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What Matters Most for
School Autonomy and Accountability:
A Framework Paper

Systems Approach for Better Education Results
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What Matters Most for School Autonomy and Accountability: A Framework Paper

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Acronyms

| | |
|--------|---|
| AAA | Autonomy, Assessment, and Accountability |
| BOS | Bantuan Operasional Sekolah |
| CMS | Community-Managed Schools |
| DCI | Data Collection Instrument |
| EDUCO | Educación con Participación de la Comunidad |
| EMIS | Education Management Information System |
| ETP | Extra Teacher Program |
| OECD | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development |
| PEC | Programa Escuelas de Calidad |
| PACE-A | Partnership for Advancing Community-based Education-Afghanistan |
| PISA | Program for International Student Assessment |
| SAA | School Autonomy and Accountability |
| SIPs | School Improvement Plans |
| SBM | School-Based Management |
| SABER | Systems Approach for Better Education Results |

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Abstract

This paper provides an overview of what matters most for school autonomy and accountability. The focus is on public schools at the primary and the secondary level. This paper begins by grounding School Autonomy and Accountability in its theoretical evidence base (impact evaluations, lessons learned from experience, and literature reviews) and then discusses guiding principles and tools for analyzing country policy choices. The goal of this paper is to provide a framework for classifying and analyzing education systems around the world according to the following five policy goals that are critical for enabling effective school autonomy and accountability: (1) level of autonomy in the planning and management of the school budget; (2) level of autonomy in personnel management; (3) role of school councils in school governance; (4) school and student assessment, and (5) accountability to stakeholders. This paper also discusses how country context matters to school autonomy and accountability and how balancing policy goals matters to policy making for improved education quality and learning for all.

I. Introduction

Objectives

The objective of this paper is to provide a framework for what matters most in fostering school autonomy and accountability (SAA) and why this is important. The focus is on public schools at the primary and secondary levels. The paper also discusses School Autonomy and Accountability tools for assessing a country's development of policies that provide an enabling environment for SAA. SABER-SAA is one of the instruments that has been developed and tested under [SABER](#), the Systems Approach to Better Education Results, initiative created by the World Bank as part of its education strategy (World Bank 2011b). The application of the policy intent and policy implementation instruments can be important tools for education system reform if they are used as instruments for planning and monitoring the enabling conditions for improving system performance.

This paper begins by providing a short background on decentralization and its relationship to the education sector through SAA. It then provides the case for school autonomy and accountability and introduces the conceptual framework for SAA. Next, it grounds SAA in its theoretical evidence base and discusses the guiding principles and tools for analyzing country policy choices. A goal of the paper is to provide a framework for classifying and analyzing education systems around the world according to the following five policy goals that are critical for enabling effective school autonomy and accountability: (1) level of autonomy in the planning and management of the school budget; (2) level of autonomy in personnel management; (3) role of school councils in school governance; (4) school and student assessment, and (5) accountability to stakeholders. This paper also discusses how country context matters to school autonomy and accountability and how balancing policy goals matters to policy making for improved education quality and learning for all.

Decentralization and Education

In matters of governance, decentralization is seen as an appealing alternative to the centralized state given the range of benefits associated with this approach. It is regarded as a way to: (i) introduce more intergovernmental competition and checks and balances; (ii) make government more responsive and efficient in service delivery, (iii) diffuse social and political tensions and ensure local and political autonomy (Bardhan 2002). Decentralization can help ease decision-making bottlenecks that are caused by central government planning and control of important economic and social activities. It can also help simplify complex bureaucratic procedures and increase sensitivity to local conditions and needs, by placing more control at the local level where needs are best known. With decentralization, the impact will depend on the many factors related to design. Similar to other policy issues that are complicated, the outcome will depend on a myriad of individual political, fiscal, and administrative policies and institutions as well as their interaction within a given country (Litvak and Seddon 1999; Bardhan 2002). At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that structures of local accountability may not be in place in developing countries and "capture" by local elites may frustrate the goal of quality and equitable public service delivery. To be effective, decentralization must attempt to change existing structures of power within communities, improve opportunities for participation and voice, and engage all citizens including the poor or disadvantaged in the process (Bardhan 2002).

There seems to be a consensus since the 1980s, that too much centralization or, conversely, absolute local autonomy are both harmful and that it is necessary to put in place a better system of collaboration between the national, regional and local centers of decision-making. For decentralizing education

systems, the process requires strong political commitment and leadership in order to succeed (McLean and King 1999). Countries around the world have been experimenting with some form of education decentralization. It has become central to education policy. Initial evidence indicates that decentralization to subnational governments may be insufficient, and in order to improve schools and learning, increased autonomy for communities and school actors may be necessary (McLean and King 1999). A way to decentralize decision-making power in education from the central government to the school level is known as school-based management (SBM) (Caldwell 2005; Barrera, Fasih and Patrinos 2009).

Decentralized education can help get parents and students closer to the providers of education, ensuring better access to pedagogical and managerial methods more in tune with their needs. However, if such an approach is taken to the limit, it may result in a fragmented education system where standards may be reduced and local community values may become too parochial to benefit society at large (Ritzen, van Domelen and de Vijlder 1997). This paper discusses what matters most for school autonomy and accountability and producing an enabling environment for the intended outcomes.

II. What are School Autonomy and School Accountability?

Improved school management leads to better outcomes. Decentralization, school autonomy and community empowerment have been at the center of the education policy discussions for several decades. We are beginning to understand more and more through a growing body of evidence that higher management quality is strongly associated with better educational outcomes (Bloom et al. 2014). It leads to more efficient schools that have autonomy to make decisions on budget, management, personnel, and everyday items that have an impact on their school environment and learning that is taking place. This includes changing the environment in which decisions about resource allocation are made, where effective school-level decision-making can take place by school-level agents. It also means that those who are taking decisions are accountable to higher levels of authority at the district and central levels but also to the greater school community who all, to some degree, have oversight roles whether they are policy-makers, supervisors or consumers of education services.

School autonomy and accountability are key components of an education system that ensure educational quality. By transferring core managerial responsibilities to schools, school autonomy fosters local accountability; helps reflect local priorities, values, and needs through increased participation of parents and the community; and gives teachers the opportunity to establish a personal commitment to students and their parents. Increased school autonomy and improved accountability are necessary conditions for improved learning because they align teacher and parent incentives (Bruns, Filmer and Patrinos 2011). Studies have shown a clear causal link between school autonomy and efficiency in resource use (Barrera et al. 2009). Viewed in this context, school autonomy and accountability should be considered essential components of an overall strategy for improving learning outcomes. Benchmarking and monitoring indicators of school autonomy and accountability allows a country to rapidly assess its education system, thus setting the stage for improving policy planning and implementation. To be clear on what is meant by school autonomy and accountability in this paper see definitions in Box 1.

Box 1. What are School Autonomy and Accountability?

School autonomy is a form of school management in which schools are given decision-making authority over their operations, including the hiring and firing of personnel, and the assessment of teachers and pedagogical practices. School management under autonomy may give an important role to the School Council, representing the interests of parents, in budget planning and approval, as well as a voice/vote in personnel decisions. By including the School Council in school management, school autonomy fosters accountability (Di Gropello 2004, 2006; Barrera, Fasih and Patrinos 2009).

In its basic form **accountability** is defined as the acceptance of responsibility and being answerable for one's actions. In school management, accountability may take other additional meanings: (i) the act of compliance with the rules and regulations of school governance; (ii) reporting to those with oversight authority over the school; and (iii) linking rewards and sanctions to expected results (Heim 1996; Rechebei 2010).

To be effective, school autonomy must function on the basis of compatible incentives, taking into account national education policies including incentives for the implementation of those policies. Having more managerial responsibilities at the school level automatically implies that a school must also be accountable to local stakeholders as well as national and local authorities. The empirical evidence from education systems in which schools enjoy managerial autonomy is that autonomy is beneficial for restoring the social contract between parents and schools and instrumental in setting in motion policies to improve student learning.

The progression in school autonomy in the last two decades has led to the conceptualization of **School-Based Management (SBM)** as a form of a decentralized education system in which school personnel are in charge of making most managerial decisions, frequently in partnership with parents and the community often through school councils¹ (Barrera, Fasih, and Patrinos 2009). More local control helps create better conditions for improving student learning in a sustainable way since it gives teachers and parents more opportunities to develop common goals, increase their mutual commitment to student learning, and promote more efficient use of scarce school resources.

Types of School-Based Management. In addition to the degree of devolved autonomy provided to the school level, SBM must define who is invested with the decision-making power at the school level. There are four SBM models to help us define this (Barrera-Osorio et al. 2009):

- **Administrative control:** Authority is devolved to the principal. Its aim is to make each school more accountable to the central district. The benefits include increasing efficiency of expenditures on personnel and curriculum and making one person more accountable to the central authority.
- **Professional control:** Teachers hold the main decision-making authority. This model aims to make better use of teachers' knowledge of what the school needs at the classroom level. It can motivate teachers and lead to greater efficiency and effectiveness in teaching.
- **Community-control:** Parents or the community have major decision-making authority. Under this model it is assumed that principals and teachers become more responsive to parents' needs and the curriculum can reflect local needs.

¹ The term "school council" is synonymous with several other terms used around the world, such as school management committee, parent council, school committee, etc. For consistency, this paper will use school council.

- **Balanced control:** Decision-making authority is shared by the principal, teachers and parents. The aims are to take advantage of teachers’ knowledge of the school to improve school management and to make schools more accountable to parents.

Existing models of SBM in real life generally blend the four models. *SBM is not a set of predetermined policies and procedures, but a continuum of activities and policies put into place over time and with contextual sensitivity to improve the functioning of schools, allowing parents and teachers to focus on improvements in learning.* While there is little hard evidence that teacher quality grows as a direct result of SBM, it can be argued that increasing school accountability is a necessary condition for improving teacher quality. Implementing SBM can augment the support that school councils and parents provide to good teachers through various methods including salary and non-salary incentives and establishing the necessary conditions to attract the best teachers (Arcia et al. 2011). As such, SBM can foster a new social contract between teachers and the community in which local cooperation and local accountability drive improvements in professional and personal performance by teachers (Patrinos 2010).

III. Conceptual Framework


While there have been many schools of thought across the different experiences in school autonomy, the principle of accountability was not initially linked with school autonomy (Eurydice 2007). In the mid-1990s, the concept of autonomy with accountability became increasingly important and assumed different forms in different countries. PISA results suggest that when autonomy and accountability are combined, they tend to be associated with better student performance (OECD 2011). The experience of high-performing countries² on PISA indicates that:

- Education systems in which schools have more autonomy over teaching content and student assessment tend to perform better.
- Education systems in which schools have more autonomy over resource allocation and that publish test results perform better than schools with less autonomy.
- Education systems with standardized student assessment tend to do better than those without such assessments.

It was not until almost 10 years after the concept of linking autonomy with accountability started to emerge that the World Development Report 2004 “Making service work for poor people” introduced a conceptual framework for the empowerment of communities. The report highlights the significance of a “short” route of accountability that runs directly from users (e.g. citizens/clients/ communities) to frontline service providers (e.g. schools), in addition to an indirect or “long” route of accountability where users hold service providers accountable through the state (Figure 1). School-based management has been referred to as an effective way to achieve the short route of accountability in the education sector.

² Examples of high performing countries that have implemented school-based management policies and frameworks include the Netherlands, Canada, and New Zealand among others.

Figure 1. The Short and Long Routes to Accountability



Source: Adapted from WDR 2004

This framework illustrates two routes to accountability and applies to any system where the state or politicians set policy and rules – providers of services receive funding and have the mandate to deliver quality services – and the clients or citizens who receive services. The traditional or long route of accountability happens when citizens can formally “voice” their concerns through voting for politicians who most closely are aligned with their ideologies and promise to provide the funding and services that the citizens want (compact).

The shorter route affords clients the power to more frequently provide feedback to providers to let them know how they are doing and to hold them accountable for good quality services. For education, the short route allows for voice and inputs on decision-making at the school level for direct clients who are parents and students. Decision-making at the school level is important and involves a variety of activities. The empirical evidence from SBM shows that it can take many forms or combine many activities (Barrera et al. 2009) with differing degrees of success (see Box 2).

Box 2. Paths to School-Based Management

In many countries the implementation of SBM has increased student enrollment, student and teacher attendance, and parent involvement. However, the empirical evidence from Latin America shows very few cases in which SBM has made a significant difference in learning outcomes (Patrinos 2011), while in Europe there is substantial evidence showing a positive impact of school autonomy on learning (Eurydice 2007). Two approaches to SBM - the grassroots approach taken in Latin America, in contexts where the institutional structure was weak or service delivery was hampered due to internal conflict, and the operational efficiency approach taken in Europe, where institutions were stronger - coincide in applying managerial principles to promote better education quality, but they are driven by two different modes of accountability to parents and the community. In the Latin American model, schools are held accountable through participatory school-based management (Di Gropello 2004) while in the European model accountability is based on trust in schools and their teachers (Arcia, Patrinos, Porta and Macdonald 2011). In either case, school autonomy has begun to transform traditional education from a system based on processes and inputs into one driven by results (Hood 2001).

