

Document of
The World Bank

Report No: ICR00004421

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(TF-015912)

ON A
GRANT
IN THE AMOUNT OF US\$ 85.4 MILLION
TO THE
REPUBLIC OF MADAGASCAR
FOR A
GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR EDUCATION
EMERGENCY SUPPORT TO EDUCATION FOR ALL PROJECT

June 22, 2018

Education Global Practice
Africa Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective May 30, 2018)

Currency Unit = Malagasy Ariary (MGA)

3, 336.00 MGA= US\$1

1.41 US\$ = SDR 1

FISCAL YEAR

July 1 - June 30

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

BAWP	Budgeted Annual Work Program
BCR	Benefit-Cost Ratio
BIANCO	<i>Bureau Indépendant Anti-Corruption</i> (Independent Anti-corruption Office)
CBA	Cost-benefit analysis
CEPE	<i>Certificat d'Etudes Primaires Élémentaires</i> (Elementary Primary Studies Certificate)
CISCO	<i>Circonscription Scolaire</i> (School district)
CoTGIS	<i>Comité Technique de Gestion des Intrants</i> (Technical Committee for the Management of Inputs)
DREN	<i>Direction Régionale de l'Éducation Nationale</i> (Regional Directorate of National Education)
DO	Development Objective
EA	Environmental Assessment
EMIS	Education Management Information System
ESP	Education Sector Plan
FAF	<i>Fiombonan'Antoka amin'ny Fampandrosoana</i> (School management committee)
FEFFI	<i>Farimbon'Ezaka ho Fahombiazan'ny Fanabeazana eny Ifotony</i> (Participatory School Management Committee)
FRAM	<i>Fikambanan'ny Ray aman-dRenin'ny Mpianatra</i> (Parents' Association)
FY	Fiscal Year
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEE	Government education expenditures
GPE	Global Partnership for Education
ICB	International Competitive Bidding
HGSF	Home Grown School Feeding
ICR	Implementation Completion and Results Report
IDA	International Development Agency
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group
IESP	Interim Education Sector Plan
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IP	Implementation Progress
IRR	Internal Rate of Return
ISN	Interim Strategy Note
ISR	Implementation Status and Results Report
LIC	Low-Income Countries
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
MEN	<i>Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale</i> (Ministry of Education)
MGA	Malagasy Ariary
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NPV	Net Present value
OP/BP	Operational Policy and Bank Procedures
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PAUET	<i>Projet d'Appui d'Urgence à l'Éducation pour Tous</i> (Emergency Support to Education for all Project)
PAUSENS	<i>Projet d'Appui d'Urgence aux Services essentiels de l'Éducation, Nutrition et Santé</i> (Emergency Support to Critical Education, Health, and Nutrition Services Project)
PCD	Partnership for Child Development
PDO	Project Development Objective

PIU	Project Implementation Unit
QER	Quality Enhancement Review
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
TTL	Task Team Leader
UAT-EPT	<i>Unité d'Appui Technique-Education Pour Tous</i> (Technical Assistance Unit-Education for All)
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Education Science and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
USD	United States Dollar
WB	World Bank
WDI	World Development Indicators
ZAP	<i>Zone Administrative et Pédagogique</i> (Administrative and Pedagogical Suboffice)

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DATA SHEET

BASIC INFORMATION

Product Information

Project ID	Project Name
P132616	Emergency Support to Education For all Project
Country	Financing Instrument
Madagascar	Investment Project Financing
Original EA Category	Revised EA Category
Partial Assessment (B)	Partial Assessment (B)

Organizations

Borrower	Implementing Agency
Ministry of Education	UAT

Project Development Objective (PDO)

Original PDO

The Project Development Objectives are to preserve access to primary education and improve the teaching and learning environment in targeted areas in the recipient's territory.



FINANCING

	Original Amount (US\$)	Revised Amount (US\$)	Actual Disbursed (US\$)
World Bank Financing			
TF-15607	85,400,000	85,400,000	85,350,978
Total	85,400,000	85,400,000	85,350,978
Non-World Bank Financing			
Borrower	0	0	0
Total	0	0	0
Total Project Cost	85,400,000	85,400,000	85,350,978

KEY DATES

Approval	Effectiveness	MTR Review	Original Closing	Actual Closing
16-Oct-2013	22-Jan-2014	09-Nov-2015	01-Jun-2017	31-Dec-2017

RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING

Date(s)	Amount Disbursed (US\$M)	Key Revisions
22-Jul-2015	23.38	Reallocation between Disbursement Categories
19-May-2016	42.38	Change in Results Framework Change in Components and Cost Reallocation between Disbursement Categories Change in Legal Covenants
25-May-2017	74.23	Change in Results Framework Change in Components and Cost Change in Loan Closing Date(s) Reallocation between Disbursement Categories

KEY RATINGS

Outcome	Bank Performance	M&E Quality
Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Substantial



RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs

No.	Date ISR Archived	DO Rating	IP Rating	Actual Disbursements (US\$M)
01	29-Mar-2014	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0
02	04-Oct-2014	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	13.08
03	24-Mar-2015	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	20.93
04	21-Sep-2015	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	28.00
05	10-Jan-2016	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	40.02
06	09-Sep-2016	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	55.12
07	13-Mar-2017	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	70.75
08	19-Sep-2017	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	81.53
09	04-Jan-2018	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	84.18

SECTORS AND THEMES

Sectors

Major Sector/Sector (%)

Education 100

Public Administration - Education 10

Primary Education 90

Themes

Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3) (%)

Human Development and Gender 100

Education 100

Access to Education 50

Education Financing 50



ADM STAFF

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I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES

A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL

Country Context

1. Madagascar experienced a prolonged and deep political crisis following the unconstitutional regime change in early 2009. The political crisis transitioned into a severe economic downturn, exacerbated by a series of external shocks and the withdrawal of most external funding. The crisis produced devastating effects on the economy, poverty, and social outcomes. Socio-economic development suffered from growing insecurity, faltering progress on already weak governance,¹ a worsening ability to deal with exogenous shocks, and deteriorating infrastructure.
2. The economic cost of the crisis was substantial, and the fiscal policy response resulted in drastic cuts in the national budget for the social sectors. Stagnant economic growth over 2009–12, combined with high population growth (2.9 percent), had a devastating effect on per capita income, which barely reached US\$400 in 2011² and in 2012 reverted to its 2003 level—about US\$100 lower than it would have been under a normal growth trend. The economic and social effects of the crisis were intensified by the suspension of many donor activities, which, in a country where international aid represents at least 50 percent of the government budget, significantly curtailed investments and the delivery of services.
3. In this context, the Bank applied its policy on rapid response to crises under OP/BP8.00 based on the need to address the most critical immediate and medium-term pressures on social outcomes. In February 2012 the Bank issued an Interim Strategy Note (ISN) to guide engagement with the country, exploring a wider variety of ways that it might be able to help break the deadlock. Return to constitutional government and effective mechanisms for reaching compromise were highlighted. The paper also proposed efforts to work more closely with local governments and community and private-sector initiatives that could mobilize effective development action.

Sector context

4. The crisis reversed several years of progress in education. From 2002 to 2008, Madagascar made considerable progress in expanding universal access to primary education and reaching gender parity. Enrolments in primary education almost doubled over 2002–09, from 2.4 to 4.3 million, and the primary completion rate increased substantially, from only 37 percent in 2001 to 79 percent in 2008. Since then, however, various indicators point to a sharp deterioration in access to and retention in primary education. For example, enrolment stagnated in 2010 and decreased, for the first time in decades, in 2011.
5. Access to primary education was reduced by the sharp cuts in public spending that resulted in rising out-of-pocket costs to families. Spending per primary student decreased substantially from 2008 to 2011 alone, by 15 percent. Grants provided by the Government to management committees for learning materials declined by two-thirds, from US\$1.50 per pupil per year before the crisis to US\$0.45 in 2011. To compensate for the gap in public spending

¹Efforts to improve public sector governance had stalled since the crisis erupted in 2009. Anti-corruption legislation and institutions were created prior to the crisis, but the institutional and regulatory reforms required to support their operation were yet to take place

²Based on the World Bank Atlas methodology



on learning materials and teacher salaries, the expenditures on education as a share of household consumption rose from 2.2 percent in 2005 to 3.1 percent in 2010 on average.

6. More children remained out of school after 2009. According to the 2010 National Household Survey, the number of primary-school-age children who were out of school rose from an estimated 590,000 in 2005 to over 800,000 children in 2011—an increase of 35 percent. Although the precise number of out-of-school children in 2012 is not known, the decrease in primary school enrolments in a country where population was growing by an estimated 2.9 percent annually is a clear indication that more children were staying outside the primary education system.
7. In addition, the learning and teaching environment deteriorated rapidly due to the massive increase of unqualified community (FRAM) teachers. To cope with increasing enrolment in primary education, which grew from 2.4 million in 2001 to 4.31 million in 2010, the government decided in 2002 to subsidize the payment of community (non-civil-servant) teachers, who were hired locally (and originally financed) by parents' associations. Since then, the number of community teachers expanded quickly, rising from 31,512 in 2006 to 55,686 in 2010 and about 80,000 in 2013. However, most community teachers never received any (or very little) training and thus led to a decrease in learning outcomes. There was also a deficit of primary education infrastructures: 3,000 additional classrooms were needed to meet the goal of universal primary education according to the School Construction Strategy (2008-15). However, the financial constraints that accompanied the 2009 crisis stopped the construction of new classrooms by the government, which triggered a dramatic increase in communities' involvement in building classroom using their own means. As a result, the number of substandard classrooms nearly doubled, increasing from about 5,300 in 2007 to 9,900 in 2011 leading to a strong deterioration of the school environment.
8. In a context of deteriorating education outcomes and limited political and fiscal space, the Ministry of Education developed an Interim Education Sector Plan (IESP, 2013-2015) which was focused on activities that were deemed achievable as well as essential to the survival of the system. The IESP was based on two principles: (i) addressing essential needs; and (ii) laying the foundation for long-term sector development through analytical work and capacity strengthening. The IESP gave priority to strengthening stakeholder capacity to ensure that the system was in a position to rebound when the political situation improved.
9. The ISN proposition for the Education sector was to develop an operation that could serve as bridge-financing to prevent a major disruption in the sector and facilitate a more coordinated approach to sector financing and reform efforts.
10. Prior to the crisis, technical capacity, including the technical assistance unit (Unité d'Appui Technique), had been built during the project funded by the Fast Track Initiative. However, the Ministry of Education's ability to efficiently manage and monitor the implementation of the IESP was constrained by several factors: (i) no strategic medium- and long-term planning framework to guide interventions over the long term; (ii) weak institutional capacity in planning, monitoring, human resources, and financial management; (iii) acute lack of equipment and other resources; and (iv) very limited analytical basis to inform policies and strategies. Moreover, communities had a relatively weak capacity to participate fully in managing their schools and play an active role in monitoring the system's performance at the local level.




Theory of Change (Results Chain)

11. The Emergency Support to Education for All Project (P132616, TF-15607), approved on October 16, 2013, was funded by a GPE grant in the amount of US\$ 85.4 million. It focused on mitigating the effects of the 2009 crisis on the education system by supporting the implementation of the IESP, which called for preserving access to primary education and improving the teaching and learning environment in the targeted areas.
12. The Results Chain depiction (Figure 1) demonstrates how the contributions envisaged under the project were expected to mutually reinforce the effects of the various lines of action envisaged to bring about a reliable system of affordable basic primary education for all children, and as rapidly as possible countrywide.



Figure 1: Results Chain



13. The project had three components:

- (i) It provided financial support to decrease the costs of education borne by households;
- (ii) It supported the learning process through teacher training, material supplies, school grants, school feeding, and infrastructure; and



(iii) It reinforced the system through stakeholders' capacity building and increased community involvement.

