

Document of
The World Bank

Report No: ICR0000956

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(IDA-H3460 IDA-H0250 TF-52053)

ON A

GRANT
IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 25.4 MILLION
(US\$35.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

AND A

GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL FACILITY GRANT
IN THE AMOUNT OF US\$4.0 MILLION

AND AN

ADDITIONAL GRANT
IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR2.9 MILLION
(US\$4.5 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF NIGER

FOR A

COMMUNITY ACTION PROJECT
IN SUPPORT OF THE FIRST PHASE OF THE
COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAM

June 27, 2011

Agriculture and Rural Development Unit
Sustainable Development Department
Country Department AFCW3
Africa Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective January 2011)

Currency Unit = FCFA

US\$1.00 = FCFA 480

FISCAL YEAR

January 1 – December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AfDB	African Development Bank
APL	Adaptable Program Loan
CAP	Community Action Program (or Project)
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy (of the World Bank)
CBD	Community-based Development
CBIEM	Community-Based Integrated Ecosystem Management
CBO	Community Based Organization
CCN	<i>Cellule de Coordination Nationale</i> (Project Coordination Unit)
CCR	<i>Cellule de Coordination Régionale</i> (Regional Coordination Unit)
CDD	Community-Driven Development
GEF	Global Environmental Fund
GEO	Global Environmental Objective
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GTZ	German Agency for Technical Cooperation
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
EU	European Union
HCRAD	<i>Haut Commissariat à la Reforme Administrative et de la Décentralisation</i>
HIV/AIDS	Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus/Acquired Immuno-Deficiency Syndrome
HPAI	Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICR	Implementation Completion Report
ICRISAT	International Crops Research Institute for Semi-Arid Tropics
IDA	International Development Association
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IRR	Internal rate of return
ISR	Implementation Support Reports
LDP	Local Development Plan
LIF	Local Investment Fund
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDA	<i>Ministère du Développement Agricole</i> (Ministry of Agriculture)
NEPPCAI	National Emergency Plan for Prevention & Control of Avian Influenza
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPV	Net Present Value
NRM	Natural Resource Management

OIE	<i>Office International des Epizooties</i> (World Organization for Animal Health)
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PDO	Project Development Objective
PGRN	<i>Projet de Gestion des Ressources Naturelles</i> (Natural Resource Management Project)
PHRD	Special Fund for Policy and Human Resources Development
PIM	Project Implementation Manual
PNEDD	National Environmental Plan for Sustainable Development
PNLCP	<i>Programme Cadre National de Lutte Contre la Pauvreté</i> (National Poverty Reduction Program)
PPF	Project Preparation Facility
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SLM	Sustainable Land Management
TOR	Terms of Reference
UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNEP	United National Environment Program
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

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NIGER
COMMUNITY ACTION PROJECT IN SUPPORT OF THE FIRST PHASE OF THE
COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAM

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A. Basic Information			
Country:	Niger	Project Name:	Community Action Program
Project ID:	P065991,P073011	L/C/TF Number(s):	IDA-H0250,IDA-H3460,TF-52053
ICR Date:	06/27/2011	ICR Type:	Intensive Learning ICR
Lending Instrument:	APL,APL	Borrower:	REPUBLIC OF NIGER
Original Total Commitment:	XDR 25.4M,USD 4.0M	Disbursed Amount:	XDR 28.1M,USD 3.9M
Environmental Category: F,B		Focal Area: M	
Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Agricultural Development			
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:			

B. Key Dates				
Community Action Program - P065991				
Process	Date	Process	Original Date	Revised / Actual Date(s)
Concept Review:	01/06/2000	Effectiveness:		12/11/2003
Appraisal:	04/30/2002	Restructuring(s):		12/18/2007
Approval:	03/20/2003	Mid-term Review:	02/15/2006	03/07/2006
		Closing:	06/30/2007	12/31/2010

Community-based Integrated Ecosystem Management - P073011				
Process	Date	Process	Original Date	Revised / Actual Date(s)
Concept Review:	01/06/2000	Effectiveness:	09/28/2003	12/11/2003
Appraisal:	04/30/2002	Restructuring(s):		
Approval:	03/20/2003	Mid-term Review:	02/15/2006	02/21/2006
		Closing:	06/30/2007	06/30/2008

C. Ratings Summary	
C.1 Performance Rating by ICR	
Outcomes	Satisfactory
GEO Outcomes	Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome	Moderate
Risk to GEO Outcome	Moderate
Bank Performance	Satisfactory
Borrower Performance	Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)			
Bank	Ratings	Borrower	Ratings
Quality at Entry	Satisfactory	Government:	Moderately Satisfactory
Quality of Supervision:	Satisfactory	Implementing Agency/Agencies:	Satisfactory
Overall Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Overall Borrower Performance	Satisfactory

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators			
Community Action Program - P065991			
Implementation Performance	Indicators	QAG Assessments (if any)	Rating:
Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	Yes	Quality at Entry (QEA)	None
Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	No	Quality of Supervision (QSA)	None
DO rating before Closing/Inactive status	Satisfactory		

Community-based Integrated Ecosystem Management - P073011			
Implementation Performance	Indicators	QAG Assessments (if any)	Rating:
Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	No	Quality at Entry (QEA)	None
Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	No	Quality of Supervision (QSA)	None
GEO rating before Closing/Inactive Status	Satisfactory		

D. Sector and Theme Codes		
Community Action Program - P065991		
	Original	Actual
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
General agriculture, fishing and forestry sector	20	20
General education sector	15	15
General water, sanitation and flood protection sector	20	20
Health	10	10
Sub-national government administration	35	35
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
Decentralization	23	22

Other social protection and risk management	22	22
Participation and civic engagement	22	23
Poverty strategy, analysis and monitoring	11	11
Rural services and infrastructure	22	22

Community-based Integrated Ecosystem Management - P073011		
	Original	Actual
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
Central government administration	10	10
General agriculture, fishing and forestry sector	70	70
Other social services	20	20
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
Biodiversity	29	29
Environmental policies and institutions	29	29
Land administration and management	14	14
Other rural development	14	14
Participation and civic engagement	14	14

E. Bank Staff

Community Action Program - P065991		
Positions	At ICR	At Approval
Vice President:	Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili	Callisto E. Madavo
Country Director:	Ousmane Diagana	Antoinette M. Sayeh
Sector Manager:	Karen Mcconnell Brooks	Joseph Baah-Dwomoh
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ICR Team Leader:	Daniel M. Sellen	
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Community-based Integrated Ecosystem Management - P073011		
Positions	At ICR	At Approval
Vice President:	Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili	Callisto E. Madavo
Country Director:	Ousmane Diagana	Antoinette M. Sayeh
Sector Manager:	Karen Mcconnell Brooks	Joseph Baah-Dwomoh
Project Team Leader:	El Hadj Adama Toure	Daniel M. Sellen
ICR Team Leader:	Daniel M. Sellen	
ICR Primary Author:	Turto Asseri Turtiainen	

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)

To establish and operationalize decentralized, participatory, and transparent financing mechanisms that empower poor communities and local governments to take charge of their own development.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)

The PDO was not revised.

Global Environment Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)

To promote community - based integrated management of ecosystems and natural resources as a means of reducing the region's vulnerability to desertification, while fostering multiple global environmental benefits.

Revised Global Environment Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)

The GEO was not revised.

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	Communities that have elaborated a feasible community development plan			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	28% (50 communities)	75% (133 communities)		100% (178 communities)
Date achieved	02/01/2004	06/30/2007		06/30/2008
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Reference used is the 178 communities reached today by PAC, against 150 communities initially planned. Actual value achieved exceeds target.			
Indicator 2 :	Communities that have implemented at least 5 PAC supported micro-projects from their Local Development Plan			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	60% (106 communities)		75% (134 communities)
Date achieved	02/01/2004	06/30/2007		06/30/2008
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Reference used is 178 communities reached by the project. Actual value exceeds target.			
Indicator 3 :	Communes that have implemented at least 3 PAC supported micro-projects from their Communal Development Plan (among the 54 communities reached by the project)			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	60% (32 communes)		70%
Date achieved	02/01/2004	06/30/2007		06/30/2008

Comments (incl. % achievement)	Actual value achieved exceeds target.
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(b) GEO Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	Area of marginal lands under cultivation of annual crops, and area of marginal land being protected and/or actively recovered .			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	Improvement in trend		7,837 ha of Acacia Senegal planted on degraded land (reforestation) eligible for Biocarbon Finance
Date achieved	02/01/2004	06/30/2007		06/30/2008
Comments (incl. % achievement)	No actual or baseline information exist for this indicator due to measurement problems.			

(c) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	Number of community leaders trained (Comp.1) in community development in community procurement			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0 0	787 270		1202 274
Date achieved	02/01/2004	06/30/2007		06/30/2008
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Both actual values exceed target values. Details provided in Annex 2			

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs


-						
No.	Date ISR Archived	DO	GEO	IP	Actual Disbursements (USD millions)	
					Project 1	Project 2
1	05/30/2003	S	S	S	0.00	0.00
2	11/26/2003	S	S	S	0.00	0.00
3	02/18/2004	S	S	S	2.67	0.29
4	06/26/2004	S	S	S	3.19	0.30
5	08/10/2004	S	S	S	3.53	0.30
6	01/07/2005	S	S	S	4.54	0.30
7	06/14/2005	S	S	MS	9.15	0.58
8	11/17/2005	S	MS	MS	15.33	0.72
9	06/29/2006	S	MS	MS	22.79	0.82
10	02/22/2007	S	S	S	32.12	1.34
11	06/25/2007	S	S	MS	34.27	2.02
12	12/21/2007	S	S	MS	36.89	3.08
13	04/17/2008	S	S	MS	37.30	3.41
14	06/26/2008	S	S	MS	37.42	3.56
15	12/12/2008	S	S	MS	38.23	3.99
16	05/29/2009	S	S	MS	38.41	3.99
17	12/07/2009	S	S	MS	38.79	3.91
18	04/14/2010	S	S	MS	39.28	3.91
19	05/11/2011	S	S	MS	41.81	3.91

H. Restructuring (if any)


Restructuring Date(s)	Board Approved		ISR Ratings at Restructuring			Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in USD millions		Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made
	PDO Change	GEO Change	DO	GEO	IP	Project1	Project 2	
12/18/2007			S		MS	36.89		

I. Disbursement Profile

P065991



P073011



1. Project Context, Development and Global Environment Objectives Design ¹

1.1 Context at Appraisal

1. The countries of the Sahel are among the poorest in the world, and by most measures Niger was, and still is, the poorest of these, ranked by the United Nations as number 174 of 177 in the world. Two-thirds of the people live in poverty; at the time of appraisal the per capita GDP (US\$180) had fallen to less than half of what it had been two decades earlier. The Government of Niger understood that poverty was not simply the result of low income levels, but caused by widespread lack of access to food, clean water, natural resources, medical care, education, financing, and other economic and social services.

2. At appraisal, the biggest obstacle to promoting rural development in Niger was the agro-ecological resource base, characterized by fragile and degrading arable land, low rainfall, and periodic droughts. A combination of rapid population growth, southward migration in response to droughts, and few opportunities for employment outside agriculture increased pressure on the limited amount of fertile land. Ninety-nine percent of cultivated lands were rain-fed, meaning that crops and farm incomes were vulnerable to erratic rainfall and droughts. Farmers lacked the technologies, credit, and organization to access ground and surface water and to share successfully its use. In 1965 one-quarter of Niger was arable; by 2002 only one-eighth was arable--and during that period the population almost quadrupled. Eighty-five percent of Niger's population was pressed into a corridor about 100 to 150 kilometers wide north of the Nigerian border. Given the encroachment of the Sahara and an obvious downward trend in rainfall, there is perhaps no country in the world more at risk from desertification than Niger.

3. *Biodiversity.* The flora and fauna of the Sahel are well adapted to cope with the erratic and harsh weather there, but the agricultural species are much more vulnerable to the climate change. Increasing pressure on the diminishing natural rangelands and water resources in the south decreased the availability and productivity of these natural resources, and overexploitation of natural species used as food, fodder, household energy, medicinal plants, veterinary products, and construction material led to a loss of biodiversity.

4. *Agriculture and food security.* Agriculture and livestock production provided most of employment, food, and income for Nigeriens. Of the national actively employed population, 84 percent of men and 97 percent of women were involved in growing crops or raising livestock. Despite the large share of public investments devoted to rural

¹ The first phase of the Community Action Program (CAP1) was prepared as an Adaptable Program Loan, consisting of three successive, 4-year grants, and as a collaborative effort between the World Bank and the Global Environmental Fund (GEF). CAP1 was effective in December 11, 2003 and was extended to June 30, 2010 to include a component to fight Avian Influenza, and then extended again until December 31, 2010. Although original components of CAP1 were closed by June 30, 2008, this ICR was completed during the Mid-Term Review of the second phase of the Community Action Program (CAP2) in May 2011. Because the Avian flu component was implemented following completion of the main project, a supplemental ICR mission was organized in March 2011 and has produced a detailed report on this component with details included in Annex 3.

development (53 percent over the period 1991-97), the agricultural GDP grew at an average annual rate of only 0.9 percent in real terms in the period 1966-96, mainly from increasing the area under cultivation. Considering the population growth, this meant an annual decline in per capita agricultural GDP by about two percent, and a widespread increase in the number of food-insecure households. Yields for the staple crops -- millet and sorghum - were low and declining.

5. *Health.* Statistics on the health of Nigeriens were dismal and still are. One out of four children died before their fifth birthday. Life expectancy was very low (44 years for males). Four out of five births took place outside health facilities, and two thirds of women received no prenatal care. The maternal mortality rate in Niger was the highest in the world. Forty-three percent of children under five suffered from malnutrition. Rural communities largely depended on traditional medical products coming from the declining and degrading natural rangelands.

6. *Other factors.* Other factors relevant for the project design included very low primary school enrollment rate, especially for girls; a lack of clean water and sanitation facilities; poor transport infrastructure from producers to consumers; and limited-access to rural finance following the collapse of the main rural finance institutions. In addition, while plans were far advanced for decentralization of public-sector management, the district-level administration common in most other countries was lacking. This fact alone made it difficult to promote sustainable local development.

7. The Government's strategy to attack poverty and related macroeconomic and other problems was based on the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) of 2002. On the environmental side, the Government had completed the National Environmental Plan for Sustainable Development in 1998. The plan represented a consensus of the Government, the private sector, and the civil society.

8. In its Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), the World Bank fully aligned itself with the Government's poverty reduction programs. In particular, the Community Action Program provided local investment funds that would encourage communities² to engage in income-generating activities while trying to preserve the natural resource base and ecosystems. As improved social services are priorities for communities, the project was expected to finance schools, health centers, water supply, disease prevention efforts, and other such micro-projects through a demand-driven planning. In addition, the project recognized that poverty reduction would need a greater role from communities, NGOs, and civil society in the definition, implementation, and execution of local development efforts and therefore focused on building local capacity to do so.

9. For the Global Environmental Fund (GEF), the project was to help the Government achieve its environmental goals, especially a concept known as "community-based integrated ecosystem management" (CBIEM). This concept, which is included in GEF's OP 12, is defined for this program as harmonized management of the cultivated

² / The term "community" covers, especially in the project and program names and both in PAD and this document, the local government areas (communes) and lower-level target units, village clusters ("*grappes*"). In providing grants, the village clusters are called communities, separating them thus from communes.

areas, natural rangelands, water resources, and urban areas to maintain or recover a balance as seen from local, national, and global ecosystem perspectives.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved)

10. The original PDO, as described in the PAD, was to establish and operationalize decentralized, participatory, and transparent financing mechanisms that empower poor communities and local governments to take charge of their own development.³

11. The key performance indicators were as follows:

- (a) 75 percent of communities in targeted communes carry out needs assessments and produce feasible development plans;
- (b) 60 percent of targeted communities directly executing project-supported micro-projects;
- (c) 75 percent of targeted communes (local Governments) receive training and are actively involved in local development.

1.3 Original Global Environment Objectives (GEO) and Key Indicators (as approved)

12. The original GEO, as described in the PAD, was to promote community-based integrated management of ecosystems and natural resources as a means of reducing the region's vulnerability to desertification, while fostering multiple global environmental benefits. The key indicators were: (a) trends in the condition of natural resources; (b) trends in the removal of barriers to CBIEM, such as changes in land cover, in the levels of degradation of land and water resources, and in the sources of carbon sequestration and biodiversity; and (c) trends in the different categories and effectiveness of initiatives to reduce vulnerability to climate change.

1.4 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

13. The PDO was not revised. The key performance indicators were defined more precisely at midterm to better measure the achievements and to match with the approach in the Bank's use of the new results framework rather than the old logical framework. In addition, in 2008 the avian flu component was added to the project and included its own set of indicators (see Annex 2). The new key performance indicators were as follows:

³ In the original Grant Agreement, the PDO and GEO were combined, and read as follows: "The objectives of the Project are to: (i) assist the Recipient to design and implement decentralized, participatory, and transparent financing mechanisms that enable Communities and Local Governments to carry out their own development plans; and (ii) promote Community-based Integrated Ecosystem Management, and foster multiple global environmental benefits."

- (a) Percentage of communities (village clusters) that have elaborated a feasible community development plan (the reference number of communities was not specified at appraisal, but it was defined early during implementation as at 150, and then at midterm as at 178 village clusters, and including those 12 village clusters that were included in the pilot phase);
- (b) Percentages of communities that have implemented at least five CAP-supported micro-projects from their Local Development Plans (the reference number of communities was 178 village clusters);
- (c) Percentages of communes that have implemented at least three CAP-supported micro-projects from their Communal Development Plan (the reference number of communities was 54 communes).

1.5 Revised GEO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

14. The GEO was not revised. However, the indicators were modified to be: (i) the area of marginal lands under cultivation of annual crops; and (ii) the area of marginal land being protected and/or actively recovered.

1.6 Main Beneficiaries

15. The target population of the project were the poor and vulnerable within the selected 54 communes and 178 communities (village clusters) where they live. However, because the tools to address poverty are multiple, there were several other beneficiaries. Key central institutions for implementing the PRSP were to benefit from improved governance in central ministries through the integration and the implementation of the existing cross-sectoral, institutional and legislative frameworks and through the monitoring and evaluation system. Because the program also included the environment, beneficiaries were in zones where there was a high need for achieving global environmental benefits through CBIEM.

16. Beneficiaries for the new avian flu component, added in 2008, were the local populations, mostly rural poor, who were to be helped through actions for the prevention and control of HPAI outbreaks in Niger. Among the beneficiaries were consumers of poultry products and the population at large, because a vast outbreak of avian flu--not to speak of the likely panic arising in such a case—would have seriously affected health (see Annex 3).

1.7 Original Components (as approved)

17. Originally the Project had five components:

- (a) **The Community Support** component (US\$3.5 million) was aimed at introducing decentralized and participatory planning procedures and implementation competence by developing the capacity of Community Based Organizations

(CBOs) to design, to carry out, and to manage microprojects. This component was to be implemented in all villages or village clusters (communities) in a selected sample of *communes* in all eight regions (about 15-20 percent of the total population) using a participatory approach. NGOs or other facilitators were to help communities conduct needs assessments and draft local development plans (LDPs). Especially through the capacity building efforts and experience by using the learn-by-doing approach of this component, the project was an essential instrument to support the project development objective (PDO) of establishing and operationalize a transparent mechanism for transferring funds for local development, and the environmental objective of increasing the people's knowledge about the need for integrated ecosystem management.

- (b) **The Local Governance Support** component (US\$3.75 million) was aimed at strengthening administrative and fiscal aspects of integrated local development and supporting central government activities that facilitate decentralization, which was in its infancy, thus helping achieve the objectives of empowering local administrations. The component, encompassing in this phase 54 communes (about 20 percent), had two sub-components:
- *Local governance*, which included selecting for project support local governments in each of the eight regions, and
 - *Policy and institutional reforms*, under which the project was to assist the central government bodies responsible for decentralization and land tenure issues to accelerate the process of decentralization.
- (c) **The Local Investment Fund** (US\$26.6 million). Admitting that poverty reduction is impossible or very slow to reach the local level in the poorest countries without financial resources, the project was to set up a Local Investment Fund as the financing facility for the program. It was to channel small capital grants to communities and local governments for financing microprojects. A central principle of the CAP was that communities and communes would decide to use the LIF for any microproject they consider important, as long as it was part of the development plan prepared locally in a participatory fashion. One-half of the available GEF funds (US\$2.1 million) were to be blended with the IDA funds under this component.
- (d) The **Poverty and Environmental Monitoring (M&E)** component (US\$4.99 million) had three purposes: (i) to measure , poverty trends, to set up baselines for the PRSP, to monitor national trends in Niger's ecosystems and management of natural resources, and to monitor trends in community access to social and economic services; (ii) to monitor the CAP and provide timely feedback to communities and program management on relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and impact of program interventions so that rapid corrective action could be taken when necessary; and (iii) to strengthen local communities' capacity to analyze and manage their own integrated process for local development and ecosystem planning.
- (e) **The Support to Project Management** component (US\$4.99million). Institutional arrangements for project implementation consisted of a Steering Committee, a

National Coordination Unit (*Cellule de Coordination National--CCN*), and Regional Coordination Units in each of the eight regions of the country. In addition, there were regional Approval Committees for microprojects. The component also contained significant resources for capacity building because of the recognized weaknesses in competencies of both the public and nongovernmental sectors, the latter of which were to help carry out the program. The GEF funds were to cover various aspects of program management to help coordinate crosscutting CBIEM-related activities, including communication initiatives on environmental programs.

1.8 Revised Components (Avian Influenza)

18. A supplementary grant equivalent to US\$4.5 million was added in 2008 (toward the end of the CAP's implementation) to finance a new Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) prevention and control component. This could not come from the original project (which was expected to be fully disbursed for the original components), but was an additional grant under the World Bank OP/BP 13.20. This new Component F was expected to be implemented in two years (that is by June 30, 2010) but the completion period was extended by six months to December 31, 2010. The avian flu component included the following subcomponents:

- (a) Support for the recipient country's **veterinary services** related to HPAI, particularly: (i) enhancing prevention and preparedness capacity; (ii) strengthening disease surveillance and diagnostic capacity; and (iii) strengthening control programs and outbreak containment plans;
- (b) Support for the recipient country's **human health services** for HPAI, particularly: (i) strengthening national public health surveillance systems, and (ii) strengthening the health system response capacity;
- (c) Improvement of **public awareness and communications** on HPAI, particularly: (i) supporting information and communications activities, and (ii) improving collaboration with the recipient country's partners and stakeholders, about HPAI; and
- (d) Strengthening of the **monitoring and evaluation** of avian influenza-related activities.

19. A separate and detailed review of the Avian flu component is found in Annex 3.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

20. Project preparation and background analysis were as sound as could be expected at the time of appraisal and benefited in particular from: (a) lessons already learned from other rural development projects, in particular CBD/CDD projects, in Niger and elsewhere, (b) from a

community-driven development project preceding this project, and (c) from a pilot operation (see Box 1).

21. Lessons from other programs included sustainability, decentralization, institution building, monitoring and evaluation, and community and development funds. The Natural Resource Management Project (PGRN) that was about to be completed provided an excellent source of guidance in community-driven programs, decentralized management of natural resources, and the role of stakeholders in conserving biodiversity. The preparation process included pilot activities in the field, managed by eight international and national NGOs. This was an important part of the preparation process as it provided lessons on which to design the implementation phase. In addition, they established institutional linkages with NGOs and donors which were expected to provide guidance and capacity-building to the communities.

Box 1: The CDD context: The community-driven development (CDD) approach built on a rich history of innovations in participatory development, originally experimented outside the Bank. The CDD programs also reflect lessons from earlier efforts by the Bank in support of community-based development (CBD) initiatives in the Bank's client countries. There are several CDD operating principles that are markedly different from CBD program mechanisms which were conceived in response to perceived shortcomings in earlier CBD efforts. Particular differences were in CDD design features for institutional arrangements, the role of local government, and broader governance linkages. In 2003, soon after the CAP in Niger started, the CDD portfolio comprised iterative and evolving programs that built on lessons from across the portfolio. In these programs particular focus was on sustainability, local leadership challenges, and M&E. The total number of Bank projects that included a CBD/CDD component had increased from 5 percent to 25 percent during the period 1989 to 2003. Most African countries had some type of CDD projects.

Source: World Bank OED: The Effectiveness of World Bank Support for Community-Based and -Driven Development, The World Bank, 2005

22. Designing the project was challenging because it encompassed a major task in Niger's public administration while trying to kick-start local development. The design involved a wide range of activities, including capacity building for planning and budgeting processes, transfer of financial resources to communes and communities, financial management and procurement systems, decentralization, policies and regulations for natural resource management, natural resource and agricultural extension, and so on.

23. Even in retrospect, and based on the lessons from other programs and the overall assignment of local-level development, the objectives and approach selected for the program appeared appropriate. The program was to: (a) be long-term; (b) cover multiple sectors; (c) ensure active participation of communities; (d) rely on decentralized financial management; (e) put strong emphasis on monitoring and evaluation; (f) provide financial mechanisms to satisfy basic needs while actively promoting activities that will ensure long-term viability of ecosystems and natural resources; and (g) propose concrete steps for making local governments or the private sector responsible for providing services previously provided by the central government.

24. In the pilot phase, three donors were also involved: the African Development Foundation, the United Nations Capital Development Fund, and the European Union. Still, because none of them were ready to co-finance the project, substantial financial resources and experience in carrying out similar projects were needed, thus justifying the World Bank's intervention. The pilot activities were an important part of the preparation process, because they helped share experiences between the donors and implementing NGOs and provided

lessons on which to design the implementation phase. Because of the pilot phase, project preparation was allowed to be one year longer than it would have been otherwise.

25. The Government was fully behind the program. To support program preparation a working group from central ministries, NGOs, and related donor-funded initiatives was established. Besides, the Government created a multisectoral steering committee from eight ministries to oversee the program. However, indecision about which ministry would supervise the project (the Ministry of Economy and Finance or the Ministry of Agricultural Development) delayed the project's effectiveness.

26. In essence, the risks and mitigating measures were properly assessed. One risk that had been discussed at appraisal but not recorded as a risk in PAD was the possible disinterest of the local populations in natural resource management issues, if no short-term incentives were offered. In retrospect this turned out to be a significant problem (see beneficiary survey results (Annex 6) and stakeholder workshops (Annexes 7 and 8)).

27. The component F on avian flu was prepared as an emergency project (see Annex 3). In view of the emergency nature and novelty of the avian flu component, project preparation and background analysis were as sound as could be expected at the time the Project Paper was prepared, particularly because the document was formulated by Bank staff who were very experienced in Nigerien rural development and governmental administration, in collaboration with the capable coordinator of the *Cellule Permanante/Comité nationale de la lutte contre la grippe aviaire* (a multiministerial and multiagency committee to lead the fight against avian flu). In retrospect, because little practical preparation and planning had been done before approval, the project period – two years – turned out to be unrealistic.

