Report Number : ICRR0021057

1. Project Data

Project ID	Project Name
P126576	CD-Ag. Production Support Project
Country	**Practice Area(Lead)**
Chad	Agriculture

L/C/TF Number(s)	Closing Date (Original)	Total Project Cost (USD)
IDA-51160	31-Dec-2016	63,888,890.00
Bank Approval Date	**Closing Date (Actual)**	
17-May-2012	30-Jun-2017	

	IBRD/IDA (USD)	Grants (USD)
Original Commitment	25,000,000.00	0.00
Revised Commitment	22,891,410.56	0.00
Actual	18,731,184.63	0.00

Prepared by	Reviewed by	ICR Review Coordinator	Group
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Project ID	Project Name
P131019	TD-Ag.Prod. Support Project GEF (PSG) (P131019)

L/C/TF Number(s)	Closing Date (Original)	Total Project Cost (USD)
		34,259,260.00

Bank Approval Date	**Closing Date (Actual)**	
17-May-2012		

	IBRD/IDA (USD)	**Grants (USD)**
Original Commitment	0.00	9,259,258.00
Revised Commitment	0.00	9,259,258.00
Actual	0.00	5,449,420.71

2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

The Project Development Objective (PDO) as articulated in the Emergency Project paper (p. ix) was identical to that in the Financing Agreement (p. 6) and aimed to:

"Support communities and producer organizations in increasing (i) the production of selected crops and livestock species in selected areas of the Recipient's territory; and (ii) the use of sustainable land and water management practices in climate vulnerable ecosystems."

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

No

c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?

No

d. Components

The PDO was supported by five components.

1. Provision of agricultural inputs (appraisal cost: US$1.87 million, actual cost: US$5.37 million). This component was the emergency component of the Project. It aimed to increase access of targeted households to seeds and animal feed. It complemented crisis relief interventions were already being supported by the Recipient and other development partners. It supported the purchase of 128 tons of seeds and 2,800 tons of animal feed, to were expected to be distributed at no cost to 23,500 small-scale farmers and herders in zones that had been most severely affected by the drought.

2. Support to food production (appraisal cost: US$17.88 million, actual cost: US$14.88 million). It aimed to increase crop and livestock production and enhance productivity. It included three sub-components:

2.1. Basic agricultural infrastructure for rural communities;

2.2. Productive assets for producer organizations; and
2.3. Income generating assets for women.

3. Sustainable land and ecosystem management (appraisal cost: US$3.89 million, actual cost: US$3.88 million). It complemented the investments financed under Component 2, to enhance sustainable management of land and water resources and to support protection of vulnerable ecosystems. Component 3 would include two sub-components:
3.1. Sustainable land management and climate change adaptation; and
3.2. Ecosystem management.

4. Capacity building and institutional support to public services (appraisal cost: US$4.30 million, actual cost: US$4.38 million). This component supported the implementation of Components 1, 2, and 3 of the Project. Component 4 provided institutional support to MAI, MEF, and the Ministry of Pastoral Development and Animal Production (MPDAP), as well as to their related decentralized services involved in implementation. It also supported apex producer organizations. It included the following four sub-components:
4.1. Support to Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation.
4.2. Support to Ministry of Pastoral Development and Animal Production.
4.3. Support to Ministry of Environment and Fisheries.
4.4. Strengthening apex producer organizations.

5. Project coordination and management (appraisal cost: US$5.12 million, actual cost: US$6.22 million). This component supported project implementation, including operating costs of a PCU with offices at national, regional, and local levels.

e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

Project Cost. The total project cost was estimated at appraisal to be US$34.26 million. Actual cost reported by the ICR (Annex 3) was US$32.67 million.

Financing. The project was to be financed through an International Development Association (IDA) Credit in the amount of US$25.00 million (revised amount: US$22.89 million), a Global Environmental Fund (GEF) Grant in the amount of US$4.63 million (revised amount US$2.35 million) and a Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) Grant in the amount of US$4.63 million (revised amount: US$3.00 million). Total Bank financing was US$34.26 million (revised amount; US$32.15 million). Actual amounts disbursed according to the ICR (data sheet) were US$18.73 million, US$2.35 million, and US$3.00 million for IDA, GEF and LDCF, respectively. Total amount disbursed was US$24.08 million which represented about 70% of the original amount of US$34.26.

