Risks in Fast Payment Systems and Implications for National Payments System Oversight

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I. Setting the Context

The World Bank (WB) has been monitoring closely the developments of Fast Payment Systems (FPS) by central banks and private players across the globe. This comprehensive study of FPS implementations across the world has resulted in the design of a policy toolkit on the implementation of FPS, in order to guide countries and regions on the likely alternatives and models that could assist them in their policy and implementation choices when they embark on their respective FPS journeys. The FPS Toolkit work can be found at fastpayments.worldbank.org and consists of the below components:

2. A set of country case studies that have already implemented fast payments.
3. A set of short focus notes on specific technical topics related to fast payments.

This Note is part of the third component of the Toolkit and aims to provide inputs on Oversight aspects from a fast payment perspective. It identifies the oversight requirements appropriate for an FPS and provide central banks with both an indication of the extra capacity needed to conduct effective oversight when an FPS will be in place and a tool to ensure that the FPS will be designed consistently with sound standards of safety and efficiency.

II. Background

The retail payments landscape has changed dramatically in recent years worldwide. One such development involves improvements in the speed and convenience for users of retail payment services. Enhancements to payment speeds, driven by demand for (near) real-time retail payments, is a notable trend across jurisdictions, and internet banking, mobile payments and other technological developments have increased the flexibility and convenience of making retail payments. As a result, the number of jurisdictions with services and systems that allow users to conduct (near) real-time payments on a continuous basis has grown impressively since 2010, with the prospect of further future substantial growth in the years to come.

In particular, fast retail payment services have been deployed (or are being developed) in many jurisdictions. In several jurisdictions, the interest of National Payments System (NPS) stakeholders on fast payments is becoming manifest, both on the supply and demand side, as providers compete to offer better services and users demand more of them.

III. Roles of the Central Bank in the Context of Fast Payments

In the context of an FPS, and depending on its design, the central bank may play diverse and important roles. The central bank may act as the settlement agent of the system, the entity operating the system, the trustee for holding participant funds (in deposit-based model – see below), the catalyst of system development, and it fulfils the oversight role in relation to this specific type of retail payment system. In the context of activities oriented towards the development and modernization of the NPS, the central bank can undertake measures aimed at establishing the system or can provide support to the entities that take the initiatives. In any case, the setting of an FPS should be preceded by discussions on the potential need to create the system, which would involve the payments industry, and all relevant NPS stakeholders more broadly. The central bank would be responsible for holding this policy dialogue. Its roles can be further detailed as follows.

Settlement Agent: The role of the settlement
agent is one of the roles most frequently fulfilled by the central bank in the context of an FPS. As a settlement agent, the central bank performs final settlements of payments cleared through the FPS. Settlement in the central bank money guarantees its final and irrevocable nature and enhances the reliability of the payments processed in the system. The settlement in the central bank money is aimed at limiting or removing the credit and liquidity risks that is associated with the asset used for settlement.3

**Trustee:** This role involves the central bank operating accounts for the needs of the processing payments in the FPS. This account is used to collect participants’ funds as a security for the payments being executed in the system or to set aside the liquidity of the participants, which is then used for settlement. Such solution, which is typically adopted by FPS that are based on the deposit model, guarantees the integrity of the funds deposited in the account in case of bankruptcy of a participant or the entity operating the system (if this is not the central bank) and their exclusive use only for FPS settlement. As an alternative to the real-time settlement model or deferred settlement model, an FPS can operate on the basis of the so-called "deposit model." Here, payments are executed based on deposits pre-accumulated by the participants and held on a dedicated account. Each participant has a defined limit of aggregate transaction amount, covered by the pre-funding of the dedicated account. Transactions are executed only up to the level of the limit set for a given participant. If the limit for the sent orders of a given participant is exceeded, the payment is rejected. This limit is often referred to as the “Net Debit Cap” (NDC). Participants manage the level of their liquidity on the settlement account of the system and, depending on the situation, may complement the required limit or transfer the surplus of funds collected over the limit to their account.4

**System Owner and Operator:** In some cases, the central bank owns and operates its own system (ACH or RTGS) in which fast payments are also processed. In such cases, the ACH/RTGS systems, besides executing interbank orders, enables direct, immediate execution of large volumes of retail payments in the 24-hour mode (e.g., the SIC system operated by the Swiss National Bank). Under a different variant, the RTGS system includes a dedicated but separate and yet connected module for the processing of fast payments (e.g., the NPP in Australia). Yet under another variant, the FPS is an entirely separate – standalone – system, and the RTGS only settles FPS payments (e.g., Fast in Singapore).

**Catalyzer:** The central bank is typically involved in the process of creating an FPS. This may come at the instigation of the central bank or it could be upon the initiative of some banks or other PSPs as they consider the business potential in the domestic market for retail payment services and identify areas for potential improvements.5 As a result of such an exercise, they may evaluate whether a demand for creating an FPS exists in the country, and the central bank would be engaged in the process to evaluate the opportunities and challenges and to determine whether to proceed, and how best to support the process if the decision to move forward is taken.

**Overseer:** As overseer of the NPS, the central bank holds the responsibility to oversee the FPS and the provision of fast payment services. As discussed at length below in this note, the goals of oversight include ensuring the safety and efficiency of the fast payment system and services, setting regulations and standards, monitoring PSP’s compliance with rules and regulations, and maintaining public confidence in the FPS.

