desirable, including a cost-effectiveness assessment where an ERR is not feasible, in line with the Guidelines for Preparing ICRs.30

3.3 For the Specific Investment Loans (SILs), the benefits derived mainly from increased production, increased private investment, and improved productivity. Out of 20 SILs in the portfolio, 18 had an ERR or NPV estimated at appraisal, of which 16 were re-estimated at completion. While it is comforting to note that, in 15 out of these 16 cases, the returns were greater

27. That is, whether the project creates more net benefits to the economy than other mutually exclusive options. See OP 10.04: Economic Analysis of Investment Operations, World Bank, September 1994.
29. The four completed structural adjustment loans in the sample were excluded from this analysis given the Bank’s practice of not estimating ERRs or quantifying benefits for such projects.
30. Guidelines for Preparing Implementation Completion Reports, World Bank, 1999. The earlier Bank policy on Project Completion Reports also required the preparation of an ex-post economic analysis.
31. This figure includes one Emergency Recovery Loan.
than 10 percent,\textsuperscript{32} it would also have been feasible to have reported \textit{ex-post} analyses for three of the remaining SILs.\textsuperscript{33}

Table 3.1: Economic Evaluation in Implementation Completion Reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrument (number)</th>
<th>ERR/NPV/least-cost analysis conducted at appraisal</th>
<th>ERR/NPV/least-cost analysis reported in ICR</th>
<th>Quantification of benefits feasible?</th>
<th>Quantification done in ICR?</th>
<th>Monetary value of benefits feasible?</th>
<th>Monetary value provided in ICR?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SILs (20)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20/-/-</td>
<td>17/-/3</td>
<td>20/-/-</td>
<td>15/2/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TALs (15)</td>
<td>3\textsuperscript{b}</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4/4/7</td>
<td>3/9/3</td>
<td>6/2/7</td>
<td>3/8/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECALs (9)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7/1/1</td>
<td>5/3/1</td>
<td>6/1/2</td>
<td>6/3/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (44)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>31/5/8</td>
<td>25/13/7</td>
<td>32/3/9</td>
<td>24/13/7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a} SILs include one emergency rehabilitation loan (ERL); TALs include one GEF project; SECALs include one rehabilitation investment loan (RIM)

\textsuperscript{b} The Equatorial Guinea Petroleum TA project estimated an FRR and the Azerbaijan Petroleum TA

3.4 The 15 Technical Assistance Loans (TALs)\textsuperscript{34} in the portfolio were associated with quantifiable and valuable benefits such as increased private investment, increased gas sales, increased oil and minerals production, increased fiscal revenues, improved environmental conditions, improved sector efficiency, as well as benefits that are more difficult to quantify, such as improved legal and regulatory frameworks and institutions, and preparatory studies for future projects. Of the 15 TALs, one had a re-estimated ERR\textsuperscript{35} and 7 ICRs provided at least some indication of the monetary value of the benefits. Since some benefits were amenable to monetary valuation in 12 of these projects, more could have been done to document their cost-effectiveness and highlight their economic contributions.

3.5 All 9 completed Sectoral Adjustment Loans (SECALs)\textsuperscript{36} were in the mining sector and were associated with increased or decreased production of minerals (coal, in most cases), reduced government subsidies, cleaner environment, increased operational efficiency, improved profitability, and increased private investment. Six of the ICRs provide some data on these achievements, from which a judgment can be made about the efficiency of the projects. The other three ICRs did not provide any quantitative information on results.

\textbf{ECONOMIC BENEFITS FROM PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT (PSD)}

3.6 World Bank efforts to promote privatization and boost private investment had largely positive outcomes. Eleven out of 16 completed projects with private sector development (PSD) com-

\textsuperscript{32} That is, a proxy for the opportunity cost of capital.

\textsuperscript{33} The fourth remaining SIL, Ethiopia’s Calub Energy Project, was closed prematurely, precluding any meaningful \textit{ex-post} economic analysis.

\textsuperscript{34} This figure includes one GEF grant.

\textsuperscript{35} The ERR for the Guinea Mining Sector Investment Promotion Project was estimated for the appraisal and re-estimated for the ICR.

\textsuperscript{36} This figure includes one Rehabilitation Investment Loan.
ponents yielded or promised to yield significant benefits by laying the groundwork for improving
the efficiency of public enterprises through commercialization, privatization, and increasing EI ac-
tivity by attracting private investment.

3.7 Privatization was politically complex in all cases. Wherever progress was made it was
largely due to strong government commitment, supplemented by flexibility on part of the Bank.
This is evident in Bolivia’s Regulatory Reform and Capitalization and Hydrocarbon Sector Reform
projects as well as in Peru’s Privatization Adjustment Loan and Energy/Mining projects. Privatiza-
tion of coal mines in Russia was a highly complex task carried out in a difficult political and indus-
trial relations environment, and might not have been possible without strong government commit-
ment and efforts at consulting important stakeholders, together with Bank flexibility in the design
and implementation of the projects. On the other hand, inadequate government commitment and
political consensus, apart from issues of evolving sector strategy and commercial viability, appears
to be behind the limited progress of privatization in Poland’s Hard Coal SECAL I and II projects.
The slow progress in privatizing Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines can be largely attributed to
unfavorable market conditions for copper and political interference in the process.

3.8 A particularly effective form of PSD intervention was attracting increased private in-
vestment — such as in the mining sectors of Guinea and Tanzania — through relatively low-cost
technical assistance (TA) interventions (see Box 3.1).

Box 3.1: Experience with Private Sector Development in the Extractive Industries Sectors

The Bank’s efforts at commercialization, privatization, and improving the climate for private investment
yielded largely positive returns in terms of increased investments and exports and reduced burden on state
budgets. These efforts generally involved Technical Assistance Loans (TALs) that were relatively smaller
than investment and adjustment loans. The positive results were associated with strong government com-
mitment, the prior establishment of an appropriate legal and regulatory framework, and flexibility on the
part of the Bank. However, even where earnest efforts were made, volatile commodity prices and macro-
economic crises adversely affected some of the outcomes.

Armed with a strong mandate for privatization, Bolivia moved ahead quickly with the sale of three state-
owned hydrocarbon enterprises that yielded US$828 million and improved prospects for investment of up
to US$2 billion during 1998–2000. Strong government commitment was also evident in Peru where the
hydrocarbon sector was opened to private investment. Despite strong political and labor opposition, Rus-
sia achieved a major feat of privatizing 77 percent of coal assets by 2001, helping decrease subsidies by
40 percent.

The success of Tanzania and Guinea in attracting high levels of private investment to their mining sectors
was aided by a relatively integrated approach to developing an enabling legal, regulatory, and fiscal

Argentina’s Mining Development TALs made a good beginning in improving the institutional framework
for privatization but the economic crisis in 2002 has diminished its immediate impact. Little headway was
made in Zambia on privatizing the dominant Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines due to a volatile market
for copper and stakeholder disagreements. The overall efficacy of the World Bank’s interventions in
Ghana’s mining sector during the 1990s is judged to be substantial because of the success in attracting pri-
ivate capital and strengthening sector management capabilities, particularly of the Minerals Commission.
Box 3.1 (continued)

In Ecuador, a new Mining Law passed in 1991 and amended in 2000 included much-improved provisions to attract private sector investment and helped develop a regulatory framework close to best practice. But the country's political instability and unreliable judicial system acted as disincentives, which were compounded by the negative effect of falling international commodity prices.

Finally, Kazakhstan's Petroleum TA project was successful in improving the capacity of key petroleum sector agencies to attract foreign investment. It financed the continuation of technical, financial, and legal advisory services that were critical to the conclusion of two major Caspian Sea projects. On the negative side, the effort to privatize Uzenmunaigas, the country’s largest state-owned producing enterprises, and a centerpiece of the Bank-funded TA program, did not make much headway. On the other hand, the Bank also helped reform in a broad range of sector policy issues covering petroleum legislation and taxation, pricing, and privatization of retail petroleum trade.

Source: World Bank

ECONOMIC BENEFITS FROM MINE CLOSURE OR REHABILITATION

3.9 Over 60 percent of completed mining projects, including six completed SECALs in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine, involved large-scale rehabilitation and/or closure of uneconomical coal mines. On a smaller scale, 15 small copper mines and 66 chrome mines were successfully closed or privatized in Albania. The economic benefits from such projects derive mainly from the reduced burden on government budgets (see Box 3.2).

Box 3.2: Economic Benefits of Rehabilitation/Closure of Uneconomical Mines

The economic benefits from closure of uneconomic mines mainly derive from reducing the burden on government budgets through lowered or eliminated subsidies, reduced waste of resources, the freeing up of labor that can be used more productively elsewhere in the economy, and improved climate for privatization and competition contributing to overall efficiency.

The experience was positive in this respect in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine. The Poland Hard Coal SECAL I and II projects reduced excess coal production capacity by 23 percent to 105 million tons per year (mtpy) and employment by 36 percent to 155,000 between 1997/98 and end-2001. In Poland, the coal industry's financial performance improved from a loss of US$1.0 billion in 1998 to a profit of US$43.3 million by 2001 (At an exchange rate of US$1=0.2545 PLN). Under Ukraine's Coal Pilot and Coal SECAL projects, over 25 percent of Ukraine’s coal mines were closed and the efficiency of the remaining mines was increased 85 percent between 1998 and 2000. The coal production workforce was reduced by 24 percent between 1995 and 1999, while production dropped by only 3 percent. Subsidies for loss-making coal mines were halved, from US$500 million in 1996 to US$250 million in 1999.

As of 2001, Russia's Coal SECAL I and II led to the closure of 183 heavily loss-making mines of which 158 completed substantive closure works. As a result of these projects, budgetary subsidies for the coal sector were reduced from 1.05 percent of GDP in 1993 to 0.07 percent of GDP by 2001.

In both Russia and Ukraine, Bank support not only helped reduce subsidies, but also shifted the composition of subsidies away from operating expenses toward social mitigation, mine closure, and environmental cleanup.

Source: World Bank
3.10 Rehabilitation and closure of coal mines in Russia was a major task, as already noted (para. 3.6), but government commitment, stakeholder consultation, and Bank flexibility contributed to the positive results. In Ukraine, favorable results were obtained under relatively less difficult conditions. The strategy of approaching Ukraine's rehabilitation/closure process cautiously, starting with the smaller-scale Ukraine Coal Pilot project and leveraging its success for the larger Ukraine SECAL appears to have worked well. A notable feature of Poland's Hard Coal SECALs I and II was that they succeeded in reducing uneconomical production levels and excess employment, while keeping a tense situation from exploding.

3.11 However, in all three countries, Russia, Ukraine, and Poland, attempts at generating alternative employment for laid-off workers in other sectors remained an important issue, although there was progress, for instance, in resolving the employment problem in Russia as the economy began to recover from the crisis of 1998. This may imply that adequate attention to the demanding task of generating alternative employment should be the focus of projects outside of the extractive industries sectors.

**ECONOMIC BENEFITS FROM ENVIRONMENTAL CLEAN-UP AND MITIGATION**

3.12 Most of the projects in the EI portfolio had environmental components of varying magnitude and importance. Some dealt with cleanup of existing environmental conditions and others were concerned with mitigating the environmental effects of new operations under the project or related projects. Only a few projects — five completed and three active — focused mainly on dealing with existing or ongoing environmental problems. These projects were expected to yield economic benefits through healthier living conditions, greater resources for productive activities, and improved productivity of resources, through reclamation of land and improving air, water, and soil quality.

3.13 Five completed projects, in Brazil, Ecuador, India, Russia, and Thailand, focused on technical assistance for addressing environmental impacts of past or ongoing extractive industries activities. While the outcome was broadly satisfactory in India (strategy for managing coal mine fires in Jharia coalfields), Brazil (reclaiming degraded mining areas and constructing tailings ponds through the Environmental Conservation and Rehabilitation project), and Thailand (converting to unleaded fuel production in Bangchak refinery) project.

3.14 In the case of the recently completed Coal Sector Environmental and Social Mitigation Project (CSESMP) in India, an Inspection Panel (IP) investigation found it to be out of compliance with some safeguards provisions. Notwithstanding the lack of compliance, the project resulted in considerable improvement in Coal India's approach to social and environmental mitigation. The Oil Spill Contingency project for the Western Indian Ocean Islands of Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, and Seychelles seeks to build their capacity for complying with related international conventions and protocols.

3.15 Among the projects that were not exclusively focused on environmental issues but contained significant environmental components, the Bolivia-Brazil gas pipeline project contained provisions for stakeholder consultation and community participation that gave credibility to environmental initiatives and improved the chances of their success. Bolivia-Brazil's experience thus stood in contrast to the Ecuador and India projects in this respect. Another feature worth noting is that while many projects in the portfolio contained significant environmental compo-
nents, almost none of them explicitly factored the environmental benefits into their economic cost-benefit analysis. A notable exception was Bolivia-Brazil’s pipeline project, which applied an environmental premium for the displacement of more polluting fuels by natural gas in its economic analysis.

**ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF ARTISANAL AND SMALL-SCALE MINING**

3.16 The rationale for the promotion of artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) needs to rest on its potential for poverty alleviation, through the creation and maintenance of employment in a socially and environmentally acceptable manner. Among the Bank projects reviewed in this study, ASM issues were a significant component in three completed projects in Ecuador, Ghana, and Tanzania, and four active projects in Burkina Faso, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Zambia. The main approaches involve the improvement of the legal framework/formalization of ASM activities, increasing tax revenues (Ecuador, Madagascar, Mozambique, Tanzania), improving production methods and technology and providing extension services (Burkina Faso, Ecuador, Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania), improving environmental awareness and management (Burkina Faso, Ecuador, Ghana, Madagascar, Tanzania), improving capacity of government to deal with ASM (Burkina Faso, Ecuador, Ghana, Madagascar, Tanzania, Zambia). Based on results to date, the main lesson is to recognize ASM as a poverty-driven issue, and to move from using a narrow technical approach to a more integrated approach — ensuring an appropriate legal and fiscal framework, involving ASM communities in decision-making, and considering environmental and social aspects of ASM at the project design stage (see Box 3.3, next page).

