




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Urban Peace Program Series

A Conceptual Framework for Violence Reduction

August 1999



Caroline Moser
Elizabeth Shrader

The World Bank
Latin America and Caribbean Regional Office
Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development SMU

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The opinions expressed in this document are attributable to the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the position or official policies of the World Bank.

This working paper series is produced by the Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Sector Management Unit (John Redwood, Acting Director) of the Latin America and Caribbean Regional Office.

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Foreword

This document is part of a series of papers produced by the Urban Peace Program of the Latin America and Caribbean Region's Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Sector Management Unit (LCSES). The Urban Peace Program is funded jointly by the World Bank and the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA). The program focuses on the dynamics of violence in Latin America and the Caribbean, its effects on poor communities, and the development of appropriate multisectoral strategies for violence reduction that would in turn help promote peace and development.

Violence has emerged as a significant economic, social welfare, health, and governance issue throughout the region. It is important not only in countries experiencing political unrest, such as Colombia and Peru, but also in war-to-peace transitional societies, such as Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, where levels of crime and violence remain high. Crime and violence erode physical, human, natural, and social capital, undermine the investment climate, and deplete the state's capacity to govern. Previously regarded as an issue of criminal pathology or human rights, violence is now recognized as a macroeconomic problem.

These papers synthesize information generated by one stage of activities of the Urban Peace Program. In turn, they are a contribution to the growing information infrastructure of the World Bank's Knowledge Management System in the area of Social Development.

The papers are published through the LCR Sustainable Development Working Paper series produced by LCSES. The series seeks to share the results of analytical and operational work, present preliminary findings, and describe "best practices" with regard to major sustainable development issues confronting the region. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in these papers are entirely those of the authors and should not be attributed to the World Bank, members of its Board of Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Worldwide, violence is emerging as a significant economic, social welfare, health, and governance issue. Crime and violence adversely affect stocks of physical, human, natural, and social capital, undermine the investment climate, and deplete public sector institutions' capacity to govern. Previously regarded as an issue of criminal pathology or human rights, violence is now recognized as a macroeconomic development problem (Ayres 1998).

The globalization of crime through such phenomena as international crime rings has reduced the significance of national boundaries to the problem of violence (Castells 1998). Nevertheless indicators of violence such as homicide, crime victimization, and domestic assault, reveal that levels of violence vary widely across locales, countries, and regions. The Latin American and Caribbean region demonstrates the highest rates of homicide and criminal victimization in the world—several times the rates in Asia, Europe, and Oceania (Rosenberg 1998; UNICRI 1995; UNCHS 1996). In Latin America this violence manifests itself not only in countries experiencing political unrest, such as Colombia and Peru, but also in the war-to-peace transitional societies of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. Recent research suggests that rising inequality in the urban areas of countries such as Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, and Venezuela has also increased levels of youth, gang, and community violence (Moser 1996). At the same time throughout the region, increasing visibility of family violence indicates that prevalence rates of domestic abuse remain high (Gómez Gómez 1993).

The macroeconomic consequences of high rates of violence include a weakening of investor confidence—with potentially severe consequences for image-dependent cities such as Kingston and Rio de Janeiro—and increasing costs in terms of private sector security for the manufacturing and business sectors. Violence also affects the location of factories and businesses, with implications for spatial planning. Sources estimate that countries such as Colombia invest up to 15 percent of GNP in security measures; violent crime as a business in Colombia generates 7 percent of GNP (Kalmanovitz 1990; Colombia 1997). At the microlevel, violence erodes the assets of the poor—particularly labor, human capital, productive assets such as land and housing, and social capital. Ultimately, however, violence affects all levels of society in many developing countries where the growing demands for democratic political participation, economic gains, and personal security are all thwarted by increasing levels of violence.

2. IMPORTANCE OF A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR VIOLENCE REDUCTION

In response to the dramatic growth of interest in the world's most violent region, Latin America and the Caribbean, a diversity of institutions have attempted to address the manifestations, causes, and impacts of violence in this region. Such efforts—based on different disciplines and focusing on sectors such as criminal justice, health, social welfare, and community development—have met with mixed success. Narrow definitions of violence and the lack of an integrative framework both have proven to be major constraints. Compartmentalization of knowledge and understanding has undermined much of the work so far. This has detracted from policy formulation and program design and, ultimately, hurt the poor—whose coping strategies are not sufficient to mitigate the effects of the violence on their lives.

