23242 Hinkle January 2001 Montiel Exchange Rate MISALIGNMENT CONCEPTS AND MEASUREMENT FOR ) > DEVELOPING COUNTRIES Io~ rn zr Z ; -- Lawrence E. Hinkle Peter J. Montiel 0 A WORLD BANK RESEARCH PUBLICATION Oxford University Press Exchange Rate MISALIGNMENT CONCEPTS AND MEASUREMENT FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES Exchange Rate MISALIGNMENT CONCEPTS AND MEASUREMENT FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES Lawrence E. Hinkle Peter J. Montiel A WORLD BANK RESEARCH PUBLICATION Oxford University Press Oxford University Press Oxford New York Athens Auckland Bangkok Bogata Buenos Aires Calcutta Capetown Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Florence Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi Paris Sao Paulo Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto Warsaw and associated companies in Berlin Ibadan Copyright © 1999 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ THE WORLD BANK 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20433, U.S.A. Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York, 10016 Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechani- cal, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Manufactured in the United States of America First printing June 1999 2 3 4 5 03 02 01 00 The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this study are entirely those of the authors and should not be attributed in any manner to the World Bank, to its affiliated organizations, or to members of its Board of Executive Directors or the countries they represent. The boundaries, colors, and other information shown on any map in this volume do not imply on the part of the World Bank any judgement on the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Hinkle, Lawrence E., 1944- Exchange rate misalignment : concepts and measurement for developing countries / Lawrence E. Hinkle and Peter J. Montiel. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-19-521126-X 1. Foreign exchange rates - Developing countries. 2. Foreign exchange administration - Developing countries. I. Montiel, Peter. II. Title. HG3877.H56 1999 332.4'56'091724-DC21 98-52201 CIP Table of Contents Foreword ix Preface xii Acknowledgments xiv About the Authors xvi Acronyms and Abbreviations xvii 1. Exchange Rate Misalignment: An Overview I Peter J. Montiel and Lawrence E. Hinkle The Real Exchange Rate: Concepts and Measurement 4 Determinants of the Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate 10 Methodologies for Estimating the Equilibrium RER: Empirical Applications 14 Policy and Operational Considerations 28 Conclusions 32 Part I: The Real Exchange Rate: Concepts and Measurement 2. External Real Exchange Rates: Purchasing Power Parity, the Mundell-Fleming Model, and Competitiveness in Traded Goods 41 Lawrence E. Hinkle and Fabien Nsengiyumva Common Features of All External Real Exchange Rate Indexes 43 Measurement of the Different RER Concepts: Choosing Appropriate Price or Cost Indexes 72 Comparison of Alternative External RER Measures: Competitiveness and the Terms of Trade 86 Summary and Conclusions 92 Appendix A: International Comparison Programme Exchange Rates 99 Appendix B: The Relationship between Profitability, Competitiveness, and the Different External RERs 105 3. The Two-Good Internal RER for Tradables and Nontradables 113 Lawrence E. Hinkle and Fabien Nsengiyumva The Two-Good Internal RER for Tradables and Nontradables: Concepts and Measurement 116 V vi EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT The Relationship between the External RER and the Two-Good Internal RER 129 External RERs as Proxies for the Two-Good Internal RER 141 Summary 152 Appendix: Direct Estimation of the Internal RER from National Accounts Data 155 4. The Three-Good Internal RER for Exports, Imports, and Domestic Goods 175 Lawrence E. Hinkle and Fabien Nsengiyumva The Three-Good Internal RERs for Imports and Exports: Concepts and Measurement 176 The Terms of Trade, the Internal RERs for Imports and Exports, and the External RER 186 Summary and Conclusion 201 Appendix A: The Relationship between the Internal RER for Imports, the External RER, and the Terms of Trade 209 Appendix B: An Additional Possible Proxy for the Three-Good Internal RER 212 Part II: Determinants of the Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate 5. The Long-Run Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate: Conceptual Issues and Empirical Research 219 Peter J. Mon tiel Conceptual Issues 220 Empirical Estimation: Industrial Countries 233 Empirical Estimation: Developing Countries 254 Summary 260 6. Determinants of the Long-Run Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate: An Analytical Model 264 Peter J. Montiel The Analytical Framework 266 The Long-Run Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate 274 Long-Run Fundamentals 278 Summary and Conclusions 289 Part III: Methodologies for Estimating the Equilibrium RER: Empirical Applications 7. Estimating the Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate Empirically: Operational Approaches 293 Theodore 0. Ahlers and Lawrence E. Hinkle CONTENTS vii The Relative PPP-Based Approach to RER Misalignment 296 The Trade-Equations Approach: Establishing the Quantitative Relationship between the RER and the Resource Balance 313 Determining the Target Resource Balance 321 Adjusting the Initial Resource Balance 333 Conclusion: Advantages and Limitations of the Trade-Equations Methodology 342 Appendix A: The RER, Trade-Elasticities, Resource Balance Relationship in a Three-Good Framework 345 Appendix B: Representative Estimates of the Income Elasticity of Demand for Imports 354 Appendix C: Formulas for Exchange Rate Appreciation, Depreciation, and Misalignment in Domestic- and Foreign- Currency Terms 356 8. Estimates of Real Exchange Rate Misalignment with a Simple General-Equilibrium Model 359 Shantayanan Devarajan The DLR Model 361 Applying the DLR Model to the Pre-1994 CFA Zone 365 Sensitivity Analyses and Extensions 372 Conclusion 378 Appendix: The DLR Model 380 9. Long-Run Real Exchange Rate Changes in Developing Countries: Simulations from an Econometric Model 381 Nadeem Ul Haque and Peter J. Montiel A Brief Description of the Model 383 Domestic Policy Shocks 391 External Shocks 395 Summary and Conclusions 398 Appendix: An Application to Thailand 402 10. Single-Equation Estimation of the Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate 405 John Baffes, Ibrahim A. Elbadawi, and Stephen A. O' Connell Step One: Modeling the Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate 407 A Brief Detour: Motivating the Single-Equation Approach 418 Step Two: Estimation 425 Step Three: Calculating the Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate 443 Conclusions 451 Appendix A: Conditioning and Weak Exogeneity 456 Appendix B: Data Description 459 Appendix C: Sustainable Fundamentals 461 viii EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT Part IV: Policy and Operational Considerations 11. The Three Pessimisms: Real Exchange Rates and Trade Flows in Developing Countries 467 Nita Ghei and Lant Pritchett The Import Response to a Real Depreciation 470 Export Demand Pessimism 482 The Export Supply Response to RER Movements 485 Summary and Conclusion 494 12. The Use of the Parallel Market Rate as a Guide to Setting the Official Exchange Rate 497 Nita Ghei and Steven B. Kamin Essential Characteristics of Parallel Exchange Markets 499 A Simple Model of Parallel Exchange Rate Determination 505 Trends in Official and Parallel Real Exchange Rates 522 Summary and Conclusions 532 Appendix: Sensitivity of Results to Choice of Real Exchange Rate 535 13. A Note on Nominal Devaluations, Inflation, and the Real Exchange Rate 539 Nita Ghei and Lawrence E. Hinkle Devaluations, Inflation, and the External RER: the Stylized Facts 544 An Accounting Framework for Determining Consistent Nominal and Relative Prices 552 Conclusion: Advantage and Limitations of the Consistency Framework 570 Appendix: The Accounting Framework for the Two-Good Internal RER 573 References 587 Index Foreword John Williamson Chief Economist, South Asia Region, World Bank The last week has, I suppose, been a fairly typical one for me. Twice during the week I have encountered distinguished economists ana- lyzing important current problems who asked their audience to accept the new faith that exchange rate policy has been hollowed out by capital mobility, leaving nothing coherent between a fixed exchange rate backed up by a currency board on the one hand, and floating rates on the other. One was Barry Eichengreen, discussing the design of a new interna- tional financial architecture at a meeting of the Institute for International Economics. The other was Ernie Preeg, focusing on the outlook for the U.S. economy escaping from its massive current account deficit without a hard landing, in a paper for the Hudson Institute. Interestingly, nei- ther of these analysts ended up by advocating completely freely float- ing exchange rates without any intervention. Eichengreen took it for granted that floating would be "dirty"; as we all know, "dirty floating" is an emotionally biased term invented by ideological floaters in order to try and discredit exchange rate management. Preeg argued that some "disciplines among the three key currencies on central bank interven- tion" will be necessary. If even those who think they have been driven to support floating exchange rates are still taking it for granted that there needs to be some degree of management by the authorities, then two things follow. The first is that there is still a market niche for those of us who try to think about how a system of limited flexibility might best be organized. The other is that there is going to be a continuing need for analysis of where an exchange rate lies in relation to what the authors of this volume call its long-run equilibrium level (the LRER). In the second footnote of the volume the authors gently chastise me for "the somewhat apologetic tone" of my introduction to Estimating Equilibrium Exchange Rates, a vol- ume I edited that set itself a fairly similar task, where I seek to defend the value of this exercise. I am delighted that they feel no need for such a qualification. There is indeed a serious job of work to be done, and the ix x EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT authors in this volume set about doing it with determination and a high degree of professional competence. Since it seems I am no longer as in- tellectually isolated as I have periodically feared since I began drawing analytical distinctions between different concepts of the equilibrium exchange rate back in 1983, and argued that it was important to try and develop empirical estimates of at least one of those concepts (the one that I termed the "fundamental equilibrium exchange rate," which is roughly equivalent to the LRER of this volume), I promise to be less apologetic in future. Had I been asked to guess ex ante what countries the authors planned to focus most attention on, I cannot imagine that I would have regarded C6te d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso as leading candidates. In f act this choice was driven by operational exigencies in the World Bank in the early 1990s, at a time when people valuing their careers did not talk out loud about the overvaluation of the CFA franc (any more than people with ambitions spoke about the overvaluation of the pound in the British Treasury in 1966). The natural strategy of a conscientious official con- fronted by a gag order that he believes cannot last long is to quietly initiate a research program that will help to sort out the mess when higher authority is forced to face the facts of life. That is what happened here. We should be profoundly thankful that the Bank had employees who were prepared to take the risk of reacting that way. They have ended up by producing a book that has far wider applicability than to the CFA countries, or indeed than just to developing countries. This book will surely become the standard reference on the estimation of equilibrium exchange rates (or, what amounts to the same thing, on exchange rate misalignments). I find it difficult to imagine a world in which it would not be impor- tant to estimate exchange rate misalignments. Imagine that Argentina really does dollarize, and then an asymmetrical shock leaves it in deep and seemingly permanent depression. Estimating the degree of over- valuation would be important not just as an input into the inevitable national debate on whether to recreate a national currency, but also to estimate how large a general wage cut would be needed to create the desirable real devaluation without using the exchange rate. Or consider the problems that confront the East Asian countries today (early 1999), of knowing whether their now-floating exchange rates have undone a sufficient part of the overshooting of late 1997 to make it sensible policy to start rebuilding reserves in a big way. Or it may even be that there will be a role for this type of analysis one day among the G3, if and when a concern to adjust the U.S. current account deficit re-emerges. The material in this volume covers all the important approaches to the estimation of the LRER, from the crudest PPP doctrines (currently FOREWORD xi popularized by The Economist's "Big Mac Index") through to the simula- tions of large macroeconometric models that I have attempted to use and the new approach of using unit-root econometrics to derive esti- mates from a single equation reduced form. I found it particularly inter- esting that, as an empirical proposition, relative PPP works for Burkina Faso. The volume also provides an excellent guide to the quite sophisti- cated literature on different concepts of the real exchange rate, and avoids facile identification of one concept as being "the right one." It warns against all the errors that abound in this field (for example, purporting to explain why devaluation won't work, or claiming that all one needs to do is look at the black-market rate or the Big Mac Index to know what the exchange rate should be). Some people may believe that crises are an inevitable feature of the capitalist system. Others hold that exchange-rate crises will vanish as more and more countries adopt floating exchange rates. I can under- stand adherents of both those views dismissing this book as of no inter- est. But some of us believe that crises can be avoided or at least limited by good economic management, and that having a reasonable idea of where the equilibrium exchange rate lies is an essential requirement for good macro management. Those who share these views will want to see this volume widely used to help policy analysts get a feeling on what can and cannot be said about the equilibrium exchange rate, and so make an important contribution to the improvement of macro management and hence the avoidance of future crises. Preface Exchange rate misalignment has been an important element in most of the exchange rate crises that have plagued the developing world during the last decade, including those in Mexico, East Asia, Russia, and Brazil. The increasing integration of world capital markets has escalated the costs of such crises, and some of them have even threatened the stability of the international financial system. Consequently, a broad consensus has emerged in recent years that the overriding objective of exchange rate policy in developing countries should be to avoid episodes of pro- longed and substantial misalignment - meaning situations in which the actual real exchange rate differs significantly from its long-run equilib- rium value. It was the World Bank's involvement in one such episode of misalignment -that preceding the successful devaluation of the CFA francs in 1994 - that eventually led to this book. Views on how to manage exchange rates in developing countries have recently split into two competing schools of thought. One increasingly common view holds that, in light of the heightened integration of world capital markets and the increased vulnerability of developing countries to exchange rate crises, such countries must adopt extreme exchange rate arrangements. This school of thought sees the only credible policy options as, at one extreme, truly free floating exchange rates, which al- low the unfettered action of markets to determine the exchange rate, or, at the other extreme, currency boards, which permanently fix the exchange rate, or "dollarization," which eliminates the exchange rate altogether. The alternative view holds that for many developing countries a managed exchange rate -possibly in the context of an exchange rate band - remains a potentially superior option. This option permits avoid- ing the extremes of a completely clean float with its dangers of excessive real exchange rate volatility and resulting macroeconomic instability, on the one hand, or currency boards and "dollarization" with their ri- gidities in dealing with large real shocks or domestic banking crises, on the other hand. However, with unrestricted capital flows, the viability of the managed exchange rate option requires the timely detection and measurement of exchange rate misalignment so that the nominal ex- change rate and macroeconomic policy can be adjusted appropriately to Xii PREFACE xiii avoid crises. Thus, having a reasonable idea of where the equilibrium exchange rate lies has become an increasingly important requirement for good macroeconomic management under the managed exchange rate regimes still employed by the vast majority of developing countries. Despite the importance of being able to detect and measure exchange rate misalignment, the economics profession has yet to reach a consen- sus on how to do so. The documentation of the various technical proce- dures for determining equilibrium exchange rates is also widely scat- tered among numerous sources. Hence, this World Bank research study - Exchange Rate Misalignment: Concepts and Measurement for Developing Coun- tries -takes stock of the state of the art. It undertakes a comprehensive review of the conceptual and empirical issues concerning measurement of exchange rate misalignment in developing countries and analyzes in detail the currently available methodologies for estimating the long-run equilibrium exchange rate. The study is designed to provide policy makers and their advisors with a compendium of practical techniques for measuring exchange rate misalignment. In this study we reach the cautiously optimistic conclusion that, al- though economists may not at present know enough to calculate ex- change rate misalignment with great precision, we do know enough to identify cases of serious misalignment and sound clear warning signals. The implication for exchange rate policy is that ignorance about the empirical value of the equilibrium exchange rate cannot be used to clinch arguments for extreme exchange rate arrangements such as completely clean floats, currency boards, and "dollarization." Although in some cir- cumstances other considerations may justify adoption of extreme ar- rangements, we believe that appropriate management of the nominal exchange rate will, for the foreseeable future, remain a key concern of macroeconomic policy in most developing countries. To the extent that it does, the detection and measurement of real exchange rate misalign- ment are likely to employ techniques based on or inspired by those set out in this book. Acknowledgments The initial research that eventually led to this book was motivated by one of the major exchange rate crises that punctuated the last decade in the developing world - the devaluation of the CFA francs in 1994. Most of the members of the study team participated in that initial research, although none of us had any idea at the time that our work would emerge in anything like its current form. As the relevance of our initial research on the misalignment of the CFA francs to other developing countries was highlighted by repeated exchange rate crises elsewhere, analytical techniques used in other countries, and economists experienced with these, were added to the project to complement the initial research and round out the coverage of the study. As project managers and then editors, we were blessed with a par- ticularly competent team of fellow researchers and co-authors. They both made strong individual contributions and provided invaluable com- ments and guidance on the other papers and the project as a whole. The other members of the study team were: Theodore 0. Ahlers, Country Director, Africa Country Department 13, World Bank; John Baffes, Economist, Development Prospects Group, World Bank; Shantayan Devarajan, Research Manager, Development Research Group, World Bank; Ibrahim A. Elbadawi, Senior Economist, Development Research Group, World Bank; Nita Ghei, Economist, Consultant, College Park, Md.; Nadeem Ul Haque, Advisor, IMF Institute, International Monetary Fund. Steven B. Kamin, Senior Economist, Division of International Finance, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, D.C.; xiv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Xv Fabien Nsengiyumva, Economist, IMF Institute, International Monetary Fund; Stephen A. O'Connell, Professor of Economics, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pa.; Lant Pritchett, Principal Economist, Resident Mission Indonesia, World Bank. A special note of thanks is also due to John Williamson. John came to the project as a reviewer when the manuscript of the book was first tak- ing shape. His insightful and intellectually demanding comments both shaped the volume and motivated us to push the work farther than we had initially envisaged. Ingrid Ivins provided cheerful, careful, and competent research as- sistance from the first days of the initial work on the CFA francs in 1990 through final completion of this volume in the spring of 1999. Emily Khine, Camille Darmon, and Jagdish Lal tirelessly processed and repro- cessed countless versions of the 13 papers that became the manuscript of this book. The World Bank's Africa Region, Development Research Group, and Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network provided the financial support for the research. Finally, we would like to dedicate this book as follows: To my father, Lawrence E. Hinkle, M.D., for his lifelong in- terest in research and his support. To my mother, Maria Montiel, for her unwavering support and affection. LAWRENCE E. HINKLE PETER J. MONTIEL WORLD BANK WILLIAMS COLLEGE MAY 1999 About the Authors Lawrence E. Hinkle is Lead Economist in a macroeconomic unit of the Technical Department of the World Bank's Africa Region. From 1991 to 1994, he led the Bank's technical preparatory work for the devaluation of the CFA francs. From 1994 to 1997, while much of the research for this book was carried out, he was a visiting fellow in the macroeconomics division of the World Bank's Policy Research Department. His work at the Bank has been primarily in the areas of adjustment policy, exchange rates, trade, monetary and customs unions. Peter J. Montiel is Professor of Economics and the James Finney Baxter III Professor of Public Affairs at Williams College. He has recently been the Chair of the Center for Development Economics at Williams College and has worked in the Policy Research Department of the World Bank as well as the Research Department of the International Monetary Fund. His research has been in the area of macroeconomic stabilization in de- veloping countries, and his recent work has focused on capital flows and exchange rate policy. xvi Acronyms and Abbreviations ADF augmented Dickey-Fuller ADL autoregressive distributed lag BN Beveridge-Nelson BRER bilateral real exchange rate CFA Communaute Financikre Africaine CGE computable general equilibrium CPI consumer price index DEER desired equilibrium exchange rate DER dual exchange rate DF Dickey-Fuller DLR Devarajan, Lewis, and Robinson DRER desired equlibrium real exchange rate EU European Union FDI foreign direct investment FEER fundamental equilibrium real exchange rate G-7 group of seven GDP gross domestic product HBS Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson HLM Haque-Lahiri-Montiel model ICP International Comparison Programme IFS International Financial Statistics IE Institute of International Economics IMF International Monetary Fund INS Information Notice System LIBOR London interbank offer rate LIDC low-income developing country LRER long-run equilibrium real exchange rate NATREX natural equilibrium real exchange rate NEER nominal effective exchange rate NTB nontariff barrier OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OLS ordinary least squares PP Phillips-Perron PPP purchasing power parity REER real effective exchange rate xvii xviii EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT RER real exchange rate SDR standard drawing right(s) SRER short-run equilibrium real exchange rate SSA sub-Saharan Africa UFC unit factor cost ULC unit labor cost UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization WPI wholesale price index 1 Exchange Rate Misalignment: An Overview Peter J. Montiel and Lawrence E. Hinkle The collapse of the Smithsonian agreement in March of 1973 marked the end of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates among the major industrial countries. Initially, many developing countries re- sponded to this event by attempting to sustain their fixed exchange rate parities. Over time, however, the majority of these countries have also moved toward exchange rate arrangements involving more frequent adjustments in nominal exchange rates. Most such arrangements, how- ever, have not left exchange rate determination to the market. Instead, whether in the form of crawling pegs or managed floating, they have invariably featured an important role for the authorities in the setting of nominal exchange rates and thus have led to increased activism in ex- change rate management. Consequently, the question of how to choose the appropriate value of the nominal exchange rate has remained a key concern of macroeconomic policy in developing countries. In this con- text, a broad consensus has emerged in recent years that the overriding objective of exchange rate policy should be to avoid episodes of pro- longed and substantial misalignment-meaning situations in which the actual real exchange rate (RER) differs significantly from its long-run equilibrium value. Unfortunately, following this advice is not as simple as it sounds, even for the most well intentioned policymaker. Leaving aside the sub- stantial difficulties that may arise in setting the actual nominal and real 1. For a description of the evolution of developing-country exchange rate regimes since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, see Agenor and Montiel (1999). See also Caramazza and Aziz (1998) for a review of experiences with fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes in the 1990s. I 2 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT exchange rates on their intended paths, two fundamental issues have to be confronted. The first is defining exactly what is meant by the long- run equilibrium real exchange rate. The second is estimating what the value of this long-run equilibrium rate is for a given country at any moment in time. Neither issue is trivial. Even though exchange rate misalignment is an important concern for policymakers, the economics profession has yet to reach a consensus on precisely what is meant by the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate. And not surprisingly, there- fore, it has provided little systematic guidance on how to measure it.2 Despite the absence of consensus, not only do developing-country policymakers continue to confront these issues on a daily basis, but the urgency of getting this key macroeconomic relative price "right" may be increasing over time, as growing financial integration has arguably escalated the costs associated with real exchange rate misalignment. In the developing-country context alone, recent episodes such as the Janu- ary 1994 devaluation of the CFA francs in West and Central Africa,' the Mexican currency crisis at the end of 1994, the Asian crisis that erupted in mid-1997, and the Brazilian devaluation in January 1999 have served as reminders of the macroeconomic disruptions that can be caused by real exchange rate misalignment. The severe macroeconomic disloca- tions experienced during these episodes suggest that the importance of being able to estimate the degree of misalignment may, if anything, have increased in recent years. This volume arose from one such episode of misalignment. Most of the papers collected here originated in the course of a practical exercise in measuring real exchange rate misalignment at the World Bank. Dur- ing the long dialogue over the degree of overvaluation of the CFA francs, World Bank staff were confronted with the problem of estimating the extent of real exchange rate misalignment in a context where it was im- portant to ensure that the estimates were both theoretically defensible and empirically accurate. Hence, the staff did a considerable amount of analytical work on various methodologies for calculating indexes of the actual real exchange rate and for estimating the value of the long-run 2. An interesting perspective on the evolution of these issues is provided by John Williamson's introduction to his edited book on the topic, Estimating Equi- librium Exchange Rates (1994). The somewhat apologetic tone of that introduc- tion suggests that, in the authors' opinion, the very concept of estimating long- run equilibrium exchange rate needed to be defended within the economics pro- fession. 3. CFA is the abbreviation for Communaut6 Financi&re Africaine. The CFA francs are the currencies of the West and Central African Monetary Unions, which together constitute the CFA zone. EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT: AN OVERVIEW 3 equilibrium real exchange rate. This methodological work focused on the types of analysis that could be carried out relatively quickly with (a) the limited amount and periodicity of data usually available in small African countries (for example, a monthly consumer price index (CPI), standard annual national accounts aggregates, annual export and im- port price indexes, and monthly official and parallel market exchange rates) and (b) the limited staff inputs (for example, one economist and a researcher) that are typically available for work on small developing countries. The staff also directed considerable attention to some empiri- cal problems encountered during this work that are relatively more im- portant in developing than industrial countries, such as unrecorded trade, parallel exchange markets, shifting trade patterns, and large fluc- tuations in export prices. This book is intended to preserve and disseminate this work on mea- suring misalignment because the methodologies that were used are likely to be of practical relevance in many other developing-country applica- tions. The book's objectives are thus to bring this work together, set it in an analytical framework, and complement it with other techniques that- while not employed in the CFA franc context because the operational restrictions described above prevented doing so or because the particu- lar structure of the CFA economies did not make them suitable-might well be applicable in other developing countries. What we hope to achieve is to provide policymakers and their advisers with a compen- dium of practical techniques for estimating equilibrium real exchange rates, as well as to further the development of this area of research by taking stock of the current state of the art. The objective of this first chapter is to present an overview of the book and to place the subsequent chapters in context. The remainder of this overview is divided into five sections, corresponding to each of the four parts of the book, plus a concluding section. Part I of the book considers issues that arise in the definition and measurement of the actual real exchange rate. It is indispensable to treat these first because the choices made in selecting the appropriate actual real exchange rate for a particular application will obviously affect the equilibrium concept relevant to it and also because the reliability of the estimates of the equilibrium exchange rate will clearly depend on how closely empirical proxies can approximate the "true" variable being measured. These definition and measurement issues are reviewed and summarized in the second section of this overview. Part II turns to the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate (LRER) itself. It contains two chapters that provide overviews of existing litera- ture. The first chapter considers conceptual issues that arise in defining the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate and surveys existing 4 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT techniques for its empirical estimation. The following chapter sets out an analytical model that synthesizes existing theories about the deter- minants of the LRER. The basic findings of these two chapters are de- scribed in the section below on the determinants of the equilibrium RER. Part III then analyzes in some detail four methodologies for the em- pirical estimation of the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate: a PPP- based approach, a recursive trade-equations approach, and two general equilibrium approaches-one based on structural econometric models and the other on a reduced-form methodology utilizing unit-root econo- metrics. These methodologies are described in the four chapters con- tained in Part III of the book. They are summarized and evaluated in this overview's section on methodologies for estimating the equi- librium RER. Part IV of the book, reviewed below in the section on policy and op- erational considerations, takes up some important related issues. The first chapter in Part IV examines the empirical role of the real exchange rate in promoting external balance, a mechanism that is featured promi- nently in traditional definitions of the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate but the empirical effectiveness of which has sometimes been ques- tioned. The two remaining chapters in Part IV assess the usefulness of the parallel market premium as an indicator of the LRER and describe operational techniques for estimating the magnitude of nominal exchange rate changes required to correct a given real exchange rate misalignment. The overview concludes with a final section presenting our assess- ment of where the enterprise of defining and estimating equilibrium real exchange rates in developing countries currently stands. We find, in brief, that recent developments justify optimism. The three techniques that have traditionally been used for the estimation of equilibrium real exchange rates-based on purchasing power parity, on the trade equa- tions, and on simulations of empirical general equilibrium models- each suffer from particular limitations; but each can be useful under appropriate circumstances. What we have dubbed the reduced-form general-equilibrium approach is a relatively recent technique. Although this method of estimation is not without its own pitfalls, it appears to hold promise of future progress in the empirical estimation of equilib- rium real exchange rates for developing countries. The Real Exchange Rate: Concepts and Measurement The point of departure for estimating the long-run equilibrium real ex- change rate (which we call the LRER) is the measurement of the actual real exchange rate (RER). Unfortunately, this is not a straightforward EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT: AN OVERVIEW 5 matter. The difficulties are both conceptual and empirical. Multiple con- ceptual definitions of the real exchange rate, drawn from different ana- lytical frameworks and suitable for use in different circumstances, have long complicated the analysis of real exchange rate issues. This multi- plicity poses the problem of how to choose among alternative defini- tions of the real exchange rate. In addition, in the empirical measure- ment of the RER in many developing-country applications one confronts a large number of practical problems that are not often encountered in the case of industrial countries and thus have not been as widely dis- cussed as other more general issues. The first three chapters in Part I of the book take up these definitional and measurement issues in detail. As discussed subsequently in Part IL the development of LRER theo- ries has followed somewhat different lines in industrial- and develop- ing-country applications. Somewhat surprisingly, the differences have extended to the very definition of the RER itself. In the context of industrial countries, economists have focused on the "external" RER for both analytical and empirical purposes. When defined in this manner, the RER is measured as the ratio of the foreign to the domestic values of some broad-based price index such as the CPI or the deflator for gross domestic product (GDP), expressed in a com- mon currency by using the nominal exchange rate to convert the price level in one country into the currency of the other. Unfortunately, mat- ters are complicated by the fact that alternative conceptual frameworks imply alternative choices of price indexes. As a result, even within the external real exchange rate category there exist multiple definitions from which to choose. This multiplicity of concepts would be of little conse- quence if the alternative measures all tended to move together, but they cannot be counted upon to do so-that is, empirically, the choice of price index tends to matter. In the developing-country context, moreover, the RER tends to be defined in two different ways for analytical purposes: either as the rela- tive price of traded goods in terms of nontraded goods, which is re- ferred to in this book as the two-good internal real exchange rate, or as the relative prices of exportable and importable goods in terms of nontraded goods, which are referred to here as the three-good internal real exchange rates. To complicate matters further, despite the analyti- cal preference for the use of internal RER concepts, the external RER tends to be used for empirical purposes in developing-country applica- tions. This practice raises a number of issues. For example, when is it appropriate to use one definition rather than another? What is the rela- tionship between the definitions? Are there specific pitfalls to which practitioners should be alerted in formulating hypotheses using one RER concept and testing them using another as an empirical proxy? The three 6 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT chapters in Part I by Hinkle and Nsengiyumva take up these questions, considering each of the three broad definitions of the RER in turn. The External RER Chapter 2, the first chapter in Part I, provides a general summary of conceptual and empirical issues that arise in defining and measuring the external real exchange rate. Three alternative definitions, based on different price indexes, are reviewed; and both their theoretical under- pinnings and empirical counterparts are described. Chapter 2 also pro- vides a critical evaluation of the usefulness of external RER measures in developing countries from a conceptual perspective. On a more practi- cal level, issues such as the choice of weighting schemes in the construc- tion of real effective exchange rate (REER) indexes and alternative de- compositions of such indexes for analytical purposes are also discussed. Finally, particular attention is given to measurement problems that arise with special force in developing countires because of parallel exchange rates, unrecorded trade, and rapidly shifting trade patterns. The three external real exchange rate measures examined are the rela- tive expenditure PPP-based RER, which uses domestic and partner country CPIs; the Mundell-Fleming or aggregate production cost RER, which uses GDP deflators; and the traded-goods RER, which can be constructed using relative unit labor costs in manufacturing, wholesale prices, manufacturing-sector deflators, or export unit values. The CPI- based measure has the important empirical advantage that the domes- tic price data required are widely available on a current basis for most developing countries so that REERs with reasonably comprehensive partner country representation can be computed. The aggregate pro- duction cost RER, in contrast, relies on GDP deflators that are available at much lower frequencies for developing than for industrial countries. This shortcoming also affects some versions of production cost-based RERs for traded goods, such as that based on manufacturing deflators. Both of these cost-based RERs (the aggregate and traded-goods ver- sions) can, in principle, be improved upon as measures of competitive- ness through the use of unit labor cost measures, since these take into account intercountry differences in average labor productivity. How- ever, lack of data on unit labor costs limits the usefulness of such mea- sures in developing countries. 4. However, traded-goods RERs computed using wholesale prices, when these are available, do permit the use of higher-frequency data as discussed in Chapter 2. EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT: AN OVERVIEW 7 A more fundamental problem with the cost-based RERs, however, is that they are based on a concept of competitiveness between domestic and foreign goods that are not perfectly substitutable. For countries with a large share of standardized commodities in their exports, the applica- bility of cost-based RERs may, therefore, be limited. For such countries the relevant concept of competitiveness is not the ability to produce at lower costs and thus sell at lower prices (expressed in a common cur- rency) than other countries producing similar products. Rather, it is the adequacy of domestic incentives to produce goods that are not greatly differentiated from (and thus must sell at similar prices to) those pro- duced by other countries. This difference makes such cost-based con- cepts seriously misleading in the presence of terms-of-trade changes. An increase in the price of domestic exports-which would increase in- ternal incentives to produce such goods-would, for example, show up as an increase in the GDP deflator or wholesale price index (WPI) and thus inaccurately suggest a deteriorating relative cost performance. Cost- based measures are therefore not usually considered to have particular conceptual advantages over expenditure-based measures in the devel- oping-country context. In view of the data availability advantages of the latter, Chapter 2 concludes that for most developing countries the REER computed using domestic and foreign CPIs is the most useful of the various external RER measures. However, both expenditure-based and cost-based external RER mea- sures can be very sensitive to the existence of parallel markets and unre- corded trade, as well as to shifting trade shares and weighting schemes. Calculations for C6te d'Ivoire illustrate the significant difference that such factors can make to estimated REERs. Hence, a variety of measures should be calculated and interpreted together to permit cross-checks, rather than relying on a single measure. Finally, a presentational point noted in Chapter 2, and worth repeat- ing here to avoid subsequent confusion, is that, like nominal exchange rates, all RER measures can be expressed both in foreign-currency terms and inversely in domestic-currency terms. When expressed in foreign- currency terms (that is, in units of foreign currency per unit of domestic currency), an increase in the RER represents an appreciation. However, when the RER is expressed in domestic-currency terms (that is, in units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency), the inverse is true: an increase in the RER represents a depreciation. Since for some pur- poses it is useful to express RERs in foreign-currency terms and for oth- ers in domestic-currency terms, both versions are widely used in the literature and in this volume. In the interest of clarity, we have noted throughout the text and in the graphs and tables whether the RER is 8 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT measured in foreign- or domestic-currency terms, but readers should be alert to shifts between the two measures. The Two-Good Internal RER for Tradables and Nontradables Chapter 3 turns to the two-good internal real exchange rate, the defini- tion of which is based on the familiar Swan-Salter "dependent economy" model and which is in widest use for analytical purposes in the devel- oping-country context. Although the two-good internal real exchange rate has strong analytical appeal, difficulties with this definition arise in practical applications, stemming from the absence of generally avail- able price indexes for "traded" and "nontraded" goods. Chapter 3 de- scribes and evaluates alternative approaches to the construction of such indexes, which differ according to whether they attempt to measure border prices or domestic prices as well as to whether the relative price indexes are expenditure-based or production-based. These may diverge significantly in developing countries. A familiar proxy for the internal RER, based on partner country WPIs as measures of traded-goods prices and the domestic CPI as an indicator of the price of nontraded goods, may be reasonable as long as the terms of trade and commercial policies are stable. When the terms of trade change, the measure is likely to be a better proxy for the internal RER for importables than for exportables. However, as in the case of the external RER, this measure also proves quite sensitive to parallel exchange rates, unrecorded trade, and changes in trade patterns. Hinkle and Nsengiyumva also consider the theoretical and empirical relationships between the external RER and two-good internal RER. This is a particularly important problem in the developing-country context since, as indicated above, analysis of RER issues tends to be formulated using the two-good internal RER concept, while for data availability reasons empirical work tends to rely on the external RER. Conceptually, the relationship between the two measures is well known-the home country's internal RER is a function of its external RER as well as of the internal RER of the foreign country and the relative prices of tradable goods in the two countries. Because of the role of the last two factors, a country's internal and external RERs need not move together. More- over, even if these factors were unchanged, movements in a country's internal RER are likely to be larger than those in its external RER. In Chapter 3, the two measures are compared for a specific country, and the effects on the measured RER of changes in a subset of fundamen- tals-specifically productivity and trade taxes-are analyzed. The chap- ter illustrates the familiar result that faster productivity growth in the traded than in the nontraded sector will cause the internal RER to EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT: AN OVERVIEW 9 appreciate. Further, it shows that differentially faster productivity growth in the traded-goods sectors of partner countries than in the domestic economy could cause the external RER to depreciate at the same time. A final important caveat noted by Hinkle and Nsengiyumva con- cerns the role of the law of one price. The quantitative relationships be- tween the measured internal and external RERs all depend upon the law of one price holding for tradable goods, a supposition that has been strongly challenged by much recent empirical work on large industrial countries. If the law of one price does not hold or holds only loosely as a long- run tendency, then the effect of exchange rate movements on the internal RER will be muted, the internal and external RERs will diverge, and the external RER will not be a reliable indicator of movements in domestic relative prices. The various caveats articulated in Chapter 3 concerning the relationship between the two RER concepts are relevant for the rest of the book, in which some of the empirical work utilizes the external RER. Chapter 3 thus concludes that, despite its analytical appeal, the two- good internal RER is of limited empirical utility for low-income coun- tries. Data problems make it extremely difficult to measure the two-good internal RER with any accuracy in most countries. In addition, many of these countries experience significant exogenous variations in their terms of trade, which cannot be addressed in a two-good framework. The Three-Good Internal RERs for Exportables and Importables The final chapter in Part I, Chapter 4, considers the three-good internal real exchange rate, which disaggregates tradable goods into exportables and importables and produces two real exchange rate measures- corresponding to the relative prices of exportables and importables, re- spectively, in terms of nontraded goods. Here, the central conceptual issue concerns the choice between a two-good and a three-good frame- work. Chapter 4 analyzes the conditions under which each of these may be appropriate. The three-good framework is strongly advocated for most cases since fluctuations in the terms of trade and commercial policies are often important in developing countries. These shocks tend to move exportable and importable RERs in opposite directions, making a two- good internal RER essentially meaningless. Hence, in most cases, ana- lysts will want to examine the behavior of both the exportables and importables real exchange rates. 5. If for presentational reasons a single RER measure is needed, the price of domestic goods measured in foreign exchange may be used for this purpose as illustrated in Chapter 8. 10 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT Overall, the three chapters by Hinkle and Nsengiyumva make the case that for low-income countries, the most useful RER measures are the CPI-based external RERs (or those using unit labor costs if the data are available) and the three-good internal RERs for exportables and importables. The external RER and its components are particularly useful for analyzing the effects of nominal shocks such as nominal ex- change rate movements and foreign and domestic inflation. The three- good internal RERs are useful for measuring the effects on domestic relative prices of real shocks such as changes in the terms of trade and commercial policy. If the law of one price holds for traded goods, it is possible to calcu- late any of the various internal and external RER measures from given values of the others. However, empirically the law of one price holds at best only loosely for traded goods, and (unknown) measurement errors affect the accuracy of all the empirical RER measures. Since inconsisten- cies in the data may pose serious analytical problems in some cases, best practice will typically involve constructing and analyzing several RER measures. In the case of the external RER, these would examine alterna- tive assumptions about trade through parallel markets, unrecorded trade, and trade shares. Similarly, different approaches to the estimation of the three-good internal RERs should be compared to the extent possible in each case. In a number of low-income countries the unavailability of the data required for timely and accurate measurement of the three-good inter- nal and the external RER for traded goods is still a serious analytical constraint. In these cases, improved data collection is a prerequisite for more accurate measurement and analysis of the real exchange rate. Determinants of the Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate In Part II, the book turns to the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate (LRER) itself. The two chapters, 5 and 6, in this part, both by Montiel, are overviews: the first of the existing empirical literature devoted to the estimation of the LRER, and the second of theory linking the LRER to its long-run fundamental determinants. Conceptual Issues and Empirical Research Chapter 5 actually takes up two separate topics. Since it is the first chap- ter in the volume that explicitly considers the question of the definition and measurement of the LRER, its first section is devoted to conceptual issues, examinrng in particular what is meant by the long-run equilibrium EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT: AN OVERVIEW 11 real exchange rate, before describing how economists have attempted to estimate it. The purpose of this first section is to sort out some con- ceptual problems that have arisen in defining and measuring the LRER. These are of various types, two of which are worth mentioning here. First, some economists question the very notion of distinguishing between the actual RER and its notional equilibrium value, since the actual RER is itself the outcome of the economy's macroeconomic equi- librium. This argument appears to be somewhat confused, however. The distinction between the actual RER and the LRER is not one between disequilibrium and equilibrium, but rather between different types of equilibriums-that is, equilibriums conditioned on different values of macroeconomic variables. The actual RER observed at any moment may be influenced by a variety of factors that may prove to be transitory. These include speculative "bubble" factors, actual values of predeter- mined variables that differ from their long-run values, and transitory movements in both policy and exogenous variables. When at least some of the variables on which the actual "equilibrium" RER depends are unsustainable, the actual RER will tend to change over time, tracing out an equilibrium path. It is possible, then, to think of alternative "equilibrium" RERs, for which the notion of equilibrium is defined over different time horizons. For example, we can distinguish conceptually between the actual RER and a "short-run equilibrium" RER (SRER). The latter refers to the value of the RER that would be observed in the absence of speculative (bubble) factors. This value depends on "short-run fundamentals" such as the actual values of predetermined variables as well as actual and expected future values of policy and exogenous variables. Similarly, we can dis- tinguish between this SRER and a long-run equilibrium RER (LRER). In contrast to the SRER, the LRER is a function of the steady-state values of the predetermined variables and the permanent (sustainable) values of policy and exogenous variables, rather than of the actual values of these variables. Finally, we can also distinguish between the LRER and the "desired" LRER (DRER), which is conditioned on optimal values of the policy variables, permanent values of the exogenous variables, and steady-state values of the predetermined variables. Second, even if one accepts these distinctions and is specifically in- terested in measuring the LRER, a further complication arises in deter- mining the duration of the "long run" that is relevant for policy pur- poses. The traditional definition of the LRER based on the simultaneous attainment of internal and external balance, established by Nurkse (1945), suggests that the long run should be long enough for cyclical effects to have worked themselves out. However, in specifying "external balance" as a situation in which the current account is financed by sustainable 12 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT net capital inflows, this definition leaves open the question of whether the long run implies that the economy has reached a steady-state inter- national net creditor position. Alternative definitions of external bal- ance, built on different assumptions about the economy's net external creditor position, are examined in Chapter 5. The second part of Chapter 5 surveys existing methods of estimating the LRER (based on various definitions of "external balance") in both industrial and developing countries. After reviewing evidence on the validity of purchasing power parity (PPP) as a theory of the LRER, ap- plications of three alternative approaches to empirical estimation of the LRER are surveyed: (a) a recursive partial-equilibrium trade-equations approach, (b) an approach based on the simulation of macroeconometric models, and (c) two varieties of reduced-form estimation, a traditional one and one based on unit-root econometrics. Each of these techniques is subsequently described, analyzed, and illustrated in detail in Part III of this book. Thus, the role of this survey is to provide background for the individual estimation techniques to be described later, as well as to explore the relationships among them. An Analytical Model Chapter 6 then presents a theoretical model of the determination of the LRER that is intended to synthesize previous literature on the determi- nants of the LRER. The role of this chapter is to identify the set of vari- ables that may potentially act as long-run fundamentals and to deter- mine the qualitative nature of their influence on the LRER. The vari- ables identified there are domestic supply-side factors, fiscal policy, changes in the international economic environment, and commercial policy. Each of these is discussed in turn below. Domestic supply-side factors. These essentially refer to differences in sectoral productivity growth rates-particularly, the Balassa-Samuelson effect. Traditionally, this effect has been interpreted as arising from faster productivity growth in the traded-goods sector than in the nontraded- goods sector. Differential productivity growth of this type requires an appreciation of the long-run equilibrium value of the internal RER. Fiscal policy. Permanent changes in the distribution of government spending between traded and nontraded goods affect the LRER in dif- ferent ways. Additional tax-financed spending on nontraded goods, for example, creates incipient excess demand in that market, requiring a real appreciation to restore equilibrium. By contrast, tax-financed in- creases in spending on traded goods put downward pressure on the trade balance and require a real depreciation to sustain external balance. Changes in the international economic environment. Changes in an economy's external terms of trade, the flows of external transfers, the EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT: AN OVERVIEW 13 world inflation rate, and the level of world real interest rates, all may potentially influence the LRER. Improvements in the terms of trade tend to appreciate the equilibrium real exchange rate for importables by im- proving the trade balance and creating excess demand for nontraded goods. Whether the long-run real exchange rate for exportables depreci- ates or appreciates is ambiguous in the theoretical model. Empirically, however, the exportables RER almost always depreciates when the terms of trade improve because the price of exports tends to rise much more than the price of nontraded goods. Increases in the flow of external transfers received also appreciate the equilibrium RER through posi- tive effects on the sustainable current account balance. In the model analyzed in Chapter 6, changes in world inflation affect the equilibrium real exchange rate through effects on transactions costs associated with changes in real money balances. The direction of these effects on the LRER depends on whether such costs are incurred prima- rily in the form of traded or nontraded goods. The absorption of either type of goods by transactions costs effectively reduces their supply. Hence, when transactions costs are incurred in the form of traded goods, an equilibrium real depreciation is required to maintain external bal- ance; but when they are incurred in the form of nontraded goods, an equilibrium real appreciation is required to maintain internal balance. The effects on the LRER of changes in world real interest rates de- pend on the nature of the domestic economy's financial links with the rest of the world. In the analytical model described in this chapter, al- though the domestic economy is financially open, its real interest rate is independent of the world rate in the long run, being determined in- stead by the domestic rate of time preference. In this model, reductions in world real interest rates cause the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate to depreciate. The reason is that lower world interest rates induce capital inflows that reduce the country's net creditor position over time, and the long-run loss of net interest receipts requires a real depreciation to maintain external balance. The opposite result is, however, possible with alternative assumptions about the determination of domestic in- terest rates as explained in footnote 12 below. Commercial policy. Finally, trade liberalization is associated with a long- run depreciation of the equilibrium RER. The effect of liberalization is to switch resources into the nontraded (or non-import-competing) sec- tor. The emergence of incipient excess supply in the nontraded-goods market requires a depreciation of the real exchange rate. The challenge in estimating the LRER, of course, is assessing the quan- titative influence on the LRER-if any-of changes in each of the above variables. Alternative methods of doing so are described in Part III of the book. 14 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT Methodologies for Estimating the Equilibrium RER: Empirical Applications The heart of the book is Part III, in which alternative techniques for esti- mating the LRER are presented. Four such techniques-all of them briefly reviewed earlier in the empirical survey-are analyzed individually and illustrated with specific empirical applications in the four chapters, 7 to 10, that make up this part of the book. Chapter 7 focuses on the two estimation techniques that are in widest operational use: the purchas- ing-power-parity (PPP)-based approach and a recursive partial-equilib- rium approach based on adjustments in the economy's external resource balance, which we have dubbed the trade-equations approach. There are two versions of the trade-equations approach in wide use. The first one is a Mundell-Fleming version that takes export volumes to be deter- mined on the demand side of the market; export supply is taken to be perfectly elastic. The second one is a three-good version that takes ex- port demand to be perfectly elastic; export volumes are correspondingly determined on the supply side of the market. Empirical application of the trade-equations approach also involves two analytical tasks-mea- surement of the underlying (or structural) resource balance and deter- mination of a target long-run resource balance-that are common to most other methodologies for estimating the LRER empirically.6 Chapter 7 provides a general overview of the trade-equations approach with an illustration for C6te d'Ivoire. Chapter 8 presents an application of the three-good trade-equations approach, which focuses on the role of one specific "fundamental" (the terms of trade), and applies the technique to a larger group of 12 CFA countries. The last two chapters in Part III analyze the two more explicitly general-equilibrium approaches. Chap- ter 9 describes how simulations of fairly traditional empirical macro- economic models can be used to estimate the LRER in developing coun- tries. Chapter 10 provides a detailed description and two applications of a relatively new approach based on single-equation reduced-form estimation using unit-root econometrics. The following section summa- rizes the findings of each of these four chapters. The Relative PPP-Based Approach The simplest and most venerable technique for estimating the LRER in developing countries, no less so than in industrial countries, is the PPP 6. The term "resource balance" is used throughout this volume to refer to the difference between exports and imports of goods and nonfactor services. It is equal to gross domestic savings less gross investment. EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT: AN OVERVIEW 15 approach. Chapter 7 of Part III, by Ahlers and Hinkle, describes the PPP- based method, as well as the trade-equations method discussed below. The Ahlers and Hinkle exposition is based on an illustration of how the simple PPP method could have been used to estimate the degree of mis- alignment that characterized C6te d'Ivoire prior to the devaluation of the CFA franc. Relative PPP may be applied either broadly to the external RER for all goods or more narrowly to just the RER for traded goods. The ratio- nale for applying relative PPP to traded goods, as an application of the law of one price, is stronger; and this is the standard practice in indus- trial countries. However, lack of data on the RER for traded goods, as in the C6te d'Ivoire example considered in Chapter 7, usually limits one to the use of RER for all goods in developing countries. The use of the relative PPP-based method can be justified in one of two ways. On the one hand, the analyst may simply adopt ex ante the traditional relative-PPP view on the determination of the long-run equi- librium real exchange rate, which essentially takes the LRER to be a constant.7 On the other hand, the LRER may be considered by the ana- lyst to be determined by a broad set of fundamentals, which may turn out ex post to be stationary in a time-series sense for the specific appli- cation at hand. In the first case, the decision to apply the PPP approach would be made before looking at the data. In the second case, the PPP approach would be adopted only after the RER in the country under review passes a test of stationarity. When relative PPP is assumed to hold ex ante, measuring the equi- librium real exchange rate essentially involves removing the effects of nonsystematic transitory shocks. In practice these are eliminated by iden- tifying a base period in which such shocks are believed, on the basis of independent evidence, to have been negligible-a procedure that en- sures that the actual real exchange rate coincided with its equilibrium (PPP) value during that period. Thus the actual real exchange rate in the base period represents the estimate of the equilibrium rate. The nomi- nal exchange rate consistent with the LRER from that moment on can then be calculated by simply adjusting the nominal exchange rate for the cumulative difference between domestic and foreign inflation. The alternative case is that the LRER is interpreted as subject to change in response to changes in underlying fundamentals but turns out em- pirically to be stationary for a particular country. In this case, the stationarity of the RER forces the analyst to take the position that its 7. This is in contrast to the absolute version of PPP, which takes the LRER to be unity. 16 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT fundamental determinants are either individually stationary-that is, that the "permanent" values of the fundamentals have not changed dur- ing the sample period, though the fundamentals may have been subject to transitory fluctuations-or that any nonstationary fundamentals must be cointegrated among themselves. In either situation, the LRER can still be measured using a base-year value, though the identification of a suitable base year is more complicated under this interpretation, as ex- plained below. Ahlers and Hinkle refer to the PPP-based method that estimates the LRER using the value of the RER during some base year as the "PPP base-year" approach. It calculates misalignment by simply plot- ting the real exchange rate over time and comparing its value during the period of interest to the corresponding value in the base year in which the real exchange rate was judged to be at its long-run equilibrium value. The empirically oriented exposition of the PPP base-year approach by Ahlers and Hinkle is particularly appropriate because in this meth- odology everything depends on the identification of a suitable base year. As mentioned above, how the base year is chosen depends on whether the rationale underlying the procedure is a simple ex ante relative PPP- based one or a more sophisticated one in which the real exchange rate is driven by stationary fundamentals. In the simple PPP case, the "inde- pendent evidence" of equilibrium referred to previously is likely to con- cern the behavior of a particular outcome variable, such as the resource balance. In contrast, from the "stationary fundamentals" perspective, the base year chosen should be a recent year in which the actual ex- change rate is believed to have been close to its equilibrium value be- cause all the fundamentals were close to their sustainable values. This requirement makes the application of the PPP methodology more complicated in the latter case. As explained in the survey of empirical estimation in Chapter 5, the set of fundamentals to be considered in choosing a base year may in- clude both exogenous and policy variables. In assessing the behavior of the exogenous variables, the analyst may look, for example, for terms of trade that are reasonably close to their likely long-run trend levels and for capital flows that are consistent-in amount and terms-both with the likely long-term availability of capital and the country's debt-servicing capacity. For assessing the permanence of the policy stance, the relevant criteria may involve the attainment of growth, investment, and infla- tion targets during various years over the sample period. A common problem in selecting appropriate base years is that, be- cause of policy shortcomings and external constraints, years in which exogenous variables were at sustainable levels are not always years in which policy variables were at desirable levels. Thus, the choice of a base year tends to call for subjective judgments in determining when EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT: AN OVERVIEW 17 the real exchange rate was near its long-run equilibrium value. For ex- ample, historically, desirable growth and investment levels have some- times been attained only when the terms of trade were temporarily in- flated or when capital flows were unsustainable. Conversely, sustain- able terms of trade and capital flows have often been associated with undesirable growth and investment outcomes. Hence, in applying the PPP base-year approach under the "stationary fundamentals" interpre- tation, the analyst is often forced to make tradeoffs between the sustainability of exogenous variables and that of policy variables. One way to deal with this problem is to estimate the sustainable val- ues of the fundamentals on the basis of their sample means or, in the trend-stationary case, as their trend values within the sample. In effect, this procedure amounts to estimating the LRER as the sample mean or the trend value of the RER within the sample, rather than as the particu- lar value of the RER in a specified base year. This procedure can be re- ferred to as the PPP average or trend approach. Ahlers and Hinkle also illustrate this alternative method of estimating the LRER in applications of the PPP-based method. Empirically, a large appreciation of the RER relative to its trend value in a short period of time is one of the most reliable statistical indicators of misalignment and a potential exchange rate crisis. The relative PPP-based approach, however, has one severe limita- tion: if the RER is nonstationary, its equilibrium value will be affected by changes in the fundamental variables that determine it. If these fun- damentals are subject to permanent changes, and the evidence suggests that they usually are, then techniques for estimating the long-term value of the equilibrium exchange rate must take these changes into account. In other words, estimates of the LRER must depend on the estimated permanent changes in the fundamentals. The Trade-Equations Approach The PPP-based approach described above was originally motivated by the relative-PPP theory of exchange rate determination. Similarly, the trade-equations methodology is also based on a venerable analytical tool in open-economy macroeconomics-in this case, the partial-equilibrium "elasticities" approach to exchange rate determination. This methodol- ogy is based on the notion that the primary macroeconomic role of the real exchange rate is to influence the resource balance through expendi- ture-switching mechanisms. It is more sophisticated than the simplest interpretation of the empirical PPP approach in that it acknowledges that the equilibrium real exchange rate is not necessarily constant. Ahlers and Hinkle describe and illustrate the trade-equations ap- proach as well as the relative-PPP approach. As mentioned previously, 18 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT there are two standard versions of the trade-equations approach. The version most commonly used in industrial countries is based on the Mundell-Fleming production structure. In this framework, complete spe- cialization in the production of one good by both the domestic and for- eign countries (each country's own GDP) makes export supply func- tions perfectly elastic, while the domestic and foreign goods are taken to be imperfect substitutes in demand. Export and import quantities are consequently both demand-determined, and the real exchange rate ex- erts its effect on the trade balance through its influence on the domestic demand for imports and on the external demand for the country's ex- ports. This perspective is typically adopted for industrial countries, as well as for some developing countries whose exports are dominated by differentiated manufactured goods. The alternative version is usually applied to developing countries in which exports are instead dominated by undifferentiated primary products. In this case, it is more appropri- ate to consider export demand as being infinitely price-elastic and to recognize a finite export supply elasticity.' The quantity of exports is thus determined by the elasticity of export supply In both versions of the trade-equations approach, the resource bal- ance will in general depend on the real exchange rate as well as other variables. For given values of the latter, the "equilibrium" value of the real exchange rate must be that which generates the "equilibrium" value of the resource balance-that is, that value of the resource balance that is consistent with balance of payments equilibrium. Given a target for external reserves and an exogenously determined volume of net resource flows (net capital inflows plus net interest receipts plus net transfers), the equilibrium value of the resource balance is determined. Alterna- tively, for fully creditworthy countries in which capital markets can be assumed to provide the financing required to cover a resource deficit, a sustainable or trend saving-investment balance can be projected sepa- rately and assumed to determine the equilibrium resource balance. In either case, the equilibrium value of the real exchange rate can then be calculated from the required change in the initial resource balance for given initial values of exports and imports if the relevant import and export demand or supply elasticities are known. The three key empirical requirements for implementing the trade- equations approach are: (a) estimates of the elasticity of exports and im- ports with respect to the real exchange rate; (b) methods for determin- ing a target resource balance to be used in the analysis; and (c) tech- niques for estimating the effects on the initial resource balance of 8. Conceptually, this approach implies supposing that the home country pro- duces at least one other type of good besides the exportable good. EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT: AN OVERVIEW 19 variables that affect it, other than the real exchange rate. Empirical esti- mates of the relevant elasticities needed for step (a) are given in Chapter 11 on trade flows and the RER. Steps (b) and (c), which are also required in many applications of the other methodologies discussed subsequently, are analyzed in detail by Ahlers and Hinkle. The specification of the target resource balance, step (b), is often one of the most problematic steps in the empirical estimation of the LRER. A particularly useful contribution of the Ahlers-Hinkle chapter, therefore, is its inclusion of a comprehensive discussion of practical methods for specifying the volume of net capital inflows and reserve accumulation required to derive the target resource balance. The authors describe two polar ways of establishing sustainable capital flows and a target resource balance: one for noncreditworthy countries that must rely entirely on aid flows and the other for creditworthy countries that have full access to credit markets. In the case of noncreditworthy countries-that is, coun- tries that absorb external resources primarily in the form of aid flows- resource balance targets are essentially based on projections of aid avail- ability. Such projections can be derived from independent information (for example, from donor sources) or can be projected on the basis of past history. For countries that are judged creditworthy by international financial markets, a variety of means is available to project sustainable capital flows. These can be based on demand-side or supply-side deter- minants. The former refer to domestic saving-investment balances that are deemed desirable or are otherwise judged sustainable. The latter may be based on debt stocks that are judged compatible with a country's intertemporal budget constraint or on credit allocation rules of thumb used by international lenders. However calculated, an increased inflow of capital permits the accommodation of a larger "equilibrium" resource balance deficit and is thus consistent with a more appreciated value of the equilibrium real exchange rate. As noted above, the resource balance may depend on variables other than the real exchange rate, such as the level and composition of aggre- gate demand, the external terms of trade, and commercial policy. Hence, it is usually necessary to determine the underlying or structural resource balance corresponding to a particular value of the RER by adjusting the actual resource balance in the given year for cyclical, exogenous, and policy changes that affect it. The simplest solution to this problem is to identify a base year, simi- lar to that used in the relative PPP-based approach, in which the actual 9. For a description of the application of this methodology in the context of financial programming exercises, see Khan, Haque, and Montiel (1990). 