**CONCLUSIONS**

3.17 Overall, 73 percent of the ICRs of completed extractive industries projects contained at least some *ex-post* quantification and valuation of the benefits, but only 39 percent had a re-estimated ERR or NPV, and the rest do not discuss the cost effectiveness of achieving the objectives. Based on an evaluation of the feasibility of additional economic analysis, this share could have been raised to about 89 percent. While the project’s economic returns only constitute an intermediate outcome in the transformation of mineral wealth into sustainable development, the adequate reporting and validation of project benefits, in line with Bank policy, constitutes the basis for most further evaluation, and should be an essential component in the Bank’s accountability reporting. Some improvement in this area would also help the Bank address the perception that the economic benefits of the projects may have been outweighed by adverse environmental and social impacts.

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37. There is no reason to believe that the performance of extractive industries projects in this regard is different that that of projects in other sectors.
Box 3.3: Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining

Nearly 13 million people are involved in artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) worldwide, with a high proportion of women (10 to 45 percent) and children (5 to 30 percent) in several countries. ASM production accounts for 15–20 percent of the value of the world’s non-fuel mineral production — and as much as 90–100 percent in some countries. The majority of earnings from ASM, especially artisanal mining are used for subsistence. Being largely in the informal sector (50 percent), artisanal and small-scale miners often have no legal rights to mine, do not pay taxes, and are prone to exploitation by middlemen. In general, ASM is characterized by poor standards of safety and health, and greater environmental cost per unit of output than large-scale mining activities.

Developmental priorities for ASM are improving the legal and regulatory framework, investing revenues for sustained benefits, avoiding or mitigating negative environmental and social impacts, encouraging alternative economic activities, adopting a gender-sensitive approach, ending child labor, and ensuring good relationships between miners and other stakeholders.

In Ghana, upon advice from the Bank, gold production by small-scale artisanal miners was legalized in 1989 by passage of the Small-Scale Mining Law. The establishment of legal purchasing arrangement initially by a public and later by private buying agents offering world prices for gold and diamonds to artisanal miners was the result of active policy dialogue with the Bank.

Ecuador’s Mining Development and Environmental Control Project helped to formalize most of the country’s ASM activities by granting title to 166 out of 169 ASM associations that existed before 1995. This may have contributed to the absence of land invasions by informal miners in the country in recent years. Currently, 99 percent of ASM enterprises in the country have presented environmental impact assessments (EIAs) or environmental management plans (EMPs) either individually or through associations. The project helped demonstrate the feasibility of reducing ASM-related contamination, succeeded in promoting change to less-polluting processing technologies, and increased environmental health and safety awareness among miners and other stakeholders.

Source: Mines and Minerals for Sustainable Development (MMSD) 2002; Country Case Studies; World Bank

3.18 Aside from the reporting issue, the main lesson that emerges is that projects with satisfactory outcome ratings tended to be associated with greater government commitment to project objectives and adequate infrastructure (India Coal Sector Rehabilitation; Russia I and II Oil Sector Rehabilitation; and Thailand Gas Transmission I and II), favorable commodity prices (Russia I and II Oil Sector Rehabilitation), and a high level of stakeholder involvement (Bolivia-Brazil pipeline and Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Natural Gas System Reconstruction projects). The less successful projects appeared to be affected by poor government commitment (Ethiopia’s Calub Gas Development project), and unfavorable economic conditions or commodity prices (Korea Petroleum Distribution and Sector Improvement project and Mongolia’s Coal project). These lessons are broadly consistent with the Bank’s experience in other sectors.
4. Environmental and Social Impacts and Their Mitigation

ADDRESSING ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL IMPACTS

4.1 The potential benefits from the extractive industries have often been undermined by adverse environmental and social impacts. Negative environmental impacts from oil and gas activities can result from leakages and spills, flaring of excess gas, and the opening of access to new areas where settlement and deforestation can occur. Mining activities can be associated with deforestation, soil erosion, contamination of surface and groundwater from toxic wastes, and mine tailings and coal mine fires. In addition to the damage from ongoing projects, closed and abandoned projects have often left a legacy of clean-up costs that no one may be willing or able to pay.38

4.2 Negative social impacts can arise from the need to resettle local populations, including indigenous peoples, or from disrupting traditional lifestyles to make way for extractive industries activities. Other social impacts can follow after resources are exhausted or have become uneconomical to extract, resulting in unemployment and scaled-down or abandoned infrastructure. On the whole, social impacts tend to be more prominent for mining than oil & gas activities, given the higher employment generated at the local level and greater exposure to environmental, health, and safety hazards.

4.3 To mitigate the adverse environmental and social impacts of the projects it supports, the World Bank has, over the past two decades, developed a comprehensive framework of safeguard policies (see paras. 2.8–2.10). Their main objective is to ensure that projects “do no harm,” that is, that they are environmentally and socially sustainable by ensuring that potential adverse impacts on the natural environment (air, water, and land); human health and safety; social aspects (involuntary settlement, indigenous peoples, and cultural property); and transboundary and global environmental impacts, are prevented, mitigated, or compensated. These policies define explicit requirements for the Bank to follow. In light of the potential adverse impacts associated with oil, gas, and mining activities, the evaluation included a review of the degree to which the Bank’s appraisal and implementation of extractive industries projects have been consistent with these requirements (the “Safeguards Review”), whose findings are summarized in the first section of this chapter.

4.4 Beyond achieving the objectives of the safeguards, an important aspect of the Bank’s approach to development assistance involves the pursuit of positive environmental and social goods, such as the remediation of pre-existing conditions resulting from past mining and petroleum activities (“legacy” issues), and the strengthening of the policy and institutional framework to promote the implementation of safeguards across the entire economy. Many extractive industries projects have such components to “do good,” and their experience is also discussed.

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38. The May 15, 2002, Toronto Declaration of the International Council of Mining and Metals states (on behalf of the mining industry): “orphan site legacy issues are important and complex. However, they are beyond the capacity of ICMM to resolve. Governments and international agencies should assume the lead role in addressing them.”
CONSISTENCY WITH OBJECTIVES OF THE SAFEGUARDS: "DO NO HARM"

4.5 The Safeguards Review focused on assessing the projects’ degree of consistency with the objectives of the safeguard policies in three areas: at approval, during implementation, and in the adequacy of Bank supervision inputs and reporting. Desk reviews were carried out on a sample of 38 projects drawn from the portfolio of 76 closed and active extractive industries projects approved during or after fiscal 1993.39 The sample was purposively chosen to include projects that were likely to have adverse environmental or social impacts, and included 19 oil & gas and 19 mining projects.40 In terms of the categorization of projects under the Bank’s Environmental Assessment Policy, the sample included 15 ‘A’ projects, 17 ‘B’ projects, 5 ‘C’ projects, and one uncategorized project.41

4.6 The Bank’s safeguard policies contain a long list of requirements that have been subject to differing interpretation and as yet no independent and generally agreed criteria have been established to determine if a project is in substantial compliance.42 In the absence of an established approach, the Safeguards Review has synthesized the policy requirements into a set of basic criteria, and applied them for the selected sample of projects. While there have been minor changes in some of the policies since 1993, each project was evaluated based on the specific version of the policy in force at the time the project was approved.43

4.7 Overall, the majority of projects were found to be in substantially consistent with the applicable safeguards at approval and during implementation. Thus, about 74 percent of the sample of ‘A’ and ‘B’ projects were substantially consistent with safeguards at approval, 67 percent during implementation, and only 41 percent were rated to have had adequate supervision inputs and reporting. The ‘A’ projects’ performance was higher than the ‘B’s in all three areas, but the difference was greatest at the approval stage. While the degree of consistency was lower than the WBG aims to achieve, there is no implication that the performance pattern of these projects is different from that in other sectors, since they are all subject to the same policies, procedures and constraints.44

39. Since the start of fiscal 1993, the World Bank has approved 76 projects in the extractive industries or with significant components relating to extractive industries. As of June 30, 2002, 48 projects have been completed (oil & gas, 24; mining, 24) and 28 projects are still active (oil & gas, 15; mining, 13). See paras. 2.18 ff.

40. The purposive selection of projects that were likely to have significant adverse environmental or social impacts is consistent with the objective of the Safeguards Review, since the WBG’s safeguard policies are only applicable to such projects. As a result, the validity of the findings is limited to such projects, and should not be extended to those Category ‘C’ projects that were likely to have minimal or no adverse impacts, or SAL’s, which are not covered by the safeguard policies.

41. As stated in the Bank’s policy on Environmental Assessment (OP 4.01), to fall under Category A, a project is deemed to be likely to have significant adverse environmental impacts that are sensitive, diverse, or unprecedented. Category B is assigned to projects whose potential environmental impacts are less adverse than those for Category A. Category C is for projects that are likely to have minimal or no adverse environmental impacts. Sectoral adjustment loans (SECALS) have only been covered by the policy since 1999. Earlier SECALS were uncategorized.

42. These requirements are recorded in Annex I-A and I-B of the Safeguards Review. The list is based on the latest version of the policies (as of June 30, 2002).

43. The individual project review worksheets were sent to the relevant project managers for fact checking.

44. It should also be noted that the extractive industries portfolio includes a higher share of TA and SECAL projects, whose classification has been subject to differing interpretation, as is discussed below in paras 4.14 ff.
4.8 The degree of consistency appears to have improved modestly over time. A comparison of the findings for the ‘A’ and ‘B’ projects in the sample approved before and after end-1995 indicates that, at the approval stage, there has been no overall trend. At the implementation stage, however, there has been some improvement in the more recent projects.45

4.9 The findings of the Safeguards Review fall between those of the external and internal surveys. The survey of participants of the EIR’s Regional Stakeholder Workshops,46 found that, with regard to the promotion of sustainable environmental performance and mitigation of negative environmental effects, the WBG’s effort was rated “mostly effective” or better by 60 percent of respondents, and its success as “mostly effective” or better by 46 percent. With regard to the promotion of sound social development and the identification and mitigation of negative social impacts on local communities and indigenous peoples, the WBG’s effort was rated “mostly effective” or better by 40 percent of respondents, and its success as “mostly effective” by 28 percent. Bank staff involved in E1 projects, on the other hand, feel more positive about the adequacy with which EI projects have mitigated negative environmental impacts (83 percent) and social impacts (75 percent). While the survey findings corroborate that the EI portfolio faces a gap in fully achieving the objectives of the safeguards, the difference with the Safeguards Review points to the possibility of both internal and external perception gaps.

4.10 The review also identified a number of promising practices that have established new benchmarks for safeguard policy implementation performance and “value added.” Such practices were found in the Bolivia-Brazil Gas Pipeline Project, Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project, Poland Coal SECAL II, and Thailand Clean Fuels and Environmental Improvement Project. These projects have achieved international recognition for the comprehensiveness of their environmental and social mitigation measures and stand as examples for what compliance with safeguards can achieve.

Issues During Safeguards Implementation

4.11 The most important inadequacies in the implementation of safeguards can be associated with shortcomings at the initial project screening. Another important source of problems, and a possible explanation for the decline in safeguards implementation from approval to implementation, relates to inadequacies in supervision and reporting.47

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45. Given the small size of the sample, it was not feasible to evaluate any impact from the Bank’s enhanced safeguards compliance system established in 1999.

46. See footnote 13 for additional information about the survey. The complete results are provided in Volume III, Annex 4 B.

47. The adequacy of the initial project screening and of Bank supervision were not themselves criteria for evaluating the adequacy of safeguards compliance at the project approval or implementation stage, but factors that were tracked and assessed in parallel as part of the safeguards review.
Initial Project Screening

4.12 A major finding of the Safeguards Review is that the initial screening of projects has important implications for the subsequent preparation, appraisal, and supervision of the project. In some cases, screening decisions resulted in assignment of a lower environmental category than may have been warranted given the nature of the project. This is important because there tends to be less attention and resources devoted to the assessment and mitigation of environmental impacts in lower EA categories.

4.13 On the other hand, not all difficulties in achieving the objectives of the safeguards can be traced to shortcomings in the initial project screening process. In fact, while 69 percent of the projects that were not substantially consistent with safeguards had been incorrectly screened, over half of the projects that had been incorrectly screened were in substantial consistency with policy requirements at the approval stage in terms of the adequacy of provisions for mitigation of potential adverse impacts (See Figure 4.1). These findings suggest that, while shortcomings at the initial project screening can be an important source of concern, these upstream errors can often be overcome by appropriate efforts during subsequent project preparation and appraisal.

Figure 4.1: Initial Project Screening and Consistency with Safeguards

48. That is, the process by which the EA category is assigned, the nature and extent of the EA or environmental analysis is decided, and the applicable safeguard policies are identified. Responsibility for the initial project screening resides with the project’s task team, under the supervision of regional management, subject to clearance by the regional safeguards coordinator, under the oversight of the central Quality Assurance and Control Unit (QACU). Before 2000, responsibility for initial project screening was shared between the project’s task team and the Bank’s regional environment divisions.

49. Of the 11 projects, 6 were ‘B’ projects that should have been more appropriately categorized as ‘A’, and 5 were ‘C’ projects that should have been more appropriately categorized as ‘B’. See para. 4.11 ff.
**EA Categorization**

4.14 The Safeguards Study concluded that, of the sample of 38 projects, 6 out of the 17 Category ‘B’ projects should have been classified as Category ‘A,’ and all five of the ‘C’ projects should have been ‘B.’ It is recognized that the definitions of EA categories were mainly developed for application to “investment” projects, and before the social and legal safeguard policies assumed as much importance as they have in the past decade. Since the late 1980s the Bank has been diversifying and expanding its array of lending instruments,\(^{50}\) while EA categorization definitions and guidance on application of appropriate EA instruments\(^{41}\) have not kept pace. The study found two major areas where greater clarity is needed.

