1. Project Data

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Prepared by Richard Anson
Reviewed by Vibecke Dixon
ICR Review Coordinator Christopher David Nelson
Group IEGSD (Unit 4)

2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

The project development objective is to improve the availability of and access to food and livestock productive capacity for targeted beneficiaries affected by the conflict in the Central African Republic on the Recipient's territory.

For purposes of assessing the extent which the PDO was achieved in Section 4, this review will parse the PDO into two objectives, namely:
Objective 1: to improve the availability of and access to food for targeted beneficiaries affected by the conflict in the Central African Republic on the Recipient's territory;

Objective 2: to improve livestock productivity for targeted beneficiaries affected by the conflict in the Central African Republic on the Recipient's territory.

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?
   No

c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?
   No

d. Components

Component 1: Targeted Food Assistance (Original Allocation: US$7.0 million; Revised Allocation: US$14.8 million; Actual: US$12.1 million). The original component had the objective of improving the availability of food and access to it by the target population (or “unconditional food assistance”), through: (i) the provision of vouchers; (ii) the distribution of specialized and staple food packages; and (iii) the conduct of supplemental feeding programs. The component was designed to support WFP’s existing safety net operation for vulnerable households in Chad, providing resources to cover 31,200 refugees and returnees for 12 months.

The Additional Financing/AF (2017) expanded component 1, which was split into three subcomponents:

   (i) 1.1: Unconditional food assistance. The activity was unchanged, and subsequently dropped;

   (ii) 1.2: Conditional food assistance. This was a new subcomponent, linking food assistance to sustainable productive asset-building, for example through cash-for-work programs. The rationale was to increase the focus on strengthening the resilience of beneficiary populations; and

   (iii) 1.3: Improving access to sustainable cooking systems and drinking water. This new sub-component included construction and distribution of mobile cooking facilities, rehabilitation of wells, and awareness campaigns and training.

Component 2: Agricultural Production and Livestock Stabilization (Original Allocation: US$11.0 million; Revised Allocation: US$19.2 million; Actual: US$17.6 million). Its objective was to restore and maintain crop and livestock production capacity among the affected populations in a context where socio-economic conditions were precarious and distress sales of assets were likely, and where pressure on the natural resource base was increasing rapidly. There were three sub-components, which remained the same following additional financing (ref. second restructuring), while expanding activities for each:

   (i) 2.1: Support for agricultural production (Original: US$5.4 million). This subcomponent aimed at securing and increasing food production capacity. The activities were: (i) provision of technology packages to approximately 15,000 affected households; (ii) support to seed multiplication producer groups; and (iii) construction or rehabilitation of communal storage facilities;
(ii) **2.2: Support for livestock stabilization** (Original: US$5.0 million). This subcomponent was designed to support stabilization of the productive capacity of the target refugees, returnees and host communities’ (RRHC) livestock activities through: (i) a vaccination campaign for 1,500,000 animals; (ii) a targeted animal feeding program benefitting 1,500 households in areas where the grazing capacity had been exceeded; and (iii) a restocking program for 1,000 displaced households. The AF added distribution of harvesting, milling and drilling equipment.

(iii) **2.3: Support for conflict mitigation** (Original: US$0.6 million). This subcomponent aimed to help: mitigate potential conflicts among users of natural resources; reduce the pressure on limited grazing areas; and prevent overuse of an already fragile ecosystem. Priority activities included: (a) participatory development of transhumance corridors; (b) organization of forums for peaceful coexistence amongst stakeholders; and (c) establishment of committees of elders.

As stated above, the project was restructured three times. While the project retained the same PDO, components and subcomponents, the first and second restructurings were level 2; the main restructuring was carried out in 2017, and involved additional financing/AF; the first two restructurings expanded the existing and added some new activities, as follows: (a) scaled-up emergency activities due to continued influx of refugees and returnees from the CAR, and to strengthen the resilience of the entire target group (ref. subcomponent 1.2 above); (b) shifted the balance from the initial humanitarian actions towards increased emphasis on resilience building, whereby some food assistance became conditional, tied to rebuilding productive assets.

Also, part of the first restructuring (2017) involved modifying implementation arrangements. The Project of the **Regional Sustainable Pastoral Support Project** (PRAPS) within the Ministry of Livestock and Animal Production took over responsibility for coordination of implementation from EAPSP which was closing. The existing contractual arrangements with WFP and FAO were renewed. UNICEF became the implementing agency for sub-component 1.3 (see above).

The project’s second restructuring was carried out in early 2019, mainly to provide more resources for asset-building activities in order to strengthen the resilience of beneficiaries, favoring a more resilience-oriented approach, while still providing emergency assistance (ICR, para 30). Subcomponent A1 Unconditional food assistance was dropped, and the remaining resources (SDR 1.9 million) transferred to Subcomponent 1.2, Conditional food assistance. WFP was dropped as implementing agency for Subcomponent 1.2 due to failure to comply with World Bank fiduciary requirements, especially regarding the fund reconciliation requirements for cash transfer type of operations. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) was selected to implement the sub-component based on its expertise and sound track record in implementing food assistance and asset building in Chad.

