


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VIOLENCE

IN THE CITY

Understanding and Supporting
Community Responses to Urban Violence

Violence in the City

***Understanding and Supporting
Community Responses to Urban Violence***



The World Bank
Social Development Department
Conflict, Crime and Violence Team
April 2011

©2010 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development /The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433
Telephone: 202-473-1000
Internet: www.worldbank.org
E-mail: feedback@worldbank.org

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Acronyms

ADR	Alternative dispute resolution
BACRIM	<i>Bandas Criminales Emergentes</i>
BWPI	Brooks World Poverty Institute
CAEN	Pós-Graduação em Economia-Universidade Federal do Ceará, Brazil
CDD	Community-driven development
CDPHD	Centro de Defesa e Promoção dos Direitos Humanos da Arquidiocese de <i>Fortaleza</i>
CPTED	Crime Prevention through Environmental Design
CRISP	Center of Studies in Criminality and Public Security
CSO	Civil society organization
CUCA	<i>Cultura, Arte, Esporte e Cidadania</i>
DESEPAZ	DEsarrollo (development), SEguridad (public safety), and PAZ (peace)
DFID	Department of Foreign Investment and Development
DHS	Demographic and Health Surveys
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECD	Early childhood development
FGC	Family Group Conferencing
FGD	Focus group discussion
FMR	Forced Migration Review
GBV	Gender-based violence
GDP	Gross domestic product
IADB	Inter-American Development Bank
IAHCR	Inter-American Human Rights Commission
IBGE	Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics
ICPC	International Centre for the Prevention of Crime
ICRW	International Center for Research on Women

IDT	Instituto de Desenvolvimento do Trabalho
ILO	International Labour Organization
INCAF	International Network on Conflict and Fragility
INURED	Inter-university Institute for Research and Development
MST	Multisystemic therapy
NBER	National Bureau of Economic Research
NCDDR	National Council on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee
PRIO	International Peace Research Institute
PRONASCI	<i>Programa Nacional de Segurança Pública com Cidadania</i>
PTSD	Post-traumatic stress disorder
SALW	Small arms light weapons control program
SANE	Sexual assault (or forensic) nurse examiner program
SAPS	South Africa Police Service
SINASE	<i>Sistema Nacional de Medidas Socioeducativas</i>
SOLIDU	<i>Organização Granja Portugal Solidária</i>
SSPDS	Secretaria de Segurança Pública e Defesa Social Brazil
UFMG	Minas Gerais Federal University
UK	United Kingdom
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNICRI	United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
WHO	World Health Organization

Executive Summary

For millions of people around the world, violence, or the fear of violence, is a daily reality. Much of this violence concentrates in urban centers¹ in the developing world. These cities are home to half of the world's population and are expected to absorb almost all new population growth over the next 25 years (UN-HABITAT 2007). In many cases, the scale of urban violence can eclipse that of open warfare. Some of the world's highest homicide rates occur in countries that have not undergone wars but have violence epidemics in their urban areas. Concern over these experiences has made urban violence a central preoccupation of policymakers, planners, and development practitioners (Jütersonke and others 2009; UN-HABITAT 2007).

This study emerged from a growing recognition that urban communities themselves are an integral part of understanding the causes and impacts of urban violence and for generating sustainable violence prevention initiatives. Participatory appraisals in Latin America and the Caribbean have produced important insights into the manifestations of violence in different contexts (Moser and McIlwaine 2004, Narayan and Petesch 2007). Nevertheless, much still is to be learned in understanding the myriad strategies that communities employ to manage high levels of violence. Coping mechanisms may range broadly from individual strategies, such as changing one's work or study routine to avoid victimization, to collective strategies that involve formal institutions such as community-based policing, to reliance on traditional or alternative dispute fora. Some coping mechanisms—such as forming extralegal security groups—can be negative and undermine the bases for long-term violence prevention.

This study aims to understand how urban residents cope with violence, or the threat of it, in their everyday lives, to inform the design of policies and programs for violence prevention. The study is the first global study on urban violence undertaken by the World Bank and covers three regions. It emerged

1. Urban centers generally are understood as geographic areas in which population density is higher than in surrounding areas. The UN State of the World's Cities 2006/07 defines an urban agglomeration as the "built-up or densely populated area containing the city proper, suburbs and continuously settled commuter areas."

from the growing demand within the Bank and client governments for a more comprehensive understanding of the social dimensions of urban violence. The study is not an exhaustive review of the topic, but rather is an exploration of the social drivers of violence, and its impact on social relations. The work has been guided by five objectives:

1. Introduce the social dimensions of urban violence and review existing lessons for supporting community capacities to prevent violence.
2. Analyze from the community perspective the experience of violence in five urban areas, including the different forms of violence found there, their prevalence, impacts on different groups, and communities' perceptions of the driving factors behind the violence.
3. Provide insights into community responses to high levels of violence, including individual and collective help-seeking behavior, and reliance on different informal and formal institutions to deal with and prevent violence.
4. Drawing on these insights, provide orientations to policymakers, especially mayors and municipal authorities, to inform successful violence-prevention interventions.
5. Suggest ways that the World Bank could be more involved in addressing the social dimensions of violence.

The report is aimed at two **audiences**. First, the study addresses policymakers in the field, primarily mayors or municipal government officials tasked with addressing urban violence. It also is aimed at World Bank country teams and Task Team Leaders who wish to understand the social dimensions of urban violence to guide operations to address them. As more and more clients request support and advice on the issue of urban violence, Bank staff must be appropriately informed to meet client demand.

The study **methodology** included a review of the literature on urban violence, with a focus on the social dimensions, and a global review of interventions. These capacities are further explored through fieldwork in selected neighborhoods in Nairobi (Kenya), Johannesburg (South Africa), Port-au-Prince (Haiti), Fortaleza (Brazil), and Dili (Timor-Leste) during 2008 and 2009. The fieldwork included a formal survey, key informant interviews, and focus groups. The countries were selected in coordination with World Bank country teams to represent the experiences of both low- and middle-income countries and countries with varying levels of capacity, and to ensure regional balance. Countries were chosen that are already active on these issues and have an ongoing dia-

logue with the World Bank on the topic. Within the selected cities, 2–4 neighborhoods were chosen to compare neighborhoods with varying degrees of both economic disadvantage and violence.

The study is guided by an **analytical framework** centered on key characteristics of community structure and organization important for the prevention of violence. *The framework emerges from a review of the literature on social control, social capital, and collective efficacy.* The key capacities included in the framework are the capacity to generate and maintain trust; to heal from past trauma; to link community efforts with initiatives at different levels of government and society; to exert social control (act as guardians) over violent and antisocial behavior; and to ensure inclusion to guard against capture of collective action by dominant power groups. This framework is applied to the global review of interventions, which discusses the ways that different programs have worked to support community capacities to prevent violence. The framework is discussed in more detail in chapter 3.

STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

The report consists of six chapters. In **chapter 1**, the topic of urban violence is introduced as a pressing development issue. Violence always has been a chief concern of city governments, and their concern has only increased as more and more people move to urban areas. Violence and crime exact incalculable costs on development in economic terms by discouraging investment; and by diverting resources from development toward law enforcement and health and social services for victims. The social costs are even higher. Violence erodes social cohesion, limits mobility, and erodes governance by lessening citizens' trust in a state that is unable to protect them. Recognition of these harmful effects has led policymakers to increasingly prioritize violence and crime prevention on the international agenda. A number of alliances and working groups have formed around the issue, and donor partners, including the World Bank, are addressing it in operations.

Policy toward violence prevention has evolved in recent years from an initial focus on law enforcement toward greater attention to the economic and social drivers of violence. The problem of urban violence increasingly is recognized as not simply a security issue but also one that has deep social and economic roots and consequences. Policymakers increasingly have understood that criminal justice reforms such as strengthening the police force and reforming the justice system must be linked to broader reforms that address the drivers of violence

via a wider array of sectors. These include urban development, education, health, social protection, and labor markets. In addition, many governments are empowering urban communities to be partners in crime and violence prevention through community policing and other initiatives. However, despite this increased focus on the social dimensions of violence, control measures continue to absorb significant portions of the national budgets of many countries.

Chapter 2 discusses the complex relationship between cities and violence. Even though many cities are experiencing dramatic problems with violence, there is certainly nothing inevitable about violence in cities. Cities have the potential to be prime sites for violence prevention because resources and services are concentrated there, and geographic proximity facilitates outreach to communities and households. Many cities have succeeded in reducing violence. Cities are not always more violent than rural areas, as measured by homicide rates. Nor are bigger, or more crowded, cities always more violent than smaller ones. The rate of growth of a city has some relationship to violence, but it is by no means direct or automatic. It is probably more accurate to say that **many of today's cities—especially those that are growing very quickly—experience a convergence of factors that increase the risk for destabilizing levels of violence if they are not appropriately addressed.**

As centers of economic and social power, urban areas offer the space for both collusion and conflict among violent actors with different social, political, and economic motivations. In cities, different forms of violence interact and may reinforce one another in very complex ways. For example, the line between organized crime and organized political violence may be quite thin. Urban gangs may mobilize for economic and social goals, but, alternately, can put themselves at the service of political actors. Similarly, sexual and gender-based violence can be used as a political tool by power interests, or to exert social power within urban households. This blurring of the lines among a variety of expressions of violence and the actors involved may be one of the most striking characteristics of urban violence.

In turn, violence transforms the physical and social landscape of urban communities. Fear of violence prompts the physical separation of high-violence neighborhoods from surrounding areas by high walls or gated entrances. This separation often limits the access of residents of high-crime neighborhoods to social and economic opportunities, thus reinforcing their sense of exclusion, which can, in turn, fuel additional frustration and violence. At the same time, the reduced contact among neighbors of the same city reinforces perceptions of

insecurity on the part of wealthier residents, who may change their habits to further isolate themselves. In these ways, violence transforms relationships among urban residents and changes the way that they relate to their environment.

In **chapter 3**, the report reviews the literature to develop an analytical framework for understanding community capacities for violence prevention. Early literature on urban violence from criminology and sociology endeavored to explain why violence tends to concentrate in particular geographic areas of a city rather than spreading evenly throughout. Some consensus exists that certain structural factors are particularly important. They include economic disadvantage, high turnover of residents, ethnic and racial heterogeneity, and poor infrastructure.

However, not all neighborhoods that exhibit these characteristics experience high rates of violence. The absence of social capital and/or social cohesion often is offered as an explanation for the concentration, but the relationship between these two contexts and rates of violence is not always clear or consistent. The concept of *collective efficacy* evolved to more accurately describe the mix of social capital and shared expectations for action—that is, trust in an overarching framework of rules for behavior—that seems to be key to a community’s capacity to control and prevent violence.

Nevertheless, while theories of collective efficacy and social capital are useful in explaining the characteristics that seem to matter for exerting social control, they have much less to say about *how* these capacities are built. The ability to heal, both collectively and individually, from the experience of violence seems to be fundamental in this regard.

Chapter 3 draws on this literature to identify key community capacities that help determine a community’s ability to control and prevent violence. These capacities frame the discussion of interventions in the subsequent chapter and the analysis for the overall report.

Chapter 4 reviews interventions to prevent violence in terms of their impact on these key community capacities. First, interventions to generate and maintain trust include early childhood development (ECD) programs, home visitation, school-based mediation projects, and mentoring programs. Other programs support healing from the trauma of violence. They include services to victims and reconciliation and healing rituals. Still other successful programs have aimed to support communities as they link their own efforts with initiatives at other levels of government and society. The latter comprise many multi-sectoral programs that involve sectors ranging from criminal justice to health and education to urban development, and connect across multiple levels of gov-

ernment. Programs to support community exertion of social control over violent behavior include community policing and situational prevention through urban design. Finally, interventions to ensure inclusion help guard against capture of the benefits of collective action by power groups. These include supporting participatory assessments of the problem, inclusive planning processes, and community action groups such as community councils.

The empirical findings from the five case studies are presented in **chapter 5**, followed by strategic policy orientations in **chapter 6**. These are summarized in the remaining two sections below.

KEY FINDINGS

When the study applied the framework to the experiences of urban residents in the 5 selected cities, 4 insights emerged. First, **the current policy approach of treating different forms of violence separately clashes with the reality that the lines between different expressions of violence—from domestic to collective political violence—are very blurry**. Similarly, in the everyday experiences of the urban residents with whom we spoke, the experiences of both victimization and perpetration of different forms of violence are interlinked. Respondents made particularly strong connections between violence experienced in the home and violence occurring in the street or in political conflict.

Second, **the coping mechanisms to deal with violence occur mostly on the individual level, and many actually undermine long-term violence prevention by generating perverse social capital**. Common strategies included keeping silent, buying guns or acquiring other weapons, or relying (many times coerced) on extralegal security groups for protection. Further research will be needed to understand the triggers that can help move communities out of this cycle.

Third, **the built environment has an important relationship with urban violence**. This relationship is more complex than often is assumed. The study finds that, despite public disorder, some communities are dealing with less intense violence than others and with different patterns of violence. These findings suggest that other factors are at play. The study identifies four different channels through which the built environment affects violent behavior:

1. Inadequate infrastructure means that there often is no safe space to hold community meanings or to gather in public places.

2. Narrow alleyways or lack of street lighting create opportunities for violent assault.
3. Limited infrastructure and services add to daily frustrations that can escalate to violence and exacerbate a sense of exclusion.
4. Inadequate infrastructure creates vulnerabilities as residents try to meet basic needs (fetching water, visiting public toilets).

Fourth, **there is a strong perception in all of the communities studied that unemployment, especially of youth, is driving violence.** The literature is not conclusive on the nature of the relationship between unemployment and violence, or on the type of employment programs that help in reducing violence. Nonetheless, the fact that people perceive unemployment to be the main cause of violence is important in formulating policy responses.

STRATEGIC POLICY ORIENTATIONS

The social dimensions of urban violence are highly complex and dynamic. This study does not attempt to simplify the problem or recommend simple or technical solutions. It is recognized that the successful programs of Bogotá, Cali, and Diadema are not realistic for many governments that are struggling with real human and financial resource constraints. Instead, there is a clear need to **create the basic conditions for collective action**, first, by reassuring residents that conditions will improve, then by providing a minimum of security, and finally by addressing the underlying drivers of violence.

There is a critical need to rebuild community trust by sending clear signals that the current situation will change. This implies the need for a minimum of basic security. It would allow people the mobility to work collectively and would create the social environment in which people feel it is worthwhile to trust one another and work together. These signals need to address the issues that people in communities perceive to be driving the problem, most often the lack of viable livelihoods and employment opportunities, especially for youth.

A focus should be given to building better relationships between state institutions, especially police, and the communities they serve. People in all of the communities studied expressed a desire for a different kind of policing—one based on trust and coordination with the community. This change could be a good start toward **addressing the trend toward extralegal, private security solutions.**

The study indicates the need to **address the relationships among different forms of violence**, particularly between domestic violence and other, more public expressions of violence. Domestic and sexual violence are different enough from other forms of violence that they require special interventions. However, they share enough commonalities with other forms to warrant addressing all of these forms in coordination.

The study recommends several orientations for supporting community capacities for prevention. First, **improving the built environment** is essential to create the necessary conditions for collective action in affected communities. While it cannot stop violence on its own, this support can be a crucial catalytic force. Additionally, **improvements in data collection** and mechanisms can provide communities with accurate information on violence to empower community action.

On the national level, many governments need greater support to **clarify roles across various levels of government** and **coordinate across donor agencies and levels of government**. The international community can play a stronger role in supporting greater coordination within a national framework on violence prevention. This role will look different in high capacity versus lower capacity contexts. It can include support to governments in developing a national framework and coordinating efforts of different agencies and levels of government within this framework. This international clarifying and coordinating role could be an important niche for the World Bank to pursue in future.

1

Introduction and Context

URBAN VIOLENCE

Urban violence always has been an important concern for local governments and policymakers. With the increased urbanization of the last decade, this issue has become even more pressing. Urban centers are now home to half of the world's population and are expected to absorb almost all new population growth over the next 25 years (UN-HABITAT 2007).² The urbanization trend has been especially impressive in some regions, particularly Africa and Asia. The development of cities has been an engine for overall economic growth and has opened up opportunities for millions of people to drastically improve their living conditions and to climb up the social ladder. Nevertheless, even as overall poverty has decreased worldwide, it is growing in many urban areas. Inequalities also are increasing as cities create wealth while, at the same time, host an increasingly diverse group of poor migrants. It is estimated that more than one-quarter of the urban population worldwide lives in slums (UN-HABITAT 2007).

Some cities, especially in Latin America and Africa, are struggling with high levels of violence that undermine the very foundations of the economic and social development of the entire population. In some cases, areas of the city have deteriorated into “no-go zones” that undermine the overall governance of the area and trap the poorest population in a dangerous cycle of poverty and violence.

2. Urban centers generally are understood as geographic areas in which population density is higher than in surrounding areas. The UN State of the World's Cities 2006/07 defines an urban agglomeration as the “built-up or densely populated area containing the city proper, suburbs and continuously settled commuter areas.”

Even if these extreme situations do not affect the majority of urban centers, rising levels of violence in many cities throughout the world represent a major concern for its citizens and their local government.

However, common violence and organized violence³ have not followed the growth of urban centers everywhere—and the relationship between urban growth and violence is not absolutely clear. It is certain that many cities have seen a dramatic escalation of violence in urban areas, particularly in Latin America and Africa. This escalation has forced countries—at least those that can afford it—to implement drastic and comprehensive policy measures. It also is clear that, even in regions with relatively low levels of urban violence, such as the Middle East or Western Europe, in many cases, this urban violence is higher than rural-based violence.

Violence can have strong, negative impacts on economic development by drastically reducing growth and producing long-lasting detrimental social impacts (World Bank 2009). At the national level, the costs of violence can add up to a substantial portion of the GDP and harm economic growth. In 2005 in Guatemala, the direct costs of violence, concentrated primarily in the capital city, were estimated at \$2.4 billion or 7.3 percent of GDP. This figure is more than double the damage caused by Hurricane Stan in the same year and more than double the combined budget for the Ministries of Agriculture, Health, and Education in 2006 (UNDP 2006). The Mexican government estimated that urban crime and violence together cost the country \$9.6 billion from lost sales, jobs, and investment in 2007 alone. Similarly, it is estimated that if Jamaica and Haiti reduced their crime levels to those of Costa Rica, they could increase their annual GDP growth by 5.4 percent (UNODC and World Bank 2007).

Chronic violence transforms social networks and relationships in ways that can erode trust and effective collective action. The climate of fear and distrust created by chronic violence can become so entrenched that it engenders additional violence, which then is justified as defense (Simpson 1993). Violence, or the fear of it, deters investment, stigmatizes neighborhoods, erodes social cohesion, and limits access to employment and educational opportunities. On the individual level, urban residents in crime and violence hot spots may decrease or avoid investing in their own human capital, postpone starting small businesses, and stop practicing some forms of solidarity with neighbors for fear that these actions would put them at greater risk of victimization. The resulting climate of insecurity also weakens urban governance by limiting mobility and creating fear

3. See the end of this chapter for a discussion of these concepts.

and distrust among community members. These impacts are especially pronounced in cities in which institutions already are fragile. Given the above effects, violence clearly is inherently disempowering for both the affected communities and the broader city.

Some groups are impacted more, or differently, by urban violence than others. In most cases, the areas of the city that are most blighted by violence also happen to be the poorest (Winton 2004; Briceno-Leon and Zubillaga 2002). Furthermore, there are clear gender dimensions to the experiences of violence. Globally, male homicide rates are roughly double female rates for all age groups (WHO 2008). In 2007 in Colombia, there were 12 male homicides for every 1 female homicide. In El Salvador, young men are 10 times more likely to be murdered than young women (Cruz and Beltrán 2000). In addition, men commit the majority of violent crimes, from domestic violence to homicide (WHO 2008). Yet, even though men are more likely to kill or be killed, the rates of nonfatal victimization by violence are more equal by gender. As discussed later in this study, we found that, overall, men were only slightly more likely than females to be victimized by violence. In South Africa, studies have found that women are more likely to suffer violence than men (Vogelman and Lewis 1993; Simpson 1997). For sexual and domestic violence, women are especially vulnerable: an estimated 1 in 3 women worldwide will experience one of these in her lifetime (Heise and Gottemoeller 1999). It also can be a human tragedy when violence reaches extreme levels, translating into murders, sexual violence and violence against particularly vulnerable groups, such as young children or the elderly.

VIOLENCE PREVENTION ON THE POLICY AGENDA

The preoccupation with policing cities is as old as cities themselves. There always has been a perception that cities need specific modalities of social control because of the high density of population and the naturally loose community networks. Crime and violence prevention always have been high on the agenda for mayors and city managers. At the end of the Middle Ages in Europe, the growth of cities had supported an enormous drive to “clean up cities” by building walls around them, creating special police forces, strictly controlling entry, heavy-handedly controlling taverns and places of “pleasure,” and prohibiting vagabondage (Muechembled 2008). Today, many cities have integrated violence prevention as part of their broader development plans.

An increasing number of donors and development agencies are now involved in violence prevention. At the international level, growing concern about urban violence is reflected in the establishment of global institutions such as the UN-Habitat Safer Cities Program, the International Center for the Prevention of Crime and Violence, and the European Forum for Urban Security. A growing field of consultants and experts within academia and the nongovernmental sector also has emerged. Within the United Nations, efforts are underway to streamline the work of various agencies on the issue through the establishment of the UN Armed Violence Prevention Program, a joint effort with the WHO that includes various UN agencies focused on violence and conflict.⁴ Several international alliances now exist on the issue, including the WHO Violence Prevention Alliance, the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence Reduction, and the OECD-DAC working group on armed violence reduction.⁵ Violence reduction is now seen as a crucial impediment to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Recognizing this, in May 2010, 60 countries agreed to the “Oslo Commitments,” under which they committed to implement concrete measures to address armed violence. These measures include systematic monitoring and measurement, recognizing victims’ rights, and integrating violence prevention efforts in development plans at all levels of government.

The World Bank has placed increasing priority on violence prevention, and will address the issue in the *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development*. This report will build on prior research and analysis of urban violence in the Latin American region (World Bank 2008) the Caribbean (World Bank 2003, and Central America (World Bank 2010). World Bank operations that contain violence prevention components are underway in Brazil, Honduras, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Mexico, Kenya, and Papua New Guinea.

KNOWLEDGE BASE FOR PREVENTION

Over the last two decades, there has been a growing consensus among policymakers that violence is not simply a security issue but that it has deep social and economic roots and consequences. Policymakers have increasingly understood that strengthening the police force and improving the justice system must go

4. More information on the program is available at http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/activities/armed_violence/en/index.html

5. The OECD-DAC working group is part of the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), based in Geneva.

hand-in-hand with violence prevention policies that touch a wider array of sectors. These include urban development, education, health, social protection, labor markets, and community involvement in the development of the cities.

The initial response to problems of rising crime and violence—for example, in North America during the 1960s and 1970s, and Central America in the 1980s—consisted of tough-on-crime approaches. Policies such as the *mano dura* policies of much of Central America and the “three strikes” laws in California focused primarily on arrests as the key indicator of success, paying much less attention to the underlying risk factors for violence. These policies combined muscular crack-down operations with stiffer penalties—in many cases mandatory sentencing—as a means of deterring gang membership. Under these policies, the criminal justice sector took on the bulk of the work, often complemented with reform of the judicial sector (Jütersonke and others 2009). These policies have been criticized for creating disincentives for the police to distinguish among repeat offenders and opportunistic offenders, and instead to favor “crackdowns” or “round-ups” of people involved in crime. If jails are not prepared to accept the influx of new arrestees, they often become breeding grounds for further violence rather than spaces for rehabilitation. In other words, crackdowns on crime can generate the opposite of the intended effects. In turn, the distrust of police created in areas of high crime hinders investigations.

Recognizing these troubling trends, many governments shifted away from tough-on-crime approaches toward more targeted policing and greater partnership with affected communities. In Central America, for example, the *mano dura* approaches have given way to *mano amiga* (“friendly hand”) interventions that address risk factors for gang violence and provide incentives for individuals to demobilize from gangs (see review in Jütersonke and others 2009).

The evidence suggests that more effective approaches include both control and prevention strategies. Short-term measures, such as enforcement of bylaws on firearm carrying and alcohol sales and environmental design (urban renewal), can yield quick reductions of the homicide rates. On the other hand, long-term measures, which address social and cultural norms, and social and economic inequalities, have long-delay effects, but in the long run, they are the most cost effective violence prevention measures. Even though governments often favor interventions with quick results, it is important to consider designing a program that combines mitigation measures with quick results with the long-term prevention measures.

Another emerging lesson is that more effective interventions are based on continuing analysis of solid data on crime and violence. The majority of com-

prehensive violence prevention programs with promising results have designed interventions based on their data analyses of crime and violence in specific areas. Collection of timely and accurate data on crime and violence has been essential in understanding the main issues of crime and violence affecting specific citizens and communities. Collecting these data helps municipal governments to define interventions that target vulnerable communities and risk groups, such as children, youth and women. Crime and Violence Observatories are being established in many countries to collect and share data across different sectors for evidence-based programming. A regional Observatory for Central America also has been established in partnership with various donors. Violence data can be drawn from a rich variety of sources, including death certificates, vital statistics records, hospital records, police crime statistics, court records, and population surveys.

Despite more policy attention being turned toward prevention, there still is a general over-reliance on control approaches over the world. Both wealthy and developing countries continue to spend a significant share of their national budget to control crime and violence within the criminal justice sector.⁶ In Latin America and the Caribbean countries, and in particular countries in Central America that have emphasized repressive approaches, institutions such as the police and the criminal justice system also absorb significant shares of budgetary allocations. For example, in Honduras, the combined budgets for the police and the justice system amount to almost 3 percent of annual GDP (Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Pública de El Salvador 2008).

COMMUNITIES AS PART OF THE SOLUTION

Within the bottom-up approach to violence prevention, communities play a key role. Because the impact of crime and violence is localized in communities, the latter can help municipal policymakers to identify issues related to violence and public safety as well as to prioritize interventions. Doing so requires an active participation of community members and organizations (both formal and infor-

6. We refer here to direct crime prevention activities. There are other sectors such as youth and health that have programs that might have an indirect impact in the levels of crime and violence. These programs are not accounted for in the estimates because they do not directly target crime and violence through prevention activities.

mal institutions) to address crime and violence issues specific to their community. In turn, participation and ownership by communities can help transform cultures of violence that can become entrenched in communities, as residents regain trust in one another and in security institutions that they require to proactively address the problem.

This project takes communities' experience of violence as the point of departure to understand the coping mechanisms that they employ to address violence. An analysis of the ways that households and communities cope with and respond to violence has much to contribute to policymaking on violence prevention. Understanding where communities turn for support can help in understanding which institutions matter most to the people. In contrast, many existing violence prevention programs take the national or municipal government as the point of departure and employ a top-down approach. However, where social cohesion is tenuous—as a result of prolonged conflict, high rates of in-migration, exclusion of certain subgroups, or other factors—top-down interventions may exacerbate (or even perpetrate) intercommunity tensions and violence. Thus, obtaining communities' input should be viewed as an essential part of formulating violence prevention strategies.

An analysis of violence at the community level also allows for greater understanding of the interrelationships between different forms of violence. These interrelationships have been under-explored. The focus of this project is on interpersonal violence, as defined by physical violence by one person or small group against another and including violent assault, robbery, sexual assault, and domestic violence. While, in the literature, these expressions of violence tend to be compartmentalized, the analysis aims to draw out the ways in which they relate to, and may reinforce, one another in the everyday lives of the urban poor. For example, it often is assumed that levels of domestic violence follow trends in overall levels of violence; yet these relationships rarely are explored empirically.⁷ Examining these linkages from the community perspective represents an important contribution toward formulating more comprehensive interventions that can address multiple forms and levels of violence.

7. A recent study by a team of experts on armed violence estimates that women account for 10 percent of all violent deaths in "high-violence" countries, but comprise 30% of violent deaths in "low-violence" countries. This difference suggests that domestic violence may not follow trends of overall violence (Geneva Declaration 2008).

OVERVIEW OF STUDY APPROACH AND OBJECTIVES

The present study emerged from growing demand within the World Bank and client governments for a more comprehensive understanding of the social dimensions of urban violence. The project represents the first global study of urban violence undertaken by the World Bank and covers three regions. The overall objective of this project is to advance the current understanding of urban violence by reviewing existing knowledge on violence prevention at the community level, offering new analysis of the ways in which communities respond to violence every day; and generating practical orientations for reducing violence. More specifically, the study has endeavored to:

- Introduce the social dimensions of urban violence and review existing lessons for intervening at the community level
- Analyze, from a community perspective, the experience of violence in five urban areas regarding the different forms of violence that exist, their prevalence, impacts on different groups, and communities' perceptions of the driving factors behind the violence
- Provide insights into community responses to high levels of violence, including individual and collective help-seeking behavior, and reliance on different informal and formal institutions to deal with and prevent violence
- Drawing on these insights, provide orientations to policymakers, especially mayors and municipal authorities, to inform successful violence-prevention interventions
- Suggest ways that the World Bank could be more involved in addressing the social dimensions of violence.

There are two intended audiences for this study. First, the analysis is aimed at policymakers in the field, primarily mayors or municipal level government officials tasked with addressing urban violence. The study also is aimed at World Bank country teams and task team leaders who wish to understand the social dimensions of urban violence to guide operations to address them. As more and more clients are requesting support and advice on the issue of urban violence, there is a need for Bank staff to be appropriately informed to meet client demand.

METHODOLOGY

The methodology included, first, a review of the literature on the relationship between cities and violence to distill some common myths around this connection. This review is presented in chapter 2. Next, the literature on community collective action was reviewed to identify characteristics that seem important for communities to prevent violence. These characteristics, discussed in more detail in chapter 3, form the guiding framework for the study.

The fieldwork consisted of victimization surveys and qualitative research conducted in selected neighborhoods of Fortaleza (Brazil), Port-au-Prince (Haiti), Johannesburg (South Africa), Nairobi (Kenya), and Dili (Timor-Leste). These sites were selected to represent the experiences of both low- and middle-income countries and countries with varying levels of capacity; and to ensure regional balance. Prioritization was given to countries that are already active on these issues and have an ongoing dialogue with the World Bank on the topic.

The study employed purposive sampling to select communities that were most representative of the dynamics the team sought to understand. Within each city, 2–4 neighborhoods were selected for fieldwork. The selected neighborhoods shared low levels of development (development indicators below the national average) but differed in the levels of violence that they were experiencing. In each of the 5 sites, data were collected from 4 sources: analysis of official data from police and health service providers, a survey of a random sample of the population in the selected neighborhoods, focus groups, and interviews with key informants. The latter included leaders in the communities and experts working on violence prevention in the studied areas. The survey was implemented in 2–4 neighborhoods in each site to obtain data on victimization, perceptions of drivers of the violence, and coping mechanisms. Data from these three sources have been triangulated to improve understanding of the dynamics of urban violence and of collective and individual responses.

Certain challenges in the methodology are worth noting here, as they cause us to interpret the study findings with considerable caution. First, the neighborhoods selected for study are not intended to be representative of the city or country as a whole. Thus it would be dangerous to generalize from these experiences. Instead, the study aims to illustrate differences in experiences and agency around urban violence, and offer strategic orientations to policymakers and practitioners.

Second, and more important, as often is the case with research on violence, the very sensitivity of the topic creates difficulties in generating accurate data. Official data on violence give only a partial picture of the extent and nature of the violence because of under-reporting. Victimization surveys often capture many incidents that go unreported, especially when they employ measures for ensuring privacy for the survey, thus generating trust with researchers; have an interviewer of the same gender as the respondent administer the survey; and other practices. We relied on local researchers to carry out the survey and tried to maximize use of best practices. Where possible, to minimize the risk and impact of re-traumatization through the survey, we provided referrals to victim respondents.

Triangulating the survey data with qualitative data allowed for a richer picture of the experience of violence in the studied communities and the different coping mechanisms they employ. However, these methods still rely primarily on self-reporting, which introduces an element of bias. The study resources and security concerns did not allow for extended observations in the communities, which might have helped to correct possible bias.

In addition, much of the data relies on community members' perceptions. The focus groups and informant interviews gathered data primarily on perceptions of the scope of the problem, the drivers behind it, and the effectiveness of coping mechanisms to deal with it. This data can be problematic given that perceptions of security can shift dramatically based on recent events—such as the establishment of a police station nearby or a violent incident down the street. The extent to which perceptual data can be used to inform policy recommendations and strategies remains a matter of debate, although recent studies have given it increased legitimacy (Moser and McIlwaine 2004; Moser and McIlwaine 2000; Narayan and Petesch 2007). Because our research focus was on understanding community perspectives, we prioritized the voices of urban residents, whose perceptions may or may not reflect the overall reality. However, this study contends that whether or not the perceptions are verifiably accurate, they are nonetheless important to consider and address in prevention programs if communities are to feel real ownership over interventions.

Finally, the differences in levels of violence across the communities were smaller than expected, complicating the comparisons. The neighborhoods (between 2 and 4 in each city) initially were selected based on levels of violence and sociodemographic characteristics. The rationale was to compare communities with similar development indicators but varying levels of violence. Official data and interviews with country teams and experts on the ground informed this selection. Because the goal was to generate orientations for dealing with violence in low-income,

high-violence areas, the study deliberately avoided wealthy neighborhoods with more resources for prevention, under the assertion that few applicable lessons could be drawn from these experiences. However, after conducting the survey in some of the communities, the study found only very small differences in levels of violence. In other words, communities that had been expected to have lower levels of violence actually had higher prevalence than initially thought. This result complicates the comparisons among neighborhoods but still allows for meaningful analysis of the dynamics in resource-poor environments.

STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

The report is divided in five chapters. The first explores the relationship between urban areas and violence, discussing the key risk factors associated with urban environments. Chapter 2 reviews the literature and presents a guiding framework for understanding the community capacities that are needed for violence prevention. Chapter 3 discusses examples of programs that have aimed to support these capacities. The ensuing chapter turns to the four case studies, describing the ways in which communities experience and cope with violence every day. Finally, chapter 5, drawing on both the literature review and the field work, presents conclusions and recommendations. The country case studies are presented in a different volume with each case study constituting one chapter.

KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS

Violence itself is an intensely contested concept, and numerous competing definitions and frameworks have been proposed to understand it. Much of the literature on conflict draws on a multilevel schema for understanding violence. At the broadest level, structural violence consists of institutions and systems that create and maintain disparities across individuals and groups. Direct violence includes the more common understandings of violence: the direct inflicting of physical or psychological harm on a person. Structural violence may provoke direct violence as a response to (real or perceived) exclusion from social, political, or economic systems.

Direct violence can then be subdivided into four categories. Self-inflicted violence includes self-harming behaviors ranging from suicide to substance abuse. Domestic violence consists of violence perpetrated against a family member or intimate partner. Common violence includes violence between individuals, such

as street assaults. Finally, collective violence, also called organized violence, is committed by organized groups to advance a political, financial, or social agenda. The latter type includes organized crime, urban gangs, and armed political groups. The category of collective violence is potentially problematic in that it encompasses a wide diversity of motivations, which would require very different policy approaches.

Any categorization is necessarily static so creates artificial divisions among different expressions of violence. In this project, we relied on the above set of categories but also aimed to emphasize the fluidity among them. Without discounting the importance of self-inflicted violence,⁸ this report focuses on domestic, common, and collective forms of violence as they interact in urban areas. We discuss structural violence as it interacts and underlies these three forms.

Violence is related to crime, and, in the literature, “violence” and “violent crime” often are used interchangeably. However, the legal status of violence varies with context: some violent acts will not be treated as crimes everywhere, for example, domestic violence or psychological violence such as stalking. This report uses “violence” to refer to activities and behaviors that intentionally cause physical harm, or threaten to harm an individual or group, regardless of whether they are sanctioned as crimes under the prevailing legal framework.

8. While this type of violence is certainly related to domestic, common, and collective expressions of violence, we contend that it derives from sufficiently different risk factors and calls for distinct policy interventions to deserve separate treatment.

Box 1.1 Measuring Violence

Comparability of crime and violence data across contexts is notoriously problematic, given differences in definitions of forms of violence and inconsistencies in reporting. The most widely used indicator for measuring levels of violent crime is homicide, generally defined as the intentional killing of a person. Because of its severity, homicide is more likely than other violent crimes to be recorded—by either the health system or the police. However, comparative analyses of homicide statistics across countries are problematic because they rely on social norms about which types of killings are deemed acceptable. For example, national definitions may include or exclude assistance with suicide, abortion, infanticide, the killing of a person by a police officer acting in the line of duty, or other forms of intentional death. Thus, in comparing homicides—intentional killings—across countries, one is implicitly also comparing the degree to which particular countries believe that these killings should be classified as such (Geneva Declaration 2008).

The most common sources for data on homicide and other violent crimes are *administrative*, such as crime reports from the police or medical reports, and victimization surveys. These sources have the advantage of generally including more detailed information about the crime and are less subject to recall bias. However, the quality of administrative sources depends greatly on the quality of institutions in a particular context, and on the confidence that people have in those institutions. Better quality institutions are more effective at gathering and managing data. In addition, victims are more likely to report crimes where institutions are stronger. In Africa, an estimated 75 percent of crimes are not reported at all (Assiago 2005 [AW: Add full cite to Refs]). Some violent acts may not be considered crimes—for example, domestic violence or rape—and therefore would not be captured at all by official sources. Finally, different institutions collect and report different types of data, with the result that data from criminal justice bodies, police, and public health institutions often vary widely even within the same country. Data on domestic violence, or organized violence, for example, may be separated from data on other forms of violence because it is collected by different institutions.

Victimization surveys avoid some reporting biases by collecting information directly from victims or households. This technique enables researchers to capture data from victims who would not/did not report crimes to police or other institutions, either because of low confidence in these institutions or fear of retaliation; or because the violence they experienced is not criminalized. Such surveys often employ sophisticated methodologies designed to address sensitivities in reporting, thus enabling analysis of victimization in a broader context. For example, the survey might be administered by interviewers of the same sex as the respondents, thus ensuring privacy for the interview; or by asking sensitive questions in several different ways. Surveys also typically collect data on a wider array of crimes, as well as different aspects of victimization, including perceptions of crime and violence, changes in these perceptions over time, the types of solutions people would like to see to address violence, and the sociodemographic characteristics.

These disparities across data sources often are dealt with by triangulating various sources to minimize the shortcomings of each. **This report relies on triangulation**

(continued on next page)

Box 1.1 Measuring Violence *(Continued)*

of various sources to understand both the manifestations of violence in communities as well as the sociodemographic landscape against which the violence occurs. We maintain the focus on the homicide rate as the most accurate indicator for comparing violence across countries. However, we also examine experience of other violent crimes to analyze violence within the communities under study. We rely on two main sources of data: administrative data as reported by official sources, including police, in the countries considered; and data from victimization surveys conducted in each of the five countries.

2

Violence and Cities


URBANIZATION AND VIOLENCE

Why are cities so often associated with violence? More to the point, how accurate is this characterization? Much of the conventional wisdom on urban violence outlines a particular scenario: rapid growth of cities feeds the chaotic formation of slums, in which overcrowding and competition for scarce resources combine with weak state security presence to foster criminality and violence (Buvinic and Morrison 2000; Glaeser and Sacerdote 1996; Van Dijk 1998; Naudé and others 2006). Yet, there is nothing inevitable about violence in the urban environment. Megacities such as Cairo and Tokyo are among the safest cities in the world. Similarly, large cities such as Bogotá, New York City, and Sao Paulo have seen a remarkable drop in violent crime despite dense and growing populations. In reality, the relationship between cities and violence is quite complex. This section outlines some features of that relationship, relying on homicide rates as the most accurate measure of overall rates of violence (see figure 2.1 for a further explanation of different measures of violence).

To be sure, some large cities are particularly blighted by violence. An IADB assessment of Latin American cities estimated that households located in cities with more than one million inhabitants had a 70 percent higher likelihood of experiencing violence than those in cities of between 50,000 and 100,000 (Gaviría 2002). In the United States, homicide rates have tended to be higher in more densely populated areas than rural ones (Wilkinsen and Bell 2006).

In countries where most of the population is rural, a lot of the violence still is concentrated in cities. In Guatemala alone, an estimated 40 percent of homicides

Figure 2.1 Homicide Rates: City vs. National, averages 2005–06



Source: Office of Drugs and Crime of the United Nations Secretariat, *Tenth United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, 2005–2006*. <http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/CTS10%20homicide.pdf> August 12, 2010.

Note: City selection was based on availability of data.

occurred in the capital city in 2006, where only 20 percent of the population resides (Matute and García 2007). As highlighted in the figure below, Santo Domingo, the capital of Dominican Republic, with just 10 percent of the country's population, saw nearly 18 percent of the homicides, while Panama City, with just 24 percent of the country's population, saw 68 percent of that country's homicides. Similarly, in Nepal, 33 percent of all homicides occurred in the capital city Kathmandu, which is home to just 3 percent of the population.


But cities are not always more violent than rural areas. The graph below compares the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants in the largest cities of 50 countries to their national homicide rate.

Of the 50 cities listed, 32 had homicide rates higher than their national average.⁹ Panama City, Managua, Amsterdam, Kathmandu, Ulaanbaatar, Bishkek, and Santa Domingo had the largest differences, with Panama City registering over 19 homicides (for 100,000 people)—more than the national average—and Kathmandu and Santo Domingo registering over 16. However, in some other cities the reverse was true—the homicide rate within the city was lower than the national rate. In San Salvador, for instance, the homicide rate was less than the national rate by over 39 homicides per 100,000. In a 2010 study of violence in Central America, the World Bank found that victimization rates overall were lower in rural areas but that the rates across cities varied substantially. Additionally, research suggests that some types of violence may be more prevalent in rural areas than in cities. A 10-country comparative study found consistently higher rates of violence against women in rural areas than in the capital areas studied (WHO 2005).

Nor does bigger city size or density always correlate with more violence. Figure 2.2 shows the population size and homicide rate for 50 cities. Overall, there is no significant relationship between city population size and the homicide rate. For some cities, the homicide rate is quite high compared to the size of the city—for example Asuncion, Panama City, Managua, Kathmandu, Ulaanbaatar, Almaty, Tbilisi, San Salvador, and Santo Domingo. In other cases, large cities such as Cairo, Dhaka, and Mumbai have relatively low homicide rates compared to the size of their populations.

A city's growth rate appears to have a stronger relationship with homicide rates than does its size. Both small and large cities can be plagued by violence.

9. The UNODC database provides both the city and national homicide rates for the years 2005 and 2006. For the current analysis, the average of 2005 and 2006 of both the city and national rates has been used.

Figure 2.2 City Population Size vs. Homicides, averages for 2005–06

Source: (for both homicide rate and population size): UNODC, *Tenth United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, 2005–2006*. <http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/CTS10%20homicide.pdf> August 12, 2010.

Cities that are growing rapidly, however, seem more prone to violence. In figure 2.3, we mapped the annual change in population density against the homicide rate for the 50 cities. A full list of the data is in appendix A.

The annual rate of city population growth correlates positively with the homicide rate ($r = 0.27$). This correlation is statistically significant ($p < 0.06$).¹⁰ This relationship between city growth and the murder rate is especially pronounced in city agglomerates such as Asunción, Kathmandu, Nairobi, and Quito. However, some exceptions bear mention. For example, Dubai, Aleppo, Mumbai, and Dhaka show relatively low homicide rates despite rapid population growth. In addition, some

10. A note of caution: although the UNODC data on homicide rates (y-axis) depend primarily on its Survey of Crime Trends, the data also extrapolate the homicide rate for certain cities using the *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision* database—the same source for the data on annual rate of population change (x-axis). Therefore, part of the correlation could be driven by the commonality of the date source for the two axes. The lack of information on the extent to which UNODC homicide data used the *World Urbanization Prospects* data prevents us from controlling for them in the analysis.

Figure 2.3 Change in Population Size vs. Homicide Rates, 2005–06

Sources: Office of Drugs and Crime of the United Nations Secretariat, Tenth United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, covering the period 2005–2006, <http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/CTS10%20homicide.pdf> August 12, 2010; Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision, <http://esa.un.org/unup> April 6, 2010.

cities with lower population growth, such as Managua, Mexico City, Almaty and Tbilisi, show relatively high levels of homicides.

UNDERSTANDING COMMUNITY LEVEL RISK AND PROTECTIVE FACTORS

There is no one direct cause in personal development that leads absolutely to violent behavior or attitudes.¹¹ Rather, there are characteristics of an individual's biology, personality, and environment that impose stresses, which increase the risk that he or she will perpetrate or experience violence. The accumulation of

11. At the same time, there are some direct causes of violence, such as the decision to hire someone to carry out a murder.

these stresses, or **risk factors**, is associated with an increased tendency of being a victim or a perpetrator of violence. Conversely, **protective factors** can be understood as characteristics of an individual and his/her environment that strengthen the capacity to confront stresses without the use of violence. In the field of violence prevention, these factors are generally understood within an “ecological model.” Employed predominantly within the public health approach (WHO 2002), this model outlines factors at the individual, interpersonal, community, and society levels. Development-centered approaches to violence prevention use a slightly different framework, including the individual, micro (family and community) and macro levels. A detailed discussion of the evidence base on risk and protective factors is beyond the scope of this report. Instead, a summary is provided in table 2.1, and this section focuses on the factors with most relevance for urban environments.

Most individuals are able to cope with low levels of risk in positive ways, even while growing up in high-risk environments (World Bank 2008; O’Toole 2002). Why, then, are some individuals able to survive even in high-risk environments, while others are not? The answer lies, at least in part, in the particular accumulation of different risk and protective factors. Studies in the United States (Sameroff and others 1987, Dunst 1993) and elsewhere (Garbarino and Kostelny 1996) suggest that the *accumulation* of risk is more influential than the impact of any one risk factor. Conversely, protective factors accumulate to facilitate healing and decrease the propensity for violence. Generally speaking, “risk accumulates; opportunity ameliorates” (J. Garbarino 2001: 362).

Much of the evidence on violent behavior points to the importance of a sense of social connection as an important protective factor against violent behavior. Research in psychology emphasizes that this sense of connection is vital from infancy, as most violent perpetrators already show signs of aggressive behavior by age one or two, especially if they experience neglect or abuse (Tremblay 2008). It is here that the individual and community levels overlap in important ways. A child exposed to violence in her home will look first for refuge in her community. Indeed, these family experiences can often be mitigated by positive support at school, community groups, and other bodies. Studies of the United States (Blum and others 2002) and various countries across Latin America and the Caribbean (World Bank 2008) found that the impacts of exposure to violence in the home can be mitigated by a sense of social connection to school and/or community. Other studies in the U.S. have found that a sense of social connection, including opportunities for participation in social and economic life, help protect against

Table 2.1 Key Risk and Protective Factors for Violence

	Risk factors	Protective factors
Individual	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gender • Age • Low social status related to class, race, ethnicity • Poor nutrition/prenatal and health care • Psychological health (mental disorders, learning disabilities/low self-esteem) • Engagement in risky behaviors (alcohol/drug misuse, high-risk sexual behavior) • Employment status 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Good nutrition, health care • School attendance and connectedness • Sense of family connectedness • Level and coverage of public services in the community
Micro – Family – Community	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Family violence; harsh, authoritarian parenting or neglect • Poor parental mental health • Family/community attitudes condoning violence • High levels of neighborhood crime and violence • Low access to quality education, training opportunities • Easy availability of drugs, alcohol, firearms 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Connected, consistent families/households • Opportunities for participation in social, political, economic life • Availability of service organizations, neighborhood support groups in the community
Macro/structural	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • History of conflict • Structural inequalities (economic, political) • Rapid urbanization, migration (both rural-urban and external) • Demographic factors (youth bulge) • Social norms condoning inequality or violence • Discriminatory legal frameworks • Institutional fragility (poor or uneven provision of services, weak criminal justice system, weak governance, weak control of arms and drug trade) 	

Source: Compiled from various sources listed in accompanying text.

violent behavior (J. Garbarino 1995; Benard 1996). A review of hundreds of studies on protective factors in North America identified 40 different factors, of which half were individual characteristics, and half were associated with the community and home environment (Search Institute 1998). These findings suggest that

community-level factors are at least as important as individual level factors in protecting against violent behavior.

Access to employment opportunities often is set forth as a protective factor against violent behavior. However, in the literature, the relationship between employment, especially youth employment, and violence outcomes is inconclusive. One recent study of unemployment and crime in France over 1990–2000 found a positive, causal effect of unemployment on property crimes and drug offenses, yet no effect on rapes, homicides, or other violent crimes (Fougere and others 2009).¹² Other studies of crime and unemployment generally have found a positive relationship, but the effect is not always significant; and some have found a negative relationship (Chirico 1987).¹³ This distinction is important, as many programs promote youth employment as a means to combat *both* crime and violence. However, during the literature review for this study, we found no evaluations of youth employment programs that had considered the impact on violence rates.

It is perhaps more likely that the relationship between unemployment and violence is mediated by other factors related to the stress of earning a livelihood. For example Lamas and Hoffman (2010) note that unemployment can lead to boredom and depression, which, in turn, are connected to substance abuse and perpetration of violence. These dynamics have been documented in qualitative studies (Moser and McIlwaine 2004), and particularly in refugee camps in various contexts (Benjamin 1996). It could be that the type of employment is equally, or even more, important than the fact of employment itself. In particular, the type of social connection created by access to employment could be an important factor. This correlation is suggested in evaluations of youth employment projects that identify the provision of social and life skills as equally or more important than technical skills training in improving outcomes for employment and social integration (World Bank 2008). The study takes up this issue again in chapter 5, as many urban residents in the selected studies felt that unemployment was driving the violence in their communities. This perception is discussed again in chapter 6, as an important element to address in prevention interventions.

12. These findings are in accordance with Becker's model of crime, which assumes that the propensity to commit a crime depends on a cost-benefit comparison of expected consequences of legal and illegal activities.

13. These findings are in accordance with Becker's model of crime, which assumes that the propensity to commit a crime depends on a cost-benefit comparison of expected consequences of legal and illegal activities.

CITIES AS SITES OF MULTIPLE FORMS OF VIOLENCE

As centers of social, political, and economic power, cities can be flashpoints for violence and conflict. Where cities are undergoing rapid, unmanaged growth, risk factors can accumulate and intensify the potential for violence. This chaotic growth transforms power relationships and creates new social and economic opportunities, which, in turn, can generate conflict. The resulting frustrations often are expressed as violence, ranging from domestic violence occurring between family members or intimate partners; common violence encompassing stranger assault or small-group violence within the community; to violence perpetrated by an organized armed group with a criminal or political agenda.

A look at the literature on various expressions of violence in urban areas raises more questions than it answers about how such expressions interact in cities. Much of the research—and thus many resulting policy approaches—remains compartmentalized. Research on civil war, for example, rarely includes data on common violence or domestic violence. Assumptions often are made about these relationships, but few studies have empirically tested them. As one example, domestic violence often is either not included in studies of urban violence or civil conflict, or is assumed to follow the same trends as other types of violence. However, a recent study by a team of experts on armed violence estimated that women account for 10 percent of all violent deaths in “high-violence” countries, but comprise 30 percent of violent deaths in “low-violence” countries. These estimates suggest that domestic violence does not follow the trends of overall violence levels (Geneva Declaration Secretariat 2008).

Overall, there still is much to be learned about the relationships among different patterns of city growth, economic growth, and the expression of violence in urban areas. In some cities, rapid, chaotic urban growth simply outstrips both the capacity and the resources of the government to manage it, leaving vast areas of the city without a consistent state presence. Other cities may experience high economic growth without creating enough jobs to support a growing urban population. In still other cases, the institutional capacity exists, but the economic growth is insufficient to supply the resources the state needs to expand its presence to rapidly urbanizing areas. All of these scenarios create social disturbances that can disrupt urban residents and pose unique challenges for urban governance.

As power centers, cities witness the convergence of many risk factors for violence. Urban areas offer the space for both collusion and conflict among violent

actors with different social, political, and economic motivations. In cities, different forms of violence interact and may reinforce one another in very complex ways. This blurring of the lines between different expressions of violence and the actors may be one of the most striking characteristics of violence in urban areas.

Cities offer both space and opportunity for political and economic actors to mobilize groups for their own gain, in many cases through the collusion of the state with violent groups (Winton 2004). In cases in which the state is weak or unwilling to exert control over the city, different power groups emerge to fill the vacuum. These “violence entrepreneurs” are, almost without exception, based in urban areas for the visibility that cities offer and for the access that cities give to a pool of recruits. This politically or financially driven urban violence relies on the complicity of state institutions, and, in many cases, is a continuation of past political violence. In some cases, the intent may be to control the state in order to access powerful patronage networks. This scenario has been the case in Jamaica, in which power struggles between the two dominant political parties have played out violently through the mobilization of urban gangs. Violent clashes in Jamaica’s urban neighborhoods are driven by the desire for “control of the state, and with it its corresponding prestige, patronage and power” (Duncan and Woolcock 2008: 34). In Cambodia, gangs are more directly linked to the elite patronage networks, which enables them to be mobilized for “controlled escalation of violence” when needed, and affords them protection from the police (Kurtenbach and Hensengerth, forthcoming).

In other cases, the intent may be to disrupt a political process, such as elections, by mobilizing urban gangs or other non-state groups. This has been the case with Haiti’s violence entrepreneurs (World Bank 2006; Willman and Marcelin 2010), who are used to foment instability during times of political conflict; and with the mobilization of violent groups during elections in Kenya and the Philippines (World Bank 2005).

Sometimes the intent of violent actors is not to take over state power, but to maintain control over strategic geographic areas in which criminal activities can be conducted. In the resulting “under-governed areas,” or “no-go zones,” the state is unable to control violence, offer protection, and respond to the demands of its citizens, enabling violence to thrive with impunity (OECD 2009). While violence concentrates in these areas, these areas may present a security threat to the overall city as well. In countries ranging from Brazil to Pakistan and South Africa, sections of cities have fallen under the control of armed gangs with cohesive organizations and clearly demarcated territories.

In countries undergoing social and political transition, the line between organized crime and organized political violence in urban areas is very blurry. In post-conflict contexts, some members of formerly armed groups have changed their status to organized crime networks, maintaining their general organizational structure. An example of this phenomenon are the *Bandas Criminales Emergentes* (BACRIM) in Colombia, which emerged following the implementation of a disarmament program between 2003–06. The BACRIM consist of some former members of the now-demobilized self-defense communities (AUC), the country's chief paramilitary group, which are alleged to have taken over many of the criminal operations previously run by members of the AUC. They also are alleged by some human rights groups to play a strong role in troubling trends in rising violence, including doubling the homicide rate in Medellín in 2009 and a steep increase in the number of internally displaced people (Human Rights Watch 2010).

Similarly, in the South African case, the failure of the post-apartheid system to meaningfully incorporate black youth into the political process only increased the appeal of urban gangs:

“The Party had given people a new uniform, a new language, new songs of liberation, but now the criminal gangs offered ready-made alternatives. Membership [in] these gangs provides an identity, social clothing, a language of its own and the added advantage of providing some alternative forms of wealth creation, . . .” (Simpson 1997).

Some of the strongest evidence for the interaction among different forms of violence is that of the links between domestic violence (witnessing spousal abuse or experiencing child abuse) and later perpetration of violence, in both common and organized forms. In environments of chronic violence, a cycle of violence is created between victimization and perpetration that can persist over generations. In most cases, the experience of victimization occurs within the household or immediate community of a young person. There is strong evidence that *this experience alters brain physiology*, and increases the risk of *perpetrating violence later in life* (Tremblay and others 2004). Various studies demonstrate that male children who witness abuse may present an increased tendency to perpetuate violence as adolescents and adults, whether in their own homes or in delinquent or gang activities (APA 1996; Dahlberg 1998; World Bank 2008). Female children who witness or experience violence at home may be more likely to enter

abusive relationships as adults (Kalmuss 1984; Seltzer and Kalmuss 1988). In a study of nine countries, women were found to be twice as likely to report suffering abuse by an intimate partner if their own mothers had been abused (Kishor and Johnson 2004). In cross-national studies of both male and female youth involvement in armed groups, whether gangs or political groups, adolescents repeatedly emphasize experiences of abuse within their families (Dowdney 2004; Brett and Specht 2004). Thus, gang or political conflicts in urban areas are one manifestation of continuing the cycle of violence begun in the home.

Gender-based violence also interacts with political and criminal violence when it is used as a tool to escalate conflict. Sexual and physical violence against women and children often adds fuel to the fire of existing rivalries, either between urban gangs (see Willman and Marcelin 2010 on Haiti) or within the context of war (Barstow 2001). A rapid assessment of gender-based violence following the disputed 2007 elections in Kenya asserted that alarming increases in sexual violence were occurring not only as “a by-product of the collapse in social order in Kenya brought on by the post-election conflicts, but . . . also as a tool to terrorize individuals and families and precipitate their expulsion from the communities in which they live” (Myrum and others 2008: i).

VIOLENCE AS A TRANSFORMATIVE FORCE IN URBAN LANDSCAPES

Violence, or the fear of it, has the power to dramatically transform urban space. This transformation occurs, first, through the conversion of some areas of the city into “no-go zones” in which law enforcement cannot enter. Often, slums and shantytowns take on these characteristics, with the resulting stigmatization and limited mobility of the residents there. In turn, neighboring residents of more middle-class areas may be motivated to build walls or gated communities to protect themselves. In some cases, even the transport infrastructure adapts to the fear of violent areas, effectively isolating and containing violent areas. In this way, the real and perceived threat of violence combine to generate what Agbola has called, in the context of Lagos, an “architecture of fear” (Agbola 1997). Increasingly higher walls and barriers, more elaborate security systems, the presence of private security, and, often, a stronger police presence in wealthier areas fragment public space and break down social cohesion in the city.

This spatial fragmentation of the city, in turn, can fuel further violence in several ways. For the residents of higher violence neighborhoods, the spatial exclu-

sion reinforces perceptions of social and economic exclusion and inequality. In the following chapters, residents of neighborhoods in the five countries connected the built environment to violence in many cases. Because they live, often literally, next door to areas with better service coverage, stronger security protections, and more economic opportunities, they often feel resentful. This resentment can translate to the sentiment that violence is the only, or at least one of the most effective, means of meeting economic or social needs.

For the residents of upper-class neighborhoods, the fragmentation of urban space changes the habits and attitudes in ways that reinforce stereotypes and fear. Those who spend their time behind high walls, protected by armed guards and closed streets automatically change their habits of interaction with other urban residents. In the words of Teresa Caldeira:

“How could the experience of walking on the streets not be transformed if one’s environment consists of high fences, armed guards, closed streets and video cameras instead of gardens and yards, neighbors talking, and the possibility of glancing at some family scene through the windows? The idea of going for a walk, of naturally passing among strangers, the act of strolling through a crowd that symbolizes the modern experience of the city, are all compromised in a city of walls. . . . Encounters in public space become increasingly tense, even violent, because they are framed by people’s fears and stereotypes” (Caldeira 2000).

This transformation of physical space thus reinforces the social transformations wrought by violence. The experience or fear of violence affects how people relate to one another and to their environments. We take up this issue again in chapter 3, as we turn to a discussion of how urban communities and governments have addressed urban violence in different contexts.

3

Community Capacities for Violence Prevention

SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION, STRESSES, AND VIOLENCE

Why is violence more pronounced in some areas of the city than others? It is now well-recognized that violence is not evenly spread across cities, but tends to concentrate in particular geographic areas. These “hot spots,” or “no-go zones,” tend to have several structural features in common, and these commonalities extend across countries. That is, violence generally concentrates in areas of strong economic disadvantage, social exclusion, and poverty.

These observations formed the basis for the beginnings of social disorganization theory, which originally posited that economic disadvantage, ethnic and racial heterogeneity, and residential instability (high turnover of residents) resulted in community disorganization, which then led to the emergence of deviant, or delinquent, subcultures and, ultimately, to high rates of crime and violence (Shaw and McKay 1942). The built environment feeds into this as well. Of the different explanations, the “broken window” theory of crime is perhaps the best known. This theory posits that dilapidated infrastructure and physical disorder facilitate crime by signaling to would-be criminals that there is little consequence to crime in the area (Kelling and Coles 1996). Factors such as broken windows, garbage in the streets, graffiti on the walls, abandoned buildings, and lack of street lighting create an environment that promotes crime and delinquency, and thus impact citizens’ feeling safe (Guerra 2005; ICPC 2008). Policies stemming from this theory have been credited with decreases in crime in various contexts. New York City is the most-cited example. However, despite the popularity of this theory in the policy world, the empirical link between neighborhood disorder and crime

and violence rates still is disputed. In fact, one study revealed the relationship to be spurious (Sampson and Raudenbush 2001).

Other theories argue that structural issues such as neighborhood disadvantage affect crime and violence through the stresses that they impose on the residents. Strain theory posits that individuals feel strain as they work to meet their own basic needs. When an individual's expectations for economic or social advancement, or even for the simple meeting of her/his basic needs, are higher than what s/he can expect given real-world conditions, frustration results. This mismatch between aspirations and actual outcomes causes frustration and anger, which some individuals express through criminal and/or violent acts. Strain theory has its roots in Emile Durkheim's concept of *anomie*, a condition that occurs when aspirations (themselves heavily influenced by culture) are not constrained by social forces, producing a sense of "deregulation" or "normlessness" (Durkheim 1887/1997). Later iterations of strain theory describe how individuals feel stress when they are denied the just rewards for their efforts, as perceived/compared to other individuals expending the same effort for the same outcomes (Agnew 1992). Gilligan reached similar conclusions by studying repeat violent offenders in U.S. jails, arguing that structural injustices, such as growing up in disadvantaged conditions, cause feelings of shame and humiliation, which drive violent behavior. The violence often is justified as self-defense, whether under actual threat of harm, or when one's pride or self-worth is wounded or "disrespected" (Gilligan 2001).

These theories have been useful for understanding the emotional underpinnings of violent behavior. Nonetheless, they fail to convincingly explain why, in an environment of structural disadvantage, only *some*—not all—individuals respond with violence.

SOCIAL CAPITAL AND SOCIAL COHESION

In reality, not all disadvantaged neighborhoods are hot spots for violence. Some communities do manage to exert social control and resiliency to structural challenges in positive ways. The question then remains, "What is it that communities supply (or fail to supply) that may explain the link between these structural features of neighborhood environments and the rates of violent crime? (Morenoff and others 2001: 518)" While early theories of social disorganization neglected the role of community agency, later contributions defined disorganization as the inability of a community to pursue the common values of its residents and main-

tain social controls over behavior (R.J. Bursik 1988; Sampson and Groves 1989). The “routine activities” theory built on this to lay out three elements that must intersect for a crime to occur: motivated offenders, suitable targets of opportunity, and ineffective or absent guardians of the area (Cohen and Felson 1979). Thus, crime and violence can be concentrated geographically because some communities supply a sufficient number of targets, or too few effective guardians, even if the pool of motivated offenders is equally spread across the city.

Some have argued that social capital is a necessary ingredient for reducing violence. Understood as the “networks, norms and trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam 1993), social capital is seen as providing the basis for communities being able to act together to address violence and disorder. The concept of social capital is related to social disorganization; neighborhoods that have little social capital would potentially have less capacity to organize to exert social control over violence and crime than communities with strong social capital (R. Bursik 1999). Related to this, social cohesion—the social forces that bring people together—describes community capacity to form groups that can realize collective action, including maintaining public order (Friedkin 2004).

Social capital and cohesion in themselves do not always, or automatically, translate into collective action to reduce violence. In some cases, strong ties within a group, or “bonding social capital,” can contribute to reducing violent behavior if the group leader is able to impose a value system that condemns the use of violence, either within the group or against other groups. This effect has been observed, for example, in ethnic-based conflicts in India (Varshney 2002). On the other hand, research in the U.S. has emphasized how strong social ties within a group can actually hinder collective action by creating a dense network of connections that ends up isolating residents from broader society (Wilson 1996); or foster collective action that itself inevitably drives the breakdown of social capital (Patillo-McCoy 1999).