When do SBM components become critical for learning? When a school or a school system does not function properly, it can be a substantial barrier to success. The managerial component of a school system is a necessary but insufficient condition for learning. One can fix some managerial components and obtain no results or alter other components and get good results. The combination of components crucial for success is still under study, but the evidence to date points to a set of variables that foster managerial **autonomy**, the **assessment** of results, and the use of the assessment to promote **accountability** among all stakeholders (Bruns, Filmer and Patrinos 2011). When these three components are in balance with each other, they form a “closed-loop system” (see Box 3). Visually, it is the closing of a circle of the three interrelated components.

Box 3. Closed-loop systems and SBM

The interrelations between autonomy, assessment, and accountability can be compared to a “closed-loop system”, or one in which feedback constantly informs output. In a closed-loop system, data does not flow one way; instead, it returns to parts of the system to provide new information that dynamically influences results. In the case of SBM, assessment, for example, both enables the autonomy of school councils to make informed decisions about school quality and also allows for accountability at a higher level, which can measure results at the school level and provide support as necessary. In a closed-loop system, all elements in balance are critical to achieving success (Kaplan and Norton 2008).



Defining a managerial system that can achieve closure is conceptually important for school based management, since it transforms its components from a list of managerial activities (Box 4), to a set of interconnected variables that work together to improve system performance. Unless SBM activities contribute to system closure, they are just a collection of isolated managerial decisions. As components of a managerial system, SBM activities may behave as mediating variables: they produce an enabling environment for teachers and students, allowing for pedagogical variables, school inputs, and personal effort to work as intended.


Box 4. Managerial Activities

- ✓ Budgeting, salaries
- ✓ Hiring, transfers
- ✓ Curriculum
- ✓ Infrastructure
- ✓ School grants
- ✓ School calendar
- ✓ Monitoring & Evaluation
- ✓ Dissemination

If an SBM system is unable to close the loop, are partial solutions effective? Yes, schools can still function but their degree of effectiveness and efficiency would be lower than if the system closes the loop. In this regard, ***SBM can achieve closure of the loop when it allows enough autonomy to make informed decisions, evaluate its results and use that information to hold someone accountable.***

Representationally this is captured in the “Three A’s Model.” SBM can achieve balance as a closed-loop system when autonomy, student assessment, and accountability, are operationally interrelated through the functions of their school councils, the policies for improving teacher quality, and Education Management Information Systems (EMIS) (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. The 3 A’s Model as a Closed-loop System



Source: Adapted from Arcia et al. 2011

School councils are crucial for implementing school autonomy because they serve as representatives of the school clients: parents and students. As such, the school council can be a resource to school management in the process of tailoring school services (curricula, teaching materials, school calendar, and teacher selection) to the needs of students. A more active role of school councils in school governance can make school autonomy more effective.

School assessments are the vehicles used by schools to determine their needs for changes in pedagogical practices and to determine the training needs of teachers. The main objective of any assessment system is to monitor learning, which in turn is linked to teacher quality. So for SBM to be a closed-loop system, school and student assessment would need to link to teacher performance and teacher quality.

Finally, an EMIS is integral to accountability because it is the mechanism in place to report on performance indicators at the school and system levels. An EMIS enforces accountability to the extent that it is fed data of good quality and it is used to produce reports that are informative to parents and society about the performance of the education sector. In summary, the interrelation between Autonomy, Assessment, and Accountability (AAA) must be made operational by reinforcing the roles of school councils, policies aimed at improving teacher quality, and the operation of an EMIS. Otherwise, there is a risk that the AAA model may not reach the optimal status as a closed-loop system.

In managerial terms, it is clear that the point of contact between autonomous schools and their clients is primarily through the school council (Corrales 2006). Similarly, school assessments are the vehicles used by schools to determine their needs for changes in pedagogical practices and to determine the training needs of their teachers. Both pedagogical changes and teacher training are determinant factors of teacher quality (Vegas 2001). Finally, the role of EMIS on accountability is well established and makes it easier to report on indicators of internal efficiency and on standardized test scores (Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos 2011).

Evidence

We have discussed what school autonomy and accountability are and that when they are applied together they can be beneficial for improving school efficiency, effectiveness and learning outcomes. Empirical evidence from countries that have implemented school autonomy and accountability suggests that a certain set of policies and practices are effective in fostering managerial autonomy, assessment of results, and the use of assessments to promote accountability (Table 1).


Table 1. Selected experiences with SBM interventions and their impacts

| Country | Program/Project | Authors | Intervention | Results/Findings |
|-------------------------------|--|--|---|--|
| El Salvador | Educación con Participación de la Comunidad (EDUCO) | Jimenez & Sawada 1999, 2003, 2014 | Community associations responsible for administering funds, hiring/firing teachers, monitoring & maintaining infrastructure. | Increases reading scores & decreases absenteeism (1999); Increases retention (2003, 2014) |
| Indonesia | Bantuan Operasional Sekolah (BOS) (School Operational Assistance) | Pradhan et al. 2011. | a) School grant for all schools (school committee develop SIP), b) Training for school committee in planning, budgeting and supporting education quality. c) Democratic election of school committee members, d) Linkage between school committee and village council to enable school committee to mobilize community support. | Positive effect on learning outcomes; increased test scores in language 0.51 standard deviations and math by 0.46 SD. School committee's linkage with village councils and having elected school committee members made positive impact. |
| Kenya | Extra Teacher Program - Peer Effects, PTR, and Teacher Incentives | Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer. 2007 | Training school committees to monitor teacher performance and committee-based hiring of teachers. | Higher student test scores, lower teacher absenteeism, small decrease in student dropout |
| Mexico | Programa Escuelas de Calidad (PEC) (Quality School Program) | Murnane, Willett, and Cardenas. 2006. | Grants provided to public schools to implement 5-year school improvement plans (SIPs) that school staff and community design. Parent associations purchasing supplies and carry out the plans. Training for school principals. | Reduced dropout rate; no effect on repetition |
| | | Skoufias & Shapiro. 2006. | | Decreased dropout, failure, and repetition rates. No measurable impact on outcomes in indigenous schools. |
| | Apoyo a la Gestion Escolar (AGE)(Support to School Management Program) | Gertler, Patrinos, and Rubio-Codina. 2006. | Small grants to parent associations (AGEs); AGEs manage grants (civil works, school equipment, materials for students, pedagogical training, and performance-based incentives for teachers. | Increased participation of parents in monitoring school performance and decision-making. Decreased grade failure and repetition. Positive impact on test scores |
| Lopez-Calva & Espinosa, 2006. | Increased test scores. | | | |

| Country | Program/Project | Authors | Intervention | Results/Findings |
|-------------|---|---|--|---|
| Nepal | Nepal Community Support Project | Chaudhury and Parajuli. 2010. | a) Incentive grants for communities that take over management of government-funded schools; block grants tied to performance for schools; b) Scholarship for out-of school children from poor households, c)Capacity building for SMC, training for teachers in instructional planning & delivery. | (1) Reduction in out-of-school children and repetition rate, (2) Increased equity (disadvantaged castes performed better), (3) Increased student performance (higher avg. in TIMSS science) |
| Philippines | Third Elementary Education Project (TEEP) | Cristina Ling, Nidhi Khattri, Shreyasi Jha. 2010. | a) Introduction of SBM; schools develop (SIP) with parents and the community using student achievement and learning needs data. Annual Implementation Plan (AIP) at beginning of school year and report card shared with the community at end of the school year, b)Training of head teachers in implementation of SIP and AIP, c) School grants for maintenance, training, curriculum development, textbooks and operating expenses based on AIP. | Small, overall positive effect on average school-level test scores. |
| The Gambia | Whole School Development (WSD) | Blimpo and Evans. 2011. | School grant (only in the first year), comprehensive school management-training program to principals, teachers, and representatives of the community; provision of school management manual. | Positive impacts on teacher and student absenteeism, but no impact on student learning |

One key factor to keep in mind is that it takes time to achieve results through SBM. Evidence from the USA based on 232 studies examining school-based management shows that improvements do not become evident until about five years of implementation and not until the eighth year are they substantially significant (Borman et al. 2003) (Figure 3).

Figure 3. SBM implementation - years until full impact of intervention



Source: Borman et al. 2003

Another factor to keep in mind is that there are different depths to what is meant by devolving autonomy and accountability to the school level and different country contexts usually influence the design and composition of SAA reforms. Often school grants are a popular way to provide resources directly to schools, but while they are a mechanism to transfer funds, that alone does not transfer autonomy or decision-making on how those funds are spent, nor does it imply accountability. Some forms of SBM include community schools which are the grassroots method of choice in Central America. Other forms of SBM that take the concepts further are autonomous schools like Australia's Independent Public Schools, US Charter schools and UK Academies.

There are some regional variations in context and emphasis of higher objectives of SAA. In studies from Africa for example, SBM reforms or community participation were often emphasized to meet the increasing demands to access secondary education and quality of education. In Europe and Central Asia, they focused on SAA in order to improve efficiency and quality of service delivery in an environment of a declining school-age population. In East Asia and the Pacific, there is an interest in SAA as part of overall decentralization of governance and an increase in participation at local levels (Takeda, Demas and Shibuya 2014).

Typically, in developing countries seeking to provide better access to education, the first kinds of results experienced as a product of SAA reforms include decrease in absenteeism of students and teachers. This may or may not help increase learning outcomes. Without effective oversight and capacity to take on additional responsibilities at the local level, school councils or parent associations may not be able to understand school and student results enough to know that their schools are underperforming and that school authorities or governments should be held accountable (Mansuri and Rao 2013; Hanushek et al. 2013). The system remains out of balance.

A form of community school SBM where participation is introduced to solve a principal-agent problem is El Salvador's EDUCO³ schools, which started in 1995 to address a gap in provision of education service from the central government after the civil war. The objective was to provide access to school for the poorest and most isolated rural communities. Other goals included supporting community participation in education; improving the quality of pre and primary schooling; and improving school-level management

³ Community Managed Schools Program

administration by allowing communities to identify and manage school priorities. Community associations were trained and given autonomy for administering funds, hiring and firing teachers and monitoring and maintaining infrastructure. As expected the first impact evaluation confirmed decreases in absenteeism. However, it also confirmed that by enhancing community and parental involvement in EDUCO schools, it improved student reading scores in comparison to traditional schools which may have long-term effects on achievement (Jimenez and Sawada 1999). Other evaluations have shown significant increases in retention rates (Jimenez and Sawada 2003; 2014). The increased capacity of parents through training and their involvement in management and oversight in some critical areas helped to foster autonomy with accountability.

While the EDUCO Schools did register some gains for the poor in terms of reading scores, in general the Central American experience with SBM is better known for gains in internal efficiency indicators and less so in learning outcomes. This may be because the contextual nature of these SBM programs emphasized more the administrative and community participation aspects of reform and less on school and student assessment that under the circumstances were better managed by the central technical authority rather than at the school level. Such an approach would not fix deficiencies in teacher knowledge and, by inference, increase learning. In isolation, SAA activities may improve the performance of process variables, such as school attendance, but may yield inconsistent results in terms of gains in test scores. If SAA is considered as a school level system that includes the periodic assessment of teachers and students and the incentives for improving teacher quality, then the impact of SAA activities related to increased autonomy and accountability may yield improved learning more consistently than at present.

A system that has decentralized only some autonomy to schools is the case of Mexico. The PEC Program (*Programa de Escuela con Calidad*), which increased responsibility of parents by involving them in the management of school grants made the most difference in lowering repetition and failure rates in comparison to control schools (Skoufias and Shapiro 2006; Gertler et al. 2006). Targeted training to parents in School Improvement Planning (SIP) and monitoring also significantly increased Spanish and math scores (Lopez-Calva and Espinosa 2006; Arcia, Kattan, Patrinos and Rivera-Olvera 2013). A similar outcome was reported in preliminary results of an impact evaluation of SAA programs in Niger (Kunieda 2014). Targeted training of school management committees in establishing learning goals for their schools and supporting and monitoring them through the SIP registered significant improvements in test scores. Without this targeted training, the SAA programs, while useful, did not record significant increases in learning outcomes at the schools that participated.

On the SBM spectrum, schools that are managed as autonomous government schools probably have the most freedom. They are government funded but operate with substantial independence and many are owned and managed by their own governing body. A study comparing autonomous government schools, private schools and traditional public schools, found that differences in the institutional environment have a particularly important effect on the way schools are managed (Bloom et al. 2014). The autonomous government schools garnered significantly higher management scores than public and private schools and those higher management scores are positively correlated with better student outcomes. This held true for the OECD countries and Brazil. An example is the UK Academies that came about during a 1988 Education Reform that promoted autonomous schools. When the program was evaluated nine years later there was a significantly large achievement gain (0.25 standard deviation improvement in pass rates on standardized exams) at schools which opted into the program in comparison to those that did not (Clark 2009). This gain in learning outcomes represents about one year of schooling.

