

# UNIVERSITIES THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS

BENCHMARKING UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE  
TO ENABLE HIGHER EDUCATION MODERNIZATION IN MENA



THE WORLD BANK



# Universities through the Looking Glass: Benchmarking University Governance to Enable Higher Education Modernization in MENA

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*Validation of the Governance Screening Card:  
First Benchmarking Results in 41 Universities in  
Tunisia, West Bank and Gaza, Morocco, and Egypt*

Report prepared by a team led by Adriana Jaramillo\*

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\* Team members: Juan Manuel Moreno, Axel Demenet, Hafedh Zaafrane, Odile Monet, Sebastian Trenner, Tamer Taha, Jennifer Barry, Andre Kwak, and Silvia Marchionne.

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## Foreword

Employers in many countries around the world are increasingly demanding a new mix of skills and competencies from their employees. Yet, in many of these same countries, there is high unemployment among university graduates, a paradox which clearly suggests that universities need to do more to align what they offer in terms of education provision with the new demands of an evolving global economy. A key element of this misalignment is, as this study demonstrates, the weak governance of universities.

University governance reform has been on the agenda of governments in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) for some time. In response to demands by those countries in the region currently engaged in governance reforms, a World Bank team based in Marseille, at the Center for Mediterranean Integration, carried out a university governance benchmarking exercise by profiling 41 universities in four countries of the region using a University Governance Screening Card.

The results collected as part of this effort have laid the foundation for future systematic monitoring of university performance. This is a significant achievement that moves the region further toward the goal of improving accountability in service delivery and one which will become a cornerstone of the strategy for developing greater capacity to do evidence-based policy making related to higher education in MENA.

I would like to thank the institutions that participated in the program. The openness of universities and government officials involved in this first benchmarking exercise in the region has paved the way for others: several additional ministries of higher education in the Arab world and elsewhere are now eager to participate in future benchmarking activities. The hope is that universities will

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benchmark their governance with the Screening Card, and in so doing, hold up a looking glass to themselves, take stock of what they see, and reflect on how they can further improve.

Inger Andersen  
Vice-President  
Middle East and North Africa Region

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# Abbreviations

AWI	Arab World Initiative
CMI	Center for Mediterranean Integration
CUC	Committee of University Chairmen
DEC	Development Economics (World Bank)
GAC	Governance and Anticorruption
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
NPM	New Public Management
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
QA	Quality Assurance
TTO	Technology Transfer Offices
WBI	World Bank Institute
WB&G	West Bank and Gaza
WGI	World Governance Indicators

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**Benchmarking University Governance in MENA:<sup>1</sup>  
Validation of the Governance Screening Card  
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## Introduction

Countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region are going through an important political transformation, and this is likely to impact their economic and social development for the next few years. The January 2011 Revolution in Tunisia and Egypt's uprising transformed the political and social environments in both countries. A period of transition to more democratic societies is already underway, and while the final destination is yet unknown, there is optimism that the road to peaceful change is being built.

Many challenges are emerging from this transformation, at a time when similar economic and social transformations are occurring across the world. Higher education graduates looking for jobs today are facing critical challenges. One consequence of the 2009 global financial crisis has been increased unemployment rates worldwide, particularly for young people, which are likely to persist for a few more years. MENA countries have been affected by the financial crisis in various ways. The Gulf countries have been affected mainly due to the drop in oil prices and the real estate market collapse. For oil producers with limited

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<sup>1</sup> This is a program sponsored by the Arab World Initiative (AWI) and the Center for Mediterranean Integration (CMI).

integration with the international banking system, such as Algeria and Libya, the financial crisis has had less impact. Secondary effects of the crisis, including reduced trade, remittances, and foreign direct investment, hit oil-importing countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, and Lebanon. In all MENA countries, recovery will depend on the capacity to develop new markets and to employ fiscal prudence. The recent political changes in the region give hope that governance in MENA will be more democratic, transparent, and efficient in the long term. In the short term, however, the transition will add some fiscal burden in most countries.

The Arab Spring made it clear that young people in MENA are asking for change and for more and better opportunities to study and work. Economic growth in MENA countries over the past decade has not been enough to absorb the increasing labor force for a variety of reasons, including: excessive GDP volatility; labor demand heavily dominated by the public sector; economies over-dependent on oil revenues and highly dependent on low value-added products; and weak integration into the global economy. This macro scenario, coupled with mismatches between labor supply and demand, very slow school-to-work transition, and low quality and relevance of post-basic education and training systems (resulting in high numbers of secondary school dropouts, many of whom enter the labor force with low basic skills), provides a bleak outlook for sustainable economic development in the region.

Universities play a key role in all societies because they are directly involved in generating new knowledge and because they teach and form young people to become leaders, entrepreneurs, scientists, and professionals in all fields of knowledge. In today's world, knowledge generation has replaced capital assets as the key ingredient for economic growth. This is the underlying principle for what is known as the knowledge-based economy. A well-performing higher education system is necessary for any country in the world to be competitive today.

For developing countries this is even more important, as well-performing universities are a pre-requisite for participation in the process of knowledge creation and exchange with leading institutions from developed and industrialized countries. Further, well-performing universities are instrumental in solving low- and middle-income country problems, such as providing good health care and education, developing agriculture to maximize results, and protecting the environment.

Higher education systems in the MENA region are particularly under pressure, as there is an important gap between the skills demanded by labor markets and those acquired by higher education graduates. The unemployment rates of tertiary education graduates in MENA have been persistently higher than those

in any other regions for the past decade, and the recent financial crisis makes this even more critical. Universities need to innovate to provide the kind of education that will enable their graduates to be competitive and to contribute to the economic and social growth of their countries. Innovative institutions must have governance systems that encourage all constituent groups to have a say in improving the institution and advancing its mission.

## Why University Governance?

Globalization and mobility of students have brought important challenges to universities all over the world. In the past two decades, university reforms have been observed in most OECD countries, a trend now seen worldwide. In Europe, the Bologna process, the European Qualifications Framework, and the declaration of the Lisbon goals are important and defining drivers of change in tertiary education. The effects of these European processes are seen outside of Europe, and the tools brought in to harmonize programs, provide quality control, and emphasize outcomes are being used widely, not only in countries in the European Neighborhood or those aspiring to be part of the European Higher Education Area, but also in the United States, Canada, Australia, and more recently in Latin America, East Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa.

University governance is one of the key elements that can lead to improving outcomes. Altbach and Salmi (2011) report that the important characteristics of successful world class universities are: leadership, government policy, funding, the ability to continually focus on a clear set of goals and institutional policies, development of a strong academic culture, and quality of the academic staff.

University governance is an important driver of change: how institutions are managed is one of the most decisive factors in achieving their goals. There are many governance models that vary according to the national context, the type of institution, the historical legacy, and other cultural, political, and, sometimes, economic factors. It is clear that there is no single model or “one size fits all” approach to university governance. It is also clear that choosing a governance model for adoption by a given institution must be a well thought out decision. As Trakman (2008) suggests, “Good governance is much about timing and judgment: it requires boards of governors to recognize when a governance model is not working, why, and how to repair it.”

The key role that university governance plays in the improvement of education quality has been the focus of attention in MENA countries for the past two years. Higher education ministers and policymakers expressed their specific need

for benchmarking university governance at a seminar held in December 2009 at the Center for Mediterranean Integration (CMI) in Marseille.<sup>2</sup>

As a result of this request, the World Bank Regional Program on Higher Education based in the CMI initiated the process of developing a University Governance Screening Card. The Screening Card assesses the extent to which universities in the MENA region are following governance practices aligned with their institutional goals and international trends and monitors their progress over time. It is a tool that allows MENA universities to compare themselves with universities around the world.

The Screening Card was developed taking into account other benchmarking tools, such as the Australian Universities Benchmarking tools, the European University Autonomy Score Card, the U.K. Good Practice Code developed by the Committee of University Chairmen (CUC), and the Governance Guidelines reviewed by OECD. The Screening Card incorporates lessons learned from the use of some of these tools, and provides a mechanism for monitoring changes introduced in governance practices and structures.

## Benchmarking and Improving Accountability

The Screening Card was tested in 41 universities in four countries: Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and West Bank and Gaza. It is a first step toward developing a more comprehensive tool for monitoring university performance. As governance is one important determinant of performance, this tool is an entry point for assessing other dimensions of performance, such as quality assurance, student-learning outcomes, quality of teaching and research, and graduate employability.

The use of this tool in 41 universities, including the validation of their results at a regional workshop in Cairo in November 2011, has yielded a few lessons on the advantages of benchmarking and how it can be a powerful mechanism for orienting reforms. The exemplary and courageous journey undertaken by these 41 institutions is an important milestone in improving accountability for social services delivery.

Prior to the Arab Spring, one of the most important obstacles found throughout the Arab World was the lack of national statistics. Although countries do collect information regarding services and needs of their populations, this is not necessarily made available to the public, and it is seldom used to inform policy.

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<sup>2</sup> The Center for Mediterranean Integration CMI is a World Bank-managed multi-partner platform for knowledge sharing.

The interest shown by the institutions that participated in this screening exercise is an important step in the right direction. Benchmarking is critical for understanding weaknesses and identifying areas for improvement. Service delivery must first be monitored to improve service quality; having information available is the first step.

Based on the continued interest expressed by leaders and policy makers in MENA on the need to introduce reforms, governance was the central topic for discussion at the biannual Conference of Arab World Ministers of Higher Education, held in Abu Dhabi in December 2011. At this conference, the University Governance Screening Card was endorsed as a Regional Arab League Initiative. Seven additional ministries of higher education (from Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan) showed an interest in benchmarking university governance, and an expansion plan to include them in the next round of data collection is underway.

## Lessons from Benchmarking


This benchmarking exercise provided some important lessons on the tool itself and its capacity to: 1) identify strengths and weaknesses at individual institutions; 2) identify trends at the national level; 3) identify trends and practices by type of institution; and 4) generate interest to initiate reforms at the institutional, national, and regional levels. It is clear from this first round of data collection (and the subsequent increased demand and interest from institutions to participate), that universities are seeking to find meaningful ways to compare themselves with other institutions around the world, but more importantly, that they are genuinely interested in finding ways of improving their performance.

The amount of information gathered through this exercise has created an opportunity to build large databases with important potential for more research. The results of this exercise have also provided an opportunity to establish correlations between governance and other aspects important for policy development related to performance, such as admission and retention rates, insertion into the labor market, skills development, innovation, and contributions to economic growth. Although data related to university performance are not yet available in most MENA countries, this first benchmarking exercise raised awareness among the participating countries on the need to produce, collect, and disseminate performance related information. The information collected has been useful not only for the 41 universities that participated in the exercise; it also constitutes the basis for a regional and global benchmarking exercise, and many countries in the Arab World and beyond are interested in joining.

## Benchmarking to Monitor Implementation of Reforms

It is clear that this exercise has elicited interest in reform. Based on their Screening Cards, institutions will be able to plan and monitor individual reforms and monitor their progress over time. This is also the case for governments seeking to develop and monitor the progress of national reforms.

Chapters 1 and 2 discuss the development of this benchmarking tool, the methodology used to measure and score university governance, and the lessons learned from its use and validation in Tunisia, Palestine, Morocco, and Egypt. Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 are the corresponding individual country reports, with some examples of how the information gathered through the Screening Card can be used to make comparisons at a national level. Annex 1 has the list of indicators by dimension, while Annex 2 contains details of the methodology used for developing the instrument and the scoring. Annexes 3, 4, 5, and 6 contain the corresponding individual institutions screening cards.



CHAPTER

1

# How to Measure University Governance

## University Governance: Concepts, Trends, and Models

University governance is a key element in the recent focus on reform trends in tertiary education worldwide. A relatively new concept (one of the first typologies was established by Clark in 1983), it addresses how universities and higher education systems define and implement their goals, manage their institutions, and monitor their achievements.

University reforms are clearly linked to either economic or political crises or both. Until the 1960s, European universities were mostly “ivory towers,” catering to the elite and governed by academic interests with limited links to local problems. Since then, and with the aim of democratizing higher education, government intervention has brought about important changes in terms of both funding and governing the system and the universities themselves. With pressure to accommodate more students, more financial resources were needed and governance reforms were introduced. In 2000, Anglo-Saxon countries (mainly) introduced a series of reforms that sought increased accountability and that transferred power from academics, researchers, and the state to intermediate bodies (sometimes known as “buffer bodies”) primarily for the purpose of allocating funds through competitive mechanisms. With these changes came increased institutional autonomy, allowing governments to use instruments such as resource allocation to promote their policies. The use of these competitive tools, aligned with the “New

Public Management”<sup>3</sup> (NPM) reforms, helped universities transition into more entrepreneurial organizations, thus enabling them to widen their revenue-generating capacity.

There is a wide variety of governance models; however, most of them can be defined based on the tension or balance between three main forces: the state, market forces, and academic excellence and the capacity to exert academic freedom. Taking into account how these three main forces interact, at one end of the spectrum are centrally-driven, state-controlled universities and university systems; private, profit-oriented corporate institutions are the other end of the spectrum, and varying degrees of power for academic staff and academic interests exist in between. Based on which force is predominant, University Governance Models can be identified.

The tension between government-led and market-driven higher education governance practices is seen worldwide. In the past two decades, many countries have opted to grant more autonomy to universities and to move from state-controlled to state-steered systems (Fielden, 2008). One impetus is governments’ “failure” to respond to rapid technology-driven changes and their capacity to adapt to globalization demands. Market failures, on the other hand, relate to equity issues, information asymmetry, and the potential for monopolies due to institutions’ market power (Raza, 2010).

Trakman (2008) studied governance models in U.K., Australian, and U.S. universities, which are less government-led than in European countries. He proposed four distinct models: Academic, Corporate, Trustee, and Representational.


The academic-driven governance models are the most traditional and are based on the assumption that universities should be governed by academic staff. There are several ways of adopting such an approach; e.g., by granting decision powers to the academic council or senate, by having important representation of academic staff on governing boards, or by appointing a prominent academic as president or head of the institution.

In Academic Governance, academic staff have the most representation and the greatest voice in defining the mission and management of the university. The most classic example of this model is Oxford University, where academic staff have openly rejected any kind of corporate governance. Corporate Governance, on the other hand, has emerged as a response to financial crises and the need for

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<sup>3</sup> Defined as the transition into more entrepreneurial organizations that enables them to widen their capacity and to use different governing instruments, such as resource allocation, to promote their policies. See: [http://www.mh-lectures.co.uk/npm\\_2.htm](http://www.mh-lectures.co.uk/npm_2.htm)

**FIGURE 1** Main forces at play in defining University Governance Models



universities to manage financial resources more responsibly. This model is prevalent in Australia, the U.S., and the U.K., and it emerged as a response to the need to improve public university management. Corporate Governance operates under the assumption that applying corporate approaches, such as financial accountability, helps to improve outcomes. This model usually implies that the head of the university is a professional corporate manager as opposed to an academic.

Trustee Governance, in contrast with Representational Governance, gives management powers to a “trustee,” usually in the form of a board of trustees. Its members are not elected from within the institution, nor do they represent the different stakeholders. The board of trustees usually has fiduciary responsibilities and due diligence in protecting the trust, including disclosing any factors that might constitute a conflict of interest with that trust. Representational Governance occurs when governance is vested in a wide array of stakeholders, including students, academic staff, alumni, corporate partners, government, and civil society.

In the U.S., private higher education institutions have been well developed for over a century, in many cases with funding from philanthropic donors, following corporate practices such as governance by boards of trustees, and significant organizational and legal autonomy. A chief executive officer and a chief operating officer usually serve on the board as the senior management team. This model is

widely used in public and private universities and is now common outside the U.S., notably in Australia.

The economic crisis of the 1980s in the U.S. prompted a crisis within higher education systems and tension between academic and corporate governance emerged. Some have labeled this a “crisis of purpose” among higher education institutions. Driven by the need to meet labor market demands, many colleges and universities responded by adopting a market-centered approach, focusing on providing programs that lead to jobs for students (Bloom, Hartley, and Rosovsky, 2006).

The same economic crisis in the U.S. led to a national campaign in the 1990s for universities to “serve a larger purpose.” Many of the associated efforts were funded through philanthropic and government sources, especially the Corporation for National and Community Service, established in 1994. Today, campuses across the U.S. actively promote community-based learning and research in partnership with their communities to advance learning, generate new knowledge, and promote research and to strengthen democratic practices (Saltmarsh and Hartley, 2011.)

It is clear that the adoption of a governance approach is an important decision in a given time and context for an institution or university system. It is also evident that the need to modify and adjust it to changing times is an important element of success.

The amalgam model (Birnbaum, 1991) provides a combination of Academic, Corporate, Trustee, and Representational governance. The advantage of the amalgam model is that it incorporates the strengths of each model to better suit the needs of an institution at a given point in time or to meet specific objectives.

### *System Governance versus Institutional Governance*

A wide variety of literature is available on higher education system governance, and, indeed, one of the critical elements of any strategy for university governance is its interaction with the state and the national higher education system in which it operates. There have been some important benchmarking exercises, such as the recent Autonomy Score Card published by the European University Association (EUA, 2009, 2011), which offers a tool to benchmark higher education frameworks in relation to autonomy and aims to establish correlations between autonomy and performance.

University Autonomy in Europe (2009) provided data on institutional autonomy, aiming to compare systems across Europe. The Autonomy Scorecard

(EUA, 2011) provided rankings and ratings of higher education systems according to their degree of autonomy for all European member states.

## Principles and Objectives of the Screening Card

The University Governance Screening Card focused on universities and higher education institutions and identified the models of governance followed by different type of institutions in different countries. This benchmarking tool focused on institutions as opposed to national systems or country ratings, unlike, for example, the EUA Autonomy Scorecard, which provided a scorecard for countries in each of the autonomy dimensions. Although the higher education system as a whole is an important context for understanding governance, the institution-based approach used by the University Governance Screening Card was based on several assumptions:

1. Universities and higher education institutions are complex organizations, called to perform a variety of tasks that vary from managing assets and personnel—like other organizations—to managing academic and research production, student affairs, community interactions, and government functions.
2. Unlike in basic and secondary education, identifying indicators to assess comparable higher education outcomes is quite complex, and there have been very few attempts to measure higher education institutions' performance that can be used to make valid international comparisons.
3. Tertiary education is much more contextualized than basic and secondary education, and there is such a wide range of institutions that it is not possible to adopt universal criteria to assess their performance. Tertiary education institutions have very diversified goals; therefore, their performance cannot be measured with a standardized or "one size fits all" approach.
4. Looking at university governance and identifying different patterns and "fitness for purpose" is a critical step toward understanding how higher education institutions could improve their performance.
5. Direct observations at the institution level allow the assessment of practices as opposed to policies (the focus of system-wide assessments). They also enable the assessment of gaps between policies and practices, key to identifying reform needs.
6. In current times, university rankings have a critical impact on how universities are perceived by the media and, therefore, the public. It is

important to have alternative tools that can provide comparable data for different types of tertiary education institutions.

7. This benchmarking tool is not intended to evaluate performance: It is an incentive to promote change and reform and is ultimately oriented toward helping universities improve their performance and adopt measures to help them better serve the needs of their stakeholders.

## Measuring Governance: Building Indicators

As already discussed, university governance is a multidimensional issue. Based on an examination of the literature, including the Guidelines and Good Practice Codes revised by the OECD, the European University Association, the Guide for Members of Higher Education Governing Bodies in the U.K. (CUC, 2006), the Australian Universities, and the West Coast Guidelines, this benchmarking tool uses five dimensions that together paint a complete picture of governance: (1) Overall Context, Mission, and Goals; (2) Management Orientation; (3) Autonomy; (4) Accountability; and (5) Participation. For each dimension, the related international trend was highlighted to position the institutions relative to those trends. More details on how these trends were used to build the indicators and the questionnaire are described ahead.

Once the five dimensions of university governance were defined a set of indicators for each dimension was identified, and a detailed questionnaire developed from which governance indicators could be scored. (See Annex 1 and 2). A weighting system aggregated those indicators and translated the questionnaire to a scoring instrument to record the results by institution. A spider chart was used to provide a visual representation of each university's position on each of the five dimensions. The score on a dimension was interpreted as an indication of the university's situation vis-à-vis one of the global trends in governance practices.


Each dimension had a set of questions and a scoring methodology, and each question was designed to ensure that the response would help determine how closely the institution behaved relative to the global trend represented by the dimension. Most of the questions required "yes" or "no" answers to facilitate the scoring. Each dimension was scored on a scale of 1 to 5. Given the lack of scientific basis to help prioritize, no hypothesis was formulated on the relative importance of indicators in the short term. Accordingly, each major indicator had the same contribution to the numeric value representing the entire dimension. In this way, it was possible to assign a weight to each answer of the questionnaire (coded in 0/1) simply by dividing the contribution of each indicator by the number

of constituting answers. This was both the most logical and the most understandable approach, and had the additional advantage of making the indicators independent of the number of proposed answers. Annex 1 has details of how each set of indicators for each dimension was built and how it was scored.

In addition to the questionnaire, the Screening Card included a self-perception tool to assess the extent to which universities were aware of the governance model and practices they follow. This was based on a single question per dimension that respondents rated on a scale of 1 to 5. Thus each institution has a self-perception report for the five dimensions of governance and a scored result based on the answers provided to the questionnaire (scored by an independent observer trained to conduct the interview and score the questions).

One important caveat is that the University Governance Screening Card does not reveal an ideal or even a “good” governance model; its purpose is to identify trends. As governance patterns are complex and context-sensitive, the aim was not to get the maximum score on each dimension but instead to determine if an institution’s governance arrangement was coherent. For instance, it is not possible to state the appropriate level of stakeholder participation *per se*: too much participation could regress into an ineffective “talking shop.” Similarly, there is broad consensus that more autonomy requires more accountability: the appropriate governance arrangement should be balanced rather than high and skewed. Figure 2 illustrates a hypothetical spider chart created using the results of a University Governance Screening Card.

**FIGURE 2** Hypothetical results from a University Governance Screening Card



## Dimension 1 – Context, Mission, and Goals

A key element in defining university governance is the overall framework of the system and the interaction between the institution and the state. For public universities, where the main source of funding comes from the state, a national law often centrally defines the legal framework. In the public system, the law defines a university's legal status and can go as far as determining its institutional goals.

One critical challenge that confronts countries when developing a higher education system is the extent to which the system should be oriented towards meeting high level research goals as opposed to providing teaching and access to a wide majority of people. The California Master Plan of 1960 constitutes an effective way of organizing a differentiated public education system to cater both to research excellence and to provide access to a large segment of the population (Altbach, 2011).

The California Master Plan, developed by Clark Kerr (Kerr, 2001), established a successful three-tiered public higher education system that has been used as a model not only in the U.S. but also around the world. It makes clear distinctions between: a) research universities that cater to elite researchers, offer Ph.D. programs, and have a clear research mission; b) traditional universities that offer bachelors and masters degrees where the main mission is teaching and there are no Ph.D. programs; and c) community colleges, which focus mainly on two- and four-year programs and are not involved in research.

As a truly integrated system, there are important linkages between the three tiers, and the admissions processes and number of student placements available in each tier are defined in terms of the state's economic and development needs. Thus, in California, research universities annually admit the top performing high school students (approximately 100,000 students), the second tier enrolls 450,000 students, and the third tier admits 3 million students. This differentiation allows the state to combine its needs for cutting-edge research with access to high quality, relevant education for a vast majority of students.

This definition of system also benefits the universities themselves, allowing them to focus on their mission and to align their goals with that mission. Thus, state universities are not expected to conduct cutting-edge research and their academic staff are not obligated to maintain the same research intensity as faculty from the research campuses. A community college is not expected to produce the same results as a research university. Their missions are different and therefore their goals and expected results must be different. Having this clear distinction

is absolutely essential for sound governance. The definition of each university's mission is fundamental to the governance structure, and, correspondingly, this system allows the state to differentiate funding and to align resources with the mission and goals of the different types of institutions.

