



## 1. Project Data

<b>Project ID</b> P124715	<b>Project Name</b> CI Emergency Infrastructure Renewal	
<b>Country</b> Cote d'Ivoire	<b>Practice Area(Lead)</b> Transport	
<b>L/C/TF Number(s)</b> IDA-58930,IDA-H7900	<b>Closing Date (Original)</b> 31-Dec-2016	<b>Total Project Cost (USD)</b> 156,436,249.40
<b>Bank Approval Date</b> 26-Jun-2012	<b>Closing Date (Actual)</b> 30-Sep-2020	
	<b>IBRD/IDA (USD)</b>	<b>Grants (USD)</b>
Original Commitment	100,000,000.00	0.00
Revised Commitment	159,992,494.79	0.00
Actual	156,436,249.40	0.00

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## 2. Project Objectives and Components

### a. Objectives

According to both the Financing Agreement (FA, p.5) and the Emergency Project Paper (EPP, paragraph 35), the project development objective (PDO) was "to improve access to basic infrastructure in targeted urban and rural areas."

The FA for the Additional Financing (AF, p.6) and the accompanying Project Paper (PP, paragraph 16) revised this PDO to "improve access to basic infrastructure in targeted urban and rural areas, and, in the



event of an Eligible Crisis or Emergency, to provide immediate and effective response to said Eligible Crisis or Emergency."

In this review, the project performance is assessed against the achievement of the revised PDO consisting of the unchanged original PDO and a new objective with the addition of the Contingent Emergency Response Component (CERC). Project performance would be assessed against these three sub-objectives, in line with the ICR assessment:

- to improve access to basic infrastructure in targeted urban areas;
- to improve access to basic infrastructure in targeted rural areas; and
- to provide immediate and effective response to the crisis or emergency, in the event of an Eligible Crisis or Emergency.

**b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?**

Yes

**Did the Board approve the revised objectives/key associated outcome targets?**

Yes

**Date of Board Approval**

02-Aug-2016

**c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?**

No

**d. Components**

**1. Urban Infrastructure Rehabilitation:** (US\$78.4 million at appraisal, AF revised to US\$124.1 million, US\$115.3 million actual). This would finance the rehabilitation of the following: (i) urban roads, including drainage, and street lighting; (ii) school buildings, health centers, and other public buildings; (iii) urban water supply infrastructure; and (iv) sanitation, drainage and flood protection infrastructure. AF would provide resources for construction and rehabilitation of additional facilities and public spaces identified in Communal Investment Programs of participating target areas.

**2. Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation** (US\$11.0 million at appraisal, US\$12.1 million actual). This would finance the construction of the Bassawa Bridge, rehabilitation of key rural roads, and provision of basic social infrastructure. AF would supplement the rehabilitation of economic and basic social infrastructure along the corridor between San Pedro-Daloa-Seguela-Boundiali, and the border with Mali, including a logistics platform in the Nawa region.

**3. Project Management and Coordination** (US\$10.6 million at appraisal, AF revised to US\$14.5 million, US\$14.5 million actual). This would finance the project management and coordination costs, including consultant services, technical assistance, training and operating costs.

**4. Urban and Municipal Management** (US\$10.4 million at AF and actual) AF added this component to finance the preparation and implementation of performance-based city contracts (*contrats de*



*performance*) between municipalities and the central government. This component would also finance the implementation of Communal Maintenance, and Communal Management Support programs that would establish municipal maintenance accounts, set operations and maintenance (O&M) performance targets, and implement management programs to improve technical, budgeting, and financial management practices. This component would also finance the preparation of urban audits and capacity building for added target municipalities. Finally, just-in-time, as needed technical assistance in decentralization, intergovernmental transfers, and municipal finance directed at national entities would also be financed.

**5. Contingent Emergency Response** (US\$ 0 million at AF, US\$8.8 million actual). AF added this component to finance works, consultant services, and/or operation costs of a list of goods required for immediate response to recover from a declared emergency.

**e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates**

**Project Cost:** The original total project cost at appraisal was US\$200 million. With AF from both the Bank and the government, the revised total project cost was US\$420 million (see Financing below). The credit disbursed US\$156.4 million. The balance of the credit was cancelled because the activities would not be completed in time (see Sections 4 Efficacy, 8 Assessment of Bank Performance (b) Quality of Supervision, and 10 Other Issues below).

**Financing:** The World Bank's International Development Association (IDA) financed this project in two tranches. First, a US\$100.0 million grant in emergency financing under OP/BP 8.00. Second, a US\$60 million in Additional Financing (AF) credit for a total of US\$160 million.

**Borrower Contribution:** The recipient/borrower originally committed US\$100 million and added US\$160 million after the AF. The recipient/borrower disbursed US\$260 million at project closing.

**Dates and Project Restructuring:** The project, approved on June 26, 2012 and made effective on October 10, 2012, was expected to close on December 31, 2016. A Mid Term Review (MTR) was completed on March 26, 2015. On August 2, 2016, a Level 1 restructuring approved US\$60 million in AF, expanded the project scope to add two new components (urban and municipal management, contingent emergency response component (CERC)), updated the PDO to include the outcomes from the added components, and extended the project closing date to January 31, 2020, 37 months after the original closing date. OP 10.00 allowed AF to close beyond three years. On September 16, 2018, a level 2 restructuring triggered CERC. On November 15, 2019, another level 2 restructuring extended the project closing date by another 8 months to September 30, 2020. The project was extended for a total of 45 months.

