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GOVERNANCE AND ANTI-CORRUPTION DIAGNOSTIC SURVEY
THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

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*Please contact Edouard Al-Dahdah for any questions or comments ealdahdah@worldbank.org

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1 Acknowledgments

The main client in this project is the Supreme National Anticorruption Committee (SNACC), headed by Mr. Ahamd al-Anssi, and which reports to the Presidency.

The team consisted of: Arun Arya (MNSSED, Task Team Leader of the Technical Assistance on Anti Corruption to Government of Yemen), Edouard Al-Dahdah (WBIG, Task Team Leader for the Household Governance Survey), Hala Hanna (MNSSED), and Audrey Sacks (WBIGV). The sampling strategy was developed by Juan Munoz and Beatriz Godoy from Sistemas Integrales. With help from the Central Statistics Office of Yemen's Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (cite them) The data collection was contracted to the Yemen Polling Center (cite them). A special thanks to Thirumalai G Srinivasan (Waly Wane? Benson Ateng?) and the staff at the Yemen Country Office in Sana'a.

2 Executive Summary

3 Chapter One: Introduction

3.1 Background

The Government of Yemen (GoY) has made significant progress in addressing governance and corruption in the last two years. The country has taken important steps in terms of passing legislation likely to affect the problem of corruption, such as the National Anti-Corruption Act 2006, Financial Disclosure Act 2007 and the National Procurement Act 2007. The Yemeni parliament ratified the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) on November 7, 2005. Recently, the government decided to join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) to try and improve the transparency of revenue from oil reserves. Yemen has also begun undertaking significant reforms in the area of civil service management and the development of a comprehensive Human Resource Management System. These reforms are still at the initial stage of implementation, but make Yemen a pioneer in implementing needed reforms in this area.

While the full implementation of these reforms should improve the quality of a country's governance, Yemen has continued to lag behind in terms of its governance ratings. However, because these aggregate measures primarily monitor expert opinions on the issue of governance and corruption, they do not always reflect the experience of Yemeni households.

3.2 Rationale

One of the landmark developments was the 2006 enactment of the National Anti-Corruption Act and the constitution of the new Supreme Authority to Combat Corruption (SNACC). SNACC has a triple mandate: taking preventive measures to minimize chances of corruption; investigating and pursuing reported cases of corruption; and, educating and raising the awareness of citizens about their rights and the legal framework to fight corruption.

The Deputy Prime Minister, in a letter dated 4 June 2007, requested the World Bank to provide Technical Assistance (TA) to the government in the area of anti-corruption, in alignment with other donors working on this agenda. The TA package to SNACC includes: conducting a baseline survey on the incidence of corruption, reviewing the existing legal and regulatory framework, developing a National Strategy and Action Plan to combat corruption, developing an investigation mechanism, and conducting training to build capacity.

One component of this TA is a diagnosis of mis-governance and corruption in specific sectors of the Yemeni economy, through a Governance and Service Delivery survey. This delivery survey will provide an assessment of Yemeni households' experiences with public sector governance and service delivery in order to provide policy-oriented advice and support the mainstreaming and implementation of SNACC's National Strategy and Action Plan to Combat Corruption.

In contrast with perception-based and expert opinion surveys, this document reports the findings of a survey assessing Yemeni households' experience with corruption in Yemen. In addition, while some available polls measure the opinion of the street, their questions remain general. For example, while 76 percent of Yemenis think that corruption is widespread throughout the government (Gallup Poll, September 2009), little is known about which public services are most affected by the problem, and to what extent.

3.3 Survey Scope and Objectives

The Yemen household survey focuses mainly on the nature, extent and form of corruption and the management of public service delivery in the sectors of health, education, and justice. It surveys private citizens on their experiences and perceptions of corruption and service delivery in these sectors.

The objective of this household survey is to diagnose, through the scope and manifestations of poor governance and from the lenses of access to public services, the quality of public services, and the obstacles to effective, accountable and transparent public service delivery. By measuring the degree of corruption in each public sector institution delivering services to

citizens in a scientific and nationally representative way, the survey will enable the Government of Yemen to direct its anti-corruption efforts to the sectors where corruption is most entrenched.

As an outcome, this initiative:

- Provides **benchmark data** that will be used for the monitoring and evaluation of the government's performance in implementing ongoing and future reforms.
- Acts as key input towards preparation of **SNACC's National Action Plan to Combat Corruption** - which is a key outcome of the WB anti-corruption TA.
- Prepares the ground for **future interventions** aimed at leveling obstacles to a more responsive, transparent, accountable, and efficient delivery of public services in Yemen.

3.4 Sampling Strategy

The survey interviewed a nationally representative sample of 1,331 households on their general perceptions of standards of living; their opinion on and experience with the integrity and accountability of various public services providers; their experiences reporting corruption; their perception and experiences with corruption in multiple sectors including: transportation and roads, judiciary, education and health. The last section inquires about respondents' personal and households characteristics.

The sampling methodology was constructed to produce a nationally representative sample and with the objective of linking its results with the Multipurpose Household Budget Survey (HBS) 2005/2006 conducted by the Central Statistics Office (CSO). For that reason, the master sample was the HBS sample, which in turn was based on the 2004 census. Therefore the sampling frame was identical to that of the HBS: it was generated by the General Population, Housing, and Establishment Census 2004. The sample frame used provides the advantage of being up-to-date, giving stability to the selected households, and insuring the accuracy and precision of the elements of the chosen sample.

Dwelling units (with residing households) were defined as primary sampling units (PSUs) on the urban and rural levels of each governorate, except nomadic communities, collective housing, and military camps. According to the administrative divisions, Yemeni households are spread out in 21 governorates, including the Secretariat of the Capital (Sana'a City) (see Figure 1). The study population was allocated into 38 strata, where 17 governorates were represented by two strata (urban and rural), Sana'a City and Aden were represented by urban stratum only, while Raima and Sana'a Region were represented by only rural stratum. This resulted in 19 urban strata and 19 rural strata.

The main frame of households was used to draw districts, sectors, sections, and enumeration areas included in the survey sample. Yemen HBS follows two-stage cluster sampling. Sample is designed to produce estimate of consumption in all governorates of both rural and urban population. In the first stage, 1200 clusters were picked by a combination of probability proportional to size (PPS) and equal allocation of sample across strata (for allocation of sample across strata, see Box 1). In the second stage, 12 households were picked from each cluster by simple random sampling to make the final size of 14400 households.

For the purpose of this survey, 10 percent of the HBS sample was selected in a nationally representative manner, ensuring the coverage of all 21 governorates and 38 strata. Of the 1200 HBS clusters, 129 were selected at random (10 percent of the total, plus 9 clusters to account for dropout rate), covering a total of 1,434 households.

3.5 Timeline

The Yemen household survey instruments were peer-reviewed on January 2009 and pre-tested in April 2009. The survey was administered in the Yemeni dialect of Arabic, in June 2009. The results of this survey were first presented at a conference in December 2009 in Sana'a City, in the presence of SNACC members, ministers and members of parliament, civil society representatives, donors, academics, and other interested stakeholders.

Training and Pilot Testing

Training of enumerators was conducted with the participation of representatives from the Central Statistics Office. 65 field supervisors and field interviewers participated in the training workshop, including 20 field supervisors. Five researchers were excluded after a weak performance at the evaluative tests. We were left with 60 participants: 20 field supervisors and 40 field interviewers. Every two interviewers had one field supervisor.

The trainees were divided into two groups:

- The first group involved the field supervisors and interviewers in Sana'a City, Sana'a governorate, Ibb, Al-Mahweet, Amran, Sa'ada, Al-Jawf, Mareb and Hajjah governorates and the training lasted for three days May 30 - June 1, 2009. Field training was conducted on Tuesday, June 2, 2009.
- The second group included the field interviewers and supervisors from Aden, Lahj, Abyan, Shabwa, Hadramout, Al-Dhale', Dhamar, Taiz, Al-Hodeidah, Rayma. The in-

class training of this group lasted for three days, June 2-4. The group's field training was conducted on Friday, June 5, 2009.