Some researchers argue that SAA reforms work better in developed countries in contrast to developing countries mostly due to low capacity of local participants (Hanushek, Link and Woessman 2013). Knowing the context can help to avoid these pitfalls. SAA reforms can take many shapes and forms and this is usually in response to the country's political economy, education goals, performance issues, and history just to name a few contextual factors that may influence the policies and design of intended SAA measures. SAA reforms just become a menu of activities if they are not connected and balanced via the three A's – autonomy, accountability and assessment. This is what makes the difference. Even here, however, there are no proven combinations and as education systems evolve, the mix of interventions and policies must adjust to stay in alignment and achieve or maintain a closed-loop among the three A's.

The Three A's and SABER SAA

The **Three A's** framework serves as the architecture of the SABER SAA tool. Available research suggested five main policy goals that school autonomy and accountability should meet in order to enable a closed-loop system where autonomy, assessment, and accountability reinforce each other in order to produce an enabling managerial environment that promotes better learning outcomes. The five main policy goals that are derived from this model and that matter for success in SAA are the following:

1. Level of autonomy in planning and management of the school budget.
2. Level of autonomy in personnel management
3. Role of the school council in school governance (participation)
4. School and student assessment
5. Accountability

The first policy goal focuses on the degree of autonomy that schools have in planning and managing their budgets. This is desirable because it can increase efficiency of financial resources and give schools flexibility on planning and execution. The second policy goal focuses on the degree of autonomy a school has in personnel management including principals, teachers and non-teaching staff. The third goal focuses on participation in school governance, and it is where parents can exercise real power as clients of the education system. The fourth focuses on the regularity of measuring student learning with the intent to use results to inform stakeholders and make adjustments (managerial, pedagogical and personnel). Finally, the fifth focuses on using information to promote accountability and reinforce better management of financial, operational and learning outcomes. The five policy goals are broken down by 24 corresponding policy actions. Each of these policy actions is supported by a series of questions that help us understand if policies/ laws/ and manuals enabling these activities exist and how well developed they are.

In this next section of the paper we will present the supporting evidence for what matters in school autonomy and accountability according to the five policy goals and their policy actions.

IV. What Matters Most? SAA Policy Goals, Policy Actions and Evidence

Understanding that school-based management (SBM) activities are part of a system significantly alters the conceptualization of SBM indicators of autonomy and accountability, since now they should be linked in a way that achieves a closed-loop system. The 3As framework helps diagnose the status of SBM in a given country, where some subcomponents of the system may be absent or in nascent form while other subcomponents may already be well-functioning. The fact that some subcomponents may be at earlier

stages may simply be a reflection of the political economy of SBM in a given country, where particular social, legal or institutional barriers may take more time to overcome.

- The first two policy goals are about autonomy at the school level, especially the authority of school level stakeholders over school resources – budget and personnel. By giving authority to schools and school councils, where parents participate, SBM incorporates local incentives into the planning and resource allocation process.
- The third policy goal focuses on community participation and the role of the school council in school governance. This not only includes the community’s ability to have a voice or oversee key school governance functions, but also how well supported those communities are to define and understand their roles, build capacity, execute the school plan and do so in a transparent and inclusive manner.
- The fourth policy goal is about the routine use of school and student assessment results to continually reflect and make pedagogical, operational and personnel adjustments for the purpose of improving performance. In this case, the sharing and analysis of results at the various levels of the education system and to the public is important so that all stakeholders can take the necessary actions.
- The fifth policy goal relates to school accountability, which is key for improving education quality and service delivery. This goal includes the policies that enable stakeholders to receive comprehensible information on their schools, provide oversight, comply with regulations, link rewards and sanctions, and create feedback loops.

These policy goals reinforce each other. Improvements in their implementation have an impact on the performance of other policies. This is the systemic nature of SBM that is assessed by SABER-SAA.

The system’s approach to Autonomy, Assessment, and Accountability suggests that their related policy actions move along a continuum of strength, with some areas becoming stronger before others, but keeping in mind that attaining a balance among the three As helps to achieve a necessary closed-loop system and reinforces relationships between the three areas to better support successful school level outcomes. By examining policy actions in terms of strength, one could anticipate the pace and depth of the SBM reforms.

Policy Goal One: Level of Autonomy in the Planning and Management of the School Budget

This policy goal focuses on the degree of autonomy that schools have in planning and managing their budgets. There is a strong positive relationship between school autonomy and student performance (Barrera, Fasih, and Patrinos 2009). When fiscal transfers given to schools are under local control, authority rests at the school level. A combination of local authority figures—school principals, teachers, communities, parents—are then involved in monitoring those central budgetary allocations. School autonomy in the planning and management of the school budget is considered desirable because it can increase the efficiency of financial resources, give schools more flexibility in budget management, and give parents the opportunity to have more voice on budget planning and execution. Greater autonomy at the school level helps schools fight for central resources since they can use the indicators of assessment to render accounts of student performance and in the process use moral suasion to get increased funding from the central level.

Budgetary autonomy includes giving schools responsibility for negotiating and setting the salaries of its teaching and non-teaching staff and using monetary and non-monetary bonuses as rewards for good performance. In centralized systems, teachers are paid directly by the Ministry of Education or the Ministry of Finance under union or civil service agreements. As a result, in centralized systems schools have less influence over teacher performance because they have no financial leverage over teachers. Inversely, if a school negotiates teachers' salaries, as private schools routinely do, it may be able to motivate teachers directly with rewards for a job well done.

Based on the review of the evidence on school autonomy and accountability policies, the SABER-SAA framework has identified five policy actions that education systems can use to reach this goal of school autonomy in planning and management of the budget.

| Policy Goal 1 | Policy Actions |
|--|---|
| Level of autonomy in the planning and management of the school budget. | 1A. Legal authority over management of the operational budget 1B. Legal authority over the management of non-teaching staff salaries 1C. Legal authority over management of teacher salaries 1D. Legal authority to raise additional funds for the school 1E. Collaborative budget planning |

1A. Legal authority over management of the operational budget. Most countries whose students perform well in international student achievement tests give their local authorities and schools substantial autonomy over allocating and managing resources and adapting and implementing educational content, or both (Barerra, Fasih, and Patrinos 2009). In a study of eight countries⁴ covering 1,800 schools, results show that schools with higher management scores are positively correlated with better pupil outcomes (Bloom, Lemos, Sadun, and Van Reenen 2014). In particular, autonomous government schools (e.g. charter schools in the US and academies in the UK) have significantly higher management scores than regular government schools and private schools. The difference in management between both types of schools is closely linked to the strength of governance or having a strong accountability for student performance to an outside body, degree of school leadership, and a long-term strategy for the school. It does not appear to be influenced by differences in student composition, geographic characteristics, basic demographics, or characteristics of school principals.

There are several ways for funds to be transferred to schools. They include: central allocation to local government, direct transfer to schools, block/school grants, and formula-financing, among others. To some extent, the method of transfer depends on how much decision-making authority over management of the budget is devolved to the local or school level. Even at the school level, some SBM programs transfer authority only to school principals or teachers, while others mandate parental and community participation through a legally established body, like a school council (Barrera, Fasih, and Patrinos 2009). Autonomy in the management of the budget at the school level is beneficial for school operations and for accountability since funds can be allocated to relevant areas in need and monitored by local stakeholders.

Controlled experiments on school grants in The Gambia (Blimpo and Evans 2011) and Indonesia (World Bank 2011a), where decision-making authority was devolved to the school council to manage those grants, have demonstrated a variety of benefits. In The Gambia, schools that received a grant and

⁴ Brazil, Canada, Germany, India, Italy, Sweden, United Kingdom, and USA

management training for school staff and parents showed lower rates of teacher absenteeism and higher levels of student attendance.

Indonesia's BOS program set up and empowered school committees with the authority to plan and make decisions over non-salary operational expenditures. It gave schools block grants based on a per-student formula and provided management training to school committees that were elected by the community into their positions. The block grants were used to pay for more student support activities and to hire more staff, with results showing a significant increase in teacher attendance and student scores in language and mathematics (World Bank 2011a).

1B and 1C. Legal authority over management of non-teaching staff and teacher salaries. The enforcement of school-based management activities is a necessary but insufficient condition for improving learning. The interaction between teachers and students determines to a large extent what students learn. The quality of teaching and importance of teachers in student learning is confirmed through various studies (Vegas and Umansky 2005, World Bank 2004). Evidence from these studies holds that SBM can foster teacher effectiveness if it addresses personal incentives, such as if wages are defined locally which we address here, if hiring and firing decisions are made locally (see Policy Goal 2), and if teacher incentives are understood better at the local level.

Autonomy includes giving schools responsibility for negotiating and setting the salaries of its teaching and non-teaching staff and using monetary and non-monetary bonuses as rewards for good performance. Moving the authority to determine salaries closer to the school level can be controversial and is more likely to be good policy in situations where central management of teachers is not working well and does not show prospects of improving. Authority over management of teacher salaries has been legally granted to local authorities in some countries (for example Bulgaria, Hong Kong, and Kazakhstan). In Bulgaria, the government instituted school autonomy reforms in 2007-08 in an effort to shift away from a system where central government managed inputs and lacked outcome measures. In the new system, school principals manage all funds allocated to the school and determine an individual teacher's remuneration. The reforms also introduced differentiated teacher pay based on teachers' performance and effort. Under the new system, the principal makes the pay determination based on a centrally defined framework and specific criteria determined at the school level. Additionally, while current legislation neither requires nor discourages the use of student assessment data for differentiating teachers' pay, principals are increasingly using student assessment test results for that purpose (World Bank 2010).

While there have been studies from both developed and developing countries that show benefits of pay for performance, more field evidence is needed. However, if a school negotiates teachers' bonuses or salaries, as private schools routinely do, it may be able to motivate teachers directly with rewards for a job well done.

Nepal is a case in point, where community-managed schools (CMS) have various legal rights when it comes to managing teachers, including the right to link teacher salaries to school performance⁵. Nepal first introduced CMS in 1951 to fill a void in services in the education sector. However, in 1971, the government took back fiscal and managerial responsibility. In theory, teachers were accountable to a state that was far removed from the school and in reality the only substantial relationship between state and teacher was the salary payment. In 2001, due to overwhelming public dissatisfaction, Nepal's government

⁵ CMS have the legal right to transfer regular (government-recruited) teachers back to the district headquarters and to directly hire and fire community-recruited teachers as well.

decided to return schools to community management on a gradual and voluntary basis. The impact evaluation on Nepal's program reveals that devolving managerial responsibilities to communities has had a significant impact on outcomes related to access and equity, and for system efficiency measured by grade progression and repetition, the treatment effects were both substantial⁶ (Chaudhury and Parajuli 2010).

In El Salvador's EDUCO program, teachers' wages were set by the local Educational Community Association (ACE) every year and were linked to their performance. This was in contrast to traditional schools where teacher salaries followed a fixed-wage system. The incentive provided by annual pay raises contingent on an individual teacher's performance had a positive effect on EDUCO schools. In particular, the effect of a teacher's experience had a positive effect on a student's continuation in school and the appropriate compensation for teachers had an important effect on teacher effort (Jimenez and Sawada, 1999 & 2003).

1D. Legal authority to raise additional funds for the school. Greater community and parental involvement in school affairs can sometimes lead to the school receiving more private donations and grants in addition to funding that the school receives from the national government or from local taxes (World Bank 2007a). The issue here is the legal authority to seek funds outside of the central government budget rather than the need to raise additional funds from parents. There is evidence that user fees deter the very poor from attending schools; however, there is also evidence indicating that fees empower parents to demand accountability (Bold et al 2013). This policy action assesses when schools can seek contributions from a variety of potential financial sources including city and local governments, domestic and international NGOs, and private donors. When combined with parent participation, this legal mandate reduces the chance of parents being pressured into giving more money to the school beyond what they want to contribute voluntarily. Ensuring that local contributions preserve financial equity among parents requires that governments adopt a strong compensatory policy in distributing funds across regions. Under such conditions, local financing and modest user charges can boost performance by allowing parents and the community to exert greater control over school operations (King and Cordeiro 2005). Furthermore, if the right to raise additional funds is approached with equity in mind, it can improve efficiency without worsening inequality (King and Cordeiro 2005).

1E. Collaborative Budget Planning and Preparation. Parent collaboration in budget planning and preparation has been recognized as a positive influence on transparency and accountability in the budget preparation process at the school level. This is called participatory budgeting. Participatory budgeting is a decision-making process through which citizens deliberate and negotiate over the distribution of public resources (Wampler 2007).