**Split Rating:** The original PDO remained unchanged but added a sub-objective after the severe water crisis in Bouake triggered CERC in 2018. According to the guidelines, a split rating of the outcome was not warranted because the AF expanded the scope of the project and targets related to the increased scope were met (see Section 4 Achievement of Objectives below).

### 3. Relevance of Objectives



## Rationale

**Country Context:** Côte d'Ivoire has experienced political, social, and economic crises since the late 1990s. The country was included in the World Bank's list of countries experiencing Fragility and Conflict situations (FCS) from 2006 until 2019 (<https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/brief/harmonized-list-of-fragile-situations>). These events led to the deterioration of infrastructure and productive assets. By 2012, the economy began to recover. By 2014, its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) reached US\$135 million (CPF, paragraph 1), one of the largest in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) region. The country contributed about 40 percent to WAEMU's GDP and remained an important transit hub for its landlocked neighboring countries. The PDOs and the project addressed the country's fragile recovery (ICR, paragraph 78).

**Relevance to Country Priorities:** The PDOs were relevant to two of the government's development plans. In 2011, the Government prepared a 15-year, US\$1.8 billion capital district plan based on an Emergency Presidential Program. The program aimed to (i) restore peace and security and promote reconciliation and reunification; (ii) rebuild basic infrastructure and social services; (iii) establish fiscal and debt sustainability; and (iv) promote economic growth through key structural reforms in energy, agriculture, manufacturing and financial services (ICR, paragraph 6). The government also prepared a National Development Plan for 2016-2020. In the plan, infrastructure in general, and transport in particular, would promote inclusive growth to reduce poverty. Activities would enhance economic competitiveness, facilitate mobility, and promote access to basic services. The PDOs contributed toward achieving the objectives in these plans.

In early May 2018, the Government requested urgent support to respond to a severe water crisis in Bouake, the second largest city of Cote d'Ivoire. Years-long drought, reduced rainfall, watershed damaged by sand extraction that prevented the reservoir to replenish resulted in this emergency and triggered the Contingent Emergency Response component (CERC). Uncommitted funds designed for water supply works in Bouake were reallocated to fund the emergency water intervention in the same city.

**Relevance to Bank Assistance Strategy:** The PDOs was relevant to the World Bank's latest Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for Cote D'Ivoire for FY16-FY19. This CPF remained valid at project closing. The PDOs contributed toward all three focus areas of the CPF. In Focus Area 1 - accelerating sustainable private sector-led growth, the PDOs contributed to achieving Objective 2 to strengthen economic infrastructure. In Focus Area 2 - building human capital for economic development and social cohesion, the PDOs supported Objective 7, to improve the delivery and quality of health and water services. In Focus Area 3 - strengthening public financial management and accountability at the local level, the PDOs and the project interventions were directed at urban and municipal management in line with Objective 10, which aimed to increase accountability and transparency in public expenditures. The PDOs also contributed toward the CPF's cross cutting area 2, complementing the government's intent to reduce spatial disparities and address lagging regions by targeting these areas.

**Previous Bank Sector Experience in the Country:** The World Bank has extensive experience and global expertise in emergency operations and in supporting the rehabilitation of infrastructure and basic services in post conflict countries. The World Bank launched a two-phased approach for an Emergency Infrastructure Renewal Program for the country's long-term post conflict recovery. The first phase consisted of two operations: (i) US\$150 million Post Conflict Reconstruction and Recovery grant, and (ii) US\$50 million Emergency Youth Employment and Skills Development project. The second phase would consist of the following: (i) two US\$150 million each budget support operations; (ii) agriculture sector support; (iii) basic education support; and (iv) this project to address priority urban and rural infrastructure reconstruction



needs. The Bank also cooperated in the following projects: (i) US\$144 million Urban Infrastructure Emergency Project (*Le Projet d'Urgence d'Infrastructures Urbaines* or PUIUR) grant to improve the urban environment in Abidjan and Bouake and other internal cities; (ii) US\$50 million Urgent Electricity Rehabilitation Project grant for urgent distribution network extension and rehabilitation; and (iii) US\$120 million equivalent Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance Project grant to improve target communities by offering economic reintegration opportunities and access to social services (EPP, paragraphs 27,30,31, and ICR, paragraph 79; see also Section 8, Assessment of Bank Performance (a) Quality at Entry below).

**PDO addressing a development problem:** However, while there is clear alignment between the project's development objectives and the country and World Bank strategies, the relevance of the objectives is pitched at a level that does not adequately reflect a potential solution to a development problem. While acknowledging the difficulty of the operational environment, a shortcoming here was that the objectives were not defined such that its achievement would be plausibly traceable to improvements envisioned to arise from "improved access to basic infrastructure." Focusing on "improved access to infrastructure" alone is not outcome focused and does not help in understanding what development results were expected as a consequence of the project. These may be longer term targets but tracking them and identifying them is an important aspect of a successful development operation.

Overall, relevance of objectives is rated Substantial. The PDOs were highly relevant to the government's and the Bank priorities toward post conflict recovery. The PDOs were relevant in addressing the infrastructure decay in the target urban and rural areas of a country emerging from conflict and instability. The PDOs considered the country's existing capacity and expanded the target to reach both urban and rural communities, building upon those that have been reached by previous operations. However, the PDOs' formulation did not adequately reflect a potential solution to a development problem as these were pitched at a lower level of the results chain.