The third restructuring, a level 1 restructuring, was carried out in mid-2020, involving only the advanced closing of the project, to June 5, 2020, instead of March 31,2021. The rationale for the early closing was a joint GoC/WB effort to consolidate the Chad World Bank portfolio. There were still some pending activities to be implemented by IOM, but it was decided that these activities could be efficiently integrated into the World Bank-financed Climate Resilient Agriculture and Productivity Enhancement Project (PROPAD), which had been approved in mid-2018 (with a closing date of end-2023). The remaining PURCAE activities and the implementation arrangements were unchanged. This integration became effective with the amendment of the PROPAD Financing Agreement in May 2020, which incorporated the remaining PURCAE activities into PROPAD and its results framework.
e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

1. **Project Costs**: The total project costs at approval was US$18.0 million; there was additional financing of US$16.0 million (in 2017), such that the total project cost was US$34.0 million. The actual cost at project closing was US$29.7 million, which also reflected the early project closing, as stated above.

2. **Financing**: Total financing was provided by IDA, through two separate IDA credits ($18.0 million and $16.0 million). There was no Government counterpart funding, aside from the staffing and operational costs during implementation. The conditional food assistance involved some contributions from beneficiaries through their labor for project works, although the amount was not quantified.

3. **Borrower/Recipient Contribution**: There was zero counterpart contribution.

4. **Dates**: The project was approved on October 14, 2014, became effective on March 2, 2015. The Bank approved Additional Financing/AF in September, 2017, essentially a second phase. The original closing date was April 30, 2017, and the actual closing date was June 5, 2020. The project was thus extended for 3 years and 2 months, for a total of 38 months.

3. Relevance of Objectives

**Rationale**

The project objectives were “to improve the availability of and access to food and livestock productive capacity for targeted beneficiaries affected by the conflict in the Central African Republic on the Recipient's territory.” The targeted beneficiaries were clearly defined to include 3 types: refugees, returnees and local (or “host”) populations in the areas where the displaced populations were being resettled, and which provided the rationale for the project interventions (ICR, para. 17). The two sub-objectives were complementary, and their supporting components (and subsequent adjustments during the 2 main restructurings) demonstrated high relevance to the priority needs of the target beneficiaries, by addressing key elements of the Government’s national and sectoral policies/strategies. These objectives also supported and were strongly aligned with the Bank’s: FY11/12 Interim Assistance Strategy, which guided the Bank’s operations at the time of formulation and approval of the PURCAE, especially with respect to helping to stabilize food production and help address the added pressures from large numbers of incoming refugees and returnees. The restructured project (2017) also was strongly aligned with the Bank’s new Country Partnership Framework (CPF 2016 -2020), especially with respect to prioritizing support to GoC’s poverty reduction strategy, with particular focus on supporting the agriculture sector (see below).

This relevance of both phases of the PURCAE is evidenced in several key Government and Bank documents, including the following (see PAD, paras. 1-9, 13 – 17, 20 – 21); and ICR, paras. 9 – 11):

(a) Government of Chad’s National Development Plan (2013-2015), which emphasized sustainable agriculture and rural development, which were key pillars to serve as key “levers” for promoting a diversified, inclusive, and sustainable economy;
(b) Government of Chad’s Global Emergency Response Plan for the Returnees/Refugees, which was used to appeal to the international community to raise US$ 53 million. The Bank responded by helping to convene donor support and, in June 2014, by restructuring an existing project, the Emergency Agricultural Production Support Project, to reallocate US$ 3.5 million to support the GoC Emergency Plan;

(c) Government of Chad’s National Food Security Program (2014), which focused on overcoming hunger and combating food insecurity through sustainable increases in productivity and through improved access to food;

(d) The Bank’s Country Partnership Framework (CPF 2016-2020, approved in December, 2015), which prioritized support to GoC’s poverty reduction strategy, with particular focus on improving returns to agriculture, building value chains, and reducing vulnerability.

(f) The Bank’s World Development Report/WDR of 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development. The main lessons from this WDR were incorporated into PURCAE, notably the need to: sustain human capital; prevent the conditions of returnees, refugees and their host communities (RRHCs) from deteriorating and prejudicing their prospects for development; and leverage United Nations (UN) capacities to support effective implementation.

A core development challenge which PURCAE was designed to address involved the growing number of refugees and returnees coming into Chad, therefore requiring the need for appropriate emergency AND developmental-type of responses and interventions from Government, to be funded by developmental partners in a coordinated manner. Since the project originally was designed as an emergency project for a limited period of time, the original scope of interventions were limited, and focused primarily on the output level. Subsequently, when the project was restructured, and supported by additional financing and implementation period, the main indicators focused primarily on outputs, while stating an intention to also contribute to five strategic outcomes (see below).

Accordingly, the Project’s focus on two strategic components, with highly relevant and responsive subcomponents, further enhanced and expanded by the two restructurings and AF, the overall relevance of objectives was rated “High”.

Rating  
High  

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

OBJECTIVE 1  
Objective  
To improve the availability of and access to food for targeted beneficiaries affected by the conflict in the Central African Republic on the Recipient's territory.
Rationale

Theory of Change (ToC): While the project's design included a results framework (RF), the PAD did not develop a ToC because it was not required at the time the PAD was written. The ICR reconstructed a ToC that was consistent with the PAD and the AF (paras. 12 - 14, and illustrated in Figure 1), which explained how the two broad and inter-related objectives of availability and access to food and livestock productive capacity would be achieved. This ToC/Figure 1 combined both objectives, to illustrate cause-effect linkages. The following points refer to and assess the ToC for Objective 1:

(a) PDO and relevant intermediate outcomes and supporting indicators which correspond to improved availability of and access to food, and which correspond to the two project components, and their relevant subcomponents, although most of indicators are output-based, rather than outcome-based);

(b) corresponding project activities/interventions channeled to the target beneficiaries, which contributed to key outputs (see below) and then also contributed to improved food and nutritional security. These outputs included: vouchers to purchase food basket; direct food transfers; distribution of mobile cooking facilities and rehabilitation of wells; various income-generating activities; purchase and distribution of key agricultural inputs (for increased food production); small storage facilities to enable post-harvest storage and price stabilization of foods.

