Report No. 6454-SE Senegal An Economy under Adjustment Main Report February 13,1987 Western Africa Region FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY n1~Ii' ~~a o!0rs ipayinotpothvs CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit CPA Franc (CFAF) US$1.00 CPA 320 1/ CFAF 1 million US$3125 CFAF/US$ (Annual Average) (End Period) 271.7 1981 287.4 328.6 1982 336.3 381.1 1983 417.4 437.0 1984 479.6 449.3 1985 378.1 346.3 1986 322.8 MEASURES AND EQUIVALENTS 1 meter (m) = 39.37 inches (in) 1 square meter (mW) - 10.9 square feet (sq ft) 1 kilometer (km) 0.62 mil (ml) 1 hectare (ha) 10,000 I or 2.471 acres 1 acre - 4,047 m or 0.405 ha 1 kilogram (kg) - 2.2 pounds (lbs) 1 pound (lb) 0.454 kg 1 tonne (metric) - 2,205 lbs or 1,000 kgs FISCAL YEAR Government of Senegal July 1 - June 30 DEVELOPM2NT PLANS IVth Plan Fiscal years 1973/74 - 1976/77 Vth Plan Fiscal years 1977/78 - 1980/81 VIth Plan Fiscal years 1981/82 - 1984/85 VIIth Plan Fiscal years 1985/86 - 1988/89 1/ The CFA Franc (CFAF) is tied to the French Franc (FF) in the ratio of FF 1 to CFAF 50. The French Franc is currently floating. An Exchange rate of CFAF345 - US$1.00 is used for projection purposes in this report. FOR OFFXIL US ONLY ABSTRACT Sives mid-1983, Senegal has made steady and substantial progress toward economic and financial adjustment. The economy has been progressively liberalized, production incentives have been strenthened and, through stricter demand management policies, the fiscal position and external account have registered substantial Ihprovements. However, economic growth has been sluggish, owing largely to the adverse impact of drought and continuing structural problems in several sectors. This study reviews Senegal's economic developments and adjustment efforts since the last Country Economic Memorandum (November 1984) and analyzes the country's medium-term growth prospects and its prospective financing gap. The report shows that the Government's determined effort to accelerate the rate of adjustment could, assuming the convergence of a number of favorable developments on the supply side, lead to faster growth togother with sustainable fiscal and external account deficits. This favorable outcome is, however, predicated on the assumpt4on that the Government will press ahead with policies to further liberalize the economy, contlnue the incentive policy reforms, and strengthen public sector management as well as policy planning. This document ha a sc distbutionand may be oud by repients onl In te pform of thei offica dutie ItB contn may not othrwis be dicoe withnt Word Bank authoriaon. PREFACE This report was prepared on the basis of information obtained by a Bank mission consisting of Messrs. Christopher Redfern (mission chief), Eugene Scantele and Mohammad-Hassan Ordoubadi and Ms. Maria-Cristina Germany which took place in April-May 1986. It also takes into account the findings of various Bank missions which visited Senegal between January 1985 and June 1986 for the preparation and supervision of the Second Structural Adjustment Credit as well as of IMF missions which have colla- borated closely iD discussions on the adjustment program. Mr. Brian Ngo assisted in the preparation of the final draft. The word processing was carried out ably by Ms. Ann Joseph. The statistics used in the report are based on data provided by the Senegalese Government and the Senegal branch of the BCEAO (regional central bank). These generally cover the period up to December 1986. Many of the official data for the 1982-86 period used in compiling the Statistical Appendix are preliminary and subject to revision by the authorities. Following the detailed policy analysis presented in the last CEM 1/, this report sets out to provide an updated assessment of Senegal's recent economic developments and prospects and identify the broad priorities for the next phase of the adjustment program. This assessment takes account of progress made in implementing the first phase of the medium-term adjustment program which was endorsed by donors in December 1984, and of changes in the international economic situation which have taken place since the program was prepared. A review of economic developments in 1984-86 is contained in Chapter I of the report. Chapter II provides an account of recent adjustment efforts and their implications for Senegal's medium-term recovery prospects. Chapter III focuses on Senegal's use of financial resources in recent years, including the considerable efforts made to reduce the weight of the public sector in total claims on resources. Chapter IV is devoted to an analysis of aid and capital flows to Senegal by source and type, the structure and serviciag requirement of the external debt, and the prospective financing gaps on the balance of payments. The report was discussed with the Senegalese authorities in December 1986 and reflects their comments. 1/ "Senegal: Country Economic Memorandum" (Report No.5243-SE, Novamber 5, 1984) LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ACC Agent Comptable Central BCEAO Banque Centrale des Etate de l'Afrique de l'Ouest BNDS Banque Nationale du Developpemetn Senegalais BOX Bureau d'Organisation et MAthodes CAA Caisse Autonome d'Amortissement CFP Contr8le Financier de la Pr4sidence CNTOS Centre National du Theatre Daniel Soran COF Contr81e des Operations Financieres COUD Centre des Oeuvres Universitaires de Dakar CPSP Caisse de P6rdquation et de Stabilisation des Prix CSS Compagnie Sucri4re S6n4galaise CSPT Soci6td Nationale des Phosphates de Taiba CVCCEP Commission de VWrification de Contr6le des Comptes des Etablissements Publics DTAI Direction du Traitement Automatique des Informations GES Groupements Economiques S6ndgalais GESP Groupe d'Etudes du Secteur Parapublic ISRA Institut S6n6galais de Recherches Agronomiques LTA Institut Technologiques Alimentaire LONASE Loterie Nationale du Senegal MEF Ministere de l'Economie et des Finances OHLM Office des Habitations a Loyer Mod6r6 ONCAD Office National de Cooperation et d'Assistance pour le D4veloppement OPT Office des Postes et Telecouunications PAD Port Autonome de Dakar PREF Programe de Redressement Economique et Financier RCFS R4gie des Chemins de For du Senegal SAED Societe d'Am6nagement et d'Exploitation des Terres du Delta SAFAL Socigtg Africaine de Fonderie et l'Aluminium SAFCOP Soci6t6 Africaine de Commercialisation des Produits de la Mer SAIH Socift6 Africaine Immobilire et Hoteliare SAR Sociftf Africaine de Raffinage SEIB Soci6t6 Electrique et Industrielle de Baol SENELEC Soci6t6 Nationale de l'Electricite SENOTEL Socift6 Anonyme do Gestion Immobili0re et HEoteli&re SERAS Socift6 d'Exploitation des RessourceF. Animales du S6n4gal SICAP Socit6 Ilwiobiliare du Cap Vert SIDEC Societe de Distribution et d'Exploitation Cin4matographique SODAGRI Societ6 de Developpcment Agricole et Industrielle SODEFITEX Soci6te de DUveloppement des Fibres Textiles SODESP Soci6t6 de D6veloppement de la Zone Sylvo-Pastora'e SODEVA Societ6 de D&veloppement et de Vulgarisation Agricole SOFISEDIT SociWt4 Financiere S6negalaise pour le D6veloppement Industriel et du Tourisme SOFRIGAL Soci6t6 des Frigorifiques du Senegal SOMIVAC Soci6t4 de la Mise en Valour de la Casamance SONACOS Soci6t6 Nationale de CommerciAlisation des Ol4agineux de S4n6gal SONAR SociWt6 Nationale d'Approvisionnoment Rural SONATRA Soci6t6 Nationale de Transport AWrien SONEES Soci6t6 Nationale d'Exploitation des Eaux du Sen6gal SOTRAC Soci4t4 de Transport en Commun du Cap Vert SNTI Soci4tt Nationale de la Tomate Industrielle SNSSS Socift6 Nouvelle des Saline du Sine-Saloum SPBU Soci4t6 Propri6taire de 1'H8tel de l'Union SSPT Soci4t4 S4n4galaise des Phosphates de Thies STN Socidt6 des Torres Neuves USB Union S4n6galaise de Banque Table of Contents Page No. PR88AC.... ..... .................... .......... ........ ............ INTRODUCTION I.................................................... 1 I. RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS ................*............... 4 A. Background ............ ..................4.. ............. 4 B. Responses to the Crisis .......................... . 5 C. Recent Economic Developments 6.......................... 6 1. Production .............. 6 2. Employment, Wages and Prices ...................... 13 3. External Trade ......... ........................... 16 4. Balance of Payments ..... ........... .. 20 5, Public Finance .......................................... 22 Do Conclusion ........... .................................. 25 II. THE MEDIUM-TERM ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM .......................... 26 A. Long-Run Development Potential ......................... 26 B. Medium-Term Adjustment Objectives ...................... 27 C* Reforms Underway . 29 D. Constraints on the Speed of Adjustment ................. 30 E. Evaluation of Progress ...... ........................... 32 F. Medium-Term Growth Prospects ........................... 33 G. Potential Growth Constraints ...... ..................... 36 III. RESOURCE UTILIZATION ........ ..........................*.... 39 A. Macroeconomic Picture - A Summary ...................... 39 B. Strengthening Public Sector Management ................. 41 C. Recent Performance .....*.............***e*e*******e* 43 D. Making Better Use of Public Resources ...... ............ 48 B. Conclusion . 51 IV. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS ..... ..................................... 53 A. Review of Aid Comitments/Flows, 198145 ............... 53 B. External Public Debt and Debt Service .................. 56 C. Balance of Payments Projections ......................... 59 D. Conclusion ............................................ 62 STATISTICAL APPENDIX MAP LIST OF TEXT TABLES 1.1 Estimated Growth in GDP, 1982-86 7 1.2 Selected Agriculture Data for 1981/82-85/86 9 1.3 Growth in the Secondary Sector 12 1.4 Trends in Fish Landings 12 1.5 Price Indices and GDP Deflator 15 1.6 GD? and External Trade, 1980-85 16 1.7 Composition of Merchandise Exports 1982-86 17 1.8 Terms of Trade, 1982-1986 18 1.' Estimated Real Growth of Imports, 1981-85 18 1.10 Composition of Imports, 1982-86 19 1.11 Summary Balance of Payments, 1982-86 23 1.12 Government Financial Operations, Summary 23 1.13 Composition of Tax Revenues 24 1,14 Reduction in Domestic Indebtedness of Central Government 24 2.1 Policy Objectives for the Medium-Term Projections 34 2.2 Detailed Growth Assumptions for the Medium-Term Projections 35 2.3 Commodity Price Forecasts 36 3.1 National Accounts Summary 40 3.2 Public Finance Indicators 44 4.1 Commitments of NLT Loans and Grants 54 4.2 External Public Debt Outstanding, 1981-85 57 4.3 Selected Results of the Medium-Term Projections 59 4.4 Projected Resource Gap, 1986-95 60 4.5 Projected Current Account Deficit, 1986-95 61 4.6 Projected Balance of Payments, 1986-95 62 Page I of 2 AIWA M-NIM i 1 MIYMIA- SIEM cc . i Wbal 19,20 B . 1. 6.4 u 4cn~I ) 314 pr s. 1 Ald~u1tara 10I30sq. ra lea of10)2 55,.2 u ot1eprq.I 1OPUJTf OIAR7iS1 (1981) (19?8) Cple Bireb kg. (par 1,0001 41t P1Auti WC: d1 1(1981) 14,200 9e 1 a th tef ( tr 1,000 1. Vt bed 0 3)4 briti lAte (p4 1,00) a = DTSI WI (1960) ___ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ Sof Natk re Not avalabble .. IH4*ft aAne41^ 62.5 TlW"t 0iinus* 3.2 A m PI) (v AC (1 0cOied dm11ii~s without I of Poptatim - ltal 16x safewter (S) 63.0 -10ual ( e ) mNm (19B1i83) SwA9| L Caloric totdo as S of B_mirmonm 9 9.0 AdhlU Lltey Pate 2 10.0 Per Cap:a Potein Tatke daiy) 10.0 Ptbm Sdto atolJat S 48.0 P? GCA tSn 1985Sg: 138*370 QM76 NAT1IWL PR=INU 11498 MKIAL urn OF (MM (2 fameui Wed. 08 *t 1960-70 1970-75 1975-80 190.5 P at H*et Prices 2417 100.0 2.5 1.9 0.6 2.6 Grossw Dat. Insmd nt 351 14.5 1.4 3.0 .6 _0 *OS8?ati(NUSBi fp -99 4.1 2.1 3.1 -3"1'.7 3 Current Acsmcat blane -451 -18.7 . . &xports of Coods, NPES 802 33.2 0.1 1.0 -3.2 0.3 taports of Goods, NFS 1123 46.5 0.2 1.4 -2.0 -0.7 MMw, MDiWr AND WCM 1N83 Valuo Adad Labor Fobce V.A. per lkedr AgtkultxiLbure 537.1 21.7 1.9 77.0 287 28.0 Tit1istiy 596.7 24.1 0.2 10.0 2456 241.0 Sezvices 1342.2 54.2 0.3 13.0 4208 414.0 Total 2476.0 10D.0 2.4 100.0 1017 100.0 a1/82 82/83 83/84 84/85 85/86 hbBFs a8nd le-4*B 46 43 48 49 48 7.4 Oppratlng ~euYixtwems 35 31 33 30 33 1.4 InteRret on publlc debt 10 13 18 20 18 22.3 Treaairqy.accounts,oet 9 13 1 1 1 Orb¢et wpativres 100 100 100 100 1O0 (CFAF bUlbs) C4sruiteiqwswunxI rm 182 215 206 220 232 6.3 Pesenous 152 176 189 204 219 9.6 Net btaxy savlr2 -30 -39 -17 -16 -13 13.2 1hveio~mit peIi-in es 31 39 40 35 34 2.3 Nmmu& item: G (acrrt CiAF bo) 757 892 978 1083 1,224 12.8 (G1W d ator) 8.8 9.2 10.7 11.6 8.4 10.0 a Perlda GN est mO calatod by the am owrsim telmiq as s lkbra AtMn, 1964485 editic All odi cxwsion to dollara In ths table a¢s at th aver g mbcWa4P .wnt hWdUlBib Pag 2 of 2 ........... COUNTRY DATA -ENEP.L ...................... ONE?, CREDIT AND PRICES 198* 1983 1984 1985 196 a/ ........................ .... .... .... .... .... tSillion CFAF, outstwWin, ord period) Noney Supply (Ond of Junm) b/ 238.1 266.8 276.6 284.3 299.3 Ua.* Credit to Govrmnrnt (net) 70.2 90.4 120.9 126.6 149.0 ank Credit to Private Sector 328.3 37.6 369.2 376.9 404.1 (Percentage or index #mabers) Ncneyasd X of GDP 28.2 28.4 2V.2 24.7 23.1 Generl Price Indbx (1979100) 138.9 151.1 165.9 183.3 195.4 Ainwwl Pere ntago Change 1n: General Price Index 10.2 8.8 9.8 10.S 6.6 8ank Credit to Gcoverrient (not) 134.8 28.8 33.? 4.7 17.7 Sank Credit to Privato Sector 11.5 15.0 *2.2 2.1 7.2 SALANCE Of PAYNENTS NERCNANDISE EXPMRTS (AVEARGE 196385) .................. ^ 1982 1983 1984 1985 - - . - . - .- .... .... . .... .... (USS Nm) X CUSS lli .... .....n s..) Grom*kt Products 108 19.4 Petroleum Imports c/ 251 252 195 174 Fish and Fish Product 110 19.7 Petroleum Exports 139 10? 99 87 Phosphotes 58 10.4 Petroleum Pro6acts 98 17.6 Exports of Goods & NUS 892 919 920 802 Fertitizers 33 5.9 3rports of Goods & NfS i6?6 1269 1179 1123 Salt II 2.0 Resource Salanee 384 *350 .259 -321 Cotton 18 3.2 GthNr Goods 90 16.1 Interest Payments (net) 88 98 116 124 Entrapot 32 1.1 Other Factor Payments (not) 28 23 23 23 t.. .. Net Transfers (private) 5 *9 .5 17 Total S58 100.0 Eslance on Current Accowt -SOS .480 *403 *451 EXTERNAL DEOT AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1985 (USS Ntn) Direct Investment 5 2 -2 .3 Officiat Transfer 182 158 139 133 Public & Publicly Guaranteed Debt 1989 Public MLT Loans (net) 275 304 172 171 Non-Guaranteed Private Debt 9 fisbursement 284 320 204 216 Total Outstandin and Disbursed 1998 Amortization 9 16 33 45 Other Capital (net) eo t71 .37 92 52 NET O1T SERVICE RATIO for 196S dt Overall Balance -114 *53 .2 .99 Public & Publicly Guaranteed Debt 11.0 Net Foreign Assets (end year) *514 -476 *470 -689 Non-Guaranteed Private Debt 0.6 Total Outstandiro and Disbursed 11.6 RATE OF EXCHANGE I RD/IDA LENDING AS OF DEC. 31, 1985 (USS NIn.) Annual Averages 18RD IDA ............................................ IR 1982 1983 1984 1985 19866 outstanding nd Disbursed 90.4 231.5 US$ 1.00 a CFAP 328.6 381.1 437.0 449.3 346.3 Undisbursed 20.5 129.7 CFAF 1000 a USS 3.04 2.62 2.29 2.23 2.89 Outstanding tncl. Undisbursed 110.9 361.2 ............................................................................................................................. a/ Dacafber 1986. bl Noney and quasI nflow. cJ Crude lnd derivatives. d/ Oebt service, net of interest accured on foreign exchange reserves s a percentage of xports of goods and Mon-factor services; after r 'cheduling. e/ Includes errors and omsions. February, 1987 INTRODUCTION 1. Senegal, a country with limited resources and a long experience of economic and Zinancial imbalances, is now engaged in a process of structural adjustment. The new realism of Senegal's economic policies, the close partnership it enjoys with many donors, and the openness of its poli- tical institutions, are in many ways a model for other African countries to follow. 2. For these reasons, too, Senegal has come to be considered as a test case for the new style of relationship created between a growing number of low-income developing countries (especially in Sub-Saharan Africa) and the international community. This relationship is characterized by a focus on structural adjustment and a search for greater effectiveness and tighter coordination of aid amongst donors. The success of these efforts in the case of Senegal will, therefore, be watched closely by many countries which are faced with similar difficuties. 3. This new-style aid relationship and the domestic adjustment process it supports are delicate operations with a heavy penalty for failure. Senegal is in the midst of this process and is experiencing many of the stresses and strains involved as short-run corrective measures begin to bite and before longer-term policy adjustments have a chance to achieve visible and positive results. Senegal began a serious program of economic reforms in mid-1983, after the current government was elected. The country is now in its fourth year of financial austerity policies, the impact of which on the population at large has been compounded by a drought-stricken and somewhat discouraged agriculture sector, a decline in foreign private Investment, and a fall-off in net aid disbursements. With new elections scheduled for Spring 1988, it is only natural for Senegal's people to ask for how much longer are the sacrifices going to be required, and when will the benefits begin to be seen. 4. And yet, this report will argue, Senegal still has a long way to go on its road to achieving adjustment and growth. The Government has cut back extensively on public spending, has energetically pursued institu- tional reform in the agricultural sector, and has adopted a bold new incen- tive policy package for developing industrial production and exports. On the whole, it has shown itself to be highly responsive to pressure for reform, even when powerful interests are affected. New policies are approved, ministerial and other senior management responsibilities changed, and yet the results seem to fall short of what is needed. What is the explanation for this? Have the adjustment policies been wrong? Are they the right policies but are not being correctly followed? Are the measures insufficient? Or is it simply too soon to observe the full results? 5. The Government's General Policy Statement (DPG, after its French title) presented to the Consultative Group meeting in December 1984 made clear that the underlying causes of the country's economic crisis were structural and not temporary. Essentially, these were a fluctuating and uncertain international environment, a limited and increasingly fragile resource Baaee, and an incapacity of the economy to generate enough savings for investment, even taking foreign aid receipts into account. The country's low savings rate and imprudent recourse to foreign borrowing in the 19708 to finance some over-ambitious development projects, and the difficulties in adjusting domestic demand when circumstances changed, had led to &n unsustainable foreign debt burden and a serious balance of payments crisis starting in 1978, which worsened in the next two years. The Government took the first steps toward bringing the crisis under control during 1980-82, with the help of the first round of structural adjustment programs financed by the World Bank and the IMP 6. By the time of the Consultative Group mecting in December 1984, the Government had concluded that these first adjustment efforts had been insufficient and needed to be intensified and sustained over a much longer period. 'he year 1990 was set as a target date for resolving the external debt problem and paying off the Government's large domestic arrears; elimi- nating the overall deficit on the government budget (including capital expenditures); achieving a much more efficient public investment program, concentrated on rehabilitation and expansion of key public services; and giving a freer rein to private sector activities by a combination of admi- nistrative decontrol, higher producer prices and liberalized marketing for farmers, and better export incentives for manufacturers. 7. The DPG established the broad economic policy objectives in each of these areas in the form of an overall plan with sector strategies for 14985-92. A much more detailed agenda for the first two-year phase was worked out during 1985 and eventually formed the program supported by the Bank's Structural Adjustment Credit approved in early 1986. More recently, the Government decided to pursue the adjustment process within the context of an overall policy framework agreed with the Bank and the IMF. 1/ While the implementation of this set of reforms is still continuing, it will soon be time to put in place the next phase in light of the experience gained. It will also soon be time for donors to review their own programs of aid to Senegal and to share the results at the next Consultative Group meeting planned for March 1987. 8. This Country Economic Memorandum (CEM) has been prepared, therefore, with the double objective of reporting on Senegal's economJe developments and adjustment efforts over the two years since the first CG meeting, and of identifying the broad priorities for the next phase of the adjustment program. The macroeconomic analysis given in the Bank's last CEM of the causes of Senegal's economic crisis is not repeated in the present report, because that analysis has been not only shared but acted I/ "Senegal: Economic Policy Framework for 1986/87-1988/89" dated September 19, 1986. -3- upon by the Senegal Government, as will be shown in Chapter II. Greater attention Is given in this report to reviewing the medium-term prospects and constraints for the different sectors, to updating the medium-term economic projections in the light of this review and the changes which have occurred on the international scene since 1984, and to reassessing Senegal's needs for external concessionary financing to help it through the next phase of the adjustment process. 9. How long this will take is an open question. It depends mainly on the time it takes to restructure Senegal's agriculture and industries, increase labor productivity, remodel its public sector and civil service, and restore confidence among investors willing to usa Senegal's excellent location and facilities as a base for export-oriented activities. The speed of recovery of international markets for traditional exports such as groundnut oil and phosphates, as well as for petroleum, will also be important. Restoration of financial soundness will depend on two things: the ability of the Government to continue to adjust demand to resources, so that the external trade deficit and the rate of inflation are reduced; and continued support for the Government's policies from the donor community. Any attempt to quantify the amounts of such support for more than a year or two ahead is inexact. - whether it is done on a prospective requirements or availabilities basis. (Both kinds of projections are given in Chapter IV, and the above qualifications apply.) Nevertheless, it is reasonable to expect that, other things being equal, the volume of aid which Senegal receives will be larger if its adjustment efforts are strong and effective; also, that the quality of project aid Senegal obtains (as measured by its overall economic impact) will be higher, the more quickly Senegal can strengthen its institutional capacities for planning, coordinating and absorbing that aid. If this is true, it means that there exists a direct and positive relationship between the quantity and quality of aid offered to Senegal and the country's economic policy performance. 10. There will clearly be an inverse relationship, on the other hand, between the amount of aid needed by Senegal and the effectiveness over the medium term of its economic policies. The central task of the new-style aid partnership is to find an equilibrium between these two relationships, one positive and the other inverse, and to keep this equilibrium from slipping. The instability of the equilibrium emerges all too clearly from the examination of the actual and projected figures for the external debt of Senegal which is given in the final chapter of this report. Indisput- ably, Senegal will need a considerable amount of help from the donors for a good many years to come, no matter how hard it tries itself. But Senegal will stand a better chance of attracting support if it can maintain and, indeed, intensify its current adjustment efforts for a few years more as well as search for new ways to encourage productivity in all sectors. -4- CHAPTER I: RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS A. Background 1. Even in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, Senegal confronts an unusual development challenge. At independence (1960), it inherited a relatively wvll-equipped physical and social infrastructure. Since 1960, it has experienced the lowest GDP growth rate (2.3% per annum) of any African state not affected by war or civil strife. As in most other African countries, Senegal's population growth is high and rising (esti- mated at 3.0% as of 1985) and, although the Government has adopted a popu- lation policy, demographic factors will continue to absorb most of the growth in real incomes for nome time to come. In 1985, Senegal had an estimated per capita income of US$370 1/, roughly half that of Cameroon or C8te d'Ivoire, placing it squarely in the ranks of the lower income countries. 2. Despite considerable efforts at modernization, the Senegalese economy has not yet escaped its dependence on the traditional mainstays: millet cultivation and cattle raising for domestic consumption and ground- nut production for export. Moreover, this traditional economy is in stag- nation, as is much of the modern sector. Both rural and urban average incomes are lower in real terms than in 1960, and nearly half of Senegal's ,esource-poor and relatively open economy is highly vulnerable to climatic vagaries and adverse movements in the international terms of trade. In the 15 years since 1970, Senegal's agriculture has been hit by drought no less than seven times? i.e., every other year, on average. Lacking the rich agricultural potential or mineral resources of other countries on the West African coast, the nation's growth prospects are more modest than those of some neighboring countries. 3. Another important feature of the economy is the high concentra- tian in Dakar inherited from the colonial period, and the coastal belt of most modern sector employment, commercial facilities and social services, resulting in important urban-rural and inter-regional disparities in employment opportunities and consumption patterns. The economy is also characterized by widespread Government participation or regulatory controls, although this is now changing. The sluggish economic performance of the 1960s and 1970s witnessed only a small structural shift of employment from agriculture towards industry; in fact, the proportions remain much as they were in 1960. Slow growth has also limited domestic savings, prolonged dependence on foreign aid, and made structural adjustment measures more difficult to implement. Yet adjustment became unavoidable at the end of the 19709, when a combination of poor financial and investment policies, worsened terms of trade and successive droughts 1/ Based on the Bank's Atlas methodology. -5- plunged an already weakened economy into a severe crisis. This crisis has been largely brought under control as a result of the Government's determined efforts since 1983 to implement adjustment policies, but it will require further adjustment as well as exceptional financirg to end the crisis. B. Responses to the Crisis 4. In the late 1970s, the Government began to recognize the short- comings of its over-ambitious development plans and nationalization, policies, which had been launched following a short-lived boom in ground- nut and phosphate earnings in the mid-70s. In December 1979, the Govern- ment announced its Plan A moyen term. de redressement 4conomigue et financier (Medium-Term Program for Economic and Financial Adjustment) or PREP, which had been worked out with the Bank and the IMP. The PREF, which was to run for five years (1980-84), was designed to stabilize the finan- cial situation, increase investment in the productive sectors, raise public savings, liberalize trade, reduce state participation in the economy, and streamline the parapublic sector. 5. These new policies facilitated the mobilization of balance of payments support and budgetary aid to Senegal and were the basis for an IMP Extended Fund Facility (EFF) for SDR 184.8 million, approved in August 1980, and a combined Structural Adjustment Credit/Loan (IDA, SDR 22.9 million; IBRD, $30 million), approved in December 1980. Macro-economic performance, however, quickly got off track for a variety of internal and external reasons, including droughts both in 1980 and in 1981, and results were mixed for both the SAL and the various IMP programs which accompanied it or followed it between 1980 and 1983. Further details were given in the last CEM (1984). 6. At the request of the Government, the first meeting of a Consul- tative Group (CG) for Senegal was organized by the Bank in December 1984. At this meeting, donors endorsed Senegal's medium-term adjustment objec- tives and broad policy framework for the period 1985-1992. 2/ Following the CG meeting, the Government prepared and discussed with the Bank a three-year action plan for 1985-87 with specific policy measures to imple- ment the objectives outlined in the medium-term adjustment program. The main objectives of the program are to reestablish a viable balance of pay- ments and public finance situation, to establish an incentive environment which maximizes the exploitation of the country's growth potential, par- ticularly in agriculture and industry, and to strengthen the planning and 2/ At the sectoral level, the Government has defined comprehensive strategies and investment programs for agriculture, industry, energy, telecommunications and education, as well as for reorganizing para- public enterprises. Most of these sectoral programs have been the subject of special donor conferences. -6- central economic management institutions. The Government's strategy for accomplishing these objectives is to progressively withdraw the State from direct involvement in production activities, to promote private sector initiative through a change in incentive policies, and, at the same time, to achieve greater efficiency of public resource management. The latter is being sought through improvements in the quality and management of public investment, streamlining and reform of the parapublic sector, and applica- tion of rigorous control over public expenditures. The first phase of this program is being supported by a Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) which was approved on February 4, 1986 and is now fully disbursed. 