## Rating

Substantial

## 4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

### OBJECTIVE 1

#### Objective

To improve access to basic infrastructure in targeted urban areas.

#### Rationale

**Theory of Change (TOC):** The TOC provided a plausible causal relationship between inputs, outputs, and outcomes to express the PDO. However, the TOC did not capture the full extent of the support provided by the project or capture outcomes arising from multiple areas of development. Outputs in target urban areas such as the rehabilitation of roads and drainage; extending water networks; constructing schools, health centers and other public buildings; and providing public lighting; and regularizing illegal networks would



provide protection from periodic flooding and access to improved services to the urban residents of Abidjan, Yamoussoukro, Korhogo, Bouaké, Abengourou, and Soubré. However, the TOC did not provide sufficient detail in the outcomes associated with "access to improved services" beyond the number of beneficiaries to capture service delivery attributes, such as reliability, adequacy, quality. An increase in secondary level graduation rates was attributed as an outcome in the ICR but not included in the TOC. Interventions outside the project that may have bolstered project outcomes were not noted. For example, the improved high school graduation rate noted for the one high school renovated by the project may have benefited from national sector policies or resources in secondary level education. The results framework in the Emergency Project Paper (EPP) and the ICR TOC were consistent except that after the AF, outcome indicators were scaled up and the causal links in the results framework were adjusted accordingly. AF would consolidate and scale up the original inputs by addressing financing gaps to meet targets, aim for lagging areas with urgent infrastructure needs and "connector" cities identified by the Côte d'Ivoire Urbanization Review, such as the construction and rehabilitation of public spaces and markets in the original and added target areas (Korhogo, Koumassi, and Port Bouet), and provide management capacity technical assistance to selected municipalities and national agencies. The capacity building assistance would lead to maintenance line items in municipal budgets and adoption of consultative municipal budget processes. The new water production plant in Bouake was cancelled once CERC was triggered (see below). The underlying assumptions, which materialized during implementation were: (i) technical and engineering standards adopted were within the government's implementation capacity; (ii) activities would be rapidly implemented; and (ii) the Project Coordination Unit (PCU) staff had the necessary implementation experience (ICR, paragraph 12).

**OUTPUTS** The following targets were exceeded, achieved or substantially achieved:

- 98.7 km (target 98 km) of roads were rehabilitated, benefiting 3,823,000 urban residents with access to all season roads within 500 meter range (baseline 3,140,000, original target 3,640,000, revised target 3,822,000). Along these constructed roads, storm water drains were cleaned and rehabilitated, improving access and usability throughout the year proving resilience to weather changes.
- 20 health facilities (as targeted) were constructed, renovated, and/or equipped benefiting 663,204 residents with access to rehabilitated health centers.
- 55 (as targeted) primary level schools and one secondary level school (as targeted) were renovated in Abidjan, Korhogo, Bouake, Abengourou, and Soubré benefited. 22,000 pupils
- 6,162 (target 5,400) public lighting fixtures were rehabilitated along 167.5 km of the public lighting network in some areas of Abidjan, Bouake and converted 16 683 (original target 16,673) public lighting fixtures into more efficient lighting.

AF achieved the following targets:

- 8 drainage, sewer, and urban master plans were completed and updated, as targeted.
- Six (baseline 0, original target 7) municipalities achieved their objectives specified in their performance contracts.
- The Communal Management Support program (*Programme d'Appui à la Gestion Communale*, PAGEC) was implemented as targeted.
- The commune investment program (*Programmes d'Investissements Communaux*, PIC) implemented 34 activities (target 42 originally planned in 7 communes). Targets were established during implementation as part of the urban audits that were carried out. These were (i) pedestrian amenities such as streetscapes, tertiary drainage, pedestrian amenities, landscaping and open green space in





Bouaké; (ii) public Plaza in Daloa, (iii) tertiary drainage and landscaping and open green space in Koumassi and (iv) parking space in San-Pedro.

- The commune maintenance program (*Programmes d'Entretien Communaux*, PEC) was implemented (ICR, paragraph 53 did not provide targets. However, the AF Project Paper indicated that these maintenance targets were established during implementation in a dedicated communal maintenance account (*Compte Entretien Communal* or CEC. PP for AF, Annex 3, paragraph 8 (b)). Targeted communes implemented 178 activities including the renovation of 500 classroom benefiting 28,000 pupils. All communes were reported to exceed detailed targets maintained in a dashboard document but not reported in the ICR.

The construction of a new water production plant in Bouake was cancelled and reallocated to finance CERC below. The rehabilitation of urban roads in Bondoukou and Bouna, the construction of flood prevention systems in Seguela and Man (see Section 10 Other Issues, Procurement below) were cancelled because these would not be completed by the time the project closed.

