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IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

IDA-4873-KE, TF-18327 and COFN C1440-KE

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 65 MILLION

(US\$94.7 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

FOR THE

KENYA INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS IMPROVEMENT PROJECT (KISIP)

AUGUST 14, 2020

Urban, Resilience And Land Global Practice  
Africa East and Southern Region

## CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective {Oct 08, 2019})

Currency Unit = Kenya Shillings (KSH)

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103.8 KSH = US\$1

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US\$ 1.37 = SDR 1

FISCAL YEAR

July 1 - June 30

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## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AFD	Agence Française de Développement
AMs	Aide Memoire
CPS	Country Partnership Strategy
COVID	Corona Virus Disease
ESIAs	Environmental and Social Impact Assessments
GIS	Geographic Information System
GoK	Government of Kenya
GRC	Grievance Redress Committee
ICR	Implementation Completion and Results Report
IDA	International Development Association
IFR	Interim Financial Report
ISR	Implementation Status Report
ISM	Implementation Support Mission
KENSUP	Kenya Slum Upgrading Program
KISIP	Kenya Informal Settlements Improvement Project
KLGRP	Kenya Local Government Reform Program
KMP	Kenya Municipal Program
LATF	Local Authority Transfer Fund
LPDP	Local Physical Development Plan
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDAs	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MLHUD	Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development
MoH	Ministry of Housing
MS	Moderately Satisfactory
MoL	Ministry of Lands
MTIHUD	Ministry of Transport, Infrastructure, Housing and Urban Development
MTP	Medium Term Plan
NAMSIP	Nairobi Metropolitan Services Improvement Project
NEMA	National Environmental Management Agency
NHP	National Hygiene Program
NLP	National Land Policy
NSUP	National Slum Upgrading Program
PAP	Project Affected Person
PCT	Project Coordination Team
PDO	Project Development Objective
RAP	Resettlement Action Plan
RF	Results Framework
RPF	Resettlement Policy Framework
SEC	Settlement Executive Committee
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SPA	Special Planning Area
SWM	Solid Waste Management
TTL	Task Team Leader

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**DATA SHEET**

**BASIC INFORMATION**

**Product Information**

Project ID	Project Name
P113542	Kenya Informal Settlements Improvement Project (KISIP)
Country	Financing Instrument
Kenya	Investment Project Financing
Original EA Category	Revised EA Category
Partial Assessment (B)	Partial Assessment (B)

**Organizations**

Borrower	Implementing Agency
Republic of Kenya	State Department of Housing and Urban Development

**Project Development Objective (PDO)**

Original PDO

The overall project development objective of the KISIP is to improve living conditions in informal settlements in selected municipalities in Kenya. This will be achieved by enhancing security of tenure and improving infrastructure based on plans developed in consultation with the community.

Revised PDO

To improve living conditions in informal settlements in selected urban centers in selected counties in Kenya.



**FINANCING**

	Original Amount (US\$)	Revised Amount (US\$)	Actual Disbursed (US\$)
<b>World Bank Financing</b>			
IDA-48730	100,000,000	99,998,818	93,287,879
TF-18327	8,300,000	8,300,000	8,300,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>108,300,000</b>	<b>108,298,818</b>	<b>101,587,879</b>
<b>Non-World Bank Financing</b>			
Borrower/Recipient	10,000,000	0	0
FRANCE: French Agency for Development	45,000,000	39,000,000	38,950,000
SWEDEN: Swedish Intl. Dev. Cooperation Agency (SIDA)	10,000,000	8,300,000	8,300,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>65,000,000</b>	<b>47,300,000</b>	<b>47,250,000</b>
<b>Total Project Cost</b>	<b>173,300,000</b>	<b>155,598,818</b>	<b>148,837,879</b>

**KEY DATES**

Approval	Effectiveness	MTR Review	Original Closing	Actual Closing
24-Mar-2011	30-Jun-2011	19-May-2014	30-Jun-2016	30-Nov-2019

**RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING**

Date(s)	Amount Disbursed (US\$M)	Key Revisions
06-Apr-2016	67.05	Change in Loan Closing Date(s)
06-Dec-2017	90.65	Reallocation between Disbursement Categories
31-May-2018	101.47	Change in Results Framework Change in Loan Closing Date(s)

**KEY RATINGS**

Outcome	Bank Performance	M&E Quality
Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Substantial



**RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs**

No.	Date ISR Archived	DO Rating	IP Rating	Actual Disbursements (US\$M)
01	19-Sep-2011	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	.35
02	24-Apr-2012	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	.35
03	17-Nov-2012	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	5.36
04	16-May-2013	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	9.52
05	14-Dec-2013	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	15.39
06	23-Jun-2014	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	21.89
07	11-Nov-2014	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	24.35
08	08-Jun-2015	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	54.19
09	18-Sep-2015	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	54.19
10	12-Feb-2016	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	66.46
11	05-Aug-2016	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	73.56
12	02-Mar-2017	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	79.19
13	11-Sep-2017	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	87.16
14	30-Apr-2018	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	108.24
15	03-Dec-2018	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	113.56
16	10-Jun-2019	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	127.11
17	19-Dec-2019	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	135.76

**SECTORS AND THEMES**

**Sectors**

Major Sector/Sector	(%)
<b>Public Administration</b>	<b>30</b>
Sub-National Government	30



<b>Transportation</b>	<b>30</b>
Other Transportation	30
<b>Water, Sanitation and Waste Management</b>	<b>40</b>
Other Water Supply, Sanitation and Waste Management	40
<b>Themes</b>	
Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3)	(%)
<b>Public Sector Management</b>	<b>20</b>
Public Administration	20
Administrative and Civil Service Reform	6
Municipal Institution Building	14
<b>Urban and Rural Development</b>	<b>80</b>
Urban Development	80
Urban Infrastructure and Service Delivery	20
Services and Housing for the Poor	60

**ADM STAFF**

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## I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES

### A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL

#### Context

1. **Kenya's urban transition is characterized by ubiquitous informality.** In 2009, an estimated 39 percent of the Kenyan population lived in urban areas (about 15.2 million people)<sup>1</sup> and of them, more than half (54.8 percent) lived in informal settlements totaling 8.3 million.<sup>2</sup> Features of these informal settlements include constrained access to water and sanitation, tenure insecurity, inaccessibility, poor lighting and extensive flooding. Weak institutional capacity and lack of policy frameworks and guidelines at the county and urban level further exacerbate the challenge of informal settlements.

2. **To address living conditions within informal settlements, the Government of Kenya (GoK) initiated national programs and passed policy and constitutional reforms.** Three main national programs initiated are the Kenya Local Government Reform Program (KLGRP), Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF) and Kenya Slum Upgrading Program (KENSUP) (2005-20).<sup>3</sup> Among others, the KLGRP focused on financial, information and project management in local authorities. To expand service delivery at the local level, LATF aimed to supplement local authority revenues. KENSUP's interventions include participatory planning and development, strengthening of tenure security and provision of housing and infrastructure services. The National Land Policy (NLP) 2009 and the Constitution of Kenya 2010 recognizes and prioritizes the need for tenure security for all Kenyans, including residents of informal settlements.

3. **Rationale for Bank Involvement.** After requests from the GoK to help in addressing urban challenges, the World Bank has been supporting several urban projects in Kenya since 2010. In May 2010, the Bank approved the Kenya Municipal Program (KMP) (P066488) which benefitted about 2.6 million people through upgraded and new access roads and drainage systems, pedestrian and bicycle pathways, street and security lights and new markets.<sup>4</sup> After passing a historic constitution and the first NLP, the GoK requested the Bank to help the government to (a) facilitate the regularization of existing squatter settlements located on public land for purposes of upgrading or development; (b) develop, in consultation with affected communities, a slum upgrading and resettlement program under specified flexible tenure systems; and (c) put in place measures to prevent further slum development.<sup>5</sup> Targeting the same municipalities as the KMP, the Kenya Informal Settlements Improvement Project (KISIP) focused on tenure security, participatory planning, regularization and infrastructure upgrading. The Nairobi Metropolitan Services Improvement Project (NAMSIP) (P107314), approved in May 2012 focused on financing investments in infrastructure and services in the Nairobi metropolitan area.

4. **Project contribution to higher-level objectives.** Through providing basic infrastructure and services, KISIP contributed to the GoK's Vision 2030 urban goal of 'a well-housed population living in an environmentally secure urban environment'. The Medium-Term Plan (MTP) (2008-13) focused on improving urban informal settlements. To

<sup>1</sup> Kenya National Bureau of Statistics. 2010. '2009 Population and Housing Census Results'.

<sup>2</sup> UN-Habitat. 2010. 'State of African Cities Report'.

<sup>3</sup> GoK provided an annual budget of about US\$6.6 million to the KENSUP.

<sup>4</sup> KMP Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR). The program targeted 15 of Kenya's largest urban centers.

<sup>5</sup> Key focus issues of the NLP 2009.



compliment Kenya’s urban goal and the MTP, KISIP provided basic infrastructure and services and enhanced tenure and human security in informal settlements. KISIP supported the Kenya Country Partnership Strategy’s (CPS) (2010-13) three themes namely growth, equity and environment. Equity was advanced through recognition and improvement of slum dwellers living conditions and access to services. Infrastructure investments increase the economic competitiveness of urban centers while investments in stormwater drainage and sanitation systems support the environment agenda.

**Theory of Change (Results Chain)**

5. The theory of change is illustrated in Fig 1 and is implicit in the PAD as no theory of change was developed during project preparation.




Fig 1: KISIP theory of change.

**Project Development Objectives (PDOs)**

6. The PDO was ‘to improve living conditions in informal settlements in selected municipalities in Kenya’. The Project Appraisal Document added: ‘This will be achieved by improving security of tenure and investing in infrastructure based on plans developed in consultation with the community’ to the PDO stated in the Financing Agreement.

**Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators**

7. The key outcome indicators measured include (a) people benefiting from improved tenure; (b) people in informal settlements provided with access to improved drainage infrastructure; (c) number of people in urban areas provided with access to all-season roads within a 500-meter range; (d) number of people in urban areas provided with



access to improved water sources; and (e) direct beneficiaries. The intermediate outcome indicators measured progress on physical infrastructure, its coverage and technical support to government agencies (see Annex 1).

## Components

8. The project had four components, all implemented by the National Project Coordination Team (PCT).

### Component 1: Strengthening institutions and program management (IDA US\$10.0 million)

9. This component supported institutional strengthening and capacity building of select government ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs). It supported: (a) development of policies, frameworks, systems, and guidelines for slum upgrading; (b) institutional analysis of the Ministry of Housing (MoH); (c) municipal-level housing strategies; (d) community mobilization in slums; (e) training and capacity building program for the MoH and the Ministry of Lands (MoL); and (f) management activities associated with program implementation.

### Component 2: Enhancing tenure security (IDA US\$8.0 million).

10. This component included: (a) preparing a database on the land tenure status of slums; (b) planning and surveying of settlements; (c) identification and verification of beneficiaries; and (d) preparation, registration and issuance of titles to individual households or groups.

### Component 3: Investing in infrastructure and service delivery (IDA US\$70.3 million).

11. Investments in settlement infrastructure i.e. roads, bicycle paths, pedestrian walkways, street and security lighting, vending platforms, solid waste management (SWM), stormwater drains, water and sanitation systems, electrification, public parks, and green spaces were eligible for financing under this component.

### Component 4: Planning for urban growth (IDA US\$4.0 million)

12. The component supported planning and development of options that facilitate delivery of infrastructure services, land and affordable housing for future urban growth.

## B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE)

### Revised PDOs and Outcome Targets

13. The project's PDO was revised during a restructuring approved by the World Bank on May 7, 2015 to reflect changes in the institutional set-up of government that took place following the elections of March 4, 2013, the first under the 2010 constitution. Under Kenya's 2010 Constitution, newly created county governments became responsible for managing Kenya's urban areas, and urban local authorities (the former third tier of government) ceased to exist. To better reflect this new institutional set-up, the PDO was changed from *'to improve living conditions in informal settlements in selected municipalities in Kenya. This will be achieved by enhancing security of tenure and improving infrastructure based on plans developed in consultation with the community'* to *'to improve living conditions in informal settlements in selected urban centers in selected counties in Kenya'*.

14. The results framework (RF) was changed three times (Table 1). Variations between targets set at appraisal stage and final revised targets (Table 1) are explained by four main factors. First, they were revised upwards to reflect the additional scope from Additional Financing from SIDA and AFD co-financing. Second, the RF used a flexible approach as investments could only be determined after community-led project prioritization processes. Third, counting became



more refined and accurate during project implementation. Finally, substantial capacity improvements on tenure regularization by the client led to targets being revised upwards.

15. Increases in five PDO indicators were made to reflect the anticipated additional scope from Additional Financing (US\$8.3million) from SIDA and AFD co-financing (EUR 35 million; about US\$39 million at project closing), that became available only after the project became effective. The target for the PDO indicator *‘People benefiting from improved tenure security’* was reduced after the Bank team’s assessment of implementation progress and challenges in the tenure regularization over the initial years of the project. It was revised upwards once the challenges were resolved and implementation had advanced. The largest increase in targets were on *the number of people in informal settlements provided with access to improved drainage infrastructure* and *the number of people in urban areas provided with access to all-season roads within a 500-meter range under the project* while the smallest increase was on *people benefiting from improved tenure security*.

16. This ICR assesses the achievements under IDA, SIDA and AFD financing. The project closing date in this ICR is maintained as the IDA credit closing date of November 30, 2019 even though the AFD credit is open until December 31, 2020 and thus was still open at the time of writing this ICR. As the results from AFD financing had already been achieved at project closing and AFD funds were fully disbursed by ICR preparation, the task team decided, in agreement with AFD, to prepare one ICR that aligns with IDA ICR preparation timelines and that include results from AFD financing. Supervision of the use of SIDA and AFD financing in the project was done by the Bank. SIDA financing was supervised through a Trust Fund arrangement while AFD financing was supervised through arrangements stipulated in an IDA-AFD co-financing agreement which is currently valid until December 31, 2020 when the AFD credit closes.

Table 1: Changes to the Results Framework

PDO Indicator	Target (PAD)	Revised Target (May 7, 2015)	Revised Target (April 6, 2016)	Final Revised Target (May 31, 2018)
People benefiting from improved tenure security under component 2 of the KISIP.	180,000	71,000	25,000	100,000
Direct project beneficiaries (Females)	700,000 (350,000)	1,070,000 (535,000)	No change	No change (585,000)
People in informal settlements provided with access to improved drainage infrastructure under KISIP	200,000	1,000,000	No change	1,100,000
Number of people in urban areas provided with access to all-season roads within a 500-meter range under the project	200,000	1,000,000	No change	1,100,000
Number of people in urban areas provided with access to improved water sources under the project	100,000	No change	162,000	No change

### Revised PDO Indicators

17. PDO indicators were not changed during the life of the project.

### Revised Components

18. Component 1 dropped activities that were financed through government resources. These include the institutional analysis of MoH and MoL and the identification and implementation of measures to improve the speed and efficiency of mapping, planning, survey and land registration.<sup>6</sup> On component 4, two studies, focused on (a) affordable

<sup>6</sup> Due to data unavailability, establishment of housing quality index was dropped.



housing and serviced land and (b) low-income housing finance were dropped, respectively, due to similar studies conducted by the World Bank and other agencies.

### **Other Changes**

19. The project's closing date was extended twice from June 30, 2016 to May 31, 2018 (23 months) and then to November 30, 2019 (18 months) through restructurings approved on April 6, 2016 and on December 6, 2017 respectively. The first extension was motivated by: (a) the need to allow additional time to complete all project activities financed through the additional and co-financing; and (b) the recognition that the 5-year implementation period was unrealistic given the community engagement requirement in prioritizing infrastructure works. The second extension was requested to extend the Bank's supervision of AFD co-financing which became effective only in July 28, 2017 and to supervise the implementation of outstanding resettlement action plans (RAPs)/abbreviated RAPs. By the second extension, about 83 percent of IDA funds had been disbursed. With these extensions, the project implementation period was extended by 41 months from five to eight and a half years.

20. The name of the project's implementing agency changed twice during project implementation. After the 2013 elections, national government ministries were restructured to meet the new constitutional limit of 22 ministries, down from the previous 43. KISIP's key implementing agency before the elections, the MoH, was merged into the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development (MLHUD) and the restructuring approved on May 7, 2015 recognized this change.<sup>7</sup> Another ministerial reorganization separated land from housing and urban development functions. KISIP's implementing agency became the Ministry of Transport, Infrastructure, Housing and Urban Development (MTIHUD) which was reflected in the restructuring approved on May 31, 2018.

21. The disbursement arrangements were changed through a restructuring approved on December 6, 2017. The initial disbursement arrangements were designed such that each donor financed a portion of each contract. The delay in the effectiveness of AFD's financing agreement affected these arrangements such that there was an IDA shortfall (US\$8million). The restructuring allowed IDA/SIDA to retroactively finance 100 percent of expenditures, with SIDA funds being utilized first and exhausted before using IDA funds, until the funding is depleted or four months after the closing date of May 31, 2018 for activities completed on or before the closing date (whichever came first), and AFD to finance 100 percent of expenditures consecutively. This restructuring allowed the IDA shortfall to become eligible spending.

### **Rationale for Changes and Their Implication on the Original Theory of Change**

22. The four restructurings were done to allow the project to remain responsive to the changing environment during implementation and had no implication on the original Theory of Change. Targets for most PDO indicators were revised upwards largely due to the increase in the project envelope from SIDA and AFD financing. As such, the number of beneficiaries of improved infrastructure services rose significantly positively contributing to project outcomes.

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<sup>7</sup> With the dissolution of municipalities in 2013, municipal agreements were dropped.



## II. OUTCOME

### A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs

#### Assessment of Relevance of PDOs and Rating

Rating: *High*

23. At appraisal, KISIP was consistent with the Bank's CPS (2010-13) themes of equity, environment and growth. Specifically, the CPS focused on initiating an urban development program to upgrade slums and improve urban service delivery.<sup>8</sup> Therefore, KISIP became a pioneering program targeted at addressing the unique service delivery challenges in informal settlements.