3/ Details of the program are given in Chapters II and III. A new SAL, which will support the next phase of reforms, is under preparation. 7. In early 1985, an 18-month Stand-by arrangement for SDR 76.6 million was approved by the Fund, covering the period through June 1986. The main objectives of the program were to reduce the current account defi- cit of the balance of payments (including official transfers) from 11.1% of GDP in 1983/84 to 6.9% in 1985/86 and to bring the overall fiscal deficit, on a commitment basis, to no more than 1.4% of GDP in 1985/86. Performance under this program has been judged largely satisfactory by the IMF. (Details concerning the individual objectives are given in Chapter 1I1). A new IMF one-year Stand-by prog am for SDR 34.0 million and a three-year Structural Adjustment Facility (SAP), for which the economic policy frame- work is already agreed with the World Bank and the 1W, were finalized in November 1986. 4/ C. Recent Economic Developments Production 8. Aggrgate Output. The backdrop to these adjustment efforts has been a difficult one. Senegal's economy has stagnated over the period 1984-85, mainly as a result of the impact of climatic conditions on agri- cultural production and related industries (SA Table 3). Following the severe drought of 1983/84, the whole economy suffered a recession of about the same amplitude as that of 1980-81, but there are hopes for recovery and growth, starting in 1986, based on improved agricultural performance. 9. The last CEM estimated that Senegal's long-term growth rate since Independence in 1960 had averaged only 2.3% per annum, well below the esti- mated 2.8% rate of population growth, and that the long-term trend of 3/ Of the total financing package of US$70 million, a first tranche equivalent to US$37.8 million was disbursed in March; the rest was disbursed in early October 1986. 4/ See "Senegal: Economic Policy Framework for 1986/87-1988/89", o. cit. -7- economic growth appeared to be decelerating. 5/ Real growth up to 1984 confirms this trend and suggests that the underlying trend of Senegal's economy in the early 1980's has been one of near-stagnation. And, in spite of the moderate recovery in 1985, estimated at 3.8% by the Government, and even stronger growth of 4.6% in 1986 according to preliminary estitates, the level of Senegal's real GDP in 1986 is likely to fall about 3<8% short (in real terms) of the level projected in the last CEM. Even if the pre- liminary real GDP growth for 1986 is confirmed, the average annual growth rate between 1979 and 1986 (both were good crop years) would only be about 2.5%, corresponding roughly to the long-term average over the two previous decades. 6/ Table 1.1 shows by how much the actual growth of GDP achieved in 1985 and 1986 may fall short of the projections made two years ago. Table 1.1 Estimated Growth in GDP, 1982-86 (CFAF bn, at 1979 prices) 1983 1984 1985 1986 (prelim.) (prelim.) June 1986 estimates a/ GDP 660.9 630.9 654.8 685.1 2 annual change 2.7 -4.6 3.8 4.6 July 1984 estimates b/ GDP 665.4 638.0 671.4 711.9 % annual change 4.2 -4.1 5.2 6.0 a/ 1983-86 are estimates by Direction de la Pr6vision, Ministere de l'Economie et des Finances. b/ For 1983, same source as above. 1984 was a Bank forecast; 1985-86 were Bank CEM projections ("managed adjustment" scenario). 10. Agriculture. The climatic conditions for agricultural production improved substantially over the last two seasons, compared with the severe drought conditions of 1983/84. Rainfall in the 1984/85 season was close to normal but was unfavorably distributed, leading to high pest and disease incidence and uneven maturing of crops. The weather was generally much more favorable in the 1985/86 season, and early rainfall indications in the 5/ 1984 CEM, op. cit., para. 1.10. 6/ The above figures should be interpreted with great care. In many instances, the statistical indicators are incomplete or only became available with a long lag. More importantly, provisional GDP estimates have tended to be generally over-optimistic, particularly as they concern the infomial manufacturing and trading sectors. -8- groundnut basin (Sine-Saloum) through September 1986 are also promising for the 1986/87 season. Table 1.2 provides saumary data on agricultural condi- tions and production for the last five seasons, 1981/82-85/86. It should be noted that Senegal's national accounts treat the agricultural production in, say the 1981/82 season, as falling entirely within the GDP estimates for the calendar year 1982. This convention is reasonable in the case of Senegal, since it facilitates comparison between production and annual trade statistics. 11. In 1984, agriculture's contribution to GDP was drastically reduced by the effects of a severe drought. Farmers' gross income in the 1983/84 season fell by an estimated 35%; agricultural exports (groundauts and cotton) fell by 47% in volume; and large quantities of food aid, as well as normal commercial imports of rice and wheat, were needed to offset a 250,000 ton decline in domestic foodgrain production. The volume of groundnut oil exported fell by one-half, from 85,000 tons in 1984 to only 42,000 tons in 1985 (oil export volume in 1984 was already half its level of 1982/83), although the mills have a capacity to produce about 300,000 tons of unrefined oil. 12. The disastrous drought conditions of 1983/84 were followed by a disappointing season in 1984/85 even though total rainfall was close to normal. 7/ For the second year in a row, millet production was less than 0.5 million tons (compared with 0.7 million tons harvested in 1981/82), or only about 100 kg per head of the rural population; and emergency food aid shipments, which in 1984 amounted to 182,000 tons, we:e again needed to help ensure adequate supplies. The food aid requirement would have been even greater had farmers not prudently shifted 200,000 ha of land from groundnuts to millet for the 1984/85 season. Consequently, the results for the groundnut crushing industry and for agricultural exports were much less favorable. Even in the drought year of 1983/84, SONACOS and SEIB (the two state-owned oil-crushing companies) had managed to purchase some 375,000 tons of unshelled groundauts, of which 216,000 tons were left for crushing after allowing for seed and losses. In 1984/85, the oll mills purchased only 238,000 tons out of a total crop estimated to have been around 500,000 tons. 8/ 7/ Ironically, it was the reappearance of late rains in October which mildewed many of the crops as they ripened for harvest. 8/ The sudden revival of the parallel market seems to have resulted mainly from a diversion of supplies from SONACOS/SEIB to small-scale artisanal oil crushers whose activities became much more profitable when the controlled retail selling price of groundnut oil was raised from 300 to 400 CFAP/liter. The following year the author'4ies raised the official purchase price of groundnuts and reduced the aelling price of oil. - 9 - Table 1.2 Selected Agriculture Data for 1981/82-85/86 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 Climate Overall climatic conditions Good Good Very Bad Poor a/ Good Rainfall (mm) in Sine-Saloum 599 584 355 609 634 Producer Prices (CFAP/kg) Groundnuts b7 60 60 50 60 90 Millet/sorghum 50 50 55 60 70 Paddy 52.5 51.5 60 66 85 Maize 47 47 50 60 70 Cotton 68 70 70 70 100 Area harvested (mn ha) Millet/sorghum 1.2 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.3 Groundnuts b/ 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.6 0.8 Other crops 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 Total 2.4 2.4 2.0 2.2 2.3 Average Yields (ton/ha) Millet/sorghum 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.7 Groundnuts b/ 0.9 1.0 0.5 0.6 1.0 Production (mn tons) Millet/sorghum 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.5 1.0 Groundnuts 0.9 1.1 0.6 0.5 0.6 Other crops 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.6 Cash Valuw (CFAF billion) Millet/sorghum 39.4 29.3 19.3 28.3 66.5 Groundnuts 61.0 81.5 40.3 39.9 53.9 Other Crops 28.0 28.1 30.0 38.3 50.7 Total 128.4 138.9 89.6 106.5 171.1 Value-added, Primary Sector (CPAF billion, 1979 prices) 134.3 140.9 114.3 123.4 135.5 Annual Growth Rate (%) 24.8 4.9 -18.9 8.0 9.8 a/ Although close to normal, rainfall in 1984/85 was poorly distributed. See para. 12 above for more details. b/ Only those for crushing. Source: SA Tables 3, 28 and 31, and Department of Statistics. 13. The lone exception to the poor rainfed crop performance in 1984/85 was cotton, average yields of which remained at over one ton of - 10 - seed cotton per hectare and which equalled the 1982/83 record production level of 47,000 tons. Senegal's cotton yields seen to have withstood the variations in the climate rather better than groundnuts and millet. Good organization of input supplies and crop marketing by SODEFITEX have been responsible for this. 14. During the 1985/86 agricultural season, rainfall was good in most of Senegal's regions, which translated into above-average yields for most crops. This time, it was cotton which did less well than all the others, as farmers concentrated on planting more cereal crops, despite an increase in the producer price of cotton from ClAF 70 to 100 per kg. The 300,000 ha swltch of acreage out of groundnuts into millet at planting time brought the cumulative increase in foodgrains area over the period 1983184-1984/85 to more than 500,000 ha, or 63% in just two years. With average yields of around 700 kg/ha (considered good for millet in Sahelian conditions), the 1985/86 grain harvest was an abundant one reaching a total of 950,000 tons. Including 150,000 tons of maize (a crop which is gaining ground in the less drought-prone parts of the country) and 150,000 tons of paddy rice (of which roughly two-thirds from the Pleuve region), a record 1.25 million tons of grain were produced, or 77% more than in the previous year. This allowed Senegal to replenish its granaries in the countryside, to avoid the need for emergency food aid and to reduce its planned commercial imports of rice for the 1986 calendar year from 360,000 to 340,000 tons. 15. For groundnuts, however, the picture was less rosy: despite excellent yields (averaging close to 1,000 kg/ha), total production reached only 600,000 tons in 1985/86, of which 350,000 tons were prrchased by SONACOS. Over the two seasons 1983/84 and 1984/85, the acreage devoted to groundnut cultivation has shrunk by an estimated 500,000 ha, or 45Z of its 1983/84 level of 1.1 million ha (SA Table 28). This development was accounted for partly by severe drought conditions, by the need for farmers to replenish their stocks of grains, and by the fact that groundnut prices have remained practically unchanged since 1981/82. It should also be noted that the reduction in groundnut acreage can partly be attributed to the southward shift of groundnut production into better-rainfall areas, which was one of the objectives of the New Agricultural Policy of 1984. Helped by better rainfall and by a temporary rise in groundaut producer prices, the downward trend in groundnut acreage was reversed in 1985/86 with the area under cultivation rising by 200,000 ha to 800,000 ha. Concerned, howev-r, that the downward trend in groundnut area may be more or less permanent, SONACOS has recently decided to shut down its most modern but poorly located crushing plant at Djourbel in the north and to adapt the installation for other purposes. 16. Over a somewhat longer period (1979/80-1985/86), the statistics on agricultural production (SA Table 28) display no trend other than a certain stability in the total area planted to crops each year, implying a downwasd tendency in the average cultivated area per head of the rural population. What is also notable but hard to explain is that there seems to be a biennial yield pattern for all the principal rainfed crops (ground- nuts, cotton, millet, and sorghum), such that good years and bad years - 11 - occur in pairs. This has certainly been the case since 1979/80; possibly it is connected witn a transmission of one bad harvest to another via an effect on seed quality or a build-up of pests. If not simply a coin- cidence, this pattern suggests that the coming agricultural season -- 1986/87 -- may be another good one, and this appears to be confirmed by reports of a timely arrival of first planting rains this year in many districts. 17. Industry and Other Sectors. Senegal's industrial sector (includ- ing mining, groundnut processig and energy production, and the modern and informal construction and manufacturing sub-sectors) is more important as a contributor to GDP than the agricultural sector (including livestock, forestry and fishing). Over the period 1983-86, agricultural production represented an average of 20X of GDP, while industry (including agro- industrial processing) accounted for 271. However, according to Government estimates, the value-added of the sector as a whole has barely grown at all over the last three years (Table 1.3). Output of the mining and oil- milling sub-sectors is largely destined for export, while the remaining industrial sub-sectors are mainly geared to the domestic market. There is a direct link between the performance of the two groups, because a decline in export production feeds back to import-substituting industries through a decline in the domestic demand for their products. 18. Output in the secondary sector as a whole, and in almost all major sub-sectors with the exception of mining, reacted quickly to the fall of agricultural production in 1983/84 and these sub-sectors fell into recession themselves. They also all recovered modestly in 1985; the oil mill sub-sector rebounded sharply in 1986 following the good groundnut harvest. "Other industry" (see Table 1.3), which accounts for almost 601 of the total, has been essentially stagnant since 1982, which is confirmed by the official Index of Industrial Production (SA Table 30) for the dominant food processing sub-sector. A substantial fall in the output of Senegal's important fish canning industry was only partially offset by a modest increase in sugar production and refining. - 12 - Table 1.3 Growth in the Secondary Sector (Z annual change, in real terms) 1983 1984 1985 1986 (prelim.) Mining 24.1 9.7 7.6 7.1 Oil Mills 10.9 -14.7 2.3 30.3 Energy and Water 5.1 -8.9 3.6 3.4 Construction 4.4 -5.2 2.5 7.2 Other Industry a/ -1.0 1.0 1.2 0.1 Total Secondary Sector 2.3 -1.8 2.0 4.0 (Value, 1979, CFAF bn) (170.1) (167.0) (170.4) (177.2) a/ Includes manufacturing and food processing industries. Source: SA Table 3. 19. The fish canning industry -- and the fisheries sector itself -- has been especially hard hit in the last two years by a combination of factors: depletion of the higher-value pelagic species due to over- fishing, competition from foreign factory-trawlers and seine-netters (leading to a decline in landings at Dakar), and higher costs reflecting increased energy prices and obsolete equipment. In 1985, it is reported that at least five of a total of 19 fish processing plants were obliged to close down for lack of supplies or because of financial problems. The following figures show the extent by which fish landings have declined in recent years: Table 1.4 Trends in Fish Landings (thousand tons) Average Average Change 1979-81 1983-85 (E) Artisanal Fishing 177.9 145.0 -18.5 Industrial Fishing 114.2 79.2 -30.6 Tuna 17.4 8.1 -53.4 Sardine 78.6 54.2 -31.0 Trawler 18.2 17.0 -6.6 Total 292.0 224.3 -23.2 Source: Department of Oceanography and Maritime Fishing (DOPM). - 13 - The Government has an ambitious program to modernize and re-equip the industrial fishing fleet and to provide more services for the small-scale fishermen. However, even assuming that the major technical problems are corrected, expectations of growth in this sector are not nsarly as high as they were a few years ago, because foreign competition for the more valu- able offshore resources has emerged as a more severe constraint. For this reason, the Senegal Government has initiated a review of the advantages gained by the country from the fishing agreements it has signed in the past with various European countries. Employment, Wages and Prices 20. According to the Department of Statistics of the Ministry of Finance, the number of people considered to be employed, on the basis of the tax rolls, was close to 210,000 in 1983, including about 140,000 employed in the private and parapublic sectors. Although little data are available for the informal sector, it is generally known that wages are substantially lower and work rules more flexible than those of the modern sector. The relative wage differential between the two sectors also ensures that the informal sector serves as a reservoir of labor for the modern sector and is the ultimate destination for most rural-urban migrants. 21. Although registered modern sector employment is reported to have been growing fairly rapidly, labor market regulations and inadequate incen- tives have precluded greater employment of youth as well as gains in productivity. In particular, the strict control by the Department of Labor over hiring and layoffs 9/, as well as the legal guarantee of virtually permanent jobs for most industrial workers, have severely constrained the efficient functioning of the modern-sector labor market. The most signifi- cant effects are discernible in the lack of freedom of employers to engage in direct hiring, administrative problems associated with the monopoly powers of the Department of Labor, and a disincentive to employers to hire new workers in view of the limited possibilities for layoffs or temporary recruitment. 22. A current debate focuses on whether labor productivity relative to unit labor costs in Senegal has been falling compared to that of its main competitors. Although no reliable evidence is available on this issue, it may well be that the existence of permanent employment contracts, together with a rigid wage system, has a negative effect on labor produc- tivity. (This question is the subject of a Bank-financed research project in Senegal which started in October 1986.) 9/ Until recently employers had to have official approval for all staff hirings and dismissals. - 14 - 23. The high wage differential between the modern and informal sectors indicates that the basic industrial wage (SMIG) is maintained above a strictly market-clearing level, and that a slower increase of the SMIG over time might be conducive to greater employment growth. Although the SMIG affects only a small section of the labor force in the formal sector, it is worth still noting that in recent years, it has not kept up with inflation. The hourly SMIG rose from CFAF 133.81 in January 1980 to CFAP 175 in April 1983 (a 30.8% increase), while the cost of living index for low-income families rose by 36.9% over the same period. The SMIG. which remained at CFAF 175 throughout 1984, was raised by 6.9% to CPA? 184 in early 1985, and has since remained unchanged. Meanwhile, the cost of living in Dakar rose by 34.5X in the three-year period 1984-86. Private sector wages above the SMIG are subject to a tripartite negotiation process including the Government, and they too have increased by much less than the cost of living since 1983. 24. In Senegal it is the public sector, because of its size, which sets the level of wages and salaries. Increases in wages and salaries in the civil service and public sector have been kept well below inflation as a result of Government policies over the last five years, and they have fallen behind salaries for qualified personnel in the private sector. At lower levels, however, earnings are comparable with those in the modern private sector. The last major increase in salary scales for civil servants was in 1981 and, since then, it is estimated that they have been eroded by some 25% as a result of inflation. Because opportunities for promotion are limited and annual increments are, in practice, unrelated to performance on the Job, it is difficult to maintain a well-motivated civil service, and many of its skills are thus diverted elsewhere. Correct remuneration of performance will unfortunately only be possible when the Government wage bill (which is currently about CFAF 10 billion per month) can be reduced to a more manageable size relative to fiscal revenues. This ratio was 56.6% in 1983/84 and it was planned to bring It down to no more than 48% by 1987/88 under SAL II. 25. Consumer price indices (CPI) for Dakar residents (low and high income groups) have been published monthly since 1959 by the Department of Statistics. The accuracy of these indices has been questioned, especially since the weights have not been revised since 1967. The Government plans to conduct a Bank-executed UNDP-financed household expenditure survey in 1987 or 1988, which will permit a re-basing of the indices. 26. While the general trend based on the urban CPI has been a decele- rating one since 1982, the recorded rate of domestic inflation still remains high, compared with that of France and Senegal's other industri- alized trading partners in Europe. In part, this has been due to external factors. In 1984, the 13.21 rate of inflation (as measured by the GDP deflator) resulted largely from a surge in import prices as the value of the CFA franc fell against the US dollar and the currencies of Senegal's main suppliers other than France (Table 1.5). In 1985 and 1986, however, the role of "imported" inflation has greatly diminished, and domestic _ 15 - factors have constituted the principal causes of a continuing, although decelerating, rate of inflation. Table 1.5: Price Indices and GDP Deflator -( annual change) 1982 1983 1984 1985 19B6 (prelim.) CPI, low Income 17.3 11.7 11.8 13.0 6.5 CPI, expatriates 12.6 8.4 9.5 8.0 6.7 GDP deflator 9.5 8.4 13.2 9.3 7.5 Nemo items: International inflation (index of manufactured export prices, in US$) -1.4 -2.6 -1.8 0.7 13.0 Exchange rate movement, CFAF/$ 20.9 16.0 14.7 2.8 -22.9 Real effective exchange rate a/ 1.3 -0.5 2.3 9.2 10.4 a/ Import-trade weighted estimtes by the IMF staff. Source: Department of Statistics, BCEAO and Bank estimates (December 1986). 27. The main domestic factors explaining Senegal's inflation rate appear to be three-fold: first, a steady upward trend in the prices of food and urban housing (the cost of the latter rose by 19.91 in 1985 for low-income Dakar families); second, a relaxation of the price control system which has given more liberty to local manufacturers and distributors to raise prices; and third, deliberate action by the Government to raise prices in 1985 for a number of goods and services (including rice, bread, petroleum products, energyj, water, sugar, and cooking oil) which were giving rise to financial losses by the Government which it could not afford. The sharp decline in the import prices for rice and petroleum, the substantial strengthening of the CFAF vis-a-vis the US dollar and the continuation of current policies for the control of domestic credit and money supply have led to a significant improvement in Senegal's inflation, although it continues to exceed that in Senegal's main trading partners. Thus, lowering the rate of inflation becomes an espacially important policy objective for Senegal, given the need to improve the competitiveness of its exports and to discourage consumer goods imports, and its inability to adjust the rate of exchange of the CFAF. The problem this poses for - 16 - Senegal's Industrial export prospects, in particular, is discussed in Chapter II. External Trade 28. Although the last officially published data on Senegal's external trade date back to 1981, the unadjusted customs "listings" for the years 1982-86 became available recently. These listings give detailed figures for Special and General trade but have to be checked by the Department of Statistics and reprocessed by the Government dAta center (DTAI) before they can be published. On the basis of these preliminary trade data and GDP estimates, the following table summarizes the behavior of exports, imports and GDP over the last seven years. Table 1.6 GDP and External Trade, 1980-85 (CFA-P billions, current prices) 1980 1982 1984 1986 (prelim.) Nominal GDP 627.6 844.3 1015.5 1,295.3 Export. a/ 180.1 293.2 402.2 375.0 Imports a/ 280.4 419.8 515.1 445.0 Resource Gap b/ -100.3 -126.6 -112.9 -70.0 (as % of GDP) Exports a/ 28.7 34.7 39.6 29.0 Imports a/ 44.7 49.7 50.7 34.4 Resource Gap bl 16.0 15.0 11.1 5.4 a/ Of goods and non-factor services. b/ Exports minus imports. Source: SA Table 4. 29. Between 1981 and 1984, Senegal's earnings from the export of goods and non-factor services had achieved a good recovery from the abnor- mally low level (28.7% of GDP) to which they had fallen in 1980. The average rate of growth of nominal exports between 1980 and 1984 exceeded 20% per year, although much of this growth in earnings resulted from improved commodity prices and from%a eubstantial depreciation of the CPA franc. In volume terms, the rate of; ,rowth of Senegal's exports betweetn 1980 and 1984 was only about 2.9% per year. Increased shipnents of ground- nuts, fish and fertilizers accounte'.iEor half of the incresse in exports over this period; the rest was dke 1, a reported substantial increase in entrepot export sales. "Non-tradlt4onal" (manufactured goods) exports contributed hardly at all to the inre=ase in exports in real terms. Data on the composition of exports are given in Table 1.7. 4 K -~~~~~~~~17- mT ele Coi.lition of Merchandise xports 1982.86 (CFAF billion) a, , l1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 Gro%rn4*ut products 42.1 55.3 54.5 23.7 24.4 l,Phiphate rock 18.3 18.7 28.6 - 27.3 21.0 'Ptisi 4fti8h & canned) 30.2 37.3 49.5 53.9 56.6 g"h."lnic products 2.2 4.1 18.9 18.4 21.0 L ptroleu,,products 45.8 40.8 43.2 39.0 23.6 'ufactured goods 33.8 39.4 37.3 39.9 43.5 ' Others " 7.7 11.2 12.1 12.3 11.9 Entrepot trade ; ' -15.1 14.4 24.0 1.5 26.0 Total 165.0 221.2 268.1 216.0 228.0 Source': SA Table 11. 30. The volume and value of exports fell off considerably in 1985 and *l-hhough export volumes recovered strongly in 1986, much weaker prices have minta'ined the value of exports at roughly its 1983 level. The volume actvally reached a peak in 1983 and had already begun to fall off in 1984 (after te drought of 1983 which ravaged the groundnut crop), but this was masked by the persistence of favorable price conditions. For example, the wholesale price of unrefined groundnut oil remained at over $1,000 per ton basin Bope for most of 1985, before dropping to below US $550 (on a CIF basis) In late 1986. A unit value index (Laspeyre) for Senegal's exports with 1979 base weights shows a doubling of Senegal's average export unit values (in CFAF terms) between 1980 and 1985. The reversal of this trend in 1986, with a 13.2% drop in Senegal's export price index, represents a major adverse development which could delay Senegal's prospects for an early econqmic recovery. This is discussed further in Chapter II. An e*tiaat8 of the terms of trade for Senegal is given in the following tabue I g. ,. I,.- - 18 - Table 1.8 Terms of Trade, 1982-1986 (unit value indices) al 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 (prelim.) Exports b/ 139.2 148.6 198.2 200.6 160.7 Imports b/ 158.1 177.7 194.5 190.6 167.8 Terms of Trade 88.1 83.7 101.9 105.2 95.7 (1979 - 100) a/ Laspeyre index using 1979 base weights. bl Based on "commerce special" customs data for merchandise trade. Source: SA Table 9, and 11. 31. Data for Senegal's imports are generally less reliable than for exports, because of the large number of importers and of commodities and the existence of undocumented imports and clandestine border trade. The commodity breakdown of imports and their CIF prices is, therefore, generally less certain than for exports. Nevertheless, the decline in Imports, both in absolute volume and relative to GDP, appears to have continued during 1985 and 1986, as shown below. Table 1.9 Estimated Real Growth of Imorts, 1982-86 (CFAF billion, 1979Iconstant prices) 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 (preim.) GDP 643.3 660.9 630.8 654.8 685.1 Imports a/ 290.1 301.0 273.0 254.3 262.0 Imports/GD? (ratio) 0.45 0.46 0.43 0.39 0.38 Annual change (Z) GD? (real) 15.1 2.7 -4.6 3.8 4.6 Imports (volume) -4.4 -3.8 -9.3 -6.8 3.0 a/ Imports of goods and non-factor services. Source: SA Table 5. 32. Table 1.10 shows the estimated composition of Senegal's imports for the last five years. 19 - Table 1.10 Composition of Imports, 1982-86 (CFAF billion, annual average) Value Distribution Food and be-.rages 97.1 (24.6) Other consumer goods 53.1 (13.5) Petroleum (crude and refined) a/ 86.8 (22.0) Intermediate goods a/ 103.7 (26.3) Capital equipment 53.3 (13.6) Total merchandise imports 39Z.6 (10-o-Y a/ Adjusted (downward) for estimated entrepot trade (CFAP 0.4 bn in each case). Source: SA Tables 9. 