

IEG ICR Review

Independent Evaluation Group

1. Project Data:		Date Posted : 10/29/2012	
Country:	Ghana		
Project ID:	P116441	Appraisal	Actual
Project Name:	Ghana Education For All Fast Track Initiative	Project Costs (US\$M):	14.20 0
L/C Number:		Loan/Credit (US\$M):	14.2 0
Sector Board :	Education	Cofinancing (US\$M):	
Cofinanciers :		Board Approval Date :	04/01/2009
		Closing Date :	02/27/2010 06/30/2011
Sector(s):	Primary education (80%); Secondary education (20%)		
Theme(s):	Education for all (100% - P)		
Prepared by :	Reviewed by :	ICR Review Coordinator :	Group:
Susan Ann Caceres	Robert Mark Lacey	Soniya Carvalho	IEGPS1

2. Project Objectives and Components:

a. Objectives:

The Catalytic Fund Project Paper (p. 9) and the signed Catalytic Fund Grant Agreement (p. 3) state the project's development objective as follows: " to improve the quality of basic education in Ghana ".

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

No

c. Components:

There were two components.

1. Procure core textbooks and other teaching and learning materials . (appraisal US\$11.36 actual US\$ 0). To improve the core textbook pupil ratio to ensure that pupils in primary and junior high schools have at least three core textbooks each, and to purchase teaching and learning materials .

2. Provide incentives to attract and retain teachers in deprived districts . (appraisal US\$2.84 actual US\$ 0) To improve the quality of teachers in deprived districts by providing incentives that will help attract and retain qualified teachers in those areas . Activities included providing accommodation and means of transport to teachers working in deprived communities, as well as training of untrained teachers through district in -service and a distance learning program.

The project also included financing for the preparation and updating of environmental and social reports and for hiring consultants for technical and financial project audits (PAD, p.9).

d. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates:

Project Costs : The Bank initially advanced US\$8.6 million from the Grant to the Government. When the Government could not provide supporting documentation on its use, the Bank cancelled the remaining US\$ 5.6 million and later declared the other amount ineligible . The Government repaid the US\$8.6 million to the Bank. None of the

proposed activities was supported with project resources . Since there were no net disbursements of the Catalytic Fund for this operation, this ICR is being reviewed as a Note of Cancelled Operation . The project was cancelled before significant implementation, defined by OPCS as "final actual disbursement of less than five percent of the initial commitment or US\$ 1 million (whichever is smaller), excluding any Project Preparation Facility and front-end fees" (OPCS Implementation Completion and Results Report Guidelines).

Financing : The project was financed by the Education for All Fast Track Initiative (EFA-FTI) Catalytic Fund for US\$14.2 million dollars. During the preparation of the project, EFA-FTI guidelines were changed, so that direct budget or programmatic support would no longer be provided . The project was, therefore, to be prepared using a sector investment loan (SIL) approach, under which procurement procedures would require Bank approval . However, in 2007 before the approval of the Grant, the Government had already initiated a textbook procurement that it expected to be financed by this Grant, without prior Bank review of procurement documents . In doing this, it was following the same practice as under a previous EFA -FTI grant to Ghana; nonetheless, the ICR reports that the government had been informed of the upcoming changes to the EFA -FTI procurement and financing policies that would be effective with this project .

Borrower Contribution : There were no Borrower contributions .

Dates: On January 19, 2011, the closing date was extended from February 27, 2010 to June 30, 2011. This extension was provided to enable the Government to repay ineligible expenditures .

3. Relevance of Objectives & Design:

a. Relevance of Objectives:

Substantial : The objectives of this project continue to be substantially relevant to IDA 's current Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Ghana for the period 2008-2011, which states that improving quality in basic education is the central challenge in the education system (CAS, p. 19). The objective is also relevant to Ghana's Education Strategic Plan. The CAS also notes that the Bank will support the Government's new human resource strategy of increasing quality of learning, expansion of secondary education, reform of vocational learning, reform of tertiary learning, and youth employment and science and technology .

b. Relevance of Design:

Modest: The link between objectives, outcomes, and activities was weak . The link between objectives, outcomes, and activities was weak . The strategies selected to attract and retain effective teachers were likely to be insufficient . As stated in the ICR (p.7) "motorbikes alone are not enough to retain teachers in deprived areas ". The ICR (p. 4) also pointed out another design weakness -- the short time period (less than one year) in which to procure textbooks and civil works.

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy):

Efficacy is not evaluated, since the project was cancelled before significant implementation .

5. Efficiency:

Efficiency is not evaluated .

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR)/Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation :

	Rate Available?	Point Value	Coverage/Scope*
Appraisal	No		
ICR estimate	No		

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

6. Outcome:

Outcome is not evaluated .

a. Outcome Rating : Not Applicable

7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating:

a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating : Not Applicable

8. Assessment of Bank Performance:

a. Quality at entry:

IDA had detailed discussions with the Government regarding the changes in EFA -FTI guidelines and the need for more rigorous project documentation and adherence to World Bank procurement and financial management procedures. The preparation team was experienced in working with the Government in designing the previous EFA-FTI projects, as well as another Bank-supported Education Sector Project.