Different academic and professional disciplines have tended to formulate separate definitions of violence and apply them operationally in a diversity of ways. Thus, although there are many project activities that address the problem of violence, there is neither enough cross-communication, nor sufficient recognition by actors of the direct contribution each makes to a holistic understanding, or overall reduction, of violence. There is little synthesis of experience; existing information is fragmented, rarely pulled together in a way that could inform policy, research, or interventions. An example is gender issues—which rarely surface except in discussion of family violence. Donor agencies and research institutions alike tend to follow these historical axes, perpetuating the disarticulation of the “violence and development” field.

Because violence is a complex social, economic, and political problem, its resolution requires strategies integrated throughout affected communities and nations, and based on a conceptual framework that brings a holistic understanding of the causes and impacts of violence and possible interventions for reducing it. This paper presents a preliminary conceptual framework to assist policymakers, planners, and communities in conceptualizing violence and developing sustainable initiatives for peace.

Section 3 of the paper discusses operational definitions of violence and presents a way to categorize violence. Section 4 proposes an integrated framework for violence causality. Section 5 examines how violence can erode different types of capital and their associated assets. Section 6 presents different approaches to the interventions most commonly used to reduce or prevent violence and draws on a World Bank proposal for violence reduction in Colombia to illustrate a framework for interventions to foster violence reduction and peace and development. Section 7 summarizes the components of effective violence reduction that have been identified in sections 3–6.

3. CATEGORIZING VIOLENCE: THE DISTINCTIONS AMONG POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL VIOLENCE

Categorizing violence is a critical first step toward systematically understanding violence and developing sustainable violence reduction and peace initiatives. Any attempt to categorize violence faces three major constraints:

Constraints in Categorizing Violence

- Violence is highly complex and context-specific. In a recent participatory study in urban Jamaica, for example, local residents listed 19 types of violence, including political, drug, gang, economic, interpersonal, and domestic disputes (see Box 1).
- Perceived rates of violence negatively affect citizen well-being even when they are not borne out by statistical evidence. Public opinion surveys in Uruguay and Costa Rica—countries with relatively low levels of violent crime—indicate that citizens in these countries believe that rates of violence are much higher than they actually are. Their risk of violence victimization is disproportionate to measured levels of homicide and assault. This disparity may be explained in part by the use of homicide as the primary or sole measure of violence, and in part by the fact that perceptions may reflect a concern with robberies, assaults, and domestic disputes—types of violence that are often underreported.

- Community priorities regarding the importance of different categories of violence may differ from the priorities of politicians or policymakers. The Jamaica study, for example, showed that the government considered political violence—characterized as political candidates’ arming of youth gangs to terrorize voters—the most critical violence issue facing the urban poor. Local communities, however, emphasized other types of violence; through participatory methodologies these communities identified interpersonal violence—“pickney war,” “matey war,” and “tenant war”—as the most widespread type of violence, and gang violence as the type of violence with the most severe impact on the community.¹ The Jamaican experience points to the need to incorporate community-based needs assessment tools and participatory methodologies in the prioritization of the importance of different categories of violence—with implications for the design of policy- and project-level interventions.

Box 1. Types of Violence Identified in Jamaica

Political	Political Mercenary
Drugs	Drug Cocaine
Gang	Gang war War over guns Knives/bottles/stones
Economic	Housebreaking Thieving/stealing Contract
Interpersonal	Rape Verbal abuse Physical abuse Tenant war Pickney war Matey war War over women
Domestic	Male-female Adult-child

Source: Moser and Holland 1997.

An important first step towards addressing these challenges is to clarify the complexity of violence without oversimplifying the concept. Any categorization is by its very nature static. In the real world violence exists along a continuum with important reinforcing linkages between types of violence. The violence categorization proposed for the conceptual framework presented here is preceded by a brief review of the evolution of thinking on violence typologies in Latin America.

Violence Typologies in Latin America

Colombian experts, in an effort to categorize *las violencias* that plague their country, first distinguished rural violence (*la violencia del monte*) from urban violence (*la violencia de la calle*) to discuss types of violence that were, at that time, generally geographically confined (Deas 1998). They added more spatial categorizations to distinguish violence in private arenas (*aviolencia en la casa*) from violence in public arenas (*violencia en la calle*) (Jimeno and Roldan 1996). They distinguished another dichotomy between “political” and “nonpolitical” (or “social”) violence—tending to emphasize the political violence and limit examination of the nonpolitical violence. Recognition of the prevalence and complexity of nonpolitical violence has rendered this dichotomy too simplistic, and violence experts (*violentólogos*) today often distinguish among “political, delinquency, and interpersonal violence” (Rozenenthal 1998), or “political, criminal, and social violence” (Chernick 1998). However, even these typologies lack conceptual congruency, and fail to acknowledge the roles and motivations of social actors that employ violence to achieve an end.