Borrower Contribution. This was an emergency project and no counterpart funding was expected from the borrower.

Dates. The project was expected to close on December, 31, 2016. It closed six months later on June, 30, 2017. The project was restructured three times, all of which were Level 2 restructurings. The first was on July, 18, 2014, when the amount disbursed was US$4.43 million in order to provide emergency support to address the migrant crisis associated with the return of about 150,000 Chadians and their herds fleeing the conflict in neighboring Central African Republic. The second was on December 30, 2016, when the amount disbursed was US$15.76 million, in order to extend the Loan closing date by six months; and to allow reallocation between disbursement categories. The third was on June 27, 2017, when the amount disbursed was US$18.43 million, in order to allow reallocation between disbursement categories. The Midterm Review was carried out on December 31, 2014. The PAD did not state a specific date for the Midterm Review, but stated that it "will be conducted two years after the first disbursement (PAD, p. 45)." The ICR (para 51, p. 19) reported that the Midterm Review was undertaken from June 6-14, 2016-about 6 months before the project's original closing date.

3. Relevance of Objectives

Rationale

Chad suffers from chronic political instability, periodic bouts of civil conflict, a shortage of resources, weak institutional capacity, and challenging agro-climatic conditions. These factors have undermined the efforts of successive governments to reduce poverty and ensure national food security. Agricultural development is a leading priority in the Republic of Chad's poverty reduction strategy. Agriculture is the main livelihood source for most Chadians. It has considerable potential and is expected to continue being a major engine of growth and poverty reduction. The project aimed to reduce vulnerabilities caused by drought, food insecurity and instability caused from refugee movements and degrading landscapes.

At project appraisal, the county was experiencing a prolonged drought that led to widespread crop failures and the loss of large numbers of livestock. The delayed onset of the rainy season and significantly below normal precipitation levels led to a steep reduction in planted area and caused production of cereals to fall by nearly 40% and production of other food crops to fall by approximately 28%. Objectives were in line with Chad's Country Interim Assistance Strategy (CIAS- FY11- FY12) that aimed at supporting the National Poverty Reduction Strategy (NPRS-II 2008-11) which emphasized the importance of agriculture for food security, growth, and diversification.

At project completion, objectives continued to be in line with Government priorities. Objectives were in line with the Government's National Development Plan (July-2017). Objectives were also in line with the Country Partnership Framework (CPF-2015) that identified improving returns to agriculture and building value chains, strengthening management of public resources and building human capital and reducing vulnerability as the three main themes of engagement.

While the PDO was clear in reflecting what the project aimed to achieve, it lacked any reference to the nature of the project as an emergency operation. It was not clear how the project's success as an emergency operation responding to a crisis in a timely fashion would be assessed.

Based on the aforementioned information, relevance of objectives is rated substantial.

Rating
Substantial

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

Objective 1

Objective
Support communities and producer organizations in increasing the production of selected crops and livestock species in selected areas of the Recipient's territory.

Rationale
(a) Support communities and producer organizations in increasing the production of selected crops and livestock species in selected areas of the Recipient's territory. Rated: modest.

Outputs

- The project distributed 230 metric tons (target: 230 metric tons) of seeds with the goal of improving livelihoods, ensuring food security, and preventing livestock decapitalization in areas of northern Chad most affected by the 2010-2011drought.
- 12,800 hectares were sowed with sorghum with a total production of 5,166 MT (target: 10,500 tons), lower than expected due to the drought which caused a delay in sowing.
- 4,550 metric tons of (target:4,550 tons) animal feed was distributed.
- 99, 774 trainees/attendants (target: 23,300) received training and extension services, as transfer of know-how to the beneficiaries on the proper use of the inputs.
- The project supported 196 sub-projects (target: 260) on productive assets, 43 sub-projects (target: 180) on rural infrastructure and 74 sub-projects (target: 200) for women's organizations.