20 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT RER and its fundamental determinants are believed to have been close to their equilibrium levels. This technique is sometimes employed in empirical applications of all of the methodologies for estimating the LRER as explained in Chapters 8 to 10. However, for the reasons explained on pages 16 and 17 above, a suit- able base year may not be available in many cases. Ahlers and Hinkle demonstrate an alternative two-step procedure for taking into account the effects of changes in variables other than the RER that influence the resource balance such as the terms of trade, taxes on international trade, and underutilized productive capacity. First, the initial resource balance is adjusted to reflect the impact of changes in these variables, resulting in an "adjusted" resource balance.10 Second, the required change in the real exchange rate is calculated as that which would cause a change in the resource balance equal to the difference between its adjusted and target values. For example, for a given target resource balance, the achievement of a higher long-run growth target for the economy may require a shift in the composition of aggregate demand from consump- tion to investment. If the import intensity of investment spending ex- ceeds that of consumption, an increase in the share of investment in aggregate demand would increase the resource balance deficit associ- ated with any given real exchange rate. Thus, such a change in the com- position of demand would result in a larger adjusted resource balance deficit. To reconcile the larger projected resource balance deficit with the unchanged projected long-run equilibrium value of capital inflows, a larger real depreciation would be required. Hence, the adoption of a more ambitious long-run growth target would imply a more depreci- ated long-run equilibrium real exchange rate. The second chapter in Part III, Chapter 8 by Devarajan, links the par- tial-equilibrium trade-equations approach with general equilibrium models. Devarajan shows how the trade-equations approach can be ex- tracted from a restricted form of a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. The particular model on which the Devarajan chapter is based (taken from Devarajan, Lewis, and Robinson (DLR, 1993)) utilizes a three- good framework, with exports, imports, and domestic goods. As indi- cated above, the extension to three goods has important advantages in 10. To the extent that the composition of aggregate demand (for example, between consumption and investment, between private or public expenditure, or between different categories of government spending) affects the resource balance, the change in the real exchange rate required to achieve the target re- source balance target will depend on how the target resource balance is attained. The adjustment procedure suggested by Ahlers and Hinkle also permits taking into account such effects. EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT: AN OVERVIEW 21 developing-country applications. Because of its two-good production structure, the Mundell-Fleming approach cannot distinguish between the terms of trade and the real exchange rate. Thus, it cannot be used to analyze the impact of changes in fundamentals that involve changes in the domestic relative price of exportables and importables, such as the terms of trade and commercial policy. A three-good framework is nec- essary to analyze how the LRER is affected by changes in the relative prices of imports and exports. The particular concern of the Devarajan chapter is to demonstrate how the effects on the LRER of changes in such fundamentals can be handled in this expanded framework." The DLR method is based on three equations: (a) a "transformation function" linking the exports-GDP ratio to the relative price of exports in terms of domestic goods, (b) a "substitution function" relating the imports-GDP ratio to the relative price of imports in terms of domestic goods, and (c) an identity deriving the resource balance-GDP ratio from the export and import ratios. Given a target value for the resource bal- ance, as well as exogenously determined export and import prices, the system can be solved for the equilibrium value of the price of domestic goods and, therefore, for the real exchange rates for exportables and importables. Devarajan's chapter thus illustrates how a general-equilib- rium "fundamentals" approach to the determination of the LRER can be simplified and tailored to a specific application. An attractive feature of this method relative to the more explicitly general equilibrium ap- proaches described below is that it benefits from the primary opera- tional advantage of partial-equilibrium approaches: it requires minimal data and is easy to implement. To illustrate the relative ease with which this methodology can be implemented empirically, the DLR model was applied to the estimation of misalignment in 12 of the 13 countries in the CFA zone on the eve of the devaluation of the CFA franc. Since the CFA countries are special- ized primary exporters, changes in the terms of trade proved to be the dominant influence on the LRER in this case, justifying the focus on this variable. The results indicated a substantial degree of misalignment, averaging 31 percent but varying substantially among the CFA coun- tries, with middle-income countries and oil producers exhibiting the most pronounced degree of misalignment. As we shall see below, these estimates are consistent with those obtained in the subsequent chapter by Baffes, Elbadawi, and O'Connell for C6te d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso, using a single-equation methodology. Both Devarajan and Baffes, 11. Devarajan also shows how the DLR methodology can be applied to exam- ine the effects of changes in other fundamentals conventionally considered in the trade-equations approach in industrial countries such as capital flows. 22 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT Elbadawi, and O'Connell find a substantial degree of overvaluation in COte d'Ivoire by 1993. In contrast, the real exchange rate for Burkina Faso is found to be quite close to the LRER estimated under both methodologies. The two operational estimation techniques described in Chapters 7 and 8 impose minimal data requirements, appear to make few demands on empirical knowledge about the structure of the relevant economy, and are computationally straightforward. Thus, they have been the tech- niques of choice for estimating the LRER when research resources are limited or when the context in which estimates of the LRER are needed does not allow time for further research. They remain extremely useful under both sets of circumstances. The Structural General-Equilibrium Approach A key shortcoming of the trade-equations approach, however, is that it may not do enough justice to the general-equilibrium nature of the proccess by which the equilibrium RER is determined. While the de- mand for imports and exports undoubtedly depends on their relative prices in terms of other goods, it also depends on the level and compo- sition of domestic spending (as the "absorption" approach of Alexander (1951) emphasized), as well as on the costs of production of exportables and importables. The problem is that variables such as these and the capital flows that determine the "equilibrium" value of the resource balance are themselves endogenous and thus are determined by the ul- timate fundamentals identified in the discussion above of the long-run equilibrium RER. Consequently, the real exchange rate is deeply em- bedded in the economy's short-run macroeconomic equilibrium. The trade-equations approach, however, employs a recursive partial-equi- librium methodology. Given required changes in an economy's resource balance, it determines new equilibrium values for the RER, imports, and exports but not for other important macroeconomic variables such as government revenue, saving, and investment. Nor does it explicitly al- low for feedback from the RER to the variables determining the target resource balance (capital flows or the saving-investment balance). While rough adjustments can be made for some of the more important income and feedback effects, one would be more confident of the results if they were determined in a complete general-equilibrium framework that takes into account all important macroeconomic interactions in a fully consis- tent manner. Chapters 9 and 10, the two remaining chapters in Part III, implement general-equilibrium methods for detecting empirically the influence of changes in some fundamentals on the LRER. By and large, these chap- ters take a practical approach. Their objective is to estimate the value to EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT: AN OVERVIEW 23 which a country's RER would tend to converge over time, given sus- tained values of certain "fundamentals," including both policy variables and variables that are exogenous to the economy. It is important to em- phasize that these chapters set a limited task for themselves. They are concerned neither with deriving optimal values of the policy variables, which have been considered necessary for some definitions of the LRER, nor with detailed exploration of the time-series properties of the truly exogenous variables. These restrictions greatly simplify both the con- ceptual and empirical issues and are logically defensible. Both the opti- mal setting of the broad range of policy instruments that may influence the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate and the specification of ap- propriate techniques for decomposing movements in exogenous vari- ables into permanent and transitory components are logically separate from the issue of how particular values of the policy and exogenous variables affect the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate. Thus, Chap- ters 9 and 10 focus on the task of assessing how the value of the LRER is empirically affected by once-and-for-all changes in the values of what- ever subset of these variables is relevant for the particular technique being used. Chapter 9, by Haque and Montiel, adopts a structural general-equi- librium modeling approach. The model employed, taken from Haque, Lahiri, and Montiel (HLM, 1993), is based on a Mundell-Fleming pro- duction structure and assumes a high degree of integration of the do- mestic economy with international financial markets. In that sense, the HLM model is best suited for applications to middle-income develop- ing countries with diversified manufactured exports and an open capi- tal account. The model was estimated with panel data from a large sample of developing countries. Consequently, the simulations produced with the HLM model are intended to be representative of such economies, illustrating the outcomes in a model economy, rather than generating an estimate of the LRER for a specific country. In estimating changes in the LRER using simulations from an em- pirical macroeconomic model, the Haque-Montiel chapter is closely re- lated to the work of Williamson (1994) and others on the estimation of the LRER for industrial countries. However, in addition to being based on a "representative" economy, the simulation exercises in Chapter 9 differ from those conducted by Williamson in two other ways. First, in contrast to the Williamson approach, Haque and Montiel make no at- tempt to identify "desirable" values of the policy fundamentals. Sec- ond, they report "analytic" simulations, consisting of tracing the dy- namic responses of the model economy to permanent shocks adminis- tered to individual fundamental variables, with a view to exploring how such shocks would affect the equilibrium real exchange rate that char- acterizes the new postshock steady state. In such simulations, policy 24 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT and external variables are exogenous, and the sustainable trade balance is endogenously determined simultaneously with the LRER. By con- trast, the simulations in Williamson (1994) are "real-time" simulations, which solve for the value of the RER associated with the achievement of internal and external balance targets within a specified policy-relevant period of time. Since the external balance target is specified exogenously and the time frame allowed to attain it will in general be shorter than that required for the model to approach its steady-state configuration, the attainment of such targets in general requires endogenous adjust- ment of policy variables. The simulations in Chapter 9 confirm that nominal variables-namely, the nominal exchange rate and monetary policy-have no effect on the LRER, which is a real variable. This result is a consequence of the model's long-run neutrality to monetary shocks. In contrast, permanent changes in "real" fundamentals do affect the LRER. To complement the exercises conducted in the preceding chapters, the simulations of real shocks by Haque and Montiel analyze the effects of changes in some fundamen- tals not considered there. These are the effects of a permanent change in the world real interest rate and in external demand, considered sepa- rately, as well as a shift in the composition of government spending from foreign to domestic goods. A permanent increase in the world real inter- est rate depreciates the LRER in the HLM model, while increases in both external demand and in government spending on domestic goods cause the LRER to appreciate.12 The Haque-Montiel simulations are used to estimate the elasticity of response of the LRER to permanent changes in the set of fundamentals considered. These results can be used in a number of ways: a. The elasticities themselves can be used directly to estimate changes in the LRER in specific applications when one of the fundamen- tals has changed in a known way, b. The structural parameter estimates of the model can be imposed in a structural model of an actual economy for which the LRER is 12. The qualitative result for the external real interest rate here is the opposite of that derived in the theoretical model in Chapter 6. The reason is that the way that imperfect capital mobility is modeled in the theoretical paper causes the domestic real interest rate to remain unchanged in response to increases in the external rate (since it is determined by the exogenous domestic rate of time pref- erence). The Haque-Montiel model, in contrast, assumes that the domestic inter- est rate is determined by the world interest rate so that the domestic real interest rate rises one-for-one with increases in the world rate. The negative effect of the higher domestic interest rate on the demand for domestic goods causes the LRER to depreciate in the Haque-Montiel model. EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT: AN OVERVIEW 25 to be estimated, and then simulations similar to those of Haque and Montiel can be run using data for that economy c. The model's specification can be used as guidance for actual esti- mation of a similar structural model for the economy in question, and the required simulations can be based on the estimated model. Haque and Montiel illustrate the second of the above possibilities in an application to Thailand. Retaining the estimated representative pa- rameters but using Thai macroeconomic data, they estimate the LRER for Thailand in 1995 on the assumption that the actual and equilibrium real exchange rates coincided in 1991. They find that between 1991 and 1995 the Thai LRER depreciated by 17 percent. Since the actual real ex- change rate depreciated by only about 4 percent over the same time, Haque and Montiel estimate that the baht was overvalued by about 13 percent in 1995. In principle, the general-equilibrium modeling approach illustrated in Chapter 9 is the most attractive method for estimating the LRER. It permits the incorporation of the full range of macroeconomic influences that may potentially affect the LRER and imposes a minimum of restric- tive and possibly erroneous assumptions about the structure of the economy. Two traits argue strongly in favor of this methodology: the richness of the macroeconomic interactions that can be taken into ac- count in estimating the LRER by simulating a fully dynamic aggregate macroeconomic model and the flexibility that this method offers in de- fining alternative versions of the LRER over different time horizons. Moreover, an important feature of this approach for policy purposes is that its structural nature makes transparent the mechanism through which the LRER is determined, at least in principle. This structural general-equilibrium approach, however, is subject to a variety of limitations. Some of these are shared with other approaches. For example, when implemented in "real-time" simulations-which are its most operationally relevant form-the structural general-equilibrium approach relies, like the trade-equations approach, on an exogenous specification of the equilibrium resource balance. More important, the estimation of general-equilibrium macroeconomic models places very strong demands on economic theory, on the power of statistical tech- niques, and on the availability and quality of data. Even in industrial countries, where off-the-shelf models with known track records are of- ten available, doubts about model specification, empirical estimation, and parameter stability have eroded confidence in these models during recent years. With no previous track record, made-to-suit models for individual developing countries with limited data and more frequently changing economic structures and policy regimes confront a higher 26 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT hurdle of credibility. Furthermore, the modeling approach has serious operational limitations. In the absence of a previously existing model, it is likely to be very time consuming and expensive to implement. It may thus be more suited to large research projects in countries with long time-series data than to operational applications in most low-income developing countries. For the near future, estimates of the LRER de- rived from simulations of dynamic macroeconomic models should be treated as indicative in developing-country applications and used to supplement and inform other approaches to estimation. The Reduced-Form General-Equilibrium Approach The final chapter in Part III-Chapter 10, by Baffes, Elbadawi, and O'Connell-abandons the specification of structural models, adopting a single-equation reduced-form methodology. It relies on unit-root econo- metrics to measure the effect that potential fundamentals have on the LRER in two CFA franc countries, C6te d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso.13 The attraction of this method is that, like the structural general-equilibrium approach, it incorporates the full general-equilibrium interaction of the fundamentals in a dynamic structure that generates a time series, rather than just a point estimate, for the LRER. Yet, relative to the structural general-equilibrium approach, it places fewer demands on both theory and data. From the perspective of theory, the method requires an appro- priate specification of long-run relationships, but the dynamic structure of the economy does not need to be imposed ex ante. Instead, it is deter- mined entirely by the data. The data required, in turn, are only those that would enter the reduced-form equation for the real exchange rate in a short-run macroeconomic equilibrium model. Structural equations for the economy do not have to be estimated, and data on other short- run endogenous macroeconomic variables are not required. The fundamentals considered by Baffes, Elbadawi, and O'Connell for the two countries in their study include many of those examined in the previous chapters: the terms of trade, trade openness (as a proxy for commercial policy), capital flows, and the composition of domestic ab- sorption (the share of investment in GDP). Interestingly, these variables prove to be nonstationary and cointegrated with the real exchange rate in C6te d'Ivoire but stationary in Burkina Faso. In the case of Burkina Faso, all but the composition of absorption prove to be statistically sig- nificant determinants of the (stationary) real exchange rate. Thus, Burkina Faso provides an illustration of how in certain cases PPP can continue 13. Previous applications of this methodology to developing countries in- clude Elbadawi (1994), as well as Elbadawi and Soto (1994, 1995). EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT: AN OVERVIEW 27 to provide an adequate representation of the behavior of the LRER, de- spite the role of "fundamentals" in influencing the LRER. As mentioned previously, the key ingredient in reconciling PPP with a fundamentals- driven theory of the LRER is stationarity of the fundamentals, as in Burkina Faso. Baffes, Elbadawi, and O'Connell show how their estimated cointegrating equations can be used to construct estimates of the LRER. Given the estimated cointegrating equation, they utilize a variety of sta- tistical techniques to estimate the permanent values of the fundamen- tals (including employing the actual values, calculating moving aver- ages, and computing Beveridge-Nelson decompositions). In addition, Baffes, Elbadawi, and O'Connell employ counterfactual simulations of the fundamentals, an innovation that can allow these variables to take on out-of-sample values and permits measuring normative as well as positive misalignment. Substituting their estimates of the permanent or sustainable values of the fundamentals into the cointegrating regres- sions, they derive for both countries LRER estimates that can be com- pared with the actual RER to provide measures of misalignment. The results suggest that overvaluation was severe in C6te d'Jvoire in 1993 (approximately 34 percent in domestic-currency terms), just prior to the devaluation of the CFA franc, but that Burkina Faso escaped major episodes of overvaluation during the sample period.4 This finding is consistent with the widely held view that overvaluation was a more serious problem among the middle-income CFA countries than for the low-income countries. As already indicated, the reduced-form methodology has significant advantages over both the traditional PPP and trade-equations ap- proaches, on the one hand, and simulations of general-equilibrium mod- els, on the other. Accordingly, it has begun to receive a substantial amount of attention from researchers as a technique for estimating the LRER in both industrial- and developing-country contexts.5 Because of these advantages, it is a promising avenue for further research. Nevertheless, the methodology is not without its own shortcomings. Chief among these are that the statistical tests involved have low power in small samples and that the dynamic specifications required in some of the statistical techniques employed absorb a large number of degrees of freedom, par- ticularly when a priori exclusion restrictions cannot be imposed on the set of included fundamentals. As a result, estimates of the LRER de- rived using this technique may be fragile. In particular, they may not 14. Devarajan also found only a mild misalignment in Burkina Faso. 15. See the survey of empirical research in Chapter 5. 28 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT prove to be robust with respect to the set of included fundamentals or to procedures for selecting the "best" model in circumstances in which the set of potential fundamentals is large and time series are short, as is typically the case in developing countries. Operationally, like the trade- equations and structural general-equilibrium approaches, the procedure usually requires an exogenous specification of the equilibrium resource balance. In addition, use of the reduced-form methodology may be hin- dered not only by inadequate time-series data in low-income countries but also, in crisis situations, by the time-consuming nature of the fairly sophisticated econometric analysis that is involved in implementing it. Policy and Operational Considerations The last part of the book, Chapters 11 to 13, rounds out the analysis of techniques for estimating the LRER by discussing three operational con- siderations. The first has to do with the applicability of the analysis in this book to small low-income countries. All of the approaches to esti- mating the LRER described here rely on the key macroeconomic role of the real exchange rate in influencing the trade balance by allocating demand and supply between traded and nontraded (or foreign and domestic) goods. Many observers, however, question the empirical strength of this influence, particularly for small low-income countries, on the basis of various types of elasticity pessimism. This issue is taken up in Chapter 11, the first chapter in Part IV. The second consideration has to do with countries having dual exchange markets. The question in this case is how much information the parallel exchange rate-which can be observed directly--contains about the LRER that would prevail if the exchange markets were unified. In an extreme case, if the parallel rate is simply taken as revealing the value of the "true" long-run equi- librium real exchange rate, one would circumvent the need to imple- ment any of the techniques described in this book for measuring the LRER in countries with dual exchange markets. The validity of this ap- proach is considered in Chapter 12. The final issue taken up in Part IV is not directly related to the estimation of the LRER but is likely to be of interest in operational attempts to correct misalignment. It concerns how to estimate, in operational applications, the nominal exchange rate move- ment required to eliminate any misalignment identified using one of the previously described techniques for measuring the LRER. Empirical Estimates of Trade Elasticities Chapter 11 by Ghei and Pritchett analyzes a topic that is central to the macroeconomic role of the real exchange rate and therefore that must be addressed in the definition and estimation of the LRER: what effect does EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT: AN OVERVIEW 29 the real exchange rate have empirically on trade flows and external ad- justment in developing countries? While the role of relative prices in adjusting trade balances has long been a central tenet of open-economy macroeconomics, this tenet has been questioned by "elasticity pessimists" as well as by advocates of "global monetarism." More recently, the ef- fects of real exchange rate changes on the trade balance have also been called into question by sophisticated empirical analysis (see Rose 1990). Since most definitions of the LRER emphasize the role that the RER plays in the simultaneous achievement of internal and external balance, this issue is an important one for this book. Ghei and Pritchett ask whether the empirical effectiveness of the real exchange rate in adjusting the trade balance is sufficiently strong to link "external balance" outcomes to the path of the RER, particularly in small low-income countries, for which "elasticity pessimism" has been most widespread. They further ask how, if the RER does significantly affect trade flows, useful estimates of the relevant elasticities can be obtained even for countries in which notional import demand cannot be observed in the historical data because of the prevalence of foreign exchange ra- tioning. Ghei and Pritchett group reasons for doubting elastic import and export responses under three types of elasticity pessimism regard- ing the elasticity of import demand and export supply in the develop- ing country itself as well as the elasticity of demand for the country's exports in world markets. They find that none of the three pessimisms is justified, even for small low-income countries for which such con- cerns are most often articulated. Along the way, they provide represen- tative values of the relevant elasticities for small low-income countries. These values can be used by practitioners in empirical applications of the trade-equations approach for countries where the accurate estima- tion of such elasticities proves to be impractical. Ghei and Pritchett con- clude that a reasonable range for the aggregate price elasticity of de- mand for imports is -0.7 to -0.9, even for low-income countries, and that elasticities of export supply tend to be in the range of 1.0 to 2.0. Consequently, given the typically high world price elasticity of demand for exports from individual countries, RER movements should gener- ally be expected to have significant effects on trade balances. Using the Parallel Market Premium as an Indicator of Misalignment The frequent use of quantitative restrictions on the availability of for- eign exchange under managed exchange rate systems in many develop- ing countries has in the past given rise to parallel exchange rates as ex- cess demand for foreign exchange spills over into the unofficial market. Since private traders buy and sell foreign exchange at a price that is 30 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT freely determined in the parallel market, it is natural to interpret the freely determined exchange rate in the unofficial market as a "shadow" exchange rate-that is, as an indicator of the value that the official ex- change rate would reach if left to market forces and thus as an estimate of the LRER. Chapter 12, by Ghei and Kamin, on the use of the parallel market premium as an indicator of misalignment, emphasizes that there are at least two reasons why this interpretation is not appropriate. First, even if the parallel rate accurately represented the value that a freely floating rate would reach if a unified floating system were in ef- fect, that floating rate would not necessarily equal the LRER at any given moment. The reason is that, as an asset price, the spot value of the float- ing rate would in part depend on its expected future value as well as on the current stock of foreign exchange in residents' hands, both of which are dynamic variables that need not be at their steady-state values for any arbitrarily chosen initial configuration of the economy16 When mac- roeconomic conditions and policies are volatile, as frequently is the case in developing countries with parallel exchange markets, adverse expec- tations may drive the parallel exchange rate to levels much more depre- ciated than the LRER. Second, even when financial markets are tranquil and macroeconomic conditions are close to their average levels, the parallel market exchange rate may still provide a poor approximation of the rate that would pre- vail under a unified float and hence of the LRER as well. As Ghei and Kamin show, the very conditions that may give rise to a parallel market in the first place-an overvalued official exchange rate, combined with foreign exchange rationing to conserve international reserves-may lead to scarcities of and excess demand for foreign exchange in the parallel market. Unless these demands are restrained by other barriers to im- ports, therefore, the parallel market exchange rate is likely to be more depreciated than the equilibrium unified rate and would be even more so under unstable macroeconomic conditions.17 Ghei and Kamin conduct some empirical exercises to evaluate this conclusion. They compare the parallel market exchange rate with esti- mates of the equilibrium unified rate computed using averages of the official rate over long periods in which the exchange market was uni- 16. This point is simply the familiar one that in flexible exchange rate models shocks typically trigger exchange-rate dynamics as in Dornbusch (1976). Note that if under a floating exchange rate regime the market-determined exchange rate were always equal to the LRER, there would be no need to estimate the LRER for major industrial countries during clean floats as in the research on these countries described in the empirical survey in Chapter 5. 17. Montiel and Ostry (1994) reached a similar conclusion. EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT: AN OVERVIEW 31 fied. They find that, consistent with their theoretical analysis, for Latin American countries the parallel rate tended to be substantially more depreciated than their estimate of the equilibrium unified rate, For countries in Africa and South Asia, in contrast, the parallel rate was not significantly more depreciated than the estimated equilibrium unified rate. However, Ghei and Kamin attribute this outcome to special cir- cumstances prevailing in these countries-namely, poorly enforced ex- change controls in African countries and extremely well-enforced im- port controls in Asian countries. Overall, they conclude that under gen- eral conditions the parallel premium is a biased and volatile indicator of misalignment between the official rate and a unified long-run equi- librium exchange rate. Setting the Nominal Exchange Rate The primary purpose of estimating the degree of misalignment, of course, is to move the nominal exchange rate in the direction of equilibrium. As mentioned at the outset, moving the nominal exchange rate to attain a desired path of the actual RER is not a straightforward task. The degree to which a domestic price level response will erode any gains in com- petitiveness achieved through a nominal devaluation, for example, is likely to depend on structural characteristics of the economy such as the nature of the wage-price mechanism, as well as on the nature of the accompanying macroeconomic policies and the initial degree of mis- alignment. Without a complete and reliable structural model of the economy with endogenous nominal variables, ex ante estimates of the real exchange rate change that will accompany a given change in the path of the nominal exchange rate in any given application can only be crude approximations. Nevertheless, such approximations must inevitably be made in the course of exchange rate management since most policy variables are set in nominal terms. In the absence of a macroeconomic model that deter- mines nominal as well as relative prices, two sources of guidance are available on the relative sizes of the nominal and real changes that are likely to follow a devaluation: the experience of other countries that have successfully devalued and the accounting relationships between the nominal and real changes. The last chapter in this book, by Ghei and Hinkle, examines the usefulness of these two sources of information for estimating the change required in the nominal exchange rate when one has already made an estimate of the real change required using one or more of the methodologies discussed above. Both theoretically and empirically any combination of RER realign- ment and inflation is possible after a devaluation-a depreciation, an appreciation, or no change in the RER, accompanied by an acceleration 32 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT of the trend inflation rate or a return to predevaluation price trends. The key to a successful devaluation is monetary discipline and appropriate demand management policies. Successful devaluations (that is, those accompanied by appropriate macroeconomic policies) in open develop- ing economies have typically led to a depreciation of the external RER of 30-65 percent of the nominal devaluation in domestic-currency terms. The RER typically depreciates on impact by the full amount of the de- valuation and then gradually appreciates as the domestic price level shifts upward. In successful devaluations, the aggregate price level has generally shifted upwards by 20-55 percent of the nominal devaluation expressed in percentage terms in domestic currency with no increase in the long-term trend inflation rate. Chapter 13 by Ghei and Hinkle describes a simple method for pre- paring "first-pass" estimates of the effects of nominal exchange rate changes on actual RERs in developing countries. The chapter sets out a consistent accounting framework in the form of an eight-equation struc- ture, which can easily be incorporated into a spreadsheet format. This framework can be used to calculate the nominal exchange rate required to achieve a given real exchange rate target, conditional on an assump- tion about the response of domestic nominal wages to the nominal de- valuation or to the change in domestic prices. Alternatively, the frame- work can be used to calculate the real exchange rate adjustment that a given nominal exchange rate would produce, on the basis of assump- tions about the behavior of nominal wages or the degree of pass-through. Although the methodology, not being based on a general-equilibrium model, can provide only first-pass approximations to the nominal changes, it can be a useful tool in the hands of informed analysts. As an illustration of its usefulness, the authors analyze various policy scenarios used to determine the effectiveness of the nominal CFA franc devalua- tion in altering the real exchange rate and compare these with the actual outcome. In short, the accounting framework described in this last chapter de- scribes a simple yet reasonably accurate method for translating a de- sired real exchange rate movement into a required adjustment in the instrument actually controlled by the authorities-the nominal exchange rate. It thus complements the methodologies for measuring real exchange rate misalignment that came before. Conclusions Developing countries that avoid extreme exchange rate arrangements- currency boards and floating rates with purely domestic objectives for monetary policy-need to manage the nominal exchange rate. In doing so, they have long been enjoined to avoid misalignment-that is, the EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT: AN OVERVIEW 33 emergence of large gaps between the actual real exchange rate and some notion of a sustainable "equilibrium" real exchange rate. Defining and measuring this sustainable equilibrium real exchange rate, however, has not proven to be an easy task, either for practitioners or for research- ers. Unfortunately, the urgency of doing so has not gone away and may even have increased in recent years as the result of increasing financial integration. This book provides a unified overview of the conceptual and empiri- cal problems that arise in defining and measuring the real exchange rate in specific applications. It then explores and illustrates alternative em- pirical methods for measuring the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate. Four distinct approaches to doing so are considered. Although all of these approaches have shortcomings, there are circumstances under which the use of each may be appropriate. Hence, to conclude this over- view, we briefly summarize the main advantages and disadvantages of each approach and describe the situations for which each is best suited. The relative PPP-based approach can be justified as a method of estimat- ing the LRER when the RER is shown to be stationary in a time-series sense. In this case, estimation of the LRER boils down to choosing an appropriate base period consisting of one or more years during which the RER was close to its equilibrium value (the PPP base-year approach) or taking a sample average of the actual RER (the PPP-average or trend approach). However, the applicability of these relatively simple meth- ods is restricted by the empirical observation that real exchange rates in developing countries often prove to be nonstationary. Nevertheless, because of the simplicity of its application and the complexity of alter- native methodologies, the PPP approach is likely to continue to be the only feasible approach for the estimation of misalignment in large multicountry research studies and hence to remain the method of choice for such studies. It is also useful for initial detection of misalignment, particularly in high-inflation countries, and for identification of hypoth- eses for subsequent analysis using more sophisticated techniques. When the RER is nonstationary, this nonstationarity must be the re- sult of nonstationarity in some subset of its fundamental determinants. Estimating the LRER then consists of three steps: identifying the rel- evant set of nonstationary fundamentals, determining their "long-run equilibrium" (sustainable) values, and determining how these funda- mentals are empirically linked to the LRER. The remaining three meth- ods of estimation described in the following paragraphs permit the in- corporation of permanent changes in the fundamentals into the analysis. The trade-equations approach is a well-established estimation technique that allows the estimated LRER to depend on the values taken by fun- damentals. This approach is structural so the determination of the LRER can be understood. It makes use of a small set of behavioral parameters 34 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT that are widely estimated and thus readily available, and it is relatively simple to apply. Hence, the trade-equations approach has been the work- horse of empirical analysis and is still widely used by the IMF and oth- ers for industrial as well as developing countries." However, it relies on an ad hoc specification of the trade balance, and its recursive partial- equilibrium framework may ignore potentially important macroeco- nomic interactions. Furthermore, like other methodologies, the trade- equations approach requires often problematic estimates of the under- lying and target resource balances and forecasts of the "permanent" val- ues of potentially volatile fundamental variables such as the terms of trade and private capital flows. Nevertheless, in country applications in which data limitations or time constraints do not permit the implemen- tation of the more sophisticated approaches described below, the trade- equations approach may be the only feasible way of taking into account changes in the fundamentals. Under these circumstances the trade-equa- tions approach, despite its limitations, may be the method of choice. In principle, simulation of empirical general-equilibrium models should dominate other estimation methods. This approach allows the estimated LRER to reflect the full range of known macroeconomic interactions in the economy. Since the entire dynamic path of the RER from its current value to the steady-state (or semisteady-state, if conditioned on some slowly adjusting variable) LRER can be simulated, the approach also provides complete information about the dynamics. The model-based general-equilibrium method, however, suffers from a variety of short- comings. When implemented in the form of "real-time" simulations, it remains dependent, like the trade-equations approach, on an exogenous specification of the equilibrium resource balance and on forecasts of sometimes volatile exogenous variables. Moreover, it places relatively strong demands on economic theory, on the power of statistical tech- niques, and on the availability and quality of data. Made-to-suit models for individual developing countries with limited data and possibly un- stable economic structures are vulnerable to doubts about model speci- fication and parameter stability. Estimates derived from such models may thus fail to command much credibility, particularly when the mod- els on which they are based have no previous track record. For the near future, it is likely that estimates of the LRER derived from simulations of macroeconomic models should be treated as indicative and used to supplement and inform other approaches to estimation. Model simula- tions may be most attractive in applications in which an existing model 18. See, for example, Isard and Faruqee (1998) and Wren-Lewis and Driver (1998). EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT: AN OVERVIEW 35 has demonstrated its usefulness through an established record of track- ing the macroeconomic performance of a particular economy. Recent developments in unit-root econometrics seem to hold special promise for the estimation of long-run equilibrium real exchange rates. Estimates of the LRER based on cointegrating equations are derived from a single-equation reduced-form approach. This approach follows naturally from the time-series tests for stationarity required to assess the applica- bility of the simple PPP-based approach. Relative to the general-equi- librium models, it places fewer demands on economic theory since the theory required is about long-run relationships, not short-run macro- economic dynamics. Moreover, fewer data (time series) are required since the researcher needs time-series data only for the variables that can be expected to appear in the reduced-form equation for the real exchange rate in short-run macroeconomic equilibrium. For these reasons, the re- duced-form methodology has the potential to significantly advance our ability to generate credible empirical estimates of the LRER in specific country cases. Despite these advantages, it would be premature to suggest that cointegration-based estimation of the LRER should dominate the other techniques under all circumstances. The method shares some of the other approaches' limitations and is subject to others that are specific to it. When net capital inflows are treated as a fundamental, for example, the problematic estimation of a target resource balance is a required input for this approach, just as it is for several others. Even when they are not, an independent method for estimating the "permanent" values of the fundamentals such as the terms of trade is indispensable for the imple- mentation of the reduced-form single-equation approach. Determining the permanent value of these may prove to be as problematic as the estimation of a target resource balance. Moreover, as indicated above, the statistical tests associated with this approach tend to have low power in small samples. They are particularly vulnerable to low degrees of freedom when a priori exclusion restrictions cannot be imposed on the fundamentals or when the time-series data of the country under study is characterized by structural breaks. Thus, while the method may re- quire fewer time-series than general equilibrium models, achieving re- sults of reasonable confidence may only be possible with time series of greater length than may be available in many developing countries. Es- timates of the LRER derived using the reduced-form technique may thus prove to be too fragile to dominate those from the more transparent struc- tural approaches, particularly in policy applications. Nonetheless, the results achieved with the reduced-form method to date, both in the previous research surveyed in Part II of the book as well as in Chapter 10 in Part III, provide justification for additional work 36 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT using this approach. More research is also needed comparing the re- sults from the reduced-form methodology with those obtainable from the other approaches set out here. Our hope is that this book will con- tribute to motivating such research. Where, then, do we currently stand in our ability to estimate the LRER in developing countries, and what are the policy implications of the current state of the art? The "true" value of the LRER, of course, is unobservable, even ex post. Thus, we cannot evaluate the various meth- odologies examined in this book in the same manner that theories of nominal exchange rate determination under floating exchange rates are evaluated empirically-that is, by their ability to track the variable be- ing explained in sample or to predict it out of sample. However, other methods of evaluating these techniques are available. Two such meth- ods are described in the survey of empirical work in Chapter 5. First, empirical estimates of the LRER for particular countries can be judged by how well measures of misalignment derived from such estimates are able to replicate historical episodes for which RER misalignment has emerged as the consensus diagnosis ex post. Second, if the notion of the LRER has any meaning, then a current gap between the actual RER and the estimated LRER should have predictive value for (that is, should Granger-cause) the future actual RER. Both of these tests have been met by available techniques for estimating the LRER. Moreover, error-cor- rection equations based on lagged estimates of misalignment from the reduced-form general-equilibrium methodology, as well as on lagged changes in fundamentals, have proved able to explain a substantial part of the variance of the change in the actual RER (a stationary variable) in several applications. Although much has been learned about the estimation of the LRER in recent years, much still remains to be learned. Accurately establish- ing precise targets for a managed exchange rate-for example, for a new pegged rate after a devaluation-is currently beyond the state of the art. Furthermore, if some of the fundamental variables determining the LRER such as the terms of trade or capital flows are completely unpredictable or subject to repeated shock to their "permanent" values, the LRER will also be unpredictable or volatile. More research is also needed on how the results from different methodologies for estimating the LRER are likely to be related to each other in different country cases. Yet, while we may not at present know enough to calculate the LRER in specific applications with great precision, we do know enough to sound warning signals of serious misalignment.9 The implication for 19. For a discussion of the interpretation of apparent misalignments, see Isard and Faruqee (1998), pp. 1-3 and 16-17. EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT: AN OVERVIEW 37 nominal exchange rate policy is this: except perhaps for periods of large economic dislocations, ignorance about the empirical value of the LRER cannot be used to underpin arguments for extreme exchange rate ar- rangements-for example, currency boards or completely clean floats with only monetary targets-that imply abandoning the management of nominal exchange rates. We hope that the cautiously optimistic tone of this conclusion can be put to the test in future work motivated by the contents of this book. m r1 3 P 2 External Real Exchange Rates: Purchasing Power Parity, the Mundell-Fleming Model, and Competitiveness in Traded Goods Lawrence E. Hinkle and Fabien Nsengiyumva* The real exchange rate is generally defined in the economic literature in two principal ways: either (a) in external terms as the nominal exchange rate adjusted for price level differences between countries (that is, as the ratio of the aggregate foreign price level or cost level to the home country's aggregate price level or cost level measured in a common cur- rency) or (b) in internal terms as the ratio of the domestic price of trad- able to nontradable goods within a single country. The first of these con- cepts of the RER derives originally from the purchasing power parity (PPP) theory. It compares the relative value of currencies by measuring the relative prices of foreign and domestic consumption or production baskets. Following the terminology adopted by De Gregorio and Wolf (1994), this chapter refers to this RER concept as the external real ex- change rate because it compares the relative prices of baskets of goods produced (or consumed) in different countries. The second concept, the internal RER, captures the internal relative price incentive in a particu- lar economy for producing or consuming tradable as opposed to nontradable goods. The real exchange rate in this case is an indicator of domestic resource allocation incentives in the home economy. To * Ms. Ingrid Ivins provided research assistance in the preparation of this chap- ter. Ted Ahlers developed the original computer spread sheet used for calculat- ing multilateral RER indexes. The authors are grateful to Amparo Ballivian, Shanta Devarajan, Peter Montiel, and three anonymous readers for helpful suggestions and comments on earlier drafts. 41 42 EXCHANGE RATE MTSALIGNMENT distinguish this second concept from the first, this real exchange rate is referred to here as the internal RER. Within each of these two broad RER concepts, there are several alter- native formulations derived from different analytical approaches. There are three primary versions of the external RER. These are based alterna- tively on purchasing power parity theory, on the Mundell-Fleming one composite good model, and on the law of one price and competitive- ness in the pricing of internationally traded goods. Similarly, there are several different definitions of the internal RER based on two-, three-, or multi-good models. The existence of multiple concepts and alternative measures of the RER raises questions concerning the theoretical and empirical relationship among these, the interpretation of differences in their behavior, and the appropriate measure to use in given circumstances. The three chapters in Part I of this book discuss the different theoreti- cal concepts of the RER, their empirical measurement, and the relation- ships among them. This chapter reviews indexes for measuring the ex- ternal RER in developing countries. Measurement of the internal RER and the relationship between the internal and external RERs are dis- cussed in the following two chapters on the two-good and three-good internal RERs. Several different types of problems are encountered in the measure- ment of the external RER. At a conceptual level, one set of problems arises from the multiplicity of theories underlying the external RER. The various theories that have motivated the different definitions of the ex- ternal RER imply the use of different empirical price and cost indexes in computing the external RER. Some theories are also ambiguous as to exactly what baskets and weightings of domestic and foreign goods should be used empirically. These conceptual problems are common to both industrial- and developing-country applications. A second set of problems is practical and empirical. These problems tend to be particularly acute in developing-country applications. Paral- lel foreign exchange markets, substantial smuggling and unrecorded trade, and large shifts in the terms of trade, trade policy, and trade pat- terns create complexities not commonly encountered in measuring the external RER in industrial countries. Moreover, even after one has sorted through the conceptual issues involved in the use of alternative price or cost indexes, it is often difficult to find reasonably exact empirical mea- sures of the desired indexes in developing countries. For many devel- oping countries only the consumer price index (CPI) and the gross do- mestic product (GDP) deflator are available. Hence, the analyst's choice is often limited to these. In light of the above problems, this chapter attempts to describe best practice in the calculation of external RER indexes for developing coun- tries. It has three objectives: EXTERNAL REAL EXCHANGE RATES 43 a. To review and operationalize the definitions of the three principal theoretical concepts of the external RER as a starting point for the subsequent discussion of their empirical measurement; b. To examine important empirical problems that often compli- cate the measurement of the external RER in developing coun- tries; and c. To clarify the interrelationships among the different external RERs. This chapter and the following two are intended as user's guides. They therefore give enough details of the methodologies and calcula- tions that readers who wish to use these indexes can replicate the calcu- lations. Data from Cte d'Ivoire prior to the devaluation of the CFA francs in January 1994 are used to illustrate the calculations. The rest of this chapter is divided into four sections and two appen- dixes. Certain features are common to all external RER indexes, but oth- ers depend upon the particular concept being measured. The next sec- tion discusses those features that are common to all external RER in- dexes. The following section on the measurement of different RER con- cepts then reviews the three principal external RER concepts and exam- ines the methodological issues that are specific to measuring each of these. This is followed by a section comparing the effects of changes in the terms of trade on the three external RERs and their implications for competitiveness. The final section summarizes and concludes. Appen- dix A briefly reviews the International Comparison Programme and the purchasing power parity exchange rates derived from it. Appendix B sets out in more detail the relationship between competitiveness and the different external RERs. Common Features of All External Real Exchange Rate Indexes The concept of the external real exchange rate derives originally from expenditure or purchasing power parity (PPP) theory. Over time, two additional concepts of the external RER developed based on the law of one price and competitiveness in production of traded goods and on the Mundell-Fleming one composite good model or competitiveness in aggregate production costs of all goods. Relative labor costs expressed in foreign currency are a fourth, although somewhat less common, mea- sure of the external RER. To empirically calculate these external RER indexes, four elements are needed: (1) the operational mathematical formulas to be used, (2) appropriate measures of the nominal exchange rate, (3) country weights and the averaging method to be used in computing the multilateral RER, 44 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT and (4) empirical counterparts of the price or cost indexes desired theo- retically. The first three elements-the operational formulas, the nomi- nal exchange rate, and the country weights-are common to the various different versions of the external RER. The fourth element, the appro- priate price or cost index, varies with the version of the external RER being constructed. This section reviews the elements that are common to all external RER indexes. Computation of External RERs: Common Formula and Conventions Similar conventions and formulas are used for calculating all of the ba- sic versions of the external RER. The following subsection sets out these conventions, which are used in the remainder of the volume. Readers al- ready familiar with these conventions may wish to skim this subsection. Domestic Versus Foreign Currency Terms Nominal exchange rates and external RER indexes can be measured in domestic-currency terms (units of domestic currency per unit of foreign exchange, E) or in foreign-currency terms (units of foreign exchange per unit of domestic currency, E ). The domestic- and foreign-currency measures are the inverses of each other, as shown in equation 2.1: (2.1) Edc = . The term appreciation (depreciation) is used to refer to an increase (decrease) in the value of the home currency relative to foreign curren- cies. An appreciation corresponds to an increase (or an upward move- ment graphically) in the RER indexes in foreign-currency terms but to a decrease (or a downward movement) in an index in domestic-currency terms since this is the inverse of the index in foreign-currency terms. For some purposes, it is useful to express RER indexes in domestic-currency terms and for others in foreign-currency terms. Both versions are widely used in the literature and are used in this volume. For ease of exposi- tion, most of the equations in this chapter are expressed in domestic- currency terms; but, unless otherwise noted, all graphs are in foreign- currency terms so that an upward movement indicates an appreciation. 1. Appendix C of Chapter 7 on operational approaches to estimating equilib- rium RERs gives formulas for converting appreciations and depreciations in for- eign-currency terms to domestic currency and vice versa. EXTERNAL REAL EXCHANGE RATES 45 The Bilateral RER Irrespective of the price or cost concept employed, the external RER for the home economy can be defined either in relation to one trading part- ner or to an average for all of its main trading partners or competitor countries. In the first case of a pair of countries, it is called a bilateral real exchange rate (BRER). In the second multicountry case, it is called a multilateral real exchange rate, which is also known as a real effective exchange rate (REER), and is calculated as a weighted average. The bilateral RER is the simplest and easiest to calculate of the exter- nal RER indexes. It compares the price of a representative consumption or production basket in the home country with the price of a representa- tive basket in a foreign country measured in the same currency, either domestic or foreign, and indicates the relative value of the domestic and foreign currencies. The bilateral RER is useful both as a bilateral and as a more general indicator of the external RER in cases in which a country belongs to a currency bloc, such as the dollar or the franc zones, or has one dominant trading partner. For these reasons, the bilateral RER has been widely used in empirical work, particularly before the increased availability of high-powered personal computers facilitated the calcula- tion of multilateral RERs. The external bilateral RER index in domestic-currency terms (BRERd) between the domestic economy (d) and a foreign country (f) is given by equation 2.2: E, -Pc (2.2) BRERd = Gd where Edc is the index of the nominal exchange rate, defined as units of domestic currency per one unit of foreign currency. PG and PGd are the foreign and the domestic general or aggregate price indexes, respectively.2 The subscript dc indicates that the RER is defined in domestic-currency terms. A decline in the BRERd, index (which corresponds to a real ex- change rate appreciation) reflects an increase in the price or cost of do- mestic goods and services relative to foreign goods and services. The equivalent definition of the external bilateral real exchange rate index in foreign-currency terms is shown in equation 2.3: (2.3) BRER = E - =Pd 1 fc P, BRERdc 2. To simplify the notation in this chapter, the bases for all indexes are set at 1.00 in the reference period rather than at 100. 46 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT Bilateral RERs in relation to the dollar, the two other major currency blocks (the yen, and the DM or the euro), the currency in terms of which a country pegs or manages its exchange rate, and the currency of a country's principal trading partner are often particularly useful for ana- lytical purposes. These bilateral RERs are both as simple to calculate and more broadly representative than the bilateral RERs with smaller trading partners. Table 2.1 illustrates how radically bilateral RERs of developing coun- tries can diverge as a result of movements in the major currencies and the policies of individual countries. It shows the bilateral RERs between C6te d'Ivoire and its competitors, along with weighted averages for coun- try groupings. While C8te d'Ivoire's RER appreciated moderately (by 8-9 percent) from 1985 to 1993 relative to France and European coun- tries as a group and depreciated relative to Japan (by 12 percent), it ap- preciated by 60 percent relative to the dollar, by almost 100 percent rela- tive to the currencies of its non-African developing-country competi- tors, and by more than 400 percent relative to its African competitors. Similarly, figure 2.1 shows the movement of the bilateral RERs between Figure 2.1 The Bilateral RERs Between C6te d'Ivoire and France, Germany, Japan, and the United States, 1980-96 (1985=100) 220 200 ' RER with United States 180 160 'A' RER with 140 A' France 100M 80 60 German I 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 RER with France - ---- - RER with Germany X RER with Japan --- A--- RER with the United States Note: The RERs were calculated using CPIs and official exchange rates. An upward move- ment represents an appreciation of the RER for C6te d'Ivoire. Source: Computed from World Bank data. Table 2.1 Bilateral Real Exchange Rate Indexes for C6te d'Ivoire Computed Using CPIs and Official Exchange Rates, 1980-96 (1985=100) Adjusted IFS country weights Country % 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 European Countries, 53.9 122.1 116.7 110.1 105.5 102.6 100.0 107.9 111.0 114.4 111.1 107.0 103.9 106.5 109.1 67.6 76.6 76.7 France 25.9 120.2 115.3 111.0 106.9 103.8 100.0 107.0 110.7 115.3 112.6 108.0 106.4 108.4 108.4 67.2 75.5 75.8 Netherlands 5.5 118.9 118.3 106.3 100.7 99.7 100.0 104.9 107.6 112.5 112.6 109.7 106.4 107.2 106.3 65.4 72.0 74.0 Italy 4.4 140.2 131.7 119.7 106.7 101.4 100.0 104.9 107.3 110.7 103.6 98.8 94.5 99.2 115.7 73.4 89.5 81.6 Germany 7.2 120.9 119.6 108.6 100.7 99.7 100.0 105.1 106.9 111.3 109.4 106.4 103.7 104.1 101.2 62.0 68.4 70.8 United Kingdom 6.4 127.6 110.7 105.0 105.6 103.8 100.0 121.6 124.6 121.8 115.9 113.0 105.6 113.4 125.4 77.1 92.0 90.7 Spain 1.9 121.5 115.5 106.9 113.3 103.8 100.0 107.7 111.2 108.0 96.9 90.9 85.9 88.8 100.7 65.1 73.6 72.2 Belgium-Luxembourg 2.7 112.0 111.8 112.5 106.5 103.0 100.0 105.7 107.1 112.5 110.4 105.2 102.2 104.4 104.4 63.4 70.0 72.0 Other Industrial Countries, 20.1 191.9 148.3 131.7 115.1 101.7 100.0 124.1 139.9 138.3 127.9 144.4 132.8 142.5 128.9 79.1 95.9 98.5 United States 9.8 211.3 162.1 135.8 119.9 104.5 100.0 139.6 165.9 172.1 154.9 170.9 160.8 173.4 160.8 100.9 124.7 121.2 Japan 7.0 176.5 138.2 135.2 115.4 102.6 100.0 99.9 105.6 100.2 99.5 117.8 104.1 106.9 88.6 52.0 60.9 70.3 Canada 1.8 198.3 153.0 126.4 108.6 99.5 100.0 139.0 156.6 150.8 130.4 142.5 130.0 150.1 150.3 102.1 127.6 124.9 Australia 1.6 148.3 113.4 102.5 95.6 85.8 100.0 136.3 148.1 133.2 115.6 127.1 121.2 141.3 143.3 84.0 100.7 93.0 (Table continues on next page) (Table 2.1 continued) Adjusted IFS country weights Country % 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 CFA Countries" 2.0 134.6 132.2 125.6 113.8 106.5 100.0 101.8 96.2 101.2 104.0 102.0 103.7 108.1 114.1 106.4 106.8 104.9 Cameroon 2.0 134.6 132.2 125.6 113.8 106.5 100.0 101.8 96.2 101.2 104.0 102.0 103.7 108.1 114.1 106.4 106.8 104.9 African Countries (non-CFA? 12.9 133.1 74.0 59.9 61.2 82.8 100.0 222.3 436.4 403.1 408.1 448.7 449.5 570.1 547.1 297.6 243.6 222.5 C1 Nigeria 6.4 238.0 188.3 169.6 134.9 93.0 100.0 263.8 669.2 527.9 538.2 635.9 680.7 913.1 740.8 288.8 211.5 172.2 Ghana 6.4 74.4 29.1 21.2 27.8 73.7 100.0 187.4 284.6 307.7 309.4 316.7 296.8 355.9 404.0 306.6 280.5 287.6 Developing Countries (excluding AfricaY 11.1 148.8 120.7 104.6 99.4 93.6 100.0 153.6 194.8 200.8 185.6 220.4 212.9 219.5 197.4 123.9 142.4 136.4 Malaysia 4.4 178.1 145.4 123.9 108.2 95.6 100.0 146.9 176.2 192.6 182.8 206.8 197.6 194.8 181.0 113.9 131.8 128.5 Indonesia 2.7 145.3 110.3 93.9 105.2 97.6 100.0 155.2 224.5 230.5 214.5 240.9 228.7 245.8 220.2 135.1 163.3 158.2 Colombia 2.2 147.3 112.8 94.6 88.6 88.7 100.0 163.4 203.9 211.8 203.1 240.0 227.6 238.8 211.4 106.7 122.0 115.2 China 1.8 101.3 95.1 92.1 85.8 89.2 100.0 156.4 190.9 170.7 140.1 203.9 212.0 224.6 191.5 159.9 168.5 154.9 Total' 100.0 138.5 116.2 105.2 99.6 98.7 100.0 126.5 147.2 148.5 142.9 148.0 142.8 152.0 148.5 91.1 100.3 99.2 Note: a. The REERs for the regional groupings have been computed as geometric averages of the bilateral RERs in their constituent countries. Source: Computed from World Bank data. EXTERNAL REAL EXCHANGE RATES 49 the CFA franc, French franc, and the major currency blocks. France, the United States, Germany, and Japan are also C6te d'Lvoire's four largest trading partners and account for one half of the weights in table 2.1. The Multilateral or Effective RER (REER) The multilateral or real effective exchange rate index (REER) is used when multiple trading partners are considered.' It is a weighted external real exchange rate index. The REER is defined in domestic-currency terms as shown in equation 2.4: (2.4) REERdc = EcGiw 1 -=1 Gd1 where m is the number of trading partners or competitors of the home country and H denotes the product of the bracketed terms over the m countries. The geometric averaging method is used where (Did is the ap- propriate weight for each foreign country i (i = 1, ...m) and the sum of weights must equal one, as shown in equation 2.5: (2.5) ,X ' =1. i=1 The equivalent definition of the REER in foreign-currency terms is expressed by equation 2.6 as follows: (2.6) REER = [ ] Gd i=1 PGi REERdc The REER can also be defined as an arithmetic average. Although the arithmetic average is easier to calculate, the geometric averaging tech- nique is used in the above formulations because a geometric index has certain properties of symmetry and consistency that an arithmetic index 3. The term "effective" has two common but different meanings when used to describe exchange rates in the economic literature. Its first meaning is "weighted average," and this is the sense in which the term effective is used here. The sec- ond common meaning of an effective exchange rate is one that includes the ef- fects of tariffs, subsidies, and other charges on the domestic costs of imports and domestic prices of exports. Such exchange rates are referred to in this book as including taxes. The terms bilateral, multilateral, and effective indicate the num- ber of external trading partners to which an RER applies and, therefore, do not apply to the internal RER, which is an indicator of relative internal domestic prices in a particular country 50 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT does not. In analyzing RER indexes, one is often interested in determin- ing not only the level of the index at a particular point in time but also the rate at which the RER is appreciating or depreciating over time. In an arithmetic index, the percentage changes between any two dates de- pends upon the reference date used for the index so that rescaling (or rebasing) the index from the original base year equal 100 to a different reference year equal 100 affects the percentage changes in the index. A geometric index, in contrast, gives RER levels for which the percentage change between two dates is not influenced by the choice of the base period and may, therefore, be readily rescaled to have a different refer- ence year equal 100. In addition, an arithmetic index, in effect, gives larger weights to currencies that have appreciated or depreciated to a significant extent relative to the home currency. A geometric average treats depreciating and appreciating currencies in an entirely symmet- ric manner.4 There are two equivalent ways of calculating the real effective ex- change rate. These two methods decompose the components of the REER index differently and provide supplementary empirical information useful in analyzing the evolution of the effective exchange rate indexes. The first method calculates the REER as a geometric weighted average of the bilateral RERs of the home country with each of its main trading partners or competitors. The real effective exchange rate in domestic- currency terms is then given by equation 2.7: (2.7) RER,C = HIBRER< where BRERdc is the bilateral real exchange rate in domestic currency as defined by equation 2.2. The second method calculates the REER as the product of the nomi- nal effective exchange rate and the effective relative price index. Equa- tion 2.4 is then rewritten as equation 2.8: (2.8) REERd = NEERdc EPGf PGd in which: 4. The properties of the geometric averages are discussed further in Brodsky (1982) and Maciejewski (1983). 