14. Component 1 of the project consisted of subsidizing community teachers' salaries and providing school kits to all primary school students in the 12 regions of operation to ensure that families would not have to support those costs themselves in order for the school to continue to function. The expected outcome of these interventions was that access and retention in primary school would be sustained. The indicator associated with this outcome was the number of students enrolled in primary schools.
15. Component 2 of the project included four key activities: training of non-government teachers and new recruits; providing school grants to complement the school funds from the government; constructing classrooms in 12 school districts; and providing meals in the three regions of the South affected by drought every year. These interventions were specifically designed to improve the teaching and learning environment, the expected outcome of which was that students' learning process would be supported. The associated indicators were the number of community (FRAM) teachers benefitting from training in key basic competencies and the number of classrooms built or rehabilitated at the primary level.
16. Component 3 consisted of four activities: training of school directors and decentralized technical services in school report cards; financing the purchase of equipment contributing to the strengthening of decentralized technical services that were meant to build primary education stakeholders' capacity; training local communities in school management and social accountability tools to improve community participation and transparency; financing sectoral studies contributing to the preparation of the ESP. The expected outcome of these interventions was a stronger foundation for the primary education system.
17. Finally, the project was designed to use activities that could be quickly implemented, deliver results, and reduce risks. It relied on the preserved technical capacity (including the UAT team) that had been built prior to the crisis. Specifically, the school component construction could piggy back on the national strategy of school construction that was developed in 2009.
18. The operation aimed to complement donor's interventions by ensuring that all regions of Madagascar benefited from a package of activities essential to the basic functioning of the primary education system. The package provided by the project was necessary to turn around a rapidly deteriorating primary education sector and build the foundation of a stronger, more resilient system. In order to ensure close supervision of the implementation of the IESP, development partners decided to coordinate their support at the regional level at the time of the project's approval. It was agreed to ensure complementarity and avoid overlap between projects. Thus, the Madagascar Emergency Support to Education for All project (MESEA) PAUET was established to cover 12 of the most vulnerable regions based on poverty and education indicators (see map in Annex 8) that were not already under the IDA-financed Emergency Support to Critical Education, Health and Nutrition Project (P131945), UNICEF or the European Commission.

Project Development Objectives (PDOs)

19. The Project Development Objectives (PDOs) are to preserve access to primary education and improve the teaching and learning environment in targeted areas in the recipient's territory.



Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators

20. The key expected outcomes were the following:

- Access to primary education is preserved, with the following outcome indicator:
 - Students enrolled in primary schools in project areas (including number of females).
- The teaching and learning environment are improved, with the following outcome indicators:
 - Number of classrooms built or rehabilitated at the primary level resulting from project interventions;
 - Number of community (FRAM) teachers (including number of females) benefitting from training in key basic competencies provided by the project.

In addition, the Results Framework included one general outcome indicator: the number of direct project beneficiaries.

Components

21. Each outcome was associated with one component

- Component 1 consisted of “Facilitating access to and retention in primary education by reducing the costs of schooling borne by families” and included the following subcomponents/activities:
 - ✓ Subsidies to community teacher salaries
 - ✓ Provision of school kits.
- Component 2 consisted of “Supporting the learning process by improving the teaching and learning environment” and included the following subcomponents/activities:
 - ✓ Training of teachers and school directors
 - ✓ Support to school grants
 - ✓ School construction
 - ✓ Provision of textbooks.
- Component 3 consisted of “Strengthening the foundations of the primary education system by rebuilding stakeholders’ capacity and improving community participation and transparency” and included the following subcomponents/activities:
 - ✓ Training of school directors and decentralized technical services in school report cards
 - ✓ Financing of equipment contributing to the strengthening of decentralized technical services
 - ✓ Training of local communities in school management and social accountability tools
 - ✓ Financing of sectoral studies contributing to the preparation of the ESP.

B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION

Revised PDOs

22. The PDOs remained unchanged throughout the project, reflecting the need to create a more reassuring environment for preservation of essential services following years of budgetary instability.



Revised PDO Indicators

23. End target values for the following outcome indicators were revised (increased) under midterm review (MTR) and the third restructuring:
- Students enrolled in primary schools in project areas (number of females)
 - Number of classrooms built or rehabilitated at the primary level resulting from project interventions
 - Number of community (FRAM) teachers benefitting from training in key basic competencies provided by the project (including number of females).
 - Number of total direct project beneficiaries.

Revised Components

24. Components of the project were not revised, but opportunities were taken during implementation to (i) respond to issues that had to be postponed due to uncertainty in the Ministry of Education at project preparation stage, as reported in the GPE QER (e.g., remedying the serious dearth of basic textbooks in many schools, especially in the rural areas, which was not planned to be addressed due to confusion in programs and curricula but remained an important issue in political dialogue) or (ii) extend support for school feeding to places facing unexpected and unpredictable climatic disasters. Provision of textbooks was made possible from large exchange rate fluctuations of US dollars and Ariary. The savings that accrued also allowed the project to increase the scope of selected activities—payment of community teachers, provision of school kits, in-service teacher training, classroom construction, and institutional strengthening—and extend the targeted regions from 12 regions to 17 regions.

Other Changes

25. A degree of flexibility for responding to opportunities was maintained throughout project implementation, but there were three occasions of formal revision of commitments under the grant: first, shortly before the mid-term review, to respond to urgent school feeding needs in an area not previously included in the project; second, a few months later, to take advantage of improvements in the project's financial position by purchasing textbooks, constructing more classrooms, and training more teachers; and third, toward the end of the project, to extend the project's closing date.
26. During the MTR, new intermediate indicators were introduced to monitor new activities:
- Textbook-pupil ratio in schools in targeted areas
 - Percentage of trained schools having a school report card
 - Percentage of schools in targeted areas visited by pedagogic advisors.
27. The targets for some intermediate indicators were revised during the 2017 restructuring. The details of those revisions are summarized in the Tables 1 and 2 in the achievement of PDOs section.



Rationale for Changes and Their Implication for the Original Theory of Change

28. Changes had a limited impact on the original theory of change of the project. However, they did affect the list of activities implemented under the project, target values of intermediate results indicators, and formulation of new intermediate results indicators.
29. The rationale for revising PDO indicators is as follows:
- Students enrolled in primary schools were increased to take into account the expansion of the project into new regions.
 - Number of classrooms built was augmented from 200 to 266.
 - Number of community teachers (FRAM) benefitting from training increased to take into account the regions that were added to the project.
 - Number of total project beneficiaries increased by expanding into other regions and adding activities.
30. The rationale for selected added activities in the project was (i) to provide continuity in the basic education services supported by the IDA-financed Emergency Support to Critical education, Health and Nutrition Services Project (PAUSENS-P131945), which closed in July 2016; or (ii) to increase current successful activities:
- **School kits:** An additional five regions (covered by PAUSENS) received school kits (a 41 percent increase in coverage).
 - **Community Teacher Training:** Four additional regions benefitted from training developed in the project (a 33 per cent increase in coverage).
 - **Textbooks and teaching materials:** Given the dramatic shortage of textbooks in schools, it was agreed that the project would support improvements in the learning and teaching environment, as well as facilitate student literacy and numeracy, through the provision of textbooks, teachers' guides and school programming guides (not included in the project at appraisal, see para.24) in the regions covered by the project and the ones not covered by other development partners.
 - **School feeding:** Due to continued high levels of nutritional insecurity in certain regions covered by the project in the South of the country—insecurity that was expected to persist with El Niño—it was decided to increase the scope of the activity (a 26 per cent increase to the initial contract of WFP).
 - **Community-based school classrooms:** Following the satisfactory review community-based school classrooms: as well as the satisfactory review of school construction activities at MTR, it was agreed to add 66 classrooms (a 33 percent increase) in existing communities that had been trained in school construction by the project.
 - **Institutional strengthening:** Specific support was added to Pedagogic Advisors and “Chef ZAP” to allow them to effectively visit schools and conduct professional development meetings. This activity covered regions originally targeted by the project as well as regions covered by PAUSENS after its closing.
31. Finally, the rationale for the final restructuring was to extend the closing date to allow for completion of additional activities, particularly classroom construction.



II. OUTCOME

A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs

Assessment of Relevance of PDOs and Rating

32. The project development objectives remain highly relevant. To respond to the impact of the 2009-2013 crisis period, the Government decided to adopt the Interim Education Sector Plan (IESP), which aims at improving access and quality and strengthening institutional capacity.
33. Activities were therefore selected based on their potential to preserve basic education service delivery and to thus provide rapid relief for vulnerable populations. The proposed project design aimed to be realistic by selecting simple activities with achievable and measurable results appropriate to the fragile country and sector context, which is characterized by low capacity and persistent uncertainty.
34. The IESP identified a package of interventions essential to limiting the rapid deterioration of the primary education sector. The package included (i) subsidies to community teacher salaries, (ii) provision of school kits to pupils, (iii) key training activities for community teachers, (iv) school grants (*caisse école*) for regular purchase of small supplies, (v) school feeding in areas with severe food insecurity and (vi) school infrastructure improvements.
35. Those interventions were implemented by the project in order to protect education outcomes by making it easier to access, stay, and learn in primary school and by building the system's resilience. On the one hand, activities were implemented to ease key demand-side constraints to access and retention by enabling households to reduce the financial burden of schooling. The poorest spent on average 3.5 percent of their budget on education in 2012, against 2.2 percent in 2005. On the other hand, the number of out-of-school children rose by 35 percent between 2005 and 2011, project activities attempted to improve the supply of primary education services by promoting a conducive school environment to address the challenge of school dropout rates. In fact, the School Construction Strategy adopted by the MoE in 2009 aimed at scaling up the community-based approach to school construction that was already successfully implemented by the multi-sectoral (IDA-funded) project.
36. In addition, the Emergency Support to Education for All project supported the implementation of the package proposed in the IESP which was aligned with the Axe 4 of the Madagascar National Development Plan, to promote "adequate human capital for the development process." The public spending on education declined as government resources dwindled and out-of-pocket expenditures increased as a share of household expenditures. The main reason for this decline was the massive increase in the number of poorly qualified community teachers—80 percent of whom had no formal training. Although improving low teacher competencies and qualifications requires comprehensive reforms of teacher management, training and career development, the short-term intervention of the project called for a different approach that was supported by all donors: in-service training of community teachers in key basic competencies.
37. Several partners had already committed to supporting these activities, but mainly in particular regions. The five poorest regions (with an average of poverty rate of 84.68%) were covered by the Madagascar Emergency



Support to Critical Education, Health and Nutrition Services—an IDA-funded project .To ensure complementarity and avoid overlap, the donors' Local Education Group undertook a detailed mapping to guide the regional targeting proposed for this operation (see Annex 8). The average poverty rate of the 12 primary regions was 68.6 percent, which was lower than the national average of 71.5 percent, although some regions had a poverty rate of 87.7 percent. The regions selected for funding under the grant received the package of essential interventions; in other regions, the same package was supported by a mix of sources.

38. Besides these programs for the 12 regions, the project also supported improved school feeding—the school canteens program—particularly for interested schools in three of the country's southern regions (Androy, Anosy, and Atsimo Andrefana), the area which is most food insecure and has a low school retention rate. In 2012, these three regions suffered from a 49 percent food insecurity rate and with children having access to only 2 meals per day, primary school completion rate was less than 30 percent³.
39. As indicated in the FY 12-13 ISN, the impact of the crisis in the education sector was particularly high and a degradation of the system and human capital asset posed enormous challenges, not only for poverty reduction but also for economic growth, if any action were not taken. The FY 12-13 ISN's recommendations were to reestablish access to social basic services and to increase resilience, both of which were fully aligned with the project's objective.
40. Finally, the country context development challenges did not change significantly during implementation, and the operation remained highly relevant to the Country Partnership Framework for FY 17-FY 21, which is focused on increasing resilience with an objective of strengthening human development.
41. Given those several elements, the relevance of the operation's development objectives is **High**.

³ World Food Programme Madagascar, 2012



B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY)

Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome

42. The operation exceeded or fully achieved the target values for three out of four outcome indicators. All the outcome indicators were significantly revised upwards twice during the project. The initial target was fully achieved. For the number of community (FRAM) teachers benefitting from training in key basic competencies provided by the project, the revised value the final target value was not achieved but was extremely close (52,907 trained teachers against a target of 54,184). However, the revised final target value was truly a stretch— from 10,000 to 54,184 trained teachers. In addition, most of the final target values for intermediate results indicators were fully achieved or exceeded. Among the 11 intermediate results indicators, eight final target values were fully achieved or exceeded.