33. Pood and beverage imports, accounting for about one-fifth of total imports, increased sharply between 1982 and 1985 and are estimated to have fallen for the first time in 1986. Rice imports declined from ClAF 34 billion in 1984 to only ClAF 17.7 billion in 1986 as a result of price and volume reductions. Wheat imports too are sharply down in 1986. The value of imports of other food products (such as canned goods, rice, cheese and vegetables, mainly consumed by foreign residents and tourists) has risen sharply over the last five years, but fell in 1986. The value of other consumergoods imports has fluctuated from year to year according to the Rete of the economy, without any noticeable trend since 1982. Inter- mediate goods for construction and industry have been increasing each year but declined in 1986 to around their 1984 level. Imports of capital equipment are only about 50X of the value of intermediate imports and have generally been increasing more slowly, following a substantial decline in 1984. Imports of new automobiles, in particular, have fallen sharply since the motor vehicle taxes were increased in 1985, and there has been a pick- up in sales of small-capacity motorcycles. Overall, there has been a sub- stantial decline in the volume of all imports since 1984, which translated into a fall in value for the second year in a row in 1986 as a result of substantial price declines for petroleum, rice, wheat and other products. The fall in imports is a consequence both of th'-. stagnation of economic activity and of the restrictive demand policies which have been applied; to some extent, it may have been partially offset by an increase in contraband imports, but it is impossible to gauge the size of this trade with any degree of confidence. The decline in imports through official channels has had an important impact on the amount of customs duties which can be collected. - 20 - Balance of Payments 34. While Senegal's balance of payments continues to register an overall deficit requiring recourse to excepticnal financing, the improving trend which began in 1983, has persisted, except for the poor performance in 1985. As indicated in Table 1.11, the trade deficit declined signi- ficantly between 1982 and 1984 as exports recovered from their low 1980-82 level. The sharp fall in export earnings, caused mainly by a dismal groundnut crop following the 1983/84 drought, explained most of the adverse performance in 1985. The trade picture, however, reversed itself dramatic- ally in 1986 as lower international prices of petroleum products and grains, reduced the imports bill by over fl5. The favorable trend in the trade balance was, however, offset by a substantial deterioration on the services account in the 1982-85 period, attributable to the fast rising interest payments due on external debt. Lower international interest rates and growth in tourism receipts have helped to reverse the situation in 1986. Consequently, the current account deficit (excluding official trans- fers) which amounted to CFAP 166 billion (US$505 million) in 1982, widened during 1983-85 but fell to CFAF 127.5 billion (US$365 million) in 1986. - 21 - Table 1.11 Sumary Balance of Paments, 1952-86* (ClAP billion) 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 Exports of GNFS 293.2 350.2 402.2 360.3 375.0 Imports of GNFS 419.8 483.6 515.1 504.6 445.0 Resource Balance -126.6 -133.3 -112.9 -144.3 -70.0 Net Factor Income -38.0 -46.4 -60.6 -65.9 -66.4 Net Private Transfers -1.5 3.4 -2.3 7.7 9.0 Current Account -166.1 -183.1 -175.8 -202.5 -127.5 Official Transfers 59.9 60.1 60.6 59.9 57.5 MLT Loan Disbursements 93.2 122.0 89.3 97.1 71.8 INLT Loan Repayments a/ 3.1 6.1 14.3 20.3 49.6 Other Capital Movements b/ -21.5 -13.0 39.2 21.2 62.5 Decrease in Reserves 37.6 20.1 1.0 44.6 -14.7 (- - increase) Memo Items: Trade Balance -121.9 -124.3 -99.1 -138.9 -71.1 Current Account (IMF definition) -106.2 -123.0 -115.2 -142.6 -70.0 * Figures for 1983-85 are provisional and those for 1986 are preliminary forecasts, based on official data. a/ After rescheduling. b/ Including short-term capital, direct foreign investment, and errors and omissions. Source: SA Table 13. 35. Net capital Inflows have fluctuated widely. Public transfers (i.e., offic4al grants), of which the main source $*o France, have been the most stable item and have grown by an average of about 1OX p.a. in recent years. Net foreign borrowing has fallen off sharply since reaching a peak in 1983. The main reason for the drop in net inflows has been a decline in gross disbursements rather than an Increase in scheduled amortization pay- ments. Over the period 1983-85, approximately ClAF 64 billion in such pay- ments, out of a total of CFAF 109 billion, or 62X, were rescheduled with the Paris and London Clubs. Total debt relief (including rescheduling of interest payments) has been of the order of CFAF 30 billion in each of the last five years. - 22 - 36. The overall balance of payments deficit fell in 1983 and 1984 (after allowing for debt rescheduling), rose sharply in 1985 to exceed its 1982 level but has improved significantly in 1986 on account of favorable trade developments. It has been financed by recourse to IMF facilities and by drawings upon the BCEA0 operations account with the French Treasury) as well as by the accumulation of external arrears in 1985. These arrears were virtually liquidated in 1986. 37. It is clear from the above that, despite the improvements regis- tered (particularly in containing the growth of imports), Senegal's balance of payments position remains weak and considerable efforts will be required to augment export earnings and net capital inflows in order to avoid a further rapid accumulation of foreign liabilities. Public Finance 38. Senegal's public finance situation has improved significantly over the last three years as indicated by the further reductions in the Government's overall fiscal deficit. Also notable is the reattaimment of a small budgetary saving in fiscal year 1985/86. Because of the stagnation in economic activity and weaknesses in tax administration, improvement has been achieved mainly through containment of expenditures: the share of total Government outlays in GDP has, in fact, declined from 32% in 1980/81 to only 22% in 1985/86. Since interest payments on the Government debt (mostly external) have risen sharply even after debt rescheduling, the containment of expenditures has necessarily fallen on the wage bill, devel- opment expenditures and, above all, current operating expenditures and transfers. It is worth notdtg, however, that spenadings for key sectors such as health and educatio*, expressed as a share of GDP have remained unchanged although there has been a small decline in real terms over the recent period. Transfers have been kept virtually constant (in cash terms) for five years, outlays on Government wages and salaries have also been severely restrained since 1982/83. Capital expenditures by the central Government have similarly shown very little growth, although this partly reflects an increased share of investment by the parapublic sector as well as the emergence of absorption capacity constraints. - 23 - Table 1.12 Government Financial Operations, Suimary (CFAF billions) (Actual) (Actual) (Provisional) 1983/84 .1984/85 1985/86 Total Revenue and Grants 201.6 216.1 237.9 Total Expenditures and Transfers 246.3 254.2 266.0 Current Budgetary Savings -10.4 I. -8.4 -2.3 Overall Fiscal Deficit a/ -44.7 -38.1 -28.1 (as 2 of estimated GDP) (4.6) (3.5) (2.3) a/ On a commitment basis. Source: IMF (TOF, December 13, 1986). For further details, see SA Table 19. 39. The slow growth of tax revenues, particularly of customs duties, has emerged during the last two years as a particularly important factor slowing down the pace of financial consolidation. As shown by the figures on actual tax receipts given below, the estimated buoyancy ratio (of tax receipts to GDP) has fallen off considerably - even allowing for a pos- sible over-estimation of GDP growth -- and the reasons for this decline are being investigated by the Government. This lacklustre tax collection per- formance has increased the Goverrment's reliance on non-tax revenues, not- ably the temporary windfall surplus from rice and Xpetroleum imports. As a consequence, measures to restore an adequate growth of revenues will need to form part of the Government's action plan for the next phase of the adjustment program. - 24 - Table 1.13 Composition of Tax Revenues (CFA) billion) 1983/84 1984185 1985/86 Income taxes 41.0 43.9 43.9 Sales taxes 54.2 58.2 58.1 Customs duties 74.2 79.0 73.7 Other taxes 8.7 9.0 32.7 a/ Total tax revenues 178.1 190.1 208.4 Tax/GDP (t) 18.2 17.5 17.0 Customs duties/iuports (2) 22.6 22.6 22.6 a/ Including oil sector taxes. Source: IMF staff estimates. 40. Notwithstanding these difficulties, the Government has been able to make substantial progress, as a result of its expenditure cuts and foreign assistance, in reducing its domestic indebtedness and releasing much-needed liquidity to the private sector. A total of CPAF 73.6 billion has been reinjected into the economy in this way over the last three years (see Table 1.13). The substantial reduction in domestic indebtedness has been facilitated by the inflow of budgetary aid from abroad. Table '.14 Reduction in Domestic Indebtedness of Central Government (CFAF billions) 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 Reduction in payment arrears to suppliers 2.0 16.2 1.6 a/ Repayment of crop credits via CPSP 20.6 4.0 3.0 Repayment of ONCAD debt consolidated vith banks 8.8 10.0 8.0 Total Repayment 31.4 30.2 12.6 a/ CFAE 10.9 billion were also repaid in respect of external debt arrears during 1985/86. - 25 D. Conclusion 41. In conclusion, Senegal's economy suffered stagnation and declin- ing real incomes during 1984 and 1985 partly as a consequence of the severe drought of 1983/84. This outcome demonst 'tes (albeit negatively) the leading role of agriculture. But by the same token it gives hope of a significant recovery in 1986 and 1987, given the welcome fall in import prices. Yet, in spite of the adverse economic circumstances of 1984 and 1985, the Government has managed to enhance financial stability and sustain public expenditures while limiting imports. This has rendered the serious adjustment efforts introduced by the Senegal Government during this period all the more creditable. These efforts have prepared the way -or address- ing a still difficult future. The adjustment efforts and their continua- tion are the subject-matter of the next two chapters. .s3. - 26 - CHAPTER II: THE MEDIUM-TERM ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM 1. The economic developments described in the previous chapter have formed the backdrop for the "mise en scane" of Senegal's structural adjust- ment efforts which began in 1983. Despite some significant progress during the past three yqars, Senegal still faces major structural and financial difficulties. More particularly, government finances remain difficult, the public enterprise sector is overextended and the external current account deficit remains large. In view of the magnitude of the existing problems, the Government has recently decided to move rigorously in the adjustment effort as set out in its Policy Framework Paper. 1/ The question is, how- ever, whether these policy measures would ensure an average economic growth rate sufficiently high to help improve real per capita incomes. This question is addressed in the next two chapters. A. Long-Run Development Potential 2. The last CEK argued that, despite its limited physical resource base, Senegal could sustain a significantly higher long-term rate of eco- nomic growth than it has achieved in the past. This growth could be based on a diversification of agricultural production (export-based and import- substituting) and on creating stronger linkages between modern sector industry and the rest of the economy, especially by developing more small- scale enterprises to supply inputs (the manufacturing industry's imports are equivalent to 60X of the value of its output). However, faster growth can only be sustained by a reversal of some of the past trends in the economy and by restoring a better balance of financial uses and resources while maintaining an open 2conomy. For these reasons, Senegal's long-term prospects critically depend on the success of its uedium-term adjustment program to create a stronger base for long-term development. 3. The country faces the fundamental technical problems of devel- oping rainfed and irrigated crop production at reasonable cost, calling for a transformation of rural institutions, giving greater responsibility to farmers, and the provision of adequate pricing, marketing, credit and support services for agriculture within budgetary constraints. The syste- matic survey and evaluation of the country's hydrological resources and the definition of a comprehensive plan for arresting desertification should form key elements of the development strategy for agriculture. 4. In the long run, the prospects for employment creation in non- agricultural activities will depend in large measure on the Government's success in: extricating Itself from activities which it could better leave to the private sector; reducing the excessive levels of protection which have tended to minimize competition, efficiency and potential for growth 1/ "Senegal: Policy Framework Paper 1986/87-1988/89", o2.cit. - 27 - among Senegal's industries; and creating an environment that encourages local entrepreneurs to develop viable businesses which can survive in the modern sector. This latter task requires a careful re-examination of the conditions for financing of small and medium-scale enterprises by the banking sector. In parallel, the country will need to define a clearer strategy to deal with the high rate of population growth and to adapt those parts of its education system which are excessively costly as well as unsuited to the needs of the economy. B. Medium-Term AdJustment Objectives 5. The basic long-term objective of the Government's structural adjustment program is to lay a firm foundation for the resumption of sustainable growth with equity. As stated in the policy framework docu- ment, one of the basic objectives is to achieve an average annual growth rate of real GDP on the order of 3.5 percent. The prerequisites for attaining that objective are an incentive environment which maximizes production and a management of the economy which optimizes public resource allocation and promotes domestic savings. 6. Two main themes underpin the Government's strategy to accomplish these objectives over the period 1985-1992: (i) progressive withdrawal of the State from direct involvement in productive activities - simultane- ously with the promotion of private sector investment and production through . change in incentive policies; and (ii) achievement of greater efficiency of public resource management through improvements in the quality and management of public investments, streamlining and reform of the parapublic sector, and generation of publi# savings. 7. The explicit assumptions and objectives of the Government's medium/long-term adjustment program for 1985-92 (PAML) were set out in the General Policy Statement it presented to the Consultative Group meeting in December 1984. The same data, assumptions and objectives were adopted for the macro-economic framework of the Seventh Development Plan (PY86-89) issued in July 1985. The PAHL/Seventh Plan objectives for the economy are summarized below. 8. Adjustment with growth is to be sought through policies to increase food self-sufficiency (import substitution) and to encourage export production. The PAOL and the Seventh Plan project an average growth of GDP of 3.2% p.a. between 1985-92, fueled by: a growth of the agricul- tural sector of 3.3% p.a. (twice the rate observed during the previous decade) to be generated by the introduction of improved price and marketing incentives (especially for cereal production) and more efficient technical support services to farmers; an accelerated growth of the fisheries sub- sector at 8% p.a. as a result of modernization and upgraded management of the fishing fleet; and an expansion of the secondary sector (industry and mining) at a rate of around 6% p.a. following the introduction of a new industrial incentives policy. - 28 - 9. To re-equilibrate the national accounts, the PAML and the Seventh Plan propose containing the growth of. consumption and improving the offi- ciency of investment. In order to increase domestic savings, the growth of private consumption (estimated at 4.3% p.a. on average between 1976-85) would be limited to only 2.5Z p.a. in real terms (l.e., a reduction in real per capita consumption) and that of publc consmtion (estimated at 3.5Z p.a. between 1979/81-1983/85) to only IX p.a. (made up of 2.5% p.a. for goods and services, 0.5Z p.a. for Gor,7ernment salaries). Assuming that consumption could be contained as detailed above, domestic savings$ which averaged 3.2% of GDP in the 1984-85 period, would reach 9X o-f GP by 1989 and 13.7% of GDP by 1992. This savings rate would allow Senegal to raise the proportion of investment financed with domestic resources from around 38% in 1985 (according to the Government calculations) to 52% in 1989 and 902 in 1992. 10. The marginal efficiency of investment is assumed in the Seventh Plan to average 23% over 1985-89, 2/ representing a 202 improvement over the preceding period. The increased efficiency of investment is predicated on the following assumptions: (a) priority to be given to selective rehabilitation and maintenance programs in the public sector; (b) identi- fication of new projects offering high and fast returns in the productive sectors; and (c) a positive change in the climate for private investment (including divestiture of part of the State's portfolio to the private sector). The share of direct foreign investment is projected to double from 1985 to 1992, reaching 132 of total investment. 11. Public finance targets are aimed at virtually eliminating the fiscal deficit (on a coumitment basis) by 1989/90, as compared to deficits of up to CFAF 74.5 billion (equivalent to 11X of GDP) in 1981, and at clearing the State's arrears to enterprises and banks by 1989/90 (these stood at an estimated CFAF 140 billion in 1984). Thus, the Government expect to gradually eliminate the need for external financing to balance its budget, while generating increased public resources for investment and re-injecting liquidity into private sector enterprises and financial institutions. 12. Export-oriented and import-substitution policies were projected to reduce the external resource gap by sustaining a growth in the volume of exports of 5.5% a year and of imports of 2.5% a year (i.e., below the rate of growth of GDP). This would help to shrink the current account deficit of the balance of payments 3/ from an estimated 11.31 of GDP in 1984 to 2/ Corresponding to an incremental capital/output ratio (ICOR) of about 4.4. 3/ Including official transfers, corresponding to the IMF definition of the current account. - 29 - only 1.4% by 1992 and to permit a reduction in Senegal's debit position in the BCEAO operations account with the French Treasury. C. Reforms Underway 13. The Government has successfully launched the first phase (1985- 87) of the medium-term adjustment program (1985-92). This phase consists of a comprehensive action program aimed at restoring a sustainable economic growth over the medium term. Considerable progress has been achieved in the strategic areas of the program: agriculture, industry and public sector management. In agriculture, the Government has introduced a new policy intended to promote food self-sufficiency, while consolidating the gains made in industrial crops. Assignment of greater responsibilities to the producers, partial withdrawal of the State from production and market- ing operations, and an appropriate pricing policy are the main instruments of the new policy. Concurrently, the Government is Implementing a new industrial policy designed to improve the long-run competitiveness of the sector and to make enterprises more fully responsible and accountable for their business decisions. To this end, the system of protection is being rationalized by basing it progressively on a reduced and narrowed band of harmonized tariffs--to achieve a lower and more uniform level of effective protection--and by phasing out the extensive system of quantitative restrictions on imports. Government controls and administrative con- straints burdening enterprises are also being reduced or eliminated, and export promotion incentives are being revamped. 14. In the public sector, the Government has embarked on a vigorous .reform of some of the 180 or so parapublic enterprises. Under the reform, a list of about 10 such enterprises have been identified for privatization, while those remaining in the public sector will be either rehabilitated or liquidated. Enterprises eligible to be sold to private operators have already been identified and their list published. A number of Important reforms have also been undertaken to improve the investment programming/budgeting process. These include organizational changes within the Planning Ministry, and the preparation of the first three-year "rolling" investment program (1987/1990) and a consolidated budget which is to be included in the 1987/88 budget law. The Government's efforts to strengthen public finances have also been successful: all performance criteria set by the IMF in the context of a Stand-by operation which ended on June 30, 1986 have been met. The overall fiscal deficit (on a commitment basis) declined from CFAF 38.1 billion 4/ in 1984/85 to CFAF 28.1 billion in 1985/86, representing 2.3% of GDP against 3.5% a year earlier and 8.2% in 1982/83. The current account deficit of the balance of payments was reduced from CFAP 202.5 billion in 1985 to CPAF 12'.5 billion in 1986. Real GDP growth in 1986 is expected to exceed the growth achieved in 1985 (3.81) in sharp contrast to the 4.6% drop in 1984. This will be 4/ Excluding official unrequited transfers. realized despite a financial sitmuaton vh'i is',iuch. fiare difficult than earlier envisaged as a result of revonu#,shkrtfalls and',higher outlays for debt servicing. ' ,, '', D. Constraints on the Speed of 15. Besides the largely t64cAnIcal `4uest016n f -tU quickness of response of the economy to policy measures, the main c4*straints on the pace of adjustment concern the neod -to preserve a politically acceptable sharing of the necessary savings,ef.f6tt and the availability of foreign aid to complement that effort. These constraints are obviously genieric but their particular combination in'Senegal,i4 special. The constraints on the speed of response are of three types: (a) natural resource avd technology related; (b) institutions-related; and (c) cost and market-related. In each of these three categories, there are Nome constraints which fall within the realm of Senegal's control, and others which do not. 16. Resources and Technology. As noted at the beginning of Chapter I, Senegal's endowment in natural resources is relatively poor and the country's economic growth potential therefore modest. This fact alone constitutes a factor limiting the speed of adjustatat, because the links between an improved policy environment and faster growth are far from automatic. Raising the productivity of capital is obviously a long-term process. Experience with the dominant sector in terms of employment agriculture -- shows that it remains difficult to identify high-return investment projects, at least such as can be replicated on a scale large enough to make an impact on the national economy. Despite reasonably high yields obtained (4 to 5 tons of paddy per ha harvested), it has not yet been demonstrated on a strict cost/benefit basis -- without taking into account social and food sufficiency considerations -, that irrigation investments can give a satisfactory rate of return because of the heavy capital and managemeat costs involved. Technical and environmental factors represent important blockages to obtaining faster growth in rainfed agricultural output. It now appears that expansion of the maritime fishing industry is also becoming severely constrained by a depletion of certain higher-value stocks. The long-term growth of the mining sector is, in the last resort, dependent on the life of the rock phosphate reserves, esti- mated to last for only another 15 years, although market constraints also condition the rate of exploitation of these reserves. 5/ The main hope for 5/ Although the studies have not been concluded, it would appear that the phosphate rock deposits at Matam and the iron ore reserves at Fal6ad are situated too far from the coast to make them commercially profitable to exploit for the time being. - 31 - expan4ing the frontiers of production in all these sectors lies in contin- uing exploration and research efforts and in seeking to ensure that the resources, material and human, which are available for research purposes are employed to maximum advantage. In this context, it is essential to streggt8t~ep Senegal's applied research in all areas of the natural and f ocihl "Oi¶nces which would contribute to understanding and ultimately afresting 'the desertification process and overcoming the technical constraint. of poor soils and lack of water. This problem, together with the related dfwigraphic issue, overshadows all others in terms of Senegal's long-term econolaiO prospects. 17. Institu'ti.ns. A second group of constraints relates to institu- tional factorh and.the organization of the economy. That the central * \ ,Government has.conte to occupy an excessively large role in the economy and dneeds to progresstvely disengage itself in favor of the private sector is recognized as qJn.axiom of the adjustment strategy and has begun to be 4l applied. but it;ts equally clear that the conditions for such a transfer of activities h6vi to be studied carefully according to the circumstances. The much-dicsussed privatization of rice importing is one example: if, as part of it '' cereals development policy, the Government feels obliged to control the dctdmtic selling price of rice and the quantities to be im- ported, and p1aqcte'the highest priority upon security of supply, then it < \ becomes exceediviiyAdifficult to design the privatization of this activity in such a way *s to-capture the usual benefits of competition and achieve the greater efficiency of profit-maximizing private traders. In other ongoing cases of public sector disengagement from commercial activities - SAID's rice marketing and milling activities, the buying of groundnuts by SONACOS or the distribution of fertilizers by rural development agencies the transfer of rmqpcnsibilities is difficult because of the differences in scaleS g,' esoureas, between the parapublic entities concerned and the private sector agents available to take over from them. Such a transfer aotan n*eds the active support of the public organization helping small senei6let' operators get started. SONACOS has been relatively successful * in p)*Iy-g,this role vis-a-vis the private buying agents who re-entered the grou#dnut markqting .-hain ("filiare") in 1985/86. The latter managed to purchase about ,25 of the marketed groundnut crop despite their financial and transp"rt difficulties, with substantial savings for SONACOS, which has i been able to halve the number of official buying points. ' 8. Markets, Cests and Efficiency. The third set of constraints on the response of the economy to financial and policy adjustment relates to - efficiency and marlWet demand. It concerns especially Senegal's difficulty in obtaining a larger share of export markets - or even maintaining its present shar. in key exports such as phosphates and canned fish. The reasons for Senegal's relative lack of competitiveness in exporting processed and manufactured goods were explored in the last CRM: absence of competition and excessive protection given to industries in the home market; rigidittes In employment and wage structures, providing little incentive for improved labor productivity; high cost of energy inputs; linkage to regional markets (CEAO, CEDEAO) which are not growing fast; inexperience with international markets, where Senegal's products would - 32 - often be disadvantaged by their quality; a rigid exchange rate regime; and lack of export market intelligence and financial services for exporters, etc. 19. A recent study of the tariff structure conducted by the Govern- ment with Bank assistance revealed the enormous disparity in effective protection granted to Senegal industries, with many of the more capita'- intensive enterprises receiving an effective protection of over 1002 on the basis of international prices. Most of the above constraints are being addressed under the adjustment program or under the planned IDA-financed third Structural Adjustment Credit, which would finance industrial restructuring and strengthen support services for investors and exporters. Until a series of industrial restructuring studies are carried out as part of the preparation of this project, there is some uncertainty as to which industries will be the first to respond to the new industrial incentives and labor policy measures which have been agreed under the SAL for the 1986-88 period. The method of calculating the industrial export subsidy has recently been revised to a value-added basis; this in itself should improve the overall impact of the subsidy, which cannot be extended for the time being because of budgetary constraints. Tourism is another export sector which already makes a substantial contribution to Senegal's balance of payments. According to a recent study, its growth potential depends on improving management and maintenance of existing hotels and infrastructure, and negotiating changes in transport arrangements with airlines. In summAry, there are many difficulties to overcome in developing new export products and markets, while the short-term market prospects for most of Senegal's main export commodities (groundnut oil, cotton, canned fish, phosphate, fertilizers, and petroleum products) have deteriorated since 1984. Until world market conditions improve, many of Senegal's export industries will continue to go through a difficult period. B. Evaluation of Progress 20. The Senegal Government's progress in implementing its adjustment program since 1983 has been generally good. Even though some difficulties have (inevitably) been encountered and some modifications to implementation details have been introduced, the Government has clearly taken its commit- ments seriously. In some areas, the results of the program are already visible - notably in the turnaround of the Government's fiscal perform- ance; but in most areas of the program, which is a long-term one. implemen- tation of new policies is still at an early stage, and it is too soon to observe their impact on the economy at large. The industrial policy reform, for example, which will take until 1988 to put into place, may not produce its full positive benefits to the economy until after 1990, given the time needed for industrialists to respond to the new policy environment. 21. It is, nevertheless, evident in the light of the experience of the last two years that the adjustment efforts will need to be intensified in order to permit the attainment of the original goals for the end of this decade. There are three reasons for this. One is that the poor growth - 33 - performance of Senegal's economy in 1984 and 1985 (described in Chapter I) means that the "growth with adjustment" effort has to start from a lower base. The second reason is that the supply side constraints on expanding Senegal's output and, particularly, its "traditional" exports like ground- nuts and phosphates as well as fish, have become more apparent since 1984, so that the supply response to policy reform assumed in the 1984 DPG may have been unrealistic. The third reason is that the prospective external environment for Senegal's economic recovery has, notwithstanding lower oil prices, become more difficult. The recent decline in international prices for most of Senegal's exports (and of some imports) and the reappearance of an appreciating real effective exchange rate 6/ will, if these trends persist, make it that much harder to regain competitiveness and dynamism in its exporting (and import-substituting) sectors. P. Medium-Term Growth Prospects 22. Since the objective circumstances have changed, it is necessary to review the assumptions made in the last CEM (1984) regarding the likely impact of the structural adjustment program on the main economic and financial variables. This has been done in the form of projections of the economy covering the period 1987-95 which incorporate not only the experi- enc,t of 1984-86 (as depicted in the Government's provisional estimates) but also the latest World Bank projections concerning commodity prices, interest rates and international inflation. The assumptions and results of these projections are described in the following section. 