

Document of
The World Bank

Report No: ICR00001518

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(TF-92835)

ON A GRANT

UNDER THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS RESPONSE PROGRAM

IN THE AMOUNT OF US\$7.0 MILLION

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF NIGER

FOR THE

EMERGENCY FOOD SECURITY SUPPORT PROJECT

June 28, 2010

Agricultural and Rural Development Unit (AFTAR)
Sustainable Development Department
Country Department AF2CF
Africa Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective June 22, 2010)

Currency Unit = Franc CFA
US\$1 = 535 CFAF

FISCAL YEAR

January 1 - December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AFTQK	Operational Quality and Knowledge Services
AHA	<i>Aménagements Hydroagricoles</i> (Irrigated areas)
ARD	Agriculture and Rural Development
ASPEN	Africa Safeguards Policy Enhancement
BCR	Benefit/Cost Ratio
BEEI	<i>Bureau des Evaluations d'Etudes d'Impact Environnemental</i> (Office for the Evaluation of Environment Impact Studies)
CA	<i>Centrale d'Approvisionnement</i> (Central Agricultural Inputs Procurement Unit, within the Ministry of Agricultural Development)
CAADP	Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Program
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
CCA	<i>Cellule Crises Alimentaires</i> (Food Crises Coordination Unit)
CFA	<i>Communauté Financière Africaine</i>
CIC	Communication and Information Center
CIF	Cost Insurance and Freight
CMU	Country Management Unit
CRC	Joint Government–Donor Food Crises Committee
DAP	Diammonium Phosphate
DGA	<i>Direction Générale de l'Agriculture</i> (General Directorate of Agriculture)
DRC	Domestic Resource Cost
EPP	Emergency Project Paper
ESMF	Environmental and Social Management Framework
ESW	Economic and Sector Work
FCD	<i>Fonds Commun des Donateurs</i> (Food Crises Donor Basket Fund)
FCPMF	Food Crisis Prevention and Management Framework
FM	Financial Management
FPCR	Food Price Crisis Response
FPCRTF	Food Price Crisis Response Trust Fund
FSA	Food Security Fund
FUCOPRI	<i>Fédération des Unions Coopératives des Producteurs de Riz</i> (Rice Producers' Apex Organization)
GAFFSP	Global Agriculture and Food Security Program
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
GFRP	Global Food Crisis Response Program

IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICR	Implementation Completion and Results Report
IDA	International Development Association
IFR	Interim Financial Reports
INRA	<i>Institut National de Recherche Agronomique</i> (National Agricultural Research Institute)
MDA	Ministry of Agricultural Development
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
OPVN	<i>Office des Produits Vivriers du Niger</i> (Office of National Food Security Stocks)
ONAHA	<i>Office National des Aménagements Hydroagricoles</i> (National Irrigation Development Office)
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PAM	Policy Analysis Matrix
PDO	Project Development Objectives
PMP	Pest Management Plan
PMT	Proxy Means Testing
PPF	Project Preparation Facility
PRODEX	<i>Programme d'Exportation des Produits Agro-Pastoraux</i> (Agro-Sylvo-Pastoral Exports and Markets Development Project)
PRSP2	Poverty Reduction Strategy 2
RDS	Rural Development Strategy
SAP	<i>Système d'Alerte Précoce</i> (The FCPMF's Early Warning System)
SE-SDR	<i>Secrétariat Exécutif de la Stratégie du Développement Rural</i> (Executive Secretariat of the Rural Development Strategy)
SIMA	<i>Système d'Information pour les Marchés Agricoles</i> (Agricultural Markets Information System)
SRP	Subsidy Ratio to Producers
TTL	Task Team Leader
UEMOA	<i>Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine</i> (West African Economic and Monetary Union)
VAT	Value Added Tax

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NIGER
EMERGENCY FOOD SECURITY SUPPORT PROJECT

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MAP

A. Basic Information			
Country:	Niger	Project Name:	Niger : Emergency Food Security Support Project
Project ID:	P113222	L/C/TF Number(s):	TF-92835
ICR Date:	06/29/2010	ICR Type:	Core ICR
Lending Instrument:	ERL	Borrower:	REPUBLIC OF NIGER
Original Total Commitment:	USD 7.0M	Disbursed Amount:	USD 6.9M
Revised Amount:	USD 7.0M		
Environmental Category: B			
Implementing Agencies: Cellule Crises Alimentaires (CCA) Centrale d'Approvisionnement (CA)			
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:			

B. Key Dates				
Process	Date	Process	Original Date	Revised / Actual Date(s)
Concept Review:	06/25/2008	Effectiveness:	08/26/2008	09/16/2008
Appraisal:	07/11/2008	Restructuring(s):		
Approval:	08/26/2008	Mid-term Review:	06/08/2009	
		Closing:	06/30/2009	12/31/2009

C. Ratings Summary	
C.1 Performance Rating by ICR	
Outcomes:	Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome:	Moderate
Bank Performance:	Satisfactory
Borrower Performance:	Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)			
Bank	Ratings	Borrower	Ratings
Quality at Entry:	Highly Satisfactory	Government:	Satisfactory
Quality of Supervision:	Satisfactory	Implementing Agency/Agencies:	Satisfactory
Overall Bank Performance:	Satisfactory	Overall Borrower Performance:	Satisfactory

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators			
Implementation Performance	Indicators	QAG Assessments (if any)	Rating
Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	Yes	Quality at Entry (QEA):	None
Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	No	Quality of Supervision (QSA):	None
DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:	Satisfactory		

D. Sector and Theme Codes		
	Original	Actual
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
Crops	93	93
Public administration- Agriculture, fishing and forestry	7	7
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
Global food crisis response	100	100

E. Bank Staff		
Positions	At ICR	At Approval
Vice President:	Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili	Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili
Country Director:	Madani M. Tall	Madani M. Tall
Sector Manager:	Karen Mcconnell Brooks	Karen Mcconnell Brooks
Project Team Leader:	El Hadj Adama Toure	El Hadj Adama Toure
ICR Team Leader:	Soulemane Fofana	
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	Carlo Del Ninno	
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F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)

The objective of the Project is to support the Recipient's efforts to mitigate the impact of the food price crisis by: (a) increasing the production of the rice in irrigated farmlands; and (b) enhancing its capacity to respond adequately to future food security threats.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)

Not revised.

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	Increase in rice yield in plots treated with recommended dose of fertilizers			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	2.5 tons per ha (without fertilizers)	3.5 tons per ha		5.4 tons per hectare
Date achieved	08/26/2008	12/31/2009		12/31/2009
Comments (incl. % achievement)	54% over the target and 116% over the baseline.			

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	Tons of fertilizers procured and distributed to rice farmers at subsidized price			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	4000 metric tons		4000 metric tons
Date achieved	08/26/2008	12/31/2009		12/31/2009
Comments (incl. % achievement)	100%			
Indicator 2 :	Hectares of irrigated rice fields treated with adequate dose of fertilizers.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	Not determined	10,000 ha		9265 ha, including 8239 ha by Cooperatives, and 1025 ha by individuals.
Date achieved	08/26/2008	12/31/2009		12/31/2009
Comments (incl. % achievement)	93%			
Indicator 3 :	Regular reporting on relevant food prices and national security stocks			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	Weekly bulletin on prices and areas at risk from the FPMF's Early Warning System.	Report on Food security and project implementation including food security stocks.		Information on food prices, production and interventions published by the FCPMF's Information and Communication Center (CIC).

Date achieved	08/26/2008	12/31/2009		12/31/2009
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Partially achieved. The system still needs to be improved with an effective monitoring of food stocks managed by the Office des Produits Vivriers du Niger (OPVN- Office of National Food Security Stocks).			
Indicator 4 :	Preparation and implementation of sustainable safety nets programs			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	None	Government starts implementing programs using net revenues from the fertilizers		The preparation of the pilot cash transfer program has been completed and Government started rolling it out in June 2010.
Date achieved	08/26/2008	12/31/2009		12/31/2009
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Fully achieved.			


G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No.	Date ISR Archived	DO	IP	Actual Disbursements (USD millions)
1	12/12/2008	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	0.00
2	05/29/2009	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	6.85
3	12/10/2009	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	6.85

H. Restructuring (if any)

Not Applicable

I. Disbursement Profile



1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1. Niger is a very poor country that faces many hardships and struggles with significant levels of poverty and household food insecurity. A Sahelian landlocked country, Niger is confronted by a harsh climate, with nearly 90 percent of the territory receiving less than 350 mm of rainfall yearly, resulting in recurrent natural disasters and high exposure to climate change. With a per capita Gross National Income (GNI) of US\$ 260 and an estimated 62 percent of the population living below the poverty line, Niger is one of the lowest-ranked countries on the United Nations' Human Development Index. The incidence of poverty has remained constant since the early 1990s.

2. Low agricultural productivity and uncontrolled population growth make the country seasonally and chronically food insecure. Only 10 percent of Niger's territory, or 120,000 km², benefits from rain-fed agriculture. Meanwhile, in a context of declining rainfall and cyclical droughts, unsustainable land management practices abound, with communities overexploiting natural resources in order to preserve or increase their level of production to feed a rapidly growing population.

3. While over 60 percent of households rely in part on their own production to meet their consumption needs, 68 percent of households are net buyers of staples such as millet and cowpeas. Drought also often results in increases in the prices of millet, sorghum, and other staple foods, and dramatic decreases in prices of livestock, contributing to food insecurity. Furthermore, supply and demand conditions in Nigeria, especially the northern regions, have a major influence on prices and availability of staple food crops in Niger.

1.1 Context at Appraisal

4. Reducing vulnerability and ensuring food and nutrition security are an overarching priority for the Government of Niger. It has, therefore, set up its strategic vision, policies, and institutional framework to address these objectives in the Rural Development Strategy (RDS), as well as in the Accelerated Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy 2 (PRSP2). Indeed, the RDS Action Plan, adopted in 2006, identified various instruments to address food insecurity, including efforts to increase staple food crop production, market interventions, and a variety of safety net programs, especially after emergencies. This includes a food crisis contingency plan to cope with drought episodes and a National Strategy to Support Vulnerable Population for times of increased food prices.

5. In order to improve the institutional and operational framework for food security of Niger, the development partners, jointly with the donors, set up three facilities, as part of the FCPMF, and under the oversight and management of the *Cellule Crises Alimentaires* (CCA-Food Crisis Coordination Unit): a) a Donor Basket Fund, b) a Food Security Fund; and c) the National Food Security Stocks. In this context, food aid has served as an important resource for the Government and is considered to be integral to providing safety net interventions, especially for emergency responses.

Table 1: Variation in Food Prices in Niamey

	Monthly (June/May08)	June08/Average 2003-2007
Millet	18%	7%
Sorghum	18%	3%
Maize	51%	31%
Rice	18%	21%
Niebe	20%	23%

Source: Agricultural Market Information System,
Ministry of Commerce

6. The rise in international oil and food prices, low cereal production in 2007 because of drought, and increased demand for cereals and other agricultural products in neighboring countries -- namely Nigeria -- contributed to a sharp increase in food prices in 2008. In June 2008, the early warning system of the joint Government-Donors' Food Crisis Prevention and Management Framework (FCPMF) stated that about three million people were living in areas identified as vulnerable to soaring food prices. Around one million people were affected by serious food insecurity, implying an urgent need for relief measures to prevent another human disaster three years after the 2005 crisis.

7. The Government responded swiftly to the food price crisis. In June 2008, the Parliament adopted a supplemental Budget Law which included tax exemptions on rice, wheat flour, edible oil, sugar, and milk, which led to a loss of tax revenues of CFAF 12.4 billion (about USD 30 million), equivalent to 0.56 percent of GDP. The Government also requested the Bank to help with its efforts to mitigate the impact of the crisis, resulting from sharply rising global food prices, to which the Bank responded by making available USD 7 million of special financing through the Emergency Food Security Project.

8. The Bank's response which is under the Bank's Global Food Crisis Response Program (GFRP), and is aligned with the Government's strategic approach as well as the coordinated and joint donor framework focused on measures to address the short and medium to long-term implication of the global food crisis for Niger.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators

9. The objective of the Project was to support the Recipient's efforts to mitigate the impact of the food price crisis by: (a) increasing the production of the rice in irrigated farmlands; and (b) enhancing its capacity to respond adequately to future food security threats. The key performance indicators were as follows:

- (i) Outcome indicator: Rice yield in metric tons per hectare is expected to increase by 20 percent in the irrigated plots treated with the recommended dose of fertilizers at the end of the project.
- (ii) Intermediate outcomes :
 - (a) With 4,000 tons of fertilizer procured under the grant, and distributed at an affordable price to farmers, 10,000 ha of paddy are expected to be adequately fertilized over the project time frame.
 - (b) The management capacity of the CCA and OPVN for monitoring food security will be strengthened.
 - (c) A comprehensive safety net program is prepared and being implemented with the FCPMF instruments.