Other recent Latin American categorizations of violence include “political, economic, and intrafamilial” violence (Carrión 1994), the Inter-American Development Bank’s distinction between

1. “Pickney war” is violence between two nonrelated adults (such as neighbors) whose children are fighting each other. “Matey war” is violence between two women who are both attracted to the same man. “Tenant war” is violence between tenants—such as when competing for access to water.

criminal and social violence at individual, household, or community levels (Buvinic, Morrison, and Shifter 1998), and recent work by Brazilian sociologists on institutional violence that centers on the role of “social actors” in perpetuating violence to maintain power (Pineiro 1998).

A New Categorization of Violence

Building on the work of violence experts in Colombia and elsewhere, this paper proposes dividing violence into three categories: *political violence*, *economic violence*, and *social violence*—each identified in terms of the type of power that consciously or unconsciously violence is used to gain or maintain. Table 1 summarizes some of the common types of violence for each category, in terms that are deliberately broad, and not necessarily mutually exclusive.²

Table 1. Categories of Violence

<i>Category</i>	<i>Definition</i>	<i>Manifestation</i>
Political	The commission of violent acts motivated by a desire, conscious or unconscious, to obtain or maintain political power.	Guerrilla conflict; paramilitary conflict; political assassinations; armed conflict between political parties.
Economic	The commission of violent acts motivated by a desire, conscious or unconscious, for economic gain or to obtain or maintain economic power.	Street crime; carjacking; robbery/theft; drug trafficking; kidnapping; assaults made during economic crimes.
Social	The commission of violent acts motivated by a desire, conscious or unconscious, for social gain or to obtain or maintain social power.	Interpersonal violence such as spouse and child abuse; sexual assault of women and children; arguments that get out of control.

A categorization that distinguishes political, economic, and social violence is extremely useful for several reasons. First it allows for integrated approaches, both conceptual and operational, that recognize the connections between the dynamics of different types of violence. This will help policymakers and project managers to view the impacts and causes of violence in a holistic way and so move from individual violence reduction interventions towards integrated strategies for sustainable peace.

Second, this categorization highlights the need for approaches to violence reduction that are based on the differing motivations of the perpetrators. In Colombia, for example, politically motivated violence will require both a negotiated peace addressing the guerrilla’s political motives and job creation for demobilized combatants addressing the economic dimensions of belonging to a guerrilla group. The economic issues related to the drug trade have complicated the quest for peace; guerrillas often use revenue-generating tactics such as “taxation” of drug traffickers to achieve financial stability. However, without a negotiated peace, efforts to eliminate cocaine production will not eliminate the guerrilla forces, who will find other means to support their essentially politically motivated violence. Violence against women is another example for which root causes and motivations must be addressed;

2. The categories are not exclusive in terms of violent acts committed, because the same violent act can be committed for different reasons. A guerrilla group may kidnap a local official to make a political statement; the same group may kidnap a wealthy landowner to generate revenue. A youth gang member may commit a robbery as an initiation rite within his peer group; another youth may rob for money and violence on an interpersonal level—a man beating his wife, neighbors in a hostile argument—is sometimes an issue of social dominance.

while economic independence through job creation may aid some battered women, it does not address the root causes of this violence—which are social based on gender subordination. This disparity explains why many battered women are middle-class, and employed and educated.

Third, this framework assists in explaining why interventions to reduce one type of violence may not yield results for other types of violence. Reductions in one sphere of violence can be accompanied by increases in another. For example, while community policing programs have been credited with a 43 percent decline in New York City's economic crime rates, reports of police brutality in the city have increased by 41 percent (a social problem). In the wake of El Salvador's peace accords and corresponding reduction in political violence, rates of homicide and economic crime increased. For example, the number of violent deaths in 1994 stood at 9,135, and despite a decline to 8,047 in 1996, this still exceeded the annual average of 6,000 violent deaths a year during the civil war (Pearce 1998). Similarly, in South Africa, police data show that violent crimes have increased substantially during the democratic transition from the apartheid system—especially since 1990 and particularly for murder and rape (Louw 1997).

