Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit Social Development Department Dissemination Notes The Structure of Rebel Organizations Implications for Post-Conflict Reconstruction June 2002 Number 4 . | Applying organizational dynamics to the study of rebel groups yields a number of interesting findings. Whether a rebel group is organized around material incentives or shared identities has dramatic implications for how the organization behaves during the conflict, for negotiations to end the conflict, and for the design of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration programs. Introduction Civil wa is now the most common form ofviolentconflict: behavior of their members? What implications does the Civl w r ise n now the most commoni formr ofo violentt conflict: organizational structure of rebellion have for post-conflict all but seven of the 110 conflicts recorded between 1989 policy options? I explore these questions in more detail and 2000 were civil wars. To be considered a civil war, in this brief dissemination note. 1 according to the academic definition, conflicts must be between a government and an identifiable rebel organization and generate at least 1,000 combat-related Stated simply, economic models of conflict assert that deaths, of which at least 5 percent must be on each side. rebellion is costly. To engage in conflict, groups must While significant attention has focused on the macro- find ways to entice individuals to participate, even though level factors that explain where conflicts break out, how the risk of death is extremely high and the likelihood of long they last, and why they come to an end, victory quite small. Without some mechanism for comparatively little research has been done at the micro- attracting recruits, prospective organizations will surely level on a central question with significant implications for fail as individuals reject risky opportunities and free-ride policy: how do rebel groups organize violence? on whatever gains are achieved down the road. The key is for groups to make rebellion profitable for potential This is true, in part, because rebellion has been recruits. traditionally analyzed as a "romantic" phenomenon. Like participants in social movements, rebels have been seen Empirical research from the World Bank's project on the as activists working outside of the political system, economics of crime and violence suggests that rebel fighting for a collective cause, at significant costs to groups meet these high costs of organization in two themselves and their families, against a typically specific ways. First, where resources are available to repressive government. In such an analysis, the finance the organization of violence, rebel groups are expressed grievances of the rebellion are sufficient to more likely to form. These resources can be generated make sense of the organization itself. Motivated by calls internally (through the extortion of natural resources, the for economic redistribution, ethnic pride, religious production of illegal drugs, trade in legal goods, or from hegemony, or nationalism, it is assumed that rebels join taxes levied for protection) or solicited externally (from movements voluntarily, take risks and absorb costs in foreign powers, ethnic and religious diasporas, or order to achieve the group's objective, and rarely act in criminal networks). The presence of these potential ways that threaten the organization. economic endowments makes rebel organizations more likely because it enables rebel leaders to finance A growing body of scholarship challenges this depiction recruitment and purchase the military resources needed of rebel organizations. Instead, it argues that rebellion is for war. shaped by opportunity rather than motivation. It is the circumstances in which groups are able to rebel that are Second, where ethnic groups are highly polarized, the sufficiently rare to deserve attention. This economic cohesion that exists within ethnic groups enables rebel perspecti\e on rebellion demands a more fine-grained examination of the factors shaping the groups that 1 The argument presented in this note is based on an in-depth analysis organize violence. of three rebel groups: the National Resistance Army (Uganda), Renamo (Mozambique), and Sendero Luminoso (Peru). Interviews with former combatants and commanders were used in all three cases How do rebel organizations overcome collective action to reconstruct the organizational development of the insurgencies. problems? To what extent are groups able to control the 2 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. 2001. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." Policy Research Working Paper 2355. World Bank, Washington, D.C. organizations to form and survive through long periods of actions and by making commitments within the group to conflict.3 Ethnic identities are used to signal support for a deliver benefits credible. Groups able to access both cause, make promises of future benefits credible, economic wealth and social networks (type C) are best coordinate actions across individuals, and work within equipped to reduce the costs of organization. social networks that ease the process of recruiting members and generating the supplies necessary for war. Rebel leaders who find themselves without any financing Cohesion (or "social capital") may also come from other nor an ethnic, religious, or ideological base (type q are shared identities (religious, cultural, or regional) or unlikely to grow large enough to engage in civil war. ideological