4.15 **Sectoral Adjustment Projects:** Five of the six ‘B’ projects which should have more appropriately categorized as ‘A’s were SECALs involving the closure of mines.\(^{52}\) While the EA OP 4.01 can be interpreted to allow categorizing them as ‘B’s, it would have been more appropriate to categorize them as ‘A’s, given the significant, diverse, and unprecedented cumulative impact of the mining sector on the environment and communities in the mining areas, and to ensure a level of attention, normally associated with a full EA, commensurate with the degree of environmental and social impacts and risks.\(^{53}\) Thus, the guidance set out in the (1993) EA Source Book Update on Environmental Screening recommends that Sectoral EAs (SEA) be carried out for SECALs, and the (1991) EA Source Book\(^{54}\) recommends that EIAs be carried out on each individual mine closure plan.\(^{55}\) While this guidance is not mandatory, they support the objectives of the safeguards policies and OED has used them to underpin its assessment.

4.16 Among mining SECALs, the Poland Coal SECAL II illustrates the potential usefulness of a Sectoral EA which, for this project, found that the damage costs of saline water discharge were not as serious as previously estimated\(^{56}\) and identified land subsidence as a potential problem. It also found several shortcomings in clarity and prioritization of recommended actions in

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50. The Bank’s Operational Manual lists seven *investment lending instruments*: Specific Investment Loan (SIL); Learning and Innovation Loan (LIL); Technical Assistance Loan (TAL); Emergency Recovery Loan (ERL); Financial Intermediary Loan (FIL); Sector Investment and Maintenance Loan (SIM); and Adaptable Program Loan (APL). The manual lists the following six *adjustment lending instruments*: Programmatic Structural Adjustment Loan (PSAL); Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC); Sector Adjustment Loan (SECAL); Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL); Special Structural Adjustment Loan (SSAL); and Rehabilitation Loan (RIL).

51. EIA, Sectoral EA, Regional EA, Environmental Audit, Hazard/Risk Assessment.

52. The five SECALs in Russia, Poland, and Ukraine were subject to careful environmental and social review. The remaining one is the Madagascar Sector Reform Project, which should also have been categorized as an ‘A’ because of proposed new port facilities.

53. The mine closures supported by these SECALs were unprecedented in scale, diversity of environmental conditions, and the complexity of environmental, safety, and social issues. The past environmental and social neglect of these mining operations further aggravated the problems involved in their closure.


55. As indicated earlier, there is no implication that the treatment of extractive industries projects in this regard is different from the Bank’s practice in other sectors at the time, which was to interpret the EA Source Book with great flexibility. In recent years, management, the Inspection Panel and the Bank’s legal department have clarified that the EA Source Book is to be followed. The Safeguards Review is in line with this position.

56. However, Poland’s Ministry of the Environment has not endorsed this conclusion.
the mine-specific EIAs. Other mine restructuring SECALs did not follow this model and therefore may have missed the opportunity for considerably more appropriate and cost-effective actions for mitigating negative environmental and social impacts.

4.17 **Technical Assistance Projects:** While six of the Technical Assistance projects in the sample were correctly categorized as 'A' or 'B' projects, five were incorrectly categorized as 'C.' As noted in the (1993) EA Source Book Update on "Environmental Screening": *while most technical assistance (TA) projects should fall into Category 'C'... certain TA operations are designed to pave the way for major investments or privatization... In such cases, it is appropriate to undertake a limited review of the environmental institutional and regulatory framework for the sector and recommend improvements (as needed). Category B is normally the correct classification for such projects.*  

4.18 The Colombia Energy TA project, a 'B,' illustrates the importance of early attention to the environmental and institutional and regulatory framework, which allowed for the preparation of a well-designed set of components to operationalize the application of the Bank’s safeguard policies. On the other hand, in line with the objectives of the safeguard policies, TA projects in Cameroon, Kazakhstan, Papua New Guinea, Russia, and Zambia should all have been categorized as 'B's rather than 'C's, which resulted in less attention being given to reviewing substantial issues of environmental and social impacts that can emerge in the process of attracting major investments and preparing the ground for privatization.

**Identification of Applicable Safeguards**

4.19 An important function of the initial project screening is to identify the safeguard policies that should apply to a particular project. Aside from the EA policy, the most frequently triggered safeguards in the sample of extractive industries projects relate to involuntary resettlement, indigenous peoples, natural habitats, dam safety, and cultural properties. There is a natural inclination to downplay the relevance of individual safeguards in order to simplify processing of projects. Moreover, in the case of TA projects, such issues as protection of natural habitats, cultural property, and indigenous people, etc., while possibly relevant to the sector, had not been triggered when needed, as the policies have been worded to apply when “investment” projects are undertaken. This is unfortunate, as often the TA projects are helping governments to improve the regulatory system for private investments in extractive industries for which such issues are highly relevant.

4.20 **Involuntary Resettlement:** Of the seven projects that should have triggered the Involuntary Resettlement policy, four had prepared comprehensive Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs), while for three of the projects the RAPs were either not prepared or inadequate. The risks associated with inadequate safeguard identification at the screening stage are illustrated by the Second Gas Transmission Project in Thailand,  where the issue of resettlement only arose very late in project preparation — so late, in fact, that it had to be dealt with at loan negotiations. At this stage it was not even certain how many people had to be relocated and how many had to be compensated for loss.

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57. Environmental Assessment Sourcebook Update No. 2: Environmental Screening, April 1993, Environmental Department, World Bank, Washington, D.C.

of income during pipeline construction or for loss of structures. While the completion document reports that the resettlement of the few families was in line with the guidelines and carried out without a problem, it also reports that problems with land acquisition were compounded by difficulties in purchasing the right-of-way because of landowner lock-outs. There were also problems with squatters moving onto the pipeline route in an attempt to obtain compensation. It is quite possible that problems, which happened before in earlier projects, could have been reduced through earlier identification of resettlement issues and the earlier involvement of resettlement specialists in planning for their mitigation, as would have been appropriate.

4.21 **Indigenous Peoples:** Three out of the seven projects for which the Indigenous Peoples policy applied met the requirement for preparation of an Indigenous Peoples Development Plan (IPDP). A good example of an IPDP was prepared for the Bolivian section of the Bolivia-Brazil Gas Pipeline Project. Under this plan, indigenous peoples land rights were established through land titling and communities were supported in developing sustainable resource management practices. A Trust Fund of US$1 million was also established for protection and management of the Kaa-Iya National Park, which is co-managed by an indigenous NGO in collaboration with Bolivia’s National Protected Areas Agency.

4.22 **Natural Habitats:** Three of the five projects in which the Natural Habitats policy applied met the requirements of this policy. For the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project alternative corridors for the pipeline were assessed and alignment of the pipeline within the preferred corridor was optimized from cost, technical, safety, environment, and social perspectives. In addition to aligning the pipeline to follow existing infrastructure and/or traverse degraded land to the extent possible, due to the proximity of the right-of-way to areas of important natural habitat in Cameroon, biodiversity impact mitigation measures included two environmental offsets — one for the semi-deciduous forest and one for the Atlantic Littoral forest.

**Supervision, Monitoring, and Consultation**

4.23 Other issues that emerged from the Safeguards Review relate to (a) the adequacy of supervision inputs and reporting, (b) the management and/or action plans that were prepared, (c) the adequacy of provisions for monitoring and evaluation of environmental and social impacts, and (d) provisions for disclosure and stakeholder consultation.

4.24 **Supervision Inputs and Reporting:** The study found that in only 41 percent of the projects in the sample, the task teams had adequately supervised and reported the implementation of safeguard policies. About 30 percent of the projects in the sample (all of which were likely to have adverse impacts) included environmental or social specialists in at least one supervision mission, which is about half the level projected in the supervision plans prepared at appraisal. Frequent changes in task teams, especially task leaders, and the lower managerial attention and resources devoted to safeguards supervision in incorrectly screened and categorized projects,

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59. The issue was settled amicably, but it took some time.
60. Cameroon: Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project; Chad: Petroleum Sector Capacity Management Project.
61. As mentioned in para. 4.12, this may be related to the fact that many of the projects had been assigned to lower EA categories or applicable safeguards were not triggered at the initial project screening.
also contributed to the modest intensity of safeguards supervision, as reflected in infrequent and inadequate reporting on safeguard policy matters in aide-memoires, supervision reports, and completion reports.

4.25 These issues are important since they account for the entire slippage in the projects' consistency with safeguards from the approval to the implementation stage. Thus, for about a quarter of the 23 projects for which supervision inputs and reporting were inadequate, the consistency with safeguards deteriorated during implementation. On the other hand, of the 14 projects that were adequately supervised, not a single one failed to meet the safeguard objectives, and 2 previously inconsistent projects (14 percent) became substantially consistent with safeguards during implementation (see Figure 4.2).

Figure 4.2: Adequacy of Project Supervision and Change in Consistency with Safeguard Objectives

4.26 The oversight and reporting of safeguards compliance and Environmental Management Plan (EMP) implementation can only be as effective as the environmental and social monitoring reporting system provided for under the projects. Since these were found to be deficient in nearly half of the projects reviewed, the same can be said for the oversight system. Supervision reports generally record safeguards compliance positively without any discussion or evidence provided in the text, and there was only a single reported violation of safeguard policies. Finally, less than a quarter of the ICRs reviewed discuss the implementation of safeguards, even though the Bank's ICR policy requires such a discussion for all Category A projects and those that triggered any other safeguards, and could reasonably be expected for all Category B projects. The paucity of monitoring, documentation, and reporting of the projects' implementation of safeguards is a weakness in the oversight system that has to be addressed given the importance of the issues for the sector.

62. The PSR for the India Coal Sector Rehabilitation Project (CSRP) dated March 28, 2001, records a “Highly Unsatisfactory” rating in respect of compliance with the safeguard policy for Involuntary Resettlement (OD 4.30), prior to receipt of a complaint by the Inspection Panel (RQ01/2) on June 21, 2001.
4.27 **Environmental and Social Management and Action Plans:** The basic instruments that the Bank safeguard policies rely on for implementation of environmental and social mitigation measures are the Environmental Management Plans (EMPs), Resettlement Action Plans (RAPS), and Indigenous Peoples Action Plans (IPAPs). The review found that EMPs are being prepared to an appropriate standard for 93 percent of the ‘A’ projects, but only 60 percent of the ‘B’ projects. Since the EA policy leaves the decision on the scope of EMPs to the judgment of Bank staff, this is likely to have been less of a compliance problem if the projects had been assigned to their proper EA category at the screening stage, with attendant greater availability of resources for specialist staff to help define and supervise the EMP. Similarly, about half of the sample projects that involved involuntary resettlement and affected indigenous peoples did not have comprehensive and implementable RAPs and IPAPs, largely because the relevant safeguards had not been triggered at the initial project screening.

4.28 **Monitoring and Baseline Surveys:** An important requirement, often overlooked, is that of monitoring and evaluation of safeguard compliance “on-site,” which was effectively implemented in only about 33 percent of the projects reviewed. This weakness in the compliance oversight and supervision system, if allowed to persist, can lead to substantial and costly failures for the borrower as well as the Bank. Moreover, it is rare that a monitoring plan, no matter how well prepared, will completely cover all the potential environmental and social impacts in any new project. Some impacts only become evident during implementation. Such impacts can be most quickly and effectively documented if comprehensive environmental and social baseline surveys have been prepared before project implementation, as were available for only about half of the ‘A’ projects in the sample.63

4.29 **Public Disclosure, Consultation, and Participation:** Bank policy expects the borrower to consult project-affected groups and local NGOs for all Category A and B projects, to disclose relevant EA materials, and to incorporate their legitimate concerns into project designs. The specific requirements are somewhat more rigorous for ‘A’ than for ‘B’ projects. The Safeguards Review found that public consultation in the EA preparation process had been substantially addressed in 73 percent of the ‘A’ projects in the sample and 38 percent of the ‘B’ projects. Stakeholder participation, in terms of opportunities to influence and share control over development initiatives, decisions and resources, is not required under Bank policy, and has only been attempted in a few projects.

4.30 Here again, the ‘B’ projects appear to have had fewer resources than necessary to devote to this area, with the attendant consequences. The ICRs of several ‘B’ projects where consultation took place noted the importance of stakeholder consultation. OED’s assessment of a ‘B’ project in Ecuador, in which full public consultation only started 5 years into implementation, concludes the projects and programs involving natural resources extraction need to be carefully and pro-actively managed. Effective communication, consultation and stakeholder participation strategies need to be designed early during preparation and maintained throughout implementation.

4.31 Beyond consultation, the Bolivia-Brazil Gas Pipeline Project offers an excellent model for the establishment of an participatory safeguards compliance monitoring, evaluation, and re-

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63. The Bank’s EA policy only requires comprehensive environmental and social baseline surveys for Category A projects.
porting framework. The completion report notes that continuous dialogue and exchange of information between the local communities and civil society representatives with the environmental inspectors, environmental auditor, ombudsperson was an important feature of the on-site supervision of the environmental and social concerns. This process allowed a growing understanding of the concerns of each of the stakeholders, the identification of new issues, better monitoring of the performance of social compensation programs in the field and, more importantly, an improvement of the environmental inspection/monitoring system, which resulted in a better definition of roles and functions for the contractor environmental field inspectors, the environmental inspection team and management unit independent from the contractor, and the independent environmental Auditor and Ombudsperson.

**BEYOND SAFEGUARDS: “DOING GOOD”**

4.32 An important aspect of the Bank’s approach to development assistance involves the pursuit of positive environmental and social impacts beyond strict compliance with safeguards, such as the remediation of pre-existing conditions resulting from past mining and petroleum activities, and the strengthening of the policy and institutional framework to promote the implementation of safeguards across the entire economy. Many extractive industries projects have such objectives and components.

**Addressing Pre-existing Environmental Conditions**

4.33 *Environmental Rehabilitation:* Nine completed projects (oil & gas: 5; mining: 4) provided assistance for addressing environmental impacts from past or ongoing extractive industries activities, while other completed projects approached them as part of larger efforts in economic transition. Based on the generally limited information provided in the ICRs, pre-existing environmental conditions appear to have been addressed in a moderately satisfactory or better manner, in all but two cases (see Box 4.1).