2.2 Implementation

28. During the project period, there were no major changes in the project design, neither was the project ever in a risk status. The midterm review was carried out in the third year of the project, and it included both a self-assessment by the project and an external analysis by the World Bank team.

29. Many factors helped implement the project, including :

- (a) An effective dialogue and coordination mechanism was maintained between the Government, donor partners, and the project both in the field and at the national level.
- (b) Supervision missions were carried out regularly and as a combined effort of the Bank, the Government, and the project staff. The midterm review provided effective guidance and feedback to the implementing authorities. This probably helped offset, at least partly, the lack of a well-defined results framework during the first two or three years of the project (see 2.3 below).
- (c) The project benefited from an experienced project management team; essentially the same team that had managed implementation of the Natural Resources Management Project (PGRN) continued in the Central Coordination Unit (CCN) of this project.

30. Several factors adversely affected the speed and quality of implementation:
- (a) Diversity of the project components and activities required preparation of a multitude of manuals, guidelines, and training modules, consuming project resources and delaying implementation; supervision and technical support to the project required large missions and plenty of time to carry them out.
 - (b) During the first two years, the M&E system of the project did not provide, apart from financial monitoring, satisfactory information to effectively gauge implementation progress.
 - (c) During the early years of the project, Niger was hit by a locust invasion and drought in two consecutive years.
 - (d) Throughout the project, there was lack of funds for some activities, especially because of delays and of failure to provide counterpart funds in a timely fashion, common also for other projects in Niger. These funds were needed for staff salaries, but also for procurement of goods and consultant services, and payment of operating costs. (However, the Government continues to pay the arrears counterpart contributions, thus allowing the project to keep the core CCN staff and continue with the carbon sequestration program).

31. The implementation of the avian flu component started slowly (see Annex 3) because of inadequate preparation in the emergency context. The operations manual, implementation plan, budgeting, logical framework, procurement plan, etc., all had to be done before the component's work could properly proceed. Thus, 18 months after the component became effective, only 21 percent of component funds had been disbursed. However, progress was excellent after the January 2010 implementation support mission, and at the end of the extended implementation period nearly all component funds was used.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

32. *Design.* The funds under Component D helped establishment of the project's M&E. The project had a satisfactory logical framework according to the World Bank guidelines at the project appraisal. It laid out the objectives of the program, causal relationships, and underlying assumptions about how program actions would lead to intended outcomes. The design of the project's M&E had two main weaknesses: (i) input indicators were sometimes used as output indicators and some output indicators were not precise or quantitative; and (ii) the indicators for the GEF objective were difficult to measure in practice.

33. *Implementation.* Except for financial monitoring that was good from the very beginning of the project, implementation of the M&E system started relatively slowly because of an inexperienced M&E coordinator. After two years, a new coordinator was selected, and since then progress in M&E implementation was generally very good. Suitable data was collected by the project through an M&E set-up established from villages to CCN and surveys were conducted on a regular and timely basis. With respect to the main design weaknesses: (i) CAP was the first IDA project in Niger to complete the transition to a results-based M&E system; (ii) new environmental sub-indicators were developed to better monitor the GEF output, baseline data were established, and two environmental surveys were undertaken. Also, it proved difficult to fully carry out the national-level poverty monitoring system.

34. *Utilization.* Especially after midterm, the M&E system was a very important part of the project management and supervision missions. Qualitative evidence, coupled with quantitative facts allowed better-informed decision making. Examples were the use of M&E results to readjust and simplify guidelines for micro-projects to improve their mix and spread, and halting the implementation of Component A one year before the end of the project, because an adequate level of knowledge and know-how about micro-projects was achieved in village clusters supported by the project.

35. The *Project Paper* for the avian flu component listed indicators to measure the performance, and a detailed logical framework was developed which served as an excellent tool for management. Extensive training on M&E was successful in ensuring that reporting on the component's activities was regular. Because of the short duration of the component, there was no formal evaluation of outcomes. However, the CAP organized in 2010 an evaluation exercise with beneficiaries (see Annex 8).

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

36. *Safeguard policies.* The Bank's safeguard policies triggered by the project were OP 4.01 (Environmental Assessment), OP 4.04 (Natural Habitats), and OP4.12 (Involuntary resettlement). An environmental assessment and an environmental management plan were prepared before the project began, and a study on conservation of natural habitats was expected at appraisal. Subsequent studies have shown an increase in land animals and birds especially in project-supported reforestation and land management areas. In the early part of project implementation, CCN review teams noted lack of environmental considerations in some of the micro-projects. Although no substantive concern about involuntary resettlement was originally expected, some micro-projects (water schemes, Acacia Senegal, and other indigenous plantations) have resulted in actual movement of households. Thus, CCN and the Permanent Secretariat of "*Code Rural*" have prepared and implemented compensation rules for such cases.

37. The *Project Paper* for the avian flu component was assigned category B and it triggered OP/BP 4.01 because of its generation of medical waste in health centers and laboratories, thus requiring an environmental assessment. It also triggered OP/BP 4.09 (Pest Management) because of the use of chemicals in disinfecting carcasses and decontaminating burning sites, and OP/BP 4.12 (Involuntary Resettlement) because of the potential need for land acquisition for burning and burial sites (see Annex 3).

38. *Fiduciary compliance.* The project accounts, including regional sub-accounts and Special Accounts, were audited regularly. All audits were unqualified. The main problems stemmed from a lack of budget control; that is, coordination between the financial accounts and commitments for project implementation, resulting in an over-commitment, especially in micro-project approvals, and frequent complaints by Bank missions about "IDA overruns" (in disbursement categories). These problems were resolved toward the end of the project by halting approval of new micro-project applications and by reallocating project funds.

39. During the project period two Procurement Reviews were carried out. In addition, the Bank's procurement specialists regularly participated in supervision missions. Apart from some advisory notes, the reviewers have made no major comments on CAP's procurement activities. The procurement activities have been considered as moderately

risky in the Procurement Reviews and as satisfactory in most Implementation Support Reports (ISRs).

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

40. To ensure a seamless transition from CAP1 to CAP2 under this 12-year adaptable loan (grant) approach, and to take advantage of the fact that CAP I had achieved the triggers and thus qualified to move to the next phase of the program, CAP2 was prepared and appraised under an accelerated procedure in early 2008. The project was approved by the World Bank during the first week of September 2008, with financing of a US\$30 million IDA grant and a US\$4.67 million GEF grant. Project costs were estimated to total US\$44.97 million, including US\$10.3 million from the Government and beneficiaries. CAP2 was co-financed with \$16m from the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD).

41. For the avian flu component, the most important achievement after project completion is the existence of the *Cellule Permanante/Comité nationale de la lutte contre la grippe aviaire*, and the network of committees, focal points, and trained field agents in three ministries. The Government is committed to continue their work, but resources are very limited. It can continue paying the salaries of the two permanent staff and the office expenses, but nothing more has been budgeted for, and no donor agencies are continuing assistance for this purpose. Although there has been no new attack of avian flu in Niger, the case for having a new project or other form of continued financial assistance is strong (see Annex 3).

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

42. The objectives, design, and contribution of the Community Action Project have retained their **high overall current relevance**. The project objectives of institutional development, reduction of poverty through local investments and infrastructures, and a contribution to reducing natural resource degradation, remain as high a priority as they were at appraisal. This is confirmed by the Government's Strategy to Accelerate Growth and Poverty Reduction for the period 2008-2012. The World Bank's current CAS acknowledges that a key development challenge for Niger is rural development, in particular to unlock the growth potential of the agricultural sector. During implementation, the project adapted, as much as possible within its resources and framework, to changed circumstances; for example, the main environmental focus became carbon sequestration (growing Acacia Senegal and other indigenous trees), and a completely new component, preparations to fight against the avian flu was added.

43. During 2009 and 2010 there were no outbreaks of avian flu. Because the networks built up in Niger can be used against other epidemic diseases, subcomponents for helping veterinary services, human health care, communications, and monitoring and evaluation in the fight against avian flu (which subcomponents are applicable also for fighting other epidemics), the objectives, design, and implementation approach are still highly relevant.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development and Global Environment Objectives

44. In assessing the achievement of project objectives, it is necessary to recall that the PDO indicators were defined more precisely at midterm to better measure the achievements and to match with the new Results Framework rather than the old Logical Framework. Here below are the revised indicators.. The achievement of key indicators was as follows:

Key Indicator	Total number of units supported	Target percentage	Percentage reached
Percentage of communities that have elaborated a feasible Local Development Plans	178 communities	75%	100%
Percentage of communities that have implemented at least five CAP-supported micro-projects	178 communities	60%	75%
Percentage of communes that have implemented at least three CAP-supported micro-projects	54 communes	60%	70%

45. The achievements provide appropriate evidence that the Project Development Objective has been met and causal linkages between the components and objectives have been established. Without successfully setting up decentralized, participatory, and transparent financing (resource transfer) mechanisms—as required by PDO--it would have not been possible to have community and commune development plans and to implement the expected number of micro-projects. All stakeholder groups and anyone contacted (including the Departmental officials in Tillabéri and commune councils) agreed on this conclusion in conversations with or reports to the mission.

46. The successful achievement of the PDO stemmed largely from the success of activities in the various components of the project. Most targets set for these were attained or exceeded, as shown in Annex 2. These results were reached essentially with the project interventions (other donors were active in other, more limited areas).

47. *Achievement of GEO.* The goal of the GEO was to promote community-based integrated management of ecosystems and natural resources in order to reduce the region's vulnerability to desertification. While it was not clear at project closing whether some of the original indicators had been achieved (for example, trends in cropping areas and energy for household, food, and medicinal products were not measured), important achievements were made in community-based management of natural resources. For instance, 93 percent of the approved micro-projects included measures to safeguard environmental and social aspects (the target was 32 percent), some 7,800 ha by Acacia Senegal and other indigenous trees had been planted, and 9,000 ha of land area had been improved by sustainable natural management technologies. (Outputs are presented in Annex 2.)

48. *Achievement of objectives for avian flu component:* Most targets set for the indicators were attained or exceeded. Achieving the objectives stemmed largely from the success of activities in the various subcomponents (building a good response against the

avian flu required capacity building in veterinary and human health services, in environmental surveillance, and in communications and monitoring).

3.3 Efficiency

49. The appraisal mission did not perform economic analysis or calculate a financial rate of return for the whole project for several reasons, in particular because the type of project in question, with its several components, many for social development or capacity building, does not lend itself to reliable economic analysis.

50. The PAD analysis tried to use a conventional approach and estimated returns to typical project investments financed under one component, the Local Investment Fund. Thus, a cost-benefit analysis was undertaken on a sample of income-generating activities that were likely to be among community priorities. The analyses included small animal husbandry, petty trade, peanut oil extraction, flour milling, animal carts, and irrigated agriculture. All micro-project investments were found to be profitable, with the exception of growing niébe and rice, which could be made profitable only by improving farming practices (for details, see Annex 4).

51. In 2007 the Project Coordination Unit (CCN) and the Ministry of Agriculture organized, with the help of consultants, an extensive study on the profitability of micro-projects.⁴ This study, using NPV and IRR as the principal tools, showed that 60 percent of micro-project investments were profitable. The remaining 40 percent would have required improvements in their design and implementation to be profitable (nonmonetary benefits were not counted). There were wide variations of profitability depending on the purpose of micro-project, regions where they were implemented, and their “management” group (women’s groups being the best). A summary of the method and results is in Annex 4.

52. No cost analysis was done in the above-mentioned micro-project study, and even for the Local Investment Fund component no cost-efficiency analysis was done of micro-projects or areas to be covered by GEF activities apart from NPV and IRR calculations. It was not possible for the ICR mission to do this analysis retroactively, partly because the project components were related to “soft “ activities and partly because the mission did not have information on the costs of the large number of activities carried out by the project. However, in general terms the ICR mission noted that the projected cost of project management exceeded the budget by more than 120 percent. There were some acceptable reasons for this: new activities were incorporated into the project, training costs in the field were mistakenly assigned to the management component in the early years, and there was a lack of knowledge about the complexities of multi-sectoral local development at appraisal.

53. The cost-efficiency of the micro-projects, especially those for social purposes, also needs further exploring. The micro-project study did not analyze these costs, but the estimates of the ICR team show that the average cost of a micro-project was equivalent of

⁴ / *Evaluation de la rentabilité économique et financière des microprojets générateurs de revenus.* by CAP consultants Yeve Hassane, Doga Garbo, et Siddo Mahamadou, Septembre 2007.

US\$13,000. As most of the 1,170 village-level investments were small, it is probable that the 375 commune-level micro-projects were substantially more expensive, but CCN M&E activity had not collected separate information about the amounts used for commune-level grants and community-level productive micro-projects. The mission's review of selected investments in the regions pointed out that funding for productive micro-projects ranged from a few hundred US dollars for individuals to between US\$5,000 and US\$9,000 for groups (for example, for flour mills, raising animals and processing animal products, and peanut oil milling), and between US\$10,000 and US\$20,000 for such commune-level investments as for cereal, animal feed, and farm input stores.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome and Global Environment Outcome Rating

54. **Rating: Satisfactory.** Factors favoring the satisfactory rating or better include the following:

55. The project objective remains relevant even in the current economic and environmental situation, particularly considering the impossibility of developing such a large country as Niger without decentralization and improved local development capacity (Section 3.1)

56. The development objectives and output targets based on agreed performance indicators were achieved and partially exceeded (Annex 2).

57. Work to attain the GEO generated significant results, although not all targets were achieved.

58. A factor that prevented a higher rating for project development and output objectives was the uncertainty about the project's efficiency (that is, whether the results could have been achieved less expensively), which could not be fully verified because of a lack of relevant information in the Government's study on project results. Also, although NPV and IRR calculations indicated that the most of micro-project investments were profitable, as much as 40 percent of them were unprofitable (not counting the non-monetary benefits) and would have required better design and implementation.

59. The ICR mission for the avian flu component also found that the overall outcome was satisfactory, given that output targets were achieved and the component objective remains relevant (see Annex 3).

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

60. The extent of the project's impact on poverty was not measured, because the planned poverty and environmental monitoring and evaluation system has not yet been completed (see 2.3). However, the micro-project profitability studies and end-of-project evaluation reports point out that poverty among the project's beneficiaries has declined. It is noteworthy that although the productive micro-projects under CAP may not have been for the very poorest because participation in these micro-projects has required a

contribution of 10 to 20 percent, even the very poorest could still benefit from the social micro-projects and collectively managed environmental micro-projects. The Bank's economic sector work on the impacts of SLM programs on land management practices, agricultural production, and poverty in Niger have also showed favorable economic impacts of several land management practices.

61. In 2006, CCN organized a study on the position of women and youth in project areas. The results showed that both groups had gained recognition, particularly women. The target of providing 25 percent of productive micro-projects to women's groups was reached, and the target of having women account for one-third of the members of elected bodies at communes, communities, and micro-project committee was reached in many places, especially where women were active enough to present themselves for elections. Where women were traditionally more withdrawn and less educated, this target was not attained. For youth, the project has offered new opportunities to show their initiative, especially under the carbon sequestration program.

62. The project had substantial impact on social development through financing construction and equipment of schools, improving access to potable water and hygienic latrines, developing feeder roads and marketing infrastructures, and so on. Micro-projects for these purposes totaled 672, representing, 43 percent of all micro-projects. The statistics on these investments are shown in Annex 2.

63. The extent of the avian flu component's impact on poverty was not measured, because no actual attack occurred. However, if this had been the case, it would have mostly affected the poor (see Annex 3).

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

64. As discussed in section 3.2 above, CAP was the main financial instrument for decentralizing public administration and services to 54 communes (20 percent of the total). In addition, the project helped 178 communities (village clusters) develop adequate capacity to design, execute, and evaluate integrated local development/ecosystem plans; to improve their management capabilities; and to secure, plan, and manage financial resources. Furthermore, the key central institutions for carrying out the PRSP benefited from better governance in central ministries through the integration of existing cross-sectoral, institutional, and legislative frameworks and through support to the monitoring and evaluation systems. The opinion shared by all groups of stakeholders is that without CAP these developments would not have been possible (see Annex 7 and 8 on stakeholders' workshops).

65. Similarly, the avian flu component was the main financier for building decentralized capacity to fight the threat of the avian flu in three key ministries and in the regions that were perceived to be areas most likely to suffer should the virus find its way to Niger. Besides the network created, the main institutional beneficiary was the *Cellule permanente/Comité national de lutte contre la grippe aviaire*, for which the avian flu component developed the operational tools.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

66. The large number of approved micro-projects in relation to the available manpower and financial resources forced the project to develop a better-integrated financial control system that will serve the follow-on project as well.

67. A major discovery during the project was that the network built against avian flu was also useful for other animal-human-transmissible diseases. This benefit was recognized during the February 2010 emergence of the swine flu (H1N1 virus) in Niger and raised discussion within the avian flu network about other possible similar uses for the network.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

68. *Stakeholder workshops.* The ICR mission held workshops with stakeholders in three groups: the public and the private sectors, the donor community, and NGOs (see Annex 7) and in 2010 there was another stakeholder meeting on the avian flu component (Annex 8). The lessons suggested by stakeholders are incorporated in Section 6—Lessons learned. Highlights from workshops are as follows:

- (a) The CAP provided a platform for extensive discussions among international and national development partners and therefore has helped a certain degree of harmonization of external assistance in the rural development sector; the development partners have been actively reviewing and commenting on such documents as project-related policies and various guidelines and manuals;
- (b) Commune- and community-level investments have helped establish elected bodies at the communes and have reinforced the capacities and provided infrastructure both at commune and cluster levels. Other donor agencies have benefited from increased capacities and facilities. However, too little attention may have been paid to maintenance of facilities created at these levels, and if maintenance is not improved, the results may be lost when donor money is no longer available;
- (c) Various sectoral ministries have provided technical assistance to micro-projects, but the quality needs to be monitored, especially for water; in addition, the triple involvement of technical services (in preparation of a micro-project, in its approval, and in supervision) could be a weakness; delays and shortfalls in the Government's ten percent counterpart funding have impeded the organization of field missions;
- (d) When people are struggling for survival, they do not necessarily prioritize environmental microprojects, which only generate benefits in the long run, over productive and social microprojects which tend to generate benefits in a shorter timeframe. The participatory planning process need to take account of this bias.
- (e) With respect to avian flu, the project was extremely influential in Niger because it introduced an integrated approach to the fight against the avian flu, one that has been successfully implemented in the key ministries and other agencies. The new component stimulated an entirely new level of dynamism in the ministries, their personnel, and local populations by providing important information, training,

equipment, and operational resources to stakeholders in the fight against avian flu and who, without the project, would have had little chances to organize protection against this potential calamity. The project gave a large number of people knowledge about and skills to fight avian flu; and it helped form coordination committees at the regional, departmental, and community levels to take charge of the avian flu-related activities.

69. *Beneficiary survey.* A beneficiary survey was carried out in 2005-06. It is summarized in Annex 6 and the full survey is available in project files (see Annex 9). While the survey report handles all beneficiary groups, the following presents selected observations regarding women and environmental issues:

- (a) Women's groups in general predate CAP and are organized around contribution or savings and credit activity (*tontines*). Women have confirmed that CAP has energized their groups and offered new possibilities to improve their conditions and start new economic activities;
- (b) Although the beneficiaries of CAP are aware of the degradation of their environment, environmental micro-projects do not have the highest priority in LDPs, and the villagers have been reluctant to provide cash or in-kind contributions to the community to implement such micro-projects, although the required contributions were only from 5 percent to 10 percent of the investment. The reasons include the extent of poverty, which makes people favor such activities as cereal banks, farm input stores, and the breeding of animals, but also wide-spread approaches by other donors and in particular NGOs, which provide different kinds of material incentives to make people participate in environmental programs.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome and Global Environment Outcome

70. **Rating: Moderate.** The moderate risk rating reflects the following assessment of the potential sources of risks and the likely mitigating effect of existing/likely arrangements.

71. *Capacity to continue decentralization and finance the established communes.* A concern is the limited financial capacity of the central and the decentralized public sectors to perform their duties and provide services initiated by CAP1 funds. The mitigating factors of this risk include the Government's clear commitment to decentralization, the capacity-building that has already taken place in target communes, and the fact that communes have already been able to improve their fund raising (e.g., collection of taxes). There is low risk that the decentralization will not continue because the Government's financial gap will be filled largely over the next few years by CAP2 and other donor funds.

72. *Profitability and maintenance of micro-projects:* The technical review of the micro-project facilities in 2007 showed that nearly all structures were technically well implemented and only about 3 percent were of inadequate quality. However, the unprofitability rate of 40 percent for productive micro-projects under Component 3 (Local Investment Fund) raised some concerns (Annex 4): The micro-projects do have nonmonetary benefits, but if their profitability cannot be improved, they may soon be

closed or must find subsidy funds to continue. CAP has already been promoting better budgeting and budget control. It is also important to maintain enough net income to ensure good maintenance of micro-project investments, irrespective of whether they are for productive or social purposes. In this respect, improved fund raising by communes could provide some relief at least for social micro-projects.

73. *Capacity to deal with threat of avian flu:* The review mission for this component rated the risk as “significant” (see Annex 3), given the potential sources of risk and the likely mitigating effect of existing arrangements to deal with the threat in future. Resources are too limited in the post-completion phase to effectively operate the *Cellule Permanente* and continue to expand the avian flu network.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

74. **Rating: Satisfactory.** It was well known at the time of project design that getting local development started in one of the poorest countries in the world would be difficult and could not be done by single-component projects, however well coordinated or linked with other financiers. Thus, a multi-component and multi-agency approach, while clearly demanding, was the only option for the preparation and appraisal teams. The Bank played a key role in helping the Government develop the strategy and the concept for Nigerien conditions. The Bank also financed a Project Preparation Facility and helped with its personnel needed to do analytical work and to coordinate with the Government and potential development partners (although none of them joined as co-financiers). Considering the poverty-reduction strategies of Government (in whose formulation the Bank had been instrumental), the objectives of the project were fully relevant at the time of preparation. Circumstances dictated the linking of decentralization, development of capacity at the national, regional, and local levels, and management of natural resources with community-driven development and financing mechanisms (funds transfer). Moreover, a separate management/coordination unit for the project was dictated by the total lack of field organization before the project. The long and extensive process helped build strong commitment by the Government and approval by other donors. The risk assessment was generally appropriate. However, project preparation was inadequate in respect to the M&E system, especially for the environmental aspects. It was impossible to implement this fully in the field and thus had to be changed at midterm.

75. The review mission for the avian flu component rated Quality at Entry as “moderately satisfactory” (see Annex 3). Bank management reacted to the potential pandemic well and responded to the Government’s request to help by providing a substantial amount from the very limited grant amounts available at that time. Furthermore, the Bank treated the situation as a potential crisis, processed the additional component (in reality, a new small-scale project) under its emergency rules, and approved the grant on the basis of the Project Paper without insisting on an appraisal as usual. The Bank disbursed the funds on timely basis without delays and extended the implementation period of the component to allow sufficient time to achieve the objectives (which was

done successfully). However, because of the urgency to get the project approved, the level of preparedness to start project activities was insufficient. The detailed planning and preparation of basic implementation documents, usually done at appraisal or before, were not done. These were important steps, and doing them after the project had been approved and became effective led to a slow start in the implementation of the component. Especially in view of the component staff's lack of experience in Bank procedures, the Bank management should have provided full-time personnel experienced in Bank operations to help the component get started, for instance, by recruiting consultants to act as expeditors or facilitators.

(b) Quality of Supervision

76. **Rating: Satisfactory.** There were no shortcomings in the proactive identification of opportunities and resolution of threats. Bank supervision was regular and thorough. The nine supervision missions during the project period contained a suitable mix of specialty skills, which was adjusted after each mission. Especially at the beginning of the project the supervision efforts faced a lack of capacity in the region as the Bank's decentralization strategy had not yet been implemented. The aide-memoires were extensive and helped keep the overall implementation process on track. The ratings in Implementation Status and Results reports (ISRs) were generally candid, providing Bank management with information for staff supervision and guiding CCN to pay attention to activities or processes to be corrected.

77. Supervision in general was very proactive and flexible. The midterm mission and its report, for example, led to corrections of the M&E system to make it manageable and focused on development objectives. Two elements were added to the project: (a) the very innovative PHRD grant to promote carbon sequestration, and (b) a component to fight against avian flu.

78. Preparation of the follow-on project was started early to ensure continuity of the program. It should also be noted that the extension of the closing date was not due to shortcomings in the supervision efforts but related to: (a) a delay in effectiveness caused by the political context in Niger; and (b) the addition of the component on avian flu. The supervision budget was higher than average but justified given the very high travel cost in Niger, the lack of supervision skills in-country at the beginning, and the successful achievement of project outcomes.

79. The review mission for the avian flu component rated Quality of Supervision as "moderately satisfactory" (see Annex 3). The Government's internal project completion report evaluated the Bank's assistance as valuable. There had been no formal implementation support mission, although admittedly Bank staff had often been available for the component management, and the Bank had organized training of component staff. But a formal, well-staffed mission immediately after effectiveness would surely have helped the component start faster than it did. When the first and only implementation support mission was carried out in January 2010 in collaboration with the Government, it was thorough and productive. The mission's report gave good advice, prepared procurement plans, and organized continued follow-up by requesting weekly progress reports from the component management. The component's PDO and intermediate indicators were satisfactorily achieved.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance

80. **Rating: Satisfactory.** The satisfactory rating of overall Bank performance is justified by the satisfactory Bank performance at entry and satisfactory performance during supervision. Had Bank performance for the avian flu component been better, overall Bank performance might have justified a “highly satisfactory” rating.

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance

81. **Rating: Moderately satisfactory.** Government contribution was important both in the design of the project and in the success of its implementation. The Government had prepared a poverty-reduction strategy and considered the CAP an important vehicle to achieve its objectives in this respect. In addition, it:

- (a) Organized a multi-agency team to prepare the program, supervise project design, acquire the funds to prepare the program, and generally demonstrate its commitment to the program;
- (b) Promoted policies and legislation that supported CAP objectives and implementation;
- (c) Favored involvement of all donors in the design, discussion, and supervision of the program, and encouraged the use of its practices in other rural development efforts;
- (d) Promptly endorsed the recommendations of the supervision missions (e.g., facilitating contacts with the Bank, including making fund transfers);
- (e) Retained the same experienced staff throughout the project period (e.g., by providing incentives) and facilitated the one change that was necessary (M&E Coordinator);
- (f) Ensured an early start for the transition arrangements by applying for a PPF for the follow-on project.

82. However, the political context was at times difficult. In particular two Government shortcomings offset the favorable factors just mentioned and justify the lowering of the overall rating to “moderately satisfactory”:

- (a) Indecision about which ministry would supervise the project (the Ministry of Economy and Finance or the Ministry of Agricultural Development) delayed the project’s effectiveness;
- (b) Constant delay in paying the annual counterpart funds and failure to contribute part of the committed funds made it difficult to implement the disbursement categories where Government financing was implied. However, the Government has continued to pay counterpart funds after the project ended, thereby enabling the

project staff to continue work while waiting for the follow-on project to become effective).