5. These two methods are shown here only for the real effective exchange rate defined in domestic-currency terms (equation 2.4). They are equally applicable to the REER defined in foreign-currency terms. EXTERNAL REAL EXCHANGE RATES 51 m (2.9) NEER,, = HE" (2.10) EPGf Gd NEERC is the nominal effective exchange rate in domestic-currency terms between the home economy and its trading partners or competitors. EP1 is the geometric weighted average (or effective) foreign aggregate price index for the home country's trading partners. The real effective exchange rate indexes obtained from equations 2.7 and 2.8 are exactly the same, as the two equations are mathematically equivalent. However, the two alternative calculations generate differ- ent statistical information as by-products. Computing the REER as the weighted average of bilateral RERs can provide calculations of bilateral RER indexes for individual countries or subsets of countries. In cases in which a country pegs its exchange rate to or targets it on that of another country, it is often useful to analyze the home country's REER in terms of (a) changes in the home country's bilateral RER with the peg currency caused by differences in inflation rates in the home and peg countries and (b) changes in the home country's REER relative to the bilateral RER with the peg currency caused by in- flation and exchange rate movements in third-country currencies. This relationship is given in equation 2.11: (2.11) REERd = BRER * REER,C 'c BRERd., where BRERdCb is the bilateral RER with the base or target currency. Calculating the REER as the product of the nominal effective exchange rate and the effective relative price index, by contrast, makes possible a separate analysis of the effects of movements in nominal exchange rates and foreign prices as shown in equation 2.8 above.' It also permits a further decomposition of the NEER to express movements in it in terms of changes in the exchange rate between the home currency and its peg currency and in the NEER relative to the peg currency. This decomposi- tion is shown in equation 2.12: (2.12) NEERdc = EdcNEER Edc 6. NEERs for selected developing countries are reported in IFS. 52 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT where E.b is the nominal exchange rate with the base or target currency. Such a decomposition is often useful because the pegged rate in equa- tion 2.12 is typically a policy variable or target while the NEER relative to the peg currency is exogenous for the pegging country. The usefulness of these alternative REER decompositions can be il- lustrated with data from Cte d'Ivoire. Figure 2.2, for example, decom- poses its REER into its NEER and effective relative price indexes. It indi- cates that C6te d'Jvoire's relative price performance was actually quite good in the period 1985-93, with its prices falling by 20 percent relative to its trading partners. However, its REER, nevertheless, appreciated by almost 50 percent as a result of the 85 percent appreciation in its NEER. When the home country's currency is pegged, like C8te d'Ivoire's, to another currency, it may be also useful to use equation 2.12 to express the NEER in terms of the bilateral exchange rate relative to the peg cur- rency and the NEER relative to the peg currency This procedure sepa- rates the effects of changes in the peg, a policy variable, from the other exogenous changes in the NEER. For the CFA countries, however, such Figure 2.2 The Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (NEER), Relative Consumer Prices, and REER for C6te d'Ivoire, 1980--93 (1985=100) 190 180 NEER A" 170 - REER 160 A - -A R 150 140, A- 130, 120 - . ,A 110 . . m. 100 A. E- -U- *II 90 A -... A" 80 Relative - . Consumer Prices 70 l i l l i ii l i 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 - - - - NEER - - a - - Relative Consumer Prices - REER Note: The NEER and REER were calculated using official exchange rates and adjusted IFS country weights. The relative consumer price index is the CPI for Cote d'Ivoire divided by the weighted average of the CPIs for its foreign competitors. An upward movement repre- sents an appreciation of the NEER, REER, or relative consumer prices. Source: Computed from World Bank data. EXTERNAL REAL EXCHANGE RATES 53 a decomposition is not necessary as the pegged rate to the French franc remained at 50:1 for the entire period from 1948 through 1993. Hence, all of the variation in Cte d'Ivoire's NEER during this period was due to exogenous changes in the exchange rate between the French franc and other currencies. It is worth noting, however, that because of different trading patterns, and hence country weights, the NEER for the home currency and that for the peg currency may behave quite differently. Figure 2.3 shows that, while the NEER for France appreciated by about 15 percent in the pe- riod 1985-93, the NEER for C6te d'Ivoire appreciated by 320 percent because of its different trading partners. Hence, C6te d'Ivoire experi- enced a huge nominal appreciation as a result of its peg to the French franc, even though the NEER for the franc itself only appreciated mod- erately. Such divergences can have significant implications for decisions about the appropriateness of maintaining a given peg. Figure 2.3 The Nominal Effective Exchange Rates (NEER)for C6te d'Ivoire and France at Official Exchange Rates, 1980-96 (1985=100) 360- 340-- 320-- 300-- 280-- NEER for n 260-- Cte dIvoire 0 240-- 220-- 200-- 180- . NEER . .r 160 for France 140 -. NEER for C6te d'Ivoire as a 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 - - * - -NEER for France - -n - NEER for Cote dIvoire -.--NEER for COte d'Ivoire as a percentage of France's NEER Note: The NEERs have been calculated using IFS country weights. An upward movement represents an appreciation of the NEER. Source: Computed from World Bank data. 54 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT Similarly, figure 2.4 uses equation 2.11 to express C6te d'Ivoire's REER in terms of its RER relative to the French franc, the peg currency, and the REER between the French franc and the currencies of C6te d'Ivoire's other trading partners. It shows that while C6te d'Ivoire's bilateral RER appreciated by about 10 percent relative to the French franc, C6te d'Ivoire's REER appreciated by an additional 20 percent relative to France's RER because of larger real depreciations by C6te d'Ivoire's trad- ing partners. Determining the Appropriate Nominal Exchange Rate Industrial countries typically have unified exchange rates and curren- cies that are freely convertible for current and most capital transactions. In these circumstances, the single nominal exchange rate truly repre- sents the market price of foreign exchange. In developing countries, however, the situation may be more compli- cated. Although convertible currencies and unified exchange rates are becoming more common, many developing-country currencies are still Figure 2.4 The Bilateral RER with France and the REER for C6te d'Ivoire, 1980-96 (1985=100) 150 REER for 140 C6te d' Ivoire (CIV) 130 120 * *- - - 110 re-- 110 /A' A.. REERfor 100 : CIV/RER *..... ....-with 90 RER with France France 80 A.... 70 60 I I I I II I I I I I I 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 --RER with France- -REER for CIV/RER with France ---REER for CIV Note: CIV=C6te d' Ivoire. The RER and REER were calculated using CPIs official exchange rates and IFS country weights. An upward movement represents an appreciation of the RER and REER for C6te d'Ivoire. Source: Computed from World Bank data. EXTERNAL REAL EXCHANGE RATES 55 not readily convertible for capital transactions. Sometimes current trans- actions are also subject to exchange controls; and smuggling, unrecorded, and misrecorded trade may be common. Hence, at different points in time there may be a quite significant parallel (or black) market for for- eign exchange in the home country, in some of its major trading part- ners, or both. The coverage and importance of these parallel markets may vary from country to country and from period to period. Under such circumstances, an RER computed using only official nominal ex- change rates could be quite misleading as an economic indicator. When a parallel market exists, a country has, in effect, two external real exchange rates, one for transactions at the official nominal rate and one for transactions at the parallel rate. These two rates may create quite different incentives for different types of activities. Which of the two RERs is the more relevant analytically will depend upon the situation in the country concerned. It may in some cases be desirable to use both these RERs for analytical purposes rather than trying to arrive at a single unique measure of the external RER. Jorgensen and Paldam (1986) argue, however, that an average of the parallel and official rates is usually much more stable and representa- tive than either of the two rates separately. Misalignments in the paral- lel and official rates tend to be in opposite directions (the parallel rate being undervalued when the official rate is overvalued) and policy shocks such as large devaluations often move the two rates in opposite direc- tions. Hence, when a parallel market exists in the home country or its trading partner(s), one possibility for calculating a single representative bilateral RER is to use a weighted average of the official and parallel market nominal exchange rates. The weights should reflect the share of transactions at each rate and corrections should be applied to the paral- lel rate for the extra risks and other costs of transactions in the informal market. In practice, however, it is likely to be quite difficult to obtain the data required to arrive at anything more than reasonable assumptions about the shares of transactions taking place in the official and parallel markets and about the extra costs of transactions at the parallel rate. Parallel foreign exchange markets may exist for the home country or for one or more of its trading partners. When it is the home country that has a parallel market, potentially all of its trade and capital flows with all of its trading partners could be affected by the parallel rate. When it is a major trading partner (or partners) that has a parallel market, the overall analytical problem is less serious; but bilateral trade and capital flows with these countries may still be significantly affected by the par- allel rate. For any given developing country, the effect of parallel rates on the multilateral RER will depend upon both the size of the black market premiums and the weights assigned to countries having parallel 56 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT rates. Box 2.1 illustrates the effects of other countries' parallel market rates on the bilateral and multilateral RERs of Cbte d'Ivoire, which itself had a unified exchange rate.' Box 2.1 The Effects of Parallel Markets on C6te d'Ivoire's Bilateral and Multilateral RERs In the case of C6te d'Ivoire, the home currency, the CFA franc, was itself actually freely convertible in the 1980-93 period. However, Nigeria, which was Cte d'Ivoire's second largest trading partner after France in 1993 (accounting for 11 percent of total trade) had an important parallel market that had significant effects on Cte d'Ivoire's bilateral and multilateral RERs. The Bilateral RER. Figure 2.B.1 shows how the official and par- allel exchange rates for the naira and the parallel market premium have varied over time. Figures 2.B.2 and 2.B.3 illustrate the effects of the divergence between the parallel and official exchange rates on the bilateral RER between C6te d'Ivoire and Nigeria. Figure 2.B.2 shows the bilateral RERs calculated using CPIs and the par- allel and official exchange rates. The trends in the official and parallel RERs are quite different in the period 1981-85 when Cte d'Ivoire's official RER depreciated 130 percent while its parallel RER fluctuated moderately but changed little over the period as a whole. The large devaluations of the naira during 1986-87, which substantially reduced the parallel market premium on the naira as shown in figure 2.B.1, then caused C6te d'Ivoire's official RER to appreciate much more strongly than its parallel RER. Varia- tions in the official RER have also been much more pronounced than those in the parallel RER, although the changes in both have been substantial. Thus, transactions taking place in the official and parallel markets have been subject to quite different incen- tives; and the conclusions at which one arrives may depend upon which of the two RERs is used. (Box continues on page 54) 7. For a further discussion of parallel markets and the use of the parallel rate as a guide for setting the official exchange rate, see Chapter 12 by Ghei and Kamin in Part IV of this volume. EXTERNAL REAL EXCHANGE RATES 57 Figure 2.B.1 The Official and Parallel Naira/US$ Exchange Rates and the Parallel Market Premium, 1980-96 2.2 350 a 2.0-- Parallel 1.8.. Exchange 300 1.--Rate 8 ~21.50 0.8 0.6 .. A' Parallel15 0.6 Official Parket 0.4 Exchange Prermum 100 z0.2-- Rae AM 0.0,0 -0.2 ... A'" 0.4i "i I I I I I I 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 ---Log of Parallel Exchange Rate - - * - - Log of Official Exchange Rate -&--Parallel Market Premium Note: An upward movement represents a depreciation of the naira. Source: PIC's Currency Year Book. Figure 2.B.2 The Bilateral RER Between C6te d'Ivoire and Nigeria Computed Using CPIs at Official, Parallel, and Weighted Average Exchange Rates, 1980-96 (1985=100) 1,000 900-- A 800 700-- RER at . Official 600 Exchange : RER at the Naira's 500-. Rates , - Weighted Average Exchange Rate 400 300 20 'A -A 200 --4... ... --- a--- 100 ... .RER at the Naira s Parallel ExchanRe Rate 0 I 1 1 : 1 I I : I I I I I 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 e -. RER at the Naira's Parallel Exchange Rate -+-RER at the Naira's Weighted Average Exchange Rate * . - RER at Official Exchange Rates Note: The weighted average is calculated using 36 percent for the official rate and 64 per- cent for the parallel rate based on the adjusted IFS country weights in table 2.3. An upward movement represents an appreciation of the RER for C6te d'Ivoire. Source: Computed from figure 2.B.1 and World Bank data. 58 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT (Box 2.1 continued) Figure 2.B.2 also gives a weighted average bilateral RER that was computed using a weight of 0.36 for the official rate and 0.64 for the parallel rate. These weights were based on World Bank staff estimates of the shares of trade taking place at the official and parallel rates.* Because of the shortage of data, these estimated weights are little more than educated guesses that give an idea of what the average bilateral RER might have been. The official, par- allel, and average bilateral RERs give quite different impressions of the magnitude and timing of the appreciation in the measured RER. Which of them is the more representative indicator for trans- actions between C6te d'Jvoire and Nigeria is an empirical ques- tion that depends upon one's assumptions about the relative importance of trade at the official and parallel rates. Hence, de- tailed knowledge of the functioning of any parallel markets is criti- cal for measuring the actual bilateral RER accurately. In cases where both the home country itself and its trading partner have parallel markets, computing a representative bilateral RER may be further complicated; and an understanding of parallel markets becomes even more critical. The Multilateral RER. In addition to Nigeria, five of C6te d'Ivoire's other developing-country competitors appearing in the official weights used in IFS had parallel markets during 1980-93. (These countries were China, Colombia, Ghana, Indonesia, and Malaysia.) Together these six countries accounted for 14.8 per- cent of the country weights used for C6te d'Ivoire in IFS. Figure 2.B.3 illustrates the effect of taking into account parallel markets when measuring real effective exchange rate (REER) and the po- tential sensitivity of the REER to assumptions about parallel ex- change rates. It shows the REER for COte d'Ivoire calculated us- ing both the official and parallel rates for the countries having paral- lel exchange rates. Figure 2.B.3 also gives a weighted average of the * Because of lack of data on the extra costs and risks of transactions in the parallel market, no adjustment for these was made to the parallel rate. (Box continues on next page) EXTERNAL REAL EXCHANGE RATES 59 Figure 2.B.3 The REER for C6te d'Ivoire Computed at Official, Parallel, and Weighted Average Exchange Rates, 1980-95 (1985=100) 140 REER at Weighted Average Exchange Rates 130 .***g/ A. 120 ' REER at Parallel 110 Exchange Rates REER at Official 100 Exchange Rates 90 80 70 : : I I I I I I I I I 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 - -*- -REER at Official Exchange Rates -9-- REER at Weighted Average Exchange Rates - - * - - REER at Parallel Exchange Rates Note: The REER was calculated using CPIs and IFS country weights. An upward movement represents an appreciation of the REER for C6te d'Ivoire. Source: Computed from PIC's Currency Year Book and World Bank data. (Box 2.1 continued) parallel and official REERs, using weights equal to the estimated shares of recorded and unrecorded trade for Ghana and Nigeria and equal weights for the parallel and official rates for the other countries having parallel markets. While the differences in C6te d'Ivoire's REER are not as pronounced as in the bilateral RER be- tween C6te d'Ivoire and Nigeria (because the six countries with parallel markets account for only 14.8 percent of the total weights in the REER and the parallel market premium was not as large for the other countries as for Nigeria), the use of parallel rates still affects the overall index by as much as 10 percent in a given year. 60 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT Multilateral or Effective RERs (REERs): Weighting Schemes, Unrecorded Trade, and Hyperinflation The calculation of multilateral RERs or real effective exchange rates (REERs) presents a number of additional empirical problems beyond those involved in computing bilateral RERs-namely, the choice of a weighting scheme appropriate for a particular country, adjustments for unrecorded trade, and the effects of hyperinflation. Weighting Schemes Unfortunately, the determination of appropriate country weights for use in calculating REERs sometimes poses difficult conceptual and empiri- cal problems, particularly in developing countries. For countries with- out parallel exchange markets and substantial unrecorded or misrecorded trade, actual trade weights can usually be calculated with- out too much difficulty. However, when the intercountry pattern of trade is significantly different for imports and exports, it may be preferable for some analytical purposes to calculate separate REERs for imports and exports rather than, in effect, just averaging these together in a single REER for all trade. In addition, if (a) the home country experiences sig- nificant competition in its export markets from third countries with which it does not trade much directly or (b) its pattern of intercountry trade is at the margin significantly different from the average (for example, non- traditional exports are sold in different markets from traditional com- modity exports), the problem of determining appropriate weights is fur- ther complicated. For countries that have, or whose major trading part- ners have, parallel exchange markets, or significant unrecorded or misrecorded trade, determination of even actual trade weights can be problematic. Furthermore, trade is sometimes denominated in a major currency rather than in the trading partners' currencies (for example, many commodities are priced in U.S. dollars) so that country weights may need to be adjusted to reflect the currency composition of trade rather than its geographic origin and destination. Moreover, patterns of trade are not independent of the bilateral RERs but, rather, are influenced by them. Fixed weight averages become less representative as bilateral RERs and trading patterns change over time, and it is necessary to update country weights periodically. Hence, for calculating REERs, it is desirable to have country weights that reflect reasonably well the structure of trade in the period being analyzed. Fairly recent weights should be used for current policy analysis and represen- tative ones from the past for historical or econometric analysis of time- series data. Using current weighting schemes or Fisher indexes also EXTERNAL REAL EXCHANGE RATES 61 mitigates the problem of changing trade structure but increases the com- plexity of the calculations required. Ideally, it is desirable that, for a given country, the reference period for the weighting scheme for calculating the multilateral RER and the base (or equilibrium) year be the same so that the weights reflect the equilibrium RER. This approach, however, may require different base years for different countries and complicates the computation of a con- sistent set of REER indexes for a group of countries. Hence, when con- sistent REER indexes are needed for groups of countries, it is standard practice to calculate all of them using country weights for the same year. However, it is unlikely that the real exchange rates of all developing countries will be in equilibrium at the same time. Hence, for interpret- ing real exchange rate movements for an individual country its REER is usually "rebased" or rescaled so that it equals 100 in a representative "equilibrium year" for that country. As long as the reference year for the trade weights and the equilibrium year to which the REER index is rebased are reasonably close in time and the trade pattern has not changed significantly in the interim, this practice is satisfactory for most empirical purposes. It does, however, reinforce the desirability of using geometric rather than arithmetic averaging as discussed earlier.' Shares of Direct Trade Several different country weighting schemes are employed in the litera- ture for calculating REERs. The simplest and most transparent way to determine country weightings is to use shares of total direct trade (im- ports and exports) as calculated-for example, from the statistics pub- lished in the IMF's Direction of Trade. This procedure is simple enough to give the analyst many options for the choice of base year and also per- mits calculation of relatively up-to-date trade weights. The IMF, in fact, uses such a simplified procedure of calculating competitiveness weights on the basis of bilateral trade flows for new member countries in which data deficiencies and unstable trade patterns preclude utilization of the more sophisticated weighting methodology discussed below (see Zanello and Desruelle 1997). Since trade patterns can change considerably as a result of changes in bilateral RERs and other factors, the first step in devising a weighting 8. A Fisher index is a geometric average of the indexes calculated using weights of the initial year and of the most recent year. 9. The problem of choosing an appropriate base year for analytical purposes is discussed further in Chapter 7 on operational methodologies for estimating the equilibrium RER. 62 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT scheme is to establish an appropriate, up-to-date base year for the coun- try concerned. Table 2.2 illustrates this problem for Cte d'Ivoire. It gives country shares for Cte d'Ivoire's imports, exports, and total trade for 1985, the last reasonable base year before the impact of the shocks of the mid-1980s, and for 1993, the year before the devaluation. A comparison of the movements in the bilateral RERs in table 2.1 and the changes in the trade shares in table 2.2 illustrates how trade shares can change with movements in RERs. In 1985 the dollar peaked relative to the French and CFA francs, after appreciating sharply in the early 1980s, and then began to depreciate. In 1985, C6te d'Ivoire was also hit by a large de- cline in its terms of trade. The trade share figures for 1993 show the considerably different trade pattern that existed by the time of the de- valuation of the CFA franc in January 1994, as the share of Cte d'Ivoire's total trade with other African countries had increased by 16 percentage points in the intervening years while that with industrial countries had fallen correspondingly. Figure 2.5 shows how the REER differs when computed using the different trade weights for 1985 and 1993. At 1985 weights, the REER Figure 2.5 The REER for C6te d'Ivoire Calculated Using 1985, Average 1980-82, and 1993 Total Trade Weights and Old IFS Country Weights, 1980-93 (1985=100) 170 REER at 1993 Total Trade Weights 160 150 REER with Old -. IFS Country Weights REER at 1985 Total 140 Trade Weights 130 A 120 110 REER at Average 1980-82 Total Trade Weights 100 R" 90 II I I I I l I 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 --o--REER at 1993 Total Trade Weights --*--REER with Old IFS Country Weights REER at Average 1980-82 Total -* REER at 1985 Total Trade Trade Weights Weights Note: The REER has been calculated using CPIs and official exchange rates. An upward movement represents an appreciation of the REER for Cbte d'Ivoire. Source: Computed from World Bank data. Table 2.2 Shares in Percent of C6te d'Ivoire's Exports, Imports, and Total Trade by Country, in 1985 and 1993 Exports (%) Imnports (%) Total trade (%) Counltry, 1985 1993 1985 1993 1985 1993 European countries 65.0 54.9 59.7 50.5 63.0 53.0 France 16.6 16.7 34.3 30.5 22.9 22.4 Other EU 47.3 35.2 22.9 17.5 38.1 27.8 Other European countries 1.2 3.2 2.5 2.5 2.0 2.8 Other industrial countries 13.2 6.8 13.7 7.2 13.4 7.1 United States 11.7 5.8 7.3 4.4 10.2 5.2 Japan 1.0 0.5 5.3 2.7 2.6 1.5 m Other 0.5 0.5 1.1 0.1 0.6 0.4 CFA countries 10.4 18.4 7.3 1.3 9.3 11.3 Other UMOA 9.5 14.1 2.6 0.7 7.0 8.5 UDEAC 1.0 4.3 4.8 0.6 2.3 2.7 Non-CFA African countries 2.3 11.2 12.7 32.4 6.0 20.2 Nigeria 0.6 1.3 11.9 24.4 4.6 11.0 Other African countries 1.7 9.8 0.8 8.0 1.4 9.2 Non-African developing countries 9.1 8.3 6.4 8.3 8.1 8.2 Total developing countries 21.9 37.9 26.4 42.0 23.4 39.7 Source: IMF, Direction of Trade. 64 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT appreciated by 32 percent between 1985 and 1993, whereas at 1993 weights it appreciated by 57 percent. The REER using the 1985 base- year weights is appropriate for assessing the misalignment of the RER over the period 1980-93. The 1993 weights, which reflected the then cur- rent structure of trade, should be used to assess the immediate impact of the January 1994 devaluation, however. A developing country may import from and export to different sets of countries. Hence, its export- and import-competing industries may be affected by the bilateral RERs with sets of quite different countries. Figure 2.6 compares the multilateral RERs for C6te d'Ivoire's import and export markets computed using the 1985 trade shares for imports and exports given in table 2.2. It shows that the REER with the countries from which C6te d'Ivoire imports appreciated considerably more (44 percent) than the REER with the countries to which it exports (25 percent). In some cases, it may also be desirable to disaggregate the REERs for imports and exports. For example, an oil exporter may sell its oil and nonoil exports in different markets under different competitive condi- tions. In this case it may be desirable to calculate separate REERs for oil Figure 2.6 The REERs for C6te d'Ivoire's Export and Import Markets Calculated Using 1985 Export and Import Weights, 1980-93 (1985=100) 160 REER at 1985 Import Weights 150 ik 140 REER at 1985 Export Weights 130 120 110 100 90 I 1 : I I1 I 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 - - u - REER at 1985 Import Weights ----REER at 1985 Export Weights Note: The REER has been calculated using CPIs and official exchange rates. An upward movement represents an appreciation of the REER for Cte d'Ivoire. Source: Computed from World Bank data. EXTERNAL REAL EXCHANGE RATES 65 and nonoil exports. Similarly, a particular country may export nontradi- tional products to markets that are significantly different from those in which it sells its traditional export commodities; or a country's tradi- tional and nontraditional exports may experience quite different move- ments in their terms of trade. In such cases, it may be desirable to com- pute separate REERs for traditional and nontraditional exports in order to give a clearer picture of the incentives for export expansion and di- versification. Third-Country Competition Exports of the home country compete both with domestic production of the same product in its trading partner i and with exports from other countries, which may not trade at all with the home country, selling in the same market in country i. Ideally, competitiveness weights should take into account not only the aggregate trade flows between the home country and its trading main partners but also the effects on these trade flows of competition in export markets from third countries, which are not important direct trading partners of the home country. For example, although COte d'Ivoire has only a small amount of direct trade with Malaysia, both countries export very similar primary products to the United States, which is one of C6te d'Ivoire's major trading partners. Hence, a change in the bilateral RER between the ringitt (Malaysia's currency) and the U.S. dollar is likely to have an impact on C6te d'Ivoire's exports to the United States. Empirically, taking into account competition from third countries is much more difficult than simply allowing for direct trade-as it requires a model of competition in international markets that is not available to most analysts. The only weights incorporating such third-country com- petition available for calculating REERs are those from the IMF's Infor- mation Notice System (INS) used in International Financial Statistics. Table 2.3 shows the original IFS competitiveness weights for C6te d'Ivoire, which were in use at the time the CFA franc was devalued in 1994. These weights were based on data for the period 1980-82. They reflected both the relative importance of C6te d'Ivoire's trading part- ners in direct bilateral trade and competition from third countries." Figure 2.5 compares the REERs for C6te d'Ivoire computed using the original IFS weights and actual trade shares both for the 1980-82 base period used in computing these weights and for 1985. The main differ- ences between the original IFS weights and the actual trade shares are that the IFS gave significantly higher weights to third-country competitors 10. See Wickham (1987) and McGuirk (1987) for a discussion of the original weighting scheme employed by the IMF at that time. 66 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT Table 2.3 C6te d'Ivoire: Average 1980-82 Total Trade Weights, Official and Adjusted IFS Country Weights, and 1993 Total Trade Weights Average 1980-82 Old IFS Adjusted old New IFS 1993 total trade country IFS country country total trade weights weights weights weights weights (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) European countries 62.3 56.5 53.9 62.8 53.0 France 30.1 27.2 25.9 21.6 22.4 Netherlands 9.4 5.8 5.5 6.3 5.8 Italy 7.5 4.6 4.4 6.5 5.8 Germany 6.1 7.5 7.2 10.6 6.1 United Kingdom 3.3 6.7 6.4 5.9 2.8 Spain 2.9 2.0 1.9 2.9 3.3 Belgium-Luxembourg 2.2 2.8 2.7 5.8 4.0 Portugal 0.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Switzerland n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.8 n.a. Sweden n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.4 n.a. Other European Countries n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.8 Other industrial countries 12.9 21.1 20.1 23.5 7.1 United States 8.6 10.3 9.8 11.7 5.2 Japan 3.7 7.3 7.0 7.2 1.5 Canada 0.4 1.8 1.8 3.1 0.3 Australia 0.2 1.7 1.6 1.4 0.1 CFA countries 7.8 1.6 2.0 0.0 11.1 Burkina Faso 2.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.9 Mali 2.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.5 Senegal 1.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Togo 0.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.0 Niger 0.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.9 Cameroon n.a. 1.6 2.0 n.a. n.a. Gabon n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.1 Other CFA Countries n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.7 (Ghana, Brazil, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Colombia, and Cameroon) and non-European industrial countries (the United States, Japan, Canada, and Australia) and significantly lower weights to the European and other CFA countries than their shares of total trade. Despite these differences in the country weights, the REERs for C6te d'Ivoire calculated using the original IFS weights, average 1980-82 trade shares, and 1985 trade shares actually tracked each other fairly closely. The original IFS competitiveness weights were subsequently updated during 1994-96 for 146 countries using disaggregated world trade data for 1988-90. These new weights are based on separate models of world trade and competition in the markets for nonoil primary products, manu- EXTERNAL REAL EXCHANGE RATES 67 Average 1980-82 Old IFS Adjusted old New IFS 1993 total trade country IFS country country total trade weights weights weights weights weights (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) Non-CFA African countries 3.4 5.7 12.9 0.0 20.2 Nigeria 2.4 2.3 6.4 n.a. 11.0 Morocco 0.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.6 Mauritania 0.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.6 Ghana 0.2 3.4 6.4 n.a. 2.1 Guinea n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.0 South Africa n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.0 Zaire n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.6 Sierra Leone n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.5 Mozambique n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.5 Other African countries n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.3 Non-African developing countries 13.7 15.1 11.1 13.7 8.2 Algeria 2.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Taiwan (China) 1.6 1.3 0.0 1.3 1.2 Venezuela 4.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Saudi Arabia 1.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Pakistan 1.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Thailand 0.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.3 Brazil 1.4 4.8 0.0 4.2 0.9 China 0.9 1.5 1.8 2.0 1.1 Indonesia 0.3 2.2 2.7 1.3 0.3 Malaysia n.a. 3.6 4.4 1.9 0.4 Colombia n.a. 1.8 2.2 1.7 n.a. Korea n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.4 n.a. Poland n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.7 Tunisia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.5 Other developing countries n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.8 Total developing countries 24.9 22.4 26.0 13.7 39.5 Source: IMF. factures, and, where significant, tourism. The choice of the 1988-90 base period was a compromise between the use of up-to-date information, on the one hand, and comprehensive coverage, on the other. The meth- odology and data used to compute the new weights are described in Zanello and Desruelle (1997).n Even the new competitiveness weights 11. As explained in Zanello and Desruelle (1997), in the updating, a some- what different weighting system-based on data for 1989-91-was employed for calculating the REERs using unit labor costs in manufacturing for 17 indus- trial countries rather than the system for calculating weights for computing REERs using CPIs for all countries, which is discussed above. 68 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT are, unfortunately, not readily available to all analysts; may be out of date for some countries; and are difficult for others to update or adjust for such factors as unrecorded trade and shifting trade patterns. The updating of the IMF's competitiveness weights was finalized af- ter most of the REER calculations and analysis reported in this chapter had been completed, and the new weights were not used in the REER indexes shown in most of the graphs and tables. For illustrative pur- poses, figure 2.7 compares the REERs computed with the original IFS weights, the new IFS weights, and 1993 trade shares. If the new IFS weights were actually the correct ones to use, then the measure of the REER actually used at the time of the devaluation was off by 20 percent because of incorrect weights; and the adjustments made by Bank and Fund staff for unrecorded trade (see below) only made matters worse, increasing the error by another 20 percent. However, the new weights themselves raise some puzzling questions, for example: should neigh- boring African countries really have been given a zero competitiveness Figure 2.7 The REER for C6te d'Ivoire Computed with New and Old IFS Country Weights, Adjusted IFS Country Weights, and 1993 Total Trade Weights, 1980--93 (1985=100) 180 REER with Adjusted 170 REER with 1993 IFS Country Weights Total Trade Weights 160 150 REERwithOldIFS *.. u 140 Country Weights . - - 130 120 110 REER with New IFS Country Weights 100 .... 90 I I I 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 -a-- REER with New IFS Country Weights --- REER with Old IFS Country Weights -*- - REER with Adjusted IFS Country Weights -*- REER with 1993 Total Trade Weights Note: The REER has been calculated using CPIs and official exchange rates. An upward movement represents an appreciation of the REER for C6te d'Ivoire. Source: Computed from World Bank data. EXTERNAL REAL EXCHANGE RATES 69 weight despite a trade share of 31 percent in 1993 (table 2.3)? Was the REER fully 40 percent less appreciated than 1993 trade shares indicated? Unrecorded Trade Another practical complication that may be important for some SSA and other low-income countries is the existence of a significant amount of unrecorded trade through parallel markets. Such unrecorded trade is likely to be greater the higher are tariffs and nontariff barriers to official trade and the greater is the parallel market premium. In such cases, some adjustments may be required to all weighting schemes that are based on the official direction of trade statistics. Any adjustments for unrecorded trade should be consistent with the treatment of parallel market exchange rates discussed previously. For example, in calculating adjusted REER indexes for the CFA coun- tries, the original IFS weights for Ghana and Nigeria were revised up- ward for some countries to take into account the high level of unre- corded trade with these two countries that is not reflected in the official trade statistics. Thus, as shown in table 2.3, for C6te d'Ivoire the weight for Ghana was increased from 0.034 to 0.064 and that for Nigeria from 0.023 to 0.064 to allow for unrecorded trade. Figure 2.8 illustrates the possible effects of an adjustment for unrecorded trade on the REER. It shows that the REER appreciated by almost twice as much between 1985 and 1993 with the adjusted weights (50 percent) as with the unadjusted ones (28 percent). Use of the parallel exchange rates for the unrecorded trade reduces the difference to 10 percent, however. Hyperinflation Once the country weights have been determined, the calculation of the REER as a geometric weighted average of the bilateral RERs (shown in equation 2.7 above) is straightforward. However, a possible additional complication may arise in calculating separate NEER and effective price indexes as components of the REER (as in equation 2.8 above). If any of the trading partners-even those with small country weightings in the home country's index-are experiencing hyperinflation, including these countries in the calculation may distort the separate NEER and effective relative price indexes. The only practical way to get around this prob- lem and arrive at analytically useful NEER and relative price indexes is to delete the hyperinflation countries and adjust the weights for the re- maining countries accordingly. The REER index itself, in contrast, will not be distorted because hyperinflations are usually accompanied by offsetting hyperdevaluations. Hence, the REER indexes calculated in- cluding and excluding countries experiencing hyperinflation can be com- 70 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT Figure 2.8 The REER for C6te d'Ivoire Computed Using IFS Country Weights and Adjusted IFS Country Weights, and Official and Weighted Average Exchange Rates, 1980-93 (1985=100) 160 REER with Adjusted IFS Country REER with Adjusted IFS Country Weights 150 Weights and Official ER m' .. and Weighted. 140Average ER 130 120 110 REER with IFS Country 10- R Weights and Official ER 90- 80 - 70 - 60 I Ill llI l 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 --REER with IFS Country Weights and Official Exchange Rates (ER) --- - REER with Adjusted IFS Country Weights and Official ER REER with Adjusted IFS Country Weights and Weighted Average ER Note: An upward movement represents an appreciation of the REER for C8te d'Ivoire. Source: Computed from World Bank data. pared to see if the adjustments to the country weights necessary to cal- culate separate NEER and relative price indexes are reasonable. For example, Brazil, which experienced hyperinflation in the 1980s, was assigned a weight of .048 in the old IFS competitiveness weights for C6te d'Ivoire. Figure 2.9, which compares the NEER and relative price indexes for C6te d'Ivoire computed with and without Brazil, shows how even one such hyperinflation country can distort these indexes. C6te d'Ivoire's NEER including Brazil appreciated by 220 percent between 1985 and 1993, whereas without Brazil it appreciated by only 45 per- cent. Similarly, C6te d'Ivoire's price level relative to its competitors de- clined by 60 percent if Brazil is included but by only 10 percent if it is excluded. The behavior of C6te d'Ivoire's REER index, on the other hand, was relatively little affected by the inclusion or exclusion of Brazil. The Choice of Appropriate Country Weights Hence, in addition to actual recorded trade flows, the choice of appro- priate country weights may be affected by a number of additional fac- EXTERNAL REAL EXCHANGE RATES 71 tors, including parallel foreign exchange markets, unrecorded trade, and changing patterns of trade. Other relevant factors may include third- country competition in export markets, the pricing of trade in major currencies rather than in the trading partners' currencies, and hyperinflations-hyperdevaluations in competing countries. In addition, in some cases, it may be useful analytically to calculate separate REERs for imports and exports when the factors affecting these differ signifi- cantly. Given the analytical complexity of making systematic adjustments for all of the above factors and the shortage of empirical data needed for doing so, the choice of appropriate country weights may in some cases be as much art as science. Different (reasonable) weighting systems can affect measurement of the REER by as much as 25 percent in a particu- lar year. Hence, the choice of weights may call on the analyst for sub- stantial judgment as empirical accuracy may be a matter of knowing which factors are important (and which are not) in a specific case and making the most reasonable adjustments for the important factors with Figure 2.9 The NEER, Relative Prices, and Expenditure-PPP REER at Old IFS Country Weights for C6te d'Ivoire with and without Brazil, 1980-96 (1985=200) 320 300-- 280.- NEER with 260-- Brazil 0 240 220 200 NEER without 180- Brazil 160- Relative Prices with Brazil 20 i il I I I I 11 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 --- Expenditure-PPP REER with Brazil -- Relative Prices with Brazil -x- Relative Prices without Brazil -i- NEER with Brazil --- Expenditure-PPP REER without Brazil ---NEER without Brazil Note: An upward movement is an appreciation. Source: Computed from World Bank data. 72 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT the limited empirical information available. It is also important to check the sensitivity of the REER index to alternative weighting schemes. While the task of determining appropriate weights may seem daunting, arriv- ing at reasonably accurate and up-to-date weights for one small coun- try is inherently simpler than determining a consistent set of general- equilibrium weights for all countries. Measurement of the Different RER Concepts: Choosing Appropriate Price or Cost Indexes All three of the primary versions of the external RER are widely used in empirical applications. The computational formulas and conventions, nominal exchange rates, and country weighting schemes discussed above are common to all of these. The differences among the measures result primarily from using different foreign and domestic price indexes in their calculations.2 Since the different versions of the external RER are based on different types of price indexes, empirical measures of them will be similar only if the price indexes are. If these price indexes always moved in parallel, the choice between the indexes might make little prac- tical difference in determining the change in the external RER. How- ever, as discussed below, for a given country the different types of price indexes, and the corresponding measures of the external RER, may dif- fer significantly because of changes in the terms of trade, trade policy, or productivity. Unfortunately, changes in these factors, particularly the terms of trade and trade policy, tend to be much larger in developing countries than in industrial ones, magnifying the differences between different external RER measures. In constructing external RER indexes, similar types of price indexes should be used for both the home country and its foreign competitors, with the type of index depending upon the theoretical concept being used. Thus, it is not conceptually consistent, in calculating an external RER, to use a consumption price index for the home country and a pro- duction price index for its competitors because the resulting ratio would be based neither on expenditure price nor on production cost parity. Similarly, it would be inconsistent to compare a value-added deflator for one country with a final product price index for another. This section discusses the choice of appropriate price or cost indexes for measuring each of the three primary versions of the external RER. 12. The statistical problems involved in the construction of price indexes are not discussed in this chapter. See Maciejewski (1983) for an extensive discussion of statistical issues. EXTERNAL REAL EXCHANGE RATES 73 The following three subsections take up, in turn, the empirical indexes needed for measuring the expenditure-PPP, Mundell-Fleming, and traded-goods versions of the RER. The Expenditure-PPP External RER Purchasing power parity, the oldest theory of the equilibrium exchange rate, may be applied to the prices of all goods, as discussed here, or only to the prices of traded goods, as discussed below in the subsection on the external RER for traded goods. There are two versions of PPP: abso- lute and relative. Since both versions are concerned with purchasing power, they employ expenditure price rather than production cost in- dexes. However, the two versions use different baskets of goods; abso- lute PPP requires standardized baskets whereas relative PPP requires representative ones. Absolute PPP The original absolute form of PPP theory holds that the equilibrium nominal exchange rate between two currencies is equal to the ratio of the actual domestic and foreign prices of an identical standardized bas- ket of goods in the home and foreign countries as shown in equation 2.13: (2.13) Edc - Ad where P and P are the actual domestic- and foreign-currency prices of the standardized basket of goods.13 Note that absolute PPP both deter- mines an equilibrium nominal exchange rate and implies that the real exchange rate in equation (2) equals one. Because, among other things, of the shortage of data on the actual costs of standardized baskets of goods in different countries, absolute PPP has not been much used empirically." Recently, however, in order 13. See Rogoff (1996). If the baskets of goods are not identical in two coun- tries, the nominal exchange rate cannot be uniquely determined as the ratio of the cost of the baskets in the two currencies because the cost of the baskets will in general depend upon their composition. Absolute PPP is theoretically unattrac- tive in that a standardized basket of goods will not be representative of the ex- penditure patterns in two countries unless they have identical consumption pat- terns. (See Officer 1982). Absolute PPP is also sometimes referred to as "strong PPP."1 14. The Economist's "Big Mac Index" is, as noted in appendix A, a simple one- good absolute PPP nominal exchange rate and is the most commonly encoun- tered example of the empirical use of absolute PPP. 74 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT to make possible more accurate comparisons of income and consump- tion levels across countries, a large research effort known as the Interna- tional Comparison Programme (ICP) was carried out to price standard- ized baskets of goods in different countries. From the comparative pur- chasing power parity indexes derived under the ICP, implicit nominal PPP exchange rates can be calculated as the relative cost of the stan- dardized basket of goods in the countries being compared. These ICP exchange rates have been used in a few multicountry studies as esti- mates of the equilibrium nominal exchange rate and are discussed further in appendix A. Relative PPP In its relative form, PPP holds that the nominal exchange rate is propor- tional to the ratio of the domestic and foreign price levels as expressed by equation 2.14: (2.14) Ed PG" k where k is a constant.3 Relative PPP in equation 2.14 implies that the real exchange rate in equation 2.2 is a constant. Conceptually, for the expenditure version of relative-PPP external RER price indexes should be comprehensive, representative expenditure-based indexes including both traded and nontraded goods.16 Because of the ready availability of consumer price indexes for representative baskets of goods for most countries, the relative expenditure-PPP version of the external RER has been extensively used empirically. Unless other- 15. Because k is an arbitrary constant, rather than a specific number, the "prices" in equations 2.2 and 2.14 may be either actual prices or indexes. The value of k will depend upon which of these is used but will still be constant. Relative PPP is also sometimes referred to as "weak PPP," and some formulations of it allow k to follow a time trend. 16. The representative baskets should include both traded and nontraded goods in whatever proportions they are actually purchased in the domestic and foreign economies. Use of a standardized but arbitrary basket in calculating the relative-PPP version of the RER would require an improbable behavioral as- sumption-that households and firms in both countries know the composition of this standardized basket and value currencies accordingly rather than in terms of their actual expenditure patterns. Even the use of representative baskets of goods in measuring expenditure PPP could, however, be problematic if the com- position of these baskets tends to change systematically over time because of the demand and supply factors discussed in Chapter 5. EXTERNAL REAL EXCHANGE RATES 75 wise specified in this volume, the term PPP always refers to relative expenditure PPP. References to absolute PPP are explicitly identified as such. The consumer price index (CPI) is usually broadly representative of both traded and nontraded goods. It is the most commonly used index in the calculation of the expenditure-PPP version of the external RER. The CPI is available monthly in most developing countries so that the movements in the RER computed from it can also be tracked on a monthly basis.17 The IMF publishes in International Financial Statistics (IFS) ex- ternal RER indexes based on consumer price indexes for most industrial and developing countries. IFS treats the expenditure-PPP version of the external REER as "the REER" for developing countries, although, as dis- cussed below, it gives primacy to the REER for traded goods computed using unit labor cost in manufacturing for 17 industrial countries for which the required data are available. Two main caveats concerning expenditure-PPP external RER indexes are worth noting. First, CPIs are subject to the influence of price con- trols, subsidies, and indirect taxes; and CPI levels and movements may be affected by these. Hence, in interpreting RERs based on CPIs it is necessary to distinguish between the effects of changes in indirect taxes, subsidies, and price controls and movements in the general price level.8 Second, CPIs for different countries are not based on the same baskets of goods (or even ones that are necessarily fairly comparable), and their weightings often reflect patterns of consumer spending that may differ in the home country from those in its foreign competitors. These differ- ences in expenditure patterns do not pose a conceptual problem from the point of view of relative-PPP theory, which applies to representative domestic and foreign baskets that may differ in composition, but do limit the usefulness of RERs based on CPIs for comparing standards of living. Compared with the CPI, the wholesale price index (WPI) is usually more heavily weighted with traded goods and underweighted with 17. For example, monthly CPIs were available for the period 1980-93 for all of the CFA countries except Benin and Mali. 18. CPIs are also subject to seasonal variations. Although seasonal variations do not pose any particular problems for analysis of annual data, such as those reported in this chapter, they may cause seasonal fluctuations in RER indexes calculated using quarterly or monthly data. The IMF thus adjusts for seasonal variations in computing REERs as explained in Zanello and Desruelle (1997). Although it may be possible for other analysts to adjust home country data for seasonal variations, it may be too time consuming to do so for competing coun- tries unless seasonally adjusted CPI data can be obtained from other sources. 76 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT nontraded goods. Thus, the WPI is not an appropriate candidate for calculation of the expenditure-PPP version of the external RER, although the WPI may be used for the traded-goods version of the external RER as noted below. Two plausible alternatives to the CPI for expenditure PPP are the absorption deflator and the overall consumption deflators from the national accounts. However, neither of these is commonly used in the computation of the expenditure-PPP version of the RER. National account data are typically available only annually for low-income de- veloping countries whereas the CPI is usually available monthly. In ad- dition, both the absorption and the total consumption deflators include public consumption, the price of which often is not determined by mar- ket forces. Absorption also includes investment, which makes it a broader measure of the expenditure price level than the CPI but which some analysts prefer to consider as an "intermediate" product for producing final consumption.19 Although for the foregoing reasons the absorption and consumption deflators are not often used, in specific circumstances they may be worth considering. For example, CPIs were not available for Benin and Mali for the period for which the overvaluation of the CFA franc was being analyzed. Since the private consumption deflator from the national ac- counts was the most comparable of the price indexes actually available, it was used as a proxy for the CPI for estimating the expenditure-PPP version of the RER for these two countries. Bilateral RERs can also be readily constructed using absorption and consumption deflators for those competitors for which comparable data are available, but construction of similar multilateral RERs may be more problematic because of prob- lems with timely data availability and comparability for some develop- ing-country competitors. The Mundell-Fleming or Aggregate Production Cost Version of the External RER The second principal external RER concept is based on the standard Mundell-Fleming open economy macroeconomic model used for indus- trial countries. In this model, each country is assumed to produce a single unique aggregate good (that is, its GDP), which it both consumes and exports. This composite good is in imperfect competition with the unique composite goods produced and exported by other countries and faces less than perfectly price-elastic foreign and domestic demand. The price of each country's good is determined by its cost of production. Hence, in the Mundell-Fleming model, the price index in the definition of the 19. See, for example, Jorgenson and Paldam (1986). EXTERNAL REAL EXCHANGE RATES 77 external RER (given in equation 2.2) is an output price index or produc- tion cost index for the economy, which is composed of exports and goods produced and sold domestically by a country, rather than an expendi- ture price index as in the PPP theory, which is composed of imports plus goods produced and sold domestically. The Mundell-Fleming version of the external RER can also be viewed as measuring competitiveness in the aggregate production of all goods, both traded and nontraded.20 In this formulation, the home and foreign GDP (value-added) deflators are clearly the appropriate price indexes to use in computing the exter- nal RER. Thus, in foreign-currency terms, the Mundell-Fleming RER (MFRERC) is computed as shown in equation 2.15: (2.15) MFRER = E Z GDPd PGDPf where PGDPd and PGDPf are, respectively, the domestic and foreign GDP deflators. The Mundell-Fleming model assumes that the home country's GDP and exports are a single composite good whose prices move in parallel. Similarly, the foreign-currency price of imports is assumed to move in parallel with the foreign country's GDP deflator. Hence, the foreign- currency prices of exports and imports are determined as indicated in equations 2.16 and 2.17: (2.16) Efc 'PGDPd = Efc PXdc = 'PXfc 20. Some authors interpret the Mundell-Fleming RER as a way of stating pur- chasing power parity theory in terms of aggregate production costs of all goods, both traded and nontraded. Since the competitiveness of the traded-goods sec- tor depends, among other things, upon cost of inputs produced by the nontraded sector and the opportunity cost of the factors employed in it, these authors view aggregate "cost structure parity" as preferable to the version of the external RER that only takes into account competitiveness in producing traded goods. (See Officer 1982, Chapter 8, for the arguments favoring production cost over expen- diture price parity theories.) This aggregate producer cost parity theory is also sometimes interpreted as producer price parity theory. Perfect competition in domestic and foreign markets would force the domestic price of any commodity (and thus the general price level) to equal its cost of production, including labor, capital, and intermediate inputs. Hence, some authors replace the production cost index by the general producer price level in the formulas defining the Mundell-Fleming RER and arrive at a formulation quite similar to that for ex- penditure PPP. However, the price index used in cost parity theory should, in principle, be a production cost (or price) index whereas that used in expendi- ture-PPP theory is an expenditure or cost of living related index. 78 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT (2.17) PGDPf Plfe where Pxac is the home country's export price deflator measured in do- mestic currency, Pxfc is its export price deflator measured in foreign cur- rency, and P is the home country's import price deflator measured in foreign currency. Substituting the right hand sides of equations 2.16 and 2.17 into equation 2.15 yields equation 2.18: P where TOT is the home country's terms of trade. Thus, the Mundell- Fleming formulation makes no distinction between the terms of trade and the RER. Since the export price deflator is assumed to equal the home country's GDP deflator and the import price deflator is assumed to equal the foreign country's GDP deflator, the RER and the terms of trade are the same; and both are endogenous in Mundell-Fleming models. The Mundell-Fleming model is appropriate for many industrial coun- tries because their trade is dominated by differentiated manufactured products, their terms of trade often do not vary substantially, and their CPIs and GDP deflators move largely in parallel. In these circumstances, an external RER computed using GDP deflators provides a good indica- tor of changes in the degree of competitiveness in aggregate production of both traded and nontraded goods and takes into account the interac- tion between these two sectors as discussed in the section below on the comparison of alternative external RER measures.21 It is a broader pro- duction cost measure than the unit labor cost as it includes in principle the cost of all factors of production per unit of value added. While the above assumptions may be reasonable for industrial coun- tries producing diversified manufactured exports, they are less so for small developing countries that rely heavily on exports of a few pri- mary products and whose terms of trade are exogenously determined. In these countries, export prices often move much more sharply than the GDP deflator, and it is often desirable analytically to distinguish between the terms of trade and the RER. Production cost and price in- dexes (such as the GDP deflator) include export prices but exclude the prices of imports of final goods,12 whereas an expenditure price index (such as the CPI) does the opposite, including the prices of imports of 21. See for example Edwards (1990, p. 74), Lipschitz and McDonald (1991), Williamson (1994), and Stein, Allen, and Associates (1995). 22. The prices of imported inputs may be reflected in some production cost indexes. EXTERNAL REAL EXCHANGE RATES 79 final goods and excluding the prices of exports. When the terms of trade (the relative prices of imports and exports) change, the movements in production and expenditure price indexes may differ significantly In these circumstances, the GDP deflator and the Mundell-Fleming RER may be heavily influenced by swings in the volatile prices of commod- ity exports and will tend to diverge from the CPI and the expenditure- PPP RER. Another limitation in using the Mundell-Fleming RER for develop- ing countries is that the GDP deflator is available only on a yearly basis for most developing countries, whereas it is often available quarterly for industrial countries. In addition, the GDP deflator may not always be ideal for international comparisons among developing countries be- cause nonstandardized methods are used for its computation in some low-income countries. The External RER for Traded Goods The external RER for traded goods is defined as the relative cost of pro- ducing traded goods, measured in a common currency, in the home and foreign country. This third version of the external RER uses output price, production cost, or factor cost indexes for traded goods in the home and foreign country in equation 2.2 rather than price or cost indexes for all goods as in the expenditure-PPP and Mundell-Fleming RERs. The ex- ternal RER for traded goods measures competitiveness only among the subsets of goods, produced in the home and foreign countries, that are internationally traded. It, in effect, adjusts the nominal exchange rate to reflect relative prices, costs, or unit costs in the traded-goods sectors at home and abroad. The law of one price and purchasing power parity theory may be applied either broadly to the external RER for all goods or more nar- rowly to the external RER for traded goods. The law of one price holds that, because of competition among sellers and arbitrage in goods mar- kets, the prices of identical goods sold in different countries will be the same after adjustment for transactions costs such as transportation and tariffs. Algebraically, the law of one price may be written for goods i as in equation 2.19: (2.19) l,c = Ed (1+t).pi,ft where t, is a broad measure of transportation, tariffs, and other transac- tions costs. If the prices of individual goods tend to be equalized by the law of one price, so will the prices of baskets of these goods. If the law of one price held for all goods, both traded and nontraded, and transactions 80 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT costs were negligible, absolute PPP would also hold for all goods since the price of a standard basket of these would be equalized. If transac- tions costs were non-negligible but constant and the law of one price held for all goods, then relative PPP would hold for all goods since the ratio of the prices of a basket of goods in two competing countries would be constant. However, there is little reason to suppose that international competi- tion will tend to equalize the prices of goods that are not traded. Hence, the law of one price is more logically applied only to traded goods. In this case, if transactions were negligible, absolute PPP would hold for homogeneous traded goods. If transactions costs were non-negligible but constant and the law of one price held for traded goods but not for nontraded goods, relative PPP would hold for traded goods. Hence, for those traded goods to which the law of one price applies, the external RER should be a constant.23 Internationally traded goods are of two basic types: homogeneous, standardized commodities, and more diversified products, usually manufactured. Developing countries typically export combinations of these two types of products, which may range from almost 100 percent standardized commodities to almost 100 percent manufactures depend- ing upon the country. The law of one price is most applicable to homo- geneous commodities and would suggest full price equalization after allowance for transportation, tariffs, and other transactions costs. Di- versified manufactures are, in contrast, usually imperfect substitutes. However, international markets for traded goods are large, with many potential sources of supply, and tend to be highly competitive. Hence, even if manufactured products are not perfect substitutes, the cross-elas- ticities between them are significant; and their prices and costs of pro- duction must be reasonably competitive. Theoretically, how much prices will be equalized by international trade depends critically upon whether traded goods are homogeneous perfect substitutes or differentiated imperfect substitutes. For standard- 23. This relationship should, in theory, hold for both bilateral and multilat- eral RERs. However, the assumptions underlying the theoretical argument that the relative cost of a basket of internationally traded goods should be stable can be questioned on the following grounds: (a) the composition of tradable goods can change with the passage of time; (b) if the weightings of different categories of goods are different in different countries, a change in the relative prices of some tradables can cause the relative prices of different baskets including these to vary; and (c) changes in trade policy or transactions costs can alter the price differentials between countries. See Goldberg and Knetter (1997) and Isard and Faruqee (1998) for a fuller discussion of this point. EXTERNAL REAL EXCHANGE RATES 81 ized commodities, theoretically, complete price equalization should take place; and the empirical evidence is that it does. Although the tendency for the prices of differentiated manufactured goods to be equalized is less strong, a rise in their costs or prices, expressed in foreign currency, still usually leads to a loss of competitiveness and market share. (The empirical evidence on the validity of the law of one price is further dis- cussed in Chapter 3, pages 129 through 131). Hence, the RER for traded goods is often used as an indicator of the competitiveness of industrial countries' external sectors and is often employed as the relative price variable in trade equations for these countries. Since this RER focuses exclusively on the traded-goods sector, it has the important advantage of minimizing the effect of productivity bias resulting from more rapid growth of productivity in the traded-goods sector than in the nontraded- goods sector.24 However, the usefulness of the RER for traded goods for a particular developing country will depend upon the mixture of homogeneous and diversified traded goods that it produces, as will the degree of price equalization to be expected. At the limit, countries that produced only homogeneous commodities would be price takers and face perfectly elas- tic foreign demand. In this case, international demand rather than home country costs would determine prices; and there would be full equal- ization of domestic and foreign prices. If transactions costs are negli- gible (as is the case for gold, for example) the traded-goods version of the external RER must equal one.25 If transaction costs are non-negli- gible but constant, which is the more common case, the external RER for homogeneous goods will also tend to be constant. However, many de- veloping countries produce a mix of homogeneous and differentiated goods so that their overall external RER for traded goods may vary with their competitiveness. While the choice of empirical price indexes for the expenditure-PPP and Mundell-Fleming versions of the external RER is reasonably straight- forward, finding empirical measures of competitiveness in producing traded goods is more problematic because lack of data is a serious con- straint for most developing countries. Four alternative price indexes have been suggested in the economic literature as possible candidates for measuring competitiveness in producing traded goods: unit labor costs for traded goods or manufacturing, the wholesale price index (WPI), 24. See the discussion of the Balassa-Samuelson effect in Chapters 3, 5, and 6 and Wren-Lewis and Driver (1998), Chapter 3. 25. See Rogoff (1996) for data showing that the law of one price holds for gold prices in different countries. 