GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND
ESTABLISHMENT OF A MULTIDONOR TRUST FUND

June 13, 2012
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANSA</td>
<td>Affiliated Network on Social Accountability</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Country Assistance Strategy or Country Partnership Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMU</td>
<td>Country management unit</td>
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<td>CSF</td>
<td>Civil Society Fund</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>DGF</td>
<td>Development Grant Facility</td>
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<td>GAC</td>
<td>Governance and anticorruption</td>
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<td>GPSA</td>
<td>Global Partnership for Social Accountability</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and communications technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>IEG</td>
<td>Independent Evaluation Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and evaluation</td>
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<td>MDTF</td>
<td>Multidonor trust fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>RoE</td>
<td>Roster of Experts</td>
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<td>SC</td>
<td>Steering Committee</td>
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<td>SPF</td>
<td>State and Peace-building Fund</td>
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<td>WBI</td>
<td>World Bank Institute</td>
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# Global Partnership for Social Accountability

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GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The World Bank views beneficiary participation and feedback in partnership with governments as critical for effective social and economic development and poverty reduction. In carrying out its core mission of poverty reduction, the Bank engages with civil society across a wide range of activities—such as promoting public consensus and local ownership of reforms; giving voice to beneficiaries, particularly poor and marginalized groups; bringing innovative ideas and solutions to development challenges; and increasing country capacity for effective service delivery.¹

2. Bank Engagement with Civil Society. In 1983, the Bank established the Small Grants Program (later known as the Civil Society Fund, or CSF) to provide direct support to civil society organizations; in recent years, the CSF has supported 350-400 CSOs in more than 55 countries. Additional Bank funding for CSOs, made directly and through governmental channels, has also increased steadily over the past decade, totaling an estimated $645 million during FY08-10.² Beneficiary engagement on the demand side of governance is a key pillar in the Bank’s updated Governance and Anti-Corruption (GAC) Strategy.³ The Independent Evaluation Group’s recent evaluation of GAC challenges Management to pay attention to civil society capacity building as part of an urgent update of the Bank’s approach to institution building for better in-country economic governance.⁴ In this context, Management seeks the Board’s approval to create a Global Partnership for Social Accountability (GPSA) and to establish a multidonor trust fund (MDTF) for the GPSA, to provide more strategic and sustained support to reflect the voice of beneficiaries, promote greater transparency and accountability, and achieve stronger development results.

3. Growing Beneficiary Engagement and Needs. Recent years have seen growing beneficiary engagement in monitoring and assessing government performance—particularly in providing feedback on, and voicing demand for, improved service delivery—and thus contributing to greater development effectiveness. This kind of engagement—also referred to as social accountability—enables beneficiaries and civil society groups to engage with policymakers and service providers to bring about greater accountability and responsiveness to beneficiary needs. At the same time, many factors—especially the proliferation of new

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¹ World Bank (2005), Issues and Options for Improving Engagement between the World Bank and Civil Society Organizations.
² The Bank does not systematically capture funding going to civil society. These figures are based on a study conducted during July-October 2011 that examined 27 Bank mechanisms providing grants to civil society. The study also reviewed more than 1,000 Project Appraisal Documents (PADs) of projects approved and recorded in SAP from FY08 to FY10, including community-driven development projects, social funds, and other special loans and credits such as the Multi-country HIV-AIDS Program (MAP). After a preliminary review of the PADs that had a CSO or CSO contracting component, the team reviewed the procurement documents from them to extract the dollar amounts of those contracts.
information and communications technologies—are changing how beneficiaries and CSOs engage with governments; and many governments are creating better enabling environments for voice, transparency, and accountability (e.g., adopting access-to-information laws, establishing independent accountability institutions, and joining the 51-country Open Government Partnership). There is some rigorous empirical evidence that under the right conditions, civil society can contribute to better government policies and performance, and hence better development outcomes. However, feedback from over 1,000 diverse stakeholders in all Regions indicates that there are large knowledge and evidence gaps, especially in terms of what works and why, under what conditions approaches can be scaled up, whether successful approaches can be replicated in different sociopolitical settings, and how to sustain successful approaches. Particular needs are practical “how-to” guides, greater South-South learning and exchanges, and more systematic support to civil society networks.

4. **The Bank’s Comparative Advantage.** Although many donors and foundations provide direct support to civil society, consultations undertaken for this paper confirm that the Bank has a comparative advantage in providing support to better integrate beneficiary and civil society voice and feedback for stronger development results. GPSA would focus on areas of Bank comparative advantage and value addition arising from a combination of the Bank’s official and unique relationship with governments, the range and reach of its partnership and knowledge services, its convening power, and its ability to complement and reinforce supply-side GAC interventions with demand-side efforts for better development results. The Bank can use its convening power and leverage its traditional engagements with governments to create more space for constructive engagement between CSOs and governments to enhance development effectiveness. And through its analytic, knowledge, and advisory activities, the Bank is well equipped to understand the capacity and constraints of state institutions and CSOs, encourage ways to improve their effectiveness as providers of services and development inputs, and open up development policy discussions to non-state actors.

5. **Building on Past Bank Support for Social Accountability.** Over the years, the Bank has actively supported a range of social accountability initiatives across Regions. For example, in Accra, Ghana, consultative citizens’ report cards allow 4,000 households to prioritize their service needs and report on the quality of services received; in Porto Alegre, Brazil, participatory budgeting began in 1990 and has spread to 200 cities; in Morocco, local committees of civil society representatives and elected government officials express and prioritize community needs in local development plans; in Bangladesh, adoption of access-to-information legislation is leading to enhanced accountability and improved service delivery; in Armenia, the Bank partnered with a local nongovernmental organization to build the capacity of civil society groups to use participatory monitoring tools to improve service delivery; and in the Philippines an interactive map of public education facilities allows beneficiaries to provide feedback on the use of resources, state of facilities, and teacher attendance. The proposed GPSA would build on this history of support and continue the Bank’s engagement with beneficiaries and with the CSOs that act as their intermediaries.

A. **The Proposed GPSA**

6. The GPSA would be aimed specifically at improving development results by supporting capacity building for enhanced beneficiary feedback and participation. GPSA support would be
consistent with the GAC strategy, Guidance Note on Bank Multi-Stakeholder Engagement, and the Bank’s Articles of Agreement (including the prohibition of involvement with political activities). GPSA features strong country ownership, explicit government agreement to “opt in” to GPSA, and astute risk identification and risk management of activities it would fund. GPSA would start small, learn from experience, and expand on the basis of lessons learned and rigorous demonstration of positive impact. The GPSA would contribute to country-level governance reforms and improved service delivery by (a) generating knowledge, networking, and financing to build civil society’s capacity to engage in evidence-based social accountability; (b) supporting Bank teams and government counterparts in embedding social accountability more strategically in their programs; and (c) drawing on the experience, knowledge, and resources of external partners to enable the Bank to scale up its engagement in this area. The GPSA’s proposed partnership and governance structure reflects good practice distilled from many years of World Bank experience working with over 100 global and regional partnership programs (ranging from the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor to the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program), the feedback from extensive consultations, and the lessons and good practices of other partners at the global and country levels.

7. **Partnerships.** The GPSA would seek global partnerships on two fronts: knowledge and funding. Funding would be channeled through a multidonor trust fund (MDTF) to which the Bank would contribute the resources that are currently dedicated to the CSF. All activities supported by the GPSA and funded by the MDTF would be consistent with the Guidance Note on Bank Multi-Stakeholder Engagement, endorsed by the Board in June 2009. The GPSA would make larger grants for periods of 3-5 years, with disbursement tranches linked to agreed milestones. In addition to the MDTF, flexible arrangements would allow the partners in the GPSA to contribute in a variety of ways at global, regional, or country levels: for example, partners could provide parallel externally managed funding that follow criteria harmonized with the GPSA’s. The recipient-executed portion of activities funded by the MDTF would—like all recipient-executed activities financed by IDA/IBRD and trust funds—be subject to the Bank’s operational policies and procedures in line with risk levels and funds involved. The MDTF would be in line with the four pillars of ongoing Bankwide trust fund reforms: ensuring strategic alignment and consolidation; integration with business processes; cost recovery; and improved oversight. Outreach to donors on the GPSA would be coordinated at the corporate level, with broad participation of Bank VPUs and Senior Management, and full integration into country and network strategies. To increase strategic impact, the GPSA would seek to link supported activities with Bank programs, but such linkages would not be a requirement for GPSA support.

8. **GPSA Governance.** The partnership would have a Steering Committee (SC), chaired initially by the Bank, with balanced representation among donors, CSOs, and developing country governments. The initial number of SC members would be 10; three donor partners (two sovereign donors and one foundation representative); three CSOs (one Part I representative and two Part II representatives); and three government representatives from Regions with the most participating countries (likely Africa, Middle East and North Africa, and East Asia and the

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6 World Bank (2009), Guidance Note on Bank Multi-Stakeholder Engagement.

7 Most donors would be government agencies.
Pacific), in addition to a World Bank representative. Donor members would need to make a minimum threshold contribution to the MDTF to be eligible for a seat on the SC. CSO members will be nominated through regional CSO networks, from a pool initially identified by EXT (for Part I) and the Regional Vice Presidencies (for Part II). A small CSO–donor–Bank selection committee would review the nominations and make final decisions. Government members will be selected by the Bank’s Board of Executive Directors. All member seats except the Bank’s would rotate after three years; the first rotations will be staggered between the third and fourth years to avoid a complete turnover of SC membership at the same time. Over time the SC could increase the number of members, provided it maintains a numerical balance of members from all three groups. The SC would be supported by a small Secretariat of Bank staff. A Roster of Experts drawn from around the world would also provide support to the Secretariat. The Secretariat would work closely with Bank country teams to ensure that grants and activities are rooted in the needs and realities of the local context and, when possible, to leverage the Bank’s engagement.

9. **Bank Role.** The Bank’s role would be to (a) sponsor and support the GPSA and seek participation by donors, developing countries, and other stakeholders; (b) establish an MDTF and serve as its Trustee; (c) provide funding to the MDTF; (d) administer the GPSA Secretariat; (e) participate in the SC as initial Chair and as donor member; and (f) through active participation by Bank country teams, seek synergies and complementarities between supply-side governance reforms and support for demand-side interventions. Country directors would take the lead in securing country consent for the GPSA to operate in their country and in submitting the proposed grants to the government(s) for review.

10. **Country-level Management, Grant-making Process, and Implementation.** The GPSA would make country-level grants on a competitive basis to eligible CSOs for knowledge creation, knowledge sharing and networking, and institutional strengthening for social accountability. Bank country directors and country teams would play a pivotal role for country-level grants, since GPSA support needs to be tailored to the country context, including country-level partnerships and risk. Multi-stakeholder consultations, held before issuing calls for proposals, would maximize the alignment of GPSA activities with country development strategies. The country management unit (CMU) would vet country-specific proposals for compliance with GPSA requirements. Cleared proposals would then be submitted to external experts who are knowledgeable about the country for review of the technical quality and strategic alignment with the country’s development strategies and GPSA criteria. The GPSA Secretariat would decide which proposals merit consideration by the SC and would forward these proposals, along with any peer review comments, to the SC for its concurrence on a no-objection basis. Proposals to which the SC has concurred would then be submitted to the government for a ten-day review period, after which the Bank will follow with a five-day public disclosure period during which information on the proposed purpose and recipient of the grants would be made public. The country director would take comments received into account in providing the final clearance. The CMU would designate Bank staff to play a key role in monitoring and evaluating grant implementation in close coordination with the GPSA Secretariat.

11. **Global and Regional Grants.** The process for global and regional grants would be broadly similar. The SC would determine Regional calls for proposals, with input from the relevant Regional Vice President to ensure alignment with Bank strategic directions. The
Secretariat would vet incoming proposals to ensure they meet Bank and GPSA eligibility criteria, forward them for review to appropriate experts, and decide which proposals merit consideration by the SC and forward these proposals, along with any peer review comments, to the SC for its concurrence on a no-objection basis. Regional proposals to which the SC has concurred would be submitted for the same ten-day comment period with relevant governments, followed by a five-day period of public disclosure and comment. The relevant Regional Vice President would take comments received into account in providing final clearance. For global proposals, the SC would follow a similar process.

12. **Bank Contribution.** Management proposes to apply the Bank’s current annual $2.8 million contribution to the CSF (starting in FY13), as a contribution to the GPSA MDTF. In addition, in FY13 about $2.2 million would be redeployed from other below-the-line grant programs, bringing total Bank contributions to the GPSA to $5 million in FY13. The contribution would continue to be treated as a below-the-line item, and would be the subject of a separate recommendation in the budget document. Management proposes to keep the FY13 level of annual funding to the GPSA—$5 million—through FY16. As part of the subsequent annual and business planning processes, Management would review with the Board the level of the Bank’s funding to the GPSA.

13. **Results.** The GPSA would adopt a robust results framework to systematically measure and quantify results achieved by individual grants and the partnership as a whole. The results tracked would include inputs and outputs as well as development outcomes, including, for example, capacity built, improvements in the enabling environment for social accountability, and development effectiveness.

**B. Challenges**

14. The establishment of the GPSA would both create opportunities and pose challenges. Thus Management proposes to move incrementally, adapting the GPSA to reflect the lessons of experience and reporting periodically to the Board on lessons, progress, and impact.

- **Country relationships.** Key among these challenges would be the relationship with governments of countries where the GPSA would seek to operate. The GPSA would operate in a country only with the knowledge and written consent of the member government. The government’s overall consent would be recorded in a memorandum of understanding or exchange of letters signed by the Bank and the government. In working with governments and CSOs, the Bank would take appropriate measures to avoid the risk of political interference and address reputational risks, consistent with the Guidance on Bank Multi-Stakeholder Engagement.