24. At completion, the PDO remained highly relevant to the World Bank Group CPS for Kenya (FY14–18), extended under the Performance and Learning Review of the CPS to FY20. The CPS has three strategic results areas: (a) competitiveness and sustainability—growth to eradicate poverty, (b) protection and potential—human resource development for shared prosperity, and (c) consistency and equity—delivering a devolution dividend. KISIP contributed to the first two strategic results areas. This is through supporting participatory planning of informal settlements, and financing settlement infrastructure and services.

25. KISIP has contributed to the inclusion of slum upgrading in the mainstream urban development agenda in Kenya. The National Slum Upgrading and Prevention Policy (NSUPP), adopted by the GoK in 2016, has mainstreamed the KISIP approach (i.e., focus on in-situ upgrading and tenure security using a community-centered approach) into existing and future informal upgrading initiatives. While KENSUP has a strong emphasis on constructing housing units, the NSUPP focuses on: (a) recognizing, integrating and mainstreaming informal settlements into all aspects of economy and public service delivery; (b) promoting community slum upgrading and prevention initiatives; and (c) improving livelihoods in informal settlements.<sup>9</sup> To implement the 2016 Policy, the GoK has committed to setting up the Inter- Government Agency for Slum Upgrading and Prevention, Kenya Slum Upgrading Low-Cost Housing and Infrastructure Trust Fund and County Slum Upgrading Multi-Stakeholder Support Group.

### B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY)

Rating: *Substantial*

#### Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome

26. **Since all the restructurings did not lead to material changes to the Project scope, this ICR uses an integrated evaluation as opposed to a split evaluation.** The change in PDO was a reflection of the new subnational level institutions, rather than a change in project focus and this is reflected in the fact that the underlying PDO indicators did not change.

27. **To independently assess the project's achievement of results, KISIP commissioned a Beneficiary Assessment, a Gender Analysis and an analysis of the functionality of Settlement Executive Committees (SECs) and Grievance Redress Committees (GRCs).** Conducted in 22 KISIP settlements in 11 selected counties, the Beneficiary Assessment conducted 60 focus group discussions constituting 435 beneficiaries (232 male and 203 female) and 73 key informant interviews. The gender analysis was conducted in 12 KISIP settlements in 4 counties and 689 households were interviewed. The analysis

<sup>8</sup> World Bank Kenya CPS (2010-13), p. 19.

<sup>9</sup> GoK. March 2016. National Slum Upgrading and Prevention Policy. MLHUD.



of SECs and GRCs covered 56 KISIP settlements in 11 counties and interviewed 508 people (including 73 PAPs). Among others, the ICR draws from these studies.

28. **Achievement of PDO.** The project achieved its PDO of improving living conditions in Kenya's urban informal settlements. At project closing, KISIP had fully achieved all its five PDO indicators (surpassing three). Across 14 counties, the project reached a total of 1,389,980 (135 percent more than the target of 1,030,000) direct beneficiaries. Of these, an estimated 694,000 were females (at project design about 50% of beneficiaries were targeted to be female). About 1 million people benefited from drainage infrastructure and all-season roads upgraded by KISIP. Some 262,780 people, about 162 percent more than the target of 162,000, benefited from improved water sources provided through the project. About 125,525 people, some 125 percent more than the target of 100,000, benefitted from improved tenure security.

29. On intermediate results indicators, of its 12 targets, the project fully achieved all but one. Within 11 counties, the upgrading of infrastructure investments included (a) roads; (b) storm water drains; (c) water supply systems; (d) sewer systems; (e) high mast lights; and (f) footpaths. In addition, the project (a) provided tenure security; (b) equipped GIS lab; (c) developed slum inventory database; (d) developed housing policies; (e) conducted housing studies; and (f) strengthened community-level structures, i.e. the SECs and GRCs.

30. **Access to tenure security.** Tenure security was considered achieved at the point a beneficiary's name is included in a Registry Index Map (RIM)<sup>10</sup> and about 125,525 people had benefitted from improved tenure security by project closing. Previous regularization trends in Kenya indicate that regularization often stalls before RIM stage, and the Bank and project team identified that once the beneficiaries were confirmed at this stage, the continued strong political motivation behind issuing titles ensured that titles will be issued. Based on the RIMs, a total of 25,105 titles<sup>11</sup> will be issued in 80 informal settlements by the AFD credit closing date, with about 22 percent of the titles issued to women. The number of settlements completed is short of the target of 86 settlements although the project surpassed targeted number of beneficiaries. In settlements where regularization could not be completed due to challenges such as unclear land ownership, a clear consultation process was used to ensure the community and county remained aware of the reasons for dropping the settlement. Before the project, fear of eviction and tenure insecurity constrained major improvements on housing structures. People had lived for decades (e.g. more than 30 years in Misifuni settlement (Mombasa County) and 8 decades in Swahili settlement (Kisumu County) facing evictions, losing productive assets and maintaining a cautious approach to investing in a settlement with unclear tenure. Tenure regularization is being associated with certainty, long term investments on housing structures, access to bank loans and improved service delivery in many settlements.<sup>12</sup>

31. **Access to surfaced roads and improved drainage networks.** About 98.28 kilometers (km) of roads, 109.21km of drainage systems and 120.07km of footpaths were upgraded. Before the project, beneficiaries had extremely poor access to settlements whether by walking or with motorized vehicles. People walked long distances to access transport and fire emergency services could not access settlements. During the rainy season, storm water would flow through houses and muddy conditions constrained people walking to work and children walking to school. A beneficiary in Nyalenda settlement, Kisumu County, summarized the impact of KISIP's upgrading by saying *'If my ancestors were to resurrect from their graves today, they will run away saying this is not where they grew up. Roads, storm water drains, flood lights were not there. They will say this is not Nyalenda. In fact, nobody ever imagined Nyalenda would have a road, it was*

<sup>10</sup> A Registry Index Map (RIM) is a document that contains all the parcels, with landownership details, that have been registered at the Ministry of Lands

<sup>11</sup> With an average household of 5 persons, 25,105 titles provide tenure security to 125,525 people.

<sup>12</sup> KISIP Beneficiary Assessment Report, p. 44.



*unimaginable. Now people drive through*'.<sup>13</sup>

32. The new drainage infrastructure has improved general sanitation and reduced flooding and waterlogging. The roads and storm water drainage have improved mobility within settlements, opened the economic potential of these settlements and improved access for emergency vehicles. Access to schools, clinics and other public service institutions has improved.<sup>14</sup> Across settlements, major economic changes include investments in housing structures, informal change of use (to commercial) along upgraded roads, improved land value (average of 400 percent increase), new business opportunities and improved returns from rental houses (rentals increased by an average of 20 percent).<sup>15</sup> For example, in Eldoret, *'by the time the first road was completed in Huruma Mwaderi, the first set of multi-story buildings was also completed.... new permanent residential and commercial buildings are coming up. This area is prime, we only lack[ed] infrastructure*'.<sup>16</sup>

33. **Improved human security.** KISIP installed 134 high-mast security flood lights with each lighting up a radius of 150 meters. Before the project, insecurity (compounded by poor lighting) was a major concern in all settlements. Muggings, robberies, killings and dumping of dead bodies were common. A case in point is Machakos where *'the police could not dare come to Kariobangi. The area was dangerous given the lack of lighting. With the lights and roads, they [police] are always patrolling our settlement making us feel more secure*'.<sup>17</sup> Arising from improved security, across settlements, new businesses have been set up, trading hours have increased by 2-3 hours (from 7-8PM before the project to 10-11PM), sexual assault risks to women have reduced (women can now leave for the fresh market by 5am), house occupancy by tenants has improved and the perception that people living in slums are criminals is changing. Also, the transformers installed to serve the high mast lights have enough capacity to stimulate other electricity-based economic activities for instance salons, barbershops and welding stores.<sup>18</sup>

34. **Access to improved water sources and sanitation facilities.** The project provided 262,780 people with access to improved water sources. It invested in (a) 110km of water pipelines; (b) 8,739 new piped household water connections and 11 water kiosks; (c) 59km of sewer lines; (d) 4,788 new sewer connections; and (e) 21 ablution blocks. About 3,050 people now have access to improved shared sanitation facilities. In all targeted settlements, before the intervention, water and sanitation were the top-rated development challenge by communities. In other areas, like Jomvu Kuu (Mombasa), people had lived for about 10 years without tapped water while in KCC (Nairobi), they traveled to Umoja 2 (neighboring settlement) to get water (a round trip of 30 minutes). In Mjini, Kitui county, the settlement had no sewerage infrastructure, thus residents would instead open septic tanks or pit latrines to stormwater during the rainy season. KISIP changed this practice with 95 percent of the plots connected to the new sewer system.<sup>19</sup>

35. Other changes include improved access to clean water (to known sources unlike before the project), and remarkable decreases in: (a) water borne diseases; (b) reliance on water vendors; and (c) time spent by women and girls fetching water. With toilet improvements, people are now living with dignity (no longer using flying toilets).<sup>20</sup> Water costs went down drastically, for example, in Kamkunji (Eldoret), a 20 liter water container was sold for between KES 30-50 (about US\$ 0.30-0.50) pre-project and KES 3 (about US\$0.03) after the project, a reduction in water access costs by 94

<sup>13</sup> Interview with SEC Chairperson, Nyalenda, Kisumu.

<sup>14</sup> In Machakos, according to the school head teacher, the project has improved school attendance during the rainy season.

<sup>15</sup> KISIP Beneficiary Assessment Report.

<sup>16</sup> Interview, Huruma, Eldoret.

<sup>17</sup> Interview, Kariobangi, Machakos.

<sup>18</sup> KISIP Beneficiary Assessment Report, p. 31.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid, p. 37.

<sup>20</sup> Toilets where people relieve themselves in plastic bags and throw these bags in roadsides, ditches or any open space.





percent.<sup>21</sup>

36. **Strengthened institutions.** The project developed an inventory of informal settlements in Kenya in conjunction with the Slum Upgrading Department of the MTIHUD. The exercise established that there are 498 informal settlements in Kenya, of which KISIP intervened in 115 settlements. KISIP equipped the GIS labs which benefitted three departments in the Ministry of Lands and Physical Planning involved in planning, surveying and land management in Kenya (Survey of Kenya, Land Registry and Department of Physical Planning). Also, the project developed land tenure regularization guidelines which are premised on a community-based approach to tenure regularization.

37. **Planning for urban growth.** The project conducted a situation analysis which provided project key data on 351 informal settlements in 15 urban centers<sup>22</sup> and a housing survey which provided existing housing conditions in urban Kenya and housing needs, affordability and finance options.<sup>23</sup> The two studies assisted KISIP in the selection and phasing of informal settlements. Housing policies developed for Nairobi and Kisumu by KISIP are expected to serve as examples to other counties on handling housing challenges. Overall, the outputs of this component did not provide options that facilitate delivery of infrastructure services and land for future urban growth as envisaged. Instead of conducting studies to help counties and the national government plan for future urban growth, studies conducted mainly focused in helping the project.

#### Justification of Overall Efficacy Rating

38. The overall efficacy rating is assessed as *Substantial*. The project achieved all its outcome targets (surpassing three of them). On intermediate results indicators, it achieved all but one (surpassing four of the 12 targets). Instead of the 86 settlements targeted, the project could only reach 80. Also, one component (planning for urban growth) did not have any significant impact on guiding future urban growth.

### C. EFFICIENCY

#### Assessment of Efficiency and Rating

Rating: *Substantial*

39. **Economic Analysis:** The economic analysis conducted at project completion indicates that the interventions under Component 3 were economically feasible. The net present value of the investment in urban roads and drainage systems (US\$70.3 million) is estimated at US\$158.7 million and the internal rate of return is estimated at 44 percent.

40. KISIP yielded positive externalities on the overall population through numerous direct and indirect benefits. For instance, the project's direct benefits include improved mobility, public health and human security as outlined below. The indirect benefits of the project are improved health outcomes across all segments of the population and most notably, among youth, female and elderly population by providing more affordable access to potable water and sanitation services. The main benefits from the investments are:

- (a) **Improved mobility:** The benefits derived from this intervention consist of (i) travel time savings; (ii) travel cost savings; (iii) reductions in vehicle operating costs; (iv) enhanced access to jobs, markets, health facilities, schools, and other services at lower cost than otherwise available (reflected in enhanced land values); (v) reduced number of days of work

<sup>21</sup> KISIP Beneficiary Assessment Report, p. 36.

<sup>22</sup> Eldoret, Embu, Garissa, Kakamega, Kericho, Kitui, Kisumu, Machakos, Malindi, Mombasa, Nairobi, Naivasha, Nakuru, Nyeri, and Thika.

<sup>23</sup> Conducted in Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu and Nakuru.



lost due to flooding; (vi) reduced property damage (buildings, roads, furniture, appliances, household goods); (vii) increased property values; and (viii) reduced costs of illness associated with exposure to polluted and stagnant water.

**(b) Improved public health:** Benefits include: (i) value of improved health outcomes; (ii) value of saved lives; and (iii) value of time saved fetching water.

**(c) Improved human security:** Benefits of street lighting include: (i) increased perception of safety; (ii) reduced road accidents; and (iii) increased ability to do business after sunset. People interviewed during the Beneficiary Assessment noted that they felt a greater sense of security at night and were now walking along streets with lighting, rather than taking motorized transport to their destinations. Also, accidents have declined; business hours have expanded and that the appearance and livability of settlements had improved.

41. Studies indicate that beneficiaries in upgraded settlements could pay user fees. In eight informal settlements surveyed, an average of 93 percent of households indicated willingness to pay for water and sanitation user fees.<sup>24</sup> Studies on affordability of water and sanitation services in Nairobi have, however, indicated that beneficiaries require a subsidy towards connection fees (US\$ 175 for a sewerage connection and US\$ 80 for a water connection per household).<sup>25</sup> KISIP offered subsidized water meters and negotiated for connections under the Low-Income Consumers arrangement with water companies. As a result, the KISIP Beneficiary Assessment reported that respondents indicated that the improved access to safe water and sewerage connections had a cost saving implication on their household economics.<sup>26</sup>

42. **Efficiency of implementation.** To implement the expanded scope of work made possible by the additional financing and co-financing, the project was extended twice for a total of 41 months. The per capita investment was reduced from the expected US\$157 (\$110million/700,000 beneficiaries) as initially stated at appraisal, to an actual of US\$115 (\$160.3million/1,389,980 beneficiaries). This indicates that the potential negative impact of project extension on efficiency was compensated by the additional outcomes achieved and increased investment efficiency. Also, the per capita investment is very cost efficient compared to similar slum upgrading projects in other countries, especially considering that the project includes both basic infrastructure and tenure regularization. For instance, the Vietnam Mekong Delta Region Urban Upgrading Project (P113904) had an actual per capita investment of US\$ 534. For these reasons, efficiency of implementation is rated High.

#### D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING

Rating: *Satisfactory*.

43. The relevance of the PDO is *High*, the efficacy in achieving the PDO is *Substantial*, and the efficiency is also *High*. Based on these ratings, the overall outcome rating is assessed as *Satisfactory*. While the project was extended twice, the project achieved all its outcomes (surpassing three) and all but one of its intermediate results targets (surpassing four).

#### E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY)

##### Gender

44. Access to improved water sources has reduced time spent by women to fetch water (from 30 to less than 5 minutes) while access to improved sanitation has contributed to better reproductive health practices. Although the objective of street lighting was increasing human security in general, female beneficiaries pointed to a reduction in the

<sup>24</sup> Nairobi Sanitation Project Commitment Paper, 2012.

<sup>25</sup> Nairobi Sanitation Project Commitment Paper, 2012.

<sup>26</sup> KISIP Beneficiary Assessment, p. 6



risk of sexual assault, being able to leave for the fresh market at 5am and ability of children to do their homework under high mast lights.

45. Both the Beneficiary Assessment and Gender Analysis pointed to some key lessons learned and innovations. About 33 percent of SEC members were women.<sup>27</sup> Women benefited from the tenure regularization and females who were heads of households were entitled to an individual title or, in the case of a community title, be formally recognized as a member of the community. About 22 percent of titles are issued to women. Further, in Jomvu Mikanjuni (Mombasa), women signed a management contract with the county to manage ablution facilities which brings some extra income.

46. KISIP helped change gender dimensions of productive roles. For instance, the Gender Analysis revealed that ‘some productive roles are gradually changing even with the effect of KISIP project activities. Some of the work or roles traditionally assigned to men such as road construction, mechanical work and construction of buildings are progressively being done by women’.<sup>28</sup> In Malindi, the roads contractor highlighted that most of the day workers were women. Such changes are economically empowering women. However, KISIP project team observed that gender issues were not captured within contracts but were introduced after concerns were raised by women.

47. In 2016, a pilot on crime and violence prevention was conducted in Kayole Soweto settlement (Nairobi County) where men and women developed a participatory mapping of safety and security in their settlement. The exercise confirmed that women find informal settlements more unsafe than men and plan their routes from one point to another to avoid areas they perceived as unsafe. They enhance their safety by walking along routes that had streetlights and these alternative routes are generally more expensive if using public transport, and take more time, restricting women’s mobility and thus their access to jobs and services. This pilot confirmed the mapping exercise should be integrated into the infrastructure intervention so that women’s perspectives are incorporated.

### **Institutional Strengthening**

48. The project upgraded GIS labs which benefitted three government departments namely Physical Planning, Survey, and Lands. Support was through providing necessary equipment and software and the training of staff on the management of GIS and the use of GPS. Essentially, the project developed capacity facilitating the development of long-term spatial plans and accurate surveys – which two are essential in regulating the built environment.

49. All 14 counties which participated in KISIP had no prior experience in World Bank funded projects. KISIP strengthened capacity of counties through support to County Coordinators on project management and safeguards. These competencies are vital in the day to day operations of counties as they execute their core functions.

