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Jo sioddns aql 1. a1ju)s s!qj Jt luawdola.ap aqj loj )ndU! up sV U! le PE"ppto, aqj ww,} 0tajU.j)s LJuawdoplap IlIPos e 3UiuKjap U! suo!)0/!um;Imo .4)ll0os 5I!AP 'JopaS 3iitflnd aqJ SuoutVz!lu0ljo qa;reasa.i eu!os q11! pale.adoa.0 seq juq0 PP.OI 3a'D Jo t1l0 u3q UE3qq!i.b) mqO pue uUM.d3MaN uIlS 314] J°0 Putl muatudolia2ta( lt'!,)S aqlJ SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: ISSUES FOR PUBLIC POLICY SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: ISSUES FOR PUBLIC POLICY CARLOS SoJo (EDITOR) MAYRA BUVINIC, ROLANDO FRANCO, SARA GORDON, EDGAR E. GUTiERREZ, ANDREW MORRISON, MARiA BEATRIZ ORLANDO, JUAN PABLO PEREZ SAINZ, ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ, CARLOS STRASSER. FLS DEC s~EACnEJCCSTAosrKA THE WORLD BANK SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA II. THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AGENDA .......................................... 76 1. Towards more equalitarian societies ................................................... 76 2. Integration to consumer society .................................................... 80 3. Poverty Reduction ............. ....................................... 84 4. Social Mobility .................................................... 83 III. HOW CAN THE AGENDA BE FULFILLED? ...................... ................ 85 Public Policy Perspectives ................... ................................. 85 Principles Guiding Social Policy ......................................... ........... 90 CONCLUSION ..................................................... 98 REFERENCES ..................................................... 99 CHAPTER II SOCIAL INDICATORS A BRIEF INTERPRETATION OF THEIR STATE OF DEVELOPMENT EDGAR E. GUTIERREZ-EsPELETA INTRODUCTION ................................................... 105 The social within the predominant sphere ............................................. 105 Social Indicators: can a single system be created? ................11................ I United Nations, The Social Issue and Social Indicators . .................. 115 Social Indicators and Latin America .................................................... 126 National and international challenge .................................................... 129 ANNEX A Menu of Indicators .................................................... 133 ANNEX B Millennium Development Goals .................................................... 137 ANNEX C Fundamental Principles of Official Statistics ...................... ................. 141 CHAPTER III SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS SARA GORDON INTRODUCTION ................................................... 145 Poverty in Latin America .................................................... 147 COMPONENTS OF THE CONCEPTION AND SOCIAL RIGHT PRACTICES IN LATIN AMERICA . ............................. 148 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ....... 149 6 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA Debate ................................................. 152 Validity and applicability of the ICESCR in the international legal context ................................................. 158 The concept and practice of rights in Latin America .............. .............. 161 Social citizenship as construction of democracy ................................... 168 PROBLEMATIC AREAS RELATED TO THE ECONOMIC MODEL AND TO CERTAIN STRUCTURAL FEATURES IN LAC ........................................ 173 OBSTACLES, DIFFICULTIES AND LIMITATIONS RELATED TO THE APPLICATION OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS ................................................. 185 Market logic versus rights logic ................................................. 185 -Employment ................................................. 187 -Taxation ................................................. 188 -Social Spending ................................................. 190 FINAL REFLECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................. 193 Recommendations ................................................. 195 REFERENCES ................................................. 197 APENDIX ................................................. 204 CHAPTER IV YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES ERNESTO RODRfGUEZ INTRODUCTION ................................................. 207 Latin American youth: strategic actors of development ........................ 207 THE CONTEXT: MAIN PARAMETERS FOR ANALYSIS ....................... 210 What are we talking about?: Some basic concepts on youth .......... ...... 210 Youth and society: Diverse aspects of a complex link .......................... 216 YOUTH IN LATIN AMERICAN EXCLUSION AND PROTAGONISM ................................................. 220 Public youth policies: Hypothetical models and historic review .......... 225 YOUTH POLICIES: A BALANCE OF THE 90'S ...................................... 231 Programmatic Evaluation: Sectorial, Limited and Discontinuous Progress ..................................... 231 Institutional Evaluation: Confusion of roles and disarticulation ........... 236 7 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA Resources Invested: How many, on GAT and How they are spent ....... 241 The Vision of the Participating Actors: Between Discourse and Effective Practice ............................................ 246 OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NEW ERA ................................................ 251 Demographic Bonus, Youth and Human Development in the 21 st Century ................................................... 251 The Construction of the Knowledge Society ........................................ 256 Financing Public Youth Policies ................................................... 265 A GENERATIONAL APPROACH TO PUBLIC POLICIES ...................... 270 Basic criteria and foundations for the design of alternative policies ................................................... 270 Four substantive priorities for this first decade of the century ............. 273 Youth volunteering, citizen's participation and human development ................ ................................... 278 Regional cooperation and public youth policies: the W orld Bank Role ................................................... 284 REFERENCES .................................................... 289 CHAPTER V VIOLENCE, CRIME AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN MAYRA BUVINIC, ANDREW MORRISON AND MARiA BEATRIZ ORLANDO INTRODUCTION .................................................... 301 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ........................................ 302 Definition of violence. Difference between crime and violence. Types of violence ................................................... 302 Causes of violence. Risk factors and protection factors ........................ 305 THE CURRENT SITUATION OF VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA ................................................... 310 Indicators of Violence in Latin America and Main Trends .......... ........ 311 Violence according to gender ................................................... 316 Violence and socio-economic groups ................................................... 319 Ethnic violence in Latin America ................................................... 322 Violence by age ................................................... 323 8 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA -Social and domestic violence against children ..................................... 323 -Youth as aggressor and victims .................................................... 326 THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC COST OF VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA .................................................... 328 Direct costs of violence .................................................... 330 Non monetary costs .................................................... 333 Multiplying economic costs .................................................... 334 Multiplying social costs ..................................................... 335 RISK FACTORS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS FOR VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN ...................... ................. 339 Epidemiological surveillance system .................................................... 341 Violence risk factors and long-term solutions .. ..................................... 342 Short-term violence risk factors and solutions ... ................................... 345 Violence control and social answers .................................................... 347 A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR STRATEGIES TO REDUCE VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA ................................................. ... 349 CONCLUSIONS .................................................... 355 BIBLIOGRAPHIC AND ELECTRONIC REFERENCES ... ........... 357 CHAPTER VI LATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION. DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE THE OBSTACLES AND THE ISSUES CARLOS STRASSER INTRODUCTION .................................................... 365 The essential concepts .................................................... 368 RESHAPING (AND ADDING COMPLEXITY TO) THE ISSUE OF OBSTACLES ..................................................... 373 On the capability of politics .................................................... 375 On the ongoing political practices (and ideas) ........................ .............. 380 - On Democracy .................................................... 380 - On the political class .................................................... 383 - On the Citizenry .................................................... 385 On some conditions and over determinations of the politico-cultural order .................................................... 389 - On genes and crossbreedings ........................................ ............ 390 - Political consequences of the same .................................................... 394 9 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA THE CIRCLE OF REALITY, POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE ............................................. 397 Multilateral organizations, NGO's or third sector, and democratic politics ............................................. 401 What alternatives are there in any case? Possible positive ventures versus a hard and dense web ............ .......... 404 In the picture, what policies? ............................................. 410 The two faces of the non state public field ............................................ 418 Government, governability, governance and State ................................ 420 CONCLUSIONS THAT ALSO MAKE A SUMMARY .............................. 423 REFERENCES ............................................. 427 ABOUT THE AUTHORS ............................................. 433 10 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA PROLOGUE SHELTON H. DAVIS ESTANISLAO GACITUA MARIO Social Development Unit, Department of Sustainable Social and Environmental Development, Latin American and Caribbean Region, World Bank Since the Social Development Summit in Copenhagen, in 1995, there has been a progressive search for mechanisms to incorporate the social dimension systematically in the development agenda. Three core themes have marked the debate. First, the persistence of poverty and inequity during a period of economic growth and increased liberalization of markets. Second, the unbalance between macro economic reforms and social policies, that have primarily focused on the mitigation of crisis and not on the existing inequity both in the global system and national societies. Third, the need to strengthen democratic governance both in the public administration and in reaffirming citizen's rights. All these issues have resounded in Latin America and the Caribbean as well as in the development agencies working in the region. In the case of the World Bank, this has translated into the establishment of a Social Development Department that has recently began to prepare a social development strategy. At the general level, the principles of that strategy are outlined in the 2000/1 World Development Report of the World Bank. The report proposes attack- ing poverty considering three fundamental issues: Opportunity, 11 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA Inclusion and Security. The process has coincided with the work carried out in the region in connection with the subject of poverty reduction and social inclusionl. Within that context, the Social Development Unit of the Latin American and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank has cooperated with social research organiza- tions, the public sector, civil society organizations and other inter- national agencies in defining a social development strategy for the World Bank in the region. As an input for the development of this strategy, the support of FLACSO Costa Rica was requested to identify regional specialists that could help in the analysis and development of proposals referring to certain issues that the Social Development Unit had identified as pri- orities. Particularly, the aspects identified included a general panora- ma of issues relevant for the social development of the region, indica- tors of social development, governance and citizen's rights. Also con- sidered were two specific issues with high visibility in the region's contemporary social context, which are youth and social development and the prevention of crime and violence. The papers published in this volume are highly stimulated and gen- erate a basis for debate towards the formulation of a social develop- ment strategy for the region in the first decades of the 21 st. Century. Likewise, these papers contribute to thinking on the Millennium Development Objectives and the instruments of public policy required for their attainment. The above is a challenge which requires breaking the existing unbalance between social and economic aspects, which needs the will and the belief to face up to the structural problems of the region characterized by persistent poverty, inequality and social exclusion. We wish to thank FLACSO and the authors for an excellent work that reflects the better qualities of the region's sociological imagina- tion. We hope it will serve to promote the dialogue on social policy alternatives among the various actors in the region, other multilateral institutions and the World Bank. I See the joint volume World Bank/FLACSO Costa Rica, Social Exclusion and Poverty Reduction in Latin America and the Caribbean, published in Spanish (2000) and English (2001). 12 INTRODUCTION REINVENTING THE SOCIAL DIMENSION IN LATIN AMERICA CARLOS SOJO JUAN PABLO PEREZ SAINZ "It was the 'invention of the social dimension' that tamed the market and humanized capitalism." With clairvoyance and this happy turn of phrase, Castel (1997:442) marked the importance of the social dimension. Taming makes reference to the control of the self-regulated market, "... that satanic mill" in Polanyi's words (1992:82); while humanizing suggests that the material and symbolic reproduction of society continues being historically possible. At the current point in time, this relevance of the social element is heightened since, as suggested by Filgueira (1999)1, it is possible to draw a sort of historical parallel between the disintegration impacts of the expansion of the market over precapitalist peasant communities and the current process of globalization and its effects on the Nation-State and its functions of social protection. That is to say that the historic achievements of the social sphere, in terms of taming the market and humanizing capitalism, are being challenged. In this sense, the great societal challenge of our times is to prevent the social sphere from vanishing by "reinventing" it, so that it continues to perform its civilizing functions. I This author vindicates, with certain caveats, the "moral economic approach". 13 REINVENTING THE SOCIAL DIMENSION IN LATIN AMERICA Castel's statement also invites us to explore various interpretations of the social dimension that may help understand the challenge and face up to it. In this sense, it may be said that the social dimension implies the existence of a community and the need of guarantying through a dynamics of integration, the material and symbolic reproduction of its constituents. This approach implies that the analytical challenges of the social dimension are fundamentally two-fold. On the one hand, it relates to how we define the community in question and the condition of member in the same. And, on the other, to determining which are the dynamics of integration, but also of exclusion, at work. Two almost obvious methodological clarifications need to be added. First, integration and exclusion are not absolute but rather relative processes. And second, these analytical challenges should not be undertaken in the abstract, but within concrete historical contexts; that is, the criteria of community membership and the mechanisms that make it possible or hinder it change over time. In this case we are concerned with Latin America at the current time that we will qualify as a time of globalized modernity. But before making that analysis it is necessary to clarify, at least briefly, what is meant by globalized modernity. It simultaneously assumes continuity and rupture. Continuity insofar as it posits that the historical horizon to approach the social sphere is still the modernization process, that has a different starting point and pace for each country. In spite of the foreign debt crisis and the implementation of structural adjustment programs, Latin America is still immersed in a modernity that has not been left behind but rather redefined2. While we believe that, for Latin America and during the first stage of modernization, the social dimension was expressed in the construction of the Nation on the basis of the State, at the present instance of globalization this expression has changed, since both elements have lost their previous centrality. Although still important and not superfluous, social integration processes are not limited to the 2 The reality currently observed is not that of posmodernity, but rather of a redefined modernity. It has a reflective nature that questions its limits as opposed to the past, when there was an unlimited faith in progress, as a result of the Enlightment thought. 14 CARLOS SOJO. JUAN PABLO PEREZ SAINZ constitution of the Nation and they are not fundamentally driven by the state's actions3. It is in this sense that we speak of globalized modernity to draw a distinction with the former, that we qualify as national modernity. This brief clarification makes it possible to formulate two basic analytical propositions, that will be explored further in the following pages, to begin thinking about "reinventing" the social dimension in Latin America during the current globalized modernity. The first one posits that the loss of centrality of the Nation-State makes it necessary to revisit it in light of globalization: the nation with its territorial foundations and the State based on citizenship. In this sense, we will see that with globalized modernity the limits that define the community of integration have become more blurred and, a better known aspect, state actions loose the protagonic role they had in the past. The second analytical proposal is that, in this new globalized modernity, societal dynamics become affected by the primacy of the market. And, in this sense, the labor market takes center stage in the dynamics of social integration and exclusion in the region4. In this respect we posit, on the one hand, that the exclusion trends (formal employment crisis, emergence of structural unemployment and persistence of a poverty economy) tend to predominate over the integration trends and, on the other, the very nature of the integration dynamics is changing and is currently expressed in terms of employability. An analysis of these transformations of employment 3 In fact, what is being discussed is the persistence of the Nation-State as one of the major debates on globalization. In this sense, we take distance both from the "hyperglobalizing" positions that assert that, currently, only globalized markets and transnational business count and that neither can be "governed" by the national States (Ohmae, 1990, 1995) as well as from "skeptical" interpretations arguing that the current changes simply reflect a highly internationalized economy, but without supposing any radical transformation of capitalism (Hirst and Thompson, 1996.) In this sense, we identify with Sassen's (1996) more balanced formulation positing that globalization has pushed sovereignty off center and partially denationalized territory. That is, these two elements, sovereignty and territory continue being essential elements of the international system, which implies that the Nation-State continues configuring such system, although without the same strength as of old. In the same sense, see Perraton et al. (1997), Gray (1998) and Held et al. (1999). 4 This is confirmed in many places in this text. 15 REINVENTING THE SOCIAL DIMENSION IN LATIN AMERICA will provide us with a privileged vantage point to understand the configuration of the social dimension in Latin America during this new period of globalized modernity. Territoriality and citizenship National modernity relates to what is known as the stage of inward growth with a process of accumulation based on import substitution industrialization. The social dimension, understood as the constitution of the Nation on the basis of the State, assumed that the community of membership was the Nation and that the means for integration, to a great degree, resulted from actions by the State and the political system, in general terms. This integration was consolidated through a certain harmonic triangle that linked labor market with social policies and welfare situation. Concretely, such a triangle presupposed the mutual interplay of three phenomena: formal employment, state regulation and social integration. Urbanization and social mobility gave rise to the creation of a social citizenship, which was processed through the formal segment of the urban labor market, that was consolidated by the State, specially through social security coverage. Various modalities of modernization (early, fast and late), and the corresponding arrangements at the national scale, provided different outcomes in each country (Mesa-Lago, 1994; Roberts, 1996). Obviously, the populist contract was the most refined expression of this integration dynamics of a socio-political nature. However, its integration achievements, albeit with differences between one country and another, were limited. The countryside, the non-privileged scenario of modernization, was characterized by a re- peasentryfication. This was not only due to the maintenance of the traditional small land-holding or indigenous communities, but also to the generation of new family productive units through agrarian reform or colonization processes. That is, the peasant unit, in its different forms, played the role of a haven for that labor which was neither absorbed into the modern agrarian sector nor migrated to urban centers. But owing to the modernization of agriculture itself (especially, export- oriented agriculture) it produced a greater seasonality of work (PREALC, 1991; G6mez and Klein, 1993.) That is, the majority of 16 CARLOS SOJO. JUAN PABLO PEREZ SAINZ rural sectors were imperfectly integrated and in some cases there was extreme impoverishment5. But, this exclusion dynamics also affected urban sectors which became the structural surplus of labor that was forced to self-generate low productivity employment, giving rise to the emergence of the so-called informal sector. That is, the construction of the Nation as a community of social integration was limited. The crisis of this national modernity in the 80's inevitably led to a breakdown of the harmonic triangle of integration that was mentioned before. Thus, on one side, state intervention became geared towards constructing a social citizenship that did not necessarily operates through the employment structure. The targeting logic that redefined the social policies in the region focused directly on certain social groups (preferably the extremely poor) in terms of certain types of deficits (education and housing, mainly)6. And on the other, the substitution of the State by the market, has made it the core of societal construction. In this sense, the labor market emerges, stronger than before, in configuring the dynamics of social (dis)integration. However, its effects are different since the very structure of employment has suffered important transformations in the aftermath of the crisis and the subsequent processes of structural adjustment that have incorporated the economies and societies of the region to the process of globalization. We will refer to such transformations later. As mentioned, in spite of having lost their centrality, State and Nation have not disappeared, but they need to be reinterpreted at light of globalization: the Nation from perspective of territoriality and the State on the basis of citizenship. In territorial terms, the first thing to recall is that the foremost territory of national modernity was the metropolitan environment nurtured by migration flows from rural areas, considered the scenarios of tradition. It was in the large cities that formal employment and 5 In Central America, this extreme poverty was combined with the existence of authoritarian regimes, thus generating the conditions for the armed conflicts that occurred later. 6 Reflecting on the realities of the North, Castel ( 1997) has described this change as a shift from "integration" policies, designed to homogenize society on the basis of an institutionalized employment relationship, to "insertion" policies underpinned by a positive discrimination logic. 17 REINVENTING THE SOCIAL DIMENSION IN LATIN AMERICA public services tended to concentrate, making social integration possible. This spacial primacy is being challenged by globalization. These changes are taking place both at the supranational level with transnationalization processes, and subnationally, with the revitalization of local territories. Let us consider each of these phenomena separately, together with their consequences for the processes of social integration and exclusion. In supranational terms and with reference to the social sphere, what comes to the forefront is, without doubt, that of transnational migration. In its origins it supposes an extreme exclusion that implies territorial expulsion but in its effects, paradoxically, it implies direct integration into the globalization process although at a very high social cost. Although international migration is not a new phenomenon, currently it has three new features as compared to previous migration patterns. First, migration is the outcome of global capitalism since it responds to the demand for labor from the North. Secondly, it is a social phenomenon different from traditional migration adaptation patterns. And thirdly, it offers greater possibilities for popular initiatives (Portes et al., 1999.) It not only affects those who transmigrate and their respective households, but the community as a whole, which by participating in this transmigration dynamics, becomes a differentiated socio-territory in globalization. That is, is results in the generation of transnational communities. This transnationalization introduces new elements with respect to the social dimension. It is possible to mention at least three. The first one relates to the importance of cash transfers in terms of coping with poverty for the targeted households7. The second element refers to the existence of collective remittances, transfers made by associations of immigrants in the North, providing collective goods to their communities of origin. In that sense, there is an unprecedented supply of this type of goods. And finally, transnational communities operate not only with the standards of living of their respective country, but also under those of the host country, giving rise to complex perceptions of integration and exclusion. 7 A phenomenon that, in countries such as El Salvador, at a macro level, has resulted in significant reductions of the poverty levels. 18 CARLOS SOJO. JUAN PABLO PEREZ SAINZ Therefore, there is a transnationalization of the social sphere that redefines the intervention field for social aspects beyond the national frameworks. This phenomenon also has implications in terms of citizenship, as we will see below8. In connection with the second dynamics challenging the centrality of the national territoriality, it is already commonplace to state that globalization has revitalized the local environment. As opposed to an expected homogenization at planetary scale, induced by the global market, there emerge locations showing different conditions of materialization for globalization, thus emphasizing their socio- cultural peculiarities. The literature, usually from the North, points at the appearance of two types of local socio-territorialities in globalization: the so called global cities9 and the regions qualifying as winners that have managed to generate successful economies10. In Latin America it is difficult to speak of global cities although attempts may be made. On the other hand, certain regions are being redefined in ways that lead to thinking about their (re)insertion in globalization (Panadero Moya et al., 1992; Curbelo et al., 1994; De Mattos et al., 1998; ILPES/CEUR, 1999). But there is a modality of local socio- territoriality that is not contemplated due to its invisibility. We refer to the neighborhood community that has managed to structure its local economy around a cluster of small firms dedicated to a globalized 8 It is in this sense that the distinction between formal citizenship (merely membership in a Nation-State) and substantive citizenship (actual exercise of rights) is made (Bottomore, 1998). 9 These would be characterized by the following traits: transnational companies developing strategic activities (design, management, marketing, etc.); localization of financial markets (dominant form of globalized capital); important presence of foreign migrant labor; concentration of intellectual elites providing prestige to the respective city and important flow of international tourists (Sassen, 1991; Castells and Hall, 1994; Borja and Castells, 1997: Garcia Canclini, 1999). 10 Noted examples of this are the so-called industrial districts (Pyke et al., 1992; Pyke and Sengenberger, 1993; Benko and Lipietz, 1994). 19 REINVENTING THE SOCIAL DIMENSION IN LATIN AMERICA activity11. Like transnational migration, this type of local socio- territoriality shows that there are globalization insertion processes that do not result from the action of multinational companies (the actors of globalization par excellence) and/or of state policies. This explains, to a great extent, their invisibilityI2 . But, together with such socioeconomic dynamics, it is also necessary to take into account the policies of administrative decentralization linked to the reform of the State, that also tend to revitalize the local level. The discussion of decentralization in Latin America is very broad but, in summary, it may be said that it has centered along three lines. The first has to do with the desire to increase popular participation in public affairs. The second is more geared towards a greater control and accountability of local authorities. And the third relates to the supply of public services through the cooperation of sundry actors (the State itself, the multilateral international agencies, the private sector and the NGOs). It is important to note that these discussions take place within the framework of two basic parameters: on one hand, the transition from authoritarian regimes to liberal democracies and, on the other, the reform of the State imposed by structural adjustment programs (Donner and Hershberg, 1999). As in the case of cross-borders migration, this revitalization of the local level results in new social elements arising. Two may be underlined. First, the restricted socio-territoriality has the effect of inducing social processes through more concrete relations in which demands and responsibilities are more clearly outlined than at the more abstract national level. And, second, socio-territorialities with greater social integration are more likely to achieve consensus 11 The term neighborhood community comes from classical sociology. It is a type of site community, based on geographical proximity links and having a village as its space. Its insertion in globalization takes place through various activities such as new agricultural exports, manufacturing subcontracting, handicrafts, tourism, etc. For an analysis of this type of socio-territorialities in Central America, see Perez Sainz et al. (2000). 12 There are answers to globalization provided by society itself that have managed to acquire visibility. We refer to international labor migration and to the phenomenon called "bottom up" transnationalism (Smith and Guarnizo, 1998; Portes et al., 1999). 20 CARLOS SOJO, JUAN PABLO P lREZ SAINZ around local projects for an insertion in the globalized market. This assumes having the advantage of collective action regarding such insertion. That is, social integration can become a factor of competitiveness vis-a-vis globalization. Therefore, we see that with globalized modernity, community outlines have become more diffuse. There still exists a national community, with diminished integration possibilities both due to the crisis of formal employment and the limitations of state intervention, as we will see later. But simultaneously, the possibility of new community memberships opens up in a double sense. On one side there is translationalization, creating a sense of multiple belongings. And on the other, there appear very concrete local references where the community is clearly and materiality imaginable because it is demarcated along social-territorial lines. That is, in globalized modernity, social integration and exclusion can have multiple meanings. But this multiplicity is even more leveraged by the fact that the blurring of the Nation's contour, as a result of the dialectics between global and local, challenges a basic logic of the concept of national community: its homogeneity. Such homogeneity was never truly general since there were always manifest differences, specially class differences. But currently, the level of heterogeneity has grown with the appearance of new differences (gender, ethnicity, age, etc.) which tended to remain hidden in the past. This means that the makeup of the Nation, as is the case of any other community, needs to incorporate diversity and this makes the problem of defining community and membership -and therefore the social dimension- increasingly more complex. In terms of citizenship, as a key to read the State in globalized modernity, the first thing to be highlighted is that in the previous period of modernization, it could be said that social citizenship prevailed over civil or political citizenship. Meaning that Latin America did not follow along the English path of citizenship development (from civil to political to social) as presented by Marshall (1998), but rather veered towards the Prussian path. That is, in the region, the construction of citizenship fundamentally took place on the basis of social citizenship. The populist contract would 21 REINVENTING THE SOCIAL DIMENSION IN LATIN AMERICA appear as the most highly developed expression of this phenomenonl3. However, this primacy was challenged by the authoritarian regimes that followed in the wake of the populist crisis. First, such regimes suppressed rights and, above all, the possibility of demanding them. Second, as a consequence of the former there arose movements advocating for rights more basic than social ones, i.e. human rights. And third, the fact that such regimes were not viable gave rise to processes for a transition towards democratic regimes, resulting from more or less competitive elections, which presupposed an unprecedented development of political citizenship in the region. That is, the other types of citizenship have displaced social citizenship (Roberts, 1995, 1996)14. This new situation raises two questions regarding the loss of primacy of social citizenship: what are its relations with other types of citizenship and which are its internal transformations15. In terms of the relationship between civil and social citizenship, the most evident link was proposed by Marshall himself (1998) by considering the right to work as a basic civil right. With the historical development of labor regulations, such right has become enriched: it is the right to a dignified job complying with certain standards. In that sense, there is an unbreakable articulation between civil and social citizenship. But, with globalized modernity, the right to a dignified job is affected by two things. The first relates to the process of deregulation of labor markets that tends to undermine it, an issue we will discuss later. The second phenomenon has to do with the transnationalization of labor standards. This becomes manifest in new export activities, specially those that are part of global chains driven by buyers. In these cases, different types of actors in the countries for which the products are targeted (trade unions, NGOs or consumer 13 Populism was accompanied by corporatism, while patronage and political parties played a more secondary role in this popular representation arrangement (Chalmers et al., 1997). 14 Garcia Delgado (1998) posits that there has been a shift from social citizenship to a postmodern consumption citizenship. 15 For a discussion of the use of the concept of citizenship in Latin America, see Sojo (2002). 22 CARLOS SOJO, JUAN PABLO PEREZ SAINZ associations) can influence the adoption of minimum labor standards, at the risk of stigmatizing the product brand16 .This raises the issue of universally valid labor standars as an attempt at moralizing economic life in globalization. In this respect, the issue is to differentiate between types of rights. Portes (1994) proposed postulating the existence of four types of rights: basic rights (against child labor, physical coercion and forced labor); civil rights (association and collective representation); survival rights (minimum wage, compensation for labor accidents and regulated work day); and security (against unfair dismissal, retirement compensation and indemnification of relatives in case of death). The author proposes that the first two should constitute international standards, while the others would be applied in a flexible manner according to the context17. In this sense, maintaining basic rights assumes a continuity of the State's regulatory function with the expectation that it will be effective, i.e. that the legal enforcement of such rights is achieved. As has been shown, in a context of generalized deregulation as the one that has characterized the Latin American region in the 80's and 90's, the State's protective intervention becomes important for labor conditions (Itzigsohn, 2000). As for the relationship between social and political citizenship, it is necessary to recall the close and contradictory articulation between market and citizenship development that was pointed out by Marshall (1992); on one side, the market strengthens individual rights, since it depends on them, and therefore reinforces citizenship; but, on the other, it generates inequalities, besides undermining the traditional mechanisms for social protection. According to the author, political citizenship can serve to partially mitigate such contradiction, since 16 The best study on the issue in Latin America is Quinteros (2000) on the transnationalization of labor action, with the State taking a backstage role and the important presence of both local and extralocal non union actors, in the Central America garment manufacturing maquila. 17 Similarly, the World Bank (The World Bank, 1995) proposed differentiating between basic rights (freedom of association and collective bargaining, elimination of forced labor, child labor and other forms of discrimination) and other standards (e.g. minimum wages). The first would have a universal scope, while the second would be linked to national development conditions. 23 REINVENTING THE SOCIAL DIMENSION IN LATIN AMERICA those affected would express themselves through their vote and, above all, through political organization. The question to be answered is whether, today in Latin America, political citizenship, stemming from democratic transitions, can play such role of partial mitigation. The answer would seem to veer towards the negative. Three phenomena need to be highlighted. First, this social voice had a certain presence during the 1980's, with the crisis and the initial implementation of structural adjustment measures when, in certain countries, the trade union movement made an ethical defense of the poor (Touraine, 1988; Calder6n, 1995). But this action had no translation into the electoral field and in the 1990's, unions have lost that protagonic role, with the exception of the Brazilian CUT and its influence on the Workers' Party. Secondly, faced with this vacuum, social discontent has had a perverse electoral expression in the so- called "neopopulist" phenomenon. However, its integration proposal is less ambitious than that of traditional populism (the construction of the Nation) and therefore less contentious and with more possibilities of becoming institutionalized (Novaro, 1996). And thirdly, there is a phenomenon with a wider scope. We have argued in the sense that the constraints of the political environment affect social integration. In that sense, using a non-dichothomic conception of social integration, we have postulated that the later related to the phenomenon of an active citizenship, while exclusion would be associated to phenomena such as corruption and patrimonialism. On its part, vulnerability, the intermediate area between the poles of integration and exclusion, relates to problems such as the growing abstentionism, elitism and the rule by political parties nomenclaturas as political elements with a negative influence on social integration (Sojo, 2000). The second question regarding citizenship has to do with changes within social citizenship itself. In the national modernity, there was a double protagonism. On one side, in the public sphere, the State appeared very visibly with its social policies, but with a limited scope, as we have already pointed out. And on the other, as a corollary of those limits, households deployed, in a very silent manner, multiple coping strategies that were analyzed by numerous studies in the region. Currently, the scenario has become more complex. At least four situations may be identified that would express the same 24 CARLOS SOJO, JUAN PABLO PEREZ SAINZ of types of social citizenship in the region, taking into account both the form of participation (collective or individual) and the definition of responsibility (public or private). The first situation corresponds to the voluntary sector and to social movements which combine collective participation with public responsibility. The same responsibility is found in the State's action and the sponsorship by social bureaucracies where, participation, however, is individual. A third situation comprises the strategies of linking communities and households with private responsibility, but with collective participation. And finally, the market imposes a contractual social citizenship, where participation is individual and responsibility is, obviously, private (Roberts, 1998). Therefore, this regard across citizenships shows a State that is loosing the central role it had in the integration dynamics of the previous modernization. This loss is reflected in a three-fold manner. First, the definition of welfare standards extends beyond the limits of the State's sovereignty as is the case of international labor standards18 Secondly, the current democratic dynamics and- therefore -the political system as a whole - does not appear to be a functional mechanism to mitigate the contradictions between the market and citizenship. And, finally, the delivery of social welfare takes place in different scenarios, with the State becoming relegated to simply one. Labor Market and Social (dis)integration No one refutes that currently, the market has displaced the State from the central role it had in the construction of modernity in Latin America. Regarding the social dimension, this shift is fundamentally expressed in the centrality that the labor market has acquired in the dynamics of social (dis)integration. In this respect, there seem to be four transformations of the labor markets in the region that have important social consequences: the crisis of formal employment; the emergence of structural unemployment; the persistence of the economy of poverty; and employability as a new labor integration dynamics (Perez Sainz, 2000). 18 In this respect, Bottomore ( 1998) has proposed that citizenship should be redefined in terms of worldwide human rights. 25 REINVENTING THE SOCIAL DIMENSION IN LATIN AMERICA The crisis of formal employment has a double dimension. The first relates to the lesser importance of public employment, the mechanism -par excellence - of social integration since it has been the melting pot that gave rise to the constitution of middle sectors. Marshall (1996) has pointed to three factors that have played a role in the impact of the first wave of state reforms on public employment. The first one relates to the internal composition of public employment in terms of the difference between central and local governments. In this respect, it is important to mention that the state reform itself has implied reinforcing local institutions with the possibility of increased occupation at that level. Second, in the current democratization climate characterizing the region, electoral clientalism has, to a certain degree, neutralized fiscal discipline. And, finally, the resistance of public employees and of their unions is a third factor to be taken into accountl9. However, as a regional average, the weight of public employment within the overall non-agricultural EAP has fallen from 15.5% in 1990 to 13.0% in 2000. Panama and Argentina appear as the cases where the reduction has been more dramatic (ILO, 2001, table 6-A). In this respect, it is important to recall the role that has been played by this type of occupation in reducing the gender gap in terms of labor earnings20. This means that this function of gender equity will be reduced in the future21. 19 The emphasis in the next (the second) wave of reforms (fiscal, electoral and judicial) would not have a direct effect on public employment, although the elimination of job stability can effect, overall, the employment levels in this sector (Fleury, 1999). 20 The World Bank, in a series of studies of the region for the 1970's and 1980's, identified two cases (Costa Rica and Panama) where such gaps were smaller than in the rest of the countries. In both situations, the weight of public employment in total employment and access by women to the same were underlined as the explaining factors (Psacharapoulos and Tzannatos, 1992). 21 However, Weller (2000) has argued that the reduction of the salary gap between male and female labor is the only substantive labor achievement of the structural adjustment strategies in the region. 26 CARLOS SOJO, JUAN PABLO PEREZ SAINZ The second dimension relates to the precariousness of wage labor. This is an issue that has, as a minimum, three facets, although we will deal with only one: labor deregulation22. It may be stated that the deregulation of labor relations constitutes one of the basic features of the new economic model prevailing in the region, inspired in the so- called Washington Consensus (Bulmer-Thomas, 1997; Lozano, 1998). The World Bank, the institution that has more strongly advocated for this deregulation trend, evaluated this process in the region towards the mid 1990's. The main conclusion is that a majority of the countries still show labor rigidities. Thus, on one side, there appear to be two exceptions to such rigidity. The first one is Chile that would have attained a flexible labor market at the beginning of the 1990's. Peru would be the other case, representing the most radical deregulation process in the 1990s. At the opposite end are Mexico and Nicaragua (Burki and Perry, 1997). On its part, the International Labor Organization offers a different perspective of the scope of labor reforms in the region (ILO, 2000). Mostly, the change of rules has affected individual relationships, specially in terms of new hiring modalities and severance requirements. In Peru and Argentina, the reforms have been drastic, while in Brazil, Colombia and Panama they have had a more limited scope. Neither have countries with a protectionist tradition such as Venezuela or the Dominican Republic escaped the winds of reform. In fact, eleven out of the seventeen countries studied23, representing 70% of the wage employment in the region, can be said to have adopted labor reforms with a flexibility approach. A phenomenon linked to the labor reforms and of great importance in terms of social integration is that linked with to social security. In terms of the total EAP, in 1990 the coverage was low, scarcely 29.2% and it dropped to 26.9% ten years later. But in terms of wages labor, the percentage rose to 80.6% by the beginning of that decade, with a very slight decrease (79.0%) through time. However, in 22 The other two are the productive restructuring with the labor flexibility it fosters and the weakening of the role of unions. 23 Chile is an exception, since the labor reform, under a democratic government. improved the existing legislation passed by the previous authoritarian regime. 27 REINVENTING THE SOCIAL DIMENSION IN LATIN AMERICA several countries, some of them with an important weight in the region, coverage fell, as was the case of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Costa Rica. But, without doubt, the greatest crisis in this regulatory dimension is the case of Ecuador that by 1990 had 72.1% of wages labor paying in, while ten years later, the coverage had fallen to only 49.8% (ILO, 2001, table 8-A). In this respect, Tamez and Moreno (2000) have pointed out that it is very difficult to speak of regional patterns and that each national case presents peculiarities. However, the authors emphasize a common trend that has a great relevance: the prevalence of mixed models that has resulted in a redefinition of public and private, with the first financing while the second delivers services. And, specifically for the pension scheme, an inverse relation has been posited between the degree of democratization and the privatization of such scheme (Mesa-Lago, 1999). The second phenomenon to be underlined, in terms of transformation of labor markets in the region, is that of unemployment. Although it did not constitute the major mechanism of labor adjustment during the crisis of the 1980's, it represents one of the most prominent features of the current labor dynamics. During the 1990's high open unemployment rates have persisted in the face of economic recovery. Thus, regional weighted averages show a level of urban unemployment of 8.4% in 2000, identical to that of 1985, when the region was immersed in the midst of the debt crisis. By the end of the decade, eight countries present the most alarming situations with two digit rates of open urban unemployment: Argentina (15.1%), Colombia (17.2%), Ecuador (14.1%), Panama (15.3%), Paraguay (10.0%); Dominican Republic (13.9%); Uruguay (13.6%) and Venezuela (15.3%) (ILO, 2001, table 1-A). As in the past, women and, above all youths, are the social-labor groups more deeply affected in this respect. As for the female labor force, the unemployment rates acquire more relevance since, starting the 1980's, there has been an growing process of feminization of employment in the region (Tardanico and Menjivar Larin, 1997)24. 24 Of these eight countries, only in the case of Argentina is the rate of unemployment for men higher than that for women. It should be mentioned that there is no gender disaggregated unemployment data for the case of Ecuador. 28 CARLOS SOJO, JUAN PABLO PEREZ SAINZ The importance of this issue extends beyond the adjustment of the labor market and relates to four key issues for social integration. The first one is connected with the nature of the new economic model and its inability to generate sufficient jobs (Tokman, 1998; Stallings and Peres, 2000). In this respect, two phenomena should be noted. One the one hand, labor deregulation processes are under way, so that such levels of unemployment cannot be merely attributed to the rigidity of labor markets. But on the other, currently the self-generation of employment has become more limited and will not be able to play the same role of absorbing the labor surplus that was played by informal employment in the preceding decades. Even worse, the opening up of the economy, inscribed within structural adjustment programs, has subjected a series of self-employment activities to international competition, making them no longer viable. Thus, the counter-cyclical function that the informal sector played in the past, making possible labor market adjustment effects, has now become limited and this type of activities progressively acquire a rather pro- cyclical behavior (Cerrutti, 2000). The second issue connects with the erosion of social capital and, concretely, of the networks to access the labor market. This reminds us that the resources mobilized by poor households to face poverty are not immune to significant social changes and there seems to be a shift underway, from a situation in which there existed "resources of poverty" to one where what prevails is the "poverty of resources" (Gonzalez de la Rocha, 1999). The third issue ties into the subject of identity. It is known that labor identities are central in a society, where work is socially recognized through remuneration. Following the identity- shaping model proposed by Dubar (1991), unemployment supposes, in terms of internal transaction25, the prevalence of rupture over continuity in 25 This author proposes that there are two types of transactions in shaping labor identities. The first one is internal and has to do with how an individual evaluates his/her current occupational situation as a function of past experiences and future aspirations. This transaction is ruled by the opposition between continuity and rupture. The second transaction, in turn, is external and is linked to the exposure of the internal transaction to "the other". In this case the opposition takes place in terms of recognition and denial. 29 REINVENTING THE SOCIAL DIMENSION IN LATIN AMERICA the case of workers loosing their job. And unemployment, for new entrants into the labor market, presupposes a non-recognition that makes the external transaction impossible. Consequently, identity processes become mutilated and embrittled. The result is the development of anomyc behaviors, a recurrent phenomenon among youths, the group most severely impacted by unemployment, who may opt for perverse violence paths in view of the pressures of consumerism. This is an issue on which it is worthwhile to make a few reflections since it also reflects the current primacy of the market in societal construction. This phenomenon relates to the fact that, progressively, social distinctions would seem to operate through the differentiation of consumption. That is, consumption would be displacing production from the center of social action26. In Latin America the phenomenon does not appear so evidently since, in national modernization, the mass consumption corresponding to the Fordist contract of the societies of the North did not fully materialize. However, changes in consumption patterns began to become apparent due to globalization. The point that seems to be critical in order to reflect on the future is the possibility of a shift in the criteria that define social integration that, in terms of modernization, meant having the production of wealth and its distribution as the ultimate reference. In this sense, there seem to be glimpses of a possible breakdown of the historical horizon of modernity and the social dimension would be radically redefined. This phenomenon is insinuated in youths, who are submitted to a double process. On one hand, their historical difficulties in joining the labor market are currently becoming more acute, as already noted. This entails that it is impossible to gain access to traditional identity references based on the world of labor. But on the other, it is precisely the new generations that have a worldview that is more sensitive to the 26 In tnis sense, it has been argued that consumption has become the new mechanism for social mobility (Cerny, 1995) and that the consumer has become fetichized (Appadurai, 1990), leading to a shift in the emphasis of identity construction from production to consumption (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2000). Consequently it is not surprising that together with business (specially, multinationals) consumers have become the actors of globalization although their possibilities of a protagonic role are much more limited than in the case of business. For a provocative discussion of the phenomenon of consumerism in the countries of the North, see Storper (2000). 30 CARLOS SOJO, JUAN PABLO PEREZ SAINZ dynamics of global consumption. But this consumerism is not defined in terms of moral standards that relate to the basic material and symbolic reproduction that social integration historically implied until now. That is, there are processes of identity assertion on the part of youths that imply dynamics of integration to communities which do not correspond to the classical parameters. Being is centered on consuming and it can be achieved by transgressions to the rules and by resorting to violence. Individualism takes precedence over collective action, competition over cooperation, and there is an estrangement regarding the public sphere, with reclusion into the private world (Garcia Delgado, 1998). Finally, unemployment is strongly linked to poverty and vulnerability. Its positive correlation with impoverishment has been demonstrated in numerous studies. It acquires a perverse bias in the case of youths since it has the possibility of developing mechanisms of intergenerational poverty transmission that challenge the historical trends of poverty reduction (Tokman, 1998). Less studied is its link with vulnerability. This phenomenon recalls that in societies which do not have a very high social polarization, it is necessary to overcome dichotomic visions and incorporate a third analytical and empirical category of vulnerability (Minujin, 1998). The phenomenon that can be understood as the relation between the capability of mobilizing resources and the structure of opportunities existing in society. The latter refers both to the market (employment, income, etc.) and to the State (series of public policies with redistributive effects) and to society itself (in the social-cultural and political levels) (Filgueira, 1999). This phenomenon relates to the risk of impoverishment that affects a certain segment of integrated households. The origin of such risk, in the current modernity, would precisely lie in unemployment based on its income reduction impacts, as opposed to hyperinflation which was the main source of risk in the 1980's. In this respect, it becomes necessary to expand the concept of unemployment to capture its full import in terms of labor exclusion. Thus, open unemployment should be complemented with discouraged unemployment. This makes it possible to recover a more structural perspective of this phenomenon unlinked to the economic cycle. Besides, since discouraged people are recorded as "inactive", there is a challenge to the distinction between 31 REINVENTING THE SOCIAL DIMENSION IN LATIN AMERICA work and employment imposed by the market. Likewise, this provides visibility to women, who are usually the majority in terms of the discouraged unemployed, enclosed in the domestic sphere. But also, an expansion of this concept makes it necessary to incorporate the phenomenon of visible underemployment, as involuntary partial unemployment. This is a phenomenon that can become significant given the trend towards greater precariousness of the labor markets in the region. Therefore, in societies lacking a major socio-economic polarization, and where the middle sectors continue having a significant weight, there may exist a band of social integration characterized by vulnerability. It comprises domestic units that are not poor, but have income levels that in case of composite unemployment (open, discouraged and partial, involuntary) can drop under the poverty line. That is, they are households at risk for poverty (Perez Sainz and Mora, 2001). The third phenomenon to be underlined in the current configuration of labor markets is the persistence of a poverty economy in self-employment activities that fail to generate a dynamics of accumulation. It is a matter of the poor producing for the poor and therefore it is an occupational environment marked by exclusion which, to a great extent, constitutes an extension of the subsistence activities of the preceding modernity. In this respect, it is important to take into account its rural expression as well as the urban one. The data available for the 1990's suggests a close association between poverty and self-employment in agriculture which would be a proxy for subsistence farming. However, there are differences to be noted between groups of countries. Costa Rica and Chile are the countries where the incidence of impoverishment is lowest, less than one third of this occupational category. At the other end, Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico show levels above two thirds; i.e. the large majority of all peasants have become impoverished. The remaining countries (Brazil, Panama, Dominican Republic and Venezuela) are placed at an intermediate position (CEPAL, 1999; table 19). In this sense, two effects of the new economic model on rural labor markets have been highlighted. The first is that, in those cases in which peasants owned communal lands, the policies to create land markets have had a negative effect, influencing the 32 CARLOS SOJO. JUAN PABLO PtREZ SAINZ proletarization of peasants. And the second is linked to the introduction of new, capital-intensive technologies, that have displaced labor, thus increasing the seasonality of agricultural employment (Thomas, 1999). This last effect reinforces a historical trend that was already present in the preceding modernization (G6mez and Klein, 1993). This relationship between self-employment and poverty is less marked in urban environments since there, the incidence of poverty is less than in rural areas. Microbusinesses (units that employ less than 5 individuals) appear as the occupational environment (together with domestic employment) where the incidence is greatest. But it is also necessary to mark differences by groups of countries. The percentage is less than one fourth of that occupational category in the countries of the Southern Cone and Costa Rica, while in the other Central American and Andean countries, the level increases to more than half; the rest are somewhere in between (CEPAL, 1999; table 18). That is, there is a suggested link between the types of previous modernization (early, late and fast) and the impoverishment of the urban self-employment. These trends are accentuated when productive self employment is considered (manufacturing and construction), where half the labor force is poor. This modality of self-employment is, to a great extent, an extension of the past, specially in its urban component, i.e. subsistence informality. However, there are novel elements since the economy of poverty can incorporate the so-called new poor. These are sectors that, as a result of the crisis and the adjustment policies, have fallen into a situation of poverty. The term designates groups, consisting specially of urban workers, who although having their basic needs satisfied as a result of being located in city environments, have seen their income decrease below the poverty line as a consequence of the crisis of the 1980's. As Katzman (1989), to whom this denomination is owed, has pointed out, they are different from the structurally poor for two reasons; on one hand, they are not subject to mechanisms - specially intergenerational ones - of poverty perpetuation; and secondly, because they can come out of their poverty situation if the economic context changes. Consequently, the exclusion trends seem to appear strongly and affect important portions of the region's labor force. For that reason, we posit that in the current globalized modernization, such trends, with 33 REINVENTING THE SOCIAL DIMENSION IN LATIN AMERICA their social disintegration effects, tend to predominate. However, this does not mean to say that the integration trends have disappeared, but their nature is changing since the emphasis, as indicated, would be shifting from the demand (the generation of jobs in the old formal sector, currently in crisis) to the supply (generation of employment opportunities resulting from the workers own initiative). It is in this sense that the term "employable labor force" is used (Novick and Gallart, 1997; Leite and Neves, 1998; Gallart, 1999). Human capital, where its general component (schooling) is important to acquire the specific components imposed by the volatility of the global market. Latin American empirical evidence shows that for the crisis and adjustment period of the 1980's, this relation is confirmed albeit with cross-country differences (Berhman, 1996). Secondly, it is also possible to speak of employability as an attitude towards the labor process. The introduction of post-taylorist organizational models implies changes in terms of the participation of workers that is no longer merely passive. In this respect, the notions of multifunctionality and involvement come into play. Employability thus refers to "knowledge about being" (competencies) in the labor process as a more important attribute than the traditional "knowledge about doing" (skills) (Carrillo, 1995; Mertens, 1996; Hirata, 1997; Leite, 1999; Carrillo and Iranzo, 2000; Hualde, 2001). However, the organizational innovations implemented in the companies of the region do not seem to foster this manifestation of employability to a great extent. Thus, such innovations do not become systemic since they arise from initiatives by individual firms; they are unilaterally imposed on workers without much negotiation; and as a corollary of the above, the involvement of labor is limited (Carrillo, 1995). Thirdly, it is possible to think of employability in terms of the birth of a new work ethics and culture, in which workers demonstrate the capacity to create jobs or to modify the current labor conditions. In this respect, employability would be synonymous with trajectories that do not seek job stability and a protected and regulated work environment. A labor mobility that assumes risk as its own in the ethymological sense of the word in Portuguese: daring (Giddens, 1999). This implies redefining the "normal" old day biographies (Beck, 1998) and, therefore, the process of identity building. 34 CARLOS SOJO, JUAN PABLO PEREZ SAINZ And finally, employability implies, in terms of social citizenship, that a shift is taking place, from rights (adequate employment) to duties. In the previous modernity, the emphasis lied on labor rights, codified in the respective national rules, that fundamentally protected formal workers. The counterpart (the duties of workers) was the acceptance of the populist type contract (a sort of pseudo-Fordist arrangement) guaranteed by the State that emerged as the main player. This type of alliance, as well known, hit a crisis in the 1970's with the development of authoritarian regimes that evidenced the historical limits of such contract. The 1980's crisis and the implementation of structural adjustment programs have generated a new context of hegemonic uncertainty that have turned poverty and exclusion into basic governance problems (Lozano, 1998). In labor terms, it has meant a shift from rights to duties and, in this respect, four factor should be noted in such a redefinition. First, rights and duties are defined in connection with the market, in this case the labor market and, therefore, the State is no longer the major arbiter. Second, the market is subject to a deregulation process, as already argued, that makes flexibility the key issue at stake. Third, this pre-eminence of the market implies individuation, and rights and duties progressively loose their collective nature. And, finally, the shift of emphasis from rights to duties brings forth the question of what type of citizenship is being bred. But the issue is even more complex, since the consideration of rights and obligations also implies symbolic and ethical aspects that are played out in the public sphere (Jelin, 1996). Therefore, the importance of employability with reference to the social dimension is two-fold and this reflects its two faces. On one side, it displays this shift of focus, from rights to duties, in the current configuration of social citizenship. In that sense, it expresses one of the dimensions of what has been called negative individualism; in this case, the one associated with independence from institutional arrangements27. And, on the other, as a positive side, employability articulates the social dimension with globalization's strategic resource: knowledge. That is, in globalized modernity, the big challenge of the 27 The other expression is individuation due to lack of social protection and links (Castel, 1997). 35 REINVENTING THE SOCIAL DIMENSION IN LATIN AMERICA social dimension is, fundamentally, how to arrive at institutionalities that provide democratic access to such resource. It is around that fundamental core that we believe it is possible to "reinvent" the social dimension, for the market to remain tamed and capitalism humanized. This volume The works in this volume cover a thematic horizon that simultaneously attempts to be integrated and specific. In a good share of the contemporaneous social debate, the observation of general aspects and concrete issues does not presuppose "alternative" thinking, different approaches, but the need to recognize differential spheres for action. Specialization is common and well known both for social thinkers as for economic operators. Likewise its advantages and limitations. The first three chapters deal with general aspects: the agenda of social development, entrusted to Rolando Franco, a Uruguayan sociologist, who, as head of CEPAL's Social Development Division has enjoyed a privileged vantage point of the challenges of social development and its demands on public policies in the region in the next few years. The second chapter reflects around the issue of social development indicators, with the analysis of Edgar Gutierrez, who, from the Development Observatory of Costa Rica University, has been actively involved in this field. The third chapter, entrusted to Sara Gordon, from the National Autonomous University of Mexico, analyzes the issue of citizenship and its links to development in an approach that is simultaneously extremely popular in the environment of political discourse while not very clear in its conceptual implications and therefore its consequences for public policy decision making. Then follow two chapters that are more specific in their approach, but essential in their consequences for the region's social development. In the fourth chapter, Ernesto Rodriguez has systematized the issue of development from the perspective of youth. Undoubtedly, the issue refers to a core aspect of social development policies that concerns the generation of opportunities for social mobility that demand short term fiscal resources, but with yields that are observable in the medium and 36 CARLOS SOJO. JUAN PABLO PItREZ SAINZ long term. The fifth chapter, entrusted to Mayra Buvinic, Andrew Morrison and Ana Maria Orlando, elaborates on urban violence, without doubts one of the major threats to Latin Americans quality of life. The volume concludes with a reflection by Carlos Strasser, academic of FLACSO Argentina, on the centrality of politics. He examines the possibilities of governance for the States in the region and its implications for the achievement of better thresholds of social development and welfare. Rolando Franco recognizes in his contributions progress and limitations in the development of the region along the last decade. There are significant increases in social investment, but sharp inequalities between the countries persist and the mobility opportunities have not been substantially improved. Therefore, the region continues to be immersed in poverty and in the multiplication of barriers to the attainment of the objectives of social equity and welfare. It is very hard, in general terms, for the bounty of growth to move towards the public action spheres that have to distribute it, but it is very easy for the consequences of stagnation or recession to translate into serious social consequences. Apparently, the trickle down only operates under conditions of economic crisis and recession. Franco puts it this way: "in one year of recession, between four and five years of growth are lost". Of no less importance is the link between socioeconomic development and political situation. In the eighties, recalls Franco, the concern seemed to focus specially in the precariousness of income and the weakness of purchasing power under inflationary conditions. The control thereof also provided clear political yields for the successful governments and penalties to those that failed in this regard. However, today, when the threat of inflation has not be dispelled, there is evidence of a greater concern regarding the structural characteristics of the model and its effective capacity to produce welfare that can be transferred to all social sectors. This has not yet produced a sanction to the democratic form of government, but undoubtedly, as indicated by the Argentine crisis, it broadens the possibilities of ingovernability, by reducing citizens' tolerance margin to the consequences of economic and political leadership crises. The will to resist new costs is reduced in view of the uncertainty, increasingly greater, that these will not be clearly compensated in the 37 REINVENTING THE SOCIAL DIMENSION IN LATIN AMERICA good times. This is linked to the manner in which the social assistance resources are managed (the so called "safety nets") and their erroneous pro-cyclical behavior in a majority of the countries of the region that is denounced by Franco. Franco's article, after a brief diagnosis, goes deeper into the identification of strategic themes and public policy orientations that could allow for new possibilities of growth with welfare and equity. The axis he considers essential to mobilize means for social integration and welfare in his judgment relate to four factors: Latin America, recognized as the most unequal region of the world, it is so in times of crisis and growth and becomes more acute at a particularly regressive moment at a global scale. In his analysis, Franco proposes examining inequality from the basis of identifying four factors that are hardly sensitive to short term political variations. Access to assets -he points out- is more unequal than access to income; the size of poor households, on average larger than non poor ones, generates an additional demographic burden; access to educational capital damaged by supply restrictions and the pressure that is implied in the need to expand the family level, the fourth factor, referring to the "occupational density" relating to the number of employed per family, substantially higher among those families in the lower quintiles. The last part of the article refers to the forms of a public policy committed to social development. Franco asserts the need to recognize a cooperation link between economic policies and social policies, recognizing the primary component of income generation derived from labor markets in expansion under situation of economic growth. He also points at the importance of differentiating between the functions of social policies in three areas: investment in human capital, social compensation and social cohesion. The first area, human capital, relates to the issue of traditional social investment within an innovative framework focusing on the importance of the "inter-generational transmission of opportunities" affected by factors associated to the "household of origin"; school, affected by the combination of "educational devaluation" understood as the inter-generational ratio between the level of education and the employment or income obtained, and the "educational threshold", relating to the number of years required to enjoy comparable levels of 38 CARLOS SOJO. JUAN PABLO PEREZ SAINZ welfare. The third dimension affecting households is employment, closely related to opportunities for access to the educational system. The second area underlines the importance of social compensation mechanisms that -to start with- do not compete, but rather complement, universal services that have a relevance for the attainment of long term integration objectives that is unquestioned. Second, that compensation mechanisms have not been sufficiently stable and particularly, have been unable to manage an adequate distribution of fiscal resources in the periods where the demand is the greatest. The third area referring to social cohesion implies the need to design strategies for social development that while aspiring to create and maintain communities of goals and standards "make room for a wide range of particular goals" associated to issues of discrimination and social exclusion. Franco ends his contribution by pointing at four "principles to orient" social policy: the emphasis on universality; the institutional arrangements whereby it is executed; the concern for impact and the effectiveness of management. Shaping a social policy that attempts to satisfy the needs of all does not necessarily suppose equality of intervention. Affirmative action and targeted compensation are instruments and not alternatives of a universalistic social policy. The institutional issue refers to a needed reflection on decentralization and the participation of individuals and communities as mechanisms to modernize social policy. The issue of impact relates to the magnitude and the use of the available resources, specially deepening the actions addressed at strengthening the redistributive capacity of social spending as a whole. This is a factor closely linked to the four element, referring to the efficiency of social programs understood as the maximization of outputs to be obtained with the limited resources available. Here, Franco recalls, the challenge lies in understanding that sometimes the outcomes confuse means with ends, like in education, when the need for fostering knowledge and values is forgotten in the haste to have classrooms built or teachers hired. The chapter by Edgar Gutierrez, director of the project Observatorio del Desarrollo of Universidad de Costa Rica, proposes a historical and analytical review of the issue of setting up social indicators. Several elements are highlighted in Gutierrez' analysis. It is 39 REINVENTING THE SOCIAL DIMENSION IN LATIN AMERICA relevant to point at what might be called the social and disciplinarian determination of data. As instruments of scientific approach to the understanding of a social reality, the indicators enunciate a status of the disciplinarian debate. Social indicators are further the product of the degree of development of the demands for social welfare, and their evolution through time is the expression of the search for welfare thresholds that societies aspire to individually and globally. Their formulation is, therefore, the result of a social tension towards the scientific demonstration of "realities" that are intended to be modified, while resulting from a paradigmatic competition (Kuhn, 1971) which determined the basic consensus of the scientific community on what is observable. This link between the political and the scientific is not exclusive of the human or social sciences, as it is mistakenly believed, but it becomes manifest in them with less symbolic and argumentative mediations. Even because common sense becomes the criterion of validity of social knowledge. But, in at the bottom, social data are the product of what society demands to know, governments weigh and publish, and the scientific community proposes and analyzes. A second relevant aspect in the analysis by Gutierrez points at the clear difficulties to identify indicators that are acceptable in common. In general, there is a lack of sufficient consensus among the scientific community and the operators of social policy on the manner of approaching social knowledge in several fields. General aspects such as quality of life, or even specific manifestations such as the crowding indicator (that can range from 2, 3 or 4 people per room), illustrate the diversity of approaches to the social dimension that underlay political and conceptual discrepancies. The history of how social indicators have evolved and their transformation is indicative of the degree of development attained by countries and of the social demands that become organized. The preeminence of certain information over other possibilities of explanation results from competition and interest and is closely linked to the prescriptive orientation of administrative actions. If the dominant perception of poverty or human deprivation is the insufficiency of income with regards to a threshold considered minimum, then the assessment of the corresponding social policies and the distributive capacity of markets will be closely referred to the expansion of 40 CARLOS SOJO. JUAN PABLO PEREZ SAINZ income. Other manifestations of social life that cause inequality such as sex, race and ethnicity, age, are not - in this sense - subject to scrutiny or analysis. The third aspect is connected with the capacity and possibility of building indicators. The responsibility of the state is essential and in general, institutional weakness decreases the possibilities of States of having quality data on social development. Here, the link with international cooperation shows that there is a relationship between the generation of indicators and the availability of resources to produce them. It is not coincidental that in the economic field, where the interest of the financial and production operators is concentrated, the global data are more homogeneous and generalized. Therefore the importance of the role of multilateral agencies to generate scientific consensus and the resources to develop new measurement instruments that will, in time, make it possible to overcome the lack of information and generate new data according to the times. The article by Gutierrez examines the status of the debate and the historical evolution of the building of social indicators in the first three sections. First, it shows how the building of social indicators develops in a permanent dispute with economic indicators to capture broader dimensions of human development. The second part is a reflection on the difficulties to set up a single measurement system and the third analyzes the role of the United Nations in generating and proposing indicators based on establishing the main limitations observed, in this respect, at a global scale: connected with availability (coverage, dates, existence); international comparability; clear definitions of indicators; clear gathering and processing guidelines and quality control. When observing the particular situation of Latin America and pondering on the offering of indicators from three multilateral agencies with involvement in the region (the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC, the United Nations and the World Bank), the study verifies the little commonality of the available indicators, which limits the possibility of comparisons, and the heterogeneous sources of information that determine that each entity process in their own way the data that have been gathered. Gutierrez further verifies that the available indicators cover scantly the commitments undertaken in the international conferences 41 REINVENTING THE SOCIAL DIMENSION IN LATIN AMERICA and summits, which poses an important deficit in what is considered to be the minimum capacity to account for the evolution of social development in the region. The three sources consulted cover between two thirds and one half of the indicators forming the "minimum set of national social data" recommended by the United Nations Statistics Committee. The author concludes on the need to continue advancing in identifying and developing the indicators required to account for social development appropriately, but recommends doing so within an environment sensitive to cultural differences. Comparability cannot sacrifice the specificity required to account for certain social circumstances, linked to phenomena that are little or rarely measurable such as spirituality, social capital, life experiences. In terms of the challenge of social indicators, he concludes that "moving in the right direction depends on which is that direction and who has defined it." The issue of citizenship, explored in chapter 3 by Sara Gordon Rapoport, for many years the editor of the prestigious Revista Mexicana de Sociologia, contains the outlines of a debate that is at the center of any contemporaneous reflection on social development. The issue of rights is at the core of a new regard on the link between social demands and public responsibilities that implies reviewing some of the referents of the social development model propounded in the period prior to the Latin American debt crisis. With the advent of the new democratic regimes, the issue of rights acquired a new dynamism paradoxically in a stage marked by the fiscal restrictions with which the Latin American States emerged from the lost decade. Thus, at the time when rights acquired citizenship charter, the possibilities of their effective realization by the State suffered a significant breakdown. Therefore the importance of the review proposed by Gordon on citizens rights, specially economic, social and cultural, in a region marked by centrifugal forces that allow for the build-up of expectations and aspirations to an improved social status in the midst of material conditions that are constantly precarious. Perhaps the most relevant link between citizenship and social development is precisely the paradox of an age that has made it possible for new demands to become visible and emerge, while the capacity of the State to guarantee them through institutional means is reduced. 42 CARLOS SOJO. JUAN PABLO PEREZ SAINZ Gordon's text begins with a review of the sociological origin of the definition of citizenship, which is attributed to British academic T.H. Marshall, based on his lectures at Cambridge University in 1949. In Gordon's opinion, that is the source of the main enumerations which currently typify the issue of rights. However, this aspect is not exempt from controversy Marshall's tripartite formulation has been broadly questioned, among other things, for assuming a sequential relationship in the definition of rights in their various fields; for disregarding the political and historical determinations of their definition and for taking for granted inadequate equivalences in the degree of standardization of the definition of civil and political rights, the definition of which is quite universal, with social ones which, in light of the preceding chapter, display an extreme diversity in the selection of their enunciation variables and the degrees of development that are aspired to. In the first part of the article, Gordon assesses the implications of the critiques to Marshall on the basis of the adoption of institutional framework for the international aspiration to defend economic, social and cultural rights fostered by the United Nations. In general, the rationale of the critiques are based on the lack of basic agreements around issues of principle such as what is an economic and social right, how is it attained and who protects it. The debate questions the definition of universal parameter to define welfare thresholds the adoption of which is extremely sensitive to historical experiences and cultural coordinates. Here, the issue of "indicators" is also present in terms of the lack of consistency in the effective, standardized and universal operationalization of social rights. Besides, the role of the State as generator of conditions to "assist in the realization of the rights, in terms of outcomes" is unclear. Finally, it is not clear when the realization of a result relates mostly to the operation of markets than to public management and there frequently exists a tense and contradictory relationship between the integration purposes of public policies for the promotion of rights and the exclusion effects of market operation. On the basis of this analysis, Gordon explores various dimensions of the difficulty in setting up social policies geared towards satisfying economic, social and cultural rights in the Latin American region. She links the appearance of notions of rights 43 REINVENTING THE SOCIAL DIMENSION IN LATIN AMERICA associated to socioeconomic conditions to the link between industrialization and labor markets that were developed in the Latin American countries throughout the XX century. This results in an extremely important characteristic of the history of social citizenship in Latin America: "the combination of workers in the formal market together with the criterion of fundamentally serving organized sectors with pressure capacity, contributed to configuring welfare provision as a privilege to which access is gained through an organization or a clientelistic relation, and not as a universal right." The combination of workers the formal market together with the criterion of fundamentally attending to organized sectors with pressure capacity, contributed to configuring an approach to welfare as a privilege that is obtained by means of an organization or a clientelistic relation, and not as a universal right." This gestational trait remains current and it constitutes one of the main barriers for the effective setup of rights thresholds and institutional frameworks for their safeguard. The evolution of citizen rights is condition by structural features of which the author underlines, in coincidence with Franco's article, aspects such as the unequal distribution of wealth; the unfavorable evolution of labor markets and remunerations; the worsening of the welfare indicators at light of the situation of those groups subject to situations of exclusion such as women or ethnical groups; the precariousness and sustained deterioration of the quality of life and opportunities in rural areas that together with the concentration in urban spaces lead to a sustained trend towards "geographical fragmentation"; and the diminished possibilities of access to education. Summarizing, the author concludes that the theoretical difficulties to apply the concept of social citizenship are confirmed by the evidence gathered on the modes of access to social citizenship in the region and can be summarized as a) the "corporatist pattern" governing the identification of rights thresholds and their enforcement in a anti-universalistic and exclusion framework; b) the "insufficiency of fiscal resources" as a result of a precarious public management in terms of capture and modest in terms of distribution as well as consequentially of mercantile operations and c) "the high proportion of population with serious deficits" that makes it necessary to develop differential policies prioritizing the satisfaction of needs and not following criteria 44 CARLOS SOJO, JUAN PABLO PEREZ SAINZ of satisfaction of social rights. To face up to these challenges, she proposes adopting Bellamy's category of "institutional rights", resulting from limited "political deliberation" that is translated into particular laws instead of constitutional norms of doubtful application. The article by Ernesto Rodriguez on the link between the issue of youth, social development and public policies is broad and profound in terms of analysis and proposals. At the center of his concern is the need of identifying public policies with a generational approach that may contribute to stopping the exclusion processes affecting Latin American youths while simultaneously unleashing their creative forces, by tapping into the force of lack of conformity that characterizes youth. The reader will find here a clear link between the youth issue and the general components of the preceding contributions. Also clear is the contact - frequently tragic -between the violence and the social exclusion that youths experience; likewise, the importance of their active incorporation into political management and the decision-making process not restricted to the electoral means, and even to the management of other social policy areas through their participation in "volunteer" networks. The general proposal, both in conceptual and normative terms, postulated by this work is directly opposed to one of the dominant approaches, certainly under review, the characteristics of which are well summarized in the following paragraph. Rodriguez says "The model centered on education and leisure time, characterized in the first part, is an adult, conservative and functionalist approach, in the strictest sense of the three terms, to the extent that the existing society is taken for granted, and the specific objective defined in connection with the young generations is their future integration into such society, to ensure the reproduction of that society through time and space. This approach, furthermore, operated with certain fluidity in the framework of expansive and dynamic economies that ensured a certain degree of "upwards social mobility" specially for those youths who were "integrated", while showing severe limitations to respond to the issues of the "excluded" youths, specially during times of crisis" (between inverted commas in the original). The basis of the alternative argument proposed by Rodriguez surrounding youth and the challenges for social development policies 45 REINVENTING THE SOCIAL DIMENSION IN LATIN AMERICA begins with the definition of condition of youth itself. As already established in this volume, the definition of the life cycle corresponding to "youth" is not absolutely clear. The ambiguity permits defining a space that extends from 10 to 29 years of age, from the beginning of the physiological changes up to the transformation of the social condition; according to Rodriguez "from the attainment of physiological maturity to the attainment of social maturity" extremes that each society and each age construct in a completely different way. For that reason, the author prefers the identification of specific youth groups, since "youth" in abstract does not exist. They are the university students; the popular urban youth; the rural youth and the young women with the caveat that all these should be sensitive to the ethnical dimension permeating the other situations. From that option, undoubtedly, an essential consequence is derived for research and public policies, connected with the need for identification and effective action on the diverse conditions within which the experience of youth takes place. On the contrary, as Rodriguez observes, policies tend to be generalistic, rather insensitive to the peculiarities and disregarding the actual needs of youths in favor of the future expectations of the system. The formulation of youth policies, first associated to job training and to the administration of leisure time, has evolved, as a result of the reaction of youths to the more excluding manifestations of the social and political systems. The satisfaction of the right to education in relatively significant degrees, as illustrated by the doubling of the secondary schooling rates and the five-fold increase of the higher education rates in the second half of the XX century, has created the conditions for new "youth" demands to emerge that, in turn, triggered new public responses. First, designed to decrease students autonomous mobilization capability and then to attenuate the material needs of urban youths, squashed by the crisis, poverty and the economic reform programs by means of social compensation programs that are only apparently disconnected for the issue of youth. Currently, the predominant trait of youth policies tends to respond to the dissatisfaction for the lack of expectations for social improvement as a consequence of the economic recession and the reduction and deterioration of labor markets. These are policies designed to 46 CARLOS SOJO, JUAN PABLO PEREZ SAINZ strengthen "youth's labor and social inclusion". For that reason, mediated through political and "social control" programs of youth's movements and demands, the policies have shifted from education centered on roles preassigned by the adult thought structure and production to job training, sensitive to youth's capacity to adapt to shifting social, political and economic demands. Rodriguez then explores the analysis of the status of youth policies in the region, drawing distinctions between the programmatic, fiscal and purely policy dimensions. The program dimension, that refers to production and relation between sectorial interventions in the field of education, employment, health and recreation, the conclusion is that the lack of consistency and articulation in the implementation of the initiatives has diminished their capacity for an effective transformation of youth's situation. He points at the limited intervention in fields of primary importance such as violence mitigation and fostering participation. In the institutional aspect, the author's main concern relates to the confusion of roles and the lack of constructive relations between the specialized institutions and the administration, in general. Among them there arise problems of competition and duplication, the first because of their attempt to address all the dimensions of the issue and the second due to their lack of sensitivity to particular social situations. The fiscal issue, on its side, refers to the availability and use of resources to address youth issues. Rodriguez points out that, in spite of the lack of comparative studies for a sufficient number of countries, two trends may be observed: a) insufficient investments, and b) their overwhelming concentration on regular education where the corporatist pressure of teachers for salary increases, coupled with the fiscal restrictions under which governments operate, reduce the quality of educational services in terms of infrastructure, materials and resources. Finally, the political dimension leads to an underlying problem in the emergence of youth antagonism. Youths do not act in a corporatist fashion and their representation environment, more than referring to material needs, responds to symbolic horizons that do not have an easy linkage with the fiscal services with which States "address" social issues. This problem of political representation and construction of 47 REINVENTING THE SOCIAL DIMENSION IN LATIN AMERICA demands becomes more acute at light of the evidence, as Rodriguez finds, that "the corporatist actors involved (in decision-making) are not interested in leveraging youth policies". Rodriguez infers a core institutional implication: "the role of the institutions specializing in juvenile promotion is much more important than in the case of any other public policy since they have to act as surrogates of the corporatist role that organized beneficiaries play in other areas (women policies, for example)." The fifth chapter examines the situation of violence and crime in Latin America and its implications for social development. The centrality of this reflection, that is abundantly documented by Buvinic, Morrison and Orlando, lies in the magnitude and intensity of the phenomenon of violence. Latin Americans have a long history of social coexistence marked by violent acts and criminal behavior. In the past, the State perpetrated illegal violence against citizens under a national security cover. In many countries, the reaction of citizens led to military action. As a result, the link between citizens and State was shaped through fear and dissuasion, where the use of force frequently substituted for dialogue and appeals to reason. Currently, Latin American societies no longer face militarized state apparatus that are therefore aggressors to human security; however, violence continues undermining intersubjective trust, eroding public resources and decreasing the possibilities of economic growth. In some regions, such as Central America, the advent of peace has not translated into overcoming violence nor increasing security. The new approaches to tackle violence and crime, specially severe in urban environments, requires a very close contact with the source issues and the social context that generates and nurtures criminal behaviors and violence of different types. As opposed to the narrowly legalistic viewpoints that are centered on the reliance on rules and punishment as social control mechanisms, contemporary approaches start by recognizing the heterogeneity of violence and its causes. In general, in the shaping of social violence phenomena, understood by the authors as "the use of force with the intent to damage" are the result of the confluence of motivations associated to the family and the community, as well as the capacity for control and creation of welfare by the State. But, furthermore, violence is 48 CARLOS SOJO. JUAN PABLO PEREZ SAINZ extremely sensitive to individual circumstances that are frequently overlooked in the analysis of other social problems and which refers to psychosocial aspects connected with the shaping of violent behaviors, the weight of psychogenetic factors and the influence of risky habits connected with practices such as drug and alcohol abuse. The authors of this chapter present, in this sense, two classifications of violence, one that classifies violence according to criteria such as the characteristics of the victims, the aggressors, nature of the act, purpose, localization and relationship between the victim and the aggressor, the later a central aspect in identifying the forms of violence associated to family and gender. The second classification looks at risk factors, drawing a distinction between individual situations, where the maleness and alcohol abuse are, for example, recurrent conditions that have triggering effects over other factors such as having been exposed to violence or biological conditioning factors. The second order of risk factors relate to the condition of the household, where the size, the structure and a history of violence are the central aspects. The third element integrates community-social factors in a more complex set that ranges from access to weapons, control thereon, social violence, income inequality, cultural standards, etc. The definition of the diversity of phenomena associated to crime and violence in society, is combined with the difficulty of obtaining adequate and sufficient information to account for this diversity of manifestations. In general, the authors observe that in Latin America there is information available on homicide rates and some surveys on victimization. They warn about the care needed when working with information that in general is gathered using sundry registration methods and debatable quality. Some expressions of violence, specially domestic violence and violence against women, are recognized as largely underestimated by limited reporting and registration practices. In any case, the hard evidence agrees with the citizen's perception of insecurity given the high rates of homicides that exist in Latin America as compared to other regions, in excess to 50 per 100,000 inhabitants in some countries, something like six times the world mean. The article examines closely the dimensions of violence in the region, distinguishing its manifestations based on gender, unequal distribution of wealth and poverty; violence against 49 REINVENTING THE SOCIAL DIMENSION IN LATIN AMERICA dominated ethnic groups or minorities; and forms of violence associated to the life cycle. The socioeconomic implications of violence are one of the main challenges for public social development policies for two reasons at least: first, because violence has direct economic implications, since it produces consequences on productive and social activities that generate costs associated to their combat or prevention. Ranging from the build up of an economic sector devoted to security including from insurance companies to surveillance firms; up to individual and family investments that are made at the expense of other consumption, in connection with the need of satisfying the demand for security. The indirect implications relate to the allocation of resources that, thus, are not invested in productive or distributive activities of a public or private character and thus become "economic multiplication effects of violence" at the macroeconomic level. The magnitudes of direct costs are alarming, such as for example in Colombia, where the costs of violence, including armed conflict, reach proportions that are close to one fifth of the gross domestic product. The multiplication effects can, in turn, have different characteristics depending on whether their impact is felt at the macroeconomic, family or individual level. Thus, for example, violence reduces the possibilities of accumulating social and human capital and mitigates the opportunities of generating income due to such apparently unlinked aspects as the decision of not working night hours or attending educational and job training activities after working during the day. In the area of proposals, the article by Buvinic, Morrison and Orlando associates the risk factors with possible solutions, distinguishing between those that suppose short term interventions, specially dear to the rationality of the governments of the day, that have to provide answers to this acute problem within the time horizon of their administration, and long term interventions that address structural issues. As expressed in the multidimensional approach to violence, its causes cannot be merely attributed to economic factors; however, addressing the problem in the long term requires attending to the more important social integration deficits presented by Latin American societies: the extreme inequality not only of income but also in terms of assets and opportunities, and poverty, aspects that once 50 CARLOS SOJO, JUAN PABLO PEREZ SAINZ again make reference to the importance of sustained economic growth with distributive capacity. They also mention interventions relating to unemployment and educational dropping out as risk factors that can be better addressed by improving the link between work and school and the relationships between the training-education environment and community and family. In the short term, addressing the risks for violence is connected with dealing with the triggers that are "close to the individual" and the "situational factors" referring to the relative advantage of the aggressors in committing the offenses. In the first case, the measures refer to controlling the markets for alcohol and weapons, as well as a stricter regulation of the permits to carry guns. In the situational environment, they mention improvements in the availability of collective services such as street lighting or wide streets and sidewalks, as well as the promotion of "safe" practices in the individual field that, together with greater patrolling and closeness of law-enforcement forces to the community, are the means to overcome conditions which favor violence and crime. There remains pending in this issue a broad investigation agenda that also illustrates the need of having more information available on the forms of violence, their magnitude and evolution, as well as the effect of public and private actions designed for risk mitigation. For a reason that is not random, the volume ends with a profound reflection on politics and its forms that is not always present in debates on "social" issues but that is integrated in the citizen's vision of the public sphere. It is not by chance that the sources of legitimacy of politics are associated to the performance of the social institutions and such performance, as Carlos Strasser acutely explores it, is not unrelated to the practices of governments and States and to the formulas with which their relationship with society is defined. Strasser's analytical journey to account for the issue of governability, governance and their interfaces with social develop begins, as in the case of the other contributions, with a review of basic concepts that are frequently taken for granted, not less explanatory for that reason, but subject to ambiguity and argumentative prejudice. Strasser proposes a minimum consensus to begin with on three concepts: democracy, governability and governance. For the first, he resorts to the normative and procedural conception, based on Bobbio 51 REINVENTING THE SOCIAL DIMENSION IN LATIN AMERICA and Dahl. The idea of governability refers to the attainment on the part of the political regime of a balance between the administrative actions of the political regime and social consequences that "absorb" the conflict or "contain" social indiscipline. Governance relates to the adoption of participatory modalities to improve the legitimacy of governmental action or designed to more efficiently manage the social demands made on the State. "Good governance - says Strasser - would in itself imply governments that are "really" legitimate and that provide room for social participation in terms of a collection of public governmental and non governmental actors, consensus between such parties, bureaucracies and effective and efficient institutions and administrations, and transparency. Ending his chapter, Strasser makes an additional conceptual clarification of extreme importance: the distinction between State and Government, a common sense stop for the sciences on political affairs, but extremely eluded by technical discourses and by governmental rhetoric itself. This preoccupation is always essential when attempting to distinguish the challenges through time: the goals to be attained, the resources to achieve them. It is a paradox that this reference to these four dimensions of political life is regularly noted by political actors and international organizations at a time in which the "space for politics" is clearly being questioned. The deliberation is today understood as a reform restoring the practice of democracy and not as its constitutive foundation, for example. The economic reform has taken up the full time of governments in an apparently technical exercise that, as Strasser clearly points out, is essentially political, as is the case of the decision on the costs and benefits of the reform and their distribution among the population. To examine the current situation of politics in Latin America, the author proposes an approximation to political practice based on three dimensions: the properly democratic one, the one relating to the political class and that of citizenship. Regarding the first dimension, he observes that, democracy being the predominant form of government in the region, it is so in a barely hegemonic manner: i.e. it coexists with a set of "forms of government" which do not reflect the basic principles of democratic competition summarized by the author as "majority and constitution." The identification of these forms of 52 CARLOS SOJO. JUAN PABLO PEREZ SAINZ government that coexist with democracy in our societies is also an indication of the limits of governability and the exercise of a "good governance". These forms gather reminiscences of the past, distant or close, that have stood the test of history and others that have emerged in the last two decades as a result of the socioeconomic transformations under way. Among the first we can mention oligarchy (omnipresent and possible made more acute by the concentration trends of the economic model summarized in the preceding chapters of this volume), and bureaucracy and neocorporatism, both a product of the expansion of the State and the production activities that developed under its protection and which gave rise to that combination of welfare apparatus with military authoritarianism that entered a period of crisis at the beginning of the 1980's. The other two forms of government identified by Strasser correspond to more recent evolutions: the rule of the political parties nomenclatitra and technocracy. The first one becomes stronger with the deterioration of the corporatist arrangements and the trend towards the diminution of the social and ideological underpinning of political parties, which, in turn has led to their crisis and potential dismemberment. The second one arising from the economic transformation driven by the first generation of reforms that placed the technical-economic rationality above the political need of re-election and the demand by citizens for welfare, to use Przeworski's terms. This gave rise to the practices that organize the situation of the political class and citizen's actions in the region. The first one affected by the gross corruption or patrimonial approach to the goods of the State. The second one consumed in the mundane need for survival, disregarding progressively the political issue that has thus been left in the hands of intermediate representations such as those exercised by non-governmental organizations. Propositionally, Strasser's work points out that the policies to be fosters should be first and foremost "shaped, formulated and implemented" in a democratic-participatory way. Then he underlines a series of related preconditions such as the critical dimensions of the current political practice to be promoted: the return of politics as affirmation of the common good; democracy without cohabitation; the restoration of representative politics that presupposes a restored 53 REINVENTING THE SOCIAL DIMENSION IN LATIN AMERICA political class and parties; and last but not least, the expansion of the "sense of citizenship" of the population. It is not inappropriate nor exaggerated to think that in the end, the issues of social development, in terms of central action of public policies, should be tackled based on a new driving force, not even fiscal, or administrative. Possibly connected with the final phrases in Strasser's text: "a task of political education" leading to recognize and confront "the dense web of power". The six chapters provide a contribution for the reinvention of the social dimension. It is not exclusive nor absolute, because inevitably there are issues that slip away and problems that are pushed to the sides by justified and necessary generalizations. Reinventing the social sphere is a permanent task and certainly, not only a responsibility of academia. The social sphere is thought, done and invented by subjective action, political practice and discourse shaping. No more and no less. 54 CARLOS SOJO, JUAN PABLO PtREZ SAINZ REFERENCES Appadurai, A. 