83. The review mission for the avian flu component rated Government performance as “satisfactory” (see Annex 3). First, the Government contribution was important because of the many actions taken before the component was financed. Second, the Government directed the key ministries to collaborate in the fight against avian flu, use the limited funds in a rational way, and appointed focal points from among its staff both in the center and in the regions. Third, the Government also helped supervise the program and promptly endorsed the recommendations of the supervision mission, as well as following up with the Bank to obtain an extension to the project period and reallocation of funds. The good performance of the Government was somewhat tarnished by the slow procurement process, for which it had review and approval obligations, and by a lack of effort to identify donors for follow-on support.

(b) Implementing Agency Performance

84. **Rating: Satisfactory.** The “satisfactory” rating for agency performance was based primarily on the effective work of the Program Coordination Unit (*Cellule de Coordination Nationale*, CCN) and the Ministry of Decentralization, although several other organizations and agencies were also responsible for implementing the key activities of CAP.

85. The positive factors included the following:

- (a) Building up from next to nothing a functioning public-sector structure in 20 percent of Niger’s newly established communes;
- (b) Quickly setting up the program coordination unit and field organization and recruiting the service providers in all eight regions;
- (c) Achieving an impressive number of outputs in many and diverse activities;
- (d) Ensuring that a major tenet of the strategy—popular participation and consultation with all stakeholders and donors—was strictly and conscientiously adhered to;
- (e) Carrying out numerous studies that improved understanding of the complexities of rural development and implementation of poverty alleviation, and validating the methodologies by getting key stakeholders and resource persons involved;
- (f) Successfully planning and appraising transition arrangements for the next phase of CAP.

86. Operational problems were corrected gradually. These included an inadequate monitoring system for management purposes, poor procurement archives, lack of budget control concerning micro-project applications and available funds, and problems in replenishing Special Accounts, which caused delays in payments to contractors. However, the credit for achieving project development objectives offsets the problems encountered and on balance justifies a “satisfactory” rating.

87. The review mission for the avian flu component rated implementing agency performance as “satisfactory” (see Annex 3). This is based primarily on satisfactorily attaining the PDO and intermediate indicators, for which result the implementing agency, *Cellule Permanente* and the component staff had the greatest effect. The start of the implementation was slow, but once the staff learned the procedures required by the Bank, progress on the numerous targets set for the component was rapid. Moreover, the main project, CAP1, and its successor, CAP2, provided valuable help in resolving particularly procurement problems.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance

88. **Rating: Satisfactory.** The satisfactory rating of overall Borrower’s performance is justified on the following basis:

- (a) The moderately satisfactory rating for the Government performance is offset by the successful performance in project implementation, especially once the main design problem, inadequate M&E planning, was corrected at midterm and CCN was able to produce acceptable information for decision-making;
- (b) The disbursement lag was eliminated before the extended project period ended;
- (c) The development outcome objectives were essentially reached or even exceeded, thanks largely to effectiveness of CCN and support by government agencies, earning an overall satisfactory rating for PDO;
- (d) The Government and the implementing agency behaved proactively with respect to the avian flu component.

6. Lessons Learned

89. The following lessons arise from a review of the CAP experience. They consider the specific country and project characteristics while being forward-looking and relevant to other countries and projects in the region:⁵

- (a) *Importance of strong supervision and a dedicated team.* Bottom-up development based on a community-driven development (CDD) approach can be achieved in a context like Niger if supervision is careful and benefits from a dedicated team. The process is particularly difficult if public services and institutions outside the main cities are limited or non-existent (as was the case in Niger). Success in such situations requires appropriate policies and laws, establishment or strengthening of technical services; extensive education and capacity-building programs at all levels from the capital to villages; and good plans based on long-term and gradual implementation schedules. In such a context implementation arrangements need to

⁵ These lessons are in addition to the “lessons learned” listed in the August 2008 Project Document for the second phase of the Project (CAP2).

be centered in a body that is solely dedicated to the project and thinks about specific activities on a daily basis.

- (b) *Understanding the value of environmental improvements.* In promoting environmental improvements and SLM practices, it is necessary to understand the local people and their habits, concerns, and priorities. To get people interested in such long-term matters as natural resource management and environmental protection (including maintenance of trees), it is absolutely necessary to provide them with concrete incentives (food or cash for work) and perhaps be more “supply-driven.” Poor people struggling with survival always rank subprojects with production benefits above natural resource management subprojects in their priority list. To ensure adequate interest in the latter, natural resource management subprojects may need their own priority listing and separately allocated funds. Also, to improve efficiency, the public-sector environmental staff needs to receive incentives (transport, training, allowances). In addition, political- and higher-level administrators must strongly encourage elected local officials and higher-level administrators to view natural resource management as a high priority.
- (c) *Gradually start using lessons learned.* For a new program in such a challenging field as community-driven development, it is necessary to have modest expectations at the beginning. In Niger, the Community Action Program had an outreach target of 20 percent of the communes (districts) for the first four years.
- (d) *Provision of technical services.* A new and extensive bottom-up program places great demands on technical services, which are usually limited in the regional and provincial (“departmental” in Niger) levels. To be able to respond to demands from the communities, manpower, competencies, and mobility of both the public-sector services and those of NGOs need to be strengthened.
- (e) *Micro-projects and women.* Participating in micro-projects improves the status of women in society. In establishing and running micro-projects in Niger, women proved to be more energetic and responsible in their commitments for financial and in-kind contributions, as well as better at making their micro-projects profitable than were men, mixed groups, or commune administrations. It is not clear, however, whether the better profitability of women’s projects might be attributable to their selection of activities with which they are traditionally more familiar (for example, batik coloring, small business and raising small animals).

90. For the avian flu component, the following lessons were learned (see also Annex 3):

- (a) *Ministerial collaboration.* A concerted effort is useful to bring the different ministries together for a common course of action. Perhaps as its biggest achievement, the avian flu component succeeded in building new, collaborative networks at all four levels (central, regional, departmental, and local communities) to fight avian flu.
- (b) *Special nature of an emergency program.* The slow start in carrying out this component revealed some special requirements. In an emergency, extraordinary measures are needed. While it is important to process loans or grants rapidly to

bring the necessary resources to where they are needed, it is equally important to make sure that there is sufficient knowledgeable personnel to get the program started without delay.

- (c) *Appropriate indicators.* For an emergency program the intended outcome is that the effects of the crisis are minimized and recovery from the disaster can start. For an avian flu attack the outcome would be that information is quickly shared with responsible authorities and that deaths are avoided or at least minimized. Thus the original outcome indicators in the Project Paper were correctly conceived when they largely concentrated on the reaction and reporting times by the local population and then by the authorities responsible for surveillance and treatment. Because, fortunately, no H5N1 virus reappeared in Niger, the emphasis was shifted to indicators that measured attainment of objectives set for different activities.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners

(a) Borrower/implementing agencies

91. See Annexes 9 and 10.

(b) Cofinanciers

92. Not applicable

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent) ⁶

Community Action Program - P065991			
Components	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
A. Community Support	2.60	0.69	26
B. Local Governance Support	2.75	3.24	117
C. Local Investment Fund	22.50	19.55	86
D. Poverty and Environmental Monitoring	3.44	2.83	82
E. Support to Project Management	3.71	8.69	234
F. Avian Flu⁷	0.00	0.00	
Total Project Costs	35.00	35.00	100
Community-based Integrated Ecosystem Management - P073011			
Components	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
A. Community Support	0.50	0.29	58
B. Local Governance Support	0.40	0.22	55
C. Local Investment Fund	2.10	1.99	94
D. Poverty and Environmental Monitoring	0.50	0.60	120
E. Support to Project Management	0.50	0.90	180
F. Avian Flu	0.00	0.00	
Total Project Cost	4.00	4.00	100

⁶ / Financial information is from CAP. The amounts do not correspond exactly with the appraisal estimates, because the grant was in SDR and there has been a substantial change in the exchange rates between dollar and SDR. (On November 11, 2008 the disbursements were 99.99% for IDA and 99.76% for GEF.)

⁷ The Avian flu component is trust funded.

Component F (IDA-H0250) of the Community Action Program (P065991)			
Components	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
A. Support to Veterinary Services	2.37	2.03	86.6
B. Support to Human Health Services	0.74	0.88	118.9
C. Public Awareness and Communications	0.34	0.24	70.5
D. M&E	1.04	1.00	96.2
Total Project Costs	4.50	4.15	92.3

(b) Financing

P065991 - Community Action Program				
Source of Funds	Type of Financing	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
Borrower		2.83	2.83	100
Local Communities		2.00	2.00	100
IDA Grant		35.00	35.00	100
P073011 - Community-based Integrated Ecosystem Management				
Source of Funds	Type of Financing	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
Borrower		0.00	0.00	0
Global Environment Facility (GEF)		4.00	4.00	100

Component F (IDA-H0250) - Community Action Program (P065991)--Avian flu				
Source of Funds	Type of Financing	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
Borrower		0.00	0.00	0
Local Communities		0.00	0.00	0
IDA Grant		4.50	4.15	92

Annex 2. Outputs by Component

A. MAIN PROJECT (i.e. without Avian Flu component)

Component A—Community Support (end 2007)

Principal Activities	Indicators	Project-ion	Actual	Rate of Implementation
Organizing of information missions	Number of people contacted	Not projected	52,760	-
Organizing village clusters	Number of self-organized clusters	150	178	119%
Putting in place or activated management organs for clusters	Number of organs supported	534	534	100%
Training of cluster organs in collaborative approach	Number of persons trained	3,750	5,609	149%
Training of Procurement Committees	Number of persons trained	890	1,167	131%
Organizing forums for inter-cluster meetings	Number of persons trained	Not projected	1,160	-
Preparing or activating local development plans (LDP)	Number of LDP prepared or activated	150	170	119%
Preparing micro-project plans and request	Number of plans and requests	2,000	2,934	147%
Reactivating savings and credit cooperatives of the previous PGRN	Number of cooperatives supported	5	5	100%

1. To achieve the outputs listed above, it was necessary, besides recruiting NGOs to carry out the field work, to develop the necessary tools, such as:

- Guidelines for preparing local development plans;
- Documentation for the micro-projects and the model formats and rules for analyzing and approval of micro-projects;
- Training modules and training guidelines for teachers and instructors in different topics, including alphabetization, environmental education, cluster committee work, etc.; and
- Technical manuals on natural resource management and agricultural and livestock activities

Component B—Local Government Support (end 2007)

Principal Activities	Indicators	Projection	Actual	Rate of Implementation
Bring technical assistance to communes (put in place Community Organizers)	communes supported	54	54	100%
Train persons active in commune organs in administration and management	active persons	787	1,134	144%
Train persons active in commune organs in budget management	active persons	787	1,051	133%
Train persons active in commune organs fiscal management	active persons	787	1,179	146%
Train persons active in commune organs in communal planning	active persons	787	1,202	152%
Train persons active in commune organs in procurement	active persons	270	274	101%
Train persons active in commune organs in M&E	active persons	270	185	68%
Train persons active in commune organs in civil society activities	active persons	270	450	166%
Train persons active in commune organs in environmental activities	active persons	787	615	78%
Train persons active in commune organs in land management and “dominiale”	active persons	280	117	41%
Study tours outside the commune	communes benefited	54	54	100%
Prepare, validate, and adopt commune development plans (CDP)	CDP prepared and validated	54	54	100%
Financing a CDP preparation guide	Document prepared	1	1	100%
Preparation of micro-project plans and applications for communes	plans	540	675	125%
Inform/sensitize people active in commune organs about cooperative laws	people informed/sensitized	Not projected	229	-
Carrying out studies	studies	5	4	80%
Support preparation of decentralization laws and decrees	projects	5	3	60%
Establish COFODEPs (Commissions foncières departementales)	COFODEPs established	2	2	100%
Establish COFOCOMs (Commissions foncières communes)	COFOCOMs established	54	9	17%

2. Other benefits accompanying the outputs were noticed during project implementation, such as:

- Alphabetization of elected representatives and increased use of local languages;
- Establishment of local information “banks;”

- Reorientation of training courses and their lengthening; and
- Creation of improved synergies among the development partners.

Component C: Local Investment Fund (End 2007)

Table 1: Implementation of Micro-Projects in Different Regions

Type of micro-project	Region								
	Agadez	Diffa	Dosso	Maradi	Tahoua	Tillabèri	Zinder	CUN	Total
Water and purification	16	11	19	26	20	50	27	13	182
Education	23	41	57	10	22	84	50	21	302
Natural resource management	16	43	23	24	23	71	26	16	252
Production, processing, trading	119	68	61	71	63	122	91	35	621
Health	4	14	9	16	0	17	41	4	105
Rural transport						2		4	6
Other infrastructures	8	5	15	8	6	8	19	9	78
Total	186	182	184	155	134	348	254	102	1,546

3. In the environmental sector, the project incorporated during its latter part an activity of planting Acacia Senegal trees (and similar other indigenous trees) that gained great enthusiasm among the villagers under a program of carbon sequestration, under the Kyoto environmental agreement. The target for years 2006 and 2007 was planting 9,000 ha, of which 7,800 ha were planted (87 percent). The work happened in 82 micro-project sites (part of the 2,525 sites mentioned above), and required establishment of 110 tree nurseries.

Table 2: Physical Achievements in the Environmental Sector (December 31, 2007)

Principal activities	Indicators	Physical achievements
Financing and implementation of natural resource management micro-projects	Number of sites planted by Acacia Senegal	41
	Area recovered and planted by Acacia Senegal	6 943 ha
	Number of wells built or rehabilitated	36 wells
	Number of pastoral water systems (<i>forages</i>) constructed or rehabilitated	2 water systems
	Number of <i>koris</i> (river-bottom overpasses) treated	5 <i>koris</i>
	Number of hearths (fireplaces) improved and distributed	2,210 hearths
Financing and implementation of micro-projects for water and sanitation	Number of village wells	77 wells
	Number of village water systems	55 water systems
	Number of mini waterpipe lines	14 lines
	Number of village latrines	189 latrines
	Number of refuse collection/dumping ground	215 dumping grounds

4. Out of the 1,564 implemented micro-projects, 375 were at the commune level and 1,171 at the communities' level (village clusters--“*grappes*”). Preparation and planning of micro-projects accelerated over the project years, except for the last year, when the total finances of the project were nearly exhausted. The rate of implementation of micro-projects in years 2004 to 2006 was as follows: 93, 394, 980, and 79, respectively.

5. Only about 88 percent of funds reserved for the component in PAD were used for this component, because dollar devaluation reduced the overall project funds and because the project management component required more funds than anticipated. Many micro-projects approved were canceled in Tillabèri, Dosso, Maradi, and Tahoua regions.

Component D—Poverty and Environmental Monitoring

6. Monitoring of project financial and physical activities started immediately after the start of the project. It contained preparation of a manual (*Système Intégré de Gestion du PAC*) and installation of two computer programs (*Tompro and Tecpro*) to integrate the financial and physical aspects of monitoring. However, in the beginning the system did not provide adequate information for the management to learn whether the project was advancing at the required speed. At mid-term, the systems were improved and changed to follow both the physical and financial outputs and project outcomes. (CAP was the first Nigerien project to change to Results Framework.)

7. *Subcomponent National Poverty Monitoring System.* At the national level, CAP provided funds to several governmental agencies (SP/SRP, SE/SDR, DGEPD, and SIGNER) for training, defining of indicators, and collecting of data and information. In 2006 and 2007, CAP, in collaboration with ICRISAT and IFPRI, carried out two studies. One study on the impacts of the recommended natural resource technologies and another on outlining of a M&E system that suits into the realities of Niger.

8. *Subcomponent Community-Based M&E.* The monitoring and evaluation system for following local-level project activities has been implemented to provide an extensive set of data and information. During the final year of the project, 91 percent of the 54 communes benefiting from the project collected data and information satisfactorily manner and sent them regularly to their Regional Coordination Unit. Respectively, 74 percent of the 278 village clusters benefiting from the project collected data and information satisfactorily manner and sent them regularly to their Regional Coordination Unit.

9. Beside preparation of the manuals, installation of computer systems, and extensive training at different levels from the Steering Committee to local villages, the project has prepared:

- Four annual, consolidated work plans,
- 54 baseline analysis of communes;
- Eight base-line analysis of GEF-funding sites;
- Eight regional baseline analysis of village clusters;
- Two special studies on intermediary results;
- Two special mid-term studies;
- Five evaluation studies of the performance of intermediary and support organizations,

- Four sub-sector studies (sustainability of natural resource management; methodology for communal M&E, public-sector expenditures in 2001-2006; and harmonization of programs and plans of natural resource management); and
- Two audit reports on environmental and social microprojects financed by CAP.

10. The funds used for the component Poverty and Environmental Monitoring were equivalent to US\$3.8 million, that is, 90 percent of the original allocation of funds for the component.

Component E—Support to Project Management

11. Financing of Component E has facilitated the following outputs:

- Establishment of the project management office and carrying out the coordination, administrative, financial, audit, procurement, logistics management, and M&E functions of the project;
- Establishment of effective regional coordination offices and provision of funds for their operations and the micro-projects in communes and village clusters;
- Outsourcing of field operations to NGOs and engaging consultants and various agencies for fieldwork and studies; making memorandums of understanding or contracts with nearly 20 government and private agencies;
- Provision of funds and guidance to project-linked public-sector agencies;
- Carrying out an extensive communication program, including radio programs in local languages, international radio programs, TV programs; newspaper articles, pamphlets on various topics; translation of manuals and documents into local languages and French, training of community organizers in communication techniques, etc.;
- Supervision of fieldwork and organizing the external support missions;
- Keeping the donor community well-informed about CAP activities; and
- Organizing mid-term review and related studies and preparation of the final evaluation of the project.

12. In addition, the project has incorporated new activities and funding, such carbon sequestration and fighting against the avian flu (the latter is not reviewed in this report).

13. While GEF funds have been largely blended within the micro-projects, the following other outputs were recorded:

- Evaluation of the National Civil service personnel responsible for GEF sites (as recommended by the mid-term review);
- Organizing a workshop to train CAP agents and service providers in environmental and social safeguards;
- Production of communication documents on environmental matters in local languages;
- Preparation of education modules on environmental protection;
- Subject-matter support to the preparation of modules for training of trainers;
- Review of technical world list to be included in database of land use in Niger; and
- Preparation of several methodological tools for environmental procedures, natural resources manual, intervention plans in GEF sites, databases, etc.

14. The funds used for the Project Management Component, including the communication activities and national-level studies, were US\$9.7 million, that is, 22 percent of the project costs and more than double of the original allocation of funds for this component.

B. AVIAN FLU COMPONENT

Subcomponent 1— Support for the veterinary services (end 2010)

Key indicators:⁸

Principal Activities	Indicators	Project-ion	Actual	Rate of Implementation
Acquiring of cartographic software on zoning and habitation centers of Niger	Number of software packages	1	4	400%
Training of veterinary agents in geographic information system	Number of agents	10	26	260%
Providing the Regional livestock and animal industry directorates with Global Positioning Systems (GPS)	Number of units	10	10	100%
Preparation of a cartographic study on aviculture farms in Niger	Study	1	1	100%
Training of veterinary and environmental staff in active surveillance of avian flu	Number of persons	88	118	134%
Training of veterinary staff in slaughtering and vaccination of birds	Number of persons	90	104	116%
Rehabilitation of veterinary laboratories	Number of laboratories	2	2	100%
Organizing visits to active veterinary and environmental surveillance posts established (in key regions)	Number of visit	11,200	14,512	130%
Provision of surveillance items for environmental surveillance posts (binoculars, telescopes, GPS, birds recognition guidelines, information technology, etc.	Procurement lot	1	1	100
Training of environmental and water services agents in humid zone bird observation	Number of persons	62	49	79%
Training of veterinary, environmental, and human health personnel in biosecurity	Number of persons	87	78	90%

⁸ / The full set of indicators and outputs is in the Government's Project Completion Report, which is in Project Files and available from the TTL. The ICR mission chose for this annex the indicators that were most closely related to the PDO of the component, that is, to develop national response capacity in case of an avian flu attack. .

Buying of a new freezer-dryer or spareparts for the old one	Unit or set	1	0	0%%
Establishing a Website for the surveillance network	Internet setup	1	0	0%

15. These and other outputs were attained by using FCFA 958 million, that is, 85 percent of the subcomponent allocation. To achieve the outputs listed above, it was necessary to purchase equipment, to develop the necessary tools, such as training modules and training guidelines for teachers and instructors in different topics, including environmental education, bio-security, active surveillance, committee work, etc., and prepare technical manuals on operational procedures and environmental protection issues.

Subcomponent 2— Support for the human health services (end 2010)

Principal Activities	Indicators	Project-ion	Actual	Rate of Implementation
Rehabilitation of isolation rooms in three regional and one national hospital	Number	4	3	75%
Provide four reference hospitals/health centers with basic equipment needed for handling avian flu	Number	4	4	100%
Provide 20 districts in the risk zone with radios	Radios	20	20	100%
Provide 4 reference hospitals, 20 district hospitals and 16 health centers in the risk zone with protection equipment and medicines	Sets of equipment and medicine	40	40	100%
Provide the laboratories in 4 reference hospitals, 20 district hospitals and 16 health centers in the risk zone with reactivities, medical testing material and other laboratory material (“ <i>consommables</i> ”)	Sets of reactivities, testing material, and <i>consommables</i>	24	24	100%
Training and rotating of health-sector staff in taking care of people with the avian flu virus	Number of persons	156	202	129%
Organizing rapid missions of an investigation team from national level	Number of response missions	1	1	100% (Carried out for swine flu)
Organizing missions of regional and departmental investigations teams	Amount	FCFA 3.2 million	0	0% (no report on avian flu was received from the field)

16. These and other health-sector outputs were attained by using FCFA 432 million, that is, 122 percent of the subcomponent allocation, because most of the equipment and hospital materials cost more than originally estimated. Training costs were very close to the projection at 101 percent of the funds reserved for it.

Subcomponent 3: Improvement of public awareness and communications on HPAI (End 2010)

Principal Activities	Indicators	Project-ion	Actual	Rate of Implementation
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Preparation and pre-testing of educational support material	Sets of material	3	1	33%
Dissemination of educational support material	Regional contracts	3	4	133%
Training of 200 persons in the aviculture subsector (sales people, processors, farmers, etc.) in preventive and processing measures	Training sessions	6	21	350%
Production and distributing out educational posters on surveillance avian flu	Posters	10,000	6,000	60%
Training the large-scale poultry entrepreneurs on biosecurity	Training sessions	3	1	33%
Training and rotating of health-sector staff in taking care of people with the avian flu virus	Number of persons	156	202	129%
Provide the surveillance system agents (incl. veterinary, human health, and environmental) with cellular phone	Number	500	500	100%
Distribute directive guidelines on culling of sick birds and financial compensation	Contracts	50	0	0% (No new attack, so no culling or compensation were needed)

17. These and other health-sector outputs were attained by using FCFA 118 million, that is, 71 percent of the allocation of funds for the subcomponent. Many of the planned activities were to be carried out only if an avian flu attack occurred.

Subcomponent 4— Strengthening of the monitoring and evaluation of avian influenza-related activities (end 2010)

Principal Activities	Indicators	Project-ion	Actual	Rate of Implementation
Organizing meetings of the Steering Committee	Meetings	2	2	33%
Paying regularly the salaries and benefits of the contractual personnel	Person months	49	70	144% (Project period and contracts were extended)
Organizing component launching workshop for all stakeholders	Workshop	1	1	100%
Organizing workshop for all stakeholders for gaining consensus for operations manual and culling and	Workshop	1	1	100%

compensation directives				
Assuring the functioning of the decentralized avian flu committees	Amount	FCFA 56 million	FCFA 151 million	269%
Preparation of the periodic M&E reports and monitoring notes	Number of reports and notes	13	31	238%
Organizing joint supervision missions for the Bank, Government and component staff	Number of missions	3	1	33%
Organizing technical support missions to provinces by the PIU/ <i>Cellular permanent</i>	Number of missions	4	2	50%
Organizing selected committee members' participation in national and international conferences on avian flu	Persons	6	11	183
Providing the regional committees with computers and video projectors	Sets	8	8	100%
Providing the Veterinary, human health and environmental units with Internet connections	Units	10	4	40

18. These and other M&E and component coordination outputs were attained by using FCFA 479 million, that is, 96 percent of the subcomponent allocation. Many of the planned activities were to be carried out only if an avian flu attack occurred.

Annex 3. Supplementary Annex on Avian flu Component

Context

1. Of the actively employed population in Niger, 84 percent of men and 97 percent of women were involved in growing crops or raising livestock. The poultry subsector, estimated at 30 million birds, is very important in Niger despite its predominantly traditional production. Since the January 2006 outbreak of the highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in northern Nigeria, Niger has faced a serious threat of spillover. The first outbreak in Niger, which occurred in Magaria and Boko Mai Gao departments (at the border with Nigeria), resulted in the culling of 17,891 birds; some 1,950 affected households were compensated with FCFA 18,871,000 (US\$37,700 equivalent), by French development aid. If such an outbreak were to happen again and without compensation, mostly very poor households would suffer a significant loss.
2. Following a Government-organized rapid assessment mission of veterinary services in March 2006, the performance of the veterinary services was evaluated in accordance with the World Organization for Animal Health/*Office International des Epizooties* (OIE) guidelines. The evaluation mission concluded that the veterinary services in Niger were particularly weak in human resources management, data and statistics management, legal and regulatory aspects, laboratory capacity, and financial and logistical resources. The mission recommended that restoring the capacity of veterinary services should have a high priority if these services were expected fulfill their expected mandate in conformity with standards of OIE
3. The Ministry of Animal Resources, the Ministry of Public Health, and the Ministry of Environment and Control of Desertification, in collaboration with other concerned Government agencies and the donor community, prepared in February 2006 a National Emergency Plan for Prevention and Control of Avian Influenza (NEPPCAI) to address outbreaks of HPAI in the country. This plan, consolidated in April 2006, had 21 areas of intervention and its overall cost was estimated at US\$24 million. The plan was multi-sectoral, covering animal health, human health, and communications, and it promoted partnership between animal and human health agencies to facilitate control of zoonotic diseases while also addressing potential adverse environmental impacts.
4. When the first NEPPCAI was prepared, the Government requested support from the Bank to respond to the threat of avian influenza. The organizational and institutional arrangements set up to respond to the HPAI issue--and, more specifically, the National Emergency Plan -- proved the Government's serious commitment to fight HPAI. The March 2006 evaluation of the performance of the veterinary services implied the same level of commitment. But, as mentioned, the human and material capacity of Niger to meet the challenge that HPAI presented was questionable.
5. When the Niger Government requested financial assistance from IDA, it was well known that, despite considerable efforts made in Nigeria to contain the HPAI outbreaks, the relatively high density of poultry production in Niger and the various sources of poultry importation posed a substantial risk of HPAI reoccurrences. It was feared that Nigeria would be a source of new outbreaks in Niger given the two countries' long and porous border of about 1,500 kilometers.