The pilot testing of the sample and the questionnaire form was made on a random sample comprising 70 households in six areas, namely Shibam, Al-Mahweet city, Hamdan, Al-Thawrah area in Sana'a city, Old City of Sana'a and Al-Haymah Al-Dhakhliya. The first group conducted the pilot testing in Shibam, Al-Mahweet and Hamdan on Wednesday, June 3, 2009, while the second group made the pilot testing in Sana'a city and Al-Hayma Al-Dakhliya on Friday, June 5, 2009.

These 70 households interviewed during the pilot test were not included in the final sample.

Data Collection

The fieldwork started on Tuesday, June 9 in the Capital Secretariat, Sana'a and Sana'a governorate, and two days later in other governorates, with the exception of Al-Jawf, Aden and Al-Dhale where the fieldwork was delayed for security reasons beyond the field staff's control. The fieldwork was concluded on Wednesday, June 24, 2009.

Control and Data Quality

While the team was working in the field, the field supervisors were responsible for checking questionnaire forms. The control measures include a complete review of the questionnaire in its early stages and discussion of errors that occurred while collecting the data with each field interviewer. Likewise, the supervisors in Sana'a contacted the field interviewers and supervisors on a daily basis and ensured the filling of the form of response rate tables.

3.6 Difficulties and Limitations

1. Security: 2.3 percent of the original sample was not covered due to security reasons. The sample had to exclude three rural clusters (Bani Dhabian in Sana'a governorate, Saqeen in Sa'ada governorate, and Kharab Al-Marashi in Al-Jawf governorate). Therefore 19 of the 21 governorates, and 34 of the 38 strata were covered. Despite the precautions, the research team in Sa'ada was subject to an assault by a group of young people and was asked to hand over the questionnaire forms. While no team member was hurt, the questionnaires were left incomplete for that PSU.

2. Population dispersion: field interviewers faced difficulties in reaching the targeted households because of the sample dispersion, particularly in rural areas. These problems were faced most in Taiz, Ibb and Al-Mahweet governorates. Census signs were unclear in most areas, and almost nonexistent in rural areas. Thus, the interviewers resorted to asking people where they could find the target households.
3. Response rate: Due to internal emigration and tribal conflicts, there has been a rise in the number of vacant households. In particular, certain areas of the governorates of Hadramout and Mahara were victims of severe floods in the fall of 2008, forcing households out of their dwelling. In addition, due to the nature of the sampling which targeted the same households as those interviewed for the HBS, targeted respondents were identified by their name. This caused some of them to get concerned: “why me”? The interviewers tried best to explain to the respondents that the targeting was due to linkages with the HBS. Enumerators and supervisors were successful enough in overcoming this challenge.

Despite these difficulties and limitations, 1,331 of the 1,434 targeted households were interviewed - a dropout rate of less than 8 percent (7.18 percent). Of those 1,331 households, 91.81 percent (1,222) were the same households that were interviewed in 2005 for the HBS.

3.7 Sample Characteristics

The Household Survey covered heads of households who are Yemenis and who are beneficiaries of public services. The enumerators were to speak to the head of household (breadwinners and housewives) as they are most involved in their families’ spending. If, after two attempts, the head of household was not reachable, the enumerator could interview any other household member above the age of 18 that was in charge of administering household affairs.

The final sample allocation is as shown in Table 1 and 2 and Figure 1. Due to the nationally representative sampling strategy, geographical characteristics of the sample mirror the national distribution of the population. For example, the Yemeni population remains rural at 75 percent; Taiz, Ibb and Al Hodeidat are the three most populated governorates.

3.8 Scope and Structure of the Report

The report is structured as follows:

1. Chapter One provides general introduction and has included background to the study, justification and objectives.
2. Chapter Two addresses issues of access to public service delivery, reporting on Yemeni households' contact with public service providers, with an emphasis on public health-care and education services.
3. For those who have had contact with public service providers, Chapter Three assesses their satisfaction with the quality of these services. Specific attention is given to education and healthcare services.
4. Next, Chapter Four provides synthetic discussion and analysis of access to the judicial sector.
5. Chapter Five discusses and analyzes bribes and petty corruption, critical to service delivery and the performance of public institutions.
6. Following on from Chapter Five, Chapter Six analyzes mechanisms for reporting corruption.
7. The final chapter presents general analytical governance conclusions that could be drawn from the survey results.

4 Contact with Public Service Providers

Inflation, Cost of Living Biggest Concerns: Respondents were probed on what they see as the most serious problem facing Yemen today. As Table 3 suggests, more respondents, 20.8 percent, rank inflation as the most serious problem facing Yemen today than any other problem. The high cost of living is the second most cited problem (16.1 percent) followed by political instability (12.2 percent), unemployment (11.9 percent) and then corruption (8.4 percent). As illustrated in Table 4, the vast majority of Yemeni respondents believe that all four of these issues are serious problems, in addition to several others including drug abuse or trafficking, lack of access to clean water, and safety concerns or crime, and, the high cost of living.

Most Yemenis Interface with Public Health and Public Education Services: Respondents were probed on whether they have had contact with fifteen different public services ranging from public health services to traffic police in the past six months. The majority of respondents, 68.9 percent, have had contact with public health services in the last six months. With the exception of public health, public education and electricity services, very few Yemenis have had contact with public service providers in the last six months (see Figure 2). Less than one-fifth of respondents have had contact with social security services.

Only 10.1 percent of respondents have had contact with judges and court officials and only 3.5 percent of respondents have had contact with the tax division.

With the available data, we do not know whether contact with public services means that respondents actually accessed the services. The survey only asked respondents whether they have accessed public health and public education services, as well as official courts. We find a moderately strong correlation between questions asking about contact with a public service provider and questions asking about access to that service. The bivariate correlation between respondents who said they had contact with electricity services in the last six months and respondents who report that they have electricity at home is 0.41. The correlation between respondents who have had contact with public education services and respondents whose oldest school-age child attends school is 0.26. The correlation between respondents who have had contact with public health services and respondents who have visited a health care facility or whose family members visited a health care facility is 0.49. Finally, the correlation between respondents who report having had contact with judges and court officials in the last six months and respondents who reported having turned to a formal court to resolve a dispute is 0.38.

Contact with public services varies substantially across Yemen's Governorates: There is substantial variation in the percent of respondents who have had contact with public services across governorates.

Sana'a City has the highest percentage of respondents who have had contact with judges and court officials and traffic police within the last year: As illustrated by Table 6, about one-third of respondents from Sana'a City and Hajjah have had contact with the police and no one from Saadah or Al Jawf have had contact with the police. Whereas about a quarter of respondents from Amran and Lahej have had contact with judges and courts, only 2.2 percent of respondents from Al Hodiedah and none of the respondents from Al Jawf have had contact with judges and courts. Whereas over a quarter of respondents from Sana'a City have had contact with traffic police, less than 5 percent of respondents from Haijah, Raimah, Aden, Al Hodiedah, Al Mahweet, Taiz, and Al Jawf have had contact with traffic police.

Sana'a City and Aden have the highest percentage of respondents who have had contact with infrastructure services within the last year: About three-quarter of the respondents from Aden, Sana'a City, and Abyan have had contact with electricity services within the past year. By contrast, no respondent from Hajjah, Marib, Raimah and Saadah have had contact with electricity services. While over half of Aden and Sana'a City's respondents have had contact with telephone services, no one from Hajjah, Marib and Saadah have had contact with telephone services. Aden leads in the percentage of its respondents who have had contact with water and sewage services (81.6 percent) followed by Sana'a City (45.7 percent) and Lahej (42.6 percent). No respondents from Al Baydha, Al Mahweet, Marib and Saadah have had contact with water and sewage services (see Table 7).