50. KISIP set up and trained SECs in all 115 KISIP settlements. The SECs had representatives of youth, business community, women groups, disabled, religious groups, local professionals (such as teachers), landlords, tenants, and local members of county assembly. SECs as community level structures were responsible for community mobilization, linking communities to KISIP and contractors, facilitating enumerations and settlement upgrading plans.

### **Mobilizing Private Sector Financing**

51. There was no private sector financing under the project.

### **Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity**

<sup>27</sup> KISIP Analysis of Functionality of GRCs and SECs, p. 8.

<sup>28</sup> KISIP Gender Analysis, p. 8.



52. KISIP directly improved living conditions in informal settlements which accommodate the country's urban poor. The project provided access to basic services such as water and sanitation among others which are key in improving living conditions. The roads and street lighting have improved mobility within the settlement and outside to access jobs. The project also directly reduces poverty and boosts prosperity by providing land titles, valuable assets, to settlement residents. The KISIP interventions have also triggered considerable investments in businesses and properties in the upgraded settlements.

### Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts

53. SECs are doing more for their communities than anticipated. For instance, a study on the functionality of SECs found that most SEC members had also served and continued to serve as focal points for other development projects in parallel to KISIP. Such engagements enabled SEC members to acquire valuable experience in community mobilization and most have earned trust and respect of communities. Also, SECs maintain a repository of data collected from various project engagements which is helping other development partners implementing projects in various communities.

54. Upgrading infrastructure also had some unintended outcomes. In some settlements, the improved drainage affected people living downstream from the project settlements due to flooding. For example, in Huruma, Eldoret, downstream areas that had no storm water harvesters became flooded leading to major access challenges.<sup>29</sup> Increased demand for housing in upgraded settlements triggered increase in house rents. In such cases, informal settlement beneficiaries were being edged out of the rented houses since they were unable to pay the higher rents.<sup>30</sup> The increase in land values led to 'some incidences where original owners of land are selling off their land and utilizing the proceeds to buy land in cheaper areas or start businesses'.<sup>31</sup> These sales were not widely observed, though the fact that some land owners are starting business enterprises after disposing off land has some potential to improve their livelihoods.

55. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the GoK, using KISIP, developed emergency response measures in informal settlements. Between April 29, 2020 and June 2, 2020, the GoK implemented Phase 1A of the National Hygiene Program (NHP or *Kazi Mtaani*), a labor-intensive community works program in informal settlements. In Phase 1A, 26,148 jobs were created in 27 settlements across 8 counties (counties severely constrained by the restricted movements) and the wages were financed by KISIP AFD funds.<sup>32</sup> Phase 1A paid for 22 eight hour working days for the 26,148 workers. Based on demand, the GoK with its own financing has extended the program for the same workers by another 20 working days which is Phase 1B of the project.

56. Initial assessment of Phase 1A of the NHP indicates that, overall, the activities provided critical income for informal settlement residents. The NHP has had significant social, physical and economic benefits in the participating informal settlements which include creation of 26,148 direct jobs, regeneration of local economies sustaining small businesses and livelihoods, improved hygiene and occupation for young people who could either be idle or engage in risky behavior. A list of selected media coverage is provided in Annex 7 (pages 73-75) and indicates the scale of the impact from this intervention.

<sup>29</sup> Interview with SEC member, Huruma, Eldoret.

<sup>30</sup> KISIP Gender Analysis.

<sup>31</sup> KISIP Beneficiary Assessment Report, p. 23.

<sup>32</sup> The project has been utilizing the last disbursement of AFD funds since project closure in November 2019.



57. KISIP proved to be quite agile, making necessary adjustments to accommodate COVID-19 response activities. The Bank shared with the client its guidance on operating within the COVID-19 restrictions and how the project could enhance its safeguards mechanism to cover for additional activities under the NHP. Operations guidelines were developed which included financial management (FM) and Safeguards additional considerations for these labor-intensive community work activities. The guidelines have been annexed to the Projects Operations Manual to be legally binding as per the Financing Agreement. The ESMF was also amended to accommodate this activity and the KISIP PCT integrated COVID-19 guidelines and government directives into these operations including providing personal protective equipment, sanitation facilities and ensure social distancing is maintained. The guidelines provided for the use of project and settlement-level GRM and severe incident reporting protocols in the program.

### III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME

#### A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION

58. **Government commitment and leadership in informal upgrading.** Being the first large-scale informal upgrading project in Kenya, the Bank had extensive consultations with GoK. The project was aligned to the GoK's KENSUP, MTP (2008-13) and Vision 2030. The KENSUP, Constitution of Kenya 2010 and NLP 2009 prioritized the upgrading of informal settlements and issuance of titles. The ministry responsible for housing was given the mandate to lead this agenda across the country. KISIP became a key intervention to implement the GoK's slum upgrading priorities as articulated in KENSUP and the NLP and to realize constitutional priorities on water, sanitation, standards of living and land tenure.

59. **Project design amidst constitutional and government reforms.** KISIP was prepared during a historic period for Kenya where fundamental constitutional reforms were initiated and passed. The project's: PDO, RF and M&E were realistic and straightforward. The objective 'to improve living conditions in informal settlements' resonated with the key urban development challenge in Kenya of addressing informality. The PDO and intermediate indicators were uncomplicated to measure, the targets were reasonable, and the RF was structured to maintain flexibility required in the project. The project maintained a modest approach of four components with community engagement cutting across the components. Key stakeholders such as the ministries responsible for land and urban development, the water services boards and municipalities were consulted throughout project preparation. The PCT was situated in the ministry responsible for housing and was responsible for FM, procurement, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and reporting.

60. **Risk assessment and mitigation measures.** The project was rated *High* which is an appropriate rating due to uncertainty over government structures and lack of experience by the selected implementing agency in Bank projects. Key risks, such as complaints from unselected municipalities or settlements and elite capture in settlements, were identified and appropriate mitigation measures put in place. Despite acknowledging the implementing agency risks, the mitigation measures were put in place were inadequate. For example, the capacity of the PCT became a recurring issue during the early years of project implementation. O&M was identified as a vital project risk, however, the identified mitigation measure of only financing investments where O&M plans are prepared did not lead to any O&M of infrastructure.

#### B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION

61. **The March 2013 elections, the first elections after the 2010 Constitution, changed the structure of government.** First, national government ministries were restructured to meet the new constitutional limit of 22 ministries, down from the previous 43. Second, the Local Government Act (Cap 265) was repealed, and the country's 175 local authorities ceased to exist, and their functions and revenues taken over by the newly established county governments. The 15 municipalities that were benefiting from the KISIP then became under the management of 14 county governments. Two of these—



Nairobi City County and Mombasa City County—manage jurisdictions identical to those of the former local authorities. However, the other 13 urban areas participating in the KISIP no longer had structures in place to plan, manage, and govern their affairs. While the Urban Areas and Cities Act (2011, amended in 2016 and 2019) provided procedures for chartering cities and municipalities and establishing urban boards, county governments struggled to nurture and develop strong urban institutions throughout the project period.

62. **The profound changes in the structure of government led to significant delays in project implementation.** The ministerial restructuring led to project implementation delays as functions, staff and responsibilities of new ministries had to be agreed upon, amongst themselves and with county governments. The 2010 constitution devolved the responsibilities for housing and urban infrastructure and services to counties, leaving the national level with a policy, regulatory, and advisory role. As a result, some county governments wanted to take over full implementation of project activities creating delays and tensions between the PCT and the new county governments. However, for most of the project period, the National Treasury had still not determined a framework to allow for donor funds to be on-granted to counties. In consideration of the length of time these challenges would take to resolve, the Bank, PCT and county governments eventually agreed to allow the project to continue using the pre-devolution implementation arrangements with close collaboration between the PCT and county governments. These changes also meant that the project design was not able to formally decentralize project activities to counties.

63. **The Mid-Term Review (MTR), aligned the project with the new devolved structures and the PDO was changed to reflect these structures.** The MTR also provided a comprehensive assessment of progress towards development objectives and implementation performance, confirmed the overall relevance of the project, and recommended changes in its objectives, key performance indicators, and design to align with the new government institutional structure. It also identified implementation challenges and recommended measures for addressing them.

64. **The Bank supervision team remained consistent through project implementation contributing to deeper client relations.** From approval to project closing, the project had five Task Team Leaders (TTLs), but most of project implementation (seven and a half years) was under two TTLs, both of whom were based in the region. The consistency allowed the TTLs to build strong client relationships and gain a deeper understanding the project. In addition, most members of the task team were locally based and were consistent throughout project implementation. This consistency allowed the Bank’s supervision team to gain the trust of the client to effectively guide them in implementing the first large-scale informal upgrading program in Kenya and worked closely with county governments and the PCT.

65. **Initial staffing and capacity issues at the PCT and county governments affected implementation.** Delays in initial implementation and disbursements were a result of: (a) the time taken to build the implementation capacity of the PCT; (b) weak capacity in the implementing agency in procurement and contract management<sup>33</sup>; (c) turnover of county project teams<sup>34</sup>; and (d) part-time assignment of PCT members to other non-project related duties. All these factors had a combined effect of delaying project implementation in the first few years. In the last five years of implementation, however, the PCT increased its team members, maintained consistency in its membership and staff were assigned to the project on full-time basis which helped to accelerate implementation and disbursement. The national project coordinator was also the same person throughout project implementation. County team members also became largely consistent as understanding of the project grew and stronger support was provided to them was provided by the enhanced PCT.

66. **Tenure regularization faced severe challenges initially but was able to reach completion.** Challenges

<sup>33</sup> Aide Memoire: KISIP ISM, May 27-June 7, 2019; KISIP ISM, June 2- 12, 2015.

<sup>34</sup> Aide Memoire: KISIP Mid-Term Review, May 19–30, 2014.



encountered in the early years was primarily weak implementation capacity. When implementation got underway, the Bank noticed that the country's rigid planning standards would, if implemented, displace high numbers of settlement residents. The Bank raised strong concerns over the high level of potential displacement caused by rigid planning standards and introduced RAP preparation into the intervention. However, the potential high compensation costs from the RAPs and strong political commitment to provide titles to informal settlement residents motivated the PCT to identify and utilize a regulatory instrument that could meet the Bank's threshold acceptable for displacement and allow the intervention to continue. The Physical Planning Act (1986) (Section 23) provided for the declaration of Special Planning Areas (SPAs) at the discretion of the national Director of Physical Planning. In SPAs, innovative approaches to planning (for example, suspending planning standards) could be explored. The project implemented 'adoptive planning' characterized by flexible planning standards that minimized displacement and disturbance to a settlement's socio-economic fabric. Implementing adoptive planning allowed the project to meet the contesting interests and demands that had arisen.

67. **Title issuance was delayed due to the emerging Safeguards considerations.** The requirement to prepare and implement RAPs before issuing titles was introduced belatedly into the project and delayed the project from handing out titles to beneficiaries. The PDO indicator measures tenure security from the first point of confirmed tenure security, thus the indicator target was met by project closing. At project closing, however, titles were yet to be distributed in some settlements as some RAPs were still undergoing Bank review and some of the RAPs already approved were still being implemented by KISIP. The delays sometimes created anxiety in some informal settlements. RAP implementation and title issuance continue under Bank supervision until the expected completion date of September 2020.

68. **Focused attention on community participation allowed the project to gain strong community acceptance, participation and support.** The SECs and the GRCs at settlement level proved to be fundamental institutions in the implementation of KISIP and provided a highly effective means through which different interest groups within the settlements were represented. The SECs served as a bridging mechanism between communities, county and national governments and mobilized the communities to participate in project activities.

69. **The centrality of community participation in the project design contributed to implementation delays and indicated that the original five-year period was unrealistic.** Meaningful engagement with communities took time resulting in long lead times in infrastructure upgrading. This process, while critical, took up to one and half years in the project as communities had to be mobilized and consultancies procured to conduct socio-economic surveys and work with communities to prioritize the choice of infrastructure. After this process, the project had to prepare settlement upgrading plans, feasibility studies and detailed designs. These multiple steps led to long lead times before infrastructure works could commence (construction of works began nearly three years into project implementation).

70. **Between July 2018 and June 2019, the Bank and the client had to pay close attention to resolve two infrastructure failures which posed severe risks to surrounding communities.** The July 2018 KISIP implementation support mission (ISM) noted that unfinished drainage works (about 5percent of the total contract) had contributed to deepening existing canyons in Kaptembwa settlement (Nakuru County) during the March-April 2018 rainy season. In Machakos, a 400m section of a road has cracked and the retaining wall to maintain the road was at risk of collapse. Safeguards risks were assessed and mitigated. With Bank concurrence, the client terminated the Nakuru works contract and a new contractor was procured by January 2019 to finish the outstanding 5 percent works. For Machakos, the project team conducted an independent investigation report to understand the cause of the failure. Mutual agreement was reached between the client and the contractor and the remedial road works were concluded by project closing.



## IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

### A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)

Rating: *Substantial*

#### M&E Design

71. The RF was initially prepared only for IDA financing and it made clear links between the PDO, project activities, data sources and responsible agencies. As specific infrastructure projects had to be first agreed upon with communities and could not be known *a priori*, the RF at design appropriately adopted a flexible approach where targets were indicative based on settlements determined for the project's first 18 months. The RF was revised during the restructuring that SIDA and AFD financing to reflect the increased scope that the additional financing would provide.

#### M&E Implementation

72. The PCT had a M&E team with overall responsibility of collating, verifying, synthesizing and storing project data. It relied on county level M&E teams whose task was to measure, collate and relay settlement level project data to the PCT. As the implementation progressed, counting became more refined and accurate as the project became better understood. Quarterly reports shared with the Bank have been consistent with findings from independent beneficiary assessment and the Banks's validation and verification exercises during ISM. Regular site visits and inspections were essential in collecting data for the M&E framework. The quarterly progress reports from the client captured project indicators and progress by site, settlement, county and infrastructure service. At project completion, the M&E team provided consistent and verifiable project data disaggregated by settlement and type of infrastructure.

#### M&E Utilization

73. The M&E framework informed project related decisions especially monitoring the progress of infrastructure works and planning and survey consultancies. It was also used for: (a) briefing ministerial policy makers/heads of departments; (b) designing Ministerial Performance Contracting regimes; and (c) reporting under the Presidential Delivery Unit and the electronic Project Monitoring Information System.

### Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E

Rating: *Substantial*

74. For an infrastructure project based on participatory approaches, designing an M&E framework requires a degree of flexibility. At design, the KISIP M&E took this requirement into consideration. The implementation and utilization of the M&E framework was consistent and informed decision making outside the project. For these reasons, the quality of the M&E is rated *Substantial*.

### B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE

#### Environmental safeguards

75. The project was classified as Category B and three policies were triggered: Environmental Assessment (OP/BP/GP 4.01), Cultural Property (OP/BP/ 4.11), and Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP/4.12). An ESMF was prepared and disclosed before commencement of the project (March 15, 2011). It was also reviewed and re-disclosed after the MTR.

76. Across project counties, environmental compliance was consistent throughout the project period. Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs) for 11 counties under component 3 were prepared and approved by the National Environmental Management Agency (NEMA). Quarries and burrow pits were rehabilitated in Eldoret, Kisumu and Naivasha and handed back to the landowners including NEMA licenses and accompanying conditions. Where incidences





of non-compliance took place, the PCT was quick to institute safeguards corrective action plans with guidance from the Bank team.

77. The project tried, though without success, to support counties and communities on SWM. KISIP identified weak SWM practices as posing significant risks to the sustainability of infrastructure investments. At project closing, many drainage networks built by the project were clogged by solid waste and wastewater as residents and counties have yet to work out a mechanism to collect solid waste and maintain the upgraded infrastructure.

78. At project closing, the resolution and closure of the five fatality cases that were related to KISIP, which took place in 2015 and 2018 were still pending. The issue was first identified by the Bank task team through a review of the September monthly progress report. During the October 2018 mission, the Bank team learned that six fatalities had occurred after requesting the client to confirm all incidents involving KISIP-related works or vehicles. A key finding in that mission was that there was local-level awareness to document and report severe injuries and fatalities to resident engineers, contractors, and law enforcement, but there was a systemic failure of reporting to KISIP high level management and to the World Bank. An action plan was developed and implemented which included developing a protocol for reporting incidences. As of ICR preparation, one fatality case was considered resolved, three of the fatality cases were in court, one with the insurance company and one still in dialogue with the contractor. The PCT committed to resolving these cases by enforcing the contract obligations until the affected families are compensated. The timelines for resolution of the cases was set to be end of August 2020. Bank supervision continues until the cases are resolved.

### **Social Safeguards**

79. A Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) was prepared and disclosed before commencement of the project (November 26, 2010). The RPF was reviewed and re-disclosed after the MTR. Under component 3, there were 30,000 project affected persons (PAPs) or about 2 percent of the total beneficiaries for infrastructure. Under component 2, there were about 18,000 PAPs, about 14 percent of total beneficiaries of tenure regularization. All displacement was in-situ (within the settlement) except for three settlements in Kericho and Mombasa (Kwa Hakatsa, Mwatate and Majengo Talai) where alternative land was required to resettle 82 households (328 PAPs) as they were living on environmentally fragile areas and could not be settled in-situ.<sup>35</sup> At the time of project closing, alternative land had been identified in Mombasa and the planning and resettlement process had commenced. Two options for alternative land were being explored in Kericho. Bank supervision will continue to ensure that the resettlement of these the PAPs is completed.

80. During the first three years of the project, the capacity of the PCT on safeguards was constrained but with close support from the Bank team, the safeguards capacity of the PCT improved. Over time, the PCT prepared and implemented numerous settlement-based RAPs, many of them commented by the Bank Safeguards Team as of good quality. The decision to conduct RAPs for tenure regularization settlements (approximately 70 settlements) midway through implementation, stretched the capacity of the PCT to prepare and implement RAPs, and on the Bank's recommendation the client procured additional Social Safeguards consultants. Due to the increased capacity, about 61 of the 70 RAPs in settlements where tenure regularization led to displacement impacts had been cleared for implementation by ICR preparation and about 40 RAPs had been implemented or nearly implemented by the client. Bank supervision continues until all outstanding RAPs are completed (expected completion date is September 2020).