4. CAUSES OF VIOLENCE: AN INTEGRATED MODEL FOR CAUSALITY

Violence is complex not only because of its different categories, but also because of its multiple causes. Empirical evidence shows that individuals are not equally violent, that communities vary in their levels of violent conflict, and that violence tolerance levels differ across societies. Circumstances relating to the individual, the family, the community, and the broader national context combine to play a role in violence perpetration or victimization.

Despite the wealth of descriptive evidence on violence, theoretical analysis of the specific causes of violence is both limited and fragmented. Theories of causality tend to reflect the professional discipline informing the debate, and therefore are often compartmentalized and disarticulated with each other, perpetuating numerous, fragmented understandings of violence (see Annex 1).

Without being overly deterministic this paper seeks to combine the disparate theories of causality by adopting an integrated model that identifies four different levels of violence causality: structural, institutional, interpersonal, and individual (Figure 1). This model recognizes the mutually reinforcing roles played by factors at different levels of causality. Drawing on the "ecological model," it seeks to demonstrate that no single level or cause determines or explains violence but that each, when combined with one or more additional causal variables, may yield a situation where violence occurs³ Applications of this model are not necessarily confined to a single manifestation of violence; nor must they focus primarily on fomenting factors or risk factors for violence victimization or perpetration. The integrated model is flexible enough to identify the predeterminants of political, economic, and social violence without reducing the analysis to an assessment of a sole cause of any single type of violence. Figure 2 illustrates the application of the framework to gang violence (Moser and van Bronkhorst 1999).

3. First used to explain human development (Bronfenbrenner 1977), the "ecological model" has been used by violence researchers to elucidate the complex causes of child abuse (Belsky 1980), sexual coercion (Brown 1995), and domestic violence (Heise 1998). The ecological model is a multilevel framework that incorporates both individual-level factors—biophysical, psychological, and social—and external factors that act upon the individual.

Figure 1. An Integrated Model for Violence Causality





Figure 2. The Integrated Model for Violence Causality Applied to Gang Violence



5. THE COSTS OF VIOLENCE: THE EROSION OF A SOCIETY'S CAPITAL AND ASSOCIATED ASSETS

The economic and social costs of violence are a burden for all members of society. In the context of macroeconomic deterioration—with rising inflation, unemployment, and fiscal deficits—and public concern about the relationship between economic insecurity, crime, and violence, it is important to understand these costs—both direct and indirect—on various levels.

The direct costs of violence—and associated losses due to deaths, disabilities, and “transferals” resulting from property crimes—can be measured as percentages of GNP or GDP. This does not necessarily imply that GDP would have increased by that percentage had these losses not occurred. Yet despite decades of research by economists these remain difficult to measure, with extensive debates as to the accuracy of different cost estimates. Many methodological challenges remain. In many contexts expenditure assessments of the police, the judiciary, the penal system, and even the armed forces are constrained by serious problems of access to information.

While accurate measurements of the costs of violence are critical, assessing the impacts of violence on a country's capital—its stocks of assets—can also facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of the true price of violence. In identifying the costs of sustained high levels of violence to a society, it is useful to consider the links between vulnerability and asset ownership. The more assets that individuals, households, and communities can acquire and the better they manage them, the less vulnerable they are. The more their assets are eroded, the greater their insecurity and, consequently, their poverty. This paper distinguishes four types of capital: *physical*, *human*, *social*, and *natural*, each with a number of associated assets (Box 2).⁴ It is useful to highlight some of the main ways in which violence erodes these types of capital.

Box 2. Four Kinds of Capital and Their Associated Assets

Physical capital (also known as *produced* or *man-made capital*) comprises a country's stock of plant, equipment, infrastructure and other productive resources owned by individuals, the business sector or the country itself. Physical capital comprise those assets generally considered in financial and economic accounts.

Human capital includes investments in education, health, and the nutrition of individuals. Labor is a critical asset linked to investments in human capital; health status determines people's capacity to work, and skill and education determine the returns from their labor.

Social capital is defined as the rules, norms, obligations, reciprocity, and trust embedded in social relations, social structures, and societies' institutional arrangements which enable its members to achieve their individual and community objectives. Social capital is embedded in social institutions at the micro-institutional level—communities and households—as well as referring to the rules and regulations governing formalized institutions in the market- place, the political system, and civil society.