Likewise, social capital can be created by or used for activities that do not serve the collective interest (Moser and McIlwaine 2004). In Colombia, Rubio speaks of “perverse social capital,” the use of strong ties and networks in communities to facilitate drug trafficking networks that have negative repercussions across those communities and beyond (Rubio 1997). When social capital is used for destructive purposes, a set of norms emerges that tolerates, if not promotes, those ends, and makes the cycle difficult to break. This tolerance has been the case in many communities where drug dealing or trafficking becomes a key economic activity, creating a culture in which drug lords are idealized. The new

norms include the creation of a drug culture that idealizes easy money and violence as ways to meet needs or get ahead socially (Gaviría 1998). Furthermore, where drug networks become institutionalized in urban neighborhoods, they may supplant the state, even to providing social services from feeding programs to basic security. Replacing the state, in turn, can contribute to the further normalization of violence and weakening of state presence in favor of what Dowdney has called “narcocracy,” a replacement of democracy with a “concurrent presence” that exploits state weaknesses (Dowdney 2003).

An additional problem with the theory that social capital directly reduces violence is that, in reality, many urban communities have managed to exert social control over violence even without having strong ties among neighbors (Sampson and others 1999). This fact has been tested by Bellair, who showed that weak ties (less frequent interaction among neighbors) were predictive of lower crime rates, and that the type of interaction matters more than the frequency (Bellair 1997).

COLLECTIVE EFFICACY

A community needs more than networks and social ties to effectively maintain public order. Sampson has proposed an alternative theory to explain the necessary components that a community needs to maintain public order. He focuses on the concept of “collective efficacy.” This concept combines working trust (social capital) with shared expectations for action. Collective efficacy is defined as “social control enacted under conditions of social trust” (R. Sampson 2004). This theory helps explain why, despite weak ties among community members, the existence of shared values and expectations can enable enough trust for the community to achieve common goals. The theory was tested in Chicago and was shown to predict lower rates of violence. Additionally, in the same study, the presence of collective efficacy was associated with a 30 percent decrease in the potential for victimization. Collective efficacy was shown to mediate the impacts of structural disadvantages including residential instability, social exclusion (in this case, measured in terms of economic stratification by race), and concentrated economic disadvantage (Sampson and others 1997).

Others have argued that collective efficacy within a community is limited in what it can achieve. Communities may share strong private ties and shared expectations for social control, yet still may not have the institutional capacity to

exert social control (Hunter 1985). Many tasks necessary to the well-being of a community—from water and sanitation services and school improvements to strengthening police presence—cannot be achieved only through strong ties and cohesion in the community. Rather, they are dependent on residents' trust in and connections to a broader institutional framework. To explain, this kind of action “depends on connections among organizations, connections that are not necessarily dense or reflective of the structure of personal ties in a neighborhood” (R. Sampson 2004). Similar to the idea of “bridging social capital,” this institutional component of collective efficacy means that even if neighbors do not feel close ties to one another, they do trust in an overarching institutional framework that governs their relationships. This working trust helps support and sustain collective efficacy by transcending personal ties.

There are, of course, limits on what can be expected from communities and their collective action. Similarly to social capital, collective efficacy and collective action have a “dark side.” Communities may come together for actions that are discriminatory against minority groups, as when surveillance of “suspicious” individuals converts to racial or ethnic profiling in the interest of public order. Vigilante or militia groups are another example of collective action that often brings people together for purposes that benefit certain individuals or groups over others in a community. Some organizations in these contexts may be more interested in their own survival than the collective good. Theories of the types of mechanisms that are needed to guard against these effects are scarce, but some have posited that a strengthened environment of inclusion can help. The components can include mediating institutions, such as law enforcement or community dispute resolution mechanisms, that build an environment of reciprocal engagement and negotiation (R. Sampson 2004).

Thus, external interventions that predefine communities along geographic lines can be problematic if, within these lines, people feel little affinity for the group. Mansuri and Rao (2004) have described the unintended negative consequences of imposing predefined notions of community within community-driven development (CDD) projects. They emphasize how, in contexts of inequality, processes can be dominated by elites. The result is that targeting the poor generally is ineffective, and benefits thus are unequally distributed. Thus, imposing externally defined notions of communities could reinforce existing power dynamics if measures are not taken to ensure inclusion of minority groups.

HEALING TRAUMA, BUILDING COLLECTIVE EFFICACY

While theories of collective efficacy and social capital are useful in explaining the characteristics that seem to matter for exerting social control, they have much less to say about *how* these capacities are built. How does a community build up a stock of these social resources, and, perhaps more importantly, how does a community rebuild them when they have been destroyed?

Violence itself tends to work against collective efficacy and erode working trust in urban communities in two ways. First, violent incidents signal to residents that the mechanisms of social control are not working, which in turn signals to would-be perpetrators that opportunities for crime and violence exist, leading to more likelihood of violence (Foster 1995). Second, on a deeper level, the trauma created by experience or witness of violence critically alters individuals and communities. Trauma—understood as “a response to an extraordinary event that overwhelms an individual’s coping resources”—transforms not only the individual victims but also social relationships and networks (Poulligny 2010). The effect of trauma on trust in communities becomes more serious as more people are victimized. Various field studies have documented how trauma from violence begins to affect trust after a particular threshold is reached. Once this happens, the effect intensifies rapidly. Trauma tends to first impact trust at the family and intimate levels, followed by the community level, then the broader societal level (Dowdney 2004, Francis and Amuyunzu-Nyamongo 2008, Cuesta and others 2007). That is, “trust can be broken in an instant, but may take years to be re-established” (Bar-on 2006).

When violence permeates daily life, people often experience trauma, and they begin to change their habits. They may limit their mobility or their investment in business enterprises for fear of victimization. They also may stop practicing different forms of solidarity if they do not feel safe doing so (Poulligny 2006). Trauma also may take on a life of its own, creating new social patterns where victims essentially re-enact the trauma by perpetrating violence against others in their families or communities. Examples include child abuse by former victims, domestic abuse, or violence against others in the community (Poulligny 2010; van der Kolk and McFarlane 1996). These cycles of violence undermine the most basic trust and erode trust in any overarching framework of shared values that may have existed. It is not uncommon for people living in traumatizing situations to express feelings of being “lost” or in losing trust in a basic order of society (Lederach 2010; Barsalou 2001). The result often is less participation in community life, particularly in community collective action. Emerging evidence

from Sao Paulo, Brazil, suggests that not only does victimization by violence lead to lower participation but also avoiding participation is an effective coping strategy to avoid violence (World Bank forthcoming). This tendency also emerges in our own fieldwork for this study, as discussed in the following chapters.

As a result, another key capacity needed for communities to cope with violence is the capacity to heal from trauma related to violence, to rebuild the trust needed to maintain social control. This capacity to heal—through offering support to victims and reintegration for perpetrators—not only is a matter of psychological health but also has deep development dimensions. Trauma impacts on livelihoods in several ways. Trauma or injury from violence can impair a victim's ability to work. When family members are killed violently, or sent to jail for perpetrating violence, the resulting loss of family income arguably can be as traumatic as the human impact of the loss.

COMMUNITY CAPACITIES FOR REDUCING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE

Drawing on this discussion, the following features emerge as particularly important in affecting a community's capacity to maintain public order and prevent violence. These elements form the framework for understanding effective interventions in the following chapter and community coping mechanisms in the five cities in this study. The elements are:

- Capacity to generate trust among residents; and with formal and informal institutions, to create a trusted institutional framework that can transcend personal ties
- Capacity to heal from past trauma imposed by violence, to build trust
- Ability to link community efforts with broader initiatives at different levels of government and society
- Capacity to exert social control (act as guardians) over violent and antisocial behavior. Includes the capacity to enforce public order, resolve conflict, (drawing on the material, psychological, and spiritual resources of the community), and promote reconciliation with and reintegration of former violent perpetrators
- Mechanisms to ensure the degree of inclusion that helps guard against the capture of collective action by dominant power groups.

These capacities represent the key elements important at the community level for preventing violence. However, as noted earlier, the literature has much less to say about how these capacities are generated, or how they can be rebuilt once they have been destroyed or depleted. Overall of the structures and elements that are needed to help communities rebuild social capital and collective efficacy once they have been broken down by violence remain only partially understood, and very under-studied. Because violence prevention programs are usually put in place only after a serious problem of violence has emerged, these questions are particularly critical for policy. The following chapter reviews interventions to highlight ways that some projects have addressed this challenge.

4

Social Interventions for Urban Violence Prevention

INTRODUCTION

The chapter begins with an overview of emerging lessons and challenges for the prevention agenda. Next, we review social interventions in violence that have made a difference at the community level, highlighting examples of effective programs. It is not an exhaustive review of violence prevention initiatives and best practices; these are available elsewhere (see, for example, ICPC 2008; WHO 2008; WHO 2009; Willman and Makisaka 2010). The interventions are categorized based on their contributions to the different capacities to illustrate how different projects have supported these capacities in various contexts. The categories below are not mutually exclusive; many of the interventions contribute to more than one area of community capacity. The study has endeavored to include projects that have undergone rigorous impact assessments or evaluations. Projects with disputed findings are noted in the text.

The previous chapter has identified some core capacities that influence the effectiveness of communities in preventing violence. This chapter explores how different programs and projects have supported those capacities in different contexts. The matrix below summarizes the main ideas.

INTERVENTIONS SUPPORTING COMMUNITY CAPACITY TO GENERATE TRUST AMONG RESIDENTS, AND WITH FORMAL AND INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS

As described previously, a sense of social connection is one of the most important protective factors against violent behavior. *When urban residents feel connected to*

Table 4.1 Summary of Areas of Intervention to Support Community Capacities for Preventing Violence

Key capacity	Area of intervention	Examples of programs
Generating trust between residents, and with institutions	Building trust in families	Early childhood development, parenting support, home visitation
	Building trust in schools	Conditional cash transfers, after-school programs, school-based mediation
	Building trust across generations	Youth reintegration programs, mentoring programs
Healing trauma to build trust	Services to victims	Hospital protocols, hospital-based prevention, crisis centers
	Supporting collective healing rituals	Integrating indigenous healing rituals into prevention programs
Linking community initiatives with broader levels of government and society	Building collaboration across sectors	Multisectoral approaches
	Engaging various levels of government	Getting high-level political leadership; integrating municipal, state, and national levels
Supporting community capacity to exert social control over violent and antisocial behavior	Building trust to enforce public order	Community policing, enforcing local by-laws to address triggers for violence
	Supporting conflict resolution and addressing grievances	Alternate dispute resolution
	Promoting reintegration of former offenders	Reintegration programs
	Strengthening capacity for social control by improving the built environment	Crime prevention through environmental design
Promoting inclusion	Participatory approaches to planning and design	Participatory assessments, community councils, safety audits

one another, whether directly through personal ties or more broadly through shared values, they are less likely to engage in violence. Interventions to build trust generally have focused on three levels: within families, within schools, and across generations.

Building Trust within Families

In general, the impact of interventions is usually greater when the interventions target the early stages of human development. Some of the most effective programs have been early childhood development (ECD) programs. These focus on supporting the people and institutions that most impact the lives of children and adolescents, which include families, communities, schools, and health centers. Investing in high-quality ECD programs, which promote access to health care, good nutrition, parenting skill training, educational activities, and a safe environment yields some of the strongest impacts on risky behaviors from violence to criminal activity and substance abuse (Schweinhart and others 2005; Grantham-McGregor and others 2007; UNESCO 2007; World Bank 2002, 2005, 2008). Key elements of effective programs include supporting parents in learning positive discipline and communicating with their children (Bilchik 1998 review). One often-noted program in the United States, the *Perry Preschool Study*, followed high-risk individuals who had attended the preschool over 40 subsequent years. It found that by ages 27 and 40, they had committed fewer crimes, earned higher wages, had fewer unplanned pregnancies, and had been arrested fewer times than a control group. In addition, it was estimated that for every taxpayer dollar invested, the program had achieved a \$17 return (Schweinhart and others 2005).

Another program, called *Child-Parent Center*, provides comprehensive education, health, and family support to economically disadvantaged children from preschool to third grade in Chicago's inner city. This program also included educational workshops and home visits to parents. The federally funded Chicago Longitudinal Study demonstrated that Child-Parent Center program participants had significantly higher rates of educational attainment and lower rates of juvenile arrest than a control group (Reynolds and others 2004; Reynolds and others 1998). Similar results have been documented for preschool enrichment programs in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Honduras, Jamaica, and Mexico (World Bank 2002, 2005b, 2008). Similar results have been documented for ECD programs in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Honduras, Jamaica, and Mexico (World Bank 2008, 2003).

Home Visitation and Parenting Training programs also aim to build trust within families and protect against violence. Home visitation programs conducted by healthcare professionals focus on increasing parental skills and improving the relationship between parents and children. With support and information, the programs strengthen parents' ability to adapt to the changing needs of the child, develop strategies to cope with their child's behavior, and build knowledge of child development and capabilities. One often-cited successful home visitation program is the U.S. *Nurse-Family Partnership*. This program aims to help change the lives of vulnerable first-time mothers and their babies through ongoing home visits from registered nurses. This evidence-based community health program has proven results including long-term family improvements in health, education, and economic self-sufficiency (ICPC 2008). The Nurse-Family Partnership is estimated to save communities more than it costs by reducing welfare, healthcare and juvenile justice expenditures. Olds and others (1998) conducted a 15-year follow-up study showing a 79 percent reduction in reporting child abuse or neglect cases. *Triple P (Positive Parenting Program)* is another effective program, which supports parents by providing parental skills training to build a safe, stable, and nurturing relationship with their children (WHO 2009).

Building Trust within Schools

A child's feeling of connectedness to her or his school has been shown to be one of the most important protective factors against that child's violent behavior and other risky behaviors (World Bank 2008). Schools thus are key violence intervention sites. A child's building a social connection with his or her school obviously relies on that child's school attendance. To address this connection, some governments have implemented programs to increase enrollment and reduce dropout rates. One of the most common approaches relies on conditional cash transfer programs to provide incentives for students to stay in school. An assessment of Mexico's *Oportunidades* program documented an increase in secondary school enrollment by 8 percent for girls and 5 percent for boys and grade completion by 10 percent. Similarly, Brazil's *Bolsa Escola* program reported lower drop-out rates (0.4 percent) for participants compared to nonparticipants (5.6 percent) (Guarcello and others 2006)¹⁴. Other policy changes that have been shown to affect

14 In 2003, Brazil's President Luiz Inácio da Silva combined the Bolsa Escola program with other subsidy and income programs linked to food and gas to create the Bolsa Família program.

dropout rates are eliminating expulsion requirements for pregnancy or loosening them for behavioral problems (Cunningham and others 2008). Programs such as *First Things First* and *Skills, Opportunity and Recognition* in the United States, which train teachers and parents to engage children with their schools, also have shown increases in students' school attendance and reduce antisocial behavior and delinquency (World Bank 2008).

After-school programs offer another school-based entry point for prevention. According to the National Youth Violence Prevention Resource Center,¹⁵ youth often engage in risky behaviors, such as alcohol and drug use, during the after-school hours. After-school programs offer a mixture of academic, cultural, and recreational activities for young people in supervised environments. These programs create alternatives for youth, serving as effective youth violence intervention strategies. Instead of engaging with risky behaviors, youth can improve their academic achievement, and develop teamwork skills and positive relationships with their peers through playing sports and other recreational activities. After-school programs are offered by schools, community-based nonprofit organizations, faith-based organizations, youth groups, and local governments.

After-school programs typically include academic assistance (tutoring, homework assistance, language classes), drug and alcohol prevention, leadership building, volunteer and community service opportunities, cultural activities (arts and music), life skills training, computer training, mentoring, and counseling (Reno and Riley 2000). Providing structured activities and offering multiple learning opportunities help ensure children's continued growth and development. Quality and adequate staffing and involving families in the program also are key components to having successful after-school programs. A good example of an after-school program is Brazil's *Open Schools (Abrindo Espaços)* launched by UNESCO in partnership with the Brazilian Ministry of Education. The program offers weekend sports, cultural, arts and leisure activities, and initial work training. The evaluations have shown its success in reducing the levels of violence registered in schools and their surroundings. In São Paulo, between 2003 and 2006, the Open Schools Program, known locally as the Family School, was implemented in 5,306 schools, resulting in criminal acts being reduced by 45.5 percent (World Bank 2008; UNESCO 2007).

School-based mediation and conflict resolution also are increasingly employed to prevent violence among youth. In Argentina, the government passed a provin-

15. www.safeyouth.org/scripts/facts/afterschool.asp#1

cial law on school mediation in 2003, establishing school mediation programs in 42 municipalities (ICPC 2008). In the Chaco province of Argentina, school mediation trainings are given to teachers so that they can apply conflict resolution techniques in school conflicts.¹⁶ In Chile, Colegio Mayor of the Municipality of Pente Alto, Santiago has implemented a school mediation program targeting preschool children age up to five years old. Experiences during the first five years of life strongly influence social and psychological behavior later in life. The program teaches small children conflict resolution techniques through socialization in the school environment. During the first year after implementing the program, disagreements among children in the school dropped by 50 percent, and physical aggression among children also dropped a strong 60 percent (ICPC 2008).

Building Trust across Generations

Chronic violence erodes trust in a community. One of the most affected relationships often is that between older generations and youth, particularly in post-conflict contexts in which many youth have been recruited into armed groups. Youth may lose contact with older people in the community who could have served as role models for positive behavior, and elders may lose trust in the younger generation to promote stability in the community. Certain programs have been more successful than others in repairing these relationships. For example, the *YouthBuild* model brings young people—many of whom are involved with the criminal justice system—back to their home communities and trains them for jobs rebuilding broken infrastructure. Their labor can generate a positive image with other age groups in the society, offering these youth a chance to redeem any negative reputations they had gained previously.

Another type of intervention aiming to build trust across generations is *mentoring programs*. These programs pair a young person with an older person who can serve as a role model for positive behavior, and/or help the young person achieve education or employment goals. The evidence on these programs suggests that they can provide modest benefits, and that at-risk youth benefit from them more than other groups. The *Big Brothers/Big Sisters program* in the U.S. is one example of a mentoring program that has been deemed effective. However, other programs have yielded mixed results. Moreover, evidence suggests that poorly managed programs may actually have an adverse effect (Dubois 2002; Rhodes 2008).

16. www.mediacioneducativa.com.ar/index.htm

INTERVENTIONS SUPPORTING HEALING FROM PAST TRAUMA IMPOSED BY VIOLENCE TO BUILD TRUST

Services to Victims of Violence

A fundamental component of building trust in high-violence communities is to provide immediate services to victims of violence. Hospital protocols or specialized service centers can play a key role in assisting victims as well as prevent additional violence in several ways. A variety of **screening tools** have been developed to assist healthcare staff to identify victims of violence. Employed primarily in developed countries, these tools have been most effective in identifying victims of intimate partner violence (Mcfarlane and others 1991; Olive 2007; Feder and others 1999). In one Canadian emergency department, the use of a screening tool was found to increase detection rates from less than 1 percent to 14 percent (Morrison and Grunfeld 2000). However, even though screening tools seem to help identify victims, there is little evidence of their sustainability or effectiveness in reducing future exposure to violence. In addition, there is little evidence of the effectiveness of screening for other types of violence, such as child maltreatment and elder abuse. Some argue that screening may harm victims through retraumatizing them or through violations of confidentiality to an accompanying partner (WHO 2009).

Following the identification of victims, some healthcare providers offer them comprehensive care and support. Used primarily in developed countries, such as Canada, England, and the United States, sexual assault (or forensic) nurse examiner (SANE) programs provide comprehensive care and support to victims of sexual violence. These services include medical evaluation, counseling, collection of forensic evidence to be provided in court, and referral service to appropriate agencies (Regan and others 2004; Campbell and others 2005). Some developing countries, including Bangladesh, Malaysia, Namibia, and Thailand, have established national one-stop crisis centers, which offer a range of integrated services to victims of child abuse, intimate partner violence, and sexual violence. Psychosocial interventions such as psychological debriefing and cognitive behavioral therapy also are used to address victims' mental health problems, which include anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and depression.

Supporting Collective Healing Rituals and Processes

It is not uncommon for communities to bring their own indigenous practices and spiritualities to deal with the breakdown of trust that trauma can generate.

Diverse healing and cleansing rituals support individual healing as well as rebuild trust within the community. In short, they are meant to help restore a sense of order to both victims and the broader community. Many of these mechanisms do not separate the needs of the individual from those of the community, and rely on solidarity and a system of shared values. In this sense, conflicts are seen to affect the entire community not solely the actors directly involved (Penal Report International 2000). Many such rituals have a public component in which the affected parties drink from the same cup, or eat from the same bowl together, to both signify the reintegration of the offender back into the community and recognize the harm caused to the victim (Poulligny 2010).

INTERVENTIONS LINKING COMMUNITY EFFORTS WITH BROADER INITIATIVES AT DIFFERENT LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY

Importance of a Multisectoral Approach

Generally speaking, the more effective youth violence reduction initiatives have involved multiple sectors. No one government agency, with the possible exception of the police, has violence prevention as its main priority. In other words, for most government departments, violence is only a peripheral concern. In addition, both risk and protective factors for violence cut across various sectors, from deficiencies in health care and nutrition to issues with leaving school early to unemployment and poor infrastructure. Taken together, the multidimensionality of violence and the fact that no one agency is mandated to address all of its dimensions speaks clearly to the need for sharing responsibility for violence prevention and collaborating across sectors. Because of this multidimensionality of drivers, interventions in one sector alone, or in various sectors done in isolation, are likely to either shift the problem elsewhere or duplicate efforts.

The more effective approaches to prevention have involved coordination across multiple sectors. For example, in Diadema, Brazil, between 2002 and 2005 enforcing local bylaws to restrict alcohol and gun sales, coupled with establishment of mediation centers to promote nonviolent conflict resolution, and public education on preventing crime and violence, helped reduce the homicide rate by 44 percent (Duailibi and others 2007) (appendix B3). In addition, multisectoral coordination offers more opportunities to combine long- and short-term interventions. For more comprehensive results, immediate-term, quick-impact inter-

ventions such as police training often can be combined with longer-term programs to change cultural norms around violence.

Linking Community Initiatives with Multiple Levels of Government

There are certain limits to what communities can be expected to achieve in the realm of violence prevention. Thus, local initiatives are more likely to be successful when they are located within a national framework on violence reduction and prevention. Working at the local level is essential in violence programming, because it is closest to the affected populations and most responsive to local needs. However, because different levels of government perform different functions, it often is necessary to work across these levels to address the different dimensions of urban violence. Local efforts are more likely to be effective if supported by a regional or national framework on violence prevention.

Local governments are a natural locus for the design and execution of prevention policies. First, their proximity to citizens and communities allows for a more accurate understanding of a wide range of problems that affect crime and violence. Second, local governments also can assemble and coordinate a wide array of key sectors and actors such as police, health, education, communities, civil society organizations (CSOs), private sector, and others, to analyze, discuss, design and implement more effective interventions (World Bank 2003; ICPC 2008). Finally, local governments offer far more flexibility in the execution of prevention programs than the central State because they are able to monitor closely the execution of the programs and make necessary adjustments along the way. Most evidence of the advantage of a strong involvement of local government in violence prevention comes from industrialized countries, such as the Canada, France, United Kingdom, and United States, which have a long history in developing prevention programs. Experiences from cities in developing countries, from middle-income countries in particular, such as Brazil and Colombia, also show that municipalities, when adequately empowered, have been extremely effective at reducing the level of violence. Local initiatives may even formally need national state participation, for example, in the case of municipal gun restriction programs in Colombia, which required a national law. In turn, national legislation—for example the mandatory creation of Municipal Security Councils in Colombia—may be a critical trigger for local government action.

In addition, *strong political leadership*, preferably at high levels of government, is important for sustainability. Without political commitment and leadership, the programs presented in this chapter would have only limited or no impact in

reducing violence. In the case of Bogotá, despite going through various municipal administrations, they continued carrying out the previous policies and incorporated new ones to broaden the impact on crime and violence.

Some municipal governments reach out to urban neighborhoods through *community councils*, organized to promote citizens' participation in public safety and political process. Community councils are not only to deal with the public safety issues but also to enhance social capital and ensure safe environment for all community members. For example, *Fica Vivo* (Stay Alive) program in Belo Horizonte, Brazil set up a community forum to hold monthly community meetings to discuss issues including crime prevention, unemployment, and education (Beato 2005). The forum aimed to reduce the fears of residents and to develop solutions to the local problems. *DESEPAZ* Program in Cali, Colombia also created Community Security Councils and Community Government Councils in each community (Guerrero and Concha-Eastman 2001). The councils held periodic public meetings to promote the transparency of the city government and community participation in resolving public security and other issues in the community. Similarly, UN-HABITAT's *Safer Cities* projects engage vulnerable groups in the community, such as women, children, the elderly, and people with disabilities, in developing *safety audit*. The safety audit includes exploratory walks by small groups (mainly groups of women) to identify the high crime areas and what makes the area unsafe for them. The audit provides an opportunity to reflect the security concerns of vulnerable groups in the prevention strategies in the community.

INTERVENTIONS SUPPORTING COMMUNITY CAPACITY TO EXERT SOCIAL CONTROL (ACT AS GUARDIANS) OVER VIOLENT AND ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR

Enforcing Public Order: Community Policing

In communities that experience chronic violence, trust is eroded not only among neighbors, but also among the residents and the institutions charged with protecting them. This erosion of trust directly impacts the community's ability to act as guardian over behavior. In many cities, initial responses to high rates of crime and violence were heavy-handed, strong-arm policies designed to be "tough on crime." These policies included mass arrests, mandatory sentencing for certain crimes, and aggressive search and interrogation procedures. The *mano dura* policies of some Central American countries are examples. Over time, evidence has

shown that these tactics undermine trust with police and, in the process, compromise law enforcement effectiveness in high-violence communities. Recognizing this, many cities have shifted toward approaches that build trust with residents and form partnerships with communities.

The most popular version, community policing, also called neighborhood policing, aims to reduce crime through community partnership. This approach defines policing “as something not done *to* people but *with* people” (*The Economist* 2009). Working with people in the community, this approach identifies, responds to, and solves crime and other problems that affect the local community. The municipality of Hatillo, Costa Rica has applied community policing, thus involving community members in action plans for public safety. After one year of implementation, the program’s impact on delinquency was not significant. However, the feeling of insecurity among community members decreased from 36 percent to 19 percent, and public perception of the police was also improved (ICPC 2008). Community policing models have been implemented in countries from Brazil to Haiti to Kenya to South Africa and Uganda. These models tend to work best in contexts that have a high level support for the program and that already have strong networks of community organizations (Davis and others 2003).

Community policing generally is located within a broader policing approach called problem-oriented policing. This approach identifies a specific problem in a community and designs solutions that often involve multiple agencies. A derivative of this approach, hot-spots policing, targets law enforcement efforts in the areas of a city in which crime and violence are most concentrated. This kind of policing is based on the recognition that crime and violence are concentrated in particular geographic areas and occur at particular times of the day. Evaluations of this approach in different U.S. cities have found that hot-spots policing can reduce crime in the targeted areas. This approach does not displace crime

Box 4.1 Community Policing in Kenya

Saferworld, an NGO based in England, implemented 2 community policing initiatives in Kenya beginning in 2003. One initiative was located in a slum area of Nairobi, the other in a rural area. Activities included training and consciousness-raising for police officers and communities, setting up community safety and information centers, street lighting, and anonymous information boxes in which residents could leave information on crime and violence. Saferworld’s evaluation asserted that, as a result of the program, trust between residents and law enforcement had improved, and safety and security had increased.

and violence to nearby areas (Clarke and Weisburd 1994; Hesselting 1994) but, instead, can actually create a “diffusion of benefits” to other areas (Weisburd and Mazerolle 2000). Hot-spots policing also has been implemented in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, through the Fica Vivo (Stay Alive) program, which aims to control crime in high crime rate areas through a mix of police intervention and social programs with a focus on youth.

Many municipal governments have had success in restoring order and reducing violence by relying on police to *enforce local by-laws* to redress the drivers of violence, especially via restrictions on the sale of alcohol and firearms. For example, the Development, Security and Peace Programme (DESEPAZ), in Cali implemented a series of strategies to prevent violence and improve security through local bylaws. The interventions included efforts to enhance public security by enforcing existing state and city regulations and using the mayor’s office to issue new decrees and laws. For example, the mayor restricted the hours during which alcoholic beverages could be sold. Similarly, the high proportion of homicides committed with guns prompted prohibitions on the carrying of guns in public during high-risk weekends, holidays, and election days (Guerrero and Concha-Eastman 2001).

Other by-laws can relate to arms control. In this area, Small Arms Light Weapons (SALW) Control Programs have been successful in some cases. These evolved from the national weapon buy-back programs to community-based weapon control approaches. One example is the Weapons Lotteries in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, implemented by the nongovernmental organization, Via Rio. The lotteries offered allows individuals to turn in their weapons in exchange for a lottery ticket, with which they could win a number of prizes, from kitchen appliances to motor scooters (OECD 2009).

Resolving Conflict and Addressing Grievances

At the most basic level, justice institutions and legal processes are meant to provide a nonviolent forum for addressing conflicts over goods and resources so that they do not progress to violent struggle. However these legal institutions and processes also can strengthen different protective factors against violence. For example, projects to promote citizenship and legal recognition of excluded groups, through issuing identity cards, laws of standing, and voter registration can improve social connections across groups and reduce perceptions of exclusion that fuel violence. Similarly, in cases in which uneven service coverage drives grievances among groups, courts can intervene to enforce demands for more equal service provision.

Box 4.2 Example of SALW in Port-au-Prince, Haiti

Viva Rio is a Brazilian organization based in Rio with 15 years of experience working in urban slums to prevent gang violence. Placing the UN mission in Haiti under Brazilian supervision created a unique opportunity to set up a project in Bel-Air, Port-au-Prince. In 2007–08, together with the National Council on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR) and the support of the UN Peacekeeping Force (MINU.S.TAH), Viva Rio helped negotiate a micro peace agreement among rival gangs in 14 areas of Port-au-Prince. The agreement prohibits the possession and use of firearms in beneficiary communities as a first step in mobilization and peace building. Each month, the team meets with community leaders, the Brazilian military in the zone, and the Haitian National Police to review violent deaths in the area. For every month without a violent incident, a lottery is held to award scholarships to youth in the beneficiary communities. Every two months without an incident result in a lottery for musicians to receive scholarships.

An impact assessment found that in Viva Rio's area of intervention, Bel-Air, homicide rates dropped from 21 to 17 per 100,000 people over the 3 years that the organization has been active there (Moestue and Muggah 2010).

Viva Rio's inclusive approach includes incentives for strengthening the fragile state-society relationship. The NGO's commitment to work with a range of state institutions, some of which have been largely isolated by other donors, has facilitated project implementation and institutional strengthening. Its inclusion of former gang members in community efforts has been criticized by some observers but credited with aiding reconciliation by others.

Finally, it is important not to discount the importance of the presence of the Brazilian military in the zones in which Viva Rio works. This presence provides a degree of security that is not present in other areas, or for other actors in violence prevention, and points to the importance of a basic minimum of security in building longer-term programs to reduce violence.

Source: Moestue and Muggah 2010.

The legal system also can proactively address structural inequalities through affirmative action interventions. As one example, the 2003 Black Economic Empowerment Act in South Africa was used to redress the inequalities of apartheid by giving historically excluded groups access to economic opportunities previously denied them. The act included measures to promote skills training, preferential procurement, ownership, and management.

Once conflicts occur, some governments have had important successes with alternative dispute resolution (ADR). ADR fits within a broader restorative justice approach so, rather than focusing solely on punishing the offender, also aims to address the harm done to individuals or a community by a criminal action (Bazemore and Walgrave 1999). For example, Family Group Conferencing (FGC) brings together families of both the perpetrator and the affected person or group

to discuss the impacts of the action, determine appropriate reparations, and develop a plan for the perpetrator and his/her family to ensure positive behavior in the future. In New Zealand, FGCs are mandated for juvenile offenders, and restorative principles also are available for adult offenders.

Other ADR mechanisms, such as community-based mediation and arbitration centers, intend primarily to increase access to justice for marginalized populations. Casas de Justicia (Houses of Justice) have established in many Latin American countries. The 40 Casas de Justicia in Colombia provide information on rights and conflict resolution services to the most marginalized populations. In Bolivia, Centros Integrados de Justicia (Integrated Justice Centers) have been established in remote regions to provide access to law and justice and other services to marginalized populations, particularly Indigenous Peoples (ICPC 2008). Honduras has developed “mobile justice of the peace courts,” using buses as mobile judicial offices that serve marginal areas of Tegucigalpa and San Pedro (World Bank forthcoming 2010). With the availability of these services, people are able to resolve their disputes peacefully.

Some violence intervention programs have had success by *integrating informal institutions for resolving conflict*. In Sierra Leone, the nongovernmental organization, *Timap for Justice*, has trained paralegals to assist citizens in accessing the justice sector (Maru 2005).¹⁷ As trained paralegals, the people can advocate within the formal justice system. However, they often also use traditional dispute mechanisms, such as community elders.

These alternative programs have had important successes in increasing access to justice and in resolving disputes outside of traditional courtrooms. Nevertheless, their use remains constrained primarily to informal and community levels, and to nonviolent, mostly petty, crimes. One important limitation in applying ADR in the justice sector is domestic violence cases. The power imbalance between victim and perpetrator often is so large so that it may prevent the victim from effectively advocating for herself (see evaluation of Bogotá programs in Guerrero 2006).

Promoting Reintegration

Second-chance programming intends to reintegrate young people who either have had conflict with the criminal justice system as criminal offenders, or whose circumstances put them at high risk of perpetrating violence. Second-chance programs often target youth who have dropped out of school and help them earn

17. Their work was supported by the Open Society Institute and the World Bank.

formal equivalency of degrees. For example, the *YouthBuild* program begins working with youth while they are still incarcerated, or shortly after release, to train them in construction and life skills that they can use to help transform their home communities. The program began in Washington D.C. It provided education programs to attain general education degrees (GEDs or high school diplomas for unemployed young men and women ages from 16 to 24, most of whom have dropped out of high school. Approximately 40 percent of YouthBuild students previously had been court-involved. However, during their participation in the program, their recidivism rates dropped dramatically compared to the court-involved young adults who did not participate in the program. Pilots or programs have been started in Canada, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Serbia, and South Africa.¹⁸


Promoting Violence Prevention Through Improving the Built Environment

The built environment has an important relationship with violent behavior. Poorly designed buildings or public areas can create situational opportunities for violent crime. They may allow for places for perpetrators to hide, or not allow neighbors to observe the area and thus exert a natural control over behavior. Recognizing this, the Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) approach focuses on the design of the built environment to allow for natural surveillance. CPTED is guided by three principles: (1) natural surveillance, (2) control of natural access points to public spaces, and (3) natural territorial reinforcement (ICPC 2008).

Enhancing visibility in public spaces enables neighbors to “keep an eye” on one another. Open space encourages legitimate users to interact and ensure their mutual safety. CPTED can be applied by building open stairways inside housing projects or building open central patio areas with benches where neighbors can gather (Figure 4.1). Designing public spaces to attract people of different generations and backgrounds invites potential users and increases the sense of belonging and ownership. An example is to build a park to include sports areas, play areas for smaller children, and benches for senior residents. Once the users have the sense of ownership, they are more likely to defend their environment against unwanted behaviors and activities. CPTED interventions are promising in that they reduce opportunities for crime as well as citizens’ fear of crime. For example, in South Africa, the environmental designs that include improving lighting near

18. See <http://www.youthbuildinternational.org> for details.

Figure 4.1 Example of a street that incorporates CPTED methodology



Source: Bronkhorst and others 2008.

and inside public transportation, reorganization of bus terminals, and reducing the distance between transportation services increase the feeling of safety among citizens (ICPC 2008).

INTERVENTIONS TO PROMOTE INCLUSION

High-violence contexts present tough challenges for encouraging inclusion. In high-violence situations, there is a tendency to rush programming to respond to urgent needs. In contrast, experience is showing that it pays to take time to foster participatory decisionmaking. Programs such as the World Bank's community-driven development (CDD) and the UN Community Violence Reduction programs do this by bringing together communities to identify development goals,

define priorities, and implement small projects. These programs have been successful in contexts as diverse as China, Haiti, Indonesia, Liberia, and the Philippines. Although violence prevention is not their direct objective, these programs have contributed to a “peace dividend” in many conflict and high-violence contexts, because they give (often competing) groups a stake in development.

Some NGOs have gone even further: they make participatory processes a condition of funding. Pact, an international NGO focused on development and capacity building, does this by allocating a separate budget for participatory processes in communities. Community organizations are trained in tools such as stakeholder analysis and community mapping; and are funded to spend 4–5 days in communities, with supervision by Pact staff, discussing needs and priorities. By keeping the separate budget and providing training, Pact has greater assurance that the beneficiaries in the communities are truly part of the decisionmaking and that the eventual projects will have greater community ownership.

5

Community Perspectives On Urban Violence

UNDERSTANDING COMMUNITY EXPERIENCES AND COPING MECHANISMS

This study was designed to understand how residents of urban communities that have high levels of violence deal with its everyday impacts, and which individual and collective strategies the residents employ to prevent violence. The preceding chapters have given an overview of the literature on the social dimensions of violence in urban areas and examined the capacities that seem to matter most in helping communities reduce and prevent violence. Chapter 3 outlined an analytical framework organized around these key capacities. They are: generating trust, healing from trauma, linking community efforts with broader levels of government; exerting social control over violent behavior, and ensuring inclusion to guard against the capture of collective action by groups with narrower self interest.

The field component of the study took these insights from the literature and from the experiences of effective prevention programs. The team then explored these capacities in selected neighborhoods in five countries: Nairobi (Kenya), Johannesburg (South Africa), Port-au-Prince (Haiti), Fortaleza (Brazil), and Dili (Timor-Leste). The intent was not to generate broad generalizations across cities but to understand how these dynamics play out in the everyday lives of urban residents. The study's particular focus was to explore how the communities' coping mechanisms did or did not support strengthening the capacities needed for prevention.

At the outset of the study, the team expected to find collective strategies for violence prevention that could offer lessons for program design or that merited

greater support from donors. The study drew from the literature on collective action and collective efficacy to understand the elements that might help communities address violence. The findings, however, speak more about how violence can erode collective efficacy. Although there were certainly elements of resilience to be built upon, overall, the study found a general lack of the fundamental conditions that would enable people to come together collectively. In these communities, chronic violence has generated the erosion of trust, the degradation of the built environment, and a fear of victimization. These present obstacles are, in many cases, simply too much for communities to get past. As a result, most coping mechanisms were found to be at the individual rather than the collective level. Moreover, many directly undermine building the needed foundations for preventing violence over the long term. These findings enable a richer understanding of the ways that violence impacts on trust and collective efficacy, and gives some insights of what might need to be done to build up collective efficacy once it has broken down.

The second key finding relates to the generation of perverse social capital. Previous studies have documented how social capital can be channeled toward activities that serve the interests of a small group within the neighborhood, rather than support the collective interest (Moser and McIlwaine 2004, Rubio 1997). This “perverse social capital” can have very negative repercussions across these communities and beyond. The emergence of private, extralegal security groups in several cities included in this study fit well within this description of perverse social capital and give additional illustrations of these negative dynamics. In many cases, these groups coerce residents into paying for security to generate benefits primarily for their own narrow groups. An in-depth exploration of the role that these groups play and their impacts on the communities is beyond the scope of the current study and would require more extensive qualitative methods. However, what is clear, and is discussed in the following sections, is how these practices undermine the very type of security services that residents say they want to see in their communities. Thus, an important question going forward will be how to generate triggers that can move communities out of this negative cycle.

Third, the experiences of urban communities described here help illustrate the complex relationship between the built environment and violent behavior. As discussed earlier, the “broken window” theory of crime posits that public disorder encourages violent behavior by signaling a lack of consequence to would-be perpetrators, and by increasing residents’ feelings of insecurity, which undermines the trust necessary for social control. All of the communities included in

this study suffer physical degradation of infrastructure. Nevertheless, the study finds that, despite the public disorder, some communities are dealing with less intense violence than others. This finding suggests that additional factors are at play. Finally, the study adds nuance to the current understanding of how the built environment interacts with violence by describing differences in crime and violence patterns corresponding to differing levels of quality of infrastructure.

Before discussing the findings in more detail, it is important to reemphasize that generalizing from a study of this type is challenging. Given the sensitivity of violence and the way that meanings of violence are embedded in social and cultural life, asking questions about it is fraught with difficulties. For example, reporting on victimization is influenced by a multiplicity of factors that do not plague other research topics in the same way. Perceptions of security can shift dramatically based on recent events—such as the establishment of a police station nearby or a violent incident down the street. We adapted our methodology as much as possible to the context, and adopted best practice methodologies from international standards to address these risks. It is clear that to fully understand the dynamics of violence in these communities, more and longer term qualitative work is needed. Given these challenges and the diversity of contexts that the study covered, our analysis is done with considerable caution.

EXPERIENCES AND PERCEPTIONS OF FORMS OF VIOLENCE IN URBAN COMMUNITIES

In the communities we studied, the lines between these different expressions of violence are very blurred. People living in high-violence urban communities do not easily differentiate between political or common violence. Nor do they necessarily respond any differently to the threat of collective political violence than they would to, say, an urban gang conducting illicit activities in their neighborhood. In all of the communities studied, it was difficult to discern whether the violence they had experienced or witnessed would best be categorized as political, economic, or social. A rape can be a political statement, a turf-marker for a drug gang, or the result of a domestic or community grievance.

Similarly, the experiences of victimization and perpetration of different forms of violence are interlinked in the everyday experiences of the urban residents with whom we spoke. The same individual may alternately be victim and perpetrator of violence. In all five case study sites, people consistently made this connection when they spoke living in high-violence neighborhoods. In Timor,

violence periodically shifts from violence in the home to common violence in the street and to political violence.

In Haiti and South Africa, residents spoke at length about how *violence is learned at home* and later perpetrated in the street. *Focus group participants in Haiti saw domestic violence as crucial in explaining other manifestations of violence in Cité Soleil.* In focus groups, Haitian women of all ages tended to define violence on a continuum that does not separate the private sphere from the public. They tended to begin their narratives by describing their experiences in the home and then in the street; whereas men tended to minimize—if not ignore—violence in the domestic sphere in favor of accounts of street violence. Young people, in particular, felt that violence against children in the home later reproduces itself on the street. Experiencing repeated violence desensitizes children and normalizes violence in their view. As one youth described:

“When a parent uses force to coerce the child, it becomes a habit. The child begins to think there is nothing wrong with this and it becomes a game. I have heard adults say that if you beat a child for too long, the beating no longer shames him; it doesn’t affect him strongly. That child will grow up and buy a gun for a small sum of money, and will become a hardened criminal capable of anything.” (Youth, Cité Soleil, Haiti)

The quote above seems to indicate that, over time, violence creates a cycle of victimization and perpetration that is very difficult to disrupt. In the communities studied, residents were acutely aware that the experience or witness of violence by children—whether in the home, or during political conflict—played a role in their later perpetration of violence against others. Thus, not only do the lines among types of violence blur, but so does the line between victim and perpetrator.

To victims, the distinctions among different forms of violence may matter little after the fact. However, the forms do tell policymakers something about the ways that social and political conflicts are expressed and shift over time. In particular, this study makes clear that the policy approach of treating different forms of violence separately clashes with the reality that *the different forms overlap and interact*, particularly in youth violence. In some cases, youth may be motivated to use violence to further a cause they truly believe in. Such was the case of the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa, or current youth movements in Palestine. However, in the communities we studied, it seemed that whether a group of youth is an armed political group or an organized crime network depends largely on where its financing is coming from at the moment, and allegiances can shift

quite quickly. In Timor-Leste, for example, martial arts groups can be considered alternately as social or recreational groups, peacekeepers, delinquents, protection racketeering groups, or pawns for political power groups. Similarly, in Haiti, urban youth gangs alternatively serve financial purposes through petty crime and more organized crime via the drug trade, and periodically mobilize at the service of political actors. These groups prove remarkably resilient in shifting their use of violence toward alternating objectives.

The task is not to clarify the distinctions, but to recognize that *violence is a fluid phenomenon* and to treat it that way in practice. Social conflicts will morph into different expressions. There is a balloon effect: violence often does not simply reduce across the board. Rather, control measures will dislocate it to another sphere. Conflict on the battlefield plays out in the home; urban gangs find themselves mobilized by political actors; demobilized armed groups apply their skills to organized crime; and so on. Stabilization of common and political violence in Haiti and Timor-Leste has not reduced domestic violence, but rather may have simply shifted it into the private sphere, or pushed it into latent forms that could pick up again under certain conditions. The point is to recognize these transformations and not pretend that the forms can meaningfully be separated. More is needed to understand the complex relationships and to address the underlying structural drivers.

Victimization

The patterns of violence differ in important ways across the sites. In the selected neighborhoods of Fortaleza, Johannesburg, and Nairobi, levels of violence have been rising or maintained at high levels over the past few decades, representing a chronic problem. In Haiti, the threat of violence is relatively constant, although there are periodic outbursts when violence escalates to even higher levels triggered by natural disasters, political instability, or other factors. Timor-Leste, in contrast, seems to experience periods of relative peace punctuated by bursts of large-scale violence.

As one might expect, patterns and incidence of victimization differ across the five cities studied. Overall, robbery and assault were the most common types of violence victimization, but there was variation within them. In Haiti, reported incidence of sexual violence was much higher than the other areas, as was mob justice.

When asked where the violence occurred, answers also varied. While, in Port-au-Prince, violence is almost as likely to occur in the home as outside, in Johannesburg, only 26 percent of violent incidents occurred in the home. In Fortaleza,

Table 5.1 Violence Victimization in Five Communities

	Reporting victimization (% last 12 mos.)	Robbery (%)	Assault (%)	Arson (%)	Mob justice/ witchcraft (%)	Sexual violence (%)
Nairobi	44	38	18.4	4.3	3	1.8
Port-au-Prince	33	NA	38.8	[NA?]	36.9	20.6
Johannesburg	48.8	43.3	28	[NA?]	5.8	5.9
Fortaleza	39	32.2	44	0.6	4.6	0.8
Dili	21	20.1	3.5	1.6	NA	NA

Notes: Victimization numbers for Dili refer to total population; all others refer to % of total victims. The Port-au-Prince study covered current victimization within the previous 9 months; all other case studies covered 12 months preceding. Robbery in Johannesburg includes both robbery and theft. Assault for Fortaleza combines the categories "assault" and "physical attack." In Haiti, the category "verbal abuse" was included, and 3.7% claimed to have been victims of it. Arson was not included as a category in Johannesburg or Port-au-Prince. In Dili, mob justice and sexual violence were not included in the question.

the question was slightly different: participants were asked to report where they believed most violence take place, and only 13.4 said they thought it happens in the home.

Violence has destructive impacts throughout the city, but some groups are more seriously impacted than others. Consistent with other studies on violence, youth were the age group that seemed to be most disproportionately victimized by violence. In South Africa, for example, youth (in this case, between 15–34 years old), comprised two-thirds of all victims. In Brazil, youth aged 15–24 accounted for 51 percent of violence victims. In Nairobi, the percentage was slightly lower, at 37 percent. In Haiti, youth aged 18–34 accounted for 49 percent of all victims of violence.

In most cases of violence, men, particularly men between the ages of 15–25, were cast as the perpetrators. Perpetration was associated with young males in all of the communities studied, particularly with youth gangs, which tended to be

Table 5.2 Where Violence Occurred

	Home	In neighborhood	Outside neighborhood
Fortaleza	13.4	86.5	
Johannesburg	26	25.7	20.9
Nairobi	NA	NA	NA
Port-au-Prince	45.4	46.8	7.8

Notes: In Fortaleza, residents were asked where they *believed* most violence occurred. In Johannesburg, 19.3 percent said violence occurred in a *shebeen* (drinking establishment). In Dili, this information was not included in the survey.

Table 5.3 Violence Victimization by Gender and Age

	Male (%)	Female (%)	Age 15–24 (%)	Age 25–34 (%)	Age 35+ (%)
Nairobi	53	47	37	27.3	35.9
Port-au-Prince	43	57	15*	33.0	52.0
Johannesburg	52	48	75	31.0	40.4
Fortaleza	53	47	51	21.7	30.9

Notes: In Port-au-Prince, only respondents over 18 years old were interviewed; thus, the first age category is 18–34. In Dili, this information was not included in the survey.

composed primarily of young men. In Haiti, gangs were named as perpetrators in 72 percent of cases of reported victimization. In Johannesburg, 78 percent of respondents felt that youth were responsible for most violence in their community. In Dili, Fortaleza, and Nairobi these questions were not asked in the survey due to the sensitivity of the question, but in focus groups respondents named youth as the primary perpetrators of violence.

Violence victimization overall differed little by gender in the communities studied. Most studies of violence rely on homicide rates as the key indicator. Globally, men are several times more likely to die violently than women. However, for nonfatal victimization, we found only small differences between men and women. In Brazil, men made up 53 percent of victims; in South Africa 52 percent, and in Nairobi 53 percent. Haiti is an exception. There, women made up 57 percent of victims of violence.¹⁹ This suggests that while men may be more likely to die from violence than women, vulnerability to violence in general is more equal. In addition, the type of violence victimization does vary by gender. In all case studies, men were more likely to suffer assault or robbery, or be involved in physical confrontations. Women were more likely to be victims of sexual assault.

Sexual and Domestic Violence

Overall, sexual and domestic violence were perceived to be important problems. In all five sites, the incidence of domestic and sexual violence appears to have been under-reported when compared to findings from surveys using specialized methodologies for these types of violence. However in interviews and focus groups, participants voiced serious concerns about both types of violence and the vulnerability of women and, in many cases, children, to them. In Brazil, for

19. In Dili these data were not available.

example, fewer than 1 percent of respondents reported having been victims of sexual violence. However, when asked if they knew of a member of the community who had been a victim of sexual violence, 27 percent said yes, and 6 percent said a family member had been a victim. In Dili the question about direct experience with domestic violence was deemed too sensitive, but 17 percent of respondents said they knew someone who had experienced domestic violence in the past year.

Domestic violence was a common theme in the focus group discussions (FGDs). In Haiti, women in particular tended to begin their narratives with a description of violence experienced in the home, at the hands of either parents or partners. It was emphasized that both men and women perpetrate violence against each other and against children. In Fortaleza, people spoke of domestic altercations that sometimes escalate in the public spaces, but mostly are disregarded as private matters in which it is best not to intervene. In *Nairobi and Dili, the surveys and focus groups revealed strong attitudes and values that permitted, or at least did not condemn, domestic violence*. In Dili, general reluctance to discuss domestic violence seemed to be driven by cultural attitudes that condone such violence as legitimate means of disciplining disobedient wives or children.

In Nairobi, all but one of the in-depth interviews with females contained an account of domestic violence. In the focus groups, participants cited drug and alcohol abuse, refusal to have sex, and engagement in extramarital affairs as the main causes of domestic violence. Furthermore, a group of adult men in one of the Nairobi communities considered violence against women a legitimate cultural way of disciplining married women.

The dynamics driving sexual violence are very complex so our findings should be interpreted with some caution. What is striking, however, is that in many cases, sexual assault is perpetrated in public spaces, as opposed to in the home. In Johannesburg, a full 68 percent of victims of sexual assault were attacked outside the home, most frequently in public places within the community. Of those victimized in public space, 21 percent said the offense had happened near their homes, 30 percent elsewhere in the community, and 12 percent in a shebeen.²⁰ In Nairobi, 58 percent of the victims suffered the sexual assaults in public spaces within their neighborhoods, compared to 42 percent in their homes. The case study of Haiti showed the highest incidence of rape; and in focus groups, it was asserted that most rape in Haiti is committed by youth gangs, much of it in public spaces within the neighborhood.

20. Unlicensed drinking establishment.

Victims of sexual abuse in the researched communities are more likely to be attacked by someone they do not know than by an acquaintance or family member. In Johannesburg, fewer than half (41 percent) of rape victims said they knew the perpetrators, compared to 40 percent who said the perpetrators were strangers. Sixteen percent of victims responded that offenders came in a group/gang. In Kenya, similar findings were reported. Fewer than half of victims said they knew their perpetrators; 33 percent said the males were strangers; and 20 percent said that the males were part of gangs.

A particularly alarming finding is that many victims suffered more than one attack of sexual violence. In Johannesburg, 10.6 percent of rape victims had been sexually assaulted twice in the last year. Another 2.1 percent had been victimized three times. In Nairobi, 15 percent of victims had suffered the offense twice during the 12 months prior to the survey.

The drivers of sexual violence are hard to discern from the data that we collected. In Brazil, respondents associated sexual and domestic violence with alcohol and drug use. In Haiti, where we found the highest incidence of sexual violence, much of the rape was alleged to have been perpetrated by youth gangs. It was emphasized that these gangs use rape strategically, at some times to escalate a conflict, and at others to avoid offending other gangs in order not to escalate a conflict. For example, one woman described a situation:

“You are in the street, and you are attacked by a group of young men. They try to find out who your man is. If it is someone one of them is on good terms with, he works it out with another who doesn’t know your man to have you raped.” (Young female, Cité Soleil)

Given the tendency generally to under-report sexual and domestic violence, it is difficult to get a full picture of the issue. However the fact that many attacks are taking place in public spaces and perpetrated by strangers suggests some problematic trends. First, it implies a level of public tolerance within the community, and second, a degree of impunity that would empower perpetrators to act in the public spaces. We revisit these issues in the recommendations.

Links between Experience of Violence and Perceptions of Security

Experience—especially recent experience—with violence strongly affected perceptions of security in the researched communities. Despite the fact that all communities studied were experiencing high rates of violence and crime, perceptions of safety differed in important ways. On one hand, historical experience with

violence seemed to have a strong influence on the way community residents perceived the current security in their neighborhoods. It may seem paradoxical that in Timor-Leste, a site of some of the most extreme violence of all 5 case studies, 89 percent of respondents said their community was relatively free of violence. This response could be explained by the historical patterns of violence experienced there. In contrast to the chronic violence in Brazil or South Africa, violence in Timor-Leste has erupted in short bursts of extreme brutality, followed by periods of relative calm. Thus, respondents may likely be comparing today's relatively peaceful situation to the dramatic episodes of past violence. Similarly, in Haiti, 63.4 percent of Cité Soleil residents described their neighborhood as peaceful, and nearly 86 percent said they felt safer now than they did a year ago.²¹ Almost the inverse was found in Fortaleza, where 86 percent of the surveyed residents said they did not feel safe most of the time in their communities, and 80 percent of respondents thought that their communities were more violent than 5 years ago. In Nairobi and Johannesburg, the percentages who said they did not feel safe were 52 percent, and 62 percent, respectively.

Perceptions of security can shift quickly, based on changing contexts. Therefore, relying on perceptions can be problematic when designing policy, because they are so intricately linked to experiences of fear, or the erosion of trust in an area. Often, strong-arm policies for control of violence are driven by perceptions of insecurity based on fear; yet, these kinds of interventions have been proven to be less sustainable in the longer term. Survey data and even the focus group discussions alone did not produce enough information to formulate policy. Instead, it became clear that, to really understand the dynamics affecting changing perceptions of security, it would be necessary to conduct observations over time in the communities.

VIOLENCE, TRUST, AND SOCIAL CONTROL

Impacts on Trust and Social Networks

Violence alters the social networks and social interactions in any environment (chapter 3). The communities studied here are no exception, although the particular patterns of violence seem to affect trust among community members in different ways. These differences were evident, first, in that in areas of more chronic violence, community members reported feeling stronger distrust of their

21. It is telling that when the same question was asked after the earthquake, 74% of residents said they felt unsafe where they are living (INURED 2010).

neighbors. In Fortaleza, 65 percent of respondents thought that people in their neighborhoods only look out for themselves and cannot be trusted to help one another. In Johannesburg, 68 percent felt this way. In Nairobi, the number was slightly lower, at 55 percent. Conversely, in Timor, where violence has taken a more episodic pattern, 87 percent thought that people could be trusted to look out for one another.²² These findings suggest that the erosion of trust from experience of violence occurs over time, as violence becomes chronic.

One overall consequence of chronic violence in urban environments, particularly those that are growing rapidly or have higher residential instability, is that traditional social networks are disrupted. In Haiti and Timor-Leste, urban residents are physically distant from the traditional mechanisms of support and conflict resolution present in the rural areas that might have helped protect them against both victimization and the tendency to perpetrate violence. In Haiti, young women and children who have migrated to Cité Soleil often end up living with extended family or friends of family, whom they may not know well, leaving them particularly vulnerable to victimization by household members, as well as strangers. Preliminary findings from rapid assessments are suggesting that the earthquake intensified these vulnerabilities. *The incidence of sexual violence against children was particularly high.*

The disruption of social networks also impacts social control of violence by rupturing relationships across generations, breaking a crucial source of support that could protect against violent behavioral tendencies. Whereas in a rural community, children may have various adult family members as mentors and caretakers, in urban environments these supports often are not available to the same degree. The stresses of making a living in the city add to the inherent pressures of parenting, with the result being less interaction of parents with their children. As one resident of Fortaleza put it, “What the child cannot find [at] home, he goes to find it in the streets, and he finds good and bad things, and he does not have a role model who can mentor him, and then violence is the one that mentors him.”

To further complicate matters, in contexts of extreme poverty, children and youth may take on income-earning roles, which tends to disrupt the power dynamic in the household. When these income-earning opportunities are illicit and/or involve violence, the situation is complicated even further. In these situations, family members are unable or unwilling to enforce behavioral controls on

22. In Port-au-Prince, we were not able to include this question in the survey, because, due to the particular research challenges in the area, we relied on a survey designed and conducted by another organization.

their children. As one mother in Johannesburg recounted, “On my birthday, my son bought me a very beautiful ring. But one day he turned to me and said, ‘Mommy, give me that ring. I want to go and sell it.’ I could not even ask him why, because I know he is involved in some of the criminal activities.”

In many of these communities, many adults, particularly parents, have simply given up trying to influence their children, either because they feel it is useless, or because they fear retaliation. In Port-au-Prince, one community leader described feeling as if the community were held hostage to a group of youth who could disrupt community life at will, with little parental or other elder authority to set limits on negative behavior:

“The children may live in situations where the parents are unemployed. When these children go out to the streets and bring something home to sustain the family, their parents have less authority over them, because when they want to reprimand such children, either the bandit [they work for] will cause them harm or the children will simply stop making a contribution.” (Young male, Cité Soleil, Haiti)

For their part, youth in many of the communities felt victimized as well, and some cast their own use of violence in this light. In Port-au-Prince, youth described frustration with a lack of opportunities to study or to work, to the point that they felt justified in using violence to advance social or economic goals. Even those who claimed not to engage in violence expressed understanding for those who do. In Nairobi, youth felt victimized not only by a lack of job opportunities, but by a stigma attached to youth generally because of the violent behaviors by a small number of youth. “Since we do not have jobs, if anything goes wrong we are victimized,” one youth reported, referring to a tendency for police and elders to scapegoat youth from poor communities for violence as well as other social problems. Because they felt treated as criminals simply for being young, some felt they had little holding them back from engaging in violence.

The Built Environment and Social Control

Some of the case studies spoke to the important relationship of the built environment with violence. The built environment interacts with violence in several ways. First, poor housing and sanitation increase the everyday pressures on earning a living and raising a family in the city. Inadequate infrastructure can increase

tensions within families and communities, making it easy for everyday conflicts to escalate. In Cité Soleil, for example, many violent confrontations begin with relatively mundane conflicts over garbage disposal or throwing out wastewater in the neighborhood.

Second, poor roads and infrastructure create situational opportunities for violence, making it easier for perpetrators to commit crimes without being seen or pursued by neighbors or police. In Johannesburg, focus group participants emphasized that even though new housing is being built, it is not keeping up with the growth of informal settlements, which they felt contributed to violence in their community. Perpetrators are believed to take advantage of the poor environmental design of these areas. Emergency vehicles and motorized police patrols often are unable to enter owing to the lack of paved roads, narrow alleyways, and maze-like passages that typically characterize such settlements. At night, poorly lit alleyways create places in which assaults can occur.

The built environment also may influence the type of violence perpetrated in different areas. In Upper Cité Soleil, where socioeconomic conditions are better (albeit marginally), service coverage is more extensive, and infrastructure is of higher quality, compared to Lower Cité Soleil. This reality drives the incidence of opportunistic crime and violence (pick-pocketing, assault) in Upper Cité Soleil, after which perpetrators often are able to run and hide in the labyrinthine alleyways of Lower Cité. In Lower Cité, violent confrontations among youth of the same community were more common, often taking the form of rock-throwing in the streets.

Limited service provision in the communities, also a function of the built environment, also was cited as enabling violence. In Nairobi, respondents said they felt vulnerable to attacks if they had to leave the house to fetch water or use the toilet, especially after dark. In addition, the lack of service provision in one area compared to another can feed a sense of social exclusion, itself a driver of violence.

Finally, the built environment can affect violent behavior by providing clean, orderly spaces for people to interact safely and to provide outlets for recreation and leisure. In Brazil, conversations about the built environment focused more on the lack of secure public spaces for recreation, and the limits to mobility posed by the threat of common violence (assault, theft). The perception was that youths, without a safe place to play sports or other activities, were more easily drawn into violent behaviors.

COMMUNITY PERCEPTIONS OF THE DRIVERS OF URBAN VIOLENCE

Each of the case studies has included an analysis of the social, economic, and political drivers of violence in the different urban communities, ranging from the macro to the micro level. Within each case study, we also asked the community residents what they perceived to be driving the violence in their neighborhood.

In all of the urban communities studied, people immediately pointed to unemployment, specifically youth unemployment, as the main source of the problems they faced with violence. This unanimity deserves special attention because, although in the literature, the evidence that unemployment drives violence is quite thin, people strongly perceive unemployment to be the main cause of the violence that they see in their communities. In Johannesburg, 41.2 percent said unemployment was the main driver of violence, followed by poverty (31.8 percent), substance abuse (16.9 percent), laziness (5.2 percent), peer pressure (4 percent), and boredom (0.8 percent). In Brazil, focus group participants spoke about the idleness of youth, particularly young males, who “have nothing else to do. . . . and they are scattered around the streets and corners of the community doing nothing and eventually end up doing these [violent] things.”

Similarly, in Nairobi, people pointed to idleness and unemployment as a key driver:

“What causes these murders, muggings and burglary? I think is unemployment. If all of these people have work everybody could have peace. They have idle minds. They have nothing to do, even sweeping for fifty shillings. He does not have food and he sees that the only way out is to steal a phone he sees and sell it.” (Adult male, Nairobi)

In Dili, residents drew indirect links among violence, unemployment, boredom, depression, and alcohol consumption. As one focus group participant summarized:

“We know that the conflict occurred because there are many unemployed youth or there are no activities for them to carry out, therefore they feel stress, they drink and get drunk, they destroy and create problems with other people.” (Young female, Dili)

In focus groups, community members saw *alcoholism and unemployment as mutually reinforcing*. People drink because unemployment intensifies the stress of poverty; and increases depression and boredom. Drinking too much alcohol then reinforces the cycle, making them both violent and unemployable. This association between unoccupied time and violence fits reasonably with frequent statements that engagement in sports, arts and music groups, and school (to keep youths occupied with positive activities) would prevent violence.

Underlying this lack of opportunities is a *deep social exclusion of the communities we studied*.

This sense of exclusion interacts with powerful pull factors into violent activity, particularly for youth. When young people see that they are not allowed access to many luxuries or even basic needs in the city, they become resentful and may even feel entitled to take these things by force. These dynamics are behind some of the opportunistic crime and violence perpetrated by low-income residents in richer neighborhoods.

More often, however, these lacks seem to drive violence of the poor on other poor. In Johannesburg, focus group participants spoke of jealousy among neighbors as a common trigger for violence and crime. Community members who are able to afford relative luxuries such as household furniture or brand-name clothing are more prone to assaults outside the home and burglary of the home to force them to “share” what they have. Similarly, neighborhood businesses are succeeding can be targeted by jealous residents.

In Port-au-Prince, youth expressed a certain conviction that, while they do not condone violence overall, they have a certain empathy for those who engage in it, and have felt pushed to such limits themselves. A common sentiment was that if one’s basic needs were not being met by the state, one might feel capable of brutal acts of violence to meet those needs and such actions would be, to an extent, justified.

