1. Project Data

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2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

The Project Development Objective (PDO) of the Agriculture Sector Support Project (ASSP) as articulated in the Project Appraisal Document (paragraph 13) was identical to both PDO statements stated in the Financing Agreement (FA, page 5) and the Grant Agreement (GA, page 5) and aimed to:
"(i) rehabilitate and reinforce productive capacities among targeted beneficiaries across Selected Value Chains, and (ii) foster an enabling institutional environment for the development of the agricultural sector, in the Recipient’s territory."

According to the PAD (paragraph 14) the project direct beneficiaries included: "approximately 60,000 crop farmers, 13,000 animal herders, 1,600 fish producers and 500 fish merchants, within all five administrative regions of Togo (of which up to 40 percent females and young producers). In addition, about 650,000 households raising poultry and/or small ruminants will benefit from the dedicated animal vaccination campaigns."

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?
   No

c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?
   No

d. Components
   The PDO was supported by the following three components:

1. Promotion of strategic food crop, export crop and freshwater fish development (appraisal cost: US$22.90 million, actual cost: US$26.60 million, total Bank channeled contribution of US$17.5 million under the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program - GAFSP). This component aimed to improve production and value-added of key commodities chosen for their growth potential and poverty reduction impact. It included the following three sub-components described in detail because of the numerous important partnerships, programs and commodities they involved:

1.1. Support for food crops development (GAFSP contribution of US$7.5 million). This sub-component aimed to foster the development of food production and integration of key value chains by building innovative and sustainable market based mechanisms. This would be mainly achieved through partnerships between producer organizations, input distributors, wholesalers, food processors and marketers, financial institutions and other service providers. The project would support: (i) the scaling-up of the already piloted ESOP model (Entreprises de Services et d’Organisation des Producteurs successfully developed in Togo and Benin since 2002 with support from two NGOs) for processing key strategic products (especially rice, soybeans and cassava) through a qualified service provider recruited under a performance based contract; (ii) pilot inventory credit schemes (warrantage) for cereal producers (especially maize and sorghum) in regions meeting economic viability conditions and in connection with contracting partners already bearing expertise in this field, which will be selected through a competitive development funding process; (iii) innovative initiatives to expand market access for other crops (e.g. fruits and vegetables) through a competitive grant scheme; and (iv) information and communication campaigns to promote Togolese food products on local and regional markets, through matching grants. This sub-component would also generate synergies with other projects, by capitalizing on the improved technologies and services provided through the West African Agricultural Productivity Program (WAAPP), and on the producer organizations and
infrastructures strengthened through the Togo Rural Development Support Project (PADAT), to improve integration across the targeted value chains.

1.2. Support for export crops (GAFSP contribution of US$7 million). For cotton, the project would support institutional strengthening of the producers’ organization (Togo Federation of Cotton Producers’ Groups-FNGPC), in order to enable it to take full responsibility for input distribution to farmers, to improve quality of seed cotton and to participate effectively in the governance of the cotton company (New Togo Cotton Company- NSCT), as a strategic shareholder. The project would also finance a study for preparing the entry of a private partner in the capital of the cotton company and for the creation of the cotton inter-professional board. For coffee and cocoa, the project would support gradual regeneration of the existing plantations (and some extensions in favorable zones) through (i) provision of adapted technical advisory services under the initial coordination of the Togo Institute for Agricultural Extension (ICAT); and (ii) provision of good quality planting material. The Project would also support the restructuring of the Togo Federation of Coffee & Cocoa Producers’ Groups Union (FUPROCAT) and of the Coffee and Cocoa Inter-professional Board (CIFCC). For export diversification, the Bank would support promising innovative micro-projects targeted at nontraditional export crops through a competitive grant scheme.

1.3. Support for freshwater fish production (GAFSP contribution of US$3 million). This sub-component aimed at improving the management of inland fisheries and developing fish farming, of particular interest to small rural enterprises and to youth groups. The project would support efforts to increase the supply and access to five critical inputs required for aquaculture development: information, fingerlings, feed, finance and markets. A series of fish production training and demonstrations will be conducted on existing private fish farms that would serve as a basis for technical packages that demonstrate profitable and environmentally sound best management practices. Additionally, some small inland water bodies would be re-stocked with fish following adoption of co-management plans with relevant stakeholders, particularly fishers. Resources would also be used in a compensation plan to provide legal-size fishing nets and small livestock as an alternative livelihood for Lake Nangbeto fishers and fish-vendors (essentially women) for the one season of expected low captures following renewed enforcement of the fishing regulations.

2. Support for livestock sub-sector development (appraisal cost: US$13.40 million, actual cost: US$16.40 million, emergency Global Food Response Program - GFRP contribution of US$9.00 million). GFRP emergency funding would focus on three most critical factors for the livestock sub-sector: (i) re-stocking with locally available breeding herds and flocks of higher genetic potential for growth and disease resistance to compensate for asset depletion and mortality in selected areas, drawing on the experience of competent local NGOs and on enhanced breeding facilities at the Togo Institute for Agricultural Research (ITRA), as well as new or upgraded border inspection/quarantine facilities for animals purchased in neighboring countries; (ii) support to animal health and disease control programs (country-wide de-worming and vaccinations campaigns), using a sustainable mechanism for vaccine procurement and administration already developed in Togo and enhanced control of the inputs supply chains; and (iii) support to the provision of enhanced traditional farm animal housing using readily available techniques and local materials, through the training of available service providers and direct assistance to farmers with a view to improve traditional husbandry and reduce the loss of animal due to diseases, predation and theft. Communication to reach out to targeted groups and training to mitigate risks would be included as an integral part of each of these three clusters of activities.
3. Support for capacity building and sector coordination (appraisal cost: US$14.90 million, actual cost: US$18.00 million, total Bank channeled contribution of US$10.5 million, of which US$9.0 million IDA funds and US$1.5 million GAFSP funds). This component aimed to strengthen the capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Water Resources (MAEP) to coordinate the implementation of this Bank financed project efficiently and manage other National Agriculture and Food and Nutrition Security Investment Program (PNIASA) investments, while preparing the transition to a Sector-wide Approach (SWAp) in the future. It included the following three sub-components:

3.1. Reform and capacity building of MAEP (IDA contribution of US$6.3 million). The project would support the implementation of MAEP reform including the restructuring of MAEP and its subsidiary agencies at central and regional/local levels, the introduction of a results-based management and accountability system (RBMAS), the strengthening of fiduciary management capacities in all MAEP structures, and the modernization of MAEP infrastructures and equipment. MAEP restructuring would result in a new MAEP organigram that would be endorsed by the Cabinet. The RBMAS would be introduced as part of the restructuring targets. MAEP structures (directorates at central level, regional structures and specialized agencies) would be subject to performance agreements agreed and monitored by the General Secretariat. The General Secretary would also sign and monitor the implementation of service delivery contracts with private partners. Specifically, the Project would finance: (i) methodological support (e.g. studies, manuals) and tools (e.g. software) for the implementation of the MAEP reform (including the RBMAS), and of the fiduciary management and M&E systems; (ii) the accompanying training plan of MAEP staff, to ensure effective capacity building; (iii) critical managerial or technical studies to accompany sector policy reform, and their public dissemination, and (iv) the modernization of MAEP’s infrastructures, equipment and work environment (construction and restoration of buildings, purchase of computer equipment, internet access, vehicles, among others).