- **Legitimacy.** To be effective, the GPSA must be seen as legitimate by the general public and partners. To achieve that legitimacy it would need to (a) be regarded as a genuine partnership among CSOs, donors, and governments; (b) have an inclusive governance structure that enables the voices of CSOs, donors, and governments to be heard; (c) have transparent grant-making processes; and (d) allow for external feedback on application of and compliance with its established procedures and operating terms. Various features in the design of the GPSA address these challenges.
C. Next Steps

15. Management requests Board approval to repurpose the CSF funds expected for FY13-16 to be used for the GPSA, thereby eliminating the CSF. Management intends to request in its FY13 budget submission to the Board the sum of $5 million as a contribution to the proposed MDTF. This includes reallocation of the $2.8 million now going to the CSF. Management proposes to keep the FY13 level of annual funding to the GPSA—$5 million—through FY16. As part of subsequent annual and business planning processes, Management would review with the Board the level of Bank funding to the GPSA. Consistent with BP 14.40, Trust Funds, Management requests Board approval to establish the proposed MDTF to support social accountability. If the Board approves the establishment of the MDTF, and the budget document is approved, Management would launch GPSA operations in early FY13. In preparation for the launch, consultations would be held in “first mover” countries to identify strategic priorities and provide input to the development of an Operations Manual, which is now ongoing. Management would conduct further internal briefings of managers and staff on the GPSA over the upcoming weeks.

16. Governance Bodies. At the same time, the Secretariat would be established. It would be located in the World Bank Institute for an incubation period, after which Management would review the experience and decide when the Secretariat should be transferred to the Bank’s Sustainable Development Network. The Secretariat would be staffed by a Program Manager (competitively recruited Bank staff) and a senior operations officer. As soon as feasible, given the progress of consultations, the Steering Committee and Roster of Experts would be established.

17. Implementation Review. Management fully agrees with the recommendation that came from the first round of consultations—that in the beginning of such a new initiative as the GPSA, it makes sense to start small, learn from experience, and make adjustments as necessary. Management would report regularly to Executive Directors to monitor progress, beginning with an informal report delivered to the Board in Q2 of FY13, and would carry out an independent evaluation at the end of the second year of operation.

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9 BP 14.40 states that “Executive Directors approve any proposal for a Bank-administered trust fund where one or more of the following circumstances arise: (i) it includes a transfer or transfers from the Bank’s net income or surplus; (ii) it would provide assistance to a non-member country, or to a member not in good standing with the Bank; or (iii) it presents novel or significant policy issue(s) which, in Management’s judgment, warrant consideration by the Executive Directors” (footnote 8).
GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The World Bank views beneficiaries and civil society as critical actors and partners with governments for effective social and economic development. Consistent with its mandate, the Bank engages with civil society organizations (CSOs) to contribute to the Bank’s core mission of poverty reduction by strengthening and leveraging the impact of development programs; promoting public consensus and local ownership of reforms; giving voice to beneficiaries, particularly poor and marginalized groups; bringing innovative ideas and solutions to development challenges; increasing country capacity for effective service delivery; and promoting good governance and accountability.¹ This paper proposes the establishment of a Global Partnership for Social Accountability (GPSA) that is based on these approaches and the Bank’s mandate.

2. Bank Engagement with Civil Society. Bank engagement with civil society has grown extensively over more than 30 years—an engagement that was first described in 1981 in a Good Practices Statement, Involving Nongovernmental Organizations in Bank-Supported Activities. Subsequent years saw a series of operational policies, procedures, and guidance supporting or mandating engagement with civil society to improve operations and promote sustainability of results—including the Bank’s policies on Country Assistance Strategies (CASs) and social and environmental safeguards. Bank funding for CSOs, provided directly and through governmental channels, has also increased steadily. The recent Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) evaluation of the Bank’s Governance and Anticorruption (GAC) Strategy challenges Management to pay attention to civil society capacity building as part of an urgent update of the Bank’s approach to institution building for better in-country economic governance;² and the second phase of the GAC Strategy emphasizes the importance of building the capacity of non-executive actors, such as CSOs, parliaments, and the media, through its Demand for Good Governance agenda. The Bank engages with civil society groups worldwide, providing them information on Bank activities; consulting them on policies and strategies; contracting with them for research and training services; involving them in implementing, monitoring, and evaluating Bank projects; partnering on global or regional programs; and funding civil society development initiatives and social accountability.

3. Global Support for Civil Society. Worldwide, CSOs have grown in both number and reach.⁴ This growth has been accompanied and fueled by the widespread emergence of

¹ World Bank (2005), Issues and Options for Improving Engagement between the World Bank and Civil Society Organizations.
³ For the purpose of this paper, CSOs include legal entities that fall outside the public or for-profit sector, such as NGOs, not-for-profit media organizations, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional organizations, labor unions, associations of elected local representatives, foundations, and policy development and research institutes.
⁴ A study of 36 developed, developing, and transitional countries estimated the share of GDP produced by the CSO sector at 5.4 percent of the combined GDP and employment in the CSO sector at 4.4 percent of the economically active population (Salomon, Sakolowski and Associates, 2004).
innovations and new approaches to the involvement of civil society in development, often generated indigenously but also supported and fostered by global CSOs, foundations, private corporations and beneficiaries, and other development partners—including, in many cases, governments themselves. CSOs promote transparency and accountability at the international and national levels, and they support community-driven approaches in local settings. Bilateral and multilateral organizations, as well as foundations, are scaling up their support.

4. **Bank Financing for CSOs.** The Bank has provided direct grant funding to civil society since 1983, when it established the Small Grants Program (now called the Social Development Civil Society Fund, or CSF) to directly support the activities of CSOs at the country level (described in greater detail in Section III). In addition, the Bank’s overall financial support to CSOs has increased over the past decade. While it is difficult to get a comprehensive picture of Bank funding for CSOs, estimates from a recent draft assessment found that Bank financing to CSOs through operations for service delivery reached at least $645 million during FY08-10.\(^6\) Grant funding through the Development Grant Facility (DGF) and trust funds for a wide range of purposes (e.g., research, community mobilization, social accountability) totaled $197 million during the same period.

5. **Social Accountability.** Recent years have also seen growing beneficiary and civil society engagement in monitoring and assessing government performance, particularly in providing feedback on, and voicing demands for, improved service delivery. This kind of engagement—also referred to as social accountability—enables beneficiaries and civil society groups to engage with policymakers and service providers to bring about greater accountability for and responsiveness to beneficiary needs. The Bank has supported this work in a number of countries. For example, through report cards in Bangalore, India, individuals provided feedback on the quality of services delivered by public agencies (health, transportation, housing, telecommunications); in the Philippines a civil-society-led association is monitoring construction in the roads sector; in South Africa, a CSO conducts independent budget analysis and disseminates budget information to the public in accessible formats; in Brazil, civil society participates in budget monitoring in 200 cities; in Uganda, community organizations developed action plans with public health staff to improve health services, which led to significantly improved services and mother-child health outcomes; and in Accra, Ghana, report cards allow 4,000 households to prioritize their service needs and monitor the quality of service delivery. The Bank is actively supporting access-to-information initiatives, working on both the supply and demand sides of information, as well as expanding the knowledge base on access-to-information reforms (see Annex A). The Bank is also using technological innovations to open participation in development. Open data and innovative visualization such as the Mapping for Results Initiative are powerful tools for CSOs and beneficiaries.\(^7\) These new approaches can increase

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\(^{5}\) For example, civil society groups have come together to support a new Accountability Charter to demonstrate their commitment to accountability and transparency.

\(^{6}\) The Bank does not systematically capture funding going to civil society. These figures are based on a study conducted during July-October 2011 that examined 27 Bank mechanisms providing grants to civil society. The study also reviewed more than 1,000 Project Appraisal Documents (PADs) of projects approved and recorded in SAP from FY08 to FY10, including community-driven development projects, social funds, and other special loans and credits such as the Multi-country HIV-AIDs Program (MAP). After a preliminary review of the PADs that had a CSO or CSO contracting component, the team reviewed the procurement documents from them to extract the dollar amounts of those contracts.

\(^{7}\) In partnership with AidData, the program has analyzed and geographically coded World Bank and African Development Bank-financed project portfolios in six countries—DRC, Rwanda, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Botswana—to demonstrate how this can promote development effectiveness.
government responsiveness, transform the way public services are delivered to beneficiaries, enhance the transparency and accountability of development assistance, and empower beneficiaries to communicate directly with governments and service providers.

6. **Purpose of Paper.** In view of civil society’s and beneficiaries’ growing engagement with governments and their potential role in improving development impact, Management believes it is important to strategically enhance the Bank’s support for social accountability. This paper proposes repositioning the CSF as the Global Partnership for Social Accountability (GPSA) to continue the Bank’s engagement with beneficiaries and the CSOs that act as their intermediaries. The GPSA would focus on (a) generating knowledge, networking, and financing to build civil society’s capacity to engage in evidence-based social accountability; (b) supporting Bank teams and government counterparts in embedding social accountability more strategically in their programs; and (c) drawing on the experience, knowledge, and resources of external partners to enable the Bank to scale up its engagement in this area. By creating the GPSA, Management proposes to strategically refocus and scale up its support to CSOs engaged in social accountability, with greater emphasis on knowledge generation and partnerships.

7. **Structure of the Paper.** This paper reviews the need for an increased focus on social accountability, describes experience with the CSF, proposes establishing the GPSA, discusses the opportunities and challenges of the proposed approach, presents a results framework to measure impact, and describes proposed next steps.

II. **THE ROLE OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY**

8. A number of global factors—among them the increase in youth populations in many parts of the world, growth in the number and variety of CSOs, rising education levels, and the gradual increase in civil society’s ability to access information—are changing how beneficiaries and CSOs interact with governments, policymakers, and service providers. At the same time, the proliferation of new information and communications technologies (ICTs)—such as cell phones and text messaging—is opening up government processes to a larger public and empowering beneficiaries to demand transparency and accountability from the public sector. Similarly, by instantly linking individuals across country boundaries, social networks are lending impetus to country-level reform coalitions. This section briefly reviews the potential of social accountability to contribute to improved development outcomes; the interest of development partners and countries themselves in supporting greater social accountability; and the extent of the Bank’s involvement with and support for civil society.

A. **Value of Promoting Social Accountability**

9. Global research has shown that under appropriate conditions, beneficiaries and civil society can contribute to improved public policies and government performance, with benefits that can extend beyond targeted development outcomes to improved intrinsic and instrumental outcomes. By emphasizing participation and transparency and by strengthening the enabling

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8 Various reviews have been undertaken of the impact of CSO engagement on government performance and development outcomes. See, for example, McGee, R. and J. Gaventa (2011), “Review of the Impact and Effectiveness of Transparency and Accountability Initiatives: Synthesis Report,” Institute for Development
environment, social accountability can give voice to many who are at risk of being left out of the development process, and can lead to greater trust and mutual respect between beneficiaries and the state. Instrumentally, it can bring added value by helping countries set and adopt policies that are more responsive to the broad public interest and beneficiary needs; ensuring that policies and budgets allocate resources to areas and services that individuals need; tracking whether there are leakages in funds as they flow to their final destination; providing incentives for front-line staff and service agencies to perform better; monitoring quality of outputs and services delivered; and generating beneficiary awareness of and demand for services.

10. **State of Knowledge.** Although there are striking and promising examples of social accountability, there are also large gaps in our understanding of when and why different groups of beneficiaries organize, and what instruments of civic engagement can promote accountability of public institutions. Available evidence suggests that underlying political economy conditions shape both the nature of beneficiary engagement and its impact, and that demand-side accountability interventions need to complement and be coordinated with efforts on the supply side of governance. There is a need for more robust evidence on whether and how social accountability approaches can be sustained, scaled up, and replicated in different sociopolitical settings, and how international partnerships can leverage beneficial change. Addressing these knowledge gaps requires learning by doing, rather than passive research. The proposed GPSA would help to address such knowledge gaps.

B. **Support for Social Accountability**

11. In the spirit of the Accra Agenda for Action, the Bank’s multilateral and bilateral development partners increasingly see civil society as having an important role in building country ownership of aid policies, and in holding governments to account and ensuring that policy commitments are met. This role was endorsed during the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, Korea, in November 2011. The Forum acknowledged that CSOs play “a vital role in shaping development policies and partnerships, and in overseeing their implementation.”