## OUTCOME

- Direct beneficiaries of 4.234 million residents benefited from the project (original target 3 million, revised target 4.3 million, substantially achieved), of which 48 percent were female, as targeted. Delays in counterpart financing affected fully achieving this target.
- 3,823,000 (baseline 3,000,000, original target 4,000,000, target almost achieved) urban residents were provided with access to improved water sources. Rehabilitated 6 water production infrastructure in Abidjan, Yamoussoukro, and Bouake; 8 boreholes were drilled, and over 538 km of water distribution network extensions were implemented connecting 288,902 households (original target 350,000) with new piped household water connections. The target was only almost achieved because funds for the construction of a new water production plant in Bouake were reallocated to CERC (see below). AF added this indicator under the new component, Urban and Municipal Management (ICR, paragraph 22).
- 404,000 (baseline 0, original target 262,000, revised target 412,000) additional people in the target urban areas were protected against flooding. 30 hectares of the San Pedro lake and resilient drainage systems were rehabilitated and 7,963 km of storm water basins and drainage systems in Yopougon, Daloa, Man, and Abidjan were rehabilitated. Construction delays, drop in flood prevention investments in Maputo and Seguela, and gaps in counterpart financing led to the slight drop in reaching the revised target of beneficiaries.
- 16,700 residents (baseline 0, original target 15,000) in Yamoussoukro and peri-urban areas of Kokrenous, Morofe, Nanan and Korhogo were provided household electricity connections and 149 illegal household electricity connections in Korhogo were regularized.
- As a result of improved access, by the time of the 2015 Mid Term Review, the rehabilitated health centers had an increase in capacity in the number of patients visiting the facilities (up to 22 percent). No targets provided or other data at closing. Although Covid19 did not allow a field survey to measure the material impacts, the MTR noted an increase in the number of consultations in the rehabilitated health centers by an average of 25 percent (up to 200 percent in Abengourou) and an average of 20 percent (up to 120 percent in Korhogo) in the number of people who had access to a health facility.
- In the commune maintenance program (*Programmes d'Entretien Communaux*, PEC), shares of municipal budgets were allocated to maintenance in their respective Municipal Maintenance Accounts - Abidjan municipal budgets allocated 6.76 percent (target 6 percent) of their Municipal Maintenance



Account for maintenance while those municipalities outside of Abidjan, allocated 12.67 percent (target 12 percent) of their Municipal Maintenance Account for maintenance.

- All seven cities/municipalities, as targeted, adopted citizen participation/consultations in their budgeting process.
- Six of seven municipalities, achieved their target objectives specified in their respective performance contracts. The commune of Bouaké achieved 90 percent of its planned activities.

Overall, the efficacy of the project to achieve this objective is rated Substantial as most of target outputs were delivered and outcomes achieved, and in some cases exceeded. Several outcomes associated with access, however, lack the evidence on the associated service delivery improvements.

### Rating

Substantial

## OBJECTIVE 2

### Objective

To improve access to basic infrastructure in targeted rural areas.

### Rationale

**Theory of Change (TOC):** In the rural areas, the TOC provided a plausible causal chain that linked inputs and outputs. The rehabilitation of roads, construction of Bassawa bridge, and rehabilitation of social infrastructure in the Nawa region and across the district of San Pedro would lead to the km length of rehabilitated rural roads, a new bridge, and facilities in the Nawa region and San Pedro district. AF specified additional outputs such as the construction of a logistics platform in the Nawa region to serve as an important transit point for coffee, cocoa, and rubber, along the corridor between San Pedro-Daloa-Seguella-Boundiali and the Mali border. The outcome was reflected in the number of rural beneficiaries of the improved rural infrastructure services. The results framework did not include outcome indicators or improved service delivery parameters associated with basic infrastructure, beyond the number of beneficiaries.

### OUTPUTS

- A new Bassawa bridge was constructed, as targeted. This enabled crossing the Comoé River in the Eastern Region of the country.
- 1,205 km (original target 700 km in the EPP, revised to 1,100 in the PP for the AF, exceeded) of primary rural roads were rehabilitated.
- 53 (original target 60) community water points (water boreholes and mini-water supply systems) were constructed.
- A six-classroom school with teachers' house and gender-differentiated toilets for school children (no target provided) was constructed.
- A hangar (roofed space) was constructed for use by villagers for consultative meetings (as targeted).





- A planned logistic platform/station in the Nawa region along the corridor of San Pedro-Daloa-Seguella-Boundiali and the border with Mali was not constructed due to delays and financing gaps (target not achieved).

## OUTCOMES

- 1,425,000 (baseline 170,0000, original target 1,240,000, target exceeded) rural residents with access to all-season roads and connecting them to the primary network. The works reduced travel times (no data provided) and improved the linking of agricultural production areas of the Nawa Region to Soubré, the capital of the Nawa Region and the Bas-Sassandra Region and the Port of San-Pedro (no data provided) (see Section 9, M&E Design below for a discussion of the lack in target outcome indicators for rural infrastructure). Rural roads were noted to have unlocked the region between Tanda and Bouake but no data associated with this "unlocking."
- The new bridge facilitated the transport of cashew and yam produced in the North Eastern part of the country to the main consumption centers of Bouaké and Abidjan (no data on time savings).
- Rural water supply systems increased access to drinkable water (no data on beneficiaries provided or service delivery parameters).
- With the new classrooms, two elementary school grades no longer rotated attendance in a school day.

Overall, the objective is rated Modest. While the target outcome of the number of beneficiaries was slightly exceeded (due to km of rural roads), the ICR does not provide adequate evidence and outcome data with regard to the infrastructure delivery and associated service delivery improvements in the targeted rural areas.