3.2. Sector coordination and program management (IDA contribution of US$2.2 million and GAFSP contribution of US$1.5 million). The sub-component would strengthen MAEP’s capacity to coordinate the implementation of the project and of the PNIASA, overall. To this end, the project would finance the technical assistance of an International Consultancy Firm (ICF), recruited through a performance based contract from the beginning of the project to assist in project implementation and supervision, and to strengthen MAEP’s structures, processes and capacities through the transfer of competencies. The technical assistance support would cover ICF’s staffing and operational expenses, as well as small office equipment. In addition, the sub-component would finance: (i) an interim work plan and annual budget, which would be developed to launch project implementation, before the actual implementation of the MAEP reform and of the RBMAS; and (ii) activities related to the supervision and the M&E of the Project and PNIASA (including M&E surveys, and audits).

3.3. Management of financial support instruments (IDA contribution of US$0.5 million). The project would contract with a private partner to help refine and operate financial support instruments for service delivery to beneficiaries: (i) grants and matching grants; (ii) competitive funds; and (iii) credit guarantee (using GoT available resources of US$1.5 million for this purpose). The project would ensure only viable loans are guaranteed by the fund.

Revised Components. The Additional Financing in 2017 included adding new activities under components 1 and 2.
Component 1 had five new activities added: (i) the consolidation of existing 20 ESOPs (Entreprises de Services et Organisations Paysannes) developed under the original project with the construction of small infrastructure (warehouses and drying areas); (ii) the provision of equipment to improve the quality of processed products, capacity building for better management, marketing of final products, and increased profitability; (iii) the provision of technical assistance to beneficiaries of sub projects to improve profitability of their businesses; (iv) the selection of new beneficiaries under the competitive and matching grant scheme; (v) the transformation of successful sub projects into small or medium enterprises with a specialized service provider and facilitating access to finance. Further assistance was given to the recently created coffee and cocoa inter-profession. The project promoted, in collaboration with WAAPP, the dissemination of improved technologies for fish farming.

Component 2 was complemented with support for processing, quality improvement and increased access to markets for animal products through the establishment of small-scale culling areas in key livestock rearing regions in the country as well as capacity building of livestock producers for better organization of marketing (consolidated sales) of animal products (especially for poultry and small ruminants).

e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

Project Cost. The total project cost at appraisal was estimated at US$53.90 million. This amount was revised upwards to US$66.49 million after the project received additional financing in 2017. The actual project cost according to the ICR data sheet (page 2) was US$67.27 million.

Financing. The project was initially financed through an IDA Specific Investment Loan (SIL) worth US$9.00 million over five years, given that the investment activities can be pre-defined and implemented over a pre-determined period of time. In 2017, the project received an additional IDA financing of US$20.00 million to consolidate and scale up its achievements and enhance the developmental impact for beneficiaries. Total IDA financing was US$29.00 million. The project also received US$9.00 million from the Global Food Response Program (GFRP), and US$19.00 million from the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP). The actual amounts disbursed according to the ICR data sheet (page 2) were: US$8.47 million of the original IDA amount, US$21.10 million of the IDA additional financing, US$8.17 million of the GFRP and US$18.23 of the GAFSP. The total disbursed amount was US$55.97 million compared to an original cost estimate of US$57.00 million. The ICR did not explain the reason(s) for a US$1.03 million difference between the original cost estimates and the actual amounts disbursed. In a further communication between IEG and the Bank project team it was explained that "the second IDA support for the project was financed in Euros. Changes in exchange rates between the US dollar and the Euro during the lifetime of the project had affected the final US dollar amount of the project proceeds, which increased from US$20 million to US$21.09 million equivalent."

Borrower Contribution. The project was expected to receive US$7.90 million from the Government of Togo and US$9.00 million from the project beneficiaries, totaling US$16.90 million. The actual amounts according to the ICR data sheet (page 2) were US$11.30 million. The ICR did not provide a disaggregation of the reported amount.
**Dates.** The project was approved on April 12, 2011, and became effective eight months later on December 14, 2011. The ICR (paragraph 13) stated that the Mid-Term Review (MTR) was conducted in 2014, but no specific date was provided. The PAD did not include a specific date for the MTR. The project closed on December 15, 2020 compared to an original closing date on December 15, 2016. The closing date was extended twice (see below for more details).

**Restructuring.** The project was restructured four times, all Level Two restructurings as follows:

1. On June 20, 2014, when the total amount disbursed was US$14.14 million, funds were reallocated among the disbursement categories. According to the ICR (paragraph 13) this reallocation was necessary "in order to make up for the increased costs of some of the inputs (vaccines, deworming medicines) and veterinary services, the underestimations in the initial provisions of categories, and the cost overruns resulting from the lack of partners’ funding to co-finance component 3 of the project as planned."

2. On August 11, 2016, when the total amount disbursed was US$31.43 million, funds were reallocated among the disbursement categories to make up for the increased costs of some of the activities (under component 1) as well as for the underestimations in the initial provisions by categories, and to extend the closing date from December 15, 2016 to June 15, 2017 "to allow completion of project activities (initially delayed by the slowdown in the procurement process and in selecting the beneficiaries of the third batch of sub-projects under the competitive grant scheme) and the achievement of the PDO (ICR, paragraph 14)."

3. On April 14, 2017, when the total amount disbursed was US$34.61 million, additional IDA financing of US$20 million was approved to consolidate and scale up the project's achievements and enhance the developmental impact for beneficiaries. Component 1 cost allocation increased by US$9.10 million equivalent from IDA. Component 2 cost allocation increased by US$6.40 million equivalent from IDA. Component 3 cost allocation increased by US$4.50 million equivalent from IDA. Also, the implementation schedule changed, and the closing date was extended from June 15, 2017 to June 15, 2020 to allow more time to implement the activities under the proposed Additional Financing. Indicator targets in the results framework were also revised to reflect the increased overall financing.