12. **Development Partners.** Multilateral organizations are scaling up their support for CSOs; for example, the Inter-American Development Bank has launched a regional fund to support CSO sustainability. The European Union recently launched a €22 million support facility for civil society groups in North Africa and overall provides €1 billion annually to civil society groups. Bilateral donor governments, often as part of their foreign policy, have also promoted greater transparency and supported individual CSOs in developing countries. For example, the UK’s Department for International Development has provided £135 million through its Governance and Transparency Fund to strengthen civil society’s voice in holding governments accountable. In 2011, the Swedish development agency provided €165 million and the Norwegian development agency €65 million to support civil society. Foundations, too, have

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9 This section draws on the findings and arguments in Devarajan, Khemani, and Walton (2011), op. cit.
encouraged cross-national research and reflections on how best to promote demand-side governance to enhance development impact. For example, the Transparency and Accountability Initiative, which is supported by a consortium of foundations and bilateral donors, has financed research on the impact of accountability and transparency approaches, as well as a global survey on the use of ICTs in enhancing individual demand for improved services.\(^\text{10}\)

13. **Countries.** Many countries are also providing a more enabling environment for beneficiary voice, transparency, and accountability, including through access to government-held information, more transparent processes around the formulation and implementation of public budgets, beneficiary and third-party tracking of expenditure flows, and monitoring of public services. Investments in e-government are growing, as are reforms in decentralized governance that assign more voice and resources to local levels. A range of independent accountability institutions—ombuds offices, supreme audit institutions, parliamentary public accounts committees, and anticorruption bodies—are being endowed with new mandates to change the ways governments operate and account for their actions.\(^\text{11}\) The recent launch of the multilateral Open Government Partnership, in which 51 countries have committed to the principles of transparency and openness, is further evidence of many countries’ willingness to bring greater transparency and accountability into their governing process. (Annex A provides examples of government initiatives.) At the same time, consultations for this paper revealed that in some countries the space for government-beneficiary engagement is narrowing, with increasing government restrictions on assembly, resource mobilization, and public disclosure of information. CSOs expressed a need for development partners to encourage governments to open and maintain space for constructive government-beneficiary engagement.\(^\text{12}\)

**C. Bank Engagement with Beneficiaries and CSOs**

14. The Bank’s approach to governance promotes building more transparent, accountable, and capable states, not only by developing public sector capacity, but also increasingly through supporting reciprocal engagement between the state and beneficiaries (Annex A provides examples). This implies the need to work more closely with CSOs that engage beneficiaries with official actors in the governance process; to build their capacity to engage productively with the state; and to strengthen and sustain their involvement in the governance dialogue. It also calls for greater knowledge exchange, learning, and active collaboration among diverse practitioners of social accountability to improve practice. Increasingly, the Bank recognizes that CSOs’ role in promoting accountability and good governance, ensuring improved service delivery, and incubating development solutions that can be brought to scale responds directly to its fundamental mandate of poverty reduction.

15. **Bank Policy on Engagement with Beneficiaries and CSOs.** Engagement with CSOs is embedded in the Bank’s policies and guidelines. The Bank’s legal and policy framework outlines modalities for multi-stakeholder engagement\(^\text{13}\) that seek to balance the value of such engagement.

\(^\text{10}\)& For more information, see www.transparency-initiative.org.

\(^\text{11}\)& According to the International Ombudsman Institute, in 1983 about 21 countries had ombudsman institutions. In 2010/11 it registered more than 150 ombudsman institutions across the world. See http://www.theioi.org.

\(^\text{12}\)& One initiative to address this concern, “Defending Civil Society,” has been launched by the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law and World Movement for Democracy.

\(^\text{13}\)& Multi-stakeholder engagement includes engagement with CSOs, parliaments, and media.
in improving both development outcomes and the Bank’s work, with the need to respect the various limits set out in the Bank’s Articles of Agreement. The Guidance Note on Bank Multi-Stakeholder Engagement, endorsed by the Board in June 2009, notes that the Bank’s work with CSOs has increasingly become a matter of regular practice and has often been a source of innovative solutions to country needs and development challenges. It recognizes that civil society “can make important contributions toward ensuring that the views of local people are taken into account, promoting community participation, extending project reach to the poorest, and introducing flexible and innovative approaches.” The Bank’s GAC Strategy, approved in 2007, contained a call for systematically scaling up the Bank’s engagement with a variety of stakeholders, including CSOs. The recent IEG evaluation of the GAC Strategy challenges Management to pay attention to civil society capacity building as part of an urgent update of the Bank’s approach to institution building for better in-country economic governance. A major focus of the updated GAC Strategy, reviewed by the Board in March 2012, is a focus on closer interaction between beneficiaries and the state. The strategy update recognizes that transparency, accountability, voice, and participation are critical to ensuring that development is socially and politically sustainable. It calls for a more strategic approach to the demand-side agenda, with one priority being support to CSOs to constructively engage with governments on social accountability; and it includes a reference to the establishment of the GPSA.

16. Interactions with Beneficiaries and CSOs. The Bank interacts with beneficiaries and CSOs on several fronts: through direct consultations to improve its policies and strategies; by incorporating civil society into all stages of the Bank project cycle; by partnering with civil society to implement key global programs, including contracting to carry out research and other Bank activities; and by supporting social accountability through financing and capacity development. A few examples:

- An FY09 review of Project Appraisal Documents found that civil society was involved in 82 percent of all new Bank projects and was consulted for 92 percent of all CASs.

- Under investment operations, the Bank provides funding to CSOs through governments by contracting CSOs as service providers or via community-based mechanisms such as community-driven development projects and social funds. Between FY08 and FY10, the Bank provided an estimated $645 million to CSOs.

- The Bank also includes capacity-building support to CSOs in global and regional-level policy dialogues, consultations, and training activities. For example, since 2001

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14 Among other things, the Articles require that the Bank make decisions “with due attention to considerations of economy and efficiency and without regard to political or other non-economic influences or considerations.” IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article IV, Section 10. Similarly, Article III Section (5) (b) provides that the Bank’s loan proceeds must be used “without regard to political or other non-economic influences or considerations.”
15 World Bank (2009), Guidance Note on Bank Multi-Stakeholder Engagement.
16 GP 14.70, Involving Nongovernmental Organizations in Bank-Supported Activities, para. 1.
18 IEG GAC Evaluation, op.cit.
20 Civil society was also involved in 84 percent of all Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.
the Bank has funded CSO representatives from developing countries to attend the Annual and Spring Meetings, which includes collaborative workshops on key development themes in the Civil Society Forum, and briefings by Bank staff. The World Bank Institute (WBI) organizes and delivers a number of training and capacity-building programs to CSOs and media practitioners across a wide range of sectors, including public financial management, public procurement, extractive industries, and climate change. There are also a number of standing forums created to facilitate Bank-CSO engagement on specific issues—for example, the World Bank/Civil Society Consultative Group on Health, Nutrition, and Population.

- The Bank supports the social accountability work of CSOs and other non-state actors through various grant programs, including DGF, the State and Peace-building Fund (SPF), and the Institutional Development Fund (IDF). Key initiatives include the IDA- and SPF-funded Program to Enhance Capacities for Social Accountability in Cambodia, the SPF-funded Program on Accountability in Nepal, and an IDF grant to build the capacity of emerging multi-stakeholder groups in several African countries to more effectively monitor procurement/contracting processes and outcomes.

III. THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT CIVIL SOCIETY FUND

17. In 1983, the Bank established the Small Grants Program (later known as the Social Development Civil Society Fund, or CSF) to enhance understanding and awareness of development issues, increase opportunities to discuss ideas of strategic interest to the Bank and partners, and help CSOs focus on development questions. The CSF is one of the few Bank programs that directly support CSOs. Since FY97, CSF funds have been restricted to Part II CSOs; and starting in FY98 the program was largely decentralized to country offices. Over the past decade, the CSF distributed approximately $2.8 million annually in micro-grants (averaging $6,000) to CSOs in more than 55 countries, supporting 350-400 CSOs every year. In FY10, 52 countries participated and 356 organizations were supported. The CSF encourages, but does not mandate, strong links with Bank country programs. When country regulations require government approval of foreign funding to CSOs, the Bank’s country office handles government consent through normal Bank-member country channels. Since CSF funds are used for micro-grants, the awards usually target smaller or start-up CSOs that might be unable to access other sources of international funds.

18. CSF Experience. External evaluations through FY09 found that the CSF fulfilled its purpose of supporting a wide range of activities that advanced civic engagement for vulnerable and marginalized populations. Its most frequent target beneficiaries were children and youth, women and girls, and rural communities. The CSF also created valuable partnerships between Bank country management units (CMUs) and domestic CSOs, especially smaller CSOs working outside of capital cities. However, the impact of the CSF on development outcomes has been limited because of the small size of the grants, the variety of topics addressed, and the limited capacity of grantees. The small size and relatively short-term nature of grants—which have to be

22 For more information, see www.worldbank.org/hnp/cso.
23 Results of an evaluation of the CSF from FY09-11 are due in mid-2012.
completed within one fiscal year—spread over a large number of countries and recipients, and without a clear longer-term focus or linkage to country programs, has meant that at times the intended linkage to the CAS remained peripheral. The CSF experience thus indicates the need for a more comprehensive and strategic engagement with CSOs, with a narrowed thematic focus; more emphasis on building CSO capacity through increased training, funding, and institutionalized learning; and monitoring and evaluation as part of the grant-making process.

19. **New CSF Windows.** To become more strategic, in FY11 the CSF opened two new windows, with funding of up to $40,000 per grant, focused on supporting activities that enhance social accountability. Under these windows, the CSF provided grants to 6 CSOs working on budget transparency and 10 working on third-party monitoring, with emphasis on building the capacity of coalitions among CSOs to better monitor government performance in national and local budget formulation, service delivery, and access-to-information laws. Beginning in FY12, to lay additional groundwork for the launching of the proposed GPSA, the CSF allocated all grants to the theme of social accountability and scaled up the size of grants to $100,000, providing $1.95 million in grants to CSOs in 10 countries in AFR and MNA.

20. **Need for a Different Kind of Support.** CSOs receive significant direct support in the accountability and transparency area through initiatives funded by donors and foundations. However, most initiatives are for specific projects, with funds disbursed in relatively small amounts scattered across numerous initiatives. Thus CSOs often have to operate on short-term programmatic funding cycles, and they lack sustained support to build technical expertise in implementing cross-cutting social accountability approaches, sound accounting and financial reporting processes, systematic institutional record-keeping, and transparent procurement and hiring practices. This limits their ability to implement evidence-based approaches that are sustained over time. A case in point is the Philippines’ G-Watch initiative, which broke barriers in engaging individuals in monitoring the delivery of textbooks at local levels and brought about a fundamental change in the accountability chain in the Ministry of Education. External funding dried up after only three years, and despite the initial success, G-Watch has not been able to institutionalize change in ministries beyond election cycles.

21. **Other Constraints.** Adequate long-term core funding is part of the solution to these constraints, and surveys indicate that raising funds is one of the greatest challenges for CSOs. In many developing countries, local philanthropy and options for mobilizing resources for CSOs are limited or nonexistent, and the global financial crisis has had a significant impact on charitable giving that has affected even the best-funded international CSOs—which in turn have less money to on-grant to developing country CSOs. But there are also other constraints, notably low institutional capacity in terms of knowledge, skills, and tools for effective social accountability.

- CSOs have indicated a strong need for cross-regional knowledge exchange and dissemination, or a “global knowledge platform” that gathers and disseminates experience. Also lacking are broad-based empirical research to measure the impact of

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24 In a survey of CSO grant recipients by the Partnership for Transparency Fund (a DGF-supported initiative), 26 of 30 responded that funding resources were a very difficult or moderately difficult constraint.
social accountability efforts, and proven tools to measure and analyze service delivery data, and to access and organize such data.

- Country-level constraints CSOs identified include the lack of an enabling environment in which they can operate; political interference in their work; restrictive controls on resource mobilization; legal constraints on association and expression; inadequate mechanisms for CSO engagement with government; and lack of transparency and disclosure of government information (e.g., on policies, budgets, and development initiatives), as well as legal frameworks for access to information.

- CSOs also identified constraints in relationships with donors: lack of clarity in donor policies; heavy and directive donor conditionality accompanied by heavy transaction costs, in part due to fragmentation of donor initiatives and absence of harmonization; and lack of mechanisms for systemic mutual learning. This is especially true for indigenous CSOs, whose attempts at self-governance are often held hostage to donor priorities.

A successful model for local ownership and governance is emerging in Africa through TrustAfrica, which, in addition to creating an endowment, is proactively seeking philanthropic contributions to ensure its African ownership. However, TrustAfrica has emerged after more than 10 years of continued support from the Ford Foundation—a reasonable timeline to ensure financial sustainability, yet one not often fostered by donors seeking short-term results. Another promising example is the Foundation for Civil Society in Tanzania, which is funded by a variety of donors and governed by an independent board.

22. **Proposed Bank Action.** To address these concerns, the Bank proposes to repurpose the CSF as the GPSA, a dedicated partnership program that would focus on two key areas: knowledge and funding. The Bank would establish a multidonor trust fund (MDTF) to support the GPSA; the CSF as a program would be closed. Civil society has expressed a need for support in both areas; and under the right conditions, Bank support can play a catalytic role and improve development effectiveness in both of them. The next section sets out details on the proposed GPSA.

IV. **The Proposed GPSA**

23. The Bank recognizes that there are many ways in which civil society can contribute to greater development effectiveness, as well as a range of modalities by which it can support such efforts.

- The GPSA and social accountability are not panaceas—governments can enhance governance and improve service delivery through a variety of means. The GPSA is intended to be an important complement to other activities, including on the supply

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25. See Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness ([www.cso-effectiveness.org](http://www.cso-effectiveness.org)), a CSO-led global initiative to define a framework for CSO development effectiveness and to engage with donors, governments, and other stakeholders to create an enabling framework for CSOs to work.


side of governance, which can help to fill important gaps in knowledge and offer more strategic capacity support for CSOs working on social accountability.

- CSOs are and will remain engaged across a broad range of development activities, including direct service provision, advocacy, and policy dialogue on development issues. Establishment of the GPSA would not imply that Bank engagement with civil society would be limited to social accountability; the Bank would continue to engage with civil society across the spectrum of its activities.

- Establishment of the GPSA is expected to improve harmonization of support for social accountability as other development partners and civil society groups contribute to GPSA goals. The GPSA would seek to build on these efforts and avoid replacing or duplicating what others, both within and outside the Bank, are already doing.