4.34 Pre-existing environmental impacts tended to be given less priority in countries where the sector faced poor economic and financial conditions, where the priority was to restore production levels and earn import revenues, and the mitigation components were a relatively small part of the project. All these factors were evident in Russia’s Oil Sector Rehabilitation I and II projects as well as Coal SECAL I and II projects. In countries where the economic and financial situation was relatively better (Poland’s Hard Coal SECAL I and II) and in cases where environmental components were larger relative to the entire project (Mongolia Coal project) and where stakeholder participation was higher (Tanzania Mineral Sector Development TA), there was greater progress on dealing with pre-existing environmental impacts.

4.35 *Social Rehabilitation:* The results from dealing with social impacts in the context of mine rehabilitation projects were mixed. Important coal mine rehabilitation projects in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine substantially achieved their mine closure objectives, but the results on the social front have been mixed. The greatest difficulties were faced in generating alternative employment for workers who lost their jobs in the rehabilitation and mine closure process. It is recognized that the difficult economic transition in Russia and Ukraine made it very hard to make progress in generating alternative employment, and it is not clear if these issues were addressed through projects in sectors other than the extractive industries. Another area of concern was find-
ing alternative funding sources for social services that previously had been provided by the state mining enterprises. These issues are important since the process by which employment reduction is handled is crucial for the acceptance by the mining communities of economically necessary mine closure programs.

Box 4.1: World Bank Projects and Pre-Existing Environmental Impacts

In the oil & gas sector, the efforts included controlling drilling wastes and reducing environmental impacts from existing oil and gas operations (Russia); controlling and mitigating pollution from refinery activities (Thailand); controlling pollution from leaking pipes and storage facilities (Tanzania); and addressing the impact of petroleum development in an area of extreme environmental sensitivity near the Caspian Sea (Azerbaijan).

In the mining sub-sector, pre-existing pollution issues included water and air pollution from mine tailings and airborne particles (Guinea, Peru, Poland, and Mongolia); environmental impacts on surrounding communities (Ghana, Russia); contamination from activities of artisanal and informal miners (Ecuador, Peru); a strategy to control widespread mine fires that were affecting local infrastructure, farmland, and habitation, and could potentially dislocate hundreds of thousands of people in the Jharia coalfields (India); and passage of a new environmental code for mining to ensure cleanup of existing pollution and rigorous guidelines for new foreign investors (Peru).

The efforts in Tanzania and Thailand yielded positive results, and good progress was made in Peru where contamination levels were reduced by 15 to 20 percent, and in Poland, where saline water and solid discharge from coal mines were reduced by 21 percent and 29 percent, respectively. Under the Mongolia Coal Project, a beginning was made by establishing an Environmental Management Unit. In Guinea, environmental audits of all mining operations were carried out. Ghana’s project made some headway in reclaiming three pilot areas reclaimed, and launched a “green communities” plan.

Source: Portfolio Review

Capacity-Building and Reform for Environmental and Social Management

4.36 Components in support of capacity building, institutional development, and policy reform for environmental management were part of 16 completed and 9 active projects. Most of the activities were completed satisfactorily. For many of these efforts the impacts are not evident from the ICRs, perhaps because results may be realized only in the long term. Projects in three countries — Burkina Faso, Madagascar, and Mauritania — aim to improve capacity for environmental management in their mining sectors. Burkina Faso’s Mining Capacity Building project seeks to establish capacity for environmental management. The Madagascar Mining Sector Reform project will establish capacity in the country by means of pilot projects to identify and address environmental as well as social impacts from mining. The Mauritania Mining Sector Capacity Project has an Environmental Management System to include capacity building at the Ministry of Mining and Industry, for monitoring and enforcement of environmental regulations.

4.37 Capacity building for environmental and social management represents a valuable contribution by the Bank to client countries at a relatively low cost. While it is too early to judge the impacts of these project components in many cases, indications are that most of the changes are sustainable, especially in countries that already had a reasonable level of institutions and human resources in these areas. The Bank’s cross-country experience also helped client countries to learn from other countries facing similar environmental situations. The number of efforts to build capacity for environmental management in extractive industries projects appears to be increasing.
Other Environmental Benefits from Extractive Industries Projects

4.38 In the portfolio of 48 completed projects, five projects produced other miscellaneous environmental benefits. Under Brazil’s Gas Sector Development project, the creation or improvement of 13 national parks was initiated. This project, as well as Thailand’s Gas Transmission I and II projects made available larger amounts of environmentally acceptable fuel — natural gas — and along with Thailand’s Clean Fuels and Environmental Improvement, had consequent benefits for air quality and health. Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Natural Gas System Reconstruction project helped reduce environmental pollution through rehabilitating war-damaged gas distribution systems.

Missed Opportunities in Addressing Adverse Impacts

4.39 The survey of Bank staff followed-up on a recent QAG Quality-at-Entry Assessment, which noted, “in numerous interviews with task teams, panelists detected an aversion to including project components that may trigger safeguard policies, ...[and]...that it was too risky to design operations with significant social safeguard issues.” Thus, the survey asked if the WBG has avoided good projects in the EI sectors due to concerns related to safeguards policies. The majority of respondents agreed that this has been the case, particularly in response to concerns originating from WBG management (86 percent) and WBG task managers (56 percent), rather than client countries (22 percent) or private investors (40 percent). This suggests that the WBG is missing opportunities to help its clients address adverse impacts in the sector mainly because of an internally generated aversion based on the significant costs and risks associated with its safeguard policies.

CONCLUSIONS

4.40 The Safeguards Review of a sample of extractive industries projects most likely to face environmental and social challenges found the majority to be substantially consistent with applicable safeguard policies, but the degree of consistency is below the expectation that Board approved policies will be implemented as a matter of routine. The degree of consistency varied greatly depending on the phase of project cycle and the environmental category of the projects. The degree of consistency appears to have improved modestly over time. The review also found that supervision inputs for and reporting of safeguards compliance had been adequate for less than half of the projects.

4.41 The most important shortcomings with regard to the implementation of safeguards can be traced to inadequacies in the initial project screening. Another important source of problems was inadequacies in supervision inputs and reporting. Inadequate attention to safeguards policy compliance during project implementation is also reflected in the fact that environmental and social specialists were involved in supervision in only about 30 percent of the sample, and that fewer than a quarter of the project completion reports discuss this subject.

64. World Bank 2001d.

65. However, some allowance needs to be made for the evolving more rigorous interpretation of these policies, in a world that is more concerned about sustainable development, as noted in para. 2.10.
4.42 While the validity of these findings is limited to the sample of projects that was reviewed, some of the implications of those findings may be helpful for strengthening the Bank's safeguards framework, which is no different for extractive industries than for other types of projects. In particular, the findings point to the need for clearer and more consistent guidance for the categorization of sectoral adjustment and technical assistance projects, the identification of applicable safeguards at the initial project screening, the appropriate scope and arrangements for monitoring of safeguards compliance during project implementation, including the preparation of comprehensive baseline surveys at the start of the project, and the reporting and evaluation of results at project completion. Some improvement here would be of particular importance to the extractive industries portfolio, given its large share of sectoral adjustment and technical assistance projects, the inadequacies in monitoring and reporting, and the extensive controversy surrounding the sector’s environmental and social impacts.

4.43 On the other hand, the Bank's safeguards policies have received wide acceptance, even for projects where the Bank is not involved, which points to the potential for the Bank to continue building on its global mandate and convening power for catalyzing good practice in respect to safeguards and other issues. Beyond compliance with safeguards, the Bank’s efforts at “doing good” by addressing pre-existing environmental “legacy” issues and building capacity for the management of environmental and social impacts have yielded mostly satisfactory results. These appear to be areas where the Bank should continue to make a valuable contribution to the development of the resource-abundant countries.

66. Here again, there is no reason to believe that the performance of extractive industries projects in this regard is different that that of projects in other sectors.
5. From Resource Revenues to Sustainable Development

5.1 From a country development perspective, the most important component of the economic benefits from extractive industries is usually the flow of fiscal revenues that can be used for growth-promoting public expenditure.\(^{67}\) Thus, this chapter assesses the Bank’s efforts to integrate the incremental revenues from resource extraction into the countries’ overall development strategy through improved fiscal management and expenditure policies.\(^{68}\) While the potential for major fiscal revenues is generally greater from the petroleum than the mining sector, it is useful to discuss them together in light of their shared characteristics of volatility and exhaustibility.

LINKING EI SECTOR DEVELOPMENT TO OVERALL COUNTRY ASSISTANCE

5.2 The management of EI revenues cannot be isolated from the larger context of economic management. In a resource-rich country, EI revenues deserve special attention because of their importance to the economy, and their concentration in a few sources, which affords greater scope for rent-seeking. Hence, an assistance strategy for a resource-abundant country must not only recognize the specific issues involved in managing EI revenues but also chart their linkages with the broader management of the country’s development.

5.3 A review of the World Bank’s most recent Country Assistance Strategies (CASs)\(^{69}\) found that a majority (64 percent) of those for poorly performing EI-dependent countries\(^{70}\) recognized one or more issues related to the management of EI revenues (see Figure 5.1).\(^{71}\) The issues that were mentioned spanned a wide range, including the management of volatility and exhaustibility of EI revenues (Azerbaijan, Mongolia), achieving macroeconomic stability (Gabon, Trinidad and Tobago), public expenditure policies for EI revenues (Bolivia, Chad), transparency in handling EI revenues (Kazakhstan, Papua New Guinea), diversification of economic activity (Nigeria, Zambia), and reduction of subsidies to the EI sectors (Russia).

5.4 In general, the mention of EI revenue issues in a CAS does not appear to translate readily into developmental interventions by the Bank. The dearth of follow-up interventions could be related to the relatively low level of Bank involvement in poorly performing EI-dependent countries. World Bank lending per capita over 1990–99, was significantly lower (at US$47) for poorly performing EI-dependent countries, than for better performing EI-dependent countries.

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\(^{67}\) Other potential economic benefits include financial flows accruing to private investors, employees, local communities, etc., which represent compensation for risk capital, labor, and social and environmental services.

\(^{68}\) Beyond the allocation of fiscal revenues in line with national development priorities, an assessment of the efficacy of public expenditure for achieving sustainable development and poverty reduction was outside the scope of this evaluation. Such assessments are regularly included in OED’s Country Assistance Evaluations.

\(^{69}\) As stated in BP 2.11, “The Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) is the central vehicle for Board review of the World Bank Group’s assistance strategy for IDA and IBRD borrowers. The CAS document (a) describes the World Bank Group’s strategy based on an assessment of priorities in the country, and (b) indicates the level and composition of assistance to be provided based on the strategy and the country’s portfolio performance.”

\(^{70}\) That is, those with negative GDP/capita growth during the 1990s.

\(^{71}\) The percentage was higher for better performing EI-dependent countries at 80 percent, and lower for non-EI dependent countries.
(US$80) or poorly performing non-EI-dependent countries (US$61) (see Figure 5.2). While this is a consequence of the Bank’s country policy and institutional performance based allocation of IDA credits, there is no indication that the shortfall in lending has been mitigated by non-lending interventions such as economic and sector work, as would seem desirable in light of these countries’ needs72 (see Box 5.1).

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72. Many of these countries fit the description of low-income countries under stress (LICUS). As stated in the LICUS Task Force Report (World Bank 2002): “Low-income countries under stress are characterized by very weak policies, institutions, and governance. Aid does not work well in these environments... Yet neglect of such countries (by the development community) perpetuates poverty and may contribute to the collapse of the state, with adverse regional and even global consequences.”
Box 5.1: Analytical and Advisory Activities in the EI Sectors

The Bank has engaged in a variety of analytical and advisory activities (AAA) in the EI sectors, including economic and sector work (ESW) as well as sponsoring meetings, conferences, and workshops for stakeholders.

None of the AAA in the EI sectors has been evaluated through either self-evaluative Activity Completion Summaries (ACS) or the annual reviews of ESW by the Quality Assurance Group (QAG) from 1998 to 2001. However, some reporting in the ICRs, as well as in country case studies prepared for this evaluation, gives an idea of the integration of representative AAA with project preparation.

In Papua New Guinea, the Bank has provided a range of ESW on many occasions since the 1980s in the mining sector and it undertook reviews of environmental issues in 1992 and again in 2000 that provided input into the mining TA project. The Argentina Mining Sector Review (1993) helped improve the quality of project preparation for the country's Mining TA and Mining Sector Development TA projects. In Ecuador, the Bank assisted the government in the preparation of a Mining Sector Policy and Strategy Paper in 1990 (updated in 1993) stressing the need for legal and institutional reform to attract private sector investment in the sector, and to address environmental impacts of artisanal and small-scale mining.


In the mining sector, several country-level sectoral reviews have been prepared, among them the Kyrgyz Republic: Mining Sector Review (World Bank 1994a), Russian Federation: Restructuring the Coal Industry: Putting the People First (World Bank 1994b), Kazakhstan: National Gas Investment Strategy Study (ESMAP 1997), and Ecuador — Public Sector Reforms for Growth in the Era of Declining Oil Output (1991). “A Mining Strategy for Latin America and the Caribbean” (Van de Veen et al. 1996) and “Strategy for African Mining” (World Bank 1992) spell out strategies for boosting private investment in the regions.

5.5 For a more in-depth assessment of the Bank’s involvement in the revenue management issues of EI-dependent countries, the Revenue Study reviewed CASs, Country Assistance Evaluations (CAEs), project documents for EI and other sectors, and adjustment lending and Public Expenditure Reviews and other documents for five EI-dependent countries: Bolivia, Ecuador, Ghana, Kazakhstan, and Papua New Guinea.

5.6 The study found that in all five countries, governance was the key to successful management of EI revenues and fed into the quality of revenue distribution and utilization, as well as attempts at economic stabilization and diversification. Ecuador and Ghana lacked the political will and the fiscal discipline necessary to maintain macroeconomic stability, putting other reforms in jeopardy. Kazakhstan and Papua New Guinea showed little institutional development or commitment to governing openly or fairly. Only in Bolivia did the government show a commit-

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73. The five countries were chosen based on the relative importance of extractive industries in their economies, the intensity of Bank assistance they received, and for regional diversity.
ment to managing its revenues within the context of overall public finance management, but even this country is having difficulty maintaining fiscal discipline. The Revenue Study also found that desirable structural reforms were slowed down in the face of large resource flows from resource extraction (see Box 5.2).