82 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT value-added deflators for manufacturing and other sectors producing traded goods, and export unit values.' IFS reports external RER indexes for 17 industrial countries computed using these four price indexes for traded goods. The advantages and drawbacks of using each of these four indexes are reviewed briefly below, and the relationship among profitability, competitiveness, and the different external RERs is dis- cussed in appendix B. Unit Labor Costs in Manufacturing The IMF regards relative unit labor costs in manufacturing, measured in a common currency, as the single most useful measure of competi- tiveness in producing traded goods in industrial countries. Zanello and Desruelle (1997) argue that unit labor costs in manufacturing "capture cost developments in an important sector exposed to international com- petition. They offer a reliable gauge of the relative profitability. And, they bring into focus the largest component of nontraded costs and of value added, thus proxying for significant developments in total vari- able costs." For 17 industrial countries, IFS, in fact, reports the REER computed using unit labor costs in manufacturing most prominently as "the REER," rather than the expenditure-PPP REER computed using CPIs, which is reported for developing countries.27 Because of the difficulty of obtaining data on unit labor cost in most developing countries, the REER computed with unit labor costs is of much less use for them.28 Unit labor cost may be calculated either di- rectly as total labor costs divided by the total value of output or indi- rectly as the average wage rate divided by labor productivity. Unfortu- nately, many developing countries, including C6te d'Ivoire and the ma- jority of low-income countries, lack the data necessary to calculate unit labor costs by either method. The REER computed using unit labor costs has been included in this chapter for use in more advanced developing countries for which the necessary data are available. However, it is not 26. See Mills and Nallari (1992). 27. A set of competitiveness weights (reflecting only trade in manufactured products) that is different from the one used for calculating REERs (which use CPIs) is used for calculating REERs that are based on unit labor costs. In addi- tion, unit labor costs may be highly sensitive to cyclical changes in productivity, caused by labor hoarding. IFS reports both an unadjusted and a "normalized" unit labor cost index that adjusts for cyclical changes in productivity. RERs based on relative unit labor costs are discussed further in this chapter's section on the comparison of alternative external RER measures and in Zanello and Desruelle (1997). 28. Even for some industrial countries, the IMF has to interpolate from quar- terly data to obtain a monthly series on unit labor costs in manufacturing. EXTERNAL REAL EXCHANGE RATES 83 likely to be a practical empirical option for many low-income develop- ing countries with limited data.29 Consequently, some authors have simplified the relative unit labor cost version of the external RER for developing countries by assuming that productivity differentials are constant and restating this version of the RER as the relative nominal wage rate expressed in foreign exchange terms or relative to per capita GDP. Wage data also have important em- pirical advantages: levels as well as changes are meaningful, and wage data can be easily compared with other indicators such as GDP per capita. Relative wage indicators may be used either narrowly for the traded- goods sector or more broadly for the aggregate production of all goods. Although these simplified indicators may be biased when productivity changes at different rates in the countries being compared or labor force participation rates differ significantly (if per capita GDP is used), data are at least available for calculating such relative labor cost indicators for some developing countries. These indicators also provide useful in- formation about competitiveness that is readily comprehensible by non- technical audiences.30 However, even the simplified approach of measuring the external RER as relative labor costs expressed in a common currency could not be used for the CFA countries as adequate time-series data on nominal wages were not available. The best that could be done with the frag- mentary wage data available was, as illustrated in figure 2.10, to ana- lyze the relationship of wages to GNP per capita. This relatively simple presentation does, however, give a striking impression of how inflated relative labor costs in the formal sector were in the CFA countries prior to the January 1994 devaluation. Wholesale Price Indexes WPIs are relatively heavily weighted with traded goods and are, there- fore, generally more representative of traded-goods prices than are other aggregate indexes of traded and nontraded goods. RERs for traded goods, computed with WPIs, are thus often used in import and export equations for industrial countries." Unfortunately, WPIs, like measures of unit labor costs, are not avail- able for many developing countries (including COte d'Ivoire). Hence, 29. See Guerguil and Kaufman (1998) for an example, for Chile, of the type of analysis that can be done when data on unit labor costs are available. 30. See Halpern and Wyplosz (1997) and KrajnyAk and Zettelmeyer (1997) for examples of analyses using wage rates in foreign currencies to measure the RER. 31. See Wren-Lewis and Driver (1998). For an example of the use of WPIs for some developing countries, see Fleissig and Grennes (1994). 84 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT Figure 2.10 Annual Labor Compensation in the Largest CFA Economies, 1986-88, as a Multiple of GNP per Capita 14 12- 10- 8- 6- 4- 2- 0- Senegal Cbte d'Ivoire Cameroon Competing United France less developed States countries U Manufacturing O Government Note: "Competing less developed countries" is the average for six adjusting developing countries-Morocco, Ghana, Tunisia, Indonesia, Mauritius, and Malaysia. Source: Computed from World Bank data. the home country's cost of aggregate production is sometimes measured by its CPI or GDP deflator, with the WPI being used to measure the price of traded goods of foreign competitors.32 However, this ratio gives a mixed indicator of competitiveness because the foreign prices of traded goods (as measured by foreign WPIs) are compared with the domestic price or production costs of all goods (as measured by the GDP deflator or CPI). This indicator may be biased by differential changes in produc- tivity in the traded and nontraded sectors as discussed in the following chapter on the two-good internal RER.31 Value-Added Deflators for Manufacturing For the industrial countries, IFS reports external RER indexes based on value-added deflators for the manufacturing sector as a measure of com- petitiveness in producing traded goods. These deflators are calculated as the quotient of the current and constant price estimates of value added 32. See, for example, Stein, Allen, and Associates (1995), Chapter 5. 33. This indicator is sometimes also used as a proxy for the internal RER as noted in Chapter 3. EXTERNAL REAL EXCHANGE RATES 85 in the manufacturing sector, adjusted for changes in indirect taxes. There is, unfortunately, an important conceptual problem with using this in- dicator as a single RER for most developing countries. Although the manufacturing sector may be broadly representative of tradable goods production for industrial countries, it is much less so for developing countries in which many of the actual and potential exports and import substitutes are agricultural products. Nevertheless, relative manufac- turing sector deflators, when available, may still be a useful partial indi- cator of competitiveness trends in manufacturing.' Unfortunately, as is the case with unit labor costs and WPIs, the data required for calculat- ing an index of relative manufacturing sector deflators are not available for many developing countries. The only CFA country for which the value-added deflator for the manufacturing sector was available is C6te d'Ivoire. Even for it, this deflator was only available for the period 1985-93, and the data required for making adjustments for indirect taxes were lacking. Although it is possible to construct bilateral RERs using manufacturing deflators for C6te d'Ivoire's industrial-country trading partners, a representative multilateral RER cannot be constructed because of lack of data on manu- facturing deflators for C6te d'Ivoire's developing-country trading part- ners. This problem is a general one. Lack of data on unit labor costs, WPIs, and manufacturing-sector deflators for many developing coun- tries generally prevents computation of REERs based on these indica- tors even when the required data are available for the home country. Export Unit Values A fourth indicator used to assess competitiveness in traded-goods production in industrial countries is the external RER based on rela- tive export unit values in manufacturing. International Financial Sta- tistics reports this indicator for 17 industrial countries. In this indicator, the unit values serve as proxies for export costs or prices. If the price of the home country's manufactured exports fall relative to its competi- tors', its exports should become more competitive. This RER concept is useful only for countries exporting a group of diversified heterogeneous manufactured products that are in imperfect competition with those of their trading partners.35 Export unit values 34. See Chapter 3 for a discussion of using sectoral value-added deflators for calculating the internal RER. 35. Even for countries exporting differentiated products, the use of export deflators or unit value indexes may bias measures of the external RER since these indexes include only products exportable at the current exchange rate and do not cover those potentially exportable at a more depreciated exchange rate. See Clark and others (1994). 86 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT are less useful in cases in which the home country exports significant amounts of homogeneous primary products (such as cocoa, coffee, and cotton in the Cbte d'Ivoire example). In this case, competition in inter- national commodity markets will tend to equalize export prices (and unit values that are proxies for them) expressed in a common currency, and the countries concerned will be price takers facing perfectly elastic foreign demand as discussed earlier. This external RER measure will also be biased if the unit value of a developing country's exports in- creases over time as a result of structural increases in value added in the export sector-for example, through greater processing of primary prod- ucts or diversification into higher-value products. Hence, the external RER based on export unit values is often of less help than in industrial countries in assessing the competitiveness of developing countries in producing traded goods (unless disaggregated data are available for the manufacturing exports separately) and was not computed for Cte d'Ivoire. Comparison of Alternative External RER Measures: Competitiveness and the Terms of Trade The preceding sections have discussed the three basic versions of the external RER: the expenditure-PPP, the Mundell-Fleming or aggregate production cost, and the traded-goods RERs. Although these three RER measures are all used to draw inferences about a country's competitive- ness, fluctuations in the terms of trade can cause them to diverge sig- nificantly. The following two subsections consider first the relationship between competitiveness and the different external RERs and then the effects of fluctuations in the terms of trade on them. Competitiveness and the External RER To more firmly link the different concepts of external competitiveness to internal price incentives, the IMF has done a considerable amount of work on the relationship between the various measures of the external RER and the profitability of production and investment, both in the traded-goods sector and in aggregate domestic production. In this work, an improvement in the competitiveness of an economy is defined as an increase in the relative share of profits in value added and is expected to lead to an expansion of output and investment. To take into account both the cost of inputs produced in the nontraded-goods sector and the opportunity cost of the factors employed by it, this interpretation of com- petitiveness has been applied to aggregate domestic production of both EXTERNAL REAL EXCHANGE RATES 87 traded and nontraded goods as well as to traded goods separately. The IMF's analytical work on the relationship between profitability, com- petitiveness, and the different external RERs is reviewed in appendix B, on which the following discussion is based. To take into account total factor productivity in assessing competi- tiveness in producing traded goods, one formulation of the external RER for traded goods suggests using total unit factor cost (UFC) of produc- ing traded goods, including wages, interest, rents, and profits, adjusted for total productivity and measured in foreign exchange. A simplifica- tion of this approach discussed in the preceding section incorporates the idea of competitiveness, implying an increase in profitability. It uses unit labor costs of producing traded goods, rather than total unit factor costs, measured in foreign exchange terms. The rationale behind using unit labor is that the cost of labor usually represents the largest share in the total cost of production and that the shares of different factors change slowly over time. Labor is usually the least mobile factor of production internationally, whereas capital goods are internationally traded and financial market integration tends to equal- ize long-term real interest rates in liberalized economies. Unit labor costs are in a certain sense the most fundamental measure of a country's pro- ductivity, domestic production costs, and real factor incomes. Relative labor costs can also be directly related both to the internal RER and to other measures of the external RER; and real exchange rates and real wages tend to be closely linked, both theoretically and empirically. Hence, relative unit labor costs are widely used to assess external competitive- ness in producing traded goods, as discussed earlier. Marsh and Tokarick (1994) see three advantages in using unit labor cost for assessing competitiveness in industrial countries. First, data on labor costs are generally available on a comparable basis for these coun- tries. Second, unit labor costs are an important component of overall production costs. And, third, the containment of wage costs is often an important component of policies designed to achieve macroeconomic stability and competitiveness in industrial countries. Because of these advantages, the IMF reports the RER computed using unit labor costs in manufacturing as the primary measure of competitiveness in industrial countries. The main limitation of external RER indexes based on unit labor costs is, of course, that they take into account only one factor of production. As explained in Lipschitz and McDonald (1991) and Marsh and Tokarick (1994), relative unit labor costs accurately measure the relative profit- ability of producing traded goods only under certain conditions: that is, if prices of traded goods are determined by international competition, if the capital stock is fixed, if all countries have the same technology, and 88 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT if no imported inputs are used. Under these conditions, increases in rela- tive unit labor costs in the home country will reduce the share of profits in the traded-goods sector and lead to a deterioration in the country's competitiveness and external trade position. If the foregoing conditions are not met, however, movements in relative unit labor costs can some- times give misleading signals about profitability. As the capital-labor ratio differs across countries, this difference may introduce a bias into such indexes.36 Moreover, production activities typically use intermedi- ate inputs, which are not included in factor costs. Imported and domes- tic inputs may be used in differing proportions in the home and foreign countries and may have different shares in total cost. Their prices may also vary significantly across countries. For instance, if petroleum and other forms of energy are important intermediate inputs and their rela- tive prices change significantly, competitiveness may improve or dete- riorate without any corresponding change in unit labor costs. Hence, some economists prefer to use broader measures of competitiveness than relative unit labor costs. The RER measured in terms of the aggregate cost or price level is par- tially a function of unit labor costs in the traded and nontraded sectors but encompasses more information. It takes into account changes in the prices of imported intermediate inputs and developments in the nontraded-goods sector. As noted earlier, external competitiveness in producing traded goods should, ideally, take into account both the cost of inputs produced in the nontraded-goods sector and the opportunity cost of the factors employed by it. Hence, cost competitiveness theory has been applied by some authors to aggregate production of all goods, both traded and nontraded.17 These authors prefer to use the GDP de- flator or the CPI to calculate the external RER as a measure of competi- tiveness in the aggregate production of all goods. For them, the Mundell- Fleming and expenditure-PPP versions of the RER, rather than the exter- nal RER for traded goods, are the preferred measures of competitiveness. Effects of Fluctuations in the Terms of Trade The three principal versions of the external RER are thus all used as measures of a country's external competitiveness. These external RER indexes all contain the nominal exchange rate. Movements in nominal exchange rates tend to be much larger than those in the various mea- sures of relative domestic and foreign prices because floating exchange 36. See Edwards (1990). 37. See, for example, Officer (1982). EXTERNAL REAL EXCHANGE RATES 89 rates are quite flexible and respond quickly to monetary as well as real shocks. Since changes in nominal exchange rates often swamp those in relative prices, the nominal exchange rate and the different measures of the external RER usually show a pronounced tendency to move together statistically, particularly in the short term in industrial countries. Over the longer term, changes in three variables-productivity, tar- iffs, and the terms of trade-can, nevertheless, cause the different mea- sures of the external RER to diverge significantly. Changes in produc- tivity and tariffs, although important in some cases, tend to be less dra- matic than those in the terms of trade. These are most conveniently ana- lyzed using the two- and three-good internal RERs discussed in the next two chapters. However, when a country's terms of trade change signifi- cantly, the effects of such a change tend to be evident even in aggregate external RERs. Hence, this subsection examines the effects of fluctua- tions in the terms of trade on the three principal external RERs in a typi- cal developing country.39 When the external terms of trade change significantly, movements in the CPI (which reflects the cost of imported goods) and in the GDP de- flator (which reflects the cost of exports) may diverge. Typically, when the terms of trade improve, the GDP deflator will rise faster than the CPI. But, when the terms of trade deteriorate, the opposite will happen-the CPI will rise faster than the GDP deflator. Hence, the ex- penditure-PPP and Mundell-Fleming RERs computed using these price indexes will diverge. Figure 2.11 compares the behavior of the GDP deflator, the CPI, the private consumption deflator, and the price deflator for manufacturing for C6te d'Ivoire (the only available indicator of the behavior of the prices of differentiated traded goods as noted in the section on the external RER for traded goods). It shows how in the period 1985-93 the CPI and the private consumption deflator both rose while the GDP deflator fell by 11 percent as a result of the sharp drop in commodity export prices." 38. For a further discussion of the empirical relationship between the nomi- nal and real exchange rates, see the paragraphs on the law of one price in Chap- ter 11, footnote 7 in Chapter 13, and Clark and others (1994). 39. For a further discussion of other factors that can cause the external RER for traded goods and the RER for all goods to diverge, see MacDonald (1997), pages 6-11. 40. Until 1987 the CPI and private consumption deflators tracked each other fairly closely. However, in 1992-93 the CPI series was revised from 1987 on- ward. Since then the two series have increasingly diverged as shown in figure 2.11. 90 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT Figure 2.11 Price Deflators and the Terms of Trade for C6te d'Ivoire, 1980-93 (1985=100) 140 CPI 130 Private Consumption 120 Absorbtion Manufacturing Deflator Deflator Deflator 110 --- .......--. 90 -. 8*0 Terms of Trade 80 - . GDP 70 - Deflator 60 I I I 1 1 1 1 1 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 CPI - - - - Private Consumption Deflator --- Manufacturing Deflator - - - - GDP Deflator --- Terms of Trade -+- Absorption Deflator Note: The manufacturing deflator for C6te d'Ivoire is available only from 1985 onward. Source: Computed from World Bank data. Figure 2.12 shows the effects of the different behavior of the CPI and GDP deflators during 1980-93 on the expenditure-PPP and Mundell- Fleming versions of the REER. It shows that, when C6te d'Ivoire's terms of trade dropped by 35 percent between 1985 and 1993, the expenditure- PPP version of its REER appreciated by 45 percent whereas the Mundell- Fleming REER appreciated by only 10 percent as a result of falling ex- port prices. This figure is a good example of the differences between aggregate expenditure and production cost external RERs that can be caused by changes in the external terms of trade. In addition, the relative prices of traded and nontraded goods will not necessarily behave in the same fashion both at home and abroad. Hence, it is possible for the aggregate and traded-goods production costs RERs to give quite different signals from time to time. As traded goods contain both imports and exports, the net effect of fluctuations in the terms of trade on external RERs measuring competitiveness in produc- ing traded goods is theoretically ambiguous. Rising import and rising exports prices will both tend to appreciate external RERs for traded goods, and declines in both import and export prices will tend to depreciate EXTERNAL REAL EXCHANGE RATES 91 both these RERs. The net effect of a change in the terms of trade will depend upon the relative size of the changes in export and import prices and on the sizes of the export and import competing sectors. Thus, the direction of the net effect cannot be determined a priori. The very limited data on the traded-goods external RER measures that are available for developing countries also make it difficult to make empirical comparisons of the movements in the RERs for traded goods with those in the expenditure-PPP and Mundell-Fleming RERs. Never- theless, in practice, for developing countries exporting primary com- modities, a deterioration in the terms of trade caused by declining com- modity prices will be reflected much less strongly, if at all, in standard IFS measures of the external RER for traded goods computed using the prices of diversified manufactured goods, than in the Mundell-Fleming REER. As figure 2.11 shows, the prices of manufactured goods fell by 2 per- cent in C6te d'Ivoire in the early 1990s, while the private consumption deflator rose by 10 percent. Thus, domestic prices of traded goods may have been falling relative to domestic prices of nontraded goods, Figure 2.12 The REER for C6te d'Ivoire Computed Using CPIs, GDP Deflators, and Domestic CPI-Foreign WPIs, and the Terms of Trade, 1980-95 (1985=100) 180 REER Using CPI/WPIs . 160- 140 ,^REER Using CPIs 120 m 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 - - REER using Domestic CPIs-Foreign WPIs - - - - REER Using GDP Deflators -w-Terms of Trade -+--REER Using CPIs Note: The REERs have been calcualted using official exchange rates and adjusted IFS coun- try weights. An upward movement represents an appreciation of the REER for C6te d'Ivoire. Source: Computed from World Bank data. 92 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT causing the internal RER to appreciate and internal competitiveness to deteriorate as shown in figures 3.1 and 3.2 of Chapter 3 on the two-good internal RER. Similar divergences in the prices of traded and nontraded goods can also occur in foreign countries. Figure 2.13 compares the bi- lateral RERs for C6te d'Ivoire with France and the United States calcu- lated using manufacturing deflators with the same RERs calculated us- ing the CPIs and GDP deflators. It suggests that after 1985 external com- petitiveness in producing manufactured goods compared with both France and the United States was significantly better than the changes in the nominal exchange rates and relative CPIs would indicate.41 Thus, indicators of external competitiveness in traded goods and in aggregate production can sometimes give different pictures, and one needs to ex- ercise some care in interpreting them empirically.42 The significance of RERs for traded goods for a developing country will also depend upon the relative importance of homogeneous com- modities, subject to the law of one price, and differentiated nonstandardized products in its trade. For example, manufactures accounted for only 16 percent of C6te d'Ivoire's exports in 1993, with standardized primary commodities accounting for nearly all of the remainder. Hence, the mac- roeconomic effect of better price performance in manufactures was quite limited. For countries exporting primary products, the external RER for aggregate production is a broader indicator than the RER for traded goods. However, as noted above, when the terms of trade change sig- nificantly aggregate cost-price indicators giving larger weights to im- ports (such as the CPI) may diverge quite significantly from those giv- ing larger weights to exports (such as the GDP deflator). In this case, it is usually more informative to calculate separate RER indexes for imports and exports as discussed in Chapter 4 on the three-good internal RER. Summary and Conclusions This concluding section first summarizes the different measures of the external RER. It then briefly reviews the major factors causing the be- havior of these RER measures in developing countries to differ from that in industrial countries. 41. The bilateral Mundell-Fleming RERs are not reliable indicators in this case as they are distorted by the effects of the falling prices of commodity exports on C6te d'Ivoire's GDP deflator. 42. Neither bilateral RERs for trade in manufactured products with most de- veloping countries nor REERs for manufactured goods can be calculated for C6te d'Ivoire because of lack of comparable data for C6te d'Ivoire's developing-coun- try competitors. EXTERNAL REAL EXCHANGE RATES 93 Figure 2.13 The Bilateral RERs Between C6te d'Ivoire and the United States and France Calculated Using CPIs, GDP Deflators, and Value- Added Deflators for Manufacturing, 1988-93 (1985=100) 180 160 RER with Francesn ~ ilatral ER wth RER Usig thenUactUring DePIos RER with the U.S. Using Manufacturing B Deflators 120- Using CPIs RER with the U.S. Using. IIGDP Deflators 100 1 RER with France Using .o.e C d f.... Manu acturing el ators 80 .- .. . .. . ------ RER with France Using GDP Deflators 60: I:I 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 - -d Bilateral RER with France Using Manufacturing Deflators --m-Bilateral RER with the U.S. Using Manufacturing Deflators ----Bilateral RER with the U.S. Using GDP Deflators -t-Bilateral RER with France Using GDP Deflators ---- Bilateral RER with France Using CPIs ---r----Bilateral RER with the U.S. Using CPs Note: An upward movement is an appreciation of the RER for C8te d' Ivoire. Source: Computed from World Bank data. Measurement of the External RER: A Summary The four primary versions of the external RER-the expenditure-PPP, Mundell-Fleming or aggregate cost, competitiveness in traded goods, and relative labor cost concepts-are summarized in table 2.4. These alternative RER indexes provide different but related information. Empirically, the use of CPIs in measuring relative expenditure PPP is well established. CPIs are widely available on a fairly current basis for most developing countries and permit the reasonably easy computa- tion of the expenditure-PPP version of the external RER. This is a useful, internationally comparable measure that provides a good indicator of movements in relative price levels between countries and of nominal shocks to exchange rates and price levels. However, it, like all external RERs, can be quite sensitive to assumptions about parallel exchange markets, unrecorded trade, and shifting trade shares as discussed below. Table 2.4 Summary of External RER Measures Price-Cost Index Used in Availability of Developig RER Measure Computation Country Data Comments 1. Purchasing Power Parity a. Expenditure PPP-Relative CPIs Monthly in most countries Most widely used measure in developing countries. b. ICP Exchange Rates-Absolute ICP Price Data Selected years for Data are available only with a long time lag. participating countries These are nominal rather than real exchange rates. 2. Mundell-Fleming Aggregate GDP Deflators Annually, most countries CDP deflators may be heavily influenced Production Cost RER by volatile commodity prices. 3. RERs for Traded Goods to a. Relative Unit Labor Cost in Manufacturing Unit Labor Annually, a few countries Useful partial indicator for manufacturing Manufacturing Costs sector when available. b. Relative Manufacturing Sector Deflators Manufacturing Sector Annually, some countries Useful partial indicator for manufacturing Deflators sector when available. c. Relative Wholesale Prices WPIs Monthly, a few countries Not suitable for most developing countries because of predominance of primary commodities, d. Relative Export Unit Values Export Unit Value Indexes Annually, some countries Not suitable for most developing countries because of predominance of primary commodities. 4. Relative Labor Cost in Production of All Goods a. Relative Wages Average Wage Rates Annually, some countries Useful when available but may be biased by productivity changes. b. Relative Average Unit Labor Cost Average Unit Labor Costs Annually, very few countries Useful when available, but very few countries have necessary data. EXTERNAL REAL EXCHANGE RATES 95 Similarly, GDP deflators are commonly used to measure the Mundell- Fleming or aggregate production cost RER. This measure is widely used in empirical analysis of industrial countries, to which the Mundell-Fleming model of trade in differentiated manufactured products is well suited. This model is, however, much less appropriate for developing countries that export significant quantities of primary commodities and whose terms of trade fluctuate considerably. Volatility in the export prices of primary commodities can cause the Mundell-Fleming RER to diverge significantly from the expenditure-PPP version of the RER and limit the utility of the former to those developing countries that export diversi- fied manufactured products. In addition, although the GDP deflator is usually available quarterly in industrial countries for computing the Mundell-Fleming RER, it is often available only annually in developing countries, making it hard to monitor the Mundell-Fleming RER on a current basis. The traded-goods version of the RER is widely used for the OECD coun- tries. The IMF regularly publishes data on four of these RERs-relative unit labor costs in manufacturing, relative wholesale prices, relative manufacturing sector deflators, and relative export unit values-for 17 industrial countries. The IMF, in fact, treats the external REER for traded goods computed using unit labor costs in manufacturing as "the REER" for 17 industrial countries rather than the REER computed using CPIs, which is used for developing countries. However, the limited availabil- ity of data on unit labor costs, productivity, and wholesale prices makes computation of these four measures of the external RER for traded goods problematic for most low-income developing countries. In addition, the usefulness of relative export unit values and wholesale prices in devel- oping countries is limited by the prevalence of standardized commodi- ties in their exports, for which they are price takers. In those developing countries in which the required data are avail- able, relative unit labor costs and manufacturing sector deflators can be useful partial indicators of competitiveness in producing manufactured goods and differentiated nontraditional exports. Such indexes can be used for making comparisons to industrial countries, although lack of data for competing developing countries will generally prevent the cal- culation of multilateral REERs that include them. However, these RER measures will be representative neither of the incentives facing primary commodity exports nor of the export sector as a whole. The macroeco- nomic significance of these measures will depend upon the relative sizes of a country's manufacturing and commodity-producing sectors. Although, when the required data are available, it is preferable to use unit labor costs to take into account the effects of productivity changes, relative labor costs expressed in foreign exchange can also be 96 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT useful indicators for developing countries where unit labor cost data are not available. Labor is usually the least mobile factor of production internationally. Hence, aggregate unit labor costs in the production of all goods are, in a certain sense, the most fundamental measure of a country's productivity, domestic production costs, and real factor in- comes. Relative labor costs can also be directly related both to other measures of the external RER and to the internal RER. Unfortunately, as is the case with the measures of competitiveness in traded goods, the use of relative labor costs in developing countries is often limited by data availability. While ad hoc comparison of labor costs among repre- sentative developing and industrial countries is common and quite use- ful, systematic multilateral comparisons of these are not usually pos- sible. External RERs based on labor costs may also diverge from those based on CPIs because of gains and losses in income caused by move- ments in the terms of trade. The only other empirical index generally available for measuring the traded-goods version of the RER is the mixed one, which uses foreign country WPIs to represent traded-goods prices together with home coun- try GDP deflators or CPIs to represent aggregate domestic production costs. Unfortunately, this indicator is significantly affected by produc- tivity bias as explained in the following chapters on the internal RER. As noted there, it is best used only as a proxy for the RER for imports when more accurate measures are not available. Factors Affecting the Behavior of External RERs in Developing Countries The two most important factors that complicate the interpretation of standard industrial-country RER measures in developing countries are the volatility of commodity export prices and major changes in trade policy. Both of these can cause the expenditure-PPP, Mundell-Fleming, and traded-goods versions of the RER to diverge significantly and limit the representativeness of any single measure of the external RER. The Mundell-Fleming RER is particularly sensitive to the terms of trade be- cause it uses the GDP deflator, which includes volatile commodity ex- port prices. When the terms of trade fluctuate significantly or when pro- ductivity grows at different rates in different sectors at home and abroad, it is often desirable to look at separate RERs for imports and exports, a subject that the following chapters on the internal RERs discuss at length. The expenditure-PPP version of the RER, particularly if computed using import weights, gives a good indication both of the relative gen- eral price level and of the competitive environment faced by import- substituting industries and manufactured exports. Available measures EXTERNAL REAL EXCHANGE RATES 97 of the RER for differentiated traded goods (for example, relative manu- facturing deflators, unit labor costs, or wages) can give additional infor- mation about the manufacturing sector and should be weighted by trade shares that exclude primary commodities. The measurement of relative price incentives for primary commod- ity exports is, however, a different problem. Since the price elasticity of demand for commodity exports is effectively infinite for small produc- ers, the problem in small countries is basically one of the internal incen- tives for producing these commodities-that is, of the internal RER for commodity exports, which the next two chapters treat in detail. In addition to the general problems posed by volatile terms of trade and changes in trade policy, the measurement of the external RER in developing countries can be complicated by parallel markets, unrecorded trade, and quickly shifting trade patterns. Parallel exchange rates can diverge significantly from official exchange rates, causing similar diver- gences in parallel and official RERs. As figure 2.B.3 illustrated, because of parallel markets in competing countries, the parallel REER differed from the official REER for C6te d'Ivoire by 5 percent to 10 percent dur- ing 1980-93, even though C6te d'Ivoire itself had a unified exchange rate. The decisions on which of these REERs is the most representative or whether both the parallel and official REERs should be used may be important for the subsequent analysis. Unrecorded trade can similarly affect the results (by 20 percent in the case of C6te d'Ivoire in 1993 as shown in figure 2.7). Adjustments for unrecorded trade usually tend to increase the weights assigned to countries with parallel exchange mar- kets as unrecorded trade tends to take place through informal market channels at parallel rates. Fixed weight averages become less representative for computing REERs as bilateral RERs and trading patterns change over time, and it is necessary to update country weights periodically. Shifting trade pat- terns can outdate standard base-year country weights fairly quickly and give a misleading impression of current relative prices. As figure 2.5 shows, in 1993 the REER for C6te d'Ivoire was 25 percent more appreci- ated at current year (1993) weights than at base-year (1985) weights. While the new IFS country weights may be useful for intercountry analy- sis, they may be out of date or otherwise unrepresentative for some de- veloping countries. Alternative (reasonable) weighting systems can af- fect the measurement of the REER by as much as 25 percent in some circumstances. Hence, some attention should be devoted to carefully choosing the weights for calculating the REER for a particular develop- ing country; and the sensitivity of the REER index to alternative weight- ing systems should be checked. For calculating REERs, it is desirable to have country weights that reflect reasonably well the structure of trade 98 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT in the period being analyzed: that is, fairly recent weights for current and forward-looking policy analysis and representative weights from the past for historical or time-series analysis." When a country experiences significant changes in its terms of trade or trade policy, the different external RER measures may diverge sig- nificantly. Computation of the RERs themselves may also be sensitive to assumptions about parallel markets, unrecorded trade, and trade pat- terns. Hence, to the extent data availability permits, one should calcu- late and interpret the relevant measures together rather than concen- trate exclusively on a single external RER measure. Analyzing the rel- evant measures together helps to give a fuller picture of what may be happening empirically and to avoid potentially misleading signals that might be given by any one measure taken in isolation." Divergent move- ments in different measures can sometimes be consistently interpreted, but the analyst needs to pay some attention both to the theoretical rela- tionship among the various concepts and to data problems involved in their empirical measurement. 43. For example, an appropriate base year or a Fisher average of indexes us- ing beginning- and end-year weights. 44. See Clark and others (1994) for a further discussion of this point. Appendix A International Comparison Programme Exchange Rates Intercountry comparisons of nominal national incomes (or GDPs) mea- sured in different currencies require their conversion into a common numeraire such as the U.S. dollar or the IMF's standard drawing right (SDR). The market (or official) nominal exchange rate is the only readily available exchange rate that can be used for this purpose. However, the use of market exchange rates for making intercountry comparisons of income levels is problematic for two reasons. First, market exchange rates can fluctuate significantly even in the short term and may diverge from their equilibrium levels for temporary or even protracted periods. Second, even equilibrium rates at best reflect only price parity for traded goods. As discussed in Chapter 5 on the determinants of the equilib- rium RER, market-determined rates do not usually reflect parity in the prices of nontraded goods, except perhaps among selected indus- trial countries in the ultra-long term because of the Balassa- Samuelson effect. Hence, conversions using market exchange rates may be distorted by both exchange rate fluctuations and differences in price levels; and relative price levels may bear little relationship to intercountry differ- ences in real incomes. Conceptually, for making intercountry compari- sons it is desirable to have nominal exchange rates based on a standard- ized basket of goods and relative prices that reflect purchasing power parity more accurately than do market rates. This appendix briefly dis- cusses the problem of estimating such "purchasing power parity" ex- change rates and the International Comparison Programme (ICP) that has been undertaken for this purpose. In order to distinguish these nomi- nal exchange rates from the relative-PPP version of the real exchange rate discussed in the text, these rates are referred to here as ICP exchange rates. 99 100 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT The Meaning of "Purchasing Power Parity" Intercountry comparisons and aggregations of GDPs are more mean- ingful economically if the nominal conversion factors used reflect a stan- dardized basket of goods and set of relative prices rather than each country's own particular basket of goods and relative prices. The con- version factor would then give each currency's purchasing power rela- tive to the numeraire currency. Converting GDPs measured in terms of current domestic prices and national currencies by such "purchasing power parity" or ICP exchange rates into a common numeraire currency would then yield GDP data valued in the numeraire currency and com- parable across countries. The One Good Case At a disaggregated one-good level, the ICP exchange rate (ICPER) be- tween a given home country j and foreign country k is defined as the ratio of nominal prices for a single specific good i, as shown in equation 2.A.1: (2.A.1) ICPER:;,k = The ICP exchange rate is the number of units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency required for the purchase of good i. The Economist's "Big Mac Index" is an example of a one good ICP exchange rate. It is simply the ratio of the domestic-currency price of a Big Mac in the home country to its price in the numeraire country.45 The nominal domestic price of a given good in any country, when converted to the currency of the numeraire country by its ICP exchange rate, is equal to its price in the numeraire country and, therefore, is the same in all countries.4 Hence, meaningful real quantity comparisons are possible across countries when ICP exchange rates are used. The expenditures on final output of good i in country j can also be priced in the currency of the numeraire country (in most cases, the United States) by dividing nominal national currency expenditures on good i, P Q,, by its corresponding ICP exchange rate [(P Q)/(P /Ps)]. This procedure is equivalent to valuing the quantity in country J at the numeraire coun- try price (Ps Q,,Q) for good i. The ICP exchange rate is different from the external real exchange rate between countries j and k. The external RER in the one good case is given by equation 2.A.2: 45. See The Econoiist (1995, August 26 and 1996, April 27). 46. For any country j, equation 2.A.1 gives that P / JCPER,k , EXTERNAL REAL EXCHANGE RATES 101 (2.A.2) RERj = E d ' Ec 1 :v ' P I1CPERi,jk and, conversely, as equation 2.A.3 shows, (2.A.3) ICPER,k Edc RERjk The ICP exchange rate is the ratio of two nominal prices in different currencies and is itself a nominal exchange rate. As equation 2.A.3 indicates, the ICP exchange rate will equal the nomi- nal exchange rate only in the special case when the external RER is equal to one, that is, when absolute PPP holds (see page 73). In general, if the external RER is greater than one, then the ICP exchange rate will be lower than the nominal exchange rate in domestic-currency terms. The Multi-Good Case In order to determine the overall purchasing power of home country j's currency relative to that of a foreign country k in the standard multi- good case, a large number of prices for individual items have to be aver- aged in some way to yield a ratio of weighted averages of prices. The overall or aggregate ICP exchange rate for GDP is thus conceptually a function of the sets of domestic and foreign prices (P, Pk) and their re- spective weights (W1, Wk), as expressed in equation 2.A.4: (2.A.4) ICPER,k =f(lPk f IWk) The core problem in constructing multi-good ICP exchange rates for converting aggregate national accounts is to choose the appropriate sets of prices and weights and to determine the precise form of the function f in equation 2.A.4. Note that the resulting ICP rates are absolute PPP exchange rates calculated with a particular standardized basket of goods. The International Comparison Programme The International Comparison Programme, set up by the United Na- tions and the University of Pennsylvania with the support of the World Bank, has generated substantial data on ICP exchange rates and on ICP- based real GDP and its components. The ICP has concentrated on the expenditure side of GDP rather than the production side because more accurate data are available for market prices than for factor cost, and for expenditures than for sectoral output. The exchange rates estimated by the ICP are based on extensive price surveys, which were conducted in 102 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT participating countries in phases every three to five years. Six phases have been completed, beginning in 1970. A total of 90 countries have now participated at some point in ICP surveys. During the ICP surveys, data on final product prices (which include taxes and subsidies) and quantities are collected for more than 400 types of goods and services in each of the countries surveyed. These price data are then aggregated into approximately 150 basic categories of goods and services. All of each country's individual final output items are as- signed to one or another of the 150 categories. The averaging procedure used in the ICP involves a specialized method designed to allow for the fact that every item is not priced in every country.47 The averaging procedure most widely employed in the international comparisons is known as the Geary-Khamis method. It is summarized in the following sets of equations, 2.A.5 and 2.A.6: (2.A.5) ICPER, j=1......,n(countries) (2.A.6) ,=y P, q =i=1,......,m(goods), ' =ICPER Y where n = number of countries m = number of categories of goods P = price of good i in country j q, = quantity of good i in country j f1 = international price of good i ICPER, = aggregate ICP exchange rate between country j and the numeraire currency. The Geary-Khamis method yields a vector of international relative prices for the m goods and a vector of aggregate ICP exchange rates for the n countries such that the international price for an individual good is a quantity-weighted average of the relative prices in individual coun- 47. See Summers and Heston (1991). EXTERNAL REAL EXCHANGE RATES 103 tries. With this method, the aggregate ICP exchange rate for a given coun- try j is calculated (in equation 2.A.5) as the ratio of total expenditures on GDP valued at the country j's own prices (P,,) to total expenditures on its GDP valued at international prices (0). Data on domestic expendi- tures on the basic categories of goods for a country are divided by their domestic prices to obtain quantities. These quantities are multiplied by their international prices and aggregated to obtain GDP and its compo- nents in international prices for the country. International prices are calculated simultaneously (in equation 2.A.6) as the quantity-weighted average of domestic prices of the countries being compared, with the domestic prices converted into a common cur- rency using the country's aggregate ICP exchange rate. The price in each country is weighted by that country's share of each of the basic product categories in the total output of the participating countries. The ICP ex- change rates and the international prices are generated simultaneously from the above system of m + n linear equations, using prices and quan- tities in individual countries as inputs. Only m + n - 1 equations of the system described by 2.A.5 and 2.A.6 are independent, and in the calcu- lations the ICP exchange rate for the numeraire country is set equal to one so that international prices are expressed in the numeraire currency. Empirical Uses of ICP Data The ICP data have been used for comparing per capita income levels and aggregating GDP across countries.49 They have also been used in studies of various macroeconomic subjects such as cross-country differ- ences in long-run economic growth and the relationship between prices, income levels, and real quantities."9 In comparing nominal GDPs converted at market exchange rates with ICP-based GDPs, three conclusions are generally reached." The first is that ICP-based GDPs dramatically alter the rankings of the world's largest economies. For example, using market exchange rates in 1992, the five largest economies ranked by GDP were the United States, Japan, Germany, France, and Italy. However, using the 1990 ICP- based GDPs yields the following ranking: the United States, China, Ja- pan, Germany, and India. The second conclusion is that ICP exchange rates for developing countries are generally lower than nominal mar- ket exchange rates with the U.S. dollar (in domestic-currency terms), as one would expect, because of the Balassa-Samuelson effect discussed in the chapter on the two-good internal RER. Figure 7 in Chapter 7, which 48. See, for example, Kravis, Heston, and Summers (1982). 49. See, for example, the World Bank (1993). 50. See Wagner (1995). 104 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT compares the aggregate ICP dollar exchange rate for C6te d'Ivoire with the market rate, illustrates this point. Third, the difference between ag- gregate ICP exchange rates for GDP and market exchange rates tends to vary inversely with per capita income. As a result, valuation of GDP in terms of ICP exchange rates yields generally higher income for poorer countries than valuation at nominal exchange rates."' 51. See, for example, Rogoff (1996) for data and regressions documenting these findings. Appendix B The Relationship between Profitability, Competitiveness, and the Different External RERs To more firmly link the different concepts of external competitiveness to internal price incentives, the IMF has done a considerable amount of work on the relationship between measures of the external RER and the profitability of production and investment, both in the traded-goods sector and in aggregate domestic production. In this work, an improve- ment in the competitiveness of an economy is defined as an increase in the relative share of profits in value added and is expected to lead to an expansion of output and investment. To take into account both the cost of inputs produced in the nontraded-goods sector and the opportunity cost of the factors employed by it, this interpretation has been applied to aggregate domestic production of both traded and nontraded goods as well as to traded goods separately. The rest of this appendix discusses the relationship between profit- ability, competitiveness, and the external RERs for both traded goods and aggregate production. The analytical approach employed below fol- lows that used by IMF staff in Lipschitz and McDonald (1991) and in Marsh and Tokarick (1994). The following subsections start by setting out the analytical framework and then discuss profitability first in terms of the cost of producing traded goods and subsequently in terms of ag- gregate production costs. Analytical Framework To provide a common framework for discussing indicators of profitabil- ity (defined as the share of profits in value added), it is useful to start with a basic analytical structure that describes the supply side of the 105 106 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT home economy. Consider the case of a small open economy that pro- duces both tradable (T) and nontradable (N) goods. Assume that each category of goods is produced by a two-tier production function, com- bining value added and imported and nontraded intermediate inputs, as shown in equation 2.B.1: (2.B.1) Q, = F,[V,(L,K),I,IM] i= T,N where Q denotes domestic output of good i and V, K,, L,, I,, and I., are, respectively, value added and inputs of capital, labor, nontradable and imported intermediate goods. To simplify the presentation, we will as- sume that the value-added function is based on a constant returns-to- scale Cobb-Douglas technology and that both imported and nontradable intermediate inputs are fixed proportions of domestic output, as shown in equations 2.B.2 through 2.B.4: (2.B.2) V, = A, L K,-a (2.B.3) INi = 9N, Q (2.B.4) I4, = (PA, Q, where A, is a scale technological factor that also measures the total pro- ductivity of labor and capital in sector i, B is the share of labor in value added, and
0,
where c is total consumption expenditure measured in terms of traded
goods. This specification postulates that transactions costs per unit of
consumption are a decreasing function of the stock of money per unit of
consumption, but that the productivity of money in reducing transac-
tions costs is subject to diminishing returns. The accumulation of net
9. Adding an exogenous currency risk premium to this condition would not
affect any of the properties of the model.
DETERMINANTS OF THE LRER 269
worth over time is the sum of household saving and net real capital
gains or losses. It can be expressed in the form of the budget constraint
shown by equation 6.7:
(6.7) ti=y+(i*+E)f -t-(11+r)c-r*a
where t denotes real (lump-sum) taxes, and x* is the rate of increase in
the domestic-currency price of traded goods. The latter, in turn, is the
sum of the rate of depreciation of the domestic currency and the exter-
nal inflation rate, denoted 7r,:
The path of consumption expenditure is determined by the maximi-
zation over an infinite horizon of an additively separable utility func-
tion in which future felicity (that is, the future flow of utility) is dis-
counted at the constant rate of time preference p. Consumption of traded
goods, denoted cT, and of nontraded goods cN, are the only direct sources
of utility for the household. Thus the representative household will seek
to maximize a function of the form:
f u(c,,c,)e-'dt
To make the analysis more tractable, I will give the felicity function u(c,
cN) a specific form. Following Dornbusch (1983), I will assume that the
felicity function is of the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) type in
total consumption, while the intratemporal elasticity of substitution be-
tween the two types of goods is unity. This means that the felicity func-
tion can be written as equation 6.8:
(6.8) u(cT,c) - N
1-o
The parameter 9 represents the share of traded-goods consumption in
total consumption expenditure (see below), while a is the inverse of the
intertemporal rate of substitution. The Cobb-Douglas specification for
intratemporal substitution between the two types of goods implies that
consumption expenditure is allocated in constant shares between the
two types of consumption goods as shown in equation 6.9:
(6.9) cT-0
c, = (1- 9)ec
270 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
where total consumption expenditure c is given by c = CT + c\,/e. Using
these in equation 6.8 permits us to express the felicity function in the
indirect form in equation 6.10:
(6.10) u(c,c,) = v(e, c) = 1C[e C]
1-a
where ic is a constant. The term in square brackets is the ratio of the
price of traded goods to the "true" consumption price index Po P-
(where PT is the domestic-currency price of traded goods, and PN is the
domestic-currency price of nontraded goods) times total consump-
tion measured in terms of traded goods. Thus this term measures
total consumption in units of the consumption bundle, which is the
direct source of utility for the household.
The household's problem can thus be stated as follows: it chooses
paths for consumption expenditure c and money m so as to maximize:
(6.11) [Kel0 exp(-pt)dt
Jo- 1-C
subject to the flow-budget constraint (equation 6.7) and a transversality
condition. These constraints can conveniently be written as equation
6.12:
a= y - t + ra - im -(1+ - r(m/c))c
(6.12)
lim a exp(- rdt) > 0
where r is the real interest rate earned by domestic residents on their
holdings of foreign bonds, measured in terms of traded goods (r = i -
7t*). This is equivalent to the external nominal interest rate i* faced
by domestic residents, minus the foreign-currency rate of inflation
in the price of traded goods:
r = i - r* = (i* + e) - ( +-e) = i* -r,.
The present-value Hamiltonian for this problem can be written as:
H = (recf + A)exp(-pt)
1-u
where A is the costate variable for the household's financial wealth a,
with economic interpretation as the marginal utility of wealth. The so-
lution of this problem is characterized by the first-order conditions shown
in equations 6.13.a through 6.13.b:
DETERMINANTS OF THE LRER 271
(6.13.a) KCYC - A(1 -r(m/c) -T'(m/c))c
(6.13.b) -'C'(m / c)
(6.13.c) A(p - r) = A
as well as the budget constraint and transversality conditions given in
equation 6.12. These conditions have intuitive interpretations. Equation
6.13.a describes the necessary condition for the level of consumption to
be at its optimal level at each instant, conditional on the marginal utility
of wealth. It states that the marginal utility gain from an extra unit of
consumption must be equal to its marginal utility cost-that is, the loss
arising from forgone saving. The latter is the product of the marginal
utility of wealth A and the reduction in saving associated with an extra
unit of consumption, given by the quantity (1 + T + '), which includes
the transaction costs associated with each extra unit of consumption.
Equation 6.13.b is the necessary condition for the allocation of the house-
hold portfolio between money and bonds to be at its optimal level, con-
ditional on the level of consumption expenditure. It states that the mar-
ginal gain from holding an extra unit of money, in the form of re-
duced transaction costs, must be equal to its marginal cost, in the
form of forgone interest. Finally, equation 6.13.c is necessary for
wealth to be allocated optimally over time. It states that since wealth
should be drawn down more quickly (through increased consump-
tion) when the household is more impatient (that is, when p is large
relative to r), the marginal utility of wealth should rise more rapidly
under those conditions.
These equations can be used to describe the household's demand for
money, the path of its consumption expenditure, and its rate of accumu-
lation of financial assets at each moment in time. Equation 6.13.b im-
plicitly defines a relationship between money and consumption that
resembles a standard money-demand equation, shown in equation
6.14:
(6.14) m = h(i)c, h' < 0.
Thus the demand for money depends in familiar fashion on the interest
rate and the level of transactions. To derive an expression for the path of
consumption expenditure, differentiate equation 6.13.a with respect to
time. Using equations 6.13.b, 6.13.c, and 6.14, we can derive the time
path of consumption. It is given by equation 6.15:
( + ihi ]
272 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
where y = (1 - a)(1 - 0). This represents a generalization of the familiar
Euler equation for the optimal time path of consumption under con-
stant relative risk aversion, to incorporate changing relative prices of
the two consumption goods as well as the role of the transactions tech-
nology. Note that, given the real interest rate measured in terms of traded
goods r:
a. An expected real depreciation makes consumption cheaper in the
future (since it implies a lower relative price of nontraded goods).
This increases the consumption-based real interest rate (the op-
portunity cost of current consumption), which steepens the con-
sumption path (thereby discouraging current consumption), and
b. A steepening of the path of the future nominal interest rate (a posi-
tive value of i) would tend to increase the transactions costs asso-
ciated with future consumption, thus decreasing the consumption-
based real interest rate, which tends to tilt the consumption path
toward the present, making it flatter.
The Consolidated Public Sector
The consolidated public sector includes both the government and the
central bank. The economy operates with a predetermined exchange rate,
administered as a crawling peg in which the domestic currency depreci-
ates continuously at the policy-determined rate e. The central bank's
functions consist of maintaining the parity (by exchanging domestic and
foreign currency for each other on demand in unlimited amounts at the
official exchange rate) and providing credit to the government. The lat-
ter, in addition to credit from the central bank, receives lump-sum taxes
from the private sector and spends by purchasing both traded and
nontraded goods, in the amounts g, and g, respectively. Thus the con-
solidated period-by-period (flow) budget constraint of the public sector
can be expressed as equation 6.16:
(6.16) fc = t + rfc + (th + 7r* m) - (g, + g, /e)
where fc, which may be positive or negative, is the stock of bonds held
by the consolidated public sector. Like the private sector, the govern-
ment has to respect an intertemporal budget constraint, given by limfc
exp(-*r dt)>O.
For concreteness, I shall assume that it does so in a particularly simple
way-by levying taxes in an amount sufficient to keep fc - tih = 0. Notice
that this does not imply a balanced budget, but rather a reliance on the
inflation tax to finance fiscal deficits.
DETERMINANTS OF THE LRER 273
Equilibrium Conditions
The model is closed with two equilibrium conditions. The first is an
arbitrage relationship describing the terms on which the rest of the world
will lend to the domestic economy, and the second characterizes equi-
librium in the market for nontraded goods.
The Supply of Funds
Though the home country is a price taker in the world goods market, its
financial liabilities are not perfect substitutes for those of the rest of the
world, and thus the interest rate at which residents of the country can
borrow abroad reflects a risk premium, which is an increasing function
of the share of the country's liabilities held in world financial portfolios.
This is incorporated in the model in the form of an upward-sloping sup-
ply-of-funds schedule relating the external interest rate confronted by
the country's residents, i*, to the country's net international indebted-
ness, as well as to world financial conditions, measured by the world
interest rate iW. The specific formulation expresses i* as the sum of the
world interest rate and a risk premium p, which is inversely related to
the country's aggregate net creditor position, as expressed by equation 6.17:
(6.17) i* = i + p(f), p(0) > 0, p' < 0.
The supply-of-funds schedule described by equation 6.17 is depicted as
the curve i* in figure 6.1.10 The external interest rate faced by the economy
is determined by the height of this schedule above the relevant value of
the net external asset position f.
Equilibrium in the Market for Nontraded Goods
Finally the equilibrium condition in the market for nontraded goods
can be expressed as equation 6.18:
(6.18) YyeCN +9-
= (1-9O)ec + g_
For future reference, it is worth noting that the specification of equilib-
rium in the nontraded-goods market (equation 6.18) implies that all
10. For a similar specification, see Bhandari, Haque, and Turnovsky (1990).
Agenor (1997) provides more detail on this specification and how it relates to
alternative approaches to modeling international capital market imperfections.
274 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
Figure 6.1 The Supply-of-Funds Schedule
1
0
production of nontraded goods is available for consumption, either by
the households or by the government. This has the consequence that the
transactions costs associated with consumption must absorb traded
goods only. This assumption is not necessary and is discussed further
below.
Equation 6.18 can be solved for the value of the real exchange rate
that clears the nontraded-goods market, conditional on the values of c
and g.. This short-run equilibrium real exchange rate is given by equa-
tion 6.19:
e = e(c,g,)
(6.19) e= (1-O)e/(y' -(1- O)c) <0
e2 =1/(y - (1 -O)c) < 0
The real exchange rate that solves equation 6.19 is a short-run equilib-
rium one in the sense that it clears the market for nontraded goods for a
given value of private consumption expenditure c. Thus, this real ex-
change rate will be sustainable only to the extent that c is itself sustainable.
The Long-Run Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate
As shown in Montiel (1998), the model of the previous section can be
solved to derive the entire dynamic path of the real exchange rate and
other endogenous macroeconomic variables in response to a variety of
DETERMINANTS OF THE LRER 275
macroeconomic shocks, be they transitory or permanent, occurring in
the present, or expected to occur in the future. A key characteristic of the
model is that the economy it describes tends to settle into a steady-state
equilibrium after a shock in which the stock of net international indebt-
edness and the real exchange rate are both unchanging.
This section examines the properties of that equilibrium. Since the
focus is specifically on the determination of the long-run equilibrium
real exchange rate, the solution method chosen in this section is one that
focuses specifically on that variable and links up with the traditional
literature that views the equilibrium real exchange rate as that value of
the real exchange rate that is consistent with the simultaneous attain-
ment of internal and external balance.
To solve the model, we first reduce it to a smaller number of key
relationships. The first step is to consolidate the budget constraints of
the household and public sectors. To do so, we differentiate the house-
hold balance sheet constraint (equation 6.4) and substitute into the flow-
budget constraint (equation 6.12). This permits equation 6.12 to be writ-
ten as equation 6.12':
(6.12') f, = y-t+rf, -(th+n* m)-(1+r(m/c))c.
Adding equations 6.12' and 6.16 together, and using the definitions of y
and c as well as the equilibrium condition in the nontraded-goods mar-
ket (equation 6.18), we have equation 6.20:
(6.20) f = y,(e)+ rf -(8+T(m/c))c- g,.
This is the flow-budget constraint for the economy as a whole. Recalling
that c, = Oc, and that transactions costs are assumed to be incurred in
traded goods, aggregate demand for traded goods is given by (Oc + g,),
and aggregate supply is (y,- c). Thus, aggregate excess supply of traded
goods, equal to the real trade balance surplus, is (YT - zc) - (Oc - gT) = YT -
(T +O)c - gT. Adding the receipt of real interest payments from abroad
(recall that f is the country's international net creditor position) yields
the inflation-adjusted current account surplus, measured in units of
traded goods, which is the right-hand side of equation 6.20. This is
equated to the change in the economy's real net creditor position (f).
This equation thus determines how the real net creditor position evolves
over time.
11. As is common with models of this type, that equilibrium is unique and
saddlepoint stable.
276 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
Private spending, in turn, evolves over time according to the Euler
equation 6.15, reproduced here for convenience:
(6.15) c=. r+ye/e- h+-p c.
1 +-tr(h(i)) + ih(i)
As is evident from equation 6.15, the evolution of private expenditure
over time is itself dependent on the paths of the real exchange rate and
domestic nominal interest rates. These are determined respectively by
the nontraded-goods market equilibrium condition (equation 6.19, re-
produced below for reference) and the arbitrage condition (equation 6.5),
reproduced below as equation 6.5':
(6.19) e= e(c,g,)
(6.5') i= (r + ir, + p(f)) +E-
where equation 6.5 has been modified to take into account the foreign
Fisher relationship and the supply-of-funds schedule (equation 6.17).
To analyze the properties of the long-run equilibrium real exchange
rate, begin by imposing the long-run equilibrium conditions c = e = i in
the Euler equation 6.15. This implies the steady-state condition equa-
tion 6.21:
(6.21) p
= r" + p(f).
Since rw and p are both exogenous, this equation determines the long-
run equilibrium value of the net international creditor position for this
economy, f*.12 Because the premium p is a decreasing function of the net
creditor position f, the equation implies that countries with a high rate
of time preference will be driven to have a smaller stock of net external
claims in long-run equilibrium than those with lower rates of time
preference.
Next, to derive the long-run equilibrium value of the domestic nomi-
nal interest rate, substitute equation 6.21 in 6.5', yielding equation 6.22:
i= (p + Z) + e
(6.22) .
12. This value can be positive or negative, without violating the transversality
conditions on the private and public sectors.
DETERMINANTS OF THE LRER 277
This value of i pins down the long-run values of consumption velocity h
and transactions cost per unit of consumption T, as expressed in equa-
tions 6.23 and 6.24:
(6.23) h*= h(i) = h(p + *)
(6.24) * = Tfh(i)] = T[h(p + x*)].
With these results in hand, the conditions that characterize the long-
run equilibrium real exchange rate in this model can be described. Us-
ing equations 6.22 and 6.24 in 6.21 yields equation 6.25:
(6.25) 0 = YT(e)+ pf -(T[h(p +;,r*)] +6)c - g,.
This is the long-run external balance condition in the model. It states
that for the economy's real external net creditor position to reach an
equilibrium value, the inflation-adjusted current account balance must
be zero. An alternative and more useful formulation, however, focuses
on the conventional (non-inflation-adjusted) current account balance.
Adding the inflation adjustment 7rwf* to both sides, we can write equa-
tion 6.25 as 6.25':
(6.25') ,wf*=y,(e)+(p+rw)f*-(rl h(p+nr +eO+6)c-g,.
Condition 6.25' states that in long-run equilibrium the real current ac-
count balance, which is equal to real national saving, must be equal to
the inflationary erosion of the real value of the country's net claims on
the rest of the world.13 The latter represents the sustainable value of the
country's capital account balance. A net creditor country (with a posi-
tive value of f*) would run a sustainable current account surplus and
capital account deficit that would enable it to acquire claims on the rest
of the world that are sufficient to offset the inflationary erosion of its
existing claims. By contrast, a net debtor country would run a sustain-
able current account deficit and capital account surplus, accumulating
13. The model from which equation 6.25 was derived does not feature growth
of productive capacity. In a growth context-for example, with constant Harrod-
neutral technical change at the rate n-steady-state equilibrium would require
constancy of the country's net international creditor position per effective worker,
so the left-hand side of equation 6.25 would be modified to (n + 2,)f. In a growth
context, a net debtor country would be able to run larger sustainable current
account deficits than in the static case.
278 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
new debt sufficient to offset the effective amortization of its existing debt
through the inflation component of its nominal interest payments.
Since YT is increasing in the real exchange rate e, and since an increase
in consumption expenditure reduces the trade surplus, the set of combi-
nations of e and c that satisfies equation 6.25' is plotted as the positively
sloped external balance locus EB in figure 6.2. Internal balance is, of
course, given by the nontraded-goods market clearing condition 6.19.