### IV. Risks in Fast Payments

Fast payments are a specific type of retail payments. As with other retail payment services, actors involved in fast payment transactions on both the demand and supply sides face various types of risk. The main risk categories considered are those mentioned in Chapter 2 of the *Principles for financial market infrastructures* (cit.): legal, credit, liquidity and operational risk. Particular attention is paid to security risks, particularly fraudulent activity, due to the potential importance that security plays for user confidence in retail payment service in general, and fast payments in particular. An additional area that
deserves special attention is reputational risk, which is the risk of losing revenue or customers resulting from negative publicity or loss of confidence (whether based on fact or generated by misperceptions).

**Legal Risk:** Fast payments, like other retail payment services, need to be supported by sound legal arrangements according to their specific design, operation, and use. Payment service providers (PSPs) need clarity on the rules and regulations that apply when they process fast payments. Rules could be general (i.e., not specific to fast payments), but the speed that characterizes fast payments could make it more challenging to fulfil some of the requirements. In fast payments, it is especially important to have clear rules on payments finality and post-transaction resolution of fraudulent or erroneous transactions, and to make sure that netting is legally recognized. The related customer liability aspects must also be considered.

**Credit Risk:** Credit risk in fast payment services does not normally arise between the payer or the payee but may exist between their respective PSPs. The payer’s PSP would normally require funds to be present in the payer’s account in order to initiate a fast payment, and the payee’s PSP will immediately credit the funds with finality in the payee’s account. Should the payer’s PSP allow payments to be made on a credit push or debit pull basis, this would normally be a consequence of a bilateral agreement between the service provider and the customer, and the credit risk would be managed by the PSP. Credit risk may arise between PSPs in the FPS depending on the settlement model. If settlement takes place in real time and before the PSP of the payee credits the funds in the account of its customer, credit risk does not arise. If settlement is deferred, the PSP of the payee will advance the funds to its customer before receiving them from the PSP of the payer and credit risk arises between the PSP of the payee and the PSP of the payer. In this case, the use of pre-funding or collateralization arrangements would mitigate such risk. The main difference between fast payments and other payment services is that, in the former, the payee’s PSP would normally be unable to block or recover the funds from the payee, because they have been credited irrevocably, and the payee may have used them immediately for other transactions.

**Liquidity Risk:** For payers, liquidity risk would not be different in fast payments as compared with other payment services. For payees, liquidity issues are mitigated in an FPS, because the funds are available immediately and with finality, whereas in other types of service the funds are paid later or, in some cases, conditionally, so that payments could be reversed or subject to conditions. In an FPS, however, irrespective of the settlement model, liquidity risk arises between PSPs, because PSPs require liquidity to ensure inter-PSP settlement. In an FPS with deferred settlement, liquidity would be needed only at the end of each settlement cycle; yet liquidity risk may arise if the system conducts inter-PSP settlement cycles outside normal business hours. In this case, such tools as prefunding, liquidity or collateral pools, or agreements with liquidity providers can be used to ensure that sufficient funds are available for settlement. The adequacy of these tools to support, when needed, settlement cycles outside normal business hours may be an important consideration in an FPS with deferred settlement. In particular, this requires considering scenarios where the NDC is exceeded or where the collateral management and large value payment systems are not functioning (due, say, to a business holiday).

**Operational Risk:** Continuous availability on a near-24/7 basis is very demanding in terms of operational reliability for the FPS and its participating PSPs. Due to their speed, any operational incident that results in the delay or interruption of fast payment services would be immediately observable by users. Delays in processing are not easily accommodated in an FPS, as a processing delay will not allow the provision of an immediate payment experience to users. As a result, the impact of an operational incident might materialize much earlier than in traditional retail payments, in which a service interruption or slowdown might go unnoticed. Additionally, as users grow accustomed to fast payment services and choose to send their payments on the payment’s due date (rather than a few days in advance), if the FPS is unavailable due to an operational incident, they would be immediately
affected and could incur penalties for late payment or have insufficient funds for other transactions. An FPS is exposed to security risk, as a specific type of operational risk, which can be defined as the risk that an actor’s assets are compromised following an unauthorized use, loss, damage, disclosure or modification of those assets, originating from both internal and external sources, and is highly interrelated to operational risks in an actor’s IT systems and processes.

**Fraud Risk:** Fraud risk is a subtype of operational risk that merits further discussion due to its potential importance in an FPS. Fraud could encompass various situations, including: (i) the manipulation of the payer or payee by a fraudster, resulting in the issuance of a payment instruction by the payer acting in good faith, (ii) the initiation of a payment instruction by a fraudster (who has fraudulently obtained the payer/payee’s sensitive payment data) or (iii) the modification of an attribute (such as the account number, transaction amount, name of payee or payer) of a genuinely issued payment instruction intercepted by the fraudster. These fraud types might affect all actors in the payment chain, including end users, PSPs and the FPS overall, and they are common to both fast and traditional retail payments. However, considering the end-to-end speed and, in particular, the immediacy of funds availability, an FPS may be a more attractive target for fraud than traditional retail payment systems. If funds are immediately and unconditionally available to the payee, a fraudster could attempt to quickly withdraw the funds before the fraud is detected, and measures to reverse or recall fraudulent fast payments may have limited effectiveness.

**Risk to Data Integrity and Privacy:** The use of FPS would require data and privacy protection. As for all digital financial services, breaches of privacy and data security may result in identity theft, harm to financial records, fraud, and other risks. Mitigating such risks would necessitate legal and regulatory provisions that, among other things, clarify the rights of users, define data types, give control to users over their personal data, and set out the legal obligations of data controllers and processors when interacting with data users and with each other. In delivering FPS services, PSPs should consider the aspects of privacy protection involved and oversight should make sure that they do so effectively.