23. As noted earlier (para.5), the Government's overriding objec- tives, as set out in the Policy Framework Paper, is to achieve an average annual growth rate of real GDP of about 3.5% p.a., which would help improve real per capita income, and to re-establish by 1990 a viable balance of payments, including normal debt servicing, thereby ending the recourse to exceptional financing. Specific macro-economic objectives to achieve the above scenario are shown in Table 2.1 and the key assumptions are given in Table 2.2. The policy framework behind these assumptions takes into account the need to intensify the adjustment effort, discussed in paragraph 21. That framework encompasses two key strategies. First, the Government will promote private sector initiative through appropriate pricing and other incentive policies, particularly in agriculture and industry, coupled with a progressive withdrawal of the Government and public agencies from direct involvement in production activities. Second, it will strive to achieve greater efficiency in public resource management through improve- ment in the allocation and implementation of public investments, reforms of the public enterprise sector, and strengthening of government finances. 61 Due to higher inflation in Senegal compared to that in its main trading partners and to the fall in the dollar. - 34 - Table 2.1 Policy Objectives for the Medium-Term Projections * 1. Underlying Assumption DPG adjustment objectives for 1989/90 are maintained, implying acceleration of rate of adjustment from 1986. 2. Long-run Government To permit higher rate of economic growth objective commensurate with sustainable fiscal and external account deficits. 3. Specific macro-economic objectives (a) Real GDP growth To achieve a rate of economic growth of around 3.5% p.a. (b) Balance of payments To reduce the CA deficit to around 3% of GDP in 1990, and to avoid exceptional financing of the balance of payments after 1988. (c) Public finance To eliminate the Government's overall fiscal deficit (on a commitment basis) and clear all domestic arrears by the end of 1988/89. (d) Inflation To reduce the annual rate of inflation from an estimated 9.0% in 1985/86 to around 5% in 1988/89. (e) Investment rate 14% of GDP through 1992, rising gradually thereafter (DPG, 7th Plan). * See SA Table 36 for greater detail. 24. It should be stressed that the target growth rate indicated above is predicated on the convergence of a number of favorable developments on the supply side - in addition to the rigorous application of the specific policy measures which nave been identified for the FY87-89 period. According to the assumptions for the medium term projections presented In Table 2.2, the Senegalese economy will gradually become more industrialized, partly by containing the growth of the tertiary sector, brought about mainly by maintaining the size of the government service sector unchanged during the forecast period. The more rapid growth rate in the secondary sector (relative to GDP) assumes that the policy reform designed to improve the competitiveness of the manufacturing sector and to make enterprises more fully responsible and accountable for their business decisions will succeed in restructuring and modernizing Senegalese industries so that they will be in a better position to face up to international competition. During the projection period, the mining - 35 - sector will lag behind GDP because of both demand and supply constraints on phosphate expansion. 25. Over the forecast period, the agricultural sector is projected to grow at approximately the same rate as the overall economy. This projection is based on the growth targets adopted in the Government's Cereal Development Plan, which was endorsed by donors at a meeting on agriculture held in Dakar in June 1986. According to this plan, total cereal production is projected to reach an average of 1.4 million metric tons between 1991 and 1995, an average annual growth rate of 4.9Z. This relatively ambitious growth target assumes that agricultural reforms will continue to receive high priority in order to assure minimum acceptable rural incomes and to provide adequate incentives to farmers to improve farming techniques and to liberalize progressively marketing arrangements. Groundnut production is projected to recover and stabilize at the level achieved in the early 1980s, or about 825 thousand metric tons on average in the decade 1986-95. This is predicated on the maintenance of adequate price incentives to farmers while encouraging the use of fertilizers. The projected recovery in groundnut oil prices in the world market in the next several years (see Table 2.3) will contribute significantly to achieving the above target. Table 2.2 Detailed Growth Assumptions for the Medium-Term Projection 1. Agricultural Production 1986-90 1991-95 Assumptions ('000 MT per year, average) Groundnut, total production a/ 780 830 Groundnut, for crushing 405 410 Cereals, total production b/ 1100 1400 2. Export growth assumptions 1986-90 1991-95 (volume) (average annual growth, %) Groundnut products 10.1 -1.0 Fresh fish 4.0 4.0 Canned fish 2.0 2.0 Phosphates 3.2 3.0 Petroleum products 4.3 3.0 Salt 3.0 3.0 Chemical products 5.5 4.0 Manufactured goods 3.9 5.5 NFS 2.5 2.5 Total exports 3.8 2.7 -36 - 3. Sectoral growth projections 1986-90 1990-95 (average annual growth, %) a/ Primary sector 4.9 3.5 (fishing, livestock) (3.8) (4.0) Secondary sector 3.7 4.2 (manufacturing) (3.6) (5.2) Tertiary sector 3.0 3.2 (public admin.) (0.0) (0.9) Total GDP 3.5 3.5 4. External trade projections (average annual growth in volume, %) Exports (GNFS) 3.8 2.7 Tmports (GNFS) 2.8 3.1 a/ Staff estimates. b/ Based on Plan CUr6alier, adopted in June 1986. Table 2.3 Commodity Price Forecasts ($ nominal prices) 1986 1988 1990 1995 Groundaut oil ($/t) 585 599 701 860 Groundaut cake ($/t) 165 17 181 206 Cotton (c/kg) 100 121 166 237 Phosphate rock ($It) 33 38 41 50 TSP ($/t) 130 145 160 210 Petroleum ($/bl) 14 18 18 25 Rice ($/t) 210 243 287 307 Wheat ($/t) 160 153 178 195 Sugar (c/kg) 154 253 390 380 Source: World Bank commodity price forecasts October 1986. G. Potential Growth Constraints 26. While the necessary adjustment program has been launched, the achievement of the target growth rate of about 3.5Z per annum must be supported by the combination of favorable developments, particularly as they relate to the supply responses in agriculture and Industry and to the capacity of the economy to generate adequate resources for the - 37 - rehabilitation of existing infrastructure, and the undertaking of new investments. Equally important are the assumptions concerning the external environment facing Senegal, including future commodity prices for its major exports, and its success in competing for a larger share of the world market for its key exports. 27. While the policy measures designed to restructure the industrial sector are commendable, it is uncertain how quickly the declared objectives can be achieved. Also, given the various institutional constraints mentioned earlier, it is conceivable that the rate at which the Government could proceed with the adjustment measures may be tempered by the concern to minimize any worsening of the already worrisome urban unemployment situation. And although the Government has taken steps to review its rather stringent labor laws -- which resulted in rigidity of labor movement and considerable government involvement in specific labor decisions -- the relatively high cost of labor in Senegal will continue to be a major hindrance to Senegal's competitiveness abroad. 28. Furthermore, the expansion of the industrial sector, according to the Government's strategy, will rely to a large extent on the revival of private sector activity and the privatization of a number of parapublic enterprises. The success in promoting the private sector, in turn, requires adequate credit availability, which under the difficult financial position of Senegal's banking system, is by no means assured. The planned restructuring and rehabilitation of commercial banks facing serious difficulties will, in the long run, provide the conditions for the banking sector to perform their role of financial intermediation more efficiently. In the short run, however, these same measures could lead to a tightening of credit creation, which would impede the development of private enterprises. The settlement of cross-arrears between the Government, private and parapublic enterprises, and commercial banks - a necessary step which has already begun -- could further lengthen the revamping of the banking sector. 29. While development of the industrial sector is crucial to the achievement of the target growth rate and of the desired diversification of the economy, the dual objectives of higher real GDP growth and a viable balance of payments will continue to depend, for several more years, on Senegal's traditional export items such as groundnuts and fish, to be supplemented by manufactured good exports at a later stage. The problems affecting the fisheries industry, particularly the reduction in landings due to overfishing, competition from foreign factory-traders, higher energy prices and obsolete equipment are well detailed in Chapter I. Therefore, even assuming that the Government's ambitious program to modernize the industrial fishing fleet will proceed relatively successfully, foreign competition for the more valuable offshore resources will remain a major constraint. 30. The outlook for groundnuts has been relatively more favorable last season, following a severe shrinkage of the acreage devoted to this crop in 1983-85, helped by a higher producer prices which took effect in - 38 - 1985/86. Unless international prices of groundnut oil recover begivning in 1988, as called for by the World Bank's most recent commodity price fore- casts, maintaining these higher producer prices over an extended time may not be financially feasible, given the continuing tight government financial position. Furthermore, the objective of increasing food self- sufficiency by promoting rice cultivation will lead to increasing compe- tition between groundnut and cereal production in better-rainfall areas. 31. In uMmf the various supply side policy measures and the pro- gressive liberalization of the economy have laid the framework for a more rapid rate of economic growth in the medium term. Nevertheless, wbat emerges from the preceding sections is that institutional rigidities, supply constraints in important sectors, the limited capacity of the economy to quickly re-orient toward export promotion, and the veak banking sector could prove to be serious obstacles to achieving the target growth rates. - 39 - CHAPTER III: RESOURCE UTILIZATION 1. This chapter first summarizes recent trends in resource use at a macro-economic level in order to see to what extent the pattern of exces- sive consumption referred to in the last CEM has been modified during the first two years of the adjustment program. The rest of the chapter is devoted to a closer analysis of the new policies which have been introduced over the last two to three years to Improve the management of resources in the public sector, and to a discussion of the actions needed to bring about further improvement in this area. A. Macroeconomic Picture - A Suimury 2. Table 3.1 presents Senegal's national accounts on the basis of three-year averages for the periods 1979-81 and 1983-85. A number of trends can be discerned. Aggregate demand continues to outstrip produc- tion; however, since 1981, when total expenditure exceeded GDP by a record 20%, the growth of demand has slowed down and now exceeds GDP only by about 10 to llX (although this is still too large a resource gap to be sus- tained). The relative reduction in expenditure has been achieved essen- tially at the expense of private consumption, which grew at only 2.0% p.a. between 1979-81 and 1983-853 while Government consumption expanded by 3.31 p.a. on average. The sluggish growth of investment at 1.41 p.a. between 1979-81 and 1983-85 has also played a part in slowing down the growth of expenditures. Public investment has been declining, whilo private invest- ment (including that of companies in the parapublic sector) appears to be on the rise, being estimated at 72.41 of fixed investment in 1983-85, as compared to 65.7% in 1979-81. Reflecting the slower growth of consumption vis-a-vis production, domestic savings moved from a negative position in 1979-81 to a positive one in 1983-85, reaching 3.7% of GDP in 1985. How- ever, owing to a decline in net factor income from abroad (only partly compensated by net current transfers), national savings remain negative. The deterioration of the net factor income position (because of rising foreign interest payments) also led to the gross national product growing at a slower rate than GDP, and a decline in per capita GNP between 1979-81 and 1983-85. - 40 - T] 3.1 a S As Permap Mwa Grwth Per Cita kzual 'Of (MP Rate Growh RPate 19798 9B 1979f8G' -9l/85 1979/81 -1 CDP at N ket Prkes 100.0 100.0 3.4 0.5 Apiedture <19.5 1.2 -1.7 bduffty 24.8 26.1 4.7 1.7 a. _ g 14.3 15.2 5.0 2.0 b. odw industry 10.5 10.8 4.2 1.5 Service 54.0 54.5 3.6 0.7 1esource cap 15.1 11.4 -3.5 -6.3 ur tof Gbods & NFS 47.6 42.6 -0.5 -2.3 ports of Gbods & F 32.5 31.1 2.3 -0.6 Total DcmstiI Demind 115.1 111.4 2.6 -0.3 Total CkOU tilm 100.2 97.4 2.7 -0.2 General Gonvermnt 19.9 19.9 3.3 0.4 Private Cwwy tion 80.2 77.5 2.5 -0.4 Grows DIxiu stinvesft 14.9 14.0 1.8 -1.0 Pixed Iuvestunt 14.6 13.7 1.7 -1.1 Gmanea Gmoernit 5.0 3.9 -3.3 -6.0 Private 9.6 9.9 4.1 1.1 invwtory w"esUmet 0.3 -0.3 6.9 3.9 :Itm: Net Factor Imevsa -3.6 -5.5 -15.5 12.3 Net OCrent Transfers -0.1 0.0 n.a. noa. Gross TDumstic Savizg -0.2 2.6 n.e. n.a. (koss Nadiaxl1 Savicp -3.8 -2.9 n*a. n.a. Gros Natiaxl Product 96.4 94.5 2.9 -0.0 Source: SA1Tb]es 5 and 7. - 41 - 3. Until recently, the growth of private consumption in the rural areas, though slow, appears to outstrip that of priuary sector production, which displays a stagnant trend. Between 1979-81 and 1984-85, rural value- added per capita declined at 1.7% p.a. on average, but rural consumption levels were maintained at approximately the same level. Since rural savings are already very low, this greatly limits the resources available for investment by farmers. This represents a problem for any development strategy based on agricultural intensification so long as there are no viable credit facilities. Equally worrying is the insufficient pace of adjustment in public coneumption: its share of GDP has actually slightly increased from 19.91 in 1979-81 to 20.21 in 1983-85 (Table 3.1). 4. Domestic savings mobilization, advanced by the PAlL as one of the main pillars of the adjustment program, is hampered by the slow growth of production and the relative inability of financial institutions to attract and invest these savings. In this connection, the large level of non- performing assets has proved to be a uajor obstacle to the provision of new credit by the banking sector. Short-term credit accounted for about 75% of the 1980-84 net credit extension to the private sector, while long-term loans accounted for only 51. As well, over two-thirds of the credit going to the private sector were absorbed by commercial, manufacturing and con- struction activities. 5. In conclusion, the measures taken so far by Senegal to introduce production incentives, to reduce consumption and to improve the efficiency of investment are too recent to have corrected the substantial imbalances in the economy and to produce growth. This accentuates the importance of improving resource allocation and management. The recent efforts in this area are highlighted in the next section. B. Strengthening Public Sector ManaBement 6. Current Expenditures. A major effort has been achieved and is being pursued by the Government to strengthen the management of current expenditures. The growth of wages and salaries has been limited to merit promotions (4-5% p.a.) by freezing the size of the civil service 1/ at about 70,000 and the basic salary scales at their 1983 level. Public debt management has been improved through the establishment of a computerized system for recording and servicing the external debt. Procurement guide- lines and practices have been strengthened with a view to providing uniform practices and better control of expenditures. Subsidies and transfers to the parapublic sector are being reduced and subjected to performance criteria through the system of performance contracts ("contrat-plan"). Transactions with Treasury correspondents (notably the stabilization funds for agricultural commodities -- the CPSP - and for petroleum products) are 1/ Including army, police, judiciary, and teachers. - 42 - being closely monitored, and all arrears due to the Treasury by the CPSP on account of rice imports are being repaid. 7. Public Investment. A number of important actions are being taken with a view to lmproving the quality and management of public investment. The sectoral policy framework and the selection of priority projects was Improved under the Seventh Plan (1985-89). While the share of Government investments has been reduced from 5.8Z of GDP in 1980 to 3.92 in 1985, public investment is increasingly focused on the necessary infrastructure and support for production. A new system of three-year "rolling" invest- ment program was introduced in 1986 to replace the "shopping list" approach of previous development plans. 2/ This new system is expected to gradually permit the authorities to monitor the use of aid resources more efficiently. 8. Parapublic Sector. A Government policy paper and "action plan" were adopted in July 1985 which established firm objectives and a work program for an accelerated reform of the parapublic sector. Their main objectives were to: reduce the extensive Government holdings through divestiture of non-essential parapublic enterprises (notably in manu- facturing, trade, hotels, banking, and insurance); improve the performance of those remaining under government control, through the establisbment of contractual performance ("contrat-plan") criteria; ease Government's financial and administrative controls by consolidating oversight agencies and making them more effective; reduce direct and indirect subsidies and transfers to parapublic enterprises; and increase the transparency of financial transactions between the Government and public enterprises. 9. Since this action plan was adopted, Senegal, as first mentioned in para. 14, of chapter II, has made progress in all these areas. A list of enterprises slated for divestiture was made public, the general criteria for divestiture were established, and a detailed study of divestiture mechanisms is being conducted. "Contrat-plans" were, in general, signed on schedule, and the system is under review with a view to Improve compliance by both the Government and enterprises and to seek simpler formulas for their elaboration and implementation. The Government has also conducted a thorough inventory of direct subsidies and transfers, as well as of the cro0s-arrears between the Treasury and enterprises. A plan for the settlement of these arrears has been finalized. Finally a study of indirect subsidies has been launched with the objective of obtaining a complete picture of the financial transactions between the Government and public enterprises, and putting in place a permanent monitoring system for these transactions. 2/ The first three-year program was reviewe4 by Bank staff. See "Senegal - A Review of the Three-Year Public Investment Program, 1987/88 - 1989/90" (Report No. 6450-SE). - 43 - C. Recent Performance 10. Overall Fiscal Performance. Table 3.2 shows that fiscal performance has improved markedly since 1982/83 under the various adjustment programs undertaken with IMF support. The overall fiscal deficit (on a commitment basis) was reduced from 8.21 of GDP in 1982/83 to an estimated 2.3% in 1985/86. This reduction was, however, achieved essentially by containing the growth of expenditures. The fiscal deficit was reduced on a cash basis from 7.5% of GDP in 1982/83 to 3.3% in 1985/86, despite the repayment of CFAF 84.5 billion of domestic indebtedness and external arrears over the period 1983/84-1985/86. / 11. This positive picture of an improved overall fiscal performance masks, nearrtheless, certain important problems. Foremost among these are: (i) poor revenue mobilization and the increased dependence on exceptional revenue sources such as the surpluses on petroleus and rice imports; (ii) an erosion of fixed assets through cuts in maintenance spending and of civil servants' motivation due to declining real salaries; (lit) the virtual drying out of Government resources allocated for capital expendi- ture; (iv) extensive indirect subsidies and tax exemptions to public and private enterprises, which are not reflected by the fiscal tables; and (v) continuing crisis management of public finances and dependence on external budgetary support. 12. Revenue Mobilization. Revenue mobilization, particularly in the case of tax revenues, has deteriorated: current revenue fell from 19.71 of GDP in 1982/83 to 17.8% in 1985/86, while tax revenue declined from 18.51 to 17%. Thus, the buoyancy of current revenue and tax revenue with respect to GDP were both only 0.9. The greatly increased reliance on non-tax revenues (for 6.7% of total revenues in 1985/86) introduces great un- certainty into the budgetary process. The bulk of the exceptional revenue originates with the surpluses accruing to the National Energy Fund and the CPSP from petroleum and rice, owing to the sharp fall in world market prices for both commodities and the rapid depreciation of the dollar via-a- vis the CFAF. Although this extraordinary revenue is easing the pain of adjustment by compensating for the unexpected shortfall in tax revenues, its reliability for the future cannot be assured. Besides, the reliance on these exceptional revenues has maintained high energy costs which are hampering the competitiveness of the industrial sector. 3/ This consisted of CFAF 19.2 billion of arrears paid to enterprises, CFAF 26.8 billion to service the consolidated debt of the former ONCAD to the banking sector, CFAF 27.6 billion of crop credits repaid to the banks and CPAF 10.9 billion of external arrears. - 44 - Table 3.2 Publ5c FIc aace Indicators (in b, 1. Jon CTAFv current prices) 1982/83 1985/86 1986/87 Projected Revenue & Grants - 180.9 237.9 267.7 Revenue 175.7 218.7 252.7 Tax 164.5 208.4 - Non-Tax 11.2 10.3 - Grants 5.2 19.2 15.0 of which, capital 3.4 8.0 9.0 Current Expenditure & Net Lending 215.2 232.2 238.4 of which, budgetary expenditure 186.6 220.3 226.4 Current Budget Savings (net) -37.7 -2.3 20.3 Capital Expenditure 39.0 33.8 42.6 Fiscal Deficit (commitments) -73.3 -28.1 -13.3 Reduction in Arrears 5.6 -9.6 -14.0 Repayment of Crop Credit 1.2 -3.0 -15.0 Fiscal Deficit (cash) -66.5 -40.7 -42.3 GDP. current market prices 891.9 1,223.7 1,358.4 …---- Percentage as of GDP Revenue & Grants 20.3 19.4 19.7 Revenue 19.7 17.9 18.6 Tax 18.5 17.0 - Non-Tax 1.3 0.8 - Grants 0.6 1.6 1.1 Current Expenditure & Net Lending 24.1 19.0 17.6 of which, budgetary 20.9 18.0 16.7 Current Budget (net) -4.2 -2.0 1.5 Capital Expenditure 4.4 2.8 3.1 Fiscal Deficit (commitments) -8.2 -2.3 -1.0 Fiscal Deficit (cash) -7.5 -3.3 -3.1 Source: SA Table 19. (5. - ea I," -~~45- * 5 . 4' 13. The declining yield' of tax revenues has multiple explanations: (1) much of,the estimated increase in GDP in the early 1980s was generated b:' odern sector. enterpises which enjoy extensive tax holidays; (li) customs du4tUs (whoae share In total revenue between 1982/83 and 1,985/86 averase4' 41X) Ubae an uneven incidence between tax-paying and exempted importers an4'sre5 very high for the former, which encourages PuRglifg; (4i1) in rec"ng years, the CPSP was unable to pay customs duties on imported, rice (fdue 'mainly to the accumulation of larger stocks of imported 'rieq), estimated at CPAF 10.5 billion during the 1982/83-1984/85; (iv) tax rates on goods and services (30.8% of revenue between 1982/83 and 1985/86) hiave'be*6 raised with the introduction of value added and service taxes it,, tertaiu sectors (telecoununications, petroleum products, motor vehicles), "but receipts grew by only at 7.7% p.a., well below nominal GDP growth which averaged about 11.5%; (v) collection of taxes on net income and profit. (23.4% of t#x rvevnue) also grew at a rate significantly slower than GDP, suggesting an inadequate enforcement of business income taxes; (vi) collection of other taxes (e.g., property taxes) stagnated because of a poor aseseevuent ijn4 enforcement (reliance on outdated property rolls); and (vii) the scal. cf tax arrears remained significant, particularly for business income tax a" essed which amounted to 18.9% as of mid-1985. 14. In recognition of these issues, the Government has initiated a series of measures to increase revenue mobilization: the Tax Code is now being reviewed; a decision has been taken to discontinue the system of special agreements ("conventions sphciales") under which extensive tax holidays and other benefits were bestowed upon certain enterprises; 4/ a study of indirect subsidies is currently being conducted; the tax base is being expanded (e.g., by introduction of a fiscal cadaster in the Greater Dakar area); and the tax and customs administration are being strengthened (e.g., by reorganization of the Tax Department). Tightening of existing loopholes in the tax system and of its administration is probably of a higher priority than trying to introduce new revenue-generating instruments (such as Government bonds and Treasury notes) at this time. 15. Current Expenditures. The reduction in current expenditures has been achieved largely at the expense of outlays for maintaining existing assets and 4arosion of the real wages of the civil servants. Neither trend can be ptrsued indefinitely without endangering the recovery strategy adopted in "the medium-term adjustment program. As shown in Table 3.2 above. IuAigetary current expenditures declined from 20.9% of GD? in 1982/83 to a10e$tihata4 &% in 1985/86. They increased, thus, at an average rate of jut _ 'in nominal terms over the 1982/83-1985/86 period. Wages and salaites whiVh represent roughly half of current budgetary expenditures X 41 TheXC tom Department estimated the revenue lost incurred by granting duty exonerations to some 20 enterprises at about CFAF 40 billion p.a. - ~~~over the post 4 yearsf. . * .~~~~~~. 1/ . ~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~ . . I , 5, :. I "' ; . ' . ' ' . 4'- - 46 - increased at about the same pace. Expenditures on materials, supplies and maintenance have decreased sharply from about 201 of total current budget- asy expenditures in 1982/83 to 151 in 1984/85. Contractual interest on the Government's external debt representing 19% of current budgetary expendi- ture, as against 7.7% as recently as 1980/81. 16. Despite its austerity policies, the Government has not been able to fully adjust current budgetary expenditures to tax revenue which has only covered some 87.52 of the former between 1982/83 and 1985/86. The present adjustment formula, based on maintaining civil servants' nominal wage increases below inflation and reducing the budget for operating and maintenance expenditures, cannot by itself solve the structural deficit of the budget. The alternatives are, first, to increase the tax effort by broadening the tax base and improving tax assessment and collection; and second, to consider deep cuts in the size of the civil service and in the transfers and subsidies to the parapublic sector. According to current plans, parapublic sector subsidies are to be reduced by at least 50S by 1989/90 (in nominal terms). As well, the Government is proposing a study of indirect subsidies to parapublic enterprises, in an attempt to quantify price subsidies, transfers in kind, and tax benefits. 17. A functional analysis of current budgetary expenditure is being undertaken by the Government in order to determine whether intersectoral and intrasectoral budgetary allocations conform to national priorities. A review undertaken by the Bank during the first SAL implementation revealed that while no major sectoral distortions were evident, there was a generalized under-provision for operating and maintenance expenditures. An examination of more recent data indicates a decline in the quality and volume of services offered by the Government in the areas of health, social and economic services, and general public services. A more efficient allocation of current expenditures would also free more resources for maintaining and operating existing assets. There is, finally, important potential gains in the areas of improved procurement policies and practices, improved matching of staff with the tasks at hand, additional incentives for budgetary savings, design of less-costly-to-operate invest- ments, cost-recovery schemes. 18. The education sector deserves special attention in this context, as it consumes about 201 of Government's current expenditures, 60S of these outlays being for secondary and higher education. The Government has already identified a number of specific measures to address this issue in the context of the preparation of the Primary Education Development project. It intends to: improve the use of personnel (widespread intro- duction of multigrade and double-shift classrooms, increased use of associate teachers, redeployment of administrative staff to teaching positions); expand cost-recovery schemes (student loans, cost-sharing arrangements with local communities); emphasize rehabilitation and mainten- ance of existing facilities; favor low-cost/low-maintenance investments using local designs, materials and labor; consolidate specialized civil service schools to increase student/teacher ratios; and strengthen sector resource management at all levels. - 47 - 19. Capital Expenditures. 