Outcome

According to the ICR the project direct beneficiaries reached 289,680 compared to a target of 95,300 beneficiary. However, only 12,800 agricultural producers benefited from project support compared to a target of 30,000. The ICR (p. 12) attributed this shortcoming to the disproportionate reallocation of resources at restructuring to herders/pastoralists at the expense of farmers in the regions where the refugees were settled and integrated. As part of the emergency response the project supplied seeds and inputs to farmers. According to the ICR these inputs "positively affected the outcome without significant changes in productivity." In a further communication, the project team explained that "the original project expected that the widespread application of certified seed would lead to an increase in yields and hence and increased food production. However, increased certified seed use happen as can be seen from the Results Framework has only changed modestly; so it is also likely that yields did not move much but that in fact seed distribution

to refugees meant larger areas were sown leading to this increased in total production."
The ICR reported that the production of targeted crops reached 956,426 metric tons or 97% of the appraisal target of 989,900 metric tons. However, there was no baseline provided and it was not clear how the data on production was collected. By project completion, livestock numbers increased from 12.39 to 12.73 million or about 330,000 additional animals. These included 80,000 additional sheep and 140,000 additional goats. However, it the ICR (p. 12) reported that the influx of refugees (150,000) with their herds fleeing the conflict in Central African Republic "substantially contributed to this result."
Despite the afore mentioned achievements, the project suffered from attribution issues with the achievement of some of the outcomes. According to the ICR (p. 15), the Bank and other donors financed other projects in Chad for a number of years addressing concerns very similar to those addressed under this project. Hence, it was not possible to easily segregate the impacts of all these projects. Furthermore, the increments in livestock and food production "may be mostly as a result of the reallocation of about $3.5 million to the Emergency component" (ICR, p. 15). Therefore, outcome is rated modest.

Rating
Modest

Objective 2

Objective
Support communities and producer organizations in increasing the use of sustainable land and water management practices in climate vulnerable ecosystems.

Rationale
Outputs

- Two innovations (target: 3) introduced under the project included agroforestry and rangeland management through the development of transhumance corridors.
- 36 Global Environment Facility(GEF)/Sustainable Land and Water Management (SLWM) micro-projects were completed by project end against an original target of 40.
- The project provided ***c***apacity building at the community level that touched on issues related to natural resource and ecosystem management and climate change based on a framework for enabling environment, awareness and education, with related activities for Natural Resource Management (NRM). The ICR reported that achievement rate was 73%, however, it provided no further details were provided on number of farmers trained or impact of these trainings.
- 85 community groups (target: 200) were trained on the promotion of water harvesting and water conservation technologies in dryland farming zones, introduction of improved water management practices in small -scale irrigation systems (irrigation and drainage), protection of vegetation on hillsides surrounding irrigated lowlands, and adoption of integrated watershed management approaches to maximize returns to scarce water resources in the face of competing demands.

Outcome

By project completion, the area brought under sustainable land and water management practices was 235,520 ha (target: 95,000 ha). While this was 2.5 times higher than the appraisal target, the ICR (p. 13) explained that two out of three Sustainable Land Management (SLM) measures envisaged at appraisal were effectively implemented; and only 85 community groups participated in the program involving micro-projects against an appraisal target of 200. Also, as indicated above, there are attribution issues because the Bank and other donors financed other projects in Chad for a number of years addressing concerns very similar to those addressed under this project.
Based on this information and given the shortcomings in achieving outcome targets, outcome is rated modest.

Rating
Modest

Rationale
Both objectives are rated as Modest.

Overall Efficacy Rating	**Primary reason**
Modest	Low achievement

5. Efficiency

Economic and Financial Efficiency

ex-ante

- The overall Economic Rate of Return (ERR) of the project was estimated to range from 18.2% to 19.0%, and the Net Present Value (NPV) was estimated to fall between US$11.4 million and US$11.6 million.
- The Project would use a community demand-driven (CDD) approach to identify investment priorities, therefore, it was not possible to conduct a full ex-ante quantitative evaluation of the expected economic and financial benefits. Nevertheless, an attempt was made to assess the benefits likely to result from the micro-project and sub-project investments. These results should be considered indicative, rather than definitive.
- A sensitivity analysis showed that the project results were sensitive to decrease of benefits, crop yields and implementation delays. For example, a 30% decrease of benefits would result in an ERR of 12.1%, while a 25% decrease in crop yields would result in a 10.8% ERR, and a two year delay in benefits would result in an ERR of 11.9%.