**Reputational Risk:** Financial or operational problems experienced by any entity involved in the processing of fast payments could lead to reputational impacts for that entity or for the system as a whole. This type of risk affects mainly the clearing and settlement arrangements and the PSPs participating in the system. It could also affect users, as consumers or merchants might also suffer reputational damage if their payments are delayed due to a fast payment system malfunction. The sources of reputational risk in an FPS are similar to those faced by traditional retail payment systems. Yet, expectations in relation to the FPS’s speed and time availability may lead to a quicker materialization of the risk in the event of service degradation. Reputational risk might also affect the central bank or other authorities, if they have given the fast payment initiative their explicit support, and especially if they own and operate the FPS.

### V. Oversight Requirements in Fast Payments

As a retail payments system, the FPS could be designated as system-wide important (or critical, or important) and be subject to appropriate oversight standards. The relevant oversight criteria discussed in this note should encompass the following four relevant dimensions of FPS: a) legal basis, b) governance, c) risk management, d) efficiency and effectiveness. The oversight criteria discussed below build on a combination of three sets of oversight tools: the *Principles for financial market infrastructures* (PFMI), cited earlier; the criteria for effective fast payments developed in the U.S. under the aegis of the Federal Reserve Banks; and the oversight requirements for payment instruments adopted by the European System of Central Banks.

The criteria can be used both at the design stage of the FPS as well as to assess FPS performance. The criteria could thus be used to identify system
weaknesses and vulnerabilities that require remedial actions. On request by the central bank, the FPS operator would be responsible for implementing the criteria, setting system rules that are consistent with the criteria, and ensuring that all relevant entities operating in the system comply with the rules. In its capacity as overseer, the central bank would make sure that the FPS operator delivers on the criteria (and all other oversight requirements determined by the central bank) and would hold the FPS operator to account for their observance.

5.1 Legal Framework

The FPS should have a sound legal basis. Consistent with relevant national laws, the governance authority of the FPS should establish rules and contractual arrangements for governing the system in such a way that it provides a complete, unambiguous and enforceable legal and regulatory framework for the proper functioning of the system.

The legal basis should have requirements, standards, protocols and procedures that govern the rights and obligations of all relevant entities operating in the FPS (i.e., participating PSPs, fast service providers, users). The legal basis should address:

- Authentication of all entities, payments or messages connected to a payment.
- Legal responsibility of PSPs.
- Payment order initiation/authorization and termination of authorization.
- Cancellation of payments.
- Delayed and failed payments.
- Payment finality and settlement.
- Timing of sending and receipt of payments.
- Records as proof of payment for payers and payees.
- Resolution for disputed payments among users and PSPs.9

The legal basis has to provide clear and unambiguous rules on payment settlement finality. The FPS should define the point in time after which a payment is final, that is, the associated transfer of value between the payer and the payee is irrevocable and unconditional, including under netting arrangements.

The FPS should require the payer’s PSP to approve each payment following payment initiation in order to assure that the payer’s account has good funds. In assuring good funds, the FPS should provide for customers to be fully informed by their PSPs about account management implications and any related fees. Also, the permissibility of overdrafts should be decided by an appropriate regulatory authority and the FPS demonstrate compliance with all regulatory requirements relating to overdrafts and credit, as applicable. The finality of settlement should happen after good funds approval and not later than when funds are made available to the payee.

The legal basis should provide for clear, risk-based, proportional rules on market integrity. The objective is to prevent the abuse of fund transfers for financial crime purposes, to detect such abuse should it occur, to support the implementation of restrictive measures and to allow relevant authorities to access the information promptly. Rules should be in line with the International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation, which the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), adopted in 2012. Such standards determine, inter alia, which information on the payer and the payee PSPs have to attach to fund transfers.

The legal basis should provide for consumer protection rules. These rules and procedures should allocate in a clear and transparent way the legal and financial responsibilities by which all relevant entities in the FPS would be bound in the event of losses deriving from unauthorized, fraudulent or erroneous payments. In particular, the FPS should delineate the roles, responsibilities and liability allocation, which would protect consumers, business and government payers against losses related to fraud or errors.

The legal basis should provide for rules to protect data privacy and integrity. These should secure information that should not be disclosed, including by setting limitations on collection of users’ and providers’ data and on the use or disclosure of payment data to third parties, and by protecting data access and use in the FPS and at users’ and
providers’ locations. The rules for data privacy and integrity should:

- Identify the nature and type of user data that may be required for security, legal compliance and authentication purposes within the FPS.
- Indicate how users may get visibility into the data collected on them and limit sharing of such data.
- Identify and allocate legal and financial responsibilities in the event of data breaches at the FPS or at users’ and providers’ locations.

5.2 Governance

The FPS should implement effective, accountable and transparent governance arrangements that promote the provision of safe and efficient services. The internal decision-making process of the FPS should reflect appropriately the legitimate interests of the system’s stakeholders.

Weak governance may have adverse effects on the FPS and eventually on the quality of its services, which could ultimately cause serious financial losses to its stakeholders. Governance arrangements should aim to protect the trustworthiness of the FPS and to promote public confidence in it by placing a high priority on safety and efficiency. They should: assign clear and direct lines of responsibility and accountability within the FPS; achieve effective decision making in crises and emergencies; and ensure that the risk-management and internal control functions have sufficient authority, independence, and resources. The governance arrangements should be publicly disclosed.

The governance arrangements of the FPS should be inclusive. They should allow for input and representation from diverse stakeholders (irrespective of ownership) and should include consideration of the public interest when making decisions and rules. In particular, they should enable stakeholders or stakeholder groups to proportionately influence the outcomes of the decision-making process. This could be achieved by giving them appropriate representation in the governing body and/or by establishing with them effective channels of communication and consultation. The governance arrangements of the FPS should address and manage actual, perceived, or potential conflicts of interest.