Key assumptions in the ToC were generally sound, including (ICR, Figure 1): commitment and role of the GoC to integrate the returnees and refugees in the "least disruptive manner"; supportive role of the host communities to enable resettling these new arrivals; and the supportive and enabling role of the relevant UN agencies, which ended up as the main implementers of the project.

Outputs: (ref. ICR, paras. 36-45, 47-48, Annex 1 and Table 3):

(a) No. of improved cookstoves fabricated and distributed: Target: 9,000; Actual: 13,107; 146% of target;

(b) No. of drinking water wells rehabilitated: Target: 157; Actual: 172; 110% of target;

(c) No. of beneficiaries of conditional food assistance: Target: 152,960; Actual: 78,710; 51 % of target;

(d) No. beneficiaries of direct food transfers/vouchers: Target: 31,200; Actual: 32,460; 104% of target; this indicator was dropped after Year 1;

(e) No. of beneficiaries receiving agricultural input packages: Target: 45,200; Actual: 47,038; 104% of target;

(f) No. of assets rehabilitated: Target: 40; Actual: 15: 37 % of target; (assets included: rehabilitated water wells; installed water pumps; rehabilitated boreholes, with handpumps; drilled and equipped new boreholes; constructed latrine units;

(g) No. of people trained (by IOM): Target: 14,000; Actual: 8,371; 60% of target; this training focused on enhancing financial management, skills and practices of households and cooperative associations;

(h) No. of people trained on conflict resolution: Target: 1,656; Actual: 2,433; 68% of target;
(i) No. of decentralized staff trained (by FAO): Target: 100; Actual: 72; 72% of target; the training included basic skills/tools for improved planning and implementation of development projects at the provincial and district levels, consistent with Government’s decentralization strategies;

(j) No. of people benefitted from other trainings (by FAO): Target: 1,956; Actual: 3,379; 58% of target; the training included: individual capacity building in household management; creation of small businesses, basic accounting; group business activities, including management of cooperative associations;

The PAD, AF and ICR presented some of the above indicators (items c, d, and e) as outcomes; these indicators and their measures are actually outputs, and therefore reflected above (and not under outcomes).

Key Outcomes: (which correspond to the relevant PDO indicators, Annex 1, with original or revised targets):

(a) No. of direct project beneficiaries: Target: 550,000; Actual 592,350; 107% of target;

(b) Percentage of female beneficiaries: Target: 52; Actual: 53; 102% of target;

It should be noted that para. 38 and Annex 1 (Table 3) present the output results (and corresponding project activities and components) in terms of contributing toward 5 relevant strategic outcomes, namely: (1) improved nutritional status and well-being; (2) enhanced water security; (3) improved agricultural productivity and local livelihoods; (4) improved livestock productivity, which is linked to objective 2 below; and an added dimension, (5) strengthened social cohesion, which is a very relevant and sound addition of the project.

However, the results framework did not include indicators and corresponding measures for these 5 key outcomes, but rather, showed various output indicators and their measures. It would have been preferable for the Project’s M&E system to have developed appropriate outcome indicators to enable the monitoring and reporting of each of these 5 key outcomes, especially to help pave the way for follow-up support.

Given the emergency nature of the project, the PAD and ICR output-focused approach in its indicators may be appropriate to some degree, while recognizing that the output-focused approach makes it difficult to assess in a more rigorous manner the progress toward achieving the above 5 outcomes, and therefore, progress toward objective 1. For example, it is difficult to assess: the extent of progress toward “improving agricultural productivity and local livelihoods (ref. to one of the six intermediate outcomes in the ToC); how effective were the input packages used (“adapted”) by the beneficiaries, and also difficult to assess the type and extent of technical support/advise provided to beneficiaries to enable them to generate increases in crop productivity and livelihoods; also, it is difficult to assess the actual use and effects of the project-funded community assets. These aspects were presented in a vague manner in the ICR, paras. 39 – 45, and the conclusions in the ICR were not supported by clear evidence and relevant documentation. While the ICR reported that “there was evidence from FAO that agricultural production was significantly improved with high yields of main crops” (ICR, para. 44), the ICR does not provide supporting evidence or report references. Given that only 2 of the 8 outputs were achieved/exceeded (or 25%), and 2 of the 2 outcomes were slightly exceeded (or 100%, albeit weak outcomes), the efficacy with which the project has achieved Objective 1 is “modest”.

Rating
OBJECTIVE 2

Objective
To improve livestock productivity for targeted beneficiaries affected by the conflict in the Central African Republic on the Recipient's territory.

Rationale
Theory of Change: While the ToC presented in the ICR (Figure 1 Results Chain and ToC) shows two relevant PDO outcomes and six corresponding intermediate outcomes, the specific indicators and measures to assess the progress to achieving these PDO and intermediate outcomes are relatively weak, and focusing primarily on output measures. With respect to Objective 2 involving livestock productivity increases, the linkages between the project livestock activities, project livestock outputs (2), project intermediate livestock outcome (1) and the PDO livestock productivity outcome (1) are relatively weak. As stated above, the ICR presented one integrated ToC to cover both objectives, with their associated activities, outputs, and to a very limited extent, outcomes.