**Box 5.2: EI Revenue Management and Macroeconomic Performance: Some World Bank Country Experiences**

The World Bank has assisted several EI-dependent countries in reconciling EI revenue management with broader macroeconomic management. In most cases the outcomes have been less than satisfactory.

In Ecuador, in the 1990s, the Bank identified constraints to macroeconomic performance as the major negative effect of the decline in oil revenues and their mismanagement, but it failed to develop a more comprehensive strategy to isolate the economy from volatility and exhaustibility of the resources and for sharing oil benefits. Though the Bank provided financial assistance to sectoral rehabilitation and macroeconomic stabilization, the expected reforms were not implemented and export and fiscal revenues went to finance highly inefficient public expenditures. Overall, the Bank had a very limited influence on how oil revenues were managed to promote macroeconomic stability and social equity.

In Ghana, during the 1990s, the Bank supported efforts for better financial management and civil service reform, but OED’s Country Assistance Evaluation (CAE) of 2000 found these efforts were only partly successful. Many shortcomings remain in the overall quality of Ghana’s public governance, as illustrated by politically motivated spending on public sector wage increases and consumer subsidies before each election in 1992, 1996, and 2000. These led to persistent macroeconomic instability with negative consequences for investment and growth.

In Kazakhstan, an inflow of petroleum revenues created prosperity that began to produce symptoms of the “Dutch disease” and reduced commitment to overall reform, to the point that the country has forgone sound advice from the World Bank regarding the management of EI revenues.

In Papua New Guinea, private investment in the EI sectors created some prosperity in the early 1990s, after which the government discontinued reforms, which precipitated a financial crisis. Following this, the WBG supported a new government effort to restore macroeconomic stability and initiate structural reform, with emphasis on governance and economic diversification. But macroeconomic mismanagement continued, compounded by political uncertainty and poor transparency and accountability, forcing the Bank to suspend the second tranche of a structural adjustment loan.

In Bolivia, WBG strategy in both hydrocarbons and minerals had great success in generating revenues, helped in great measure by the country’s own “capitalization” program. However, public expenditure management in the country is still weak, and it has not responded well to several WBG technical assistance and structural adjustment operations targeted at public finance management, civil service reform, customs administration, and judicial reform.

Sources: Revenue Study, Country Case Studies.

5.7 The Revenue Study also found that while economic diversification through directing public expenditure toward socially profitable investments is necessary for the sustainable development of EI-dependent countries, this approach has proved difficult to promote in the face of poor governance. Bolivia successfully developed agriculture in the lowlands, but at the cost of additional environmental damages that are difficult to control. The Bank and the government showed clear commitment to develop agriculture in Papua New Guinea early during the period, but after 10 years of assistance the strategic options for stimulating agriculture have yet to be developed. Ghana had difficulties in developing agriculture and streamlining cocoa production
management, and competition between mining and agriculture for arable land continues to be an important issue. The Bank advised Kazakhstan that efficient management of the National Oil Stabilization Fund and better management of public finances in general were preconditions for promoting economic growth in the non-extractive industries sectors, but governance of the oil fund and of public finance continue to be difficult problems. Ecuador's poor management of public expenditures is the core cause of the continuous financial crises faced by the country in the 1990s and it is still excessively dependent on oil exports. In general, while the World Bank supported diversification in all these countries, it has not been able to address these diversification issues with any clarity, and the efficacy of its interventions has been low.

5.8 Overall, the Revenue Study concluded that the relevance of the World Bank's interventions for revenue management in the EI sectors had been modest for Ecuador and Kazakhstan, substantial for Papua New Guinea, and high for Bolivia and Ghana. The study rated the efficacy of interventions as negligible for Ecuador, Kazakhstan, and Papua New Guinea, modest for Ghana, and substantial for Bolivia.

Managing Volatility and Exhaustibility of Revenues

5.9 Fewer than half of the CASs for EI-dependent countries (12 out of 26) recognized the importance of dealing with volatility and exhaustibility of revenues from the EI sectors. These CASs identified broad approaches to dealing with the issues: creation of a windfall fund, and encouragement of growth outside the oil sector (Gabon); offshore funds (Kazakhstan); longer-term strategy of fiscal management of copper revenues, and diversifying exports (Mongolia); developing a strong private sector in industries other than oil (Azerbaijan); an oil stabilization fund (Colombia); and keeping a sizeable reserve cushion (Chile).

5.10 In two CASs a clear link was found between issues relating to volatility and exhaustibility of EI revenues, appropriate policy dialogue, and a lending/non-lending program to address them: The PNG CAS addresses the country's vulnerability to external shocks and enhancing macroeconomic stability through appropriate policy dialogue and a structural adjustment loan. The Kazakhstan CAS addresses the volatility inherent in commodity-led growth by proposing careful management of oil revenues, reflected in lending for public sector resource management and structural adjustment, as well as non-lending initiatives.

5.11 A general review of experiences with savings and stabilization funds, with or without Bank intervention, as well as recent analytical work suggests that the experience with such funds has been mixed, with the few important successes coming from countries with a strong history of fiscal prudence (Botswana, Chile). Without such a tradition, the integration of resource funds with overall fiscal policy has proved problematic, and the stabilization of expenditure has remained elusive (see Box 5.3).

Revenue Generation

5.12 Project components designed to help resource-dependent countries improve the generation and accounting of fiscal revenues from resource extraction were included in 10 of the completed projects in the portfolio. These components focused on improving the capacity of governments to negotiate with investors and on upgrading accounting procedures to international standards, with mixed results.
Box 5.3: How Effective Are Resource Funds?

A number of EI-dependent countries have responded to the prospect of volatility and exhaustibility of EI revenues by setting up petroleum, resource, or future generations funds, with the objectives of maintaining fiscal discipline, overall macroeconomic stabilization, or saving for future generations. These attempts have been mostly unsatisfactory.

Papua New Guinea’s Mineral Resource Stabilization Fund (MRSF) of the 1970s was depleted by withdrawals and excessive public spending, and was finally used up in 1999 to retire debt that had then reached 25 percent of GDP. Ghana’s Mineral Fund is currently a source of controversy because its recipients, both mining communities and the Ministry of Finance, have mishandled its system of resource-rent sharing. Kazakhstan’s National Oil Stabilization Fund, created in 2001 with the intention of reducing the negative impact of oil revenues on the domestic economy and providing for the welfare of future generations, has yet to evolve rules for transfer of funds and establish spending priorities, and has already been criticized for misuse of funds. The Petroleum Stabilization Fund established by Ecuador in 1990 turned into an additional source of revenues to finance regular budgetary expenditures. In Equatorial Guinea, the government has established a Future Generations Fund in its overall scheme for the utilization of anticipated petroleum revenues, but no significant amounts have been deposited.

In general, the same elements of disciplined economic management are needed to make a success of a resource fund as are needed to run an economy effectively. Thus, recourse to resource funds is unlikely to yield better results than pursuing equitable distribution and effective utilization of EI revenues through sound fiscal policies.

Source: Davis et al. 2001; World Bank; Country Case Studies.

5.13 Six of the completed Technical Assistance Loans helped to improve negotiating capacity and four others helped upgrade accounting procedures. Three projects, in Georgia (Oil Institution Building TA), Papua New Guinea (Petroleum Exploration TA), and Peru (Peru’s Energy/Mining TA), helped build negotiating capacity through improved data collection and economic analysis for exploration and development. Capacity was developed in Russia for working with foreign suppliers and organizing bidding (Oil Sector Rehabilitation I and II projects) and in Equatorial Guinea (Petroleum TA project) for maintaining a dialogue on long-term development plans with oil companies.

5.14 Four completed projects supported the adoption of international accounting practices by state enterprises for improving transparency and compatibility with foreign investors: Azerbaijan’s Petroleum TA with respect to the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan, the Mongolia Economic Transition Support project for the planning and restructuring of operations of the ERDENET copper mine, and Thailand’s Gas Transmission I and II projects with respect to the Petroleum Authority of Thailand. The results are reported to have been satisfactory.

5.15 Efforts at improving capacity for negotiating with private investors and for adopting international accounting practices have yielded generally favorable results. This was mainly because the client governments and implementing agencies recognized the immediate benefits of attracting higher private investment and gaining more favorable contractual terms. The lesson is that where such conditions are given, these seem to be straightforward and effective project initiatives.
Revenue Distribution

5.16 A distribution of EI revenues between federal, state, and local governments that is broadly acceptable and sustainable to key stakeholders is critical for converting the revenues into sustainable development and poverty reduction. In general terms, an acceptable distribution of revenues is that which is consistent with national developmental priorities, subject to (i) entitlements of legal, customary, and traditional owners of resource rights, and sub-national units of the government, as recognized under national laws, and (ii) compensation for negative environmental and social impacts. An additional negotiated premium to local communities and governments may also be appropriate, depending on national priorities. While the perception of equity will vary, the experience of several countries shows that it is important that none of the claimants gets an excessive share; poor governance does not constrain the actual transfer of funds; and there are clear regulatory provisions for using the funds in the intended manner (see Box 5.4).

Box 5.4: Distribution of EI Revenues — Striking the Right Balance

Striking the right balance in distribution of EI revenues involves many complex issues and needs firm institutional arrangements and provisions for consultations between stakeholders to arrive at equitable and sustainable arrangements.

The government of Papua New Guinea (GOPNG) has handed over a greater share of the resource rent to the provincial governments and landowners since pioneering an innovative “Development Forum” in 1989 to represent their interests. In a recent project, GOPNG ceded 30 percent of its equity to the landowners, though the 1998 Oil and Gas Act had established a cap of 20 percent. Neither side has demonstrated effective use of these resources, and it is clear that the distribution of revenues has not yet been settled to everyone’s satisfaction.

In Equatorial Guinea, all oil revenues accrue to the central government, which exclusively decides their allocation, though local municipalities are deeply affected by the oil economy. In Chad, just under 5 percent of anticipated oil revenues are allocated to the local authorities in the oil production region and 70 percent to poverty sectors throughout the country (including the oil producing region).

The experience of Nigeria and Peru illustrates how revenue distribution can go awry for lack of proper implementation and proper regulatory mechanisms. In Nigeria, federal revenues, predominantly from oil, appear to be reasonably shared between the federal government (49 percent), state government (24 percent), and local government (20 percent). In practice, these shares are not realized because of prior appropriations, which are taken off the top, effectively reducing the share of state and local governments, making the issue one of actual implementation and quality of governance rather than a lack of appropriate constitutional provisions. In Peru, since 2001, the law requires a large share (50 percent) of mining profits taxes to be plowed back into local communities. Yet little of these funds appears to reach the communities, primarily due the federal government’s retaining them for payment of ancient debts.
Box 5.4 (continued)

In Ghana, the constitution explicitly reserves all mineral rights for the state. Despite this, public sentiment has favored local communities receiving a direct share in royalties paid to the government of Ghana by mining companies. As a result, the government set up a Mineral Development Fund (MDF), which restored a traditional practice of payments to custodians of the mining land. The MDF receives 20 percent of all mining royalties, of which 9 percent goes to mining communities, which in turn is subdivided between local authorities. The other 11 percent goes to mining sector institutions and mineral-related investment projects. In practice, however, the discretion given to the Ministry of Finance in handling the MDF together with the lack of clear expenditure guidelines for the local authorities has resulted in little benefit to the local communities.

The distribution of oil rents in Ecuador is considered the most centralized and least transparent of the four Andean countries (ESMAP 2000). Over 1995–2000, an average of 90 percent of available oil rents was assigned to the central government and its institutions, 62 percent to the central budget, 7 percent to the armed forces, and 23 percent to the universities. Producing provinces and municipalities averaged 1.2 and 2.4 percent, much below the Andean Countries’ average of 18.9 percent and 9.5 percent. Although a large share of local government resources came from other central government transfers, they account for less than 1 percent of central government expenditures.

Sources: Country Case Studies; World Bank

5.17 Issues relating to distribution of revenues among owners of resource rights and different levels of government figured in six of the completed projects in the portfolio — with largely satisfactory outcomes — and two active projects relating to the Chad-Cameroon pipeline. The six completed projects — in Bolivia, Papua New Guinea, and Russia — contained provisions for distribution of revenues from resource extraction to meet entitlements, compensation, and other national priorities. Of the six completed projects, four had satisfactory outcomes in terms of achieving their distributional objectives.

Revenue Utilization

5.18 Developmentally efficient use of EI revenue can stimulate broad-based and sustainable economic development that goes beyond the EI sectors. Approaches to better use of EI revenues are discussed in CASs for 6 out of 26 EI-dependent countries. The approaches discussed in the CASs include: improving capacity for public finance management and developing a strategy for poverty-oriented use of revenues (Chad), resisting the unwise expenditure of oil revenues (Azerbaijan), effective management of resource rents (Mongolia), and directing revenues toward sustainable use (Kazakhstan). Once again, there is little evidence in the CASs of lending or non-lending activities that follow directly from these discussions. Only three active projects relating to the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline contain explicit provisions for allocating fiscal revenues from extractive industries (see Box 5.5, next page).

Coordination Across the World Bank Group

5.19 Aside from serving as an instrument for integrating activities within the Bank, the CAS is also expected to strengthen coordination and cooperation between the Bank and IFC/MIGA. However, the review of CASs of EI-dependent countries found that, while the discussion of linkages with the Bank’s EI activities has been very modest, the EI activities of IFC and MIGA are not always
Box 5.5: Applying EI Revenues to the Right Developmental Priorities

Issues related to utilization of EI revenues are intertwined with those of public expenditure policies. However, depending on the relative importance of EI revenues and the nature of developmental and macroeconomic priorities, sector-specific strategies need to be devised.

In Papua New Guinea, a large proportion of EI revenues went toward non-productive uses in the 1990s, a period of poor economic growth for the country. This was due to inadequate institutional capacity as well as government preoccupation with macroeconomic imbalances, which distracted it from the scope and the quality of public expenditure. Since 2000 the government of PNG has been consciously redirecting recurrent expenditure toward development projects.