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(2000): "Tendencias del empleo en los afios noventa en America Latina y el Ca- ribe", Revista de la CEPAL, No. 72. 60 CHAPTER I MAJOR THEMES IN THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN ROLANDO FRANCO II I ROLANDO FRANCO INTRODUCTION It is usually said that Latin America has had world's most regressive income distribution ever since the relevant statistics have been maintained (Morley, 2000). Recognizing this structural and long standing characteristic should not, however, make us forget how much progress has been achieved, which places the region at an intermediate stage of development, or the slow but ongoing improvements evidenced by its social indicators, nor is it possible to disregard that changes in the world economy -the process that has come to be known as globalization- have introduced new specificities, which need to be taken into account in order to explain what is occurring today in the region and the challenges to be faced in the future. This paper analyses the current state of social development, based on equal opportunities and certain minimum assurances of well being for all. As this requires overcoming demographic, economic and social barriers, what it is happening in the region in those aspects is explained. We also we propose an agenda of the key themes for making progress in overcoming the inequalities which hinder the actualization of each individual's potential and the achievement of a society with more social equity. 63 MAJOR THEMES IN THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN THE REGION'S RECENT EVOLUTION The eighties form a watershed in Latin American history. It was then that the long period of import substitution collapsed, as a result of the debt crisis that was mainly created during the previous decade by the private and public sector, and it was the beginning of the stage of reforms that were, designed to recover macro-economic balances, redefine the function of the State, expand the ground for private players, and orient these economies towards the international market. The new period has been marked by progress, stagnation and setbacks, the most outstanding characteristics of which will be analyzed later. It should be noted that this all took place within a framework of restoration of democracy. The demographic framework The Latin American region has gone through an accelerated change of key demographic values. On the one hand, there has been an attenuation of the rate of population increase, which makes it the first region in which an advanced demographic transition takes place in a context of economic and social underdevelopment. Today it is at the peak of the expansion of the youth segment, but given the rapid moderation of growth of the young population, the trend will be for its weight in the total population to decrease, thus facilitating the accelerated expansion of the proportion of older adults and the subsequent accelerated demographic aging. These transformations take place within the framework of an "urbanization" of the population and the public agenda, with a strong metropolitan focus and intra-metropolitan segregation and mobility processes. Instability of growth Latin America had a significant economic recovery after the "lost decade", that peaked in 1997 with a 5.3% rate of GDP growth. Later, international financial volatility was reflected in various crises that evidenced the vulnerability of the region, with the average growth rate 64 ROLANDO FRANCO decreasing to 2.6% between 1995-2000 (Figure 1). This rate of expansion was lower than the historical rate (5.5% per annum between 1945 and 1980) and also lower than that recommended for the region in order to ensure growth, job generation and social development. Figure 1 Latin America: Annual Average Growth Rate (1954-2000) 6,0 5,7 5.6 5,0 50 1951-1960 1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 Source: ECLAC. A bnref recovery began in 2000, and was interrupted in 2001, when the regional product barely grew (0.5%), generating rather discouraging expectations. The positive aspects are that, despite the adverse factors, the region's economies have in general managed to avoid a return to serious imbalances, inflation has continued to drop and the increase in the external deficit has been manageable. 65 MAJOR THEMES IN THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN Unemployment and informality Another problem in the region lies in a high level of unemployment that in increasing (Figure 2). This is explained not only by the slow economic growth, but also by the rapid incorporation of new technologies and the re-engineering of production processes based-among other factors- on greater flexibility of the systems to hire and dismiss workers. The characteristics of this unemployment are also noteworthy: it affects more people, over longer periods, thus decisively eroding the wealth of households, producing acute psychological effects and family problems, and forcing workers to accept significantly lower salaries in order to be able to rejoin the labor market. Figure 2 Latin America: Evolution of the Rate of Open Unemployment (1991 - 2000) 10 s,s . ... .............. . ..... , ............................... ............. ... .. .. . 9- 88 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Source: ECLAC 66 ROLANDO FRANCO As for unemployment trends in the region, two situations should be distinguished. Whereas Mexico and some Central American and Caribbean countries experienced considerable economic growth and a reduction in unemployment, the number of unemployed increased in the South American countries that faced stagnation problems. In Chile, the unemployment rate went from 6.4% in 1996 to 10.6% in 2000, and to then taped off slightly. In Argentina, a fall of 3% in the product increased unemployment to 14.3%, and then came the 2002 collapse which, according to the Chief Economist at the Inter- American Development Bank, is the worst crisis the world has seen in times of peace. There has also been an increase in precariousness. This can be seen in the increase of non-permanent employment, although there exists a very wide heterogeneity among the national cases; in 1997 it ranged between 9.5% (Costa Rica) to 45.1% (Ecuador), and had an extreme increase in Colombia, where it went from 6.6% in 1980 to 20.0% en 1997. This type of temporary employment is more common in micro-businesses and among those aged under 30, women, and persons with a low level of education (Martinez and Tokman, in ECLAC, 2000:99). By the same token, the number of employees without a labor contract increased. In 1996, the proportion of employees in this situation fluctuated between 22% and 65% according to the countries. A large proportion of workers do not have social security and health protection. There are marked national differences: they range from over 60% in Bolivia and Paraguay to almost universal protection in Uruguay (ECLAC, 2000: 101). Unemployment also affects relatively more women, young people and individuals from the lower and middle-income sectors, they encounter greater difficulties in competing in the labor market (Figure 3). 67 MAJOR THEMES IN THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN Figure 3 Profile of urban unemployment in countries most affected by unemployment between 1994 and 1999 30,0 1 1994 j1999 gs 278 1 24,8 Argentina 25,0- - * t Brazil 4 ~~~~~~~~~Chile ot ' * ' Colombia iVi , , Ecuador C 20,0 - Paraguay C | | | Uruguay E Iss | | g as ,5,8 Venezuela iss 4 5,8 15.6 oE is |_j__ E Etoth Men Women Young Quintile 1 QOuintile 2 QOuintle 3 Quintd. 4 Quintile 5 genders people aged 15-24 Sources: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of the household surveys of the respective countries. Poverty and indigence Poverty is defined and measured in different ways. In Latin America the concept of absolute poverty is usually used, which takes into account the household income, and estimates whether it covers the basic needs that are expressed as the cost of a minimum basket of food to measure indigence, and two minimun basketsI to estimate poverty2. This measurement, appropriate for market economies, has been carried out for some time for a large number of countries in the region. I The Orshansky coefficient is the value by which the cost of the food basket is multiplied to account for other basic needs. This value increases with the country's level of development and is estimated by means of special surveys, to determine the share that food has in the consumption of these population strata. For more details, see ECLAC 200 1. 2 Note the difference both in the definition and in the way of measuring it as compared to those normally used by OECD, the World Bank and other international agencies and governments. 68 ROLANDO FRANCO During the 1990s, poverty decreased in 11 and increased in 4 countries. In the period under consideration, 43.8% of the Latin American population was below the poverty line; this implied an improvement over the situation at the end of the 1980s (48.3%), but it is still greater than the proportion of the population that was poor before the debt crisis, which was 40.5% (Figure 4). The absolute number of poor reached 211,400,000 in 1999 (Figure 5), which is was mainly due to the fact that demographic growth was still high (ECLAC, 2001b). In that year, there were 89 million extremely poor people, which was 18.5% of the total population, a proportion higher than two decades previously. Figure 4 Latin America: Percentage of the population living in poverty and indigence 60 50 40 40,5% 48,3% 45,7% 43,5% 43,8% 0) E 0) 20 1980 1990 1994 1997 1999 D Poverty Indigence Source: ECLAC 69 MAJOR THEMES IN THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN Figure 5 Latin America: Numbers of poor and indigent in the population, 1980-1999 (in millions) 240 200 CO 160 135,9 200,2 201,5 203,8 211,4 120 93A4 g1.6 68,8 80,41 4: - 62.4 1980 1990 1994 1997 1999 j Indigence Poverty Source: ECLAC The generational factor is relevant. Between 1990 and 1999, the total number of poor aged under 20 increased from 110 to 114 million. This creates a major regional challenge since "most of the lifetime opportunities are determined by the start in life" (ECLAC/UNICEF/ SECIB, 2001). The geographical or regional location is also important. The incidence of rural poverty is higher than that of urban poverty (64% and 37% of the population, respectively), despite which the number of urban poor is almost double that of rural poor (134 million and 77 million, respectively), as a result of the remarkable urbanization process that has taken place in Latin American countries. 70 ROLANDO FRANCO Income Distribution During the 1980s, governments focused their concern on economic growth and poverty alleviation. It was assumed that both objectives would be achieved by regaining macroeconomic balances, ending inflation, withdrawing the State from certain areas, and expanding the spaces for the private sector. Income distribution was not a public policy objective. Today, however, it has regained space, both because economic growth has not improved it, and because economic debate relates it to three relevant issues. As opposed to the traditional argument that, at least during the initial phases of the development process, income tends to concentrate in those with the capacity to save and invest, it is asserted that a more equalitarian income distribution promotes economic growth: the more unequal a country, the less effective growth will be in reducing poverty (Lustig et al., 2001). Others state that it is not possible for Latin America to grow at rates higher than 3% or 4% precisely because half of its population does not take part in the growth effort, owing its low share of national income and its poverty (Birdsall, 1998). It has also been argued that there is now "unnecessary" poverty in Latin America (Berry, 1997) since if the [already concentrated] income distribution of the beginning of the eighties had been maintained, the increase in the number of poor derived from the crisis would have been 50% less (Londonio and Szekely, 1997). It has also been recalled that if Latin America had the income distribution corresponding to its level of development in accordance with international standards, the incidence of poverty would be half of what it actually is" (IDB, 1998). Lastly, it is asserted that the reduction of inequality increases the stability of democratic political systems, while concentration creates risks derived from the reaction of the groups that loose out. This new importance given to income distribution has led to greater interest in looking at the situation of Latin America in the 1990s, making use of several indicators. 71 MAJOR THEMES IN THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN The percentage of households with an income of less than halfof the below society 's average increased in 9 countries and only decreased in 3 during the 1990s (Figure 6), which also indicates an increase in inequality as a characteristic of the region as a whole (Figure 6). Graph 6 Latin America (16 countries): Percentage of persons with income of less than half the average a/, 1990-1999 1990 1999 Colombia _ i Brazdl 74.6 ;u 77.6 Guatemala 3 _.E Nicaragua 72.9 ; _ii. 74.9 Chile 74.0 74.5 Mex-co 752 F D__ _-____ _creased -- I : Argentina b, 72.0 ; I|_ _ 73 Ecuador 609.8 , i . ._ . * Panama 70.5 ; iEi== =i_ 71.t Bolivia c/ 71.3 7i ,,| 1 Honduras 73.4 1 d 71 6 Panaguav dv 68.4 70.6 Venezuela c/ 69.4 *,75 El Salvador 69.8 Iereased X 68.1 Uruguay 7223 Decreased i 67.9 Costa Rica 64.7 67.4 100 60 60 40 20 0 20 40 60 60 100 a/ The blue bars indicate an increase in income concentration, and the yellow bars indicate a decrease. b/ The initial year is 1994. c/ The figure for the initial year (1989) refers only to eight major cities and El Alto. d/ Greater Buenos Aires e/ Urban total f/ Metropolitan area of Asunci6n in 1990 Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of the household surveys of the respective countries. The Gini coefficient shows that in the period 1990-99, inequality increased in 8 countries and was reduced only in 3 (Figure 7), but with major differences among the countries of the region. In this respect, the extremes are represented by Brazil and Uruguay. 72 ROLANDO FRANCO Figure 7 Latin America (16 countries): Changes in the Gini Coefficient of income distribution, a/ 1990-1999 1990 1999 1raz-l 062; r I 05640 Bom 053b / l __ 0 58 Nicaragua 0.50 2 l 0 584 Guatemala 0.582 0 I82 Colomb,a c: J w1x Decreased 0 572 Paraguay d' 0 447 0.565 IHonduras 1 5 . . Decreased 0 564 Chile t 4 0558 Panama 0.5i60 0 557 Argentma e, I ol 0 542 Mestca 0.536ll 0 539 Ecuador C l 461 0.621 El Salvador 1I 507 0.518 Venezuelac/ 0 471 0.493 Carta Rica 0.438 . 0 473 Uruguay f J492 lDecreased 0.440 1C 0 0S 0.6 04 0.2 C0 02 0.4 o.e os 1. Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of the household surveys of the respective countries. a/ Calculated on the basis of the per capita income distribution for the country as a whole. The blue bars indicate an increase in income concentration, and the yellow bars indicate a decrease. b/ The figure for the initial year (1989) refers only to eight major cities and El Alto. c/ The initial year is 1994 d/ Metropolitan area of Asunci6n in 1990 e/ Greater Buenos Aires f/ Urban Total The ratio between the income obtained by the richest 10% of the population and the 40% with lowest income is very expressive of distribution problems in Latin America: the upper 10% receives, in most countries, over 35%, and in general, the income of that segment is 20 times that of the poorest 40% (Figure 8). 73 MAJOR THEMES IN THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN Figure 8 Latin America: (17 countries): Share of total income of the 40% poorest and the 10% richest households, 1999 a/ (in percentages) A,g ent- bl \en«rtaeIs - _,BSo ci Liuua cI 4 -, Brail Dommican Republ, C, V' i. Proouoy (. /j Z Panama ;c . 1. N -. 1r 9 u ' ' , ' ' ;.E - 1fd C | 4 0 .do n' 3S r o b r e t ' > / on'xRh -40% ns>: pobre __ Mexico >_4 Slvod.r 10% wa, riCO FronnaurOs Gu .ton&sl Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of the household surveys of the respective countries. a/ Households throughout the country, ranked by per capita income b/ Greater Buenos Aires c/ Urban Total Political unrest Public opinion has been affected by the economic and social fluctuations that have occurred over the past decade. At the beginning of the 1990s, Latin Americans' main concern was on the inflationary processes that were eroding their income. Those governments that achieved success in stabilization received electoral backing (Mora y Araujo, 1992). Workers in some sectors, especially in the public sector, reacted to the relative losses of salaries and benefits (ECLAC, 1996). The rest of the people expected to receive their share of the fruits of growth in the future. Today, in contrast, uncertainty prevails. The economic and social situation described above has contributed to diluting hopes and in 74 ROLANDO FRANCO many cases has made people weary of permanent adjustment. Opinion surveys conducted in 16 countries point out that approximately 67% of the respondents considered that the distribution of wealth is unfair and 61% said their country was not developing (ECLAC, 1998a). Obviously, such opinions are strongly rooted in the personal experiences of those who express them. The feeling is not the same among emerging groups as among those coming out of poverty, or among the members of now impoverished middle sectors, that can compare their current standard of living with what they enjoyed in the past. There are also other differences. The current generation feels that there are less opportunities available to it than those offered to the previous generation and to the succeeding one (Latinobar6metro, 2000:11). It is very common for young people to express dissatisfaction on account of the difficulties they face in finding a job that corresponds to their aspirations. This perception seems to be based on the development of the labor market and the difficulties of finding employment for young people with insufficient educational capital. In Chile -where the economic reforms have matured more than elsewhere and where significant levels of growth have been attained, there are indications of a growing concern regarding inequality that has tended to displace poverty conceived in terms of a lack of resources. This change implies that the population pays particular attention to the different pace at which the benefits of economic progress reach different sectors in society (Manzi and Catalan, 1998:555). The respondents from low and middle sectors consider that the current levels of poverty and inequality are not consistent with the growth achieved. They believe that this disparity derives from the dynamics of the system itself and from decision-makers, who are criticized for their lack of sensitivity. This all results in disenchantment with political activity, whether because of disappointment or because it is no longer perceived to be the apppropriate arena to conduct the defense of group interests. However, there is still support for democracy as the best system of government, although only 37% of Latin Americans are satisfied with its performance (Latinobar6metro, 2000:6). 75 MAJOR THEMES IN THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AGENDA The complex social scenario described above shows that the Latin American challenge for the new century will be the construction of more developed and more equitable societies, in which equality before the law is ensured, and the economic and social limitations that hinder the realization of each individual's potential are compensated. Inequality in access to goods and services and, in general, to consumption, is usually based on some attribute (ethnicity, age, gender, social economic origin, etc.) that, under certain circumstances, is used to justify discrimination that goes against human rights. The lack of participation in societal decision-making by those who suffer such situations constitutes a double obstacle for the realization of the individual's potential, because it hinders the exercise of political citizenship and likewise prevents the defence of individual and group interests and obstructs social citizenship (Marshall, 1950). Social development requires an agreement between the various players taking part in economic and social decision-making, around an agenda with the following main issues: developing more egalitarian societies, that are concerned with overcoming poverty and incorporating into the consumer society those sectors that today are excluded from it, and that allow for social mobility. Towards more egalitarian societies The recent decades have not allowed for progress in the reduction of inequalities. It is important to emphasize however, that these problems do not exist only in this period since they also characterized the previous one and those that preceded it. Thus, they reflect, and this should not be concealed, fundamental problems of the economic and social structure (Ocampo, 2000: 125). Likewise, the trend towards inequality is not -at least today- exclusive to Latin America. It is also present in the developed world, although at other levels of concentration. In the United States of America, for example, several analysts have underlined that information 76 ROLANDO FRANCO technologies increase employment and income opportunities for "symbolic analysts", the designation given to highly qualified workers dedicated to the production of knowledge-intensive immaterial goods (Reich, 1993). Conversely, the workers on the assembly line are affected by the growing demand for computer skills, and because companies transfer routine production processes to other countries (Thurow, 1992). Likewise, striking differences have been perceived in the European Community between the level of compensation of the better-off sectors of the population, which is increasing in a significant manner and employment opportunities, the characteristics of the type of jobs they obtain and the remuneration of individuals in the bottom 40% (Dahrendorf, 1996:44). This has given rise in those societies to a debate on "tolerable" inequality and feasible alternatives to develop (or maintain) the protection of those who are vulnerable (Giddens, 1998). The efforts to make progress in reducing inequality in Latin America are affected by the characteristics imposed by globalization but also by specific factors in the region which are not modifiable in the short term. There are four of special relevance. First, the distribution of wealth in the region is even more concentrated than that of total income. Its average concentration is in the 85th percentile (ECLAC, 1998a), which indicates that 85% of the Latin American population has access to wealth that is lower than society's average level. Secondly, there is also a demographic component, since the lower income households have more members (on average five or more people) than higher income households. Thirdly, there is still a high concentration of the educational capital. Only half of those who start primary school complete it and those who do manage to complete it have a much lower performance than their counterparts in industrialized countries. Also, the rate of those repeating school years is high. Of the 9 million children who begin their schooling on an annual basis, around 4 million fail in the first year. It is calculated that the additional cost of teaching those who repeat amounts to 4.2 billion dollars per year. Fourthly,, the occupational density, i.e. the number 77 MAJOR THEMES IN THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN of people in relation to the total household members, accounts to a great extent for the differences in household income. In some countries, the value of this indicator for the high segment is double that of the low segment. Given the importance that labor income has in the total household income, this difference would explain a good share of the high distribution concentration. The gaps separating those found in the first decile of income distribution and those in the bottom 40 percent is increased by the already-noted growing gap between the levels of remuneration for modem occupations and for low productivity jobs (Figure 9). Figure 9 Latin America: Labor compensation gaps between skilled and unskilled workers (1990 - 1997) 350 - t 1990 300- 1994 294,6 303 1997 250- 241,3 200- 178,6 181,8 154,7 150- Professionals / Formal workers Proiessionals t Informal workers Source: ECLAC. Emphasis is usually placed on the importance of education for competitiveness and also for improving income distribution. This is undoubtedly an appropriate recommendation, but any efforts made in that direction will not translate into distribution improvements within the next decade. The reason for this is that the turnover of individuals in the labor force takes place at a rate of 2% or 3% per year, meaning that 80% of the workers who will be in employment until the end of 78 ROLANDO FRANCO the next decade are already incorporated in the labor market. They will not benefit from the educational improvements. The concern for building more egalitarian societies extends beyond the areas of the economy and material well-being. There are other forms of equality without which no good society can exist. Some are even prerequisites for the good operation of the market itself. This is the case of equality under the law, which is proclaimed in Latin American Constitutions but far from occurring in reality. The reforms in the justice systems that are taking place in some of the countries of the region constitute a recognition of the existing deficits, that also occur in other places where no progress has yet been made. Another inescapable requirement is to secure equality of opportunities, which implies removing the connections existing between the possibilities of well-being and certain personal characteristics that cannot be modified or are only altered with difficulty (ethnicity, gender), or which are derived from being born in a family with certain attributes (socio-economic level, caste, etc.). Summing up, even when priority is given to freedom, the equality of freedoms should be ensured; that is to be equally concerned, at whatever level, for all the individuals involved (Sen, 1999:7). It is also necessary to promote the equality of opportunities for expressing thoughts. In any country, there are many perspectives on how society should be organized, and individuals, communities and groups of different types should be able to take their own perspective and develop their "differential acts", which leads to cultural plurality and to the right to express their preferences and to organize themselves to uphold them in democratic debate. Many of these principles are fundamental for an adequate functioning of democracy. The principle of "one man, one vote" has to be respected for democracy to work. There is therefore a requirement for civic equality. Although there is talk of the "political market", it is not acceptable for the (economic) market to determine political decisions. Thus, safeguards should be instituted so that those who have different weights and values in the market on the basis of what they have, acquire equal weight and value at the time of exercising their civic and political, social and labor, judgmental and 79 MAJOR THEMES IN THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN The United Nations Millennium Summit has set the goal of reducing extreme poverty by half in the coming 15 years. What are the possibilities of the Latin American and Caribbean countries of doing so? To go from 18% to 9% indigence, the region has so maintain an annual economic growth of 3.8% (Table 1). If the region is considered to be at an intermediate development stage, however, perhaps the challenge should be greater. ECLAC has therefore insisted that the goal should be to reduce poverty (not indigence) by half. In that case, the necessary level of economic growth would be 4.4% per year. The recent economic performance, however, as has been seen, is far from permitting the attainment not just of the more ambitious goals, but also of those less challenging. Table 1 Latin America: Economic growth rate required to reduce by half the proportion of the population in extreme poverty over the next fifteen years (target of the Millennium Summit) Extreme poverty (%) Growth (yearly average) Current Target Total GDP GDP p/c Latin America 18 9 3,8 2,3 Countries with 11 5,5 3,5 2,2 least poverty Countries with 25 12,5 4,5 2,7 most poverty Source: ECLAC. 1/ In relation to the regional average in 1999. 82 ROLANDO FRANCO Social mobility An open and modem society, concerned with equity, should be characterized by the fluidity of its social mobility. One way of ensuring a good performance of social roles is for possibilities or incentives to exist for access to better paid or higher status positions, on the basis of personal merit. In traditional societies, in contrast, roles are assigned on the basis of principles that reserve such positions according to factors determined by birth. In the first phases of development, there is a sort of "structural" mobility, whereby new positions of a better level are rapidly created, to which access is gained even without sufficient training to exercise such functions. In more advanced phases, mobility becomes "circular", in the sense that less new positions are generated and change occurs by turnover; that is, some of those occupying higher positions leave them (owing to retirement, death or unemployment) and the individuals who replace them must have adequate credentials (Pastore and Silva, 2000:5). Studies show that, in the region, only two out of each four urban youths had educational mobility, and one of each rural four. Conse- quently, it may be concluded that the probability of social mobility has remained is practically unchanged since 1980 (ECLAC, 1998a). Changing this pattern is strongly linked to the educational system. It should be noted here that merit-based societies, where positions are performed as a consequence of possessing certain capabilities, may result in exclusion and poverty for those who do not have them. Special reference should be made to a form of horizontal social mobility which is international migration. It has shown strong and sustained growth between the countries of the region and from various zones of Latin America towards the developed countries, in spite of those countries' restrictive entry policies. Migration, on the one hand, generates problems of illegality, border control and vulnerability of the immigrants, who on occasion are the victims criminal groups. But, on the other hand, it tends to generate improvements in the living conditions of those who migrate, because 83 MAJOR THEMES IN THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN they move to countries needing labor and with salary levels that are higher than those prevailing in the areas of origin of the migrants. These migrants have also demonstrated a saving capacity which allows them to send money back to their relatives remaining in the countries of origin. These remittances, undoubtedly, have a great social and economic potential. According to the IDB Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF) the region receives annually some 20 billion dollars from emigrants living in the United States. For six Latin American countries, the remittances represent over 10% of their gross domestic product. It is calculated that in 2001, the money sent by Salvadoreans residing abroad amounted to more than the cost of the economic damage caused by the earthquakes that the country suffered during that year. In larger countries such as Mexico, they undoubtedly represent a lesser proportion of the national income, but they still are one of the main sources of hard currency. Such remittances can alter income distribution in the receiving countries, because the likely targets are low income families. The links with the emigrants are an important connection for their countries of origin. In the first place, they form a market for traditional goods -especially food products- which stimulates the production of those goods in the country of origin. Secondly, they boost the local economy of small rural communities where the recipients of the remittances live. Thirdly, qualified emigrants (whose training was financed by the underdeveloped countries of origin and will be taken advantage of by the developed receiving countries) who maintain links with their country can become a transmission link contributing to the country's modernization and to the establishment of academic networks. 84 ROLANDO FRANCO HOW CAN THE AGENDA BE FULFILLED? Public policy perspectives Public policies are critical for the achievement of the objectives of growth and equity by means of appropriate economic and social decisions. A good economic policy has positive social effects, since it translates into growth, which is a fundamental condition for creating jobs and improving salaries. Even if only occupations with low productivity and low income are created, as has predominantly been the case over the last few years, they allow poor households to increase their occupational density and, consequently, their per capita income, which increases the probability that they will be able to escape poverty. The importance of the existence of a second contributor to household income becomes evident when extreme quintiles of distribution are compared (Figure 1). Likewise, growth generates more public revenues that can be used to finance social policies. Figure 1 1 Latin America: Primary families with more than one income earner, 1999 (percentages) H§ j10. 1' ;0l-> ~~~~I 0 Q- . 0 I t e w Source ECA, bae on 1 seil tblan of th _oshlssreso h re spe ctv countries. rn 8 - ~~~~~~~.~~~~~ D. - un12 . Cun,,2 Source: ECLAC, based on special tabulations of the households surveys of the respective countries. 85 MAJOR THEMES IN THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN On the other hand, it is clear that social policies assist economic growth by generating human capital and have an influence, directly and indirectly, on poverty reduction and improving living conditions. However, they cannot be considered exclusively responsible for the well-being of the population. The latter can only be the result of a combination of good economic policy with the right social policies. The three basic functions of social policies, which it is important to emphasize here, are investment in human capital, social compensation and social cohesion. a) Investment in human capital: education, health, housing. When the main production factor is knowledge, it is no longer necessary to resort only to ethical, philanthropic or solidarity arguments to justify the convenience of implementing social policies. Countries cannot become competitive if they lack a well educated and trained labor force, that can incorporate such knowledge in their work. It is therefore possible to think of competitiveness and equity as objectives that can be pursued simultaneously and are mutually reinforcing. From this point of view, social policies geared to investigating in human capital become a prerequisite for economic growth. Human capital is also crucial for the purpose of having welfare opportunities. However, it is necessary to recognize that in these societies it is an inherited asset. There is an intergenerational transmission of welfare opportunities (ECLAC, 1998a), through several linkages. First of all, the household of origin has a fundamental role in educational performance. Several factors are influential: i) the socio- economic level which affects nutrition and access to health; ii) the living conditions (whether there is crowding or not) which underlines the importance of housing policies; iii) the family organization (which can be single-parent, or with both parents present, and the type of union also has an influence); and iv) educational climate, defined as the number of years of schooling completed by adults in the household. 86 ROLANDO FRANCO Secondly, school is a critical link, which demonstrates the importance of policies for infrastructure construction, expansion of coverage, student retention and improvement of the quality of education, such as student training, classroom dynamics and teaching methods, libraries and curriculum. At this point, it is important to note the effect of non-school factors, which require efforts designed to compensate for them. This is the only way to prevent the educational system from operating as a mechanism for the reproduction of pre- existing differences. Another two phenomena of education that need to be considered in the process of generating human capital are educational devaluation and the educational threshold. Educational devaluation is the loss of importance of certain academic levels as their attainment becomes widespread; in the end, it accounts for the need to have ever more years of formal education in order to gain access to the same job or to obtain a salary similar to what the preceding generation attained with a lower level of formal education. Experience shows that the lower the educational level, the greater the devaluation. The educational threshold, in turn, is the minimum number of years of schooling required at each point in time to obtain a job that ensures a high probability of avoiding poverty throughout life. Currently it is around 12 years (CEPAL, 1999b) and is only attained by one third of young people in urban areas and one tenth in rural areas. This aspect is critical for establishing the responsibility of the State regarding the years of schooling that should be made available to the population. What was reasonable for the previous generation is totally insufficient today. Basic education is no longer enough for a reasonable entry into the labor force. Occupation is another link in the chain. Those with less than 8 years of schooling will only be able to obtain jobs providing income in the region of around two and a half poverty lines, which is insufficient for a minimum level of well-being. At the other extreme, those with 12 or more years of schooling will become technicians, managers or proprietors, and, in those occupations, will obtain income above four poverty lines. Those who are in an intermediate position 87 MAJOR THEMES IN THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (9 -11 years of schooling) in general will work as salespersons or in similar professions, receiving an income which, at certain stages of the life cycle -when they have formed a family and their children reach adolescence- may not provide them with a minimum welfare level (CEPAL, 1998a). Thus, the future of the new generations is decided at an early stage, with a division between integrated and the excluded, the latter being those with insufficient education to occupy well-paid jobs. They will not obtain adequate living conditions, nor will they be in a position to contribute to competitiveness, as they lack the knowledge and the flexibility to use technical progress into contributing to production. b) Social compensation: social protection networks. The fight to overcome poverty and indigence will remain a core issue. Social protection networks i.e. those sets of compensatory interventions which increase income and other wealth by means of targeted transfers, and are specifically designed to sustain or increase the welfare of the poor or vulnerable groups in periods of economic transition [or crisis] (Graham, 1994), acquire importance. Such networks should be stable. For that reason they need to be part of permanent institutional systems, with specialized staff and eligibility mechanisms for the beneficiaries of their services, as well as project portfolios to be implemented, with proven monitoring and evaluation methodologies. Otherwise, they will not be in a position to provide a timely response to protection needs at times of crisis. Since the eighties, such protection has been based on emergency employment programs, programs to combat poverty, and social investment funds, in an attempt to supplement traditional social assistance programs. Yet it is also appropriate to use measures to maintain employment, by moving forward scheduled infrastructure investments or promoting public works in communities that have faced natural disasters or unfavorable economic circumstances (Iglesias, 2001). It is inherent to the nature of such programs that they operate during periods of recession; that is to say, at times when the economy is contracting. Yet little attention is usually paid to this aspect, although 88 ROLANDO FRANCO it has been demonstrated that in a typical recessionary process, social expenditure focused on the poor decreases 2% for each 1% of contraction of the product (Hicks and Wodon, 2001). Summing up, the resources that would be necessary to overcome the emergency were not foreseen. The counter cyclical feature that should characterize the network was not considered. The decision on resources goes beyond social policy and relates to fiscal polices, which are usually procyclical, basically because governments find it hard to resist political pressures to increase expenditure during times of economic boom. This not only prevents the setting up of a pool of reserves that could finance a social protection network at the time it needs to operate (during recession), but also affects the government's credibility vis-a-vis creditors which become reluctant to grant new loans or demand higher interest rate. The solution could be found in the establishment of a flexible fiscal rule that requires maintaining a moderate and forecasted surplus during boom periods and the creation of a stabilization fund to finance social protection networks during times of crisis (Perry, 2002). c) Social Cohesion. An integrated society is one in which the population behaves according to socially accepted patterns and it generates an adjustment between the cultural goals, the structure of opportunities to attain them and the generation of individual skills to take advantage of such opportunities. Clearly, there are always behaviors which do not adjust to such guidelines, that can affect social cohesion or produce disintegration processes, and they are usually connected with exclusion phenomena; that is, to circumstances in which society does not make available adequate means (opportunities) to achieve the goals of the respective culture (ECLAC, 1997:111.73). The concern for cohesion does not imply a search for homogenization. On the contrary, it is important to ensure respect for individual cultural identities and to value diversity together with the contributions derived from creativity. For that reason, a cohesive society is one that shares global objectives and standards, and makes 89 MAJOR THEMES IN THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN room for a broad gamut of particular goals of individual and groups. This has special importance in multi-ethnic and multi-cultural societies. The incorporation of those who are excluded as a result of different types of discrimination (ethnic, gender based, etc.) is a pending task. In this regard, affirmative action or positive discrimination is a fundamental means of making progress in overcoming ascribed inequalities and the problems of low levels of integration in the region (poverty, social segmentation, residential segregation), with the addition of phenomena that are perhaps not new, but have currently reached a heightened relevance, such as the different forms of violence, urban insecurity, drug trafficking and corruption. Principles guiding social policy Social policy should pursue universality and impact. To this end it needs to resolve the issues of the institutional framework, through which its programs will be carried out, and efficiency in employing the resources available. Instruments such as targeting and appropriate methodologies for monitoring and evaluation will be used. Universal coverage has been part of the traditional discourse of Latin American governments, and it has been interpreted as the effort to deliver equal services to all, as a way of contributing to social integration. But Latin American practice has always shown notorious delivery inequalities, and for these reasons there are references to cases of exclusionary universal coverage and stratijied coverage (Gordon, 1996). The former gives emphasis to those who are left unprotected; while the second accentuates that although many are taken care of, the service provided varies in terms of quality and quantity. Such differences do not relate to greater or lesser needs, but to the status of the beneficiaries. Those who are better covered belong to the more educated, better informed, more organized sectors, or they live in areas with better service delivery and have the resources to 90 ROLANDO FRANCO afford the transaction costs (transportation, time), that are incurred in receiving the services. In contrast, access to services has always been difficult for those who, although having greater needs, lack the above characteristics. In the field of education, for example, although the Constitutions establish that the State has the obligation of ensuring a certain number of years of schooling for the population, there is a sizeable proportion of each cohort which does not even start school and another which drops out rapidly. The lower income groups are overrepresented among the excluded. Universal services thus understood have high costs and low impact. It is evident that providing equal service to all will be very expensive. To adjust it to the resources available, the quality of services is usually decreased and, therefore, almost surely the impact of the program on the beneficiaries is degraded, or, instead, "universality" is cut back on the basis of non-transparent criteria which orient services towards the groups mentioned, to the detriment of the neediest. Universal services should therefore be understood as seeking to satisfy the actual needs of all people. To overcome the existing differences, it is necessary to provide equal treatment to those who are socioeconomically unequal, by means of affirmative action or positive discrimination. Thus, for the children of poor families to go to school and stay there, requires assigning, in addition to good quality education, more extended school hours to compensate for the limitations that originate at home. It likewise requires providing nutritional programs and, even, grants for the opportunity cost implied in choosing school rather than a job (Levin, 1995). Programs such as Bolsa Scola of Brazil have precisely the purpose of tackling that aspect. These details are necessary because in the last few years great confusion has been generated between the instruments -such as targeting- and the principles which should guide social sector reforms (Ocampo, 2000). Fortunately, there is now a growing consensus that targeting is not opposed to the universalisation of social rights and even less it implies disassembling acquired rights, rather it is a form of positive discrimination for particular groups in the population that need special attention if they are to be effectively given 91 MAJOR THEMES IN THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN access to socially produced wealth and goods and services, that can place them in a decent situation (Silva and Silva, 2001:14). There has also been agreement on the fact that targeting does not mean reducing expenditure on social programs, but rather increasing the effectiveness of social spending (Draibe, 1997:24, in Silva and Silva et al, 2001:139). From the above, it may be concluded that there is a growing consensus that targeting should be considered an instrument for social services to gain universal coverage, and never a substitute for universality (Ocampo, 2001). Along the same lines, Barry (2001:52), when attempting to recover the "difference-blind" classic liberal principles states that the universality of economic and social rights constitutes an advance within the tradition of Enlightment. He understands that this framework includes affirmative action, to assist those groups whose members suffer systematic deprivations, provided that 'deprivation' is defined in universal terms, such as the lack of things (resources and opportunities), possession of which would generally be considered advantageous. And he concludes by asserting that such targeting on those suffering from systematic deficits would be a way of helping satisfy the egalitarian liberal demand that certain individuals should not have less resources and opportunities than others when inequality has been the product of circumstances in the generation of which they had no responsibility. The institutional framework relates to the role of the State and of other actors in social policy. In the last few years, civil society and the market have been given more participation, and it has been sought that other jurisdictions assume responsibilities and use their own and transferred resources for social policy However, in practice the State has continued to have great importance and this has surely had an influence in the growing abandonment of the more radical positions in the contemporary theoretical discussion. The Latin American historical trend has been one of centralization, both in the typical predominant unitarian matrix, and in the hidden centralism characterizing those countries which adopted federal structures. In the last few years, however, the experiences of social policies, especially those designed to overcome poverty, have revealed many of the defects of centralism, which leads to decision-making 92 ROLANDO FRANCO without adequate consideration of local characteristics and prefer homogeneous solutions for heterogeneous realities. This has led to many decentralization efforts that attempted to promote local participation and to create conditions for programs and their execution to be controlled by the beneficiaries. It also showed, that at the local level it is possible to calculate more accurately the costs and benefits of the actions to be implemented and that there is even room for experiments with alternative methods to deliver the same service. Not all decentralization experiences were successful. Perhaps in many of the failures, the lack of experience in decision-making regarding issues in their own interest played a role. It is usually said that the problems of democracy are only solved with more democracy, although attention should also be drawn to the community utopia lying behind many decentralization approaches that seem to believe that at that level there is no power, or infighting for scarce resources, or corruption risks. In that sense, the future perspective in terms of the institutional framework should lean towards avoiding general decisions, learning from existing experiences, taking into account local capacities on a case-by-case basis, and reinforcing that level where it shows weaknesses that prevent an adequate execution of projects, while defining the quantum of decentralization which is possible in each case. There will always be functions more suited to a central level, that should not be delegated, such as those of a normative, or surveillance nature, and others such as those relating to funding which, even if desired, cannot be totally transferred. But it is necessary to overcome the attitude, that the State knows best, which are the problems and how to solve them, and create spaces for the participation of other social actors and other jurisdictional levels, asserting that the capacity to innovate is disseminated throuighout society. It is not possible to carry out effective social policies without resources. For that reason, it is appropriate to review what has happened with social spending. As a consequence of the crisis of the 1980's, many countries, although not all, have reduced social spending. During the 1990's, in contrast, Latin America and the Caribbean devoted a record amount of resources to social issues, both in terms of the share of GDP (Figure 12) and in the amount of dollars 93 MAJOR THEMES IN THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN per capita allocated for that purpose (Figure 13). Social spending per inhabitant increased by 50% during the 1990's going from 360 dollars to 540 dollars per capita as the regional average, with only two countries recording a decrease in real terms. The increase was higher than the growth of the product per inhabitant. Over the decade, the relative importance of social allocations thus increased from 10.4% to 13.1% of GDP. Figure 12 Latin America (17 countries): Social public spending as a percentage of GDP, 1990-1991 and 1998-1999. C,E 'A~ l181' Prg- --tin- -- - Pananma1?7 1S* - 186b, 127 Mexa ico a18 'e10§10 t6axica _, - 71124 , 6l Penu_. Do-,mca Aepbkri 6 e 7. ; [33~~~~8 62~~~~~2 R Meninioa 16 6 *16 El Sabk11-1 _ 4 3 AMERICA LATINAt bl oa so roo lso16 200 25 0 Social spending as a % of GDP Source: ECLAC, Social Development Division, social spending data base a/ The initial figure is the average for 1994-1995 b/ Simple average of the countries, excluding Bolivia and El Salvador. 94 ROLANDO FRANCO Figure 13 Latin America (17 countries): Social public spending per inhabitant, 1990-1991 and 1998-1999 (in 1997 dollars) Social spending per capita (1997 dollars) Argentna i : , ; Uruguay um mmm Bnazil 1011 Chile " 4.0; 2 Panama a#4 Colombia 211E §o1c Venezuela e 2 , , 0 1C Domnican Rgpub-c *3 Paraguay 122 El Salvadora - on , Nicaragua * 7 § Ameonca Lorina bi sod1 1' C.I-N~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~' C I 0 200 4100 bOO 600 1000 120U 14JO 16O0 B800 Source: ECLAC, Social Development Division, social spending data base a! The initial figure is the average for 1994-1995 b/ Simple average of the countries, excluding Bolivia and El Salvador.a It should be noted that there are significant variations in the magnitude of spending, among the countries. While Argentina and Uruguay had social spending in excess of 1,500 dollars per inhabitant, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala were below 100 dollars. These are clearly different situations. Some countries need to increase the available resources, which requires a commitment from both Government and civil society, and the support of international cooperation. In others, the greatest concern should focus on maintaining -given the prevailing economic situation the level of resources for social purposes that were made available during the 1990's. In both situations, however, it is essential that efforts be made to make better use of the available resources in order to increase their redistributional impact. Although some budget items may be 95 MAJOR THEMES IN THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN redistributive, social spending as a whole is not so to a sufficient degree. If a monetary value is given to the services people receive as a result of public policies, excluding social security, distribution improves and it may be stated that the 20% poorest households receive a fraction of social spending that on average is six-fold their share of primary income distribution (28.2% of social spending as compared to 4.8% of total income). Such transfers represent 43% of the receipts of the lower income strata. In spite of this, the less needy continue to receive a huge proportion of social spending, when social security is included. The "window of opportunity" that the increased social spending gave to the region, which was furthermore accompanied by what has been called the "demographic bonus" 5 has not been fully taken advantage of. A high level of spending does not necessarily correspond to wise spending. Resources can be used with greater or lesser efficiency and programs can produce different impacts: they may improve the deficits existing at the time the program was started, be neutral, or even make things worse. For that reason, the pending tasks of Latin American social policy include improving the efficiency of use of the scarce resources, and the impact of programs. Efficiency seeks the alternative that will minimize the costs per unit of output (goods or services) supplied by the program. Many times this is considered "narrowly economic", which overlooks the fact that resources are always scarce, while needs are growing. What is badly spent in one case will not be available to cover a different need. Yet pure efficiency does not justify programs. They have to reach the objective for which they are implemented. In education, for example, the aim pursued is not building schools or paying teachers. 5 The "demographic bonus" is the advantage for the Latin American region derived from a slower population growth, which causes an increase in the proportion of adults in the total population, so that, in theory, there is a reduction of the dependency rate (CEPAL/CELADE/IDB, 1996). 96 ROLANDO FRANCO These are only the means to achieve the true end, which is to provide knowledge and values to the students. Therefore, in social policy the key issue is the impact, which consists of the magnitude of the benefit received by the target population as a result of the program. Thus, in a nutritional program, it is about assessing the percentage of reduction in grade 1 and 2 malnutrition in the target group (Cohen and Franco, 1992). The concern for efficiency and impact demands paying special attention to targeting. To target is to identify the potential beneficiaries as precisely as possible and to design the program with the objective of ensuring a high per capita impact on the selected group, using monetary transfers or delivering goods or services (Franco, 1 990a and 1995). This is the way to improve program design, since the more precisely identified the problem (deficits to be covered) and those who suffer from them (target population) the easier it will be to design differential and specific measures for their solution; besides, the scarce resources are used more efficiently; and the impact produced by the program is enhanced by concentrating resources on the population at the highest risk level. 97 MAJOR THEMES IN THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN CONCLUSION The Latin American economic, social and political situation is not satisfactory. Economic growth is not achieving the necessary pace to improve the standards of living of the population as a whole. Social policies, for their part, have received very significant levels of resources and it will not be easy to maintain them if economic growth is not sustained. At the same time it is necessary to improve efficiency in their use, as well as their effectiveness in meeting objectives and the impact of programs on the beneficiary population. It is necessary to insist on the importance of democracy and its quality. Democracy is a basic ingredient for a good society. Illiterate democracies are not such democracies and they very easily open up the way to clientage and to populism. Exclusionary societies are also a breeding ground for violence and urban insecurity and eventually have an impact on the functioning of democracy. They degrade the living conditions not only of the poor but also of those integrated into society, who are forced to live in behind walls, and cannot walk the streets freely in their own city, and it promotes the development of the private security business. One of the current European debates centers on the two-thirds society; i.e. a society where only two out of every three people are integrated. In Latin America today, one-third societies prevail. The concern is therefore heightened. As stated above, a good society and social development cannot be achieved by means of social policies alone. Economic policy has to do its share, and generate good-quality growth; that is, create formal jobs. It is evident that the region exhibits great vulnerability to unpredictable shifts in the international financial market, but it also needs to be recognized that there are degrees of freedom to make things better or worse through public policies. It is crucial for governments and other societal actors, to take on that responsibility in order to achieve success in the areas discussed above. 98 ROLANDO FRANCO REFERENCES Barry, B. 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(1992), Ensayo y error, Buenos Aires, Sudamericana. 101 MAJOR THEMES IN THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN Morley, S. (2000), La distribucion del ingreso en America Latina y el Caribe, Santiago, ECLAC/Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica. Ocampo, J. A. (2000), "Nuestra Agenda", Presentation by the Executive Secretary at the forum commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of ECLAC, Santiago, Chile, October 26, 1998. In La CEPAL en sus 50 anios. Notas de un seminario conmemorativo. Santiago, ECLAC (LC/G.2103.P). Pastore, J. and N. do Valle Silva, Mobilidade Social no Brasil. Sao Paulo, Makron Books. Perry, G. (2002), "Reglas fiscales y volatilidad macroecon6mica en America Latina", Informe No. 211, www.asuntospublicos.org. Reich, R. (1993), El trabajo de las naciones. Hacia el capitalismo del siglo XXI, Buenos Aires, Vergara. Sen, A. K. (1999). Nuevo examen de la desigualdad. Madrid, Alianza Editorial. Silva e Silva, Maria Ozanira, Coord (2001) 0 Comunidade Solidaria: 0 Nedo-Enfrentamento da Pobreza no Brasil, Sao Paulo, Cortez Editora. Thurow, L. (1992), La guerra del siglo XXI, Buenos Aires, Javier Vergara editor. United Nations (2000), The Millenium Declaration, New York. 102 CHAPTER II SOCIAL INDICATORS A BRIEF INTERPRETATION OF THEIR STATE OF DEVELOPMENT EDGAR E. GUTIERREZ-ESPELETA i I EDGAR E. GUTIERREZ-ESPELETA INTRODUCTION It would seem that social indicators have become once again of interest for social researchers, policy makers and bankers. After a lethargic period of over 25 years, and for many reasons, they are being rediscovered within a more promising and challenging context for social scientists. This chapter attempts to provide a context for the development of statistics and social indicators within the framework of the evolution of the term "development" and its relation with the predominant order in international spheres. Next, an effort is made to present a summary of the United Nations' efforts, especially in connection with the world summits. Likewise, the state of statistics and sources of data for Latin America and the Caribbean will be reviewed. Finally, there is an indication of which might be the current and future challenges. THE SOCIAL WITHIN THE PREDOMINANT SPHERE The issue of social indicators cannot be looked at in isolation from the evolution of the concept of development itself, which explains their slow evolution towards effective decision-making tools. 105 SOCIAL INDICATORS A BRIEF INTERPRETATION OF THEIR STATE OF DEVELOPMENT As from 19491, the word development became a perception shaping reality, a myth comforting society, a fantasy that unleashes passions. However, perceptions, myths and fantasies rise and fall independently from empirical results and rational conclusions; they appear and fade away, not because they are correct or incorrect, but because they are pregnant with promise or become irrelevant. To outline the evolution of the term, Wilfred Benson, of the ILO Secretariat was probably the first to refer to the countries in the South as underdeveloped countries in 1942. Rosenstein-Rodan, in 1944, called them "economically backward areas". On that same year, Arthur Lewis was already speaking of the gap between rich and poor nations. The term continued to pop up here and there in United Nations documents, but it wasn't until Harry Truman's speech of January 20, 1949, that it took on force and effect. Next, many thinkers proposed other definitions. For example, when Rodolfo Stavenhagen proposed the concept of ethno- development, recognizing that in order to shape national development, it is necessary to look inward and into one's own culture instead of using borrowed or foreign ones. When Omo-Fadaka proposed "from the bottom up" development, he recognized the disappointment and failures of the "from the top down" model in achieving the objectives established in various parts of the world. Or when Orlando Fals Borda and Anisur Rahman insisted on development with participation, they recognized the exclusion that development was causing. In parallel, a very pragmatic attention evolved with the purpose of finding causal explanations for underdevelopment; these mentioned: trade balance factors; unequal trade; dependency; protectionism; market imperfections; corruption; lack of democracy or entrepreneurial spirit. Some of these opinions continued to be echoed in the spheres of makers of public opinion. Between 1950 and 1970, we had in Latin America the Peace Corp, the War on Poverty, the Four Point Program, the Alliance for Progress, among other programs, which did nothing but embed the notion of underdevelopment in popular perception and deepen the lack of I The Development Dictionary. 1993. Ed. W Sachs. Witwatersrand Univ. Press, South Africa. 3rd. edition. 106 |DGAR E. GUTIERREZ-ESPELETA capacity created by such perception. Here, the theoreticians of dependence had their own share of responsibility, since the explanation they provided to underdevelopment was fundamentally the exploitation of one nation by others; the plundering of its resources in the past; underdevelopment as the creator of development among other arguments. On the basis of the lack of criticism, their critiques to the ambiguity and hypocrisy of development gave its colonial character an added strength. The concept of development was taken up by the United Nations since its creation in 1946, connecting its meaning with economic growth. During the fifties, the national accounts and the concept of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) begin to prevail in the analysis of the development of the countries in the South. By 1962, the United Nations Economic and Social Council proposed that the social and economic aspects be integrated as fundamental components of development. During the 60's that vision was maintained, but the recommended path to opt for development was economic growth going through various phases where the social element was integrated. By the end of that decade, it had become evident that rapid growth had brought about numerous inequities and, therefore, the attributes that the integration of the social and economic aspects demanded had become expanded (by that time, social conditions had become social obstacles to development). By 1970, Robert McNamara, the World Bank President, recognized that for the 70's it was necessary to analyze something else apart from the growth of the Gross Domestic Product; however, there was no consensus, either international or academic, or alternatives for other definitions. While during the first decade development conceptualized the economic and the social elements separately, in the second decade they needed to become integrated. Therefore, a new paradigm had to be formulated, under the recognition that there was an interaction between physical resources, technical processes, economic aspects and social aspects. The second decade of development that began under the unified approach, turned out to be quite the contrary: dispersion. Relevant themes or issues, such as the environment, population, hunger, women, 107 SOCIAL INDICATORS A BRIEF INTERPRETATION OF THEIR STATE OF DEVELOPMENT habitat or employment, were placed on the discussion table successively; each problem followed an independent career in focusing the attention of the public and the institutions. Later, it was recognized that the problems had a common denominator and that efforts were required towards unifying them. This gave rise to a new difficulty: Which of these issues was going to be considered at the core of the others? Disputes emerged in the different burocratic instances, since that determined survival and resource allocation in the United Nations spheres. Then, in 1970, the international development strategy was announced, while the United Nations proclaimed the need for a unified development approach, and for planning that would fully integrate the economic and social components in the formulation of policies and programs. But it wasn't until 1974, that the Cocoyoc Declaration2, in Mexico, emphasized that development should not develop things but human beings. Any growth process not leading to the satisfaction of basic needs or, even worst, interrupting them, is a parody of development. The Declaration also emphasizes the need for diversity and the search for different pathways to development as well as the goal of developing confidence in self reliance and the requirement of a fundamental change in the political, economic and social fields. By 1975, development was already focused on human beings. 2 In October 1974, the United Nations Environmental Program and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, brought together an important group of world personalities in a symposium on "Patterns of resource use, environmental and development strategies ". The result of this symposium was the Cocoyoc Declaration, which reads: "Development should not be limited to the satisfaction of basic needs. There are other needs, other goals and other values, the right to imparting and receiving ideas and stimuli. There is a profound need to participate in setting the basis for one own existence and making some contribution to the consolidation of the world s future." In Cocoyoc it was established that the objective of development is Mankind and not material goods, so that over consumption was strongly questioned as opposed to the search for the satisfaction of needs and a harmonic differential growth for countries, since it is in direct relation with the cultural and environmental characteristic of each region. Sources: http.//cederul. unizar es/revista/num Ol/pagl 8. htm; www.neticoop. org. uv/lapalo- ma/vidart.htm; www:semarnat.gob.mex cecadesu/ldigital/desarrollo sustentable_3.shtml 108 EDGAR E. GUTIERREZ-ESPELETA In the second half of the 70's, many declarations and definitions of development emerged. It was even recognized that development would not solve the problem of extreme poverty and hunger, or even, quite the contrary, it would make them worse; therefore, it was proposed that instead of trying to solve this problem, what was needed was to try to satisfy, as far as possible, the basic needs. This gave rise to the idea of group goals, very attractive to the World Bank that, since 1973 had already began working with the rural poor and small land holders. Around that date, the end of the 70's, UNESCO experts began promoting the concept of endogenous development, that was opposed to the concept of development as a linear process which led the different nations to follow in the footsteps of industrialized societies. The next decade, the 1980's, was called the "lost decade" in Latin America and the Caribbean. The adjustment processes meant for many countries forsaking the partial or totally many achievements obtained in the past, all in the name of development. During the 90's, a new paradigm originates called redevelopment in the North, meaning to say by this that it is necessary to develop that which was not well done in the past. The concept of competitiveness gains strength and is based on the fear of being left behind in the technological race. In the South, this meant maquiladoras and sink grounds for the waste from the North and the organization of the informal sector. From the conceptual and political point of view, redevelopment is re-interpreted as sustainable development, a common future as suggested by the Brundtland Commission. Sustainable development was conceived as a strategy for sustained development, not to support the flourishing and persistence of an infinitely diverse social and natural life. The Human Development Index is likewise born out of the United Nations, which bases its calculation in measures of adjusted income, life expectancy and educational attainments of nations. With it, over 130 countries have been ranked using a numerical scale. The Human Development Report also provides varied quantitative information of those countries, but does not solve the problem of using the GDP in the index, so that the choice is to recognize the limitations and suggest an improvement of the same. Currently, the report offers measures complementing the HDI, such as the Index of Human Poverty, the 109 SOCIAL INDICATORS A BRIEF INTERPRETATION OF THEIR STATE OF DEVELOPMENT Index of Gender Related Development, the Index of Women Empowerment, among others. The concept of GDP expresses the belief that the world is an enormous market, in which nations compete for economic respectability and a preferential spot. Considered the standard of behavior, productivity has become the new anthropological condition of each person's legitimacy. The GDP extends that condition to a national scale and thanks to the magic of numbers, experts see the world economy as a game in which a country's GDP marks the scoring. In spite of all this, as far back as the beginning of the 70's, the GDP had its enemies. Robert Kennedy had the following to say on the use of the GDP: "For a long time it would seem we have renounced excellence and community values for the mere accumulation of material things...the GDP includes air pollution and cigarette advertising, and ambulances cleaning our streets of accidents. It considers the special locks in our doors, and the prisons for those who break them. The GDP includes the destruction of the pinewoods and the death of Lake Superior It rises with the production of NAPALM and missiles and nuclear heads.. .And if the GDP includes all this, there is more that is not comprised. It does not include the health of ourfamilies, the quality of education, or the enjoyment of games. It is indifferent to the decency of our factories and the safety of our streets. It does not include the beauty of our poetry or the bonds of married couples or the intelligence in public debates or the integrity ofpublic officials... The GDP does not measure our ingenuity or our courage, our wisdom or our learning Neither does it measure our compassion nor our devotion to the country. To sum up, it measures everything, except what makes life worth living; it can tell us all aboutAmerica -except if we feel proud to beAmericans-. In our days it would be hard to imagine somebody disagreeing with an opinion such as Robert Kennedy's. However, the predominant ideology, even in the spheres of the United Nations, in practice leads to the adoption of positions and scenarios where per capita income continues to be the only accepted pathway for the resolution of contemporary social problems and inequities. Within that scheme, the broad development and political support that economic indicators have had is then justified. 110 EDGAR E. GUTIERREZ-ESPELETA Social Indicators: can a single system be created? An indicator is an instrument constructed on the basis of a set of statistics, allowing us to tell a story about phenomena that are not directly measurable or evident. The evolution of social indicators and statistics does not yet satisfy the expectations of social fora. "Poverty", for example continues to be analyzed only from the perspective of income. The "auxiliary" role of the social to the economic has resulted in the development of social indicators being subordinated to explaining how resources are invested and not to explaining the satisfaction of people in our societies. Although there is still talk of the development paradigm focused on human beings, there still are no international mechanisms effectively surveying and reorienting the future of the current and future generations towards higher levels of satisfaction, while respecting cultural diversity. Perhaps one of the most acute problems that social measurement has had to face is the lack of internationally agreed standards, with a slight exception in the demographic and labor fields. Referring to the limitations faced by social measurement, O.D. Duncan3 points out that -with the possible and in any case, limited exception of the economy- the social sciences do not have a measurement system that can be consistently described in terms of a small number of dimensions. As in the case of physical scientists, there are thousand of "instruments", but they are intended to measure thousand of variables; there is no system of units (much less standards) that, at least in principle relate all variables to a common set of primitive quantities logically constructed. The social sciences do not have the counterparts of mass, length and time and to these physical dimensions, as Duncan continues pointing out, economics has added money as a unit. The fact that Social Sciences, beyond economics, do not have a measurement system is, perhaps, another way of saying that theory in this field is 3 Duncan, O.D. 1984. Notes on social measurement: Historical and Critical. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Quoted by Martin Blumer. 2001. Social Measurement: GATT Stands in Its Ways? Social Research (Consulted in May 2002 in wwwfindarticles.com/cf O/m2267/2_68/77187771). 111 SOCIAL INDICATORS A BRIEF INTERPRETATION OF THEIR STATE OF DEVELOPMENT fragmented and undeveloped and that knowledge is broadly correlational rather than theoretical. At the beginning of the 60's, and as a result of the success in the management of economic policies, the analytical or deductive approach prevailed over the descriptive or inductive one in the United States. J. F. Kennedy's decision in 1964 to cut down taxes and the apparent accuracy of the predictions of econometric models about its effects on the United States' economy turned economists into a very influential group in the management of public policy in that country. The work of groups such as the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) of the U.S.A. government, became a model to apply Social Sciences in public policy matters, assuming that if the same attention and support had been provided, then social policy would have been rationalized in the same way as economic policy. This argument stimulated the birth of the social indicators movement in the 60's and beginning of the 70's. On the basis of these events, academic groups and social scientists began developing systems of social statistics comparable to those existing in the economic field, producing such important publications as Social Indicators in 1966, developed by NASA and Toward a Social Report in 1969 by the Health and Welfare Department of the United States, or Social Trends, produced in Great Britain since 1973. Later, Senator W Mondale and others legislated between 1967 and 1973 to set up the Council of Social Advisors, that would have the function of preparing an annual report such as The President's Economic Report, believing that with the creation of the CEA, economic information and the power of economists had been institutionalized4. At the beginning of the 70's, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) established a program on social indicators until the publication of Living Conditions in the OECD countries in 1986, while in the United Nations, the relationship between economic development and human development has been explored in different ways, to which reference shall be made in a later section. 4 Cobb, C. W & C. Rixford, 1998. Lessons learned from the history of social indicators. Redefining Progress. San Francisco CA (consulted in May 2002: www.rprogress.org). 112 EDGAR E. GUTIERREZ-ESPELETA The movement of social indicators was an ambitious attempt to produce precise, concise and neutral measurements evaluating the state of society and its change, using a variety of data, many of them originating in government. This movement had attractive ideas. According to Andrews5, it is important to monitor changes along time in a number of life qualities, both at the level of the population as a whole, and for significant subgroups, since such information, when combined with other data, may generate new knowledge about how to increase the quality of life through more effective social policies. This idea demanded two fundamental changes in the preceding practices. One was the expansion of the environment of the phenomenon being monitored beyond traditional economic indicators, as well as an explicit recognition in the sense that "quality of life", regardless of how it is defined, implied more than only economic considerations. The second change had to do with the intention of focusing directly on "production" indicators i.e., indicators showing how affluent people really were, beyond the more traditional indicators of "factors of production" that reflected budgetary distribution, procedures and processes that are assumed to increase welfare. An attempt was then made to build standard measures about the state of health, crime, welfare, education and other social characteristics of the population. According to Blumer (op. cit.), in a special 1989 issue of the Journal of Public Policy, a group of commentators agreed that the social indicators movement had failed as a consequence of its ambitious goals. Some of the reasons for this related to the political skepticism of right-wing governments in Great Britain and the United States during the 80's, regarding the value of the social indicator programs. But there also existed serious conceptual limitations, including the problems of developing a social indicators system and the absence of a common measurement unit in connection with social phenomena such as education, households, health or crime. 5 Andrews, F. M. 1989. The evolution of a Movement. Quoted by Martin Blumer. 2001. Social Measurement: GAT Stands in Its Way? Social Research (consulted in May 2002 in wwwfindarticles.com/cf O/m2267/2_68/77187771). 113 SOCIAL INDICATORS A BRIEF INTERPRETATION OF THEIR STATE OF DEVELOPMENT Blumer pointed out that the difficulties to make more precise social measurements are, actually, the most important obstacles in constructing indicators. One condition has been missing in order to create a system of social indicators: the existence of a common measurement unit. It is also pointed out that the government does not constitute an ideal scenario on which to implement the application of Social Sciences to public affairs and that the poor harmonization between countries are the causes of the failure of the social indicators movement. He contrasts this with economic indicators and their success both in the public and the private field, and summarizes it in the fact that they have a common unit: money, which provides a unifying thread. This type of common unit has not yet been found for fields such as education, health, crime or housing. He assumes that the public scenario is the object of diverse political interests and that, therefore, it is subject to substantial budgetary cutbacks according to short-term political agendas. Furthermore, the bifurcation of approaches makes the task of harmonization more difficult: there is a trend towards objective measurements (such as in the Scandinavian school of building indicators, centered on how the population lives) and another of subjective measurement of quality of life experiences and evaluations, more characteristic of Western Europe and the USA. Summarizing, the social indicators movement failed in its goal of initiating a harmonic international system of "social accounts". The difficulties in establishing a system of social indicators, such as the national accounts, are linked with the fact that social measurements go beyond the mere establishment or definition of units or variables. The national accounts and the "system" of economic indicators used currently respond to a concept of State and national interrelations that have been emphasized for the last 50 years. They respond to a way of seeing the world, which has previously been agreed upon in international fora, such as those of the United Nations and trade fora. Once the rules to "play" the game of world economy were derived, the "players" (countries) followed them and established their statistical systems to that end. In other words, the system of economic indicators is possible because it responds to a previously established conceptual model. For that 114 EDGAR E. GUTIERREZ-ESPELETA reason, Marris6 could design a system of coupled pipes and tanks as the basis of a general statistical image of the economy, where measurements would respond to three types: rates of flow of quantities of goods and services, rates of flow of payments in cash and average price levels. On the basis of such a system, it is possible to design not only a "consistent anatomic description", but also a common unit. In the social field, there is and there will not be a preconceived system on how social behaviors and interrelations should operate for a country in particular. In this "game", the actors are the inhabitants, human beings, everyone different and with different aspirations which collectively make up the social aspirations in their environments. Interrelations appear in a spontaneous and free manner and become expressed in a thousand ways. In a scenario such as that, it is not possible to build a "system of coupled tubes and tanks" representing inputs, flows and outputs. In the social field, the challenge of building indicators requires creativity and a new development model. In such a situation, the government is not, in effect, the best scenario to develop social indicators; more players are required. The participation of the various organized groups and the window for individual participation, are necessary to define a system to monitor national progress, although the government may be responsible for standardizing the data for their systematic and quality collection. UNITED NATIONS, THE SOCIAL ISSUE AND SOCIAL INDICATORS As indicated from the beginning, the social has taken second place in the world sphere since the start of the development era. However, in the last few decades important efforts have been made to construct rules of the social game as was done in the economic field, thus setting the basis for further initiatives. 6 Marris, R. 1958. Economic Arithmetic. McMillan, London. 115 SOCIAL INDICATORS A BRIEF INTERPRETATION OF THEIR STATE OF DEVELOPMENT As part of the preparation for the World Summit on Social Development (June 1995), the Conference of European Statisticians (CES)7 presented the Declaration on Statistics for Social Progress. It contains a historic overview of the contribution of statistics to the formulation of economic and social policies. It recognizes the usefulness of data sources originating in the administrative systems of government in areas such as social protection, health, education and crime. However, it also underlines the fact that these developments have not gone hand in hand with the need of counting with comparable, reliable and relevant statistics, in a timely manner, for policy making and monitoring: "Governments have often had to sail in the dark." Moreover, the CES recognizes that within the wide range of statistics, social statistics have tended to take backstage as compared to economic statistics. "The best estimate of the number of dispossessed in the European Community ranges between 3 and 6 million people at the time when the number of whales in the ocean has been carefully estimated and monitored". It is further recognized that social statistics tend to be seen as subordinate to economic indicators and that is a paradox of fundamental consequences for public policy, that while gigantic efforts are made to design or redesign social programs, the collective empirical knowledge in this area is at an elementary level. In this situation, the Declaration underscores that statistics should explicitly aim at attaining two objectives of the greatest interest for public policy: * Monitoring the attainment of outcomes of social policies and programs (e.g. changes in unemployment levels; income distribution; population's health); * Identifying those factors that seem to be linked to specific outcomes (desirable or undesirable) and that are a target for intervention via social programs and policies. 7 The Conference of European Statisticians is an intergovernmental organization whose members are the directors of the statistics offices of European and North American countries. Its secretariat is the Statistics Division of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and it is also a subsidiary agency of the United Nations Statistics Committee. 116 EDGAR E. GUTIERREZ-ESPELETA According to the Declaration, the mission should also include the development of relevant conceptual frameworks from the point of view of policies and the corresponding measurement systems. This Declaration was made seven years ago and, as we shall see in the next paragraph, the situation that then existed within the framework of "developed" Western countries still prevails in our region. In its 28th Session, of April, 1996, the Statistics Commission of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (UNESCECOSOC) asked its Working Group on Coordination and International Statistic Programs to follow up on the World Summit for Social Development (Copenhagen, March 1995). It likewise established an Expert Group on the Statistical Implications of United Nations Conferences to extract a work program reflecting the most important areas of action identified in the Summit and indicate where the international statistical work in the social field should be concentrated, with proper consideration to the Program of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo, September 1994) and the Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, September 1995)8. This Working Group, made up of statisticians of several parts of the world, but fundamentally from Europe and North America, recommended the adoption, on the part of the United Nations Statistics Commission, of a list of five policy themes and major social areas resulting from the three world conferences mentioned above, namely: 1. Population and development a. Health b. Material welfare c. Education 2 Poverty eradication a. Income and expenditures b. Economic resources 8 UN Economic and Social Council. 1996. Social Statistics: Follow-Up to the World Summit for Social Development. 