“Sometimes I listen to them [my friends] and say to myself: ‘I am going to the streets and, be it as it may, I would do anything, including killing—even if that person was my mom—if I could be sure nobody would know that it was me who did it.’” (Young male, Cité Soleil)

These feelings of desperation and frustration are easily taken advantage of by external actors. The experience of Haiti, Kenya, and Timor-Leste show how

easily discontent among youths can be mobilized by political/financial entrepreneurs for violent ends. In Kenya, political leaders historically have mobilized youth toward violence. In Timor-Leste, youth martial arts groups alternately shift from being healthy recreational outlets to being violent movements enlisted by political leaders to foment instability. In Port-au-Prince, where youth played key roles in the ouster of former President Aristide in 2004, youth in our focus groups strongly asserted that mobilization of young people by “violence entrepreneurs” continues, even if it was currently dormant. They saw themselves as caught between the need to earn a living and the pressure from these actors to create disruptions to meet political agendas. In turn, any conflict generated by political groups was known to lead to a revival of latent oppositions between factions and neighborhoods. Youth alleged that political leaders continue to buy favors from area gang leaders. Thus, youth understand that all that they need to do to attract such support is to create a disturbance that calls the politicians’ attention.

“When we talk about political violence, we don’t mean to say that they actually come into the Cité and do the actions themselves, but, well, they give the means for us to act for them. Imagine that I have money and I come here and I offer you money to commit criminal acts. It’s like the proverb, *Moun ki lonje dwèt sou koulèv la se li ki tiye* (“the one who points out the snake to everyone is the one who killed it”). So this act, you would not do it yourself if I did not give you money to do it for me. These are the political actors who are the principal responsible ones for the violence and, if they want, they can stir things up with violence.” (Young male, Cité Soleil)

COPING MECHANISMS

One common theme from all five case studies is that chronic violence is inherently disempowering for both individuals and communities. At the outset of the study, we planned to explore the individual and collective coping behaviors that urban communities employ in the face of chronic violence. In particular, we had expected to find mechanisms that could be better supported and mobilized to prevent further violence. Instead, what we found was a general inability of communities to come together for collective action, which resulted in more individual-level strategies. We also found that some collective strategies actually undermined building sustainable networks for prevention. The latter strategies

deserve more attention in policy. They are discussed in more detail below and in the final chapter.

What was striking in all of the case studies was the clear tendency toward more individual-level coping behaviors rather than collective efforts. There was a sense that trust both in neighbors and institutions has broken down to the extent that taking collective action involves too much risk compared to the perceived potential benefits. This lack of trust seems to be driven, first, by fear of victimization, or of retaliation with further violence if one takes action. Many reported “doing nothing” to prevent victimization. “Doing nothing,” can mean simply keeping silent about violence. In Haiti, people spoke of keeping silent as a coping strategy. Particularly for sexual crimes, many victims felt that keeping silent was the best means to protect themselves, at least in the short term. Lack of trust also is driven by a sense by many residents that efforts to avoid victimization were largely futile, that there was simply nothing one could do to avoid violence. This lack of hope correlated strongly with perceptions of police capacity in the communities. In Fortaleza, residents described a state that they feel is not there to protect them, but rather intervenes only with punitive force, when it intervenes at all. This perception, in turn, discourages collective strategies to address the problem. These sentiments were summarized well by a resident of Fortaleza:

“We don’t run, we retreat. This is part of our lives. We don’t see anything, we don’t do anything regardless of whether we have seen it or not [. . .] There was a day when a 10-year-old girl was murdered in daylight as if it were as normal as fetching a bucket of water in the well, you understand? What do you think we said when the police came and asked who the criminal was that killed her?” (Male, Fortaleza)

The lack of collective coping mechanisms is reinforced by the built environment in the areas studied. Respondents emphasized that without good street lighting, police patrols, or generally safe spaces to meet, people simply cannot find a place to come together for collective action. In addition, if there are no community centers or parks, people cannot mix in public spaces, which in itself has a powerful impact on trust and social capital.

A common strategy to avoid victimization was to limit mobility in the community to certain hours or particular areas that were deemed more secure. Many spoke of staying home at night, or of changing their route to and from work often to avoid victimization. In Nairobi almost half of the respondents (45 percent) choose to avoid traveling during certain hours and 19 percent say they stay home

more. In Johannesburg, 42 percent and 37 percent, respectively, adopted these measures.

Other individual behaviors focused on investing in security infrastructure at home, by installing locks or gates, or improved lighting. In Fortaleza, 27 percent said they had installed new locks or a gate on their houses: 36 percent in Johannesburg and 18 percent in Nairobi said they had taken these measures. In Haiti, residents went beyond these precautions and actually moved houses. Particularly during the more intense years of the violence, many residents who had the means to move did so, resulting in massive displacement out of and within Cité Soleil. Residents continue to speak of leaving the area to avoid further victimization.

In some of the countries, residents took even stronger precautions by acquiring weapons. In Haiti, residents obtained guns through illicit stockpiles in the community, or bought them on the illegal market. In Fortaleza, respondents spoke of renting weapons during times of increased insecurity. In Dili, residents emphasized the need to “be ready with machetes,” as well as knives, stones, and other weapons.

TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS TO RESOLVE CONFLICT AND PROVIDE SECURITY

A key objective of the study was to understand where urban residents turn to deal with conflict and security in their communities. We found interesting divergences in the responses within the different contexts. However, one commonality was that, in all of the research sites, we found a general fatigue with formal institutions. Police have a weak presence in these areas; and when they are present, it is usually with punitive force. In one Johannesburg community, the closest police station was located 10 miles away. In Port-au-Prince, recruitment and staffing of the new police station had proceeded painfully slowly, so that troops were sorely inadequate to serve the demand in the slums. In Fortaleza, residents remarked that they rarely saw police in their neighborhoods during the times of day that they felt most threatened by violence.

People in *all countries saw the police as one or a combination of the following: repressive, inefficient, corrupt, and biased.* Particularly in South Africa and Timor-Leste, the strong distrust of the police was associated with continued association of police with the repressive tactics of former regimes. In South Africa, the national police had played a crucial role in enforcing the repressive policies of apartheid and, in turn, crushing popular resistance to those policies. Their tactics

Table 5.4 Measures That Communities Wanted to See to Improve Security

	More police	Better employment programs	More youth employment	Better street lighting	Community policing	Strengthen the justice system*
Nairobi	45.0	28.7	58.4	29.0	25.0	
Port-au-Prince	51.9	31.3				10.3
Johannesburg	54.0	37.0	32.0	23.5	23.5	
Fortaleza	44.0	38.2	45.0		34.0	

Note: *This question was asked only in Port-au-Prince. For Nairobi, Johannesburg, and Fortaleza, respondents were allowed to choose more than one answer; thus, the percentages do not total 100.

included torture and assassination. The style of policing developed during the 1970s and 1980s had to be transformed to be able to enforce laws in a democracy, and this transformation remains incomplete. In Dili, police reform was complicated by the fact that many of the leaders of the national police, established in 2002 by the UN Transitional Administration, were former Timorese officers who had served under the Indonesian Police Service during the repressive occupation. In both cases, the association of police institutions with former, strong-arm tactics presented formidable challenges to adapting to democracy, and to building trust with a population highly suspicious of the validity of this transformation. Other institutions in the criminal justice system faced similar challenges, although to a limited extent.

In all of the communities studied, people say they want strong state institutions to promote rule of law and security. When asked what would make the community safer, over half of the respondents in all five communities said they wanted to see a stronger police presence.

Yet, when urban residents were asked where they actually turn for conflict resolution and security, we found an array of responses. In the Fortaleza communities, people had very little trust in formal institutions, and equally little in neighborhood groups or associations. Only 3.2 percent said they had attended any kind of community forum on the issues of crime and violence; and fewer than 1 percent said they had formed or joined a community group to address the problem.

In Dili, residents tended to favor institutions carried over from rural areas, such as community leaders, for dealing with conflict, and they generally avoided state institutions. When asked to rank their top responses to the question, "What

groups are doing the best to reduce violence in your community?” 87 percent of survey respondents named community (*aldeia*) leaders as their first choice.

In Nairobi, some spoke of relying on village chiefs and elders to help resolve conflicts. Village chiefs and elders in Kenya are officially appointed as local administrators and play a central role in mediating everyday conflicts in the village. However, in connection with security problems and conflict mediation, participants in the FGDs expressed disappointment with the work of the village chief and elders. Discussions revealed that the effectiveness of and accessibility to these mechanisms often is limited due to corrupt practices, such as bribing and elite capture, and due to the elders’ limited ability to address key causes of conflict.

In Haiti, people seem to be hedging their bets more. Eighty percent said that if they were victimized, they would go to the police, compared to 18 percent to a local magistrate, 1.8 percent to a church leader, 1.1 percent to a community leader, and only 0.3 percent to a gang leader. However, in practice, many seemed to rely on more traditional mechanisms of dealing with disputes inherited from the rural areas. For example, in focus groups, people described collective means of justice, especially lynching and beating, which take the place of formal justice mechanisms in Cité Soleil. More to the point, 37 percent of those victimized said they had been the victim of witchcraft or neighborhood rivalries, suggesting a significant reliance on these more informal mechanisms of justice.

Evidence from Dili suggests that the type of dispute may have an important influence on the institution to which people go for assistance. Therefore, in deciding where people turn, the distinction between state and informal institutions may be less important than the nature of the issue. This possible finding is outside the scope of the present study, but is worth pursuing in future work.

One troubling trend that emerges from the study is a significant reliance on private security groups, in many cases, extralegal groups. This trend is directly related to people’s confidence, or lack thereof, in the state to provide security in different areas of the city. *In many countries, the perception of state failure to provide adequate security has gone hand-in-hand with greater tolerance for repressive measures to suppress crime and violence.* This combination has produced approaches such as the *mano dura* and *mano super-dura* policies in Central America, which include mandatory sentencing for many crimes and criminalization of gang membership (chapter 2).

The nature and extent of private security coverage vividly reflects the socio-economic landscape. Wealthier neighborhoods are characterized by state-of-the-art technology and private guards, whereas poorer neighborhoods are overtaken by informal militias or vigilante groups. For more upper class areas,

private security may include legally regulated companies with cutting edge technology at their disposal. Wealthier areas of Nairobi tend to be protected by these types of groups. Kenyan businesses spend 7 percent of their sales revenue on security, infrastructure, and personnel; another 4 percent on insuring property; and 2 percent on neighborhood security (Kpundeh 2008). Estimates of the number of private security firms vary from 400 to 2000, employing a total of approximately 50,000 people. In many cases (for example, in transport), these private security firms are better equipped than state police services. In Kenya, regulation of these groups is thin, posing a concern for holding them accountable for any abuses.

In the areas we studied, there are no professional private security groups. Instead, they range in nature and organization from tightly organized vigilante groups, to looser bands of gangsters who coerce support through extortion of community members. All operate at the margin of the law, filling an institutional vacuum left by ineffective or inadequate police and other bodies responsible for security. In Nairobi, residents of the slums are coerced to pay *Masaai* groups for protection, with amounts ranging from US\$2 a week up to roughly the equivalent of half an average monthly income in the area during the post-election violence of December 2007.

In Brazil, participants in the focus groups explained that community residents sometimes turn to vigilante groups known as *milícias*. These paramilitary style groups are composed of former and active police, firefighters, prison guards, soldiers, and other security sector personnel. *Milícias* emerged ostensibly to crack down on drug traffickers and have operated in some states with clandestine political support. However, in a weak rule-of-law setting in which there is a historic legacy of death squads, this has resulted in *milícia* “takeover of and profit from aspects of the drug trade under the guise of law and order and in widespread human rights abuses” (Hinton 2009: 219). These groups have begun to extort protection “taxes” from residents of poorer areas, and to charge user rights for illegal transport and electrical connections. Nevertheless, while not denying the violence used by *milícias*, residents said they felt protected because these groups are more effective and trusted, than the police:

“Community residents feel safer with the *milícia* . . . because many times, if something has been stolen and it was taken by a member of the *milícia*, people go there and talk to the member to return the item to the resident. This is why residents trust the *milícia*. Often the police do not know about what has happened. It stays with the residents.”

In Haiti, there is a long history of self-defense groups in rural areas, which to some extent has carried over to urban life. In some rural areas, these groups may hand over the alleged criminal to the police, whereas in others, they may kill or otherwise punish the offender (UNIFEM 2008: 6). In contrast, in urban areas, extralegal justice is fragmented and erratic. In the absence of a viable system of justice—whether formal or traditional—people rely on other means of regulating behavior. One form of this is spontaneous community action against those who violate norms. As one community leader described:

“Let me tell you about a situation. . . . They caught someone, and he was lynched. The community had reacted because they had had enough. This man had killed a man, but a brave seven year-old boy hit him in the back with a rock, enabling the community to catch him. The police drove by and looked at the scene. They wrote their report but did nothing.” (Male, Cité Soleil)

A second form of extralegal justice in Port-au-Prince is the payment to individuals or small gangs to settle disputes or punish other residents. For example, in the market areas, vendors may pay for protection from robbers. Others may pay for hit men to settle disputes with neighbors. Rivalries between drug traffickers and organized crimes group may use extrajudicial means to castigate their enemies.

In the communities we studied, private security operates outside the sphere of the law, often with the tacit approval of the state via its failure to regulate these groups. This lack of regulation allows practices to continue that may differ only minimally, if at all, from social cleansing. In turn, the perpetuation of these groups and their practices undermines the very foundations of a strong and effective security sector. Thus, the contradiction that, while communities said they wanted to see a stronger presence of police and justice institutions, the communities continue to undermine building this stronger presence, often inadvertently, through relying on extralegal security groups. One clear question for violence prevention is how to generate triggers that can move communities out of this cycle.

STATE RESPONSE

Earlier in the report, we provided an overview of successful violence prevention programs, highlighting some examples of how these have been implemented in developing countries. However, the success stories of Bogotá, Cali, and Diadema

remain few and far between. Their experience has shown that effective programs need the support and investment of multiple sectors, coordination across multiple levels of government, empowered communities who can engage the challenges, and strong leadership at high political levels to advance the agenda. Few contexts have all of these elements at their disposal. The governments of Brazil, Kenya, and South Africa have adopted national plans for violence prevention, but still face problems coordinating across different levels of government and sectors. Haiti and Timor-Leste remain under the purview of international peacekeeping forces, who are still considered vital to stability.

In 1996 South Africa adopted a National Crime Prevention Strategy. It was a comprehensive framework for coordinating across various levels of government and enlisting the strong participation of affected communities. However, at the implementation level, the strategy has not yielded the expected results. A key issue has been that the decentralization process has not adequately defined the respective roles of different levels of government. This confusion over roles in turn has led to difficulties in coordinating between national and municipal governments, and insufficient funding of programs that could address key underlying drivers of crime and violence, such as unemployment, poverty, lack of education, and the absence of adequate social services.

Of the sites studied, Brazil has placed the highest priority on crime and violence prevention. Previous plans at the municipal level have had important successes in reducing violence. In 2007 the national government enacted a national plan, PRONASCI (*Programa Nacional de Segurança Pública com Cidadania*). Approved in 2007, PRONASCI will invest US\$4 billion through 2012 through a massive multisectoral program with the participation of 19 ministries. One important obstacle encountered by all of these programs and interventions across the different levels of government and sectors is the lack of appropriate coordination mechanisms. Efforts are being made to integrate data collection systems of the municipal guard with those of the state police. Nevertheless, currently, the level of coordination still is unable to keep pace with the plethora of innovative initiatives being implemented.

In Kenya, activities to address crime and violence span an array of governmental and civil society organizations (CSOs). Most of these predate the 2007 post-election violence. While some programs have been demonstrably successful, there remains a serious lack of coordination at the national level. In addition, responsibility for dealing with crime and violence are still considered only within the police and justice sectors, which has limited the support for initiatives that could address the broader structural, social, and environmental drivers.

In Timor and Haiti, a constant atmosphere of crisis makes it hard to put in place long-term reforms that would sustainably bring down violence levels. In both contexts, security is overseen by an international peacekeeping force that favors more heavy-handed tactics and that focuses primarily on stabilization, rather than long-term structural changes. While this form of security has reduced more visible and disruptive forms of violence—riots and common street crime, for example—it has barely begun to tackle less visible forms, especially domestic violence.

In contexts of lower state capacity (Haiti, Timor-Leste), coordination across donor agencies remains a serious problem in supporting long-term, sustainable violence prevention interventions. The short attention span of many donors, who must adhere to project funding cycles and political timelines in their respective countries, results in many short-term programs that may overlap, duplicate, or in the worst case, contravene one another. The competing agendas of donor agencies compound this confusion. As a consequence, struggling governments are overwhelmed by the task of coordinating international aid efforts, to the detriment of local communities.

One key lesson that emerges from the above is the need for governments and donors to adopt a longer-term, better coordinated vision for reducing violence, with sustained support for programs that can span a generation or more. Some countries (Brazil, South Africa) have national strategies in place and have shown some important progress. The challenge remains as to how to scale up these strategies so that they better connect the vulnerable communities with security and other state services. These challenges and suggested recommendations are discussed further in the following chapter.

6

Conclusions and Recommendations

This study elucidates the social dimensions of urban violence by examining how communities experience and cope with violence every day. Increasingly over the past two decades, urban violence has been recognized as a serious threat to development and as a result has risen on the agenda of many governments and donors. Recent years have seen increased attention to the problem. Central and local governments have developed successful prevention policies to reduce violence. In a number of cases, these policies have yielded impressive results. Bogotá, Medellín, Sao Paulo, and others have seen their crime rates fall impressively. Nonetheless, in many cases, policies to address violence, and the accompanying financial resources, remain focused on control rather than on prevention. In many countries, violence prevention still is seen primarily as a security issue with little relation to development. As a result, security is not well integrated in the country's overall development policies (health, education, urban policies, youth inclusion). The situation varies considerably according to continents. Impressive progress has been made in Latin America to review policies of violence prevention. In contrast, in Africa, whose urban violence is among the worst in the world, violence prevention still is very limited; and donors have focused very little on the issue. Without discounting the importance of security and law enforcement in addressing violence, *this study argues for a more balanced approach that can address the social dimensions of the problem.*

As the preceding chapters have demonstrated, violence is a highly complex phenomenon that eludes simple solutions. This study has been wary of silver-bullet, technical solutions. It argues instead that complex social problems require comprehensive social interventions. While many projects have emerged to address the technical aspects of urban violence (such as upgrading infrastructure,

increasing policing, or providing health services to victims), the type of social interventions that could complement these remains less understood. Ultimately, technical solutions will be limited in their effectiveness if the social dimensions are not addressed. For example, installing new street lighting may reduce violence in the immediate term; but if the social drivers of violence are neglected, the street lights will be destroyed in a matter of weeks, if not days.

This study confirms that violence is inherently disempowering for communities. Violence destroys social networks and human capital and degrades the built environment. As a consequence, people often are not able or willing to come together collectively to form initiatives for violence prevention. Moreover, there are few safe spaces for them to congregate when they do attempt collective action. Finally, in the absence of dependable security services, people increasingly adopt coping behaviors that undermine the establishment of long-term security and development. These behaviors range from keeping silent about victimization, to buying weapons for self-defense to reliance on private, extralegal security groups.

It is clear that asking communities to come together and confront violence in their neighborhoods under these conditions without the support of external actors such as the state, municipal governments, or NGOs and agencies simply is not realistic. The success stories discussed earlier enlisted the strong support of communities, but they also had the advantages of strong state capacity, political commitment, and substantial resources. In many cases, particularly in fragile situations, these basic conditions do not exist. In these situations, interventions must be phased so as to first, establish basic security and second, begin to address the underlying drivers of violence. Only then can communities be true partners in violence prevention efforts.

From the analysis presented in the previous chapters, a number of strategic recommendations emerge:

REBUILDING TRUST

- Phasing interventions to reduce violence is very important. For this, clear signals need to be sent that assure citizens that the state is engaged and addressing the problem. As a first step, there is a need for a minimum of basic security that would allow people the mobility to work collectively, and create the social environment where people feel it is worthwhile to trust each other and work together. This can be done through quick-impact interventions

that help build confidence in the community, such as enhanced police presence or upgrading of infrastructure. These short-term, quick-impact interventions can be mixed with longer-term programs to transform the structural drivers of violence.

- **Initial interventions need to address the issues that people in communities perceive to be driving the problem, most often the lack of viable livelihood and employment opportunities, especially for youth.** As detailed earlier, the relationship between unemployment and violence still is not well understood. Mostly likely, there is an indirect relationship that involves not only the lack of a job but also the lack of other assets that employment can bring. These include self-respect, strengthened identity, and social connection. In Dili, respondents made this connection by asserting that unemployment feeds alcohol abuse, which feeds depression and hinders the ability to find work. Addressing unemployment will not resolve violence. However, it is important because it sends a clear message to communities that the state is interested in addressing what they perceive to be the main problem. Similarly, there is a need for programs to deal with substance abuse, another trigger frequently identified by residents in the study.
- **Governments will need to address the international drug trade as a driver of urban violence.** In many of the neighborhoods studied (Dili was a notable exception), residents pointed to the role of drug trafficking in escalating the violence in their neighborhoods. Drug trade networks generate perverse social capital that undermines the public good, including idolization of drug culture, which encourages violence. Taking concrete measures to address the drug trade can help in building trust between communities and state institutions.
- **More attention should be given to improving generational relationships in affected communities.** The stress of urban life and the constantly growing and changing communities in urban areas have ruptured the relationship between elders and youth. This disruption results in less social control on youth violent behavior and a vilification of youth by elders that itself can feed the cycle of violence. Projects that integrate youth into transforming their own communities can go a long way in strengthening these relationships by giving youth a chance to demonstrate that they can make positive changes in their communities.
- **Building better relationships between state institutions, especially police, and the community is essential.** In all of the communities studied, people say police are corrupt and ineffective; yet the residents want to see a strong

police presence. In the meantime, many of the behaviors of the police and the inhabitants that we observed undermine building longer-term peace and stability. These findings suggest that communities would welcome not necessarily *more* police but a *different type* of policing involving a more trusting relationship with the community. There is some evidence to suggest that improving the relationship between police and community—for example, through community policing initiatives—can be one way to increase police effectiveness and build confidence with communities. These can be important steps in moving communities out of the cycle of distrust. Obviously, police reforms such as adjustments of pay levels, strong oversight, training, and change of attitude are central elements and need to be carried out through broader institutional reforms at the State or municipal level.

- **Of urgent concern, the trend toward private security solutions must be addressed.** In all of the communities studied, observation showed that in the absence of effective state security, people turned to (or were coerced into) private security groups. In wealthier communities these may consist of professionalized forces under the regulation of the government. However, in poorer areas, these groups range from loose bands of thugs to organized vigilante or militia groups operating at the margin of the law. More attention must be placed on replacing these groups with more equal community access to sustainable security services.

ADDRESSING RELATIONSHIPS AMONG FORMS OF VIOLENCE

- **More attention should be paid to the relationships among different forms of violence, and how these relationships might be addressed.** The experiences here show that violence is very fluid and can shift between different expressions and settings. The lines among different forms of violence are often very blurry. An example is the political mobilization of a gang versus economically motivated violence by that same gang. Given the complexity of these relationships, it cannot be assumed that an intervention to address certain forms of violence—street or gang violence—also will reduce violence in the other forms—in the home, for example.
- **Domestic and sexual violence should not be addressed in isolation to other forms of violence.** Our analysis indicates that domestic and sexual violence are different enough from other forms of violence that they require

special interventions. It also suggests that they are related enough to other forms to warrant addressing all of these forms in coordination. Experience of violence in the home, for example, is a key risk factor for perpetrating or being a victim of violence later in life. Sexual violence also seems to be integrated in violence by gangs. There appears to be a need for more integrated programs to address multiple forms of violence and at different stages of the life cycle.

SUPPORTING COMMUNITY CAPACITIES FOR ACTION

- **Improving the built environment is essential to create the necessary conditions for collective action in affected communities.** Simply put, people need safe spaces to interact and come together collectively—without fear of victimization and with the belief that such collective action is worthwhile. While it cannot stop violence on its own, support for upgrading infrastructure, from street lighting to housing to sanitation services and parks can be a crucial catalyzing force.
- **More focus needs to be given to triggers that move communities out of a cycle of coping behaviors that undermine the foundations of long-term security and stability.** Associational life is particularly crucial in this respect. It helps to generate the necessary oversight by governing authorities to ensure that public policies are delivered in the ways and places that they are needed most and to stem service delivery corruption. Community-driven forms of collective action also help to generate self-help solutions to the problems that affect residents most directly. Such collective action can strengthen the social fabric, which in turn makes it more difficult for criminals to victimize residents without detection. Most importantly, collective action helps to change the culture inside the community and reduce the acceptance of violence.
- **In many counties, improvements in data collection and mechanisms to provide communities with accurate information on violence are needed to empower community action.** The successful examples of crime and violence observatories in various countries illustrate how sharing data across agencies can contribute to more effective prevention. In addition, when communities are involved in the collecting and sharing the data, this information can support their efforts to reduce violence in their neighborhoods.

IMPROVING COORDINATION FOR VIOLENCE PREVENTION

- **On the national level, clear roles across various levels of government are needed to execute effective violence prevention strategies.** The successful examples of different cities in reducing violence have relied on strong coordination mechanisms that channel energy, leadership, and expertise to where it can most effectively be put to use. However, these programs are expensive, and rely on high levels of capacity and political commitment, making them difficult to replicate. In Brazil and South Africa, for example, the necessary capacity exists, but the nature of decentralization has complicated implementation of national strategies. Municipal governments do not always have clear authority or the resources that they need to carry out initiatives on the local level. In other cases, such as Nairobi, violence prevention programs have emerged at the local level but have been unable to connect to different levels of government. Thus, they remain scattered and fragmented. In these and similar contexts, clearer definition of the roles and responsibilities of different levels of government is needed to ensure that funding gets to the areas in which it is most needed for prevention.
- **More research and experience are required to understand what works in fragile contexts and for low-income countries.** For lower capacity contexts, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to adapt the lessons of North American or other middle-income contexts such as Sao Paulo, Bogotá, and Cali. The evidence base for what works in fragile contexts is very thin, and much work remains to be done to identify good practices. In these environments, smaller-scale initiatives that build community and government capacity may work best when larger scale reforms are very difficult.
- **Finally, the international community can play a stronger role in supporting greater coordination within a national framework on violence prevention, although this role will look different in high-capacity versus lower-capacity contexts.** Initially, donors could support governments in mapping needs and interventions regarding crime and violence, and developing national plans. Then, governments can be supported in coordinating efforts across different agencies, sectors and levels of government. This would be an important role for the World Bank to consider pursuing in future.

Implications for the World Bank

Violence is a major issue in a range of World Bank sectors. Many projects of slum upgrading and urban development that the World Bank supports face challenges

with violence. It also is an issue that often requires attention in projects focusing on youth inclusion, education, health and social protection. Urban violence also can be a serious issue in post-conflict situations, El Salvador or Guatemala are showing. It is, therefore, very important for the World Bank to be able to provide advice and support in the field of violence prevention as part of its policy dialogue with governments and development partners.

Many activities and programs that support a violence prevention strategy consist of social and infrastructure investments that already are supported by many World Bank activities. What differs in an engagement that focuses on violence prevention is the strategic approach, which often requires different targeting, sequencing and implementation of activities and coordination with the justice and security sector. Because the World Bank often takes a broad sectoral engagement and is working increasingly with local governments, it is well placed to participate in such a dialogue and to use its convening power to bring the variety of actors required for an effective violence prevention strategy to the table.

Community development and community participation are very important entry points for violence prevention, as illustrated by the findings of this study. Community participation also is extremely important to support any urban development programs in economically disadvantaged areas. In the case of violence prevention, community participation should go beyond consultations. Programs and policies should encourage the creation of neighborhood associations, the strengthening of local NGOs, and the development of civic action and collective efficacy through participatory mechanisms. Consequently, *violence prevention should be included in the urban community-driven development (CDD) agenda.*

Violence prevention also is very closely related to issues linked to citizen participation and local governance, what donors often call “demand-side governance.” In this context, security should be seen both as a service delivered to citizens and an area of responsibility for citizen engagement. Citizens should be able to hold municipal governments accountable for security. For this reason, citizens should be engaged in the local debate on security and violence prevention and the formulation of adapted strategies.

The World Bank is only recently getting involved in urban violence prevention, and the bulk of its activities in this area are in Latin America. However, its ability to engage governments in multisectoral dialogue and its focus on poverty reduction mean that the Bank has the potential to be an important actor in urban violence prevention. The Bank could organize cross-regional learning. Many of the innovative community-based approaches are being implemented in Latin America, and regions such as Africa could benefit from these approaches. The

Bank could also generate lessons on possible approaches in low-income and fragile environments through pilot initiatives, action research programs, and other activities to build the evidence base. Urban violence prevention is an area in which the development community still has little knowledge of the types of programs that can be effective.

Appendixes

- A. City Population and Homicide Rates for 50 Cities:
City-Agglomerate Population and Homicide Rates, 2005–06
- B. Summaries of Urban Violence Prevention Programs
- C. Dili Case Study
- D. Fortaleza Case Study
- E. Johannesburg Case Study
- F. Nairobi Case Study
- G. Haiti Case Study

Appendix A. City Population and Homicide Rates for 50 Cities:
 City-Agglomerate Population and Homicide Rates, 2005–06

		City agglomerate pop.	Change in city pop. (%)	Homicide rate for 100,000 (ave.)
1	Algiers	2,561,992	2.99	0.645
2	Buenos Aires	3,018,102	1.16	4.07
3	Yerevan	1,102,800	-0.15	2.085
4	Vienna	1,613,329	0.96	1.23
5	Baku	1,829,000	0.67	3.70
6	Dhaka	13,485,000	4.02	2.13
7	Minsk	1,765,500	0.85	4.295
8	La Paz	839,594	1.89	5.36
9	Toronto	5,324,148	1.78	1.885
10	San Jose	2,000,000	3.29	6.40
11	Prague	1,183,576	-0.14	1.44
12	Copenhagen	502,362	0.14	2.195
13	Santo Domingo	984,373	2.12	33.27
14	Quito	2,008,819	3.2	12.495
15	Cairo	11,893,000	1.73	0.395
16	San Salvador	2,198,193	2.16	18.135
17	London	7,429,222	0.67	2.315
18	Helsinki	560,905	1.42	2.045
19	Tbilisi	1,079,700	-0.12	10.425
20	Berlin	3,387,828	0.04	1.62
21	Athens	3,412,740	0.31	1.08
22	Mumbai	16,370,000	2.47	1.38
23	Dublin	1,059,000	0.96	2.975
24	Rome	2,547,677	-0.22	1.145
25	Amman	1,528,687	0.68	1.67
26	Almaty	1,226,433	0.82	13.535
27	Nairobi	2,815,838	4.43	7.945
28	Bishkek	820,200	1.2	14.205
29	Kuala Lumpur	1,556,200	1.47	3.725
30	Mexico City	8,720,916	0.78	7.68
31	Ulaanbaatar	965,300	2.3	15.775
32	Casablanca	3,181,000	0.62	1.49
33	Kathmandu	895,000	4.71	18.885
34	Amsterdam	742,783	0.36	3.30
35	Auckland	1,354,800	2.24	1.535
36	Managua	1,380,339	0.5	12.915
37	Oslo	529,846	1.07	1.685
38	Panama City	813,097	2.51	30.69
39	Asunción	519,647	3.13	11.84
40	Warsaw	1,697,600	0.33	2.145
41	Lisbon	2,012,925	0.66	0.795
42	Bucharest	1,927,448	-0.13	1.345
43	Belgrade	1,576,120	-0.38	2.89
44	Madrid	3,155,359	1.41	1.16

(continued on next page)

Appendix A. City Population and Homicide Rates for 50 Cities:
City-Agglomerate Population and Homicide Rates, 2005–06 *(Continued)*

		City agglomerate pop.	Change in city pop. (%)	Homicide rate for 100,000 (ave.)
45	Aleppo	2,738,000	3.02	0.35
46	Bangkok	5,658,953	0.78	5.64
47	Istanbul	11,332,000	2.09	5.0
48	Kiev	2,666,300	0.5	4.555
49	Dubai	1,321,453	6.08	1.69
50	New York	8,115,690	0.97	6.97

Source (for both homicide rate and population size): Office of Drugs and Crime of the United Nations Secretariat, *Tenth United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, covering the period 2005–2006*, [http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/CTS10 percent20replies percent20bypercent20section.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/CTS10%20replies%20by%20section.pdf) March 25, 2010.

Note: *Both city population and homicide rates are based on UNODC data on homicides.

Appendix B

Summaries of Effective Multisectoral Programs

This appendix reviews some successful multisectoral programs in the cities of the middle-income countries, Bogotá and Cali in Colombia, and Diadema and Belo Horizonte in Brazil, highlighting effective interventions where possible. The interventions in each multisectoral program introduced are not exhaustive, and evaluations of four programs are not sufficient to prove the full effectiveness of the multisectoral approach.

CITIZEN SECURITY PROGRAM IN BOGOTÁ, COLOMBIA

Bogotá has become a model case of crime and violence reduction in urban environments in Latin America. During the 1980s and early 1990s, Bogotá experienced the steadily increase of crime and violence, with a growing sense of insecurity among citizens. The high level of crime and violence and citizens' sense of insecurity were often resulted from a culture of violence, high level of intra-family violence, high consumption of alcohol, easy access to firearms, impunity, lack of institutional credibility of justice and police, and deteriorated urban environments (Llorente and Rivas 2005).

Bogotá's transformation has began during Jaime Castro (1992–94)'s administration. Its success with violence reduction illustrates the importance of political commitment, sustained across three different administrations, and of the allocation of sufficient resources to combat crime and violence. The administrations carried out a comprehensive program combining various approaches including criminal justice (crime control), public health (epidemiological and analytical approach), urban upgrading (interventions in deteriorating urban environments), and social capital (building social capital through informal and formal social institutions).

Table B.1 Citizen Security Program in *Bogotá, Colombia*

Objectives	Interventions
1) Analyzing the violence and crime information and identify the main risk factors and define preventive measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Observatory: The observatory of violence and crime was established to collect reliable information about the violence and crime situation in the city. It involved people from the police, the health sector, forensics, and others. The local university consultants conducted a research on risk factors. All of the information was put on the website so that people could see what is going in the city.
2) Strengthening the police force to control crime and violence in the city	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Police reform: The police force was reformed emphasizing results-based performance. The police adapted an epidemiological approach to monitor crime and violence and implement crime prevention actions. The government made significant investments in the police mainly due to improve the police’s infrastructure, to establish more police posts and attention centers, and to upgrade communication system.
3) Controlling risk factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Firearms and alcohol regulations: Under the Mayor’s leadership, the <i>Bogotá</i> government conducted campaigns to promote voluntary disarmament and to restrict alcohol consumption. Through voluntary disarmament campaigns, such as “Gifts for Guns” that encouraged citizen to hand over their guns in return for gift vouchers, helped, 6,500 firearms were voluntarily returned to the police by 2001. The restriction of firearm possession during weekends and public holidays was also enforced. In parallel, an alcohol consumption control policy was implemented, and this policy limited alcohol sales until 1 a.m. initially and later extended until 3 a.m. on weekends to reduce the number of homicides.
4) Strengthening the solidarity among different actors and increasing community members’ commitment their own safety	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community policing: The city of <i>Bogotá</i> set up local security councils to collaborate between the police officers and local residents. By 2003, there were approximately 6,600 councils in <i>Bogotá</i>, reporting abnormal or suspicious circumstances to the police. It helped to mend the mistrust of police among the residents and increased the collaborative effort in crime prevention.
5) Reducing intra-family violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Family police stations: The family police stations (<i>comisarias de familia</i>) were created so that families are informed about conflict resolution, domestic violence prevention and child abuse issues. An interdisciplinary team, which consisted of a lawyer, a psychologist, a doctor, and a social worker, provided comprehensive services.

Objectives	Interventions
6) Promoting alternate mechanisms to resolve minor and everyday conflicts between citizens and within families	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Access to justice: Casas de Justicia (House of Justice) were established in the communities to resolve everyday conflicts, such as agreement and rights violations and alimony issues. Lawyers, social workers and psychologists contributed their time in the mediation process. The community residents found the mechanism effective to resolve conflicts.
7) Regenerating deteriorated public spaces with high crime rates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Urban renewal program: Bogotá invested in renewing urban and transportation infrastructure in the most violent areas in the city. For example, Avenida Caracas, one of the most dangerous in the capital due to the high rates of mugging, was completely rebuilt as one of the main routes of a public transportation system, called <i>Transmilenio</i>. Another example is the case of El Cartucho with a critical situation of social deterioration characterized by a large concentration of paper gatherers, homeless people, drug addicts and illegal sale of drugs, guns and stolen merchandise. The program demolished the entire area to build a park and implemented a social management plan that assisted over 14,000 people.
8) Changing the norms through education and communication	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civic campaigns: Civic campaigns were introduced to change the behaviors of Bogotá's citizens through education and communication. Vaccination days against violence were established to raise awareness about the violence especially with regards to domestic violence and child abuse.
9) Creating employment opportunities for at-risk population	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Employment program: The program offered civic guide positions to about 4,000 people. Civic guides were hired to regulate citizens' activities in areas such as traffic, security, community organization and waste recycling.

Sources: Buvinió, Alda, and Lamas 2005; Guerrero 2006; Llorente and Rivas 2005.

Bogotá has achieved reducing its homicide rate from 80 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 1993 to 22 in 2004 (Guerrero 2005). It is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of each intervention to see which interventions in the program actually have worked to reduce the level of crime and violence in Bogotá because of the uncontrolled setting and the absence of basic guidelines to develop adequate indicators over time (Llorente and Rivas 2005). However, Llorente and Rivas (2005) reported that the evaluation of some interventions showed positive results.

After implementing urban renewal program in the most dangerous public areas in Bogotá, the records indicated that certain crimes in some areas had been decreased significantly. In Avenida Caracas, there was a 60 percent reduction in the homicide rate and almost a 100 percent reduction in the street assaults rates

between 1999 to 2003. In El Cartucho, the homicide and assaults rates fell more than 70 percent between 2000 and 2003.

A government financed study found that gun and alcohol consumption measures reduced homicides in the city by 14 percent in the case of the gun control interventions and 8 percent in the case of the control of alcohol consumption. Another study which looked at the impact of gun possession restrictions concluded that the homicide rate during restriction time in Bogotá was reduced by 13 percent.

Some studies showed the changes in citizens' attitude about firearms and alcohol through educational and communication campaigns. The survey conducted by the Instituto Distrital de Cultura y Turismo illustrated that the number of citizens who thought it was best to have a gun for protection reduced from 24.8 percent in 2001 to 11.4 percent in 2003. Regarding the alcohol consumption control, even though the study did not address the total population but it showed significant impact among youth's attitude towards alcohol. According to the survey taken by over 3,500 children (10–11 years old) who participated in an educational course on alcohol risks, nearly 80 percent reported being more aware of the risks of alcohol and about 60 percent of participants said they had changed their behavior towards alcohol consumption.

DESEPAZ IN CALI, COLOMBIA

Similar to Bogotá, Cali also experienced an increase in its homicide rates from 23 per 100,000 people in 1983 to 90 per 100,000 people in 1993 (Guerrero and Concha-Eastman 2001). The high level of crime and violence was accompanied by citizens' sense of insecurity, and the security issue became the most serious concern in the city over other important issues, such as unemployment.

The Mayor, Rodrigo Guerrero, started implementing a comprehensive program, called DESEPAZ²² in 1993 with the aim of reducing crime and violence and improving public safety in Cali. The program was based on the following six guiding principles:

- 1) **Multicausality of violence:** Violence is a complex interaction between multiple risk factors, therefore, it requires multiple and comprehensive interventions to have a significant impact;

22. DESEPAZ is an acronym for the Spanish words DEsarrollo (development), SEguridad (public safety), and PAZ (peace).

- 2) **Research:** Data collection and analysis is key to understand the causes of violence, and interventions should be based on scientific research;
- 3) **Prevention:** As traditional control measures have not shown results in reducing violence, violence prevention is a priority in violence reduction efforts;
- 4) **Citizen Participation:** It is necessary to encourage citizens and community organizations to get involved in violence reduction efforts together with the police and military;
- 5) **Respect and Tolerance:** Respect for others' rights and a culture of tolerance should be promoted;
- 6) **Social Equity:** Social equity is essential for peace therefore special efforts are needed to correct the existing inequality in education, access to services, and living conditions (Guerrero and Concha-Eastman 2001; Guerrero 2006).

Epidemiological studies were conducted to identify the primary risk factors for violence and shape the priorities for action during the initial stage of the program. Special budgets were allocated to strengthen the police and the judicial system by the municipality government. Based on the earlier epidemiological studies, the city government implemented various interventions to address multiple risk factors (see Table B.2). For example, they enforced restrictions on the sale of alcohol, and prohibited the carrying of handguns on weekends and special occasions. They promoted social equity and social cohesion by carrying out various social development and education projects. To strengthen the connectedness of family and community, a range of cultural and educational projects were organized for community members, families, children and youth.

The homicide rate in Cali was declined from 124 per 100,000 in 1994 to 886 per 100,000 people in 1997 with a reduction rate of 30 percent (World Health Organization 2002). As Guerrero and Concha-Eastman (2001) noted it would be very difficult to determine which specific measures actually contributed to the reduction of homicide rates in Cali since the DESEPAZ program was not designed as a controlled experiment.

There has been a limited work done to evaluate the effectiveness of the program. A study found the homicide rate was reduced by 14 percent during periods when the ban on carrying firearms was in effect (Villaveces and others 2000). However, this study did not explain the mechanism of the homicide reduction associated with the firearms ban and was not able to isolate other factors (for

Table B.2 DESEPAZ Program in Cali, Colombia

Objectives	Interventions
<p>1. Collecting and analyzing various data on crime and violence and making the decision based on evidence</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Epidemiology of Violence: An intersectoral committee, which was made up of representatives from the police, judiciary, forensic medicine, health and human rights, held weekly meetings to analyze various data (e.g. police records, hospital records, judiciary data) and reach consensus on the occurrences of crime. The committee reported their findings and recommendations to the Municipal Security Council.
<p>2. Improving the effectiveness of law enforcement</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improvement of the Police: Even though the police and the judiciary institutions were usually financed and directed by the central government, the municipality government invested in their development and improvement at the local level. First, the housing program was established for police officers to fight with corruption. Second, the municipality started a program for all members of the police to complete their high school within two years. Third, the municipality also provided a training program to police officers on human rights about the Colombian Constitution and on specific skills relating to their job. • City Security Councils: To improve coordination and efficiency in the use of resources, the Mayor held weekly meetings inviting the heads of all of the institutions involved in law enforcement (for example, police, army, courts). They discussed and coordinated for law enforcement actions based on the reports from the inter-sectoral committee which studied the epidemiology of violence. • Casas de Paz (House of Peace): The House of Peace was built to have all of the public institutions involved in public safety (for example, police, courts, family precinct) in one place. It aimed to enhance personal contact among staff of different institutions, improve coordination and effectiveness in their work, and bring justice closer to the people. The first House of Peace was built in the largest poverty-stricken area of the city. • Computer Network: A computer network was set up between, police, courts, and other law enforcement agencies to improve their communication and performance.

Objectives	Interventions
3. Enforcing the local bylaws to control risk factors of homicides	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Restrictions on Alcohol Sales:The city government established the “ley semi seca (semi-dry law)” by ordering the bars and night clubs to close at 1 a.m. on weekdays and 2 a.m. on Fridays and Saturday because of the early epidemiological data on homicides. The epidemiological data showed that almost two thirds of homicides took place during late evening and early morning, particularly on the weekends, and autopsies showed that 26 percent of the victims of violent deaths were intoxicated with alcohol. • Restrictions on Carrying Firearms: As data indicated that firearms caused about 80 percent of the homicides, particularly on the weekends and special occasions in the city, the carrying of firearms was prohibited during weekends and other holidays so that weapon carrying permits were no longer valid during these periods.
4. Promoting citizens’ participation in violence reduction efforts and political process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community Security Councils: Requested by citizens and community and neighborhood leaders, special meetings were organized to discuss safety related issues and intervention planning with the local law enforcement agents. Citizens also provided information about criminals in the community. • Community Government Councils:The Mayor called for periodic public meetings that invited all members of his Cabinet and leaders and citizens of the communities to have more transparency of the city government and promote public participation. The average of 200–300 people attended the meetings.
5. Reducing family violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Family Judiciary Precincts: Six family precincts were created to help resolve family violence. Led by a family lawyer with specialization in family issues, multidisciplinary teams of social workers, forensic doctors and psychologists engaged in prevention of family violence.

(continued on next page)

Table B.2 DESEPAZ Program in Cali, Colombia (Continued)

Objectives	Interventions
<p>6. Promoting social equity through social development programs</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Employment programs: A micro-enterprise development program was offered to small business owners. The program included business management training workshops, individual tutoring, and credit support. Job training centers were also established to provide training in specific skills, such as car and motorcycle mechanics, child and elderly care, hotel cleaning, restaurant waiters/waitresses, etc. • Primary School Education: Because of a shortage of primary schools in the city, 40,000 new primary school were opened to guarantee 100 percent public primary school education. • Public Housing: Through the urban development project, called “Ciudadela Desepaz,” 28,000 families with minimum wage built their own houses. • Social Service Center in La Olla: A Social Service Center was built to improve the living conditions of people in La Olla, one of the most violent communities in Cali. It offered healthcare service and other services include rehabilitation and job training for prostitutes, a night-care center for the children of prostitutes, and open school for street children.
<p>7. Promoting social cohesion to change people’s attitude and behavior</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mass Media Campaign: A mass media campaign was carried out with collaboration of the private sector. Various educational commercials about peaceful coexistence, civic education, tolerance and responsible behavior were broadcasted through the local television channel. • Awareness Raising Program for Children: The city government launched a program, “Children Friends of Peace,” to raise awareness about restriction of carrying the firearms. The program invited children to give up their war toys in exchange for free admittance to the city’s recreational facilities for one year, training workshops on civic education and peace, and the big party at the city’s largest park. • Family programs: Workshops for parents and school teachers were created to empower families to fulfill their emotional and social functions. • Youth Houses: Seventeen youth houses were opened for young people from the poorer areas to use them for parties, meetings, dancing, aerobics, and organizing sporting and cultural events.

Objectives	Interventions
8. Reducing youth violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Employment Programs: High risk youth, such as members of the gangs, received training to run micro-enterprises and become contractors of the city government, such as building cleaning, gardening and the public park maintenance. • Education Program: A program provided high risk youth to continue their high school education. Young people who participated in the program were admitted to the Job Oriented Training Centers to learn skills to open their own businesses or get jobs. • Group Support and Mentor Program: A team of educators organized group activities with the high risk youth and provide them with mentors for role model and guidance. Community leaders supported the program by helping restore between the citizens and youth involved in the rehabilitation process.

Source: Guerrero and Concha-Eastman 2001.

example, visible and aggressive police presence in the city), which might also have an effect on the homicide rate.

Unfortunately, contrary to Bogotá, this strategy was not sustained by the other administrations, and the level of violence started to increase again after the Guerrero administration (1992–96). The only intervention kept by all administration was the data collection of crime and violence in Cali (Guerrero and Concha-Eastman 2001).

PUBLIC SECURITY POLICY IN DIADEMA, BRAZIL

During the late 1990s, Diadema had one of the highest rates of homicides in the State of Sao Paulo and Brazil in 1999, with 374 homicides per 100,000 people (Miki 2006). Between 1995 and 1998, the homicide rate went up by 49 percent (International Centre for the Prevention of Crime 2005). In Brazil, public safety issues are usually handled at the national or state level, however, due to the high demand from the public, municipality government decided to implement a comprehensive violence reduction strategy, which involved state government, civil society organizations (CSOs), academics, and the police.

The case of Diadema showcases the leadership and commitment of the mayor in the reduction of very high levels of crime and violence. Interventions comparable to those in Colombia have been adapted to the local reality of Diadema.

Table B.3 Public Security Policy in Diadema, Brazil

Objectives	Interventions
1. Analyzing the violence and crime information and define interventions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Observatory: A crime observatory was created to collect timely and precise information of crime events to target interventions to vulnerable populations
2. Controlling risk factor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dry Law: Similar to in Bogotá and Cali, Colombia, a law, <i>Lei de Fechamento de Bares</i>, was enforced. It limited alcohol sales after 11 p.m. every day, as data indicated that in 2001, 60 percent of homicides occurred between 11pm and 6am in nearby locations in which alcohol was served. Parallel to this intervention, a law was approved to closely monitor the number and legality of the alcohol licenses in the city.
3. Strengthening the enforcement agencies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Integrated Operations: Both enforcement agencies, the Diadema Municipal Guard and the State Police Force, worked closely to patrol the streets and bars of Diadema to prevent crime. • Neighborhood Policing: Inspired by the French policing model, the Block Angels was created to increase the number of municipal guards to further enhance the neighborhood safety. The municipal guard became more visible as they patrolled the neighborhood by foot, bicycles and motorcycles. It helped build the bond between the law enforcement and community members.
4. Promoting alternate conflict resolution mechanisms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conflict Mediation: This intervention sought to promote a culture of peace in Diadema's communities. The administration trained more than 100 people to identify and resolve conflict situations among neighbors and family.
5. Establishing and reinforcing the culture of peace	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Disarmament Campaign: The campaign for disarmament was carried out to promote the culture of peace in Diadema. The Campaign helped to remove 1,600 weapons. • Campaign to Promote Disarmament among children: Similar to what was implemented in Cali, the municipality government developed a program to promote disarmament among children by exchanging children's toy guns with children's books. Since its implementation, more than 60,000 children have participated. • Education for Life: A half-year course on illicit drug prevention was given by police officers in city schools.
6. Providing services to youth at risk	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adolescente Aprendiz (Teen apprentice) Project: As data indicated that poor youth were the age cohort most affected by crime and violence. Consequently, the proposed project aimed at building life skills and citizenship among youth and offers them skills for the labor market. In five years the project benefited more than 10,000 youths.

Objectives	Interventions
7. Encouraging the community members' participation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public Security Forums and Municipal Security Council: The municipal government considered the community members' participation was key to the success of the municipality public security plan. Representatives from civil society, the town hall and state offices participated in the public security forums every two weeks, and discussed local security issues and proposed solutions. In the Municipal Security Council, representatives discussed and coordinated intra-secretariat policies, including security, health, education and urban development, to end violence.
8. Improving public security through environmental design	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED): The municipal government tried to reduce the level of crime by improving public lighting and installing security cameras to monitor specific areas with high crime rate.

Sources: International Centre for the Prevention of Crime 2005; Miki 2006, Botton 2006.

Successful policies includes the closing of bars before 1 a.m., the integration of the military police and the municipal guard, promoting alternate conflict resolution mechanism, working with youth at risk and their families, and situational prevention interventions among others (Duailibi and others 2007). Regina Miki, the former Secretary of Social Defense in Diadema, explained that “Public security is not done with policing alone. Prevention should be done in the urban environment and has to include sports, culture, hobbies, education and health” (Botton 2006).

Since the Public Security Policy started in 2000, the number of homicides dropped from 389 cases in 1999 to 167 cases in 2003, with a reduction rate of 57 percent (International Centre for the Prevention of Crime 2005). Some studies indicated that the local bylaw of limiting the hours of alcoholic beverage sales in bars led the remarkable reduction in homicide rate. The study conducted by the Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation presented that Diadema prevented 11 homicides and 9 assaults against women each month as a direct result of the new alcohol policy adopted in July 2002, which prohibited alcohol sales between 11 p.m. and 6 a.m. (Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation 2004). Evidence from another study suggested that the city reduced the homicide rate by 44 percent and the rate of assaults against women by 56 percent from what was expected without the new alcohol policy. Unfortunately, the evaluations of other interventions are not available.

FICA VIVO IN BELO HORIZONTE, BRAZIL

The City of Belo Horizonte in Brazil had a steep rise in homicide rates from 1997–2001; the number of homicides increased from 325 homicides statewide in 1997 to 701 homicides in 2001 (Beato 2005). The crimes were often associated with young males under the age of 24, and usually happened in slums where both victims and offenders lived. Due to the rise of homicides and youth violence, the public demanded the solution for reducing and controlling the problem.

Fica Vivo (Stay Alive) program was initially developed by the Center of Studies in Criminality and Public Security at the Federal University of Minas Gerais (CRISP/UFGM) in 2002. The programs involved various sectors, including the City Council, the municipal, federal, and military police, the public prosecutor's office, private businesses, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and local communities (ICPC 2005). It adopted the multifaceted approach integrating crime control with social development programs (Beato 2005). A series of preventive actions were implemented targeting youth for social support, education, and sports. The program also offered workshops on violence, drugs, sexual transmitted disease, sports, arts and performance, computer, and job training. Based on CRISP/UFGM's hotspot analysis, the program was piloted in the most violent slums in the city.

Belo Horizonte saw an overall decrease in violent crime in 30 months after the implementation of Fica Vivo: a 47 percent reduction in homicides and a 65 percent reduction in attempted homicides in the targeted slum areas (ICPC 2005). The World Bank compared the cost-effectiveness of the nine crime prevention and control programs in Brazil, and Fica Vivo was proved to be the most cost effective program (World Bank 2006). Following the success of the program, the state government of Minas Gerais replicated and scaled up the Fica Vivo model in other high-violence areas throughout the state.

UPP AND UPP SOCIAL IN RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL

In 2008, Rio de Janeiro began to implement what has been hailed as one of the most promising interventions to reduce crime and violence in impoverished slums, known in Brazil as *favelas*, as the Rio State Government made violence reduction its top priority. Historically, there was an overall increase in the State of Rio's homicide rate from 26 per 100,000 inhabitants in 1980, to 58.8 homicides per 100,000 in 1997, when it became the most violent state

Table B.4 Fica Vivo program in Belo Horizonte, Brazil

Objectives	Interventions
1. Analyzing the violence and crime information and define interventions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hot spot Analysis and Victimization Survey: CRISP/UFMG carried out a study and identified the existence of 6 areas with high homicide rates. A victimization survey was designed to gather information that might be helpful in understanding specific localities and conditions favoring violent episodes in these areas. Based on their data and analysis, the municipal government defined interventions.
2. Controlling risk factor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Drug Market Intervention: CRISP/UFMG's analysis indicated an intimate correlation between crime and drugs. The military police, the civilian police and the public prosecution service and the course worked closely to disrupt drug market by investigating each homicide and drug related crimes and issuing arrest warrants.
3. Improving the effectiveness of law enforcement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Patrol Group for Risk Areas: The police placed the officers with the most adequate profile in terms of interacting with the local community so as to improve the perceptions of the police and work together with the community members. They were trained to interact with community to build better relationship. • Improving Communication among Law Enforcement Agencies: A simple solution, such as exchanging mobile phone numbers of the law enforcement agents and officers involved in the program, made the communication process more fluent, speeded up their process and improved their collaboration.
4. Encouraging the community members' participation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community Forum: Monthly community meetings were held to discuss issues, such as crime prevention, unemployment, and education. The forum aimed to reduce the fears of residents and to develop solutions to the local problems. • Crime Prevention Centers: Training on public security issues as well as how to relate to the youth was offered to police officers, community members, educators, school directors, social workers and healthcare workers.
5. Providing services to youth at risk	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assisted Freedom: The municipal government provided a series of projects, which included income generation, leadership training, educational, leisure, and sports components, to youth at risk. With the aim of reaching the target population, they also conducted interviews with youth who are deeply involved with gangs and whom conventional social programs did not reach.

Sources: Beato 2005; International Centre for the Prevention of Crime 2005.

in the country (Waiselfisz 2011). Economic stagnation, hyperinflation, and high unemployment were among the factors that contributed to the rise in homicide and lethal violence in the city during the so called “lost decade” (Shyne 2010). In addition to that, since 1985 increasing numbers of Rio de Janeiro’s approximately 1,000 favelas started to fall under the control of local drug gangs, contributing to an increase of crime and violence in these places as well as other areas of the city.

Crime started to drop in the state of Rio in the 2000s, specifically due to the passing of a national gun control legislation in 2003, which was accompanied by a successful small arms buyback campaign that received intense support from the state and local governments, as well as from civil society²³. By 2008, homicide rates in the state had fallen to 34 per 100,000 habitants.²⁴ During the same period, the city of Rio’s homicide rate ranking went from the third worst nationally (65.8 per 100,000) to the eighth least violent, with a rate of 31 per 100,000.

However, the prevalence of drug-trafficking in the favelas remained the single most difficult challenge for policy makers in the state and its capital, affecting the livelihoods, access to services, and outsiders’ perceptions of favela residents, diminishing their opportunities for social and spatial mobility and increasing insecurity in these areas and the rest of the city. This scenario began to change at the end of 2008, when state governor Sergio Cabral launched an innovative initiative to take back control of the favela territories through the *Unidades de Policia Pacificadora – UPPs (Pacification Police Units)*. The already decreasing trend in per capita homicides and other lethal violent crimes became more pronounced in the wake of the implementation of the first UPP interventions. The precise contribution of UPP cannot be pinpointed, however, according to monthly data published by the Rio de Janeiro Institute of Public Security, the absolute number of homicides in the capital fell from 2,069, in 2008, to 1,628, in 2010, representing a 21 percent decline.

UPPs enter slums after elite police units have successfully expelled or eliminated traffickers from a certain *favela* during preannounced repressive operations. They then focus on building trust between the community and the police while ensuring a sustained security presence. They establish a ‘round the clock’ unit of mostly new and specially trained military police recruits

23. Recent studies have found the Federal Disarmament Law and the small arms buyback campaign led directly to a 12 percent reduction in homicides in the state of Rio between 2004 and 2005 (Dreyfus, et al. 2008).

24. Waiselfisz, 2010; Waiselfisz, 2011.

within the selected favela communities and ensure the total disarmament of the drug traffic. The second phase of the program, *UPP Social*, complements the public security interventions of the UPP program with multi-sector, targeted social assistance to residents of the pacified favelas. It aims to ensure that the pacification gains will create the conditions for new economic, social, and political opportunities for *favela* residents.

UPP Social consists of a coordination mechanism that allows residents, local officials, community organizations, and various tools (such as surveys, database, and analytical research) to generate “demands” that are mapped to existing national, state, municipal, and private sector or civil society programs and interventions, channeling them towards the consolidation of peace and the promotion of sustained social development.²⁵ The initiative is launched in each new community through a community forum, designed to provide a space for open debate among the different stakeholders. A local management unit produces detailed information about the communities, identifying programs/interventions, strengthening dialogue among residents, service providers, government agencies and the private sector. The unit then engages the necessary institutions to respond to the identified needs and provide support and supervision to their execution. This phase also includes efforts to normalize legal services; formalize informal services such as electricity, gas, cable, and internet provision; recuperate public spaces; rehabilitate youth who were formerly involved in criminal activity; and revitalize the urban area. Together, UPP and *UPP Social* have the ultimate goal of restoring and strengthening slum residents’ citizenship by reintegrating them into the greater city.²⁶ The program is completed with the development of an Integrated Policy Plan based on the dialogue and the identified needs.

As of March 2011, 14 UPPs were in place and at least eight more are planned by the end of the year. The government hopes to serve 165 communities through the placement of 45 UPPs by 2014. This would require an estimated

25. Presentation provided by Ricardo Henriques, UPP Social coordinator.

26. UPP Social was initially launched at the State level, under Secretary for Social Assistance and Human Rights, but in January 2011 was moved, along with its leader, to the Instituto Pereira Passos, becoming UPP Social Carioca (the Portuguese name for Rio’s inhabitants) and being managed at the municipal government in conjunction with the slum-upgrading program Morar Carioca. Morar Carioca was inaugurated by the municipal government as an extension of the Favela-Bairro program and aims to urbanize all slums by 2020 (Interviews with local official carried out in Rio in January 2011).

Table B.5 UPP Social program in Rio de Janeiro city, Brazil

Objectives	Interventions
1. Ensure consolidation of territorial control and peace in the areas of UPP intervention	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local Management – A local management unit is formed to promote citizenship and reverse the main factors of territorial exclusion and violence experienced previously by (i) establishing quality standards for public services and monitoring their provision; (ii) building trust with the community; (iii) promoting institutional coordination. • Regularization – UPP Social promotes the adoption of policies to regularize and formalize the various dimensions of everyday lives of the benefited areas characterized by informality (urban planning and environmental rules, land ownership, businesses, provision of energy, water, gas, cable and internet, public transportation etc.). • Access to Justice – In December 2010, the Rio State Government, Ministry of Justice, National Justice Council, and Rio Justice Tribunal signed an agreement to provide UPP communities with opportunities to access to justice. The first initiative—the Community Justice program—is now on-going in the Complexo de Alemão. It focuses on conflict resolution through dialogue and local resident mediation. Communities are trained in dialogue and mediation techniques, as well as human rights and family law. These interventions are meant to address local conflicts, such as fights between neighbors or interpersonal enmities caused by debts. • Youth Violence Prevention – To sustain peace in the favelas, UPP Social supports several programs targeting the most vulnerable population to criminal activity - youth – by promoting sports, cultural and recreational programs, job training, education, psychological support to adolescents and youth at risk, and social reintegration of graduates of criminal groups or penitentiary systems.

12,500 officers and benefit nearly 860,000 residents.²⁷ Currently, there are approximately 1,500 UPP police officers and soldiers on duty (WOLA 2010). UPP Social was first implemented in July 2010 in Morro de Providência (two years after the initial UPP entry) and by early 2011 it had been expanded to Borel, Cidade de Deus, and Morro dos Macacos. The municipal government has allocated R\$ 650 million (approximately US\$ 400 million) to invest in UPP Social initiatives until the end of 2012.

27. Roberto Alzir Das Chavez, “A New Approach to Citizen Security in Brazil: Rio’s Pacifying Police Units,” Wilson Center, March 16, 2011.

Objectives	Interventions
2. Promote citizenship and social and economic development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participatory Citizenship – Establishment of channels of permanent communication and social dialogue (forums, ombudsmen), and support to citizens’ organizations and activities developed in each community. • Research and diagnoses –The program identifies the potential demand and supply actions for the benefited areas and articulates their integration around shared goals, indicators and guidelines in order better target the most pressing needs of favelas residents. In 2010, UPP Social teams carried out: (i) ethnographic research in 12 favelas with UPPs; (ii) quantitative surveys in 8; (iii) participatory mapping of interventions in 10; (iv) socioeconomic and demographic analyses of 14; (v) and a Rapid Appraisal – GIS Mapping of Social Services in Borel. • Institutional Coordination –The abovementioned strong communications and mapping strategy is accompanied by a permanent dialogue with different stakeholders (government agencies, local organizations, NGOs, private sector) in order to coordinate efforts and improve social programs’ effectiveness and the delivery of universal services. • Economic Inclusion – Expansion and improvement of training and job placement programs by expanding cooperation with companies based in the surroundings of each community; offers of alternatives to credit; technical assistance and expansion of activities of entrepreneurs and local services.
3. Fully integrate the favelas areas into the larger city	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Diversity and Rights – Guidance and promotion of access to services to guarantee equal rights and support for different vulnerable groups (based on gender, race, sexual orientation, persons with disability, religion and age groups). • Territorial Integration – Support and recovery of local culture, sport and recreation equipment and services; facilitating access to equipment and services located in the surrounding communities and the rest of the city; construction or improvement of public areas for living and recreation that can help consolidate the territorial integration of the favelas. • Infrastructure and access –To promote the integration of residents with their surroundings and the rest of the city, UPP Social supports improvements in local urban, transportation and economic infrastructure and implementation or enhancement of regular services of urban and environmental conservation; opening of access roads and improvement of local public transportation; development of touristic and cultural attractions in the benefited areas.