Traditionally, the preparation stages of the budget process are driven by agencies with some basic guidance on budget constraints and priorities from elected officials. Agencies tend to prepare their budget based on previous allocations, fostering a high degree of inflexibility in the allocation of resources (Moynihan 2007). Participatory budgeting makes the budgeting process more transparent and responsive to citizens' needs, empowering marginalized groups, making the budget more pro-poor, and reducing corruption (Mansuri and Rao 2013).

⁶ Grade progression is estimated at a 15.6 percentage point increase and for repetition there was a 10.6 percentage point decrease.

One major example of participatory budgeting is from Porto Alegre, the capital of the Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul (Mansuri and Rao 2013). Involving citizens in the discussions of budget planning helped improve public services, such as expanded access to basic services including sewerage systems, water, schooling, housing, and paved roads. This approach can also be applied to service delivery in the education sector. If schools, including parents and community members, can participate in the school budget processes, then transparency and accountability will be improved with possible gains in resource efficiency. When the school budget is proposed by the school level, it can better reflect the needs of schools and lead to more efficient resource utilization and higher satisfaction of school-level stakeholders.

Table 2. Policy Goal 1: Policy actions, indicators and evidence

| | Policy Actions | Details of Policy Action | Evidence |
|-----------|---|--|--|
| 1A | Legal authority over management of the operational budget | At what level is the authority? Can schools manage non-salary expenditure? Under guidelines? In consultation w/community? | Barrera, Fasih, Patrinos 2009. Bloom, Lemos, Sadun and Reenen 2014. Blimpo and Evans 2011. World Bank 2011a. |
| 1B | Legal authority over the management of non-teaching staff salaries | Who has legal authority over non-teaching staff salary? Is there a pay scale with guidelines? Who sets the pay scale? Any consultation process? | Vegas and Umansky 2005. WB 2004. WB 2010. Chaudhury and Parajuli 2010. Jimenez and Sawada 1999 & 2003. |
| 1C | Legal authority over the management of teacher salaries | Who has legal authority over teaching staff salary? Is there a pay scale with guidelines? Who sets the pay scale? Any consultation process? | Together with 1B (see above) |
| 1D | Legal authority to raise additional funds for the school | Can schools raise additional funds and from what sources? | World Bank 2007. Bold et al 2013. King and Cordeiro, 2005. |
| 1E | Collaborative budget planning | Can the school level make a proposal for the budget? Will higher levels of authority consider the proposal, use it as a reference, or as the main guide to transfer resources? | Wampler 2007. Moynihan 2007. Mansuri and Rao, 2013. |

Policy Goal Two: Level of Autonomy in Personnel Management

This policy goal assesses policy intent in the management of school personnel, which includes the principal, teachers, and non-teaching staff. Appointing and deploying principals and teachers can be centralized at the level of the Ministry of Education or it can be the responsibility of regional or municipal governments. In fully decentralized education systems, schools can have autonomy in teacher hiring and removal decisions for their particular schools usually within acceptable standards set centrally or by the civil service rules. This gives a clear signal to teachers that the school council has voice or the authority to weigh in on school personnel, which could cover hiring, overseeing salaries and performance, and

provision of additional support. This realization should make teachers more responsive to parents’ needs. Personnel decision-making at the school level regarding principals is less common and is usually instituted when there is very weak central capacity to deliver and manage education services.

Based on the review of the evidence on school autonomy and accountability policies, the SABER-SAA framework has identified three policy actions that education systems can use to reach the goal of school autonomy in personnel management.

| Policy Goal 2 | Policy Actions |
|---|--|
| The level of autonomy in personnel management | 2A. Autonomy in teacher appointment and deployment decisions 2B. Autonomy in non-teaching staff appointment and deployment decisions 2C. Autonomy in school principal appointment and deployment decisions |

2A. Autonomy in teacher appointment and deployment decisions. There are SBM programs that can be described as “weak” which do not typically involve personnel decisions and there are those that are considered “strong” which do provide personnel autonomy to local stakeholders. Programs that can significantly improve outcomes, especially for poor and low performing schools, empower school councils and/or parents to have an effect on personnel decisions. There are different degrees of effect size, but it is recognized that a critical aspect of SBM effectiveness is management of teachers, including the ability to establish incentives and to fire non-performing teachers (Bruns et al. 2011). A study from Korea finds that in providing schools with greater autonomy in hiring and staffing decisions, their principals and teachers face stronger incentives to deliver good student performance. Greater autonomy combined with keeping school principals and teachers accountable can be effective in improving student outcomes (Hahn, Wang, and Yang 2014).

The country context for determining the degree of autonomy in teacher appointment and deployment at the local level is also critical. When the ability of the central government to deliver services (such as quality education) is weak, policies allowing for strong personnel autonomy at the school level can be effective in ensuring responsive and satisfactory delivery of education to communities. When central or regional government authority is more efficient in service delivery and able to meet quality standards and be responsive, there is less need for strong personnel autonomy at the school level.

Weak ability is often seen in post-conflict countries where service delivery is lacking and there is little contact or accountability between the central authority and what is happening at the local school. For example, in Central America in the 1990s and early 2000s, several countries experimented with variations of El Salvador’s EDUCO model (PROHECO, PRONADE, etc.). EDUCO was first developed as a response to rural communities in El Salvador that were not adequately funded, managed or supported from the central level during and shortly after the civil war. Lack of access to public schools during the civil war also led many rural communities to organize their own schools by the community members themselves and request direct funding from the central government (Di Gropello 2006; Gillies, Crouch and Florez 2010). Given the crisis, communities were given wide autonomy, including hiring, replacing, and dismissing teachers according to their school’s needs. In the short term, these programs worked well and were successful in increasing enrollment and reducing dropout rates. Afghanistan’s Partnership for Advancing Community-based Education (PACE-A) also allows for locally recruited village teachers who are provided with educational materials and training. Results show the program significantly increases enrollment and

test scores among all children, eliminates the 21 percentage point gender disparity in enrollment, and dramatically reduces the disparity in test scores (Burde and Linden 2012).

Even without a post-conflict situation, allowing school councils to hire teachers on renewable contracts outside the civil service system and to influence their tenure may have reinforcing impacts on student learning when combined with local autonomy (Bruns, Filmer and Patrinos 2011). Kenya's Extra Teacher Program (ETP) showed that class size reduction combined with hiring local teachers on short term contract and increasing parental oversight led to significant increases in test scores (Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer 2007). Some Eastern European countries (e.g. Kazakhstan) have decentralized the authority to hire and replace teachers to the school principal. Spain and the United Kingdom are also examples of countries that have mainstreamed the provision of autonomy to the school to hire and fire teachers.

As the government's ability to deliver good quality services in an equitable way increases, it may become less necessary for parents or school councils to have the highest degree of autonomy in the hiring and firing of teachers, yet it is still important for them to have a voice and affect change as may be warranted to ensure learning outcomes and responsiveness at the local level. This is evidenced by many European countries (Eurydice 2007) that may be considered to have weak personnel autonomy at the school level.

In some school systems in Europe (e.g. Finland), where teachers are contracted under collective agreement or under civil service rules, the degree of autonomy over personnel administration is limited. In these countries, the central and local governments have in place a very stringent selection process in which most of the initial effort goes into selecting the best teacher candidates (Eurydice 2007). In these cases, one could argue that the role of school autonomy on personnel management is done at the very beginning through the selection process undertaken by local governments.

Under any circumstance, it is important to keep in mind that reforms that involve teacher incentives whether indirectly through increasing personnel autonomy at the school level or directly through teacher pay, are among the most politically sensitive. Creating coalitions for reform is critical and using information to communicate the goals and benefits of the reforms is one way to build understanding and buy-in from the various local stakeholders including teachers and unions.

2B. Autonomy in non-teaching staff appointment and deployment decisions. Personnel autonomy that may be less politically sensitive but still allows the school council to make decisions affecting the quality of their school is the area of non-teaching staff. This includes administration, support, and maintenance staff. Decisions about recruiting, disciplining and dismissing non-teaching staff are taken within schools in many European countries (Eurydice, 2007). Often it is those at the school level who will know best the needs of the school's learning environment and if empowered, they can affect timely decisions that will support the school's outcomes. Bulgaria has been steadily advancing its school autonomy reforms which like other Eastern European countries have been put in place to gain greater efficiency and quality in the education system (Zafeirakou 2004). These goals have been achieved in part by delegating more powers in personnel autonomy to school principals who are in charge of hiring and firing of non-teaching staff (World Bank, 2010; Eurydice, 2007). The indirect effect is that better efficiency leaves more resources dedicated to improving outcomes.

2C. Autonomy in school principal appointment and deployment decisions. School principals are instructional leaders as well as administrators who work with the local community and local education offices. An effective principal can be critical for the success of SBM and improving school and student performance. There is a small but statistically significant indirect effect of school leadership on school

achievement (Hallinger and Heck, 1996). Therefore, how school principals are appointed and deployed is an important decision-making power. The level of personnel autonomy decentralized to an intermediate level or even to the local level through the school council, gives more control or influence to local actors in determining a key leader at the school and holding that leader responsible as well as providing the principal support in reaching school goals.

The school autonomy reform in Nicaragua which allowed school councils to hire and fire school principals had a positive effect on student test scores. King and Özler (1998) studied the effects of Nicaragua’s school autonomy on student test scores in mathematics and Spanish. The authors found that *de facto* autonomy begun in 1990 had positive effects on student promotion and student achievement in math and language in primary school and in language in secondary school. The positive impacts of locally-hired principals persisted for more than a decade, until the autonomy program ended (Arcia, Porta and Laguna 2004).

Two other examples are from Brazil and Chile, which implemented aggressive reforms that included student assessment and accountability and resulted in improved learning outcomes. Both countries introduced a more transparent and competitive process for hiring principals using merit as the criterion instead of political connections. Many states in Brazil now hire their principals, who are required to have passed a school management program, through school elections (Elacqua and Alves 2014).

Table 3. Policy Goal 2: Policy actions, indicators and evidence

| | Policy Action | Details of Policy Action | Evidence |
|-----------|--|--|--|
| 2A | Autonomy in teacher appointment and deployment decisions | Who has legal authority to appoint, deploy and transfer teachers? Are these decisions made under civil servant agreements? Who has final review? | Bruns, Filmer, Patrinos 2011. Hahn Wang, and Yang 2014. Di Gropello, 2006. Gillies et al 2010. Burde and Linden, 2012. Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer, 2007. Eurydice, 2007. |
| 2B | Autonomy in non-teaching staff appointment and deployment decisions | Who has the legal authority to appoint and deploy non-teaching staff? Do civil servant agreements regulate appointments? | Eurydice, 2007. Zafeirakou, 2004. WB - Bulgaria SA Reforms, 2010. |
| 2C | Autonomy in school principal appointment and deployment decisions | Who appoints and deploys principals? Who evaluates principals' performance? How are principals' tenure, transfer, and removal determined? Is there a consultation process? | Hallinger and Heck, 1996. King and Ozler, 1998. Arcia, Porta and Laguna, 2004. Elacqua and Alves, 2014. |

Policy Goal Three: Role of the School Council on School Governance

In the context of school governance, the main objectives of school autonomy and accountability are to increase local stakeholder participation⁷ in school management activities, promote local decision-making, and allow for local voice and oversight at the school level. The participation of the school council in school management is linked to school autonomy because the school council is a component of the local school management team, which also links the school council to accountability through its part in the budget approval and supervision process.

There are several reasons why local stakeholder participation in school governance is important. First, parents have a natural incentive to improve their children's education and they have a sound understanding of the needs of their children and the local school. Given the opportunity through the right mix of enabling policies and support, parent and community participation through a representative body like the school council can positively influence the educational environment and outcomes through closer monitoring of school personnel, inclusive and better management of resources, school evaluations, and a closer match between the school's needs and its policies. Second, a wider participation of parent and community members in school management fosters managerial transparency and reduces opportunities for corruption (Barrera-Osorio, Fasih, and Patrinos 2009). Third, participation of the school council can develop a higher sense of local ownership in schools. Finally, it is important to note that change management studies also have provided evidence that bringing stakeholders together to plan and implement meaningful activities also contributes to behavioral change in institutions, including schools. Collective school planning activities can provide a mutual vision and shared accountability of what parents and school staff can commit in terms of support to the school. These processes provide an enabling environment for better governance.

Several studies by various development partners assert the importance of parent and community participation in school management. Impact evaluations supported by the World Bank have shown that parent and community participation in school management have positive effects in increasing access to education (Di Gropello 2006, Chaudhury and Parajuli 2010), improving internal efficiency such as repetition and dropout (Jimenez and Sawada 2003, 2014; Skoufias and Shapiro 2006; Gertler, Patrinos, and Rubio-Codina 2006, Benveniste and Marshall 2004) and facilitating teacher and student attendance (Evans and Blimpo 2011; Jesse et al, 2010). However, there are also results that have not shown statistically significant and positive effects on these outcomes. In terms of student learning outcomes, the evidence on parent and community participation in school management is mixed. Schools with autonomous decision-making do not necessarily produce higher test scores; however, schools with greater parent involvement that are better equipped do have better school outcomes (Gunnarsson et al 2009). For developing countries in particular, Contreras (2015) suggests that, developing institutional arrangements that allow parents to participate in academic content decisions at the school level has a greater impact on student learning than autonomous decision-making without enabling parent participation.