4. On May 25, 2020, when the total amount disbursed was US$52.04 million, a final restructuring extended the Loan closing date from June 15, 2020 to December 15, 2020 "to compensate for the COVID-19 induced slowdown in project, implementation – especially the construction and rehabilitation of warehouses and food processing facilities in support of women beneficiaries" (ICR, paragraph 14).

This review finds the above-mentioned changes relevant and timely to introduce necessary changes to facilitate implementation and allow more time to achieve the project outcomes. None of the project’s restructuring lowered the level of ambition of the project’s objectives, PDO indicators or targets. Hence a split rating of objectives was not necessary.

### 3. Relevance of Objectives
Rationale

**Context at Appraisal.** Togo was severely impacted by the surge in global food and fuel prices, and the economy was further aggravated by heavy flooding in the summers of 2008 and 2010. According to the PAD (paragraph 3) food prices rose by 34% on average and never fell back. The agriculture sector usually provides the greatest potential to respond to food price increases by increasing production which stabilized food prices and protected the real incomes of the poor. While food production increased at an annual rate of 3.0% from 1990/91 to 2004/05, on-farm productivity was still very low (with no or limited use of improved inputs, modern production methods or efficient farm machinery), and the irrigation potential was largely untapped. Key sector constraints, included: (a) low productivity and weak agricultural value chains; (b) lack of agriculture product processing industries, (c) inadequate research and extension, (d) poor rural infrastructures and limited funding for agricultural irrigation development, and (e) land tenure issues and poor access to financial services. This project aimed to target priority investments that were identified in each of the key production sub-sectors (food crops, export crops, livestock, fisheries), and provide cross-cutting investments to relevant agricultural inputs and services.

**Previous Bank Experience and Linkage with Development Partners.** The Bank was co-chair of the newly created Agricultural Donor Working Group in Togo. The initial group of donors (including the World Bank, IFAD, West Africa Development Bank-BOAD and ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development-EBID) had indicated a willingness to invest in the sector and support the first trans-sector national agriculture and food security investment plan (PNIASA) priorities in a concerted manner. The World Bank, through its International Development Association (IDA) and the use of trust funds (including the Global Food Response Program-GFRP and the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program-GAFSP), had committed to contribute resources for supporting the productive sectors and for institutional strengthening. The Bank is also committed to financing agricultural research and extension through a separate regional project, WAAPP (West Africa Agricultural Productivity Project). Additional World Bank support included the TerrAfrica program (US$5.49 million under GEF5 over the 2011-15 period) to provide “Ecological Support to Agricultural Activities of PNIASA.” through the Ministry of Environment and Forest Resources. Other contemporary Bank activities in Togo included a Development Policy Operation and the scaling up of the Community Development Project (CDP).

**Consistency with Government Strategies.** At project appraisal, objectives were in line with the Government priorities for the agriculture sector. In 2009, the Government of Togo (GoT) adopted the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP 2009– 2011), which considered that the agricultural sector was the key engine of economic growth. In 2009, the GoT engaged in a reform process of key line ministries to increase its capacity to embrace poverty reduction strategies and economic growth. The reform of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries (MAEP) already included for the first time implementation of a Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) in 2010. Togo also encompassed the general orientations of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) to design its national agriculture and food security investment plan (PNIASA); the country was the first in West Africa to sign a national Compact (July 30, 2009), thereby committing to allocate at least 10% of the national budget to agriculture by 2010 and targeting 6% annual agricultural growth by 2015.

At the completion the objectives of this project were still in line with the government priorities. The PDO was aligned with objectives 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the PNIASA as well as for the updated version of the PNIASA (2017-2026) (ICR, paragraph 22). The PNIASA, aimed at achieving five specific objectives: (i) improve the coverage of the country’s food needs and increase agricultural exports; ii) improve the coverage of the country’s needs in livestock products; (iii) improve the coverage of the country’s needs in fishery products;
(iv) develop and disseminate improved technologies for the sustainable intensification of agricultural production systems and; (v) ensure an efficient management of the sector and improve the provision of public services.

Consistency with the Bank Strategies. At appraisal this project’s objectives were in line with the World Bank’s Interim Strategy Note, as well as with the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and with the overall policy declaration of the GoT. This project would support the implementation of the findings of the Sources of Growth Study – Country Economic Memorandum (CEM) undertaken in FY09.

At completion, objectives remained in line with the Bank's Country Partnership Framework for Togo (CPF, FY17-FY22), and contributed to the focus area 1 related to private sector performance and job creation and focus area 3 on environmental sustainability and resilience of the extended CPF.

The PDO statement for this project, while highly relevant, was broad and ambitious since it aimed to comprehensively tackle the challenges facing the agriculture sector through multiple interventions. However, the PDO statement lacked clarity with regard to its aim to “reinforce productive capacities” because the statement lacked an explicit connection to the ultimate goal of the project, namely, to improve agricultural productivity and reduce rural poverty. While the project's objectives were within the capacity and experience of the Bank to support, they were ambitious in the context of the project's resources and the limited in-country implementation capacity.

Based on the above assessment, the Relevance of Objectives is rated Substantial.

Rating
Substantial

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

OBJECTIVE 1
Objective
PDO#1: To rehabilitate and reinforce productive capacities among targeted beneficiaries across selected value chains in the Recipient’s Territory.

Rationale
Theory of Change (ToC). The project aimed to achieve the stated objective through the provision of agricultural production inputs, provision of advisory services to farmers, and strengthening post-harvest produce management and marketing – provided through direct support to farmers and through the Business Services and Producer Organizations (ESOPs) whose specific assistance included the replenishments of the
number of small livestock with improved breeds and the re-stocking of inland waters for fishing. These activities were expected to result in the restoration of productive capacity of target beneficiaries across selected value chains including: rice, corn, soybean, coffee, cocoa, fisheries and livestock (small ruminants and poultry). Anticipated longer term impacts included: increased productivity and market access for producers and improved production and value added of key commodities, increased farming revenues and decreased poverty level, and improved trade balances.

The achievement of the stated PDO in the retrospective theory of change (ToC) presented in Figure 1 in the ICR was underpinned by two key assumptions:

1. Improved agricultural practices, technologies and marketing services are used leading to productivity and production increases

2. Increased demand for local products on the local and regional markets.

It is the assessment of this review that the activities included in the ToC were directly linked to the stated PDO in valid causal chains. The stated key assumptions were logical and realistic.

Outputs

The following outputs were reported by the ICR (Annex 1) unless referenced otherwise:

Support for food crops.