6. *Consistency with CAS.* At the time the avian flu component for CAPI was designed, the Country Assistance Strategy of 2003-2007 was still current. It was expected then that the PRSP II would strongly inspire the upcoming CAS. The HPAI activity was in line with the CAS, which made clear the need for strategic forecasting for natural disasters, including animal disease outbreaks comprising epizooties. A well-designed and fully implemented HPAI preparedness and control component was needed to prevent heavy losses of poultry, and thus to avoid compromising poultry's initial role as a "stepping-stone" in asset accumulation and poverty alleviation among the poorest. Under the IDA 13 guidelines for allocation of grants, the CAS 2003-2007 provided Niger with a significant amount of future funding in the form of IDA grants.

7. *Beneficiaries:* The ultimate beneficiaries for the new avian flu component were the local populations, mostly poor people and those living in rural areas, who were to be helped through appropriate actions for the prevention and control of HPAI outbreaks in Niger. The closest beneficiaries were expected to be commercial and "backyard" poultry farmers, but the Project Paper identified as intermediate beneficiaries identified also veterinary and public health service workers and laboratory staffs, whose work would be greatly facilitated by the funding that Component F entailed.

8. The beneficiaries were also to include the consumers of poultry products and the population at large, because a vast outbreak of avian flu--not to speak of the likely panic arising in such a case--would have seriously affected them. Public concerns about consuming poultry and information about personal safety measures against the avian flu virus were to be addressed through the information and communications activities planned under Component F. Besides increasing public awareness and participation in HPAI control and prevention, it was also important to ensure full compliance with environmental and social safeguard regulations.

Component Details

9. The proposed additional grant was planned to help pay for a new HPAI prevention and control component, which would include the following subcomponents:

- (a) Support for the recipient country's veterinary services related to HPAI, particularly: (i) enhancing prevention and preparedness capacity; (ii) strengthening disease surveillance and diagnostic capacity; and (iii) strengthening control programs and outbreak containment plans;
- (b) Support for the recipient country's human health services about HPAI, particularly: (i) strengthening national public health surveillance systems and (ii) strengthening the health system response capacity;
- (c) Improvement of public awareness and communications on HPAI, particularly: (i) supporting information and communications activities and (ii) improving collaboration with the recipient country's partners and stakeholders, on HPAI; and
- (d) Strengthening of the monitoring and evaluation of avian influenza-related activities.

10. Funding the new component, equivalent to US\$4.5 million, did not come from the original project (which was expected to be fully disbursed for the original components), but was an additional grant under the World Bank OP/BP 13.20. The component was expected to be completed in two years, that is, by June 30, 2010, but the completion period was extended by six months to December 31, 2010.

11. *Objectives of Component F.* Although the World Bank grant to fight avian flu resulted in a new component, it did not change the PDO; on the contrary, the incremental component was to contribute to the first set of outcomes of CAP1, which were to design and implement decentralized, participatory, and transparent financing mechanisms that enable communities and local governments to carry out their development plans. The new component was also to concentrate on enabling communities and local governments to take appropriate action for the prevention and control of HPAI outbreaks in Niger. For this purpose, the avian flu component added seven new performance indicators for accurately measuring achievement of the component's envisaged outcomes.⁹

12. The proposed activities were to enhance the impact of the original development objectives of the CAP1 by helping communities and local governments to carry out their own development plans and to promote community-based integrated ecosystem management, because the HPAI activities will help the country to prevent or mitigate any avian flu outbreak and help communities restore their poultry subsector as an income-generating activity, if avian flu outbreak.

13. *Indicators of Component F.* Expected outcomes and outcome indicators as presented in CAP1 remained unchanged. The following intermediate outcomes indicators were introduced to monitor the new CAP'S HPAI subcomponents (the revised Project Implementation Manual was to consider these changes, and to gather baseline data during the first two months of the additional financing):

14. Animal Health subcomponent:

- Animal disease control and prevention systems are strengthened:
 - Time for farmers to report suspicious deaths to veterinarians (private and public);
 - The response time (official Veterinarian Services) after a declared outbreak to cull the birds is established;
 - Farmers get appropriate and on-time compensation for culled birds; and
 - Birds are culled in accordance with the environmental plan guidelines.

15. Human Health subcomponent:

- HPAI surveillance system and preparedness abilities are strengthened:
 - Time to report suspicious sickness to officials; and
 - The officials' response time (quarantine measures) following a report of a suspicious sickness.

⁹ / Project Paper on additional financing grant for CAP1 for the fight against avian flu, Section VI.

16. Social Mobilization and Strategic Communication subcomponent:

- Increased awareness and participation in HFAI infection control and prevention;
- Use of good health practices among key people in commercial farms, markets, and laboratories.

17. When the component was restructured for extending the completion period for the avian flu component in May 2010, some intermediate indicators were modified. No avian flu attack had taken place during the implementation period of the component, and some indicators were meant to measure the reaction time for such an attack at different levels. Thus, some indicators were removed, as was the one dealing with good health practices by poultry handlers and respective laboratories. Instead, the following indicators were introduced:¹⁰

- H5N1 surveillance committees at the local, departmental, and regional levels are fully operational;
- Personnel of the Veterinary Services and of the Ministry of environment are trained in H5N1- and H1N1-related areas;
- The Central Veterinary Laboratory in Niamey has increased its capacity for production of vaccines;
- Public health service personnel are trained to handle H5N1 and H1N1; and
- Key regional and departmental health centers are functional and equipped with isolation facilities.

Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

18. The component F of CAP1 on avian flu was an emergency project. Considering that there were no other such projects in Niger, direct guidance on its formulation could not be obtained in the country. However, there was already a large avian flu project in Nigeria, as well as substantial information on the Internet (WHO Website and others), and the small component preparation team used both of these resources effectively. Also, the Government had two years earlier prepared an emergency plan (essentially, the material and training requirements), and UNICEF and WHO, among others, had helped prepare and partly implement an information plan. In view of the emergency nature and novelty of the avian flu component, project preparation and background analysis were as sound as could be expected at the time the Project Paper was prepared, particularly because the document was drafted by Bank staff who were very experienced in Nigerien rural development and governmental administration, as well as the coordinator of the *Cellule Permanente/Comité nationale de la lutte contre la grippe aviaire* (a multiministerial and multiagency committee to lead the fight against avian flu) and the Bank's head office staff.

19. The Project Paper carefully considered the environmental implications of the avian flu component, as well as the safeguarding policies. The planners also considered the risks

¹⁰ / Project Restructuring Paper, Annex 1.

involved in successful implementation of the component. Considering the newness of the project, the ICR mission judged most of the risks identified to be appropriate, except for the financial management risks, which were overestimated, since the component was a part of the Community Action Program that already had good financial management. The concern about the Government's commitment was perhaps unnecessary; the Government was fully behind the program. Two years earlier besides setting-up the *Cellule Permanente*, the Government had a multisectoral steering committee from eight ministries to oversee the CAP. The avian flu component, being entirely financed by the World Bank, did not require financial commitment from the Government beyond maintaining the staff in the *Cellule Permanente*.

20. One risk that escaped the planners was the potential tardiness in getting the project started. Because of the perceived emergency, the grant was approved on the basis of the Project Paper without an appraisal, and Niger was not ready to start implementation of the component immediately. However, the overall design of the component—objectives, components, and organization—was appropriate, especially the aspect that it was linked closely to the existing CAP1, which ensured, for instance, the accounting and financial reporting would experience no problems during the component's implementation period. But because so little practical preparation and planning had been done before approval, the project period—two years--was unrealistic.

Implementation

21. During the project period there were no major changes in the component design, and the project was never in a risk status. However, the implementation period of two years turned out to be too short and it was extended by six months. Because of the short implementation period, there was no midterm review. As the new Bank procedures require a formal restructuring when the completion period is extended, such restructuring was carried out in May 2010 based on the January 2010 supervision mission. The restructuring also included some reallocation of funds among components.

22. Many factors facilitated implementation of the project:

- The danger of a potential pandemic was well understood and the Government maintained its strong commitment to the project, participating in its supervision, facilitating communication with the Bank and funds transfer from the Bank, as well as providing guidance through the National Committee for the Fight against Avian Flu and the Steering Committee of the CAP.
- Although there was only one formal implementation support mission, Bank staff, especially those of the Niamey Country Office, were available for advice and guidance throughout the implementation period.
- The project benefited from a committed staff and access to the experienced management team of CAP1 and later CAP2, for instance, in financial management and, to some extent, in procurement (the component office was in the same premises with these projects). The monitoring and evaluation system, which had a detailed logical framework with indicators that was implemented early, helped implementing the program in regions and departments.

23. However, as already mentioned, implementation of the avian flu component started slowly. The main reason was that because this was an emergency project, the usual plans and preparations that are done at project preparation or appraisal were not completed and partially not even started when the component was approved or became effective. The operations manual, other manuals, identification of requirements and preparation of a detailed implementation plan, annual budgeting, logical framework, procurement plan, and so on--all had to be done before the component's work could properly proceed. Thus, 18 months after the component became effective, only 21 percent of component funds had been disbursed. However, progress was excellent after the January 2010 implementation support mission, and at the end of the extended implementation period nearly all component funds had been used (see Annex 1).

24. Other factors also adversely affected the speed and quality of implementation:

- The component's staff was unfamiliar with World Bank procedures, particularly the procurement regulations and the review procedures requiring the Bank's no-objections.
- The distances to the areas that were perceived as critical in preventing and controlling avian flu were huge (the distance from Niamey to Tahoua Region is 550 km, to Maradi Region 700 km, and to Zinder Region 900 km).
- A tense political situation resulted in a military coup in February 2010 and temporarily halted the Bank's operations in Niger.
- All the focal points at the central ministries and in the respective administrative units in the regions and departments were responsible for other, often very demanding, tasks, and they sometimes found it difficult to focus on the avian flu program.¹¹

Monitoring and Evaluation

25. The funds under Component D of CAP1 had helped establishment of the main project's M&E, which provided the basis for the M&E of the new avian flu component. The Project Paper provided a basis for the missing logical framework by suggesting a list of indicators to measure the performance of the component, but further work was required to make it serve as a management tool. The component management organized a stakeholders' workshop to identify the requirements that the project was expected to finance and prepare a detailed logical framework. Another workshop and various reviews validated it and the World Bank gave its no-objection. The logical framework laid out the objectives of the program, causal relationships, and underlying assumptions about how program actions would lead to intended outcomes. As a minor deviation from the norm for these project frameworks, the ICR mission noted that the framework was not solely for the avian flu component of the project but also included all the activities of the *Cellule Permanente pour la Lutte contre la Grippe Aviaire*, and that some activities had been financed by other donors.

26. *M&E implementation.* Although the size of the country and even the "passive surveillance" area¹² posed significant challenges for M&E, the organized training--

¹¹ / Other problems are mentioned in Annex 6 (Stakeholders' views).

including extensive training material and model forms, and field arrangements--was successful and reporting became soon regular. The reporting was based on standardized monthly monitoring forms filled in by the agents of the three key ministers at the community level. The forms were first collated at the departmental level and then at the regional level. The regions sent them monthly to the M&E Unit at the center, which reviewed them, verified information when necessary (the cellular phones purchased and distributed under the project were of special help), and used the results as a basis for quarterly and annual reports of the component. The system worked so well that it continued even when the M&E Coordinator moved to CAP2 in June 2010 and was able to use only a small part of his time for the avian flu monitoring, but the quarterly reports and the internal component completion report came out on time. (See the summary of the final report in Annex 7).

27. *M&E utilization.* At the beginning of the implementation, the project organized a baseline survey, which gave a basis for comparing the outputs to the before-project situation. Because the logical framework was very detailed, containing tens of indicators for each subcomponent, it was an excellent tool to enable management to see what happened in the center and the field. Especially after the Bank's implementation support mission in January 2010 it helped speed up the activities under the component and monitor their implementation. Qualitative evidence, coupled with quantitative facts, allowed for well-informed decision-making.

28. Because of the short duration of the component, there was no formal evaluation of outcomes. However, the internal review on the knowledge and awareness level of beneficiaries the M&E Unit of the Component F of CAP1 organized in 2010 may be considered an evaluation exercise. No report on this study was completed, but the statistical results were incorporated in the Government's Project Completion Report (*Rapport Interne d'Achèvement de Composante Grippe Aviaire du Programme d'Actions Communautaires Phase 1*) under the section "Mobilization of social and communication strategy." (For more, see Annex 6—Beneficiary surveys, and Annex 10—the summary of Government's completion report).

Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

29. *Safeguard policies.* In the Project Paper, the component was assigned the environmental category B and it triggered OP/BP 4.01 because of its generation of medical waste in health centers and laboratories, thus requiring an environmental assessment. It also triggered OP/BP 4.09 (Pest Management) because of the use of chemicals in disinfecting carcasses and decontaminating burning sites, and OP/BP 4.12 (Involuntary Resettlement) because of the potential need for land acquisition for burning and burial sites.

¹² / "Passive surveillance" means that the veterinary and environmental agents and health-sector personnel observe, in the context of their duties, if there are dead birds or people with apparent influenza. "Active surveillance" was organized in regions that were perceived more risky for an H5N1 virus attack, and there trained agents visit a large number of observations posts according to a regular schedule (also getting an incentive allowance).

30. To address potential adverse environmental and social impacts, the main project (CAP1) had prepared an Environmental Management Plan (EMP), which was disclosed in Niger and at the Bank's Infoshop on July 27, 2007. The EMP discussed the potential adverse impacts of the relevant components of CAP1 and proposed mitigation and monitoring measures as well as monitoring indicators. However, the EMP did not address the potential adverse impacts of civil works carried out for implementing the avian flu component (especially rehabilitation of laboratories, hospitals, and cold-chain facilities, initially not considered in the proposed activities to be financed from the proceeds of the additional financing). Therefore, the following safeguard mechanisms were provided for in the Financing Agreement of the avian flu component:

- (a) The Recipient will, prior to contracting any civil works, (i) prepare an assessment of the potential impact of the proposed civil works and mitigation measures in a manner satisfactory to IDA, (ii) organize consultations with stakeholders, also in a manner satisfactory to IDA, and (iii) include in bidding documents and contracts for implementing civil works provisions satisfactory to IDA for the prevention or mitigation of the negative impacts of such works on the environment and the population;
- (b) The Recipient will send to IDA for review the bidding documents and contracts for implementing civil works to ensure that safeguards-related commitments have been complied with satisfactorily to IDA; and
- (c) The Recipient will see to it that the safeguards-related commitments/prior reviews are reflected in the Project Implementation Manual. These conditions were complied with before or during component implementation.

31. As for involuntary resettlement to ensure that potential adverse social impacts are addressed effectively, the Recipient was to carry out the Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) that had been prepared and disclosed for the ongoing CAP. The RPF was re-disclosed in Niger on September 4, 2007, and at the Bank's Info shop on September 10, 2007. In practice, this disclosure was not needed, because there was no avian flu attack during implementation of the component.

32. *Fiduciary compliance.* The project accounts, including regional subaccounts and Special Accounts, were audited for the partial year 2008 and full year 2009. Both audits were unqualified. The auditors' management letter contained no recommendations beyond emphasizing the importance of internal control (without making any complaint in this respect).

33. During the project period one formal Procurement Review was carried out as part of the supervision mission and concluded in January 2010. The conclusions were discussed with the Permanent Unit and included in the mission aide memoir. Furthermore, Bank's procurement specialists regularly reviewed the documents requiring the Bank's prior-review, and the Procurement specialist in the Niamey country office participated to the weekly follow up meeting in the last two quarters of 2009 and the first quarter of 2010 to help address the lagging disbursement and speed up the implementation of project's activities. The procurement specialist of the ICR mission did a thorough review of the procurement activities. In practice, procurement was slow, especially in the beginning of the implementation period, and the procurement activities were considered as moderately satisfactory in most ISRs.

Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

34. The most important element for operation of the avian flu component after project completion is the existence of the *Cellule Permanante/Comité nationale de la lutte contre la grippe aviaire*, and the existence of the network of committees, focal points, and trained field agents in three ministries. The Government is committed to continue their work, but resources are very limited. It continues paying the salaries of the two permanent staff (Coordinator¹³ and Permanent Secretary) and the office expenses, but nothing more has been budgeted for, and no donor agencies are continuing assistance for this purpose.

35. Although there has been no new attack of avian flu in Niger, the case for having a new project or other form of continued financial assistance is strong. There are at least four arguments for this:

- (a) With the limited grant funds available, the avian flu component under CAP1 did not cover the whole country with active surveillance or training agents for prevention and control, let alone for treatment if an attack were to occur. It is probable that the avian flu network will survive a couple of years without external assistance, but after that it will start crumbling.
- (b) The equipment will age; there is no money for operations; committees, focal points, and field agents will lose interest in surveillance and reporting and slide back to their other duties when no incentives are offered for the extra work; members of trained committees, focal points, and field agents whom the avian flu component trained will change, but no new training can be arranged, and so forth.
- (c) The planned benefit of using the network for diseases other than avian flu will be lost (the network was used in 2010 for the swine flu epidemic).
- (d) The avian flu virus has not died and it is capable to mutating and reappearing in new forms. Thus a new attack is always a possibility.

Assessment of Outcomes

36. The avian flu component was designed as a response to the highly pathogenic H5N1 virus that was capable of transferring from birds to humans. The virus is one of the most lethal currently existing; of the nearly 500 known cases where the virus has infected humans, more than 300 people have died; that is, the mortality rate is more than 60 percent. The perceived threat of a new outbreak of H5N1 in Niger--combined with Niger's weak veterinary and human health services, lack of funds for communication and environmental protection plans--constituted the rationale for additional World Bank financing for Niger, which was then provided under the new avian flu component of the existing CAP.

¹³ / The Coordinator is the same as for the avian flu component.

37. However, the only known cases in Africa during 2009 and 2010 were in Egypt (that is, quite far from Niger), and it would be easy to downplay the current danger, especially as new vaccines against avian flu are being developed. At the same time, H5N1 may cause more than one influenza pandemic as it is expected to continue mutating in birds regardless of whether humans develop herd immunity to a future pandemic strain. In addition, because the networks built up in Niger can be used against other epidemic diseases, the avian flu component is still highly relevant. In addition, because the avian flu component, as planned, contained complementary subcomponents for helping veterinary services, human health care, communications, and monitoring and evaluation in the fight against avian flu (which subcomponents are applicable also for fighting other epidemics), the objectives, design, and implementation approach are still highly relevant. Linking the new avian flu component to the existing Community Development Program was a practical solution¹⁴ because this project was active in the same areas, which were to have become the priority areas of the fight against avian flu.

38. The Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy and the Government’s Rural Development and Poverty Alleviation Strategies remain the same as in 2008 when the component was formulated, and thus they still support the component rationale as a tool to rural development and improved health services in rural areas.

Achievement of Project Development Objectives

39. In assessing achieving the objectives of the avian flu component, it is necessary to note that the Project Development Objective of the main project CAPI, which was formulated into a brief sentence with several elements (see Section 1), does not allow for direct estimation of its achievement even with the indicators listed in the original PAD. Thus, this section evaluates the attainment of the Component’s objectives based on the key indicators as they were adjusted at restructuring to better measure the achievement and to match with the approach in the Bank’s use of the new Results Framework rather the old Logical Framework.¹⁵

40. The achievement of key indicators for the avian influenza component were as follows (each key indicator had several sub-indicators—see Annex 2):

Key Indicator : ¹⁶	Achievement of indicator by the end of 2010 ¹⁷	ICR mission’s evaluation of achievements
H5N1 surveillance committees	The 44 regional and departmental committees, as	Indicator was satisfactorily

¹⁴ / The other alternative would have been to link it with the Agro-pastoral Export Promotion Project, but that project had a poor implementation record and was about to close.

¹⁵ / The original Component F indicators (see Section 1.9) were closer to the real outcome/PDO to be expected from the component, but as they were based on reaction and reporting times by poultry farmers and the participants of the surveillance system for which no standards had been established (or such standards would not have been feasible in the highly variable conditions in Niger), they were abandoned and replaced by more practical intermediate indicators. (See also the recommendation under Lessons Learned.)

¹⁶ / Project Restructuring Paper, Annex 1.

¹⁷ / Key intermediate indicators are presented here; for the rest, see Annex 2.

at the local, departmental, and regional levels are fully operational.	well as those in most respective communities, are established and operational	achieved in four key regions
Personnel of the Veterinary Service and of the Ministry of Environment are trained in H5N1- and H1N1-related areas.	697 veterinary agents (100% of the target); 93 environmental agents (150%).	Indicator was achieved fully satisfactorily in four key regions. Some training was also organized in non-key regions.
The Central Veterinary Laboratory in Niamey has increased its capacity for production of vaccines.	A new laboratory has been built and equipment ordered and partly delivered. ¹⁸	Indicator was satisfactorily achieved. ¹⁹
Public health service personnel are trained to handle H5N1 outbreaks.	221 health-sector workers were trained in key regions (100%).	Indicator was satisfactorily achieved
Key regional and departmental health centers are functional and equipped with isolation facilities.	Isolation rooms (<i>salles</i>) in the key regions (Tahoua, Maradi, and Zinder) were constructed and equipped, and respective centers have been supplied with medications and other needs.	Indicator was satisfactorily achieved.

41. The achievements provide appropriate evidence that the Component's objectives have been met and that causal linkages between the components and objectives have been established (building a good response against the avian flu required capacity building in veterinary and human health services, in environmental surveillance, and in communications and monitoring). The successful achievement of the objectives stemmed largely from the success of activities in the various subcomponents. Most targets set for the indicators were attained or exceeded, as shown in Annex 2 (Outputs by Components). These results were reached essentially with the interventions of the avian flu component of CAP1. (Among the other donors, the European Union was particularly active in the same areas during the implementation period, but with smaller resources, several other donors were active before the avian flu component started.)

Efficiency

42. The appraisal mission of CAP1 did not perform economic analysis or calculate a financial rate of return for CAP1, primarily because the type of project in question (which had several components, many for social purposes or capacity building) does not lend itself to reliable economic analysis. Similarly, there was no attempt in the Project Paper to calculate economic or financial returns because there were no data or examples about how these returns could be computed for an avian flu pandemic. Consequently, no economic and financial return analyses were attempted for this ICR.

43. As for cost efficiency, the fact that all procurement above the limit set under CAP1 (US\$50,000) was carried out on a competitive basis provides a certain degree of confidence that the costs of various items procured were economical in Niger conditions.²⁰

¹⁸ / However, the purchase of a new freezer-dryer (*lyophilisateur*) and some other items were delayed so much that they could not be procured during the project period.

¹⁹ / The production capacity of veterinary vaccines has increased, but avian influenza vaccine is not being produced because the Government decided it is cheaper to cull the infected poultry.

Justification of Overall Outcome of the Avian Flu Component

44. **Rating: Satisfactory.** Factors favoring the satisfactory rating or better include the following:

- The project objective is relevant even in the current situation, because avian flu still exists in Asia and elsewhere in Africa (Egypt), it mutates rapidly, and it is highly pathogenic with potentially dire human and economic consequences. Moreover, the surveillance networks and the prevention and treatment methods built in Niger are useful for control of other diseases transmittable from animals to humans (Section 3.1).
- The development objectives and output targets were satisfactorily achieved (Section 3 and Annex 2).
- The World Bank and Government administration showed appropriate flexibility, for example, by revising the indicators (and monitoring them effectively) and reallocating funds among the disbursement categories when it turned out that no avian flu attack actually occurred (Section 2.3).

45. Some factors that prevented a higher rating for project development and output objectives were as follows:

- Contrary to the procurement plans, an important element for the central veterinary laboratory, a new freezer-dryer, was not procured during the project period (however, the old one is still in use and can be maintained for some time) (Section 3.2).
- The future of the network built with the help of the avian flu component remains uncertain, because no donor funds have been committed for its upkeep (Section 2.5).

Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

46. The extent of the avian flu component's impact on poverty was not measured, because no actual attack occurred. If one had occurred, it probably would have most affected the poor, who try to improve their income by growing poultry (in Tahoua, for instance, 90 percent of poultry growers have fewer than 200 birds), or who work as slaughterers, pluckers, and poultry handlers. The planners of the component had taken this possibility into account in costing the component and had reserved US\$50,000 for compensating the potential losses of the poultry farmers.²¹ Women and children also had been considered when planning the fight against the disease because of their role as primary domestic handlers of poultry. During implementation of the component and earlier, with support from other donors, they received training in prevention and sanitary measures.

²⁰ / Procurement was supervised by the Bank's Country Office, and the cases of procurement below the prior-review limit were inspected during the January 2010 implementation support mission and by the ICR mission in February 2011.

²¹ / The poultry farmers who lost their birds during the 2006 attack of avian flu in Magaria and Boko Mai Gao departments were compensated for their losses by French development aid.

Institutional Change/Strengthening

47. As discussed in section 3.2 of the main ICR report, CAP I was the main financial instrument for decentralizing public administration and services to 15 percent of the rural communes in Niger. Similarly, the avian flu component was the main financier for building the capacity to fight the threat of the avian flu in three key ministries and in the regions that were perceived to be areas most likely to suffer should the H5H1 virus find its way again to Niger. The opinion shared by all groups of stakeholders was that without the financing by the World Bank and to some extent by other donors, most notably EU, this development would not have been possible (see Annex 6—Stakeholders’ workshops). Besides the network that now appears broadly approved as a near-formal arrangement, the main institutional beneficiary was the *Cellule permanente/Comité national de lutte contre la grippe aviaire*, for which the avian flu component brought operational tools. As for the future and to sustain the readiness of the network (not to talk about its expansion), more assistance is needed.

Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

48. A major discovery during the project was that the network built against avian flu was also useful for other animal-human-transmissible diseases. This benefit was recognized during the February 2010 emergence of the swine flu (H1N1 virus) in Niger and raised discussion within the avian flu network about other possible similar uses for the network.

Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

49. The ICR mission on the avian flu component of CAP1 organized three stakeholder workshops/meetings and as well as individual sessions with stakeholders. The first meeting was with the National Committee in charge of the fight against avian flu, the second with focal points from the regions that were the main beneficiaries of the project assistance (Tahoua, Maradi, and Zinder), and the third with representatives of the international donor community. In addition, the ICR mission interviewed many high officials and focal points of the involved and benefiting ministries and other agencies (see Annex 6). This section presents highlights from workshops/meetings:

- (a) The project was extremely influential in Niger because it introduced an integrated approach to the fight against the avian flu, one that has been successfully implemented in the key ministries and other agencies. But in a crisis, it is easy to underestimate the financial and manpower resources needed for an effective, countrywide response;
- (b) The project stimulated an entirely new level of dynamism in the ministries, their personnel, and local populations by providing important information, training, equipment, and operational resources to people who were stakeholders in the fight against avian flu and who, without the project, would have had little chances to organize protection against this potential calamity;
- (c) The stakeholders particularly appreciated the construction or rehabilitation of new laboratories, health centers, and isolation facilities, and their own role in

- identifying the critical areas for these facilities. The project gave many people knowledge about and skills to fight avian flu; and it helped form coordination committees at the regional, departmental, and community levels to take charge of the avian flu-related activities. The stakeholders also greatly appreciated the diagnostic material, medicines, incinerators for medical waste, refrigerators, information technology, communications equipment (for example, 500 cellular phones for surveillance and communication), bought by the project;
- (d) The Government people involved in the project were inexperienced with the project activities and especially with the procedures of the World Bank. There was not enough expertise among those involved in the project even to write specifications for the requirements for this special project. Consultant assistance in preparing specifications for goods and services to be procured was too little or too late; and
 - (e) In the environmental sector, agents and veterinary service people suffered from the fact that the frontier between Niger on the one side and Nigeria and Burkina Faso on the other side is very long, “porous,” and difficult to guard. More vehicles (cars and motorcycles) were needed and more agents should have been trained.

50. *Beneficiary survey.* No formal end-of-the-project survey of beneficiaries was prepared. Benefits would have accrued to the population if an avian flu attack had occurred during the project period, but fortunately no attack occurred. However, the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit of the Component F of CAPI organized in 2010 an internal impact review that may serve as a knowledge and awareness survey of beneficiaries. Its main conclusion was that the awareness of the population of the existence of the disease, its symptoms, and measures of prevention had increased from 64 percent to 91 percent during implementation of the avian flu component (see Annex 3).

Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome of the Avian Flu Component

51. **Rating: Significant.** The significant risk rating reflects the assessment of the potential sources of risks and the likely mitigating effect of existing/likely arrangements:

- (a) As described in Section 2.5, the most important element for post-completion operation of the avian flu component is the existence of the *Cellule permanente/Comité national de lutte contre la grippe aviaire*, and the existence of the network (*reseau*) of committees, focal points, and trained field agents in three ministries. However, the resources available are too limited to effectively manage the *Cellule Permanante* and to continue or even expand the avian flu network. The Government should start actively seeking donors who would like to come to Niger’s assistance. (During the actual avian flu attack in Niger in 2006 it was relatively easy to get commitments, though relatively small and of short duration, from many donors, such as FAO, UNICEF, WHO, USAID, European Union, French development aid); and
- (b) A mitigating factor is that the network appears so well established that it may continue working for one or two years even with minimal funding, as long as

budgets allow the continued payment of the salaries of the two permanent staff (Coordinator²² and Permanent Secretary), the office expenses, and some operating costs. Thus the Government and donors have some time to start a follow-on activity. Another mitigating factor is the Government's clear commitment to protect its people against this calamity (as expressed by several high authorities to the ICR mission).

Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

52. **Rating: Moderately satisfactory.** Bank management reacted to the potential pandemic well and responded to the Government's request to help by providing a large amount from the very limited grant amounts available. It also provided Bank staff to work with the Coordinator of the *Cellule Permanente* to prepare the Project Paper. Furthermore, the Bank treated the situation as a potential crisis, processed the additional component (in reality, a new small-scale project) under its emergency rules, and approved the grant based on the Project Paper without insisting on an appraisal as usual. The Bank's activities in other respects were also satisfactory; the Bank disbursed the funds on timely basis without delays and extended the implementation period of the component to allow enough time to achieve the objectives (which was done successfully).

53. However, because of the urgency to get the project approved, the preparedness to start project activities--was not sufficient. The detailed planning and preparation of basic implementation documents, usually done at appraisal or before, were not done (see Section 2.2). These were important steps, and doing them after the project had been approved and became effective led to delays in the start of implementing the component. Especially in view of the component staff's lack of experience in Bank procedures, the project should have included provisions to ensure availability of full-time personnel experienced in Bank operations to help the component get started, for instance, by recruiting consultants to act as expeditors or facilitators.²³

Quality of Supervision

54. **Rating: Moderately satisfactory.** The Government's internal project completion report evaluated the Bank's assistance as valuable. The adage that "all's well that ends well" applies well to this avian flu component/project. After 18 months of the two-year implementation period, only 21 percent of the component funds had been used,²⁴ and there is no denying that the Bank's support for implementation initially had been light. There had been no formal supervision/implementation support mission, although admittedly

²² / The Coordinator is the same as for the avian flu component.

²³ / The ICR mission checked the workload of the resident mission staff supposed to help the avian flu component get started, and found it excessive in the second part of 2008 because the staff were working on an emergency food supply project, among other obligations. Also, when an overworked staff has to choose among priorities, a small program, such as the avian flu component, is bound to be ranked below much bigger programs.

²⁴ / The low disbursement percentage did not give a true picture of the progress; much training took place, and because almost all of it was provided by the project and Government personnel, it was inexpensive.

Bank staff had often been available for the component management, thus providing “continuous supervision” (paraphrasing the term “continuous audit”), and the Bank had organized training of component staff. But a formal, well-staffed mission immediately after effectiveness would surely have helped the component start faster than it did (for an explanation, see the footnote in Section 5.1 (a)).

55. It is to the credit of the Bank staff that they upheld their confidence in the avian flu program, did not use the low disbursement rate as a measure of progress, and did not rate this program as a problem project or take other drastic steps. When the first and only implementation support mission was carried out in January 2010 in collaboration with the Government, it was thorough and productive. The mission’s report gave good advice, prepared procurement plans, and organized continued follow-up by requesting weekly progress reports from the component management. All this worked out as expected (by then the component staff had learned the “Bank’s ways”), progress was excellent, and the component’s PDO and intermediate indicators were satisfactorily achieved (see Annex 2). The ratings in Implementation Support Reports (ISP) were adequately candid, providing Bank management with information to guide the staff.

Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance

56. **Rating: Moderately satisfactory.** Whereas the overall achievement of PDO and intermediate indicators would point out a rating of “satisfactory” for the Bank’s performance, the rating is lowered to “moderately satisfactory” because: (a) Bank management did not follow up the accelerated approval process with more personnel to get the program started equally fast; and (b) the supervision effort during the initial months immediately after the component became effective was less than optimal.

Government Performance

57. **Rating: Satisfactory.** First, the Government contribution was important because of the actions taken before the Bank-financed component (establishment of the National Committee to Fight the Avian Flu; mobilization of the donor community for assistance; preparation, with their help, of a communication plan and an early list of requirements; establishment of the *Cellule Permanente*, etc.). Second, the Government directed the key ministries to collaborate in the fight against avian flu, used the limited funds in a rational way (and according to the allocation suggested by WHO), and appointed focal points from its staff both in the center and in the regions. Third, the Government also helped supervise the program and quickly backed the recommendations of the supervision mission, as well as following up with the Bank to obtain an extension to the project period and reallocation of funds. The good performance of the Government was somewhat tarnished by the slow procurement process, for which it had review and approval obligations, and by a lack of effort to identify donors for follow-on support.

Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance

58. **Rating: Satisfactory.** The “satisfactory” rating for agency performance is based primarily on satisfactorily achieving the PDO and intermediate indicators, for which result the implementing agency, *Cellule Permanente* and the component staff had the greatest

effect. As mentioned, the start of the implementation was slow, but once the staff learned the procedures required by the Bank, progress on the numerous targets set for the component was rapid. Moreover, the main project, CAP1, and its successor, CAP2, provided valuable help in resolving procurement problems.

59. The Monitoring and Evaluation Unit also played several valuable roles. When at effectiveness there were no detailed plans for the component, the M&E Unit and component management organized a large workshop for stakeholders to prepare implementation plans and monitoring indicators for all subcomponents (as well as for the *Cellule Permanante*), thus providing a blueprint for the whole implementation period.²⁵ The unit also successfully organized the field monitoring and reporting, a very challenging job considering the large operational area and many stakeholders involved. Regular reports from the M&E system helped the component management and the Bank staff to follow the progress and improvements. The ICR mission noted that the M&E staff prepared the limited impact assessment internally without external technical assistance and without preparing a written document (see Annex 3). Financial management and reporting were good throughout the implementation period (with guidance from the CAP staff), and the audit reports were unqualified.

Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance

60. **Rating: Satisfactory.** The satisfactory rating of overall Borrower's performance is justified on the grounds that the Government performance was satisfactory and that the PDO and key implementation indicators were reached. The Government's slow procurement process and the tardiness of the implementing agency in getting the program started kept the project from meriting a rating higher than "satisfactory."

Lessons Learned

61. The implementation completion report of the main project (CAP1) contains several lessons learned, and this report provides three additional lessons:

- *Ministerial collaboration.* A concentrated effort (like a project approach) is useful to bring the different ministries together for a common course of action. Perhaps as its biggest achievement, the project/avian-flu component succeeded in building new, collaborative networks at all four levels (central, regional, departmental, and local communities) to fight avian flu. The networks included the staffs of the ministries of agriculture and animal services, health, and water and environment, plus many other participants from the public and private sectors on the coordination committees (all of whom were trained to fight avian flu). Also, the project brought the veterinary and human testing laboratories into the networks. The general view of the stakeholders was that now Niger was able to detect, treat, and monitor not only avian flu but also similar animal-conveyed diseases, including swine flu.

²⁵ / Some indicators were changed after the January 2010 supervision mission.

- *Special nature of an emergency program.* The slow start of implementing the avian flu component revealed some special requirements. In an emergency situation, extraordinary measures are needed. While it is important to process loans or grants rapidly in order to bring the necessary resources to where they are needed, it is equally important to make sure that there will be enough knowledgeable personnel to get the program started without delay. In the case of Niger, when no appraisal and related detailed planning occurred, the Bank should have recruited “expeditors” experienced in Bank procedures and the Government should have appointed full-time staff instead of relying on part-time persons, often already overburdened with other duties.
- *Appropriate indicators.* For an emergency program the envisaged outcome is that the effects of the crisis are minimized and recovery from the disaster can start quickly. For an avian flu attack the envisaged outcome would be that information is quickly passed to responsible authorities and that deaths are avoided or at least minimized. Thus the original outcome indicators in the Project Paper were correctly conceived when they largely concentrated on the reaction and reporting times by the local population and then by the authorities responsible for surveillance and treatment. Because, fortunately, no H5N1 virus reappeared in Niger, the emphasis was shifted to indicators that measured attainment of objectives set for different activities. However, now that the information, surveillance, and treatment network is ready, it would be advisable to test its effectiveness. Such testing could be arranged by an exercise in which the field would be informed that a bogus test would be done in an unspecified region, but without informing which one. Such testing, if repeated from time to time, would probably help maintain alertness among the stakeholders. (The component management is already developing this idea.)

Annex 4. Economic and Financial Analysis

Introduction

1. The appraisal mission did not perform economic analysis or calculate a financial rate of return for the whole project for several reasons. The project in question, with its several components, many for social purposes or capacity building, does not lend itself to reliable economic analysis. First, benefits of the capacity-building components (support to communities and local governance for poverty and environmental monitoring) cannot easily be quantified in monetary terms. Second, because the investment component—Local Investment Fund--was demand-driven, the types of subprojects and the ratios between them could not be known in advance. Third, many of the benefits from anticipated investments (for example, in natural resource management, education, and health) similarly defy quantification.

2. The PAD analysis tried to use a conventional approach and estimated returns to typical project investments financed under one component, the Local Investment Fund. Thus, a cost-benefit analysis was undertaken on a sample of income-generating activities that were likely to be among community priorities.

3. In retrospect, because the project was focused largely on process-type improvements about institutional arrangements and capacity building, it might have been appropriate also to estimate the cost-effectiveness of resources spent on components other than the Local Investment Fund (through unit-rate norms, service standards, and other yardsticks as appropriate). But because this approach was not used in the PAD, and because relevant information on both output and cost sides was lacking, this approach could not be undertaken at the ICR stage.

4. For these reasons, no economic or financial analyses were tried during project implementation or at completion. Also, even if the micro-project investments during project implementation had matched with those projected at appraisal (they did not), the ICR mission did not try to repeat the estimates made at appraisal because in implementing CAP, the investment were not those projected in PAD (and PAD did not include any details about assumptions, prices, adoption rates, and the like). However, the project has used consultants to carry out profitability analysis on many micro-projects. Thus, the following text presents separately the projections at appraisal and at closing the project.

Cost-Benefit analysis at appraisal

5. The objective of the study at appraisal was to analyze typical income-generating activities that were likely to be selected by communities as micro-projects of CAP. These activities, which included crop farming, livestock production, and petty trading, were commonly carried out by Nigeriens, and represented sources of income for most Nigeriens.

6. *Methodology.* The appraisal team carried out a desk-study to assess the capacity of selected micro-projects to achieve the financial objectives of CAP. The instruments used were the cash flow, Net Present Value (NPV), and the Internal Rate of Return (IRR). No

correction for inflation was included in the calculations. Any activity was estimated to be satisfactory when its NPV was greater than zero or when its IRR was more than 10 percent. The inputs for the analysis were obtained from NGO and donor reports, including reports from the World Bank and the African Development Bank.

7. *Results.* The analyses were made on small animal husbandry, small-scale trading, peanut oil extraction, flour milling, animal carts, and irrigated agriculture. All micro-project investments were found to be profitable, except growing niébe and rice, which could be made profitable only by improving farming practices.

Table 3: Financial returns of selected productive activities at appraisal

Activity	Annual Net Income (FCFA)					NPV (10% 10 years)	IRR
	1	2	3	4-9	10		
Small ruminants	14,160	14,160	14,160	idem	14,160	87,007	
Small trading	90,000	90,000	90,000	idem	90,000	553,011	
Peanut oil extr.	26,640	26,640	26,640	idem	26,640	163,691	
Cattle cart	- 182,694	67,306	67,306	idem	67,306	231,870	36%
Donkey cart	- 115,216	41,784	41,784	idem	41,784	143,149	36%
Seed mills	- 870,964	279,037	279,037	idem	279,037	855,424	31%
Gardening	29,500	29,500	29,500	idem	29,500	181,265	
Rice (1 ha)	326,500	326,500	326,500	idem	326,500	2,006,201	
Niébe (1 ha)	253,500	253,500	253,500	idem	253,500	1,557,648	
Maize (1 ha)	57,700	57,700	57,700	idem	57,700	354,542	

Profitability Analysis at Project Completion

8. In 2007 the Project Coordination Unit (CCN) and the Ministry of Agriculture organized, with the help of consultants, an extensive study on the profitability of productive micro-projects²⁶.

9. *Methodology.* The objectives and methodology were first validated in a workshop that CCN organized for the consultants and key stakeholders. The study had two objectives: (a) to find the economic and financial results of revenue-earning micro-projects for individual and collective beneficiaries; and (b) to develop tools to follow the cash flows, financial planning, and decision making for promoters of the scheme.

10. The work consisted of an analysis of documentary materials, a field mission in the country's eight regions, and preparation of the study report. The agreed approach was to use a sampling method that had three dimensions: (a) development of a systematic analytical method for all the regions; (b) selection of village clusters, removing those clusters that were inaccessible because of rains or those that did not have revenue-generating activities; and (c) final selection of micro-projects based on their advance

²⁶ *Evaluation de la rentabilité économique et financière des microprojets générateurs de revenus. Par PAC consultants Yeve Hassane, Doga Garbo, et Siddo Mahamadou, Septembre 2007.*

classification by type of activities carried out, including micro-projects of all classes and all regions.

11. As a result, a sample of 145 micro-projects was selected, representing 23 percent of the 631 revenue-generating micro-projects financed at that time. They were located in 61 village clusters (34 percent) and in all eight regions. However, only 118 of the micro-projects selected were evaluated because of difficulties in reaching the rest.

12. The following categories were used for classifying micro-projects:

- Agro-pastoral micro-projects for raising lambs and sheep, milk goats, and cattle, and processing products based on them
- Artisan work and small-scale trading (batik coloring, leather treatment, basketwork, sale of wood, embroidery)
- Environmental protection micro-projects (collecting household refuse, planting trees, setting up bio-carbon sites, stocking fish in ponds, and providing equipment for fishermen).
- For computing results, the principal tools were cash flow, Net Present Value (NPV), and Internal Rate of Return (IRR), for which the team prepared matrix tables to ensure consistency of the fieldwork.

13. Finally, the team prepared a synthesis of results by region. Besides cash flows, NPVs, and IRRs, the synthesis considered internal and external factors that explained the level of profitability reached and estimated the nonmonetary benefits and effects.

14. *Results.* The analysis was carried out separately for each of the eight regions in Niger. The study found substantial variations in profitability both in the types of micro-projects and in the regions where they were carried out. Table 2 presents selected summaries of the overall results. About 60 percent of productive micro-projects were profitable in financial terms, leaving 40 percent as unprofitable (if no improvements were made). The nonmonetary benefits are discussed later in this annex.

Table 4: Profitability of micro-projects

Profitability level	Number of micro-project analyzed	Percentage of micro-projects in the group
Fully profitable micro-projects	58	44%
Marginally profitable micro-projects	27	16%
Unprofitable micro-projects	58	40%
Total	143	100%

15. The most profitable micro-projects were those belonging to the environmental protection category²⁷. The large numbers of agro-pastoral micro-projects that are unprofitable pull down the overall success rate.²⁸

²⁷ / The profitability of environmental subprojects was also confirmed in the 2008 study of *Pender et Ndjeunga Evaluation des Impacts de Programmes de Gestion Durable des Terres sur le Gestion des Terres et la Pauvreté au Niger*.

Table 5: Profitability by type of micro-projects

Type of micro-projects	Number of micro-project in the sample	Percentage of Fully profitable micro-projects	Percentage of Marginally profitable micro-projects	Percentage of Unprofitable micro-projects
Agro-pastoral micro-projects for production and processing	104	33%	21%	47%
Micro-projects for artisan work and small-scale trading	23	74%	9%	17%
Environmental protection micro-projects ²⁹	9	78%	11%	0%

16. Outcomes also vary greatly with the management of the micro-projects. The most successful micro-projects are those managed by groups of women, even when the micro-projects are in the least profitable category, that is, agro-pastoral micro-projects. The less-successful micro-projects are those managed by mixed groups or communities (village clusters), which generally work like collectives with social objectives, such as marketplaces, grain banks for food security, or production support, such as farm input and animal feed stores.

Table 6: Profitability of micro-projects by "management" group

Management of micro-projects, by type	Number of micro-projects in the sample	Number of profitable micro-projects
Women or female groups		
--Artisanal or small business	9	8
-- Agro-pastoral production	58	45
Men or mixed male/female groups		
-- Production	58	15
-- Mineral coal	1	0
Communities		
-- Production support	38	4
-- Natural resource improvement.	18	13

17. Somewhat surprisingly, ecological conditions are not clearly reflected in the profitability results. Micro-projects in better ecological zones, such regions as Maradi and Dosso, can have high unprofitability rates (67% and 87%, respectively), whereas micro-projects in faraway and near-desert regions such as Agadez and Diffa have relatively low unprofitability rates (13% and 45%, respectively). These differences can be explained at

²⁸ / The study by Pender and Ndjeunga also shows how the agro-pastoral micro-projects could be improved, for instance by using organic fertilizer.

²⁹ / Probably the most extensive study on the profitability of natural resource management investments is the World Bank report, Impacts of Sustainable Land Management on Land Management and Poverty in Niger, (Pender, Ndjeunga, etc., June 2008). It reaches essentially the same conclusions, namely, that NRM investments in Niger are or can be made profitable, noting that "overall, these investments have paid for the costs of SLM activities from the value of increased wood and fodder production."

least partly by the different types of micro-projects that were implemented in the various regions.³⁰

18. *Nonmonetary benefits.* The study identified many nonmonetary benefits arising from the micro-projects (but in the longer run, nonmonetary benefits will be earned only from productive micro-projects if they are profitable). In general, the study argues that all micro-projects contribute to the financial and social security of participating individuals and households and to increased employment in communities. With micro-projects, the standard of living and the social status of beneficiaries, especially of women, rise. Examples of nonmonetary benefits in this respect include:

- Women learn management skills and decision making (for instance, in managing flour mills), and most young women involved in women groups gain status and become more “marriageable.”
- Many more children attend schools than previously because of rotating savings and credit associations (Roscas, tontines) that are facilitated by micro-projects.
- Cereal banks and farm input and animal feed stores, although almost always unprofitable, contribute to balancing or even lowering prices, as well as improving food security and improving productivity.
- Raising cattle and other animals result in improved nutrition for children when not all the milk or meat is sold for cash.
- Animal-drawn transport micro-projects have helped construction of houses for some people

19. *Improvements recommended.* The study noted that those micro-projects that are in financial difficulties could be closed early if improvements are not made in the short-term. The actions recommended are as follows:

- Revise attributing funds for operational costs and the reasons for delays in implementation;
- Develop measures to increase operational funds (for almost all micro-projects);
- Educate the beneficiaries in operational (profitability) accounting, market negotiations, marketing, and scheduling of activities;
- Strengthen the capacities of committees for monitoring the activities of beneficiaries, for evaluating their micro-projects, internal controls, and for reporting and providing feedback.

20. *Cost analysis.* Because the financial analyses in PAD and in the study carried out by CAP consultants are not compatible, additional analysis about the project’s efficiency could have been tried by using suitable cost-efficiency criteria to decide whether the project represented the least-cost solution to reach identified and measurable benefits. This was not done in the CAP study. It would be difficult to do this retroactively, partly because the project components were related to “soft “ activities (for example, developing organizational and administrative setups and monitoring systems, and supporting capacity

³⁰ / The 2008 study by Pender, Ndjeunga, and others (see Annex 9, the list of reference documents) reported that the effects of sustainable land management programs and land management practices vary widely across agro-ecological zones, community characteristics, and household wealth status.

building) and partly because they either did not contain quantified targets or the targets were set afterwards. Even for the Local Investment Fund component no estimation was made for the number of micro-projects or areas to be supported by GEF activities.

21. However, the ICR mission noted that the actual cost of project management was more than 120 percent above the budget. There were some justifiable reasons for this: New activities were incorporated into the project (promotion of cooperative savings and credit; making communities legally approved units; avian flu; Acacia Senegal), training costs in the field were mistakenly attributed to the management component in the early years, and the lack of knowledge about the complexities of local development at appraisal should have attracted the attention of the Government and the Bank early.

22. *Evaluation of the economic and financial analysis.* As noted at appraisal, the type of project does not easily lend itself to rigorous economic or financial analysis as the term is traditionally used at the World Bank. However, a partial analysis for the micro-project component might have been possible. In that case, on the cost side at least, the community support component (or a part of it), as well as a part of the project management component, should have been added. However, the types of micro-project investments demanded by the beneficiaries would have been estimated somehow, even though it might have been possible to distinguish micro-projects from similar projects in neighboring countries. Also, allocating costs of other components for micro-projects in the analysis would have been arbitrary. Thus, the decision by the appraisal team to estimate only NPV and IRR for a set of “representative” productive activities appears reasonable. However, the estimates even in these cases seem simplified (for example, all income-cost streams over the 10-year periods used in calculations are equal) but this and other assumptions cannot be subjected to post-analysis because of the lack of details in the reports.

23. The analysis in 2007 was carefully planned and carried out. It included a plan for the study and methodology and for their confirmation by a workshop. The sampling was targeted to cover typical investments classified in categories of near-similar investments, and thus the sampling size (22.5 percent of all 631 productive micro-projects at that time) was enough. The study was carried out by experienced consultants, it included both study of documents prepared earlier by CCN and actual visit to the project sites, and the results were extensively recorded based on Niger’s administrative departments. For the benefit of an ICR, estimates in the study should have been made for the same micro-project investments as in PAD. This was not done, and thus comparison with PAD is not possible. However, the report gives the essential information for decision-makers to decide which micro-project investments are profitable, as well as suggestions for improvement.

Annex 5. Bank Lending and Implementation Support Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names	Title	Unit	Responsibility/ Specialty
Lending			
Daniel Sellen	Sector Leader	AFTAR	Team leader 1
Amadou Alassane	Sr Agricultural Spec.	AFTAR	Team member
Soulemame Fofana	Operations Officer	AFTAR	Team member
Marie Jeanne Ndiaye	Program Assistant	IEGSE	Team member
Mahaman Salifou	Sr. Agricultural Spec.	AFTAR	Team member
Hadidia Djimba	Program Assistant	AFMNE	Team member
Gabriele Rechbauer	Environmental Specialist	AFTEN	Consultant
Josef Toledano	Sr. Agricultural Spec.	AFTAR	Team member
Hope Neighbour	M&E specialist		Consultant
Angelo Bonfiglioli	Local Governance Spec.		Consultant
Loic Braune	M&E Specialist		Consultant
Elizabeth Morris-Hughes	Consultant		Consultant
Supervision/ICR			
Abdoul-Wahab Seyni	Social Development Spec.	AFTCS	Team member
Amadou Alassane	Sr Agricultural Spec.	AFTAR	Team leader 3
Andrew Osei Asibey	Sr Monitoring & Evaluation Spe	AFTRL	Team member
Ayi Adamah Klouvi	Agric. Economist	AFTAR	Team member
Emanuele Santi	Communications Officer	EXTCD	Team member
Germaine Mafougong	Program Assistant	AFTAR	Team member
Hadidia Diallo Djimba	Program Assistant	AFMNE	Team member
Ibrah Rahamane Sanoussi	Procurement Spec.	AFTPC	Team member
Ibrahim Cheik Diop	Communications Officer	AFREX	Team member
Issa Faye	Economist	AFTAR	Team member
Joelle Dehasse	Senior Operations Officer	AFCCI	Team member
Mamadou Yaro	Sr Financial Management Specia	AFTFM	Team member
Marie-Claudine Fundi	Language Program Assistant	AFTAR	Team member
Patrick Verissimo	Senior Sector Economist	AFTAR	Team leader 2
Salifou Noma	E T Temporary	AFMNE	Team member
Soulemame Fofana	Operations Officer	AFTAR	Team member
Taoufiq Bennouna	Sr Environmental Spec.	AFTEN	Team member
Valerie Layrol	Senior Operations Officer	AFTSN	Team member
Yao Wottor	Procurement Specialist	LCSPT	Team member

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)			
	No. of staff weeks	USD Thousands	No. of staff weeks	USD Thousands
Lending		BB		BBGEF
FY1		115,086		
FY2		148,612	15.41	62,004
FY3		150,179	15.16	51,549
FY4		63,789	9.93	55,048
Total:		477,667		168,602
Supervision/ICR		BB		BBGEF
FY1		19,162	0.20	29,352
FY2		130,479	5.49	41,131
FY3	39.16	92,673	4.76	43,959
FY4	42.43	123,769	3.91	42,045
FY5	40.89	122,612	1.72	34,240
FY6	26.22	53,971		
Total:		542,668		190,730

Annex 6. Beneficiary Survey Results

No end-of-the-project beneficiary survey was prepared. However, in 2005-06 the CAP Coordination Unit organized an internal evaluation that served as a beneficiary survey (*PAC—Evaluation Interne à mi-parcour par Pietronella van den Oever, E. Oumarou, A. Oumarou, février 2006*).³¹

A. 2006 Internal Evaluation

1. Conclusion

The study concluded that the approach adopted by the Community Action Program (CAP) had efficiently engaged the target populations in consultations and acceptance of the program at the local, regional, and national levels was good.