There are various levels and formality of parent and community involvement in school governance and school activities. In West Africa, it was noted that Parent Associations or Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs) lacked the capacity to make real change and be sustainable (Burkina Faso, Senegal) (Shibuya 2014). The need for a more institutionalized body beyond parent associations has been recognized as necessary

⁷ Local stakeholders can include the school principal, teachers, parents, community members and, in some cases, students. Their recognized, legal participation is usually through an institutional body, namely a school council/parent council/school management committee/parent teacher association, etc.

to allow parent and community voices to be better represented, and this has resulted in the establishment of such entities referred to as school councils, school management committees, school committees, school boards and so on. The underlying premise for institutionalized support is that relevant procedures will be new to the communities and that they would require support in legal and administrative matters. Without the legal status, school councils cannot open bank accounts, receive financial transfers, and perform functions on the government’s behalf (Di Gropello, 2006). These constraints are a reflection of the limitations of PTAs or parent associations to manage school resources. The school councils are supposed to ensure that school resources are used more effectively (Lugaz and De Grauwe 2010).

In general, SBM programs devolve authority to the school level over the following activities: budget issues such as allocating and overseeing budget; personnel management such as hiring and firing teachers; pedagogical issues such as selecting textbooks/curriculum; maintenance and infrastructure; and monitoring and evaluation (Barrera-Osorio, Fasih, and Patrinos 2009). Authority over budget, personnel, and curriculum is stressed as crucial for those at the school level (Odden and Wohlstetter 1995; Wohlstetter 1995). The election of school council members and their representation of parents and community members in a transparent manner are regarded as ingredients for successful SBM programs.

Based on review of the evidence on school autonomy and accountability policies, the SABER-SAA framework has identified five policy actions that education systems can use to reach this goal of school council participation in school governance.

| Policy Goal 3 | Policy Action |
|--|---|
| Role of the School Council in School Governance | 3A. Participation of the school council in budget preparation 3B. Participation in financial oversight 3C. Participation in personnel management 3D. Community participation in school activities 3E. Community participation in learning inputs 3F. Transparency in community participation |

3A & B. Participation of the school council in budget preparation and financial oversight. The participation of the school council in school finances has several links to autonomy and accountability. First, it allows for the school to render financial accounts to parents, which fosters efficiency in resource use; it allows for school councils to seek additional funds for the school from non-governmental sources; it allows for schools to articulate the financial implications of their work plans in a way that school councils can understand, and it can help school councils demand more resources or better financial accountability at other levels of government. In most cases, provision of a school grant or direct transfer of financial resources from the central government via regional or local governments to schools requires a school-level body to prepare a budget plan (proposal for expenditure) and to oversee the budget.

Evidence from Uganda and Mexico demonstrates the potential for positive effects of school council participation in budget preparation and financial oversight. The Uganda study shows that a School Management Committee’s satisfaction with school-level planning and budgeting processes increases the chances of higher student pass rates (Mulindwa, Habyarimana, and Bunjo 2013). In Mexico’s Quality Schools Program (PEC), Parent Councils (*Padres de Familia*) are active in the preparation of the school budget. They prepare a plan for improving the school’s quality and then receive a five-year grant to implement the activities based on the school plan. The PEC grant is allocated to different areas of school operations depending on the preferences of the parent council and the principal working together (SABER CR, World Bank, 2013b). Community participation in PEC schools significantly decreased the dropout,

failure, and repetition rates (Skoufias and Shapiro, 2006). Financial oversight is also a common function of school councils and is an important component for accountability and efficiency. Financial oversight by school councils was one of the common functions performed by school councils in Central America (Sawada, 2003; Di Gropello and Marshall 2005; Di Gropello 2006).

3C. Participation of the school council in personnel oversight. Personnel oversight is one of the key authorities that school councils can use to hold teachers accountable. It may include paying staff salaries, establishing incentives for teaching staff, hiring and firing teachers and administrative staff, supervising and evaluating teachers, and funding teacher training or other forms of support (World Bank 2007).

Evidence from Central America (Sawada, 2003; Di Gropello and Marshall 2009; Di Gropello 2006) suggests that communities delegated with greater autonomy will do a better job of maximizing existing capacity by eliciting more effort from teachers. In Kenya, providing school committees with funds to hire an extra teacher on a short-term contract had a positive effect on learning. School committees were responsible for hiring the contract teacher and were free to replace or keep the original contract teacher based on performance (Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer 2007).

Delegating personnel management authority to the school council has been shown to be beneficial for reducing teacher absenteeism and for inducing teachers to work harder. At the same time, as studies show, this could change the power dynamics at the school level (World Bank 2007b). Decentralized teacher management may be opposed by teachers and/or teacher unions because it shifts the balance of power in favor of parents and the school. Thus, necessary measures should be taken to deal with the political economy of school management and the school stakeholders particularly for changes in the area of personnel management authority.

3D. Participation of the school council in school activities. One of the core objectives of decentralization is to expand the involvement of actors who do not belong to the community of education professionals, in particular elected local authorities and community or parent representatives (Lugaz and De Grauwe 2010). Participation of parents and community members in school activities through the school council is crucial to gain their support for school activities and to foster accountability. A commonly used tool to allow community participation in school activities is a school improvement/development/action plan (SIP). This tool can promote school-level planning to reflect local voices and needs and form a basis for monitoring and evaluation of school activities, which is essential for school-level decision-making. Having a school plan that focuses on students' performance, staffing levels, and instructional material provision increases chances for children's pass rate as evidenced in Uganda for Grade 7 passes (Mulindwa et al., 2013).

In contrast, poor understanding of roles by parents and community members can be a major constraint for SBM and may have a low impact on school outcomes (Lugaz and De Grauwe 2010; Banerjee, Banerji, Duflo, Glennerster, and Khemani 2008). This is why it is important for school councils to have the regulations and the tools they need to carry out their missions, such as the SIP tool that channels shared missions and visions into feasible activities in a participatory way. To assist school councils to have a clear understanding of their roles and how to develop school improvement plans, the availability of detailed instructions, guides, and manuals will be one of the enabling conditions to facilitate stakeholder engagement in school activities. These types of interventions in Madagascar resulted in an increase in test scores and a four percentage point increase in student attendance (Jesse, Tan, Lassibille, and Nguyen 2010). Mexico's use of simple posters and simple storyboards assisted parents (literate and illiterate) to learn the basics about parent councils and perform their duties effectively (Arcia et al 2013). In Senegal, the greater functionality of school management committees (measured by implementation of procedural

policies such as holding general assemblies and supporting variables such as training and monitoring visits) is related to better learning achievement, as measured by the pass rate of the primary graduation exam (Yuki, Igei and Demas, 2015).

3E. Community participation on learning inputs. It has been emphasized that school-based management should lead to improvement in teaching and learning. A study about schools and school districts that implemented SBM in the US, Canada and Australia, showed that people at the school site must have genuine authority over curriculum in addition to budget and personnel authorities as conditions for school-based management to improve school performance (Odden and Wohlstetter 1995; Wohlstetter 1995). According to Caldwell (2005), recent studies have highlighted the importance of local decision-making regarding learning and teaching that meet the needs of students and take into account local priorities. OECD PISA data show that at the country level, the greater the number of schools that have the responsibility to define and elaborate their curricula and assessments, the better the performance of the entire school system, even though it is not always the case for an individual school (OECD, 2011).

It can be observed that developed countries tend to have devolved decision-making on learning inputs to the school level (World Bank, 2007, 2009). For instance, New Zealand delegated several pedagogical functions such as setting classroom hours by subject, selecting some textbook/curriculum, and determining the method of instruction. In contrast, only a few developing countries have devolved these functions to the school level. El Salvador and The Gambia are two examples of developing countries that delegated some pedagogical functions to school councils, but in general, most developing countries have only made partial advances in delegating pedagogical authority at the school level. For example, in Guatemala, local authority is given only over the school calendar; whereas in Madagascar and Kenya, schools can select some textbooks or make some curriculum adjustments (World Bank, 2007; Barrera et al 2009).

There could be two reasons that account for less delegation of control over learning inputs. First, these pedagogical issues still tend to be controlled by the central level because of uniformity and standardization. Second, mostly it is not school councils but teachers who deal with pedagogical issues. This often prevents school councils from intervening with pedagogical issues at the school level. However, it is still critical to know whether school councils are involved in the process of selecting or taking decisions on learning inputs that can directly affect student learning outcomes.

3F. Transparency in community participation. Ensuring transparency in selecting school council members is a critical entry point for school-based management with accountability. Without transparency, it cannot be assumed that school council members are representing the voices of parents and the whole community. Democratic election is considered a way to ensure transparency in selecting school council members. Electing school council members can also be a way to identify leaders who, by virtue of their social preferences, are less willing to capture contributions to public goods than most others in the village, including externally appointed village executive officers. In the case of Tanzania, such relationships do not exist in randomly drawn residents or externally appointed village executive officers, which suggests that either electoral selection, or the power of elections to transform the preferences of incumbents, produce leaders with pro-social preferences (Lierl 2014). An impact evaluation of Indonesia's school grant program, Batuan Operasional Sekolah (BOS) shows that a treatment group with the democratic election of school council members and the linkage with village representative councils, in combination with committee training, had substantial positive effects on student learning (Pradhan, M., et al, 2011). There are risks of "elite capture", or that a few key stakeholders such as the school principal or a particular representative on the school management committee dominate decision-making powers (Mansuri and Rao 2013; Lugaz and De Grauwe 2010; Nielsen, H.D 2007). However, such risk can be mitigated by using

term limits for school council members as well as open and scheduled elections to reduce dominance by particular stakeholders.

In addition, holding general assemblies ensures that school councils are held accountable to parents and the whole community for the results of school improvement plans and the use of the school budget. The impact evaluation of the Nepal Community School Support Project shows positive effects on reduction in the proportion of out-of-school children, and an increase in grade progression in primary grades. According to its Implementation Completion Report, the social audit conducted by a committee comprised of the chairperson of the PTA and two other parents was the most significant tool for monitoring project implementation. The social audit report was to be presented to and endorsed by the parents' assembly. Thus, general assembly should be reinforced by SBM policies as a platform to hold the school council and school accountable to parents and the whole community for their performance.

Table 4. Policy Goal 3: Policy actions, indicators and evidence

| | Policy Action | Details of Policy Action | Evidence |
|-----------|--|--|--|
| 3A | Participation of the school council in Budget Preparation | Who prepares the school budget? Does the school council have a role in planning and preparation of the school budget? Are these responsibilities shared with the school principal? | Mulindwa, Habyarimana, Bunjo, 2013. Mexico PEC Country Report, 2013. Skoufias and Shapiro, 2006. Sawada, 2003. Di Gropello and Marshall, 2005. Di Gropello, 2006. |
| 3B | Participation in financial oversight | Does the school council have legal standing as an organization, or legal authority to have a voice or oversight on budget issues? | Together with 3A |
| 3C | Participation in personnel management | Does the school council have legal right or voice over teacher appointments, transfers, and removals? | WB 2007. Sawada 2003. Di Gropello and Marshall, 2005. Di Gropello 2006. Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer 2007. |
| 3D | Community participation in school activities | Are there formal instructions, manuals, or mandates for organizing volunteers? Do these guidelines address implementing, planning, or evaluating activities? | Lugaz and De Grauwe 2010. Mulindwa, et al, 2013. Banerjee, Banerji, Duflo, Glennerster, and Khemani 2008. Jesse, Tan, Lassibille, Nguyen 2010. Yuki, Igei, and Demas 2015. |
| 3E | Community participation on learning inputs | Does the school council have legal authority to voice an opinion on learning inputs? Does the school council have legal oversight for all learning inputs? | Odden and Wohlstetter 1995. Caldwell 2005. OECD 2011. WB 2007. Barrera et al, 2009. |
| 3F | Transparency in community participation | Are there provisions for open election of school council members? Are there term limits or regularly scheduled elections? Are there guidelines for calling general assemblies? | Lierl 2014. Pradhan, et al, 2011. Mansuri and Rao, 2013. Lugaz and De Grauwe 2010. Nielson, 2007. |

Policy Goal Four: School and Student Assessment

In any education system, it is critical for stakeholders to know how well schools, teachers, and children are performing. Evidence shows that in schools where school-based management has worked well, a variety of communication mechanisms were used to share information on assessment results. Thus, it is recommended to create a well-developed system for sharing school-related information with a broad range of constituents (Wohlstetter 1995). This policy goal looks at the importance of school and student assessment—their existence, frequency, and use of information generated from assessments for making adjustments.