24. **GPSA Overview.** The proposed GPSA would be aimed specifically at improving development results by supporting capacity building for enhanced beneficiary feedback and participation. The GPSA would contribute to country-level governance reforms and improved service delivery by (a) generating knowledge, networking, and financing to build civil society’s capacity to engage in evidence-based social accountability; (b) supporting Bank teams and government counterparts in embedding social accountability more strategically in their programs; and (c) drawing on the experience, knowledge, and resources of external partners to enable the Bank to scale up its engagement in this area. The GPSA’s proposed partnership and governance structure reflects good practice distilled from many years of World Bank experience working with over 100 global and regional partnership programs (ranging from the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor to the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program), the feedback from extensive consultations, and the lessons and good practices of other partners at the global and country levels.

A. **Role of the Bank**

25. The Bank has a number of comparative advantages in sponsoring the GPSA and administering the MDTF.

- It has the ability to use its convening power and to leverage its traditional engagement with governments to create more space for constructive engagement between CSOs and governments that can enhance development effectiveness.

- It can achieve better development results by strengthening demand-side capacity to complement and reinforce its supply-side interventions.

- Through its analytic, knowledge, and advisory activities, the Bank is well equipped to understand the capacity and constraints of state institutions and CSOs and encourage ways to improve their effectiveness as providers of services and development inputs, and to open up development policy discussions to non-state actors.

- Through donor coordination and partnership activities it can help to strengthen and harmonize the funding roles and impact of development partners supporting social accountability to promote development effectiveness.
• Through its lending operations it can help scale up effective demand-side mechanisms into national systems linked to supply-side initiatives.

• It can draw on its growing Demand for Good Governance portfolio, and can bring to bear its range of policy instruments and research capacity.

• Its fiduciary and administrative capacity related to trust funds and secretariats can help ensure a common platform and reporting requirements that satisfy a range of potential donors and other participating stakeholders.

26. **Bank Role.** Given these strengths and comparative advantages, the Bank’s role in the GPSA would be to (a) sponsor the GPSA and seek participation by donors, developing countries, and other stakeholders; (b) establish an MDTF and serve as its Trustee; (c) provide funding to the MDTF; (d) administer the GPSA Secretariat; (e) participate in the GPSA’s Steering Committee as initial Chair and as donor member; and (f) seek synergies and complementarities between supply-side governance reforms and support for demand-side interventions. The Bank would also rely on its country staff to support stakeholder consultations, assess demand from CSOs, assist in managing calls for proposals, and carry out an initial vetting of eligibility requirements for proposals.

B. **Consultations**

27. Over the past few months, Bank Management has sought input on the proposed GPSA from a wide range of stakeholders—the Bank’s Executive Directors, CSO representatives and thought-leaders, potential partners, and government representatives. This section summarizes the principal comments (Annex B provides a more detailed summary). Management took these comments into account in designing the proposed GPSA.

• *Potential external partners are enthusiastic about the Bank’s sponsorship of the GPSA.* They see the GPSA as adding considerable value by providing CSOs with the enhanced access to policymakers, technical knowledge, capacity building, and institutional development that will enable them to play a more effective role in development processes.

• *The GPSA should be structured as a partnership with other development actors that are committed to enhancing social accountability, and should leverage Bank financing from other sources.* Likely partners include governments, donors, multilateral organizations, foundations, and CSOs.

• *It should have legitimacy at the global, regional, and country levels, particularly in terms of governance.* To ensure legitimacy, the GPSA should have a transparent and representative governance structure that reflects its partnership approach and includes representatives of funding partners, recipient countries, and civil society. It also needs to draw on local knowledge and expertise.

• *The GPSA should operate transparently and efficiently.* The grant-making criteria and decisions should be transparent and well communicated and disseminated; conflicts of interest should be managed; and the procedures should allow for continuous feedback and learning-by-doing. Participants also suggested that the Bank should simplify fiduciary and reporting requirements for grant recipients.
• The GPSA should respect the independence of CSOs. It should avoid capturing CSOs receiving GPSA support.

• Key strategic aims of the GPSA should be knowledge generation and dissemination, and institutional strengthening of CSOs. The Bank’s value-added lies mainly in generating knowledge on what works and why in social accountability, and in leveraging sustained support for CSO capacity building. Particular needs are to encourage South-South learning and provide more systematic support for networks of practitioners.

• The GPSA should not be driven by global CSOs, but should support the priorities of country-based and indigenous CSOs. The key will be to ensure that knowledge, research, and capacity building are responsive to local context and demand.

• Start small and allow learning-by-doing to get the design right. It will be important to start small, focus on getting the governance and operational structures right, and manage expectations.

• The main purpose of the GPSA should not be to exclusively support Bank programs. The GPSA should support enhanced social accountability in each participating country as a public good that can improve effectiveness and impact across the development spectrum. Nonetheless, where appropriate, linkages with Bank programs would help integrate the supply and demand sides of governance and would allow partners and CSOs to draw on the Bank’s comparative advantage in terms of country presence, convening power, access to government, and global knowledge.

• Bank support for, and activities under, the GPSA should be guided by existing guidance and experience. In particular, the Bank should rely on the Guidance Note on Bank Multi-Stakeholder Engagement—which outlines modalities for engagement in a manner consistent with the Bank’s Articles of Agreement—and the Bank’s extensive experience in engagement with CSOs, including lessons from the CSF.

• A relatively small number of CSOs expressed skepticism about the proposal, which they saw as a departure from the Bank’s usual business lines. They voiced concerns that the Bank could seek to capture or co-opt CSOs, or that working with CSOs in this way would not be sustained. Even these CSOs, however, were willing to discuss the proposed GPSA and provide input on its form and function.

C. GPSA Features

28. The proposed GPSA is designed to help improve development results by supporting capacity building for enhanced beneficiary feedback and participation. GPSA support would be consistent with the GAC Strategy,28 Guidance Note on Bank Multi-Stakeholder Engagement, and the Bank’s Articles of Agreement (including the prohibition of involvement with political activities). GPSA features strong country ownership, explicit government agreement to “opt in” to GPSA, and astute risk identification and risk management of the activities it would fund. GPSA would start small, learn from experience, and expand on the basis of lessons learned and rigorous demonstration of positive impact.

29. **Focus Areas.** It is proposed that the GPSA focus on two areas:

- A global platform for knowledge exchange and research, especially in measuring and documenting the impact of social accountability interventions; this would include developing and nurturing practitioner networks, especially those aimed at supporting South-South exchanges.

- Programmatic financial support for the institutional development of CSOs working on social accountability, and for efforts to improve the overall "ecosystem," or enabling environment, for social accountability.

1. **Support for Knowledge Exchange and Research**

30. Consultation participants suggested a number of areas in which the knowledge component of the GPSA would add value:

- Facilitating multi-stakeholder dialogue and peer learning at global and country levels.

- Creating a knowledge platform for knowledge generation, exchange, and dissemination.

- Developing new tools and evidence-based approaches, and making them more broadly available to practitioners.

- Undertaking rigorous and in-depth research that could be disseminated as a public good.

- Linking CSOs with governments, academics, and practitioners.

- Helping to leverage and scale up activities.

To achieve these objectives, the GPSA would provide funding for knowledge exchange and generation that would build on knowledge gained through the implementation of operational activities and would ensure that research priorities are based on operational demand.

31. **Analysis.** To fill additional research gaps, the GPSA may commission global analysis in areas fundamental to the advancement of the social accountability field. For example, there is need for more robust evidence on whether and how social accountability approaches can be sustained, scaled up, and replicated in different sociopolitical settings, and how international partnerships can leverage beneficial changes. Improved knowledge about how emerging forces of beneficiary engagement can be channeled to promote broad development outcomes and mitigate associated risks is therefore a global common good.

32. **Knowledge Platform.** A global knowledge platform would serve to connect a diverse range of development actors seeking increased collaboration, learning, and adaptation, as well as to more broadly share on-the-ground results from GPSA grant recipients and other sources. In addition, the knowledge platform would link networks and partnerships of GPSA grant recipients to promote collaborative learning and sharing of knowledge from funded activities and other sources. A particular focus would be encouraging South-South exchanges and peer learning.
2. Grants to Support CSO Operations for Social Accountability

33. Because there is a need for more predictable core funding that can sustain CSO capacity-building efforts over longer time periods, it is proposed that the GPSA, through the MDTF, would make larger individual grants disbursed over longer periods (e.g., 3-5 years), and might fund a series of grants to support a longer-term and phased program. In each case, disbursements would be linked to the achievement of milestones agreed as part of the results framework developed for each grant, and adapted to reflect performance and lessons learned. It might also develop options to meet the needs of smaller, start-up CSOs, which may not fully meet the eligibility criteria—for example, by working through global, regional, or country grantees to on-grant and administer smaller grants, as many foundations now do. (Annex C presents more details on criteria for CSOs’ eligibility for grants.)

34. **Purpose of Grants.** Grants from the MDTF could be made available for capacity building, research and knowledge dissemination, networking, and programmatic activities related to social accountability, including activities supporting the enabling environment for social accountability and efforts to improve development effectiveness through social accountability approaches.

35. **Focus of Grants.** Periodic calls for proposals under the MDTF could include a geographic or thematic focus—perhaps targeting countries in a specific area, a particular GPSA objective, or a particular sector. Call for proposals at the country level would be based on demands identified in consultation with Bank country teams, partners, CSOs, and other stakeholders. Each grant under the GPSA would be expected to yield specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, and time-bound results in one or more of the following “pillars of governance”:

- **Transparency:** beneficiaries are able to get more information about government activities and are able to use this information effectively.
- **Representation and voice:** beneficiaries have a mechanism and/or policies through which they can voice their concerns to the government and influence policy.
- **Accountability:** governments are more accountable to beneficiaries in delivery of services and in management and use of public resources.
- **Learning for improved results:** beneficiaries have greater knowledge and practice of social accountability, and civil society has greater capacity to implement social accountability initiatives.

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29 Care would be taken to preserve MDTF flexibility by ensuring that resources are not tied up in open-ended commitments with no exit strategy, creating dependency and “lock-in” situations.

30 There are several precedents for this in the Bank; the most recent is the Extractive Industries Fund, which provided a block grant to Revenue Watch to pass on small grants to local CSOs in some 12 countries.

31 Key social accountability activities or approaches that could be supported would include: budget literacy campaigns, citizen charters, citizen report cards, community contracting, community management and/or contracting, community oversight, community scorecards, grievance redress mechanisms, independent budget analysis, input or expenditure tracking, integrity pacts, participatory budgeting, participatory physical audits, procurement monitoring, public access to information legislation, social audits, and user management committees. More details and definitions can be found at: http://dfggdb.
3. Partnerships

36. The GPSA would seek partnerships with a range of development actors. Funding would be channeled through an MDTF to which the Bank would contribute the resources that are currently dedicated to the CSF. In addition to the MDTF, flexible arrangements would allow the partners in the GPSA to contribute in a variety of ways at global, regional, or country levels: for example, partners could provide parallel externally managed funding that follow criteria harmonized with the GPSA’s. The recipient-executed portion of activities funded by the MDTF would—like all recipient-executed activities financed by IDA/IBRD and trust funds—be subject to the Bank’s operational policies and procedures in line with risk levels and funds involved. The MDTF would be executed in line with the four pillars of ongoing Bank-wide trust fund reforms: ensuring strategic alignment and consolidation; integration with business processes; cost recovery; and improved oversight. Outreach to donors on the GPSA would be coordinated at the corporate level, with broad participation of Bank VPUs and Senior Management, and full integration into country and network strategies.

37. Countries of Operation. The GPSA would generally fund operations only in a member country that is eligible to borrow from the World Bank (IBRD/IDA), and proposes that it may also provide grants for Bank member countries in arrears and non-Bank member countries when the Executive Directors determine that it is in the interests of the membership as a whole, and in all cases whose government has agreed to permit entities in its country to receive funding from the GPSA. All activities supported by the GPSA and funded by the MDTF would be consistent with the Guidance Note on Bank Multi-Stakeholder Engagement. In member countries that do not agree to permit entities to receive GPSA funding, the Bank would continue to engage with the government through policy dialogue and analytic work, to encourage greater space for civil society engagement in social accountability.

38. Role of the CMU and Country Teams. Because GPSA support would need to be tailored to country context and risks, Bank CMUs and country teams would play an important role in its implementation. Country teams would support stakeholder consultations, assess demand from CSOs, assist in managing calls for proposals, carry out an initial vetting of eligibility requirements for initial proposals, conduct or commission risk assessments as needed, monitor progress in grant implementation, assist in linking demand-side activities with supply-side interventions, and contribute to evaluating the knowledge and development impact of completed grants. Country directors would take the lead in obtaining the government’s consent for the GPSA to operate in the country, and would play a role in grant monitoring and evaluation. Therefore, the GPSA would work initially in countries in which support from the CMU and country director is strong.

39. Relationship with Country Programs. Within the framework of a participating country’s development strategy, the GPSA would support social accountability initiatives by civil society that may complement country-led governance reforms or may engage with policymakers and service providers to enhance development effectiveness and service delivery. A particular focus would be to seek synergies and help integrate the Bank’s support for supply-side governance

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32 In some cases, this may be contracted out to reliable research institutes, think-tanks, or other suitable organizations.

33 Country development strategies (e.g., the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) increasingly include and describe the development roles of civil society.
reforms and the GPSA’s support for demand-side interventions. While coordination and synergies with Bank projects and policy reforms would be encouraged, the GPSA would not fund or cofinance Bank activities. To the extent possible, and to encourage harmonization and enhance impact, the GPSA would also seek country-level collaboration with other donors, country officials, and stakeholders supporting broad governance reforms and social accountability programs.