Outputs (ICR, para. 46, Annex 1/Tables 1-3):

Some of these, especially involving training of beneficiaries, are the same outputs as outlined above for Objective 1, especially items: e, g, h, i and j);

(b) No. of beneficiary households receiving breeding stock: Target: 2,000; Actual: 3,300; 165% of target;

(c) No. of Breeding Stock Distributed: Target: None; Actual: 17,500; % of target: NA.

(d) Metric Tons/MTs of animal feed distributed: Target: 3,546; Actual: 3,746; 106 % of target;

Outcomes

(a) No. of livestock/cattle vaccinated: Target: 4,000,000; Actual: 3,926,263; 97.5 % of target;

The overall assessment for the second objective reflects some of the same factors/considerations outlined for objective 1, involving the project’s focus on output results, and limited measures of livestock productivity. Based on available information, it appears that 5 of the 8 output targets were achieved/exceeded, and the sole outcome target, which is actually an output measure, was slightly exceeded. While there is an absence of outcome indicators and other relevant evidence to document the actual increase in livestock productivity, it is plausible that the distribution of breeding stock and animal feed (both exceeding output targets) will lead to an increase in livestock production. Hence, the second objective is rated “substantial” with some shortcomings as cited above.

Rating
Substantial
OVERALL EFFICACY
Rationale
Overall efficacy is rated marginally Substantial, based on the following two considerations:

(1) Objective 1, which was rated Modest for reasons stated above, and Objective 2, was rated Substantial with some shortcomings in terms of relevant evidence for the project period. The final end-of-project reports which were prepared by IMO, UNICEF and FAO, provide useful results, but they are limited for the period of mid-2018 to early 2020, and the results focus almost entirely on the project’s activities and associated outputs;

(2) As discussed above, for both objectives, there are shortcomings in the relevance and depth of the reported evidence to assess the depth and sustainability of meeting these two objectives, especially in terms of assessing the 5 outcomes cited in the ICR (paras. 39 – 47, and Annex 1/Table 3). Also, key pending targets and their expected results of PURCAE were transferred to the Bank-supported PROPAD, which is expected to implement and meet these pending targets by 2023.

Overall Efficacy Rating
Substantial

5. Efficiency

Given the emergency nature of the project, a formal economic and financial analysis (EFA) was not carried ex-ante, nor at the time of the 2017 restructuring, and was not carried out at completion. However, the ICR provides some evidence of production benefits, such as the increases in agricultural production and the establishment of numerous micro-enterprises discussed in the assessment of efficacy (e.g., with some of the evidence presented in the final project reports prepared by FAO and UNICEF, for a limited period of time, from 2018 to early 2020). The ICR also provides “negative” evidence of the benefits of the animal health campaigns in terms of the avoidance of disease outbreak, contributed by PURCAE (ICR, para. 49). PROPAD, based on its M&E system, is supposed to conduct an Economic and Financial Analysis/EFA of PURCAE (at the end of 2023, ICR, para. 49).

The following section highlights key efficiency aspects resulting from the project (ICR, paras. 50-56).

(a) Administrative Efficiency (paras. 50 and 51): The relatively simple design of the emergency project and the implementation arrangements employed contributed to the Project’s efficiency. By relying on UN agencies, the Project adopted the most cost-effective means of ensuring the required rapid response. Each agency received 7 percent of the respective contract value to cover administrative overhead charges, management of all project activities (technical, financial, and procurement), and delivery of project services to the intended beneficiaries. These arrangements, together with accountability reports, were reflected in a Memo of Understanding (MOU) between GoC and each participating UN agency. The ratio of administrative costs to direct costs (7:93) was relatively efficient compared to similar operations in the region. Comparable emergency operations in South Sudan show ratios as high as 14:86, while those in CAR are consistent with the Chad experience (i.e., 6:94).
Another cost-effective implementation approach used by the Project was to involve credible national NGOs to support implementation of activities at the field level. Also, the alternative option to first create local capacities and then implement the project, would not have been cost-effective.

(b) **Value for Money**: On the cost side (ICR, Annex 4), the project spent US$29.7 million to benefit 592,350 people, or equivalent to US$50 per direct beneficiary; this ratio compares well with the ratio of the total estimated/revised cost and revised target of beneficiaries ($34 million and 550,000, respectively, for a ratio of $62 per direct beneficiary).

(c) **Overall Assessment**: The ICR provides relevant qualitative assessment and conclusions on the overall effects of the project, and states that (ICR, para. 53): “there is evidence of reasonable costs and substantial benefits” arising from the Project, which clearly helped the country address the emergency crisis. No evidence is provided in the ICR to back this up, though. Another conclusion presented in the IC is that with a “large influx of refugees and returnees, the without-the-project scenario would have been one of increased food insecurity and competition for resources, which would doubtless have aggravated conflict and social instability. Although no evidence is provided to back up this statement, it is plausible to be a correct assessment of the situation. In this context, the ICR states that the project made a significant contribution to improving livelihoods and stabilizing the social situation by reducing household food insecurity, enhancing resilience and sustainability of production systems, and fostering social cohesion (ICR, para. 53). While it is plausible that the project may have contributed to such results, limited evidence of such outcomes is presented. Notwithstanding these positive qualitative conclusions, two anecdotal statements/"testimonies" from beneficiaries, and three end-of-project reports prepared by the 3 implementation agencies (IMO, UNICEF and FAO, 2020), provide limited scope and in-depth analyses and some supporting evidence to substantiate the above conclusions. Accordingly, efficiency is rated substantial, with some shortcomings as highlighted above.