81. The project's Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM) was key in ensuring PAPs were compensated, grievances addressed and promoting community participation throughout the project. The GRM was three-tiered and included the settlement-level GRCs, as well as county and national levels. From an assessment conducted on the GRCs, 'about 84% of

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<sup>35</sup> Titles will not be released until the land for the PAPs have been identified and survey of that land completed.



the GRCs were in possession of the commonly used grievance register at the time of the study, and these were noted as well kept, properly filled including details of resolution (e.g. whether cases had been resolved or not) and escalation of cases'.<sup>36</sup> The analysis of the functionality of GRCs and SECs also pointed to some lessons. First, the formation of settlement GRCs and SECs should be concurrently undertaken at the onset of the project within a settlement, as these two community-level institutions are independent of each other, though complementary. Second, to enhance their effectiveness, SECs and GRCs require (a) support in terms of office space, basic stationery, and airtime for communication; (b) improved relationships between them and works contractors.

### **Procurement**

82. By project closing, the PCT had awarded all contracts, and all contracts under IDA financing were completed or in Defects Liability Period. After the project closing date, the MTIHUUD utilized the four-month disbursement period for making payments for all eligible expenditures under the project. In total, the project managed 108 contracts with 86 percent of these complete at project closing.<sup>37</sup> The contracts that were ongoing at project closing are AFD financed.

83. In general, the procurement capacity was weak at national level. Contract management weaknesses and other related challenges affected procurement performance. For instance, there were cases of unsatisfactory performance of supervision consultants leading to prolonged and unexplained delays in the completion of works contracts and thus attracting prolongation costs for the consultant contracts ranging between 30-110 percent. Still, in some cases, the PCT took corrective action on contracts that were flagged as being at risk.

### **Financial Management**

84. Throughout the project cycle, the project complied with the Bank's financial reporting requirements. Quarterly interim financial reports (IFRs) and annual audit reports were submitted within the stipulated timelines. No material fiduciary risks were identified. For example, all audits had unqualified opinions. KISIP's FM arrangements, including FM staff, planning and budgeting and internal control procedures were appropriately maintained throughout the project. Nevertheless, the project's FY19 audit report is yet to be submitted to the Bank. Though, this is a portfolio wide challenge caused by the delay in the appointment of the Auditor General and is expected to be corrected shortly with the recent confirmation.

## **C. BANK PERFORMANCE**

### **Quality at Entry**

85. Preparation from Concept Note to Board Approval took approximately three years, cost US\$443,504 and involved 77.9 staff weeks. The cost is comparable with other informal upgrading projects in the Bank. The preparation took three years largely due to building client awareness of slum upgrading and conducting analytical work which informed project preparation.

86. Considering that more than 50 percent of Kenya's urban population lives in informal settlements, the PDO was highly relevant. Focusing on tenure security and provision of infrastructure services was a direct way to improve living and material conditions in these settlements. In general, urban development challenges are multi-faceted and complex.

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<sup>36</sup> KISIP Analysis of Functionality of GRCs and SECs, p. 12.

<sup>37</sup> Broken down as: 26 for component 1, 22 for component 2 (5 have outstanding issues), 55 for component 3 (10 have outstanding issues), 5 for component 4.



Hence, KISIP complimented other World Bank projects i.e. KMP and NAMSIP. The design was tailor-made to feed into KMP and NAMSIP with linkages such as targeting the same municipalities targeted by the KMP.

### **Quality of Supervision**

87. The World Bank undertook 17 full missions during the eight and half years of implementing KISIP. Also, on many missions, the World Bank team was accompanied by a Lead Specialist who provided strategic advice to the project team. The Bank team engaged additional specialists to help on complex emerging issues in the project i.e. road failure in Machakos. The average annual supervision cost was US\$ 297,419 and an average of 46.2 staff weeks per year. The initial changes to TTLs in the first three years of implementation did not affect the quality of supervision as the team remained largely consistent and most of the supervision (seven and a half of the eight and a half-year implementation period) was done under two TTLs. These two TTLs led the project in a commendable way and interacted with the PCT frequently to ensure progression towards the development objective.

88. The Bank proactively and flexibly worked with the government to implement the project. The missions produced candid aide memoires and implementation status reports with detailed corrective actions where necessary. Based on outcomes of supervision missions, the project was restructured four times. The MTR took project lessons and reviewed some activities in line with the changing institutional environment. The project encountered safeguards challenges, for example, preparation and compliance to instruments, and in response to these challenges, the Bank instituted numerous capacity building sessions for the client and provided hands-on support to the client in developing and implementing corrective actions. The Bank teams carried out technical missions in between formal supervision missions. Technical missions were used to ensure implementation momentum and provide hands-on support to the PCT and county project teams. As a result, the project had no major fiduciary issues and prepared and implemented more than 70 RAPs.

89. Considering the slow implementation in the first two years, the team downgraded the Implementation Progress rating to Moderately Satisfactory (MS) in April 2012 and the PDO rating to MS in December 2013. The two ratings remained MS until project closing. Even though the ratings remained MS throughout the implementation period, the project reached all its targets and surpassed some, which can be attributed to the intensity of the Bank supervision and its ability to remain adaptable and responsive to the project needs.

90. The Social Safeguards rating was downgraded to Moderately Unsatisfactory in February 2018 given the client's initial poor response to the component 2 RAP preparation process and a GRM that needed strengthening. The Environmental Safeguards rating was downgraded to Moderately Unsatisfactory in November 2018 due to the reporting lapse on fatalities. The World Bank team closely provided intensive support to the client in improving these issues by, for example (a) supporting the client to develop a protocol for fatality reporting; and (b) providing training to strengthen the GRM and improve the quality of the RAPs. By project closing, both safeguards ratings were upgraded to Moderately Satisfactory indicating the strides that the client made in improving their Safeguards capacity.

91. Sufficient transitional arrangements were put in place at project closing. The closing mission supported the client to put in place transition arrangements that ensured handover of all completed works to county governments and completion of environmental management plans such as rehabilitating burrow pits and removing debris from construction sites. At project closing, the project team had commenced exit meetings with the communities which included discussions on how to transition SECs and GRCs into other useful community development structures. Once the exit meetings are completed (after all RAPs have been implemented), a ceremony will be held to show appreciation to the work done by



the SEC and GRC members. Bank supervision continues to ensure that implementation of all outstanding RAPs under the tenure regularization component and all outstanding works under defects liability period after project closing will be concluded.

### Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance

Rating: Satisfactory

92. Considering the Bank's intensive supervision which supported the client take timely corrective actions, the proactive and flexible support to the client, and the transitional arrangements set up at closing with Bank support, Bank performance is rated *Satisfactory*.

### D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

93. **O&M of upgraded infrastructure remains a challenge.** Most counties have not yet taken up O&M and as a result there is heavy solid waste and wastewater discharge into the drains.<sup>38</sup> Communities are also dumping waste in drains, which is likely to lead to incidences of flooding. O&M has been a persistent challenge throughout the project and the MTR tried to introduce some measures though largely unsuccessful. Upgraded infrastructure under KISIP lack maintenance and some counties cannot afford electricity bills of high mast lights (US\$ 186,000 annually). Despite this, there are some isolated attempts at maintaining the infrastructure i.e. in (a) Eldoret, where the County Department of Roads has allocated budgets for O&M including for regular clearing of the drains; (b) Kitui where the County Government regularly clears and unclogs the drains; (c) Mombasa (Mkomani), where residents have taken up the role of clearing the drains and protecting the walkways and footpaths from encroachment. A permanent solution to SWM in Kenya's urban areas could enhance the sustainability of completed infrastructure.

94. **Low uptake of some upgraded infrastructure.** Despite the project upgrading key infrastructure, uptake of water and sewer connections has not been as envisaged. Three major constraints facing project beneficiaries to connect are existing bills (arrears) from previous connections, standing charges (minimum monthly charge regardless of consumption) and water rationing. Also, the use of pit latrines by most residents, water rationing, and the lack of minimal management capacity has led to suboptimal use of project financed ablution blocks.

### V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

95. **Financial and institutional sustainability needs focused attention to scale up slum-upgrading.** The KISIP intervention thus far represents only a small fraction of the total households in informal settlements in Kenya today. There are currently between 330–367 informal settlements in the 15 urban areas alone where KISIP worked and this number is growing steadily. Focus on financial capacity to continue upgrading is the main way to which governments (national and local) can continue upgrading as an integral function and a dedicated slum upgrading fund at both national and urban level is required to continue upgrading as an everyday routine. In addition, continuous capacity building is needed in key areas to ensure the implementation capacity of national and county staff deliver slum upgrading in areas of project management, procurement, FM, planning, surveying, and community mobilization. Thus, an upfront focus on identifying capacity gaps and rolling out a capacity development program on the implementing agency is vital. Such capacity enhancement process early on the project reduces implementation delays.

96. **The lessons learnt from the tenure regularization process bring out two important considerations.** First, a different approach to conventional planning and surveying. In many instances in KISIP, the morphology of the informal

<sup>38</sup> KISIP AM November 4-15, 2019.



settlements did not allow for the project interventions to conform to conventional planning standards without significant displacement. Flexible standards had to be adopted to minimize displacement and resettlement and to maintain the existing social fabric. This flexible planning has been called adoptive planning by the GoK. Such flexibility should be captured in the country's planning instruments, such as establishing SPAs which allow flexible standards and need to be applied more centrally in slum upgrading projects. Second, tenure regularization in KISIP applied primarily to informal settlements on public land, and slums on non-public land did not receive the needed resources for upgrading. Attention to these informal settlements is still needed despite the complex tenure arrangement involved. It will be important to explore innovative mechanisms to achieve tenure regularization which involve the private sector more actively.

97. **An integrated approach to informal upgrading could result in better outcomes.** In some instances, in KISIP, there was duplication of activities in settlements undergoing both tenure regularization and infrastructure upgrading, for example, conducting a socio-economic survey. Time and money could have been saved through better coordination between the two interventions in one settlement, resulting in an integrated planning approach. Secondly, the focus in KISIP was upgrading the living conditions in informal settlements by improving tenure security and infrastructure for basic services. However, rehabilitating the physical environment needs to be complemented with addressing socio-economic issues within the settlement to ensure residents can afford the upgraded services and contribute to achieving higher level socio-economic outcomes. Income-generating activities allow households to pay for upgraded services, such as water, or to improve their housing structures.

98. **Post-project maintenance of infrastructure should be addressed prior to the intervention.** In KISIP, non-maintenance of infrastructure after its upgrading was an ongoing issue identified during supervision. Discussions on the costs of operating and maintaining infrastructure and services need to take place in early stages of the project in order to establish clear institutional arrangements for O&M, O&M budget allocations and cost recovery mechanisms, and communication and sensitization activities (such as appropriate use of facilities, anti-littering campaigns, and general neighborhood hygiene). A joint approach to O&M between communities and national and county institutions would be an approach which, if supported by a budget, would increase the sustainability of the infrastructure investments.

99. **Trusted community level institutions are essential in promoting community participation.** The SECs and GRCs at settlement level were fundamental institutions in the implementation of KISIP and provided a highly effective means through which different interest groups within the settlements were represented. The SECs served as a bridging mechanism between communities, county and national governments and mobilized the communities to participate in project activities while GRCs addressed conflicts and grievances that arose during project interventions. Communities can only meaningfully engage in upgrading processes when they trust institutions and the individuals leading them. Thus, informal settlement upgrading programs must invest in a transparent process to which communities select their leadership and decide on how they want to be organized.

100. **Time needs to be allocated in the project to allow for additional financing, innovation and meaningful community engagement.** Given that the scale of the needs of informal settlements went beyond the initial project envelope, additional financing was anticipated even after the project had commenced, and the project was designed to be flexible by using a framework approach and a flexible RF. However, the additional financing did require additional time to be utilized. Implementation delays in tenure regularization were caused by the challenges and changes in approach needed to overcome the challenges in tenure regularization. The five-year project period did not factor in the time needed for this kind of innovation and trial-and-error approach to implementation or for additional financing. Similarly, the initial project period did not factor in the time needed for community engagement in infrastructure upgrading. In general, slum upgrading projects around the globe tend to have similar time challenges and consideration should be given towards



providing longer project timelines where additional financing may be anticipated, where interventions are being implemented for the first time or where community engagement is required.

101. **Focused attention to mitigate on potential negative impacts of upgrading on tenants is required.** Some gentrification of both tenants and owners was noted during project implementation. Impacts on tenants are particularly pertinent given that majority of housing in slums in Nairobi are tenant occupied. To address this potential impact in KISIP, the SEC membership had to include a tenant representative so that their voice could be included in project decisions. However, it is not clear if such representation was enough. In KENSUP, tenants were provided upgraded housing and this program's experience, and other experiences from slum upgrading projects globally, could be vital in ensuring that tenants benefit and participate meaningfully in the project.

102. **The lessons discussed in this section have been incorporated into the design of the Second Kenya Informal Settlements Improvement Project (KISIP2; Board approved on August 7, 2020).** KISIP2 will provide continuous institutional capacity development through its component 3; document experiences of developing financing mechanisms at subnational level to scale up slum upgrading; continue to use flexible planning standards to reduce displacement and address displacement impacts early; and prioritize setting county and community level structures responsible for O&M. The project will also ensure better integrated approach and will include activities to contribute towards improving the socio-economic conditions of vulnerable residents. Studies will be done to understand the impact of slum upgrading on tenants and to document experiences of upgrading slums on private land. Community institutions will continue to be a fundamental pillar of KISIP2. Finally, fiduciary mitigation measures have been introduced to ensure better contract and financial management.



**ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS**

**A. RESULTS INDICATORS**

**A.1 PDO Indicators**

**Objective/Outcome:** To improve living conditions in informal settlements in selected urban centers in selected counties

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
People benefiting from improved tenure security under component 2 of the KISIP.	Number	0.00	180000.00	100000.00	125525.00
		25-Oct-2010	25-Oct-2010	31-Jul-2018	15-Nov-2019
<b>Comments (achievements against targets):</b>					

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Direct project beneficiaries	Number	0.00	700000.00	1070000.00	1389980.00
		25-Oct-2010	25-Oct-2010	07-May-2015	15-Nov-2019
Female beneficiaries	Percentage	0.00	350000.00 19-Feb-2018	585000.00	694900.00



Comments (achievements against targets):

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
People in informal settlements provided with access to improved drainage infrastructure under KISIP	Number	0.00	200000.00	1100000.00	1000000.00
		25-Oct-2010	25-Oct-2010	31-May-2018	15-Nov-2019

Comments (achievements against targets):

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of people in urban areas provided with access to all-season roads within a 500 meter range under the project	Number	0.00	200000.00	1100000.00	1000000.00
		25-Oct-2010	25-Oct-2010	31-May-2018	15-Nov-2019

Comments (achievements against targets):

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of people in urban	Number	0.00	100000.00	162000.00	262780.00





areas provided with access to Improved Water Sources under the project		25-Oct-2010	25-Oct-2010	06-Apr-2016	15-Nov-2019
<b>Comments (achievements against targets):</b>					

**A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators**

**Component:** Component 1: Strengthening Institutions and Program Management.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Policies, frameworks, and guidelines for slum upgrading developed and adopted by the MLHUD	Number	0.00 25-Oct-2010	1.00 30-Sep-2018		1.00 15-Nov-2019
<b>Comments (achievements against targets):</b>					

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Database with slum inventory operational and accessible to the public.	Yes/No	N 25-Oct-2010	Y 30-Sep-2018		Y 15-Nov-2019



Comments (achievements against targets):

**Component:** Component 2: Enhancing Tenure Security.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Informal settlements benefiting from enhanced tenure security under KISIP.	Number	0.00 25-Oct-2010	86.00 30-Sep-2018		80.00 15-Nov-2019

Comments (achievements against targets):

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
GIS lab at the ministry upgraded and operational.	Yes/No	N 25-Oct-2010	Y 30-Sep-2018		Y 15-Nov-2019

Comments (achievements against targets):

**Component:** Component 3: Investing in Infrastructure and Service Delivery.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion



People in settlements provided with access to improved shared sanitation facilities under the KISIP.	Number	0.00	7600.00	3050.00	35000.00
		25-Oct-2010	25-Oct-2010	30-Sep-2018	15-Nov-2019
<b>Comments (achievements against targets):</b>					

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
New piped household water connections that are resulting from the project intervention	Number	0.00	4000.00	7306.00	8739.00
		25-Oct-2010	25-Oct-2010	30-Sep-2018	15-Nov-2019
<b>Comments (achievements against targets):</b>					

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Roads rehabilitated, Non-rural	Kilometers	0.00	40.00	90.20	98.28
		25-Oct-2010	25-Oct-2010	30-Sep-2018	15-Nov-2019
<b>Comments (achievements against targets):</b>					



Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
New street or security lights put into place under the KISIP.	Number	0.00	160.00	134.00	134.00
		25-Oct-2010	25-Oct-2010	30-Sep-2018	15-Nov-2019
<b>Comments (achievements against targets):</b>					

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
New Sewer connections constructed under the project	Number	0.00	200.00	4730.00	4788.00
		25-Oct-2010	25-Oct-2010	30-Sep-2018	15-Nov-2019
<b>Comments (achievements against targets):</b>					

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Drainage System Rehabilitated	Kilometers	0.00	100.00		109.21
		04-Jan-2016	30-Sep-2018	30-Sep-2018	15-Nov-2019
<b>Comments (achievements against targets):</b>					



Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Footpaths Rehabilitated	Kilometers	0.00	120.00		120.07
		04-Jan-2016	04-Jan-2016		15-Nov-2019
<b>Comments (achievements against targets):</b>					

**Component:** Component 4: Planning for Urban Growth.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Situational Analysis	Yes/No	N	N		Y
		04-Jan-2016	04-Jan-2016		15-Nov-2019
<b>Comments (achievements against targets):</b>					