Table 1: PDO target achievement

Indicator	Baseline	Initial End Target (Emergency Project Paper)	Revised End Target (2016) RES21795	Revised End Target (2017) RES27102	Actual end value	Exceeded
1. Number of total direct project beneficiaries	0	1,935,963	1,954,818	2,011,070	2,098,474	✓
2. Number of students enrolled in primary schools in project	1,773,609	1,816,560	-	1,864,356	1,965,452	✓
3. Number of classrooms built or rehabilitated at the primary level resulting from project interventions	0	200	266	266	266	✓
4. Number of community (FRAM) teachers benefitting from training in key basic competencies provided by the project	0	10,000	47,113	54,184	52,907	

Outcome 1: Access to primary education is preserved

43. The successful preservation of access to primary education was achieved by taking over costs related to community teachers and school kits, which reduced the out of pocket costs of households thus leading to a decrease in the dropout rate. On average, in the 12 project regions, the dropout rate fell by 2.2 percentage points between the year prior to project implementation and the last year of the project.
44. For the period between 2006 and the 2009 crisis, the 12 regions of intervention of the project had a 5 percent of growth enrollment rate, which was lower than for the rest of the country. As a result of the crisis, growth of the enrollment rate declined nationwide; however, for the 2014-2017 period, it remained at 3.85 percent annually for the regions covered by the project while it decreased to 1.9 percent in the others. This enrolment rate is above the nationwide enrolment growth rate of 2.8 percent.



45. Table 2 shows that the main quantitative outcomes sought were more than fully fulfilled by the time the project closed in 2017. Good progress has been made in preserving and expanding a reliable public primary school system. Indeed, the number of children enrolled in the 12 regions increased by 10.9 percent since the beginning of the project (compared to the baseline).

Table 2 – Outcome 1 indicators – targets and actual end targets

Indicator	Initial indicator	Baseline	Initial End Target (Emergency Project Paper)	Revised End Target (2016) RES21795	Revised End Target (2017) RES27102	Actual end value
Outcome indicator						
Students enrolled in primary schools in project	☒	1,773,609	1,816,560	-	1,864,356	1,965,452
Of which female	☒	867,497	888,505	-	913,534	964,928
Intermediate Results Indicators						
Number of community teachers certified to be in service paid	☒	19,503	23,798	21,635	16 841	16 117
Of which % female	☒	49	50	50	50	53
Number of school kits distributed	☒	1,784,251	1,816,560	3,361,560	0	0
Number of children benefitting from school feeding activities	☒	0	83,065	104,065	140,214	113,303

46. The provision of school kits was originally planned to be carried out in partnership with UNICEF, but due to their high cost (US\$ 11), the MoE decided to procure them through an ICB and could obtain them for US\$5 per kit. This decrease in costs enabled more school kits to be distributed and more regions to participate in the project in 2016 when the IDA education and health emergency operation were closed, which reflect in the improvement of access. No school kits were distributed in the school year 2017-2018, however, because the project closed on December 31, 2017. The apparent shortfall in respect of community teachers in service (in the second line under Intermediate Results) reflects the increase in recent conversions of selected community teachers to the status of state-system contracted teachers. In fact, the Government decided to recruit a wave of community teachers who did not benefit from project's subsidies.
47. Regarding school feeding activities, about 113,000 school children in about 600 schools have received one meal per day through the school feeding program since June 2014, contributing to an attendance rate of about 90 percent in the schools receiving these services, as compared to schools in the same region not receiving school feeding, which had an attendance rate of about 65 percent. In addition, nearly 10,000 more students benefited from school feeding services in 94 schools in one additional district in July 2015, following the July 2015 reallocation allowing for an emergency response to the critical status of nutritional insecurity in this district following a drought in February 2015. The services in these schools consisted of take-home family rations and led to increased enrollments in the schools served. A feasibility study on sustainable school feeding (Home Grown School Feeding—HGSE) was completed in December 2015 and was recommended as a model, which was piloted in 2016. Due to some administrative and procurement delays at the local level in starting the pilot, the project could not achieve the 20% of remaining beneficiaries who were supposed be targeted. Following the evidence from the literature on the impact of school feeding in enrollment, it is assumed that enrollment rates increased by 14 percent due to



school feeding activities.

Outcome 2: The teaching and learning environment is improved

48. Table 3 shows that all outcome indicators were fulfilled if not exceeded. About 10 percent more schools than initially targeted received school grants; 23.5 percent more than the initial target for teachers used new teaching methods (although the end target was revised to account for the total lack of training of the teachers); and targeted students of Grade 1 to Grade 5 could have access to one textbook per two students (Malagasy and Mathematics). At the end of the project, those efforts yielded results in improving the teaching and learning environment as students' learning achievements increased significantly in the areas of intervention.

Table 3 – Outcome 2 indicators – targets and actual end target

Indicator	Initial indicator	Baseline	Initial End Target (Emergency Project Paper)	Revised End Target (2016) RES21795	Revised End Target (2017) RES27102	Actual end value
Intermediate Results Indicators						
Number of schools receiving school grants funded by the project	☒	0	11,092	11,092	12,200	12,327
Percentage of teachers using new teaching methods	☒	0	75	75	40	49.4
Change in learning achievements	☒	0	Significant	Significant	Significant	Significant
Textbook-pupil ratio in schools in targeted areas		1 st grade: 1 textbook for 33 pupils 2 nd grade: 1 textbook for 25 pupils 3 rd grade: 1 textbook for 20 pupils CM1: 1 textbook for 20 pupils CM2: 1 textbook for 14 pupils	-	1 st grade: 1 textbook for 2 pupils 2 nd grade: 1 textbook for 2 pupils 3 rd grade: 1 textbook for 2 pupils 4 th grade: 1 textbook for 2 pupils 5 th grade: 1 textbook for 2 pupils	1 st grade: 1 textbook for 2 pupils 2 nd grade: 1 textbook for 2 pupils 3 rd grade: 1 textbook for 2 pupils 4 th grade: 1 textbook for 2 pupils 5 th grade: 1 textbook for 2 pupils	1 st grade: 1 textbook for 2 pupils 2 nd grade: 1.1 textbook for 2 pupils 3 rd grade: 1.1 textbook for 2 pupils 4 th grade: 1.1 textbook for 2 pupils 5 th grade: 1 textbook for 2 pupils

49. School grants helped to improve the teaching and learning environment by giving schools operational funds for classroom supplies and school maintenance. Since the crisis, the government has been struggling to continue



paying the school grants regularly and on time. It was forced to reduce the amount of the school grant by more than two-thirds, from MGA 3,000 (approximately US\$1.50) per student in 2008 to MGA 800 (about US\$0.40) in 2010, MGA 900 (about US\$0.45) in 2011, and MGA 2,000 (US\$1.0) in 2012. The government's severely constrained ability to finance school grants greatly impeded schools' ability to adequately equip classrooms to receive students in a favorable learning environment. With the project-funded school grant top-up (about \$2. per student in 2016), schools were able to purchase basic supplies (chalks, notebooks), procure learning aids, and carry out infrastructure restorations.

50. Textbooks for students in targeted regions from Grade 1 to Grade 5 were very insufficient prior to the project (one textbook per 33 pupils in Grade 1). Malagasy and Mathematics textbooks have been made available during project intervention. The first Malagasy textbooks were available just after the MTR. The ratio of one textbook for two students was achieved.
51. For teacher professional development, six-week courses were followed up with very carefully planned efforts to establish the impact that the training could have at the level that mattered: on the children in a primary school over the course of a year. The assessment of the work of graduates in working with schools was paralleled by a similar assessment effort in a comparable school but with the teaching done by competent staff who had not been through the new training. The conclusions drawn were based mainly on the answers that the children in the two schools gave to questions they were asked toward the end of the school year.
52. The principal findings from the learning assessment showed that the teacher training activities had a good impact. Students taught by teachers who had learned the pedagogical aspects of their subject, as well as the underlying substance, and who had taken the time and trouble to design a good didactic structure for the test-class in the school, performed better than teachers using a more traditional approach. The evaluation made it possible to affirm that the teacher training supported by the project had a positive impact on students' learning outcomes and improved the learning environment: the evaluation revealed that there was a difference between the students' scores at the beginning of the year and at the end of the year, and that that difference was statistically significant between the treated group (whose teachers had been trained) and the control group (whose teachers were not trained).
53. The project laid the groundwork for several activities of the newly approved education project. The "needed increase in attention to the pedagogical dimension" triggered the development of major components in the new education project: namely, emphasizing teachers' regional training plans, strengthening CISCO's role, and supporting the school Directors' performance. In addition, the new project will continue to support activities tested and developed in the project (e.g., school construction and school grants).

Because the operation fully achieved most projected outcomes and almost fully achieved its objectives, the overall efficacy is rated **Substantial**.



C. EFFICIENCY

Assessment of Efficiency and Rating

Economic analysis at appraisal

54. During appraisal, the economic analysis discussed the following three elements (1) the costs of hiring community teachers compared to civil servant teachers; (2) that acquiring supplies locally is more cost-efficient than having a centralized process; and (3) that according to the literature, the contribution to social outcomes related to investments in primary education have a higher “benefit to cost ratio” than investments in other education levels.
55. However, due to the emergency situation in Madagascar in the first years of the current decade, the condensed timeline for preparation of the project, and standard practices for the education sector at the time, no calculation of economic return to the investments planned was presented in the appraisal report for the grant. Therefore, the findings from the cost-benefit analysis for this ICR cannot be directly compared with expected results at appraisal, and there are no assumptions to be validated in terms of expected impact/benefits.

Economic analysis for the ICR

56. These 12 regions were selected to ensure complementarity and to avoid overlap with other donor interventions. Based on the comparison between the actual enrollment numbers in the regions that received the full set of interventions from the Emergency Project and to the total enrollment in the other regions, it is observed that for the period before the political crisis – 2006 to 2009 - the annual growth in enrollment was already smaller for the 12 regions participating in the Emergency project, a 5 percent annual growth rate compared to 8.9 percent in the other regions.
57. For the years after the crisis until the start of the project implementation, project-supported regions presented a negative annual growth rate (close to zero) while others still presented increased enrollment, but at a much slower rate, minus 0.26 percent versus 2.4 percent, respectively. After the project implementation, for the period from 2014 to 2017, the growth in enrollment is higher in the Emergency project regions, at 3.85 percent annually, while others start growing at 1.9 percent.
58. The benefits of the project interventions were estimated using the PDO indicator on “The number of students enrolled in primary schools in the targeted regions”. The objective was to capture to what extent the project interventions (i) preserved access to primary education by building/rehabilitating classrooms, paying community teachers subsidies, distributing school kits and (ii) improved the teaching and learning environment by training community teachers, providing school grants and supporting school feeding.
59. To estimate the impact on children’s participation in school attributable to the project, the difference was calculated between the observed number of children enrolled in primary school (number of children enrolled in years 2014-17) and the number of children that would have been enrolled had the project not been implemented (number of children enrolled under the counterfactual scenario). The counterfactual scenario was estimated using the following assumptions:
- In the absence of the project, the number of children enrolled in each region would have increased at



the same rate observed in the other regions not supported by the project from 2014 to 2016. This reference period is used since interventions in other regions began in 2016. We consider that up until 2016, the increases in enrollment are independent of the project interventions.

- In 2016, five other regions received school kits. As these are regions were part of another project – PAUSENS – we assumed the impact of these kits on children enrollment is negligible. Indeed, 2016 is the only year when school kits were distributed in those regions, and is difficult to separate its impact from other ongoing interventions.
- From the literature, increases in enrollment rates due to school feeding activities is estimated at 14 percent. This value has been used to estimate the counterfactual enrollment numbers for the 3 regions that benefited from the school feeding activities.

Costs

60. The costs include all the resources added to the system, or the entire amount of the project costs. These amount for the actual total disbursement of US\$85.2 million, during the period from 2014 to 2018.

Benefits

61. It is assumed that the increase in primary school enrollment over the project implementation years brings economic benefits to the target children through the increase in their future potential income. Benefits yielded from the interventions were measured in terms of preserved increases in wages. The average national monthly wage of 151,000 Ariary is used as the reference wage⁴, or US\$810 per year. The economic return to one additional year of schooling is 11.4 percent in Madagascar (Montenegro and Patrinos, 2014)⁵, which results in an expected increase of US\$92 in annual wages for an additional year of schooling.
62. The estimated model also assumes that students who benefited from the project will enter the workforce at age 18 and will retire at age 60 (after 42 years of work). Based on the average annual projections for the 2018-2022 period⁶, it is assumed that there will be economic growth equal to 2.4 percent, used as an estimate of wage growth. Finally, a discount rate of 9.5 percent is used, which is the current interest rate from the Madagascar Central Bank.

Results

63. Under the baseline scenario considered in this analysis, the Emergency Project yields a ratio of benefits to costs of 6.1, suggesting that for every dollar invested, the project yields an economic return of 6.1 dollars. The initial investment of US\$85.4 million generates economic benefits with a net present value of US\$340 million. The internal rate of return is 12 percent, which is significantly higher than the current costs of capital in Madagascar (9.5 percent).