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

10. The PDO and key indicators were not revised.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

11. The project's primary beneficiaries were the paddy producers in Niger, who had been identified through their cooperatives to receive, at affordable prices the fertilizers procured under the Project. Project executing agencies, namely the *Centrale d'Approvisionnement* (CA- Input Procurement Unit) and the *Office National des Aménagements Hydroagricoles* (ONAHA- National Irrigation Development Agency) within CCA were also targeted for capacity building in the areas of fiduciary management and monitoring and evaluation.

1.5 Original Components

12. The Project had the following two components at appraisal:

13. **Component I: Procurement of Fertilizers (USD 6.5 million).** The objective of the component was to support the CA's and the CCA's operating costs associated with the procurement and distribution of 4,000 metric tons of fertilizers to be used on 10,000 ha of irrigated rice on time for the July- December 2008 cropping season, and with an anticipation of using the fertilizers in subsequent cropping seasons, in case delivery was delayed due to any reasonable reason. These fertilizers were planned to be procured by the CA and delivered to rice producers at affordable price using CA's current subsidy policy (a 30 to 40 percent subsidy for fertilizer).

14. **Component II: Support to the National Food Crises Prevention and Management Framework (USD 0.5 million).** The objective of this component was to: (a) contribute to the strengthening of the CCA, as the permanent secretariat for the FCPMF, to manage the grant, and monitor and evaluate the grant funded activities; these activities include the monitoring of targeting eligible beneficiaries of fertilizers procured and distributed under the grant, and adequate information disclosure regarding the distribution process; (b) provide technical assistance to CCA, CA and the *Office des Produits Vivriers du Niger* (OPVN- Office of National Food Security Stocks) (and ONAHA); (c) ensure adequate monitoring of food security, including accurately and timely reporting on food prices across the country, and along the borders with Nigeria; (d) support management of grain storage and early identification of population and areas at risk of starvation; (e) support the design of safety net programs to permanently tackle food insecurity affecting 20 percent of the population in Niger; and (f) ensure close advisory services to cooperatives and rice farmers during the two successive irrigation campaigns covered by the project. This would include providing basic instructions on proper use of fertilizers, as well as adequate quantities of application.

1.6 Revised Components

15. The components have not been revised

1.7 Other significant changes

16. There was no change in project design, scope and scale, implementation arrangements, or funding.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

17. The quality at entry is assessed as satisfactory, given that the Project has been implemented according to plan and has achieved its development objective. Inclusion of representatives of rice producer cooperatives ensured adequate targeting of beneficiaries, i.e. farmers with 0.25 hectares or less. Therefore, the Project reached 20,788 farmers through their cooperatives and contributed to the food security of 124,728 people¹ in areas targeted by the Project. Involvement of the FCPMF's Joint Government-Donors Committee (CRC), as envisaged under the agreed project implementation arrangements, turned out to be instrumental in guaranteeing good governance in the procurement of fertilizers, resulting in timely delivery of good quality products to farmers. Also, the envisaged sequencing of project activities, starting with the urgent procurement of fertilizers and focusing later on the preparation and the implementation of safety nets, proved to be an effective approach to getting the best results out of limited resources. In this context, the up-front agreement that the proceeds of the fertilizer sales would be used for the establishment of the safety net program needs to be noted.

18. Using the emergency procedures under OP8.0, it took only one month to prepare the project and obtain approval, following GFRP procedures adopted in June 2008. The Bank brought together a multi-sectoral, high level team, including a country office-based task team leader (TTL) working together with the Country Management Unit (CMU), social protection staff and country office-based Agriculture and Rural Development and fiduciary teams, with a strong and permanent back-stopping from the Quality and Knowledge (AFTQK) Department and the Environment and Social Development team (ASPEN). This ensured good quality documentation and swift processing of clearances and approval of the project.

19. The Bank team worked closely with the CRC to ensure coordination among partners, and the use of adequate procedures for procurement of goods in a situation of emergency. The Government also set up an ad hoc high level counterpart team to work with the Bank team which was chaired by the Secretary General of the Ministry of Agricultural Development, and included CCA Coordinator and Financial Manager, the Director General of Agriculture, Director of CA and the Director of Development Department (*Mise en Valeur*) ONAHA. The *Fédération des Union Coopératives des Producteurs de Riz* (FUCOPRI- Federation of Rice Producer Cooperatives) also participated in the preparation and was invited by the Government to take part in the technical discussions and negotiations, which was unprecedented in Niger. The inclusion of FUCOPRI and CRC ensured improved project targeting, transparency and good governance, which is critical in emergency operations.

20. Project preparation took lessons from similar operations in the Africa region, including the Africa Emergency Locust Project. The preparation team worked well together and made good use of management support and cross-sectoral collaboration. It facilitated the Recipient's ownership at inception through responding to its urgent need and sharing the responsibility of project preparation with a tight schedule.


¹ Considering an average number of 6 dependents per farmer's household as provided by FUCOPRI and ONAHA.

2.2 Implementation

21. Under Component I (92 percent of the grant proceeds), the delivery of fertilizers was fully completed on November 12, 2008, i.e. two months after the contract was signed and three months after project approval. Delivery could have occurred two to three weeks earlier if settlement of taxes and duties between the supplier and the Ministry of Finance had been expedited, and without the advance enforcement by the Government of Niger of the new WAEMU² regulations on truck loads, which became effective on January 1, 2009. However, even without this delay of two to three weeks, only part of the fertilizers would have been used in 2008, as the cropping cycle started well before in July 2008. As anticipated in the Emergency Project Paper (EPP), the fertilizers were envisaged to be primarily used in the following crop cycles, including in the off-season in 2008 and the rainy season in 2009.

22. The Government established the price of fertilizers after a consultative process with farmer's cooperatives. The price (13,500 CFA Franc per bag of 50kg, both for urea and NPK) was kept slightly above the price before the crisis peak in early 2008 (13,000 CFA Franc/bag) and well below the 17,000 CFA Franc that CA announced in May 2008 to reflect the sharp increase in international markets. This resulted in a 54 percent subsidy compared to what it would have been without government intervention. This decision, a consequence of the soaring prices of fertilizers in the international markets helped farmers face the unprecedented increase in fertilizers prices in 2008 and kept alive rice production, which assures food security and revenues of rural households in the targeted areas. It is worth noting that CA fully recovered the payments from farmers and the net revenues of the sales, i.e. cost of fertilizers nets of subsidies and CA 10 percent fees for transportation and management, were transferred to the FCPMF's account to support the safety nets programs.


Figure 1: International and domestic prices of fertilizers



Source: FAO Outlook, June 2008.

² West Africa Economic and Monetary Union, which includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Togo, and Senegal.

Figure 2: Diammonium Phosphate (DAP) Prices



23. Under Component II, the Project: (i) assisted CA to develop a Procurement and Financial Management Procedures Manual, which did not exist prior to project intervention; (ii) contributed to enhancing the FM system of CCA by upgrading its FM software and providing related training to its accounting staff; and (iii) supported ONAHA and DGA with communications and M&E, including to carry out farm surveys and to document performance of beneficiary cooperatives.

24. Following on the key recommendations from the Bank-supported study on Food Security and Safety Nets in Niger (Report No.44072-NE, February 18, 2009), the project assisted the Government in outlining TORs for studies and in preparing a detailed action plan, including milestones and time line for delivering the reports. In order to facilitate the process, the Government set up an *ad hoc* Steering Committee under the supervision of Prime Minister's Office, and put in place arrangements with clear assignment of responsibilities among relevant government bodies for the execution of agreed actions. The Government has fully implemented the work plan before project closing, including the completion of four background analytical reports to support the development of a safety-net system and the launch of a cash transfer pilot that will make use of the sales revenue of the fertilizers distributed by the Project. The four preliminary reports included: (i) a review of existing safety net programs; (ii) the feasibility and identification of a pilot safety net program; (iii) an analysis of the characteristics of poor households (chronic and seasonal) and targeting mechanisms; and (iv) a proposal for the improvement of the information system on food security and government programs.

25. Originally, a fifth study was planned to improve the monitoring system of the management of the national food security stocks in Niger, but the Office of National Food Security Stocks (OPVN), which is responsible for managing the stocks, did not express an interest in participating in the proposed activities.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

26. The design of the M&E system was simple and focused on measuring project performance indicators as identified in the Project's Results Framework. To carry out this task the Project provided incremental support in terms of additional equipment (one vehicle,

two computers, and four electronic scales) to ONAHA and DGA for the measurement of rice productivity at the end of each cropping season.

27. Monitoring was done on a weekly basis. For this purpose, CA collected data from its own accounting system and from local fertilizer distribution committees (composed of representatives of CA, the local administration, the regional directorate of agriculture, and beneficiaries). The tabulated data were regularly sent to the Bank to feed into the GFRP bi-weekly update, and included volumes of fertilizers sold by category (urea and NPK), payments recovered and modalities (through Bank credit/guarantee or in cash), for each cooperative and in each irrigated perimeter. As a result, the Government completion report (see summary in Annex 7) adequately documented the project's achievement against agreed indicators as set in the result framework. Overall, the M&E system was strong and provided good quality information on project's outcomes, implementation, and fiduciary management

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

28. *Safeguards.* From an environmental and social safeguards standpoint, the Project was classified as B, requiring a Partial Environmental Assessment, and the following two policies were triggered: (i) the Environmental Assessment Policy (OP 4.01) and the Pest Management Policy (OP 4.09). The triggering of OP 4.09 was predicated on the basis of the procurement of a large amount of fertilizers, which was expected to lead to an intensification of agricultural production and productivity and an increased use of pesticides on the part of producers.

29. The existing Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) and the Pest Management Plan (PMP) that had been developed in 2008, in the context of the preparation of Agro-sylvo-pastoral Exports and Markets Development Project (PRODEX) were considered appropriate for the Project. It was agreed during project preparation that these existing ESMF and PMP were to be updated within six months of grant effectiveness to address project specific safeguards issues. It is noted that the Government submitted an Environmental Impact Assessment report in September 2009, well after the six months post-effectiveness approval deadline agreed on during project preparation. The delay was due to: late submission of the terms of reference due to lack of clear leadership for the study between involved agencies within the Ministry of Agricultural Development, namely the Ministry's General Secretariat, CA, ONAHA, and DGA; and the lengthy approval procedures for approval of environmental impact-related documents by the *Bureau des Evaluations d'Etudes Impact Environnemental* (BEEI -the National Bureau for Environmental Impact Assessment). The TORs were submitted and approved by the Bank in June 2009. A training session on integrated rice production management, including pest management aspects, was delivered in July 2009 to the frontline extension agents – both of ONAHA and the Department of Agriculture, by specialists from the National Agricultural Research Institute (INRA). No significant negative environmental impacts were reported during project implementation.

30. *Procurement.* Procurement under the Project was of satisfactory quality; the final review of the project procurement system concluded that: (i) a Procurement Plan has been prepared during preparation, updated and approved in June 2009; (ii) the filing of procurement documents within CA and CCA was of good quality and allowed for easy tracking of the procurement processes, though some room for improvement was identified; and (iii) all contracts were pre-reviewed and adequately implemented.

31. The main challenge was the acquisition of a large amount of fertilizers (92 percent of the Grant amount) on a tight schedule. The bidding documents were prepared during project preparation and the Limited International Competitive Bidding was appropriately appraised as the method to use to ensure urgent delivery of the products while safeguarding fair

competition in an emergency context. The process was completed within a month, from preparation of bidding documents to contract approval and signing, including Bank clearances and no objection at required stages, as shown in Table 2 below.

32. The fertilizer procurement process was a good example of what can reasonably be done in terms of improving project implementation when there is strong commitment on both the Bank and Government sides.