The clarity of the mission and goals of the university or university system is therefore the first element in assessing university governance. A mission represents a shared understanding of the core purposes of the institution. While it is informed by an institution's history, it must continually be re-interpreted to meet the contingencies of the times. The establishment and occasional modification of a university mission is a classic governance function that, depending on the governance model, is most often shared among the academic staff, sometimes only the regular faculty or even only the regular senior faculty, and sometimes with professional staff and even students and the government. This governance function may be shared with a Ministry of Higher Education, a parliament or legislative body, a powerful head of state, or one or more of the so-called buffer bodies, such as an institutional or system governing board, a national council, or an accrediting agency. The delicate balance of authority usually involves a negotiation between the academic staff of the university or of the academic council or senate, depending on the system; the university management in the person of a rector, president, vice chancellor, or dean; the Ministry of Higher Education; the Ministry of Finance, if there are budget implications; and one or more of the quasi-public governing entities such as a university governing board, a system governing board, or one or more of the several quasi-public agencies charged with ensuring that the institutional resources are adequate to the proposed mission expansion or alteration and that a larger public purpose will be served.

University governance also entails establishment and occasional modification of the institutional and programmatic management structures that carry out these several missions: that is, the assembly of schools, faculties, departments, institutes, and similar institutions, as well as the lines of authority and accountability that are employed throughout these structures to achieve the institutional or system goals. Part of governance is securing, insofar as possible, the resources required to carry out these missions, as well as monitoring and holding accountable the performance of institutional managers at the highest levels. Finally, university governance includes appointing, assisting, defending, and, if necessary, removing those at the highest levels to whom the management of the institution or system of higher education is entrusted.

Recent research (Altbach and Salmi, 2011) indicates that important factors for defining sound governance include clarity in the mission definition and the

alignment between the mission and goals. From this starting point, the Context, Mission, and Goals dimension takes into account three sets of indicators: (i) the definition of the university mission, the process followed, and the stakeholders involved; (ii) the definition of the goals, their implementation, and the monitoring mechanisms used to evaluate them; and (iii) the legal framework and national context in which the university operates. Annex 1 provides a summary of indicators and sub-indicators for this dimension.

The self-perception question for this dimension asked: *Are the missions of the university formally stated?*

## Dimension 2 – Management Orientation

Strong leadership and strategic planning are key elements of a well-performing university. Management refers to the day-to-day but no less critical decisions of operating the institution: admission, registration, and certification of degrees for students; appointment, remuneration, and promotion of the academic and other staff; construction and maintenance of facilities; scheduling classes and assignment of staff to classes and laboratory spaces; securing sufficient resources to carry out the complex mission of the institution; and allocation of scarce resources to various claimants. Management is sometimes undervalued and contrasted with leadership, which is generally portrayed as more visionary and more likely to alter the fundamental trajectory of the institution than mere management. Vision and the capacity to fundamentally change a university (or any institution or organization) require the ability to institutionalize change, to effectively create new resources by the efficient use of existing resources, and to make difficult managerial decisions of resource reallocation. Effective governance and effective management, then, are inextricably woven together. Management without vision cannot adapt; leadership without effective management remains merely visionary (Johnstone, 2010).

Academic leadership is also an important role played by universities. The role of a university president is both managerial and academic. The literature is divided on whether a university leader must be a top scholar or whether a president should be a manager from outside of the academic world. How the university leader's profile is defined is closely related to the governance model or trend a given university follows (e.g., Academic or Corporate). In some Corporate models, the role of the university head is purely representative, depending on the powers given to the board. In most cases, however, the president is responsible for day-to-day management of the university and for implementation of its goals.

The Management Orientation dimension refers to the head of the university and the available governing bodies, their composition, the process for selecting or appointing its members, their role and responsibilities, their reporting lines, their accountability measures, and the duration of their assignment. This dimension also includes the clarity of the bodies' mandates; the alignment of their mandate with the university's mission, goals, and legal framework; the accountability measures for governing bodies; and mechanisms for measuring governing bodies' performance.

The Screening Card indicators for the Management Orientation dimension were designed to identify the extent to which a university followed results-based management aligned with the NPM practices. These indicators included: the type of university leader (i.e., president, rector, or chief executive officer) and the process for appointing that person; the roles and responsibilities assigned, including the legal functions; his/her lines of accountability; and the mechanisms for evaluating his/her performance. Indicators also included the management structures, departments, or units and their roles, responsibilities, lines of accountability, and mechanisms for performance evaluation. To get a good picture of the management structure of a university, the most critical departments and functions, such as human resources, budgeting and accounting, academics, procurement, and legal services, were also taken into account.<sup>4</sup>

Strategic planning is a tool used by well-performing institutions and, as reported in the literature (Altbach and Salmi, 2011), its use is a significant factor of success. Thus, the Screening Card gave attention to the process followed for preparing a strategic plan, the actors involved in preparing and defining goals, and the mechanisms used to monitor achievement. The indicators and sub-indicators used for Management Orientation are found in Annex 1.

The self-perception question for this dimension asked: *Is the Management Orientation of the Institution focused on Results?*

### Dimension 3 – Autonomy

There is a strong international trend to increase the autonomy of public institutions by making them independent and self-governing. This emerged from the need to make universities more responsive to social and economic environments and more able to adapt to changing technologies and innovate. Academic autonomy

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<sup>4</sup> For universities with a research department and/or science and technology transfer departments, this can be an additional area to look at.

and academic freedom are critical elements of well-performing universities. To be successful, Rosovsky (2001) observed that academic staff must be involved in the decision-making of the university. Research universities especially need the full involvement of academic staff in decision-making, and typically have a greater degree of professorial power and stronger guarantees of academic autonomy than other academic institutions (Altbach, 2011).

Anderson and Johnson (1998) found that Anglo-American countries have more academically autonomous systems but have more government control over budgets and financial management. Research by Aghion *et al* (2008, and 2010) highlighted the importance of autonomy for developing world-class universities and generating innovation. It examined the relationship between autonomy and university rankings, using the Shanghai rankings as a way to evaluate university performance and U.S. data on patents to establish innovation. The findings suggested that autonomy is important and needs to be accompanied by competition to deliver optimal outcomes. In Aghion's study, the factors correlated with a well-ranked institution were: (1) independent budget; (2) freedom in student admissions; (3) payment incentives for faculty based on performance; (4) independent hiring of staff; (5) autonomy for definition of their curriculum; and (6) high percentages of funds obtained through competitive grants (Aghion *et al*, 2010).

In 2006, the European Commission marked as a priority the creation of new frameworks for universities characterized by improved autonomy and accountability. Based on this mandate, the European University Association (EUA) further developed the concept of university autonomy and defined four dimensions of autonomy: academic, financial, organizational, and staffing. The University Governance Screening Card took into account the factors highlighted by researchers as having a correlation with high performance, and used the autonomy typology developed by the EUA. The Screening Card used only the financial, academic, and staffing autonomy definitions, however, as organizational autonomy overlapped with the Screening Card Context, Mission, and Goals and Management Orientation dimensions.

Financial autonomy was defined by indicators such as the ability of universities to: set tuition fees, accumulate reserves, and keep surplus on state funding; borrow money; invest money in financial or physical assets; own and sell the land and buildings they occupy; deliver contractual services; and attract funds on a competitive basis. Academic autonomy took into account: the responsibility for curriculum design; the extent to which universities are autonomous to introduce or cancel degree programs and to determine academic structure; the overall number of students; admissions criteria; admissions per discipline; evaluation of

programs; evaluation of learning outcomes; and teaching methodologies. Human Resources autonomy related to: the recruitment procedures for the appointment of senior academic staff; the status of employees (whether they are considered civil servants); and the procedure for determining salary levels, salary incentives, and workloads; human resources policies; career development policies; and performance management.

The self-perception question for this dimension asked: *What is the degree of academic, human resources management and financial autonomy?*

## Dimension 4 – Accountability

As governments and ministries around the world promote more autonomy for public universities, the price to pay is often greater demand for accountability, and these demands are increasingly in the form of measurable demonstrations of achievement and progress on the university's goals. For instance, if the goal is to advance scholarship in basic science, then a measurable outcome might be the number of articles accepted in internationally-recognized, peer-reviewed journals in the university's self-identified fields of scholarly emphasis. If the goal is applied scholarship, then the number and success rate of consulting contracts, grants, and patents applied for and awarded in a particular field might be measured.

Accountability for the university's professed teaching mission is more difficult to measure and is subject to the vagaries of sub-optimization and unintended consequences. For example, if the state overemphasizes the number of students admitted as a measure of success, then universities may respond by admitting more students with little concern for their programs of study or their progress or completion. The unintended consequences, then, may be too many students admitted into low-cost programs for which there is little public need and a high number of dropouts. If the metric for success is degree completion, then universities may admit only the most academically well-prepared and ambitious students, for whom completion is statistically most likely, and admit fewer high-risk students whose secondary school preparations may be weak because of poor secondary schools, socio-economic background, or poor language instruction. If the metric is gainful employment, success may be distorted by the state of the economy and the job market.

On the other hand, not using any metrics of success, whether in teaching or research, may inadvertently reward whatever is most comfortable for both the faculty and the university management, without taking outcomes into account. As governments provide more management flexibility and autonomy, universities

must be held accountable to some measures of success in implementing their missions. Further, to reward improvement these metrics should be used not only at a single moment in time but also over time.

The Accountability dimension indicators looked at academic accountability, accountability to civil society or social responsibility, and financial accountability. The indicators addressed: clarity in the definition of accountability lines at all levels (academic staff, managerial staff, administrative staff, and governing bodies); the process for evaluating the completion of institutional goals; dissemination of information on institutional goals, student achievements, graduate insertion in the labor market, institutional evaluations (internal and external), and accreditation; methods used for evaluating the performance of students, teaching staff, administrative staff, and managerial staff; the process for auditing university accounts; and the processes for risk management and dealing with misconduct (see Annex 1).

The self-perception question for accountability asked: *How much is the university held responsible vis-à-vis its stakeholders?*

## Dimension 5 – Participation

Voice and accountability are key elements for good governance, as access to information on the government's decisions and participation in policy development are important elements of democratic and open societies. Freedom of expression and availability of free media are very important in monitoring public policy making and implementation. Improving transparency and accountability are key obstacles in MENA that need to be overcome to succeed in improving governance for development.

Increasing awareness and participation of civil society help improve governments' accountability, in particular on outcomes and quality of public services delivery. One of the priority areas under the AWI is to strengthen Governance and Anticorruption (GAC) initiatives, not only in the MENA region but in Arab countries at large. The MENA Education Flagship Report (2008) concluded that education systems in the region need to follow a new path of reform with a focus on incentives and public accountability.


According to the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) produced by DEC and WBI, in 2007—prior to the Arab Spring—the MENA region scored the lowest on Voice and Accountability, an aggregate indicator that measures perceptions of citizens' ability to participate in selecting their government, possibility of freedom of expression, freedom of association, and access to free and independent media. Most

countries in MENA ranked below the 15<sup>th</sup> percentile for Voice and Accountability in the 2007 survey. The only exceptions were Lebanon, Morocco, and Jordan, which scored below the 30<sup>th</sup> percentile, low given their GDP levels (see Figure 3).

In the Participation dimension, the extent to which different stakeholders are taken into account in the decision-making process was proposed for analysis. A wide range of stakeholders have interest in university matters, depending on the type of institution as well as on the overall framework of the system. Common stakeholders included in decision-making are students, academic staff, government, industry representatives, donors, community associations, unions, and alumni.

With the growing demand in the region for voice and accountability, benchmarking this dimension of university governance has the potential to respond to the demands of young people in Arab countries and to promote governance reforms widely. The indicators used for this dimension are seen in Annex 1.

The self-perception question for this dimension asked: *Do the stakeholders have a voice in decision-making mechanisms?*



Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2008: Governance Matters VII: Governance Indicators for 1996–20.

CHAPTER

# 2

## Results of the Benchmarking Exercise in 41 Universities: An International Comparison

**D**uring a pilot phase from June 15 to August 31, 2010, the University Governance Screening Card tools and methodology were tested in a sample of universities in Egypt, Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia. These four countries expressed the most interest and readiness to participate in the benchmarking. The pilot phase was a very positive step forward, ending with an empirical fine-tuning of the instruments. The universities' reactions were very encouraging: the collection of answers often involved several actors, triggered their attention, and elicited important conversations on important aspects of governance. The Screening Card thereby fulfilled one of its goals by raising awareness of governance matters within the institutions in which it was applied. After the instruments were fine-tuned, the project proceeded with data collection from a purposeful sample in each country to represent the diversity of institutions in terms of their size, location, date of creation, and legal type.

Universities were classified as public, private for-profit, and private not-for-profit. This distinction was initially defined and taken into account in preparing the sample. In addition, each university provided its own classification. The size criterion for the universities was the average student enrollment per country. Medium size universities were defined as those within one standard deviation of the average enrollment in the country; those below medium size were defined as small; and those with enrollment higher than one standard deviation of the average were defined as large. Location was defined as either a main or capital city or a small


or intermediate city. The average age for all universities in each country was estimated; universities older than the average age were considered old, while those “younger” than the average age were considered recent. To calculate the average, “historic” universities such as the University Al Quaraouiyine in Morocco, created in 859, and Zitouna in Tunisia, created in 737, were not taken into account.

It was difficult to establish a difference between research universities, teaching universities, and community colleges for several reasons: first, the distinction between research and teaching universities is not made in the countries studied; and second, not all countries have community colleges. The Screening Card thus designated universities as General, Specialized, Religious (three universities), and Open (two universities).

Table 1 describes the sample of universities studied by country. It is important to note that in Morocco and Tunisia, there is no distinction between private for-profit and private not-for-profit; the law considers all private institutions as for-profit. In West Bank and Gaza, all universities are “private” by international standards. Although purposeful samples may reduce representativeness, in this case representativeness is gauged by enrollment: the universities surveyed represented 78 percent of all enrollment in Palestine, 60 percent in Morocco, 46 percent in Tunisia, and 36 percent in Egypt (see Table 2). Therefore, we have enough confidence to make cross-country comparisons based on the data collected.

Figure 4 shows the average self-perception of all universities in each of the five dimensions and the average results from the Screening Card questionnaire.

**FIGURE 4** Four-country average: self-perception and questionnaire results



**TABLE 1** Universities in the sample by characteristic

	Legal Orientation			Size			Age			Localization			Type		
	Public	Large	Medium	Small	Old	Recent	Capital	Province	General	Religious	Specialized	Open	University	Total	
<b>Egypt</b>															
University E01	1	1			1		1			1				1	
University E02	1	1			1			1						1	
University E03	1		1			1	1							1	
University E04	1			1		1		1						1	
University E05	1	1			1		1							1	
University E06	1			1		1	1							1	
University E07	1		1		1		1							1	
University E08	1			1		1		1						1	
University E09	1		1			1	1							1	
University E10	1			1		1		1						1	
University E11	1		1			1	1							1	
University E12	1			1	1			1						1	
University E013	1			1	1			1						1	
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>13</b>		<b>13</b>	
<b>Morocco</b>															
University M01	1			1		1		1		1				1	
University M02	1	1				1		1		1				1	

(continued on next page)

**TABLE 1** Universities in the sample by characteristic (continued)

	Legal Orientation			Size			Age			Localization			Type		
	Public	Large	Medium	Small	Old	Recent	Capital	Province	General	Religious	Specialized	Open	University	Total	
University M03	1			1	1		1							1	
University M04	1	1			1		1							1	
University M05	1			1		1								1	
University M06	1			1		1								1	
University M07	1		1		1		1							1	
University M08	1		1		1		1							1	
University M09	1	1			1		1							1	
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>9</b>	
<b>Palestine</b>															
University P01	1	1			1		1		1					1	
University P02	1	1			1		1		1					1	
University P03	1		1		1		1		1					1	
University P04	1	1			1		1		1					1	
University P05	1			1	1		1		1					1	
University P06	1		1		1		1		1					1	
University P07	1		1		1		1		1					1	
University P08	1	1			1		1		1					1	
University P09	1			1	1		1		1					1	
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>9</b>	

(continued on next page)

**TABLE 1** Universities in the sample by characteristic (continued)

	Legal Orientation		Size			Age			Localization			Type		
	Public	Private, not for profit	Large	Medium	Small	Old	Recent	Capital	Province	General	Religious	Specialized	Open University	Total
<b>Tunisia</b>														
University T01	1			1	1	1	1	1					1	
University T02	1			1	1	1	1	1		1				
University T03		1		1		1		1	1					
University T04	1			1	1	1	1	1		1				
University T05		1		1	1	1		1	1					
University T06	1		1		1	1	1	1		1				
University T07	1			1	1	1	1	1			1			
University T08	1			1	1	1	1	1		1				
University T09			1	1	1	1	1	1		1				
University T10	1			1	1	1	1	1					1	
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>41</b>

(continued on next page)

TABLE 2


### Sample representativeness (in terms of student enrollment)

	Student Enrollment		
	National	Sample	
	Student Enrollment	Student Enrollment	% of National Enrollment
Egypt	2,232,434	801,179	35.9%
Morocco	324,100	196,182	60.5%
Palestine	196,625	153,802	78.2%
Tunisia	370,058	169,234	45.7%

Although the averages mask important differences between countries and institutions (analyzed later in this chapter), the comparison shows that the self-perception scores were higher in all dimensions except Management Orientation. Overall, universities perceived that they were more autonomous, defined clearer mission statements, and had higher levels of stakeholder participation than they actually do, as revealed by the questionnaire. On the other hand, they perceived that their management did not follow market-oriented practices. One possible interpretation for this is that perhaps universities did not perceive the use of market-oriented practices well and, as a result, they did not see themselves as following them. This point is further discussed later on.

Figures 5 and 6 present the individual university results by country. Individual results for each dimension are illustrated with Tunisia at the bottom and Egypt at the top. Figure 5 shows the results of the self-perception and Figure 6 shows the results obtained through the questionnaire. Shades of color are used to illustrate the scores, with dark orange being 0 and dark blue being 5. Overall, these results show that universities' self-perception followed the same pattern observed in the questionnaire results, indicating that there was awareness of the strengths and weaknesses at the institutional and country level. However, as mentioned above, there are differences in magnitude: the dark blue areas in the self-perception figures (Figure 5) become light blue in the questionnaire results (Figure 6); in some cases, the light red areas in the self-perception figures become dark orange in the questionnaire results. Individual institution assessments and country reports are discussed in the chapters ahead. The overall findings and a comparison between countries are the subject of this chapter.


**FIGURE 5** Self-perception results by country



## Highlights of the International Comparison

The same university typologies used for the definition of the sample in each country were used for the results analysis. However, no distinctive patterns emerged when size, age, or location of the institutions were analyzed, while quite important differences were observed between public and private universities for all five governance dimensions and in all four countries. As a result, the analysis focused on the differences between private and public institutions.

**FIGURE 6** Questionnaire results by country



## Dimension 1 – Context, Mission, and Goals

Defining the university or university system’s mission and goals, or more accurately the appropriate “mission mix,” is a fundamental governance question. This implies thorough discussion and analysis on topics such as: whether the mission of the institution should be focused on applied or basic research; if the focus has an international, local, or regional emphasis; and if the objective of the university is to train scholars and academics, to train productive workers and employees, or to educate

young adults for citizenship and their place in society. This definition of university mission is what the California Master Plan of 1960 clearly articulates (recall Chapter 1).

Based on an analysis of the mission statements of the 41 universities in the sample, it seemed that there was no distinction between research, teaching, and forming professionals. All participating universities stated a combined mission that included research, teaching, forming professionals, and providing community service. Box 1 gives some examples of how universities in the four countries defined their missions.

This “one size fits all” approach to defining university missions has some problems. In Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco, the mission of public universities is defined by law. This could imply that universities do not engage in the process of defining their mission and that all public universities in a given country have the same mission, at least on paper. This in itself is a challenge for the state to guarantee

### **Box 1: Examples of how universities in the four countries defined their missions**

“As a teaching, research and community service and community development institution of higher education this university seeks to be the number one university inXX, in the way of offering the undergraduate and graduate programs and the way we conduct our research to reflect on building and consolidating our, social, economic, political and other institutions”.

“They include provide access to qualified high school graduates to higher education opportunities, promotion of research & development, support of continuing education, empowerment of the nationals with new technologies & know how, provision of the society with experts and trained work force, support international cooperation, promotion of critical thinking & innovation & voluntary work, promotion of scientific and spiritual values as well as academic integrity.”

« formation des compétences, développement et diffusion des connaissances, contribution aux progrès scientifique, technique, professionnel, économique et culturel de la Nation, maîtrise et développement des sciences, des techniques et du savoir-faire, par la recherche et l'innovation, valorisation du patrimoine culturel national et le rayonnement de ses valeurs ancestrales »

« formation initiale, formation par la recherche et la recherche, et ouverture sur l'environnement socio-économique. »

“Universities are concerned with everything related higher education and scientific research being offered by the faculties and institutes in the service of society and its cultural advancement.”

“Universities are concerned with everything related higher education and scientific research being offered by the faculties and institutes in the service of society and its cultural advancement.”

“There are 3 main missions: 1- Develop post-secondary students to be ready to enter the labor market, 2- Offering graduate degrees and researches according to a pre-defined research plan 3- Offering social services in different fields “

that it is serving well the different needs that a university system is called to meet. At the same time, requiring universities to have the same mission makes it difficult for them to focus, develop a competitive advantage, excel in certain areas of knowledge, or pursue specific objectives.

Staff composition and workload, as well as the incentives to perform, are derived from the definition of the university mission as either a research or teaching institution. Incentive structures are set around publishing research, which may not make sense for a non-research university, where the emphasis might instead be on promoting and teaching talent. Some universities in the sample did not state their mission formally; this is an important challenge to overcome, as the mission definition is the starting point for defining the governance model. The lack of differentiation is a concern not only for the country or system as a whole but also for the universities themselves. Therefore it would be useful to have a collective discussion in each country to establish priorities and accept that not all institutions need to be involved in doing research, nor to offer graduate programs. That is, not all institutions need to be “everything for all people,” and defining specific missions can better meet system-wide goals and objectives.

### *Actors Involved in Defining the University Mission*

In terms of the actors involved in the statement of an institution’s mission, Table 3 shows the average results by country. One important observation is that academic staff were well represented in defining the university mission in all institutions in the four countries studied.

An important difference is noted between public and private universities in all countries.<sup>5</sup> For instance, in Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco, it is clear that the state at the national level has direct involvement in defining the mission of both public and private universities. In Egypt, private universities reported having 100 percent involvement of the state at the national level, while this was the case in only 50 percent of public universities. This seems counterintuitive, perhaps because of the perception that public universities should have greater state involvement in determining university matters. However, in terms of other stakeholders’ participation, in Egypt, the results regarding civil society representatives, faculty, and staff were higher in public universities than in private ones. Tunisia showed the lowest level

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<sup>5</sup> Morocco and Tunisia do not have private not-for-profit universities, as the law stipulates that all private institutions are for-profit. In WB&G, public universities are non-governmental, so in the sample there were only private universities.

TABLE 3

### Actors involved in the definition of the university mission (% positive responses)

3. During their elaboration, which actor had a voice?	Egypt			Morocco		Tunisia		West Bank and Gaza	
	Private for profit	Private, not for profit	Public	Private for profit	Public	Private for profit	Public	Private for profit	Private, not for profit
The State, national level	100.0%	100.0%	57.1%	100.0%	100.0%	66.7%	100.0%	0.0%	62.5%
The State, regional level	66.7%	33.3%	42.9%	0.0%	37.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	25.0%
Civil society representatives	33.3%	33.3%	100.0%	100.0%	75.0%	0.0%	28.6%	100.0%	62.5%
Industry & business representatives	33.3%	33.3%	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%	66.7%	42.9%	0.0%	75.0%
Universities representatives	66.7%	100.0%	85.7%	100.0%	100.0%	33.3%	85.7%	100.0%	87.5%
Syndicates/unions	0.0%	0.0%	57.1%	0.0%	100.0%	33.3%	28.6%	0.0%	37.5%

of participation from other stakeholders in the definition of the university mission in both public and private institutions (see Table 3).