Respondents in former Southern Yemen are more likely to have had contact with infrastructure and administrative services than the rest of Yemen: [ADD SOMETHING ABOUT WHY WE EXPECT SOUTHERN YEMENIS TO HAVE MORE CONTACT WITH PUBLIC SERVICES] Using logistic regression, we test whether households from former southern Yemen, Aden, Lahej, Abyan, Shabwah and Hadramout, are more likely to have had contact with public services while controlling for age, gender, urban/rural residence, income and education levels. We find that respondents from former southern Yemen are more likely ($p < .05$) to have had contact with the following: public health services; the national registration office; water and sewage services; electricity services; telephone services; pensions; and, social security. We calculate first differences of the effect of living in southern Yemen in the predicted probability of having contact with these services.¹ As illustrated by Figure 3, living in the southern Yemen corresponds to a percentage point increase (with the standard errors in parantheses) of 12.0 (0.04), 10.0 (0.04), 9.7 (0.04), 9.6 (0.03), and 5.3 (0.02) in the likelihood of having contact with water and sewage services, social security, public health services, electricity services, and the national registration office.

Female, Rural Areas, the Poor, and the Uneducated have Less Contact with Public Services: The infrequent contact between Yemenis and public service providers suggests either that there is a low level of service provision across Yemen or that there are prohibitive obstacles to accessing these services for some groups of Yemen citizens, or a combination of the two. With the exception of Social Security, from Figure 4, 5 and 6, we can see that the poor appear to have less contact with public services than the wealthy.

We estimated a multilevel logistic regression on each of the fifteen types of public services included on the survey to examine the relationship between socio-demographic factors and contact with public services (see, for example, Table 5; the rest of the regression results are available upon request).² Regression results suggest that, in general, males, the wealthy, and the more educated are more likely to have had contact with public service providers than females, poor respondents, and less educated respondents. Similarly, urban respondents are more likely to have had contact with public service providers than rural respondents.

¹To calculate the first differences, we estimated the multilevel parameters and drew 10,000 sets of simulated coefficients and simulated random errors from their posterior distribution. We then set our conceptual measures for civil bureaucracy, infrastructure, and law and order that were significant at the $p < 0.05$ level in model 1 to their minimum and maximum values, while holding all other variables at their central tendencies, and calculated 10,000 expected values. The first difference is $\tilde{E}(Y_{max}) - \tilde{E}(Y_{min})$. We then averaged the simulated values to obtain a point estimate and sorted the values to obtain a standard error.

²The dataset used for this paper has a multilevel structure; individuals are nested within primary sampling units (PSU), which are nested within districts, which are nested within governorates. Ignoring the multilevel nature of the data would generate a number of severe statistical problems. We deal with these issues by estimating a multilevel model that allows us to estimate varying intercepts for the governorates while producing asymptotically efficient standard errors. We construct a measure of income based on respondents' self-reported total income in the last month, which we divide into quartiles. The poorest quartile corresponds to the first quartile and the wealthiest quartile corresponds to the fourth quartile. We use this measure of income for in all regression analyses and in tables and figures.

More specifically, regression results suggest that men are more likely than women to have had contact with law enforcement services (police and traffic police, and judges and court officials), public education, administrative services (the national registration and passport offices), and, water and sewage services. For example, the difference in the predicted probability of having contact with traffic police, judges and court officials, and public education services for males compared to females is 1.1 percentage points (0.01), 3.9 percentage points (0.02), and 19.0 percentage points (0.05), respectively.

Urban respondents are more likely than rural respondents to have had contact with the national registration office, traffic police, electricity and telephone services, and pensions. For example, the first difference in the impact of living area in an urban as opposed to a rural area on having contact with traffic police, electricity and telephone services is 1.8 percentage points (0.02), 34 percentage points (0.08) and 38 percentage points (0.1), respectively.

Education levels are correlated with a greater likelihood of contact with law enforcement services, infrastructure services (telephone and water and sewage services), public education, and pensions. Having technical or higher education corresponds to a percentage point increase of 52 (0.1), 13 (0.13) and 9.1 (0.1) in the predicted probability of having contact with public education services, the police and the national passport office, respectively.

Wealthier respondents are more likely than poorer respondents to have had contact with the following: human development services (public health and public education); administrative services (social security, pensions, insurance, and the passport office); some law enforcement services (the police and judges and court officials); and, some infrastructure services (water and sewage and telephone services). For example, being in the wealthiest quartile corresponds to a percentage point increase of 7.8 (0.04), 17.2 (0.5) and 8.9 (0.5) in the predicted probability of having contact with public health services, public education services and judges and court officials, respectively.

4.1 Contact with Public Health Services

Yemenis use public hospitals more frequently than other types of health care center: The majority of respondents, 76.8 percent, report that either they or someone in their immediate household visited a hospital, clinic, or primary health care center for medical attention in the last twelve months. The majority of both urban and rural respondents report that they had gone to a public hospital on their last health care visit. Urban respondents are no more or less likely to have visited a health care facility than their rural counterparts. Of the respondents who had visited a health care facility, 31 percent went to a public hospital, 20.6 percent went to a private hospital, and 18.1 percent went to a public dispensary.

Over 90 percent of respondents from Marib, Al Baydha and Lahej have used

public health services in the last twelve months: There is substantial variation in the percentage of respondents who have used public health services in the last twelve months (see Table 15). Over 95 percent of respondents from Marib, Al Baydha and Lahej report that either they or a household member visited a health care center in the last six months. By contrast, only 61.9 percent, 57.9 percent, and 54.8 of respondents from Al Jawf, Aden and Dhamar, respectively, reported that either they or a household member visited a health care center within the last twelve months.

Wealthier and more educated respondents more likely to have visited a health care center: Regression results suggest that more educated respondents are more likely to report that either they or a household member visited a health care facility within the last twelve months ($p < 0.01$). There is a positive relationship between household size and the likelihood that a respondent or household member visited a health care center ($p < 0.01$); in other words, as the size of the household increases, the likelihood that the respondent or a household member visited a health care center increases. There are no statistically significant relationships between a respondent's income quartile, gender, age, urban or rural status, and the likelihood that a respondent or household member visited a health care center (see Table 9).

The average cost of a health care visit is over four times respondents' average monthly income: On average, respondents report that the official cost of their last visit to a public health care facility is 33.00 USD (6,814.00 YER), which is 18 percent of respondents' average monthly income of 179.00 USD (36,628.00 YER). On average, respondents report that the official cost of their last health care visit to a private facility is 106.00 USD (21,707.00 YER), which is 52 percent of respondents' average monthly income of 202.00 USD (41,431.00 YER).

The Distance between a Respondents' Houses and the Closest Health Facility is Higher in Rural Areas: On average, the closest health care facility is 8339 km from a respondents' house. The average distance to the closest health care facility is substantially higher for rural respondents (10,602 km) than for urban respondents (1790 km) ($\chi^2 = 631$, $p < 0.001$). The bivariate correlation between whether a respondent has used a health care facility in the last twelve months and the distance to the closest health facility is small, -0.09. This suggests that only 9 percent of the variation in whether a respondent has used a health care facility in the last twelve months can be attributed to the distance from a respondent's house to the closest health facility. Once we control for socio-demographic factors, the bivariate relationship between distance to a health care facility and use of a health care facility within the last six months loses its statistical significance.

4.2 Contact with Public Education

Majority of Respondents' Oldest School-Age Child Goes to School: The majority, 69 percent, of respondents with school-age children report that their oldest-child goes to school. Of these respondents, the majority, 96 percent, report that their oldest-child attends public school. A higher percentage of rural respondents send their oldest school-age child to public schools compared to urban respondents ($\chi^2=56.04$, $p<0.001$). Respondents report that their oldest-child attends school, on average, 5.7 days a week and teachers are present, on average, 5.1 days per week.