- The project supported the establishment of 20 new ESOPs along the rice, pineapple, cassava, honey, soybean and groundnut value chains (ICR, paragraph 24).
- 191 innovative sub-projects were funded by the project, including 103 sub-projects for the development of food crops. These sub-projects covered three areas: the diversification and processing of food crops (109 sub-projects), the promotion and marketing of locally processed produces (5 sub-projects), and the promotion of the warrantage scheme (9 sub-projects) (ICR, paragraph 24).

Support for export crops

- 44,427 ha of coffee and 25,806 ha cocoa were regenerated or newly planted against the end targets of 40,000 ha and 22,000 ha, respectively (targets exceeded).
- 4.3 million units of coffee rootstocks were replaced and almost 390,000 seedlings of cocoa were distributed to farmers (ICR, paragraph 24).
- Eight sub-projects on coffee and cocoa were supported under the matching grant scheme.
- 22,079 clients were members of created ESOPs and were reached by the project activities, against the end target of 17,000 clients (target exceeded).
- 592 cooperatives totaling 16,582 producers of coffee and cocoa and 2,500 cooperatives totaling 80,529 cotton producers, were trained. Two inter-professional bodies (one for coffee and one for cocoa) were established (ICR, paragraph 24).

Support for the fishery sub-sector.
• 24,800 ha of water areas were covered by new management plans adopted by fishermen themselves and 206 fish farms were either established or upgraded as a result of project support, against a target of 186 fish farms (target exceeded).
• The project supported 60 sub-projects on aquaculture and fisheries under the matching grant scheme.

**Support for the livestock sub-sector.**

• 3,800 and 2,500 improved housing units for poultry and small ruminants were constructed on farms (ICR, paragraph 24).
• 13,244 small livestock producers adopted improved animal husbandry practices, against the end project target of 13,000 (target exceeded).
• 3,679 improved genitors (male biological lines) for small ruminants and 5,300 improved poultry genitors were sourced from the Togolese institute of agricultural research and private breeders and distributed to livestock producers (ICR, paragraph 24).
• 7,479 livestock producers were using improved breeds and 13,244 were using improved animal husbandry practices as results of project support (ICR, paragraph 24).
• 16.8 million chickens were vaccinated and treated for parasites, while 3.8 million small ruminants where also treated for sheep and goat plague (PPR) and other afflictions to improve animal health and reduce the mortality rate (ICR, paragraph 24).
• 481 commercial farms of poultry and small ruminants farms financed with matching grants against an end target of 470 farms (ICR, paragraph 24).
• The project supported processing, quality improvement and increased access to markets for animal products through the establishment of small-scale culling areas (of 100-120 animals per day) in key livestock rearing regions of the country (Kara, Sokodé et Kpalimé). The ICR did not report how many culling areas were established through project support.

**Outcomes**

The project direct beneficiaries reached 282,92 compared with the target of 200,000 (target exceeded). The project recorded the following four main achievements towards the objective to “rehabilitate and reinforce productive capacities among targeted beneficiaries across selected value chains in the recipient’s territory” through various activities solely financed through the project as follows:

1. **Support for food crops.** The project supported the creation of ESOPs and funded sub-projects through matching grants as noted above. These activities led to significant increases in the processing of the rice, corn, and soybean adding value to their marketing chains: 21,798 tons for rice (155% of the PDO target of 14,000 tons), 18,132 tons for corn (120% of the PDO target of 15,000), and 5,350 tons for soybean (127% of the PDO target of 4,200 tons, baseline was 874 tons). However, baseline data were only provided for soybean in the ICR.

2. **Support for export crops.** The project provided advisory support and training to cooperative organizations, input support to cocoa, coffee and cotton producers, and support for the establishment of the inter-professional bodies for the development of coffee and cocoa value chains. These activities improved incentives for coffee and cocoa production (major export crops), from 10,843 tons to 21,316 tons or 118% of the PDO target of 18,000 tons for coffee, and from 6,126 tons to 14,264 tons or 129% PDO target of 11,000 tons for cocoa, both PDO targets were exceeded.
3. Support for the fish subsector. The project provided support in five main areas: (i) the development and implementation of fisheries management plans for the main national lakes and rivers; (ii) training of fishermen; (iii) technical capacity building of civil servants in charge of fisheries advisory support; (iv) access to fish feed and fingerlings, promotion of fish processing (especially among women), and improving market access for fish farmers and fishermen; (v) the production of highly productive fingerlings by the project which rehabilitated the national aquaculture research and fingerling rearing center; and (vi) assisted private fish hatcheries. As a result of these activities, annual fish production increased from 600 tons (baseline) to 18,058 tons, significantly exceeding the PDO target of 7,500 tons by 240%.

4. Support for the livestock sub-sector. The project supported the livestock sector through improving breeds, construction of improved housing for poultry and small ruminant, financing country-wide vaccination campaigns, and supporting commercial poultry and small ruminants farms through matching grants. These activities increased livestock numbers for small ruminants from a baseline of 40,000 to 105,218 head or 120% of the end-project target of 87,000 heads, and increased poultry numbers from a baseline of 60,000 to 394,240 or 157% of the project end target of 250,000. Also, the number of animals marketed by commercial farms increased to 109,211 heads of small ruminants and 748,415 of chickens exceeding the project end-targets of 14,100 and 530,000, respectively, no baseline data were provided by the ICR. The project also supported processing, quality improvements of livestock marketed as reflected in higher prices received and increased access to markets for animal products by increasing livestock marketing points in village and regional markets, which resulted in the improvements of food safety standards and quality and a better hygiene for the meat sold in domestic markets. However, the ICR did not explain how these parameters were assessed.

In a further communication, the Bank project team explained to IEG that: "the reported improvements were based on verbal reports of users during monitoring visits of the ministry staff. This was not based on a formal survey or quantitative assessment. The government planned to conduct a formal assessment of these parameters in the coming months."

The above-mentioned assessment provides considerable evidence that the project was successful in “rehabilitating and reinforcing productive capacities among targeted beneficiaries across selected value chains in the recipient’s territory”. The project also met or exceeded all its output and outcome targets. The recorded results were attributable to the project activities as the project was the sole source of financing for agricultural development for the targeted beneficiaries (ICR paragraph 24).

Therefore, the efficacy with which Objective 1 was achieved is rated Substantial.

Rating
Substantial

OBJECTIVE 2
Objective
PDO#2: To foster an enabling institutional environment for the development of the agricultural sector, in the Recipient’s territory.
Rationale

Theory of Change (ToC). An enabling institutional environment for agricultural sector development would emerge through support to reforms and capacity building for producers and their organizations, the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries (MAEH) and its affiliated agencies, and the modernization of MAEH’s infrastructure. Achieving an enabling institutional environment was expected to have a positive impact on agricultural productivity and would result in increased rates of financial execution of the project.