In West Bank and Gaza (WB&G), it is clear that the state has a much lower level of intervention than in any of the other countries. This is largely due to the facts that: (1) there are only two governmental universities (not in the sample), and (2) the Palestinian State for historical, political, and economic reasons has a lower level of intervention in university matters. WB&G also showed the highest levels of representation of other actors, such as civil society, industry, and staff, than the other three participating countries. Further, in WB&G, governing boards have a high level of power: they are independent and not accountable to any higher order organization or entity.


## Dimension 2 – Management Orientation

As mentioned earlier, in all cases, the self-perception of Management Orientation scored lower than results from the questionnaire. The self-perception question on Management Orientation was, “Is the university management orientation following market-oriented policies?”, and may have been misinterpreted. This was actually discussed at the November 2011 Cairo workshop, and many institutions interpreted

the self-perception question as following what the labor market is demanding. Based on this misunderstanding, it was concluded that the phrasing of the self-perception question should be revised to better reflect its meaning as results-based management. One of the underlying assumptions of Management Orientation is that good management is results-based; when the results of the questionnaire were analyzed, it was observed that most universities used tools to monitor the achievement of their goals. This could help explain the higher questionnaire scores.

Most universities in the sample gave low scores on the self-perception of Management Orientation, as seen in Figure 5. This negative response was more frequent in Tunisia than in other countries. In Egypt, for instance, about half of the universities replied positively to this question, as did the private for-profit universities in Morocco and Palestine. However, when the results of the questionnaire were analyzed (Figure 6), it was observed that most of the sample (only two exceptions among the 41 universities) scored between 3 and 4.5 in Management Orientation. A possible explanation for this difference could be related to one important aspect of modern market-oriented policies, the extent of monitoring of goals and results and the use of instruments such as scorecards. Most universities in the sample stated that they had mechanisms to monitor achievement of goals and that they used performance reports typically evaluated by the president and/or the governing board (see Figure 7). The lack of evaluations conducted by independent agencies in Tunisia and Morocco is also evident in Figure 7.

Although the questionnaire did not ask for details on the types of reports used by governing boards, the fact that reports are used to evaluate institutional




## Which actors are in charge of monitoring achievement of institutional goals?

**FIGURE 8** (% of positive responses)

7. Which actors are in charge for monitoring their achievement?	Egypt	Morocco	Palestine	Tunisia
The State (Government, MoE, Parliament)	69%	89%	33%	80%
Institutional leadership (Head or equivalent)	100%	100%	89%	90%
Social council (e.g. civil society, business rep., associations)	46%	33%	11%	0%
Senior Managers	85%	33%	56%	40%
Governing Board (or equivalent)	100%	100%	100%	60%
Other councils (e.g. Academic, Research, Student's Senate...)	92%	78%	78%	50%
Private owners/Donors	62%	11%	22%	20%

## Are the following elements used to measure the attainment of institutional goals?

**FIGURE 9**



goals is in itself a measure of modern management. More information is needed to establish the extent to which the instruments used are using performance indicators and how these indicators are established.

The actors most heavily involved in monitoring institutional goals were the president and the governing boards in all countries. Academic councils had high participation in all countries except Tunisia, and the central government played an important role in all countries except Palestine.

### *Types of University Leaders and their Selection Process*

All universities in the sample had presidents: there were no chief executive officers, provosts, or rectors as university leaders. Generally, the governments of Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia appoint the university presidents in those countries, and in WB&G, university presidents are appointed by the governing boards. The only cases in which appointments followed a competitive process were in private universities in WB&G, some private universities in Egypt, and in public universities in Morocco (see Table 4). It is important to note that information in Egypt and Tunisia was collected prior to changes introduced after the Arab Spring; in both countries, university presidents are now elected.

Regarding qualifications, only in Morocco must the president have an academic profile, although he/she must also have a managerial background, as in Egypt and WB&G. In Tunisia, university presidents do not have a specific or formally stated profile. In most cases and in all countries, presidents can be selected from candidates outside the university, and they are required to prepare a strategic vision for the university. Governing boards and private donors have a leading role in selecting presidents in WB&G as well as in private universities in Egypt and Tunisia. Senior academic staff only have a role in selecting the university president of public universities in Morocco and in some cases of private not-for-profit universities in WB&G.

Palestine has the most corporate-like governance in this regard, as the state is not involved in the selection process of the president, who is always appointed by the governing board, and Palestinian universities use evaluation reports more frequently than the other countries.

In all other countries, the government appoints the president of public universities. In some cases, there is consultation with the governing boards, but academic staff are consulted only in Morocco. Of the four countries, Morocco's governance model seems to come closest to being Academic: it is the only country in which university presidents must have an academic background, and in which academic staff are involved in the university president selection process.

**TABLE 4** Selection of decision-makers


13. Are the following elements used to measure their attainment?	Egypt		Morocco		Palestine		Tunisia	
	Private for profit	Private, not for profit	Public	Private for profit	Private for profit	Private, not for profit	Private for profit	Public
<b>15.1 President - What is the selection process</b>								
Appointment by the Government	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	12.5%	33.3%	100.0%
Appointment by a Selection Committee (Board of Trustees)	100.0%	100.0%	14.3%	100.0%	100.0%	87.5%	100.0%	0.0%
Elections	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	0.0%
Competitive recruitment	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	33.3%	0.0%
<b>16.1 President - Who is implicated in this process?</b>								
The State (Parliament, MoE or Regional authorities)	0.0%	66.7%	85.7%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Institutional leadership (Governing Board,...)	66.7%	66.7%	28.6%	0.0%	37.5%	100.0%	66.7%	0.0%
Senior Academic staff	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Private owners or donors	66.7%	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%	12.5%	100.0%	66.7%	0.0%
<b>17.1 President - What are the requirements to be selected?</b>								
S/he is not necessarily an academic	0.0%	0.0%	14.3%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	14.3%
S/he needs to have a Managerial profile	100.0%	100.0%	71.4%	100.0%	75.0%	100.0%	100.0%	0.0%
S/he can be an external person from the University	100.0%	100.0%	42.9%	0.0%	75.0%	100.0%	87.5%	57.1%
S/he has to meet a full job specification	100.0%	100.0%	71.4%	0.0%	37.5%	100.0%	66.7%	57.1%
S/he is not necessarily a member of a political party	100.0%	100.0%	71.4%	0.0%	100.0%	87.5%	100.0%	85.7%
S/he has to propose a strategic vision for the university	100.0%	100.0%	71.4%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	66.7%	14.3%
<b>18.1 President - What are the conditions of their mandate?</b>								
The length is less than 4 years	0.0%	0.0%	14.3%	0.0%	37.5%	100.0%	66.7%	57.1%
It's not renewable	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	12.5%	66.7%	14.3%
It's renewable but the number of mandates is limited	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

### Dimension 3 – Autonomy


Important differences between countries were observed in the self-perception results of Autonomy. On the one hand, Palestinian universities had a high perception of their autonomy, which, as discussed earlier, corresponds to the actual high degree of autonomy and low intervention from the state. In contrast, Tunisian universities had a very low perception of their autonomy (see Figure 5). This is not a surprise, not only because the role of the state in these two countries is very different, but also because the information was gathered in Tunisia before the Jasmine Revolution.

#### *Differences in Self-Perception and Scored Results in Public and Private Universities*

Interestingly, in Egypt, private universities reported low levels of autonomy, while public ones reported high levels. This seems counterintuitive, but this pattern also emerged in other countries' questionnaire results, particularly in reference to academic autonomy. Figure 10 shows public and private universities' self-perceptions; in general, private universities perceived that they were more autonomous.



**FIGURE 11** Autonomy: Questionnaire results of public and private universities




However, the results for Autonomy based on the questionnaire show that private universities had much less autonomy than they perceived (see Figure 11). This is in part due to the frequent responses given by private universities regarding their lack of academic autonomy. Private universities had much more autonomy regarding managing, selecting, recruiting, and firing staff and using salaries to reward performance. On the other hand, private universities had less autonomy to introduce new programs, although they had autonomy in defining delivery modes and enrollment and admission policies.

### Public and Private Universities: Opposite Patterns of Autonomy

Public and private universities had opposite patterns of autonomy, as shown in Figure 12. For instance, private universities reported more often that the state had control over their academic autonomy, although they reported having autonomy to charge fees, define enrollment, and use their funds at their own discretion. This counterintuitive observation might be due to the different perceptions that public and private universities have of the role of the state: private universities tend to think that the state has no role to play in how their institutions are run. This could also indicate how much more control the state exerts over academic autonomy in private universities.

**FIGURE 12**

**Academic and human resources autonomy of private and public universities**



*Lack of Academic Autonomy: An Important Concern*

One area in which all countries and all types of universities scored systematically low was academic autonomy. Even in Palestine, which had the highest degree of autonomy, academic autonomy was low. This is a concern, as academic autonomy has been reported to be a key element of success for high-performing universities. Autonomy in academic decision-making is a critical element for innovating, producing knowledge, and excelling on academic and research grounds.

All universities reported not having the autonomy to introduce new programs, and only 15 percent of public universities and 25 percent of private universities reported having the autonomy to define the structure of their curricula. Although most universities had the autonomy to assess student learning outcomes and to engage in partnerships with other universities, most public universities did not have the possibility to set admissions policies or the number of

students per program. This was in contrast with private universities, which had the autonomy to define their admissions policies and to determine the overall number of students to enroll and number of students per program.


*Autonomy in Human Resources Management*

In human resources management, private universities had much more autonomy than public universities. In most cases, private universities had the autonomy to hire and fire staff and to develop staff development and training programs. In all cases, private universities had the autonomy to evaluate staff performance, and, although in some cases they had the autonomy to set salaries, in most they had the ability to link salaries to performance. This is a significant difference from public universities, which in all cases could not set salaries, could evaluate staff performance in only 60 percent of cases, and could link salaries to performance in only 10 percent of cases.

*Financial Autonomy*

One unsurprising finding was the overdependence on government resources by public universities and on student fees by private universities, as shown in Figure 13. Tunisia and Morocco rely heavily on government funds, while WB&G relies mostly on student fees. Less than 10 percent (mostly private universities) reported sources of revenue other than student fees, which indicates that these universities were not engaged in providing services and were not engaged with their local environments.

**FIGURE 13** Sources of funds by country



In most universities in the sample, there is a need to develop alternative sources of revenue and to engage in research or provision of continuing education services.

## Dimension 4 – Accountability

The correlation between autonomy and accountability is important. The more autonomous institutions are, the more likely they are to be subject to accountability measures. This correlation was observed in all four countries studied. Public and private universities in WB&G and Egypt had higher levels of autonomy, and, as shown in Table 5, used more accountability measures. For instance, in Egypt and WB&G, human resources departments had policies that linked compensation and salaries to performance, unlike Morocco and Tunisia. In academic departments, compensation and salaries were attached to performance in private universities in all countries, in 57 percent of public universities in Tunisia, and in 62 percent of public universities in Morocco. Needing to provide justifications for expenditures was a common practice in Egypt and WB&G, but was observed in only 50 percent of public universities in Morocco and 71 percent of public universities in Tunisia. Further, private universities in Tunisia and Morocco did not have standardized sanctions for professional misconduct.

### *External Accountability*

Public or external accountability is the extent to which outcomes (as opposed to inputs and outputs) are measured and to which clear definitions exist regarding who is accountable for the outcomes. It is important to examine how university leaders and governing boards are held accountable by society. Figure 14 shows the extent to which public and private universities conducted tracking surveys to learn about graduates and their employment rates or used statistics to establish efficiency measures, such as years required to complete a degree. The figure shows that most public universities had statistics on completion rates, and that 70 percent of universities conducted tracking surveys to learn about graduates' employment rates. However, when it came to disseminating information, only 30 percent of public universities and 53 percent of private universities made this information available on their websites.

### *Dissemination of Information*


The practice of disseminating information is another critical element of accountability. Figure 15 shows that the information most frequently made available were

**TABLE 5** Performance, sanctions, and incentives

20. What kind of policies to provide incentives/ enforcing of rules are used to manage the staff of each department?	Egypt			Morocco			Palestine			Tunisia		
	Private for profit	Private not for profit	Public	Private for profit	Private not for profit	Public	Private for profit	Private not for profit	Public	Private for profit	Private not for profit	Public
<b>20.1 Human resources department</b>												
Reporting measures	100.0%	33.3%	85.7%	0.0%	0.0%	62.5%	100.0%	75.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	71.4%
Compensations, salaries attached to performance	100.0%	100.0%	85.7%	0.0%	0.0%	12.5%	100.0%	50.0%	100.0%	33.3%	33.3%	14.3%
Providing justifications for expenditures	66.7%	100.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	37.5%	100.0%	62.5%	100.0%	33.3%	33.3%	42.9%
Scorecards	66.7%	0.0%	85.7%	100.0%	0.0%	62.5%	100.0%	25.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	42.9%
Standardized sanctions in case of professional misconduct	100.0%	100.0%	85.7%	0.0%	0.0%	75.0%	100.0%	87.5%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
<b>20.2 Financial department</b>												
Compensations, salaries attached to performance	100.0%	100.0%	85.7%	0.0%	0.0%	75.0%	100.0%	87.5%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Reporting measures	100.0%	66.7%	85.7%	0.0%	0.0%	62.5%	100.0%	50.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	71.4%
Providing justifications for expenditures	100.0%	66.7%	71.4%	100.0%	100.0%	12.5%	100.0%	62.5%	100.0%	33.3%	33.3%	14.3%
Scorecards	33.3%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	50.0%	100.0%	87.5%	100.0%	33.3%	33.3%	71.4%
Standardized sanctions in case of professional misconduct	66.7%	0.0%	85.7%	100.0%	100.0%	62.5%	100.0%	37.5%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	42.9%
<b>20.3 Academic department</b>												
Compensations, salaries attached to performance	100.0%	66.7%	85.7%	100.0%	100.0%	62.5%	100.0%	62.5%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	57.1%
Reporting measures	100.0%	66.7%	71.4%	0.0%	0.0%	12.5%	100.0%	75.0%	100.0%	33.3%	33.3%	14.3%
Providing justifications for expenditures	66.7%	100.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	100.0%	75.0%	100.0%	33.3%	33.3%	71.4%
Scorecards	66.7%	0.0%	85.7%	100.0%	100.0%	50.0%	100.0%	25.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	42.9%
Standardized sanctions in case of professional misconduct	100.0%	100.0%	85.7%	0.0%	0.0%	62.5%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%

**FIGURE 14**

**Tracking surveys and their dissemination in public and private universities**




the goals and strategy of the university and, to a much lesser extent, information such as accreditation results. This represents a form of external accountability.

Although 70 percent of universities stated that they conducted tracking surveys, information that could be used to develop performance indicators, such as completion rates, number of years it takes to complete a degree, and data on graduate labor market insertion, was not readily available. This corroborates once again that even if institutions make the effort to collect information, they seldom make it available to the public.


The above findings indicate that public or external accountability on service delivery—which makes public the extent to which institutions obtain outcomes that contribute to economic and social development—still has a long way to go. This is one of the most important claims arising from the Arab Spring. Young people want their public officers and leaders to be held accountable to society. Although this benchmarking exercise is a step in the right direction, there is still an important gap in terms of information, particularly related to academic performance indicators.

A “transparency index” was calculated according to universities’ performance in: development of indicators for monitoring graduates; and the diffusion, dissemination, and sharing of documents on the mission and goals of the university, its

**FIGURE 15** Dissemination of information by country




**FIGURE 16** “Transparency index” of all 41 universities



**FIGURE 17**

**“Transparency index” by country and legal orientation of universities**



strategy, the results of evaluations and accreditations; sharing of budgetary documents to non-state actors; and dissemination of financial audits outside the universities. The transparency index is the average of 18 parameters reflecting these indicators, and ranges from 0 to 100 percent. The 41 surveyed universities had an average score of 50 percent, with a minimum of 11 percent and a maximum of 95 percent.

The score distribution shows that private non-profit universities were the most transparent in their operation (index 55 percent), followed by private for-profit universities (50 percent), and then public universities (index 47 percent). The distribution by country shows that Palestinian universities had the highest scores while Tunisian universities had the lowest.

## Dimension 5 – Participation


Stakeholder participation in the decision-making process was the area in which all universities in all four countries systematically presented low scores. The low levels of participation in decision-making throughout the MENA region are well known. As discussed earlier, according to the WGI produced by DEC and WBI, the MENA

region scores lowest on voice and accountability, and universities are no exception to the practice of excluding stakeholders from decision-making.

The ability of academic staff to participate in decisions concerning the university is one critical factor to not only improving democratic practices but also to determining academic excellence. Altbach (2011) reported that one of primary factors of success of the University of California at Berkeley is that “the internal governance of the university is mainly in the hands of the professors; key decisions concerning academic policy and direction, even if initiated by administrators, receive input from the academics.”

Figure 18 shows that academic staff were generally reported as having a “voice” when it came to defining goals and preparing the strategy of the university. However, the questionnaire asked more precisely if academic staff were represented in academic, research, or administrative councils; most of the universities in all four countries responded negatively. This contradiction may be related to misinterpretation of the questions, or could be due to the fact that academic staff actually do not have formal representation on these decision-making bodies.

**FIGURE 18** Academic staff voice and participation in decision-making by country



Finally, private universities tended to have fewer mechanisms for the participation of students, civil society, and other stakeholders than did public universities.

### Identifying Patterns

In an attempt to identify patterns, the five governance dimensions used in the Screening Card were correlated with system-level governance, and two models were identified: i) government-driven, and ii) autonomous and government-steered, as defined by Fielden (2008). Table 6 provides a summary of how each dimension is mostly likely to be observed in the two types of system-level governance.

The five governance dimensions used in the Screening Card were also correlated with the four governance models defined earlier: Corporate, Academic, Representational, and Trustee. Table 7 summarizes how each dimension is most likely represented in each of these models.

The patterns observed in public and private universities and the predominant characteristics in the five dimensions of the Screening Card are summarized by country in Table 8.

**TABLE 6** System-wide governance and the five dimensions of the Screening Card

System Level	Context, Mission and Goals	Management	Autonomy	Accountability	Participation
<b>Government-driven</b>	Government-defined missions and policies	Government-appointed president	Centrally managed budget Central control for new programs and curriculum Central HR management	Central audits Central QA National driven curriculum Low accountability-no links between performance and rewards	Mainly on consultation basis
<b>Autonomous-Government-steered</b>	Mission-oriented Institutions Strategic plans prepared by Institutions	Governing boards led	Competitive funds allocation Autonomy to introduce new programs and set curriculum HR autonomy	External audits Independent external QA Performance-based salaries	High participation of stakeholders throughout the decision-making process

**TABLE 7**

**University governance models<sup>a</sup> and the five dimensions of the Screening Card**

	<b>Context, Mission and Goals</b>	<b>Management Orientation</b>	<b>Autonomy</b>	<b>Accountability</b>	<b>Participation</b>
<b>Corporate</b>	Mission-oriented Decentralized	Results-based	High autonomy in all three areas, academic, financial and HR	High accountability in financial and HR	
<b>Academic</b>	Mission-oriented- Defined in consultation with academic staff		High academic autonomy	High internal academic accountability	High participation of academic staff
<b>Representational</b>				High external accountability	High participation of stakeholders
<b>Trustee</b>	Mission-oriented-Defined in consultation with trustee	Results-based		High internal accountability	

<sup>a</sup> Based on Trakman (2008).

## Summary and Conclusions

The culture of benchmarking universities in the Arab World has been introduced. This benchmarking exercise represented an important first step toward monitoring university performance. Although the purpose was not to look at performance itself (i.e., the focus was on identifying governance trends), this initiative has increased awareness on the need to identify and collect performance indicators. Given the lack of information generally, and in particular on performance indicators, and the absence of information-based policies, particularly prior to the Arab Spring, this exercise constitutes an important achievement regarding public accountability for higher education services. The openness and willingness of universities to share information, identify problems, and plan reforms was timely, as civil societies across the Arab World are now demanding transparency, accountability, and active participation in building open and democratic societies.

**TABLE 8**

**Public and private universities and the five dimensions of the Screening Card**

	<b>Context, Mission, and Goals</b>	<b>Management Orientation</b>	<b>Autonomy</b>	<b>Accountability</b>	<b>Participation</b>
<b>Egypt Public</b>	Centrally defined mission	Results-based	Low HR and financial autonomy	High academic accountability	High participation of stakeholders
<b>Egypt Private</b>		Results-based	High HR and financial autonomy Low academic autonomy	High HR, financial and academic accountability	Low participation of stakeholders
<b>West Bank and Gaza Private</b>		Results-based management, Governing bodies led	High HR and financial autonomy, and restricted academic autonomy	High HR, financial and academic accountability	High participation of stakeholders
<b>Morocco Public</b>	Centrally defined mission	Academic led	Low HR and financial autonomy	Low academic and HR accountability	High participation of academic staff in decision-making
<b>Tunisia Public</b>	Centrally defined mission	Traditional	Low HR, financial and academic autonomy	Low academic and HR accountability	Low participation of all stakeholders
<b>Tunisia Private</b>	Centrally defined mission		High HR and financial autonomy Low academic autonomy	High HR and financial accountability	Low participation of stakeholders

The Screening Card has demonstrated its capacity to assess and benchmark university governance. Strengths, weaknesses, and areas of reform have been identified at the institution, country, and regional level. Each surveyed university has its own assessment, and is able to compare itself to other institutions in its own country and abroad. In Egypt and Tunisia, where post-Arab Spring changes in how universities are managed have already been introduced, this baseline survey will be the basis for monitoring progress on those reforms. The information collected is useful not only for the 41 universities that participated in the exercise, but

it also constitutes the basis for a regional and global benchmarking exercise, and many countries in the Arab World and beyond are interested in joining.

**Clear models and governance trends have been identified.** Several trends have been identified, and, in particular, differences between public and private universities governance models have become evident. At the national level, two clear models emerged. To a great extent, they reflect European legacy, as one model follows a more autonomous and government-steered approach, coinciding with an Anglophone legacy as in Egypt and WB&G. A more centralized, government-controlled model is evident in Tunisia and Morocco, following a Francophone tradition. The autonomous, government-steered model shows more external accountability measures, higher levels of a “corporate” approach with the use of governing boards, and higher levels of participation by civil society on such boards. In contrast, the government-controlled model shows more internal accountability and less external accountability; low financial, academic, and human resources autonomy; and low levels of participation of civil society. All countries could explore the different models of governance used in American, Australian, and East Asian universities to update their current frameworks.

**There is room for improvement regarding awareness on the suitability of different governance models.** One major finding is the lack of differentiation in the definition of universities’ missions. Although universities showed awareness of their strengths and weaknesses along the dimensions of governance, there was not necessarily a conscious decision on the type of governance model followed by institutions. This stems from the tendency to have centrally driven systems, a high level of intervention from the state in the mission definition, and a lack of mission differentiation. This “one size fits all” approach undermines the potential for different governance models to suit the specific needs of a given type of institution.

**The absence of a national vision for higher education was observed in most countries.** One consequence of the lack of differentiated missions for institutions is the absence of a National Strategy and a clear definition of the purpose of a Higher Education System. To evolve, systems will need to choose more specific university missions, and build tertiary education systems with clearly-defined institution types to serve different populations, each with a clear set of objectives and goals. As systems evolve, universities will need to adopt more consciously the governance models that best fit their mission.

