

Document of
The World Bank

Report No: ICR00001679

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(IDA-35780 IDA-3578A)

ON A

LEARNING AND INNOVATION LOAN

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 2,6 MILLION
(US\$ 3.3 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF MAURITANIA

FOR A

GLOBAL DISTANCE LEARNING CENTER

February 22, 2011

AFRCP – Capacity Development & Partnerships
AFCW3
Africa Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective October 26, 2010)

Currency Unit = Mauritanian Ouguiya

1.00 = US\$ 0.00350877

US\$ 1.00 = 285.000

FISCAL YEAR

January 1 to December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AADLC	Association of African Distance Learning Centers
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
DLC	Development Learning Center (GDLN Center)
CFED	<i>Centre de Formation et d'Échanges à Distance</i> (Mauritania GDLN Center)
GDG	Global Development Gateway (<i>Portail Mondial du Développement</i>)
GDLN	Global Development Learning Network
ICR	Implementation Completion Report
IDA	International Development Association
IP	Implementation Performance
ISG	Information Solutions Group
KPI(s)	Key Performance Indicator(s)
LIL	Learning and Innovation Loan
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
MEAD	Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development (<i>MAED</i>)
MRDG	Mauritanian Development Gateway (<i>Portail Mauritanien du Développement</i>)
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NCB	National Competitive Bidding
NGO(s)	Non Governmental Organization(s)
NS	National Shopping
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PCU	Project Coordination Unit
PDO	Project Development Objective
PDU	Urban Development Program (<i>Programme de Développement urbain</i>)
PMD	<i>Portail Mauritanien du Développement</i> (see MRDG)
PPF	Project Preparation Facility
PRECASP	Capacity Building Program for the Public Sector
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PRSC	Poverty Reduction Strategy Credit
SDR	Special Drawing Rights
SSNT	State Secretariat for New Technologies (<i>Secrétariat d'Etat aux Nouvelles Technologies</i>)
WBI	World Bank Institute

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MAURITANIA
GLOBAL DISTANCE LEARNING CENTER PROJECT

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A. Basic Information			
Country:	Mauritania	Project Name:	Global Distance Learning Center
Project ID:	P071881	L/C/TF Number(s):	IDA-35780,IDA-3578A
ICR Date:	02/22/2011	ICR Type:	Core ICR
Lending Instrument:	LIL	Borrower:	GOVERNMENT OF MAURITANIA
Original Total Commitment:	XDR 2.7M	Disbursed Amount:	XDR 2.7M
Revised Amount:	XDR 2.7M		
Environmental Category: C			
Implementing Agencies: Centre de Formation et d Echanges a Distance-CFED Portail Mauritanien du D			
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:			

B. Key Dates				
Process	Date	Process	Original Date	Revised / Actual Date(s)
Concept Review:	10/03/2000	Effectiveness:	11/13/2002	11/13/2002
Appraisal:	01/27/2001	Restructuring(s):		
Approval:	11/21/2001	Mid-term Review:	07/15/2004	03/25/2005
		Closing:	01/31/2006	05/31/2010

C. Ratings Summary	
C.1 Performance Rating by ICR	
Outcomes:	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome:	High
Bank Performance:	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Borrower Performance:	Unsatisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)			
Bank	Ratings	Borrower	Ratings
Quality at Entry:	Unsatisfactory	Government:	Unsatisfactory
Quality of Supervision:	Moderately Satisfactory	Implementing Agency/Agencies:	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Overall Bank Performance:	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Overall Borrower Performance:	Unsatisfactory

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators			
Implementation Performance	Indicators	QAG Assessments (if any)	Rating
Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	Yes	Quality at Entry (QEA):	None
Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	Yes	Quality of Supervision (QSA):	None
DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:	Unsatisfactory		

D. Sector and Theme Codes		
	Original	Actual
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
General public administration sector		34
Telecommunications	100	33
Vocational training		33
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
Administrative and civil service reform		25
Education for the knowledge economy	25	15
Infrastructure services for private sector development	25	20
Participation and civic engagement	25	20
Technology diffusion	25	20

E. Bank Staff		
Positions	At ICR	At Approval
Vice President:	Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili	Callisto E. Madavo
Country Director:	Mary Kathryn Hollifield	A. David Craig
Sector Manager:	Tijan M. Sallah	John A. Roome
Project Team Leader:	Marc Jean Yves Lixi	Jean Mazurelle
ICR Team Leader:	Laurent Porte	
ICR Primary Author:	Laurent Porte	

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)

Test mechanisms of public and private sector partnership to promote better access to and dissemination of information relevant for country development and policy reforms
Strengthen the environment for policy reform Build capacity in the public and private

sectors Promote internationally Mauritania best practices in development , and thus provide an image of the country conducive to foreign private sector investment. Build partnership with Research centers and center of excellence in key fields of MR development (fishery/ mining, etc). Build or expand national links into the Global Development community to target Mauritania-specific needs and support the use of the Internet for e-business, communications, and knowledge sharing among local development stakeholders.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	The DLC covers operating expenses through revenue generation			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	0	100%		32.73%
Date achieved	09/15/2003	01/31/2009		05/31/2010
Comments (incl. % achievement)				
Indicator 2 :	Introduction by the DLC of courses that improve the Borrower s capacity to implement its poverty reduction strategy			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	0	At least 11 relevant courses have been planned for the FY09 Mauritania GDLN Center program		7
Date achieved	09/15/2003	01/31/2009		05/31/2010
Comments (incl. % achievement)				

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	At least two (2) training institutions use the DLC in each year of Project implementation			
Value	0	At least eight (8)		0

(quantitative or Qualitative)		local training institutions use the DLC		
Date achieved	09/15/2003	01/31/2009		05/31/2010
Comments (incl. % achievement)				
Indicator 2 :	80 training sessions are held during the first year of Project implementation following the respective establishment of the DLC, and 120 training sessions for each subsequent year			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	440 training sessions were held during the project implementation period		981 training sessions (VC-based + web-based) were held during the project implementation period
Date achieved	09/15/2003	01/31/2009		05/31/2010
Comments (incl. % achievement)				
Indicator 3 :	The MRDG server is permanently visible.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	The MRDG server has been visible during at least 330 days per year		The MRDG server has been visible 350 days per year
Date achieved	09/15/2003	01/31/2009		05/31/2010
Comments (incl. % achievement)				
Indicator 4 :	The number of connections per year has reached (20,000 the first year of implementation, 40,000 the second year, and 50,000 the third year).			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	more than 50,000 connections to the MRDG site per year.		There has been more than 200,000 connections to MRDG server during the first year, and more than 720,000 connections during the third year
Date achieved	09/15/2003	01/31/2009		05/31/2010
Comments (incl. % achievement)				


G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No.	Date ISR Archived	DO	IP	Actual Disbursements (USD millions)
1	04/26/2002	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.00
2	12/09/2002	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.00
3	06/20/2003	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.87
4	12/09/2003	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	1.11
5	06/02/2004	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	1.72
6	01/01/2005	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	2.10
7	04/21/2005	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	2.21
8	09/29/2005	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	2.35
9	12/21/2005	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	2.45
10	04/26/2006	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	2.91
11	10/30/2006	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	3.02
12	06/13/2007	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	3.42
13	01/09/2008	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	3.61
14	12/30/2008	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	3.73

H. Restructuring (if any)

Not Applicable

I. Disbursement Profile



Introduction

The Mauritania Distance Learning Center project differs from standard projects in important ways. First, it was financed through the instrument of a Learning and Innovation Loan (LIL). The choice of this instrument was driven mainly by the size of the project: it was too small for any other instrument. The chosen instrument also made it easy to fast-track the project. Second, by definition a LIL is an opportunity to test the viability of an innovation, in the case of GDLN, the use of the latest distance learning tools for capacity development. Therefore, GDLN Mauritania, like all first-generation GDLN projects, was a test of a hypothesis and a pilot. It incorporated design features from similar first-generation GDLN operations implemented in West Africa, including flaws and shortcomings. For these reasons, the PDO required the Task Team to comply with the LIL Guidelines "to test the mechanisms". Notwithstanding these unusual aspects of the project, this Implementation Completion Report assesses this project as a standard operation thereby shifting the focus away from the test or pilot nature of the project. For instance, as to the suitability of a LIL to support the establishment of a GDLN center, the Mauritania case shows that this instrument (LIL) is well suited for this purpose. An exemplary center was successfully created using this instrument, thereby achieving a major part of the 'learning' or testing or piloting. However, the Mauritania case also suggests that beyond the fast-track creation of a center, the LIL may not be effective in guiding the operations of a center. Additional features should have been built into the LIL so as to make the operational phase (Component 2) as successful as the establishment phase (Component 1).

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

Launched in 2000, the Global Development Learning Network (GDLN) was designed to use information and communication technologies (ICT) to give policy makers and public sector managers access to cutting-edge, just in time knowledge in a cost efficient manner. Coordinated by the World Bank Institute (WBI), the GDLN is a unique partnership specializing in knowledge and learning solutions that promote knowledge sharing among people working in international development, and in particular South-South knowledge exchanges. At project appraisal, GDLN was starting to play an important role in brokering relationships and partnerships to help developing countries on issues such as environment, health, education, peace and security, good governance and trade. Reaching across geographic borders, time zones and language barriers, it helped countries learn from the experiences of other countries.

The main rationale for establishing a GDLN center in Mauritania was as follows:

- 1) At project appraisal, efforts to foster good governance and institutional reform were being made in Mauritania. Civil service reform was a key element of the improved institutional framework, and, while distance learning alone would not resolve the shortcomings of public administration, it would nonetheless facilitate improved governance through knowledge transfer. It would expose national decision-makers to international best practice and enhance their skills in the priority areas of economics, finance, accounting and management.

- 2) The private sector lacked exposure to the latest developments in corporate finance and management as well as supporting institutions and human resources that were critical to sound corporate governance. Distance learning course modules relayed from international institutions would strengthen corporate management while access to the latest technical information would possibly allow the Mauritanian private sector to effectively compete globally.
- 3) The recent liberalization of the telecommunications sector and the willingness of the Government to facilitate universal access to new technologies through the Telecommunications and Postal Sector Reform Project had generated the need for a Distance Learning Center as an important element of this framework.