School assessments can have a big impact on school performance because they encourage parents and teachers to agree on indicators, scoring rules and ways to keep track of them. **Student assessment** is another important way to determine if a school is effective in improving learning. A key function of SAA is the regular measurement of student learning, with the intent of using the results to inform parents and society, and to make adjustments to managerial and pedagogical practices. Without a regular assessment of learning outcomes, school accountability decreases and improving education quality becomes less certain.

The main idea of the policy actions for school and student assessment is that the school and its community take assessments as a routine task to be performed. By making this task routine it is bound to become a managerial tool and not a punitive tool. Results from PISA suggest that, when autonomy and accountability are intelligently combined, they tend to be associated with better student performance (OECD 2011).

Based on the review of the evidence on school autonomy and accountability policies, the SABER-SAA framework has identified five policy actions for assessment and their links with autonomy and accountability.

| Policy Goal 4 | Policy Action |
|-------------------------------|--|
| School and Student Assessment | 4A. Existence and frequency of school assessments 4B. Use of school assessments for making school adjustments 4C. Existence and frequency of standardized student assessments 4D. Use of standardized student assessments for pedagogical, operational, and personnel adjustments 4E. Publication of student assessments |

4A. Existence and frequency of school assessments. School assessment can be defined as any type of assessment that collects school information and measures its achievement either directly or through third parties. There are many forms of school assessments such as school inspection, teacher appraisal by school directors, school self-evaluation or own quality assurance, school report cards, and test-based ranking. School assessment may take many forms, but it should deal with two main issues: (i) the integrity of the assessment process and (ii) the use of yearly assessment of teachers and students to evaluate school performance. Without the existence of and a suitable frequency in administration of school assessments, the education system, school, and community cannot understand how the different parts of the school (teachers, resources, curriculum, infrastructure, etc.) are either supporting or not supporting student learning.

Education quality assurance in the United Kingdom effectively integrates student assessment results into both self-evaluations and school inspections. Schools participate in self-evaluations on an ongoing basis that typically incorporate data on attainment, predicted results, and value-added scores. In addition, the Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills (Ofsted 2014) externally monitors whether schools have met standards in learning outcomes, student well-being, school facilities, and other areas (typically every 5 years). Schools are also able to analyze their performance with RAISE online, a tool that provides interactive analysis of school and student performance, as well as comparisons to peers (Ofsted 2014).

4B. Use of school assessments for making school adjustments. School assessments are the vehicles used by schools to determine their needs for changes in pedagogical practices and to determine the training needs of their teachers (teacher quality). For these purposes, the regular management and analysis of school data plays an important part. The role of EMIS is linked to accountability as it makes it easier to report on school assessment results including indicators of internal efficiency and standardized test scores (Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos 2011). It also provides local decision-makers with key information needed for improving efficiency and effectiveness.

In the absence of centralized systems of school assessments, it may be possible to rely on school report cards. Several report card programs have had success in increasing parental knowledge about the quality of instruction in schools and have helped to raise parents’ voice in school matters at the school council and state levels. They can also increase awareness among school personnel about their schools’ instructional quality and academic performance—Brazil, Uganda, Nigeria, Central America, Namibia—which can lead to pedagogical and operational adjustments (Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos 2011).

The experience of Paraná State in Brazil in using school report cards from 1999 to 2002 suggests positive effects (Winkler 2005). A short, simple summary of indicators was disseminated to parents and teachers through local workshops and through publication in the state’s education newsletter. The report cards served as a management tool at the school level helping principals, teachers and school councils to make managerial decisions or changes to practices. Teachers and parents engaged in discussions on how they might improve school performance and through the school councils increased their voice in policy debates about education (Winkler 2005).

In Liberia, a randomized controlled trial was conducted in 180 schools where a group of 60 schools received a full treatment that included the Early Grade Reading Assessment (EGRA) along with teacher training in the assessment of reading performance, frequent pedagogical support, and books and pedagogical materials. A second group of 60 schools received a *light* treatment, in which only the school report cards based on EGRA were distributed among parents and the community. The control group of 60 schools did not get any of the above interventions (Piper and Korda 2011). The full-treatment students showed a significantly higher improvement in reading ability than the light-treatment and control groups, and the light-treatment group showed better results than the control group.

4C. Existence and frequency of standardized student assessments. The experience of high-performing countries on PISA indicates that education systems with standardized student assessment tend to do better than those without such assessments (OECD 2011). Systemic efforts to measure learning outcomes are important for all countries. Some developing countries have dabbled in standardized student assessments but fail to make them a part of their education strategy and do not implement them with regularity or maintain them over time (Clarke 2012). An important difference between one time assessments and a sustained assessment system is that one time assessments only provide a snapshot of

student achievement levels while an annual assessment or those provided with a regular frequency allows for the possibility of monitoring trends in achievement and learning levels over time. Additionally, research shows a weak but positive link between the uses of data from large, system-level assessments to hold schools and educators accountable and for better student learning outcomes (Clarke, 2012).

4D. Use of standardized student assessments for pedagogical, operational, and personnel adjustments.

The existence, use and publicity of school and student assessment for making school adjustments including pedagogical, operational and personnel aspects are key enabling conditions for SBM to work better. More successful schools have teachers and administrators who have formed a professional learning community that focuses on student work (assessment) and based on information resulting from those assessments, they change their instructional practice (pedagogical support for learning) in order to get better results (Newmann and Wehlage 1995; Fullan and Watson 1998). To take full advantage of the benefits to learning, it requires that teachers develop better assessment literacy (Hargreaves and Fullan 1998). Therefore it is important to build capacity of principals and teachers to examine and accurately understand student work and performance data to be able to develop corresponding school and classroom plans and to alter conditions necessary to achieve better results (Hatch 2013, Fullan and Watson 1998).

A study by Darling-Hammond and Wentworth (2010) noted that among other positive effects, student assessment activities in high performing education systems regularly provide feedback to students, teachers and schools about what has been learned and identify information that can shape future learning. Information in this case is used to enable better decision-making rather than to leverage accountability. Data resulting from student assessments may also assist in addressing inequities. In education systems that use standardized student assessments, PISA scores among schools with students from different social backgrounds differ less than in systems that do not use standardized student assessments (OECD 2011). Test score disclosure also has the potential to change the behavior of teachers and school managers as noted in private schools by affecting the market incentives faced by such schools (Camargo et al 2014).

Differences among schools on what types of information they receive about student performance (including comparative analysis) and on whether they use this information for making school improvements (pedagogical, operational, and personnel) matter for learning results (Yuki, Igei, Demas 2015). A study in Senegal investigating SBM policies and their implementation found that in order to make SBM more functional for better learning results, it is important not only that school directors know there are comparative analyses and use student assessment results for school-level improvement, but also to increase the functional level of school councils, as well as to ensure a better implementation of the budgetary autonomy decentralized to communes. The study confirmed that one of the key policy messages of the SABER-SAA framework, the 3 As working together in balance enable better learning results, is valid for rural public schools in Senegal.

4E. Publication of student assessments. Making student assessment results available at the different levels of the education system (central, regional, municipal) as well as at the school level and to the public can have a positive effect on student performance. Some findings on test-based accountability in the U.S. suggest that simply reporting information about average school test scores led to increased performance (Hoxby 2001, Hanushek and Raymond, 2003). Additionally, education systems in which schools publish test results and have more autonomy over resource allocation perform better than schools with less autonomy (OECD 2011).

Table 5. Policy Goal 4: Policy actions, indicators and evidence

| | Policy Actions | Details of Policy Action | Evidence |
|-----------|--|---|--|
| 4A | Existence and frequency of school assessments | How often is school performance assessed? Are Ministry of Education criteria used to assess schools? Are special topics addressed during school assessment, such as poverty, nutrition, or migration? | Ofsted 2014. |
| 4B | Use of school assessments for making school adjustments | Do schools use school assessments for making pedagogical, personnel, or operational adjustments? Are school assessment results analyzed? Who is mandated to receive school assessment results and recommendations? | Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos 2011. OECD 2011. Winkler 2005. Brooke 2005. Piper and Korda 2011. |
| 4C | Existence and frequency of standardized student assessments | How frequently do students participate in standardized assessments? Are student assessments carried out on a sample or census basis? | OECD, 2011. Clarke, 2012. |
| 4D | Use of standardized student assessments for pedagogical, operational, and personnel adjustments | Are student assessment results used to make pedagogical, personnel, or operational adjustments? Who analyzes student assessment results, and who is mandated to receive student assessment results and recommendations? | Newmann and Wehlage 1995. Fullan and Watson 1998. Hargreaves and Fullan 1998. Hatch 2013. Darling-Hammond and Wentworth, 2010. OECD 2011. Camargo, Camelo, Firpo, and Ponczek 2014. Yuki, Igei, Demas 2015 |
| 4E | Publication of student assessments | Who is mandated to receive results of student assessments? | Hoxby, 2001. Hanushek and Raymond, 2003. OECD, 2011. |

Policy Goal Five: School Accountability

Accountability is at the heart of school-based management. The systemic connection between budgetary and personnel autonomy, parent participation in the financial and operational aspects of a school, and the measurement of learning outcomes are all aimed to reinforce accountability. Only by being accountable to local stakeholders can educational quality be sustainable.

A way in which SAA can theoretically change educational outcomes is by promoting more involvement by the community and parents in the school and by holding accountable and monitoring those making decisions about school management (World Bank 2007a). Ways to increase voice, transparency and accountability include some innovative tools such as public expenditure tracking, school report cards, community monitoring and social audits (Gaventa and McGee 2013).

In order to be consistent with the use of assessments as managerial tools, accountability should also be routine and objective. To that effect, the proposed policy actions rely on the school’s social and economic context to make comparisons with other schools in similar conditions. The main idea is that accountability has a context and that the school’s context is important for evaluating progress. As a result, teachers may feel encouraged to see school assessments taking into account internal progress throughout the years, as well as progress relative to schools with similar social and economic conditions.

The following policy actions address aspects of accountability that can be implemented within the framework of school autonomy and accountability.

| Policy Goal 5 | Policy Actions |
|----------------|--|
| Accountability | 5A. Guidelines for the use of results of student assessments 5B. Analysis of school and student performance 5C. Degree of financial accountability at the central, regional, and school levels 5D. Degree of accountability in school operations 5E. Degree of learning accountability |

5A. Guidelines for the use of results of student assessments. An important defining feature of information-for-accountability interventions is that they focus on the use of information as the instrument for change (Bruns, Filmer, Patrinos, 2011). There is reason to believe that if well-informed, parents will try to hold the schools accountable for their children’s learning outcomes. However, Hanushek, Link and Woessman (2013) argue that the success of autonomy reforms may depend on the general level of human capital which affects the quality of parental monitoring. Some studies show that low adult literacy communities may have a negative effect or no effect on student learning outcomes compared to villages with a high adult literacy rate that may post gains, as was the case in The Gambia (Blimpo and Evans, 2011). Regardless of literacy levels, however, evidence suggests that a mechanism to supply accurate information to communities about the relative performance of their children and schools could be desirable (Blimpo and Evans 2011). Establishing guidelines for packaging and use of school and student results in the appropriate form is important for reaching all parents so that they may be able to understand, react, and take action if need be. Communication of information alone is insufficient, but information that is perceived as actionable in an enabling environment can motivate collective action especially if community voice triggers responsiveness of the authorities (Fox, 2014).

5B. Analysis of school and student performance. Accountability with a context means that the publication of the results of student performance and the position of the school relative to years past, as well as in relation to schools in similar conditions can be empowering to teachers and parents. Therefore, it is important not just to present scores and other achievement data, but to conduct a comparative analysis that offsets disadvantages such as socioeconomic status, size and types of schools, across regions, and for previous years. Otherwise, for example, schools in poor areas that perform badly on achievement tests because they receive low-income students may be discouraged from improving teaching quality, since school ranking does not reflect all the effort made (McEwen, Urquiola, and Vegas 2008).

In Pakistan, an experiment with report cards in 823 schools covering 12,000 children was shown to have helped increase test scores by 0.10 standard deviations and reduced private school fees by 23 percent (Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja 2012). The report card was designed in collaboration with parents and the schools. Parents wanted to know their child’s score and his/her rank relative to other students in the class,

the average score for each school in their village, and the scores by category (word recognition, sentence building, etc.) so they would know in which category their child needed more help.

Another example comes from Nigeria. In Kano State, simplified reports showing school-specific indicators compared with local area and state-wide data were used by local stakeholders and increased transparency in the management of the system. Furthermore, the use of the comparative data in the reports helped to strengthen accountability links between the communities and schools as well as between the central and local governments (Winkler and Herstein 2005).