belief-systems, such as Marxism, Maoism, or Because there are economies of scale in rebel capitalism, that bring individuals together and harmonize organization-groups must be large enough to credibly their behavior. These social endowments provide a challenge the government-rebel leaders must develop a second, critical avenue through which rebel consistent source of finance (becoming type A) or invest organizations can reduce the costs of conflict. in the cultivation of social or ideological identities (becoming type B) if they are to survive. Without such We can therefore imagine a "production function" for efforts, leaders will be unable to overcome the threshold violence. Rebel leaders build organizations by using of rebel organization and will be quickly crushed by economic and/or social endowments to recruit the labor government forces or left to operate as a gang of necessary for war, given the strength of the state and its bandits. military. Economic resources and social identities can be usefully seen as "inputs" in the process of organizing The reasons these initial endowments are so important is violence. that they fundamentally shape the internal dynamics of the organization. The presence (or absence) of Imagine a small core of rebel leaders plotting a rebellion. economic endowments influences the type of individual At least in the short run, the level of economic and social who chooses to join a rebellion and determines how endowments is relatively fixed. As a result, theoretically, organizations keep members committed over time. rebel leaders might find themselves in one of four Resource-rich groups attract opportunistic joiners and situations (Figure 1). must maintain their organizations through a consistent flow of material payoffs or through the use of force. Figure 1: Theoretical Possibilities Resource-poor groups must recruit followers by drawing on sources of social cohesion. Only die-hard activists are attracted to rebel and these organizations are held together by the power of shared identities or beliefs. A A c rebel organization lucky enough to have wealth and cohesion will try to recruit and organize without wasting its resources on material incentives; if it cannot, it E becomes a type A group as it spends its wealth on 0 recruitment. O E Figure 2: Actual Rebel Organizations 0 0 us0\ Materially-based J D \ B Coercion-based Social Endowments El E 0 For groups of type A, rebellion will be cheap and relatively more attractive because the financing is X \ already available. On the opposite extreme, where no E2 financing exists, rebellion is a risky proposition. 0 However, groups of type B will be able to compensate for 0 a lack of economic resources by drawing on their social X endowments. If strong social identities or ideologies Identity-based exist, the costs of organization can still be overcome in Beliefs -based these contexts by enabling individuals to coordinate their Social Endowments 3Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Mans Soderbom. 2001. "On the Duration of Civil War." Policy Research Working Paper 2681. World Bank, Washington, D.C. 2 Thus, rebel organizations separate into two distinct levels of discipline, active engagement with non- equilibria (Figure 2). In the first, the organization is held combatant populations, and the selective use of violence. together by material incentives or by force. Large enough to compete against the government, this group Post-Conflict Strategies: Dealing with the Group survives by maintaining a consistent flow of resources, making payments (of some form) to its members, or When the time comes to negotiate a transition from war using force to prevent defection. Members' to peace, the structure of the rebel organization becomes commitments to the group are weak and based largely extremely important. Actors from the international on short-term considerations. The RUF (Sierra Leone), community that seek to lay the groundwork for a peace UNITA (Angola), and RENAMO (Mozambique) are good agreement and the incorporation of all the major actors examples. into the political system, must ask themselves: with whom are we dealing? This is a question about the In the second equilibrium, the glue holding the structure of the rebel group, its command and control, organization together is fundamentally different. This and the capacity of its leadership to influence the group survives because of social bonds that tie its behavior of its dispersed and armed membership. members together. Shared identities or belief systems generate trust across members enabling the group to Groups built around a shared identity or commitment to a recruit by promising only future rewards. Commitment is set of ideological beliefs are best able to make credible maintained because individuals believe that if the group's commitments in the peace process. The leadership objectives are achieved, they will be rewarded. The structure of these groups has the capacity to guarantee National Resistance Army (Uganda), Sendero Luminoso that its commitments will be honored at all levels of the (Peru), the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union organization. In these contexts, engaging with the (Guatemala), and the FMLN (El Salvador) are leadership structure and securing its commitment to the representative of this class of rebel organizations. peace framework is absolutely critical. Good examples are provided by recent peace agreements or war-to- Three Implications peace transitions in Uganda, El Salvador, and Guatemala. What do we gain by