18th Session Working Group on International Statistical Programmes and Coordination. New York. 117 SOCIAL INDICATORS A BRIEF INTERPRETATION OF THEIR STATE OF DEVELOPMENT 3 Expansion of productive employment and unemployment reduction a. Labor b. Labor environment c. Education and training 4 Social Integration a. Housing b. Work c. Crime and criminal justice 5 Condition of women and men a. Health care, education b. Work c. Income It is recognized that the policy themes are closely linked, emphasizing the need to develop a conceptual framework to integrate and articulate the concerns expressed in these world events. Likewise, the adoption of a list and menu of social indicators was recommended to set up a Minimum National Social Data Set (MNSDS), compiled based on the following criteria: * Direct relevance with respect to the five identified policy themes * Internationally accepted definition and classification * Indicator executable by the majority of countries * Feasibility of breakdown per sex. Since the World Summit for Social Development recognized that each country should define its own poverty indicators, the MNSDS proposal does not include specific poverty indicators. However, many of the indicators included are relevant to assess the degree of 118 EDGAR E. GUTIERREZ-ESPELETA disadvantage in participating in key areas of the economy and society. The 15 indicators suggested for the MNSDS are: * Population estimates by sex, age and, where appropriate and feasible, by ethnic group * Life expectancy at birth, by sex * Infant mortality, by sex * Child mortality, by sex * Maternal mortality * Percentage of infants weighing less than 2,500 grams at birth, by sex * Average number of years of schooling completed by sex and, when feasible, by income category * Gross domestic product per capita * Household income per capita (level and distribution) * Monetary value of the food basket required for minimum nutritional requirements * Unemployment rate by sex * Employment - population ratio by sex and, where appropriate, formal and informal sector * Access to safe water * Access to sanitation * Number of people per room, excluding kitchen and bathroom. It is also pointed out that the above list should be reported broken down into urban and rural, when the rural population is greater than 25% of the total population. The absence of process indicators, in spite of their importance, is due to the lack of international consensus on definitions and to the absence of data gathering mechanisms in many countries. This Working Group also recognized that an appropriate social statistics system is vital for the effective development of social policies, to inform the decision making process on policy issues and in order to evaluate the impact of social and economic policies. However, it was also recognized that inadequate social statistics systems constitute a major obstacle for an effective social 119 SOCIAL INDICATORS A BRIEF INTERPRETATION OF THEIR STATE OF DEVELOPMENT development. The lack of awareness on the importance of the link between policy development and social statistics, the need for more internationally harmonized statistical standards and guidelines, and to improve conceptual frameworks on which to summarize policy results, all points to the need of giving social statistics a higher priority, both at a national and international scale. Finally, it is important to mention that the MNSDS is suggested as a minimum data set; its adoption, according to the Working Group of reference, should not become a precondition for assistance in developing social statistics in a particular country. National circumstances and priorities differ, and this must be accepted and recognized as a potential source for different statistical priorities. The MNSDS may be seen as a menu out of which countries can select items of the highest national priority (See Annex A). But the suggested MNSDS was kept as small and basic as possible to improve the likelihood of adoption by as many countries as possible. At the 30th meeting of the United Nations Statistics Committee (March 1999) a report was presented on the experimental compilation of the minimum national social data set (MNSDS), which had been adopted in the previous session9. This compilation was initially based on official national data reported to the international organizations or gathered by the same, and complemented with national reports. The trial period went from 1985 to 1998 for the majority of indicators. No adjusted data, model-based or otherwise estimated data were included, the same as projections prepared by international organizations. In the end, "three indicators were left aside because of lack of international data, namely, average number of years of schooling completed, monetary value of a food basket needed for minimum nutritional requirements and household income per capita... In general, the data available and reported in international publications on the countries of Africa, America, Asia and Oceania are not as recent as those corresponding to European countries. Regarding the indicators of the minimum national social data set, with the exception of estimated data for total population and access to drinking water and sanitation, 9 United Nations Statistics Commission. 1998. Statistical implications of recent major United Nations Conferences. E/CN.3/1999/14 120 EDGAR E. GUTIERREZ-ESPELETA the latest available data for most of the countries in Africa, America, Asia and Oceania, go back to the period comprised between 1985 and 1994, while those corresponding to the European countries are almost all for 1995 or beyond". Some of the conclusions drawn by the Working Group are the following: * There are many data gaps in the international field * Coverage problems a Date of data * Scarcity of data (specially in Africa and Asia) * For some indicators it is necessary to consider the quality, comparability and usefulness of the indicator at an international scale (i.e. household per capita income), while for others no clear standards of calculation have been found (i.e. monetary value of the basket of food needed for minimum nutritional requirements). * It does not suffice to provide countries with a list of indicators. It is also necessary to provide clear definitions for each indicator. * There is lack of consistency among the countries regarding the concepts and the methods used in data gathering and processing and in the presentation of the corresponding reports. * The quality of the statistical data which are reported to the international statistics systems varies enormously among countries. As an illustration, the following chart shows the availability of data in the international field, by indicator and region. The Statistics Committee accepted the set of indicators with the replacement of the 121 SOCIAL INDICATORS A BRIEF INTERPRETATION OF THEIR STATE OF DEVELOPMENT indicator "percentage of infants weighing less than 2,500 grams at birth by sex" with the indicator "contraceptive prevalence rate". Annex B indicates the availability of data in the international field by indicator, region and date of the data. Availability of data at the International Level By indicator and region Indicator Number of Countries Total Africa America Asia Europe Oceania (Total No. of countries) (195) (54) (39) (48) (42) (12) Total Population 191 52 39 46 42 12 Population by gender & age 158 36 35 38 40 9 Life Expectancy at Birth 104 10 24 28 37 5 Infant Mortality Rate 93 6 21 23 38 5 Child Mortality Rate 96 8 25 22 36 5 Maternal Mortality Rate 78 4 22 15 35 2 Contraceptive Prevalence Rate 128 40 29 36 17 6 Mean Number of People per Room 37 3 11 8 13 2 Percentage of People with access to Safe Water 155 52 34 42 18 9 Percentage of People with access to Sanitation 167 51 32 42 32 10 Per Capita Gross Domestic Product 172 50 39 39 36 8 Unemployment Rate 87 5 26 17 36 3 Ratio of employment- population aged 15 to 64 66 3 26 12 23 2 * Number of indicators per dominion and priority level. 122 EDGAR E. GUTIERREZ-ESPELETA The United Nations Social and Economic Council asked the Statistics Commission, in its capacity as official technical advisory body to submit a report providing orientation on the conference indicators; conduct an in-depth technical analysis of the conference indicators; formulate recommendations on a limited list of conference indicators, and draft and recommend to the Council a statistical examination mechanism of indicators proposed in the future. This report was prepared by the Friends of the Chair of the Statistics Commission and it was presented to the Commission for information in its 33rd period of sessions held in March 200210. This report, which includes comments from a large number of individuals from 34 countries, besides the contribution of members of various international organizations, subdivided 280 indicators into the following dominions: demography, health and nutrition; environment and energy; economy and poverty; education, and other social indicators. The indicators were classified, furthermore, into three priority categories: indicators fundamental for surveillance of policies of the highest world and national importance, the gathering of which is recommended to all countries (first category); indicators adding information to that contained in the first category and comprising different policy objectives than those comprised in the highest priority indicators (second category), and indicators needed to establish a more detailed image of the situation in the dominion according to national circumstances (third category). The majority of the remaining indicators were classified in the fourth category of additional indicators1 1. 10 United Nations Economic and Social Council, 2001. Report of the Friends of the Chair of the Statistics Commission on an evaluation of statistical indicators resulting from the United Nations Summit. E/CN.3/2002/26 II The technical evaluations of eaeh indicator may be found in http://esa.un.or- g/unsd/indicatorfoc/ 123 SOCIAL INDICATORS A BRIEF INTERPRETATION OF THEIR STATE OF DEVELOPMENT The distribution of indicators per dominion was the following: PRIORITY Dominion First Category Second Category Third Category Demography 2 0 2 Demography/health 4 4 2 Health and nutrition 7 1 8 Environment and energy 6 13 8 Economy and Poverty 6 6 4 Employment and Labor Force 5 12 8 Education 5 2 4 Other social indicators 3 4 7 TOTAL 38 42 43 Source: ECN3/2002/26 of the United Nations Economic and Social Council. This study includes the indicators resulting from the Minimum National Social Data Set; the United Nations Framework of Assistance for Development-System of Country Common Evaluations for the Countries Assessment; International Development Objectives; Basic Social Services for All; Indicators of the Commission on Sustainable Development and Millennium Development Objectives, which is intended to follow up on the Millennium Declaration, that is included in this section as Annex B. As already seen in this section, the efforts within the context of the United Nations have fundamentally been unidimensional, disintegrated and focal; that is, the indicators proposed to follow up either action plans of world summits or initiatives of the Economic Social Council itself, have revolved on specific issues that are measurable on the basis of data collection whether by way of surveys 124 EDGAR E. GUTIERREZ-ESPELETA or census, or by means of administrative records. This assembly of initiatives also shows the absence of a conceptual framework allowing not only for assessments to be made on the condition of society, but also evaluations of the impacts of public policies. One characteristic that makes social measurement very complex is its multidimensional character and perhaps, for that reason, and due to the difficulties in arriving at consensus among nations in this field, the task has not been approached with the necessary enthusiasm. However, we believe that the effort by the Statistics Commission to initiate the process of harmonization between the information requirements of the major United Nations conferences is a very suitable step forward towards a better conceptualization of a minimum international system of social statistics. Within the United Nations there is an initiative, as already mentioned, intending to offer a multidimensional and integrated response to the situation of human development and its trends in the World. I am referring to the Human Development Index, that requires very basic statistics for calculations. Even so, there are 29 member states of the United Nations that were excluded from the HDI for lack of data, which is "indicative of the lack of data in a broad range of regulatory fields"12. Among the conclusions of this study, special attention was drawn to the following: lack of data and low quality of available data, inconsistencies between statistics published at the national and international scale, which undermines their usefulness and credibility and, the metadata accompanying the statistics that are published must include notes covering any other uncertainties. In spite of this effort, still pending is the substantive task of formulating conceptual frameworks to integrate unidimensional social measures in an instrument that will make it possible to analyze the processes and outcomes of social interaction. 12 Economic and Social Council. 2001. Reportfrom the Qffice in charge of the UNDP Human Development Report. Document E/CN.3/2002/27 125 SOCIAL INDICATORS A BRIEF INTERPRETATION OF THEIR STATE OF DEVELOPMENT SOCIAL INDICATORS AND LATIN AMERICA In order to make an assessment of the social indicators available for Latin America and the Caribbean, the following sources of information were consulted: United Nations * Human Development Report 2001 * http://www.un.org/Deps/unsd/social/index.htm * Statistical Annuary 1996 * 1998 World population projection * 1998 Demographic Annuary World Bank * World Indicators CD-ROM 2000 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean * Statistical Annuary 2000 * Social Panorama 1999-2000. For the case of the first two sources, the data used correspond to those variables that showed data for a good numbers of countries in the region and at least one year in the last two decades. In total, a set of 113 social variables was obtained, which is made up of 79 variables from the United Nations sources, 35 from the World Bank and 48 from the ECLAC. The following table shows the number of common variables; that is, variables that are available in the sources consulted. SOURCES United Bank Nations World ECLAC United Nations 79 World Bank 23 35 ECLAC 21 15 48 126 EDGAR E. GUTIERREZ-ESPELETA This table clearly underlines the scarce commonality between the sources, indicating very different interests among them. Of the 113 indicators, United Nations shares 21 indicators with ECLAC, while it shares 23 social indicators with the World Bank. The World Bank and the ECLAC only share 15 indicators. Only 10 indicators are shared by all three sources. Regarding the values of these shared indicators, it may be stated that, in general terms, their comparability does not reach satisfactory levels. Since the primary data are generated by different means at a national scale, the various organizations use different methods or protocols to incorporate the data into their respective databases. Of the 13 indicators, 34 come from surveys (of households, income and expenditure, fertility or nutrition); 66 are derived from administrative records (vitals, education, health, judicial, others); 5 indicators are built on the basis of census information and 8 come from the national accounts. The problem pointed out here was also underlined by the Working Group which made the experimental summary for the United Nations Statistics Commission. If the purpose was to follow up the indicators that emerged from the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), the World Summit for Social Development and the 4th World Women's Conference, the information available in the region, according to the sources mentioned above, shows the following: Conference Total No. of United World ECLAC indicators Nations Bank proposed International Conference 8 4 3 1 on Population and Development World Summit for Social 42 3 2 9 Development 4th World Women's 9 6 5 6 Conference If it is accepted that the conclusions or recommendations of these Conferences synthesize the concerns of an international ensemble; that is, not only of the governments, but also of other relevant players 127 SOCIAL INDICATORS A BRIEF INTERPRETATION OF THEIR STATE OF DEVELOPMENT in social dynamics, Latin America and the Caribbean would be in debt with the submittal of the respective follow up reports, or even more, knowing that some of the data for the indicators in these sources respond to projections or estimates made in the headquarters of those agencies. An interesting exercise has been the experimental compilation of the minimum national social data set (MNSDS) by a Working Group of the United Nations Statistics Commission. For the case of 39 countries of The Americas and using the sources indicated for the experimental compilation, it was found that for one of the 15 indicators, there were no recent data in 72% of the countries; i.e. 28 of the 39 countries of The Americas that were included in this exercise did not have recent data for Number of people per room. The percentages of countries without available data are shown below: % of countries without recent data available Total population 0 Population by sex and age 10 Life expectancy at birth, by sex 38 Infant mortality, by sex 46 Mortality of children under 5, by sex 36 Maternal mortality 44 Contraceptive prevalence ratio 26 Number of people per room, excluding kitchen and bathroom 72 Access to safe water 13 Access to sanitation 18 GDP per capita 0 Unemployment rate, by sex 33 Ratio of Employment-population, aged 15-64 33 128 EDGAR E. GUTIERREZ-ESPELETA This exercise did not include three of the indicators in the Minimum Set, which were not considered part of the experimental compilation. Both this exercise and the one shown previously, show a deficit scenario when attempting to make an assessment of the condition of society and its trends based on the proposals of the international conferences. With respect to the Minimum National Social Data Set recommended by the United Nations Statistics Commission, it was verified that the United Nations sources consulted provided data for 10 of the 15 indicators proposed; the World Bank supplied information for 7 of the indicators and the ECLAC sources gave information for 9 of the 15 indicators. It should be noted that for two indicators (Average number of years of schooling completed and Monetary value of the food basket needed for minimum nutritional requirements) no data are recorded in any of these sources. THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGE In the previous paragraphs it was noted that an indicator makes reference to a set of statistics that serve to approximate, or build a metaphor, on social phenomena which are not directly measurable. Likewise, indicators are instruments to visualize a concept, or approximate an assessment of the same in a very factual manner; i.e. through statistics. Therefore, indicators are supporting instruments required not only to explain the conditions or the state of a society, but also to answer why those conditions exist. Social indicators have been conceived to respond to very particular concerns, previously defined as unidimensional, when, in reality, social dynamics are complex and require the integration and measurement of the synergies between the various components that interact within a society. Indicators, therefore, cannot stand as isolated items of information, but in response to a concept. As their name indicates it, they tell a story about something, but that something has been previously defined. Consequently, there is a substantial difference here with some other groups of thinking. If "something" is to be measured, this should be done to the extent that 129 SOCIAL INDICATORS A BRIEF INTERPRETATION OF THEIR STATE OF DEVELOPMENT this "something" may be explained or analyzed in greater depth, and not merely to describe the phenomenon. There are groups of investigators proposing indicators with the intention of having them help elucidate the essence of the problem, without having previously defined which was the problem of interest the problem of interest was; that is, they use an inductive approach. These groups focus on measurement for its own sake. Many consider that the gross domestic product is used as a measure of economic welfare, although it was not designed for that purpose, and for that reason they look for alternatives (namely, True Genuine Progress Indicator or Social Health Index). The field is so varied that the construction of social indicators sometimes responds to very disparate interests. For example, the social activists of community movements would like to have indicators showing the impact of public spending reduction on the levels of social welfare. Others, such as the institutions traditionally involved in social policy at a national scale, would like to count with information instruments allowing them to define new social roles in policy making. It is common for this group to speak of "social audits", which, in spite of having many definitions, almost always refer to a set of social indicators designed to increase social responsibility and accountabilityl3. The Economic Commission for Europe14 alleges that there still is a major gap between the state and the use of statistics for social development. This is particularly evident when comparisons are made between economic statistics and indicators and social ones. This gap is more evident and profound in the development of international policies, as part of the abyss between the integration of the world economy and the discourse on the social conditions and implications of globalization. Among the difficulties that relate to this situation the 13 Social Watch (Citizens Control) is an example of this. This movement is the result of coalitions of citizens of over 40 countries that every year since 1995 (since the World Summit on Social Development) asks governments what have they done to implement the commitment of eradicating world poverty and report on what has been achieved and what has not. See http://www.socwathc.org.uy/indicators/queryhtm 14 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. 2000. Statistics and Indicators for Social Progress. Outline of a proposal for the Geneva 2000 Special Session on Social Development. 130 EDGAR E. GUTIERREZ-ESPELETA follow ones are pointed out:, the large number of different sources of data and players are pointed at, both public and private; administrative and based on sarnple baseds; national and local; the "conceptual" issues that are reflected in the statistical definitions, accounting frameworks, classifications, etc. and the lack of international standards. There is therefore a dilemma between satisfying the international demands for social information in a world that is ever closer, more globalized and the national and even local requirements. It is necessary to have a common classification language, but on the other side there is the need to maintain the diversity which enriches cultures. We find very particular phenomena, at least in the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, where spiritual and religious elements play a fundamental role in social dynamics, particularly in their capacity to support the construction of solidarity and safety nets at the local level with clear expressions at the regional scale, as well as migratory movements originating from many diverse reasons, ranging from urban insecurity, to environmental displacements and even those merely motivated by individual and consumption aspirations. The experiences of social life are obviously not the same between the city and the countryside, between the "more advanced" countries and the less advanced ones. We also face situations where we are told that the growth of this or that country is surprising, but its nationals do not feel this to be true. We are told that countries have good to excellent behaviors but, again, nationals feel the contrary. The economic discourse has become divorced from social reality and, as previously mentioned, the social has been subordinated to the economic, because it has lacked the instruments enabling society to chart the desired course, in a robust and sustained manner. Such complexity means that when an assessment of reality is effectively attempted through information items that may be easily become knowledge items, the task is neither simple nor easy. On the contrary, it is complex and requires creativity and forsaking the conceptions of the past. We therefore face the reality of an initiative at an international scale, conducted by the United Nations, making a proposal such as the minimum social indicators set and that, on the other side also recognizes the need for countries to define their own 131 SOCIAL INDICATORS A BRIEF INTERPRETATION OF THEIR STATE OF DEVELOPMENT indicators, at least in the field of what has come to be called "poverty". Faced with this situation, there is the challenge of providing, in the first place, for the satisfaction of a set of demands from society regarding itself, in the sense of being able to make appropriate assessments of its integration, its inclusion and its participation in the decision making process, and on the other, a demand from the international community to be able to provide tracking for a set of issues that are fundamental for human development. The support to generate official statistics is fundamental in that sense (See Annex C). In some initiatives relating to the social indicators movement, it was said that the definition of indicators was important to tell us if we are heading the right way, that they should be relevant in policy- making and help in effectively evaluating social programs. However, going in the right direction depends on what that direction is and who has defined it. Within that context, the right direction is that which has been defined by the social ensemble formed by the participation of organized groups (non governmental organizations, labor, business, professionals, etc.) and the government and the political class represented in political parties. Although it is true and needs to be recognized that social indicators are lagging behind and that there lacks a conceptual framework to integrate them, it is also important to recognize that society, its organizations and windows for individual participation are those that should define the desired orientation ; the goals at five, ten or fifteen years time, and consequently support those indicators that allow for the tracking down of the social ensemble in that journey. That is important and fundamental, if social indicators are truly to serve for an effective assessment of the social parameters considered relevant towards a society for all. 132 EDGAR E. GUTIERREZ-ESPELETA ANNEX A MENU OF INDICATORS Document E/CN.3/AC. 1/l 996/R.4 of the United Nations Economic and Social Council General Population estimates by sex, age and, where appropriate and feasible, ethnic group 1. Population and development * Life expectancy at birth, by sex * Child mortality, by sex * Under-five mortality, by sex * Maternal mortality * Percentage of underweight infants at birth, by sex * Average number of years of schooling completed, by urban/rural, sex and, where possible, by income classes * Percentage of pregnant women who have at least one ante- natal visit * Percentage of pregnant women who have a trained attendant at delivery * Percentage of pregnant women immunized against tetanus 133 SOCIAL INDICATORS A BRIEF INTERPRETATION OF THEIR STATE OF DEVELOPMENT * Contraceptive prevalence rate * Incidence and prevalence of sexually transmitted diseases * Quality of family planning services * Access to, and quality of, maternal health services * Incidence of female genital mutilation 2. Eradicating poverty * Physical and mental health * Literacy * Family conditions * Unemployment * Social exclusion * Homelessness * National and international causes underlying poverty Absolute poverty * Number of people per room, excluding kitchen and bathroom * Access to safe water * Access to sanitation * Monetary value of the basket of food needed for minimum nutritional requirements * Percentage of the population in poverty (poverty or poverty line defined nationally) * Access to services related to health, nutrition, and community infrastructure * Income * Education * Possibility of entering the labor force * Food * Food prices * Access to productive assets, especially land and water * Geographic location * Public transfers 134 EDGAR E. GUTIERREZ-ESPELETA Relative poverty * Families below a minimum standard of income (poverty line) * Poverty gap * Families with less than 25 per cent of mean income * Gini coefficients * Percentage of the population in the lowest income quintile * Percentage of the population in the highest income quintile 3. Expansion of productive employment and reduction of unemployment * GDP per capita * Household income per capita (level and distribution) * Unemployment rate, by sex * Employment rate, by sex and, where appropriate, formal and informal sector * Wage employment as a percentage of the population aged 16 and over, where possible by sex * Formal sector employment as a percentage of total employment * Median and average length of job tenure in years, where possible by sex * Index of real wages in manufacturing and in the economy as a whole where possible * Ratio of average wage in the formal sector and GDP per person * Wage dispersion in manufacturing industries, measured by the coefficient of variation, for males and females separately where possible * Ratio of average female to average male wage in manufacturing and in the economy as a whole where possible * Unpaid work outside of the market economy * Non-wage compensation (fringe benefits) * Time-use * Precariousness of employment * Visible underemployment * Invisible underemployment * Training data, including informal kinds of training 135 SOCIAL INDICATORS A BRIEF INTERPRETATION OF THEIR STATE OF DEVELOPMENT 4. Social integration * Number of people in vulnerable groups * Age/gender structure * Occupational profile * Economic activity profile * Income levels * Position within overall income distribution * Housing standards/amenities, such as access to safe water, sanitation and floor space per person * Health status, such as infant mortality rate, age-specific mortality rates, expectation of life and nutritional intake * Educational standards, such as adult literacy rate, number of years of formal education and participation rates (for children) * Crime victimization rate * Proportion eligible to vote 5. Status of women and men * Data distributed by sex on: * Population and housing * Health * Diseases and causes of death * Education * Enrolment rates * Drop-out rates * Highest level education by subject * Time-use * Child health care * Gainful employment * Wage, salary and income * Informal sector * Income control * Access to land and credit * Influence and power * Decision-making * Violence and crime 136 EDGAR E. GUTIERREZ-ESPELETA ANNEX B MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS Document E/CN.3/2002/25 of the United Nations Economic and Social Council Goals and Targets Indicators Goal 1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger Target 1. Halve, between 1990 and 2015, 1 Proportion of population whose income is the proportion of people whose below $ la day. income is less than one dollar a 2 Poverty gap ratio (incidence x depth of poverty. day. 3 Share of poorest quintile in national consumption. Target 2. Halve, between 1990 and 2015, 4 Prevalence of underweight children (under five the proportion of people who years of age) suffer from hunger. 5 Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption. Goal 2. Achieve universal primary education Target 3. Ensure that, by 2015. children 6 Enrolment ratio in primary education. everywhere, boys and girls 7 Proportion of pupils starting grade I who reach alike, will be able to complete a grade 5. full course of primary 8 Literacy rate of 15-to-24-year-olds. schooling. 137 SOCIAL INDICATORS A BRIEF INTERPRETATION OF THEIR STATE OF DEVELOPMENT Goals and Targets Indicators Goal 3. Promote gender equality and empower women Target 4. Eliminate gender disparity in 9. Ratio of girls to boys in primary, secondary and pnmary and secondary education, tertiary education. preferably by 2005, and to all 10. Ratio of literate females to males of 15-to-24- levels of education no later than year-olds. 2015. 11. Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector. 12. Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament. Goal 4. Reduce child mortality Target 5. Reduce by two thirds, between 13. Under-five mortality rate. 1990 and 2015, the under-five 14. Infant mortality rate. mortality rate. 15. Proportion of 1-year-old children immunized against measles. Goal 5. Improve maternal health Target 6. Reduce by three quarters, 16. Matemal mortality ratio. between 1990 and 2015, the 17. Proportion of births attended by skilled health matemal mortality ratio. personnel. Goal 6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases Target 7. Havehaltedby 2015 and begun 18. HIV prevalence among 15-to-24-year-old to reverse the spread of pregnant women. HIV/AIDS. 19. Contraceptive prevalence rate. 20. Number of children orphaned by HIV/AIDS. 21. Prevalence and death rates associated with malaria. Target 8. Have halted, by 2015, and 22. Proportion of population in malaria risk areas begun to reverse the incidence using effective malaria prevention and of malaria and other major treatment measures. diseases. 23. Prevalence and death rates associated with tuberculosis. 24. Proportion of tuberculosis cases detected and cured under directly observed treatmnent short course. 138 EDGAR E. GUTIERREZ-ESPELETA Goals and Targets Indicators Goal 7. Ensure environmental sustainability Target 9. Integrate the principles of 25. Proportion of land area covered by forest. sustainable development into 26. Land area protected to maintain biological country policies and programs diversity. and reverse the loss of 27. GDP per unit of energy use (as proxy for energy environmental resources, efficiency) 28 Carbon dioxide emissions (per capita) [Plus Target 10. Halve by 2015 the proportion two figures of global atmospheric pollution: of people without sustainable ozone depletion and the accumulation of global access to safe drinking water. warming gases] 29. Proportion of population with sustainable Target 1. By 2020 to have achieved a access to an improved water source. significant improvement in the 30. Proportion of people with access to improved lives of at least 100 million sanitation. slum dwellers. 31. Proportion of people with access to secure tenure. [Urban/rural disaggregation of several of the above indicators may be relevant for monitoring |__________ _ improvement in the lives of slum dwellers] Goal 8. Develop a global partnership for development Target 12. Develop further an open, rule- [Some of the indicators listed below will be based, predictable, non- monitored separately for the least developed discriminatory trading and countries (LCDs), Africa, landlocked countries financial system. and small island developing States] Includes a commitment to good Oficia development assistance govemance, development, and 32. Net ODA as percentage of OECD/DAC poverty reduction - both donor's gross national product (targets of 0.7% nationally and intemationally. in total and 0.15% for LDCs) Target 13. Address the special needs of the 33. Proportion of ODA to basic social services least developed countries. (basic education, primary health care, nutrition, Includes: tariff and quota free safe water and sanitation) access for least developed countries' exports; enhanced 34. Proportion of ODA that is untied program of debt relief for HIPCs and cancellation of official bilateral debt: and more generous ODA for countries committed to poverty reduction. 139 SOCIAL INDICATORS A BRIEF INTERPRETATION OF THEIR STATE OF DEVELOPMENT Target 14. Address the special needs of 35. Proportion of ODA for environment in small landlocked countries and small island developing States island developing States. 36. Proportion of ODA for transport sector in landlocked countries. (through the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Market Access Development of Small Island 37. Proportion of exports (by value and excluding Developing States and the arms) admitted free of duties and quotas outcome of the twenty-second 38. Average tariffs and quotas on agricultural special session of the General products and textiles and clothing Assembly) 39. Domestic and export agricultural subsidies in OECD countries Target 15. Deal comprehensively with the 40. Proportion of ODA provided to help build trade debt problems of developing capacity countries through national and intemational measures in order Debt Sustainability to make debt sustainable in the 41. Proportion of official bilateral HIPC debt long term. cancelled 42. Debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services Target 16. In cooperation with developing 43. Proportion of ODA provided as debt relief countries, develop and 44. Number of countries reaching HIPC decision implement strategies for decent and completion points. and productive work for youth 45. Unemployment rate of 15-to-24-year-olds Target 17. In cooperation with pharma- 46. Proportion of population with access to ceutical companies, provide affordable essential drugs on a sustainable basis access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries. Target 18. In cooperation with the private 47. Telephone lines per 1,000 people sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, 48. Personal computers per 1,000 people especially information and communications a [Other indicators to be decided] 140 EDGAR E. GUTIERREZ-ESPELETA ANNEX C FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF OFFICIAL STATISTICS United Nations Statistical Commission: 1. Official statistics provide an indispensable element in the information system of a society, serving the government, the economy and the public with data about the economic, demographic, social and environmental situation. To this end, official statistics that meet the test of practical utility are to be compiled and made available on an impartial basis by official statistical agencies to honor citizens' entitlement to public information; 2. To retain trust in official statistics, the statistical agencies need to decide according to strictly professional considerations, including scientific principles and professional ethics, on the methods and procedures for the collection, processing, storage and presentation of statistical data; 3. To facilitate a correct interpretation of the data, the statistical agencies are to present information according to scientific standards on the sources, methods and procedures of the statistics; 141 SOCIAL INDICATORS A BRIEF INTERPRETATION OF THEIR STATE OF DEVELOPMENT 4. The statistical agencies are entitled to comment on erroneous interpretation and misuse of statistics; 5. Data for statistical purposes may be drawn from all types of sources, be they statistical surveys or administrative records. Statistical agencies are to choose the source with regard to quality, timeliness, costs and the burden on respondents; 6. Individual data collected by statistical agencies for statistical compilation, whether they refer to natural or legal persons, are to be strictly confidential and used exclusively for statistical purposes; 7. The laws, regulations and measures under which the statistical systems operate are to be made public; 8. Coordination among statistical agencies within countries is essential to achieve consistency and efficiency in the statistical system; 9. The use by statistical agencies in each country of international concepts, classifications and methods promotes the consistency and efficiency of statistical systems at all official levels; 10. Bilateral and multilateral cooperation in statistics contributes to the improvement of systems of official statistics in all countries. 142 CHAPTER III SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS SARA GORDON R. i i i i SARA GORDON R. INTRODUCTION The difficulties being experienced by the economies of Latin American countries to consolidate an ongoing growth allowing substantive achievements in social welfare have driven the debate on the most appropriate ways to shield the majority of the population from poverty in a constant manner and without interruptions or discontinuities. Starting with the processes of democratization and reforms designed to establish regulation by the market, the use of the concept of citizenship and social rights related to the same has become increasingly more frequent, as a criterion to address social welfare. In the debate involving various political and social regional and international actors, committed to or involved in the fight against poverty, the notion has become disseminated that the appropriate way of protecting the most vulnerable population and preventing deficits beyond certain limits is guaranteeing economic and social rights; thus, they say, government policies will focus on satisfying people's basic needs, and solid safety nets will be established to ensure lasting welfare. Other modes of providing welfare, such as charity or generosity, lack the mechanisms to guarantee continuity and foster gratitude and dependence. 145 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS Undoubtedly, appealing to citizenship and to social and economic rights as allocation criteria indicates common social objectives to be attained, and the bearing towards which society wishes to be steered, thus becoming guiding principles. In Marshall's words: ".... societies in which citizenship is a developing institution create an image of ideal citizenship against which they may compare the achievements attained and that becomes the object of aspirations" (1950). This process is strengthened because citizenship contains a strongly integrating character and because numerous social services, such as, e.g. health and education, by addressing the interests and welfare of individual citizens, satisfy the needs of the community as a whole (Hindess, 1993:28). The allocation of welfare, in accordance with the criteria of rights, will in turn make it possible to build conditions to make the development model feasible and facilitate consensus in favor of democracy. As a result of the growing use and influence of citizenship and social rights, it is essential to reflect on the power of such principles to become distribution criteria and on the feasibility of applying international legal instruments with a view to their attainment in Latin America and the Caribbean. This paper has the purpose of reflecting on the advantages and difficulties of this approach to address needs, a task which implies analyzing the postulate of economic, social and cultural rights in the light of the main perspectives of the debate in the international and Latin American scene and the components of the vision over those that prevail in most of the countries of the continent. Likewise, it implies an approach to the operating conditions and an evaluation of the extent to which the international legislation signed by the countries in the region is an effective instrument for the realization of such rights. We shall start from a general description of the socio-economic situation of the countries in the region, with special emphasis on poverty related variables, with the aim of keeping in sight the magnitude of the task ahead, and will approach the reflection in two planes: one, theoretical-conceptual and the other, instrumental, with the latter linked to operating conditions. In the conceptual plane we will go back to some approaches to citizenship developed in the 146 SARA GORDON R. international analysis, the manner in which they have become embodied in agreements signed within the framework of international organizations and the main components of the debate that has resulted from them. Likewise, we shall refer to the validity and applicability of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in the international field, and, regionally, we shall analyze the fundamental traits of the conceptions and practices relating to those rights. To develop the instrumental plane, we will select essential variables linked to these concepts and illustrate some with empirical references. Poverty in Latin America In general terms, the economic recovery experienced by the countries of the region after the financial crisis of the eighties has been weak, with irregular growth rates and discontinuities, that have had little effect on poverty (IDB, 1997:18). Few countries in the region have achieved a high and sustained growth rate, and only Chile and Colombia grew by more than 5% per year for four consecutive years (IDB, 1997:9-10) and only five countries -Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica and Uruguay- managed to reach a level of per capita income higher than that of the period prior to the crisis (Ibid.). Although the resumption of growth during the nineties made possible a slight decrease of the poverty rate in most of the countries of the region, the number of poor has risen due to population growth. According to ECLAC data, the reduction of the relative incidence of poverty, both at a household and individual level, was not sufficient to fully counterbalance the demographic growth of the period, since between 1990 and 1999, poverty increased by 11 million people. However, what was achieved was a reduction of the quantity of population in a situation of extreme poverty, by almost 4 million people (CEPAL, 2001:15). The lack of growth stability and of achievements in poverty reduction is also evidenced when we observe briefer periods. According to the same source, towards 1999, "43.8% of the population in the region (211 million people) were in a situation of 147 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS poverty, three tenths of one percent more than in 1997" I, while in that period the population in a situation of extreme poverty went from 19% to 18.5% (a little more than 89 million), which in absolute terms meant an increase of 0.6 million people (CEPAL, 2001:13). These characteristics of the development model and the difficulty in abating poverty rates, have contributed to build a consensus around the urgency of applying measures to make it possible to ensure subsistence minimums to the population. One approach to materialize this consensus is that of guaranteeing access to certain aspects of welfare by the effective application of economic, social and cultural rights as citizenship rights. However, this approach presents obstacles and difficulties that should be known and, as may be the case, overcome, with the purpose of clarifying the conditions under which the rights can be applied as an allocation criterion. COMPONENTS OF THE CONCEPTION AND SOCIAL RIGHT PRACTICES IN LATIN AMERICA Although we cannot speak of a homogeneous notion of economic, social and cultural rights in Latin America, there are undoubtedly common sources and similar traits. We will touch upon the most important ones. This conception is shaped by the perspective of international organizations, embodied in the legislation of the majority of the countries, the social protection tradition of each nation, and by the notion of citizenship as a construction process that resounds with the democratization struggles of several countries. It also involves the practices and modalities of service delivery, clientalistic or corporatist, with the development that is specific of each country and is expressed in the political culture of each of them. 1 With respect to 1997, this figure represents an increase of 7.6 million poor (CEPAL, 2001:13). 148 SARA GORDON R. The perspective of the international organizations is contained in several documents that the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean2 have signed and ratified, above all the United Nations Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Declaration of the Right to Development, and several conventions sponsored by the ILO. This perspective is regained by several United Nations agencies, such as UNICEF and UNRISD, as well as by The World Bank (Apodaca)3. Indigenous rights have been reflected in specific documents, notably the 1989 ILO Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, and the declarations on indigenous rights drafted by the United Nations and the OAS. These documents, but above all the Covenant, condense the main elements of the liberal and democratic conception about the rights; for that reason, we will discuss it in some detail. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights The Intemnational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) was adopted by the UN in December 1966 and become effective in January 1976 (Craven, 1998:22). Like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, also adopted on the same date, the Covenant on Economic Rights emanates from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, signed in 1948 within the framework of the United Nations Organization. On the basis of recognizing that human beings are the core subject of human rights and fundamental liberties and should be the main beneficiaries of such rights, three categories of rights are recognized: economic, social and cultural. Within the economic field, States recognize classical labor rights, contemplated in various agreements sponsored by the ILO, such as the right to work, which comprises the 2 Besides the above, the Convention against the Discrimination of Women, and the Convention for the Protection of Children and Adolescents. 3 UJNRISD, UNICEF and The World Bank have considered some rights to be basic and fundamental. Among others, the right to health and welfare, to basic education, the right to work and to a just remuneration and to an appropriate standard of living. 149 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS right to earn a living by means of freely elected or accepted activities (Section 6); fair salaries, equal pay for equal work, equal access for men and women to State promoted opportunities (Section 7), prerogatives linked to the exercise of civil rights, such as those of organizing unions for the protection of interests and strikes4 (Section 8) and various characteristics relating to adequate work conditions such as safety and hygiene, maximum working hours, weekly rest, periodical paid vacation and social security, etc.5 (Craven, 1998:226). With the aim of guaranteeing the safeguard of such rights, States should apply appropriate measures, among others, vocational counseling, training programs, and policies to achieve development and full productive employment (Craven, 1998: 194). Social rights to be protected include: the right to an adequate standard of living including food, clothing and housing and a continuous improvement of living conditions. Also recognized is the right not to go hungry, wherefore States are responsible for taking the necessary steps to ensure its enforcement6. Likewise, recognized are the rights to physical and mental health (Article 12), to basic education7 (Article 13) and equal access to higher education and finally, the right to participate in cultural life (Article 15). (Craven, 1998: 22-23, and Alston and Quinn, 1987:185). States should satisfy, as a minimum, the basic needs of the population and guarantee equal rights for men and women to all the rights contemplated without distinction of race, sex, color, language, religion, political opinion, 4 Also recognized is the right of trade unions to setting up national federations or confederations and of becoming part of international labor organizations, as well as to operate freely under the sole limitation of the law (Section 8, in A and Q, 198:209-210). 5 Also contemplated is providing equal opportunities for promotion at work, under the sole criteria of capacity and seniority. 6 This includes: a) improving the methods to produce, preserve and distribute food, using scientific and technological knowledge, dissemination of nutritional principles and development of land reforms to achieve a more efficient development and utilization of natural resources; b) taking into account the problems faced by countries both in terms of food imports and exports to ensure an equitable food distribution in connection with the needs (Article 11, in Craven, 287). Also contemplated is the importance of international cooperation for the achievement of this end. 7 States undertake to develop detailed plans to instrument mandatory primary education where lacking (Article 14). 150 SARA GORDON R. social or national origin, equity, birth or any other status. (Craven, 1998:153, Chapter II, Articles 2 to 5). The above rights were confirmed and expanded by the Declaration on the Right to Development, which asserts the right to development as a universal inalienable right, that is part of human rights8. At the same time, it establishes the right and the duty by States of formulating national development policies, based on social participation, to improve the welfare of the population. In the area of indigenous rights, the 1989 ILO Conference adopted an orientation which reasserts the right of tribal and indigenous people to continue existing and developing as they better understand it. It also recognizes the aspiration of indigenous peoples to "have control of their institutions, their way of living and their economic development, besides maintaining and developing their identity, languages and religions within the framework of the States in which they live" (Plant, 2998:8). A similar guideline inspires the UN's Declaration of indigenous rights, emphasizing the rights of indigenous peoples to have their own and separate functions and institutions, while ensuring for them all human rights recognized internationally, as well as the opportunity of participating in the State and its political institutions should they so decide (Plant, 1998:9). 8 "Declaration on the Right to Development", Resolution 41/128, December 4, 1986, United Nations. Web page: http://unhchrch/spanish/html/menu3/b/74-sp.htm. The right to development was confirmed by the World Human Rights Conference held in Vienna in 1993. The Conference recommended assigning priority to national and international actions to promote democracy, development and human rights, and eradicate illiteracy and direct education towards the comprehensive development of human beings (Vienna, 1993). 151 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS Debate As evidenced by the above list, the rights comprised in the ICESCR clearly evoke the formulation of T.H. Marshall, especially because they are considered to be an extension of human rights. For that reason, the debate that this Covenant has triggered leads to the discussion generated by the conception of this author about social rights. Marshall approached the issue of rights within the framework of his concept of citizenship, that he conceived as a status of full membership of individuals in a society, that is conferred to those who are members in full right of a certain community, by virtue of which they enjoy rights in three realms: civil, political and social. The civil realm comprises the rights required for individual freedom (personal freedom, freedom of speech, thought, faith, property and possibility of entering into contracts and the right to Justice); the political realm involves the right to participate in exercising political power, either as a member of a body endowed with political authority, or as an elector of the members of such body. The social realm comprises both the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security, and the right to partake in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being, in accordance with the standards prevailing in society (Marshall, 1950). Including the various types of rights under a single concept, that of citizenship, allows Marshall to bring together the values and principles of liberal democracy (civil and political) with the concerns for material welfare (social), and to incorporate into the membership derived from citizenship the possibility of compensating for market effects. The core idea is that there is a type of social equality associated to the concept of full membership in a community that is not consistent with the inequities that are seen in the various economic levels of society. The equality of individuals linked to social citizenship is an equality of status and is considered by Marshall to be more important than equality of income. Thus, the basic human equality of membership is enriched with new contents, endowed with a series of rights and identified with citizenship status. The economic feasibility of a universal application of social 152 SARA GORDON R. rights is fundamentally derived from the participation of individuals in the labor market, which is explained by the fact that Marshall systematized his conception at a full employment stage. Several authors have pointed at the theoretical weakness of Marshall's postulate. Although it has received several critiques9, we shall focus on those that are linked to the debate resulting from the ICESCR. The main criticism resides on the fact of confusing rights that have a different structure within the same concept. Social rights cannot be placed at a same level as civil and political rights, which in the liberal tradition are universal. Although not all civil rights are universal, since the right to property and to sign contracts are not applicable to all, given that people may hold such rights or not, and the political rights give rise to obligations that the State must respect: the right to people's immunity, to the sanctity of domicile. In that sense, its action or lack of action is clearly demarcated. Social rights, instead, require the State to provide specific services that are only possible if there is prior compliance with complex economic, administrative and professional conditions (Barbalet, 1988). Questions such as: which particular services should be incorporated into social rights and be distributed according to non-mercantile criteria? or which should be the level of benefits granted? cannot be established with the same methodical character that is applied in the case of civil and political rights. While the latter establish the rules of the game, social rights represent the operation of these rules in interaction with the market (Sgritta, 1993). 9 Among other critiques, the strong evolutionary content of this concept has been pointed out, since Marshall presented the development of citizenship rights as a gradual process, occurring in a spontaneous manner on the basis of market institutions and thanks to the benevolent protection of the State. and not as a product of political and social conflict. (A. Giddens, 1982). The Anglo-centric character of his analysis has also been underlined since he only focuses on the English experience (Turner, 1986, Mann, 1987), and he has been criticized for not elaborating a causal explanation of why citizenship develops (Turner, 1993), and for not making a profound analysis of the State and the political conditions that favor its emergence and persistence (Turner, 1986). In the area of rights what has been highlighted is the heterogeneous character of civil rights, since the right to strike cannot be equated to the right to property (Giddens, 1982). 153 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS On the other hand, social rights are not in and of themselves the right to participate in a common national community, but only practical conditions enabling such participation. Besides, as opposed to civil and political rights, which are universal and formal, social rights only make sense if they are conceived as aspirations to concrete services and these cannot be universal but particular and selective (Barbalet, 1988, Zolo, 1994). Linked to this specific character is the fact that it is not clear how the right to health, to education or to housing should be embodied. In general, such rights are defined in terms of minimum or mean services, such as a minimum level of instruction, or a minimum health care level, but the right to work is an expectation which is not realizable, with respect to which public arrangements lack effective long term means, unless they intervene in market rules, from where, to a good extent, the resources required to pay for the services arise (Zolo, 1994). Additionally, since social rights imply expectations that are set at public services (transfers, minimum education, health and welfare levels, etc.), they bring about organizational and procedural requirements, and demand a high amount of resources. Their enforcement is closely related to the existence of a well-developed market economy, a solid administrative and professional infrastructure and an efficient fiscal system. The definition of the contents and amounts of social services depends, to an extent greater than civil and political rights, on the availability of economic and financial resources generated in the market, and it is also linked to discretional decisions by the public administration, to the interplay of power balances and to political and social claims which frequently arise in a conflictive manner within society. As a result of their high cost and their incidence on the mechanisms for the accumulation of wealth and fiscal capture, social rights have a much more random character than actions directed at protecting civil and political rights. Thus, while the lack of effectiveness of the right to work is a completely normal feature in the social rule of law, the sanctity of domicile or the guaranties on private property are not (Barbalet, 1988; Zolo, 1994). Several of the criticisms to Marshall's conception have also been addressed at the ICESCR and have given rise to a broad debate. 154 SARA GORDON R. Mention is made of the fundamental points of that debate, because they embody the problematic issues contained in the Covenant and provide the guidelines of the matters to be approached. We will return to some of these points when reflecting on the enforcement difficulties in Latin America. As opposed to Marshall's formulation, the ICESCR does not confuse civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights within the same group because in providing an implementation procedure for each, the distinct nature of both categories of rights is recognized: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Craven, 1998: 7). However, by referring them both to human rights, they are conferred universality. This is so argued by some authors when fundamenting the importance of social rights, when they point out that they are valuable in themselves, independently from their contribution to the enjoyment of civil and political rights. In Craven's words: [the rights] "... may be considered universal human rights to the extent that they relate to fundamental elements of the physical nature of individuals be they their material needs or the capacity to enjoy social goods" (Craven, 1998:13) The issue of universality has been the crux of the discussion of economic, social and cultural rights. Several authors have stated that such rights are not universal, since they lack an absolute character, and, as opposed to civil and political rights, they cannot be applied in an immediate and total way, but need to be applied in a progressive manner in specific sectors of the population (Bossuit, quoted by Craven, 998:15). For that reason, they are conditional opportunities, that is, instruments providing access to the effective exercise of civil and political rights (Barbalet, 1988, Santoro, 1994:109). Those who state they should be considered universal argue that precisely because freedom can only have meaning if individuals enjoy a certain degree of material security, the rights should be considered as such; in that sense, they agree with the idea that they are conditional opportunities providing access to other rights. Supporting the interdependence between both categories of rights, President Franklin D. Roosevelt's well-known phrase in his 1944 speech to Congress is quoted: "We have arrived at the clear 155 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS understanding of the fact that true individual freedom cannot exist without economic security and independence. Men in need are not free men"10. A path proposed by those who assert the universal character of economic rights and recognize the distinct nature of these as compared to civil and political rights, is stating that the difference between them is not categorical, and their implementation should not be categorically distinguished, since in many cases civil and political rights also imply actions on the part of the State (Craven, 1998:13). By the same token, there are social rights that to become effective require the regulation of private agents more than economic resources, such as labor and trade union rights (Abramovich and Curtis, 2001:151). However, this solution does not solve the fundamental problem: that of specifying how should expectations be translated and to what extent should they be satisfied? Such difficulties have been reflected in the lack of international legal frameworks and, of course, in national legislations. That is why, with the exception of labor rights, there is no detailed legal analysis or a specification of into what in particular should the rights to health, food, clothing, housing, education, etc. be translated. Neither at the international nor the national level (Alston, 1987: 351-352). The only stipulation is the obligation of protecting the most vulnerable groups (people with disabilities, the elderly, children, HIV patients, the mentally ill, the victims of natural disasters, etc.) and to give them priority, especially at times of economic adjustment (Abramovich, Courtis, 2001:188). This lack of precision is expressed in the formulation of some rights in the Covenant; thus, as some specialists have pointed out, while some rights are established in detail, with steps to be followed on the part of the State, such as the right to health (Article 12), and to prevent hunger (Article 11); in others there is simply a recognition to the right to social security (Article 9) and no step to attain it is mentioned. (Alston and Quinn, 1987: 165)1 1. 10 Roosevelt, ED., 11 To enforce the right to health among other steps the prevention, treatment and control of occupational, epidemic, endemic and other diseases is recommended (Craven, 1998: 108). 156 SARA GORDON R. The lack of specifications of the Covenant, due to the very nature of the economic, social and cultural rights, has been expressed in other international documents which reassert the right to development, where, although some priorities have been established12, these are only pointed out in a general way, and certain objectives of the Covenant are repeated or new ones are added, as in the fight against extreme poverty, the obligation by the States of "...creating and maintaining measures at a national level in the fields of education, health and social support, to promote and protect the right of people in vulnerable sectors ( ... ) and ensure the participation of those interested in finding a solution to their problems". (Vienna 1993, paragraph 14). There is also a reiteration of the nights to an adequate standard of living for health and well being, including food, health care, housing and the necessary social services (Ibid. paragraph 31). Linked to this problem is the fact that two issues are confused: the measures, actions or behaviors needed to assist in the realization of the rights, are confused with the results thereofl3. An example of that is Article 6 mentioned before, containing the right to work which in turn points at some of the steps to be followed to achieve full employment; that is, an outcome obligation, while another paragraph in the same article prohibits forced labor, which implies a behavior obligation. Finally, in the field of social and economic processes relating to the conditions for the enforcement of the rights, several economic processes that should eventually lead to the realization of the rights respond to logics that the State cannot control, such as the right to work, or else go against economic policy objectives, as in the case of the fight against the inflation, one of the major measures of which, wage containment, is opposed to the right to a compensatory salary. By the same token, the fact that in the framework of privatization 12 Specially in the declaration issued as a result of the World Conference on Human Rights, held in Vienna in 1993. 13 A "behavior obligation" is understood by the International Law Commission as that in which a State agency is obliged to embark on a specific course of action or behavior, be it through an action or lack thereof, which represents a goal in itself Instead, the "outcome obligation" requires that the State obtain certain results and the course of action is left to the discretion of the State (Craven. 1998: 107). 157 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS processes various public services changed to being operated by private agents and to depending on market forces, subordinates access to such services to income distribution which entails a clear disadvantage for poor sectors. Later, when analyzing the difficulties to instrument the rights in Latin America and the Caribbean, we shall return to this issue. Validity and applicability of the ICESCR in the international legal context The ambiguity of many norms, the programmatic nature of some rights and the consequential absence of national institutions specifically committed to promoting the rights as rights, make their enforcement difficult (Alston, 1987:333). Also, the complexity of several issues related to the enforcement of the rights should be noted. That, even when evaluation instruments have been developed. In effect, the consensus on the need to institute surveillance of the commitments undertaken by the signatory countries and verify the degree of social progress achieved, led to the establishment of the reporting mechanism, which is the only form of international supervision that has received the formal support of the party States and has been institutionalized (Alston, 1987: 355)14. States should report, in accordance with a program established by the Economic and Social Council, on the measures adopted and the progress attained in the observance of the rights recognized in the Covenant (Articles 16-22). Such reports are reviewed by a Committee of experts on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Alston, 1987)15, a body that determines whether a State has complied with its obligations and issues general recommendations. 14 States are required to submit reports in stages specifying the steps taken and the progress achieved in the observance of the rights, as well as the difficulties encountered (Craven, 1998: 37; 38). 15 The Committee, set up in 1996, is made up of 18 experts in the field of human rights elected by secret vote for 4 years, and renewed by half every two years. To preserve its independence the members are paid by UN (Alston, 1987, 349-350). 158 SARA GORDON R. This mechanism offers several advantages; among others, it has made it possible to establish and develop the standards to be applied to verify compliance with the rights. Thus, as a result of a recommendation by the Committee reviewing the reports, States began providing data per gender which affords a more precise knowledge of the situation of women, and led to the introduction of new measures to capture gender gaps in the enforcement of the rights, such as the Gender Development Index which quantifies human development achievements, and the Gender Empowerment Index, evaluating women's participation in political and economic life, 6. On the other hand, the report requires government officials to periodically compare the Covenant with national practices and laws, which favors the increased dissemination of the need of enforcement of the rights by governments. It also facilitates decision-making on the basis of certain principles, since the preparation of the report requires drafting documents on government policy in a certain social or economic sector. Likewise, the fact of evaluating the degree to which States comply with their obligations makes it possible to design actions to prevent or correct situations to insure the enforcement of the rights (Craven, 1998: 31). Likewise, it provides the basis to stimulate public debates in connection with the adequacy of existing policies with the enforcement of the rights, thus giving various sectors in society the opportunity of commenting on the government's assessment of the situation. In an implicit manner, it is expected that publicity will trigger pressure for enforcement by the States (Craven, 1998: 55). Since the main responsibility of ensuring compliance with the obligations contained in the Covenant rests on governments, they are given considerable discretion to determine the measures to be applied and the amount of resources to be allocated for the achievement of the objectives. 16 Recommendation No. 9 confirms that sex differentiated data is extremely useful in assessing compliance with clauses found in both the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women that mandate nondiscrimination and equality of treatment (Apodaca, 1998: 140-141). 159 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS The difficulties involved in the enforcement of the economic, social and cultural rights, including the fact that their achievement depends on the availability of resources and the magnitude of the tasks ahead, are implicitly recognized in the criteria ruling the action by the States in the achievement of the commitments: the principle of phased realization, that refers to the continuous improvement of the rights and that the States should take steps ". . .to the utmost of their available resources". The States undertake to develop the steps individually and by means of international assistance, specially technical and economic, to the utmost of their available resources, with the goal of progressively attaining the full realization of the rights recognized by the Covenant through various appropriate means, specially the adoption of various legislative measures (Article 2(1), Alston and Quinn, 1987: 165). Without doubt, the surveillance mechanism instituted by the Covenant as well as the notion of progressive compliance contained in the same, have influenced the fact that States make efforts to gradually approach the observance of economic rights. However, such notion does not manage to guarantee continuity in the delivery of services during periods of difficulties and the economic crises that have repeatedly accompanied the establishment of the new development model. Calculations made on the basis of official figures on the effects of the Covenant on the enforcement of rights on the part of the States, do not make it possible to establish a clear and definite influence. Regarding enforcement of the rights of women, in general terms, the evidence finds a positive correlation between the economic development attained by countries and the realization of the rights of women. The proportion of women with paid jobs, as compared to the number of men employed, increased between 1975 and 1985, which indicates a progressive advance in the economic rights of women. However, between 1985 and 1990 the rate experienced a slight drop, from 56% to 55%. Although women's economic activity has increased with time, the average employment level of women is only half than of men (Apodaca, 1998: 151). Recent data on the Gender Empowerment Index (GEI) indicate that in general, countries holding the first places of the ranking according to the Human Development Index (HDI), are also topmost in the GEI. In developed countries there is a certain correspondence between the place each of the countries 160 SARA GORDON R. holds in the Gender Empowerment Index (GEI) and the Human Development Index (HDI). Six of the countries found in the first ten places of the GEI, are likewise ranked in HDI, and four are among the first twenty. Instead, there is no such correspondence in Latin America and the Caribbean. In general, countries have a better ranking in the GEI than in the HDI. Of the 19 countries for which both indexes have been calculated, five are ranked in the first places for the region in GEI and HDI, but in the assembly of nations they are ranked differently. Thus, for example, Venezuela holds place number 20 in GEI, but 65 in the HDI, and Bolivia is 54 in GEI but 114 in HDI. Conversely, Chile is 51 in GEI and 38 in HDI (See GEI Chart in the Appendix)17. On the other hand, in terms of effective delivery of reports, Craven mentions that in ten years (up to 1997), 14 countries had delivered no report to the Committee in charge of monitoring the observance of the rights, and 72 countries were delayed in the delivery of their reports (Craven, 1998: 57). The concept and practice of rights in Latin America Besides the perspective of international agencies, the Latin America concept has been shaped by institutional practices referring to the organization of social protection, by modalities of service and benefit delivery and by social objectives pursued by organized sectors. A core element in the concept is the belief on the capacity for economic growth through industrialization to create paid employment and thus absorb population increases. Through import substitution, 17 Source: ww4 undp.org/hdr2000/spanish/presskit/gem.pdf. The GEI is calculated based in four variables: a) the percentage of parliamentary sits held by women (data as of February 29, 2000), b) percentage of women in executive and administrative positions (the most recent year available); c) professional and technical positions, and d) Women's GDP per capita (PPA in dollars). 161 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS the domestic market was protected from external shocks and policies designed to promote employment were implemented. The confidence in growth by way of import substitution was materialized in the creation of social security, and in the preference for granting welfare benefits to the workers and middle sectors belonging to the formal sector of the economy. Similarly, the process of creation of social security systems comprised the regulation of the labor market by means of labor codes guaranteeing certain levels ofjob security, establishing minimum wages and setting safety and hygiene standards. The labor rules adopted contemplated protecting workers from business; they set a premium on seniority, since severance payments increased proportionally with the duration of employment. The economic growth and the expansion of formal employment for workers and middle sectors, experienced after the Second World War and until the 1980's, provided social mobility opportunities for the popular sectors and made it possible to incorporate new social categories to the enjoyment of benefits and expand the services provided. Between 1950 and 1980, in Latin America, on average, 60% of the new jobs were created by the formal sectors of the economy, with the government being responsible for 15%, while mid-sized and large private companies generated the remaining 45%. The informal sector contributed with 40% of the new jobs (ILO, 1996, cited in Klein, 2000: 18). Social benefits comprised health care, insurance against work accidents, death, disease, maternity, retirement pensions and, in some countries, family allowances, and extended many of the benefits to the dependents of the direct participants (Abel and Lewis, 1993, Cruz- Saco, 1998: 1). As a result of this processes, poverty decreased from 50% of urban families in 1960, to 35% in 1980 (PREALC, 1991: 81). The welfare of the population, as expressed in the HDI, progressed very slowly, closely linked to GDP evolution. A study that calculates the HDI for Latin America as from 1900, points out that improvements began in the 1930s and accelerated until the 1970s in coincidence with improvements in life expectancy, literacy rate and GDP growth. The main variable in the slow progress of the social variables has been the pace of GDP growth. In some countries, the positive changes of these variables are attributed to spectacular improvements in the GDP, as 162 SARA GORDON R. was the case of Venezuela starting from 1930, with the exploitation of oil fields (Yanez, 2002: 10). The classification of social security regimes that Mesa Lago recovers (1986) where the stage of creation of social security systems is linked to the type and quantity of benefits provided, is an appropnate approach to establish the main features and the differences of protection systems and, in that sense, the economic and social rights in force in Latin American countries. The first group comprises countries that pioneered the creation of social security in the 1920's and 1930's, which had the most extended set of rightsl8. Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil and Cuba are included in that group. Uruguay (1914) and Chile (1924) were the first countries in the region to adopt legislation that protected workers from the risks of occupational accidents and diseases (Uruguay) and against the risks of old age, disablement, death and ordinary disease (Chile). From the beginning of the Twentieth Century, these two countries gradually expanded the coverage of health, education and social security services and, together with Argentina, developed the social security systems with the greatest degree of universality of the region. (Mesa Lago, 1986: 133). In these countries, an employment insurance was instituted. This first group of countries achieved a coverage of 62 to 96% (Cruz-Saco, 1998:7). The second group is comprised of Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Paraguay, Ecuador, Panama, Bolivia, Peru and Venezuela, countries in which the social security system was established during the 1940's and achieved an intermediate level of coverage. The countries with greater relative development in this group had social security institutions that protected the most powerful pressure groups: the military, civil servants, teachers, power and railroad workers, before the creation of the general management institute (Mesa Lago, 1986: 134). This second group reached coverage rates in the range of 18 to 50% (Cruz Saco, 1998: 7). 18 Roberts suggests that the organization of social security systems is linked to the differentiation between countries with early, rapid and slow development, based on the pace and period of urbanization and economic growth of the region (1996: 47). 163 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS Finally, the social security systems of the third group, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Guatemalal9, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua20, developed during the 1950's and 1960's and reached the lowest coverage level of the region. This group showed the lowest coverage rates, between 2 and 19% (Ibid.). The labor bias of social security institutions, based on three-party contributions (State, workers, employers), determined that not the whole population of the region be covered: according to an ECLAC study quoted by Mesa Lago, by 1980, 61% of the total Latin American population had health coverage and a similar percentage (61%) of the economically active population (EAP), had pension coverage. However, if Brazil is excluded from the calculation, the regional coverage drops to 43%, and in the majority of the countries, it is below 25% (Mesa Lago, 1986:135). At the same time, until the 1980's, governments emphasized social policies addressed at the whole population, based on the assumption that economic growth would bring about social development. In most countries, only the basic education and primary health care services had universal coverage objectives, closely linked with development related objectives. The organization of social security, fundamentally connected with the insertion in the formal market, determined that those sectors marginalized from the formal market, both urban and rural, were excluded; among others, agricultural workers, the self employed, the employees of very small businesses, domestic workers and the unemployed as well as the dependents of all of the above, wherefore 19 During the mid 1990's, the Guatemalan Ministry of Health covered approximately one third of the population, the Institute of Social Security of Guatemala, 17% and the rest was covered by the private sector. The attainments of this country in health care are very reduced: it has the third lowest life expectancy at the birth of Latin America (64.5 years in 1999) and diarrhea and respiratory infections are the main causes of children mortality (Cruz-Saco, 1998: 10-1 1). 20 In Nicaragua, the Nicaragua Social Security Institute (INSS), established in 1957, served mainly middle class sectors and its services were concentrated in urban zones. Sollis (1993) underlines that in 1979 the INSS was responsible for 50% of the effective spending of the health sector, but less than 10% of the total population or 16% of the EAP had access to the same. The INSS covered 67% of the salaried population of Managua, mostly the regime's burocrats (Ibid.). 164 SARA GORDON R. the more needy groups lacked social security in almost all countries (Mesa-Lago, 1986: 135-36, Roberts, 1996). Besides, the social security structure based on a family model assuming a male provider and a care-taker woman, led to reduced benefits for working women. The insured were the urban employees and their close dependents. Regarding the informal sector2lit should be recalled that the proportion represented by this sector vis-a-vis the urban EAP of Latin America in 1960, around 31%, had not changed towards 1989 (Oliveira and Roberts, 1994, quoted by Roberts, 1996: 48). There are significant differences by country: while in Chile the informal sector experienced a progressive reduction as compared to the urban working population between 1960 and 1980, this was not the case in Argentina and Uruguay (PREALC, 1982). Data from Mexico indicate that at least 99 of the workers in small informal businesses lack the coverage of the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS) (Mesa-Lago, 1990). In Brazil, the social welfare system implemented at the beginning of the 1930's has excluded an important proportion of the population, basically the rural and urban poor, who represent almost 50% of the EAP In El Salvador, 1992 data point at the system's very low coverage comprising only 17.6% of the EAP (Mena, 1995), and the subsequent exclusion of informal workers, both rural and urban. In 1991, only 6.5% of the workers in the agricultural sector and 11.7% of the workers in the sector of personal and social services -a sector presenting a high level of informality- was covered by the ISSS with health programs (Mesa-Lago, 1994). Costa Rica, instead, represents an exception in Central America, both for having a relatively small informal sector -that remained constant at around 12% of the EAP between 1950 and 1980 (PREALC, 1982)- and an active social policy. According to Mesa-Lago (1990), the Costa Rica Social Security Institute (CCSS) provides one of the broadest pension and health service systems of the region. The whole of the informal sector 21 According to criteria established by PREALC, the informal sector is made up of self- employed workers, unpaid family workers and workers in companies with less than 5 employees (PREALC, 1982). 165 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS was covered in 1986 by different health programs of the CCSS, although the pension coverage was very restricted: almost 97% of the informal workers lacked pensions (Mesa-Lago, 1990). A very important characteristic of the organization of the social security systems and of welfare systems in general that contributed to shaping criteria about welfare allocations is the corporate modality that it has assumed in most of the countries. On the one hand, the political power of trade unions and the importance of the sector (economic or political), have been essential criteria to extend social benefits, which generated a distribution logic based on power and the capacity of organizations to exert pressure, whereby the system granted earlier and more complete coverages, more generous benefits and more advantageous financing to the groups with greater power and mobilization possibilities (Mesa Lago, 1986: 133). At the beginning of the eighties it was estimated that Argentina, Chile and Venezuela had between 30 and 40% of their EAPs unionized, Mexico and Colombia between 30 and 40%, while El Salvador and Guatemala had less than 10% (Roberts, 1996: 50-51). On the other hand, in several countries the State developed forms of corporatism, according to Schmitter's definition, based on hierarchical union and sectoral structures which co-opted members by means of social security benefits, such as health insurance, pensions, housing, etc. Thus, the welfare care and protection institutions were used as instruments to co-opt, neutralize and control various groups in order to reinforce the legitimacy of a certain regime and maintain social order (Ibidem). This model of welfare supply established a certain type of State-society relationship in which certain social integration mechanisms were characterized by the stratification and the verticalism of social benefits, which generated a paternalistic and clientalistic relationship of beneficiaries with the State22. The access of the popular sectors lacking social security to the social benefits provided by the State, also took place through clientalistic relationships. The complex assembly of patron-client 22 The "regulated citizenship" in Brazil, the industrial worker of Peronism in Argentina and the sectoral organization of the official party in Mexico, to mention just the better known cases. illustrate this modality. 166 SARA GORDON R. networks with State officials or political leaders represented one of the main sources of social capital for marginalized and informal sectors. Malloy (1993) underlines that, in spite of rules that might say that the benefits are citizenship rights, in practice, the decision-making structures insure that many, if not the majority of the low-income sectors, operate as clients of some patron at an intermediate level, which explains why the relationship of popular sectors with the State was expressed more in terms of clientalism or paternalism than in terms of rights and duties, which contributed to hindering access to welfare proposed in terms of rights (Jelin, 1996: 82-84). Such characteristics influenced the fact that citizenship, in the sense of access to diverse and varied forms of welfare, is only fully acquired by belonging to certain organizations or associations recognized by the State, and that socially, the privilege of organized demands towards the State was socially accepted over and above individual revindications. Organizations with official recognition thus functioned as strong subjects of citizenship, according to Zolo's formulation (Zolo, 1994: 28). This modality of access to satisfactors by way of the organizations determined that in many countries no universal forms of individual access be specified except in the case of social security, that was based on individual contracts, and in services related with the requirements of development, such as basic education and primary health care. For the purpose of our reflection, it is necessary to note the important pressure capacity of organized groups in the obtention of social benefits: middle sectors, large union groupings and, in certain countries, political parties. Thus, the combination of workers in the formal market together with the criterion of fundamentally serving organized sectors with pressure capacity, contributed to configuring welfare provision as a privilege to which access is gained through an organization or a clientalistic relation, and not as a universal right. Besides, the manner in which the social service systems were organized, according to the criteria of providing for social categories in stratified and fragmented systems, brought about a reinforcement of the profound social inequities and contributed to strengthening a civic culture that undermined social solidarity, and to defending access to benefits as a privilege by resorting to the capacity for pressure or 167 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS mobilization. The recurrent economic crises and the structural adjustment measures experienced by the countries in the region, by causing losses in the purchasing power of the population covered by social security (workers and middle sectors) would make this trait more acute, as well as heightening the distribution conflicts linked with access to welfare. Social Citizenship as Construction of Democracy The processes of political change and democratization in Latin America have brought about a reflection around citizenship and the exercise of rights linked to the same, as well as the insertion or actualization of economic, social and cultural rights in the Constitutions of the countries, fostered within the framework of the international agencies. Economic, social and cultural rights are the object of analysis and affirmation, at two levels: in their character as conditions allowing for access to the exercise of other rights and in the sense of membership, which in turn contributes to configuring the concept of economic, social and cultural rights that are linked to the debate on the universality of the rights, as already pointed out in the section on the international debate. An aspect of the concept is given by the idea of democracy as a construction, and within that framework, citizenship is understood as the product of the struggle, as a process, in which various social actors gain access to the revindication of their demands. To the extent that the realization of the rights is conceived as a process under construction, it comes together with the progressive character of enforcement of the rights expressed in the ICESCR. The reflection on the issue of the conditions necessary for the exercise of civil and political rights is condensed in the question: "Can civil and political rights be enjoyed without having access to the basic conditions (the elimination of hunger, but also access to education and information) that ensure the possibility of exercising those rights?" (Hershberg and Hershberg, 1996:233). Extreme poverty places people in a situation in which they cannot "assert themselves", which leads to the reformulation of the liberal and autonomic notion of citizenship 168 SARA GORDON R. and gives it a paternalistic bias, an ingredient inherent in the idea of "social protection" and the social dimension, as such, of citizenship. (Reis, 1996: 138) Economic and social rights as requirement and expression of belonging to a community are based on Hannah Arendt's argument in that the human condition implies belonging to a political community. This perspective implies starting from the premise that the basic right is "the right to have rights". There can be no democracy with extreme levels of poverty and exclusion, since extreme poverty and exclusion are the denial of fundamental rights and are opposed to the idea of actors (Hershberg and Hershberg, 1996: 233). On the other hand, citizenship conceived as a process refers to a conflictive practice linked to power and exercise, and that of the rights which are part of the transition to democracy, the construction of institutions linked to the democratic regime. In this task, civil society organizations have an important role to play. It is for them to demand, promote and monitor that construction (Jelin, 1996: 116, 118). Citizenship involves a process of defining and redefining rights and expanding the base of participation (Roberts, 1996: 39). Implicitly, democracy is seen as a pre-requisite of social justice, based on the idea that a greater possibility of participation by people in political processes increases the opportunity of taking part in the distribution of economic goods and, therefore, may lead to a more equitable distribution. Nohlen recalls that this expectation is supported by the experience of development of the welfare State in the democracies of the industrialized countries after the war, a phenomenon associated to the extension of universal vote and to the growing participation of the organizations of the lower classes in the process of shaping the political will (Nohlen, 2001: 338-339). This combination of objectives still provides an excessively general and abstract, vague, character to the concept of rights in most of Latin America. A condensation of objectives is deposited on social rights. It is taken for granted that the definition of citizenship should also incorporate the acceptance which refers to the conditions favoring social equality and participation, eluding the discussion on the necessary specifications. That is, they include in the definition of citizenship both the formal equality of individuals and the conditions 169 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS that make the equality possible. Thus, rights are confused with integration objectives. It should be noted that although this current of thinking has fundamentally extended in the 1990's, it has influenced the growing use of rights and citizenship on the part of various social and political actors. In spite of the ambiguities to which we have referred, their use is explained because it expresses objectives to be attained and gives visibility to a very serious problem of deficits, while attempting at the same time to provide a strong argument to address it and solve it. The two references mentioned have had their expression in the work of several Latin American authors, disseminated both in academic publications and in documents of regional agencies, such as ECLAC. These papers start from the triad of rights postulated by Marshall and understand economic and social rights as an extension of individual human rights into a social scale, without questioning their differences in nature. As can be understood from the above statement, the sources of the concept of rights prevailing in Latin America have a diverse and opposed character, when not a contradictory one, over which liberal thought traditions are overlaid with corporate modalities, and highlight the objectives tending to the prevalence of criteria of social ethics. These concepts have had their legal expression in documents of a regional character, and in the Constitutions of some countries. In some of them, economic and social rights have a long tradition as a guiding objective of society, as in the case of Mexico, and in others they have become recently embodied, in a close relationship with the democratization processes, as in the case of the Brazilian Constitution, that goes back to 1988, while indigenous rights were included in the nineties. Economic, social and cultural rights have been incorporated in a succinct manner in an OAS Agreement, incorporating the substantive aspects of the ICESCR; Article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights reads: 170 SARA GORDON R. "The member States undertake to adopt provisions both domestically and through international cooperation, specially technical and economic, to progressively achieve the full enforcement of the rights derived from the economic, social, educational, science and culture standards contained in the Charter of the Organization of American States, as amended by the Buenos Aires' Protocol, to the extent of the available resources, through legislation or other appropriate means" 23. Most of the Latin American Constitutions include in their texts the rights contained in the ICESCR. They recognize the freedom to organize trade unions, the right to strike and they establish the maximum work day. Out of those consulted24, the Chilean Constitution is the only one that in a brief manner mentions "freedom to work and its protection" and does not contain a formulation of the right to a minimum salary or compensation. Argentina has not enshrined the right to health and education in the Constitution. The Costa Rica Charter includes specifications on the funding of education and the minimum percentage of the GDP to be spent in that sector, and in the Constitution of Ecuador there is an indication of the percentage of government expenditure that has to be allocated to education up to high school (no less than 30%). Brazil's Constitution, in turn, details the percentage to be spent by the Union (18% of fiscal revenues) and the States, the Federal District and the municipalities (25% of fiscal revenues). It further orders the collection from private companies of a contribution for elementary education. Although in the Charter of Guatemala it is declared that literacy is a "national urgency and social obligation" the only specification is the percentage to be allocated to the University of San Carlos (5%). 23 American Human Rights Convention, San Jose de Costa Rica, issued on November 22, 1969. www.oas.orgISP/Prog/pg29-58.htm 24 The source for this Section were the Constitutions of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 171 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS With regards to the right to social security, a good share of the Constitutions in the region contain it, and the way it will be funded, and in some as in the case of Ecuador, the progressive incorporation of the whole population is contemplated, including people who do not participate in the formal labor market. Costa Rica and Panama have no record of social security in their Constitution. Additionally, some Constitutions, as the Colombian one, contemplate the supply of a food grant during pregnancy and after birth to unemployed and dispossessed women. Explicit mention of the elderly as a specific sector for care is found in the Constitutions of Guatemala, Honduras and Venezuela, while the Peruvian Constitution only grants protection to abandoned elderly people. The disabled are only mentioned in the Charter of Nicaragua. With regards to housing, several countries consider it a right: Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Nicaragua and Uruguay. Finally, the right of the population to the protection of the environment is recognized in the Constitutions of Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Uruguay. The rights included in Convention 169 of the ILO, referring to indigenous communities, have been the subject of legal coverage in several countries during the 1990's, and the multicultural character of these countries has been recognized. Besides, in 1994, Bolivia provided for the strengthening of indigenous institutions at the local level in the popular participation reforms, so that indigenous institutions, set up according to their traditional customs and uses, can receive legal recognition allowing them to participate in municipal governments, and indigenous municipal districts have been set up with subunits of the municipal structure of local government (Plant, 1998: 26). Peru's 1993 Constitution, in turn, states (Article 149) that the authorities of the "peasant and native communities" can have jurisdictional functions within their territories following their traditional law (Plant, 1998:27). Although in Mexico, social development has received special attention, indigenous communities have not been awarded legal standing. In Guatemala, since the signature of the final peace agreement in 1996, which includes the signature of a separate agreement in March 1995, on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples, indigenous rights are recognized (Plant: 28). 