2. Methodology

The methodology comprised several phases. To begin with, the study team collected and read the relevant documents on CAP. Then the team identified the principal stakeholders of the program, including the main local “actors” and agencies, benefiting village clusters (*grappes*) and communes that were set up during decentralization, and the village groups that had benefited from micro-projects and government services associated with CAP.

Identification of the principal groups of « actors » allowed the study team to develop evaluation instruments that were adapted to the specific needs of selected groups, including women’s groups. The team planned to conduct focus group studies in the field using a questionnaire prepared by the team. The methodology was then tested during the first visits in the field with the help of the Niamey Regional Coordination Unit of CCN.

The team presented the first draft report to a plenary workshop that was attended by a group of CAP stakeholders and development partners, and the team considered workshop comments when preparing the final report.

3. Contents of the review

This summary concentrates on selected topics, that is, poverty and implications to women, environmental issues, and the local governments. Other study targets dealt with in the study team’s report include intermediary organs or groups, that is, civil society representatives (service providers), technical services, micro-project approval committees, communal trainers, and student and their professors (who have helped carry out various inquiries and studies).

4. Waging the fight against poverty and encouraging women’s involvement

³¹ / The full document, 36 pages, is available in project files.

In the local activities CAP grants special attention to women's participation, as elaborated in the manual on the rules of investment prepared by CAP. The rules reserve 25 percent of productive investments to finance activities identified and managed by women's groups.

The regional coordination units of CCN collect information on the number of female members of elected bodies and of special commissions in village clusters, the number of women elected to Commune Councils, and the number of women who took part in different training sessions. However, the women who have official roles could not confirm to the study team that they are effectively involved or consulted when important decisions are taken or when priority activities are chosen into the Local Development Plans (LDP) or Commune Development Plans (CDP).

The study showed that the extent to which women participated effectively in CAP projects varies among regions and even among communities within the same region. In several communities of Agadez, Tahoua, and Niamey regions, for example, women have long been members of different management organs and often have played important roles. In other regions, for instance in Maradi, women have been very little involved in official functions. Even women in female micro-project groups seemed to have little knowledge of decision-making and the priorities under the Local or Commune Development Plans.

Long before the arrival of CAP, women's groups in Niger had participated in contributions or savings and credit activity (*tontines*). Many women confirmed that CAP had energized the groups and opened new possibilities for improving women's lives through new economic activities. With CAP activities, the groups often kept their social character as well as economic character, and the spirit of mutual help was strong. For instance, when women raise goats or breed cattle and an animal belonging to one woman dies, the other women collect money to buy her a new one.

Obviously, women's groups have a gift for mobilizing personal contributions so that all members can benefit from micro-projects. The study team noted that in all cases the women had been able to collect the necessary funds for the micro-projects in time to receive a grant. However, it is important to note that the micro-projects undertaken by women were generally more modest than micro-projects run by mixed or male groups.

Most of the members of women's groups in Niger are illiterate, but they all wished for their own children—boys and girls—“to have the opportunity to go to school so that they could help improve the life of their parents, and live a better life than their parents.”

5. Revealing women's potential in the fight against poverty

The ability of women's groups to mobilize and manage funds means that they have a potentially important role in the fight against poverty. One high-level government administrator told the study team that «It is necessary to place much more funds in the hands of women. They know very well how to manage money and how to grow the initial capital, and at the same time improve the life of the family. »

The study team, however, suggested that the contribution of women to poverty reduction could be optimized only if the following preconditions are met:

- (a) Clean drinking water must be available close by, both to save time for women who now must fetch water from a distance, and to allow women to enter productive activities that require water;
- (b) A solution must be found to the drudgery of grinding grains. Some groups have received flour mills under the CAP micro-project program, but unfortunately the mills have not worked well or have broken down. Better maintenance and improved bookkeeping are needed;
- (c) The capacity of women groups must be improved. Women's groups have requested literacy programs and training in simple accounting and management.

6. Fight against poverty and degradation of the environment

The degradation of land in Niger has accelerated in recent times and the environment there is already fragile and getting worse because of increased demographic and animal stress. In this context, CAP, with its objectives of fighting poverty through economic development, risks confrontation with the fragile environment in Niger.

To reach economic development goals without endangering the environment, CAP should emphasize the need to improve natural resource management, that is, CAP should insist that each micro-project integrate environmental improvement or protection elements, and that no investments harmful to the environment will be funded.

The environmental objectives of CAP were appropriate, but the number of environmental micro-projects has been inadequate to meet the objectives. Although the beneficiaries of CAP were aware of the degradation of their environment, environmental micro-projects did not have a high priority in the Local Development Plans, and villagers were reluctant to provide cash or in-kind contributions to the community to carry out such micro-projects. The reasons were several, including:

- The high-level of poverty restricts people from investing in non-urgent activities (whereas for example, cereal banks, farm input stores, breeding animals are seen as urgent);
- It is difficult to mobilize people for collective activities without concrete incentives;
- Most environmental improvement sites are sparsely populated and in areas that are already badly degraded. Hence it is difficult to convince people of their potential (production) benefits;
- Other projects in the environmental sector, including the Special Program of the President, offered food and cash incentives;
- Environmental protection is costly; and
- People were expected to contribute 10 percent to 20 percent for micro-projects.

As a result, relatively few environmental micro-projects had been carried out by midterm.³² The rare environmental micro-projects that were implemented, especially on common lands, showed both the difficulty of getting people to participate in communal work without compensation (as in Tahoua région, *grappa de Bouza*), and some ways to get the people to improve their environment when suitable incentives are provided (as in the Tillabéry, *grappe de Tcharga*).

With respect to taking into account the environmental concerns in financing all the micro-projects (ref. the World Bank's safeguarding policy), the study team noted that the key tools (the environmental strategy paper, environmental guides, and evaluation manual) had been given only limited distribution and were insufficiently mastered by the stakeholders and others related to the project. The training-of-trainers courses organized by CAP had not been offered to other members of CAP or to ONG partners. The members of the village clusters received none of these tools.

The study team also noted that most of micro-projects had received no environmental evaluation, and even fewer micro-projects had included measures aimed at reducing potentially negative effects. For instance, in the Diffa region, mitigating measures had been included in certain micro-project proposals, but they had not been carried out in practice.

It is important for CAP to give all « actors » involved in local and commune development plans the tools they need to analyze environmental effects on micro-projects, and put in place appropriate mechanisms to supervise and monitor micro-projects. In addition, adequate supervision arrangements must be made for micro-projects, even if part of environmental monitoring has been outsourced (for example, to ROSELT or SIGNER).

7. Observations on local governance

One of the CAP components supports the decentralization process being carried out in the country as follows.

- In the field, CAP provides some support to selected communes and their elected bodies; and
- At the central government level, CAP helps the *Haut Commissariat à la Modernisation de l'Etat* (HCME) prepare policies and institutional reforms to speed up the process of decentralization.

CAP has provided help to HCME through the Ministry of Interior and Decentralization, in accordance with memorandums of understanding (*conventions*) between CAP and the Ministry. However, in the field the study team learned of some frustration among village clusters that had been left outside the project assistance during the first phase of the program. According to some local politicians, « double speed » phasing was not fair.

³² / However, at the end of 2007 their number was 434, that is, 28 percent of the total (ICR mission's note).

The study team suggested that coexisting village clusters and communes as targets of assistance cannot continue beyond the first phase of the program, but that the CAP should direct all its assistance henceforth to the communes. Whatever the level of support, the project must adhere to the same strict rules on the use of funds as until now.

8. Some observations on social cohesion

Wherever the study team interviewed beneficiary groups, the members of the groups spoke about «social capital» (*la vie associative*). As was the case with other subjects, the team noted that the villagers who had participated in training organized by CAP had indeed internalized the principal elements of the training. Interviews confirmed this time after time. As a result, there is a new sense of social dynamism among the target groups. This dynamism allows, both in the short run and in the long run, the villagers to undertake community-oriented activities that will have positive effects and improvement of the living conditions in the target villages.

9. Study team's recommendations

The report contains recommendations on both operational and policy matters. They are not reproduced here, because they are too many and because many of them were implemented during the latter part of the project period.

B. 2010 Impact Evaluation of Avian Flu Component

No formal end-of-the-project survey of beneficiaries was prepared. Actually, benefits would have accrued to the population if an avian flu attack had occurred during the project period, but fortunately no attack occurred. However, the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit of the Component F of CAP1 organized in 2010 an internal impact review that may serve as a knowledge and awareness survey of beneficiaries. No report on this study was completed, but the statistical results were incorporated in the Government's Project Completion Report (*Rapport Interne d'Achevement de Composante Grippe Aviaire du Programme d'Actions Communautaires Phase 1*) under the section "Mobilization of social and communication strategy."

1. Conclusion

The study concluded that the approach adopted by the avian flu component had efficiently engaged the target populations and had told them about the avian flu and its symptoms as well as methods for avoiding it. At the baseline in 2008 64 percent of the population was aware of the existence of the disease, its symptoms, and measures to be used to prevent it (since the information campaigns launched by the Government and planned and financed by UNICEF and other international and bilateral donors). At the end of 2010 this percentage had increased to 91 percent thanks to the activities of the project and some support from other sources such as the European Union through SPINAP, an NGO.

2. Methodology

The methodology had two phases. First, the M&E Unit distributed questionnaires to all the field agents trained by the project, that is, staffs of the public-sector agricultural and

veterinary services, human-health officials, and field agents of the environmental services. They interviewed more than 1.200 individuals in the areas where active surveillance of the avian flu was practiced. The results were first summarized at the departmental level, then at the regional level and finally by the M&E Unit at CAP1.

Second, the component management organized a workshop for key stakeholders in which the interview results were approved and made uniform.

The methodology used in interviews and selection of interviewees may not have been so scientific as it would have been if a professional consulting firm or university had been used to plan and execute the study. The method of selecting interviewees was said to be random because it was left to field agents to decide where they carried out the interviews. They did it mainly at marketplaces and mosques of their own choosing. However, as the sample size was six times larger than a scientifically representative random sampling would have required, the results were sufficiently valid to determine that the knowledge and awareness level of the population improved substantially during implementation of the project.

Annex 7. Stakeholder Workshop Report (Original Project)

1. Organization of stakeholder workshops

The ICR mission organized two stakeholder workshops as well as individual sessions with three NGOs. The first workshop included 18 ministries and public- and private- sector organizations. (For example, in the Ministries of Agricultural Development, Decentralization, and Environment), for supervisors or technical support personnel (for example, in the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Ministries of Livestock and Hydraulics), or for implementers (for example, in ASI, a private-sector company involved in carbon sequestration). The second workshop included 10 organizations from the international technical and financial donor community, including among other the European Union (the leader of the donor community workgroup), World Bank, FAO, Danish, Swiss, and Luxemburg development agencies. The NGO group was represented by major agencies ARIDEL (*Action pour le renforcement des initiatives de développement local*), ONG-CDR (*Contribution au développement rural*), and ICRISAT. In addition, the mission interacted with the public-sector, elected officials, and beneficiary groups in Tillabéri Department.

2. Workshop with the public and private sector

In the workshop organized for the representatives of public and private sectors involved in the Community Action Program (CAP), the ICR mission asked each participant to make a presentation on four topics.

The four topics were as follows:

- The role of the organization/agency in question vis-à-vis CAP;
- The main achievements during project implementation;
- The main difficulties faced during project implementation;
- The most important lessons that could have been gained from the project and its implementation for the follow-on project or similar projects in other countries.

Partnerships with CAP. The interrelationships among the different organizations/agencies and CAP attending the workshop, showed the broad reach of the Community Action Program:

- *Secrétariat Permanent de la Stratégie de Réduction de la Pauvreté (SP/SRP):* SP/SRP has supported in the revision of the Poverty Reduction Strategy and definition of monitoring and evaluation linked with outcomes;
- *Direction des Etudes et de la Programmation (DEP)* in the Ministry of Hydraulics: DEP has participated in supervising the project and represented the Ministry in the Steering Committee. The ministry has provided technical assistance to CAP in the field and benefited in its promotion of increased access to clean water.
- *Conseil National de l'Environnement pour un Développement Durable (CNEDD)* was a partnership that was created to advance the Bio-Carbon Initiative Program,

and is a nationally designated agency (Autorité Nationale Désignée-AND) of all projects belonging to Mécanisme de Développement Propre (MDP).

- *Achat Services International* (ASI) is a partnership that is based on the Bio-Carbon Initiative; ASI acts as recorder of carbon-retrieval credits.
- Direction Générale d'Évaluation des Programmes de Développement (DGEPD) of the Ministry of Economy and Finance has helped design the project, conduct a trial of M&E arrangements in a few regions, and supervise CAP.
- *Direction Générale de Financement* (DGF) of the Ministry of Economy and Finance was the interface between the project and the World Bank, and it has helped processing withdraw applications to the World Bank and to the Government..
- *Secrétariat Permanent du Code Rural* (SP/CR) has worked to secure land rights for the reforestation areas and to develop the land use and registration legislation, as well as participating in CAP supervision missions.
- *Direction Générale pour les Collectivités Territoriales* (DGCT) has assured that the regional administration and elected bodies provide the general guidance for the project operations.
- *Direction de Production Animale* (DPA) was a member of the project's Steering Committee. It has participated in supervision missions, and its staff provides technical assistance to village clusters;
- *Haut Commissariat à la Modernisation de l'Etat* (HCME): CAP has supported HCME's process of decentralization; and
- *Direction Générale du Développement Communautaire* (DGDC): The mutual interest of CAP and DGDC has been in developing the concept of communal planning and its advocacy. DGDC was also a member of the Steering Committee.

Main achievements. In general, the agencies and organizations that participated in the workshop expressed appreciation for the project's achievements in the field. In their own work and organizations they credited several results to the project: As a summary, the public- and private-sector partners reported that the project had:

- Organized or facilitated organization of workshops, seminars, and conferences for training, for study of climate change and for actions required on environmental problems at all levels, from the National Assembly to the private sector and local villages; had recruited consultants; and had provided tools for development and its measurement (SP/SRP; CNEDD; DGCT, DGDC);
- Acquired or facilitated acquiring of information technology and materials, and created policies, manuals, and documents of good quality (including a new version of Strategy for Reducing Poverty) (SP/SRP;);

- Increased coverage of water points and sanitation facilities according to the demand presented by the local populations (DEP);
- Accelerated environmental improvements, including introduction of Acacia Senegal plantations and carbon sequestration (CNEDD);
- Facilitated signing of a contract with the World Bank-administered bio-carbon fund and creating contracts with 41 communities to establish carbon sequestration plantations (ASI);
- Provided management training and facilitated field visits to install field-level M&E (DGEPD),
- Helped establish a number of land commissions and facilitated juridical clarification of investments in reforestation sites (SP/CR);
- Facilitated promotion of the cattle-breeding policies of the Government through CAP micro-projects (DPA); and
- Facilitated evaluation of the decentralized administrations in selected regions (DGCT) and complementary studies on decentralization, leading to adoption of a frame law for decentralization and establishment of an Agency for Financing of Elected Bodies in the Niger Territory (HCME).

Problem areas and difficulties

The participated agencies and organizations reported no major problems in dealing with CAP, but mentioned a few that either they or the project in their view had encountered:

- Delays and shortcomings in the Government's 10 percent counterpart funding have impeded the organization of field missions (SOP/SRP; DGF);
- Local specialists of technical ministries have provided technical assistance to micro-projects, but the quality needs to be monitored, especially for water (DEP);
- Monitoring of bio-carbon plantations requires a lot of time because the plantations are far from each other; moreover, the population does not yet understand the effects of carbon gas despite workshops around the country (CNEDD);
- The weakening of the U.S. dollar has reduced the amount of local funds available for planned activities and for beneficiary groups (the U.S. dollar is a major currency in the SDR basket) (DGF);
- It has been impossible to attain the target number of land commissions (SP/CR);
- Slow release of funds for payments to service providers has slowed implementation of micro-projects; the evaluation process has not yet covered all regions (DGCT);

- Triple involvement of technical services (in preparation, approval, and supervision of a micro-project) could be a weakness (DPA); and
- The ministry always needs financial and equipment support to participate in the supervision missions (DGDC).

Lessons suggested by participating stakeholders. The problem areas and difficulties just listed imply some lessons and the need for improvement. In addition, the participating agencies and organizations suggested the following:

- External input, such as that of CAP, has been necessary to introduce the Results-Based Management approach (*Gestion Axée sur les Résultats—GAR*) into monitoring and evaluation of poverty and to improve policies (SP/SRP);
- The teamwork between partners and the information flows that CAP has introduced have been adequate (CNEDD); The project introduced an approach that favored integration of activities and actors and made the partners work as teams (DGDC);
- CAP has been a key instrument in developing land registration and land decrees (SP/CR);
- Timing of CAP financing was good for communes, allowing them to establish themselves and get training before attempting to start preparing their development plans and implementing micro-projects identified in communal development plans (DGCT); and
- The methodological approach, tools, and documents that CAP has introduced were well used by partners (DGDC).

3. Workshop with the donor community

Representatives of the donor community made the following observations and recommendations (the workshop did not attempt to reach consensus on these views and recommendations):

- CAP I was a large program covering a substantial part of Niger and, has provided a major basis for introducing practical actions to support the country's rural development strategy. Its objectives are still relevant in the current circumstances;
- CAP I has provided a platform for extensive discussions among international and national development partners and therefore has facilitated a certain degree of harmonization of external assistance in the rural development field; the development partners have been active in reviewing and commenting on documents as project-related policies and various guidelines and manuals, interesting also for their own programs;

- CAP I has been a multi-activity package (like a brand-type program) and it has been collaborative, transparent, and well known in the country. It also has eased the entrance of donors besides the World Bank, with their own local or technical assistance programs, into the rural development field. However, while the general structure of CAP I has been well known, its details, procedures, and even results have remained less familiar to other development partners. During PAC II, information should be better disseminated and project reports and documents should be more widely distributed;
- Collaboration with others in the field has been adequate in many cases; for example, FAO has provided technical expertise in the irrigation subsector. However, not all programs of donor agencies have been fully compatible with CAP. CAP could have benefited from better cooperation with other agencies when program locations coincided, and better results might have been obtained if CAP and others had agreed on locations where complementary services could be provided.
- Commune- and community - level investments have helped establish elected bodies at the communes and have reinforced the capacities and provided infrastructure both at commune and cluster levels. Other donor agencies have benefited from increased capacities and facilities. However, donor agencies fear that too little attention has been paid to maintenance of facilities created at these levels, and that the results may be lost when donor money is no longer available (this concern applied also to other field-level facilities financed by external funds);
- Although CAP is a long-term program with preset development objectives, it should be flexible enough to take into account new developments and facilities and to allow a more rapid change of course. For instance, when irrigation becomes an apparent priority or when additional funds for the Government's development programs become available (e.g., the European Union's allocation of 20 million euros), CAP should be quick to adjust its components or develop appropriate financing instruments so that these opportunities could be seized; and
- There is an apparent controversy between the "investment" structures (communities or "grappes"—village clusters) and the new structure of "communes" (districts). It is not clear, whether CAP should support either structures, or whether CAP should concentrate more, if not all, of its attention to the communes. The communes might, as public-sector administrative units, be better able to look after sustainability and maintenance of village-level investments than the voluntary committees of village cluster.

On a minor note, donor community participants also questioned whether "multi-supervisions" every six months, sometimes involving tens of persons from various agencies and the project, would really improve the project, be cost-effective, and increase "ownership," or whether wrap-up sessions with broad participation and adequate distribution of mission reports would be sufficient.

4. Working sessions with NGO/research representatives

The ICR mission interacted with three agencies,--ARIDEL (Action pour le renforcement des initiatives de développement local), ONG-CDR (Contribution au développement rural), and ICRISAT--.

ARIDEL was created by the personnel who had implemented the World Bank-financed Natural Resources Management Project (PGRN) from 1997- to 2002. Besides natural resource management programs, it has been active in social fields, HIV/AIDS prevention, alphabetization, capacity building, and rural development in a broad sense for several multi- and bilateral agencies. ARIDEL has a head office in Douchi, 27 permanent staff and temporarily, 13 consultants and 10 resource persons. For PAC, it has been active in four regions, implementing some 20 subcontracts for communes and village clusters.

ONG-CDR was established in 1990. Its headquarters is in Niamey and six branches in the regions, with regional coordinators and technical advisers. It has 45 permanent staff and a support group of 320 members. The activities in which ONG-CDR has been involved range from research to project implementation, monitoring and evaluation, advisory work, and communication and training. With different external financiers, ONG-CDR has been involved, among other things, in training of preparation of 240 commune and village cluster development plans, of which about 35 have been implemented through subcontracts financed by CAP.

ICRISAT is an international organization that has its headquarters in India and branches in semi-arid regions of India and Africa, including one in Niger. Although, it is essentially a crop-research institute, in Niger, ICRISAT has been heavily involved in research of Acacia Senegal and other indigenous tree species. It collaborated with CAP early on, but once the carbon sequestration program became part of CAP, ICRISAT was contracted to carry out activities relating to planting of locally adaptable trees. In these activities, it has undertaken capacity building (collection of seeds, nursery techniques, involvement of local people), started local programs (selection of sites and involvement of government agencies and NGOs), technical assistance to CAP and NGOs, and supervision on behalf of CAP.

Apart from delays in getting payments from the project for the contracts, there have been no major problems (but a huge amount of work). The NGOs cited the following lessons:

- A manual for outsourcing services (*“faire-faire”*) would have helped speed up the contracting procedures with communes and village clusters (thus also speeding up the preparation of development plans, micro-projects, and their implementation);
- Although communes and communities may have been unfamiliar with competition in selecting the service providers--and competition might have slowed the start of field work—competition has allowed the communes to choose the best and least expensive NGOs to carry out the field activities;
- CAP support and financing were critical both for starting the decentralization program and for kick-starting local-level development. The communes that were included in

CAP have proved to be much more advanced, competent, and energetic than those that were left outside;

- In promoting environmental improvements, it is necessary to understand the local people and their habits, concerns, and priorities. To get people interested in such long-term matters as natural resource management and environmental protection (including maintenance of trees), it is absolutely necessary to provide them with concrete incentives (food or cash for work). Similarly, to improve efficiency, the public-sector staff needs to be given incentives for better efficiency (transport, training, allowances);
- Political- and higher-level administrators must strongly encourage local administrators to view natural resource management as a high priority. Elected officials and higher-level administrators (and the rest of the world) must emphasize that desertification is not simply a problem for some local people but a problem for the whole country and even the world, because leaving land to erode un-reclaimed will quickly expand the desert and reduce carbon absorption.

Annex 8. Stakeholder Workshop Report (Avian Flu Component)

Organization of stakeholder workshops

The ICR mission on the avian flu component of CAP1 organized three stakeholder workshops/meetings and had individual sessions with stakeholders. The first meeting was with the National Committee in charge of the fight against avian flu; 12 persons from the key ministries and public sector organizations and from international organizations attended. The second meeting was with nine representatives (“focal points”) from the regions that were the main beneficiaries of the project assistance (Tahoue, Maradi, and Zinder). The representatives were from the regional offices of the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Services, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Environment. The third meeting was with the international donor community; the mission met representatives of FAO, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),³³ and the World Health Organization. In addition, the mission met in private sessions all the Component F staff of CAP1, key persons of the Second Community Action Program Support Project (CAP2), the Bank’s resident mission staff who had dealt with Component F, and high officials and focal points of the involved and benefiting ministries, that is, the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Services, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Environment.

Methodology

After the opening discussion with the stakeholders to clarify the relationship of the respective ministry/agency/organization to the avian flu component (hereafter called the project), or ways in which the ministry/agency/organization engaged with the project, the mission asked the stakeholders three key questions.

- What were the most significant results/achievements of the project?
- What were the main problems that negatively affected implementation of the project?
- What are the most important lessons learned from the project and its implementation that can help to inform the design of a follow-on project in Niger, or similar projects in other countries?

The views expressed in these workshops and meetings are summarized in the next section.

Main achievements

All stakeholders who were interviewed expressed appreciation for the achievements of the project. They strongly endorsed the general approach of the avian flu component, as a country response in case of an attack by the pathogenic H5N1 virus. They also recognized that, in order to be effective, the approach must be a collaborative effort among several ministries at the central, regional, departmental, and local levels and that the approach

³³ / Several others had been invited, but because their assistance in the fight against avian flu had ended, they did not see it as necessary for them to come.

must be accompanied by supporting actions and activities, for example, provision of information, training, and technical and operational support.

The stakeholders reported that the project had generated benefits in a number of areas:

- The project brought a new approach to the fight against avian flu (and similar diseases) in Niger, one that has been successfully integrated into the Government's strategic planning and decentralization efforts. It linked donors that were active in animal- and human-health and environmental fields, leading them to better coordinate their efforts around a common set of decentralized, participatory approaches.
- The project provided sorely needed funds to help continue the work started by the Government and the *Cellule Permanente/Comité national de lutte contre la grippe aviaire* and supported by several international agencies with small resources, but for which assistance had ended. (Only the support by the European Union through SPINAP continued, apart from technical advice from others such as WHO.)
- Perhaps as its biggest achievement, the project helped build new, collaborative networks at all four levels (central, regional, departmental, and local communities) to fight against avian flu. The networks included the staffs of the ministries of agriculture and animal services, health, and water and environment, plus many other participants from the public and private sectors on the coordination committees (all of whom were trained to fight avian flu). Also, the project brought the veterinary and human testing laboratories into the networks. The general view was that now Niger was able to detect, treat, and monitor avian flu or similar animal-conveyed diseases, including swine flu. When there was an outbreak of a milder flu in February 2010 (H1N1--swine flu) the networks were able to respond to it in a coordinated manner.
- The project stimulated an entirely new level of dynamism in the ministries, their personnel, and local populations by providing important information, training, equipment, and operational resources to people, who were stakeholders in the fight against avian flu and who, without the project, would have had little chances to organize protection against this potential calamity. It also facilitated anti-flu operations by allowing adequate planning and financing implementation of the plans. The key players among the public, such as animal traders, poultry farmers, slaughterers, and poultry handlers, especially women and children, were trained. Vigilance was organized all the way from the national to the village level (in the critical areas that is, in regions neighboring Nigeria and Burkina Faso, where cases of avian flu had appeared earlier).
- The stakeholders particularly appreciated the construction or rehabilitation of new laboratories, health centers, and isolation facilities, and their own role in identifying the critical areas for these facilities. The project gave a large number of people the knowledge about and skills to fight avian flu; and it helped form coordination committees at the regional, departmental, and community levels to take charge of the avian flu-related activities.
- Stakeholders also greatly appreciated the diagnostic material, medicines, incinerators for medical waste, refrigerators, information technology, communications equipment

(e.g., 500 cellular phones for surveillance and communication), purchased by the project. Also the human-health and environmental people appreciated the technical training they received, as did the project staff and focal points.