5.3 Risk Management

The FPS should establish a sound risk-management framework for managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks across the end-to-end spectrum of the payments process. The risk-management framework should enable the FPS to prevent, detect and respond promptly to disruptions. In particular, it should enable the FPS to:

- Address risks related to settlement.
- Address the risk of unauthorized, fraudulent or erroneous payments.
- Provide incentives (i.e., positive, negative, financial, or non-financial) for the FPS operator and providers to address and contain the risks they pose to others.

5.4 Settlement

The risk management framework should provide tools to mitigate settlement risk. Where feasible, an FPS should settle in central bank money. The FPS should ensure that all relevant entities are fit to perform their role in the system by identifying the financial risks involved in the payments process and by having the appropriate measures defined in order to address these risks. The risk management framework should provide for measures to mitigate credit and liquidity risk exposures arising from any lag between transaction finality and settlement and to ensure that credit exposures among participants are fully covered. Also, credit and liquidity risk issues that may affect users should be addressed on a 24x7x365 basis. In an FPS with deferred settlement, the credit risk borne by PSPs can be managed through limits (to the aggregate net positions of PSPs), frequent settlement cycles, loss-sharing agreements, collateralization, prefunding arrangements, or an agreement with one or more liquidity providers. In an FPS with real-time settlement, as the liquidity needs extend beyond normal business hours, this might require procedures to ensure that sufficient liquidity is available in advance (e.g., through supplementary funding in the FPS settlement accounts of the PSPs).
or provided by the central bank). In an FPS with deferred settlement, liquidity needs could be mitigated as participating PSPs would require funds to cover only the net debit position at a specific settlement time.

Participants in the FPS should be given access to the information needed for them to evaluate and mitigate financial risks. However, sensitive information should only be disclosed to the relevant actors on a need-to-know basis.

5.5 Operational Risk and Operational Resilience

Operational risk, including fraud, could have a serious impact on FPS settlement (Box 1). Operational risk results from the failure of internal processes and systems as a result of human error or external events and could lead to financial losses for one or more of the parties using the FPS, possibly undermining user confidence in it. Thus, the governance arrangements of the FPS should ensure that all relevant entities in the system have adequate policies and procedures in place to mitigate operational risk and to ensure business continuity. In this last regard, entities that use outsourced services should make sure that their business continuity is protected against possible contingencies affecting their service suppliers. The impact of an operational incident could in principle be mitigated by measures similar to those used in other non-fast payment deployments: rigorous operational processes for the identification and mitigation of operational risk, including cyber-resilience (see below), redundancy and business continuity arrangements to ensure the timely recovery of the services in the event of a major disruption. Timely communication and information to stakeholders in case of operational incidents should be part of these operational risk management processes.

Box 1. Operational Risk in FPS

Fast payment systems are unlikely to eliminate much of what is considered customary operational risk. In fact, they may introduce new sources of operational risk. The new systems and processes of an FPS will have to coexist and integrate with legacy payment complexes that are largely batch environments.

An FPS being unavailable for a few minutes can cause several hundred payments to fail and the consequences of any downtime to become even more serious than in traditional systems.

Operating in a 24x7 environment also impacts how PSPs perform end-of-day batch tasks. With real-time payments flowing uninterrupted, PSPs can no longer afford the luxury of having downtime to process end-of-day runs, which have to be done while still processing payments from customers. This requires PSPs to run two processing sites, live, enabling them to switch from one site to another if downtime on one infrastructure is required.

A 24-hour operation that doesn’t afford downtime, which will be required to operate continuously while moving ever-increasing volumes, is largely unique in the context of banking and legacy payments. Ceaseless operations of the nature being considered are not only more demanding and less forgiving on their face, they are arguably countercultural across a swath of payment franchises in the world of banking.

This change could differ substantially and qualitatively from those that have come before. In spite of the many developments that the payments industry has experienced throughout its history, and even in more recent times due to the dramatic improvements in technology, it has never dealt with a similar change so far. And the industry may have come to be overly reliant on the occurrence of natural downtimes that exist in many operations and that are used for maintenance, repair, and cross-system assimilation and turn out to be unprepared to act in a no-interruption environment.

Shouldn’t then planned downtimes be considered as a policy tool for an FPS? Planned downtime might serve as a mitigating measure to the risk that continuous operation may pose to the FPS and its stakeholders, and since an FPS could facilitate faster runs on banks, planned downtime, or the notion that downtime may be decided for policy purposes, might prove a useful tool in the context of slowing or halting the occurrence of a run. In any case, planned downtimes of the FPS and the systems of its participants
5.6 Resiliency

The FPS should have mechanisms and systems to ensure high levels of end-to-end availability and reliability under both normal and stressed operating conditions. The FPS should define target availability metrics. It should also have business continuity and disaster recovery plans to ensure timely recovery and resumption of critical services in the event of an outage or cyber-attack. The FPS should have mechanisms to minimize the chance that an adverse event would cause other market participants to fail to meet their obligations (i.e., trigger system-wide risk). The FPS should demonstrate that sufficient resources are devoted to business continuity and resiliency and should conduct regular contingency testing across all operators and providers of its end-to-end systems.