172 SARA GORDON R. PROBLEMATIC AREAS RELATED TO THE ECONOMIC MODEL AND TO CERTAIN STRUCTURAL FEATURES IN LAC The main features which represent problematic areas for the realization of rights in Latin America are well-known. These features are expressed both in the difficulties inherent to economic, social and cultural rights as universal human rights, and in the obstacles connected with their implementation. The first feature is, without doubt, the inequitable (unequal) income distribution prevailing in most of the region. Although between 1970 and 1982 Gini's coefficient decreased 10%25, and "the income ratio between the richest 20% of the population and the poorest 20% was reduced from 23 to 18 times" (IDB, 1998: 16), these trends were reverted during the debt crisis of the 1980's, when the highest income decile increased its share by over 10%, while the income of the other deciles decreased. The income share of the poorest decile dropped 15% (Ibid., 16-17). The highest increase of Gini's coefficient occurred in the three largest countries of the region, Argentina, Mexico and Brazil. (Filgueira, 1996:15, quoted by Portes, 2001:76). Although the trend towards the worsening of income distribution stopped in some countries during the 1990's the concentration of income continues being very high. According to IDB calculations, the poorest 20% of the population in each country only receives 3% of the total income, while the wealthiest 20% gets 60% (IDB 1997, 43); between 1990 and 1995, the poorest 10% in the region had a loss in its income share of 15% and the following 10% of 4%. (IDB, 1998: 17). The countries with greatest inequity are Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama and Paraguay. Three countries of the English-speaking Caribbean -Jamaica, Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago- show lower concentration indexes than the Spanish-speaking 25 Approximated estimates of IDB, on the basis of findings available for 13 countries which, according to the source, represent four fifths of the Latin American population. 173 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS countries, but only Jamaica has an inequality level that is significantly below the international pattern (IDB, 1998: 15). In fact, in the nineties the countries having the worst initial distributions, such as Brazil, Guatemala and Panama, became even worst, while those that had the best distributions, such as Uruguay and Jamaica, continued improving (IDB, 1997: 43). Colombia, that had a remarkable improvement in income distribution between 1980 and 1986, later remained stable (Filgueira, 1996: 15, quoted by Portes 2001: 76). The increased income concentration is associated to the economic changes developed within the framework of globalization, and to the adjustment, de-regulation and privatization policies, promoted with the purpose of shifting to an open economy model. Although globalization has opened up new possibilities for growth and job creation, it has affected the factors determining employment and salaries. At the same time, the region's economy began to be characterized by a great volatility, with the most serious repercussions being felt by the lower income population (Klein, 2000: 8)26. These changes have contributed to worsening inequality as a result of the modifications caused in the labor market. According to Klein over 55% of the income differences are explained by the results of this market; the increased unemployment, the shift towards less productive and more unstable jobs and the increase in salary differences have increased income inequalities because they affect the poorer households more. Unemployment rates are higher among poor households: in Chile, in 1996, the unemployment rate of the poorest quintile was 2.7 times that of the richest quintile (Klein, 2000: 21). Similarly, unemployment affects women and youth more severely. While the unemployment rate for women is approximately 30% higher than the average, in the case of youth, it is usually double the national level (Klein, 2000: 12)27. 26 According to IDB studies, "the positive relationship between volatility and income inequality is significant in statistical and economic terms. The statistical relation suggests that a reduction of three percentage points in the volatility of the real GDP growth would approximately reduce Gini's coefficient of income inequality by two percentage points ". (IDB, 1998: 107). 27 The average variation for the whole of Latin America is 1.5 times (IDB, 2000). 174 SARA GORDON R. The slow and discontinuous economic growth has shown insufficient job creation capacity, to be able to absorb the growing participation of women in the work force and the growth of the EAP, of 2.6% per year. The work force in the region, which comprised at the end of the 1990's close to 212 million people, grew by 44 million in the last decade, representing in 1999 42% of the total population, three percentage points above the figure recorded in 1990 (CEPAL, 2001: 20). Discontinuous economic growth and increased population led to the increase of the unemployment rate from 6.7% on average in 1980, to 8.8% in 1999, with fluctuations in the intermediate period (Ibid.,12), although some countries have had higher figures: at mid 1996, Argentina had a 16% official unemployment rate, 10 percentage points higher than five years before. Other four countries recorded rates above 10%, that increased or remained static during the nineties. Only four countries -three of them in Central America- recorded reductions of 2 to 3 percent in unemployment during the same period (Latin American Weekly Report, 1996c, quoted by Portes, 2001: 77). By the end of 1998, the situation had not improved: Argentina, Colombia and Venezuela experienced two digit unemployment rates (IDB, 2000). The processes of growing informality, precariousness and flexibilization, related among themselves, have contributed to configuring a labor market in which job security is lost: very low salaries are paid to unskilled workers and precarious employment conditions proliferate (Klein, 2000: 13). In view of the international competition faced by industries in the modern sector based on labor intensive procedures, the payment of very low salaries and the elimination of employment benefits is frequent, so that workers opt for a job in the informal sector, where they lack benefits but have better salaries. This has been the case in the Dominican Republic, where the labor conditions in exporting free- trade zones are so bad that they cause a considerable flow of labor returning to informal jobs and to self employment. Thus, the informal sector, that during the import substitution industrialization period was considered a haven for those unable to find a job in the modern sector of the economy, has now become a haven of free market in the modern sector (Portes, 2001: 78). 175 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS Another process that has developed in connection with the requirement of business competitiveness is outsourcing, which provides greater flexibility in response to fluctuations in the economic environments. The results in terms of salaries and labor conditions are diverse: occasionally there are improved salaries at the cost of lost job security, but in others no improvements are recorded. In Chile's State mining sector, where there were mass layoffs to reduce production costs, many workers were then rehired by subcontractors. They lost job security and benefits, but gained in terms of working conditions and lower accident rates. However, in many cases, the employment and income conditions were deteriorated, associated to the installation of maquiladoras, companies in which labor standards and even human rights are not always respected. Currently, precarious jobs and sectors in which subcontracting becomes the common characteristic of the labor market are abundant. In those cases, temporary jobs, lack of social security, inexistence of unions, collective bargaining and training mechanism are frequent, although they may also be accompanied by high salaries (Klein, 2000: 25-26). As a result of the increased precariousness of employment, the proportion of salaried workers with permanent contracts has been reduced; in Chile (1996) and Venezuela (1995) only 38% of salaried workers are employed under that modality, and in Mexico (1994) it only represents 19% of the employees. The differences between men and women are considerable. In Chile, Venezuela and Mexico, 55%, 56% and 27%, respectively of the salaried men have a permanent contract; for women the respective figures are 25%, 26% and 12% (IDB 1998: 157-158). In the nineties, employment in the informal sector (self employed, non-paid family workers and workers in micro-businesses, i.e. with less than five workers, or in domestic service) recorded an important increase, going from 51.6% of the total active population in 1990 to 56% in 1995 (ILO, quoted by Lustig, 1998: 303)28. Only Argentina, Chile and Honduras succeeded in preventing the expansion of the 28 Other calculations indicate that informal employment has only expanded from 44% to 48% between 1990 and 1998, Klein, 2000: 16-17. 176 SARA GORDON R. informal sector. For the region as a whole, 61 of each 100 jobs generated in the nineties were informal and those created by micro- businesses were specially dynamic (Klein, 2000: 17). In spite of the valid employment option represented by micro- businesses, since in general they pay better salaries than other sectors, the working conditions offered are, however, inadequate. They provide no job security or social protection and violations of basic labor rights (child labor, freedom to unionize, collective bargaining and forced labor) are more frequent than in larger companies. It is calculated that the mean income of micro-businesses is close to 90% of the mean income in modem activities, but only 55% of the mean income of mid and large companies. Between 65% and 95% of those working in micro-businesses lack a written employment contract, and between 65% and 80% have no health insurance or security. They also tend to work longer hours and have more labor accidents. In Chile, 30% of the workers had no contract or had atypical contracts; in Argentina and Colombia the proportion increased to 40% and 74% in Peru. Most worked in micro-businesses: 50% in Chile, 65-70% in Colombia and Argentina, and 80% in Peru (Klein, 2000: 17). A phenomenon which has characterized the performance of Latin American economies is the reduction in purchasing power of the minimum salary in most countries. Currently it is much lower than it was at the beginning of the 1980's. The debt crisis and the subsequent adjustment processes led to the drop of the minimum wage that was only partially corrected in the nineties. On average, "minimum salaries in 1999 were 26% below those of 1980, but in manufacturing industry they have increased by 2.9% over the same period" (Klein, 2000: 11). Only Colombia, Costa Rica and Panama have managed to maintain the minimum salary relatively stable in real terms (IDB, 1998: 169). These trends are expressed more acutely in women's labor participation, since they show a greater probability of working in the informal sector and in badly paid professions. "In fact, there is a high correlation between the proportion of women employed in a certain job and its remuneration as compared with other professions" (IDB, 2000, 78). In all of Latin America there is a wide salary gap between male and female workers. In all employment categories, women receive 177 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS lower pay, although the greatest differences are found in informal jobs, both rural and urban. In the formal sector, women earn 10% less than men for the same job, and in informal occupations, women receive 25% less for work hour than men with the same level of age and education (IDB, 1998: 43). It should be noted that the informal sector allows people, and above all women, to perform activities offering more flexibility to adjust working hours and enabling them to take better advantage of some skills, which helps explain the growth of this sector, although the enforcement of the rules is low and it does not provide conditions of stability (Ibid., 154). Less educated women joining the labor force tend to be concentrated in informal sector jobs that pay less than in the formal sector for women with comparable education levels. The greatest share of women in informal companies that on average have low productivity, would help explain women's lower income (IDB, 2000, 78). Besides, due to the influence of the educational level on the share in the labor force and the probability of working in the formal or informal sector, women's incomes vary more widely than men's (IDB, 1998: 68). This situation becomes worst in the case of the indigenous and black population. In Guatemala, towards 1996, the indigenous population of the capital represented 12% of the population, was concentrated in precarious jobs and had less possibilities of social security coverage than the mixed-race population (Perez Sainz et al., 1992). In the case of Brazil, the black population is concentrated in the poorest segments of the rural and urban population. In spite of the statement that in that country race has less significance in producing inequality than in others, the black population continues to be at the bottom of the scale of poverty indicators (Roberts, 1996). Certain trends in salary behavior, related to educational or specialization levels, have tended to increase the inequality and to deepen the disadvantages of the poorest sector. We refer to the higher increase recorded in industrial salaries, as compared with minimum wages. Industrial salaries grew at the pace of 1.4% per year between 1990 and 1997, while minimum wages only grew by 0.3% (Klein, 2000:19). On the other hand, considerable differences are recorded among countries with respect to agricultural salaries; although in all countries 178 SARA GORDON R. the agricultural sector pays workers less than the industrial sector, the difference is very little in Panama, less than 10% in Honduras, but more than 40% in Peru and Mexico (IDB, 1998: 44). In 1995 or 1996, the majority of the countries in Latin America had minimum wage levels representing less than half the average salary. In Bolivia, Brazil and Argentina it was below 30%, and in Chile, Mexico and Peru between 30 and 40% of the average salary. These proportions are low as compared to those of developed countries. However, in several Latin American countries, minimum salaries were above 50% of the average, while in the extreme case of Venezuela, in 1995 they represented close to 90% of the average salary (IDB, 1998: 170). Where minimum salaries are higher in relation with the average salary non-observance of the rules is higher: in Paraguay and El Salvador, close to half the workers have salaries under 80% of the minimum, and in Honduras and Venezuela out of every 100 workers, between 30 and 40 are in the same situation (Ibid., 171). On the other hand, in several countries, the behavior of income has led to a non-reduction of inequality, but rather to its persistence as has been the case in Chile, where, in spite of the increase in jobs and real salaries between 1983 and 1995, inequality has not decreased because the income of the richest ten per cent grew even more rapidly. Its Gini coefficient of .479 in 1994, was only slightly below that of Brazil, the country with the most unequal income distribution in the region (Filgueira, 1996: 16, quoted in Portes, 2001:77). The educational condition is another trait closely related to income concentration. The close relationship between education and income distribution is illustrated by the fact that in those countries with the highest inequity rate, there are also the greatest educational gaps. The more pronounced educational gaps between the two richest deciles are found in Brazil, Mexico and Honduras, where they are in excess of 3 years, and only in Peru they are below 2 years. And between the richest decile and the 30% at the bottom of the income scale, the average educational gaps are in excess of 9 years in Mexico and between 8 and 9 years in Brazil, Panama and El Salvador, countries with a very high concentration of total income. The lowest educational gaps between rich and poor are found in Uruguay, Venezuela and Peru, which have moderate income concentrations, as 179 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS compared to the standards for the region (IDB, 1998: 20). Such educational gaps produce high returns for the few that receive higher education, who benefit from a greater quality education than the low income sectors, which in their majority attend public school and cannot gain access to better quality private education. Since a deficient education translates into lower performance and lower income during an individual's work life, education is an additional channel for the concentration of labor income and contributes to the reproduction of inequality (IDB, 1998: 56). In effect, it has been documented that in those countries with a greater proportion of unskilled labor, inequality tended to remain invariable or to increase slightly between 1989 and around 1995, as was the case of Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico and Venezuela (Lustig, 1998: 306). Thus, the deeply stratified education characterizing Latin American countries is reproducing income inequalities, instead of correcting them. The low performance of basic education expresses the influence of globalization related factors. In effect, the incorporation of China and other less developed countries to world trade has pushed down the pay for basic education jobs. At the same time, the trade liberalization implemented by countries in Latin America and other regions has contributed to increasing the relative price of local natural resources, with negative effects on worker's relative income. "And together with macro-economic policies, trade liberalization in Latin America seems to have fostered the adoption of technological changes that have displaced labor demands towards more skilled jobs". These demand factors have also interacted with a strong expansion of the non-skilled labor supply for demographic reasons, which has not been compensated for with an improvement in educational levels (IDB, 1998: 55). On the other hand, poor households have a high rate of school drop outs. An IDB study (1998), quoted by Klein, states that "94% of poor children in countries with high educational development, enroll in the first year of school, as opposed to 76% in less developed countries. School enrollment rates decrease respectively to 63% and 32% in the fifth year, and to 15% and 6% in the ninth year. Entry rates are similar among poor children and those of families with higher 180 SARA GORDON R. income, but the latter remain in school for longer periods. By the fifth year, the rates were 93% and 83%, while in the ninth year, they were 58% and 49%, respectively" (Klein, 2000: 21). A research comparing the educational attainments as of 1995 of individuals born between 1968-70 (who were then between age 25 and 27), with the education of those born thirty years earlier, found that progress had been on average, only some 3 years of schooling, which represents approximately one year per decade. In this slow change, progress among women has been faster than among men, but it is limited (IDB, 1998: 49). In that period, the improvement has been in excess of 3 years for men and 4 years for women in Chile, Peru and Mexico. But it has only been around 2.5 years for men in Brazil, Costa Rica, Honduras and Venezuela, and between 3 and 3.5 years for women in Brazil and Costa Rica. Although as a result of the faster rate of increase of women's education, currently women have overtaken men in average years of schooling in almost all countries, there are still serious exceptions in the region. The data mentioned do not include Guatemala, or the rural zones of Bolivia, where the enrolment of school aged girls is far below that of boys; in both countries, the deficits in female education is concentrated in the indigenous populations. This is also the case of the indigenous population of Panama, where in 1990 female illiteracy rates were 53%, as compared to 11% for all women in the country, or 10% for men (IDB, 1998: 49-50). According to calculations based on official data, in Guatemala, the average years of schooling for women aged 15 to 24 in rural zones went from 2.4 to 3.1 between 1989 and 199829. The profound social inequalities are also associated with the concentration of the main productive activities and metropolitan zones, and with spatial and ethno-linguistic fractures which determine degrees of ethno-linguistic and geographical fragmentation. These two lines of social fracture make the gender and ethnic inequity and the inequality in several countries of Latin America even worst. 29 CEPAL, Indicadores comparados. Cuadro America Latina (17 paises): promedio de afios de estudio de la poblaci6n de 15 a 24 anos de edad segin sexo, zonas urbanas y rurales, 1980-1999. http.//wwu:cepal.org/muier/proyectos/perfiles/comparados/t- educacion 7.htm. 181 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS Although Latin America is not an extremely fragmented region from the ethno-linguistic point of view, since there is a predominant language (Spanish, Portuguese or English) in the most of the countries, in some of them this fragmentation is important: Surinam, Bolivia, Guatemala and Peru (IDB, 2000: 209). The majority of the estimates of indigenous population in the region agree in placing it around 40 million natives (8% of the total population). In Bolivia and Guatemala, the indigenous people represent more than half the national population, although official figures differ from those of independent analysts. In the case of Guatemala, the official estimate is that it represents 42% of the population, according to the most recent census, while the HDIC of the OAS indicates it is 48% and other sources mention 60% (Plant, 1998: 5). This population lives in conditions of extreme poverty30. In other countries, although less significant, it is still very relevant: in Ecuador, the indigenous population represents between 35 and 45% of the population, the majority of which is in a situation of extreme poverty; in Mexico, around 10% of the population speaks indigenous languages, resides in a third of the country's municipal districts, representing 82% of the municipalities with very high marginality (CONAPO, 1999). In Brazil, indigenous people only represent 0.2% of the population, but their living conditions are extremely precarious and have become worst in the last few years3 1. Poverty has driven the indigenous peoples of most countries in Latin America to take part in the labor market, both urban and in commercial agriculture. Studies undertaken in several countries with indigenous population report the development of similar processes: growing decrease of the cultivation of their own land as main activity and increased participation in commercial agriculture, in regional and international labor markets, in formal and informal trade in urban zones of their own countries and neighboring countries, 30 In Guatemala, 77% of the population is below the poverty line and it is calculated that almost all the Maya Quiche are in that situation. Report of the Inter-American Human Rights Committee http://wwwcidh.org/indigenas/indice.htm 31 Life expectancy dropped from 48.3 years in 1993 to 45.6 years in 1997. Plant, 1998:5. 182 SARA GORDON R. in the service sector, in transport, and in Guatemala in extraction activities (Plant, 1998: 18-19). A survey conducted in Guatemala in 1989 estimated that only a fourth of the indigenous population of Guatemala's western plateau participated mainly in cultivating their own land, while a study in Ecuador found that the poorest obtain 22% of their income from agriculture, 16% from livestock, 9% from manual production and 53% from migratory jobs (Ibid., 19). An investigation of the Bolivian southern plateau, based on community interviews, estimated that 18% of the population had emigrated since 1983, 45% to the city of Sucre, 18% to the urban portion of Santa Cruz, 7% to the rural part of Santa Cruz and 10% to Argentina. The same trend is seen in Guatemala, where several hundred thousand new immigrants into the City of Guatemala have been recorded during the 1990's32 (Plant, 1998: 24). Temporary migration to commercial agricultural fields does not always imply a substantive improvement in the situation of poverty, since the forms of recruitment, transport, living and working conditions of indigenous temporary workers in agriculture are a source of concern in humanitarian terms. Although with salaries higher than the average income in the communities of origin, the cost is also high in terms of health, hygiene, children's lost education and social disarticulation (Ibid.). This fracture line has effects on the education and labor market variables, specially in connection with the unequal terms with which indigenous populations have entered the market as compared to other sectors (Plant, 1998:13). According to the conclusions of an analysis of inequalities in the schooling of Mexican children, indigenous boys and girls finish primary school in a lower proportion, which ... "shows there is a language barrier that some children cannot overcome" (Mier y Teran and Rabell: 20). However, the fact that children who are speakers have greater probabilities of entering high-school than the non-speakers and that the indigenous girls have the same probability than the non-speakers, indicates that the indigenous tongue has a different effect on attendance to secondary school. With reference to 32 Although migration is also partially due to the flight from the plateau during the years of intense civil conflict, it is also attributed to current economic factors. 183 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS the participation of minors in work, indigenous families are forced to send their children to work at earlier ages in a greater proportion than the families which do not speak an indigenous language; in effect, among males aged 12 to 14, 51 % of the indigenous language speakers work, while the proportion is 37% among non-speakers (Ibid., 21). Since the ethno-linguistic line is combined with differences in cultural standards with respect to the mixed society, this feeds into discrimination behaviors which erode social cohesion. Geographical fragmentation in turn, helps explain the territorial concentration of urban productive activities in a few areas, which has brought about intense migratory currents from the countryside into the cities and disorderly urbanization processes that favored the sprawling of settlements in zones that initially lacked urban services, so that the policies targeted to the poorest sectors have benefited, as a priority, urban zones. This characteristic is expressed in the factors that determine the greater availability of health services on the part of the population: place of residence, according to the geographical distribution of services, and membership in some of the social security systems. Geographical fragmentation has also affected the isolation of vast areas that once open to colonization have not been incorporated into development, with the perpetuation of regional inequalities: Brazil is a case in point, where in 1960 the poorest state was Piaui, in the northeast, with a per capita GDP equivalent to 11% of Sao Paulo's, the richest state in the Southeast. In 1995, thirty five years later, Piaui continued being Brazil poorest state and its per capita GDP amounted to only 16% of Sao Paulo's which continued being the richest one (IDB, 2000, 168). From the point of view of the extension of the phenomenon, geographical fragmentation is very important. According to data from an IDB, Latin America is the most fragmented region in the world, although, of course, there are substantial differences within the region. The countries with the greatest degree of geographical fragmentation are Ecuador, Colombia and Peru, and the least fragmented ones are Uruguay, Bahamas and El Salvador (IDB, 2000, 209). The deepening of the inequality traits described are at the same time the core of the issues to be addressed and the mark of the 184 SARA GORDON R. obstacles to be surmounted with the purpose of guaranteeing universal attention by way of rights to the satisfaction of certain needs. Such traits mark the contours and the limits of the policies' scope. The following section analyses the way in which such contours configure the obstacles to be overcome for a policy based on rights. OBSTACLES, DIFFICULTIES AND LIMITATIONS RELATED TO THE APPLICATION OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS Although the concept of economic, social and cultural rights gives rise to ideal goals that play the role of guiding standards, focusing on this aspect of the ideal to be attained, leaving aside a discussion of the foundation of the rights, leads to leaving the conditions and requirements in the background, and to disregarding the design of specific forms of realization of the rights, formulated on the basis of the essential traits of the issues to be addressed, the limits arising as a result of the market's configuration and the fiscal resources constraints, or from the relations of power or demand processes, be they political, social or both. Market logic versus rights logic The first set of obstacles refers to the divergence of the logic of market and efficiency criteria and the logic of rights, which is expressed in several fields. Such divergence, inherent to the operation of the rights and to the market's criteria of efficiency and rationality, have become more acute with the reforms designed for the opening of the economies and with the volatility that has characterized their operation. The objective of "improving economic efficiency, more than any other social protection or even macro-stabilization purpose" prevailed in the implementation of the reforms (IDB, 1997:37). Some 185 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS countries such as Guatemala, Paraguay and Peru, added to their Constitutions norms designed to avoid economic mismanagement, prohibiting the use of expansive monetary policies to cover fiscal requirements and the State monopoly in the supply of social security (Cruz-Saco, 1998:6). Although some globalization processes have caused Latin American countries to assume stronger commitments with the international organizations for the realization of the rights, others have contributed to hindering that task. How can the right to employment be guaranteed within the recessionary context in which the economies of the region operate, where unemployment continues to be high even though the economy recovers after each external shock? The goal of progressive enforcement of rights that is established in the ICESCR presupposes that governments can achieve sustained growth over a long period, an assumption which is not realized. And regarding the goal of a compensatory salary, included in the legislation of the majority of Latin American countries, it faces restrictions, since it is opposed to the logic of competitiveness required by the international environment, in which there are countries where salaries even lower than those of the region are paid. But, furthermore, several studies have found that although increases in minimum wages may effectively reduce poverty in the short term, they cannot be used indiscriminately with that purpose, because they may generate unemployment and reduce growth, damaging the poor in the long term (Morley, 1992 and 1997; Lustig and McLeod, 1997, quoted in IDB, 1998:169). On the other hand, the fact that within the framework of privatization processes, several public utilities have come to be operated by private agents and to be dependent on market forces, contributes to subordinating access to such services to income distribution, which implies a clear disadvantage for the poorer sectors. In those cases in which the private participation schemes do not include clear solidarity principles, as is the case of the health system in Chile, an adverse selection operates, both based on socio-economic strata and on health risks related to the age of the population covered (Ocampo, 1998: 12-13). 186 SARA GORDON R. -Employment Comprised within the framework of the opposed logics of the market and the rights, is the issue of employment, which has several aspects. A first and more general one concerns the lack of adequacy of labor regulation -protecting the rights of workers in the formal market- to the requirements of international competition and women's growing participation in labor markets. This lack of adequacy has led several countries to approve labor reforms representing a challenge to the economic, social and cultural rights enshrined in the Constitutions. The above lack of adequacy of labor regulations comprises the workers protection rules on which job security has rested, such as the restrictions to trial periods, temporary and fixed term contracts and penalizations to the termination of labor contracts, that have made it possible to increase labor stability and have protected against the loss of income associated with unemployment for the workers covered by the law. However, such rules are being questioned since they are applied very little, favor better educated, more experienced and better paid male workers (IDB, 1998: 153) and tend to limit female participation in the labor market, as women have to balance their jobs with other activities. Among others, the high cost of contract termination is underlined, the rules that imply imposing maternity costs on business and those which force them to maintain facilities for child care at the work place33. Young workers are likewise affected by this form of job protection, since their unemployment rates are 1.5 times higher than the overall unemployment rate (IDB, 2000, 78)34. Labor reforms were undertaken in the 1990's in Colombia (1990), Peru (1991), Nicaragua and Argentina (1995) and Venezuela (1997), 33 That was the case of Peru, where the law required that companies with over 25 women maintain child care facilities, involuntarily fostering the employment of a lower number of female workers. The law was repealed in 1991. 34 The measures suggested to adjust labor legislation to the new requirements and processes consist above all in replacing the protection that is enjoyed today by some workers by broader systems that are based on the basic needs for protection, equity and competitiveness, separating the regime of penalties for unjust dismissal from the regime to protect unemployment income, and collectivize the costs so they are not exclusively borne by business. Cf IDB, 2000, page 78. IDB, 1998: 154, 159 and IDB, 2000: 69-70. 187 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS incorporating more flexible employment contracts by reducing severance costs and introducing contracts with less payroll taxes. As a result of the reforms, the percentage of employment contracts granting full benefits over total employment has decreased and more precarious forms of employment have expanded (IDB, 2000: 71). As derived from the above reflections, the various processes related with job generation and with the quality of jobs are beyond the possibility of control by governments, implying an important obstacle that can only be modified partially to achieve the enforcement of labor related rights. -Taxation The funding of the services relating to the enforcement of social rights involves, besides an extended market economy, a very solid tax system, managing to collect the necessary resources. This requires a strong tax collection capacity on the part of the State -essential to make effective the obligation by citizens of paying taxes- comprising mechanisms to prevent tax evasion and to collect from workers in the informal market in a position to pay. Table 1 shows the average composition of fiscal revenues in Latin America, as compared with OECD countries, with the aim of establishing an international reference point. Table 1 Structure of fiscal revenue, consolidated Central Government, 1990-94 (Percentages over total income) OECD Latin America Non tax revenue 8.1 15.9 Tax revenues 90.2 71.8 Income tax 35.0 20.4 Social security contributions 32.2 23.5 Indirect taxes 20.4 26.3 Taxes on trade 1.0 5.2 Source: Gavin et al. (1996), taken from IDB, ibid., 1997, page 1 14. The figure represents averages of the countries' data, weighted by population. 188 SARA GORDON R. The table clearly illustrates the differences between the revenue structure of Latin America and that of industrialized countries. To start with, it is seen that Latin American governments are more dependent on non-tax revenue sources than the governments of the OECD countries (almost 16% as compared to 8%). The composition of tax revenues also presents differences, above all, income tax represents a considerable lower percentage in Latin America as do social security contributions, while indirect taxes and taxes on trade imply greater proportions than in the OECD (IDB, 1997: 114-115). The lower percentage of income tax in Latin America over total fiscal revenues, is explained because income tax rates in the region are very low; on average around 25%. It has been calculated that (maximum) tax rates of 25 to 30% generate revenues in the range of 3.5 to 4.5 of GDP when according to the level of development of the countries they should generate 8%35. In the region, only Barbados, Belize, Chile (and Honduras until 1997) have maximum personal tax rates of 40% or more. The trend in corporate taxes has been similar36. This insufficient revenue based on income tax drives federal or central governments to depend on non-tax income for an important proportion of their budgets, obtained from the income derived from natural resources and State-owned company revenues. On the other hand, since, as already mentioned, these governments also depend to a greater extent on indirect taxes, and in turn, these are associated to the operation of the economies which have been characterized in the last few years by volatility, the result is that government budgets are subject to the effects of such volatility. As a consequence, Latin American governments have a poor tax collection capacity, which is evidenced in the ratio of tax revenues to GDP. It is 18%, when according to the levels of development of the countries it should be 24% (IDB, 1998: 203-204; IDB, 1997, 114-115). 35 These rates are lower than those of any other region; in developed countries the top tax rates are, on average, in excess of 40% and in Asian countries they are slightly below that figure Cf. IDB, 1998, page 204. 36 The average of maximum corporate tax rates in Latin America is currently around 27%, below the averages of all other groups of countries, with the exception of Eastern Europe. IDB, 1998: 203. 189 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS This poor tax collection capacity has an ingredient of tax evasion, expressing the lack of confidence of citizens in the authorities, as well as the degradation of social solidarity, connected with the profound social gaps that were considered in the previous section (IDB, 2000: 211). The lack of confidence is also connected with citizens' dissatisfaction with the performance by government in solving the economic, politic and social problems of their respective countries. This satisfaction varies in a close relation with the manner in which governments perform, and shows clear differences between countries. According to data of Latinobar6metro, the level of satisfaction with democracy has decreased, because the region's average went from 37% in 2000 to 25% in 2001. The country with the highest satisfaction is Uruguay with 55%, and least satisfied are Colombia and Paraguay with 10. In Chile, 71% of the citizens are not satisfied with democracy37. -Social Spending Funding for the services addressing welfare relating to social rights implies two aspects of spending: the level of spending and its distribution or allocation. With reference to the level of spending, on average, Latin America is slightly above the world pattern of social spending, and in Uruguay, Costa Rica, Panama and Nicaragua it is substantially higher than might be expected in accordance with their levels of development (IDB, 1998: 201). ECLAC calculations indicate that Argentina and Uruguay have the highest per capita social spending (in 1997 US dollars) of the region, although it is necessary to point out that given their demographic structure, characterized by a larger proportion of older population, these two countries have the highest social security budgets (CEPAL, 2001: 268-269). In fact, of the countries where social spending is high, a very high percentage of the social spending increase has been allocated to social security, especially to the payment of pensions (IDB, 1998: 201). 37 The question asked is: "In general, Would you say you are very satisfied, rather satisfied. not too satisfied or not satisfied with the operation of democracy in your country?." See Press release. Encuesta Latinoh6rometro 2001, www.latinobarometro.org. 190 SARA GORDON R. A second group of countries is made up of Brazil, Chile and Panama, where the levels of social spending, in the fiscal year 1998/1999 were in the range of $647 to $1011 per capita. The remaining 17 countries analyzed by ECLAC have levels of spending below $500 per capita, and some, such as El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua are below $ 100 and Guatemala is slightly above that figure ($107). There are, besides, other countries in which social spending is very insufficient in accordance with their level of development: Colombia, Mexico and Dominican Republic (IDB, 1998: 201). In the first two, the per capita spending in the above period was $ 381 in the first, $406 and $135 (CEPAL, 2001: 268-269). On the other hand, the economies' volatility, by affecting fiscal revenues, also has an impact on the fluctuations of expenditure, in periods of external shocks. Of the 15 countries analyzed by ECLAC, for which there were comparable data between 1990 and 1999, social spending had falls at some point in time in 12 (Ibid.). Such spending fluctuations, as well as the loss of jobs associated with recession, has produced reductions in the HDI in some countries, as indicated in the following chart: Human Development Index for Latin America 1997 and 1999 Selected countries Classification HDI Classification HDI by HDI 1997 1997 a by HDI 1999 1gggb Barbados 29 0,857 31 0,864 Bahamas 31 0,851 42 0,820 Chile 34 0,844 39 0,825 Antigua and Barbuda 38 0,828 Argentina 39 0,827 34 0,842 Uruguay 40 0,826 37 0,828 Costa Rica 45 0,801 41 0,821 Trinidad and Tobago 49 0,797 49 0,798 Venezuela 48 0,792 61 0,765 191 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS Classification HDI Classification HDI by HDI 1997 1997 a by HDI 1999 1999b Panama 49 0,791 52 0,784 Mexico 50 0,786 51 0,790 Colombia 57 0,768 62 0,765 Cuba 58 0,765 Ecuador 72 0,747 84 0,726 Saint Vicent and Grenadines 75 0,744 Brazil 79 0,739 69 0,750 Peru 80 0,739 73 0,743 Jamaica 82 0,734 78 0,738 Belize 83 0,732 54 0,776 Paraguay 84 0,730 80 0,738 Dominican Republic 88 0,726 86 0,722 Guyana 93 0,704 99 0,701 El Salvador 107 0,674 95 0,701 Bolivia 112 0,652 104 0,648 Honduras 114 0,641 107 0,634 Guatemala 117 0,624 108 0,626 Nicaragua 121 0,616 106 0,635 Haiti 152 0,430 134 0,467 Sources: a. UNDP, Human Development Report 1999, Washington D.C; b. Human Development Report 2001 www.undp.org/hdr200l Between 1997 and 1999, of the 25 countries for which comparative data are available, 15 had a slight improvement of the HDI, but in six of them the improvement was very small, less than five thousands (Uruguay, Trinidad and Tobago, Mexico, Peru, Jamaica and Guatemala). In ten countries the index values dropped. The issue of universality of the rights introduces the discussion of the progressive or regressive character of the expenditure, and posses dilemmas on its allocation, since the various types of expenditures have very different distributive effects. Ocampo recalls that "in absolute terms, the higher income sectors benefit more from social spending (although)... as a proportion of the income of each stratum, 192 SARA GORDON R. the subsides that are channeled through said expenditures are greater for the poorer sectors of the population". The expenditure allocated to the poor in connection with the share of population in a situation of poverty is progressive in the case of health, primary education and, to a lower extent, secondary education. However, expenditures in social security and higher education generally have a regressive trend. Housing expenditures are at an intermediate situation, since they especially benefit the middle segments of income distribution (Ocampo, 1998: 11). Targeting social spending primarily to social security, as is the case of Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Argentina, poses distributional dilemmas in connection with the progressive or regressive nature of the expenditure, especially because of the proportion of the population that is left unattended. However, the demographic structure of the population in which the percentage of individuals over age 65 has increased, requires orienting expenditures towards social protection demands, the cost of which tends to be very high. According to IDB data, for every percentage point of increase of the elderly population public spending raises 1% (IDB, 1998: 200). These difficulties have led to the fact that, although in the majority of the countries in the region, social rights are enshrined in the Constitutions and there has been a process of harmonization of the legal-political instruments with respect to international legislation, this has not translated into radical improvements in the indicators for such rights, such as the human development index. Only a progressive, but not continuous, increase. FINAL REFLECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS A review of the main criticisms to the concept of social citizenship has shown the theoretical difficulties inherent in this concept, which were confirmed by the analysis of the modalities of access to social citizenship prevailing in Latin America, and point to three fundamental findings: 193 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS * The prevalence of a corporatist pattern for access to collective goods, fundamentally by way of the organizations, restricting the universality of welfare satisfactors delivery; * Insufficient fiscal resources, both due to the scarce taxing capacity of the State and to the characteristics of the economy, favoring the expansion of the informal production of resources; * The high proportion of population with serious deficits indicates the convenience of orienting distribution criteria according to the needs, by addressing the magnitude of the deficits, rather than according to social rights. Regarding this final point, Latin America has a vast bibliography identifying needs on the basis of measurements that have been carried out in a more and more systematic way at least from the beginning of the 1980's. Given the difficulty implied in establishing welfare services by way of universal rights proclaimed but not specified, an interesting option to sustain distributive criteria is found in Bellamy's proposal, who suggests specifying so called "institutional" rights, instead of social rights emanating from human rights. According to this author, institutional rights are born from political deliberations and translate into particular laws and conventions with which citizens participating in the political process agree, and make it possible to refer to the dimension of the duties and obligations contained in citizenship. Such rights represent advantages over the rights of man since, as opposed to the latter, they express socially determined ends that can be reformulated as required in the face of changing circumstances. Besides, it is possible to use legislation to grant specific rights, addressing the demands from the various fields of social life, as in the case of women's reproductive rights, instead of being limited to a homogeneous standard. On the other hand, when the rights are institutionalized, the corresponding duties can be precisely allocated to resolve conflicts. Such characteristics of "institutional rights" make them more adaptable to social heterogeneity than the rights of man (Bellamy, 1994: 225,250). 194 SARA GORDON R. The concept of institutional rights makes it possible to consider in a clear manner aspects that are ambiguous in the case of social rights and they unify integration objectives with social policy criteria taking into account constraints, limitations and goals. They also take into account the conditions in which such rights will be enforced. On the basis of the debate on institutional rights, it is possible to return to Alston's proposal (1987: 358), who suggested adopting a programmatic approach that would require that the progressive realization of several rights becomes the objective of a clearly defined program. Finally, the specification of such rights should be oriented to preventing the circuits of exchange of political support for welfare services -set up by political parties, trade unions, public burocracies, etc.- providing a systematic discrimination in favor of the interests of those organizations endowed with greater organizational and advocacy power and, to a lesser extent, of the associations with a lower organizational capacity, to the detriment of the large majority of citizens who lack organizational resources to press their claims. In other words, the satisfaction of social expectations should not be dependent on the possibilities of corporate membership of various sectors, so that the more powerful the organization involved, the more effective the claim, which leads to the defacto exclusion of those with little affiliation capacity. Thus, it would be possible to give effect to a general commitment of society to work for the proper operation of economic, political and social arrangements to favor rights as recommended by Sen (2000: 123). Recommendations The high incidence of poverty determines the need to implement programs targeted at lower income sectors, both to develop individual capacities and to expand such sectors' opportunities. But, furthermore, the existence of serious social inequities makes it necessary to apply specific policies allowing wide sectors of the population to emerge from the low place they occupy in income distribution. Framed by the characteristics of access to rights in Latin America which make organizations the core subject of citizenship, attention to inequities cannot be approached only through universal social rights. 195 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS It is necessary to address the basic needs of the population with less resources: basic education38 and basic health care for the poor, particularly those living in backward areas or belonging to disadvantage groups such as the indigenous population. Regarding education, some of the findings of the research on that population should be recalled, in the sense that once the children who speak indigenous languages succeed in completing primary education, they have higher probabilities than those who are non-speakers of completing secondary education, which is grounds for optimism. With respect to health, it is necessary to take into account that none of the reforms of the health care system carried out in various Latin American countries in the nineties, have achieved substantial success in expanding coverage to those sectors of the population traditionally excluded by social security schemes (Cruz-Saco, 1998:4). On the other hand, it is necessary to provide minimum pensions to the extremely poor, and in that sense direct transfers are of major importance to prevent the transmission of extreme poverty from one generation to the next. According to some calculations, "if it was possible to set as a goal the allocation of less than 0.5 to 2% of GDP to individuals living in extreme poverty conditions, they would stop belonging to that class" (Lustig, 1998: 307). Indigenous communities require specific attention through the formulation of indicators defining poverty in terms of unsatisfied basic needs, taking into account the nature of subsistence economies, which are characterized by low cash income levels and by the fact that to a great extent, basic needs are satisfied by way of mechanisms of redistribution of goods outside the market (Plant, 1998: 34). Such measures should respect and promote the greatest possible degree of control by the indigenous communities of their own development (Ibid., 30) Funding should also be provided to day-care and other health programs that favor the education of children and the participation of women in the work force. Finally, investments in water, sanitation and electricity services for the lower income households (IDB, 1998: 199). 38 Given the low performance of basic education, an attempt should be made to expand the coverage of medium level education (high school) 196 SARA GORDON R. 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(1994) "La strategia della cittadinanza", in Danilo Zolo, La UNDP (United Nations Development Program) (2001) Human Development Report 2001, wuuw. undp.org./hdr2001. (2000) Informe sobre desarrollo humano 2000, ww.undp.org/hdr2000/ spanish/presskit/gem.pdf (1999) Informe sobre desarrollo humano 1999, Mundi-Prensa Libros, Madrid and Washington. La cittadinanza. Appartenenza, identita, diritti, Roma, Latterza. 203 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS APENDIX Gender Empowerment Index by selected countries Ranking per Value of Ranking per Seats in Female Female Women's Gender Gender Human Parliament Administrators Proffesional GDP per Empowerment Empowerment Development held and and Technical capita (PPP Index Index Index by women Managers Workers US$) b (%) a (%) b (%) b I. Norway 0,825 2 36,4 30,6 58,5 22.400 2. Iceland 0,802 5 34,9 25,4 52,8 22.062 3. Sweden 0,794 6 42.7 27,4 48,6 18.605 4. Denmark 0,791 15 37,4 23,1 49,7 19.965 5. Finland 0,757 11 36,5 26,6 62,7 17.063 6. Germany 0,756 14 33,6 26,6 49,0 15.189 7. The Netherlands 0,739 8 32,9 22,8 45,7 14.902 8. Canada 0,739 1 22,7 37,3 52,2 17.980 9. New Zealand 0,731 20 29,2 36,6 51,5 13.646 10. Belgium 0,725 7 24,9 30,2 47,1 15.951 16. Bahamas 0,633 33 19,6 31,0 51,4 11.577 17. Barbados 0,629 30 20,4 38,7 51,2 9.037 20. Venezuela 0,597 65 28,6 24,3 57,6 3.281 22 Trinidad and Tobago 0,583 50 19,4 39,7 50,5 4.131 24. Costa Rica 0,553 48 19,3 29,9 45,1 3.126 30. El Salvador 0,527 104 16,7 34,9 44,3 2.779 35. Mexico 0,514 55 18,0 20,7 40,2 4.112 37. Colombia 0,510 68 12,2 40,4 44,6 4.079 39. Dominican Republic 0,505 87 14,5 30,6 49,4 2.333 40. Belize 0,493 58 13,5 36,6 38,8 1.704 43. Ecuador 0,481 91 14,6 27,5 46,6 1.173 45. Uruguay 0,472 39 11,5 24,0 63,1 5.791 46. Panama 0,470 46 9,9 33,6 48,6 3.034 48. Honduras 0,460 113 9,4 54,4 48,5 1.252 50. Peru 0,446 80 10,8 26,9 41,6 2.104 51. Chile 0,440 38 8,9 22,4 50,5 4.011 52. Surinam 0,482 67 15,7 13,3 69,0 2.735 54. Bolivia 0,422 114 10,2 24,9 42,6 1.217 57. Paraguay 0,406 81 8,0 22,6 54,1 2.058 Antigua and Barbuda 37 8,3 Argentina 35 21,3 Brazil 74 5,9 62,0 Cuba 56 27,6 18,5 Dominica 51 Grenada 54 17,9 Guatemala 120 8,8 Guyana 96 18,5 Haiti 150 Jamaica 83 16,9 Nicaragua 116 9,7 a. Data as at February 29, 2000. b. Data corresponding to the most recent available year. Source: www.undp.org/hdr2000/spanish/presskit/gem.pdf 204 CHAPTER IV YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ i i I I i I I I ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ INTRODUCTION Latin American youth: strategic actors of development In the 20th. Century, Latin America witnessed a dynamics eminently centered in the consideration of youth as simple beneficiaries of public policies, designed to incorporate them into the process of social and biological reproduction of our societies. The 21St Century, instead, should focus on the understanding that youth, far from being part of the problem (as they are usually seen from the perspective of the adult world), can be part of the solution to the acute problems we are facing at all levels, in their capacity as strategic actors of development. The above is mainly connected with the development style that prevailed throughout the last century, as opposed to the development style that is beginning to emerge forcefully at this turn of century and millennium. While in the past, the main premise was reproducing and maintaining the existing rules of the game (forged within the framework of the import substitution industrialization model), in the future, the fundamental rule will be "ongoing change"; i.e., the permanent and systematic transformation of the existing rules of the game. 207 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN Although it may be seen an irrelevant statement, the truth is that the change of paradigm this implies can have enormous repercussions in the logic of public policies and on the place that young generations may come to have in the societies of which they are members. Whereas in the past and based on the logic of reproduction, youth only had to prepare to become adults (gradually assuming adult roles, mainly as workers and citizens) in the knowledge society (currently under construction) they must be the champions of social change and modernization. The demographic transition in which our countries are essentially involved offers, besides, the best conditions to process this radical change of paradigm, to the extent that the enormous cohorts of children that we had to incorporate into our societies in the last fifty years are no longer being born, and we are not yet facing the significant masses of elderly adult population that will decisively weigh on the overall population in the second half of this new century. We therefore stand at the best ratio between active and passive population from the point of view of development. The next twenty years, therefore, will witness the existence of the largest young generation of the whole of Latin American demographic history, that will have to become dynamically integrated into the development process, assuming the role of protagonists in driving the changes that our countries inevitably will have to process, within the framework of building the knowledge society. In turn, this will be possible because youths are infinitely more and better prepared than adults to deal with the new information and communication technologies (the fundamental tools in the construction of the knowledge society) and have a much greater flexibility to adapt to the ongoing changes that in the future will characterize the dynamics of our societies, without being conditioned by sterile links to the present; i.e. quite the opposite of what is now and will in the future be the case with the adult population, whose general and specific skills will become obsolete at an increasingly faster pace. If these elements of analysis are adequately perceived by the leading classes of our society, totally renovated youth public policies could be promoted, in a decided bet on youth participation in the construction of the knowledge society; clearly abandoning the traditional past approaches that fundamentally mistrusted the role of 208 ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ youth, on the basis of their evident protagonic role in the more radical social and political challenges to the established system (fundamentally, from the university student movements). In this way, it would be possible to construct bridges between the new youth movements (less politicized and more centered on the welfare of the whole) and public policies designed to address the main development deficits in our societies. A renewed emphasis on youth volunteering could become a cornerstone of the fight against poverty, the main goal of development in all our countries. In this way, it would be possible to achieve a positive impact on the growing gap between youth and public institutionality (elections, parliament, justice, police, etc.) while at the same time the generous willingness to cooperate of youth would be harnessed to overcome the major problem being faced at present by the whole of Latin America. Naturally, it would be necessary to maintain and expand (with renovated approaches) those public policies designed to achieve the social insertion of youth (through education, employment, health and recreation services, as the major ones) but this needs to be driven on the basis of integrated, articulated, decentralized and targeted approaches, to be able to respond in an effective and relevant manner to the various issues that affect the new generations, visible in the evident social exclusion that they face, and leaving behind in a decisive manner those sectorial, centralized and supposedly universal approaches of the past, that only manage to provide partial, transient responses addressed at some youth sectors in particular (belonging to the middle and upper classes). An adequate articulation between the processes of State reform and the design and implementation of these renovated youth public policies could significantly leverage this dynamics, to the extent that it would be possible to modernize and strengthen public management itself in these realms (as in many others) attempting to construct new relations between the State, the market and civil society; reformulating the interrelations between Youth Culture and School Culture (with an adequate incorporation of the mass media in the actions to be deployed) and with a professional upgrading of the work of the people acting in these fields. It is therefore urgent to include these issues to a greater and better extent in academic reflections, the public debate on development and 209 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN the design and implementation of public policies, on the basis of renovated approaches; reverting the stigma placed on youth, betting on their creativity and generous willingness, and opening up more and better spaces to channel their active participation at all levels. We will thus be able to address in a more effective and appropriate manner the main problems that our societies face (for example, urban insecurity) which in all cases have an evident youth component. Youths are currently the main target of unemployment and social exclusion, while at the same time they are at the core of all movements linked to violence; but they can become the main constructors of peace, equity and prosperity if we change the coordinates under which we have operated so far. THE CONTEXT: MAIN PARAMETERS FOR ANALYSIS To begin, it is important to characterize the context within which the issue is placed, reviewing some of the basic concepts, analyzing the complex link between youth and society, characterizing generically the current condition of youth in Latin America and briefly reviewing the history of the main models of public youth policies adopted in our countries in the last decades. What are we talking about?: Some basic concepts on youth Youth has been analyzed from very different theoretical and methodological perspectives, on the basis of the contribution of very diverse scientific disciplines. In its more general conception, the term "youth" refers to the period in the life cycle in which individuals move from childhood to an adult condition and during which important biological, psychological, social and cultural changes occur. Such changes vary according to societies, cultures, ethnias, social classes and genders. Conventionally, in order to compare the condition of 210 ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ youth in different contexts and to track down its evolution along time, age limits are established (a simple but rigorous criterion) with evident advantages: measuring them does not imply major reliability problems and it is a variable researched in most of the available sources of periodical data gathering. But, where are these limits? In order to establish the age of youth onset a reasonable consensus is observed, granting priority to criteria derived from a biological and psychological approach, under the understanding that the development of sexual and reproductive functions represents a profound transformation in the physical, biological and psychological dynamics that clearly differentiates adolescents from children. It is in establishing the upper limit, however, that important doubts arise. In order to clarify the issue, it is necessary to recognize the growing breadth of the field of youth, recalling that as societies shift from rural to urban, from agricultural to industrial and from industrial to the current knowledge society, the field becomes wider and includes dimensions that are unprecedented in the history of mankind. But what is more relevant is that the set of conditions that constituted the core nodes of identification of the adult world have lost consistency. In the past, entering the adult world implied the coming together in time of economic, social, cultural and political behaviors that converged around well-established patterns of behavior. At present, however, at least three processes which modify the nature and characteristics of adult roles may be observed: (i) they are less central in economic and cultural production; (ii) they are less consistent (the number of people who assume typically adult and typically juvenile roles increases) and (iii) their meaning losses clarity with the changes in family structure and labor participation. From a demographic point of view, youths are, above all, a group in the population that corresponds to a certain age environment and varies according to particular contexts, that is generally placed between the ages of 15 and 24. In the case of rural or acute poverty contexts, the environment shifts downwards to include the group aged 10 to 14. In several cases, in the context of urban middle and upper social strata, it is expanded upwards to include the group aged 25 to 29. From this perspective, youths -according to several particular circumstances-may be identified as the group of people having 211 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN between 10 and 29 years of age. The chosen age group has sufficient substantive foundations to the extent that the entry and exit from that stage in life coincide with extremely relevant processes. Thus, the lower limit of the selected environment considers the age at which sexual and reproductive functions have already developed, clearly differentiating adolescents from children and having profound repercussions in their physical, biological and psychological dynamics. The upper limit, on its part, is identified -with the above mentioned caveats- with the time at which individuals arrive- under diverse specific circumstances and at various paces in each particular sphere- to the end of the formal education cycle, facing entry into the labor market and the establishment of their own household, becoming adults. By virtue of such processes, and from a psychological and biological approach, youth would be defined -in any individual's life cycle-as the period ranging between the achievement of physiological maturity up to the attainment of social maturity. But not all individuals of the same age cover this vital period in the same manner nor do they achieve their goals at the same time, so that from Sociology and Political Sciences, the need of incorporating other variables into the analysis of the juvenile phenomenon has been underlined. Thus, it has been shown with sufficient eloquence that youth has very different meanings for people belonging to each specific social sector and that youth is experienced in very diverse manners, according to the circumstantial contexts in which people grow and mature. And recent studies have gone even further, including criteria from Anthropology and other related disciplines, with the purpose of demonstrating the existence of true juvenile cultures, and specially underscoring the problems of youth identity as an axis to characterize youth as a social group. From this viewpoint, the existence of juvenile groups with common characteristics has been shown to extend beyond the differences among their members in terms of belonging to different social strata, increasingly influenced by mass culture. However, which are the essential aspects to be underlined in the analysis, with the purpose of having a precise and useful characterization to design and apply public policies that are youth related? To begin, one of the most relevant is the type of roles and functions that youths should play in the society in which they live, and 212 ERNESTO RODRIGUEZ in this sense, at least four crucial elements are defining: (i) the obtention of an adult condition as main goal; (ii) emancipation and autonomy as a path: (iii) the construction of one's own identity as core problem and, (iv) intergenerational relationships as a basic framework for the attainment of these goals. A schematic and summarized review in this respect may provide relevant elements of judgment for the analysis at hand. It seems clear that obtaining an adult condition is the main goal, processing in the best possible way this transit between childhood and adulthood that every youth has to cover. No longer a child but not yet an adult, and however the juvenile condition is stretched in temporal terms, by remaining longer in the educational system, delaying entry into the work market and constituting new households, what is inevitable is for youths to become adults. By definition, youth is a temporary condition and it is rapidly lost with the passage of time (even the differences between youths of different ages are evident). Within this framework, emancipation becomes the central axis of the path that youths have to cover between the total dependency on parents and tutors typical of childhood and the full autonomy of an adult condition. In this sense, that journey will have to face multiple and complex challenges -resulting from the change of roles in process- that will add significant difficulty to shaping their own identity (not constructed by parents and tutors as in children) which constitutes the central problem in this process. As asserted in numerous ECLAC studies "on one side, the nature of the transition itself assumes the existence of an ongoing process of role change; on the other, such changes imply the risk of affecting the identities constructed. In other words, individuals are subject to a particular tension: they have to change while remaining the same. Otherwise, in the face of the decisions that need to be permanently taken in their emancipation process, they could go adrift in any direction" (Filgueira, 1998). Besides, in this process, youths shift from interacting with the society in which they live in a growing and almost always conflictive manner, especially with the preceding adult generations that are already integrated in the societal dynamics and are scarcely willing to facilitate the incorporation of the younger generations into that complex dynamics, to a context in 213 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN which -paradoxically- such incorporation is key to ensure the process of biological and social reproduction of a society dominated by adults. Such perspective confers on generational conflicts a significant relevance, to the extent it largely explains the tensions that permanently arise in our societies. As may be gleaned from many of the above remarks, it is possible to assert that youth does not exist as such. Actually, there are many and very sundry juvenile sectors or groups, with particular and specific characteristics that clearly differentiate them. In this sense, it is important to differentiate at least four specific groups of youths. (i) University students. Evidently, these form one of the main juvenile groups; the only one -in fact- that was socially recognized until the 1970's. To a good extent, they were traditionally the prototype of youth, insofar as they always complied fully with the substantial conditions to be recognized as such. During decades, this was the only youth sector that participated in the social and political scenarios of our countries as an actor, through student movements, but its essential characteristics have varied with time and the massification and segmentation of our universities, and they no longer have such hegemonic recognition. (ii) Popular urban youth. In parallel, especially starting from the 1970's and 1980's our countries witnessed the social irruption of the other youth; that is, urban popular youth, excluded from access to middle and higher education, living in sprawling and extended marginal zones and with completely different methods from those of their university peers, who began to become organized in corner groups and even juvenile gangs, and to deploy their own identification processes together with practices linked to various forms of violence as an expression of their rejection of that integrated society of which they are not a part. (iii) Rural youth. After enjoying certain privileges granted as priorities of public policies in the 1940's and 1950's, rural 214 ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ youth have lost protagonism and visibility -from the hand of the growing urbanization and social modernization processes- until becoming a minority. Subject to strong processes of transformation in their essential characteristics, increasingly influenced by modem urban culture and by the changes happening in the rural societies in which they reside, they still retain, however, extremely relevant singular characteristics while presenting a better inclination towards innovation and higher educational levels than previous generations, all of which can become an important contribution to the modernization of the rural environment at the family, community and production levels. (iv) Young women. Finally, another sector having its own very marked characteristics, and affected by intense processes of exclusion and reclusion, but with a clear trend towards social integration, is that formed with young women. Affected by a double exclusion (age and gender-based), without their own identity in juvenile movements or in women's movements and bearing the load of extremely conservative traditions in terms of their roles in the household and society, they have won recognition, as a result of their growing incorporation into education and in particular to work, although still from subordinated positions. But this list would not be complete if we fail to include the ethnic variable, to the extent that the conditions in which indigenous and Afro Americans youth (for example) grow and mature have their own specificities, making them clearly different from youths belonging to the dominant white cultures. An even though we may take into account that some specialists assert with solid foundations that the status of youth does not exist or is very short-lived in these groups, the truth is that they are clearly identifiable and visible individuals in several Latin American societies (in which they are far from being "ethnic minorities") affected by acute social exclusion and serious identity conflicts that cannot be disregarded within public policies. 215 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN Finally, it is important to underline that the above classification is far from being exhaustive, to the extent that there are several relevant overlappings that may be easily observed, leading to the assertion that when we focus on poor women belonging to ethnic groups and living in a rural environment (for example) we are in the presence of the most serious situations of social exclusion. The opposite is the case with white urban males who are students from the middle and upper classes, who enjoy all the advantages. Youth and society: Diverse aspects of a complex link As it is known, youths are not isolated. In reality, they live and interact permanently with the society to which they belong, and receive from it many and extremely varied influences. One of the linkages takes place within the framework of juvenile socialization, understood as the process of transmission of standards, values and habits from adult society to the new generations, performed with the objective of ensuring biological and social reproduction, through "socializing agents", significantly through family, school, peer groups and the mass media. Traditionally, the family has been the main socializing agent, concentrating even some functions linked to basic education. However, with the passage of time and in the framework of social modernization processes, formal education gradually absorbed some of these domestic education functions while families experienced profound transformations, that specially affected the stability and nuclear model, opening the way to multiple diverse family schemes (complete and incomplete) where both spouses participate in the labor market. In this way, families lost influence in the socialization processes and receded in the face of the growing influence of other agents, such as the educational system (which has not succeeded in complying with its socialization functions beyond the frontiers of transmitting knowledge) and the mass media. Something similar occurred with the emergence of the mass communication media, particularly television, that in the course of a 216 ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ few decades came to exert a decisive influence in juvenile socialization, competing with families within their own homes, and even with the formal educational system, and developing methods and instruments that are much more attractive for youth, as well as values and standards that are different and even opposed to those transmitted by families and the formal education system. Until today, the education system has not managed to resolve this growing and challenging competition -to which the content of information technology networks is now added- and has not yet succeeded in incorporating such media massively in its daily dynamics as instruments of great potential for the development of its own purposes. On their part, the so called peer groups have always played a decisive role in the socialization of youth and constitute one of the few properly juvenile agents that have little adult control, but it is difficult to identify a unique sign of their incidence on youth generations because the very constitution of juvenile groups is extremely heterogeneous (student movements, more informal groupings in the popular urban and rural scale, church-linked juvenile movements, etc.) and they have been increasingly influenced by the mass media, blurring internal differences. Therefore, the rule in this case is diversity. But, together with receiving various influences from the society in which they live, youths try to influence society's dynamics through very diverse strategies, whether by attempting to become social and political actors or by implementing various forms of identity and expression that they try to impart to the rest of society. However, most of the forms that this youth participation urge has adopted through history has been characterized by its transitoriness, alternating periods of major public visibility and protagonism with others where a strong retraction and invisibility prevail. Everything seems to be closely connected with the transitoriness of the juvenile condition leading to, as opposed to the case of workers or women, who are guided by the material dimensions of their existence, based on youths being oriented by the svmbolic dimensions of their existence, without developing corporatist practices as women and workers do. From this basis, it is easier to approach a more objective analysis of the controversial issue of the actual or assumed youth apathy (particularly in connection with their political participation) as compared to the supposed interest of 217 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN previous youth generations, fundamentally during the 60's and the 70's. The available evidence indicates that there effectively exists a marked estrangement of youth from the main public institutions (political parties, parliament, justice, police and others), but it also points at the little distance with the perceptions -likewise very critical- that other sectors of the population hold (as shown, for example, by the Latinobar6metro surveys), which would indicate that it is a problem linked to these institutions and their specific dynamics in the current society and not an antidemocratic challenge specific of youth (Balardini coord., 2000). Actually, everything seems to indicate that the actual or assumed juvenile apathy is related to the disenchantment produced by institutions which are increasingly operating within the framework of routines more boring than spectacular in terms of innovations (corresponding to the democracies that are becoming settled down in almost all the region), which contrasts with the mentality prevailing in youths who would wish to witness rapid and fundamental changes. The truth is that when youths perceive real possibilities of making a difference in the decisions, they participate with enthusiasm, as was the case of Colombian youths with the National Constitutional Assembly of 1990 or Paraguayan youths in the March, 1999 crisis, for example, where they were major protagonists in blocking the frustrated coup attempts. On the other hand, it is important to assume that the link between youth and society allows for a third approach strategy, connected with the difficulties in the social integration process that youths attempt to travel in their transit towards adult roles, and that public policies themselves try to facilitate through various initiatives. In this case, there are four dimensions that are particularly critical: education, work, health and housing. In connection with education, the important attainments achieved in Latin America in terms of coverage are evident, as are also the considerable deficits that are still recorded in terms of equity and quality. This is an explosive combination, since on the one hand it allows youth to duly note the opportunities and possibilities existing in society, while, on the other, it places them at precarious conditions to take advantage of the same. The outcome is a great frustration, which discourages youths and drives them to drop out 218 ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ _ of school (above all in the poorer and more excluded strata). This is closely related with the issue of work insertion of youths, since one of the main difficulties they face is linked to the lack of training, which is added to youths' lack of experience (placing them at a disadvantage vis- a-vis adults) and the high selectivity available to those having high levels of education at the time of looking for a job. If we add to this the little interest of the main actors in the production process (trade unions, business and governments) for incorporating youths (under the pressure of other priorities) we have a very difficult panorama for youths going forward. The other aspect of concern is related with health, where youths face serious difficulties in several fields simultaneously, visible in terms of risk behaviors that need to be addressed through prevention and the promotion of healthy life styles. Car accidents, sexually transmitted diseases, consumption of legal and illicit drugs and early teenage pregnancy are some of the main problems, but only a few countries and certain specific spheres have developed integrated responses consistent with the dimension and complexity of such problems (PAHO's studies are a fundamental reference on these issues). Finally, youths face serious difficulties in connection with access to their own housing, when considering the possibility of establishing new households, independent from their respective households of origin. This leads to reinforcing two types of extremely worrying behaviors on the part of youths: on the one hand, setting up new households that do not become independent from the parental households (the new couple lives together with the parents of one of its members) and, on the other, the increasinigly more frequent development of transient relationships that are constantly being broken and reconstituted, giving the process a very evident short term tendency. 219 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN YOUTH IN LATIN AMERICA: EXCLUSION AND PROTAGONISM How do all these concepts apply to the current situation of youth in Latin America? As underlined in numerous recent diagnoses, "the main signs of the times are the institutionalization of change and the centrality of knowledge as the engine of growth". The same diagnoses emphasize that "both factors place youth in a situation of privilege to contribute to development", so that the issue is extremely relevant in the context of these notes. Why are these parameters underlined in recent papers on the subject? The arguments are many, but, essentially the idea is that in this new century that is beginning, "youth has become the segment of the population with a dynamics that naturally fits with the pace of the times (while) the opposite is the case with the adult population, for which the speed of the transformations in the world of production reduces the market value of their cumulative experience and places their skills at the permanent risk of becoming obsolete". "In this manner -it is underlined-the focus of the dynamics shifts to the new generations" (CEPAL-OIJ, 2000). As it is known, the subject of knowledge and information as pillars of the new development strategies are being analyzed in all the international fora and in this same line, the World Bank dedicated the 1998-1999 World Development Report to these subjects (knowledge at the service of development) as did the UNDP in their 2001 Human Development Report (putting technological progress at the service of human development). Within that framework, and in what strictly relates to the core subject of this report, the CEPAL-OIJ document states that "there are several reasons making it possible to assert that globalization as well as the growing expansion of the competitiveness frontiers in a scenario of accelerated incorporation of technological innovations is accompanied by a notable increase of the potentiality of youth contribution to the development of their societies. Certainly, the main of those reasons is the major role of knowledge as the engine of transformation and fundamental resource of societies to address the challenges that they bring about. Youth -it is underlined- is the stage in life essentially 220 ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ dedicated to acquiring knowledge. To that end, society grants a role moratorium, that is, a temporary suspension of obligations favoring both the flexibility to adjust to new situations (by experimenting with them and drawing a rapid balance of their advantages and disadvantages) and the rapid incorporation of innovations, a process which does not face, as is usually the case in adult generations, the resistances stemming from ingrained habits or practices, interests that have already taken root in institutional structures". The arguments are striking, although they have not yet been properly incorporated into the logic of public policies. This is very visible, if the current condition of youth is looked upon, as the CEPAL and OIJ, 2000 text does, when underlining that "while the implementation of the current development styles requires an optimum leveraging of the type of assets that are concentrated in youth, paradoxically the social exclusion of youth increases", remarking as main evidence the high levels of juvenile unemployment in the region, which double and even triple, in several cases, adult unemployment. In Labor Panorama of Latin America and the Caribbean, the ILO gathers more updated evidence in this respect, and it is not necessary to dwell too much on it (ILO, 2001). It is sufficient to recall that juvenile unemployment clearly has structural characteristics, and has persisted at extremely high levels for the last forty years (at least) both during times of crisis and in stages of sustained economic growth, and it is explained by structural reasons, linked to the attitude of fundamental actors in the operation of the labor market, that are guided by other priorities (trade unions prioritize those workers who are already integrated in the labor market, business people prefer to hire adults, and governments prioritize attention to the heads of households, who are also adults). But "the heterogeneity among the asset portfolios (especially in human capital and social capital) of youths placed in different social positions of the national stratification systems -underscores the CEPAL-OIJ text- seems to be becoming more acute. While one sector manages to acquire the resources needed for a rapid adaptation to the new qualification requirements, others do not. On one hand, because the speed of the demand for this type of skills 221 YOUTH. SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN seems to move faster than the capacity of societies both to generate a labor supply with sufficient competences and to create the conditions that make it possible to develop the skills and the attitudes favoring a flexible adaptation to change and a rapid incorporation of new knowledge. On the other, because the weakening of some of the primary institutions, such as the family and the community, is greater among youths from poorer households than in the rest, which translates into a widening gap in terms of the skills of the families to invest in the education of their children and to perform a socializing role complementing that performed by school". "A second element to be considered -adds the report- is the greater degree of institutional and political articulation of adult generations as compared with younger generations. In a situation of growing employment uncertainty, those segments of the population that act as corporations tend to close ranks around the defense of their conquests and, in particular, the positions attained in the market. Such actions generate rigidities that hinder both the full utilization of youth human resources and a higher investment by the State in developing their capacities, all of which poses a serious question on the level of intergenerational inequity existing in our societies" (idem). However, the subject is not found among the substantive priorities of the strategies designed to achieve greater levels of social equity, which focus almost exclusively on the differences of social stratification, to a certain extent on the urban-rural dichotomy and lately only to a certain extent on gender inequities. The elements included in the above quotes are very relevant, and deserve some additional comment, going back to the concept of social exclusion as a complex and integrated phenomenon, that is not mechanically limited to the lack of work opportunities, and that is fed by many other problematic dimensions, linked to the crisis of the traditional juvenile socialization systems and to the issue of the intergenerational reproduction of poverty, subjects that have been increasingly analyzed by the main international organizations (especially by those of the United Nations). The CEPAL-OIJ report specifies these processes, when highlighting that currently, youth from popular urban strata experience a historically unprecedented level of social exclusion 222 ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ risk (...) the result of a confluence of determinations by the market, the State and society which tend to concentrate poverty among the youth, isolating them from other society strata", among which they underline: "(i) the growing incapacity exhibited by the labor market to absorb people with few skills and to guarantee the coverage of the social services traditionally linked to the performance of stable jobs; (ii) the difficulties faced by the State to reform education and training systems at a pace in accordance with the requirements for new skills and capacities; (iii) the transformation of families and the composition of neighborhoods (...) affected by a reduction of their competence to generate in children and youths stimuli and confidence on the virtues associated with investing efforts in education as the primary means to attain the desired goals; (iv) the early emancipation of youths with low educational levels and higher fertility rates than those of their peers with higher educational levels, which contributes to concentrating poverty in the first stages of the family life cycle; (v) residential segregation, producing a growing spatial concentration of households with similar standards of living, homogenizing inwardly and creating an outward gap; (vi) a separation of the public spaces for informal sociability outside the market, which reduces the frequency of face to face encounters between people of different socio-economic origins; and (vii) the segmentation of basic services, among which the case of education is especially noted because of its significance in these issues. What are the consequences of all this? "First of all, the weak participation in the educational system and the precarious labor insertion prevent both systems from operating as transmitters of standards and values that order daily life, structure aspirations and define goals to be attained. Secondly, the phenomena of instability and incompleteness that are affecting families in these sectors, which also contribute to reducing their socialization capacity and the performance of a complementary role to reinforce the functions of educational institutions. Thirdly, the isolation from society's mainstream that deprives youths from close success models linked to an adequate leveraging of the estructure of opportunities. That is, the social isolation of popular urban youth occurs within a context 223 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN of normative void caused by the degradation of the primary institutions, the weak and precarious participation in education and work and the growing estrangement of the success models which link efforts to achievements" (idem). But in analyzing the consequences of the above elements, it is imperative to go one step further and wonder about the influence of other factors which play a role in juvenile dynamics. The CEPAL-OIJ report does so, underlining that within the framework of the above circumstances, "youths remain available, open to other influences that allow them to construct an identity which helps to shore up their self esteem and provides a sense of belonging or being part of the community", a subject which has been analyzed at the light of the considerations on juvenile tribes. From this perspective, tribes are - above all- "the outcome of innumerable tensions, contradictions and anxieties which flood contemporaneous youth", and are therefore viewed as "a social and symbolic response to the excessive rationality of present life, the individualistic isolation to which large cities subject us and the coldness of an extremely competitive society. Adolescents and youths tend to see in the tribes the possibility of finding a new way of expression, a manner of taking distance from the normalcy which does not satisfy them and, above all, the occasion of intensifying their personal experiences and finding a gratifying core of affection. It is, from many points of view, a sort of emotional haven as opposed to the contemporaneous urban exposure, which paradoxically leads them to the street" (Costa, Perez and Tropea, 1996). Which are the goals and aspirations they may have under these circumstances? wonder CEPAL and OIJ. "Another paradox arises here -they respond- because the conditions of social exclusion which particularly affect urban popular youths are accompanied by an unprecedented level of exposure to massive consumption proposals, and an equally unprecedented centrality of youth culture in society. All of this defines a situation of structural anomy, in which youths have a relatively high symbolic participation in a society that shapes their aspirations and a material participation which does not allow for the satisfaction of such aspirations by legitimate means". "The combination of all these elements -adds the report- contributes to the emergence of marginal subclultulres, gangs and 224 ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ cliques having they own codes, subcultures that usually incorporate and consolidate, through time, habits and behaviors which emerge as socially disruptive reflections of the situations of social exclusion and marginality. The crystallization of marginal subcultures does not only prevent youths from contributing to the operation of society, but further erode the social fabric and the standards of coexistence, and ultimately, fuel a vicious circle of reinforcing of segregation and segmentation" (idem). Summarizing, we stand before a quite reasonable and transparent explanation to one of the more concerning current problems: the growing violence in which -in their capacity as victims as well as aggressors- youths are clearly and unfortunately, the protagonists. Public insecurity, juvenile exclusion and normative void are, therefore, three elements closely linked in terms of rational explanation, but they do not appear as it should at the time of designing relevant and timely responses through public policies. Public youth policies: Hypothetical models and historic review How have youth policies responded to this particular set of problems? In this respect it is possible to characterize, at least four hypothetical "models". A first model of public policies with fundamental characteristics that became evident during the three decades with the largest and most sustained economic growth in Latin America (between 1950 and 1980) was concentrated in two particularly important spheres of the condition of youth: education and leisure time. The achievements obtained are evident, specially with regards to the growing incorporation of wide juvenile sectors to the benefits of education, specially at the basic level and, more recently, to middle and higher education. Thus, while at the beginning of the 50's, schooling rates in the primary level were close to 48%, by the end of the 90's they had reached 98%; during the same period, secondary education gross rates increased from 36% to almost 60% and for higher education they went from 6% to 30%. However, the quantitative achievements have not 225 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN been attained in qualitative terms to the same extent, since as time went on, the opportunities of upward social mobility provided by education narrowed. On one side, the investment in infrastructure, equipment and teacher training was relatively insufficient and led to the degradation of its quality. On the other, an important part of the middle and upper sectors abandoned the public system, choosing private options and giving rise to a growing segmentation of the system. In the meantime, and together with the expansion of the educational system, govermnents attempted to provide more and better opportunities for the use of youths so-called leisure time. Such initiatives were directed in an explicit or implicit manner, at avoiding certain behaviors in youth such as drug and alcohol abuse, irresponsible sexuality and any other type of "antisocial" behavior that, besides placing their welfare at risk, could have negative consequences on the health of the social fabric. Thus, various sporting, recreational and cultural activities began to be developed, designed to occupy youth's leisure time creatively. In parallel, health services were established for adolescents, emphasizing risk prevention and the promotion of healthy life styles and not only addressing care for existing diseases, with differential failures and successes in each individual national case. The benefits, ultimately, have been evident but, in any case, what needs to be highlighted is that the essence of this youth policy model, conceived as valid for all youths, was only effective for those who were integrated in society, in general, and in education in particular, limiting its real scope. With the growing incorporation of youth to the educational system, a great juvenile mobilization began to emerge based on the student condition. The following have influenced the roots of this mobilization: the changes in the social composition of the university student body; the first signs of exhaustion of the import substitution industrialization model and the consequent reduction in upward mobility opportunities of the labor market; the prevalence of two antagonic conceptions, within the framework of the Cold War, for the development of societies; and the echoes of the Cuban revolution. In this context, juvenile mobilization rapidly took on traits of acute defiance, in open challenge to the established political and social system, and in response to the serious situation existing at the end of 226 ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ the 60's, visible in almost all the countries of the region, independently of their degree of development. Although the mobilization of Latin American youths was influenced by developments in other parts of the world -such as those associated with the "French May"- its association with some popular movements consolidated gradually. That was particularly the case of the movements led by the trade unions that had developed in almost all the countries of the region in the shadow of import substitution industrialization. Although to a lesser extent, some agreements were also reached with peasant movements, basically translating into supporting their strong claims for access to the land. University students, additionally and increasingly organized, also began to have an influence in the constitution of left- wing political groupings and even the guerilla movements that boomed in the 60's and 70's. In a context of strong polarization worldwide, such processes were logical, as were also the reactions of the dominant sectors. Thus, there began to emerge some variations on the youth policy models previously described linked with the functions of social control traditionally performed by the Home or Government ministries. Given the eminently juvenile character of the rebel demonstrations of the time, the work of those agencies needed to be supported by other institutions more closely linked to the promotion of youth, and the strategy, consisting in isolating student movements and limiting them to university facilities, was successful since the expansion of the mobilizations was curtailed, preventing them from joining with those of urban popular youths. The eminently autonomous nature of student movements (an element that was not present in the model oriented to education and leisure time, which was a response by the State to the new generations and not an initiative originated and driven by youths themselves) explains, to a good degree, the rapid and widespread politization of student movements, that demonstrated a capacity of striking alliances with other non-juvenile social organizations, although this did not happen with other youth organizations with a different social sign, such as those that developed in the popular urban environment, as already noted. On the other hand, and as it is known, the growing student and trade union mobilization-together with the development of left wing 227 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN parties and sundry guerrilla movements-derived, to a good extent, in the establishment of military governments in most of the countries that had had populist experiences in Latin America, a fact that coincided with the beginning of the economic and social recession and the expansion of poverty in the 1980's. The democratic governments that began to become generalized -specially in South America- received a heavy burden, that forced them to attempt to strengthen the new born political regimes and to put in practice extremely unpopular economic adjustment programs that were postulated as necessary in order to pay the large foreign debt and reorder the national economies. In Central America, instead, the adjustment was processed in parallel with the development of the civil war, sustained on the East-West polarization. New juvenile movements were born within this framework, this time having youths from the marginal populations of the main cities of the continent as protagonists, for the major part excluded from education and society in general, as has already been noted. In parallel and as a reaction to widespread poverty, new social phenomena emerged, which at the end of the 80's derived in true national uprisings, including supermarket lootings and the siege of public offices. Although the events that took place in Caracas at the beginning of 1989 were the most striking, there were similar reactions in Argentine and Brazilian cities and in all cases the protagonism of youth was clear (like in the more recent events in Argentina). As a transitory remedy for the acute social problems caused by the structural adjustment measures, various programs against poverty were implemented, based on the direct transfer of resources to the most impoverished sectors, food and health assistance mechanisms and the creation of temporary jobs. To this end, social compensation agencies (emergency funds) were set up outside ministerial structures and although none of those initiatives was ever catalogued as a youth program, in almost all the countries the majority of beneficiaries were youths (the emergency employment programs benefited thousands of them). Such programs had the clear purpose of preventing criminal behaviors, since the relaxation of the repressive social controls on the wake of the military regimes in various countries -coupled with the 228 ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ representation crisis of social and political institution- left a huge void. However, the successes were undermined both by the major dimensions of the crisis and by the tension between the short-term character conferred to these programs and the persistence of the economic restrictions. This seems to have influenced in the reimplementation of such programs, this time with more integrated strategies and greater stability in time and with measures designed to address the growing urban insecurity; that is the sense of the recent urban security programs, which have explicit components targeting the youth population that have began to multiply in different countries of the region (we will return to this subject). Finally, a fourth model of youth policies seems to have began operating since the beginning of the 90's, underscoring the importance of human capital for development, and structured around youth's labor and social insertion. German Rama (1992) justified these orientations, arguing that "dealing with youth is a crucial dimension of society's survival and development. A society's capacity to safeguard the biological equity of the new generations, socializing youths on the fundamental values which define its existence as a society, educating them in the culture and knowledge appropriate for the level of development of the countries that are at the frontier of scientific and technological transformations, establishing conditions of equity in the access to material and cultural goods to preserve the social foundations of democracy, preventing the loss of future human resources through adequate education and training for all and providing those who will be its citizens with capacity and responsibility to exercise their sovereign rights will determine the future development of the current national societies", adding that "in an ever changing world, youth acquires a more relevant role than in the past". "For society -adds the author- it is no longer a matter of ensuring its collective reproduction, but rather of addressing the problem of counting with individuals capable of learning to learn throughout their lives (... .) The flexibility of youth to learn permanently and to adjust, with the flair of the initiated, to the new forms of social organization, in the transformation has become a capital of equal value as the economic one. The capacity of our societies to educate them for a changing world and the skill of appealing to youth to incorporate them into activities that 229 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN require modem procedures and technologies will determine the adaptability of societies to a type of social modality that will surely prevail throughout the 21st Century, that will be defined by a permanent impregnation of science and technology in social exchanges and a constant change in the ways of feeling, thinking and doing". On the basis of this type of rationale important consensus were achieved during the last decade on the centrality of education in development processes and the issue of labor insertion of youths was given a high priority. The job training program "Chile Joven", began in 1990, was a pioneer in this field and is being replicated in many other countries. In general, these are measures designed to provide training in relatively brief periods and through new operating modes, concentrating the focus on the pertinence of the traits selected and the effective labor insertion of youth rather than in the mere technical qualification. These programs are executed through sundry public and private institutions, within a competitive framework; governments participate in the design, supervision and evaluation functions, separate from execution and the objective is to incorporate youths to the social modernization and productive transformation required by the current processes of internationalization of the economy. As indicated, this model is based on a different approach from the others, clearly associated with the transformation. 