5/ Government's capital expenditures have declined from just over 4% of GDP between the fiscal years 1981-83 to about 31 in 1984-86. The budgetary allocation for counterpart financing of foreign-financed projects was sharply curtailed as part of the ongoing fiscal austerity program; "national" projects (projects without external financing) were virtually eliminated from the investment budget (BNE), and a large proportion of external financing was diverted to budgetary support. If not compensated elsewhere In the program, these developments could erode the productive foundation of the economy and the tax base. 20. For the Sixth Plan period (1981/82 - 1984/85), Government capital expenditures amounted to CPAF 170 billion, or about CFAF 42 billion on average per year. Using the Plan data 6/, it would appear that financing did not represent a constraint: sufficient financing for 942 of the cost of foreseen Sixth Plan investments was secured by end-June 1985. However, Plan execution amounted to only 74X of the financing secured. The Sixth Plan investment was heavily biased towards industry and mining (391 of total expenditure), while agriculture received only 11.51. The financial execution rate varied by sector: low execution of under 501 for urban water supply; average execution of 50-70% in maritime transport, telecom- munications, tourism or other infrastructure; and relatively high execution of above 70% in most other sectors. 21. Conclusion. The preceding evaluation of the use of public resources shows that the fiscal austerity programs have been successful in containing overall Government expenditures and reducing the fiscal deficit but that these results have been obtalned to some extent at the expense of investment and of the quality of public services and that the policies followed so far could not be prolonged indefinitely without jeopardizing the basis for economic recovery. In the future, policy should focus more on efforts to expand Senegal's taxable base and improve tax assessment and collection; to introduce budgetary reform; and to increase the share of government resources to be made available for the operation and maintenance of public services, for the rehabilitation of public assets and for essential new public investments. 22. The Government wage bill deserves special attention: as long as this item consumes such a large share of available tax revenues (56.7% in the last three fiscal years), Senegal will have great difficulty in 5/ A more detailed analysis of Government and parapublic sector capital expenditures and their place in the economy is found in Senegal - Public Investment Program Review, op. cit. 6/ The 4-year plans have traditionally defined "investment" to include Government, parapublic sector, and private modern sector capital expenditures. - 48 - eliminating the fiscal deficit while, at the same time, maintaining civil servants' motivation. The short-run target was to reduce the above ratio by freezing the number of civil servants and their salary scales. However, the experience of other countries in a similar situation suggests that the only long-term solution to this problem is to achieve a reduction in the numbers of the civil service. 7/ It is thus advisable for the Government to undertake a study in order to identify the activities which could profitably be transferred to the private sector as well as to implement a department by department staff audit to identify where overstaffing is occurring. D. Making Better Use of Public Resources 23. The previous sections have attempted to document the serious constraint on resources facing Senegal's public sector and the pressure building on the allocation of these resources. While efforts should be directed in the longer term to the generation of additional resources, they should be complemented in the short run by greater efforts to improve the allocation of existing resources. This will require improvements in four areas: Mi) the information base for economic and financial management; (ii) planning and the execution of the current budget; (iii) design and execution of the public investment progam; and (iv) management of the parapublic sector. 24. Better Information Systems for Economic Management. Although economic data problems are by no means unique to Senegal, their absence or shortcomings can lead to unwarranted decisions, to waste of precious time and staff resources, and to an inability to monitor the impact of measures which have been implemented. Major weaknesses exist as regards the avail- ability, quality, consistency and timeliness of data, as related to the needs of decision-makers. 25. These weaknesses result in major deficiencies in the macro- economic data base (e.g., national accounts, prices and deflators, foreign trade, debt, investment, income disttibution, demographic indicators), sectoral data to support specific reforms (e.g., industrial or agricultural statistics, labor statistics)* and economic and financial forecasts. The production of most of these data could be speeded up and improved through measures to upgrade the capacity of the Statistics Department, to improve 7/ See also Peter C. Bloch, "Senegal: A Study of Public Sector Employment Policies", University of Wisconsin, Land Tenure Center, May 1985. - 49 - the approach to data collection and their distribution, and to better define the responsibilities of various Government departments involved in the collection of statistics. Projects such as household consumption surveys or a population census will have to be expedited. 26. Budgetary System. To improve the workings of the budget system, efforts should concentrate on improving its flexibility, transparency, management, control and forecasting - in short, ensuring that budgetary revenue and expenditure decisions are consistent with policy priorities and faithfully executed. 27. The rigidity of Senegal'e budgetary system is typified by the application of the so-called 'szivices votes" system. Under procedures established by Law no. 75-64, most budgetary appropriations are auto- matically carried forward from the previous year's level. Although the law, in theory, allows the reevaluation of the appropriateness or priority of expenditures during the preparation of the annual budget, in practice almost all expenditure authorizations are automatically renewed within the overall limit of the new budget. Even the relatively few "new measures" are virtually automatic, since they mainly concern the hiring of graduates from Government training schools and debt service. Thus, the budget cannot and does not reflect changing priorities, be it between different depart- ments or between types of expenditure. While the Government considers that the introduction of "performance budgeting" is not feasible at this time, the need remains, however, for much greater flexibility in the budgetary allocation system, and resolution of this problem is especially desirable in the current period of budgetary contraction. 28. Improved allocation of public resources also requires greater transparency in the current budget in order to present information in a more useful way. Among the measures to be considered are: (i) a more complete coverage of the Central Government's financial operations in the budget, for example by including extra-budgetary revenues and expenditures (e.g., the external debt amortization fund, price stabilization funds), as well as certain indirect transfer items (e.g., guarantees on borrowing by parapublic enterprises, tax exemptions); (ii) a clearer separation of current and capital expenditures, e.g., by integrating into the current budget all recurrent charges currently financed through the capital budget; (iii) the consolidation by user of certain budgetary allocations and expen- ditures (e.g., subsidies and transfers to parapublic enterprises); and (iv) the introduction of a functional classification of expenditures in the current budget and for certain categories within it, such as subsidies to the parapublic sector. 29. To strengthen the management of expenditures and, at the same time, to improve the quality of public services, the following actions are needed: (a) in the area of personnel management, which has not received suf- ficient attention by the Government so far, there is need for: (i) the introduction of an efficient system for classification, - 50 - storage and retrieval of information; (ii) improved coordination in this area among the departments involved (MFP, MEF, President's Office and the administrative units in other ministries); (iII) measures to improve civil servants' motivation (e.g., replacing seniority salary raises by merit increases, strengthening the control of work attendance and performance, application of sanctions for unsatisfactory performance); (iv) measures to simplify the 'corps" system, and to reduce their number in order to improve career development for civil servants and staff reallocation among departments; (b) in the area of procurement, the existing system leads to slow processing and Increased costs, even though it is basically sound. Taking into account the complexity of the procurement system with a view to simplifying it in due course, emphasis In the short term could be put on speeding up the internal proces- sing of documents and on understanding better (and conforming to) donors' disbursement procedares; (c) in the area of debt management, the main priorities are to: (i) complete the external debt management system to include real- time recording of actual transactions, including the issuance of payment orders to avoid the re-emergence of arrears although much progress has already been achieved on this front; (ii) expand the system to cover domestic debt, short-term debt, and grants; (iii) link the debt monitoring system to the financial monitoring of the execution of investment projects; (iv) improve the debt reporting by DDI to other departments of MEF and other minis- tries; and (v) develop a borrowing strategy and a monitoring system for assessing actual performance against that strategy; and (d) concerning domestic arrears, steps have been taken to (i) estab- lish standard criteria for repayment and an allocation system; and (ii) complete the inventory and reconciliation of arrears and negotiate a schedule for their settlement. New measures should be implemented to prevent the accumulation of new arrears. 30. The existing mechanisms for budgetary control of expenditures are cumbersome, costly and have a limited impact on the improved allocation of budgetary resources. They emphasize legalistic and procedural aspects rather than the output of the system. Steps should be taken to simplify the procedures used in the control of procurement, contract and payments; to reduce the multiplicity of the control agencies monitoring similar aspects; to eliminate, whenever poEsible, ex ante controls; and to provide the necessary feed-back in order to prevent the recurrence of the same issues observed by control agencies. 31. Finally, an extended forecasting of current expenditure trends could improve resource allocation. Multiannual financial planning could give the Government sufficient lead time to define and implement changes in - 51 - budgetary allocations according to changing circumstances and objectives. This task would require a significant revamping, strengthening and consoli- dation of existing forecasting capabilities within the Ministries of Finance and Planning and the Central Bank. 32. Public Investment Programming According to Development Needs. The Government has made sigaificant progress in addressing some of the issues raised by the previous CEM with regard to public Investment manage- ment. The new Development Plan has improved its analytical justification of resource allocation according to sectoral strategies and priority action programs. The overall size of investment was reduced to reflect the resource constraint; directly productive investment is increasingly being left to the private sector; public investment is increasingly being focused on rehabilitation and maintenance of existing assets and on up- stream projects which permit future private Investment to take place; project selection and screening criteria (including recurrent cost impact) are being applied more systematically; and the first steps have been taken to introduce a rolling three-year investment program and consolidated investment budget. 33. The continuing resource constraint necessitates pursuing and amplifying these reforms. The following actions, inter alia, deserve priority: (i) strengthening the institutions involved in project prepa- ration and investment programming (MPC, MEF, technical ministries) and Implementing an effective inter-departmental system of project screening; (ii) generating more domestic resources for the investment budget; (iII) tightening budget discipline in using external funds and streng- thening project management; (iv) improving the coordination of aid donors' programs; (v) accelerating the introduction of the system of computerized physical and financial monitoring of public investment execution; (vi) pro- viding a firm linkage with the current budget by strengthening the system for estimating recurrent costs and submitting consolidated forecasts of recurrent costs of investments; and (vii) ensuring consistency between the general macro-economic framework, the sectoral strategies needed to guide investment, and the projected impact of the investment program on the economy. E. Conclusion 34. The preceding analysis indicates that, so far, the results of the financial adjustment are mixed. Fiscal performance has improved largely at the cost of allowing existing assets to deteriorate and civil servants to become demotivated. An attempt to improve the public finance situation more permanently has already begun and will require structural changes to increase the taxable base, improve revenue collection, and reduce the size of the civil service. The improvement of the current account balance has been marginal because of the weak performance of exports. The new incen- tives already introduced or proposed in agriculture and industry require considerably more time to yield results. The short-term growth and export prospects are modest, while the medium-term prospects will heavily depend on the private sector's response to the new incentives. - 52 - 35. The objectives set by the Government's Medium and Long-Term Adjustment Program remain valid, but to achieve them Senegal would have to make a more determined effort to contain the growth of public consumption, to improve the efficiency of public investment, to mobilize domestic savings, and to encourage private investment. While continuing to intro- duce structural adjustment measures, Senegal could and should improve the use of public resources by taking steps to improve the information base for development management, to improve the execution of the current budget (flexibility, transparency, management and control of operations), to speed up the introduction of the new system for programming and budgeting public investment, and to accelerate parapublic sector reforms. 36. In the next phase of the adjustment program, more effort ought to be devoted to identifying and implementing changes of a more structural nature in resource allocation, while broadening the scope of supply- stimulation policies. The former concerns, for example, reviewing the Government's role in the economy, the modalities of its intervention, the organization of public administration, staffing policies and practices, and budgetary procedures (including allocation of resources between current and capital expenditures). The latter (as shown in Chapter IV), points to the need for a longer-term perspective of economic development options. - 53 - CHAPTER IV: RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS 1. The previous three chapters have described the recent trends of stagnation and unemployment in Senegal's economy, the difficult prospects for a quick acceleration in growth, and the measurable progress that is being made to reduce domestic and external payment deficits. Chapter II provided detailed projections of growth in the real sectors of the economy, while Chapter III examined hov the Government has been coping with the heavy pressure of demand on its financial resources. This concluding chapter focuses on external financing requirements. The first section provides an analysis of aid and other sources of external capital and financing, by type and use, for the past five years (1981-85); the second examines the growth and evolving structure of Senegal's external debt over this period, the resources needed to service it, and the benefits and costs associated with Senegal's debt rescheduling agreements signed between 1981 and 1986; the third compares the likely growth in aid disbursements and private capital flows with the external financing requirements which result from the medium-term projections presented in Chapter II. The chapter concludes with a section evaluating Senegal's options and prospects for achieving an overall balance on the balance of payments without permanent recourse to exceptional financing; that section also identifies priorities for economic policy. A. Review of Aid Commitments/Flows, 1981-85 Commitments 2. During the period 1981-85, commitments of medium and long-term (MLT) loans plus grants averaged CFAF 190 billion, or US$520 million. Both loans and grants have behaved in a cyclical pattern. Commitments of MLT loans dropped to their lowest level in 1985, CFAF 52.4 billion, after peaking in 1982 at about CFAF 180 billion (Table 4.1). Unlike MLT loans, rants show an upward trend from 1981 to 1984, dropping for the first time in 1985 to CFAP 90 billion, or about the 1983 level. The portion of grants devoted to technical assistance has been declining since 1981: from more than half to about a third of the total grants commitments. 3. Thanks largely to loans from the African Development Fund and IDA and, in 1983, from financial institutions on unusually soft terms, conces- sioal commitments strongly increased relative to total NILT commitments during the years 1982-83; however, in the following two years, their weight declined largely because of increased commitments from financial insti- tutions, in particular from French banks. The increased availability of concessional loans during 1980-83 had a corresponding Impact on the terms of Senegal's new commitments: the average grant element jumped from 28% to 522. When commitments from financial institutions increased during 1984 and 1985, the average terms hardened (SA Table 17). The overall conces- sionality of Senegal's commitments, nevertheless, improved over the 1981-85 period. - 54 - 4. During the five years under review, the bulk of the commitments of MLT loans have come from bilateral and multilateral official sources. Howevert bilateral sources have increased their share to nearly 502 of all commitments, while multilateral sources accounted for only a quarter in 1985 compared to one half In 1981. Commitments from financial institutions accounted for the rest. Table 4.1 Commitments of MLT Loans and Grants (billions of CIA.?) 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 MLT Loans by source 92.8 179.5 80.7 137.0 52.4 Bilateral 36.4 133.2 3T9 80.5 25.5 Multilateral 47.9 30.5 35.4 29.8 13.6 Suppliers credits - 1.2 - 0.1 - Financial institutions 8.5 14.6 6.2 26.6 13.3 Concessional loans 42.9 107.6 58.6 85.4 23.9 Nonconcessional loans 49.9 71.9 22.1 46.6 28.5 Concessional loans as (%) of total loans (46.2) (59.9) (72.6) (62.3) (45.6) Grants 54.8 64.2 94.6 102.6 89.9 Total MLT loans plus grants 147.6 243.7 175.3 239.6 Total concessional as (%) of total MLT loans plus grants (66.2) (70.5) (87.4) (78.5) (80.0) Sources: World Bank Debt Reporting System (DRS) and OECD. 5. The majority of grant commitments have come from bilateral sources, with France, the United States, Canada, Italy, and Germany being the major donors. The EC has been the most important multilateral contributor of grants. 6. In 1984, 272 of the total commitments of MLT loans plus monetary grants were for budgetary support, in particular for food aid and balance of payments support, continuing the trend away from investment projects. Moreover, during the period 1981-84, commitments for budgetary support and social services combined have been rising, with the result that only half of the resources received could be allocated for investment in the productive sectors. The breakdown of technical assistance by sector is available only for 1984; it shows about three-quarters of the comitments going to the quaternary sector, thus implying an even lower priority for the productive sectors. - 55 - Disbursements 7. Gross disbursements to Senegal (excluding the operations account of the Central Bank with the French Treasury) averaged CPAF 226 billion, or US$610 million, during the period 1981-85. They consisted, in order of importance, of HLT loans, grants, private nonguaranteed flows, and IMP purchases. Disbursements of MLT loans increased by about 15% in 1985 to an estimated CFAF 97 billion, or 60m ore than in 1981. Bilateral sources accounted for half of the total (see SA Table 13). 8. After a strong upward trend between 1981 and 1984, disbursements of grants are estimated to have dropped to about CFAF 50 billion in 1984. It should be noted that, historically, grant disbursemuents to Senegal have grown at a rapid pace: by 6.5 times in nominal terms and 4.5 times in per capita terms between 1970 and 1984. In those 15 years, they have accounted for 3.5 to 4.5% of grant disbursements to Sub-Saharan Africa; moreover, in 1984, per capita grants were CPAP 6,000 for the region but more than CFAF 16,000 for Senegal. Despite the recent drop, per capita grants to this country are still double the average for Sub-Saharan Africa 1/. 9. After falling sharply in 1982 and 1983, gross disbursements to the private sector (excluding banks of deposits) recovered in 1984 and 1985 when they reached CPAF 37 billion. These flows are highly volatile and are derived as a residual; they should, therefore, be interpreted with caution. The available data nevertheless suggest that the 1984-85 increase went in part to the expansion of the textile industry and, in part, to finance rising current imports. 10. The substantial improvement in the overall deficit of Senegal's balance of payments during 1981-84 reduced the need for DMP purchases, which declined from CPAF 19.3 billion in 1981 to CFAF 14.3 billion in 1984. Followlng a sharp rebound in 1985, new purchases from the IMF amounted to CFAF 17.1 billion in 1986, including CFAF 5.9 billion from the Structural Adjustment Facility. 11. Private transfer, including workers' remittances and flows from foreign private organizations, are estimated at CPAF 41 billion in 1985. These flows are the fastest-growing external receipts of Senegal having more than doubled since 1981; in 1985, they amounted to half of the central Government's gross drawings on MLT loans--ap from roughly a quarter in 1981. 1/ World Bank, World Development Report 1986. 56 - Not Flows 12. After rising in 1983 and 1984, net flows (disbursements minus amortization) to Senegal dropped in 1985 (from CFAF 119 billion in 1984 to CFAF 115 billion) because of a fall in net short-term capital inflows to banks of deposit and in grants that more than offset the growth of MLT bor- rowings. Total net flows to Senegal have been boosted by 11% annually during the last five years as a result of the yearly reschedulings with the Paris and London Clubs. However, total actual payments have been increasing rapidly since 1983, as amortization for MLT loans rose because of the contraction of the pool of loans eligible for rescheduling. This phenomenon is to continue in the next few years; the original loans eligible for London Club rescheduling have practically dried out. B. External Public Debt and Debt Service Debt Outstandind 13. During the period 1981-85, Senegal's total public debt out- standing nearly doubled in dollar terms and increased by over 2.4 times in terms of CFA francs (Table 4.2). As the US dollar appreciated rapidly between 1981 and 1984, Senegal's debt denominated in CFAF suffered the extra burden of the adverse exchange rate, but with the depreciation of the US dollar beginning in 1985, the CFAP-denominated debt virtually stagnated despite the new disbursements and riduced payments resulting from reschedulings. Total debt increased by an average of more than 40% a year in 1981-83, reaching 78% of GDP in 1983, because of rapid increases in all categories of debt, including IMF credit. The pace of growth slowed down to 14% in 1984 due to the moderate increase registered In medium and long-term debt and IMF credit, and a reduction of short-term obligations. Although the growth amounted to just 3X in 1985, the stock of public debt (CFAF 954 billion) is estimated to have reached 98% of GDP. The ratio of total public debt to GDP nearly doubled over the period 1981-85, and the ratio of total debt to annual exports of goods and NFS services fared even worse, increasing from 137% in 1981 to 318% in 1985. Per capita external debt grew from CFAF 223,000 to CFAF 385,000 over those four years - an increase of 77X. 14. The share of MLT debt in the stock of outstanding disbursed debt was 79% at the end of 1985; short-term obligations and IMF credit represented 11 and 10%, respectively. - 57 - Table 4.2 External Public Debt Outstanding, 1981-85 (CF4A billion, End of Period) 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 Medium- and long-term loans 289.1 416.3 625.0 734.4 757.4 Bilateral 105.2 195.6 340.8 4i2.3 448.0 Multilateral 100.3 130.6 196.5 237.2 212.9 Suppliers' credits 12.9 10.8 6.7 4.3 2.3 Financial institutions 69.6 78.3 80.4 80.1 93.8 Other 1.1 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.3 Short-term debt a/ 60.6 85.9 100.6 94.2 104.7 IMP credit 42.5 61.9 82.1 96.4 92.0 Total debt outstandlng 392.5 564.1 807.7 925.0 954.1 Memo items: Concessional 138.2 193.2 289.9 371.1 347.9 Concessional loans as (2) of total DOD (35.2) (34.3) (35.9) (40.0) (36.5) aI Foreign liabilities of the Central Bank, excluding IMF credit. Source: SA Table 16, DRS and IMF. 15. In 1981, bilateral and multilateral creditors (excluding the IMF) accounted for over a quarter each of Senegal's total public debt, while financial institutions accounted for 182. By the end of 1985, a marked shift in the composition had occurred: while the share of multilateral sources (excluding the INM) and financial institutions declined to 22% and 10%, respectively, the share of bilateral sources almost doubled (to 47%) as a result of increasing borrowing and, especially, as a consequence of the repeated reschedulings of principal and interest payments. The share of suppliers' credits, even though small in 1981, had declined to less than 1% by the end of 1985, reflecting a lack of meaningful new loans in view of the creditworthiness problem of the country. Debt Service and Reschedulings 16. Senegal's total scheduled external public debt service obliga- tions increased by 1.9 times between 1981 and 1985: from CFAF 42.5 billion in 1981 to ClAF 80.5 billion in 1985, with obligations on IMF credit and short-term public debt rising from CFAF 4 billion to 32 billion. The scheduled obligations rose from 17.2% of exports of goods and NFS in 1981 to 31% in 1985. Although these figures do not appear excessively high when compared to other countries, Senegal has been unable to meet its debt service obligations. - 58 - 17. Senegal has turned to the Paris and London Clubs five times to reschedule its debt service obliptions. Agreements were signed with official bilateral creditors under tlhe auspices of the Paris Club in 1981 through 1983 and again in January 1985 and in December 1986 for each of the six fiscal years 1981/82-86/87. As a result of the 1986 agreement, bilateral creditors granted debt t'lief covering 1001 of the principal and interest payments scheduled for,the period July 1986 through October 1987. In May 1985, an agreement was,also signed with the London Club, which granted debt relief for the payments of principal owed to financial institutions falling due in the fiscal years 1984/85 and 1985/86. In addition, Senegal obtained some debt relief from Saudi Arabia and Oman regarding payments due in the same two years. The total debt relief obtained from all sources until thie end of fiscal year 1986/87 is estimated to amount to CFAF 177 billion. 18. As a result of these resehedulings, actual debt service payments were lower than were shown In paragraph 17 abov;e bu nevertheless increasing. They rose from CPAF 29.2 billion in 1981 to an estimated CFAP 79.6 billion in 1985, or from 10.8 to 22.11 of exports of goods and NFS. This is explained by several factors: i*creasing payments to the IMF and on short-term obligations of the Central Bank; increasing payments to the multilateral institutions, which are not eligible for debt rescheduling; and lncreasing payments to bilateral creditors and financial institutions, as the pool of loans eligible for rescheduling began to shrink. 19. Because of the significant recent depreciation of the US dollar- and the CFAF being pegged to the French franc--the external debt obli- gations of Senegal in CFAF have been iiduced by about 30%. In addition, the country stands to benefit significantly from the drop in oil and rice prices, given its high volume of imports of these commodities. The windfall from these favorable external tircumstances could make it easier for the country to service the large obligations due over the period 1986-90. If the country were to-choose to use these savings for other purposes, debt rescheduling could still be avoided by obtaining either monetary grants or highly concessional loans in amounts which permit servicing the debt; this would avoid not only postponing the payments due, but it would also save the added interest. To help reduce the servicing of external debt, concessional loans might also be obtained to pay off the debt outstanding to financial institutions. Some quick inflows could be generated by accelerating the rate of execution of foreign-financed projects: according to donor representatives in Dakar, there is significant room for such acceleration. il ,/xL @ I 9':) . * X, | *K'- ~~~~~~59 ) '7 VS* I,J 4 )i -C. Balance of Payments Projections 20. 