Table 2: Timetable for the procurement of fertilizers under the Project

Steps	Date	Remarks/Quality assurance
Preparation and submission to the Bank of bidding documents	August 3-6, 2008	By CA upon receiving of template sent by the Bank team; endorsed by the Ad Hoc Commission set up by the FCPMF's Join Government-Donor Committee prior to sending to the Bank
Bank No Objection on the bidding documents	August 7, 2008	Following a review by The Country Office Procurement Specialist and cleared by the designated Procurement Hub Coordinator
Opening and evaluation of bids	August 25-27, 2008	By the Ad Hoc Commission
Bank No Objection on Evaluation report and proposal for contract award	August 29, 2008	Following a review by The Country Office Procurement Specialist and cleared by the designated Procurement Hub Coordinator
Contract signing	September 4, 2008	Signing by the supplier and relevant parties within the MDA on September 4, approved by the Ministry of Finance on September 9, 2008.
Delivery Dates	October 24- November 12, 2008	Load was shipped from Mali on Oct 8, and delivered in Niamey during the period of October 24-November 12, 2008.

33. *Financial management.* The financial, administrative, and accounting resources and tools were in place within the Food Crisis Unit (CCA), which managed the Grant's Designated Account. CCA provided to the Bank the required information on financial management through the quarterly Interim Financial Reports (IFRs) which were of adequate quality and responsive to Bank's recommendations. The final IFR was received with no comment from the Bank.

34. At the preparation stage the overall fiduciary risk was assessed as substantial for the CA and moderate for the CCA. In line with the recommendations provided as a result of the FM assessment, the Project included provisions to strengthen the respective FM system through training of staff and upgrading the accounting software and mainstreaming through a financial reporting system to track the use of the proceeds on a quarterly basis. CCA successfully implemented its new financial management system. The Ministry of Agricultural

Development's Inputs Procurement Unit (CA) also implemented the agreed action plan to correct weaknesses that were identified in its financial and management system during preparation. Indeed, CA developed a detailed manual of procedures for accounting and procurement, and included the audit of its accounts for years 2008 and 2009 in the terms of reference of the external auditor of the project-designated account, even though it did not manage project proceeds. However, despite the progress made, CA still needs to improve its internal control system through hiring of an internal controller as recommended in the action plan.

35. Ninety-eight percent of the grant proceeds had been disbursed at project closing, of which 94 percent through direct payment for the fertilizers procured under the Project. To conduct an external audit of the designated account, which handled 6 percent of the grant proceeds, as well as the financial statements of CA for 2008 and 2009, a firm was only selected in April 2010. The audit report was submitted to the Bank on June 18, 2010, and it was unqualified.

36. The final rating for project financial management was moderately satisfactory, taking into account the good management of the project-designated account on the one hand and factoring in delays and shortcomings in the implementation of the action plan for improving CA's financial management system and the contracting of the external auditor on the other hand.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

37. The project design was able to capitalize on the key recommendations from the Bank-supported study on Food Security and Safety Nets in Niger (Report No.44072-NE, published on February 18, 2009) and included a component on the development of a safety net system that addresses chronic food insecurity that impacts the life of 20 percent of the total population in Niger. Indeed, the Project assisted the Government in preparing food safety net programs under Component II. To this end, the net revenues from the sales of fertilizers procured under the project (about USD 2 million) were transferred to the FCPMF to support the implementation of the safety net programs on a pilot basis. The Government and stakeholders welcomed this sequencing approach which proved to be relevant in the current context of a severe food crisis which affects half of the population.

38. As a result of the activities of the Project, the steering committee and the CCA have shown a real commitment towards the setup and implementation of the safety net programs. They received the approval by the CRC on April 12, 2009, for the use of the funds for the development of a cash transfer pilot. The preparation of the pilot cash transfer project is underway and should start in the third quarter of 2010. In view of locally high food prices caused by recent droughts in Niger, the Bank and the Government are also discussing further Bank assistance to the Government's Support Plan to Vulnerable People, and subsequent assistance is envisioned to be delivered early in Fiscal Year 2011 using available IDA or other resources including from available trust funds under the GFRP or from the newly established Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP).

39. The Project also contributed to improving CA's procurement and financial management procedures through the preparation of a comprehensive manual of procedures for accounting, financial management, and procurement, which CA did not have before the Project.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

40. The Project was relevant and timely with respect to the global food prices crisis, and the unprecedented soaring prices of agricultural commodities in 2008, including fertilizers. The response, which consisted of focusing on supporting food production in combination with safety nets, fitted well into the Rural Development Strategy's Action Plan (adopted in 2006 and updated in September 2009 in the context of the CAADP roundtables), especially as related to Risk Prevention, Improvement of Food Security, and Sustainable Management of Natural Resources. Doing so allowed the Government to mount an immediate response to the effects of the food price crisis, while laying the basis for enhanced preparedness to deal with future food security threats. In view of the newly unfolding food crisis in 2010 in Niger caused by extreme drought conditions, project support for enhancing this preparedness turns out to be highly relevant.

41. Echoing the ESW on food security and safety nets referred to earlier, the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS FY08-FY11) for Niger stressed the need of a "balanced mix of policies and programs that simultaneously: (i) address the production and marketing constraints to food availability and access, and (ii) provide safety nets to help those who are in a situation of chronic food insecurity". By focusing on both aspects, the design of the Project was closely aligned with the overarching orientation of the CAS.

42. The design of the Project was also consistent with the broader objectives of the GFRP which were to: (i) reduce the negative impact of high and volatile food prices on the lives of the poor in a timely way, (ii) support governments in the design of sustainable policies that mitigate the adverse impacts of high and more volatile food prices on poverty while minimizing the creation of long-term market distortions, and (iii) support broad-based growth in productivity and market participation in agriculture to ensure an adequate and sustainable food supply response.

43. In terms of operational procedures, the Project also built on the guidelines and instruments set in the GFRP Framework document, approved by the Board in May 2008. In particular, Component I of the Project was aligned with Component III of the GFRP Framework (Enhancing Domestic Food production and Marketing Response), while Component II was inspired by Component II of the Framework (Ensuring Food Access and Reducing Nutritional Vulnerability which listed an array of safety net instruments to use). The swift timetable that was followed for the procurement of the fertilizers under the project also reflects the pro-active steps that were taken during preparation to ensure adequate implementation readiness that allowed the Project to go into effect immediately once approved.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

44. Achievement of project objectives is measured based on the key performance indicators in the Emergency Project Paper. The main outcome indicator was defined as "increase in rice yield by 20 percent in plots treated with recommended dose of fertilizers". Data were collated from the Ministry of Agricultural Development yearly surveys for yield and production estimates. For the purpose of project M&E, and with incremental support from the Project, specific surveys in rice production areas along the Niger Valley were

conducted by ONAHA and DGA to ensure appropriate documentation of project performance.

45. Table 3 below summarizes the results of the surveys, which take into account both irrigated areas cropped by rice producer cooperatives and individuals which received fertilizers procured under the Project for the first 2009 season (January-June cycle, during which 86 percent of the fertilizers was distributed), and the rainfall season (July-December cycle, during which 14 percent of the fertilizers was distributed). At the end of the project, rice yields in irrigated plots treated with the recommended dose of fertilizers was 5.4 tons/ha on average, thereby exceeding the baseline yield of 2.5 tons/ha by 116 percent and outpacing the project's target of 3.5 tons/ha by 54 percent.

46. According to the stakeholders interviewed during the ICR mission, the difference in yield came from the availability of quality fertilizers at the very beginning of the cropping cycle, while all other production parameters, including irrigation conditions, planting materials, and labor, remained the same. Because rice response to minerals is almost linear up to a limit of productivity, timely available fertilizers augmented yield per hectare (see Annex 2 for more details).

Table 3: Summary of project outcomes

Outcome Indicator	Baseline (July 2008)	Projection target	Results at project completion	Rate of realization
Increase in rice yield in plots treated with recommended dose of fertilizers	2.5 tons per ha (without fertilization)	3.5 tons per hectare	5.4 tons per hectare (by farmer cooperatives)	116 percent over the baseline and 54 percent over the target

47. Intermediary outcomes indicators or outputs³ agreed under the Project included:

- (i) For Component I: (a) the total envisaged volume (4,000 tons) of fertilizers was procured and distributed; (b) a total of 9,265 hectares was treated with those fertilizer, including 8,239 hectares by farmer cooperatives and 1026⁴ hectares by individuals who accessed fertilizers at CA open selling points; against the expectation that at total of 10,000 hectares would be treated, this target was achieved at 93 percent;
- (ii) For Component II: (a) regular reporting on relevant food prices and national food security system stocks by FCPMF; the FCPMF information system (including data collection and dissemination aspects) is effective, and a first bulletin was published by the Communication and Information Center (CIC) in April 2010; and (b) the preparation and implementation of a safety net program by CCA, the studies were completed and a pilot safety net program was launched.

³ See Annex 2 for details on project outputs per component. Figures on production estimates may differ from those in the Government summary report, as the ICR take only into account data in conjunction with fertilizers procured and distributed under the Project.

⁴ The M&E system of ONAHA has fairly good information on cooperatives, but is not yet able to monitor individuals who are not affiliated to cooperatives. Areas cropped by this category of farmers are estimated based on the amount of fertilizers bought at CA open selling points.

48. However, the monitoring of security stocks under OPVN management needs to be made more transparent. Unlike other FCPMF-related bodies such as the CRC, CCA, SAP, and CIC, OPVN did not collaborate on the background studies with other stakeholders to improve the food security stocks monitoring as planned under the Project. It is expected that the recent change in OPVN's management and the new Government's orientation towards more openness and transparency on food security-related information will help improve the situation in the short term. As for the safety net-related activity, the studies were done, and a pilot program is being implemented using the net revenues from the sales of fertilizers. This is very timely in the current context of a severe food crisis in Niger.

3.3 Efficiency

49. A Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM; Monke and Pearson, 1989) model was used for the *ex-post* economic analysis of the Project, though not required under Bank's operational policy for emergency operations (OP 8.0). The analysis concluded that the Project produced significant private and social profits, with important transfers to paddy farmers as expected. The low Domestic Resource Cost (DRC) ratio ($0.64 < 1$) suggests an efficient use of domestic factors such as labor and land for production of rice in Niger.

50. The Subsidy Ratio to Producers (SRP) is a single measure of all transfer effects. It indicates the extent to which the system's revenues are increased or decreased because of transfers. The SRP for paddy production in the context of the project is 0.18, meaning that the net transfer could be created solely by a tariff on rice of 18 percent (i.e. the current level of VAT in Niger) if all other divergences were eliminated.

51. While the DRC and the SRP give an idea of the efficiency and competitiveness in general of the rice production system in Niger, they do not measure the project efficiency itself, i.e. whether the project investment, in particular investing in fertilizers as in Component 1, was profitable or not. In this context it is worthwhile looking at Benefit/Cost Ratio (BCR), i.e. the producer benefit per hectare. The analysis (with details presented in Annex 3) indicates that the BCR is 1.20, i.e. for each dollar invested in fertilizers, producers gain USD 1.20. Net benefits (difference in profits with and without project, which is 209,258 FCFA/ha) exceed 7.3 times incremental costs induced by the Project (calculated as net subsidy on fertilizer per hectare, i.e. 28,620 FCFA/ha).

52. These ratios indicate that irrigated rice production in Niger is competitive and efficient. However, further support to rice development in Niger should closely look at longer-term sustainability of the intervention in terms of the scope, nature, and profitability of public investments, especially if currently high international rice prices would return to levels that reflect historic trends.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

Rating: Satisfactory

53. The overall project outcome is rated as satisfactory. The rating is based on the continuing high relevance, the achievement of agreed performance indicators, and explicit evidence of the efficiency of the Project. The supporting data are also of good quality.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

54. The Project effectively targeted poor rural households with less than 0.25 hectares. Indeed, 88 percent of the fertilizers were distributed to producers' cooperatives, while only 12 percent were sold at open selling points in the project intervention areas.

55. The development of a safety net strategy as one of the outcomes of the Project is expected to lay the groundwork for a permanent safety net program that can address the needs of the chronically poor population (close to 20 percent of the population) in terms of emergencies as well as during normal times. The lessons from the on-going pilots contribute and are factored into the dialogue about the design of an effective system. In this context it is worthwhile to highlight the results of the study on the "Analysis of the characteristics of poor households (chronic and seasonal) and targeting mechanisms" which was completed in December 2009. This activity, led by the *Système d'Alerte Précoce* (SAP - Early Warning System) of the FCPMF, provides concrete findings and recommendations for improving the targeting system, including: (i) most targeting methods are based on communities' targeting, and there are also good experiences with the collection of quantitative information; (ii) in a country like Niger geographic targeting is very important to identify disadvantaged areas with higher levels of chronic poverty and facing risks of drought; and (iii) within a geographically determined area (including an estimate of the number of beneficiaries), community methods and quantitative methods (proxy means testing - PMT) can be used to classify and select beneficiaries.