⁴ INSTAT/ENSOMD 2012-2013, available in the Education Sector Plan 2017-2022.

⁵ Montenegro, C. E., and H. A. Patrinos. 2014. Comparable estimates of returns to schooling around the world. Policy Research Working Paper, no. WPS 7020. Washington DC: World Bank Group.

⁶ WB estimates, 2018



Limitations

64. The PDO aims at improving the quality of the education service provided as well, however, these are not captured in the analysis. The indicators of the results framework suggest that overall quality has improved, which may lead to further economic benefits. Also, additional gains related to improved health, reduction in criminality, or increase in political participation have not been taken into account. The results presented in this section have to be considered as a lower bound estimate. Finally, all the costs and benefits estimated for all the other interventions in the project regions were assumed to result from the Project.

Operational efficiency

65. The time preparation of the project (13 months) from the concept to the approval is long compared to the OP/BP 8.00, which indicates that for simple new emergency recovery loans, the task team should aim to prepare the operation (from concept to approval) within 2.5 months. This delay was due to the fact that the Interim Education Sector Plan was also under preparation and as the project was 100 percent financed by the GPE funding, the development partners' consultation process is mandatory, which took almost one year to get approval from each stage since the project conception exercise. The short time from approval to effectiveness is shorter than the average for Africa region and Madagascar. (3.3 comparing to 5), it is the same status with the time from project effectiveness until the first disbursement (2.3 comparing to 5).

Table 4: Time for Project approval, effectiveness, and first disbursement compared to Bank's average time

	Concept-Approval	Approval-Effectiveness	Effectiveness-First disbursement	Concept-First disbursement
This project	13	3.3	2.3	18
Madagascar	14	5	2	26
Africa	14	5	3	24
Bank	14	5	4	24

66. The level of readiness for implementation was high due to the specific activities supported by the project: support to teacher salaries and school grants could be implemented without any procurement (money transfer), ensuring that disbursements were made right at the beginning of implementation, in the first year. However, some project activities happened more slowly: (i) the purchase of school kits was delayed one year due to unsuccessful negotiation with UNICEF purchase center; (ii) the HGSF approach was delayed due to lengthy negotiation between MEN and the consultant; and (iii) the purchase of textbooks was delayed because a supplier defaulted after signing the contract. The delay in school kits was compensated by a better unit price and savings through international bidding; HGSF-consultant negotiations delayed the implementation of this pilot approach until the last year of the project; and another supplier delivered textbooks on time before project end.
67. The staff turnover of the project implementation unit was relatively low although the coordinator of the PIU changed a year and half before the closing date of the project. The Bank staff turnover was a relatively high, since the TTL changed three times over the course of the project.
68. The in-country project operating costs (including monitoring and evaluation) made up 5 percent of the total



project costs, which is relatively low and thus efficient.

69. The project was extended by six months. However, the initial expected outcomes were reached before the initial end date of the project, indicating that the project was efficient.

Sensitivity and financial analysis

70. Our sensitivity analysis is based on several assumptions that can be modified to check the robustness of results. Alternative values for some key parameters were used and results are summarized in Table 5. In order to capture the uncertainty in economic growth, especially in a country with considerable political instability, more conservative assumptions of no economic growth and a higher discount rate were considered. For a scenario with no economic growth—that is no growth in per capita GDP—the benefit/cost ratio was estimated as 3.7, for an IRR of 9 percent. In the case where a higher discount rate of 12 percent is used, the benefit/cost ratio is 4.0, for an IRR of 10 percent. Under weaker restrictions in the key assumptions, the estimated economic return was higher. Assuming the economy grew at the WB-forecasted rate of 4.9 percent over the time 2016-2022, and dropped to 2.2 percent afterwards, the benefit/cost ratio was estimated at 7, and the IRR at 13 percent. For a lower discount rate at 5 percent (commonly used for cost-benefit analysis), the benefit/cost ratio was estimated in 15.8, for an IRR of 17 percent.

Table 5. Results from sensitivity analyses

	Benefit/Cost Ratio	IRR	NPV
Baseline scenario	6.1	12%	US\$340 M
Discount rate			
Alternative value (5%)	15.8	17%	US\$1101 M
Alternative value (12%)	4.0	10%	US\$187 M
GDP Growth			
No growth rate in per capita GDP	3.7	9%	US\$177 M
Growth rate 2016-2022 (4.9%)	7.0	13%	US\$402 M

71. The total value allocated to education was available in the Education Sector Plan 2017-2022, including the value of current expenditures (operational costs and salaries) and investments. The project's annual investment represented a sizable share of the government budget for education. The maximum impact of the project on the total educational budget is estimated to have been 11 percent in 2016.
72. Considering the relevant data on economic analysis generated by the project and on operation effectiveness, the efficiency is rated **Substantial**.

D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING



73. As per Bank guidance on ICRs, the overall outcome rating is **Satisfactory** (Table 6).

Table 6. Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

Sub-Ratings			Overall Outcome Rating
Relevance	Efficacy	Efficiency	
High	Substantial	Substantial	Satisfactory

E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS

Gender

74. The project has given significant attention to encouraging full participation of girls as well as boys in public primary education and to giving full opportunities to female teachers. Females have had an increasing role as school directors.

Community Government Structure and Practices

75. In separate but related initiatives, as mentioned earlier, the Ministry of Education has also given close attention to encouraging the creation of local school-based promotional bodies with important financial responsibilities, and requiring design and implementation—including monitoring, managing and advertising school performance—of a constantly updated report card summarizing the latest year’s performance of the school and its pupils compared with its neighbors.

Institutional Strengthening

76. Despite preparation of the project in a context of crisis and a non-recognized Government, the project unfolded smoothly with an increased involvement of the democratically appointed new Government. The project was implemented (Grant Agreement) at the beginning by the Project Implementation Unit (PIU). With the new Government in place, project activities and responsibilities were gradually shifted from the PIU to the Directorates of the Ministry. At the end of the project, the Ministry had full responsibility for the activities; only the fiduciary aspects were handled by the PIU. After the MTR, the Ministry was fully implementing the project.

77. The project benefitted from the experience of the PIU staff who were involved in previous projects with the World Bank. However, PIU staff were all consultants, including the Project Coordinator. An agreement was reached with the Ministry during implementation to replace the consultant Coordinator with a staff member from the Ministry (the former Director of Infrastructures) who took charge of the project on a full-time basis.

78. The Ministry of Education received support from the project in various areas: (i) the Department of Planning (training, equipment and consultant services); (ii) the decentralized level (DREN, CISCO and ZAP) in terms of training, office equipment, motorcycles, etc.; (iii) the consultancies (national, international and UNESCO) which prepared the Education Sector Plan.



Mobilizing Private Sector Financing

Not applicable.

Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity

79. As expressed in the PAD during preparation, the project targeted the most vulnerable regions. In particular, 12 regions were targeted with an additional 5 regions (originally covered by PAUSENS) included in 2016. By reducing household out-of-pocket payments for education services (school kits, textbooks, school grants, payment of community teachers, school feeding, etc.) the project contributed to poverty reduction and shared prosperity.

Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts

Not applicable.

III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME

A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION

80. **Objective.** The proposed project reflects a core area of the World Bank's Africa Strategy, notably by addressing vulnerability and strengthening resilience, and it will contribute to achieving key objectives of the World Bank Education Strategy, including reducing inequality and improving learning outcomes. As noted, the proposed operation is aligned with the GPE Strategic Goals for 2012–15: (i) access for all; (ii) learning for all; (iii) reaching every child; and (iv) building for the future.
81. **Design.** The project was designed to meet two main purposes: first, to preserve the primary education system already developed and to enable continued recovery of enrolment levels under conditions of tight budgetary stringency and, for many, reduced income levels; and second, to start building towards an improved and enlarged system capable of supporting the country's long-term needs. Consequently, extensive provision was made for building human and institutional capacities—for planning and managing education sector development, for training teachers and school managers, and for strengthening physical school infrastructure and equipment of the public education system, especially for the first ten or twelve years of a child's life. A small reserve was included for unforeseen supplementary expenditure.
82. **Institutional arrangements.** Two factors greatly facilitated rapid development of the project envisaged for financing with the GPE grant: The Bank had stayed in touch with Madagascar's crucial education sector through the long years of political crisis and the Bank included the sector in the first commitment ending the IDA suspension, in late 2012. The project was developed to Board approval level within 12 months. However, the preparation time could have been reduced significantly if the GPE approval were expedited to fit with the emergency situation. Rapid assembly of the needed up-to-date data was also helped by the fact that the government had retained the small unit outside government that it had set up to handle work on Education for All activities (UAT-EPT), recognizing the particular importance of that UN initiative to the country's needs.



B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION

83. **Increased funding.** The main factor that facilitated the implementation was the increase in available funds in Malagasy Ariary, due to the fall in the exchange rate against the US dollar. For this reason, additional funds were available in local currency that could be used to increase existing activities and add new activities and initiatives (see MTR para. 23). All these new activities and initiatives were implemented within the original time frame plus a six-month extension.
84. **Access to textbooks.** Besides the strong performance on the ambitious objectives set for the reinforcement of primary school operation in these regions, significant progress was also made, with project help, on dimensions not sufficiently clear at the time of project conception, notably access to textbooks. Provision of textbooks was not part of the original project despite the construction of new classrooms increasing access. This was corrected at MTR and books have now been procured (with substantial help from the GPE grant) to get close to the IESP objective, reinforced in the 2018-22 Education Sector Plan prepared with project help and issued in 2017, which calls for one copy of a basic book for each major subject (Malagasy, mathematics, etc.) for every two pupils.
85. **New distribution unit.** The main work remaining is to catch up with the overall targets in the regions still lagging behind and to complete distribution of the books to the many thousands of individual schools in all regions. The major task of planning and eventually distributing of these materials among the establishments throughout the country will be carried out by a specially created new unit CoTGIS (*Comité Technique de Gestion des Intrants*) that should be able to play a very useful role in achieving the rapid spread of other imported inputs into the education process.
86. **Continuity of school construction strategy.** The project exceeded its initial goal to build 200 classrooms by project end: 66 extra classrooms were built using the savings and MTR recommendation. Although the Bank team did not plan to include construction activities in an Emergency project, the component was nevertheless included for the reasons already stated and because of its high cost-effectiveness and the need to build technical capacity. The existing “School Construction Strategy” from a previous Fast Track Initiative project was based on Community Empowerment. Classroom drawings (following para-cyclonic guidelines and compliant with para-seismic guidelines) were certified by an international engineering firm and endorsed by a construction committee. Recipient communities were trained in all aspects of construction (see below). The UAT construction team worked closely with the Education Ministry department of Construction (DPFI) to achieve a successful program of 266 classrooms built by project end, with water points and toilets available in all schools receiving new classrooms. **Quality of construction and compliance to drawings were controlled by construction technicians and a post-technical audit assessed them satisfactory.**
87. **Community involvement in school management.** When communities or schools indicated interest, the Ministry organized, at project cost, brief training for carefully selected groups of potential participants in such a community government body. As plans for adding classrooms took shape, the FEFFIs that had been created also replaced (and took over the responsibilities of) so-called FAFs which were school-related bodies (established under 2002 legislation), consisting mainly of selected parents and the school director, who managed the school fund (*caisse école*) that received central government contributions to school operating costs. There is a long tradition of school communities’ involvement in school management in Madagascar,



which survived the crisis thanks to the project support and Ministry of Education leadership. School management by communities was already supported by the FTI operation 2006-2009) and is rarely found in other regional countries.

88. **Fiduciary bodies to help manage construction.** The FEFIs were assisted in their work by national establishments with extensive experience in construction hired by the central government as fiduciary bodies for advising and assisting the FEFIs on their management of the project design, bidding and contracting processes. A thorough independent review in 2017 of the first major round of classroom construction found some small shortfalls on some of the completed projects but reached generally highly favorable views of the innovation, the low building costs, and the potential for major positive impact on school development and management in the coming years.
89. **School report cards.** In a separate, wider-ranging initiative, the Ministry has also given close attention to promoting design and implementation—and active use for monitoring, managing and advertising school performance —of a constantly updated report card summarizing the latest year’s performance of the school and its pupils compared with neighbors. All the public primary schools that participated in the broader training on community management now maintain and regularly update such a Report Card – some 12,047 schools in all.
90. **Carefully designed curriculum for training community teachers.** The effort to address the country’s problem with the large accumulation of community teachers began with a six-week course in August-September 2015 that had been carefully prepared over many months with the aim of adjusting their work-styles as much as possible to the emerging substantive needs and the absorptive capacities and psychologies of Madagascar’s modern youth. A second, somewhat revised version of the course was given in August-September 2016, and a third one was given in August-September 2017, again directed mainly to community teachers, accompanied by a few school directors and staff of the decentralized units of the Ministry located in the regional-level DREN and the CISCOS. A tremendous effort was made by the Ministry to train many more community teachers on basic pedagogical competencies.