'It will be r;alled from Chapter II that Senega1' ability to expaUd4.ts export earn"Ings would have a major influence on whether the ;taSit g1!pth rite wuld be reached. The export growth that can be *chieved~',Il also laigely determine: 1 (a) the feasible growth in incomes; k .j u j (b) the cApa,ity to import and invest; and * '7',5 (c). thq capaci.y to service the external public debt without . i ,< ' Jtt$ relief. A particulu; -r4ison for concern in this connoction is that for most of . i;/ Senegal'- ikstingmajor exports a decline in the rate of growth (in .Kvv;lume) after 1,94 seems much more likely than an increase. d. -, Q SAThe pToj-etions regarding GDP, investmmet, imports, and external ; rt are summarized in Table 4.3 below. Table 4.3 Selected Results of the Medium-Term Projections (Annual increase, % p.a.) 1986-90 1990-95 I$forts (volume) 3.8 2.7 '> Exiorts (value) 8.6 7.0 '. (real terms) 3.5 3.5 K . nv esicent. (real) 3.5 3.9 2.8 3.0 'f ' rts (v4u4a\ 6.7 6.9 ;'; Delbt outsaiadivg 6.5 5.8 Source: Annex SA Tw-ble 36. rk lo owho 11 ort growth after 1990 compared to the 1986-90 period is ''du ei ioly *to projected stagnation in the groundnut sector once > } J productlon Ms regained the peak reached In the early yeare of the 1980s. , por. .f fXp6fhosphate rock and phosphate-based fertilizers will be to trainidQby both demand and supply. The modest overall export outlook -ai(r .19'O has two important implications: efforts to contain imports will have to do *inqe in order to maintain the external deficits at sustainable 7 , . .. 7 7 jN 2> ... . , ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~* ,'7 5 {A ', _ i , . t )7 '7 o \, ,} ' '\ \ { _7 . - 60 - levels; and the sources of overall economic growth will become more balanced with domestic dwtand playing a relatively larger role. 22. Assuming a constant exchange rate of CFAF 345 - US$1 2/ and the commodity projections detailed in Table 2.2 above, the projected resource gap under the target-growth scenario is shown in Table 4.4 (complete year-by-year projections are provided in Annex SA Table 36). As a proportion of GDP the resource gap would decline gradually, though more and more slowly after 1990, to a level of around 3% by 1995. Table 4.4 Projected Resource Gap, 1986-95 1986 1988 1990 1995 (CPAF billionsTF Exports GNFS 3X5 450 514 725 Imports GNFS 445 514 584 812 Resource balance -70 -64 -70 -87 GDP at market prices 1296 1543 1839 2820 Res.bal./GDP (X) -5.4 -4.1 -3.8 -3.1 23. The above trend in GDP and resource gap would inevitably be interrupted by random disturbances to production volumes and to international market conditions. But even assuming that these disruptive events could be overcome through short-term adjustment measures, the above projections still rely on the progressive development of an export structure where non-traditional exports play an increasingly important role. The constraints to economic growth, including export growth -- detailed in section G of chapter II -- unless successfully surmounted, could not only reduce real GD? growth below the target level but would also prevent the improvement In the resource gap as shown in Table 4.4. 24. By estimating of the quantities and types of "regular" aid (excluding "exceptional" assistance) which could be available each year to Senegal, and taking Into account the annual interest charges engendered by this aid, it is possible to estimate the current account balance (including / Since the projections were finalized, the dollar has fallen further to about ClAF 300 - $1. The higher exchange rate of the CFAP vis-&-vis the dollar would, if it persists, make it more difficult to achieve the export growth rate required to obtain the target GDP growth rate. - 61 - interest and current transfers) 3/. The assumptions made about such aid for the purpose of this exercise may be summarized as follows: (a) the total value and the composition of new commitments vill reflect the average, in terms of CFAF* reported by the Bank's Debt Reporting System for the years 1982-85, growing by a rate of 3% p.a. in real terms (i.e., 3% in excess of the international rate of inflation as measured by the Bank's projected unit value index of exports of manufactured goods from selected developed countries to developing countries); (b) grant aid (i.e., official transfers in the balance of pay- ments) will also increase by 3% annually in real terms; (c) the average disbursement profile for each type of aid will neither shortiei nor lengthenj, by comparison with the recent past. 25. The projected current account deficit, derived on the basis of the above assumptions, is shown below. Although the deficit will increase in nominal terms towards the end of this decade, it is expected to fall progressively as a proportion of projected GDP, to 2.9% by 1995. Table 4.5 Projected Current Account Deficit, 1986-95 a/ 1986 1988 1990 1995 (CFAF billions) Current Account -70 -64 -69 -83 As (X) of GDP (5.5) (4.1) (3.7) (2.9) a/ Includes official transfers and grants. Source: SA Table 36. 26. Capital Flows and Additional Financing. Table 4.6 summarizes the projection results as far as net capital flows and remaining financing requirements are concerned. Because of the bunching of scheduled repay- ments in the next few years as a result of earlier reschedulings, net 3/ The current account formulation used in the text of this chapter corresponds to that used by the IMN and by Senegal itself, to facilitate comparison with these sources. - 62 - capital flows to Senegal are projected to be lower in the remaining years of the 1980s compared to their level in 1986. If new commitments increased by 3% p.a. in real terms as assumed in our projections, then net flows would begin to recover after about 1992 (assuming no new reschedulings in the meantime). 27. The projections indicate a need for only modest additional balance of payments financing (or drop in reserves) over the 1986-95 period. The recourse to additional financing, while remaining necessary throughout the forecast period is sufficiently insignificant that, for all intents and purposes, the projections portray a scenario where a viable balance of payments is achieved from 1990 onwards. For a more detailed breakdown of the projections, see Annex SA Table 36. The implications of the projections are discussed in the next section. Table 4.6 Projected Balance of Payments, 1986-95 (CFAP billions) 1986 1988 1990 1995 Current Balance a/ -70 -64 -69 -83 Capital Account ?LT Disbursements b/ 103 119 134 177 MLT Repayments b/ -49 -72 -73 -94 Other Capital _7 21 2 2 3 Net capital 75 49 63 86 Overall Balance t -15 -6 -3 As a proportion of GDP (t) (0.4) (-1.0) (-0.3) (0.1) a/ Including official transfers and gap financing charges. b,/ Official and private sources. c/ Including short-term, commercial non-guaranteed and direct investment. Source: Annex SA Table 36. D. Conclusion External Financing 28. The above projection results suggest two important conclusions as far as external financing is concerned. The first is that debt rescheduling or relief after about 1988 is no longer a necessary feature of the total aid package -- if Senegal succeeds in its structural adjustment program. Rescheduling will probably be needed in 1987 and 1988 anyway, partly to help get over the hump of repayments due as a result of the first - 63 - reschedulings. But by 1990 Senegal would have achieved an overall balance, and could handle its external debt commitments without further rescheduling, even if the rate of growth of exports tends to slow somewhat after 1990. Should the current adjustment program, however, take substantially longer to yield positive results in output and exports, given the capital account position as projected, the deficit in the overall balance of payments would not only require continuing debt reschedulings in the future but could necessitate drastic measures to control imports, which will have a detrimental Impact on growth performance itself. 29. The above figures serve to underline the relative Importance of domestic performance as compared with external financing for balance of payments purposes. It is clearly essential that the major part, if not all, of the present CFAF 80 billion in net external capital assistance to Senegal (excluding grants) be applied to productive - i.e., income generating - uses. The value of Senegal's exports of goods and mon-factor services in 1990 being projected at CFAY 515 billion, it only takes a 1I improvement in this figure to eliminate the projected balance of payments deficit. A 10 improvement would permit the Government (were it to acquire these resources) to repay its entire stock of unpaid bills to the private sector - all in one year. A 201 improvement would cover most of the outstanding ONCAD debt due to the banks. Neither the short-term problems of economic policy nor the long-term goals of human resource development should distract attention away from this obvious truth: if Senegal is to survive economically and to pay its way, then a major effort is needed to improve its export production capacity and export competitiveness over the next five to 10 years. Priorities for Economic Policy 30. The most recent phase of Senegal's adjustment efforts has placed emphasis on financial stabilization, improved investment programming, and the design of policy reforms to encourage growth, particularly in agriculture and industry. The implementation of most of these measures is still going on and, in some cases (e.g., tariff and labor policy reforms), will take at least two uore years to complete. And it may well be another two years after that before a positive supply response can be expected from Senegal's farmers and industrial entrepreneurs or from foreign investors. In the meantime, the continued application of the necessary financial stabilization policies will inevitably have the effect of restraining the expansion of domestic demand and possibly slowing economic growth in the short-run. Yet, judging by its past experience, Senegal would be well-advised to stay on its present course rather than seek to create growth through expanding domestic demand, because the latter course would probably not work and would certainly lead to further debt servicing problems. 31. As for the broad directions in economic policy which may be needed over the next few years, some indications of priority may be given. First, the present close association between stabilization and growth objectives in the program needs to be preserved. There could be some shift - 64 - of emphasis towards the latter as the financial situation improves, but achievements made in this domain need to be conserved. (Under the present exchange rate system, the capacity of the Government to finance its deficit is bound to assume more importance than under a system where the exchange rate is adjustable.) Second, greater attention needs to be given by Government and donors to the design of more effective programs of technical and financial support for the sectoral development programs, because these are critically important if stabilization is to be accompanied by growth. Third, there is a need for continuity of financial and TA support by donors for the implementation of policy reforms which have been already started or agreed upon during the preceding phase. Such support, to be effective, will also require that continued efforts be made to improve the coordi- nation of aid and policy support among the different donor agencies. Fourth, the design of the forthcoming phases of the adjustment program should more consciously integrate long-run development issues. Examples of these issues are those concerning the difficult choices to be made in the areas of education, health and population policy, and in the strategies to be adopted for river-basin irrigation development and for countering the effects of desertification on rainfed agriculture. Greater attention to these long-range issues should also be reflected in Senegal's economic planning structures, which have tended to become preoccupied with current policy issues and short-term crisis resolution. 32. Regarding the population issue, while the Government is becoming aware of the implications of rapid population growth and supports the provision of family planning, there is a persistent reluctance from the Government to articulate a well-defined and comprehensive policy. While cultural and religious sensitivities indeed play an important role, and will have to be taken in consideration in the design of a population policy, they should not be allowed to distract from the obvious fact that, even assuming a moderate decline in the fertility rate, Senegal's population will most probably double in the next 30 years. Not only would this trend result in enormous growth in demand for basic aeeds, basic physical infrastructure and social services, it would also severely hamper the Government's objective of raising the standards of living in the country. 33. Reflecting these broad policy directions, the next phase of the adjustment program (starting in 1987) should continue the reforms initiated or agreed during the ongoing (1985-86) phase. The next phase should, like the present phase, combine production incentives with measures to improve public sector management. The scope for introducing improved incentives for production in Senegal is very directly linked to the public finance situation; so, indirectly, is the speed at which some parts of the economy can be liberalized or sold off to the private sector, because of the elaborate controls and restrictions needed to compensate for the inflexible exchange rate. There will be more scope for improving production incentives as the overall financial situation improves as a result of continued tight budgetary and credit policies and continued budgetary assistance during the critical period. If either of the latter is missing, then it will be production incentives which will be the first to suffer. - 65 - 34. The two main sectors to be helped by improving incentives are agriculture and industry. In agriculture the Government should press ahead with its New Agricultural Policy (NPA), its Cereal Development Plan, and the donor-backed program to strengthen agricultural research, particularly with a view to diversifying agricultural high-value exports. The most important elements of the NPA are the rationalization of rural development agencies, the further liberalization of the internal marketing of cereals, including paddy rice, and the reorganization of the groundnut sector. The latter consists of three main elements: (a) making farmers fully responsible for producing and storing their own seed; (b) replacing the former cooperatives with licensed buying agents, and reducing the number of groundnut buying points substantially; and (c) rationalizing the use of the existing industrial capacity and sales organization by merging SONACOS and SEIB. In the interest of budgetary savings as well as of efficiency, it may be advisable to consider new measures to reduce the outflow of public funds through the CPSP in order to subsidize the sugar industry. The production costs of Senegal's one sugar-producing company are high, averaging between three to four times the comparable world price. Another new area for action would be to conduct a full review of the operations of the Food Security Commission (CSA), which is the agency in charge of enforcing the official floor price for cereals. 35. In industry, the next phase of the program would essentially consist of the implementation of the incentive policy reforms prepared and agreed during the present phase. The next two years should see the elimination of remaining quantitative restrictions and price controls, completion of the agreed process for harmonizing the customs tariff and revising the export subsidy scheme, removal of controls over the working of the labor market, and review of the "special conventions" with major industrial companies like CSS (sugar), SOCOCIM (cement), SAR (petroleum refinery), and SENELEC (electric power). The Government has already agreed to reduce tariffs in three stages over the 1986-88 period. The export subsidy, which has not been effective in promoting exports because of its low rate relative to the high level of effective protection in the domestic market, has recently been increased through the introduction of a revised subsidy scheme based on industrial value-added in international prices. An important new program in the industrial sector will be the restructuring of a number of existing industries (notably textiles) and the preparation of a plan for rationalizing the several business development banks and similar agencies such as BNDS, SOFISEDIT, and SONAGA. 36. In the area of public sector management, the main components of the next phase would concern strengthening the management of the civil - 66 - STATISTICAL APPENDIX LIST OF TABLES 1. Population by Age Group, 1985 2. GDP by Industrial Origin in Current Prices, 1981-86 3. GDP by Industrial Origin in Constant Prices, 1981-86 4. National Accounts Summary in Current Prices, 1981-86 5. National Accounts Summary in Constant Prices, 1981-86 6. GDP Deflators, 1981-86 7. Per Capita GDP and Expenditure, Three-year Moving Average 8. Origin and Use of Resources, 1959-86 9. Import Value, Volume and Prices 10, Imports of Goods and Non-Factor Services at Current Prices, 1981-86 11. Export Value, Volume and Prices 12. Exports of Goods and Non-Factor Services at Current Prices, 1981-86 13. Balance of Payments in CFAF, 1981-86 14. Balance of Payments in US Dollar, 1981-86 15. Direction of Foreign Trade, 1981-85 16. External Debt, Service Payments, Disbursements and Outstanding Amounts 17. Structure and Terms of External Public Debt 18. Medium and Long-Term External Public Debt 19. Governmnt Financial Operation 20. Budgetary Revenues, 1981-85 21. Current Expenditure, Functional Classification -22. Current Expenditures, Economic Classification 23. Minimum and Maximum Salaries for Civil Servants 24. Sixth Plan - Resource Mobilization 25. Sixth Plan - Execution 26. Seventh Plan by Year 27. Monetary Survey, 1981-86 28. Agricultural Production, Area Under Cultivation, and Yields 29. Estimated Cereals Supplies and Requirements, 1982-86 30. Indices of Industrial Production 31. Agricultural Producer Prices in Current Terms 32. Agricultural Producer Prices in Constant Terms 33. Consumer Price Indices for Senegalese Family in Dakar, 1979-85 34. Consumer price Indices for European Family in Dakar, 1979-85 35. World Prices of Selected Primary Commodities, 1985-95 36. Country Analysis Model, Summary Results - 67 - SA TABLI I SEINE¢Lt Populatfin by Age GroW, 198 (in thousans) Age asp *.**.- alot * ..... . f te *-.. . Total *---- Active Inactfve Total Active Inactive Total Active Inactive Total ......................................................................................... Less than 10 yoer 1.118 1.102 2,220 10 year u d oltdr 1,808 332 2,140 1,238 969 2,20? 3,046 1,301 4,347 of whufch: 10-14 252 161 413 161 258 419 413 419 832 14.19 256 72 328 181 154 335 437 226 663 20-24 244 29 273 153 126 279 397 155 552 25-29 222 7 229 143 90 233 365 9? 462 30.34 t89 4 193 129 6? 196 318 71 389 35-39 18 2 160 110 53 163 268 55 323 40-44 131 2 133 77 58 135 208 60 268 45;49 109 1 110 81 30 111 190 31 221 50-54 86 S 91 68 26 94 154 31 185 55.59 64 7 71 53 24 77 117 31 148 60.64 45 10 55 36 25 61 81 3s 116 65 & oldsr 52 32 84 46 58 104 98 90 188 Total Population 3,258 3,309 6,567 ................ ..... .... Distribution by Region Dakar 724 704 1,428 Kaotack 388 385 m Ofourbel & Louga 511 S22 1,033 St-Louis 303 329 632 tarbAcound 188 190 378 Ziguinchor 178 186 364 Thies 430 444 874 Fatfiek 263 275 538 Kolds 274 273 547 Source: Direction de lt Statistique, uSituation Economfque, 1985." - 68 - SA TALE 2 SENEGAL. GDP by Industriat Origin in Current Prices, 1981-86 (billions of current CFAF) 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 b/ 196 b/ Primary sector 121.1 185.7 204.? 174.1 218.8 -.90.2 Agriculture 54.1 111.9 119.1 74.8 99.3 156.4 Livstock 41.5 45.7 S4.2 64.2 79.0 92.0 FfhWng 15.9 18.0 20.8 24.0 27.8 28.8 Foretry 9.6 10.1 10.6 11.1 12.? 13.0 Seondary Sector 171.6 205.0 23S.S 280.4 330.1 344.4 ..... ..... . . ..... .......... ....... ............... ifnfin 12.8 12.2 13.? 16.5 20.4 20.5 Oit Nills 4.3 7.0 18.8 19.0 23.8 27.8 energy 8.2 8.6 12.8 16.2 18.8 22.9 Construction 42.8 S1.2 71.2 72.3 78.1 84.3 Other trnstry 103.5 126.0 119.0 156.4 189.0 188.9 Services 254.6 316.9 349.8 396.1 434.2 484.0 transportation 48.1 60.8 66.7 79.0 87.0 97.1 Co- eerc 136.8 167.2 189.6 206.9 236.0 249.8 Other Services 69.7 88.9 93.5 110.2 111.2 137.1 Domtic Production S47.3 707.6 790.0 850.6 983.1 1118.6 Saltries 122.5 136.7 149.5 164.9 168.9 176.7 Pubalic el 113.0 125.9 138.0 153.5 155.0 162.0 Housiehold 9.S 10.8 11.5 11.4 13.9 14.7 Gross Domtic Product 669.8 844.3 939.S 1015.5 11S2.0 1295.3 ausw ama .saa ina aus age,.-w a/ Includes public enterprises. b/ Preliminary estimates. Source: Direction de ta Prevision, Ministry of EconWmy and Finance (HEF), December 198 and Jeruary 1987. Estimates for 1981 have ben finalited by the Statistics Department, HEF; the rest are provisional. - 69 - SA TABLE 3 SENEGAL: GDP by Industrial Origin in Constant Prices, 1981-86 (billions o 1979 CFAF) 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 b/ 1986 bl ............................................................................. Primary Sector 107.6 134.3 140.9 114.3 123.4 135.5 ..... ..... . ..... ..... . . ..... .......... .... ........... Agricuiture 50.5 75.2 80.1 46.4 51.2 60.8 Livestock 34.8 35.7 36.8 41.9 45.3 46.8 Fishing 11.3 12.4 13.0 15.0 15.8 16.6 Forestry 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.1 11.3 Secondary Sector 144.6 166.3 170.1 167.0 170.4 177.2 ,...................... ..... ....... ..... ....... ..... Mining 9.1 5.8 7.2 7.9 8.5 9.1 Oil mitts 2.8 9.2 10.2 8.7 8.9 11.6 Energy 7.1 11.7 12.3 11.2 11.6 12.0 Construction 36.0 40.8 42.6 40.4 41.4 44.4 Other Industry 89.6 98.8 97.8 98.8 100.0 100.1 Services 211.9 242.7 245.4 239.7 244.? 255.6 ,..... . ..... .......... ....... ............... Transportation 40.5 47.2 47.9 49.7 50.1 50.7 Coamerce 122.6 137.6 137.6 130.6 133.3 141.6 Other Services 48.8 57.9 59.9 59.4 61.3 63.3 Domestic Production 464.1 543.3 556.4 521.0 538.5 568.3 ..... ..... . ..... ....I. . ..... .......... ............... Salaries 94.8 100.0 104.5 109.9 116.3 116.8 Pubtic a/ 87.4 92.6 96.8 102.5 106.1 106.5 Household 7.4 7.4 7.7 7.4 10.2 10.3 Gross Domestic Product 558.9 643.3 660.9 630.9 654.8 685.1 8*2U U*ts 22U;- 232U f=3~ Z3 - a/ IncLudes public enterprises. bl Preliminary estimates. Source: Direction de la Prevision, Ministry of Economy and Finace (MEF). Deceaber 22, 1986 and January 1987. Estimates for 1981 have ben finalized by the Statistics Department MEF; the rest are provisional. - 70 - 8a TAXI 4 maL nati1d komts fy in Oamt Pdg0 1981VW6 (Qd114 of axret CM 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 l9B6 SIGNI 33I Ct3 1 A.1. GP at Ikiket Prim a/ 669.8 844.3 939.5 1015.5 1152.0 1295.3 2. dtui-tudb 121.1 185.7 204.7 174.1 218.8 290.2 3. DIftzy 171.6 205.0 235.5 280.4 330.1 341.4 a. IrF_ I darin 103.5 126.0 119.0 156.4 189.0 18B.9 b. CtbE Mas"r 68.1 79.0 116.5 124.0 141.1 15S.S 4. Sszdoms 377.1 453.6 499.3 561.0 603.1 660.7 B.l. Regowros qp 141.1 126.6 133.4 112.9 144.3 70.0 2. pworts o Gbo & MS bJ 411.1 419.8 483.6 515.1 504.6 445.0 3. Eaort of GbAs & WS c/ 270.0 293.2 350.2 402.2 360.3 375.0 C.1. 1Ttal Iqmiitur 810.9 970.9 1072.9 1128.4 1296.3 1365.3 D.1. Tbtal Cam.tLah 700.8 840.5 920.7 967.7 1138.5 1185.9 2. 6mnsVa1 _ Gost d/ 150.7 169.2 186.5 206.8 213.0 226.7 3. dvte Mtia */ 550.1 671.3 734.2 760.9 925.5 9612 LI. GOm Utic wstt 1 110. 130.4 152.2 160.7 157.8 179.4 2. Flad Tx tn 41 102.4 121.5 148.3 151.8 161.3 183.0 omea osvut 30.3 35.4 40.5 441 49.3 53.0 Priyat. 72.1 89.1 107.8 107.7 112.0 130.0 3. Dwatty Invwtmmt 61 7.7 5.9 3.9 8.9 -3.5 -3.6 F.1. not rerw Fmom fU -29.7 -38.0 -6.4 -60.6 -65.9 -66.4 2. Not OCuet T rwfws f/ -2.7 -1.5 -3.4 -2.3 7.7 9.0 G.1 ar Damstic SW8 -31.0 3.8 18.8 47.8 13.5 109.4 2. Otoss IWal 6wa -63.4 -35.7 -31.0 -15.1 -4.7 52.0 3. O Gos ktrnl ftr iot 60.1 806.3 893.1 9549 1066.1 1228.9 ki.~ kti: gi LI. (2WiI 271.7 328.6 381.1 437.0 419.3 346.5 2. ai/ri 362.7 407.6 4421 446.8 441.3 409.9 a/IRTabl.1. b/laW i9 ad 10. c/ a# "Uau1 12. 4i Wz.adim de laPvi. .1 ccw&d a roUau. fMti DI.kwhu 94.197 I/ ?gid OI WErSSel JtM tkhUlm MIU 8atS tim, NC-0 198. - 71. - SA TABLE 5 SENEGAL: National Accounts Sumery In Constant Prices, 1981-86 (bfilions of CFAF at 1979 constnt prima) 1961 1982 1983 1986 1965 1986 ......................................................................................... ORIGIN AND USE OF RESOURCES ........................... A.1. GDP at farket Prices 558.9 643.3 660.9 630.9 654.8 68S.1 2. Agerculture 107.6 134.3 140.9 114.3 123.4 135.5 3. Industry 144.6 166.3 170.1 167.0 170.4 177.2 a. Nanufacturing 89.6 98.8 97.6 98.8 100.0 100.1 b. Other Industry 5S.0 67.S n.s 68.2 70.4 77.1 4. Service 306.7 342.7 349.9 349.6 361.0 m3.4 0.1. Resource Gap 111.0 88.5 79.7 67.7 75.1 47.2 2. tmports of Goods N uFS 303.4 290.1 301.0 273.0 254.3 262.0 3. Exports of Goods N UFS 192.4 201.6 221.3 205.3 179.2 214.8 C.1. Total Expenditure 669.9 731.8 740.6 698.6 729.9 732.3 0.1. Total Consumption S83.5 640.5 644.2 604.5 647.1 644.8 2. General Govornnent 115.5 120.7 12S.5 132.6 129.3 126.3 3. Private Conrunption 468.0 519.8 518.7 471.9 517.8 518.5 E.1. Gross Domestic Investment 86.4 91.3 96.4 94.0 82.8 87.5 2. Fixed Investment 80.2 87.1 93.8 88.6 84.7 89.3 General Government 23.3 24.0 24.7 25.3 25.2 25.9 Private S7.0 63.1 69.1 63.4 59.S 63.S 3. Inventory Investment 6.2 4.2 2.6 5.4 -1.9 -1.8 Memorandum Items: f 1. Net Factor Incom -24.8 *29.0 -32.6 3?.6 37.5 -35.1 2. Net Current Tr=.sfers -2.3 -1.1 .2.4 .1.4 4.4 4.8 G.1 Gross Domestic Savirg *24.6 2.8 16.7 26.3 7.? 40.3 2. Gross NationL Saving -51.6 -27.3 -18.4 -12.8 .25.4 10.0 3. Gross National Product 534.1 614.3 628.3 593.2 617.3 650.0 ......................................................................................... Sources: Dfrection de to Provision; and SA Tables 3, 4. 12. -72- SA TAKE 6 SENEGAL: GDP etftators, 1981*86 C19?9100) ................... ................... ...... ......*.-.-.-.-*-*--- ...................jes----- 1981 ¶962 1983 1984 198S 196 ................................................. ............................................................................. . ORIGIN AND USE OF RESOURCES ........................... A.1, GOP at Market Prices 119.8 131.2 142.2 161.0 17549 189.1 2. AgricuLture 112.5 138.3 145.3 152.3 177.3 214.2 3. Industry 118.7 123.3 138.4 167.9 193.8 194.4 a. Kenufacturing 11S.5 127S 121.7 158.3 189.0 188.7 b. Other Industry 123.8 117.0 161.1 181.8 200.5 201.7 4. Services 123.0 132.4 142.? 160.5 167.1 177.4 3.1. Resource GaP 127.1 143.1 167.4 166.8 192.1 148.3 2. Imports of Goods & WFS 13S.5 144.7 160.7 188.7 198.4 169.8 3. Exports of Goods & NFS 140.3 14.4 138.2 19f.9 201.1 174.6 C.1. Total Expenditure 121.0 132.? 144.9 161.5 177.6 186.4 0.1. Total Consumption 120,1 131.2 142.9 160.1 175.9 183.9 2. General Government 130.5 10.1, 148.5 156.0 164.? 178.0 3. Private Consumption 117.6 129.2 141.6 161.2 178.7 185.4 E.1. Gross Domestic Investment 127.4 142.8 157.9 170.9 190.6 204.9 2. Fixed Investment 127.6 142.9 158.1 171.3 190.5 204.9 General Goverreent 130.2 14?.? 164.1 174.6 195.9 203.0 Private 126.6 141.1 15S.9 170.0 188.2 204.9 3. Inventory Investment 124.2 140.2 151.6 164.6 183.7 203.6 Nemorandum Items: f.1. Net Factor Income 119.8 131.2 142.2 161.0 17S.9 189.1 2. Net Current Transfers 119.8 131.2 142.2 161.0 175.9 189.1 G.1 Gross Domestic saving 126.2 135.4 112.? 181.6 175.8 271.2 2. Gross National Saving 122.9 130.8 168.9 118.4 176.0 520,7 3. Gross NationaL Product 119.8 131.2 142.2 161.0 175.9 189.1 ........................................................................................ Source: SA tables 4 and 5. A ' 't'a w1 ). - ' . i .- 73 AS TABLE 7 ;SINIGAL: Per Cit$ GMP and Expenditure, Three-Year Noving Aversge ( thousands of CfA francs at 1979 prices) 1979- 1980. 1981- 1962- 1983- growth 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1979-81/ ..................................................................... 1983-85 ORIGIN kwD USE OF RESOURCES MX) *.. . . period annual A.1. GDP at market prices 99.5 100.3 102.9 103.9 101.4 1.9 0.5 2. Agriculture 21.1 20.2 21.1 20.9 19.7 6.5 -1.7 3. Industry 24.7 25.5 26.6 27.0 26.4 7.1 1.7 a. mumfacturing 14.3 15.2 15.8 15.9 15.5 8.4 2.0 b. other industry 10.4 10.3 10.8 11.2 11.0 5.3 1.3 4. Services S3.? 54.6 55.2 S5.9 55.3 2.9 0.7 3.1. Rasource Gap 15.0 16.3 15.4 12.7 11.6 -22.8 *6.3 2. lIports of Goods & NFS 47.4 48.? 49.4 46.4 43.2 -8.9 -2.3 3. Exports of Goods & NPS 32.4 32.4 34.0 33.? 31.6 2.5 .0.6 C.I. Total Expenditure 114.6 116.6 118.4 116.5 113.0 -1.3 -0.3 D.1. Total Cons.ption 99.7 101.7 103.2 101.4 98.8 0.9 -0.2 2. General Governnent 19.9 19.0 20.0 20.3 20.2 1.7 0.4 3. Private Consumption 79.9 81.8 83.2 01.1 78.6 -1.6 -0.4 E.1. Gross Domestic Investment 14.8 14.9 15.1 15.1 14.2 .4.1 .1.0 2. Fixed Investment 14.6 14.4 14.4 14.5 13.9 4.5 -1.1 General Governwint 5.0 4.5 4.0 4.0 3.9 21.9 -6.0 Private 9.6 9.9 10.5 10.5 10.0 4.6 1.1 3. Inventory Investment 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.? 0.3 16.5 3.9 Nemnoradun I tems: F.1. Net Factor Income -3.5 -4.1 '.8 -5.3 -S.6 58.8 12.3 2. Net current Transfers -0.1 0.2 -3.3 -0.3 0.0 G.1 Gross Domtic Saving -0.2 -1.4 -0.3 2.S 2.6 2. Gross Natinal Saving .3.8 -5.7 -5.' -3.1 *2.9 *6.2 3. Gross National Product 96.0 96.2 98.2 98.5 95.8 -0.2 0.0 N.1. Gross Domtic Prodct lural 32.2 30.8 32.2 31.9 30.1 -6.5 -1.? Urban 228.0 232.8 23R.7 241.2 237.5 4.2 1.0 1.1. Poputation ('000) S704.3 586.3 6033.7 6210.3 6396.3 12.1 2.9 Souces SA Tale 5, ntd The World an Soial Indicators of oetopment, 1966. -74- SA TABLS 8 , . . . . . .mam.w. . .i. t t1|11 1959 1960 19U1 290 1963 196 16 094 1967 194 24 MM I 10 054 9n.2 n.9 146 62.7 Mot 11 4.t7 IW24 IU4 I2. 114-5 V 37 6a. 4u.e I 72.9 l. n 2. 2 No. No. Nt.2 9442 WlE 25 6. 2 2 39. 27. 33 MA. 2SI 2MI 20. 264 29.2 w 3 20 WA 3. 39.t m 4. 4176 49 *4 4.t 4.6_ 43_4 MM l 4 -VA -22.4 13 64 -172 -U.1t -46.9 414 -11A -31.0 *21.9 1516 4 216.4 19.3 1664 31 3.4 3051 99 193. 4.9 214U. 214 263 £3931 43 145.025.3 14645 160,0 t4A, 140.3 140.3 6. 10.5 163. W61. UKTA 1S3 46 33.7 o.t I.7 43A. 44 0.7 *4 M. W9 . .7 at .an5 40 45.2 46.1 46.1 74.0 75.6 79.4 6 34 45.2 7" 6. 9mv1 CO 4 3 24*.1 MI 7.9 264 327.0 317.6 .9 345.3 342.3 133 321.4 WIL 011. 42 72.4 H9.7 62.3 2. 0.9 7. 714 .3.4 72.4 73 734 . _ 18 474 43t 47.3 44.6 D .4 13. 2. 2.7 4 31o7 1A 35 10.6 rns _ a UK u. _ tw - 19 !-UttN W 1MCW) i5 t170 t171 192 193 1974 t1 t19 t 17 t16 7 t FhIWNU 26 21. t251. 2.2 15.0 2.3 2344 1144 17 10l.7 13 1141 3_ 37 102.2 104. 107.0 104.t 1A. It1. 3 1 1RA 27.0 141.0 13 Oml 3 332.0 23. 272.9 .7 Ws9.? MA M. 344 301.2 311.6 w 3 475.3 474.7 505.1 47. 496.9 34. 