**Self-awareness is important for developing a reform process.** Participation in this benchmarking exercise elicited healthy discussions inside institutions and prompted the introduction of reforms in all countries. Awareness of the governance model used (or not used) in an institution has important implications for: i) improving both the way the institution is managed and the education and other services it offers; and ii) enabling the institution to assess for itself how fit it is for its purposes.

It is clear that there is no one single model or “one size fits all” approach to university governance. It is therefore important to acknowledge the model being used to determine if it is the best approach for a particular institution, given its political, social, and economic context. Good governance involves the ability to objectively assess when changes are needed.

**Benchmarking is critical to monitor implementation of reforms.** As each university has its own Screening Card with details on its score in each dimension, it will be able to plan its own institutional reforms and monitor its progress over time. Some critical points to mention regarding the overall findings are: the low academic autonomy observed in most countries for both public and private universities; the high dependence on government and student fees, limiting financial autonomy; and the lack of information shared on performance indicators and graduate insertion into the labor market. Institutions must discuss how to overcome these challenges collectively—as a higher education system within a country—and individually, as each university develops its strategic plan to improve.

**The first steps have been taken to build a system to monitor performance and make evidence-based policy decisions.** The Screening Card served to identify governance trends and models and is applicable to universities in other regions. A critical next step in the Arab World is to correlate governance models with performance indicators. Countries in the region must make efforts to collect information on performance indicators such as student learning outcomes, skills developed, research and development capacity, and insertion in the labor market. Once this information is available, it will be possible to correlate governance models with performance, a critical element for enabling countries to define policies based on accurate and meaningful information.

## CHAPTER

# 3


## Tunisia Country Report

The scores for the participant institutions from Tunisia (displayed in Annex 3) are averaged in Figure 19, below. The Screening Card results for Tunisia show a spider chart marked by relatively high scores for Mission (3.9) and Management Orientation (3.2). In contrast, scores were lower for Autonomy (2.5) and Accountability (2.3), and particularly low for Participation (1). The self-perception scores for Participation (2.2) and Accountability (4.1) appeared overvalued, while they were lower for Management Orientation and Autonomy, and almost identical for Mission (4). There are two possible explanations for the differences between the self-perception and questionnaire scores. On one hand, universities did not have a clear perception of their strengths and weaknesses in the three areas where the differences were the most marked: Participation, Accountability, and Management Orientation. In axes where the questionnaire results were below those of the self-perception, this study aims to provide “food for thought” to university decision-makers and enable them to perhaps improve their scores. Where the self-perception scores were lower than the questionnaire results, such as the Managerial Orientation axis, the difference may be an issue of methodology. The question posed in the self-perception survey (“Are management methods drawn from the private sector?”) did not correspond to the questions posed on the Screening Card questionnaire. There was therefore a methodological discrepancy between the two tools.

A more detailed examination of the scores of Tunisian universities was conducted for the following categories: legal status, size, age, location, type, and partnerships. In Tunisia, as in the overall analysis, university status was the most

**FIGURE 19**

**Spider chart comparing the self-perception and questionnaire results for Tunisia**




significant differentiating variable. It dominated those of size, age, and, to a lesser extent, type. Private universities are smaller compared to public universities that oversee several faculties and engineering schools. The legal framework for private universities was only established in 2000, so they are also the most recently created. Private universities are often specialized as they usually include a limited number of faculties. Location and partnerships had little impact on the results.

The status of the university was a particularly distinguishing feature for two axes of the evaluation: Autonomy had a score of 4.1 for private universities, much higher than the 1.8 score for public universities, and Participation had a score of 1.3 score for public universities, exceeding the 0.4 for private universities. These results are analyzed in more detail below.

Even among public universities, it is surprising to note the differences in governance despite the law on higher education that sets the goals and missions of universities, their internal operation, and the methods of follow-up and evaluation. The differences between public universities may be the result of qualified interpretations of the text. For example, certain universities are more involved in establishing links with the productive sector than others. These differences may also be the result of incomplete application of the law, however. As the state has not created an independent evaluation body at the national level, universities may adopt different strategies to monitor quality. In short, governance also constitutes a set of practices managed by the management team within institutional constraints.

**FIGURE 20** Tunisian university Screening Card results by status



## Dimension 1 – Context, Mission, and Goals

Public and private Tunisian universities were relatively similar in their mission and obtained an average score of 3.9 on this dimension, slightly higher than the average of 3.6 for the four countries studied.

### Mission

Among the actors with influence on the establishment of the university mission statement, it is striking to note the absence of the influence of the state at the regional level (28 percent at the MENA level), confirming the centralized organization of the Tunisian state, despite the official discourse. Public universities differed in their perception of strong involvement by university representatives (86 percent) in contrast with 33 percent in private universities. The perceived 50 percent participation of representatives from the productive sector is below the 68 percent MENA average.

### Goals

The majority (85.7 percent) of public institutions and two-thirds (66.7 percent) of private institutions gave great significance to the place of the state in realizing

goals set by the various universities. Private universities in Tunisia gave the state greater significance than their counterparts at the MENA level (50 percent). Private universities also stood out because of the greater importance given to groups apart from university leaders, such as managers, administration, academic and research committees, and backers.

### *Legal Framework*

Universities agreed that the mission of universities is formally defined at the national level through the law of February 25, 2008 that stipulates the fundamental objectives and general organization.<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, universities confided that their missions were only partly implemented. As an illustration, cooperative relationships between universities and the socio-economic world remain weak even though the law encourages them. The professionalization of the university should be increased as a result of a regional project of the World Intellectual Property Organization which aims to create Technology Transfer Offices (TTO) in universities, dependent on the National Scientific Research Development Agency. These should promote the socio-economic value of research results and the transfer towards industrial and commercial exploitation. In addition, certain universities have created an integration unit to encourage teachers to develop links with the private sector. Another example is the facilitation of the path between professional training and university, also promoted by the law, which has not been introduced for lack of recognition links. These would be facilitated by the implementation of a procedure such as credit for life and work experience. This procedure would also enable universities to develop continuing education and lifelong learning programs.

During the interviews, private universities spoke about the uncertainty of the legal framework. Even though they often based their financing plan on the law N° 2001–82 of July 24, 2001 (Art. 52 c) comprising incentives<sup>7</sup> to the private

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<sup>6</sup> "Higher education aims at ensuring university training, developing skills, contributing to developing a knowledge society, enriching knowledge, developing technology and putting them in place for the service of the national community." (Art. 1<sup>st</sup>). Article 2 describes the missions in detail: i) develop and circulate knowledge with a view to building a knowledge-based economy and strengthen the employability of graduates under the framework of the partnership with the economic, social and cultural environment, ii) perform and develop scientific research, by improving the quality, contributing to technological innovation and its value enhancement, iii) provide face-to-face learning, distance learning, continuous learning, sandwich course and training on demand, and offer lifelong training opportunities, (...) »

<sup>7</sup> The incentives are as follows: i) grant of an investment premium not exceeding 25 percent of the project cost, ii) cost borne by the state of a share of the salaries paid to Tunisian teachers

sector for investment in the education sector, higher education, and professional training, this has not been respected. Interviewees had the sentiment that these laws were conceived with the goal of benefiting projects of the family of the deposed president. In addition, the private education law of 2008 required private universities to increase the capital of their establishments to two million dinars.<sup>8</sup> The law also forbids the establishment of subsidiaries. Finally, the word “university” is no longer allowed to be used in the name: private higher education establishments are created in the form of faculties, higher education institutes, or postgraduate professional and vocational schools.

## Dimension 2 – Management Orientation

Tunisian universities attained an overall score of 3.2 in this dimension, slightly less than the 3.4 average for the four countries studied. For this dimension, private and public universities in Tunisia had very similar scores. It seems quite surprising that private universities have not introduced management tools more in line with those used in the private sector, such as the automatic use of salaries indexed to performance or the general development of detailed action plans. Two explanations can be given for this: first, private university presidents are often former professors from the public sector; and, second, the private sector in Tunisia has for a long time remained closed to new management techniques.

### Strategy

Universities made little use of large consultations (one university in ten) in defining their strategies. The implementation of the strategy was evaluated for 90 percent by quantitative studies producing data on performance of the institution. The absence of an evaluation agency in Tunisia was borne out by the low rate of independent evaluation (20 percent).

Nevertheless, certain universities criticized the lack of strategic vision despite the Law N° 2008–19 of February 25, 2008 relating to higher education anticipating


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and trainers recruited on a permanent basis not exceeding 25 percent of the salary and for a period not exceeding ten years, iii) the state bears the cost of employer contributions to the social security system for salaries paid to Tunisian teachers or trainers recruited on a permanent basis for five years, with the possibility of renewal on one occasion, for an equivalent period, and iv) grant a concession of land to investors under a contract.

<sup>8</sup> Law N° 2008–59 of August 4, 2008, modifying and as a complement to Law N° 2000–73 of July 25, 2000, relating to private higher education.

**FIGURE 21**

**Tunisian universities' Screening Card results for Management Orientation**



quadrennial training and research contracts: “The activities of universities and university establishments in relation to training, technological research and development are subject to training and research contracts. The aforementioned contracts are concluded for a period of four years (...) and sets the obligations of universities and higher education establishments, the resources and credits that may be allocated by the State as well as its own resources that it commits to using” (Art. 13). The contracting process begun in 2009 has not been implemented uniformly and has been put on hold. It seems that changes at the top in the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research did not allow the recognition and continuation of the measures. Contracting is a favored strategic planning and follow-up and evaluation tool. The merits of contracting justify the call of certain decision-makers for its restoration.

**Selection of Decision-Makers**

Methods for selecting decision-makers differ significantly between public and private universities. In the selection of the president in public universities, it is important to recall that most of the data were gathered before the law change by the provisional government establishing the election of university presidents. Thus, the Tunisia score for the selection of decision-makers would not be the same today. It should also be pointed out that Tunisia differs from its survey peers in

that the permanent teaching staff elect the deans in public universities (Art. 25 of the 2008 law). Tunisian faculties have been able to create their own internal regulation mechanism. The election of deans was perceived as an area of freedom in Tunisian society under Bourguiba.<sup>9</sup> The positive historic perception of faculties and their ability to create democratic internal regulations furthermore explains their autonomy within the university institution.

Another distinctive trait of Tunisian universities is the required profile of the president or dean. While 75 percent of the public universities in the countries studied recruited their president or deans for their managerial skills, among other features, no Tunisian public universities required this (0 percent). In contrast, Tunisian private universities were unanimous in the importance they gave to managerial qualities.

### *Staff Performance and Evaluation*

In Tunisia, the performance and evaluation of staff stood out with its recourse to reporting instruments (tracking indicators), at 80 percent for human resources and the financial department, and 70 percent for academic staff. Nevertheless, public universities used less reporting on academic staff (57.1 percent) than two of the other staff categories (human resources and finance department, 71.4 percent). This difference might be explained by a cultural heritage where the teacher is independent and not subject to evaluation, except by his immediate superior when there is a change of grade. Evaluation should not be confused with imposing teaching standards that would impair innovation by the professorial body. An evaluation by students may also be introduced. Finally, all private universities had more systematic recourse to scorecards (100 percent), compared to the 42.9 percent for public universities.

Private universities did not have any standardized sanctions in contrast with public universities. Variable performance-based salaries were used by 33.3 percent of private universities and 14.3 percent of public universities. This tool could be a source of staff motivation. In public universities, there was an attendance bonus, almost automatically granted, due to low professors' salaries. It appeared

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<sup>9</sup> See Michel Camau and Vincent Geisser's book *Le syndrome autoritaire, Politique en Tunisie de Bourguiba à Ben Ali* (Authoritarian syndrome. Politics in Tunisia from Bourguiba to Ben Ali) (page 320). The authors qualify this collective belief in the principle of the relative autonomy of the university. They emphasize that the university is subject to idealization and highlight the many limits on autonomy: intervention of the police, etc.

that universities did not have the tools necessary to motivate their human resource management.

These observations show that Tunisian universities in general, and public universities in particular, lack evaluation and incentive procedures. These two tools would enable improvements in the accountability of participants.

### Dimension 3 – Autonomy

Tunisian universities obtained an overall score of 2.5 on this dimension, lower than the 3.1 average score of the four countries. Private universities achieved a score of 4.1 for Autonomy, compared to 1.8 for public universities.

#### *Academic Autonomy*

Private and public universities shared the same perception of the absence of relative academic autonomy at the level of curriculum development, the introduction of new programs, and the allocation of the number of hours (0 percent). While academic autonomy in the four MENA countries was limited overall, Tunisian universities had greater freedom on average in the evaluation of students (65 percent) and institutional partnerships (57.5 percent). Law N° 2008–19 of February 25, 2008, which established the autonomy of universities, therefore still seems not to be widely applied.<sup>10</sup>

Private higher education institutions are not free to introduce innovations into programs; they must obtain approval through the Ministry of Higher Education and research. The Ministry of Higher Education therefore has a dual role: in addition to providing educational services, it is the regulator system through the supervision of the private system. According to the 2000 law (Art. 4), “private higher education institutions may not deliver teaching whose level is inferior to that of teaching delivered in public higher institutions.” The Ministry seems to have made a very restrictive interpretation of this text. It only gives its consent to programs directly copied from the public system and not in accordance with a qualitative assessment. Optional teaching programs constitute the sole margin of freedom for private universities. As a result, universities have limited innovation ability. Despite being created to raise the overall quality of the higher education system to meet the skills requirements of the productive sector, universities cannot easily realize

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<sup>10</sup> Art. 11 – Universities are independent in carrying out their scientific and teaching missions. They guarantee the objectivity of knowledge.

this original objective, as the state has not given them the resources and the degree of freedom necessary.

In contrast, private universities reported enjoying total autonomy in the student selection process (100 percent).<sup>11</sup> Thus, they may develop varied strategies: favor excellence in recruitment or target students who are victims of an inefficient orientation system. The current system steers students not meeting the quota in competitive subjects towards failure subjects (law, social sciences). Even so, private universities may restrict the number of students by level and try to offer quality supervision at the same time. On the contrary, public universities were characterized by a very limited autonomy in the selection of students: only 14.3 percent of them admitted to having any autonomy. Nevertheless, it should be noted that certain institutions under the aegis of the public universities had greater freedom in the admissions process.

### *Autonomy of Human Resources*

Responses from private and public universities were very different with respect to autonomy in HR matters. Public universities had no scope in hiring and dismissing administrative or academic staff. The university must express its requirements beforehand with the Ministry. Nevertheless, temporary or contractual staff may be freely recruited. Public universities emphasized their total absence of autonomy in setting salaries of academic and administrative staff and in the possibility of introducing performance-based salaries (there is only an attendance bonus that seems to be almost always automatically awarded given the low salaries). Palestinian and Egyptian public universities appear to have introduced variable salary mechanisms linked to performance (50 percent of cases). By contrast, Tunisian private universities had total autonomy in the management of their administrative and academic staff.

### *Financial Autonomy*

Public and private universities differed markedly in their financial autonomy. Private universities stated that they had complete autonomy except in relation to deficits. Tunisian public universities were more constrained. They could not manage their assets freely (only 42.9 percent of positive responses) and only 14.3 percent were able to set student tuition fees. Currently, the law sets student tuition fees.

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<sup>11</sup> The student selection process covers the ability to determine: i) the number of students admitted to university; ii) the number of students per program; and iii) the admission mechanisms.

Tunisian public universities stood out in their ability to use a multi-year expenditure program (i.e., Medium-term Expenditure Framework) and to shrewdly allocate the budget from a global grant (100 percent of positive responses compared to an average 75 percent for the four countries). However, the quadrennial program agreements between the university and the state enabling a strategy to be developed and a Medium-term Expenditure Framework to be established were suspended in 2010 (cf. 5.1). While the law is favorable, it is not therefore applied.

This financial autonomy of universities in the establishment of their budget was nevertheless broadly constrained by the prior control of all expenditure. By contrast, the institutions under the aegis of the university were much freer in the management and expenditure of resources.

## Dimension 4 – Accountability

Tunisian universities scored 2.3 for Accountability, below the average score of 3 for the four countries surveyed. The overall score for public universities (2.2) differed little from that of private universities (2.6).

### *Quality of Education*

Half of Tunisian universities (both private and public) had established a quality system internal to the university. However, the questionnaire results showed weaknesses in the quality systems in terms of indicators retained and the tracking mechanisms established (see the spider charts below). Current mechanisms for measuring quality were located more at the university level (faculties and institutes) and were limited. By way of illustration, the external evaluations of institutions by peers promoted by the National Evaluation Committee are hardly circulated and followed up by action plans. The quality committees instituted in 2006 are perceived as being imposed by the Ministry, from which there has been limited appropriation. The quality committees at the university level, which bring together quality committee chairmen from other universities, were disbanded in 2010.

In parallel, the institutions and public universities have had the opportunity to improve quality as a result of cooperation programs, such as under the competitive support fund for quality initiated by the World Bank (Second support for higher education – PARESII<sup>12</sup>) or under the European framework through TEMPUS

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
<sup>12</sup> The Quality Support Program (PAQ) proposed two types of financing, the first intended for the improvement of education and training and the second for the development of managerial abilities. Only public universities have benefitted from this fund.

programs. These projects allowed the introduction of good practices that would be worthwhile documenting to capitalize on lessons learned.

One path for improvement would be to devote a greater role to the university in quality management. The university would constitute the pilot institution of quality systems and would provide greater consistency for current programs situated at the level of the establishment and faculties.


Private Tunisian universities showed more highly developed quality systems and their scores were very close to the average of the four MENA countries (see the spider charts below). A nuanced interpretation needs to be given to the positive results of private universities' programs for accreditation. In fact, universities considered the approval of their programs by the Ministry of Higher Education as accreditation. Only one private university had a foreign external evaluation giving it its accreditation.

In conclusion, Tunisia, like Morocco, does not have an evaluation agency that is independent or under the responsibility of the government. In fact, the national evaluation authority for quality assurance and accreditation, provided for under the law 19 of February 25, 2008, Chapter V (Art. 42), has yet to be created. This authority would contribute to legitimatizing and organizing the overall evaluation framework. The definition of an evaluation agency's mission and prerogatives could result in a participatory process involving the universities.



**FIGURE 23**

**Monitoring mechanisms of quality indicators in Tunisian public and private universities versus the four survey countries**  
 (% of positive responses)



**Social Responsibility and Transparency**


Tunisian universities stood out for their widespread practice of conducting statistical surveys on graduate employment (100 percent), the periods of unemployment between graduation and the first job (80 percent), the principal sectors of employment (80 percent), and the average number of years required to obtain a degree (100 percent).

However, universities did not often communicate these results through websites (30 percent), public reports (30 percent), or newsletters (20 percent). Private universities made greater use of communication brochures (66.7 percent), as opposed to public universities (14.3 percent), which certainly felt less of a need to market to the public. Even the university strategy was little publicized: 50 percent in Tunisia, compared to 75 percent for the four survey countries.

In summary, there was a disconnect between the general practice of using statistical surveys and the limited communication of their results. Several reasons account for the absence of transparency at universities. First, before the January 14, 2011 revolution, there was no culture of administrative accountability towards civil society. Universities were no exception to this, and would perhaps conceal inadequate or poor results (notably the integration ratio of graduates). Today, given the central role unemployed graduates have played in the revolution, the


**FIGURE 24**

**Collection of employment statistics and studies in Tunisia versus the four survey countries**



**FIGURE 25**

**Distribution tools for employment statistics and studies in Tunisia versus the four survey countries**



transparency and accountability of universities to the government (their financier) and their beneficiaries (the students) should be increased.


Universities did not share financial information easily. While budget information was made available to the state, it was never communicated to academic staff by private universities and only by 43 percent of public universities. Administrative staff had greater access (60 percent). In contrast, only 14 percent of public universities communicated this information to students (compared to none of the private universities). These documents were never sent to the media and general public. Once again, these practices were similar to those in the other countries studied, but could be changed by a policy of increased transparency.

### Financial Integrity

Practices of private and public universities differed somewhat in financial matters. Private universities systematically used external audits, and 87.1 percent of public universities did so. The frequency of audits was higher at private universities: 66.7 percent of them had an annual audit while 87.5 percent of public universities were audited less frequently than once a year. Only 30 percent of private and public universities communicated audit results to internal actors, compared to 67.5 percent on average for the four countries studied. Tunisian universities, like their peers in other countries, never communicated audit results outside the university.

**FIGURE 26**

**Existence of standardized sanctions for misappropriation of funds, inappropriate expenditures, and questionable contracts**  
(% of Tunisian universities)



## Dimension 5 – Participation

In terms of participation, Tunisia's score (1) was slightly lower than the average of 1.3 for the four countries studied. Private universities had an even lower score (0.4) compared to 1.3 for public universities. The absence of unions or associations representing professors, administrative bodies, or students bears out this lower score. Similarly, there was no formal representation by the private sector. However, the participation result of private universities should be qualified. As private universities are small, discussions may occur more through informal channels. As these universities grow, formalization of the participation process will be required.

At the level of participation in the strategic process (definition of goals, development of the strategy, budget allocation, determination of the type of course), of note were:

- The low student participation rate of 12.5 percent.<sup>13</sup> Student participation was non-existent in public universities.
- The significant participation of academic staff (87.5 percent).<sup>14</sup> While 85.7 percent of public universities gave academic staff voting rights on the board of directors, universities did not allow them participation on the board of directors. Universities have therefore had to develop other channels for cooperation.
- The lower participation of administrative staff (57.5 percent),<sup>15</sup> and representatives from the private sector (50 percent).<sup>16</sup>
- The significant alumni participation (92.5 percent),<sup>17</sup> but the mode of their involvement was not specified. They were not represented on university boards.

The authorization of the higher education teachers' union that occurred after the revolution, as well as the general freeing up of expression, will have impacts in the short- and medium-term on participation in universities. These institutions must create channels to promote free expression by the various actors.

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<sup>13</sup> Average of responses to question 43.1.

<sup>14</sup> Average of responses to question 43.2.

<sup>15</sup> Average of responses to question 43.3.

<sup>16</sup> Average of responses to question 43.6.

<sup>17</sup> Average of responses to question 43.5.


## Conclusions

A comparative analysis of the scores for Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, and Palestine revealed that Tunisia has the same weakness as its Mediterranean peer group in terms of participation and high scores regarding mission and management. As seen in Figure 27, Tunisia's scores for autonomy and accountability were slightly lower than those of Morocco and Egypt, while Palestine obtained much higher scores on these two points (3.9 for autonomy and 3.6 for accountability).

As discussed earlier, the distinction of university status (private for-profit as opposed to public) allowed for comparison of the results by axis and within each axis, where differences appeared.

For the Mission and Management Orientation dimensions, this distinction was not very significant. The relatively close scores of public and private universities in the definition of the overall mission and the specific goals of universities revealed a common understanding and the importance of the role allowed the state, even by private institutions, reflecting the strong culture of the state in Tunisia. In addition, several university presidents began their career in the public sector and as a result remain marked by the pre-eminence of the state. The similarity of results between public and private universities for Management Orientation also stood out. Private universities made little use of management tools from the private sector, such as the automatic use of salaries indexed to performances or the

**FIGURE 27** Screening Cards results for Egypt, Palestine, Morocco, and Tunisia



joint development of detailed action plans. Once again, presidents, often former professors from the public sector, did not have a private sector culture. On the other hand, the private sector in Tunisia has for a long time remained closed to new management techniques.

Public and private universities differed markedly in the Autonomy, Accountability, and Participation dimensions, justifying two distinct portraits. Public universities are recent institutions (the first public university was founded in 1986), conceived as administrative structures intended to group together various faculties. The appointment of university presidents by the Ministry has tarnished their image. Public universities suffer from a lack of autonomy in the management of human resources and the selection of students. By contrast, faculties have enjoyed a more favorable image and have been able to create internal governance mechanisms, such as the election of deans.