40. **Consistency with Bank Policy Framework.** It has been noted that activities under by the GPSA would be consistent with the GAC Strategy, *Guidance Note on Bank Multi-Stakeholder Engagement*, and the Bank’s Articles of Agreement. The World Bank would, for example, in consultation with government, be careful to work within the country’s constitutional and legislative framework, and avoid engagements that are not consistent with the Articles. Consistent with the Articles of Agreement, working with CSOs requires the Bank specifically to avoid political interference. To address this, the Bank would undertake a risk assessment in line with the *Guidance Note on Bank Multi-Stakeholder Engagement*. In addition, consistent with the Bank’s policies and procedures, CSO’s would need to meet fiduciary and disclosure requirements to receive any grants and the Bank would make arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any such grant are used only for the purposes for which the grant is made.

D. **Partnership Structure**

41. The proposed GPSA partnership structure is based on a number of principles and objectives:

- Involvement of a broad range of stakeholders.
- Coordinated funding through a common vehicle.
- Programmatic coordination across multiple funding sources.
- Efficient operation, building on the Bank’s experience as Trustee and Secretariat.
- Support from governments, CSOs, and other stakeholders for country activities.

To achieve these objectives, the proposed partnership structure is designed to be simple, to divide roles and responsibilities according to comparative advantage, to balance inclusion and efficiency, and to be flexible enough to allow incremental growth and adjustment over time.

42. **Governance Structure and Roles.** The proposed GPSA governance structure would be lean: a Steering Committee supported by a small Secretariat, which in turn would be supported by a Roster of Experts. As with other aspects of the GPSA, once there is sufficient operational implementation experience the structure could be reassessed and modified as appropriate. This section summarizes the proposed partnership structure and roles.

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34 “The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the purposes stated in Article I.” Article IV, Section 10.

35 Article II Section 5(b) (ibid).
**Steering Committee.** The Partnership would have a Steering Committee (SC), chaired initially by the Bank, with balanced representation among donors, three donor partners (two sovereign donors and one foundation representative); three CSOs (one Part I representative and two Part II representatives), who would serve in their individual capacity; and three government representatives from Regions with the most participating countries (likely Africa (AFR), Middle East and North Africa (MNA), and East Asia and the Pacific (EAP)), in addition to a World Bank representative. Donor members would need to make a minimum threshold contribution to the MDTF to be eligible for a seat on the SC. CSO members would be nominated through regional CSO networks, from a pool initially identified by EXT (for Part I) and the Regional Vice Presidencies of AFR, MNA, and EAP (for Part II). A small CSO-donor-Bank selection committee would review the nominations and make final decisions. Government members would be selected by the Bank’s Board of Executive Directors. All member seats except the Bank’s would rotate after three years; the first rotations would be staggered between the third and fourth years to avoid a complete turnover of SC membership at the same time. The SC could increase the number of SC members from each group, provided it maintains a numerical balance of members from all three groups. The Program Manager of the Secretariat would be an observer. To control costs, the SC would normally have one face-to-face annual meeting, and other interim meetings would take place virtually or through audio-conferencing.

**Secretariat.** A small Secretariat, staffed with Bank personnel, would provide administrative and logistical support to the SC and manage the MDTF grant-approval process. Its Program Manager would be a Bank staff selected in accordance with and subject to Bank staff rules and hiring procedures, reporting to Bank Management.

**Roster of Experts.** A Roster of Experts (RoE) would be established to support the proposal review process and, potentially, to provide other support as well (to be determined as the GPSA moves forward). The RoE (reviewed by the Secretariat and publicly disclosed) would be drawn from around the world and would be representative in terms of key geographic areas, social accountability themes and expertise, and relevant constituencies (e.g., civil society, media, and academia). The RoE would be used as a resource on an “as needed” basis as determined by the Secretariat and SC; it would not be a governing body.

43. **Monitoring, Reporting, and Evaluation.** To support effectiveness, transparency, and accountability, the GPSA would establish a robust results monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and reporting framework that would apply to country, regional, and global levels of engagement. Prepared in a broadly consultative process and disclosed to the public, the framework would provide the basis for regular monitoring of and reporting on the overall accomplishments of the GPSA. In addition, it would require that each major activity funded by GPSA have a results M&E framework. Management would report regularly to the Executive Directors on progress.

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36 Most donors would be government agencies.

37 Examples of such advisory bodies (with differing roles) can be found in many global partnerships, e.g., the Independent Technical Advisory Committee in GFRP.
beginning with an informal report to the Board in Q2 of FY13 and an independent evaluation at the end of the second year of operations.

E. Proposed Budget

44. Bank Management proposes to establish and administer an MDTF as a mechanism for funding activities under the GPSA. It proposes that the MDTF receive a regular allocation of funds from the Bank’s own resources (subject, in the first instance, to Board approval in the FY13 budget), as a sign of the commitment of the Bank and its shareholders to this initiative. It would also receive contributions from donors—which could include bilateral donors, nongovernmental organizations, and foundations—that wish to pool funds to contribute toward achieving the GPSA’s objectives. Other partners could also use parallel, externally managed financing for activities consistent with the GPSA. Consultations undertaken for this paper suggest there is considerable demand for the activities that the GPSA would support, and while it is difficult at this stage to predict interest from potential funding partners, the MDTF is envisioned to grow to a total funding of $75-125 million over the next 5-7 years.

45. Bank Contribution. Management proposes to repurpose the Bank’s annual contribution of $2.8 million to the CSF (starting in FY13) for inclusion in the GPSA MDTF, and in its FY13 budget submission it intends to request $2.8 million as the Bank’s contribution to the MDTF. In addition, in FY13 about $2.2 million would be redeployed from other below-the-line grant programs, bringing total Bank contributions to the GPSA to $5 million in FY13. The contribution would continue to be treated as a below-the-line item, and would be the subject of a separate recommendation in the budget document. Management proposes to keep the FY13 level of annual funding to the GPSA—$5 million—through FY16. As part of subsequent annual and business planning processes, Management would review with the Board the level of the Bank’s funding to the GPSA.

V. CHALLENGES

46. As a new undertaking for the Bank and its partners, the establishment of the GPSA poses a number of complex challenges, many of which are addressed in the GPSA design. Once the GPSA is launched, Management proposes to move incrementally, adapting the GPSA to reflect the lessons of experience and reporting periodically to the Board.

A. Relations with Governments

47. The GPSA can achieve its development objectives only if recipient member countries and CSOs perceive it as legitimate. To be effective, the GPSA would need to work with participating governments while respecting the independence of CSOs. Thus the GPSA would operate in a country only with the knowledge and consent of the member government and consistent with the country’s constitutional and legislative framework. The agreement between the GPSA and the government would apply to the program financed by the MDTF.

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48. **Government Consent.** The government’s explicit overall agreement to the GPSA’s operating in the country—like the consent for CSF fund—could be obtained in a variety of ways, depending on the country context. In most cases, the Bank’s country director and country team would (with the support of the Secretariat and SC, if appropriate)\(^40\) take the lead in reaching out to the government to discuss the objectives and operating modalities of the GPSA, and the possible fit and potential contribution to country and Bank strategic priorities. In countries where the Bank is preparing a CAS, Interim Strategy Note, or CAS Progress Report, overall government consent to the GPSA’s operating in the country could be sought during consultations and discussions as part of the strategy preparation process and recorded in an exchange of letters, minutes of meetings, or any other documents that both the Bank and the government sign. In addition, each grant proposal would be submitted to the government for a ten-day review period. In countries where the government does not consent to the GPSA operating in the country, the Bank would continue to engage with the government through policy dialogue and analytic work, to encourage greater space for constructive civil society engagement, including options and opportunities to enhance the responsiveness of government institutions to the needs of beneficiaries.

49. **Bank/GPSA Procedures.** In working with governments and CSOs, the Bank would take appropriate measures to avoid the risk of political interference in the member country. In particular, the Bank would ensure that the objectives and modalities of its engagement are consistent with its Articles of Agreement and the Bank’s operational policies and procedures, as well as the GAC Strategy and the *Guidance Note on Bank Multi-Stakeholder Engagement*. In line with the Guidance Note, staff would seek to have a good understanding of the political economy of the country in which financing is provided. The Guidance Note requires that “the risk of political entanglement—real or perceived—be carefully assessed” and that “measures be taken to ensure that [the funded activities] are implemented in a neutral, non-partisan fashion.” GPSA grant proposals would include a risk section that would be reviewed early in project processing.

50. **Governing Principles.** In dealing with the governments of participating countries, the GPSA would be governed by the principles of transparency and flexibility, and would take account of country context within the boundaries set by the GPSA’s and the Bank’s policies and procedures. The composition of the SC and the modalities for selecting members would be made publicly available. At the country level, CSO eligibility criteria, which would need to meet the GPSA overall requirements while being consistent with the recipient country’s constitutional and legislative framework, would be publicly disclosed to foster trust and transparency. In addition, all approved grants would be made publicly available in accordance with the Bank’s Access to Information Policy, so that there would be transparency about operations in each country.

51. **Development Objective and Ownership.** In any country, GPSA assistance should be tied to a clear development objective and supported by the government, civil society, and other relevant stakeholders. This could be achieved most effectively by ensuring that GPSA activities are consistent with the country priorities as described in the country’s poverty reduction strategy or other country strategy document. By providing opportunities for wider dialogue, leverage, and synergy with country programs, the GPSA would enhance the development and service delivery

\(^40\) In the early stages of the GPSA’s existence, it is expected that the Secretariat would proactively reach out to Bank teams, governments, other partners, and CSOs, to inform them about the GPSA.
impact of ongoing and future social accountability programs of donors, country governments, the Bank, foundations, and CSOs. Depending on country circumstances, this synergy could be sought as part of the CAS process, or as part of a wider country strategic dialogue with stakeholders, in which the Bank country team would take the lead.

52. **Link with Bank Program.** To the extent possible, the GPSA would seek to link supported activities with the Bank’s program. Such linkages would help integrate the supply and demand sides of governance reforms for greater development effectiveness, and would allow partners to draw on the Bank’s comparative advantages of country presence, convening power, access to government and policy dialogue, and global knowledge. However, linkages to Bank programs, especially on the supply side, would be encouraged, but not required, for GPSA-supported activities. Requests for GPSA support and potential links with Bank country programs would be considered flexibly in light of country context, strategic priorities agreed between the Bank and government, the Bank’s comparative advantage, and the activities of other partners. Thus, through the MDTF, the GPSA could support social accountability initiatives not directly linked to Bank programs.

B. **Fiduciary Arrangements**

53. Under the partnership framework, all funding—the Bank’s annual contributions as approved by the Board, and contributions from partners/donors—would be pooled in the MDTF. Funds from the MDTF that flow directly to recipients as grants would be governed by OP 14.40, *Trust Funds*, and the GPSA Secretariat costs would be subject to the Administrative Manual, which applies to the Bank’s own administrative expenses. The GPSA mechanism could also encompass such arrangements as bilateral programs that follow funding criteria harmonized with those of the GPSA, or grants processed by the GPSA but disbursed bilaterally.

54. **Policy Framework for Grant-making.** Like all recipient-executed activities financed from IDA/IBRD and trust funds, MDTF-funded grants would be subject to Bank operational policies and procedures in line with the level of risks and of funds involved. The *Procedures for Small Recipient-Executed Trust Fund Grants: Guidance to Staff*[^41] sets out streamlined project processing procedures applicable to small (below $5 million) and micro (below $500,000) recipient-executed grants[^42]—procedures that would apply to MDTF grants of the GPSA.

55. **Grant-making Process and Implementation.** The GPSA would make country-level grants on a competitive basis to eligible CSOs for knowledge creation, knowledge sharing and networking, and institutional strengthening for social accountability. Bank country directors and country teams would play a pivotal role for country-level grants, since GPSA support needs to be tailored to country context, including country-level partnerships and risks. Multi-stakeholder consultations held before issuing calls for proposals would maximize the alignment of GPSA activities with country development strategies. The CMU would vet country-specific proposals for compliance with GPSA requirements. Cleared proposals would then be submitted to external experts who are knowledgeable about the country (drawn from the larger Roster of Experts) for review of their technical quality and strategic alignment with the country’s development.


[^42]: OP 14.40 provides that while activities financed from recipient-executed trust funds are to be administered under the operational policies and procedures that apply to IBRD/IDA financing, smaller grants may be subject to simplified procedures.
strategies and GPSA criteria. The GPSA Secretariat would decide which proposals merit consideration by the SC and would forward these proposals, along with any peer review comments, to the SC for its concurrence on a no-objection basis. Proposals to which the SC had concurred would then be submitted to the government for a ten-day review period, after which the Bank would follow with a five-day public disclosure period during which information on the proposed purpose and recipient of the grant would be made public. The country director would take comments received into account in providing the final clearance. The CMU would designate Bank staff to play a key role in monitoring and evaluating grant implementation in close coordination with the GPSA Secretariat.

56. **Global and Regional Grants.** The process for global and regional grants would be broadly similar. The SC would determine Regional calls for proposals, with input from the relevant Regional Vice President to ensure alignment with Bank strategic directions. The Secretariat would vet incoming proposals to ensure they meet Bank and GPSA eligibility criteria, forward them for review to appropriate experts, and decide which proposals merit consideration by the SC and forward these proposals, along with any peer review comments, to the SC for its concurrence on a no-objection basis. Regional proposals to which the SC has concurred would undergo the same ten-day comment period with relevant governments, after which the Bank would follow with a five-day public disclosure period during which information on the proposed purpose and recipient of the grants will be made public. The Regional Vice President would take comments received into account in providing the final clearance. For global proposals, the SC would follow a similar process.

C. **Ensuring the Legitimacy of the GPSA**

57. A key challenge in designing the GPSA is ensuring its legitimacy in the eyes of the general public and of partners. To be legitimate, it should (a) be regarded as a genuine partnership among CSOs, donors, and governments; (b) have an inclusive partnership structure that enables the voices of CSOs, donors, and governments to be heard; (c) have transparent grant-making processes; (d) allow for external feedback on application of and compliance with GPSA procedures and operating terms; and (e) incorporate independent evaluation of the development effectiveness of its operations. These challenges have been addressed through various features in the design of the GPSA.