56. It is somewhat unfortunate to note, though, that most of the cooperatives' members are men, with less than 3 percent of women, mostly widows, who inherited plots from their deceased husbands. Gender is a general issue in Niger, in particular in the rural areas, which needs to be addressed with a comprehensive and multi-sectoral approach. Subsequent operations may take advantage of the upcoming Poverty and Gender Assessment to tackle more aggressively gender inequality in Niger.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

57. Thanks to the project, the FCPMF is now working beyond emergency situations to tackle chronic food insecurity. Also the strengthening of CCA financial management system has increased its capacity to better reporting on the use of Donors' contributions to the *Fonds Commun des Donateurs* (FCD - Donors' Basket Fund), and the *Fond de Sécurité Alimentaire* (FSA- Food Security Fund). The project assisted the MDA's CA to move to a modern management system with a new manual of procurement, accounting and financial management procedures.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

N/A

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

58. No formal beneficiary assessment was performed, but results from supervision missions indicate that beneficiaries praised timely delivery and quality of fertilizers and affordable prices. This has been confirmed by the Government's completion report (see the summary of the report in Annex 7).

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

59. **Rating: Moderate.** The major risks to development outcomes are the following:

(a) High fertilizer subsidies which entail a financial sustainability issue, but the PAM analysis indicates that, overall, the operation is beneficial to the whole economy, provided that the international prices for rice remain high, which is likely in the near future.

(b) The new Government has shown an interest in tackling chronic food insecurity and to set up a safety net system and develop an institutional framework separate from the emergency response system. The Government has already made several steps towards the development of the system through the setup of a steering committee, the preparation of a safety net strategy, and the implementation of a safety net pilot program under the leadership of CCA, which is the FCPMC permanent secretariat. However, the conversion of a temporary steering committee into a permanent inter-ministerial coordinating body presents many challenges that may take time to be addressed adequately, thereby running the risk of undermining preparedness in the short run.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

60. **Rating: Satisfactory.** As mentioned earlier in section 2.1 above, Bank management provided what it required to adequately prepare the Project including: (i) putting in place a multi-sectoral team from the CMU, SDN, HD, and PREM, with high-level support on fiduciary, legal, disbursement, and safeguards. An appraisal mission was carried out in July 2008 to discuss the Government request and reach agreement on the project design. All parties from within the Bank, up to and including the Region's Front Office, made necessary arrangements, including an effective backup system, to ensure continuity and to keep up the momentum in the project preparation process, using emergency procedures under OP 8.00.

61. Inclusion of the producer cooperatives through their APEX organization, FUCOPRI, in the project design also paid off. They were able to contribute to the fertilizer distribution arrangements during preparation and were invited by the Government to the technical discussions and negotiations of the Grant Agreement, which is unusual in the Bank cooperation with the Government of Niger in the agriculture and rural development sector. FUCOPRI representatives also participated to the supervision missions and the final evaluation and were instrumental in the Project's M&E system as well as for the quality of information collected for the ICR.

(b) Quality of Supervision

62. **Rating: Satisfactory.** The Bank ensured quality supervision of the Project, mainly from the field, with regular interaction with the MDA and project implementing agencies. Supervision missions were undertaken in October and June 2008, and the final one in late November 2009, one month before the closing date. The ICR mission was carried out in April 2010. Meetings, and audio- or video-conferences with relevant specialists from Washington,

as necessary, mostly with the environmental and safety net specialists, were organized from time to time as the need arose.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance

63. *Rating: Satisfactory.* Overall Bank performance is rated as satisfactory, especially taking into account the high quality and fast speed of project preparation.

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance

64. *Rating: Satisfactory.* The Government was swift in preparing the Project, putting in place a technical team coordinated by the Secretary General of the Ministry of Agricultural Development, and later setting up a Steering Committee led by Director of Cabinet of the Prime Minister to supervise the studies and activities on the safety nets under Component II. The Government also agreed that the CRC play a key role and ensured transparency and good governance in the procurement of the fertilizers.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance

65. *Rating Satisfactory.* Overall, the implementing agencies, namely CCA and CA, have delivered on their commitments and were responsive to Bank requests in terms of monitoring project performance and in implementing recommendations from missions and reviews. There were some delays in starting the implementation of Component II as both institutions initially were not familiar with Bank procedures. CA did not implement the recommendation to hire an internal auditor, as agreed in the financial management action plan. However, this did not impact overall management of the grant proceeds as CA did not manage the designated account, and direct payment was used for the acquisition of fertilizers. The external auditor could also have been selected earlier by CA and CCA. The audit report was submitted to the Bank on June 18, 2010, and it was unqualified.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance

66. *Rating is Satisfactory.* The Borrower's overall performance is rated as satisfactory, taking into account Government commitment and leadership in preparing the Project, and satisfactory implementation of project activities by implementing agencies according to initial plans.

6. Lessons Learned

67. **High level commitment, both by the Bank and Government,** is instrumental in increasing effectiveness and speed of preparing emergency operations.

68. **A simple design of emergency operations is a key for success:** the design of the Project, which rightly focused on responding to the Government's short-term priority and to the urgent needs of the beneficiaries, was a key factor in the Project's successful implementation.

69. **An emergency project should not undermine governance issues:** there were substantial governance-related risks associated with the procurement of a large amount of fertilizers. Involving a competent third party, namely the CRC, in the procurement process

and getting beneficiaries involved in critical steps of the project cycle helped safeguard transparency and ensured accountability.

70. **Emergency operations may provide an opportunity for crafting longer-term responses to vulnerability:** the Project was used as an opportunity to move forward the long-standing agenda for developing safety nets in a country which definitely needs a comprehensive and long-term response to recurrent food crises and chronic food insecurity.

71. **Availability of analytical work** on risks and safety net schemes in Niger facilitated the design and preparation of the operation.

72. **Sustained and continuous capacity building is needed for implementing agencies** in their learning curve regarding Bank procedures during preparation and implementation. This technical assistance was provided by the Bank team and has proven to be demanding, given the short project implementation time frame. Supplementing government agencies with personnel with adequate skills and experience of Bank operations and procedures would contribute to improving project execution.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners

(a) Borrower/implementing agencies

73. Annex 7 summarizes the Borrower's ICR which is in line with the Bank assessment.

(b) Co-financiers

N/A.

(c) Other partners and stakeholders

(e.g. NGOs/private sector/civil society)

74. Annex 5 presents the minutes of the stakeholders' workshop held in May 2010 which aimed at reviewing and validating the Government's draft report. Unfortunately, the Federation of Rice Producer cooperatives (FUCOPRI) did not participate at the workshop, in spite of its critical contribution to the Project's preparation and implementation. The Bank team raised the issue with FUCOPRI and requested from its Director General a written summary of their assessment of the project which was not yet received by submission of this ICR. Per Bank request, a summary of the discussions with cooperatives has been prepared by the Government's consultant and added to the document as Annex 6.

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD million equivalent)

Components	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
Procurement of Fertilizers	6.50	6.45	99%
Support to National Food Crisis Management Framework	0.50	0.40	80%
Total Baseline Cost	7.00	6.85	98%
Physical Contingencies	0.00	0.00	N/A
Price Contingencies	0.00	0.00	N/A
Total Project Costs	7.00	6.85	98%
Front-end fee PPF	0.00	0.00	N/A
Front-end fee IBRD	0.00	0.00	N/A
Total Financing Required	7.00	6.85	98%

(b) Financing

Source of Funds	Type of Co- financing	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
Borrower		0.00	0.00	N/A
Special Financing		7.00	6.85	98%

Annex 2. Outputs by Component

Table 2.1: Project's Performance Indicators (from the Result Framework in the Emergency Project Paper)

Outcome Indicators	Baseline (July 2008)	Projection target	Results at project completion (12/31/2009)	Rate of realization
Increase in rice yield in plots treated with recommended dose of fertilizers	2.5 tons per ha (without fertilization)	3.5 tons per hectare	5.4 tons per hectare	54 percent over the target and 116 percent over the baseline.
Component 1-Procurement of Fertilizers (USD 6.5 million)				
Tons of fertilizers procured and distributed to rice paddy farmers at a subsidized price	0	4,000 metric tons	4,000 metric tons	100 percent
Hectares of irrigated rice fields treated with adequate dose of fertilizers	0	10,000	9,265 hectares including 8,239 ha by cooperatives and 1,025 by individuals	93 percent
Component 2- Support to the National Food Crisis Prevention and Management Framework (USD 0.5 million)				
Regular reporting on relevant food prices and national food security stocks	Weekly bulletin on prices and areas at risk from SAP and EWS	Report on food security and project implementation including food security stocks	Information bulletin on food prices, production, and interventions published by the FCPMF's CIC	Partially achieved. There is still a need for improvement in monitoring of food stocks managed by OPVN.
Preparation and implementation of sustainable safety net programs	None	Government starts implementing programs using net revenues from the sale of fertilizers	The preparation of the pilot cash transfer program has been completed, and the program is expected to be made effective in June 2010.	Fully achieved.

Additional Information on Outputs under Component 2 -- Support to the National Food Crisis Prevention and Management Framework

A. Studies/reports

1. The following background reports on safety nets were produced:
 - (i) ***Review of existing safety nets programs (December 2009)***. This activity was led by the Executive Secretariat of the Rural Development Strategy (SE-SDR). The main findings included: (a) spending on social safety nets is very low except during the crisis years (2005-2006 and 2008); and (b) the majority of expenditures were for emergency programs in 2005-2006 and for universal programs (non-targeted) for importing food products and supporting the price of petroleum products.
 - (ii) ***Improvement of the information system on poor households and safety net programs (December 2009)***. This activity was led by Communication and Information Center (CIC) of the FCPMF, which will be responsible for the analysis

and the dissemination of basic information. Main conclusion: the need to disseminate existing information is requested by several actors.

(iii) ***Identification of pilot safety net program (December 2009)***. CCA led this activity for a feasibility analysis to pilot direct transfers. These pilot programs will be financed by the sales revenues of the fertilizers as approved by the CRC. Main conclusions: (a) experiences in other countries confirm the effectiveness of transfers; (b) the experiences in Niger are recent and limited in coverage but with positive results; (c) the introduction of a cash transfer program in Niger is desirable and feasible, but still as a pilot phase to test and validate the approach, and to capitalize on the experience already acquired, while adapting to different contexts; (d) preliminary proposals suggest a transfer program for the poorest households for a period of at least 18-24 months; (e) complementary activities for Prevention/Protection and Promotion/Transformation should also be considered.

(iv) ***Analysis of the characteristics of poor households (chronic and seasonal) and targeting mechanisms (December 2009)***. This activity, led by the Early Warning System (SAP) of the FCPMF, includes a review of existing information systems and targeting mechanisms and will provide recommendations for improving the targeting system. The study found that the percentage of chronically poor (households that are expected to be always below a minimum level of consumption) is at least 20 percent of the population even during non-crisis periods. The main conclusions for the targeting are: (a) most targeting methods are based on communities' targeting, and there are also good experiences in the collection of quantitative information; (b) in a country like Niger geographic targeting is very important to identify disadvantaged areas with higher levels of chronic poverty and facing risks of drought; (c) within a geographically-determined area (including an estimate of the number of beneficiaries), community methods and quantitative methods (proxy means testing - PMT) can be used to classify and select beneficiaries.

2. The Government prepared a strategic document and a summary report based on the above background reports and policy papers:

(i) ***Strategic document for the setup of a system of a safety net action plan to protect the poor and vulnerable groups (December 2009)***. This activity was led by the Executive Secretariat of the Rural Development Strategy (SE-SDR). It provided recommendations for preparing an action plan and for setting up a monitoring system of the safety net programs.

(ii) ***Summary report (April 2010)***. The CCA led this activity which included a synthesis of the background reports.

B. Workshops and other outputs

(i) ***November 2009*** – Presentation of the preliminary background reports and discussion of key aspects of their conclusions and recommendations.

(ii) ***May 2010*** – presentation of synthesis report and the action plan.

(iii) ***April 2010*** - Information bulletin on food prices, production, and interventions published by the FCPMF's Information and Communication (Center CIC).