Factors subject to Government and/or Implementing Entities Control

91. During implementation, when challenges emerged, mainly in the areas of procurement and timely implementation of activities, the Government and the Bank addressed them in a timely manner with limited negative impact on project implementation and outcomes. At the end of the project, the closing date needed to be extended by six months from June 30, 2017 to December 31, 2017 to allow for the completion of activities.
92. **Institutional Arrangements.** Under the “*Secrétaire Général*” leadership, a “*Comité de Coordination*” regrouping all Directors of Ministry was involved in reviewing the progress of project activities, particularly during Implementation Support missions from the Bank. Concerning the payment of teachers’ salaries, it was agreed between Ministry of Education and Ministry of Finance to move from payment through micro-credit agencies (in the first part of the project) to payment through the National Treasury (in the second part). This successfully emphasized the change from an initial parallel financing approach (for fiduciary



reasons in times of Government crisis) to a full alignment with national procedures for civil servants' salaries transfers.

93. **Procurement.** Complex procurement of vehicles, motorcycles and IT equipment was performed through the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) in accordance with the Financing Agreement. Procurement of school kits were under negotiation with UNICEF but were finally purchased through ICB following the Bank's procurement rules, because it was difficult to find the right items in UNICEF's catalogue and the unit prices were high. Textbooks were also purchased through ICB, but a first contract had to be canceled and re-advertised due to non-responsiveness of the supplier, delaying the entire process. In general, the procurement of goods, works and services was handled satisfactorily and in accordance to the Procurement Plan. Contracting of the right consultant to develop Home Grown School Feeding pilot (HGSF) took time because the department in charge of School Feeding in the Ministry was slow to respond, but also because it took time to mobilize the consultant team and conduct on the ground assessment before starting the pilot. Finally, when the pilot was implemented at the end of the project, the Ministry of Education approved the approach and decided to build on it for developing its own school feeding strategy.
94. **Environment and safeguards.** School constructions refer to the national construction standard and design. It was carried out by the enterprises and supervised by local communities FEEFI. The project was classified in category B and two safeguard policies were triggered: OP 4.01 (Environmental Assessment) and OP 4.12 (Involuntary Resettlement). The Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) and Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) have been prepared. These steps suggest that the project's environmental and social aspects have been correctly managed and implemented.

Factors Subject to World Bank Control

95. **Close monitoring.** The Bank ensured a close monitoring of project activities, not only through timely formal implementation support missions but also through monthly close monitoring of the Budgeted Annual Work Program (BAWP), including the Procurement Plan, and appropriate quick decisions or no-objections. In addition, the TTL of the project was based in the Country Office and could interact with the Ministry departments and the PIU on a daily basis or as issues arose.
96. **Financing.** Despite the crisis environment at project preparation stage, the Bank continued engagement in the sector through the financing of this project has triggered positive impact: students remained in schools, additional classrooms were built, textbooks were delivered, teachers received their salaries and were trained, communities were trained, annual school grants were delivered and school feeding was operational in poor and drought suffering areas.
97. **Mid-Term Review.** The Bank took the opportunity of Mid-Term Review to look into cross-cutting issues. The Bank discussed with Government the project activities which could not have been included at appraisal (such as textbook availability, strengthening the supervision role of CISCOS, payment of teachers through Treasury, and expansion of the project into additional regions) in order to improve the spectrum of project activities to address key sectoral issues.



Factors Outside the Control of Government and/or Implementing Agencies

98. **Inadequate capacity of the decentralized parts of the Ministry.** Three areas can nonetheless be identified where action was probably more limited than would have been desirable, mainly because of somewhat excessive hesitancy on the part of Government. It became clear fairly quickly that expectations about how much and how quickly community teachers (and others) could change the substantive or didactic quality of their teaching on the basis of attendance at a six-week course had been over-optimistic and that more time and more help were needed. A significant part of the problem was inadequate capacity of the decentralized parts of the Ministry (DRENs and CISCOS), in terms of both staff and budgets for travel and communications, to provide the needed extent of encouragement, reinforcement and monitoring.
99. **Acquisition and delivery of textbooks.** A second problem with widespread unfortunate consequences was long delay in progress on the textbooks problem, followed by considerable mishandling of the within-country distribution of large purchases (hundreds of thousands) of school books.
100. **Experience in new school feeding approach.** The third area was the seemingly inappropriate, government-dominated way of trying to build cooperation between farmers, schools, and school-children's parents for provision of commodities that would be more profitable for farmers and less expensive to schools than their respective alternatives and therefore mutually interesting. The result of the approach adopted was at least temporarily to require abandonment of a promising experiment (called Home Grown School Feeding - School Feeding based on Local Purchases) which had proven popular in its six-month life in 2016-17 across some 60 schools in one of the areas in the south of the country most subject to sharp climatic variations and consequent short periods of serious food scarcity.

IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)

101. The Bank gave particularly close attention to the design of a tailor-made structure of monitoring and evaluation that was responsive to the inevitable risks of the project, especially the heavy reliance on community teachers who had been hired outside normal Education Ministry recruitment procedures. Special attention was given at start-up with UAT-EPT to ensure that the necessary systems were in place to generate valid data in a timely manner on the many dimensions specified in the Results Framework. Those systems worked very well and enabled the Bank to concentrate its continuing support of the project on issues that the monitoring data identified as in need of attention.
102. One of the most important project contributions of the Bank and its consultants was their guidance on how to improve the quality of teaching of community teachers. The monitoring systems highlighted a key problem early in the project's implementation: that it would take much longer than the highly optimistic original expectations to raise the quality of teaching of community teachers to the levels demanded of teachers who had met the much higher qualification standards for recruitment into government service.



103. A first six-week course for selected community teachers and related staff had been successfully carried out in August-September 2015. Follow-up efforts from school directors and decentralized staff of the Education Ministry to help the teachers fully apply in their own teaching what they had learned at the six-week course fell short of expectations because of other responsibilities and poor provision for coverage of travel costs.
104. Since incorporation of the community teachers into the modernized national education system obviously remained a very important issue, much more elaborate measures were applied in 2016 and 2017 to follow up on the matter and identify promising solutions. It had always been recognized that two separate aspects were involved: on the one hand, the substance of whatever was to be taught, such as Malagasy language or Elementary mathematics, and on the other hand, the pedagogical and didactic aspects of how best to convey that substance and stimulate interest and response from the pupils. Both had been covered in the 2015 training course and follow-ups.
105. It had also been recognized that effective testing of the results of the effort to upgrade teaching practice needed to be organized quite scientifically, by matching a group who had been through the training with a control group of already qualified government teachers, and asking both to plan and conduct a small course before a group of children not previously involved who would be asked to answer questions on the substance and the style of both sets of trainers (as a group and individually) and how much they had learned from each. The results could therefore give reasonably well-founded indications of how much real progress had been made, with the control group results setting a useful neutral base. It was the result of exercises of this sort that provided relatively unbiased estimates for matters such as “percentage of teachers using new teaching methods” in the Results Monitoring Framework—and, more importantly, in the actual practice of the country’s education system.

M&E Design

106. The operations theory of change included in the Project Papers was clear and sound. The objective was clearly defined and all expected outcomes were reflected in the results framework indicators, which also captured project activities and outputs contributing to the achievement of outcomes.
107. The results framework indicators were chosen in a way that could be easily monitored. Besides, they systematically included baselines and targets. The results framework also focused on changes over time, which was in line with the objective of the project to preserve service delivery in targeted regions.
108. However, the number of community (FRAM) teachers benefitting from training in key basic competencies provided by the project was included as an outcome indicator when it should have typically been listed as output/intermediate results indicators. Conversely, the change in learning achievements and the percentage of teachers using new teaching methods were included as intermediate results indicators while they could have been outcome indicators.



M&E Implementation

109. A monitoring and evaluation specialist was recruited by the PIU and served throughout the project's implementation. All progress reports produced by the PIU were reporting on indicators' evolution. The only difficulty was the slow publication of the Annual Statistics for Education that provide annual indicator values. The project supported actively the strengthening of the Department of Planning, at central and CISCOS level (internet connection and computers) in order to reduce the time between the beginning of the school year and the availability of annual statistics. This improved the speed of production in the second part of the project.
110. Despite occasional confusions on two indicators (number of community teachers certified as paid service and number of parents' associations/school management committees trained in social accountability tools), definitions and methodologies for calculating the indicators provided at the beginning of the project were respected throughout the implementation period. Working sessions with the Ministry of Education were also initiated during the implementation of the project to recall the definitions, calculation methods and data to be collected for certain indicators. These sessions also adjusted the differences between the various data sources, as needed, and highlighted lessons for further implementation.
111. Implementation support missions systematically included an in-depth review of the status of project implementation, including joint sessions to update the results framework. The results of these joint sessions were systematically integrated into the mission's Aide-Memoires and ISRs. This allowed all stakeholders to monitor progress in the project implementation and the achievement of defined objectives. Two restructurings took place during the implementation of the project. These restructurings allowed adjustments of target values for certain indicators and the addition of new indicators, among other things. The content of these changes is detailed in Tables 1 and 2 (Achieving Project Development Objectives).

M&E Utilization

112. Data on performance and results were used on a regular basis by the PIU in order to evaluate the impact of the project, and indicators were reported through progress reports that informed project management and decision making. In addition, each Bank's Implementation Support Aide Memoire had an annex with an updated results framework, which was informed by values produced by the Department of Planning. An updated results framework available at MTR allowed the Ministry and the Bank to assess the situation and agree on increased activities and new activities, based on verified facts.

Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E

113. The rating of quality of M&E is **Substantial**. The M&E system, as designed and implemented, was sufficient to assess the achievements of the objectives and test the links in the results chain despite the slow production of statistics informing the results framework.



B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE

114. School construction followed the national construction standard and design. It was carried out by the enterprises and supervised by local communities FEEFI. The project was classified in category B and two safeguard policies were triggered: OP 4.01 (Environmental Assessment) and OP 4.12 (Involuntary Resettlement). The Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) and Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) were prepared. It could be concluded that the project environmental and social aspects were correctly managed and implemented by the project. In fact, the project held three safeguard sessions on the preparation of Environmental and Social Manage Plans (ESMPs) in accordance with the project ESMF and RPF with the participation of 162 practitioners from consultant firms, enterprise's engineers, DPFI/Ministry of Education staff and the fiduciary staffs (FID and Aide Action). The environmental and social clauses in the bidding documents of infrastructure were implemented in a manner deemed acceptable by the enterprises.
115. The implementation support missions and the results of the environmental audit noted an appropriation of mitigation measures and contractors' Environmental and Social Manage Plans (ESMPs) during the work, as well as the adequacy and consistency of the proposed mitigation measures considering the risks and negative impacts encountered. The project also contributed to the fight against the spread of HIV/AIDS by conducting it systematically on each site by professionals in accordance with the national policy on the fight against HIV/AIDS available at the level of the SE/CNLS: 1,587 people (workers, local populations and members of FEEFI) were sensitized and 3,173 awareness kits on HIV/AIDS were distributed on all 66 construction sites.
116. An environmental issue that was identified only after completion of the 266 new classrooms were built concerned the air space required within the building per occupant. Ministry requirements set 3 cubic meters for building in the highlands of the country, with moderate temperature, and 4 cubic meters in the hotter and often more densely populated areas. The designs applied in the project used 4 cubic meters in all areas, so the relatively few schools involved from the highlands may have had somewhat higher construction costs than necessary.
117. The respect of the use by the worker of individual protection equipment to ensure the safety of workers constitutes the main social issue during the school construction/rehabilitation. However, no major accident was noted in the project.

C. BANK PERFORMANCE

118. The Bank has given strong and flexible support to the Malagasy Education Ministry to shape the overall direction for the development of primary education and to offer guidance in project implementation. Although it did not impose any particular solutions, it helped find feasible answers to any problems that arose, such as adjustment of the community teachers to the needs of the more advanced education system that will be so crucial in creating more employment opportunities for the population.