In Equatorial Guinea, after a long period of poor economic growth, there have been visible signs of infrastructure improvements since 1995 that support the oil and associated service industry, and access roads in agricultural areas. The investment budget — which reflects a 1997 commitment to give priority to essential infrastructure and to poverty alleviation through investments in social services and agricultural diversification — is allocated among administration (20 percent), the productive sectors (13 percent), health (10 percent), education (15 percent), and infrastructure (32 percent). While the allocation appears appropriate for Equatorial Guinea’s development needs, much needs to be done to develop the capacity of the sector ministries to implement such a large investment program efficiently.

In Bolivia and in Ghana, EI revenue enabled the government to increase spending on social programs and begin to alleviate poverty, but poverty remains entrenched in both countries. In Ecuador and PNG, poverty alleviation is an even more distant hope. In Kazakhstan, poverty assessments were undertaken only in the late 1990s, and their conclusions have been incorporated in World Bank strategy, but the Bank has little leverage after abundant oil revenue reduced the government’s commitment to reform.

Chad’s ongoing Petroleum Revenue Management Project contains a detailed Revenue Management Plan that allocates prospective revenue from petroleum projects to: poverty-related sectors such as education, health, rural development, and infrastructure (70 percent); civil sector operation expenditure (15 percent); a future generations account (10 percent); and a supplement to the producing region (5 percent). Capacity-building and institutional arrangements for transparent allocation and utilization are in process.

In Ecuador, a Bank review concluded that most of the country’s oil capital was being used to finance government consumption, including widespread overstaffing in the public sector, growth in inefficient public enterprises and low levels of non-oil taxation, and high levels of subsidies for petroleum.

*Source:* Country Case Studies

74. Of the 60 CASs that were reviewed, 26 covered EI-dependent countries, and 4 of these were joint Bank-IFC-MIGA CASs.
CONCLUSIONS

5.20 At the country level, the majority of CASs in EI-dependent countries recognized one or more issues related to the management of fiscal revenues from resource extraction, but in only a few instances is the discussion linked to specific interventions to address them. Also, the Bank’s overall lending to EI-dependent countries experiencing negative growth has been substantially lower than average, with no indications of compensating non-lending interventions, and no evaluative evidence on the results of such interventions. A desk review of Bank interventions in five EI-dependent countries found that governance was the key to the successful management of EI revenues and fed into the quality of revenue distribution and the efficiency of its use in support of broad-based and sustainable development.

5.21 The CAS review and the staff survey findings point to a need for greater integration of EI sectoral and macro interventions in the assistance strategies. The evidence suggests that the actual level of coordination was believed to be adequate by only half of WBG staff, and with inadequate linkages between EI activities and sustainable development, and inadequate support from the Bank’s country units emerging as the main areas for improvement. The joint CAS process, which has not been much used in EI-dependent countries, would appear to be an important instrument to achieve this.

5.22 Taken together, these findings suggest that, while the Bank has been reasonably effective in the few cases when it addressed revenue generation and distribution issues at the project level, it has yet to formulate and implement a strategy to consistently transform resource rents into sustainable development, particularly in the most poorly performing EI-dependent countries where the need is greatest. If the Bank is to have a more effective role in such countries, it will likely require government commitment as well as the full leverage of the Bank to achieve sound fiscal management as well as a supportive governance framework. The best place to clarify the linkages between resource rents and sustainable development is the CAS, which can then be used guide the design of specific projects and the monitoring and evaluation of results.

5.23 The strategic approach needs to ensure that project-specific interventions are effectively integrated with a macro-level effort to manage the revenues for sustainable development. Projects and analytical and advisory activities to strengthen policies and institutions to ensure that the management and use of EI revenues is efficient and transparent should play a major role. Projects to close uneconomic mines and mitigate pre-existing environmental and social conditions, including the integration of artisanal and small-scale mining within the formal sector, will also be important where such problems exist. Projects to establish a legal and regulatory framework that is appropriate, stable, and consistently enforced, and that will facilitate the privatization of ongoing activities should also be expected to make a major contribution. Where the Bank can be confident that the incremental revenues will support sustainable development, it should continue to promote private investment for sector expansion.

75. Since 2002, the Bank’s LICUS program (see footnote 72) has led to the allocation of additional budget to eligible countries for activities designed to improve the institutional and policy framework.
6. Addressing the Challenge of Governance

6.1 High dependence on revenues from extractive industries has been associated with corrosive effects on economic and political life in many countries, including rent-seeking and government ineffectiveness. Indeed, a review of the literature and feedback from NGOs suggest that good governance is central to creating an environment that fosters sustainable and equitable development, and is an essential complement to sound revenue management and safeguard policies. Figure 6.1 shows the association between the quality of governance and EI dependence. 

![Figure 6.1: Worse Country Governance with Greater EI-Dependence]

Countries such as Botswana and Chile have successfully leveraged their wealth into sustainable growth through investment-friendly policies, fiscal discipline, and long-term planning. While the highest quality of overall and sectoral governance may not be required for an EI project to be beneficial to a client country, some minimum conditions should exist to help ensure that the benefits of EI projects are not squandered and the citizens left with costs that can include environmental damage, health risks, and war.

6.3 Governance, defined as the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development, has been an explicit concern for the World Bank at least since 1990, when the Bank's General Counsel articulated the legal basis for

76. This relationship, which is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level (t-statistic = 2.44), illustrates a conclusion that is widely accepted in the literature. No claim is made that EI dependence is the sole determinant of a country's quality of governance. The figure includes all countries eligible for borrowing from the WBG with a population greater than 1 million as of 2000, for which data is available.

77. In Figure 5.1, Chile and Botswana are shown at the top, near center and to the right hand side, respectively.
its work in this area. This was followed by a Board Paper on “Governance and Development” that outlined the Bank’s general approach to improving governance. Before this time, the Bank had undertaken many initiatives that addressed institutional and policy aspects related to governance. These included projects to reform public sector policies and institutions, and to create an enabling environment for private sector development. Since the early 1990s, much effort has been devoted to strengthening complementary process-oriented aspects of governance, including public participation, information disclosure, promoting transparency, and reducing corruption.

**PROJECT COMPONENTS RELATING TO GOVERNANCE AND TRANSPARENCY**

6.4 The Portfolio Review found that about 41 percent of extractive industry projects had at least one component that bears directly or indirectly on improving governance and transparency. The relevant project components address sectoral governance issues such as (i) the *institutional and policy framework* and related capacity-building for clarification of property rights, and improved accounting and auditing standards and practices; and (ii) *strengthening governance processes*, including public consultation and participation, information disclosure and dissemination, promoting transparency, and reducing corruption.

6.5 **Institutional and Policy Framework:** *Property rights issues* relating mainly to clarification and administration of exploration rights and access to pipelines were addressed in nine completed and five active projects, and had generally satisfactory outcomes. Cadastre and registry systems were formulated or upgraded (Argentina, Ecuador, and Peru) and institutional capacity was improved for enforcement of laws and regulations, as well as for administering mine titles (Albania, Bolivia, Guinea, Peru, Russia, Zambia). Ongoing efforts among active projects included strengthening mining cadastral systems and related institutional capacity (Madagascar, Mozambique, Romania). In addition, components addressing the *management of fiscal revenues* were included in 10 projects as noted in para. 5.12.

6.6 **Public Consultation and Participation:** Consultative and participative decision-making processes involving all important stakeholders — local community, government, and industry — have recently emerged as important in a strategy to strengthen governance processes. In the portfolio of completed projects, public consultations of varying levels and in different forms, beyond the minimum requirements of the Bank’s EA policy (see para. 4.29 ff.) were undertaken in only four projects. The Bolivia-Brazil gas pipeline project involved the creation of community-based organizations and committees, and consulting the public on draft regulations and the project’s environmental assessment. The Georgia Oil Institution Building project, provided for training in stakeholder analysis and public consultation to maximize public participation in environmental decision-making. During the India Jharia Mine Fire Control project, effective public consultation processes included concerned state government, union leaders, tribal communities, and NGOs. The Russia Coal Implementation TA Project provided support for stakeholders’ participatory activities, especially local trade unions and the Association of Mining Cities.

6.7 Among the active projects, the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline project has involved public consultations in the preparation of the project’s Environmental Assessment and Environmental

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Management Plan. Extensive and frequent public consultation has also taken place on the subject of likely project impacts and compensation measures. Compensation rates for all crops, trees, and other assets have been well researched and discussed with affected people in all categories of land tenure. The private sponsors will pay compensation at real market values, which are over and above government schedules.

6.8 Overall, while recourse to public consultation and participation has helped project implementation where it was carried out, it was quite rare across the portfolio of extractive industries projects. This is an important gap in a sector where production and rehabilitation activities directly affect the livelihood and environmental and social well being of large numbers of people, and where sharing of benefits needs to be done in a cooperative and transparent manner to prevent the dangers of rent-seeking behavior. The prominent examples of public consultation have occurred in countries with relatively higher levels of education and per capita incomes. In light of this finding, it would be important to develop suitable mechanisms to ensure that affected people who are less literate and economically weak are given appropriate and fair means to register their feedback on issues that effect them. The provisions established for the Chad-Cameroon projects represent a particularly important pilot experience in this area.

6.9 Disclosure and Information Dissemination: Public disclosure and information dissemination, including conduct of opinion surveys, figured in only six completed projects. Opinion surveys of project beneficiaries were conducted in six projects in Albania, Peru, Poland, and Ukraine. Public information and communications campaigns were mounted with six completed projects in Albania, Bolivia, Peru, Poland, and Zambia, with mixed results. Among active projects, the four projects associated with the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline contain exemplary provisions for public disclosure and information dissemination.79

6.10 In Albania, as part of the Structural Adjustment Credit project (in which mining was only one component), the government conducted a survey of citizens’ satisfaction with services, governance, and institutional reform strategy and received generally favorable feedback. A survey of beneficiaries and stakeholders was made under Poland’s Coal SECAL I and II projects, while Poland’s government also initiated an intensive dialogue with representatives of local government, labor unions, and NGOs. In the Ukraine Coal Pilot and Coal SECAL projects, an independent institute was involved in monitoring social rehabilitation efforts with affected parties, and obtained generally positive feedback from project beneficiaries. A public opinion survey was conducted following the Privatization Adjustment Project in Peru.

6.11 A public information campaign was mounted in Poland’s Hard Coal SECAL I and Albania began a program to survey citizen’s satisfaction with key public services, and publicized reviews of the impact of each element of its governance and institutional reform strategy (Albania Structural Adjustment Credit project). Following a controversy with its mapping work, the Ecuador Mining/Environment TA project began a dissemination effort to present scientific facts

79. For example, the Bank has set up a project web site with a comprehensive set of documents including: (i) the Project Appraisal Documents for the three projects, (ii) the full set of Environmental Assessments and Environmental Management Plan documents, (iii) the Loan and Credit Agreements, (iv) Environmental Compliance Monitoring Group and International Advisory Group reports, and up-to-date progress reports on project implementation. Many of these reports are in English and French to make them more broadly accessible. See http://www.worldbank.org/afi/ccproj/project/pro_document.htm.
through various public forums. Bolivia’s public information campaign on the benefits of the reform was not sufficient or effective enough to answer public criticism of the Regulatory Reform and Capitalization projects regarding benefits of newly capitalized firms. Zambia’s efforts to produce an NGO policy paper proved insufficient to bridge the gap between the complex groups of NGOs and the government. Ukraine failed to respond adequately with appropriate information or disclosure to damaging reports in the media on the conduct of coal sector reform, and in the process, may have invited political opposition to the reform process.

6.12 **Promoting Transparency and Reducing Corruption:** Promoting transparency and reducing corruption did not figure as explicit objectives in any of the completed projects that were reviewed, with the exception of the Russia Coal SECAL I and II projects. However, some technical assistance components, such as those relating to accounting standards, bidding processes, and better management practices, had the effect of improving transparency, some of which may have lasting effects. There was one instance of misuse of project funds that was eventually addressed. Overall, 16 projects had components related to transparency or corruption, some of which were minor in scope.

6.13 An important objective of Russia’s Coal SECAL I and II projects was the establishment of a transparent mechanism for the allocation and effective monitoring of subsidies. During these projects, the Government of Russia took a series of radical and far-reaching steps that enhanced transparency and accountability through transfer of subsidy administration to government ministries and creating mechanisms for direct payment of entitlements to individuals and job creation programs to local administrations.

6.14 The Bank’s funding for Peru’s Committee for Promotion of Private Investment (COPRI) helped it function with greater independence during the sale of state-owned enterprises (Peru’s Privatization Adjustment project) and open and transparent bidding was used for the first time for petroleum imports, which helped to reduce costs of petroleum purchases (Petroleum Sector Reform project). Transparency was improved through upgrading accounting and auditing procedures during Azerbaijan’s Petroleum TA, Thailand’s Gas Transmission project, as well as under Madagascar’s Petroleum Sector Reform project.

6.15 A notable achievement of the Peru Energy/mining TA was that the government and public have accepted the concept of autonomous regulatory operators with stable and non-discriminatory rules. The funds for the Miners’ Separation Package (MSP) scheme under Poland’s Hard Coal SECAL were properly accounted for through audits, and accountability of mining companies was improved through more transparent company business plans and operating plans.

6.16 In the Ukraine Coal SECAL, the small business component saw some fraud in applications for micro-credit and employment subsidies, but follow-up measures to prevent recurrence were effective. Some administrative problems were encountered during audits of the employment restructuring funds and mine liquidation funds in Poland’s Coal SECAL I, and were satisfactorily resolved, and it was confirmed that the funds had been used properly.

6.17 There were some less successful experiences, as in Zambia’s Second Economic and Social Adjustment project where bilateral donors suspended program lending because of their concerns about governance issues. The Bank’s sector policy initiatives in Russia helped underline the importance of institutional regulations surrounding transparent allocation of quotas and ac-
cess to export pipeline facilities (Oil Sector Rehabilitation I and II projects), though a draft law for this purpose fell short of expectations. Albania’s Anti-Corruption Plan supported an array of measures to increase transparency, such as deregulation, more transparent privatization and licensing procedures, public administration reform, and judicial reform, which had an impact on all sectors, including hydrocarbon and mining.