Natural capital includes the stocks of environmentally provided assets such as soil, atmosphere, forests, minerals, water and wetlands. In rural communities land is a critical productive asset for the poor; while in urban areas land for shelter is also a critical productive asset.

Source: Moser 1996, 1998; Narayan 1997; North 1990; Olson 1982; Serageldin 1996.

4. This draws on recent work on sustainable economic, environmental, and social development (Serageldin and Steer 1994; Serageldin 1996) as well as on the asset vulnerability framework (Moser 1996, 1998).

Physical Capital

- The banking and taxation sectors can be affected—albeit indirectly—by illegal violence linked to, for example, the drug industry. Drug syndicates generate enormous amounts of cash, that to be useful, must pass through legitimate international banking or commercial channels.
- Economic costs are frequently associated with violent attacks on infrastructure—such as electrical installations, roads, airports, and petroleum installations.
- Where police and judicial institutions are weak, the privatization of security is a growing phenomenon in both rural and urban areas, increasing production costs for the private sector.

Human Capital

- Violence reduces access to, and the quality of, education and health services. Teachers or health workers are threatened, attacked, or even killed—causing schools and health posts to be abandoned.
- School dropout rates may increase because of neighborhood violence—which can result from family conflicts or scandals, gang presence, drug use and prostitution. Dropout rates are also associated with domestic violence or abuse (and alcohol or drug use within the family).
- Night school dropout rates are increased by fear of street or public transportation crime.
- Violence creates an additional burden for the health sector, when trauma care consumes a significant portion of health resources. Trauma care includes not only treating physical injuries and attending to disabilities caused by violence, but also treating the psychological traumas of victimization or of witnessing violence among adults—ranging from emotional stress to post-traumatic stress disorder.

Social Capital

Social capital is important because of its recognized contribution to sustainable development and because both the size and density of social networks and institutions, and the nature of interpersonal interactions significantly affect the efficiency and sustainability of development processes (Putnam 1993). Violence erodes social capital when it reduces trust and cooperation within formal and informal social organizations and their members, both formal and informal, that are critical for a society to function (Moser 1998; Moser and Holland 1997).

Social capital in formal social institutions

- Violence often erodes faith in the relevance and governability of many social institutions in contexts where there are human rights violations and a high impunity rate. When judicial, educational, health, media, and security institutions are no longer able to function appropriately and transparently, this tests the institution of democracy itself.
- Most serious of all the violence-linked drug industry erodes the state by corrupting institutions and dividing the population. Drug trafficking corrupts the judicial system when narco-terrorism—threats and acts of kidnapping and assassination—influence the administration of justice and cause changes to the penal code that benefit traffickers. Drug traffickers' systematic threats and attacks against the communications media effectively suppress “the voice” of civil society institutions to participate effectively and peacefully in political decisions at community and national levels.

Social capital in informal community-level institutions

- The capacity for community-level organizations to function depends on levels of cohesion and the ability to meet locally—which hinges on personal safety issues. Sustained violence often systematically reduces the trust between neighbors and communities. There are often higher levels of participation in community action groups in less violent areas, and lower levels in more violent areas.
- In many cities, epidemiological studies and police figures show that murder and violence are often clustered in specific delinquency areas with high concentrations of prostitution, street crime, and drug dealing, low-income housing, unemployment, single-parent families, and school desertion. These factors help create a cultural climate in which violence and delinquency are normative.
- In some instances, violence contributes to the creation of a type of “perverse” social capital. A primary example of perverse social capital is gang involvement—in which young people, bereft of strong family and community support, form mutually reinforcing groups. In many poor neighborhoods gangs form the main pole of socialization for children, who join as young as age 12 or 13. Often gangs may be at war with rival groups involved in robbery, theft, drug distribution or consumption, and assaults. In some communities gangs protect their neighbors, committing crimes elsewhere; in others they prey on their neighbors, creating a climate of fear.