In this context, the project proposed to pilot two initiatives: the Global Distance Learning Center (DLC or *Centre de Formation et d'Échanges à Distance - CFED*) and the Mauritania Development Gateway (or *Portail Mauritanien du Développement - PMD*)

- A. The CFED aimed to: (a) strengthen the environment for policy reforms and (b) build capacity in the public and private sectors by increasing local access to global knowledge and specialized information using internet-based technology. Distance learning would facilitate the increased dissemination of knowledge and cross-country experience in support of reform. Public and private sector decision-makers would access interactive multimedia training programs developed by the World Bank Institute, major universities, private corporations and technical organizations around the world. This exposure to global knowledge was to enhance the capacity of Mauritanian decision-makers to conceptualize and implement reforms. This would, in turn, lead to improved governance, economic growth and poverty reduction.
- B. The Mauritania Development Gateway (MRDG, or *PMD – Portail Mauritanien du Développement*), an Internet-based comprehensive development partnership, first of its kind in Mauritania, was designed as a high-impact and low-cost cutting edge technology tool to build or expand national links into the global development community by targeting Mauritania-specific needs and supporting the use of the Internet for e-business, communications, and knowledge sharing among the development stakeholders. It aimed to assist Mauritania cross the digital divide and become fully integrated into the increasingly digitized international economy. More specifically, it would: (i) maximize opportunities and minimize risks of the global Internet revolution; (ii) facilitate e-commerce, e-banking, and e-government; (iii) mobilize development knowledge; (iv) improve communications within various communities; and (v) ultimately help to increase living standards and the country's global competitiveness through lower transaction costs and greater productivity and transparency.

The need to invest in a Global Distance Learning Center was not explicitly identified in the CAS (June 1997). The Bank agreed to consider providing support in this area at the

specific request of the Government. The constraints this Learning and Innovation Loan (LIL) sought to address were however consistent with the CAS objectives.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved)

The PDO was to test mechanisms of public and private sector partnership to promote better access to and dissemination of information relevant for country development and policy reforms. To this end the project would build capacity in the public and private sectors, bring best practice in development to Mauritania and thus promote an image of the country conducive to foreign direct investment, build partnership with research centers and centers of excellence in key fields of Mauritania development (fisheries/mining, etc), build or expand national links into the global development community to target Mauritania-specific needs and support the use of the Internet for e-business communications and knowledge sharing among local development stakeholders.

The Key Performance Indicators identified and approved were the following:

- Number of specific initiatives in designated areas covered by distance learning with emphasis on sector reforms (e.g. fishing / mining, administration/civil service, etc...)
- Number of trained decision-makers implementing best practice guidelines on governance
- Demand for and utilization of distance learning services as demonstrated in course enrollment
- The Internet penetration rate in the country
- Number of local stakeholders using the MRDG on a regular basis
- Ability for the project to cover operating expenses through fees (100% of operating expenses to be covered by revenue generation by the 4th year of project implementation)

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

Not applicable

1.4 Main Beneficiaries,

The project was intended to support, in particular but not only, local efforts to strengthen institutional capacity within the civil service. A large number of government staff was to be trained through distance learning and to apply what they have learned to improve governance in the public sector. The project intended to support IDA policy dialogues with regional decision-makers. By convening them in one forum, it was also supposed to facilitate internal debate on the reform agenda and to help link regional decision-makers to the information super highway and facilitate regional input in national planning

The project also intended to enhance private sector efforts to adopt international principles of corporate governance and train executives in financial and management skills. Exposure to modern methods of planning, finance and management were to enhance corporate governance. The project also aimed at bringing together the local public and private sectors in high-profile deliberations for input in national planning.

1.5 Original Components (as approved)

The project comprises three main components:

- 1- Construction and equipment of the Distance Learning Center
- 2- Support for DLC establishment and operation,
- 3- Support of the Mauritania Development Gateway establishment and operation.

Component I consisted of building facilities on the site of the *Palais des Congrès* for the establishment of the DLC, to provide a videoconference room with a 30-person capacity, a computer room outfitted for 30 computer stations (hardware, software and Internet hook-up), a technical and administrative center, and installation and/or upgrading of electrical and telephone wiring. It also comprised equipment of the DLC including purchase and installation of VSAT, video and audio systems, office equipment, furniture, and various other equipment for DLC operation and security.

Component 2 aimed to assist the DLC begin operation and become financially viable. It included (a) financing of DLC operation costs on a decreasing basis over the first three years of operation; (b) purchase of a vehicle to facilitate transport and marketing of DLC services and (c) technical assistance for the training of Center staff, periodic evaluation of Center operation and management effectiveness and establishment of financial accounts and their annual audit.

The Distance Learning Center (CFED) was established as a Mauritanian private law public interest Association. It is a legal entity with financial autonomy, governed by a Board, equally comprising representatives of government ministries, Mauritanian academic institutions, the private sector and civil society, and chaired by an official elected from among the members.

Component 3 consisted of installing the Mauritania Development Gateway (Portail Mauritanien du Développement-PMD) facilities and assist PMD begin operation. It covered the retrofitting of a working space to host the technical operations and the administrative office of PMD and the provision of Mauritania-related content for the PMD database. Component 3 also planned for financing PMD operation costs on a decreasing basis over the first three years of operation.

This component was added to the PAD during the project decision meeting as it corresponded to a set of new initiatives promoted by Bank management and it generated seemingly genuine interest on the part of the Mauritanian Government.

The Mauritania Development Gateway (PMD) was established as a non-profit Association which was promulgated as a public utility by government order on 04 November 2002. It is governed by a Steering Committee, equally comprising representatives of government ministries, Mauritanian academic institutions, the private sector and civil society, and chaired by an official elected from among the members.

This report will focus on the Global Development Learning Center (Centre de Formation et d'Echanges à Distance-CFED)

1.6 Revised Components

Not applicable

1.7 Other significant changes

Not applicable

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

Project Design: the PDOs as stated in the PAD were vague, ambitious and unrealistic, which affected the implementation of the project. There is also some inconsistency between the PDOs stated in the PAD and in the Credit Agreement and the same is true for the performance indicators. The project team had difficulties translating these PDOs into intermediate and concrete short-term outcomes.

- a) There is little evidence to suggest that a proper assessment was carried out to determine the readiness of the Government and institutional environment to implement this project. Also, the PAD does not give any indication of how the expected outcomes could be integrated/mainstreamed into policy reform processes.
- b) Performance indicators were unrealistic and broad. There were no short term, medium term and long term performance indicators. In addition, the indicators were only quantitative, very difficult to measure and, most importantly, not appropriate to assess the overall impact of the project on capacity development. Considering the weak institutional environment and limited human capacity both at the public and private sector levels, performance indicators should have been designed accordingly through a participatory process with clear responsibilities assigned. Critical assumptions made were general and do not reflect overall local challenges.
- c) Although it was a LIL, the project lacked a M&E framework. Given that LILs are by nature pilot projects to test new approaches, M&E is critical to assess the success of pilot projects and draw lessons for future operations. A few concrete objectives and indicators of success should have been defined so as to allow building a knowledge base for future similar operations. The “one size fits all” approach should have been avoided.
- d) Not enough consultations with other donors and Human Resources departments within the ministries were carried out during the different phases of the project. Consultations are a key component of the design phase to help assess priority needs in terms of capacity development, absorption and implementation capacity. Such consultations would have allowed the Task Team to better design a budget in response to agreed priorities, i.e. training and capacity development in the public administration (*See Lessons Learned Section*).
- e) The project design was based on the model developed during the GDLN Program Pilot Phase (2000-2002). Although at the time of project appraisal the successes and failures of ongoing GDLN projects were not yet known, the Task Team consulted operational GDLN center staff in Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire and Benin for

- suggestions. These were included in the design of Components 1 and 2. However, more attention should have been given to local constraints and potential risks.
- f) The use of the PPF to fund Component 1 was based on the design of GDLN projects in Benin, Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire. The rationale for using the PPF to fund all the investment parts of the project was two-fold. First, the project is a capacity-building project and the construction and installation of the center itself were prerequisites to the capacity-building function of the project (Component 2). Second, the GDLN network was under pressure to expand in order to reach a critical mass of centers in Africa that would ensure the viability of the overall sub-regional network; thus the funding of construction through the PPF was supposed to speed up the implementation of Component 1 by starting before the credit effectiveness. This exception was a mistake: (i) embarking upon the construction of such a single purpose building before credit effectiveness represented a risk, in the event the project did not go to the Board; (ii) the supposed gain in time was largely offset by various factors and the construction was eventually completed with more than a year delay. The PPF should not be used to invest such a large part of the credit (39%). Also, the pressure for expansion of the GDLN network reflected a "top down" approach. Careful consideration of most appropriate timing, institutional readiness and sufficient local level engagement in each country should have been given in order to assure sustainability of such an effort.

2.2 Implementation

Several issues have directly affected the project implementation:

Inappropriate institutional setup and high staff turnover have affected the project implementation

Institutional arrangements for the project generated complexity and diluted responsibilities. Over the implementation period (November 2002-May 2010), the project had 4 Project Coordinators, 4 Center Directors, 3 sponsoring Ministries and remained without a Director for 10 months. These constant and major changes made it impossible for CFED to design and implement a sustained marketing and business development strategy. The constant change of interlocutors in sponsoring ministries did not allow for effective follow-up and implementation of action plans.

The lack of pro-activity by the CFED team had a negative impact on project implementation

A strong marketing strategy and pro-activity by GDLN center staff were identified as key factors of success for a GDLN project (*see Lessons Learned section*). In spite of repeated recommendations made by the Task Team, the CFED team was slow to engage in a more aggressive and creative marketing strategy highlighting the added value of GDLN and the ability of CFED to access a wide range of international expertise rather than focusing only on the technological aspects of the center and presenting it as another local training institution (*see Bank Performance in Supervision*).

Government Support was not sufficient

The quality of government engagement in the project was unhelpful in that the CFED was not challenged to upgrade skills in the public sector, which was contrary to the

justification of the project. It may be said that government support was not possible given the low level unrest in the country during part of the time. However, it should be noted that the DLC in Côte d'Ivoire fared better during the civil unrest because their governments were clear on the PDO and gave their support irrespective of events in the country. Had similar engagement existed in Mauritania, the center would have fared far better despite the civil unrest.

Limited ownership and commitment from the government affected the implementation of the project. Government counterpart funds were sometimes delayed, which generated cash flow problems for both CFED and PMD. Moreover, the distribution of the funds showed lack of commitment and ownership: of the US\$ 680,000 counterpart funds, the ministry-level Project Coordination Unit which did little to support CFED nonetheless received over 50% of the funds while only 27% were allocated to the Center. To make matters worse, the US\$ 55,000 grant allocation which had been promised to CFED under a March 2008 partnership agreement with the Ministry of Public Service and Administration Modernization was never paid to the center.