6.18 In Bolivia’s Regulatory Reform and Capitalization Assistance projects, detailed asset valuation helped set a benchmark to ensure a fair bidding process and the privatization process were considered most transparent by investors. However, the government’s scheme for sharing the proceeds of capitalization with specified sections of the population was marred by cases of fraud by claimants who falsified their ages to claim benefits. During the Guinea Mining Sector Investment Project, the Ministry of Mines negotiated mining rights with potential private investors in a non-transparent way, in respect of bauxite and alumina concessions, especially for the Dian Dian deposits. Though outside the scope of the project, these actions could well have affected the interest of potential investors for activities undertaken within the ambit of the project. However, on another count, budgetary transparency was improved by the elimination of the Agency for the Management of Mines Infrastructure (ANAIM). Under the Mongolia Coal Project, modern financial accounting, budgeting, and cost accounting have been introduced and adopted.

6.19 Overall, the scope of the project components relating to governance and transparency tended to be narrow, relating to specific steps in the sequence of project-related activities. In most cases, the link with better governance and transparency was incidental, and did not follow from a stated objective of the project. None of the projects have any stated objectives dealing with larger governance or transparency issues, though these are recognized in many CASs. One reason for this could be the political sensitivity of this subject, making it difficult to convince client countries to adopt specific objectives in this regard. Another possibility is that these issues, being common to many sectors, may need to be dealt with at the macro level rather than through sectoral interventions.

ADDRESSING GOVERNANCE AT THE COUNTRY LEVEL

6.20 Since major governance issues are most likely to be addressed through interventions that are not directly tied to EI projects, the Governance Study was undertaken to review the World Bank’s assistance to six EI-dependent countries — Chile, Ecuador, Ghana, Kazakhstan, Papua New Guinea, and Tanzania — in light of macro and sectoral governance problems. The study sought to understand the degree to which the Bank is factoring governance into its sectoral approach through governance-focused ESW, a governance-informed sectoral assistance strategy and the design of projects. The study also makes an important distinction between macro and sectoral governance.

6.21 **Macro Governance:** Governance at the macro level covers all aspects of exercising authority through formal and informal institutions in managing a state’s resources for sustainable development. Thus, the elements of macro governance include creating a favorable climate for economic growth, transparent budgetary and financial management, transparency in the political

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80. The six countries were chosen for variation in region, size and importance of the EI sector, quality of governance, and intensity of Bank intervention in the sector.
process and a voice for all citizens, while providing them with effective social and environmental services. Many indicators have been developed for measuring the quality of macro governance in terms of its performance and process. Each indicator tends to cover one or two aspects of macro governance, and the viewpoint of one or more important stakeholders — the government, civil society, or the business community. The World Bank Institute’s Governance Research Indicators (GRICS) estimates six dimensions — voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.*

6.22 **Sectoral Governance**: In contrast to macro governance, sectoral governance in the context of the EI sector is more closely concerned with a satisfactory legal, regulatory, and institutional framework to manage environmental and social risks, involving and protecting local communities against negative impacts of EI activities, including abuse of individual rights, ensuring investor compliance with the law, and protecting investor contractual rights. This requires that appropriate environmental, financial, and compensation regulations exist and are enforced, with the effective participation of the local communities, while the rights of investors are respected. The structure and process of good sectoral governance can be ensured through government capacity building and appropriate policy, legal, and institutional reforms, preferably in the overall context of good macro governance. In the absence of indicators specific to sectoral governance, they may need to be derived from those for macro governance, but extra efforts may be needed to tailor them to the specific situations and for data collection.

**From Governance Awareness to Project Design**

6.23 The Governance Study found that most of the Bank’s EI projects are not the result of a governance-informed sector strategy. There is no indication that the decision to support increased investment or structural adjustment loans was preceded by an analysis that considered the likely governance benefits and risks of such investments. At the same time, it is recognized that most of the EI projects under review pre-date the Bank’s sharpened focus on governance in the later 1990s. The Bank’s apparent lack of integration of governance concerns into the lending program is reflected in recent OED Country Assistance Evaluations (CAEs) covering the 1990s that found fault with the Bank for a belated, indirect, or muffled response to obvious governance issues in Ecuador, Ghana, Kazakhstan, and Papua New Guinea.

6.24 Papua New Guinea (PNG) presents a rare case where a link can be discerned between governance ESW, a governance-informed strategic approach to the EI sectors set out in the CAS, and the design of EI projects in the period under review. Both of PNG’s Petroleum TA projects

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81. For additional information on GRICS, see [http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/data.html#dataset2001](http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/data.html#dataset2001)

82. Since abuse of individual rights, mostly in connection with site security arrangements for project sites, has been alleged in connection with some EI projects — albeit none in connection with projects in the Bank portfolio under review — the Bank needs to consider its position on these issues. While extractive industry leaders and some governments subscribe to Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, the Bank has no comparable guidance.

83. In recent years, the Bank’s governance-related public expenditure and financial accountability sector work has rapidly evolved. Public Expenditure Reviews (PERs), Country Financial Accountability Assessments (CFAAs), and Country Procurement Assessment Reviews (CPARs) are now part of core economic and sector work in all borrowing countries. Follow-up to these core diagnostics in terms of policies and institutions and capacity building is part of regular CAS preparation discussions.
pre-dated the Bank's increased focus on governance. But despite the success of these projects in building Papua New Guinea's petroleum sector, OED's CAE found that "progress in managing the growth of the oil & gas industry has not led to sustained economic benefits to the country because of macroeconomic mismanagement of oil revenues" and recommended that "the Bank should intensify its non-lending assistance, but restrain its lending services." Although both later operations, the 2000 Mining Sector Institutional TA Project and the 2000 Gas Development TA Project, are primarily intended to increase private investment in their respective sectors, they also include components to address macro and sectoral governance issues. 84 The Governance Study, however, found no indication that the Bank considered the likely benefits of such increased investment in light of governance risks.

6.25 In Kazakhstan, while a public sector reform loan achieved the technocratic reforms it sought, but did not achieve its stated purpose of improving the effectiveness of resource mobilization and the efficiency of the use of resources because of the absence of system-wide checks and balances. 85 Papua New Guinea and Kazakhstan are not isolated cases.

6.26 The findings of the Governance Study are broadly similar to those of the Stakeholders' Survey, but WBG staff involved in EI projects and countries tend to be more sanguine. The Survey of Participants in the EIR's Stakeholder Workshops found that, while 83 percent of respondents expressed a need for the WBG to become involved in improving governance and transparency, only 41 percent felt that the level of effort and 26 percent that the level of success had been adequate. The survey of WBG staff found that 90 percent of respondents felt that improving governance and transparency in EI-dependent countries was important, and 64 percent that these issues had been adequately addressed in projects. Here again, the survey findings confirm that there is room for significant improvement in strengthening the linkage between EI activities and governance issues.

**Sequencing EI Lending vis-à-vis Improved Macro and Sectoral Governance**

6.27 In pursuing lending interventions in EI without paying sufficient attention to governance, the World Bank risks a situation where a country is unable to capture the benefits or control the risks. Historically, the Bank's approach to the EI sectors has promoted private investment for sector expansion as a major objective on the basis that state enterprises in the sector had not been managed to maximize productivity and were subject to corruption and political interference. The rationale was that private sector development was desirable because it would be better managed, and produce more fiscal revenue; but no explicit linkage was made to the efficient use of these revenues. This focus on expanding production through PSD pre-dates the institutional changes in the late 1990s that allowed governance to be diagnosed, analyzed, and considered, and it may pre-date much of the debate on the development impact of EI sectors.

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84. The Mining TA project includes, among others, components for (a) policy and regulatory institutional strengthening of the Department of Mining, and (b) institutional strengthening and capacity building for the Internal Revenue Commission. The Gas TA project includes, among others, components to (a) enhance the monitoring and regulatory capacity of the Department of Petroleum, and (b) facilitate the participation of local communities.

85. Notably a weak legislature and civil society, lack of freedom for the media, and lack of transparency of public accounts.
6.28 The Bank has no strategy for sequencing governance interventions in the EI sectors or coordinating them with work done in other sectors. Instead, the sequence of Bank actions has been shaped by the institutional evolution of its understanding of the issues and its mandate. As a consequence, where the Bank sought to increase investment in the EI sectors, it pursued this objective either before supporting better risk management, or simultaneously. But as the experience in Papua New Guinea and Kazakhstan illustrates, working to establish the prerequisites for good development outcomes from EI investments in parallel with, or after supporting expansion of the sector, poses a major challenge and is a high-risk strategy in countries with poor macro and sectoral governance.

6.29 Finally, countries are likely to be less receptive to improving governance in revenue and safeguards after the major investments have been made and incremental revenues are flowing. Yet no awareness of such logic is evident in the portfolio under review, nor is there any indication from ESW that the World Bank considered a sequencing of its interventions to mitigate the attendant risks. The decision to focus the policy dialogue with Equatorial Guinea, Kazakhstan, and Papua New Guinea on governance issues came after private investments in resource development had made the Bank unimportant as a source of finance. At least in hindsight, the experience in these countries points to the need for the Bank to develop a more selective and sequenced approach that takes macro and sectoral governance issues into account and gives priority to improving management of existing sectoral revenue flows and environmental and social risk, ahead of promoting new investments in expanding the EI sector. Alternatively, effective measures need to be taken to ensure that revenues from new production are used to promote development and reduce poverty.

CONCLUSIONS

6.30 While the Bank has long been aware of the importance of addressing the governance challenge for ensuring the transformation of resource rents into sustainable development, there is little evidence of sector-specific governance strategies in CASs of EI-dependent countries. The Bank’s project-level interventions tend to be sporadic and narrow in scope, with few cases where a link can be discerned between these interventions and governance ESW or a governance-informed strategic approach to the EI sectors set out in the CAS. Where some links can be observed, as in Papua New Guinea and Kazakhstan, their experience suggests that governance issues take a long time to address, and working to establish good governance in parallel with, or after supporting increased investment in EI is a high-risk strategy in countries with poor macro and sectoral governance.

6.31 The priority of supporting increased investment in the EI sectors needs to be based on an assessment of the quality of macro and sectoral governance. Where sectoral governance is poor, the Bank may focus its efforts on helping the borrower better capture the benefits and control the risks of EI projects in preparation for greater investment. Where macro governance is also weak, however, the Bank’s decision to support sectoral reforms must be undertaken strategically with an understanding of their likely impact.

6.32 To assess the quality of macro and sectoral governance, the Bank needs to develop appropriate diagnostic instruments that take key indicators into account, supplemented by additional analysis. Key indicators of macro governance relate to the quality of public financial man-
agement and rule of law, as a measure of the government's ability to address problems through institutional reforms. At present, while there is substantial Bank ESW focused on the quality of public financial management, there is no diagnostic instrument to evaluate the rule of law or the quality of sectoral governance. Both of these gaps would need to be addressed for the Bank to be able to take macro and sectoral governance into account, at least in EI-dependent countries.

6.33 Given an assessment of the quality of macro and sectoral governance, a three-tiered approach would seem appropriate:

- For countries with sound macro and sectoral governance, the Bank should support the country as needed to attract investment to expand the sector or further improve management of resource revenue flows and environmental and social risks.

- For countries with sound macro governance and weak sectoral governance, the Bank should focus its support on strengthening sectoral governance, including management of environmental and social risks, and only support significant sector expansion in conjunction with adequate provisions to compensate for sectoral governance weaknesses.

- For countries with weak macro and sectoral governance, where the government lacks the ability to manage revenues well, increased investment designed to augment government revenues will have little benefit, and the Bank should focus its support on the strengthening of governance and the management of environmental and social risks. The promotion of investments for significant sector expansion should be avoided, except where the Bank can adequately mitigate the risk that fiscal revenues from new investment may not be used for the country’s development priorities. The Chad-Cameroon model represents an important test case for such a holistic approach.

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86. That is, the use of public power in accordance with law

87. For example, through analytical and advisory activities (AAA), technical assistance projects, and other instruments that are primarily aimed at strengthening governance and management of environmental and social risks.

88. Given the Bank’s very modest record with fiscal revenue management in EI-dependent countries (see para. 5.8) the number of such “test cases” is expected to be small.
7. Recommendations

7.1 How effectively has the World Bank assisted its client countries in improving the contribution of the extractive industries to sustainable development? On the one hand, with its global mandate and experience, comprehensive country development focus, and overarching mission to fight poverty, the Bank is well positioned to help countries overcome the policy, institutional, and technical challenges required to transform resource riches into sustainable benefits, and its achievements are many. Overall, nearly 80 percent of the Bank’s EI projects had at least moderately satisfactory outcomes, and the performance of this portfolio has been consistently and significantly above Bank-wide averages in terms of outcome, institutional development impact, and sustainability. The Bank’s research made major contributions to broadening and deepening understanding of the disappointing performance of resource-abundant countries. It has helped set standards in the formulation and implementation of guidelines for the mitigation of environmental and social impacts. More recently, it has begun to address the challenge of governance with a variety of innovative tools.

7.2 On the other hand, the Bank can do much more to further improve its performance in enhancing the EI sector’s contribution to development and poverty reduction. The main areas for improvement are: (i) formulating and implementing integrated corporate and country level strategies for addressing the broader developmental issues that lie at the heart of many resource-rich countries’ inability to achieve sustainable development; (ii) strengthening the implementation of the Bank’s projects based on its policies for the mitigation of environmental and social impacts, and for monitoring and reporting of economic, environmental, and social results; and (iii) engaging stakeholders to develop stronger and widely accepted governance frameworks to assist the transformation of resource endowments into sustainable development.