**Rating**  
Modest

## OBJECTIVE 3

### Objective

To provide immediate and effective response to an Eligible Crisis or Emergency.

### Rationale

**Theory of Change (TOC):** The AF added the Contingent Emergency Response Component (CERC) in August 2016. This contingency financing mechanism was to provide an immediate response to a potential eligible crisis or emergency. In May 2018, the government declared a severe water crisis in Bouake. 80 percent of the water supply served over a million inhabitants. The Bank and the government had a prior agreed list of eligible activities to be financed under CERC such as works, consultant services, and operation costs. CERC funds would be disbursed within 4 weeks after the declared crisis triggered CERC. After the severe water crisis was declared, CERC was triggered, funds were rapidly released and made available, within the targeted time frame.

As reported by the ICR (paragraphs 49-50), disbursements under the project funds requested by the Government for an eligible crisis or emergency were made available within 4 weeks, as targeted, and all eligible activities have been implemented, i.e.,



- 18 water boreholes were rehabilitated and equipped (although 2 were deemed ineligible after an audit; costs were reimbursed (see Section 10 Other Issues (b) Financial Management below)). These boreholes were part of the 53 (target 60) rural water supply systems that included boreholes and mini water supply systems.
- 84 manually operated pumps (*pompe à motricité humaine*, or PMH) were rehabilitated in Bouake.
- Two water production units with a cumulative capacity of 480 m<sup>3</sup>/h were procured.

The ICR reports that activities under the CERC served 200, 000 people with drinkable water. The PDO wording is however process oriented, and does not add much value from the point of a development effectiveness.

### **Rating**

Substantial

## **OVERALL EFFICACY**

### **Rationale**

With two substantial ratings and one modest rating, the overall efficacy of the project to achieve its objective is rated substantial, with moderate shortcomings.

### **Overall Efficacy Rating**

Substantial

## **5. Efficiency**

**Economic Efficiency:** During the appraisal of the emergency project, no cost-benefit analysis (CBA) was carried out because of short preparation time under emergency procedures and limited data (EPP, paragraph 59 and ICR, paragraph 78). An ex -post CBA for activities financed under the first tranche and an ex-ante CBA for the key quantifiable activities/infrastructure that constituted the majority of the investments, five urban roads and two urban drainage sub-projects, under the AF were conducted.

At closing, the ex-post CBA of the project components financed under the first tranche was not conducted due to travel restrictions following COVID-19 and limited data (ICR, paragraph 59). At closing, three urban roads and one drainage infrastructure were dropped from the project. Other activities were significantly modified at implementation so could not provide comparison with ex ante assumptions. The model used data from the San Pedro neighborhood access roads to arrive an ex-ante EIRR of 24.1%. Lower than anticipated traffic reduced this EIRR at closing to 15%, still above the Bank's 12% benchmark (ICR, Annex 4).



**Administrative and Operational Efficiency:** The project was extended twice, for a total of 37 months. Poor contract management led to major delays. Some activities were dropped. Cost overruns of over 30 percent were associated with the poor quality of feasibility designs including discrepancies in completed works that had to be reduced in scope (ICR, paragraph 61). More than 80 percent of works were extended by more than 12 months to address design shortcomings. The Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) associated with the bridge construction was significantly delayed.

Overall, the efficiency is rated Modest for shortcomings in project and contract management that led to cost overruns, implementation delays, ineligible CERC expenses, and dropping of some activities (ICR, paragraph 61).

### Efficiency Rating

Modest

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal		0	0 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable
ICR Estimate		0	0 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable

\* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

### 6. Outcome

The relevance of objectives is rated Substantial. The overall efficacy of the project to achieve its objectives is rated Substantial with moderate shortcomings. Efficiency is rated Modest due to the administrative and operational inefficiencies. The overall outcome is therefore rated Moderately Satisfactory.

a. **Outcome Rating**  
Moderately Satisfactory

### 7. Risk to Development Outcome

The ICR noted (paragraphs 126-128) and IEG agrees that there are substantial risks to development outcome posed by financial considerations. These risks could be further broken down into the following:



- **Political Commitment:** A presidential election was held in October 31, 2020. There remained substantial risk that the new leadership and the government's tight fiscal constraints may pose difficulties in mobilizing financing to pay for arrears.
- **Availability of Adequate O&M resources:** Completed urban and rural infrastructure investments require sustainable O&M financing. To mitigate this risk of this not materializing, AF introduced performance based urban and municipal management practices. Urban audits were carried out for new target municipalities and updated for the others. Investments were prioritized through a consultative process and assembled into a communal investment program. Cities and municipalities encouraged citizen participation in allocating budgets for maintenance of assets financed under the project (ICR, paragraph 53). Master plans were prepared and these included measures to address the backlog in infrastructure maintenance needs (ICR, paragraph 42). In addition, the Road Agency Ageroute (*Agence de Gestion des Routes*) was expected to expand its capacity and its resources to contribute toward the maintenance of the rehabilitated rural roads. Municipal budgets would need to continue to allocate O&M resources for urban roads.
- **Commitment to Road Safety Measures may waver.** Road investments in this project improved access and made traffic operation safe. Road safety measures may deteriorate over time if no additional resources are provided. The Africa Transport Policy Program has supported the country to develop a national road safety strategy and through the African Road Safety Observatory (ARSO) improve crash data collection and management systems. Several partners such as the Global Road Safety Facility (with financial support from the United Kingdom's Agency for International Development), the African Union Commission, the Africa Transport Policy Program (Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program), the International Transport Workers Federation, the *Federation Internationale de l'Automobile* (FIA), Safer Africa, the FIA High Level Panel, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the European Union, the African Development Bank, AfDB, and the World Bank Group support this Facility. Better quality data is anticipated to inform how to manage risks associated with road safety in specific road investments completed under the project.