Quality at Entry

119. The project, which was carried out as an emergency intervention in a short period of time, was part of a coordinated response to the crisis to provide needed support to families, many of whom were in serious financial distress. The Bank managed to successfully identify the key dimensions of the project, as follows:

- **Development objective:** The objective was clearly set out in the Project Papers and focused on the right issues of the education sector (preserving access and improving learning environment) in a context of long-lasting political and economic crisis.
- **Design of the operation:** The design of the operation was sound and kept simple. Three components were clearly defined (access, learning and institutional strengthening). The project supported activities that were already part of the Ministry's priorities and implemented community teachers' salary, school grants, and student kits through the UN system (such as school feeding through the World Food Program, which was familiar with implementation in the targeted regions). Institutional strengthening of the Ministry (the third component), with the objective support preparation of the new Sector Strategy, was finalized before the end of the project. Innovative approaches were also carefully introduced (e.g., school construction by communities). Plans for capacity strengthening in PIU and Ministry departments (e.g., Planning department) were included.
- **Institutional arrangements:** Given the nature of the emergency and the fragile country context, the Bank decided to base the institutional and implementation arrangements on existing and well-performing structures (existing PIU) and mechanisms (PIU in charge of implementation and fiduciary aspects for the Ministry) to ensure speedy implementation, provide tangible benefits quickly to communities, and minimize fiduciary risks.
- **Monitoring and evaluation:** The quality of the monitoring and evaluation was substantial.

120. The operational risk framework was comprehensive. The overall implementation risk of the operation was appropriately rated "Substantial", because the rating was "substantial" for five risks (Stakeholders, Governance, Program and Donor, Political Interference and Delivery Monitoring and Sustainability), "Moderate" for four risks (Capacity, Design, Rising Insecurity and Natural Disasters) and "Low" for Social and Environment. Appropriate mitigation measures were identified and reflected in the project documents. For example, substantial fiduciary risks were mitigated through an existing and well-performing PIU, close supervision of fiduciary issues, and strengthening controls and audits with introduction of an internal audit function. The risk of political interference, on the other hand, was mitigated by selection upfront of the regions of intervention, strong involvement of direct beneficiaries, capacity building of communities, and strengthening of grievance mechanisms through training of parents' associations on governance of grants and teacher salary subsidies.



Quality of Supervision

121. Things moved somewhat slowly in the project's first 12 months—not surprising given the fact that the country had little recent experience in dealing with the Bank. But communications were gradually built up, with the Bank's officers most directly responsible for the project residing in Antananarivo, full review missions with participation from Washington and elsewhere every six or nine months, and regular follow-up to missions in the form of Aide-Memoires addressed to the government and Implementation Status and Results Reports widely circulated in Washington. Even before the Mid-Term Review in late 2015 there seems to have been a much greater degree of confidence on all sides because the country now had a newly elected and hence more powerful government, and more experience had been accumulated in working with the Bank.
122. The Bank provided a strong support to MEN teams during implementation. For example, in procurement, the Bank team helped by advising and organizing the purchase of school kits through international competitive bidding (in place of a direct contract with UNICEF, as planned at preparation stage), which reduced substantially the cost per kit with similar quality and allowed the Ministry to purchase more kits (Aide Memoire 2016). In school community development, the Bank provided expertise to support development of capacity building modules. In data and strategy, the Bank supported the SDI exercise that provided quantitative information on the strengths and weaknesses of the sector, helped strengthen the Ministry planning department and provided a better data foundation for the Education Sector Strategy issued on 2017 and the new project recently approved by the Board.

Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance

123. Based on the above, the rating of Bank's performance is **Satisfactory** since there were only minor shortcomings in the quality of supervision.

D.RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

124. The management improvements and significant investments in schools and communication systems that have characterized Madagascar's primary education system in the last three years still need to be maintained in good order and substantially enlarged. The country has made very good progress in developing ways of mobilizing local private and community initiatives and resources to work with whatever it is able to attract from international sources or earn from national economic activity, but the sector will continue to depend significantly on international aid flows. Provided the country's leading families and aspirant politicians can avoid the breakdowns in political dialogue that have repeatedly had such devastating effects on the country's progress in the last 50 years, Madagascar should be able to complete the development of a modern primary education system as outlined in the 2018-22 Sectoral Plan for Education and maintain the system in good working order.



V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

125. **Cooperative ventures.** The effective cooperation and mutual trust that the concerned staff of the Bank and the Ministry of Education were at pains to develop after the last breakdown— from 2009 to 2012— may have had their greatest payoff in the form of cooperative ventures that have significantly wider relevance than initially foreseen. One venture was the effort to upgrade the capacities of the community teachers, which soon led to much deeper focus on identifying the particular aspects where improvement offered the greatest benefits and came, through considerable reflection and debate, to focus on pedagogy and didactics. Similar solutions are now being found to have to other problems and dilemmas that the Ministry faces.
126. **Mid-Term Review.** Taking a regional approach of the project, in coordination with other donors, that targeted 12 regions was the most practical way to operate in a crisis situation and solve the issue of possible system collapse; however, at Mid-Term Review, activities evolved into more thematic approaches (curricula strategy and manuals delivery, nation-wide teacher training and pedagogic supervision through strengthened role of CISCOS and “Pedagogical advisors”). Using Mid-Term Review for refining activities within the development objective emerged as a key lesson from the project.
127. **Training potential Board members for local schools:** The training of potential Board members gave local residents tools, procedures and advice for strengthening the schools where their children would be educated, and developed important support to the Ministry’s work without requiring any remuneration. This innovation has great potential for improving the quality of local governance, not only in education but in other fields.
128. **Working with UN Agencies:** The project was supposed to work with UNICEF for school kits purchase and with WFP for school feeding. Outcomes differed: with WFP a strong partnership developed quickly and a contract was signed between the Government and WFP who delivered school feeding as planned; while with UNICEF, the contract did not materialize due to higher prices for the items and the difficulty in reaching an agreement on the items themselves. For future projects, the best approach would be to negotiate with the UN agency during the project preparation and negotiations stage, as part of the readiness filter for implementation.
129. **Coordination with other donors:** The project enjoyed a close coordination with other donors, as the Bank is part of the Local Education Group led by UNICEF as the coordinating agency. Moreover, the leadership of the MoE, which had the capacity to invite all donors to meet regularly, significantly improved the exchanges of ideas and set up the platform for new Sector Strategy discussions. Coordination between donors is key, but including Government in the same forum triggers a more efficient approach to resolving issues in a coordinated way.



130. **Home Grown School Feeding pilot (HGSF):** During preparation, it was decided to introduce a pilot on school feeding that relied on local farmers' markets to reduce imports through the WFP. This pilot was to research the real prospects of finding the variety of agricultural products and other commodities required within the country, particularly those reasonably accessible to the southern areas that periodically face serious and worsening climatic problems. The pilot was implemented, although with delays and only in the last year of the project. This was a new and innovative approach that needed time to recruit the necessary technical assistance and to sensitize stakeholders. For that reason, it was not appropriate for an emergency operation. For emergency projects, it is better to focus on the current complex challenges affecting people without introducing new challenges that must be addressed in the same short timeframe.
131. **Internal audit:** A valuable support was provided by the internal audit team of the PIU in the follow up of decentralized activities. The team also contributed as counsel in important cases during implementation, such as the analysis of payment providers' options and finding a resolution to delays in important debtor balances justification. A key lesson of this project is the important role played by such a team. In addition to external audit as per the Legal Agreement, all projects should have an internal audit team to address issues of organization or dysfunctional financial matters on a daily basis and make recommendations to the Project Coordinator/Manager to improve implementation and reduce financial risk.
132. **Community approach:** The community approach was implemented in a very short period of time, and at a very low cost, allowing for the introduction (at MTR) of an additional construction subprogram. This approach also allowed for community capacity building (through a Grassroots Management Training program developed by MoE). As a result, the MoE has now incorporated the Community Empowerment approach as one of the key implementation approaches in the 10-year PSE (2018-2022) and incorporated the approach in the recently approved IDA-GPE-financed BESP. The Ministry is currently streamlining the ex-UAT capacity within the regular Construction Directorate (DPFI). None of this would have been achieved if a small construction component had not been included in the ESEFP project. Given such positive results, the community approach for primary school construction should be the preferred option in all new operations in the education sector.
133. **Simple design:** The simple design of the project and its explicit focus on the main issues during the crisis helped facilitate the implementation of the project. However, due to the Mid-Term Review process from the GPE board, which took from March to May 2016, it is important to review the timeline to make it consistent with the IDA process.



ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS

A. RESULTS INDICATORS

A.1 PDO Indicators

Objective/Outcome: Preserve access to primary education

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Direct project beneficiaries	Number	0.00 28-Feb-2013	1935963.00 16-Oct-2013	2011070.00 25-May-2017	2098474.00 31-Dec-2017
Female beneficiaries	Percentage	0.00 28-Feb-2013	50.00 16-Oct-2013	0.00 25-May-2017	49.00 31-Dec-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): The target value was exceeded.					

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Students enrolled in primary schools in project areas, including by gender	Number	1773609.00 28-Feb-2013	1816560.00 16-Oct-2013	1864356.00 25-May-2017	1965452.00 31-Dec-2017
Female students enrolled in	Number	867497.00	888505.00	913534.00	964928.00



primary schools in project areas		28-Feb-2013	16-Oct-2013	25-May-2017	31-Dec-2017
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Comments (achievements against targets): The target value was exceeded.

Objective/Outcome: Improve the teaching and learning environment

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of additional classrooms built or rehabilitated at the primary level resulting from project interventions.	Number	0.00 28-Feb-2013	200.00 16-Oct-2013	266.00 25-May-2017	266.00 31-Dec-2017

Comments (achievements against targets): The target value was achieved.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of community (FRAM) teachers benefiting from training in key basic competencies provided by the project (disaggregated by gender)	Number	0.00 28-Feb-2013	10000.00 16-Oct-2013	54184.00 25-May-2017	52907.00 31-Dec-2017
Female community teachers benefiting from training in key basic competencies	Number	0.00 28-Feb-2013	0.00 16-Oct-2013	3250.00 25-May-2017	1991.00 31-Dec-2017



provided by the project

Comments (achievements against targets): The targeted number of female community teachers certified to be in service paid has not been defined in the initial PAD. It is set at 0 here.

The number of trained teachers is reported cumulatively. The number of female teachers trained is reported yearly though. Indeed, the lack of data regarding trained female teachers for the first wave of training made it impossible to report the data cumulatively.

A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators

Component: Facilitating access to and retention in Primary Education by reducing the cost of schooling borne by families

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of community teachers certified to be in service paid	Number	19503.00 28-Feb-2013	23798.00 16-Oct-2013	16841.00 19-May-2016	16117.00 31-Dec-2017
Number of female community teachers certified to be in service paid (Percentage, Custom Supplement)	Percentage	49.00 28-Feb-2013	50.00 16-Oct-2013	19-May-2016	53.00 31-Dec-2017

Comments (achievements against targets): At completion, a proportion of the community teachers were recruited as civil servant teachers, hence they do not get paid by the project anymore. This explains the gap between target and actual achieved at completion.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
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Number of school kits distributed	Number	1784251.00	1816560.00	0.00	5180576.00
		28-Feb-2013	16-Oct-2013	19-May-2016	31-Dec-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): The formally revised target is 0 since the project did not support the distribution of school kits during the last year of implementation (the indicator is not cumulative). The actual achieved at completion reports the total number of school kits distributed during the project.					

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of children benefiting from school feeding activities	Number	0.00	83065.00	140214.00	113303.00
		28-Feb-2013	16-Oct-2013	19-May-2016	31-Dec-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): The original target value was exceeded.					

Component: Supporting the learning process by improving the teaching and learning Environment

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Percentage of teachers using new teaching methods	Percentage	0.00	75.00	40.00	49.40
		28-Feb-2013	16-Oct-2013	19-May-2016	31-Dec-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): The revised target value was exceeded.					

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised	Actual Achieved at
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				Target	Completion
Change in learning achievements	Text	0 28-Feb-2013	Significant 16-Oct-2013		Significant 31-Dec-2017

Comments (achievements against targets): The indicator is obtained by testing two groups of students : those whose teachers have been trained (treated group) and those whose teachers have not been trained (control group). Tests are administered twice : at the beginning and at the end of the school year. For both groups, the score difference between the two tests is measured. Then, we look whether the difference is more important in the treated group. "Significant" here means that the difference of the score differences of the two groups is statistically significant. (Difference-in-differences method).