7.3 Given the size and complexity of the World Bank Group, and the diversity of issues that need to be addressed, it is expected that the responsibility for following up on these recommendations will not rest exclusively with the sector specialists in the Energy and Mining Sector Board and the Oil, Gas, Mining and Chemicals Global Products Group.89

Recommendation 1: Formulate an Integrated Strategy. The Bank has not devoted enough attention to the developmental needs of the poorly performing resource-abundant countries, many of which experienced negative growth during the 1990s. To address this gap, the Bank Group needs to formulate and implement integrated strategies, at both the corporate and country levels, for transforming resource endowments into sustainable development. Such an integrated strategy will start with the presumption that successful EI projects — whether financed by the Bank or not — have to provide revenues to governments, mitigate negative environmental and social effects, and benefit local communities. It will also need to address governance squarely and help to ensure that EI revenues are effectively used to support development priorities. It will also require much better cooperation within the WBG and with other stakeholders.

89. The Management Response is expected to identify the unit(s) responsible for following up on each recommendation.
(a) **Formulate a sector strategy:** The Bank, together with other members of the World Bank Group needs to design and implement a sector strategy that closely integrates resource extraction with sustainable development through the effective management of EI revenues in support of developmental priorities and the reliable mitigation of adverse environmental and social impacts. Where macro and sectoral governance are weak, the Bank's assistance should focus on strengthening macro and sectoral governance. In such cases, the Bank should carefully assess and report on the risks that EI fiscal revenues may not be used for development priorities. The Bank should not support significant sector expansion unless it can adequately mitigate these risks. Where macro governance is sound but sectoral governance is weak, the Bank should focus on improving sectoral governance.

(b) **Address extractive industries in CASs:** For all resource-rich countries the Bank should explicitly address extractive industries in the CASs. The CAS should discuss the sector's economy-wide linkages (such as the importance of government revenues, their management, and distribution) and reference the underlying governance assessment. This should guide future project design, facilitate monitoring and evaluation, and provide an agreed framework for WBG-wide coordination and collaboration in the EI sector.

(c) **Promote governance improvement where governance is weak:** The Bank should compensate for the lower level of lending that may be appropriate for resource-rich countries with weak macro and sectoral governance by devoting greater management attention and administrative budget for advisory and analytical activities aimed at improving the policy, institutional, and governance framework for EI. This would enable the Bank to establish and maintain continuity of engagement and facilitate a quick response to opportunities for assistance when they arise.

(d) **Support private sector development and environmental sustainability:** In all countries, the Bank should be ready to support the closure of uneconomic mines, reform and privatization of state-owned enterprises, and mitigation of pre-existing environmental and social problems. Where appropriate, the Bank should help integrate artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) with the formal sector and internalize their environmental and social impacts, while at the same time creating alternative employment opportunities and supporting the consolidation of ASM activities for greater efficiencies and economies of scale.

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90. Aspects to be addressed should include, inter alia, key policy issues, the Bank's role, and business implications (including resource issues and WBG coordination).

91. Management accepts the need to factor governance into its support for extractive industry activities and will work to improve its approaches, based on country circumstances. However, it does not feel that mandating for an entire set of countries a specific program to ensure that fiscal revenues are used for development priorities would be a practical solution.

92. "Significant" should be considered in both absolute terms and in relation to total sector production, based on analysis of past experience, and may vary by country.

93. In resource-rich countries, the WBG should also encourage client countries to include EI in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.

94. In line with the Bank's performance-based allocation of IDA credits.

95. This recommendation is consistent with the LICUS approach mentioned in para. 5.22.
Recommendation 2: Strengthen Project Implementation. The Bank needs to strengthen the implementation of its existing policy framework and ensure that it remains up to date in line with evolving needs. Given the potential impacts of resource extraction and the controversy surrounding the sector, rigorous implementation of safeguard policies is a minimum requirement for it to operate in a world concerned with sustainable development. In addition, in light of growing concerns about the sustainability of EI-based development, the Bank needs to more systematically define, monitor, document, and report on the economic, social, and environmental impacts of its projects. Specifically, the sharing of benefits, identified by many stakeholders as a very important issue for resource extraction, needs to be explicitly monitored and evaluated.

(a) Improve upstream project screening: The Bank should provide clearer and more consistent guidance for the categorization of sectoral adjustment and technical assistance projects, the identification of applicable safeguards at the initial project screening, the appropriate scope and nature of the EA instruments, and the reporting and evaluation of safeguards implementation. This needs to be followed up through the entire implementation framework, from good practice guidelines to appropriate monitoring and training.

(b) Provide for adequate specialist involvement at every stage: The Bank should strengthen the implementation of its safeguard policies by providing adequate resources for the participation of qualified environmental and social specialists at the preparation, appraisal, and supervision of all projects that are likely to have adverse impacts. This will ensure that such impacts are adequately addressed through the upstream design of appropriate mitigation strategies or project alternatives, as well as through the retrofit of timely remediation measures should unexpected impacts materialize during project implementation.

(c) Enhance reporting of results: The Bank should strengthen the implementation of its completion reporting requirements by (i) ensuring that project completion reports include the calculation of an ex-post economic rate of return or net present value or, where that is not feasible, a cost-effectiveness analysis to determine whether the project represented the least-cost solution to attain its objectives; and (ii) preparing an activity completion summary for every significant non-lending activity.

(d) Evaluate the sharing of benefits: At appraisal and project completion, the Bank should systematically estimate the distribution of project benefits among different stakeholder groups — government at different levels, private companies, and local communities — evaluate its sensitivity to different scenarios, and discuss its acceptability with key stakeholder groups.

Recommendation 3: Engage the Stakeholders. Often in collaboration with other organizations, the Bank has brought together diverse stakeholders in extractive industries to address issues at the local, national, regional, and global levels. The Bank’s convening role has been actively sought and has been significant because of its access to all stakeholders, private and public development experience, and ongoing involvement with project investment and technical assistance in the sector. But the Bank has inadequately addressed some areas — notably governance and revenue management. The Bank’s performance in these areas can be enhanced through improved consultation with stakeholders, including local communities, and
by systematically and transparently reporting on key sustainability indicators. Such an approach is also likely to raise standards and practices of the sector as a whole.

(a) Update policy framework: In consultation with its stakeholders, the Bank should periodically adjust its policy framework for extractive industries to ensure that they remain up-to-date with evolving industry practice. It should resolve remaining inconsistencies within the WBG and address identified gaps. It should also recognize the expanding awareness of the human rights dimension of Bank policies and projects, and explore possible avenues for addressing the issues, especially where it lags industry best practice.

(b) Promote disclosure of fiscal revenues from EI: The Bank should vigorously pursue country- and industry-wide disclosure of government revenues from EI and related contractual arrangements (such as production sharing agreements, concession and privatization terms). It should work toward and support disclosure of EI revenues and their use in resource-rich countries.

(c) Define and monitor sustainability indicators: Together with other stakeholders, the Bank should define indicators of economic, social, and environmental sustainability, establish baseline data, provide for adequate monitoring over the life of the project, and report and evaluate on the results during supervision and in project completion reports. The Bank should also encourage more independent outside monitoring, ideally using local capacity (that may have to be developed).

(d) Increase local community participation: The Bank should support enhanced community consultation and participation throughout the life cycle of EI-projects. The Bank should assist countries to increase involvement by local communities in EI decision-making processes, and ongoing consultation throughout the project life cycle, including closure.

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96. Such as on mine closure, safety of dams, forced and child labor.
97. Such as those related to consultation and disclosure, community development, security, hazardous materials management, acid rock drainage, gas flaring, and transportation of oil, for which the good practice guidelines that have been issued need to be complemented by supporting language in the policies.
98. Several stakeholders have already sought IMF and WBG assistance in advocating or requiring disclosure and in developing a reporting framework.
99. Such indicators could include, for example, health and safety statistics, gas flaring (or greenhouse gas emissions), adequacy of mine closure preparations (including funding) and oil transportation arrangements, hazardous materials management and emergency response plans, availability of infrastructure and services (e.g., health and education), and revenues generated for governments.
## Annex A: Portfolio of Extractive Industries Projects: FY93–FY02

Total Number of Projects: 76  
Oil & Gas (Completed 24; Active 15); Mining (Completed 24; Active 13)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Lending Instrument</th>
<th>FY Approval</th>
<th>FY Completed</th>
<th>EA Category</th>
<th>Project Cost (US$M)</th>
<th>WB Loan (US$M)</th>
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## Oil & Gas: Active Projects

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<th>Country</th>
<th>Lending Instrument</th>
<th>FY Approval</th>
<th>Environmental Assessment Category</th>
<th>Project Cost at Appraisal (US$ M)</th>
<th>Bank Loan at Appraisal</th>
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<td>Oil Spill Contingency</td>
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<td>Africa</td>
<td>Global Environment Facility (GEF)</td>
<td>1999</td>
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<td>Petroleum Environment Capacity Enhancement Project</td>
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<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
<td>2000</td>
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<td>Chad/Cameroon Pipeline</td>
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<td>Specific Investment</td>
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<td>Specific Investment</td>
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<td>Specific Investment</td>
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<td>Songo Songo Gas Development and Power Generation Project</td>
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## Annex A

### Mining: Completed Projects

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Sources:  
<sup>1</sup>World Bank and International Finance Corporation (2002);  
<sup>2</sup>World Development Indicators, Central Database, World Bank.  
<sup>3</sup>World Development Indicators, World Development Report 2003;  
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<th>Country</th>
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<th>Population below Poverty Line(^3)(%)</th>
<th>GNI/Capita(^2) (US$, 1999)</th>
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Sources: \(^1\)World Bank and International Finance Corporation (2002); \(^2\)World Development Indicators, Central Database, World Bank. \(^3\)World Development Indicators, World Development Report 2003;
"..": Not Available
Annex C: OED Evaluation Guidelines

OED’s guidelines for evaluating the Outcome, Sustainability and Institutional Development Impact of projects are summarized below:

OUTCOME

**Definition:** the extent to which the project’s major relevant objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently.

The outcome criterion is assessed on a 6-point scale -- highly satisfactory, satisfactory, moderately satisfactory, moderately unsatisfactory, unsatisfactory, highly unsatisfactory. These differentiations reflect the large amount of information contained in the assessments of the three criteria supporting the outcome assessment (relevance, efficacy, and efficiency). The guiding principles provided below cover a high proportion of likely project evaluation scenarios.

**Ratings**

**Highly Satisfactory:** Project achieved or exceeded, or is expected to achieve or exceed, all its major relevant objectives efficiently without major shortcomings.

**Satisfactory:** Project achieved, or is expected to achieve, most of its major relevant objectives efficiently with only minor shortcomings.

**Moderately Satisfactory:** Project achieved, or is expected to achieve, most of its major relevant objectives efficiently but with either significant shortcomings or modest overall relevance.

**Moderately Unsatisfactory:** Project is expected to achieve its major relevant objectives with major shortcomings or is expected to achieve only some of its major relevant objectives, yet achieve positive efficiency.

**Unsatisfactory:** Project has failed to achieve, and is not expected to achieve, most of its major relevant objectives with only minor development benefits.

**Highly Unsatisfactory:** Project has failed to achieve, and is not expected to achieve, any of its major relevant objectives with no worthwhile development benefits.

INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IMPACT (IDI)

**Definition:** the extent to which a project improves the ability of a country or region to make more efficient, equitable and sustainable use of its human, financial, and natural resources through: (a) better definition, stability, transparency, enforceability, and predictability of institutional arrangements and/or (b) better alignment of the mission and capacity of an organization with its mandate, which derives from these institutional arrangements. IDI includes both intended and unintended effects of a project.

Development can be defined as a process of institutional transformation through which scarce resources are used to enhance human welfare over the long term. This transformation involves changes in values, customs, laws and regulations, formal and informal rules as well as periodic realignments of organizational mandates, objectives, competencies and resources. A development intervention has a positive institutional development impact if it effects such a transformation and thereby has enhanced the ability of a country or region to make more efficient, equitable
and sustainable use of the human, financial, and natural resources at its disposal. Accountability, good governance, the rule of law and the participation of the civil society and the private sector are prominent characteristics of an effective institutional environment.

Ratings

**High:** Project as a whole made, or is expected to make, a critical contribution to the country’s/region’s ability to effectively use human, financial, and natural resources, either through the achievement of the project’s stated ID objectives or through unintended effects.

**Substantial:** Project as a whole made, or is expected to make, a significant contribution to the country’s/region’s ability to effectively use human, financial, and natural resources, either through the achievement of the project’s stated ID objectives or through unintended effects.

**Modest:** Project as a whole increased, or is expected to increase, to a limited extent the country’s/region’s ability to effectively use human, financial, and natural resources, either through the achievement of the project’s stated ID objectives or through unintended effects.

**Negligible:** Project as a whole made, or is expected to make, little or no contribution to the country’s/region’s ability to effectively use human, financial, and natural resources, either through the achievement of the project’s stated ID objectives or through unintended effects.

**SUSTAINABILITY**

**Definition:** the resilience to risk of net benefits flows over time

Sustainability is evaluated by assessing the risks and uncertainties faced by a project and by ascertaining whether adequate arrangements are in place to help avoid known operational risks or mitigate their impact. The rating helps to identify projects that require close attention by the borrower, the Bank and other partners in managing risks that may affect the flow of net benefits. Sustainability says nothing about the absolute level of the net benefits in relation to economic justification thresholds. It focuses on the features that contribute to the maintenance of operational achievements over the long term and the adaptability of operational designs and implementation arrangements to deal with shocks and changing circumstances.

Ratings

**Highly Likely:** Project net benefits flow meets most of the relevant factors determining overall resilience at the “high level”, with all others rated at the “substantial” level.

** Likely:** Project net benefits flow meets all relevant factors determining overall resilience at the “substantial” level.

**Unlikely:** Project net benefits flow meets some but not all relevant factors determining overall resilience at the “substantial” level.

**Highly Unlikely:** Project net benefits flow meets few of the relevant factors determining overall resilience at the “substantial” level.

**Not Evaluable:** Insufficient information available to make a judgment.
Annex D: Background Papers

THEMATIC STUDIES


COUNTRY CASE STUDIES


PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORTS


Annex D


**Survey Report**

References


References