**Efficiency Rating**

Substantial

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**Efficiency Rating**

Substantial

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6. **Outcome**

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Based on the project's “high” relevance, marginal “substantial” rating for efficacy and “substantial” efficiency, and given the emergency nature of the project, this IEG review concludes there were modest to moderate shortcomings in the project’s outcome, resulting in an overall outcome rating of “Moderately Satisfactory”

The rationale for the ratings of the 3 core elements discussed above is as follows:

(1) **High relevance of the PDO**, based on its strong alignment with Government's strategies and plans, especially with respect to addressing a core developmental challenge of addressing the multiple needs of the refugees and returnees (i.e., considering the Government’s: Emergency Response Plan; Poverty Reduction Strategy, National Food Security Plan; the project also shows high relevance with the Bank’s strategies for Chad: Interim and CPF, sectoral strategies; and the Bank-wide WDR on Conflict, Security and Development). Moreover, the project remained relevant during implementation, including the AF phase, given the continued influx of refugees and returnees, coupled with the added challenges on the existing host communities in Chad;

(2) **Substantial rating for efficacy**, but marginally so given the Project’s exclusive focus on providing and measuring outputs, and the mixed and uneven performance in meeting the two core objectives of the overall PDO and Intermediate Result targets, and weak linkages of project activities in generating relevant outcomes and robust measures and direct evidence addressing the 5 sound project outcomes, while also considering emergency nature of the project, notwithstanding the evidence presented in the final project reports prepared by IMO, UNICEF and FAO; and

(3) **Substantial rating for efficiency**, despite the absence of any type of EFA and quantitative and robust analyses of the costs and benefits, while also recognizing the evidence regarding the project's efficient implementation, favorable comparative cost-effective measures and positive qualitative benefits of this emergency operation.

a. **Outcome Rating**
   Moderately Satisfactory

7. **Risk to Development Outcome**

Given the complex and continued emergency conditions prevailing in the project area of Chad, there are significant risks to sustaining the project’s outputs, and especially making tangible and sustained progress to contributing to the 5 intended outcomes and eventual impacts. The ICR presents a candid, although brief, assessment of these risks, but does not assess and present clear mitigation measures to address these risks (i.e., assessing the measures outlined in the PAD/Annex 4), aside from relying on the ongoing Bank-financed PROPAD to address the emerging gaps. More specifically, the ICR provides a brief summary of the project’s extensive and inter-related risks, especially involving (paras. 102 and 103):

(a, b and c) Political, Social and Governance Risks: the gains made under the project are fragile because the security situation in CAR is still volatile, from various perspectives and risk criteria. At the end of 2019, Chad was still hosting over 465,000 refugees and asylum seekers. Accordingly, the current INFORM index for Chad is very high --- 7.2 out of 10 – ranking Chad as the third country most at risk of humanitarian crisis, fueled by further political and social instability. Furthermore, Chad has a “vulnerability score” of 7.6 (out of 10), and the lack of adaptation capacity presents a score of 8.9, which illustrates the country’s incapacity and weak governance system to manage the crisis and the persistent social and political “shocks”, resulting from
the continued flow of large numbers of refugees/asylum seekers, including the social and economic impacts on the host communities;

(d) Financial Risks: the continued flows of refugees and asylum seekers are straining the Government’s and donor’s capacities and willingness to provide continued financial assistance to address the emergency needs, including emergency food requirements, agricultural inputs, breeding stock, and especially to provide the required developmental investments to promote sustained development, even beyond the on-going support from PROSAD (which closes in 2023);

(e) Environmental Risks: the continued flow of refugees and asylum seekers, with limited food supplies, are resulting in extensive environmental threats to grazing areas of host communities, which are already being degraded by uncontrolled livestock;

(f) Stakeholder ownership/support Risks: there are growing and somewhat uncontrolled flows of the refugees and asylum seekers on host communities, and there is an apparent absence of mitigation measures of social impacts on host communities, which intensify the above mentioned social, political, governance, financial and environmental risks.

The ICR correctly concludes the severity of these risks, that: “In face of these challenges, GoC capacity to intervene and sustain project activities to support refugees, returnees and supporting communities is still very limited” (ICR, para. 103). Moreover, the ICR, coupled with other available information, also imply that there are constraints faced by the relevant UN agencies in stepping up and sustaining the project interventions. At the same time, the ICR does not assess the status and implementation of the Operational Risk Assessment Framework mitigation measures outlined in Annex 4 of the PAD. Addressing these mitigation measures could provide useful inputs to be supported by the on-going Bank-supported PROPAD Project.