5.0 1 1.t =10.7 5.9 162.6 5 W 5 4 -3.3 -4.7 -19.7 -40. -513. -2. -31.7 -04 -91.4 -593 -66. Wm 44 204.2 1. 197 16.2 MA M3 24.2 271 Mo. 244. 2a3.1 we 43 176 A .1Mot 1MA 150 .6 l .0 37. 237.2 14. 35 1764 WL. WM 46 MA35 55 M4A 517.4 0- 91.7 6237 WA70 41 601.3 64 15.4 3 40 7n.5 71A 744 74.6 60.3 62. "A 95i. 19. 21A 11. 91111053 42 34.1 3.1 4.6 340.4 35.1t 37 423.3 411.0 436.5 44, 02.0 01 M. 4 I4 955 10.4 102.4 93 14.3 97.9 1o.t CI. 6 4.0 663 M 47 10.6 3.6 6. 61.9 65.*4 4l 4.2 40.0 0 4.3 -2.7 urnMM: I OF =w tum 1- 1966 (Sam a It cro to 1M6 12 19 1904 1n IOU 5M 1 3 107. U1.3 140. 124*3 MA.4 139 5053E V 3 144. 13 170. 16. 276A. 177#.2 GM N 3 007 342.7 o.t 34A 301. 3VI. ROM W 5 a -21e 64 -79.7 -67.7 -75,1 -47.2 1Wm 44 .1 290.1 301.0 273.0 32 ORI -43 192.4 201.6 31.3 20. 179.2 214. IO. M9 4 6.9 7T 7406 64I 79. t 2.3 MCM 45 115.1 1.7 15. 26 134 124 1101 41 4464 5194 51.7 47.0 uta 1.5 M0 I.. 42 (M. 914 96.4 9. 12.3 D4 a 47 -346 2a 1647 26.3 7.7 40.3 MM - im a 1SfUialz m 316I - 75 a SA TABL9 9 SENEGAL: Zaports Vtlue, Votuwe aid Price (Velul in SiltIons of CfAF, Votwu In thousan tams Prices in CFAF/Kg) . .... ......................... ,..................... 1981 1982 193 1984 1985 1986 ................................................................................... PetrolewA Prod"cts 80.49 96.11 90.94 112.58 87.63 46.96 Crude VaLue 5S.44 ".32 29.49 37.79 13.23 27.15 Volume 684.80 473.17 306.49 383.70 132.62 600.00 Price 80.96 93.S5 ".St 96.50 99.90 45.25 Finihd Value 25.05 51.78 61.45 74.76 74.38 19.81 Votul 310.95 510.70 653.70 706.90 763.70 313.90 Price 80.56 101.40 94.00 105.t9 97.40 63.10 Food ad Beverages 73.29 77.07 92.43 111.61 115.14 89.24 Food 69.09 72.17 86.63 105.51 107.94 80.47 Rice Value a/ 27.01 28.09 33.82 34.21 27.29 17.69 Voliua 339.80 376.60 360.00 371.90 336.10 318.10 Prie 79.50 74.60 89.00 92.00 81.20 5S.60 Wheat Value 5.48 6.79 6.61 7.10 7.10 3.96 Volumo 100.50 112.30 116.0 116.50 97.60 100.00 Price 54.50 60.50 S6.70 S9.90 72.70 39.84 Sue Value 7.00 5.08 2.70 2.00 0.00 0.00 Voluie 51.70 51.80 2S.60 25.20 0.00 0.00 Price 135.40 98.10 10S.50 79.40 69.10 116.50 Others 29.60 32.20 43.50 62.20 n3.55 5a.80 Beverages and Tobacco 4.20 4.90 5.60 6.10 ?.20 6.7? Other Conswwrs Goods 36.90 50.70 54.20 48.90 54.00 S7.84 Capital Goods 32.50 45.00 74.00 47.00 S1.70 48.90 Intermediate Goods 68.80 82.10 93.80 109.50 120.40 112.50 Commerce Special (Clf) 291.98 350.98 405.36 429.59 428.87 355.4 Entrapot & AdJustments 23.03 *25.60 *12.69 -12.27 *25.41 *1?.19 CMMRCE G£NERAL (CIF) 315.01 325.38 392.6? 417.32 403.46 338.25 Freight and Insurance 37.80 38.51 47.12 S0.06 48.40 40.10 COMNERCE GENERAL (FOB) 277.21 286.87 345.55 367.24 35S.06 298.1S ................................................................................... 2/ The "officiaLt figure for 1983 1s CFAF10.8 b. (besed on 127,000 tons); the figure shown is based on 380,000 tons (CPP), which is consistent with historical level of rice fport. Source: BCEAO Bulletfn, October 1986; Direction de la Statistiqus; IMF, December 22, 1986 and January 9,1967. - 76 - SA TABLE 10 SENG4AL; Imports of Goods and Non*Factor Services at Current Prices, 1981*86 (mittions of current US doltars) 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 ................................................................................... Food and Beverages 269.8 234.5 242.5 255.4 256.3 257.7 Food 254.3 219.6 227.3 241.5 240.2 232.4 Rice 99.4 85.5 88.7 78.3 60.7 51.1 Wheat 20.2 20.7 17.3 16.2 15.8 11.5 Sugar 25.8 15.5 7.1 4.6 0.0 0.0 Other 108.9 98.0 114.1 142.3 163.7 169.8 Beverages & Tobacco 15.5 14.9 15.2 14.0 16.0 25.3 Other Coneumer Goods 135.8 154.3 142.2 111.9 120.2 167.0 Petroleum 296.3 292.5 238.6 257.6 195.0 135.6 Crude 204.1 134.9 77.4 86.5 29.5 78.4 Finished 92.2 1S7.6 161.2 171.1 165.6 57.2 Intermediste Goods 253.2 249.8 246.1 250.6 268.0 324.9 Capital Goods 119.6 136.9 194.2 107.6 115.1 141.2 Commerce Special 1074.7 1068.1 1063.7 983.0 954.5 1026.4 Entrepot & Adjustment 84.8 *77.9 *33.3 *28.1 -56.6 *49.6 Commerce General (CJF) 1159.4 990.2 1030.4 953.0 898.0 976.7 Freight & Insurance 139.1 117.2 123.6 114.6 107.7 115.8 Imports of Goods (FOB) 1020.3 873.0 906.7 840.4 790.3 861.0 Imports of NFS 492.8 404.5 362.2 338.4 332.7 424.2 Freight and Insurance 139.1 117.2 123.6 114.6 107.7 115.8 Other Transportation 46.4 53.0 40.9 36.4 38.3 53.4 Travel and Tourism 49.7 46.6 44.9 41.9 49.4 71.0 Government 168.2 147.6 120.7 99.5 89.0 115.5 Other 89.4 40.2 32.0 46.0 48.3 68.4 Imports of Goods & NFS 1513.1 1277.5 1268.9 1178.8 1123.0 128S.2 3U33n3US*SaafU3U*3 Una3* *23383 3333* unu3* as* 2Usaa emo I tem: Exchange rate (CFAF/S) 271.7 328.6 381.1 437.0 449.3 346.3 Source: SA Tabte 9; International Financial Statistics, Novaiber 1986; and IMF, D9ceaber 22,1986 and January 9, 1987. - 77 - IIA TASL I I1 SNALt EJports Value, VolUe end Prife (Value in Billions of CFAP, Volume In thowusd ton, Prices In CFAF/K#) ................................................................................... 1981 1962 1983 1984 1965 1906 ................................................................................... Groumt8s 9.10 42.10 S5.32 54.49 23.69 24.38 Crude Oil Value a/ 6.20 31.10 36.30 39.30 18.40 17.50 Votle 21t60 11.50 157.90 85.50 40.00 83.10 Price 287.04 205.28 229.9 459.65 460.70 210.60 Refined Oil Vatue 0.10 0.26 1.55 3.30 1.04 1.25 Volum 0.40 0.0 5.80 6.96 1.65 5.00 Price 250.00 323.00 2o 6.60 47.76 542.10 250.00 Cak Value 1.90 10.05 13.53 7.66 4.19 5.60 Volut 31.90 195.90 214.44 94.79 n.70 25.90 Price 59.60 51.30 3.10 81.02 57.70 44.48 Seede Value 0.90 0.69 3.94 4.21 0.05 0.02 Volut 2.90 4.60 24.74 16.10 0.20 0.20 Price 310.30 149.80 159.30 261.50 253.00 120.60 Phoshates value 19.87 18.30 16.70 28.60 27.30 21.01 VOtIE 1333.40 1102.30 1265.00 1514.00 1575.50 1S08.00 Price 14.90 16.60 14.78 18.I9 17.r3 13.93 Fish 27.90 30.20 37.30 49.50 53.91 S6.62 Fresh/Frozen Vatue 17.30 18.50 21.10 28.30 30.96 33.00 Voluta 53.90 53.70 53.30 64.30 66.50 70.00 Price 320.90 344.51 395.6? 440.12 465.60 471.40 Carned Fish Value 10.60 11.70 16.20 21.20 22.95 23.63 Volume 15.20 1S.40 19.60 24.30 25.00 27.00 Price 697.40 759.74 826.53 872.43 918.00 867.00 tertil iters Value 2.61 2.19 4.10 6.70 0.00 0.00 Volum 130.40 138.00 173.60 13.10 0.00 0.00 Priee 20.00 15.90 23.62 38.71 0.00 0.00 Value 2.00 4.80 8.10 6.90 7.13 S.90 Voltuw 4.20 10.10 t3.60 9.10 1O.0O 13.20 Price 476.20 475.20 595.60 758.24 713.00 446.97 Salt Value 2.30 2.90 3.10 S.20 5.19 6.00 Volume 147.70 155.80 152.20 186.70 137.30 154.90 Price 1S.60 18.60 20.40 27.8S 37.80 38.73 Petroleus Value 38.29 45.81 40.81 43.19 39.00 23.58 Volum 347.80 391.50 323.40 313.90 282.60 260.00 Price 110.10 117.00 126.20 137.60 138.00 90.68 icR 12.20 18.40 21.00 other Produets 33.80 33.80 39.40 37.30 39.90 43.S0 Comre Special 135.87 180.09 206.84 244.08 214.52 201.96 Entrepot S AdJustments 16.40 *15.10 14.40 24.00 1.45 26.00 CuuqsjCE GENSUL (FOS) 152.27 164.99 221.24 266.08 215.97 227.96 ................................................................................... f TMhe 1982 grourdwut ofl export value Is reported by DOrection de to Statistique to be CPAF40 billion; the difference is possIbly 6* the discrepncy between th amount sold -- change of omwerahip - ondl lt hal oeon phsicaltly sent, which my require time adjustment. In absone of auch adjustment ftor 1983, we accepted the original estimetes. Sourceus MMIO lulletin, October 1966; Oirection de to Stotistique; ond INF, Pepember 22, 1986, nd Jmfary 9, 198T. - 78 - S TADJ 12 SENEGALs Exsrta of Goods &W hon-Factor Sorvices at Current Prices, 1981-86 (mtllionm of current US dotltrs) 1981 1962 1963 1964 198S 1986 ....-...................................... ........ I.......... Groundnut Product 33.5 128.1 145.2 124.7 52.7 70.4 Crudl olt 22.8 94.6 95.3 89.9 41.0 50.5 Refined oil 0.4 0.8 4.1 7.6 2.3 3.6 Coke 7.0 30.6 35.5 17.6 9.3 16.2 Se*ds 3.3 2.1 10.3 9.6 0.1 0.1 fish Proucts 102.7 91.9 97.9 113.3 120.0 163.5 Frosh fish 63.7 56.3 55.4 64. 68.9 95.3 Processed fish 39.0 35.6 42.5 48.S 51.1 68.2 Phosphates 73.1 55.7 49.1 65.4 60.8 60.7 Perotera Products 140.9 139.4 107.1 98.8 86.8 68.1 $Stt 8.5 8.8 8.1 11.9 11.6 17.3 Cotton 7.4 14.6 21.3 15.8 15.9 17.0 FertiUzer 9.6 6.7 10.8 43.2 41.0 60.6 Other 124.4 102.9 103.4 85.4 88.8 125.6 "CoreSpucecital 500.1 548.1 542.7 558.5 47.5 5683.3 Entrapot & AdJusatonts 60.4 *46.0 37.8 54.9 3.2 75.1 Exports of Goods 560.4 S02.1 580.5 613.5 460.7 658.3 ................ ..... . ...... ...... .. ..... ..... . . ..... ..... . . ..... ....................... Exports of IFS 433.2 3.1 338.5 306.9 321.2 424.5 Freght dt Inswrance 8.8 8.5 7.3 6.6 6.5 8.4 Other tmrwportatton 90.2 108.0 74.0 64.8 65.9 85.5 Travel nd Tourim 83.2 77.6 78.2 74.8 82.6 107.7 Goenrnt 146.1 112.6 98.1 87.6 89.5 115.5 Other 104.9 83.4 80.8 73.0 76.8 107.4 Exports of Goods & IFS 99.6 892.3 919.0 920.3 801.8 1082.8 No Itin: Ex dhw Rts CFAF/h 271.7 328.6 381.1 437.0 449.3 346.3 CFAf/O 362.7 407.6 42.1 46.8 41.3 406.3 Sure $A Tu le 6; Inentioatl F*nie statistics" Wewb_r 1966; u1 INP, ecubwn 3221 . -791- A Table 13 SINEGAL: Balance of Paymits In CFAJ, 1981 86 (Billions of CFAF) 1981 1963 4t 1964 1985 1986 ........................ . .. ............................................................. A.1. Exports of GUFS 270.0 293.2 350.2 402.2 360.3 375.0 2. Rorchnwiise 152,3 165.0 221.2 268.1 216.0 228.0 3. Von-factor Services 117.7 128.2 129.0 134.1 144.3 147.0 B.1. Ieports of G&NFS 411.1 419.8 483.6 515.1 504.6 445.0 2. Nerchandise 2.2 286.9 345.6 367.2 355.1 298.1 3. Non-factor Services 133.9 132.9 138.0 147.9 149.5 146.9 C.1. Resource telance -141.1 *12f,6 *133.3 112.9 -144.3 70.1 0.1. Net Factor Inem -29.? -38.0 *4.4 '60.6 *65.9 66.4 2. Factor Recelpts 4.2 4.9 5.8 6.0 6.1 6.0 3. Factor Payments 33.9 42.9 52.2 66.6 72.0 72.4 a. of which Interest 21.1 28.8 37.5 50.7 55.6 55.0 E.1. Net Private Transfers *2.7 -1.5 -3.4 -2.3 7.7 9.0 F.1. Current Acct. SaLanre *173.5 *166.1 *183.1 *175.8 *202.5 *127.5 0.1 Net Direct Investment 1.4 1.5 0.9 *0.7 *1.5 *0.7 2. Official Transferswnet 48.1 59.9 60.1 60.6 59.9 57.5 3. Net NALT Loans (Mli) 47.2 90.1 115.9 75.0 76.8 22.2 a. DOsbursements 60.3 93.2 122.0 89.5 97.1 71.8 b. Repayments 13.1 3.1 6.1 14.3 20.3 49.6 4. Other NILT inflows(nt) 23.6 *17.6 14.9 27.1 35.1 69.9 N.1 Capital Flows n.e.i. 5.4 1.1 -6.9 16.4 2.8 1.3 2. Errors and nmissions -0.5 4.3 -21.9 -3.6 *15.2 *8.0 1.1. Decrease fn Net Reserves 48.3 7.6 20.1 1.0 44.6 -14.7 2. Net Credit from INF 16.5 14.5 8.6 7.6 6.7 *0.4 3. Other Reserve Changes 31.8 23.1 11.5 -6.6 37.9 p14.3 Nem Items: CA BSl. (IMF Definition) a/ *125.4 *106.2 *123.0 *115.2 -142.6 '70.0 a/ Current Accowut Balance lncluding Official Transfers. Source: BA Tables 10 and 12; IBRD, Debt Reporting System, December 30, 1966; and IMF, January 9,1987. - 80 - SA TABLE 14 SENEGAL Bcalnce of Paymnts In US Dollars, 1981-a6 (millions of US dollars) 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 .........................................I--..................I..... I....... A.1. Exports of OSUFS 993.6 892.3 919.0 920.3 801.8 1082.2 2. Merchandise 560.4 502.1 580.5 613.5 480.7 658.0 3. Non-factor Services 433.2 390.1 338.5 306.9 321.2 424.2 B.1. lrports of GUNFS 1513.1 1277.5 1268.9 1178.8 1123.0 1284.4 2. Merchandise 1020.3 873.0 906.7 840.4 790.3 860.5 3. Non-factor Services 492.8 404.5 362.2 338.4 332.7 424.0 C.1. Resource Balance *519.S -385.2 -349.9 -258.4 *321.1 -202.2 0.1. Not Factor Incom -109.3 -11S.6 -121.8 *138.7 .146.7 .191.6 2. Factor Receipts 15.5 14.9 15.2 13.7 13.6 17.3 3. Factor Payments 124.8 130.6 137.0 152.4 160.2 208.9 a. of thich Intorest 77.7 87.6 98.4 116.0 123.? 1S8.? ' 1. Net Prfveto Transfers *9.9 -4.6 *8.9 -5.3 17.1 26.0 F.1. Current Account Balance *638.7 -SO5.4 *480.5 -402.4 -450.7 -367.9 B.1 Met Direct Investment S.2 4.6 2.4 -1.6 -3.3 -2.0 2. Official Transfers (net) 177.0 182.3 157.7 138.7 133.3 165.9 3. Net MILT Loans (D0R) 173.7 274.2 304.1 171.6 171.0 64.1 a. Disbursements 221.9 283.6 320.1 204.3 216.1 207.2 b. Repayments 48.2 9.4 16.0 32.7 45.1 143.1 4. Other MUT Inflows (net) 86.9 *53.6 39.1 62.0 78.1 201.7 .1 Capital Flows n.e.i. 19.9 *3.3 *18.1 37.5 6.2 3.8 2. Errors and Oissiaons -1.8 -13.1 -57.5 -8.2 .33.8 -23.1 S.1. Decrease in Net Reserves 177.9 114.4 52.8 2.4 99.2 -42.5 2. Net Credit from IMF 60.7 44.1 22.6 17.4 14.9 -1.2 3. Other Reserve hane 117.2 70.2 30.3 -15.0 84.3 -41.4 Mmo Items: CA B3l. (IMF Definition) a/ -461.7 -323.1 -322.8 -26.7 -317.4 -201.9 a/ Current Account Balance including Official Transfers. Source: SA Tables 10 and 12; 1BRO, Debt Reporting System, Dceeber 30, 1986; and IMF, January 9,1987. - 81 - SA TABLE 15 SENEGAL: Direction of foreign Trade, 1981.85 (In percent) Exports, f.o.b. ----. .. Imports, c.I.f. . -. 1981 1982 1983 1964 1985 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 ..................................................... ............................................................ Industrial Countries 39.6 47.6 so.7 50.3 46.3 62.9 58.0 65.7 60.0 65.7 France 24.8 29.4 28.3 29.2 25.5 31.2 33.6 38.4 27.6 30.2 Federal Republic of Germany 1.3 1.8 3.5 2.1 1.2 3.3 3.5 3.2 2.9 4.4 Itaty- 0.7 3.1 3.3 3.8 4.0 2.7 2.5 2.6 3.8 3.2 Spain 1.3 2.1 2.8 2.8 3.7 2.8 2.1 3.7 S.2 7.7 United Kingdom 5.5 4.1 4.9 4.8 3.7 3.2 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.0 United States 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.9 4.6 3.7 3.9 9.3 7.0 Other 5.8 6.8 7.6 7.2 7.3 15.1 10.3 11.8 9.1 11.2 -Dewloping Countries 45.4 26.3 23.6 23.4 25.0 33.2 37.7 30.1 3S.8 29.9 Africa 36.8 21.2 18.5 18.5 20.7 12.7 16.7 14.2 12.0 13.1 Cote d'lvoire 7.9 5.6 4.8 4.3 4.7 3.2 2.9 3.3 3.2 2.4 Malf 7.7 2.6 2.5 2.7 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Mauritania 9.4 4.2 4.1 4.3 4.7 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 Nigeria 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4 2.6 10.3 7.7 6.6 6.9 Other 11.5 8.2 6.7 6.8 8.0 6.9 3.4 3.1 2.1 3.7 Asia 4.3 2.0 2.1 1.9 2.0 12.4 12.0 9.0 9.9 5.9 People Republic of China 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 2.2 2.8 2.0 2.5 1.8 Thaitand 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 6.8 7.6 5.0 6.0 1.5 Other 4.0 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.8 3.4 1.6 2.0 1.4 2.6 Europe 4.1 2.9 2.5 2.7 1.5 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.3 Middle East 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 3.3 6.0 4.5 3.8 4.0 Western Hemisphere 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.7 3.8 2.0 1.5 9.0 5.6 Other 1/ 15.0 26.1 25.7 26.3 28.7 3.9 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.4 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 ......................................................................................................... 1/ Includes trade with Eastern Euorope and the U.S.S.R. Source: IMF. Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1986. SERVICE PAYmENTS. CONITE NTS. DJ5atW31s me UISTA306IN 3.S OF EAtitI P t.oF. PRUOfCTIONS ASdIO Oie DEBT OUTSTANDING tCLUDINS 6WISBURSEO AS Of DEC 3t. 196 INCLUDfS ONLY DEST q00t V 000000 - *19652 DEBT REPAYABLE IN FORE IGN CUKENCY M6 GODS 11N THOUSANS or U.S. ootutast * * TALE tOTAl. * * DATE OEBT OUTSTANN aAT TRANSACT EO"S D U a I MG C a a I 6 0 OTR CMS : fEND OF PEfItD ~~~~..., ._........___.._......................_. ....._._. _................ _.. _. ..... ._........ ...... ............._ .. .. .._. _....... ___.......... _.. ___.______ 0O1 SE6*(D INCLUDING COYIT- DISBURISE- S E a R I C f P A V 4tEN t S CANCEL- :00Mtt-. ONLY UNDISSUA SE NEWTS :ENTS ----------- -----------: * PRINCIPAL meftEsr TOTAL III (21 : t3t 2 441 i5s 461 (T7 o6, 4to 197012 900.997 $432410 6.903 19.491 5.O99 *.9S 6.90 1.300 - $97t12 $22.6S 170.148 31.6R0 34.990 7.6$7 4.020 9.647 4.460 6.401 $97212 13t.753 218.437 50.t53 20.077 1. 24 4.907 13.211 - SAW 197312. $76.400 36S.469 lv1.51H 97.261 22.069 7.221 2S.2 n 30.020 20.46A $97412 243.207 416.216 6S.644 79.1648 t.627 13.779 32.4106 an #4.20D 197S12 292.*06 54.50 164.544 76.39$ 2.663 *0.420 39. 03 - .12.947 197612 354.632 653.676 141.626 90.975 24.522 17.912 4a.434 meS -0#."a 197712 426.763 M5. 13 212.810 104.945 34.697 21.646 56.643 3 "4.56S 197612 643.37S 1.252.324 400.742 242.326 6.4646 31.*53 100.224 3020 64.39 397912 "25.7S3 S.40#.*, "G.079 222.2#1 7t.90 44.946 123.653 S.4100 S.863 *96012 960.92$ S.664.149 . i.59 3*9.*76 $22.327 56e.7I0 $79.03? 32 Sol -6t.722 1S9112 1.005.666 1.666.606 241.199 221.901 433'76 41.97$ 90.147 *.065 - on.7 n2 $96212 1.237.342 2.118.622 S4.204 263.77 9.373 33666 4S.059 10.30% -76.501 196)12 1.496.990 2. S6.4SS 212.062 320.092 16.997 40.316 56.6s5 65.106 -56.1 3 ?o 196412 I.530.396 2.244.962 311.644 204.02 32.7'3 So.064 63.7"? 4.253 -9 66.06 0 " 196512 1.969. 3" 2,602.011 6.6423 236o.65 45.102 43.47S M.AT7T 96 937 340*95 1 ** * * * *TE lfOOWING FIGUS ARE PROJECTED ' ' * * s ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~a' 190662 2.044.599 2.449.217 - 207.229 143.200 0104.69 246.066 974 **.660 $9 712 2.033.694 2.275.J 2 - 6632.42 674.052 09. 76 263.230 - 3 1966t2 1.933 $76 2.067.901 - Me. 754 207.260 *6.623 30003 - - 196912 S.795.094 1.64.91 - 6S. 124 203.203 So.579 209.760 - To $99012 1.642.827 t.674.529 - 27.699 690.045 74.626 264.771 - -17 #99*12 1.476.493 S. 49.00 - 6.403 to0.7 n2. tOD, 242*00 1"232 1.320.261 1.232.10S - 97 $6t 620 49.63 2t15.71 - - U $99322 1. 19 1.5 1.193.033 - 4. 02 12.stt 39.1 172.502 -9 19942 1.064.719 1.0.S1S - 1.131 129.271 22.039 160.20 - 3 399512 960.277 960.29$ - 32 *04.S20 24.947 12".467 - -4 #90662 *70o.92 670.945 - - 99.245 $643 40.911 - $99792 7. 0 79 342 - - 7.7I " 0.41 94.30 - $99362 727.210 727.22$ - - 64.91 2.260 7.211 - 4 199902 07..739 $74.800 - -2.430 00.070 62.500 - 9 2001Dt2 23.76 6*2t7 - - 46.09 6.41$ 54.420 - 200162 594.077 594.0t7 - - 34.709 T.254 4 1.63 - 0 200202 69629 61.*2 - - 32.950 6.66 2.0 - 200312 S21.559 3*.G6 - - 26.S72 .024 3.506 - 2 200412 504.334 504.344 - - 2t.236 5.49 3.72% - to 200512 477.230 477.2-0 27.09 5. 05 .206 - - * PROJECTED AltMNTS IN THIS COLLIN ARE AMOUNTS EXCLUDED FROM PROJECTIONS BECAUSE OF UNKNOWN TERMS. THIS COLUM14 SHOWS THF AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCtUOINC UNDISBUlRSED FRON ONE PERIOD TO THE NEXT. 4dE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CIIANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFERS OF DEBTS FROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THf TABLE. STRUCTURE AND TERMS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT AS OF DEC 3t. 1985 INCLUDES ONLY DEBT COMMITTED 000000 - DEC 31. 1985 * DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. OOLLARS) AVERAGE TERMS INTEREST MtATURITY GRACE GRANT GRANT TOTAL-** AKOUNT** X% (VRS) (YRS) ELEMENT(%) EQUIVALENT AMOUNT 196912 15.137 3.938 31.0 7.3 47.1 7.124 15.137 197012 6.5O3 3.762 23.6 6.8 44.9 2.917 6.503 197t12 31.608 5.220 19.5 5.2 32.6 10.295 31.608 1 197212 50.853 4.207 29.6 6.7 44.6 22.67t 50.8S3 197312 178.519 S.444 19.7 6.3 36.8 65.779 178.59 CO 147412 58.646 4.560 19.0 5.9 34.9 20.484 56.646 197S12 164.544 5.176 20.7 5.8 35.0 57.615 t64.S44 1 197612 141.636 6.113 19.7 5.5 27.4 38.786 141.636 197712 212.888 7.148 11.2 3.3 14.4 30.633 212.888 197812 396.986 6.950 13.0 3.9 18.3 72.6t7 396.986 197912 196.t79 4.663 20.6 5.5 36.6 71.789 196 179 Ca 198012 399.539 6.336 21.4 6.1 27.6 110.353 399539 198112 341.399 6.234 22.0 6.1 28.0 95.430 341.399 t- 198212 546.214 4.956 27.5 7.1 40.1 218.933 546.214 G 198312 212.032 3.374 29.7 7.0 52.0 110.235 212.032 r' t98412 311.644 5.045 20.4 5.8 35.7 111.379 311.644 " 198512 76.643 6.368 24.5 5.7 30.5 23.406 76.643 ' TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT 3.340.970 5.615 21.2 5.8 32.0 1.070.454 3.340.970 * INCLUDES INCREASES DURING THIS PERIOD TO DEBTS WITH ORIGINAL COMMITMENT DATES FROM JAN. t. 1900 TO DEC 31. 1985. *. IOTAL LOAf#S HAVING INTEREST. GRACE PERIOD AND MATURITY INFORNATION AVAILABLE. USED TO COMPUTE AVERAGE TERMS. *T. TOTAL OF ALL LOANS IN THIS BREAKDOWN REGARDLESS OF AVAILABILITY OF INTEREST. GRACE PERIOD. AND MATURITY INFORMATION. - 84 - SA TABLE 18 Senegal: Medium and Long-Term External Public Debt a/ 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 b/ billions of CFAP in Current Prices Debt outstanding (end of period) 479.7 712.6 900.2 1076.8 984.8 Debt outstanding and disbursed 289.2 416.3 625.0 734.4 757.4 Debt undisbursed 190.5 296.3 275.2 342.4 227.4 Commitments 92.8 179.5 80.8 136.2 34.3 disbursements (gross) Scheduled Actual 60.3 93.3 122.0 89.4 97.1 Net flows c/ Scheduled Actual 49.7 95.2 122.3 81.7 86.8 Debt service Scheduled 43.4 35.9 50.3 66.5 90.0 Actual 24.4 14.2 24.5 40.1 54.7 GDP at current prices 669.8 844.3 939.5 1015.5 1152.0 Exports, GNFS 270.0 293.2 350.2 402.2 360.3 As Percentage of GDP Debt outstanding 71.6 84.4 95.8 106.0 85.5 Debt outstanding and disbursed 43.2 49.3 66.5 72.3 65.6 Gross actual disbursements 9.0 11.1 13.0 8.8 8.9 Net actual flows 7.4 11.3 13.0 8.1 7.5 As Percentage of Exports GNFS Debt outstanding 177.7 243.0 257.1 267.7 273.3 Debt Outstanding and disbursed 107.1 142.0 178.5 182.6 210.2 Scheduled debt service 16.1 12.2 14.4 16.5 25.0 Actual debt service 9.0 4.8 7.0 10.1 15.2 a/ Exclusive of IMF Credit b/ Partial data c/ Including debt relief and proceeds of Kuwaiti deposit. Source: BCEAO and Ministry of Finance, May 1986 - 85 - SA TA8LI 19 SIUALI Oowrwunt Firnanst Qeations, 1960/81-195/86 I/ (in billion of CFA francs) 1979/80 190/1 1981/U 192/3 193/84 194/8 1985/86 ................................................................................................................ 1. totl re aNd ts 143.8 132.3 160.6 180.9 201.6 216.1 237,9 1. ev 2/ 139. 125.5 151.9 175.7 189.4 203.9 218. te ?VW" 2/ 130.8 118.2 139.7 164.5 178.1 190.1 208.4 othe rovm 8.4 7.3 12.2 11.2 11.3 13.8 10.3 2. Grants 4.6 6.6 8. 5.2 12.2 12.2 19.2 apitat 3/ 4.6 6.8 8.r 3.4 6.0 5.0 8.0 nr-capital 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 6.2 7.2 11.2 Current Recipts 139.2 125.5 151.9 177.5 195.6 211.1 22t.9 11. Currant epediture NWdrat tlding (1-2-3) 142.3 166.6 162.0 215.2 206.0 219.5 332.2 1. Current ba_ tary seenitur 2/ 144.9 151.3 165.4 186.6 205.3 217.1 220.3 momen eataries 66.5 78.3 83.3 92.7 100.4 106.6 111.8 Intest an owuan debt 12.9 11. 18.3 26.7 36.9 44.4 41.0 of wAlsh: external 4 12.0 11.0 17.0 26.2 36.4 43.6 40.3 Othe cwrrnt esditurs 5/ 63.5 61.3 63.8 67.2 68.0 66.1 67.5 2. Treeur Correpints net) 9/ 1.2 -17.3 *21.6 -16.3 6.2 1.7 1.0 WSP ad SOM 0.0 *13.4 *11.2 -11.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 otr Correrprndnts 1.2 3.9 -10.4 *4.9 6.2 1.7 1.0 3. tresr smisal accomts S/ 9/ 1.4 0.0 5.0 -12.3 -6.9 -4.1 -12.9 Current Sudtry, Operetion (fst) -3.1 -43.1 -30.1 -7.r -10.4 -8.4 -2.3 111. Capitalt senitura 30.4 38.2 30.6 39.0 40.3 34.? 33.8 Sudet (on) 13.2 21.1 6.9 7.9 10.0 9.7 5.8 gxtrebdtwary 17.2 17.1 23.7 31.1 30.3 25.0 28.0 IV. Ov"ll ffsel defieit ) 28.9 -74.5 *52.0 73.3 -44.7 -38.1 .28.1 (Csaitant b"ees a II- ll) *J * sas *uses *sas 8susa 28=- V. Adjustmet to cub basis r 16.5 -20.? 6.8 -22.6 -11.6 o 12.6 1. Paysent strrr of the Goverrent aNd pAwlic agercies (redwrtion *) 7.s 2.9 -11.1 5.6 -2.0 -7.6 -9.6 2. Crop credits (repaysat -) 10/ 0.0 13.6 -9.6 1.2 -20.6 -4.0 -3.0 VI. Overall fiscal deficit (t) (cash besis IV*V ) -21.4 -58.0 -72.7 -66.5 *67.3 -49.7 -40.7 we"U." *x-*as **-S some** *so.*** Sv *v .atx VII. Financing equireM t (*VI) 21.4 58.0 72.7 66.5 67.3 49.7 40.7 1. Extwfsl finaning 1. 35.3 29.1 48.5 36.7 38.0 28.0 orauin 35.2 51.1 33.8 49.5 35.9 40.9 36.7 Budbetery old 22.6 40.0 18.8 21.8 11.6 20.9 16.7 Other 3/ 12.6 10.3 15.0 27.7 24.3 20.0 20.0 Externl debt rlietf 0.0 0.0 25.2 26.3 29.2 28.3 20.9 Aortization 4/ -18.2 -15.8 -29.9 -27.3 -28.4 -31.2 -29.6 2. Oastc fiancirng 4.4 22.? 43.6 18.0 30.6 11.7 12.7 Banking s"stm 11/ 6.9 18.9 38.? 20.2 34.7 17.9 19.6 Central 5m* Advamnce -o.? 4.4 tHU et Purwchea 7.9 1.4 Other posits 12/ 10.7 13.8 oae* betwng 1.0 1.8 3.0 2.0 1.4 2.0 0.8 Repwmnt of CCO debt to benks 0.0 0.0 0.0 -2.0 -8.8 -10.0 -8.0 Other -3.5 2.0 1.9 -2.2 3.3 1.8 0.3 NM t MP at current merkt price 604.8 "68.7 757.1 891.9 977.5 108.6 1223.7 Overell ficel deficit (IV)/MOP (2) -4.8 -11.S *6.9 -8.2 -4.6 -3.5 -2.3 .................................................................................................................................. ................................................................................... 1/ liet yar ending me 30. 2/ includin petmian of the ai Auto dAmrt#issmmt (CM), opwating as tresury special ceouwt. 3/ Foreign fitnnel sistnc for etrabAdgtary, capital outlas of the central ovont. 4/ On a cnrwtusl basis, i.e. bfore debt relifa. rnclude 30 percent of rewsyets la in respect of ewsrww dets. 5/ Coistirn of budetay tays for- meterisae, auplises.intennce, si1idie O otber curret trnsfers, rnd unctssif led ez_1diture. 6/ Includife CFAF8.6 bit lion fat settlnt of Fifth 0evtlqnt Plan operation. 7/ Insluding CFAF 2.8 billion for settlimnt of Fifth oesetop I Plan ope ion. 8J UaclAlding the CM and the accemt for sttlemnt of fiftt Plan operations. 9/ efiaits are sho~ in and assuch they aot asbd to orWt ecprnditure an the suplus vice verse. 10/ Crop cedits 0i by th CUSP end SONAR. 11/ cluding otteparts1 C of the Interneti Monetary ft facilitie. 12f IncludIng walfebursd fwe Ot CCCI structura Idjusttant loan. Soue Oatce provided by the S lea authorities. ud Ilt. (billions of CPAF) mug-au.-- ~ ~ -------- Tax Revenu 118.1 139.7 164.5 178.1 190.1 ...... ..... ...... ...... Taxe an net incmoe an prof Its 29.4 32,0 3d.? 41.0 43.9 On industriat and comwerial profits b/ 10. #.P 9.8 11.5 13.2 On mome and salaries 8.4 i2.6 11.9 ¶2.3 13. On capitatl toncs 2.8 2.1 2.6 3.2 3.6 On rental income 0.2 0.3 On Mea estate capital gairs 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 General incP= tax 7.8 8.3 12.2 13.6 ~3.6 gtIapoes' payrol tax 2.1 1.6 3.8 4.3 4J~ Taxm on property 3.9 3.4 2.8 2.8 2.8 Taxe" an goods amnd servce 36.6 41.0 48.8 54.2 58.2 Value-added tax 28.5 33.0 39.1 43.6 48.0 Other excise 3.9 3.7 4.2 5.1 4.3 Tax on insrance contracts 0.8 0.9 1.3 1.2 1.4 Tax on vehicles 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.6 Business. tience fee 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 T"axs earmarked to the CMA cl 2.1 2.3 3.0 3.1 2.9 Towaxe n foroign trade 44.6 60.6 71.2 74.'I 79.0 loWot duties d/ 43.1i 59.3 70.1 73.4 78.5 Ixwrt duties 1.5 1.3 1.1 0.7 0.5 Other taxes e/1.6 1.1 1.2 1.6 1.7 Kanta" Ravamni 7.3 12.2 11.2 11.2 13.8 Proprty income 1.1 1.0 1.4 1.2 2.0 service fee 0.2 0.4 0.8 1.4 2.2 Revenu earmarked to the CAA f/ 0.8 2.4 5.8 4.1 5.8 Other g/ 5.2 8.4 3.2 4.4 3.8 TOTAL REVENU 125.5 151.9 175.7 189.4 203.9 88828UU SC=UU asNum ME"u mUgam *um. mas ci Budget year ending June 30. b/ Includes professional incas. C/ Calse Autonam d'Amotissmmnt. d/ Inluding regiona Cooperation Tax, velue-mdded tam, andether surcarge on lapors, for tihich no breakdms are available. e/ Neinty stopi dities. f/ Casisting of profit tram the central beft, intert on s ietia doposits. SnW Prcemed of water sal.. a, I#oWdin wiellocab revmnu. - 87 - SA TABLE 21 Senegals Current Expenditures Functional Classification 1980/81 1982/83 1984/85 1985/86 (-FAF billion, current prices) Budgetary Current Expenditure 151.3 186.6 217.1 220.3 General Public Services 48.5 62.2 65.7 70.2 Defense 19.7 23.2 27.5 28.2 Education 33.3 37.4 43.1 45.0 Health 7.3 7.9 8.1 8.9 Social Services 4.6 6.7 5.9 8.7 Economic Services 10.6 12.0 13.2 13.4 Unallocable 27.3 37.2 53.6 45.9 (debt interest) (11.7) (26.7) (44.4) (41.0) (as % of budgetary current expenditure) General Public Services 32.1 33.3 30.3 31.9 Defense 13.0 12.4 12.7 12.8 Education 22.0 20.0 19.9 20.4 Health 4.9 4.2 3.7 4.0 Social Services 3.0 3.6 2.7 4.0 Economic Services 7.0 6.4 6.1 6.1 Unallocable 18.0 19.9 24.7 20.8 - (debt interest) (7.7) (14.3) (20.5) (18.6) Source: IMF, Recent Economic Developments, March 1986. - 88 t S TAW22 190/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 BiM11m ClF Ourent Prim rrrodt wstary BqmrAitr 151.3 165.4 18.6 205.3 217.1 220.3 WaOe and SalarIes 78.3 83.3 92.7 100.4 106.6 111.8 xxtr1as, supply, mint. 34.8 30.3 36.9 35.4 33.5 40.9 Interest on debt 11.7 18.3 26.7 36.9 44.4 41.0 dmestic 0.7 1.3 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 external 11.0 17.0 26.2 36.4 43.8 40.3 TIanfers and Subsidies 18.2 24.4 28.4 30.6 32.3 25.7 Other 8.3 9.1 1.9 2.0 0.3 1.9 Mew: To FRwenue 118.6 140. 164.8 178.1 190.1 208.4 As Peacent of Cwrent Budgetary Eb penditure bages and Salar¢es 51.8 50.4 49.7 48.9 49.1 50.8 )ateria1sl supply, noInt. 23.0 18.3 19.8 17.2 15.4 18.6 Interest on debt 7.7 11.1 14.3 18.0 20.5 18.6 Transfers and Stbsidies 12.0 14.8 15.2 14.9 14.9 11.7 Other 5.5 5.5 1.0 1.0 0.1 0.9 As Percent of Tox Pesvenue Wages and Salaries 66.0 59.5 56.3 56.4 56.3 58.9 )iteiEale, supply, idnt. 29.3 21.6 22.4 19.9 17.7 21.6 Interet on debt 9.9 13.1 16.2 20.7 23.4 21.6 Transfers ani Su&bs8ies 15.4 17.4 17.2 17.2 17.0 13.6 Other 7.0 6.5 1.2 1.1 0.2 1.0 Total 127.6 118.1 113.2 115.3 114.6 116.2 Source: 1W. - 89 - S TABLE 23 SENEGAL: Ninism and Mximum Salaries for Civil Servants (In CPA froncs per manth) 1980 1981 1962 a4 1963 b/ 1984 c/ 195 dU .................................. ................................................................ Ninisum Sase salary 22,080 22,080 24,080 26,080 26,080 27,211 Special allonce 4,416 4,416 4,816 5,216 5,216 5,442 Reside atllowance 3,091 3,091 3,371 3,651 3,651 3,651 Total 29,58? 29,58? 