Preliminary Results

UPPs may have had a major impact in the reduction of crime and violence in the affected areas and favorable effects on improving residents' living conditions. In the first year of the initiative, homicides in the Cidade de Deus favela dropped from 34 to 6 and car thefts from 69 to 11. Similarly, in Dona Marta, homicides fell from three to none and car thefts from 25 to 14.²⁸ A January 2010 survey of favela residents found that 86 percent of respondents believed that safety had greatly improved. In those communities that have not received UPPs, 72 percent of respondents considered it a positive program and 70 percent supported receiving a UPP.²⁹ School attendance in ten schools located in UPP communities has increased dramatically. In Cidade de Deus, attendance at one local high school increased by 90 percent.³⁰ In another community, the main performance indicator that measures the quality of basic education in Brazil, the Ideb, almost doubled compared to 2007 data.³¹ Finally, the spillover effects into communities surrounding the favelas appears to be positive. A study by the Housing Union (SECOVI) found that the rental value of houses located near UPP favelas in the South Zone had increased by 149 percent, while their sale value had increased by 59 percent.³²

It is still too early for extensive evaluations of the UPP Social's impact. However, anecdotal evidence highlights some successes. In addition to the programs mentioned above, in Borel, the community was able to secure additional dumpsters through dialogue with the Conservation Secretary, facilitated by the local UPP Social unit. The Cidade de Deus unit has formed partnerships with community organizations and UN-Habitat to plan a citywide youth conference which will take place in the slum itself.

28. Instituto de Seguranca Publica, December 2009.

29. IBPS, 2010.

30. "Vitoria contra o tempo perdido," O Dia, 07/24/2010

31. "Vitória contra o tempo perdido", O Dia, 07/24/2010.

32. O Globo 3/12/2010.

Appendix C

Conflict, Violence, and Community Resilience in Dili, Timor-Leste



With a predominantly rural population of about 1.1 million, Timor-Leste constitutes the eastern part of an island in the Indonesian archipelago, to the northwest of Australia. After 4 centuries as a Portuguese colony (–1975), a brief period of independence (1975), and 24 years under Indonesian rule (1975–99), Timor-Leste emerged from a United Nations transitional government in 2002 as the first new country of the twenty-first century. The road to self-determination has been a difficult one. Over the past 35 years, colonial repression, insurgency, civil war, mass violence, and reprisals have left a staggering death toll and displaced hundreds of thousands of Timorese from their homes. What has emerged is a state with crippled infrastructure and a 2009 UNDP Human Development Index ranking of 162 out of 182 countries. Since Timor-Leste’s referendum for independence in 1999, there were intense outbreaks of collective

violence in 2002, 2006, and 2007. As recently as 2008, the president and prime minister were attacked in a failed coup and assassination attempt. To prevent a renewed breakdown of law and order, Australian troops were called in and a state of emergency was declared until the situation was stabilized.

Timor-Leste's socioeconomic challenges and the legacies of its past collide most acutely in Dili, the country's fast-growing capital and only major urban center. Crucial to the country's future are the questions of how Timor-Leste's political institutions function to prevent political and social conflict from inciting large-scale violence and also how community-level engagement can reduce existing crime and violence and lower the likelihood of a future spike. To contribute to knowledge and debate over these issues, this case study assesses the nature and prevalence of crime and violence in three poor urban communities in Dili. The chapter is structured as follows. Section two addresses the drivers of crime and violence in Timor-Leste. Section three presents the institutional framework for security and violence prevention. Section four discusses the research methodology and profiles of the communities in the sample. Section five describes the crime victimization patterns found in the surveyed communities together with community perceptions of its causes and impacts. Section six concludes with policy recommendations.

VIOLENCE VICTIMIZATION IN TIMOR-LESTE

Obtaining reliable data on violence victimization in Timor-Leste is challenging. There is some indication that levels of victimization are on the decline nationally. According to one early warning system, incidents of violence decreased in 2009, from 187 between February and May, to 139 between June and September, the last period for which data are available. Most of these incidents, 56 percent, take place inside homes or on private property, indicating that most violence occurs in the private sphere. This was followed by streets and markets, with 12 and seven percent, respectively. The report also found that confrontations seemed to be escalating to violence more often than previously; while verbal threats and intimidation were the most common expressions, these often developed into physical violence. Most incidents occurred between individuals, rather than among groups, and most did not involve weapons (in only 12 cases were rocks thrown, and in 29 cases machetes were drawn) (BELUN and Columbia University's Center for International Conflict 2010). When considering Timorese crime statistics, one must also bear in mind the fact that "the majority

of everyday disputes are, for reasons of convenience, swiftness, and legitimacy, carried out without direct reference to the state system” (Peake 2009: 144–62). In part for these reasons, expert perspectives on security and violence in Dili vary significantly. Some view with optimism the calm that has persisted since the 2006–07 mass violence. Others fear that this optimism will lead to a draw-down of the international security forces and then a resurgence of violence.

DRIVERS AND DYNAMICS OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN TIMOR-LESTE

In Timor-Leste, as in many post-conflict countries around the world, the past is present. A thorough understanding of the country’s historical development is critical to identifying the drivers of crime and violence in the country, specifically in Dili (see box A1 for a brief summary of recent mass violence in Timor-Leste). The 450 years of foreign occupation brought limited economic development and left behind few state structures. At the close of Portuguese colonial rule, only an estimated 10 percent of the population was literate (World Bank 2007: 1). After internal political turmoil in Portugal led to a hasty withdrawal from the colony in 1975, a brief civil war ensued in August and September of 1975. During this civil war, between 1,500 and 3,000 people were killed, with hundreds of political prisoners being executed and 20,000 civilians displaced to Indonesian West Timor (Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation Timor-Leste 2005: 43). Against a Cold War backdrop of concern that a newly independent East Timor would fall to communism and/or spur secessionist movements in restive regions of the Indonesian archipelago, Indonesia annexed the territory by force in December 1975. The occupation which ensued and lasted for 24 years was characterized by state repression, insurgency, and counter-insurgency (Peake 2009: 146).

The Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR), which was conducted between 2002 and 2005, documented a high incidence of torture, forced displacement, systemic rape, and arbitrary detention committed under Indonesian rule (1975–99). An estimated 102,000–183,000 people died from killings, repression, starvation, and widespread malnutrition (Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation Timor-Leste 2005: 83). Documented atrocities include public mass executions, gang rapes, public beatings, and death by acts of torture. Timorese society became deeply divided between those involved in the Timorese clandestine resistance movement and those loyal to Indonesia, with both sides targeting each other and anyone sus-

pected of sympathy to, or pragmatic cooption by, the rival cause. From the late 1980s onward, Dili stood at the center of the clandestine resistance network. While this network was comprised of Timorese men and women of all ages, it relied primarily on young men to carry out dangerous tasks. Indonesia resorted to terror and violence in order to quell the civilian movement. In the early 1990s, Indonesian special forces and intelligence services implemented a counter-insurgency campaign in Dili, activating units whose purpose was to abduct, torture and execute/disappear members of the clandestine resistance. They were supplemented by a wide range of informants, paramilitary units, politicized youth groups and civil defense organizations (Small Arms Survey 2009).

Asian economic crisis of 1997 and the 1998 overthrow of Indonesia's Suharto regime allowed Timor-Leste's independence movement to gain momentum, domestically and internationally. A referendum on independence from Indonesia under the auspices of the United Nations was held in August 1999. Results showed more than 78 percent of Timorese had voted for independence. Immediately thereafter, pro-Indonesian militias and elements of the Indonesian military launched a campaign of systemic violence, looting, and arson (United Nations East Timor Country Team 2000) (Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation Timor-Leste 2005). By the time the UN peacekeeping force arrived to halt the violence, the damage already caused was devastating in scale. In just 21 days, more than 1,400 civilians were killed, hundreds of women were raped, and thousands were assaulted and beaten (Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation Timor-Leste 2005: 110).

An estimated 70 percent of all homes, essential utilities, roads, and public buildings were left in ruins (United Nations East Timor Country Team 2000: 23). Nearly 80 percent of all health facilities suffered damage, and virtually all medical equipment and consumables were destroyed, collapsing the health system. Some 95 percent of all schools and educational institutions were also destroyed. An estimated 90 percent of the country's secondary school teachers left the country along with 20 percent of its primary school teachers (United Nations East Timor Country Team 2000: 10–11). More than 75 percent of the entire population was displaced by fear or forced removals. Approximately 200,000 were displaced to West Timor and other parts of Indonesia. The remainder were displaced to camps in Dili and other parts of the territory (United Nations East Timor Country Team 2000: 23). In short, "the events of September 1999 saw the near total destruction of all systems of government and administration" resulting in a "complete vacuum of administrative authority, policing and justice" (United Nations East Timor Country Team 2000: 14).

Thus, when the UN Transitional Administration (UNTAET) arrived, the challenges were great as well as compounded. The territory faced not only grinding poverty but also the arduous tasks of building a new state, building infrastructure, undertaking democratic elections, promoting national reconciliation, resettling three-quarters of its population, and demobilizing armed groups. Over the following years, the Timor-Leste received a sizable injection of foreign aid and international technical assistance (TA). Indeed, during 2002 and 2006, Timor-Leste received a total of \$3.65 billion in foreign assistance, one of the highest per-capita injections received by any post-conflict state in history (Scanteam 2007: 32). Yet, shortly after the UN mission wound down in 2006, another upsurge in violence led to the total breakdown of law and order, a humanitarian crisis, and the collapse of the state security forces.

With the benefit of hindsight, some international development agencies concluded that the grievances which generated the crisis had been largely fuelled by longstanding conflicts that remained unresolved by independence, the pressing nature of the country's developmental challenges, and the necessarily long-term nature of peace-building and nation-building. One Scandinavian expert group commissioned by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) also speculated that one key driver was that international TA had created a "structural dependence on international technical assistance" and had failed to channel resources toward generating productive activity, private sector development, or rural sector growth (Scanteam 2007: 34).

SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS

Timor-Leste's historical experiences with political violence, widespread trauma, and weak state structures pose difficult challenges. In addition, unfortunately, many additional contemporary socioeconomic issues significantly build on and exacerbate these challenges. Poverty has intensified since the country's independence. While 36 percent of the population was living under the poverty line in 2001, by 2009 the UN Millennium Development Goals progress report indicated that this figure had increased to 50 percent, even though the basic needs threshold of Timor-Leste is only \$0.88 per day (UNDP and República Democrática de Timor-Leste 2009: 8). Beyond subsistence farming, which employs three-quarters of the population, employment and business opportunities are very limited (World Bank 2009: 4). While international donors have worked to promote new business opportunities in the capital, Dili, they remain limited, and business regulations are constraining. World Bank's 2010 Doing Business Report

Box C.1 Mass Violence in (now-)Timor-Leste since World War II

1942

The Japanese military invades Timor-Leste, with capital city, Dili, taking the brunt of the attack.

1975

As Portuguese colonial government departs, a civil war emerges for control of the new country. Between 1,500 and 3,000 people are killed.

1975–76 (through 1999)

Indonesia invades Timor-Leste. Approximately 2,000 civilians are killed in the first week. Between 102,000 and 183,000 people die over the subsequent 24 years from killings, disappearances, starvation, and widespread malnutrition.

1991

On November 12, in Dili, government forces attack unarmed civilians during a burial procession and peaceful protest. Two hundred and seventy-one protesters are killed and approximately 250 are disappeared.

1999

On August 30, 78.5 percent of residents vote for independence from Indonesia. During and after the vote, violence against people and property is instigated by Indonesian forces and anti-succession militias. Approximately 1,500 people are killed, and 550,000 (more than half the population) are displaced. More than 25 percent of the Timorese population flees to the neighboring Indonesian province of West Timor (Nusa Tenggara Timur). Seventy percent of all homes and infrastructure are destroyed.

2002

A riot on December 4 creates a 12-hour period of lawlessness. Several people are killed by the national police, and many properties are destroyed or attacked including the prime minister's residence and the national Parliament building.

2006–07

Combined political and opportunistic violence amidst broad public disorder leads to 38 deaths between April and May 2006 and up to 150 deaths between October 2006 and April 2007. In Dili, approximately 6,000 properties have been destroyed, and over 100,000 people are displaced.

ranks the country's economy at 163 of 183 (World Bank and International Finance Corporation 2009). On the whole, government institutions are generally weak and function with a dearth of technically skilled labor. Indeed, 40 percent of the over six-age population has never attended school (UNDP 2009) and 42 percent of the adult population is illiterate (UNDP and República Democrática de Timor-Leste 2009: 28). While Timor-Leste has made some progress in in-

creasing primary school net enrollment (2003–08) to 63 percent, secondary school education enrollment continues to lag at only 23 percent (UNICEF 2009). Half of all children are malnourished and underweight, with 130 out of every 1000 children dying before their fifth birthday (UNDP and República Democrática de Timor-Leste 2009: 8).

The socioeconomic picture is worsened by population pressures. The country's population is expected to double in the next 15 years (US Agency for International Development November 2006: 2). With nearly half its population under the age of 15 (World Bank 2008) and a fertility rate of 7.8,³³ Timor-Leste will need to significantly expand employment opportunities to accommodate this extremely large youth cohort. Yet state institutions, infrastructure, and the social fabric of Dili are poorly equipped for such socioeconomic stresses. As mentioned, the capital city is the only sizeable urban center in a predominantly rural country and its population is rapidly swelling. Growing government expenditure and international assistance in Dili create *pull factors* that attract rural-to-urban migration, primarily by unskilled, male youths. The 2004 National Census put the Dili population at 175,730, a 42 percent increase over the 123,474 population, recorded in 2001 (National Statistics Directorate 2006: 29). While some of this population growth is recent, the process of rural-to-urban migration was set off during the Indonesian occupation. It forcibly relocated thousands to Dili, where they would ostensibly be easier to monitor and control than if dispersed over vast rural territories (Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation Timor-Leste 2005: 88). Dili's population in 1975 was only about 28,000, according to CAVR estimates meaning that overall, during only 34 years (1975–2004), Dili's population experienced a staggering 528 percent increase (Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation Timor-Leste 2005: 62). In the absence of effective urban planning, resources, and jobs to accommodate such growth, conditions in Dili's low-income settlements have become increasingly grim, with only 45 percent of housing units having access to piped water and about 50 percent with access to private toilets (UN-Habitat Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific 2006).

At present, the formal sector shows few signs of being able to absorb this population growth. Unemployment in Dili stood at an estimated 23 percent according to the 2004 census, with youth unemployment at 40 percent, and a staggering 58 percent for the 15–19 year age bracket (UNDP and República Democrática de Timor-Leste 2009, 62). The combination of a large youth cohort with high population growth and weak employment within a context of

33. Only two countries have higher fertility rates: Yemen and Afghanistan.

rapid social change and political transition has the potential to generate a highly criminogenic situation in the near future, even if Dili's current crime rates do not yet reflect this situation (Urdal 2006). As will be seen later, youth gang violence is an emerging issue and one that has flared up several times in the independent country's young history.

Some of Timor-Leste's social tensions have been mitigated by the income generated from offshore oil and gas exports developed mainly through joint Australian ventures, but this sector is high-technology intensive and provides almost no jobs to the local population. Oil and gas exports account for over 95 percent of GDP (World Bank 2009, 7). Income from these sources exceeds the government's ability to disburse its budget through state institutions, which have limited effectiveness and absorptive capacity. To safeguard Timor-Leste's petroleum-generated resources and finance development into the future, the country established in mid-2005 a national Petroleum Fund. Created with IMF TA and based on the Norwegian model, it has been rated one of the best-managed natural resource revenue regimes in the world, third only to New Zealand and Norway's (Peterson Institute for International Economics 2007).

Downstream potential problems exist regarding the disbursement of extraction-based revenue however. The readily available wealth has enabled greater social spending, including for several new entitlement programs that provide much needed support to veterans, the elderly, and returning internally displaced persons (IDPs). These benefits are entangled in the politicization of identity and historical alliances. At the same time that they pacify large groups with collective needs and grievances, they potentially build and strengthen existing animosities by creating tension between recipients and nonrecipients (International Crisis Group 2009). There are also intensifying calls for using petroleum wealth to bring about broader more immediate improvements in societal living standards, particularly as poverty has increased since 2001. In this connection, the question arises of whether more money will help build much needed government capacity, or merely enable weak and dysfunctional institutions to persist without the necessary reforms. Another concern is whether the country's oil exports may foster Dutch Disease and undermine other sectors of the country's fledgling economy. Distribution of entitlements could build and bolster Melanesian-style *big men* who will resist any curtailing of benefits. If these individuals' spheres of influence expand to a level at which the funds create competition instead of pacification, this development could lead to additional conflict dynamics and increased violence.

POLITICAL AND LAND CONFLICT

The conflicts and debates surrounding Timor-Leste's oil wealth are best considered within the broader context of other ongoing political, identity-based, and land-related disputes that make the competition for resources all the more competitive and tense. This competition and these tensions are compounded by the fact that segments of Timorese society remain organized to deploy violence if and when deemed necessary or politically convenient.

Severe social trauma is widespread following many waves of forced displacement and opportunistic occupation. These phenomena have created unresolved land conflicts throughout the country (Australian Agency for International Development 2008). Multiple parties often hold claims to the same property, based on official policies and/or documentation from the Portuguese or Indonesian governments, as well as the Timorese government. Parties to land conflicts are often unable or unwilling to negotiate a resolution to the conflict because they fear the violence that motivated the vacating of the property, which often remains unresolved.

The current government has been delayed in providing legal guidance for resolving land conflicts; a Transitional Land Law was finally approved on March 10, 2010. The long-standing absence of laws to determine both the criteria and procedures for resolving land disputes allowed past collective and interpersonal grievances to persist. Hopefully, the new law will promote resolution and closure of some of these issues.

Some land conflicts can be addressed through traditional dispute resolution systems, as evidenced by a 2002 survey which found that land-related disputes were the most common type of dispute raised in traditional village councils (Asia Foundation 2004). However, when the parties to a land dispute belong to different kin or ethno-linguistic groups it may not be possible to identify a mutually respected traditional authority who can oversee a resolution to the dispute. As communities have become more heterogeneous, because of migration, land disputes become increasingly difficult to resolve through traditional kin-based practices. In the past, allegiance to Portuguese or Indonesian authorities often earned people the "gift" of desired properties. These past alliances can now be a liability, and rightful ownership of such properties is often aggressively contested. Collective memory of past grievances, alliances and threats is strong. Even when contentious issues lay dormant, they often remain unforgotten. Recurrent waves of migration, displacement and violence in Timor-Leste have woven together the

issues of identity, violence, trauma, land disputes, and displacement. Amidst the tense social interactions in Dili, it is recognized that future outbreaks of mass violence would once again present the cover and opportunity to “rectify” any number or type of perceived past injustices.

In addition to land conflicts, a host of continuing political conflicts also persist. One particular tension is a division between East and West heritage groups. The distinctions *Lorosaê* (Easterners) and *Loromonu* (Westerners) broadly represent the two largest ethnolinguistic groups in Timor-Leste (Trindade 2007). Antagonism between them rose quickly in April 2006, when a crisis broke out following the dismissal of one-third of the Timor-Leste Defense Force, or *Falintil-Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste* (F-FDTL). Believing that they were being discriminated against by Easterners, the “petitioners” (as the dismissed personnel became known) staged a protest. These grievances fused with other political conflicts and armed clashes ensued between the *Polícia Nacional de Timor-Leste* (PNTL) and the defense forces (F-FDTL), compounded by fighting between armed gangs and martial arts groups. In the violence of April and May 2006, 38 people were killed, and hundreds were injured in street fighting. Some six thousand homes were destroyed, causing the displacement of nearly 150,000 people (Timor-Leste Armed Violence Assessment 2009: 4). Some fled in fear, while others were ejected in land grabs amidst a breakdown of law and order. Many police abandoned their uniforms and fled, some joining in the fighting along kinship lines against civilians, other police officers, or defense force personnel, leading to a period of great violence and uncertainty. Timor-Leste requested emergency international police and military assistance, and asked the UN to establish a police force to maintain law and order until such time as the national police force could be reconstituted and reformed (United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste 2010). Amidst this chaos, political actors were able to quickly reactivate networks of armed groups which proliferated during the Indonesian occupation both as collaborators and resisters.

Today, these once-resistance networks remain active and integrated with other social networks. Individual and group alliances often overlap with martial arts groups, youth groups, veterans groups, gangs and others. The size, composition, resources, and activities of these groups vary immensely (Scambray 2006). While some have a formal face, others have unspecified membership, funding, and activities. Depending on the situation and group in question, they may be viewed as social and recreational outlets, community leaders, and peacekeepers; or as delinquents, protection rackets, and political pawns. These groups have proven remarkably resilient, and their potential for intervening in interpersonal

grievances using violent means remains high. Resources are channeled to them through a complex network of memberships and alliances, which, as mentioned above, can shift and overlap (Timor-Leste Armed Violence Assessment 2008). As mentioned above, the city features an expanding youth population, detached from family support and traditional, village-based control mechanisms.

During the “petitioners” conflict of April 2006, youth groups were closely involved, with some Westerner youths attacking Easterner neighborhoods and vice versa (Arnold 2009: 381). And while it cannot be established for certain, “there were persistent and credible reports of gang members receiving money for provoking violence and carrying out attacks (Timor-Leste Armed Violence Assessment 2009: 4).” Rivalries between the police and defense forces, the weak rule of law, and political infighting opened the gates for groups and individuals to pursue vendettas and opportunistic land grabs with little fear of consequences from the authorities (Arnold 2009: 386). Simmering instances of collective and interpersonal violence continued for several weeks in Dili and culminated in the resignation of Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri at the end of June 2006.

SOCIOCULTURAL FACTORS

In addition to the above-mentioned drivers of crime and violence, there are sociocultural factors that contribute to and compound these dynamics. Violence is enabled by the longstanding tradition of idolizing colonial-era resistance fighters (World Bank 2007: 14). This tradition is linked with a dangerous sense of impunity for perpetrators of violence given the fledgling nature of Timor-Leste’s criminal justice institutions. Formal justice remains uncommon in Dili. The backlog of criminal cases in 2008, with some cases dating back to 2000, was 4,700 (Asia Foundation 2008). Many high-level criminals have been pardoned by politicians, which has frustrated a population that increasingly sees the judicial system as ineffective and politically compromised. People also see little connection between the police and the law (Asia Foundation 2004). The lack of faith in the formal justice system promotes an acceptance of violent gangs and private security companies that provide justice or “enforce peace” according to their own judgment and the will of their patrons. This tendency to deliver informal justice can extend to the police as well, who sometimes chose to deliver their own immediate—and violent—justice.

The spikes in violence since Timor-Leste’s independence have shown that violence in Dili can be quickly and effectively mobilized. During these periods, the context of mass violence created opportunity and cover for the retribution of in-

terpersonal disputes. The seeming fluidity of violence (to flow from political to identity-based to community-based to interpersonal violence) is a dangerous catalyst for rapid escalation in Dili. The international community in Timor-Leste has put significant resources into improving the country's security sector, but the success or lack of success of these measures is contested. It is likely, though, that if mass violence should erupt in the near future, the international community would likely once again assume the lead role in establishing peace. These institutional themes will be addressed in more detail in the following section.

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR SECURITY AND VIOLENCE PREVENTION

Timor-Leste's laws and state institutions are in a simultaneous process of construction, habilitation, and reform. Of particular relevance to issues of crime and violence is the criminal justice system. Unfortunately, institutional development of an effective, accountable, and equitable criminal justice system is an extremely contentious and arduous process, particularly in a fledgling post-conflict setting such as in Timor-Leste (Hinton 2009).

Since 1999, five successive United Nations missions in Timor-Leste have played an active role in police capacity building and state-building efforts in addition to a direct role in state-sponsored security over several periods. Following two years of recruiting and training, the Timorese police force, *Polícia Nacional de Timor-Leste* (PNTL), was established in May 2002 by UNTAET. One source of community tension has been the fact that many of the senior officers of the force initially selected by the UN were drawn from a pool of former Timorese officers who had served under the scorned Indonesian police service (POLRI) during the repressive occupation. While this recruitment source was justified on the basis of bringing in experienced officers, there were unintended consequences in terms of community trust in the police (Peake 2009).

Another problem has been the rivalry between PNTL and Timor-Leste's defense forces, the *Falintil-Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste* (F-FDTL). The F-FDTL was integrated by members of the former liberation movement forces in February 2001 and, after an incremental handover of authority from the UN, accepted complete authority for external security in May 2004. The respective mandates and jurisdictions of PNTL and F-FDTL are unclear and the fact that significant percentages of their personnel were on opposing sides of the political spectrum during the Indonesian occupation is a source of tension between the institutions. As mentioned above, the fault lines between and within these institutions con-

tributed to the crisis of 2006. Following this collapse of security, an Australian-led stabilization force entered. The current United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) was mandated in August 2006 to support state-building, elections, policing, and human rights in coordination with the various UN agencies and other international and domestic institutions engaged in these efforts. Capacity building of Timorese counterparts has been a fundamental objective of UNMIT in each of these areas. UNMIT's mandate with regard to policing includes provision of interim law enforcement and public security until such time as the PNTL is fully reconstituted in all districts (UN Secretary General 2010: 16). As of January 2010, the force strength of the PNTL had reached 3,155, a ratio of 1 officer per 300 inhabitants, a level considered by the UN to be appropriate for the needs of the country. Women constitute 19 percent of the force, a ratio higher than that found in many western European countries (UN Secretary General 2010: 9).

UNMIT began incrementally devolving policing authority back to the PNTL in May 2009, with the objective of a full handover by December 2010, although there is much debate over whether this is suitable or feasible. As reflected in box C.2, a 2008 survey found that nonstate actors were more closely identified with the provision of security than the police.

Some observers have criticized UNMIT for moving too slowly in passing police authority to their Timorese counterparts and on capacity-building for the PNTL (International Crisis Group 2009). Others have said the exact opposite, criticizing the UN for turning over authority too quickly and predicting that a hasty drawdown of UNMIT will increase the likelihood of another episode of mass violence. In his February 2010 report on UNMIT to the Security Council, the Secretary General praised the progress that had been made but also observed that there is a "limited base of national ownership" over the process of security sector reform, adding that "the formal justice system is characterized

Box C.2 Role of Village Chiefs and Community Leaders

While village chiefs and community leaders do not constitute a formal or organized cadre of security providers, they are perceived by Timorese citizens as being primarily responsible for security in Timor-Leste. A 2008 nationwide survey found that respondents were four times more likely to identify community leaders (rather than the police) as primarily responsible for providing security (Asia Foundation 2008: 8). The same survey also found that only 12 percent of respondents said they or someone in their family had had any contact with a police officer in the past year. Of respondents in Dili, 19 percent had had contact with a police officer in the past year.

by a lack of public confidence underpinned by perceived impunity.” The Secretary General went on to observe that many of the issues that fueled the 2006 crisis remained intact including “concerns about politicization” and deficits in “internal accountability mechanisms, professionalism and respect for human rights and gender equality (UN Secretary General 2010: 8).” Gaps in essential equipment, logistics, and specialized skills in forensics and specialized crimes were also cited. The issue of language is another problem that was highlighted in the Secretary General’s report and in a separate document prepared by an independent judicial mission of experts, convened through the Independent Comprehensive Needs Assessment (ICNA).

Timor-Leste has a peculiar language dynamic that poses many challenges. Portuguese and Tetum are the official languages of the country, but the operating language of the courts and all legislation is Portuguese. The difficulties that this poses are evidenced by the fact that just prior to independence in 2001, only 5.3 percent of the population spoke Portuguese, whereas 81.7 percent spoke Tetum. While the government recorded an increase in Portuguese speakers to 15.6 percent in 2007, this remains a small proportion of the population (Independent Comprehensive Needs Assessment 2009: 7). Therefore, the vast majority of Timorese can neither speak nor read the language of the courts. Similarly, the vast majority of PNTL officers do not speak Portuguese. Therefore, they are not equipped to read or understand new legislation that has not yet been translated from Portuguese (UN Secretary General 2010: 13). Investigation files are sometimes written in a combination of four languages: Portuguese, Tetum, Indonesian, and English. (English is the operating language of UNMIT and UNMIT police.) These multilingual records and reports cause downstream problems for investigators, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and defendants.

Language is also a challenge for the UNMIT police in their ability to relate to the public during police patrols and operations and in providing mentorship and capacity building for the PNTL (Independent Comprehensive Needs Assessment 2009: 38). The official language of the UNMIT mission is English and proficiency in that language is a recruitment criterion for UNMIT police officers. As of early 2010, a total of 1,532 UN police officers were deployed in Timor-Leste from more than 41 contributing countries (UN Secretary General 2010: 10). The quality of UNMIT officers in terms of age, range of experience, previous training, educational background, fitness, aptitude, and policing styles is equally diverse (Peake 2009: 149). Knowledge of the local culture, communities, and terrain (particularly since large parts of the country lack formal streets

and much of the population lacks fixed addresses, residences, or phone numbers) is limited and difficult to embed, especially as the various serving nationalities have varying arrival and departure dates and lengths of mission. As a result “personnel are changing regularly and few people remain in a job for more than a few months at a time” such that “everything functions on a short-term basis” (Peake 2009: 150). Within this structure, a degree of stability was offered by the Portuguese Republican Guard, the *Guarda Nacional Republicana* (GNR), which sent between 140 and 200 officers with specialized skills riot control, crowd control, demonstration control, and gang control to staff four UNMIT Formed Police Units (FPU) and to train and develop a similar Timorese PNTL unit. These specialized units have played a crucial role in restoring security and order in Dili (Lemay-Hérbert 2009: 396). Other international actors provide security and capacity building to Timorese police as well. Since May 2006, the International Stabilisation Force (ISF), under Australian command and including one thousand Australian and New Zealand defense forces, has provided support to UNMIT.

Together, FPUs, the UNMIT Police, and the ISF have conducted rapid response actions against gang violence, in addition to carrying out regular patrols and establishing static police posts at a number of key “hot spots.” There have been two key initiatives specifically aimed at combating gang violence, and many community policing initiatives. In response to escalating gang violence, in January 2007 UNMIT authorized the formation of the Gang Task Force, with members from the UNMIT Human Rights and Political Affairs sections, the PNTL, and the ISF. The Gang Task Force at first attempted to mediate between the opposing groups. It hosted high-level talks with the major martial arts group leaders on 24 January 2007 at the PNTL Dili headquarters. When this failed, the UNMIT police, FPUs, and the ISF, in coordination with the Gang Task Force, raided the headquarters of the largest martial arts group, PSHT (*Persaudaraan Setia Hati Terate*).³⁴

Another area of need in Timor-Leste is the prevention of domestic violence. Widespread domestic violence emerges at an early age as Timorese youth first “see and accept violence from their parents (World Bank 2007: 14).” While efforts have been made to address it through the criminal justice system, these

34. In what was probably the largest single operation against a gang, the raid resulted in the arrest of the PSHT leader and approximately 47 of its members, and the seizure of a variety of weapons, including home-made arrows, incendiary devices, police uniforms, and radios.

measures are slow to take effect. Police procedures exist for prosecuting domestic violence as a crime. However, as domestic violence is traditionally considered a family issue, women are often pressured by family members not to report it to the police. If they do, police officers often advise women to return to their family and seek resolution through traditional practices (International Rescue Committee 2003). In traditional practice, however, justice for violence against women is typically negotiated by family elders and meted through compensation to the woman's family, not the woman (IRC 2003). Little or nothing is done to address a woman's physical or psychological suffering (IRC 2003). Additionally, women who persist in pursuing police procedures and later obtain a divorce are often seen as unfit to remarry.

While the police and defense forces constitute the primary front in state-sponsored security provision, many more programs are involved in the broader effort to provide security and stability (box C.3).

In recent years, the government has heavily boosted public spending. While the national budget was \$250 million in 2006 it rose to US\$820 million in 2008, before dropping to \$620 million in 2009. Furthermore, while government execution of its budget was just 35 percent in 2005, it rose to approximately 85 percent in 2009. This massive increase in public spending is often conceived as the government's pursuit of "buying the peace." Indeed, Prime Minister Gusmão, Foreign Minister da Costa and Vice Prime Minister Guterres are all on record as stating that "buying the peace" has been government policy. Government entitlement and benefit programs are extensive. They include pensions for veterans, support payments for persons over 55 years of age, generous housing packages for IDPs, payments to the petitioners, subsidized rice provisions, and local vegetable subsidies. Overall, the government of Timor-Leste has expanded the public service via short term contracts by as much as 40 percent since 2007. The Ministry of Agriculture has almost doubled in size and the Ministry of Education is awarding thousands of scholarships per year to Timorese between the ages of 22 to 50 to study abroad, with destinations including China, Indonesia, Macau, the Philippines, and the United States.

Notwithstanding the aforementioned February 2008 coup and assassination attempts on President José Ramos Horta and Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão, the broad security situation in Timor-Leste has been relatively stable since the cessation of mass violence in 2006–07. The return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) since that violence is progressing well, with some exceptions. A survey of 218 village chiefs in areas to which IDPs are returning and/or resettling found that almost three-quarters of those displaced over the last 3 years have

Box C.3 Security and Violence Prevention Programs (by Sector)

Government entitlement programs

- Pension benefits for veterans, disbursed by the Secretary of State for Issues of Former Combatants of National Liberation.
- Entitlements to hundreds of thousands of people over the age of 60, disbursed by the Ministry of Social Solidarity.
- Housing packages to nearly 13,000 displaced families, disbursed by the Ministry of Social Solidarity.
- Payments of \$8,500 to each of over 700 petitioners, disbursed by the Office of the Prime Minister.
- \$120 million of subsidized rice (for the entire population), disbursed by the Ministry of Tourism, Commerce and Industry.
- \$7 million of local vegetable subsidies for central highlands farmers, disbursed by the Ministry of Tourism, Commerce and Industry.
- Across-the-board civil service employee salary increases.

Policing

- Under the Ministry of Defense and Security, the national police force of Timor-Leste (PNTL) currently shares policing responsibility with the United National Police Force (UNPOL). Note that the current UN mission's mandate ended in February 2010 and was extended until March 2011.
- 1,532 UNPOL police under the United Nations Integrated Mission Timor-Leste (UNMIT) provide policing and policing support to the PNTL. The presence is the second largest in UN history and costs approximately \$200 million per year.
- The International Stabilization Force (ISF) includes 650 Australian and 150 New Zealand defense force personnel and costs approximately \$350 million per year.
- Australian Federal Police Timor-Leste Police Development Program and USAID (through the Asia Foundation) provide training and fund pilot activities to develop procedures and develop capacity within the PNTL.
- Timor-Leste's small but growing national defense force (F-FDTL) receives donor support from several countries including Portugal, Australia, China, and India (Initiative for Peacebuilding 2009).
- In 2008 a national weapons collection program called Operation Kilat (*Gun*) was coordinated by the Ministry of Defense and Security.

Early warning systems for mass violence

- In 2008 the Secretary of State for Security established a Conflict Prevention and Research Unit.
- In 2009 BELUN began issuing quarterly early warning reports. (BELUN is an umbrella NGO that coordinates and assists many smaller, local NGOs)

Employment projects

- Youth employment creation through road work has been coordinated by the Ministry of Infrastructure, the Secretary of State for Vocational Training, and UN ILO; and has received funding from AusAID.
- World Bank is exploring a \$60 million rural youth employment project (2010–15).

(continued on next page)

Box C.3 Security and Violence Prevention Programs (by Sector)
(Continued)

- The Government of Timor-Leste has expanded the public service via short-term contracts by as much as 40 percent since 2007. The Ministry of Agriculture has almost doubled in size.
- There are strong indications that both the police service and defense force will be expanded in size significantly in the coming three years.

Domestic violence and psychosocial services

- The Vulnerable Persons Unit, which operates within the national police force and in coordination with UNPOL.

Informal/Private security provision

- Private security companies
- Maubere Security (2,500 guards)
- APAC Security (1,800 guards)
- Gardamor Security (650 guards)

Land reform

- *Ita Nia Rai* (Our Land) is a large-scale Ministry of Justice pilot program to advance land registration and cadastral development in selected provinces (*Ita Nia Rai* n.d.). Program funding from USAID and implementation through an international consultancy, ARD, is supporting both land titling and the integration of dispute resolution councils to resolve land disputes. The dispute resolution component is being implemented by an international development contractor and nonprofit ACDI/VOCA.

Reconciliation initiatives

- CEPAD-National Dialogue Forum with emphasis on middle-ranking political leaders in the rural districts.
- High-level discussions for political reconciliation have been led by special envoys from Norway, Club of Madrid, and others, with funding from Norway and the World Bank.
- The Timor-Leste/Indonesia Truth and Friendship Commission has endeavored to address grievances between Timor-Leste and Indonesia.
- The Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste (CAVR, aka *Chega!*) addressed violence committed under Indonesian rule (The Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation n.d.).
- Hundreds of low level-reconciliation initiatives are being conducted or have been conducted at the community level concentrating on community and youth leaders.

returned or resettled (International Organization for Migration 2009).³⁵ A 2008 survey found that 53 percent of Timorese nationwide and 78 percent of Dili residents said that security had improved over the 2007–08 period (Asia Foundation 2008).

35. That said, tensions are often still high. Only 20 percent of chiefs said they would accept future resettlements, and some returned IDPs have been re-displaced.

STUDY METHODOLOGY

The study applied both standard victimization data collection as well as qualitative information gathering on people's perceptions of crime and violence, who perpetrates it, what causes it and which actors and what activities are perceived to effectively address crime and violence. This study included a survey, focus group discussions (FGDs), and interviews with NGO representatives, government officials, and business owners. The survey, FGDs, and the business-owner interviews were conducted by a team from the Small Arms Survey, which operates the Dili-based organization, the Timor-Leste Armed Violence Assessment (TLAVA).³⁶ Primary data was collected June 5 through July 17, 2009.

The survey was conducted by selecting one member of each household to be a respondent. The minimum age for selection was 17. The total number of survey respondents was 615, and the total number of focus group discussions (FGDs) was 12, plus 2 pilot FGDs. Timorese enumerators were hired from the pool of enumerators utilized by the National Statistics Directorate. Surveys were conducted in the local language, Tetum. Results were translated into English.

Four FGDs were convened in each community. These groups were separated by age and gender. The 4 groups in each community were constituted as follows: males 17–34; males 35+; females 17–34; and females 35+. A minimum of eight participants was in each FGD. The average number of participants in each FGD was 10–12. Differentiating “youth” from “non-youth” was a challenge. For Timorese, the categories of “youth” and “non-youth” are fundamentally tied to whether or not a person is married. Age is an important factor in the distinction, but for a man or woman in his/her thirties, marriage status seems to be a determining factor. An unmarried person in his/her thirties is generally considered “youth” and a married person in his/her thirties is generally considered “adult.” In the FGDs, age was used as the sole distinction between youth and non-youth because it was decided that asking marriage status in the selection process would confuse the process and potentially lead to selection errors.

Three Dili communities were selected for inclusion in this study: Perumnas, Ai Mutin, and Delta III. Piloting was carried out in a fourth community, Fatuhada (see box C.4 for additional information.) “Communities” were defined in local terms as a recognized area of Dili with relatively clear boundaries, as understood by residents of Dili.

36. The TLAVA team's report will later be posted at their website: www.timor-lesteviolence.org

Box C.4 Communities Selected for Data Collection

1. **Perumnas** (aka Moris ba Dame) in Barrio Pite was selected as a community with a history of high violence, although at the time of the study it was relatively calm. There is significant presence of youth and martial arts groups. There were a total of 357 survey respondents and 4 FGDs.
2. **Ai Mutin** (aka Dom Aleixio) was selected as a community with moderate levels of violence and a high presence of martial arts groups. Violence levels were considered relatively high at the time of the study. There were a total of 141 survey respondents and 4 FGDs.
3. **Delta III** in Comoro was selected as a community with comparatively low levels of violence. Martial arts groups in Delta III are also common. There were a total of 117 survey respondents and four FGDs.
4. **Fatuhada** was selected for piloting the survey and FGDs. The 3 selected communities were so small that piloting in 1 of those communities would have likely influenced the survey results, thus leading to choice of an external community for piloting.

VICTIMIZATION AND PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE


Victimization Levels

Twenty-one per cent of respondents said they were victims of crime in the previous 12 months (Figure C.1). There was no statistically significant difference among the three surveyed communities. In nearly all sections of the survey, the findings in the three communities were virtually identical. Where differences were found, they are discussed.

Victimization by type of crime reveals robbery as overwhelmingly the most common (Figure C.2). Assault and arson were the second and third most prevalent. Differentiation of responses across the three communities was not significant, with the exception that respondents in Ai Mutin reported slightly higher victimization by assault. In Ai Mutin, 6.8 percent of respondents indicated they had been victims of assault in the preceding year, compared to an overall average of 3.5 percent.

In the survey and focus groups, respondents strongly indicated that their communities were relatively free from violence. Nearly 90 percent of respondents said they very much or somewhat agreed that their respective communities were relatively free from violence. That being said, nearly 96 percent indicated that more should be done to prevent violence in their community. Despite this assertion and the relatively high incidence of robbery, when questioned as to whether their communities were relatively free from violence, 89.2 percent said very much or somewhat agreed (Figure C.3). From the FGDs on the topic,

Figure C.1 Population Victimized by Crime in the Previous 12 Months (by Community) (%)



one could infer the reason for this to be that respondents frequently—and consciously—based their assessment of current violence on a comparison to previous historical episodes of violence. When set against Timor-Leste’s violent historical continuum discussed earlier, and particularly the mass violence of the past. On the one hand, communities report very low violence (because of a conscious or subconscious comparison with the extreme violence during 2006–07) and they also strongly desire increased efforts to prevent violence (based on the same historical experiences).

Moreover, because the international community has been most predominantly concerned with mass violence, it is possible that participants assumed that the World Bank study enumerators were researching mass violence (instead of interpersonal or criminal violence). Indeed, separate interviews with government officials revealed the perception that Timor-Leste is one the most heavily surveyed countries in the world, because of the massive international TA

Figure C.2 Population Victimized by Crime in Past Year (by Type of Crime) (%)





Figure C.3 Your Community is Relatively Free from Violence (%)

In this community there is no major problem because everyone understands each other, but sometimes people from other communities come and make problems.

Adult female

efforts.³⁷ Thus, household respondents may not have succeeded in divorcing their responses to these questions on interpersonal or criminal violence from their responses to previous surveys or subjective comparisons to previous periods.


Indoors, outdoors, and at markets, survey respondents indicated they felt safe.

When asked about spending time in these various locations, during both daytime and nighttime, respondents said they felt safe. Each of the questions in this grouping elicited a “very safe” or “somewhat safe” response from between 88 percent and 99 percent of respondents. The time and location with the lowest perceived safety (88 percent) was time spent walking outdoors at night. The highest perceived safety was felt during the day, regardless of whether the respondents were inside their homes or outdoors (both 99 percent).

Respondents also indicated a very high level of trust in members of their community (Figure C.4). Again with consistent responses across the three communities, 87 percent of all respondents agreed when asked whether people in their community could be trusted to look out for one another. This likely represents a strong degree of social cohesion within communities or at the least the perception that community members are internally innocuous. By contrast, FGD participants revealed low levels of trust in people from neighboring communities and blamed local offenses, such as animal theft, on outsiders. FGDs indicated the perception that intra-community problems were managed well through consul-

37. Personal correspondence with the Ministers of Finance and the Secretary of State for Youth and Sport, May 2009 (Dili and Geneva).

Figure C.4 People in This Neighborhood Can Be Trusted to Look Out for One Another (%)



tation with—or intervention of—chiefs or elders. They suggested that the serious problems lay in inter-community disputes, as there was no means to engage with neighboring communities through traditional means. It seems likely that individuals who seek to commit crime, do so outside of their own community, where they are more likely to be anonymous and less likely to receive retribution.

COPING BEHAVIORS

In the survey, respondents were asked if they had taken any measures to avoid being hurt or assaulted. Seventy percent responded negatively, while 30 percent responded that they had taken measures to avoid victimization.

Coping strategies were discussed in more detail in the focus groups. The most commonly indicated strategy to avoid violence was to establish and maintain good relationships with neighbors. Example responses include the following: “Preserve peace and unity.” “Exercise caution and protect the unity.” “Solve the problem in the spirit of family.” “Discipline and peace is based on trust.” “For the security in this community, let us support each other to preserve the peace, and prevent more violence.”

Other common responses were to take measures to protect houses in various ways. These included turning lights on at night, building fences, getting an aggressive dog. Examples responses were: “Build fence around the house, raise dogs, and lock the doors.” “Put high power lights outside the house.” “Exercise caution when walking around, lock the house, and turn on the light when in need to do or get something outside at night.”

A large number of respondents also said they gather weapons and supporters to protect themselves, suggesting that their fear of a renewed escalation of mass

violence was a realistic possibility. For example: “We must be ready with machetes.” “Be prepared with a sharp weapon, a club, a machete, or arrows.” “We keep dogs, we prepare arrows and machetes.” “We have to be ready with lights and some machetes.” “To be ready with any sharp objects like machetes and iron pipes for self-protection.” One particular response seems to indicate the dual roles that youth groups can play as both defensive and offensive actors: “Prepare the knives, organize community members and youth to provide the security, also prepare stones.”


DOMESTIC AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

Young women, in FGDs, described many examples of public harassment. Often this was sexually based, with young men calling out, beating, or throwing rocks at young women. Women also described being beaten by other women. FGD participants noted that these events sometimes escalated into martial arts group violence when victimized girls later turned to their boyfriends, brothers and other male relatives. Seventeen percent of respondents said they knew of *anyone* who had been a victim of domestic violence or “family disagreements” in the past year.

This finding is lower than was expected, given expert views that domestic violence against women and children is widespread in Timor-Leste.³⁸ This survey finding may simply reflect a difference between Western ideas of domestic violence and local norms. Indeed, in Timor-Leste “what constitutes a crime is derived from local-based understanding rather than legal texts” (Peake 2009: 144). Domestic violence is traditionally perceived as a private and familial matter, and thus may be seen as a matter of family interaction and *not* a matter of violence as such (Figure C.5). If this is the case, the low survey response to questions about domestic violence is in itself may reveal something about the ingrained nature of violence in everyday life. Other surveys carried out by other organizations may have succeeded at directly capturing instances of spousal and child abuse because these surveys focused exclusively on these issues rather than on more general crime and violence patterns, thus allowing for greater sensitivity in discussion of privacy issues and more direct questioning. If this survey had queried specific incidents such as “Has your spouse hit you in the previous 12 months?” then a different response might have been forthcoming. Indeed a 2003 survey that directly questioned domestic violence issues found that over

38. See UN Secretary General (2010: 20) for example.

Figure C.5 Do You Know of Anyone Who, During the Last Year, Was a Victim of Violent Domestic Circumstances or Family Disagreements? (%)



half of the women surveyed (51 percent) strongly agreed that “a man has good reason to hit his wife if she disobeys him” (Swain cited in TLAVA 2009: 4). Related to this, 45 percent strongly agreed that “family problems should only be discussed with people in the family” (Swaine cited in TLAVA 2009: 4).

PERCEIVED DRIVERS OF VIOLENCE

Unemployment was overwhelmingly identified as the greatest problem in the selected communities (Figure C.6). Violence was noted as a distant second. This focus is unsurprising, considering that 44 percent of respondents claimed they “do not work” and 26 percent described themselves as “self-employed,” which is likely to include some degree of underemployment.

Respondents drew strong causal links between violence, unemployment, boredom, depression, and alcohol consumption. Community members indicated across all methods of data collection that alcohol consumption was a serious problem. Indeed, local palm liquor is inexpensive and easily available. In focus groups, community members saw alcoholism and unemployment as mutually reinforcing. People drink because unemployment intensifies the stress of poverty and also increases depression and boredom. Drinking too much alcohol then reinforces the cycle, making them both violent and unemploy-

We know that the conflict occurred because there are many unemployed youth or there are no activities for them to carry out, therefore they feel stress, they drink and get drunk, they destroy and create problems with other people.

Lots of young people are not attending school, so they have nothing to do but get drunk.

Female youths

Figure C.6 What is Currently the Greatest Problem in This Community? (%)





Figure C.7 What Do You Mainly Do to Generate Income? (%)



able. This association between unoccupied time and violence fits reasonably with frequent statements that engagement in sports, arts, music groups, and attendance at school would prevent youths from engaging in violence.

Jealousy or “social envy” was also described in a FGD of adult men as a motivator of crime and violence. One young woman also noted that “social jealousy . . . stemming from an unequal standard of living” was a trigger of hatred. A young man expressed that if someone is jealous of a person’s motorcycle, he will be motivated to steal it because of his own perceived low status.

Tension between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of government disbursements was also occasionally raised in FGDs. Examples of contested benefits in these discussions were sometimes scholarships, sometimes payments to IDPs, and sometimes general favoritism to members of a certain political party.

Everyone’s attention goes to the IDPs, but not to those who were not.

Male youth

YOUTH VIOLENCE AND MARTIAL ARTS GROUPS

The survey also endeavored to query community perspectives on youth and martial arts groups to gain a perspective on their perceived role as relates to crime and insecurity. Community perspectives on youth groups and martial arts groups were found to be polarized and ambiguous, suggesting the dual positive/negative role that these groups can play in community dynamics. A strong majority of respondents identified youth and martial arts group violence as the type of violence with the greatest negative impact on their community (Figure C.8). Over 90 percent of respondents indicated one of these two groups, with youth groups receiving the higher percentage.


Similarly, 63 percent of respondents very much or somewhat agreed with the statement that youth and/or martial arts groups are the primary source of violence in their community (Figure C.9).

Paradoxically, however, two-thirds of respondents also indicated that youth and martial arts groups have a positive impact on their community.

Thieves have broken into my house at night three or four times. When the dogs alert us, we call the youths out to protect us.

Adult male


Figure C.8 What Type of Violence Has the Greatest Negative Impact on Your Community? (%)



While this response may seem to contradict the two preceding findings, there are many possible explanations to reconcile these attitudes towards youth and martial arts groups.

First, significant percentages of the household respondents were probably members of these groups and this could have positively biased responses. Secondly, individual martial arts groups and individual youth groups vary greatly from and their actions vary over time. It is, thus, quite plausible for a single respondent to indicate that *some* youth/martial arts groups are the greatest source of violence in the community, and at the same time believe that *other* youth/martial arts groups have a positive impact on the community. It should also be expected that many respondents were members of these groups. It is

Figure C.9 Youth and/or Martial Arts Groups Are the Primary Source of Violence in Your Community (%)



reasonable that they might consider their group to have a positive impact on the community, while some other groups are responsible for violence.

Communities may also perceive that these groups play a functional role in keeping the peace, even if this may sometimes involve the instrumental use of violence, for example in the form of retributive violence. Thirdly, mixed responses may also reflect the belief that “our” local youth groups are positive as compared with those of other communities, given the fact that crime was highlighted as being an inter-community issue rather than an intra-community one.

Notably mixed responses were found when asked about the safety that membership in one of these groups affords (figure C.11). It seems likely that ambiguity in these responses may reflect the heterogeneity and multiple functions of these groups, as discussed above.

In my opinion, it's not the martial arts groups who have created the problem, but it is the political parties that use the martial arts groups for politics.

Adult male

The root of the problem is that they [martial arts groups] fight over girls.

Adult male

RELIANCE ON INSTITUTIONS TO ADDRESS VIOLENCE

Survey respondents and FGD participants overwhelmingly stated that they preferred to have community leaders resolve disputes. They noted police officers as a very distant second. When asked to rank their top responses to the question “what groups are doing the best to reduce violence in your community,” 94 per-

Figure C.10 These Youth/Martial Arts Groups Have a Positive Impact on Your Community (%)





Figure C.11 People Have More Protection If They Join Youth/Martial Arts Groups (%)

What is the most serious problem in your community?
 “There is always violence among the family members in a household.”

Adult woman

group participants noted that parents and/or youth leaders are often approached instead of elders. And for more substantial disputes, some focus group participants indicated preferences for police. A national survey conducted in 2008 illuminated how Timorese preferences change depending both on the type of dispute and whether the respondent is based in a rural or urban community (Table C.1).

When the problem is severe, we call the neighborhood elder but when it is a light problem, we call those responsible or the youth leader to resolve the problem. When the problem still cannot be resolved, we call the police.


Adult male

cent of survey respondents named “community/aldeia leaders” as their first choice. This preference for community leaders to resolve disputes is noteworthy as the thrust of international TA efforts directed towards violence prevention has been to focus on developing and strengthening centralized criminal justice institutions.

For minor disputes, though, some focus group participants noted that parents and/or youth leaders are often approached instead of elders. And for more substantial disputes, some focus group participants indicated preferences for police. A national survey conducted in 2008 illuminated how Timorese preferences change depending both on the type of dispute and whether the respondent is based in a rural or urban community (Table C.1).

The Catholic Church was also recognized in some focus groups as a unifying force and an effective provider of services. With 97 percent of Timorese identifying as Catholic, this unifying identity could succeed in transcending other divisions.

Perceptions of police were mixed. When asked how they respond to violence, many survey respondents indicated that they informed the police. However, participants in FGDs often spoke of police officers arriving too late, arresting everyone involved,

Figure C.12 What Groups Are Doing the Best to Reduce Violence in Your Community? (%)**Table C.1** Use of formal authorities to resolve hypothetical disputes (%)

Using formal authorities	Brother beaten up*	Land dispute with another household**	Land dispute with another village***	Conflicting land ownership****	Request for triple the price*****
National	48	18	46	35	84
Urban	48	26	45	31	74
Rural	49	16	46	50	87

Source: World Bank. "Trust, Authority and Decision Making: Findings from the Extended Timor-Leste Survey of Living Standards," Justice for the Poor, World Bank, June 2010.

Notes: In this figure, "formal authorities," refers to police, courts, lawyers, judges, prosecutor, Prosecutor's Office, and district/subdistrict authorities.

* Your younger brother was beaten up by someone from a neighboring village.

** Your household is experiencing a property boundary dispute with another household.

*** Your village is experiencing a property boundary dispute with another village, which involves part of the land that you farm.

**** Someone is claiming ownership over your land.

***** An official at the subdistrict level is asking triple the asking price to process government documents.

or beating people up. Frustration with police was also connected to respondents' frustration with the justice system, which FGD participants complained was broadly ineffective. FGD participants rarely made distinctions among the various police forces that patrol Dili streets and rarely made distinctions between the court system and the police.

CONCLUSIONS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE OPTIONS

While Timor-Leste no longer faces the state repression and terror that it once did, the potential for mass violence remains and is closely linked to political developments, as shown by the events of 2006–07. As before, there is a risk that politically linked conflict may rapidly incite and enable other conflicts and disputes to become violent. Post-conflict countries often experience an upsurge in

street-crime related violence (Hinton and Newburn 2009). The goal therefore should be to strengthen governmental capacity, the functioning of the nonoil economy, prevention of traditional patterns of violence, together with preventing the entrenchment of new patterns of street and organized crime. Prior to addressing some specific policy interventions, some caveats are worth mentioning.

First, proactively addressing mass violence in Dili requires a keen understanding of Timor-Leste's complex historical, political, filial, and economic networks and alliances. While community-based violence prevention activities must engage and integrate with these networks, a significant challenge is to avoid cooption of program resources for ulterior purposes. Extensive consultations and ongoing engagement is recommended.

Second, any community-based intervention will create relative winners and losers; it will be difficult for external donors to keep a balanced perspective on group dynamics and group/interpersonal relationships that divide and transcend beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries. Close monitoring of programs is prudent, particularly because one legacy of the colonial period is the popular justification of violence against perceived aggressors and the lionization of grassroots leaders who rebel against external oppression.

Related to the tradition of the resistance movement, is the existence of martial arts groups. These groups have only recently gained recognition by many outside observers, but they emerged early during the Indonesian occupation and have deep societal roots (Timor-Leste Armed Violence Assessment 2009: 1). While some martial arts groups may often engage in violence, extortion, or related activities, others may not. Historical connections and allegiances with veterans groups, kinship groups, etc. create a geographically vast and easily mobilized network. Patronage by long-time members who have risen to high political office afford both political protection and financial support.³⁹ Political elites have been rumored to seek political objectives by mobilizing youth and martial arts groups to violence, an issue that was indeed echoed in the FGDs of this study. Implementing community-based programs without acknowledging the role of martial arts groups is likely to lead to cooption or failure. Engaging with martial arts groups, on the other hand, should be done alongside extensive research and oversight.⁴⁰

39. Note that women also constitute a sizable minority among some martial arts groups. They are also frequently members of youth groups.

40. In recent years, research on the roles and typology of martial arts groups and youth groups in parts of Dili has been conducted by James Scambray. His publications include "A Survey of Gangs and Youth Groups in Dili, Timor-Leste: A Report Prepared for AusAID, Timor-Leste," Sept 7, 2006;

With these caveats in mind, the sections below address some avenues for policy intervention. Timor-Leste's development challenges are great and its state institutions still quite new. Advancing the processes of state-building and capacity building are rightly the primary areas of assistance by international actors, and these activities require a long span of time. Additional laws and reforms are being created each month. New political groups are forming and old rivals are working together even as they, at times, fan the flames of contentious issues. More than three-quarters of the country is struggling to learn to speak Portuguese, the operating language of the law and courts, even as many strive with basic literacy in their mother tongue or hope to learn English. A new generation of civil servants, educators, police, and legal professionals are learning the ropes and developing professional standards. While it is impossible identify all possible areas of intervention relating to crime and violence prevention, listed below are some of the key areas of action that emerge from the research undertaken in this study. Because crime and violence are complex social issues and respond to a dynamic mix of social, demographic, economic, and political forces, the following policy recommendations should not be seen exclusively as violence prevention initiatives, but as broader initiatives that will also foster conditions for effective development and good governance, with positive spillover effects in other areas as well.

SOCIAL AND SITUATIONAL PREVENTION OPPORTUNITIES

Employment was overwhelmingly recognized as the greatest problem in all three communities involved in this study and is a recognized problem nationwide, particularly for the youth. While the government is vastly expanding state spending and increasing the size of the public sector, nonoil private sector development is needed. Government-support for employment and skills training was requested in virtually all of the FGDs. The participants all stressed the connections between unemployment and violence and, thus, skills training and employment support is a logical area for intervention. Virtually all FGDs requested reinstatement of a discontinued International Labor Organization public works program, which paid \$2.00 per day. On the subject of job support and skills, an FGD of adult women asked specifically for sewing machines, while an FGD of

"Groups, Gangs and Armed Violence in Timor-Leste," TLAVA, April 2009; and "Anatomy of a Conflict: The 2006–2007 Communal Violence in East Timor," June 2009.

young women asked for computer classes and English courses. Both groups said these types of skills would create new opportunities and jobs. Such initiatives could be explored within a broader micro-credit or micro financing framework.

Several FGD participants also advocated skills training specifically targeted to youth. Youth programs are some of the most common community-based violence prevention programs in Dili, but there is a need for activities beyond providing support for recreational youth group activities. Many international NGOs and donors organize sporting tournaments and theatre performances or provide equipment, musical instruments, or art supplies to promote student groups engaged in cohesive social activities (Scambary 2006). These can be positive interventions and serve as an entry point for social cohesion. They are also nearly universally well received. Still, it would be important to evaluate whether these activities have a direct impact on preventing violence. There is also a limit to support that can be absorbed at this level.

Highly recommended would be to experiment with targeted interventions of an educational or life skills nature, as youths are sometimes engaged in informal employment pursuits, for example cleaning storefronts, providing security to businesses. Thus, piloting programs to develop entrepreneurial skills and integrate some of these activities into the formal sector would be a valuable complement to sporting, musical, or artistic programs. Civic education could also be incorporated into life skills training to promote awareness of individual responsibility regarding prevention of politically motivated mobilization of violent groups (Grenfell 2006: 334) and also improved understanding of political and electoral processes. Related to this is the often cited proposal for youth center support. The construction of youth centers can provide positive social activities and a safe environment for youths. These centers can also be locations for educational activities, skills and trade building, or small entrepreneurial activities.

Related to the issue of employment and skills generation in the nonoil, urban economy, is the importance of the agricultural sector. Attention to the rural economy is critical, particularly as most Timorese live in rural areas. Improved employment opportunities and productivity in rural agriculture could reduce the rural-to-urban migration that is burdening Dili. Timor-Leste is also heavily dependent on food imports and vulnerable to commodity fluctuations, so improved agricultural productivity will help with this as well. Improving government service provision on a routine basis was described as relevant to the crime and violence issues in the FGDs. It should also be understood that the Catholic Church is a widely recognized provider of many services in these communities and support to or collaboration with the Catholic Church could be fruitful. A

lack of good roads in Dili's low-income communities make it difficult for police and other vehicles to enter to provide assistance or protection, which would promote overall quality of life, health, and productivity. Without the presence of public provision of water, sanitation, transportation, security, and lighting, informal sector providers may arise along with the potential for their consolidation into protection rackets and mafia-style crime groups as has been seen in other settings (Hinton 2009).

LEGAL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM WORK

There are a number of areas relating to legal, judicial, and police development that would contribute directly or indirectly to violence and crime prevention. As mentioned above, land tenure issues remain a latent and active source of social tension and conflict. The recent approval of the land law is an important step forward for progress on this front. Respondents in this study expressed a strong preference for resolving grievances through community leaders over formal processes such as police and courts. For several years, USAID has funded a pilot land tenure dispute resolution program that involves traditional village leaders in the process of establishing formal land registration in urban and periurban areas. Lessons from this program could be incorporated into a pilot program to address land disputes on a larger scale. The new land law could mark an opportunity for outreach programs and services to help people resolve land disputes through applying the new land law.

Many of these initiatives would need to be supported by an effective judicial system. Whether to uphold newly developed property laws or other categories of legislation, Timor-Leste will need to make rapid progress in expanding the capacity of courts to process cases, and increase the number of courts with trained Timorese judges.⁴¹ As mentioned earlier, courts are heavily overburdened with only 13 Timorese judges, whose work is supplemented by a foreign judges brought from Portuguese-speaking countries (Independent Comprehensive Needs Assessment 2009). Training programs for Timorese judges, both locally and abroad, could be an important means to provide a wider background for practitioners, and to better integrate the judicial system within Timorese society. Access to justice initiatives and support for overcoming the language and translation barriers that restrain the system are also important. Programs to

41. UNDP operates a training program for judges called the Justice System Program.

support the development of public prosecutors and public defenders could help to ensure that suspects receive a fair defense, offenders are brought to justice and that would-be law breakers learn that there is both a likelihood of detection and sanctions for crime.

Prison capacity and prison conditions are in need of increase and improvement, respectively. If other parts of the justice sector are improved and the country's backlog of criminal cases is reduced, it is likely that convictions and prison sentences will increase. If offenders are sentenced to prison, but released because prison space is unavailable, confidence in the justice system will remain low and further erode the rule of law (Hinton and Newburn 2009). Donors may provide support for construction of prisons and also the training of employees for prisons.

World Bank's Justice for the Poor Program has an active program of research addressing the interface of customary land management and rural development. The group also examines how the government and communities can better interact through, for example, decentralization and cash transfers (Justice for the Poor, World Bank n.d.). Many FGD participants described a need for these types of programs that formally and routinely engage local, traditional authorities in the management of community problems. One proposed that a council of community leaders be organized to meet to discuss inter-community problems, which they said were not being addressed by any existing mechanism. Others added that this council of chiefs should be meeting monthly to discuss routine issues. An FGD of adult men proposed that traditional gatherings (*nahe biti boot*) should be held in Dili. These gatherings are often quite large, where many people (not just village chiefs) come together to resolve their problems through dialogue.

Several FGDs also suggested support for mediation services and/or mediation training. They noted that some previous mediation support had been conducted at too high a level, involving the leaders of martial arts groups. The FGDs suggested more help for low-level mediation to address interpersonal—instead of collective—disputes, especially those that cross community lines where mutually respected traditional elders among the disputants often do not exist.

Related to the issue of dispute resolution and mediation is also the issue of the police. While respondents in this study expressed a preference for community leaders over police in resolving disputes, a large number also expressed that to protect themselves from assault or other violence, they would call the police. It is also clear that traditional leaders were unable to quell the mass violence that erupted in 1999, 2002, 2006, and 2007 and that traditional structures provide insufficient recourse to women and children who are victimized by domes-

tic violence. Traditional leaders are an important part of community security in Dili, but police are an essential component as well, particularly as urbanization seems to compromise the effectiveness of traditional dispute resolution practices. Bringing community leaders and police together to develop collaborative and reinforcing practices could be a successful combination. This could be particularly important in times of crisis when people are likely to seek trusted, traditional leadership figures (Hohe 2004). If large-scale violence erupts again in Dili, people are likely to turn to their community leaders. If police have developed relationships with these leaders, they may be better able to work together to limit the violence.