focusing on the organizational dynamics of rebel groups? In-depth research on rebel Where groups are held together by material incentives or organizations in Uganda, Mozambique, and Peru has force, it is more likely that multiple actors (on the rebel yielded a number of interesting findings. side) will determine the likelihood of the transition's success. Because rebel groups often disperse Rebel Behavior in Conflict combatants throughout the country, even if the leadership commits itself to a transition plan, local Whether a group is organized around material incentives commanders and combatants may reject the terms of the or shared identities has dramatic implications for how the settlement and continue the conflict. Such a result is far organization and its members behave during the conflict. more likely in cases where the organization is held By attracting participants interested in short-term gains, together by profit-motives or force. This situation may resource-rich groups face significant and damaging confront the international community in Afghanistan, principal-agent problems in the course of conflict. where local warlords cobbled together to defeat the Individuals soldiers and small units operating far from the Taliban, may attempt to reinforce their political and central command are hard to control, even when groups economic power at the local level and may resist plans have access to communications technology. To deal for their incorporation into the political system and with these problems, rebel leaders choose organizational demobilization. Many transitions have failed because the structures that are either highly centralized (a traditional rebel organization was unable to credibly commit to the military) or highly decentralized (warlords). Rebel process. Recent experience in Angola, the Democratic behavior in these contexts is often characterized by a Republic of the Congo, and Sierra Leone (for a total disregard for the interests of the civilian population significant period of time) bears this out. and includes looting, destruction, and the use of indiscriminate force. Post-Conflict Strategies: Dealing with the Individuals Resource-poor groups attract only individuals truly At the same time, in the process of conceptualizing committed to the cause. Accordingly, principal-agent demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) problems are much less damaging to this type of rebel programs, international agencies must keep in mind the organization. Rebel leaders can successfully individual incentives at work in the rebel organization. decentralize power to independent, operating units DDR programs are a critical tool for bringing rebel groups without sacrificing the objectives of the group. The and their members to the table and preventing a return to influence of the leadership provides a steady, guiding conflict. hand, even without resorting to coercion and force. In this environment, rebel behavior is characterized by high 3 Where individuals lack a strong commitment to the the conflict, taking advantage of these skills in designing organization and participate for short-term gains or reintegration initiatives should be a priority. because they are coerced, cash payment schemes can work especially well in reducing the motivation for continued conflict. With the high costs of war, the risk of death, and a significant probability of failure, offers of economic resources will often be sufficient to encourage individual combatants to lay down their arms, even if the leadership of the group is not committed to the process. However, given that combatants in these forces engage largely in military activities and profit-seeking, they are unlikely to have education or other skills. As a result, reintegration into civilian communities can be incredibly difficult. As World Bank experience demonstrates, though, DDR programs are not one-size-fits-all. Where individuals commit themselves to rebel organizations that seek long- term goals for an ethnic, religious, or cultural group or envision fundamental political or economic transformation, DDR programs designed to change the CPR Unit short-term calculus of combatants are less likely to be successful. In these contexts, program planners must This Dissemination Note was written by Jeremy Weinstein, a Visiting invest more heavily in the design of individual-level Scholar in DECRG, who is currently finishing his Ph.D. at Harvard initiatives that reflect the substantive motivations of the University. This note series is intended to disseminate good practice participants including access to land, education, training, and key findings on conflict prevention and reconstruction The series is edited by the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction (CPR) Unit in and political power. DDR should be accompanied by the Social Development Department of the Environmentally and investments in the design of political institutions that Socially Sustainable Development Network of the Worid Bank. The incorporate the former rebel forces, either as a political views expressed in these notes are those of the authors and do not party or as actors in a decentralized administration. In necessarily reflect the views of the Worid Bank Group, its Executive Directors, or the countnes they represent. CPR Dissemination Notes addition, since individuals in these types of groups often are distributed widely to Bank staff and are also available on the CPR engage in administrative work and governance during website (http://www.worldbank.org/conflict). 4