Social capital in household relations

- Violence erodes household relations as an asset when it reduces the capacity of households to effectively function as a unit. Family life is seriously disrupted by high levels of stress in conflict zones, for instance, where many men join illegal guerrilla or paramilitary groups.
- In poor urban communities, many women identify a direct link between male unemployment, alcohol abuse, and increased domestic violence.
- Family members—both male and female—are put in a vulnerable position when communities are displaced by violence. Women are often more vulnerable than men at the moment of eviction, when they are exposed to flight, and separation from their homes. While men seem better equipped to cope at such times, the reverse is true when displaced households restructure their lives; then the impact is greater for men, who become unemployed and experience a loss of status as breadwinners and a rupture of their sense of masculine identity. Women seem better equipped to develop support networks to continue the routines of daily survival and find new ways of earning an income, creating social capital not with other women originating from the same area, but with those sharing the same history of displacement.⁵

Natural Capital

- Terrorism can cause oil spills—with incalculable long-term environmental impacts
- Some illicit crops are sprayed aerially with chemicals that contaminate soil and groundwater, rendering these lands unusable for many years. Deforestation rates increase when peasants, driven from their lands after the spraying, raze nearby forests for planting.
- Displaced populations fleeing violence often flow into urban areas, exacerbating such environmental problems as solid waste disposal and water contamination.
- Inappropriate land use and land degradation usually become more severe when peasants are forcibly evicted or voluntarily flee to escape violence.

5. See Meertens and Segura-Escobar (1996).

6. AN INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK FOR INTERVENTION

In the past few decades, extensive and highly innovative interventions have been implemented to address and reduce violence. However, like much of the analysis of violence itself, interventions to reduce violence have usually been dominated by a particular policy approach and its associated professional discipline (such as criminology or epidemiology). Thus interventions have tended to prioritize a particular type of violence and focus on a particular level of causality. Even when initiatives do address more than one type of violence or target multiple levels of causality, a lack of impact evaluation or cost-benefit analysis often severely hinders identification of “best practices,” reducing the chances of replicating successful interventions.

Current Policy Approaches

To provide an integrated framework for intervention, it is important to classify the dominant policy approaches in the field in terms of both the categories of violence they address and the causal factors on which they focus. In general there has been a broad shift from approaches that focus on the *control* of violence, to those that concentrate on *prevention*, to more recent perspectives that aim to *rebuild social capital*.

The following policy approaches, outlined in Table 2, should be viewed as “ideal types.” More than one approach can be used simultaneously; often well-established approaches are combined with more innovative ones.

- *Criminal justice* is one of the most widely established approaches. It focuses on deterrence and control of violence through higher rates of arrest, conviction, and punishment, facilitated by judicial, police, and penal reform. More successful in reducing economic crime than in reducing social and political violence, this top-down approach is popular among politicians seeking short-term solutions to the symptoms of violence.
- The *public health* approach—also a well-established approach—focuses on economic and social violence at individual and interpersonal levels. This approach aims to prevent violence by reducing individual risk factors. It draws on epidemiological surveillance—especially homicide rates—and identification of risk factors to develop strategies for modifying individual behavior, the social and physical environment, or both.
- The *conflict transformation* approach is a less established perspective that aims to rebuild the fabric of societies. Initially influenced by international actors such as the United Nations, it addresses political and, to a lesser extent, social violence through nonviolent negotiation among conflicting parties—often relying on third-party mediation. While negotiations may take place through international organizations at the structural and institutional levels, they are also important at the interpersonal level, through formal and informal arbitration and community-based training in communication skills.
- The *human rights* approach, a “rights-based approach” to violence reduction, focuses on the role of the state in protecting citizens’ rights to be free from the threat or victimization of violence. Drawing on the documentation of abuse in relation to international human rights conventions, this approach addresses political and social violence, mainly at the individual and

structural levels. While early users of this perspective were targeted towards governments that violated human rights, more recent formulations have focused on all social actors who deny or abuse rights. In particular, this deals with currently excluded groups, such as women, children, and indigenous people, and with future generations who may be harmed by the erosion of the natural resource base.

- The *social capital* approach is still in the process of formulation. Of all perspectives, it focuses most directly on rebuilding social capital in informal and formal institutions such as families, community organizations, and the judiciary. Using bottom-up, participatory processes, this approach creates trust by building on community identification of needs, and focuses on the strengths and assets of communities affected by violence. This approach also provides the potential for community needs to be scaled up to public sector interventions.