One pathway for improvement in accountability is to reinforce “quality” systems, notably through the revival of “quality committees” both at the establishment and university levels. In addition, creation of a national body for evaluation, quality assurance, and accreditation would contribute to establishing the readability, legitimacy, and consistency of the “quality” systems. Definition of its missions and prerogatives could result in a participatory process involving the universities.

For enhanced social responsibility and transparency, universities should inform, publish, and reinforce the accountability mechanisms to stakeholders such as the government, internal actors (professorial and administrative bodies), and their beneficiaries (the students) by publishing statistics on graduate monitoring, strategies, self-perception, and even financial audits. Circulation of information would encourage participation and increased engagement from actors concerned about the performance of their institution. These general remarks should not overshadow the positive features and initiatives shown by certain universities or faculties, however, and it would be worthwhile to draw up a list of good practices.

Private universities continue to be marked by a strong public-sector culture in their Mission and Management Orientation dimensions. Despite their high score for Autonomy (4.1), private universities have no freedom to innovate in their teaching. The Ministry of Higher Education seems only to approve programs copied from public universities. Private universities were created primarily to raise the overall quality of the higher education system and meet the skill needs of the productive sector. It is difficult for them to realize this objective as the state has not provided them with the necessary resources or freedom required.

Generally, private universities were marked by less bureaucratic structure and fewer procedures, due to their smaller size and their more recent establishment. The low score of 0.4 relating to participation should be interpreted carefully, as participation channels are perhaps more informal in these universities. Nevertheless, private universities would gain by clearly formalizing their procedures to make them more understandable to all actors. Increasing participation would also improve feedback on the expectations of the beneficiaries, which can often be a source of improvement of the institution.

In conclusion, it would appear that Tunisian universities have particularly suffered from the unsettled nature of public policies. Private universities have not benefitted from the grants expected, have had to increase their capital, and have not been free to innovate. The creation of a private university statute could be considered to give further recognition to this sector. Public universities have suffered from the suspension of contract programs, and from the lack of follow-up of evaluations and the disbanding of quality committees at the university level. Today, universities must complete their paradigm shift towards more efficient institutions as a result of the legitimacy acknowledged to the presidents elected in July 2011. The restoration of contract programs with the state, leading to the establishment of a medium-term expense framework, is a special strategic tool. Universities should not restrict themselves to an administrative coordinating role between the institutes and the supervision of the Ministry of Higher Education and scientific research. On the contrary, they must constitute managerial bodies working to enhance the quality of teaching.


Participants from public universities and the Ministry for Higher Education expressed their surprise at the results of the assessment of professors, financial autonomy, and quality systems in universities at the November 2011 workshop in Cairo. It should be recalled that the presidents who attended the Cairo workshop were elected in July 2011, and were not the university presidents involved in the survey. They have, as a result, sensed a difference between the results presented and their own perception and analysis of the situation. This study could be repeated next year for a scientific comparison, and could raise awareness of governance among new management teams. Future studies could include the participation of various participants such as academic and administrative staff and students.

# CHAPTER 4

## Palestine Country Report

Figure 28 shows the average self-perception and questionnaire scores for all Palestinian universities in each of the dimensions (the spider charts for the participant institutions from Palestine are displayed in Annex 4). It can be seen that the self-perception score was higher in all dimensions except Management Orientation. Overall, universities perceived that they were more autonomous, defined clearer mission statements, and had higher levels of participation of

**FIGURE 28** Average self-perception and questionnaire results for Palestinian universities



stakeholders than they actually did. On the other hand, they had the perception that their management did not follow market-oriented practices. This was clarified at the Cairo workshop: respondents understood the question of institutional alignment with market-oriented practices to mean alignment with labor market needs (the degree to which programs produce employable graduates), whereas the question was meant to measure the extent to which the institution followed modern management principles internally. The way the self-perception question was posed led to different interpretations, and therefore the results of the self-perception were low in all countries.


In general, Palestinian universities' scores for the self-perception were very similar. However, important differences emerged between institutions based on their questionnaire results. Figure 29 graphically represents the self-perception results and those based on the questionnaire by institution.

The largest differences between the self-perception and the questionnaire results were those related to the process followed for establishing the university mission and goals and levels of stakeholder participation in the decision-making process. This is observed for all types of universities, whether public or private or small or large, as shown in Table 9.

All Palestinian universities, both public and private, had a high perceived level of Autonomy that seemed to be focused on the freedom regarding recruitment policies, establishing student fees, use of financial resources, and human resources policies and management. However, Palestinian universities showed less autonomy in developing curricula and new programs. Given the critical importance that academic autonomy has in innovation, there are important issues to be discussed regarding what is driving this low academic autonomy. This could be related to the need to limit the number of programs offered, but there must be a balance between having the freedom to innovate and meeting national goals.

As Palestinian universities are classified such that public universities are not governmental universities, it was difficult to replicate the public-private analysis used in the other survey countries: the Palestinian sample had no governmental universities. This explains why there are no civil servants in public universities (although there are in private not-for-profit universities), and why public universities reported receiving less public funding than private not-for-profit universities.

One of the outstanding features of the Palestinian university system is the low level of state participation. This is understandable, given the peculiarities of the Palestinian Authority. In contrast, the governing boards have notoriously high

**FIGURE 29****Self-perception and questionnaire results of Palestinian universities**

power. They seem to be the key governing bodies of tertiary institutions, and are independent and not accountable to any higher order organization or entity. This situation is observed only in Palestine, in part explained by the unique status of the Palestinian territories, where institutional development and, in particular, state-type institutions are challenged by the overall political and economic environment.


**TABLE 9** Palestine: Average self-perception and questionnaire results by dimension and university characteristic

	Legal orientation			Size			Age			Localization			Type		
	Private for profit	Private, not for profit	Public	Large	Medium	Small	Old	Recent	Capital	Province	General	Religious	Specialized	Open University	Total
<b>Self-Assessment</b>															
Mission	4.0	4.8	—	4.8	4.5	4.7	4.8	4.3	4.7	—	4.7	4.0	5.0	5.0	4.7
Management	3.0	2.9	—	3.3	3.5	2.0	3.0	2.7	2.9	—	2.8	3.0	2.0	4.0	2.9
Autonomy	4.0	4.9	—	5.0	5.0	4.3	4.8	4.7	4.8	—	4.8	5.0	4.0	5.0	4.8
Accountability	4.0	4.6	—	4.5	4.5	4.7	4.7	4.3	4.6	—	4.5	4.0	5.0	5.0	4.6
Participation	4.0	3.0	—	3.0	4.0	2.7	3.3	2.7	3.1	—	3.0	3.0	2.0	5.0	3.1
<b>Screening Card</b>															
Mission	2.8	3.1	—	2.9	3.5	3.0	2.8	3.6	3.1	—	3.4	2.3	3.5	1.6	3.1
Management	4.8	3.4	—	3.5	3.2	4.1	3.6	3.6	3.6	—	3.6	3.4	3.8	3.7	3.6
Autonomy	3.2	4.0	—	3.8	4.0	3.9	4.2	3.4	3.9	—	3.7	4.2	4.2	4.1	3.9
Accountability	2.9	3.7	—	3.5	4.1	3.5	3.7	3.6	3.6	—	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.8	3.6
Participation	0.9	1.5	—	1.5	0.9	1.7	1.7	0.9	1.4	—	1.2	1.5	2.9	1.3	1.4

## Dimension 1 – Context, Mission, and Goals

Defining the university or university system mission and goals, or more accurately the appropriate *mission mix*, is a fundamental governance question that requires a thorough discussion and analysis on topics such as whether: the mission of the institution should be focused on applied or basic research; the focus should have an international, regional, or local emphasis; or the mission is to train scholars and academics, to train productive workers and employees, or to educate young adults for citizenship and their place in society. As shown in Figure 30, the university mission was formally stated in only 66 percent of the institutions in the Palestinian sample. In the majority of cases, the actors involved in the process of defining the mission and goals included university representatives, private sector and industry representatives, and civil society. The state was involved in only 50 percent of cases, and in a few cases the unions were involved. Overall, universities seemed to follow a process involving different stakeholders. However, the definition of goals did not seem to distinguish between training and educated young people and conducting research. The lack of differentiation between these functions could be a limiting factor in defining clear missions for different types of universities.

Setting a clear mission for a university is critical for defining the type of institution being developed and for establishing clear and aligned goals and



objectives. Although Palestinian universities realized that they were not research universities, they still wanted to do research. The implication is that they will need the necessary financial resources. Defining the mission of a university as either a research or teaching institution determines the staff composition and workload, as well as the incentives to perform. Developing incentive structures set around publishing research may not make sense for non-research universities; their emphasis should instead be to promote teaching talent. Given that some universities did not state their mission formally, and in particular private for-profit universities, this is an important challenge to overcome. A collective discussion to establish priorities for the country as a whole, accepting that not all institutions need to be involved in doing research or offer graduate programs, would be constructive.

The governing boards and university presidents were in charge of monitoring the goals of the institutions in every university studied in Palestine. In 70 percent of the cases, university representatives such as academic councils were also involved. In only two public universities, the state was involved in monitoring achievement of the university goals. In all cases, this was done through assessment reports conducted by the university's governing board. The questionnaire did not go into the details of how these assessments are done; however, at the Cairo workshop it became clear that several different levels are involved in preparing annual reports in all Palestinian universities. Deans have to produce their own reports, and academic staff are evaluated by students and need to produce their own assessment reports validated by their deans. It seems that Palestinian universities are following good practices established by the QIF/ WB funded project; these merit dissemination as examples for others to follow. Given the importance that these assessment reports have for monitoring universities' results, more information on how they are used and the extent to which they are aligned with evaluating the achievement of objectives would be useful.

## Dimension 2 – Management Orientation

Palestinian universities' governing boards played a key role in Management Orientation, more so than any other governing body. They were also responsible for selecting the president of the universities in all cases, but did not follow a competitive process, with the exception of one university. In two cases, senior academic staff were consulted by the governing board during the selection process. With one exception, universities reported that the president must have a managerial profile and that he/she could be recruited from outside of the university. In all

cases, candidates were required to present a strategic plan. A similar process was followed for the selection of deans, although deans were not required to prepare strategic plans.

Members of university governing boards were always appointed, and the president and board were the main stakeholders in this appointment. Some of the current governing boards for Palestinian universities were elected more than ten years ago, and the process by which they were established is not formally available. Given the importance that governing boards have for Palestinian universities, it is important to understand how they were established. The questionnaire did not elicit information on the actors involved, or the process followed, in appointing the governing boards.

**TABLE 10** Composition of staff in Palestinian universities

Composition of the Staff	Legal orientation		
	Private for profit	Private, not for profit	Total
<b>21. What is the composition of the overall staff in terms of:</b>			
Administrative staff (as opposed to Academic)	25.0%	55.8%	52.4%
Administrative Senior Staff as oppose to all staff	7.0%	4.7%	5.0%
Academic Senior Staff as opposed to all staff	0.0%	7.2%	6.4%
<b>22. What is the composition of the administrative staff in terms of:</b>			
Civil servants (e.g. employed by the State)	0.0%	11.3%	10.0
Part-time contracts	2.0%	12.8%	11.6%
Fixed-term contracts	98.0%	70.9%	73.9%
<b>23. What is the composition of the academic staff in terms of:</b>			
Civil servants (e.g. employed by the State)	0.0%	10.0%	8.9%
Part-time contracts	10.0%	25.3%	23.6%
Fixed-term contracts	90.0%	58.5%	62.0%
<b>24. What is the composition of the academic staff in terms of:</b>			
PhD Holders	55.0%	53.3%	53.5%
PhD holders having more than 10 years of service at the University	3.0%	27.8%	25.0%
PhD holders having more than 10 years of service in a managerial position	1.0%	7.4%	6.7%

In terms of managerial decisions and procedures for monitoring and rewarding staff, in most cases reporting procedures and standardized sanctions for misconduct were in place. The use of scorecards was reported in only a few cases, and in only 50 percent of Palestinian institutions were compensation and salaries attached to performance.

There were important differences between private for-profit and not-for-profit universities in staff composition. At private for-profit institutions, the ratio of administrative staff to academic staff was 25:75, while in private not-for-profit institutions, administrative staff comprised 56 percent of all staff.

Other aspects of modern-market oriented policies are: the level of monitoring of goals and results; the use of instruments such as score cards; the degree of freedom for recruitment of staff; and the extent to which compensation and salaries are used to reward well-performing staff. Many of these elements were present in the surveyed Palestinian universities, as all of them reported the use of assessment reports (in itself a measure of modern management). The low percentage of civil servants and the high percentage of fixed-term contracts give room to implement linkages between performance, recruitment, and career development.

### Dimension 3 – Autonomy

There was a difference in the academic autonomy of public and private universities, although in Palestine, universities classified as private not-for-profit resemble public universities in many regards, as discussed already. In the sample, only one private not-for-profit university had the autonomy to define its curriculum. All universities reported not having the autonomy to introduce new programs, although one of the public universities gave a positive response to this question. All universities had autonomy to assess student-learning outcomes and to engage in partnerships with other universities.

All private not-for-profit universities had the autonomy to define their admission policies and to determine the overall number of students to enroll as well as the number of students per program. Only one public university stated the same level of autonomy, and the private for-profit university stated no autonomy in this regard.

Palestinian universities seemed to have much more autonomy in HR management than universities in other survey countries. In all cases, they had the autonomy to hire and fire staff and to develop staff development and training programs. In all cases, they had the autonomy to evaluate staff performance, and

in 50 percent of cases they had the possibility to link salaries to performance (although none had the autonomy to set salaries).

Palestinian universities relied up to 90 percent on student fees, even in public universities. Consequently, they had the autonomy to allocate resources, manage their own resources, and use multi-year budgeting. However, only 12 percent (all private not-for-profit) reported sources of revenue other than student fees. It would seem that given this financial autonomy, they could be more proactive in developing alternative sources of revenue.

## Dimension 4 – Accountability

### Education Quality and Academic Integrity

In this area, Palestinian universities gave consistently positive responses, and it was clear that quality assurance (QA) systems were in place. All universities had an internal QA system, but there seemed to be a mixed perception regarding whether or not the government QA system is operational. Although all universities stated that there is an accreditation system in place, only 50 percent of institutions stated that a QA function is carried out by the government or an independent agency. The discussion at the Cairo workshop clarified that the QA system is mainly concerned with accreditation of programs, which is mandatory. Other QA functions are only carried if there are funds available through international cooperation projects, such as the World Bank-funded Tertiary Education Project (TEP). It is important to follow up on the role of the QA agency, its governance, and how it serves the interests of Palestinian universities. It is worth noting that in all cases, there were mechanisms in place to follow up on academic quality evaluation results, as shown in Table 11.

**TABLE 11** **Palestine: Education quality and academic integrity**  
(% of positive response)

34. What are the mechanisms used to follow up on evaluations' results?	Legal orientation		
	Private for profit	Private, not for profit	Total
Action Plans are followed by Internal QA units	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Action Plans are followed by Deans	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Action Plans are followed by the head of the university	100.0%	87.5%	88.9%
The Action Plans are regularly reviewed (every 2 years or more)	100.0%	87.5%	88.9%
Variable budget allocations are linked with results	100.0%	12.5%	22.2%

TABLE 12

## Palestine: State participation in review of budgets by type of university

39. Are the budget documents available and/or reviewed by the following actors:	Legal orientation		
	Private for profit	Private, not for profit	Total
State (MoE, responsible agency)	100.0%	37.5%	44.4%
Academic staff	0.0%	50.0%	44.4%
Administrative staff	0.0%	87.5%	77.8%
Students	0.0%	12.5%	11.1%
Medias, public audience	0.0%	25.0%	22.2%

### Social Responsibility and Transparency

About 50 percent of institutions had conducted surveys to learn the employment status of new graduates, although information such as salaries or unemployment periods was rarely collected. Most universities stated that they conducted market studies to understand demand.

Information about the budget was known mostly to administrative staff. Private for-profit universities reported that the budget was shared with the state, while 50 percent of private not-for-profit universities reported that they made their budgets available to the state (as did the private for-profit university). These counterintuitive results are again explained by the fact that Palestinian public universities are non-governmental.

### Financial Integrity

All universities reported having external audits conducted on a yearly basis, and procedures were in place for misuse or misappropriation of funds.

## Dimension 5 – Participation

Student voices seemed to be represented well in university decision-making. At least 50 percent of universities reported that students had a voice in the elaboration of the strategy, and they were represented in the academic and administrative councils on a consultative basis.

## Conclusions

Palestinian university leaders seemed to have a high level of autonomy to manage their institutions. They were mainly accountable to governing boards, and the state played no role in defining the university mission or goals. These are important elements in the definition of university autonomy. Universities in general seemed to have good mechanisms for accountability. There were important differences between public and private institutions, some of which did not follow the regional or international trends given that in Palestine, public universities are non-governmental.

One other aspect that stood out was that the state had a low profile in university management compared to other countries in the region. In this regard, Palestinian universities gave consistently positive responses to the issue of QA. All universities had an internal QA system, and there seemed to be a mixed perception about whether the government QA system is operational. Although all universities stated that there is an accreditation system in place, only 50 percent of institutions stated that there is a QA function carried by the government or an independent agency. Given that this is a key role that the state can promote, in particular when private provision is encouraged and regulations and standards are needed, it is important to follow up on the role the QA agency is playing and how is it serving the interests of Palestinian universities and students.

Several best practice examples emerged from the benchmarking on Palestinian universities. Regarding accountability and evaluation of academic staff, standard procedures were followed by all institutions. More information on these reports and how they are prepared should be made available to others.

Given that the Palestinian Quality Assurance System seems to be following international best practices, the QA agency should also adhere to international standards. It is easier to build trust between agencies when there are some common standards to assess the authenticity and integrity of an accreditation agency. The U.S. Department of Education has benchmarks to guide its recognition processes of the numerous national, regional, and programmatic accrediting agencies. The following principles, drawn from those benchmarks and from good administrative practice, could be the basis of a QA framework. That is, to be successful, an accreditation agency must adopt the following core operating principles:

- The agency should be singular in purpose; i.e., involved only in QA and not in the design or delivery of educational programs;

- The agency should have sufficient intellectual and fiscal capacity; i.e., be solvent and appropriately staffed;
- The agency should be separate and independent, not subject to direction or control in accreditation decisions by state funding agencies;
- The agency should be not-for-profit;
- The agency should be accepted by peer agencies, the academic community, employers, and relevant professionals;
- The agency should encourage public participation and transparency in governance;
- The agency should maintain accurate and open records of accreditation decisions; and
- The agency should be experienced and recognized for its work in the region, discipline, or programs of study.

Finally, one recommendation made at the Cairo workshop to the World Bank was to provide best practice models for non-research universities and community colleges.



# CHAPTER 5


## Morocco Country Report

The charts in Figure 31 incorporate the self-perception and Screening Card results of all Moroccan universities surveyed, while the distribution of the self-perception and Screening Card results by category of universities are shown in Table 13. The results show certain features:

There was relative homogeneity overall, except in the Participation dimension. The differences between the self-perception and the questionnaire results were also relatively consistent. Nevertheless, despite the legal framework defined under the 01/00 law for Moroccan public universities (only a few implementation texts are still lacking and the overall scope for interpretation of the texts is relatively limited), differences were noted, particularly between larger and smaller universities and between newer and older universities. Overall, newer universities perceived themselves more accurately and obtained better results than did older universities.

There was low participation overall (1.7), and a significant difference between the self-perception and the questionnaire results. The variance between the self-perception and the questionnaire score was 2.4, more than double that of the other dimensions' variances. This variance was highest for the smaller universities. The questionnaire asked only about the formal representation of participants; it is possible that because of their size, smaller universities were governed in a more informal manner compared to larger establishments (where such management would inevitably be synonymous with conservatism and patronage due to the number of voices present) and that the questionnaire did not capture this.

**FIGURE 31** Overall self-perception and questionnaire results for Morocco



**TABLE 13** Self-perception and questionnaire results by category of university in Morocco


Self-perception	Size			Age	
	Large	Medium	Small	Old	New
Mission	4.4	4.3	4.4	4.5	4.2
Management	2.6	3.3	2.8	2.4	3.3
Autonomy	3.5	3.2	3.5	3.3	3.5
Accountability	4.2	4.4	4.3	4.3	4.3
Participation	2.9	3.4	3.0	2.9	3.3
<b>Screening card</b>					
Mission	3.4	3.8	3.6	3.6	3.6
Management	3.6	3.3	3.4	3.5	3.4
Autonomy	2.9	3.1	3.3	3.0	3.3
Accountability	3.0	3.0	2.9	3.0	3.0
Participation	1.7	1.3	1.1	1.5	1.1

Note: Green: lowest; red: highest.

A more traditional perception of management existed than the results would imply. The questionnaire results were lower than the self-perception results for all dimensions except Management Orientation. Universities perceived their own

**FIGURE 32**

**Visual presentation of self-perception and questionnaire results for all Moroccan universities**



management style as being more traditional than it actually was. This difference was more prominent for the larger and older universities.

Figure 32 shows the results by university and by dimension. The colors vary according to scores, going from dark red (close to 0) to dark blue (close to 5). A number of comments can be made based on Figure 32:

- i. *Self-perception*: Moroccan universities were quite similar to one another except in three cases, one of which is particularly significant (the public university has a unique legal statute which explains its different governance model), as represented by the red spot in the middle.
- ii. *Screening Cards*:

- The two public universities had significantly different results from the others: one has a special legal status as described above, which explains this difference.
  - The results for participation were generally low, which may be related either to the level of participation in Moroccan universities or the structure of the questionnaire. Only a detailed analysis would confirm either of these assumptions.
- iii. *Difference between self-perception and Screening Card results:* the red zones on the management axis in the self-perception graph are difficult to explain. The questionnaire results for participation were clearly less than those from the self-perception. Only one university showed a blue zone in this dimension.

The individual self-perceptions and Screening Cards shown in Annex 5 reflect these differences. While most universities presented the same form overall, two (in particular) deviated from this standard.

## Dimension 1 – Context, Mission, and Goals

The great majority (89 percent) of Moroccan universities mentioned having general, formally established mission statements. Only the larger universities (67 percent) and the older universities (75 percent) did not respond unanimously.

TABLE 14

Who participates in drawing up Moroccan universities' general mission statements?

	Morocco						All countries
	Size			Age		Total	
	Larger	Medium	Smaller	Older	Newer		
State – national	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	80%
State – regional	33%	50%	25%	75%	0%	33%	28%
Civil society	67%	50%	100%	100%	60%	78%	58%
Private sector	100%	100%	75%	100%	80%	89%	68%
Universities	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	85%
Unions	100%	100%	75%	100%	80%	89%	43%

Note: Blue: lowest; red: highest.

Table 14 details the responses regarding participants involved in the preparation of mission statements. Participation generally appears to have been broad (state at the national level, universities, unions, private sector, and civil society), probably due to the state’s desire to involve stakeholders in the drafting of the various reform texts (national charter and the 01/00 law). Moroccan universities were unanimous about their participation in the process as well as about that of the state at the national level. While the former appears related to the previous explanation, the latter may be a reflection of the significantly centralized nature of the Moroccan state.

In Morocco, a large majority of universities (89 percent) maintained that their goals were formalized. Only a minority of the larger and older universities did not share this perception. These responses are in line with those given previously for the formalization of their mission and may be explained by the composition of the Moroccan sample, which was significantly dominated by public universities.

All universities reported that university leaders and boards were in charge of monitoring the realization of these goals. Again, probably because of its centralized nature, the state was also seen as responsible for monitoring (90 percent of universities); only the smaller and newer universities did not respond unanimously. Perhaps these have more rapidly felt the impacts of the 2009–12 emergency plan aimed at giving universities more autonomy but also making them accountable. In addition, only the smaller universities (75 percent) said that a committee or a board was responsible for monitoring the realization of the goals of universities (see Table 15).