In post-conflict countries, community policing is a common form of security sector assistance that can be effectively implemented at the development stages of assistance (Goldsmith 2009). Many donors in Timor-Leste are involved in community policing studies, pilots, and training programs, some of which claim positive results.⁴² Timor-Leste's police force is not yet ten years old and community perceptions of the police are evolving. Assistance to the PNTL at this early stage could be a good opportunity to create an effective role for the police and to determine best practice, common guidelines, and training models. Exchanging experiences and lessons learned with other emerging democracies that have had some success in reforming the police may be an effective approach.

Assistance with data collection, analysis, and dissemination, based on a violence observatory model could also be an effective strategy to link community needs with government service provision, and promote South-South learning. Violence observatory programs throughout Latin America could be used as models for pilot programs in Dili. Related programs could improve collection and analysis of health statistics, which provide violence-related data that is typically less prone to political manipulation.

Another connection to the health sector is the potential to support victims of psychosocial trauma or domestic abuse through related services. Understanding historical issues and traditional norms in Timor-Leste is critical to providing these services. Pilot studies combining foreign and national expertise would be useful in conceiving effective services and delivery. The Office for the Promotion of Equality is the leading force in the government for domestic abuse issues. The UN's Vulnerable Person's Unit provides services to victims and related programs. Support for these bodies could be a useful starting point for expanding programs with best practices and/or developing new pilot programs. Pro-

42. For example: UNPOL, Australia, New Zealand, and Portugal.

moting awareness of existing and new programs may also help to influence how domestic abuse and trauma are perceived, and broaden the recognition that these are serious problems that deserve attention. Skills training for women to bridge the divide between domestic violence service provision and traditional justice structures could be a useful area to pursue. Currently, the lack of women's involvement in traditional justice structures limits the potential for government-provided services to reach women in need.⁴³

GOVERNANCE


Finally, interventions to support oversight of institutions and policing are needed if programs and services are to reach the poor without significant diversion of resources in the process. Corruption poses a significant obstacle to development effectiveness and a direct challenge to any rule of law initiatives. It prevents needed services and programs from reaching the needy and allows criminal groups to entrench themselves with official connivance or protection. In Timor-Leste where there is a heavy dependence on oil wealth, there is immense potential for conflict over entitlements and the use of state resources to assert political power and compromise institutional effectiveness. Initiatives to support civil society and media oversight could be effective in promoting both vertical and horizontal accountability,⁴⁴ as well as checks and balances across government.

43. ACIDI/VOCA's community mediation program, which requires the participation of women on village councils to determine land rights issues, could be a resource for learning.

44. For more on vertical and horizontal accountability, see O'Donnell (1998) and World Bank (2004).

Appendix D

Crime and Violence and the Urban Poor: The Case of Fortaleza, Brazil



Brazil is the ninth largest economy of the world and is the largest country in population and area in Latin America (World Bank 2010). It also is one of the world's most unequal societies, with stark income and land tenure disparities. Regional levels of prosperity also are highly skewed. The wealthy Southeast is very developed as compared to the poverty stricken Northeast, which is home to roughly 50 percent of the poor in Brazil (DFID 2006). According to official data from the 2000 census, approximately 77 percent of the municipalities in northeast Brazil had more than half of their population living below the poverty line at the beginning of this decade (IBGE 2008). Structural reasons such as adverse climate conditions, low levels of education, inequitable economic development, and weak governance are among the main causes of such high levels of poverty.

One of the largest cities of the Northeast—and the subject of this study—is Fortaleza, the capital of the state of Ceará. In recent years, Ceará has made commendable progress in transforming from a mainly rural economy to a dynamic, modern one (World Bank 2003). During the 1990s, the state's government invested heavily in a fiscally sound development agenda that attracted new industries, which yielded impressive results. At 4 percent, the annual growth rate for much of the 1990s was higher than the average for Brazil as a whole. Ceará also made substantive progress in health care through advancements in preventive health services. In addition, the state made impressive gains in the education sector, mainly by increasing primary education coverage to 98 percent of children and adolescents aged 7–14, and by reducing the rate of school abandonment by 20 percent from 1995 to 2000 (Naspolini 2001).⁴⁵

Ceará's position in Brazil's National Human Development Index improved from 0.47 in 1980 to 0.80 in 2004. Nevertheless, despite all the efforts to promote social development and economic growth, important challenges remain. Most socioeconomic indicators in Ceará are well below the average for Brazil as a whole. In addition, levels of income inequality and poverty are still high. Ceará's level of income inequality measured by the Gini index is 0.62—among the highest in Brazil. Despite a reduction of more than 10 percent in the number of poor people from 2006 to 2008, 47 percent of the population in Ceará still lives below the poverty line (CAEN 2008).⁴⁶ As a result, the poorest sectors of the population bear the brunt of the consequences associated with high levels of inequality and social exclusion, including crime and violence.

Crime and violence are serious issues in Fortaleza. During 1997–2007, the homicide rate in Fortaleza climbed from 27.0 to 40.3, and surpassed the national rate (36.6 in 2007) (Waiselfisz 2010).

Youth violence increasingly has contributed to the overall increase in violence in Brazil, particularly in Fortaleza. In 1980, 23 percent of the deaths among men aged 15–24 in Brazil were homicides, and 36 percent were due to natural causes. By 2002, 51 percent of deaths among this group were homicides, and 20 percent due to natural causes. In Fortaleza, levels of youth violence are not as high as in other major cities in Brazil but are growing very rapidly. According to findings from the *Mapa da Violência: Os Jovens do Brasil* (Waiselfisz 2006: 42) the homicide rate among youth aged 15–24 in Fortaleza increased by

45. School abandonment rates went down from 13.2% in 1995 to 10.5% in 1999.

46. The poverty line used for this study was the per-capita income of up to half of the minimum salary (R\$207.50).

53 percent between 1994 and 2004 from 32.3 to an alarming 49.5 per 100,000 inhabitants.

Women are disproportionately affected by intimate partner violence. Intimate partner violence is the most common form of violence against women in Brazil. According to results from a 2005 study by the Brazilian Senate, 17 percent of women interviewed had been victims of some form of domestic violence at some point in their lives (Senado Federal 2005). Of these, 55 percent had been victims of physical violence; 24 percent had been victims of psychological violence; 14 percent had been victims of moral violence; and 7 percent had been victims of sexual violence (Senado Federal 2005). In Fortaleza and Ceará as a whole, data on violence against women is scanty but available statistics show that violence against women has increased significantly in the past five years. Since 2004, more than 600 women have been killed in the state.⁴⁷ Data on other forms of violence against women at the state and municipal levels remain a challenge in Ceará.

Levels of other crimes also are high in Ceará and Brazil. According to official data, violent crimes against property are far more frequent nationally than other types of crime (Ministério da Justiça 2006). For example, the risk of being a victim of robbery was 23 times higher than the risk of being a victim of homicide (Ministério da Justiça 2006). The overall robbery⁴⁸ and assault rates per 100,000 people in 2005 in Brazil were 519.4 and 1,163.1, respectively. Data disaggregated at the state level show that Ceará has the second highest rate of robbery of all states in Brazil: 889.2 robberies per 100,000 people, next to the Federal District with 1,159.4 robberies per 100,000 people. In 2004 Fortaleza ranked third among municipalities in Brazil for the highest rate of robberies per 100,000 people at 1908.1. However, in 2005 Fortaleza catapulted to the top, when it ranked as the Brazilian municipality with the highest rate of robbery per 100,000 people at 2,617.7. It was 35 percent higher than the second-ranked municipality, Belem, in the state of Pará, with a rate of 1933.5 robberies per 100,000 people.

Despite these high levels of crime and violence, Brazil has experienced many positive changes at the national and subnational levels. While many Latin American countries—and especially Central America—have recently seen a rise

47. http://www.antasul.fm.br/antena/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=270:violencia-contra-mulher-cresce-315&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=93

48. The rate of robbery is the sum of all the reported crimes related to extortion, car and truck robbery, bank robbery, street robbery, robbery in a bus, robbery in a commercial locale, house robbery, and other robberies.

in national homicide rates over the past decade, Brazil's national homicide rates have declined from 28.9 per 100,000 in 2003 to 26.4 per 100,000 in 2008. This decline is even more pronounced in major cities, such as São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Belo Horizonte. The Northeast, however, has not experienced the same level of crime reduction as the Southeast.

The chapter is structured as follows: section one presents background information on the researched communities and the sampling methodology for the data collection. Section two discusses the general levels of crime and violence victimization found in the surveyed communities. It also disaggregates data to reveal information about the most prevalent types of crime and violence, including intimate partner violence, in the researched communities. Section three discusses people's perceptions of crime and violence and levels of fear. Section four analyzes the levels of interpersonal trust and confidence in institutional efficacy, and discusses how residents have sought to cope with insecurity issues. Section five presents information on respondent views of appropriate policy interventions. Section six presents the current institutional crime prevention arrangements at the national, state, and municipal levels. Finally, section seven concludes and offers suggestions for policy formulation.

COMMUNITY BACKGROUND AND SURVEY SAMPLE METHODOLOGY

Fortaleza is now the fourth largest city in Brazil, with a total population of 2.4 million. The metropolitan area of Fortaleza includes another 12 municipalities and if we take these into account, the population increases to 3.6 million. Fortaleza is a fragmented society with huge socioeconomic gaps between the haves and the have-nots. Levels of development in the more affluent communities are comparable to those of industrialized countries whereas the levels of development in the poorest communities are comparable to some of the poorest countries in the world. For example, the neighborhood of Meireles has a human development index (HDI) of 0.916, which is similar to that of Portugal and other OECD countries. Conversely, the communities that are part of the study have an average HDI of 0.420, which is comparable to those countries with the lowest levels of human development according to the UN, such as Zambia and Côte d'Ivoire (Agora XXI 2002).

To shed some light on how crime and violence issues may affect the urban poor in Fortaleza, six communities were selected for study through a quantitative and qualitative survey. The neighborhoods of Serviluz, São Miguel, Bom


Table D.1 Age Distribution of Respondents

Age Group	%
15–19	29.7
20–24	17.7
25–29	15.5
30–34	6.2
35–39	12.1
40–44	5.1
45–49	3.6
50–54	3.4
55–60	4.9
61 and over	1.8

Source: Author's calculations.

Jardim, Granja Portugal, Granja Lisboa, and Dendê were selected for study (table D.1). These communities were selected because statistics show high levels of crime and violence in these neighborhoods and they have been identified by the Ceará state government as a priority in the fight against the crack epidemic in Fortaleza (table D.1). All the sites are largely informal settlements located in the periphery of Fortaleza, except for Dendê, which is situated closer to the center of the municipality (the map in figure D.1).

The selected communities present similar characteristics in terms of demographics and socioeconomic indicators. The communities are densely populated (altogether they account for almost 10 percent of the total population in Fortaleza), a significant share of the population is composed of children and youths, and the communities rank among the poorest in the municipality. All

Figure D.1 Map of Fortaleza

Source: Prefeitura Municipal de Fortaleza

these communities have limited access to public services and infrastructure, especially to recreational and cultural activities. For example, the São Miguel community does not have a kindergarten, public spaces for recreational activities, or access to a health center; others have public service institutions present in their communities but they are not fully operational, as, for example, the case of Serviluz, where a police post has barely been utilized in years and a unit of the Secretariat of Social Services of the municipality remains vacant.

The **quantitative phase** of the project involved the use of a pre-coded questionnaire to capture the experiences of individuals and households. 1,100 households were randomly selected across the six sites. After the data collected were validated, the total sample was adjusted to 1,098 questionnaires, with a 3 percent margin of error. The survey instrument was applied during three weeks in the month of July, 2009. In each household, interviews were conducted with one household member 15 years of age and older who voluntarily agreed to participate in the study after being informed of its objectives and the processes involved in participation in the study. The survey instrument was complemented by seven focus group discussions (**the qualitative phase**) with groups of youths and adult women, as they were perceived to be of particular vulnerability to crime and violence. Availability of time and space was also a factor in the selection as levels of neighborhood insecurity affected safety considerations.

DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF THE SAMPLE

As noted previously, 1,098 respondents were randomly selected and interviewed in the six communities. The survey results revealed a fairly even distribution between gender and age such that 52 percent of the respondents were women and 48 percent were men. Of these, 53 percent were adults, and 47 percent were youths aged 15–24. Respondents included persons of all ages, with a large pool of respondents falling in the 16–29 year age category, as shown in table 1.

Almost half of the surveyed respondents reported being single (48 percent). The rest were either married (33 percent), divorced (2 percent), separated (4 percent), widowed (4 percent), or living in a stable partnership (8 percent).

Levels of education are low in the researched communities. Data findings show that 43 percent of the respondents have either no education (6 percent) or have not completed primary education (37 percent) compared to 33 percent of the respondents who have finished primary or secondary education. Interest-


ingly, a higher percentage of respondents (19 percent) said they had finished secondary education compared to 14 percent of residents who have finished primary education. To try to better understand these percentages, we disaggregated the data by age groups. After being disaggregated by age group, the data do not show statistically significant differences between youths and adults. Data collected in these communities confirm the findings of previous studies in Fortaleza. Even though adults have higher levels of no education (9 percent compared to 2 percent of youths), the percentage of youth (65 percent) who have not finished primary, secondary, or tertiary education is substantially higher than the percentage of adults (49 percent)—a worrying trend worthy of early intervention.

Levels of unemployment are high. Overall, four out of ten respondents—including respondents who were still attending school⁴⁹—said they were unemployed. The data further suggests that under-employment and informal sector work is high as **only 30 percent of all respondents were employed full time.** Another 15 percent were self-employed, and 4 percent of respondents worked as casual laborers. (figure D.2). Youths suffer from far higher levels of unemployment than adults. According to the data, 60 percent of youth aged 15 to 24 years old said they were unemployed compared to 20 percent of adults. Women have slightly higher levels of unemployment than men, 41 percent and 37 percent of respondents, respectively.

Data on socioeconomic status reveal the average household and individual per-capita income is low. Twenty-seven percent of respondents said that their total household income is 0 to 1 minimum salary (R\$465 for 2009) and 49 percent up to the two minimum salaries. Only 15 percent of the households in the survey earn three or more minimum salaries. On a per-capita income basis, the individuals interviewed identified that three quarters (75 percent) earn up to one minimum salary, 15 percent up to twice the minimum salary, and approximately 3 percent of the interviewed earn three times or more the minimum salary. Overall, the average individual income per capita was R\$306.16 in the researched communities. According to data from the IBGE, the average individual per-capita income for the whole of the northeast of Brazil in 2007 was R\$716.16. This reveals that residents in the researched communities live in very poor conditions.

Respondents were further asked if anyone within their household receives any form of financial or in-kind support or grant. Overall, close to 20 percent of re-

49. It is important to note that the minimum age to enter the labor market in Brazil is 16. Therefore, some of the youths who are still attending school could also be working during their free time to supplement the family income or not working at all.

Figure D.2 Employment Status

Source: Author's calculations

spondents (18.7 percent) receive *Bolsa Familia* while 12 percent of respondents receive another form of government assistance. It is interesting that 70 percent responded that it was not applicable. This may indicate a lack of awareness about the program or a lack of qualification for it, since *Bolsa Familia* provides small monthly payments to low income families who keep their children in school and on target with regular vaccination schedules and medical supervision.

LEVELS AND DRIVERS OF VIOLENCE VICTIMIZATION

The incidence of crime and violence is high in the researched communities. Thirty nine percent of respondents had been a victim of some form of violent crime—robbery, assault, sexual abuse, or mob justice in the previous 12 months. Unless otherwise specified, victims of crime and violence will capture those respondents who have been victims of robbery, assault, sexual abuse, or mob justice in the 12 months preceding the survey. Comparing the levels of victimization across communities shows that, according to respondents, Dendê and Serviluz are the two communities with the highest levels of victimization for robbery, assault, sexually abuse, or mob justice. In Bom Jardim, Granja Portugal,


and São Miguel, approximately 30 percent of respondents have been victims of the above-mentioned violent crimes, but in Granja Lisboa, only 17 percent of respondents were victimized by violent crimes (figure D.3).

The results suggest there are significant levels of crime violence in the surveyed communities. Men are more likely to be victims of crime and violence than women, but only slightly. Men make up more than half of the respondents (53 percent) who have been victims of at least one of the crimes in the survey described above, compared to 47 percent of women. Focus groups respondents mentioned that more men are victims of crime and violence than women because men are far more involved in youth gangs than women.

Youths are the age group most victimized by crime and violence. Young people age 15–19 years old are the main victims of crime and violence (28 percent of the respondents), followed by 20 to 24 year olds (23 percent), and 25 to 29 year olds (15 percent) (figure D.4). Adults 30 years and older accounted for 34 percent of the total number of victims.


Youths are identified by residents as the main victims and perpetrators of violence in the majority of cases, and residents felt youth tend to commit vio-

Figure D.3 Levels of Victimization: General and by Community in the 12 Months Preceding the Survey (%)



Source: Author's calculations

Figure D.4 Levels of Victimization by Age in the 12 Months Preceding the Survey (%)



lence within their own communities. A full 63 percent of respondents said that the main perpetrators of violence were youths from the same community compared to 27 percent who said that the perpetrators were youths from other communities. Accounts from focus group interviews also showed similar views about youths, especially youths from the same communities, as perpetrators of violence. Participants did not identify a single factor but a mix of multiple factors to explain why youths engage in criminal and violent behavior. **Lack of opportunities was identified as one of the main problems for youth engaging in criminal and violent activities.**

“It is like that, because of [a] lack of opportunities for youths. Most youths have nothing else to do in their idle times, and they are scattered around the streets and corners of the community doing nothing and eventually end up doing these [violent] things. I think, in my opinion, the underlying cause of violence in the community is the lack of opportunities for youths.” (Adult male, Bom Jardim)

Communities also felt that **the absence of positive role models within the family and community, especially that of male role models for young men,**

and high levels of child neglect are associated with youth engagement in violent behavior. One of the chief factors that increase the likelihood of youths engaging in criminal or violent behavior increases if that person has grown in a dysfunctional or unstructured household (Steinberg 2000; Moser and Van Bronkhorst 1999).

“There are many factors that cause violence in the community, you know? However, for me, the main cause of violence in our communities is the lack of a structured family; it is not poverty. It is in fact the lack of culture within the family, the lack of a structure, love, lack of attention from parents. Therefore, what the child cannot find [at] home, he goes to find it in the streets, and he finds good and bad things, and he does not have a role model who can mentor him, and then violence is the one that mentors them. You can see eight year olds in our communities who walk in the streets armed. The parents have no influence over them anymore. Also, lack of education in schools [is a problem]. Teaching is really lagging behind in our communities, and this is really affecting our children and youth.” (Adult male, Serviluz)

However, in cases where a stable family structure *was* present, other environmental factors in the community such as peer pressure were identified as a cause of youths engaging in drugs and violence.

“It was because I lived with my dad. It was like this. My dad gave me everything but did not let me go out at night and talk to my friends on the streets. Then what I did was, go directly from school to other places when I had some money my dad gave me. In these places, I started meeting people who were doing these things, you know, and I got involved.” (Female drug user, Serviluz)


Other residents in the community link the involvement of youths in violence to drug abuse and trafficking, which stems from the absence of a structured family, role models, lack of opportunities, and a general poor outlook on life. These conditions push youths to start consuming and then engage in trafficking to subsidize their consumption patterns. Youths in Fortaleza are not only active participants in the drug trafficking but also its victims.

“Today we can see that the main problem of youth violence is drugs. Youths who use drugs are violent with each other; they create a lot of confusion with their gangs for drugs and the drug sales. They fight with each other, and they kill each other. Consequently, he takes violence inside the household because he starts using drugs at home and is accompanied by people he should not be with . . . Once he starts using drugs, it’s a roller-coaster because he will want to buy more. When he doesn’t have money to buy drugs, he steals objects from home to sell them for drugs and generates negative situations at home.” (Adult female Bom Jardim)

Another reason why youths engage in criminal behavior is greatly influenced by perceptions of social status within their communities. Youths that grow up within a culture of violence and abject poverty feel that being a “bad guy” is an accepted way to lift themselves out of their situation. In poor urban communities, many youths often look up to other delinquents and drug traffickers as role models, earning easy money and gaining respect among within the community.

“In the past, children would play and say, ‘I want to be the hero of game playing.’ Today, children say, ‘I want to be the bad guy of game playing.’ One example of this is the people who live in the area where the surfing community lives. There was a guy who lived there, and the youths thought that he was the coolest because he was involved in large robberies of pharmacies, grocery stores, and they said, ‘I want to be like that guy.’ This kind of thing happens a lot there. The one who has the highest status in the community is the one who kills the most, the one who robs the most.” (Adult male, Serviluz)

“Well, I think it is the lack of opportunities, you know? For young people. They don’t have anything else to do and start doing things with other youths that are already involved, that have a history, and there is nothing to do then. Children in this community look up to these people, and this is a bad example for young people, and there are no other opportunities, right? Involvement with delinquents raises the adrenaline levels and offers them a better status in the community. Therefore, this generates more violence because if they had other opportunities I think they could follow other paths in their lives.” (Young male, Serviluz)

Figure D.5 Levels of Victimization by Type of Crime

Source: Author's calculations

Robbery is the most common type of violent crime, among those surveyed. Findings reveal that robbery is the most common type of violent crime committed in the selected communities (32.2 percent of all crimes), followed by assault (27 percent), physical attacks (17 percent), and mob justice (close to 5 percent of the responses). Other types of crime such as sexual abuse and rape, which are generally difficult to capture in a survey of this type, showed very low responses, 0.8 percent (figure D.5). In the past five years, Fortaleza has suffered a spike in the rates of robberies and assaults. According to official data, the number of city-wide robberies increased by 81 percent from 2004 to 2008 and assaults increased by 35 percent in the same period (SSPDS 2008). This sharp increase in these rates has been directly attributed to the crack epidemic in Fortaleza. Moreover, crack-cocaine is responsible for 75 percent of all crime in Fortaleza according to experts from the State Police (Diário do Nordeste 2009).

Residents who participated in the focus group surveys corroborated the findings mentioned above. The availability of firearms to carry out the assaults and robberies in these communities was also mentioned. Most guns, according to participants, are rented for the day or by the hour to carry out the crime.

“I have already seen 10–11 year olds in the corner carrying a gun. They rent the gun. There is a child who lives near my house, and he has a gun that is rented. He rents it for a day, for an hour.” (Adult female, Bom Jardim)

VIOLENCE AND DRUGS

As mentioned previously, drugs and drug trafficking, especially crack-cocaine, are fueling the increase in crime and violence in these communities. This is reflected in resident responses to the survey. **One third place drugs at the core of crime and violence over other causes such as poverty and unemployment.** Drugs have long been an issue in the slums of Fortaleza but the increasing availability of crack cocaine in the last five years has intensified the issue of drug-related violence. Levels of drug consumption in the researched communities are considerable. Although consumption is a very difficult issue to capture in a household survey because of its sensitivity, 11 percent of respondents admitted to currently consuming drugs, and 20 percent said they had consumed drugs at some point in their lives. Disaggregating the data by age group, 14 percent of youths said they currently consume drugs compared to 8 percent of adults. The difference between both cohorts is statistically significantly larger for youths. An association between drug use and the probability of increased levels of violence has been found in several studies (Carneiro and others 2005; Fernandes and Chofard 1995; Santos and Kassouf 2007).

The focus group interviews illustrated the connection between drugs and violence in these communities. Participants in all of the researched communities mentioned drug use and trafficking as the chief drivers of violence, which generate even more violence as a result.

“Our community suffers greatly with the issue of drugs, the territorial disputes for business, and the involvement of youths. Youths involved are very young, and then it is about territorial power, drugs. In fact, today we already had a murder in the area of Curio because of drugs, so it is like that.” (Female adult, São Miguel)

One youth, in speaking about the difficult conditions in the slums owing to poverty and territorial fights between gangs, rival traffickers, and the police prompted the population to do drugs.

“Sometimes you have to do drugs to face life in this community, right?”
(Male adult, Serviluz)

According to respondents, not only youths are involved in drugs. Parents also participate, engaging in small-scale trafficking to be able to satisfy their ad-

diction. This can generate serious irreversible problems for the structure of the family. The following young female from Serviluz illustrates the far-reaching impacts that drugs have.

“She is an addict as well, right? She and all her children, her three children. The three older children are traffickers. . . . Then, she works as their drug dealer, stealing from them [instead of selling it] by smoking some if it behind their backs.” (Female youth, Serviluz)

SEXUAL AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

Issues related to sexual violence were difficult to capture in a quantitative survey of this kind. Less than 1 percent of respondents admitted to being victims of sexual violence during the 12 months before the survey, a low figure which likely under-represents the total number of events occurring in these communities. Nonetheless, the responses about sexual violence committed against others reveal that sexual violence is a serious problem in the researched communities. When respondents were asked if they knew of a member of the community or a member of the family who had been a victim of sexual violence, 27 percent responded affirmatively and 6 percent said they knew of a family member who had been a victim of sexual abuse.

While focus groups participants did not talk extensively about issues of domestic violence, there were a few accounts of domestic violence problems in the researched communities.

“From Saturday to Sunday, we had a problem nearby my house at 3:15 am. We woke up and there was this woman, and naïve she was, yelling ‘Help!!!! Help!!! Please help me, He is killing me!!’ And no one went out to help. Because it is like this, in my community this happens often so we are used to it. And . . . she was screaming to her daughter . . . ‘Euarda, get the knife, get the knife because he is going to kill me!!! He is killing me; he is killing me!!!’ and the girl is only five or six years old . . . the next day [the couple] were together again. We hear this everyday and do nothing about it, we don’t call the police. Because it is like this every day, a fight between husband and wife and nobody gets in the middle.” (Female youth, Bom Jardim)

Another young female from the same neighborhood provided another story to illustrate the problem of domestic violence:

“This year we had a very tragic event happening where I live. A couple started arguing and the husband beat her up and killed her in front of their two children. . . . He even beat up the boy, he did not kill him because the child managed to escape.” (Female youth, Granja Lisboa)

Respondents associated sexual and domestic violence in the family or in the community with the use of drugs and alcohol.

PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE AND FEELINGS OF SAFETY

Community perception data is a useful counterpart to victimization data to illustrate the impact of crime and violence. In the researched communities, both the quantitative and qualitative surveys show a strong sense of insecurity across communities, age groups, and gender. Perceptions of insecurity are not limited to a particular type of crime, location, or time of the day.

Residents consider that most crime and violence occur in the streets and public places. Eighty-six percent of the respondents think that crime and violence happen in the streets and public places of the community (table D.2) compared to 8 percent who think violence occurs mostly at home. Violence in school settings, in shops, and at the workplace accounted for 2.1 percent, 1.4 percent, and 0.9 percent of responses, respectively.

Table D.2 Where Crime and Violence Take Place in the Community

Location	%
Streets/Public spaces	86.5
Home	7.9
Schools	2.1
Shops	1.4
Workplace	0.9
N/R	1.1

Poor infrastructure is a serious problem in these communities and makes it relatively easy for violent crime to take place. The most dangerous areas in these communities emerged as a result of rapid growth of irregular settlements in the absence of a sound urban planning strategy. Municipal governments have attempted to address issues of infrastructure in some areas, but others remain problematic. There is limited public lighting, poor housing infrastructure, and few public spaces and recreation areas, with available spaces often used for illicit activities. Qualitative findings help us better understand the infrastructure conditions in these communities.

“There are no options for recreation for youths in our community . . . before, it was better. There were more opportunities for recreation, but when opportunities for recreation diminished, violence increased. . . . What is lacking is recreational areas for youths . . . [The moderator then asked if they have a public square] Yes, we do, but [it] is the same as nothing. You only have three. You have a soccer field and it is very far away.”

“We have a public square, but it is a meeting point for thugs.” (Female youth, Bom Jardim)

Feelings of insecurity among residents are very high (Figure D.6). Eighty-six percent of the surveyed residents disagreed when asked if they felt safe in their community most of the time compared to 13 percent who agreed with this statement. Such feelings of insecurity are higher at night. The vast majority of residents—nine out of ten—said they felt insecure at night.

Focus group participants noted that crime and violence occur at all times of the day. Crime and violence are already a part of the participants’ daily lives because they witness it happening to others or believe that they can be personally victimized at any place or time of day in their communities.

Figure D.6 Perceptions of Safety at Night (General and by Communities)





Figure D.7 Percentage of Respondents Who Think Violence Has Increased in the Past Five Years




“Everywhere [in Bom Jardim], there are robbers, assassins; everywhere . . . there will be robbers and murderers, people who have money who will pay other people to kill.” (Female youth—Bom Jardim)

“We can’t really avoid it (risk of being a victim of crime), wherever we walk it is dangerous . . . Once I was walking and stopped to talk to a friend of mine, then a guy passed by and robbed me. What happens now is that I avoid walking in the afternoon and tried to walk in the areas that are safer, but in general it is very difficult to avoid.” (Male youth, Dendê)

“There is violence everywhere there are people of all ages, men, women, children . . . There are a lot of children involved (in violence). In Bom Jardim, this is what residents talk about. The only thing is that there is not a specific age. People start getting involved because of friends when they are 7, 8.” (Female youth, Bom Jardim)

“People are afraid of going out because of assaults all the time, because of gangs, in some areas of Bom Jardim. A lot of people are afraid because of people from other communities will come to assault them.” (Male youth, Bom Jardim)

Figure D.8 Levels of Trust (General and by Community)

Most residents believe that violence has increased in recent years (figure D.7). Eight out of ten respondents think that their community is more violent than five years ago. In some communities such as Serviluz and Granja Lisboa, nine out of ten respondents think their community has become more violent in recent years.

LEVELS OF TRUST AND COPING MECHANISMS

Levels of trust are low among residents. Sixty-five percent of the people interviewed think that most residents look only after themselves and not after each other, compared to 35 percent who disagree. There are slight differences between communities except for Serviluz where only 23 percent of the population think that people look only after themselves (figure D.8).

Because levels of trust are low, residents tend to adopt the “culture of silence” whereby they refrain from discussing issues of violence in the community among themselves or with the police for fear of revenge. This strategy is not characteristic only of Fortaleza or Brazil but common in many poor urban communities of large urban centers (Moser and McIlwaine 2005). Law and order in these communities is often influenced or filled by parallel structures—drug traffickers in this case—that also are in charge of maintaining order in the community to maximize their economic gain.

One young woman from Dendê explained how this strategy applies in her community:

“People don’t really do anything to . . . help [the] police to discover who [the traffickers are] because many people are really afraid.”

Sometimes, however, the “law of silence” is applied to protect family members committing violence:

“Many times we shut up, we don’t say anything because it is people that we know, it is people from the family, we know who they are . . . When people don’t talk, they say it is because they are afraid, but sometimes it is because their family is involved.” (Person, Location)

Table D.3 Assessment of Institutional Performance

Institution	Excellent/Good	Mediocre/Bad
Community committee	12.5	84.9
Religious organizations	58.1	41.4
Social services	13.9	81.3
Police	17.9	81.3
Community watch	9.2	85.4
Civic committee	6.0	77.6

Note: No-response responses were not included in the table.

Residents believe that most institutions, especially state institutions, are doing a bad job and, therefore, are not trusted to deal with issues of insecurity (table D.3). The police, community watch, and community committees are institutions that should ideally help residents resolve law and order and other conflicts in the community. However, these institutions received the worst evaluations by residents: 81 percent, 85 percent, and 85 percent, respectively, thought these institutions were doing a mediocre or bad job. Conversely, residents gave positive evaluations to religious organizations.⁵⁰

During the focus group interviews, it became evident that residents strongly reject the ways police perform their activities. Whether this is due to police use

50. The importance of the church in these communities can also be perceived in the quantitative findings. When respondents were asked about group membership, the church was the institution with the highest percentage of adherents (18%).

of violent force or inefficiency in chasing down criminals and keeping the peace in the communities, responses clearly illustrate this mistrust:

The vast majority of residents in these communities do not see the police as an institution that can actually resolve issues of crime and violence, which in practice means that victims tend not to go to the police to get help. In cases where victims do go to the police for help, they still doubt whether this action will bring any result. This also is evident in the responses of the survey and the focus groups.

“We don’t trust them, but when something happens I seek help from the police, even if I don’t trust them. I was assaulted, and it took two hours for the police to come.” (Female youth, Bom Jardim)

“If you tried to get help from the police, it is unlikely that they fix the problem, and even if they catch the criminal they will have to let him go later.” (Female youth, Granja Lisboa)

Such levels of distrust constitute a hard-to-overcome obstacle to the vast majority of public safety policies, especially in the poor areas most affected by crime and violence. A starting point to break historical patterns of distrust between the police and the community would be to look for models that bring public institutions, such as the police, closer to the population.

In a context of such high levels of crime, violence, and insecurity, one must ask if there are any strategies that residents adopt to cope and improve their situation. The findings reveal that violence is so pervasive and “normalized” that more than half of respondents report “doing nothing” to avoid being a victim of a crime (Table D.4). Others report a variety of individual-level solutions that include staying home more (34 percent), installing some form of security measures (27 percent), changing routes to go to school or to work (24 percent), avoiding travelling during certain hours, especially at night (21.4 percent), and going to the police or authorities (21 percent). Collective strategies such as attending public forums and forming a community group to address the problem received very low responses.

The preference for individual strategies over collective mechanisms reflects both the general level of mistrust among community members, as well as low confidence in state authorities to respond to the problem. In focus groups, respondents described how they felt disempowered from organizing against violence or even approaching authorities, preferring instead to “do nothing.”

Table D.4 Measures Taken to Avoid Being a Victim of Crime

Doing nothing	53.7
Staying home more	33.9
Installing locks/gate	26.8
Changing routes	24.5
Avoiding traveling during certain hours	21.4
Going to the police/authorities	21.1
Attending public forums	3.2
Buying/carrying a weapon	1.3
Paying for security	0.8
Forming/joining a community group to address problems	0.7
Other	0.7
Pressured to pay for security	0.6
Quit job/closed business	0.3
Joining a vigilante group	0.1

“We don’t run, we retreat, this is part of our lives, we don’t see anything, we don’t do anything regardless of whether we have seen it or not [. . .] There was a day when a 10-year-old girl was murdered in daylight as if it were as normal as fetching a bucket of water in the well, you understand? What do you think we said when the police came and asked who the criminal was that killed her?” (Adult male, São Miguel)

Participants in the focus groups, also explained that community residents sometimes turned to vigilante groups known as *milícias*. These para-military style groups are composed of former and active police, firefighters, prison guards, soldiers, and other security sector personnel. *Milícias* emerged ostensibly to crack down on drug traffickers and have operated in some states with clandestine political support. But in a weak rule of law setting where there is a historical legacy of death squads, this has resulted in *milícia* “takeover of and profit from aspects of the drug trade under the guise of law and order and in widespread human rights abuses.” These groups have also “begun to impose protection ‘taxes’ on slum residents in addition to charging illegal user rights for alternate transport and poached electrical connections.” (Hinton 2009: 219). Respondents acknowledged the violent tactics of these groups, but many stated that when *milícias* get the job done, residents feel safer.

“The way that [*milícias*] deliver service to the population is by beating and killing youths that are delinquents.” (Female youth, Bom Jardim)

“Police rarely resolve the problem. If they catch the criminal, they’ll release him soon. But if you seek the *milícia*, they will resolve it. People know that they do what they are supposed to do because they have been paid.” (Female youth, Dendê)

“Community residents feel safer with the *milícia* . . . because many times if something has been robbed and it was caused by a member of the *milícia*, people go there and talk to the member to return the item to the resident. This is why residents trust the *milícia*. Often the police do not know about what has happened. It stays with the residents.” (Male youth, Bom Jardim)

In many of Brazil’s shantytowns, there is no choice about whether or not to pay the *milícia*,⁵¹ as they have become a parallel order in control of the slum—with damaging consequences for the rule of law, authority of the state, and prospects for independent civil society (Hinton 2009). Given the nature of turf wars, however, whether controlled by a *milícia* or drug gang, the resulting slum security dynamic is ultimately unstable.

POLICY INTERVENTIONS TO ADDRESS CRIME AND VIOLENCE

In terms of what policy interventions could help reduce levels of crime and violence in these communities, 45 percent of respondents think that **more employment programs for young people and more police presence are the most important policy interventions for reducing the levels of crime and violence and improving the levels of insecurity in the communities**. Thirty-eight percent of the population thought that more general employment programs are needed, 34 percent mentioned community policing, and 30 percent cited improving access to education. Other important responses included recreational programs for youths (24 percent), enforcement of the ban on drugs (22 percent), and improved infrastructure in the communities and control of gun sales (13 percent). Other issues such as a ban on alcohol sales, improved street lighting, limited opening hours of bars, and the development of more alternative resolution mechanisms were mentioned by 9 percent, 6 percent, and 5 percent of the residents, respectively (table D.5).

51. According to respondents, the cost per resident is R\$15 per month, R\$8 bi-weekly or R\$3 per day.

Table D.5 Most Important Policy Change to Address Crime and Violence Problems

Policy intervention	(%)
Youth employment programs	45.1
More police presence	44.9
Employment programs	38.2
Increased community policing	34.4
Improved access to education	30.2
Recreational programs for youths	24.0
Enforcement of ban on drugs	22.0
Development of infrastructure in communities	13.3
Gun control	12.9
Ban on alcohol sales	9.0
N/A	6.4
Improved street lighting	6.1
Limited opening hours of bars	4.7
Alternative conflict resolution mechanisms	4.7
Did not respond	0.2
Do not know	0.2

Youth targeted employment programs and skills-based education initiatives are indeed a much needed policy intervention. As described in section 3, the levels of youth unemployment in these communities are very high, and one of the underlying reasons for so much crime and violence in their communities. Respondents also referred to lack of opportunities for recreational and cultural activities. São Miguel, for instance, does not have a single public space for youths to engage in recreational activities. As a result, youths loiter around community corners, putting themselves at risk of being victimized by either other youths or the police, as some of the focus groups have illustrated. The Municipality of Fortaleza is making considerable efforts to provide safe spaces for recreational activities for these communities. The recent inauguration of the first of six CUCAs (multi-service centers) is expected to provide recreational and cultural activities for youths and families in poor urban communities.

Related to the issue of community centers, is the broader issue of infrastructure. Policy responses related to improving infrastructure and street lighting, accounted for 20 percent of the responses. As mentioned before, the infrastructure in these communities is poor, and access to services is very limited. Implementing small low-cost interventions such as improving street lighting can yield measureable results within a very short time and even greater results if implemented as part of a broader integrated strategy of urban upgrading. Some programs in other areas of Brazil have shown very positive results in a matter of

months. The case of the program *Campos de Luz* in Minas Gerais has become a showcase for situational prevention and service delivery. *Campos de Luz* is a partnership between the public and private sectors to provide lighting in open spaces in poor urban communities. The impact on community life and activities was immediate.

All of these initiatives, however, must be underpinned by appropriate policing policies. Indeed 34 percent of community respondents called for greater police presence. Without a security strategy to accompany developmental interventions, there will be limits to their sustainability. Newly created community centers, for example, could easily fall prey to criminal elements who may in turn use them as a base of local drug dealing. Given the armed conflicts over turf that frequently result, this could rapidly contribute to their physical degradation. The same applies to investment to infrastructure, housing stock, and public services. Without stabilization of the security situation, service providers will be hampered in their ability to enter for construction or maintenance purposes and infrastructure can become quickly damaged or destroyed as a by-product of armed confrontations. Similarly, community residents will not have the freedom to travel safely to and from work and school to provide for their families and improve their skills or otherwise participate in forums for civic engagement, unless developmental initiatives are accompanied by an effective and accountable policing strategy (Hinton 2009, 2006). Particularly as the Ronda do Quarteirão flagship program from the state government, which is considered to be a modern community policing approach, does not yet seem to have had the desired impact in the three communities researched here, more attention to this issue is warranted.

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR CRIME AND VIOLENCE PREVENTION

The government of Brazil has placed the fight against crime and violence atop the political and institutional agenda. Brazil has made serious efforts to curb the levels of crime, in particular violent crime, at the national, state, and municipal levels. There have been promising cases in the reduction of levels of violence such as the case of Diadema in São Paulo, discussed in chapter two of this report. Diadema has become a case for replication in other municipalities of Brazil and in the rest of Latin America. The program *Fica Vivo in Belo Horizonte* significantly reduced the homicide levels within a very short period of time

(Peixoto and others 2008). More recently, promising programs have been implemented in Nova Iguaçu in the State of Rio de Janeiro. Notwithstanding these two successful experiences and other interesting sectoral interventions, the rate of violence is still unacceptably high in many Brazilian states and municipalities. What are the national, state, and municipal governments and civil society organizations doing to reduce and prevent crime and violence? This section attempts to answer this question and presents a brief analysis of institutional policies and programs at the national, state, and municipal levels on crime and violence prevention. Policies and programs at the state and local levels are those that are currently being executed or have been developed in Fortaleza and the state of Ceará. In addition, this section also discusses initiatives by civil society organizations in the surveyed communities.

National Level

Perhaps Brazil's most ambitious project yet in the area of public safety since the country's transition to democracy is the PRONASCI (*Programa Nacional de Segurança Pública com Cidadania*). Approved in 2007, the PRONASCI will invest US\$4 billion until 2012 through a massive multi-sectoral program with the participation of 19 ministries. This program is expected to benefit a wide range of actors, including public safety professionals, youth at risk and youth in conflict with the law, prisoners, and those who have left the system, among others, with the objective of promoting violence prevention combined with social inclusion in some of the most violent urban centers of Brazil (Ministério da Justiça, 2009). To date, 17 states are already beneficiaries—Alagoas, Acre, Bahia, Ceará, Federal District, Espírito Santo, Maranhão, Minas Gerais, Pará, Paraná, Pernambuco, Piauí, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Norte, Rio Grande do Sul, São Paulo, and Sergipe. The PRONASCI will develop and implement activities in 94 different areas. The most salient activities include the following:

This program follows the same structure of the National Public Security Plan that was developed during President Lula's first term—which was not approved (Soares 2007). The failed security plan was an effort to systematize the concepts of the National Security Plan that was developed under Fernando Henrique Cardoso's presidency. Despite the program's short life, the PRONASCI has not been exempt from criticism due to its slowness in disbursing funds (Amnesty International 2009). Moreover, most projects that are presented for funding are basically multisectoral pilot programs. Hence, evaluating these programs appropriately to measure their impact and formulate broad sustainable public policies based on results will be a major challenge. According to the Ministry of Justice,

Box D.1 Activities Implemented under the PRONASCI

Training Scholarships. To increase the skills and capacity of public security professionals, the PRONASCI envisions offering scholarships as a stimulus to study and increase the professionals' capacity as security agents. To be able to access the scholarships, all agents must take and pass courses accredited by the National Secretariat of Public Safety and the Ministry of Justice.

Police Training. Police officers will benefit from a wide range of courses in areas related to citizen security such as the use of non-lethal technologies for policing, investigative capacity training, forensic criminology, and human rights, among others. More than 66 universities all over Brazil will offer these courses.

Women of Peace. This project will offer training to female community leaders in a wide range of areas such as ethics, human rights, and citizenship. It is expected that women will also train other women as part of the program in their respective communities to attract as many youth at risk or youth in conflict with the law.

Correctional System. More than 40,000 new vacancies will be created to attend different age cohorts separately. Youths 18 to 24 years of age will be placed in different units to avoid contact with prisoners from organized crime and other groups. In addition, health services for female prisoners will be improved. Furthermore, the program will offer training to build the capacity and the skills of both correctional officers and prisoners.

Partnerships with Other Ministries and Secretariats. Because of the program's multi-sectoral nature, the PRONASCI will be executed in partnership with other programs from the government such as the *Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento* (PAC), the National Secretariat for Drug Policy, among others, to increase the program's capillarity with other interventions such as urban upgrading programs.

Source: Ministério da Justiça

the PRONASCI will be monitored and evaluated by two consultants in each of the municipalities where projects will be implemented (Ministério da Justiça 2009). For example, Fortaleza alone will execute 14 different projects in communities that are difficult to access and are socially defragmented, such as the communities of São Miguel and Serviluz, which also have very high levels of crime and violence.⁵²

State Level

At the State level, it is important to mention Ceará's new flagship program of policing that was implemented in 2008. This initiative, the *Ronda do Quarteirão* is, according to the government, a new model of doing policing at the community level (Estado do Ceará 2008). This program was conceptualized to cre-

52. Annex A includes a list of all programs and projects in the selected communities including those financed under the PRONASCI.

ate a police unit that is closer to the citizenry and, at the same time, reduce the response time to emergency calls. To date, this program has been implemented across the metropolitan area of Fortaleza and is now in the process of expansion in important cities of the interior of the state. The impact of this program has been mixed. On the one hand, according to the Secretariat of Public Safety of the State of Ceará, 85 percent of the population is satisfied with this new form of policing. Yet this was not reflected in the findings from the research of the six communities undertaken here. This is not to say that the initiative may not achieve greater success in future. It is simply that reform efforts which seek to break negative cycles of police-community relations are long-term processes, particularly in settings where there are entrenched historical legacies, patterns of police violence, high levels of public corruption and intense levels of poverty and inequality (Hinton and Newburn 2009).

A related challenge of the *Ronda do Quarteirão* program is that official data reflects that the number of adolescents placed in juvenile courts has increased threefold since the start of this policing program. While it is not possible to attribute causality, there may be a relationship. Without corresponding efforts to unblock the already overburdened judiciary, the number of detainees awaiting trial in overcrowded detention centers and police stations will increase even more. This poses negative human rights implications and dampens the prospects for offender rehabilitation and successful community re-entry. Fortunately, the state government appears to have identified and responded to this issue. To address this problem, a new state policy for youth in conflict with the law following the new National policy (*Sistema Nacional de Medidas Socioeducativas*, or SINASE) is being drafted. This new statewide policy seeks to integrate programs and activities among the three spheres of government—national, state, and municipal—to guarantee full and satisfactory rehabilitation of youth offenders and, in turn, reduce the levels of recidivism, which is approximately 50 percent. This is significantly higher than the State of São Paulo (30 percent) and the average for Brazil as a whole (20 percent).⁵³

The overall objective of the new strategy for youth in conflict with the law is three-pronged:

53. http://www.presidencia.gov.br/estrutura_presidencia/sedh/noticias/ultimas_noticias/MySQLNoticia.2007-07-13.4657

1. Build new socioeducational centers according to the architectural standards of the SINASE and renovate existing centers to prevent current levels of overcrowding as much as possible
2. Implement a continuous training and capacity building program for all public servants working in the socio-educational centers as well as those working in the appropriate Secretariats to follow the new national framework (SINASE)
3. Establish intergovernmental coordination between the state and municipal governments. The lack of it has been found to be one of the potential obstacles to achieve full rehabilitation of these youths. After exiting the socioeducational centers and returning to their communities, youths are no longer under the close supervision of the state government—although they might be beneficiaries of other state programs—and are under the supervision of the municipal government.

Municipal Level

At the municipal level, Fortaleza has a Municipal Guard corps that is in charge of protecting the municipal patrimony, protecting public spaces, and monitoring the public transportation system. This department is in charge of developing and implementing 17 projects financed by the PRONASCI in high-crime communities. The projects seek to prevent crime and violence among youths aged 15 to 29 through a wide range of interventions, including skills training and recreational, cultural, and sports activities.

The flagship project of the municipality is the construction of six multi-purpose centers across the city, one in each of the regional districts of Fortaleza. The objective of these centers is twofold (*Centros de Cultura, Arte, Esporte e Cidadania*, or CUCAs). On the one hand, the centers offer recreational and cultural alternatives to adolescents and youths in Fortaleza, in particular those living in poor urban communities, where access to recreational, cultural, and sports activities (including equipment) is limited. On the other hand, given the high levels of social exclusion in Fortaleza, centers such as the CUCAs aim at bridging the gap between the haves and the have-nots.

Civil Society

The civil society sector in Ceará while dynamic and vibrant is hampered by the magnitude of the challenges and scarcity of resources. Nevertheless, work undertaken by several NGOs, in spite of limited financial and human resource capacity, has yielded promising results. In the specific area of crime and violence preven-

tion, the work done by CUFA-CE⁵⁴ and MH2O Ceará should be emphasized.⁵⁵ Both NGOs work with youth at risk in poor urban communities in Fortaleza and other state municipalities. Most of the NGO programs and activities are designed around culture and music, especially hip-hop, and offer an alternative lifestyle to youth at risk and youth engaged in risky and violent behaviors. While these organizations have had success in pulling youths away from reengaging in risky and violent behaviors, limited financial and human resource capacities are significant obstacles for the sustainability of the activities. As much as institutions of the public sector need civil society to be more effective in their work, civil society organizations also need to rely on the public sector to be able to sustain their interventions in the long term.

One important obstacle encountered by all these programs and interventions across three different levels of government and sectors is the lack of appropriate coordination mechanisms. Efforts are being made to integrate data collection systems of the municipal guard with those of the state police. With so many new and innovative initiatives being implemented to reduce and prevent the high and increasing levels of crime and violence, multi-sectoral coordination is paramount. Programs such as the PRONASCI will likely contribute to facilitating the integration of interventions and approaches by public sector institutions and civil society organizations, including the private sector. They are central actors in these efforts in poor urban communities in Fortaleza and Ceará. Moreover, without the interventions of civil society organizations, it is very difficult to gain access to some communities because of the high levels of violence and low levels of trust in public institutions.⁵⁶

CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR POLICYMAKING

The results presented here show that crime and violence are issues of central importance in poor urban communities in Fortaleza. The fact that most slum communities in Fortaleza lack proper infrastructure and access to services and

54. Central Única das Favelas-Ceará.

55. Movimento Hip-Hop Organizado do Ceará.

56. For example, during visits to the surveyed communities June 9–June 19, 2009, many residents voiced concerns over the limited presence of the police force in some of the most violent areas of the communities. In fact, the visiting mission had access to the communities only via these NGOs. Access with the police force was feasible but would change the dynamics of the interaction with the residents of these communities given the low levels of trust in law enforcement, which are seen by residents as corrupt, inefficient, and violent.

opportunities takes a toll on the fabric of the community and increasingly frustrates residents, especially youths. These conditions have been exacerbated by the invasion of drugs such as crack cocaine and by the proliferation of firearms, which has driven crime and violence to unprecedented levels in recent years. In response, the government of Brazil has placed violence reduction and prevention at the top of the national agenda, and is implementing a coordinated response at multiple levels of government.

Based on the findings from this survey, this section offers several policy interventions that could be useful catalysts in addressing the issues of crime and violence in these communities. Some interventions can be implemented relatively quickly, are low cost, and can yield measurable results in a short period of time. Others require strong inter-sectoral coordination and capacity building and generally take longer to produce any measureable results. Nonetheless, both approaches are part of an overall comprehensive prevention strategy that is much needed to effectively address violence and insecurity.

There is first, the need to improve relations between police agencies and the community. Data from the quantitative and qualitative surveys indicate that trust in the police as an institution is low even as a symbiotic relationship between communities and law enforcement is much needed to address insecurity and resolve conflicts. Communities see building trust with the police as key to improving dialogue and cooperation, increasing social accountability of police performance, and helping to establish a guiding framework for community policing. There is a need to promote activities to **empower communities to help identify problems and solutions to crime and violence from within.** It is evident from both the quantitative and qualitative analysis that communities feel quite disempowered in the face of insecurity. Communities in poor urban areas in Fortaleza operate in the face of tremendous adversity and express willingness to rebuild the social fabric damaged by the pervasiveness of crime and violence. Programs developed should encourage active community participation in peace-building efforts. Equally important is community involvement in governmental and police oversight efforts to ensure that policing resources are deployed with equity and where they are needed most. Indeed, as mentioned, developmental interventions must dovetail with efforts to increase appropriate policing in these communities so that it will be safe for service providers to enter to work, provide public services, and perform maintenance. Otherwise, armed conflicts between rival gangs will all too quickly damage and erode infrastructure and social capital.

Equally important, *there is a need to address the issue of drug consumption and trafficking* as a major driver of violence in poor communities. As mentioned before, the current epidemic of crack cocaine in Fortaleza has driven violence to levels not experienced and is becoming a major public health problem. It is generating huge backlogs in the criminal justice system and eroding the physical and social fabric of entire communities, while presenting a terrible corrupting influence on authorities (Hinton 2009). Contrary to other drugs, crack cocaine is highly addictive and lasts for a short period of time, generating a very high repeat demand and hence, high potential for profits to those who sell it. It is therefore critical to work with children and youths and their families and communities in general to try to discourage them from initiating the use of this or any other drug.

Improving urban infrastructure and access to services. Poor urban infrastructure and limited access to services and public spaces are a major problem in these communities. The results clearly indicate that crime and violence occur mostly on the streets of the surveyed communities. Therefore, there is an urgent need to invest in these communities to improve urban infrastructure and access to basic services, which the government of the municipality of Fortaleza has started doing in some areas of the city. New slum upgrading programs are being developed in the areas most at risk, and new infrastructure is being built to provide spaces to the poor for cultural and recreational activities. Despite considerable efforts, there is still a lot of work to be done to provide decent housing and access to public goods in the municipality. Situational prevention programs such as the experience in Minas Gerais with *Campos de Luz* would be a suitable fit in Fortaleza.

Invest in children and youths. Young people are the most common victims of crime and violence in these communities, and residents think of youth employment programs as a problem-solving intervention. Clearly, this is a strong policy intervention that should be considered to assist the vast majority of youth who are unemployed and spend most of their time unoccupied and inactive. In addition, the problem of drugs is becoming a priority in terms of policymaking for both the state and municipal governments. This issue requires strong and seamless coordination among a wide range of sectors and actors, including public health, police, criminal justice system, and civil society. Programs that educate children and youth on the dangers of engaging in the use of drugs would be an appropriate starting point. For example, schools in these communities constitute a major locus for violence prevention activities. Recreational activities—both sports and cultural—during and after school with school-attending

children and the community could contribute to reducing risky behaviors among youths and strengthening the social fabric of the community.

Finally, there is a need for improving coordination and collaboration among sectors and actors. Crime and violence prevention strategies, regardless of their scale, are inherently very ambitious and complex endeavors and require the active participation of national and local institutions, communities, and civil society organizations, including the private sector. Institutional agendas often differ, and to be effective, these actors must share a common vision on how to effectively prevent violence. While improving institutional capacity is central to crime and violence prevention, being able to coordinate policies, programs, and interventions to reach the communities and remain there working in partnership is indispensable if they are to be sustainable. In Brazil, current efforts to integrate data collection across state agencies, and to coordinate initiatives across various sectors via PRONASCI are an important first step. These have made important progress in bringing together stakeholders from the state, private and civil society sectors. The challenge remains as to how to scale up coordination across these groups to ensure sustainability in the longer term.

Annex A Projects and Activities in the Researched Communities

Bom Jardim

Fundação da Rede DLIS
Programa Território da Paz

Promoting local sustainable development
Financed by the PRONASCI and will implement 14 citizen security projects in the Grande Bom Jardim area

Granja Portugal

Projeto Cirandas da Vida

Promotes cultural and recreational activities in the community

Organização Granja Portugal Solidária (SOLIDU)
Programa Território da Paz

Works with communities to promotes the implementation of barter economy projects
Financed by the PRONASCI and will implement 14 citizen security projects in the Grande Bom Jardim area

Banco Comunitário de Fortaleza

Local Bank, which promotes a barter economy based on the model initiated by Banco Palmas¹

Granja Lisboa

Projeto Mais Criança
Programa Território da Paz

Works with malnourished children and their families
Financed by the PRONASCI and will implement 14 citizen security projects in the Grande Bom Jardim area

Projeto Dançando e Cantando pela Paz

Through the arts and recreation, this project seeks to construct a culture of peace in public spaces in Fortaleza

Serviluz

O Serviluz Sem Fronteiras

Recreational and cultural activities for children and youth

Inclusão Digital
Projeto Energia Social

Project that promotes social inclusion through IT
Brings skills and qualification for youths most at risk

Dendê

Rádio Comunitária Edson Queiroz
Edson Queiroz Foundation

Community radio that promotes social inclusion with hip-hop and break-dance.
Promotes sustainable development in the community through small-scale production of kitchen tools, jewelry, candles, and other items.

1. Banco Palmas facilitates local production and consumption in Brazil's Fortaleza region by instituting a network of community banks that serve local needs as a strategy to address a larger cycle of poverty and stalled economic growth as a result of the lack of credit in poorer regions (Ashoka 2009). Banco Palmas' website is: <http://www.bancopalmas.org>

Annex 2 Official Data on Violent Crimes in Researched Communities

	Homicide	Robbery w/death	Sexual violence	Physical injuries
Fortaleza	34.0	0.9	10.7	386.1
Bom Jardim	12.0	3.5	3.8	67.2
Granja Lisboa	2.0	N/R	0.4	7.8
Granja Portugal	4.0	N/R	0.5	41.0
Edson Queiroz/Dendê	6.0	0.5	1.5	92.2
Mucuripe/Serviluz	4.0	0.8	0.8	33.6
Messejana/São Miguel	26.0	N/R	2.9	99.3

Source: Municipal Observatory on Crime and Violence, Prefeitura de Fortaleza 2008.

N/R: No registry

Note: Data for communities is per 10,000 people, given that total population in these communities is well below 100,000 inhabitants. Extrapolating the data under the assumption of a population of at least 100,000 inhabitants would provide misleading statistics.

Appendix E

Crime and Violence in Poor Urban Communities in Johannesburg



In 1994 South Africa underwent one of the most eagerly anticipated and successful political transitions of the twentieth century. The country not only cast off decades of racial dictatorship and oppression but also successfully averted civil war, navigated a foreign debt crisis, and established a vibrant constitutional democracy. During the past 15 years, strong economic growth and the government's pro-poor initiatives have manifested a generalized improvement of social development indicators, particularly in access to education and health and a marked reduction in the levels of income poverty (World Bank 2008). However,


post-apartheid South Africa remains a country characterized by stark contrasts. Large income disparities, unemployment, deficient housing and infrastructure, uneven access to services, and the spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic mean that a significant share of the population is socially and economically marginalized.

The social and economic gap in South Africa has been partly mirrored in the staggering levels of crime and violence. In the 15 years since the transition, 328,244 people have been murdered. An additional 395,789 murder attempts were recorded (SAPS 1994–2009). Several thousand serious assaults, aggravated robberies, and residential burglaries take place each day and gender-based violence has reached epidemic proportions. Tens of thousands of rapes are recorded by the police each year, even despite the under-reported nature of the crime. One survey-based study performed by the South African Medical Research Council found that one-quarter (27.6 percent) of all South African men had committed rape in their lifetimes. Of these, 23 percent had raped 2–3 women or girls; 8.4 percent had raped 4–5 women or girls; 7.1 percent 6–10 women or girls; and 7.7 percent had raped more than 10 women or girls (MRC 2009). In this context, large segments of the population are armed for self-protection; and the police, private security firms, and vigilante groups are notoriously heavy handed. Although the country has a long history of violence, dating back to the 1950s (Dissel 2007), it is after the transition to a constitutional democracy that South Africa experienced a rapid increase in its levels of crime and violence. Violence, particularly homicide, peaked during the middle to late 1990s, with more than 60 homicides per 100,000 people (SAPS 2008) (figure E.1).

Recent years have shown a moderate decrease in violent crime levels. Nevertheless, homicide remains the leading cause of non-natural death and South Africa still ranks among the most violent of the world's countries (National Injury Mortality Surveillance 2007; CSV 2008). The homicide rate recorded in 2007–8 was 38.6 homicides per 100,000 people. This murder rate is comparable to that of Colombia, which recorded 39.7 homicides per 100,000 people in the same year, and is significantly higher than the rate in Brazil, which stood at 26.1 homicides per 100,000 people in 2008.

Violence has become such a source of instability that in May 2008, angry mobs living in the impoverished periphery of Johannesburg turned their frustrations on groups of Zimbabweans and Mozambicans, among other immigrant groups, attacking them for taking away jobs, housing, and benefits. The violence quickly escalated as groups of men wielding clubs, axes, machetes, and iron bars went from shack to shack driving suspected foreigners from their homes, beating and raping residents, and torching homes by the thousands.

Figure E.1 Rates of Violent Crimes in South Africa, 1994–2008



Source: South African Police Services 2008.

Sixty two were killed in the two-week period of violence, which spread from Johannesburg to the rest of the country displacing upwards of 25,000 from their homes. After the news media captured images of a mob burning a Malawian man alive, President Mbeki sent in the army to contain the situation to prevent ethnic cleansing and stabilize the situation.⁵⁷

As the data and examples presented suggest, the negative effects of crime and violence on the population are high, and often devastating, for individuals, families, businesses, institutions, and society. Moreover, high levels of crime and violence also place a significant burden on the economy. Recent comprehensive estimates show that, in 2007, the total costs of violence in South Africa amount to 7.5 percent of the GDP (Alda and Cuesta 2009).⁵⁸ These costs are felt at the family level, whereas crime and resulting injuries leave households bereft of loved ones, property, income-generating work days, and school time. Employers suffer losses of productive labor output from absentee workers, and lose resources from criminal theft and destruction of property and infrastructure and from private security expenditures. Crime and violence also drain the criminal justice system because of the expenses associated with the deployment of police, forensics, and legal personnel, investigation of crimes, prosecution of suspects and any resulting imprisonment. Schools deteriorate from missed attendance and gang violence and the health care system is also stretched by the high costs of emergency care. There are also countless indirect costs which are more difficult to measure. These include costs arising from the ways in which cycles of violence feed into continuing patterns of underdevelopment, spatial segregation, brain-drain, underinvestment, public disaffection, weak oversight of governing authorities, and vigilantism.

The impact of the above is most acutely felt in poor urban communities, where residents have fewer resources at their disposal to insulate themselves from violence and to effectively pressure governing authorities for change (Hinton and Newburn 2009). To better understand both the community-level impact and potential sources of resilience, this appendix presents the results of a case study on crime and violence in four poor urban communities in Johannesburg. It is hoped that this discussion will contribute to current debates and policies on crime and violence prevention.

57. Among other articles on this ethnic violence, see: "South Africa Immigrant Violence Leaves 25,000 Displaced." Agence France Press, May 25, 2008. "Xenophobia Deaths: One-Third was South African." Mail and Guardian. June 12, 2008; "South Africa's Shame: Ethnic Cleansing." The Independent, May 25, 2008; "Migrants Burned Alive in South Africa." Los Angeles Times, May 20, 2008.

58. Or the equivalent of US\$21.5 billion that were spent in fighting crime and violence in South Africa in 2007.

The chapter is structured as follows: section 2 briefly describes the factors contributing to crime and violence in South Africa. Section 3 presents the sampling methodology and the demographic profile of the sample. Section 4 discusses the crime victimization patterns found in the surveyed communities. Section 5 presents community perceptions of the causes and impact of crime and violence; Section 6 addresses community coping mechanisms and policy preferences. Section 7 summarizes the existing policy framework. Section 8 concludes with policy recommendations.

THE DRIVERS OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA

As mentioned in the introduction, crime and violence in South Africa are not recent problems. What has caused such an increase in the levels of crime and violence in recent years? In South Africa, as in other countries, it is difficult to rank the factors associated with crime and violence, since they tend to be correlated with one another. Rather than one factor alone, it is the complex interaction of social, economic, political, and cultural factors that can explain past and current levels of violence in the country.

An appropriate point of departure for this section is the socioeconomic picture. As mentioned, South Africa is one of the most unequal countries in the world. The latest estimations of the Gini coefficient of income inequality reveal that inequality has worsened in the post-apartheid era—it was .64 in 1995 increasing to .68 in 2008 (Presidency of the Republic of South Africa 2009: 25). Moreover, the share of income of the richest 10 percent of the population is 45 percent, compared to a 1.4 percent share for the poorest 10 percent of the population (World Bank 2009b). As a result, an estimated 34 percent of the population lives on less than US\$2 a day (World Bank 2009b). These contrasts between rich and poor have exacerbated the levels of social and economic exclusion of the poorest members of society, generating crime-accelerating pressures (Hinton and Newburn 2009). Contributing to this, are the high and persistent levels of unemployment found in South Africa (Simpson 1998; Blackmore 2003). According to data from Statistics South Africa,⁵⁹ the unemployment rate has remained constant at a range of 23 percent to 26 percent from 2000 to 2005, only to decrease slightly in 2006 and 2007 with 22 percent and 21 percent unemployment, respectively. Youth unemployment in South Africa is especially high; data

59. Statistics South Africa is the official statistical office of the Government of South Africa. <http://www.statssa.gov.za>

reveal that among the 15 to 24 age group, the unemployment rate is 30 percent, while for the 25 to 34 age bracket unemployment stands at 41 percent (Bhorat 2007). These levels on their own are a cause for concern, yet they are all the more alarming if one considers South Africa's "youth bulge." In South Africa, youths overall represent more than 50 percent of the population and the 15 to 24 year old group accounts for a 21 percent share (Statistics South Africa, 2008). A large youth population, particularly one with limited employment opportunities, is a demographic factor undoubtedly associated with high levels of violent crime (Altbeker 2009). Indeed, data on South African patterns of victimization and offending bear out this claim. Youths in South Africa account for 85 percent of all victims of homicide (Dissel 2007).