## 8. Assessment of Bank Performance

### a. Quality-at-Entry

The project was designed as an emergency response in accordance with the principles of OP/BP 8.00. This meant design was made simple to avoid inherent risk in emergency operations and recognized the critical importance of speed, flexibility, and simplicity of a rapid response. The technical, financial, and economic aspects of the project considered the emergency nature of the project. The design was ambitious but pragmatic - rehabilitation of existing infrastructure, phasing implementation, having shovel-ready sub-projects, and adopting a modified procurement strategy (ICR, paragraph 82). The M&E design had minor shortcomings in that there were no indicators to monitor outcome beyond completing project activities. Lessons from prior operations and the Bank's global experience in emergency response were included in the design. One lesson was that a successful multi-sector post conflict operation rested on a strong implementation arrangement. This meant a centralized project coordination unit (PCU) and engaging implementing agencies early on. When the project was prepared, the Bank team took advantage of ongoing engagement with implementing agencies of the Urban Infrastructure Emergency Project (*Le Projet d'Urgence d'Infrastructures Urbaines* or PUIUR). With a multi-sectoral design, each sector was to be autonomously managed by separate implementing entities (the Road



Agency (*Agence de Gestion des Routes* or AGEROUTE) for roads, the Water Supply Agency (*Office National de l'Eau Potable* or ONEP) for Water, the Sanitation and Drainage Agency (*Office National de l'Assainissement et du Drainage* or ONAD) for drainage, sanitation and flood prevention, and the Ivoirian Electricity Company (*Compagnie Ivoirienne d'Electricite* or CIE) for electricity and lighting) were assessed to have sufficient institutional capacity. The World Bank team worked with the staff from the closed Transport Sector Adjustment and Investment Project to ensure readiness to implement this project. Risk assessment overestimated PCU capacity and access to counterpart financing as borne out by challenges faced in project and contract management during implementation (see below and Section 10 Other Issues, Fiduciary Compliance below).

Overall, the quality at entry of an emergency operation had only minor shortcomings and is rated Satisfactory.

### **Quality-at-Entry Rating**

Satisfactory

#### **b. Quality of supervision**

The World Bank team conducted 15 supervision missions over the eight year implementation period. The project team went through four task team leaders with adequate handover arrangements (ICR , paragraph 122). A Mid Term Review was conducted as planned. Supervision revealed that the government over-committed its resources for counterpart financing. This led to significant delays. The April 2021 audit submitted by the *Inspection Générale des Finances* (IGF) reported that the project closed with arrears of 17,954 billion FCFA (US\$33 million equivalent) although the government reported it had mobilized 24.7 billion FCFA (US\$45.5 million equivalent) and only 8 billion FCFA (US\$14.7 million equivalent) of arrears remain (ICR, paragraph 85). The Bank team did not assess outcomes beyond the indicators in the Results Framework. The Covid19 pandemic may not have allowed for field or beneficiary surveys to measure the impacts of the project as planned. However, as the ICR noted, M&E indicators could have been better defined beyond progress toward completing project activities (ICR, paragraph 97, see Section 9 M&E below). The Bank team responded to poor contract and financial management by closely monitoring arrears arising from a lack of counterpart funds, conducting additional contract management training during the AF, recommending the hiring of a contract management consultant, which the government declined as non-priority, and recommended corrective measures to hasten contract signing, and processing of interim payments. In the case of fatal worksite accidents (see Section 10 Other Issues below), the Bank team responded by mobilizing three missions, followed the Environmental and Social Incident Response Toolkit including After-Action memos of fatal incidents. The Bank team also recommended that the PCU conduct occupational and health safety audits, and implement corrective and preventative measures to address root causes and prevent recurrence of the incidents. With implementation delays, the Bank team and the government agreed to reallocate funds for construction of a new water production plant in Bouake to CERC, and drop activities that would not be completed in time - (i) urban roads rehabilitation in Bondoukou and Bouna, and (ii) flood prevention systems in Seguela and Man (ICR, paragraph 91).

### **Quality of Supervision Rating**



Satisfactory

### **Overall Bank Performance Rating**

Satisfactory

## **9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization**

### **a. M&E Design**

The PDOs were clear but broadly defined ("improve access"). The PCU were to prepare a comprehensive Management Information System (MIS), designate an M&E focal point to collect and consolidate data from executing agencies to monitor the 8 outcome indicators and 11 intermediate results indicators divided along components (EPP, paragraph 88). The results framework captured the achievements towards the objectives of providing access to basic infrastructure in urban and rural areas. The indicators showed valid links along a causal chain between inputs and outputs in the results framework. However, outcomes attributable to the project interventions were expressed as the number of beneficiaries. While this was an emergency operation and indicators were not used to monitor impact of the interventions, the improvements in service delivery could have been better captured (e.g., reliability, quality, and adequacy of services, time savings). All indicators had targets but baselines were noted only for population, none for the infrastructure investments. A comprehensive ex post evaluation was, however, planned (EPP, Annex 10).