- To be a partner in the GPSA would require a commitment to its objectives and purpose; it would not require a financial contribution. Partners that provide resources to the GPSA to the MDTF above a minimum threshold would be invited to participate in its governance structure, along with developing countries and other stakeholders.
- The SC, as the GPSA’s decision-making body, would provide for the membership and voice of key stakeholders (donors, CSOs, member countries). It would make decisions by consensus, taking into account the views of experts familiar with the local context. The Bank as Trustee would have the right to refuse certain grants.
- The operating procedures would be finalized after broad-based consultations.
- The GPSA would operate only in countries that give explicit consent to its doing so and would submit each grant proposal to the government for a ten-day review.
It would fund only CSOs that are legal entities and are eligible to receive foreign funding under the country’s applicable legal framework. The eligibility criteria would include a due diligence process to ensure that only CSOs with a proven track record are funded and the activities funded have a development focus, although on-granting or other approaches to support low-capacity or nascent CSOs would also be considered. Procedures, including an up-front analysis of risks, would be set out in the GPSA’s Operational Manual (Annex C includes more details on the proposed eligibility criteria).

The Bank’s Access to Information policy would apply: all policies and procedures, as well as programs/projects and recipients funded, would be disclosed publicly, and the GPSA would publish progress reports and evaluations.

58. **Supporting CSOs with Low Capacity.** Most countries have a large number of CSOs that vary greatly in terms of size, capacity, governance structure, and experience. Limiting funding only to CSOs that meet high capacity, operational, and governance standards may discourage smaller and new CSOs. There would also be a risk that the GPSA would end up favoring larger and more well-established CSOs, to the detriment of smaller grassroots or local-level CSOs. To conform to the spirit of the initiative, the GPSA should be able to support CSOs in countries where there is not yet strong expertise on social accountability (and where there may be no CSOs with a track record of social accountability work), and CSOs that are newly formed or that have low capacity. One modality that would be considered is to use intermediary organizations to either on-grant or provide direct capacity-building support and mentoring to nascent or low-capacity CSOs. In addition, in countries where small CSOs with low capacity make up the main fabric of civil society, the knowledge platform would consider facilitating multi-stakeholder dialogue and peer learning at the country level.

VI. **RESULTS FRAMEWORKS**

59. The GPSA’s goal is to contribute to country-level governance reforms and improved service delivery by developing more sustainable and effective CSOs that support social accountability initiatives. The GPSA “inputs”—that is, knowledge, advice, and funding—are intended to enable a range of activities designed to strengthen government transparency, representation and voice, and accountability, as well as the body of knowledge and learning on social accountability. This process is illustrated in the notional value chain in the figure below. (Annex D presents an indicative results matrix. In the initial stage of implementation, once the focus of activities for the first year(s) of activity is narrowed down, baselines and targets would be defined and the results matrix finalized.)

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43 The Operational Manual would specify on-granting requirements and eligibility criteria.
44 Many factors influence the strength of linkages in this chain. In particular, the policy environment and overall “ecosystem” of governance in the country influence the degree to which social accountability outputs can be converted to practical outcomes.
60. **Monitoring.** Results monitoring would focus on three levels:\(^{45}\)

- **Grantee level—outputs.** Each grant under the GPSA should yield specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, and time-bound results toward the achievement of the GPSA objectives. Grantees would report on their activities and demonstrate how those activities led to desired outputs in terms of increased capacity and/or more effective social accountability approaches.

- **Grantee level and program level—outcomes.** Each grantee—depending on the focus of its activity—would be required to report on at least some of the generic outcome indicators of transparency, representation and voice, accountability, and learning for improved results (see Box 1). The Secretariat would then aggregate those reports for overall GPSA reporting.

- **Grantee level and program level—impact.** Finally, the GPSA, through its knowledge component, would support the global exchange of knowledge, including South-South learning; development of tools and approaches needed to both measure and implement social accountability approaches; and capacity building of CSOs and research on the impact evaluation of social accountability approaches. Some grantees would be supported in conducting rigorous impact evaluation.

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\(^{45}\) Depending on the capacity of grantees and the size and time length of grant, beneficiary CSOs may be asked to develop a “theory of change” showing how the inputs and activities financed are expected to lead to real benefits, especially in terms of improvements in development effectiveness.
Box 1. Results Areas and Related Activities

**Transparency**: beneficiaries are able to access more information on government activities and to use it effectively.

- **Possible activities**: initiatives to monitor the application and impact of freedom-of-information legislation; publication of local and national budgets; development of knowledge platforms for dissemination of government information; enactment of freedom-of-information legislation.

**Representation and voice**: beneficiaries have mechanisms and/or policies through which they can engage in government processes.

- **Possible activities**: creation of inclusive forums and formal and informal channels for state-civil society engagement; use of participatory tools (participatory planning and budgeting).

**Accountability**: governments are more accountable to beneficiaries in service delivery and in management of public resources.

- **Possible activities**: application of social accountability tools and approaches, i.e., independent budget analysis, grievance redress mechanisms, government performance monitoring, beneficiary monitoring of procurement and contracting processes, participatory monitoring of government service delivery.

**Learning for Improved Results**: improved knowledge and practice of social accountability.

- **Possible activities**: cross-country or country-specific analytic work on enabling environment; creation of global platform for knowledge codification and exchange; strengthening of existing practitioner networks at global, regional, and country levels; conduct of longitudinal impact assessments; development of “how-to” tool kits.

### VII. Next Steps

61. If the Board approves (a) the proposal to repurpose the CSF as the GPSA, and (b) the arrangements for funding the GPSA through the establishment of the MDTF, Management would launch GPSA operations in early FY13. In preparation for the launch, Management would undertake a second phase of external consultations that would focus on the operational details of the GPSA in specific country contexts. The results of the consultations would be an input in the development of an Operational Manual, to be prepared by the Secretariat and presented to the SC for approval.

62. **MDTF**. In FY12 Management proposes to establish an MDTF, administered by the Bank, which would pool Bank and donor contributions, with the Bank’s funding to be contributed upon Board approval of the FY13 budget. The MDTF would be a recipient- and Bank-executed trust fund that would support the objectives of the GPSA.

63. **Governance Bodies**. At the same time, the Secretariat would be established. It would be administered by the World Bank Institute for an incubation period, after which Management would review the experience and decide when the Secretariat should be transferred to the Bank’s Sustainable Development Network. The Secretariat would be staffed by a Program Manager (competitively recruited Bank staff) and a senior operations officer. As soon as feasible, given the progress of consultations, the SC and RoE would be established.

64. **Implementation Review**. Management fully agrees with the recommendation that came from the first round of consultations—that in beginning such a new initiative as the GPSA, it makes sense to start small, learn from experience, and make adjustments as necessary. Management would report regularly to Executive Directors to monitor progress, beginning with
an informal report delivered to the Board in Q2 of FY13, and would carry out an independent evaluation of the GPSA at the end of the second year of operation.
ANNEX A. ACCESS TO INFORMATION, GOVERNMENT OPENNESS, AND BANK SUPPORT TO SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

A. Bank Support for Access-to-Information Initiatives

1. Bank support focuses on policy dialogue and capacity building on both the supply and demand side of information, as well as on expanding the knowledge base on access-to-information reforms. The Bank is providing support through a number of instruments:
   - DPLs in Ghana, Tunisia, and Jordan.
   - IDF grants to access-to-information oversight bodies, mainly in LCR: in Chile, to the Council of Transparency, with a component to support a Network of Transparency and Access to Information Oversight bodies in five LCR countries (http://redintercambio.cplt.cl/SitePages/Inicio.aspx); and in Argentina, to the Directorate of Transparency and Anti-corruption in the Province of Santa Fe. Previous IDFs supported Honduras’s Information Commission, and Mexico's Federal Institute of Access to Information.
   - GPF grants support a participatory process to formulate and adopt access-to-information bills in Ghana, Kenya, and Zambia, as well as a study on access to information in Thailand, and a regional project in SAR.
   - DGF grants support communities of practice on access to information as part of ANSA SAR and ANSA AW (jointly with WBI).
   - The CSF has supported a number of initiatives on access to information, including in Honduras to improve access to information on the budget, and in El Salvador to build the capacity of CSOs and government officials to monitor and implement the recently approved public information law.
   - A JSDF grant to strengthen local communities’ capacity to make use of the access-to-information law in the Dominican Republic.

2. Efforts to expand the knowledge base on access to information include the following:
   - A WBI Working Paper Series on Access to Information, addressing emerging issues (more than 10 titles to date).
   - A GPF-supported political economy study on the implementation of access-to-information legislation in eight countries, to be completed by end-FY12.
B. Government Initiatives to Become More Open and Transparent

3. Many governments are making efforts to increase voice, transparency, and accountability, including through access to information. The examples of Peru, Indonesia, and Turkey are briefly described here.

- **Peru.** Peru’s access-to-public-information law requires Government agencies to publish information on their organization, activities, regulations, budget, salaries, costs of the acquisition of goods and services, and official activities of high-ranking officials. In 2008, specific targets were introduced in five priority areas: neonatal/maternal health, childhood nutrition, identity registration, basic education, and access to basic social services and market opportunities (transport and telecommunications). Output targets were established for each budget line at various government levels, giving beneficiaries the possibility to monitor progress and hold government accountable. Apart from improving access to information and introducing results-based budgeting processes, this process has created new arenas for individual participation and monitoring at the national, regional, and municipal levels in such sectors as health, education, and social assistance.

- **Indonesia.** A profound and complex transition followed the ouster of President Suharto, who had severely curtailed civil society, media activities, and political rights during his three decades of rule (1966–1998). One of the main achievements of the Reformasi period has been the adoption and initial implementation of decentralization reforms, bringing services closer to the people while also engaging beneficiaries in an open and democratic process of self-governance. Subnational governments are now responsible for roughly one-third of all public expenditures in Indonesia, and in a growing number of cities across the country, local organizations have established dialogues with local governments on legislation and development programs.

- **Turkey.** Turkey is beginning to enact progressive reforms to create an enabling environment for civil society, strengthening civil and political rights. Key legislative reforms such as the Law on the Right to Access to Information, mandating dissemination of all administrative documents (except for national security, personal information, and legal and administrative prosecutions) to the public upon request, have opened the door for improvements in government transparency. The Government has also taken a number of important steps on public financial management, including open data, e-government, and transparency of procurement and taxation policies.

C. Bank Support for Social Accountability

4. The Bank is supporting social accountability across a wide range of countries and sectors. Several examples are briefly presented here.

- **Uganda: Community Scorecards Reduce Child Mortality.** An estimated 73 percent of deaths of children under 5 years old in Uganda are from preventable causes, such as diarrhea, pneumonia, malaria, measles, and neonatal disorders. However, the institutions assigned to monitor health care providers have been inadequate or ineffectual. In collaboration with several Ugandan practitioners and community-based
organizations, in 2004 the World Bank, Stockholm University, and Bocconi University launched a social accountability program in Uganda’s primary health sector. After one year, improvements were reported in the treatment communities’ monitoring of health centers, health workers’ service to the community, and, importantly, health outcomes, specifically those of reduced child mortality and increased child weight.

- **Morocco: National Initiative for Human Development Support.** In 2005, with support from the Bank, the government launched the National Initiative for Human Development Support project, which relies on participatory processes led by local committees composed of representatives from civil society, elected officials, and government officials—with an emphasis on participation by women. These committees express and prioritize community needs (basic infrastructure, social services, income-generating activities, and capacity building) in a local development plan that is then financed by the program, line ministries, and other development agencies. This process has strengthened local decision-making, empowered local communities to have a voice in how they are governed, and encouraged the Government to respond to issues and needs prioritized by local communities.

- **Bangladesh: Access to Information to Improve Service Delivery.** Access to information is about empowering beneficiaries to participate in public affairs and fostering public accountability (through monitoring and advocacy). The Bank and other partners supported in-country coalitions for the adoption of access-to-information legislation, which took place in 2009. Thereafter, broad-based demand for and use of information has enhanced accountability and service delivery—for example, allowing excluded people to learn about, and access, their benefits under Government programs. South-South exchanges played a key role in strengthening the capacity of local stakeholders in the adoption and implementation stages.

- **Philippines: Oversight of Public Education.** Checkmyschool.org, an interactive map of basic public education information in the Philippines, provides information about the condition of the education sector and the services and facilities in public schools—for example, each school’s budget, enrollment, teaching personnel, furniture, textbooks, classrooms, toilets, and test performance or proficiency ratings. Users can send feedback, comments, photos and videos, and additional information. Information on the website comes from several offices of the Department of Education, and updates on school information come from administrators, volunteers, and organizations in each local school. This program takes advantage of ICT to enable public oversight of public education services and infrastructure, promoting transparency and social accountability in the sector.