According to its legal status, the CFED Board was supposed to meet on a regular basis and to help define and implement a clear strategy. During the first 3 years of implementation, the Board held very few meetings and government representatives were absent most of the time.

The lack of political stability in Mauritania had a negative impact on the implementation of the project.

Following the coup of August 2008, Bank operations in Mauritania were put on hold for 14 months and CFED closed for 2 months. The subsequent economic slowdown significantly reduced the level of activity in the DLC. The center relied mostly on public demand for its services and faced reduced demand from the Government.

Political instability could seriously affect capacity development projects which are often jeopardized (sacrificed) by an institutional crisis like the one that occurred in Mauritania. In addition, dealing with the increasing security issues in the sub-region is now a top priority for the Government of Mauritania, to the detriment of capacity building initiatives.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

At the start of implementation, the project did not have an M&E component therefore CFED only collected basic information about the project's throughputs. In 2007, the CFED designed and implemented a basic M&E tool using Excel. It covered administrative management, financial management, scheduled activities and client satisfaction, sales/net result progression and equipment management. It allowed for a better day-to-day monitoring of the DLC's operations and a better control of operating costs. Several successive supervision missions strongly recommended the set-up of a real M&E plan with automated tools and clear and accurate performance score cards to assess the achievement of the project's development objectives. Unfortunately, such a system was never put in place.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

The project is rated category C and no safeguard policy was triggered. CFED is located in a small building next to the Palais des Congrès, in a developing urban area.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

In November 2009, the project team alerted the Bank to the difficult financial situation of CFED and the urgent need to generate income in order to be able to cover basic operating costs such as staff salaries, connectivity charges or maintenance services. As a partial solution to this problem, the supervision missions carried out between November 2009 and May 2010 identified several partnership opportunities for CFED with institutions such as UNDP, GTZ, CNAM, MAED and ENA as well as with three major IDA-funded projects with large capacity building components: the Urban Development Program (PDU), the Program for Capacity Building in the Public Sector (PRECASP) and the Higher Education Project (PNDSE). A number of recommendations were formulated by the Project Team in order to turn these opportunities into real partnership agreements but very little was done by the project closing date (30 May 2010).

As of January 2011, the CFED has signed a partnership agreement with MAED within the framework of the PDU, for a global amount of US\$ 77,000. This partnership aims at training civil servants in regional administrations and it will translate in the use of CFED facilities for a series of face-to-face training sessions but will not make any use of the distance learning tools of the Center and the expertise of the GDLN. The signature of a partnership agreement with PRECASP is still pending.

Beyond these clearly identified opportunities for strategic partnerships, a regular use of the CFED services by the Government would have helped the center reach its financial sustainability.

From an institutional set-up stand point, the current legal status of CFED (Public Interest Association) is similar to GDLN Affiliates in Benin or Senegal and allows the center to contract with international organizations (such as the World Bank) or with private operators. Both the management of CFED and the Chairman of the CFED Association (Board) strongly recommend that this legal status remains unchanged. However, a public institution status may make it easier for CFED to receive grants from the Government .

The drastic cut in operating costs (mostly affecting staffing) initiated by the CFED Manager in 2009 (- 68% from 2005 to 2010 – see Table#1) and the signature of partnership agreements with other WB-funded projects (PRECASP, PNDSE, ...) will allow the CFED to keep operating for some time but may not be sufficient for the project to achieve its development objectives. (*See Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome section*).

Table #1 – Recap on CFED Expenditures from 2005 to 30 June 2010

In Mauritanian Ouguiya

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Operating Costs	87 141 894	87 162 897	74 512 146	70 569 054	65 423 012	32 096 517
VSAT maintenance/Satellite Link	15 346 548	14 055 303	13 823 945	12 022 461	16 368 125	8 857 550
CFED Staff	35 877 357	35 392 728	39 034 538	35 871 125	31 341 402	15 420 688
CFED Maintenance & Insurance	4 600 445	2 404 068	2 016 902	1 084 880	1 355 976	535 260
Gas for CFED vehicle	1 877 000	2 328 800	2 400 000	2 520 000	1 974 590	776 500
Water and Electricity	212 240	151 745	32 564	94 893	71 650	13 045
Other variable Costs	26 082 612	30 272 028	15 385 040	17 796 782	13 044 675	6 239 623
Telephone and Internet	2 060 810	2 474 783	1 819 157	1 146 513	1 229 094	244 451
Miscellaneous and provision for unforeseen costs	1 084 882	83 442		32 400	37 500	9 400
Investments	12 981 927	5 141 842	3 681 498	14 012 345	1 553 489	120 000
Consultant and Training Costs	5 068 927	4 392 746	1 540 464	5 171 001	1 350 089	0
Civil Works and Equipment	7 913 000	749 096	2 141 034	8 841 344	203 400	120 000
Total	100 123 821	92 304 739	78 193 644	84 581 399	66 976 501	32 216 517
Sales	24 160 577	33 171 607	23 775 338	44 894 278	25 362 670	13 550 415

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

In 1999, the Global Development Learning Network was established as a technology and connectivity provider for training and capacity building of development practitioners. With the development of technological and connectivity capacity, the GDLN comparative advantage now lies in the international expertise developed across the network, the convening power of the GDLN affiliates worldwide, the design and delivery of learning events, the dissemination of good practices in development topics and the facilitation of South-South knowledge exchanges among peers.

Although the PDOs as they were defined in the PAD seem vague and ambitious, the CFED is still relevant. The new Mauritania CAS includes explicit references to “*capacity building in core government ministries and agencies, both central and local*” and to “*institutional development and governance to help the government build an efficient, market-oriented public sector apparatus and a strong civil service*”. However, the project design would have greatly benefitted from a more realistic assessment of existing local institutional and human capacities, an M&E framework and stronger ownership by local stakeholders.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

The CFED initiative has achieved some of the Project Development Objectives

During its 7 years of operations, the CFED has offered 474 videoconference-based learning events and 507 web-based activities. These capacity building programs addressed developments issues such as poverty reduction, project M&E, public financial management, corporate management, business relations, governance, public health or rural development. Over the 7 years of project execution, the CFED hosted a dozen of consultation sessions organized by the Government with its main technical and financial partners (World Bank, IMF) and about 10 WB portfolio review meetings. In addition, CFED offered more than 20 training programs in areas such as office management, software training or language skills.

Learning events reached 20,706 participant/days, in the form of structured training programs, action learning activities, South-South knowledge exchanges or regional policy dialogues. Of this participants, 15,381 were government officials or civil servants (ministers, secretary general, directors, heads of department, project managers), national or local elected representatives and corporate leaders.

Table #2 - CFED Learning Events 2003 to 2009 – Participants per sector

	Total nr of participants	Public Sector		Private Sector	
		Number	%	Number	%
Year					
2003	266	200	75,19	66	24,81
2004	754	526	69,76	228	30,24
2005	2053	941	45,84	1112	54,16
2006	7973	6798	85,26	1175	14,74
2007	4595	3205	69,75	1390	30,25
2008	2546	1991	78,20	585	22,98
2009	2519	1720	68,28	799	31,72

To a certain extent, the project has also strengthened Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) through learning events that convened representatives from both sectors, while simultaneously contributing to the popularization of information technology and Internet-based learning in the country. Beyond this, the project could not test the PPP as a mechanism for promoting better access to, and dissemination of, information relevant to development and policy reforms.

Finally, the learning events offered by CFED generated substantial income for the Center although they did not always match the priority areas of the PRSP.

Regrettably, at project closing, no partnership was built with research centers or centers of excellence. In this regard, the closest that CFED has achieved is to sign a cooperation agreement with the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development (MAED) within the framework of the Urban Development Project (PDU) for an amount of US\$ 75,000 (*see Lessons Learned section*).

In the absence of an M&E system, the project did not carry out a study of the impact of its effort on capacity development and reforms. Only one follow-up survey of trainees' satisfaction was carried out by the CFED in 2008 (*see Annex 5*) but it did not measure the extent to which directors had implemented best practices in corporate governance learned at CFED. It is therefore difficult to assess the extent to which the CFED project has strengthened the environment for policy reform or built capacity in the public and private sectors.

Over the 7 years of project execution, the variety of content offered in CFED/PMD learning events has covered at least 8 key sectors: agriculture, education, energy and mining, finance, health and social services, industry and trade, information and communication and transport.

During the few months preceding the political crisis in Mauritania in June 2008, the CFED was covering more than 80% of its operating costs and was therefore well on its way to achieving financial sustainability. It was offering capacity-building activities in areas that were increasingly aligned to the priorities of the country (as described in the PRSP) and, at the same time receiving highly positive assessments by clients as indicated in a 2008 survey (*see Annex 5*). Unfortunately, the August 2008 coup and its repercussions seriously affected the performance of the project.

3.3 Efficiency

The DLC is cost-effective. The average cost of training decision-makers and development practitioners in Mauritania delivered through the DLC is far less than the cost of comparable training programs delivered through traditional methods. Specifically, the average cost of a distance learning event offered through the CFED by a foreign program partner with expertise that is not readily available locally is US\$ 10,000. The average cost of developing such a course locally is much higher because it involves bringing an expert from outside the country.

Since most of the learning events offered by the CFED are usually shared by at least 4 other centers in Francophone Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal), the cost for the CFED for a typical event is around US\$ 2,000. As the average attendance in GDLN Centers is around 12 participants for such learning events, the participant fee is about US\$ 170, a cost saving greater than 50% based on US\$ 493 per participant cost estimate based on traditional methods of delivery used in the PAD.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

Rating: **Moderately Unsatisfactory**

The current PDOs are vague and unrealistic. They should have been better focused, less ambitious and defined in the PAD in a more measurable way. There was limited attention to the engagement of local stakeholders (learning / knowledge institutions) beyond the government, leading to limited sustainability and impact. However, the spirit of these PDOs is still relevant given the need for efficient capacity-building tools in a post-institutional crisis environment. The DLC is cost effective but the achievement of PDOs is rated unsatisfactory for the reasons described in Section 3.2.

The overall outcome is therefore rated **moderately unsatisfactory**.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

The gender aspects have been monitored since 2003. The gender balance in the learning events organized by CFED is low with respect to the professional environment in Mauritania, where the female labor force represents around 40% of total labor force.