5.7 Security & Safety

The FPS should have identification and verification procedures for enrolling and transacting with providers and users. These procedures will be used by the FPS operator and providers to authenticate providers and users to access the system. The FPS should have mechanisms to ensure payments reach the intended payees at the intended payee accounts. For example, the FPS might i) require the payee’s PSP to explicitly communicate acceptance of a payment before finalizing the transaction, ii) provide a mechanism for sending a pre-notification or test message to help confirm the identity of the payee and to validate the existence of the payee’s account, and iii) require monitoring for payment anomalies. The FPS should apply effective user authentication controls across all delivery channels and may vary the authentication procedure based on the risk-profile of a given transaction. The FPS should enable the user to be authenticated initially to the system (at enrollment and prior to transactions) and should also require PSPs to reauthenticate users based on the risk-profile of a transaction. The FPS should be able to adopt new and decommission old authentication models based on the evolving threat landscape. In particular, the FPS could be integrated with a national digital ID system.

Box 2. Fast payments: Enormous Potential versus Financial Crime Risks

Clients want their payments to be processed quickly because for them it increases efficiency, transparency, convenience, and financial control. For small and medium-sized companies, this form of payment processing can alleviate liquidity stress and counterparty risk. More broadly, people have grown accustomed to things moving fast, so they have little patience and understanding when payment processing is slow. Fast payments allow sellers and buyers to exchange money and purchase services in seconds. Funds are received in the payee bank account almost immediately, instead of requiring few business days. That can make a significant difference to a small business’s cash flow, in particular, and it means less time spent waiting for money to clear from the buyer’s point of view. Fast payments are a common requirement in the new economy: the current generations of customers (millennials and beyond) want to be able to make payments anytime, anywhere, using their mobile devices.

But...

Fast payment processing also makes it more difficult to detect financial crimes like money laundering and financial fraud. Criminals want to move money as quickly as possible through a number of accounts at
different international banks to disguise the origin of funds. There is no faster way to do this than with fast payments. How can a PSP detect money laundering activity in a real-time world when transaction monitoring is conducted in a batch process?

It is difficult enough for financial institutions to monitor against money laundering violations when it takes three to five days for a transaction to be cleared, or at best overnight. With fast payments, the near-impossible becomes totally impossible using conventional methods as transactions clear in a matter of milliseconds. Conventional here refers to suspicious transactions being put in a queue and investigated in batch mode, where AML systems generate too many false positives (typically between two and 15% of all transactions) and therefore imposes a huge workload on PSPs and investigators. With fast payments, this problem is greatly increased because PSPs are under pressure to meet the agreed level of service.

**Technology and risk management**

Transaction monitoring systems built on current technology and machine learning offers a credible answer. By creating algorithms that learn from past results with the expertise and knowledge of AML compliance officers, the system learns to identify false positives, and compliance officers can focus on alerts where there is a higher probability that money laundering is actually occurring. Another recently developed technology approach, called visual mapping, provides insights into how fast payments are moved around. Suspicious payments can be tracked as they move between customer accounts, regardless of whether the payment amount is split between multiple accounts or whether accounts belong to the same or different financial institutions. The software creates a visual map of where and when money has moved, providing new insights and intelligence for fraud and compliance teams to take action. By bringing together transactional data from multiple financial institutions and running sophisticated algorithms, such solutions can identify the so-called “mule accounts” that are used for money laundering and other illegal activity. Many of these accounts are not set up directly by the criminals themselves but via a number of scams including phishing, spam email, instant messaging.

However, while technology is a necessary condition for successful FSP compliance with AML, it is not sufficient. Also, even with advanced technology, PSPs need to increase their staffing in order to meet the challenge and to ensure that they have enough staff with sufficient knowledge and authority to be available to review transactions quickly. Some banks have offshored or outsourced simple customer due diligence functions to keep pace. That said, the trend is definitely towards investment in more technology. As a recent article in *The Economist* put it, “Now, the biggest question for bank controllers is how many humans they can replace with bots without compromising compliance […] Banks are going into partnership with some of the hundreds of ‘Regtechs’ that have sprouted in recent years.” Technology must be a large part of the solution, but banks will just need to take care and seek expert independent advice in reviewing the new Regtech apps: the regulators and the markets will penalize them should their techno-experiments fail.

The FPS should be capable to comply with the anti-money laundering and counter terrorism finance (AML/CFT) rules and regulations. This involves both operational and other risk issues. Operational issues, such as inadequate or failed internal processes or decisions made by people, can leave the system vulnerable to money laundering. Other risks play a similar role since prominent or repeated breaches can harm the reputation of PSPs with regulators and stakeholders (including consumers), and the country reputation vis-à-vis standard-setting bodies and the international community. Technology can be a precious ally in the AML fight (Box 2).

The FPS should have procedures to authenticate payments. The FPS should require each payment to be initiated only with the explicit and informed consent of the payer to the payer’s PSP, unless the payment is pre-authorized prior to payment initiation. If the FPS allows pre-authorization, it should enable the payer to pre-authorize the payer’s PSP to make one or more payments based on defined parameters, as relevant to those payments (e.g., account from which funds are drawn, payee, frequency, time and date, amount, amount limits, duration of authorization, etc.) The set of pre-authorizations made by the payer should
subsequently be made visible to the payer. If the FPS allows pre-authorization, it should enable the payer to revoke any pre-authorization of payments easily and timely or to change relevant pre-authorization parameters easily and timely.

Based on the rules for consumer protection under the legal basis, the FPS should have controls and mechanisms to protect user data. These should prevent the unintended exposure of user data, both digital and physical, which should be protected in transit and at rest, before, during and after a transaction. The FPS should require that all entities have in place robust controls and mechanisms (including for users), appropriate to their roles, to protect sensitive information through the end-to-end payments process. The FPS should have controls and mechanisms to protect sensitive information needed for account setup, transaction setup and problem resolution from unnecessary disclosure. For example, the payer and payee should not need to know each other’s account numbers or other sensitive information to initiate or receive the payment. Also, the FPS should have controls and mechanisms to protect any sensitive information that is needed to process and complete a payment. For example, the payer and payee should not learn of one another’s account numbers or other sensitive information at any point throughout the end-to-end payment process. Note that sensitive information should be defined by the FPS consistent with the applicable national law.

An FPS should protect user from the risk of fraud.15 Most of the measures applied in traditional systems to mitigate fraud risk (whether ex ante measures to detect fraud, such as security screening or ex post measures, such as SMS alerts for users) might be used to help detect and manage fraud cases in fast payments. Some of these measures may take advantage of the information that accompanies fast payments; many fast payment systems have detailed information about the sender, recipient, time of transaction and geographic references, which can enhance payments analysis to detect fraud. However, these measures could be less effective in an FPS, due to the small time-lapse between payment initiation and execution. For this reason, an FPS may face challenges in being able to complete the necessary security screening on payments while at the same time meeting end-user expectations for speed.16 Yet, although screening could be performed quickly and automatically, the management of payments identified as suspicious might require interventions that could slow the process. Limits on the amounts of individual transactions are a potential mitigating measure to cap the exposure of payers and intermediary institutions to fraudulent operations. Such limits would also make the fast payment deployment less attractive for fraudsters.

The FPS should require and facilitate timely and frequent sharing of information on fraud across all relevant stakeholders and across systems. The FPS should require the sharing of information to facilitate managing and monitoring of fraud (e.g., patterns suggestive of risk, known instances of fraud, known vulnerabilities, the significance of the information and effective mitigation techniques). Information shared for anti-fraud activities should be used only for fraud management purposes. Whenever possible, personally identifiable information should be excluded from information sharing; if shared, such information should be encrypted. The FPS should indicate how proprietary data of entities other than PSPs would be aggregated, managed and protected for purposes of fraud information sharing. The FPS should facilitate information sharing that supports real-time and ex-post management and monitoring of fraud and should provide timely updates and alerts. The FPS’s information sharing mechanisms should be easy to implement, update and maintain. The FPS’s information sharing mechanisms should support differential access to contents based on the roles and responsibilities of each entity (i.e., operator, provider, regulator). The FPS’s information sharing mechanisms may include a central trusted repository to perform functions such as storage and aggregation of the
information. The FPS should have the ability to aggregate fraud information to spot patterns that may not be visible at the level of an individual entity.

The FPS should have a robust system of controls in place to address and foster security, including but not limited to the integrity and protection of data. The control system should be integrated with the existing risk management processes. More in detail, the FPS should provide layered and robust technical, access, operational, procedural, and managerial controls strong technical access components and controls, including:

- Identity verification and access management.
- Data encryption in-transit and at-rest.
- Data quality and integrity controls.
- Data breach prevention and detection.
- Layered security controls.
- Components and controls that leverage industry standards.
- Data retention and disposal controls.
- Operations security, monitoring, and incident response.
- Communications and network security.

The FPS should be robust against cyber risk and resilient to it. It is important that FPS identifies its critical business functions and supporting information assets that should be protected, in order of priority, against compromise. The FPS should implement appropriate and effective controls and design systems and processes in line with leading cyber resilience and information security practices to prevent, limit and contain the impact of a potential cyber incident. The FPS should be able to detect the occurrence of potential cyber incidents and should be ready to take appropriate countermeasures against breaches. The FPS should also design and test its processes to enable the safe resumption of critical operations within two hours of a disruption and to enable itself to complete settlement by the end of the day of the disruption, even in the case of extreme but plausible scenarios. Once employed within the FPS, the elements of its cyber resilience framework should be rigorously tested to determine their overall effectiveness.⑭

The FPS should monitor PSP compliance with risk management requirements on an ongoing basis. All participating PSPs should adhere to the FPS’s requirements relevant to their role and should fulfill all related obligations and responsibilities. The FPS should have effective processes in place to monitor and to enforce compliance by all relevant entities, including by adopting appropriate sanctions in the event of noncompliance.

The FPS operation should be consistent with the protection of market integrity. The FPS should require PSPs to put in place effective procedures to detect transfers of funds that lack the required information, and to determine whether to execute, reject or suspend such transfers of funds.⑮

Finally, based on the rules for consumer protection under the legal basis, the FPS should have processes and timeframes for handling disputed payments. These would arise from fraudulent or erroneous activities and would require mechanisms to i) block funds availability (in a way that is consistent with any applicable laws and/or regulations) if an unauthorized, fraudulent, or erroneous payment is identified by the receiving PSP prior to payment finality, and ii) hold rule violators accountable. The FPS should clarify how PSPs should act on error resolution and fraudulent or unauthorized payments. The FPS should also provide mechanisms for any party to the transaction to request prompt voluntary return of funds from the payee or the return of funds as required by law.

5.8 Efficiency and Effectiveness

The FPS should be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and users. This should hold as regards the choice of the clearing and settlement arrangement, operating structure, scope of products cleared, settled, and delivered to users, and use of technology and procedures. The FPS should offer convenient
baseline features and facilitate the provision of value-added services to users and support cross-border payments. The FPS should be inter-linked with other payment systems and other FMIs, including, for instance, collateral management systems. Also, access to the FPS should be open to all non-bank PSPs that intend to offer fast payment services. The FPS should have clearly defined goals and objectives that are measurable and achievable, such as in the areas of minimum service levels, risk-management expectations, and business priorities, and should have mechanisms for regularly reviewing its efficiency and effectiveness.

The FPS should provide the central bank with all relevant information and data on the pricing structure of its services. An FPS ecosystem normally features multiple points of pricing. The pricing strategy employed at each point may differ, but the pricing scheme and fee structure charged to users by participants are dependent on the pricing scheme adopted by the FPS and the participants. Information and data on pricing, covering participation fees and user charges, especially if benchmarked against same information and data from FPS in other countries, constitute essential inputs for the FPS and the central bank to evaluate the overall level of competition within the system.

5.9 Competition

The FPS should allow PSPs to compete to offer services. The FPS should allow choice of PSPs based on factors such as services (range and quality) and prices, and consumer preferences more broadly. The FPS should allow any entity to easily switch among PSPs and/or to use multiple PSPs. The FPS should require PSPs to disclose in advance to their customers, all information necessary to easily understand the total cost of using their services. The FPS should allow PSPs to provide value-added services. The FPS should not prevent, and should possibly facilitate, PSPs to offer additional services beyond the FPS’s defined baseline features, as long as the PSPs meet participation requirements. The FPS should allow PSPs to integrate with the FPS by adopting open and accessible standards. The FPS should be interoperable with payment format standards (e.g., ISO 20022) and should utilize a message format that:

- Interfaces or interoperates with existing payment format standards that are relevant to use cases targeted by the FPS.
- Enables cross-border interoperability.
- Is cost effective to adopt.
- Facilitates innovation.
- Is adaptable to future needs and standards by permitting a mechanism for update.

5.10 Accessibility

The FPS should enable any authorized entity to initiate and/or receive payments to/from any other entity (consistent with applicable legal restrictions). The FPS should facilitate payments to/from all types of payment accounts (or e-money storing devices) based in the national jurisdiction and held at licensed PSPs and to/from all bank and nonbank PSPs. The FPS should authorize the use of "open banking" practices and APIs [Application Programming Interfaces], which allow PSPs to access their clients’ account information, upon client consent via dedicated interfaces. The FPS should demonstrate how all entities choosing to use it can be sure that their payments can reach any and all payees. The FPS should address the needs of the unbanked or underserved to affordably send or receive payments and should set up a credible plan for achieving widespread adoption. The plan should demonstrate credibility by showing that the FPS is technically feasible for PSPs to adopt it and explaining how PSPs are motivated to participate and to make the system available to users. If the FPS includes multiple operators or networks, it should have a credible plan to achieve interoperability across these entities. The plan should demonstrate credibility by showing that a payment initiated through one operator/ network/ provider can be received by a user served by another operator/ network/ provider. Finally, consistent with relevant law provisions, the FPS should allow participating PSPs to make fast payment services available to their
customers through agents. The activity of PSP agents would be under the oversight of the central bank.

5.11 Usability
The FPS should provide a straightforward and simple user experience and be available anytime, anywhere, any way, using a variety of access points. The FPS should be available to users in a variety of circumstances, and through a variety of channels, devices, and platforms (e.g., in person without a mobile device, in person with a mobile device, remote with a mobile device, online). The FPS should enable an authorized entity to initiate a payment with limited information (e.g., with a name, email address, and/or phone number) as appropriate for each use case and in a way that sufficiently supports receiver authentication. The FPS should be accessible to users on a 24x7x365 basis, including to initiate the payment, have visibility into payment status, and receive final availability of good funds. The FPS should be easy to use, accommodate varying levels of user technological proficiency, and address the usability needs of individuals with disabilities, the elderly, and individuals with limited language proficiency. Annex 3 provides a country example of access criteria for participation in an FPS.

5.12 Predictability
The FPS should provide a reliable and standard user experience for its baseline features. The FPS design should ensure that the system can deliver a defined baseline of core features. Baseline features of the payment experience (e.g., timing, legal rights, costs, risks) should be defined, documented, and communicated so that they are well known to users and compliant with consumer protection and commercial law. Aspects that might vary between payments (e.g., fees, timing) should be communicated by the PSP to the user in advance and at the time of each payment. Communications should be appropriate for the audience, uniform, clear, concise and easily understood. In order to facilitate a consistent experience for users, the FPS should adopt standard communication and messaging protocols. Finally, error resolution protections, rights, and liabilities of the payer and payee should be clearly defined and easily understood by all parties.

5.13 Scalability and adaptability
The FPS should be able to readily adjust to ongoing environmental developments and should thus demonstrate to be scalable and adaptable. The FPS readily support projected transaction volumes, values, and use cases. The FPS technical design should support projected use cases and should demonstrate the capacity to handle projected volumes and values, including increased transaction volumes and values during peak times or periods of stress and to accommodate a cushion above projections. The FPS technical design should be readily adaptable to developments origination from technology, the economy (e.g., financial system failures, economic crises), regulations, and customer demands.

The FPS should support payments in multiple use cases and should demonstrate to be adaptable to new payment use cases in the future. Examples of use cases include business-to-business, low-value, just-in-time supplier payments; business-to-person, high-value payments (e.g., medical insurance claims); business-to-person, low-value payments (e.g., wages for temporary workers); person-to-person payment (e.g., payments to friends); person-to-business, remote, real-time payments (e.g., emergency bill payments).