However, the project used limited analysis to design the strategies to address the problem of recruitment and retention of teachers in deprived areas. The Grant Agreement made no provision for retroactive financing. There were three other shortcomings. First, there was no Quality Assessment (QER) of the project. Second, the time period of ten months was unrealistic to accomplish procurement, civil works, and teacher training, particularly in view of the replacement of implementation staff in the Ministry of Education after the national elections. Third, the country assessment conducted significantly underestimated the risks (ICR, p. 5).

Quality-at-Entry Rating : Unsatisfactory

b. Quality of supervision:

There were significant weaknesses in supervision performance. The team did not advise Management in a timely manner about the Government's procurement problems or about the Government's reluctance to request an extension of the closing date of the project to allow it time to resolve the procurement problems. A retroactive extension had, therefore, to be granted by the Regional Vice President. Administrative errors were also made (e.g. linking this project with the Education Sector Project in Operations Portal, and not writing aid memoires and supervision reports dealing only with this project), which "effectively masked major implementation problems" (ICR, p. 9). The region reported that this was common practice at the time.

Quality of Supervision Rating : Unsatisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating : Unsatisfactory

9. Assessment of Borrower Performance:

a. Government Performance:

There were significant shortcomings in Government performance. The change in Administration following the 2008 elections led to a long delay in placing key project implementation staff. This delay caused significant problems for the project given its short implementation period. Key documents were misplaced or lost during the transition period. The Government delayed requesting an extension of the project closing date, believing that an extension would delay the next EFA-FTI application (ICR, p. 5).

Government Performance Rating : Unsatisfactory

b. Implementing Agency Performance:

The Ministry of Education did not follow Bank procurement guidelines even though these guidelines were discussed with the implementation team, and the same implementation team had followed Bank procedures in another project. The Ministry did not send any no-objection request to the Bank. The lack of adherence to procurement guidelines led to US\$ 8.6 million in ineligible expenditures that was repaid by the Government. According to the region, the Government did not inform the Bank of the sites selected for civil works until after the operation was cancelled.

Implementing Agency Performance Rating : Unsatisfactory

Overall Borrower Performance Rating : Unsatisfactory

10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization:

a. M&E Design:

- The project's development objective (improved education quality) is very general, but clearly specified. According to the Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (Annex 3B of the Catalytic Fund Project Paper), there were three main outcome indicators to be used to measure progress towards attaining this objective : (i) core textbook-pupil ratio (primary); (ii) core textbook-pupil ratio (junior high school); and (iii) percentage of untrained teachers in 53 deprived districts. The first two indicators are outputs, and it is not clear that a change in the textbook-pupil ratio would be either a necessary or sufficient condition for improving the quality of education .
- Other indicators were all outputs such as number of teacher housing units constructed and the number of teachers sponsored for distance learning courses, and provided with motorbikes (to increase their mobility and hence lessen their resistance to working in deprived and isolated areas).
- There were no baseline data for any of the indicators . Evolution of the third outcome indicator - the percentage of untrained teachers - would, in any event, have been difficult to measure since no disaggregation by district was available.
- Responsibility for data collection was to be spread among different departments of the Ministry of Education - the Planning Division for the outcome indicators, the Procurement Division for the number of textbooks acquired, the Funds and Procurement Management Unit for the number of accommodation units constructed, and the Basic Education and Teacher Education Divisions for the number of untrained teachers supplied with motorbikes and sponsored for distance learning courses . It is unclear from the project documents how the coordinated management of the M&E system as a whole was to be provided for . The degree of ministerial ownership of, and commitment to, the system is equally unspecified .

b. M&E Implementation:

c. M&E Utilization:

M&E Quality Rating : Non-evaluable

11. Other Issues

a. Safeguards:

The project as rated Category B for Environmental Assessment (OP 4.01), which was the only safeguards policy triggered.

b. Fiduciary Compliance:

c. Unintended Impacts (positive or negative):

None

d. Other:

None

12. Ratings:	ICR	IEG Review	Reason for Disagreement / Comments
Outcome:	Unsatisfactory	Not Applicable	Outcome was not evaluated, since the project was cancelled before significant implementation.
Risk to Development Outcome:	Significant	Not Applicable	

Bank Performance :	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	
Borrower Performance :	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	
Quality of ICR :		Satisfactory	

NOTES:

- When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006.
- The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate.

13. Lessons:

The ICR recorded the following lessons :

- Strong project supervision with knowledge of Bank procedures is important to avoid implementation complications. Significant project implementation problems need to be escalated to Senior Management quickly so that mitigation measures can be discussed and developed .
- Project design needs to set a realistic time frame for accomplishing the activities . Projects that include large procurement and packages of goods and civil works cannot be implemented in ten months .

14. Assessment Recommended? Yes No

15. Comments on Quality of ICR:

The ICR provides an objective analysis and assessment of why the project was cancelled . Given the fact that no significant implementation took place, the ICR would more appropriately have been designated as a Note on a Cancelled Operation.

a. Quality of ICR Rating : Satisfactory