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis

1. An economic analysis was not required under Bank's operational policy for emergency operations (OP 8.0). It was, however, assumed in the Project Paper that increases in paddy yields would result in increased farmers' revenues over the marginal cost associated with the procurement of fertilizers at subsidized prices.
2. An economic analysis was undertaken *ex post* by comparing actual farm-level data for project beneficiaries with a farm budget assuming that farmers that did not benefit from the Project. In addition, the question of the sustainability of the high subsidy level (54 percent of CIF prices) on fertilizers was addressed in light of Government's financing capacity and the social benefit/cost for the country as a whole.
3. A social cost-benefit analysis was conducted using the Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM) approach in Table 1 to assess the farm-level productivity (private profit – Cell D), economic efficiency (social profit – Cell H), and subsidies (effects of divergences – Cells I to L).

Table 3.1: The PAM structure

	Revenues	Costs		Profits
		Inputs	Factors	
Private prices	A	B	C	D
Social prices	E	F	G	H
Effects of divergences	I	J	K	L

4. Farm budget data was collected from the farm survey and production estimates and additional data from FUCOPRI and the MDA (*Strategie Nationale de Développement de la Filière Riz, Novembre 2009*), as well as from the Ministry of Trade's Agricultural Markets Information System (SIMA) which provided detailed information regarding imported rice (including taxes, transportation costs, and margins). This information was utilized to estimate international parity price of paddy produced in the Niger River Valley. Given that there are two production seasons in a year, Table 3.2 indicates how annual figures were calculated.

Table 3.2: Basic data for extrapolation

	Cropped areas (ha)	Average Yields (kg/ha)	Fargate prices (private)
Counter season	7,649	5,436	181
Rainy season	1,616	5,132	194
Total/Average	9,265	5,378	184

5. Assumptions for the situation without the project include: (i) a decrease in the use of fertilizers -- but not less than the quantities used in the previous production cycle -- which would be less available and more expensive; (ii) fertilizer prices before project are maintained at FCFA 17,000 per 50 kg bag, instead of FCFA 13,000 as in late 2007 (to partially reflect soaring prices in international markets); (iii) yield per hectare is as in the previous production cycle, i.e. average weighted yield per hectare of the off-season and the rainy season in 2008. Table 3.3 shows with and without project scenarios at the farm level.

Table 3.3: Farm budgets

Designation /unit of quantities	WITH PROJECT			WITHOUT PROJECT		
	Quantities per hectare	At Private prices (FCFA/ha)	At social prices (FCFA/ha)	Quantities per hectare	At Private prices (FCFA/ha)	At social prices (FCFA/ha)
Fertilizer (kg/ha)						
Urea	242.7	65,529	142,295	200.0	68,000	117,260
NPK	242.7	65,529	139,310	200.0	68,000	114,800
Chemicals						
Liquid pesticide (liters/ha)	4.0	20,000	16,750	4.0	20,000	16,750
Granulated pesticide (kgs/ha)	50.0	125,000	104,690	50.0	125,000	104,690
Seed (kg/ha)	60.0	28,000	28,000	60.0	28,000	28,000
Electricity (kWh)	-	30,000	25,210	-	30,000	25,210
Labor (hr/ha)						
Seedbed Prep	16.0	20,000	20,000	16.0	20,000	20,000
Crop Care/ canals Maintenance	72.0	90,000	90,000	72.0	90,000	90,000
Harvesting	32.0	40,000	40,000	32.0	40,000	40,000
Threshing	32.0	40,000	40,000	32.0	40,000	40,000
Irrigation-labor	32.0	40,000	40,000	32.0	40,000	40,000
Capital	-			-	0	-
Working Capital (FCFA/ha)	304,058.2	18,243	25,863	309,000.2	18,540	18,540
Tractor Services (hr/ha)	10.0	20,000	20,000	10.0	20,000	20,000
Amortization irig equip	-	10,000	10,000	-	10,000	10,000
Land (rent price per ha)	1.0	0	80,000	1.0	0	80,000
(kg/ha)	5,377.5	989,694	1,026,326	4,269.0	785,674	814,755
Total Cost (excluding land) (FCFA/ha)		612,302	742,118		617,540	685,251
Profit excluding land (FCFA/ha)		377,392	284,208		168,134	129,504
Net Profit including land (FCFA/ha)		377,392	204,208		168,134	49,504

Table 3.4: PAM analysis for “with-project” scenario (FCFA/ha)

	Revenues	Costs		Profits
		Inputs	Factors	
Private prices	989,694	334,058	278,243	377,392
Social prices	1,026,326	456,256	365,863	204,208
Effects of divergences	(36,632)	(122,197)	(87,619)	173,185

Table 3.5: PAM analysis for total area cropped by project beneficiaries (in USD million)

	Revenues	Costs		Profits
		Inputs	Factor	
Private prices	20.376	6.878	5.729	7.770
Social prices	21.131	9.394	7.533	4.204
Effects of divergences	(0.754)	(2.516)	(1.804)	3.566

6. Table 3.5 above indicates that rice production was privately profitable (at FCFA 168,134 per hectare) and marginally economic (at under FCFA 50,000 per hectare) before the

Project. Under project assistance, however, fertilizer use increased. Together with improved quality and timing of fertilizer application, yields increased substantially. Table 3.4 indicates that private profit more than doubled to FCFA 377,392 per hectare, and social profit also increased. The latter indicates that, despite fertilizer subsidies (indicated in Cell J), the paddy system remains efficient. The Domestic Resource Cost (G/E-F) is greater than zero, indicating economic efficiency. The Subsidy Ratio to Producers (SRP) is positive at 0.17, implying a net transfer to paddy producers.

7. Private and social benefit-cost ratios, respectively 1.2 and 1.1, also indicate that the Project is financially profitable for producers as well as for the whole economy. The net benefit-cost ratio, calculated as incremental benefit divided by incremental cost as in Table 6 below, is even more favorable.

Table 4: Benefit/Cost analysis (in FCFA per ha)

Private Project Benefits	377,392
Private Project investment*	313,397
Private Benefit/Cost Ratio	1.20
Social Project Benefits	284,208
Social Project investment**	255,222
Social Benefit/Cost Ratio	1.11
Incremental benefits	209,258
Incremental cost ***	28,620
Ratio of Net Benefit/Net cost	7.31

**Project investment is calculated as total cost of fertilizers at private price procured under the Project divided by total areas cropped.*

***Social project investment is total cost of fertilizers without transfers, plus social cost of transportation to production areas.*

**** Incremental cost is computed as the additional subsidy on fertilizers per hectare of paddy.*

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names	Title	Unit	Responsibility/ Specialty
Lending			
El Hadji Adama Touré	Sr. Agricultural Economist	AFTAR	Task Team Leader
Amadou Alassane	Sr. Agriculture Services Specialist	AFTAR	
Joelle Dehasse	Sr. Operations Officer	AFCCI	
Mamadou Yaro	Sr. Financial Management Specialist	AFTFM	
Trichur K. Balakrishnan	Lead Financial Management Specialist	AFTFM	
Luis Schwarz	Senior Finance Officer	LOAFC	
Amadou Ibrahim	Sr. Economist	AFTP4	
Ibrah Rahmane Sanoussi	Procurement Specialist	AFTPC	
Irina Luca	Lead Procurement Specialist	AFTPC	
Eric Jean Yoboué	Sr. Procurement Specialist	AFTPC	
T. Mpoy-Kamulayi	Lead Counsel	LEGAF	
Amadou Konare	Sr. Environmental Specialist	AFTEN	
Gilles Marie Veillot	Sr. Counsel	LEGAF	
Setareh Razmara	Lead Social Protection Specialist	AFTH2	
Carlo Del Ninno	Principal Economist	AFDSN	
Hadidia Djimba	Team Assistant	AFMNE	
Elisabeth Mekonnen	Language Program Assistant	AFTAR	
Supervision/ICR			
El Hadj Adama Touré	Sr. Agricultural Economist	AFTAR	Project TTL
Soulemane Fofana	Operations Officer	AFTAR	ICR Primary Author
Amadou Alassane	Sr. Agricultural Specialist	AFTAR	
Carlo Del Ninno	Senior Economist	AFTSP	
Hadidia Diallo Djimba	Program Assistant	AFMNE	
Amadou Konare	Sr. Environmental Specialist	AFTEN	
Karima Laouali Ladjo	Program Assistant	AFMNE	
Elisabeth Mekonnen	Program Assistant	LCC3C	
Janet M. Owens	Consultant	AFTP3	
Setareh Razmara	Lead Social Protection Special	AFTSP	
Ibrah Rahamane Sanoussi	Procurement Specialist	AFTPC	
Ludovic Subran	Social Protection Economist	LCSHS-DPT	
Nko Etesin Umoren	Resource Management Analyst	AFTRM	
Mamadou Yaro	Sr. Financial Management Specialist	AFTFM	
Marie Claudine Fundi	Language Program Assistant	AFTAR	

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)	
	No. of staff weeks	USD thousands (including travel and consultant costs)
Lending		
Total:	12.37	35,399
Supervision/ICR		
Total:	16.75	89,267

Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results

Dans leur intégralité les coopératives et la FUCOPRI ont avancé les avantages et les points faibles du PUASA suivants:

Points forts:

- L'engrais a été disponible et accessible en quantité et à temps et aussi à un prix raisonnable
 - La mise des producteurs à l'abri des commerçants usuriers qui leur fournissaient de l'engrais de mauvaise qualité et très cher
 - L'assurance de la disponibilité et de l'accessibilité de l'engrais qui a fait augmenter les superficies mises en valeur car l'exploitant qui ne dispose pas de moyens pour acquérir l'engrais ne s'aventure pas à repiquer sa parcelle: en exemple les superficies mises en valeur pendant la SH 2009 dépassent celles exploitées pendant la SH 2008 de 736 ha.
 - L'amélioration appréciable de la sécurité alimentaire
 - La multiplication d'effets secondaires positifs (augmentation du fourrage pour le bétail, du travail salarié)
 - Le repiquage à temps du fait que les producteurs sont assurés de la disponibilité de l'engrais et par conséquent d'un accroissement certain du rendement
 - la formation à l'endroit des cadres et des élus très appréciée
 - la reprise des activités de suivi de la campagne et de l'évaluation de la production qui étaient délaissées auparavant faute de moyens
- Lors de la mission de terrain, les élus formés ont reconnu le bien fondé de cette formation et de la nécessité de son élargissement aux autres membres des comités de gestion des coopératives, aiguadiers, pompistes,
 - Les différents documents supports de la formation sont utilisés au niveau des coopératives et renouvelés au besoin depuis leur mise en place par l'ONAHA au cours des années de la réhabilitation (1987-1990). Le problème est le manque de missions de suivi particulièrement des coopératives non membres du Centre de promotion de services (CPS) qui au nombre de neuf (9) bénéficient de l'appui de ce centre en matière de formation et suivi de gestion.

Point faible:

- Le retard accusé pour la mission d'information et de sensibilisation qui a joué sur les résultats attendus car ils auraient été plus avantageux si la mission s'était déroulée avant le démarrage du projet

Dans leur ensemble, les coopératives visitées et la Fucopri ont souhaité le renouvellement de l'opération et sa pérennisation par la mise en place de structures de suivi et de gestion appropriées.

⁵ Summary of beneficiary of discussions with representatives of beneficiary cooperatives as in the Government Completion report (May, 2010).

Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results

République du Niger
Ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage
Direction Générale de l'Agriculture

Projet d'appui à la Sécurité Alimentaire (PUASA)

(Compte rendu des travaux de l'atelier de validation du rapport d'achèvement)

Mai 2010

INTRODUCTION

L'an deux mil dix et le mardi 18 Mai, s'est tenue dans la salle des Banquets de la Primature, l'atelier de validation du rapport d'achèvement du projet d'urgence d'Appui à la Sécurité alimentaire (PUASA). L'atelier a vu la participation des membres du comité de pilotage du projet ainsi que plusieurs invités. (Voir liste de présence en annexe).

Avant de commencer les travaux, un bureau de séance a été mis en place. Le bureau est composé de :

Président : Mr Ahmed ALI : DG/CA

Rapporteurs:

-Mr Ekoye Amadou: ONAHA

-Yaro Iddé: DGA

Les travaux se sont déroulés en plénière. Après l'exposé du consultant sur le contenu du rapport provisoire, les observations, conclusions et recommandations suivantes ont été formulées:

I : Observations de forme

A la page 38 paragraphe 1 et première ligne, lire « engrais » au lieu de « semences ».