Another important factor associated with crime and violence is South Africa's experience of rapid urbanization. From the 1950s to today, South African cities urbanized at an average annual rate of 2.7 percent. According to the South African Institute of Racial Relations (SAIRR), this rapid urbanization was motivated by three main factors: compacted urbanization as a result of an end to the years of influx control by the apartheid regime's restricted system of residence permits and mobility passes; a massive influx of foreigners; and a more recent (and ongoing) decay/slump in the rural agricultural economy (SAIRR 2008). As racial mobility controls began to wane, the population of the Durban metropolis doubled in only one decade, from the 1970s to the 1980s (Jenkins 1997); the populations of Johannesburg and Pretoria also increased substantially as a result of people migrating to seek jobs and a better urban infrastructure. Today, it is estimated that 60 percent of South Africa's population resides in cities: by 2030, it is expected to reach 70 percent to 80 percent (Jenkins 1997; UN 2006). In addition to the rapid levels of urbanization, poor urban planning led to an increase in the number of informal settlements in the peripheral areas of major cities like Johannesburg, Pretoria, Durban, Cape Town, and others. Residents of these settlements live predominantly in precarious shacks, are mainly unemployed, have low levels of education, and have recently migrated from rural areas or from another country (SAIRR 2008). The combination of these factors—unemployment, low levels of education, and high levels of heterogeneity in densely populated informal settlements—are all associated with higher levels of crime and violence.

Institutions have also played a prominent role in the crime and violence situation in South Africa. An upsurge in street crime is typically characteristic of societies undergoing profound economic and political transitions because of the resulting disorder in political and social control mechanisms (Hinton and New-

burn 2009). This was the case in Latin America and Eastern Europe in the 1980s and 1990s. To deal with the onset of its own post-transition crime wave, South Africa launched an innovative policy framework in 1996 known as the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS). This strategy argued that the national government could no longer deal with these issues alone, setting out the need for institutions at the national, provincial, and local levels to work together in an integrated manner to fight the rising tide of crime and violence. However, several problems ensued from the implementation of this policy framework. On the one hand, there was not enough funding allocated to activities recommended by the NCPS, especially prevention activities, which limited inter-governmental coordination. On the other hand, as levels of crime continued to increase, the desired balance-of-control approaches with those more long-term preventive ones was tipped in favor of the former (Rauch 2005).

Added to the limitations of the NCPS were the inherent challenges of reforming the South African Police Service. The police had played a fundamental role in enforcing the repressive policies of apartheid and, during the 1970s and 1980s, in trying to quell popular resistance to these hated policies. For this, the police relied on “draconian security legislation as well as illegal tactics of torture and assassination” (Altbeker 2009: 260). There were thus enormous organizational, personnel, training, and cultural challenges to be resolved in reforming the police. By far the most important was that at the outset of the transition, the style of political policing organized to combat resistance to apartheid was ill-suited to the challenges of policing ordinary criminality in a democracy—a challenge with which the South African Police Service still grapples with today (Altbeker 2009). Finally, the other institutions of the criminal justice system—namely the courts and prisons—were also in need of reform as they too had been designed with the political exigencies of apartheid in mind.

For South African social policy planners and criminal justice professionals, the difficulties of coping with the post-transition crime wave have been magnified by the fact that, as in other countries with very high levels of violence, an entrenched culture of violence has taken root. As a result, even the most banal of everyday conflicts are often resolved through violent means (Cock 2000; Simpson 1993). Starting in the household, where the incidence of beatings between parents and against children is very high, the seeds of violent conflict resolution are sown. Other key social institutions such as schools, where violence is highly prevalent, also replicate these patterns. Indeed, the first national study on violence in schools revealed that one in five students was found to have been victimized by some form of violence on school premises (Leoschut 2008). High

levels of violence in the household and in school settings are often further multiplied across society, contributing to the culture of violence prevalent in South Africa today.

Finally, easy access to firearms and high levels of alcohol consumption exacerbate the degree and magnitude of violent behavior, both in the household and on the streets. There are 3.7 million registered firearms in the country and an estimated 500,000 to 4 million illegal guns in circulation (Gun Free South Africa 2008; Safe South Africa 2008). Already in 1994, the percentage of homicides committed with firearms stood at 41 percent, a share that increased to 43 percent in 2000. Also of note is South Africa's status as having one of the world's highest rates of alcohol consumption, resulting in explosive binge drinking (Altbeker 2009).

The factors presented above have, over the years, generated the conditions for high and persistent societal levels of crime and violence. It is South Africa's poor, however, who bear the heaviest and most direct impact of these problems. These broad issues will be further illuminated at the local level by means of discussion of the World Bank's quantitative and qualitative study of four poor urban communities in the metropolitan area of Johannesburg.

METHODOLOGY AND DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF THE SAMPLE

The survey was conducted in four urban communities in the greater Johannesburg area—Alexandra, Tembisa (Winnie Mandela Section, Phomulong, Extensions 4 and 5), Soweto (Kliptown), and Diepsloot 1 and 2—which are largely informal settlements, situated on the outskirts of Johannesburg central, in February and March 2009.

A combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods were employed to collect the study data. The **quantitative phase** of the project involved the use of a pre-coded questionnaire to capture household experiences. In each of the four sites, a total of 350 households were randomly selected for participation, creating a total sample of 1401 households. The questionnaire was administered orally to one household representative, aged 16 years and older, after obtaining informed consent. The survey methodology used was supplemented with 16 focus group interviews—four per site, one each with separate groups of young girls, young boys, adult men, and adult women. These group categories were selected because of their demographic vulnerability to crime and violence.

Of 1,401 people interviewed, aged 16 to 78 years old, 51 percent were males and 49 percent females. The largest share of the population interviewed was between 15 and 34 years of age; the 16 to 19 year old cohort included the largest

respondent segment, with 16.7 percent of the total sample, followed by youths aged 20 to 24 with 16 percent, and youths aged 25 to 29 with 15 percent. For the purposes of this chapter, youth are defined as individuals of 14 to 35 years of age, following the South Africa National Youth Act of 1996. In their majority, respondents were South African citizens (91.9 percent); less than a 10th of the sample was non-South African—3.2 percent were from Zimbabwe, 3.5 percent Mozambique, 0.6 percent Malawi, 0.4 percent Lesotho, 0.1 percent Swaziland, 0.1 percent Botswana, and 0.1 percent Tanzania.

More than half (51 percent) of those surveyed had reportedly never been married before, while 22 percent were married at the time of the interview, 14 percent were cohabiting with a partner, 6 percent were widowed, 4 percent were divorced, and 3 percent were separated from their spouses. Nearly three-quarters (65.6 percent) of the participants reported having biological children, while 34.4 percent indicated the contrary. One in every three (31.1 percent) respondents who had children indicated they had only one child. The majority (53 percent) of respondents with children had borne their child at or before the age of 20.

In terms of educational levels, the data reveal that these **are relatively low in the researched communities**. When asked about their highest completed level of education, 25.5 percent had completed high school, 19.7 percent had completed grade 11, and 17.4 percent had completed grades 9 to 10. Over five percent of respondents had never attended school. Very few respondents had furthered their studies to obtain a diploma (3.7 percent), undergraduate degree (1 percent), or postgraduate degree (0.3 percent). Others reported that they had obtained trade certificates (5.2 percent) or other certificates (1.5 percent). One-quarter (28.7 percent) of respondents were still attending school or some other educational institution.

Although the study did not attempt to directly explore socioeconomic status, household employment/unemployment was used as an indirect indicator of socio-economic status. Survey findings show **high levels of unemployment in the researched communities. Forty-three percent of respondents were unemployed.**⁶⁰ One-fifth (21.6 percent) of the sample was employed full-time, 10.7 percent were employed part time, and 15 percent were self-employed. Still others worked as casual laborers (6.9 percent), in their family businesses (1.7 percent), or were members of a cooperative or joint business venture (0.5 percent).

60. Including youths that are attending school.

To summarize, the above data indicate high local risk factors for crime and violence. **An elevated unemployment rate (at 43 percent nearly double the national rate), low levels of educational attainment and a high rate of teenage pregnancy and motherhood, were all social problems found in the researched communities.** These are the predominant factors in situations of social conflict (Herrenkohl and others 2000). The next section presents data on the levels of crime and violence victimization in the studied communities based on results of the quantitative and qualitative surveys.

PATTERNS OF VICTIMIZATION



Close to 50 percent of respondents (48.8 percent) had been a victim of one of the crimes explored in the survey—robbery, assault, sexual abuse, or mob justice in the 12 months prior to the survey. Disaggregated results show that residents in Diepsloot⁶¹ were victimized at higher rates, with almost 70 percent reporting they had been victims of robbery, assault, sexual abuse or mob justice. Residents of Tembisa showed the second highest risk of victimization, at 54 percent, followed by Soweto (Kliptown) with 39 percent and Alexandra with 33 percent. The breakdown by type of crime and location can be seen in figure E.2.

Males are slightly more likely to be victimized than women, and youth are more vulnerable than other age groups. Males account for just over half (52 percent) of respondents who had been victims of at least one of the crimes described above, compared to 48 percent of females. Two-thirds of victims overall were in the youth cohort between the ages of 15 and 34 years old (figure E.3). This age distribution for crime victims reflects similar findings in other countries with high levels of crime and violence, wherein the risk of victimization peaks in the late teen years and starts to decline as people get older (NedBank 1999).


Of the crimes surveyed, respondents were most likely to be victims of robbery and assault.⁶² Robbery was experienced by 30 percent of respondents,

61. These percentages are statistically significantly larger in Diepsloot than in the rest of the communities (t test: -7.36, F > prob = 0.0).

62. Survey findings reveal that home burglary is the most rampant crime in the surveyed communities. Seventy-six percent of respondents said that they had been burglarized in their home in the 12 months prior to the survey. Because the objective of the case study is to analyze those crimes that are violent in nature, burglaries are not included; however, it is important to note that burglaries in South Africa are often accompanied by violence and brutality (CSVR 2007). Therefore, it is likely that a large percentage of the residents victimized by burglaries were also victims of some type of violence during the burglary.

Figure E.2 Levels of Victimization by Type of Crime (Location)**Figure E.3** Victimization by Age

followed by assaults at 28 percent. Mob justice and sexual offenses affected 5.9 and 5.8 percent of residents surveyed, respectively. These local results reveal dramatically higher victimization rates than shown in national victimization surveys that do not disaggregate the local picture. The 2007 National Crime Victims Survey conducted by the Institute for Security Studies, for example, revealed the following adult victimization levels over the previous 12 months:

Figure E.4 Most Common Types of Crimes (%)

robbery (2.1 percent); assault (1.3); and rape/sexual offense (0.2 percent) (ISS 2008: 4). While these surveys relied on slightly different methodologies and are not strictly comparable, they are suggestive of the much higher levels of crime and violence found at the poor-urban community level in Johannesburg.

SEXUAL VIOLENCE

Sexual violence is a very serious issue in South Africa. Official data in South Africa for 2006 showed that 55,000 rapes were reported, which suggests a slight decrease over the four year period to 116 rapes per 100,000 people.

Seven percent of household respondents reported victimization by sexual abuse in the prior 12 months, with females and youths the most victimized. Incidence of rape was highest in Tembisa (9.5 percent) followed by Diepsloot (8.6 percent), Alexandra (5.7 percent), and Soweto (4.3 percent). Females made up the majority of sexual assault victims; 12 percent of females said they had been sexually assaulted in the 12 months prior to the survey, compared to 2.1 percent of males. An alarming finding is that 10.6 percent of victims had been sexually assaulted twice in the last year, and another 2.1 percent had been vic-

timized 3 times. Seventy-one percent of the victims said they considered the act a rape, compared to 11 percent who said it was attempted rape or unwanted touching, and 5 percent who said it was offensive sexual behavior. Survey results show that 41 percent of the victims knew the offender followed by 40 percent who said he was a stranger, and 16 percent of victims who responded that offenders came in a group/gang.

Sexual offenses were also found to have occurred most frequently outside the home. A full 68 percent of victims of sexual assault were attacked outside the home, most frequently in public places within the community. Of these, 21 percent said the offense happened near their homes, 30 percent elsewhere in the community, and 12 percent in a *shebeen*.⁶³


COMMUNITY PERCEPTIONS OF THE CAUSES AND IMPACT OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE

Household respondents considered unemployment and poverty to be the major underlying causes of crime and violence. Forty-one percent of respondents attributed unemployment as the most important cause, followed by poverty (32 percent), drug addiction (17 percent), idleness (5 percent), peer pressure (4 percent), and boredom/idleness (1 percent) (figure E.5). These results are consistent with the previously mentioned high unemployment and youth unemployment rates in South Africa.

Focus groups added further texture to these themes. Respondents emphasized that unemployment and poverty go hand in hand. The lack of a stable source of income to provide for basic needs was pointed as a causal factor for alternative (criminal) means of ensuring their livelihood. Discussions also expressed that the lack of structure provided by steady employment, moreover, means that unemployed people have more idle time, frustration, and propensity for drug and alcohol abuse. A large and increasing number of alcohol outlets, along with easy access to alcohol for minors were also highlighted as a factor in robberies, common assault, and sexual assault. Indeed, research carried out by the Gauteng provincial department of community safety found a strong correlation between alcohol and crime and violence in Diepsloot and other poor urban communities in the Greater Johannesburg area (Gauteng Govt. 2005).

63. Unlicensed drinking establishment.

Figure E.5 Respondent Views of the Most Important Causes of Crime and Violence



To help counter some of these problems, focus groups advocated five measures:

1. Employment and recreational programs for youth
2. Provision of skills workshops
3. Provision of capital to start businesses
4. Assistance for young people who have been blacklisted to start anew
5. A database of skilled people to avoid favoritism and nepotism in providing employment.

Another problem related to poverty and unemployment brought forward by residents in focus groups was the precarious infrastructure and housing found in their neighborhoods. Housing is a national problem in South Africa. Even though the government has made considerable efforts to provide affordable housing to low-income South Africans through its National Social Housing Policy (Government of South Africa 2003), the growth of informal settlements has continued to outpace government capacity for urban planning. This, according to respondents, has also contributed to the high levels of violence and crime in their communities. **Perpetrators are believed to take advantage of the poor environmental design of these areas, since emergency vehicles and motor-**

ized police patrols are often unable to enter owing to the lack of paved roads, narrow alleyways and maze-like passages that typically characterize such settlements.

Added to this was the issue of access to services. The lack of electricity inside dwellings or in the streets of informal settlements exacerbates feelings of insecurity because criminals are able to profit from the relative obscurity characterizing dawn and evening. In the case of Diepsloot, residents were particularly troubled by these issues and by the fact that the closest police station was located 10 miles away. As a result, residents perceived that lawlessness was increasing in their area.

Early and late shift patrols were particularly needed, according to focus group discussions, to provide safe passage to those travelling to work and school. Residents also advocated that a stipend be provided to those who participate in neighborhood watches and community-based patrols, given that residents concerned with subsistence needs often lack the available time to engage in non-income generating activities.

Both focus groups and household survey data showed that not only is the incidence of crime high, but also the levels of fear. Across all four neighborhoods, focus groups spoke of the daily occurrence of armed robberies and assaults in the area.

“Robberies are happening everyday in our community . . . they are usually at gun point.”

When surveyed, 62 percent of residents responded negatively when asked if their community is safe most of the time. Of those who had been robbed in the last year, 54.5 percent had been robbed once, while 43.8 percent had been robbed two or more times in the past year.

According to respondents, females and youths are more fearful than adults and males. **Sixty-six percent of females do not feel safe most of the time, compared to 58 percent of males; 63 percent of youths feel unsafe most of the time compared to 61 percent of adults.** While these differences are statistically significantly larger for females, they are not significant for youths. Disaggregating the data by community, the results show that respondents from Diepsloot, Soweto, and Alexandra feel unsafe most of the time, at 67 percent, 66 percent, and 66 percent, respectively, compared to 49 percent of residents in Tembisa. Seventy-two percent of residents also think that, in general, there is more violence in their communities now than five years ago.


Residents feel extremely unsafe at night. In general, 8 out of 10 respondents said they feel very unsafe at night. At the community level, in Alexandra, virtually all the respondents feel very unsafe at night (96 percent). In the rest of the communities, feelings of insecurity at night were also very high, at 84 percent (Soweto), 76 percent (Tembisa), and 74 percent (Diepsloot). Feelings of insecurity at night are statistically significantly larger for females (86.5 percent) than males (79.2 percent); 83.6 percent of youths feel very unsafe at night compared to 81.4 percent of adults, although this difference is not statistically significant.

The results above clearly show that **insecurity is a constant factor in people’s lives**. Focus groups emphasized that community members feel unsafe moving around the areas in which they live. Older women and girls were especially affected; their movement is restricted during the day and more so at night, and they were fearful of falling victim to rape or robbery. Older persons also expressed fears over targeting by criminals when they go to get their pension checks at the end of the month.

Household surveys indicated that victimized respondents had sustained both serious and mild injuries after being robbed (33.8 percent), assaulted (35.1 percent), and sexually assaulted or raped (23.2 percent). Psychological and emotional injuries were another consequence for 10 percent of robbery victims, 13 percent of assault victims, and 21 percent of sexual assault or rape victims. More than half of victims experienced both physical and psychological effects after robbery (37.4 percent), assault (51.9 percent), and sexual assault or rape (54.6 percent) experiences (figure E.6).

Such physical and psychological injuries have negative consequences on health, education, productivity, and livelihood. Victims may be partially or per-

Figure E.6 Physical and Psychological Effects of Victimization



manently disabled. Sexual assault can also lead a victim to contract HIV/Aids, with devastating consequences. Indeed, there are already 5.7 million people living with HIV in South Africa, representing 18.1 percent of the adult population (UNAIDS 2008). Similarly, crime has a deleterious effect on completion of studies if a victim or their close relative are too injured to travel to school or must leave school to recover lost household income. Children also become prone to acting out in school when their families experience difficulties. Focus groups mentioned that children often fail to complete school as a result of (1) being expelled for wrongdoing, (2) viewing crime as an easier and quicker means to obtain money, and (3) being arrested for delinquency.

“Some of us never managed to finish school because we did not have money. So we turned to crime and violence to satisfy our needs. When we are drunk and/or high on drugs, we know we act in strange ways that are unacceptable to the community and we become violent and uncontrollable.” (Male youths, Soweto)

Involvement in criminal activity can have damaging consequences even where it produces a temporary boost to income. Focus groups indicated that perpetrators of violence are often injured in the process. Discussions also highlighted that young people engaged in criminal activities often suffer from depression and other psychological disorders. This was attributed largely to the idea that those involved in crime suffer from paranoia. Psychological issues were believed to increase the likelihood of resorting to violence, putting the criminals’ families, as well as other community members, at risk.

The involvement of young people in crime also contributes to a breakdown of parental authority, as parents have difficulty disciplining their children when they are main contributors to household income. One quote is illustrative:

“On my birthday, my son bought me a very beautiful ring but one day he turned to me and said ‘Mommy, gimme that ring, I want to go and sell it.’ So I could not even ask him why because I know he is involved in some criminal activities.” (Adult female, Soweto).

Some parents feel that when it comes to the involvement of their children in crime, their only option left is to tell them to commit crimes in other neighborhoods, rather than close to home.

“Parents tell their children to go and commit crime elsewhere so they don’t get in trouble during community meetings.” (Young female, Soweto)

Such attitudes further contribute to distrust between and among neighbors.

According to the results of the survey, 68 percent of the population interviewed expressed that people cannot be trusted to look out for one another, compared to 31 percent who think they can. In the focus group of community residents, mutual distrust and lack of unity was a common feature of the discussions.

“How do we trust each if ‘they’ rape our women and steal from us?” (Young male, Alexandra)

“I was left to watch my neighbor’s house, I quickly went to the shop and when I came back there was a break-in and I was the one to blame.” (Adult male, Soweto)

Violence feeds on itself, and its increasing prevalence results in its normalization as a means to resolve conflicts. Focus group participants reported that violence had become so entrenched that it had created a generalized lack of respect for human life, and a pervading sense of hopelessness and carelessness in the way that people, predominantly young people, engage with others. These views were largely expressed by the older generation, who specifically mentioned their perception of youths’ lack of respect toward adults and human life in general. One of the participants spoke about her experience being robbed and reported that:

“He [the young perpetrator] did it with no shame or remorse and I was left moneyless and without my groceries because he knew a gun speaks louder than words.”

Adults and youths also resort to violence to take revenge for themselves, their families or their communities, further spreading the cycle of violence. Revenge can be based on real or perceived harms and for actions as trivial as to “silence” gossipers and to regain a sense of respect.

In a context of deep inequality, high patterns of crime and violence, and widespread impunity, normal patterns of competition with peers and neighbors can also degenerate into violence. Jealousy amongst neighbors was also

noted throughout the focus groups as one of the major causes of violence in the four communities represented here. Since most families in these communities live in poverty, they often become envious of neighbors who are able to afford various material possessions such as household furniture and branded clothing:

“There is a lot of competition and people hate seeing someone with something that seems better than theirs.” (Female youths, Diepsloot).

As a result, they are apparently prone to assault outside of their homes and to home burglaries, intended to make them “share” what they have. In addition, non-South Africans also mentioned that South African citizens were often jealous of their business ventures and consequently targeted them and their businesses. **This in turn creates a negative incentive to traditional routes to personal success and investment in property and personal betterment.**

Where every citizen is a potential victim and even neighbors are seen as potential perpetrators, fear of crime will be widespread. Fear in turn generally feeds on itself, and often grows exponentially in relation to the actual crime rate (Masuku 2002). This further erodes the social fabric of communities. **Residents become prone to spending their time inside the household and less and less time engaging in the kinds of community activities that can enable them to pressure governing authorities for change.** It also impedes the genesis of self-help community based prevention activities that could help prevent or divert youths and others from crime. High crime and fear also breed disaffection with governing authorities and criminal justice institutions (Roberts, 2008). As per the latest results of the 2008 Afrobarometer⁶⁴ survey, 69 percent felt that the government was handling the matter of crime very badly (41 percent) or fairly badly (28 percent). Similarly, 54 percent of South Africans do not trust the police at all (22 percent) or just a little (32 percent) as compared to the 42 percent who trust them a lot (18 percent) or somewhat (24 percent) (Afrobarometer 2009). The kinds of low levels of trust provide fertile ground for vigilante forms of justice to gain more credibility and sway, in turn eroding the rule of law (Hinton and Newburn 2009).

Fear of crime also feeds popular demand that the state implement high-impact coercive responses. For example, when respondents were asked in the

64. Afrobarometer surveys are conducted periodically in more than a dozen Sub-Saharan African nations. The series represents a large-scale, cross-national survey research project designed to systematically map mass attitudes to democracy, markets, and civil society and, ultimately, to track the evolution of such attitudes in selected nations over time.

survey about what should be done with youths that frequently commit robberies and assaults in their communities, 83 percent said they should be put in jail and incapacitated. Seven percent said that they should be beaten by community members, and 4 percent said that they should attend rehabilitation programs. In this kind of environment state responses are often short-term and populist in nature, emphasizing repressive approaches.

Against the backdrop of the preceding discussion, what have been the main coping mechanisms to high levels of crime and dissatisfaction with the government’s handling of it? According to Garofalo (1981), residents try to reduce their risk of victimization in three different ways: avoidance behaviors, protective behaviors, and insurance behaviors. In poor urban communities, however, residents have limited financial means to invest in protective behaviors or insurance. As a result, the most common measure adopted to reduce the risk of victimization will be to avoid certain places during certain hours; the survey results corroborate this claim. **The ranking of the five most important responses reveals that 42 percent of the respondents choose to avoid traveling during certain hours; 37 percent decide to stay home more; 36 percent invest in security arrangements such as locks and gates; 34 percent go to the police; and 17 percent do nothing to avoid being a victim of crime** (table E.1).

Most coping mechanisms are individual-level behaviors, mostly aimed at restricting mobility within the community. The most common response was to limit traveling during certain hours; others included staying home more or in-

Table E.1 Measures Taken to Avoid Being a Victim of Crime

Not traveling during certain hours	42.4
Staying home more	37.4
Installing locks/gates	36.0
Going to the police	34.0
Nothing	17.0
Going to the authorities	14.1
Attending a public forum	13.5
Changing route*	10.4
Pressuring for security	8.0
Buying/carrying weapon	6.3
Joining a vigilante group	4.6
Forming a community group to address problems	3.1
Quitting job/closing business	1.3
Dropping out of school	1.2
Paying for security	0.9
Other	0.3

vesting in physical protections for the home, such as locks or gates. Usually these take the form of multiple padlocks on household doors, rather than the sophisticated kinds of alarm systems and dead bolts that will be available in more affluent neighborhoods.

Focus groups added more details, emphasizing the highly individualized nature of local responses to crime. Individuals highlighted the following when asked how they alter their behavior to avoid becoming victims of crime:

1. Purchasing and installing multiple door locks
2. Minimizing unnecessary walking at night and in areas known to be unsafe
3. Asking a family member or trusted friend to house-sit in the owner's absence
4. Becoming associated with a church for emotional support
5. Providing information about perpetrators to the police
6. Engaging in good and constructive parental communication
7. Study
8. Prayer.

Only a select few focus groups voiced collective solutions such as joining street patrols or setting up a neighborhood watch. Focus groups by and large mentioned the following kinds of collective efforts:

- Walking in groups after school and at night
- Whistle-blowing to attract attention from neighbors
- Encouraging youth to engage in sports activities to keep them busy
- Keeping others' contact numbers to call them if in need of help
- Attending street committee meetings to voice any disturbing issues.

More than half of the people interviewed (54 percent) stated that more police are needed to address crime and violence problems⁶⁵ when asked what kinds of interventions could help. Thirty seven percent of the surveyed population considered employment programs to be the most important solution to the crime and violence problem, with 32 percent emphasizing that they should target youth. Twenty-seven percent mentioned more community-oriented policemen, and 25 percent called for better infrastructure. Other important responses include

65. Percentage presented in table A3.2 includes the percentage of all responses, regardless of how they were ranked.

Table E.2 Most Important Policy Change to Address Crime and Violence Problems

More police	54.0
Employment programs	37.2
Employment programs for youth	32.4
Community-oriented police	26.9
Infrastructure	25.3
Better street lighting	23.5
Increasing community-oriented policing	23.5
More recreational activities for youth	20.7
Enforce ban on drugs	13.1
Ban illegal taverns	12.2
Enforce ban on sales of illicit alcohol	8.2
Gun control	6.1
More alternative dispute resolution systems	2.4

better street lighting and more community-oriented policing programs (23 percent), and offering more recreational activities for youth (21 percent). Thirty-three percent of responses advocate enforcing the ban on drugs and restrictions on sales of alcohol, including the ban on illegal taverns. Finally, gun control programs and alternative conflict resolution systems were supported by 6 percent and 2 percent of the population, respectively (table E2).

EXISTING POLICY FRAMEWORK

The preceding discussion has endeavored to capture the seriousness of crime and violence problems at the local urban level in South Africa. Respondents also suggested priority areas for government intervention and leadership. At this point, it is worth comparing information presented with a summary of government strategies to address crime and violence across the different spheres of life. Indeed the fight against crime and violence continues to rank among the top 10 priorities of the government. The array of policies and programs pursued across national, provincial, and municipal levels,⁶⁶ as well as civil society organizations, have been synthesized below.

66. Because the case study focuses on poor urban communities in Johannesburg, the municipal programs and activities presented in this section relate to Johannesburg only.

National Level

In 1996, shortly after the end of apartheid, the South African government developed the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS), as mentioned earlier in Section II. The NCPS was envisaged as the main policy framework to address crime and violence. The NCPS has the following objectives (box E.1):

As seen in Box 2, the NCPS emphasizes a broad approach to tackling crime. At the implementation level the strategy has not yielded the expected results, however. This was mainly due to the fact that it failed to directly fund programs that could address the underlying socioeconomic causes of crime and violence, such as unemployment, poverty, lack of education, and the absence of adequate social services, even though these ills were considered the biggest threat to the security and safety of South Africa in the diagnostic prior to developing the NCPS. In addition, there has been an overreliance on the criminal justice system, leading to extremely high incarceration rates and a reactive approach to crime.

The South Africa Police Services (SAPS) have sought to increase their prevention activities in recent years through their Community Police Forums (CPFs). These forums are a way to facilitate partnerships between the police and the community and to engage in joint problem identification and consultative problem solving. CPFs consist of organizations and institutions such as schools, businesses, and civil and religious institutions, working in partnership with the local police. Some of the activities of the CPFs focus on the development of yearly community safety plans, which identify priorities and needs for the area.

Box E.1 Objectives of the South African National Crime Prevention Survey

- Establishment of a comprehensive policy framework to enable government to address crime in a coordinated and focused manner that draws on the resources of all government agencies, as well as civil society.
- Promotion of a shared understanding and common vision of how South Africa, as a nation, is going to tackle crime at all levels of government.
- Development of a set of national programs to kick-start and focus the efforts of various government departments in delivering quality services to solve the problems leading to high crime levels.
- Maximization of civil society's participation in mobilizing and sustaining crime prevention initiatives.
- Creation of a dedicated and integrated crime prevention infrastructure to conduct ongoing research into crime prevention as well as research to evaluate the efficacy of national, provincial, and local campaigns.

Source: Government of South Africa.

However, this program has faced several hurdles in its implementation due to constant policy shifts regarding the role of these institutions (Chiliza 2004).

The criminal justice system itself has been under review in the past year in order to increase conviction rates, speed trials throughout and improve the rehabilitation side of the prison system and societal re-entry, particularly as South Africa has one of the highest rates of incarceration in the world, with 330 prisoners per 100,000 people (King's College 2009). This comprehensive review of the criminal justice system aims to:

- Identify key weaknesses and blockages in the system
- Find solutions to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Criminal Justice System (CJS)
- Encourage a modernized CJS with a single vision and mission leading to joint objectives, priorities, and performance measurements across the justice, crime prevention and security clusters,⁶⁷ and eliminate presently misaligned priorities and targets. (Government of South Africa 2006)⁶⁸

As mentioned above, youth violence is a major problem in South Africa. Fighting this problem has become a policy priority for the Government of South Africa. The National Youth Commission is currently developing and implementing programs and activities to prevent youths at risk from engaging in criminal and violent behaviors. Among the most salient activities of the commission are:

The Umsobomvu Youth Fund: This fund was created in 2001 to facilitate and create jobs, and develop skills in South African youth between 18 and 35 years. The fund has three major areas of action:

- Contact, Information and Counseling (CIC)
- Skills Development and Transfer (SDT)
- Youth Entrepreneurship.

The major target groups of the fund's programs are young women and men with disabilities; unemployed young women and men; school-aged, out-of-school young women and men; and young rural and urban women.

67. To make integrated governance effective, programs of the government's 39 departments are grouped into 6 sectoral cluster committees, overseen by cabinet ministers. The clusters are as follows: Social Sector; Economic Sector; Investment and Employment; International Relations, Peace and Security; Justice, Crime Prevention and Security; Governance and Administration (Overview of the government's program of action).

68. <http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2008/08081216151003.htm>.

“Ke Moja” (“I’m fine without drugs”) is a joint program of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Government of South Africa that aims at increasing drug awareness and prevention among youth in South Africa. The program addresses the socioeconomic causes of substance abuse by providing skill development activities and recreational activities for youth—such as sports, arts, and performance arts—to use their time more productively and reduce the risk of engaging in substance abuse.

Provincial Level

The province of Gauteng, wherein Johannesburg and the researched communities are found, was the first province in South Africa to develop a crime prevention strategy. Under the auspices of the Ministry of Community Safety, it launched a regional strategy modeled on the National Crime Prevention Strategy, targeting violent and serious crime, which accounts for one-third of all crime in the province. Through a combination of social crime prevention strategies and criminal justice system reforms, interventions are carried out across four major pillars:

Improvement of the quality of policing through: police oversight, strengthening the monitoring of police performance and conduct, improving the functioning of CPFs, and improving collaboration and coordination between the SAPS and other agencies involved in crime prevention.

Promotion of social crime prevention by: developing violence prevention programs and activities for children, school safety strategies, attention to out-of-school youth, and gender-based violence prevention programs.

Development of institutional arrangements to increase the effectiveness and the efficiency of crime prevention activities by: better coordination of the criminal justice system, a multi-sectoral approach to crime prevention, expansion of the role of local government in crime prevention, and a strengthening of information management as relates to crime and safety statistics.

Encouragement of community participation in the development and implementation of crime prevention interventions by: fomenting social mobilization against crime, promoting awareness and changing behavior toward crime, and facilitating coordination between civil societies, communities, and government to implement crime prevention activities and reduce duplication of programs.

Municipal

Johannesburg is currently implementing a comprehensive multi-stakeholder Johannesburg City Safety Strategy under the auspices of Johannesburg’s key development

plan, Joburg 2030. Its main objective is to define a common approach to addressing issues of crime, safety, and security in Johannesburg, in order to enhance the city's economic development. In close cooperation with SAPS and the Gauteng Department of Community Safety, the strategy prioritizes the geographic targeting of areas⁶⁹ that are deemed central to the promotion of economic development, with a view to gradual broadening of the boundaries of crime reduction and prevention interventions. In order to address crime issues more effectively in targeted areas, the safety strategy has identified seven key programs based on an analysis of the most serious crimes.⁷⁰ The programs are:

Focused Surveillance, including patrols, CCTV, and other tools to deter criminals and increase people's perception of safety.

- Residential and economic development to win back the streets to improve municipal services and infrastructure, good urban management and environmental design, increasing the use of the streets through events and activities, and strengthening the collaboration between police and communities.
- Improving the orderliness of the city through strengthened enforcement of building by-laws and city ordinances along with increased attention to traffic policing and regulation enforcement.
- Reduction of supply and availability of illegally owned firearms, particularly among youths.
- A dismantling of organized crime groups among youths by targeting armed robberies across Johannesburg and making use of surveillance tools such as CCTV cameras, plate recognition, and other tools to increase law enforcement's effectiveness.

Private Sector and Civil Society

Civil society organizations (CSOs) are very active in the sector of security, crime, and violence prevention.⁷¹ Institutions such as the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), the Centre for Science and Industrial Research, Centre for Justice and Crime Prevention, NICRO, and the Open Society Institute have generated

69. These areas include the Ellis Park Area, Orange Farm, Norwood, Moroka, Newton, and the Central Business District.

70. Prioritized by the safety strategy are: serious violent interpersonal crimes, serious violent property crimes, fraud and corruption, crimes affecting tourists, crime and grime, and hijacking and theft of freight and cargo.

71. Appendix A.3 presents a list of organizations that are working directly or indirectly to address violence in the researched communities.

a substantial amount of research to advise the government on crime and violence issues affecting South Africa. The Open Society Foundation and the Center for Justice and Crime Prevention, in particular, have also been very active in the development and implementation of crime prevention projects at the community level. Their activities include the implementation of safety audits as a diagnostic tool in poor communities—urban and rural—to design crime prevention programs tailored to the local context.

The private sector is also heavily involved in crime-prevention activities. Business against Crime, a coalition of South African companies, collaborates closely with the Government of South Africa to develop of effective public/private partnerships for reducing crime. In this way they have influenced government and business strategy, policy, and priorities in the area of crime and transferred business skills, knowledge, and expertise.

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The case study presented here has attempted to analyze the impact of crime and violence in poor urban communities in Johannesburg. Crime and violence are serious and pervasive issues in the researched communities, generating fear, dampening productivity, investment and quality of life. Local residents cannot travel to work or school or form associations without facing the real threat of physical attack and loss of property, injury, and even death. Survey findings have indicated that resident responses to violence occur primarily at the individual level. Majorities surveyed here felt powerless to do anything to change the situation, beyond reporting crimes to the authorities, purchasing additional padlocks, and staying at home more. As residents retreat indoors and behind walls of mutual suspicion, social bonds are further weakened. Poverty, which already limits the available time and resources for collective action, is intensified by the scale of the crime problem. This in turn inhibits effective public oversight and locally generated solutions for change, damaging overall human development prospects. The challenges are thus vast. Before suggesting policy options, it is important to highlight a few points.

South Africa has made considerable efforts in recent years to address the problems of insecurity. Although there have been moderate reductions in the levels of some types of violent crime, as noted before, South Africa's crime and violence rates are still unacceptably high. South Africa has endeavored to strengthen the criminal justice system and increase budget and locations for the police, courts, and prisons. South Africa also benefits from a relatively well

developed criminal justice data collection system as compared to its African neighbors. Indeed, the results of the latest national crime victimization survey (ISS 2008) reveal that, on average, 62 percent of South Africans reported crimes. However, while having a good and effective criminal justice system is key to address the levels of crime and violence, in the long term, these measures will likely have a limited impact where they do not also address the root causes of crime and violence (Dammert and others 2008). Second, as mentioned before and well documented by international studies, effective public policy in crime prevention requires inter-sectoral (control + prevention), multi-level mechanisms of coordination that will enable the formulation of programs that capture the particularities of the local context. Third, it is important to note that there are no straightforward explanations for the levels of crime and violence and, as a result, no silver bullets to address this issue. In a diverse and heterogeneous country like South Africa, the dynamics of crime and violence are driven by a multiplicity of factors and, therefore, finding solutions to the problem is a major challenge.

With these caveats in mind, we present some policy suggestions based on the findings of the survey that will hopefully encourage further discussion of potential policy interventions in these and other poor urban communities in Johannesburg and other major South African urban centers. The results clearly indicate that insecurity is most acute in the streets and public spaces of the surveyed communities. Evidence regarding the physical infrastructure of these communities reveals poor lighting, absence of roads and bridges, and limited spaces for residents to walk in (COURC 2005). As discussed in this study, communities such as Diepsloot have extremely precarious levels of infrastructure in addition to poor lighting. There are few or no educational facilities, limited access to health clinics and police stations, and an absence of proper recreational facilities in these communities in addition to a lack of roads and bridges (COURC 2005)—all of which impede development and generate criminogenic conditions.

Short-term, quick-win interventions such as improved lighting in the streets and passages of the slums, as well as other situational prevention interventions, could help to deter potential offenders from opportunistic crimes such as robbery and assault. It could also facilitate the entry of motorized police patrols, emergency vehicles, and other public services thereby reducing the levels of fear and insecurity of residents, particularly at night.

Reduction of fear and insecurity is especially important for the development of a greater number of local civic associations and other forms of collective ac-

tion (Hinton 2009). Associational life is particularly crucial in generating the necessary oversight of governing authorities to ensure that public policies are delivered in the ways and places they are needed most and to stem service delivery corruption. Community driven forms of collective action also help to generate self-help solutions to the problems affecting residents most directly. It can also lead to a strengthening of the social fabric, which in turn makes it more difficult for criminals to victimize residents without detection. While improved street lighting on its own cannot deliver all of these goals, it can serve as a catalyzing force. A promising intervention related to street lighting was developed in conjunction with other urban upgrading efforts in Minas Gerais, Brazil, wherein a public-private partnership was established between the state government and the electricity company to light up open areas in Belo Horizonte's slums, in an effort to encourage more community participation and reduce the levels of violent crime. Official data collected since the implementation of this measure in 2004, reveals a 60 percent decrease in violent crime in those areas (Agencia de Minas 2006).

Related to this is the issue of the levels of policing coverage provided to poor urban communities. Findings from the quantitative surveys indicate that residents strongly believe that a greater police presence and more community-oriented policing are needed to address the crime and violence problems. South Africa already has a high police/citizen ratio—one police officer per 300 citizens—relative to international standards (SAPS 2008; Burger 2007; Altbeker 2005), but this ratio provides no indication about distribution. In a context of unequal power relations such as found in South Africa, policing coverage may be more heavily tilted towards protection of affluent neighborhoods. For this reason, governing authorities and police agencies must assign policing resources with local needs at the forefront. Without a modicum of security at the local level, it will be difficult for the state and other public service providers to establish the necessary presence to effectively deliver goods and services or improve and maintain housing and infrastructure.

The findings of this study also indicate that programs targeted at youth education and employment are much needed interventions in a context where youth unemployment stands at alarmingly high levels, and where youth are both main perpetrators as well as victims of crime in the poor communities studied. Education, in particular, can counter-balance violent messages learned in the home and on the streets, inform young people about the parameters and risks of abuse sexual abuse, and the spread of HIV/Aids and other sexually transmitted diseases. South Africa has developed promising interventions on

sexual and domestic violence through its Victim Empowerment Program, but earlier targeting would be a valuable prevention tool.

Programs to keep youths in school and trade-based learning models can also help to address the skills gap that contributes to unemployment and poverty. In addition, schools can serve as a central locus for violence-prevention activities. Recreational activities—both sports and cultural—during and after school that include school-attending children, parents, friends, and other neighborhood residents could help provide positive outlets for youth and bring communities together. Experiences from Brazil and other countries in Latin America show that these types of interventions are promising.⁷²

Other interesting interventions that have been implemented with success in other middle-income countries include epidemiological assessments of the hours and days in which alcohol-fueled homicides occur to ban alcohol sales during these times of the night. Such initiatives were part of broader urban management programs that have been successful in the case of some of Colombia's main urban centers. For such kinds of laws and ordinances to achieve effect, however, an appropriate enforcement and oversight regime is necessary. Otherwise there is substantial risk of noncompliance and bribery to get around the regulation.

Finally, until poor communities achieve higher levels of economic security, capacity, and political voice, national authorities should take special care to ensure that local municipalities survey, analyze, and target social policies to the poor. Otherwise, the marketplace of political competition may be heavily tilted to the concerns of business groups and higher income neighborhoods. Ultimately, unless the issues of urban insecurity are addressed through a combination of social and situational prevention and control methods at both the macro and micro levels, human development will continue its dangerous imbalance.

72. The Latin America and Caribbean region of the World Bank is piloting a school-based violence prevention manual in several countries in Central America. This manual provides a practical framework for the development and implementation of violence prevention programs that will help reduce levels of violence and aggression in schools, as well as allow for related community activities in school settings.

Appendix F

Crime and Violence in Poor Urban Communities in Nairobi



INTRODUCTION

Since its independence in 1963, Kenya was considered to be among the most stable and peaceful democracies in the continent, and a prosperous economy (Gimode 2001) The transition to a multiparty state was considered essential to establish democratic stability and guarantee the inclusion and participation of all ethnic groups in the country (Rapando 1999). At the same time, Kenya recorded strong levels of economic growth during the first years of independence, but started to decline in the decade that followed from 6.5 percent annual growth to about four percent. During the 1980s, growth continued its steady decline, falling to 1.5 percent by the 1990s. It only picked up in the early years of this decade to about four to five percent annually (Library of Congress 2007).

Several decades of economic decline, along with very rapid population growth—since 1965 Kenya’s population grew at a rate of three to four percent annually only to decline to two percent in 2000—contributed to increased levels of poverty and inequality. Today, levels of poverty and inequality in Kenya are pervasive. In 2003 it was estimated that 56 percent of households lived below the poverty line, and inequality has remained high for over a decade (World Bank 2006c). The social, economic, and political exclusion of some sectors of the population has contributed to fuel the levels of crime and violence in the country, including the explosion of violence after the highly contested 2007 national election where close to 2,000 people were killed and some 600,000 displaced from their homes in a matter of days.⁷³


Kenya’s crime statistics are not considered reliable. In a context of widespread corruption, political manipulation, weak police oversight, and a variety of organizational inefficiencies, recording practices invariably suffer (Hill 2009). Exacerbating this is limited reporting of crimes by victims (Gimode 2001). The number of murders captured in the Kenyan homicide statistics is comparatively low to in relation to many other Sub-Saharan African countries. The recorded homicide rate has remained roughly constant since 1987 (at a level of 3 to 6 homicides per 100,000 people—see figure F.1). Other types of crime and violence, particularly offenses against people (including assault, creating disturbance, and affray⁷⁴) and property (theft, burglary, and robbery) are also low by international standards but are believed to be pervasive issues throughout Kenya. Official records indicate that these types of offenses accounted for 60 percent of all crimes reported to the police. Of these crimes, assault has increased the most in the past 15 years. Since 1995 it followed an upward trend to reach a rate of nine assaults per 100,000 people. In 2005, the rate of assault had increased markedly to 35 assaults per 100,000. The rate has remained significantly high in spite of a slight decrease in 2008 to 27 assaults per 100,000 people. Also, the rate of robbery has decreased substantially from a peak of 41 robberies per 100,000 people to a rate of nine per 100,000 in 2007.

Crime and violence in Kenya are concentrated in Nairobi and other large urban centers, but in recent years have permeated rural areas as well. Recent studies have shown an increasing incidence and brutality of rural violence in Kenya, often involving assault, rape, murder, and the destruction of property (Francis and Nyamongo 2008). The negative impact of such high levels of crime and vio-

73. <http://www.propertykenya.com/news/476867-we-must-address-social-causes-of-crime>

74. “Affray” refers to noisy fighting between two or more people in a public place.

Figure F.1 Rates of Violent Crimes in Kenya, 1987–2008



Source: Kenya Police Statistics, 1987–2008. The dotted line from 2004 to 2005 implies that no data are available that year).

lence in Kenya range from a reduction in the quality of life, constraints on mobility, reduced school attendance, and the erosion of levels of trust both within communities and in public institutions. In addition, crime and violence impact the economy negatively. Businesses incur significant losses as a result of crime and violence. For example, data from the World Bank's enterprise survey shows that Kenyan firms lost close to 4 percent of their total sales in 2007 due to crime. This is slightly higher than the average for Sub-Saharan Africa at 3.7 percent. Moreover, the overall cost of crime and violence on the economy is estimated to be 4.6 percent of GDP (Alda 2009).⁷⁵

However, these impacts are not felt uniformly: it is the lives of the poorest that are the most affected by violence and crime. At the same time, they have fewer means to address and cope with these problems. Designing effective interventions to help the poorest sectors of Kenyan society to deal with violence and insecurity requires a thorough understanding of these problems. This chapter outlines the main characteristics of crime and violence as they affect poor urban communities in Nairobi and discusses the ways in which these communities cope with these problems.

The chapter has nine sections structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the historical, political, social, and economic factors that might explain the current levels of insecurity in Kenya. Section 3 presents background information on the researched communities. Section 4 presents information on the survey sample. Section 5 discusses the general levels of crime and violence victimization found in the surveyed communities; data are also disaggregated to bring up information about the most prevalent types of crime and violence including domestic and sexual violence in the researched communities. Section 6 discusses people's perceptions of crime and violence and their levels of fear as a result of high levels of crime and victimization. Section 7 analyzes the impact of crime and violence in the communities, as well as the levels of interpersonal trust and of trust in institutions as these relate to insecurity and goes on to discuss the coping mechanisms developed by residents. This section also discusses implications for policy interventions to help address crime and violence in the selected neighborhoods. Section 8 presents a summary of the current institutional arrangements at the national and municipal levels to combat crime and violence in

75. 4.6% of GDP estimation is based on the aggregate of health, institutional, and investment losses, and material transfers as a result of crime.

Kenya. Finally, section 9 offers a broader perspective on policy formulation to address these issues more effectively.

DRIVING FACTORS OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN KENYA

What accounts for the high levels of crime and violence that have made some of Kenya's largest cities, like Nairobi, among the most crime-ridden cities in Africa? The answer to this question is not a simple one. The driving factors that shape levels of crime are complex and interwoven, ranging from social and economic to historical and political.

Among the most salient explanatory factors of violence in Kenya are the levels of income inequality. In Kenya, income inequality has remained high for over a decade. In the 1998–2002 period, the Gini index was 43 (World Bank 2006c). Another dimension of this disparity is the level of horizontal inequality.⁷⁶ Since its independence, Kenya has had significant levels of horizontal inequalities among groups when the group in power has benefited politically, economically, and socially (Stewart 2008). Consequently, it is likely that the impact horizontal of inequality over the years on the groups not in power contributed to increased levels of crime and violence.

Another important and key factor that may help explain the levels of crime and violence is Kenya's large youth population. Youths 15–30 years comprise 32 percent of the total population and account for 60 percent of the labor force in Kenya (Government of Kenya 2006). Most of these youth are unemployed, accounting for six out every ten people out of work in Kenya (64 percent). Moreover, nine out of ten unemployed youths lack professional or vocational skills to find work (Odhiambo 2006). In Nairobi, the youth unemployment rate is also high and accounts for 46 percent of the total unemployed population. As a result, youths tend to spend long periods of idleness in their communities and are easily lured into criminal activities (Government of Kenya 2006) In fact, many of the youths involved in 2007 post-election violence in Kenya were unemployed (CIPEV 2008). Other demographic and social factors relevant to explain the current levels of crime and violence include changes in family and household structures, and gender norms, which along with the abuse of alcohol and drugs, undermine social cohesion and are associated with growing violence on

76. According to Stewart and others (2005), horizontal inequalities (that is, inequalities among groups) are important explanatory variables in explaining violence.

the street and in the home. These changes are reflected in a growing culture of violence in public and private life (Francis and Nyamongo 2008).

Urban growth in Kenya has been very rapid, especially in Nairobi. Between 2000 and 2005, Kenya's urban growth was 4.4 percent, compared to the regional average of 3.5 percent (UN-Habitat 2009). As a result, more and more people end up living in poor conditions and Nairobi's urban settlements continue to swell (70 percent of Nairobi's population now lives in slums) (UN-HABITAT 2001). For example, since its birth, Kibera, one of the most notorious settlements in Nairobi has grown at a staggering rate of 17 percent per year. Today it is estimated that 700,000–1 million people live there. (Shofco 2009). Other slum areas in Nairobi have grown very rapidly in recent years as well. The impact of this very rapid urbanization combined with poor urban planning may have contributed to the current levels of crime and violence in the main urban centers.

Institutional factors may have also contributed to the spike in the levels of crime and violence in Kenya. Despite considerable efforts by the Government of Kenya to improve the capacity of the criminal justice system institutions, these are still largely ineffective and corruption remains rampant. The police force is considered to be among the most corrupt institutions in the country. Kenyans are doubtful that the police are able to provide the basic good of security (Human Rights Watch 2008; Gimode 2001). The justice system is considered to be one of the most corrupt institutions in Kenya after the police (Hodess and Lavers 2006). Other institutions, such as schools, may also contribute to the generation of a culture of violence in Kenya. Violence within schools is rampant, not only among students, but also between teachers and students. Although Kenyan law strictly prohibits teacher aggression and violence, it is a prevalent and serious problem. A survey of school children revealed that 60 percent of students had been physically abused and were victims of other forms of punishment by teachers (Newell 2006; Stavropoulos 2006). Collective violence also occurs in Kenyan high schools. During July 2008, violence and vandalism by high school students erupted in several parts of the country.

Finally, political factors also promote violence in Kenya. Political parties have used violence as a weapon for power and political gain (Muller 2008). Since the beginning of the 1990s, politics in Kenya began to rupture and the emergence of alternative political views to a one-party system in power was addressed using the repressive force of the State (Gimode 2001). The use of the State's coercive force against the Kenyan people led to a generalized culture of impunity for politically-linked killings that remains until today (Human Rights Watch 2008; CIPEV 2008).

SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF STUDIED COMMUNITIES

The study was conducted in two Nairobi settlements: Korogocho and Viwandani. To provide a context for the findings of the study, this section, largely based on secondary sources, outlines the social and economic characteristics of these communities.⁷⁷

Korogocho is the third-largest slum in Nairobi and is composed of ten villages. It is one of the oldest informal settlements in Nairobi, having been in existence for over 50 years. Population estimates vary significantly: from 120,000 (UN-Habitat⁷⁸) to 44,000 and 25,000 (Amuyunzu-Nyamongo and Taffa 2004; Africa Population and Health Research Centre 2002–2003⁷⁹). Although its population is believed to have steadily declined in recent years, Korogocho remains the most densely populated slum in Nairobi with an estimated 250 house units per hectare, each containing an average of 5–6 inhabitants.⁸⁰

Viwandani lies 7 km from the centre of Nairobi, close to the city's main industrial sector. Population estimates in Viwandani range from 27,000 to 56,000 residents (Amuyunzu-Nyamongo and Taffa 2004). Compared to Korogocho, Viwandani is characterized by having a more transient population with residents remaining in the settlement for an average of 6 years (Cohen and Menken 2006: 191). Although is not as densely populated as Korogocho, estimates are approximately 53,000 inhabitants per square kilometer (Izugbara and others 2008).

Alkema and others (2008) identify three social tiers in Korogocho.⁸¹ The poorest group includes 19 percent of the total population, 75 percent of whom do not have enough food; the middle tier contains 56 percent of the population, 6 percent of whom do not have enough food; and the richest group includes 25 percent of the population, just 4 percent of whom do not have enough food. Korogocho has extremely high rates of unemployment. Among men aged 18 and over, 11 percent are in salaried employment, 10 percent in established trading, 34 percent in casual employment, 29 percent in petty trading, and 15 percent with no income-generating activity. Among women in the same age

77. This section draws largely from a review of secondary material undertaken by Sophie Tholstrup.

78. <http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?cid=5263&catid=510&typeid=24&subMenuId=0>

79. http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11708&page=196

80. "People United for a New Korogocho": Bega Kwa Bega Project. <http://www.begakwabega.com/ScrittiKorogocho-eng.html>

81. <http://paa2008.princeton.edu/download.aspx?submissionId=80116>

bracket, 50 percent had no income generating activity, 32 percent were engaged in petty trading, 8 percent in casual employment, and 6 percent in established trading (Mudege and others 2008).

The same study identifies four socioeconomic tiers in Viwandani.⁸² The poorest tier contains 28 percent of the population, 68 percent of whom do not have enough food; the medium tier includes 50 percent of the population, 11 percent of whom do not have enough food; the lower-rich tier comprises 9 percent of the population and the upper-rich tier includes 13 percent of the population. No individual in this category lacks sufficient food. Average income levels are higher in Viwandani than in Korogocho because of Viwandani's proximity to Nairobi's southern industrial sector, thus housing a large share of industrial workers and stimulating the emergence of casual workers selling food and vegetables in the slum's surrounding areas.

One of the most predominant problems affecting these communities is related to service delivery and infrastructure. Service provision in Korogocho is minimal, consisting of rudimentary drains, community water points and pit latrines, which are shared by 30–40 families. Similarly, recent data from Viwandani show that less than 5 percent of households have their own toilets (Ezeh and others 2006). The water in both communities is controlled and sold at prohibitive prices by “water cartels”—gangs who dominate the water points.⁸³ This has sometimes generated conflicts over access to it (Undie and others 2006). Possible reasons for the failure of the councils to provide adequate services to the population include financial mismanagement, lack of political will, rapid and disorganized urbanization and the limited economic capacity of the residents to pay for the services they demand.⁸⁴ Community-based organizations (CBOs) have arisen in many areas to fill the existing vacuum in service delivery.

Access to health and education facilities is also limited in both communities, with only 5 health facilities in Korogocho and 11 in Viwandani targeting poor households or vulnerable populations such as expectant mothers, HIV/AIDS patients or orphans (APHRC 2002). School access is equally limited in both communities, with 40 schools in Korogocho and 42 in Viwandani, of which only two and four are public. Poor access to health and education facilities may explain the poor performance of both communities in social indicators. Health

82. <http://paa2008.princeton.edu/download.aspx?submissionId=80116>

83. <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=73718>

84. <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=33416>

issues are rampant in both communities but significantly worse in Korogocho, where levels of infant mortality are extremely high: with 81.8 infant deaths per 1,000 live births,⁸⁵ it exceeds the national rate of 64 deaths per 1,000 live births and Nairobi's rate of 76 deaths per 1,000 live births (Amuyunzu-Nyamongo and Taffa 2004). Other health problems affecting both communities include malnutrition, especially among children, and HIV/AIDS, which is more prevalent here than in central Nairobi.⁸⁶ In terms of schooling, both Viwandani and Korogocho's net primary school enrollments rate are higher than the national average, at 80.2 percent and 87 percent respectively.⁸⁷

The challenging socioeconomic conditions that residents of both Korogocho and Viwandani face on a daily basis have fuelled conditions for the emergence of crime and violence to emerge and persist overtime. The next section presents the findings of the quantitative and qualitative surveys conducted in Korogocho and Viwandani.

SURVEY SAMPLE

The study was conducted in four sites—Grogan and Highridge in Korogocho and Kingstone and Lunga-Lunga in Viwandani. The selection of the study areas was made during a pre-test before the main study. Because very little data on violence exists on these communities, residents in each area were asked questions on violence levels and trends in their different sub-locations; their responses led to the selection of the two sites per area. More information on methodology is included in Annex A to this chapter. Roughly equal numbers of males and females were interviewed, with 70 percent of respondents being between 15 and 34 years old. Table F.1 summarizes the general characteristics of the participants in the study.

A total of 16 focus group discussions (FGDs) were also conducted at the community level (4 each from village involved in the study). The distribution of the groups was as follows: 4 for adult males (25 yrs and above), 4 for adult females (25 yrs and above), 4 for female youth (aged 18–24 years) and 4 for young males (18–24 years). Participants were contacted in advance of the interview and invited to attend.

85. http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11708&page=196

86. In a recent study, 29% of children in Viwandani reported not having enough to eat, compared to 42% in Korogocho. http://www.isuh.org/download/newsletter_November_2007.pdf

87. http://www.isuh.org/download/newsletter_November_2007.pdf, 104

Table F.1 Distribution of Respondents by Background Characteristics, in Korogocho and Viwandani (%)

Age		Education		Employment	
Background characteristics	(%)	Background characteristics	(%)	Background characteristics	(%)
15–19	11	No education	13	Unemployed	31
20–24	29	Primary	49	Employed w/benefits	6
25–29	18	Secondary	30	Self-employed	31
30–34	12	Post-secondary	6	Member of cooperative	.3
35–39	10	Vocational	2	Casual worker	29
40–44	6	Training	0	Work in family business	2
45–49	5	University		Beggar	1
50–54	3				
55–60	2				
61 and above	4				


CRIME AND VIOLENCE VICTIMIZATION

Forty-four percent (44 percent) of respondents have been a victim of either a robbery, assault, have been sexually abused, or have been victims of arson during the 12 months prior to the survey. Males are slightly more likely to be victims of crime than females. Males make up for over half of the respondents (53 percent) who have been victims of at least one of the crimes in the survey described above, compared to 47 percent of females. This difference, while small, is statistically significant.

Youths are the age cohort most victimized. Twenty-seven percent of the respondents who were victims of crime were youths 20 to 24 years of age⁸⁸ followed by the 25 to 29 year olds with 15 percent (figure F.2). Disaggregating data by type of crime and age, once again youths emerge as the age cohort most victimized by robbery, assault, sexual abuse, and mob justice. In fact, arson was the only crime for which the victims were mostly adults (60 percent, compared to 38 percent of youths), which is likely explained by the fact that older residents have more possibilities to own property than youths.

Youths not only are the victims of violence but also are seen as the main perpetrators. Youths comprise a large share of the population in the selected slums, with a majority of people aged between 15–30 years (61 percent). Data collected indicate that youths are the most affected by unemployment as they face multi-

88. When data are not presented in the 5-year bands format, this chapter adopts the Government of Kenya's (GoK) official definition of youth as those 15 to 30 years of age (GoK 2006).

Figure F.2 Levels of Victimization by Age Group

ple barriers to employment including poor educational attainment and stigmatization. During FGDs, unemployment, idleness, poverty and lack of opportunities were identified as the main causes of crime and violence in the communities, as idle young men with limited hope for social mobility may get involved in criminal activities both out of necessity or because it is the easiest way for them to gain an income.

“Lack of employment leads to crime and violence—sometimes you go to these factories around to look for a job then those guards cannot allow you to get into the factory. By so doing, you cannot get the job. Since you have no alternative you now decide to involve yourself into wrong activities.” (Adult male Kingstone)

“Moderator: “What causes these murders, muggings and burglary?”

“I think is unemployment. If all these people have work everybody could have peace. They have idle minds. They have nothing to do, even sweeping for fifty shillings. He does not have food and he sees that the only way out is to steal a phone he sees and sell it.” (Female youth Viwandani).

“What I could say is that the life we are living is the main contributor to this crime. Imagine if you [are] hungry and you got no food and you don’t know where you will get something to put inside of your stomach.” (Adult male, Highridge)

“Youths prefer being idle and that’s why they are being arrested. They just find it easier to just take things from other people and it’s not that they cannot work. Most youths from other areas don’t choose which job they want to do like doing odd jobs but our youths here are choosy. They like waiting to mug people in the streets and get money in the easy way. But when you tell them that what they are doing is wrong, they end calling Mtiaji (traitor) which means you are colluding with the cops so that they (youth) can be caught” (Highridge, adult male)


Other reasons identified in both communities as causes of crime and violence include substance abuse and peer pressure. The quotes below illustrate these aspects clearly:

“I have to find ways of getting money to buy bhang (marijuana). In this case, since I need to be drunk, even if it means stealing I will do it to get money. These drugs make one to feel hungry all the time, so one has to steal to get money to buy food.” (Lunga Lunga male youth)

“The youth tend to compete with one another on what they have that the others don’t have. The peer pressure drives them to engage in crime like mugging so that they get money to buy what the others have.” (Adult male Highridge).

However, youths, especially the males, expressed the view that they are always considered suspects whether they committed a crime or not: “Since we do not have jobs, if anything goes wrong we are victimized” was an observation by a male youth in Kingstone. They also observed that stigmatization of youth is common among the authorities, including the community elders, the chairman and the police. According to them, if for example a policeman saw a young man in trendy clothes, the latter would be apprehended on suspicion of illegal activities.


Among the types of crimes occurring in the researched communities, robbery is the most common. According to respondents, robbery accounts for 38

Figure F.3 Levels of Victimization by Type of Crime

percent of all crime, followed by assault with 18 percent of responses. The quantitative survey shows a much lower percentage of victims of sexual abuse, arson, and mob justice (figure F.3). Similar surveys also found robbery and assault as two of the most common crimes in urban settings. For example, results from the Nairobi crime victimization survey carried out by UN-Habitat (Stavrou 2001), showed robbery as the most reported type of crime in Nairobi (36 percent), followed by personal theft (22 percent—not included in the World Bank’s survey) and assault (18 percent). Focus groups accounts also highlighted robbery as a major problem in the researched communities. All focus groups, including males and females, mentioned robberies and muggings as the most common and pressing types of violent crimes in their communities.

“Grogan is very notorious in crimes of mugging and robbery. . . . Thugs will also stop you on the streets, and in broad, daylight, and ask you for your phone and other precious commodities, e.g., money, wristwatch, shoes among others. They rob you at gunpoint and strip you of all your possessions. It’s very risky walking along the streets.” (Adult male, Grogan)

The quantitative survey showed relatively low incidence of mob justice attacks (by vigilante groups)—at 3 percent. The presence of mob justice groups is similarly prevalent in Korogocho and Viwandani as in other slums in Nairobi and other major urban conglomerates in Africa. The absence or ineffectiveness

Figure F.4 Levels of Victimization by Type of Crime (by Location)

of state institutions, notably the police, in preventing and resolving crime and violence issues in those communities creates a fertile environment for ad hoc vigilante and private security groups to flourish. Some of these groups are associated with extortion and political violence, and were a malevolent force during the post-election crisis of early 2008.

Residents of Korogocho are at a higher risk of being victims of crime. Incidence of victimization by robbery, assault, arson, sexual abuse, and mob justice are higher in Korogocho (figure F.4). Differences in levels of victimization are particularly marked for arson, sexual abuse, and mob justice, for which victims from Korogocho are more than double those from Viwandani. Within these communities, the village of Grogan (a and b) has the highest levels of victimization for all types of crimes.