5C. Degree of financial accountability at the central, regional, and school levels. The degree of financial accountability is important because it can be used as a source of support for teachers and the principal. Parents tend to look at teachers and principals more favorably if they are aware that the production of good results is tied to adequate funding and management of those funds. As academic accountability becomes more routine, financial support can be forthcoming. Participation of the school council in the development of the school improvement plan encourages ownership and deepens local stakeholders' knowledge of school goals. This in turn enables the council and wider community to monitor the inputs, outputs, and outcomes. Key decisions and changes about spending in terms of magnitude of spending, on what items, and who made the investment decisions are critical for maintaining financial accountability and keeping on track with education outcome goals (World Bank 2007a).

The education budget represents the plan for implementing education policy. Reported education expenditure at all levels of government along budget priorities allows school finance systems to monitor the success of budget execution and make adjustments as necessary (World Bank 2011c). Internal and external audits can provide regular feedback to education authorities on management of funds. Establishing rewards and sanctions for financial and operational compliance provides a clear framework and incentives for transparently executing the budget and implementing the corresponding education goals. Consequences, such as improved supervision, dismissal, or salary cuts should exist for failed internal audits (World Bank 2011c). In addition to formal audit mechanisms, dissemination of financial information to the school and the public can be an effective monitoring tool. An example from Uganda demonstrates that reporting on school grants through a newspaper campaign boosted the ability of schools and parents to monitor local officials' handling of the grants. The gains in financial knowledge about the school grants and increase in monitoring reduced the diversion of funds from 80 percent to less than 20 percent over a six-year period (Reinikka and Svensson 2004).

5D. Degree of accountability in school operations. The introduction of consequential accountability systems has a clearly beneficial impact on overall performance (Hanushek and Raymond 2005). A variety of approaches to using information for accountability can be used including report card programs discussed earlier, test-based score cards and participatory public expenditure or input-tracking (Bruns, Filmer, Patrinos 2011). For example, preliminary research has found that the improvements introduced to Chile's voucher program combined with the test-based accountability policies provided schools with incentives to operate more efficiently (Elacqua and Alves 2014). Another example is the Philippines where public resource tracking was used to increase accountability of textbook distribution to schools with the goal of increasing learning outcomes. Parent-teacher associations and other local groups were used to verify and report on the delivery of textbooks. Anecdotal evidence suggests the program successfully reduced corruption in school operations and by 2005, all textbooks produced were delivered in comparison to a loss of 40 percent in 2001 (Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos 2011). Efforts like this could be expanded to school buildings and furniture as well.

5E. Degree of learning accountability. Despite design flaws in most existing accountability systems, Hanushek and Raymond, 2003 find that they have a positive impact on achievement in US schools. However, the impact holds only for states attaching consequences to performance. Those that only provide information through report cards without attaching consequences to performance get similar results to those with no accountability. Work still needs to be done on determining the best set of rewards and sanctions. Similarly, in Chile, a study analyzing the effects of accountability pressures on teacher policies and practices in low-performing schools finds that the impact of the Preferential School Subsidies Law, 2008, which offers an additional subsidy to schools that serve the most vulnerable students, has been effective in generating incentives for schools to seek strategies to improve their results as quickly as possible. Participating schools must meet a series of minimum academic performance standards and face sanctions if they do not (Elacqua and Treviño 2008).

Table 6: Policy Goal 5: Policy actions, indicators, and evidence

| | Policy Actions | Details of Policy Action | Evidence |
|-----------------------|---|--|---|
| 5A | Guidelines for the use of results of student assessments | Do guidelines exist for the use of student assessment results? Which levels (school and government) do these guidelines concern? | Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos, 2011. Hanushek, Link, and Woessman, 2013. Blimpo and Evans, 2011. Fox, 2014. |
| 5B | Analysis of school and student performance | Are there provisions for the comparative analysis of student assessment results? Are comparative analyses of student assessment results carried out at different levels? Are comparative analyses mandated to be distributed to parents or available online? | McEwen, Urquiola, and Vegas 2008. Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja 2009. Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos 2011. |
| 5Ci, Cii, Ciii | Degree of financial accountability at the central level; regional/ municipal level; school level | Are regulations in place for complying with rules of financial management and transparency, reporting to those with oversight authority, and linking rewards and sanctions to compliance? | World Bank 2007a. Reinikka and Svensson 2004. World Bank 2011c. |
| 5D | Degree of accountability in school operations | Are regulations in place for complying with rules of financial management and transparency, reporting to those with oversight authority, and linking rewards and sanctions to compliance? | Hanushek and Raymond 2005. Bruns, Filmer and Patrinos, 2011. Elacqua and Alves 2014. |
| 5E | Degree of learning accountability | Is there a mandate to simplify and explain results of student assessment to the public? How is feedback solicited from parents and community members? | Hanushek and Raymond 2003. Elacqua and Treviño 2008. |

V. Implementing the SABER Framework

SABER Instrument and Methodology

SABER-SAA is a diagnostic tool that benchmarks education policies according to evidence-based global standards and best practice. The School Autonomy and Accountability (SAA) tool is part of SABER (Systems Approach for Better Education Results). SABER helps countries systematically examine and strengthen the performance of their education systems to achieve learning for all (Rogers and Demas 2013). The World Bank has been working with partners around the world to develop diagnostic tools that benchmark education policies according to evidence-based global standards and best practice. By leveraging global knowledge, SABER fills a gap in the availability of policy data, information and knowledge on what matters most to improve the quality of education.

The policy actions/indicators listed in the previous SAA policy goal section help us to identify key features of effective service delivery systems. Indicators are identified based on a combination of criteria, including:

- empirical research on the characteristics of effective school autonomy and accountability
- experience of high-performing systems
- theory or general consensus among experts regarding effective service delivery
- rational connections between policy evidence and indicator application

SABER SAA benchmarks a country's policy intent based on a country's policies, laws, and guidelines using a standardized protocol. The data collection process includes a review of laws, policies, and manuals currently in place as an enabling environment for school autonomy and accountability. The SABER-SAA team has developed an instrument to collect data on each country's policies. Answers to the data collection instrument (DCI) include references from education legislation, policy documents, and explanations against which responses are verified. *A point of emphasis here is that the aim of the SABER SAA policy intent tool is to assess a country's official and established policies. An adaptation of this tool – the SABER SAA policy implementation tool - has also been developed to determine on-the-ground implementation of these policies at the local level.* Education policies regarding school autonomy and accountability can be found in a range of documents such as national and local constitutions, education acts and laws, memoranda of understanding, official education policy documents, school regulations manuals, and education reform documents, among others. The official documents vary for each country. Once the policies and laws have been collected, the data are analyzed and scored using a rubric for each corresponding policy goal. These rubrics allow for country policies to be scored by each individual policy action (see Appendix 1 for a list of all policy goals and policy actions and Appendix 2 for the detailed rubrics).

As discussed previously, each policy goal consists of a set of key policy actions. For each policy action, the country will be benchmarked into one of four levels of development: 1 (Latent), 2 (Emerging), 3 (Established), or 4 (Advanced):

- Latent is the lowest performance level and reflects that policy is not in place or there is limited engagement;
- Emerging represents some good practice with policy development still in progress;
- Established represents good practice with some limitations
- Advanced represents the international best practice

The country team or consultant first collects information in order to answer the questions in the DCI. Once the DCI is completed, the scoring rules that correspond to the rubrics are applied. Using the rubrics, a level of development and score is assigned to the policy actions within each policy goal:

| | |
|-------------|------------|
| Latent | = 1 point |
| Emerging | = 2 points |
| Established | = 3 points |
| Advanced | = 4 points |

The score for each policy goal is then computed by aggregating the scores for each of its policy actions to the policy goal level. The Data Collection Instrument was designed to provide equal weight to each indicator. For example, a hypothetical country receives the following scores for one of its policy goals: Policy Action IA = 2 points; Policy Action IB = 3 points; Policy Action IC = 3 points; Policy Action ID = 3 points; Policy Action IE = 2 points. The hypothetical country's overall score for this policy goal would be: $(2+3+3+3+2)/5 = 2.6$. The following scale is used to determine a development level for the policy goal:

| | |
|--------------|-------------|
| Latent: | 1.00 – 1.75 |
| Emerging: | 1.76 – 2.75 |
| Established: | 2.76 – 3.75 |
| Advanced: | 3.76 – 4.00 |

For this example, the policy goal score is 2.60 placing it in the Emerging range.

Applying the SABER instrument and comparing countries can help governments make evidence-based policy decisions. Through the application of SABER-SAA, countries will gain a better understanding of how well developed the set of policies are to foster managerial autonomy, assess school and student performance, and use information from assessments to promote accountability. The scoring allows for easy identification of strengths and weaknesses of the school autonomy and accountability policies, in reference to each policy goal. Once the data are collected and analyzed, and scores are produced, then the results can be used to inform larger studies in addition to the typical product which is a country report. SABER-SAA produces a country report, summarizing the results of this benchmarking process and the policy implications in connection with the country's particular educational context. The SABER report also includes policy recommendations to guide countries in further developing an enabling environment for SAA or to act as a basis for in-country dialogue taking into account the local context. Thus, the SABER tool is to be used not as prescriptive policy assessment but rather as an informed policy assessment of the country policies in reference to the current knowledge of effective approaches. This information is compiled in a comparative database where interested stakeholders can access framework papers, detailed country reports, and other resources describing how different education systems have approached school autonomy and accountability with a view to improving learning outcomes <http://saber.worldbank.org/index.cfm>.

Conclusions

Learning for All is a common goal for all developed and developing countries as well as the World Bank's Education Sector Strategy 2020. It is critically important how SABER-School Autonomy and Accountability can help to identify the enabling environment that can lead to better learning. There are two important conclusions which should be emphasized from this paper. One conclusion is that balancing the Three As, namely autonomy, assessment, and accountability, matters. SAA reforms just become a menu of activities if the Three As are not interconnected to form a closed-loop system. This is what makes the difference. Implementing autonomy or accountability alone has no additional effect on learning. If SAA is considered as a school level system that includes the periodic assessment of teachers and students and the incentives for improving teacher quality, then the impact of SAA activities related to increased autonomy and accountability may yield improved learning more consistently than if implemented in isolation. School autonomy must be complemented with school accountability to promote academic excellence. This has been well documented through various impact evaluations. We also know that the highest PISA scores come from countries where autonomy and accountability are implemented together (OECD 2011).

The second conclusion is that context matters. Knowing the context for SAA can help to avoid the risks inherent in its implementation in developing countries. In fact, context makes all the difference. SAA reforms can take many shapes and forms and this is usually in response to the country's political economy, education goals, capacity, performance issues, and history, just to name a few contextual factors that may influence the policies and design of the intended SAA measures.

In countries where educational institutions are strong, especially in the area of training and in the selection of good teachers, autonomy and accountability in SBM may not be a necessary condition for success. In these conditions, which are found in many high performing countries in Europe, *trust* is the main element of accountability. Parents trust and support the system because the empirical evidence—shown by the results in international testing exercises such as PISA—indicates that it is producing good results. Nevertheless, even in high-performing countries, trust and professionalism flourish in a context of school autonomy and accountability.

What should be noted is that when undertaking school autonomy and accountability reforms, there is a general assumption that actors and stakeholders at the school level will come together in an automatic and collegial way to put school-based authority and accountability into practice. However, due to weak data, there is only a small body of robust evidence to show that this happens. At present, we have few randomized experiments to draw upon; however, more and more projects are building in impact evaluation so that we can understand better what combination of SAA policies and activities are meaningful for better learning outcomes in a variety of contextual situations in the future.