As suggested by equation 6.19, the locus traced out by the set of combi-
nations of e and c that are consistent with internal balance (IB) has a
negative slope in figure 6.2. The long-run equilibrium real exchange rate
is that which is simultaneously consistent with external and internal
balances in the long run. It is defined by the intersection of the two loci
at point A in figure 6.2, and is labeled e*.
Long-Run Fundamentals
The response of the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate to its fun-
damental determinants can be established by examining the effects of
permanent changes in the various exogenous variables included in the
Figure 6.2 Determination of the Long-Run Equilibrium Real
Exchange Rate
e
EB
A
e* - - - - - - - - - - - -
II
Ic
C
Note: An upward movement is a depreciation of the real exchange rate.
DETERMINANTS OF THE LRER 279
model on the location of the long-run equilibrium point A. In this sec-
tion, I take up these fundamentals one at a time, identifying individual
fundamentals as well as the qualitative nature of their influence on the
long-run equilibrium real exchange rate.
Fiscal Policy
I begin by considering changes in government spending, holding the
fiscal deficit constant. As is well known, effects on the long-run equilib-
rium real exchange rate depend on the sectoral composition of these
changes."
Changes in Government Spending on Traded Goods
An increase in government spending on traded goods has no effect on
the internal balance locus, but it shifts the external balance locus up-
ward-to EB' in figure 6.3. The increase in government spending cre-
ates an incipient trade deficit, which requires a real depreciation in or-
der to maintain external balance. As indicated in figure 6.3, at the new
long-run equilibrium B, the equilibrium real exchange rate depreciates,
and private consumption of traded goods falls." The reduction in pri-
vate consumption of traded goods is smaller than the increase in gov-
ernment consumption, however, because the real depreciation induces
an increase in the production of traded goods, allowing the accommo-
dation of an increase in total spending on traded goods.
Changes in Government Spending on Nontraded Goods
In contrast to the previous case, the locus affected in this case is the
internal balance locus IB. The increased demand for nontraded goods
requires an increase in their relative price to maintain equilibrium in the
nontraded-goods market, and the IB schedule thus shifts downward, to
14. For earlier work on the effects of the composition of government spend-
ing on the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate see Montiel (1986) and Khan
and Lizondo (1987).
15. In contrast, Penati (1987) finds that an increase in government spending
on traded goods has no effect on the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate.
The aspect of model specification that accounts for this difference is that in the
present model, a steady-state equilibrium is ensured by an endogenous risk pre-
mium, while in Penati's model the same result is achieved by endogenizing the
rate of time preference. This feature makes Penati's model block-recursive and
permits external balance to be restored after an increase in government spend-
ing on traded goods through an increase in the economy's net claims on the rest
of the world, with no repercussions for relative prices.
280 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
Figure 6.3 Effects of Changes in Government Spending on the Long-
Run Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate
e
EB'
EB
B
A
e2 --------------- -- - -
C
IB'
IB
Note: An upward movement is a depreciation of the real exchange rate.
IB' in figure 6.3. The new equilibrium is at point C. As in the previous
case, private consumption expenditure is crowded out in long-run equi-
librium, but in this case the equilibrium real exchange rate appreciates.
The upshot of this exercise and the previous one is that the long-run
equilibrium real exchange rate is a function of the sectoral composition
of government spending.
A Reduction in the Fiscal Deficit
Consider a reduction in the fiscal deficit, in the form of a tax increase.
Since taxes are actually endogenous in the model under the assump-
tions made in the section on the analytical framework, this shock is
equivalent to a reduction in the rate of monetary emission by the central
bank, which in turn is equivalent to a reduction in the rate of crawl of
the nominal exchange rate. The gain from a lower fiscal deficit in this
model comes in the form of a reduction in the distortions associated
with the inflation tax. A reduced rate of depreciation lowers the domes-
tic interest rate, increases the demand for money, and reduces the trans-
actions costs associated with consumption-in other words, T* falls. This
has the effect of increasing the supply of real output. Whether the long-
run equilibrium real exchange rate will appreciate or depreciate depends
DETERMINANTS OF THE LRER 281
on whether transactions costs are borne in the form of traded or
nontraded goods.6 This will determine the form that the increase in real
output takes. As currently specified, the model assumes that these costs
are borne in the form of traded goods. The reduction in r* will thus
increase the supply of such goods, shifting the external balance locus
downward and resulting in a real appreciation, together with an increase
in consumption. On the other hand, if transactions costs are incurred in
nontraded goods, the external balance locus would remain fixed, and
the internal balance locus would shift to the right. In that case, the
equilibrium real exchange rate would depreciate, and consumption
would rise."
It may be worth noting that the effects of a reduction in the fiscal
deficit brought about by changes in spending would simply be a combi-
nation of one of the first two shocks described above with the third. The
effects would depend on whether the reduction in spending fell on traded
or nontraded goods, as well as on the composition of transactions costs.
Changes in the Value of International Transfers
The other demand-side variable that enters the model is the external
real interest rate r,. Before analyzing the effects of changes in external
financial conditions, however, it is useful as a point of reference to con-
sider the effects on the equilibrium real exchange rate of changes in the
level of international transfers received by the domestic economy. These
will provide an interesting contrast with the case of interest rate changes.
As formulated above, the model does not explicitly consider the role of
international transfers. It is straightforward to add them, however. Such
transfers would simply represent an addition to household incomes equal
to the amount of the transfer. They would appear as an additive term in
the household's budget constraint equation 6.7, in the dynamic equa-
tion 6.20 forf, and in the long-run equilibrium condition equation 6.25'. "1
Accordingly, the effect of a permanent increase in the receipt of transfer
income would be to shift the external balance locus to the right-the
16. This property that the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate is affected
by a change in the rate of monetary expansion-that is, the failure of
superneutrality-also characterizes the model of Penati (1987).
17. A change in the foreign inflation rate i, affects the model in exactly the
same way as a change in the rate of depreciation E, since the two variables enter
only in the additive form 7r* = e + tFv in equation 6.25.
18. It makes no difference in this model whether the transfer is received di-
rectly by the private sector or whether it goes to the government, since under the
fiscal regime assumed above, the latter would transfer the proceeds to the pri-
vate sector.
282 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
receipt of additional transfer income permits an expansion of consump-
tion to be consistent with external balance at an unchanged exchange
rate. There are no direct effects on the internal balance locus, so the equi-
librium is at B in figure 6.4, with an equilibrium real appreciation and an
increase in private absorption.
Changes in International Financial Conditions
The analysis of transfers is instructive because many observers' intu-
ition about the effects of changes in capital inflows on the long-run equi-
librium real exchange rate is derived from the corresponding effects of
transfers. Capital inflows and transfers have in common the feature that
they permit an expansion of absorption relative to income in the short
run. However, the two phenomena differ in two important respects. First,
the volume of capital inflows is an endogenous variable that can arise
from a variety of changes in domestic and external economic conditions.
Presumably, the change in the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate
associated with a particular capital-inflow episode depends on the source
of the shock that triggers the inflow. Second, unlike transfers, capital
inflows create repayment obligations in the long run. These also will
affect the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate.19
Consider, then, a particular shock that has been associated with the
emergence of capital inflows: a reduction in world real interest rates.20
Again, this shock directly affects only the external balance locus. To see
in which direction the locus moves, differentiate equation 6.25':
de/dr, + <0.
Thus, the real exchange rate consistent with external equilibrium moves
in a direction opposite to the world interest rate. In this case, when the
world real interest rate falls, the external balance locus thus shifts
19. Such obligations will affect the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate
under the "stock" approach to the definition of external balance described in the
previous chapter, which is the approach adopted here. If the "flow" approach
were adopted instead, the effects of capital inflows on the LRER would resemble
those of transfers, except that the endogenous nature of capital inflows would
cause those effects to depend on the source of the shock triggering the inflows.
20. The view that the capital-inflow episode affecting several large develop-
ing countries during the early 1990s was triggered by a reduction in interest
rates in the United States, first put forward by Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart
(1993), is now widely accepted. For a review of this episode, see Fernandez-
Arias and Montiel (1996).
DETERMINANTS OF THE LRER 283
Figure 6.4 Effects of Changes in Foreign Transfers and World Real
Interest Rates on the Long-Run Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate
e EB"
LB
C
e2 - -- -- --- - -- - ---
EB'
A
BL
I I
II
C2 C 01
Note: An upward movement is a depreciation of the real exchange rate.
upward, to a position similar to EB " in figure 6.4, and the equilibrium
real exchange rate, determined at point C, actually depreciates, contrary
to what happens in the case of an increase in the level of transfer receipts.1
Why is this the case? Equation 6.25' suggests that the effect of a change
in world interest rates on the real exchange rate consistent with external
balance depends on the effect of this change on the country's long-run
net interest receipts. Thus, like those of a transfer, the effects of a change
in external interest rates on the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate
depend on their long-run implications for national income. In this model,
however, the implications of a reduction in world interest rates for
21. Notice that deldr~, does not depend onf*. Thus, the direction of the shift in
the external balance locus, and therefore the result that a change in r, causes the
long-run equilibrium value of e to move in the opposite direction, does not de-
pend on whether the economy is initially a net external creditor or debtor. This
result is also derived, with a different approach to modeling imperfect asset sub-
stitutability, by Agenor (1996). However, the dynamics of adjustment to the new
equilibrium do indeed depend on the economy's initial international net credi-
tor position, as shown in Montiel (1998).
284 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
national income are negative in the long run, unlike those of transfers.
This is precisely because of the capital inflows induced by the change in
world financial conditions. In the new long-run equilibrium, the
country's net creditor position with the rest of the world deteriorates,
reflecting the effects of net external borrowing (capital inflows) during
the transition from one long-run equilibrium to the next.2 The change
in the external real interest rate has no other direct effects on the country's
long-run current account balance (equation 6.25'). In particular, the in-
terest rate that the country actually faces in world capital markets is
unchanged from one long-run equilibrium to the next, because changes
in the country's net external creditor position drive that interest rate to
equality with the domestic rate of time preference. A higher risk pre-
mium, associated with a reduced net international creditor position, rec-
onciles the constant effective interest rate faced by domestic residents in
the long run with the lower world interest rate. Since, unlike in the case
of transfers, the borrowing has to be repaid, this is reflected in a reduc-
tion in long-run equilibrium national income.2
The Balassa-Samuelson Effect
To capture the effects of differential productivity growth in the traded-
goods sector, the production function in this sector can be respecified as
shown by equation 6.26:
(6.26) yT =YT(LT,a); Y- > 0, YT2 >0
where a is a productivity parameter. Since the demand for labor in the
traded-goods sector will now be a function of this productivity param-
eter, labor market equilibrium becomes equation 6.27:
(6.27) LT(w,a)+ L,(w)= L
and the equilibrium real wage can be written as equation 6.28:
w=w(e,a), with:
(6.28) LT2
w2 = _> 0.
LTI + LNe
This means that output in the traded- and nontraded-goods sectors are
given respectively by equations 6.29 and 6.30:
22. The transition is described in Montiel (1998).
23. For a more extensive discussion of this issue, see Agenor (1996).
DETERMINANTS OF THE LRER 285
(6.29) YT = yT [LT [w(e, a), a], a]
dy,L L4e L YT2>.
da LT1 +L've
YN = yN[LN[w(e,a)]], with:
(6.30) dy,, I,I
da = y,L,w2 < 0.
Thus, the effect of the productivity shock in the traded-goods sector is
to increase the demand for labor in that sector, thereby increasing the
equilibrium real wage. In turn, this causes the nontraded-goods sector
to release labor, which is absorbed by the traded-goods sector. At a given
real exchange rate, the traded-goods sector expands, while the
nontraded-goods sector contracts.
To examine the effects on the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate,
notice that the productivity shock a enters the internal and external bal-
ance equations 6.19 and 6.25' only through its effects on yN and y, re-
spectively. Since, according to equation 6.30, an increase in a reduces y,
it creates excess demand in the nontraded-goods market, requiring a
real appreciation to restore internal balance. In figure 6.5, the IB locus
shifts downward. At the same time, however, by increasing production
of traded goods (see equation 6.29), the shock gives rise to an incipient
trade surplus, so a real appreciation is also required for the restoration
of external balance. Thus, EB shifts downward as well. Both effects op-
erate in the direction of equilibrium real appreciation, as proposed by
the Balassa-Samuelson analysis. Thus, differential productivity growth
in the traded-goods sector creates an appreciation of the equilibrium
real exchange rate."
Changes in the Terms of Trade
As indicated previously, the model as specified is not suitable for ana-
lyzing changes in the terms of trade, since exportable and importable
goods are not distinguished from each other in the traded-goods sector.
To make the necessary modifications, split up total traded-goods out-
put into output of exportables yx and importables yz, both produced
under conditions described previously for YT, that is, with a fixed
24. It can be shown that the downward shift in EB exceeds that in IB. The
implication is that the favorable productivity shock results in an increase in real
private absorption in equilibrium, as one would expect.
286 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
Figure 6.5 Effects of Differential Productivity Shocks and Terms-of-
Trade Changes on the Long-Run Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate
e A
e* - - --~-- -- ----- -
EB'
e B
IB
I JB'
c* C,
Note: An upward movement is a depreciation of the real exchange rate.
sector-specific factor and mobile labor, with sectoral employment lev-
els Lx and LZ. Let 0 denote the terms of trade, defined as the price of
exportables in terms of importables, and redefine the real exchange rate
e as the relative price of importables in terms of nontraded goods. To keep
the demand side of the model simple, assume that the exportable good
is not consumed at home.
The analysis of the effects of terms-of-trade changes is, as might be
expected, quite similar to that of productivity shocks to the traded-goods
sector. Labor market equilibrium is now given by equation 6.31:
(6.31) Lx(w/) + Lz(w) + L,(we) = L
where w is now the real wage in terms of importables. The real wage
that clears the labor market becomes:
w = w(e, O), with
(6.32) L'w /2
w2 = w > 0.
L/0 + L' + L',e
DETERMINANTS OF THE LRER 287
An improvement in the terms of trade increases the real wage, because
this permits labor to be transferred from the importables and nontraded
sectors to the expanding exportables sector. Sectoral supplies are now
as expressed in equations 6.33, 6.34, and 6.35:
dp
y = y7[Lw(e, )]
(6.34) dy y L W 0
y, = y[L,[w(e,0)e]]
(6.35) dyN = yLQw,e <0.
The internal balance equilibrium condition remains as before, with the
exception that output of nontraded goods is now specified as in equa-
tion 6.35. The external balance condition (equation 6.25'), however, has
to be modified to take into account that traded-goods production now
involves output of both exportables and importables, yielding equa-
tion 6.36:
(6.36) rwf*= yx(e,)+yz(e,o)+(p+ ,)f*-(z *+O)c -gz
As shown above, an improvement in the terms of trade results in a con-
traction in output of nontraded goods. The resulting excess demand in
the nontraded-goods market causes the internal balance schedule to shift
downward. The effects on the external balance schedule depend on
whether the real value of total traded-goods output increases or de-
creases. This effect is given by:
a(0yx +Yz) = yx - Py'IAew,> 0
The value of traded-goods output increases through two channels: a
valuation (income) effect arising from the higher relative price of
exportables and an output effect arising from the absorption in the ex-
portable sector of labor released by the nontraded-goods sector. The
implication is that, as in the case of the favorable productivity shock, the
external balance locus will shift downward-the incipient improvement
288 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
in the trade balance requires a real appreciation to keep the trade bal-
ance at its sustainable level. Thus, the effects of a terms-of-trade im-
provement can also be represented as in figure 6.5.25,26
Commercial Policy
Finally, consider the effects on the long-run real exchange rate of a liber-
alization of commercial policy, modeled as a reduction in export subsi-
dies. This is the simplest case to model in the present context, because it
makes using several of the results derived for the analysis of the effects
of terms-of-trade shocks possible. Consider, in particular, an export sub-
sidy set at the rate (4 - 1). In this case, the internal terms of trade will be
0, and the previous analysis can be repeated, at least on the supply side
of the economy. In particular, an increase in the subsidy would pull la-
bor out of the importable and traded-goods sectors into the exportables
sector, just as would an equivalent favorable terms-of-trade shock. A
direct implication is that effects of subsidy changes on the internal bal-
ance schedule IB are the same as those of an equivalent terms-of-trade
shock. A subsidy increase causes IB to shift downward by creating an
excess demand for nontraded goods, and a subsidy decrease causes it to
shift upward.
Where matters differ is in regard to the effects of export subsidies on
the external balance schedule. Because changes in the internal terms of
trade have the same output effects whether brought about by external
terms-of-trade changes or by subsidy rate changes, an increase in the
subsidy rate would create an expansion in the output of traded goods
and cause an incipient trade balance improvement, just as before. Again,
the reason is because a subsidy increase draws labor from the nontraded
to the exportables sector. However, the income effect is absent in this
case. The reason is that, unlike in the case of an external terms-of-trade
improvement, the increase in the price of exportables brought about by
a subsidy increase has to be financed. In the case of the subsidy, a tax
liability is created for the private sector in an amount equal to the sub-
sidy rate times the output of exportables-that is, in the amount (4 - 1)yx.
When this tax liability is taken into account in equation 6.36, the result is
equation 6.37:
25. Just as before, it can be shown that the downward movement in EB exceeds
that in IB, so the sustainable level of private absorption increases as a result of this
shock.
26. As figure 6.5 suggests, an improvement in the terms of trade is associated
with an appreciation of the long-run importables real exchange rate. Whether
the long-run exportables real exchange rate, given by eo, depreciates or appreci-
ates, however, is ambiguous in the model.
DETERMINANTS OF THE LRER 289
(6.37)
Irwf* =yx(e,0) +yz(e, )+(p + irw)f]* -(0 - 1)yx(e,) - (z +69)c
=yx(e,0)+ yz(e,0)+(p +7,)f *-(r +6)c.
The implication is that a given change in the export subsidy rate would
cause the external balance schedule to shift in the same direction, but by
a smaller amount, than a terms-of-trade change that has an equivalent
impact on the internal terms of trade.
In the case at hand, the issue concerns the effect on the real exchange
rate of liberalization of commercial policy-that is, a reduction in the
export subsidy rate. The results just established imply that a shock of
this type would shift both the internal and external balance schedules
upward, with the implication that commercial liberalization results in a
depreciation of the equilibrium real exchange rate.
Summary and Conclusions
The objective of this chapter has been to analyze the determination of
the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate in the context of a simple
analytical framework that is flexible enough to accommodate a broad
variety of potential influences on the real exchange rate. The long-run
equilibrium real exchange rate was defined as the rate consistent with
the steady-state value of a country's international net creditor position,
given the paths of all relevant policy and exogenous variables.
The determinants of the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate iden-
tified here consisted of the following:
Domestic Supply-Side Factors. The most venerable theory regarding
long-run real exchange rate determination is the Balassa-Samuelson ef-
fect. This was incorporated in the analysis in the form of an asymmetric
productivity shock favoring the traded-goods sector. The equilibrium
real exchange rate appreciates, both because excess demand is created
in the nontraded-goods sector and because the trade balance tends to
improve.
Fiscal Policy. Changes in the composition of government spending
between traded and nontraded goods affect the long-run equilibrium
real exchange rate in different ways. Additional tax-financed spending
on nontraded goods creates incipient excess demand in that market, re-
quiring a real appreciation to restore equilibrium. By contrast, tax-fi-
nanced increases in spending on traded goods put downward pressure
on the trade balance, and require a real depreciation to sustain external
balance. The effects of a tax-based fiscal adjustment depend on the form
in which transactions costs are incurred.
290 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
Changes in the International Economic Environment. The aspects of the
world economic environment analyzed here consisted of the terms of
trade for the domestic economy, the availability of external transfers,
the level of world real interest rates, and the world inflation rate. Im-
provements in the terms of trade and increases in the flow of transfers
received tend to appreciate the equilibrium real exchange rate, the former
both by improving the trade balance and creating excess demand for
nontraded goods, and the latter through positive effects on the current
account. Reductions in world real interest rates and increases in world
inflation, by contrast, cause the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate
to depreciate. Lower world interest rates cause capital inflows, which
reduce the country's net creditor position over time, and the long-run
loss of net interest receipts requires a real depreciation to maintain ex-
ternal balance. Changes in world inflation affect the equilibrium real
exchange rate through effects on transactions costs associated with
changes in real money balances. In the case of an increase in world infla-
tion, the long-run real exchange rate tended to depreciate in this model,
though this conclusion is sensitive to an essentially arbitrary assump-
tion about the form in which transactions costs are incurred.
Commercial Policy. Finally, trade liberalization, analyzed here in the
form of a reduction in export subsidies, is associated with long-run real
depreciation. The effect works by channeling resources into the
nontraded-goods sectors. The emergence of incipient excess supply in
the nontraded-goods market dictates the nature of the adjustment in the
real exchange rate.
Part III
Methodologies for Estimating
the Equilibrium RER:
Empirical Applications
7
Estimating the Equilibrium
RER Empirically:
Operational Approaches
Theodore 0. Ahlers and Lawrence E. Hinkle*
The estimation of long-run equilibrium RERs (LRERs) and measurement
of misalignment have traditionally relied on two approaches with strong
operational advantages: a relative purchasing power parity-based meth-
odology that assumes a stationary LRER and a target resource balance
methodology that employs trade equations or elasticities.' In addition,
in cases of split or multiple exchange rates, the parallel market rate has
sometimes been used as an indicator of misalignment.
The two traditional approaches are still widely used in operational
applications in both industrial and developing countries, particularly
when the data or time required for implementing more complex
methodologies are not available. Even when it is feasible to employ the
general-equilibrium methodologies discussed in the subsequent chap-
ters in Part III of this volume, the traditional operational approaches
still provide good starting points for the analysis, and transparent refer-
ence points for cross-checking the plausibility, of the results from the more
complex methodologies. Most of the input data required to implement
* Ms. Ingrid Ivins provided research and computational assistance in the prepa-
ration of this chapter. The authors are grateful to Peter Montiel, Fabien
Nsengiyumva, and three anonymous readers for very helpful comments on ear-
lier drafts.
1. The term resource balance is used in this chapter to refer to the difference
between exports of goods and nonfactor services, and imports of goods and
nonfactor services. The resource balance equals the current account balance ex-
clusive of net interest and other factor service payments.
293
294 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
the two operational approaches are needed for the other methodologies
in any case.
When the RER is stationary in a time-series sense, long-run equilib-
rium exchange rates may be estimated on the basis of relative purchas-
ing power parity (PPP) by using either a base-year or a trend approach.
The base-year approach first establishes a base period in which the ob-
served RER is believed to be at its equilibrium level. Misalignment is
then measured as the difference between the observed RER and its base-
period value, on the implicit PPP assumption that the LRER has remained
at its base level. The utility of this PPP-based methodology is limited
because of its inability to allow for permanent changes in the LRER that
would cause the RER to be nonstationary. The methodology is, how-
ever, still useful for analyzing situations where the LRER is believed to
have remained unchanged, such as when shocks to the economy have
primarily affected nominal variables or when shocks to the "real" fun-
damentals have been transitory In both cases, relative PPP would hold
during the sample period. Alternatively, the LRER may be estimated as
the trend or mean value to which the RER tends to return in the long
term under PPP theory; and misalignment is then measured as the de-
viation from this trend or mean value.
Since all the other methodologies for measuring misalignment, in-
cluding the trade-equations approach, are much more time-consuming
to implement than the above relative PPP-based approaches, these are
often the only feasible methodologies for multicountry studies in which
the amount of time that can be devoted to individual country cases is
limited. For the same reason, PPP-based graphical analysis is also widely
used for making initial diagnoses of individual countries and for identi-
fying hypotheses for analysis using more sophisticated techniques.
The trade equations-elasticities methodology is the second of the stan-
dard operational approaches for estimating the LRER. Although there
are a number of variations of this methodology, the key quantitative
relationships in each are relatively straightforward and transparent. Each
of the variants of this methodology involves the same three basic ana-
lytical tasks. First, trade equations or trade elasticities are used to estab-
lish a quantitative relationship between the RER, imports, exports, and,
hence, the resource balance. Second, a target, norm, or equilibrium re-
source balance is determined using independent projections of the sav-
ing-investment balance or of sustainable capital flows. And, third, the
actual resource balance in the initial year is adjusted for changes in cy-
clical, exogenous, and policy variables that affect it in order to estimate
the underlying structural balance and provide an appropriate basis for
computing the change required in the initial RER. The quantitative rela-
tionship between the RER and the resource balance established in the
ESTIMATING THE EQUILIBRIUM RER EMPIRICALLY 295
first step is then used to calculate the appreciation or depreciation in the
initial RER required to move the resource balance from its adjusted level
in the initial year to the target level, everything else remaining the same.
The estimated long-run equilibrium RER is the one that corresponds to
the target or equilibrium resource balance.
The trade-equations-elasticities methodology permits taking into ac-
count permanent changes in some of the fundamental determinants of
the RER. The methodology can directly address the relative price effects
of changes in the terms of trade and tariff rates, and cover, at least in a
back-of-the-envelope fashion, permanent changes in most of the other
fundamental exogenous and policy variables in which one may be in-
terested. Like the relative-PPP-based approach, the trade-equations meth-
odology can also provide useful inputs for more complex ones. For ex-
ample, adjusting the initial resource balance, determining a target re-
source balance, and projecting exogenous variables are steps common
to many of the approaches used for estimating equilibrium real exchange
rates. The analytical techniques for carrying out these steps, which are
set out in this chapter, are used both with the trade-equations method-
ology and with some of the other methodologies discussed in the subse-
quent chapters of Part III of this book.
As noted above, a parallel exchange rate has sometimes been used as
an additional indicator of distortions in the foreign exchange market
and potential misalignment. However, because exchange rate misalign-
ment does not necessarily lead to the development of a parallel market
and parallel rates are much less common than they were a decade ago,
opportunities to apply this approach are limited. Moreover, the approach
turns out to be fraught with analytical difficulties. For both reasons, the
existence of a parallel foreign exchange market is considered as a spe-
cial case in Part IV of this volume. There the chapter by Ghei and Kamin
examines the relationship between the parallel and the unified equilib-
rium exchange rates and considers the usefulness of the parallel rate as
a guide for determining a unified exchange rate.
This chapter discusses the two standard operational approaches for
estimating the LRER. The structure of the chapter is as follows. The fol-
lowing section first sets the PPP-based approach in the context of recent
theoretical and empirical work on the determination of equilibrium RERs
and then discusses the interpretation and usefulness of PPP-based esti-
mates of misalignment. The remainder of the chapter goes on to con-
sider alternative ways of carrying out the three basic analytical tasks
involved in implementing the trade-equations methodology. Since the
trade-equations methodology is more complex than the PPP-based ap-
proach, the rest of the chapter is considerably longer than the discussion
in the following section on the PPP-based approach. The first section on
296 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
the trade-equations approach discusses the use of trade equations and
trade elasticities to establish quantitative relationships between the RER
and the resource balance. It also presents a specific example of a trade-
elasticities methodology employing a three-good framework (with ex-
ports, imports, and domestic goods) that is suitable for use in low-in-
come countries with minimal data in which changes in the terms of trade
and commercial policy are important considerations. Then come two
sections on the resource balance. The first of these examines alternative
methods of determining a target resource balance using saving-invest-
ment balance and sustainable capital flows approaches. The second then
considers techniques for adjusting the initial resource balance to reflect
changes in cyclical, exogenous, and policy variables affecting it in order
to estimate the underlying structural balance. The final section concludes
with a brief discussion of the advantages and limitations of the trade-
equations methodology. The various analytical techniques are illustrated
with empirical examples for C6te d'Ivoire at the time of the devaluation
of the CFA francs in 1994.
The Relative PPP-Based Approach to RER
Misalignment
As noted above, the simplest methods of estimating the long-run equi-
librium RER are based on relative PPP. Although more sophisticated
methodologies that take into account variations in the fundamentals
determining the LRER have been developed, the PPP-based approaches
are still widely used in both graphical analyses of individual countries
and in econometric analyses of large multicountry samples because of
the relative ease with which these can be implemented.
The use of a relative-PPP-based methodology can be justified in ei-
ther of two ways. On the one hand, the analyst may simply adopt ex
ante the traditional relative-PPP view on the determination of the long-
run equilibrium real exchange rate, which essentially takes the LRER to
be a constant. On the other hand, the analyst may view the LRER as
being determined by a broad set of fundamentals, which may turn out
ex post to be stationary in a time-series sense for the specific country
concerned. In the first case, the decision to apply the PPP approach would
be made without considering the data. In the second case, the PPP ap-
proach would be adapted only after the RER for the country concerned
passes a test of stationarity.
Whichever justification for using relative PPP is adopted in a specific
case, theoretical and empirical work on PPP has suggested that the equi-
librium RER may be estimated in two ways-using either a base-year or
a long-term trend value. This section gives an updated presentation of
ESTIMATING THE EQUILIBRIUM RER EMPIRICALLY 297
these two standard techniques for estimating the LRER and then dis-
cusses the interpretation of such PPP-based analyses.
Base-Year Estimates of the Equilibrium RER
When relative PPP is assumed to hold ex ante, measuring the equilib-
rium real exchange rate essentially involves removing the effects of
nonsytematic transitory shocks. In practice, these are eliminated by iden-
tifying a base period in which such shocks are believed, on the basis of
independent evidence, to have been negligible-a procedure that en-
sures that the actual RER coincided with its equilibrium-PPP value in
the base period. Thus the actual RER in the base period represents the
estimate of the equilibrium rate, and the nominal exchange rate consis-
tent with the LRER from that moment on can be calculated by simply
adjusting the nominal exchange rate for the cumulative difference be-
tween domestic and foreign inflation.
The alternative case is that the LRER is interpreted as subject to change
in response to changes in underlying fundamentals but turns out em-
pirically to be stationary for a particular country. In this case, the
stationarity of the RER forces the analyst to take the position that its
fundamental determinants are either individually stationary-that is,
their "permanent" values have not changed during the sample period
although the fundamentals may have been subject to transitory varia-
tions-or that any nonstationary fundamentals must be cointegrated
among themselves. In either situation, the LRER can still be measured
using a base-year value, although the identification of a suitable base
year is more complicated under their interpretation. In this case, the
base-year method for estimating the equilibrium RER involves analyz-
ing the movements in the fundamental variables determining the LRER
to identify a base year in which, on average, these fundamentals, and
hence the RER, were at sustainable levels. If the fundamental variables
do not change after the base year, or return to their level in that year,
then the LRER should also remain at the base-year level. Misalignment
is then measured as the difference between the actual RER in the current
year and its (unchanged) equilibrium value in the base year.2 Note that
the expenditure-PPP version of the external RER (usually computed with
CPIs) should be used both in the base-year analysis and in the trend
analysis discussed below since this RER concept is the one employed in
relative-PPP theory.
2. Appreciations, depreciations, and misalignment may be expressed in ei-
ther domestic- or foreign-currency terms. Formulas for converting from one to
the other are given in appendix C.
298 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
The base-year approach is most useful in cases in which all move-
ments after the base year result from either nominal shocks (which tem-
porarily cause the actual RER to diverge from its equilibrium level) or
from transitory movements in the fundamentals. However, if the fun-
damentals change permanently after the base year, so too will the LRERW
In this case, the base-year approach will provide little guidance on the
RER's new equilibrium value until a new base year has been established.
In the base-year approach everything thus depends upon the identifica-
tion of a suitable base year.
The definition of the long-run equilibrium RER in Part II suggests
the criteria for selecting a representative base or equilibrium year. Re-
call that this definition requires that the current account deficit can be
financed by a "sustainable" level of capital flows and that the market
for nontraded (or domestic) goods also be in a sustainable equilibrium
for given values of the predetermined, exogenous, and policy variables
that influence these objectives. As mentioned above, the procedure for
choosing the base year also depends upon whether the rationale under-
lying the procedure is a simple ex ante relative-PPP-based one or a more
sophisticated one in which the real exchange rate is driven by stationary
fundamentals. In the simple PPP case, the "independent evidence" of
equilibrium referred to previously is likely to concern the behavior of a
particular outcome variable, such as the resource balance.
In contrast, from the "stationary fundamentals" perspective, the base
year chosen should be a recent year in which the actual exchange rate is
believed to have been close to its equilibrium value because all the fun-
damentals were close to their sustainable values. As explained in the
survey of empirical estimation in Chapter 5, the set of fundamentals to
be considered in choosing a base year may include both exogenous and
policy variables. In practice, when selecting base years, one usually fo-
cuses first on the external balance criteria, typically interpreted as choos-
ing a year with a reasonable or normal current account (or resource)
deficit for the country concerned. For assessing the sustainability of ex-
ogenous variables, the analyst looks for terms of trade that are reason-
ably close to their likely long-term trend levels and capital flows that
are consistent in amount and terms both with the likely longer-term
availability of capital and with the country's debt-servicing capacity. For
assessing the sustainability and desirability of policy or objective vari-
ables, one looks at growth, investment, employment, and inflation per-
formance and compares these to the country's long-run policy targets.
3. In addition, if the law of one price does not hold or only holds loosely, the
return to a base-year value could be quite slow even after a purely nominal shock
to the exchange rate, as domestic prices may be quite sticky and the actual RER
will tend to follow the nominal RER.
ESTIMATING THE EQUILIBRIUM RER EMPIRICALLY 299
Other things being equal, it is also desirable to select as recent a base
year as possible to minimize the changes in the economy's structure
taking place between the base year and the current year. Because a year
that is appropriate as a base for a particular country may not be appro-
priate for another, country-specific rather than standardized base years
should be used when measuring misalignment relative to a base year.'
The Devarajan-Lewis-Robinson (DLR) constant-elasticities model, the
econometric model, and the reduced-form econometric methodology
presented in Chapters 8, 9, and 10, respectively, also employ base peri-
ods, like those used here, in which the observed RER equals the equilib-
rium RER. The criteria for selecting these base periods are essentially
the same under these methodologies so that the base period used for the
relative-PPP-based analysis may also be used with the more sophisti-
cated methodologies.
A common problem in determining an appropriate base year is that,
because of policy shortcomings and external constraints, years in which
exogenous variables are at sustainable levels are not always years in
which policy variables were at desirable levels. For example, histori-
cally, desirable growth and investment levels have sometimes been at-
tained only when the terms of trade have been temporarily inflated or
capital flows have been unsustainable. Conversely, sustainable terms of
trade and capital flows have often been associated with undesirable
growth and investment outcomes. Hence, in determining when the RER
was near its long-run equilibrium value and selecting a corresponding
base year, one is often forced to make tradeoffs between sustainability
and desirability and to take these tradeoffs into account in an ad hoc
way in subsequent qualitative analysis. Moreover, in both historical and
forward-looking analysis, some care is needed in analyzing the move-
ments of the fundamentals to identify shifts in these or breaks in time
series that could indicate that a change in the base year is needed. As a
result, the choice of a base year may be subjective; and reasonable alter-
natives should be considered when they are available.
For the C6te d'Ivoire examples shown in the graphs in this section,
the RER was nonstationary, as explained in Chapter 10, and 1985 was
chosen as the base or equilibrium year for analytical purposes. This was
the most recent year before the devaluation year of 1994, in which both
the terms of trade and capital flows were at broadly sustainable levels
and there was reasonable growth and low inflation. This choice, however,
4. The standard procedure is to select the RER for the base year as its equilib-
rium value. However, because of lags in the effects of the RER on the economy,
one could also argue that the RER for the preceding year or a three-year moving
average centered on the preceding year would be a more accurate estimate of
the rate that actually generated the base-year equilibrium.
300 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
has elements of both unsustainability and undesirability. The situation
in 1985 was unsustainable in that the debt service burden was too heavy
for the long term and the terms of trade were more favorable than their
historical trend. It was also undesirable in that the investment level was
too low to support the desired long-term growth rate and trade policy
was too restrictive to promote accelerated export and productivity
growth. Hence, even in 1985 the actual RER was probably overvalued
relative to the equilibrium RER in normative terms and even somewhat
overvalued in positive terms. Furthermore, as a result of the sharp de-
cline in the terms of trade in subsequent years, the equilibrium RER
probably depreciated in the 1986-93 period rather than remaining con-
stant at the 1985 base-year level as assumed in the PPP-based analysis.
The effect that choosing different base years can have on PPP-based
analysis is illustrated in figure 7.1. In the long debate over the overvalu-
ation of the CFA franc, most of those arguing for a devaluation chose
1985 as the best available base year. This choice indicated that on the eve
of the devaluation in 1993 Cte d'Ivoire's actual real effective exchange
rate (REER) had appreciated by 37 percent relative to the equilibrium
base year. In contrast, some of those arguing for maintaining the exist-
ing parity chose 1980 as a base year, a choice which showed that C6te
d'Ivoire's actual REER in 1993 was close to its base-year level. Note, in
addition, that the use of either year as a base assumes that the equilib-
rium RER remained constant at the level of that year. If, however, as
discussed in the preceding paragraph, the sustainable values of the terms
of trade or other fundamentals in fact deteriorated after the base year,
the equilibrium RER would depreciate. The use of either base year would
thus give an underestimate of the misalignment.
Means for Short Base Periods
For sustainability of predetermined variables, theoretically it would be
desirable to have an equilibrium period, rather than just a single equi-
librium year, so that the predetermined variables have time to approach
their steady-state values. In addition, in practice all of the fundamentals
will not necessarily be at sustainable levels in precisely the same year.
One way of dealing with these problems is to use the average value of
the RER over a short equilibrium period as a base. However, the utility
of this alternative empirically depends very much on the situation in
the particular country concerned. In some circumstances, particularly
when an appropriate choice of base year is not obvious or when a coun-
try has a market-determined exchange rate that fluctuates significantly
year to year, a mean for a short time period may be a more representa-
tive indicator of the equilibrium value of the RER than a single base-
year estimate. In other cases, equilibrium periods may be limited to little
ESTIMATING THE EQUILIBRIUM RER EMPIRICALLY 301
Figure 7.1 The REER for C6te d'Ivoire, 1970-95 (Base Years 1985= 100
and 1980=100)
140-
I
130
120 REER with Base
Year 1985
110-
100 .
90 *U .*.
80 REER with Base
---. :Year 1980
70 --
6 0I I I I I I I I
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 S4 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
--*--REERwith Base Year 1980 ----REER with Base Year 1985
Note: The REER has been calculated using CPIs, weighted average parallel and official ex-
change rates, and adjusted IFS country weights. An upward movement is an appreciation
of the REER.
Source: Computed from World Bank data.
more than a year or two by the volatility of the terms of trade, capital
flows, or other fundamentals. In Cte d'lvoire, for example, the longest
period in the 1980s that might reasonably have been used as a base was
1985-86. If this two-year period had been used as a base together with a
one-year lag in the RER, the results would have been similar to those
from using 1985 because the average RER for 1984-85 was almost equal
to that in 1985. However, when, as in this case, some exogenous or policy
variables diverge in the same direction from sustainable levels for the
entire period, the mean value of the RER for the period may not reflect
the sustainable values of these variables any better than does the RER
for a single year.
Long-Period Mean and Trend PPP Estimates of the
Equilibrium RER
One way of dealing with fluctuations in the fundamentals during the
sample period is to estimate their sustainable values on the basis of their
sample means or, in the trend-stationary case, as their trend values within
the sample. In effect, this procedure amounts to estimating the LRER as
the sample mean or the trend value of the RER within the sample, rather
than as the particular value of the RER in a specified base year. Hence,
302 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
instead of trying to identify a particular year or short span of years in
which the RER is believed to be at its equilibrium level, one tries to
identify the long-term trend value toward which the actual RER tends.
Thus, the LRER could be estimated as being the mean value of the RER
over a long period of time or as evolving along a deterministic or sto-
chastic trend. Justification for both procedures can be found in the
literature.
However, as discussed in the survey of empirical research on PPP in
Chapter 5, the evidence supporting relative PPP is not that strong; and,
hence, some care is needed in using this procedure. For example, ac-
cording to Clark and others (1994): "Empirical evidence suggests that
PPP-based indicators may be useful to explain long-run movements in
exchange rates among industrial countries, but less so to explain move-
ments of these exchange rates in the short run, or of exchange rates be-
tween industrial and developing countries, either in the long or the short
run." Hence, before deciding whether to use a long-period mean or a
trend as a base for a particular developing country, time-series data for
its RER should be analyzed to determine, if possible, whether its RER
has been stationary for the sample period as illustrated for C6te d'Ivoire
and Burkina Faso in Chapter 10 on the single-equation methodology.
Unfortunately, sometimes the short time period for which RER data are
available and the weak power of unit-root tests will make it impossible
to determine whether the RER is stationary or nonstationary for the
sample period. Both possibilities should then be considered.
Means for Long Time Periods.
The long-run referred to in the above citation for which relative PPP has
been found to hold for a few industrial countries is in fact very long-
specifically, periods of 70 to 100 years, over which both nominal and
real shocks to the external RER may prove transitory. In addition, ultra-
long-term relative PPP has been shown to hold only for a small group of
industrial countries with fairly similar income levels. The long-term
behavior of RERs between developing and industrial countries at quite
different income levels, which is our primary interest here, could be
equally different. If a sufficiently long data series is available for a par-
ticular developing country, the equilibrium value of the RER in the very
long term could be determined as its mean; and RER misalignment could
be measured accordingly However, data for 70 to 100 years are only
rarely available for developing countries. Data for even 20 to 30 years
are hard to come by for many low-income and transition economies.
Since PPP theory permits extended periods of misalignment during
which the actual RER diverges from its long-term equilibrium value and
empirical studies of PPP have found substantial volatility in RERs and
ESTIMATING THE EQU[LIBRIUM RER EMPIRICALLY 303
only very slow convergence toward the mean, the significance of a mean
for anything other than a very long period is not clear. Despite the weak-
ness of the theoretical and empirical support for PPP, it is entirely pos-
sible that, as in the Burkina Faso case in Chapter 10, the RER for a par-
ticular country will be stationary for a given sample period. In this case,
the mean value of the RER for the sample period will be the best esti-
mate of its equilibrium value. However, when available time-series data
are long enough neither for determining with any accuracy whether the
RER for a particular country is stationary or nonstationary nor for com-
puting a meaningful long-term mean, a base-year estimate of the equi-
librium RER is likely to be preferable.
Trend Estimates of the Equilibrium RER
As discussed in the chapter on the two-good internal RER and the sur-
vey of empirical research, the Balassa-Samuelson effect provides theo-
retical justification for observing persistent long-term trends in the equi-
librium RER. Countries experiencing significantly higher or lower pro-
ductivity growth than their trading partners should show a statistically
significant long-term trend appreciation or depreciation in their exter-
nal RER. Demand factors (for example, a high-income elasticity of de-
mand for services and other nontraded goods) or long-term trends in
other fundamentals (for example, a sustained deterioration in the terms
of trade) can also generate trends in the RER. In samples for which the
RER is nonstationary, such trends are more meaningful measures of the
equilibrium RER than the mean; and misalignment should be measured
relative to the trend value of the RER rather than relative to its mean.
Such time trends can be either deterministic or stochastic. Figure 7.2
shows the time trends in the RER for C6te d'Ivoire and compares these
to the mean and 1985 base-year values of the equilibrium RER. Since
empirically it is very hard to distinguish between deterministic and sto-
chastic time trends with short noisy time-series data, deterministic trends
have been used in figure 7.2 for simplicity.
Interpretation of PPP-Based Analyses
Five points concerning the interpretation of analyses based on relative
PPP are worth noting: (a) the alternative of measuring competitiveness
only in terms of goods that are internationally traded, (b) the relation-
ship between the expenditure-PPP external RER and the internal RER,
(c) the effects of structural breaks in the RER series, (d) statistical indica-
tors of misalignment from multicountry studies, and (e) measures of
misalignment based on data for standardized baskets of goods from the
International Comparison Programme (ICP).
304 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
Figure 7.2 C6te dIvoire: The REER-Actual Values, Average Values,
and Time Trends, 1967-85 and 1986-93 (1985=100)
160
150-
140-
130-
120-
11011---------------- - ---- ---------
100-
90
80 1
67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
-*-Actual Values 1967-95 ------ Average Value 1967-85
--- Time Trend 1967-85 -*- Time Trend 1986-93
--- Average Value 1986-93
Note: The time trend value was computed as an OLS regression of the logarithm of the
REER and a time trend. The annual growth rate is 0.3 percent in 1967-85 and 1.0 percent in
1986-93. The REER was computed using CPIs, adjusted country weights, and weighted aver-
age official and parallel exchange rates. An upward movement of the REER is an appreciation.
Source: Computed from World Bank data.
Competitiveness in Internationally Traded Goods: An Alternative
Approach
The base-year and trend approaches for measuring RER misalignment
were originally developed for use with the expenditure-PPP version of
external RER. However, they can be used equally well with the external
RER for traded goods since relative PPP can be applied to traded goods
as an interpretation of the law of one price. As discussed in the chapter
on the external RER, it can, in fact, be quite reasonably argued that the
entire foregoing analysis should be in terms of the external RER for traded
goods rather than the expenditure-PPP version using CPJs.
Theoretically, somewhat different behavior should be expected in the
prices of homogeneous and differentiated traded goods, with the exter-
nal RER for homogeneous traded goods obeying relative PPP more
closely than the RER for differentiated traded goods. Unfortunately,
5. Although the theoretical basis for expecting relative PPP to hold for inter-
nationally traded goods is stronger than for all goods (both traded and nontraded),
Isard and Faruquee (1998) note that the hypothesis that the relative price of traded
ESTIMATING THE EQUILIBRIUM RER EMPIRICALLY 305
data on the relative prices of internationally traded goods are only avail-
able for recent years for industrial countries and often not available at
all for developing countries. Because of the shortage of data, relatively
little empirical research has been done for industrial countries, and even
less research for developing countries, on whether relative PPP holds
for traded goods.
When the required data are available, it is useful to examine the be-
havior of the external RERs for both homogeneous and differentiated
traded goods. Unfortunately, only limited data are available for the prices
of traded goods in C6te d'Ivoire. Since these data have already been
presented in figures 2.12 and 2.13 in Chapter 2 on the external RER and
the application of the techniques presented above to traded goods is
straightforward, the external RER for traded goods is not shown here.
Relationship to the Internal RER
Because of the Belassa-Samuelson effect and highly income-elastic de-
mand for nontraded goods, all countries in which productivity grows
faster in the traded-goods sector than in the nontraded-goods sector,
the common experience, should experience a sustained trend apprecia-
tion in the equilibrium internal RER. This pattern is in fact what has
been observed in studies of the internal RER in industrial countries. De
Gregorio, Giovannini, and Wolf (1994), for example, find that for 14 in-
dustrial countries the internal RER appreciated almost uniformly at an
average rate of more than 1 percent per year in the period 1970-85. Fur-
thermore, as explained in earlier chapters, it is entirely possible and con-
sistent for the external RER for all goods, the external RER for traded
goods, and the internal RERs to follow different trends. The typical pat-
tern for a country experiencing more rapid productivity growth than its
trading partners is a rapidly appreciating internal RER, a more slowly
goods should remain constant over time can still be questioned on the following
grounds: "(1) the composition of tradable goods across countries can change
over time; (2) changes over time in the relative prices of different tradables can
contribute to deviations from PPP insofar as the weights of different categories
of tradable goods in national price or cost indices differ across countries; and (3)
the scope for arbitraging price or cost differentials across countries can be af-
fected by the liberalization of trade and foreign exchange restrictions, reduc-
tions in transportation costs, or changes in other components of the costs of mar-
ket penetration." But they conclude that "these limitations notwithstanding, cal-
culations of different measures of international price and cost competitiveness
can often be helpful when judging whether exchange rates are reasonably close
to medium-run equilibrium levels."
306 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
appreciating external RER for all goods, and a constant or depreciating
external RER for traded goods. The internal RER is, in addition, gener-
ally more useful than the external RER in assessing the magnitude of
real shocks.
Although relative PPP is not directly applicable to the internal RERs,
analytically it is still useful to know how the internal RERs have be-
haved both relative to trend and to their values in the last equilibrium
(base) year. Figures 7.3 and 7.4 thus look separately at the internal RERs
for imports and exports for C8te d'Jvoire. Figure 7.3 indicates that the
internal RER for imports behaved in a similar fashion to the expendi-
ture-PPP external RER, jumping upward by 20 percent during 1985-86
because of the appreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER)
and then remaining relatively stable until the 1994 devaluation. As fig-
ure 7.4 shows, the export sector was more severely affected than the
import competing sector. Because of the sustained decline in the prices
of its major export commodities (primarily coffee and cocoa) and de-
valuations by competing developing-country exporters, C6te d'Ivoire's
internal RER for exports appreciated strongly throughout the entire pe-
riod, rising by almost 80 percent during 1986-93, four times the appre-
ciation in the RER for imports.
Structural Breaks
Large external shocks and major regime shifts can cause structural breaks
in the RER data for developing countries and create significant prob-
lems in interpreting these. Such structural breaks can cause
nonstationarity in the RER and lead to significant shifts in means, trends,
and base years.
The data for C6te d'Ivoire provide a good example of the possible
effects of structural breaks. The combination of the large drop in C6te
d'Ivoire's terms of trade after 1985 and the strong appreciation in its
NEER shown in figure 7.5 caused a marked change in the external envi-
ronment that the country faced, and its RER was nonstationary as dis-
cussed in Chapter 10. Since figure 7.5 shows that the NEER and the terms
of trade behaved in significantly different ways in the periods 1967-85
and 1986-93, figures 7.2-7.4 take 1985 as the dividing point between
two different time periods and give the means and time trend values
separately for the 1967-85 and the 1986-93 periods. During 1967-85, the
average value of the expenditure-PPP external RER was 10 percent more
appreciated than the 1985 base-year level but showed little trend move-
ment over the period. In the 1986-93 period, in contrast, the external
RER appreciated strongly and was, on average, nearly 30 percent more
appreciated than in the 1985 base year.
Figure 7.3 C6te d'Ivoire: The REER and the Internal RER for Imports-Actual Values, Average Values, and Time Trends,
1970-85 and 1986-93 (1985=100)
140 ---
,* -RI . .-*r a.-
130 - - ,II
120 9-
100,
'0 ~ I
I '
10 - -- - - - - - ---
90 '
80 I
70I I I I I I I I I I l i l l I 1 1 1 1 11I
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
-U- Internal RER for Imports: Actual Values 1970-95 0 Internal RER for Imports: Time Trend 1970-85
--- Internal RER for Imports: Time Trend 1986-93 ------ Internal RER for Imports: Average Value 1970-85
- - - Internal RER for Imports: Average Value 1986-93 - - * - - REER
Note: The time trend value was computed as an OLS regression of the logarithm of the RER and a time trend. The annual growth rate is 0.4
percent in 1970-85 and -0.5 percent in 1986-93. The REER was computed using CPIs, adjusted country weights, and weighted average
official and parallel exchange rates. An upward movement is an appreciation.
Source: Computed from World Bank data.
Figure 7.4 C6te d1voire: The REER and the Internal RER for Exports-Actual Values, Average Values, and Time Trends,
1970-85 and 1986--93 (1985=100)
200 --
180
160
14 - e-- -- - - - --.- -
140
120
80 -
60
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
- Internal RER for Exports: Actual Values 1970-95 ------ Internal RER for Exports: Average Value 1970-85
- - - Internal RER for Exports: Average Value 1986-93 ----- Internal RER for Exports: Time Trend 1970-85
---- Internal RER for Exports: Time Trend 1986-93 - - * - - REER
Note: The time trend value was computed as an OLS regression of the logarithm of the RER and a time trend. The annual growth rate is 31
percent in 1970-85 and 7.9 percent in 1986-93. The REER was computed using CPlx, ad3usted country weights, and weighted average official
and parallel exchange rates. An upward movement is an appreciation.
Source: Computed from World Bank data.
ESTIMATING THE EQU1LIBRIUM RER EMPIRICALLY 309
Statistical Indicators of RER Misalignment
Because of the availability of CPIs for calculating the expenditure-PPP
version of the RER in most developing countries and the relative ease of
computing PPP-based measures of misalignment, these measures have
been used in numerous multicountry econometric studies. These stud-
ies have noted some empirical regularities that are useful in assessing
RER misalignment in individual countries. Since selection of appropri-
ate base years requires detailed knowledge of individual countries and
can be criticized as subjective, most large multicountry studies have
measured misalignment of the RER relative to its long-term mean or
trend value; and hence their insights apply to misalignment measured
in this way. In Chapter 12, for example, in analyzing parallel market
exchange rates for a sample of 24 developing countries, Ghei and Kamin
use a simple relative PPP-based measure for the equilibrium unified
RER-the average of the official real exchange over long periods of time
during which a county's exchange markets were unified.
Large appreciations of the actual RER relative to its trend value, which
are easily detectable in a PPP-based analysis, are often warning signs of
serious exchange rate misalignment and potential currency crises. For
Figure 7.5 C6te d'Ivoire: The Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER), the
NEER, and the Terms of Trade, 1970-95 (1985=100)
180
170- - NEER
160 -
150
140..*. 4 4
130 .
120 -.-
110 - REER
90
80 Teqs
70 ofTrade
60
5 0 l I l l I I I I I I I I I 1 1 I I
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
-a- NEER using Adjusted Country Weights and Weighted Average
Official and Parallel Exchange Rates
--+-- REER using CPIs, Adjusted Country Weights, and Weighted
Average Official and Parallel Exchange Rates
-+-- Terms of Trade
Note: An upward movement is an appreciation of the REER.
Source: Computed from World Bank data.
310 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
example, Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1996, 1998) use the degree of appre-
ciation of the RER relative to its 25-year average (median) as a bench-
mark for assessing the sustainability of current account deficits and find
that even this crude measure of misalignment is a useful predictor of
currency crises. Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1997) find that sub-
stantial appreciation of the RER above its trend value is a warning sign
of a future devaluation and that the 10 percent of RER observations that
are the farthest from the trend are accurate leading indicators of a cur-
rency crisis within the next 24 months. Similarly, Goldfajn and Valdes
(1996, 1997) analyze a large set of RER appreciations for 93 countries
from 1960 to 1994 and find that for large real appreciations of 15 percent
to 35 percent relative to trend the probability of a subsequent devalua-
tion ranged from 68 percent for real appreciations of 15 percent or more
to 100 percent for appreciations exceeding 35 percent. Hence, even if
there is some uncertainty about the precise level of the equilibrium RER,
large appreciations in a short period of time are a warning sign of mis-
alignment. Finally, volatility of the real exchange rate, which is readily
measurable, implies that the RER spends more time farther away from
its equilibrium level. Volatility is, as noted in Chapter 11 on the effect of
the RER on trade flows, a deterrent to export growth; and, as Razin and
Collins (1997) have observed, volatility has served in effect as a reason-
able proxy for misalignment in some multicountry studies.
Measures of Misalignment Based on International Comparison
Program Data
Equilibrium exchange rates can be based on absolute as well as relative
PPP. As explained in the chapter on the external RER, measurement of
absolute PPP requires the use of standardized baskets of goods. For ex-
ample, the "Big Mac Index" is a simple one-good absolute-PPP exchange
rate, which The Economist uses as an informal indicator of the equilib-
rium nominal exchange rate. It is simply the ratio of the domestic-currency
price of a Big Mac in the home country to its price in the numeraire
country.' However, data for more comprehensive measures of absolute
PPP have been hard to come by.
Because relative-PPP-based measures of misalignment have various
theoretical shortcomings and estimating equilibrium exchange rates
using the more sophisticated methodologies discussed later in this vol-
6. See The Economist (1995, August 26) and (1996, April 27). In a lighter vein,
Cumby (1996) analyzes data for 14 countries for the "Big Mac Index" and finds
that their exchange rates converge to "Big Mac parity" twice as fast as to relative
PPP.
ESTIMATING THE EQUILIBRIUM RER EMPIRICALLY 311
ume is quite time-consuming, researchers have long sought a method-
ology simple enough to use in measuring misalignment for panel data
for a large number of countries. Until recently, the lack of price data for
representative standardized baskets of goods had inhibited the empiri-
cal use of absolute PPP for this purpose. Hence, as the Summers-Heston
data for standardized baskets of goods has become available for 90 or so
countries from the International Comparison Programme (ICP) described
in appendix A to Chapter 2, some researchers have utilized these to de-
velop alternative simplified procedures for estimating equilibrium ex-
change rates.
Aggregate ICP exchange rates have themselves occasionally been used
to analyze trade distortions and exchange rate misalignment. Nominal
exchange rates for developing countries derived from the ICP data are
generally lower (less appreciated) than nominal market exchange rates
with the U.S. dollar because of the Balassa-Samuelson effect discussed
in Chapters 3, 5, and 6. Figure 7.6, which compares the aggregate ICP
dollar exchange rate for GDP for C6te d'lvoire with the official rate,
illustrates this point. The magnitude of the differences between aggre-
gate ICP exchange rates and nominal exchange rates also tends to vary
inversely with per capita income.