A key assumption underlying the theory of change was that the overall rate of budget execution of the project was an adequate proxy for improvements in the enabling institutional environment for agricultural sector development as this reflected the rate at which planned activities could be implemented – which was a function of the enabling environment. Also, the relevant reforms needed to be identified and implemented.

The activities included in the ToC were directly linked to the stated PDO in a valid causal chain. The stated key assumptions were logical and realistic.

Outputs

- By project completion all (100%) of the entities of the Ministry of Agriculture developed and implemented a Results-based management and accountability system, against the end target of 95% (target exceeded).
- 10 sub-sectoral policies and implementation plans were adopted, against the end target of 9 (target exceeded).
- 8,579 ministry staff were trained on a Results Based Management and Accountability System (RBMAS), fiduciary management, and monitoring and evaluation, against the end target of 7,500 (target exceeded).

Outcome

To foster an enabling institutional environment, the project focused on two main activities:

1. Supporting reforms and capacity building for the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Water Resources (MAEH). The project funded the restructuring of the MAEH and its subsidiary agencies and upgraded its infrastructure. Through the project’s support, ten sub-sectoral policies and implementation plans were adopted. The project also provided training support to MAEH staff on Financial Management (FM), Public Relations (PR), Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E), and a Results Based Management and Accountability System (RBMAS). According to the ICR (paragraph 24) “these activities resulted in all (100%) of the MAEH institutional structures using annual work plans and budgets in line with the RBMAS manual and submitting activity reports following the manual format, against an end project target of 95%.” Also, all of the MAEH staff were participating in performance agreements in line with the RBMAS manual, against an end project target of 75%. All the projects within the Ministry were monitored through the common platform of a Monitoring and Evaluation System.

2. Support for sector coordination and program management. According to the ICR (paragraph 24) the project improved the management of the Ministry’s resources as it managed its delivery against the line items defined in the annual Agriculture Investment Plan of the government. The impact of the capacity building activities was demonstrated through the ability of the Ministry to efficiently implement and coordinate three complementary projects: Togo Agriculture Sector Support Project (ASSP), Togo Rural Development Support
Project (TRDPSP) and the West African Agricultural Productivity Program (WAAPP). The strengthened capacity, improved infrastructure, reforms and better sector coordination, enabled the Ministry to implement 78% of its National Agriculture and Food Security Investment Program (PNIASA) budget against a target of 75%. The ICR (paragraph 24) explained that achieving this result was significant because it happened without the continued technical assistance by an outside consultant to support the management of the process. The project delivered 379 grants to beneficiaries and the project reached 282,921 direct beneficiaries, against an end target of 200,000 beneficiaries (target exceeded).

While the Results Framework lacked any direct indicators to assess objective 2, the evidence provided and the proxy indicator used (rate of budget execution of the National Agriculture and Food Security Investment Program) makes it plausible to conclude that the project was highly successful in fostering "an enabling institutional environment for the development of the agricultural sector in the recipient’s territory." However, it is unknown whether this enabling institutional environment would be sustainable post project completion since it is only an achievement if sustained.

Therefore, and based on the above-mentioned assessment, the efficacy with which Objective 2 was achieved is rated Substantial.

Rating
Substantial

OVERALL EFFICACY

Rationale
The overall efficacy is rated Substantial. For PDO#1, the project was successful in rehabilitating and reinforcing productive capacities among targeted beneficiaries across selected value chains. The project also met or exceeded all its output and outcome targets. The achieved results were attributable to the project activities as the project was the only source of financing in the project areas (ICR paragraph 24).

For PDO#2, the evidence provided and the proxy indicator used (rate of budget execution of the National Agriculture and Food Security Investment Program) made it plausible to conclude that the project succeeded in fostering an enabling institutional environment for the development of the agricultural sector in the “recipient’s territory”. However, it is unknown whether this enabling institutional environment would be sustainable post project completion.

Overall Efficacy Rating
Substantial
5. Efficiency

Economic Efficiency

ex ante

- The economic analysis of total project costs and quantifiable benefits showed economic rates of return (ERR) and financial rates of return (FRR) of 16.4% and 17.7%, respectively, in the base case for 20 years. For the Additional Financing, the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) for the project was estimated at 21%. The estimated economic NPV at a 12% interest rate was US$13.6 million – again for a 20 year lifecycle.
- It was assumed that the project would target the following value-chains: (i) food crops (rice, maize and cassava or yam); (ii) export crops (cotton, coffee and cocoa); (iii) freshwater aquaculture production (tilapia and catfish); and (iv) livestock (poultry and small ruminants).
- Direct (quantifiable) project benefits were estimated for activities corresponding to Components 1 and 2 (support to productive sub-sectors). For Component 3 (Support for Capacity Building and Sector Coordination), no cost-benefit analysis was prepared because benefits arising from institutional strengthening would have been extremely difficult to estimate. Also, since investments were to be demand-driven, the type and size of sub-projects and facilities could not be known ex-ante. Hence the economic and financial analysis was not based on an actual preset portfolio of investment operations. Rather, the analysis was based on the typology of investments expected to be implemented, as a proxy to actual investments.
- The analysis used estimated ‘without’ and ‘with’ project situations: in the ‘without project’ situation, producers were assumed to use low yielding traditional seeds put aside following earlier cropping seasons or bought on the market before the current season. In the ‘with project’ situation, producers were assumed to have access to an improved production package (high yielding seeds and improved animals, chemical inputs and animal and improved fish feed and fish fingerlings, good quality agriculture tools, etc.). They would be provided with advisory services to apply the technical packages. They were also assumed to have access to post-harvest facilities and technologies (drying areas, warehouses, etc.), processing facilities that added value to their products, as well as marketing advice that improved their negotiating power which allowed them to obtain better prices.
- The project was expected to generate four benefit streams: (i) Improved farm animal productivity (small ruminants, poultry); (ii) Improved aquaculture production (catfish/tilapia); (iii) Increased food crops (rice) processing activity; and (iv) Improved export crop production.
- The sensitivity analysis showed that projected benefits were robust against variations in investment costs. However, it was critical for the project to be provided with close support for the adoption of improved technology embodied in the sub-projects and ensure that farmers adhere strictly to technology prescriptions.

ex post

- The ex-post economic internal rate of return (EIRR) of the project was 23%, the NPV at US$43.5 million and the Benefit-Cost Ratio at 1.9, over a 20-year period, with a social discount rate of 6% against project expenditures of US$64 million. The economic analysis followed the same methodology as at appraisal but relied on the project’s M&E data.
- The sensitivity analysis revealed that even under the most severe scenario, where costs increased by 25% or benefits decrease by 25% (prices or yields of the crops decrease by 25%), the EIRR was still
positive, above the 6% social cost of capital, respectively at 15.8% with the NPV at US$31 million and, at 14% with the NPV at US$20 million. Even in a scenario where benefits are delayed by 2 years due to a crisis linked to conflict or disease, the EIRR remained positive at 13.8% with the NPV at US$27.5 million.