- **Armenia: Piloting Participatory Monitoring.** In 2002, the Bank, in collaboration with a local NGO, launched a pilot to build the capacity of civil society groups to use participatory tools to monitor public service delivery. After using these tools, groups came together into a single coalition with institutionalized communication to coordinate continued monitoring of government action. The coalition also developed assessment tools and processes for the general public to use to diagnose service delivery problems in the education and health sectors.
West Bank and Gaza: Municipal Development Program. Since 2009 the multidonor Municipal Development Program has worked to improve municipal management practices for better transparency. By the 2011 midterm review, 56% of municipalities had publicly disclosed their budgets (baseline 0, target of 50% exceeded), and 100% of municipal subprojects met the target for community-based design. Despite these improvements, public participation still varies in quality, and other aspects of social accountability are not yet mainstreamed. The second phase (2013+) will enhance the focus on and support for social accountability.
AN EX B. OVERVIEW OF CONSULTATION PROCESS AND FEEDBACK

1. The proposed GPSA has benefited from feedback from 1,300 stakeholders from all Regions. Stakeholders consulted included a broad range of actors involved in social accountability work, including civil society organizations and foundations, government officials, development agencies, academia, and think tanks. They provided their feedback during face-to-face discussions, in audio and video conferences, and through online submissions to a dedicated website.¹

A. Early Discussions

2. The process was conducted in two rounds. A series of early discussions with civil society thought leaders and partners was undertaken between April and November 2011. Over 160 stakeholders from 33 different (mostly Part II) countries participated in these early discussions. The feedback at this stage enabled the Bank to draft a set of preliminary concepts and principles, based on client demand, to shape the proposed partnership.

3. Feedback received during these early discussions strongly indicated that the Bank has three areas of comparative advantage in supporting the GPSA:

- Generating, harvesting, warehousing, and disseminating knowledge.
- Its potential to open up space for constructive engagement between civil society and government.
- Its expertise on the supply side and its strong convening power, which, when matched with enhanced demand-side capacity, could lead to improved development outcomes.

Core funding for capacity building was also seen as a need that the Bank could fill, but perceptions of the scale of this need varied somewhat among stakeholders.

4. These early discussions also cautioned that the GPSA should be designed to ensure the legitimacy of civil society, be governed by a structure that ensured the voice of civil society and other stakeholders, and build on and complement existing initiatives.

¹ A website supported the consultation process (www.worldbank.org/gpsa). It contained an overall consultation plan, background materials from early discussions, a schedule of consultation meetings, and a questionnaire. A PowerPoint presentation on Key Concepts and Principles, which captured the emerging ideas, was made available as a basis for the discussion. The website was made available in English, French, Spanish, and Arabic, with key materials available also in Russian and Chinese. Stakeholders had the opportunity to submit formal written comments to a dedicated e-mail account, or through the questionnaire. They could also join an online discussion forum hosted on a World Bank blog which featured a conversation on social accountability, and could join face-to-face meetings.
B. Formal Consultation

5. From January 1 through March 15, 2012,\(^2\) the Bank conducted a formal consultation process on the key concepts, principles, and some operational elements of the GPSA that had been presented at a Technical Briefing for the staffs of Executive Directors on December 15, 2011. The formal consultation engaged with 870 stakeholders from 57 different (mostly Part II) countries in face to face discussions, and audio and video conferences. Over 10,000 persons visited the website, and about 275 of them submitted written comments.

6. These in-country consultations confirmed the significant knowledge gap CSOs are experiencing in the field of social accountability and the need to tailor GPSA support to local and country context. Respondents wanted global platforms that would link up their experience with others; that could support, adapt, and disseminate knowledge and research; and that could provide enhanced capacity building on the “how to” of social accountability. They also brought to the fore the important role of the Bank’s country teams and country directors in implementing the proposed GPSA, and the often shrinking space for civil society that the GPSA could help to address.

C. Feedback

7. The matrix below presents highlights of all the feedback received—online and in face-to-face meetings—from stakeholders during the consultations. The matrix cannot fully capture the richness of the discussions, or the range of issues that were raised. However, it reflects the general aspirations and concerns of participants with regard to the GPSA, and their conviction that GPSA has the potential to contribute to improvements in development effectiveness. While many of the issues raised by participants were country- and context-specific, there were commonalities such as relations with government and capacity and funding limitations on the part of CSOs. Many participants urged greater engagement of the Bank with civil society beyond the GPSA, including through the Bank’s lending operations, and indicated that inclusion of civil society should be a fundamental aspect of Bank involvement with countries. In essence, stakeholders urged the Bank to leverage the GPSA by mainstreaming social accountability in Bank operations, and ensuring that country directors and country teams receive the support and encouragement they may need to do so.

\(^2\) Subject to Board approval of the proposed GPSA, consultations and conversations will continue through June 2012 to go deeper into the operational details of the GPSA in different country contexts. The results of the consultations would be used in the development of a GPSA Operational Manual.
### Challenges Faced by Civil Society Organizations

| Lack of enabling environment |  
|------------------------------|---|
| Factors include asymmetry of government and civil society relations; government capacity limitations and lack of experience in participatory governance; limited access of CSOs and citizens to government officials; poor or nonexistent communication channels between government and civil society; and general lack of understanding on the part of governments that civil society can be an effective partner in development.  
In some countries, the space for civil society is shrinking; the relationship between governments and CSOs is adversarial; CSOs are subject to government interference and restrictive legislation; and/or they fear governmental response. |

| Capacity limitations |  
|---------------------|---|
| Limited technical, analytic, and management capacity reduces the ability of some CSOs to effectively articulate and address issues, scale up activities, find innovative solutions, or negotiate on behalf of their constituents.  
This is exacerbated by lack of access to information and few opportunities to network and build coalitions within and across countries. |

| Funding |  
|---------|---|
| National or subnational CSOs often face funding constraints, especially for building core capacity, including developing financial independence, and are dependent on donors and short-term financing. |

### Partnership Focus and Support

| Leveraging |  
|------------|---|
| Leveraging through partnerships was a recurring theme. For example, partnerships could allow the GPSA to achieve legitimacy among key stakeholders; harvest, disseminate, and scale up good practices; strengthen and extend the reach of communities of social accountability practice; and nurture nascent CSOs and build their capacity. Partnerships within the Bank and with the rest of the development community could help to ensure mainstreaming of social accountability initiatives within development programs, including those funded by the Bank. |

| National empowerment |  
|---------------------|---|
| The predominant focus should be national/local organizations promoting improved governance and social accountability, including those working with underserved communities. |

| Knowledge and capacity development |  
|-----------------------------------|---|
| This should cover networking, South-South collaboration, access to information, ideas, expertise, technical assistance, and training. |

| Financial support |  
|--------------------|---|
| Long-term, direct, and core funding of CSOs, combined with training and technical assistance where necessary. |

| Overall GPSA brand |  
|--------------------|---|
| The emphasis on partnership should be reflected in all aspects of the GPSA, including its launch and the branding of its products and services. |

| Understanding of social accountability |  
|---------------------------------------|---|
| The partnership should be aware that the term “social accountability” has different connotations across different countries and languages; local context should be taken into account. |
### World Bank Role in Supporting Civil Society

| Dialogue with governments | Policy dialogue with governments should encourage partnership with civil society and indicate how service delivery and development outcomes can be improved by the participation of civil society; it should explicitly address issues of governance and social accountability and, where necessary, condition assistance on improvements in governance.  
|                           | Social accountability should be incorporated into CASs and PRSPs, and the active participation of civil society should be sought. |
| Civil society-government relations | The Bank should facilitate channels of engagement between civil society and governments, at international, national and subnational levels, and promote dialogue using its convening power. |
| Engagement with civil society | Beyond the GPSA, the Bank should build further on its “democratizing development” initiatives and become even more open and accessible to CSOs, explicitly reach out to them, provide information, engage in dialogue, and involve them in Bank projects and programs.  
|                           | It should provide mentoring, technical assistance, and funding; partner with other donors to support CSOs; and use innovative funding mechanisms, including channeling of private funds. |

### Governance and Eligibility

| Independent and inclusive | Governance structures should be independent and inclusive, with diversity of representation, including women and youth.  
|                          | Membership should be predominantly from CSOs with a track record of working in development, complemented by individuals recognized as leaders in their fields.  
|                          | Criteria for selection should be transparent, and members should serve for a fixed term.  
|                          | Various approaches should be considered for selecting CSO representatives on the SC, including subregional elections and selection of individuals based on their experience and passion for this agenda rather than as representatives of CSOs.  
|                          | A Memorandum of Understanding should define the parameters of the partnership and operating procedures. |
| Tiered governance structure | Tiered governance structures involving CSO representation at the national, subregional, or regional levels could complement the international governance structure and facilitate inclusion and operational efficiency.  
|                          | Decisions could be taken by an executive management team, with advice and input from a broad panel of advisers and patrons.  
|                          | Governance structures should include regional advisers and local mentors, as well as in-country teams to monitor implementation.  
<p>|                          | A high-level advisory team could act as ambassadors for the GPSA and engage with governments, while greater outreach and inclusion could be facilitated by an online forum. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rules of procedure and operational guidelines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Integrity and impartiality should be guiding principles; decision-making processes should be transparent, with clearly defined roles, responsibilities, and operational procedures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• All actions should have a timeline for implementation, performance should be reviewed against targets, and proper reports issued.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**RISKS AND RISK MANAGEMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participation of countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Scope and impact of partnership will be limited if countries opt out.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• High-level advocacy could be used to encourage governments to participate, while risk of state capture could be mitigated by an open flow of information.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inclusion and efficiency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Selection of a limited number of CSOs could be difficult; Northern CSOs, donors, governments, or the Bank could dominate; broad-based governance structures could be managerially challenging; and processes could become overly bureaucratic and lengthy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• These risks could be mitigated by in-country review; impartial application of clear and open selection criteria; diversity of membership; clear rules of engagement; open flow of information; timelines for decisions and actions; and regular reporting, including through electronic media, to reach broad constituencies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sustainability and effectiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• The Bank will need to demonstrate its commitment to the GSPA after changes at the senior management level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• This will depend on the extent of engagement and success of interventions; the first phase of the GPSA should be seen as a pilot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ongoing assessment and revision of processes and procedures will provide flexibility to respond to changing situations and priorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tensions between high expectations, limited funding levels, and capacity to deliver will need to be managed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Substantially increased financial resources will be needed beyond the pilot phase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The pilot phase track record will help to allay CSO concerns about the Bank’s intentions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unintended consequences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• CSO selection processes and criteria could have unintended consequences, such as creating unhealthy competition among CSOs, discouraging coordination, and contributing to fragmentation among them.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### I. Schedule and Country Coverage of Early Discussions (April - November 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Meeting type</th>
<th>Participation from</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>April 27</td>
<td>Roundtable discussion with CSO leaders</td>
<td>Dubai, Egypt, Ghana, India, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Senegal, Uruguay, United Kingdom, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>August 27</td>
<td>Discussion meeting with leaders of International Forum of National NGO Platforms</td>
<td>Canada, France, Senegal, United Kingdom, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dakar</td>
<td>October 07</td>
<td>Discussion meeting with CSO representatives</td>
<td>Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>October 10</td>
<td>Discussion meeting with CSO representatives</td>
<td>Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>October 13</td>
<td>Discussion meeting with CSO representatives</td>
<td>Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Kyrgyzstan, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>October 26</td>
<td>Discussion meeting with CSO representatives</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>October 27</td>
<td>Discussion meeting with CSO representatives</td>
<td>Belgium, France, Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabat, Tunis</td>
<td>November 3</td>
<td>Discussion meeting with CSO representatives</td>
<td>Morocco, Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santiago, Medellin, Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Santo Domingo, Mexico City</td>
<td>November 4</td>
<td>Discussion meeting with CSO representatives</td>
<td>Chile, Colombia, Argentina, Uruguay, Dominican Republic, Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut, Cairo</td>
<td>November 9</td>
<td>Discussion meeting with CSO leaders</td>
<td>Lebanon, Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>November 10</td>
<td>Discussion meeting with CSO representatives</td>
<td>Canada, USA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### II. Schedule and Country Coverage of Formal Public Consultations (January - March 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Meeting type</th>
<th>Participation from</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
<td>January 31</td>
<td>Public consultation</td>
<td>Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait City</td>
<td>January 31</td>
<td>Public consultation</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Online consultation</td>
<td>February 1-29</td>
<td>Public consultation</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accra</td>
<td>February 2</td>
<td>Public consultation</td>
<td>Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabat</td>
<td>February 2</td>
<td>Public consultation</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bamako</td>
<td>February 3</td>
<td>Public consultation</td>
<td>Mali, Cameroon, Chad, Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Madagascar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pretoria</td>
<td>February 6</td>
<td>Public consultation</td>
<td>South Africa, Rwanda, Malawi, Zambia, Lesotho, Botswana, Mozambique, Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>February 8</td>
<td>Public consultation</td>
<td>West Bank &amp; Gaza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>February 13</td>
<td>Public consultation</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>February 14</td>
<td>Technical partners meeting</td>
<td>Denmark, Morocco, Senegal, Uruguay, United Kingdom, United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>February 16</td>
<td>Public consultation</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cairo</td>
<td>February 23</td>
<td>Public consultation</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>February 27</td>
<td>Public consultation</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>February 29</td>
<td>Public consultation</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>March 5</td>
<td>Public consultation</td>
<td>Germany, Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>March 5</td>
<td>Public consultation</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Delhi</td>
<td>March 6</td>
<td>Public consultation</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>March 7</td>
<td>Public consultation</td>
<td>Belgium, France, Italy, Switzerland, United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>March 7</td>
<td>Public consultation</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tegucigalpa</td>
<td>March 7</td>
<td>Public consultation</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bogota, Mexico City</td>
<td>March 8</td>
<td>Public consultation</td>
<td>Colombia, Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kathmandu</td>
<td>March 8</td>
<td>Public consultation</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanoi</td>
<td>March 9</td>
<td>Public consultation</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almaty</td>
<td>March 13</td>
<td>Public consultation</td>
<td>Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>March 14</td>
<td>Public consultation</td>
<td>Australia, Solomon Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhaka</td>
<td>March 14</td>
<td>Public consultation</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX C. ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA

A. Introduction

1. The GPSA would support CSOs working at global, regional, and country levels, and operating in participating countries. For the purpose of the GPSA, CSOs include legal entities that fall outside the public or for-profit sector, such as nongovernment organizations, not-for-profit media organizations, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional organizations, labor unions, associations of elected local representatives, foundations, and policy development and research institutes. Global and regional CSOs/networks would be eligible provided they can demonstrate either that they have an established and effective relationship with local CSOs in the countries where the GPSA will operate or that their own local offices have an independent administrative and governance structure, and will execute the grants. Gender sensitivity would be a cross-cutting criterion.