**TABLE 15** Which actors are responsible for monitoring the realization of the specific goals of Moroccan universities?

	Morocco						All countries
	Size			Age		Total	
	Larger	Medium	Smaller	Older	Newer		
State	100%	100%	75%	100%	80%	89%	70%
University leaders	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	95%
Commission or social committee	0%	0%	75%	25%	40%	33%	23%
Managers	0%	100%	25%	25%	40%	33%	55%
University board	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	90%
Other boards	33%	100%	100%	50%	100%	78%	75%

Note: Blue: lowest; red: highest.

## Dimension 2 – Management Orientation

The questionnaire identified four mechanisms for monitoring the strategy of universities: quantitative studies producing data on the performance of the institution; evaluation reports issued by the board of directors; evaluation reports issued by the state; and evaluation reports issued by an independent agency. Moroccan universities unanimously stated that evaluation reports issued by the state were the most important. Three other elements may be noted: (i) reports issued by an independent agency were only mentioned by the larger and newer universities—probably because of the cost and complexity of such evaluations, and the more innovative nature of the newer universities; (ii) the quantitative studies producing data on the performance of the institution seemed to concern the newer universities much more than the older universities, also perhaps because of their innovative nature; (iii) Moroccan universities seemed to be behind compared to the average of the countries studied, showing a relatively significant lag in independent evaluation (with the exception of state reports). This situation could nevertheless change rapidly with implementation of the monitoring process provided for in the 2009–12 emergency plan.

### *Selection of Decision-Makers*

The selection process for university presidents was perceived in a relatively uniform manner and was consistently understood: a call for candidates is launched; candidates present a project to a panel comprising representatives of the various stakeholders (state, university, academic staff, etc.); and the panel selects three of the candidates and proposes them to the royal cabinet, who then appoints the new president. It is therefore a government appointment, conducted on a competitive basis following a nomination by a selection committee. Similarly, those involved in the process were relatively well defined. On the other hand, while universities agreed on the general terms and conditions of the position,<sup>18</sup> opinion was more divided as to whether the candidate may be external to the university or whether he/she should correspond to a precise job description. Universities agreed on a limited number of terms but the phrase “term of appointment less

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<sup>18</sup> E.g., the candidate does not necessarily come from academia; has a managerial profile; is not necessarily a member of a political party; and presents a strategic vision (the aforementioned project) for the university.

than four years” seemed to have been misunderstood, despite clarifications provided before and during the interviews.<sup>19</sup>

Responses related to the selection of deans and participants involved in the process were relatively similar. Perception of the terms and conditions to obtain the post gave rise to more varied responses, such as the term of appointment (the number of renewals was well defined)—probably for the aforementioned reason.

Finally, it was reported that university board members are appointed and elected according to their association with a political party or region of the country. Certain local elected representatives are appointed automatically (but elected by their constituency) and student representatives are elected directly by their peers.

### *Staff Performance and Evaluation*

Table 16 on the next page shows that Moroccan universities lagged in the use of formal management tools compared to the other countries surveyed, with the exception of the use of scorecards, a consequence of the 2009–12 emergency plan.

The difference was particularly marked in the use of variable salaries linked to performance. The sample of Moroccan universities comprised almost entirely public institutions, in which public servants are subject to the country’s traditional and relatively rigid public service system. Moreover, 87 percent of their academic staff and 76 percent of their administrative staff are public servants. Part-time and fixed-term contracts were very much in the minority and it became clear during interviews that the majority of temporary staff in public universities were teachers from other public institutions (teachers of foreign languages, special teachers from other public universities, etc.), who were also public servants. Nevertheless, despite this rigid framework, certain newer universities (between 20 and 40 percent) and those of average size (50 percent) had succeeded in introducing variable salaries to varying degrees, and particularly within their finance departments.

Compared to the smaller and newer universities, the larger and older universities generally had more systems requiring proof of expenses and standardized sanctions for misconduct, probably a reflection of more formal internal rules.

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<sup>19</sup> The term of appointment is four years exactly, but it is possible that “less than four years” has been come to be understood over time as “four years or less.”

TABLE 16

## What management tools are used to motivate or manage staff in these departments?

	Morocco						All countries
	Size			Age			
	Large	Medium	Small	Old	New	Total	Total
<b>If there is a quality assurance system, what form does it take?</b>							
Internal to the university	100%	100%	75%	75%	100%	89%	83%
External, under the control of the government	33%	100%	50%	50%	60%	56%	38%
External, under the control of an independent agency	33%	50%	0%	50%	0%	22%	30%
<b>If a quality assurance system exists, does it include the following elements?</b>							
University accreditation	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	40%
Program accreditation	67%	50%	75%	50%	80%	67%	57%
Evaluation of education results	33%	100%	50%	50%	60%	56%	70%
Teaching methodology	33%	100%	25%	50%	40%	44%	65%
Research work	67%	100%	75%	50%	60%	78%	63%
Equipment	33%	100%	50%	50%	60%	56%	65%
<b>What mechanisms are used to follow up evaluation results</b>							
Action plans monitored by internal quality assurance units	100%	50%	50%	50%	80%	67%	70%
Action plans monitored by deans	100%	100%	50%	75%	80%	78%	78%
Action plans monitored by leaders	100%	100%	50%	75%	80%	78%	70%
Action plans regularly reviewed (at least every two years)	100%	100%	75%	75%	100%	89%	70%
Variable budget allocations are related to results	33%	100%	50%	50%	60%	56%	38%
<b>Are there standardized sanctions in place (and enforced) against:</b>							
Examination misconduct	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	95%
Academic staff misconduct	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	80%
Corruption of admissions procedures	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	65%
Unethical career advancements	100%	100%	75%	75%	100%	89%	58%

Note: Blue: lowest; red: highest.

### Composition of Staff

Moroccan academic staff appeared more qualified (a 26.5 percent higher tendency to have a Ph.D.) and more experienced (29.1 percent higher proportion

of Ph.D.'s with more than ten years of experience) than the average of the countries surveyed. The proportion of administrative staff (44.7 percent) was similar to the overall average (48.8 percent), but 64.9 percent of administrative staff and 33.9 percent of academic staff were in management, more than double the rates in the other countries studied (30.9 percent and 15.1 percent, respectively). This could be related to the greater experience required and/or the definition of management status in accordance with a public service grade.

### Dimension 3 – Autonomy

The prior limit dictated by the structure of the sample for Moroccan universities and the single private university representative inevitably influenced the results for the autonomy dimension. In reality, the public sector system is generally stricter and includes fewer freedoms because of the larger direct state funding and the associated obligations.

#### *Academic Autonomy*

The structure of courses and programs is centralized under direct government control. However, around half the universities said that they had autonomy in the area of student evaluation and two-thirds had autonomy in setting up academic partnerships.

Over two-thirds of Moroccan universities also claimed to be able to choose the number of students admitted and to control the admission process for at least a third of their study programs.<sup>20</sup>

#### *Human Resources Autonomy*

Autonomy was minimal in this area, in line with the Moroccan public service legal statute. Autonomy was limited to training and partial evaluation of staff. Only a few newer universities claimed to be able to recruit and dismiss staff or even set variable salaries—but they were still very much the minority. Currently, any disciplinary procedure against a public servant involves the university calling upon

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<sup>20</sup> Most of the Moroccan universities studied include a group of subjects both with and without student graduation quotas. As it was impossible to reflect the two scenarios at the same time in the questionnaire, the survey staff focused on the maximum autonomy of the universities. Put another way, responses favored autonomy from the moment a subject or program gave rise to independent selection.

a government committee and therefore invoking a set of rules and regulations largely external to the university. Finally, any salary change must comply with the pre-established national salary scale for the Moroccan public service.

### *Financial Autonomy*

The state provides 71 percent of university income, much more than the 10 percent of income from student fees. Other sources of funding are negligible for the moment. In the context of recent reforms, this is understandable in the sense that universities are only beginning to discover the advantages (and necessity) of a greater diversity of funding sources, a freedom acquired as a result of the 01/00 law. If this survey on university governance is continued in coming years, an increase in non-governmental resources can be expected. In the future, the questionnaire could sub-divide state funds according to their payment mechanisms to determine changes in fixed and variable components (for example, derived from competitive funding or even linked to results) of university budgets coming from the state.

Financial autonomy appeared to be fully established in: (i) retention and reuse of excess funds from one year to another; (ii) detailed allocation of the budget from a global allocation; and (iii) expense programs over a number of years, with the exception of a few larger and historic universities. The distinction between historic and newer universities was also marked in terms of management of assets and the definition of the structure of income.

## **Dimension 4 – Accountability**

### *Education Quality and Academic Integrity*

Although QA systems were principally internal to the universities (89 percent), nevertheless over half (56 percent) of the institutions considered the government to also have a role to play. Only a minority mentioned a QA system managed by an independent agency. Despite plans in this area, Morocco currently still has no such agency. Moreover, several universities reported that the QA system covered research work (78 percent), the accreditation of programs (67 percent), the evaluation of education outcomes and facilities (56 percent for both), and, to a lesser extent, the teaching methodology (44 percent). Only accreditation of universities was not mentioned because this continues to be the responsibility of government.

With the exception of smaller universities that probably have informal methods, monitoring of evaluations was carried out principally by the deans, university leaders, and internal QA units (mostly for the larger and newer universities). Three-quarters of universities interviewed review their action plans at least every two years and more than half mentioned variable results-based budgetary

**TABLE 17** Education quality and academic integrity in Moroccan universities

	Morocco						All countries Total
	Size			Age		Total	
	Larger	Medium	Smaller	Older	Newer		
<b>If there is a quality assurance system, what form does it take?</b>							
Internal to the university	100%	100%	75%	75%	100%	89%	83%
External, under the control of the government	33%	100%	50%	50%	60%	56%	38%
External, under the control of an independent agency	33%	50%	0%	50%	0%	22%	30%
<b>If a quality assurance system exists, does it include the following elements?</b>							
University accreditation	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	40%
Program accreditation	67%	50%	75%	50%	80%	67%	57%
Evaluation of education results	33%	100%	50%	50%	60%	56%	70%
Teaching methodology	33%	100%	25%	50%	40%	44%	65%
Research work	67%	100%	75%	50%	60%	78%	63%
Equipment	33%	100%	50%	50%	60%	56%	65%
<b>What mechanisms are used to follow up evaluation results</b>							
Action plans monitored by internal quality assurance units	100%	50%	50%	50%	80%	67%	70%
Action plans monitored by deans	100%	100%	50%	75%	80%	78%	78%
Action plans monitored by leaders	100%	100%	50%	75%	80%	78%	70%
Action plans regularly reviewed (at least every two years)	100%	100%	75%	75%	100%	89%	70%
Variable budget allocations are related to results	33%	100%	50%	50%	60%	56%	38%
<b>Are there standardized sanctions in place (and enforced) against:</b>							
Examination misconduct	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	95%
Academic staff misconduct	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	80%
Corruption of admissions procedures	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	65%
Unethical career advancements	100%	100%	75%	75%	100%	89%	58%

Note: Blue: lowest; red: highest.

allocations. This corresponds to the wish expressed in the 2009–12 emergency plan to give universities greater responsibility by increasing the variable component of higher education budgets.

In the area of standardized sanctions, Moroccan universities scored virtually 100 percent in all sub-categories: examination and academic staff misconduct, abuse of terms, and conditions of admissions and career advancement contrary to ethical principles.

### *Social Responsibility and Transparency*

Following the 2009–12 emergency plans, Moroccan universities established statistical surveys in almost all areas of student monitoring, with the exception of graduate salary levels. Nevertheless, differences were noted between the older (apparently less advanced in survey methodology) and newer universities.

Generally, broad and open communication of results in Morocco was relatively infrequent: universities did not communicate their results at all on their websites (compared to 40 percent on average across the four survey countries), but instead communicated mainly through reports made publicly available, communication bulletins, and brochures. Once again, older universities were less innovative than newer ones; this same trend was also observed between larger universities and medium- and smaller-sized ones. Moroccan universities, however, seemed to use the previously mentioned communication media to communicate other aspects of their work, such as their missions and goals, their strategy, and their accreditation process.

Finally, again due to the predominance of public universities in the sample and given the centralized nature of the country, it is mainly the government that reviews budgetary documents. The newer universities reported a tendency to grant access to their budgetary documents to a greater number of categories of staff, as well did the medium-sized universities and, to a much greater extent, the smaller universities, probably because of more informal management (as mentioned previously).

### *Financial Integrity*

Audits of Moroccan universities are conducted on an irregular basis by the Moroccan audit office (*cour des comptes*), which makes its reports public. These are never published by the universities themselves. A majority of universities had formal procedures in place to address financial fraud.

## Dimension 5 – Participation

As the sample only included a single private university, no details are given about the representation of its investors and/or owners for confidentiality reasons.

Moreover, it should be noted that in Morocco the university board is the principal decision-making body, and various combinations of its members meet to discuss particular issues of interest (e.g., academic and administrative subjects, etc.). The members of these sub-groups are volunteers, which may have biased some of the responses given. For example, certain responses to question 44 of the questionnaire (regarding representation in various decision-making bodies other than the university board) and question 45 (regarding appointment/election to different decision-making bodies other than the university board) may have been influenced by this peculiarity. Thus, questions 42 and 43 (existence of formal and active representation, and influence over decision making) and the sub-questions relating to the university board may be more objective measures for evaluating the real level of involvement of various participants.

Finally, in the future, it might be useful to also attempt to gather information on the relative weight (in terms of votes) of each stakeholder, in addition to asking about the simple existence or absence of representation.

### Students

Moroccan universities appear to give a significant place to the participation of student representatives, elected by their peers. Public universities were unanimous in acknowledging a formal and active means of representation, with a large majority (87.5 percent) indicating that their representatives have a right to vote on the university board. Over half the public universities said that students had influence over decisions taken on all subjects contained in the questionnaire, with slightly higher proportions in the newer universities: e.g., definition of the goals of the university was 75 percent compared to 47.5 percent for the average of the countries studied; development of the strategy was 87.5 percent compared to 52.5 percent; budget allocation was 75 percent compared to 22.5 percent; and the type and number of courses was 50 percent compared to 25 percent.

On the other hand, it was reported that students do not attend meetings or vote on purely administrative matters dealing with the management of university staff, probably a voluntary withdrawal as previously described. Moreover, smaller universities reported much lower participation of students in decision-making bodies other than the main university board, again potentially due to self-selection.

## *Alumni*

Generally, Moroccan public universities reported that alumni have no formal and active means of representation, except in the smaller and newer universities (25 percent and 20 percent, respectively). Alumni were also found to have no role in the various decision-making bodies except as noted above.

## *Academic Staff*

Following reforms introduced under the 01/00 law, academic staff are strongly represented in all decision-making bodies and have significant influence. All public universities acknowledged a formal and active method of representation, with a large majority (87.5 percent) indicating that their representatives have a voting right on the university board. Their voice is heard in all areas in 100 percent of universities, except in the type and number of courses, for which one smaller and older university responded in the negative. Moreover, 87.5 percent of public universities confirmed that academic staff representatives have a seat and voting rights in all decision-making bodies.

## *Administrative Staff*

Moroccan public universities unanimously claimed formal and active representation of administrative staff, with a large majority (87.5 percent) indicating that their representatives have a voting right on the university board. Their representation in other diverse bodies was also reported to be very high (between 75 percent and 87.5 percent), and only the smaller universities were not unanimous in this. As discussed earlier, this could be due to voluntary participation, with meeting agendas enabling identification of key subjects for each stakeholder.

## *Private Sector Representatives*

The 01/00 law provides for formal and active representation on university boards in Morocco by the private sector, which is why all public universities mentioned it. The private sector's voice is heard principally in the definition of the goals of the university, the preparation of the strategy, and the allocation of the budget (all at 75 percent), and also, to a lesser extent, on the type and number of courses (50 percent).

Only the larger (66.7 percent) and older (50 percent) public universities mentioned a consultative role of representatives from the private sector on their decision-making bodies, while most newer universities (between 40 and 80 percent according to the institution) and all medium-sized ones mentioned their presence with voting rights.

## Conclusions

The interviews held during the study on university governance enabled similarities between Moroccan public universities to be observed at the national level. The averages obtained for each dimension were relatively uniform, except for those related to participation of the various stakeholders. In this area, the average was comparatively low and also showed a pronounced difference from the self-perception. Furthermore, universities perceived their management as being more traditional than the questionnaire results would suggest.

Among the different universities studied, it appears that three diverge from the standard, in the sense that their questionnaire results were overall relatively similar. One of the three divergent universities was the sole private university surveyed; another has a special legal status, which has obvious impacts in terms of governance. Thus, only one public university showed significantly different characteristics from the others not explained by obvious factors. Given the legislation governing public universities and the highly centralized nature of the Moroccan state—a characteristic found in the analysis of many dimensions—this may appear surprising.

More detailed responses by dimension and by specific question enabled the detection of a few variances, principally those related to the size and age of institutions. Newer universities, for example, more often made use of various modern management techniques compared to longer established universities. Generally, universities of smaller size were less rule-bound; their method of operating seemed to be based to a greater extent on informal exchanges between stakeholders (at different levels and in various fields) than in larger universities. In addition, in certain cases, the size and age of universities were correlated, as often the newer universities were also smaller. In any event, the results show that it is possible to incorporate some innovative elements into the governance of Moroccan public universities.

The results related to participation were generally low for the four countries surveyed. Notwithstanding, participation seems generally to have been broader in Morocco, probably due to the wish of the state to involve stakeholders in the

establishment of various texts for reform (the national charter and the 01/00 law).

To extend the sample of Moroccan universities and to be able to really compare the different methods of governance between public and private institutions, it would be useful to conduct additional interviews with private universities. This would also enable a better comparison with the other countries studied.

Finally, it would be interesting to repeat the interviews in the near future to establish whether the variations observed according to university size and age correspond to a factual difference or to a gradual change in the governance of Moroccan universities. That is, this change could be a consequence of actions undertaken under the framework of the 2009–12 emergency plan; smaller and newer universities could have implemented them more rapidly as a result of their more reactive and flexible structures—a testable hypothesis.

## Egypt Country Report

The scores for the participant institutions from Egypt are displayed in Annex 6. As in the other surveyed countries, the main differences observed in Egypt were between public and private universities. Although there were observable differences based on other criteria (size, age, and location), most of these variations were seen in isolated specific questions and did not have a major impact on the aggregate scores by dimension. Figure 33 on the next page shows the average self-perception scores of public and private universities. It appears that private universities had a better self-image than public universities. Private universities had consistently higher self-perception scores than their public counterparts for each of the five dimensions. The largest gaps were in Management Orientation (public universities scored 2.6 while private universities scored 4.0) and Autonomy (public universities scored 2.6 while private ones scored 4.3).

However, there were not many differences between public and private universities based on the Screening Card results (Figure 34). In fact, public universities had slightly higher scores in some dimensions (Mission and Accountability).

### Dimension 1 – Context, Mission, and Goals


This dimension had the highest scores in both self-perception (4.1) and in the questionnaire (3.6), with a difference of only 0.5. However, some variation appeared in this dimension.

According to the results in Table 18, most participants responded that university representatives have a voice in stating the national universities' mission

**FIGURE 33** Self-perception of private and public universities in Egypt



**FIGURE 34** Screening Card results for private and public universities in Egypt



in Egypt, while 75 percent of respondents said that the state has a voice at the national level. All private universities thought that the state had a role in setting the universities' goals at the national level, while only half of public universities did. This suggests that private universities might feel somewhat constrained by a national formal mission for all universities that leaves them no flexibility to

**TABLE 18** During the elaboration of the Missions of the Universities (on the national level), which actor had a voice?  
(% of positive responses)

Actors	Legal orientation			Size			Age			Location	
	Private for profit	Private, not for profit	Public	Large	Medium	Small	Old	Recent	Capitale	Province	Total
The State, national level	100%	100%	57%	67%	75%	83%	67%	86%	100%	63%	77%
The State, regional level	67%	33%	43%	33%	25%	67%	67%	29%	60%	38%	46%
Civil society representatives	33%	33%	100%	100%	50%	67%	83%	57%	60%	75%	69%
Industry & business representatives	33%	33%	100%	100%	50%	67%	83%	57%	60%	75%	69%
Universities representatives	67%	100%	86%	100%	75%	83%	100%	71%	100%	75%	85%
Syndicates/unions	0%	0%	57%	67%	25%	17%	50%	14%	40%	25%	31%

**TABLE 19****All Egyptian universities think that the national missions are formally stated and that goals are well defined**

	Q1. Misions of universities are formally stated in your country	Q4. Goals of your University formally stated
Egypt	100%	100%
Morocco	88.9%	88.9%
Palestine	66.7%	100%
Tunisia	90%	100%
Total	87.5%	97.5%

incorporate either the business sector or civil society. This might also explain the low levels of participation of civil society and industry and business representatives in the elaboration of the private universities' missions (33 percent) compared to that in public universities (100 percent).

As Table 19 shows, Egyptian universities had a unanimous positive response regarding the existence of a formally stated university mission at the national level, the only survey country for which this was the case. There is an explicit legal mandate organizing all universities in Egypt, and each university mission must have three key "sectors" (education, scientific research, and community service). Alexandria University, for instance, like most participating universities, has a generic mission that addresses these three sectors, but its activities stem from its proximity to the Mediterranean Sea and the desert, focusing on Mediterranean cooperation and desert studies. This suggests that better alignment is needed in Egypt between the formal mission stated by the law and actual individual university goals.

In addition, there is a need for inquiry about implementation of the mission and its permeation throughout the university. Implementing the mission to make it part of the university culture is also an important next step for all Egyptian universities.


## Dimension 2 – Management Orientation

On a scale from 1 for "Traditional Management" to 5 for "New Public Management"<sup>21</sup> (or results-based management), the total average scores of the self-perception of Egyptian universities and the questionnaire results for this axis were

<sup>21</sup> Defined as the transition into more entrepreneurial organizations that enables them to widen their capacity and to use different governing instruments, such as resource allocation, to promote their policies. See: [http://www.mh-lectures.co.uk/npm\\_2.htm](http://www.mh-lectures.co.uk/npm_2.htm)

**FIGURE 35**

**Average score and deviation interval of the self-perception of Management Orientation by university type and country**



very similar (3.4 and 3.5, respectively). However, these averages are not very representative; there is very high variation across the self-perception responses for Management Orientation, mainly due to confusion caused by using the phrase “market orientation versus traditional.” For instance, Egyptian public universities had self-perception scores for their management that ranged from 1 to 5. This high dispersion of responses was witnessed in the other countries studied, but was more common at public institutions, as Figure 35 shows.

Generally speaking, Figure 35 also illustrates the higher tendency of private for-profit universities (which are usually more market-oriented) to adopt NPM, compared to private not-for-profit and public universities.

Given that the Management Orientation dimension encompassed multiple factors (such as strategic process, selection of decision makers, and incentives measures for the staff), it was a relatively difficult dimension for accurate self-perception. Management is key to determining the comprehensive governance structure of an institution; therefore, more analysis is needed to understand why there was relatively high variability in that axis.

### Strategic Process

All interviewed universities had established their own strategies, whether in the form of internal strategic plans, through wide consultations, or partnerships with

the state (mainly for public universities). Regarding the follow-up of the attainment of these strategies, Egyptian universities scored higher positive responses than Morocco and Tunisia, and scored as high as Palestinian universities.

To measure the attainment of institutional goals, all Egyptian universities reported that they conducted quantitative surveys that produce performance data, compared to an average of 85 percent across the four-country group studied. In addition, all of the private universities interviewed used assessment reports conducted by their governing boards, whereas 83.3 percent of public universities did so. Given the importance of these assessment reports, a more in-depth examination of how they are conducted could shed light on the monitoring of universities' results and the extent to which they are aligned with evaluating the achievement of objectives.