A predictable tendency in the ICP data for the relative price levels of
countries to vary positively with their relative income levels as a result
of the Balassa-Samuelson effect has been exploited by a number of re-
searchers to derive estimates of the equilibrium RER. Dollar (1992) re-
gresses the relative price levels of the standardized baskets of goods
from the ICP data on relative per capita GDP. This regression gives him
a norm that he considers as the equilibrium relationship between the
free trade RER and per capita income. Deviations from this norm give a
measure of the combined effects of trade and exchange rate policy on
outward orientation. Bosworth, Collins, and Chen (1996) employ a pro-
cedure similar to Dollar's to derive a measure of exchange rate mis-
alignment that they then use in analyzing the factors affecting growth
in an 88-country sample. Razin and Collins (1997) use data on the rela-
tive international price of the standardized basket of consumption goods
and services in different countries as a measure of the real exchange
rate. This measure is then regressed on the fundamental variables deter-
mining the RER using panel data, and the fitted values are used as an
estimate of the equilibrium RER.
7. See, for example, Rogoff (1996) for data and regression results document-
ing these stylized facts.
312 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
Figure 7.6 CMte d'Ivoire: The International Comparison Programme
and Official Exchange Rates with the U.S. Dollar
0.0095
0.008511-m'. V,M. K- : International Comparison
0.0075-- . Program US$ Exchange Rate
0.0065-- orA
0.0055--
0.004-- Wit
0.0035-
Official US$
0.0025-. Ex change Rate..
0.0015-
60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96
-*--Official US$ Exchange Rate
- - a - - International Comparison Program US$ Exchange Rate
Note: An upward movement is an appreciation.
Source: Computed from World Bank data.
Such statistical analyses of ICP exchange rates may give broad indi-
cations of misalignment suitable for use in general multicountry studies
and provide country-specific information that is useful in particular
cases. However, more research is needed on the relationship between
these general measures of misalignment and those from the methodolo-
gies discussed elsewhere in this volume before basing policy recom-
mendations for individual countries on ICP exchange rates.
Conclusion: Advantages and Limitations of the
Relative-PPP-Based Approach
The relative-PPP-based approach set out above has a number of practi-
cal advantages in estimating the equilibrium RER in low-income devel-
oping countries. Its data requirements are limited. The methodology is
both straightforward and transparent. With simple computer spread-
sheets it is easy to run extensive sensitivity analyses of the results as-
suming different base years or means. A number of multicountry statis-
tical analyses of misalignment are also available for comparative pur-
poses. These are significant practical advantages for balance-of-payments
management in a developing country in which data and professional
manpower may both be limited. Relative-PPP-based measures of mis-
ESTIMATING THE EQUILIBRIUM RER EMPIRICALLY 313
alignment can also be quite useful in high-inflation countries where
shocks to the external RER are primarily nominal ones. Thus, for ex-
ample, the implementation of real exchange rate targeting has often re-
lied on simple relative-PPP-based rules.
The PPP-based approach does have some major limitations, however.
In developing countries, lack of data on the prices of internationally
traded goods usually forces one to use the external RER for all goods
(computed with CPIs) rather than the theoretically preferable external
RER for traded goods. The PPP-based analysis also relies on relatively
simple base-year or mean-trend estimates of the equilibrium RER. If there
are structural breaks in the time-series data for the RER or permanent
changes in the fundamentals and hence in the equilibrium RER, base-
period or mean estimates of misalignment may no longer be relevant,
and PPP analysis is of little help in determining the new equilibrium
RER. Moreover, real exchange rates can be quite volatile-and conver-
gence to the mean, if it occurs at all, is typically quite slow. Hence, the
RER may diverge from a PPP-based equilibrium for long periods, and it
may be of little practical use for policy purposes.
However, all of the other methodologies for measuring misalignment,
including the trade-equations approach discussed below, are much more
time-consuming to implement than the relative-PPP-based approaches.
Thus the relative-PPP-based approaches are often the only feasible meth-
odologies for multicountry studies in which the amount of time that
can be devoted to individual country cases is limited. For the same rea-
son, PPP-based analysis is also widely used for making initial diagnoses
of individual countries and for identifying hypotheses for analysis us-
ing more sophisticated techniques. A comparison of the movements of
the fundamentals with movements of the RER since the last equilib-
rium may also be useful for detecting cases of possible misalignment.
The PPP-based methodology thus provides a starting point-it may be
used alone, when nothing else is available, or as a reference point when
more sophisticated methodologies are also used.
The Trade-Equations Approach: Establishing the
Quantitative Relationship between the RER and
the Resource Balance
The second of the established operational methodologies for measuring
exchange rate misalignment is the trade-equations approach. The
8. See, for example, Calvo, Reinhart, and Vegh (1995).
314 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
general rubric "trade-equations approach" is used here to cover a
group of similar methodologies, all of which involve three basic ana-
lytical tasks:
a. Using trade equations or trade elasticities to establish a quantita-
tive relationship between the RER, imports, exports, and, hence,
the resource balance;
b. Independently determining a target, norm, or equilibrium resource
balance using projections of the saving-investment balance or sus-
tainable capital flows; and
c. Estimating the underlying or structural resource balance by ad-
justing the actual resource balance in the initial year for cyclical,
exogenous, and policy changes that affect it.
The quantitative relationship between the RER and the resource bal-
ance established in task (a) is then used to calculate the appreciation or
depreciation in the initial RER required to move the resource balance
from its adjusted level in the initial year to its target level, everything
else remaining the same. The estimated long-run equilibrium RER is the
one that corresponds to the target or equilibrium resource balance. The
following section of this chapter discusses task (a). Tasks (b) and (c) are
taken up in the subsequent two sections.
Because of the different structures of industrial and low-income de-
veloping economies and the greater availability of data in the former,
trade is usually modeled in somewhat different fashions for the two
groups. In industrial countries, trade equations based on the Mundell-
Fleming production structure, the subject of the first part of this section,
are usually used. In developing countries, in contrast, a trade-elastici-
ties approach based on a three-good production structure, the subject of
the last part of this section, is often employed.
The Mundell-Fleming Framework-Industrial
Countries
The general analytical framework used in the trade-equations method-
ology in industrial countries usually employs equations 7.1 through 7.3:
(7.1) logM =E logRER +r, logYD + f(Z,)
(7.2) logX logRER+ qx logY, +g(Zx)
(7.3) ARB = AX - AM
where M and X are the quantities of imports and exports, YD and Y, are
ESTIMATING THE EQUILIBRIUM RER EMPIRICALLY 315
domestic and foreign real income, Zm arid Zx are vectors of whatever
predetermined or exogenous variables (for example, lagged values of
the RER, the terms of trade, commercial policy) are relevant in a particu-
lar case, and the resource balance (RB) is expressed in real terms. The
two trade equations are usually estimated econometrically to obtain
values for eM and Ex, the price elasticities of import and export demand,
and for T, and rx, the income elasticities of import and export demand.
To solve the above system of three equations, domestic and foreign
income are determined exogenously by setting them at full employment
or some other desired level. The change in the resource balance is also
set exogenously as the difference between the target and the adjusted
resource balances, which are determined separately in tasks (b) and (c).
One is thus left with three variables-M, X, and RER-to be determined
endogenously; and the three equations are solved for these.
A number of general points about the application of the trade-equa-
tions approach to industrial economies are worth noting. First, the ana-
lytical framework used for industrial countries is usually based on the
Mundell-Fleming production structure. In this framework, complete spe-
cialization of both the domestic and foreign economies in producing
one composite good (their own GDPs) makes export supply functions
perfectly elastic, while the domestic and foreign goods are taken to be
imperfect substitutes in demand. Export and import quantities are thus
demand-determined. The RER exerts its effect on the trade balance
through the price elasticities of domestic demand for imports and of
foreign demand for exports. Second, since industrial-country trade mod-
els focus primarily on competitiveness in the domestic and foreign mar-
kets for differentiated traded goods, the traded-goods version of the ex-
ternal RER (computed using relative wholesale prices or unit labor costs
in the traded-goods sector) is commonly used in equations 7.2 and 7.3.
Third, the estimated equilibrium exchange rates for large industrial coun-
tries like the G-7 that account for large shares of world trade need to be
mutually consistent since one country's economy can have important
income and relative price effects on the others', a fact that considerably
complicates the estimation of equilibrium exchange rates for large in-
dustrial economies. Fourth, if the RER is quite volatile and subject to
large random fluctuations, these could be reflected either in similar vola-
tility in the resource balance or in significant statistical noise in the em-
pirical relationship between the RER and the resource balance, either of
which could complicate empirical analysis and policy making.'
9. See Knight and Scacciavillani (1998).
316 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
Both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Institute for In-
ternational Economics (IIE) employ the trade-equations approach for
estimating equilibrium exchange rates for the G-7 countries. Major pa-
pers by Wren-Lewis and Driver (1998) for the IE and Isard and Faruqee
(1998) for the IMF documenting their approaches have been published
within the last year. Since both of these papers have already been re-
viewed in the survey of empirical research in Chapter 5, they are not
discussed further here. The reader is referred, instead, to the previous
survey for a review of the papers and to the papers themselves for de-
tailed presentations of industrial-country applications of the trade-equa-
tions methodology.
The Three-Good Framework-Developing Countries
The General Analytical Framework
An alternative analytical framework is usually adopted for small devel-
oping countries whose production structures are less flexible and whose
exports are dominated by undifferentiated primary products. For these
countries, imports could still reasonably be modeled by equation 7.1, in
which the demand for imports depends upon the domestic price and
income elasticities of demand. However, equation 7.2 for exports is more
problematic in a developing-country context. For a small open develop-
ing economy that accounts for a tiny fraction of world trade, it is more
appropriate to consider export demand as being infinitely price-elastic
and to drop foreign income from the export equation but to allow for a
finite elasticity of export supply.0 Then the quantity of exports is deter-
mined by the elasticity of export supply. Hence, export supply elasticities
are conventionally employed in modeling developing countries rather
than export demand elasticities used in equation 7.2.
For example, Wren-Lewis and Driver (1998) follow the Mundell-
Fleming tradition of modeling trade in industrial countries in terms of
differentiated products that are imperfect substitutes. They estimate price
elasticities of demand for exports ranging from -0.23 for Canada to
-1.36 for Japan, with a median of -0.96. In contrast, the empirical evi-
dence on RERs and trade flows in developing countries cited by Ghei
and Pritchett in Chapter 11 suggests that the standard assumption of an
infinite price elasticity of demand for developing-country exports is rea-
sonable. Conversely, Wren-Lewis and Driver assume an infinite price
elasticity of export supply for the G-7 countries rather than supply
10. Conceptually, this approach also implies supposing that the home coun-
try produces at least one other type of good besides the exportable good and,
hence, requires adopting a three-good framework.
ESTIMATING THE EQUILIBRIUM RER EMPIRICALLY 317
elasticities in the 1.0-2.0 range suggested for developing countries by
Ghei and Pritchett.
The differences in approach to modeling trade in industrial and de-
veloping economies also lead to differences in view about the relevance
of the Marshall-Lerner condition. This condition for a real depreciation
to improve the resource balance measured in domestic currency terms,
starting from a zero balance, requires that the sum of the absolute val-
ues of the price elasticities of demand for imports and exports exceed
unity.n The Marshall-Lerner condition is satisfied for industrial coun-
tries by the average values of the price elasticities of demand for im-
ports (-0.9) from Ghei and Pritchett and of the demand for exports
(-1.0) from Wren-Lewis and Driver (1998). Although the Marshall-Lemer
condition would also be satisfied by the representative values of de-
mand elasticities for developing countries, it is not directly applicable
to them for two reasons. First, the condition assumes an infinite price
elasticity of export supply, whereas the empirical evidence suggests a
supply elasticity of 1.0 to 2.0 for developing countries. Second, many
developing countries are capital importers and start from a resource
deficit rather than from the balanced position assumed in deriving the
simplest version of the Marshall-Lerner condition.
Because trade models of developing countries focus on domestic re-
source allocation incentives, the internal RER rather than the external
RER for traded goods is usually the appropriate RER measure for them.
The use of the internal RER also has the advantage that the effects of
changes in some fundamentals on the equilibrium RER that are difficult
to handle in the Mundell-Fleming framework can easily be handled in a
three-good framework with importables, exportables, and domestic
goods. Because of its assumed production structure, the Mundell-
Fleming framework cannot distinguish between the terms of trade and
the RER. Thus, it cannot be used to analyze the impact of changes in the
terms of trade and commercial policy whereas these can be readily in-
corporated in a three-good framework.
Finally, for analyzing small economies it is not necessary to deter-
mine a set of mutually consistent multicountry RERs as is done in mod-
eling the G-7 economies. Rather, a simpler partial-equilibrium approach
that ignores the impact of a developing country's RER and trade flows
on the rest of the world can be used. Because of the relative ease with
which it can be implemented and the availability of estimated elastici-
ties from the large amount of empirical work on trade reviewed in
11. The resource balance measured in foreign-currency terms will almost al-
ways improve for reasons explained in footnote 40 in Chapter 11 on trade flows
and the RER.
318 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
Chapter 11, the trade-elasticities approach has been widely used in op-
erational applications in developing countries. This chapter and the sub-
sequent one on the DLR model give two examples of trade-elasticity
methodologies. Both chapters utilize three-good frameworks with ex-
ports, imports, and domestic goods and constant-elasticities assump-
tions. In this chapter, the relationship between the three goods is in terms
of constant price elasticities of the supply of exports and of the demand
for imports. The DLR model also assumes constant elasticities-but in
this case they are elasticities of transformation in production between
exports and domestic goods and of substitution in consumption between
imports and domestic goods.12
A Specific Three-Good Methodology
The remainder of this section presents a specific trade-elasticities meth-
odology that is suitable for use in low-income countries in which only
limited data are available. The relationship between the resource bal-
ance, trade elasticities, and the internal RER is set in an explicit three-
good framework. This formulation allows for different RERs for imports
and exports and facilitates the analysis of the relative price effects of
changes in the terms of trade and commercial policy.3 Essentially, the
approach involves using the definitions of the price elasticities of de-
mand for imports and the supply of exports to replace the trade equa-
tions 7.1 and 7.2 above for imports and exports." The procedure for cal-
culating the equilibrium RER is otherwise the same as that set out above
for the trade-equations approach.
Appendix A gives the detailed derivation of the basic RER, trade-
elasticities, resource balance equation in a three-good framework. As shown
there, the RER for imports (RERM) may be expressed as in equation 7.4:
(AITT
(7.4) ARERM A ITT
RERM x- X-e 1). These properties
can readily be revealed using standard tests for the presence of a unit
root.20 The appropriate unit-root tests are well known; in our applica-
tions we use the Dickey-Fuller (DF), augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF),
and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests. Although there are concerns about the
low power of these tests against stationary but persistent alternatives,
the ADF test appears to perform satisfactorily on this score even when
(as in our case) the number of observations is small (Hamilton 1994). We
also supplement the unit-root tests with variance ratio tests (Cochrane
1988); these tests exploit the fact that the variances of conditional fore-
casts explode for nonstationary series and converge for stationary series
as the forecast horizon grows.
20. Hamilton (1994) emphasizes the difficulty of distinguishing truly
nonstationary processes from processes that are stationary but persistent. The
problem is that the finite-sample autocovariances of any nonstationary series
can be reproduced arbitrarily closely by those of a suitably persistent stationary
series. The usual tradeoff between consistency and efficiency is therefore present
even at this preliminary stage. If we correctly characterize the order of integra-
tion, we gain efficiency in estimation and inference by applying the appropriate
estimation technique; but a misclassification typically means that these techniques
will deliver inconsistent estimates or standard errors. Unfortunately the alterna-
tives are non-nested and we see no generally robust way of proceeding in mar-
ginal cases. Hamilton (p. 447) suggests comparing estimates obtained under al-
ternative classifications; if they differ widely the investigator may sometimes
see ancillary statistical or other grounds for preferring one over the other.
428 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
Table 10.1 Stationarity Statistics-Levels without and with Time Trend
C6te d'Ivoire Burkina Faso
DF ADF PP DF ADF PP
Levels without Time Trend
log(REER) -0.59 -1.26 -1.89 -2.25 -4.25 -2.25
log(TOT) -1.42 -1.54 -1.78 -1.95 -1.82 -1.87
RESGDP -2.11 -2.57 -2.25 -3.84 -2.22 -4.07
log(OPEN1) -1.06 -1.39 -1.42 -4.02 -3.04 -4.30
log(OPEN2) -2.35 -1.99 -2.48 -3.23 -3.02 -3.35
log(OPEN3) -2.52 -2.16 -2.69 -3.63 -2.99 -3.82
log(HBS3) n.a. n.a. n.a. -1.21 -2.05 -1.67
log(ISHARE) -1.01 -0.78 -0.68 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Levels with Time Trend
log(REER) -1.83 -2.46 -2.09 -4.89 -2.76 -5.35
log(TOT) -1.51 -1.56 -1.69 -2.30 -2.08 -2.34
RESGDP -2.05 -2.50 -2.24 -4.27 -2.69 -4.64
log(OPEN1) -1.02 -1.32 -1.29 -3.84 -2.94 -4.20
log(OPEN2) -2.81 -2.30 -3.02 -3.12 -2.95 -3.31
log(OPEN3) -2.47 -1.99 -2.72 -3.47 -2.91 -3.75
log(HBS3) n.a. n.a. n.a. -3.65 -3.75 -3.68
log(ISHARE) -2.42 -2.19 -2.42 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Note: DF, ADF, and PP refer to Dickey-Fuller, augmented Dickey-Fuller, and Phillips-Per-
ron stationaritv statistics. The number of observations is 29 for C6te d'Ivoire and 24 for
Burkina Faso. The variables are defined in appendix B (ISHARE is not available for Burkina
Faso).
Source: Computed from data from sources listed in appendix B.
Table 10.1 shows the results of unit-root tests for all stochastic vari-
ables. C6te d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso represent two extremes. For C6te
d'Ivoire, all three tests indicate nonstationarity for all variables. More-
over, we can reject the unit-root hypothesis for the first difference of the
variables (not reported), so we conclude that these are I(1) variables. For
Burkina Faso, all variables appear to be trend-stationary, with the pos-
sible exception of the terms of trade, which is bordering on
nonstationarity. Figures 10.3 and 10.4 provide some additional informa-
tion in the form of variance ratio tests.2" These tests corroborate the unit-root
21. This ratio is defined as (1/k)Var (X,- X,_)/Var (X, - X,_), where X, is the
variable of interest and k is the lag length (Cochrane, 1988).
SINGLE-EQUATION ESTIMATION OF THE LRER 429
Figure 10.3 Variance Ratio Tests for CMte D'Ivoire
log(TOT) RESGDP
1.80 1.80
1.50 150
Z
q 1.20 1.20
0.90 0.90
0.90
0.60 0.60
0.30 0.30
0.00 i ii i i I 0.00 I I~ 1 I
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 1 3 5 7 9 11213115
loglOPENI) log(REER)
2.10 1.80
0 00
1.50 L
1.20
S0.90
0.90
S0.60
0.60
0.30 0.30
~~0.00 il 1 1 1 1 1 00
1 3 5 7 9 1113 15 123456 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
log(REER)
1.80
1.50
Zj 1.20
S0.90
r 0.60
0.30
0.00 I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11121314 15
Source: Computed from data from sources listed in appendix B.
tests, and for Burkina Faso's terms of trade the variance ratios decline at
longer horizons, consistent with a persistent but stationary variable. We
therefore proceed under the assumption that the terms of trade are sta-
tionary. In principle, of course, the vector [ln e,Fj, sj']' may contain an
arbitrary combination of 1(0) and I(1)-or even 1(2)-variables. We focus
our exposition, however, on the two cases represented by our examples.,
22. Methods have recently been developed that allow consistent estimation
and inference in regressions that involve mixtures of integrated processes. See
Phillips (1995) and Phillips and Chang (1995).
430 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
Figure 10.4 Variance Ratio Tests for Burkina Faso
log(TOT) RESGDP
1.80 1.80
150 1.50
1.20 - 120
0.90 0.90
0.30 0.30
0.00 0.00
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 1 3 3 7 9 11 13 15
log(OPEN1) log(REER)
1.80 1.80
11.80
II0 1.50
1.2 1.20
0.90 00.90
.0 60
0.30 0.30
0.00 1L iii 0.00
1 3 5 7 9 1 1 3 15 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15
log(HBS3)
1.80
1.50
S1.20
S0.90
S060
3T 5 7 9 11 13 15
Source: Computed from data from sources listed in appendix B.
The 1(1) Case
When the variables are all I(1), as for Cte d'Ivoire, stationarity of the
residual 1 case is the "struc-
tural error correction model" of Boswijk (1995; discussed in Ericsson 1995), which
is obtained by premultiplying equation 10.14 by a square matrix and then im-
posing a set of restrictions.
432 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
Determining the Cointegrating Rank
The cointegrating rank is a property of the full system, and a system
estimator is required to test for it. Table 10.2 reports the results of
Johansen's likelihood ratio tests for the cointegrating rank in COte
d'Ivoire. We use a lag length of one for the underlying VAR system; this
is very restrictive even for annual data, but longer lag length leaves us
with very few degrees of freedom. The null hypothesis for these tests is
that the number of cointegrating vectors relating the n nonstationary
variables is less than or equal to r (where r < n). Comparing the esti-
mated likelihood ratios in column 2 to the asymptotic critical values in
column 3, we see (row 1) that the hypothesis of no cointegration (r = 0)
can be rejected in favor of at most one cointegrating vector. In row 2, the
hypothesis of one vector cannot be rejected in favor of more than one.
The asymptotic tests therefore indicate one cointegrating vector.
Likelihood ratio tests of cointegration are known to be sensitive to
small-sample bias, tending to reject low values of r too often. In col-
umns 3 and 5 we show a set of critical values that adjust for small-sample
bias using a method suggested by Cheung and Lai (1993). Using these
critical values it is difficult to distinguish between zero and one
Table 10.2 Johansen's Maximum Likelihood Test of Cointegration
Rank for C6te d'Ivoire
10 Percent Critical Value 5 Percent Critical Value
L-Max Unadjusted Adjusted Unadjusted Adjusted
With the drought dummy variable
r = 0 45.01 36.35 48.34 39.43 52.44
r 1 30.05 30.84 41.02 33.32 44.31
Without the drought dummy variable
r = 0 32.65 30.84 39.17 33.32 42.32
r < 1 18.63 24.78 31.47 27.14 34.47
Note: The first row (r = 0) tests the null hypothesis of no cointegration; the second (r 1)
tests the null of at most one cointegration vector. The first column (L-Max) gives the esti-
mated Johansen likelihood value in each case. The second and fourth columns give the 10
percent and 5 percent critical values taken from Osterwald-Lenum (1992, table 1.1). The
third and fifth columns give the small-sample-adjusted critical values. The adjustment fac-
tor is calculated as T/(T-nk), where T is the number of observations (28), n is the number of
variables including the intercept (6) and drought dummy variable where included, and k is
the number of lags (1). When the dummy is included (upper panel), the adjustment factor
is 1.33; when it is excluded, this becomes 1.27. See Cheung and Lai (1993) for discussion of
the adjustment factor.
Source: Computed from data from sources listed in appendix B.
SINGLE-EQUATION ESTIMATION OF THE LRER 433
cointegrating vector. We will proceed under the assumption that there
is one vector, although we are marginally unable to reject the hypoth-
esis of zero at the 10 percent level using the adjusted critical values.25
Alternative Estimators
There are a number of potential approaches to estimating the
cointegrating parameters. The simplest and earliest is the Engle-Granger
(1987) "two-step" method, which applies OLS to a static regression re-
lating the levels of the real exchange rate and its fundamentals (equa-
tion 10.10). Cointegration implies that the residuals from this regression
are stationary, and this restriction provides a test for cointegration. Be-
cause of the dominance of the common stochastic trend, the estimates of
P from the static regression are super-consistent, approaching the true
parameters at a rate proportional to the sample size rather than the square
root of the sample size; and they remain so even in the absence of weak
exogeneity. In the second step, lagged residuals from the static regres-
sion are used in place of the equilibrium errors on the right-hand side of
a reduced-form error-correction equation Again OLS provides consis-
tent estimates, this time of the adjustment speed a and short-run pa-
rameters of the error-correction specification.26
While the Engle-Granger method is extremely simple to implement,
the estimates of the cointegrating vector are biased in small samples.
The degree of bias depends on the degree of persistence in the residual,
suggesting that superior estimates might be obtained by accounting for
the short-run dynamics (Banerjee and others 1993). We therefore also
report OLS estimates of 0 taken directly from the error-correction speci-
fication (equation 10.9). These control for the short-run dynamics-which
may be of interest themselves-and, like the static regression estimates,
25. We include the drought variable in the long-run relationship, on the
grounds that it picks up a supply shock that is highly asymmetric between traded
and nontraded goods. Unfortunately, the critical values of Dickey-Fuller tests
and the majority of the tests used in the Johansen procedure are sensitive to the
exact specification of deterministic variables in the cointegrating relationship.
We do not attempt the Monte Carlo simulations that would be required to estab-
lish critical values for our case.
26. Engle and Granger (1987) demonstrated an equivalence between
cointegration and error correction for nonstationary variables. In the
nonstationary case, therefore, equation 10.10, which implies cointegration, also
implies that the real exchange rate has a reduced-form error-correction repre-
sentation-that is, one that is similar to equaton 10.11 but with contemporane-
ous values of the fundamentals excluded. It is this reduced-form error-correc-
tion equation that is estimated in the second step of the Engle-Granger method.
434 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
remain consistent even with a failure of weak exogeneity.27 Moreover, in
line with our earlier discussion, a second and potentially decisive ad-
vantage emerges under weak exogeneity: estimates of I taken from the
conditional error-correction model are equivalent to full-information
maximum-likelihood estimates. They are therefore asymptotically effi-
cient, and the t-ratios generated by OLS are asymptotically normal,
allowing standard inference. This is in contrast to the static regres-
sion case, where the t-ratios have nonstandard distributions even
asymptotically.
A third natural alternative is the Johansen (1988) procedure, which is
a systems approach based on estimation of the full VAR in equation
10.13. The "curse of dimensionality" is a serious limitation here, how-
ever. Monte Carlo evidence suggests that the Johansen procedure dete-
riorates dramatically in small samples, generating estimates with "fat
tails" (in other words, frequent outliers) and sometimes substantial mean
bias. Moreover, the procedure is less robust than the single-equation
alternatives to mis-specification of system parameters such as lag length
and to practical features such as serial correlation in the equilibrium
error (Hargreaves 1994). Because of these small-sample problems, we
limit our use of the Johansen procedure to determination of the number
of cointegration vectors and investigation of weak exogeneity, both of
which are features of the entire system of equations 10.13. For estima-
tion purposes we restrict attention to the single-equation methods.
The 1(0) Case
In the case of Burkina Faso, we find that all variables are stationary in
levels. We pointed out above that in this case, the long-run "equilib-
rium" value of In e,, like that of any stationary variable, is simply its
mean. A consistent and efficient estimator of the equilibrium real ex-
change rate is therefore the sample mean, corrected for any determinis-
tic trend. This implies that the long-run parameters need not be esti-
mated for the purpose of tying down the long-run equilibrium. If the
fundamentals are super-exogenous with respect to these parameters,
however, a structural shift in the marginal process generating the fun-
damentals (for example, a shift in the mean of F,) will produce a corre-
sponding change in the mean of In e,, with the slope of the effect given
by the associated long-run parameter. Moreover, the long-run param-
eters and the short-run dynamics may be of theoretical interest even in
27. A failure of weak exogeneity, however, means small-sample bias and in-
valid inference regarding the long-run parameters. Recall also that the condi-
tions for weak exogeneity with respect to short-run parameters are stronger.
SINGLE-EQUATION ESTIMATION OF THE LRER 435
the absence of super-exogeneity; and the investigator may have a prac-
tical interest in generating short-to-medium-term conditional forecasts
of the real exchange rate. For all of these reasons, we proceed with esti-
mation in the stationary case, even though it is not strictly necessary for
assessment of the long-run equilibrium.
The theory of specification and estimation in the stationary case is
well developed and we will not review it here; see Hendry 1995. What
is clear is that the existence of a long-run relationship no longer exerts
the kind of statistical leverage that it does when the variables are indi-
vidually nonstationary. This is apparent in equation 10.10 since all the
dynamics have been pushed into the residual co, which is therefore likely
to be correlated with the right-hand side variables. OLS estimates of the
static regression are therefore inconsistent in the 1(0) case, even though
(as emphasized above) they are super-consistent when the variables are
nonstationary and cointegrated.n The error-correction model addresses
this problem to some degree by incorporating dynamics; but the con-
temporaneous values of the fundamentals still raise issues of
predeterminedness. Lacking identifying information on equation 10.11,
one way to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters in that equa-
tion is to use higher lags of the fundamentals as instruments.29
Empirical Results
Tables 10.3 and 10.4 contain estimation results for C6te d'Lvoire while
table 10.5 contains results for Burkina Faso. For C6te d'Ivoire, table 10.3
shows long-run parameters obtained from OLS regressions in levels (the
first step of the Engle-Granger two-step method), using three alternative
28. The standard sufficient condition for consistency of OLS in the stationary
case is that the right-hand side variables are predetermined-that is, that the re-
sidual is uncorrelated with contemporaneous and lagged right-hand side vari-
ables. In equation 10.10 the condition is Cov(o F, t k) = 0 for k > 0 and for each of
the fundamentals F. In the stationary case, predeterminedness corresponds closely
(but not exactly) to weak exogeneity (Engle, Hendry, and Richard 1983); Monfort
and Rabemanajara 1990).
29. The lack of a clear statistical distinction between the individual and joint
variation of the variables carries over to the conditions for weak exogeneity, which
now make no general distinction between the short- and long-run parameters. A
sufficient condition in the present limited information context (that is, in which
identifying restrictions on the marginal model are not available) is that equation
10.11 and the marginal model form a block-recursive system (which guarantees
predeterminedness and obviates the need for instrumental variables). We do not
formally test for weak exogeneity in the 1(0) case (Burkina Faso), treating it
instead as a maintained hypothesis where necessary (see Monfort and
Rabemanajara 1990).
436 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
Table 10.3 Long-Run Parameter Estimates for CMte d'Ivoire Using
Alternative Proxies for Openness
OPENI OPEN2 OPEN3
Constant -3.61 -4.29 -4.30
(-16.71) (-22.01) (-12.22)
log(TOT) -0.04 -0.16 -0.15
(-3.03) (-1.06) (-0.94)
RESGDP 2.67 1.47 1.45
(5.49) (3.25) (3.71)
log(OPEN) 0.78 0.08 0.03
(3.68) (0.34) (0.12)
log(ISHARE) 0.27 0.31 0.30
(5.83) (4.63) (5.15)
D8384 0.22 0.30 0.30
(3.01) (3.43) (3.49)
Adjusted R2 0.72 0.56 0.56
Q 14.32 13.80 14.21
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
DW 1.16 1.14 1.15
DF -3.55 -3.31 -3.31
ADF -3.54 -3.84 -3.89
PP -3.61 -3.30 -3.29
Note: The numbers in parentheses are t-ratios (note that these have nonstandard distribu-
tions even asymptotically). The period of estimation is 1965-93. The three regressions use
the alternative openness variables discussed in appendix B. The dependent variable is log
(REER).
Source: Computed from data from sources listed in appendix B.
versions of the openness variable. There is strong evidence of
cointegration in each case, as indicated by the unit-root tests applied to
the estimated residuals: in each case the calculated values reject
nonstationarity in favor of stationarity at standard levels.0 Since the
OPENI results are generally strongest, we use this variable in what fol-
lows. Except where otherwise noted, in the following discussion we fo-
cus on columns 1 and 3 of table 10.4 for C6te d'Ivoire and column 3 of
table 10.5 for Burkina Faso. For C6te d'Ivoire, the selected columns
30. Note that the critical values for this test are more demanding than when
testing for a unit root in a single variable, since the OLS estimation tends to
induce stationarity in the residual.
SINGLE-EQUATION ESTIMATION OF THE LRER 437
Table 10.4 ECM Parameter Estimates for C6te d'Ivoire
Two-Step ECM Unrestricted ECM
OLS IV OLS IV
Constant 5.60 5.69 5.54 5.53
(25.99) (25.28) (15.02) (9.13)
Adjustment Speed
log(REER,_) or Errort_1 -0.34 -0.39 -0.45 -0.37
(-2.05) (-2.09) (-2.32) (-1.63)
Long-Run Parameters
log(TOTt_) -040 -0.50 -0.54 -0.75
(-3.03) (-3.24) (-2.83) (-2.21)
RESGDPt-, 2.67 2.81 2.60 1.53
(5.49) (5.58) (3.04) (1.04)
log(OPEN 1) 0.78 0.81 0.64 0.46
(3.68) (3.69) (1.87) (0.82)
log(ISHAREt_,) 0.27 0.30 0.33 0.43
(5.83) (5.38) (4.97) (3.56)
D8384_, 0.22 0.23 0.31 0.44
(3.01) (3.07) (3.03) (2.51)
Short-Run Parameters
Alog(TOT) -0.38 -0.43 -0.37 -0.33
(-2.86) (-2..97) (-1.78) (-1.44)
ARESGDP, 1.47 1.86 0.95 0.76
(3.29) (3.72) (1.27) (0.90)
Alog(OPENt) 0.38 0.49 0.29 0.28
(1.99) (2.59) (0.95) (0.87)
Alog(ISHARE) 0.10 0.10 0.18 0.11
(1.72) (1.40) (2.37) (0.96)
Alog(PFOR) 0.30 0.14 0.21 0.14
(2.39) (1.06) (0.97) (0.58)
AD8384 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.04
(1.04) (-1.01) (0.97) (0.43)
Adjusted R2 0.49 0.55 0.42 0.36
Q 14.32 7.21 7.16 4.68
(0.30) (0.31) (0.59) (0.05)
DW 1.11 1.14 2.22 2.15
Note: The numbers in parentheses are t-ratios. The period of estimation is 1965-93. In col-
umns 3 and 4, the long-run parameters and associated standard errors are obtained by
estimating the Bewley transform of the ECM. In columns 1 and 2, we use the lagged re-
sidual from the static regression as the error-correction term. Columns 2 and 4 are instru-
mental variable estimates, using two lags of all right-side variables as instruments for ISHARE.
The dependent variable is log(REER).
Source: Computed from data from sources listed in appendix B.
438 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
correspond to the two-step Engle-Granger method and an unrestricted
ECM. For Burkina Faso, where the sample is shorter and long-run coef-
ficients are estimated imprecisely in the unrestricted ECM, we focus
mainly on a parsimonious parameterization (column 3) obtained by
eliminating short-run variables with statistically insignificant coefficients
from the unrestricted ECM. Except when using the Engle-Granger
method, long-run parameters and associated standard errors were ob-
tained by estimating by OLS the appropriate transform of the ECM.31
Long-Run Parameters and Adjustment Speed
For both countries, the estimated long-run parameters strongly corrobo-
rate the theoretical model. We begin with the estimated coefficients on
the resource balance to GDP ratio (RESGDP), which are positive as ex-
pected for both countries, suggesting that an increase in net capital in-
flows (inducing a decrease in the resource balance) raises domestic ab-
sorption and shifts the composition of potential output toward nontraded
goods. The implied elasticities of the real exchange rate with respect to
the resource balance (0.26 for C6te d'Ivoire and 1.02 for Burkina Faso)
are comparable in magnitude to those obtained in Elbadawi and Soto
(1995) for Cte d'Ivoire and Mali.
The effects of shocks to the terms of trade (TOT), as pointed out in the
first main section of this chapter (on modeling the equilibrium exchange
rate), are theoretically ambiguous. However, consistent with the bulk of
the empirical literature (for example, Edwards (1989), Elbadawi and Soto
1995), we find that an improvement in the terms of trade appreciates the
real exchange rate, suggesting that the spending effects of this variable
dominate substitution effects. The estimated elasticities are plausible in
light of the existing literature. Perhaps most strikingly, the magnitude
of the estimated effect is very similar in the two countries despite their
differences in economic structure. A 10 percent improvement in the terms
of trade appreciates the real exchange rate by 4 percent in Cbte d'lvoire
and 3 percent in Burkina Faso.
In both countries the estimated coefficient on the openness variable
is positive, supporting the notion that trade-liberalizing reforms depre-
ciate the equilibrium real exchange rate. The size of the elasticity differs,
31. For example, we obtain the long-run parameter estimates and their stan-
dard errors by applying instrumental variables to the Bewley transform of the
ADL representation, using the ADL variables as instruments. This gives numeri-
cally equivalent results to applying OLS to the ADL, but with the advantage that
the long-run parameters and associated standard errors can be read directly from
the estimated equation. See Banerjee and others (1993), pp. 55-64.
SINGLE-EQUATION ESTIMATION OF THE LRER 439
Table 10.5 ECM Parameter Estimates for Burkina Faso
1 2 3
Constant 8.94 7.01 6.12
(2.96) (2.80) (3.43)
Adjustment Speed
log(REER,-1) -0.94 -0.70 -0.76
(-2.83) (-2.77) (-3.89)
Long-Run Parameters
log(TOT,,) -0.10 -0.50 -0.30
(-0.29) (-2.02) (-2.27)
log(OPEN,_) -0.17 0.18 0.22
(-0.45) (0.62) (1.13)
RESGDP, 2.28 4.06 3.89
(1.34) (3.53) (4.48)
log(HBS3,_) -1.27 -0.96 -0.72
(-3.22) (-2.84) (-3.48)
log(PFOR,-) 0.14 n.a. n.a.
(0.99)
Short-Run Parameters
Alog(TOT) 0.28 0.03 n.a.
(0.97) (1.16)
Alog(OPEN,) -0.13 -0.02 n.a.
(-0.53) (-0.10)
ARESGDP, 1.87 2.46 2.73
(2.01) (3.20) (4.34)
Alog(HBS3,) -1.19 -0.68 n.a.
(-2.09) (-1.36)
Alog(PFOR ) 0.07 0.14 n.a.
(0.36) (0.74)
Adjusted R1 0.78 0.77 0.75
Q 7.60 9.02 7.29
(0.18) (0.11) (0.21)
DW 2.34 2.83 1.99
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios. The period of estimation is 1970-93. The first
column (unrestricted ECM) corresponds to equation 10.11 in the text. The long-run param-
eters and associated standard errors are obtained by estimating the Bewley transform of
the ECM. The dependent variable is Alog(REER).
Source: Computed from data from sources listed in appendix B.
440 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
however: it is 0.78 for C6te d'Ivoire and 0.22 for Burkina Faso. While
these elasticities are not precisely estimated, they are consistent with
evidence obtained by M'Bet and Madeleine (1994) and Elbadawi and
Soto (1995), suggesting that the effects are stronger in the larger CFA
countries.
For C6te d'Ivoire, a 10 percent increase in the share of investment in
GDP (ISHARE) depreciates the real exchange rate by at least 2.7 per-
cent, consistent with the view that this shifts the composition of spend-
ing toward traded goods. This evidence is consistent with that of
Edwards (1989), but reveals an effect substantially lower than his esti-
mates, which are in the range of 7 percent for a group of 12 developing
countries. For Burkina Faso, the negative coefficient on HBS3 is consis-
tent with a Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect: a 10 percent increase in
domestic labor productivity compared to OECD labor productivity ap-
preciates the real exchange rate by 7.2 percent.
To test the long-run homogeneity property-that the foreign price
level, converted to CFA francs using the nominal exchange rate, does
not affect the equilibrium real exchange rate-we include the log of PFOR
in the specification and test the null hypothesis of a zero long-run coef-
ficient. We use the dynamic regression results for this test since the t-
statistics from the static regression have nonstandard distributions even
under weak exogeneity. For Burkina Faso, homogeneity cannot be re-
jected at any reasonable level of significance (table 10.5). For C6te d'Ivoire,
inclusion of the change in PFOR (or just the change in the trade-weighted
nominal exchange rate) in the ECM causes a marked deterioration in
the results. Thus, while long-run homogeneity cannot be rejected, the
remaining results are unsatisfactory.32 For the purposes of subsequent
calculations, we impose long-run homogeneity for both countries by
restricting the long-run parameter on PFOR to be zero.
Short-Run Dynamics
Tables 10.4 and 10.5 show the short-run parameters from the estimated
ECMs for C6te d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso. For C6te d'Ivoire (table 10.4)
we show two alternatives, corresponding to the second step of the Engle-
Granger procedure and the unrestricted ECM. Column 1 uses the lagged
residual from the static regression in column 1 of table 10.3, so that the
short-run parameters are estimated conditional on the cointegration
32. When Alog(PFOR) is included in the regression, it soaks up much of the
explanatory power of other variables. The remaining coefficients, including the
long-run coefficient on LPFOR, are estimated imprecisely and often with the
"wrong" signs.
SINGLE-EQUATION ESTIMATION OF THE LRER 441
vector from the static regression. In column 2 we estimate the short-
run parameters jointly with the long-run parameters using the unre-
stricted ECM.
The dynamic estimates provide direct evidence on the short-run ef-
fects of nominal devaluations on the real exchange rate. We emphasized
earlier in this chapter that even under long-run homogeneity, nominal
devaluations may play an important macroeconomic role if nominal ri-
gidities prevent the price of nontraded goods from responding quickly
to shocks that alter the equilibrium real exchange rate. This role requires
that movements in the nominal exchange rate not be fully offset in the
short run by domestic inflation. Our estimates are consistent with a tran-
sitional role for the nominal exchange rate if the coefficient on Alog(PFOR)
in the error-correction representation is positive (note also that since we
are using an external real exchange rate, the upper boundary for this
coefficient is not 1 but the share of traded goods in the domestic price
index). For C6te d'Ivoire, the point estimates in columns 1 and 3 of table
10.4 suggest that over 20 percent of a nominal devaluation passes through
to the real exchange rate over a one-year horizon. The elasticity is high-
est (at 0.3) in the Engle-Granger ECM (column 1), in which it is also
statistically significant. An elasticity of 0.3 implies that a 50 percent nomi-
nal devaluation (as implemented in 1994: note that PFOR rises by 100
percent) will depreciate the real exchange rate by 30 percent in the short
run. For Burkina Faso, the point estimates are uniformly smaller and
have large standard errors. Wage-price rigidity therefore appears to give
some role to the nominal exchange rate in macroeconomic adjustment
in C6te d'Ivoire, but there is little evidence here of such a role for
Burkina Faso.
Turning to the fundamentals, for C6te d'Ivoire we find short-run ef-
fects that are generally appreciable in size, statistically significant, and
in the same direction as the long-run effects. For Burkina Faso, the short-
run impact effects are substantially less than the size of their correspond-
ing long-run coefficients, and in most cases are statistically insignificant.
A crucial parameter in the estimation of these short-run dynamic
models is the coefficient of the error-correction term, which measures
the speed of adjustment of the real exchange rate to its equilibrium level.
The adjustment speeds estimated for C6te d'Lvoire in table 10.4 are lower
(at -0.30 and -0.45, respectively, in the two-step and unrestricted ECM)
than the corresponding estimate for Burkina Faso in table 10.5 (at -0.76).
33. Note that this is not the same as the error-correction representation re-
ferred to in the Granger Representation Theorem (Engle and Granger, 1987). The
latter is a reduced-form equation that omits contemporaneous changes of the
fundamentals.
442 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
The adjustment speed for C6te d'Ivoire is somewhat higher than that
obtained for C6te d'Ivoire by Elbadawi and Soto (1995) using a similar
framework. From these estimates the number of years required to elimi-
nate a given misalignment can be derived.- For example, eliminating
95 percent of a shock to the real exchange rate would take slightly more
than three years in Burkina Faso and could take as long as eight years in
C6te d'Ivoire. Elbadawi and Soto (1995) find a similar difference in ad-
justment speed for C6te d'Tvoire and Mali. In this respect the smaller
economies in the zone appear to be more adaptive to shocks than the
larger ones. This conclusion is consistent with the widely held view that
the latter group experienced a much higher degree of overvaluation
during the 1986-94 period than the former. The results just discussed
for PFOR suggest one reason for this: adjustment may be slower in these
countries because nominal rigidities are more important. Slower adjust-
ment of wages and nontraded-goods prices is consistent with a larger
formal sector in Cte d'Ivoire than in Burkina Faso (here we would in-
clude both government and medium- to large-scale private enterprises)
and also, for any given degree of nominal rigidity, with a larger share of
nontraded goods in domestic prices. By the same token, while adjust-
ment in Burkina Faso is relatively rapid, convergence to the new equi-
librium is not immediate, suggesting the existence of some source of
real rigidity of the type alluded to in the subsection on nominal rigidi-
ties and short-run dynamics.
Adjustment speeds for both countries, however, are substantially
larger than the -0.19 figure obtained by Edwards (1989) using a partial
adjustment model for a group of 12 developing countries with predeter-
mined nominal exchange rates. To the degree that these adjustment
speeds can be legitimately compared, they provide some support for
the view that membership in a monetary union increases the credibility
of monetary policy, thereby producing greater flexibility of nominal wage
settlements in the private sector (Rodrik 1993).
Finally, a note on weak exogeneity for the case of C6te d'Ivoire. As
discussed earlier, weak exogeneity holds with respect to the long-run
parameters if the cointegrating vector does not enter the marginal model
for the fundamentals. Engle and Granger (1987) suggest testing for weak
exogeneity by introducing the error-correction term (the lagged residual
from the static regression) into the equations of the marginal model and
applying asymptotic t-tests to the hypothesis that the coefficients are
zero. Using this test we are not able to reject weak exogeneity of the
34. The time required to dissipate x percent of a shock is determined accord-
ing to (1-I a ) = 1 - x, where t is the number of years and a the speed of adjust-
ment parameter.
SINGLE-EQUATION ESTIMATION OF THE LRER 443
variables individually at reasonable significance levels, with the excep-
tion of ISHARE in which we reject weak exogeneity at the 5 percent
level. Rejection for ISHARE suggests problems with inference in the er-
ror-correction specification: the long-run parameter estimates remain su-
per-consistent, but standard errors are biased and inconsistent. To handle
this we re-estimate the ECM via instrumental variables, using two lagged
differences of all fundamentals as instruments for ISHARE (see columns
2 and 4 of table 10.4). Inference can proceed from the IV version of the
ECM, conditional on legitimacy of the chosen instruments.35 The results
of the IV estimation do not alter the conclusions reported above.
Step Three: Calculating the Equilibrium Real
Exchange Rate
In the subsection on the relationship of the single-equation approach to
the PPP approach we distinguished conditional forecasts and
counterfactual simulations as two alternative approaches to construct-
ing sustainable values for the fundamentals. Here we broaden the first
of these alternatives to consider various alternatives based on the time-
series behavior of the data. For policy purposes, concern often centers
about the current or prospective situation rather than the historical epi-
sodes that make up the data sample. While our discussion focuses on
within-sample estimates or simulations, the considerations outlined
below apply equally to the construction of projected sustainable values
for the fundamentals.
Sustainable Fundamentals: Time-Series-Based
Estimates
When the fundamentals are stationary, their movements are inherently
temporary and the conditional long-run forecast is simply the sample
mean (as corrected for any deterministic trend). At the other extreme all
movements in the fundamentals are permanent. In this case, the funda-
mentals are individually random walks and the equilibrium real ex-
change rate in period r is simply P'F,.
In practice, the fundamentals are likely to include both transitory and
permanent components. This is dear for nonstationary fundamentals, in which
the permanent component corresponds to the underlying stochastic trend.
35. Although these results are encouraging, weak exogeneity may be a more
serious problem than is indicated by our variable-by-variable tests. Using
Johansen's system-based chi-squared test, we strongly reject joint weak exogeneity
for the fundamentals taken together.
444 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
The Beveridge-Nelson (B-N) method, which we use below in the C6te
d'Jvoire case, assumes that the fundamentals each follow a univariate
ARIMA(p,1,q) process, with the autoregressive and moving average parts
generating stationary fluctuations about an underlying random walk
(Beveridge and Nelson 1981). Movements generated by the unit-root
part are permanent and are extracted to construct F,1, the permanent com-
ponent of F. The equilibrium rate is then given by #'FtP, where p is the
vector of estimated long-run parameters. This will tend to be a some-
what smoother series than /'F, reflecting the elimination of transitory
shocks to the fundamentals.6
We will also calculate sustainable values using centered moving av-
erages of the fundamentals in both the stationary and nonstationary
cases. This approach can be defended by appealing to the judgmental
nature of the decomposition exercise and noting the disadvantages im-
posed by small samples. Moving averages mechanically smooth the data,
to a greater degree the larger the number of periods used. In the
nonstationary case, even a narrow moving average typically smoothes
the individual series more substantially than a B-N decomposition and
may therefore yield results that are more appealing economically. The
B-N approach is particularly problematic in small samples, where the
results can be highly sensitive to the underlying ARIMA specification
and can often exacerbate turning points in economically implausible
ways. This problem can affect the resulting equilibrium rate even more
dramatically: if the fundamentals are all smoothed with a moving aver-
age, the resulting equilibrium rate is simply the corresponding moving
average of P'E. The weighted sum of permanent components, in con-
trast, can easily be substantially more variable than F itself (as in our
C6te d'Ivoire example below). Small samples also increase the possibil-
ity that stationary but persistent series are misidentified as nonstationary,
in which case the B-N decomposition presumes a permanent compo-
nent that in fact is not present.
In the stationary case, the moving average approach provides a way
of acknowledging that even stationary fundamentals may have long-
lasting movements. When a stationary variable is highly persistent, its
conditional expectation at policy-relevant horizons can easily be rela-
tively far from its unconditional mean. Using a moving average allows
the long-run equilibrium rate to move in response to the current values
36. Any set of cointegrated variables has a common trend representation; this
could be the basis of a joint decomposition of the real exchange rate and funda-
mentals into a stochastic trend component and a stationary (moving average)
component (see Banerjee and others 1993). The B-N approach approximates this
by treating the variables one by one.
SINGLE-EQUATION ESTIMATION OF THE LRER 445
of the fundamentals, even though these movements are thought ulti-
mately to be temporary.
Sustainable Fundamentals: Counterfactual Estimates
Ex ante modeling of the permanent components of the fundamentals
provides an important alternative to ex post approaches that rely on the
underlying data-generating processes of the fundamentals. There are
both positive and normative reasons for pursuing this extension. On the
positive side, small samples can make it virtually impossible, when us-
ing time-series decomposition methods or moving averages, to distin-
guish persistent but unsustainable changes in the fundamentals from
genuinely sustainable changes. The accumulation of international ar-
rears by C8te d'Ivoire starting in the early 1980s provides an example:
by this indicator, trade balances in that country appear to have been
unsustainably large for over a decade. A natural approach in such a case
is to construct a counterfactual path for the fundamental(s) in question
that is more in line with a plausible notion of sustainability. For example,
one might construct a path for the trade balance that would have kept
arrears reasonably low given "voluntary" capital inflows. The exercise
will often require a sequence of judgments; in this case, one needs a
plausible description of voluntary inflows, and one may be as interested
in the sensitivity of the estimated misalignment to changes in assump-
tions as in the overall change relative to the baseline.
The second, more normative use for counterfactual simulations is in
addressing the "what if" questions that are of central interest to
policymakers, particularly when the fundamentals include variables
potentially under policy control. Again using the C6te d'Ivoire case,
policymakers might want to know the implications for the real exchange
rate of a trade liberalization or change in government spending pat-
terns. Preserving the relative simplicity of the single-equation approach,
a natural way of handling these concerns is to construct counterfactual
simulations of desirable values for selected fundamentals. As in the posi-
tive case, the construction of "desirable" values for the fundamentals is
not a trivial exercise. Theory can often provide loose guidelines (for ex-
ample, in the proposition that the optimal tariff is zero for a small open
economy with no other distortions), but translating these into alterna-
tive values for the fundamentals will require an additional set of judg-
ments (in this case, assessing what freer trade would have meant for the
openness ratio, which is our proxy for trade policy).
As pointed out in appendix C, a potentially important side effect of
counterfactual simulations, whether the underlying motivation is posi-
tive or normative, is to break the restriction implicit in the methodology
that the average degree of misalignment be near zero within sample.
446 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
The reason is straightforward: the misalignment calculation is now done
using time paths for the fundamentals that were not used estimating
the long-run parameters. The implicit super-exogeneity assumption, as
emphasized earlier, is that the 3 vector estimated using sample infor-
mation is relevant for assessing the effect of alternative paths for
the fundamentals.
In appendix C, we construct counterfactual simulations for the re-
source balance, openness, and investment share variables for both C6te
d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso. For C6te d'Ivoire, the simulations incorpo-
rate the following judgments (using "unsustainable" and "undesirable"
to distinguish essentially positive rationales from essentially normative
ones):
* The actual resource balance was unsustainably low after 1979;
* Trade policy was undesirably restrictive, particularly after 1979;
and
* The investment to GDP ratio was undesirably low, particularly
after 1979.
For Burkina Faso, in which the investment to GDP ratio does not enter
the model, the key judgments are:
* The resource balance is determined by the volume of concessional
inflows, and drought-year levels are unsustainable; and
* Trade policy was undesirably restrictive throughout the sample.
The details of these calculations appear in appendix C.
Estimating the Degree of Misalignment
The estimated degree of misalignment, m,, is simply the percentage dif-
ference between the real exchange rate and its computed equilibrium
value, as expressed in equation 10.15:
(10.15) m, = In e, -ln e; = [ln e, - 3'F,I + '(F, - F,).
For within-sample estimates, e, is simply the actual real exchange rate.
For out-of-sample estimates, e, can be forecasted using a dynamic simu-
lation that feeds projected paths for the fundamentals through the esti-
mated short-run parameters of the model.
The degree of misalignment is decomposed mechanically in equa-
tion 10.15 into an error-correction term that captures the deviation of
the exchange rate from the "fitted" real exchange rate using long-run
parameters (the term in square brackets) and a term that captures the
SINGLE-EQUATION ESTIMATION OF THE LRER 447
deviation of the current fundamentals from sustainable values. Express-
ing m, this way brings out the role of sustainability calculations for the
fundamentals. Suppose, for example, that the long-run parameter for
the terms of trade is negative, implying that a sustained terms-of-trade
improvement appreciates the real exchange rate. If most movements in
the terms of trade are temporary, however, and households optimize
without borrowing constraints, then the short-run impact of a change in
the terms of trade should be substantially below the estimated long-run
impact (as in our theoretical model). A temporary improvement in the
terms of trade would then produce offsetting changes in the compo-
nents of m,. The second component would be large and negative, re-
flecting the temporary nature of the terms of trade boom; the first would
be large and positive, reflecting the very modest response of the actual
real exchange rate to the substantial short-run movement in F,. Misalign-
ment calculated using the actual rather than sustainable value of the
terms of trade (that is, setting F, = F) would pick up only the second of
these effects, producing the mistaken impression of a badly underval-
ued real exchange rate.
What the decomposition cannot do, of course, is identify the source
of misalignment relative to plausible values for P. As discussed earlier,
e, may differ from F,1 for reasons of real or nominal rigidities or, equiva-
lently, equilibrium or disequilibrium dynamics; or it may be pushed by
random shocks.
Empirical Results: Equilibrium Real Exchange Rates
and Misalignment
Tables 10.6 and 10.7 show alternative measures of the equilibrium real
exchange rate while figures 10.5 and 10.6 depict the observed and sus-
tainable RERs as well as the fitted (for Cbte d'Ivoire) and trend (for
Burkina Faso) real exchange rates." For C6te d'Ivoire, we use the long-
run parameters derived from the static regression in column 1 of table
10.3. For Burkina Faso, we use the long-run parameters from the unre-
stricted ECM in column 1 of table 10.5.
We report four measures of the equilibrium real exchange rate for
C6te d'Ivoire: the fitted RER, its corresponding five-year moving
37. Figures 10.5 and 10.6 could have been supplemented by confidence inter-
vals based either on the standard errors of the estimated parameters or (via
bootstrapping) on the empirical distribution of the data. Bootstrapping confi-
dence intervals, however, are in general quite wide and, given the imprecision of
our parameter estimates, are likely to be so in our case.
448 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
Figure 10.5 The RER for C6te d'Ivoire, 1965 to 1993 (1985 Actual
RER=100)
120
110
100
90
80
70
60 - Actual-- Fitted -)-Sustainable
5 0 I1 I i l l l l l i lli i i l li
1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993
Note: An upward movement is an appreciation of the RER.
Figure 10.6 The RER for Burkina Faso, 1970 to 1993 (1985 Actual
RER=100)
120
110
100 -
90
80
70
60 - - Actual ---Trend -K-+Sustainable
50 I i I l I l I l i
1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992
Note: An upward movement is an appreciation of the RER.
average, an equilibrium rate based on Beveridge-Nelson decomposi-
tions of the fundamentals, and one based on the counterfactual simula-
tions described in appendix C. For Burkina Faso, we replace the B-N
decomposition with the fitted trend for the real exchange rate; as
SINGLE-EQUATION ESTIMATION OF THE LRER 449
discussed earlier, this represents the most natural long-run forecast for
a trend-stationary variable.