II. Observations de fond

1. La réunion constate qu'une grande différence existe entre la couverture des besoins en engrais de la campagne SS 2009 et la campagne SH 2009. Elle recommande au consultant d'expliquer cette différence; de nuancer certaines de ses conclusions, puis de compléter les informations sur les quantités d'engrais reçues toute sources confondues;
2. La réunion constate qu'en matière d'évaluation des productions, le rapport a fait ressortir les quantités d'engrais vendues ou placées en prêt de campagne aux coopératives. A la lecture des chiffres liés à ces placements, la réunion estime qu'il aurait fallu accorder une attention particulière aux exploitants qui ont des difficultés d'acquérir les engrais tout en garantissant les chances de remboursement des prêts de campagne;
3. Par rapport à la durabilité de l'intervention du projet d'urgence, la réunion constate que le rapport provisoire est resté muet sur cette question qui reste et demeure le nœud des problèmes des coopératives sur les AHA ;
4. La réunion constate que les études réalisées sur les thématiques des filets sociaux de sécurité n'ont pas été traitées dans le rapport. Pourtant, au vu de l'intitulé même du sujet, en dehors des aspects d'input, toutes les questions d'output doivent y être intégrés; 1
5. La réunion constate que le rapport n'a pas suffisamment décrit le contexte et justifie: les conditions dans lesquelles le gouvernement du Niger à solliciter le financement dudit projet par la Banque Mondiale;
6. le rapport provisoire dans certains cas, apparait plus descriptif qu'analytique. Les analyses sur la situation socio économique des producteurs, des périmètres et enfin des coopératives n'ont pu être établis et donc n'apparaissent pas suffisamment dans le rapport. L'établissement de cette analyse plus fine, a pourtant été vivement demandé lors de la deuxième mission de supervision du projet. A ce sujet, des TOR restés sans suite, ont été

établis et envoyés pour non objection;

7. A l'issue des travaux, la réunion constate que le temps n'a pas permis aux participants de mieux se prononcer sur le rapport. Elle recommande donc aux participants de faire suivre leurs observations qui pourront être intégrées par la suite dans le compte rendu.

III. Conclusions et recommandations

En conclusion, la réunion estime que le rapport d'achèvement du projet d'urgence d'appui à la sécurité alimentaire est adopté sous réserve de la prise en compte des observations ci-dessus évoquées. En conséquence de quoi elle formule les recommandations suivantes:

3.1 A l'endroit du consultant de :

- a) nuancer d'une part certaines des conclusions et compléter les informations sur les quantités d'engrais reçues sur les AHA toutes sources confondues;
- b) traiter dans le rapport les questions des études réalisées sur les thématiques des filets sociaux de sécurité;
- c) expliquer la différence de taux de couverture des besoins en engrais entre la première et la deuxième campagne;
- d) décrire le contexte dans lequel le gouvernement du Niger à solliciter le financement dudit projet par la Banque Mondiale.

3.2 : A l'endroit des participants :


Faire suivre leurs observations qui pourront être intégrées par la suite dans le compte rendu des travaux de l'atelier.

3.3 A l'endroit de la CCA et de la Banque Mondiale


Prendre les dispositions pour délibérer sur le reliquat de fonds du projet et examiner la faisabilité de conduire les enquêtes socio économiques et l'évaluation environnementale paysanne demandées lors de la deuxième mission de supervision du projet dont les TDR sont élaborés et transmis pour non objection.

Ont signé :

1^{er} Rapporteur : Ekoyé Adamou



2^{ème} rapporteur



Vu le Président : Ahmed ALI



Appendix of Annex 6: List of Participants

	Nom et Prénom	Structures
1.	Amadou Djibo	DRDA/Niamey
2.	Hassane Saley	CIC
3.	Djibo Kinguigé	DDA/Say
4.	Amadou Badjé	DDA/kollo
5.	Hamidou Adamou	CA
6.	Chaibou Dadi	Consultant/PPFS
7.	Iddé Vara	DGA
8.	Adamou Ekoye	ONAHA
9.	Djibo Banaou	CCA/Cabinet du PM
10.	Aboubacar Omar Farouk	CCA/Cabinet du PM
11.	Ousmane Arbonkana	CCA/Cabinet du PM
12.	Harauna Mahamane	DGE/Finances
13.	DR Aboubacar Mahamadou	DN/MSP
14.	Saidou OUA	CC/SAP
15.	Moukara Yacouba	CIC
16.	Moukara Hamidou	CCA/Cabinet du PM
17.	Mme Rabiadou Chaoulani	DDR/E
18.	Mahamane Sani Abdou	SE/SDR
19.	Mahamane Ousmane	RINI
20.	Kango Moctar	CCA/Cabinet du PM
21.	Mounkaila Adamou	CCA/Cabinet du PM
22.	Saidou Anattché	OPVN
23.	Bacharau Salissou	CIC
24.	Adamou Seydou	DDA/Tillabéri
25.	Assoumane Doka	Consultant/PUASA
26.	Ahmed Ali	DG/CA

Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR

Face à l'augmentation des prix des denrées alimentaires sur le plan international et au déficit céréalier de la campagne d'hivernage 2007, le gouvernement du Niger a pris un certain nombre de mesures pour répondre aux besoins des populations vulnérables et accroître de façon durable la production agricole nationale. Ainsi, le Niger a transmis une requête auprès de la Banque Mondiale dont l'objectif est de solliciter l'appui de la Banque Mondiale pour couvrir les besoins en engrais de la campagne rizicole saison pluvieuse 2008.

La demande du Niger auprès de la Banque Mondiale afin de mettre en œuvre son plan de contingence et de gestion des crises alimentaires a été approuvée sous la forme d'un don pour le financement d'un projet d'urgence d'appui à la sécurité alimentaire pour un montant d'environ sept millions de dollars US. **Le but visé par le projet à terme est d'augmenter la production du riz à hauteur de 20percent.** Le PUASA s'inscrit dans le cadre de la Stratégie de Développement Rural (SDR) et est inscrit au programme structurant 11: « Lutte contre l'insécurité Alimentaire par le Développement de l'Irrigation ». Ainsi, il cherchera à traduire concrètement l'objectif de la SDR à savoir « favoriser l'accès des ruraux aux opportunités économiques pour créer les conditions d'une **croissance économique durable en milieu rural** ».

Au Niger, le potentiel riz cultivable est estimé à **24.000 ha** dont seulement **8.500 ha** sont exploités en Aménagements Hydro agricole (A.H.A.). La production nationale du riz paddy est estimée à **70.000 tonnes** soit **45.500 tonnes** de riz blanc.

Selon les informations collectées par la Douane, les volumes de riz importé s'établissent autour de **200.000 tonnes en 2002** et **300.000 tonnes en 2005** avec des valeurs CAF respectives de **35,5 milliards** et **43 milliards** de francs CFA.

Devant cette tendance généralisée de diminution des stocks mondiaux et d'accroissement des prix sur le marché international d'une part et dans un souci de réduction de la pauvreté en milieu rural et de dépenses de devises étrangères dues aux importations du riz d'autre part, le Gouvernement du Niger a trouvé qu'il y a une impérieuse nécessité de réhabiliter la filière rizicole dans son ensemble.

Du fait que la maîtrise totale de l'eau permet de sécuriser la production, les cultures irriguées (rizicoles principalement) sont aujourd'hui la solution adéquate pour contribuer à la recherche de la sécurité alimentaire des populations et améliorer leurs revenus.

Cet objectif ne peut être atteint sans une fertilisation optimale des terres cultivées.

Les besoins évalués pour cette campagne s'élèvent à 4 000 tonnes d'engrais, soit:

- 2 000 tonnes d'Urée et 2000 tonnes de NPK pour la riziculture moderne dans les périmètres encadrés par l'ONAHA (8 500 ha) et les exploitations à titre privé (1 500 ha)
- Cette quantité permettra la fertilisation de 10 000 ha à raison de 400kg/ha/campagne (200kg d'Urée et 200 kg de NPK)

Les périodes d'utilisation de ces engrais sont les suivantes:

- premier apport (NPK): en mi- août 2008
- deuxième apport (Urée): en mi-septembre

Ainsi la satisfaction de la présente requête rendra possible la couverture des besoins en vue de :

- relever, à un niveau acceptable, la fertilité des terres agricoles;
- mettre à la disposition des agriculteurs les quantités d'engrais vendues à des prix modérés;
- contribuer à la lutte contre l'insécurité alimentaire et la pauvreté en milieu rural par l'augmentation de la production agricole;
- améliorer la balance commerciale en réduisant les importations alimentaires notamment du riz grâce à l'augmentation des productions.

L'objectif du projet est de soutenir la production rizicole irriguée et la sécurité alimentaire des ménages par:

- a) l'acquisition et la distribution d'engrais minéraux à des prix modérés aux producteurs de riz
- b) la fourniture de l'assistance technique au renforcement des capacités du dispositif national de prévention et de gestion des crises alimentaires et des structures mises en place.

Le groupe cible est constitué par les producteurs de riz **localisés dans les zones agro écologiques** de la vallée du fleuve et de la Komadougou organisés au sein des aménagements hydro agricoles.

La durée du projet est de 18 mois afin de lui permettre de couvrir les 2 campagnes réalisées dans l'année à savoir la Saison sèche (SS) et la saison d'hivernage (SH).

Les zones agro écologiques concernées par les actions du Projet d'urgence de soutien à la sécurité alimentaire sont les vallées du fleuve Niger et de la Komadougou yobé.

Le projet d'urgence d'appui à la sécurité alimentaire est placé sous la tutelle du Ministère du Développement Agricole (MDA) et est exécuté sous la responsabilité conjointe de : (i) la Cellule crises alimentaires (CCA), (ii) la Centrale d'approvisionnement (CA), (iii) la Direction générale de l'Agriculture (DGA) (iv), et l'ONAHA.

La CCA a eu la charge de la coordination de l'exécution technique des différentes sous composantes, le suivi et l'évaluation des résultats.

Dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre du PUASA, la stratégie d'acquisition d'engrais, l'appui au dispositif national de prévention et de gestion des crises alimentaires (DNPGCA) et aux structures de mise en œuvre du projet ont été réalisés au niveau des composantes.

Le projet s'articule autour de deux (2) composantes telles que définies dans le document du projet:

La Composante 1: Acquisition, distribution-vente et recouvrement des coûts de l'engrais par la Centrale d'Approvisionnement (CA)

La Centrale d'Approvisionnement a été retenue pour l'exécution de cette composante à travers l'acquisition et la distribution de 4000 tonnes d'engrais au niveau des bénéficiaires ainsi que le recouvrement et le versement du produit de la vente dans un compte spécial ouvert à cet effet. Cette composante a été réalisée à 100percent au plan financier pour une valeur d'achat d'engrais TTC fourni aux magasins de la CA de

6 452 400 dollars US soit **deux milliards neuf cent vingt neuf millions trois cent quatre vingt neuf mille six cents (2 929 389 600) FCFA.**

Les étapes de l'appel d'offres ont été conformes aux procédures de la Banque Mondiale :

- Après le lancement de l'appel d'offres, international restreint N° 003/2008/MDA/SG/CA relatif à la fourniture d'engrais au Ministère du développement agricole sur financement IDA, la commission ad hoc chargée de l'évaluation des offres créée le 25 août 2003 par arrêté N° 143/MDA/CA du 25 août s'est réunie le même jour afin d'évaluer sur les offres réceptionnées.
- Quatre soumissions ont été réceptionnées le même jour : Groupe DEC/Midnight Sun, Fertilizer Bénin et Yara France, DFA et DSA, Multi Média Récolte.
- Au vu des résultats de la vérification des pièces demandées et de la vérification par rapport aux spécifications techniques, la commission a proposé comme adjudicataire le groupement DEC/Midnight Sun pour un montant total TTC de 6 452 400 dollars US soit deux milliards neuf cent vingt neuf millions trois cent quatre vingt neuf mille six cents (2 929 389 600) F CFA.
- La réception de l'engrais a débuté le 12 novembre 2008 dans les magasins de la CA et de l'OPVN Gamkalé.

Les différentes étapes du marché ayant accusé du retard principalement la réception de l'engrais intervenue en novembre, n'ont pas permis son utilisation au cours de la campagne SH 2008 à laquelle il était destiné. Cependant la période s'est avérée propice pour sa mise en place au niveau des bénéficiaires et par conséquent son accessibilité et sa disponibilité pour la saison sèche 2009.