As illustrated in Figure 36, private for-profit universities' strategies were assessed by more than one entity (the University Council (100 percent), the state (66.7 percent), and an independent agency (100 percent)), as compared to public universities, which responded with lower frequencies (83.3 percent, 33.3 percent, and 83.3 percent, respectively). One possible explanation for this difference might be the perception that for-profit universities, like any for-profit establishment, are more tightly controlled by external stakeholders.

### *Selection of Decision-Makers*


The way decision-makers are selected was found to be very similar in private and public institutions. For instance, during the study period: (i) none of the interviewed universities chose its leaders (presidents or deans) through an electoral process; (ii) none of the senior academic staff of any of the interviewed universities was involved in the selection process, as the selection was done either by the state<sup>22</sup> (83.3 percent of public universities) or the governing board and the private owners (83.3 percent of private universities); and (iii) all of the presidents and deans of the interviewed universities have renewable mandates. These three observations show that in the pre-revolution context in Egypt, university leaders have held their positions for long periods of time and that they mainly serve either the state's or the private owners' interests, instead of those of stakeholders at large. This was also illustrated in the responses to question Q17.1: one-third of public universities expressed that, prior to the revolution on January 25, 2011, the

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<sup>22</sup> For public universities, it is a decision made by the President of the Republic. Source: Law 49/1972.

FIGURE 36

Elements used to measure the attainment of institutional goals in Egypt



presidents and the deans of their universities were necessarily members of a political party and *“even if they were not already members, they would join the party just after their nomination.”*<sup>23</sup>

*Performance and Evaluation of Staff*


Most of the Egyptian universities that are old and located outside Cairo had a slightly higher tendency to adopt more management and incentive procedures, notably for the human resources and academic departments. As shown in Figure 37, older universities answered positively to nearly every type of measure taken to create incentives and enforce rules, whereas newer universities reported less positively (only 29 percent conducted scorecards for their staff compared to 100 percent in older universities). This phenomenon was also seen when comparing universities located in and outside of Cairo (see Figure 37). Most of the interviewees took the term “scorecard” in the questionnaire to mean regular evaluation processes. However, there was no uniform “scorecard” used by universities.

This can be explained by the greater importance given to these incentives in the salaries of the old and provincial (mostly public) universities to attract or retain

<sup>23</sup> Statement from one of the interviews.

**FIGURE 37**

**Policies used to provide incentives and rules enforced to manage staff by Egyptian universities' location and age**



academic and managerial expertise that might be recruited by an academic institution in the capital with more luxurious facilities.

In addition, there is a significant difference in the wage levels at public and private universities (see Table 20 on the next page). For example, the average monthly net salary of a teaching assistant can vary from 700 EGP at a public university to 2,500 EGP in a private one. This difference highlights the importance of adopting a variable salary, particularly for public and private universities to ensure a competitive environment within the academic community. However, setting a variable salary usually requires a certain level of university autonomy.<sup>24</sup> Notably, many public university staff do not work full time, so the hourly wage rate can actually be even higher for academic staff in public universities. Therefore, there is a need to distinguish between monthly wage and income. Differences also exist between the salaries of foreign and domestic academic staff and their motivation to pursue higher-level degrees.

The majority of academic staff in public universities (82.3 percent) had open-ended contracts, whereas in private for-profit universities, most of them had a fixed-term contract (80 percent). While the contracts in public universities are more secure and less flexible, the amount of variable salary related to performance is relatively low and does not induce a significant incentive to outperform compared to the incentives offered in private universities. For instance, *“When a public university professor publishes a paper in an international review, he will get no more than a lump sum of less than 1000 LE (\$170) as compensation.”*<sup>25</sup>

### Dimension 3 – Autonomy

As seen in Table 21, Autonomy represents a major concern for all universities in Egypt, particularly financial autonomy in public universities. Of the nineteen university functions reviewed, only two were reported by all respondents to be subject to complete autonomy: “assessing the performance of administrative and academic staff” and “developing training programs.” Further, only two universities answered that they had the right to decide the “structure of curricula” and the “introduction of new programs.”

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<sup>24</sup> 50 percent of public universities apply a variable salary compared to 100 percent of private ones.

<sup>25</sup> Statement from one of the interviews.

**TABLE 20** Policies used to provide incentives/enforce rules to manage staff by department

	Legal orientation		Size			Age		Location		
	Private, not for profit	Public	Large	Medium	Small	Old	Recent	Capital	Province	Total
<b>20. What kind of policies to provide incentives/enforcing of rules are used to manage the staff of each department?</b>										
<b>20.1. Human resources department</b>										
Reporting measures	100.0%	33.3%	100.0%	100.0%	50.0%	80.0%	71.4%	50.0%	87.5%	<b>75.0%</b>
Compensations, salaries attached to performance	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	<b>100.0%</b>
Providing justifications for expenditures	66.7%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	83.3%	100.0%	85.7%	100.0%	87.5%	<b>91.7%</b>
Scorecards	66.7%	0.0%	100.0%	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%	28.6%	50.0%	62.5%	<b>58.3%</b>
Standardized sanctions in case of professional misconduct	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	75.0%	100.0%	100.0%	85.7%	100.0%	87.5%	<b>91.7%</b>
<b>20.2. Financial department</b>										
Compensations, salaries attached to performance	100.0%	66.7%	100.0%	75.0%	83.3%	100.0%	71.4%	75.0%	87.5%	<b>83.3%</b>
Reporting measures	100.0%	66.7%	100.0%	100.0%	66.7%	80.0%	85.7%	75.0%	87.5%	<b>83.3%</b>
Providing justifications for expenditures	33.3%	100.0%	100.0%	75.0%	83.3%	80.0%	85.7%	75.0%	87.5%	<b>83.3%</b>
Scorecards	66.7%	0.0%	100.0%	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%	28.6%	50.0%	62.5%	<b>58.3%</b>
Standardized sanctions in case of professional misconduct	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	75.0%	100.0%	100.0%	85.7%	100.0%	87.5%	<b>91.7%</b>

(continued on next page)

**TABLE 20** Policies used to provide incentives/enforce rules to manage staff by department (continued)

20. What kind of policies to provide incentives/enforcing of rules are used to manage the staff of each department?	Legal orientation			Size			Age			Location							
	100.0%	Private for profit	66.7%	100.0%	Large	100.0%	100.0%	83.3%	100.0%	Recent	71.4%	Capital	75.0%	Province	87.5%	Total	
																	Private, not for profit
<b>20.3. Academic department</b>																	
Compensations, salaries attached to performance	100.0%	Private for profit	66.7%	100.0%	Large	100.0%	100.0%	83.3%	100.0%	Recent	71.4%	Capital	75.0%	Province	87.5%	<b>83.3%</b>	
Reporting measures	100.0%	Private, not for profit	66.7%	100.0%	Large	100.0%	100.0%	66.7%	80.0%	Recent	85.7%	Capital	75.0%	Province	87.5%	<b>83.3%</b>	
Providing justifications for expenditures	66.7%	Private for profit	100.0%	100.0%	Large	100.0%	100.0%	83.3%	100.0%	Recent	85.7%	Capital	100.0%	Province	87.5%	<b>91.7%</b>	
Scorecards	66.7%	Private, not for profit	0.0%	100.0%	Large	100.0%	100.0%	50.0%	100.0%	Recent	28.6%	Capital	50.0%	Province	62.5%	<b>58.3%</b>	
Standardized sanctions in case of professional misconduct	100.0%	Private for profit	100.0%	100.0%	Large	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	Recent	85.7%	Capital	100.0%	Province	87.5%	<b>91.7%</b>	

**TABLE 21** Autonomy in Egyptian universities per legal orientation, size, age, and location

	Legal orientation				Size			Age		Location		
	Private for profit	Private not for profit	Public	Public	Large	Medium	Small	Old	Recent	Capital	Province	Total
<b>25-28 Autonomy</b>												
<b>25. Has the university autonomy to decide the:</b>												
Structure of curricula (e.g. type of degrees)	33.3%	0.0%	14.3%	0.0%	0.0%	25.0%	16.7%	0.0%	28.6%	0.0%	25.0%	16.7%
Introduction of new programs	0.0%	0.0%	42.9%	33.3%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	16.7%	28.6%	20.0%	25.0%	16.7%
Types of courses (level, sector, mode)	66.7%	33.3%	57.1%	66.7%	100.0%	100.0%	16.7%	50.0%	57.1%	40.0%	62.5%	50.0%
Number of hours per program per year	66.7%	66.7%	57.1%	66.7%	100.0%	100.0%	33.3%	50.0%	71.4%	60.0%	62.5%	58.3%
Assessment of students (learning outcomes), format of exams	66.7%	66.7%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	66.7%	100.0%	71.4%	80.0%	87.5%	83.3%
Academic partnerships with other institutions	66.7%	33.3%	85.7%	66.7%	66.7%	50.0%	83.3%	66.7%	71.4%	60.0%	75.0%	66.7%
<b>26. Has the University autonomy to determine:</b>												
The overall number of students admitted in the University?	66.7%	33.3%	14.3%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	33.3%	16.7%	42.9%	40.0%	25.0%	33.3%
The number of students per program?	33.3%	66.7%	42.9%	0.0%	0.0%	75.0%	50.0%	16.7%	71.4%	20.0%	62.5%	50.0%
The admission mechanisms (e.g. entry-exams, analysis of academic grades of students)?	66.7%	66.7%	71.4%	66.7%	100.0%	100.0%	50.0%	66.7%	71.4%	60.0%	75.0%	75.0%

(continued on next page)

**TABLE 21** Autonomy in Egyptian universities per legal orientation, size, age, and location *(continued)*

	Legal orientation				Size			Age		Location		
	Private for profit	Private not for profit	Public	Public	Large	Medium	Small	Old	Recent	Capital	Province	Total
<b>25-28 Autonomy</b>												
<b>27. Regarding staffing procedures, has the University autonomy for:</b>												
Hiring new open-ended administrative staff	66.7%	100.0%	42.9%	42.9%	33.3%	75.0%	66.7%	50.0%	71.4%	60.0%	62.5%	<b>66.7%</b>
Dismissing open-ended administrative staff	100.0%	100.0%	57.1%	57.1%	33.3%	100.0%	83.3%	50.0%	100.0%	60.0%	87.5%	<b>83.3%</b>
Hiring open-ended academic staff	100.0%	66.7%	85.7%	85.7%	66.7%	100.0%	83.3%	83.3%	85.7%	60.0%	100.0%	<b>83.3%</b>
Dismissing open-ended academic staff	100.0%	66.7%	71.4%	71.4%	66.7%	75.0%	83.3%	83.3%	71.4%	60.0%	87.5%	<b>75.0%</b>
Developing training programs	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	<b>100.0%</b>
<b>28. Has the University autonomy for :</b>												
Assessing the performance of administrative and academic staff	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	<b>100.0%</b>
Setting the salaries of academic staff	100.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	66.7%	16.7%	71.4%	60.0%	37.5%	<b>50.0%</b>
Setting the salaries of administrative staff	100.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	66.7%	16.7%	71.4%	60.0%	37.5%	<b>50.0%</b>
Setting variable salaries (linked with performance)	100.0%	100.0%	42.9%	42.9%	33.3%	75.0%	83.3%	50.0%	85.7%	80.0%	62.5%	<b>75.0%</b>
Setting the Contracts of administrative staff and academics	100.0%	100.0%	42.9%	42.9%	33.3%	75.0%	83.3%	50.0%	85.7%	80.0%	62.5%	<b>66.7%</b>

## *Human Resources Management and Financial Autonomy*

It is important to note that all private universities believed that they were fully autonomous in setting the salaries of their staff (academic and administrative), whereas none of the public universities thought the same. This is due to the rigid control of the Central Agency for Organization and Management in determining the grade, and consequently the salaries, of all public employees, including university civil servants. In addition, the Ministry of Finance restricts public universities' ability to shift public funds (which represent 63.3 percent of their revenue) across line items, including salaries. According to the World Bank and OECD (2010), salaries constitute about 70 percent of the total public university budget.

All universities have two main sources of funding: one from the Ministry of Higher Education, for which budgetary approval is required by the Ministry, and one "specialized unit" that is made up of self-funding mechanisms, such as fees, grants, and sponsors. Because each funding stream has variable autonomy, based on the proportions of each source as part of the university's total budget, a university may have more or less financial autonomy. For instance, 38 percent of Alexandria University's total budget is based in the specialized unit, so only 62 percent of its total funding requires budgetary approval by the state.

In addition, as seen in Table 22, only one out of six public universities said that it had the autonomy to carry unspent funds from one year to the next; 50 percent responded that they have the freedom to set the level of student fees. While 83.3 percent of public universities answered that they have enough autonomy to manage (buy, sell, or rent) their assets, doing so requires prior approval from the Cabinet of Ministers. Private universities seemed to have a higher degree of freedom; some governmental control might also apply, but with a smaller magnitude. Finally, with the exception of asset management, province-based universities reported having less financial autonomy than their Cairo-based counterparts.

## *Academic Autonomy*

In contrast to financial autonomy, the results show that public and private universities had a common perception of their academic autonomy. Both groups had the same or similar autonomy regarding the introduction of new programs (0 percent for private and 33.3 percent for public) and structure of curricula (both private and public scored 16.7 percent). This is likely because of the similarity between the regulatory procedures and roles of the two higher education councils (the Supreme Council of Universities and the Supreme Council of Private Universities), which

**TABLE 22**

**Question 30: Regarding the Financial Procedures, has the University Autonomy to:**

	Legal orientation				Size			Age		Location		
	Private for profit	Private not for profit	Public		Large	Medium	Small	Old	Recent	Capital	Province	Total
Manage its assets (e.g. sell, buy, rent)	100.0%	66.7%	71.4%	66.7%	66.7%	100.0%	66.7%	66.7%	85.7%	60.0%	87.5%	<b>76.9%</b>
Use unspent funds from one year to another	100.0%	66.7%	14.3%	33.3%	33.3%	25.0%	66.7%	33.3%	57.1%	60.0%	37.5%	<b>46.2%</b>
Set the level of fees	66.7%	66.7%	42.9%	33.3%	33.3%	75.0%	50.0%	33.3%	71.4%	60.0%	50.0%	<b>53.8%</b>
Define the revenue structure of the University (e.g. public/private sources, banks, assets interests, endowments, fees)	66.7%	66.7%	57.1%	66.7%	66.7%	75.0%	50.0%	50.0%	71.4%	80.0%	50.0%	<b>61.5%</b>
Run a deficit	66.7%	66.7%	57.1%	66.7%	66.7%	75.0%	50.0%	50.0%	71.4%	80.0%	50.0%	<b>61.5%</b>
Use a multi-year forecast (e.g. Medium Term Expenditure Framework system)	66.7%	66.7%	57.1%	66.7%	66.7%	75.0%	50.0%	50.0%	71.4%	80.0%	50.0%	<b>61.5%</b>
Choose the budget allocation inside a block-grant budget	66.7%	66.7%	28.6%	0.0%	0.0%	75.0%	50.0%	16.7%	71.4%	60.0%	37.5%	<b>46.2%</b>
Set the bonuses to be paid to private owners (for Private institutions)	66.7%	66.7%	28.6%	33.3%	33.3%	50.0%	50.0%	33.3%	57.1%	60.0%	37.5%	<b>46.2%</b>

both have the right to approve new programs based on certain criteria and quality guidelines. This procedure assures homogeneity and equivalence among the graduates of either public or private programs. Despite this, private universities believed that they had greater flexibility in determining the number of students enrolled than did public universities (50 percent and 16.7 percent, respectively). These numbers are much less than the average scores of the four survey countries (about 75 percent for private and 40 percent for public universities).

## Dimension 4 – Accountability

### *Education Quality and Academic Integrity*

Since its establishment in 2007, the National Quality Assurance & Accreditation Agency in Education (NAQAAE) has been involved in fostering QA mechanisms and practices in both public and private Egyptian universities. Generally speaking, Egyptian universities reported a relatively well-established QA system, particularly in terms of academic accreditation (accreditation of programs, learning outcomes, teaching methodologies, and research production and facilities), in which all public universities have been involved.<sup>26</sup>

As shown in Table 23, the scores were slightly lower for private universities regarding QA for research production (33 percent for private for-profit universities). Most probably this is owed to the lack of research in these types of universities, which are more often concentrated on technical and professional programs that lead to higher levels of employability.

In addition, as in Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia, about 91.7 percent of the respondents said that their QA system takes place inside the university, compared to 50 percent under the responsibility of an independent agency, and 41.7 percent by the government. The internal QA centers in each university and QA units in each faculty were directly linked to the NAQAAE, as Figure 38 shows.

NAQAAE has a major role in higher education policies, particularly in terms of governance. Some respondents considered NAQAAE to be an independent agency because it is independent from the Ministry of Higher Education; on the other hand, some considered it a governmental body since it is controlled by the Council of Ministers. This explains why 41.7 percent of the universities answered positively that the QA system is a government responsibility, and


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<sup>26</sup> Except for institutional licensing (scored only 50 percent for public universities), which is probably not under the mandate of NAQAAE.

**TABLE 23** Forms of QA systems and their role

	Legal orientation			Size			Age			Location	
	Private for profit	Private, not for profit	Public	Large	Medium	Small	Old	Recent	Capital	Province	Total
<b>30. Regarding the financial procedures, has the University autonomy to:</b>											
<b>32. If there is a Quality Assurance system, what is its form:</b>											
It takes place inside the University (e.g. assessing programs, committee, participatory team...)	66.7%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	83.3%	100.0%	85.7%	100.0%	87.5%	<b>91.7%</b>
It takes place outside the university under the responsibility of the Government	33.3%	33.3%	57.1%	66.7%	0.0%	66.7%	66.7%	28.6%	40.0%	50.0%	<b>41.7%</b>
It takes place outside the university under the responsibility of an independent agency	100.0%	33.3%	28.6%	33.3%	50.0%	50.0%	33.3%	57.1%	60.0%	37.5%	<b>50.0%</b>
<b>33. If existent, is/are the QA system(s) to address the following items?</b>											
Institutional licensing	100.0%	66.7%	42.9%	0.0%	100.0%	66.7%	33.3%	85.7%	40.0%	75.0%	<b>66.7%</b>
Accreditation of programs	100.0%	100.0%	85.7%	66.7%	100.0%	100.0%	83.3%	100.0%	80.0%	100.0%	<b>100.0%</b>
Assessing Learning Outcomes	66.7%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	83.3%	100.0%	85.7%	100.0%	87.5%	<b>91.7%</b>
Teaching methodologies	66.7%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	83.3%	100.0%	85.7%	100.0%	87.5%	<b>91.7%</b>
Research production	33.3%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	75.0%	83.3%	83.3%	85.7%	80.0%	87.5%	<b>83.3%</b>
Facilities	66.7%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	83.3%	100.0%	85.7%	100.0%	87.5%	<b>91.7%</b>

**FIGURE 38** The NAQAAE structure vis-à-vis Egyptian universities



Source: El Dessouky 2008.

50 percent answered that it is under the responsibility of an independent agency (see Table 24).

Although Egyptian universities had the highest rate of positive answers concerning the “existence of variable budget allocations linked to results” (58.3 percent, compared to 55.6 percent in Morocco, 22.2 percent in Palestine, and 10 percent in Tunisia), this is still not meeting many respondents’ goals. Only half of public universities and two-thirds of private universities responded positively to this question (Table 24).

If there is a willingness to make budget allocations more decentralized and mission-oriented, then elaborating a specific mission at each university is crucial. Budget allocations would respond to the respective roles and needs of each institution, especially public universities which currently have a very centralized governance system.


### *Social Responsibility and Transparency*

Overall, Egypt had the lowest scores regarding the existence of graduate tracking surveys. Credible information about the average unemployment rates or salaries after graduation was not available in many universities, as only 25 percent of universities sampled had established such mechanisms. Further, only 14 percent of public universities had conducted surveys about average unemployment period after graduation, compared to 40 percent of private universities. Conversely, many of the surveyed public universities answered that it was feasible to disseminate these indicators on their website (71 percent), in publicly disseminated reports (57 percent), and in newsletters and brochures (86 percent). The responses averaged around 40 percent for private universities.

**TABLE 24 Mechanisms used to follow up on evaluation results and standardized sanctions**

	Legal orientation				Size			Age		Location		
	Private for profit	Private for not profit	Public	Public	Large	Medium	Small	Old	Recent	Capital	Province	Total
<b>30. Regarding the financial procedures, has the University autonomy to:</b>												
<b>34. What are the mechanisms used to follow up on evaluations' results?</b>												
Action Plans are followed by Internal QA units	100.0%	66.7%	85.7%	85.7%	66.7%	100.0%	83.3%	83.3%	85.7%	60.0%	100.0%	<b>91.7%</b>
Action Plans are followed by Deans	100.0%	100.0%	71.4%	71.4%	66.7%	100.0%	83.3%	66.7%	100.0%	80.0%	87.5%	<b>91.7%</b>
Action Plans are followed by the head of the university	66.7%	100.0%	71.4%	71.4%	66.7%	100.0%	66.7%	66.7%	85.7%	80.0%	75.0%	<b>83.3%</b>
The Action Plans are regularly reviewed (every 2 years or more)	66.7%	100.0%	57.1%	57.1%	33.3%	100.0%	66.7%	50.0%	85.7%	80.0%	62.5%	<b>75.0%</b>
Variable budget allocations are linked with results	66.7%	66.7%	42.9%	42.9%	33.3%	100.0%	33.3%	33.3%	71.4%	40.0%	62.5%	<b>58.3%</b>
<b>35. Has the university applied standardized sanctions against:</b>												
Examination fraud	100.0%	100.0%	85.7%	85.7%	66.7%	100.0%	100.0%	83.3%	100.0%	80.0%	100.0%	<b>100.0%</b>
Unethical behavior of faculty (sale of exams, nepotism...)	33.3%	66.7%	85.7%	85.7%	66.7%	75.0%	66.7%	66.7%	71.4%	40.0%	87.5%	<b>75.0%</b>
Non compliance with admission standards	33.3%	33.3%	42.9%	42.9%	33.3%	50.0%	33.3%	33.3%	42.9%	0.0%	62.5%	<b>41.7%</b>
Unethical management of faculty careers	33.3%	66.7%	57.1%	57.1%	33.3%	50.0%	66.7%	50.0%	57.1%	40.0%	62.5%	<b>58.3%</b>

**FIGURE 39** Lack of tracking surveys in Egyptian universities




These results highlight the need to promote the use of such tools across all universities to assess the performance and employability of university graduates, one of the main national higher education missions.

In terms of financial transparency, universities reported that budget documents were always available for internal use, although not all internal actors had access to them. For instance, out of all the participant universities, only two public universities responded that budget documents were available and/or reviewed by their academic staff, which is not the case in any private university. As Figure 40 shows, no Egyptian university made its budget documents available to students or the public. In addition, three out of six private universities answered negatively to all questions regarding the availability of their budget documents to any of the abovementioned actors.

## Dimension 5 – Participation

Participation is the main challenge to Egyptian university governance in the post-revolution era. An optimal level of participation must be identified to guarantee: (i) the democratic decision process; (ii) the general interest of all stakeholders; and

**FIGURE 40** Dissemination of budget documents



(iii) the viability of the system within a higher level of transparency and therefore accountability. However, most of the stakeholders were represented in all of the universities. Notable exceptions were alumni, who were missing from private universities, and the private sector and donors, who were missing from public universities.

### Students

All public universities and many of the private universities reported that students were represented by an elected “Student Union.” The latter has embarked on many changes since the revolution and the removal of all political obstacles for candidacies.

Although 83.3 percent of universities reported active and formal student representation, only 41.7 percent were represented on the University Councils and even those had only a consultative role. In addition, only 8.3 percent of student representatives had a voice in budget allocation and 16.7 percent had a voice in the type and number of courses.

### Academic Staff

Academic staff were represented in the majority of influential councils, such as the University Council, Research Council, and Faculty Council. Their role, however,

was relatively marginal: only 25 percent of Egyptian universities responded that academic staff had a voice in determining budget allocation.