- The project had a disbursement rate of 99.5% by project closing (ICR, paragraph 42). The expenditure by component showed that the project targets were achieved with an efficient use of the allocated resources. Additional Financing was used to consolidate and strengthen the results of the initial project and speed up the achievement of the project's objectives. The project benefited directly to 282,921 farmers and agriculture sector stakeholders. This corresponds to a cost per beneficiary of US$201. The ICR did not comment on how the cost per beneficiary for this project compared to similar projects so as to estimate cost-effectiveness. In a further communication, the project team explained to IEG that the cost per beneficiary for this project compared favorably to a similar project in Benin, the Agriculture Productivity and Diversification Project (P115886 closing date September 30, 2021) where the cost per beneficiary was US$190.

**Conclusion.** This review finds that the ICR and the PAD both included a robust economic analysis based on clear assumptions, as well as benefit streams and cost streams based on facts from the project, together with a logical methodology, to assess the project’s net benefits and rate of return on capital.

**Administrative Efficiency**

The project effectiveness date was eight months after approval due to delays in meeting the effectiveness conditions. The project closing date was extended by four years. The ICR (paragraph 21) stated that “the closing dates were extended to provide additional time to catch up with implementation delays (2016) caused by procurement challenges and the slowdown experienced by the project because of the government-imposed restrictions following the Covid-19 pandemic (2020).” Overall, the project experienced considerable delays that stemmed from administrative and procurement issues (ICR, paragraph 38) and presumably also the impact of the Additional Financing on project activities.

Efficiency is rated Substantial, overall. This rating reflects a higher ex-post ERR at 23% compared to 16% at appraisal and an efficient use of the project's resources despite considerable implementation delays.

**Efficiency Rating**

Substantial

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<th>Rate Available?</th>
<th>Point value (%)</th>
<th>*Coverage/Scope (%)</th>
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6. Outcome

Relevance of Objectives was rated Substantial. Overall efficacy was also rated Substantial. The project was successful in rehabilitating and reinforcing productive capacities among targeted farmer beneficiaries across selected value chains. The project also met or exceeded all its outcome/output targets for PDO#1. In addition, the evidence provided in the ICR for the achievement of PDO#2, including the proxy indicator used (rate of budget execution of the National Agriculture and Food Security Investment Program) made it plausible to conclude that the project succeeded in fostering an enabling institutional environment for the development of the agricultural sector in Togo. Efficiency was rated Substantial. The project investments resulted in a higher ex-post ERR at 23% compared to 16% at appraisal with efficient use of the project's resources, despite considerable delays.

With the three outcome criteria (Relevance of Objectives, Efficacy and Efficiency) all rated Substantial. Hence there were only minor shortcomings in the project's relevance, efficacy and efficiency and therefore this review rates the project's overall outcome as Satisfactory.

a. Outcome Rating
   Satisfactory

7. Risk to Development Outcome

The ICR discussed the following risks that could potentially impact the development outcome:

1. The risk that improved productive capacities will not be sustained. The ICR (paragraph 60) rated this risk as moderate since the project incorporated sustainability mechanisms. These included: (i) Organizing and supporting producer's apex organizations so that they could be capable of providing support to beneficiaries after the project ended; (ii) Capacity building: investments in training were to improve beneficiaries' technical and managerial skills for the maintenance and growth of their businesses and as well as ensuring an efficient of the assets provided by the project; (iii) Support and capacity building for public entities. The project provided support (training, technical assistance, infrastructures, equipment) to public entities so that they can continue providing quality inputs capacity building, advisory services and other supports to beneficiaries with government-funded operational costs even after project closing; and (iv) Establishment of various revolving funds: these secured and earmarked to facilitate the continuation of support activities and maintenance of assets funded by the project and ensure that benefits endure beyond project.
However, as the ICR noted, sustainability of this outcome could potentially be undermined if: (i) There is a failure to maintain infrastructure and equipment acquired under the project, (ii) The Business Services and Producer Organizations (ESOPs) fail to attract the participation of producers and the private sector in the enterprise ownership. Also, some ESOPs could face difficulties in securing enough funds to purchase the required quantities of raw materials and cover their operating costs; and (iii) The warehouse receipt system fails as this would hinder marketing of production. The sustainability of the receipt system hinges around finding strong financial institutions willing to lend to the warehouse owners.

2. The risk that fostering an enabling institutional environment will not be sustained. The ICR (paragraph 61) rated this risk as moderate based on the cross cutting support provided by the project to the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries. The challenge for the Ministry will be to maintain or improve on its performance levels that were achieved through the project's support. A critical factor to sustain performance going forward is the allocation of adequate budget to the agriculture sector and meet the CAADP commitment of 10% of the national budget. This would help maintain the performance achieved at project closing.

3. The risk related to external factors such as: COVID-19, natural disasters and climatic shocks, and a fall in the demand for agriculture products on the local, regional, and international markets. These factors are beyond the control of the project and could negatively impact the sustainability of both of the project's main outcomes. For example, the COVID-19 pandemic could over-stretch the government resources and result in a reduction of budget funds allocated to agriculture. Also, natural disasters (such as pest outbreaks and floods) could negatively impact productivity. Finally, a fall in demand would result in excess supply and depressed prices. This situation could force farmers to reduce their focus on some crops or livestock enterprises and seek other sources of off-farm income.

8. Assessment of Bank Performance

a. Quality-at-Entry

The Bank was requested by the GoT to take the lead and help mobilize donor agencies, align and harmonize their interventions, and strengthen capacities of rural institutions to achieve PNIASA implementation (PAD, paragraph 9). The project objectives were in line with the country priorities and the Bank’s strategies (see section 3 for more details). To prepare the project, “the Bank set up the team with the required expertise and enough specialists with extensive experience in the agricultural sector (ICR, paragraph 36).” The project design reflected complementarity with other projects implemented in the country, namely, Togo Rural Development Support Project (TRDSP), and West African Agricultural Productivity Program (WAAPP). Design reflected lessons learned from past Bank and non-Bank projects in Togo (including the ongoing Community Development Project) and value chain development projects in neighboring countries. These lessons related to: (i) successful value chain development required a market-oriented and private sector-led approach; (ii) technology adoption hinges on the availability of inputs, access to adequate agricultural finance and advisory services; (iii) selectivity of actions and commodity choices deriving from the most promising economic perspectives outlined in the Sources of Growth Study – Country Economic Memorandum (CEM) undertaken in FY09.
The project's design featured clearly structured components with a consistent operational logic. It combined emergency activities for the recovery of the livestock sub-sector (small ruminants and poultry) with medium to long term structural actions to support other productive sub-sectors (e.g. strategic food and export crops, freshwater fisheries) through better organized food chains, processing and related market access, in addition to providing critical capacity building to the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Water Resources. However, the costs for some activities were underestimated, which required reallocation of funds during implementation. Implementation arrangements included embedding the project in government implementing institutions. This facilitated streamlining and coordinating project activities and ensured ownership through including the project as an integral part of priority government programs (ICR, paragraph 56). According to the ICR (paragraph 56) the “financial management (FM) system was adequately designed” and “the environmental risks associated with project activities were clearly identified and mitigation measures understood before implementation.”