Participants in CFED Learning Events, by Gender

Year	Total Number of participants	Male		Female	
		Number	%	Number	%
2003	266	246	92.48	20	7.52
2004	754	629	83.42	125	16.58
2005	2,089	1,690	80.90	399	19.10
2006	7,937	5,976	75.29	1,961	24.71
2007	4,295	3,715	86.50	580	13.50
2008	2,327	1,710	73.49	617	26.51
2009	2,519	2,104	85.53	415	16.47
2010	519	459	88.44	60	11.56
Total :	20,706	16,529		4,177	

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

The project has developed an innovative model of learning through technology-based training services, South-South exchanges and communities of practice. It introduced the concept of web-based collaborative work and, according to feedback provided by a sample of clients, it contributed to an increase of the Mauritanian public awareness of the learning potential of ICTs and Internet.

The project has introduced the notion of capacity building through distance learning. With about 60% of the themes covered by CFED programs being consistent with the PRSP priorities, the project has had a moderate impact on institutional development. However, it did not yet have a chance to reach its full potential.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

Promoting face-to-face training was not an objective of the project. Nevertheless, over the last seven years, in addition to typical GDLN events involving using distance learning tools, the CFED has offered many face-to-face training programs in management, human resource management, communication and computer skills that were very well received and generated a substantial income for the Center. Several ministries, administrations and private entities provided the CFED team with a very positive feedback on the quality and the cost-efficiency of these training programs (*see Annex 5 on Beneficiary Survey Results*).

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

Over the last 7 years, the CFED has been collecting level 1 evaluation data from all participants and has organized a synthesis of the beneficiary surveys on a yearly basis. More than 95% of the participants rated the overall quality of services offered by the

Center good or very good. 94% of the participants rated the relevance and usefulness of pedagogical materials good or very good and 98% rated the use of VC and web technologies very efficient (*see Annex 5 of this ICR for more details*)

Discussions with focal points within key ministries and other client institutions allowed the team to collect feedback on the quality and relevance of learning events organized by the CFED.

The Director for Training and Improvement at the Ministry of Civil Service (in charge of civil servants career management) reported on a GDLN program on training needs analysis and training plan development which enabled participants to exchange practical experience and lessons learned with their peers in 3 countries in the sub-region. He added that distance learning is now seen as an essential tool for building capacity of state agents in Mauritania.

The Director of the Mauritanian Office for Statistics (OMS) explained how a series of GDLN discussions on the Medium Term Expenditures Framework in the rural sector (*Cadre des dépenses à moyen terme – CDMT*) with experts in France and the USA and practitioners in four African countries allowed to demystify this exercise and to expedite the implementation of a national action plan. Similarly, a series of teleseminars (short training programs) with OECD-Paris21 have helped tremendously the OMS to implement the integration of statistics in the national development strategy. The CFED has allowed for significant savings in terms of time and budget resources and it is now perceived as a real “challenge to distance”.

The Secretary General of Mauritanian National Union of Employers (*Union Nationale du Patronat Mauritanien*) who is also the President of the CFED Association (Board) reported on how the project has contributed to reduce training costs in both the public and private sectors, and how it helped strengthen public-private partnerships in Mauritania, through South-South dialogues and benchmarking activities organized by CFED in connection with 4 other GDLN centers in the sub-region.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

Rating: **High**

The lack of support from the Government, the political instability in Mauritania, the very high turnover of decision-makers in ministries and administrations may jeopardize the sustainability of the Project over the coming years. In addition, the technical issues entailed by the migration of African GDLN centers to private connectivity providers in 2009 and the decreased availability of WBI programs have resulted in a significant drop of GDLN-based capacity-building activities offered by GDLN centers in the sub-region. At ICR date, the post-migration technical problems have now been solved but the volume of GDLN learning events has not yet rebounded. This is another potential obstacle preventing the project from achieving its development objectives. Therefore the Risk to Development Outcomes is rated **high**.

However, it should be noted that despite a difficult environment and external constraints, the CFED has managed to stay active, to pay its staff, and to keep the premises open to the public. This situation is encouraging and demonstrates the capacity of the current management team to optimize the use of its resources. It also suggests that, in a more stable environment, the GDLN center would easily break even and would become rapidly sustainable.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

Rating: **Unsatisfactory**

The Bank's lending performance is *unsatisfactory*. The choice of a LIL as the funding instrument for this operation allowed to fast-track its implementation but the design of the project should have paid more attention to Mauritania's institutional context and realities. The assumptions on the prospects of a GDLN center were mostly based on lessons learned in countries with a more favorable environment, such as Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire. As noted above, even before the onset of the crisis in the country in 2008, the project had serious challenges – insufficient engagement of stakeholders, limited government ownership, lack of M&E feature – that should have been better anticipated and addressed through suitable risk mitigation measures from the outset. Thus, for example, explicitly encouraging Human Resources units in ministries to use the services of CFED to upgrade the capacity of staff could have fostered deeper government ownership of the center. By linking the center to capacity development needs of the ministries, the Bank could have improved the performance of the project.

(b) Quality of Supervision (including of fiduciary and safeguards policies)

Rating: **Moderately Satisfactory**

The Bank's supervision is *moderately satisfactory*. The Supervision Team maintained constant contact with the project and also organized regular missions (except during the 14 months when Bank operations were on hold) with detailed reports after each mission. These reports show that the team made strong recommendations to address aspects that were critical to the success of the project – marketing, M&E, building partnerships with major development agents. On several occasions, the team took the initiative of setting up meetings between CFED and development partners, key public institutions, professional organizations and IDA-funded project teams – all potential clients/partners of the center. These steps were taken in a bid to compensate for institutional weakness that emerged during implementation. The team also sought the assistance of the GDLN Secretariat in providing content for training and capacity building as well as the identification of new program partners for CFED.

Although Africa GDLN provides guidelines for the recruitment of center staff, the host government ultimately makes the decision on the recruitment of staff. From the outset, the supervision team was concerned that the CFED team did not have the recommended profile. Therefore, during the recruitment of a new CFED director in 2006, the TTL

intervened at the highest levels in the sponsoring ministry to prevent the appointment of a candidate who lacked any qualifications as an entrepreneur with strong management, business development and marketing skills. Experience shows that these skills are critical in the success of a center. The TTL's efforts failed.

Likewise, the Bank's supervision did not attempt to revise the PDOs but pushed very hard for the set-up of a real M&E plan with automated tools and accurate performance score cards to assess the achievement of the project's development objectives. Unfortunately, such a system was never put in place.

As is shown in successive Aide-Mémoires, the Task Team formulated numerous recommendations and sent strong signals to the Government to flag the lack of leadership by CFED Board and Management, the issues related to the institutional set-up or the need for stronger government support to the project. It is important to note that this project was not assigned to any officer of the Bank in Mauritania. This tended to limit the extent to which the Bank could have been more pro-active with, for instance, the Ministry of Finance to ensure the implementation of the numerous recommendations formulated during supervision missions. Improvements in the project occurred only during supervision missions. There was a limit to the frequency of supervision given that for most of the time in question, AFR GDLN program was housed in AFTQK and did not provide supervision support or assistance since it is not a project implementing unit.

When Bank operations were put on-hold in Mauritania, the Task Team could not travel for supervision and contact with center staff was limited to exchanges during the yearly GDLN Regional Coordination meeting. The Task Team took the opportunity provided by these meetings held outside Mauritania to resume contact with the project team, gather information on project performance and provide guidance as necessary.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance

Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

Because the supervision performance partly compensated the weaknesses during the preparation phase, overall Bank performance is rated *moderately unsatisfactory*.

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance

Rating: Unsatisfactory

The Government performance is rated *unsatisfactory*. The Government of Mauritania borrowed IDA funds to finance the establishment of a GDLN center and a large number of government staff was to be trained through distance learning with the expectation that they would apply what they have learned to improve governance in the public sector. However, most of the ministries have not been allocated sufficient funds for training and capacity building activities, including learning events that could be offered by the CFED. Over the last seven years, CFED has been underutilized.

Many attempts by the CFED Management to set-up cooperation agreements with key ministries and administrations to build the capacity of decision-makers and to strengthen governance mechanisms have failed due to a lack of follow-up on the government side,

as a direct consequence of the high staff turnover in these ministries/administration which did not allow for proper implementation of a number of pilot capacity-building activities.

The payment of the counterpart funds to the Project by the Government was sometimes delayed which created cash flow problems. Furthermore, the bulk of the funds were allocated to the Project Coordination Unit at the ministry which provided minimum support to CFED.

On the rare occasions when the government has agreed to engage CFED in training of decision makers and senior civil servants as in GDLN centers in other African countries, there has been no follow-up. For instance, the government agreed to allocate CFED a grant of US\$ 160,000 to train policy makers and senior civil servants, but this grant was never paid. Eventually, in March 2008, the CFED signed a partnership agreement with the Ministry of Public Service and Administration Modernization, with a US\$ 55,000 allocation. At the time of the ICR, this small amount has not been paid to the Center.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance

Rating: **Moderately Unsatisfactory**

The CFED Association (Board) is supposed to provide guidance to the center. In fact though, the Board provided no guidance to the center during its first 3 years operation. A new Board was appointed in 2006 and there was slight improvement in terms of engagement of the Board: meetings were held regularly as a sign of pro-activity.

A standard function of all GDLN Boards is to ensure that the centers develop strong business plans. It is also the responsibility of the Boards to review and approve annual business plans. In this regard, the CFED Board has failed the center by providing limited support or guidance.

The performance of the Implementing Agencies is rated *moderately unsatisfactory*.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance

Rating: **Unsatisfactory**

At the end of the project's implementation, the lack of support by the Government, the lack of follow-up and implementation by the project on the various recommendations made by the successive supervision missions (since 2009) and the limited pro-activity by the members of the respective Boards are seriously jeopardizing the achievement of the Project's development objectives. Therefore, the overall borrower performance is rated *unsatisfactory*.

6. Lessons Learned

Given the importance of the Lessons Learned in the case of a LIL, this section divides the Lessons into two groups: (i) the general lessons on GDLN and (ii) the specific lessons on this LIL.