Less than one-third of respondents from Shabwah and over 90 percent of respondents from Sana'a City send their oldest school age child to public school: There is substantial variation across governorates in the percentage of respondents who send their oldest school-age child to school. (see Table 11). Over 80 percents of respondents from Sana'a City, Sana'a, Al Dhalea, Lahej, Taiz, and Al Baydha send their oldest school age child to public school. Less than 60 percent of respondents from Al Hodiedah, Al Mahweet, Dhamar, and Shabwah send their oldest school-age child to public school.

Wealthier respondents more likely to send oldest school-age child to school: Regression results suggests that wealthier respondents are more likely to send their child to school than poorer respondents ($p<0.001$). The average annual income for respondents who do not send their oldest school-age child to school, 1,830 USD (375,168.00 YER), is substantially less than the average income of respondents who send their oldest school-age child to school, 2,382.00 USD (488,244 YER). There is no statistically significant relationship between respondents' gender, education, age, urban/rural status, and household size (see Table 10)

The annual fee for school is over 6.29 percent of respondents' average annual salary: The average annual fee for public school is 1.48 USD (304 YER), which is less than one percent of respondents' (who send their oldest school-age child to public school) average annual salary of 2215.67 USD (454,212.00 YER). The average annual fee for private school is 265.41 USD (54,410.00 YER), which is 4.0 percent of respondents' (who send their oldest school-age child to private school) of average annual salary of 6721.93 USD (1,377,996.00 YER).

There is also variation in the average annual cost of public school across governorates. Whereas in Al Jawf, the average annual school fee is 2.40 USD (488.00 RYI), in Al Mahweet, the average annual school fee is less than one dollar (110.00 RYI).

5 User Satisfaction with Public Service Providers

Yemenis Rate the Quality of Administrative Services Most Favorably: As Figure 7 illustrates, a higher percentage of respondents rate the quality of administrative services - social security, national registration, and telephone - as “good” or “very good” than any other type of service. By contrast, a smaller percentage of respondents rate extractive and law enforcement services as “good” or “very good” than any other service. This suggests that citizens are more satisfied with services that are voluntary as compared to services that are coercive.

Urban Respondents are more Satisfied with the Quality of Public Services: As Figures 8, 9 and 10 illustrate, with the exception of electricity and water and sewage services, a higher percentage of respondents from urban areas are satisfied with the quality of public services than rural respondents. We estimate ordered logistic regressions with the perceived quality of each type of public service as the response variable; quality is coded on the survey as “very bad”, “bad”, “neither good nor bad”, “good”, or “very good”. We control for socio-demographic characteristics including income, education, gender, age, and test whether there is a relationship between urban/rural residence, income, and perceptions of the quality of the service.

The results from ordered logistic regressions point to a statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) relationship between living in an urban area and satisfaction with the quality of public health, education, police, traffic police, passport and telephone services.³ User satisfaction with the quality of services varies little across income groups. With the exception of water and sewage services, we do not find any statistically significant relationships between a respondents’ income quartile and satisfaction with the quality of service provision. To summarize, results suggest that user satisfaction with public services varies by urban/rural residence but not income.

5.1 Complaints and Service Delivery

Respondents who are not satisfied with a service are more likely to have a complaint about the service: Respondents were asked whether they had a valid reason to make a complaint while seeking any of the fifteen different public services included on the survey during the past six months. Of all the services, traffic police and judges and courts have elicited the most amount of complaints from respondents. 32 percent and 31 percent of respondents who have had contact with traffic police and judges and courts, respectively, in the last six months believe they have a valid reason to complain about these services.

³We could not estimate the models on the customs division, tax division, passport office, and judges and court officials, because of too few observations.

As illustrated by Figure 11, there is a very high negative correlation, -0.87, between the percentage of respondents who are satisfied with the quality of a service and the percentage of respondents who believe they have a valid reason to complain about the service.

Respondents who have been asked to pay a bribe for a service are more likely to have a complaint about the service: There is also a strong correlation, 0.66, between the percentage of respondents who have been asked to pay a bribe for a service and the percentage of respondents who believe they have a valid reason to complain about the service (see Figure 12). This suggests that being asked to pay a bribe affects one's perception of the quality of public services.

A small percentage of respondents with valid complaints actually complain: Respondents who claim that they have a valid reason to complain about a service were asked whether they actually made a complaint. The correlation between having a valid reason to complain about a service and actually complaining is negative, -0.06. The negative correlation suggests that services with a higher percentage of respondents who believe they have a valid reason to complain receive fewer complaints. As illustrated by Figure 13, of all the services, public education and judges and courts have received the most amount of complaints from respondents; 18 percent and 17 percent of respondents have lodged a complaint against public education services and judges and courts, respectively.

The majority of respondents did not complain because they anticipated that the complaint would be ineffective: Respondents who have a valid complaint about a service but did not complain were asked why they did not complain. The vast majority of respondents, 55.7 percent, said they did not complain because they knew “they would not do what you needed”. 21.8 percent of respondents (the second most common response) said that they did not complain because they did not know who to turn to.

5.2 User Satisfaction with Public Health

Urban respondents are more satisfied with the quality of health services: Less than half of the respondents, 41.49 percent, rate the quality of physicians and other medical staff and the quality of facilities at the health care center the respondent or a household member last visited as “good”. The vast majority of respondents agree that the provision of adequate drugs and medicine (97 percent), better hygiene (96.9 percent), and enhancement of providers' capacity (90.7 percent) are key to improving public health (see Table 14).

Saadah leads in the percentage of respondents who are satisfied with both the quality of physicians and medical staff and the quality of facilities at the health care center that they last visited: 78.9 percent, 68 percent, and 66.7 percent of Saadah's, Abyan's and Marib's respondents are satisfied with the physicians and medical staff at the

health care center they last visited. By contrast, only 5.9 percent of Hajjah's respondents are satisfied with the quality of physicians and medical staff at the health care center they last visited. 73.7 percent, 66.7 percent and 61.2 percent of Saadah, Sana'a Sana'a City. By contrast, only 7.1 and 7.7 percent of Hajjah and Al Jawf respondents are satisfied with the quality of facilities at the health care center they last visited (see Table 15).

Urban respondents are more satisfied with the quality of health services: As is the case with the majority of public services, a higher percentage of urban respondents (52.3 percent) are satisfied with the quality of physicians and medical staff at the health care center last visited than rural respondents (37.8 percent) ($\chi^2=17.16$, $p < 0.001$) (see Table 12). A higher percentage of urban respondents are also satisfied with the quality of health care facility at the health care center the respondent or household member last visited than rural respondents ($\chi^2=25.37$, $p < 0.001$) (see Table 13).

5.3 User Satisfaction with Public Education

Less than one-third of respondents are satisfied with the quality of education:: Less than one-third of respondents, 29.03 percent, are satisfied with the quality of education that their oldest school-age child received during the last school year. Respondents are more satisfied with teachers' attendance (79.7 percent), subject coverage and syllabi (79.5 percent) and the number of teachers (78.2 percent) than with any other school-related factor (see Table 17).

Al Mahweet leads in the percentage of respondents who are satisfied with the quality of education: The majority of respondents from Al Mahweet (80.00 percent), Sana'a City (59.2) and Marib (53.8 percent) of respondents are satisfied with the quality of education their oldest school-age child is receiving. By contrast, few respondents from Amran (7.3 percent) and Lahej (4.4 percent) are satisfied with the quality of education their oldest school-age child is receiving(see Table 18).

Urban respondents are more satisfied with the quality of education: A higher percentage of urban respondents (43.3) percent) compared to rural respondents (24.3) are satisfied with the quality of their child's ($\chi^2=24.30$, $p < 0.001$) (see Table 16). Satisfaction with the quality of schools is also higher for respondents, whose oldest school-age goes to private school (60 percent) compared to public school (27.8 percent) ($\chi^2= 13.74$, $p < 0.01$).