Table 2. Different Policy Approaches to Violence Intervention

<i>Approach</i>	<i>Objective</i>	<i>Category of violence addressed</i>	<i>Causal level(s) addressed</i>	<i>Policy/planning intervention</i>	<i>Limitations</i>
Criminal justice	Violence deterrence and control through higher arrest and conviction rates and more severe punishment	Economic	Individual Institutional	Top-down strengthening of judicial, penal, and police systems and their associated institutions	Limited applicability to situations of political and social violence; success highly dependent on enforcement
Public health	Violence prevention through the reduction of individual risk factors	Economic Social	Individual Interpersonal	Top-down surveillance; risk factor identification; resultant behavior modification; scaling up of successful interventions	Almost exclusive focus on individual; often imposed top-down; highly sensitive to quality of surveillance data; limitations in indicators
Conflict transformation	Achieving nonviolent resolution of conflict through negotiated terms between conflicting parties	Political Social	Interpersonal Institutional Structural	Negotiations to ensure conflict reduction between different social actors—often using third party mediation. May be top-down or bottom-up	Often long-term in its impact; often faces challenges in bringing parties to the table and in mediating conflict
Human rights	Legal enforcement of human rights and documentation of abuses by states, and other social actors	Political Social	Individual Structural	Top-down legal enforcement reinforced by bottom-up popular participation and NGO lobbying	Legalistic framework often difficult to enforce in a context of lawlessness, corruption and impunity; documentation of abuse sometimes dangerous.
Social capital	Building social capital to reduce violence in both informal and formal social institutions, such as families, community organizations, and the judiciary	Political Economic Social	Interpersonal Institutional Structural	Bottom-up participatory appraisal of violence; institutional mapping to address problems; community participation in violence reduction measures	Less well articulated than other approaches; fewer indicators developed

Developing an Integrated Intervention Framework: The Colombian National Strategy for Peace and Development

Given the varied emphases and levels of interventions of different policy approaches such as those highlighted above, a more integrated intervention framework needs to be developed. Such a framework allow policymakers to shift from menu-like checklists of single-sector interventions towards an interdisciplinary approach that recognizes a continuum of violence and addresses simultaneously the reduction of different categories of violence. This will facilitate synergies between interventions at different levels, and between interventions designed to reduce different types of violence. Such an integrated framework seeks to incorporate interventions that prevent and reduce violence, as well as interventions that rebuild social capital.

Since ultimately the causes and manifestations of violence are context specific, the particular details of integrated intervention frameworks need to be tailor-made to the requirements of different situations. A 1999 World Bank proposal for a violence reduction, peace, and development framework in Colombia provides one example of an effort to operationalize many of the issues outlined in the sections above.

Basic Principles for a Colombian National Strategy for Peace and Development

In proposing a national strategy for peace and development in Colombia, a number of basic principles were identified at the outset. These included the following:

- Develop a fiscal policy to pay for peace. A peace strategy requires not only political will, but also an adequate budget for implementation. Measures that may help Colombia realize this goal include peace bonds, taxation, and external donor assistance.
- Create partnerships for sustainable peace and development. While the government has responsibility to provide security for its citizens, it also requires the collaboration of key social actors to fulfill this obligation. Such collaboration becomes particularly important when the institutional capacity of the state itself is weak. In Colombia, the private business sector, civil society, and the international community are already contributing to the process of facilitating sustainable peace and development.
- Promote participatory debate about local-level causes of and solutions to violence. Sustainable peace and development are unlikely without open debate among all social actors about the causes as well as the solutions. Such participatory processes can also identify local-level solutions to rebuild social capital and citizenship and to address the needs of priority target groups.
- Adopt a coordinated approach to violence reduction. During the past decade an impressive menu of initiatives implemented by government, private, and nongovernmental sectors has been constrained by several factors including: a lack of cohesive policy that integrates different objectives and instruments for reducing violence; fragmented approaches to violence reduction with single-focused independent programs; a proliferation of interventions focusing on short-term gain rather than long-term structural change; and limited evaluation and cost analyses—preventing informed policy decisions regarding the relative fiscal returns of different programs.

The Components of the Colombian National Strategy for Peace and Development

Drawing on the extensive initiatives already implemented by Colombians, the proposed strategy seeks to control the symptoms of violence, introduce preventive measures, and rebuild the fabric of society—with particular emphasis on strengthening social capital. In some cases single interventions will be used to address different types of violence simultaneously; in other cases a number of interventions in combination will be used to reduce violence. The strategy has three critical components, addressing the continuum of violence at national, sector and municipal levels. The plan for each level has a number of detailed components (Table 3).