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Housing Survey	Yes/No	N	N		Y
		04-Jan-2016	04-Jan-2016		15-Nov-2019
<b>Comments (achievements against targets):</b>					



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**B. KEY OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT**

<b>Objective/Outcome 1:</b> To improve living conditions in informal settlements in selected urban centers in selected counties in Kenya.	
Outcome Indicators	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. People benefiting from improved tenure security under component 2 of the KISIP</li> <li>2. Direct project beneficiaries (male/ female)</li> <li>3. People in informal settlements provided with access to improved drainage infrastructure under KISIP</li> <li>4. People in urban areas provided with access to all-season roads within a 500-meter range under the project</li> <li>5. People in urban areas provided with access to improved water sources under the project</li> </ol>
Intermediate Results Indicators	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Number of titles issued</li> <li>2. Length of new or rehabilitated storm drains</li> <li>3. Length of new or upgraded roads</li> <li>4. Number of new piped household water connections</li> <li>5. Number of new high mast lights</li> <li>6. Number of new sewer connections</li> <li>7. Length of footpaths rehabilitated</li> <li>8. Slum policies, frameworks and guidelines</li> </ol>
Key Outputs by Component (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 1)	<p><i>Component 1: Strengthening Institutions and Program Management.</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Slum inventory database</li> <li>2. Housing policies for Nairobi and Kisumu.</li> </ol> <p><i>Component 2: Enhancing Tenure Security</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. 25,105 titles</li> <li>2. Fully equipped GIS lab</li> </ol> <p><i>Component 3: Investing in Infrastructure and Service Delivery.</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. 8,739 water connections</li> <li>2. 4,788 sewer connections</li> </ol>



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|--|--|
|  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>3. 98.28 km of roads</li><li>4. 109.21 km of storm drains</li><li>5. 134 high mast lights</li><li>6. 120.07 km of footpaths</li></ul> <p><i>Component 4: Planning for urban growth</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Housing situational analysis</li><li>2. Housing survey</li></ul> |
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**ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION**

**A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Role</b>
<b>Preparation</b>	
<b>Supervision/ICR</b>	
Sheila W. Kamunyori, Abebaw Alemayehu	Task Team Leader(s)
Joel Buku Munyori, Lucie Muchekehu, Dahir Elmi Warsame	Procurement Specialist(s)
Henry Amena Amuguni	Financial Management Specialist
Wendy Schreiber Ayres	Team Member
James N. Karuiru	Team Member
Rahmoune Essalhi	Team Member
Svetlana Khvostova	Environmental Specialist
Kimberly Vilar	Social Specialist
Abdu Muwonge	Team Member
Roderick M. Babijes	Team Member
Yohannes Fisseha	Team Member
Elizabeth Wairimu Karuoya	Team Member
Maina Ephantus Githinji	Team Member
Raymond Simon Maina Kirwa	Social Specialist
Davison Muchadenyika	ICR author



**B. STAFF TIME AND COST**

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost	
	No. of staff weeks	US\$ (including travel and consultant costs)
<b>Preparation</b>		
FY09	18.825	108,219.01
FY10	19.574	116,352.91
FY11	39.285	218,932.32
FY16	6.260	8,311.21
FY17	6.525	9,168.71
<b>Total</b>	<b>90.47</b>	<b>460,984.16</b>
<b>Supervision/ICR</b>		
FY12	67.046	376,314.12
FY13	112.547	1,056,596.25
FY14	40.635	462,959.96
FY15	39.800	76,829.07
FY16	47.435	44,891.47
FY17	36.850	189,051.69
FY18	41.407	302,884.79
FY19	21.249	111,952.50
FY20	48.632	101,605.11
<b>Total</b>	<b>455.60</b>	<b>2,723,084.96</b>



**ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT**

<b>Components</b>	<b>Amount at Approval (US\$M)</b>	<b>Actual at Project Closing (US\$M)</b>	<b>Percentage of Approval (US\$M)</b>
Component 1: Strengthening Institutions and Program Management.	0	10.00	0
Component 2: Enhancing Tenure Security.	0	8.00	0
Component 3: Investing in Infrastructure and Service Delivery.	0	70.30	0
Component 4: Planning for Urban Growth.	0	4.00	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>92.30</b>	<b>0.00</b>



## ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS

1. The economic analysis conducted as part of the project completion process suggests that the proposed interventions under Component 3 were economically feasible. The following assumptions were made as part of the economic analysis:

- Valuation of costs and benefits: based on market and shadow prices;
- Appraisal period: a 20-year appraisal period is selected;
- Discount rate: a 12 percent discount rate is applied on investment in urban roads and drainage systems, and a 6 percent discount rate is applied on investment in water and sanitation services, and in floodlights;
- Standard Conversion Factor (SCF): a SCF of 0.85 is applied to the capital expenditure on roads and drainage systems to account for market price imperfections; and
- Annual operations and maintenance cost: equivalent to 3 percent of capital expenditures.

2. *Investment in urban roads and drainage systems:* This intervention constructed 98.2 km of settlement access roads, 120.07 km of footpaths, and 109.21 km of drainage canals. Beneficiaries from these interventions are estimated at roughly 744,000 individuals. The benefits derived from this intervention consist of: (i) travel time savings; (ii) travel cost savings for 2.4 percent of the beneficiaries who are estimated to own a vehicle ; (iii) reductions in vehicle operating costs; (iv) enhanced access to jobs, markets, health facilities, schools, and other services at lower cost than otherwise available (reflected in enhanced land values); (v) reduced number of days of work lost due to flooding; (vi) reduced property damage (buildings, roads, furniture, appliances, household goods); (vii) increased property values for roughly 125,000 households (based on the average national household size of 4.4 individuals); and (viii) reduced costs of illness associated with exposure to polluted and stagnant water. The net present value of this intervention was estimated at US\$158.7 million and the internal rate of return is estimated at 44 percent.

3. *Investment in water and sanitation services:* The intervention installed 59 km of sewer pipeline and 4,788 sewer connections, and 110 km of water pipeline and 8,739 water connections, as well as 21 ablution blocks. Beneficiaries from this investment are estimated at 162,000 individuals. Benefits include: (i) value of improved health outcomes; (ii) value of saved lives; and (iii) value of time saved accessing water supply. The net present value of this intervention was estimated at US\$11.2 million and the internal rate of return was estimated at 21 percent.

4. *Investment in floodlights:* The intervention installed of 134 high mast security lights. This investment is expected to benefit an estimated 743,653 individuals. Benefits of street lighting include (i) increased perception of safety; (ii) reduced road accidents; and (iii) increased ability to do business after dark. People interviewed during KISIP beneficiary analysis noted that they felt a greater sense of security at night and were now walking along streets with lights, rather than taking motorized transport to their destinations. Accidents declined, business hours had expanded and that the appearance and livability of the urban center had improved. The net



present value of this intervention was estimated at US\$40.8 million and the internal rate of return is estimated at 56 percent.

5. The sensitivity analysis performed indicates that the economic rate of return for interventions under Component 3 remain significant even when considering potential downside adjustments to the assumptions made as presented in Table 1.

**Table 1: Sensitivity Analysis**

	Roads and Drainage		WASH		Flood lights	
	NPV (US\$)	IRR	NPV (US\$)	IRR	NPV (US\$)	IRR
Costs increase by 10 percent	152.9	41.4%	10.1	18.7%	40.2	53.0%
Benefits reduce by 10 percent	137.0	41.2%	9.0	18.4%	36.1	52.6%
Benefits lag by 2 years	97.0	30.1%	6.2	13.3%	29.9	36.4%

*Source:* World Bank staff estimates.

6. The interventions identified under the project would also bear positive inter-generational externalities on the overall population. Indeed, improved health outcomes across all segments of the population and, most notably, among the youth and female populations, along with reduced time to fetch water for women which could be allocated to children attending educational facilities, would raise the human capital of the youth population, allowing the country to become more productive over time.



ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS

Para.	Borrower's comments	Recommendations
6 & 10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In the diagram on page 6 and text on page 10, change from local physical development plan (LPDP) to local physical and land use development plan (LP&amp;LUP)</li> </ul>	–
18 (65)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Please add this sentence at the end of the paragraph (65)</li> <li>"It is worth noting that during the KISIP1 conceptualization, preparation and implementation of RAPs was not envisioned under component 2".</li> </ul>	–
18 (65)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Replace Kisumu with Kericho</li> </ul>	–
56. b	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Many of the activities were under component one (infrastructure and service delivery)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Change to component three: Infrastructure and service delivery is component 3</li> </ul>
63	<p>Two sections under the paragraph</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Lack of Ministry support in procurement</li> <li>Assignment of PCT members to other duties</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>should be: inadequate support from the ministry due to weak ministerial capacity (as identified within the paragraph.) However, consultants were hired to bridge the gap.</li> <li>Most PCT staff were engaged in the project on full time except a few (for one component) early in the project who were being assigned other duties. The same essentially stopped. Similarly, there was engagement of CTAT to increase the capacity for all the components</li> </ul>
73	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>See the highlights</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The RPF was reviewed and re-disclosed after the MTR in 2014.</li> <li>Under component 3, there were approximately 9,000 projects affected persons (PAPs) (about 0.6% percent of the total beneficiaries for infrastructure).</li> <li>Under component 2, there were about 12,000 PAPs .....</li> </ul>
74	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Propose the re-wording of the paragraph as follows:</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>During the first 3 years of the project, the capacity of the PCT on safeguards progressively improved with technical support from the Bank. Over this</li> </ul>



		<p>time, the PCT prepared and implemented numerous settlement-based RAPs, especially for component 3, many of them commented by the Bank Safeguards Team as of good quality. However, the decision to conduct RAPs for component two settlements (approximately 70 settlements) midstream, stretched the capacity of the PCT to prepare and implement RAPs. With Bank support and engagement of safeguard consultants, this has improved. About 61 of the 68 RAPs in settlements where tenure regularization led to displacement impacts have been cleared for implementation (expected to be complete by September 2020). Of these, 23 RAPs had been implemented at project closing.</p>
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Additional comments

1. Para 1; It will be useful to include 2019 census figures;
2. Para 2: KENSUP not KSUP; Other policies that recognize upgrading of informal settlements include National Urban Development Policy (2018) , National Land Use Policy (2017), National Slum Upgrading and Prevention Policy (2016) National Land Policy (2009) National Housing Policy (2004,2018) -all of which provide a framework for upgrading informal settlements and preventing the emergence of new ones.
3. Para 4- the theory of change illustration/flow chart- use correct naming on first box on outputs– physical and land use plans. On the activities boxes – a key aspect was left out, that of efforts towards prevention of slums through the preparation of strategies , guidelines and policies under component 1 and 4.
4. Para 52: The correct number of workers is 26,148 NOT 26,128 on second last sentence. Consider making annotation 29 as a last sentence within para 52 for a full picture.
5. Para 55; constitution always comes first. Also consider including policies listed in 2 above
6. Para 57: On sentence that “not enough mitigation measures were put in place” should be qualified otherwise as it is it is not justified. On PCT capacity, the statement should be in reference to capacity on world bank processes and procedures NOT general as it is.
7. Para 63. Same comment on capacity as pointed out in no.6 above
8. The descriptions/write ups in para 62 and para 63 are juxtaposed. 62 is favorably described in contrast to 63. 63 also sharply contrasts achievements and outcomes in para 25-54. Suggest to pick and include some of the positives in the aide memoirs and add to 63 in the same spirit of balancing shown in para 62, 80 etc.



**ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (IF ANY)**

- 1) *Project Appraisal Document*. World Bank. February 2011.
- 2) *Financing Agreement*. World Bank. May 2011.
- 3) *Aide Memoires (various)*. World Bank. 2011–2019.
- 4) *Implementation Status Reports (various)*. World Bank. 2011–2019.
- 5) *Restructuring Papers*. World Bank. 2016, 2017, 2018.
- 6) *Beneficiary Assessment – Kenya Informal Settlements Improvement Program*. July 2018.
- 7) *Gender Analysis - Kenya Informal Settlements Improvement Program*. March 2016.
- 8) *Analysis of Functionality of Grievance Redress Committees (GRCs) and Settlement Executive Committees (SECs) Under the KISIP*. June 2020.
- 9) *Country Partnership Strategy for Kenya 2010-2013*. World Bank. April 2010.
- 10) *Country Partnership Strategy for Kenya (2014–18)*. World Bank. 2014.





## **ANNEX 7. BORROWER ICR**

### **KISIP EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The Kenya Informal Settlements Improvement Project was initiated in June 2011 with the primary development objective to improve living conditions in informal settlements in selected urban areas in 14 counties in Kenya. The project was jointly designed and implemented by the Government of Kenya in partnership with the World Bank, Agence Française de Développement (AFD) and the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida).

The project's primary beneficiaries were the informal settlements in the 15 urban areas in 14 counties of Kenya, which are: Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru/Naivasha, Uasin Gishu, Kiambu, Embu, Kitui, Machakos, Kilifi, Kakamega, Kisumu, Garissa, Kericho and Nyeri. The total cost of the project was \$165million where IDA (World Bank) contributed US\$100 million of the costs, AFD contributed US\$ 45 million, Sida contributed US\$10 million and the Government of Kenya's contribution was US\$10 million. The project was undertaken in eight years (2011-2019).

As a result of the project, 21 ablution blocks, 112.494km of water pipeline was constructed which led to 8,739 water connections; 63.048km of sewer pipeline was constructed which led to 4,788 sewer connections; 98.289 kilometers of roads were constructed to bitumen standards; 134 number 30 meter high mast security lighting were installed; 109.219km of drainage canals were constructed and 120.078km of footpaths were constructed.

The project also saw 25,440 beneficiaries from 80 informal settlements in 13 counties benefit directly from tenure through planning and survey. Some 16,456 have already been forwarded to the Lands Ministry while 7,212 are awaiting the final regularization process.

There were several changes that occurred during the implementation stage, some of which affected the outcome. The changes ranged from the implementation of the 2010 Constitution, which led to a lot of institutional changes; and with it some delays in the implementation of some aspects of the project to the extension of the project by 23 months to allow for the completion of activities financed under the program.

The project, which closed on November 30<sup>th</sup> 2019, met its objectives as it improved the living conditions and positively transformed the lives of 1,389,980 people in informal settlements. In turn, the project gave the beneficiaries back their dignity and enabled them to actively contribute to the country's social and economic growth. It was also very instrumental in contributing towards the Government and the Development partners' urbanization efforts.

From this project, a lot of lessons have been learnt over the last 8 years which will be key in ensuring that the next phase of the project will be done seamlessly in order to ensure that: more deserving areas are



covered, more lives are upgraded, access to services in informal settlements is enhanced and the residents are included in the growth agenda. This will be the only sure way of harnessing the potential that urbanization portends thus ensure sustainable development of the country.

## **1. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES**

### **A. Context at Appraisal**

- 1) Since independence, Kenya, like most African countries, has experienced rapid urbanization driven largely by increasing population growth and rural urban migration. This rapid urbanization, poor management partly explains the proliferation of sprawling, overcrowded, and impoverished informal settlements which result in poor housing and little or no infrastructure services.<sup>39</sup> It is widely acknowledged that a significant proportion of urban residents live in these underserved informal settlements. Not only is the full potential of productive and inclusive cities not being realized, the glaring inequality causes its own problems and tensions, one manifestation of which is increasing urban violence and insecurity.
- 2) This was the context within which the Kenya Informal Settlements Improvement Project (KISIP) was designed in 2011. Two years earlier in 2009, an estimated 32 per cent of Kenya's population or 12.5 million people at the time, resided in urban areas and it was projected that the number would reach 54 per cent (or 23.6 million people) by 2030. The situation at the time was compounded by a sluggish economy occasioned by the 2008 post-election violence, the global economic crisis, and a severe drought in 2009.
- 3) Acknowledging the need to directly tackle the problem of poor living conditions in slums, the government formulated a 15-year National Slum Upgrading Program that outlined interventions such as participatory planning and development, strengthening of tenure security for residents, and provision of housing and infrastructure services<sup>40</sup>. The government also allocated an annual budget of about KSh500 million (US\$6.6 million) to the program.
- 4) Additionally, the government developed the National Land Policy which for the first time in many years, recognized the need for tenure security for all Kenyans, including residents of informal settlements. The policy was approved by Parliament in December 2009 and incorporated in the 2010 Constitution, through which the Government would facilitate the regularization of existing squatter settlements found on public land for purposes of upgrading or development of those areas.
- 5) These efforts were projected to complement the government's Medium-Term Plan 2008–2013, which presented the first five-year program to implement the country's development program,

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<sup>39</sup> KISIP PAD

<sup>40</sup> *ibid*



Vision 2030 which also prioritized the improvement of urban informal settlements<sup>41</sup>. One of its flagship projects was the installation of physical and social infrastructure in slums in 20 urban areas to make them formal settlements, permit construction of permanent houses, and attract private investment.

- 6) To fulfil this vision of improving the overall functioning of cities and improve the living conditions of residents in informal settlements, the Government requested support from the World Bank for financing three projects that addressed different elements of urban development.

### ***Rationale for KISIP Project***

- 7) The Project was designed to bring basic infrastructure and services—roads, street lights, water and sanitation facilities, stormwater drains, footpaths, and others—to informal settlements and also by strengthening tenure security in informal settlements. It was anticipated that KISIP would also foster private investment in housing and in businesses.
- 8) KISIP was projected to contribute to the goals of the government’s Vision 2030 and Medium-Term Plan which outlined that rapid urbanization would henceforth be guided by a planned programme in urbanization and which would be consistent with the path of economic and social investments outlined in the development blueprint in order to change the lives of millions of Kenyans for the better.
- 9) It was also anticipated that KISIP would contribute to the equity objective of the Bank’s Country Partnership Strategy 2010–2013 by supporting the formal recognition of the rights of residents of informal settlements to occupy the land and homes in which they live, thus helping to reduce the vulnerability of residents to displacement without warning or compensation.<sup>42</sup>
- 10) Additionally, the project would further promote equity by upgrading infrastructure and services in the most underserved neighborhoods of cities, thereby helping to directly raise the quality of living conditions of Kenya’s poorest and most vulnerable citizens. Finally, KISIP would directly support the environmental agenda through its investments in water and sanitation services, solid waste management, storm water drainage, and public parks.
- 11) KISIP was second of the three programs that were designed to address different issues of urban development. The first was the Kenya Municipal Program (KMP) which approved in May 2010 and focused on strengthening the essential institutions of urban management—budgeting, financial management, participatory planning, project management, operations and maintenance, and good governance—in 15 of Kenya’s largest urban centres, while also financing investments in citywide infrastructure.