6 Attitudes Toward the Judiciary

A small percentage of respondents and household members have recently been involved in a dispute: Respondents were asked whether they or their household members have been involved in a dispute over the past three years. Only 18 percent of respondents answered “yes” to this question. 40.9 percent of respondents from Al-Dhalea said that they have been involved in a dispute over the past three years. Over 25 percent of respondents from Al Baydha, Lahej, Amran, Sana’a and Ibb said they have been involved in a dispute over the past three years. By contrast, less than 10 percent of Al Hodiedah’s (8.6 percent) and Marib (5.6 percent) said that they have been involved in a dispute over the past three years (see Table 19).

Of the respondents who were involved in a dispute, the majority, 55 percent, said that the dispute involved land issues. The second most common issue involved in disputes was “family and society issues”. Respondents were then asked how long it took for the dispute to be resolved. Of the respondents who were involved in a dispute, 37.1 percent said that their case was still unresolved. As illustrated by Figure 14, 14.8 percent said that their dispute took one to two years to resolve and 12.2 percent said that the dispute took one to two months to resolve. Of the respondents who claimed they had a dispute, the majority, 60 percent, turned to formal courts to resolve the case.

The length of procedure times is the most common reason why respondents opted out of court: Respondents who felt the need to use courts but opted out were asked whether any of the following factors influenced their decision: procedure times are too long; a need to make extra payments to register or advance a case; court decisions are not implemented; courts are too far; and the process is too complex, among several other factors. The most cited reason for opting out of courts is the length of procedure times for cases. The second most cited reason is the need to make extra payments and the third most cited reason is the perception that court decisions are not actually implemented (see Table 20).

Traditional or tribal leaders is the most common form of dispute resolution that occurs outside of courts: The majority, 51.6 percent, of respondents involved in a dispute who did not use the formal court system turned to a traditional or tribal leader. Rural respondents are more likely to rely on traditional or tribal leaders compared to urban respondents ($\chi^2=12.33$, $p < 0.001$). The second and third most common form of conflict resolution involved formal mediators and arbitrators (37.9 percent) and a religious person (20 percent) (see Table 21).

7 Incidence of Bribes and Informal Payments

Bribes are More Common among Law Enforcement and Tax Authorities: Respondents were probed on whether they were asked to make extra payments while seeking the fifteen public services included on the survey. Of the public services, a higher percentage of respondents were asked to make an extra payment for law enforcement services - traffic police, judges and courts, and the tax division - than other services. Of the respondents who have had contact with traffic police, judges and courts and the tax division in the past six months, 62 percent, 47 percent and 40 percent, respectively, claimed that they were asked to make an extra payment. Infrastructure services - water and sewage, telephone, and electricity services, appear to ask for extra payments the least frequently (see Figure 15).

There does not appear to be any statistically significant relationship between gender and the likelihood of getting asked to make any extra payment with two exceptions. The results of a multilevel logistic regression suggest that women are more likely to have been asked to make extra payments by judges and court officials than men ($p < 0.05$) (see Table 22). Similarly, regression results suggest that men are more likely to be asked to make an extra payment by police than women ($p < 0.05$) (see Table 23). Regression results suggest that there is no statistically significant relationship between income and the likelihood of being asked to make an extra payment.

There are too few observations to be able to statistically test the relationship between gender, income, and the amount of extra payments made for public services. Yet, from Figure 16, 17 and 18, we can that the median amount of the extra payment made for public services is higher for women than men, especially for the following services: public health services; electricity services; water and sewage services; judges and court officials; and, the tax division. As Figure 19, 20 and 21 suggest, the relationship between income and the median extra amount paid for public services is mixed. On the one hand, the wealthy pay higher bribes for public health and public education services and to the tax division than the poor. On the other hand, the poor pay higher bribes for judges and court officials and for electricity and telephone services.

The median cost of bribes is higher for less commonly used services: We expect that the high price of bribes demanded for services deters a large portion of Yemenis from seeking services in the first place. Indeed, the scatterplot in Figure 22 shows a negative relationship between the percentage of respondents who have had contact with a public service and the median of the extra amount respondents paid for that service. The scatterplot shows that the cost of extra payments is higher for less utilized services like the court system and the tax division and lower for the more utilized services like public health and public education services.

As the cost of bribes for service increase, satisfaction with the services decreases:

As illustrated in Figure 23, there is a negative correlation between satisfaction with the quality of services and the median amount of extra payments for the service. For example, on the one hand, 83 percent of respondent are satisfied with telephone services and the median of the extra amount paid for telephone services is 3.30 USD (675 RYI). On the other hand, only 21 percent of respondents are satisfied with the quality of courts and judges and the median amount of the bribe paid for courts and judges is 24.00 USD (5,000.00 RYI).

Bribes work better for discrete, instant transactions: Respondents were probed on whether paying a bribe helped them to obtain a service or resolve a problem. Bribes appear to be more effective for discrete, instant transaction, specifically, for the traffic police, national registration, and public health services (see Figure 24). Of the respondents who made an extra payment to traffic police within the past six months, 91.5 percent said that the bribe was effective. Similarly, of those respondents who made extra payments to the national registration office or to public health services, 83.7 percent and 81.6 of respondents, respectively, said that that the bribes were effective.

7.1 Public Health

Corruption is less prevalent in the health sector: Of the 1,019 respondents or household members who have visited a health care facility within the last twelve months, 10.5 percent of respondents were asked to make an extra payment for health care. There are no statistically significant relationships between whether a respondent was asked to pay a bribe, whether a respondent lives in an urban or rural area, and the type of health care facility the respondent last visited.

The average bribe the respondent paid on their last health care visit was 18.00 USD (3,629.00 RYI), which is 1.19 times respondents' average monthly salary of 15.00 USD (3056.00 RYI). The amount of the extra payment paid does not appear to be related to the type of health care facility the respondent last visited or whether the respondent lives in an urban or rural area.

None of Al Baydha's, Hadramout's and Marib's respondents were asked to make an extra payment for health care services: By comparison, 25 percent of respondents from Sana'a were asked to make an unofficial payment or gift for public health services received. 17.2 percent of respondents from Ibb and 17.1 percent of respondents from Taiz were asked to make an extra payment for public health services (see Table 24).

7.2 Public Education

Corruption is prevalent in the education sector especially in rural areas: About one-third of respondents were asked to make an extra payment for their eldest child's primary or secondary school in the last school year (N=689). Rural respondents (33.5 percent) are more likely to have been asked to make an extra payment for their eldest child's primary or secondary school in the last school year than urban respondents (22.8) ($p < 0.05$). There is no statistically significant relationship between the type of school a respondents' oldest school-age child attends (public or private) whether the respondent was asked to make an extra payment, and the amount of the bribe paid for the school. The average bribe the respondent paid for education is 5.00 USD (972.00 Riyal), which is 31.81 percent of respondents average monthly salary.

Over 50 percent of respondents from Taiz, Hajjah and Sanna had to make extra payments for their eldest child's education during the last school year: By contrast, less than ten percent of respondents from Al Mahweet, Abyan and Al Baydha report that they had to make extra payments for their eldest child's education during the last school year (see Table 25).

8 Reporting Corruption

Few respondents who have knowledge of a corrupt act report it: One-fifth of respondents claimed that they had knowledge of an act of corruption committed by a public official during the past three years. Of those, only 15 percent reported that act. There is some variation in the percentage of respondents who report having observed an act of corruption across governorates. One-quarter of Sana'a's respondent report having observed an act of corruption and no one from Al Baydha, Hadramout, and Marib report having observed an act of corruption (see Table 26).

Of those who reported a corrupt act, over a quarter reported the act to the person in charge at a corrupt entity: Of those who reported a corrupt act, over a quarter reported the act to the person in charge at a corrupt entity. The second and third most common entities to which respondents reported corrupt acts are police (19.5 percent) and tribal chiefs (17.1 percent), respectively (see Table 27). Whereas a higher percentage of rural respondents reported corruption to tribal chiefs, a higher percentage of urban respondents reported corruption to the person in charge at the corrupt entity (see Table 28). Only 9.8 percent of respondents reported the corrupt act to SNACC.