ex-post

- The overall ex-post Economic Rate of Return (ERR) for the Project was 15.9%, which was lower than the ex-ante estimate of 19%. The ex-post NPV was $ 2.635 million compared to the ex-ante NPV of $11.65 million. The opportunity cost of capital was 12%. The ICR (para 29, p. 14) attributed the lower ex-post ERR to "to the long delay (of about 3 years) before the execution of the micro- and productive sub-projects and the generation of benefit streams from these investments by the beneficiary-communities."
- The analysis relied on a with and without project and before and after financing situation scenarios. Only direct costs and benefits were estimated and quantified. Social and other non-quantifiable benefits such as structural investments and capacity building support arising from the project were not taken into account.
- A sensitivity analysis revealed that the ex-post ERR was sensitive to cost increase, Gross margin decrease and delays in benefits. For example, a 30% cost increase would reduce the overall ERR to 12.5%, while a 25% decrease in Gross margins would result in an overall ERR of 11.3%; and a two year delay in benefits would reduce the overall ERR to 11.1%.
- Efficacy also suffered from significant implementation delays and poor implementation capacity at all levels of Government. The micro-infrastructure, and productive and income-generating activities were implemented during the last two years of project implementation. These activities only began to generate a revenue stream during the final year of the project. In addition, sub-project implementation suffered delays that stemmed from problems in management of the fiduciary issues, processing and approval process. Finally, the project disbursed only two thirds of its available resources despite the critical unaddressed needs in the project area (ICR, p, 15).

Administrative and Institutional Efficiency

The project closing was delayed by six months (December, 31, 2016 compared to June, 30, 2017). The project suffered from a three year delay in the implementation of the micro- and productive sub-projects and the generation of benefit streams from these investments by the beneficiary-communities. Micro- and sub-projects of the beneficiaries did not begin to generate a revenue stream until the final year of the project. There were also implementation delays that resulted from the decentralized nature of the project combined with weaknesses in implementation capacity by its stakeholders (ICR, para 26, p. 12). The ICR (para 28, p. 13) also reported that the delivery of inputs such as seeds was delayed till after the sowing season. Coordination of implementation activities was challenging and contributed to implementation delays. Finally, Financial management and procurement activities both suffered from weaknesses. This contributed to recurrent problems in management of the fiduciary issues, and long delays in the sub-projects processing and approval process.

Efficiency is rated modest due to lower than expected ex-post ERR, and weaknesses at the administrative and institutional levels.

Efficiency Rating
Modest

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal	✓	19.00	85.00 ☐Not Applicable
ICR Estimate	✓	15.90	85.00 ☐Not Applicable

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

6. Outcome

Relevance of objectives was rated substantial. Efficacy was rated modest due to attribution concerns, a weak M&E system that failed to segregate emergency activities from conventional activities and falling short on achieving outcome targets. Efficiency was rated modest due to lower than expected ex-post ERR, and weaknesses at the administrative and institutional levels.
Based on substantial relevance, modest efficacy and modest efficiency, Outcome is rated Unsatisfactory.

a. Outcome Rating
Unsatisfactory

7. Risk to Development Outcome

There were a number of risks that could potentially undermine the sustainability of the development outcome. These included:

- The lack of adequate time to follow-up with beneficiaries with Technical Assistance (TA) and advisory services undermines the sustainability of the investments in the micro-and sub-projects. Critical training and TA support after the completion and closure of this project were unlikely to be continued (ICR, para 28, p. 13).
- The country remains vulnerable to climate change risk. This includes short-term risks associated with climatic variability and long-terms risks associated with climate change. Such risks could negatively impact crop yields and undermine the sustainability of the development outcome.
- The risk of conflict between herders and farmers could negatively impact the sustainability of the development outcome. If conflicts do break out there is a risk of damage to project investments.

- Risk to protected areas through infringement activities whether agriculture related or by herders especially in view of a lack of an enforcement policy.
- Concerns about the Government's commitment to the CDD approach because during implementation the Government actions "hampered rather than aided the successful adoption of the CDD approach (ICR, para 72, p. 25)."

8. Assessment of Bank Performance

a. Quality-at-Entry

- The project had a complex design that on one hand, aimed to address an emergency situation in a fragile country and on the other hand, aimed to deliver longer term development impacts involving numerous stakeholders and a long chain of responsibilities. Design also did not factor in the weak implementation capacity of the borrower. This undermined implementation and contributed to delays.
- Design featured a CDD approach without enough buy-in from the Government. The Bank assumed that the project design would benefit from the Bank funded Local Development Program Support Project. However, this assumption was wrong since the Local Development Program Support Project was itself a failure (ICR, para 65, page 23).
- At entry, the project's fiduciary aspects should have received more attention given that the overall Risk ranking of financial management was rated High. Fiduciary weaknesses contributed to implementation delays.
- The Operational Risk Assessment Framework (Emergency Project Paper, Annex 4) included eight risks. Despite rating both fiduciary risk and implementing agency risks "high", the ICR reported that mitigation measures fell short of achieving the stated objective on fiduciary aspects. It was also implicit in the ICR that the implementing agency faced challenges throughout implementation.
- M&E suffered from design and implementation weaknesses (see section 9 a b for more detail).