Recall that when we generate long-run "forecasts" of the real exchange
rate using time-series-based estimates of the "permanent" fundamen-
tals, we require not only adequate estimates of the long-run parameters
but also a lack of Granger causality from the real exchange rate to the
fundamentals. With a lag length of one, weak and strong exogeneity
coincide and the partial tests reported earlier for C6te d'Ivoire therefore
provide some support for these calculations. As an additional check, we
tested the multivariate generalization of Granger noncausality from the
real exchange rate to the fundamentals and were unable to reject
noncausality at any reasonable levels, using a lag length of either one or
two. As argued earlier, the use of counterfactual simulations for the fun-
damentals involves an assumption that the long-run parameters are in-
variant to the interventions being constructed; we treat this as a main-
tained hypothesis.
The last columns of tables 10.6 and 10.7 show the percentage gap
between the observed and equilibrium real exchange rates, using the
counterfactual simulations for the equilibrium rate. The gap between
these two series provides a measure of real exchange rate misalignment.
The figures show a remarkable success on the part of the computed in-
dex in reproducing well-known overvaluation (and undervaluation)
episodes in the recent macroeconomic history of these countries and the
CFA zone more generally. In particular, note that C6te d'Ivoire man-
aged to reverse substantial real overvaluation by 1985-86. While some
of this was generated by contractionary macroeconomic policies that
fell heavily on investment, a substantial contribution came from the
steady depreciation of the French franc against the U.S. dollar and other
major currencies and an ultimately temporary recovery in the terms of
trade. When the French franc moved in the reverse direction following
1986, the fiscal laxity and structural rigidities that characterized the C6te
d'Ivoire economy all along were fully exposed; our calculations imply
that during the 1987-93 period the real exchange rate was overvalued
by 34 percent on average. By 1994 a set of corrective measures, includ-
ing a zone-wide 50 percent devaluation, were implemented. Using a
constant elasticity model, Devarajan (Chapter 8) finds a somewhat larger
degree of overvaluation in C6te d'Ivoire for 1993 (56 percent in domestic-
currency terms) than our estimates based on counterfactual simulations
of the fundamentals.
For Burkina Faso, in contrast, our results for 1980-93 do not indicate
any major overvaluation (last column of table 10.7 and figure 10.6). In-
deed, according to our estimates, Burkina Faso's real exchange rate was
undervalued by 1 percent on average between 1980 and 1986 and by
450 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
Table 10.6 Observed and Equilibrium RER Indexes for C6te d'Ivoire-
1980 to 1993 (1985 Observed RER=100)
Equilibrium RER
Year Observed Fitted 5-year MA B-N "Sustainable" Overvaluation
1980 72 77 85 74 108 51
1981 83 80 93 81 107 29
1982 91 85 94 86 101 10
1983 96 102 95 83 94 -3
1984 100 95 87 82 76 -24
1985 100 90 76 96 90 -10
1986 79 76 82 87 84 6
1987 67 71 85 83 98 46
1988 67 68 80 96 103 54
1989 70 67 75 54 92 32
1990 66 64 79 52 83 26
1991 66 68 76 60 91 38
1992 61 71 81 60 93 52
1993 60 65 80 64 85 41
Note: The observed RER is the one used in the econometric analysis. The long-run param-
eter vector is taken from the static regression in column 1 of table 10.3. "Fitted" values are
obtained directly from that regression; "5-year MA" refers to five-year moving averages for
all fundamentals; "B-N" refers to Beveridge-Nelson decompositions of all fundamentals;
and the "sustainable" RER is defined as the fitted RER with all fundamentals replaced by
counterfactual sustainable values, as determined in appendix C. Overvaluation is defined
as 100 - (sustainable RER - observed RER)/(observed RER).
Source: Computed from data from sources listed in appendix B.
nearly 14 percent during 1987-93.31 The estimated undervaluation may
be on the high side for the latter period. Burkina Faso is generally re-
garded, however, as having adjusted more successfully to the adverse
shocks that affected the entire zone after 1986, especially in comparison
with the larger CFA countries (Devarajan and Hinkle 1995). Substan-
tially milder overvaluation (or even undervaluation) is one measure of
this success; another is the absence in Burkina Faso of the deep reces-
38. The apparent overvaluation in 1980 was eliminated by the depreciation of
the actual REER in the early 1980s that was caused largely by the depreciation of
the French franc to which the CFA franc was linked.
39. For example Elbadawi and Soto (1995), using a similar methodology, esti-
mate that the RER in Mali was virtually in equilibrium (on average) during the
1987-94 period, while the CGE estimates of Devarajan in Chapter 8 suggest that
the RER in Burkina Faso was overvalued by about 9 percent in 1993.
SINGLE-EQUATION ESTIMATION OF THE LRER 451
Table 10.7 Observed and Equilibrium RER Indexes for Burkina Faso-
1980 to 1993 (1985 Observed RER=100)
Equilibrium RER
Year Observed Fitted Trend 5-year MA "Sustainable" Overvaluation
1980 86 100 94 101 104 17
1981 94 100 95 101 102 7
1982 93 103 95 104 98 6
1983 97 103 96 103 86 -13
1984 104 113 96 102 79 -31
1985 100 98 96 101 87 -16
1986 95 93 97 100 91 -4
1987 97 100 97 98 96 -1
1988 98 99 97 100 96 -2
1989 102 102 98 101 93 -10
1990 99 106 98 100 94 -6
1991 98 99 98 101 95 -4
1992 98 98 99 100 98 0
1993 96 99 99 99 100 -4
Note: The observed RER is the one used in the econometric analysis. The fitted RER is the
one estimated from the cointegration regression (see table 10.6). "Trend" refers to a fitted
linear trend for the RER. "5-year MA" refers to five-year moving averages. The "sustain-
able" RER is the fitted RER in which the fundamentals (RESGDP and OPEN) have been
replaced by their sustainable counterparts as outlined in appendix C. Overvaluation is de-
fined as 100-(sustainable RER - observed RER)/(observed RER).
Source: Computed from data from sources listed in appendix B.
sion experienced by Cbte d'Ivoire during the 1980s and early 1990s. Both
observations suggest a more flexible domestic wage and price structure
in the smaller of the two countries, and therefore significantly milder
nominal rigidities.
Conclusions
The decision to devalue depends fundamentally on the degree of mis-
alignment of the real exchange rate and the speed with which internal
adjustment mechanisms are likely to restore macroeconomic balance.
Measuring the degree of misalignment is difficult, however, given that
the equilibrium real exchange rate is unobservable whenever the
economy is not in internal and external balance. The standard PPP ap-
proach is to identify a period in which the economy is judged to have
been in balance, and to take the real exchange rate of that period as the
equilibrium rate for all years. But this fails to account for the effect of
changes in the fundamentals on the equilibrium real exchange rate.
452 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
Once the endogeneity of the equilibrium real exchange rate is recog-
nized, however, a second problem arises: restricting attention to plau-
sible candidates for years of macroeconomic balance, there will rarely
be enough observations to estimate the elasticities of the equilibrium
rate with respect to even a small list of fundamentals. In this chapter, we
addressed these problems by imposing the relatively mild (and testable)
restriction, drawn from standard theories of the equilibrium real ex-
change rate, that the distance between the actual and equilibrium real
exchange rates is a stationary random variable. When the variables are
I(1), this leads naturally to the use of cointegration methods for estimat-
ing the long-run relationship between the real exchange rate and its fun-
damentals. When the variables are stationary, standard procedures of
dynamic specification and estimation apply. We illustrated the method-
ology using annual data for C6te d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso.
How useful an addition is this methodology to the standard toolbox
for assessing the equilibrium real exchange rate and the degree of mis-
alignment? Our view is that this methodology belongs in the analyst's
toolkit as a clear advance over PPP and a useful complement to other
methods. There are three fundamental reasons for this.
* First and foremost, this approach provides a natural way of incor-
porating the reality that the fundamentals will sometimes move
permanently. In such a case our approach extracts maximal lever-
age from the theoretical proposition that the real exchange rate
will not stray indefinitely from a function of the fundamentals.
* Second, estimating the equilibrium real exchange rate is typically
motivated by policy concerns. The analyst may therefore be par-
ticularly interested in the relationship between the equilibrium real
exchange rate and hypothetical changes in individual fundamen-
tals. For out-of-sample exercises, interest would center on how
changes in the fundamentals would alter both the actual and the
equilibrium rates, and thereby the degree of misalignment. Under
super-exogeneity of the fundamentals, our approach delivers a set
of parameters that can be used for such policy analysis in a trans-
parent and straightforward manner.
* Third, this approach takes a partial step toward imbedding the
determination of the long-run relationship in the overall dynamic
relationship between the real exchange rate and its fundamentals.
Under weak exogeneity with respect to the short-run parameters,
fully efficient estimation and inference on these parameters can
take place conditional on the current and lagged fundamentals.
The resulting information on short-run dynamics may be of inter-
est in its own right and if Granger noncausality also holds, can be
SINGLE-EQUATION ESTIMATION OF THE LRER 453
used to generate short-term forecasts of the real exchange rate and
degree of misalignment.
From the viewpoint of dynamic specification, there are various di-
rections in which the approach advocated here might be extended. One
is to allow both 1(0) and I(1) variables in the long-run relationship. In
this case, the theory still implies cointegration among the I(1) variables,
but the Engle-Granger two-step method will produce inconsistent esti-
mates of the long-run parameters on the stationary variables. We are
therefore pushed toward allowing explicitly for the short-run dynam-
ics, whether via the error-correction model, the Johansen procedure, or
some alternative. A second extension would be allowing multiple long-
run relationships between the variables. Such a case might arise, for ex-
ample, from the existence of a reaction function relating fiscal policy to
the trade balance or the real exchange rate. Moreover, since most of our
variables are already measured in ratios (the real exchange rate, the open-
ness variable, and so on), we may already be reducing the order of inte-
gration of underlying nonstationary variables (such as the domestic price
level). The structural error-correction model of Boswijk (1995) represents
the closest counterpart to our analysis in the case of multiple
cointegrating relationships. Finally, we have chosen not to impose any
theoretical structure on the short-run dynamics. In cases where particu-
lar sources of short-run dynamics are of interest, there may be a sub-
stantial return to developing a theoretical structure to capture these dy-
namics, and imposing the resulting identifying restrictions; for an inter-
esting attempt to incorporate rigidity of domestic prices, see Kaminsky
(1987). An important challenge along these lines is that of separating
misalignments caused by price rigidities from those caused by internal
real dynamics or temporary movements in the fundamentals. Naturally,
most of these extensions will bring out a tension between maintaining
the simplicity of a single-equation approach-an important feature if
this approach is to be used "in the field"--and allowing the overall dy-
namic relationship(s) to emerge from the data.
As a final extension of the single-equation approach, we note the pos-
sible usefulness of cross-country data in tying down the long-run elas-
ticities. A version of our static regression could easily be run on a pure
cross-section or panel of countries. The obvious advantage of this ap-
proach lies in its expansion of the sample size. The resulting increase in
degrees of freedom is conditional on the validity of pooling restrictions,
but with multiple time periods some of these will be testable. The han-
dling of dynamics remains a difficult problem in panel data, however,
and in this area there is a clear tradeoff between the flexibility associ-
ated with our single-country approach and the restrictions required to
454 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
support dynamic estimation in a panel. Our theoretical model and em-
pirical results suggest that pooling restrictions are at least as likely to
fail with respect to short-run parameters and error structure as with re-
spect to the long-run parameters. Strategies such as using nonoverlap-
ping time-averaged data (for example, five-year averages) may help
minimize some of these difficulties but to our knowledge a consensus
has not yet emerged on how to handle nonstationarity in panel data.
In the field, of course, the virtue of cross-sectional or panel results is
that the long-run parameters can be "borrowed" from existing studies
without requiring new estimation. Such parameters could be combined
with data on changes in a given country's fundamentals to derive changes
in the equilibrium real exchange rate for that country and therefore
changes in the degree of misalignment. Identifying the level of misalign-
ment in any particular year would then require a "rebasing" exercise of
some sort, and in this respect the use of borrowed cross-country param-
eters is a kind of hybrid of the PPP approach and econometric approaches.
Our aim in this chapter has been to give a self-contained presenta-
tion of a methodology that we consider to be applicable at reasonably
low cost in the field. The chapter is not a cookbook, however. In the end,
the effective use of the single-equation, time-series approach requires a
balanced sense of both its virtues and its limitations and-as always in
econometric practice-some attention to the evolving state of time-se-
ries econometrics. We close by identifying three particular cautions re-
garding the use of our methodology in the policy arena.
First, the econometric approach is data intensive and inherits all the
limitations of developing-country data. Our empirical findings for Cte
d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso are broadly consistent with the empirical lit-
erature on equilibrium real exchange rates in developing countries, and
they line up well with estimates obtained by other methods. But they
are not robust. We noted above that the econometric results were quite
sensitive to the choice of proxies for the fundamentals and to the esti-
mation procedure. The choice of real exchange rate index also made a
difference empirically, and although changes in long-run elasticities are
to be expected, we found that the overall statistical performance was
highly sensitive to whether an internal or external real exchange rate
concept was employed and whether the nominal exchange rate was
adjusted for black market transactions. While such conditions define
the art of econometric practice, they may be particularly acute when the
notion of long-run equilibrium is required to carry so much weight in
short samples.
The reality of short samples brings out a second potential weakness
in this approach, even relative to the PPP approach. In effect, the single-
equation methodology assumes that the economy was in internal and
SINGLE-EQUATION ESTIMATION OF THE LRER 455
external balance on average over the sample period. This avoids the need
for a priori and possibly ad hoc claims about macroeconomic balance in
any particular year, providing instead a systematic way of bringing the
whole sample to bear in determining the path of the equilibrium rate.
But it implies that unless the analyst is prepared to undertake
counterfactual simulations for the fundamentals, the average degree of
misalignment in the sample will tend, by construction, to be small. There
will be little scope for uncovering episodes of overvaluation or under-
valuation that last more than a few years.. In the CFA zone, where the
real exchange rate was widely thought to be overvalued for most of the
period between 1978 and 1994, the implicit "balance on average" as-
sumption may be seriously misleading. The PPP approach, of course,
does not require such an assumption; the result is that the real exchange
rate can in principle be overvalued (or undervalued) in every period
other than the benchmark one. We suggested that a natural way of han-
dling this within our methodology was to construct counterfactual simu-
lations for the fundamentals. In our counterfactuals for C6te d'Ivoire,
freer trade, higher domestic investment, and smaller trade deficits all
produced a depreciation of the equilibrium rate and therefore tended to
increase the estimated degree of misalignment.
Finally, the methodology relies on concepts of equilibrium and mis-
alignment that are conditional on policies or structural features that can
reasonably be treated as predetermined, whether or not those policies
or features generate welfare losses. In this view, short-run misalignments
may well reflect market-clearing responses to shocks, and long-run
movements in the real exchange rate may well reflect highly subopti-
mal macroeconomic policy choices. For both reasons the misalignments
most readily identified using single-equation time-series methods-those
not requiring counterfactual simulations--may not be the most inter-
esting from a policy perspective. While we have seen that policy con-
tent can be imposed in the form of normative counterfactual simula-
tions for the fundamentals, the implicit assumption of super-exogeneity
places an additional burden on the data that may or may not be justified
in the sample at hand.
Appendix A
Conditioning and Weak
Exogeneity
Weak exogeneity is (potentially) a property of the joint distribution of
the real exchange rate and the fundamentals. In this appendix we intro-
duce the concept of conditional and marginal models and explore the
relationship between the single-equation model (equation 10.11) and the
full distribution of the (nxl) vector x, = [In e,, F,, sJ', conditional on its
own past (see also Ericsson 1992). With reasonable generality we can
describe this distribution as the pth-order Gaussian vector autoregression
(VAR), as expressed by equation 10.A.1:
P
(10.A.1) xt = rHjx'_' + E,, e, ~ IN(0,Y-)
where the H are (nxn) matrices of reduced-form coefficients and I is the
nxn symmetric and positive definite matrix of contemporaneous covari-
ances between the innovations Ed. Equation 10.A.1 can be written equiva-
lently as equation 10.A.2:
P
(10.A.2) Ax, = Fx,_1+ AAx, +e,
j=1
where l=[(1 = IT1) - I] and A, = - Ir,. The first row of equation
10.A.2 is a reduced-form error-correction model for Aln e,; it is similar to
equation 10.11 but excludes contemporaneous values of F and s. To ob-
tain the distribution of Aln e, conditional on lagged x, and contempora-
neous F and s, we first partition the vector x, into x, = [In e,, w[', where
w, = [F,', z,]' is the vector of macroeconomic determinants of the real
exchange rate. Without loss of generality, we can then factorize the
joint distribution represented by equation 10.A.2 into the distribution
456
SINGLE-EQUATION ESTIMATION OF THE LRER 457
of Aln e, conditional on contemporaneous w,'s and lagged x,'s and the
associated marginal distribution of the w,'s given lagged x,'s. Under nor-
mality of e,, the conditional and marginal models take the form shown
in equation 10.A.3.a:
A ln e, = Z12(E20)1AW, + (F1 - E12(22-12X-1 +
(10.A.3.a)P
((A - E12(E22)-1A2,)AX11 +
]=1
(10.A.3.b) Aw, = F2x11 + A2'AXJ + 2j
j=1
where the numerical subscripts refer to the blocks of appropriately par-
titioned matrices (so that, for example, F, is the first row of F and 12 the
n - 1 x n - 1 lower-diagonal bloc of Y). By construction, the disturbance
term in (10.A.3.a), 4, = 1,1 - IT2Z22121 is uncorrelated with all of the
variables on the right-hand side of that equation. That this representa-
tion is simply a reparameterization of (10.A.2) can be confirmed by
premultiplying equation 10.A.2 by the nxn nonsingular matrix
B = K 1122-11
0 1-1_
which results in equation 10.A.3.
Equation 10.A.3.a is a single-equation conditional error-correction
model whose form mimics that of equation 10.11. Although it is often
assumed in writing an equation like 10.11 that the disturbance is
uncorrelated with the right-hand side variables, this is true by construc-
tion for equation 10.15.a. To the degree that the parameterizations differ,
therefore, OLS estimation of equation 10.11 will tend to uncover the
parameters of equation 10.A.3.a (in which orthogonality holds by con-
struction), yielding inconsistent estimates of the parameters of equation
10.11. Moreover, even if the parameters of equation 10.11 can be recov-
ered from those of equation 10.A.3.a, the latter are potentially compli-
cated functions of the underlying VAR parameters. There may therefore
be cross-equation restrictions linking these parameters to those of the
marginal model (equation 10.A.3.b). In such a case efficient estimation
of the conditional model requires that these restrictions be imposed; and
failure to impose them may produce inconsistent standard errors, in-
validating inference.
These considerations motivate a search for conditions under which
estimation and inference regarding particular parameters of equation
458 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
10.11 can proceed successfully in the conditional model alone (in other
words, without analyzing the full system). In such cases the subvector
w, is said to be weakly exogenous for the parameters of interest (Engle,
Hendry, and Richard 1983). In the context of the above discussion, weak
exogeneity requires (a) that the parameters of interest can be directly
recovered from those of the conditional model and (b) that there be no
cross-equation restrictions linking these parameters to those of the mar-
ginal model.
Weak exogeneity is testable, though generally at the cost of moving
to systems estimation. For the case of nonstationary but cointegrated
variables (see the section on the 1(1) case), Urbain (1992) and Johansen
(1992) show that w, is weakly exogenous for the long-run parameters
and adjustment speed if T = 0, or equivalently if the cointegration vec-
tor does not enter the marginal model. In our empirical section we test
this restriction for the case of C6te d'Ivoire. With respect to the short-
run parameters of equation 10.11, matters are more complicated. The
condition for weak exogeneity with respect to the long-run parameters
of equation 10.11 also guarantees weak exogeneity with respect to the
short-run parameters of the conditional model itself (that is, of equation
10.A.3.a). Recall, however, that the long-run parameters of interest were
derived not from conditioning but from a theoretical model. If the short-
run parameters (equation 10.11) have similar structural interpretations,
then the conditions for weak exogeneity are more demanding. A set of
sufficient conditions (Urbain 1992) when the variables are nonstationary
and cointegrated is k = 0 and 9 = 0, where 0 is the vector of covariances
between the disturbance in equation 10.11 and the vector of disturbances
from the marginal model (equation 10.A.3.b). (Under these conditions,
equations 10.A.3.a and 10.A.3.b form a block-recursive system.) We do
not test for weak exogeneity of the short-run parameters in this chapter.
When the variables are stationary, the lack of a clear statistical dis-
tinction between their individual and joint variation carries over to the
conditions for weak exogeneity, which now make no general distinction
between the short- and long-run parameters. A sufficient condition in
the limited information context of this chapter (that is, the context in
which identifying restrictions on the marginal model are not available)
is that equation 10.11 and the marginal model form a block-recursive
system. As is well known, this guarantees predeterminedness and obvi-
ates the need for instrumental variables. We will not formally test for
weak exogeneity in the 1(0) case (see for example, Monfort and
Rabemanajara 1990), treating it instead as a maintained hypothesis where
necessary.
Appendix B
Data Description
The data were taken from three sources: (a) IMF, International Financial
Statistics; (b) UNCTAD; and (c) the World Bank's Unified Survey. The
variables were constructed as follows:
Real Exchange Rate (RER). The ratio of the trade-weighted index of
foreign wholesale prices each expressed in CFA (local currency) terms
by converting at the relevant bilateral official exchange rate to the home
country's consumer price index (CPI). The price and exchange rate in-
dexes (WPI and NER) are calculated as geometric averages across the
home country's n largest trading partners, with bilateral total (import
plus export) trade shares (normalized to unity) as weights. We use offi-
cial data for the trade weights; these are not corrected for unrecorded
trade: RER = (WPI - NER)/CPI.
Terms of Trade (TOT). The external terms of trade are P"/P, where
P.Q and P,w are export and import price indexes (expressed in dollars)
from UNCTAD. The macroeconomic impact of a change in the terms of
trade is proportional to the share of international trade in economic ac-
tivity. If the export share is relatively constant over the sample there is
little point in adjusting the relative price measure. Our data for C6te
d'Ivoire, however, show what appears to be a major structural increase
in exports starting in 1984. To capture this feature we multiply C6te
d'Ivoire's external terms of trade by an export share dummy variable,
defined for observations between 1965 and 1983 inclusive as the aver-
age export share for that period and for later observations as the aver-
age export share after 1984.
Openness (OPEN). OPEN1 is the import to GDP ratio (IMPGDP),
and is defined as the value of imports at current prices (IMPCP) over
GDP at current prices (GDPKP): OPEN1 = IMPCP/ GDPCP. OPEN2 is
the ratio of the value of imports at constant prices (IMPKP) plus exports
459
460 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
at constant prices (EXPKP) to GDP at constant prices (GDPKP): OPEN2
= (IMPKP + EXPKP)/GDPKP. OPEN3 is the ratio of imports at constant
prices to domestic absorption at constant prices: OPEN3 = IMPKP/
(GDPKP - (EXPKP - IMPKP)).
Resource Balance to GDP Ratio (RESGDP). Value of exports at con-
stant prices (EXPKP) minus value of imports at constant prices (IMPKP),
divided by GDP at constant prices (GDPKP). EXPKP has been adjusted
by the domestic terms of trade (TOTD), which are defined as the ratio of
export to import deflator. Thus RESGDP = (EXPKP -TOTD - IMPKP)/
GDPKP.
Investment Share (ISHARE). Ratio of gross investment at constant
prices (IGROSS) to the sum of private consumption (PCONK), govern-
ment consumption (GCONK), and gross investment, all at constant
prices: ISHARE = IGROSS/(PCONK+GCONK + IGROSSK).
Foreign Price Level (PFOR). Trade-weighted index of foreign whole-
sale prices expressed in CFA terms (that is, in home-country currency).
Thus PFOR = WPI - NER (and RER = PFOR/CPI; see definition of RER
above).
Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson Proxy (HBS3). A lagged 3-year weighted
moving average of the ratio of home country GDP per worker to OECD
GDP per worker, using the Penn World Tables (Heston-Summers) data
for these variables. OECD GDP per worker was constructed by sum-
ming OECD GDP and dividing by total OECD workers. Weights de-
cline linearly. Denoting the ratio of GDPs per worker in year t by R(t):
HBS3(t) = (3/6) - R(t - 1) + (2/6) - R(t - 2) + (1/6) - R(t - 3).
Appendix C
Sustainable Fundamentals
Time-Series Measures: TOT and LPFOR
Both Burkina Faso and Cte d'Ivoire are very small economies by world
standards and are therefore price takers in the markets for both their
exports and imports. Moreover, the nominal exchange rate for the CFA
francs was fixed throughout the 1970-93 sample period and could not
be changed by individual CFA countries. The terms of trade (TOT) and
the foreign price level converted to CFA francs (LPFOR) are therefore
exogenous variables. While these variables fluctuate substantially from
year to year, we have no basis on which to question the sustainability of
their longer-run movements. We therefore use five-year centered mov-
ing averages as the sustainable values of these variables (extrapolating
out of sample using the first- and last-year values). We also generate
alternative sustainable values for Burkina Faso and Cte d'Ivoire using
sample means and Beveridge-Nelson decompositions, respectively.
Counterfactual Simulations: RESGDP
RESGDP is the ratio of the resource balance to GDP, both in constant
prices. Since Burkina Faso relied heavily on concessional aid flows in
1970-93, determining a sustainable resource balance is essentially a prob-
lem of determining sustainable levels of financial inflows. These inflows
can be divided into net factor income, net transfers, and net capital flows.
We used five-year moving averages for the first two (interest payments
were small and changed very slowly over the sample, so we ignored the
feedback from borrowings to interest payments). We then divided net
capital flows into its dominant component-net long-term concessional
borrowing-and "other" flows (net direct investment, net portfolio in-
vestment, net short-term borrowing, net errors and omissions), using
five-year moving averages for the latter. The government of Burkina
461
462 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
Faso attempted to maximize net concessional borrowing during the
sample period, so this component was ultimately determined by the
foreign donors. To smooth out year-to-year fluctuations in net
concessional borrowing, we used the smaller of the five-year moving
average of the actuals or 3.5 percent of GDP (the highest level reached
except in drought years). The sustainable resource balance is then the
sum of these sustainable components. Note that the World Bank's debt
stock and flow data are not consistent with the national accounts and
balance-of-payments data for Burkina Faso and C6te d'Ivoire. Since the
balance of payments and national accounts data are consistent with each
other and essential for the analysis, we used balance-of-payments data
when there were conflicts between these and the Bank's debt data.
The C6te d'Ivoire case is both more complicated and more represen-
tative of the problems likely to emerge in developing-country applica-
tions. C6te d'Ivoire avoided balance-of-payments and debt problems in
the 1970s. We therefore treated actual flows as essentially sustainable
during the 1965-79 period, using five-year moving averages to smooth
out temporary fluctuations. After 1980, the country was unable to meet
its debt service payments. Moving averages therefore seem unlikely to
capture sustainable movements in net borrowing and interest payments
after 1980, and we cannot ignore the feedback from higher debt levels
to higher interest payments. For 1980-93 we proceed as follows.
To proxy the sustainable level of borrowing, we used zero net repay-
ments and net disbursements after 1979 (in other words, no change in
the debt stock other than through write-downs). C6te d'Ivoire's debt
ratio jumped from 47 percent in 1979 to 62 percent in 1980, then climbed
to 115 percent in 1985, after which the country defaulted. The Maastricht
Treaty, after which the fiscal guidelines for the West African Monetary
Union are modeled, sets 60 percent of GDP as the maximum desirable
debt level for the EU countries. A developing country might be able to
target a somewhat higher debt level than 60 percent depending upon its
rate of growth and its access to financing on concessional terms; so 1979
is by these criteria the last year of sustainable debt levels.
We calculate sustainable direct and portfolio investment as assumed
percentages of total sustainable investment as determined below; to-
gether with the sustainable borrowing figures, these yield a sustainable
level of total capital inflows.
To proxy sustainable interest payments, we use 4 percent of GDP.
This represents a kind of compromise between a normative scenario in
which interest payments are capped at 2.5 percent of GDP and a posi-
tive scenario (essentially feasibility calculation) that caps them at 5 per-
cent. For comparison, the Maastricht debt ceiling, with an inflation rate
of 3 percent and a real interest rate of 3 percent, implies interest pay-
ments of 1.8 percent of GDP for the EU countries. C6te d'Ivoire was
SINGLE-EQUATION ESTIMATION OF THE LRER 463
unable to sustain the service payments on its debt after interest pay-
ments reached 3.5 and 5.2 percent of GDP in 1981 and 1982.
The sustainable resource deficit for 1980-93 is then calculated as the
sum of net transfers, net factor income, and net capital inflows, using
five-year moving averages of the actuals for transfers and factor income
flows other than interest payments.
Counterfactual Simulations: ISHARE and OPEN1
ISHARE is the ratio of investment to GDP in constant prices; OPENI is
the ratio of imports to absorption in current prices. The sustainability
criterion we use for these variables is consistency with a 3 percent long-
run growth rate of GDP per capita.
With population growth estimated at about 3 percent for both coun-
tries over the sample, GDP growth of 6 percent is required to achieve 3
percent growth in GDP per capita. Using ICORs of 4 for C6te d'Ivoire
and 5 for Burkina Faso, this would in turn require investment ratios of
about 25 percent and 30 percent of GDP, respectively. The 25 percent
ratio is in line with those actually achieved during the 1960s and 1970s
in C6te d'Ivoire; it is also the target that the World Bank has suggested
as a guideline for Africa as a whole (World Bank 1989). For C6te d'Ivoire,
therefore, we use a moving average of the actual investment levels for
1965 to 1981, which were reasonably close to 25 percent, and 20 percent
for 1982-93 when investment was depressed far below this level. For
Burkina Faso, in which the investment to GDP ratio is used only as an
input to calculate the target import to absorption ratio (see below), we
assume a sustainable investment ratio of 25 percent.
For both countries, we assume that increases in the import to GDP
ratio were required to deliver the import content of additional invest-
ment and also support a more liberal trade regime. We estimate an im-
port content of investment of roughly 0.6 for both countries. To incorpo-
rate trade liberalization, we assume increases in the import ratio of 3
percent and 2 percent of GDP, respectively, for C6te d'Ivoire and Burkina
Faso. The target import ratio is then estimated as the actual import ratio
plus 3 percent of GDP plus 0.6 times the difference between the target
investment ratio and the actual investment ratio. This target import to
absorption ratio is used for the entire sample period, as a more open
trade policy would have been desirable throughout.
A Caveat
As the above discussion suggests, determining target values for par-
ticular countries requires considerable country-specific knowledge and
a number of assumptions based on partial information and analysis.
These assumptions are open to question--and different ones (regarding
464 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
either the key parameters or the underlying notion of sustainability)
would yield different results. It may therefore be important in specific
cases to consider alternative plausible assumptions and to compare the
results of the various alternatives to those from using moving averages
for the target variables.
Part IV
Policy and Operational
Considerations
11
The Three Pessimisms: Real
Exchange Rates and Trade
Flows in Developing Countries
Nita Ghei and Lant Pritchett*
The preceding chapters in this volume have argued that the real exchange
rate is one of the primary determinants of the resource balance. This
chapter turns to the question of how, empirically, the RER actually af-
fects trade flows and the resource balance in developing countries.
A significant strand of the development literature of the 1950s and
1960s, based on the work of Myrdal, Prebisch, and Singer, was pessimis-
tic about the trade elasticities faced by low-income countries. Some
economists disputed the ability of changes in the real exchange rate to
improve the trade balance of developing countries, even in the medium
to long run. They argued that import and export elasticities are so low
that the required changes in the RER would be neither feasible nor de-
sirable and that structural policies rather than real exchange rate adjust-
ment should be pursued for dealing with balance-of-payments deficits.
Pessimism about the long-term trends in the terms of trade and the pros-
pects for export-led growth also led this group of economists to advo-
cate inward-looking industrialization.I More recently, some authors have
reopened this debate, citing new empirical evidence on unit roots and
nonstationarity of key variables to reassert that depreciation of the real
exchange rate is not strongly associated with a significant improvement
* The authors are grateful to Peter Montiel, Larry Hinkle, and three anony-
mous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.
1. See Meier (1995) for a succinct discussion of this literature.
467
468 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
in the trade balance.2 These arguments are still echoed in policy debates
over devaluations in low-income countries, such as that of the CFA franc
in 1994.
The view that the real exchange rate is unimportant for trade perfor-
mance and external balance is derived from three pessimistic assess-
ments of the responsiveness of trade in low-income developing coun-
tries (LIDCs) to shifts in the RER and relative prices. The first, "import
demand pessimism," is based on the view that the import structure in
LIDCs is such that most imports are inputs into production and that the
elasticity of substitution in production between imports and domestic
value added is essentially zero. "Export supply pessimism," in turn,
holds that LIDC exports are concentrated in a few products with a very
low domestic supply response so that changes in relative prices will not
induce domestic producers to change marketed output by much. Finally,
"export demand pessimism" maintains that world demand is inelastic,
with respect to both income and prices, for the products in which LIDC
exports are concentrated.
Conventionally, adjustment of overvalued real exchange rates is con-
sidered an essential element in improving the trade balance of an
economy; and an expansion of trade is seen as an important element of
a growth strategy. However, if true, the above three pessimisms would
imply that there is little role for the RER in achieving internal and exter-
nal macroeconomic balance and would suggest that much of the con-
cern about the effects of RER misalignment on macroeconomic stability
and growth is irrelevant or even misguided. This chapter undertakes a
critical evaluation of these three pessimisms in low-income countries.
In addition, accurate estimates of import and export price elasticities
are quite useful for applied policy analysis, and this chapter provides a
summary of the best available estimates of these. Such estimates may be
used, among other things, in calculating the value of the RER required
to achieve a target trade or resource balance. They provide a "back of
the envelope" way of estimating the equilibrium RER for small low-
income countries in which limited data availability and frequent changes
in policy make more sophisticated techniques problematic. Trade elas-
ticities may also be used with estimates of required RER adjustment
made with other methodologies to calculate and cross-check the impact
of a proposed RER realignment on exports and imports. However, for
such methodologies to yield meaningful results, import and export price
elasticities must be high enough that the trade balance is reasonably
2. See, for example, Rose (1990, 1991) and Rose and Yellen (1989).
3. Set Chapter 7 for a discussion of this methodology.
RERs AND TRADE FLOWS 469
responsive to changes in the RER; and one must be able to estimate the
elasticities with reasonable precision.
A few preliminary comments are in order before proceeding. First,
the analysis in this chapter relies solely on a partial-equilibrium relative
price approach. That is, we assume that changes in the relative prices of
imports and exports take place and examine only how the markets for
imports and exports respond to such changes. This relative price ap-
proach is in contrast to, although not in conflict with, the absorption
approach of treating the current account as an element of the funda-
mental macroeconomic identity and focusing on the changes in saving
and investment necessary to accommodate reductions in the current
account deficit. The focus in the relative price approach is on only the
expenditure and resource switching component of adjusting an imbal-
ance. The two perspectives, macroeconomic consistency and relative
price, are mutually consistent, as both must hold in short- and long-run
equilibrium.
Nor does this chapter address the question of "nominal exchange rate
pessimism." It considers neither whether a nominal devaluation will be
able to achieve a change in the RER nor what complementary policies
are necessary to sustain a real depreciation. It simply assumes that a
policy package that changes the RER is adopted and then examines the
implications for imports and exports of such a change.4
The third caveat is that the chapter concentrates primarily on the com-
ponents of the merchandise trade balance. The reason for the lack of
attention to the nonmerchandise trade components of the current ac-
count is not that the exchange rate effect on these flows is believed to be
negligible, but only that relatively less empirical work has been done on
the determinants of nonfactor service flows.5
Fourth, the chapter does not explore the short-run adjustments sur-
rounding an exchange rate change. Some short-run effects of devalua-
tions can be empirically important, such as a speculative rise in imports
and a withholding of exports preceding an anticipated devaluation.
These effects are noted but not dealt with in depth here.
Finally, unless otherwise noted, the RER concept cited here is, de-
pending upon the study, either the bilateral or multilateral expenditure-
PPP version of the external RER. This is the best established of the vari-
ous internal and external RER concepts and has been widely used in
4. See Chapter 13 for a discussion of nominal exchange rate pessimism and
the role of devaluations in depreciating the RER.
5. Empirical evidence, in fact, suggests that earnings flows from tourism, for
instance, are quite responsive to the RER. (See, for example, Wren-Lewis and
Driver (1998) and Zanello and Desruelle 1997).
470 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
empirical work in developing countries, although the external RER for
traded goods is now sometimes used in studies of industrial countries.
The chapter takes up each of the three pessimisms in turn and sum-
marizes the best estimates of the corresponding import and export price
elasticities. The next section, on the import response to a real deprecia-
tion, analyzes import demand pessimism and the response of imports
to devaluations. The subsequent section examines export demand pes-
simism. The following section on the export supply response to RER
movements then discusses export supply pessimism and elasticities. The
final section summarizes and concludes. Since some of the original work
for this chapter was done at the time of the devaluation of the CFA franc
in 1994, the CFA countries are used as examples in a number of places.
The Import Response to a Real Depreciation
"Import demand pessimism" and the expected response of imports to a
real depreciation are examined in three steps. First, we review the em-
pirical literature. Much of this literature, in fact, does not find much
evidence of a strong response of imports to exchange rate changes in
developing countries, a finding that has been taken to support the pes-
simists' view. Second, we argue that this apparent lack of import re-
sponse to devaluations is attributable to an "import compression" (or
rationing) syndrome. Import restrictions have often been imposed or
tightened in response to a balance-of-payments deficit in developing
countries. Therefore, even though a devaluation, other things being held
constant, would reduce imports, a devaluation accompanied by an eas-
ing of import restrictions may or may not lead to reduced imports. Fi-
nally we examine the likely magnitude and speed of import adjustment
in countries that are not starting from a predevaluation import com-
pression situation.
Evidence of the Apparent Failure of Imports to Respond
to Changes in the Real Exchange Rate
Both episodic and econometric evidence suggest that exchange rate ad-
justment and changes in import flows have historically been weakly
associated, on average, in developing countries. Kamin (1988a), for ex-
ample, compared the evolution of a number of macroeconomic vari-
ables (imports, exports, trade balance, inflation) in countries that expe-
rienced discrete devaluations with a comparator group of nondevaluing
countries. He found that, although the trade balance improved in the
devaluing group, the group's imports actually grew more rapidly in the
years following a devaluation than in the years preceding it-contrary
to what one would expect if a devaluation increased the relative price of
imports and imports were price sensitive. Similarly, Rose (1991) was
RERs AND TRADE FLOWS 471
among the earliest to consider the possibility that, because of the
nonstationarity of the variables, previous statistical estimates of import
elasticities may have been invalid. He analyzed data for 30 developing
countries using unit-root techniques and was unable to find a strong,
stable effect of the RER on the trade balance.
The statistical evidence in Pritchett (1991) tells the same story. In a
sample of 60 non-oil-exporting developing countries for the period 1965-
88, the trade balance did not have any consistent empirical relationship
to the real exchange rate, whether comparing across countries or in in-
dividual countries over time. When the trade balance effect was decom-
posed into exports and imports separately, the expected negative rela-
tionship was found between exports and the RER,6 but an appreciating
RER was associated with decreasing, rather than increasing, imports.
Pritchett's findings are consistent with the previous econometric evi-
dence from the estimation of import functions. In the past, multicountry
studies that estimated simple import quantum RER elasticities rarely
got more than half of the coefficients with the "right" sign.
The Import Compression Syndrome
However, the lack of an empirical association on average between RER
depreciation and reductions in imports does not necessarily imply that
imports are not affected by the exchange rate as was conventionally as-
sumed. Three strands of empirical evidence suggest that the common
failure to find an impact of devaluation on import levels in developing
countries is attributable to the fact that devaluations typically take place
after an episode of import compression and are often accompanied by
an easing of import restrictions. Hence, the impact of a devaluation alone
is difficult to isolate statistically.
Often, as the exchange rate becomes overvalued and imports become
relatively cheap, developing countries have resorted to rationing im-
ports through quantitative restrictions on them, foreign exchange, or
both. Therefore, even though "notional" import demand increases as
imports become cheaper relative to domestic goods, actual import quan-
tities do not increase, as these notional import demands are not real-
ized.7 Hence, an overvalued exchange rate may lead to apparently
6. Using the "depreciation is down" convention of measuring the RER in
foreign-currency terms, an increase in the RER in foreign-currency terms is an
appreciation and should reduce exports.
7. Neary and Roberts (1980) provide a framework for analyzing rationing in
which demands may or may not be realized and the "notional" demand is the
demand if the good were in fact available at that price. There is a price along
their notional demand schedule such that the rationed quantity would be the
quantity demanded at that "virtual" price.
472 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
"cheap" imports at border prices and the official exchange rate while
import rationing (either through foreign exchange controls or quantita-
tive restrictions) actually makes imports quite expensive domestically
by generating rents for those controlling rationed imports. The variable
that adjusts to "clear" the markets in this case is the implicit rationing
premium on imports, which is usually unobservable by the
econometrician. A devaluation may not increase (and even may decrease)
the "true" price of importables (that is, including the implicit rationing
premium) if accompanied by reductions in rationing that lower the im-
plicit premium.
To put this point algebraically, the internal real exchange rate for im-
ports in domestic currency terms (IRERM,) may be expressed as in equa-
tion 11.1:
(11.1) IRERMN = Md
where t. is the implicit average ad valorem trade tax on imports, taking
into account both tariffs and the tariff equivalent of nontariff barriers
(NTBs).8 Import compression increases NTBs and their tariff equivalents
and, like a nominal devaluation, depreciates the internal RER for
importables. Similarly, a trade liberalization, which reduces import com-
pression and t,,,, appreciates the internal RER for imports and will offset,
partially or entirely, an accompanying nominal devaluation.
Krueger (1978) provided early empirical evidence on the import com-
pression syndrome. She found that trade regimes generally move through
different phases of control over imports. Initial moves to reduce quan-
tity rationing of imports and foreign exchange licensing were generally
associated with large nominal devaluations that wiped out the rents
associated with the divergence between border and domestic prices.
However, since true internal relative prices did not change much in spite
of the depreciation of the external RER, the volume of imports was not
much affected by such devaluations cum liberalizations.
The second strand of evidence comes from Edwards' study (1989,
Chapter 6) of devaluation episodes. This study documented the evolu-
tion of payments restrictions before and after devaluation episodes,
showing clearly the typical accumulation of administrative import con-
trols in the period leading up to a devaluation.
8. See Chapter 4 on the three-good internal RER.
9. Edwards' episodic evaluation of nominal devaluations also showed no ef-
fect on the current account for the devaluing countries, even for those that main-
tained a depreciated RER.
RERs AND TRADE FLOWS 473
The final strand of evidence on changes in import compression sur-
rounding devaluations comes from studies of the parallel market pre-
mium and its response to devaluations. The parallel market premium is
not a perfect indicator of import compression since asset markets and
capital controls, as well as the rationing of foreign exchange for imports,
may play an important role in determining its value. However, in many
cases the marginal price of imports is a function of the price of foreign
exchange available through the parallel market.10 Episodic and econo-
metric studies (Kamin 1988b, Edwards 1989) confirm that the parallel
market premium tends to grow in the period prior to a devaluation and
fall immediately after a devaluation.
Import Response without Import Compression
In the absence of import compression, the expected response of imports
to a real depreciation depends on (a) the response of the domestic price
of imports to a change in the exchange rate and (b) the aggregate long-
run price elasticity.
Exchange Rates and Domestic Prices
Since the supply of imports represents the willingness of the rest of the
world to sell goods to a given country, the import supply curve is likely
to be infinitely elastic for small low-income countries. For this reason
there are three, not four pessimisms. No one has argued that small coun-
tries can lower the price of their imports by reducing their own demand
for them. Hence, the border price of imports in domestic-currency terms
should rise one for one with a devaluation; and, unless trade restric-
tions are simultaneously relaxed, the internal price of imports should
increase accordingly. Such price responsiveness is indeed confirmed
by the empirical evidence for nearly all developing countries. The evi-
dence indicates that import prices respond one for one (generally within
at most two quarters) to exchange rate changes (Goldstein and Khan,
1985). A more recent study of the impact of exchange rate movements
on domestic prices in developing countries (Feinberg 1997) confirms that
10. In cases in which smuggling is pervasive, the level of domestic prices of
importables (especially easily smuggled items with low weight to value ratios,
such as consumer electronics) may be determined more by the parallel rate of
exchange than the official rate as discussed in Chapter 12.
11. Simultaneous reductions in a country's tariffs or nontariff barriers would
tend to offset a devaluation. If part of a devaluation is offset by accompanying
changes, the response to it will be accordingly muted as indicated by equation
11.1 above.
474 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
exchange rate changes are passed through to the domestic prices of traded
goods. The behavior of prices of imported goods in high-inflation coun-
tries, in which price increases are passed through almost instantaneously
after a devaluation, is also consistent with these findings. Therefore, a
discussion of the responsiveness of imports to real exchange rate changes
becomes essentially a discussion of price elasticities, which must be aug-
mented by distinctions between small and large, and transitory and per-
manent, changes in prices.12
However, for large industrial countries there is considerable evidence
that the domestic price of imports rises less than proportionately after a
devaluation and that the response of import prices to changes in the
exchange rate is often quite delayed. There is in fact a substantial litera-
ture on the question of the applicability of the law of one price to large
industrial countries, particularly the United States and Japan. Goldberg
and Knetter (1997) recently reviewed this literature. They noted the con-
siderable empirical evidence of widespread, prolonged, substantial di-
vergences of the prices of imported manufactured products from the
law of one price, incomplete partial pass-through of exchange rate
changes to the prices of imported manufactures, and strategic pricing-
to-market behavior by firms selling in large industrial countries.
Goldberg and Knetter find that in the United States typically only half
of a change in the nominal exchange rate is passed through to the do-
mestic prices of imports of manufactures.
In light of the above findings about pricing behavior in large indus-
trial countries, it is also possible that foreign firms selling in a few large
developing countries with large import-competing sectors may engage
in strategic pricing to market for selected important differentiated manu-
factured products. Feinberg (1997) warns that monopolistic behavior is
a potentially important problem in developing countries, but there is
little empirical evidence of pricing to market in these countries. Hence,
12. The empirical literature notes only one important exception to full pass-
through of exchange rate movements to the prices of imports in developing coun-
tries. This concerns import-competing firms protected by quantitative restric-
tions. Such firms may not raise their prices proportionately after a devaluation
as the existing quantitative restriction may have already permitted them to set
their predevaluation prices at as high a level as the market would bear. The
existence of such binding import quotas can also affect the attitude of import-
substituting industries toward devaluations. These industries may view devalu-
ations as raising the cost of their imported inputs without giving them any fur-
ther protection--or scope to raise their output prices-than was already pro-
vided by the import quotas.
RERs AND TRADE FLOWS 475
in most circumstances, the most realistic assumption would still appear
to be that, despite widespread violations of the law of one price in large
industrial countries, in small developing countries exchange rate ad-
justments are usually fully and quickly passed through to domestic prices
unless trade restrictions are simultaneously relaxed.
Price Elasticity of Import Demand
What is the "typical" aggregate price elasticity of import demand in a
small, developing, non-import-compressed economy? Three sources of
evidence can be used to generate estimates: developing-country esti-
mates of the price elasticity of import demand, industrial-country esti-
mates of the import price elasticities, and industrial-country price elas-
ticity estimates that are adjusted to take into account the different struc-
ture of imports in developing countries. Each source has its difficulties,
but together they suggest that the long-run price elasticity to a perma-
nent change in relative import prices is around -0.7 to -0.9.
Industrial Countries. Table 11.1 summarizes the price elasticity esti-
mates from a number of studies that estimate import price elasticities
Table 11.1 Price Elasticity of Import Demand: Average Estimates for
Industrial Countries
Average Number of Countries (of
Study Elasticity Which Positive)
Houthakker and Magee (1969) -.81 13 (3)
Adams and others (1969) -.72 9 (3)
Armington (1970) -1.35 14 (0)
Samuelson (1973) -.92 14 (7)
Taplin (1973) -.79 13 (0)
Beenstock Minford (1976) -1.51 7 (2)
Stern, Francis, and Schumacher (1976) -.99 17 (0)
Gylfason (1978) -1.24 10 (3)
Geraci and Prewo (1980) -.73 5 (0)
Marquez (1990) -.74 6 (0)
Senhadji (1997) -.64 19 (0)
Driver and Wren-Lewis (1997) -.71 7 (0)
Mean (median) of the study averages -.93 (-.80)
Source: Updated from Pritchett (1988a).
476 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
for industrial countries." The grand mean (median) of the averaged esti-
mates is -93 (-80). The range of the averaged estimates is from -64
to -1.51. The two most recent of these studies (Senhadji (1997) and Wren-
Lewis and Driver (1998)), which test and adjust for unit roots, yield esti-
mates at the low end of this range. Bayoumi and Faruqee (1998), how-
ever, use an import elasticity of -0.92 as a representative value for the G-
7 countries. The advantage of these industrial-country estimates is that
they are, on average, much less likely to be contaminated by import
compression episodes that would result in underestimation of the price
response. But the more advanced economic structure of the industrial
countries may create greater import substitution possibilities, in which
case their elasticities may overestimate price responsiveness in a devel-
oping country.
Developing Countries. Table 11.2 below summarizes estimates of price
elasticities for developing countries.14 The mean of these averaged esti-
mates is -79, with a range from -51 to -1.07. Some of the estimates for
developing countries should be considered as underestimates of the (ab-
solute value of the) price elasticity, since the presence of import com-
pression as described in the preceding subsection historically tended to
bias the estimates toward low values." Moreover, Pritchett (1988b) shows
that different estimation techniques can make a large difference in the
price elasticity estimates. Price elasticity estimates using instrumental
variables for developing countries are almost 50 percent higher on aver-
age than the traditional ordinary least-squares estimates and are similar
to the estimates for the industrial countries.'6 Bayoumi and Faruqee (1998)
suggest a representative value of -0.69 for the price elasticity of import
13. Most empirical estimates of trade elasticities are made using external ex-
penditure-PPP real exchange rate measures, either REERs or bilateral RERs with
the country's major industrial trading partner. A few recent estimates, such as
those from Wren-Lewis and Driver (1998), use the external RER for traded goods.
Senhadji (1997) uses the import price index divided by the GDP deflator as the
internal RER for imports. Unless otherwise noted, all elasticity estimates pre-
sented in this chapter are with respect to the expenditure-PPP external RER.
14. See footnote 13.
15. Pritchett (1988a) actually uses a barrage of specification tests in an at-
tempt to eliminate country estimates in which periods of import compression
lead to an unstable import demand function. Prichett (1996) also finds that there
is no reliable, robust measure of trade policy orientation that can be used in
cross-country regression analyses. The issue is, in effect, too complex and opaque
to be analyzed with a single standardized measure.
16. The instrumental variables' estimates differ from ordinary least-squares
estimates because with endogenous import, rationing the "supply" of imports
given by foreign exchange availability is not the usual horizontal supply of goods
assumed for a small country.
RERs AND TRADE FLOWS 477
Table 11.2 Price Elasticity of Import Demand, Average Estimates
for Developing Countries from Multicountry Studies
Number of Countries
Study Averages (Number Positive)
Senhadji (1997) -.88 48 (0)
Reinhart (1995) -.51 12 (1)
Pritchett (1988a) -.77 28 (4)
Bahami-Oskooee (1986) -.69 7 (0)
Moran (1986) -.81 5(1)
Khan (1974) -1.07 5 (1)
Mean (median) of the averages -.79 (-.79)
a. This average excludes positive estimates.
Source: Studies cited in this table.
demand in developing countries.
The problem of low price elasticity might be considered particularly
important for Africa, given its relatively low level of industrialization
and capacity to produce import substitutes. However, in the existing
studies African countries do not have particularly low estimated import
demand elasticities compared to other developing countries. Table 11.3
gives estimates of the typical price elasticities for sub-Saharan African
(SSA) countries; again, the price elasticity estimates are near to or greater
than one." The studies cited in table 11.3 do find substantial instability
in the estimated parameters of simple import demand equations in SSA,
as one would expect from import compression episodes.
In light of the above estimates, a best guess of the typical aggregate
import demand elasticity for low-income developing countries would
be somewhere between -0.7 and -0.9. The estimates for developing coun-
tries, once adjusted for the attenuating bias created by import controls,
are in the low range of the estimates for the industrial countries.
The Structure of Imports in Developing Countries
The concern that import demand in developing countries may be price-
inelastic stems in part from the belief their structure of imports is such
that there is very little scope for substitution. Such inflexibility could be
attributable to two causes.
17. See footnote 13.
478 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
Table 11.3 Price Elasticity of Demand for Imports in African
Countries
Median Estimate Number of Countires
Study (Number Positive)
Arize and Afifi (1986) -.88 23 (3)
Pritchett (1988a) -1.40 4 (0)
Ghurra and Grennes (1994) -1.06 -
Reinhart (1995) -1.36 -
Senhadji (1997) -0.98 15 (0)
Note: Positive estimates are excluded from the medians. The estimates from Arize and Afifi
are for the 1972-82 period. The estimates by Ghurra and Grennes and Reinhart were made
using pooled data and are for an average African country.
Source: Studies cited in this table.
First, in imposing direct controls on imports, governments may have
forced their countries' import structures into inflexibility by adminis-
tratively eliminating all imports deemed nonessential. Such artificial
price inelasticity is an aspect of the overall experience of import com-
pression discussed above. Removal of import controls and accompany-
ing reforms will over time eliminate this source of "inelasticity."
A second possible cause of inflexibility is that the natural import struc-
ture in many developing countries, even absent controls, could consist
primarily of goods such as petroleum and intermediate inputs, which
are intrinsically price insensitive and for which few domestic substi-
tutes exist. Developing countries may also tend to have a low share of
imports in the nonfood consumer goods category, which are usually the
most price elastic. Hence, even if import price elasticities by sector were
equal across industrial and developing countries, the aggregate price
elasticity would be lower in developing countries because of their im-
port structure.
How important a factor is the structure of imports in developing coun-
tries? This issue can be examined through a counterfactual statistical
experiment of estimating what the aggregate import elasticity of a typi-
cal developing country would be if the country had its own import struc-
ture (proportions of fuels, food, manufactures) but had industrial-coun-
try sectoral import price elasticities. This experiment is useful because,
since industrial countries generally have better data and fewer import
controls, estimates of sectoral import price elasticities are more accurate
for them.
RERs AND TRADE FLOWS 479
In the experiment, synthetic estimates of aggregate import price elas-
ticities were constructed using estimates of the price elasticities of the
disaggregated components of imports from the industrial countries,
weighted by the actual import structure of a sample of developing coun-
tries. The results of the exercise are reported in table 11.4. The table sug-
gests that the magnitude of the difference in elasticities between devel-
oping and industrial countries that would be created by their differing
import structure is small, only about 20 percent. Therefore, if we take -0.9,
the overall average from the studies of industrial countries, as a plau-
sible estimate of import price elasticity in industrial countries, then -0.7
would be the estimate for a developing country with roughly the same
import structure as the average for the sample group in table 11.4 if the
price elasticities were the same within sectors in industrial and devel-
oping countries." Hence, the results of our counterfactual statistical ex-
periment are consistent with the average price elasticities for develop-
ing countries reported above.
The calculations in table 11.4 would obviously be affected if the price
elasticities within sectors differed between industrial and developing
countries. Sectoral price elasticities may be higher in industrial coun-
tries because of the existence of a broader range of domestic substitutes
for imports. Unfortunately, there is very little reliable empirical evidence
on sectoral import elasticities in developing countries to resolve this
question.19 Furthermore, the most recent comprehensive analysis of im-
port elasticities for 77 industrial and developing countries using econo-
metric techniques that take into account unit roots (Senhadji 1997) actu-
ally finds, counterintuitively, that the average price elasticity is greater
in developing countries (-0.88) than in industrial countries (-0.64).
18. Note that the synthetic aggregate elasticities in table 11.4 are somewhat
higher than the averages reported in tables 11.1 and 11.2 for industrial and de-
veloping countries. However, the point of this exercise is to illustrate the differ-
ences between industrial and developing countries attibutable to import struc-
ture. A general characteristic of price elasticity estimates is that, the broader the
category, the lower the estimate, as there is less scope for substitution the fewer
the categories. For example, the import demand and export supply elasticities
will be lower for all cereals together than for a single cereal.
19. See De Rosa (1990) for a summary of the fragmentary estimates that are
available. An additional concern, especially for low-income countries, is that a
large fraction of imports are donor-financed capital goods. Since donor deci-
sions are not primarily driven by the domestic costs of capital goods, a devalua-
tion would probably not reduce such capital goods imports by much. However,
since these imports are in effect self-financing, reducing them may also not be a
practical policy concern.