A minority of respondents believe reporters of corruption cases would be protected from harassment: Respondents were asked whether they believe reporters of cor-

ruption cases would be protected from harassment. Only 35 percent of respondents answered “yes” to this question.

The most cited reason for not reporting a corruption is the belief that no investigation would be made: Of the respondents who did not report corruption, 39.2 percent cited their belief that no investigation would be made as a reason for not reporting corruption. 21.1 percent of respondents did not report corruption because they did not know where to report the case. 15.5 percent of respondents did not report because they cannot prove their case (see Table 29). There does not appear to be a relationship between the reason for not reporting the act of corruption and urban/rural residence.

Non-government actors are perceived as most helpful in fighting corruption: Respondents were asked whether a variety of government and non-government institutions are helpful fighting corruption. 81.8 percent of respondents believe that mosques and religious bodies are helpful in fighting corruption. 62.6 percent and 61.9 percent of respondents, respectively, believe that the media and academics and teachers are helpful in fighting corruption. Of the government institutions, a higher percentage of respondents, 55.7 percent, believe that courts are helpful compared to 38.1 percent who believe that Members of Parliament are helpful (see Table 30).

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Table 1: Population Characteristics of the Sample

Age	Frequency	Percent
< 24	72	5.41
24-55	985	74.00
> 55	274	20.59
Total	1,331	100

Sex	Frequency	Percent
Female	296	22.24
Male	1,035	77.76
Total	1,331	100

	Single	Married	Divorced	Women
Women	2.4	70.9	1.0	25.7
Men	5.7	91.8	0.5	2.0

Education Level	Frequency	Percent
Illiterate	547	41.1
Read and Write	252	18.93
Primary Education	132	9.92
Middle Education	69	5.18
Secondary Education	177	13.3
Technical Education	24	1.8
Higher Education	130	9.77
Total	1,331	100

Income Quartile	Average	Frequency	Percent
First Quartile	10469.0	376	29.0
Second Quartile	21969.8	275	21.2
Third Quartile	34199.1	324	25.0
Fourth Quartile	82312.69	322	24.8

Table 2: Geographical distribution of the sample

Governorate	Frequency	Percent
Abyan	30	2.3
Aden	38	2.9
Al Baydha	35	2.6
Al Dhalea	22	1.7
Al Hodiedah	185	13.9
Al Jawf	21	1.6
Al Mahweet	35	2.6
Amran	63	4.7
Dhamar	104	7.8
Hadramout	54	4.1
Hajjah	95	7.1
Ibb	139	10.4
Lahej	54	4.1
Marib	18	1.4
Raimah	34	2.6
Saadah	26	2.0
Sana'a	41	3.1
Sana'a City	129	9.7
Shabwah	27	2.0
Taiz	181	13.6
Total	1,331	100

Status	Frequency	Percent
Urban	337	25.3
Rural	994	74.7
Total	1,331	100

Table 3: Inflation, cost of living biggest concerns

Reason	Percent (N=1328)
Inflation	20.8
High cost of living	16.1
Political instability or poor leadership	12.2
Unemployment	11.9
Corruption	8.4
Drug abuse or trafficking	7.7
Lack of access to clean water	4.3
Safety concerns or crime	2.9
Other	15.8

Table 4: Yemenis perceive many social problems as serious

Reason	Percent (N=1328)
Inflation	93.5
Public Sector Corruption	91.7
Low Quality of health care	90.2
Unemployment	89.9
High Cost of living	89.1
Lack of access to clean water	88.5
Low Quality of education	88.0
Food shortage	87.8
Political instability and poor leadership	84.4
Drug abuse and trafficking	82.6
Low quality of roads	82.0
Violence	78.5
Safety concerns and crime	77.9
Environmental Destruction	77.54
Housing shortage	74.9
Qat chewing	71.7
Poor Sanitation	71.9
Private Sector Corruption	71.1

Table 5: Males, the educated, and urban households are more likely to have had contact with traffic police (N=1,297)

	Estimate		Std. Error
<i>Fixed Effects</i>			
(Intercept)	-3.61	***	0.00
Male	1.10	*	0.03
Read and write	1.32	**	0.00
Primary education	1.20	*	0.02
Middle education	1.33	*	0.02
Secondary Education	1.19	*	0.25
Technical Education	1.91	**	0.00
Higher Education	1.11	*	0.03
Age	-0.02		0.12
Rural	-0.71	*	0.01
Income - 2nd Quartile	-0.43		0.35
Income - 3rd Quartile	0.27		0.55
Income - 4th Quartile	0.72		0.08
<i>Random Intercepts</i>			
Governorates	0.1		0.3

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Table 6: Contact with law enforcement services varies across governorates with Sana'a City in the lead

Governorate	Police	Judges and Courts	Traffic Police
Sanaa City	31.0	18.6	26.4
Hajjah	29.5	6.3	3.2
Al Baydha	20.0	17.1	5.7
Lahej	14.8	24.1	13.0
Shabwah	14.8	7.4	7.4
Sana'a	12.2	9.8	14.6
Raimah	11.8	11.8	2.9
Ibb	11.5	16.5	5.0
Abyan	10.0	10.0	6.7
Amran	9.5	25.4	6.3
Al Dhalea	9.1	18.2	4.5
Dhamar	7.7	5.8	7.7
Hadramout	7.4	3.7	9.3
Marib	5.6	11.1	11.1
Aden	5.3	5.3	2.6
Al Hodiedah	3.2	2.2	2.7
Al Mahweet	2.9	8.6	2.9
Taiz	2.8	5.5	3.9
Al Jawf	0.0	0.0	4.8
Saadah	0.0	3.8	15.4
χ^2	123***	76***	89***

Table 7: Contact with infrastructure services varies across governorates with Aden and Sana'a City in the lead

Governorate	Electricity	Telephone	Water and Sewage
Aden	86.8	50.0	81.6
Sana'a City	86.8	58.9	45.7
Abyan	76.7	33.3	40.0
Al Baydha	60.0	42.9	0.0
Ibb	58.3	20.1	12.2
Amran	47.6	28.6	4.8
Al Dhalea	45.5	4.5	13.6
Shabwah	44.4	25.9	18.5
Lahej	38.9	27.8	42.6
Al Mahweet	37.1	22.9	0.0
Hadramout	37.0	16.7	31.5
Al Jawf	33.3	23.8	0.0
Dhamar	27.9	14.4	8.7
Sana'a	9.8	12.2	7.3
Al Hodiedah	4.9	1.1	4.3
Taiz	2.8	0.6	2.2
Hajjah	0.0	0.0	3.2
Marib	0.0	0.0	0.0
Raimah	0.0	2.9	2.9
Saadah	0.0	0.0	0.0
χ^2	550***	321***	378***
N	1331	1331	1331

Table 8: Over 90 percent of respondents from Marib, Al Baydha and Lahej have had contact with public health services

Governorate	Percent of Respondents (N=1331)
Marib	100.00
Al Baydha	97.1
Lahej	96.3
Sana'a City	89.9
Hajjah	89.5
Ibb	87.8
Hadramout	87.0
Abyan	83.3
Al Dhalea	81.8
Amran	81.0
Sana'a	80.5
Al Mahweet	77.1
Shabwah	74.1
Raimah	73.5
Saadah	73.4
Taiz	68.0
Al Hodiedah	62.2
Al Jawf	61.9
Aden	57.9
Dhamar	54.8
χ^2	130***

Table 9: More educated and larger households are more likely to have visited a health care facility during the past 12 months (N=1297)