Quality-at-Entry Rating
Unsatisfactory

b. Quality of supervision

The project was implemented under challenging security conditions. Supervision missions on average were conducted once per year due to the security situation. In total, only four supervision missions were conducted. The inability to undertake field visits negatively impacted the quality of supervision and project implementation. Also, conducting the MTR mission one year prior to project completion left little time for any corrective measures to bear effect. The project leadership suffered from inconsistencies and instability due to the frequent changes of TTLs as the project had five TTLs in four years. In addition, supervision missions often suffered from deficiencies in critical expertise needed by the project, including M&E, procurement and financial management (ICR, para 49, p. 19). Bank supervision also lacked proactivity to approve Borrower’s request for 18 months extension of closing date despite being an MTR recommendation. The ICR (para 49, p.

19) also noted the "lack of attention to realism in performance ratings" assigned in the project's ISRs. Supervision also failed to ensure that the project implementation and coordination function at the local level was adequately funded. Finally, supervision should have ensured that the M&E and the Project Manual of Procedures (PIM) were available before or soon after project start-up. However, these were not operationalized until the MTR Mission in 2016. This situation resulted in the absence of M&E activities and a lack of baseline data that could be used to systematically monitor the physical and financial results of the project.

Quality of Supervision Rating

Unsatisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating

Unsatisfactory

9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

a. M&E Design

The project's M&E system was to be managed by the PCU through a dedicated M&E specialist. The M&E system would be participatory and decentralized at regional and local levels. However, this system would have required a systematic review to ensure that each stakeholder in the system would be adequately performing the expected role.

The M&E manual was expected to be developed by the PCU to provide details regarding the Results Framework, the methodology and the tools for data collection, the institutional arrangements for M&E activities, and the mechanism for information diffusion.

The emergency project paper did not include a theory of change. Nonetheless, the ICR (p. 7, para 6) clearly summarized the project's theory of change; and included clear links between inputs, outputs and expected outcomes. However, the ICR failed to recognize and include the projects emergency nature.

The Results Framework included four PDO level indicators to assess different aspects of the PDO. All four indicators had clear end targets, but only two had baseline data. These indicators were relevant and directly linked to the PDO. However, there were no indicators to assess the project's emergency activities separately from the more longer development objectives. In addition, the indicators lacked proper segregation of impacts on different groups benefitting from the project activities. The RF also included ten intermediate outcome indicators to assess the different activities supported by the project. All of these were quantitative in nature, for example, number of trainees, number of framers receiving support, number of beneficiaries, among others.

b. M&E Implementation

The project did not have an M&E manual as envisaged in the design stage. The Project Manual of Procedures (PIM) was operationalized in 2016 after the MTR Mission. This situation negatively impacted the systematic and physical monitoring of project activities because no baseline data had been collected. Hence, reporting on financial results of the project, and M&E activities related to implementation of components 2,3 and 4 were neglected up to the MTR. Project data was collected directly from beneficiaries through consultants. Overall, M&E implementation was weak and received inadequate support from the implementing agency (Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation) and from Bank supervision.

c. M&E Utilization

Despite the lack of an M&E manual, there were efforts to collect data. According to the ICR (para 58, p. 21), M&E data was updated periodically and shared widely among key stakeholders. The ICR did not elaborate further on M&E utilization. Finally, it was difficult to segregate project impacts between the emergency activities and the conventional community based activities. This raises concerns about the "veracity of some of the data provided (ICR, para 59, p. 21)."

Overall, M&E design had some weaknesses, implementation was poor, and utilization was questionable--given the late start of M&E activities. Therefore, M&E quality is rated Negligible.