(i) General lessons on GDLN

While replicating projects is possible, project design requires full cognizance of country-specific conditions

For example, in this case, the project design was replicated directly from GDLN projects being implemented in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire at the time of the Appraisal. The success of these two operations led the Task Team to replicate this design in Mauritania without having properly identified the differences in context and capacity and adapt the design accordingly. This resulted in significant shortcomings during the project implementation, in particular in terms of Government ownership and support as well as availability of capacity-building funds from the public sector.

Strong Government support is key to the success of a GDLN center: it promotes the center, giving it recognition as a capacity building facility.

This is because the primary target audience of a GDLN center consists of senior policy makers within the public sector. In Mauritania, the limited and inconsistent support has hurt CFED and reduced its chances of reaching its development objectives.

By way of contrast, in Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal, the governments have provided continuous support by the sponsoring learning activities and the promotion of the center's services across the ministries and the major administrations. In Kenya, the Government has signed a partnership agreement with the local GDLN center and the World Bank for the use of the center's services to train all staff working on Bank-funded programs, in areas such as financial management, project management, M&E, use of ICTs, etc... These elements of government support are lacking in Mauritania.

DLC staff capacity is another key factor of success for a GDLN project

The entrepreneurial, business development and communication skills of the DLC staff are also crucial to the success of a GDLN project but in the case of Mauritania, none of the succession of Directors had obvious skills as entrepreneurs. Consequently, although they attempted to market the center, in their promotion initiatives they failed to highlight the whole potential of the center, especially its access to resources for South-South knowledge exchanges, peer learning, regional policy dialogues or dissemination of good practices through GDLN. Yet this is a major attraction of a GDLN center and a properly trained staff would not have missed this opportunity.

Consultative process during project design and implementation is a prerequisite

In other GDLN operations, consultations between Africa GDLN and the government included clarification of the composition of the Board: all sectors are represented with an emphasis on entities that play a major part in capacity development. In the case of Mauritania, Board members were appointed without prior consultations on their role. The lack of clarity on the role of the Board could explain the lack of commitment and support. A fully consultative process could have helped to ensure sustainability and promote engagement and ownership.

A strong M&E component is an essential element in a LIL

Having a sound M&E system is fundamental to a LIL in order to enable one to gauge success or failure from the pilot and then use that to determine scaling-up prospects. This is particularly important for projects with qualitative indicators (e.g. indicators measuring the development of capacity) which usually require a lot of resources and human capacity to evaluate. The M&E mechanisms must be developed during the project preparation phase and M&E skills should be included in the ToRs of at least one of the DLC staff.

Availability of public sector funds for capacity building activities should be secured ex-ante

The Bank should not support the establishment of a GDLN center unless the Government has developed a clear national capacity building strategy and allocated sufficient budgetary resources to implement it. Although participation in a number of GDLN learning events can be sponsored by donor agencies, it is essential that key ministries and governmental agencies have an annual budget for training and capacity building activities, part of which can be organized through the local GDLN center.

(ii) Specific lessons learned

Institutional utilization of existing assets to develop capacity should be given top priority in an environment of severe capacity shortages

Mauritania is facing several challenges linked to governance, corruption, capacity building or, more recently, security. The Government of Mauritania together with its development partners must find solutions to these challenges so that the resources put at its disposal may be used in the best possible conditions to produce optimal outcomes. Over the last seven years, CFED has been underutilized despite the fact that there are significant capacity shortages.

The positioning of a GDLN center should focus on its real added value

The marketing and communication strategy of a GDLN center should focus on GDLN's most attractive value proposition: its ability to create and foster linkages to expertise in other countries, across a variety of sectors. Mauritania would greatly benefit from becoming an active participant in the emerging global South-South knowledge exchange agenda. The CFED would be the appropriate tool to enable the Government to actively engage in inter-regional and cross-regional dialogues.

Donor-funded projects with capacity building and training components constitute a market niche where GDLN centers have a strong comparative advantage but which is not sufficiently exploited in the case of Mauritania. For instance, the CFED signed a partnership agreement with the PDU (Programme de Développement Urbain), an IDA-funded project with an important capacity-building component. This partnership will generate an important volume of activity for CFED but it will only translate in facilities rental and will not draw on the expertise that is available across GDLN. In this specific case, the added-value of CFED is very limited.

Learning incentives need to change

Although the project helped introduce a new learning approach in Mauritania and demonstrated how vocational training, capacity building and knowledge exchanges can be organized via distance learning methods, it had to cope with well-rooted habits and mindsets of many people in the Sub-Region who are very reluctant to enroll in a training program unless they can travel and receive per diems. This should no longer be the main incentive for participants to attend training courses that are relevant and necessary for their career development. Only a strong political will, to be applied at all levels, may be able to change this mindset.

Access to CFED should be made easier

On several occasions, Bank supervision missions experienced difficulties to access the Palais des Congrès compound where the center is located. Access to the compound is controlled by soldiers, which does not allow for free movements of CFED clients and visitors. This situation is likely to affect the activities of the center. The possibility to offer a dedicated access to CFED should be considered by the Ministry of Employment, Vocational Training and New Technologies (MEFPTN) and discussed with the authority in charge of the security at the Palais des Congrès.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners

- (a) Borrower/implementing agencies** : None
- (b) Cofinanciers** Not applicable
- (c) Other partners and stakeholders** Not applicable

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Components	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
1. DLC RETROFITTING AND EQUIPMENT	1.15	1.06	
2. SUPPORT FOR DLC ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION	2.35	2.68	
3. MAURITANIA DEVELOPMENT GATEWAY	1.50	1.32	
Total Baseline Cost	5.00	5.06	
Physical Contingencies	0.30	0.00	0.00
Price Contingencies	0.00	0.00	0.00
Total Project Costs	0.00	5.06	
Front-end fee PPF	0.00	0.00	.00
Front-end fee IBRD	0.00	0.00	.00
Total Financing Required	5.00	5.06	

(b) Financing

Source of Funds	Type of Cofinancing	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
Borrower		0.68	0,64	94%
CFED		1.30	0,83	64%
PMD		0.40	0.00	0
International Development Association (IDA)		3.30	3.30	

Annex 2. Outputs by Component

Component 1 – Construction and equipment of the Distance Learning Center

This component is rated **Satisfactory**

The construction is of high quality and the equipment is perfectly adequate to carry out the mission of CFED. The design of the building benefited from the experience of other GDLN centers and took into account the lessons learned from the DLCs in Benin, Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire.

Component 2 – Support for DLC establishment and operation

This component is rated **Moderately Unsatisfactory**

The Distance Learning Center (CFED) was established as a Mauritanian private law public interest Association. It is a legal entity with financial autonomy, governed by a Board, equally comprising representatives of government ministries, Mauritanian academic institutions, the private sector and civil society, and chaired by an official elected from among the members.

In February 2005, after 15 months of operations, the DLC was covering 23% of its operating costs, which matched the objectives of the PAD.

In June 2008, the CFED's performance indicators showed that the center was close to achieve financial sustainability. During the few months preceding the political crisis in Mauritania, the DLC was covering more than 80% of its operating costs. It was offering capacity-building activities in areas matching the priorities of the country (as described in the PRSP) and the beneficiaries satisfaction survey indicated that the project was about to achieve its development objectives (see Annex 5).

Unfortunately, the August 2008 coup and its repercussions have seriously affected the performance of the project. The level of activities offered by the DLC dropped significantly and at project closing date, the DLC was only covering 32.73% of its operating costs.

The viability objectives over a three year period, as defined in the PAD, were too ambitious and not realistic in terms of time frame.

On the whole, over the 7 years of project execution, the CFED has been underutilized. At ICR date, the center is still facing some financial problems, which makes its future uncertain.

Component 3 - Support of the Mauritania Development Gateway establishment and operation

This component is rated **Unsatisfactory**.

Component 3 was added to the PAD during the project decision meeting as it corresponded to a set of new initiatives promoted by Bank management. Although it generated seemingly genuine interest on the part of the Mauritanian Government, this initiative was too much supply-driven.

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis
(including assumptions in the analysis)

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names	Title	Unit	Responsibility/ Specialty
Lending			
Supervision/ICR			
Fabien Michel Raymond Brenneval	Temporary	AFMMR	
Antoine Clapier	Consultant	AFMMR	
Nestor Coffi	Sr Financial Management Specia	AFTFM	
Thiane Dia	Executive Assistant	AFMMR	
Yahya Ould Aly Jean		HRSSD-HIS	
Moustapha Ould El Bechir	Senior Procurement Specialist	AFTPC	
Laurent Porte	Program Officer	WBIKE	
Pierre Schryve	Consultant	AFMMR	
Hawa Cisse Wague	Senior Economist	AFTP4	

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)	
	No. of staff weeks	USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)
Lending		
FY02		9.54
FY03		0.00
FY04		0.00
FY05		0.00
FY06		0.00
FY07		0.00
FY08		0.00
Total:		9.54
Supervision/ICR		
FY02		5.34
FY03	3	23.96
FY04	2	12.08
FY05	11	30.51
FY06	8	37.24
FY07	6	44.45
FY08	4	22.88
FY09	3	0.00
Total:	37	176.46

Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results

This survey was carried out in 2008 over a sample of 51 institution or department heads to assess the impact of CFED learning events on the professional activity of the beneficiaries.


Out of the 51 institutions and departments surveyed, 7 did not complete the questionnaire. The main outcomes of the survey are the following:

Only 9,33% of the persons interviewed found that the training programs were not useful for their staff (90,67% of them found the programs useful, very useful or excellent).

83.33% of the persons interviewed found that the training programs had a strong or very strong impact on their staff work quality.


Program Usefulness

No	0
Not very useful	4
Useful	12
Very useful	19
Excellent	8




Acquisition of new information

No	0
Few	6
Yes	14
Good	15
Excellent	9



Improvement of work quality

No	1
Few	6
Yes	19
Good	10
Excellent	6



Training Needs

M&E	18
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Internal and external audit	8
Microfinance	8
Control and management	7
Economics and finance	6
Accounting norms	6
Oil Industry	4
Human resources	4
Taxation	4
Insurance	3
Management	3
Statistics	1
Social Law	1
ITC and software	1
Programs in Arabic language	1
Training plan preparation	1
Languague courses	1

Besoins en Formation



- suivi évaluation
- audit interne et externe
- microfinance
- contrôle et gestion
- économie et finance
- normes comptables
- industrie pétrolière
- ressources humaines
- fiscalité
- assurance
- management
- statistique
- droit sociale
- NTIC et logiciels
- VC en arabe
- plan de formation
- langues

Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results
(if any)

Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

1) Borrower's ICR : Centre de Formation et d'Echanges à Distance (CFED)

Note sur le bilan des réalisations et les perspectives du CFED à la fin du projet

I. Contexte

Le CFED a été créé dans un contexte socio économique caractérisé par une menace sur le développement durable : faiblesse des capacités institutionnelles et humaines. En outre, des opportunités se présentaient dans le cadre de la mise en place du cadre stratégique de lutte contre la pauvreté (CSLP) :

- Développement des Ressources Humaines;
- Renforcement des capacités institutionnelles et de la bonne gouvernance;
- Stratégie Nationale de Développement des NTIC;
- Mise en place du GDLN par WBI.