Six risks were identified at appraisal, with the overall risk rated medium. These risks related to stakeholders, implementation agency and project-related risks such as design, social and environmental, program and donors, and delivery quality. While procurement was identified as part of the implementing agency risks, it proved to be more challenging and contributed to implementation delays. The ICR did not comment on risks that might have materialized during implementation nor on the suitability of the mitigation measures. Finally, M&E design was robust and included adequate indicators to monitor implementation progress as well as the progress toward the achievement of the project outcomes, specifically for PDO#1. However, tracking PDO#2 relied on a proxy indicator that did not provide a comprehensive assessment of the stated PDO (see section 9 a for more details).

Based on the above-mentioned assessment, Quality at Entry is rated Satisfactory.

Quality-at-Entry Rating
Satisfactory

b. Quality of supervision
Bank support missions were conducted twice per year. According to the ICR (paragraph 57) “these missions mobilized the expertise required to support implementation of ASSP across all components as well as compliance with safeguards.” Implementation progress was reflected in the Periodic Implementation Status Reports (ISRs) and aide-memoires and issues that needed attention were highlighted. The project benefited from “adequate budget and staff resources for effective project supervision and monitoring (ICR, paragraph 59).” Also, the low turnover of TTLs (two TTLs throughout the life of the project) facilitated smooth implementation. The ICR (paragraph 57) reported that financial management was adequate and the quality of financial reporting was satisfactory. However, procurement was challenging and contributed to implementation delays and replacing procurement specialists was difficult.
The ICR (paragraph 68) described the Bank Supervision team support as “remarkable, driven by the need to foster team spirit, knowledge sharing, and the desire of the project team to showcase their results and improve performance.” The team’s close monitoring of implementation enabled the project to overcome delays and reach a 99% disbursement rate by project completion.

Quality of supervision is rated Satisfactory.

Overall Bank performance is rated Satisfactory.

**Quality of Supervision Rating**
Satisfactory

**Overall Bank Performance Rating**
Satisfactory

### 9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

#### a. M&E Design

The PAD did not include a Theory of Change (ToC) as it was not required at appraisal. Nonetheless, the ICR (page 6) included one that clearly showed the links between the project inputs, outputs, outcomes and longer-term impacts. The ToC in the ICR also included the key assumptions that underpinned the achievement of the stated objectives. The PDO was to be assessed through the following four outcome-level indicators: (i) Farm output subject to project supported post-harvest value-adding schemes (rice, corn); (ii) Increase of crop (coffee, cocoa) and continental fisheries output, and of livestock population (small ruminants, poultry) among project beneficiaries; (iii) Rates of PNIASA financial execution (for ASSP, PADAT and WAAPP altogether), and (iv) number of direct beneficiaries of which 20% are women. The first two indicators related to PDO#1 (rehabilitate and reinforce productive capacities among targeted beneficiaries across selected value chains). These were clear, measurable with reasonable targets and directly linked to the stated PDO. However, only the second indicator had baseline data. The third indicator was a proxy to assess the achievement of PDO#2 (foster an enabling institutional environment for the development of the agricultural sector, in the recipient’s territory). While the indicator was measurable and easy to track, it did not provide a comprehensive assessment of the stated PDO. Finally, the fourth indicator was a count of the project beneficiaries against an appraisal target.

The Results Framework (RF) included eleven intermediate outcome indicators to track the different activities supported by the project. Most of these indicators were quantitative and linked to the stated activities. Overall, the RF was consistent with the project’s ToC and included adequate indicators to monitor implementation progress as well as the progress toward the achievement of the project outcomes. Also, according to the ICR (paragraph 47) M&E design benefited from a well-thought-out M&E operations manual that clearly defined all key concepts and variables, including who was eligible to be counted as a beneficiary.
b. M&E Implementation

The Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Water Resources' institutional structures conducted the project’s M&E activities. According to the ICR (paragraph 48), the M&E system benefited from the project team’s close attention and from deploying adequate human and financial resources to it. Implementation support missions discussed and vetted all reports on project implementation and achievements to ensure that reliable data were provided. Also, Bank field visits verified the reported progress through spot checks and verification. M&E activities included technical discussions and joint field missions with other PNIASA partners (IFAD, FAO, German Cooperation). This allowed the triangulation and vetting of the results reported by the project team. Also, the client closing evaluation reported final outcome figures, verification methodology, links to country reporting, and a beneficiary survey. According to the ICR (paragraph 48) the results reported in the final evaluation “were fully in line with reporting throughout the life of the project.” An assessment of the beneficiary satisfaction carried out by an independent consultant found out that the project led to substantial improvements in the incomes and living conditions of the beneficiaries. However, the ICR did not provide details on the survey methodology nor the sample size. M&E implementation also benefited from using GIS localization of project investments to monitor progress in implementation more closely as well as from filed visits and technical advice by the Central Monitoring Unit of the Ministry of Agriculture (ICR, paragraph 49).

Overall, M&E implementation was successful in compiling reliable M&E data that were verified through different sources as discussed above.

c. M&E Utilization

The ICR (paragraph 49) reported that the project data especially in the last two years of implementation were used for “decision making and to refine the implementation strategy of the project.” The M&E data enabled the project team and the Government to take timely and informed decisions on "project design, implementation issues, reallocation of funds, procurement, and financial management issues" (ICR, paragraph 49).

Overall, the Quality of M&E is rated Substantial. This rating reflects a robust design, strong implementation and impactful utilization of project M&E data to inform project management decisions during implementation.