- The project improved the effectiveness of the Government's technical ministries by bringing in the appropriate technical resources to support and monitor avian flu activities at the regional, departmental, and the local levels. It financed the creation of manuals and documents that were widely used in training and implementing the project activities
- The project facilitated continuation of radio programs and information dissemination started earlier with help of UNICEF, USAID, and others on avian-flu related topics.
- The project allowed the environmental protection agents to contribute effectively to the surveillance of avian flu and other bird diseases by providing a substantial number of environmental agents with Global Positioning Systems (GPS), binoculars, cameras, vehicles, and so on, thus significantly improving surveillance, including that of migratory birds. All environmental respondents mentioned the cellular phones purchased by the project as a critical part of their communication and surveillance work. Also, reporting on field events became regular, and communication improved not only inside Niger but also in the region around Niger.
- The project financed training for environmental staff and built capacity to carry out systematic surveillance work in the field.
- Support from the main project, CAP1 and later CAP2, was important; there were no problems in the accounting, financial reporting, disbursement, or audits during the project.
- Arguably, the project may have helped avoid a new attack of avian flu, or at least to avoid any panic associated with the disease, among populations less well informed about this disease.

Problem areas and difficulties

Although the stakeholders were generally very satisfied with the avian flu project, they also recognized that a number of problems arose during implementation that it would be advisable to avoid in any eventual follow-on operation:

- Delays occurred in procurement and receipt of the promised goods and services. (However, most goods and services identified in the annual plans and budgets were delivered, albeit sometimes late.)
- The Government people involved in the project were inexperienced with the project activities and especially with the procedures of the World Bank. There was not enough expertise among those involved in the project even to write specifications for the requirements for this special type of project. Consultant assistance in preparing specifications for goods and services to be procured was too little or too late.

- The Government and World Bank procurement procedures should have been more flexible (“*soupple*”).
- The new equipment and facilities that were provided were good, but all respondents mentioned that there were too few to supply all of the agents in the priority surveillance areas, let alone the whole country. There were shortages of medications, computers, transport equipment, and laboratory security systems.
- In the environmental sector, more vehicles (cars and motorcycles) were needed and more agents should have been trained. Moreover, the training given needs to be updated and supplemented with more technical training (e.g., in recognition of the migratory birds).
- Environmental agents and veterinary service people suffered from the fact that the frontier between Niger on the one side and Nigeria and Burkina Faso on the other side is very long, “porous,” and difficult to guard.
- Project management was slow to start some activities (e.g., procurement of a freezer-dryer and initiation of the study needed for restarting the aviculture in the 2006 avian flu disaster areas, where more than 17,000 chickens had been culled). The supervising ministry was slow to approve the procurement documents, and World Bank teams were sometimes slow to give the Bank’s no-objections.
- The original project period (24 months) was too short and the funds were too little for such an extensive exercise. Not all villagers were informed and trained, especially those outside the frontier of Nigeria and Burkina Faso.
- While the idea of “mainstreaming” the project activities in the existing Government organizations was good, it was often difficult to get the full attention of the officials, including focal points in the different ministries, because all involved had other pressing tasks as well. (No person, except for the project accountant, had the project activities as his sole duty.) Some individuals expressed the view that perhaps the Government was less committed to this project than it was to bigger projects.
- The project, and all other donor assistance for this work, has ended, and there is great concern as to whether the networks, especially the committees at different levels, can sustain. Some waning of interest among the committees has already been noticed and the meetings are tapering off. The normal Government budgets provide for too few funds even to pay for telephone and Internet fees and transport. (The Government budgets cover the office premises, electricity, and salaries of two persons—coordinator and permanent secretary of the *Cellule Permanente* and those of the focal points.)
- More funds would be needed to consolidate the achievements and reinforce the structures developed.

Lessons learned

In view of the achievements of the project--and in recognition of the problem areas--the stakeholders identified the following lessons learned:

- The project was extremely influential in Niger because it introduced an integrated approach to the fight against the avian flu, one that has been successfully implemented in the key ministries and other agencies. During the crisis (2005-06), the Government relatively quickly mobilized donors to provide support, but the donors' efforts lasted only 1 to 2 years. However, there is a longer-term need for this kind of operation, and the effort will need to continue, at least to facilitate operating the organizations that have been established and the equipment that has been purchased.
- Like the main project, CAP1, the avian flu component provided a platform for extensive discussions among international and national development partners and therefore facilitated some harmonization of external assistance. Development partners regularly reviewed and commented on project-generated documents.
- In a crisis, it is easy to underestimate the financial and manpower resources needed for an effective, countrywide response. (The funds earmarked by the World Bank were not based on a needs assessment but on the allocation of a portion of the limited grant funds available.)
- A concentrated effort (like a project approach) is useful to bring the different ministries together. Collaboration among concerned ministries was generally satisfactory after the roles and shares of funds had been worked out. Previously there had been only limited linkages between the veterinary- and human-health services, and those were more in the field than at the central level. Some have also suggested that the collaboration during the project avoided duplication of effort and brought economic savings through use of the same facilities, for instance, for diagnostics, communications, and logistics.
- An impressive level of collaboration has been achieved among the implementing agencies. Teamwork among the partners was substantial, and the information flows that the project fostered allowed different development partners to feel that they were working toward a common goal and essentially using the same approach. The same can also be said of the key ministries.

Annex 9. Summary of Borrower's ICR (Original Project)

RAPPORT D'ACHEVEMENT DE LA PREMIER PHASE DU PROGRAMME D'ACTIONS COMMUNAUTAIRES (PAC)

Sommaire

Niveau d'exécution et d'atteinte des objectifs du PAC.

Le Programme d'Actions Communautaires (PAC) a pour objectif global de réduire la pauvreté et de promouvoir le développement local grâce d'une part au renforcement des capacités des collectivités et des communautés en matière de gouvernance locale et de gestion des ressources naturelles, et d'autre part à l'élévation du niveau sanitaire, de l'éducation, de la sécurité alimentaire et à l'accès aux opportunités économiques. Toutes choses qui permettront de stimuler la croissance économique. De part sa portée nationale et son ambition de s'attaquer d'une part à la situation de pauvreté généralisée et d'autre part à soutenir le processus de décentralisation, le PAC ne peut s'inscrire que dans le long terme. C'est pourquoi, l'instrument APL (Adaptable Program Loan) a été choisi dans le cadre du PAC afin de disposer d'un horizon flexible à long terme qui permet d'atteindre l'objectif du programme.

La première phase du PAC, conduite de 2003 à 2007 poursuivait deux objectifs de développement à savoir i) aider l'Etat du Niger à concevoir et à mettre en place des mécanismes de financement décentralisés, participatifs et transparents permettant aux communautés et aux collectivités territoriales de mettre en œuvre leurs propres plans de développement et ii) promouvoir une Gestion Communautaire Intégrée des Ecosystèmes et générer de multiples effets positifs sur l'environnement.

Cette première phase a été financée par l'Association pour le Développement International (IDA), le Fonds pour l'Environnement Mondial (FEM) et à travers la contribution de l'Etat et celle des populations bénéficiaires pour un montant total de 43,8 millions de dollars US. A ce montant initial, sont venus s'ajouter deux financements complémentaires dont un Don PHRD de 696 600 dollars US pour soutenir l'initiative de plantation d'*Acacia senegal* associé à la fixation du carbone (initiative bio carbone) entamée en 2005 et un don d'environ 4 millions de dollars US pour le financement de la composante F du projet dans le cadre de la lutte contre la grippe aviaire. Cette composante grippe aviaire sera mise en vigueur à partir d'août 2008.

La stratégie d'intervention a été basée sur quatre principes fondamentaux à savoir i) une démarche participative avec des interventions non ciblées, multisectorielles émanant des besoins exprimés par les communautés et les collectivités, iii) le renforcement des capacités des communautés et des collectivités, fixer des priorités, planifier le développement au niveau locale, mettre en œuvre, suivre et évaluer des microprojets et iv) un partenariat avec diverses institutions notamment les ONG.

Le PAC appuie 178 grappes de villages et 54 communes réparties dans les huit régions du pays. Il faut néanmoins noter que le PAC intervient de manière simultanée dans 172

grappes localisées dans 140 communes. Le cas le plus édifiant est celui de la commune V de Niamey où l'intervention du PAC se fait au niveau communal et dans la totalité des cinq grappes que compte cette commune. De manière générale, la zone compte environ 5 383 143 habitants soit 48% de la population du Niger.

Au terme de quatre années d'exécution effective de ses activités, la première phase du PAC a enregistré des résultats satisfaisants. Ces résultats sont présentés selon la logique d'intervention qui nous indique quel a été le niveau des fonds mobilisés, pour quelles réalisations physiques et pour quels effets observés sur les bénéficiaires. Les résultats ci-dessous résumés sont présentés à travers cinq parties à savoir :

- les niveaux des effets observés les bénéficiaires;
- les niveaux de performance sur la base des indicateurs de performance et déclencheurs de phase ;
- les niveaux des réalisations physiques ;
- les niveaux de décaissement des ressources financières ;
- les difficultés rencontrées et leçons retenues.

Les niveaux des effets observés par les bénéficiaires au cours de la première phase.

Les investigations menées à travers le dispositif interne de suivi des résultats et plusieurs consultations au cours de l'année 2007 ont permis de mettre en relief les principaux résultats observés par les bénéficiaires. Quels sont ces résultats ? du PAC a été globalement un succès. Le projet a été géré avec rigueur et compétence et a eu un impact indéniable sur l'amélioration des conditions des communautés. L'intervention du PAC a couvert 54 communes et 178 grappes totalisant 4400 villages pour une population totale estimée à 5 millions d'habitants. Près de 12 milliards de FCA ont été directement gérés par les communes et les communautés pour financer leurs microprojets utilisant les procédures de passation de marchés communautaires. L'analyse des données de suivi-évaluation et les études sur les effets du projet démontrent l'ampleur des résultats impressionnants que le projet a obtenus, parmi lesquels on peut mettre en exergue les points suivants :

En matière de renforcement des compétences des acteurs communaux et la synergie d'actions entre partenaires, il a été noté que i) 76% des élus connaissent bien l'organisation politique et administrative actuelle du Niger, ii) 80% des élus connaissent leurs rôles, leurs responsabilités et leurs domaines de compétence, iii) 87% des communes ont élaboré de règlement intérieur de leurs conseils, iv) 60% des communes ont tenu les 4 sessions ordinaires en 2006, v) 65% des conseils affichent régulièrement les procès verbaux issus des délibérations du conseil et vi) 65% des communes ont pris des actes répartissant les tâches entre les différents agents municipaux. Au plan de l'harmonisation et de la synergie avec les autres partenaires, le projet a établi des conventions de partenariat avec le LUCOP de la GTZ, le PCLCP du PNUD, et la SNV qui ont permis d'amplifier les interventions au niveau des communes des régions de Tillabéri, Zinder, Maradi et Diffa en faisant jouer la complémentarité des financements. Ce qui est une amorce de l'approche programme.

En matière de gouvernance locale, il a été observé que i) le pourcentage des communes dont les taux de recouvrement des impôts et taxes variant de 30% à 50%, qui était de 47 % en 2005 est passé à 70% en 2006, ii) en 2006, 60% des communes ont adopté leurs budgets sans que ces derniers ne fassent de la part du représentant de l'Etat des observations particulières, et on procédé au recrutement du personnel clé notamment le secrétaire général, le secrétaire municipal, iii) le receveur municipal et l'agent état civil ont été recrutés dans plus de 50% des communes et iv) en 2006, 70% des communes ont satisfait à l'obligation de l'établissement des comptes administratifs. Au plan de la décentralisation, le projet a permis de renforcer les capacités des conseils communaux en matière de planification locale, et de gestion administrative, fiscale et budgétaire. Parmi les acquis du projet, on peut noter l'appui à l'élaboration du guide de planification communale adopté au plan national et servant de base à l'intervention de tous les acteurs au niveau des communes, l'amélioration du taux de recouvrement de la fiscalité locale qui a augmenté de plus de 20% dans plus de la moitié des communes en une année. Les études et les ateliers de réflexion financés par le présent ont abouti à l'élaboration de trois projets de loi fondamentaux de la décentralisation qui sont actuellement introduits dans le circuit d'approbation, à savoir : (i) le code des collectivités, (ii) la charte de la déconcentration (iii) le fonds de péréquation et le fonds d'appui aux communes.

En matière de gestion des ressources naturelles, il est à noter que sur la base des données collectées à travers le suivi interne des résultats intermédiaires, i) le pourcentage de sites ayant enregistré une diminution de l'érosion hydrique par rapport à l'année précédente est de 88 %, ii) le pourcentage de sites ayant enregistré une augmentation de la diversité biologique (flore, faune) par rapport à l'année précédente est de 86 % et iii) environ 7 000 ha de plantation d'*Acacia senegal* ont été réalisés dans le cadre de l'initiative bio carbone en 2006 et 2007 sur 21000 ha prévue à l'horizon 2011. A cet effet, le projet a permis de mettre en place l'une des premières opérations du Fonds BioCarbone (BioCf) en Afrique Sub-Saharienne. Au total près de 9000 ha de terre y compris une partie des sites BioCf ont été aménagés avec des technologies de gestion durable des terres qui ont permis de réduire l'érosion hydrique dans 88% des sites selon les enquêtes de suivi des résultats effectuées par le projet.

Le projet est également intervenu dans 7 sites FEM en cours de dégradation et a eu pour premiers effets l'engagement des communautés dans la protection et la valorisation plus rationnelle des ressources naturelles de l'écosystème et la réhabilitation de la diversité biologique dans 86% des sites.

Enfin, le projet a appuyé la réalisation de 2 200 foyers améliorés permettant ainsi de réduire la consommation de bois de chauffe des familles bénéficiaires d'au moins 50%, la réalisation de 330 latrines dont plus de 50% dans les établissements scolaires et 215 dépotoirs d'ordures ménagères améliorant de manière significative le cadre de vie des populations. Sur le plan de la sécurisation foncière, le projet a appuyé l'élaboration et l'adoption du décret portant création de la commission foncière communale et l'installation de 11 commissions foncières. Ce qui a permis de commencer à délivrer les actes fonciers au niveau communal et de prévenir les conflits sociaux.

En matière d'accès aux infrastructures et opportunités socio-économiques, il faut souligner que i) la contribution du PAC au taux de couverture en infrastructures hydrauliques est en moyenne de 0,79 % avec un maximum de 3,18 %, ii) la contribution

du PAC au taux d'équipement des classes du primaire et des collèges est de 10 %, iii) la contribution du PAC au taux de couverture sanitaire (avec cases de santé) des populations est de 2,9%, iv) la proportion de villages ayant accès à une BC et /où des stocks sont sécurisés par un magasin est passé de 29 % en 2004 à 38 % en 2007 et v) la proportion de villages ayant accès à une banque d'intrants agricoles et/ où des stocks sont sécurisés par un magasin est passé de 7 % en 2004 à 57 % en 2007.

Au plan social le projet a permis de construire 322 classes primaires et secondaires permettant ainsi : i) à près de 15000 élèves d'étudier dans de bonnes conditions et 153 centres d'alphabétisation pour environ 6000 adultes dont 50% de femmes ; ii) de construire 8 centres de santé intégrés, 9 cases de santé, 6 maternités, 4 dépôts pharmaceutiques ; iii) de former 163 femmes relais et matrones permettant ainsi d'améliorer l'accès physiques d'environ 300.000 personnes aux soins de santé primaire ; et iv) enfin de mettre à la disposition des communautés 113 puits, 55 forages et 14 mini-adductions d'eau potable permettant à près de 170.000 personnes d'avoir accès à l'eau potable réduisant ainsi la corvée des femmes qui ont pu dégager du temps pour d'autres activités. En zone pastorale, ces ouvrages permettent à une population pastorale d'environ 56 000 personnes d'abreuver leurs animaux.

Au plan économique un millier de microprojets générateurs de revenus ont été financés dans le domaine agro-sylvo-pastoral et de l'artisanat qui ont permis à environ 100.000 personnes dont 80% de femmes d'améliorer leur revenu de plus de 10%. Et en tenant compte de la taille des familles, on peut estimer qu'environ 700.000 personnes ont bénéficié de manière directe ou indirecte des activités du projet.

Les différents résultats enregistrés démontrent que d'importants progrès sont réalisés vers l'atteinte des objectifs du PAC au cours de la première phase. Ce constat est d'ailleurs confirmé par le niveau de performance ci-dessous évalué sur la base d'indicateurs préalablement définis.

Niveau de performance enregistré au cours de la première phase.

Le niveau de performance globale du PAC au cours de sa première phase d'exécution est très satisfaisant comme l'indique les valeurs atteintes par les indicateurs de performances et déclencheurs de phase. En effet, 16 des 18 indicateurs (89%) ont atteint les valeurs cibles en fin de phase. Ces indicateurs revus, affinés et reformulés lors de la revue à mi-parcours, ont fait l'objet d'un suivi tous les six mois. Au 30 juin 2007, la situation des indicateurs de performance et déclencheurs de phase se présente comme suit:

En matière d'appui aux communautés (Composante A)

- 100 % des grappes de villages ont validé leur PDL dont 70 % avec l'appui du PAC;
- 82 % des PDL validés intègrent la gestion communautaire intégrée des écosystèmes en particulier et la gestion des ressources naturelles en général. La valeur cible de fin de phase est de 75 %;
- 93 % des grappes de villages enquêtées sont satisfaites des interventions du PAC tandis que la valeur cible de fin de phase est de 80 %.

En matière d'appui aux collectivités (composante B)

- 97 % des conseillers élus des 54 communes ont été formés sur la gestion administrative pour une valeur cible de fin de phase de 80 %;
- 97 % des conseillers élus des 54 communes ont été formés sur la gestion budgétaire pour une valeur cible de fin de phase de 80 %;
- 99 % des conseillers élus des 54 communes ont été formés sur la gestion fiscale pour une valeur cible de fin de phase de 80 %;
- 78 % des conseillers élus des 54 communes ont été formés sur les aspects environnementaux pour une valeur cible de fin de phase de 80 %;
- 100 % des communes ont validé et adopté leur PDC dont 93 % avec l'appui du PAC;
- 83 % des communes enquêtées sont satisfaites des interventions du PAC tandis que la valeur cible de fin de phase est de 80 %.

En matière de financement des investissements au niveau local (composante C)

- 85 % de grappes de villages bénéficiaires des appuis du PAC sont jugées capables de gérer les fonds d'investissement local alors que la valeur cible en fin de phase est fixée à 40% ;
- 77 % de communes bénéficiaires des appuis du PAC sont jugées capables de gérer les fonds d'investissement local alors que la valeur cible en fin de phase est fixée à 40% ;
- 70 % des communes ont exécuté au sein de leur PDC au moins 3 micro-projets à travers le fonds d'investissement local du PAC tandis que la valeur cible de fin de phase est de 65 %;
- 75 % des grappes de villages ont exécuté au sein de leur PDL au moins 5 micro-projets à travers le fonds d'investissement local du PAC tandis que la valeur cible de fin de phase est de 65 % ;
- 74 % de conventions de cofinancements ont été exécutées dans les délais tandis que la valeur cible de fin de phase est de 80 %;
- 83 % de conventions de cofinancements ont été exécutées dans les normes tandis que la valeur cible de fin de phase est de 80 %.

En matière de suivi-évaluation au niveau local (composante D).

- 91 % des communes participantes renseignent de manière satisfaisante les indicateurs de suivi-évaluation et transmettent régulièrement des informations au niveau des CCR ;

- 74 % des grappes de villages renseignent de manière satisfaisante les indicateurs de suivi-évaluation et transmettent régulièrement des informations au niveau des CCR.

Niveaux des réalisations physiques de la première phase du PAC.

Au cours de la première phase du PAC, il y a eu la réalisation de plusieurs activités qui ont touché pratiquement tous les secteurs de la vie socio-économique tant au niveau local que national. Il s'agit de:

- Des formations diverses et des conseils au profit des organisations communautaires et des communes qui ont porté principalement sur i) la mise en place et le renforcement des capacités des organes de gestion, ii) l'élaboration des plans de développement et iii) l'accompagnement dans l'élaboration, l'approbation et la mise en œuvre des micro-projets issus des plans de développement (PDL et PDC) ;
- Le financement de 1546 micro-projets dont 182 de la catégorie eau et assainissement, 302 de la catégorie éducation, 105 de la catégorie santé, 252 de la catégorie GRN et 621 de la catégorie AGR sans oublier 78 de la catégorie infrastructures socio-économiques dont 34 sièges de mairie. Ce sont seulement les micro-projets de la catégorie transport (6) qui sont peu nombreux à cause de leur complexité et leur coût très élevé. La nature des micro-projets réalisées dénote le caractère multisectoriel du PAC;
- La conduite de plusieurs études contribuant aux réflexions nationales en matière de développement local et gouvernance locale. Il s'agit de l'étude sur : i) l'impact des technologies de gestion durable des terres (GDT), ii) la revue des dépenses du secteur rural, iii) l'harmonisation des schémas d'aménagement, iv) les besoins en renforcement des capacités des communes, v) l'étude sur la charte de la déconcentration, vi) le dispositif d'appui financier aux collectivités territoriales, vii) la décentralisation et les communautés nomades au Niger.
- La réalisation de plusieurs outils méthodologiques dont les plus importants sont i) le classer de fiches techniques, ii) le guide d'élaboration des PDL et PDC, iii) le guide de passation de marchés sous le régime communautaire et iv) le guide méthodologique de conception et de mise en œuvre d'un système de suivi-évaluation local ;
- La mise en place d'un cadre de collaboration en vue d'améliorer la synergie d'action avec i) les services techniques dont le niveau opérationnel prévu par le montage du projet (niveau départemental) a été fonctionnel, ii) les partenaires du niveau national dont le HCME, SP/CR, DGEPD, SP-SDRP, SE-SDR, ICRISAT, FENU, TerreAfrica, et iii) les projets notamment avec le PLUCP, le PADL, la SNV, le LUCOP, PIP2. La synergie avec les autres projets financés à travers les fonds FEM n'a pas été très développée alors que les objectifs visés et les enjeux étaient similaires.

Sur la base des évaluations conduites en 2007, il ressort que les réalisations physiques ci-dessus énumérées ont permis d'enregistrer au niveau des bénéficiaires plusieurs résultats (en terme d'effets) notamment un changement significatif sur leurs conditions de travail et de vie.

Niveaux des réalisations financières de la première phase du PAC.

Le décaissement des fonds a été timide entre 2004 et 2005 (avant la revue à mi-parcours de février 2006). Mais il s'est progressivement amélioré pour atteindre pratiquement les 100 % en fin 2007. En effet, les niveaux de décaissement des fonds à la date d'achèvement (31 décembre 2007) par sources de financement, par catégorie de dépense et par composante sont globalement satisfaisants comme l'indique les tableaux ci-dessous. Cependant du fait de la chute de la devise de transaction (le dollars US) par rapport à la monnaie locale (F CFA) et de l'absence d'une rubrique « non allouée », la Cellule de Coordination Nationale a été amenée à solliciter des réallocations de fonds afin de corriger les déséquilibre qui se présentaient tout au long de l'exécution du projet.

Par ailleurs, le calcul du taux de réalisations financières sur la base des fonds alloués n'est valide que par rapport à la devise dans laquelle le financement est libellé. A cet le Don IDA est libellé en DTS, le Don FEM en dollars US, le Don PHRD en dollars US et la contribution de l'Etat du Niger et des Bénéficiaires en F CFA.

Table 7: Situation du niveau de décaissement par sources de financement

Source de Financement	Décaissement	Engagement en cours de liquidation	Total Réalisations Financières
IDA	19 418 204 997	142 086 086	19 560 291 083
FEM	1 684 119 806	190 858 809	1 874 978 615
PHRD	193 324 324	136 753 647	330 077 971
Total IDA/FEM/PHRD	21 295 649 127	469 698 542	21 765 347 669
Etat	931 074 596	556 006 664	1 487 081 260
Beneficiaire	1 157 345 612	0	1 157 345 612
Total Etat/Bénéficiaire	2 088 420 208	556 006 664	2 644 426 872
Total	23 384 069335	2 644 426 872	24 409 774 541

Commentaire analytique. Le niveau des réalisations financières par source de financement a atteint le niveau souhaité sur toutes les sources de financement y compris les contributions de l'Etat et des Bénéficiaires (communautés et communes). Il faut noté que les contributions de l'Etat et des Bénéficiaires est respectivement faite en grande partie sous forme de taxes exonérées et de contribution en nature. Les niveaux de réalisation sont d'environ 100 % pour les fonds extérieurs et de plus de 95 % pour les contributions internes. La mobilisation du fond PHRD a démarré en mars 2007 pour soutenir l'initiative bio-carbone du PAC qui fait l'objet d'un projet soumis au Secrétariat Exécutif du Mécanisme de Développement Propre (MDP).

Table 8: Situation du niveau de décaissement par catégorie de dépenses

Catégorie	Décaissement	Engagement en cours de liquidation	Total Réalisations Financières
1. Travaux genie civil	232 966 426		232 966 426
2. Equipement	1 065 136 437		1 065 136 437
3. Consultant	2 357 495 706		2 357 495 706
4. Formation	2 750 871 072		2 750 871 072
5. Subvention fil	12 204 601 238	888 951 559	13 093 552 797
6. Fonctionnement	3 974 709 857		3 974 709 857
Remboursement PPF	409 066 296		409 066 296
Biocarbone	389 222 303	136 753 647	525 975 950
Total	23 384 069 335	1 025 705 206	24 409 774 541

Commentaire analytique. Les réalisations financières varient en fonction des catégories de dépenses. De manière globale, les proportions de départ par rapport au fonds alloués ont été respectés car les catégories 5 (investissements au profit des communautés) et 6 (fonctionnement) ont mobilisé respectivement 55 % et 16 % des fonds globalement mobilisés.