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Textbook-pupil ratios in schools in targeted areas	Text	1st grade: 1/33 2nd grade: 1/25 3rd grade: 1/20 4th grade: 1/20 5th grade: 1/14 31-Dec-2015	1st grade: 1/2 2nd grade: 1/2 3rd grade: 1/2 4th grade: 1/2 5th grade: 1/2 19-Jan-2016		1st grade: 1/2 2nd grade: 1/2 3rd grade: 1/2 4th grade: 1/2 5th grade: 1/2 31-Dec-2017

Comments (achievements against targets): The target value was achieved.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Percentage of schools in	Percentage	30.00	75.00		55.00



targeted areas visited by pedagogic advisors		31-Dec-2015	19-Jan-2016		31-Dec-2017
Comments (achievements against targets):					
Component: Strengthening the foundations of the Primary Education System by rebuilding stakeholders' capacity and improving community participation and transparency					
Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of parents' associations/school management committees trained in social accountability tools	Number	0.00 28-Feb-2013	600.00 16-Oct-2013		603.00 31-Dec-2017
Percentage of trained schools having a school report card	Percentage	0.00 28-Feb-2013	90.00		100.00 31-Dec-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): The percentage of trained schools having a school report card is an indicator defined on the may 19, 2016 restructuration. Hence, the original target here refers to that date.					
Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Availability of long-term (5-year) Education Sector Plan	Text	-	Final and consultations		The ESP is finalized



		28-Feb-2013	16-Oct-2013		31-Dec-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): The target value was achieved.					

Unlinked Indicators

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of schools receiving school grants funded by the project	Number	0.00	11092.00	12200.00	12237.00
		28-Feb-2013	16-Oct-2013	25-May-2017	31-Dec-2017
Comments (achievements against targets): The target value was exceeded.					



B. KEY OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT

Objective/Outcome 1	
Outcome Indicators	1. Students enrolled in primary schools in project
Intermediate Results Indicators	1. Number of community teachers certified to be in service paid 2. Number of school kits distributed
Key Outputs by Component (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 1)	1. Subsidized community teachers 2. School kits available to children
Objective/Outcome 2	
Outcome Indicators	1. Number of classrooms built or rehabilitated at the primary level resulting from project interventions 2. Number of community (FRAM) teachers benefitting from training in key basic competencies provided by the project
Intermediate Results Indicators	1. Number of schools receiving school grants funded by the project 2. Number of children benefitting from school feeding activities 3. Percentage of teachers using new teaching methods 4. Change in learning achievements 5. Textbook-pupil ratio in schools in targeted areas
Key Outputs by Component (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 2)	1. Trained teachers and school directors 2. Schools subsidized 3. Classrooms built 4. Students benefiting from school feeding.

**ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION****A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS**

Name	Role
Preparation	
Supervision/ICR	
Rary Adria Rakotoarivony	Task Team Leader(s)
Sylvain Auguste Rambeloson, Rahmoune Essalhi, Miarana Heriniana Aime Razaf	Procurement Specialist(s)
Maharavo Harimandimby Ramarotahiantsoa	Financial Management Specialist
Christopher Willoughby	Team Member
Rondro Malanto Rajaobelison	Team Member
Christian A. Rey	Team Member
Serge Theunynck	Team Member
Rosario Aristorenas	Team Member
Enagnon Ernest Eric Adda	Team Member
Paul-Jean Feno	Environmental Safeguards Specialist
Peter F. B. A. Lafere	Social Development Specialist
Andrianjaka Rado Razafimandimby	Social Development Specialist
Celia A Dos Santos Faias	Team Member
Jean Emmanuel Bui	Team Member
Ousmane Togou	Team Member
Vincent Bontoux	Tema member
Bodomalala Sehenarisoa Rabarijohn	Team Member
Rija Lalaina Andriantavison	Team Member
Landiniaina Angelina Rakotonalina	Team Member

**B. STAFF TIME AND COST**

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost	
	No. of staff weeks	US\$ (including travel and consultant costs)
Preparation		
FY13	13.136	231,271.42
FY14	10.625	90,654.23
FY15	0	353.95
Total	23.76	322,279.60
Supervision/ICR		
FY14	14.313	119,442.05
FY15	23.655	188,323.19
FY16	24.595	189,080.45
FY17	34.798	277,378.13
FY18	30.762	173,312.95
Total	128.12	947,536.77

**ANNEX 3. PROJECT COSTBY COMPONENT**

Component 1: Facilitating access to and retention in primary education by reducing the costs of schooling borne by families	37.20	35.22	41%
Component 2: Supporting the learning process by improving the teaching and learning environment	35.90	40.73	48%
Component 3: Strengthening the foundations of the primary education system by rebuilding stakeholders' capacity and improving community participation and transparency	8.30	9.40	11%
Total	81.40	85.35	
Non-allocated	4.00		
Total	85.40	85.35	99.9%




ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS

Context

1. This project was implemented from 2014 to 2017, in response to the political crisis of 2009, that affected the ability of households to cover for the increasing costs of education and negatively impacted enrollment. The main objective was to preserve access to primary education while improving the teaching and learning environment in targeted areas.
2. The full set of interventions benefited 12 out of the 22 regions in Madagascar, and included subsidies to community teacher salaries, provision of school kits, teacher training, school grants, school infrastructure improvements, and school feeding activities, as well as support to planning and monitoring of activities and capacity building to improve transparency and accountability.
3. These 12 regions were selected to ensure complementarity and to avoid overlap with other donor interventions. The figure below shows the actual enrollment numbers observed in the regions that received the full set of interventions from the Emergency Project compared to the total enrollment in the other regions. It is observed that for the period before the political crisis – 2006 to 2009, the annual growth in enrollment was already smaller for the 12 regions participating in the Emergency project, a 5 percent annual growth rate compared to 8.9 percent in the other regions.

Figure 1. Actual enrollment in primary education, by participation in Emergency Project (in thousands)



Source : Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale – Madagascar.

4. For the years after the crisis until the start of the project implementation, intervened regions presented a negative annual growth rate (close to zero) while others still presented increased enrollment, but at a much slower rate, minus 0.26 percent versus 2.4 percent, respectively. After the project implementation, for the period from 2014 to 2017, the growth in enrollment is higher in the



Emergency project regions, at 3.85 percent annually, while others start growing at 1.9 percent.

Economic Analysis

5. The project supported several interventions in the education sector aimed at preserving access to primary education and improving the teaching and learning environment. The economic analysis is linked to the PDO and refers to the number of children that were enrolled in the system despite the crisis due to the support of the project. It is assumed that project's interventions increased school participation.
6. During the crisis period, access to primary education was severely affected by families' inability to pay the rising out-of-pocket costs resulting from sharp cuts in public spending. In addition, the learning and teaching environments deteriorated rapidly due to the massive increase of unqualified community teachers, who have little to no training and led to a decrease in learning. Project interventions included: (1) subsidies to community teacher salaries; (2) provision of school kits to pupils; (3) key training activities for community teachers; (4) school grants for regular purchase of small supplies; (5) school feeding activities in areas with severe food insecurity; (6) school infrastructure improvements.

Impact of Project Interventions


7. Estimating the impact of the project is challenging, as there are different components that complement each other. A review of studies covering 52 low-income countries – 21 in SSA – from 1990 to 2015 shows that some interventions are more effective in promoting enrollment and attendance while others have a higher impact on learning (Snilstveit et al., 2015 *apud* Bashir et al., 2018)⁷⁸.

⁷ Snilstveit, B., J. Stevenson, D. Phillips, M. Vojtkova, E. Gallagher, T. Schmidt, H. Jobse, M. Geelen, M. Pastorello, and J. Evers. 2015. Interventions for improving learning outcomes and access to education in low- and middle-income countries: a systematic review, 3ie Systematic Review 24. London: International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie).

⁸ Bashir, S., M. Lockheed, E. Ninan, and J. P. Tan. 2018. Facing Forward: Schooling for Learning in Africa. Washington DC: World Bank Group.



Figure 2. Interventions that improve student enrollment, low- and middle-income countries



Source : Snilstveit et al. (2015) *apud* Bashir et al. (2018).

8. In order to evaluate the impact of the projects' interventions, the actual enrollment numbers are compared with the status quo, i. e. what would have happened in the absence of the project. The analysis is based on the Education Management Information System (EMIS) data, for the period immediately before and during project implementation.

Counterfactual

9. The benefits of the project interventions were estimated using the PDO indicator on "The number of students enrolled in primary schools in the targeted regions". The objective was to capture to what extent the project interventions (i) preserved access to primary education by building/rehabilitating classrooms, paying community teachers subsidies, distributing school kits and (ii) improved the teaching and learning environment by training community teachers, providing school grants and supporting school feeding.
10. To estimate the impact on children's participation in school attributable to the project, the difference was calculated between the observed number of children enrolled in primary school (number of children enrolled in years 2014-17) and the number of children that would have been enrolled had the project not been implemented (number of children enrolled under the counterfactual scenario). The counterfactual scenario was estimated using the following assumptions:
 - In the absence of the project, the number of children enrolled in each region would have increased at the same rate observed in the other regions not supported by the project from 2014 to 2016. This reference period is used since interventions in other regions begun in 2016. We consider that up until 2016, the increases in enrollment are independent of the project interventions.



- In 2016, five other regions received school kits. As these are regions were part of another project – PAUSENS – we assumed the impact of these kits on children enrollment is negligible. Indeed, 2016 is the only year when school kits were distributed in those regions, and is difficult to separate its impact from other ongoing interventions.
- From the literature, increases in enrollment rates due to school feeding activities is assumed to reach 14 percent. This value has been used to estimate the counterfactual enrollment numbers for the 3 regions that benefited from the school feeding activities.

Table 1. Estimated Project's Impact on the Number of Children Enrolled in Primary School, by Regions

Emergency Project	2013-2014	2014-2015	2015-2016	2016-2017
ALAO TRA MANGORO	577	1395	449	12616
ANALAMANGA ⁹	-6278	-10859	-12713	-7086
ATSINANANA	1917	5283	9656	25396
BETSIBOKA	4825	6537	6563	11858
BOENY	-2336	7386	9138	22007
BONGOLAVA	3649	3885	5982	15633
DIANA	6309	13429	15680	21282
IHOROMBE	4452	14179	14669	16518
ITASY	1077	-429	-1675	8397
MELAKY	4531	10390	9723	14499
SOFIA	2808	14759	18703	30095
VAKINANKARATRA	-3202	-1821	2472	23336
Additional enrollment	18330	64133	78646	194550
School Feeding Activities	2013-2014	2014-2015	2015-2016	2016-2017
ANDROY	19967	21823	23375	23758
ANOSY	14114	14651	14354	14810
ATSIMO ANDREFANA	30556	32538	30464	32174
Additional enrollment	64637	69011	68194	70741

Costs

- The costs include all the resources added to the system, or the entire amount of the project costs. These amount for the actual total disbursement of US\$85.35 million, during the period from 2014 to 2018.

Benefits

⁹In Analamanga, the actual number of children enrolled is below the estimated counterfactual. It is important to notice that the annual growth in enrollment was smaller in the 12 regions from project during the period after the crisis and before the start of the project implementation. However, instead of extrapolating these trends, the annual growth observed in the other regions, from 2014 to 2016, was used to build the counterfactual. These numbers should be considered a conservative estimate of the actual impact, but preferred as they reflect the any expected recovering trends in enrollment after the crisis ended in 2014.



12. It is assumed that the increase in primary school enrollment over the project implementation years brings economic benefits to the target children through the increase in their future potential income. Benefits yielded from the interventions were measured in terms of preserved increases in wages. The average **national** monthly wage of 151,000 Ariary is used as the reference wage¹⁰, or US\$810 per year. The economic return to one additional year of schooling is 11.4 percent in Madagascar (Montenegro and Patrinos, 2014)¹¹, which results in an expected increase of US\$92 in annual wages for an additional year of schooling.
13. The estimated model also assumes that students who benefited from the project will enter the workforce at age 18 and will retire at age 60 (after 42 years of work). Based on the average annual projections for the 2018-2022 period¹², it is assumed that there will be economic growth equal to 2.4 percent, used as an estimate of wage growth. Finally, a discount rate of 9.5 percent is used, which is the current interest rate from the Madagascar Central Bank

Results

14. Under the baseline scenario considered in this analysis, the Emergency Project yields a ratio of benefits to costs of 6.1, suggesting that for every dollar invested, the project yields an economic return of 6.1 dollars. The initial investment of US\$85.4 million generates economic benefits with a net present value of US\$340 million. The internal rate of return is 12 percent, which is significantly higher than the current costs of capital in Madagascar (9.5 percent).