M&E Quality Rating

Negligible

10. Other Issues

a. Safeguards

The project was an environmental category B. It triggered the following five safeguard policies: Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01), Pest Management (OP 4.09), Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12), Safety of Dams (OP/BP 4.37), and Projects on International Waterways (OP/BP 7.50). Adverse impacts on human populations or environmentally important areas were assessed as low. The environmental and social impacts were expected to be local and very limited, and specific mitigation measures would be introduced. No pesticides would be procured by the project. The GEF/LDCF funding would support activities that were expected to generate positive environmental impacts.

Environmental. An Environmental and Social Screening and Assessment Framework (ESSAF) was prepared, and appropriate elements were incorporated into the Project Implementation Manual. Potential negative impacts of the project focused on the following: depletion and deterioration of water supply; deterioration of soil quality; surface water and groundwater pollution risks due to the increased use of pesticides; loss of vegetation and landscape transformation following the installation of infrastructures (pastures, irrigations schemes, rural roads, storage facilities); risks of conflict between shedders and agriculturalists; and risks to protected areas. The LDCF supported measures to identify and mitigate those risks and negative impacts and the possibility for updating of these guidelines based on project implementation experience.
Social. Implications on access to either common assets/resources or livelihoods were anticipated for small-scale irrigation infrastructure and/or rehabilitation or construction of rural roads. A Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) was prepared, outlining the overarching framework whereby potential resettlement issues

would be addressed.
Mitigation measures provided an adequate basis at mitigating safeguards risks during implementation. However, the lack of review and reporting on safeguards by the borrower made it difficult to assess the effectiveness by which safeguards measures where applied on the ground (ICR, para 61, p. 22).
The ICR did not provide an explicit compliance statement for any of the triggered safeguards.

b. Fiduciary Compliance

Financial Management. Financial management capacity was weak at both the central and regional levels of government. Weaknesses included: the lack of qualified staff with experience working with World Bank procedures; lack of accounting software; weak internal controls; and risk of fraud and corruption inherent to CDD operations. The project experienced several financial mismanagement issues including: overdue Financial Statements; recurrent cases of ineligible expenses revealed by audits at the level of the PCU and the RCUs, lack of supporting documents for operating costs (ICR, para 63, p. 23).

Procurement. The ICR (para 30, p. 13) reported that "procurement was performed in line with the contracting procedures." However, procurement procedures were complicated and contributed to implementation delays.

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

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d. Other

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11. Ratings

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Weak M&E and attribution concerns led to modest efficacy for the two sub-objectives. Efficiency was modest due to lower than expected ex-post ERR and weaknesses at the administrative and institutional levels.
Bank Performance	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	---

Quality of M&E	Substantial	Negligible	Design had weaknesses, implementation was poor, and utilization was questionable.
Quality of ICR		Substantial	---

12. Lessons

The ICR included thirteen lessons. The following are emphasized with some adaptation of language:

- **An emergency project is less effective when designed as a long-term development project.** The project's implementation showed that trying to build complex CDD systems resulted in less effective emergency operations. These are most effective when they prioritize actions and focus on the immediate restoration of productive assets for food-insecure rural households.
- **Gender/Poverty targeting mechanisms need to ensure that project resources reach the target beneficiaries.** The project experience demonstrated that targeting mechanisms that are simple, verifiable and based on objective criteria (for example: simple eligibility criteria such as: group characteristics (women who are head of households, households hosting refugees, disabled group, landless groups,...,), geographical criteria, criteria based on asset ownership, criteria based on vulnerability faced by different groups including seasonal factors, shocks (disasters, conflict,..) can foster transparency, minimize political interference in project resource allocation and ensure that project resources reach the target beneficiaries.
- **Simple, practical standardized designs for sub-projects may enhance subproject quality, sustainability and cost-effectiveness.** Field evidence from this project show that simple practical standards (including engineering, aspects of technical, financial and economic feasibility, O&M, cost parameters) enhanced the quality and outcomes of subprojects.

13. Assessment Recommended?

No

14. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR is well written. It provides thorough coverage of project activities and reports candidly on shortcomings. It clearly explains the theory of change and provides a good discussion on the achievement of outcomes-despite limited evidence due to weak M&E. However, lessons could have benefitted from better formulation as they were either over generalized, formulated as recommendations or simply descriptions.
The ICR could have improved on the following points:

- Provide explicit statements on compliance with the Bank's Safeguard policies,
- Assign ratings to relevant aspects of the ICR -- which do not include the outcome indicators.

a. Quality of ICR Rating

Substantial