32,267 34,947 34,947 36,304 NinA Base salary 172,604 17,604 174,604 176,604 176,604 17775 Special allowance 34,S20 34,520 34,921 35,321 35,321 35,54? Residenc alloance 24,164 24,164 24,446 24,M 24,725 24,883 Total 231,288 231,288 233,971 236,650 236,650 238,165 Numder of CiviL Servants 5/ 59,258 63,011 66,310 67,718 67,034 a/ From July 1982. b/ from July 1983. c/ From December 1984 dt From January 1985. e/ As of end end-June; excluding technical assistants and eqployees in process of retirement. Source: Oirection du Budget, Ministers de lEconomie et des Finances. - 90 - SA TABLE 24 Senegal: Sixth Plan - Resource Mobilization CFAF bn Current Prices Ratio of 3-Year Actual 11nancing Resource PiP Expenditure Acquired Mobilization 1987-90 1/ (Percent) (CFAF bnY Primary Sector 103.0 131.2 73.5 134.2 Agriculture 53.3 58.1 88.5 68.8 Livestock 6.9 6.9 69.0 8.7 Fishing 10.6 11.8 73.6 12.6 Forestry 9.6 12.1 62.1 13.0 Rural Water Supply 22.6 42.3 54.4 30.2 Secondary Sector 203.7 244.9 72.0 46.5 Industry 127.5 160.9 69.6 5.2 Mining 57.9 62.5 84.9 4.4 Energy 17.6 20.5 60.5 36.2 Handicrafts 0.7 1.0 28.0 0.7 Tertiary Sector 61.3 112.1 54.1 115.8 Tourism 11.3 22.1 66.1 0.1 Commerce 1.6 2.2 53.3 0.7 Road Transport 41.5 74.4 56.5 82.4 Telecommunications 6.9 13.4 34.7 32.6 Quaternary Sector 87.9 121.2 77.7 87.0 Urban Hydraulics 10.3 36.1 47.3 24.5 Housing; 7.7 7.7 42.3 4.4 Health and Social Works 17.7 20.9 112.7 8.6 Education and human dev 18.6 21.3 73.2 22.9 Social and Cultural Development, sports and information 17.8 19.4 118.7 Other (in.l multisector) 15.8 15.8 98.8 26.6 Total 455.9 609.4 70.1 383.5 1/ Preliminary version dated (December 31, 1986). Source: Ministry of Planning, Bulletin 14 _.91 - SA TABLE 25 Senexalt Sixth Plan Execution CFAF Bn Percentage Current Prices Distribution Plan Forecast 650.0 100.0 Financing Acquired 609.4 93.8 100.0 Investment Executed 455.9 70.1 74.7 Financing: 455.9 100.0 Domestic 136.3 29.9 100.0 Government 37.4 8.2 27.4 Parapublic sector 22.8 5.0 16.7 Private sector 49.2 10.8 36.1 Banking sector and other 26.9 5.9 19.7 External 319.6 70.1 100.0 Grants 75.7 16.6 23.7 Concessional borrowing 121.7 26.7 38.1 Non-concessional borrowing 122.2 26.8 38.2 Sectoral Distribution: Total 455.9 100.0 Primary 103.0 22.6 100.0 of which, agriculture 53.3 11.7 51.8 Secondary 203.7 44.7 100.0 of which, manufactuting 127.5 28.0 62.6 mining 57.9 12.7 28.4 Tertiary 61.3 13.5 100.0 of which, transport 41.5 9.1 67.4 Quaternary 87.9 19.3 100.0 of which, education 18.6 4.1 21.2 health 17.7 3.9 5.6 Source: Ministry of Planning, Bulletin 14 - 92 SA TALE 26 SEIEG: The Seventh Plan by Yeer (billfon CFAF at current and at 1985 constant prices) Total 1985/86 1986/86 197/88 19l6/89 At errant Prces 747.0 207.3 223.1 174.2 142.4 Priry Sector 232.5 64.8 75.0 52.7 40.0 Secondry Sector 187.2 56.6 54.4 45.1 31.1 Tertiary Saetor 149.2 34.9 48.9 30.5 34.9 UOUSrMy Sector 160.2 47.8 40.2 *1.0 31.2 Other I/ 17.9 3.2 4.6 4.9 5.2 At Constant Price 658.9 200.0 201.0 146.1 111.8 Primry Sector 20S.? 62.5 67.6 44.2 31.4 Secary Sector 165.8 54.6 49.0 37.8 24.4 Tertiary Setor 130.8 33.7 44.1 25.6 27.4 sternay Sector 141.2 46.1 36.2 34.4 24.5 Other 1/ 15.4 3.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 I/ Counity and local projects not attributable b sector. Sore The Seventh Economfe and Social Devlpment Plan. - 93 - S 'ABLE 2? SKNEGAL: Monetary Survey, 1981-86 (bit. of CFAF; ond of period) ........................................................................................... June Oec. Oec. fYP16l FY1192 fY1983 FY1194 1965 1965 1966 s ......................... ... * *.. ..*........... . ....... ++............ Foreign assets (not) *111.5 *133.3 -178.8 -198.4 *229.5 *240.2 .241.3 Contrel Sank -84.5 '120.7 *163.4 *18l. *215.? '216.0 -210.3 Cuourcisl Bank -27.0 *12.6 -1S.4 -16.9 -13.8 *24.2 *31.0 Dotmetic credit 324.4 398.6 468.0 490.1 503.5 548.9 ss2.9 Claim on GovernmentCnat) 29.9 70.2 90.4 120.9 126.6 146.0 148.8 Claims on private sector 294.5 328.4 377.6 369.2 376.9 402.9 404.1 Ordinary credit 264.7 300.1 334.7 356.8 360.3 374.4 374.1 of which: 0NCAD 67.7 67.7 67.? 67.? 67.7 67.? 67.7 Crop Credit 29.8 28.3 42.9 12.4 16.6 28.5 30.0 Money and quasi -money 181.0 238.1 266.8 276.6 284.3 307.4 299.3 Other Items (net) 31.9 27.2 22.4 15.1 -10.3 1.3 12.3 of which: ONCAD 26.3 29.7 26.S 22.0 gemo items: Change over previous period tX) ,............................................ Forefgn assets (net) 19.6 34.1 11.0 15.7 4.7 0.5 Domestic credit 22.9 17.4 4.7 2.7 9.0 0.? Claims on Goverrment(net) 134.8 28.8 33.7 4.7 15.3 1.9 Claims on private sector 11.5 1S.0 -2.2 2.1 6.9 0.3 MoneWi and quasi -money 31.5 12.1 3.? 2.8 8.1 '.6 ........................... ............................................................. **+**^**..................***^^Z........... a/ Estimates. Source: IMf staff estimates, December 1986. 94 - SA TABLE 28 SEWNUL: Agriculturt Production, Ates Under Cuttivation, and Yields Averap 190/81 19B1/82 1982/83 193/84 1984/85 1985/86 79/80-85/6 ........... ....................................................... PRODUCTION ('000 at) ..................... Groundrut 521.4 866.6 1145.4 575.0 490.0 601.2 I 696.5 Cotton 20.9 41.0 47.5 30.4 47.0 38.8 j 36.1 Nillet and Sorghm 545.0 986.0 S85.2 351.8 471.4 950.0 J 630.0 Maise 56.8 94.8 82.1 61.5 98.4 147.0 83.8 Rice (padAd) 64.6 127.0 W5 0 101.5 135.8 147.5 I 109.? Co*pe 17.1 28.7 13.2 12.9 15.7 80.0 I 26.6 Casava 25.1 33.7 31.0 I 28.6 Vegtables 90.8 103.5 107.3 116.0 120.0 125.0 1 106.8 ARUA NDER CULTIVATION ('000 hi) I ....................... ..................I Grouadut 1074.7 101S.S 1167.3 1109.7 874.0 604.6 j 987.9 Cotton 29.9 32.0 42.0 33.4 4.3 38.8 1 36.2 Millet and Sorhun 1116.7 1176.9 990.7 82r.8 1002.9 1335.7 1059.8 Mtite 78.0 71.2 86.2 TO.S 82.7 101.4 79.7 Rice (paddy) 67.1 71.6 68.1 52.0 66.1 78.2 68.8 Colwpes n.s. 59.2 45.9 41.6 52.5 128.5 65.S Cassavn 7.6 7.8 n.a. n.a. n.s. 7.8 I 7.8 Vegetables 6.2 6.8 n.a. n.e. n.a. n.s. n.a. YIELD (kg per ha) I ..................1 Groundmut 485.2 853.4 981.2 S18.2 560.6 994.4 I 705.1 Cotton 699.0 1281.3 1131.0 910.2 1015.1 1000.0 996.8 Nillet and Sorghuw 48a.0 837.8 590.7 425.0 470.0 711.2 1 S94.5 "site 728.2 1331.5 952.4 872.3 1189.8 1449.7 I 1052.4 Rkce (paddy) 962.7 1773.7 1395.0 1951.9 20S4.S 1886.2 j 1594.0 Cowpeas n.e. 484.8 287.6 310.1 299.0 622.6 I 406.3 Cassava 3302.6 4320.5 n.e. n.a. n.a. 3974.4 I 3690.3 Vegetables 14645.2 15220.6 n.e. n.a. n.a. n.s. j n.a. MEMO ITEMS: | ...........I Disposition of Groundnut production(unshell4d basis, '000 mt) | Oil mitts 62.8 517.0 701.0 216.0 145.0 270.0 | 307.5 Confectionery nuts 1/ 1.0 7.0 17.0 7.0 4.0 10.0 9.6 Autoconsuntion 2/ 328.6 174.6 232.4 201.0 252.0 246.2 I 233.1 seed 124.0 132.0 139.0 130.0 76.0 55.0 1 119.3 Losses 5.0 36.0 56.0 21.0 13.0 20.0 1 27.0 1 Total 521.4 866.6 114S.4 573.0 490.0 601.2 1 696.5 1/ tncluding hwnd-picked select. 2/ Including sales In parallel market. Sources: Ministwre du D,eoloppownt Rural, Nov. 1985; Dir* tion do la PrevisiOn, FebruWAy nd Deceiwef 1986; and Infe Potion obtained by the mission (Nay 1986). - 95 - SA TSLE 29 SEIEGAL: Estimated Coeal Suplipes nd Requirewnts 1982-86 1960/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 ........................................................................................ oross Produition ('000 ton) ............................ Millet/Sorghuw 545.0 966.0 58.2 351.6 471.4 950.0 Paddy 64.6 127.0 95.0 101.5 135.8 147.5 Naito 56.8 94.8 82.1 61.5 98.4 147.0 Total Cereals 666.4 1207.8 762.3 514.8 705.6 1244.S Net Equivalent 1/ .................. "Illet/Sorghmw 425.1 769.1 4S6.5 274.4 36?.? 741.0 Rice (milLed) 42.0 82.6 61.8 66.0 88.3 95.9 Maize 4.3 73.9 64.0 48.0 76.8 114.7 total Cereals 511.4 925.6 582.2 388.3 532.7 951.5 Commercial Ilports 2/ SorghwL 80.0 Sorghu.m net 3/ 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 62.4 0.0 Wheat 100.5 112.3 116.5 118.S 97.6 100.0 liheat - net 4/ 70.4 78.6 81.6 83.0 68.3 70.0 Rice 339.8 376.6 380.0 371.9 336.1 306.3 Rice - net 339.8 376.6 380.0 371.9 336.1 306.3 total - Net 410.2 455.2 461.6 454.9 466.8 376.3 Food Aid Received 2/ 60.1 16.3 182.1 73.0 40.0 Totat Supplies 2/ 921.5 1440.9 1060.1 1025.3 1072.5 1367.8 Population ('000) 5863.0 6027.0 6202.0 6380.0 6577.0 67.0 Totat Requirnants 6/ 1213.6 1247.6 1283.8 1320.7 1361.4 1402.8 Theoretical Surplus/Deficit *292.1 193.3 *223.7 .295.4 -288.9 -35.0 1/ Using the folltowin conversion factors from Plan Cerealer, Ninistre du Delppment RIrl, Ny 1986: tl llet/Sorhi (0.78), Rice 0.65), Refe (0.78). 2/ Calendar year basis. 3/ Convsion factor: 0.78, Plan Cerealefr. 4/ Convesion factor: 0.70, Plan Ceelier. S/ Expected from Canad, Italy, Japan EEC, and USA). 6/ btimted by the GoveruIbnt at 20? Kg. per psn. r/ No Infomtion on Stock chan available at a ntional toel. - 96 - OhAKU 30 :NM bu fbwiddoa (1970M) IbOt198 1982 1983 1984 1985 1 18.5 107.4 67.8 84.3 107.9 112.6 PI~s~*aata 16.2 106.5 66.5 79.6 106.6 114.5 -o Prcixwti( 4.1 8.5 105.2 109.7 10.5 103.2 of *id: ffib ani 2.8 163.2 181.3 151. 143.0 170.3 di wills 12.2 18.8 64.8 76.7 48.0 35.3 Mu anl ianmtti0Wr 13.2 140.5 140.7 137.8 153.9 166.1 TzWRes, CMOtbWN, ad Jaatb.r 12.3 110.4 W47.6 139.9 120.1 133.9 Todatils 10.0 123.3 166.3 159.2 130.2 155.9 Otber 2.3 54.1 66.2 55.9 76.1 38.3 Wood froducts 0.5 127.1 140.9 133.0 124.7 124.1 Peper 1.8 120.6 121.0 137.5 139.4 120.1 2hem1W=l bI*utri. 11.4 85.5 80.2 73.1 72.1 77.9 kA1mdxpeSamtls 1.6 96.3 85.5 40.9 51.7 61.3 tr:tilime adi iausoticid 3.7 72.7 42.6 55.8 58.2 54.5 Otber (Platic and rubbr mteials 2.8 71.8 91.8 75.0 75.2 120.1 Ctdzaatiaa materials 3.3 94.7 91.1 128.6 116.2 94.1 k&dam1y adl Eui4bt 4.0 61.8 74.3 93.6 97.8 78.1 ElActricity aMd Wate 5.1 134.6 141.4 148.7 153.2 156.0 Etectricity 2.7 132.5 138.0 154.5 149.6 165.2 Watr 2.4 137.0 145.2 142.1 157.4 143.5 G.wral Dia uithcat Oil Plloosu 87.8 108.2 108.3 111.4 122.9 117.7 ma1 h it 100.O 9.2 103.0 107.I 106.0 107.6 SRzc: 1izuC a la StatiStia. I0e dB la ProhzttO ZuitdAlk. - 97 SA TABLE 31 SENIGAL2 ArIcuIturaI ProdUcer Prices in Current Torms (CfAF per kg.) .......................................................................................... 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/8 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 Groundnuts Confectionery 54.5 54.3 74.5 ?8.8 78.8 78.8 95.0 Oil Crushing a/ 45.S 50.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 80.0 90.0 Cotton (ungsined) b/ 55.0 60.0 68.0 70 0 70.0 70.0 100.0 Millet and Sorghum 40.0 40.0 50.0 50.0 55.0 60.0 70.0 Maize 37.0 37.0 47.0 47.0 50.0 60.0 70.0 Rice (paddy) 41.5 41.5 51.5 51.3 60.0 66.0 85.0 Cowpeas 30.0 33.0 43.0 43.0 43.0 60.0 110.0 Memo ftems: Changes over the previous year (%) Groundnuts Confectionery 0.4 37.2 5.8 0.0 0.0 20.6 Ofl Crushing a/ 9.9 40.0 0.0 0.0 14.3 12.5 Cotton (unginned) b/ 9.1 13.3 2.9 0.0 0.0 42.9 Millet and Sorghum 0.0 25.0 0.0 10.0 9.1 16.7 maize 0.0 27.0 0.0 6.4 20.0 16.7 Rice (paddy) 0.0 24.1 0.0 16.5 10.0 28.8 Cowpeas 10.0 30.3 0.0 0.0 39.5 83.3 Changes in CPI, African families c/ 5.9 17.3 11.7 11.8 13.0 6.5 .......................................................................................... a/ A retainer of CFAF 10/kg is included in 1981/82 and 1982/83 prices, end of CFAF20 in 1983/84 and 84/8S prices to finance the seed distribution schem. b/ First quality. c/ CPt for Snegalose family in Dakar, calendar year. The 1986 estimate is based on avaflable data through October 1986. Sources: BCEAO Bulletin, October 1986; Direction de ta Prevision, Novesber 1986. - 98 - SA TABLE 32 SENEGAL: AgrfculturaL Producer Prices in Constant T*rrs (CFA franms per kg. In 1960 prices) ......................................................................................... 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 ......................................................................................... Growudnuts Confectionery 54.S S1.3 60.0 56.8 50.8 45.0 50.9 Oil Crushing 1/ 45.5 47.2 56.4 50.4 45.1 45.6 48.2 Cotton (ungSired) 2/ 55.0 56.7 S4.7 S0.4 45.1 39.9 53.6 Mitlet and Sorghum 40.0 37.8 40.3 36.0 35.5 34.2 37.5 Maize 37.0 34.9 37.8 33.9 32.2 34.2 37.5 Rice (paddy) 41.5 39.2 41.5 37.1 38.7 37.7 45.5 CowpeaS 30.0 31.2 34.6 31.0 27.7 34.2 58.9 Memo Items: Price Index (1980 a 100) ............................................... 8roundnuts Confectionery 100.0 94.1 117.0 94. 89.4 88.5 113.2 oil Crushing 1I 100.0 103.8 119.4 89.5 89.4 101.1 105.6 Cotton (ungimed) 2/ 100.0 103.0 96.6 92.2 89.4 88.5 134.1 Milet and Sorghum 100.0 94.4 106.6 89.5 98.4 96.5 109.5 Maize 100.0 94.4 108.3 89.5 95.2 106.2 109.5 Rice (paddy) 100.0 94.4 105.8 89.5 104.2 97.3 120.9 Cowpeas 100.0 103.9 111.1 89.5 89.4 123.S 172.1 CPI, African famtlies c/ 100.0 10S.9 124.2 138.8 155.1 175.3 186.7 ........................................................................................ a/ A retainer of CFAF 10/kg is Included In 1981/82 and 1982/83 prices, and of CFAF20 in 1983/84 and 84/8S prices to finance the seed distribution scheme. bl First quality. c/ CPI for Senegalape famity in Dakar, caLendar year. The 1966 estimte I8 based on avOilable data through October 1986. Sources: BCEAO Bulletin, October 1986; Direction de li Previson, _ovebr 1986. - 99 - SA tILE 33 SENEGAL: Consuner Prfce tndices for African Family in Dakar, 1979-85 (1967.100) Item (Weight) 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1986 1985 ls 3 a/ .................................................................................................... Genersl Index (100.0) 257.3 279.8 296.3 347.6 388.2 433.9 490.5 522.6 Food (56.0) 291.8 315.9 318.3 383.8 427.4 476.4 519.6 559.6 Ctothing (11.9) 210.3 234.1 263.8 301.0 351.8 395.6 440.3 491.9 Housins (16.2) 200.5 212.6 232.8 264.6 285.0 296.7 355.6 390.1 Houshold aoods (4.0) 252.6 279.6 320.9 354.0 394.9 600.3 780.1 727.8 Transport nd Leisure (11.9) 220.4 246.9 303.6 334.6 378.0 403.6 490.1 506.8 Percentage Change Over Previous Year General Index 8.7 5.9 17.3 11.7 11.8 13.0 6.5 Food 8.3 0.8 20.6 11.4 11.5 9.1 7.7 Clothing 11.3 12.7 14.1 16.9 12.5 11.3 11.7 Housing 6.0 9.5 13.7 7.7 4.1 19.9 9.7 Household Goods 10.7 14.8 10.3 11.6 52.0 30.0 *6.7 Transport and Leisure 12.0 23.0 10.2 13.0 6.8 21.4 3.4 UUWm2U3aUmUuUS3a-guUUaauuSaU3UUUaS..uU3 aWuU3u*u3.3au zass3ugu..gru3UgUau33gg-a3s5 a/ The 1986 estimates are based on available data through October 1986. Source: Direction de ta Statistique. - 100 - SA TABLE 34 SINEGALs Cosubr_ Price Indiac for Euorpean Family In askar, 1979 85 (1961u100) item (Weight) 1979 1960 1981 1982 1963 1984 1985 1986 a/ .................................................................................................... General Index (100.0) 311.5 351.9 391.3 440.6 477.8 523.4 565.4 603.3 Food (45.0) 384.4 429.9 483.1 S38.9 603.1 658.9 706.1 766.1 Utifttle. (2.3) 160.S 1?6.3 197.2 221.7 238.9 271.8 314.S 32?.7 Hostrn (4.6) 263.3 327.0 343.3 347.7 406.7 419.7 437.8 443.6 Nuehold goods (24.5) 247.0 276.9 288.6 358.2 375.2 398.8 440.4 469.9 Sworts and Leisure (1.7) 272.8 300.4 331.7 357.0 366.2 400.4 419.7 425.6 Trasport (7.9) 227.0 345.8 436.5 487.4 S27.4 572.6 639.4 670.7 Other (4.0) 208.4 225.6 245.5 258.7 258.1 291.6 319.3 342.6 Percentage ChWe Over Prvious Year .3................................... General index (100.0) 13.0 11.2 12.6 8.4 9.5 8.0 6.7 . ...... .... ...... .... .... . .... .... . .... .... . .... .. ..... .. Food (45.0) 11.8 12.4 11.6 11.9 9.3 7.2 8.S Utitities (2.;) 9.8 11.9 12.4 7.8 13.8 15.7 4.2 Housing (4.6) 24.2 5.0 1.3 17.0 3.2 4.3 1.3 Househotd Good (24.5) 12.1 4.2 24.1 4.7 6.3 10.4 6.7 Sports ad Leisure (11.J) 10.1 10.4 7.6 2.6 9.3 4.8 1.4 Trasport (7.9) 52.3 26.2 11.7 8.2 8.6 11.7 4.9 Other (4.0) 8.3 8.8 5.4 0.0 12.7 9.5 7.3 a/ The 1986 etimtes are based on vsittabLe data through October 1986. Source: Direction de to Statistiqur. - 101 - sA TAuLE 35 Wortd Prices of Selcted Prifmwy ComWdftfes, 190-95 ( *S/NT, untles othterwis noted; vwtl chdnges fn 2) umg-usuugauuausumuauouu------------ugu---- mu-u-uu--gg- 1965 1906 1987 198 1m6 1990 1091 1992 1993 1994 195 ................................. ............................................ OV X chae 0.7 13.0 3.1 1.3 1.3 1.3 3.5 3.5 3.S 3.5 3.5 Food X chag *11.1 7.3 *5.6 2.4 4.7 4.4 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 Petroteum $/BL 26.7 13.S 16.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 19.2 20.5 21.9 23.4 25.0 2 chnge -2.9 .49.4 18.5 12.5 - 0.0 0.0 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 Groundnut oft 905.0 S85.0 580.0 599.0 645.0 701.0 730.3 760.8 792.6 825.8 860.3 X chanoe -11.0 -35.4 *-.9 3.3 7.7 8.7 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 Grouwndut most 143.0 165.0 162.0 173.0 178.0 181.0 185.7 190.6 19S.6 200.7 206.0 2; chanse *23.5 15.4 -1.8 6.8 2.9 1.7 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 Sugar(c/ko) 90.0 154.0 187.0 253.0 316.0 390.0 388.1 386.1 384.2 382.3 380.3 X change 21.7 71.1 21.4 35.3 24.9 23.4 -0.5 -O.S *0.5 -0.5 0.5 Rice 216.0 210.0 220.0 243.0 268.0 282.0 266.8 *91.7 296.7 301.8 307.0 X change -14.3 -2.8 4.8 10.5 10.3 5.2 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 Iheat 173.0 160.0 138.0 153.0 169.0 178.0 181.3 184.6 188.0 191.5 195.0 % change 4.8 -7.5 -13.8 10.9 10.5 5.3 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 Grain sorghum 103.0 94.0 111.0 117.0 117.0 11S.0 117.9 120.8 123.8 126.8 130.0 X chanoe -13.4 -8.7 18.1 5.4 0.0 -1.7 2.S 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 Cotton (c/kg) 132.0 100.0 110.0 121.0 148.0 166.0 178.3 191.4 205.5 220.7 237.0 X change 2¢3 -27.3 14.6 10.0 22.3 12.2 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 Phosphate 34.0 33.0 34.0 38.0 39.0 41.0 42.7 44.4 46.2 48.1 50.0 S change .10.5 -2.9 3.0 11.8 2.6 5.1 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 TsP Fertilizer 121.0 130.0 130.0 14S.0 152.0 160.0 168.9 178.4 188.4 198.9 210.0 X change -.6 7.4 0.0 11.5 4.8 5.3 S.6 S.6 5.6 S.6 S.6 Sourco: The Wortd a"nk, Prfce Prospects for NaJor Primry Coimodftias (In fIve volum), October 1986. };y o vi '~~~~- f J~~~~~~~ A y,W - 102 - SA TULE 3 Wills CUTh aiLV6SI MEL MM M^ S - I aoIF0 Au (Willis Uml ml.ii othrwls noted) 1118 WIn 1966 1 1 19 199 199 1992 1993 1994 Io 01? (billion CFAF, 1979 price,l me4 4.1 7oo. Mal 740.0 7Mo 8148 643.2 72# 903.6 9Mo0 uIp - Brwith ate ni) 3*6 49' 3.5 3.5 3.6 3U5 3.5 34 35 3S 3hS Priy Sctor (growth rate, U It 9° 46 6 4.4 1.4 3.5 3,4 3.4 3.5 3*6 Secnday Sectwr (grth rati, t) 2.0 4*0 3'S 343 4*3 3S4 4.3 4.1 4*1 4.2 4*2 Otber sectors (truth rate, j 3M3 3.2 3*0 2.4 2.9 3.7 '32 32 3M2 3,2 3*1 lnmstmtIrossstit Inen {* 14.7 14t 14.0 14.0 14.0 140 13.9 13.6 13.8 13.7 13.6 Incrwntal Capitallhattl Ratio 3.3 2.6 3.7 4.0 .9 4.0 4.0 4*0 4.0 4.0 4.0 UP at Current Price (US$ ellion; 252.4 3790 4101.9 44iJ9 480.7 17.D0 14.0 W9.6 46.9 747.7 13.0 lorts OM 22.9 14.7 1A.4 1462.0 1570.2 664.2 1799.2 to.s 206.7 2192,7 24.5 lpots of patte t194.9 1NA6 190.3 228.4 230.0 240.5 2U.6 206.9 332.4 370,4 412.S pworts of lOM 6. 1082 11W.0 12982 1386.8 1434.6 139.3 11.0 1321.7 112.2 20W3.4 Exports of Uroants 52.7? 70.4 9.5 111.*6 119,3 1,8*2 133.; 137.0 Ot.9 141.0 19.2 Exprts of Fish I Fish Prodcts 20.0 143.2 1S.8 169.7 163.3 197.5 210.3 224,0 23.4 256.1 270.7 Expots/UOP lft contatt priec; 32.2 31,4 32.9 33*0 32,5 32.1 31.8 31.5 31.1 .1 30.9 lpot Elasticity -1.6 0.7 14,6 0.6 0.7 0t9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0,9 0.9 lplrtsSlS (at constant prices) 26.6 26.3 .4 3? 37.9 375 37*3 37.2 37.0 36.9 36.7 36. Resorce uance/ -12.5 4S.4 -4 45 4.0 -3. -34, -3.6 -335 -34 -3*2 -3.1 errtnt Accoant leuWceIP -17.6 4.6 -4.9 443 -7.8 7.5 -7.2 -7.0 4.7 435 4.3 CA IalancCieln. g2API1S -18.3 -10,4 4.4 40.8 4.5 -8.2 4.0 -76 7.6 7_4 -7.2 Comeitents - Official 9.2 316.5 342.7 364,0 382,9 394.3 412.7 435.7 461.4 462.9 514,3 Caeitunts - Private 27.7 38.* 41.0 42.6 44.3 46.1 491 52,3 5*6 9.J 43.1 Comeitnts - lLT 126.9 35.1 3113.6 406.6 427.2 440.4 461.8 46.0 517.1 54.1 V77.4 CauitMots Including gapfill 144.6 A0. 441.0 476.9 41S 44.9 531.1 561,0 55.9 615,2 60.0 Official Trasfers and Brants 33.3 145,9 176.0 163.0 190.4 198.0 21.9 224,6 231 254.7 271.2 Net Dibursets(LT) - Official 137.1 134.8 148.2 143.2 162.3 156.6 161.4 173.3 206.2 206,3 227.2 llt lisbsemants(lltl - Privatt 43.7 20.0 4.7 -7.2 2.3 20.2 13.6 11.0 6.7 5.6 12.2 WFIL 0.0 -13.7 44.4 43.9 20.8 15.6 25.0 21.7 0.2 .66 -9.1 True 6q 17.7 5.7 64,4 70.3 54.2 54.5 69N3 73,0 58.8 73.0 62.7 * - up 194.2 1t9.9 264.3 334.6 38.0 443.3 512.*6 5.6 64.4 7174.4 8.1 on 2002.5 2157,2 2300.8 2436.8 2601.4 278.2 253.3 3U3.6 31.4 30.3 30.7 NO lKi. gap1/16OP 65.7 63,0 62.5 62.2 61.5 60.7 59.9 n91 S8.2 57.3 56.3 WD UincI. apl/ExpEwts 274,0 17.7 215.7 213.5 215.6 217.0 216.1 218.9 219.3 219.4 219.0 dbt services 132.0 265.0 309.1 351.7 358.3 375.7 404.3 431.7 441.1 412.*6 02.6 Debt Srvite/Exwort 143 22.7 24.3 25.1 23A 22.7 22.6 22.4 21.0 21.4 20.6 Dlbt Skrvic (licl. gUExports 16.5 24.5 26.0 27.1 25.8 25.3 25.4 25.4 24.2 24.7 24.0 02/O 1105931 - 103 - SA Table 36 (continued) SEEAL? ARICLtURAL PRODUCTIOIN (1000 HT) IER 1915 136 198 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 M993 1994 1995 RIE 88.3 95.9 1225 156.4 199.7 2137 228.6 244.4 261.8 280.1 299.7 on 79.0 80.0 62*9 85.9 89.0 92.2 95.5 98.9 102.5 106*2 110.0 FR, I VEB 120.0 125.0 143.1 163.9 187,6 204.3 222.5 242.3 263.9 287*4 313.0 COtTT1 Co0 38,8 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 54.2 58.6 63.8 69X2 75.0 UUUU 490,0 601.2 756,0 650.0 o5ntG 9500 850.0 639.0 029.7 819.8 809.9 GRA1N 471.0 950M0 650.0 663.0 676.3 68WA8 703.6 717.7 732.0 746.6 761.6 TOMTO 42.0 40.0 491 60.3 74*1 77.6 61.8 86,0 90. 95.0 99.8 OTtER 115,0 258.0 268.6 279.6 291.1 30t.1 323.9 341.6 360*6 380.4 401.3 1f03l8 12:St7 PN 104 - SA Table 36 (contiuued) ummt WmU omc mm By zmsm mm> (ORLLUSSON 1979 CPA FRANC) IlEI ~ 1905 1998 1907 1990 lf69fl 990 1991 1992 1993 1994 19 CSlMUU 51.2 .0 65.1 71.0 74.5 74.5 78.8 10.9 03.2 05.6 992 DM1E PR 72.2 74.7 76.9 IM.0 9.2 f.5. 90.0 93.6 97*4 1014 10i5 "WINmY 123.4 13*5 142.0 11*0 17.7 1s.1 10.3 1745 105 164.9 1934 mm3115 O45 9.1 9.1 9.3 9.6 9.9 102 10.6 10.9 11,3 11.7 OL NM 8.9 1146 15.4 17.7 17,7 17.7 17.7 17*4 17*2 14.9 16.7 EaEmSY 11.6 12.0 12.4 12.9 13.3 14U0 14.8 15.4 16*5 17*4 1803 tCIINETwuN 41,4 44.4 42., 44.3 46*0 47.7 493 1So6 52.5 54.1 S5.9 OGMER 100.0 100.1 103.1 105.6 111.4 115.4 12.*5 127.0 134.4 lfl.5 140,9 SECUARY 170.4 177.2 103.3 109.8 1900 204.7 213,5 m22.3 231M 241.3 21.M5 CS3l 133.3 141* 150.*6 152.2 161. 171.6 179* 1N6A 19.2 202.0 210.2 AMHINIT'N 106.1 106.5 104.6 104.6 104*6 104.6 104*6 106,2 107*0 106*8 109.2 GTMER tERUARY 121.*6 124.3 1235 133.2 137*9 142.9 146,1 153.4 153.9 164.6 170*6 tRTIARY 361.0 32.4 393.7 m. 404.3 419.1 432.5 446.4 460*8 475,4 4899. uP 654s0 6E5.1 709.0 733.8 760.0 78049 814.8 043.2 6720 903*6 935,0 121t8 PN - 105 - ,IPti of cwre WC wlm otwiulu Gotu) IMI 1w 19 16 to 9m 1990 091 12 193 19 n9s Ob stbe Pcct 117 196 1421.3 156.3 U1402 181.9 31 21*9 23134 216.3 20.1 Eapwts of d* S N8 3604 3112 42.0 498 40*.5 514.4 31.7 59. 631.2 4 MAI .4 loprts of Su a we 504.? 0.1 476. 113. 147.2 3 614 1.4 710.9 71.6 3124 llee Salwce 144.4 -.9 -4A 417 6.67 69.2 .727 76*1 -79.7 6.3 -7,0 Cousiptiom 1130.3 111 220.1 1e. 149.3 10379 173. M90.0 2101.2 217.3 243.4 Private 925*3 61.3 lO3O 111.2 121.2 1=2 1411*4 1M7.e 1746*5 1910m 0 308663 hovanat 213.0 22MA 2M1 267.7 2 37 311t7 3M.5 354? 3773 40. Total lovatut 157. 179.3 216.8 2314 27.2 2.1L 33.6 30 356.5 31.4 4166 Fixed tsbut 61.3 133.0 M197. 215 M4 23,i4 m2 299.6 324.0 31.? U112 Private 11 112.0 10.0 93 1314 164.6 1739 194.5 211.3 229.J 24.7 271.3 Cewlat Epedatwo 49.3 S.0 3.3 U6. 699 76.1 82*3 .S 95.1 102.2 10M9 Chap in Stock -3S -3.7 19n2 20.9 22.7 24.7 21.8 29.2 3n. 34.5 74 wostic sive 1.4 1O.S 1S.2 172.4 190.5t 10 25.9 252.9 276 303.0 331*7 owe of 1?M Private Cuutioo 60.3 ?4.2 71.3 71.5 72.0 72n. 72.9 73.2 73.4 73.7 74.1 u6rmnt Couqtiu 16ot 174 l8O. 17.J3 167 16.0 15.6 15.2 14.t 14.6 14.2 TOWd lunstu 13.7 13. 15.3 15.3 15.3 t5.2 151 15.1 15.O 14.? 14.6 Fixed lustatt 14.0 14.l U.t 3.9 1t3.9 13.9 t3.6 13.7 13.7 13.6 13.5 P. Capita Cuuqtim (thouid CfiF at 1979 cstat pricsl Private Cos"tioo 76.7 76.5 73.S 74.0 75.3 761 77n. 7.3 79.2 60.1 61.0 6voet Cosuatie n 19.7 16,6 19.4 18.7 18.1 1MA6 17.2 17.0 16.8 16. 16.2 Total Coasutim 1.3 95.1 92.9 927 93.4 4.1 4.7 91.3 91.9 9.6 9. 11 Iucludn Public Eaterpriss. 02/OW? hURl - 106 - 9O tl£ 36 t entingd) 9b1mu. PMS NlEitC PROA VY B PENDItUIE (billion CFF at 199 constant prices) t1o5 196 19317 t93 1 1990 19t 1992 1 14 1995 Irms s emtic Portct 454.1 .t1 709 33 7600 78669 814.8 342 3726 9. 90 len of Yraje Adjistunt -367 -432 1.6 1.5 3.7 68. 3.6 to0? 12.7 14.8 1720 Oros oneatic tncn Mot.1 421.9 710.7 735.2 743.7 7MJ.7 623.4 153.8 615.$5 91.4 952.0 Rrnce so 49.9 293 36.9 34.5 34.8 34. 35.4 357 36.1 36.4 36.6 lpWrts Gdods and Ms 174.3 13.0 272.0 M2.9 '25.3 2939 303.2 312.4 . 332.0 342.4 Exports Go es ad NFS 211.1 214.9 233. 242.0 246.8 252.2 259.2 216.0 273.2 260.8 298.t Total Expditure 618,0 0,2 747.5 769.7 79.5 926.5 456.3 339.5 921.7 44.3 986 Conuption Ioneat 29.3 126.3 135.1 134.5 134.2 134.3 135*3 137,4 139.4 141,3 142.9 Private 517.8 518S 513.0 5321 557.3 5633 609.0 63.9 60.0 664 715.1 Total 67.1 6446 648.1 6666 691.5 7176 744*2 m13 799.7 623.9 653.7 InvStuut xied Inovetnt 615.4 39.4 0.5 93.9 97.5 101t1 104.4 107.6 lus.1 114.6 118.2 Change in Stock -1.9 -1.8 6.9 9.2 9.5 9.8 10.2 10.5 10.9 11.3 11.7 Total B3.5 87,6 99.4 103.1 107*0 111.0 114.5 118.2 122.0 125.9 129.9 gross )Dtic Savings 334 59.3 2.5 6.6 72.2 76h 19.2 s2.5 85.9 89.5 93.3 Factor rvice Inc=e (net) -22.6 -26.9 41.0 -39.7 -39,4 -39.7 40#5 41.2 -42.1 -3.1 4.1 et Transfer privatel 2.7 3.6 5.4 5.3 5.3 543 545 56 5.3 5.9 6.1 Gross National Savings 13.5 36.0 26.9 34,1 38.1 41.8 44U2 47.0 49.6 52.3 55.3 Gross National Product 632.0 4.2 668.1 694.0 720.6 747,2 774.3 302.0 330.8 360,5 890,9 aross National laca 545.3 595.0 669.7 6.5 724.4 754.0 732.9 612.7 343.5 815.3 907.9 02.7 148 Pl - 107 _ SA Table 36 (continued) SENEGAL :EXPORTS AND IMPORTS (NILLIN OF CURRENT US DOLLA) ITEM 1985 19RM 1907 1908 t99 1990 1991 1t92 1993 1994 1995 G#DUDNUS 52.7 70,4 97.5 111.4 119.3 128.2 133.2 137.0 140.9 145.0 149.2 FISH 120.0 163.2 158.8 169.7 183.3 197.5 210.3 224.0 238.6 254.1 270.7 PHOSPHATES 60.5 60.8 65.1 75.0 79.2 85.8 91.9 98,4 105.4 112.9 121,0 PETROLEUM 87.0 68.0 87.1 101.9 104,9 108.1 118.9 130.8 143.9 158.3 174.1 SALT 11.7 17,5 18.9 20.3 21.8 23.5 25.3 27,2 29*3 31.5 33.9 cOTTON 15.6 17.2 25.4 20.9 17.0 9.4 9,0 9.0 9.5 10.6 12,6 FERTILIZERS 41.2 60.4 66.5 77.8 84.8 92.9 102.0 112.0 123.0 135.1 14864 OTHERS 88.9 125.6 135.3 146.3 158.2 174,4 190.5 200.0 227.1 248,0 270.8 DITREPOT 3.1 75.1 82.1 90.2 99.1 108.8 118,4 128.8 140.1 152.3 165.7 EXPMRTS(FDP) 480.8 658.3 736.5 813.6 867.6 928.5 99.4 1075.1 1157.7 1247.8 1346.3 EXP NFS 320.9 424.5 452.5 484.7 519.2 556,1 589.9 625.9 663.9 704.4 747.2 EPSiNFS 801,7 1002.8 1189.0 129.2 1386.8 1484,6 1589*3 1701.0 1821.7 1952.2 2093.6 INP FOB3 256,1 257,4 241.1 248.4 257.3 274,0 282.0 292.5 303.3 314,4 325.6 RICE 60.6 51.2 47.1 48.4 46,0 47.8 49.4 50.8 52.1 53.3 54,5 SUGAm 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 FRUITtUEB. 11.9 14.2 19.8 19.0 18.7 19.4 19.7 19.7 19.4 18.9 18.1 MHEAT 15.9 11.6 9.9 11.3 13.1 14.4 15.3 16.2 17.1 18.1 19.2 OTHER FaOn 166.5 174.6 164.4 169.7 179.5 189.4 197.5 205,9 214.7 224,0 233.8 IMP PET 194.9 135.6 190.3 220.4 230.0 240.5 268.6 298.9 332.6 370.4 412.5 OTH.CON.m 120.3 166.9 173.5 181.9 191,3 201.2 207.9 215.5 224.0 232,2 241.4 INT.80085 267.9 324,7 345.0 373.2 406.8 439.5 472.1 506.3 543.1 563.2 626.2 CAPITAL 8. 115.0 140.9 145.8 151.7 157,9 164.3 174,8 185.9 197.8 210.5 223.9 ENTEROPT -56.2 -49,2 -47.9 -48.3 -48.1 -46.9 -44.7 -42.3 -39.5 -36.4 -32.8 IMPURTSFOR: 790.3 860.S 919.9 990.5 1048.3 1110.9 1189.0 1271.2 1360.7 1457.2 1561.9 NfS 332.7 424.0 455.5 491.5 530.9 573.3 610.2 649.2 691.0 735.5 782.6 IMPOIES 1123.0 12B4.5 1375.4 1482.0 1579.2 1684.2 1799.2 1920.5 2051.7 2192.7 2344.5 SEN/SIN,9EJVP4 02/03/07 1:00P -108 SA Table 36 (continued) SEN£ALIEXPORTS MU INPORTS (BILLIONS O CURRENT CFA FRANCS) ItCH 1995 1981 1987 1988 198 190 * 19 9 1 1 1995 9ROUNDIUIS 23.7 24*4 33.8 3S.7 41.3 444 46.2 47.5 48.8 50*2 51,' FISH 539 56.6 55.0 58.0 63.5 68.4 729 77*6 82.7 08.1 93.8 PNGIWAIES 27.2 21.1 22.6 26.0 27.5 29.7 31.8 34.1 36.5 39.1 41.9 PETR9LEIU 39.1 23.6 30*2 35.3 36.4 3.4 41.2 45.3 4.8 54.8 60.3 SALT 5.3 6.1 6,5 7.0 7*6 0.1 8.8 9.4 10.1 10.9 11.l coIN 7M0 6.0 0.8 7.2 5.9 3.3 3.1 3.1 J.3 3.7 4.4 FERTILIZERS 18.5 20.9 23.0 27.0 29.4 32.2 35.3 38.8 42*6 46.8 51.4 OTHERS 39*9 43.5 46*9 50.7 54*8 60.4 66,0 n71 78.7 85.9 93.8 ENTREPOT 1.4 26.0 29.5 31.3 34.3 37.7 41.0 44,6 48.5 52.0 57.4 EXPORTS(FOD) 216.1 228.1 255.2 281.9 300.6 321.7 346.3 372.5 401.1 432.4 466.5 EXP FS 144.2 147.1 156.8 167.9 179.9 192.7 204.4 216t9 230.1 244.1 258.9 EXPGS 360.3 375.2 412.0 449.8 48005 514.4 550.7 589*4 631,2 66*4 725.4 op FMOD 115.1 89.2 83.6 86.1 89.1 93.9 97.7 101.4 105l. 108.9 112.8 11 PET 87.6 47.0 66.0 76.4 79.7 83.3 93.1 103.6 115.3 1294 142.9 OTH,CON.8 54.1 57.8 60.1 63.0 66*3 69.7 72.0 74.7 77.6 B0.5 63.6 INT.SODMS 120.4 112,5 119.5 129.3 140.9 152.3 163.6 175,4 198.2 202.1 217.0 CAPITAL So 51,7 48.9 50.5 52.6 54.7 56h9 60.6 64.4 6.5 72.9 77*6 ENTEROPT -25,4 -17.2 -16.6 -16.8 -16.7 -16.3 -15.5 -14.6 -13.7 -12.6 -11.4 FR. I INS. 48.5 40.0 44.4 47.4 50.9 55.0 59.5 64.3 69,5 75*2 01.4 IMP8RTS(FO) 355.0 299.1 318.7 343.2 363.2 384M9 412.0 440.5 471.5 504.9 541.2 NFS 149.5 146.9 157.8 170.3 184.0 19B.6 211.4 225,0 2394 254.9 271.2 IWE 504.5 445*0 476.6 513. 5 547*2 583.6 623.4 665.4 7o.9 759.8 812.4 SEWIqSThtN P4 02/03/87 12159 P11 - 109 _ SA TAOE 6 I'continued) SENEBL:Ualance of Payents (millions of US Dollars at current prices) ItEII 1965 196 1991 19S8 1969 1990 1991 I9 199; 14 1995 Exports of Sam Experts of NFS 40.8 tS8.3 736.5 813.6 867.6 926.5 9.4 1075.1 1157.7 1247.8 134.3 Imports of tns 320.9 4.5 452*5 484*.7 519.2 556.1 589.9 625*9 663.9 704.4 747.2 Imports of IFS 790.2 860*7 919,9 990.5 1048.3 1110.9 1189.0 1271.2 1360.7 14572 151.9 Resource Balance 332.7 424,0 455,5 49.5 530.9 573.3 0.2 649.2 691.0 735s5 762.6 -321.2 -201.9 -106.3 -183.7 -192.5 -199.6 -209.9 -219.5 -230.0 -240.5 -250.9 factor Service Receipts 13.6 16.7 17.9 19.1 20.5 21.9 22.8 23.7 24.6 25.6 26*.6 3irect Investmtnt Incon Paymnt Interest Lt 0.0 -0, 00 0.0 0 .0 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Other Service Payments 43.5 103.8 115.8 117.5 120.2 126.3 132.0 137.3 144.2 152,2 160W0 fattor Service Paymnts 1167 105.1 109.3 113.6 118.2 122.9 130.9 139.4 146.5 l58.1 166.5 160.2 208.9 225.1 231.1 238.4 249.2 262,9 276VW 292.7 310.3 38.5 Net fector Service Incove oods and Services Balante -146,6 -192.2 -207.2 -211.9 -210.0 -227.3 -240.2 -253.1 -268.0 -24.7 -301.9 Net Current transfer 467.6 -394.1 -393.6 -395.7 410.4 -426.9 -4501 472.5 496.1 -525.2 -S52.8 17.1 26,0 27.1 28.1 29.3 30.5 32,4 34.6 36.08 39.2 41.7 Current Accaunt Balance 450.7 -368.1 -366.5 -367.6 -381.1 -396.4 -417,7 437,9 461.3 -46.0 411,1 Net Direct Foreign Investmnt '3.4 -2.0 -1.0 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 Official Grants and Transfers 133.3 165.9 176.0 183I0 190.4 196.0 210.9 224.6 239,1 2547 271.2 Disbursesent - Official 177.6 232.9 260.8 291.0 317.9 3.3 354.1 375.2 396.7 420.1 44713 bArtization - Official 40.4 98.1 112.6 14718 155.6 190.7 192.7 201.9 191.5 212.4 220.0 Net - Official 137.1 134,8 148.2 143,2 162.3 15646 161,4 173#3 205.2 20.3 227.2 Disbursement - Private 49.5 63.6 56.1 52.9 51.4 501 49.0 52.1 55.5 59.1 63.0 Aortization - Private .7 43.6 60.8 60.1 49.0 29.9 35.2 41.2 46,8 53.6 50.8 Net - Private 43.1 20.0 -4.7 -7,2 2.3 20.2 13.8 11.0 0.7 5S6 12.2 Disburseent - ntL 227.0 296.5 316.9 343M9 369.2 387.4 403.0 427.3 452.2 479.9 510.2 mortization - ILt 46.2 141.7 173.4 207.0 204.6 210.*6 227.9 243U1 2384 266.0 270.8 .t - 1.T 180.9 154.8 14.5 136.0 164U6 176.8 175.1 194.2 213.8 213.9 239.4 Short Term Capital 3,5 3.S 3.6 3.17 3.8 4.0 4.2 4.4 4.*6 4.9 5.1 Other Capital n.e.i 136A4 59.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Sdpfll 0.0 -13.7 44.4 43.9 20.8 15.6 25.0 21.7 0.2 8.6 -9.1 Interest on Sap 17.7 19.4 20.^ .26.4 33.5 38.9 44.3 51.3 58.6 64.4 71.7 Current Account (with gap) -468.3 -387.S -386.5 -394.0 -414.6 -435.3 4620 -489.2 -519.8 -5504 52.9 Tru Sap 17.7 517 644 70.3 54.2 54.5 69.3 73.0 58.0 73.0 t2.7 02/03/87 1:24 P11 W ~~~~~~~~~~~~~16' M AUR Nouakchott Rosso A SFNEGAL. 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