230 ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ YOUTH POLICIES: A BALANCE OF THE 90'S Let us now make a balance of the youth public policies implemented over the last decade, differentiating programmatic from institutional aspects, reviewing the investments and analyzing the social perceptions that were generated. Programmatic Evaluation: Sectorial, Limited and Discontinuous Progress From the programmatic point of view, substantial progress can be seen in several specific spheres; however, since this progress was not adequately articulated nor maintained for sufficient time, its effective repercussions on the target population -youths- have been few and not constant. As could be expected, the primary spheres are education, employment, health and recreation. Instead, there is little progress recorded on the issues of civic participation and prevention of violence among youths, aspects that are currently beginning to be more widely addressed. With regards to education, the main achievement is expanding the coverage of the target population, particularly among women. This progress has been attained, to a good extent, thanks to the major increase in education investment, since the public expenditure in the sector grew -in the regional average- from 2.9% to 4.5% of the gross domestic product (GDP) between 1970 and 2000. Progress in terms of social equity and quality of education, however, has been less. This is evidenced in the serious repetition and dropping out rates and the deficits in fundamental learning, especially with respect to language and mathematics. The UNDP (1998) identified five problem areas in education: (i) slowdown of the enrollment growth rate; (ii) unequal coverage of education among countries, subnational regions and social groups; (iii) poor academic performance of children and youths, especially those coming from low income households and low level of social capital; (iv) concentration of the investment on the 231 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN better-off, as illustrated by the development of higher education; and (v) multiple inefficiencies which explain the existing paradox between growing levels of investment and decreasing levels of school performance, even after controlling for the massification effects. The International Commission on Education, Equity and Economic Competitireness in Latin America and the Caribbean (several authors, 2001 c) recently arrived at similar conclusions. In the field of health, important progress was recorded in several specific items. The programs for the prevention and treatment of drug consumption (legal and illicit), for example, have made strides in several countries. Something similar may be said of the programs for care and prevention of sexually transmitted diseases (notably HIV/AIDS) since some countries have managed to stabilize and even reduce the levels of contagion and prevalence (Brazil, for example). In the case of teenage pregnancy prevention, there were also advances, although there is still a long way to go, partly due to the persistence of cultural habits and social structures which concentrate the greatest quantity of cases in the sectors affected by the more acute situation of extreme poverty. The same may be said about traffic accidents -one of the main causes of death among youths- in spite of the efforts by public authorities and in direct connection with the growing complexity of road traffic operation in the main cities of the region (PAHO, 1998). Also visible are the progresses obtained in the dominion of recreation, culture and sports, spheres from which healthy life styles for the youths are promoted. The advances have been achieved both as a result of specific public policies of a few decades ago -specially in the 1950's to 1970's- and as a consequence of private efforts (for profit and non- profit) more recently, in the following decades. The mass media have exercised a growing influence in this field; articulated with the business interests of transnational private companies, they have discovered a broad and sophisticated youth consumer market, that is very attractive from the profit point of view. The work in the area of care and prevention of the various expressions of juvenile violence has been relatively less, although it is an increasing phenomenon. The initiatives adopted in the last few years in this dominion coincide with the enforcement of urban security programs -mainly in Colombia, El Salvador and Uruguay- that 232 ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ include relevant youth-linked components in their dynamics. In this context, an effort is made to work more intensively on the basis of preventive approaches and not simply repressive ones as was traditional, with the purpose of reinserting those youths who commit offenses, assuming the complexity of the phenomenon and avoiding simplistic explanations. But perhaps the greatest progress corresponds to the sphere of creating awareness in public opinion and decision makers in connection with the need for providing more and better care in the area of reproductive health of adolescents and youths. Although there is much that remains to be done on this issue, a good share of the progress has been achieved through advocacy campaigns in which youths have been present and where their participation is part of the efforts directed at including them as strategic actors in development (Burt, 1998; Rodriguez, Russel, Madaleno and Kastrinakis, 1998). On the other hand, progress has also been achieved in the labor insertion of youths, particularly in connection with job training. Thus, on the basis of the pioneering experience of the Program "Chile Joven ", several countries of the region now have a wide gamut of new programs, demanding major investment efforts and the design of orderly execution and targeting strategies, to ensure access by youths from poor households. The evaluations conducted highlight the progress obtained by these programs and underscore that targeting has been good, both in social and gender terms. The youths that participated in these programs enjoy advantages which are not within reach of those who did not: they have greater facilities to enter the job market, more stable employment, more appropriate working conditions and better social relations. Compared with control groups, the participating youths achieve better performance, get a job faster, remain in their positions and improve their income in a higher proportion than non-participants (who share the same social profile of participating youths). This is evidenced in the various available studies that focus on national cases. Additionally, such programs achieved extremely relevant social impacts, fostering the return to the education system of a good share of the youths participating in these initiatives, improving the relationships of the beneficiaries with their families and the 233 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN community environment and their peer groups, and significantly leveraging the social capital of these youths for the purpose of processing their social integration in a more dynamic and faster way. The satisfaction of the beneficiaries with their experience is very high. Besides, since these programs have not been applied in the same manner in all countries, the variety of experiences has provided lessons on the potentialities and weaknesses of each, which will make it possible to improve these efforts in the immediate future. Thus, the PROJOVEN program of Uruguay seems to achieve better targeting (which seems to relate to the reduced scale in which it operates), while the program in Argentina has shown serious shortcomings, probably because of its broad scope (several authors, 200 lb; Gallart et al., 1999; several authors, 1998). The progress in programs designed to promote productive ventures for youths have, instead, been more limited. Although no rigorous evaluations are available, the evidence suggests serious limitations in the implementation of several of these programs and the oldest ones show lack of articulation between training, credits and technical assistance for management. Besides, the strong production reconversion processes and the recent economic crisis impose adverse conditions on micro and small businesses, adversities that are scarcely compensated by the public policies designed to that effect. In recent years, measures were adopted tending to overcome the above limitations, but their effective performance cannot yet be evaluated, so that future developments will need to be awaited in order to provide informed opinions on their results. Finally, it should be noted that the work carried out with regards to the education of youths as citizens and promoting their active participation in development is relatively minor, in spite of the concern by decision makers regarding the real (or assumed) juvenile apathy, including their growing estrangement from most of the democratic institutions. What is actually happening? How can these processes be explained? First of all, it should be recalled that the immense majority of Latin American and Caribbean youths are totally outside the existing youth organizations and movements. Barely between 5 and 20% declare participating specially in some. Besides, the huge majority of those who do participate are 234 ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ concentrated in sporting and religious organizations. Although many attend rock concerts or other similar musical events, the main activities they carry out in their free time have to do with "hanging out with friends", watching television or going to the movies or to dance. This is indicated by all known surveys, while they also indicate that the presence of youths in student, trade union, political parties and community organizations is negligible. However, when consulted on their interest for participating in said organizations, the positive answers are overwhelmingly high which shows that what they reject are the practices with which these organizations are managed and not their concrete ends or objectives. This is extremely relevant: youths wish to participate (and they do so very actively when called upon in a transparent and shared manner) but they do not wish to feel they are being manipulated. However, it is important to recognize that among those who participate there is always a great lack of constancy: in the majority of cases, they participate in specific activities, for certain periods, while not becoming involved in membership in the organization as such. This is evidence of another relevant characteristic: youths live the present with great intensity, and the notion of the medium and long term is not too important in their daily life (although adults always identify youths with the future). We are, in any case, faced with a new paradigm of juvenile participation (Sema, 1998), totally different from the traditional one: while in the past collective identities were built around socioeconomic and ideological-political codes, now they are built around action spaces related with daily life (women's rights, defense of the environment, etc.); while in the past, the demands referred to improving living conditions (in education, employment, health, etc.) now they are structured around the exercise of rights (in sexuality, coexistence, etc.); while in the past, the prevailing values had a messianic and global flavor (social change should modify the structure for individuals to change) they are now more linked to the here and now, from a logic of individuals, groups and structures (simultaneously); and while in the past, participation was highly institutionalized, now more flexible and temporary horizontal modalities and informal networks are vindicated, avoiding bureaucratization. 235 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN Institutional Evaluation: Confusion of roles and Disarticulation Although the achievements obtained in several spheres are important, their attainment has come about in an unarticulated manner, as a result of the design and execution of sectorial policies that rarely interact and mutually reinforce one another; and in institutional terms, this lack of articulation is usually associated with a confusion of competencies between the executing agencies and those in charge of the design, monitoring and evaluation. Although the theories on institutional development underline the differentiation of roles and functions between the agents implied in any public policy, the actual dynamics of our institutions attempt to do everything simultaneously so that it is frequent to find efforts overlapping at various operating levels while others are disregarded. These problems become evident when an attempt is made to establish links between institutions specializing in youth affairs (national institutes, general directorates and youth ministries or viceministries) and the sectorial secretariats or ministries (health, labor, education, and others). On the side of the specialized institutions, the attempt to "do it all" brought about more problems than advantages. On one side, they have faced serious competition problems with the large State secretariats, when trying to put in practice health, education or employment programs for youths, in parallel and without the necessary linkage with the respective ministries. These competence problems have always ended with the victory of the large State secretariats, that to all purposes have more power, legitimacy and development that the national institutes or directorates, more recently created and with little actual implementation. On the other hand, specialized institutions have, in the majority of cases, confused their role, attempting to become representatives of the State before youths and representatives of youths before the State, without having the legitimacy and the tools to perform these roles. This has happened, to a great extent, because such youth institutes and directorates have, since their beginning, been led by youth leaders of the political parties in government, without having 236 ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ previous experience of management in the public administration, and too previously accustomed to the logic of conflict for spaces of power, with adults in their same party and with youths in other parties, practices that they have transferred to the dynamics of these new institutions, as a simple continuation of the former. One of the concrete modalities in which this confusion operates, is linked with the excessive focus of several of these youth directorates or institutes in short term activities dedicated to organizing and mobilizing youths, while neglecting the development of medium and long term programs that promote access by youth to the various social services (education, health, employment, recreation, etc.) and generating problems with various social and political actors which do not accept the presence of the State in this type of dynamics. In the case of the large State secretariats, on their part, the problems are not minor either, but the explanations seem to be different. On the one hand, there is evidence of a prevalence of sectorial approaches that barely differentiate the sectors of the population with which they operate, while the prevalence of simplistic and stereotyped approaches regarding youths is maintained, showing a profound ignorance of juvenile dynamics as they actually are. Additionally, there are management problems. Since many agencies act as a monopoly, their concern for rigorous program design and appropriate tracking mechanisms tends to be limited, and under those conditions it is difficult for ex-post evaluations to have the necessary objectivity. Likewise, the discretionality and lack of articulation of efforts prevents the type of impact that would be derived from the coordinated operation of the various institutions, which are excessively isolated one from the other in terms of their operational management. The available evaluations further point out that sectorial programs are excessively concentrated on problems and individuals, loosing sight of the integrality of institutional interventions, even more necessary on the basis of the existence of evident linkages between diverse problems such as a context of economic difficulties, disfunctions and limitations in the family dynamics and risk factors which predispose in favor of developing atypical behaviors. PAHO insists on the need of overcoming such methodological limitations in its Plan ofActionforAdolescent and Youth Development 237 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN and Health in the Americas 1998-2001. Quoting Catalano and Hawkins, this report identifies some risk factors "common in the case of drug consumption, crime, teenage pregnancy, dropping out of school and violence: extreme deficit of economic resources, family conflict, a history of problematic behavior in the family and difficulty in handling family conflicts. Besides, drug abuse, crime and violence have in common certain neighborhood characteristics that provide opportunities to develop problem behaviors: community standards and rules favoring criminal activities, drug consumption and the obtention of firearms, peer groups involved in problematic behaviors, a favorable attitude from parents towards problematic behavior, little sense of belonging to the community, and in general, social disorganization (...) Under these circumstances, youths struggling to develop their identities, skills and lifestyles, have easy access to the social activities considered problematic, and a restricted access to activities favoring their development. The more adverse the context in which adolescents develop, the greater the need for support that will allow them to survive and prosper in the future" (PAHO, 1998). If this rationale is applied to any other sphere of juvenile development, similar conclusions are arrived at, therefore, it is necessary to draw clear consequences in this regard. On the other hand, in the last few years, in several countries of the region, specific offices and spaces for youth promotion have emerged at the municipal level, designed to implement actions from a local space. The basic assumption which has guided this type of efforts, in accordance with the decentralization processes in many other spheres of public policies, has been the actual or assumed greater proximity to the problems and the expectations of youths, as compared to central institutions; but, in some national cases they have been driven by broader alternative orientations. Although in several specific cases extremely relevant actions and programs have been deployed, it is also true that serious problems have been faced in connection with institutional management at this level. In some cases, the problems have been connected with the same type of competence conflicts mentioned above in the case of central level institutions, in this case in relation with other secretariats or departments of the respective municipalities. In other cases, instead, the problems have been 238 ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ generated by the almost "natural" tendency of adults (in charge of the other municipal agencies) to considering youth as "cheap labor" (as it is usually called) and to assign to youth secretariats and offices, logistic support tasks in the development of other more general plans and programs. The types of activities very commonly promoted from this type of offices have been rock concerts and recreational and sporting activities. While certainly guided by a diagnosis which emphasizes the absence of an offering specifically centered on the leisure time of the new generations, such offices have tried to fill the void while, at the same time, attempting to work with orientations drawn from the prevailing youth culture (many times as a reaction to the more bureaucratic orientations, more distant from the juvenile culture which actually or supposedly prevail at the central level). The truth is that, in any case, in many cases these activities end up being censured by the adult authorities of the same municipalities (and by the adult population as a whole) for fostering practices that are censured by the adult world, such as the consumption of drugs and alcohol, or violence among youths. All this has resulted in serious challenges to such dynamics and questions on the specificity and sense of the former in numerous meetings between the operators of this type of institutional instances. In theory, they are instances that should operate within their specific local field within the framework of a broader and more effective coordination with the specialized instances of the central level (the national youth institutes or directorates) and with the other institutions at the municipal level, but in fact, and due to several specific circumstances, in most cases this is not the case. There are also serious doubts about the real specificity of such offices, that in the immediate future will have to face the challenge of defining rigorously the role and functions to be performed, as well as the work strategies and methodologies to be deployed, leveraging the advantages and minimizing the restrictions of the local level. Finally, it is important to add some comments in connection with the participation of civil society organizations in the design, implementation and evaluation of public youth policies, with special emphasis on youth organizations and non-governmental organizations for youth promotion, framing the reflections in the corresponding 239 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES [N LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN historical context. Undoubtedly, the differences between the various national processes are in this case, equally or more marked than in other areas analyzed; but, in any case, some general comments may be made, recalling that in most cases, civil society has emerged with great strength in the last few years, within the framework of the processes of State reform currently underway, through very diverse modes of operation. But together with this ''emergence" that provides visibility to the dimension of these phenomena, it is necessary to underline the changes in the models deployed in the last decades. Thus, everything seems to indicate that in most cases, youth organizations and specialized NGOs have followed a path that has led them from opposing the established governments (clearly in the case of the military dictatorships and authoritarian governments of the 70's and 80's in Latin America), to a growing involvement in the design, implementation and evaluation of youth public policies, for the most part, in cooperation with governments in the 90's. Such process has been facilitated by the changes in the "rules of the game" with which this type of organizations have operated. While in the 70's and 80's they received important political and financial backing from international organizations and development cooperation agencies of highly industrialized countries, in the last years they have had to fund their activities on the basis of "selling services". This in turn has been linked with the opening of the national States, that in the framework of processes of outsourcing different components of public polices, have shifted to contracting with this type of organizations with a certain regularity, leaving aside their past confrontations. These processes are undoubtedly not without their share of problems, but the truth is that in most cases, extremely interesting experiences of complementation of efforts between public and non-profit private organizations have developed, which will in the future allow for an even greater strengthening of youth polices. This is very visible in the case of youth job training programs, for example, which are executed by a broad range of private training institutions, hired by State agencies that retain the role of defining the major policy guidelines and the monitoring and evaluation of the work effectively performed. In the 240 ERNESTO RODRIGUEZ same line, there have been experiences in other spheres, specially in adolescent health and in the development of urban security programs, from which it will be possible to accumulate rich experiences to deploy similar efforts in the future. Resources Invested: How many, on What and How they are Spent If to the analysis of institutional management we add the evaluation of the investment made in public youth policies in the last decades, it is possible to arrive at a more comprehensive diagnosis. And although there are no comparative studies for a sufficient number of countries, the available evaluations show at least two clear trends: (i) the investment on youth, in a broad sense, is significant but limited when compared with the investment in other population groups; (ii) such investment, as opposed to the priorities defined on the basis of the design of public polices, are overwhelmingly concentrated on regular education. Although the methodologies used until now are still approximations and dissimilar from one another, studies conducted in Brazil, Puerto Rico and Uruguay illustrate such trends and indicate that what is applied is the implicit public policy, inherent in budget appropriations, even if it differs from the explicit public policy. At a more generic level, ECLAC's 2000-2001 Panorama Social de Am&ica Latina shows the trends of public expenditure (GP) in general and social public expenditure (GPS) in particular, highlighting that in the 90's, it increased in 14 of the 17 countries analyzed. This recovery has compensated for the losses recorded in the 80's, but in the last years it has slowed down as compared to the first part of the 90's. Almost half the increase recorded in the last decade was focused on health and education (areas of progressive spending), while the other 40% was concentrated in social security (area of regressive spending in terms of income distribution). In the countries with low social spending, the increases in education and 241 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN health expenditure prevailed (60% of the total), while in the countries with medium and high expenditure the increases in social security (50%) have been predominant. In aggregate terms, the above trends are relevant to examine the distribution of GPS among different population groups. Thus, the investment in social security -that prevails in the countries with medium and high social expenditure- is almost completely related to the adult and elderly population, a statement that is also valid for a good share of the health investment; only in the case of education it can be said that it is an investment significantly focused on children and youths. Likewise, it can be stated that the largest investments (social security) are predominantly regressive, while there is progressiveness only in some spheres of education (mainly primary education) and health (primary and secondary care, fundamentally). This is in clear contrast with the priorities that should be set from the logic of constructing the knowledge society that is in full development and requires major strategic investments in education, technological development and knowledge. A second element to be considered is that connected with the investment on education, since it is the sphere that, in spite of concentrating a small proportion of the overall social spending, concentrates the major youth investment. There appear to be at least two problems at this level: an excessive concentration of the increase of education public social spending was targeted at improving teachers' salaries (which has precluded increases in infrastructure and modernization) and the regressiveness of the high expenditure in higher education, from the point of view of income distribution. In connection with the first of the problems mentioned, the explanations are very simple: to the extent that teachers are adequately organized in corporatist terms, their demands are heard and in general addressed by public authorities, to avoid having an excessive number of protest days during the school year and the closing down of courses. For that reason, when more resources are obtained for education, the actors involved in the decision making process rapidly agree to assign them fully to improving teacher salaries. Implicitly, however, it is also simultaneously decided not to invest in school infrastructure and modernization, so that educational institutions 242 ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ become systematically degraded, and loose their necessary drive towards change and adjustment to the challenges. The consequences of such trends are extremely concerning. On the other hand, although there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that public spending in higher education is regressive in terms of income distribution (to the extent that society overall funds the education of youths belonging to the highest income families), not only does this trend not change but it becomes even more acute through time. Also in this case, the explanations relate to corporatist dynamics since our societies operate on the basis of an agreement, going back several decades already, whereby governments transfer large resources to universities, without becoming involved in the use and allocation of such funds (the universities are self governed) in exchange for maintaining "rebel" attitudes contained within the university institutions. In any case, the supposedly equalitarian use of the resources assigned to higher education, as the result of non payment for the education provided by public universities, widely favors youths from the middle and upper classes, to the extent that the equal opportunities that are generated by non payment are not sufficient to secure equal access to youths of all social classes. Thus, youths belonging to the low and impoverished social strata do not have access to universities and when they do, they only remain in them for a short time, dropping out at some point in the cycle, so that in the end this social bias in favor of upper class youths becomes even more evident. Ultimately, what is needed is to ensure equal opportunities by "dealing unequally with the unequal" through scholarship programs, specially targeted at youths belonging to poor families and distributing expenditure better among the various branches of education, with a focus on secondary education. Equally urgent is the need to assign growing quotas of resources to other policies different from education, that are prioritized in the design of public policies but do not receive adequate consideration in national budgets, as is the case of job insertion programs, promotion of youth civic participation and prevention of risk behaviors. In these areas, it is possible to see major contradictions between the priorities set in the youth policies as defined by political operators (in the youth 243 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN institutes and ministries) and the priorities that are expressed in the resource allocation by national parliaments. In general, the former strongly prioritize youth job insertion and civic participation, while the second continue to clearly prioritize (one might say, almost exclusively) education and leisure (fundamentally recreation and sports). This is not intended to suggest that the investment of resources in education should be decreased. Rather, the purpose is to provide the grounds for an expansion of the public expenditure allocated to the new generations, while at the same time providing greater balance between the different spheres in which said expenditure should be concentrated, with more significant increases of the appropriations for youth job training and civic participation, since these are the spheres to which, until now, the greatest priority has been attached from the political point of view but have had purely symbolic budgetary allocations. The problem is seen to be even worst since the resources ultimately assigned to youth job training and civic participation have come, in most cases, from international organizations which, by definition make short term investments that then need to be directly undertaken by the national States if they are to be maintained and/or increased. When making this type of allocations, the expectation is that they will make it possible to demonstrate the advantage and importance of this type of investments, and facilitate the decision of maintaining them through time, once the international cooperation ceases to operate. It is also true that it is always easier to assign extra budgetary items (such as those resulting from international cooperation) to "new programs" (as the ones being now prioritized), but the main risk is the lack of sustainability of said allocations in time, once the international cooperation ceases to operate (if the State does not assume medium and long term commitments). It is therefore essential to work intensively in searching for genuine financing for this type of initiatives, that need to be stable if effective impacts on the beneficiaries are to be obtained. On the other hand, it is evident that the prevailing practices are overwhelmingly concentrated on financing the supply of services, without there being in practice, relevant experiences of financing the demand, a much more common -and certainly more efficient- practice in the 244 ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ private field. We are referring, in particular, to the extended existence of "vouchers" which facilitate access to different public services- fundamentally in health and education- which are given to the end beneficiaries (the consumers themselves) to use in the institution they may decide. Naturally, this is only possible in non-monopolic markets where there effectively exist different alternatives for the same service. For this reason, several countries are working to demonopolize public services and simultaneously create open and competitive markets for the participation of different service suppliers. In the area of youth policies, this is only being attempted in the case of job training programs. On the other hand, some studies indicate it is possible to use different concrete mechanisms for investment. In health, for example, it has been demonstrated that the investment is more efficient when assigned to preventive programs than when it is allocated to programs that directly cure. In the case of youths, besides, this is particularly relevant, since -as it is known- the prevailing conditions and problems are significantly concentrated in the so called "risk behaviors" (traffic accidents, for example) and less in diseases of the types that affect adults. Similarly, it has been highlighted that the investments associated with prison policies are more efficiently applied to preventive measures instead of punitive practices. In the area of youth issues, in particular, this is very evident when comparing the costs and results of the two types of interventions referring to young offenders: on the one hand, traditionally they have been jailed in special prisons, but on the other and more recently, work is been done in different "assisted freedom" programs, that have shown better outcomes and lower costs than the traditional ones. The example of the Juvenile Justice in Costa Rica is a paradigm in this respect and marks a road to be followed by the other countries, with the corresponding adjustments. However, the tendencies prevailing in the region are exactly the opposite. This is so to the extent that the institutions traditionally involved in providing youth services, embark on a corporatist defense of their traditional practices, as a form of defending their jobs and institutional existence, regardless of the fact that the result is greater costs or negligible marginal impacts in the target population. For that reason, changes in these areas will hardly 245 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN come from the institutions involved themselves. They will have to be promoted through the process of State reform, by means of incentives designed to achieve the cooperation of the institutions as such. The Vision of the Participating Actors: Between Discourse and Effective Practice This analysis would not be complete if it did not include some remarks on the attitudes prevailing among the actors implied in the design and execution of public youth policies. Some of these attitudes are known, but are only expressed indirectly and remain subsumed in more restrictive circles in terms of their effective influence and scope. It is not possible to examine the cases that need to be considered one by one, but it is important to, at least, compare the attitude of some of the corporatist structures with the attitude of youth movements and some relevant State institutions, without neglecting the attitudes of parents and the community, who operate as core references in youth's daily life, in all the countries of the region. In the case of youths, everywhere and at very different times of the recent history some very marked traits have been noticeable. Among them, at least in the case of the better organized and more mobilized youth (who express their points of view publicly by different means) is their wide annoyance with the leading classes that tend to identify youths with "the future". For that reason, they persistently insist that youths are "the present", making reference to their interest at being addressed in connection with their current dynamics and not only as a function of their preparation to undertake various adult roles in the future (as workers, citizens, etc.). This type of rationale prevails among the leaders of public institutions specializing in the area of youth, those at the level of central administration (youth institutes and ministries) and in the case of the provincial, municipal and local youth offices. Undoubtedly, this has been one of the major tools they have used to differentiate themselves from the rest of the public administration (the sphere where the discourse they criticize 246 ERNESTO RODRIGUEZ is predominant) and trying to get as close as possible to the world of youth, attempting to take into account the dominant youth culture, including the perceptions, expectations and demands that youth themselves formulate either implicit or explicitly. However, this discourse is very difficult to put into practice through specific and concrete measures. For that reason, many times it turns against those who disseminate it, to the extent that it becomes as inoperative as the opposite one, with the added caveat that, in this case, it is not based on erroneous or critizeable conceptions. As a result, it has lately been perceived to be almost empty of effective contents, and it has tended to become relegated in practical terms, just like the discourse of the leading class. In this sense, there is a growing awareness of the intrinsic limitations of the juvenile condition in itself, very difficult to apprehend due to the evident "volatility" of this "transitory" social condition (lost with the passing of time). The practical consequence could be to give greater emphasis to the short term in the design of programs, within the framework of a broader logic provided from the adult world, regarding the manner in which the more stable and less autonomous juvenile movements operate (in the style of those linked to church dynamics, for example). The discourse of the leading classes in turn, is focused on the previously criticized rationale: youths are the future and they have to be prepared so that in the future they may live better and participate dynamically in the society of which they are members. Therefore, at present, what youths need is not much more than preparing to be "grown up" and "stay out of trouble" in their free time. The issue has all sorts of implications that are extremely complex. On one side, it could be argued -as organized youths and specialized institutions do -that the argument is extremely conservative and has no other purpose but "disregarding" the present of youths. Taken to its extreme, this sort of arguments may be made explicit by saying that in fact, youths are denied the possibility of participating, here and now, in the dynamics of the society to which they belong. This has very profound implications in terms of non recognition of rights and corporatist practices that have the sole purpose of persisting in time, without effecting modifications in the established rules of the game. On the other 247 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN side, the core argument we refer to has a real foundation, especially if these dynamics are looked at from the logic of the protagonic roles that youths should take in constructing the knowledge society (as we will see later). From this point of view, it is true that youths have to become prepared to undertake roles and responsibilities when they become adults, but, in any case, the key is in "how" they prepare themselves. From the traditional perspective, the preparation and the undertaking of roles are completely dissociated and separated in time (first they prepare and later they assume responsibilities), while within the more modem and innovative visions, the preparation and taking on of roles is progressive and simultaneous (youths learn to participate by participating). In the end, what seems to exist is an underlying but tangible generational conflict, in which what is at stake is who makes the decisions. From this point of view, the traditional attitude of the leading classes is determined by the fear of being displaced from power by youths, and in the facts this is expressed through practices that try to delay as long as possible the necessary and inevitable generational relay. At the same time, it is an attempt to convey to the new generations all the elements that will allow for the established rules of the game to persist in time, to prevent radical changes that could move outside that logical framework. Within the framework of societies that replicate themselves over the decades (as was the case in the long stage of substitution industrialization in Latin America between the 30's and the 70's), this has some logic, but at a time when societies are trying to adapt to "ongoing change" (as is currently happening throughout the world due to the technological revolution currently underway), such logic is completely destroyed and the argument becomes dysfunctional to the new societal dynamics at all levels. It is therefore advisable to avoid the trap of this false dilemma (future or present). The issue deserves an additional twist, incorporating the attitude of the leading classes as it is expressed in various corporatist practices. The studies available do not dwell on these issues, but tend to uphold two main arguments: youth movements do not act in corporatist terms and the corporatist actors involved are not interested in leveraging youth policies. Some analysists attribute that attitude to circumstantial 248 ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ explanations, trusting that such circumstances may change; in others, the interpretations are based on more structural arguments and are less optimistic regarding the possibilities of future change. From that perspective, it is assumed that political parties are only marginally interested in youth issues, since age is not a relevant variable for electoral purposes. In those countries where youths form a relatively minor sector of the population of a voting age, that relevance is limited in quantitative terms; in the countries with large youth populations, the condition of youth is not expressed in an electoral behavior and the relevance of the issue is limited qualitatively. Trade unions and business associations fail to express great concern regarding the issue of youth. The former prioritize the workers that are already included in the production process, and the latter prefer to hire adult, more experienced workers. The same line is followed by labor ministries, that prefer to focus on adult heads of households, even if that means neglecting youths, because they do not have the same responsibilities. In any case, the previous argument is also valid here, to the extent that such positions could operate in a traditional society, one that no longer exists as it was structured at times of greater dynamism. Families today are different from the past, and the model where there is a single income earner (the adult male, head of the family) no longer operates; this function is now shared by both spouses as well as some of the older children. The same can be said of State institutions, more concerned about their own existence than about decisively incorporating the new generations in their operations. Within a context in which the users who really count are the adults -because they can have an effect on those dynamics- youths have no voice (in the sense that Hirschman gives to the concept) to a sufficient degree to be heard, so that (continuing with Hirschman's terminology) they can only fluctuate between the exit and the loyalty: accepting the rules of the game or remaining outside it. The scenario becomes disquieting when to the above we add the structural limitations of youth movements, which are the only ones in a position to become the voice of youth, but fail because -as already said- they are guided by the symbolic and not by the material dimensions of its existence. 249 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN Therefore, the combination of all these "logics", leads almost inescapably to a sort of "dead end", that precludes action. It might even be convenient to go further in the analysis and incorporate other dimensions, in particular, the vision of some actors that do not always express themselves in a corporatist way but are relevant. That is the case, for example, of youth's parents who almost always follow with more concern than their own children the situation in which they grow and mature. Parents conduct no public demonstrations in the style of trade union strikes, or publish messages to the Government and public opinion as businessmen do. But, for example, when consulted in public opinion polls, their appreciations and points of view emerge very clearly. Parents, who do have an influence in other levels, also fail to have a voice of their own, so they are not considered in the educational system, the electoral processes or even in the setting of priorities regarding public policies. In any case, their collaboration can become decisive. Because of all of the above, the role of the institutions specializing in juvenile promotion is much more important than in the case of any other public policy since they have to act as surrogates of the corporatist role that organized beneficiaries play in other areas (women policies, for example). This situation seems paradoxical, specially in connection with approaches that postulate youth participation as the driving force in transforming production, social modernization and democratic consolidation. However, the truth is that exaggerated bets on juvenile organization and mobilization have generally ended in clear failures in different contexts and diverse historic circumstances. These factors have not been adequately considered in public policies, since the experience shows that the majority of the instruments made available -information centers, for example- are used more intensely by parents, who employ them to orient and better support their children. Such mediators, as the roles that teachers perform and may carry out in educational institutions, or the promoters and leaders of youth movements, the preachers and priests and some sensitized journalists are key for the development of youth public policies. However, so far they have barely been addressed in a partial manner and in a few concrete cases, so they 250 ERNESTO RODRIGUEZ remain as another challenge for the reformulations to be made in the future. From that point of view, it can be strongly argued that the only youth organizations and movements that persist in time are those which operate with some adult "logic", as is the case of the Youth Pastoral Movement or the Young Christian Association or the Scouts Movement. By the same token, the only NGOs that persist in time and accumulate useful lessons and experiences are those that know how to combine their proximity to the world of youth, without remaining exclusively enclosed in it, with its integration into society as a whole. The same is true for specialized public institutions, that do not attempt to comply with roles that are not theirs, and focus their efforts in those areas in which they are effectively irreplaceable (global vision, driving processes, articulating efforts, etc.). OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NEW ERA Before moving on to the formulation of some alternative proposals, it is convenient to analyze the context in which public policies will operate at the beginning of this new century. To that end, an analysis of the implications of the demographic bonus and the new information and communication technologies is included, connecting youth policies with the reform of the State and looking at the difficulties surrounding the complex issue of financing these public policies. For reasons that are explained below, it is evident that we stand in front of a great historical and structural opportunity, that should be taken advantage of immediately. Demographic Bonus, Youth and Human Development in the 21st Century The first big opportunity to be analyzed relates to the so called demographic "bonus" or "dividend". Beyond the terms, what it is highlighted is that the past, present and future demographic trends 251 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN are providing a great opportunity for development, since the overwhelming amounts of children that were the demographic protagonists of the last fifty years are not longer being born, and as yet there are no excessively significant groups of elderly population, especially in developing countries. The United Nations Fund for Population Activities in its 1998 Report on the Status of World Population, has underscored the current existence of "the largest youth generation ever". "In the developing countries, it adds, lower birth rates offer the possibility of a demographic dividend in the coming 15 to 20 years, as an inflow of youths enters the active population, while, simultaneously, a lower quantity of children are born" Undoubtedly, that is an opportunity for development. "If jobs could be found for these youths, the affluence of the active population could serve as the basis for greater investments, greater work productivity and fast economic development", it emphasizes. On its side, at a regional scale, the IDB has noted the phenomenon with the same emphasis. "Most of the countries in Latin America stand now at a favorable moment of demographic transition. Fertility rates are dropping and a large cohort of children are being incorporated to the ranks of the active population. With less children to raise and as yet few retired elderly people, it may be said that the current generation of Latin Americans are really in a favorable position to become the engine of economic growth and a social change agent", adding that "in the next 20 years there will be a decrease in the proportion of children with respect to the number of workers, before the increase in the proportion of retirees with respect to the number of active workers begins to represent a much heavier financial burden. This indicates - it concludes- that we are faced with two decades to accelerate development, get people to work, finance educational improvements and save for the future". The IDB citations belong to the 1998-99 report on Economic and Social Progress in Latin America (America Latina Frente a la Desigualdad), and the issue was revisited with even greater force and depth in the 2000 Report (Desarrollo mcis alla de la Economia). In the latter, it is once again underlined that "in the period 2000-2030 the total dependency coefficients of Latin America will reach record low historical levels", but warns that the region "cannot passively await the greater potential benefits generated by the 252 ERNESTO RODRfGUEZ change in age structure, but has to actively apply policies to leverage such benefits". From that point of view, "the main policy aspects that require immediate attention for Latin American countries to take advantage of this demographic opportunity include employment, crime, education, health, savings and pensions issues". As can be noted, it is indispensable to include these dimensions into our analysis, since a good part of the elements of judgment that will determine the definition of priorities for public policies and the correspondent allocation of resources pivot on the same. If we look at the priority that the youth issue has had in the last fifty years, it can clearly be seen that children have always taken first place and that in almost all relevant fields, attention and resources were assigned to them. If on the basis of such evidence we project this type of analysis to the next fifty years, we can verify with certain ease that in the future the priority can come to be the elderly, with no intermediate stages. If we take into account the core axes of the debates and public actions in the last few years, we can easily determine that this is already occurring in practice. What in any case is important is to demonstrate that the challenge of the elderly will affect us forcefully towards the middle of this century (and of course, it is necessary to prepare for it) but emphasizing -at the same time- that the juvenile challenge is alreadi' among us, and it will have a core prevalence during the next twenty years, so it should be addressed as a priority in these two key decades. If the inertia of the past continues to be dragged (caring for children predominantly) and the concerns about the future are added (focusing exclusively the issue of the elderly), we are at risk of neglecting the situation of the young generations, with all the asynchronies that this has, visible in the social emergence of the yozung (demanding spaces that society does not give them, through all sort of strategies) without public policies responding adequately. Of course, the issue has different implications for each particular country, depending on how each of them is placed in the demographic transition as such. For that reason, and beyond not being able to make a detailed analysis of each national case, it is important to make some comments taking groups of countries, differentiating the cases of "early modernization", from those of "late modernization" and the 253 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN ones that are at "full transition" in an intermediate stage. The first category clearly comprises the countries of the Southern Cone (Argentina, Uruguay and Chile) together with Costa Rica, Cuba and to a lesser degree, Panama. In this case, the demographic transition (in comparison with the other categories) is more advanced, and the challenge of the elderly is more established, but in any case the issue of the younger generation is very relevant and will need to be addressed as a priority. In the intermediate category, we find the largest countries in Latin America (Brazil, Mexico, Colombia) together with others which are not less relevant (Venezuela and Peru, for example) and it is in them where the trends that we are underlining (the "demographic bonus") can be seen in a clearer and more categoric way. The contrasts between demographic trends and public policies are evident in all of them: while the young generations are emerging socially everywhere, public policies continue operating with the inertias of the past. The result is an unprecedented development of violence, with an evident protagonism of youth (in Colombia, as it is known, this is one of the main "occupation" of youths). Definitely, these countries will have to address these trends as a priority and with the greatest urgency if they want to be up to the major challenges of the new century. Finally, in the category of countries with "late modernization" (Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, Bolivia and Paraguay, among others) there, still exist, very numerous groups of children, but the change in trend is becoming significantly accelerated, due to the drop in birth and mortality rates and the consequent increase of life expectancy at birth. In these cases, the "demographic bonus" will come a bit later (as compared to the rest) but will have an effective prevalence in the second and third decades of this new century. The advantage will lie, above all, on the relative delay in the increase of elderly population groups, that will only begin to be significant in the second half of this century. For this reason, the priority of public policies should clearly shift from early infancy towards adolescence and youth. The theme we are analyzing poses two groups of relevant challenges: one relating to public policies as such and the other connected with the actors that shall take the lead in these debates in the immediate future. Regarding the substantive dimension, it seems clear that the areas already mentioned (employment, crime, education, 254 ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ health, savings and pensions) must be analyzed at the light of these challenges. Clearly, it is not the same to analyze employment issues from the rationale of business and trade union corporations than from the dynamics of incorporating young generations to our societies, and the same could be said regarding health public policies (it is very different to work to fight infantile mortality than to address risk behaviors among the young). The same could be argued in connection with crime, since conditions change radically in an scenario where large groups of excluded youths exist (or not) available to organized crime (drug trafficking, for example). Of course, the problem is not solved with more and better opportunities of social integration for youths, but it would significantly contribute in this respect. Likewise, the challenges change radically if in the area of education a shift is made from the historical priority on basic education to focusing on secondary education. And even in the case of the policies relating to savings and pensions (one of the more relevant forms of savings) the scenarios are changing markedly, and with them, the public policies. The issue is undoubtedly very different if it is analyzed from the logic of the public structure (preoccupied with the chronical deficit of pensions systems) or from the perspective of the pensioners and retirees (preoccupied with collecting decent pensions) or if it is analyzed from the point of view of the new generations, that in most of the countries in the region are being incorporated to new pension systems, with an uncertain future, loosing the "privileges" enjoyed by current pensioners and increasing their contributive burden to reduce the deficit of the system, without anybody having thought through the consequences that this has in terms of their social incorporation and the processing of the necessary autonomy of the new generations. On its side, the issue of "actors" is also relevant, to the extent that organized youths will not be those who will work on these issues (youth movements do not have corporatist positions as we have already noted) and for this reason institutions specializing in youth (both public and private) are forced to assume representation roles (informally but very effectively) for the purpose of incorporating these approaches to the current debates. To that end, these issues need to be rigorously analyzed,from the logic ofyouth, leaving behind the classic corporatist or the particular political-institutional approaches. 255 YOUTH. SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN The Construction of the Knowledge Society The second big opportunity for development in general and for youth policies in particular, stems from the potential of the new information and communication technologies, and their decisive influence in all dimensions of societal dynamics. As it is known, these new technologies imply innovations occurring simultaneously at various levels: microelectronics, computers (both hardware and software), telecommunications and fiber optics (microprocessors, semiconductors, fiber optics). What is relevant is that these innovations are making it possible to process and store ever more information and to distribute it with increasing speed, through networks around the world. The specialists state that the capacity of computers will double every 18 to 24 months (thanks to the rapid evolution of microprocessors) and that every 6 months the capacity of communications will double (based on an explosion in bandwidth, sustained by advances in the technology of fiber optics networks). Both trends will, besides, take place in parallel with huge cost reductions and significant increases in the speed and quantity of information to be distributed. Undoubtedly, the most evident symbol of all these trends is the development of the Internet, that has managed to interconnect million of people in the most remote parts of the world in a few years, (in 1995 the users were barely 20 million, and in 2000 there were already 400 million, and it is forecasted that by 2005 they will be one billion). But, as it is also known, access to the Internet is distributed in a very unequal manner (three fourths of the users are in highly industrialized countries, members of the OCDE, that have only 14% of the world population). Thus, while in the United States, the users are 54% of the total population, in Latin America and the Caribbean they are only 3.2%. The other divide exists within countries: the majority of the users live in urban zones (80% of the users in the Dominican Republic live in Santo Domingo), they are better educated and have more money (in Chile 89% has had higher education), are young (between the ages of 18 and 24 they are five times more likely to be users than those over 25 years of age) and the majority are men (in Latin America, two thirds) 256 ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ although this divide is being reduced (in Brazil, women were one third in 1995 and by 2000, they were already half). But what is relevant is not the dimension, but the practical implications of the subject, to the extent that the ICT are giving greater transparency to planning and transactions, they increase political participation (both in terms of formulating proposals and in the development of citizen control mechanisms), can be used to develop distance education very significantly, as well as remote medicine, telecommuting, etc. For all of this, the process underway opens important opportunities to be taken advantage of, and generates new risks that will need to be controlled. The technological progress index (TPI), developed by UNDP makes it possible to determine in comparative terms at what stage our countries are, in this regard. In operating terms, the TPI is structured based on four key dimensions, measured around eight specific indicators: creation of technology (per capita number of patents granted and per capita income collected from abroad for the concept of royalties and license fees), dissemination of recent innovations (dissemination of the Internet and exports of high and medium technology products), dissemination of old inventions (telephones and electricity), and specialized knowledge (years of schooling and gross rate of tertiary students enrolled in sciences, mathematics and engineering) and "attempts to reflect the extent to which a country is creating and disseminating technology and building a foundation of human knowledge, and therefore, its capacity to take part in the technological innovations of the Internet age" (UNDP, 2001). The scale built by UNDP includes 72 countries, grouped in four categories: leaders, potential leaders, dynamic followers and marginalized. The first one comprises 18 countries (all of them highly industrialized), while the second has 19; 26 are in the third one and 9 more in the fourth (marginalized). At the top of the global list is Finland, followed in the ranking by the United States, Sweden, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Singapore, Germany, Norway, Ireland, Belgium, New Zealand, Austria, France and Israel. The list of the potential leaders starts with Spain, and the following spots are held by Italy, several countries of Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Eslovaquia, Bulgaria, Poland, Croatia and Rumania) other "Asian tigers" (Hong 257 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN Kong, Malasia) and other European countries (Portugal, Greece, Cyprus). This category also comprises four Latin American countries (Mexico, Argentina, Costa Rica and Chile), while several others are in the group of "dynamic followers", led by Uruguay. There is only one Latin American country in the group of the marginalized (Nicaragua), but what is relevant is to note how the combinations of specific indicators are clearly different in each case. Thus, while Mexico and Costa Rica have important percentages of their exports in the technological field, Argentina and Chile are noteworthy for their high levels of university enrollment in sciences (like Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador and Dominican Republic within their group). Likewise, Uruguay is noted by its number of Internet hosts and also for its wide telephony and electricity coverage (in this last aspect, like Panama and Brazil). Within the frameworks of these notes, it is convenient to return to an item remarked in passing in the previous pages, with the purpose of taking adequate notice of the evident protagonic role of youth in the construction of the knowledge society. We refer to the over- representation of youths among Internet users, that also relates to the evident link existing between the enrollment in scientific higher education (one of the indicators used for the construction of the TPI) and the dynamics of the highly qualified youths, that constitute a human capital of great relevance in our countries. If youths belong to households affected by acute scenarios of poverty and exclusion they must be the target of public youth policies, from the angle of youths as beneficiaries, while the highly qualified youths must be a target from the angle of youths as strategic actors of development. Clearly, these youths are the protagonists of the major research and development processes, while they are decisively collaborating in developing the new tools in this area and are the protagonists of the dynamic use of the new information and communication technologies; the average age of those working in such fields and incorporating these new tools in their daily life clearly indicates it. Ultimately, it may be stated, with absolute certainty and conviction, that we are in the presence of a true revolution at all levels, significantly different from the development of minor changes associated to post modernity and this revolution has youths around the world as its clear protagonists. In the end, it is about the new tools that within the framework of glocalization (globalization 258 ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ and local development simultaneously) make it possible to bring the world to any individual or human group, anywhere in the world and at any time. The very concepts of space and time change radically, in dimensions that it is still very difficult to imagine effectively, so that we stand before a true epochal mutation, even more relevant than the industrial revolution in its time. The realms in which it would be possible to analyze these change trends are infinite, but what is important here is to return to those relating to education (defined in a very broad sense), given the angle with which this report is structured. And in that sense, we stand before the opportunity of radically reformulating everything that has until the present been done with the so called distance education, for example. Although it has existed in our countries for decades, with the incorporation of the new information and communication technologies it has acquired an unheard-of relevance that was not imagined by its original promoters (Several authors, 2000c). Clearly, this is one of the most relevant spheres of development, and for that reason, the major international organizations, governments, business, families and individuals, around the world, are investing more and more resources in developing individual, group and institutional capacities in these areas, to avoid being left on the sides of these strong change trends. Universal access and a dynamic and innovative use of these new tools are the main challenges and in the realm of public youth policies (as in many others) no relevant steps have yet been taken. Public Youth Policies and State Reform: a Link that Remains to be Constructed The third big process in terms of challenges and opportunities, at this beginning of a new century and millennium, relates to the reform of the State that is currently underway. Many structural reforms undertaken in Latin America and the Caribbean in the 90's were driven under the umbrella of the Washington Consensus and were mainly focused on matters of fiscal discipline, liberalization of trade policy 259 YOUTH. SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN and investment regimes, deregulation of domestic markets and privatization of utilities. But, as stated in a World Bank report "the Washington Consensus policy dictums ignore the function the institutional changes could play in accelerating economic and social development in the region" (World Bank, 1998). In essence, the region's priorities during the debt crisis of the 80's were centered on the search for economic stability and in pulling apart the scaffoldings of the protectionist development model. However, a new opportunity for change arises at present, based on the fact that the sustainability of economic reforms is conditioned by institutional reforms. Organizations such as the World Bank foster and provide financial support to the so-called "second generation reforms", including the reform of the judiciary, parliaments and the public administration. They further posit that the transformation should, above all, change the system of incentives and strictures on which bureaucrats and politicians operate. Within this framework, the concerns relating to democratic governance become consolidated and an attempt is made to apply various instruments to achieve a more active participation of civil society in development processes, trying to expand the protagonism of the "non-State public sector" (Bresser Pereyra and Cunill Grau Ed., 1998). As for the first dimension, the priorities refer to modernizing political parties and electoral systems, for representation and popular participation, and they try to incorporate citizens' perception more and better in the dynamics of the democratic strengthening processes in which almost all the countries in the region are immersed. And with regards to the participation of civil society, the mechanisms that are being put in practice focus on two fundamental roles: service delivery and interest representation. In the sphere of social policies, the demonopolization of utilities is thought of as an alternative to privatization (the "publicization") and the representation of interests is linked to the development of social control mechanisms for policies or participation in their design, such as the experiences of "participatory budgeting" in Brazil, that Porto Alegre pioneered more than ten years ago. In the narrower sphere of public youth policies, the distribution of roles and functions may be thought of as the main response to the lack 260 ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ of articulation of institutional efforts, approached on the basis of structuring efficient institutional systems. At the central level, the youth institutes, general directorates or ministries should devote much of their efforts to understanding the issues affecting youth and to a systematic tracking down of the dynamics of public policies targeted at them. Similarly, they could play a decisive role as facilitators of the articulation and shared work of several public institutions. They could also provide information and counseling to youths to contribute to their fluid insertion in society, and work in training human resources at all levels, homogenizing strategies and approaches. In order to perform these tasks it is necessary to carry out studies and research systematically, do a continuous evaluation of the public policies linked to the issue, and of course, have suitable human resources. In turn, the State, Provincial and Municipal counterparts of the youth institutes, directorates and secretariats should devote themselves to executing programs and projects, carefully avoiding competition with other execution instances at their same level (the education or health directorates in the subnational administrative divisions) with which they should cooperate in the broadest possible way, also articulating their work with the national levels. How can this intermediation role be defined? One way of doing it is by promoting youth participation, which requires assuming the idea that youths are strategic actors of development and not merely beneficiaries of policies, for example, as development volunteers, as we will see later. It is also possible to think of mechanisms for the various youth groups and movements to express criticisms, proposals and points of view on all those issues of their interest so that, with the necessary support, they may implement the initiatives considered a priority. But it is necessary to avoid the risk of incurring in extremes that can be negative such as manipulation by the State or the irresponsible promotion of opposition actions. In any case, it is essential to accept that youth movements are ephemeral in their existence, extremely changing in terms of interests and expectations, "lacking discipline" (seen from the outside) and, above all, reluctant to receiving external directives, specially when they are perceived as authoritarian. On the other hand, the ministries, secretariats and general directorates, as agencies responsible for the execution of 261 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN sectorial policies -on education, health, employment and others- should have specialized technical teams on youth issues, capable of looking at their activities from the viewpoint of their target and open to working with a modem and appropriate mentality. And to complete this rapid "overview" of spaces and institutions existing in the realm of youth promotion, it is also important to consider another sphere to which little attention is paid in this type of analysis: the locus for youth socialization and meetings. If there is one place where public policies designed for youth effectively operate it is there, but the operational dynamics are only exceptionally analyzed, many times they are loaded with serious "perversions" to be addressed (for example, in the last few years Youth Houses have multiplied throughout the region, with very relative success). But, how can these efforts that are so autonomous be effectively brought together? How to attain pertinent results from such logic? What mechanisms would prevent the problems that arise when trying to coordinate actions between diverse institutions? The answers should be sought in operational management, deciphering the keys and designing alternative mechanisms in those cases where it is pertinent. One of the keys refers to the financing of public policies, a sphere in which it is necessary to recognize the importance both of separating financing from execution and of the diverse ways of allocating resources. In connection with the separation between financing and execution, the rationale seems categorical: if the same party finances and executes, there are no objective mechanisms to determine if what is being done is good and if the strategic and methodological paths chosen to operate are the best. Therefore, it is fundamental to split both functions and operate on the basis of tenders that foster the broadest competition and the most effective transparency. Actually, in no case is it possible to be certain that the chosen path is the only (and the best of those possible) to address any problem so it is pertinent to convene various actors, inviting them to submit diverse proposals to resolve the issues to be addressed. Likewise, if instead of financing the institutions (the service supply) the management of the resources was given to the beneficiaries (the demand) better tools would be available to avoid the "routinization" of programs and the bureaucratization of the institutions charged with 262 ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ operating them. Additionally, it is essential to separate financing and execution from the evaluation function, that needs to be performed by a third institutional agent. When the evaluation is done by the same financing agency, it will always have the last word and the party in charge of execution will not be able to operate with autonomy and independence, a situation that defines a de facto monopoly, even if there is a separation between roles and functions. All of the above seems to make clear that these proposals contain measures directly oriented towards decentralization, but it is important to note that they are intended to go beyond the mechanisms that have been put in place until now and that have presented very evident limitations and problems. Decentralization pure and simple does not bring about better living conditions for the population at the local level, and many times, it contributes to worsening territorial inequalities (as has been the case in the sphere of education and health, in various national cases in the last few years) and towards the development of negative autarchic trends (some national processes have been paradigmatic in this sense). Therefore, it is advisable for decentralization to be accompanied by a true agreed distribution of roles and functions among central, intermediate and local levels. Finally, if everything said so far is adjusted to the cross-cutting condition that youth policies share with those referring to other specific groups in the population-children, women, ethnic groups, the elderly, migrants and others, such changes in the specific management could have extremely relevant impacts to modernize public management as a whole, since they would become a locus to accumulate experiences of simultaneous and coordinated work in several specific spheres. Youth policies could complement the limited vision of specific sectorial policies, such as educational policies -that a focus exclusively on teaching (and neglect the effective learning)- or employment policies, that a focus exclusively on the head of household (the typical adult male integrated into the formal sector of the economy), neglecting the situation of women and youths (those most severely affected by unemployment and precarious employment) -or health, that focuses on addressing the disease instead of health improvement and prevention. This type of approach will contribute to the formulation of more realistic public policies, supported on a 263 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN socio- demographic segment that is so necessary to ensure that the actions are pertinent and enforceable. Thus, public youth policies- as those referring to childhood and the elderly- could follow strategic approaches similar to the programs of equal opportunity for women, which managed to articulate -through facts and in the face of large institutional and political resistances- sectorial programs that had never been addressed head on. Within this framework, having a clear generational perspective of public policies might be essential, attempting to dynamically articulate the various phases of people's life cycle (childhood, youth, adulthood, old age) for the purpose of responding with specific policies that are part of an articulated array of general public policies. The experience of the National Population Council of Mexico, the National Population and Development Commission of Brazil and the Secretariat of Generational and Family Affairs of the Ministry of Human Development of Bolivia, can make substantial contributions in these areas, and need to be evaluated in comparative terms with greater rigour, for the purpose of extracting the corresponding lessons and be in a position to replicate these approaches in other countries of the region. In this line of action, it may be essential to count with technical and operating skills for a rigorous analysis of the approaches that should be applied in each and everyone of the public policies from this generational perspective, while it could also be extremely productive to be able to take a position from the perspective of youth in the major national debates, something that could be extremely productive in areas such as labor reform and pension systems, that in no case are neutral for the youths in the region, and however, are almost never processed taking into account that type of angle. Thus, temporary work may, for example, be looked upon critically by the trade unions (with an adult logic), but could have a more favorable evaluation when looked upon from non corporatist positions (with a youth logic) and even with a logic more dynamically related to the challenges of the future (derived from the internationalization of the economy) than linked to the privileges of the past (built under the umbrella of protectionist and clientelistic systems within the framework of closed economies). 264 ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ Financing Public Youth Policies A few other challenges, more specifically centered on the complex issue of financing should be added to the challenges we have identified so far. Here we intend to estimate the magnitude of the necessary investment, rank the priority areas in which future investments should be made, propose the reformulation of the operating strategies with which said investment should effectively be utilized and warn about the consequences that may be derived from not carrying out the necessary investment in a timely manner and in the spheres prioritized on the basis of a social and political consensus. Starting with the dimension of the necessary investment, it is necessary to point out that we face the need of substantially expanding the level of public spending dedicated to youth until now. For the reasons presented above, it is not possible to attempt to construct the knowledge society with the current levels of investment in the new generations, as compared to what is invested in the elderly, to give an example. Such relationship should be reviewed from every point of view, in an attempt to structure better balances in this respect, at least if the aim is to build more prosperous and equitable societies. This is very simple to enunciate, but at the same time very difficult to bring about. Extremely powerful interests will operate in the opposite sense, trying to prevent such changes from occurring. For that reason, it will be necessary to act in a realistic manner, trying to link the improvements in the level of public spending allocated to the new generations with improvements in economic performance. This is particularly evident with respect to the priority spheres, approached from the angle of the future challenges: education, knowledge, science and technology. To bring about such changes, it will be essential to arrive at political and parliamentary agreements that provide feasibility and stability through time. From this point of view, these orientations should cut across the competitive logic with which political parties operate, attempting to develop a consensus as broad and solid as possible. But such agreements will not be enough. It will be necessary to add to them the support of society as a whole, for which purpose, 265 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN public policies may employ specific incentives, demonstrating the advantages of a greater democratization in the access to goods and services between generations. This can be done in different spheres, in the field of labor and in the area relating to access to housing and in connection with formal and informal education as well as specifically centered on aspects linked to recreation, sports and culture, or in connection with the media. In any case, what is important is to create awareness about the close relation that exists between youth investment and development, based on the arguments that we have presented above. Increasing investment in youth is, therefore, a fundamental condition. But, a second initiative of great relevance will need to be added to the former: prioritizing those areas in which the increased investment will be focused going forward. From the basis of the logical framework within which these notes are structured, such priorities should be clearly set around access to services (education, health and employment) going back to the notion presented above regarding the need for support from society as a whole (a process in which public policies can cooperate). Concretely, it would be necessary to count with a greater inclination by business to hiring young personnel, while it would also be essential to incentivate the labor incorporation of youths within the context of family dynamics, through modalities that allow them to continue studying. To this end, public policies could generate specific legal and tax incentives, promoting temporary and part time jobs, exempting companies from paying certain taxes to be identified in each concrete case (for example). In this way, youths would dispose of their own income (with all the implications that this has in terms of autonomy and greater self esteem). In the same line, it would be essential to provide greater facilities for young couples who are trying to start their households to have access to their own housing. Thus, the process would be facilitated at the most critical time of our society's biological and social reproduction, and also at this level public policies can provide specific incentives, in this case, starting from setting longer terms for the repayment of the corresponding loans (if there is something that youths have in their favor is more years of life ahead 266 ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ to pay back their debts) including differential grace periods in accordance with particular needs. The same could be done in the field of health, confronting the perverse logic that states that, since youths fall sick less than children and adults, there is no reason for them to be a priority from the point of view of the allocation of resources devoted to the population's sanitary care. From this point of view, the development of preventive programs should be incentivated, to save future resources by addressing already existing problems (an advertising campaign or the development of specific information programs are infinitely less expensive than direct care for cases linked with drug consumption, HIV AIDS or attempted suicides, for example). Of course, within the same line, it would be indispensable to expand and improve education investment. In this case, public policies can incentivate technical orientations (to decongest universities) while prioritizing secondary education (over and above higher education) and develop broad scholarship programs for students belonging to low income households, who are competing in very unequal terms with the more advantaged (who should be charged for the services they receive) compensating for the existing inequities. Defending "free" education, based on equalitarian arguments actually conceals a defense of the privileges of middle and upper class youths in an evident manner. A third dimension that would need to be substantially reformulated is that connected with the modes of utilization of resources that have prevailed so far. From this point of view, it is important to go back to the remarks made above in connection with financing the supply and/or the demand of the services targeted at the new generations. From this viewpoint, the "voucher" system should be promoted forcefully and decisively, since the decision power on how to use resources is transfered to the end users themselves, at the expense of the power of the institutions that provide such services. This is particularly relevant in the field of education. Continuing to finance service supply (budgetary items allocated to the various branches of education and from them to the different educational institutions) will continue incentivating monopoly practices which impoverish the services provided. Since they have no competition, there 7re no incentives to try and develop 267 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN ever more pertinent responses at the lowest possible costs. In this context, it makes no sense to question whether what is being done is well done or could be improved, or if more or less could be done with the available resources. The "voucher" shifts the decision of where to invest resources to the user, and in this way, the institution rendering the service will have to demonstrate that it is the best in its area (for the purpose of getting "customers") and do it well (to prevent their customers going with their voucher to another institution). The same is applicable to any other service. However, the experiences so far have faced several relevant problems, so it will be essential to organize such systems trying to avoid those problems. Among the major ones is the trend to widening the differences between regions and social groups. For this purpose it is essential to employ active compensation mechanisms, promoted by the public policies themselves. In the same line, problems have been faced linked with the reformulation of the dynamics of supply, in which framework the more powerful institutions are in a position to dominate the market that opens up. Also in this case, it will be necessary to deploy compensation mechanisms, to support the institutions with less relative power, enabling them to compete with the more structured ones. Finally, the same is true in those cases in which markets are opened up, but there are no institutions to take over the operation of the corresponding programs. Also in this situation, public policies should be active, promoting the setting up of specific institutions (for example, as was the case in the field of job training). We are talking, in global terms, of driving demand financing, while simultaneously supporting the supply to avoid negative distortions and at the same time provide for the best conditions for the reformulated services to be rendered from the point of view of management. This will make it possible to combat the problems that are generated within bureaucratic and monopolic schemes, while avoiding the emergence of new problems in these regards. And for all of this to operate adequately, the State should also have efficient regulations and control tools, designed to avoid the replacement of public monopolies with private monopolies and the degradation of the services being demonopolized as a consequence of the irresponsibility of the companies or the institutions that benefit within that framework. 268 ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ Finally, it is convenient to go one step further and include some reflections on what would happen if the changes we are proposing are not introduced. And, in this respect, it is important to underscore at least two types of relevant costs: those that would be derived from not building the knowledge society and those resulting from neglecting youths who would then fall into different types of problem behaviors, censured by the adult world. In connection with this last dimension, it is evident that if the coordinates with which the investment of resources in the area of youth public policies are not changed, the costs will be huge. Studies conducted in the United States clearly demonstrate that the costs of maintaining a criminal in jail are infinitely higher than those involved in probation and social reinsertion programs. Likewise, it is evident that it is infinitely less expensive to finance spaces for an adequate use of their leisure time by youths, that any ex-post program designed to address the consequences of developing "problem behaviors": drug abuse, juvenile violence, reckless driving, attempted suicide, early pregnancy, etc. On its part, in the area having to do with the first of the dimensions described, the evidence indicates that several of the major challenges to be addressed in connection with the construction of the knowledge society are not resolvable without the participation of the younger generations, so that, if their participation is not promoted, the expected impacts will not be obtained. Through a different route then, we arrve at the same type of conclusions and effects. And what is most relevant is that, in both cases, it is society as a whole that loses out. The resources targeted at addressing the various problem behaviors censured by the adult world will have to be pulled out from other priority spheres, so that other programs and services will suffer. On the other hand, the lack of substantial progress in the field of constructing the knowledge society will widen the existing divides between our countries and highly industrialized one, which will count with more and better instruments to perpetuate their domination of the most backward ones, and in our case, we will be depriving ourselves from having modem tools to address the many extremely complex problems that we face. In the end, we stand before the eternal dilemma: whether to invest in the short term, solving problems momentarily, or invest in the medium and long term, based on explicit and agreed strategic choices, within 269 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN the framework of robust "fiscal covenants" that can bear the test of electoral evaluation (if all the players are committed, none will pay costs). The issue is extremely complex in itself, but much more in situations of crisis as those faced in almost all of Latin America at present, but that only reaffirms the pertinence of the approach that we are proposing, and the urgency of trying out alternative mechanisms as the ones described here. A GENERATIONAL APPROACH TO PUBLIC POLICIES Finally, it is important to present some alternative proposals, describing the foundations and basic criteria to be taken into account, together with the main substantive priorities to be addressed, analyzing the potential of youth volunteering in the combat against poverty and the regional cooperation that could be deployed in the future. Basic Criteria and Foundations for the Design of Alternative Policies The model centered on education and leisure time, characterized in the first part, is an adult, conservative and functionalist approach, in the strictest sense of the three terms, to the extent that the existing society is taken for granted, and the specific objective defined in connection with the young generations is their future integration into such society, to ensure the reproduction of that society through time and space. This approach, furthermore, operated with certain fluidity in the framework of expansive and dynamic economies that ensured a certain degree of "upwards social mobility" specially for those youths who were "integrated", while showing severe limitations to respond to the issues of the "excluded" youths, specially during times of crisis. For that reason it was only partially successful and within the framework of certain concrete circumstances, difficult to sustain in time, as the experience of the last decades has demonstrated. 