2. **Purpose of Grants.** The GPSA would allocate grants on a competitive basis to eligible CSOs for knowledge creation, knowledge sharing and networking, institutional strengthening, and programmatic activities related to social accountability. (Further guidance will be spelled out in the GPSA Operational Manual.)

B. Due Diligence Review

3. For each grant application, Bank staff would carry out a due diligence review in accordance with the *Guidance Note on Bank Multi-Stakeholder Engagement,* covering the following categories (the GPSA Operational Manual will provide further details):

   - **Legal status:** the recipient would need to be a legal entity.
   - **Representation:** community ties, accountability to members or beneficiaries, diversity and gender sensitivity would be key criteria.
   - **Governance:** sound internal management: organizational dimensions, such as clear management roles and responsibilities, clear methods of planning and organizing activities, human capital, financial and technical resources, and partnerships.
   - **Transparency:** including disclosure of sources of funding, financial accountability, efficiency.
   - **Fiduciary requirements:** ability to meet applicable World Bank policies for grants.

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1. Government-owned enterprises or institutions are not eligible, unless they can establish that the enterprise or institution (a) has a legal personality independent of any government agency or actor; (b) can function independently from government; and (c) has the authority to apply for and receive private funds (such as government-owned universities or research centers).

2. Paragraph 26 in particular. The Guidance Note also refers to GP 14.70, *Involving Nongovernmental Organizations in Bank-Supported Activities* (now retired), which stated that the following are some of the qualities that should be considered in selecting individual NGO partners (depending on the nature and purpose of a particular task): credibility, competence, local knowledge; representation, governance, legal status; and institutional capacity.

3. Also including periodicity and comprehensiveness of information flows to members in terms of budgets and of projects implemented and funded.
• **Institutional capacity:** appropriate scale of operations, facilities, and equipment.

• **Competence:** relevant skills and experience.

• **Proven track record:** organization can clearly show that it has experience (at least 3-5 years) in the area of the call for proposals, and a vision matching the goals of the GPSA.

**C. Support to Low-Capacity or Nascent CSOs**

4. Nascent or start-up CSOs may not fully meet all the eligibility criteria, but could benefit from GPSA support during an incubation period. To conform to the spirit of the initiative, as a pilot with a focus on knowledge, the GPSA would support (a) CSOs in countries where there is not yet strong expertise on social accountability (and in which there may be no CSOs with a track record of social accountability work); and (b) newly established CSOs, or CSOs with low capacity. In doing so, the GPSA would adhere to the following principles:

• Support (grants or direct capacity building/mentoring) would link institutional strengthening to implementation of social accountability activities (thus allowing for hands-on learning and providing CSOs with some means to implement right away).

• Eligibility criteria related to “track record on social accountability” could be lifted.

• Support would be planned to span several years to allow for capacity building to take root.

• Reliance on local or regional expertise for selecting beneficiaries.

5. **Modalities of Support.** Three modalities could be used for such support: (a) on-granting or direct support by regional or country-based organizations to smaller or start-up CSOs selected according to clear eligibility criteria; (b) country-based call managed by the country office targeting low-capacity, local-level, or start-up CSOs; and (c) possibility for new or low-capacity CSOs to “link up” with or be mentored by an organization that meets the eligibility criteria, including a clear agreement that spells out the contributions and roles of both partners. (The GPSA Operational Manual would set out details on these modalities.)

**D. Project Criteria**

6. In assessing grant funding proposals, the GPSA would give attention to the following areas:

• **Concept.** The central concept behind the proposal should be clear, realistic, and achievable within the project implementation timeframe. It should also be based on consideration of the country/local context and its opportunities and challenges.

• **Results framework.** The grant proposal should have a realistic plan with concrete steps or activities for achieving the grant objectives, as well as clear and measurable milestones and results that will have a direct impact on the intended beneficiaries. Disbursements may be tranched to coincide with the achievement of milestones.
• **Cost-effectiveness.** The estimated costs should be appropriate, with a reasonable balance between overheads and the funding of specific activities, independent of any specific capacity-building activities.

• **Risks and mitigation.** The proposal should adequately identify any potential risks connected to its activities, and should outline mitigation measures to address those risks. According to paragraph 15 of the *Guidance Note on Bank Multi-Stakeholder Engagement*, “in assessing the degree of risk, the Bank should examine all relevant factors, including the overall country context, the nature of the particular activities to be supported, and the nature of the actors with which it proposes to engage, including their relationship with the government.” In some cases the nature of the risks would mean that the activities would not be funded: “The Bank should avoid activities that are inherently linked to partisan politics, such as support for the electoral process, and engagement with entities or groups with partisan associations.”

• **Sustainability potential.** Key criteria in assessing the potential for sustainability would include the following:
  - Ownership/beneficiary involvement.
  - Share of budget derived from the GPSA; the GPSA should not be the organization’s predominant funder.
  - Capacity to sustain work beyond the specific grant (through own resources or external resource mobilization).
  - Growth and scalability potential.

E. **Activities Not Eligible for Funding and Conflicts of Interest**

7. In accordance with the *Guidance Note on Bank Multi-Stakeholder Engagement*, the GPSA would not support:

• Entities or groups with partisan associations.

• Grant applications that include “activities which, because of the high inherent risk of political interference, are likely to raise Articles issues. These activities include political governance, for instance, support of efforts to help organize political parties and movements, or to the organization, running and monitoring of elections” (paragraph 16).

The GPSA also would not support the following:

• Organizations that have been debarred or suspended by the Bank.

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4 Consultations with the Office of Ethics and Business Conduct (EBC) have commenced to identify and manage any conflict of interest risks arising in the GPSA. One area for possible conflicts of interest relates to the World Bank’s multiple roles in the GPSA. Information firewalls, the use of different World Bank management chains for different roles, and targeted recusals from specific decisions are among the techniques available to appropriately manage these risks. Since CSOs would be seeking GPSA funding, a robust recusal system would be set up to guard against potential CSO conflicts of interest and would be included in the Operational Manual.
• Organizations that have a conflict of interest, as described in 1.9 of the Consultant Guidelines or that are in violation of the Bank’s staff rules, including 3.02.5

• Organizations not compliant with the country’s constitutional and legal framework.

F. Core Funding as Eligible Expenditure

8. Core funding would be an eligible expenditure for CSOs meeting the eligibility requirements. The Secretariat would build on the experience of other donors/foundations in managing core funding. Preliminary principles include the following:

• A recipient CSO should have capacity building and institutional strengthening as its priority. In its funding request it should articulate its goals and explain how it intends to use the core funding over time.

• The funding horizon would be 3-5 years for individual grants, but it would also be possible to provide phased support to a longer-term program.6 In each case, the GPSA and the CSO would agree on a multiyear results framework, with measurable performance indicators. The CSO would need to designate funding to design and implement monitoring activities.7

• The impact evaluation (to be conducted by an independent party) would be funded under the grant. Attention would be given to using mixed methods approaches.

G. Research and Knowledge Grants

9. Specific criteria would be developed for research and knowledge grants.

• Core principles for research grants:
  o Credibility of the research institution (clout and relevance of past research, ongoing partnerships, reputation of research team).
  o Clear articulation of the broader impact(s) of the proposed research on the needs of the intended GPSA audience (based on documented consultation on knowledge gaps and on relevance of the issue for CSO engagement in social accountability in targeted region/countries/area of focus); the scope would need to be relevant in at least a subset of countries.
  o Clear articulation of how this research will be disseminated to target audiences in an accessible and relevant manner, which could be done through the Partnership.

• Core principles for knowledge grants:

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5 Within two years after separation from Bank Group employment, former staff members may not perform services for any other entity or person related to an activity in which the Bank Group has an interest or is a party and in which they participated personally and substantially during their employment with the Bank Group.

6 Subject to funding availability.

7 The possibility of providing a generic logical framework and/or including at least some generic result indicators that would be developed for the GPSA is being discussed, and would be spelled out in the GPSA Operational Manual.
o Outreach capacity of the institution applying (membership base, country presence).

o Track record of successfully disseminating knowledge in a format adapted to target audiences (accessibility), with creative use of various media/ICTs.

o Clear articulation of type of knowledge and type of format based on documented consultation on knowledge gaps, on relevance of the issue for CSO engagement in social accountability in targeted region/countries/area of focus, and on preferred means of accessing knowledge expressed by CSO communities.
ANNEX D. INDICATIVE RESULTS MATRIX

1. The GPSA’s goal is to contribute to country-level governance reforms and improved service delivery by developing more sustainable and effective CSOs supporting social accountability initiatives. The GPSA seeks to contribute to this objective by providing funds and advisory services. Observable indicators of progress toward the goal include a reduction in the number of instances of discrepancies in the use of public resources and an increase in the number of key services in selected sectors with demonstrated improvements. Specifically, through the kinds of activities listed below, the initiative would seek to empower CSOs to facilitate progress in the four key results areas.

2. This indicative results matrix would be refined and finalized during preparation of the GPSA Operational Manual. During the initial stage of implementation, once the focus of the first year(s) of activity is narrowed down, baselines and targets would also be defined. Generic indicators would be developed, and each grantee would be required to report on at least some of them (depending on their specific activities) to allow the Secretariat to aggregate for overall GPSA reporting.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partnership Development Objective (PDO)</th>
<th>PDO indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To contribute to country-level governance reforms and improved service delivery through developing more sustainable and effective CSOs supporting social accountability initiatives.</td>
<td># of instances in which there was a reduction in discrepancies in the use of public resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># of key services in select sectors with demonstrated improvement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results areas¹</th>
<th>Change process</th>
<th>Selected activities</th>
<th>Intermediate results indicators</th>
<th>Outcome indicators</th>
<th>Data sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td>CSOs are provided with information so they can increase their knowledge about government activities. Their skills will be enhanced so they can learn how to use the information effectively.</td>
<td>Initiatives to monitor the application and impact of access-to-information legislation; publication of local and national budgets; development of knowledge platforms for disseminating government information.</td>
<td># of CSOs that have provided information to beneficiaries on government activities</td>
<td># of CSOs engaged with government in structured dialogue to influence policy and policy implementation</td>
<td>Rankings by Article XIX specializing in freedom of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td># of CSOs trained</td>
<td># of government agencies that regularly share information with the public</td>
<td>Progress reported by government</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td># of knowledge platforms/ networks supported for dissemination of information</td>
<td># of policy changes that enhance open exchange of information (i.e., access-to-information laws)</td>
<td>Grantee reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>External evaluations of GPSA-funded projects</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ These results are focused on the GPSA at the global program level.
### Partnership Development Objective (PDO)

To contribute to country-level governance reforms and improved service delivery through developing more sustainable and effective CSOs supporting social accountability initiatives.

### PDO indicators

- # of instances in which there was a reduction in discrepancies in the use of public resources
- # of key services in select sectors with demonstrated improvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results areas</th>
<th>Change process</th>
<th>Selected activities</th>
<th>Intermediate results indicators</th>
<th>Outcome indicators</th>
<th>Data sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Representation and voice</td>
<td>New/expanded mechanism is established to ensure that governments hear the views and concerns of beneficiaries.</td>
<td>Creation of forums for state-civil society engagement. Capacity building of CSOs working with underrepresented groups.</td>
<td># of CSOs strengthened that enhance beneficiary voice</td>
<td># of policy decisions influenced by CSO-government exchanges</td>
<td>Progress reports by government Grantee reports External evaluations of GPSA-funded projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>Governments are more accountable to beneficiaries on management of public resources and in delivery of services.</td>
<td>CSOs are equipped to facilitate beneficiaries’ holding government accountable for service delivery and management of public resources.</td>
<td>Implement mechanisms that enable beneficiaries to monitor government performance in service delivery and management of public resources, including independent budget analysis, participatory budgeting, social audits, third-party monitoring of government performance; training of CSOs in specific tools and approaches.</td>
<td># of CSOs over a sustained period (at least 3 years) working to monitor government performance in public resource management and service delivery</td>
<td># of government agencies that incorporate beneficiary feedback mechanisms into service delivery mechanisms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| Data sources | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results areas(^1)</th>
<th>Change process</th>
<th>Selected activities</th>
<th>Intermediate results indicators</th>
<th>Outcome indicators</th>
<th>Data sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Learning for improved results</td>
<td>Knowledge exchange and learning enhance the effectiveness of CSOs and new tools developed or implemented to capture beneficiary input. Knowledge and research provide insights on what works and improvements for future design and implementation. Systematic monitoring of country results helps ensure continuous learning and guides discrete studies.</td>
<td>Conduct cross-country or country-specific analytic work. Create global platform for knowledge codification and exchange. Strengthen networks of global, regional, and country-level practitioners. Strengthen forums for exchange and mentoring.</td>
<td># of impact assessments undertaken by grantees</td>
<td># of people who use research (citations, downloads)</td>
<td>GPSA-funded project documents</td>
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<td>External evaluations of GPSA-funded projects</td>
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<td>Research reports</td>
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Partnership Development Objective (PDO)
To contribute to country-level governance reforms and improved service delivery through developing more sustainable and effective CSOs supporting social accountability initiatives.

PDO indicators
# of instances in which there was a reduction in discrepancies in the use of public resources
# of key services in select sectors with demonstrated improvement