### **b. M&E Implementation**

The PCU implemented the M&E system as designed. However, M&E was limited to completion of project activities. Indicators in the results framework were monitored periodically and regularly reported. AF introduced one additional outcome and four other intermediate outcome indicators to capture the added activities. Outcome remained at the beneficiary level. Three of the original eight outcome indicators were revised to better reflect core sector requirements. The ICR noted that there were no indicators to monitor outcome beyond completing project activities (ICR, paragraph 97). Four outcome indicators were moved to intermediate (output) level (ICR, paragraph 101). Beneficiary data was updated twice based on the 2014 census, and a growth rate applied for 2016 data. Citizen participation was noted to have been encouraged for municipal budget planning but not as part of target setting or for assessing outcomes. There was no indication in the ICR that the M&E function of the PCU would continue after project closing. The indicators to monitor the impact of the CERC component were only focused on the activation of the CERC and not the outcomes of CERC-funded activities beyond the beneficiaries reached (ICR, paragraph 103).

### **c. M&E Utilization**

M&E findings were communicated to stakeholders. M&E data collected informed the MTR and the preparation of the AF. M&E data was used to inform achievement of project implementation progress. However, the M&E did not include parameters that would have informed the adoption of timely corrective measures such as meeting deadlines and delays in counterpart financing. The ICR recommended that future operations may find the use of field surveys useful to establish baselines, clarify institutional aspects of the project, quality control of data and real time monitoring and evaluation. The indicators to





monitor the outcome of the CERC component could have included an indicator informing on the beneficiaries and the component's impact in a situation of an urgent need; the two related indicators rather informed on the project's teams' performance in terms of the CERC implementation (ICR, paragraph 103).

Overall, M&E is rated as Modest. The positive impacts of the project could have been better measured using a stronger M&E framework, particularly regarding benefits and impacts on beneficiaries. There were alternative sources of reported outcomes beyond those featured in the designed M&E. Most were established under the components of the AF to be part of implementation. For example, targets for the investment activities under the Communal Investment Program were in urban audits, evaluated by the PCU, in coordination with the target communes (see Section 4 Efficacy above). In another case, M&E of the Communal Maintenance Program was accomplished with the help of a document dashboard with financial and operational indicators (PP for AF, Annex 3, Paragraph 8 (b)).

## M&E Quality Rating

Modest

## 10. Other Issues

### a. Safeguards

**Environmental Safeguards:** The initial emergency project financed under the World Bank's OP/BP 8.00 was classified as environmental Category "A" because the Bassawa Bridge would be constructed over an environmentally sensitive area. The project triggered three safeguards policies: Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01), Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4.11), and Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12). An Environmental and Social Screening and Assessment Framework (ESSAF), an Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF), and a Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) were prepared and disclosed to the public. The project complied with the safeguards (ICR, paragraph 107).

Additional Financing (AF) changed the environmental category from "A" to "B." AF would finance activities that excluded category 'A' type activities (PP, paragraph 20) and finance only those activities that were not expected to have significant adverse or irreversible environmental impacts. AF triggered two safeguards - OP/BP 4.01 and OP/BP 4.12. Resettlement Action Plans (RAP) were developed, consulted, and disclosed, including for the AF-funded activities in Abobo-Akekoi (Abidjan). For AF activities with as yet to be determined sites. RAPs were developed in accordance with the RPF. Additional training on environmental and social management would be provided to municipalities for AF-added works

Shortcomings in occupational, health and safety (OHS) measures delayed completion of works. These included (i) The body of a 6-year old girl was found by the partly-filled drain along the Adzopé road works in July 2018. Police investigation reported inconclusive reason of death. After an OHS audit and reinforced OHS measures, works resumed; (ii) the body of an 8-year old was found along the Yopougou drain works in March 2019. Police investigation did not identify any non-compliance or contractor responsibility. After precautionary measures and an OHS audit, works resumed; and (iii) a 38-year old worker was buried by a landslide in October 2019. Preliminary assessment concluded contractor responsibility. Two audits were conducted (one external and another internal to the contractor). Corrective measures were undertaken. Works resumed. Longer term actions for strengthening environmental performance were identified. The



virtual mission on September 2020 recommended the implementation of residual measures to the last works site (rehabilitation of borrow pits, base-site), removal of materials, and unused prefabricated structures including the dismantling of physical installations, before the project closed. According to Environmental and Social completion report all these measures were implemented.

**Social Safeguards:** Two resettlement action plans (RAPs) under the initial emergency operation and 6 under the AF were prepared, fully executed, and completed but with some delays (ICR, paragraph 114). For example, of the 1,040 project-affected persons (PAPs), the PCU compensated 912 but was unable to reach 128 because of unclear census data and lack of evidence of asset ownership. In another case, lack of state counterpart funding to construct social and educational infrastructure in the RAP delayed the Bassawa bridge construction by over a year.

A Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM) was in place. Non-governmental organizations (NGO) were hired at work sites to explain GRM to PAPs. There were 86 works-related complaints. 85 were processed. One was before the courts. A complaint from persons affected by works in Abidjan labeled 'EIRP' but not financed under the project was filed with the World Bank's Grievance Redress Service (GRS). On August 21, 2020, the Bank notified the government that the case would be closed after the Bank received evidence that all payments due to those affected have been made (ICR, paragraph 116). The Government committed to pay compensation as part of arrears (see Financial Management below).

## b. Fiduciary Compliance

**Financial Management:** During the September 2020 supervision mission conducted virtually, the Bank team estimated that the project has accumulated about 11.8 billion FCFA (equivalent to US\$21.7 million) in arrears. Government delays in fulfilling its counterpart's payment schedule since project start, cost overruns, and payment processing caused these arrears. Two ineligible CERC expenses were noted but these have been reimbursed (ICR, paragraph 95). The Bank received a financial audit from the *Inspection Générale des Finances* (IGF) on April 13, 2021. The audit confirmed that the project closed with 17,954 billion FCFA (equivalent to US\$33.1 million) of arrears. The Bank team recommended an action plan to clear all debts within a reasonable time (ICR, paragraph 86).

**Procurement:** The government signed a procurement guideline (Instruction 192) to govern the procurement and financial management of co-financed projects and were applied to this project (ICR, footnote 15). All contracts were awarded within the agreed time frame (ICR, paragraph 63) although contract management proved to be a challenge. For example, various actors misinterpreted the Bank's directives. Some confusion arose between the PCU and implementing agencies in supervising compliance with environmental safeguards. Two layers to process Non-Objections to contract awards/amendments - one from the Bank and the DMP (*Direction des Marchés Publics*) led to a lack of proper analysis and justification. Unpaid invoices were backlogged, including advance payments for mobilization. Utilities concessionaires experienced delays in relocating rights-of-way. Cost overrun cancelled or reduced the scope of some planned activities. Contractors performed poorly, more than 80 percent of works were extended by more than 12 months. Some technical studies were of poor quality and led to numerous changes at the execution stage. There were delays in implementing the RAPs that affected startup of road works. During the AF, the Bank team initiated training sessions on contract management and in implementing corrective measures for a better management of deadlines. The Bank



team also recommended hiring a contract management consultant, but the government considered this a low priority.

**c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)**

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**d. Other**

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**11. Ratings**

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	IEG concurs with the ICR's rating of modest for efficiency. Thus, with substantial relevance, substantial with moderate shortcomings efficacy, and modest efficiency, the overall outcome rating is Moderately Satisfactory.
Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	
Quality of M&E	Modest	Modest	
Quality of ICR	---	Substantial	

**12. Lessons**

The following three lessons have been summarized from the 5 presented in the ICR with minor additions from IEG: (ICR, paragraphs 129-133):

- Future multi-sector emergency operations in a post conflict setting may find useful strengthening institutional capacity beyond those of the PCU.** In this project, capacity building activities embedded experts in each implementing agency. Similar operations may benefit from reaching out not just to implementing entities but also the private sector (contractors and consulting firms) to enhance capacity. Mitigation measures to address institutional capacity risks may include early technical assistance to entities to aid in updating detailed studies for complex activities (e.g., storm water basins, large drainage systems etc.) before contracting for works, Periodic technical audits may identify non-compliance early and corrective capacity measures applied in time. Conflict or confusion during implementation may be avoided by clarifying responsibilities between the PCU and the implementing entities. In this project, entities implementing the works may be better suited to monitor compliance with environmental safeguards at the worksite level, rather than the PCU.



- **A clear structure for co-financing or recipient contributions may result in responsive mobilization of resources.** In this project, the government overcommitted its resources for co-financing and caused implementation delays, including compliance with safeguards. Parallel or co-financing using government resources may benefit from including effective risk mitigation measures by identifying early indicators of delay and alternative measures to respond to these. Future parallel financing operations may include an engagement framework with clear, actionable corrective measures.
- **Additional Financing to emergency operations may best focus on the emergency response only.** In this project, the AF was provided when an emergency response was no longer needed. The AF activities were implemented using the same complex financial flows under the emergency operation, including the difficulties associated with use of counterpart financing. Implementation delays continued with AF activities. Limiting AF to bridge financing gaps or address cost overruns of original emergency activities may be better use of the AF. Activities to expand sectoral outcomes may be better addressed by new project preparation to avoid implementation delays or cost overruns in AF activities.

### 13. Assessment Recommended?

No

### 14. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR provided a detailed overview of the project and generally followed the guidelines although it exceeded the number of recommended pages (35 versus 15). The ICR provided extensive analysis behind poor contract management and the shortcomings brought by the lack of counterpart financing. Photos in the annexes supplemented the evidence of completed project interventions. Annexes expanded on information to support the performance of the Bank team, details of the initial emergency operations, and illustrated the impact of counterpart financing gap to overall implementation progress (Annex 6). The annex highlighting the government's own completion report was candid with regard to project efficiency and the implementation challenges the project faced (Annex 5). Lessons were informed by the operations and useful for future consideration, particularly in the prudent use of AF. There was an inconsistency in the rating of Efficiency (Modest in paragraph 64 and Substantial in paragraph 67) and of the overall outcome (Moderately Satisfactory in paragraph 67 but Satisfactory in the Data Sheet as page 2). Several editorial shortcomings (e.g., footnote 26, undefined acronyms such as DGDDL, PUIUR, GRSF, FIA, etc.) did not take away from the substantial quality of the ICR.

#### a. Quality of ICR Rating

Substantial