Dans le document de projet de l'IDA, la précaution a été prise de mentionner l'utilisation de l'engrais en SS 2009 au cas où une raison de force majeure l'imposerait.

Les opérations de distribution ont été réalisées sur la base des besoins exprimés par les coopératives des aménagements hydro agricoles (AHA) d'une part et d'autre part des mises en place effectuées au niveau des départements pour le besoin des producteurs privés en hors AHA. La fédération des unions de coopératives productrices de riz (Fucopri) n'a pas été associée lors du montage du projet mais au moment de la négociation du contrat de financement. Elle a refusé de participer à la mission de sensibilisation tant que le prix de cession de l'engrais aux coopératives n'est pas réduit. C'est ainsi que lors d'une rencontre avec le Ministre de l'Agriculture, le prix de cession a été ramené à 13 500 F subventionné de ce fait à hauteur de 55percent.

Le suivi de l'opération de distribution des engrais et le recouvrement des fonds ont été coordonnés par la direction de la CA aux niveaux régional et national.

Les modalités de cession des engrais (subventionnés par l'état) sont la vente au comptant pour les coopératives ou la vente à crédit cautionné par une banque commerciale de la place.

Les 4000 tonnes d'engrais ont été vendues aux coopératives des AHA rizicoles et aussi en détail aux producteurs de riz hors AHA de la Communauté urbaine de Niamey, à SAY, Gaya, Kollo, Tillabéry, ainsi qu'à la fédération Mooriben.

Le suivi évaluation a été réalisé sous la responsabilité de l'ONAHA avec la participation de la Direction Générale de l'Agriculture (DGA). L'ONAHA a eu en charge l'information et la sensibilisation des acteurs et bénéficiaires, le suivi de la mise en place et de la distribution des engrais, le suivi de la campagne, l'évaluation de la production.

Il a été convenu que l'engrais sera attribué sur la base de 85percent aux AHA et 15percent aux producteurs privés ; la réalisation comme le montre le tableau ci-dessous démontre le quasi respect de ce quota.

Tableau: prévision et réalisation de la distribution de l'engrais

NPK			Urée		
AHA			AHA		
Prévision (T)	Réalisation (T)	%	Prévision (T)	Réalisation(T)	%
1700	1754,78	87,7	1700	1711,95	85,6
Hors AHA			Hors AHA		
300	245,22	12,3	300	288,05	14,4
Total	2000	100	Total	2000	100

L'opération de vente à prix subventionné des 4000 tonnes d'engrais par la Centrale d'Approvisionnement a été bouclée en fin août 2009. Les engrais ont été distribués et utilisés comme suit:

- 3423 tonnes, soit 86percent, pour la production rizicole de la campagne de saison sèche 2009 (Janvier à juin 2009)
- 577 tonnes pour la saison humide 2009 (Juillet-décembre).

Le prix de cession ayant été ramené à 13 500 F lors d'une rencontre les partenaires du Projet et notamment la Fucopri avec le Ministre de l'Agriculture, les détails des coûts ont été établis ainsi qu'il suit :

- Montant à recouvrer par la CA: $13\,500 \times 4000 \text{ FCFA} = 1\,080\,000\,000 \text{ FCFA}$
- Coûts opérationnels de la CA (10%): $1\,080\,000\,000 \times 0,1 = 108\,000\,000 \text{ FCFA}$
- Montant à verser par la CA: $1\,080\,000\,000 - 108\,000\,000 = 972\,000\,000 \text{ FCFA}$

Les coûts ont été recouverts à 100% à travers l'OPVN grâce au mécanisme mis en place entre la Fucopri, le Riz du Niger, et l'OPVN;

Le montant de la récupération d'une valeur de neuf cent soixante douze millions de francs (972 000 000) CFA a été versé dans un compte ouvert par la CCA et sera destiné au financement d'autres opérations d'appui entrant dans le cadre de la sécurité alimentaire en concertation avec la Banque.

La Composante 2: Renforcement des capacités du dispositif national de prévention et de gestion des crises alimentaires ainsi que des structures de mise en œuvre du projet d'urgence d'appui à la sécurité alimentaire (**DNPGCA**).

L'objectif global de la composante 2 du projet est le renforcement des capacités des structures d'appui à la mise en œuvre du projet d'appui à la sécurité alimentaire.

Un des objectifs spécifiques est d'améliorer l'efficacité du DNP-GCA en ciblant deux domaines d'intervention:

- le renforcement des capacités de gestion de la CCA.
- la réalisation de 2 types d'études dans le domaine des filets sociaux qui sont :
 - o l'élaboration d'un programme de filets sociaux pour la protection des pauvres et des groupes vulnérables.
 - o l'amélioration de l'information et le renforcement de la réponse d'urgence

Cette composante mise en œuvre par la CCA qui a assuré la coordination technique et la mise en œuvre des actions du projet d'urgence, a regroupé les activités contribuant à l'amélioration de l'efficacité du DNP-GCA à travers le renforcement des capacités de son secrétariat exécutif et permettant l'atteinte des deux(2) résultats suivants: (i) R1-la gestion des outils du Dispositif et le suivi évaluation des activités sont renforcés, (ii) R2-l'équipement adéquat pour l'atteinte du R1 est acquis ; Pour parachever les activités prévues, il sera nécessaire de les accompagner par la formation des acteurs concernés.

Ainsi il a été acquis le logiciel de gestion Tompro et les outils de gestion ont été paramétrés. Le Directeur financier a été formé à son utilisation.

Dans le domaine des filets sociaux quatre (4) études plus une synthèse ont été réalisées et validées.

Au niveau de la Centrale d'Approvisionnement, trois (3) activités ont été prévues au titre du renforcement des capacités afin de lui permettre d'améliorer sa performance en matière d'opérations comptables et de gestion administrative et financière à savoir : (i) élaboration d'un manuel des procédures administrative, comptable et financière, (ii) recrutement d'un auditeur interne (iii), recrutement d'un auditeur externe. La CA étant en instance de réorganisation n'a pas jugé dans l'immédiat la nécessité de recruter un auditeur interne et l'élaboration du manuel de procédures a été réalisée sur financement propre car non engagé au niveau du PUASA. Seule le recrutement d'un auditeur externe est en cours.

Au niveau de l'ONAHA et de la Direction Générale de l'Agriculture: Afin de garantir la participation des structures qui contribuent aux activités de suivi-évaluation, le projet a appuyé le renforcement de leurs capacités par l'achat d'un véhicule 4*4 au profit de l'ONAHA, de deux unités informatiques (une à l'ONAHA et une autre à la DGA) et de quatre (4) balances électroniques pour la pesée des carrés de rendement.

En outre pour faciliter une meilleure participation des exploitants et des cadres de terrain (DP et agents de vulgarisation de l'agriculture) dans la recherche des informations, il a été prévu et réalisé une formation sur le remplissage des fiches.

Malgré le retard on peut retenir les résultats suivants:

- **La diffusion des informations et la sensibilisation** à travers le lancement par le Ministre du Développement Agricole des activités du projet pour porter à la connaissance des populations nigériennes en général et des bénéficiaires en particulier, les objectifs poursuivis ainsi que les résultats attendus après la mise en

œuvre du projet. les informations et la sensibilisation du personnel de l'encadrement des AHA et des membres élus des coopératives ont eu lieu au niveau des trois régions concernées (Niamey, Tillabéry, Gaya) et ont regroupé 133 participants dont 103 élus des coopératives et 30 agents d'encadrement. Les travaux ont été couverts par l'Office de la Radio et de la Télévision du Niger (ORTN) et la Télévision Nationale (Télé Sahel) ainsi que la Radio Rurale FARA'A à Gaya.

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- les résultats de la campagne saison sèche 2009 (première des deux qui doivent être concernées par le projet) ont été portés à l'assistance en vue de sa large diffusion et recueillir la réaction de l'assistance par rapport à la démarche du projet
- **la formation des membres élus des coopératives en gestion des stocks ainsi que de l'encadrement** (Directeurs de périmètre et agents de vulgarisation de l'agriculture) **sur la gestion intégrée de la riziculture.**
- **L'évaluation de la production** en vue de déterminer le rendement par périmètre ainsi que la production. Cette activité a été réalisée en saison hivernage 2008 et saison sèche 2009.
- Le **matériel** de collecte et de traitement de données (ordinateurs, sacs, balances) a été aussi fourni comme prévu par le PUASA à l'ONAHA.
- **le fonctionnement du véhicule lors des missions de suivi de la campagne** pour identifier les différents problèmes au cours du cycle végétatif du riz et y apporter des solutions en rapport avec les responsables des coopératives et les producteurs. Le véhicule a été réceptionné en octobre 2009.

Evaluation de la production

Il est important de souligner en préalable que l'évaluation n'a concerné que les AHA qui ont bénéficié de 87,7% de l'engrais NPK et 85,6% de l'Urée. Par conséquent les productions de paddy résultant du privé en hors aménagement (bénéficiaires du reliquat du pourcentage) ne sont pas prises en compte.

La procédure utilisée par l'encadrement de l'ONAHA et de la Direction générale de l'agriculture pour l'évaluation de l'impact du projet a été unique pour les deux campagnes sèche et hivernage et comporte deux aspects à savoir la pose aléatoire de carrés de rendement conformément à la méthodologie mise au point sur les aménagements rizicoles et les interviews. La pose des carrés a été réalisée selon une densité de 1 carré de 1 m² pour une superficie cultivée de 5 ha, avec un minimum de 30 carrés par aménagement. Les interviews ont été réalisées au moyen de 2 types de questionnaires : (i) d'un questionnaire administré aux membres des comités de gestion de l'ensemble des périmètres et (ii) d'un questionnaire administré à un échantillon de 10% des producteurs par périmètre pendant la commercialisation auprès des coopératives. Ces interviews ont été réalisées pour obtenir des données complémentaires sur le déroulement des activités

du projet sur le terrain. **C'est un taux de 194% soit environ le double des carrés réglementaires à poser qui ont été traités sur les 220% posés.**

Dans la requête du Gouvernement il a été question de 8500 hectares de riziculture qui seront concernés par le projet au niveau des AHA.

Les superficies repiquées en SS et SH 2009 ont été respectivement de 6802 Ha soit 80% de celle projetée dans le projet et de 6861 Ha soit 81 % de la projection.

La différence de la production en paddy de la campagne SS 2009 de **36 930 tonnes contre 26 666 tonnes en SS 2008 année sans projet équivaut à un taux de variation de la production de 38,5% supérieure à celle de 20% attendue par le projet.**

La production en paddy de la campagne SH 2009 a été de **32908 tonnes contre 25 826 tonnes en SH 2008 année sans projet soit une production additionnelle de 7082 tonnes de plus.**

La production en paddy de la campagne **SH 2009** comparée à celle de la **SH 2008**, fait ressortir une augmentation de **27,4% supérieure à celle de 20% attendue par le projet.**

La production enregistrée au cours des deux campagnes de 2009 couvertes par le projet a été de 69837 tonnes de paddy contre 52492 pour l'année de référence, **soit une variation positive de 33.04%.**

Le rendement a varié globalement de 21.50 % passant de 4207 kg/ha à 5111 kg/ha alors que la prévision du projet était de 4500kg/ha.

Nos sources de données de la DMV/ONAHA établies depuis 1992 indiquent que ce rendement n'a jamais été atteint.

En plus de la production de paddy on peut y ajouter celle du son et de la paille de riz qui sont utilisés dans l'alimentation animale notamment des gros ruminants. Dans les zones rizicoles la paille de riz est de plus en plus prisée et son rôle dans le complément fourrager notamment en année 2010 après l'important déficit fourrager résultant du déficit pluviométrique de l'hivernage 2009. Le tallage étant en corrélation positive avec le rendement⁶ l'utilisation de l'engrais au cours des 2 campagnes de 2009 a aussi tout comme le rendement provoqué l'augmentation proportionnelle de la production de la paille de riz par rapport à l'année de référence (2008).

Plusieurs travaux de recherche ont aussi démontré l'équivalence de poids de paddy et de celui de la paille de riz d'où la déduction que l'apport additionnel de paille en année 2009 a été de dix sept mille trois cents quarante cinq mille tonnes (17345) tonnes et la production additionnelle de la SH 2009 qui intervient dans l'atténuation du déficit fourrager de l'année 2009 a été de sept mille quatre vingt deux (7082) tonnes de paille de riz.