Limitations

15. The PDO aims at improving the quality of the education service provided as well, however, these are not captured in this analysis. The indicators of the results framework suggest that overall quality has improved, which may lead to further economic benefits. Also, additional gains related to improved health, reduction in criminality, or increase in political participation have not been taken into account. The results presented in this section have to be considered as a lower bound estimate. Finally, all the costs and benefits estimated for all the other interventions in the project regions were assumed to result from the Bank-funded Emergency Project.

Sensitivity Analysis

16. This analysis is based on several assumptions that can be modified to check the robustness of results. Alternative values for some key parameters were used and results are summarized below. In order to capture the uncertainty in economic growth, especially in a country with considerable political instability, more conservative assumptions of no economic growth and a higher discount rate were considered. For a scenario with no economic growth – no growth in per capita GDP – the benefit/cost ratio was estimated in 3.7, for an IRR of 9 percent. In the case where a higher discount rate of 12 percent is used, the benefit/cost ratio is 4.0, for an IRR of 10 percent. Under weaker restrictions in the

¹⁰ INSTAT/ENSOMD 2012-2013, available in the Education Sector Plan 2017-2022.

¹¹ Montenegro, C. E., and H. A. Patrinos. 2014. Comparable estimates of returns to schooling around the world. Policy Research Working Paper, no. WPS 7020. Washington DC: World Bank Group.

¹² WB estimates, 2018



key assumptions, the estimated economic return was higher. Assuming the economy would grow at the WB-forecasted rate of 4.9 percent over the time 2016-2022, and drop to 2.2 percent afterwards, the benefit/cost ratio was estimated in 7, and the IRR in 13 percent. For a lower discount rate at 5 percent (commonly used for cost-benefit analysis), the benefit/cost ratio was estimated in 15.8, for an IRR of 17 percent.

Table 2. Results from sensitivity analyses

	Benefit/Cost Ratio	IRR	NPV
Baseline scenario	6.1	12%	US\$340 M
Discount rate			
Alternative value (5%)	15.8	17%	US\$1101 M
Alternative value (12%)	4.0	10%	US\$187 M
GDP growth			
No growth rate in per capita GDP	3.7	9%	US\$177 M
Growth rate 2016-2022 (4.9%)	7.0	13%	US\$402 M

Financial Analysis

17. The total value allocated to education was available in the Education Sector Plan 2017-2022, including the value of current expenditures (operational costs and salaries) and investments. The project's annual investment represented a sizable share of the government budget for education. The maximum impact of the project on the total educational budget was estimated in 11 percent in 2016.

Table 3. Financial impact of the project

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
In billions of Ariary					
Current expenditures	674	680	761	959	1039
Investments	40	40	67	119	152
Total budget allocated to education	714	720	828	1078	1191
In millions of dollars					
Current expenditures	209	210	236	297	322
Total budget allocated to education	221	223	256	334	369
In millions of dollars					
Project disbursements	13.0	20.1	28.4	22.3	1.4
As % of current expenditures	6.2%	9.5%	12.1%	7.5%	0.44%
As % of total budget	5.9%	9.0%	11.1%	6.7%	0.38%

Source: Own calculations based on project costs and education budget from Education Sector Plan.



ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS

The ICR was shared with the client and the development partners.

The Coordinator of the UAT and the Ministry of Education:

- Agreed with the ratings of outcome achievement;
- Agreed with the descriptions of the key factors that affected project implementation;
- Concurred the fact that the achievements of the project form a solid basis for future educational projects.



ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

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ANNEX 7. SUMMARY OF CLIENT'S IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION & RESULTS REPORT (ICR)

**RAPPORT D'ÉVALUATION FINALE
EXTERNE
DU PROJET D'APPUI D'URGENCE AU
PROGRAMME DE L'ÉDUCATION POUR
TOUS - PAUET
*LIVRABLE 3***

VERSION DEFINITIVE

Don GPE No. TF015607 - P132616

**UAT - EPT
UNITE d'APPUI TECHNIQUE au PROGRAMME
ÉDUCATION POUR TOUS**

Auteur : Edeny ANDRIAMIZANA

Décembre 2017

Ce rapport d'évaluation externe a été produit à la demande de l'UAT-EPT / MEN sur financement du Partenariat Mondial pour l'Éducation (GPE). Les commentaires contenus dans ce rapport ne reflètent que les opinions de l'évaluateur.



RESUME EXECUTIF

Le projet

1. Le PROJET D'APPUI D'URGENCE A L'EDUCATION POUR TOUS (PAUET) a fait l'objet d'un accord de don signé entre le gouvernement de Madagascar et l'Association Internationale de Développement, agissant en qualité d'Administrateur du Fonds du Partenariat mondial pour l'éducation (GPE) d'un montant équivalent à 85,4 millions de dollars US. Le projet est mis en œuvre dans le territoire national depuis le 22 janvier 2014 et la date de clôture initiale a été le 1^{er} juin 2017, mais après restructuration, la mise en œuvre s'est étalée jusqu'au fin décembre 2017. Le projet est mis en œuvre au niveau des 12 régions, à savoir, Alaotra Mangoro, Analamanga, Atsinanana, Betsiboka, Boeny, Bongolava, Diana, Ihorombe, Itasy, Melaky Sofia, Vakinankaratra. En outre, 3 autres régions se trouvant dans les zones les plus vulnérables du Sud dont Anosy, Androy, et Atsimo Andrefana sont aussi concernées à travers les activités d'alimentation scolaire.

2. Cet exercice d'évaluation a pour objectif de dégager des résultats qui vont permettre aux différentes parties prenantes incluant le MEN et ses différents partenaires dans le secteur éducation de prendre des décisions pour mieux orienter les interventions dans le futur. Les enseignements qui y sont tirés seront partagés avec les autres agences dans le secteur pour la consolidation de leurs interventions.

3. Les principales activités concernent :

Composante 1 : Faciliter l'accès et le maintien dans l'enseignement primaire en réduisant les coûts de scolarité supportés par les familles

- (i) Les Subvention aux salaires des ENFs
- (ii) Les fournitures de kits scolaires afin d'alléger entre autres les charges des familles

Composante 2 : appui au processus d'apprentissage par l'amélioration de l'environnement d'enseignement et d'apprentissage

- (iii) le renforcement de la formation et des compétences des enseignants ;
- (iv) la dotation de Subvention aux écoles pour alléger les charges de fonctionnement des écoles
- (v) les activités d'alimentation scolaire à travers l'octroi de repas aux enfants des écoles primaires dans les zones ciblées
- (vi) l'amélioration des infrastructures scolaires à travers l'octroi de subventions de construction de salles de classe aux comités scolaires pour le financement des travaux, équipements et coûts et frais liés à la gestion des subventions de construction.

Composante 3 : Renforcement des fondations du système de l'éducation primaire en reconstruisant les capacités des parties prenantes et en améliorant la participation communautaire et la transparence

- (vii) le renforcement institutionnel des acteurs du système éducatif primaire en matière de planification et de suivi, la préparation du plan sectoriel de l'éducation
- (viii) la participation communautaire dans la gestion des écoles et le contrôle du rendement scolaire;
- (ix) Gestion du projet y compris le suivi-évaluation.

4. Grâce à la surliquidité après les 2 années de mise en œuvre, certains indicateurs de résultats et d'activités ont été révisés à l'issue de la revue à mi-parcours.

5. Les principales déductions, conclusions et recommandations

6. Globalement, le projet a obtenu la plupart des objectifs de développement définis au départ. Certains objectifs ont été même largement dépassés. Il en est ainsi quant aux indicateurs mentionnés dans le cadre de résultats. Compte tenu du contexte particulier de crise gouvernementale dans lequel le projet est mis en œuvre, les services fournis par le projet ont permis de préserver l'accès à l'enseignement primaire et en même temps d'améliorer les conditions d'enseignement et d'apprentissage.



- Les ressources sont gérées à bon escient grâce aux différents spécialistes et chargés d'étude affectés au projet dont le suivi-évaluation, la passation de marché, le contrôle financier, la construction, le renforcement de capacités institutionnelles...

12. Toutefois, les retards constatés lors des octrois ont parfois affecté cette performance.

13. En termes d'impacts potentiels, les consultations ont fait ressortir que le niveau d'impacts est satisfaisant. En effet, il est maintes fois évoqué que la fréquentation et les réussites scolaires sont améliorées grâce aux aides. Les enfants non scolarisés sont devenus demandeurs de services et sont venus s'inscrire et augmenter les effectifs. Entre 2012/13 et 2016/17, le taux brut de scolarisation a augmenté de 37,3% au niveau de la préscolaire et de 150,6% au niveau du primaire. De la même manière, les parents parviennent à développer d'autres activités améliorant leurs conditions de vie grâce aux économies dues à l'allègement des frais à payer pour l'éducation des enfants (frais de scolarité, subventions des ENFs, fonctionnement et réhabilitation des établissements scolaires). A ce même titre, les relations entre personnels enseignants et les parents sont nettement améliorées au vu des résultats qu'ils ont acquis pour le compte de l'école. Par ailleurs, des facteurs externes comme l'enclavement et l'insécurité limitent les impacts dans quelques localités.

14. En termes de durabilité, à priori, la durabilité du projet est partiellement assurée par le fait qu'actuellement, dans le cadre du processus de préparation du nouveau plan sectoriel de l'éducation, le Ministère de l'Education Nationale (MEN) appuyé par ses différents partenaires est en train de préparer un nouveau document de projet envisageant la continuité des efforts entrepris dans le secteur.

15. Sans cela, la majorité des acteurs communautaires ont émis beaucoup de soucis du retour en arrière et de la perte des avancées enregistrées jusque là. En dépit de l'amélioration du niveau d'appropriation et de la participation communautaire dans la gestion des écoles, l'évaluation a trouvé que le niveau de maturité institutionnelle est encore faible. Donc, cette performance est exposée à cette limite.

16. En conclusion, il est démontré que le projet répond effectivement aux besoins de la population et du pays. Plusieurs avancées ont pu être enregistrées. Le projet poursuit toujours un long et difficile défi en matière d'éducation primaire. Pour ne pas faire marche arrière, plusieurs hypothèses sont à surveiller notamment en matière de stabilité politique à l'instar des crises antérieures, il y a également la marche progressive vers l'adoption de la réforme de l'éducation primaire qui requiert la contribution de tous, allant des parents, des personnels éducatifs jusqu'aux décideurs et partenaires stratégiques.

17. Recommandations principales

- Poursuivre les appuis aux écoles sous ses formes actuelles avec une visée de couverture nationale pour ne pas nuire aux efforts et résultats déjà obtenus ;
- Multiplier les efforts au niveau des chaînes des acteurs responsables pour rendre encore plus efficaces et satisfaisants les appuis du projet :
 - Renforcer les moyens de l'Etat permettant de recruter tous les ENF sinon accorder une subvention aux ENF non bénéficiaires et les doter de moyens appropriés contribuant à l'accomplissement de leurs responsabilités ;
 - Accorder davantage de temps pour l'amélioration de la répartition des kits scolaires ;
 - Augmenter le montant de la SAE pour mieux répondre aux besoins de réparation voire de réhabilitation au sein des établissements scolaires ;
 - Etudier la possibilité d'extension du budget alloué aux actions de suivi et d'encadrement pédagogique ;
 - Etudier la collaboration avec les Organisations de la Société Civile (OSC) notamment en matière de suivi des dotations aux écoles.
- (Ré)Etudier l'installation de nouvelles cantines scolaires et le renforcement des existants afin d'éviter la migration des familles vers les écoles bénéficiaires d'appuis;



- Augmenter le nombre des nouvelles constructions suivant les normes internationales tout en veillant à l'adéquation avec l'effectif des élèves et aussi des enseignants – une étude périodique des besoins et des renforcements de capacité de gestion des communautés locales s'imposent ;
- Poursuivre le renforcement de capacité et l'autonomisation des acteurs communautaires en matière de gestion des établissements scolaires et des enseignants
 - Renforcer l'application de la convention tripartite entre parents, enseignants et FEFFI en termes de gestion des ressources et gestion pédagogique dont l'absence fréquente des élèves
 - Intercaler la période de formation de longue durée pour une meilleure assimilation.

ANNEX 8. MAP OF PROJECT REGIONS OF INTERVENTION