8. Assessment of Bank Performance

a. Quality-at-Entry

At the time leading to the Government’s request for the Bank’s emergency assistance, in 2014, the Bank was already working in partnership with GoC on the emerging refugee crisis. This engagement enabled the Bank to respond quickly to GoC’s formal request for an emergency project, which also was aligned strongly with the Government’s emergency and poverty strategies and the Bank’s country assistance strategy and priorities for Chad. Through this rapid, collaborative and aligned response, the Bank’s multi-disciplinary team worked closely with Government counterparts to design and deliver a highly relevant project. Accordingly, the quality at entry is rated Moderately Satisfactory by this review, based on the following evidence (ICR, paras. 92 96):

(i) The situation analysis at appraisal and the consequent project design were based on extensive fact-finding and use of relevant background references about the situation of RRHCs and the problems that were to be addressed. The social and gender aspects of design were particularly thoroughly researched and addressed in the design features, although there was limited in-depth assessment of the gender aspects presented in the ICR;
(ii) The inclusion of resilience-building activities, including direct humanitarian support in terms of a twelve-month feeding operations for vulnerable beneficiaries, to be delivered through an on-going UN supported program;

(iii) The general design of the project reflected strategic choices that proved to be correct, notably the inclusion of host communities among the target beneficiaries as this group proved to be just as vulnerable as the refugees and returnees; and the use of UN agencies, which reflected a pragmatic approach which recognized the weaknesses of the existing Governmental agencies (as already stated above);

(iv) The implementation arrangements, particularly the use of established UN agencies with strong in-country programs known for their general competency in their areas of work, were well planned and designed;

(v) Potential risks were candidly assessed, and included generally appropriate mitigation measures (PAD, Annex 4, Operational Risk Assessment Framework); and

(vi) Project design was able to formulate a very rudimentary M&E system, with limited indicators to measure the 5 strategic outcomes cited above, while focusing almost exclusively on output indicators and measures.

Quality-at-Entry Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

b. Quality of supervision
(i) The Bank’s implementation support was led by a TTL based in Chad, with regular missions and monthly meetings with relevant key actors directly involved in implementation (from GoC and UN agencies) to address and resolve problems. During one of the supervision missions, a Bank project team was kidnapped, and fortunately, subsequently released unscathed. This reflected the challenging implementation environment;

(ii) The Bank teams were staffed with required competencies reflecting all technical aspects as well as financial management/FM, procurement and safeguards;

(iii) The Bank team provided timely and quality guidance throughout the implementation process, with considerable hands-on support on technical, monitoring, and fiduciary aspects. Aide memoirs and ISRs were clear and complete. Also, the ICR reports that the Bank team was proactive in identifying and resolving constraints to the achievement of relevant project objectives throughout the project life (i.e., by replacing WFP with IOM; three project restructurings; providing adequate support during review missions, including safeguards, procurement and FM assistance). Nonetheless, the Bank team made limited progress in helping to ensure a functional and effective M&E system was established and operational, depending on the M&E system of the PROPAD.
Quality of Supervision Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

a. M&E Design
Overall, the M&E design, while also considering the emergency nature of the project, was modest for the following reasons:

(i) the Project's Results Framework (RF) provided the basis for designing the M&E system, which was simple, while focusing entirely on output indicators and measures; also, the Bank team had to rely on the M&E roles of the participating UN agencies in charge of the implementation of the different components;

(ii) the original RF captured major project targets; the RF was updated at the time of the 2017 restructuring, including several new indicators and revised end targets, although still with an output focus;

(iv) the RF (presented in the PAD and ICR/Annex 1), including the updated RF, focused on using mostly output level indicators, lacking relevant indicators for the project’s stated five outcomes (as stated above); and

(v) there was absence of an integrated and coherent M&E system designed for the project, and the M&E activities were fragmented among various entities, with little involvement of the Government (as part of it's a larger M&E system for emergency operations).

b. M&E Implementation
M&E implementation proceeded smoothly, while also facing numerous challenges, as follows:

(i) Implementing UN agencies managed their own M&E system and tracked implementation of their own activities independently, based on the project's overall M&E system. Each agency monitored and reported on its own activities adequately, submitting both regular reports and special reports on activities and missions (e.g., FAO reported on surveys to collect harvest-related information and on missions sent to supervise vaccination campaigns; IOM conducted regular monitoring missions for its activities and prepared reports, including observation of activities and focus group discussions with beneficiaries; UNICEF conducted regular supervision missions and reported on all its activities);

(ii) Field agents financed under the project were trained to monitor and supervise local-level activities of all three agencies. The agents were provided with equipment (3 cars, 10 motorcycles, and 13 computers);

(iii) Implementing UN agencies managed their own M&E system, and tracked and reported on implementation of their own activities independently, submitting both regular reports and special reports
on activities and missions. For example: (a) FAO reported on surveys to collect harvest-related information and on missions sent to supervise vaccination campaigns; (b) IOM conducted regular monitoring missions for its activities and prepared reports, including observation of activities and focus group discussions with beneficiaries; (c) UNICEF conducted regular supervision missions and reported on all its activities; Field agents financed under the project were trained to monitor and supervise local-level activities of all three UN agencies;

However, these reports focused primarily on tracking project activities and outputs. Also, initially, the templates of the three agencies were not directly integrated into the Project’s Results Framework and indicators. Subsequently, the Bank team resolved this issue;

(iv) The Bank convened monthly meetings with the UN agencies and GoC focal points, based on preparing/sharing with the UN agencies a unified Results Framework, which was integrated into their M&E reporting.

c. M&E Utilization
The Project’s M&E system/information was utilized effectively,

(i) The Bank convened monthly meetings with the UN agencies and GoC focal points, and shared a unified Results Framework with the UN agencies to be integrated into their M&E reporting;

(ii) GoC lacked an M&E system for emergency operations, and GoC was involved in a very limited manner in the M&E activities of this project, and therefore, there was a missed opportunity to use the project to help GoC further develop its M&E system for emergency type of interventions;

(iii) The results of the various reports cited above provided inputs to the Project Implementation Unit (PMU), eventually, from PROPAD, and which had overall responsibility for project implementation, while also under the overall purview of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. The extent to which the PURCAE progress reports were utilized for improved project decisions and performance is not clear in the ICR.