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Appendix 1: School Autonomy and Accountability Policy Goals and Policy Actions

| Policy Goal | Policy Action | |
|---|---------------|--|
| Level of autonomy in the planning and management of school budget | 1A | Legal authority over the management of the operational budget |
| | 1B | Legal authority over the management of the non-teaching staff salaries |
| | 1C | Legal authority over the management of teacher salaries |
| | 1D | Legal authority to raise additional funds for the school |
| | 1E | Collaborative budget planning |
| Level of autonomy in personnel management | 2A | Autonomy in teacher appointment and deployment decisions |
| | 2B | Autonomy in non-teaching staff appointment and deployment decisions |
| | 2C | Autonomy in school principal appointment and deployment decisions |
| Role of the school council in school governance | 3A | Participation of the school council in budget preparation |
| | 3B | Participation of the school council in financial oversight |
| | 3C | Participation of the school council in personnel oversight |
| | 3D | Participation of the school council in school activities |
| | 3E | Participation of the school council in learning inputs |
| | 3F | Transparency in community participation |
| School and student assessment | 4A | Existence and frequency of school assessments |
| | 4B | Use of school assessments for making school adjustments |
| | 4C | Existence and frequency of standardized student assessments |
| | 4D | Use of standardized student assessments for pedagogical, operational, and personnel adjustments |
| | 4E | Publication of student assessments |
| School Accountability | 5A | Guidelines for the use of results of student assessments |
| | 5B | Analysis of school and student performance |
| | 5C | Degree of financial accountability at the central level, regional, municipal, local and school level |
| | 5D | Degree of accountability in school operations |
| | 5E | Degree of learning accountability |

Appendix 2: Rubric for SABER School Autonomy and Accountability

| Policy Goal 1: The level of autonomy in the planning and management of the school budget. | | | | | |
|--|---|--|---|--|--|
| | Policy Action | Latent | Emerging | Established | Advanced |
| 1A | Legal authority over management of the operational budget | Legal management authority over the operational budget is centralized. | Legal management authority over the operational budget is at the regional or municipal levels. | Non-salary expenditure can be managed by school level without consultation with parents/community members under government guidelines. | Non-salary expenditure can be managed by school level in consultation with parents/community members. |
| 1B | Legal authority over the management of non-teaching staff salaries | Legal management authority over non-teaching staff salaries is centralized. | Legal management authority over non-teaching staff salaries is at the regional or municipal levels; a centralized pay scale may be used as a guide. | Non-teaching staff salaries can be managed at the school level without consultation with parent/community members. A centralized or regional/municipal pay scale may be used as a guide. | Non-teaching salaries can be managed by school level in consultation of parents/community members. An established pay scale may be used as a guide. |
| 1C | Legal authority over the management of teacher salaries | Legal management authority over teacher salaries is centralized | Legal management authority over teacher salaries is at the regional or municipal levels; a centralized pay scale may be used as a guide. | Teacher salaries can be managed by school level without consultation with parent/community members. A centralized or regional/municipal pay scale may be used as a guide. | Teacher salaries can be managed by school level in consultation of parents/community members. An established pay scale may be used as a guide. |
| 1D | Legal authority to raise additional funds for the school | Budget is fixed by the Ministry of Education and no additional funding is permitted | Schools can request more funds from sub-national governments. | Schools can raise additional funds from parents/ community members, private businesses, and from non-governmental institutions. | Schools can raise additional funds from any source |
| 1E | Collaborative budget planning | Budgetary decisions are made at the national and sub-national levels and there is no system to accept a budget proposal from the school level. | Provisions allow for the school level to propose a school budget to the sub-national level as a request for funding. | National and/or sub-national authorities are to use the proposed budget by the school level as a reference for the transfer of resources to the school. | National and/or sub-national authorities are to use the proposed budget by the school level as the main guide for the final transfer of resources to the school. |

| Policy Goal 2: The level of autonomy in personnel management | | | | | |
|---|--|---|---|--|--|
| | Policy Action | Latent | Emerging | Established | Advanced |
| 2A | Autonomy in teacher appointment and deployment decisions | Teachers must be appointed and deployed by the central government level under a union or civil service agreement. | Regional or municipal governments have legal authority to appoint teachers under union or civil service agreements. Appointments are subject to final review by central authorities. | Regional or municipal governments have legal authority to appoint and deploy teachers under union or civil service agreements without review by central authorities. | Schools (school principals, school council, parent association etc.) have legal authority to appoint teachers. Union and civil service agreement may or may not regulate the appointments. |
| 2B | Autonomy in non-teaching staff appointment and deployment decisions | Non-teaching staff must be appointed and deployed by central government level under civil service agreement. | Regional or municipal governments have legal authority to appoint non-teaching staff under civil service agreements. | Regional or municipal governments have legal authority to appoint and deploy non-teaching staff. Civil service agreement may or may not regulate the appointments. | Schools have legal authority to appoint non-teaching staff. Civil service agreement may or may not regulate the appointments. |
| 2C | Autonomy in school principal appointment and deployment decisions | Principals are to be appointed and deployed by the central level. Their performance is evaluated centrally and they can be transferred or fired by central authorities. | Principals are to be appointed and deployed by the central level. Their performance is evaluated regionally or by municipal inspectors, which determines their tenure, transfer, or removal by central authorities. | Principals are to be appointed and deployed by regional or municipal/local authorities, who are also responsible for their evaluation and have the authority for determining tenure, transfer, or removal. | Principals are to be appointed and deployed by municipal/local authorities in consultation with the school council/stakeholders at school level, or by the school council alone. Municipal/local authorities are responsible for the principal's evaluation to determine tenure, transfer, or removal. |

| Policy Goal 3: Role of the school council on school governance. | | | | | |
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| | Policy Action | Latent | Emerging | Established | Advanced |
| 3A | Participation of the school council in budget preparation | No role for the school council; budgets are prepared centrally by the Ministry of Education. | School council is to have a voice in the planning and preparation of the non-salary budget items at the school level, but final responsibility falls on the school principal or other government authority. | School council is to have a voice in the planning and preparation of all expenses at the school level, but final responsibility falls on the school principal or other government authority. | School council is to have a voice in the planning and preparation of all expenses at the school level and, depending on the law, may share responsibility with the school principal. |
| 3B | Participation in financial oversight | No legal standing as an organization, no legal authority to have a voice, and no legal oversight authority on budget issues. | Legal standing as an organization, but no legal authority to have a voice, and no legal oversight authority on budget issues. | Legal standing as an organization, and legal authority to have a voice, but no legal oversight authority on budget issues. | Legal standing as an organization, legal authority to have a voice, and legal oversight authority on budget issues. |
| 3C | Participation in personnel management | No legal right or voice in teacher appointments, transfers, and removals. | No legal right in teacher appointments and removals, but have a voice in teacher transfers. | Legal right to have a voice in teacher appointments, removals, and transfers. | Legal right to oversee appointments, removals, or transfer of teachers. |
| 3D | Community participation in school activities | No formal instructions, manuals, or mandates for organizing volunteers to perform activities. | There are formal instructions, manuals, and mandates for organizing volunteers to implement activities. | There are formal instructions, manuals, and mandates for organizing volunteers to plan and implement activities. | There are formal instructions, manuals, and mandates for organizing volunteers to plan, implement, and evaluate activities. |
| 3E | Community participation on learning inputs | No legal authority to voice an opinion and no legal oversight on learning inputs to the classroom. | Legal authority to voice an opinion, but no legal oversight on learning inputs to the classroom. | Legal authority to voice an opinion and legal oversight on some learning inputs to the classroom. | Legal authority to voice an opinion and legal oversight on all learning inputs to the classroom. |
| 3F | Transparency in community participation | No provisions for the open election of school council members and for general assemblies. | No provisions for the open election of school council members, but guidelines for calling general assemblies. | There are provisions for open election of school council members but no term limits or regular schedule for elections. There are guidelines for calling general assemblies. | There are provisions for regularly scheduled elections of school council members and defined term limits. There are guidelines for calling general assemblies. |

| Policy Goal 4: School and student assessment. | | | | | |
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| | Policy Action | Latent | Emerging | Established | Advanced |
| 4A | Existence and frequency of school assessments | Schools do not assess school performance on a regular basis. | Schools are to be assessed every few years using Ministry of Education criteria. | Schools are to be assessed every year using Ministry of Education criteria | Schools are to be assessed every year using Ministry of Education criteria. In addition, there should be sporadic evaluations of specific aspects of school life, such as student poverty, equity, and teacher quality. The results of all evaluations should be made public and easily accessible. |
| 4B | Use of school assessments for making school adjustments | Schools do not use school assessments to make pedagogical adjustments, or to change school materials. | Central Ministry of Education must analyze school assessment results and send them to the regions/municipalities and make broad recommendations on pedagogical and operational adjustments. | Central or regional/municipal branch of the Ministry of Education must analyze school assessment results and send them directly to the schools. Schools may use the information to make pedagogical and operational adjustments. | Ministry of Education or municipal governments must analyze school assessments, and make results easily accessible to schools and the public. Schools must use the information to make pedagogical, personnel, and operational adjustments. |
| 4C | Existence and Frequency of standardized student assessments | Students do not take standardized tests. | Assessments of student learning are done every few years in selected grades using representative samples of students. | Assessments of student learning are done every few years in selected grades for all students in the country. | Assessments of student learning are done every year in selected grades for all students in the country. |
| 4D | Use of standardized student assessments for pedagogical, operational, and personnel adjustments | Schools do not use standardized student assessments to make pedagogical adjustments or to change school materials. | Central MOE must analyze results of standardized student assessments and send them to the regions/municipalities and make broad recommendations on pedagogical, operational and/or personnel adjustments. | Central or regional/municipal branch of MoE must analyze standardized student test scores; send results and recommendations to regional, local offices and directly to the schools. Schools may use the information to make pedagogical and operational adjustments. | MOE or municipal governments must analyze standardized student test scores; make results easily accessible to schools and the public. Schools must use the information to make pedagogical, operational, or personnel adjustments. |

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| 4E | Publication of student assessments | Results of the student assessments are not reported. | Results of the student assessments are made available to central and regional/municipal levels of the MOES. | Results of the student assessments are made available to central, regional/municipal levels of the MOES, and to schools. | Results of the student assessments are made public and available online. |
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| Policy Goal 5: School Accountability | | | | | |
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| | Policy Action | Latent | Emerging | Established | Advanced |
| 5A | Guidelines for the use of results of student assessments | There are no guidelines for the use of results of student assessments. | There are guidelines for the use of results of student assessments at the national and municipal levels only. | There are guidelines for the use of results of student assessments at the national, municipal, and school levels. School councils can use the guidelines to voice accountability. | There are guidelines for the use of results of student assessments at all levels. The guidelines are available online and can be used to foster/demand accountability. |
| 5B | Analysis of school and student performance | There are no provisions for the comparative analysis of student assessment results for different types of schools, across regions, and for previous years. | There are provisions for comparative analysis of student assessment results for different types of schools, across regions, and for previous years at the national and regional levels. | There are provisions for comparative analysis of student assessment results for different types of schools, across regions, and for previous years at the national, regional, and municipal levels. Schools are required to distribute summary results to parents. | There are provisions for comparative analysis of student assessment results for different types of schools, across regions, and for previous years at the national, regional, municipal, and school levels. Detailed school performance results at the school level must be published online. |
| 5Ci | Degree of financial accountability at the central level | There are no regulations in place for (i) complying with the rules of financial management and transparency; (ii) reporting to those with oversight authority; and (iii) linking | There are regulations in place for complying with the rules of financial management and transparency, but not for reporting to those with oversight authority; and not for linking rewards | There are regulations in place for complying with the rules of financial management and transparency, and for reporting to those with oversight authority; but not for linking rewards | There are regulations in place for complying with the rules of financial management and transparency; for reporting to those with oversight authority; and for linking rewards and sanctions to compliance. |

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| 5Cii | Degree of financial accountability at the regional/municipal level | There are no regulations in place for (i) complying with the rules of financial management and transparency; (ii) reporting to those with oversight authority; and (iii) linking rewards and sanctions to compliance. | There are regulations in place for complying with the rules of financial management, but not for reporting to those with oversight authority; and not for linking rewards and sanctions to compliance. | There are regulations in place for complying with the rules of financial management, and for reporting to those with oversight authority; but not for linking rewards and sanctions to compliance. | There are regulations in place for complying with the rules of financial management and transparency; for reporting to those with oversight authority; and for linking rewards and sanctions to compliance. |
| 5Ciii | Degree of financial accountability at the school level | There are no regulations in place for (i) complying with the rules of financial management and transparency; (ii) reporting to those with oversight authority; and (iii) linking rewards and sanctions to compliance. | There are regulations in place for complying with the rules of financial management, but not for reporting to those with oversight authority; and not for linking rewards and sanctions to compliance. | There are regulations in place for complying with the rules of financial management and transparency, and for reporting to those with oversight authority; but not for linking rewards and sanctions to compliance. | There are regulations in place for complying with the rules of financial management and transparency; for reporting to those with oversight authority; and for linking rewards and sanctions to compliance. |
| 5D | Degree of accountability in school operations | There are no regulations in place for: (i) complying with the rules of school operations; (ii) reporting to those with oversight | There are regulations in place for complying with the rules of school operations, but not for reporting to those with oversight authority, and not | There are regulations in place for complying with the rules of school operations and for reporting to those with oversight authority, but not for linking rewards | There are regulations in place for complying with the rules of school operations and for reporting to those with oversight authority, and for linking rewards and sanctions to |

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| | | authority; and (iii) linking rewards and sanctions to operating performance. | for linking rewards and sanctions to operating performance. | and sanctions to operating performance. | operating performance. |
| 5E | Degree of learning accountability | No mandate for simplifying and explaining results of student assessments to the public. | There is a mandate for simplifying and explaining results of student assessment to the public. | The results of student assessments are simplified and explained to the public and the local level/schools are obligated to solicit feedback from the school community on those results. | The results of student assessments are simplified and explained to the public and the local level/schools are obligated to have a meeting with the school community to solicit feedback and to inform them of a plan of action to address the issues. |

The Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER) initiative collects data on the policies and institutions of education systems around the world and benchmarks them against practices associated with student learning. SABER aims to give all parties with a stake in educational results—from students, administrators, teachers, and parents to policymakers, business people and political leaders—an accessible, detailed, objective snapshot of how well the policies of their country’s education system are oriented toward delivering learning for all children and youth.

This framework paper focuses specifically in the area of School Autonomy and Accountability Sector.

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