II. Statut, structures, et financement

- Le CFED est une Association de droit privé Mauritanien d'utilité publique, à personnalité juridique et autonomie financière
- Le CFED est supervisé par un Bureau issu d'une Assemblée Générale composé de représentants de l'Etat, du Secteur Privé, de la Société Civile, etc.
- Le CFED est placé sous la responsabilité d'un Directeur assisté d'une petite équipe de consultants.
- Le CFED dispose d'un Crédit IDA sur 4 ans (2003 à 2006), dégressivement.

Il dispose aussi d'autres revenus :

- Fonds de contrepartie Etat
- Fonds générés par le CFED
- Dons et subvention éventuels

III. Historique

Le CFED est une Association à but non lucratif, reconnue par récépissé du Ministère de l'Intérieur des Postes et Télécommunications. Les principaux membres de l'Association CFED sont :

- Le MAED (Ministère des Affaires Economiques et du Développement) ;
- Le MIPT (Ministère de l'Intérieure des Postes et de Télécommunications) ;
- Le MEN (Ministère de l'éducation nationale) ;
- Le SETN (Secrétariat d'Etat auprès du Premier Ministre Chargé des Technologies Nouvelles) ;
- La CNPM (Confédération Nationale du Patronat Mauritanien) ;
- L'AMM (Association des Maires de Mauritanie) ;
- L'ordre national des avocats ;
- L'ordre national des experts comptables ;
- L'ordre national des médecins.

Le CFED a été reconnu d'utilité publique par Décret et peut donc, à ce titre, recevoir des dons et legs dans les conditions prévues à l'article 27 de la Loi N° 64-098 du 9 Juin 1964.

Le CFED est membre du réseau GDLN, et de l'Association africain des Centres d'Enseignement à Distance (AACED/AADLC).

Le MAED (Ministère des Affaires Economiques et du Développement) a assuré la coordination du projet global (CFED, et PMD) jusqu'au début de l'année 2003, date de transfert des responsabilités de tutelle (Coordination) au SETN (Secrétariat d'Etat aux Technologies Nouvelles). Fin juillet 2003, le Centre devenait opérationnel dans un contexte de début de vacances universitaires avec toutes les implications que cela pouvait avoir. Début Septembre 2003, intervint le lancement du CFED par son inauguration officielle par le Chef de l'Etat et le Vice Président de la Banque Mondiale.

L'année 2004 a été, notamment au cours du premier semestre, une année satisfaisante en termes d'activités de formations réalisées par le CFED. Mais Il est vrai que la plupart des cours (de qualité) étaient livrés *gratuitement* par l'Institut de la Banque mondiale. Ainsi, les activités de formation par vidéoconférence ont été réalisées à un rythme satisfaisant jusqu'au mois de juillet 2004.

L'année 2005 a été caractérisée par une tendance à la diversification des activités. Parallèlement aux actions de visibilité traditionnelles : présence sur une page de l'Annuaire téléphonique 2005, annonces publicitaires par voie de presse, mise à jour régulière du site web, des réunions de travail et des contacts divers ont été entrepris à l'adresse d'institutions diverses à Nouakchott. Dans cette perspective le CFED a engagé une grande campagne marketing centrée sur un surplus de visibilité, notamment à l'occasion du Colloque annuel du GDLN, tenu en 2005 à Nouakchott sous le patronage de la Secrétaire d'Etat auprès du Premier Ministre Chargée des technologies Nouvelles. Ce fut l'occasion pour le CFED d'accueillir plus d'une douzaine de délégations provenant d'Afrique, d'Europe et d'Amérique. Une grande couverture publicitaire a accompagné l'événement : pancartes en villes, insertions dans les journaux, couverture médiatique à l'occasion de l'ouverture et de la clôture officielles, reportages télédiffusés et radiodiffusés qui mettent en avant les missions du GDLN et du CFED.

L'année 2006 a été marquée par les difficultés de recrutement d'un nouveau Directeur, suite au départ en Septembre 2005 de son prédécesseur. L'intérim aura donc duré 10 mois. Elle a été marquée par la prolongation formelle de 24 mois pour la clôture du crédit IDA, sans rallonge de montant mais avec des réallocations budgétaires. En dépit d'une augmentation des charges, consécutives à l'entrée en fonction du nouveau Directeur, le ratio de couverture a continué à s'améliorer. En outre, de grands efforts en matière d'organisation et de maîtrise des coûts ont été déployés (mise en place d'un système de suivi-évaluation).

L'année 2007 a connu des contre-performances en matière de recettes au cours du premier semestre. Elles trouvent leur explication dans les faits ci-après:

- (i) la mauvaise conjoncture marquée par une baisse sensible des activités gouvernementales, liée à une longue période électorale (Novembre 2006- Avril 2007), puis à la mise en route du nouveau gouvernement (en particulier la finalisation des organigrammes) ;
- (ii) la perte de l'avantage comparatif du *Cybercafé* à cause de la généralisation de l'ADSL;

(iii) la baisse vertigineuse des activités du WBI qui se traduit, dans les faits, par des manques à gagner sur les recettes de location;

Pourtant, les charges récurrentes avaient continué à baisser. Ce qui a permis de poursuivre l'amélioration du ratio de couverture des charges opérationnelles par les recettes propres.

L'année 2008 devait être la dernière année du projet. En dépit des évènements politiques majeurs qu'elle a connus (crise institutionnelle) et qui ont occasionné la fermeture du CFED pendant deux mois, elle a été paradoxalement la meilleure sur le plan des réalisations :

- (i) la signature d'une convention avec le MFPMA ;
- (ii) la réalisation d'un marché avec le projet PRECASP ;
- (iii) la fidélisation d'une clientèle pour les vidéoconférences par l'intermédiaire de facilitateurs efficaces (ANAPEJ, BCM, Ministères, Banque mondiale, Système des Nations Unies, PROCAPEC...).

A partir du mois d'Août 2008, la situation financière et de trésorerie a subi la suspension des relations avec la Banque mondiale et la baisse des activités des autres partenaires. Le recouvrement des créances, notamment sur l'Etat, était devenu inexistant (la convention avec le MFPMA n'a pas été jusqu'ici honorée).

Au cours des années 2009 et 2010, la réduction draconienne des charges s'est poursuivie (voir l'évolution de la situation ci-jointe). Cela a permis de limiter les ponctions sur la trésorerie mais la situation ne peut durer indéfiniment sans le soutien politique des pouvoirs publics.

Globalement, on peut retenir l'analyse qui suit :

- **Aspects positifs :**

- Mise à la disposition du CFED de facilités essentielles : locaux viabilisés par le gouvernement ;
- Respect de l'essentiel des engagements pris par le gouvernement dans le cadre du projet, en dehors de la promesse de convention qui n'a finalement pas été convenablement tenue ;
- Hormis la période de rupture (crise institutionnelle), la Banque a respecté tous ses engagements.

- **Aspects négatifs :**

- Le montage institutionnel du projet n'a finalement pas été heureux : lourdeurs, coûts élevés, dilution des responsabilités, coordinateurs trop occupés à faire autre chose et instables dans leurs fonctions (4 coordinateurs au cours de la période) ;
- Le CFED a connu une trop longue période sans Directeur titulaire (10 mois) et ils ont été 4 à occuper la fonction dont un intérimaire. Cela fait en moyenne moins de deux années par Directeur ;
- Le désengagement progressif de la Banque quant aux activités du réseau GDLN a eu impact négatif sur la viabilité financière du centre.

IV. Objectifs

Le CFED a pour objet, le renforcement des capacités de gestion des responsables et décideurs des secteurs public et privé en matière de conception, de planification et de gestion des politiques et programmes de développement. Il vise notamment à :

- Promouvoir la formation à distance afin d'assurer le partage du savoir et du savoir-faire à moindre coût
- Favoriser la maîtrise des NTIC;
- Permettre l'accès d'un grand nombre de managers, décideurs, cadres, consultants et autres acteurs du développement des secteurs public et privé aux cours et programmes provenant d'horizons divers;
- Contribuer à la réduction des coûts de formation à l'étranger grâce à l'utilisation optimale des NTIC.

Les objectifs du Projet mentionnés dans le PAD prévoient à terme la réalisation des indicateurs de performances suivants :

- Réalisation de 80 séquences de formation dès la première année et 120 séquences pour les années suivantes
- Plus de 5 thèmes différents à aborder dans le cadre des formations réalisées
- Former annuellement plus de 150 opérateurs dans le domaine de la gestion des Projets ou de la lutte contre la pauvreté
- Assurer une fréquentation annuelle du Centre correspondant au chiffre de 5000 participants/jour
- Assurer une couverture des coûts d'opérations par les recettes sur un rythme correspondant à 20% la première année, 40% la deuxième, 60% la 3^{ème} et 70% la 4^{ème}, etc...

L'ensemble de ces indicateurs ont été largement réalisés notamment ceux relatifs aux sessions et à la fréquentation du Centre, voire à son impact sur le développement socio économique à travers le perfectionnement des ressources humaines.

Toutefois, il y a lieu de signaler que les performances en rapport avec la viabilité du CFED restent encore loin d'être réalisées...

Le taux de couverture moyen des coûts d'opérations par les recettes semble se stabiliser dans la fourchette des 40%, ce qui est loin des prévisions en rapport avec la viabilité du CFED. D'où la nécessité de recourir encore à la prorogation du Projet en perspective de la mise en place d'une stratégie pérenne.

V. Les principales réalisations:

Outre la réalisation d'un bâtiment fonctionnel équipé des meilleurs instruments et outils de visioconférence, le CFED jouit dans ce domaine d'une situation de monopole qui lui confère une certaine originalité et, à titre symbolique, une image de gardien du rapport qu'il doit y avoir entre les Tics et le développement des connaissances. Cette image symbolique se trouve amplifiée par le rôle volontaire que joue cette institution dans le domaine de la vulgarisation de la connaissance au service du développement.