270 ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ In any case, the world has changed radically in the last decades and in the new international context a growing importance is attached to the development of human resources that are fit to process the changes that need to be promoted. It is about having highly skilled workers, modern and dynamic entrepreneurs, responsible and active citizens, and pertinent strategies for the best utilization of those "human resources" in the search for economic growth, social equity and democratic consolidation, implementing new development strategies. In this context, in the area of youth policies, it no longer makes sense to design "conservative" responses (because now change is pursued) and "functional" (because what is now desired is to transform the existing rules of the game); so it makes no sense to design policies intended to incorporate the new generations into a process of "reproduction" of the prevailing society. Now, it is about designing policies that make it possible to incorporate the new generations into the process of changes that we are trying to promote. For that reason, it is necessary to design programs that attempt to prepare youths in the best possible way to be the protagonists of said changes. And, if this is so, it makes no sense to continue imagining policies and programs where youths are simply receiving objects; it is essential to promote the involvement of youths as protagonists, holders of rights and strategic actors of development. And why youths? Because they are infinitely better prepared than the adults to deal with the new technologies because they are tied to nothing in the framework of the currently existing society and because they are more and better willing to work towards the transformation of the prevailing "rules of the game". For that reason, the future youth policies should be structured with a strong emphasis in the present of youths as protagonists and not centered in their preparation for the performance of adult roles in the future. There are ten core criteria: (1) public policies should look upon youths from a double perspective: as the target of services and as strategic actors of development, participating as protagonists in the modernization of their countries; (2) they should operate on the basis of an authentic and broad partnering of efforts among all the actors involved with their effective dynamics, leaving aside efforts 271 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN that are isolated and exclusive of one another; (3) they should operate on the basis of strengthening the existing institutional networks and/or creating others where they do not exist, putting in practice the above consensus; (4) they should operate on the basis of a profound and extended territorial and institutional decentralization, prioritizing the local level; (5) they should adequately respond to the heterogeneity of the existing youth groups, rigorously targeting differential actions in response to the existing particularities; (6) they should promote the widest and most active involvement of youths in their design, implementation and effective evaluation; (7) they should clearly have a gender perspective, providing equal opportunities and possibilities to men and women; (8) they should make a deliberate effort to sensitize decision makers and public opinion in general, showing juvenile exclusion as a handicap for society as a whole; (9) they should also develop deliberate efforts to learn collectively from the work of all, fostering comparative evaluations, the exchange of experiences and the horizontal training of human resources; and (10) it is necessary to define accurately and on a consensus basis an effective distribution of roles and functions among the various institutional actors involved, for the purpose of avoiding overlapping efforts in conflict while leaving areas uncovered. As a result of the above, it is underlined that public policies as a whole should include a generational perspective, decisively overcoming the restrictive approach that has prevailed so far (sectorial, monopolic, centralized, etc.) thus avoiding falling into exclusive spaces and programs for adolescents and youths as until now, and try to include these particular issues in the best possible way into each and every one of the public policies, emulating the gender perspective adopted by women, which has had more and better results from every point of view, in most countries. What type of implications can this alternative approach have? First of all, it is necessary to have population policies that not only take care of the main sectorial dimensions in this respect (fertility, migration, mortality, etc.), but that, besides and fundamentally provide a dynamic articulation between the different phases in people's life cycle (childhood, youth, adulthood, old age) to be able 272 ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ to respond with specific policies that are part of a coordinated set of general public policies. From this point of view, it is essential to attack the inter-generational inequalities, which are very significant in almost all the countries of the region. This is clearly evidenced when analyzing the region's poverty levels, breaking down the types of family composition and stages in the life cycle in which they are. In Brazil, for example, poverty in unipersonal households is 4.9%, while in the case of families with children under 12 and between 13 and 18 years of age it stands at 49%, which is also the case in Mexico, where the respective figures are 2.8% and 37.7% (in the case of families with adolescent children) and in Colombia, while poverty in unipersonal households is 6.6%, in the cases of families with children under 12 it is 51% and in households with adolescent children it is 52.5%, according to ECLAC's Social Panorama of Latin America. Secondly, a rigorous analysis should be made of the approaches required to work in each and everyone of the public policies in connection with adolescents and youths, trying to achieve the largest and best impacts in each particular case. From this angle, secondary education institutions -for example- are not only the natural environment to develop the corresponding learning, but besides and above all, privileged environments of adolescent and juvenile socialization, in which a good share of the students spend most of their productive time (apart from that devoted to rest and leisure) and where they are prepared to undertake adult roles as workers and citizens. Four Substantive Priorities for this First Decade of the Century As it is known, the investment in human resources is a core element in the process of sustained economic growth and the attainment of social welfare, both because of the growing returns on productivity levels and as a result of the externalities associated to their improved attributes. The two key factors for an appropriate development of human resources are education and health. 273 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN Recognizing the well-known difficulties that the new generations face both in the sphere of health and in the sphere of education, while, at the same time, taking into the account the significant relevance that youths have, in their capacity as skilled and healthy human resources for the implementation of development strategies, it is obvious that in the field of youth public policies these two areas should be emphasized. In connection with education, it seems clear that the priorities will be different for each country; but, in general, there are four major challenges: (i) extending universal access to basic and specially secondary education, (ii) ensuring adequate school performance and quality standards, tackling forcefully the problems of school drop-outs and learning, (iii) substantially improving equity among the various social groups in an attempt to slow down and, eventually revert the processes of educational segmentation, and (iv) expand kindergarten to the four and five-year old population with the double purpose of compensating for the deficit in socialization capacity of the lower income households and facilitating the entry of young mothers to the labor market. For all of this to be possible, it will be necessary to expand and deepen the educational reform processes that are currently underway, modernizing the management and involving the actors that are not yet actively participating in the process (parents, communities and fundamentally students) giving them the voice that they still lack and promoting their empowerment. A key aspect to be emphasized in this sense relates to the evident divorce that exists between the juvenile culture and school culture, spheres that will have to be better articulated in the future, building bridges and promoting mutual dialogue (teachers should learn more about youth culture and students should understand better the logic of school culture). In the area of health, the priorities will also vary on a country-basis and even within them, but there are at least another three major challenges: (i) adequate and timely focus on sexual and reproductive health, with special priority to the issue of early teenage pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases, (ii) timely detection and treatment of the main risk behaviors, with special emphasis on those connected with car accidents, the abuse of legal and illicit drugs and the development of activities linked with different forms of violence, and (iii) promoting 274 ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ healthy lifestyles, by fostering all sorts of recreational, cultural and sports activities in healthy environments for socialization, growth and personal and social maturation of the target population, developing the resilience factors that exists in youngsters of both genders. The second priority should focus on the labor insertion of youths, which is the key to break the exclusion that affects them and to make them less vulnerable. Since the problems are very diverse, different measures are required, adjusted to the particularities of each of the priority youth groups, and since the causes that explain these problems are not homogeneous either, specific strategies are required in each case. A first major response will have to continue being job training, linked to the development of the first work experiences. In this way, a response will be provided to two of the main reasons for youth unemployment: lack of experience and lack of training. The countries that already have large scale programs in these areas will face the challenge of perfecting their operating strategies, correcting the defects detected within the framework of the past experiences, and expanding their scope, to be able to obtain in the future greater and better impacts on their beneficiaries. In the case of those countries which do not yet have this type of programs (the majority) the challenge is to design them and implement them. The essence of this type of program initiatives is still completely valid. Therefore, it is necessary to continue emphasizing strongly the targeting strategy (on the most vulnerable youth sectors), the decentralized mode of operation (giving a primary role to the municipalities), through non monopoly strategies (with the cooperation of the widest range of training institutions, public and private) in support of integrated proposals (training, internships and support to enter the job market) developed through market agreements (between training institutions and business, fundamentally) and backed up with demanding monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. But it is necessary to take into account that training does not generate jobs. Therefore, it is essential to implement initiatives linked to the generation of jobs, specially self-employment, given the existing difficulties to create employment. The road continues being that of fostering micro and small butsiness, but without idealizations 275 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN and with a clear economic approach, with any social or cultural goals subordinated to the former. Subsistence micro ventures (linked to the informal sector) can assist in combating poverty and promoting the social integration of youths, provided they are efficient and integrated into wider and more comprehensive programs to fight poverty, because it is essential to avoid the poverty reproduction circuits that have plagued many experiences of this type in Latin America. Development micro ventures (incorporated into the formal sector of the economy), on their part, can have extremely dynamic roles in the economies of the region, provided they locate the niches in which they can grow, by implementing -for example- the Spanish approach of the new employment repositories. A third major priority should focus on the perverse link between youth and violence. Naturally, the specific contexts in which juvenile violence is effectively deployed are very different, and for that reason, the measures to be taken should also be different. In those cases in which the issue has acquired significant dimensions and overwhelming characteristics such as in Colombia, the priorities should center on unlearning violence among youths already linked to the phenomenon, together with the development of a peace culture based on educational and preventive activities at all levels, while in those countries in which the phenomenon is still restricted to some specific spheres as in Uruguay, the priorities should very specially focus on preventive measures (without discarding the treatment of the existing cases, improving and modernizing the established arrangements). The Urban Security Programs put in practice in both countries in the last years are setting a course to be emulated in the future by many other countries. They work simultaneously in the retraining of the police, the attack on domestic violence (which generates the conditions for violence to be later used in any other environment), the implementation of disarmament measures and unlearning of violence, the promotion of alternative mechanisms for conflict resolution (for example, social mediation), the modernization of justice (to break the image of partiality and impunity that prevails in several national cases), the supply of peaceful alternatives for youth socialization (youth houses and clubs, for example) and improving the way in which the media deal with the issue. 276 ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ It is not necessary to recall that purely repressive methods are not efficient (in fact, the number of inmates is constantly increasing while urban insecurity increases much faster, for example) but it is not idle to insist once again that, besides, these are the most expensive methods; for that reason, designing and implementing this type of alternative programs is much more feasible from the point of view of the necessary investment of resources, and fosters the hope of being able to obtain better outcomes for the beneficiaries. Similarly, another key is the permanence and credibility of the institutions operating in these areas. For example, in the case of youth gangs, an important function of the institutions that address the problem is enforcing and supporting any non aggression agreements that may be reached with the parties in conflict, since if that is not the case, it will not be possible to uphold these measures due to lack of credibility. Fourthly, it should be recalled that juvenile exclusion also exists at the level of citizen's participation, and therefore it needs to be addressed by promoting new channels and more effective and attractive instances for the development of these rights. The reasons are many and varied, but, fundamentally, it is a privileged way to promote the democratic consolidation of the various countries of the region; for that reason the responsibility should be shared by many diverse actors. Of course, one of the most relevant dimensions is the one linked with the political participation of youth, that can and must be promoted simultaneously in several dimensions. In terms of electoral participation, the central issue is the devaluated credibility of political parties and leaders, that will have to be addressed by modernizing the traditional political practices. But besides, in parallel, it would be possible to promote some initiatives linked to civic development in formal and informal education with a protagonic participation by youths themselves. An effective support by the media, creating spaces for youths to voice their opinions and discuss current issues could be helpful. But the political participation of youths cannot be restricted to the electoral field. In parallel, it would be possible to instrument other specific and concrete measures among which, because of the enthusiasm they generate, are those linked with the creation of Youth parliaments, in the style of those existing in Chile and Paraguay 277 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (among others). In the same line, the creation of consultative instances at a community and municipal level, based on priorities for action and/or the design and reformulation of plans and programs, could allow for the development of experiences that can become gradually consolidated. In any case, the key is for youths not to feel manipulated and at the same time, to perceive that their involvement makes sense and plays a role in decision-making. In parallel, participation can be fostered by creating or modernizing specific roles and institutions or organizations to work actively in these fields. In the area of students, for example, it seems clear that it is essential to revitalize (by modernizing) their participation in university co-government, which has fallen on bureaucratic and excessively politized practices, leaving the bulk of students estranged. In secondary school, in turn, some innovative experiences, as that of the student representatives of Colombia, are very promising. Reviewing the operating schemes of youth organizations and movements is a different chapter. Although the creation of National and Local Youth Councils, bringing together the existing organizations and movements and granting them powers to represent interests before the public powers and other civil society organizations seems to be an extremely productive alternative, extreme care should be taken to avoid clientelistic practices and the various forms of manipulation which always appear in this type of processes, the same as the tendencies in certain youth sectors of monopolizing an exclusive role in these issues, "privatizing" participation spaces that should, by definition, be broad and plural. Youth Volunteering, Citizen's participation and Human Development But the substantive priorities should not be restricted to areas in which youth are seen as beneficiaries of public policies. Besides and fundamentally, they should look at youths as strategic actors of development and, in that sense, youth volunteering is a clear priority. It is necessary to take firm strides in this area, promoting it as a core axis of youth public policies and development strategies 278 ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ themselves. Thus, there should be large scale youth participation in the programs against poverty, literacy campaigns, care of parks, construction of infrastructure or defense of the environment, to name just a few of the initiatives that could be carried out. This volunteer work could have several simultaneous effects that would feedback in a positive way, provide experiences that would help youth mature and learn more about their respective environments, and clearly provide visible contributions both to the development of their communities and the country. Besides stimulating the consolidation of participation with a meaning valued by youths, such initiatives would oppose the existing social stigmas, centered on the widely disseminated image of problem vouths. In summary, it is evident that youth volunteering programs are an ambitious initiative with a great potential for youths and for society as a whole. It is a viable initiative since it can be based on activities that are already being carried out in several countries of the region, and the multiple examples of youths participation in response to natural catastrophes (floods, volcano eruptions, hurricanes, earthquakes) in Central America, Chile and Venezuela are concrete experiences that merit consideration, as is the generous youth contribution to the defense of the environment in cases of oil spills, forest fires and other accidents that have ocurred in a large scale in the last few years. Therefore, youth volunteering may become an excellent option to transform collective suffering into solidarity and mutual support. They can also help to show communities that it is possible to improve the quality of life by developing practices in which everybody should and can be involved in a creative and protagonic way, here and now, through proactive approaches, overcoming the limitations of purely reactive practices (claiming for others to take action) always thinking on the basis of medium and long term structural perspectives, as seen from the interest of society as a whole and not only or mainly from the logic of particular corporatist groups who always put their particular interests before the interests of society. Within the framework of this type of initiatives, several concominant problems could be addressed. For example, conscientious objectors to mandatory military service, that although a complex issue, is a subject for analysis and debate in almost all the 279 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN countries of the region. It is also possible to review the university extension programs that operate in several countries of the region under the form of "internships". Many of these programs are being run in a bureaucratic routine way which satisfy none of the intervening parts, but this practice could be revitalized through youth volunteering. In connection with the development of civil service substituting for mandatory military service, by decisively assuming the objection that according to the legislation existing in each country youths may have several problems could be addressed. From the point of view of the mandatory military service, many modifications have already been incorporated. From its pure and simple elimination as in the case of Argentina (placing this country in the group of those that do not have mandatory military service like Costa Rica and Uruguay), to countries that have made it non mandatory (as Honduras) or have legislated on conscientious objection but have not yet regulated it (as Paraguay). In this context, the civil service substitute (mandatory or voluntary) could avoid extremely serious problems of military service (such as repeated cases of death of young recruits in always complex circumstances) giving those who do not wish to participate an acceptable alternative that retains its positive aspects (in several cases, military service has become an opportunity for education and social recognition for young peasant sectors, for example). On its part, in the area of renovating and redimensioning university extension services, it is clear that on the basis of volunteers relevant reforms could be devised, that would greatly leverage these practices. As it is known, they exist in almost all the countries of the region, specially in large national universities, but with very few effective impacts, to the extent that students look upon them as one more curricular obligation and the institutions that receive them as interns use them in unimportant tasks. With a renewed approach, both parties could be better prepared and the experiences could be framed within the context of major public policies, so internships could then be implemented with greater pertinence, achieving better and greater effective impacts. The same could be said of several existing forms of voluntary work (voluntary firemen, for example) 280 ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ which are not recognized by public policies and have few incentives for effective development. With renewed approaches, better recognition could be provided to make these initiatives more attractive and expand their effective range, integrating them more clearly within the operation of public policies. But, in connection with what type of schemes could these efforts be deployed? For many reasons, the fight against poverty could be a priority scenario, since, as it is known, at this beginning of a new decade, century and millennium, poverty continues being the region's major problem and in this context, the most badly affected sectors are children and adolescents, without specific measures being taken for a more equitable distribution of the resources that are invested on the various population sectors. Furthermore, this is the sphere in which more resources are being invested in terms of social development. All of our countries have specific programs in this respect and the targets set within the framework of the Millennium Summit are a major challenge for all. On the other hand, the evaluation of the strategies employed in this area so far, show evident signs of dissatisfaction with the results obtained, not only because poverty persists or decreases marginally, but because the instruments and the methodologies employed have not been appropriate. One of the factors in this regards is linked to the actors responsible for implementing the programs and strategies of the fight against poverty, a sphere in which "State" approaches continue to prevail (with little participation of civil society and driven by public servants, without much interest). Undoubtedly, very diverse approaches have been attempted, but in almost all cases with a limited scope. Thus, the universal policies were criticized (proposing targeted intervention approaches as an alternative), then the ineffectiveness of the large State secretariats was criticized (and social funds were created in parallel) including the excessive compartamentalization of institutional efforts (creating the so called "social authorities"), passing on to recognizing the evident limits of government management (calling upon the participation of civil society organizations). But all of this has been insufficient and more pertinent and timely responses are still being sought, for greater effectiveness and efficiency. 281 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN Youths could be the foundation of the solution that is being intensively sought. Bolivia, for example, has recently obtained an important cutback in its external debt on the basis of which it will be able to invest some 1.5 billion dollars in programs against poverty during the next 15 years. Given the current institutional and political situation in Bolivia, these resources will be invested with a strong focus on local development, supporting the program actions of municipalities throughout the country; but as in many other countries of the region, the municipalities do not have the capacities to take on these opportunities and for that reason several modernization and institutional actions will be developed at that level, for a maximum leveraging of the work to be carried out. Within this framework, the government has decided to support the design and implementation of a Youth Volunteering Program, in partnership with interested national universities, as a typical university social service (to be included as part of the general curriculum) using advanced students and recent graduates to cooperate with municipalities in those specific spheres that are prioritized in each case and that are linked to their acquired skills (professions). The Secretariat for Generational and Family Affairs will be the government sector responsible for implementing the initiative and the example could be replicated in any other country (Honduras, for example) without difficulties. The White Book on Youth in Europe recently approved as the major guide for the development of horizontal cooperation actions among all members countries of the European Union, places a significant emphasis on the need for extending youth volunteering in the immediate future, and this is done from a solid foundation based on the experience developed in the recent past, showing that this is an important mechanism of youth participation with very positive simultaneous impacts in several spheres of the development of society as a whole. On its part, in Latin America, there are also relevant experiences in this regard, but, as opposed to the European, our countries have not processed systematic evaluations in this respect. For a long time this was due to the fact that for some sectors, volunteering is not an attractive participatory method because, they believe, it fosters the use of "cheap labor" destroying jobs. Along the same line, other sectors have alleged 282 ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ that, as opposed to what is the case in Europe and other highly industrialized countries, Latin America does not have the necessary resources to develop this type of initiatives. Evidently, neither the one nor the other are true. There is no evidence of the former (on the contrary) and the latter is refuted from the time that volunteering is placed at the service of public policies that have the corresponding financing (the fight against poverty, for example). And if we go one step further, the accusations that try to show these initiatives as a disguised way of State manipulation of juvenile participation are not valid either. On the contrary, volunteering can cooperate to a great extent in developing relevant experiences for all the sectors involved. The Latin American experiences also show that youth volunteering is not a simple mechanism for entertainment that only achieves marginal impacts in the dynamic of our societies. This is demonstrated in the National Literacy Campaign of Guatemala, which has been categorized as a large national youth movement. In effect, with the creation of the National Literacy Movement (MONOALF/GUA) in October 2000, based on strategic partnerships between State agencies and civil society, 50,000 youths (middle education students) have been mobilized and have provided literacy to 180,000 people. A little over 10 years ago something similar happened with the Ecuador National Literacy Campaign, in which 100,000 youths participated with extremely relevant impacts; and if we go further back in time, the same was the case in Cuba in the first stages of the revolution. It is not necessary to continue mentioning specific examples, the truth is that the debates on these issues are too ideologized and pragmatized, without incorporating a minimum rationality, based on serious and rigorous evaluations, showing the potentiality and limitations of what so far has been done. It is therefore extremely important to process these evaluations to have better elements of judgment, and be in the best position to promote such initiatives anew, correcting mistakes and channeling the rich contribution potential of the new generations to the development of our societies, in the understanding that youths do want to participate, but in specific initiatives with visible impacts in the short term. 283 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN Regional Cooperation and Public Youth Policies: the World Bank Role To end, it is important to analyze some of the main parameters of regional cooperation in the area of youth, with a view to its expansion in the immediate future. In this sense, four specific priorities to be developed are established here. The first one relates to an extremely relevant sphere: as we have already tried to demonstrate in the previous pages, there is a huge gap between youth exclusion and calls to being protagonists in constructing the knowledge society and simultaneously we have societies that operate based on corporatist pressures and youths that are guided on the basis of the symbolic dimensions of their existence (and not its material dimensions). We will need to develop significant efforts to provide public youth policies with a greater focus on the future and with a higher priority in the public agenda. Of course, this is the task in which the national and local efforts, promoted by the institutions specializing in the area of youth in each country, are fundamental and irreplaceable but the truth is that regional cooperation can provide an important assistance in this regard. Several approaches could be employed, but we would like to underline two that are particularly relevant: (1) incorporate dynamically the issue of youth in all international general and sectorial meetings that are regularly held, with special emphasis on intergovernmental meetings, in which ministers and technicians specializing in various areas of development meet periodically, cooperating in this manner with the institutions specializing in youth issues in each country; and (2) use the major mass media, in a regular and systematic manner, within the framework of an explicit policy in this regard, with special emphasis on the main TV networks that have coverage in most of the countries of the region, since the regular dissemination of appropriate messages addressed at parents, teachers, social and community leaders, youth leaders and youths in general could also clearly cooperate with this dynamics. The World Bank has cooperated in this type of initiatives in other spheres of development or in connection with other sectors of the population. It could therefore assists in the development of useful 284 ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ tools for this type of work. But to achieve relevant impacts, it would be necessary to have solid arguments, adequately presented for each target audience, that are attuned to the respective audiences, and of which they can take ownership, as a part of the process of empowering the actors with which interaction is sought as a priority. As indicated, the communication strategy we are proposing should be structured on the basis of proactive and not reactive proposals assuming that the logic of communication is more emotional than rational. Experiences so far, generated by formal education which merely transfer the logic of the classroom to television screens (for example) have shown serious limitations caused by disregarding this elementary principle of communication. A second priority should be centered on expanding and systematizing the efforts already underway in connection with the modernization of public management, specially but not exclusively in connection with youth specialized institutions. Also in this case, it would possible to operate in the future in several spheres, but among the most relevant the following could be pointed out: (1) support the design, monitoring and evaluation of plans, programs and projects (to decisively overcome the high level of improvisation that still prevails in a good share of youth specialized institutions, which continue operating almost exclusively within a framework of responding to daily emergencies and deploying short term initiatives); (2) support the development of human resources (establishing an articulated policy that provides a sequence of training, with flexible entry and exit points to develop processes and ensure the highest levels of specialization and retention of the participants, with an intense use of distance education); (3) support the development of management tools (national youth surveys, institutional directories, service guides, bibliographies and states of the art, statistical summaries, integrated youth plans, information centers, bulletins and specialized magazines, etc.; and (4) support for the development of networking (developing dynamic and effective processes for interinstitutional partnering, changing the still dominant culture that focuses efforts on the development of the complete cycle (design, execution and evaluation) of any initiative and shifting to an agreed distribution of roles and functions. 285 YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN On the other hand, for the development of these and other similar initiatives, it will be indispensable to make an intensive and innovative use of the new communication and information technologies (ICT) and that is another sphere in which regional cooperation could prove decisive. This can also be brought about in different ways and from different specific spheres, but the following should be underlined as the most relevant: (1) installation of a Major Internet Youth Portal (combining information about and on youth and dynamically integrating all the existing relevant sites, offering all sort of services and using the experience developed by the World Bank in the Program World Links for Development); (2) Installation of a Permanent Virtual Observatorv on Youth Policies (offering systematically and regularly, information and comparative analysis of the situation of youths, youth public policies, the most successful management models, the most noteworthy promotion experiences, the most pertinent tools and the most rigorous program designs, developed in the various countries of the region); and (3) Installation of a Distance Learning University on Youth Policies (as a fundamental reference for the development of the policy on human resources development, articulating in a dynamic and creative manner the local capacities scattered in the various countries of the region). Ultimately, a good part of the success in the future management at all levels will reside in the development of this type of initiatives, that will require the investment of a significant ensemble of resources (available on the basis of the various cooperation programs in these fields that almost all specialized agencies have) but, above all, a radical change of mindset, for which purpose it will be necessary to have an impact on the dominant culture that still clings to the use of traditional technologies that, besides obtaining less relevant impacts, are more costly and complex to maintain and develop (printed publications, personal courses and seminars, use of telephone, fax and traditional mail, etc.). There are many examples showing that the mere installation of "computer classrooms" in educational institutions (for example), guarantees nothing without the necessary culture (in teachers, in this case) to make intensive use of them. 286 ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ Of course, with the current levels of development of the existing initiatives, it will be impossible to put in practice the proposals formulated so far. Therefore, it will be necessary to bring together a wide gamut of international actors (that are already working within these areas in their respective specialization fields), setting up with and between them strong strategic alliances, from which everybody may win. Among them, four are particularly relevant: (1) Partnership with Intergovernmental Networks (incorporating these issues better and further in the Summits of Heads of State and in the Sectorial Conferences of Ministers, Governors and Majors, with special emphasis on the Ibero American Youth Organization which is the more highly specialized regional network in this regard); (2) Alliance with the United Nations System and the Inter American Svstem (with ECLAC, ILO, CINTERFOR, PAHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNESCO, IICA and IIN, among others); (3) Alliance with Civil Society, Networks (with the Latin American Youth Forum, the CLACSO Youth Working Group, the Rural Youth Network supported by IICA, the Latin American and Caribbean Network of Youth for Sexual and Reproductive Rights and the Latin American Confederation of Young Christian Associations to name just a few); and (4) Alliance with International Cooperation Agencies and Foundations (for example, Germany's GTZ, Spain's AECI, CIDA of Canada, USAID, the International Youth Foundation, the Kellogg's Foundation, the Ford Foundation and the Inter American Development Bank). In the end, as we have attempted to demonstrate, it is essential to shift to considering youths as strategic actors of development (promoting their active participation at all levels) and modernize management at all levels, from the basis of integrated approaches that decisively leave behind the prevailing sectorial views, that can only provide partial and inconstant progress in some of these problem areas. The main challenge in the new century will be the construction of the knowledge society, and to that end, substantial progress will have to be made in the fight against poverty and exclusion. In both fronts, as we have already underlined, youths can play active and protagonic roles, but to that end, it is essential to generate the necessary spaces and incentives. 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The objectives of this chapter are: to offer a diagnosis of violence and its negative impact on development in the region, to present a set of public policies and civil society programs for violence prevention and control in Latin America, and to identify research priorities. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK This section defines violence, describes its various types and manifestations and reviews different theoretical approaches. The conceptual framework summarized in this section has been used, during the nineties, as a basis for the analysis of violence in Latin America and to formulate policies designed to prevent and control this phenomenon. The various manifestations of violence are, in turn, linked to fundamental variables within a social development strategy, such as education, health and economic opportunities. Definition of Violence. Difference between crime and violence. Types of violence In the current literature there is a consensus on violence regarding its definition as "the use or threat of use of physical or psychological force, with a damaging intent" (Buvinic, Morrison and Shifter, 1999) 1. This definition includes both the use of force and the threat of use of force that plays a key role in the perceptions about violence and the perception about security in a certain context. Such perceptions are important because they contribute to the causes for other acts of violence. The intentional character of violent behavior excludes I See also Concha-Eastman and Villaveces (2001), Inter-American Development Bank, Londofio, Gaviria and Guerrero (eds) (2000), Buvinic, Morrison and Shifter (1999) and World Bank, Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loyza (eds) (2001). M. BUVINIC, A. MORRISON & M.B. ORLANDO accidents from this definition and includes the use of aggression for conflict solving. This definition includes suicide and other self- destructive phenomena. It is important to note that violence may be physical or psychological and that the use of force to damage includes sexual abuse. Likewise, violence thus defined can occur between strangers or acquaintances and even between members of a family group (domestic or in-family violence). Violence and crime, defined as a certain illegal action according to the legal system, are intimately related, but are not equivalent. The definition of violence emphasizes the use (or threat) of force with a damaging intent, while the definition of crime places greater emphasis on the description of certain illegal behaviors. Thus, there are both non-violent crime (fraud, burglary, prostitution without coercion) as non-criminal violence (certain cases of violence exercised by the State, and in some countries, domestic violence has still not been included in the criminal system) (Buvinic, Morrison and Shifter, 1999). Violence is a complex, multidimensional phenomenon, stemming from multiple psychological, biological, economic, social and cultural factors. The phenomena, which accompany violent behavior constantly, cross the borders between individuals, family, community and society. In turn, violence has consequences, which comprise several individual, family, community and social environments. The multidimensionality of violence itself generates various manifestations or different types of violence. The most common criteria to classify violence together with the typology stemming from them are summarized in Table 1. Categorizing violence is useful for its study and to design and implement policies for prevention and control of one or several types of violence combined. The following sections contain an analysis of the types of violence more afflicting for Latin America, given the available information, especially forms of urban violence. Another form of violence prevailing in the region that will be discussed more extensively is domestic violence. In many cases, violent situations respond to a combination of different types of violence. For example, gang violence is mostly physical and psychological instrumental violence, with economic and social ends, within an urban context. Domestic violence against women 303 VIOLENCE, CRIME AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN Table 1 Criteria to categorize violence and corresponding types of violence Criterion Types of Violence Violence Victims * Violence against Children * Violence against Women * Violence against the Elderly * Violence against Youth * Violence against the Excluded * Violence against Property (burglary, theft or vandalism) Violent Agents * Individuals (young men, young women, adults) * Youth Gangs * Drug Traffickers * Criminal Gangs * Police or Military Authorities * Crowds (during protests and lynching) * Political Movements (guerrilla groups, political parties, local strongmen) * Ethnic-Religious movements Nature of Violence * Physical (beatings, cuts, etc.) * Psychological (insults, threats, yelling) * Sexual (forced sexual activities) * Deprivation of Freedom (kidnapping, unjustified arrest) Intent of Violence * Instrumental: violence is a means towards other ends (political, economic, religious and social) * Emotional: causing damage is an end in itself Place * Urban * Rural Relationship between Victim and Aggressor * Social: Unknown or unrelated known people * Domestic or in-family: relatives and partner Source: Own development based on Inter-American Development Bank, Buvinic and Morrison Editors (2000: Note 1) and McAlister (2000). 304 M. BUVINIC, A. MORRISON & M.B. ORLANDO by the partner is, in certain cases, instrumental violence to obtain control over the household's economic resources or to exercise control over women. But both forms also frequently have an emotional component (harming) which feeds back onto violence if it is successful. Additionally, the various manifestations of violence show profound causal interrelations. There is theoretical evidence (models of behavior learning) and empirical evidence on the determining influence of domestic violence suffered or witnessed by children on the development of violent behaviors as adults (Berkowitz, 1996, quoted in Inter-American Development Bank, Buvinic and Morrison Eds., 2000). Causes of Violence Risks factors and protection factors Violence is a complex phenomenon that has multiple causes and, in turn, such causes are related among themselves. From the point of view of the design and implementation of public policies to fight violence, it is necessary to identify the risk factors of violent behavior2. In analyzing the risk and protection factors, it is useful to distinguish among those operating at the following levels: individual, household, and community (see Table 2). In analyzing violent behavior using a sequential approach, the factors associated to violence can be grouped in biological predisposition and social background, situational characteristics, and triggering event. The main causes of violence according to various disciplines are summarized below. Biological Basis for Violence: Genetic and biological factors, as well as alcohol and drug consumption increases the predisposition to exhibit aggressive and violent behavior. It is thought that genetic influences involve several genes and strong interaction with the 2 Some of these risk factors are direct causes of violence, while others are associated factors. Empirically, the concept of risk factor is analogous to that of factors that increase the likelihood of a violent event. From the point of view of policy design, actions on associated factors may be very useful in violence prevention and control. 305 VIOLENCE, CRIME AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN Table 2 Risk (protection) factors for violence Individual Household Community Society Demographic (age, gender) Household Size - Density Markets (legal or illegal) for arms and drugs Biological Household Structure, Dynamics * Violence in the Media and Standards Early Exposure to Violence History of Family Violence * Effectiveness of Public and Private Institutions of Social Control Socioeconomic and Educational * Cultural Standards Level Employment Situation * Neighborhood Crime Rate Alcohol and Drug Abuse * Neighborhood Socioeconomic Level * Neighborhood Environmental Characteristics * History of Social Violence * Inequality Source: Inter-American Development Bank, Buvinic and Morrison Eds. (2000: Note 3) environment (Reiss and Roth, 1993). But studies demonstrate, more and more, that there is a link between violence and brain and neurological anomalies, preventable for the most part. Factors increasing the brain activity or reactivity (traumas) or decreasing its capacity to moderate impulses (child abuse or neglect, alcohol or drug abuse) increase the individual's capacity to respond in a violent way (Perry, 1996). The experiences of early childhood have a disproportionate importance in the organization of the adult brain. Physical and/or emotional neglect in the prenatal and early childhood stages, as well as the exposure of infants to traumatic violence, alter the development of the central nervous system, predisposing to violence. These events also contribute to its learning, underlying the interaction between biological and environmental aspects. Even 306 M. BUVINIC, A. MORRISON & M.B. ORLANDO though cerebral damage in itself or child abuse in itself do not necessarily lead to violence and violence appears without the presence of brain damage or prior abuse, the combination of cerebral anomalies and child abuse significantly increase the likelihood of future violent behavior. The consumption of alcohol and certain drugs "modifies information processing and evaluation processes... reducing the thresholds, limiting the review of options and preventing rationality" (McAlister, 2000). Results for 16 countries confirm the existence of the link between alcohol consumption and violent crime (see Markowitz (b), 2000). According to Markowitz (a) (2000) an increase of the tax on beer would reduce the probability of assaults, while legalizing marihuana and reducing the price of cocaine would result in increased thefts and hold-ups in the United Stated. In the case of cocaine, one of the main effects is the increase in robbery and other crimes against property by addicts with the aim of obtaining funds to purchase drugs. On the other hand, in the case of crack, an inexpensive substitute for cocaine, Grogger and Willis (1998) found a direct relationship between interpersonal violence and consumption, but not a linear relation between violence against property and consumption. Violence as a Learnt Behavior: Violent behavior is learnt, and the first opportunity to learn to behave aggressively arises at home, observing and imitating the aggressive behavior of parents, other relatives or even characters appearing in mass media shows (Bandura, 1973). The reactions of parents which reward the aggressive behavior of their children and child-abuse on their part are some of the mechanisms whereby children learn to express in a violent way at an early age (Berkowitz, 1996). Children learn to associate an aggressive stimulus with violent behavior and to respond with violence to frustrations or other negative events. Studies show a significant relationship between victimization during childhood (both children who are victims of abuse and those who witnessed the chronic abuse of other relatives) and the later propensity to violent behavior (Dahlberg, 1998). Violence is also learnt at school and on the street. Demographic Factors: Age, population density and gender, influence the environment through different mechanisms and can serve to predict, in a very general way, the trends of violence in society. In Latin America, as in other regions of the world, homicides 307 VIOLENCE, CRIME AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN are mostly perpetrated by young men. Among the factors predisposing youth to choose violent careers are high rates of juvenile unemployment, impunity in the court system and easy access to alcohol, drugs and firearms. We may add to this a culture of violence in the communications media, which leads to the imitation of violence and the reduction of social inhibitions. The growth and the increase of the population density, especially in large cities increases stress, frustration and anonymity that instigate violent behavior (Calhoun,1962). One difference between the sexes that emerges before two years of age is aggressive behavior. Girls are less aggressive than boys (Maccoby and Jadelin, 1974). In Latin America, authoritarian family patterns, derived from the Napoleonic Law, emphasize and reinforce these differences between the sexes. The father is master over the life of women and children, a situation leading both to a great vulnerability to violence. Women are furthermore conditioned by legal systems that protect men and women in an unequal manner. This legal bias against women becomes an important obstacle to prevent violence against them (Mahoney, 1994). Economic Factors: The economic approach to crime is based on Becker's work (1968), according to which the aggressor makes a rational decision of incurring in illicit or violent activities, after examining their costs-benefit and trying to maximize the benefit. That is, given the assessments and objectives of the potential aggressor, the aggressor responds to the expected benefit and expected punishment of violent behavior. Several empirical studies in the continent lend ground to the conclusion that violence responds to changes in the expected punishment (see Elrich, et al., Levitt, et al., quoted in World Bank, Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza Eds., 2001). Another group of economic studies concentrates on the benefits of crime and violence (ibid.). These studies find, in the case of violent acts with economic motivation, that the greater the income inequality the greater is the expected benefit arising from the difference between the income of the victim and the income of the aggressor, and therefore the greater the probability of violent behavior. Although there is no conclusive empirical evidence with respect to the impact of poverty on violence, some conditions that are present in poverty situations, such as 308 M. BUVINIC, A. MORRISON & M.B. ORLANDO crowding and unemployment, significantly increase the probability of violence (see Buvinic, Morrison and Shifter, 1999). Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (2001) study the macroeconomic determinants of violence worldwide, using a panel of 45 countries during the period 1970-19943. The estimated model largely accounts for the variation in the homicide rate and the variation in robbery rates worldwide. Its results indicate that: the rate of growth of the Gross Domestic Product reduces violence, income inequality increases violence and the rate of violence in the past determines the rate of current violence. On the other hand, the average income level of each country and the average schooling do not have a conclusive effect on the countries' levels of violence, although the differences in income and schooling distinguish violent from non violent groups within countries. Given these results, the authors conclude that the current level of development of a country is not so important to explain the levels of violence as the reduction of inequality, economic growth and the pre-existing level of violence. The empirical presence of violence inertia is evidence of inter-generation violence transmission, as well as the time interaction between different types of violence, the environment and the standards in a society. Protecting Factors. Social Capital: Effective social control institutions play a central role in dissuading violent behavior. Such institutions include the police and the legal and court system in the public sector as well as the churches and social and community organizations in the private sector. In Latin America, the weakness of the social control institutions in the public sector and the consequent impunity of criminal behavior is seen by many as one of the major risk factors for the high rates of criminal violence (Sanjuan, 1999). Although there is growing evidence that the severity of the punishment does not have a significant dissuasive effect, the probability of being apprehended and processed may have an impact, and the probability of acting in a violent form increases to the extent that the negative costs or incentives decrease. A similar social control role is played by private groups and institutions which promote what is currently called "social capital", understood as the characteristics of 3 This study is summarized in the first chapter of World Bank, Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza Editors (2001). 309 VIOLENCE, CRIME AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN the social organization, including trust, social standards and networks that, by facilitating coordinated actions can improve the efficiency of social performance (Putnam, 1993). It can therefore be concluded that communities with little or deficient social capital should be more susceptible to violence. High migration rates seem to contribute to the reduction of social capital since they represent a breakdown of community links. Crime reduction may be more successful when the solutions involve community participation. By the same token, domestic violence care and prevention can be more effective when there are strong social networks. The study of the relation between social capital and violence is recent and confronts the problem of the double causality existing in both variables. Studies in Jamaica, Moser and Holland (1997), Guatemala, Moser and Mclllwaine (2000 a), and Colombia, Moser and Mclllwaine (2000 b), report that violence destroys social capital. These studies also evidence that the weakness of social capital and the existence of perverse social capital to compensate for such weakness form an environment that fosters violent behavior. CURRENT VIOLENCE INDICATORS IN LATIN AMERICA Quantifying violence or constructing precise indicators of magnitude for each of its multiple manifestations presents important difficulties. Some sources of information are law enforcement agencies, court statistics, and health statistics that present remarkable under-recording. Among the official statistics, the most reliable and widely used is the annual rate of gross mortality due to homicide per 100,000 inhabitants. However, homicide statistics should be interpreted with caution, since they are very sensitive to changes in data gathering methodology that have been common in many countries in the region. Homicide is the most serious violent act, but its relation with other violent acts is not necessarily linear, and in many countries the incidence of crime against property, on which there are few reliable statistics in Latin America, bears no direct relation with homicide. 310 M. BUVINIC, A. MORRISON & M.B. ORLANDO Additionally, there are violent events, such as rape and domestic violence that are rarely reported, even when they are recognized as crimes by the legal system. The lack of reporting is due, partly, to the actual or perceived lack of capacity of the competent authorities to combat violent behavior and provide protection to the victim against future retaliation on the part of the aggressors. For that reason, besides the official statistic, it is necessary to have victimization surveys, as well as special surveys to detect domestic violence, for which a representative sample of the population is interviewed. Although there are few victimization surveys in the region, those that have been developed give evidence of the high level of under-reporting of violent events in official statistics. Rubio (1998) estimates that in Latin America the proportion of violent incidents that are reported is barely between 15% and 30%. The lack of information systems on the magnitude of violence for each type of violent behavior in the region, both at the aggregate and the local level, does not contribute to the development of better policy interventions for prevention and control. Indicators of Violence in Latin America and Main Trends The omnipresence and heterogeneity of violence in Latin America can be verified both from the point of view of the victims (widespread perception, media and victimization surveys), as from the point of view of official statistics, such as the homicide rate. The homicide rate in Latin America and the Caribbean is very high compared to that in the rest of the world. At the end of the 90's (World Health Organization, 2002), at least ten countries in the American continent recorded homicide rates in excess of the world rate of 8.9 per 100.000. At least four countries recorded homicide rates above 20 per 100.000 (see Table 3). In absolute terms, it is estimated that in Latin America and the Caribbean, between 110,000 and 120,000 individuals die as a result of homicide each year (Concha and Villaveces, 2001).4 4 It should be noted that the suicide rate in Latin America is relatively low as compared to developed countries. Suicide is directly related to higher levels of income and social welfare (Buvinic and Morrison, 2000). 311 VIOLENCE, CRIME AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN The high average homicide rate for Latin America conceals important differences between countries. Guatemala and El Salvador, in Central America, and Colombia, in the Andean region, recorded homicide rates above 50 during the 80's and the 90's. The opposite is the case of the countries of the Southern Cone (Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Chile) that recorded relatively low homicide levels (rates under 10). Table 3 Homicide Rates (per 100,000 inhabitants) in the American Continent. Comparison among Countries and with Worldwide Homicide Rate End of 70's Beginning of 80's End Beginning of 90's Mid - of 80's End of 90's (a) (a) b) Central America Guatemala .. 150.0 El Salvador .. 138.2 55.6 Nicaragua .. 18.3 8.4 Honduras .. 9.4 Costa Rica 5.7 5.6 5.4 Panama 2.1 10.9 10.9 Andean Countries Colombia 20.5 89.5 61.6 Venezuela 11.7 15.2 16.0 Peru 2.4 11.5 Ecuador 6.4 10.3 15.3 Brazil and Guyana Brazil 11.5 19.7 23.0 Guyana .. .. 6.6 Caribbean Cuba .. .. 6.2 Puerto Rico .. .. 20.6 Trinidad & Tobago 2.1 12.6 12.1 Dominican Rep. .. 11.9 Jamaica .. 35.0 312 M. BUVINIC, A. MORRISON & M.B. ORLANDO End of 70's Beginning of 80's End Beginning of 90's Mid of 80's - End of 90's (a) (a) (b) North America Mexico 18.2 17.8 15.9 Canada .. 2.2 U.S.A. 10.7 10.1 6.3 (c) Southern Cone Argentina 3.9 4.8 4.7 Uruguay 2.6 4.4 4.4 Paraguay 5.1 4.0 12.3 Chile 2.6 3.0 3.0 World Level(d) 5.5 6.4 8.9 Sources: (a) Pan American Health Organization (1997), (b) World Health Organization (2002), (c) US Department of Justice -Bureau of Justice Statistics (2000) y (d) Buvinic y Morrison (2000) (Living in a More Violent World). Note: The rates for each country correspond to a specific year within the indicated period and the same year is not available for all countries. Table 3 also shows that the homicide rate had a worldwide increase in the three decades represented, as a consequence of demographic factors, the greater integration of legal and illegal markets at a global level and the very inertia of violence in time (Buvinic and Morrison, 2000). In Latin America, the incomplete information available does not make it possible to establish clear trends at a country level. However, it may be noted that during the 70's and the 80's, increases in the homicide rate were recorded in many countries, especially the Andean countries. Such increases in homicides within the Andean area are associated to the guerrilla conflict and the dissemination of drug- trafficking in Colombia, as well as to macroeconomic and structural reforms that produced significant increases in inequality and unemployment (Buvinic and Morrison, 2000, Arriagada and Godoy, 1999, World Bank, 2002). The data corresponding to the 90's in Table 3 are not directly comparable with those of the previous decades; however, it is possible to note reductions in the homicide rates of some 313 VIOLENCE, CRIME AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN Central American countries, while substantial increases were recorded in Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and Paraguay. 5 National homicide rates do not reflect the large urban-rural disparity of violence, as well as the disparity between various regions and cities. As seen in Table 4, Medellin, Cali, Ciudad de Guatemala, San Salvador, Caracas and Rio de Janeiro record homicide rates above 50. For some cities there are other statistics available besides the homicide rate.6 Armed robbery is one of the most common events, as well as other violent crimes against property. The rates of victimization in Bahia, Cali, Caracas, Rio de Janeiro, San Jose, San Salvador and Santiago oscillate between 10.6% (San Jose) and 38.5% (San Salvador), which implies a greater exposure to violence than what is indicated by the homicide rate. The inhabitants of Latin America, especially in urban areas, live with a permanent sense of insecurity. This feeling is reflected in public opinion polls such as those of Latinobar6metro (see Latinobar6metro, 2002), in which crime appears as one of the most important problems in each country together with unemployment, inflation, poverty and corruption. According to the same source, the levels of interpersonal trust in the region are low since less than 16% of the respondents in the region for the year 1997 expressed that it was possible to trust strangers. This average figure hides major differences between countries. In Brazil, less than 5% of the study's population expressed that it was possible to trust strangers, while in Uruguay over 30% was of the opinion that you can. The levels of trust constitute a measure in connection with social capital, which has deteriorated between the years 1996 and 2000 for the majority of Latin American countries. 5 Although no data are available for 2000 and 2001, it is possible to speculate that the homicide rate in Colombia suffered new increases due to the heightening of the armed conflict between the guerrilla, the paramilitary and the military forces. 6 The Pan-American Health Organization, under the program of Violence Epidemiological Surveillance Systems, has sponsored victimization surveys in several cities. 314 M. BUVINIC, A. MORRISON & M.B. ORLANDO Table 4 Urban violence in Latin America. Homicide rates (per 100,000 inhabitants) Country- Year Rate Urban centers (per 100,000) Brazil 90 23,0 Rio de Janeiro 1995 63,5 Sao Paulo 1995 48,5 Colombia 90 61,6 Bogota 1997 49,2 Cali 1995 112,0 Medellin 1995 248,0 El Salvador 90 55,6 San Salvador 1995 95,4 Guatemala 90 Guatemala City 1996 101,5 Mexico 90 15,9 Mexico City 1995 19,6 Peru 90 Lima 1995 25,0 Venezuela 90 16,0 Caracas 1995 76,0 Source: Inter American Development Bank, Buvinic and Morrison (eds.) (2000). 315 VIOLENCE, CRIME AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN Violence according to gender Both for biological reason (hormonal and physiological) and due to economic, social and cultural reasons, the majority of aggressors are men (World Health Organization, 2002). Violence against women is defined as: "any act of gender-based violence that produces or could produce, physical, sexual or mental damage or suffering in women, including threats.. .coercion or arbitrary deprivation of freedom, both in public and private life" (United Nations, 1993, quoted in Garcia- Moreno, 2000:7). Social violence against women includes rape and sexual abuse (on the part of strangers, during street assaults, at home or as the result of a strategy during armed conflicts), robberies, genital mutilation, trafficking (forced prostitution), and psychological, physical and sexual violence in the workplace. It also includes domestic violence against women, consisting in the physical, psychological or sexual mistreatment of women on the part of a relative or her partner7. Both social and domestic violence against women are related to gender patterns which comprise the patriarchal structure which places women in a position of subordination with regards to man and the lack of equity between genders from a legal, economic and social point of view. These gender patterns may be maintained in different regions, cultures, social and educational levels (Garcia-Moreno, 2000). Traditional gender patterns link the notion of maleness to authority, honor, and aggression. Violence against women is different from interpersonal violence against men in terms of its modalities, effects and social tolerance as well as that of the victim to its presence. At a world scale and in Latin America, adult men tend to be the victims of strangers or an occasional acquaintance, while for women there is a 7 The manifestations of domestic violence of women towards adult men are not considered because they are infrequent and in many cases the result of self- defense. Neither are the manifestations of social and domestic violence against homosexual men and women considered in this paper because of lack of data. 316 M. BUVINIC, A. MORRISON & M.B. ORLANDO higher probability of being a victim of a relative or partner (Heise, Ellsberg and Gottemoeller, 1999).8 According to the information available, the problem of domestic violence against women is the predominant form of violence against women in Latin America (Garcia-Moreno, 2000), for that reason greater attention will be paid to it in this section. However, the importance of other forms of violence on which there is no statistical information such as violence in the work place and violence during armed conflicts is not discarded. As a result of some 50 comparable surveys around the world, between 10% and 50% of the women declared having been beaten or physically mistreated by a current or previous partner (Heise, Ellsberg and Gottemoeller, 1999). Additionally, physical domestic violence is almost always accompanied by manifestations of psychological violence and sexual violence (almost in half the cases). For Latin America, Table 5 summarizes the results of its prevalence according to various studies, with a rate of up to 40% of women being victims of physical violence on the part of a partner throughout their life (Nicaragua). The data relating to psychological and sexual violence are equally alarming, specially when considering that in many cases the three types of violence are combined. 8 Perhaps during armed conflict periods, during which both men and women are victims of an exacerbated social violence, women have a greater probability of being the victims of strangers, above all when the different parties used systematic rape as a war weapon. There is also evidence of increased domestic violence during periods of conflict (Moser and Mclllwaine, 2000). 317 VIOLENCE, CRIME AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN Table 5 Prevalence of domestic violence against women in the American Continent. Studies conducted during the 90's Country Sample type Sample % Barbados (1990) National 264 women age 20-45, including women 30%* who have never had a partner Bolivia (1998) 3 districts 289 women above age 20 17% Chile (1997) Santiago 1,000 women aged 22-55 with a partner 26% for over 2 years Colombia (1995) National 6,097 women aged 15-49 with a partner 19% Haiti (1995) National 1,705 women 36% Mexico (1996) Monterrey 1,064 women aged 15 and over who 17%* have had a partner Nicaragua (1998) National 8,507 women aged 15-49 who have had 12% a partner Peru (1997) Lima 359 women with middle and low income 31% level, aged 17-55 currently having a partner Puerto Rico (1996) National 5.755 women aged 15-49 who have had 13% a partner Uruguay (1997) Montevideo and 545 women aged 22-55 currently having 10%* Canelones a partner United States (1993) National 8,000 women aged over 18 including 22% those that have never had a partner Canada (1993) National 12.300 women over 18 who had a 25% partner at some point Source: Heise et al. (1994); Handwerker (1998); PAHO (1999); Ordofiez et al. (1995); Granados and Shiroma (1996); Rosales Ortiz et al. (1998); Gonzalez de Olarte and Gavilano (1999); Davila (1998); Traverso (2000) and Population Reports (I 999). * Physical or sexual abuse. 318 M. BUVINIC, A. MORRISON & M.B. ORLANDO In her seminal work on domestic violence, Heise (1998) uses an ecological model of the factors specifically related with domestic violence. At a social level, the author points to the following factors: standards granting men power over women, acceptance of violence as a form of resolving conflicts, and rigid gender structures. At the community level, the major risk factors are poverty and unemployment, crime, and isolation of the woman and the family from community interactions. Risk factors at the household include marital conflict, quarrels with relatives, control over economic assets, and exclusive household decision making by the man. From the individual aggressor point of view, common factors increasing the risk of violent domestic behavior are: being male, witnessing marriage violence in childhood, being a victim of child abuse, rejection or neglect, and use of alcohol. Table 6 shows a summary of the risk factors present for women who are victims of domestic violence, according to various studies conducted in the region9. Violence and socio-economic groups Latin America is the world's region with greater income inequality (Inter American Development Bank, 1998), which contributes to the high levels of violence in the region. Inequality generates social tension and economic incentives which are important factors for robbery, street muggings, kidnapping and armed robberyl0. Among the main causes of earnings inequality in the region are the differentials in quantity and quality of education within the population (Ibid.). 9 These studies are quoted in Inter American Development Bank, Buvinic and Morrison (eds.) (2000): Americas Watch (1991) (Brazil), Larrain (1997). Valdez- Santiago and Sanin (1996) (Mexico), Ellsberg (1996) (Nicaragua), Larrain and Rodriguez ( 1993) (Chile) and Traverso (2000) (Uruguay). 10 See the section Conceptual Framework. 319 VIOLENCE, CRIME AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN Table 6 Risk factors for domestic violence against women in Latin America Risk Factor Presence Individual Level Age A majority of women victims are aged 24 to 45 Pregnancy Up to 33% of pregnant women are subject to abuse History of Domestic Boys and girls who witness or are victims of abuse at home Violence tend to be aggressors or victims in their future homes Alcohol consumption If a man abuses alcohol, the probability of mistreatment of his partner is up to 6 times greater than in households were men consume alcohol with moderation Household Level Predominance of man Women do not take part in decision making in violent households. The majority of mafital abuse begins in the first years of marriage Isolation of the woman and Women suffering aggressions tend to be isolated from family interactions with relatives, friends and the community Family income There is a greater incidence of physical violence in low income households Socio - Cultural Level Rigid gender patterns with male domination are transmitted through the family, school, workplace and media. Tolerance on the part of health and justices agencies. Source: Summary based on Inter American Development Bank, Buvinic and Morrison (eds.) (2000) At an aggregate level, poverty, in itself, does not necessarily cause violence (Arriagada and Godoy, 1999 and Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza, 2001). However, poverty originates feeling of stress and frustration that may unleash violent behaviors 320 M. BUVINIC, A. MORRISON & M.B. ORLANDO if they are accompanied by unemployment (economic exclusion) crowding in recently set-up neighborhoods (breakdown of social capital) Buvinic, Morrison and Shifter, 1999 and Moser and Lister, 1999). In Latin America, the poorer districts, and in some cases those recently formed in the cities, record levels of different types of violence above the rest of the urban area (Pan American Health Organization, 1996 and McAlister, 2000). At an individual level, the differences in income and schooling distinguish the more violent from the less violent groups, especially regarding homicide victimization rates and probability of committing homicide. In urban United States, the probability of being a victim of homicide or assault is three times greater for individuals from families with incomes below 7,500 dollars per year, as compared to individuals from families with incomes above 50,000 dollars per year (Rosenberg, 1999: 13 in Moser and Lister, 1999). An imperfect indicator of the probability of committing homicide or other crimes is the profile of the individual arrested or convicted according to judicial statistics or criminological studies based on surveys of criminals. This indicator is imperfect since the capture of criminals by the police and the judiciary system is a biased process by nature. The profile of those convicted or arrested for various types of crimes in the region is young, single men from low social economic strata. In the case of Chile, 71.5% of those arrested for homicide declared having no job or being manual workers (Arriagada and Godoy, 1999) while in Cali, Colombia, a high percentage comes from households where the mother is the single head (Inter American Development Bank, Buvinic and Morrison (eds.) 2000). The different socio-economic groups experience violence in different ways. Crimes against property are more common in middle and high income Latin American neighborhoods, while homicide, physical injury from violent conflicts and physical domestic violence are more common in low income neighborhoods (Gaviria and Velez, 2001 and Inter American Development Bank, Buvinic and Morrison (eds.) 2000). 321 VIOLENCE, CRIME AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN Ethnic violence in Latin America Ethnic diversity is a historical characteristic of Latin America going back to the colonial past, the migration movements after the First and Second World War, and the migration flows within the region. In many Latin American countries there are no statistics (at a census or household survey level) to allow for national studies on the existence of racial discrimination and problems of ethnical coexistence in the region. The case of violence is no exception and there are no homicide rates by ethnic groups. However, there is evidence at a local scale of the levels of social and cultural exclusion of certain indigenous and Afro-Latin groups (Borjas, 1995; Katzman, 1999). The Latinobar6metro opinion poll found low but significant levels of ethnic intolerance in one of its questionnaires. The questionnaire asked whom would you not like to have as neighbor. A great majority of the respondents in the region (between 43% and 67%) answered that they would not like to live close to drug addicts, homosexuals, or political extremists. However, an important minority (between 6% and 12%) indicated they would not like to live close to a specific ethnic group (Africans, Muslims, Asians or Jews, according to the case). The recent more documented cases of ethnic violence in the region are closely linked to political violence and have taken place during armed conflicts between a group holding political power and guerilla or rebel groups1 1. In the case of Guatemala, the indigenous population was decimated and terrorized, to a greater extent than the rest of the population, by State forces during the civil war lasting 36 years which ended in 1996 (Moser and Mclllwaine (a), 2000). The reason to combat indigenous was the actual or assumed link between them and the revolutionary guerrilla people (Guatemala National Revolutionary Unit) as part of a counterinsurgency policy. During that period, indigenous people were executed (up to 150,000) and other terror 11 Another type of ethnic violence with a political component is police abuse and judicial discrimination against indigenous or black race individuals. 322 M. BUVINIC, A. MORRISON & M.B. ORLANDO policies were adopted such as the systematic rape of indigenous women and the forced displacement of indigenous people (destruction of 440 villages) leaving a legacy of a culture of silence to avoid violent repercussions which implies greater tolerance to other forms of social and domestic violence (Moser and Mclllwaine (a), 2000)12. Ethnic tensions are framed, in some countries, within ancestral problems of land tenure and social and economic exclusion (Easterly, 2002). For example, the Zapatista National Liberation Army of Chiapas (Mexico), has the objective of protecting the indigenous people from exploitation and land holding problems. In Brazil, the landless movement represents groups descendent from Africans who have been systematically excluded from the property of land or expelled in a violent way from the lands they inhabited (Sutherland, 2001). Da Silva (2001) and Rivera (2001) consider that agrarian and land holding reforms are necessary to improve coexistence between different ethnic groups together with dialogue and mediation. Violence by age Age is one of the demographic factors more severely affecting the probability of being an aggressor or a victim. This section contains a summary of two types of violence that are common in Latin America: violence against children and juvenile violence. Social and domestic violence against children Social and domestic violence against children and adolescents (under age 18) is defined as: . . ."all the forms of physical and emotional mistreatment, sexual abuse, abandonment, neglect in care, commercial or other type of exploitation, resulting in actual or potential damage to 12 In the case of the confrontation between the Peruvian State against Sendero Luminoso and other guerilla groups in Peru, it is reported that three of four victims were peasants of the Andean region and the Amazonian region, mostly indigenous (The Economist, "Digging for Truth". 27 April. 2002:38). 323 VIOLENCE, CRIME AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN the health, survival, development and dignity of children, within the context of a relationship of responsibility, trust or power"... (World Health Organization, 1999). Within that definition, the forms of child abuse present some peculiarities that distinguish them from adult abuse: * emotional abuse includes, besides mockery and humiliation, the failure to provide the child with an appropriate environment supporting the child's development and a role model; * neglect includes omitting health care and lack of appropriate monitoring and protection; * sexual abuse includes all sexual activities that the boy or girl cannot understand, is physically immature to engage in or is not prepared to give consent about, including child prostitution and pornography of any type; * commercial exploitation includes child labor. Worldwide, it is calculated that every year, around 10 million children have psychological sequelae as a consequence of war and other types of violence (including violence against children) (Pan American Health Organization, 1996). In the United States alone, in 1992 over 2.9 million cases of child abuse or neglect were reported (Pan American Health Organization, 1996). Physical domestic violence against children is committed, mostly, by mothers, while sexual domestic violence is committed by fathers or other male figures such as brothers, uncles and other relatives. In Latin America and the Caribbean there are some incomplete statistics available relating to child abuse. In connection with sexual abuse, the following studies (compiled by Heise, Ellsberg and Gottemoeller, 1999) give an idea of the magnitude of the problem: * in Barbados 30% of the women interviewed have experienced sexual abuse as children; 324 M. BUVINIC, A. MORRISON & M.B. ORLANDO in Costa Rica, 32% of the women and 13% of the men; * in Nicaragua, 26% of the women and 20% of the men. One of the few children surveys conducted reveals that 63% of Chilean 8th grade children (according to data of a national representative sample of 1,533 children) indicated having experienced physical violence at home; 34% of them mentioned having suffered severe physical abuse. This seems to indicate that severe abuse against children is equal or higher to similar abuse against women (Larrain, Vega and Delgado, 1997). The existence of some 7 million "street children" in the region is linked to different forms of child violence (neglect, domestic violence that drives them to run away from home, exploitation, etc.) (Pan American Health Organization, 1996). Street children are also the object of police violence and murder (social cleaning) by death squads13. In turn, street children have a high probability of becoming criminals, given the emotional and economic deficits they face and their lack of opportunities in society. Domestic violence against the elderly is common in the United States, where it is estimated that one in 25 elderly people suffers abuse (Pan American Health Organization, 1996). Although no data are available for Latin America, it is suspected that it is a relevant issue, due to the high degree of economic dependence of seniors as a result of the failed social security systems and the little savings of the population. 13 In Brazil, 4 street children are murdered per day (Pan American Health Organization, 1996). 325 VIOLENCE, CRIME AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN Youth as aggressors and victims In Latin America, as in the rest of the world, young men (between ages 18 and 24) perpetrate most crimes. The profile of the apprehended, in the following cases, corroborates the previous statement: * in Cali, over 70% of convicted murderers are between the ages of 20 and 29 (Inter American Development Bank, Buvinic and Morrison (eds.) 2000); * in Chile, 48,6% of the murderers, 28.1 % of rapists and 61.4% of robbers are between 15 and 24 years old (Arriagada and Godoy, 1999). Young men also record the highest homicide mortality rates in the region, becoming its main victims. Worldwide, men between the ages of 14 and 44 record the highest mortality rates for homicide (see Figure 1). Among the risk factors for juvenile crime, are dropping out of secondary school (or poor school performance) and juvenile unemployment, which imply the lack of economic and social opportunities. An important role in juvenile violence is also played by the impunity of the system, access to alcohol and drug consumption and the availability of firearms. Another risk factor for youths is learning about violence as a means to resolve conflicts at home (domestic violence), school, the community and the communication media (which disseminate attitudes in favor of aggression among youth) (McAlister, 2000). Youth violence is a phenomenon that can appear in individuals or groups of youngsters or urban gangs. Youth gangs reach different levels of organization in Latin America and normally belonging to a gang is not merely a means to commit violent acts but an end in itself. (McAlister, 2000, Concha and Santacruz, 2002, Moser and Mclllwaine (a) and (b), 2000) and Rodgers, 1999 in Moser and Lister, 1999)14. At 14 According to our review, there are no cross-country comparable data for the region on the number of youths in gangs and the information that is summarized below is derived from the case studies mentioned. 326 M. BUVINIC. A. MORRISON & M.B. ORLANDO Figure 1 Homicide Mortality Rates According to Age (per 100,000 inhabitants). Men. World Level. 2000 20.0 16.0 14 0 T 1 . 12.0 a10.0 S 8.0 a 6.0 4 0 0-4 5-14 15-29 30-44 45-59 60+ AGE Source: World Health Organization, 2000. the root of the formation of gangs are, besides the individual risk factors of youth, social disintegration, lack of access to public services, poverty and crowding (Ibid.). Gangs spring up, in part, due to society's incapacity to address youth concerns and relate to high risk juvenile groups (concretely, the failures of the educational system to integrate youths from poor neighborhood) (Ibid.). Latin American youths who are members of gangs and similar groups look for a lifestyle in them ("style", fashion, access to drugs, a sense of belonging, "hanging out", and having fun) that may serve them as an escape and protection from the harsh environment in which they live. By defending one another, and creating violent situations with members of other gangs, they constitute a form of "perverse" social capital (Moser and Mclllwaine, (a) and (b), 2000 and Rodgers, 1999). The gang is a surrogate for a certain order within the chaotic life at the neighborhood and a means to identity development. The gang is, simultaneously, an outcome of the breakdown of a previous social order (many gangs emerge in recently formed neighborhoods 327 VIOLENCE, CRIME AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN during migrations to the city) and a form of socialization that uses violence for its purposes. Gangs disseminate values through a subculture including music, garments, their own jargon, and the use of crack, marihuana, and cocaine. From the economic point of view these groups can offer interesting incentives to the youths of poor neighborhoods since sometimes gangs are involved in drug trafficking (McAlister, 2000 and Concha and Santa Cruz, 2002) and other black markets that report unusual profits although at a very high risk. From a psychological point of view, studies about violent youths find that they justify their own violence by attributing it to the others and dehumanizing their victims (McAlister, 2000). Once the gang member has left early youth behind, he may abandon the gang to rejoin the life of the community, become a chief in his gang, start a new gang, or become part of a criminal "professional" gang (Moser and Mclllwaine, (a), 2000). THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC COST OF VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA Besides constituting human rights violations, the different types of violence in the region generate profound negative impacts for development and different types of costs for society as a whole. The costs of violence have an inter-temporal impact, worsening the financial and social burden for present and future generations. At a macro economic level, it reduces foreign and domestic investment and decreases internal savings, thus damaging long-term growth possibilities. At a microeconomic level, violence disincentives the investment of time and money in education and induces some to develop criminal skills instead of studying. It can also dissuade some people from studying in the evenings for fear of violent crime. Domestic violence against women and children also hinders economic development. Abuse affects children's school performance and, therefore, their future productivity and the performance of 328 M. BUVINIC, A. MORRISON & M.B. ORLANDO national investments in education. Women suffering from domestic violence are less productive at their workplaces, which is also a direct loss for national production. Caring for the consequences of domestic and social violence implies using the scarce resources available to society. Spending in police and judicial systems and the supply of social services could otherwise be allocated to more productive purposes. Determining the impacts and the cost of violence is an important step for the design of a social strategy, since it contributes to setting priorities in the formulation of public policies and is one of the elements to guide resource allocations. There are two possible approaches to measure the cost implied in violence for society. The first approach, the "global" approach attempts to capture the totality of the costs of violence. The second approach, the "partial" approach, intends to capture only an aspect of the total cost. The partial approach is used when it is impossible to implement the global approach, be it as a result of the lack of data or the complexity of the methodology, or when it is necessary to highlight a specific impact of violence. Within the global approach, three methodologies have been developed to calculate the social costs of violence: * the accounting approach, specifying cost categories and estimating the costs of the different categories, has the advantage that it can be used when there is only partial informnation, and the disadvantages of the risk of double accounting and the inevitable arbitrariness of cost categorization; * the hedonic models of housing or land, measuring the impact of neighborhood security on the value of the house or land, thus attempting to measure the population's willingness to pay for the absence of violence, has the advantage of precision in the measurement, and the disadvantage of requiring very detailed and good quality statistical information. In the United States, some estimates that employ this methodology establish an inverse relation between the crime rate in a zone and the value of 329 VIOLENCE, CRIME AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN housing (Clark and Cosgrove, 1990). For Mexico City, Teruel, Villoro, Morrison and Hammitt (2002) found that residents would be willing to pay more than 20% additional in housing rental to live in a neighborhood with a rate of homicide 50% below the current one; the method of contingent valuation, attempting to measure the value that the market would assign to the reduction of violence, assuming security was a tradable good, has the advantage of being able to generate information where there is no other indicator for the costs of violence, and the disadvantage of the fact that people's valuations depend on their income level so that the estimates will depend on the income level of the participants in the study. The following subsections present some data of the cost of violence in Latin America estimated using the accounting methodology. To facilitate the reporting, we have classified these costs into: direct costs (monetary), non monetary costs, multiplying economic costs and multiplying social costs. However, there are other categorizations possible. Direct costs of violence Using an accounting approach, the direct costs of violence comprise the value of the goods and services used to prevent it, offer treatment to its victims or capture and/or convict the perpetrators. In the Inter-American Development Bank's publication, Buvinic and Morrison (eds.) (2000) there is a summary of the result of various studies with estimates of direct costs of violence: In Colombia, public spending in security and criminal justice amounted to 5% of GDP in 1996; private security expenditure 330 M. BUVINIC. A. MORRISON & M.B. ORLANDO represented 1.4% of GDP (CEDE-UNIANDES. 1997:23-5)15. According to a study of the National Planning Department, the costs of violence between 1991 and 1996, including both urban violence and armed conflicts, is estimated in 18.5% of GDP The loss of lives has a greater weight in this cost with 43% of the total, followed by the excess in military spending with 30%, security spending with 23%, terrorism with 3% and health with 1% (National Planning Department, 1998). * In El Salvador, the expenses of government institutions, legal costs, personal injuries and prevention activities represented over 6% of GDP in 1995 (Cruz and Romano, 1997:32). * In Venezuela, public spending in security was approximately 2.6% of GDP in 1996 (IESA, 1997:25-7). * In Chile, private security expenses amounted to close to 238 million dollars in 1994, equivalent to 17 dollars per capita. These expenditures are broken down as follows: private security services (66.8%), robbery insurance (7.7%) and other insurance products (14.4%) (UNDP, 1998). * In Mexico City, expenditures relating to public and private security measures added up to 181 million dollars in 1995 (Fundaci6n Mexicana para la Salud, 1997); the administration of justice and jails accounted for other 128 and 690 million dollars respectively. * In Lima, the national government's public spending in police, courts and prisons was approximately 1% of the regional product of the metropolitan area in 1997, while private spending 15 If all the expenses of the systems for law enforcement and criminal justice are considered as "direct costs of violence", this would exaggerate the actual direct costs, since some of these expenses would exist even if there was no violence. Besides, the very existence of law enforcement and criminal justice could prevent some of the violence. 331 VIOLENCE, CRIME AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN in security measures represented another 0.41% of the regional product (Instituto Apoyo, 1997: 26-8). Table 5 shows a summary of violence costs for some Latin American countries based on comparable estimates that include direct costs. It is important to take into account that these cost categories are not mutually exclusive (the willingness of citizens to pay may include the value of better health), nor complete (they do not explicitly include the cost of a lower level of savings and investment). The most conservative estimates of the direct costs of violence in terms of losses of health and material losses reach a magnitude of up to 8.4% of the national GDP in Colombia and 9% of the national GDP in Venezuela. Table 5 Economic costs of violence in Latin America (expressed as a percentage of 1997 GDP) Brazil Colombia El Salvador Mexico Peru Venezuela Health Losses 1.9 5.0 4.3 1.3 1.5 0.3 Material Losses 3.6 8.4 5.1 4.9 2.0 9.0 Intangibles 3.4 6.9 11.5 3.3 1.0 2.2 Transfers 1.6 4.4 4.0 2.8 0.6 0.3 Source: Londono and Guerrero (2000) The consequences and costs of domestic violence against women and children and adolescents are summarized in Table 6. There is a series of significant impacts on the mental and physical health of the victims and possibly their children. Sexual violence against women and children includes rejecting the use of condoms and other contraceptives within the context of unexpected and undesired sexual relations, with severe consequences for sexual and reproductive health (see Heise, Ellsberg and Gottemoeller, 1999, Buvinic, Shifter and 332 M. BUVINIC, A. MORRISON & M.B. ORLANDO Morrison, 1999, Garcia-Moreno, 2000). The high frequency of abuse during pregnancy increases pregnancy complications and affects the health of the fetus (Ibid.). These effects on health represent significant direct costs for the health system and society as a whole in Latin America (see Table 6). Additionally, the direct costs caused by domestic violence are usually recurrent since, as stated by Heise, Ellsberg and Gottemoeller (1999:18), the consequences for health have three fundamental characteristics: * health impacts persist through time (even after the abuse has ended); * the more serious the abuse, the more severe the health impacts; * the impact of the different abuse episodes is cumulative through time. Non monetary costs The non monetary costs include health impacts that do not necessarily generate demand for the use of health services, such as, for example, greater morbidity, greater mortality due to homicides and suicides, alcohol and drug abuse and depressive disorders. In the Inter-American Development Bank publication Buvinic and Morrison (eds.) (2000), the result of several studies with non monetary cost estimates of violence are summarized: * Annually 9 million years of disability adjusted life years (DALY) are lost in the world for the concept of rape and domestic violence, a figure that is greater than the total women victims of all existing types of cancer and more than twice the total DALY loss by women in motor vehicle accidents (World Bank, 1993)16. 16 The DALY not only include years lost due to premature mortality, but also the years the person has been affected by disability or disease. 333 VIOLENCE, CRIME AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN In El Salvador, 178,000 DALY were lost in 1995 as a consequence of violent deaths (Cruz and Romano, 1997:30). In Peru, the figure was 60,792 (InstitutoApoyo, 1997:16); 163,136 for Rio de Janeiro (ISER, 1998:42), and in Mexico City 57,673 (Fundaci6n Mexicana para la Salud, 1997:14). In Caracas, casualties were not included in the calculations (only deaths); even so, 56,032 potential life years were lost in 1995 as a result of homicides (IESA, 1997: 31). In Colombia, between 18 and 27% of all the DALY lost during the period 1989-1995 were caused by homicides, while the world average is only 1.4% (CEDE-UNIANDES, 1997:12-16). Violence generates a serious of psychological damages, similar to those experienced in war zones (Cardia, 1998). Multiplying economic costs The multiplying economic effects of violence are significant and imply a lower accumulation of human capital, a lower rate of participation in the labor market, less productivity at work, greater absenteeism and lower income. There is evidence, in the case of women suffering from domestic violence, of higher rates of absenteeism and a greater probability of being dismissed or quitting their jobs (Morrison and Orlando, 1999). The impacts on productivity are owed to the difficulties in concentrating, lack of motivation and the danger implied in working overtime or attending evening training classes. This reduction in productivity has intergenerational impacts and its negative effect on economic growth is significant (Cotte- Poveda, 2001, estimates the loss for Colombia). At the macro economic level, violence implies a lower saving capacity and lower investment in physical capital (Buvinic, Morrison and Shifter, 1999) with the consequent impact on economic growth Cotte-Poveda, 2001). Violence also causes efficient economic projects to be omitted or the location of plants and ventures in sites that 334 M. BUVINIC, A. MORRISON & M.B. ORLANDO are suboptimal from an economic point of view but safer. Another macro economic impact is the reduced effectiveness of economic policies, specially fiscal policy, since violence hinders tax collection and prevents an appropriate targeting of public spending (Inter- American Development Bank, Buvinic and Morrison (eds.) 2000). Crimes against property imply sub-optimal transfers between individuals that can represent up to 4.4.% of GDP in the case of Colombia (see Table 5). Domestic violence has multiplying economic impacts by affecting women's insertion and productivity (as well as that of adults that were subject to child abuse) in the labor market. Table 6 mentions some effects on productivity such as health-based absenteeism and lack of concentration. In some cases, the abusing partner even goes to the victim's workplace to intimidate her and control her actions. This productivity reduction has an incidence on the income level, according to the economic compensation models, that could be demonstrated in the case of Nicaragua and Chile (Morrison and Orlando, 1999). By adding income losses based on domestic violence, according to the approximate percentage of victims nationwide, the cost for society as a whole represents between 1.6% of GDP for Nicaragua and 2% of GDP for Chile (Ibid.). Multiplying social costs The multiplying social effects include the intergenerational transmission of violence through learning, the erosion of social capital, a reduced quality of life and a lower participation of the population in the democratic processes. The privatization of police functions is one of the negative effects of the transmission of violence which has impacts on inequality and future violence (Inter-American Development Bank, Buvinic and Morrison (eds.) 2000)17. 17 In Guatemala, for example, there are close to 200 private security companies, with a staff of nearly 11,000, a figure equivalent to the officers in the National Police at the end of 1996 (UNO, 1998). 335 VIOLENCE, CRIME AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN The low self-esteem of women who are victims of domestic violence tends to maintain them isolated and hinders their participation in the labor market, access to credit, political participation and their involvement in community programs and projects (Morrison and Orlando, 1999 and Heise, Ellsberg and Gotemoeller, 1999). Many times these women do not participate in the parent associations of their children's schools. This scarce participation of women in the economic, political and social arena constitutes a barrier for economic and social development since it has negative impacts on the labor market, the capacity to overcome poverty, democratic institutions and the success of costly social programs and projects. Domestic violence plays a fundamental role in the intergenerational transmission of violent behaviors at a social and domestic level. The intergenerational transmission of violence has been broadly documented (see conceptual framework section). Adults, the media and society in general, in many cases depict violence to children and youth, as a quick way of solving conflicts and gaining control, accumulating wealth and acquiring approval (gangs). Thus, the individual incorporates norms and attitudes that allow violent behavior according to certain environmental stimuli and specific emotional circumstances. Political violence, where police forces and/or paramilitary groups became agents of violence perpetrated against certain groups, especially against street children, undermines democracy and generates more violence. Political violence in some countries has generated a culture of silence and a greater tolerance to all types of violence. State impunity in the face of violence generates, in turn, individual and group violence to "get justice by their own hand" in street fights between gangs and lynching (McAlister, 2000 and World Bank, 2000). The erosion of the social and human capital existing in societies, as well as the reduction of its accumulation rate, has multiplying negative consequences for development since it increases inequality, reduces economic growth and decreases the investment in physical capital (affecting future economic growth) (World Bank, 2000). Violence also has negative effects in the establishment institutions that would lead to a better climate for development (World 336 M. BUVINIC, A. MORRISON & M.B. ORLANDO Bank, 2000). Finally, violence generates a vicious circle since the erosion of capital for development and institutions generates greater future violence. Table 6 Consequences and costs of domestic violence against women and children Type of consequence or cost Presence in Latin America Physical health: * Important cause of DALY (third cause of DALY * Injuries in Mexico City) * Chronic Pain Syndrome * Greater use of public emergency rooms by * Gastric and intestinal disturbances women victims (up to 8 times more in Uruguay) * Consumption of tobacco, e Greater use of health services (specialists, X- alcohol and drugs rays, hospital admittance) (up to 10 times more * Weight excess or deficiency in Uruguay) * Lack of physical activity Sexual and reproductive health * Victims of sexual abuse in childhood or * Undesired, teen-age and high risk witnesses of domestic violence have greater pregnancies probability of teen-age pregnancy (Barbados) * Sexually transmitted diseases including * Lower use of condoms and contraceptives in HIV-AIDS violent couples imply a greater number of * Complications during birth and post- undesired pregnancies (Barbados and Brazil) partum and maternal deaths * More than double the probability of * New born health experiencing sexually transmitted diseases * Gynecological disturbances: infections, (Brazil and Haiti) inflammatory pelvic disease, * Three times more complications at birth and hemorrhages, sexual dysfunction post partum (Mexico) Mental Health e Greater depression (Nicaragua) v Problems of self-esteem * Higher suicide rate (Nicaragua) * Depression * The effects of post traumatic stress syndrome in * Anxiety the case of domestic and child violence are * Suicide comparable to those of torture and kidnapping v Somatization * Eating disorders * Paranoia, phobias, addiction * Post traumatic stress syndrome 337 VIOLENCE, CRIME AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN Work-Productivity-Community * Lower labor participation * Labor absenteeism * Women suffering severe physical violence earn * Lack of concentration only between 39% and 57% of the eamings of * Lack of initiative to assume non abused women in Chile and Nicaragua, responsibilities respectively * Apathy and lack of enthusiasm * Greater loss of work days for health reasons * Acceptance of violence at the work site (Mexico) * Low income * Difficulty to succeed in organizations * Lower political participation * Lower participation in community and school programs Welfare of Children and * Children of abused women can be born with Future Generations weight deficiencies of up to 560 grams * Physical, mental and reproductive health (Mexico) problems * Children of abused women present health and e Problems in school and dropping out of school problems school * Many street children run away because they are * Alcohol, tobacco and drug consumption abused at home (Brazil, Venezuela) * Running away from home * Aggressors and victims of domestic violence * Precedent for future domestic and social were childhood witnesses or victims (Chile, violence Nicaragua) Source: Own development based on Inter American Development Bank, Buvinic and Morrison (eds.) (2000), Heise, Ellsberg and Gottemoeller (1999) and Garcia Moreno, (2000). For specific studies quoted in Inter American Development Bank, see footnotes on pages 16 to 22. 338 M. BUVINIC, A. MORRISON & M.B. ORLANDO RISK FACTORS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS FOR VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN Interventions to combat violence are based on the prevention of violent behavior, through actions on risk factors and social control (including police and imprisonment actions) that are exercised on individuals who have already committed or are considering committing acts of violence. Primary prevention actions are addressed at the population at large with the aim of avoiding aggressive behaviors. Secondary prevention is targeted at high-risk groups and tertiary prevention addresses individuals who have already displayed violent behaviors or have been the victims of violence. These definitions indicate important differences between prevention and control but, in reality, actions designed to combat violence are part of a continuum that goes from prevention to control. There are preventive actions, such as teaching techniques for peaceful conflict resolution, which may be control strategies if they are implemented on groups of people who have already committed violent acts. Likewise, police control actions, such as arrest or fines, have in some cases an important dissuasive impact that acts as prevention of future violence on the part of other actors. Strategies for violence prevention are based on an epidemiological approach to violence. Epidemiology conceives violence as a public health problem since it is the cause of death and disability, it increases the frequency of consumption of alcohol and psychotropic substances, increases the risk of sexually transmitted diseases (sexual violence) and has impacts on depression and other mental conditions. The social "generation-transmission" of violence increases in the presence of certain risk factors and is reduced in the presence of other protection factors (World Health Organization, 2002 and Pan American Health Organization, 1996). The risk factors, whether individual or environmental characteristics, increase the probability of occurrence of a violent event, although they are not the ultimate cause of the same. Through empirical studies, it is possible to 339 VIOLENCE, CRIME AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN determine, in a rather precise manner, the probability of occurrence of certain violent events and the incidence of certain factors on that probability18. Once the most important risk factors have been identified for a certain community, epidemiology proposes public interventions on them with the aim of preventing violence and reducing its frequency. The last stage in the epidemiological approach consists of the analysis and evaluation of the effectiveness of the violence preventive actions conducted in a particular context. The epidemiological approach emphasizes a combination of multiple strategies in wide population groups since broader effects may be expected when several risk factors are treated simultaneously and when there is an early intervention (in the early years of childhood) (PAHO, 1996 and Rosenberg, 1999 in Moser and Lister, 1999). In general, violence prevention is more efficient than violence control actions; for example, in the United States it is estimated that for every dollar invested in prevention, it would be possible to save at least 6 dollars invested in control programs (Buvinic, Morrison and Shifter, 1999). Greenwood, Model, Rydell, and Cheese (1998) compare the effectiveness and the cost of four early violence prevention programs with the law that requires permanent imprisonment after three serious offenses in California (USA)19. This investigation concludes that the new penalization policy has an impact in reducing criminality rates; however, preventive programs (especially incentives to graduate from high school) have a remarkably higher cost-effectiveness (they prevent more crimes per dollar invested). 18 The following recent studies estimate statistically, using different methodologies, the impact of certain risk factors of violence in the United States: Markowitz, a and b (2000) and Grogger and Willis (1998). Studies of risk factors in Latin America: Inter American Development Bank, Londofio, Gaviria and Guerrero (eds.) (2000) and World Bank, Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (eds.) (2001). 19 The early prevention programs considered were visiting and providing day care to babies of poor single mothers, training parents in the peaceful resolution of conflicts, providing incentives to continue highschool and supervision for juvenile delinquents. 340 M. BUVINIC, A. MORRISON & M.B. ORLANDO The following sections present a set of policies that have been implemented with success or can be implemented in Latin America, emphasizing the role of prevention related policies. First of all, it is necessary to have timely and detailed information of the types and levels of violence at a local scale as well as on the major risk factors within a community. In the framework of an integrated violence prevention strategy, we have classified the range of options available into policies with incidence in the long term and policies with incidence in the medium and short term. Finally, the violence control and response actions of greater relevance for the region are summarized. Epidemiological surveillance systems The Pan American Health Organization has established guidelines to set up Epidemiological Surveillance Systems to support preventive actions against violence. Such systems allow for the systematic, ongoing, timely and reliable collection of information and the analysis and interpretation of data not only to provide a better analytical foundation for the design of preventive strategies but also to evaluate the programs adopted (Concha and Villaveces, 2001). These systems can have a universal or local character and be based on sample information or derive data from institutional records, depending on the case. For some types of violence, such as domestic violence, a "sentinel" epidemiological surveillance system is suitable, in which one or more selected institutions determine the trends of that type of violence and report them to the community and violence prevention agencies (Concha and Villaveces, 2001). Both the Pan American Health Organization and the Inter-American Development Bank emphasize the role of local government as the basic unit for violence surveillance, prevention, and control programs in Latin America. These programs require coordination and support at a regional and national scale (Concha and Villaveces, 2001 and Inter American Development Bank, Buvinic and Morrison (eds.) 2000). In Colombia, the municipalities of Bogota and Cali have developed, within their integrated programs to combat 341 VIOLENCE, CRIME AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN violence, epidemiological surveillance programs with timely and periodical information (Inter American Development Bank, Buvinic and Morrison (eds.) 2000). Violence risk factors and long-term solutions Risk factors that play a role in the long term and involve changes in society as a whole are the so-called structural risk factors. Other factors that require long-term solutions are of the social type and the social development policies to mitigate them act on groups of individuals at high risk of becoming aggressors or victims. The first structural risk factor for violence in Latin America is the inequality of income, assets and opportunities (Inter-American Development Bank, 1998). The countries with less equitable income distribution within the region are Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Guatemala and Panama, while the countries with the lowest inequality are Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico and Uruguay (Economic Commission for Latin America, 1999). Inequality affects the opportunities to which individuals have access and the expected benefit of committing violent acts against property. Within the economic and social policies aimed at reducing inequality in Latin America, increased access to primary and secondary education, improved educational quality in public schools and policies for the reduction of regional and sector income disparities should be underlined (Inter American Development Bank, 1998). Another risk factor for violence is poverty, even though it is not a direct cause of violent behavior. Poverty can generate perceptions of deprivation and feelings of frustration, as well as overcrowding and high household population density in major cities, all of which are violence risk factors. One of the necessary conditions to reduce poverty in the long term is sustained economic growth and providing access to health and education to poor groups (World Bank, 2000) Other risk factors with an important structural and social component are unemployment and juvenile school desertion (youths who neither study nor work). Juvenile unemployment and dropping out of secondary school affect at least 8% of youths between ages 13 342 M. BUVINIC, A. MORRISON & M.B. ORLANDO and 17 in the majority of Latin American countries (Economic Commission for Latin America, 1999). Since most of the crimes are committed by youths, lack of employment and school opportunities are particularly serious fostering the entry of youths in urban gangs. Among the social prevention strategies for violence linked to these risk factors are programs providing incentives for youths to complete their secondary studies. Such incentives may be direct economic incentives, increasing the linkage between secondary school and the needs of the labor markets (computer and accounting certificates), improving the relations of schools with the community and with youths and improving the school environment. Supplementing school efforts, community tutoring programs or special activities for high-risk adolescents may contribute to a reduction of violence within that group (Arriagada and Godoy, 1999, McAlister, 2000). Another example of social development strategies that can have a significant long term impact are visits to mothers in a situation of critical poverty who can be given free pre and postnatal care to prevent injuries in the children that can increase the tendency towards violent behavior. Such actions may be included within public health programs targeting women, providing greater access to reproductive health services and information for a healthy pregnancy and child rearing (Rosenberg and Mercy, 1991). Civil society can support such early violence prevention actions through non governmental organizations providing assistance in the early stages of child development and good quality day care services (public or private) (Inter-American Development Bank, Buvinic and Morrison (eds.) 2000). Another group of preventive structural interventions are those related to the acceptance and promotion of violent behaviors on the part of a community or society as a whole. Such prevention strategies use schools, health centers, religious organizations and the media to disseminate messages against violence and implement programs of training and peaceful conflict resolution, including reforms in the school curricula and mediation programs between school mates. The media may instigate violence and can be successfully used to modify collective attitudes towards violence in the long term. Some specific actions that employ the media are: reducing violent programming 343 VIOLENCE, CRIME AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN during children's viewing hours, training journalists in reporting violent crime, designing peaceful coexistence messages ( soap operas and other commercial programming can be used besides specific institutional campaigns) (Pan American Health Organization, 2000 and Sanjuan, 1999). Two examples of programs addressing peaceful conflict resolution are "Mejor Hablemos " in Cali, Colombia, illustrating real life stories with peaceful resolution and "Justicia para Todos " in Venezuela, in which the function of a peace judge is illustrated by using real life cases (Sanjuan, 1999 and Primero Justicia, 2000). In preventing domestic violence structurally it is important to eradicate discrimination against women in the educational system. Discrimination can be reduced by improving the opportunities of girls at schools and reviewing curricula with gender perspectives (eliminating sex stereotypes from textbooks and including the contributions of women in the arts and sciences). It is important to increase equal participation of boys and girls in activities that were previously considered single-gender ones such as sports and family education. Another preventive strategy in the educational system is controlling violence among school-mates and educating children in connection with the negative effects of domestic violence (Inter- American Development Bank, Buvinic and Morrison (eds.) 2000). Media campaigns have also been successfully utilized in the structural prevention of domestic violence. The campaigns have the following objectives: changing the public's attitudes and values, creating awareness in the population, providing information on available support services and disseminating awareness of the law and penalties connected with domestic violence among the real or potential victims and aggressors. An example of a comprehensive campaign against domestic violence in the media is a program implemented in Argentina (Inter-American Development Bank, Buvinic and Morrison (eds.) 2000). Other structural prevention strategies with good results are the inter-institutional information campaigns (health sector, educational sector, local government, community organizations) using local community networks (Heise, Ellsberg and Gottemoeller, 1999). 344 M. BUVINIC, A. MORRISON & M.B. ORLANDO Short-term violence risk factors and solutions Given the magnitude and serious impacts of violence in Latin America, long-term interventions are necessary but clearly insufficient for the region, since the results may take one generation or more and are dependent on complex economic, social and cultural factors. On the other hand, political representatives (specifically Governors and Majors) have more incentives to implement actions against violence if the results can be observed during their period in office. Consequently, an integrated strategy for the reduction of violence should also contain interventions offering short and medium term results and with an impact on violent events that is more observable. Such strategies act on risk factors close to the individual that trigger or instigate violent behavior and on situational factors that relate to the opportunity of committing a violent act in an advantageous manner for the aggressor. In Latin America, in accordance with the information available, the main risk factors are alcohol consumption, especially during holidays and weekends and the widespread availability of firearms. There are successful experiences in preventing these risk factors in the region, taking into account the particular characteristics of the locality, with important impacts in violence reduction. The municipalities of Bogota and Cali, within their programs against violence, have adopted legislation limiting the sale of alcohol beverages during certain times and days as well as health programs to reduce alcohol and drug consumption (Inter American Development Bank, Buvinic and Morrison (eds.) (2000)20. In connection with gun carrying, important efforts have been made in El Salvador and Nicaragua to establish controls under the pacification agreements (Arriagada and Godoy, 1999). In Panama, the municipality of Panama created the program Arms for Food with the cooperation of private food companies, where donations are turned 20 In Sao Paulo, there is a Program of Education and Resistance to Drugs in Schools with excellent results (Arriagada and Godoy, 1999). 345 VIOLENCE, CRIME AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN into food vouchers by the local government and exchanged for weapons without asking too many questions (Arriagada and Godoy, 1999). In the case of Colombia, the municipalities of Bogota and Cali have restricted arms carrying. These cities have also implemented programs for the pacific surrender of weapons with some monetary incentive or within social works for the community (programs of arms in exchange for baby spoons) (Inter-American Development Bank, Buvinic and Morrison (eds.) 2000). However, it is also necessary to conduct efforts at a national and international scale to regulate arms traffic and availability. The situational risk factors that can be managed through measures designed to reduce opportunities for specific forms of violence (burglary, vandalism and robbery, for example). Such interventions should make the use of violence by an aggressor more difficult, costly and less advantageous by modifying the environment (more lighting, doors and windows with security mechanisms, alarms, mirrors in narrow corridors, among others) (State of Victoria, 2000). These interventions may be public or private, but local governments can contribute to educating the population on ways of securing their homes and cars, as well as incorporating greater security in housing construction programs and neighborhood improvements. A special case of actions on situational risk factors is based on Kelling's "broken window theory", according to which the deterioration of the physical environment, lack of appropriate lighting and absence of police in the community incentivate violence (Buvinic, Morrison and Shifter, 1999 and PAHO, 1996). This principle was successfully applied in New York City (Ibid.). The initiatives of Latin American municipalities in connection with improving the condition of parks and streets and increasing their illumination, as well as expanding police patrols in dangerous neighborhoods have had positive results. However, considering urban development projects that include infrastructure for sports, recreation, and community organizations can ostensibly expand the range of actions (Ibid.). 346 M. BUVINIC, A. MORRISON & M.B. ORLANDO Violence control and social answers For an effective control of violence and to enhance the dissuasive power of control measures, the expected cost of committing a violent crime plays a fundamental role. This expected cost is a function of the probability of being caught, the probability of being tried and convicted and the years in jail. In Latin America, it is common for justice systems to operate poorly, which does not contribute to violence control and generates greater violence because the sense of impunity causes new violent episodes and justifies taking justice in your own hands (Arriagada and Godoy, 1999)21. Therefore, in controlling violence it is necessary to consider the reforms of the judicial and prison systems as well as the police forces of the region. Judicial reforms should include instances for the peaceful resolution of conflicts where a court is not required to settle the dispute, such as the "justice houses" in Colombia and the peace judge program in Venezuela (Justicia para Todos, 2002). These programs bring justice closer to the ordinary citizen and in turn reinforce training and institutional mechanisms for conflict resolution. One of the interesting reform experiences of police action in the region is the application of policing models that work with the community through consultation and also by improving the relationship with community organizations. These models include a police force that identifies and responds to immediate violence risk factors, (reporting failures in street lighting, for example). A violence control strategy that has afforded good results has been to modify the style of patrolling, from random to focused in zones with a high concentration of crime and during certain hours of the day. Such police strategy requires profound reforms of the police forces and even the creation of new municipal police forces. The necessary reforms in the existing police forces or the characteristics of the new police forces are summarized below (see Arriagada and Godoy, 1999): 21 A common case is the lynching of known criminals (neighborhood scourges or rapists) in many poor urban neighborhoods. Another common case is revenge between gangs and armed bands. 347 VIOLENCE, CRIME AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN increase educational requirements and improve police training and education; * create strategic plans for the police to be capable to prevent potential crime scenarios; * reduce police functions, specially administrative ones; * increase police pay; * strengthening State and civil society control over the action of police forces. Among the community policing experiences in the region are those of the municipalities of Cali, Medellin and Bogota in Colombia, Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Belo Horizonte in Brazil and Villa Nueva in Guatemala (Moreno, 2002, Candina, 2002 and Lunecke, 2002). Most of these experiences found a first obstacle in the fear of the population to police forces given the long tradition of mistrust stemming from the abuses committed against the population in Latin America. One of the problems encountered in Colombia is the coexistence of two police systems, one national and another municipal, within one same city, with different methods and philosophies (Inter-American Development Bank, Buvinic and Morrison (eds.) 2000). However, the three Colombian cities that adopted community policing within integrated violence reduction plans managed to improve the relationship of the police with the community (Ibid. and Moreno, 2000). In the case of Sao Paulo, better communication has been achieved between the police and the community, but public opinion continues to consider that the police is inefficient (Moreno, 2002). In the concrete case of Sao Paulo, the police agency adopted the philosophy of community policing, but the State has failed to commit sufficient human and financial resources for the project. In Belo Horizonte, a first model of community policing failed totally in part due to the isolation of the program within the police organization itself and the strong dedication of the members of the program to activities designed to raise funds for the same (Candina, 2002). Recently, Belo Horizonte adopted a performance-based police 348 M. BUVINIC, A. MORRISON & M.B. ORLANDO model that incorporated the criticism at the previous community police program and based its strategy in planning police actions, on the basis of preparing crime maps and decentralizing the response to community demands. From the review of these experiences it may be concluded that they have been successful in terms of modifying the relationships between the community and the police and in reducing police abuse. However, given the recent implementation of some experiences and the lack of appropriate impact studies, the incidence of community policing on violence reduction is not known with certainty. As with the control of domestic violence, the first step is to make it legally punishable, which is not yet the case throughout the region. In controlling domestic violence it is necessary to improve the response of health, police and judicial agencies by means of training and sensitization on this issue. Some countries like Costa Rica are driving programs to improve domestic violence diagnosis and care by health organizations (Inter-American Development Bank, Buvinic and Morrison (eds.) 2000). Detecting domestic violence and providing specialized care includes emotional and social support to the victims through emergency telephone lines, safe houses for battered women and children and care centers for the victims of violence. A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR STRATEGIES TO REDUCE VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA In spite of the great strides in the investigation of violence in Latin America during the last decade, there are important gaps both at the level of basic information and in the analysis to design strategies to combat violence through prevention and control. In the coming years, the most relevant research agenda for violence reduction is to identify which are the well-performing government and civil society interventions in the Latin American context. Below there are a series of recommendations for future investigation intended to improve the information and analysis available for the design of public policies against violence: 349 VIOLENCE, CRIME AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN * Violence indicators and estimates of violence cost It is necessary to count with more comparable violence indicators for Latin America and with a greater breakdown of the same according to the characteristics of the victims, the aggressors, and the place (rural or urban, neighborhood or street). Most of the information available is based on homicide rates and robbery frequency at a national scale, from police statistics and health care services. Such statistics are subject to considerable under-reporting and biases according to the type of violent behavior. For that reason it is necessary to conduct victimization surveys in more countries and more frequently, to supplement the information provided by judicial and health agencies. It is equally important to carry out victimization surveys that include excluded ethnic and social groups. However, a disadvantage of victimization surveys is the high cost involved in generating a representative sample and conducting periodical surveys. In connection with estimating the cost of violence, most of the studies on this issue in the region use an accounting methodology since it can produce cost indicators even though incomplete information is available (Teruel, Villoro, Morrison and Hammit, 2001). However, this methodology has several disadvantages, among them the possibility of double accounting since many times the information is forthcoming from different sources. Another important disadvantage is that it is not a very precise indicator of what society is willing to pay for less violence (the value that individuals place on less violence) since the expenses incurred, especially in the public sector, can be remarkably different to the expenditure demanded by society. Considering such disadvantages, it is necessary to have more studies using other methodologies to estimate the population's willingness to pay, such as studies employing hedonic models. These models estimate the price of a reduction of violence, based on the variations of housing prices, for example, in different city zones with different levels of violence (controlling for the other characteristics of housing and zones) (Teruel, Villoro, Morrison and Hammit, 2001). Among the disadvantages of the hedonic models is that they require detailed data and that the willingness of the public to pay for lower levels of violence may be affected by the various income levels since this variable is always measured with a large error 350 M. BUVINIC, A. MORRISON & M.B. ORLANDO percentage. Another methodology to investigate the willingness to pay is the method of contingent valuation in which individuals are directly questioned on their preferences using special instruments. This methodology suffers in a much more evident way of the problem of sensitivity to valuation connected with income level, since it is very difficult to control for this variable when directly questioning a group of people. * Risk and protection factors at a local level For prevention and control plans at a national scale to succeed it is important to have programs with municipalities as the executing agencies (Pan American Health Organization, 2000 and Inter American Development Bank, 2000). Municipal epidemiological surveillance systems require information at a local scale to effectively attack violence risk factors in a specific community. * The impact of violence on development Although the impact of violence on development is known, given the theoretical and empirical evidence from developed countries, there are few studies of these impacts in the majority of the countries in the region. More research is required on the impact of violence on health and the calculation of healthy years of life lost as a result of violence (DALY). It is also necessary to have more estimates of the impact of violence in the formation of human capital, both in adults and children. There is a set of studies mostly in the case of Colombia, about the impact of violence on productivity, savings, income distribution, investment, and economic growth that should be conducted for a larger number of countries (see Cotte Poveda, 2001, Gaviria and Velez, 2001, Morrison and Orlando, 1999). Relationship between individual traits, social exclusion and violence Social exclusion prevents a group of individuals from accessing human, physical and social capital (Borjas, 1995). The segregation of 351 VIOLENCE, CRIME AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN certain groups can produce higher levels of violence by originating ethnic conflicts and social unrest. On the other hand, violence takes a disproportionate toll in lower income groups (Gaviria and V6lez, 2001). In Latin America, there are no victimization and aggression rates available, taking into account variables such as belonging to a certain ethnic group. Studies on the profile of apprehended criminals make it possible to conclude that most of the aggressors are young poor males. However, these studies do not present a complete picture of the characteristics of aggressors and victims since only certain aggressors are in prison, so they do not constitute a representative sample of the population. Another area of interest is studying police abuse and judicial discrimination against individuals of indigenous or African descent (Sutherland, 2001). Violence against children and the elderlv There are a small number of studies on domestic and social violence against children that need to be replicated in more countries of the region. There are no comparable cross-country statistics of violence against children. Likewise, it is necessary to conduct studies on urban gangs in a larger number of cities and build cross-country comparable indicators of this phenomenon. On the other hand, there are no studies or statistics capturing domestic and social violence against the elderly in Latin America. Relationship between social capital, human capital and violence Moser and Mclllwaine's studies (2000) on poor urban communities of Guatemala and Colombia provide evidence of the relationship between the destruction of social capital and violence, as well as proposals to combat violence on the basis of strengthening the social capital existing in the communities22. Since each community's social capital has its own characteristics, it would be very useful to conduct this type of studies in other urban and rural communities of the region. 352 M. BUVINIC, A. MORRISON & M.B. ORLANDO At an aggregate level, the relationship between human capital and violence presents great complexity, so it has not been easy to determine empirically whether a higher average educational level in the population reduces violence (World Bank, Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (eds.) 2001). In fact, what seems to be relevant is the relationship between inequality of educational opportunities and inequality in income distribution that, in turn, has a direct influence in violence. Investigations on the relationship between education quality and income distribution within communities and individuals could throw more light on which are the interventions in the educational system that have a greater impact in reducing future income inequality and, thus, violence. Institutionalframework for the design and implementation ofpolicies for violence prevention and control It is necessary to count with more research on the institutional frameworks required for the design and implementation of violence prevention and control that are suggested in this paper. To implement some policies connected with violence control, such as replacing imprisonment with alternative penalties, it is necessary to reform the criminal code in some countries. Another important problem in connection with violence control and prevention policies is coordination mechanisms between the local and national agents and those of different sectors (health, education, justice, etc.). The need for legal and institutional reforms should be studied by means of specific research. * Impact of interventions on violent attitudes and behaviors With the purpose of identifying which government interventions are well performing in the Latin American context, it is necessary to conduct studies of impact and evaluations of the control and prevention programs that have already been implemented. Given the scarce information, the success of some programs is measured by observing the evolution of homicide rates. Since homicide rates are sensitive to many factors, including the data gathering methodology, 353 VIOLENCE, CRIME AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN and in many cases no figures are available at a regional or community level, it is fundamental to use specific instruments to determine the impact of concrete interventions on violent behaviors and attitudes. There are specific instruments to this end that have been validated and used in other countries. These instruments should become part of the intervention design. Victimization surveys are also a valuable tool to measure the impact of reforms or new programs through before and after comparisons of victimization indexes. Victimization surveys make it possible to determine the effectiveness of an intervention after controlling for the other factors that may have affected victimization rates through the period under consideration. Dissemination of good practices for violence prevention and control There is an important gap in the dissemination of good practices in the region. Experiences such as community policing and integrated prevention and control programs in municipalities of Colombia may have much to contribute to the design of policies against violence in other countries and communities (Inter American Development Bank, Buvinic and Morrison (eds.) 2000). In connection with domestic violence against women and children, there are educational guides and leaflets developed in a friendly and simple language, within the context of public health programs, in the United States, African countries and in Mexico, that could be very useful (Heise, Ellsberg and Gottemoeller, 1999). 354 M. BUVINIC, A. MORRISON & M.B. ORLANDO CONCLUSIONS The high levels of violence, in Latin America, in its various manifestations constitute an important barrier to the welfare of its population and the region's economic and social development. The incidence of the various manifestations of violence has direct costs and negative impacts on health, productivity, savings and investment. It may be concluded from this chapter that a strategy for the region's economic and social development needs to include violence reduction, as a fundamental priority. In connection with diagnosing the problem of violence, there are homicide rates at a national scale and some victimization surveys, but there is still a lack of basic and timely information on the incidence of violence at a local scale in most countries. Likewise, there are insufficient indicators regarding domestic and social violence against women, children and the elderly, so that specialized studies and surveys of these issues are required. Within the diagnosis of the problem, there is a lack of sufficient data on the percentage of victims and aggressors within groups that are socially excluded based on ethnic or socio-economic reasons. Systems of epidemiological surveillance at a national, regional and local scale can provide significant contributions to the generation and dissemination of information on violence and risk factors for specific regions and communities. 355 VIOLENCE, CRIME AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN In order to prevent and control violence in Latin America it is important to design long-term strategies with the aim of combating structural and social risk factors (inequality, unemployment, lack of postnatal care for mothers at critical poverty levels, etc.) at a national, regional, and local scale. On the other hand, given the magnitude of violence, there is a requirement for strategies with observable impact on the short and medium term with the purpose of combating the proximal (alcohol and fire arms) and situational (lighting, police presence) risk factors. For the implementation of these programs, it is essential for municipalities and local governments to become executing agencies given the multiplicity of manifestations of violence across localities. Municipalities must achieve greater effectiveness in the intervention on proximal and situational factors. Some successful experiences in the region that have used an integrated approach to violence prevention and control at a local scale include information system at a municipal level, educational programs and information campaigns, improvement of public spaces and reforms of the police force using community policing and problem solving schemes. It may be concluded that although there are reports on valuable experiences in the region, there are still wide gaps in connection with the knowledge of policies and programs that may operate in each of the countries. Additionally, it is necessary to achieve a greater dissemination of valuable experiences and good practices in the continent. The most relevant research agenda for the coming years in connection with violence is that which identifies which are the government and civil society interventions that have good outcomes in the Latin American context. With the purpose of identifying such interventions, it is necessary to conduct impact studies and evaluations of the prevention and control programs already implemented, using specific instruments to measure directly the incidence of the intervention on violent attitudes and behaviors. 356 M. BUVINIC. A. MORRISON & M.B. ORLANDO BIBLIOGRAPHIC AND ELECTRONIC REFERENCES Alschuler A. 1997. "Two Guns, Four Guns, Six Guns, More Guns: Does Arming the Public Reduce Crime?". Valparaiso University Law Review. Vol 31. Arriagada and Godoy. 1999. "Seguridad Ciudadana y Violencia en America Latina: Diagn6stico y Polifticas en los Afios Noventa". Serie Pollticas Sociales. Chile.Comisi6n Econ6mica para Am6rica Latina. Bandura, A. 1973. Aggression: A Social Learning Analysis. 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"Report of the Consultation on Child Abuse Prevention". http://www5.who.int/violence-injurm,ypreventionlmain.cftn ?s=0009 .Visited in May, 2002. 361 VIOLENCE, CRIME AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 362 CHAPTER VI LATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE THE OBSTACLES AND THE ISSUES CARLOS STRASSER i t CARLOS STRASSER INTRODUCTION Always sensible to both theory and experience, Giovanni Sartori wrote a few years ago the sharp sentence "Institutions and constitutions cannot perform miracles. But good governments are hardly possible without good government instruments"(1994:8). On the same subject, the summary chapter of an important book on political reforms in Latin America concludes, in a vein that is also found in a score of papers in recent years: "(T)he consideration on how to improve the operation of democracy should not be treated as something subordinated or subsequent to the processes of economic policy changes. Rather, the ultimate success of such efforts is deeply dependent on the development of legitimate democratic institutions that adequately represent citizens, hold public officials accountable, reinforce efficiency and uphold the rule of law". And then, in the same sense, "it is increasingly understood that the broader effort of modernizing the State and the institutions, which has been identified as the key to the region's social and economic development, cannot be successful without simultaneous progress in the quality of democratic governance. The predictability and soundness of the regulatory and policy framework, the guarantees for property rights and the enforcement of contracts, effective and equitable investments in the health and education of citizens and in infrastructure are all vital 365 LATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE conditions of sustained investment and balanced development. But creating this environment for growth", the authors insist, requires all of the above (M. Pyne et al. 2002:xi. My re-translation back to English). Today there seems to be an extended and growing academic as well as political consensus on what the two quotations assertl. This is regularly illustrated both in academic publications and in the periodical documents of the main international organizations: UNDP, World Bank, IDB, ECLAC itself, even if they each have their different nuances (see N. Rabotnikof, 1999). Beneath such differences, however, there continue to exist some basic approaches that have currently become broadly extended2. The main one would be that pointed out by J.Williamson, in the sense that nowadays our attention should shift to "strengthening a series of key State institutions, the efficient functioning of which is important for rapid and/or equitable growth" (1997: 56). But in the above there is one issue that remains in the shadows, and that is the one we are concerned with. Be it to fight against poverty or, in our case, with the purpose of effecting political changes or reforms and institutional engineering or programs in Latin America, the approaches of more than a few respectable and respected papers look rather lightly at the concepts, the theories, more generally: at the frameworks of understanding. Also in part, but stemming from the same roots, at the experiences in implementing programs (their outcomes) or the appreciation and learning derived from such experiences in Latin America, or the consideration of the conditions of possibility and the possibility of such conditions in the area, i.e. the "hard" realities existing in the same -political, social economic, cultural, historical. An example of these: the web of power in definitely I Several authors go further. For example: "The State reform, a process demanded from multiple fronts, also has multiple connotations. However, some basic consensus begin to gradually emerge. One is that, under the new historical conditions, the State needs to renew its own institutionality to be better able to serve to the uplifting of society, and, ultimately, to social economic development. Another basic consensus is that, for this purpose, it is necessary for the State apparatus to become truly public and also that the public space should not be limited to the State" (Bresser Pereira and Cunill Grau, 1998:17). But we will dwell on this below, especially in chapter 11. 2 Korzeniewicz and Smith even note, "Although their precise formulation is quite different, some close, unsuspected and surprising parallels may be observed between the reconstructed post- cold war discourse of the left and the issues, strategies and polices advocated by the technocrats of the multilateral institutions" (2000:409). 366 CARLOS STRASSER class societies with their power relationships, the web of traditions and cultural identities, and so on. There is thus a lot which may be crucial and, more than once, taken for granted when not altogether disregarded. Whence, following the lack of great success of such approaches, it is not certain that it will suffice to recondition them by incorporating successive amendments and additions, equivalent to what in the theory of science is called "ad hoc clauses", clauses that, in the end, have the purpose of maintaining the working hypotheses3. My assumption is that we have to go deeper, at least intellectually. At this point in time the observation is particularly relevant, following so much knowledge and trial & error accumulated in academia and in practice after (if we count as from the Alliance for Progress) decades of studies, proposals and endeavors pro-democracy or pro-equality, with some good results and some progress, now above all in the political and macroeconomic order, but progress that is not always homogeneous nor sustained and has not even been secured and, even worst, with so many resounding failures and horrendous poverty, evident to the naked eye4. To go further, there is even no lack of impressive and highly sophisticated technical studies on the matter which, from a purely scientific point of view (I mean: beyond the frameworks that every point of view implies in our disciplines) are, however, unacceptable. It is dramatic to observe that some come from regional institutions that are powerful and well endowed in so many senses5. 3 In this sense, one author says: "Both the Washington neoconsensus as the preceding one are still marked by the hypothesis of modernization theories (0) The objective of 'second generation reforms' is to deepen, complete and correct the insufficiencies of 'first generation' market reforms (0) The emphasis continues to be placed on the State's efficiency and the effectiveness of public policies rather than on the legitimacy of the State and the responsiveness of public policies to citizen's demands, in particular to the demands of the disadvantaged (°) It is not an altemative to the preceding one, but rather a continuation°" (C. Santiso, 2001.) 4 For a useful comprehensive critical review of the successive approaches, and their applications or developments as well as their results (although mainly centered on social policies, but not only, and partly on the Argentine experience, but not uniquely), see Cardarelli and Rosenfeld, chapter 1 (1998). 5 1 will venture to mention specifically the 1999 IDB Report "America Latina frente a la Desigualdad", coordinated by Ricardo Hausman, at that time IDB Chief Economist. I made its critique in Strasser (1999) pages 144-153 (with footnotes in pages 185-187) and pages 29-30. On the subject of international agencies and their reports or studies and policies, it is also possible to refer to Carlos M. Vilas (2000), who, in a more general and comprehensive manner but likewise and in any case specifically, made a critical analysis of those from the World Bank in the last decade of the 20th Century. Similarly, see D.Tussie's compilations (1997 and 2001), which include the IDB. 367 LATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE To date, a modicum of precaution already suggests that it would be convenient to once again situate or, in any case, situate perhaps anew the major substantive issue that concerns us: a democracy for Latin America. Capable of providing for its economic and social development, one that in turn points towards and is shored up by growth (a sufficiently stable growth) to provide for a greater prosperity and dignity, greater equality and equity, greater material and spiritual well-being for its people, uplifting them to levels at least decent or morally satisfactory. Something which about half of its inhabitants, to say the least, currently lack. Now, ours is an attempt, an effort in that sense, an attempt to dive below the surface and see if something is found that needs to be considered that is not being sufficiently considered. Or that, when it happens to be, is treated more like a "problem" to be solved than in terms of a densely interweaved and truly hard datum of Latin American reality. The enquiry to which we point will in the end hinge on the following: When in Latin America we face realities that afford lamentations and thus we say "It is necessary to act in this regard", How far are we ready to go and, most particularly, how far is it really possible to go? This is a key question. Yet it requires, in turn, previously deciphering which are exactly the challenges and the threats or, more generally, the main obstacles to democracy in Latin America; and in due course it then becomes an inquiry on whether such key issues can be overcome and, if so, how. Nothing about this will, however, obtain an answer as required if, again, on the way we fail to revisit as much as necessary those data and levels which are basic. The ones we will underline here are essentially political, as seen from political theory; there we are headed. The essential concepts The trouble with the literature that is more widely disseminated and en vogue nowadays would not so much dwell in the definition of its concepts, not even the scarce ones that are fundamental here. While it is too certain that some are not always made explicit, it is also true that they are quite consolidated and may perhaps be taken for granted. 368 CARLOS STRASSER To start with, I am referring to expressions such as democracy, governability, governance, which despite all the debates always possible -from the very old to the brand new- currently appear to be quite cutout and pretty well established, even if sometimes silenced. However, for consistency purposes, here it is important to make these concepts explicit. We understand by democracy what is also understood as such, typically, by two renowned and already classical authors such as Norberto Bobbio and Robert A. Dahl6. Said in my own words: as a government regime and a system of political procedures ultimately based on the principles of popular sovereignty and individual freedoms, rights and guaranties set by the Constitution; i.e. as a two headed body that needs and simultaneously uses its two heads: Majority and Constitution. Democracy (a liberal democracy) is then, by definition, a government regime based on the two above principles, but then, and also by definition, now of regime, it necessarily is a series of fundamental procedures and institutions. As for those that are characteristic of it, their best enunciation -so well known- is that provided by Dahl, who counts seven. We may briefly summarize them as follows: decisions are made by elected and periodically reelected or replaced officials / by means of free elections / in which all adults vote / who, in turn, can all of them stand for public office and attain it. / All citizens enjoy freedom of expression / as well as access to diverse and non monopoly sources of information / and the right to form independent associations, including those of a political nature (Dahl, 1991: 280-281). A different question, of course, is the previous or concomitant factors for democracy (thus conceptualized) to be or to become reality. It is on the lack or the presence and the mode of presence or, as the 6 Bobbio (1985), Dahl (1991). In other contexts, for other issues, I would add to their definitions what emerges for the liberal-democratic tradition (in which Dahl and Bobbio are inscribed) from that which is implied in the republican tradition as may be reconstructed following the studies by Q. Skinner, H. Baron, D. Waley, J.G.A. Pocock, F Meinecke and others (P. Pettit or H. B&jar, closer to us). with its emphasis on self government, a collective or common good, civic virtue, a committed and active citizenry, equality and patriotism, etc. But at this point I do not wish to complicate the discussion to which this paper is devoted. 369 LATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE case may be, the combination and the balance of such "conditions of possibility" (political, social, economic, cultural, historic, international) that in turn depends, country by country, the very existence as well as the type or the degree as well as the more specific traits of existence of democracy, its limits and precariousness. This distinction at three levels amongst a) the concept, b) the actual conditions of possibility of that which is conceptualized, and c) the empirical types and degrees of what is conceptualized: democracy, is fundamental and should be rigorously maintained. Only this can prevent such disputes and confusions of so little use as the eternal one between "formal democracy" and "substantive democracy" that, so inappropriately, has regularly taken place at the level of the concept yet mixing a and b and c -needlessly, to be sure. In concept, at least in the first and classical understanding, democracy is political and single; what it designates, however, either exists or does not exist in reality according to the context, the contexts; and, if it does, it exists in various subtypes and degrees, be it in one form or another and to a greater or lesser extent (Strasser, 1990/91). If desired, those contexts can also be called "democratic". But, in any case, strictly they are para-democratic. As for governability, the term simply expresses that a given political regime is capable (and shows itself capable) of absorbing the major social conflicts or conflicts of interest present in society, or rather of containing an eventual social indiscipline, while it configures, formulates and applies with effect its government decisions through time. Although there are many definitions of governability, ours does violence to none and instead recovers the essence of most, if not all7. Now, democratic governability means that the government has effective command over society by means of the democratic regime itself. 7 Some useful analyses and schematics, in this respect, in A. Camou (2001) and C. Sojo (2001). For an introduction to the history of the various ideological and theoretical understandings, see D.H. Corr6chano (2000). 370 CARLOS STRASSER Governance is a term that does not translate easily into Spanish; it is usually written as gobernaci6n, which has previous meanings, or gobernancia or gobernanza, a neologism that has finally been accepted by the Spanish Royal Academy. Beyond that and more importantly, it is not easy, either, to demarcate its meaning, which varies from source to source8. Essentially, however, we propose that the term refers to a form of government complementary of the regime established by the Constitution, in our case the democratic regime. In fact, the complement is just that, perhaps also a refinement in the operation of the regime, but no substitute. Of course it should not necessarily be one, as it is sometimes seemingly suggested. If we follow the drift or the specifications that the concept had over time, the idea of governance was readjusted. First it was (a) that through it the government leads, and then (b) that through it the government incorporates -now in a less hierarchical, more horizontal as well as more decentralized or less concentrated manner, with voice and sometimes with vote- various subjects and sectors or organizations even of a private, or non governmental, nature in the general process and/or in various defined processes of agreeing, formulating and implementing public decisions (R. Maintz: 2000). The reference was particularized on groups or organizations (and the networks thereof) such as, for example, the NGOs or other associations of the so called "third sector", sometimes in cooperation with international groups and agencies, or with the same associations of business or labor as after the Second World War, or even much before (beginnings of the 20th Century), with which this three band game baptized as "neocorporatism" by P. C. Schmitter and G. Lehmbruch (1979) was established in parallel to the oficial one. Precisely. "Neo-corporatism", so extensively considered in the literature since the 1970's until early in the 1990's, today has perhaps become included in the very idea of governance. For "governance" 8 Compare the development of the concept and theory of govemance in R. Maintz (2000). Also, International Social Science Journal, number 155 devoted to "Govemance", especially the articles by G. Stoker, B. Jessop and C.H. de Alcantara. Stocker's article in particular, breaks out and develops with precision the five major aspects in the ultimate and more refined conceptualization of govemance (p. 18). See also Cerrnllo (200 1); although slightly confusing, it presents a review of the various senses of the concept in the documents and publications of different national and intemational organizations. 371 LATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE too, as a more general mode and a set of mechanisms associated to the constitutional regime -when not seeped into it-, is already assumed to "follow" or else to cooperate with the government for its (the goverment's) own ends, e.g in the shaping or the implementing of public policies, as well as concerning the governability of the social system itself. In fact, the emergence of it, first empirical and then conceptual, was subsequent to the increased novelty & complexity and the multiplication of actors & issues in the agendas over the last decades. That is, during the period of transition from the social State to the market State, a shift that already at mid course turned out not to be precisely linear or lacking learning and corsi e recorsi with regard to processes such as, e.g., the administrative decentralizations and the so called "devolutions" to civil society. However, it must be noted that, if on the one side governance and its actors can simultaneously contribute to (i) governability and (ii) the lightening of some burdens of the State, with the advantage of favoring a better or more immediate targeting on the objects of the activity, a greater social participation or control, and a more immediate and increased transparency / effectiveness / efficiency, on the other hand (iii) they tend towards a lower institutional fixity and a certain lack of coordination, or to the dilution of ultimate responsibilities, as well as to a legitimacy which is not always increased but rather and contradictorily is usually lessened. In this sense, different surveys indicate that the citizinery, in general, continues widely preferring to have the State itself as the agent of the public interest and responsible for it. Besides, (iv) such an attempt to governance is not infrequently shown to be without power precisely when the differences in interests and the internal disagreements put an end to the degree of self- regulation that would characterize it (G. Stoker, 1998). To conclude with the concept, let us say, in the end, that from an additional perspective -more "doctrinarian" in air than denotative- governance or, precisely, good governance would imply "really" legitimate governments that in turn provide room for social participation in terms of an array of public governmental and non- governmental actors, consensus or agreements between such parties and their bureaucracies and institutions, effective / efficient administrations, and transparency. Actors currently so relevant as the 372 CARLOS STRASSER multilateral lending agencies have adopted this point of view, especially the World Bank; initially as a means towards the greater success of the programs for the development of civil society and, lately, as a value and an end in itself (D. Tussie: 2000). In this sense, good governance can thus be considered to be inscribed within democratic governability and intended to assist it. I repeat, we will later return to these issues, particularly to the third one, that of governance9. In the meantime, let us go back to the Introduction at the point where we left off. In our criterion, this is required to later focus on the issue of this paper's title. If it is a rather long sort of detour, we have not managed nor wanted to abridge it more than we could: mere quotations or references would not suffice, nor would assumptions: the issue is basic and we must clarify it. RESHAPING (AND ADDING COMPLEXITY TO) THE ISSUE OF OBSTACLES In order to define the threats and challenges to democracy and also to governability and governance in Latin America, we can still refer to Manuel Alcantara (1998: 152). He groups these challenges in four broad categories. The "first one, of a strictly political nature, would comprise the relationships between the armed forces and the government, terrorism, the poor performance of the Judiciary, people's disinterest in politics and the conflicts between the Legislative and Executive Powers. The second category comprises socio-economic variables and the foreign debt. The third category has a clear social expression and is made up of crime, burglary and robbery and by strikes, work stoppages and labor conflicts. And, finally, the fourth category contemplates a socio-economic component that includes unemployment and extreme poverty." 9 See the section on Government, governability, governance and State, page 443 373 LATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE Here or for the time being, it is not necessary to dwell more on this four categories, which are sufficiently understandable. We would merely add that these threats and challenges are part of a more global concept, that of the obstacles to democracy -among which one cannot leave aside the political, social, economic and cultural processes and structures which are inherently opposed or even at conflict with the same. Some threats and challenges derive from them, it is obvious, or are clearly their "function"10 Just to refer to the first item in Alcantara's list, in modem Latin America a military coup has never failed to obtain an essential support by certain civic-economic and social sectors (or some other notorious, national or foreign associates & sponsors). By the same token, the "people's lack of interest in politics", today a universal issue, fails to refer to certain deep structures and modalities of contemporary politics. Consequently, such a disinterest is not only, nor maybe even mainly, about what is so repeatedly mentioned today: an extended corruption, weak political systems and parties, presidentialism, etc., but also and above all what lies behind them: the frameworks. Let us then return to them. In effect, let's begin by turning around Sartori's statement quoted at the beginning so that, without being at all unfaithful to the author, his sentence becomes "It will be difficult to have good governments without good government instruments. However, institutions and constitutions cannot make miracles". We haven't changed the meaning but we have shifted the emphasis. "Institutions cannot make miracles", that is the question. Neither can institutional programs. A democracy or a democratic govemability or a governance (democratic or not so democratic) successfully addressing the challenges, the threats and, more generally, the obstacles, not only depend, nor do they mainly depend, on the institutional programs or the institutions and what they allow de jure or de facto. Using methodological jargon, certain other "intervening" or "independent variables" are fundamental; in any case, an analysis of the issues has to be more systemic. It is with that purpose that in the following chapters we will try to introduce or reintroduce into our business some issues that are 10 See J. Prats Catala (1999) throughout the text. 374 CARLOS STRASSER not being considered today or are but little considered, and which we yet find to be of particular relevance. On the capability of politics In an early article, at the beginning of the 1970's, Claus Offe (1992, chapter 1) clearly described the conflict of rationales to which governments under a democratic regime are exposed in our times. On the one hand, they owe themselves to legal legitimacy; that is, to that which since late modernity constitutes their main source of authority, as Max Weber archetypically presented it. On the other hand, and increasingly since the emergence of mass societies between the 19th and the 20th Century, they need to respond effectively to the demands of their constituencies, multiplied and in continuous reproduction in democratic countries. One and the other rationale, or the legitimacy of origin and the legitimacy of exercise, are usually in tension and, more than a few times, force governments to bend in favor of one to the detriment of the other. The conflict can only be overcome by an active search of sufficient social consensus with the purpose of getting around the crossroad, something which implies a definite political action (designed to win the coalitional support of some actors or to mobilize citizens or public opinion) in order to cut this Gordian knot with one bias or the other and carry the government forward in favor of one line. The issue is connected with the theme of the capablity of politics. Regarding which we currently have a debate, if not new, one that has been reinstalled with new force in the academic agenda by the circumstances of the last span of the 20th Century and the turn to the 21st. The stands are well summarized in a recent book by Emilio De Ipola (2001). It deals, precisely, with what might be called the creativity of politics -as opposed to politics being dependent on a global or else broader system, an assumption under which politics, the other way round, would operate within already given margins and conditions, in a subordinated way, and without being able to make any big or specific difference. 375 LATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE According to our author, these are the polar metaphors to conceive of politics. It is understood as part of a system -or as a subsystem- functional to the whole, which makes it weak; an artifact with a moderate, limited, subsidiary capacity, such as, for example, in the theoretical perspective of Niklas Luhmann or in Marx's classical one ("superstructure"). Or it is understood to be autonomous and decisive, which leads to a strong idea of the political possibility, capable even of modifying an order by itself. De Ipola is sympathetic to those who, in recent years, wishing to confront the current hegemony of what is known as neo-liberalism and the proclaimed existence of a "single thought" (of an ultimately economicist root), have valued the laterl 1. In any case, what does it mean to say that politics can be "decisive"? Apparently it would only be so in the occasion of revolutions, clearly, or else in long term plans, if the urgencies of each moment make it possible to think of them; the ultimate example being the construction of the European Union, began in Robert Schuman's time -the Coal and Steel Community-, four or more decades ago. Or, finally, relating to isolated, closely determined issues and/or those of immediate effect. Outside these two extremes, both for other immediate fields or for the mid-term, political action, particularly that proceeding through the institutional pathways of contemporary democratic regimes, is in general lagging behind events and, if not, is limited to accompanying and con-figuring with its inputs the developments and movements driven in and by civil society, the market, the international order. Norbert Lechner appropriately says in this sense (1997:80), speaking of our day Latin America: "Politics no longer has the mid and long term available to leam and mature: it becomes exhausted in the here and now. Instead of formulating and deciding on social goals, political activity runs behind the facts and barely manages to react to external challenges". As it is obvious, when efforts are made to vindicate political possibilities, it is as a reaction to this. And in direct connection with that, to document and measure what we are saying, it is worthwhile 11 For example, in Europe, Ulrich Beck and Chantal Mouffe. also Zigmunt Bauman, in a more complex form; or, among the Latin Americans, Isidoro Cheresky. To start with, note the titles of some of their books: La Invencion de la Politica, El Retorno de lo Politico, La Busqueda de la Politica, La Innovacion Politica. However, De Ipola himself willingly admits the eventual complementation or altemance in validity and usefulness of the two approaches. But, in general, there undoubtedly exist inclinations in favor of one of them. in particular. 376 CARLOS STRASSER to move on to a comparative study of, precisely, the political process of State and economic reforms in five Latin American countries in the last fifteen years (Torre, 1998)12. In effect, in his introduction to the book, the author writes, almost as a profession of scientism thereon, what we will quote in extenso since everything included is of interest for our purposes. "Certainly, economic adversity was a powerful driver for structural adjustment. But although this was a necessary condition, in and of itself it wasn't enough to define when, how and to what extent the adjustment was to be done. To explain the contrasting modalities that structural adjustment has undertaken in the various countries, the analysis needs to be completed by introducing a second order of internal contextual factors (...) The consideration of political factors (...) brings to the forefront the central role played by government elites (...) in fact their perceptions, political interests, their resources are crucial inputs in the process whereby the types of reforms to be introduced are decided, when they shall start and how they will be implemented. Being crucial inputs does not mean to say they are the only inputs (...) But their gravitation, i.e., their effectiveness, is always mediated by the behavior of government elites. In other words, the political preferences both of the international community, business, workers and other interest groups do not necessarily enter directly into the reform process; rather, they are screened through the ideological orientations and the political calculations of the government leaders, who, in the end, are the ones who adopt and authorize the continuity or change ofpublic policies" (pages 14-15, added emphasis) 13. 12 The five countries are Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Colombia. The researches were conducted by a team, led by Oscar Altimir, which included B. Heredia, L. Sola, E.A. Gamarra and A. L6pez Restrepo. 13 Here, a propos of the expression "government leaders", and also for all of the following. it may be noted that the author refers to political leadership (or what more repeatedly he calls government elites) without distinguishing them from what might be called leaders or leadership in a stronger sense (as for example, does J. Prats Catala, op. cit., properly in our criterion). Furthermore, the author does not seem to pay special attention to the non-State public -and eventually political- area; but here we simply note it. 377 LATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE After noting some "restrictions" to the "active role of government elites" (the political rules of the game, the bureaucratic and technical capacities of the State's apparatus, the characteristics of sociopolitical alignments, the historical legacies and circumstances, the negotiations with the international agencies and foreign creditors and, finally, their own "skill to maneuver within them"), the author completes his point of view as follows: "In fact, the reform process is substantially a political operation, i.e. an operation with various outcomes depending on the contingent results provided by the government elites to the dilemmas posed by the pressures of economic adversity and by the political restrictions which circumscribe their freedom of action" (page 17-18, added emphasis). To end, the author further supports his approach by criticizing the "absolutely opposite view" which underlines "the limits of political will". Summing up and in synthesis, "it is necessary to reason from an analytical perspective contemplating the reference both to the limits that economic circumstances place and to the choices made by government leaders (0) countries move towards a common repertoire of market reforms -the effect of the restrictions- but (...) they cover that road at different speeds and with different scopes - the effect of the political choices made by the government leaders in each country-" (page 18-19, added emphasis). What we can extract at the end of this long quote is precisely something that the author recognizes more in fact (thanks to his rigueur or perhaps his professional superego) than what he more manifestly tries to highlight: the importance of politics and politicians. And what he grants turns out to be that politics is not exactly autonomous, "strong" as in one of De Ipola's metaphors, but rather and in any case -as we said before- a companion and, at the most, con-figurator of the processes, conditioned as it is in its possibilities by margins it does 378 CARLOS STRASSER not control and instead has to confront with resources that are limited and uneven. This, in spite of the apparent concentration of political power that would have supposedly occurred lately in Latin America (especially at the level of the executive powers) and so-called "decisionism" (M. Novaro, 2000; O'Donnell, 1997; Palermo and Novaro, 1996). Perhaps this was diverse in different periods of the 20th Century, for instance in the "golden era" Enrc Hobsbawm has referred to, that of the Welfare State (or Social State or, as it was dubbed in Latin America, the "national and popular" State) and in the wake of the fall of the authoritarian regimes. But it does not seem to be so lately. Finally, the government elites and government leaders, so often mentioned and underlined in the above examined work, had to, in the end, find the ways to move their countries towards "the common repertoire of market reforms" even if each supposedly did it at its own pace and speed, encountering more or less resistances and overcoming them (or not) with various degrees of skill, etc. The point is that the "intervening variables" which cut across leaderships and their initiative or competence, and that Torre himself indicates, do indeed make for a long list. Summing up and to close: today, in Latin America "the centrality of politics as the maximum instance of representation and leadership of society" is diluted (Lechner 1997: 76). For that reason, let us here and in the meantime note that today the very possibility of democratic governability and governance, as well as, consequently, the capacity of institutions themselves, has to be understood to be hindered in the region due to the weakness that we have just pointed out. And let us leave unsaid how much this is in turn multiplied by the current enormous discredit of political activity and politicians in Latin American public opinion14. A result of all this is the current "representation crisis" (in the terms of B. Manin, 1991 and M. Novaro, 1995) and the emergence of micro and subpolitics (in the sense of U. Beck, 1999). 14 The above is not new and anticipates what we will deal with below, but it is worthwhile noting some opinion polls that have measured it, e.g Latinobar6metro 2001. To start with, the one saying that 68% of the Latin American population does not trust "the people leading the country". Leaving the Presidency aside (a point to which we will at some point return in connection with the typical presidentialism of Latin America and that, even then, as an 379 LATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE On the ongoing political practices (and ideas) Continuing with the deeper obstacles to democracy in Latin America, we now move, precisely, into the terrain of political practice, in three dimensions: the regime itself, the political class, and the citizens. - On Democracy The political regime prevailing in Latin America is not exactly one corresponding to our definition above: it includes democracy up to a point, but is in no way exhausted in it. It is a mixed form of government combining diverse regimes in the strict sense of the word. On the other hand, the democratic component of the whole is a subtype of democracy that from a theoretical-political perspective can be deciphered as "representative government", though not in the ordinary positive way but in that of a circumscribed, limited democracy, of a "representing government" and a "represented democracy". Lets go step by step. On the one hand, other forms of government coexist and are interwoven with democracy; what we ordinarily call democracy; and this is so in variable or alternative ways, depending on the country, the time, the cycle, each form having a greater or lesser weight. If the legitimacy that predominates is in any case, normally, the democratic one, which of course helps to the stability of the regime, the effective regime is in itself mixed and internally variable. Now: the other forms of government that coexist and are sometimes fused with democracy (and confused with it) are, in the strict meaning of each term, oligarchy -both in the old Aristotelian sense as in the institution does not merit over 39% of confidence), the population's confidence in the national Congress and the political parties stands, respectively, at the general average of 24 and 19%. Six countries out of a total of seventeen rank their confidence in Parliament in the range of 9 to 18% and another eight countries, from 23 to 25% (the exceptions: Costa Rica with 29, Chile with 33 and Venezuela with 37%. Uruguay tops at 45%). Moreover, I out of every 2 (!) inhabitants of Latin America believes there can be democracy without Congress and without parties. No suspicion should be harbored in this sense on the opinions as if stemming from any rampant populist democratism since, according to other tables, out of these same Latin Americans who, also one out of every two (!) prefer democracy as a political regime, barely 4% believes that its most important characteristic is that democracy is "the govemment of the majority" and only 6%, on the other hand, thinks that democracy means "govemment by and for the people" or, 13%, "equality". 380 CARLOS STRASSER more modem Michelsian one-, bureaucracy, in the way feared by Weber, technocracy, particracy, and neocorporatism15. What we ordinarily and more plainly call democracy is then, in fact, a composite of the democratic regime and these other five regimes. A composite in which -with greater or lesser stability or variability- some of them usually predominates, and not necessarily the one more properly called democratic. The way this works empirically needs to be considered on a case by case basis, and also according to periods. But it is usual in Latin America (and not without existence elsewhere). On the other hand, let's anticipate it, the democratic element of the mixed regime is, in turn, more one of a "representing" than a "representative government" (RG). In a sense that -if we look at political theory- was perhaps inaugurated by James Madison when he wrote that a representative government is "the first thing that distinguishes it from democracy" (The Federalist, x); something which makes it possible to understand that, in designing the government of his country, the then new United States, based on the popular election of authorities but successively divided into the federation and the states, and in each of them into three powers, this division and the whole system of checks and balances was not only and not even drawn, perhaps, so much to prevent a concentration of political power in some of the three branches as intended to impede the formation of majorities capable of confronting in a "factious" manner the central federal power or gaining the upper hand on minorities and private property. Alexander Hamilton, who in turn considered the RG "a major political invention" (The Federalist, viii) interpreted it and employed it as the more or less republican mode of creating a powerful Union rather than as an instrument of the people's will, under the 15 Forthe definitions, see Strasser ( 1990). Offe and Schmitter (1995) offeran analysis that partially follows the same direction but is more extended and comprehensive, with references to comparative processes. Their work draws a distinction between intrinsic factors "from the top down" (including veto powers on democratically elected government officials: oligarchic, technocratic, and others) and "from the bottom up" (that, on my part, I had already included outside the mixed regime, e.g. citizens demobilization) and extrinsic ones, fundamentally cut backs on the sovereignty of the States (also recognized by me in what might be called the entourage of the regime itself). 381 LATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE assumption that it would be the former, more than the latter, the one that would provide the population with its greatest welfare and security in the future (L. Banning, 1978; S.S. Wolin, 1983, 1989; B. Manin, 1994). Under this scheme "the government is delegated onto a small number of citizens elected by the rest". They (I am quoting Madison, idem, now in my own but faithful synthesis) in their wisdom will know, better than the people, how to establish the true public interest. This is not too far from the thinking on the RG, a few years later, in France, according to the famous pens of Madame de Stael and Benjamin Constant, for whom the precondition for the recovery of the republican order that had been so rapidly distorted there was making the same clear distinction between governing and governed and forgetting "popular sovereignty". Years later, Guizot and the "doctrinarians" followed in their footsteps. About them it is enough to recall here that they were appalled by the populace and favored a censitaire voting (F. Furet, 1993; D. Roldan, 1998). Thus, the RG has its linage. But in Latin America, what is particularly the case is that the linage is current, it is not history but a living tradition and, on top of it, that in the midst of the operating mixed regime, de-democratization has ways of becoming rampant between election and election. The political division of work consecrated by the RG, according to which the representatives do not respond to, but rather lead the people thanks to their very election to govern it, is compounded with the multiplier of the other five forms of government; this, since -due to the lack of an extended democratic consolidation or, the other way round, as a result of democracy having been suspended so many times and having only recently been recovered, but with a limited social scope except on election days- they all cross the regime bare-faced. The ultimate result is that the existing Latin American political order resides in a series of connections and commitments that (plus or minor existing civil liberties and rights) contains citizens politically solely as the required electorate. And an order lacking the fundamental democratic ethos that is so extended in advanced countries, a difference that will never be excessively underlined. 382 CARLOS STRASSER -On the political class The Latin American political class (as in general, that of all of the West, but more specially) finds itself, currently, with a field of action that has become strongly restricted, in which it weights perhaps less than ever before. And this should not be confused with the fact that it is seen to be very much "in charge" and always obtaining benefits, perhaps more than before. What happens is that the environment now scarcely allows itself to be controlled or governed: it escapes rather than follows any decisions made. In this regard, and against what sometimes appears to be the case, maybe never before has been so real what Jean-Paul Sartre wrote from Europe decades ago, in the sense that history is produced by man but also by the rest of men. Or, according to believers, that (in the Spanish saying) "El hombre propone pero Dios dispone", "man proposes but God makes the decision". Beyond their dominions and immediate times (when not also regarding them), even the most powerful leaders or businessmen, with very few exceptions, perhaps, cannot anticipate today with too much certainty or confidence what will finally come out of what they intend and consequently order, say or do. To begin with, there are more than a few strong leaders or businessmen, each with his/her own idea, interest, degree of influence between determined and undetermined. Neither is there a lack of other actors and civil societies as numerous as robust as complex, or of subjects who are holders of the invoked legitimations, first the democratic one and next that of market liberalism; also, those ethnic, cultural, religious, etc. And capitals ranging from the immense to the small but uncountable exercising their independence earnestly and throughout planetary stock exchanges, twenty four hours a day. The world itself has today some six billion inhabitants, around two hundred sovereign states, uncountable agencies, organizations, treaties, laws related to them, agreements, and infinite relations. Summing up, it increasingly has become much too plural and out of possible control. In effect, this very competitive and open and not too manageable scenario is further compounded, on one end by the (at least more apparent) de-ideologization in course, up to the current venal 383 LATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE corruption; a picture that excites not only the most naked greedy political ambitions but, in general, simple "self-employed entrepreneurship". It is that and not precisely the large expansion and circulation of the media that is responsible for so much scandal of illicit financing or sale of favors and payoffs that we learn about day after day, of a born again patrimonialism that merges the public and the private, or confuses a party with the State or the Nation, which associates big corporations which those that become their "colonies" in the public administration, that decreases the number of those living for politics in contrast to those living from politics (and the fiscal budget). Corruption itself has become a culture, and few things are so resistant to change. In the end, too many leaders and politicians not only "do their own thing" more and more but are increasingly devoid of qualms and any bad conscience. They can take refuge in the behavior of another one more or less in sight, and of others, and the successively enlarged, multiplied, silently admitted, but standard behavior. This explains why, with parties currently having little ideology and program, alignments and discipline have become so surprisingly established. What is at stake is the individual career of each, and that career depends fundamentally on the peers, the organization16. A factious and corporatist alignment and discipline have extended with time. Thus, in the end, largely impotent, of poor use in the function in spite of their privileges, the political class does not cease to add causes for their loss of prestige and credit, a loss that has become incomparable to date, and makes it difficult or problematic to count very much with it for that and other purposes or projects, beginning with the governability and governance of Latin American countries17. 16 There are sufficient empirical studies in this respect. One of the most interesting ones lately and with a general bibliography is M. P. Jones (1997); see especially pages 197-198. 17 The other effects or projects will be mentioned below, in the following sections. Still, we leave here aside the periodical popularity polls of leaders that go up and down and more down than up; in any case, the whole finally fits into the picture. We also leave aside the issue of the "rebellion of the elites", or their lack of interest about what is collective, that has been reported by C. Lasch (1995) for the case of the U.S.A. but has its parallel in Latin America. 384 CARLOS STRASSER -On the Citizenry While much is said about increasing -above all on the need of increasing- citizenship, and beyond current academic debates confronting theories of "participatory democracy" and "deliberative democracy" 18, a defacto reality says on its part, with extreme clarity, how far Latin America (and not just Latin America) is from having much people not simply active in politics or moved by public issues, but simply interested in them. This is one of the harshest data we come across and, for the same reason, a great current concern. For example, Fernando Vallespin (2000:19) writes: "One of the thesis (of the book), which has not been able to avoid a certain underlying pessimism, is that today the solution to a good share of the political problems necessarily requires a greater involvement of citizens in the public field, because of their permanently critical and demanding attitude and, above all, for being willing to evaluate politics as another dimension of their personality and to act in consequence." Both the need and the objective are clear. But note what the author simultaneously asserts: he "has not managed to avoid a certain basic pessimism" in this respect. This is understandable, there are reasons for it. In today's world, and especially in Latin America, now in general under governments that are between "democratic", "mixed" and "representative"; after the experiences and the tragic ideological failures of the 20th Century, followed in turn by the decomposition of the Social State and the offensive of "neo-liberal" reforms and adjustments as well as the subsequently multiplied political skepticism and estrangement already commented together with the discredit of politicians, political parties, politics itself; in that world that, besides and specially has become "globalized", citizens barely feel and perform as such; we repeat, it is a fact. The multiplication, in the last decades, of "social struggles directed at attaining recognition for the ethnic, gender, sexual orientation and even the intergenerational right to a clean environment" (J. E. Castro, 1999) actually means a new and 18 See, in this respect, E. Hauptmann (2001). In passing, let's note that for the author, in any case, deliberative is included in participatory and is actually "less" not "more" than the other. 385 LATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE valuable way of participation or mobilization of different sectors, but never -or not yet amongst us, except in definitions elastically extended from the word's original and basic meaning- a manifestation of political citizenship properly. In this respect, it may at the most be a possible bridge towards it and, in the meantime, a sort of micro-politics and micro-citizenship still at its early stages. So that citizens barely feel and perform as such. And they can do so only with difficulty. At the extreme and using Zigmunt Bauman's words (2001: 12), there seems to be no "space for citizens except as consumers. Only in this form does the financial and commercial markets put up with them"1 9. In this sense, and to return to classical political theory, that explains and anticipates more than is usually granted, nobody as Adam Ferguson (so long ago and against his two friends of the Scottish Enlightenment, David Hume and Adam Smith) foresaw this course of development and, in spite of also sharing a favorable opinion of the civilizing advantages that the new urban and commercial society brought about ("the sweetness of trade" that Montesquieu had envisaged shortly before), warned about the imperative need of not abandoning but advocating strongly for civic virtue and a properly political government. Against the civic idleness resulting from the other discourse, from his republican stand Ferguson distrusted the government that could be spontaneously derived from the economy and thus infiltrate politics in a "clandestine" way; he feared as a consequence a regression, even the return to barbarity20. We are therefore at the verge of democracy without citizens; that is, non-democracy. And there are many characteristics and circumstances of contemporary society, let alone those of the last few decades and not thinking only of Latin America, which conspire from the start against an active citizenship proper, one politically involved and participating. What could be thought to be one more reason, precisely, to foster its existence. But, on the contrary, the work (in the relatively prosperous or better off countries / areas / social sectors) of 19 Some authors, however, celebrate the shift from citizen's sovereignty" to "consumer sovereignty". Namely, P. Saunders (1993). In Latin America, in any case, this doesn't go beyond the high and mid-middle classes. 20 For more on this issue, C. Strasser (1999: 60-63). Or, even better, a whole book by A. 0. Hirschman (1999). 386 CARLOS STRASSER the trends that were deciphered so precisely and acutely already by Tocqueville in Democracy in America, towards becoming engrossed with the growing production of individual wealth and welfare, or (in those that are less rich and even poor) the alienation in the struggle for life and subsistence that is now the subject of so many studies, do not find and cannot perhaps find anything sufficient to activate or reactivate a citizenship stricto sensui in one or the other scenario. In the first one the aspiration to conspicuous consumption and hedonism prevails, and the political framework is seen as a fixed datum, a political framework that -besides been felt to be rather distant and hardly modifiable- makes it almost bothersome to become informed, discuss or even go and vote21. In the second, "social citizenship" is the condition of political citizenship and it is crudely absent for many and, if not, then it's cracked; other large sectors practically have no time or energy or resources to distract and invest in this given framework or in political action: both seem remote, one apparently beyond hope of ammendment, the other many times little less than trumped, inoperant, useless. And in the two the issue of demand-overload on the State plays a role, for the State is almost always cornered by finance, so much so that some authors (e.g. Samuel Huntington, always quoted on this point) encourage and recommend the apathy of citizens, while others, in a more quiet way, breath relief because of their retraction. Now, in such a context, the question is whether it makes "sense" to pretend for these men and women to do and feel what they are and feel so little: true citizens; or to impose such an ideal on ourselves on the basis of good doctrine, and claim it from them. This context, the reality of Latin American nations and the contemporary world as they appear (such as reality is structured within each as well as between themselves, and moreover leveraged by the common emergence of globalization), makes such a demand scarcely feasible and credible. 21 An example may be what happened in Europe at the first round of the French presidential elections in April 2002, when for this reason Le Pen so unforeseeably won the right to ballotage. This unpleasant "surprise" served as the trigger that we later indicate is necessary (and irreplaceable) to activate the citizenry. In Latin America, consider the electoral abstention indexes and other data shown in Latinobarometro 2001 as mentioned here in various footnotes. 