	Estimate		Std. Error
<i>Fixed Effects</i>			
Intercep)	0.3		0.6
Male	-0.1		0.2
Read and Write	0.5	*	0.2
Primary Education	0.5		0.3
Middle Education	0.9	*	0.4
Secondary Education	0.6	*	0.3
Technical Education	0.2		0.5
Higher Education	1.1	**	0.4
Age	0.0		0.0
Rural	0.3		0.2
Income - Second Quartile	0.4		0.2
Income - Third Quartile	0.3		0.2
Income - Fourth Fourth Quartile	0.3		0.2
Household Size 0.1	***	0.0	
Log Distance to Health Clinic 0.0		0.1	
<i>Random Intercepts</i>			
Governorates	0.5		0.8

*p<0.05,**p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Table 10: Wealthier respondents are more likely to send oldest school-age child to school (N=981)

	Estimate		Std. Error
<i>Fixed Effects</i>			
(Intercept)	0.7		0.6
Male	-0.3		0.2
Read and Write	0.4	.	0.2
Primary Education	0.1		0.3
Middle Education	0.5		0.4
Secondary Education	0.4		0.3
Technical Education	1.9	.	1.1
Higher Education	0.5		0.3
Age	0.0		0.0
Rural	0.1		0.2
Income - Second Quartile	0.4	*	0.2
Income - Third Quartile	0.6	**	0.2
Income - Fourth Fourth Quartile	0.7	**	0.2
Household Size	0.0		0.0
<i>Random Intercepts</i>			
Governorates	0.257		0.507

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Table 11: Over 85 percent of households from Sana'a City, Sana'a, Al Dhalea, and Lahej have had contact with public education services

Governorate	Percent of Respondents (N=1331)
Sana'a City	90.48
Sana'a	88.46
Al Dhalea	88.24
Lahej	88.24
Taiz	82.48
Al Baydha	81.48
Marib	72.22
Saadah	68.42
Abyan	67.86
Hajjah	67.65
Al Jawf	66.67
Amran	65.08
Aden	65.00
Hadramout	64.86
Ibb	63.44
Raimah	60.00
Al Hodiedah	55.20
Al Mahweet	50.00
Dhamar	50.00
Shabwah	36.84
χ^2	93.01***

Table 12: Urban respondents more satisfied with quality of physicians and medical staff (N=1022)

	Poor	Acceptable	Good
Urban	9.8	37.9	52.3
Rural	13.7	48.5	37.7

Table 13: Urban respondents more satisfied with quality of health facilities (N=1022)

	Poor	Acceptable	Good
Urban	11.4	35.2	53.4
Rural	22.2	40.5	37.3

Table 14: Provision of drugs and better hygiene seen as most important for improving public health

Factors	Percent
Provision of adequate drugs and medicine	97.1
More hygiene	97.0
Enhancement of providers' capacity	90.8
Increase in the number of hospitals/clinics	90.5
Increases in salary of health personnel	84.2
Increase in the number of female care providers	80.8
Increase in the number of staff	76.9

Table 15: User satisfaction with quality of public health services on last visit is highest in Saadah, Abyan and Marib

Governorate	Quality of Physicians and Staff	Quality of Facilities
Saadah	78.9	73.7
Abyan	68.0	56.0
Marib	66.7	38.9
Aden	63.6	59.1
Hadramout	59.6	51.1
Al Baydha	58.8	52.9
Sana'a	57.6	66.7
Sana'a City	56.0	61.2
Shabwah	55.0	45.0
Raimah	52.0	40.0
Ibb	48.4	45.9
Al Mahweet	48.1	44.4
Al Hodiedah	34.8	33.0
Al Dhalea	33.3	33.3
Dhamar	33.3	40.4
Lahej	32.7	51.9
Taiz	29.3	22.8
Amran	25.5	49.0
Al Jawf	15.5	7.7
Hajjah	5.9	7.1
χ^2	188.70***	265.73***
N	1022	1022

Table 16: Urban respondents more satisfied with quality of their oldest child's school (N=689)

	Poor	Acceptable	Good
Urban	14.6	42.1	43.3
Rural	25.5	50.2	24.3

Table 17: More Yemenis are satisfied with teachers' attendance and curricula than with other factors

Factors	Percent
Teachers' attendance	79.7
Subject coverage and syllabi	79.5
Number of teachers	78.2
Teachers' professional capacity	77.6
Number of schools and Distance to school	74.3
Buildings, infrastructure and equipment	73.7

Table 18: User satisfaction with quality of educations varies across governorates

Governorate	Percent Satisfied with Quality of Education
Al Mahweet	80.0
Sana'a City	59.2
Marib	53.8
Al Dhalea	53.3
Al Baydha	50.00
Hadramout	50.00
Sana'a	43.5
Saadah	38.5
Al Jawf	35.7
Ibb	33.9
Abyan	31.6
Raimah	25.0
Al Hodiedah	21.7
Taiz	16.8
Dhamar	16.0
Aden	15.4
Shabwah	14.3
Hajjah	13.0
Amran	7.3
Lahej	4.44
χ^2	170.26***
N	689

Table 19: More respondents from Al Dhalea than any other governorate have been involved in a dispute

Governorate	Percent of Respondents
Al Dhalea	40.9
Al Baydha	37.1
Lahej	35.2
Amran	34.9
Sana'a	34.1
Ibb	26.6
Shabwah	25.9
Sana'a City	17.8
Abyan	16.7
Hadramout	14.8
Dhamar	14.4
Al Jawf	14.3
Raimah	11.8
Hajjah	11.6
Saadah	11.5
Al Mahweet	11.4
Aden	10.5
Taiz	10.5
Al Hodiedah	8.6
Marib	5.6
χ^2	120.16***
N	1331

Table 20: Respondents who feel the need to use courts opt out because

Reason	Percent
Procedure times are too long	76.1
Need to make extra payments	61.2
Court decisions are not implemented	55.2
Courts are too far	53.7
Process is too complex	52.2
Lawyer fees are excessive	52.2
Court judgments influenced by corruption	40.3
Judges are incompetent	37.3
Court Fees are excessive	29.9

Table 21: Alternative methods of conflict resolution

Method	Percent (N=95)
Traditional/Tribal leader	51.6
Formal Mediator/Arbitrator	37.9
Religious person	20.0
Direct negotiation with the other party	15.8
Government official	10.5
Respected member of business community	9.5
Lawyer without going to court	7.4
Threats or use of force	4.2

Table 22: Women are more likely to be asked to make extra payment by judges and court officials (N=131)

	Estimate		Std. Error
<i>Fixed Effects</i>			
(Intercept)	2.1		2.2
Male	-2.9	*	1.3
Read and write	0.0		0.7
Primary Education	-18.0		1302.4
Middle education	-0.5		1.2
Secondary Education	-1.2		0.9
Technical Education	-0.8		1.2
Higher Education	-2.1	*	0.9
Age	0.0		0.0
Status	0.2		0.8
Income - 2nd Quartile	0.7		0.8
Income - 2nd Quartile	1.6	*	0.8
Income - 4th Quartile	0.2		0.8
<i>Random Intercepts</i>			
Governorates	1.04		1.02

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Table 23: Men are more likely to be asked to make extra payment by police (N=149)

	Estimate		Std. Error
<i>Fixed Effects</i>			
(Intercept)	0.1		2.1
Male	3.1	*	1.4
Read and write	-0.5		0.6
Primary Education	-1.3		0.8
Middle education	-0.6		1.0
Secondary Education	-1.1		0.7
Technical Education	-2.4		1.5
Higher Education	-0.9		0.8
Age	0.0	**	0.0
Status	-0.4		0.7
Income - 2nd Quartile	1.0		0.6
Income - 3rd Quartile	0.8		0.7
Income - 4th Quartile	0.5		0.6
<i>Random Intercepts</i>			
Governorates	1.02		1.01

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Table 24: No respondents from Al Baydha, Hadramout or Marib had to make an extra payment for public health services