Table 9: Situation du niveau de décaissement par composante

Composante	Décaissement	Engagement en cours de liquidation	Total Réalisations Financières
Appui aux communautés	1 539 361 030		1 539 361 030
Appui à la gouvernance locale	2 056 595 656		2 056 595 656
Fonds d'investissement locale	10 432 194 086	888 951 559	11 321 145 645
Suivi pauvreté et environnement	1 996 118 223		1 996 118 223
Appui à la gestion du projet	6 550 688 942		6 550 688 942
Biocarbone	389 222 303	136 753 647	525 975 950
Grippe Aviaire	10 822 799		10 822 799
Remboursement PPF	409 066 296		409 066 296
Total	23 384 069 335	1 025 705 206	24 409 774 541

Commentaire analytique. Les réalisations financières par composante sont conformes aux proportions de départ excepté au niveau de la composante E « Gestion du projet ». Cette situation s'explique essentiellement par la faiblesse du système d'imputation comptable qui ne désagrège pas les dépenses communes par activité et par composante. Ainsi toutes les dépenses relatives à l'acquisition des biens et services communs sont imputées dans la composante gestion du projet alors qu'ils devraient être ventilés dans les autres composantes également.

Table 10: Situation du niveau de décaissement par région

Region	Décaissement	Engagement en cours de liquidation	Total Réalisations Financières
Agadez	1 700 478 217	29 249 091	1 729 727 308
Diffa	1 962 425 220	84 515 258	2 046 940 478
Dosso	1 952 484 513	59 411 991	2 011 896 504
Maradi	1 752 139 155	179 789 691	1 931 928 846
Tahoua	1 893 058 870	39 452 604	1 932 511 474
Tillabery	3 269 861 828	94 144 853	3 364 006 681
Zinder	2 201 205 653	159 478 611	2 360 684 264
Niamey	1 387 988 044	5 491 739	1 393 479 783
CCN	6 855 361 539	374 171 368	7 229 532 907
Remboursement PPF	409 066 296		409 066 296
Total	23 384 069 335	1 025 705 206	24 409 774 541

Commentaire analytique : Les réalisations financières sont conformes au poids de chaque région en terme du nombre de grappes et communes appuyées ainsi que de l'étendue de la zone d'intervention couverte excepté la région de Tillabéry où la planification opérationnelle n'a été bien maîtrisée. Au niveau de la CCN, toutes les dépenses d'équipement et de fonctionnement dont le processus d'acquisition a été piloté par la CCN ont été imputées à ce niveau alors que les imputations doivent concerner les zones d'utilisation des biens et services.

Principales difficultés rencontrées au cours de la première phase et recommandations pour la mise en œuvre de la deuxième phase de financement du PAC.

Pendant les quatre années d'exécution du projet, il y a eu des difficultés dont certaines ont pu être résolues. Ces difficultés ou insuffisances dont il faut tenir compte au cours de la deuxième phase sont :

- le niveau jugé élevé de la contribution demandée aux bénéficiaires notamment des groupes vulnérables (les femmes, les jeunes et les handicapés) pour accéder aux micro-projets générateurs de revenus ;
- la faible capacité financière de certains entrepreneurs qui ont le plus souvent arrêté les travaux dès que le paiement des décomptes accuse un retard alors que les contrats ne prévoyaient que l'avance de démarrage. Ce qui a entraîné parfois un retard important dans l'exécution des travaux ;
- la faible prise en compte des mesures de sauvegarde environnementale et sociale, qui est liée à une incompréhension des enjeux en termes d'impacts environnementaux et sociaux négatifs par l'ensemble des acteurs impliqués dans l'exécution du projet même si tout au long de la mise en œuvre du PAC, des améliorations remarquables ont été apportées dans l'élaboration des dossiers de MP par rapport à la présentation des activités sources d'impact, des impacts potentiels et des mesures d'atténuation;

- le non respect de la planification opérationnelle particulièrement dans certaines régions. Ce qui a entraîné parfois un engorgement du flux financier ;
- le manque de régularité dans le suivi budgétaire et le contrôle interne. Ce qui est en déphasage avec l'envergure d'un projet comme le PAC, où toute négligence peut entraîner des dépassements budgétaires, des tensions de trésorerie et des retards importants dans l'acheminement des fonds sur le terrain pour la réalisation des activités régulièrement approuvées à travers les plans de travail.

Annex 10. Summary of Borrower's ICR (Avian Flu Component)

Synthèse du RAPPORT INTERNE D'ACHEVEMENT DE COMPOSANTE GRIPPE AVIAIRE DU PROGRAMME D' ACTIONS COMMUNAUTAIRES PHASE1 (Période de 2008-2010)

Résumé

Suite aux flambées de l'influenza aviaire hautement pathogène (IAHP) en 2006 dont le Niger a connu deux (2) foyers à Magaria et Boko Mai Gao, le Gouvernement de la république du Niger a sollicité et obtenu de l'Agence Internationale pour le Développement (AID) un don de deux million neuf cents mille droits de tirage spéciaux (2.900 ;000 DTS) en février 2008 dans le but d'appuyer le dispositif national de lutte contre cette maladie.

Exécuté en 2008 et 2010, ce financement a permis le renforcement des capacités de prévention et de riposte des services vétérinaires, de l'environnement, de la santé humaine et de communication à travers la formation des 697 agents, la fourniture d'équipement et de consommables, la réhabilitation de deux laboratoires vétérinaires et de 3 salles d'isolement des malades humains dans les hôpitaux régionaux de la zone à risque. En matière de communication, 437 acteurs de la filière avicole ont été formés et sensibilisés sur les mesures préventives contre l'IAHP et la biosécurité. De même que 34 150 petits producteurs à travers les missions de surveillance active.

En absence de tout foyer de l'IAHP au cours de la mise en œuvre du projet, deux(2) foyers de la grippe AH1N1 ont été détectés rapidement en février 2010 à Niamey et Gaya. Ces deux foyers ont été éradiqués avec succès, tous les malades ont été traités guéris sans aucun décès.

Sur le plan financier, 1 988 408 528 FCFA ont été dépensés pour une prévision de 2 151 894 597 FCFA, soit un taux d'exécution de 92 % au 31 décembre 2010.

Le succès de mise en œuvre du projet, a ouvert l'opportunité aux participants de l'atelier de clôture du projet en décembre 2010 à Maradi et du Comité de Pilotage en décembre 2010 de recommander la consolidation des nombreux acquis et la mise en œuvre effective du nouveau concept « un monde, une santé » dont le projet a déjà démontré la voie; à travers un programme élargi aux autres zoonoses majeures i.e. tuberculoses, brucelloses la rage etc. et d'entrevoir les voies et moyens d'utilisation du reliquat des fonds du projet.

Synthèse de la Mise en œuvre du Projet :

1. Situation des résultats en termes de produits livrés :

Les principaux produits livrés sont :

- Dix (10) études dont 2 relatives à l'étude d'impact environnemental, 1 pour les dossiers d'appels d'offres, 1 pour la cartographie des fermes, 1 audit 2008-2009 et un pour la codification des acquisitions du projet; 1 la situation de référence, 1 les directives d'abattages et d'indemnisation et 2 de manuels de gestion ;

- La formation de 697 agents des secteurs de l'élevage (383), 93 de l'Environnement et 221 de la santé publique à travers 12 ateliers de formation en 25 sessions ;
- La formation sensibilisation de 437 acteurs de la filière avicole (grands, petits producteurs, vendeurs, égorgeurs, restaurateurs et plumeurs) sur les mesures préventives et la biosécurité à travers 3 ateliers en 26 sessions ;
- La sensibilisation de 34 150 petits producteurs à travers 1110 missions de surveillance active par les agents de surveillance ;
- La reproduction et mises à la disposition des lots fiches de surveillance en santé animale, suivi de l'avifaune et de santé humaine et de sensibilisation sur la grippe AH1N1;
- L'équipement des services en logistique (7 véhicules, 20 motos), en matériel de froid, matériel informatique et électronique, en équipement technique, en consommables médicaux et vétérinaires, en réactifs de diagnostics pour les laboratoires vétérinaires et humains et d'une téléphonie cellulaire de 500 appareils (voir annexes) ;
- La réhabilitation de 2 laboratoires vétérinaires (Niamey et Zinder) et de 3 salles d'isolement dans les hôpitaux régionaux (Maradi, Tahoua et Zinder) ;
- L'organisation de 3 ateliers dont un sur les techniques d'abattage et d'indemnisation, un de lancement et de clôture du projet ;
- La prise en charge de 16 membres pour la participation de 4 rencontres internationales ;
- La prise en charge du fonctionnement de 44 comités régionaux et départementaux et la cellule permanente grippe aviaire ;
- La prise en charge de 80 postes de surveillance active (60 de l'élevage et 20 de suivi de l'avifaune) ;
- L'organisation de 2 comités de pilotage et d'une mission conjointe de supervision.

2. Situation des résultats intermédiaires :

Les principaux effets observés au niveau des groupes et leur environnement sont :

- Les dommages économiques, environnementaux et sociaux ont été nuls du fait qu'entre 2008 et 2010, aucun foyer de l'IAHP n'a été confirmé ;
- Le dispositif de surveillance et de dépistages de foyers a été proactif, car toute la totalité des cas suspects ont été rapportés dans le délai de 24heures.

3. Bilan Physique et Financier

La cellule Permanente, en collaboration avec les comités déconcentrés de lutte contre la grippe Aviaire, a au cours de la vie du Projet élaboré deux (2) plans opérationnels pour la mise en œuvre des différentes activités.

Les réalisations physiques au niveau central se résument en :

Activités préparatoires et de suivi- évaluation, gestion d'impact environnemental:

La mise en œuvre de tous les engagements datés et non datés conformément à l'accord de don notamment :

- La réalisation d'une étude d'impact environnemental ayant abouti à l'élaboration d'un Plan de Gestion Environnemental ;
- Le recrutement du personnel contractuel de la composante à savoir : le Comptable et le Spécialiste de la Grippe Aviaire ;
- La révision et l'adoption du Manuel d'Exécution du PAC1 afin de l'adapter à la nouvelle situation, le manuel de gestion administrative et financière ;
- L'élaboration et l'adoption d'un manuel de procédures d'abattage et d'indemnisation des producteurs des volailles abattues en cas d'épizootie de grippe aviaire ;
- L'organisation d'un atelier de consensus les instruments et outils de gestion de la composante ;
- L'établissement d'une situation de référence par rapport à la lutte contre la grippe aviaire dans le cadre des interventions antérieures ;
- La formation des principaux acteurs de la gestion du projet sur des thématiques relatives à l'accomplissement de leurs tâches ;
- La prise en charge du fonctionnement régulier des comités de lutte contre la grippe aviaire à tous les niveaux ainsi que du réseau de surveillance passive et active à l'échelle nationale;
- La réalisation d'un audit du projet pour les exercices 2008 et 2009;
- L'organisation d'un d'atelier de coordination et de clôture du Projet, avec l'ébauche de la mise en œuvre effective du nouveau concept « un monde, une santé », en élargissant la lutte à d'autres zoonose à travers un nouveau programme.
- L'organisation de 2 Comités de Pilotage,
- L'organisation de 'une mission conjointe de supervision ;
- La prorogation de la date de clôture du projet au 31 décembre 2010 au lieu de 30 juin 2010.

La mise en place d'un réseau de surveillance intégré par :

- La conception d'outils méthodologiques de surveillance (protocole de surveillance, techniques d'abattage, suivi de l'avifaune, prise en charge des cas humains) et leur vulgarisation à travers les ateliers de formations ; ainsi que l'approvisionnement des services concernés;
- La formation de 49 agents des Eaux et Forêts sur les techniques de suivi des oiseaux d'eau et des zones humides ;
- La formation de 104 agents d'Elevage sur les techniques d'abattage et de vaccination en cas de suspicion de grippe aviaire et le comportement à adopter en cas de suspicion de la grippe A/H1N1;
- La formation de 98 agents d'Elevage et 20 agents de l'Environnement sur les techniques de surveillance et de prélèvement en cas suspicion de la Grippe Aviaire en collaboration avec le Projet SPINAP;
- la formation de 202 agents de santé sur la prise en charge des cas humains de grippe aviaire et de grippe A/H1N1 en complément des efforts d'autres partenaires dont le SPINAP et l'OMS ;
- La formation de 26 agents d'Elevage et le recyclage de 10 d'entre eux en SIG ;
- La formation de 82 agents des 3 secteurs (37 agents d'Elevage, 21 agents de santé et 24 agents des Eaux et Forêts) en biosécurité;

L'équipement des services techniques

- L'acquisition de la logistique de 7 véhicules et 20 motos ;
- L'acquisition de matériels de froids,
- L'acquisition de matériels des matériels informatiques et électroniques
- L'acquisition d'équipements techniques;
- L'acquisition des réactifs des laboratoires vétérinaires et humains;
- L'acquisition de consommables médicaux et vétérinaires, matériels techniques, matériel informatique et matériel roulant au profit des services vétérinaires;
- L'acquisition de 20 incinérateurs pour la gestion des déchets biomédicaux;

L'amélioration des infrastructures sanitaires :

- La délocalisation du laboratoire de biologie moléculaire au niveau du Laboratoire Central de l'Elevage (LABOCEL) Niamey, en réhabilitant 6 vieilles salles délabrées. Cette délocalisation était une recommandation faite par l'équipe pluridisciplinaires (FAO, OIE) qui a élaboré le Plan National intégré de lutte contre la grippe aviaire ;
- La Réhabilitation complète de l'Antenne LABOCEL Zinder ;
- La réhabilitation de trois salles d'isolements des cas humains répondant aux normes internationales dans les régions à risques (Maradi, Zinder et Tahoua) ;
- L'équipement du Centre National de référence pour le Diagnostic des gripes (CERMES) d'équipement complémentaire pour l'élever à un niveau de biosécurité niveau 2 voire niveau 3;

La Mise en place d'un système de communication adapté à la situation épidémiologique de la maladie (accalmie) par:

- L'organisation d'un atelier de relecture des stratégies de communication en matière de grippe aviaire et d'adaptation des messages clefs au nouveau virus grippal A/H1N1 ;
- la mise en place d'une flotte intersectorielle de 500 appareils cellulaires aux niveaux des services techniques ;
- La formation de 235 acteurs de la filière (égorgeurs, plumeurs, rôtisseurs, revendeurs) sur les mesures préventives et réglementaires de la grippe aviaire ;
- La formation sensibilisation des acteurs de la filière en sur les mesures d'hygiène (180 petits producteurs, 20 grands producteurs et 232 égorgeurs, rôtisseurs, plumeurs et vendeurs) à travers plusieurs ateliers régionaux;
- La reproduction des fiches en vue de sensibiliser la population sur les mesures préventives contre la grippe A/H1N1 au niveau des frontières terrestres et des aéroports, hôtels et lieux publics ;
- La reproduction des fiches pour la collecte des informations relatives aux gripes A/H1N1 et A/H5N1 par les agents de santé ;

La Prise en charge des cas humains de Grippe AH1N1 apparue en février 2010 par :

- Le financement des investigations, prélèvements, confirmation, prise en charge des cas et suivi de contacts ;
- La mise à la disposition des formations sanitaires des médicaments,
- L'extinction des foyers de cette maladie à Niamey et à Gaya, 50 cas confirmés et aucun décès.

- Aucun cas de la Grippe H5N1 n'a été détecté chez la volaille ou chez l'homme, la maladie de Newcastle a été détectée en diagnostic différentiel chez la volaille.

Les Réalisations au niveau régional :

- L'organisation des missions d'appui et de supervision des points focaux départementaux et des agents de réseau aux niveaux régional et départemental du réseau actif de surveillance;
- L'organisation des missions d'appui de la surveillance passive en vue d'impliquer et de former les autres agents de l'Elevage et de l'Environnement pour la surveillance passive ;
- La conduite de mission de restitution et de réplication de certaines formations;
- La mise en place de certains comités communaux et cellules techniques régionales afin de palier le dysfonctionnement de ceux jugés trop pléthoriques ;
- La surveillance passive et active de la grippe aviaires et des autres maladies par les agents de réseau ;
- La collecte des prélèvements suspects de grippe H5N1, AH1N1 ;
- Le suivi des réhabilitations des salles du laboratoire vétérinaire de Zinder
- La facilitation de la mission conjointe de supervision et des différents ateliers organisés dans les régions et des missions de suivi-évaluation.

Bilan Financier :

La réalisation financière cumulée de la composante est de 1 988 408 528 FCFA pour une prévision de 2 151 894 597 FCFA dont 197 647 276 FCFA d'engagement soit des taux cumulés respectifs de 92% pour la réalisation et 83% pour le décaissement.

Le taux de réalisation ramené au montant initial du projet de 2.025.000.000 FCFA serait de 98%. La plus-value du montant initial du projet d'environ 126 894 597 F CFA provient de la dépréciation l'Euro (monnaie à laquelle le franc CFA est arrimé) par rapport au DTS.

Mais même dans ces conditions, le solde positif du projet d'un montant 163 486 070 FCFA est dû à certaines activités non exécutées dont les indemnités en absence de maladie, l'échec d'achat du lyophilisateur pour le LABOCEL d'abord et la réalisation en partie de sa réhabilitation (Expertise diagnostique), et de certaines activités de la convention PGES avec le BEEI.

Si ces résultats ont pu être obtenus, c'est grâce à la bonne collaboration des différents acteurs, tant au niveau de la Banque qu'au niveau de la Partie Gouvernementale.

Les principales contraintes rencontrées ont trait aux préparatifs du démarrage du Projet, la lourdeur dans la passation de marché et la difficulté de mobiliser certains acteurs des services à temps opportun.

En conclusion, l'approche intégrée adoptée dans la mise en œuvre du projet a convaincu les participants à l'atelier de coordination et de clôture du projet, que nous sommes déjà avancés dans la mise en œuvre effective de la nouvelle approche « One World- One Health » ou « Un monde, une santé », et qu'il y a lieu de consolider les acquis et d'étendre le champ d'intervention à d'autres zoonoses majeures (tuberculoses, rage, brucellose ...) dans le cadre d'un nouveau programme de plus grande envergure.

4. Difficultés Rencontrées

En terme de principales difficultés rencontrées, il faut noter que :

- Dans les préparatifs, il y a eu retard dans la mise en vigueur du Don, l'accord étant signé le 12 février 2008, elle n'a intervenu qu'au 21 juillet 2008, ceci tient beaucoup à la non maîtrise du circuit administratif par la coordination du Projet,
- La passation de marché a également été laborieuse. En effet, la conciliation procédures nationales et celles de la Banque n'a pas été facile surtout en absence d'un spécialiste de passation de marchés propre au Projet,
- Par fois, la mobilisation de certains responsables d'unité pose des problèmes compte tenu de leurs nombreuses tâches. En effet, le fait que des Directeurs Centraux soient des Responsables d'Unités a quelque peu entravé la bonne marche du projet car il leur est difficile de concilier les sollicitations du projet et leurs tâches classiques ;
- L'insuffisance dans la maîtrise des procédures de la Banque par la plus part des acteurs de la mise en œuvre du projet au début du Projet a conduit à des lenteurs dans l'approbation de certains documents tant à l'interne qu'au niveau de la Banque ;
- Sur le terrain certains comités régionaux nés dans la crise de 2006 n'ont pas pu bien fonctionner parce que pléthoriques. Il a fallu un recours à la mise en place de cellules techniques restreintes;
- Le suivi du niveau central n'a pas été régulier;
- Certaines activités de la convention avec le BEEEI comme le Bilan environnemental n'ont pas pu être exécutées faute de temps;
- L'aspect avifaune et environnement a été dilué entre la sous composante santé animale et la sous composante suivi et évaluation ;
- L'achat d'un lyophilisateur neuf pour le LABOCEL (non prévu dans les objectifs initiaux du projet, accepté par la Banque à la demande l'Etat) n'a pu s'exécuter pour des raisons de marché infructueux, lié au temps court et à l'insuffisance de ressources prévues ;

- Le projet n'a pu faire aboutir une étude de réhabilitation de l'aviculture dans les zones d'anciens foyers de grippe aviaire de 2006 de Magaria et de Boko Mai Gao.

5. Performances du Projet, Gouvernement et de la Banque

CCN/PAC2 :

L'arrimage du projet au PAC1 a été très bénéfique compte tenu du manque d'expérience de la Cellule Permanente dans les procédures de la Banque. L'appui conseil du personnel du PAC2 a été déterminant dans la mise en œuvre du Projet, sans oublier la mise à la disposition au projet de 2 bureaux et d'un véhicule 4X4 pour unité de gestion ;

Banque Mondiale :

La coopération de la Banque : i) l'appui conseil du chargé et de l'équipe de la Banque a été aussi déterminant, il y eu des formations au siège de la banque à Niamey pour familiariser les équipes des projets aux différentes procédures de la Banque et ceci a beaucoup à palier aux insuffisances ci-dessus mentionnées, ii) la mission conjointe de supervision a permis d'évaluer les progrès accomplis et de réorienter certaines activités pour satisfaire de nouveaux besoins, iii) le rétablissement rapide des décaissement par la Banque suite l'application de sa Politique opérationnelle 7.30, en relation avec l'évènement du 18 février 2010, iv) l'acceptation de la prorogation de la date de clôture du projet au 31 décembre 2010 au lieu de 30 juin 2010.

Performance du Gouvernement (Ministère de Tutelle) :

Le soutien du Ministère de tutelle et son implication dans la mise en œuvre du projet ont permis de résoudre certaines difficultés, notamment dans le processus de passation de marché et dans les rapports avec les autres ministères bénéficiaires du projet. Le Ministère a dirigé deux sessions de Comité de Pilotage du Projet.

De même les structures du Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances se sont acquitté honorablement leur part de responsabilités notamment, le traitement de DRF, la facilitation de la prorogation de la date de clôture du projet et la participation à la mission de supervision et réunion du Comité de Pilotage.

Performance de l'Unité de gestion du projet :

- L'Unité de gestion du projet (réduite à 3 personnes après le départ du responsable de suivi évaluation à la mi-année 2010), a été très performante eu égard aux nombreuses activités réalisées. Tous les rapports techniques et financiers ont été faits à temps, à la satisfaction du bailleur et des autres partenaires.
- En matière de passation de marché malgré un handicap d'expérience au début du projet, tous les marchés se sont bien passés. Une seule plainte a été enregistrée sur le marché des Réhabilitation, mais déboutée par l'Agence nigérienne de Régulation des Marchés Publics.

- Le Projet a entretenu des rapports avec les autres partenaires au développement (SPINAP-AHI, OMS, FAO, UNICEF) à la mise en œuvre conjointe d'activités ou des réunions d'échanges.
- En fin en matière de la mise en œuvre de démarche d'approche programme, le projet a démontré qu'il est possible, qu'avec une équipe légère, qu'on puisse réaliser tant d'activités par les services classiques de l'Etat.

6. Leçons apprises :

Malgré les quelques contraintes rencontrées dans la mise en œuvre, les principaux acteurs du projet présents à l'atelier de coordination et de clôture les 27, 28 et 29 décembre 2010 à Maradi ont été unanimes sur les résultats atteints par le projet :

- Le fait d'avoir fait travailler de façon intégrée plusieurs départements ministériels a été un fait marquant pour ce projet ;
- La mise en place d'un réseau de surveillance intégré ;
- Les différentes acquisitions en termes de logistiques, matériel de froid, matériel informatiques et électroniques, équipement techniques, consommables ont servent non seulement la lutte l'IAHP mais aussi serviront à beaucoup d'autres maladies ;
- L'amélioration des infrastructures sanitaire, les salles d'isolement normalisées et les laboratoires vétérinaires réhabilités sont des atouts indéniables ;
- La Mise en place d'un système de communication adapté à la situation épidémiologique de la maladie, la flotte de communication a été très appréciée par les services bénéficiaires et les formations sensibilisations des professionnels de la filière avicole ont permis un éveil de conscience par rapport à la maladie, un changement de comportement notamment la prise en compte de la biosécurité dans leurs activités ;
- Le projet a prouvé qu'on peut travailler en synergie d'intervention avec d'autres partenaires poursuivant les mêmes buts comme le SPINAP-AHI financé par l'Union Européenne, pour éviter les duplications.
- L'avènement de la grippe AH1N1 en février 2010 a aussi montré l'efficacité du dispositif (non encore éprouvé jusqu'à lors en matière de santé publique) aux cas humains, limitant le nombre de cas confirmés à une cinquantaine ; tous les malades étant guéris, sans aucun décès ;
- La tentative de règlement du problème du lyophilisateur du LABOCEL a permis à travers l'expertise diagnostique de mieux connaître le problème et a aussi suscité la programmation de l'achat d'un neuf dans un autre projet ;
- Le projet a jeté les bases d'un programme plus élargi, avec des besoins quantifiés de 4 composantes sur 5, lors de l'atelier de Maradi.

Annex 11. List of Supporting Documents

General

- Project Appraisal Document, February 24, 2003 (Report No: 23819-NIR)
 - Development Grant Agreement; March 28, 2003 (Grant Number H025 NIR)
 - *Code de financement des investissements (micro-projets), par le Ministère du développement agricole et Programme d'actions communautaires (CCN), janvier 2005*
 - Final Mid-Term Report, February 2006
 - Government MTR Input reports: (*PAC—Evaluation Interne à mi-parcours par Pietronella van den Oever, E. Oumarou, A. Oumarou, février 2006 (l'étude des bénéficiaires); et Aide-Memoire de la mission conjointe de revue a mi-parcours, février-mars 2006*)
 - Project Implementation Support Reports (9 reports 2003-2008)
 - ISR mission aide-memoires 2005-2008
 - Audit reports 2004-2007
 - Minutes of the Technical Partners' Committee, 2004-2005
 - Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 2003-2007 and 2006-2012, Government of Niger
 - World Bank report: Impacts of Sustainable Land Management on Land Management and Poverty in Niger, (Pender, Ndjeunga, etc., June 2008)
 - Government ICR Report (*Rapport interne achèvement de la première phase du Programme d'Actions Communautaires*), August 2008
 - Country Assistance Support, World Bank reports for 2003-2007 and 2008-2011
- CCN: *Compte Rendu de la Seance de Travail 9 Septembre 2008* (Stakeholders' meeting)

Study reports:





- *Etude Environnementale; Dess en gestion de l'environnement pour le Programme d'Actions Communautaires, février 2002 ;*
- *Deuxième rapport sur le suivi des résultats intermédiaires du Programme d'Actions Communautaires; CCD du PAC, Juillet 2007*
- *Rapport d'audit technique des infrastructures réalisées; par PAC et le Ministère du Développement Agricole, Avril 2007*
- *Evaluation de la rentabilité économique et financière des microprojets générateurs de revenus; PAC consultants Yeye Hassane, Doga Garbo, et Siddo Mahamadou, Septembre 2007*
- *Stratégie de développement rural; Comité Interministeriel de Pilotage de la SDF, Juin 2008*
- *Evaluation des Impacts de Programmes de Gestion Durable des Terres sur le Gestion des Terres et la Pauvreté au Niger; Pender et Ndjeunga, Juillet 2008.*

Avian Influenza

- Government of Niger: National Emergency Plan for Preparedness, Prevention and Control of Avian Influenza. April 2006.
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NIGER

- SELECTED CITIES AND TOWNS
- ⊙ DEPARTMENT CAPITALS
- ⊕ NATIONAL CAPITAL
-  RIVERS
-  MAIN ROADS
-  DEPARTMENT BOUNDARIES
-  INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES



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