Cette position stratégique s'explique par une stabilité du mode de connexion et une performance attestée. Ceci a été réalisé dès la mise en place du Projet avec une bande passante de l'ordre de 286 kbps aujourd'hui élevée à 510 kbps.

Les séminaires, ateliers et dialogues d'experts constamment engagés par vidéoconférence ont toujours été les lieux où les distances se trouvent abolies et les liens se trouvent établis entre des publics éloignés donnant ainsi l'opportunité de partager, d'échanger et de réfléchir ensemble.

Dans ce domaine, le Centre dispose d'un réseau important de fournisseurs de contenus et formateurs accrédités dans de nombreux pays : Maroc, Mali, Tunisie, Sénégal, Burkina Faso, Bénin, Côte d'Ivoire France, Grèce, Italie et en Hollande, Canada, USA, etc. ...

Au cours des 7 dernières années de fonctionnement, le CFED a réalisé 474 séances de formation par vidéoconférence, soit une moyenne de 80 vidéoconférences par an, ce qui rejoint l'Objectif de Projet visé dans le cadre de l'Accord de Crédit qui stipulait qu'à partir de la 3^{ème} Année le CFED doit passer à un seuil de l'ordre de 80 formations par an.

Ce chiffre ne tient pas compte de la période d'après transition où le rythme a été cassé par la conjonction d'éléments à la fois en rapport avec la *migration technique* et la *crise économique internationale*.

En matière de formation dans la salle multimédia pendant la même période, le CFED a réalisé 507 séances, soit une moyenne de 68 jours de formation par an.

Les formations réalisées sur la période écoulée se sont inscrites dans une optique de renforcement des capacités axées sur les thématiques du développement: lutte contre la pauvreté, suivi-évaluation des projets, Partenariat Public-Privé, amélioration de la gestion, comptabilité-gestion, microfinance, management stratégique, relations commerciales, formations en bureautique, formations en langues, santé publique, développement rural, bonne gouvernance, etc...

Sur les 7 ans plus de 20706 participants/jours ont eu à bénéficier du dispositif du CFED pour bénéficier d'une formation structurée, participer à des échanges ou organiser une activité de formation.

Sur ce chiffre global, 15286 sont des fonctionnaires et Agents de l'Etat et 5420 sont issus d'horizons divers (Banque mondiale, PNUD, secteur privé, société civile, etc.)

Parmi les bénéficiaires de ces formations se trouvent plusieurs cadres et responsables de haut niveau: ministres, secrétaires généraux, directeurs et chefs de projets, chefs d'entreprise, élus nationaux et locaux.

Ces exemples, entre autres, dénotent de l'impact positif du Centre en termes de formation au service du développement et de la lutte contre la pauvreté.

Une évaluation de perception effectuée sur un échantillon représentatif des bénéficiaires des prestations du CFED sur ses 7 premières années de fonctionnement ont donné les résultats suivants :

- 98% trouvent que la qualité de l'accueil est très bonne ou satisfaisante ;
- 100% trouvent que le programme de formation est globalement utile ;

- 94% trouvent que les supports pédagogiques des formations GDLN sont très bien préparés ou satisfaisants ;
- 98% trouvent que les technologies de visioconférence sont efficaces.

Une autre enquête d'évaluation d'impact à été réalisée auprès des Directions et entreprises ayant bénéficié de formations au CFED afin d'évaluer l'impact de ces formation sur le personnel formé.

Cette enquête a porté sur un échantillon de 51 responsables d'institutions ou services pour évaluer l'impact de la Formation du CFED sur l'activité des participants

Sur les 51 institutions et services enquêtés, 7 n'ont pas rempli le questionnaire.

D'une manière générale, les résultats suivants sont à retenir :

- Seuls 9,33% des responsables enquêtés ont trouvé que la formation n'a pas été utile à leurs collaborateurs
- 90,67% ont trouvé les formations ou utile ou très utile ou même excellente.
- 83,33% des responsables ont jugé que l'impact de la formation a été ou remarquable ou très bon ou excellent par rapport au rendement du personnel bénéficiaire.

Les perspectives d'avenir du CFED:

Les actions suivantes ont été entreprises au cours de l'année 2010 avec le soutien actif de la Banque mondiale :

- a. La négociation et la conclusion d'une convention avec le MAED (projet PDU) pour la formation des élus locaux et des administrations décentralisées (accord PDU-DGCL signé par le MAED, pour un montant de 21 millions d'UM) ;
- b. La négociation d'une autre Convention de partenariat avec le PRECASP est en bonne voie ;
- c. D'autres perspectives sont en cours d'exploration (l'ENA, ISCAE, Ministères).

L'équilibre financier est *possible* mais *aléatoire* à cause de l'*étroitesse* du marché de la formation et de la vidéoconférence (le réseau GDLN francophone rencontre des difficultés de contenu et de programmation depuis 2009).

La situation serait encore *plus viable* si (i) l'Etat utilise plus fréquemment les services du CFED et règle ses dettes et/ou si (ii) les conditions d'accès aux locaux s'améliorent.

Au plan institutionnel, trois scénarii s'imposent (par ordre de pertinence) :

- a. Le statu quo présente l'avantage de continuer à offrir au CFED le même statut que la plupart des autres centres du réseau GDLN (Sénégal, Bénin...). Il pourrait être expérimenté pendant les deux prochaines années pour vérifier la capacité du CFED à équilibrer ses comptes et donc ne pas constituer une charge pour les finances publiques ;
- b. La transformation en EPIC pose le problème de la subvention (il ne pourra plus contracter avec la plupart des PTF dont notamment la Banque mondiale et les projets qu'elle finance) et ceux liés aux difficultés inhérentes à la gestion publique ;
- c. La transformation en EPA va priver le CFED de ses recettes propres d'autant plus qu'il faudra payer régulièrement les charges liées au réseau (Intelsat et EMC). La situation présente en outre les mêmes inconvénients exposés plus haut dans l'hypothèse d'un EPIC.

2) Borrower's ICR : Portail mauritanien du Développement (PMD)

1. Contexte du projet, les objectifs de développement

Objectifs de la Composante PMD : Le PMD/Mauritanie sera un site web spécialisé sur le thème du développement, à partir duquel les utilisateurs pourront accéder à des informations, à des ressources et à des services ; ils pourront également l'enrichir de leur savoir et de leurs expériences, créant ainsi un espace commun d'échange d'informations, de dialogue et de recherche de solutions, plus facile d'accès et plus navigable que l'océan d'informations actuellement disponibles sur l'Internet. Le PMD permettra ainsi aux acteurs du développement d'échanger des informations, de communiquer facilement, et de former des communautés d'intervenants pour s'attaquer aux grands problèmes du développement à partir de la base.

Le PMD donnera accès à toute une gamme de services, tels que modules de formation en ligne, résultats de travaux de recherche, idées nouvelles et bonnes pratiques, études de cas, services de passation de marchés, informations sur des projets de développement, financements, opportunités commerciales, évaluations de produits, nouvelles, offres d'emploi et répertoires, tous adaptés aux besoins particuliers de chaque public — personnalités locales, investisseurs privés, décideurs, responsables de collectivités locales ou universitaires. Il permettra d'aborder une large gamme de thèmes du développement, et fera appel à une équipe de gestionnaires de contenu et de spécialistes, de rédacteurs, d'auteurs et autres membres de la communauté de développement pour évaluer, traiter et présenter le contenu.

1.2 Objectifs de départ du projet de développement(AOP) et les indicateurs clés (comme approuvé)

Les objectifs du projet n'ont pas été révisés depuis leur approbation par les autorités. Les objectifs de développement du projet tels que formulés actuellement dans l'Accord de Crédit peuvent sembler trop vagues, pas assez réalistes ou mal formulés, par exemple pour le PMD :

- (I) maximiser les opportunités et minimiser les risques sur l'économie liés à la révolution de l'Internet;
- (II) faciliter le commerce électronique, e-banking et e-gouvernement;
- (III) mobiliser le développement des connaissances;
- (IV) améliorer les communications au sein de diverses communautés sociales et économiques,
- (V) aider à augmenter le niveau de vie, la compétitivité globale du pays grâce à des coûts de transaction moins élevés et une plus grande productivité et transparence.

En 2006, des propositions de révision des objectifs ont été formulées ainsi :

Objectif 1 : Maximiser le recueil et la diffusion de l'information socio économique sur la Mauritanie ;

Objectif 2 : Faciliter et promouvoir les e-services (e-commerce, e-banking, e-gouvernement, e-learning, etc.)

Objectif 3 : favoriser l'accès et le partage des connaissances en matière de développement pour l'ensemble des communautés (agriculteurs, éleveurs, pêcheurs, etc.) .

Objectif 4 : Améliorer les niveaux de vie en augmentant la compétitivité nationale par une réduction des coûts de transaction et une meilleure transparence.

Une reprise presque des objectifs initiaux qui demeurent assez imprécis et difficilement évaluables.

Indicateurs clés

Planned Outputs	Baseline	Current (November 07)	End-Project (Jan 09)
The MRDG server is permanently visible.	0	Actual: 335	Planned: The MRDG server has been visible during at least 335 days per year
The number of connections per year has reached (20,000 the first year of implementation, 40,000 the second year, and 50,000 the third year).	0	Actual: 720000	Planned: more than 50,000 connections to the MRDG site per year.

C'est une très bonne performance pour le PMD. Par ailleurs l'équipe du PMD a continué à diffuser les informations socioéconomiques, les rapports, articles, annonces, avis de recrutement et avis de passations de marché sur le site. Cette activité quotidienne a permis la naissance de communautés d'intérêt commun et a renforcé la fidélité de notre public. Tout au long des dernières années, nous nous sommes positionnés comme l'un des sites les plus visités du pays (plus 2000 visiteurs/j). Nous avons fait beaucoup de réalisation qui ont touché aussi bien les bailleurs (Banque mondiale, GTZ, Coopération Française), que l'Administration et la société civile.