5.14 Cross-Border Functionality
The FPS should enable convenient, cost-effective, timely, secure payments to and from other countries. The FPS should allow for interoperability with similar FPSs in other countries. Relevant interoperability considerations might include differences in messaging standards, languages, character sets, mandatory data elements, party/account identifiers, regulatory considerations, and timing of settlement and good funds availability. The FPS should facilitate access
to PSPs that are active in cross-border payments as well as to foreign remittance service providers. The FPS should require PSPs to make advance disclosure (both prior to and at the time of the payer initiating the payment) of fees, exchange rates, and other user costs, as well as the timing of good funds availability and any risks with the payment, consistent with regulatory requirements. The FPS should allow conversion from one currency to another as necessary for cross-border payments. If the FPS does not have cross-border functionality at implementation, it should have a credible plan for implementing cross-border payments in the future. The plan should demonstrate credibility by showing the timeline for cross-border implementation and how the other considerations of this criterion will be addressed.

VI. Conclusion

This Note was intended to offer guidance on the oversight of FPS. The Note has identified the oversight requirements appropriate for an FPS and provides central banks with both an indication of the extra capacity needed to conduct effective oversight when an FPS will be in place and a tool to ensure that the FPS will be designed consistently with sound standards of safety and efficiency.

Oversight requires cooperation at various levels: from cooperation between regulators, supervisors and overseers, to cooperation between the authorities and all other relevant stakeholders. The aim of such cooperation is to foster communication and consultation in order for the authorities to support each other in fulfilling their respective mandates and for them to solicit collection action from stakeholders when needed. Cooperation needs to be effective in normal circumstances and should be adequately flexible to facilitate effective communication, consultation, or coordination, as appropriate, including during periods of market stress and in crisis situations.
ENDNOTES

1 According to the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI), a fast payment can be defined as a payment in which the “transmission of the payment message and the availability of ‘final’ funds to the payee occur in real time or near-real time on as near to a 24-hour and seven-day (24/7) basis as possible.

2 For a comprehensive review of the various FPS models, see *Instant Payments Systems – Analysis of selected systems, role of the central bank and development directions*, Narodowy Bank Polski, June 2015.

3 See Principle 9 (on Money settlement) of the *Principles for financial market infrastructures*, report by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), Bank for International Settlements, Basel, April 2012. Since October 2014, the CPSS has been renamed Committee on Payments and Financial Market Infrastructures (CPMI).

4 Express Elixir in Poland and BiR in Sweden are examples of this type of model.

5 The role of the Reserve Bank of Australia in spearheading the launch of the NPP is an example of the catalytic role that central banks can play for the development of FPS.

6 Designation is the process whereby the central bank, in its capacity as overseer of the NPS, identifies NPS entities (including systems, services providers, and payment instruments or schemes) and classify them according to specific classes of risk, such as systemically important, system-wide important (or critical or prominent), and others, which reflect their riskiness, that is, the level of risk that could emerge from their operation, and the extent to which such risk could spill over to other NPS entities, the financial system and the broader economy, or affect public trust in the NPS and the national currency. For each class of risk, the central bank would then identify appropriate and proportional oversight standards and requirements and require that the system observes them.

7 This section draws on *Faster Payments Effectiveness Criteria*, Faster Payments Task Force, Federal Reserve Banks, 26 January 2016.

8 See *Harmonised Oversight Approach and Oversight Standards for Payment Instruments*, European Central Bank, February 2009.

9 Disputed payments may originate from errors, unauthorized transactions or disputes in the payment process.

10 The term "stakeholders" refers not only to the entities that operate in the FPS, but also more broadly to the financial and nonfinancial industry that is involved in the production and delivery of fast payment and related services, the community of consumers and merchants, and the general public at large.


13 *The past decade has brought a compliance boom in banking*, Economist, 2 May 2019.

14 Financial authorities and international financial organizations have highlighted the relevance of developing a robust cyber-resilience framework to maintain the functioning of services of financial market infrastructure (FMIs), even after a cyber-attack. In June 2016, the CPMI and IOSCO have released the report *Guidance on cyber resilience for financial market infrastructures*, which provides FMIs with guidelines for developing and enhancing their cyber framework, focusing on the recovery of critical services within two hours after the incident occurs. In line with such guidance, the ECB has developed a powerful tool that can be adapted to systems at different levels of sophistication, see *Cyber resilience oversight expectations for financial market infrastructures*, European Central Bank, September 2018.

15 In May 2018, the CPMI issued the report *Reducing the risk of wholesale payments fraud related to endpoint security*. While focusing on large-value payment systems, the approach recommended in the report offers valid recommendations and insights that can be usefully implemented retail payment systems.

16 As reported by the CPMI, in some instances, end users may be willing to sacrifice some level of speed or service availability in order to better track payments activity and mitigate the risk of fraud. For example, in Korea, concerns about a rise in telecommunications fraud led to the introduction in October 2015 of the “delayed transfer system” under which a payer can delay the timing of otherwise fast payments for a certain period of time set in advance by the payer.

17 Financial authorities and international financial organizations have highlighted the relevance of developing a robust cyber-resilience framework in order to maintain the functioning of services of FMIs, even after a cyber-attack. In June 2016, the CPMI and IOSCO have released the report *Guidance on cyber resilience for financial market infrastructures*, which provides FMIs with guidelines for developing and enhancing their cyber framework, focusing on the recovery of critical services within two hours after the incident occurs. In line with such guidance, the ECB has developed a powerful tool that can be adapted to systems at different levels of sophistication, see *Cyber resilience oversight expectations for financial market infrastructures*, European Central Bank, September 2018.

18 Relevance guidance to this purpose is contained in *Final Guidelines, JC/GL/2017/16*, joint report by ESMA, EBA, EIOPA, and the Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities, 22 September 2017. The report elaborates joint guidelines under Article 25 of Regulation (EU) 2015/847 on the measures payment service providers should take to detect missing or incomplete information on the payer or the payee, and the procedures they should put in place to manage a transfer of funds lacking the required information.