M&E Quality Rating
Modest

10. Other Issues

a. Safeguards
The project was classified as Category B (partial assessment), because potentially negative impacts were expected to be local and limited, and specific mitigation measures had been designed. This included an Environmental and Social Screening and Assessment Framework (ESSAF), which provided general policies, guidelines, codes of practice, and procedures, and which were integrated into the design and implementation of the project. Accordingly, Project design triggered two safeguards’ policies: OP/BP 4.01
Environmental Assessment; and OP4.09 Pest Management. Overall, the Project complied with these two safeguard policies/requirements, although requiring some follow-up support by Bank missions.

(i) the OP/BP 4.01 environmental assessment was triggered because of potential environmental impacts in the support to the intensification and diversification of agricultural production as well as activities to address livestock health (a vaccination campaign and feed) and restocking, and the construction and/or rehabilitation of small-scale storage infrastructure. The ESSAF and the Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) were prepared before appraisal. The later was updated for the 2017 restructuring (in mid-2017). No specific Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP) was prepared. In practice, each participating UN agency followed its own procedures to assess potential environmental and social risks and impacts of their activities;

(ii) the OP/BP 4.09 (Pest Management) was prepared because the project supported the scaling up and/or intensification of agricultural and livestock production activities. Beneficiaries were likely to adopt pest management practices potentially involving an increased use of chemical pesticides with negative environmental and health impacts. To address OP/BP 4.09 requirements, the Pest and Pesticide Management Plan (PPMP), was developed for the ongoing IDA-funded EAPSP (P126576), and it was updated and used for PURCAE;

(iii) Regular Bank supervision missions reviewed the environmental and social compliance, and rated compliance as “Moderately Satisfactory”. While the ICR highlighted some shortcomings (involving works, pesticides, wells/pits), they were addressed and properly corrected (para. 85);

(iv) There were numerous public consultations involving environmental effects of the project, which included community mobilization and engagement by the three UN agencies (FAO, IOM and UNICEF), including community mapping exercises involving large and diverse members of the community, which proved key to promoting local ownership and sustainability of project activities (para. 86);

(v) The project included grievance redress processes/mechanism, although there was an initial delay in setting up a consolidated complaint management mechanism. IOM set up a system (2019), and the complaints were investigated and resolved satisfactorily (para. 87).

b. Fiduciary Compliance

(i) Procurement. (a) procurement inadequacies were relatively minor, mainly related to business planning and contract management; (b) otherwise, all procurement activities were well implemented, with the goods, works and services consistent with Bank review and compliance guidelines and delivered on time.

(ii) Financial Management/FM.

(a) financial management policies, procedures and covenants were complied with, and overall performance was rated Satisfactory (last ISR, 2020); (b) in accordance with agreements with GoC, the 3 UN service providers (UNICEF, IOM and FAO) used satisfactorily their own financial management procedures. However, there was a reported delay in paying the start-up advance due to a delay in IOM signing the project contract; while the payment was delayed to June, 2019, due to bureaucratic and technical reasons, and which affected/delayed the disbursement process of the entire portfolio. At the
same time, IOM was able to prefinance start-up activities, and therefore, this lag did not cause significant implementation delays (ICR, para. 89); (c) The PIUs of two Bank-supported projects that were supporting the project (EAPSP, and subsequently PRAPS) provided needed assistance to the UN agencies on financial management; (d) Supervision missions addressed fiduciary aspects and also, gave hands-on support; (e) Financial reports were prepared in compliance with Bank requirements, and were delivered on time by each of the participating UN agencies; (f) The Project’s PIU submitted these reports to the Bank within 45 days of the end of each quarter; (g) However, apart from the information provided through Aide-memoires and ISRs, there were no consolidated financial reports. Since the implementing UN agencies were considered as direct grant recipients, World Bank audits were not required.

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

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d. Other

The ICR highlighted 3 other positive aspects arising from the project. While recognizing some attribution challenges, the nature/scope of these benefits are summarized below, based on evidence presented in the ICR, paras. 59 – 61).

(i) **Gender** (para. 59): In the social and cultural context of the Project, men are the almost exclusive decision-makers. Project design specifically addressed social and economic inequalities existing between men and women, with a view to helping to close gender gaps, as follows: (a) almost all project activities, including awareness-raising and capacity building initiatives, consistently supported women’s participation; (b) a PDO indicator measured women’s participation: overall, women constituted 53% of beneficiaries of all activities combined (above the target of 52%), and about 55% of cash-for-work activities; (c) the Project contributed to increasing women’s agricultural assets and income earning and employment opportunities, as well as their meaningful participation in decision-making; (d) several project activities were specifically targeted at women, including safe water provision; and (e) capacity building was conducted for 217 lead women (known as “Women Ambassadors”), organized in 47 groups.