Table 3. Proposed Colombian National Strategy for Peace and Development: Examples of Different Interventions

<i>Potential interventions</i>	<i>Main types of violence addressed</i>	<i>Main groups targeted</i>
National level—Peace program		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pre-accord project support • Demobilization; reintegration of ex-combatants • Reconstruction measures • Programs for displaced people 	Political	Guerrilla groups, communities affected by violence; ex-combatants; displaced people
Sector level—Mainstreaming violence reduction into priority sector policies and programs		
Education sector		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Revision of curriculum • Conflict resolution programs • Restructuring timetable • Referral program for “at risk” youth • Teacher security 	Economic Social	Youth “at-risk” including gangs; future generations
Judiciary sector		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community-based conflict resolution programs • Community-based tribunals • Reduction of judicial congestion • Strengthening of managerial capacity to reduce corruption 	Economic Social	Poor rural and urban communities; people illegally detained; people affected by impunity
Environment sector		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Measures to ensure the adequate protection of environmentally fragile regions, especially those with natural resources 	Political Economic	Peasants and indigenous groups living in remote, environmentally sensitive areas
Livelihood and job creation sector		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rural credit services • Micro-enterprise loans • Private sector partnerships to generate jobs 	Political Economic Social	Peasants and indigenous groups with no access to land or livelihood; poor urban populations
Municipal level—Social capital projects		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strategic plans for peace and reconstruction • Community-level assessments • Projects to build social capital • Mechanisms to scale up local solutions 	Political Economic Social	Urban and rural communities affected by violence, especially in regions most affected by conflict

7. CONCLUDING COMMENT

Although violence is not a new development problem it is only now receiving attention because it has become so widespread and its economic, political, and social costs have been recognized. The conceptual framework presented in this paper is preliminary in nature—with considerable analytical work still needed—nevertheless the framework does identify a number of important components of effective violence reduction.

- While the categorization of violence varies widely, the concept of political, economic, and social violence as a continuum goes some way towards combining the somewhat fragmented distinctions identified elsewhere in the literature.
- Factors causing violence can be analyzed at a number of different levels: individual, interpersonal, institutional, and structural.
- It is useful to analyze how violence can erode physical, human, social, and natural capital and their associated assets.
- The description of different interventions to reduce violence shows how interventions can be approached not only from the perspective of different disciplines but also from perspectives that focus on violence control, prevention, or reduction through rebuilding social capital.
- In terms of potential concrete interventions, the proposal for violence reduction in Colombia illustrates the importance of designing simultaneous violence reduction measures at national, sectoral, and local levels.

Annex: Different Disciplinary Perspectives on Violence Causality

Biomedical sciences explore the role of biological factors—endocrinological mechanisms, neurotransmitters and receptors, nutrition, and aging processes—to explain, for example, the preponderance of men and youth who perpetuate violence.

Criminology focuses on deterrence as the principal means of controlling violent behavior. Punishment—including humiliation, incarceration, or execution—are primary control mechanisms: the demonstration effects of increased conviction and incarceration rates are arguably as important as the direct effects of punishment on offenders.

Economics relies on the theory of rational choice, where decisions to engage in criminal activity are based on considerations of costs (possible) and benefits (usually, financial gain). A person commits an offense because (s)he believes the outcome is more valuable than the outcome of other activities in which (s)he could invest time and resources. Certain people commit assaults not because their motivations are different from other people's, but because their perception of benefits and costs differ from those of other people.

Epidemiology stresses violence prevention through the identification of individual risk factors and protective factors that indicate which people are more likely to become aggressors or victims of violence. Underlying this approach is the assumption that behavior modification and/or environmental manipulation can mitigate risk factors and enhance protective factors.

Political science focuses on structural explanations for violence that identify broad societal, political, or economic causes—such as poverty or lack of opportunity—that operate independent of human cognition. According to this perspective, violence and other “illegitimate” behaviors arise when people are deprived of “legitimate” means and resources to realize culturally valued goals.

Psychology emphasizes two principal explanations for violent behavior. The first is developmental theory, in which violence is believed to result from missing early parent-child ties of love, abusive or excessively punitive childhood experiences, and a dearth of experiences that reinforce child attachments, mitigate frustrations, and encourage flexible inner controls. The second explanation is social learning theory, which postulates that behavior, including violent behavior, is learned through imitation of role models and reinforced by rewards and punishments received in interaction with others.

Sociology interprets violent behavior as a by-product of norms and values transmitted across generations. Certain subgroups exhibit higher rates of violence because they participate in a subculture that has more violent norms. Within sociology, the interactionist approach studies the sequence of actions by which conflict escalates into violence and the process through which assaultive violence occurs.

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