Governorate	Percent of Respondents
Sana'a	25.0
Ibb	17.2
Taiz	17.1
Hajjah	16.7
Abyan	16.0
Raimah	16.0
Al Mahweet	11.5
Lahej	11.5
Shabwah	10.0
Al Jawf	7.7
Dhamar	7.0
Sana'a City	6.9
Al Dhalea	5.6
Saadah	5.3
Al Hodiedah	5.2
Aden	4.5
Amran	3.9
Al Baydha	0
Hadramout	0
Marib	0
χ^2	95.71***
N	1022

Table 25: Over 50 percent of respondents from Taiz, Haijah and Sana'a had to make an extra payment for public school

Governorate	Percent of Respondents
Taiz	58.4
Hajjah	56.5
Sana'a	52.2
Al Hodiedah	43.5
Ibb	42.4
Raimah	33.3
Marib	23.1
Al Jawf	21.4
Dhamar	18.0
Lahej	17.8
Aden	15.4
Saadah	15.4
Shabwah	14.3
Al Dhalea	13.3
Hadramout	12.5
Amran	12.2
Sana'a City	11.8
Al Mahweet	6.7
Abyan	5.3
Al Baydha	4.5
χ^2	239.65***
N	689

Table 26: 25 percent of respondents from Sana'a observed act of corruption by a public official

Governorate	Percent of Respondents
Lahej	68.5
Al Dhalea	50.0
Raimah	38.2
Sana'a	36.6
Al Baydha	34.3
Saadah	26.9
Abyan	26.7
Hadramout	24.1
Amran	22.2
Marib	22.2
Ibb	21.6
Sana'a City	20.9
Taiz	20.4
Shabwah	18.5
Hajjah	17.9
Aden	15.8
Dhamar	10.6
Al Jawf	9.5
Al Mahweet	2.9
Al Hodiedah	1.6
χ^2	95.71***

Table 27: Of those who reported a corrupt act, over a quarter reported the act to the person in charge at a corrupt entity

Entity (N=41)	Percent
Person in charge at corrupt entity	26.8
Police	19.5
Tribal Chiefs	17.1
SNACC	9.8
Courts	7.3
Other	19.5

Table 28: A higher percentage of rural respondents report corruption to tribal chiefs

Entity (N=41)	Urban %	Rural %
Person in charge at corrupt entity	33.3	23.1
Police	20.0	19.2
Tribal Chiefs	6.7	23.1
SNACC	13.3	7.7
Courts	13.3	3.8
Other	13.3	23.1

Table 29: Respondents did not report corruption because

Reason (N=232)	Percent
No investigation would be made	39.2
They don't know where to report	21.1
They cannot prove their case	15.5
Decisions, even if in their favor, will not be enforced	12.5
Corruption is a normal behavior, it is not worth reporting	11.6

Table 30: Non-Government actors are perceived as most helpful in fighting corruption


Reason (N=1331)	Percent
Mosques/Religious bodies	81.8
Media (Print and TV)	63.2
Academics and Teachers	62.0
Courts	55.8
Central Organization for Control and Audit (COCA)	55.3
Anti-corruption Commission (SNACC)	54.5
Armed Forces/Military	54.1
Attorney General	55.3
Tribal Systems	52.6
Police	49.1
Professional Associations Accountants, Lawyers, etc.)	47.9
Non-Government Organizations	45.8
Members of Parliament	38.2

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28	Levels of health and education are appalling in Yemen	65



No. of PSUs Sampled from 20/21 Governorates

- over 12
- 8 – 12
- 4 – 8
- under 4

Figure 1: Sample geographical distribution




Figure 2: Most Yemenis interface with public health and public education services




Figure 3: Respondents living in southern Yemen having a greater likelihood of having contact with some public services




Figure 4: The poor have less contact with human development services than the rich




Figure 5: And even less contact with law enforcement




Figure 6: ...And infrastructure services




Figure 7: Yemenis rate the wuality of administrative services most favorably





Figure 8: User satisfaction with health, education and social security higher in urban areas

Figure 9: The Same is True for Law Enforcement Services




Figure 10: ...And Less So For Infrastructure




Figure 11: High negative correlation between user satisfaction with services and complaints about services (Corr = -0.87)




Figure 12: Strong correlation between being asked to pay bribe and complaints about services (Corr = 0.67)




Figure 13: Only a small percentage of respondents have lodged a complaint about public services




Figure 14: Over one-third of respondents involved in a dispute have not yet resolved dispute (N=237)




Figure 15: Bribes are more common among law enforcement officials and tax authorities




Figure 16: Women are more vulnerable to corruption in the health sector




Figure 17: Women are more vulnerable to corruption in the judiciary and tax sectors




Figure 18: Women are more vulnerable to corruption in the infrastructure sector




Figure 19: The wealthy pay higher bribes for health and education services




Figure 20: The poor are more vulnerable to corruption in the judiciary sector




Figure 21: The poor are more vulnerable to corruption in the electricity and telephone sectors




Figure 22: Negative correlation between contact with public services and amount of extra payment for a service (Corr=-0.57)




Figure 23: Negative correlation between quality of services and the amount of extra payment for a service (Correlation=-0.5)




Figure 24: Bribes work better for discrete, instant transactions

11 Appendix C: Supplementary Information

On the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency International, Yemen is ranked 158th out of total 180 countries (15th percentile) in 2009. In percentile terms, this is a continuous decline since 2005 when Yemen was ranked 111th out of total 163 countries (32nd percentile); and 2005, when it was ranked 103rd out of 158 countries (35th percentile). In the Middle East and North Africa Region, Yemen is ranked 16th out of 18 countries in 2009, with only Iran ranked 168th and Iraq ranked 178th below it. A comparison of Yemen's CPI scores in relation to the region and over time (see Figure 25). It is clear that Yemen has a long way to go in terms of improving on perceptions of corruption.

According to the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) issued by the World Bank Institute in 2009, Yemen has mixed results. Political stability remains elusive. Yemen scores best in "Control of Corruption" (-0.6) and "Regulatory Quality" (-0.7) amongst the six dimensions of Governance. It is showing good signs of improvement in Regulatory Quality and Rule of Law. Marginal improvements are also noted in Control of Corruption (see Figure 25). The areas of concern remain to be Government effectiveness and Voice and Accountability, which have been going down in recent years.





Figure 25: Yemen's score on the World Governance Indicators

Yemen scores below the mean in comparison to other MENA countries on all six dimensions of governance. However the country scores better than other Low Income countries in terms of governance (see Figure 26).



Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2009: Governance Matters VIII: Governance Indicators for 1996-2008
 Note: The governance indicators presented here aggregate the views on the quality of

Figure 26: Yemen’s score on the World Governance Indicators compared to Middle East/North African Countries and Low Income Countries

Under the Global Integrity Index, which assesses the existence and effectiveness of anti-corruption mechanisms that promote public integrity, Yemen has got a “very weak rating” and is ranked the lowest amongst the countries surveyed in 2008 (see Figure 27). It also performs 7 percent poorer than other MENA countries. Yemen seems to enjoy better anti-corruption and rule of law in general than the rest of the region. However, it falls short on the implementation of these laws and on all other dimensions of integrity as measured by Global Integrity Index.

Similarly, on the Yemen Polling Centre survey on Bribery, there are very important findings like (a) 86 percent of investors are facing the challenge of administrative and financial corruption (b) 78 percent believe that bribery is prevalent in most government circles, (c) Bribery is perceived to be most pervasive in the judiciary (65 percent), while security authorities (59 percent) and the finance ministry and its affiliates (47 percent) were also seen as major sources of bribery (d) 75 percent of respondents surveyed identified low salaries of workers as a primary cause of bribery while a majority also attributes the roots of bribery to the weakness of laws.




Figure 27: Yemen’s Score on the Global Integrity Index compared to Middle East/Norht African Countries




Figure 28: Levels of health and education are appalling in Yemen