(ii) **Institutional Strengthening** (para. 60): The three UN agencies (initially WFP and FAO, and subsequently, IMO replaced WFP, together with UNICEF) that implemented the project components delivered services largely through contracting with local NGOs. This arrangement generated double benefits: ensured effective grass roots implementation; and provided significant capacity building effects on local NGOs, which are committed to working in the project area for the medium to long term. These arrangements also strengthened the cooperation between NGOs and local public services and served to strengthen links between the UN agencies and local partners/government agencies. Training provided to ministry staff also helped to strengthen public service entities. However, by the end of the project, there was limited substantive and direct capacity building of government entities.

(iii) **Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity** (para. 61): There were 4 dimensions: (a) The Project contributed to reducing the vulnerability of RRHCs and to strengthening their resilience, important components of poverty reduction; (b) The food assistance component provided the poorest among the target population with short term food support, reducing hunger and malnutrition; (c) targeted interventions also supported sustainable productive asset-building activities and investment in improved cooking systems and clean drinking water, which together improved nutritional and health status; (d) the agriculture
production and livestock stabilization component, also targeted at beneficiaries who were very poor, contributed to increases in food and animal production and in cash incomes that improved livelihoods, while recognizing depth and sustainability aspects of poverty reduction were weak (see below).

### 11. Ratings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ratings</th>
<th>ICR</th>
<th>IEG</th>
<th>Reason for Disagreements/Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>IEG assessed high relevance, a marginal substantial rating for efficacy with moderate shortcomings and substantial efficiency, thereby resulting in an overall outcome rating of “moderately satisfactory”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Performance</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Quality of M&amp;E</td>
<td>Modest</td>
<td>Modest</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quality of ICR</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Substantial</td>
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### 12. Lessons

The ICR presents 6 lessons which are based on project implementation experience and supporting evidence, considering both positive and “mixed” performance (ICR, paras. 104 - 108). The relevant aspects of the lessons that have broader application beyond this project are summarized below. IEG suggests one additional lesson, which provides a further elaboration of the sixth lesson.

(1) **Ownership and Strategies**: Country ownership, including strong alignment of the project with national policies and strategies, coupled with clear, timebound and sound implementation and sustainability action plan, especially for an emergency type of project, is crucial to lay a strong foundation for securing tangible and sustainable results;

(2) **Attainable Objectives**: Practical and attainable objectives, coupled with coherent components and prioritized interventions are vital to generate tangible and sustainable results, especially in the context of a short-term emergency project, taking into account the available timeframe and resources;

(3) **Mixture of Output and Outcome Performance Measures**: Emergency-type of projects should endeavor to include an appropriate mix of output and outcome performance measures, especially during an expanded phase of financial support, which can contribute to laying a sound foundation for developmental-type of approaches to sustainable development;

(4) **Practical Approach to Emergency Operations**: There are strong practical advantages for an emergency-type of project to utilize, finance, build-on and expand, and strengthen agencies and
activities which are already in place and operational, while making the relevant adjustments to achieve and sustain the project objectives. This approach also balances the need to ensure implementation readiness, adequacy of fiduciary arrangements and the strengthening of local capacities, especially to enable the transition from emergency support to developmental support;

(5) **Role of Partner Agencies**: Emergency-type of operations merit reliance on utilizing partner development agencies which demonstrate a comparative advantage for helping to meet the project objectives, which ensuring they carry out appropriate actions to strengthen relevant local entities to enable the transition to more sustainable developmental approaches and results;

(6) **Strategic Nexus**: There is a strong nexus between emergency situations and sustainable socioeconomic development, accompanied by the appropriate type of project interventions. Short-term emergency operations which are aimed at improving food security of populations in time of crisis are best accompanied by an operational medium to long-term plan of activities aimed at strengthening national capacities, resilience, combatting poverty, improving local livelihoods, creating jobs and generating increased incomes of the target populations. Accordingly, this nexus is enabled and best achieved when an emergency-type of project devises and operationalizes relevant action plan and outcome indicators and measures to promote and assess progress toward meeting the project’s follow up phase, especially with respect to developmental objectives.

An additional lesson arising from this ICRR is that results-focused emergency projects include explicit action plans, measures and arrangements for helping to scale-up and sustain relevant emergency and sustainable interventions, especially to ensure tangible pathways to achieving the above-mentioned nexus between emergency operations and sustainable socio-economic development.

### 13. Assessment Recommended?

**No**

### 14. Comments on Quality of ICR

Overall, the ICR is well written, consistent with the guidelines, analytical, subject to being an emergency operation with no accompanying ex-ante and ex-post EFA and beneficiary feedback, a strong output-focus, candid with respect to the project’s “fragile” results and high risks of sustaining the benefits (paras. 102 and 103). While the ICR reconstructs a generally sound ToC, supported by five appropriate outcomes, the accompanying updated Results Framework lacks relevant indicators to measure the expected changes. Also, notwithstanding the evaluation report prepared by FAO and IOM, the ICR lacks evidence which measures progress toward the expected five outcomes, and which can substantiate many of the conclusions made in the ICR. The RF indicators focus entirely on outputs.

While recognizing the emergency nature of the project, the risk section did not highlight sufficiently and explicitly the need for clear strategies and interventions to sustain and expand the project’s key outputs, especially given the likely continued emergency conditions (ICR, paras. 102 and 103). Also, while the PAD
included a detailed Operational Risk Assessment Framework (Annex 4), the ICR did not provide an assessment of the implementation and results of the proposed mitigation measures.

a. **Quality of ICR Rating**
   Substantial