### *Administrative Staff*

Administrative staff had twice as much representation as academic staff in the decision-making process concerning budget allocation: 50 percent of participant universities responded that “administrative staff has a voice when it comes to budget allocation.”

### *Alumni*

Although alumni represent a pool of networks and linkages with the professional field, only one-third of universities had formal representation of alumni in the decision-making process. Most of this representation was in the form of alumni associations, which have a very limited role in the managerial operations of the university. None of these associations was represented on any of the councils, although 83 percent of the universities gave their alumni a voice in the definition of the university’s goals. This is low compared to the 95-percent average of alumni participation in administrative councils across the four survey countries.

### *Private Donors/Owners*

Certainly this category was well represented in private universities (especially private for-profit universities) and had an active role in even the managerial process of this type of university. There was an obvious distinction between the three types of legal orientation: In the private for-profit universities, owners were fully represented when it came to the definition of goals, elaboration of the strategy, budget allocation, and even the type and number of courses. However, this role was reduced in private not-for-profit universities where, for instance, only 33 percent responded, “Private owners have an active role in determining the type and number of courses.” This role disappeared in public universities.

In the same context, private owners in private for-profit universities had a vote on all four councils (66.7 percent for the University Council and administrative councils, and 33.3 percent for the academic and research councils). In not-for-profit universities, however, only one out of three answered that private owners had a vote only on its university council. This shows the extent to which there is a

difference between the missions of each type of legal orientation, and the need to adapt the legal framework to serve each one's needs.

### *Private Sector Representatives*

Representation of the private sector in Egyptian universities was equivalent to the average representation in the other three countries, although it was still low considering the importance of having academic outcomes directly linked to the market's professional and research needs. For instance, only 33.3 percent of the Egyptian universities engaged private sector representatives in the definition of the university's goals. Surprisingly, this ratio was the same in private universities. The regional average was 62.5 percent for private for-profit universities; 33.3 percent for not-for-profit universities; and 52.2 percent for public universities.

### **Conclusions**

Governance in Egyptian universities is organized under a law that has not been changed for a long time and that does not respond to universities' critical needs. Most Egyptian universities surveyed faced the same problems, although there were differences in terms of universities' legal orientation (notably private and public universities), location, and age, as seen in the analysis.

The data and analysis suggest that the role of the universities is well defined and known by all university leaders. However, there is a need to integrate all stakeholders in the elaboration of that mission, and more importantly in the monitoring and evaluation of its implementation. Linking the attainment of university goals to budgetary support would add a new perspective to ensure educational quality, especially with the well-established national quality and accreditation system.

NAQAEE has succeeded in making an important shift in the governance of higher education in Egypt. However, there are still no concrete tracking, monitoring, and evaluation tools to assess the quality of higher education output. Surveys and studies should be conducted on students' paths after graduation to measure employability, wages, and living standards to better understand the changes needed to link supply of skills with labor market demands.

The autonomy and accountability dichotomy is one of the major governance concerns for Egyptian universities. Most of the surveyed universities perceived that they had a relatively higher level of accountability than autonomy, while the questionnaire scores showed the opposite. Generally speaking, the Egyptian public higher education system is very centralized, and many universities perceived this

as a major obstacle to more efficient performance, particularly concerning budget allocation.

In addition, the analysis found that academic autonomy was quite low in both private and public universities. It is important to determine how to reach the best level of academic autonomy, one that both ensures quality control of the entire higher education system and allows specificity within each university.

Encouraging a higher level of institutional autonomy and greater engagement from different stakeholders in different strategic decisions requires a shift towards more collaboration and mutual accountability not only between the university and the government, but also among many other actors. Transparency is critical for this mechanism to be effective.

At the time this report was written, all Egyptian public universities were in the middle of their election process. This is the first step to overcoming the very low scores in the participation dimension of governance. At the Cairo workshop where results were discussed, participants speculated about the elections' effects on the president selection process. They expressed hope for a new law that would increase the transparency of the selection process and that would include private universities as well. Further steps are needed in this respect, such as the engagement of other non-academic stakeholders in the decision-making process to facilitate the role of universities given the current socio-economic changes occurring in Egypt.


# ANNEX 1

## Dimensions and Indicators of the Governance Screening Card


### Context, Mission and Goals: Indicators and sub-indicators




## Management Orientation: Indicators and sub-indicators




## Autonomy: Indicators and sub-indicators



## Accountability: Indicators and sub-indicators



## Participation: Indicators and sub-indicators



Note: For each stakeholder, (1) the representation mode and (2) the voice in the decision-making process were evaluated.



## ANNEX 2

# Methodology for Building the University Governance Screening Card

The Screening Card aimed to produce a graphical and synthetic picture of each university's governance practices in a spider chart, with each of the five governance dimensions represented independently. To produce each chart, the concrete situation of each university relative to each of the five dimensions had to be precisely evaluated with a numeric value. The Screening Card's questionnaire was designed specifically to help determine each institution's position along each of the five dimensions.

### Positioning Institutions Along Each Dimension: Questionnaire Design

Governance practices were evaluated on five axes representing the five dimensions. Each axis was formulated in a binary way, with one extremity representing a recent trend (e.g., for the Accountability dimension, the trend was "How much is the university held responsible vis-à-vis its stakeholders?"). Thus, it was possible to position an institution along an axis by performing a diagnosis of the answers to the selected indicators for each dimension described earlier.

The questionnaire had 45 questions and was divided into five parts, corresponding to each axis or dimension. As each axis represented a distinct university governance trend, the questions addressed concrete practices that revealed how closely each institution followed the related trend. For instance, the ten questions for the Accountability axis were designed to measure a university's degree

of accountability based on three indicators: (1) Education Quality Assurance, (2) Social Responsibility, and (3) Financial Integrity. Sub-indicators used to sharpen the analysis included: (1) the existence, contents, and consequences of quality assurance; (2) the dissemination of information and labor insertion surveys; and (3) the frequency and contents of financial audits.

Each question was designed to ensure that the response would help determine how close the institution was to the trend represented by the axis. An example of a “yes or no” question used in the Accountability axis is seen in Figure A2.1:

## From Questions to Indicators to Synthetic Numeric Values: The Weighting System

Since a chart to facilitate comparisons was desired, a numeric value had to be determined for each axis. The questionnaire used the indicators and sub-indicators for each dimension described earlier. Weights were attributed to these indicators to calculate a synthetic numeric value for each dimension. Weighting systems are necessarily subjective, and the system used for the Screening Card was no different, despite best efforts to remain as neutral and clear as possible.

University governance remains a new topic that has so far led to few scientific studies, so quantitative analyses were not available to help prioritize the relative importance of indicators within each axis. Given the lack of scientific basis to justify an elaborate weighting system, it was assumed that each indicator made the same contribution to the numeric value representing the axis. The aggregation

**FIGURE A2.1** Example of an “Accountability” question

**Axis 4: Accountability**  
**(1) Education Quality, Academic Integrity**

33. If existent, is/are the QA system(s) to address the following items?

- I – Institutional licensing
- II – Accreditation of programs
- III – Assessing learning outcomes
- IV – Teaching methodologies
- V – Research production
- VI – Facilities

method can therefore be compared to empirical scoring. A scale of 1 to 5 was used for each axis, and the contribution of each indicator to this maximum score was measured by simply dividing 5 by the number of indicators in the axis.

Figure A2.2 gives an illustration of the process for the Autonomy axis. Since the Autonomy axis had three major indicators, they each had the same weight of 1/3, and each indicator represented the same maximum score of 5/3. Sub-indicators were given equal weight as well. For example, the Academic Autonomy indicator comprised two sub-indicators with equal weights of 1/2.


As a result, the maximum attainable score (number of points and contribution to the maximum of 5) for each question was obtained by dividing the maximum score of the sub-indicator by the number of questions.

Thus, the value attributed to each response given in the questionnaire, coded as 1/0 for a yes/no, can be easily determined by dividing the value of each question by the number of possible answers. Table A2.1 shows an illustration for the answers of the Autonomy sub-indicator “Admission Process”:

The value attributed to a positive answer was then obtained as follows:

$$\frac{5}{\text{Maximum score}} * \frac{1}{3} \text{ Indicator's weight} * \frac{1}{2} \text{ Sub-indicators's weight} * 1 \text{ Number of questions} * \frac{1}{3} \text{ Number of possible answers} = 5/8$$

**FIGURE A2.2** Example of the scoring and weighting process for “Autonomy”



**TABLE A2.1****Example of value and scoring for the sub-indicator “Admission Process”**

<b>Axis</b>	<b>Autonomy</b>
<b>Indicator</b>	Academic Autonomy
<b>Sub-Indicator</b>	Admission Process
<b>Number of questions</b>	1
<b>Number of Possible Answers</b>	3
<b>Value Attributed to Positive Answers</b>	5/18

This system was both the most logical and the most neutral approach, and had the major advantage of making the indicators independent of the number of proposed answers.

This framework was designed to produce spider charts directly from the questionnaire and to populate the large databases that are likely to emerge from the next steps of the benchmarking exercise. The synthetic position of each university was obtained simply by calculating the sum of the answers multiplied by their weight, a precise analysis achievable through the sub-indicators. Assessments on a larger scale (for example, at the country level) are facilitated by the possibility of building large databases of comparable numeric indicators.

## Validation of Instruments


The validation of the instruments followed a three-step approach. First, during a workshop on June 14–15, 2010 in Marseille, the proposed methodology was discussed with participating countries, and the first two parts of the methodology (the dimensions and the set of indicators) were validated. To test the questionnaire and the scoring methodology, a pilot phase took place from June 15 to August 31, 2010, using a sample of universities in Egypt, Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia. The third phase was a large-scale data collection exercise in 41 universities, carried out in 2011. The findings were discussed with representatives of all 41 institutions at a workshop in Cairo in November 2011. This process led to several important lessons on the methodology itself and increased awareness on the importance of governance among the institutions in which it was used. It was also useful for validating the Screening Card’s capacity to identify different models adopted by institutions and for allowing international comparisons.

**TABLE A2.2** Chronology of validation of the tools and methodology

Identification of Governance as an Issue	Concept Note and Methodology Discussed	Pilot Phase Testing the Tools	Data Collection	Data Validation
Marseille Seminar	Marseille Seminar	Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, WB&G	Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, WB&G	Cairo Workshop
December 2009	June 2010	August 2010	November 2010-August 2011	November 2011


Comprehensive representation of the scoring and weighting systems for the four other dimensions is illustrated in Figures A2.3, A2.4, A2.5, and A2.6:

**FIGURE A2.3** Example of the scoring and weighting process for “Context, Mission, and Goals”




**FIGURE A2.4**

**Example of the scoring and weighting process for “Management Orientation”**




**FIGURE A2.5**

**Example of the scoring and weighting process for “Accountability”**




**FIGURE A2.6** Example of the scoring and weighting process for “Participation”



# ANNEX 3


## Self-Perception and Questionnaire Results for Tunisian Universities

### University T01




Although University T01 overestimated its performance, it is in fact characterized by high scores for four of the five axes. This university distinguished itself with a results-based Management style: Human resources are monitored by tools like scorecards and motivated by incentives like salaries attached to performance, and, contrary to most public universities, University T01 considers management skills necessary for positions like president or dean. This university has also implemented a QA system and is accredited by an independent international agency, and it has a very intense Accountability policy. Despite these good practices, the Participation score is very low, meaning not that there is no participation, but that it is not yet formalized. This is an area that the university should improve in the very near future.

## University T02



As a private university, University T02 is characterized by a high Autonomy score, with significant academic, human resources, and financial management autonomy. Accountability, on the other hand, is very low, way below the average Accountability score among private universities and the global average, which contrasts with the university's self-perception. The Participation score is very low but would be improved by including more alumni and private sectors representatives.


## University T03



University T03 has a very low self-perception scores for all five of the axes, which varies greatly from its strong performance for Context, Mission, and Goals and Management Orientation, as reflected in the questionnaire results. The accuracy


of the low Autonomy, Accountability, and Participation scores reveals an acute awareness of the difficulties and challenges it should face in the future.

### University T04




University T04 has an accurate self-perception regarding Context, Mission, and Goals and Management Orientation but an overstated one concerning Participation and Accountability. These axes are common issues in public universities and should be tackled as strategic priorities. In this university, Accountability could be improved by enhancing the QA system and disseminating the results of surveys about students, university performance, and budget and financial documents. Participation could be enhanced by increasing private sector and alumni involvement.

### University T05




University T05 has a globally overstated self-perception, except regarding Management Orientation. In fact, the university has very low results in Autonomy, particularly for academic and human resources management, and in terms of Accountability, the university is currently developing its QA system. The university could also be more inclusive of alumni and private sector representatives.

### University T06




Contrary to its self-image, University T06 has very balanced questionnaire results. In terms of its Management Orientation, the university's most striking features is its very complete strategic process and its follow up, the involvement of the governing board, and a well-developed performance and evaluation system of the staff like scorecards. Developing a QA system and disseminating information about tracking surveys, budget, and financial audit would improve Accountability. This university has a distinctly high Participation score, and it may be able share its best practices with the other universities.

## University T07



University T07's self-perception differs significantly from the final scorecard regarding Management Orientation, Accountability and Participation. Like other universities with similar scores, the university could improve its Accountability score by implementing a QA system and by disseminating tracking surveys, budget, and financial documents. Another theme for Participation, students and alumni have no voice in decision-making.


## University T08



University T08 is characterized by high differences between the self-perception and the scorecard results. It has good results for Context, Mission, and Goals and for Management Orientation, but the university clearly has little awareness of its


performance for four of the five axes. This problem may be solved with implementation of a QA system and active dissemination policies regarding tracking surveys, strategy papers, or budget and audit documents.

### University T09



University T09, a private university, has high scores for the first three axes, and regarding Management Orientation, this university distinguishes itself by emphasizing the management skills of its president and deans. The university has full discretion concerning the management of human and financial resources but needs the agreement of the state to make curricula decisions. Like other Tunisian universities, but contrasting with its self-perception, University T09 has a very low Participation score.

### University T10




University T10 differs from the other public universities by its very unusual and high Autonomy score. This university is relatively autonomous to make decisions about curricula, has full discretion to select its students, and has freedom to make many human resources decisions. This university distinguishes itself with a high Accountability score, despite the lack of QA system.

# ANNEX 4


## Self-Perception and Questionnaire Results for Palestinian Universities

### University P01




University P01 offers programs in most fields of study. The patterns for both the self-perception and the screening card results are very close, suggesting that the university is aware of its governance model as well as its strengths and limitations. It is interesting to note that the self-perception score for Autonomy is much higher than that for the questionnaire result. From these preliminary results, it is obvious that there is room for improvement on the Participation dimension. This is based on the low level of stakeholder participation in the decision-making process related to university matters.

## University P02



University P02 is a large institution that makes use of distance-learning methodologies. In this case, the differences between the self-perception and the questionnaire are quite large. It seems that this university has an “inflated” self-image compared to the results from the questionnaire. The areas in which the university would need to make efforts to improve its governance approach are, in addition to Participation, the alignment between its Context, Mission, and Goals and how its legal framework supports the accomplishment of its goals.


## University P03



University P03 offers programs in most disciplines and has two main campuses. From the results below, it can be observed that there is room for improvement in


the Participation of stakeholders in the university decision-making process and that there is low awareness regarding this need.

**University P04**




University P04 perceives itself as modern and close to Western patterns of governance, even if some progress has still to be made. The low score for Axis 1 is related to the lack of consultation on universities’ role in Palestine at the national level (the universities’ mission has not been defined yet). Of the sample, University P04 is the only university with a Management Orientation closest to modern management. As in the case of most other universities in Palestine, there are very few or nonexistent mechanisms for stakeholder Participation in the decision-making process, however the self-perception reveals that there is no awareness of this by the university leadership.

## University P05



University P05 is the Palestinian university with the highest level of Autonomy, and there seems to be a good balance between Accountability and Management Orientation. The difference between the self-perception and the questionnaire results could appear graphically as significant but, as a matter of fact, only axis 1 is misjudged, due mainly to the lack of overall context defined (or not, for this matter) by the national authorities.


## University P06



University P06 is similar to University P02 and University P03, as it seems to have a self-image that corresponds with international trends; however, a somewhat different picture emerges from the questionnaire results. In particular, two areas are


noticeable: the low Participation of stakeholders in decision-making and the weak alignment between Context, Mission, and Goals.

**University P07**




University P07 has 20,000 students. The pattern observed in its self-perception and questionnaire results is very similar to that of University P01, suggesting that P07 is also aware of its governance model. As with other universities in Palestine, the two dimensions that need improvement are Participation and an alignment of Context, Mission, and Goals.

**University P08**



University P08 offers programs in most disciplines at the undergraduate and graduate level. The patterns observed in the self-perception and in the questionnaire are quite similar, and are actually quite balanced, with high scores in all dimensions. Together with University P09, University P08 shows the highest score on Participation, indicating that there might be good practices that could be worth sharing with other universities.

### University P09




University P09's self-perception and questionnaire results show the same pattern. Unlike other Palestinian universities, University P09 was more self-critical than the questionnaire results revealed, particularly in Participation and Management Orientation. Its self-awareness of its governance model and the balanced scores in all of the dimensions suggest that there are important good practices to be shared on the governance structure and procedures applied in this university.

# ANNEX 5


## Self-Perception and Questionnaire Results for Moroccan Universities

### University M01




In its self-perception, University M01 largely overestimated its governance model. Although the Autonomy score reflects fairly accurately the high level of autonomy available within the university, the remaining four axes that the university is not well aware of its governance practices. Of particular note, the university's Management Orientation is not very results-based and there is very little Participation from stakeholders in decision-making.

## University M02




The self-perception and screening card results for University M02 are both generally well balanced. The screening card result for the fourth axis, Accountability, however, is nearly twice as high as perceived by the university and really distinguishes University M02 as one that may be imitated for best practices.

## University M03




The self-perception scores for University M03, a large public university, reveal that the university is not well aware of its governance style. Although there are some similarities between the self-perception scores for Context, Mission, and Goals and Autonomy, the remaining three axes vary significantly: University M03 has very low stakeholder Participation and Accountability as compared to its self-image, and the university practices more results-based Management than it realizes.

## University M04




The screening card results for University M04 are generally well balanced, although the difference between the self-perception scores for Participation and Management Orientation reveal a misperception about the university's practices in these areas. Like most universities in the sample, University M04 has lower Participation than it perceives and it also has much more results-based management practices.

## University M05




Like University M04, University M05—a small public university that offers course work in a variety of topic areas—also practices a generally well-balanced governance model. It too, however, has much lower stakeholder Participation in decision-making and a much more results-oriented Management Orientation than it perceives.

## University M06




Consistent with the pattern across the sample, University M06 also scored much lower on Participation and much higher on Management Orientation on the screening card than on the self-perception evaluation. Interestingly, however, the screening card results also revealed that this large public university also has slightly lower Autonomy and significantly higher Accountability than it perceives itself to have.

## University M07




Much like other universities, both in Morocco and across the regional sample, University M07's screening card is generally well balanced, with the exception of the Participation axis: It is clear that there is much less stakeholder Participation in university decision-making than what the university perceives.

## University M08



University M08 has a general overstated perception for all the five dimensions, although this is most marked for the Context, Mission and Goals, Management Orientation, and Accountability dimensions. The screening card result for the first axis reveals that the Context, Mission, and Goals is nearly half that of the self-perception, indicating that the university is not well aware of the misalignment within the dimension.

## University M09




The patterns for both the self-perception and the screening card results are similar for University M09, except for the Participation dimension. Like other Moroccan universities in the sample, this is mainly because the university board is the principal decision-making body, with little input from other stakeholders. With regards to the other dimensions, however, the university is acutely aware of its governance practices and its strengths and limitations.

# 6

## ANNEX


# Self-Perception and Questionnaire Results for Egyptian Universities

### University E01




University E01 is one of the biggest public institutions located in Egypt, but despite its large student body, the university lacks effective stakeholder Participation. In addition, except for the Context, Mission, and Goals and Management Orientation axes, the university has a misperception about its governance model. Consistent with the other universities' results, it is not surprising that the Participation score is lower than perceived, but the Autonomy level was average across all universities in the sample, rather than nonexistent, as perceived.

## University E02




University E02 is another big public universities, which offers programs in most fields. The scores in the self-perception are less symmetric than for the screening card. Only screening card scores for Participation and Accountability are similar to those for self-perception. Although the screening card was balanced overall, it revealed the university to be highly Autonomous with a results-oriented Management Orientation.

## University E03




University E03 is a medium-sized, public university located outside of the capital. Interestingly, the self-perception scores are higher Accountability than Autonomy, the inverse than both the traditional pattern and what is revealed in the screening card results. The university does have an accurate awareness of its need for better Participation.

## University E04




University E04 is a small private university in the capital. There are obvious differences between the results for the self-perception and the screening card, the greatest of which relate to its scores for Context, Mission, and Goals and Participation.

## University E05




University E05 is a prestigious public university that offers a variety of fields of study and research. There is a large gap between the self-perception and the screening card scores for Participation of stakeholders in the decision-making process. The university also has a significantly more results-based Management Orientation than it perceives.

## University E06




University E06 is a small private university located in Cairo, which had fairly accurate self-perception scores for three of the five axes. Although the university might have felt a high level of control from the government, the university scored relatively high in Autonomy. Further, as is common across the entire sample of universities, University E06 has a significantly lower Participation score than it perceives.

## University E07




University E07 is a medium-sized private university located in Cairo. Its self-perception scores were also fairly accurate for three of the five axes, but the screening card revealed that the university has much less Participation and practices much less Accountability that it is aware of. Although the university's legal orientation as a private university may explain its low Participation score, it should take steps to improve its Accountability.

## University E08




University E08 is a small private university located outside the capital. Consistent with the pattern seen across the majority of universities, this university perceived its Participation score to be much higher than was displayed for the screening card. Regarding Context, Mission, and Goals, however, the university projected an accurate and higher-than-average score.

## University E09




University E09 is a new medium-sized private university based outside of Cairo. As the charts show, the university has an inflated perception of its governance model, particularly relating to Context, Mission, and Goals, Accountability, and Participation.

## University E010




University E10 is a small private university based outside the capital. Like University E09, this university overestimated its governance model and scores for all axes. The university had very low Participation scores, but the relationship between Accountability and Autonomy were consistent with the patterns seen across the sample.

## University E011




University E11 is a public university from Upper Egypt and, based on the charts above, it has a clearly very skewed self-perception. Accountability was the only axis for which the self-perception and screening card scores were similar. Although—like other universities in the sample—the Participation score was the greatest overestimate, University E11 also exhibits practices that are more aligned with the Context, Mission, and Goals, have a less results-oriented Management Orientation, and almost twice as much autonomy as the university initial perceived.

## University E012



University E12 is an old public with a small student body. This university is highly self-aware for four of the five axes, although its governance model is clearly more results-oriented than the university initially perceived.

## University E013



University E13 is a small public university outside of Cairo. By and large, the university's self-perception and screening card results are well balanced, although one area for obvious improvement is the Participation axis.



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# UNIVERSITIES THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS

## BENCHMARKING UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE TO ENABLE HIGHER EDUCATION MODERNIZATION IN MENA

University governance reform has been on the agenda of governments in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) for some time. In response to demands by those countries in the region currently engaged in governance reforms, a World Bank team based in Marseille, at the Center for Mediterranean Integration, carried out a university governance benchmarking exercise by profiling 41 universities in four countries of the region using a University Governance Screening Card.

The results collected as part of this effort have laid the foundation for future systematic monitoring of university performance. This is a significant achievement that moves the region further toward the goal of improving accountability in service delivery and one which will become a cornerstone of the strategy for developing greater capacity to do evidence-based policy making related to higher education in MENA.

**Inger Anderson**

*Vice President, Middle East and North Africa Region*



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