M&E Quality Rating
Substantial

10. Other Issues

a. Safeguards

The project was Environmental Category B as no significant irreversible environmental and social impacts from proposed project activities were predicted. It triggered three safeguard policies: Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01); Pest Management (OP/BP 4.09); and Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12). The overall environmental impact of the project was expected to be positive; however, some negative impacts might arise during project implementation, such as limited impacts on soil, air, water, noise
environments, and surrounding communities, essentially during construction and/or production. These impacts were expected to be temporary and localized, and proper mitigation measures during construction and/or production could minimize or even eliminate them. The Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF), the Integrated Pest Management Plan (IPMP), and the Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) were prepared, approved, and disclosed in Togo on November 17, 2010 and at the former Infoshop on December 22, 2010.

The ICR (paragraph 53) stated that “the project complied with all applicable environmental and social safeguard policies.”

**Compliance with Environmental Safeguards.** The ICR (paragraph 51) stated that “the overall environmental safeguards compliance under ASSP was adequate.” Technical and institutional capacity in environmental safeguards benefited from training sessions that were conducted for decentralized technical services. Beneficiary groups also benefited from awareness raising and training activities. According to the ICR (paragraph 52) the “project successfully conducted environmental monitoring of activities in the field, based on established protocols and the systematic application of environmental and social screening for activities supported by the project, and mitigation measures were identified and recommended to the beneficiaries.”

**Compliance with Social Safeguards.** A Resettlement Policy Framework was developed and publicly disclosed. A formal and functioning grievance redress mechanism GRM was established under the project, but with a delay, and complaints received were timely addressed. A study to assess compliance with the safeguard policies during the additional financing indicated that "in general, project activities were implemented according to World Bank standards for environmental and social safeguards (ICR, paragraph 53)."

**b. Fiduciary Compliance**

**Financial Management (FM).** The project developed a financial management plan to ensure that the project implementation unit (PIU) would have the capacity to implement the project. According to the ICR (paragraph 54) “the project complied with the relevant financial covenants and ensured regular and timely submission of financial reports and annual audits.” The 2019 audit report was received by the Bank and the auditors issued an unqualified opinion. The disbursement rate of the project reached 99.7 %, and “no ineligible expenditures were recorded during implementation (ICR, paragraph 54)."

**Procurement.** Procurement implementation was challenging. These challenges often resulted in implementation delays and early termination of contracts (ICR, paragraph 55). The low capacity of local entrepreneurs and complexity of the national procurement system were key constraints that hindered procurement activities. Despite these challenges, the ICR (paragraph 55) stated that procurement activities were conducted in line with “agreed World Bank procedures.” Procurement capacity benefited from hiring a procurement consultant to support and coach the procurement counterparts.
c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

“There were no significant unintended outcomes or impacts noted resulting from the project (ICR, paragraph 35).”

d. Other

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11. Ratings

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<tr>
<th>Ratings</th>
<th>ICR</th>
<th>IEG</th>
<th>Reason for Disagreements/Comment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bank Performance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quality of M&amp;E</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quality of ICR</td>
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<td>Substantial</td>
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12. Lessons

The ICR included three lessons. The following lessons are emphasized with some adaptation of language:

1. To ensure effective implementation of projects by government entities, the adequacy of human resources in charge of project implementation need to be carefully assessed against the required workload and combined with the provision of the appropriate incentives. Project implementation by existing government entities fosters ownership, improves capacity building, and lays the foundation for improved institutional capacity beyond the project lifecycle. The ASSP was implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture and the capacity built remains within the Ministry so that it can continue providing quality support, capacity building and advisory services to beneficiaries even after project closing. To be effective, the right incentives (better working conditions, training and attractive compensations) are needed to compensate the staff and retain them to prevent a high turnover. The building up of capacities in institutions also needs to be based on a strategic vision and resource commitment for continuous institutional improvements to be viable.

2. Implementing projects under weak procurement capacity and therefore high procurement risk requires alternative solutions to be considered and embedded in project design to mitigate procurement risks. The ASSP was implemented in a context of weak capacity of
government entities in the agricultural sector. External technical assistance was hired to support the project team in procurement matters, but this assistance came too late. This situation was complicated by delays in setting up the evaluation committees and in finalizing evaluation reports. The impact of these delays was mitigated by stepping up capacity building, increasing the number of evaluation committees, improving timelines for finalizing procurement processes and awarding contracts, and closer monitoring by the Bank team, leading to improvements in the procurement performance of the project. To mitigate the risk of procurement for future projects in similar contexts, it is important to enlist technical assistance and appoint the required staff, train them and set up an adequate number of evaluation committees soon after effectiveness for the timely drafting of terms of reference or descriptions of works, the issue of invitations to bid, and all the steps that follow in order to speed up the procurement process.

3. To restore the productive potential of depleted ecosystems, it is essential to involve beneficiaries as stakeholders of depleted systems in restoration efforts combined with the provision of alternative income-generating activities. The ASSP supported the enforcement of a biological recovery period for fish stocks, the restocking of water bodies with fish, the prohibition of harmful fishing practices coupled with the distribution of fishing nets that comply with authorized standards, and the promotion of alternative income-generating activities. The project experience showed that these measures led to an increase in the population of fish and volume of fish captures contributing to sustainable fishing in the context of Togo, which was characterized by a growing pressure on halieutic (art of fishing) resources. Also, organizing fishermen into groups that help foster the understanding of their role in maintaining fisheries resources have better chances of success than strict enforcement of regulations.

13. Assessment Recommended?

No

14. Comments on Quality of ICR

Quality of Evidence. M&E design had a robust design that was combined with good implementation. This provided reliable data to assess implementation progress and achievement of the final outcomes of the project.

Quality of Analysis. The ICR provided clear linking between evidence and findings and used the evidence base to serve the arguments under the different sections, in particular the discussion on outcomes.

Lessons. Lessons reflected the project experience and were based on evidence and analysis in the ICR.

Results Orientation. The ICR included a comprehensive discussion on the first objective. It provided a well balanced discussion between reporting on the achievement of outcomes in relation to the indicators and what the project actually achieved on the ground. Discussion of the second objective was limited as it was tracked by one proxy indicator.
Internal Consistency. Various parts of the ICR were internally consistent and logically linked and integrated.

Consistency with guidelines. The ICR successfully used the available data to justify the assigned outcome rating. Discussion of outcomes was comprehensive, and the efficiency analysis was robust.

Conciseness. The ICR provided comprehensive coverage of the implementation experience and candidly reported on shortcomings. There was enough clarity in the report’s messaging. The outputs in Annex 1 included the expected end targets and the reporting on safeguards included an explicit statement on compliance with the Bank’s safeguard policies. Finally, the ICR could have elaborated more on the risks that materialized during implementation and the adequacy of the mitigation measures. The ICR also lacked an Annex that listed the Bank staff/Consultants who participated in the project.

Overall, the Quality of the ICR is rated Substantial despite some minor shortcomings.

a. Quality of ICR Rating
   Substantial