Domestic and Sexual Violence. As expected, females are more affected by sexual abuse than males. Data show that 81 percent of the respondents who were victims of sexual abuse are females compared to 19 percent of males. Although the overall percentage of responses is low—only 1.8 percent⁸⁹ (0.7 per-

89. Although 3% of females admitted being victims of sexual violence, it is important to note the difficulty of discussing such sensitive topics in the context of a household survey. In addition, there is evidence that levels of reporting for this type of crime to the police or other institutions is low in

cent of males and 2.8 percent of females) admitted to having been victims of sexual abuse/offense in the prior 12 months, it is a serious and prevalent problem. According to the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) (2006), sexual violence is increasing in its frequency and brutality.

While the quantitative survey carried out here captured a relatively low incidence of domestic and sexual violence, focus group moderators were able to address these topics with greater sensitivity. In these discussions, the high levels of violence affecting these communities became evident in the description of the brutality used very vividly during the focus groups when talking about sexual and domestic violence.

Although reported as common practice during most of the FGDs, both men and women appeared reluctant to report incidents of domestic violence. The 16 FGDs enumerated drug and alcohol abuse, refusal to have sex, and engagement in extramarital affairs as the main causes of domestic violence. Women considered themselves more prone to violence because the men were physically stronger. Furthermore, a group of adult men in Kingstone considered violence against women a legitimate cultural way of disciplining married women. Moreover, all but one of the individual in-depth interviews with females evoked brutal accounts of sexual violence. Sexual and domestic violence exact direct and traumatic physical and emotional impact on victims. Long-term impacts includes loss of employment and serious health issues such as sexually transmitted diseases (Willman 2010). Box F.1 presents the long-term effects of a victim of domestic and sexual violence, which include having being infected with HIV/AIDS.

The survey also elucidated the seriousness of domestic and sexual abuse in other ways. One finding is that **repeat victimization by sexual offense is not uncommon in the slums of Nairobi**. Findings reveal that 15 percent of females who said they had been victims of sexual violence had been victimized twice during the 12 months prior to the survey; 42 percent said once. In addition, **half of the women victims of sexual offenses knew the offender**, 33 percent said they were strangers and 20 percent responded they were victimized by a group/gang.

Focus groups participants also mentioned that victims of sexual abuse knew the offenders although they often did nothing about it for fear of retaliation or simply because official institutions paid scant attention to this issue. As a young girl in Highridge said during a focus group interview:

Kenya and other African countries (UNODC 2005). Accounts from residents who participated in the FGDs interviews offer compelling information on the prevalence and seriousness of this problem in poor urban communities in Nairobi.

Box F.1 Interview: Sexual Violence

“Hellen is 27 years of age and a mother of two. Her firstborn is 3 years old while the youngest is one. She struggles each day to get by but it is never easy.

Her misfortune started when she gave birth to her first child. Her husband started abusing her and continues to do so regularly for minor things: failure to prepare food on time, for instance, although he never leaves money behind for the food to be bought and cooked for him. She does casual jobs like washing clothes or utensils for others and gets paid for it. That money is how she sustains her household.

Whenever her husband gets drunk, he comes home and abuses her in front of the children. Sometimes he forces himself [sexually] on her in full view of the children. If the children cry, he beats them altogether. He would often leave the house and go away, to his lover’s house. If he comes back and the wife asks him where he spent the night, he beats her up again. Whenever she wants to leave and go home, she doesn’t have the courage to leave her children behind.

As she says, her life is already destroyed. When she was pregnant with her second child, she went to the clinic for a check-up and to her shock she tested HIV positive. When she returned home and told her husband, he refused to believe her and called her names, after which he beat her. She was lucky that her neighbors intervened for she could have lost her baby.

Unfortunately, she gave birth to an HIV-positive child. Until now she and her baby are on medication. Her husband has not been tested and continues wasting his life drinking while getting sicker every day. She always tries her best to feed her *children and keep them healthy*.

“And those people who rape people mostly are those who are known. Yes, they are known, but when you know who it is, you can say we don’t know them because most of the time they do it at night” (Youth female, Highridge).

Most sexual offenses happen close to home rather than inside the household. Close to 60 percent of the victims were sexually assaulted near their homes, compared to 42 percent inside. In view of the risk of sexual violence both inside and outside the home, one could imagine that many women would have difficulty feeling truly safe anywhere.

Sexual violence in Kenya has also been used as a weapon in times of political turmoil. The Waki Report⁹⁰ portrays very brutal accounts of sexual violence

90. The Waki Report was commissioned by the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the violence during the post-national elections period in the end of 2007, together with the conduct of state security agencies in their handling of it, to make recommendations concerning these and other matters.


during the post-election period in 2007. According to the report, in Nairobi, more than 900 women were treated for rape and other brutal acts. In one group interviewed for the report, 75 percent of women had been raped in their homes in front of their family (CIPEV 2008).

PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE AND FEELINGS OF SAFETY

Residents of Korogocho and Viwandani consider crime and violence to be the greatest problems in the community. While the quantitative results show statistically significant differences in the levels of victimization in Korogocho compared to Viwandani, residents across both communities seemed equally concerned about issues related to insecurity. Forty-three percent of the population cited high levels of crime and violence as the main problems in their communities, followed closely by levels of unemployment (42 percent). Poor sanitation was ranked third (10 percent) (figure F.5). Focus group participants confirmed the quantitative findings, mentioning crime, violence, and unemployment as the major problems in the community.

Interestingly, **access to water and sanitation was also indirectly related to issues of insecurity.** According to accounts from focus group participants,

Figure F.5 Three Most Important Problems (General and by Community)



making use of these services, especially at night, at times increased the likelihood of being a victim of violence. As one young female from Kingstone (Viwandani) explained:

“In the evening, one fears to go to the toilet. There are people who sit around that area. You fear because you don’t know if they will follow you inside once you are in.”


Nine out of 10 respondents indicated that most crime and violence occur in the streets and on the bridges of the community. Poor street lighting, limited street patrolling and ineffective policing increases the probability for robbery, theft, assault and even sexual crimes to occur. According to youth from Lunga Lunga, police in those communities only patrol the slum’s surrounding streets, hardly venturing inside the slums. The current physical structure of the slums in Nairobi, and particularly in Korogocho and Viwandani, also increases the likelihood of common crimes, such as robberies and assaults, as it makes it easy for criminals to escape from the scene of the crime.

“I would like to say the other thing that is acting as the main contributor of all this crime is the way we live in this village. First you would find that when for example I am being mugged at the road, if this person runs away and enters in to one of those alleys even if we were thirty people chasing that one person we can’t get him out of this structure of ours. And if only these structures could be built in a better manner [I think] this issue of insecurity would actually go down.” (Adult male Highridge).

“There is a big sewer down there. Most thieves hide themselves there. It is big. It is bent on one side and raised on the other. When a thief robs you and goes there he disappears completely. You can’t find him.” (Youth female, Highridge)

Despite significant levels of crime and violence, fifty-two percent of surveyed residents report feeling safe in their neighborhood most of the time; however only one fourth reported feeling safe at night. According to respondents, it is during the night when the perception of insecurity increases. Almost two thirds of those surveyed did not feel safe at compared to 41 percent who said they did (figure F.6). These finding suggest that crime and violence may be seen as a normal fact of life that is difficult to avoid during the day when one is

Figure F.6 Feelings of Safety Most of the Time and at Night (General, Korogocho and Viwandani)



Source: Author's calculations

carrying about daily business. At night, however, fear of crime goes up significantly, perhaps because of its higher incidence, greater unpredictability, and the obscurity afforded to perpetrators.

IMPACT OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE, LEVELS OF TRUST, COPING MECHANISMS, AND POLICY INTERVENTIONS

Crime and violence have devastating impact on people's lives, including physical, psychological, and economic aspects. FGDs revealed that crime and violence in these communities affect people's capacity to improve their living conditions (that is, save, invest in a business or in household items), their health, and their psychosocial well-being. Participants in most focus groups, especially females, reported living in fear of being victims of crime and violence, and also unwillingness to invest in a business or in household improvements due to the perception that this will make them a target of crime. Also, confrontations with robbers were reported to have devastating effects including rendering the victims motionless for some time, hence impacting on their ability to earn income.

"Sometimes after 8pm, you cannot move out. There are instances you may have found a job, maybe you report to work at 11:00pm and the only place

to pass is across the bridge, you cannot pass there since the place is dangerous at night. In this case you cannot go to your place of work hence losing it.” (Adult male, Kingstone)

“For example, when you are late from work on your way home you are mugged, robbed and even assaulted. Sometimes the extent of the assault leaves you with no option but to nurse your injuries at home. The next day when you do not report to work, your employer replaces you with another person. This means that you have been sacked.” (Youth male, Lunga-Lunga)

Respondents also said that violence occurring in the streets had negative impact on the life of the communities. Ninety-one percent of respondents are of this opinion, while only 6 percent believed domestic violence to be detrimental. The FGDs revealed that social life in the community is very limited due to crime and violence, as most people face restrictions in mobility in certain areas of the slum or at certain times of the day. If residents do not spend time in the streets and public areas of the community because of feelings of insecurity, the mechanisms of informal social control are damaged and the dynamic interactions between residents and local institutions also suffer. This contributes to a vicious cycle of crime and violence (Foster 1995; Moore 1999; Warner and others 2003).

Indeed, most residents thought that people in their neighborhood could not be trusted. Fifty-five percent of respondents thought that people could not be trusted to look out for one another, compared to 43 percent who thought that other people can be trusted. When levels of trust are low residents tend to adopt the strategy of “silence” whereby they do not discuss issues related to violence in the community or refrain from helping other residents for fear of revenge.

“[Sometimes you come across] a person who has robbed you. You know him very well but you fear to go and say. Because of threats, you can’t even say how it was. You just leave it . . . you leave it because your life is in danger”

“... your neighbors can also not defend you [if you are attacked by robbers] because they are afraid. Moreover, the thugs can decide to shoot in the air and everybody will be forced to lie down. Even if I am a neighbor I cannot come out to defend because I will be afraid.” (Adult female, Lunga-Lunga).

This fear to help others seems to prevail only in cases of criminal attacks.

When asked whether they would turn to their neighbors for help in cases of general problems, slightly over half (51.1 percent) of the respondents agreed with the statement. However, a respondent in Highridge provided some insight into what happens during attacks by armed thugs:

“The insecurity situation is worsened by the failure of the neighbors to come to your aid when you scream. People fear helping out because they might also be killed by other gang members who lie in wait for those who come to help. The neighbors will stay indoors throughout the night. They will only come in the morning to ask you about the incident. Yet when you needed their help, they were not there for you” (Adult female, Highridge).

The negative impact of crime and violence also affects small businesses. It

is not uncommon for businesses in poor urban communities to close early in order to avoid being robbed or assaulted; another reason for early closure is that residents simply do not go out during the night. Other businesses have to pay significant amounts of money to get private security from vigilante groups and other ad-hoc private security services. Various residents expressed their views regarding the impact of crime and violence on businesses as follows:

“For those of us who have businesses, we are losing customers because most of them are afraid to walk on the streets during the evenings after work. So they do not even pass by our stall to buy something. Because of this, our lifestyles have changed because now we get less income from our businesses.

“Maybe business people have been victims of this. Like during night time you cannot do your business well fearing for thieves. So this makes for example those who operate kiosks to close at around 7:00pm” (Youth male, Lunga-Lunga)

“Businesses are closed so early since the owners fear getting robbed or killed for their money. As a result, the business people do not get maximum returns because of closing early when most customers are about to start buying items” (Adult female, Grogan).

Table F.2 Levels of Trust in Institutions to Reduce Crime and Violence

	General	Korogocho	Viwandani
Vigilante group	56.5	70.6	41.6
Administration police	14.4	6.5	22.6
Community or neighborhood organization	9.2	3.9	14.8
Local chief/assistant chief	9.0	10.5	7.4
Kenya police	4.9	4.4	5.5
N/R	3.7	2.2	5.3
Religious organization	1.5	1.5	1.4
Social service organization	0.3	0.2	0.5
N/A	0.3	0.0	0.7
Local and community health centre	0.2	0.2	0.2

Source: Authors' calculations

“If you have a business Masaais [operating as ad-hoc private security guards] come for twenty shillings every day. If you don't give them, they don't guard your business. . . . they are very harsh, they can use their weapons on you. When one calculates the profit of their business and compares it to these payments, the business seems pointless” (Youth female, Kingstone)

Levels of trust in institutions charged with providing safety and security are extremely low (table F.2). Asked to name the three groups that are doing the best job in reducing crime and violence in the community, respondents named vigilante groups most often (56 percent). The Kenya police are ranked fifth by residents with only 5 percent of responses. These findings strikingly indicate that police, in particular Kenya police, are not trusted to resolve crime and violence issues.⁹¹ Hence, in the absence of the police as an institution that should provide safety and security, residents of Korogocho and Viwandani see vigilante groups as an institution that can provide this service in spite of the widespread extortion practiced by these groups.

The residents of Korogocho and Viwandani have developed a range of mechanisms to cope with the very high incidence of crime and violence documented here (table F.3). Given their limited means to invest in security around their household, such as fences, alarms, and other mechanisms, poor urban

91. Kenya has a dual police system formed by the Kenya Police Force and the Administration Police. Both agencies have similar responsibilities in maintaining law and order, preserving peace, and to prevent, detect and resolve crimes. Both institutions are present in the communities and, while their overall responsibilities are the same, each has its own structure and line of command (Kpundeh 2008).

Table F.3 Measures Taken to Avoid Being a Victim of Crime

General		Korogocho		Viwandani	
Avoid travelling during certain hours	45.2	Avoid travelling during certain hours	39.9	Avoid travelling during certain hours	50.8
Did not do anything	24.3	Did not do anything	24.0	Installed locks/gate	24.9
Stay home more	19.5	Paid person/group for security	23.3	Did not do anything	24.7
Installed locks/gate	18.3	Stay home more	23.1	Gone to authorities/police	20.1
Gone to authorities/police	16.5	Pressured to pay for security	19.2	Stay home more	15.7
Paid person/group for security	14.5	Gone to authorities/police	13.1	Changed route	12.9
Pressured to pay for security	12.7	Installed locks/gate	12.0	Pressured to pay for security	5.8
Changed route	9.6	Changed route	6.5	Paid person/group for security	5.1
Attended public forum	2.9	Formed a group to address problem	4.8	Bought/carry weapon	3.2
Formed a group to address problem	2.9	Attended public forum	3.9	Attended public forum	1.9
Bought/carry weapon	2.7	Joined a vigilante group	3.7	Joined a vigilante group	1.2
Joined a vigilante group	2.5	Quit job/closed business	2.4	Formed a group to address problem	0.9
Quit job/closed business	1.5	Bought/carry weapon	2.2	Prayed	0.5
Prayed	1.2	Prayed	2.0	Quit job/closed business	0.5
Dropping out of school	0.2	Dropping out of school	0.4	Divorced	0.2
Sought witchcraft	0.1	Sought witchcraft	0.2	Sought witchcraft	0.0
Divorced	0.1	Divorced	0.0	Dropped out of school	0.0

dwellers can either avoid certain areas, or stay home. Almost half of the respondents (45 percent) choose to avoid travelling during certain hours. Almost a quarter says that they do nothing special and try to continue with their daily activities (24 percent) while 19 percent say they stay home more. Some residents installed new locks on their property (table F.4). Other measures taken to reduce the risk of being a victim of crime, such as going to the police to report the problem, pay someone for security, being pressured to pay for security or changing routes were taken by 16 percent, 14 percent, 13 percent and 10 percent of the respondents, respectively. Interestingly, in Korogocho, where violence and crime are more prevalent than in Viwandani, the protective measure of paying a person or a group for security actually is ranked as the third most used measure by 23 percent of residents, much higher than in Viwandani.

Table F.4 Measures Taken to Avoid Being a Victim of Crime (by Victim/Not Victim)

Not victims		Victims	
Avoided traveling during certain hours	39.8	Avoided traveling during certain hours	52.4
Did not do anything	28.5	Gone to authorities/police	30.4
Stayed home more	18.9	Installed locks/gate	22.8
Installed locks/gate	15	Stayed home more	20.7
Paid person/group for security	13.8	Did not do anything	19.4
Pressured to pay for security	11.8	Paid person/group for security	15.1
Changed route	6.1	Changed route	14.3
Gone to authorities/police	5.7	Pressured to pay for security	14.1
Attended a public forum	3.1	Joined a vigilante group	4.1
Bought/carry weapon	2.4	Formed a group to address problem	3.8
Formed a group to address problem	2.2	Bought/carry weapon	3.1
Prayed	1.2	Attended a public forum	2.8
Joined a vigilante group	1.2	Quit job/closed business	2.1
Quit job/closed business	1	Prayed	1.3
Dropped out of school	0.4	Divorced	0.3
Sought witchcraft	0.2	Sought witchcraft	0
Divorced	0	Dropped out of school	0

The focus groups discussions confirmed that their main coping mechanism is avoiding the streets, especially at dark. The participants observed that one had to be careful to come home early; when delayed, one should go somewhere else to spend the night. One case study of a woman and her 5 year old daughter who were gang raped on their way home at 9.00 pm illustrated the lack of freedom of movement. It should however be noted that in some areas, especially Grogan, many robberies were reported to occur in broad daylight. As observed by one of the team research assistants and confirmed by the qualitative data, people are robbed with impunity because robbers know victims will do nothing.

People who have been victims of crime, especially those crimes that occur in the streets, have developed coping mechanisms to avoid being a repeat victim based on perceived risks and fear (table F.4). This survey's results confirm that victims of crime are more likely to avoid traveling during certain hours than those who have not been victims—52 percent to 39 percent, respectively. Interestingly, whether respondents have been victims or not their most immediate coping mechanism is to avoid travelling during certain hours—especially at night. This might indicate that perceptions of fear and risk spread

across the population in these communities influence people's daily behavior, even those who have not been a victim of crime or violence.

Other coping responses include going to the local authority—most likely the community chief—or to the police for help, said 30 percent of respondents. Of this group, 18 percent went to the police and the rest to the local authority. Twenty-two percent of those who have been victims of crime responded that they install locks/gates and 20 percent said they stay home more compared to 15 percent and 18.9 percent, respectively. While the latter percentage might not seem a very high response, staying home more might affect their capacity to work or to find work. Finally, 19 percent of the respondents chose to do nothing to avoid being victimized and 15 percent paid someone or a group for security.

What is particularly striking is that 28.5 percent of not-victims and 19.4 percent of victims did not take any measures or do anything different to avoid being a victim of a crime. The vast majority of those respondents who did take action engaged in individual-level responses. This suggests that crime and violence are highly disempowering. Lack of confidence in the police exacerbates the issue. There was a general sense that the police were not there to help them but to side with the criminals, engage in corrupt activities, use their position of power to oppress youths or randomly arrest or abuse residents.

“These thieves have police uniforms and guns. In such instances you cannot defend yourself even if you were in a position to do so [. . .] When you see a policeman coming towards you, you get confused because you don't know if he is a thug or a policeman. You can't really tell [. . .] I know police caps have numbers, their shirts have numbers too and their shoes. These thieves also have these numbers on their caps and shirts which makes it hard to differentiate between a thug and a police” (Adult female, Lunga-Lunga)

“The police do not bother to help you when you are mugged or your house has been broken into. They only come if someone has been shot or killed. They come to pick them up but they don't bother with the other crimes. It is very hard to see them when other crimes are involved.” (Adult female, Kingstone)

“Even if we have police, they don't come to curb crime but to collect bribes from people who own bars. If I own a hotel and a thief steals from me, he will not bother [to help me even if] he is just nearby. He does not bother.”

“The community policing has ensured collaboration between the village elders and the police to oppress youths . . . they are contributing to our pain.” (Youth male, Highridge).

“You find that the police often target the youth for no good reason. They arrest you on the streets and harass you saying you are a criminal. So it doesn’t make much of a difference if somebody engages in crime [or not, as long as] when you get arrested, you pay a bribe for what you rightfully did.” (Youth male Korogocho).

“About a youth who had refused to stop when asked by the police: it doesn’t make much of a difference if you stop. In fact if you stop, they will handcuff you and torture you [. . .] if you say that you haven’t touched a gun in your entire life, they will lock you up and keep you in an unknown location until that day that you will own up that you are a criminal.” (Adult male, Grogan)

Weak police capacity has created a vacuum that is filled by extra-legal security groups. During the FGDs, it was mentioned that it is a general practice to pay a group to provide security in the slums. According to them, the *Masaai* is the group in charge of providing security in certain areas of the neighborhood. Most residents are coerced to pay a weekly fee for protection. Estimates of the amounts paid vary, but a recent report by the Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) says that, on average, slum dwellers had to pay the *Mungiki*⁹² gang approximately US\$2 for their services, which increased to US\$28 during the post-election violence.⁹³ Payments of this kind impose an extra burden on the economies of the slum households, which earn an average income of US\$40 (Werlin 2006). Often, these security groups are also the source

92. *Mungiki* is a politico-religious group and a banned criminal organization in Kenya. The name means “a united people” or “multitude” in the Kikuyu language. The religion, which apparently originated in the late 1980s, is secretive and bears similarities to other mystery religions. Specifics of their origin and doctrines are unclear. What is clear is that they favor a return to indigenous African traditions and practices such as forced female genital cutting. They reject Westernization and all things that they believe to be trappings of colonialism, including Christianity. The ideology of the *Mungiki* is characterized by revolutionary rhetoric, Kikuyu traditions, and a disdain for Kenyan modernization, which is seen as immoral corruption. In the slums, the *Mungiki* started as a vigilante group providing security and were seen positively by residents. However, the gang slowly began taxing dwellers and charging fees for using toilets and showers and collecting a second rent (IRIN 2008). <http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL0628443520070606>

93. www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=76896

Box F.2 Community Violence Linked to the *Mungiki*

The following happened to a woman in Lunga Lunga, Viwandani, a place called Mtongwé. Mama Boi had just finished eating lunch with her kids and her sister-in-law, who had come to pay her a visit from upcountry. They decided that since it was hot, they could sit outside and relax. They chose to sit next to their neighbor's door.

One of her kids wanted to go and answer a call of nature. She gave her an old newspaper and the kid went in front of the neighbors' house. A young man came out; he got furious and demanded the removal of the feces from the front of his house.

The mother got furious in turn and asked why he was shouting, since he likely went outside for a nature call himself. That made the young man, who they only knew as Karis, very angry. He slapped, kicked and punched her so that a crowd gathered around. Mama Boi defended herself the only way she knew and bit the young man's finger, causing him to bleed. As he saw blood dripping from his small finger, Karis started kicking and dragging Mama Boi down.

Some neighbors came to her rescue and the fight was stopped. Then a most unusual thing happened. With the help of six other young men, Karis removed everything that was in his room and vacated the house he had just paid for since it was the beginning of the month.

When the day ended, at around 7.30 pm, ten men with machetes came to Mama Boi's house. They were just in the process of eating when the door was flung open. The man of the house was told to get out; he resisted a little but was dragged out. These young men commanded the neighbors to stay in their houses or die. Mama Boi was beaten in front of her kids while her husband listened from outside. It turned out that Karis was a member of a Mungiki (a tribal cult that kills), so he brought his colleagues to help revenge the blood that he had shed.

Mama Boi was beaten with machetes and clubs while her husband was also being beaten outside. He decided to run for his life and when the opportunity came, Mama Boi also ran away. The kids were left alone and the young men went away.

Later they received a one month's notice to move from Lunga Lunga. Mama Boi still cannot move her right arm. She is afraid even to talk and yet she has to go on living and fending for her kids. She is planning to move at the beginning of April but will never forget the ordeal which left her and her family traumatized.

Source: Focus group discussion, Viwandani.

of violence within the community. They scare residents by means of violence so that both individuals (box F.2) and businesses will pay a "protection tax" whether they want to pay for security services or not.

According to the qualitative data collected, residents also rely on the village elders and chairpersons to mediate conflicts. Village chiefs and elders in Kenya are officially appointed as local administrators and play a central role in

mediating everyday conflicts in the village (DFID 2008). However, participants in the FGDs expressed disappointment with the work of the village chief and elders in connection with security problems and conflict mediation. Discussions revealed that the effectiveness of and accessibility to these mechanisms is often limited due to corrupt practices, such as bribing and elite capture, and due to their limited capacity to address key causes of conflict:

“If we have a conflict [and go to the chief], I come back after we have parted ways and bribe the Chief. When it is time to resolve the case, you will be powerless against me. You have everything if you have money” (Adult female, Lunga- Lunga)

“The village elders usually handle disputes that arise at the village level. They also counsel the warring parties and encourage them to be peaceful. The problem is that this doesn’t help because they are not getting into the root of the cause of most their problems around here” (Youth male, Korogocho).

Almost two thirds of the people interviewed think that more employment programs for young people are needed in order to reduce the levels of crime and violence and improve the levels of insecurity in the communities. As noted previously, the issue of unemployment and lack of opportunities for youths came up during focus groups interviews as one of the main underlying causes of the high levels of crime and violence. Since most youths in the researched communities are unemployed—39 percent of youth respondents according to the survey—they spend large amounts of times idling. With nothing to do, they are often lured into criminal activities.

“How will the youth develop or stop stealing without an alternative source of income?” (Adult female, Lunga-Lunga).

Findings reveal that more police presence is considered to be an important intervention by 45 percent of the surveyed population. Such a significant percentage of responses provide clear evidence of the limited presence that the police has in the researched communities. In addition, deficient levels of infrastructure in poor urban communities represent a daunting security challenge for the police force. Interviews carried out by the research team with local police station chiefs in Viwandani, for example, revealed that the key police con-

cern was the difficulty in accessing the communities to chase offenders because of the unpaved streets, poor lighting, and maze-like settings.

Also related to issues of infrastructure, almost one third of respondents (29 percent) mentioned improving street lighting to effectively address issues of insecurity. While there have been improvements in the researched communities, street lighting is still inadequate and crimes can be committed with relative ease. For example, in the community clinic area of Korogocho there is a 30 meter light mast that provides intense light to close to 7,500 homes.⁹⁴ No such lighting system exists in Viwandani, though security lights have been set up in some hot spot areas. Some FGD participants reported an improvement in security levels after some of these interventions were implemented:

“Security has improved a little. As you come this way from Mareba they have set up a security light nowadays. That is where groups used to gather in wait for their victim” (Adult female, Lunga-Lunga).

A large proportion of responses requested more employment programs in general (28 percent), an increase in community policing programs (25 percent) and more community-oriented policemen (21 percent). Improving physical infrastructure was mentioned by 15 percent of the residents interviewed and youth recreational activities were cited by 14 percent. Furthermore, 22 percent considered that banning drugs and alcohol would help reduce levels of crime and violence (table F.5).

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK TO ADDRESS CRIME AND VIOLENCE

Many organizations in Kenya, both in government and in civil society, are engaged in activities to deter crime and violence. While a number of new programs were established after the post-election crisis, most pre-date it. While there is a range of initiatives to address insecurity in several sectors and administrative levels, efforts are scattered and poorly coordinated. Tackling crime and violence are still very much considered the responsibility of the police and the criminal justice system. As a result, structural, social and environmental causes behind the high rates of crime and violence are overlooked, as are the opportunities for addressing them. If levels of crime and insecurity are to be effectively reduced, it will be important to increase institutional capacity on both the con-

94. Information obtained from Adopt-a-light program. <http://www.adopt-a-light.com>

Table F5 Most Important Policy Change to Address Crime and Violence Problems

Policy intervention	(%)
Youth employment programs	58.4
More police presence	44.9
Improve street lighting	29.0
Employment programs	28.7
Increase community policing	25.5
More community oriented policemen	21.7
More infrastructure	15.6
Recreational programs for youths	14.4
Ban on drugs	11.4
Ban on illicit alcohol	10.3
Gun control	7.0
Ban community video show rooms	4.2
Mediation programs	2.0
Other responses (arrest criminals, reduce corruption, introduce village elders, community based organizations)	0.9

Source: Authors' calculations

trol and prevention sides, and foster the necessary coordination mechanisms between them.

At the national level, an appropriate starting point is **Vision 2030**. The main objective of this national level policy framework, coordinated by the National Economic and Social Council Security, is to improve security in order to lower the costs of doing business and to provide Kenyans with a more secure living and working environment. The Vision 2030 strategy has three pillars—social, political, and economic—and human security concerns feature prominently in the first two of these, to a lesser degree in the third. For example, **Security, Peace-Building and Conflict Management** is one of the key sectors of the political pillar. By 2012 it commits the country to the adoption of a policy, legal and institutional framework for security, peace building and conflict management. To achieve the main objective of the strategy, it envisages a wide range of interventions:

- Promoting public-private cooperation and civilian/community involvement for improved safety and security;
- Deepening policy, legal and institutional reform for improved enforcement of law and order;

- Institutionalizing a national and inter-community dialogue in order to build harmony among ethnic, racial and other interest groups;
- Promoting peace building and reconciliation to improve conflict management and ensure sustained peace within the country; and
- Inculcating a culture of respect for the sanctity of human life that restrains from the use of violence as an instrument for resolving personal and community disputes. This should start with the family, schools, the church and all public institutions (GoK 2008).

Reform of the criminal justice system and the police are key targets if the goals of Vision 2030 are to be achieved. Police in Kenya have been linked to rampant corruption, crime, violence, and other issues (Kpundeh 2008). Evidence from this study suggests that police presence in poor urban communities is very limited and citizens cannot fully trust them to resolve violence and insecurity problems. Activities to reform these institutions are part of an overarching reform program denominated Governance, Justice, Law and Order Sector (GJLOS). This ambitious multi-agency multi-donor program was Kenya's first sector-wide approach (SWAP), and is centered on reform of the entire judicial system. Its themes include Public Safety and Security, as well as Justice, Law and Order, and Access to Legal Services. GJLOS seeks results in six key areas:

1. Responsive and enforceable policy, law and regulation enforced through a preventative, proactive police service.
2. Improved service delivery by GJLOS institutions—by aiming for greater police accountability and response time, supported by world-class IT-led crime reporting and victim processing systems.
3. Reduction of corruption-related impunity using the Kenya Bribery Index as a performance measurement tool, particularly as concerns reducing corruption and impunity within the police force.
4. Improved access to justice especially for the marginalized and vulnerable poor by seeking to improve the police to population ratio, increasing gender-sensitivity and the proportion of women on the force.
5. Development of a more informed and participative citizenry and civil society who can provide wider community support for local level (community) policing initiatives.
6. Effective management of the GJLOS reform program by engaging effectively in cross-cutting reform initiatives via Thematic Group participation.

While a mid-term review of the GJLOS in 2007 identified some weaknesses in several areas, the impact of the program overall has been positive, in particular with regard to the efficiency in the service delivery and quality of work of the justice sector. One weakness identified was the lack of effort to decentralize GJLOS services and access to areas outside Nairobi. In practice, these programs have lacked coherence because of (a) the wide range of interpretations attached to the term, “community policing”; (b) a multiplicity of uncoordinated pilot and other programs on the theme; (c) the institutional environment of limited internal accountability, oversight, and lack of public confidence in which community policing is implemented.

Private security is a major feature of urban Kenya. Kenyan businesses spend 7 percent of their sales on security, infrastructure and personnel, another 4 percent on insuring property and 2 percent on neighborhood security (Kpundeh 2008). Estimates on the number of private security firms vary from 400 to 2000, employing approximately 50,000 people. In many cases (for example, with regard to transport), these private security firms are better equipped than state police services. Moreover, upper class Kenyans make use of private security firms whereas poor slum dwellers are forced to rely on vigilante groups to enjoy minimum levels of security. These levels of inequality related to the provision of basic security services are not a characteristic of Kenya only. Private security has grown exponentially in the last decade in Kenya and in other countries in Africa (Mkutu and Sabala 2007). Abrahamsen and Williams (2006) also suggest the need to set up a regulatory framework whereby these firms become a complementary force to the Kenya Police instead of competing for providing security.

A number of programs within Kenyan **sectoral ministries** have a bearing on crime and violence. The **Ministry of Youth and Sports**, in its **National Youth Policy**, identifies youth crime and deviant behavior, along with problems of drugs and crime overall, as important issues. The strategy recognizes that there remains “a need to adopt and implement a comprehensive action plan on youth, crime and drugs.” To address this issue, the National Youth Policy proposes to:

- Create visibility on the issue of drugs and crime through sensitization and awareness campaigns;
- Offer referral services on rehabilitation to drug-addicted youth;
- Empower the youth economically;
- Provide technical support for alternatives to the farming and growing of cannabis;

- Support social, institutional and physical programs that work towards crime prevention;
- Promote partnerships with institutions already working on crime prevention and rehabilitation programs;
- Sensitize law enforcement agencies on the rights of young people and ways to ensure that innocent youth are not criminalized.

Some **municipalities** have made progress developing strategies to integrate issues of safety and security into urban development. Notably, the **Safer Nairobi** initiative—which was first implemented under the Safer Cities Programme of UN-Habitat—within the Nairobi City Council has made significant progress in incorporating crime and violence as part of urban management through victimization surveys, crime audits, building partnerships with residents’ associations and the private sector, the introduction of street lighting, rehabilitation of key public spaces (UN-Habitat 2001). Nevertheless, institutional challenges remain in coordinating and mainstreaming these approaches. Another national policy initiative relevant to human security, crime and violence is the **Urban Development Strategy**, preparation of which is being coordinated by the Ministry of Local Government. **Urban Safety and Security** is one of the themes of this emerging strategy. This strategy will provide a general framework on how local governments can formulate and implement urban development policies, and will assist in the preparation of comprehensive long-term development plans. Crime and violence prevention efforts at the local level should be tuned into those at the national level (such as the reform of the police and criminal justice systems) to avoid the scattering of strategies among sectors and actors

Kenya’s vibrant civil society sector undertakes many activities relating to crime, violence and conflict prevention and management. Several institutions, including the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC) and Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA), have in recent years begun to generate knowledge and analysis on these issues. Many other CSOs are contributing to the policy debate on access to justice and reform of the criminal justice system. PeaceNet Kenya is a “broad-based coalition of peace-workers largely at the grassroots level who strive to foster peace in their local communities as well as at the national level.” The activities of this important network include research, capacity building, human security and development programming and advocacy and information. Other prominent organizations, such as the Kenya National Commission on

Human Rights (KNCHR), the Federation of Women Lawyers-Kenya (FIDA), and the Centre for Rights Education and Awareness (CREAW) specialize on issues such as human rights and gender-based violence. These organizations have managed to generate debate within Kenyan society about issues related to crime and violence. However, there has not been a mutually benefiting coordinating strategy between the national and/or local governments, civil society organizations, and the private sector. This has affected the implementation of projects like GJLOS, which was originally designed as a partnership between government and civil society (Yeebo 2009).

At the level of the researched communities, there are few programs that work specifically to address crime and violence. According to accounts from focus groups participants, a handful of NGOs and youth groups are helping youths engaged in crime and violence. Other organizations such as World Vision are also helping victims of domestic violence in Highridge. This is partly because in spite of the seriousness of the issues, there are other pressing concerns for the residents of the researched communities such as access to water and sanitation, and infrastructure.

Institutional efforts to address insecurity issues in Kenya are considerable and wide ranging but they are scattered and poorly coordinated. Prevailing approaches to tackling crime and violence still rely very much on the police and the criminal justice system. A chief difficulty, however, is that equitable access to policing and justice services in poor urban areas is lagging.

CONCLUSIONS AND ORIENTATIONS FOR POLICYMAKING

The results presented here show that crime and violence are pressing issues in Nairobi's impoverished urban communities. The high levels of deprivation in these communities are a result of low levels of education, lack of employment and other income-generating opportunities and frustration—all of which are strongly correlated with the levels of crime and violence. The fact that most slum communities in Nairobi are bereft of basic services means that people often have to pay informal and formal providers for each service they access including education, health care and water, or go without. It is critical to note that insecurity further hinders investment in these areas, adding to the social exclusion of community members.

Several policy interventions arise out of the findings from this study and other research carried out in similar social contexts. Some interventions can be

implemented relatively quickly, are low-cost, and can yield measurable results in a short period of time. Other interventions require strong inter-sectoral coordination and capacity building and generally take longer to produce any measurable results. Nonetheless, both approaches are part of an overall comprehensive prevention strategy that is much needed in order to effectively address crime, violence, and insecurity.

- ***Improve mechanisms of data collection and analysis.*** Obtaining reliable official data—or even any data—on crime and violence in these communities is a difficult task. Without data that can help identify major trends on crime and violence, time and location of the crimes (hot spots), and possible causes, it will be very difficult to design targeted interventions. The use of victimization surveys (or similar instruments like the one developed for this study) has been used widely as a tool to collect periodic data on personal and household experiences on crime and violence in other African countries (Naudé and others 2006). While this is not the remedy to the problem of lack of statistical capacity, it is a strong first step toward improving it.
- ***Equalize coverage of solid urban infrastructure and access to services.*** Be-reft urban infrastructure and limited access to basic services such as water and sanitation in these communities is a severe problem. The results clearly indicate that crime and violence occur mostly in the streets and bridges of the surveyed communities, and often during the evening hours. The Government of Kenya has already initiated important initiatives in some parts of Nairobi. The impact of urban upgrading programs in the reduction of levels of crime and violence is well documented. Increased lighting improves visibility, brings more people into the streets, and provides a warning sign to potential offenders that the community is working towards improving safety and the quality of life, all of which have a deterrent capacity (Alda 2006; Farrington and Welsh 2008).
- ***Invest in social and economic opportunities for children and youths.*** Young people are the main perpetrators of crime and violence in these communities, and residents think of youth employment programs as a problem-solving intervention. Clearly, this is one strong policy intervention that should be considered to assist the vast majority of youth that are unemployed and spend most of their time unoccupied and inactive. Other interventions, aside from major employment programs, which require a lot of time, funding, and coordination, could also help reduce the risk of youth engaging in risky and violent behaviors. For example, schools in these communities constitute a

major locus for violence prevention activities. Recreational activities—both sports and cultural—during and after school with school-attending children and the community could contribute to reduce risky behavior among youths and strengthen the social fabric of the community. Experiences from Brazil and other countries in Latin America show that these types of interventions are promising.⁹⁵

- ***Increase legal and social assistance for victims of domestic violence, especially young women.*** Domestic and sexual violence are also major problems according to accounts from focus groups surveys. The negative impacts are multiple and include psychological, physical and financial consequences. In addition, the impact of domestic and sexual violence resonates far beyond the victim since children that are victims of or witness violence in the household are more likely to engage in risky behavior as adolescents and criminal behavior as adults. Moreover, victims of sexual abuse (rape) also suffer from other consequences such as the spread of HIV/AIDS and other sexually-transmitted diseases, psychological traumas, and ultimately, temporary or permanent inability to work. These issues are often overlooked by policy makers and victims face many roadblocks in trying to get assistance. It is therefore important to take the necessary steps to establish safe mechanisms for victims of violence, mainly gender-based, to have access to a legal recourse. National institutions should intervene in poor communities through the creation of paralegal centers where victims can get assistance from a wide range of service providers as well as get referrals for further treatment, if necessary.
- ***Improve relationships between police agencies and the community.*** Data both from the quantitative and qualitative surveys indicate that trust in the police as an institution that can anticipate and resolve problems of violence in the community are low. The symbiotic relationship between communities and law enforcement is much needed to address insecurity and resolve conflicts. Within this framework of action it is also important to promote activities to **empower communities to help identify problems and solutions to crime and violence**. It is evident from both the quantitative and qualitative analysis that communities feel quite disempowered in the face of insecurity. Any programs developed at the level of the community should encourage a

95. The Latin America and Caribbean region of the World Bank is currently piloting a School-Based Violence Prevention manual in several countries in Central America. This manual provides a practical framework to develop and implement violence prevention programs in schools and also bring community members closer to school to carry out various activities.

bottom-up approach to resolve insecurity issues in these communities. Such strategies should incorporate a participatory planning process and a gradual delegation of responsibilities to community members in the design and execution of interventions to address crime and violence.

- ***Strengthen formal and traditional access to justice.*** In addition to mistrusting the police as an enabling institution that can assist them in the event of a crime, victims also face daunting obstacles in accessing the formal justice system. Most incidents related to conflict and violence in the researched communities are generally resolved through nonstate traditional systems of justice. However, according to accounts from the focus groups, especially the females, these systems are discriminatory and are identified as corrupt. It is therefore central to strengthen traditional mechanisms to resolve everyday conflicts in poor urban communities as they are low-cost, accessible, and can respond quickly to people's concerns in a manner that is familiar in terms of institutional culture and language. In addition, it is also important to link them with the traditional justice system so that issues that cannot be resolved through this system can be directed to the formal system. Since the formal system is largely absent in poor urban communities, successful access to justice program experiences in other developing countries could be adapted to the local context.
- ***Strengthen mechanisms of coordination among sectors and actors for violence prevention.*** Crime and violence-prevention strategies, regardless of their scale, are inherently very ambitious and complex endeavors that require the active participation of national and local institutions, communities and civil society organizations, including the private sector. Institutional agendas often differ and in order to be effective these actors must share a common vision on how to effectively prevent violence. Different sectors and institutions in Kenya are making considerable efforts to increase their capacity to address insecurity issues in Kenya. While improving institutional capacity is central to crime and violence prevention, it is also important to be able to coordinate policies, programs, and interventions and partner as appropriate with community groups. To date, regrettably, such co-coordinating mechanisms are largely absent in the slums of Nairobi.

ANNEX A. DATA AND METHODOLOGY

1. The selection for the study sample was pre-determined at a minimum of 800 respondents. Therefore, the team decided to increase the covered households by 10 percent to account for incomplete questionnaires and refusals. Systematic random sampling was utilized to select participants. Based on the demographical factors of the site, it was agreed during training that the research assistants (RAs) would visit households at the interval of five. This meant that one would interview an occupant of the 6th household after visiting the 1st. If the 6th household was not eligible, the RAs would move to the next in a sequential manner.
2. Data collection occurred concurrently in Korogocho and Viwandani locations. Both quantitative and qualitative data collection tools were utilized. The quantitative data were gathered using an interviewer-based questionnaire. The qualitative information was collected using focus group discussions (FGDs) and the key informant interview (KII) guides. A total of 894 interviewer-based questionnaires, 16 FGDs, and 9 KIIs were conducted during the 10-day field work period.
3. The KIIs were conducted with representatives of organizations working in the area and those organizations running local programs related to crime and violence. There was an attempt to visit representatives of the local Administration Police (AP) but every time an appointment was sought, they were either attending to security concerns or they were out of their stations. The local Chief of Korogocho was not interviewed because she had been in the area only two-and-a-half months and there were confrontations between her and the community at the time of the study. In her place, the village headman for Highridge was interviewed. Three interviews were held with national levels organizations, namely, the Federation of Kenya Women Lawyers (FIDA), Centre for Rights Education and Awareness (CREAW) and Women's Rights Awareness Programme (WRAP).

The Research Team

4. During the pre-testing of the tools in October 2008, there was a request by the local community members that they be included in future research undertakings. They noted that this was an effective way of generating local enthusiasm for the study and follow-up on the study results. Based on this,

(AIHD) advertised the position of research assistants (RAs) in the two locations and the response was overwhelming.

5. The Korogocho Team: Almost 150 applications were received from Korogocho. These were short-listed to 10 people who were interviewed. In the end, five RAs were recruited (Halimsadiya Abdikadir, Charles Muindi, Bernard Ooko, Mary Kanyi, and Florence Ayieko) and were joined by an AIHD-appointed team of three experienced researchers (Agnes Kisese, Alex Mooke, and Stellamaris Mumbua) to augment the team. The team was supervised by Gabriel Oguda of AIHD.
6. The Viwandani Team: There were over 100 applications from Viwandani of which five RAs from the study area were recruited: Ruth Kimama, Peninah Musyoka, Geoffrey Aseneka, Cosmas Oruka, and Millicent Ojuka. AIHD provided 3 experienced researchers to strengthen the 5 and offer technical advice during the study period. They were: Rachael Kamau, Josephat Musyoka, and Florence Khakame. The team supervisor was Dennis Marube.
7. Both teams underwent a one-week intensive training (from February 23rd–27th, 2009) to orient them on the study tools and acquaint them with research methodologies. The field work was conducted for 10 days from March 2nd–March 13th, 2009 with the exception of Saturday and Sunday.

Challenges encountered during data collection

8. As with any complex research project in such a highly volatile environment, there were significant challenges involved. One of the area chiefs demanded an allowance before allowing the study team to get into the community. Upon inquiry, the residents noted that this was how she handled organizations willing to work in the location and it had in the past resulted in withdrawal of interventions.
9. Team security was also a matter of concern, especially in Korogocho. Even with hired security personnel taking them around the community, most team members felt scared. At some point, one team member from Korogocho had to scream for help when a group of young boys threatened to steal his mobile phone.
10. There was a need to keep abreast with the daily happenings in the field. Both teams had to converge at the chief's office every morning for a security briefing before going to the field. This was done to avoid places where

the teams were likely to meet confrontation with gangs. In fact, there were some parts in Grogan that were considered no-go zones for the research team and even the police.

11. Most FGD participants were not happy with the refreshments offered. They instead demanded that they be offered cash or monetary incentives similar to those provided by other organizations. The research team politely declined explaining that it would go against AIHD's ethos. It was gratifying to note that there were no declines.

Appendix G

Crime, Violence, and Community Resilience in Cité Soleil, Haiti



PROLOGUE: CITÉ SOLEIL AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE

This case study draws on data collected during 2009 to explore the dynamics of violence and coping mechanisms in Cité Soleil, one of the most marginalized slum areas of Port-au-Prince. The earthquake that destroyed most of the capital in January 2010 dramatically altered both the physical and social landscape of the capital. It is certainly too early to discern how the situation regarding violence in Cité Soleil has changed following the earthquake. However, it is safe to say that the social upheaval surrounding the disaster has not ameliorated the potential for violence and is likely to exacerbate it, at least in the short term.

The World Bank team's partner institute in Haiti, INURED, conducted a follow-up survey to the present case study across Cité Soleil immediately following the earthquake. A total of 900 households was surveyed in the area. The survey found that in the 3 weeks following the earthquake, a full 13.4 percent of respondents had experienced physical violence of some kind. Of these, 18 percent reported being robbed with aggression; 26.8 percent had been beaten; 23.95 reported having gotten in a physical fight with someone; 19.7 percent reported rape; and 11 percent said "other" type of violence. As described in more detail in the following case study, the category "other" likely refers to the use of witchcraft or informal, extra-legal means of solving disputes.

When asked who the perpetrator was, 34 percent of respondents said it was someone they knew; compared to 23.45 percent who said their victimizers had been strangers; 13.8 percent who said the perpetrators were a group the victim knew; 12.8 percent a group they did not know (other responses included a security guard (4.3 percent), a peacekeeping officer (1.1 percent), or 9.6 percent other). Likely as a consequence of this intensified violence, 73 percent said that they did not feel safe where they are staying. This contrasts strikingly with the situation before the quake, when 63.4 percent of Cité Soleil residents said they considered their neighborhood peaceful.


Sexual assault—a serious problem in Cité Soleil and Haiti overall prior to the disaster—seems to have increased since the earthquake. Eleven percent of respondents reported that rapes had occurred where they are living; and, of these, 32 percent said that the victim was someone they knew. Most respondents did not want to answer whether they knew who the perpetrator was.

In a second post-disaster survey of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area (University of Michigan/Small Arms Survey, 2010), rape was reported by 3 percent of the survey sample. Nearly 1 in 5 of these victims said they also had been sexually assaulted previously during the 2004–09 period. All of the victims but 1 were female, and more than half were aged 17 or under—many under 12 years of age. Most of the incidents occurred in a public place, such as the street, or in tents, suggesting serious vulnerability of those left homeless by the earthquake. These findings contrast slightly with those of the case study described here, in which about half of the assaults against women and girls were reported to take place in or very near the home. The perpetrators were named primarily as "criminals," which is consistent with those of our 2009 study below, in which youth gangs were credited with most sexual violence.

Even given the obvious challenges to the police force after the disaster, confidence in the police remains relatively high for Cité Soleil residents. In the INURED survey, 70 percent said they regularly see police in the area where they are living/staying; and 75 percent said this police presence makes them feel safer. It's important to note that these percentages were even higher when asked about the presence of MINUSTAH (80 percent saw their presence, and 84 percent felt safer) and the American military (77 and 84 percent respectively).

Priorities appear to have shifted since the disaster, with security following even more basic needs for food and shelter. The earthquake caused significant deaths and injuries and deepened many families' poverty in Cité Soleil. Thirty-two percent of households lost family members and close to 50 percent have family members that were injured. Fifteen percent reported missing family members since the earthquake. Most families have between 2–5 children in their household, most of these under the age of 10, and nearly a quarter of households have a pregnant woman living there. Approximately 21 percent of households currently do not have an adult living with them. Given these conditions, security remains a key concern, even if it is not the first priority (Figure G.1).

Figure G.1 Most Challenging Problems Facing Cité Soleil Residents Post-Earthquake



Taken together with the following analysis, these preliminary, post-disaster findings suggest that the earthquake has only deepened existing vulnerabilities of particular groups, particularly youth and women. The following sections draw on the 2009 survey and qualitative work, and are intended to highlight the structural bases of violence in Cité Soleil that continue to underlie violence in post-earthquake Haiti. The recommendations remain valid as imperatives to be addressed in the reconstruction effort if Haiti is to build back peacefully from this devastating disaster. This is particularly so regarding the relationship of violence with the built environment. In our study, we found that unequal quality of infrastructure and service coverage in different areas of the slum contribute to violence both by fueling the sense of social exclusion, and by giving perpetrators places to hide where law enforcement cannot easily enter. Consideration will need to be given to these dynamics in the reconstruction phase.

The second, equally urgent, area of relevance to post-earthquake Port-au-Prince is the role of youth in development. The sections below describe a youth population frustrated with the lack of opportunities for social and economic advancement, largely preferring to put their energies toward positive endeavors, but also available for mobilization toward more destructive ends. The suggestions for more youth involvement in decisionmaking and more youth-led initiatives take on increasing relevance as Haiti rebuilds.

INTRODUCTION

Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere and one of the poorest in the world. Yet even in the face of chronic poverty and political instability, Haiti's population has proven extraordinarily tenacious and resilient. Over the last few decades, however, traditional social structures have become increasingly disrupted because of massive rural migration to urban areas ill-prepared to absorb so many new residents. Additional displacement within urban areas due to violence has further exacerbated the situation. Manipulation of these vulnerabilities by political actors, particularly during the 2003–06 period, resulted in some of the most intense violence in Haiti's recent history.

The security situation has markedly improved over the past three years since the intense violence surrounding the February 2006 elections. However, the state still demonstrates very limited capacity to provide even the most basic ser-

vices to the urban population that would help establish legitimacy and improve safety. In response, residents have developed coping behaviors, both individual and collective, to deal with the problem of urban violence. This chapter describes these responses and the areas of resilience in the communities of Cité Soleil, with a view to identifying ways these can be supported.

Five key observations emerge from the analysis:

- In Cité Soleil, multiple levels of violence are interwoven. Residents connect their experiences of family violence to their victimization or perpetration of violence in the street. This indicates the need for a comprehensive approach to preventing multiple forms of violence, and to improve donor coordination to ensure a comprehensive, multilevel response.
- The lack of basic infrastructure and poor service provision in Cité Soleil fuel feelings of marginalization that make some groups—especially youth—susceptible to recruitment for common violence and crime, and political mobilization by external actors. Across neighborhoods, differences in quality of infrastructure and access to services facilitate opportunistic crime in higher-traffic areas, and hinder law enforcement in poorer areas. These observations highlight the need to better equalize coverage across Cité Soleil.
- Unchecked urban growth, combined with previous displacements due to violence, have disrupted social institutions that help residents manage conflict. Projects therefore need to include relationship-building components to strengthen community resilience.
- While residents see visible improvements in their communities, and support the strengthening of security and justice institutions on a collective level, their coping behaviors often undermine this very process of institutional strengthening, not least through the use of extralegal systems for justice. These tendencies were strongest among youth, who express the view that violence is a credible—if not the only—recourse for meeting their basic needs. Their belief points to an immediate need for visible improvement in the provision of services, especially justice and security.

Finally, youth—who make up the majority of residents in Cité Soleil—are under-utilized in efforts to address violence. Violence prevention and development efforts could benefit from supporting youth-led initiatives that give young people a greater stake in community development.

CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN HAITI

Reliable data on crime and violence in Haiti are generally unavailable, and there is little that is comparable over time.⁹⁶ There is no national system for collecting and managing data on violence. It is widely recognized that urban violence in Haiti skyrocketed following President Aristide's departure in February 2004,⁹⁷ although it is difficult to quantify this peak or the subsequent decline. In 2008, the national police began to record data on incidence of violence at the departmental level. These data are presented in Table G.1 and reveal that most violent deaths occur in the capital and are committed using firearms. There were a total of 135 reported homicides nationally between January and June 2008, a rate of 2.04 per 100,000.⁹⁸ Of these homicides, 87 (64 percent) were committed using guns, and 48 (36 percent) involved other weapons (*arme blanche*). Violent deaths in the Western department, which includes metropolitan Port-au-Prince, account for 76 percent of the national total (Grossman-Vermaas and others 2008).

Domestic and sexual violence are also rampant in Haiti, and do not appear to have decreased as organized violence has been stabilized. An estimated 27 percent of Haitian women have suffered physical violence, and 10.8 percent have experienced sexual violence (DHS 2005–06).

Domestic violence is the most common expression of physical violence (table G.2). Both intimate partner violence and child abuse are common, although less research has been done about the latter. In about half of the reported cases of

96. UNODC and the World Bank (2007) using a 2001 national household survey with questions on victimization, and population figures from World Bank World Development Indicators database estimated a homicide rate of 33.9 per 100,000. Kolbe and Hutson (2006) had estimated that 8,000 homicides had occurred only in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area following President Aristide's departure in February 2004 and December 2005, for a rate of 219 per 100,000 residents per year. The World Health Organization estimated 5.3 homicides per 100,000 for 2004 (WHO 2004). Arthur (2006) obtained an estimate of 11.5 per 100,000 per year nationally using reports from Haitian human rights organizations. One of the few sources of panel data is the National Episcopal Justice and Peace Commission. Drawing on its network of churches nationwide, the Commission has released quarterly reports on violent crime in Haiti since June 2006. Based on this data, the national homicide rate for 2007 was 4.11 per 100,000 (author's calculations using World Development Indicators (WDI) data on population and NEJPC 2008).

97. To place this in historical perspective, the post-Aristide violence still pales in comparison to the brutality of the Duvalier years, when an estimated 20,000 to 30,000 civilians were killed, and sexual abuse was rampant (Human Rights Watch 1996).

98. Estimate derived WDI using for population, and 135 violent deaths reported nationally to police during Jan.–June 2008. Note that this estimate is only for half the year. See Grossman-Vermaas (2008) for more information.

Table G.1 Violent Crime in Western Department (Metro Port-au-Prince), Jan.-June 2008

	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	Jun.	Total Western Dept	National total	W. Dept. % of total
Armed murder	14	6	7	18	12	9	66	87	76
Arrests	16	5	11	6	14	18	80	240	33
Murder w/ other weapons	4	0	2	4	3	5	18	48	38
Arrests	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	29	3
Armed injury	20	4	6	36	8	13	87	116	75
Arrests	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kidnapping	13	12	18	24	19	21	107	128	84
Arrests	20	9	30	24	15	37	135	197	69
Rape	13	11	15	13	29	19	100	252	40
Arrests	11	11	18	7	34	22	103	252	41
Robbery	83	83	97	108	121	93	585	1,457	40
Arrests	99	94	130	130	150	104	707	1,731	41
Armed robbery	3	7	3	7	9	12	41	52	79
Arrests	5	7	6	22	10	10	60	90	67
Auto theft	28	29	22	34	20	21	154	159	97
Arrests	2	4	1	5	5	2	19	27	70

Source: Centre de Renseignement Opérationnelles, Direction Générale, Haïtien National Police (Grossman-Vermaas and others 2008).

Table G.2 Women Reporting Physical Violence at Any Time Since Age 15 (%)

Marital status	Perpetrator				Unidentified perpetrator	Total
	Spouse/ Partner alone	Ex-spouse/ partner	Spouse/ partner with others	Someone other than spouse/ partner		
Never married	N/A	N/A	N/A	98.4	1.6	212
Cohabiting relationship	49.7	4.1	13.9	32.4	0	506
Non-cohabitating relationship	43.8	9.9	16.8	29.4	0	114
Divorced/separated	0	59.1	14.4	26.5	0	113
Total	31.9	10.4	11.2	46.1	0.4	945

Source: 2005–06 DHS Domestic Violence Module.

“If he sees me talking to someone, after that person leaves, he beats me. He gives me beatings with a stick and slaps me in the face each time we argue. I sometimes retaliate and run away to a neighbor’s house, but the neighbor will bring me back home and apologize to him for me.”

**Young woman,
Lower Cité Soleil**

physical violence against women, the perpetrator is a current or former partner, acting alone. Women in cohabitating relationships who had experienced violence identified their current or former partner as the perpetrator in 53.8 percent of cases, compared to 53.7 percent for noncohabitating women. Divorced or separated women named their ex-partner as the perpetrator in 59.1 percent of the cases.

However table G.3 shows that a significant minority—30 percent for ever-coupled women (those who have ever been in an intimate relationship)—also experienced violence by someone other than

their current or former partner. In most cases, the perpetrator was someone they knew. Another 15 percent of ever-coupled women experienced violence

Table G.3 Women Reporting Domestic Violence (%)

	Lifetime	Past 12 months
Metropolitan Area (PaP)	27	16
Other cities	31	17
Rural areas	25	17

Source: 2005–06 DHS Domestic Violence Module.

perpetrated by a partner acting together with others. These findings underscore the vulnerability of Haitian women to violence in both the private and public realms. Experience of violence is slightly higher in urban areas (30 percent) compared to rural areas (25 percent).

Sexual violence in Haiti can be driven by different motivations, and understanding these motivations is critical to designing appropriate interventions. Rape can be politically motivated, as in the use of rape by the former military and paramilitary groups during the dictatorship and by gangs in the post-Aristide period. The spike in sexual violence against women and children following Aristide's departure cannot be accurately quantified, but one widely cited study estimated a rate of 1,698 rapes per 100,000 and a rate of 5,209 incidences of child sexual abuse per 100,000 between February 2004 and December 2005 alone (Kolbe and Hutson 2006). Many of these rapes appear related to inter-gang battles to consolidate control over different areas. There are indications that rape continues to be used as a political tool for establishing control over territory or silencing opposition. The analysis that follows discusses the current use of rape in Cité Soleil by youth gangs.

Rape and sexual violence can also be driven by individual or social factors, including intrafamilial or other community dynamics. At present, the data on sexual violence in Haiti is quite limited, and it is not possible to distinguish cases in this way.

Various service providers have collected data on sexual violence using different methodologies (Table G.4). While this data does not allow for generalizations, it suggests that rape is rampant and that girls are particularly vulnerable. For example, the women's organization, Kay Fanm, received reports of 133 cases of rape in 2006, most of these in Port-au-Prince, of which 55 percent of victims were younger than 18 (Kay Fanm 2006, 2008). Another women's organization, SOFA, recorded 238 rapes between January 2007 and June 2008, of which 58

Table G.4 Number of Rape Cases Reported by Various Institutions in Port-au-Prince Serving Victims of Violence

Year	SOFA	Kay Fanm	GHEKIO	MSF F
2003	13	30	58	n/a
2004	55	55	70	n/a
2005	112	188	261	109
2006	152	133	534	237
2007	155	202	389 (first quarter only)	157 (first quarter only)

Sources: SOFA 2007, 2008; Kay Fanm 2006, 2008; Larrain and Fernandez 2007; URAMEL 2007.

percent were under 18 (SOFA 2007, 2008). All show an increase in the number of reported rapes over 2003–07, although it is not possible to know how much of this was due to increased reporting.

Another recent study used the Critical Route methodology to estimate different aspects of women's experiences of violence and in seeking help. In this study, 7–9 families of every 10 were estimated to have experienced some form of physical or sexual violence. Social and economic factors, such as lack of education and poverty, were seen as important in perpetuating domestic violence. However, institutional factors were emphasized as well, especially the weak state response to victims that encourages impunity. Cultural factors included myths and stereotypes that assign to victims the responsibility for their own victimization and that give men the authority to exercise violence within the family. These cultural norms were identified as key to address in prevention initiatives (Larrain and Fernandez 2007).

DRIVERS OF VIOLENCE IN URBAN HAITI

Violence is deeply entrenched in Haitian political and social life. From the 1804 revolution for independence through the successive dictatorships that followed, political leaders have relied on violence to establish and exercise power. While the violence of the Duvalier regime (1957–86) remains unmatched in history, subsequent leaders continued to use rape and extrajudicial killings to maintain control. The election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide as president in 1990 marked a return to democracy, but also the intensification in the use of violence by extra-legal groups in the service of particular political and/or business sector leaders, particularly after Aristide disbanded the national military in 1998.

The urban slums surrounding Port-au-Prince have been the site of much of Haiti's violent crime. In these areas, violence is driven by demographic, socio-economic, and political factors, often in explosive combination.⁹⁹ These include deep structural inequalities in income and opportunity; rapid urbanization in areas without proper infrastructure and service provision; a large and growing youth population; the continued presence of gangs and the external interests who finance them; the availability of weapons; the expansion of drug trafficking networks, and a weak criminal justice system.

99. See World Bank (2006) for a fuller description of these factors and their mix in Haiti's "conflict-poverty trap."

Structural factors including a highly unequal income distribution, chronic unemployment, unequal access to services and extreme social marginalization combine to make poor, urban residents particularly vulnerable to experiencing and perpetrating violence. The 2009 United Nations Human Development Index ranked Haiti 149 out of 182 countries. A full 65 percent of Haitians live below the poverty line,¹⁰⁰ and more are expected to join them following a spike in food prices, the onslaught of four hurricanes, and a slump in remittances due to the financial crisis in 2008. **Demographic factors** add to this: youth aged 15–24 account for at least 50 percent of the population, and extremely poor households average about twice as many children as those above the poverty line (World Bank 2006).

Extremely rapid, poorly managed urbanization fuels these structural inequities. Haiti's urban population grew from 1.2 million in 1982 to 3.2 million in 2003. Port-au-Prince has received an average of 75,000 new residents annually over the past two decades and now accounts for at least 25 percent of the national population. Most migrants are driven by economic reasons (World Bank 2006) and live in urban slums whose conditions often are deplorable. According to the national police, 75 percent of all violent deaths between January and June 2008 occurred in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area.

The steady migration of rural residents to urban areas without proper infrastructure to receive them has driven intense violence in the past, and is considered one of the chief risk factors for a potential return to violence now (ICG 2008). As illustrated in the following analysis, the **inability of the state to provide visible responses to the crowded and impoverished conditions of urban slums** makes it possible for spoilers to exploit these conditions for political or financial gain. Urban youth are particularly vulnerable to recruitment by “violence entrepreneurs,” loosely defined by the International Crisis Group (ICG) as “often overlapping categories of drug traffickers, corrupt politicians, gang remnants, as well as a small segment of the oligopolistic entrepreneurs and business owners whose affairs continue to thrive under insecurity and a weak government” (ICG 2008: 2). This **instrumentalization of violence** was most intense in the years leading up to the ouster of President Aristide in 2004. During the worst period of insecurity to date, 2004–06, Haitian analysts documented payments by business owners and politicians to armed urban gangs to maintain insecurity (ICG 2009). While this manipulation has certainly diminished, it is by no means a thing of the past.

100. UNDP HDI statistics, http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_HTI.html

Dismantling these gangs has been the primary focus of the current administration. Following a joint military exercise in 2007 of the Haitian National Police (HNP) and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which has operated in Haiti since April 2004, many gang leaders in Cité Soleil and other parts of the capital were arrested or killed. Today control over the slums is largely in the hands of MINUSTAH and the HNP, and gangs are unable to “hold turf” as they did in the past. Nevertheless, smaller groups of youth continue to conduct criminal activities in much the same way as their predecessors. Indeed, while the more visible forms of organized violence have decreased in the slums, common street violence and sexual and domestic violence remain alarmingly high (box G.1).

The violence also has deeper roots in the **sociocultural changes** that have accompanied prolonged crises in socioeconomic conditions and political stability. Intense urbanization under tough economic conditions has disrupted many of the traditional social institutions that previously provided a certain degree of resilience to violence. Many people have been displaced by economic crisis or violence, so that many are living in crowded and disorganized conditions that promote distrust.