Trois (3) indicateurs et leurs niveaux requis ont été retenus pour évaluer la performance des AHA:

⁶ A. Angladette; Maisonneuve & Larose.

Indicateurs	Niveaux requis	Niveaux enregistrés
intensité culturale	160 %	164,27 %
rendement	4500 kg/ha	5111 kg/ha
taux de recouvrement	95 %	Réalisation en SS09 et SH09: 25 AHA sur 31

Le constat est que l'intensité culturale pour l'année 2009 couverte par le projet est de 167.27%, alors qu'elle a été de 155% pour l'année 2008 sans projet. On observe non seulement que le taux de l'intensité culturale a augmenté mais surtout qu'il a atteint un niveau très satisfaisant dans un système de double culture avec vingt deux (22) périmètres sur 32 (73,3%) qui dépassent le seuil requis de 160%. Ainsi il a été enregistré treize (13) périmètres (40%) qui ont obtenu des taux d'intensité culturale qui sont supérieurs à 180% alors que la norme acceptable est de 160%.

Sur le plan de vue des impacts environnementaux et sociaux, certes que un plan de gestion environnementale et sociale a été proposé et validé, mais sa non réalisation pour raison de calendrier n'est pas en contradiction avec l'atteinte des objectifs du projet du fait que :

- le problème le plus important posé par l'utilisation des produits phytosanitaires et des engrais ne se situe pas au niveau des doses appliquées par les producteurs mais concerne les origines douteuses de certains produits provenant de circuits incontrôlés. Ces produits peuvent causer des problèmes sur la santé des populations et ne permettent pas d'avoir les effets recherchés donc des impacts négatifs sur le plan sanitaire et économique.
- les producteurs des AHA au Niger ont une culture de la conduite des traitements phytosanitaires et d'application des engrais
- la complexité de l'assimilation des éléments nutritifs en riziculture irriguée ainsi que de leur nécessité, la faible teneur des sols en éléments fertilisants, font de la fertilisation minérale un élément incontournable pour obtenir des rendements satisfaisants.
- l'utilisation des herbicides et pesticides suivant les doses recommandées ne constitue pas de risques majeurs du fait de leur faible rémanence (30 à 40 jours), et les doses utilisées en moyenne par an au Niger sur les AHA du fleuve ne dépassent pas 8 000 tonnes ce qui est très infime par rapport aux utilisations d'autres pays qui partagent le bassin du Niger.

Les effets constatés du fait de l'intervention du PUASA sont nombreux et sans être exhaustifs on peut citer: l'accroissement des revenus distribués (emplois), les taxes affectées aux produits et impôts liés à l'activité, les résultats d'exploitation pour les sociétés de transformation de paddy.

La mise en œuvre du PUASA au cours des deux campagnes de 2009 a enregistré d'importants impacts positifs sur les plans financier, économique, sécurité alimentaire, social et environnemental. L'impact général du projet est sa contribution au programme structurant 11 de la Stratégie de Développement Rural (SDR)

« Lutte contre l'insécurité Alimentaire par le Développement de l'Irrigation ». Cette contribution s'est traduite par une augmentation des rendements, de la production et de l'intensité culturale en année de projet par rapport à l'année de référence. **Sur le plan financier**, le projet a engendré d'importantes recettes financières telles que : les recettes au niveau du budget de l'Etat (taxes, douane, et impôts), les recettes financières additionnelles par rapport à l'année sans projet au niveau des exploitants bénéficiaires, et les recettes financières générées par l'augmentation de la distribution de revenus aux **agents intérieurs (main d'œuvre journalière, meuniers, transformatrices, transporteurs)**. **Sur le plan économique et social on peut citer:**

- l'amélioration de la sécurité alimentaire de par la production additionnelle de paille et paddy engendrée qui de fait a amélioré la disponibilité, l'accessibilité, le pouvoir d'achat, ainsi que la qualité nutritionnelle,
- l'amélioration du revenu disponible et l'accès aux biens et services non agricoles
- l'apport du Projet dans la réduction sensible de la pauvreté et l'amélioration des conditions de vie par la création d'emplois ruraux additionnels qui ont facilité l'accès aux marchés et aux services publics de base (santé, éducation etc.)
- l'amélioration de la balance commerciale en réduisant les importations alimentaires notamment du riz du fait de la production additionnelle enregistrée.

L'exécution du PUASA a enregistré beaucoup de Points forts tels que:

- L'atteinte de tous les objectifs fixés
- l'acquisition et la distribution d'engrais minéraux à des prix modérés subventionnés par l'Etat aux producteurs de riz
- L'excellence de la collaboration entre la Fucopri et la CA qui a permis le succès du projet
- L'utilisation par toutes les coopératives des engrais de la CA à hauteur de 88% pour l'urée et 86% pour le NPK (15-15-15) ce qui est un gage de leur bonne qualité.
- L'engrais a été disponible et accessible en quantité et à temps
- La mise des producteurs à l'abri des commerçants usuriers qui leur fournissaient de l'engrais de mauvaise qualité et très cher
- Le recouvrement des coûts à 100% grâce au mécanisme Fucopri, Riz du Niger, OPVN
- L'assurance de la disponibilité et de l'accessibilité de l'engrais qui a fait augmenter les superficies mises en valeur car l'exploitant qui ne dispose pas de moyens pour acquérir l'engrais ne s'aventure pas à repiquer sa parcelle: en exemple les superficies mises en valeur pendant la SH 2009 dépassent celles exploitées pendant la SH 2008 de 736 ha.
- L'amélioration appréciable de la sécurité alimentaire
- La multiplication d'effets secondaires positifs (augmentation du fourrage pour le bétail, du travail salarié.)

- Le repiquage à temps du fait que les producteurs sont assurés de la disponibilité de l'engrais et par conséquent d'un accroissement certain du rendement
- la formation à l'endroit des cadres et des élus très appréciée
- la reprise des activités de suivi de la campagne et de l'évaluation de la production qui étaient délaissées auparavant faute de moyens
- le renforcement des capacités du dispositif national de prévention et de gestion des crises alimentaires ainsi que des structures de mise en œuvre du projet d'urgence d'appui à la sécurité alimentaire
- la réalisation d'études dans le domaine des filets sociaux.

Des points faibles du projet ont aussi été enregistrés tels que:

- Le retard accusé pour la mission d'information et de sensibilisation qui a joué sur les résultats attendus car ils auraient été plus avantageux si la mission s'était déroulée avant le démarrage du projet

Il serait aussi important de mentionner **les facteurs ayant intervenu dans la réussite du projet** tels que:

- l'implication des acteurs à tous les niveaux de décision et particulièrement à la bonne collaboration entre les structures: Fucopri, Centrale d'approvisionnement, OPVN, RINI,
- la cohésion au niveau de l'équipe d'exécution du Projet
- le besoin des exploitants rizières d'intrants de qualité et accessibles à moindres coûts

Il est à remarquer que le PUASA est un projet d'urgence dont l'exécution a répondu aux attentes malgré les exigences des procédures et des impératifs du calendrier.

Au cours de la mission de terrain les préoccupations enregistrées auprès de **l'encadrement et des bénéficiaires membres élus des coopératives auxquelles s'ajoutent nos propres analyses, se résument à :**

L'achat d'engrais

- L'opération ayant eu des effets et impacts positifs et appréciés, il s'avère nécessaire de la renouveler et de mettre en place un mécanisme fort afin de la rendre pérenne
- la sensibilisation préalable des coopératives dans l'élaboration des projets futurs
- la mise en place de mécanismes de garantie auprès des banques pouvant jouer le rôle de crédit de campagne associant la Fucopri et d'autres parties prenantes

La formation

Vu l'importance de la formation et de l'appréciation qui en est faite, il s'avère nécessaire de la répliquer à tous les niveaux (coopératives, pompistes, aiguadiers) et de façon périodique

Le suivi évaluation qui doit jouer son rôle d'activité permanente grâce à l'acquisition de moyens logistiques nécessaires afin de le rendre permanent notamment au niveau des régions.

En conclusion il a été constaté que malgré l'urgence, les objectifs du PUASA ont été atteints dans leur quasi-totalité.

Annex 8. Comments of Co-financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

N/A

Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

1. Banque Mondiale - Aides mémoire de mission de supervision du Projet d'urgence d'appui à la Sécurité alimentaire, Octobre, 2008, Juin 2009, Décembre 2009.
2. DAMEC Sarl-Cabinet d'Expertise. Rapport d'inspection de 4000 tonnes d'engrais relatif au marché /Commande No. 003/MDA/SG/CA. Niamey, 29 Décembre 2008.
3. FAO/WFP/WB- Initiative sur la flambée des prix agricoles. Mission multi-agences de consultation avec le Gouvernement et les partenaires au Développement pour la définition d'un plan d'action national pour le court et moyens termes. Rapport de mission, décembre 2008.
4. Reports on safety nets prepared with the project's support :
 - a) Andrea Borgarello (Consultant). Les filets de Sécurité Sociale au Niger. Rapport de synthèse. République du Niger, Cabinet du Premier Ministre, Décembre 2009. (*Review of existing safety nets programs*).
 - b) Assoumana SAMAILA (Consultant). Analyse et dissémination de l'information pour la prise de décision. République du Niger, Cabinet du Premier Ministre, Centre d'Information et de Communication (CIC), Décembre 2009. (*Improvement of the information system on poor households and safety net programs*).
 - c) Justin BEM (Consultant). Insécurité alimentaire chronique, transitoire et ciblage au Niger. Décembre 2009. (*Analysis of the characteristics of poor households -chronic and seasonal -and targeting mechanisms*).
 - d) République du Niger, Cabinet du Premier Ministre, Cellule Crises Alimentaires (CCA). Projet Pilote de Transfer en espèces au Niger, Avril 2010. (*Identification of pilot safety net program*).
 - e) République du Niger, Cabinet du Premier Ministre, Comité de Pilotage Filets Sociaux-les filets sociaux de sécurité, vers un plan d'action, Document de synthèse, Mai 2010. (*Toward a Safety Nets Action Plan, a Summary Report*).
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6. République du Niger - Enquête Nationale rapide sur la situation alimentaire des ménages au Niger, Résumé exécutif, Décembre 2009.
7. République du Niger, Ministère de l'Agriculture et de L'Élevage. Projet d'Urgence d'Appui à la sécurité Alimentaire (PUASA). Rapport d'Achèvement du Projet. Mai 2010.
8. République du Niger, Ministère du Développement Agricole (MDA) - Marché-Commande No. 0003/2008/MDA/SG/CA pour la Fourniture de 4000 tonnes d'engrais. Septembre 2008.
9. République du Niger, Ministère du Développement Agricole (MDA) -Appel d'offres international restreint (No 0003/2008/MDA/SG/CA) pour la fourniture de 4000 tonnes d'engrais. Aout 2008.

10. République du Niger, Ministère du Développement Agricole (MDA), Centrale d'Approvisionnement-Situations récapitulatives hebdomadaire des mouvements d'engrais (don de la Banque Mondiale) - Octobre 2008 à Juillet 2009.
11. République du Niger, ministère du Développement Agricole (MDA), ONAHA/DGA /INRAN/, Juillet 2009 – Gestion intégrée de la riziculture irriguée au profit des directeurs de périmètres (ONAHA) et agents d'encadrement (DRDA, DDDA).
12. République du Niger, ministère du Développement Agricole (MDA), PUASA Programme d'Activités, Plan de Passation des Marchés, et Plan de Trésorerie, Documents finals, Novembre 2008.
13. République du Niger, ministère du Développement Agricole (MDA), PUASA Programme d'Activités, Plan de Passation des Marchés, et Plan de Trésorerie, Documents finals, Novembre 2008.
14. République du Niger, Ministère du Développement Agricole (MDA), Division des Statistiques Agricoles. Evaluation de la campagne 2009/2010 et résultats définitifs février 2010.
15. République du Niger, Ministère du Développement Agricole (MDA), Office Nationale des Aménagement hydroagricoles (ONAHA), Projet d'Urgence d'Appui à la sécurité Alimentaire (PUASA): Evaluation du programme d'activités de l'ONAHA et la DGA-Fiche de Suivi de la campagne.
16. République du Niger, ministère du Développement Agricole (MDA),ONAHA : Formation des élus des cooperatives rizicoles en gestion des stocks.
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18. The World Bank. Niger Food Security and Safety Nets (Report No.44072-NE, February 18, 2009).

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