387 LATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE There is no doubt -based on a political ethics and theory more closely adhering to virtue, which is, of course, in abstract the healthiest one-: it is very well to ask for a real, active citizenship. What remains to be pondered is up to what point it can be effectively expected and to what extent it is reasonable to ceaselessly advocate its public convenience or its very need for a "good political life" today so distant not only from reality but also, apparently, from what is achievable. Except for the dangers inherent in renouncing to ideals and hopes. But, particularly since community-based and industrial-society identities and memberships began to break apart in ordinary life (the last decades of the 20th Century), what can be seen everywhere is that the civic population is commonly unable to weigh in the decision of anything that is globally important from the social point of view, as was somehow the case, after the Second World War, for a whole period. Not even capable (if you think of the majority) of deciding on anything personal if it s connected with the environment in which individuals live, only slightly beyond what is intimately private. Strictly speaking, they now do not hold in their hands the construction of a life "project" Such a project is fundamentally dependent on the market -if it is linked to it. Currently, each individual of the large social mass is either estranged or has been removed from practically any space of effective power: they are almost all at an unbreachable distance. If the public scenes they are forced to observe daily irritate individuals, and outrage them or mortify them, they in fact have almost no ordinary possibility but to feel impotent, to enter resignation or indifference as a psychological defense, to dwell on themselves, to become cynical and individualistic. In this situation, two or three havens remain open to each (certainly not to all), or two or three ways to perform as people: to obtain and enjoy strictly individual satisfactions of one type or another or, more limitedly, to join into consumerism, if they can or have the wherewithal; and/or practice some sort of "local" or single- issue kind of citizenships, normally rooted in the neighborhood, the school, sexuality, environmental pollution, even whale hunting. Most of the people practice or at least aspire to consumption and have in this respect an offering ad infinitum. And many, still, to gain some of the so many goods being offered, do not hesitate to corrupt themselves 388 CARLOS STRASSER little by little or at a large scale. Why wouldn't they, since from the "top" they get all too many examples. One way or the other, their degree of personal frustration and their frustration as citizens, or their anger, the frequent sensation of being nothing, are consequently deviated, sucked up, blinded: neutralized. And from discouragement they then shift to conformism, or to the loss or lack of political awareness. The very TV which now forms their fundamental link to the world reinforces the profile: it bombards them and distracts them and manipulates them ceaselessly, leaving almost nobody with the time or the capacity of knowing or becoming interested in knowing22. On some conditions and over determinations of the politico-cultural order If for some the authoritarian threat is currently lurking around the corner, at least in the meantime, and for some decades already, in Latin America we are living under more or less "democratic" regimes. In any case, such a fear is precisely related to the fact that they are rather less than more democratic -and rather less than more successful. We have seen, however, that right now, in Latin America the field of possibilities for politicians, political leaderships, political institutions (starting with governments), a democratic citizenship, is very sensibly restricted. On the other hand, let us recall, with regard to globalization (with its favorable and unfavorable consequences and opportunities), only what it is not redundant here to remember: the relative capitis diminutio suffered by the national states -particularly when penrpheral or less developed- within the existing international order and as compared to the G7 or the international agencies and the multinational corporations, with products in excess of the GDP of several of them brought together. Or as compared to the market, by its own "decision" and implementation, that of the State itself. 22 We are not saying that the public or audiences are merely passive: as well known and already underlined by so many authors, there is a two-wav street between the two faces of the printed page or the screen. We only highlight what in any case is undeniable: the manipulation of TV viewers and of general opinion, beyond the degree of success with which it is achieved. See, for example, J.Curran et. al. (1998). 389 LATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE But let us now look at other frameworks that need to be taken into account when thinking of political and social development strategies. Of the sort that are not usually included to the extent that would probably be required. -On genes and crossbreedings We now enter the field of sociocultural and sociopolitical conditions. In which different ideological "imports" (I do not mean it in any derogatory way but rather in a supposedly strict sense) hit one after another the compact culture deposited in the region over the three whole centuries of its formation. I say the Iberic culture, specially the Hispanic one. And that, beginning from the time when Spain "stood in Europe as a large edifice deja construit" (0. H. Green) and was "the most modem and developed State of its time" (R. Morse). Let's underline it: during that very long time, what took root in Spanish America23 was a solid and self assured culture, one clearly distinct from those other European cultures that were later constituted or reconstituted in exchanges with the scientific revolution, the protestant reform, humanism, thereafter the political revolution, free trade and industrialization. That culture merged the public and the private within a vision of the world that reconciliated, much more than imperium et sacerdotium, community with hierarchy, as well as power and the reason of State, simultaneously with a deep social conformity. To be sure, political sociology took it that this most formidable architecture was laid, on the other hand, on a definite State patrimonialism, pace Max Weber. Which therefore rested on an administrative machinery and its concomitant legalism and bureaucratism, the three of them well developed and connected with an effective government midway between paternalistic and authoritarian. It is thus understood that the whole assemblage was 23 For the time being I will leave aside the case of Brazil, the most different one in the region and the main country in it, which on the other hand belongs to Portuguese-America. As for the following, I especially refer to the very enlightening essays by R. Morse (1982, 1989). See also H. Wiarda (1997). 390 CARLOS STRASSER simultaneously a source of intense personalization of political and social relations, as well as of clientelism, privileges and sinecures naturally associated to the former. And, finally, a source of various subsequent forms of major and lesser chieftains, national, local, and overseas. Now, what is precisely the case is that such a web came as it stood to the new world: as a way of life or a cultural nationality rather closed to individual political autonomy. In it, on the contrary, the political individual was by nature a social specimen, a party only within the whole that signified and assumed it naturaliter Almost the opposite of the scene of the other America, the Northern one, so well depicted by Sarmiento in a famous paragraph: "...wherever ten Yankees meet, poor, beggarly, stupid, before setting an axe at the foot of the trees to build a cabin, they meet to lay out the basis of an association" (1954: Obras Completas, 334). In these other lands to the South, however, like in Spain, society was not "created" by a free and voluntary contract among the people, it was not subsequent to individuals, it was already given. "The difference with the Saxon colonies is radical" (0. Paz 1972: 93). Then, with Independence, a difficult process of change began. And, likewise, the above mentioned cultural "imports" took place. However, they happened in a succession, with each import overlaying on top of the other, though always within the existing frame. Thus, nothing ever resulted but from a crossing with the established forms of life or the socially established institutions and the "historical" rights of the people (E X. Guerra, 1989 and 1994). And, if different political fractions were formed, by more liberal or more conservative yet at the same time popular elites, the result was nevertheless a continuous national ideology partly unique, basic, though partly split. The differences are known (see, for example, J. L. Romero, 1967); what we recall, however, is that both shared the same foundations. Let us note it. This common flooring underlying them was and is still built with the aforementioned Hispanic and then hispano-criollo material, a material incorporated into each, even if certainly more solid in the case of the wide popular sectors and the democratism of the popular / populist variant than in the liberal one, for it holds with the former an evident degree of elective affinity based on the idea of the whole preceding the parts, the community and public spirit 391 LATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE controlling if not submitting the individual and the private dimension, the allegedly original consent by the people as the ultimate ratio, the association between the leadership and the popular mass as a mutual reference of one another, etc. Besides, from the time there was a "state", also by the exaltation of the figure and the role of the State itself. That is why, if liberal and demo-liberal forms, concepts and institutes in a more European or American fashion were received over time (for example, the modern political party and the general framework of public law in which it is inscribed: a Constitution in the manner of the modem Rule of Law, a Parliament and the division of powers, a representative system, the representation of majority and minorities through regulated elections, and others), in general they were received to be used instrumentally or even to be subordinated. Thus, at this point it will come as no surprise to say that even the more liberal version turned to lay on the same ground, as it still does. The most suggestive illustration, not too expected in doctrine, proceeds from liberalism Latin American style itself, with its marked traits of centralistic practices and institutions that are both paternalistic and authoritarian and linked to the privileged estates (i.e., aristocratic or oligarchic) and even, out of all things, State-dependent. A liberalism, therefore, that in spite of its rhetoric and even its ideological beliefs in the abstract, in truth was and still is little prone to pluralism and open competition, a liberalism preserver of sociopolitical structures that are only slowly and grudgingly transformed, and therefore not too inclined to political systems based on parties and operated by parties and citizens instead of the notables and the corporations. It is on that foundation, and cutting across the different variations, then, that the old tradition filtered the concepts received from liberalism, even demo-liberalism, or else from individualism and cultural privatism and, finally, the market ideology which is current today; that is, the various "imports" to which we referred above. Overlaid one over the other since the 19th century and the 20th. For better or for worse, but if not always disruptively, in fact mixturing with the local. And crossbreedings are always in tension, as we shall note below. It thus continued so, until this new turn of century and millennium. 392 CARLOS STRASSER At this point in history come the economic and fiscal crisis, the reforms, globalization, and the latest of the "impacts". And with them a tension between culture / political culture, cultural identities and types of citizenship that is not new, as has been said, but that now appears to be overcharged. What it reveals more than ever, seen from the tradition impacted is that in the Hispanic (I dare here extend to Ibero or Latin) America, along one lane we see a mute process of social cultural dis-integration, simultaneous with any other processes underway24. What I mean to say (going back, by the way, to an issue previously dealt with), is that in this form the universal thesis of the com-position of a society by politics and even by the State, and the, by axiomatic definition, very unification or integration goal of political action, appear to be even more severely challenged in today Latin America. The culmination of it all has been the last historical tranche. The penetration (the impact) of the most recent ideological "import", neoliberalism, has been socially so strong, at least in some urban middle classes that accommodated it, not to mention the upper classes, as, after some years of liberalizations and reforms with social results visibly so little satisfactory and even catastrophic, not only rather devastating, but even schizophrenic. All of this followed by the (at least nostalgic) invocation to a return of the State to its true role. 24 Time and, in particular, space are short to develop it here. We shall merely add, consequently, that the process seems what could in part be fusion and confusion at the national scale but according to the social sectors, of the two first (over three: the third one is the "moralist") political cultures that R. D. Putmam (2000) recognizes for various states or series of states in the US according to all his research and also continuing the studies by Daniel Elazar that he quotes: one, traditionalist, in which politics tends to be dominated by innovation resistant elites, and the other, individualistic, where it is directed by the supporters of economic growth. except that one and the other feature low or moderate "social capital". However, this is neither the place to outline the differences simultaneously contained there, nor those between the regions with higher or greater "civism" thus categorized according to another book by the same Putnam (1993), now with regard to Italy. 393 LATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE -Political consequences of the same In the lengthy conformation of these countries, the Spanish American model and ideology were essentially "incorporators". They prided themselves of being and continued being such over time and the historical additions and enmeshments of all sorts. It does not matter if, in reality, many times they operated in a haphazard or even savage way, because even then they were seen to be (indirectly) reaffirming this discourse. By the same token, the State's image and role, the full and protagonic role corresponding to that model and ideology consecrated during all the centuries since the Conquest and until very shortly, were always (more or less far from attaining it) proposed to be integrators, this in one way or another, below or above the conformities and unconformities with their lines of action and specific policies. Besides, as regard the image for the bulk of the popular sectors and even a large part of the middle sectors, the state ("the State"), below citizenships or above party affiliations, always meant orientation as well as protection-except, of course, there where the State did not reach, which is where it now reaches even less. Let me be clear, that is a discourse, an ideology, although certainly an extended one. On the other hand, there is nothing to deny that the current de-structuring / restructuring of the State, the so called reforms of the State, were in their way necessary and inevitable, even timely. We are just looking at the counterparts and beyond the appearances. Greater monetary stability, more efficient (also more expensive) privatized utilities, reduced state interferences and regulations on economic activity, sounder fiscal accounts and less deficit ridden public budgets, the growth (albeit sometimes erratic) of the gross product and foreign trade or investments, etc., even with all the differences existing among the various countries, indicate evolutions that are positive in themselves. Some, such as the drop in inflation, are even enjoyed by "most everybody". Now, if entire social sectors have simultaneously been separated -as they have been and still are- from society and the market itself, the case is that the State, the good old State, comes to be seen by the majority as the executor of such a "plan" and then as "washing its hands". Of course, it is not surprising that other actors upward in the 394 CARLOS STRASSER social scale or abroad may wash them. What does puzzle, in this America, is for "the State" be washing its hands, while, to make matters worse (and to continue with popular expressions) its top leaders tend to "lick their fingers" shamelessly: among them corruption and "self employment" are the order of the day and public and notorious. Thus, it turns to be also unexpected that "upstairs" so many traditions, mores, practices and institutions (political and social) are abandoned that, because so deeply rooted and naturally functional, nevertheless do not stop operating. Hence, what the new ideological preaching finally introduces, even when forcing inevitable adaptations, is a good amount of confusion and uncertainty about the frameworks, no less than a variety of legitimations available to various actors on an opportunistic or arbitrary basis. This, to the same extent as, consequently, a greater fragility or perhaps instability of the democratic political regimes in terms of sets of known values/rules which are collectively shared and permanently at play; and also of customs, "acquired rights" and expectations according to what a classic who is not my greatest favorite but had the most acute sense for these things called "historic prescriptions"25. Once again, I do not want to be misunderstood. I am not adhering to anything nor, insofar as possible, making value judgments, except those that are almost universal. Simply and basically, I try to describe. Besides, and for certain, it is not the Rule of Law that is here at issue. Absolutely not, the Rule of Law is out of the question, there is no other option, and Latin America is to date much more aware on the matter of liberties and guarantees. What I am trying to say is, only, that implants, when they are such, or impositions, in general, have been and are of little use. For example, that -beyond its actual insufficiencies or impotencies- a State that on top of it becomes weak or vaporous engages reality, social need and Latin American tradition with difficulty. Also, that a "strong" and ubiquitous State 25 1 am referring obviously, to Edmond Burke. 395 LATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE is not necessarily antidemocratic: here we are far from the remote contradiction in terms that the expression Democratic State means in itself (to the extent that "State" is in political science synonymous with "a system of domination" whereas "democracy" means self government by the people, something which is opposed to all and any political domination)26. And so on and so forth. From the presidentialism that so many competent but also culturally conditioned political scientists criticize, up to the even more severely attacked trade union "corporatism", and including the assistencial policies decided by a welfare state that, it is thought, should above all and before anything else be concerned with balancing the budget27. Summing up. On one side, some core old and persistent or derived elements of the Latin American political culture, particularly at the level of the broad popular sectors, are not too much attuned to the ethos of any "inorganic" individualism. Or with a politics / political practice of the liberal doctrinarian type latent instead in many proposals and initiatives that end up being imposed from the top down, even though they pursue or say they pursue the opposite; that is, the promotion of society, to which end it would first be necessary to agree with it. On the other, that the State, its presence, its imprint, its action, are in general so much legitimated in Latin America 26 Certainly, in the last few years there have been reactions -specially from and for the implementation of so called "second generation reforms"- warning of the need of a State in no way "minimal" (although, in view of the [still?] prevailing opinion, with great care to prevent appearing as a straightforward defense of the State). For instance, see L. C. Bresser Pereira (1997). 27 On the so hardly criticized presidentialism literature is very abundant, but so is now becoming the criticism of it (see, for instance, the recent comments, not less refined for being general, of J. Lanzaro (2000), who also elaborates on the various types of presidentialism. On this matter, too, a recent study (Mello Grohmann, 2001) underlines that in most Latin American countries the Legislative Power has, in the end, a strong weight vis-a-vis the Executive. As for neocorporatist trade unionism, I hope I do not need to say that I am not protecting the corrupt bosses and union leaderships that afflict so much the Latin American workers movement. 396 CARLOS STRASSER (notwithstanding the innumerable criticisms it has received and continues to receive for all concepts because, precisely, so much is expected of it in terms of what is due) as they are, consequently, expected by the people and hard to replace28. So far, five fundamental, political and cultural given elements. What is their incidence? We will see in the following section. THE CIRCLE OF REALITY, POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE In spite of its relative capitis diminutio mentioned before, today the nation-States continue being the main agents of politics -though not the only ones- in each country and internationally (see, among others, A. Giddens: 1999). And in Latin America's cultural geology, "the State" is still the inescapable center of reference, always expected to represent, lead and protect or safeguard society. However, and summarizing, in parallel it is the case that (i) politics as such has now a weak and subordinated capacity; (ii) democracy is, strictly speaking, more a "representative government" in part confiscated, hence a rather "representing" government, than a properly democratic one; and moreover a government inscribed in a truly mixed regime, within which democracy as a component does not necessarily prevail; that (iii) the political class seems to be adrift in 28 Paragraph 3 ending here has made no reference, in any of its two parts, to the indigenous political cultures or populations of Latin America (I am particularly thinking of those of Mexico. Guatemala and the Andean countries, where they have been and are patent in their relevance). A River Plate nationality or the consequent ignorance of the author on this matter are surely responsible for it. But at this point, I want to leave for the record that (as far as I know) what was said in the previous section comprises them equally in the rationales and the conclusions drawn throughout it. The reason is that based on their origin, and as a result of their forced incorporation into the Hispanic-criollo order, and even because of their integration with segregation, also these populations were identified with simultaneous community and hierarchical feelings, as in the case of the Precolombian Aztec or Inca State and a posteriori. Apart from that, naturally the indigenous identity constitutes an added dimension to be taken into account, so we are in debt in this second aspect. 397 LATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE events and simultaneously so engrossed in its personal interests or careers as lacking prestige and certainly credit; (iv) citizenship is ebbing and skeptical, disinterested, not only as a response to poverty, which is always inimical to it, but because governments are perceived to be at a long distance, on the one hand, and given some -more general- contemporary spirit and trends of development, on the other29. This context is compounded with other given facts. (v) One is -if not the "end of ideology" or the "end of history"- the sort of ideological blackout we are going through following that true festival of ideologies that was most of the 20th century, a festival that developed so horrendously and ended so badly, as we all know, until the end of the Cold War and authoritarisms. (vi) Another, that coincides with the said blackout, is divided into, on one hand, the lack of actuality and possibility of the consecrated (not naive, and in any case strong) ideas of both republic and democracy, today barely valid in terms of norms, or perhaps, even worse, as utopias in the derogatory sense of the word, and, on the other, the subsequent and quasi universal narrowing of the party-ideological range, symbolized by some with the expression the Republic of the center All of which, in the end, makes it difficult to imagine a broad or sustained mobilization or political activism of anybody for anything. Moreover, the social situation does not contribute in this respect; on the contrary, pushing in general, as it does -leaving aside human rights organizations and different associations or movements- towards individualism, isolation, fragmentation, marginality, insecurity, crime, fear30. (vii) If we further underline the crisis of the State (its diminished resources, institutional disftinctionality in so many respects, growing impotency) and the consequent weakening of the political-party system, action and participation are currently seen to be increasingly 29 An example of one and the other, Latinobarometro 2001 reports (i) that in 15 out of 17 Latin American countries, "satisfaction with democracy" ranges between 10 and 41%, with an average of 25 percent, even lower than in Africa, and (ii) for Latin American opinion, economic development is twice as "important" as democracy (51 versus 25 percent). 30 On the social and individual subjectivity of the current times (partly centered on Chile but more generally in Latin America) see N. Lechner (2000). Regarding Europe, the polisemic expression Unsicherheit :uncertainty, insecurity, unprotection by Z. Bauman (2001). 398 CARLOS STRASSER embodied in non-State actors as those recently set aside, sectoral and thematically limited; even if it is true, however, that several among them have at the same time configured networks, given rise to the so called third sector and also to the issue of governance itself as, in our definition, a form of government complementing the constitutional political regime, when not a new public mode -or perhaps the theory of a new public mode- of the government of society by the State and/or by itself, at least in some respects. Now, these latest phenomena have brought about a sort of new "correct" school of thought as well as high expectations, correlative to the experiences accumulated during the 20th century (and already since the final part of the 19th) a propos the insufficiencies of the States and the market to govern society and its development by themselves. What probably escapes this school, however, is the extent to which the current "third sector" and governance itself are crossed with the scenario itself and the situation of the necessary counterparts within it. But let us set our bearings: this experience went through several stages before arriving at this point. The first one (the usual narrations tend today to forget it because they focus only on the most recent) made the State the fundamental factor of national consolidation, modernization and integration, for in these countries economic growth was being strongly sponsored by the market and it was just that state & market then coincided and formed a tandem favored by (as may be the case) the elites and/or oligarchies in charge at the time, probably the first to note the need for State support actions in favor of trade and economic development. The second advocated, in different ways in the period between the two world wars and after the Second one, for a more absolute and absorbent role by the State: the state as regulator, planner, director, involved in business and also now factor or bene- factor of the social and political integration of the whole or the majority of society, a society previously consolidated as a nation (to the extent this had effectively been so)3 1. The third stage came after the previous model had become fiscally and financially depleted with the economic stagnation and social crisis that followed, and gave way 31 Certainly, in some countries such integration remains outstanding specially with regards with the indigenous population. 399 LATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE to the reign of the market (perhaps with the resigned "acceptance" but also the decisive cooperation of the State itself) or to the "first generation" neoliberal reforms of the 1980's and early 90's. That is, to the deregulations, privatizations, in general: liberalizations. These in turn had contradictory consequences (economic, specially macroeconomic, on one side, and social, on the other) and insufficient effects or results, eventually -if at all- attainable in excessively "long term" periods from the point of view of the interested parties or the population as a whole. Something that marks the beginning of the fourth stage and the "second generation" reforms (Naim, 1994; Burki and Perri, 1998). In this, the current stage, the givens are 1) that the market proves itself once again insufficient; far from enough, and 2) the State accelerates its most recent degree of institutional powerlessness; on top of it, it looks not only more co-opted and/or suspected or resisted by various major economic actors but, besides, weakened, when not taken apart, by the reforms themselves. In fact, then, this (as we said before) core political agent and indispensable center of reference so much legitimized in Latin America seems to be overcome by the circumstances. Enter then the third sector and governance. They effectively enter. Though -note- not in a casual way but as a result of the context: an ever more pluralistic society that includes what was recently said plus what was pointed out before, namely, the weakness of politics, the incapacity and lack of prestige of the political class as well as the parties / parliaments / institutions, the ebb of citizenship, the condition which tends to spurious of the democratic regime established or reestablished. That is, with the inclination to substitute or compensate for their desertion, but also, in fact, to assume their role, something which looks artificial and much more problematic. This fourth stage is underway and it is probably too early to pass judgment on how it will develop over time and with what degree of success. However, it is possible to note some tensions and other circumstances on the basis of which, in any case, we should not forecast or expect a great success. I repeat, the expectations -when they are not already recognized as adequately moderate or else "innocent" from the start- seem to be high, surely too high. 400 CARLOS STRASSER Multilateral organizations, NGO's or third sector, and democratic politics One first reason for a certain skepticism is that the third sector as such is far from being identifiable with civil society, as -inadvertedly or simplifying the question- seem to believe not a few authors, actors, organizations and agencies. Civil society, notwithstanding all the discussions, the different discussions, existing about it (N. Bobbio, 1987; Arato and Cohen, 1993; N. Rabotnikof, 1999; etc.), is essentially and beyond so many emphasis and understandings simply the old "society" of sociological or political theory going back one to two centuries, that is, the other of the State and faced to the State. More politicized, less politicized, more absorbed, less absorbed, with less freedom, more freedom, little or more organized and in more or less autonomous ways. Still, society: individuals, groups, classes. And society, in our case, in the real Latin American way. Things being so, and leaving evolutions aside, not even the whole summation of NGO's and other organizations and branches of organizations or social ensembles that can currently be listed in each country -more or less formalized, or also informal- are really commensurate with it. In any case, they are substituting it by degrees, for better and/or for worse, variably. Therefore, to start with, it is necessary to distinguish between these various and really different subjects of politics and the social action for each national unit. In this same regard, moreover, it is not possible to leave aside one other subject, i.e. the international credit agencies, precisely because today they are linked so closely to the third sector- no longer only to the State- as "in their own right", given the singular national relevance that these agencies have lately acquired on a country by country basis (Casaburi and Tussie, 2000)32. All this has its consequences for the central theme of this paper. 32 According to the above authors, whose analysis is noted, however, for its moderation, these agencies "have shifted from being mere sources of financing for infrastructure projects to becoming designers of society in the borrowing countries" (page 16). 401 LATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE But before stopping at this point, and in connection with what we were saying, let us mark the following three other sides of the NGO's coin, the face of which is undoubtedly positive and a contribution to good governance33. One. The NGO's are far from being equivalent in principle or even synthetically to civil society in totum and of having the a priori right of legitimately pretending to represent the common good. Actually, besides devoting themselves to projects or issues that so many times are restricted or local, they tend not to coordinate among themselves but rather to mistrust and compete for support and resources (starting with the preferences and the funds of the already mentioned, large multilateral credit agencies), thus making the above equivalence and their own legitimacy even more relative. This, because of some phenomena of a political essence which occur within and among them which are not exclusive of the state but, simply, all too human. Two. The NGO's, for reasons that are finally not that different, also tend to disregard, compete and even clash with the political parties -the agents or intermediaries in principle more representative and legitimate of the whole of civil society- and also with the State, its bureaucracy or technicians34. Their differences frequently are not easy ro resolve or capable of being resolved (or maybe nobody in the organizations, the parties, the government or the public administration wishes to resolve them); something which also favors the dilution of ultimate responsibilities in terms of design or execution and control of the given policies or projects, a fact that is always important, but particularly important at the time of crisis, delays or failures. Three. On their part, the said agencies have in reality a better relationship with one or another NGO, so that the prefered ones run the risk of becoming co-opted or "clientelized" by them for the sake of their agendas or points of view, what makes the general social representativeness of a score of these organizations even more 33 Be it understood, it is far from us to disregard the positive contribution of these organizations. In this sense, it would be sufficient to mention their notable, fundamental contribution in the field of human rights. Also in others: regarding political or electoral processes, environmental issues, etc. But we are now speaking of the other side of the coin. 34 "It is evident that the NGO's throughout Latin America have forged multiple and complex links with the supranational organizations°(and that) the supremacy of the traditional political parties and old institutional arrangements centered on the State are challenged" (Korzeniewicz and Smith, 2000: 406). 402 CARLOS STRASSER partial. One, two and three, without mentioning that, in any case, the multilateral agencies in question usually provide little space for an ample participation of the NGO's (much less than to that of governments, for the simple reason of their -in the end- little power) in their agendas and blueprints: in general they limit them, in spite of the efforts some have made in an opposite sense, to a share in project implementations, monitoring and evaluation. (D. Tussie: 2000; Stocker: 1996). The contribution of NGO's to governability and governance has therefore two opposite faces; but that is not all. What needs to be reviewed is their representative or democratic and democratizing quality, which to date is excessively taken for granted, probably because they and their intervention in the public space entail a participatory opening and a certain mobilization, as in effect and in their measure they do35. But the assumption is not necessarily valid. Opening a certain participation to organizationsfrom and in society could amount to a kind of corporatism; at least, for sectorialism. The natural vehicle of democracy, as we have previously defined it, are, of course, the political parties. Naturally, whether they are at fault or simply fail to assume their role ex theoria in a full and more correct way is a different matter. But, leaving that aside, the issue at hand is whether and how much do NGO's inscribe themselves and through their activity in an improved operation of the democratic order, and whether they make part of good governance understood as a form of government complementing and perfecting the existing political regime; so much as, a fortiori, whether they are really bound to the principle of looking after the general interest. 35 One example of this opinion: "On the other hand, the non-state public space is also the space of participatory or direct democracy.. (Non-governmental organizations) are "public" organizations or forms of control because they tend to the general interest" (Bresser Pereira and Cunill Grau, 1998:26). Now, from our point of view the first is neither exclusive nor the fundamental case, and the second is not necessarilv so nor even perhaps the most common. In page 45, the authors speak likewise of "the advantages" of non-state public property over state ownership for "the expansion of democracy". In the middle of both quotations, however, they seem to change their positon, as will be seen below. Actually, they are not consistent on this point. A more correct and subtle appreciation is found in E. Jelin (1998: 412), who thinks that the NGO's are very important in the construction of more democratic societies, but fail to establish accountability mechanisms, as well as the sovereigitv of their citizens. "They fundamentally account to those that provide them with funds and to their own ideology and conscience", so that they are always "at risk of arbitrary action, manipulation, lack of transparency..." 403 LATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS. GOOD GOVERNANCE In this respect, the problem could be that the NGO's and the third sector as well as the multilateral agencies do not come only or not so much to reinforce a democratic political order in the proper sense, as to keep configuring democracy in terms of a mixed regime (or one that is even more mixed). Also and in any case, to invigorate a democracy that is more representing than truly representative and more liberal (and broken down into the different subjects of a pluralistic society and their wills; a society, on the other hand, that is politically without a center) than an expression of the popular and national collective. Whatever their intentions, it is clear that the multilateral agencies are not the citizenship, of course, and -let's say it once again- the third sector, beyond any services and merits or demerits (or albeit the obvious advantages of a non-state public production of e.g. certain social services and more civically inspired attitudes), is in general far from representing the society of any country; in particular, not the bulk of the low income sectors, the marginal or excluded. Even less, from validly and effectively substituting for the political institutions simply because these are so largely at fault. Two faces of one process. Now, and in any case, it is not fit to say that there is underway a transformation of the model or the structure and the operation of what-we-call-but-is-not-what-it- ideally-was-and-yet-we-keep-calling-democracy; paying for it, moreover, a price that we fail to know whether it is always adequate (there is a scarcity of sufficient evaluations in this respect) nor whether it is convenient in this connection to pay that or any other price. This, as it is said, precisely to bring about democracy or to have it better. To make it more governable and also to endow it with governance, even good governance. What alternatives are there in any case? Possibly positive ventures versus a hard and dense web The third sector and governance, we said, entered the scene because of (a) the limitations and impotencies shown by the market and the State, a State on the other hand with a blurred role and image. Also, by reason of (b) the relative weakness of politics; (c) the gradual 404 CARLOS STRASSER but ceaseless conversion of democracy into a mixed regime, one therefore always somewhat heterogeneous, inconsistent and ungoverned; (d) the incapacity and lack of prestige of the political class; and,(e) the ebb of citizenship plus the ideological blackout and the quasi obsolescence of classical political models. All of that, combined. Their arrival at the scene is not, therefore, accidental; not even a mere and contingent result of an infinite human creativity. It has been an answer to a need in the national and international order (although the latter -the most systemic- we cannot consider here due to lack of space). In the same connection, curiously, it has been written more in general that "the reform of the State, institutional development and the strengthening of governability are at the crossroads between the economic reforms and the consolidation of democracy" (C. Santiso: 2001). Because there are "tensions between political reforms and economic reforms", "ambiguous and complex relationships between democratization and economic reforms" (ibidem). As it is evident that there are, whence the innovations or their programming or the Washington neo-consensus and the "second generation reforms", third sector and governance included. Although following on it and on the same issue, something else has been mentioned too, however: that therefore it is necessary to reactivate the citizenship and, besides, to "reinvent politics" (ibidem). Regarding which, and leaving any wishful thinking apart, one might say that the first does not seem so much a matter of convenience than a difficulty, if not improbability, whereas the second seems perhaps to be too imaginative. The problem is that in all this there is not just a circularity that we can begin, and only begin, to underline with an indication. One that is also made by the author we just quoted, in the sense that, as Juliana Bambaci (1999) has written, second generation reforms comprise the paradox of having preconditions which at the same time are their goals; that is, a dog that even while moving is biting its tail, something which makes any real progress at least difficult and clumsy. Worst, what actually exists is a circularity which on that side, with architectural overtones, precisely has no way out. If in Latin American societies resort is being made (and certainly guided to that -not incidentally but symptomatically- from abroad) to remedies which 405 LATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE progressively attack difficulty by difficulty, but, of course, only some of the most evident at the superficial level, or at least close to the surface, or to remedies such as dis-articulations and re- articulations which as a rule are of a slow or gradual action, when not contradictory, that happens because any broader and more systemic and profound changes are unthinkable, or perhaps -the 20th century experiences in sight- because on top of it they are perceived to be undesired and undesirable. The web of established power constitutes a wall of a magnitude and complexity that in practice cannot be breached but by facts or processes more cyclopean or truly gigantic than those within reach36. And yet, it is that web which represents the greatest and most authentic challenge if not threat (more generally, obstacle) both to political democratization and to less social inequality in the region, as well as to the generation of more fully legitimate, representative and transparent governments. So that, in any case, we should not deceive ourselves when the normative option is discarded because it is de facto shown as impossible and/or undesired, to retain those options that seem more realistic, moderate, accumulative and medium to long term. They would be what can be done; and, those that look as the more appropriate, rapid and successful, the best that can be done. Anyway, in parallel let us not be surprised if in the meantime many of them actually provide little in terms of mitigation or repairs, and results always and only "in works", when not "backlashes". I mean to say, certain designs -or, going back to Sartori, the given institutions themselves- will do their thing, but, at the point at which they are or they get, "cannot perform miracles". The key is in the more general system of things, and in how each subsystem, institution, etc. connects to it. This needs to be understood in depth, in the two faces exposed, and to right and left. Regarding which let us mention here the example of education, one of the more correctly noted fields (others are health or, 36 It is not the smaller part of the problem that mentioned by A. Przeworski (1998: 36) "Why would the politicians in command want to voluntarily subject themselves to greater public scrutiny and control?" Only that the question should be extended beyond politicians (and governments) to all those having power or being part of it. And to everything that constitutes such power. Some image of that may have began to be perceived before, when we discussed the incapacity of politics. 406 CARLOS STRASSER at a different level, civil service, the judiciary, etc,) to improvements upon that in turn are a precondition for social and political development or democratization (in this respect, see the sustained series of documents and reports by the World Bank, ECLAC, IDB, in the last decade). And, in that connection, let us consider the experience of Argentina throughout the 1990's, the country and the time where, more than in others of the region, concurred (i) the adoption of a sort of universal "awareness" on the decisive importance -both in general and particularly economic terms- of education as a fundamental factor of development, (ii) deliberate government policies adjusted to this newly created awareness, and (iii) an important reordering- streamlining growth of the economy capable of contributing the financial resources of the case, specially under the first Menem administration, 1989/1995 -even if the "new economic model" that imposed them also brought about at the time, inter alia, a doubling and even tripling of open unemployment and the foreign debt, and a clearly regressive redistribution of income37. The improvements in the field of education during the period (speaking globally and leaving aside nuances and details) can be summarized by saying that between 1991 and 1996 the total per capita spending in education grew a surprising 37.6%, reverting the trend of the previous decade and surpassing the levels prior to the "foreign debt crisis" of the early 80's. And, at the same time, that from 1991 to 1997 the educational profile (incomplete primary to complete tertiary) of those economically active clearly improved38. Now, in spite of those improvements, to start with -and as in the whole of Latin America- the bulk of the drop out rate and school failures continued being concentrated in the poorer sectors, as well as the probability of receiving a minimum of 37 For this and the following, I refer, among others to D. Filmus. "Educaci6n y Desigualdad en America Latina en los noventa" (1999). 38 There were also certainly negative aspects in this respect, such as, for example, maintaining low teacher salaries, almost half of those of 1980: the reduction of formal requirements in the conditions of teachers' work "in exchange for" the low salaries; the loss of hierarchy of the same teachers, required and at the same time prevented in fact from training; the contradiction between the pedagogical discourse and the policies implemented; the educational decentralization conducted in pure terms of bureaucratic-fiscal re-engineering and with the national State "passing the bucket" of most of the educational expenditure, transferred directly to the provinces. The "quality" of education decreased during that time too. 407 LATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE adequate education continued, to a great extent, being conditioned by the education of the parents and the economic capacity of the given household. The changes that took place in the economic-occupational structure turned into a factor limiting the impact of the educational transformations attempted. It is not curious, then, that the advances were accompanied by a growing inequality. Alternatively, the educational expansion in such an occupational context could not counterbalance the process of said growing inequality. Let us detail this a bit further. One, those who had access to more years of schooling evicted from the first positions in the "queue to get a job" those sectors with less formal education. That, even for jobs requiring low skills, given the high unemployment rate. The minimum number of years of schooling demanded for access to a job increased; even a portion of those who had completed secondary and tertiary studies had to take lower jobs or jobs with low productivity and less income. In any case, those more seriously damaged were, obviously, the social groups that did not manage to attain the minimum (absolute and relative) of schooling. It is therefore not surprising to note that the additional school years provide a much greater yield of income when they are above a total of twelve (!) years of schooling. Nothing less. Two, even in the Greater Buenos Aires (the country's main urban concentration, formed by the continuum of the federal capital and the twenty four adjacent districts) unemployment increased around 250% among the less educated workers and almost five times less or "only" 55% among those with complete tertiary studies. So that, if in 1991 the difference between the unemployment rate of those with complete primary studies was 30% greater than that of those who had completed tertiary studies, in 1997 the difference reached 200%. The operating educational system is thus, in fact, increasing social inequality. Likewise, the greater the education of some (those who better can access it) the greater the inequalities of the others (those who do not have the same access)39. 39 This is no different among women exclusively, not so much with respect to men as among themselves: the percentage of unemployed women (with up to incomplete secondary studies) was in 1991 practically on a par with that of those who had complete "secondary studies and more" but in 1997 one and the other reached 19.6 and 15%. 408 CARLOS STRASSER Increasingly, employment and unemployment, higher and lower income, relate to "contacts" and they, in turn, are linked to a better or worse, private-paid or public-free formal education. The "educational credential". In passing, in Latin America as a whole years of schooling are no longer enough as a passport to get modern jobs. While between the 40% poorer families, 90% of the children and youths attend public schools, in the highest income deciles, this proportion is reduced to figures ranging between 25 and 40% according to the country (IDB: 1997). Three: some aspects may have perhaps "improved" in Argentina during the same period. For example, the ratio between various education levels and the social benefits received by the employees. In effect, workers aged twenty five or over with up to "incomplete secondary studies" which did not receive them and those with "complete secondary and more" in the same situation were in 1991, 30 and 12.4% respectively and in 1997 they became 40.7 and 18.9%. But in absolute terms everybody's situation worsened, (even though curiously Argentina's GDP grew annually at over 5% during all of those years) even if by comparison the gap was slightly closed. But this is small and insufficient consolation: in 1997 more education is in any case consecrating as much as in 1991 one (another) significant manifestation of social inequality. Ultimately, if it is true that to, produce the inequalities we record, "behind" the education factor there is always the economic- social inequality of origin, in any case it becomes clear that there is a circularity between the two, but the first one operates within the scene to reinforce the "original" direction of the course of things: speaking in methodological jargon it is "the independent variable". Even with the indicated budgetary increase for education, this variable operationalizes within its environment effects that are only potential in the more material plane, and then it actualizes them in the educational system itself. In fact, in connection with lower income sectors, we have just seen that they do not serve to reduce the inferiority in which they find themselves within the socioeconomic order, but to galvanize it. Even if education does indeed improve the intellectual and perhaps even the spiritual condition of a number of individuals, as well 409 LATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE as their hopes and their mood, and very likely trains them in a more functional manner in their capacity as strictly citizens of a republic, those general outcomes cannot be disregarded. Summarizing, "education" is inscribed within a context broader than its own, and not only is a more complex and contradictory subsystem than usually perceived, but it is also in correspondence with political, sociological, economic, and other factors or environments, that do not fail to impregnate it or traverse it, so that its development processes carry within themselves important doses of inertia, reproduction and impotence. And what has been exemplified with education applies, likewise, mutatis mutandis, to other fields. To conclude: what I am saying is that we cannot disregard any of the above, even if we have to choose or do opt for what is found to be possible, i.e. "what is practical." But there is more to be said in this regard. In the picture, what policies? Ulrich Beck (1999) characterizes current society as one in which an "and" has replaced the "rather ... or ", let's say the "one out of two ". Meaning by this -and I continue in my own words- a society in which blends or mergers or a mere alternation of elements (ideas, traditions, cultures, values, aesthetical concepts, etc.) are always occurring and opening up, also when they are heterogeneous and even opposed to one another. Like a "black hole" that absorbs and absorbs. Globalization has driven this development, particularly so in the more "advanced" areas of each country around the world, although the situation in Latin America is not too different. At any rate, it is inconvenient to believe that the discontinuity proposed by Beck is all too clearcut, as -strictly speaking- no discontinuity has ever been throughout history. Therefore, these overlappings of the old and the new, or the rather closed with the contemporarily open and mixed, coexist among us too. I.e., what prevails now, with what no longer prevails as it did in the past. Everything matters. Still, it is necessary to see to what extent and how much in each unit: regions, countries, social classes or sectors. In the 410 CARLOS STRASSER case of Latin America, other differences keep existing (together with many more that surely remain to be determined) by zones, social sectors, ethnicity and gender, which are sufficiently manifest. Obviously, any reflection, policy and project need to keep that in mind foremost. It is at this point that the participation and initiative of the "stakeholders" becomes crucial and should take precedence or- when that is dysfunctional or unfeasible- at least wield auctoritas or moral authority over the officials or the experts and anything that comes "from the top down" (in my view, this should be so from the outset, with the exception, of course, of the invitation or facilitation to "the stakeholders" to do something regarding a broadly determined subject). This approach could be operational, let's mention it in passing and not so much in passing, against the deactivation of the population qua a democratic citizenship, although without believing that it will compensate by itself for such estrangement, simply opening the door to a return to citizenship proper. In fact, such a return would probably require political and ideological triggers of a much more acute and collective nature than those present (absent) today40 .And at this time we are just looking at rather limited, specific efforts or reengineerings, even if there are more than a few in the region and some wished them to become articulated, be these bigger or smaller, or even if the intention were to multiply them in terms of numbers, places, actors and likewise. Actions and reforms in the field of social policies, specially in those of "universal coverage" such as health or education (F Repetto, 1998), or in fields like the civil service, Justice, social control, access to information, or even the organization and internal political life and operation of the parties as such, or the environment, etcetera, are needed as badly as noted and known; and while important in themselves and not indifferent for many people, starting with those 40 We mentioned previously the case of France in April 2002. But let's wait and see whether and how much the currently so healthy and vigorous "Le Pen effect" that buried this candidate in the second electoral round lasts. In Latin America, the only current case of a political-ideological "detonation" that can be observed is Venezuela. Also there, it remains to be seen how it evolves and resolves (or dissolves). 411 LATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE directly involved, in any case they do not imply or invariably constitute their/an interest (their/an involvement) collectively. Now, in any case, it is still true that the initial participation of those immediately concerned in any project is required in its own definition and scope, both for an eventually greater eventual effectiveness / efficiency and for its strictly democratic character, at least lato sensu or in spirit and to recreate social links, -since the preceding ones, those that were traditional of the 20th Century- are now dissolving, when they haven't already vanished. Here we find an obvious problem. In good theory, projects just like policies must (should) always be defined two ways: for the particular, individual good, and for the common good; and, using certain jargon, their principals & agents (as unum) should in principle be respectively the communities of reference, or the neighbors, the women, the workers, even the officials to the extent they are "affected", etc., etc., on the one hand, and the public powers on the other, much better if decentralized -without losses- as may be the case of each concrete policy or program. Other parties, namely, the multilateral credit agencies, the NGOs -even if they are stakeholders or sponsors or articulators, but in their capacity of, precisely, a third sector-, the remaining associations, the unions and even the political parties, summing up: the expressions of civil / civic society (I do not say representations; whether they are such or not is casuistically open) should instead be understood and serve as agents & brokers, even when they are awarded not only the right to initiate and successively participate, of course, but also the right to vote and even to veto. In any case, the ultimate actors and sundry roles should be made clear in these terms, conscious and assumed41. But we were saying there is an obvious problem here. The problem is precisely that the so-called "public powers" have shown to feature considerable failures in terms of their representativeness, committment, effective capacity and competency, transparency and 41 An assumption for this purpose is the possibility of periodically discriminating and otherwise determining who or what constitute the vafious different players (three or four, in total). 412 CARLOS STRASSER accountability horizontal as well as vertical, and more, as everybody knows. It is precisely in view of this that the multilateral agencies have taken such a significant role in these matters, both to cooperate with the public powers or to take care (directly or indirectly) of what these have taken care of poorly, if at all. This is not a problem that has an easy or a forthcoming perhaps not even a remote- solution. Especially in today's extremely pluralistic societies. In any case, never and nowhere has the problem to date been truly solved, although the more developed countries find themselves at a shorter distance from such a horizon than the Latin American ones. In such a connection it is not idle to recall what political theory has long and perfectly understood to be the case: that "the State" is by definition society's other and, whether to establish or to maintain society, it is what interferes with, limits, subjects and dominates society, in de facto better or worse terms. While the State justifies this by invocations to the general interest, actually it is not always "telling the truth" in that respect, not quite. What we are indicating is precisely an example of the above. The history of the 19th and 20th centuries shows that the State, in parallel with its democratization, was no less captured by the interests (Bobbio, 1985.) Even so, let's agree that ours is only "the best of all possible worlds" and, in it, nothing and nobody like the State (the contemporaneous constitutional State) can in principle better represent or more comprehensively represent the common good. Especially in Latin America, as we saw, according to its tradition or political culture. So that, since there is no escaping this, even with all its deficiencies it is necessary to turn back to the State, not the less when or while attempts are made to bring it closer -through reforms and controls- to what is its justification in principle, its legitimate role. Still, what from the democratic point of view is not feasible is to replace it, as some occasionally wish and even attempt to do, going beyond the need and the will to compensate for its deficits. At this point, it "is increasingly evident that not even the development of the market itself can be assured without a democratic State, one that among other things, preserves its own competence in terms of the public good and provides the protection, 413 LATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE mediation and redistribution functions needed for socioeconomic development" (Bresser Pereira and Cunnil Grau, 1998:29)42. Any argument in favor of its replacement should therefore be understood to be an extraordinary hypothesis operating on a different level: that or those already mentioned of necessity, practicality, etc., in sum, such reasons as are invoked or can be invoked for the intervention of some other agencies and agents. And, of course, without falling in the naivete of ignoring that ultimately they respond to their own interests, including corporatist ones, or also the interests they finally answer to, political and ideological, which of course do exist side by side with the pure commendable ones or underlying those, as has always been the case among parties and actors whose views are not coincidental and are debatable. On this point, Bresser Pereira and Cunill Grau point out: "Summarizing, it has to do with opening in society a debate on institutionality in favor of satisfying public needs, as well as exerting pressure from it so that the public state sphere does effectively and actually become public; i.e. open to the participation of all, and thus able to adequately regulate the centers of economic and social power, while respecting the spaces of liberty which are increasingly being demanded (...) Social control is the way in which society can oversee the State directly, in addition to the classical forms of representative control." (1998: 30, 34, added emphasis). What policies, therefore? If it had to be said in one line, this would be: policies that are shaped, formulated and implemented in the strictest democratic-participatory way. Other programs or projects that fall outside that framework or those public initiatives and policies, in the narrow sense, remain possible, in fact, and will surely be welcome and convenient (although not always) for one or another ensemble of groups and individuals, agencies and organizations, "the stakeholders"; but democratic and for the common good, in the best of cases to be eventually determined, because this cannot (not at least 42 The authors continue saying -and by the way correcting other assertions they previously made that were already quoted in a previous foomote- that "currently the assignment of a predetermined role or an intrinsic virtue to (civil) society is being increasingly questioned it is important to look upon civil society as one organized and weighted in accordance with the power held by the various groups and individuals", including the NGOs. ..... It is therefore not reasonable to associate a necessarily positive value with civil society as a whole." (Ibidem). 414 CARLOS STRASSER from the outset) ) be attributed to the same, by definition. From this perspective, in the democratic political-theoretical perspective, their role should be understood as simply complementing the State, and performed as such. For public policies, starting with social policies, to succeed not only in attaining their more declared and immediate objectives, but also to be properly democratic and democratizing, what the above entails is that in parallel it would be necessary to think of additional policies, if not previous, in any case fundamental, and to act going forward (with a true drive) in the four or five orders that, nowadays, perhaps have the most negative impact in this respect. What orders? 1. In the field of politics, all those connected to recovering an awareness of politics as the activity that in itself has the objective of serving the common good; thus restoring it as a (sub)system that coordinates and integrates all of the others. 2. The democratic order and regime, in the strictest sense, purged of the oligarchic, bureaucratic, technocratic, partycratic and neocorporatist forms of government that have been attached to it over time (and continue being attached to it, even via the philosophy or the theory of good governance when these are or, in some approaches, become perverted). This is an issue that can already be dealt with from the legal side, that is, through legislation, for example by regulating or newly regulating republican and democratic constitutional norms that are clear in themselves and, on that basis force, for example, the registration of lobbies, etc. 3. The one concernig the political class, currently so much diminished and without prestige, as is also the case with political parties: both need to be restored in public opinion (respect) and, of course, in practice, as irreplaceable for a good political order43. This can also be partly dealt with using legislation, for example regarding financial or equity and 43 In connection with the parties, the point has been well made by C. Sojo (...): "Political parties need to deepen their relations with society, restore their representation and interest intermediation capacity. The expansion of nevvJbrms ofpolitical participation does not suppose substituting the parties or a radical trans]brmation oj the representative regime. A good share of the democratic development tasks relates to the capacity of traditional political parties of adapting to the challenges of the future (..) the challenge lies in finding the means to form party systems, where the competition and the fight between political and ideological altematives is a real fact and not merely an electoral fiction" (added emphasis). We will return to a couple of these points below, to underline them. 415 LATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE other organizational aspects. 4. The State as the most neutral representative of the common good. That, of course, with its institutions sharpened for this purpose -which is in part what some of the ongoing reforms or reengeneerings are dealing with, only that in terms of singular, determined policies. Now, all of this requires activating the related discourse, political and ethical, or the very ideas of democracy and republic, today worn so thin and discredited -except in what concerns the obvious advantages of the Rule of Law, which however needs to be integrated. Driving as a necessity, apart from something legitimate and not at all "politically incorrect" (according to what, for instance, is regularly gleaned from the emphasis on certain unique "state policies"), the shaping and formulation of programs, policies and "ideologies" that fear not being alternative. Forcefully urging and promoting debates on these issues44. And recovering or creating the public spaces and fora necessary for this purpose. This, and only this (outside the activation instances that may happen of their own accord, only that normally not subject to forecasts, for they are always beyond anybody's particular will), would manage to attain the other aspect that is now naturally missing, but which up to a point can be counterbalanced, namely, 5. the "sense" of citizenship in the population. Today no doctrinarian or theoretical claim is more sustained or enjoys a broader consensus than this. Therefore, it is necessary to act now and immediately regarding citizenship properly. To be sure, useful projects can be devised in this regard. After all, it is about creating "sense" in society, a sense today doubtlessly performed (even more than by school?) by and through the media, starting with TV; but without a plan, by means of innumerable (the chemical term) "precipitates" that are broadly scattered and, in fact, play against the homogeneous creation of a good civic sense. Also here, and urgently, action and engineering are therefore required. Much more and before "inventing" anything. And at least at the same time as any other designs and developments that the greatly bemoaned social and institutional reality of our countries requires. Of 44 "If the options relating to public policies are effectively restricted to one, democracy is reduced to zero. The political elites can deliberately apply strategies to monopolize and limit the political debate." (Offe & Schmittern 1995: 10). 416 CARLOS STRASSER course, without detracting from what the action of civil society movements or organizations, NGOs and akin social networks may contribute in this direction along the way. In this regard, beyond the observations and reservations we have posed, it should absolutely not be ruled out that their advocacy in favor of values or interests, collective in different degrees, may help to create or recreate a citizens culture. Specially in Latin America, where previously it was always the State (as opposed to, for example, what was the case in the United States, this at least until the relatively progressive innovations that began in the 1930's and followed after the second world war, although never to the same extent) that provided the public services and assets of which, in view of its defection, these organizations and networks now attempt to address45. In the end, it would be about returning to Politics without hesitation, although neither reducing it per force to the State narrowly understood. And, in this direction, about investing in this relation by means of programs, projects, bodies, organizations or agencies and actions, specific while organic, to reintroduce it as a decisive instance, the knot that effectively ties society together as such with the thread of shared values and interests and purposes. And to the politics that is underlying the political engineering, i.e. the politics behind the policies, that have partially substituted for it and, moreover, have done so "on a case by case basis", in a rather restricted way. 45 However, in this respect there's the need to take into account the necessarily complex and "multiple" relationship of the so-called "social capital" that includes these organizations, vis-a- vis democratization; see N. Lechner (2000) on this point. But it is still worthwhile to point at the rather frequent targets of the NGOs themselves, many times directed in a straightforward manner at constructing a public locus for voluntary social relations and interactions with capacity for the self-determination of the group. 417 LATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION. DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE The two faces of the non state public field Even so, and to put order into things, let us recall that politics is a system with an environment or (the different theoretical perspective does not change our target) that is nested within its context. At the beginning we made a reference to it as the "conditions of possibility" of democracy, conditions of all types: cultural, historical, social, economic, starting with its more general patterns or background and its current web. Therefore, and in connection then with the mutual reference of politics and context, it is clear that it is essential also to act in parallel or, even better, in convergence through pathways such as those of the social policies. From this point of view, these so-called "social policies" are a core imperative that extends beyond addressing social needs as such. Attaining a more extended and more properly democratic practice than the one we have today in Latin America will also result from the efforts made in the fields/environments of health, poverty, education, and job training. Another fundamental field, of course, is women, gender, so that democratization not only reaches the lowest stratum but also extends beyond man as its subject, thus reaching women, and also penetrating within the family (which nowadays, at the bottom, frequently lacks a man). Now, experience and the current state of affairs show that a general problematic side of all the aforementioned is that, to achieve greater effectiveness and efficiency, if the supply of goods and services is in state hands, it is necessary to have the participation and control of the public, and if it is in the hands of the public, state interventions are required; both, simply for reasons of differential information, of more immediate knowledge of each "case", the diverse technical or administrative expertises required, the differences in commitment and stimuli or altruism. Also, regarding third-sector volunteers and their (frequent dis-)organization as such, so that the appropriation of roles or the emergence of excluding hegemonies do not take place, or in connection with the funding and the terms in which income collection, distribution and management thereof occurs, the evaluations and audits, etc. The two parties have failures or weaknesses that need to be covered, when not by themselves, then reciprocally. 418 CARLOS STRASSER This required complementation does not imply to refute that inherently the civil or non-state public associations and NGOs effectively increase the total offering of goods and services, as well as decrease bureaucracy and rigidity in their management, while augmenting the dedication and responsibility of the actors46. It is for the same reasons that they are usually declared to be "of public benefit" and get tax exemptions. Now, their objectives, structures and working methods are, however, hugely diverse (M.J. Wyszormirski, 1990) to be able to cover them all in detail here. There even exist, according to the English model, quasi non-governmental organizations, "acting in the social field, in particular in education and health, with resources ensured by the State, and subject to a contractual relationship with the State" (Bresser Pereira & Cunill Grau, 1998:48). But another issue continues being their meaning in democratic terms, as already mentioned more than once. Eduardo Bustelo points at this aspect in the most forceful, perhaps extreme manner, yet still relevant from our perspective: If one defining trait were to be pointed out in the current "social policy", it would be causing social dismemberment and having disregard for social equality. It is not only that the processes of material production generate a "fragmented and discontinuous" society, with a plurality and a great diversity of groups and organizations with very heterogeneous interests, but that, besides, there is a "political operation" to dismember it, to inhibit its innovation potential and to deactivate the possibility of social actors emerging. Part of this "strategy of social dismemberment" is the "rediscovery" of civil society as a way of ignoring the central point of social inequalities as well as their centrally public and political character. Also the decentralization and valorization of the local level as a strategy to weaken the possibility of setting up coalitions with a potential for 46 Their merits are as arguable as varied. For example, one author highlights that their action "tends to be accompanied by innovation", to overcome the traditional "clientelism" of social policies and to rebalance the usual protection to "the more strongly organized workers, particularly those of the public sector" and urban workers as compared to rural workers, with the "potential of bringing new stakeholders into the social policy decision-making process" (J.C. Navarro, 1998:99, 103 & 104). Another one notes the experience they have in "litigation and surveying issues in society" (Gonzalez Morales, 1997:44). Etcetera. 419 LATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE change, the proliferation of NGOs as "captive" social spaces, limited to programs only, and the assembly of poverty targeted "social interventions" could be part of an approach devised as a policy to evict common concerns and narrow the democratic spaces..." (1998:13). The following is connected with this issue and will be our conclusion. So far we were, in any case, in a "tight spot". The condition of democracy lies, in principle, on the side of the constitutional political institutions, beginning with the State, that, however, is presently wrestling with incapacities, weaknesses and impotence: listing them would be redundant. A more effective action and renewal (effective and efficient) in terms of social matters and political control, usually falls de facto on those of one or other civil society group or organization; that are, in themselves, however, liable to awaken legitimate reserves and concerns from the more strictly democratic point of view, even if here or there they operate productively at the level of the above mentioned "conditions of possibility" of democracy. Government, governability, governance and State At different points in this work, emphasis has been placed on the role of the State both from the general perspective of political theory (democratic theory very specifically included) and within the tradition of Latin American political culture. Perhaps the ultimate reason for it lays in that a good part, maybe the major part, of the approaches and analyses of our core subject -such as the institutionalist ones-, come pervaded with another political vision, to use Sheldon Wolin's (1961) suggestive concept. The US-Anglo vision of government, instead of and so different from the German Staat vision, or the French V'Etat's (or, at the extreme of a continumm extending from Hegel to neo-Marxism; for example, that exemplified by N. Poulantzas (1969) once so widely known), which is, understandably, the one more "naturalized" in Latin America according to its tradition. Now, in spite of being open to both perspectives, the more habitually employed concepts of governability and governance likewise usually connotate 420 CARLOS STRASSER the difference in approaches. And, aside from the fact that the issue most seemingly implies a conflict of "paradigms", we apparently have here another ideological import impacting the political culture of the Latin American region. At the beginning we dealt with the concepts that were basic for our purposes: democracy, governability and governance. We were there almost at the point of referring to the State, which, undoubtedly, is also a basic concept, and because we understood that it would be necessary along the way at least "in act"; yet, we decided to postpone it up to this point, where its importance would perhaps become more evident. For, in effect, this is the point at which, going back to what has been said so far (partly in passing and between the lines), the idea of that very dense power web in which social relations are politically interwoven and tied indicates more clearly what kind of challenge, threat and basic obstacle we have before us for the democratization of the area. Government says little in this regard: it speaks of the institutions or the institutes and policies of the constitutional / legal order more than about anything else, when not only about them. It almost does not account for that dense web of power. However, we have not moved to another terrain when we speak of the weak and subordinated place that politics has today; or when we try to show which is the anatomy under the skin of the contemporary democratic political regime, and the situation to which the political class has been driven and is now found, on the one hand, or citizenship, on the other; and when we journeyed historically and culturally regarding the ideological-political "flooring" that is distinctive of Latin America and is still the minimum-common of its different sectors and currents; at least, the more specific of its large popular majorities. All that relates to the State, is constitutive of it, of its own, difficult, elusive concept. On the other hand, and not by chance, it is scarcely attuned with the empiricist vein of the typically American political science, born precisely for the object of government. The idea of governance, however, already seems to extend a bridge between "government" and "State". It refers to social actors or sectors together with those of the State, and to different types of relations between them, and speaks of institutions more broadly or in 421 LATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE a different manner, as if in a more sociological and sociological- political vein, a vein that is closer if not coincidental with that of the second vision previously mentioned. If this is so, the idea of governance, as well as that of good governance, is, at least in fact, understanding that democracy comprises forms or modes of government that exceed the strict dimension of the "declared" regime (and that, therefore, can complement it, which is the question; but likewise, cross in its path and hinder it, as is the case of the oligarchy, the bureaucracy and other forms that we have recorded inside it). That is, it penetrates within the realm of the concept of State, of which the regime is a part that can be analytically broken out -something that is then related to its capacity and enjoyment of a certain political "autonomy"-, but in the end both empirically and theoretically not subject to separation or isolation (Strasser: 1991.) Ultimately, therefore, one could say that the achievement of both governance and a good governance "involve" (or should "involve", at least ex hypothesis) the confrontation with the dense web of power that has held and still holds Latin America in a condition of inequality, inequity, poverty and inefficiency for which now a more sustained remedy seems to be sought. It weaves political power, economic power, media power, international power. Or else it will not involve it, because that would be so far-fetched or in fact impracticable (and, besides, with good or bad reasons, undesired by many) as trying to bring the Andes down; but then one would only be scratching the problem and there will be little success, except perhaps incrementally and over the generations. This is what we have been posing all along, even if there are no alternatives. But this is the time for conclusions. 422 CARLOS STRASSER CONCLUSIONS THAT ALSO MAKE A SUMMARY The threats and challenges, or more generally, obstacles to democracy and democratization in Latin America do not consist only, not even mainly, of the weakness of the institutions or the political and party systems, or the exacerbated complexity and incompetence of the bureaucracies, the corruption of the legislators or the officials and their counterparts, or the blatant inability of the Judiciary to enforce the effective rule of law. And even less in presidencialism (that is so varied in structures and performances). There are other factors and backgrounds to be underlined in this matter -without even speaking of the obvious and highly determinant economic and social factors. One: that politics has diminished, as in other areas of the contemporary world, the core role it performed since modernity as the integrator of the various social subsystems, and this to become increasingly -not just a subsystem articulated to the others- but a sphere and an activity closer to subordination and to impotence than the other way round. Two: that the democratic political regime, victorious in one sense at the fall of communism and the other authoritarian orders, in parallel has continued its inclination, now secular, to becoming in fact a mixed regime (a variable and variegated combination of other several regimes or forms of government stricto sensu) and therefore not only more harassed but also more blurred, ill- coordinated and partly disgoverned. Moreover, within the combination it has already tended to alter its very condition of "representative". Three: that the political classes have, by a combination of history and their own failure, lost their capacity to direct and to be trusted by the people. Four: that citizenship as such has visibly gone into a process of deactivation, disbelief and 423 LATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE individualistic engrossment, due to old and recent trends, the ones and the others added up. Something that is hardly reversible. Five: that the very political culture, considered its historical roots and independently from any value judgment in this regard, appears to be fragmented or driven to dis-arrangement and dis-concert by successive external infiltrations (above all the last one, neoliberalism) only partly assimilated and/or assimilated by different groups and therefore the almost haphazard disposition of the players, thus resulting in legitimacy conflicts and difficulties that are added to the normal ones resulting from the usual clash between legality and effectiveness that every government faces. Within this framework, and in connection with all the ongoing reforms and projects arising from the successively grown complexity of societies, from the crisis or the deficits of the State, from the increasing needs, it is necessary not to loose sight of a hard fact: that they not only each face their specific objective, but also and above all, an established and dense and partly opaque power web. The very definition of both reforms and projects actually takes into account this elementary but solid datum, when it does not, to a good extent, respond or correspond to it. In themselves, therefore, they at the most and in the best of cases imply improvements or palliatives that are on one side rather circumscribed and on the other only medium or long term effects: limited and slow or too parsimonious. Their accumulation and integration over time remain to be seen, but everything suggests the bets made are too high. Over time, many other things accumulate too. The role of governance as a form of complementary government that eventually may impove on the constitutional regime (and assist in democratic governability) should, consequently, not be exaggerated, good intentions or declarations aside. There are two dimensions to the issue. Firstly and to begin with, governance is linked by birth and development to the functioning of neocorporatist guilds and sectors and, successively, of the "third sector" or the NGOs and multilateral credit agencies. That not only do not succeed -perhaps will never manage to succeed- in coming together and partnering, but, moreover, cannot be understood a priori as representative of civil 424 CARLOS STRASSER society: this is arguable, specially when speaking of the wide popular sectors. Even less, as expressing political society; or necessarily being part of a democratization process. This because their independence - which, for the worse, is sometimes diminished along the way-, their innovation capacity, their social altruism, etc., carry with them not only natural limitations but also natural and surely incorrigible inclinations to the sectorial, when not to the strictly corporatist interests. On the other hand and secondly: together with the economic financial crisis, the weakness and defection of the State and the political institutions have been the occasion for the emergence of the third sector and the role of the multilateral credit agencies as well as, likewise, for the growing deployment of both, but besides investing them with the temptation and illusion of eventually replacing those at fault. Positive actions aside, this is not democratic, by definition or in fact. Although it "May" contribute to a subsequent greater civic awareness and a democratizing process. The defection and weaknesess mentioned are also and on the other side barriers to the possibility of a governance and good governance as defined, since the State and its institutions, like the parties, are fundamental and irreplaceable actors in both. In this sense, the role of one and the others (that of the State, central by definition and tradition, and with an incomparable legitimacy, as in principle also the parties have) should be repowered, including the reforms that are necessary and even urgent. However, it is foreseeable that this will mostly not happen, at least not in the near future; therefore the non-state public organizations and NGOs will in all probability continue growing and acting in the terms they already do. They will be welcome. With their pluses (direct and appreciable) and their minuses (the major ones indirect, and rarely taken into account.) This does not mean to say that the efforts and reforms of reference, social, political, economic, should not proceed and multiply in the meantime as much as possible. To some degree or another, with more or less success, they will always make possible some needed and positive inputs -positive at least for "the stakeholders"-, which in turn may eventually open up roads in directions that appear to be clearly desirable in quite many senses. But it will always be necessary to incorporate, as from their very design, at least on an equalfooting, 425 LATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE the involved players or subjects, together as, essentially, the political parties (that, even if reluctant or very difficult to deal with, are by principle the truest and irreplaceable possibility of a collective representation. In any case -if we consider this resistance or engrossment and their own precariousness, specially those that have become so acute of late-, favoring their own internal democratization as soon as possible, and the education of their "cadres" to this end). Therefore, a decisive field for investigation and initiatives will be the relationship between non-state public organizations and NGOs with political parties. However, the successful achievement of governance and in particular good governance lies in what its concept perhaps already implies, beyond certain political "visions" or understandings that, we suspect, in principle would appear to connotate it as if inherently. Because its does point, in fact, to the notion and practice of the "State", and not only to that of "government." That is, because it would imply articulating but, likewise, confronting the dense web of power prevailing in Latin America. The true, main obstacle to democracy in the region. Now, if this can hardly be expected, then, and in the best of cases, the goals will barely be scratched for a time that will surely be measured in generations. There is also a whole fundamental political education task pending; strictly pedagogical, immediately educational, not indirect and "propedeutic" as the current ones. Our suggestion is to address it promptly, with imagination and resources, as a policy. As it is currently done with social issues. This is a necessary investment that will surely reinforce the others and certainly afford them a greater success. It would, naturally, be especially important in the civic order stricto sensu, fundamental in itself. 426 CARLOS STRASSER REFERENCES * ALCANTARA SAEZ, MANUEL (1998). "Democracia y valores democraticos en la clase politica latinoamericana", in Revista Mexicana de Sociologia, vol. 60, No. 2. Mexico, April-June, 1998. ARATO, ANDREW and COHEN, JEAN (1993). Civil Societv and Political Theorv, MIT Press, Cambridge. BAMBACI, J., SARONT, T. and TOMMASI, M. (1999). 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WYSZOMIRSKI, MARGARET JANE (1990). "The puzzle of organizations: a trisectorial perspective", in International Journal of Public Administration, vol. 13, Nos. 1-2, special issue, New York. OTHER AUTHORS MENTIONED: Hans Baron, Dolores Bejar, Edmond Burke, Isidoro Cheresky, Adam Ferguson, Otis H. Green, Alexander Hamilton, Eric Hobsbawm, James Madison, Friedrich Meinecke, Chantal Mouffe, Philippe Pettit, J. G. A. Pocock, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Carl Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, Alexis de Tocqueville, D. H. Waley, Max Weber. 432 DESARROLLO SOCIAL EN AMERICA LATINA ABOUT THE AUTHORS Mayra Buvinic, Chief of the Social Development Division and Special Advisor on Violence of the Sustainable Development Department (SDS) of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). She joined the IDB in 1996 as Chief of the Women in Development Unit, SDS. Ms. Buvinic, a Chilean citizen, has a Ph.D. and M.A. in Social Psychology, University of Wisconsin. Founding member of the Intemational Research Center (ICRW) in Washington, D.C., and its former president from 1978 to 1996. In 1990 and 1991, she was associated with the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, in Santiago, Chile, as Visiting Researcher of the ICRW. Ms. Buvinic has published extensively in the areas of poverty and gender, job promotion, small business development and reproductive health. She has served on the board of directors of several non-profit institutions, among them the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) and the Intemational Irrigation Management Institute (IIMI). Rolando Franco, Director of the Social Development Division of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) of the United Nations and director of the ECLAC annual publication Social Panorama of Latin America. Ph.D. in Law and Social Sciences, Universidad de la Republica, Uruguay, and M.A. in Sociology, Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO), Santiago, Chile. He has published over 200 articles and 25 books. 433 DESARROLLO SOCIAL EN AMERICA LATINA Sara Gordon Rapaport. Full time researcher at the Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales of the Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de Mexico (UNAM). She holds a Licenciatura degree in Political and Social Sciences, UNAM, 1979. M.A. and Ph.D. in Latin American Studies, specializing in Political Science, Sorbonne, Paris, 1985. She has published numerous works on poverty, social development and social rights, among them: Ciudadania y derechos sociales. Una reflexi6n sobre Mexico, Revista Mexicana de Sociologia, No. 3, July/Sept. 2001. Necesidades y deman- das ante el nuevo milenio in Mufioz, Humberto (ed), La sociedad mexi- canafrente al tercer milenio, Vol. II, Miguel Angel Porruia, Coordinaci6n de Humanidades-UNAM, Mexico, 2001. Nuevas desigualdades y politi- ca social in R. Cordera and A. Ziccardi (coords.). Las politicas sociales de Mexico al fin del milenio, Miguel Angel Porrua, Coordinaci6n de Humanidades, FE, IISUNAM, Mexico, 2000. Poverty and Social Exclusion in Mexico, International Institute for Labour Studies, Discussion papers, DP/93/1997, Labour Institutions and Development Programme, Spanish version in Rafael Menjivar and Dirk Kruijt (coords.), Pobreza, exclusi6n y politica social. FLACSO-Costa Rica, UNESCO and Utrecht University, San Jose, Costa Rica, 1997. Edgar E. Gutierrez-Espeleta, Universidad de Costa Rica graduate in Statistics and M.Sc. and Ph.D. in Forest Biometry, Iowa State University. At present he is Director of the Development Observatory and lecturer at the Escuela de Estadistica of the Universidad de Costa Rica. He is a member of the panel of experts on indicators of the Sustainable Development Commission of the United Nations and was recently named member of the Statistics Commission of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. He is a member of the Scientific Commission on the project Global Environmental Change and Human Safety of the International Human Dimension Program (IHDP) and of the Consulting Group on Indicators of Sustainable Development (CGISD). He has pub- lished papers in national and international magazines, in books on sus- tainable development indicators and is the author of a book on statistical methods. He was Vice President of the Board of Directors of the scien- tific body of the Convention on Biological Diversity for two years. 434 DESARROLLO SOCIAL EN AMERICA LATINA Andrew R. Morrison. Senior Specialist in Social Development, Social Development Division of the Inter-American Development Bank. Former associate lecturer at the University of Tulane; University of New Mexico and FLACSO/Ecuador. ' Ph.D. in Economy, Vanderbilt University. He has published extensively on crime, violence and public policy. Among his most recent contributions we can mention Measuring the Costs of Crime and Violence as an Input to Public Policy: Evidence from Mexico (with Graciela Teruel, Renata Villoro and James Hammitt). Woodrow Wilson Intemational Center for Scholars volume on Citizen Security, forthcoming. Living in a Violent World (with Mayra Buvinic), Foreign Policy, 2000. Trade Reform Dynamics and Technical Efficiency: The Peruvian Experience (with Ila Alam), World Bank Economic Review, 2000. Notas Tecnicas sobre la Prevenci6n de la Violencia (with Mayra Buvinic), Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, 1999. El Costo del Silencio: Violencia Domestica en las Americas (with Loreto Biehl). Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, 1999. Third World Urbanization (with Charles Becker) in P Cheshire and E. Mills (eds), Handbook of Applied Urban Economics. Amsterdam: North Holland, 1999. Maria Beatriz Orlando. Ph.D. in Economics, University of Tulane (USA) special- izing in Economic Development. Former Lecturer and Researcher at the Universidad Cat6lica Andres Bello, Caracas, Venezuela. Has done numerous research projects on Latin American labor markets and social matters. Consultant to the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank and the Office of Economic Consultants to the Venezuelan Congress. Juan Pablo Perez Siinz. Sociologist. Researcher at FLACSO since 1981. M.A. in Sociology, Sorbonne, Paris, and in Development Studies, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague. Ph.D. in Economics, Free University, Brussels. He has worked on labor market, poverty and local econom- ic development matters. Noteworthy among his published work are: Respuestas silenciosas. Proletarizaci6n urbana y reproducci6n de fuerza de trabajo en America Latina. (Caracas, Nueva Sociedad/ UNESCO/FLACSO, 1989); Informalidad urbana en America Latina, 435 DESARROLLO SOCIAL EN AMERICA LATINA Enfoques, problematicas e interrogantes (Caracas, FLACSO/Nueva Sociedad, 1991); De la finca a la maquila. Modernizaci6n capitalista y trabajo en Centroamerica (San Jose, FLACSO, 1996) also published in English as: From the Finca to the Maquila. Labor and Capitalist Development in Central America (Boulder, Westview Press, 1999; and, with K. Andrade-Eekhoff, M. Carrera Guerra and E. Olivares Ferreto): Globalizaci6n y comunidades en Centroamerica (San Jose, FLACSO, 2001). Ernesto Rodriguez. Uruguayan sociologist, specializing in Public Youth Policies. Former Director of the Youth Forum of the Instituto Nacional de la Juventud (Ministerio de Educaci6n y Cultura), and President of Organizaci6n Iberoamericana de Juventud (OIJ). Present Director of the Centro Latinoamericano sobre Juventud (CELAJU); Consultant to the United Nations (CEPAL, UNESCO, ILO, UNICEF, UNFPA), to the Intemamerican Development Bank ((IDB), to the OIJ and to the GTZ German Technical Cooperation Agency, on public youth and social devel- opment policies. He is the author of a number of papers on his field, notable among them Primer Informe sobre la Juventud en America Latina 1990" (OIJ, Madrid, 1991), Capacitaci6n y Empleo de J6venes en America Latina: Experiencias y Desafios (CINTERFOR/ILO, Montevideo, 1995), and J6venes en America Latina: Actores Estrategicos del Desarrollo (CIEJUV Mexico, forthcoming). Carlos Sojo. Costa Rican sociologist, currently Academic Director of FLACSO Costa Rica, where he has worked as a researcher since 1989. M.A. in Sociology, Universidad de Costa Rica, and Ph.D. in Social Sciences, Utrecht University of Holland. He has published extensively on political sociology and, more recently, on general social development aspects such as poverty, exclusion and public policy. Noteworthy among his most recent publications are the book Exclusi6n Social y Reducci6n de la Pobreza en America Latina y el Caribe published in Spanish in 2000 and in English in 2001 by FLACSO Costa Rica and The World Bank. With D. Kruijt and R. Grynspan, he co-authored the book Informal Citizens, Poverty, Informality and Social Exclusion in Latin America (Rozenberg, Amsterdam, 2002). 436 DESARROLLO SOCIAL EN AMERICA LATINA Carlos Strasser. Lawyer (Universidad de Buenos Aires), Ph.D. in Political Science, University of California, Berkeley. Since 1985 he has been chief researcher of the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas of Argentina. As from 1972, he was, successively, Director of the Social Sciences Department of Fundaci6n Bariloche, Director of the Political Science School at FLACSO, creator and Director of the Masters degree in Social Sciences at FLACSO/Argentina and Director of FLACSO/Argentina, founder coordinator of the Epistemology and Policy Group of CLACSO, creator of the Political Science career at Universidad de Buenos Aires and Director of Humanities Department of Universidad de San Andres, among others. He has taught courses and given lectures at many universities and academic institutions in Latin America, the United States and Europe. He is the author of numerous articles and papers published in professional magazines in a number of countries and of eight books, the first on Philosophy of the Social Sciences and, thereafter, mainly on Political Theory and, in particular, the Theory of Democracy; among others, La Raz6n Cientifica en Politica y Sociologia (Amorrortii, Buenos Aires, 1979) and Democracia y Desigualdad. Sobre la democracia real afines del siglo XX(CLACSO, EUDEBA, Buenos Aires, 1999; second edition, 2000). He is a fellow of the Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., and has received the Honor Sash awarded by Sociedad Argentina de Escritores and the 1986-1996 Konex Platinum Award in Political Science, Argentina. 437 A I