Premier indicateur clé: le serveur est visible 335 jours/an

Deuxième indicateur clé: Le nombre de connexions par /an a atteint 20 000 à la 1ère année

Troisième indicateur clé : Le nombre de connexions par /an a atteint 50 000 à la 3ème année

1.3 Objectifs révisée (comme approuvé par l'autorité de tutelle), indicateurs clés, justification

1.4 Principaux bénéficiaires,

FORMATION

- **Le secteur public** (formations dispensées pour cpte)
ANAPEJ (diplômés chômeurs : en 2006 Informatique et langue française et anglaise)
SETN (formations en bureautique et Internet ,de haut cadres de l'Administration , inspecteurs des Impôts , du Trésor , de Douanes Etc.. , avec les sénateurs en 2006)
PNUD(formation de médecins en informatique 2008)
Scs Culturel de Coopération française /MAED(formation de 40 cadres en bureautique pour des cadres de différents ministères en 2009)
- **Le secteur privé**
Sup Consult International(formation en droit des affaires pour cadres de société privées)
Développement de systèmes d'Information :
SITP (trésor public) convention depuis 2007
CENI (contrat en 2005-2006)
CSLP (convention en 2005)
M I D (contrat pr accès au site élection présidentielle 2009)
BM (LPPMS suivi évaluation projets BM en RIM) 2008-2010)

Ont payé des services et sont satisfaits de nos prestations :

La GTZ, la Coopération Française, la CENI, l'Anapej, le Trésor public, le CSLP, la Chambre de Commerce de Mauritanie, la NASR (convention de publication), l'ISKAN, la SNIM, la SMH, l'EPBR, le NDB.

Ont des conventions de publication avec nous :

PRISME (Projet minier), Projet Education Formation, PANPA, PDU, PATRIST, PDRC, PRECASP

Partenaires

- Oracle (technologie du e-learning)
- ICDL-Mauritania (concept à diffuser en Mauritanie)
- DGMarket (convention de publication)
- InfoDev (technologies)
- Majorsystmes (sous-traitance en développement)
- 2SI (négociations en cours)
- SupConsult International
- Union Pour la République (UPR) (développement d'un système de gestion des adhérents)
- l'Agence d'Accès Universel (convention de publication)
- SANABIL (Tunisie) , en discussion

Réseaux

- CGN (Country Gateway Network) - member
- L'ADGate (Association Africaines des Portails Pays)
- MENA (Association des Portails du Moyen Orient et de l'Afrique du Nord)
- Etc.

1.5 Composantes de départ approuvées

- Composante A:
- Composante B : PMD
- Composante C :

Conception :

Le Portail Mauritanien du Développement est une innovation qui n'a pas de précédent au sein des projets de la Banque. Afin de s'assurer une mise en œuvre compatible avec les capacités d'absorption dans un domaine nouveau, il a été décidé de mettre en œuvre la composante PMD en trois phases. Si la première phase atteint les objectifs qui lui auront été attribuée, la Banque donnera son accord pour que l'exécution de cette composante entre dans la phase 2. Il en sera de même pour passer de la phase 2 à la dernière phase.

- A. La première phase qui doit durer un an consiste en (i) l'installation et la réalisation complète de la base de données du PMD, (ii) l'assurance que l'opérateur va accroître la bande passante disponible pour permettre aux utilisateurs de pouvoir accéder au PMD et de naviguer confortablement (condition nécessaire au développement du site).
- B. La deuxième phase qui doit durer un an, consiste en (i) la réalisation et mise en ligne des services définis dans le cahier des charges du PMD, (ii) la réalisation des objectifs définis dans le Business-Plan et qui assure au PMD un accroissement significatifs de ses revenus pour aboutir à la rentabilité financière à la fin de la troisième année.

- C. La dernière phase consiste à compléter la mise en ligne des services payants et à continuer la politique marketing du PMD pour accroître le nombre d'abonnés jusqu'à l'autonomie financière.

Mise en oeuvre : Le SE de cette phase c'est fait au fur et à mesure de l'avancement du projet et au moyens des différentes missions du TTL ainsi que des audits réalisés ces dernières années. Une revue à mi-parcours a été réalisée en 2004.

2.5 Avenir du projet (Opération après achèvement / Phase suivante)

Les propositions suivantes sont toutes des alternatives réalisables. Chacune d'elles peut garantir la pérennité au PMD. Il serait judicieux de garder le statu quo, en attendant de mobiliser les fonds nécessaires pour lancer les études visant à mettre en place l'institution dont les statuts seront les mieux adaptés pour le contexte mauritanien et pour la mission du PMD.

Option 1 : La transformation de l'Association PMD en une agence chargée de promouvoir et de développer les TIC à tous les niveaux et pour tous les usages (économiques, administratifs, et sociaux).

La dénomination ainsi que les démarches juridiques et administratives seront du ressort d'un consultant ou bureau qui sera chargé par la tutelle afin de mener à bien cette mission.

L'agence pourra être liée à l'Etat pour une convention de 3 à 5 ans renouvelables.

Option 2 : La transformation du PMD en une pépinière (incubateur) d'entreprises et d'innovation spécialisée en TIC, d'autant plus que le PMD est déjà membre de l'Association Africaine des Incubateurs (AIN), ainsi que de l'Association des incubateurs- innovateurs du Moyen Orient et du Maghreb (MENAinc). Dans ce cas de figure, l'Etat doit octroyer un terrain et débloquer les fonds nécessaires pour la construction de la pépinière : un grand espace (au moins 1000 M²) pour l'accueil des entrepreneurs et des porteurs de projets innovants (surtout dans le domaine des TIC).

Option 3 : Transformation du PMD en Etablissement Public à caractère Administratif (EPA) chargé de la promotion des TIC, sous le contrôle de l'Etat, disposant d'une certaine autonomie administrative et financière qui lui permettrait d'assurer une activité dans le domaine des TIC avec la possibilité de sous-traiter les marchés par le Ministère de tutelle (au niveau des administrations).

Option 4 : L'association PMD dispose d'un récépissé de reconnaissance N°0058 en date du 02 Avril 2002, délivré par le Ministère de l'intérieur, d'une durée de vie de 99 ans, des statuts et d'un règlement intérieur, elle est reconnue d'utilité publique par le décret N° 2002 -079 en date du 04 Novembre 2002, liée au Ministère de tutelle par une convention d'hébergement, peut très bien continuer sous les statuts actuels.

Dans tous les cas figure, le Ministère de tutelle en charge des TIC, pourra solliciter aux opérateurs de télécommunication exerçant en Mauritanie, le versement d'un pourcentage minimal destiné à aider le PMD pour les prochaines années.

3.2 Réalisation des Objectifs de développement du projet

PREMIER INDICATEUR : le serveur est visible 335 jours/an

Nombre cible: 335

Résultats atteints : 350

DEUXIEME INDICATEUR : Le nombre de connexions par /an a atteint 20 000 à la première année

Nombre cible: 20 000

Résultats atteints : +de 200 000 visiteurs par an la IER Année

TROISIEME INDICATEUR : Le nombre de connexions par /an a atteint 50 000 à la troisième année

Nombre cible: 50 000

Résultats atteints : 720 000

3.3 Efficacité

3.4 Autres résultats et impacts

(a) Impacts sur la pauvreté, aspects genres et le développement social.

Le PMD a pu réaliser plusieurs formations touchant les différentes composantes socioprofessionnelles du pays (diplômés sans emploi, parlementaires, société privées, informaticiens, cadres de Ministères, ONG etc.) il a pu créer des communautés au tour de plusieurs thèmes et a fidélisé les visiteurs par la mise à jour des contenus et apports en informations. Les offres d'emplois constituent aujourd'hui un espoir pour nos chômeurs que, parfois nous remerciant pour leur avoir donné l'occasion de participer à des candidatures.

(b) Changement institutionnel / Renforcement

Au cours de la durée du projet plusieurs changements ont été opérés se limitant notamment aux tutelles, aux bureaux de l'Association, à sa présidence et aux membres de l'Assemblée Générale.

5.1 Performance de la Banque

(a) Performance de la Banque dans l'accompagnement

Durant cette phase, il y a rien à reprocher aux responsable de la banque : Le TTL , Mr Marc Lixi a fait de son mieux pour supporter les équipes et assurer un bon suivi des objectifs aussi bien du CFED que du PMD, au niveau des décaissement et des conseils en matières de passation de marchés, nous rendons hommage à Mr Yahay Ali Jean ainsi qu'à Mr Monstapha Bechir qui tout fait pour nous faciliter le travail et lever les obstacles.

ETATS DES DECAISSEMENT DU PROJET CFED-PMD AU 31/12/2009

LIBELLE	BENEFICIAIRE		TOTAL DRF	Montant décaissé en USD	Génie Civil/Catég I	Equipement Matériel/Catég II	Consul formation/
ALLOCATIONS en USD			3 263 289,40	3 263 289,40	466 184,20	390 993,20	1 1
TOTAL DECAISSEMENT AU 31/12/2008			2 832 478,04	2 832 478,04	213 395,20	367 945,99	1 7
2008 DRF 60/08	UCP CFED PMD	C A B	80 585,67	859,25 52 269,28 27 457,34			
2008 DRF 61/08	NEANT						
2008 DRF 62/08	UCP CFED PMD	C A B	102 744,70	5854,98 55 666,88 41 222,84		1980,52 321,7	
TOTAL DEPENSES en USD au 31/12/2009			183 330,37	183 330,37	0	2302,22	1
CUMUL DES DEPENSES en USD au 31/12/2009			3 015 808,41	3 015 808,41	213 395,20	370 248,21	1 8
DISPONIBLE CREDIT en USD PAR Catégorie en USD au 31/12/2009				247 480,99	252 789,00	20 744,99	-7

NB : A la date officielle de clôture du Crédit au

31 Mai 2010, il n'y a eu aucun décaissement de l'IDA.

Toutefois au mois de **Juin 2010**, l'IDA a procédé au Remboursement partiel des dépenses pré financées de 2008 à Décembre 2009 pour un montant de **UM 55 445 528,39** sur une demande de **69 000 000 UM** qui ne couvre pas les dépenses de janvier à Mai 2010 .**le PMD** a reçu de ce remboursement 13 456 508,00 UM , l'UC 4 906 609,00 UM et le reste soit UM 37 082 411 à la composante CFED

Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

Project Appraisal Document

Financial Analysis and Assumptions

Development Credit Agreement

Project Activity Report (including Beneficiary Surveys)

Supervision Aide-memoires

Implementation Status and Results (ISRs)

MAURITANIA

- SELECTED CITIES AND TOWNS
- ⊙ REGION CAPITALS
- ⊗ NATIONAL CAPITAL
- ~ RIVERS
- MAIN ROADS
- RAILROADS
- REGION BOUNDARIES
- - - INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES