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<sup>41</sup> ibid

<sup>42</sup> CPS 2010-2013




- 12) The third is the Nairobi Metropolitan Services Project (NamSiP), which was to finance investments in infrastructure and service delivery in Kenya's capital city. Together, the three programs will comprehensively address core issues that are constraining the development potential, efficiency, equity, and competitiveness of Kenya's urban areas.

**Theory of Change:**


- 13) The project was designed and implemented to fill in some missing links and deliverables within the wider frameworks and contexts for Kenya and the global agenda. The project sought to address the effects of increasing urbanization of Kenya, which stands at 4.4% above the global average of 2.1%. There is need therefore for Kenya to address the effects of urbanization in the country so as to reduce the inherent inequalities that comes with the rapid nature of urbanization. Urbanization also has increased the poverty rates in the country and more specifically in the informal settlements and slums, like the ones in which KISIP has intervened in the past eight years. This has been necessary to install and construct social and physical infrastructure to continue service delivery in areas which have been underserved areas of Kenya. The project has installed various infrastructure which has been central to increasing access to the settlement and hence enabling the expected changes and development. These projects are line with the ideals of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Kenya Vision 2030, the New Urban Agenda (NUA) and AU agenda 2063 on promoting sustainable urban areas with adequate quality of life.
- 14) To attain the intended changes, the project had to develop measurable project activities centred majorly on improving local governance and improving service delivery for the selected 15 urban centres in the 14 counties of Kenya. These were done through outputs which were measured against the set targets and submitted through the annual, quarterly and monthly progress reports, which were buttressed by annual audit and financial annual reports. The evidence of performance included the number of infrastructure constructed – high mast lighting, ablution blocks and kilometers of infrastructure constructed – roads to bitumen standards, trunk water and sewer lines, footpaths, all of which were designed to achieve the Project Development Objectives (PDO), and which later led to the achievement of long term objectives like improving the overall competitiveness of the urban areas, improving inclusivity of the cities and enhancing the quality of life and livability of these urban areas, which in effect promotes the wider concept of enhancing the economic growth of urban areas. Under tenure regularization and planning for urban growth components, planning is and was key in improving the habitat. Surveying had the impact of providing physical marked land rights and titles which translated to enhanced social security and acted as a catalyst to invest in the improvement of structures and increase housing stock.
- 15) The diagram below illustrates the project's theory of change which describes the programme implementation and development as undertaken through KISIP.



Figure 1: Theory of Change



Conceptual framework for tenure security



Original Project Development Objective

16) The Project Development Objective (PDO) was to improve living conditions in informal settlements in selected municipalities in Kenya. This was to be achieved by improving security of tenure and investing in infrastructure based on plans developed in consultation with the community.



### **Amended Project Development Objective (PDO)**

17) To improve the living conditions in informal settlements in selected urban centres in selected counties in Kenya

### **Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators**

#### **a) Original PDO outcomes and outcome indicators**

18) There were five key PDO indicators that were outlined in the PAD and which were used to measure the success of the Project:

- (a) Direct project beneficiaries (number), of which female (percent).
- (b) People in informal settlements provided with access to improved drainage under KISIP (number).
- (c) People in informal settlements provided with access to all-season roads within a 500-meter range under KISIP (number).
- (d) People in informal settlements provided with access to improved water sources under KISIP (number).
- (e) People benefiting from improved tenure security under KISIP (number).

#### **b) Amended PDO Outcomes and Outcome indicators**

- (a) Direct project beneficiaries (number), of which female (percent).
- (b) People in informal settlements provided with access to improved drainage infrastructure under KISIP
- (c) People in informal settlements provided with access to all-season roads within a 500-meter range under KISIP
- (d) People in informal settlements provided with access to improved water sources under KISIP
- (e) People benefiting from improved tenure security under KISIP

### **The Project Components**

#### **A) Original project components**

19) There were four components which included:

- A. **Component 1: Strengthening institutions and program management (IDA US\$10.0 million).** This component was designed to support institutional strengthening and capacity building of the Ministry of Housing, the Ministry of Lands, and the selected municipalities. It would also finance the management activities associated with program implementation and establishment of a monitoring and evaluation system.



- B. **Component 2: Enhancing tenure security** (IDA US\$8.0 million). This component was to directly support implementation of the new national land policy in urban informal settlements through refinement, systematization, and scale-up of ongoing efforts to strengthen tenure security in slums.
- C. **Component 3: Investing in infrastructure and service delivery** (IDA US\$70.3 million). This component was projected to support investment in settlement infrastructure, and, where necessary, extension of trunk infrastructure to settlements.
- D. **Component 4: Planning for urban growth** (IDA US\$4.0 million). This component was to support planning and development of options that facilitate delivery of infrastructure services, land, and affordable housing for future urban population growth.

## 2. OUTCOME

### A. Relevance of PDOs

**Rating: High**

20) The development objective (PDO) remained highly relevant to the priorities of the government and development partners in addressing the challenges that come with urbanization and slum proliferation. This necessitated the preparation of the project to improve the conditions of urban life. In recognition that Kenya will have about 23.6 million people living in urban cities by 2030, the Government has demonstrated its commitment towards implementing the New Urban Agenda (NUA) in a bid to ensure that its cities can offer equal right, services and opportunities to all its citizens.

The PDO therefore underscored this commitment and puts the country in a good stead to achieve sustainable cities and communities.

### B. Achievement of the PDOs (efficacy)

**Rating: High**

21) KISIP largely achieved its objectives of improving living conditions in informal settlements in 15 urban centers within 14 selected counties of Kenya. KISIP completed implementing tenure security and investment in infrastructure and service delivery in 15 urban areas within 14 counties, forming the biggest proportion of urban areas in the country. Approximately 1,389,980 people against a project target of 1.03 million (exceeded the target by 359,980) benefitted from KISIP infrastructural interventions and tenure security which in effect transformed the living conditions in 115 informal settlements where the project operated. Of these beneficiaries, 694,990 were females and an equal number were males.



- 22) KISIP made significant contributions to improving the lives of Kenya's urban poor. 21 ablution blocks were constructed. 112 km of water pipeline laid and 8,739 water connections done. In addition, 11 elevated steel water tanks were constructed; 63.048km of sewer pipeline laid with 4,788 sewer connections made; 98.3 km of roads done to bitumen standards and 120.078km of stand-alone footpaths done. The improvement in roads and footpaths was a highly rated development in a country where only 14.3% of all road surfaces are paved. Kenya has since independence constructed 11,000km of roads and hence the 98.2 km constructed by KISIP is a 0.074% contribution towards having a paved surface for mobility and transportation of goods and services in the urban poor areas. Some 134 high mast lighting that were 30m long were installed, while 109.219km of drainage canals were constructed in the settlements. All the PDO indicators were achieved.
- 23) Land tenure regularization was undertaken in 13 counties. This comprised of planning, survey, issuance of allotment letters and titles. As a result, 80 informal settlements benefited from these interventions. 25,440 titles deeds have been earmarked for issuance in the 80 settlements with each title estimated to benefit an average of 5 persons. Additionally, 37 Registry Index Maps (RIMs) were amended, 16,456 title deeds were forwarded to the Lands Ministry while 7,212 are currently awaiting the final regularization process.

### **PDO Achievements**

This section is organized around each of the five outcomes included in the PDOs.

#### **Objective (i): Direct project beneficiaries (number), of which female (percent).**

- 24) As a result of KISIP, 1, 389,980 people benefitted from the tenure regularization and infrastructure interventions, against the target of 1,030,000. This is because some infrastructure services such as water connections, sewer connections, high mast lighting and roads targeted similar audiences. Approximately 1 million people benefitted from roads, storm water drainage, high mast floodlights and footpaths. 262,780 people are benefitting from improved water sources, against the set target of 162,000.

The project endeavored in its infrastructure and tenure options to ensure gender parity in projects. Currently, 694,990 number of females, translating to 50% of all beneficiaries are benefitting from KISIP projects, against the target of 151,100. This has been validated by socioeconomic surveys by various components.

#### **Objective (ii): People in informal settlements provided with access to improved drainage infrastructure under KISIP (Number).**





25) Access to drainage facilities were prioritized by communities in all counties owing to constant flooding and need for storm water management. Storm water drainage canals were constructed in Mombasa, Embu, Kericho, Kitui, Kisumu, Eldoret, Nakuru, Machakos, Naivasha and Nairobi. Drainage facilities including storm water drains and culverts were constructed along the access roads. These infrastructural facilities have helped avert flooding challenges experienced in counties such as Nakuru and Mombasa, improved subsurface drainage along the road carriageways, reduced runoffs in built up areas and reduced pollution associated with poor run off quality.

**PDO Outcome Indicator:** By end of the project, 109.219km of drainage systems had been constructed, against a PDO target of 100km. These have benefitted approximately 1,000,000 people in these urban areas.

**Objective (iii): People in informal settlements provided with access to all-season roads within a 500-meter range under KISIP (number)**

26) Investments in access road network consisted of settlement main access roads connecting the settlements and trunk roads, settlement roads providing access within the settlements, walkways and footpaths. By the close of the project, 98.2 km of settlement access roads were constructed against a target of 93 km; and 120.078 km of footpaths were constructed against a target of 120.0km, and both benefitted 1,000,000 people.

**Objective (iv): People in informal settlements provided with access to improved water sources under KISIP (number).**

27) Access to clean water is particularly gender responsive for women because they alleviate care giving burdens arising from limited access to water. During the project period, KISIP construction of 112.494km of water pipeline against a set target of 112.455 km and installed and metered 8,739 water connections inclusive of alterations. Other significant outputs supporting access to clean water included 11 water kiosks, yard taps, elevated water tanks and water pipelines to expand main infrastructure.

**PDO Outcome Indicator:** The 8,739 water connections were done against a PDO target of 6,000, representing 100% + 45.6% performance. Although the uptake is dependent on the willingness and ability of the consumers to pay, so far, these interventions have enabled 262,780 people to have access to water sources which are safe and clean water against a set target of 162,000 people.

21 ablution blocks were completed under the project, against the set target of 21, which have enhanced the sanitation aspects in the slums.




**Objective (v): People benefiting from improved tenure security under KISIP (number).**

- 28) Land tenure regularization was undertaken in 13 counties. This comprised of planning, survey, issuance of allotment letters and titles. As a result, 80 informal settlements benefited.

A lot was achieved under tenure security despite the lengthy process occasioned by the multiple government agencies required for the approval process. The process cuts across county government and several state departments which are governed by various legislations that must be adhered to in order to end up with documents that meets the threshold of a good title. The legislations give standards, guidelines, procedures and processes of achieving the objective of conferring rights to land on which the beneficiaries' structures are erected. Planning of the settlements was preceded by comprehensive community sensitization followed by preparation of base maps, physical mapping and socio-economic surveys. Analyzed data from these activities were used to prepare local physical and land use development plans in which all stakeholders participated and adopted. Some of the initial plans were processed through the repealed Physical Planning Act CAP 286, where the Cabinet Secretary Ministry of Lands and Physical Planning was the approving authority. The current plans were processed through the Physical and Land Use Planning Act 2019. Cadastral survey were thereafter carried out under the Survey Act Cap 299, and this provided for the physical demarcation of rights, preparation and approval of cadastral maps. The final list of beneficiaries was prepared and adopted by all the beneficiaries before being forwarded to KISIP. These documents were thereafter forwarded to Ministry of Lands for preparation of titles under the Land Registration Act, 2012. Resettlement Action Plans were also prepared in response to the WB OP 4.12 – involuntary resettlement to identify and laid out redress mechanisms for persons who were negatively affected by the project. The figure below illustrates the tenure regularization process.



Figure 2: tenure regularization process





**PDO Outcome Indicator:** KISIP undertook preparation of settlement-level development plans, surveys, registry index maps. Approximately 25,440 titles have been earmarked for issuance in the 80 settlements against an initial target of 83 as 3 settlements were dropped due to a myriad of court cases and reasons beyond the project.

29) **Intermediate Outcomes**

**a) Informal settlements benefiting from enhanced tenure security under KISIP. (Number, Custom) 80** out of a target of 83.

**b) GIS lab at the ministry upgraded and operational. (Yes/No, Custom) yes operational**

**c) People in settlements provided with access to improved shared sanitation facilities under the KISIP. (Number, Custom) 35,000** out of a target of 3,030. PDO target for people in settlements provided with access to improved shared sanitation facilities under KISIP was 3030. Each ablution block at a school serves about 1000 people, and each of the community ablution blocks is estimated to serve 2,000 people. Seven (7) blocks are in schools while 14 are in settlements  $(7 \times 1000) + (14 \times 2000) = 35,000$ .

PDO Target was therefore achieved since those in busy marketplaces are likely to serve more people.

**d) Policies, frameworks, and guidelines for slum upgrading developed and adopted by the MLHUD (Number, Custom) 1** policies among others, including preparation and development of Slum Upgrading and Prevention Policy and the Slum Upgrading and Prevention Bill currently being reviewed.

**e) Database with slum inventory operational and accessible to the public. (Yes/No, Custom) Yes,** KISIP data base incorporated with the Slum Upgrading department data, which has documented up to 500 slums and informal settlements in Kenya.

**f) New piped household water connections that are resulting from the project intervention (Number, Core) 8,739** out of a target of 6,000 connections.

**g) Roads rehabilitated, Non-rural (Kilometers, Core) 98.289** out of a target of 93 km.

**h) New street or security lights put into place under the KISIP. (Number, Custom) 134** number 30 high mast security lighting out of a target of 134.

**i) New Sewer connections constructed under the project (Number, Custom) 4,788** out of a target of **4,600**

**j) Drainage System Rehabilitated (Kilometers, Custom) 109.219** out of a target of 100 km

**k) Footpaths Rehabilitated (Kilometers, Custom) 120 km** out of a target of 120 km.

**l) Situational Analysis (Yes/No, Custom) Yes**



- Situation Analysis Study undertaken in 15 municipalities to identify physical characteristics of informal settlements and their conditions to assist in the selection and phasing of informal settlements;
- Qualitative Housing Survey: Undertaken in informal settlements in Nairobi, Nakuru, Kisumu and Mombasa. The study includes the current status of housing, the obstacles, access to decent, affordable housing, and recommendations on how their housing status can be improved;

**m) Housing Survey (Yes/No, Custom)** Yes Housing policies for Mombasa, Nairobi and Kisumu counties were also developed.

**C. Project Efficiency**

Rating: High rating

***Capacity Building / Institutional Strengthening (100% complete).***

30) Under component one, the project was to undertake the capacity building of the implementing agencies starting with the participating counties and Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDA's).

- a) Capacity building was undertaken to facilitate project implementation. Key among the achievements included:
- Training: 1000 officers from National and County governments were trained in various critical fields such as project management.
  - 15 double cabin vehicles, one for each of the 15 Municipalities and Office equipment and furniture were provided to participating municipalities (counties).
  - GIS equipment (hardware and software) were upgraded/installed in the Ministry and vehicles and office furniture for national team.

***Effective community participation***

31) KISIP started the projects by forming Settlement Executive Committees (SEC), which had 18 representatives from various interest groups including: landlords, tenants, youth, persons living with disability, religious leadership (Christian/Muslim), NGO's and CBO's representatives; and three ex-officio members namely: local chiefs, Ward administrators and Member of County Assembly (MCA's). There were also the Grievance Redress Committees (GRC's), with five members:- two from SEC and three others. These representatives enabled effective community participation throughout the project lifecycle. The communities were involved in the prioritization and selection of the most viable project components in each settlement. These two groups of community representation further enhanced high levels of community awareness and participation which meant that the community



voice was heard and incorporated in the development efforts of the settlements. This intentional community engagement resulted in community driven investments and helped minimize project risks that are associated with low participation and capacity of communities to drive their own development agenda. Over 130 Settlement Executive committees were formed through the project for both tenure and infrastructure works.

### **County/Municipal Participation**

32) The municipalities and later counties participated throughout the project implementation period by appointing Municipal/County Project Core Teams (MPCTs/CPCTs) who mirrored the team at the National level and comprised the component heads and teams as and in line with the national team. They had Monitoring and Evaluation officers, Environmental and Social Safeguards officers, planners/surveyors, engineers and Community Development Officers who assisted in the project implementation and linking up with KISIP PCT. The project commenced under the Municipal arrangements in 2011 and once the counties came on board in 2013, they were brought on board through adequate consultations and collaboration. Counties were involved in the designing, implementing and evaluation of projects. Also in the resolution of project related issues like wayleaves acquisitions, community mobilization, environmental management, monitoring of the implementation of the Environmental Management Plans (EMPs) and also coordination with the water service boards. In tenure regularization process, counties played a key role of validation of lists of beneficiaries and approval of plans.

### **Effective Social and Environmental Safeguards**

33) The project developed and implemented an effective Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF). This facilitated the resettlement of Project Affected Persons (PAPs) including resettlement of structures and businesses. Compliance with the environmental policies and concerns were addressed through Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs), which further had the provisions for an effective Environmental Management Plans (EMP) to ensure sustainability of the KISIP project. The project prepared 102 Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs) covering both infrastructure and tenure security and implemented 81 RAPs. The remaining 21 are planned to be implemented within the period 2020-2021 FY. 35 ESIA's were prepared and implemented for the infrastructure projects and 3 more are pending approvals for the infrastructure projects. This resulted in clear wayleaves and project development corridors which ensured the sustainability of the projects, alongside the environmental protection and management of ecologically sensitive areas.



### 3. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME

#### A. Key Factors during Preparation

34) The project's preparation benefited greatly from valuable input that was received from various ministries including Treasury (then known as Ministry of Finance), Ministry of Local Government, Housing, Lands, Environment as well as the Attorney General's office. Municipalities and communities' contribution was also notable during the design particularly in the identification of settlements and prioritizing interventions.

Being second of the three urban development programs that the Government had requested support with, KISIP's design also benefited from the extensive analysis of urban dynamics and institutional and infrastructure gaps and on lessons learned from the Kenya Municipal Program (KMP). The wealth of experience brought on board by the two major partners - AFD and Sida who are major supporters of urban development and who agreed to partner with the Bank to jointly prepare and co-finance the project through a single framework was also crucial.

#### B. Key Factors During Implementation

35) In a bid to bring basic services closer to the citizens, the Kenyan Constitution provided for decentralization of resources and responsibilities from the national government to county governments in 2011. This led to a lot of institutional changes which included transferring of urban areas management functions to the newly created county governments.

36) The PDO was revised slightly to reflect this change with the amended PDO being, *"to improve living conditions in informal settlements in selected urban centers in selected counties in Kenya"*.

37) Although KISIP has consistently remained under the housing department, there have been a lot of changes made in and under ministries where the Housing Department has been anchored. Initially, Housing was a standalone ministry but was merged into the Ministry of Lands and Housing. Currently, the project implementation task is specifically undertaken by the State Department for Housing and Urban Development which is under the Ministry of Transport, Infrastructure, Housing and Urban Development (MTHUD) docket. The department collaborated with other agencies like the Attorney General's office, Ministry of Finance, National Land Commission (NLC), Ministry of Lands and Physical Planning (MoLPP), National Environment Management Authority (NEMA), Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, Ministry of Mining, Ministry of Water and Irrigation, and Water Services Boards in various stages of the project implementation.



- 38) As part of the restructuring, changes were made to the Results Framework to reflect what the project would actually achieve.
- 39) According to the Restructuring Paper of 2016, the outcome target for people directly receiving ownership documents was reduced to 25,000 due to slow progress in the distribution of ownership documents to residents of informal settlements. This was necessitated by the fact that KISIP did not have control over the approval of the survey plans and therefore could not issue ownership documents until the approvals were granted. The reduction of the proposed target of people benefiting from enhanced tenure security, was however not expected to prevent the project from achieving its objectives, as the number of people benefiting from improved infrastructure and services increased from 200,000 listed in the Project Appraisal Document stage to 1 million.<sup>43</sup>
- 40) The framework structure of the original project design meant that infrastructure works under the project would be designed and constructed during implementation which meant that the original five-year implementation period was unrealistic. There were therefore significant changes to the timelines which saw the project’s closing date extended by 23months from the initial close date of June 30, 2016 in order to facilitate the completion of the ongoing projects, the revision of disbursement arrangements to reflect the approval of US\$ 40 million additional financing from AFD44 and the utilization of US\$ 8.3 million undisbursed funds from Sida.
- 41) The restructuring of the project on August 31, 2016 helped to effect the time extension, the modification in the Results Framework and change in the loans and disbursement framework of the project. Although the PDO and components were not revised, there were changes made to the Results Framework with some adjustments to the baseline and targets indicators which aided the implementation process. In May 2018, the project received a further 18 months’ extension which further pushed the close date to be 30th November, 2019. A summary of the project timelines is shown in the figure below.

*Figure 3: Significant Project Timelines*

Bank Approval Date: 24-Mar-2011	Effectiveness Date: 30-Jun-2011
Planned Mid Term Review Date: 28-Feb 2014	Actual Mid-Term Review Date: 19-May-2014
Original Closing date: 30-June 2016	Revised Closing Date: May 31 2018
Actual Closing Date: November 30 2019	

<sup>43</sup> Results Framework and Monitoring

<sup>44</sup> Restructuring Paper 2016





**C. Other changes**

- 42) Severe disbursement constraints hampered the progress of implementation. KISIP was expected to close on May 31, 2018, and as such no budget line for the project was included in the national budget. After significant delay, the Authority to Incur Expenses which would allow the project to incur expenses pending regularization during the Supplementary Budget was received by the Project on November 7, 2018. The request had been with National Treasury since July 2018 and no disbursement had been made since July 2018 which resulted in delaying activities and non-payment of contractors, among others.
- 43) Submission and clearance of Component 2 RAPs remained on a critical path. Delays in the preparation of RAPs/ARAPs for Bank clearance and a drawn-out Bank clearance process often held the facilitation, relocation and issuance of titles in Component 2 settlements.
- 44) Following the first confirmed case of Covid-19 in the country in March 2020, the Government swung into action and implemented unprecedented containment measures aimed at reducing the spread of the virus. However, these measures had an immediate negative impact on the economy which in turn affected many households' abilities to meet their basic needs. To alleviate the suffering of the most vulnerable in informal settlements, the Government designed and implemented a social protection program dubbed the National Hygiene Program (NHP), which had the twin objective of ensuring clean environments and putting money in the pockets of the youth. Using funds redirected from KISIP, the Government launched Phase 1A of the labor-intensive work program in the 8 counties of Nairobi, Mombasa, Kiambu, Nakuru, Kisumu, Kilifi, Kwale, and Mandera. A total of 27 informal settlements in these counties were earmarked for the pilot phase of the program and saw 29,148 youth enlisted and earned a daily wage of Kshs600 on average.
- 45) KISIP's extensive expertise, knowledge and technical know-how on informal settlements upgrading interventions came in handy in the roll out of the program that is popularly known as 'Kazi Mtaani'. Adherence to social and environmental safeguards was reinforced during the execution of the program.
- 46) The program recorded positive and transformational social and economic impact. It not only plugged income losses for those involved and their families but spurred the local economies of the beneficiary areas. Desperation levels reduced significantly as did crime and drug abuse cases as youth were actively and productively engaged. Clean environs that helped keep Covid-19 transmissions at bay were also a notable result of the program. Owing to this success and impact, there were calls to



extend the program beyond the initial 22 days earmarked in Phase 1A. The continuation of Phase 1B that was financed by the Government therefore kicked off from June 2nd to June 30th 2020.<sup>45</sup>

## **D. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME**

### **A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)**

**Rating: Substantial**

**M&E Design**

- 47) The KISIP M/E system was crafted in a way that ensured timely generation of required, timely and relevant feedback on the projects implementation progress and achievement of expected outcomes. Monitoring and evaluation took place at the settlement, county and national level as per the indicators for tenure enhancement, infrastructure investments and service delivery, the community participation process, environmental and social safeguards process and the overall public participation, including complaints and areas of correction. These indicators are as elaborated in the Results Framework (RF) see annex.
- 48) **Overall, the quality of M&E was substantial.** The M&E system as designed and implemented was more than sufficient to assess the achievement of the objectives and to test the links in the results chain. M&E findings were disseminated and used to inform the direction of the project.
- 49) **Implementation:** KISIP worked closely with the County teams which mirrored the national PCT in all implementation phases. The County teams comprised a KISIP County Coordinator, component heads and other experts including Social Safeguards Teams who monitored social safeguards and enhanced project monitoring using the KISIP Results Framework.
- 50) **Utilization:** The project had an M&E team which coordinated collection of project implementation data. The data was utilized throughout the project period to track implementation and performance of the project by providing actual status against the set targets both quarterly and annually. The actual results in any reporting period was used to show areas of improvements, a case in point being water and sewer connections where M&E results of underperformance prompted the involvement of water service providers to improve connections. Pro-poor policy was activated thus enhancing connectivity.

### **B. Environmental, Social, and Fiduciary Compliance**

#### **1. Environmental and social safeguards**

**Rating: Substantial**

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<sup>45</sup> Phase 2 of the program will start in July 2020 following the allocation of Ksh10billion in the financial budget. This phase is expected to run for 6 months.



- 51) In line with the World Bank Operational Safeguard Policies, KISIP was designed to ensure that environmental and social impacts were adequately identified, analyzed, evaluated for their significance, and avoided or appropriately mitigated in all its components and in particular for infrastructure investments, and tenure regularization (planning and survey). To achieve this, KISIP had an Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) and Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) whose key objectives were to provide a framework for systematic and effective identification and management of environmental and social issues for KISIP. The ESMF provided guidance on integrating of environmental issues into project design and implementation; while the RPF provided guidance on mitigating the likely impacts associated with land acquisition and displacement. The World Bank was heavily involved in the implementation of the Environmental and Social Safeguards through granting no objections, RAP clearances and other advisories, including training of consultants and contractors.
- 52) The ESMF/RPF formed part of the financing agreement between the World Bank and the Government of Kenya. Under the financing agreement, KISIP had obligations to:
- a) Implement the ESMF and RPF in a manner satisfactory to the Bank and Government of Kenya frameworks
  - b) Carry out environmental and social assessments and implement EMPs and RAPs
  - c) Maintain policies and procedures adequate for monitoring the implementation of the ESMF and RPF
  - d) Ensure public consultations and disclosure
  - e) Ensure all services under the project deliver products that are consistent with social and environmental safeguards
- 53) Despite the conflict between the Bank's safeguards policies and Laws of Kenya mainly on compensation and dealing with public land, the project fully adhered to and complied with all these policy requirements.

***Component 2: Enhancing tenure security.***

As part of enhancing planning and tenure security in informal settlements, the planning and survey work under Component 2 was projected to affect households that were on newly planned access roads, or in areas demarcated through the planning process for other public uses. Therefore, the planning and survey work triggered the Operational Policy (OP) 4.12 of the World Bank on Involuntary Resettlement. Consequently, the Project engaged consultants to develop Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs) to address displacement and relocation impacts. The RAPs included a robust census with clearly identified list of Project Affected Persons (PAPs), and their entitlements. Majority of these RAPs were cleared by the Bank for implementation.



***Component 3: Investing in infrastructure and service delivery.***

Under Component 3, the project financed infrastructure projects in the following areas: Roads (including foot and bike paths), storm water drainage, vending platforms, solid waste management, water supply and sanitation, high mast lighting, and open spaces and public parks. The implementation of these interventions had potentially negative impacts on the environment, and could result in displacement of people, assets, and livelihoods. They hence triggered the World Bank’s Operational Policy 4.01 on environmental Assessment, and Operational Policy 4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement. This necessitated the preparation and implementation of Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIAs) and Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs). ESIAs and RAPs under this component were prepared, cleared by the World Bank and implemented.

**2. Compliance with the project’s financial management procedures was satisfactory.**

54) KISIP was compliant with the Bank’s financial reporting requirements with quarterly IFR’s and annual audits reports being submitted within the stipulated timelines. No material fiduciary risks were identified. The project did not have any audit issues and consistently received unqualified audit opinion over the financial audits by the Office of the Auditor General.

**3. Compliance with the project’s procurement procedure was moderately satisfactory.**

55) Understanding the procurement processes for KISIP was critical. The Procurement Team ensured that World Bank Regulations were followed. Contract and Tender documents were also produced as per the Bank’s regulations. This ensured that there were very minimal complaints from bidders during the bidding processes.

In addition, the project worked with the World Bank in obtaining no objections in making key decisions of the project.

The Bank should also avail more learning opportunities such as STEP and other courses, to the Procurement Team to enable them be more efficient while carrying out their duties

**C. Bank Performance**

**Rating: Satisfactory**

**Quality at Entry**

56) The Bank performed well in project identification, preparation, and appraisal of KISIP. At the time of presentation to the Board, the relevant tools and documents had been prepared e.g Project Appraisal document (PAD), RPF, ESMF, and Project Operations Manual (POM) to guide the project kick off.

**Quality of Supervision**



57) Bank performance in supervision was satisfactory. Supervision was consistent throughout the project implementation. The Bank had a Task Team, with a Task Team Leader (TTL), who supported the project through support missions, Aide memoir releases, granting No Objections and capacity building through technical guidance and interactions.

**D. Risk to Development Outcome**

58) KISIP, having met its objective of improving the livelihoods of people living in informal settlements, has become a stepping stone to more interventions in such neighborhoods. It has led to the request for such interventions in all the counties hence the preparation for a KISIP 2. Its interventions in 115 settlements has also provided a realistic support to the National Slum Upgrading and Prevention Policy.

**E. Evaluation of the Borrower's Own Performance during the preparation and implementation of the operation**

**Government performance rating: Satisfactory**

59) The government's performance in implementation was rated as high owing to the completion rates of tenure and infrastructure projects with a weighted average of 97% (Infrastructure has been completed up to 99% while land tenure has been completed up to 94%, which gives a total of 193 divided by 2 = 96.2 = 97%).

**i. During the project preparation**

60) The Government performance during the project preparation has been rated as high. The Government was able to assemble the Project Coordinating team (PCT) that prepared the various documents for project implementation. The team consisted of the National Coordinator, Deputy Coordinator, engineers, planners, surveyors, social safeguards experts, M&E, community development, procurement and finance teams. It was able to liaise with the municipalities and later the counties in the project preparation, site and settlements identification, preparation of environmental plans and their implementation, community mobilization and their participation in prioritization of the projects to be undertaken.

**ii. During implementation of the project**

61) During the project implementation, the Government scored a high rating as it performed well in the implementation of its roles and responsibilities as assigned in the PAD and the project financing documents. It was also able to navigate the transition from municipalities to counties, bearing in mind that counties felt that the agreements had been entered into by previous entities which they felt was not participatory enough. It participated in the restructuring of the results frameworks.



**iii. Operations of the project**

- 62) During the project operations, the team scored a high rating for being able to complete about 96% of the planned activities on time and also handing over the completed projects to the counties. The handed over projects are operational and have been beneficial to the communities and fulfilling the aspirations that were intended from the development of the project.
- 63) Despite the delays occasioned by fund disbursements and challenges posed by capacity constraints, SDHUD managed to complete or substantially complete all works.
- 64) Where there were resourcing gaps that initially compromised the quality of works, the PCT facilitated the transfer of staff from other ministries and government departments and was also able to procure relevant experts who supported to address the capacity constraints and enabled the project to deliver within the stipulated timelines.

**E. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

- 65) KISIP adopted a robust, well-functioning bottoms-up approach in community engagement that ensured that the host communities were actively and deliberately involved in planning and execution of projects. This was a game-changer in the project and leads to the conclusion that intentional and well-planned community engagement in entire project cycle ensures project ownership, community empowerment and grievance resolution. It is also a great contributor in crime and violence mapping and the development of possible solutions. The weakness at first was the reliance on the county teams to handle issues of the communities, which resulted in many complaints at the beginning. This was resolved by having the National team handle the communities in the counties, implementation of community development officers training and also the monthly community meetings in the counties.
- 66) In several cases, there was a lack of compliance with contract conditions for both works and consultancies as well as weak management of supervision consultancies. The weakness was established to be the disengagement of the county engineering teams in the contract preparation, award, implementation and evaluation. This was resolved by entrenching the participation of the county engineering teams in the project preparation, award, implementation and evaluation of projects. For future projects, it would be prudent to strengthen the procurement capacity for close monitoring and evaluation of the project in order to improve the procurement performance. In addition, holding briefing meetings with consultants prior to engagements and putting in place a supervision calendar for the consultancy can lead to a more proactive contract management and a more realistic planning and feasibility stage of the project.



- 67) The project missed an opportunity to enjoy the full benefit of a high visibility communications campaign right from the commencement stage. The weakness was exhibited by situations where the communities were not adequately informed of the projects that were being implemented under KISIP and could therefore not differentiate between those done under other projects. In some cases, this resulted in complaints about other projects being directed at KISIP. This was addressed by engaging a communications consultant, although it was not actualized in good time. The key take out is that communications is a critical tool for not only elevating the visibility of KISIP but is also a powerful tool for minimizing risks and supporting the success of a project. As such, it should be incorporated from the initial stages in order for the project to derive maximum value.
- 68) Deliberate and effective stakeholder engagement is critical to a project success. Despite having a diverse and complex stakeholder universe that was made up of internal and external actors, KISIP made a deliberate effort to cultivate and foster relationships with new and existing allies all of whom worked seamlessly in the planning and execution and delivery of the project. The relationships were based on trust and mutual respect where each of the players' voices and interests were heard and accommodated. This effective engagement delivered great outcomes that not only directly and positively impacted the lives of nearly 1.4 million people who otherwise felt neglected but empowered them to contribute to the country's social and economic growth. The weaknesses exhibited in the stakeholder management has been that not all of them have been mapped and engaged as it should be. KISIP attempted to engage the visible ones but the silent majority may have been left out.
- 69) Innovative approaches that provide tailor-fit solutions to different demographics in the urban areas can deliver tangible social and economic benefits and sustainable development in these settlements. This is especially the case if these approaches are complemented by the right partnerships, strong commitments and conducive working environments. The weakness of the project was that it did not create enough room for innovative solutions for infrastructure and land tenure delivery, but this was more constrained by the implementation framework and government regulations. Some innovations were attempted like incorporation of the Council of Governors, which may need to be strengthened in the future. By adopting a bottoms-up, rather than a top-bottom approach to infrastructure upgrading and tenure regularization, KISIP ensured that the funds were spent in the priority areas identified by the residents - be it in high mast lighting, roads, sewerage and so on, while unlocking property values and creating an environment for better formalized businesses.
- 70) In conclusion, the project is a success despite the many challenges that it faced. From the transition from municipalities to counties, and the navigation on the enhanced water and sewer connections through close collaborations and meetings with the water service providers. All the objectives of the project were met and some exceeded the targets set. The benefits were realized for the intended beneficiaries which includes: Increased accessibility, enhanced security, improved drainage systems,



improved livability and improved access to water and sanitation facilities, which have been a missing link in informal settlements and slums.





**COMMUNICATIONS LINKS**

The links for various communication outputs are shared below:

1. Thought leadership/Opinion Editorial (OpEd) coverage
2. Media coverage
3. National Hygiene Program

**THOUGHT LEADERSHIP/OPINION EDITORIAL (OPED) COVERAGE**

**Summary of OpEd coverage on KISIP from June 2019 to date**

DATE	MEDIA	TITLE	SUMMARY OF THE CONTENT
<b>PRINT &amp; ONLINE</b>			
12.07.19	The People Daily	Public participation crucial for projects success	<i>Every now and then, the country is treated to dramatic scenes where communities clash with project implementers over resources. The standoffs threaten to negatively impact operations or derail the start of the projects...</i>
14.07.19	Business Daily (online)	Tackling garbage problem key to slums upgrade	<i>Basic sanitation remains a key challenge to millions of Kenyans living in informal settlements. With at least 56 percent of the country’s population living in such settlements, according to projections by the UN-Habitat, providing basic amenities to them is a key part of the ongoing national dialogue on inclusive and sustainable growth...</i>
15.07.19	Business Daily	Tackling garbage problem key to slums upgrade	<i>Basic sanitation remains a key challenge to millions of Kenyans living in informal settlements. With at least 56 percent of the country’s population living in such settlements, according to projections by the UN-Habitat, providing basic amenities to them is a key part of the ongoing national dialogue on inclusive and sustainable growth...</i>
15.07.19	Capital Blog	All-inclusive communities’ participation must be adopted for projects to succeed	<i>Every now and then, the country is treated to dramatic scenes where communities clash with project implementers over resources. The standoffs threaten to negatively impact operations or derail the start of the projects...</i>
17.07.19	Capital Blog	We must tackle the Garbage crisis in the slums	<i>Basic sanitation remains a key challenge to millions of Kenyans living in informal settlements. With at least 56 percent of the country’s population living in such</i>



			<i>settlements, according to projections by the UN-Habitat, providing basic amenities to them is a key part of the ongoing national dialogue on inclusive and sustainable growth...</i>
30.07.19	The Standard	Tackling garbage problem is critical to success of slum upgrading projects	<i>Basic sanitation or lack of it is among a myriad of challenges facing millions of Kenyans living in informal settlements. Projections by UN-Habitat show 56 per cent of Kenyans live in informal settlements...</i>
21.08.19	Business Daily (online)	Reducing water cost for slum households	<i>Imagine having to choose between buying food, paying house rent or servicing water and sewerage connection fees. All these are essential, but lack of money means you can only forgo some. Yet, this is the kind of dilemma facing thousands of poor people living in informal settlements across Kenya...</i>
22.08.19	The People Daily	Towards sustainable water provision in slums	<i>Imagine having to choose between buying food, paying rent or servicing water and sewerage connection fees. All these are essential, but lack of money means you can forgo some. Yet, this is the kind of dilemma facing thousands of poor people living in informal settlements across the country...</i>
22.08.19	Capital FM Blog	Affordability key to increasing water and sewerage connectivity in informal settlements	<i>Imagine having to choose between buying food, paying house rent or servicing water and sewerage connection fees. All these are essential, but lack of money means you can only forgo some. Yet, this is the kind of dilemma facing thousands of poor people living in informal settlements across Kenya...</i>
18.09.19	The People Daily (online)	Land tenure security initiatives changing face of slums	<i>The wanting state that defines informal settlements in Kenya catches the eye. The settlements are more often than not characterised by poor sanitation, poor waste management and inadequate housing among others. This is usually a stark difference to other urban spaces with relative planning and service provision...</i>
18.09.19	Business Daily (online)	Secure land tenure key to transforming slums	<i>The wanting state that defines informal settlements in Kenya catches the eye. The settlements are more often than not characterised by poor sanitation, poor waste management and inadequate housing among others. This is usually a stark difference to other urban spaces with relative planning and service provision...</i>
28.09.19	Capital Blog	Kenya's informal settlements reaping big from high mast lightings	<i>Try figure out a scenario where you are routinely forced to be indoors before nightfall because your neighborhood isn't lit and there is no socio-economic activity taking place outside. This can be quite frustrating, isn't it? Unfortunately, thousands of households in informal settlements across Kenya have had to</i>



			<i>endure this is kind of infuriating reality for many decades...</i>
01.10.19	Daily Nation (online)	Trust lighting to improve life in slums	<i>For decades, thousands of households in informal settlements have been routinely forced to be indoors by nightfall since their neighbourhood is not lit and, therefore, there is no socio-economic activity outside then...</i>
08.10.19	My Gov	Respite for slum dwellers as high mast lights reduce crime	<i>A couple of years ago, informal settlements in Nairobi and other major towns in the country were dark and highly insecure. One would never dare venture into them after dusk. Muggings, rape and house break-ins were common occurrences in the informal settlements, popularly known as slums...</i>
17.10.19	The Standard (online)	<i>High mast slum lighting has brightened up lives</i>	<i>Try to figure out a scenario where you are routinely forced to be doors before nightfall because your neighbourhood is not lit. This can be quite frustrating, isn't it? Unfortunately, thousands of households in informal settlements across Kenya have had to endure this reality for many decades</i>
27.01.20	Business Daily online	<i>Teamwork that community projects require to succeed</i>	<i>Picture kicking-off a multi-million-shilling project then getting stuck midway because you forgot to bring on board expert hands to tackle certain key components. Or worse, implementing a project to completion only to have low or zero utilisation because your would-be beneficiaries saw no value in it.</i>
27.01.20	The People Daily online	<i>Stakeholder engagement key to projects success</i>	<i>Kenyans have in the recent past lost billions of shillings to stalled government projects, while some never take off at all.</i>
27.01.20	Taalamu online	<i>Teamwork that community projects require to succeed</i>	<i>Picture kicking-off a multi-million-shilling project then getting stuck midway because you forgot to bring on board expert hands to tackle certain key components. Or worse, implementing a project to completion only to have low or zero utilisation because your would-be beneficiaries saw no value in it.</i>

**COVERAGE –MEDIA ARTICLES**

**Summary of media articles on KISIP from August 2019 to date**

DATE	MEDIA	TITLE	SUMMARY OF THE CONTENT
<b>PRINT &amp; ONLINE</b>			
08.08.2019	china.org.cn, (Chinese News Agency)	Improved infrastructure betters lives, creates new opportunities in Kenyan slums	<i>A recently built tarmac road stretches through New Embakasi, an informal settlement on the east of Kenya's capital, Nairobi. Months ago, at the place where the tarmac sits, there was an earth road, full of potholes and covered with filth and dirty water. Residents had to "hop, skip and jump" as they used the key road, with children being the worst affected, especially when it rained. Now, however, the tarmac road constructed in a project by the World Bank and the</i>



			<i>Kenyan government and other partners, has transformed the slum, improving the general welfare of the residents and economic activities. Lining both sides of the road are floodlights that have improved security in the slum...</i>
08.09.19	CRJ online	Miundombinu bora waboresha maisha na kutoa fursa mpya katika maskani ya watu maskini nchini Kenya	<i>Barabara ya lami iliyojengwa hivi karibuni chini ya mradi moja uliozinduliwa na Benki ya Dunia, serikali ya Kenya pamoja na wenzi wengine katika makazi yasiyo rasmi ya New Embakasi, mashariki mwa Nairobi, mji mkuu wa Kenya, imebadilisha maskani ya watu maskini, kuboresha huduma za kijamii kwa wakazi wa huko na shughuli za kiuchumi...</i>
05.11.19	KNA online	<i>Sh.487 Million KISIP Programme Transforms Informal Settlements</i>	<i>The Kenya Government and the World Bank have spent Sh.487 million on the Kenya Informal Sector Improvement Programme (KISIP) in three informal settlements in Malindi Town...</i>
20.11.19	The Star online	<i>Land prices up in Kilifi after roads, electricity projects completed</i>	<i>The upgrade of roads, drainage and installation of street light in Malindi and Magarini has caused a spike in land prices in the area.</i>
03.12.19	The Daily Nation	<i>County to put up 5000 housing units in low income urban areas</i>	<i>The county government of Uasin Gishu will put up more than 5,000 affordable housing units in the next three years as part of efforts to boost the region's image...</i>

DATE	MEDIA	TITLE	SUMMARY OF THE CONTENT
<b>Electronic</b>			
08.08.2019	Ebru TV	Govt invests in improving informal settlements	<i>Various informal settlements in urban areas are beginning to have a new face due to the ongoing projects by the government...</i>
13.08.19	Switch TV	Lighting helps combat crime	<i>Informal settlements in Kenya lack basic amenities coupled with the fact that crime and lack of opportunities are the offshoot of the spiral of poverty...</i>
14.08.19	Ghetto Radio	Millions benefit from informal settlement infrastructural improvement	<i>One million people from the informal settlements have benefited from infrastructural improvement through funding from the World Bank...</i>
14.08.19	Switch TV	Street lighting changes fortunes of slum dwellers	<i>Lives of most Kenyans in poor settlements and slums have changed following the lighting of their living areas...</i>
02.11.19	Msenangu FM	Government together with	<i>The national government together with the World Bank has used more than</i>



		World Bank utilise 400 M for Kilifi projects	<i>400 Million for the improvement of infrastructure in sections of Malindi and Magarini areas in Kilifi County...</i>
04.11.19	Citizen TV	Land price appreciates in Kilifi	<i>Kilifi residents are raising concern over high land prices following the entrance of brokers in the region...</i>
04.11.19	Kaya FM	World Bank through government spends 412 M for projects in Kilifi alone	<i>The World Bank through the national government has used 412 Million for development projects in Kilifi County alone...</i>
04.11.19	Citizen Radio	Govt has spent Sh 412 million in improving infrastructure in Sabaki Kilifi	<i>The government in collaboration with the world bank, has spent up to Sh 412 million in improving infrastructure in Sabaki Malindi Kilifi county...</i>
08.11.19	K24 News	Malindi, Magarini residents to benefit from World Bank project	<i>Malindi and Magarini residents in Kilifi County are set to benefit from a World Bank program in road network and water projects...</i>
08.11.19	Supernewsworld	Malindi and Magarini benefits from projects upgrading informal areas	<i>Thousands of residents of Malindi and Magarini in Kilifi county have a reason to smile after the national government in partnership with the World Bank implemented projects worth nearly Sh.500 million for upgrading informal areas...</i>
08.11.19	Daily Motion	Malindi and Magarini benefits from projects upgrading informal areas	<i>Thousands of residents of Malindi and Magarini in Kilifi county have a reason to smile after the national government in partnership with the World Bank implemented projects worth nearly Sh.500 million for upgrading informal areas...</i>
08.11.19	24ecuador	Malindi and Magarini benefits from projects upgrading informal areas	<i>Thousands of residents of Malindi and Magarini in Kilifi county have a reason to smile after the national government in partnership with the World Bank implemented projects worth nearly Sh.500 million for upgrading informal areas...</i>
08.11.19	The Star, Kenya	Malindi and Magarini benefits from projects upgrading informal areas	<i>Thousands of residents of Malindi and Magarini in Kilifi county have a reason to smile after the national government in partnership with the World Bank implemented projects worth nearly Sh.500 million for upgrading informal areas...</i>
23.11.19	KUTV	Infrastructure boosted in Kitui town on donor funding	<i>Infrastructure boosted in Kitui town on donor funding...</i>
24.11.19	K24 News	Kitui town amenities and infrastructure upgraded	<i>Kitui Town residents are a happy lot after the upgrade of various amenities and infrastructure...</i>
24.11.19	WatsupAfrica	KITUI TOWN FACELIFT: National govt' refurbishes amenities in town	<i>Kitui town residents are a happy lot following the upgrade of various amenities and infrastructure in their municipality through the national government's Kenya Informal Settlement Improvement Project (KISIP) and funded by World</i>



			<i>Bank...</i>
25.11.19	Syokimau FM	Residents laud ongoing Kitui beautification program	<i>Traders and residents have lauded the ongoing Kitui beautification program by World Bank and Kitui county government...</i>
25.11.19	Mbaitu FM	Kitui, World Bank commended for economic boost	<i>Kitui County in conjunction with World Bank has been commended for improving economy in that region...</i>
26.11.19	Eras TV	Insecure, filthy Kitui township gets face-lift	<i>Insecure, filthy Kitui township gets face-lift...</i>
26.11.19	Musyi FM	World Bank improves infrastructure in Kitui wards	<i>Kunda Kindu residents Kitui County have reason to smile after World Bank improved their infrastructure...</i>
27.11.19	Kenya Digital News	Joy as the once insecure and filthy kitui township gets a facelift	<i>Rampant mugging, free flowing sewerage waste and giant heaps of garbage which we the face of Kitui Township are a thing of the past after the county headquarters got a Sh. 749 million facelift...</i>
28.11.19	County FM	<i>Kenya - Informal Settlements Improvement Project in Kitui County</i>	<i>Kenya - Informal Settlements Improvement Project (KISIP): environmental assessment: Environmental and social impact assessment project report for infrastructure upgrading projects in Kunda Kindu, mosquito and Mjini informal settlements, Kitui Town...</i>

**NATIONAL HYGIENE PROGRAM**

**Summary of Kazi Mtaani Coverage May –June 2020**

DATE	MEDIA	TITLE	SUMMARY OF THE CONTENT
<b>Print</b>			
28.05.20	Radio Rahma, Online	<i>Awamu ya pili ya mradi wa kazi mtaani kuanzishwa hivi karibuni</i>	<i>Kando na changamoto zilizoshuhudiwa kwenye mradi wa kazi mtaani unaotarajiwa kukamilika hivi karibuni serikali ya kitaifa inapania kuanzisha awamu ya pili ya mradi huo.</i>
30.05.20	Saturday Standard, print	<i>New ferry eases congestion during crossing</i>	<i>MV Safari, a newly acquired ferry has eased the perennial vehicle and human traffic at the Likoni Ferry Terminal allowing for adequate social distancing in the face of coronavirus.</i>
31.05.20	Sunday Standard, print	<i>Youth get 4,000 part-time ventures</i>	<i>At least 4,000 youths have been recruited in Jomvu Subcounty to take part in the ongoing nationwide cleaning of the environment.</i>
31.05.20	KNA online	<i>Governor Says 67 Per Cent of Kwale Families Affected By the</i>	<i>Kenyans have in the recent past lost billions of shillings to stalled government projects, while some never take off at all.</i>



		<i>Coronavirus</i>	
03.06.20	The Standard, print	<i>Mvurya: 6,000 have lost hotel jobs</i>	<i>Close to 6,000 workers in hotels within Kwale County have been rendered jobless owing to covid-19 pandemic. Kwale Governor Salim Mvurya disclosed that the tourism industry has suffered a great hit after sector-related establishments shut down operations.</i>

<b>DATE</b>	<b>MEDIA</b>	<b>TITLE</b>	<b>SUMMARY OF THE CONTENT</b>
<b>Electronic</b>			
26.05.20	Pwani FM	1,000 Kilifi youth benefit from Kazi Mtaani program	<i>1,000 Youth in Kilifi County have benefited from the Kazi Mtaani program by the government...</i>
27.05.20	Kaya FM	Elungata says Kazi Mtaani program has greatly helped the youth	<i>The Kazi Mtaani program by the government will enable many youth to sustain their lives, Elungata says...</i>
27.05.20	Hope FM	Thousands of Mombasa youths engage in Kazi Mtaani programme	<i>At least 4,000 youths have been recruited in Jomvu Subcounty to take part in the ongoing nationwide cleaning of the environment...</i>
28.05.20	Pwani FM	Second phase of Kazi Mtaani to start in Kwale County	<i>The government is planning to launch the second phase of Kazi Mtaani in Kwale County...</i>
28.05.20	Rahma FM	2,000 youths from Mvita benefit from Kazi Mtaani Initiative	<i>2,000 youths from Mvita have so far benefitted from Kazi Mtaani Initiative sponsored by the national government...</i>
28.05.20	Musyi FM	Mombasa govt collecting waste in Mvita	<i>Mvita Deputy County Commissioner Charles Munari says there are lorries going around collecting garbage being cleaned by youths under Kazi Mitaani initiative...</i>
29.05.2020	Kaya FM	Kazi Mtaani program to pay the youth 650 per day, Kitio says	<i>Mombasa County Commissioner, Gilbert Kitio has dismissed claims that youth will be paid 3,000 per day in the Kazi Mtaani program...</i>
29.05.20	KBC	Mombasa Muslim Community boosts govt efforts	<i>The Mombasa Muslim Community has boosted the government efforts in the fight against coronavirus by donating equipment to be used by youth employed under Kazi Mtaani...</i>
30.05.20	Bahari FM	Contractors give way for more than 200,000 youth in Kazi Mtaani program	<i>The government has temporarily terminated the services of contractors in the country to give way for the employment of more than 200,000 youth from 10 counties for the Kazi Mtaani program...</i>
30.05.20	Bahari FM	T/River youth assured of employment in Kazi	<i>The government has assured Tana River County youth of employment in the phase 2 of the Kazi Mtaani program...</i>



		Mtaani,Phase 2	
30.05.20	Radio Maisha	More than 10K kilifi youths to benefit from Kazi mtaani	<i>More than 10K youths in Malindi Kilifi county to benefit from Kazi mtaani program...</i>
31.05.20	Milele FM	Mvurya advise youths to utilize Kazi mtaani well	<i>Kwale Governor want youths who will get a chance to serve under Kazi Mtaani to utilize the opportunity to better their lives...</i>
02.06.20	Pwani FM	300 youths in Kwale yet to receive payment from Kazi Mtaani program	<i>300 youths in 1,000 youth in Kwale employed by the government in the Kazi Mtaani program are yet to receive payment after they gave wrong mobile phone numbers...</i>
02.06.20	Musyi FM	Mombasa govt urged to work with Youths under Kazi Mtaani initiative	<i>Environment ministry in Mombasa county has been urged to work closely with Youths working under Kazi Mtaani initiative to ensure the county is clean...</i>
03.06.20	Citizen TV	Mombasa residents benefit from Kazi mtaani program	<i>Mombasa residents have benefited from Kazi mtaani program, after they cleaned VOJ dumping site...</i>