For **youth**, these changes have been especially disruptive. Youth express strong dissatisfaction with their situation—of 1.6 million Haitian youth aged 15–24, only 13 percent say they are happy with their lives. Almost half of youth do not go to school, and the youth unemployment rate is estimated at 47.4 percent, the highest in Latin America (Justesen and Verner 2007). High unemployment and limited access to education increase the pressure on urban youth, prompting many to rely on illicit means of making a living. Given the dire employment situation overall, many youth are now the breadwinners for their families. This has disrupted family relationships and weakened parents’ influence over their children. When family subsistence depends on youth, parents may turn a blind eye to criminal activities by their children. As will be discussed in the following analysis, an important number of Haiti’s urban youth continue to see violence as a credible means of meeting their basic needs—both material and psychological—and parents and elders have few means at their disposal to counter this.

The **availability of guns** constitutes another important driver of the violence in Haiti. The overwhelming majority of gun-related homicides occur in the capital, where guns remain in wide circulation. As discussed in more detail below, Haiti has undertaken a major disarmament effort since 2004, but there is no formal mechanism in place to monitor the success of this or track guns once they are confiscated.

Violence in Haiti is driven by **drug trafficking**, although there is little information available to assess the extent of this relationship. Haiti has been a key transshipment point for moving Colombian cocaine to the North American market for at least 20 years. According to U.S. officials, approximately 8 percent of the cocaine destined for the United States each year passes through Haiti.¹⁰¹ This traffic is facilitated by a highly understaffed police force, a weak justice system as well as the implication of police and justice officials in the trade (ICG 2009). As elsewhere, violence is used both within and between drug trafficking organizations as a means of settling disputes, collecting debts or consolidating territory. In addition, several indirect links exist between the drug trade and violence in Haiti. Drug traffic encourages corruption in the police, courts and customs systems, thereby weakening their capacity to respond to violence; drives weapons trafficking; is a source of financing to armed gangs; and deters investment.

Finally, a **weak criminal justice system** drives violence in Haiti by allowing for a general climate of impunity for many crimes, especially violence against women. Haiti currently ranks in the 6th percentile of the Rule of Law index, its highest ranking since the index began collecting data in 1996, and only in the 9th percentile for government effectiveness.¹⁰² The number of trained police officers remains grossly inadequate to demand, and many areas have virtually no police presence at all. Inadequate supervision of prisons prompts frequent jail breaks, and access to justice continues to be highly uneven across the population.

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR SECURITY AND VIOLENCE PREVENTION

Until the departure of President Aristide in 2004, there had been no state-led violence reduction or prevention programs in Haiti. Maintaining security, including the use of force, had been the exclusive domain of the military until Aristide disbanded the armed forces in 1996 and moved this responsibility to the national police.

The emergence of politically aligned armed groups and the intense violence that ensued post-Aristide provoked a stronger response to issues of stabilization and violence reduction. In the wake of the intense violence which preceded and

101. More details at <http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/episodes/an-honest-citizen/map-colombia-cocaine-and-cash/countries-of-concern/558/>

102. World Bank Governance Indicators Project, <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp>

followed Aristide's departure, the UN established a multidimensional stabilization operation known as the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). This mission was to oversee the implementation of a traditional Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program in Haiti. **A National Council on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR)** was established as a government counterpart, with efforts focused on disarming and reinserting gang leaders into society through labor-intensive projects and job training programs. At the same time, DDR policy promoted community-based efforts to address violence, focusing on urban "hot spots" where violence and gang activity were concentrated. Initially, this state-led program has had some positive outcomes in that most of the young people who have been in contact in the NCDDR have been receiving job training or integrated in the fragile job market. However, the lack of evaluation data on these programs does not enable conclusions in terms of the long-term effect on youth who have been previously engaged in violence and criminality.¹⁰³

The Haitian state has also established the **Bureau for Operational Coordination of Interventions in Priority Zones (BCOIZP)**, within the office of the Prime Minister. This office is charged with coordinating the activities of the state and donors in designated "priority zones," in which levels of violence are high. Within this framework, donors have focused their attention on these priority zones and shifted from humanitarian interventions to development more broadly.

Important progress has been made in improving donor coordination since 2004, yet much more is needed to ensure a comprehensive, multilevel response to the problem of violence in Haiti. During the initial response to the instability of 2004–06, donors faced the challenge of working in a highly politicized and volatile environment. In response, donors focused most of their attention on building relationships with local partners, sometimes at the expense of building a more coordinated response across the system. In addition, while all donors recognize the importance of building the capacity of the state and of local communities, they have taken different approaches to this, resulting in an overall fragmented approach from the international community. Some donors broke relationships with government counterparts altogether, while others coordinated with government entities on particular aspects of projects.

103. One important challenge is the lack of a national tracking system of guns that have been confiscated, which would be necessary to gauging effectiveness of the program.

Box G.1 Community-Driven Development (CDD) and Violence in Port-au-Prince

The World Bank implemented a pilot CDD project in Cité Soleil and Bel-Air, two slums in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. The pilot project, *Projet Pilote de Développement Participatif à Port-au-Prince/Urban Community-driven development Pilot Project in Port-au-Prince (PRODEPPAP)*, aimed to mitigate conflict/violence and support stabilization in targeted slum areas by (a) quickly providing improved access to basic services and income generation opportunities to beneficiary community groups or associations and (b) contributing to strengthen the social cohesion and capital in the targeted communities.

An evaluation of the pilot concluded that PRODEPPAP was successful in helping to create and strengthen social cohesion through the creation of development committees/councils (COPRODEPs), made up of representatives from 138 CBOs was successful in helping to create and strengthen social cohesion through the creation of development committees/councils (COPRODEPs), made up of representatives from 138 CBOs (community-based organizations) from Cité-Soleil, and from 105 CBOs from Bel-Air. The COPRODEPs were able to successfully prioritize and allocate resources for the implementation of community subprojects that were proposed and implemented by CBO members themselves through a participatory and inclusive process. The project was also able to achieve participation of local government authorities, which served to improve the relationship between local government and civil society, in terms of helping local government representatives to better understand and address their constituents' needs. Based on the success of the pilot, a national-level urban CDD project was launched in 2009.

Regarding strengthening local communities, donors have placed increasing importance on empowering them to address the driving factors for violence, as well as disrupt the recruitment of new actors into armed groups. Key to these goals is delivering visible results—a peace dividend—to urban areas affected by violence and poverty. The **World Bank** launched a community-driven development project in Cité Soleil in fall 2008, based on a successful CDD program in rural Haiti, which empowers communities to identify development priorities and implement microprojects. The latter are composed mainly of support to small businesses, training, and basic services (box G.1).

MINUSTAH was originally intended to be an integrated peacekeeping mission with UNDP. By 2007 the UN had begun to revisit the strategy and move toward a focus on development and human security. MINUSTAH and UNDP decided to complement rather than integrate their programs, resulting in the UNDP developing a Community Security Program, which later closed, and MINUSTAH beginning a **Community Violence Reduction Program (CVR)**.

The latter program signified a shift in focus from a strictly security approach to a broader focus on development. The program works in twelve “hot spots” across Haiti, including five in Port-au-Prince. The CVR program convokes communities to discuss development priorities, identifies projects for funding, and supports implementation. Communities are responsible for monitoring implementation through the selection of a monitoring committee of community members.

Additionally, in Cité Soleil, the **United States Haiti Stabilization Initiative (HSI)**, a \$20 million joint initiative of USAID and the Department of Defense, focuses on increasing police presence and training, support to justice reform as well as investments in infrastructure.

Emerging civil society initiatives present a potential opportunity to better coordinate donor efforts. To date, donors have made important investments in empowering communities to define their own priorities and implement projects. In Cité Soleil, where most donors are active, local community leaders launched a Community Forum¹⁰⁴ in June 2009 as a mechanism to strengthen local associations, initiatives, and actions of local government. The forum brought together residents of Cité Soleil to elect representatives by Block and by different sectors to develop a common platform for development and present this to major donors. There are plans now to integrate MINUSTAH’s CVR community forum with this effort, and to increase coordination with USAID’s community-level efforts in Cité Soleil as well.

Donor and state coordination can also be improved through better **data collection**, and discussions are underway toward this end. Despite many studies and reports on violence and crime victimization in urban Haiti, it remains impossible to establish a body of knowledge based on current monitoring and surveillance systems. Individual service providers collect their own data on violence victimization, and various institutions have sponsored surveys on the topic. Unfortunately, to date there has been no effort to consolidate this information for analysis of broader trends. The UNDP has proposed the creation of a national violence observatory and is currently securing funding for this. Discussions are also ongoing between research institutions and Viva Rio to improve data collection and participate in a national violence observatory.

The institutional framework for violence prevention in urban Haiti also includes a diverse **NGO sector**. This includes international NGOs such as Viva

104. The Cité Soleil Community Forum was officially launched on June 9 and 10, 2009. The Forum regroups representative from all sectors and neighborhood Blocks in Cité Soleil.

Box G.2 Viva Rio

Viva Rio is a Brazilian organization based in Rio with 15 years of experience working in urban slums on violence prevention. The placing of the UN mission in Haiti under Brazilian supervision created a unique opportunity to set up a project in Bel-Air, Port-au-Prince, a slum adjacent to Cité Soleil. Together with the NCDDR and the support of MINUSTAH, Viva Rio helped negotiate a micro peace agreement among rival gangs in 14 areas of Port-au-Prince in 2007–08. Each month, the team meets with community leaders, the Brazilian military (part of MINUSTAH) in the zone, and the HNP to review incidents of violent death in the area. For every month without an incident, a lottery is held to award scholarships to youth in the beneficiary communities. Every two months without an incident result in a similar lottery for musicians.

Viva Rio's inclusive approach has fostered greater ownership of the peace accords and better accountability for violence within the community. Its commitment to work with a range of institutions, some of which have been largely isolated by other donors, has facilitated project implementation and institutional strengthening, especially for violence prevention. At the same time, this approach has been criticized by other donors, especially Viva Rio's willingness to engage with former gang members as part of the community.

Finally, it is important not to discount the importance of the presence of the Brazilian military in the zones in which Viva Rio works. This presence provides a degree of security that is not present in other areas or for other actors in violence prevention, and points to the importance of basic security in building longer term programs to reduce violence.

Rio (box G.2) as well as various national NGOs, most of whom specialize in service provision. Some of these combine services for education and life-skills building. *L'Atletique Haiti* (box G.3) couples tutoring with sports education to support healthy alternatives for youth from various backgrounds.

Although some important efforts have been made, reforms to the **Haitian National Police (HNP)** have generally proceeded slowly, and capacity remains highly inadequate to demand. Given current trends, the national government's goal of forming an HNP of 14,000 officers by 2011 is at risk. At the end of 2008, there were only 9,000 active officers, and the vetting process for these was proceeding slowly (ICG 2008). In Cité Soleil, the Haiti Stabilization Initiative funded a new police station, but to date it is staffed by only 45 police officers—a ratio of only one police officer per 3,500 residents. In other high violence areas—such as Carrefour and Martissant in the capital, or Raboteau in Gonaïves—this ratio is even lower. In April 2009, an additional 120 police officers graduated from the police academy, but were dispatched to provinces where there was no police presence at all.

Box G.3 Creating Alternatives for Youth: *L'Atletique d'Haiti*

Some of the more creative approaches to reducing violence in Haiti are not explicitly aimed at violence reduction. L'Atletique d'Haiti combines after-school tutoring with sports training to over 1,000 children ages 6–20 in three areas of Haiti: Drouillard and Cité Soleil in Port-au-Prince, and Artibonite. All participating students must be enrolled full-time in school. Because children from all areas of the city can apply, the program brings together children from both wealthy backgrounds and at-risk situations, helping to ease the long-held class divisions in Haiti.

For more information see <http://www.lathletiquedhaiti.com/index.html>

The Haitian **criminal justice system** remains extremely weak, despite efforts at reform. Instability at the top is a major factor in this fragility: the average term for a justice minister in Haiti is only six months. Judges are appointed by the president based on references from the Senate (for the Supreme Court and Appeals Courts) and by departmental and communal assemblies for first instance courts and peace courts. The budget is controlled by the minister of justice (World Bank 2006). At the community level, justices of the peace are the principal authorities, charged with issuing warrants, mediating civil cases, taking depositions and referring cases to prosecutors and higher officials.

Access to justice services continues to be a serious problem. Coverage remains uneven, and costs often are prohibitive for the poor. International organizations have stepped in to fill the gaps, but much remains to be done. The OAS has sponsored a program to provide civil identity documentation, especially in poor communities, that would allow Haitians to file cases and stand before the court. Kay Justis, a USAID-funded project in Cité Soleil, provides free legal assistance to residents, which has contributed to increased reporting. However, Kay Justis cannot by law represent both sides of a dispute, presenting an enormous challenge in a context where few can afford legal representation. Under Haitian law, the state is not required to provide a lawyer to those who cannot afford one.

The penitentiary system has been a focus of stabilization efforts, yet Haiti still lacks the capacity to respond to criminal behavior, especially in detaining, prosecuting and sentencing perpetrators of serious crimes. Pretrial detentions are limited by the Constitution to 48 hours, yet the average time spent in custody after arrest is 20 days in Port-au-Prince, and some detainees spend up to 321 days in detention without trial (USAID 2007). Only about three percent of those detained in the national penitentiary are convicted, and the incarceration rate is only 8,000 for a population of 9 million, far lower than the regional aver-

age.¹⁰⁵ Security at jails is lax, making them prone to frequent jail breaks. As a consequence, a culture of impunity remains in Haiti, which inhibits victims from reporting crimes and weakens confidence in the state.

The **health sector** has improved provision of services to victims, but remains fragmented and with limited capacity to respond to the issues surrounding violence. There is a need for integrated programs that target victims of violence, particularly traumatized children and women.

Some primary interventions have been successful, but these remain scarce and underfunded. Some educational programs that promote behavior change at school, like Save the Children's *Rewriting the Future*, are being implemented, but are limited by funding constraints.

Despite its alarming prevalence and demonstrated negative impacts on individuals and communities, **sexual violence and domestic violence** are not prioritized by the Haitian state. Haiti is the only country in Latin America without a specific law addressing domestic violence. (Inter-American Women's Commission 2008). Domestic violence is addressed through broader laws on assault and battery, and while rape is illegal, the law does not address marital rape or incest. Penalties for rape range from 10 years forced labor to 15 years if the victim is younger than 15, though these are rarely enforced. Perpetrators of violence against children (severe corporal punishment, and neglect) are not liable for prosecution in the Haitian legal system.

Haiti has signed on to most of the major international conventions regarding violence against women, but has yet to implement many of them. For example, although Haiti ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1995, it has yet to enact laws that align the provisions of the Convention with national laws, and very little work has been done to raise awareness among lawmakers, authorities and the general public about its practical implications.

The national body responsible for addressing violence against women and girls is the **Concertation Nationale**, a coordinating body consisting of state, international and civil society entities. The Concertation has made important strides in addressing the issue, principally through the development of a National Plan to Combat Violence against Women, and by contributing to strengthening the legal framework (primarily through the passing of a law criminalizing rape). In 2006, the Concertation commissioned a study which identified the lack of a consistent mechanism for collecting data on violence as

105. Personal interview with Philip Lamarche, National Center for State Courts, Port-au-Prince, Dec. 2008.

an important obstacle to addressing domestic and sexual violence. In response, the Concertation has put forth tools that facilitate reporting and improve service delivery to victims. Victims can now file a complaint at several places: local tribunals, Kay Justis, the mayor's office, various NGO service providers, and hospitals. Victims can request a medical certificate if they are raped, which can be used in any subsequent investigation of the crime. A standardized form for collecting information is available to service providers and other institutions in contact with victims, but implementation remains weak. Finally, there is now a National Coordinator for Women's Affairs within the HNP, and gender focal points have been appointed for several departments. Some training on sexual and domestic violence has been administered to police officers, but so far this has not been systematic.

The governance system for the different bodies dealing with reducing violence and preventing violence against women is set up to allow for better coordination on both issues. For example, the MCFDF is formally part of the NCDDR and represented on the governmental task force for addressing "priority areas" for violence prevention. MINUSTAH and UNDP are, in turn, part of the Concertation Nationale. Yet reportedly little action has come of these collaborations to date (UNIFEM 2008).

STUDY SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

Data for the Port-au-Prince case study were collected via a desk review of academic and policy literature, a household survey (N = 1575), six focus groups, nine ethnographic interviews with experts in Cité Soleil, and 26 formal interviews with government officials, nongovernmental organizations and international organizations active on violence prevention. The study also included a mapping exercise to visualize the differences in infrastructure and service provision in the area.

The survey was conducted by INURED¹⁰⁶ during July–September 2008 and included 1,575 respondents. This survey built upon a previous survey conducted in the same area in March–April 2008, which provided useful background for this study. Questions focused on demographics, perceptions of security and rule of law, perceptions of government performance, and economics and social well-being. The survey was drafted and implemented in Haitian Cre-

106. Interuniversity Institute for Research and Development, based in Port-au-Prince. Based on the successful implementation of this survey, INURED was contracted to conduct the qualitative component of the fieldwork in Port-au-Prince.

ole, and piloted with 60 respondents in Cité Soleil. Both male and female interviewers were present to improve reporting on sensitive topics. All responses were anonymous, and all respondents were age 18 and older.

Cité Soleil is divided roughly into six “Blocks.” Within each Block, every fifth house was selected for sampling. To facilitate the institutional analysis, 26 formal expert interviews were conducted with key actors, such as government officials, NGOs involved in service provision and advocacy, and international organizations active in violence reduction and prevention. These were audio recorded and transcribed for analysis.

The survey data were analyzed in SPSS to identify trends and patterns, and to select two communities within Cité Soleil for comparative analysis. Blocks 2 and 4 (see annex) were selected to represent “upper” (Block 2) and “lower” (Block 5) Cité Soleil. While residents of both Blocks fall mostly below the poverty line, there are important differences in socioeconomic conditions that make for a useful comparison. These are described in more detail in the next section.

Qualitative fieldwork focused on upper and lower Cité Soleil. There were six focus groups three in each of the two Blocks; one each with women, youth and community leaders. A total of 57 people participated, including 27 men and 30 women (annex table). These were audio recorded, transcribed in Creole, translated into French, then English. To check for consistency, the texts were then back-translated into Creole. An additional nine ethnographic interviews were with community leaders and experts in Cité Soleil. For security reasons, these interviews were not audio recorded, but field interviewers relied on detailed field notes.

To protect confidentiality of the respondents and others in the community, special ethical considerations were taken. The names or other information individuals identified as associated with gangs in the focus groups has been kept confidential, and no identifiers appear in the data. Verbal consent for all participants was obtained prior to the interviews and focus groups. All original transcripts are kept under password protection by the lead investigator; all released transcripts have been edited to erase personal or location identifiers.

CITÉ SOLEIL

“If everyone were to testify to the violence they have lived through here, it would take forever.” Focus group participant, Cité Soleil

Figure G.2 Map of Neighborhood Blocks, Upper and Lower Cité Soleil

Source: INURED

Note: Upper Cité Soleil is contained in Block I in the map above; Lower Cité is Block V.

Cité Soleil, located within the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince, is one of the largest slums in Haiti (figure G.2). Living conditions for its estimated 350,000 residents are widely considered to be among the worst in the Americas. For the full sample, women make up the majority of residents (60.4 percent) and living situations are very crowded, with 70 percent of households housing more than 4 members. Eighty-six percent say they are unemployed, meaning they do not have steady work with social benefits. Just over 49 percent claim to be self-employed, and 6.1 percent report having short-term “day jobs.” Another 81.4 percent say they do not earn enough to feed their household. Only 6 percent claim to eat 3 meals a day, and 18.3 percent report they only eat every couple of days. Educational levels are also low, with 56 percent having 8 or fewer years of formal schooling.

The dire living conditions in Cité Soleil result partly from an explosion in rural migration to the capital. Cité Soleil was originally intended to house about 50,000 factory workers for manufacturing plants in the capital. The attraction of these jobs together with declining opportunities in the countryside led to a ru-

Figure G.3 Availability of Cultural Services, Cité Soleil

Source: INURED

ral exodus that has persisted even after the disappearance of the manufacturing jobs in the 1970s. Following the unrest during the 2004–06 transition, most service providers, including the police, withdrew completely from the area, exacerbating the unsafe and unsanitary conditions. Even now, basic infrastructure is lacking, so that many of the houses are accessible only through narrow alleyways, making it difficult for service providers to enter and easy for perpetrators to hide from police.

Cité Soleil has been the chief battleground for Haiti's political struggles since 2004, and is still considered the locus of much criminal activity in the capital. The poverty and social marginalization of its residents make many of them, especially youth, vulnerable to manipulation by political actors. Many of the residents in the area, including the gang leaders and many of their members, were loyal to President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. After the Aristide's ouster in 2004, Cité Soleil erupted into violence, initially between those loyal to Aristide's political party (Fanmi Lavalas) and anti-Lavalas supporters of the transition government. Among these were the HNP and the UN peacekeeping

mission, MINUSTAH. Later, the violence shifted to inter-gang rivalries, which divided among geographical and sociocultural lines. These fell into two main camps: **Upper and Lower Cité Soleil**.¹⁰⁷

During this time, violence in the slum reached alarming levels. From January 2006 to May 2007, Médecins sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders, or MSF) reported a homicide rate in Cité Soleil of 400 per 100,000 residents and cited violence as the primary cause of mortality. Kolbe and Hutson (2006) estimated that 8,000 homicides had occurred in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area alone following Aristide's departure in February 2004 and December 2005—a rate of 219 murders per 100,000 residents per year. Violence later shifted from fighting between Upper and Lower Cité to in-fighting within both sections, as gangs split off from the two main camps and fought for smaller territories. Gangs essentially dominated Cité Soleil from 2004–06, until a joint operation by MINUSTAH and the HNP reclaimed most of the slum with a military operation in 2007. Many gang leaders were killed or imprisoned as a result of the operation.

All told, the violence provoked the displacement of an estimated 100,000 Cité Soleil residents of during 2004–06. These people either returned to the countryside, or were forced to change houses within Cité Soleil. As a result, the survey found that although 79 percent of residents have lived in Cité Soleil for more than 7 years, over half of all residents have been at their current residence for fewer than 4 years.

CRIME AND VIOLENCE VICTIMIZATION IN CITÉ SOLEIL

“Our names are not mentioned, but you who are taking our voices, you who are recording us, I don't want anything to happen to us later.”

This study compared experiences of and responses to violence in Upper and Lower Cité Soleil. **Both neighborhoods are low-income areas with weak infrastructure and service delivery, but socioeconomic conditions in Upper Cité are more favorable than in Lower Cité.** Selected indicators from the survey are reported below (Table G.5).

107. “Upper” Cité Soleil includes the neighborhoods of Cité Boston, Premye Cité, Rue Sanon before the railroad, while “Lower” Cité Soleil, is composed of the more recent neighborhoods of Belekou, Ti Ayiti, Nöwe, Ti Kanada, Bwa Nèf.

Table G.5 Selected Socioeconomic Indicators, Upper and Lower Cité Soleil

	Gender (female/ male)	Years of schooling (SE)	Last grade completed (SE)	No. people in household	Earning enough money to feed everyone in the house (%)	Say neighborhood is tranquil
Upper CS	58.1/41.9	8.12 (2.94)	6.79 (.25)	4.99 (.15)	20.1	70
Lower CS	59.4/40.6	6.28 (.417)	5.23 (.358)	5.55 (.22)	12.7	68

Note: All differences are statistically significant at $p < .05$.

As the table highlights, residents of Upper Cité Soleil have more formal education, smaller households, and are nearly twice as likely to report having enough income to feed their households as residents of Lower Cité Soleil.

While overall levels of violence have diminished following the 2007 MINUSTAH intervention, the limited data available suggest that crime and violence remain highly prevalent in Cité Soleil, fueling fear and mistrust in the community. MINUSTAH is the only institution that collects data on crime and violence in Cité Soleil, and has begun releasing such data only recently. This data is reported in the table below, and compared to the totals for the Western department, which includes metropolitan Port-au-Prince (Table G.6).

Survey respondents reported high rates of victimization in Cité Soleil, with 33 percent of residents claiming that they or someone in their household has ever been attacked or threatened with violence. Of these, the most common types of violence were assault (38.8 percent), rape (20.6 percent), and verbal abuse (3.7 percent). An important minority, 36.9 percent, reported being victims of other violence such as witchcraft or neighborhood rivalries, suggesting that parallel, extralegal systems of justice remain in place (Table G.7). When

Table G.6 Crime and Violence Incidence, Cité Soleil, 2008

	March	April	May	June	Total Cité Soleil	Total western dept.	C.S. of total W. dept. (%)
Murder	3	1	1	3	8	46	17
Kidnapping	2	2	4	5	13	82	16
Rape	3	3	1	2	9	76	12
Robbery	1	2	0	1	4	31	13

Source: MINUSTAH Joint Mission Analysis Center (most recent available data).

Table G.7 Reported Victimization in Upper and Lower Cité Soleil (%)

	Households reporting victimization	Rape	Violent assault	Verbal abuse	Witchcraft, local rivalries	Where violence occurred (in house/nearby)*
Upper Cité	33.8	22.9	40.6	4.2	31.3	46.2/47.3
Lower Cité	36.0	24.5	38.8	4.1	32.7	54.3/32.6
Cité Soleil						
Total	33.0	20.6	38.8	3.7	36.9	45.4/46.8

Note: *A small percentage of cases reported the violence happened outside the immediate area; these were 6.5%, 13.1% and 7.8% respectively.

asked about current prevalence, 36 percent claimed they or someone in their household had been victimized in the nine months prior to the survey (January–September 2008), suggesting that violence victimization remains high.

Women and youth were most vulnerable to victimization. Fifty-seven percent of victims were women, compared to 43 percent of men. Those 25–34 years of age were most likely to be victimized (table G.8).

Gangs were overwhelmingly named as the perpetrators of these acts. Of those that had been victimized in the preceding nine months to the survey, 71.4 percent named local gangs as the perpetrators, followed by police (9.5 percent), petty thieves (6.5 percent), spouse (4.1 percent), neighbor (3.7 percent), MINUSTAH (3.4 percent), local magistrate (0.7 percent), and community leaders (0.5 percent). In focus groups, participants repeatedly stressed that although many gang leaders have been killed or imprisoned, gang activity continues. As one put it, “the snake’s head has been cut, but the tail continues to wreak havoc.”

On average, residents of Upper Cité Soleil reported higher incidence of violence, with 38.2 percent. Reporting they had been attacked or threatened in the past nine months. This compares to 30.3 percent of residents of lower Cité Soleil for the same period, although this difference is not statistically significant. Similarly, there were observed differences in the proportion of respondents reporting that someone in their household had been a victim of crime and violence (33.8 percent for Upper Cité Soleil compared to 36 percent for Lower Cité Soleil) but these differences were not statistically significant.

Similar types of victimization were reported in the two communities. Table G.8 shows little difference in the type of crimes reported in Upper versus

Table G.8 Victimization by Gender and Age (%)

Male	Female	Age 18–24	Age 25–34	Age 35–44	Age 45+
43	57	15	33	26	26

Figure G.4 Map of Availability of Public Services, Cité Soleil

Source: INURED

Lower Cité Soleil. A slightly higher proportion of Lower Cité Soleil residents reported that someone in their house had been raped, whereas violent assault was somewhat more prevalent in Upper Cité Soleil. Residents of Lower Cité reported violence occurring more frequently in the house as opposed to the street, in contrast to Upper Cité and Cité Soleil overall.

Yet, qualitative analysis suggests that differences in physical infrastructure and coverage of services between the two communities result in different patterns of violence victimization. The map below highlights the stark difference in availability of services and infrastructure in the two areas. A majority of small businesses and nonprofit service agencies have a presence in Upper Cité but not Lower Cité. State institutions also have a much heavier presence in Upper Cité; the only government office in Lower Cité Soleil is a branch of the municipal government, while Upper Cité houses offices for the tax authority, state housing authority and the only police station in the entire slum. Likewise, there are three health centers in Upper Cité Soleil, but none in Lower Cité. **Because of these conditions, residents felt that crime in Upper Cité tended to be more opportunistic in nature, consisting of petty crimes**

such as pick-pocketing, as well as assault associated with theft, in heavy traffic areas.

In contrast, crime and violence in Lower Cité Soleil was seen to consist primarily of fights among youth, which erupt spontaneously. These fights, described further below, often begin with youth throwing rocks at each other, and may escalate to burning or otherwise destroying houses. In addition, the physical layout of Lower Cité Soleil, with its narrow alleyways, lack of visibility around corners and dearth of open space, allows perpetrators to hide easily. Participants reported that many perpetrators of assaults and robberies that occurred in Upper Cité retreat to the Lower section to hide. Participants emphasized that police presence in Lower Cité is minimal, and residents who witness perpetrators hiding in the area are reluctant to report them for fear of retribution.

Across Cité Soleil, people are as likely to be victimized in their house as they are in the street. Residents reported nearly equal rates of victimization in their houses as in nearby areas. This pattern was stronger for Upper Cité Soleil, where the ratio was 46.2/47.3. In Lower Cité Soleil, violence is more likely to occur in the house (54.3 percent of reported cases) compared to nearby areas (32.6 percent). Women were more likely to report being victimized inside their homes (68 percent) compared to men (50 percent).

MANY LAYERS OF VIOLENCE

From the Family to the Street

When asked to speak about the types of violence they witnessed and experienced in their community, residents readily mixed different manifestations in

“I have heard adults say that if you beat a child for too long, the beating no longer shames him, it doesn’t affect him strongly. That child will grow up and buy a gun for a small sum of money, and will become a hardened criminal capable of anything.”

— Youth, Upper Cité Soleil

their responses. They emphasized the interrelationships among domestic violence aimed at control in the home, organized violence perpetrated by youth, and more opportunistic violence aimed at satisfying basic material needs.

Fundamentally, all groups saw domestic violence as crucial to explaining other manifestations of violence in Cité Soleil. Young people, in particular, felt that violence against children in the home later reproduces itself on the street. Children are abused by both mothers and fa-

thers. It is common for children to live with other relatives as well, and in these situations violence and neglect are even more prevalent. Experiencing repeated violence desensitizes children and normalizes violence in their view. As one youth described:

“When a parent uses force to coerce the child, it becomes a habit. The child begins to think there is nothing wrong with this and it becomes a game. I have heard adults say that if you beat a child for too long, the beating no longer shames him, it doesn’t affect him strongly. That child will grow up and buy a gun for a small sum of money, and will become a hardened criminal capable of anything.”—Youth, Upper Cité Soleil

Women were especially aware of the interwoven relationships between domestic and other forms of violence. When asked, women of all ages tended to define violence within a continuum that does not separate the private sphere from the public. They tended to begin their narratives by describing their experiences in their homes and then in the street, whereas men tended to minimize—if not ignore—violence in the domestic sphere in favor of accounts of street violence.

Women in Cité Soleil feel they are multiple victims of violence—both at home and in the street. They emphasized disputes between partners, usually over jealousy or household finances, that escalate to fights, most often with the husband hitting his wife or forcing sex. However, they also made clear that women perpetrate violence as well, sometimes fighting back with all the means at their disposal:

“My ex-husband and I, we were violent toward one another. I have thrown bottles at him, and he has cut me with pieces of glass. Once, I poured a pot of boiling beans on his head. I was pregnant but that didn’t stop him from beating me; that’s why I did it . . . I taught him to respect women. We seem harmless, but it is only by choice.”

Even outside the home, women remain vulnerable to sexual violence. Sexual violence is deeply embedded in Haitian social life, and this study is consistent with previous ones finding a high prevalence of rape in Cité Soleil in particular (Marcelin and others 2008a, 2008b; USAID/CHF 2008; MSF 2007). While rape by family and household members certainly occurs, focus group participants focused more on rape by groups of young men and recounted several recent

stories of gang rape in the area. Gang rape has a long history in Haiti, as a tool for asserting control over a territory or group, and for punishing rivals. The former military often used rape of dissident women or dissidents' sisters to silence opposition. In the 2004–07 period, gangs continued the pattern to establish turf and escalate wars with rival gangs. Today's youth in Cité Soleil were exposed to this violence and may or may not have directly participated in it. They continue the pattern, as described by a young woman:

“You are in the street, and you are attacked by a group of young men. They try to find out who your man is. If it is someone one of them is on good terms with, he works it out with another who doesn't know your man to have you raped.”

Participants also spoke of a more recent evolution of this practice, called “**forcing**.” A gang member might show up at a young girl's house and announce to her parents that their daughter is his sweetheart. He may even leave money for her, with a message that her sweetheart left this money for her. Other times, the pressure is more direct. One young woman recounted this exchange with a young male:

“Oh! Oh! Even if you run away, I will send someone to look for you wherever you're hiding. I will riddle your mother's house with bullets and I will make you submit to my will if you don't want to be mine. Besides, no sooner than today, you have to belong to me. I am leaving now, but I will be back.”

Youth as Victims and Agents

There is a sense that youth have “gone wild,” in Cité Soleil. The loss of parental and community authority over children was a common theme among participants. There is a sense that, under the pressures of an extended economic crisis, some parents have simply given up trying to influence their children and therefore, “the youth are in charge now.” Faced with extreme poverty and few income-earning opportunities, youth have become the breadwinners for their families, often through illicit means. This has upset traditional power relationships in the family:

“The children may live in situations where the parents are unemployed. When these children go out to the streets and bring something home to

sustain the family, their parents have less authority over them, because when they want to reprimand such children, either the bandit [they work for] will cause them harm or the children will simply stop making a contribution.”

In this context, it has become more difficult for the community to hold youth accountable for their actions. Some participants spoke of trying to hold youth accountable for crimes, only to be threatened by the youth’s parents. Things become even more difficult for the parents, who may end up protecting their children, and by extension the criminals they work for, to sustain the family livelihood and avoid retaliation themselves. The youth, knowing this protection exists, are further empowered by it. Older residents see this trend as one of the most serious threats to the current stability:

“For example there were three young men arguing, and one told the other he will crack his skull. I intervened, asking them if they did not realize that all the men who used to preach violence are either in jail or have been silenced. One of them laughed at me and said, ‘You think all these guys are gone? That they are not around? That’s what you think! They are simply asleep.’”—Community leader, Upper Cité Soleil

There was a sense in both communities that a small number of youth continue to hold the community hostage by creating violent disruptions. Participants, especially in Lower Cité Soleil where there is less police presence, spoke of not being able to leave their homes between 7pm and 7am because of fear of assault by youth, or of being caught in the middle of fighting among youth. These fights generally begin with verbal assault and escalate to rock throwing, in more extreme cases burning or otherwise destroying houses.

These activities were said to start by 7 or 8 pm, and people did not feel safe going out again until 7 am the next morning. However, activities were not confined to these hours. One participant noted:

“Sometimes I listen to them [my friends] and say to myself: I am going to the streets and be it as it may, I would do anything, including killing—even if that person was my mother—if I could be sure nobody would know that it was me who did it.”

Youth, Lower Cité Soleil

“When they want to enter into an action that could be hindered by the presence of too many people outside, they no longer have to wait until it’s past 7:00pm. All they have to do is start throwing rocks to clear the streets.”

For their part, youth expressed that they were pushed to violence not only by their early experiences of it, but also by pressure to meet basic needs and manipulation by political actors. When asked for explanations of the violence they see in their community, youth pointed to the lack of opportunities for generating income as the principal driving factor. One of the more troubling themes emerging from the study was the strong belief among youth that violence is a credible means of meeting one’s needs:

Focus group facilitator: What relationship do you find between violence at home and in the streets [of Cité Soleil] ?

Participant: Yes, the person who can’t find work pulls its knife to attack you and take everything he can take from you. But besides that there are other factors that generate violence, particularly extreme poverty [misery]. A young person who grows up in a context where nobody is looking after him, where he has nobody to talk to or to provide him his basic needs, understand what I am saying: an empty belly has no hear (cannot listen). [. . .] Well, that person will do what he must—although I would not act the same, just because I am a Christian—but I cannot blame that person for taking such an action.

Youth across Cité Soleil expressed a certain conviction that, while they don’t condone violence overall, they have a certain empathy for those who engage in it, and have felt pushed to such limits themselves. **A common sentiment was that if one’s basic needs were not being met by the state, one might feel capable of brutal acts of violence to meet those needs, and those actions would be to an extent justified.** In other words, if the state does not provide for their needs, they feel their only option is to take matters into their own hands.

Sometimes I listen to them [my friends] and say to myself: I am going to the streets and be it as it may, I would do anything, including killing—even if that person was my mom—if I could be sure nobody would know that it was me who did it. That is to say, again, that the misery [poverty] is

hard. And the authority doesn't try to solve the problems that affect the lives of young people. Before becoming adult, you have to experience childhood and if during your childhood there is nobody to provide you the basic needs, well you will learn to look for ways to satisfy your needs.

These feelings of desperation and frustration are easily taken advantage of by external actors. **Youth strongly expressed that mobilization of young people by “violence entrepreneurs” continues, even if it is currently dormant.** They saw themselves as caught between the need to earn a living and the pressure from these actors to create disruptions to meet political agendas. In turn, any conflict generated by political groups leads to a revival of latent oppositions between factions and neighborhoods. Youth alleged that political leaders continue to buy favors of gang leaders in the area, so that youth understand all they need to do to attract such support is to create a disturbance that calls their attention.

“When we talk about political violence we don't mean to say that they actually come into the Cité and do the actions themselves, but well, they give the means for us to act for them. Imagine that I have money and I come here and I offer you money to commit criminal acts. It's like the proverb, *Moun ki lonje dwèt sou koulèv la se li ki tiye* (“The one who points out the snake to everyone is the one who killed it.”) So this act, you would not do it yourself if I did not give you money to do it for me. These are the political actors who are the principal responsible ones for the violence and if they want, they can stir things up with violence.”—Youth, Upper Cité Soleil

While youth felt manipulated at times by these external actors, they also emphasized their own agency in responding—or choosing not to respond—to these efforts. In short, just as they can be mobilized to violence for one actor or another, they can just as surely change their allegiance to different actors, or resist such mobilization altogether.

At the same time, the category “violence entrepreneurs” is not limited to political actors, but also includes drug trafficking networks and other criminal groups. In the focus groups, youth emphasized that the dire conditions in their community increased their vulnerability equally to these external actors.

Institutional Performance

Residents described a climate of impunity underlying all forms of violence in Cité Soleil as a major driver of continued violence and obstacle to stabil-

ity. People of all ages said impunity generates violence and crime, and perpetuates it. The increased presence of the HNP was very welcome, and residents want to see an even greater presence, especially during nighttime hours. A common complaint was that when criminals are arrested, they often are released soon thereafter, which makes people reluctant to report crime to authorities for fear of retaliation. Indeed, among victims, fear of retaliation was the most common reason given for not reporting the crime: 49 percent listed this as the reason, compared to 19 percent who cited lack of confidence in the authorities' capacity to respond.¹⁰⁸ There was a common sense that the poor are excluded from the justice system. When asked "Do you think that if you had a lot of money you would have more protection by the law?," 61.7 percent said yes, compared to 22.8 percent who said no and 15.4 percent who answered "don't know."

"It is common knowledge that here, justice weighs on the side of those who can pay for it. Those who don't have the means to offer bribes are the ones who are wrong. . . . You have money, you have justice! You don't have money, no justice for you!"

Yet overall, residents of Cité Soleil generally felt that the security situation has improved, and credit the state with this progress. Overall, 63.4 percent of Cité Soleil residents describe

Table G.9 Those Who Feel Safer Now Than a Year Ago, (%)

Upper Cité	87
Lower Cité	86
All Cité Soleil	86

their neighborhood as peaceful, and nearly 86 percent said they felt safer now than they did a year ago (table G.9). This was evidenced by greater freedom of mobility in the area, both for residents and for police patrols.

This heightened sense of security was attributed primarily to an increased police presence (63.9 percent), and to a lesser extent stronger MINUSTAH presence (15.4 percent) (Table G.10).¹⁰⁹ When asked "who controls your neighborhood?" respondents felt that the police and MINUSTAH together were most in control (41.6 percent) and a smaller number saw the police alone (28.6 percent) followed by MINUSTAH alone (14.8 percent). Only 2.3 percent of respon-

108. An important proportion (31.2%) listed "other" reasons for not reporting.

109. Other answers were "gangs/criminals have left," (10.4%) and "other" (10.4%).

Table G.10 What Makes You Feel Safer? (%)

	Police presence	MINUSTAH presence	Gangs are gone	Other
Upper Cité	62.2	10.5	9.2	18.1
Lower Cité	67.2	20.0	8.0	4.8
All Cité Soleil	63.9	15.4	10.4	10.3

Table G.11 When You Were Victimized, to Whom Did You Report the Crime? (%)

Police	53.2
Magistrate	21.6
Gang	6.3
Community Leader	3.6
MINUSTAH	9.0
Other	6.3

Table G.12 Who Controls Your Neighborhood? (%)

Police	28.6
MINUSTAH	14.8
Police and MINUSTAH together	41.6
Gangs	2.3
No one	6.4
Other	6.0

dents felt that gangs still controlled the area (Table G.12).¹¹⁰ This support for the police, and the need for a stronger police presence, was consistent across both Upper and Lower Cité Soleil. When asked which institution they would turn to if threatened with violence, people in both areas overwhelmingly said the police (73.9 percent and 66.7 percent, respectively) (Table G.11).

Although actual reporting of violence remains low, most residents claim they would report a crime if victimized in the future. Only a small number (19.6 percent) of violence victims said they reported the incident, and of these, about half (53 percent) reported it to the police.¹¹¹ However, 82.2 percent said that, if victimized in the future, they would report the incident. Again, the police were the favored entity for reporting: 75 percent said they would go to the police, compared to 18 percent to a local magistrate, 1.8 percent to a church leader, 1.1 percent to a community leader, and only 0.3 percent to a gang leader.

RESPONSES TO VIOLENCE

Given the high levels of violence in the area, residents of Cité Soleil have developed a set of coping behaviors, both on the individual and collective levels. Particularly during the more intense years of the violence, **moving houses** was a

110. Other answers were “Don’t know/other” (5.9%) and “no one” (6.4%).

111. Other answers were: magistrate (21.6%); gang (6.3%); community leader (3.6%); MINUSTAH (9.0%), and other (6.3%).

common coping strategy. Many residents who had the means to move did so in the 2004–07 period, resulting in massive displacement within and out of Cité Soleil. The latter generally involved residents moving from Lower to Upper Cité Soleil, if they had the means. Today, residents still spoke of leaving the area to avoid further victimization.

Residents also **acquire weapons** as a means of dealing with violence. Although a disarmament program has been underway in Haiti since 2004, there is no tracking system to document the circulation of guns in Haiti. Participants mentioned that stockpiles of arms still exist in Cité Soleil, despite efforts at disarming the gangs.

Silence remains a coping strategy for many victims, especially where there is fear of retaliation. For sexual crimes in particular, many victims feel that keeping silent is the best means to protect themselves, at least in the short term. This strategy is directly related to the perception of widespread impunity surrounding violence in Cité Soleil.

Despite a perception that the state is making inroads in stabilizing the security situation and a desire among residents for stronger state institutions, people in Cité Soleil continue to rely on **alternate, often extra-legal, mechanisms** to cope with violence and crime, which undermine the very state institutions they would like to see strengthened. Of the households reporting victimization, over a third claimed to have been victims of witchcraft or other violence by neighbors. This topic was explored in more depth in focus groups, where participants spoke to the existence of a strong alternate justice system in Cité Soleil. The use of witchcraft to settle disputes between community members is embedded in the social fabric of Haiti. Nor is collective justice, including lynching or beating, new in Haiti. In rural areas, self-defense groups called *sosyete sekrèt* (secret societies) have long operated to protect communities from outside “enemies,” who threaten the peace (Métraux 1959; Laguerre 1989). These groups often are armed and composed of both men and women. In some cases, they hand over the alleged criminal to the police, while in others they may kill or otherwise punish the offender (UNIFEM 2008: 6).

In urban areas, in contrast, there are no overt such self-defined groups. Instead, extralegal justice is fragmented and erratic. In the absence of a viable system of justice—whether formal or traditional—people rely on other means of regulating behavior. One form of this is spontaneous community action against those who violate norms, as in the account below:

“Let me tell you about a situation . . . They caught someone, and he was lynched. The community reacted because they had had enough. This man killed a man, but a brave seven year-old boy hit him in the back with a rock, allowing the community to catch him. The police drove by and looked at the scene. They wrote their report but did nothing.”
—Community leader, Upper Cité Soleil

A second form of extralegal justice is the payment to individuals or small gangs to settle disputes or punish other residents. For example, in the market areas, vendors may pay for protection from robbers. Others may pay for hit men to settle disputes with neighbors. Rivalries between drug traffickers and organized crime groups may use extrajudicial means to castigate their enemies.

The continued reliance on extralegal means of doing justice relates directly to the lack of confidence in the formal justice system. At the same time, it threatens to undermine the strengthening of the kind of justice system people claim to want in their community.

SOURCES OF RESILIENCE

Overall, residents of Cité Soleil see the problem of violence in their community as directly related to the marginalization they face from the rest of Haitian society. This marginalization results in inadequate service provision, particularly of security services, and a dearth of employment opportunities. From this perspective, they spoke of areas of resilience to violence within the community, and measures they would like to see to further strengthen resilience and community cohesion.

Current efforts at **strengthening of security and criminal justice systems**, although proceeding slowly, were seen as a necessary area of further support. When asked their opinion on the best way to reduce violence in their community, most said they wanted a stronger police presence (52 percent), followed by more and better quality work opportunities (31.3 percent) and strengthening the justice system (10.3 percent) (Table G.13). When the question was asked another way—what should be done to make the community more peaceful?—answers were

Table G.13 What Would Be The Best Way to Reduce Violence in the Community?

More police	51.9
Strengthen justice system	10.3
More quality work	31.3
Other	6.3

similar. Residents preferred more security/police (46.5 percent), more work opportunities (42.1 percent), better wages (5.9 percent) and, finally, stronger participation in politics (0.5 percent). This confidence in formal institutions, even when their performance is far from optimal, is in itself an important source of resilience that can support the necessary strengthening of institutions. The need for this is urgent, given that this process is currently undermined by the use of extralegal systems of justice in the community.

Many residents see youth in their communities as untapped potential for addressing these issues. Participants spoke of community youth as a source of both fear and hope. At present, the activities of a small group of youth are holding back development efforts and heightening community tensions. Yet nearly all respondents saw the need to improve opportunities for young people—educational and vocational training, and employment opportunities—as fundamental to addressing the problem of violence. The need to increase the quality and access to education, both primary and secondary, is seen as crucial. Opportunities to create youth small businesses were another recommended avenue.

Youth also see themselves as positive actors in the community, in spite of past experiences in mobilizing toward more destructive ends. Youth emphasized that they possess a great deal of agency. There is a need to create mechanisms of support so that these energies can be channeled to more positive ends. For this, youth called for more support for youth-led initiatives, including small businesses and music and cultural groups.

In addition, efforts to rebuild relationships damaged by the violence in Cité Soleil are gaining ground. Several initiatives at rebuilding community ties in the area have made important advancements in the last two years, reflecting a renewed interest in reconciliation and collective action in Cité Soleil. As one example, the World Bank conducted a pilot of a community-driven development (CDD) project in Cité Soleil, which brought residents together to prioritize development goals and implement microprojects. While a comprehensive evaluation is still underway, preliminary results suggest that the CDD process has contributed to stability and community cohesion. Likewise, community forums organized by the United Nations' Community Violence Reduction Program have gained momentum in areas of previous conflict.

The **emergence of a nascent civil society** movement in Cité Soleil is a promising step toward increasing community participation in development efforts and improving donor coordination. The June 2009 Community Forum is one

piece of this effort and has begun integration and coordination efforts with various donors.

On the question of sexual violence, the success of public education campaigns in increasing awareness and improving reporting indicates that broader prevention efforts could be successful as well. The current security approach has stabilized the overall situation in Cité Soleil, but has not been able to go beyond basic security to longer-term violence prevention.

CONCLUSIONS

This case study has attempted to illuminate the ways residents of Cité Soleil understand the violence in their communities, and their resilience in resisting and reducing violence. Cité Soleil residents are acutely conscious and analytical in discussing their living conditions and the reasons for those conditions in their neighborhoods. For them, the issue of insecurity and violence is directly related to their poverty which in turn is directly connected to their lack of economic opportunity and their lack of access to basic services. The latter is a reflection of the marginalization of Cité Soleil from broader Haitian society. This marginalization is manifested in security and justice institutions that are inadequate to the area's needs.

"The country is at peace when Cité Soleil is at peace."

— **Community leader, Lower Cité Soleil**

1. The analysis here shows that residents of Cité Soleil see the violence in their community as multidimensional. Participants explicitly linked the violence they observe and experience today with violence that occurs in the home, particularly against children. There is a clear need for **primary prevention interventions** to address multiple types and levels of violence, and promote a culture of nonviolence in Haiti, particularly in urban areas. The effectiveness of prior education campaigns on domestic and sexual violence have created an awareness that has increased reporting and demand for services for victims. This can be built upon in broader-based primary prevention campaigns. In addition, current efforts to strengthen the legal framework to protect people, especially children, from abuse, need support.
2. A comprehensive, multilevel response depends on **greater coordination among donors, the state, and civil society**. In the politicized and fragile en-

vironment during the outbreak of violence in Haiti during 2004–06, donors were understandably focused on identifying partners on the ground to assist in project implementation. Over time, this attention came at the expense of building solid relationships across donors and with the state to present a more coordinated response. Donors have invested heavily in empowering local communities to confront the challenge of violence, yet these efforts have been fragmented even within the single area of Cité Soleil. There are promising steps underway to consolidate these efforts by integrating various community forums organized by MINUSTAH, USAID, the Cité Soleil Community Forum and potentially others as well, that can be further supported.

3. There is an immediate need for a **national system of data collection** on crime and violence. Many service providers currently collect data on violence, but there has been no effort to systematize the data for analysis. Collecting and analyzing this information from different sources could aid significantly in tracking trends, and in measuring the progress of different interventions. Conversations are underway to establish a national violence observatory, as are initiatives to share and synthesize data across institutions. These represent important opportunities for support and collaboration toward more effective interventions.

Urban upgrading is a critical component of a more comprehensive strategy to reduce and prevent violence in urban Haiti. The experiences presented here show how differences in quality of infrastructure and uneven service coverage facilitate opportunistic crime in Upper Cité Soleil, and allow perpetrators to evade law enforcement in the labyrinthine alleyways of Lower Cité Soleil. Overall, the deplorable living conditions in many areas of Cité Soleil increase the feelings of frustration and marginalization of youth, making them vulnerable to continued recruitment by violence entrepreneurs.

Likewise, efforts to **improve basic service provision** may be more effective if they are more equally distributed across Cité Soleil and other hot spots. The concentration of service providers in one area threatens to exacerbate existing inequalities.

There is a need to **invest in opportunities for urban youth and youth-led initiatives**. In the past, poor, urban youth have been the base for instrumentalized violence in Haiti, with tragic impacts on themselves and their communities. Yet they are far from passive participants. Youth see themselves as agents of their own destiny, able to choose to mobilize for the gains of others, or resist these pressures. When given a constructive role in the community, youth are

better equipped to counteract attempts to manipulate them into using violence, and can instead contribute to stabilization and development. Youth emphasize that they want to see opportunities to start small businesses and implement cultural projects. In other contexts, youth-led initiatives have yielded important returns for reducing violence and strengthening community cohesion.

Community relationship-building is a critical component of violence prevention initiatives. The disorganized living conditions in Cité Soleil, coupled with the experiences of past violence, have made residents wary of each other. This has in many ways been exacerbated by programs that targeted youth gang members only, which were seen by other members of the community as rewarding antisocial behavior without addressing the damage done to the broader community. As the experience of the World Bank CDD project and others shows, projects that reach out to the whole of community have the potential to increase community cohesion in addition to furthering development goals.

People in Cité Soleil want to see a **stronger police presence and strengthened justice system**. This underscores the need to invest in police vetting and training. Donors have long made this a priority, but time is of the essence in scaling up these efforts, as people continue to rely on extralegal means of doing justice that ultimately undermine the type of formal systems they desire.

Finally, some dynamics of the violence in urban Haiti merit **further study** to design effective interventions. For example, the changes in family structure and relationships that have accompanied the crises of the last decade need to be better understood. For example, the breakdown in relationships between different generations could be better examined to identify ways to rebuild them as a source of resilience. In rural areas, elder community members are an important source for dispute resolution, but in urban areas these relationships have deteriorated to the detriment of both generations. Likewise, the driving factors behind sexual violence and rape need to be better understood to inform more targeted interventions. At present it is difficult to differentiate between sexual violence that is politically motivated, and that which is motivated by other, usually social, motivations. A deeper examination of these dynamics and the associated risk factors could improve design of approaches to address these.

Annex I. Organizations Focused on Violence Prevention in Port-au-Prince

Name of organizations or individuals	Type of organization	Mission statement	Geographic and thematic areas of intervention activities
Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains (RNDDH)	Human rights Urban and rural violence	Monitors and advocates on matters of national and international consequence for human rights and democracy in Haiti	National (urban and rural) violence Human rights education Human rights indicator (quarterly bulletin) Monitoring human rights partnerships
Kay Fanm (Women's House)	Women rights feminist organization	Feminist organization that struggles to improve the status of women. Provides legal, health, literacy, and shelter services for women.	Urban areas, Cité Soleil Advocacy Violence against women Social justice Sexual violence Women rights education
Commission Episcopale Justice et Paix	Church-based human rights organization	Social pastoral of the Catholic Church	National (rural and urban) Data publication Monitor violence and homicide Human rights education Peacebuilding in communities
MINUSTAH/ UNDP Community Violence Reduction	UN/UNDP violence reduction	UNDP/MINUSTAH program that targets vulnerable and violence-prone communities	13 cities in urban areas Violence reduction Community forum Community participation
Ecumenical Center For Human Rights	Human rights	Protect and educate on human rights	National (urban and rural) Violence Human rights education Human rights indicator Monitoring human rights
Pan American Development Foundation	International Nonprofit organization	Opportunities for sustainable economic and social progress; strengthening civil society	National (urban and rural) Community development Economic development
USAID HR and Trafficking Program	United States Government program	Trafficking Human rights	National
City Hall of Cité Soleil	Local government City hall	Local administration Public institution	Local Commune of cité soleil Public administration Public services Public works

Name of organizations or individuals	Type of organization	Mission statement	Geographic and thematic areas of intervention activities
Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation	National government	Coordination of cooperation Strategic planning	National Planning Coordination of cooperation Strategic planning
Cité Soleil Community Forum	Civil society movement	Community advocacy and mediation	Local Cité Soleil Advocacy Mediation
Ministry of Environment	National government	Management of environmental issues	National Environmental projects Project implementation Environmental protection
National Commission for Demobilization, Disarmament and Reinsertion (NCDDR)	National government	National program on violence	National Urban gang programs Reinsertion programs Violence intervention Youth and crime monitoring
VIVA RIO	Brazilian nongovernmental organization	To strengthen communities through peace building	Bel-air (Port-au-Prince) Violence reduction Community intervention Water management
Interuniversity Institute for Research and Development (INURED)	Academic institution Research and think tank institution Higher education	Research and training for Haitians	National (urban and rural) Research Training and seminars Think tank Publication of studies Data bank

ANNEX II. DESCRIPTION OF METHODOLOGY

A household survey was implemented in Cité Soleil by the Interuniversity Institute for Research and Development (INURED) during the summer of 2008. This survey was intended to build on a previous survey of the same area completed in January 2008. The content of the survey instrument was specifically designed to reflect and capture Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) Framework Measures in the following domains: Demographics, Security, Rule of Law, Perceptions of Government, Economics, and Social Well-Being.

Specific survey items were initially drafted in Creole, and field/pilot tested with 60 residents across the entire district (10 questionnaires for each of the 6 residential Blocs). The purpose of field testing was to help determine the best level at which to “pitch” the questions (to make them understandable to the widest number of people), to examine their cultural appropriateness, and to ensure that the options available for each topical domain accurately reflected the opinions and attitudes of Cité Soleil residents. Field testing took place on August 7 and 8, and the survey instrument was revised on August 9 and 11 accordingly. The final version of the instrument was then translated into English (though it was administered in Creole).

Actual survey administration took place during August 12–20, 2008. During August 4–6, 34 interviewers were trained for survey data collection. All of the interviewers had prior experience with survey procedures (that is, from another, recent survey administered in Cité Soleil by the Interuniversity Institute for Research and Development, or INURED), but received additional training in survey research standards and protocol, and were then dispatched to specific neighborhoods according to a targeted sampling plan. To achieve a representative sampling of residents, supervisors (8) were responsible for marking every fifth house in each of 6 city “Bloc,” representing the whole of Cité Soleil.

The study operated with the assumption that the size and variability of the population of Cité Soleil are largely unknown. Standard probability sampling designed to achieve accurate “representations” of the population from which the sample is drawn is not feasible with a population whose parameters are incompletely known (for example, there is no census universe). For this reason, the team deliberately oversampled to capture the dynamics under study. The 1,575 participants age 18 and older were selected from the 6 neighborhood blocs, using as demographic guide the most recent census data from *Institut Haïtien de Statistiques et d’Informatique* in 2001 contains the oldest and most

urbanized neighborhoods (Cité Boston, Premye Cité, Rue Sanon before the railroad). These neighborhoods were built in the early 1960s by the Duvalier regime. Inhabitants viewed themselves in terms of superiority in relation to Lower Cité (Belekou, Ti Ayiti, Nòwe, Ti Kanada, Bwa Nèf)—although it is a slum area and **striking by poverty** and marginalization, similar to Lower Cité. This has led to severe political division and violence among gangs who have subdivided the Cité into balkanized territories. *Projet Drouillard*, however, is a more planned neighborhood with mixed economic and physical structures.

These Blocs included:

Bloc I: Cité Boston, Route Nationale # 1 up to the railway.

Neighborhoods: High Boston and Lower Boston, Ruelle Marie Carmelle 1 and 2I, Medeine, La Bonté, Soleil 7, left side of 1st Cité.

This Bloc is characterized as upper Cité Soleil.

Bloc II: Rue Volcy, right side of Route Nationale #1 up to the railway.

Neighborhoods: right side 1st Cité, Rue Volcy, Rue Sanon, Nazaréen, Ruelle Sonson, Ruelle la Paix, Cité Lumière 1, 2, 3 and 3 BB.

Bloc III: Bélékou, the railway up to the wharf.

Neighborhoods: Bélékou, Brooklyn, Norway, Quatre Cercueils, Soleil 9 to 29.

Bloc IV: Linteau to the wharf.

Neighborhoods: Linteau 1 and 2, Soleil 4 to the wharf.

Bloc V: Ti Ayiti to Bois Neuf.

Neighborhoods: Ti Ayiti, ti Canada, Bois Neuf, Cité Gérard 1 and 2

Bloc VI: Projet Drouillard.

Neighborhoods: Drouillard, Projet Drouillard

Every fifth (marked) home was approached and the first adult (18 years or older) was recruited to participate in the survey. When nobody in the household was available for the interview, surveyors proceeded to the next “marked” home. This household sampling procedure yielded 1700 responses initially. The final sample for data analysis, however, was reduced to 1575 after eliminating questionnaires that were grossly incomplete. In most cases of this kind, interviewers indicated that respondents had decided that they did not want to answer any more questions.

Appendix G Annex II Table 1. Sociodemographic Characteristics of Participants in Focus Groups

Type of focus groups	Female	Male	Total	From Bloc II	From Bloc V	Total
Community Leaders	4	15	19	9	10	19
Women	17	—	17	9	8	17
Youth (ages: 18–21)	9	12	21	11	10	21
Total	30	27	57	29	28	57

In consultation with the lead data analyst, supervisors entered data (survey responses) in Excel. These data were then exported to SPSS-X (v.16) from which they were eventually cleaned. Data analysis proceeded according to an agreed upon strategy that involved, primarily, targeting questions relevant to MPICE Framework measures.

Descriptive statistics (frequency distributions, means) were utilized to both characterize the sample demographically (appendix G annex II table 1) and to summarize responses in light of the MPICE Framework (appendix G annex II table 2). In several instances, specific responses were broken down by Bloc, by gender, and other variables to shed additional light on the situation.

The **qualitative work** included 26 formal expert interviews, 6 focus groups with a total of 57 participants, and 9 extended ethnographic interviews. Expert interviews were conducted in December 2008 with government officials, NGOs, service providers, and international organizations active in violence prevention. These were audio recorded, transcribed, and later coded for analysis.

In Cité Soleil, the research team conducted 6 focus groups—2 with each of the following categories: women, young people, and community leaders—in 2 neighborhood Blocs in Cité Soleil during the months of February and April 29, 2009. In addition, 9 extended ethnographic interviews were conducted with local experts of both sexes, including local elected officials, community leaders, and young people. These were open ended and provided a means to check, deepen, and further explore themes and topics that had come up during the focus group sessions. All of these were enriched by field observations and mapping services available in the neighborhoods themselves. Data from focus groups interviews were audio recorded. However, for reasons of security and confidentiality, individual interviews and conversations were recorded only in field notes by the interviewers. Given constraints of time and funding, not all transcripts were translated into English. Thus, more modern specialized analytical software geared to English was precluded; instead, axial coding and attendant analysis were used.

TRANSCRIPTION, TRANSLATION AND ANALYSIS

All focus groups and expert interviews in Cité Soleil were conducted in Creole. Audio-recorded data were then transcribed in the Creole language and verified by a different transcriber to check for errors and make corrections. Then, INURED staff members translated the texts from Creole into French and, later, English. Finally, other staff members back translated the English version into Creole for concordance. Because of time and financial constraints, only key narratives were translated into French and English, precluding the use of English-only specialized analytical software, and so were coded by older methods. Two research assistants coded the same text simultaneously and then compared the usage of codes. Concordance of less than 90 percent led to a review of all codes and a repeat of the same exercise until the standard of 90 percent concordance was achieved. Data derived from field notes and memos (for the nonrecorded interviews), as well as those notes taken during field observations, were manually coded by the note-taker.

Coding and analysis of textual data proceeded in two stages. The purpose for coding was not to quantify the recurrence of an opinion about, say gang activities or violence or police brutality, but rather to categorize the data in a way that would allow comparison within each category. The coding process thus involved two stages. In the first stage, open coding took apart specific sentences, allowing the identification of ideas (for example, if more than half of participants said: “Despite the fact that the level of gang and political violence is way lower today than two months ago, the violence can come back at any moment”), or events, which could lead to a partial understanding of (a) the consistency of a shared view on the level of violence, and (b) the extent of concern on its imminence in Cité Soleil. The process consists of breaking down, examining, comparing, conceptualizing and categorizing data; data here being the words used by participants to explain and interpret the commonality of a particular experience. The second stage consists of finding relations between the categories (for example, participants reported a “lower level of violence” while remaining concerned about its potential recrudescence “imminently”) and subcategories (such as an idea like “young people don’t find work so they are ready to go back to violence,” and a context (the electoral context in Haiti), a name, like a gang leader who terrorizes a particular neighborhood, or a discrete event. This technique is called axial coding. Axial coding was done by using a “coding paradigm” (social well-being drivers vs. security drivers), which involved thinking about possible

causal conditions, contexts, intervening conditions; then action/interaction strategies used to respond to the concerns of the population, the immediate context; and finally the possible consequences of an action/interaction not occurring. We then select a core category and develop a descriptive narrative about it. (Thus, poor economic input into the community—absence of perspectives on the future for the youth—lack of a serious and sustained socioeconomic program—growing feelings of alienation, build-up of anger, and then, an outbreak of violence as observed during the first week of the month of April in Cité Boston.)

This analysis presents the best evidence that a particular topic emerged as significant for the groups and the participants who were interviewed. In this sense, we placed more importance on what participants found interesting and important to them. This approach provided a credible account of what participants thought in a group setting and allowed a broader context in which to make sense of the large amount of materials collected from diverse sources, including ethnographic interviews, mapping, and observations. We have therefore examined, at the group level, “How many groups mentioned the topic?” and, at an individual level, “How much energy and enthusiasm did the topic generate among participants?”

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The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433

Social Development Department
Sustainable Development Network

socialdevelopment@worldbank.org | www.worldbank.org/socialdevelopment