480 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
Table 11.4 The Effect of Import Structure on Aggregate Import Price
Elasticities: A Simulation
Share of Sector in Total Importsc
Calculated Food Fuels Capital Inter- Non-food
Aggregate Goods mediates Consumer
Country Elasticity (-0.75)a (-0.75)' (-1.5)' (-0.5)' (-2.5)'
CFA Countries
Cameroon -1.12 17.9 2.2 40.4 31.3 8.3
Congo -1.04 19.1 3.1 35.9 35.7 6.2
Ivory Coast -0.94 17.3 22.2 23.1 32.0 5.4
Senegal -1.00 28.2 9.6 29.7 26.8 5.6
Togo -0.98 26.1 5.5 23.1 36.7 8.7
Niger -0.95 16.9 4.2 26.7 45.7 6.6
Other Developing Countries
Argentina -0.97 3.8 9.4 35.7 46.9 4.2
Bangladesh -0.83 24.3 16.6 18.3 38.6 2.2
Burundi -1.08 10.3 15.4 37.6 29.4 7.2
Pakistan -0.94 16.0 14.3 33.0 34.9 1.9
Morocco -0.88 12.7 13.2 25.0 45,9 3.2
Industrial Countries
Belgium-Lux -1.18 11.8 7.7 25.5 36.5 18.6
Denmark -1.13 13.0 6.5 29.5 36.5 14.4
USA -1.37 6.1 9.9 43.6 20.6 19.9
Means
Developing
Countries -.098 17.5 10.5 29.9 36.7 5.4
Industrial
Countries -1.23 10.3 8.0 32.9 31.2 17.6
Note: a. Figures in parentheses are assumed sectoral elasticities. The assumed elasticities
are taken from the review by Stern, Francis, and Schumacher (1976), which reports the
"best" estimates of the elasticities for each product category for 14 different developed coun-
tries assembled from a complete review of the literature. The assumed elasticity for each
category is taken from the middle of the range of the estimates across the countries. b. The
calculated elasticity is simply the import-share weighted average of the elasticities in the
row (for example, for Cameroon -1.12 = .179 - (-.75) + .022 - (-.75) +.404 - (-1.5) + .313 - (-.5)
+ .083 - (-2.5)). c. The import shares are calculated from the United Nations Statistical Office's
COMTRADE database.
Source: See notes a-c.
RERs AND TRADE FLOWS 481
Speed of the Import Response
The remaining question about the expected import response concerns
the speed of the adjustment. Goldstein and Khan (1985) reviewed five
studies of the speed of the adjustment of imports to relative price changes
and found that 50 percent or more of adjustment tends to take place in
the first year. They also found, however, that the estimates of the adjust-
ment speed were quite imprecise.20 More recently, Senhadji (1997) finds
that the lags involved can be substantial. His estimate of the average
price elasticity is close to zero in the short run and reaches 90 percent of
its long-run value only after five years. Bayoumi and Faruqee (1998),
however, suggest a shorter three-year lag for the G-7 countries, with 60
percent of the full effect occuring during the first year, 25 percent in the
second, and 15 percent in the third.
Wilson and Tackacs (1979) and Bahmani-Oskooee (1986) found (for
industrial countries and for seven developing countries, respectively)
that adjustments in response to exchange rate changes were faster than
adjustments in response to relative price changes arising from other
sources. That adjustment is faster for exchange rate changes is consis-
tent with the plausible conjecture that large and well-publicized price
changes (as would result from once-off nominal devaluations) will be
immediately perceived and change expectations of future price ratios,
whereas individual changes in international prices of particular traded
goods are less noticeable and their implications for future relative prof-
itability may be less clear. The more rapid recognition of relative price
shifts and greater perception of the permanence of the shifts could lead
to a faster (and potentially larger) short-run response to exchange rates
than to changes in import prices generally.21
Overall Import Response
Overall, the foregoing analysis of the literature suggests that, in the ab-
sence of import compression, the long-run aggregate import price elas-
ticity is most likely about -0.9, although it maybe as low as -0.7, for
20. One factor affecting the speed of the response in different countries is that
imports tend to recover quickly after a period of import compression. Typically,
imports of countries that have had large drops in imports under administrative
controls spring back rapidly when those controls are lifted.
21. The existence of binding import quotas can also affect the attitude of im-
port-substituting industries toward devaluatons. These industries may view de-
valuations as raising the cost of their imported inputs without giving them any
further protection, or scope to raise their output prices, than was already pro-
vided by the import quota.
482 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
small developing economies, and that full adjustment to devaluation-
induced changes in relative prices should occur over the medium term
(two to four years). If econometric estimates for individual countries
differ significantly from these price elasticity figures, then those esti-
mates themselves need to be examined carefully. Using the short time
series and noisy data generally available for the typical developing coun-
try, it is difficult to estimate an elasticity with any precision or robust-
ness and easy to get misleading results.
If a country's merchandise balance is in large deficit, import adjust-
ment may actually be quantitatively more important than export ad-
justment. Arithmetically, an equal percentage change in imports will
have a greater absolute influence on reducing the deficit than an equiva-
lent change in exports for the simple reason that in a country with a
trade deficit imports are larger than exports.
Export Demand Pessimism
Export demand pessimism is based on the beliefs that (a) developing
countries' traditional exports are concentrated in products with low
world price and income elasticities of demand facing declining long-
run terms of trade and that (b) the expansion of their nontraditional
exports is constrained by trade barriers in industrial countries. Typi-
cally, exports with low elasticities of demand are agricultural commodi-
ties such as wheat, cotton, tea, cocoa, and coffee. Low world income
elasticities imply that a country's exports of such commodities will grow
at best slowly in the absence of increases in its market share. Low world
price elasticities imply that large reductions in world prices of these com-
modities would be necessary to increase aggregate world export quan-
tities. Hence, if all developing countries were to expand their exports of
such commodities because of the high price elasticity of demand facing
each country separately, the group's total export earnings would de-
cline because of the resulting price reductions. This conundrum is known
in the literature as the "adding up problem."1 Export demand pessimism,
which the adding up problem has fed, has been reinforced by industrial
countries erecting nontariff barriers to nontraditional developing-
22. Wren-Lewis and Driver (1998), for example, found that the empirical re-
sults for a number of G-7 countries were unsatisfactory or unusable; and param-
eter estimates for these countries had to be based on results from other similar
countries.
23. For reviews of the adding up problem for Africa, see Akivama and Larson
(1994 ) (for primary commodities), Chhibber (1991), and World Bank (1993) (for
cocoa, coffee, and tea).
RERs AND TRADE FLOWS 483
country exports in a few conspicuous cases (for example, textiles and
footwear) in which such exports have expanded rapidly.
The poor export performance of most sub-Saharan African countries
has, for example, often been blamed on the countries' dependence on a
few key commodity exports facing inelastic aggregate world demand.
Relative prices of many of these commodities have been drifting down-
ward over the long term (in spite of their recent surge) .24 Export earn-
ings of many SSA countries have declined along with prices, and this
decline has engendered considerable pessimism about prospects for
export-led growth.
Declining real prices for some primary commodities and inelastic
world demand raise two issues: whether individual countries acting
alone can increase their export revenues and whether countries produc-
ing similar goods can gain by coordinating their policies. The key point,
however, is that even if the world price elasticity is low, the price elastic-
ity of export demand for standardized commodities for individual coun-
tries with small market shares may still be quite high. Hence these coun-
tries can expand their market shares rapidly if they can produce at low
cost.25 A simple rule of thumb is that the demand elasticity for one coun-
try is the world price elasticity of demand multiplied by the inverse of
the country's market share.26 Even with a low world price elasticity of
demand of 0.4, for example, a single country's price elasticity is still 8
when its market share is 5 percent, implying that a 20 percent rise in its
exports would cause only a 2.5 percent decline in the world price.
Still, individual efforts by a number of countries to expand their ex-
ports in response to such price incentives could potentially lead to a
significant decline in the world price. However, in most cases a number
of countries produce a given commodity; and the market shares of indi-
vidual countries are too small to confer any significant market power
on small groups of them. Coordinating policies is feasible only in the
few cases in which production is concentrated in a few countries and
short-run supply elasticity is low (as in the case of tree crops, which take
24. Volatility of real commodity prices, as distinct from unfavorable long-
term trends in them, has also been considered an obstacle to export-led growth.
See Dupont and Juan-Ramon (1996).
25. See the example (page 492) of the growth of textile, clothing, and foot-
wear exports from Korea and Taiwan.
26. This simple rule of thumb assumes that the entire increase in world de-
mand via the world price elasticity would accrue to the country expanding its
exports. The rule does not take into account, among other factors, the supply
response of other producers to lower world prices or strategic behavior on the
part of rivals and assumes that goods are perfect substitutes across countries.
484 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
several years to mature) so that it would take time for potential com-
petitors to enter the market. Larson, Akiyama, and Lau (1996) found
that large market shares and low price elasticity of demand make policy
coordination a realistic possibility for only a few commodities produced
by a few low-income countries. Those are cocoa in Cote d'Jvoire and
Ghana, tea in Kenya, and burley tobacco in Mali.27 For virtually all other
exports from low-income countries, market shares of individual coun-
tries are small enough that each country can gain substantially from
independently increasing its exports.
However, even if individual developing countries are small in inter-
national trade and the notional price elasticity of export demand facing
them is very large,28 trade barriers to exports to industrial countries may
provide an additional rationale for export demand pessimism. Industrial-
country trade barriers are indeed a significant obstacle to exports of a
few selected primary (for example, sugar and bananas) and nonprimary
(for example, textiles and footwear) products from developing coun-
tries. For countries relying heavily on these products, such barriers can
be a significant constraint to expansion of these particular exports, and
the price elasticity of demand for such exports may be low. It is impor-
tant, however, not to overstate the magnitude of this constraint. Despite
existing constraints, a number of developing countries have expanded
nontraditional exports rapidly as discussed in the next section. Simi-
larly, it has been well documented that Africa's poor historical trade
performance was not caused by export barriers, particularly not by bar-
riers to nontraditional exports (Amjadi, Reinke, and Yeats 1996). The
trade barriers facing other small low-income countries in today's
27. See also Akiyama and Larson (1994). Devarajan and others (1996) discuss
the optimal export tax that should be imposed by those countries facing inelastic
export demand.
28. Most economists have assumed that, in the absence of trade barriers, the
export demand elasticity facing small industrial and developing countries is ef-
fectively infinite. Until recently, there was little statistical evidence to support
this assumption. However, Panagariya, Shah, and Mishra (1996) in a study us-
ing highly disaggregated data for Bangladeshi textile exports to the United States
found consistently high demand elasticities, exceeding 65 in all cases. Exports
from major industrial countries, on the other hand, are large enough to affect
prices in other countries; and export demand functions are usually estimated for
these countries. Thus, for example for the G-7 countries, Wren-Lewis and Driver
(1998) find price elasticities of export demand ranging from -0.23 (Canada) to
-.36 (Japan) with a median of -0.96 and income elasticities ranging from 0.58
(Germany) to 1.12 (the United States) for exports with a median of 0.91. Simi-
larly, Bayoumi and Faruqee (1998) use a price elasticity of export demand for the
G-7 countries of -0.71.
RERs AND TRADE FLOWS 485
globalizing economy are no worse than the barriers that these two
groups of countries faced.
The Export Supply Response to RER Movements
Before discussing the magnitude of the potential response of aggregate
exports to changes in the RER, the path by which the relative price move-
ments are expected to work should first be considered. For an RER ad-
justment to affect exports, it must first alter the relative profitability of
factors (for example, land, labor, capital) in producing exportables
versus other domestic goods. There are some instances in which a de-
valuation may not improve the relative profitability of exports. First, a
devaluation increases the border price of export crops in domestic-
currency terms (that is, the border price in foreign currency multiplied
by the nominal exchange rate).29 However, if the increase in border prices
is not passed through the marketing system to producers, then no sup-
ply response should be expected. In some African countries, devalua-
tions have been completely absorbed by increased margins of the mar-
keting agencies, and the real prices received by farmers have not changed.
Second, if changes in the relative prices of other inputs occur simulta-
neously (for example, if fertilizer subsidies are cut or interest rates raised)
then the net improvement in relative prices may be less than the in-
crease in export prices.
The non-pass-through of devaluations to the domestic producer prices
of export products-or "export repression"-can cause empirical prob-
lems in estimating export supply elasticities that are similar to those
caused by the relaxation of import compression at the time of a devalu-
ation. That is, the exchange rate changes, but the domestic price changes
(much) less, so that in some cases it maybe difficult to detect the empiri-
cal effects of a devaluation on exports.3 Export repression is an impor-
tant consideration in analyzing the effects of devaluations but is not
treated in depth here. We ask only, "assuming a real depreciation or
appreciation changes the relative profitability of exports, by how much
would export quantities change?"
The Mundell-Fleming and other industrial-country models typically
assume that the elasticity of export supply is effectively infinite. In de-
veloping countries, however, inelasticity of aggregate export supply is
29. Because of the importance of homogeneous primary commodities and
fairly standardized nontraditional products in developing-country exports, there
is less reason to question whether the law of one price holds for their exports
than for their imports.
30. See the discussion below of Bond's results for sub-Saharan Africa.
486 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
an important concern, the evidence on which is reviewed below. The
price responsiveness of individual primary commodities and the poten-
tially rapid expansion of nontraditional exports are then considered.
Aggregate Export Elasticities
The elasticity of aggregate exports to changes in relative prices has been
the subject of several studies using econometric techniques as well
as episodic analysis. Both types of study are reviewed in this sub-
section.
Episodic Analysis
Kamin (1988a) found evidence of large export responses to nominal de-
valuations. Table 11.5 shows that between the year prior to a devalua-
tion and the year following a devaluation, the median growth of ex-
ports in U.S. dollars for devaluing countries accelerated by 11.5 percent-
age points per annum (an increase in the export growth rate of 100
percent). Devaluing countries went from export growth 4.4 percentage
points below the average of nondevaluing countries in the year preced-
ing a devaluation, to export growth 7 percentage points above in the
year following the devaluation. This export response is large when one
considers that the median real depreciation in Kamin's sample was only
15 percent. This large effect on the growth rate of exports continued for
several years after the devaluation (even though in Kamin's sample the
effect of the nominal devaluation on the real exchange rate was typi-
cally eroded after three years).
Kiguel and Ghei (1993) obtained similar results for a sample of de-
valuations in low-inflation countries. They found that the share of ex-
ports in GDP fell prior to a major devaluation and then rose. The ratio of
exports to GDP was significantly higher statistically three years after
the devaluation (mean value of 17.4 percent), compared with the year
before the devaluation (a mean of 15.4 percent).
With the episodic analysis of exports the mystery is not why the ex-
port supply response to a devaluation is so small but rather why it is so
large and swift. At least part of the large effect on export may come from
(a) complete or partial elimination of smuggling and underinvoicing of
exports and switching of some exports from parallel to official markets;
(b) speculative stockpiling of exports in anticipation of a devaluation; or
(c) delays in remitting export receipts, again in anticipation of devalua-
tion. The degree of smuggling and underinvoicing of exports (that is,
the amount by which a country's reported exports are understated rela-
tive to the world's reported imports from the same country) is also likely
to be related to the black market premium, which generally increases
before a devaluation and drops back after one.
Table 11.5 The Response of Export Growth in Nominal Devaluation Episodes
Year relative Devaluing countries' growth Total sample, growth rate Difference between devaluers
to devaluation rate of exports, percent per annum of exports, percent per annum and nondevaluers
T-3 8.5 7.3 1.2
T-2 8.2 8.6 -0.4
& T-1 3.8 8.2 -4.4
T (Year of devaluation) 12.8 9.4 3.5
T+1 16.7 9.6 7.1
T+2 13.2 9.2 4.0
T+3 8.2 6.5 2.0
Difference predevaluation (TI)
to postdevaluation (T2) 12.9 1.4 11.5
Source: Adapted from Kamin (1988a), table 3.
488 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
Econometric Analyses
Econometric studies typically find large effects of devaluations on ex-
port volumes, consistent with large elasticities of export supply with
respect to the real exchange rate if, as with imports, exchange rate changes
are passed through the domestic prices of exportables. Many of these
studies have focussed on African countries, where the question of sup-
ply response has been the most contentious. Table 11.6 summarizes esti-
mates of price elasticities of aggregate export supply for various coun-
tries.31 Most of these estimates fall in the range between 0.8 and 2.0. The
only estimates that were significantly lower than this range were two of
those for sub-Saharan African countries for the 1960-85 period (Bond
1985 and Ghurra and Grennes 1994). During this period, export repres-
sion-excessive taxation of exports and policies of not permitting the
effects of devaluations to pass through to the domestic producer prices
of major export products-was widespread. Overall, the studies sum-
marized in table 11.6 suggest that if the effects of RER movements are
passed through fully to domestic prices, the elasticity of aggregate ex-
port supply is at least 1.0 in non-oil-exporting developing countries and
may be as high as 2.0 in some cases.
Studies of Supply Elasticities for Individual Commodities
Since some primary commodity exporting countries are highly special-
ized in a few products, another way of approaching the export response
problem is to consider the likely supply elasticities of their major com-
modity exports. For example, as noted earlier, the CFA countries, like
many other low-income countries, tend to have exports that are quite
concentrated: for each country just four products account for 70-90 per-
cent of total trade.32 Since a few products are so important, a separate
analysis of the producer and export supply elasticity of the major prod-
ucts may be useful.
Earlier work has suggested that the price elasticity of supply for the
agricultural sector as a whole may be quite low because substitution
possibilities between broad sectors are more limited than those between
individual crops or industries and significant time lags are involved in
increasing aggregate resource availability." However, price elasticities
31. See footnote 13.
32. This ratio is much lower in some other developing countries, for example:
India, 31 percent; Korea, 20 percent; Argentina, 35 percent; Brazil, 26 percent;
Philippines, 31 percent. But the CPA ratio is typical for sub-Saharan Africa, for example:
Nigeria, 98 percent; Zambia, 91 percent; Kenya, 67 percent; and Tanzania, 65 percent.
33. See for example Killick (1993). Petroleum may be a special case of particu-
larly inelastic supply if most production costs are in foreign exchange so that a
devaluation does not significantly affect profitability.
Table 11.6 Econometric Studies of Aggregate Export Supply Response
Study Countries, Exports, and Estimated Price Elasticity of
Period Covered Aggregate Export Supply
Ghurra and Aggregate export supply, pooled data for 33 SSA countries, 1970-87 0.65
Grennes (1994)
Balassa (1990) Pooled SSA countries, total merchandise 1.01
exports, 1965-82
4 Balassa and others (1989) Korea and Greece 2.4 and 2.1
Bond (1987) Average for all non-oil-exporting developing countries using 2.01
pooled data, total merchandise exports 1963-81
Khan and Knight (1986) Pooled developing countries, total exports, 1971-80 0.845
Bond (1985) Average African country using pooled data for 1963-81; separate Range from 0.09 to 0.32
estimates for major product groups with one year lag
Goldstein Seven developed countries, total exports Range from 1.1 to 6.6,
and Kahn (1978) median 1.9
Source: Studies cited in this table.
490 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
of supply for individual agricultural commodities, which allow for
switching resources from nontraded to traded crops, are typically higher.
Considerable analytical work has been done by the World Bank on ma-
jor individual commodities, and representative supply elasticities are
available for a number of them on request from the staff that prepare
commodity price projections?
An Example: Cocoa and Coffee Exports from the CFA Countries
Coffee and cocoa are tree crops, and the time from planting to first pro-
duction is several years. In the short run, the production response is
entirely at the intensive margin, and supply elasticities can be expected
to be low. Akiyama and Varangis (1988) and Imran and Duncan (1988)
estimate short- and long-run supply elasticities for coffee and cocoa.
However, their estimates did not take into account the effect that low
world prices and a highly overvalued exchange rate together can have,
making it unprofitable even to harvest much of the crop. An analysis of
the potential export response to a devaluation in the CFA countries
(World Bank 1991) reviewed the literature on crop supply elasticities
and estimated the short-run (first-year) elasticity for cocoa at about 0.2
and the long-run elasticity at about 1.0. For coffee, the elasticity esti-
mates were 0.5 in the short run and 0.8 in the long run, with the short-
run estimate being fairly high because of the neglect of routine crop care
and the abandonment of harvesting in some areas during the period of
low prices.
The Role of Nontraditional Exports
A persistently overvalued RER raises foreign currency-denominated unit
labor costs relative to other countries and makes it difficult for a country
to establish export potential in anything other than resource-intensive
products. One important element in a decision to adjust the RER is to
create conditions for export diversification and the rapid expansion of
nontraditional exports." Nontraditional exports are not just manufac-
tures. Many countries have expanded into higher value-added natural
resource and agricultural or horticultural products. Higher value-added
products in this case mean more labor intensity and more labor embodied
in the exports. Without RER adjustment such export activities are not at-
tractive compared with nontradables production for the local market.
34. See also Bond (1985) for a summary of supply elasticity estimates avail-
able for individual commodities as of 1985.
35. Note also that the RER for nontraditional exports, which tends to follow
the RER for imports, can be significantly less favorable than the overall RER for
exports when the terms of trade for primary commodities improve. See Chapter
4 on the three-good internal RER.
RERs AND TRADE FLOWS 491
The experiences of many countries indicate that under the right con-
ditions the expansion of nontraditional exports can be both extremely
rapid in percentage terms and sustained for very long periods. Table
11.7 shows the expansion of manufactured exports for seven countries
during prolonged periods of rapid export growth. In many cases (for
example, Brazil in 1967, Mexico in 1982, Turkey in 1980), the rapid in-
creases in exports were preceded by trade reforms that accompanied a
large adjustment of the RER. In the early stages of export take-off, it is
not unusual for exports to grow at rates exceeding 40 percent per year.
World trade has seen numerous instances of exports rising from a few
hundred million dollars to more than a billion dollars within five years.
Even as nontraditional exports mature, sustained growth rates well over
30 percent per year are possible. Because of the relatively small changes
in the importing-country markets such expansions of small new exports
entail, these gains are unlikely to be stymied in the near term by protec-
tionist barriers raised in response, except in special cases such as tex-
tiles, in which NTBs are already well established.
Table 11.7 Episodes of Sustained Rapid Expansion of Manufacturing
Exports
Country 1970 1975 1980 Mid-1980sa
Thailand ($ mn) 32 317 1,604 n.a.
(% per year) 58 38
Brazil ($ mn) 361 2,193 7,489 n.a.
(% per year) 43 28
Malaysia ($ mn) 109 665 2,433 n.a.
(% per year) 44 30
Mexico ($ mn) n.a. n.a. 1,837 10,384
(% per year) 41
Turkey ($ mn) n.a. n.a. 782 4,854
(% per year) 44
Mauritius ($ mn) n.a. n.a. 115 623
(% per year) 23
Indonesia ($ mn) n.a. n.a. 503 5,228
(% per year) 34
a. The final year is 1987 for Mexico, 1985 for Turkey, 1988 for Indonesia and Mauritius.
Source: Computed from UNCTAD. 1990. Handbook of International Trade and Development
Statistics, table 4.1.
492 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
Even if the income elasticity for a given product is low, a country's
exports of this product will grow if the country is cost-competitive and
expands its share in the world export market. In fact, in the analysis of
export performance, the initial composition of exports tends to be an
unimportant long-term factor. Studies using "constant market share"
analysis decompose the growth of a country's exports into that compo-
nent that would have occurred because of the general increase in the
size of the market and that which is attributable to changes in market
share. Changes in the types of the products exported and in market shares
explain most of the differences in long-term export performance across
countries, with little explained by the growth of the overall markets for
the exports (income elasticities) of the particular products initially
exported.
For instance, the annual growth rate of world exports of textiles,
clothes, and footwear (TCF) in 1962-82 was 11.7 percent. However, total
world exports of all products grew more rapidly at 14.2 percent, so that
TCF actually fell as a percent of world trade from 10.1 percent to 6.5
percent. Even though TCF were not growing as rapidly as exports over-
all, Korean and Taiwanese (China) exports of these products increased
at 40 percent and 28 percent per year, as Korea's exports grew from $8
million to $7.2 billion, a thousandfold increase. Taiwan (China) and Korea
were able to achieve these rates of growth by increasing their shares of
the world market from 0.07 percent to 6.8 percent (Korea) and .4 percent
to 5.9 percent (Taiwan, China). These and other "success cases" were
not particularly well situated in the early 1960s in products whose over-
all markets had rapid subsequent growth, and they did not move into
markets that were rapidly growing. Rather they maintained their cost-
competitiveness and increased their market shares of the nontraditional
exports rapidly in order to achieve high overall export growth rates.
Successful diversification into nontraditional exports and rapid ex-
port growth need not come only in manufactures. Chile's movement
away from dependence on copper exports has seen sustained export
success, with exports more than doubling from 1985 to 1990, while the
share of exports in "manufactures" 6 has remained roughly constant.
This diversification has been accomplished by moving into higher value-
added agricultural and horticultural products such as off-season tem-
perate fruits (for example grapes, apples), processed vegetable products,
36. "Manufactures" is in quotes because the usual definition of manufactures
according to the trade classification, SITC categories 5 through 8 less 68, excludes
a number of goods with substantial processing value added that are included in
the definition of manufactures used by the United Nations Industrial Develop-
ment Organization (UNIDO) (for example, alcoholic beverages [beer and wine],
chocolate preparations, and shaped wood).
RERs AND TRADE FLOWS 493
and wines (Jafee, 1992). Chile's exports of food items doubled from $897
million to $1,988 million from 1985 to 1990. Brazil's exports of frozen
concentrated orange juice grew from $82 million in 1975 to $338 million
in 1985 to over $1 billion in 1988, becoming Brazil's fifth largest export
product (Braga and Silber, 1991). Exports of cut flowers from Colombia
grew from a very small base in the 1970s to $111 million in 1982 to $228
million in 1990. In sub-Saharan Africa, Kenya has been successful in
establishing diversified agricultural exports. Kenyan horticultural ex-
ports were $133 million in 1990. The Kenyan cut-flower industry is in-
ternationally competitive as exports grew from almost nothing in the
1970s to more than $40 million in 1990. Kenya has also managed to move
into the supply of fresh fruit and vegetables to the European market.
Many cases of nontraditional export growth of countries with com-
petitive real exchange rates have come at the expense of countries that
allowed their currencies to become overvalued. Madagascar dominated
the market for vanilla beans in the 1960s and 1970s with 80 percent of
the market by volume but has seen its share of the market shrink to 35
percent as Indonesia developed the crop and expanded its share from
almost nothing to 35 percent of the market. Ghana and Nigeria together
accounted for 50 percent of the volume of cocoa bean exports in the
early 1950s but less than 20 percent of the market in 1990. In the 1960s
and 1970s C6te d'Ivoire moved into cocoa production and increased its
share from less than 10 percent to 30 percent of the market by the early
1980s. In the 1980s, however, Malaysia and Indonesia entered the cocoa
market. Their shares of the market have risen rapidly, from 3 percent
and 1 percent in the early 1980s to almost 10 percent and 6 percent, re-
spectively, of the market today.
Overall Export Response
In sum, three strands of empirical literature show very strong export
responses to devaluations in developing countries generally. Appreciat-
ing countries tend to suffer a large deterioration in export performance,
losing market share. Exports typically have increased substantially fol-
lowing large devaluation episodes, and export supply elasticities are
generally one or greater.7 The export response has also been quite rapid,
37. Short-term supply elasticities for some primary commodities are, how-
ever, low. Hence, for countries specializing in a few such products, near-term
elasticities might be lower than the average estimates for low-income countries.
In these cases, it is worth considering the supply elasticity estimates for the par-
ticular products involved and checking the resulting estimates of the aggregate
export supply elasticity against aggregate estimates for commodity-exporting
countries.
494 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
much of it occurring within a year or two. Finally, although nontradi-
tional exports are unlikely to contribute substantially to overall export
growth in the near term, experience suggests that a competitively val-
ued exchange rate maintained over an extended period is a necessary, if
not a sufficient, condition for diversifying exports successfully and sus-
taining their rapid growth? In fact, in countries where secular deterio-
ration in the terms of trade and export diversification are long-term is-
sues, the growth of nontraditional exports is an important indicator of
the appropriateness of the RER and trade policy.
However, there is no guarantee that a change in relative prices alone
will be sufficient to stimulate rapid growth of nontraditional exports.
Nonprice factors are undoubtedly important in creating the climate for
a rapid export expansion in response to a depreciation of the real ex-
change rate. The elasticity estimates cited above do not control for dif-
ferences in the structural reforms that may accompany a devaluation.
One of the reasons for the wide range of estimates of elasticities for both
aggregate exports and individual commodity is probably differences in
accompanying measures that could enhance the export supply response,
such as provision of adequate transport, marketing, and credit facilities.39
Summary and Conclusion
To return in concluding to the question posed at the start of this chapter,
how, empirically, does the real exchange rate affect trade flows and the
resource balance in developing countries?
In some circles "real exchange rate elasticity pessimism" has been a
predominant view for developing countries. This view, that the real ex-
change rate is unimportant for trade performance and external balance,
is founded on three empirical pessimisms about developing countries'
trade:
Import demand pessimism: that LJDCs' import structure is such that
most, if not all, inputs are required for producing output so that
the elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic value
added is essentially zero (the Leontief case);
38. See, for example, World Bank (1993).
39. Excessive volatility in the RER, which creates uncertainty and increases
risks for exporters, has also been shown to negatively affect exports (Caballero
and Corbo 1989). Dell'Ariccia (1998) also finds, using panel data for the Euro-
pean Union, that an increase in exchange rate volatility depresses international
trade, although the effect is not large. Empirically, volatility in the RER has some-
times served, in effect, as a proxy for RER misalignment because of the difficulty
in measuring the latter (Collins and Razin 1997).
RERs AND TRADE FLOWS 495
* Export demand pessimism: that world demand for the products in
which LIDC exports are concentrated is inelastic, both with re-
spect to incomes and prices; and
* Export supply pessimism: that LIDC exports are concentrated in a
few products with very low supply responses and that changes in
relative prices will not induce domestic producers to change out-
put by much.
However, a substantial amount of empirical work has been done on
exchange rates, trade elasticities, and trade flows in low-income coun-
tries. The international evidence suggests the trade response to an RER
adjustment should be substantial in low-income developing countries;
and reasonably reliable estimates of trade elasticities are available as
summarized below.
Price elasticity of import demand. The response of producers of import
substitutes is typically strong as the rise in the price of imports increases
the supply of import substitutes. Unless trade is liberalized at the time
of a devaluation, low-income countries should expect an elasticity of
imports with respect to the RER of roughly -0.7 to -0.9, with the full
adjustment occurring over two to four years. For countries with large
trade deficits, the near-term response of imports may be quantitatively
more important than the export response.
Price elasticity of export demand. Because of the small size of most low-
income economies and their small shares of the markets for their ex-
ports, general export demand pessimism is not warranted. Gains in
market shares offer possibilities for substantial export expansion even
in slowly growing markets for low-income elasticity products.
Price elasticity of aggregate export supply. If the effects of exchange rate
changes are passed through to domestic producer prices, aggregate ex-
ports typically respond fairly strongly and swiftly (within a year or two)
to real exchange movements. The price elasticity of supply of aggregate
exports from non-oil-exporting countries is at least 1.0 and may be as
high as 2.0 in some cases.
Commodity exports. The supply response of some primary commod-
ity exports may tend to be rather small in the near term and so may be a
significant concern in countries specializing heavily in a few of these
products. But the supply response can be much larger in the long term.
Nontraditional exports. Analysis of growth in nontraditional exports
suggests that supply pessimism is not generally valid for these and that
the potential response of these exports to economic incentives is enor-
mous. An appropriately valued exchange rate has been a necessary con-
dition for creating the types of dramatic export expansions witnessed in
some developing countries. Furthermore, in countries in which
496 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
deteriorating terms of trade for traditional exports and export diversi-
fication are long-term issues, the growth of nontraditional exports is an
important indicator of the appropriateness of the RER and trade policy.
The above estimates of the aggregate price elasticity of demand for
imports (-0.7 to -0.9) and of the supply of exports (1.0 to 2.0) in develop-
ing countries, together with the quite high world price elasticity of de-
mand for exports from individual countries except in a few isolated cases,
suggest that RER movements have quite significant effects on trade bal-
ances. Because of the speed of both the import and export responses,
any J-curve effects (that is, the tendency of the trade balance in domes-
tic-currency terms to worsen after a depreciation before it improves)
should be limited to the first year after a depreciation.4 Only in unusual
cases, such as a tiny economy entirely dependent on oil exports, are the
effects of RER depreciation on the trade balance likely to be limited.
40. The J-curve effect is a phenomenon that may occur after a devaluation in
the balance of payments measured in domestic-currency terms and may be an
important consideration for short-term macroeconomic management. For small
countries that are price takers in international trade, a devaluation raises both
import and export prices in domestic currency proportionately. If import and
export volumes are fixed in the short term (or slow to respond) and imports
initially exceed exports (a deficit in the trade balance), the initial arithmetic ef-
fect of a devaluation will be to widen the trade deficit measured in domestic-
currency terms. A J-curve effect can also occur between industrial countries that
invoice their exports in their own currencies so that initially their export rev-
enues are unaffected by a devaluation whereas the domestic currency cost of
their imports rises, causing a deterioration in their balance of payments.
For small countries, however, a devaluation has no effect on import and ex-
port prices in foreign-currency terms. Unless import and export volumes respond
perversely to a devaluation because of a simultaneous relaxation of import com-
pression or an increase in export repression policies, the trade deficit will at worst
remain constant in foreign-currency terms. Hence, the J-curve phenomenon is
not usually observed in the balance-of-payments data in foreign-currency terms,
which are commonly reported for many developing countries.
12
The Use of the Parallel Market
Rate as a Guide to Setting the
Official Exchange Rate
Nita Ghei and Steven B. Kamin*
Determining the appropriate level at which to set the exchange rate is a
challenging problem for any country pursuing a managed or fixed ex-
change rate policy Ideally, a country would set its exchange rate at the
long-run equilibrium real rate, that is, the rate consistent with internal
and external balance (the latter referring to balance between the current
account and sustainable capital account flows). Even in relatively stable
and mature industrial economies, however, the long-run equilibrium
level of the real exchange rate is usually difficult to identify. In develop-
ing countries subject to macroeconomic instability or structural change,
this identification is even more difficult. The determination of the equi-
librium real exchange rate is especially uncertain if the economy is in
the midst of trade liberalization and other reforms that promise to change
previously existing relations between trade performance and the ex-
change rate.
The issue of how to estimate long-run equilibrium real exchange rates
has been addressed from a variety of different empirical perspectives by
other chapters in this volume. This chapter rounds out that coverage by
extending the analysis to a particular context not specifically consid-
ered elsewhere in this book: that of countries that maintain multiple
exchange rate arrangements. Such arrangements, formal and informal,
* We are grateful to Larry Hinkle, Peter Montiel, Steve O'Connell, and three
anonymous readers for helpful comments and suggestions.
497
498 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
legal and illegal, were the norm for developing countries until very re-
cently. Even though an increasing number of countries have unified their
exchange rates, often as part of a larger liberalization effort, parallel for-
eign exchange markets have not disappeared as yet. Nigeria, which has
never successfully unified its exchange rate, is a prominent example in
Africa. In Venezuela, which unified its exchange rate in 1989, a parallel
market emerged in 1994 following the reimposition of capital controls.
Because parallel exchange rates continue to exist in important countries
and because specific analytical issues in estimating the long-run equi-
librium real exchange rate (LRER) that do not arise in the context of
unified rates present themselves in this case, the implications of parallel
rates merit separate attention.
The key question to be addressed in this context is the extent to which
the free exchange rate in a parallel exchange market can provide guid-
ance in identifying the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate. In cases
in which a parallel market for foreign exchange exists, it may appear
natural to consider the parallel exchange rate as a proxy for the "under-
lying" equilibrium real exchange rate-that is, the rate that would tend
to prevail over the long run in a unified exchange market. This interpre-
tation suggests itself because the parallel exchange rate usually has the
benefit of being determined in a free market and hence may not appear
to be obviously contaminated by the distortionary effects of government
policy.
Notwithstanding the appeal of a parallel market determined exchange
rate as a guide to setting the official exchange rate, however, we will
argue that various factors complicate the relationship between the par-
allel market rate and the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate. First,
while the parallel market for foreign exchange may not itself be con-
trolled by the government, conditions in that market are likely to be
affected by government policy. Relative supplies and demands for for-
eign currency in the parallel market will be altered by the level of the
official exchange rate, the extent to which exchange and trade controls
are enforced, and the government's formula for rationing foreign ex-
change receipts to importers. Second, because the parallel exchange
market represents an asset market as well as a trade-related market, the
parallel market rate is likely to reflect expectations, political concerns,
capital flight, and other speculative factors not directly associated with
the equilibrium real exchange rate. Hence, only under a relatively nar-
row set of circumstances may the parallel market rate serve as a useful
guide to determining the equilibrium value of the official exchange rate.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. The following section on
the essential characteristics of parallel exchange markets provides the
requisite background information on multiple exchange rate arrange-
THE PARALLEL MARKET RATE 499
ments. It also defines parallel exchange markets more precisely and de-
scribes their key characteristics.' In the subsequent section we review a
simple theoretical model of parallel exchange markets to shed light on
how parallel exchange rates are determined in relation to both official
exchange rates and equilibrium exchange rates. Then comes a section
that brings some empirical evidence to bear on the analysis, comparing
the evolution of parallel and official real exchange rates over time to
provide a feel for the applicability of the theoretical results derived in
the previous section. The final section summarizes the chapter's ana-
lytical and empirical findings concerning the relation between the par-
allel exchange rate and the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate.
Essential Characteristics of Parallel Exchange
Markets
This background section sets out the essential characteristics of parallel
exchange markets. It begins by defining more precisely what we mean
by a parallel exchange market and describing its key features. The sec-
tion then considers alternative ways in which governments have man-
aged parallel markets, distinguishing broadly between the Latin Ameri-
can and African models. The section concludes with a review of trends
in parallel markets in the 1990s.
Basic Concepts
A parallel foreign exchange market system is one in which transactions
take place at more than one exchange rate and at least one of the prevail-
ing rates is a freely floating, market-determined rate (the parallel ex-
change rate).2 Parallel market systems represent a subset of the broader
category of multiple exchange rate regimes, which refer to any regimes
in which two or more exchange rates are applied to the same currency.
Many developing countries have applied separate, fixed exchange rates
to different types of transactions, but this practice is, in essence, equiva-
lent to a single exchange rate coupled with different taxes or subsidies
(depending on the transaction). By contrast, a parallel market for for-
eign exchange is distinguished by the fact that the parallel exchange
rate is determined freely in the market. Usually, the official exchange
rate in parallel market systems is pegged by the authorities at a particular
1. For general surveys of the issues associated with parallel markets for for-
eign exchange, see Agenor (1992) and Kiguel and O'Connell (1995).
2. Kiguel and O'Connell (1995).
500 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
fixed (or crawling) rate, although in principle the official rate could be
floating as well. Additionally, it is frequently-although not always-
the case that the official exchange rate applies to current account trans-
actions, while the parallel market rate, whether legal or illegal, applies
to capital account transactions.
Parallel markets for foreign exchange can emerge only when the gov-
ernment imposes exchange controls, that is, restrictions on the volume
of certain foreign exchange transactions or on the price at which such
transactions are made. Trade barriers, quantitative restrictions, or high
tariffs alone are not in themselves sufficient to give rise to a parallel
exchange market. While such controls may affect the demand or supply
of foreign currencies, they will not drive a wedge between exchange
rates for different transactions as long as foreign exchange is freely avail-
able for all transactions at an official or market-determined exchange
rate. A parallel market arises when the government limits the amount
of foreign exchange that can be bought or sold for particular transac-
tions, causing excess demand or supply to spill over into a parallel mar-
ket, or authorizes that exchange rates for certain transactions be pegged
and for other transactions be floating.
Parallel exchange rate systems may be legal or illegal. When the par-
allel market for foreign exchange is legal, it is often referred to as a dual
exchange rate (DER) system. In these cases, most current account trans-
actions take place at a pegged commercial rate, and capital account trans-
actions at a market-determined financial rate. A number of countries
have experimented with DER systems of varying duration. Some coun-
tries maintained official dual exchange rates for long time periods, such
as Belgium (from 1957 to 1990) and the Dominican Republic (until 1993).
The parallel market in these countries was used to insulate the rest of
the economy from short-term capital flows. France (1971-74) and Italy
(1973-74) adopted dual rates for a short period following the collapse of
the Bretton Woods system as a transitory measure. Argentina, Mexico,
and Venezuela adopted DER regimes in the 1980s in the wake of balance-
of-payments crises and huge capital outflows.
Illegal parallel market systems emerge when private agents attempt
to evade restrictions on the price or quantity of foreign exchange trans-
actions. Illegal parallel markets were the norm in most of Africa and
South Asia, as well as in several Latin American countries, especially
through the 1980s. The authorities, with some exceptions, generally tol-
erated the parallel markets. For example, the threat of enforcement and
penalties was significant in Ghana before 1983, but these efforts fell by
the wayside later on, and the coverage of the parallel market grew, as
did the parallel premium (Kiguel and O'Connell, 1995). In Sudan, trad-
ing on the parallel market was a capital offense, and enforcement was
THE PARALLEL MARKET RATE 501
attempted between 1970 and 1990. But even the threat of capital punish-
ment did not totally wipe out the parallel market, though it may have
been a factor in the very high premium observed in Sudan.
In principle, there is little difference, in terms of macroeconomic im-
plications, between legal and illegal systems. In either case, free-market
transactions in foreign exchange take place alongside controlled price
transactions. In either legal or illegal systems, there are incentives for
transactions to spill over or "leak" from one market into the other. These
leakages may tend to undermine the dual exchange rate systems, de-
pending upon how rigidly exchange controls are enforced.
Observers frequently view the incidence of restrictions on interna-
tional transactions as evidence of the prevalence and importance of par-
allel exchange markets. According to IMF reports, about one-half of the
member countries impose restrictions on payments on transaction on
the current account; more than three-quarters do so on capital account
payments (See table 12.1). However, the mere existence of restrictions
does not necessarily imply the existence of significant parallel markets
since the IMF data are qualitative, with only two values (yes and no),
and so do not capture either the intensity of restrictions or the effective-
ness of their enforcement. Therefore, considering the existence of pay-
ments restrictions alone would result in an overestimate of the preva-
lence of parallel markets for foreign exchange. In fact, only 46 (33 per-
cent) out of the 138 countries in table 12.1 having some form of payments
restrictions in 1994 actually had parallel market premiums exceeding 15
percent in that year. Of these 46 countries, 40 had restrictions on both
current and capital account transactions, with the other 6 having restric-
tions only on capital account transactions. Of the 46 countries with sig-
nificant parallel premiums, 20 were in Africa, 14 were socialist or for-
merly socialist economies, and the other 12 were in Latin America, Asia,
or the Middle East.3
Parallel markets are likely to be unimportant, and the parallel pre-
mium low, when payments restrictions and capital controls are either
minimal or not enforced. For example, South Africa imposed capital
controls in 1985, following massive capital outflows, and reintroduced
a dual exchange rate system at that time. But the parallel premium has
remained modest enough-the median premium was 4.4 percent for
3. Comprehensive data on parallel exchange rates used to be published in
Pick's World Currency Yearbook and by its successor, International Currency Analy-
sis, Inc. However, since these ceased publication in the mid-1990s, no single pub-
lic source of comprehensive data on parallel rates after 1994 has been readily
available. Data on parallel rates now have to be obtained on an ad hoc country-
by-country basis from whatever official or unofficial sources may be available.
502 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
Table 12.1 Incidence of Payments Restrictions among IMF Member
Countries
Transaction Type Year
1980 1994
Current Accounta 51.8% 51.7%
Capital Account 78.0% 77.5%
a. All countries with payment restrictions on current transactions also had restrictions on
capital account transactions
Source: "Exchange Restrictions and Exchange Arrangements: Annual Report of the IMF,"
various issues.
the period 1980-89 and declined to 2.3 percent during the period 1990-
94 (Ghei, Kiguel, and O'Connell 1996)-that South Africa would be con-
sidered to have a unified exchange rate regime under the definition
adopted in the section below on trends in official and parallel real ex-
change rates. There are several other examples of countries that have
had extremely low premiums, including Thailand, Malaysia, and Indo-
nesia, with median premiums varying from -1.5 to 3.4 per cent (Ghei,
Kiguel, and O'Connell 1996).
Management of Parallel Markets
Parallel market systems emerge for different reasons in different coun-
tries. There is one legitimate rationale for a system in which current ac-
count transactions are conducted at a pegged rate and capital account
transactions are conducted at a floating rate: to insulate domestic prices
and economic activity from exchange rate fluctuations deriving from
transitory shocks in the financial market.
In practice, the implementation of parallel market systems in devel-
oping countries rarely has been consistent with this rationale. In certain
Latin American countries, dual exchange rate systems were indeed
adopted in response to strong, temporary capital outflows resulting from
balance-of-payments crises in the 1980s. These did, to a certain extent,
protect their economies from excessive, transitory depreciations of the
exchange rate. There was very little rationing in the official market for
trade transactions, as foreign exchange supply was usually enough to
satisfy demand. On average, the premium of the parallel rate relative to
the official rate was quite moderate in these cases-though there were
occasional spikes when the premium was very high. But these spikes
reflected temporary macroeconomic crises, not a drastic and persistent
misalignment of the real exchange rate. However, these dual market
THE PARALLEL MARKET RATE 503
arrangements were retained long after the financial crises had passed.
Moreover, even after the crises had passed, the parallel rates continued
to be more depreciated than the official rates. In a dual rate system de-
signed to protect an economy from exchange rate variability-as op-
posed to a system designed to target the official rate at a level persis-
tently more appreciated than the one that the market would set-the
parallel rate would be expected to fluctuate both above and below the
official rate.
In African countries, parallel markets were even less consistent with
the one legitimate rationale for maintaining a dual rate system. In these
countries, exchange controls were frequently tightened as progressive
overvaluation of the official exchange rate led to excess demand for for-
eign exchange at the official rate. This tightening, in turn, led to the cre-
ation of parallel markets to evade exchange controls, even in the ab-
sence of strong capital account pressures. Hence, exchange controls were
used to prop up persistently misaligned official exchange rates, not to
insulate the domestic economy from transitory fluctuations. In the pro-
totypical case, foreign exchange rationing grew more stringent over time
as the official exchange rate became increasingly overvalued. Importers
who lacked access to ever scarcer foreign exchange through the official
channels turned to the parallel market to obtain foreign exchange for
trade transactions. The parallel premium grew to very high levels, and
stayed there, as the official rate became more and more overvalued. In
Ghana, which is the textbook example of this phenomenon, the official
exchange rate was so overvalued by the end of the 1980s that it became
irrelevant for most transactions; even domestic prices and inflation re-
flected the parallel, not the official rate (Chhibber and Shaffik, 1991).
Parallel Markets in the 1990s
Although a great many countries have experimented with parallel ex-
change arrangements at various times, the incidence of such arrange-
ments has been declining in the 1990s, since an increasing number of
developing countries have sought to unify their exchange rates, often as
part of a larger structural reform effort, which includes liberalization of
the external accounts. The breakup of the former Soviet Union tempo-
rarily added a number of new countries that initially had parallel ex-
change markets. However, the trend among the new transition econo-
mies has also been toward unification (Halpern and Wyplosz 1997).
Observers have identified various negative consequences of exchange
controls and the parallel markets that they engender. A nonexhaustive
list would include, first, the fact that exchange controls allow the au-
thorities to maintain a persistently misaligned official exchange rate-
perhaps coupled with inappropriate fiscal, monetary, and commercial
504 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
policies-without losing all their international reserves, thereby distort-
ing relative prices in the economy and inhibiting the growth of exports.
Second, because parallel market regimes often involve the rationing of
foreign exchange at subsidized rates to those with preferential access to
the authorities, exchange controls encourage the development of rent-
seeking behavior among private entrepreneurs. Finally, the introduc-
tion of exchange controls, which by their nature are hard to enforce and
profitable to evade, tends to promote a culture of law evasion among
private entrepreneurs that may spill over into other areas such as tax
compliance or adherence to other economic and financial regulations.
In response to these and other adverse effects of exchange controls,
many countries have moved to dismantle exchange controls and unify
their exchange markets. Parallel exchange rate arrangements are now
found in developing countries only; Belgium, which was the last devel-
oped country with dual exchange rates, moved to a unified exchange
rate in 1990. Some parallel markets were abandoned either because they
were no longer needed (for example, when the crisis that led to them
ended) or because they were no longer effective (for example, when ram-
pant evasion of exchange controls undermined the dual exchange rate
system). Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela had legal dual rates that were
expected to be temporary. All three created dual rates and then unified
within the period 1980 to 1994, though a parallel market did re-emerge
in Venezuela in 1994, as discussed above. Other Latin American coun-
tries moved to multiple rates or unified within the same period. In the
African and Asian countries, in contrast, parallel markets have tended
to be more long lived. A few of these countries unified their exchange
rates in the 1990s. Others (including Tanzania, Ghana, and India) moved
to legalize their parallel markets as a transitional measure while easing
restrictions on current account transactions-as a step on the path to
unification of the exchange rate. In those cases, unification has been part
of a larger structural reform effort aimed at liberalizing markets overall.
However, the trend toward unification has not been universal. Major
exceptions remain-mostly in Africa, including Nigeria, Kenya, and
Zambia. To assess the extent to which the survival of parallel markets
has been more widespread, we gathered data on the official and parallel
exchange rates for a sample of 24 developing countries listed in table
12.2.1 Our sample includes countries in which significant parallel mar-
kets existed for some time. It includes most of the more important
4. The sample is drawn from the World Bank research project on the macro-
economic implications of multiple exchange rates in developing countries, the
findings of which are reported in Kiguel, Lizondo, and O'Connell (1996). The
basic data set used here is from Ghei and Kiguel (1992). We added three African
countries-Algeria, Malawi, and Sudan-and extended the data set to the end
THE PARALLEL MARKET RATE 505
developing countries outside Eastern and Central Europe and the former
Soviet Union. The sample is otherwise fairly representative geographi-
cally, with 11 countries from Latin America, 10 from Africa, 2 from South
Asia, and Turkey. Parallel exchange rates were still present in half of
these countries at the end of 1994 (see table 12.2).1
The evolution over time of the official and parallel real exchange rates
in the sample group of countries is shown in figure 12.1.a and 12.1.b.
The level of the parallel premium has decreased, on average, in the coun-
tries that have retained parallel exchange rate arrangements. For a se-
lected group of high-premium countries, Ghei, Kiguel, and O'Connell
(1996) find that the median premium for the period 1990 to 1994 was 49
percent, compared with a figure of 100 per cent for the period 1980 to
1989.6 Similar trends have been observed for moderate and low-premium
countries as well. For our sample, we find lower premiums in 1994 rela-
tive to 1985 in many cases.
Overall, then, there are indications that developing countries are
moving in the direction of unified exchange rates. The number of coun-
tries with significant parallel markets has declined, and the gap between
the official and the parallel rate is steadily decreasing in most of the
countries that still have parallel rates. Nonetheless, parallel exchange
rates continue to exist in a significant number of developing countries
around the world.
A Simple Model of Parallel Exchange Rate
Determination
As we have just seen, unification of parallel exchange markets has been
on the policy agenda of many developing countries in recent years. When
the unification of parallel exchange rates is intended to result in a single
exchange rate that is officially determined-as is generally the case-
the authorities will need to identify the long-run equilibrium value of
the real exchange rate, and, as noted in the introduction, this task will
of 1994, the last year for which consistent data are available as explained in foot-
note 3. A number of transition economies also had parallel rates in 1994 but were
not part of the sample studied.
5. However, documenting the trend toward unification, parallel exchange
rate arrangements had been even more widespread in developing countries in
the 1980s-every country in our sample had more than one exchange rate in 1985.
6. A high-premium country is one in which the median premium exceeds 50
percent. The term "moderate premium" is applied to countries with a median
premium between 10 percent and 50 percent. A median level of less than 10
percent puts a country into the low-premium category. The time period exam-
ined is 1970-94.
506 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
Table 12.2 Status of the Parallel Market and Level of the Parallel
Premium (%)
Year
Country 1980 1985 1990 1994
Latin America and Turkey
Argentina Unified 30.79 29.93 Unified
Bolivia 19.85 223.60 Unified Unified
Brazil 8.90 30.12 14.28 Unified
Chile 6.03 25.39 16.78 8.67
Colombia Unified 11.42 9.24 6.12
Dominican Rep. 38.00 7.69 68.01 Unified
Ecuador 11.45 76.90 23.53 5.45
Mexico Unified 28.46 7.41 Unified
Peru 36.25 29.53 104.80 Unified
Uruguay Unified 9.41 10.93 16.51
Venezuela Unified 104.00 Unified 4.73
Turkey 9.98 -7.17 Unified Unified
Africa and South Asia
Algeria 193.25 375.23 248.81 253.95
Egypt 7.77 122.90 89.47 Unified
Ethiopia 35.02 127.66 192.75 113.26
Ghana 485.92 143.48 9.84 Unified
Kenya 9.38 4.51 3.11 19.78
Malawi 92.27 49.51 17.51 14.62
Nigeria 67.67 306.22 19.40 231.87
Sudan 92.40 27.14 955.45 53.13
Tanzania 174.00 271.89 56.36 Unified
Zambia 70.27 65.39 279.56 -6.15
India 9.58 15.12 9.10 Unified
Pakistan 26.26 -0.67 8.72 Unified
# Parallel Markets 19 24 22 12
Note: The premium is defined as (er/e'- 1) 100. The exchange rate is expressed as domestic
currency/U.S. dollars. Data are annual averages calculated using ending of quarter values.
Source: IFS and World Currency Yearbook, Currency Analysis, various issues.
be fraught with considerable uncertainty. Under these circumstances,
the prevailing preunification parallel exchange rate appears as an
obvious proxy for the postunification equilibrium rate, and the authori-
ties might naturally consider the parallel rate to be an appropriate tar-
get toward which to move the official rate, either gradually or all at
once. However, there are many factors that could cause the parallel rate
to diverge significantly from the long-run equilibrium value of a uni-
fied rate, making it, in many instances, an inappropriate target for the
official exchange rate.
THE PARALLEL MARKET RATE 507
Figure 12.1.a Latin America and Turkey: Official and Parallel
Bilateral Real Exchange Rates with the U.S. Dollar, 1970-94 (First
Quarter of 1985=100)
Argentina
400
300
200
- Official RER ----- Parallel RER
O f i i RBolivia
200
600-
500
400-
300-
100-
0
- Official RER ------ Parallel RER
Brazil
850
200-
150
400
100 . ... .....
- Official RER ··. -.-. Parallel RER
Chile
00
700-
600-
500 -
400-
300-
200-
-Official RER -- -- - -- Parallel RER
Note: Quarterly figures with year marking fourth quarter. An upward rnovemnent is a de-
preciation of the RER.
508 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
Colombia
10
160-
40-
20
- Official RER ------- Parallel RER
Dominican Republic
140
120i7
100--
60- ........
40
20 -
- Official RER .---- Parallel RER
Ecuador
400
350--
300
250*,
150
100
50
- Official RER - --- - -- Parallel RER
100-
-Official RERrParallel RER
Not: Qartrlyfigreswit yer Merk otqare.Auprdmvnntiad-
300ato o heRR
THE PARALLEL MARKET RATE 509
Peru
250
200--
50
50 ;fi;
- Official RER .·-.--Parallel RER
Uruguay
140
120
100 -
80 -
60 -I ý 1- ........
40
20
0
- Official RER . Parallel RER
Turkey
120-
100 -- -
80--
60
40
20
0
- Official RER ----- Parallel RER
Venezuela
350
300--
250
200 ·
150--
100
50
0 -
- Official RER ----- Parallel RER
Note: Quarterly figures with year marking fourth quarter. An upward movement is a de-
preciation of the RER.
510 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
Figure 12.1.b Africa and South Asia: Official and Parallel Bilateral
Real Exchanges with the U.S. Dollar, 1970--94 (First Quarter of
1985=100)
Algeria
1,000
800
600
400. .
200
0 i
- Offical RER ---- Parallel RER
Egypt
250
200 -a ... R
150
300
50
Co CY Co Co ci
Official RER - - - Parallel RER
450- Ethiopia
Ofica5PR -Prall E
Ghana
700
600
500
40
30- Ofca RE ........rall. E
200
100
0
1a'- I- I' -*IIt ,......
- Official RER ------- Parallel RER
Note: Quarterly figures with year marking fourth quarter. An upward movement is a de-
preciation of the RER.
THE PARALLEL MARKET RATE 511
India
200
150-
100-
50
CY
- Official RER ----- Parallel RER
Kenya
200
180--
160
140-
60
40
20
-Official RER ··---- Parallel RER
Malawi
25û
200-
150-
100 -
500-
- Official RER ----- Parallel RER
Nigeria
1,500
1,000- -
500
0
- Official RER ------ Parallel RER
Note: Quarterly figures with year marking fourth quarter. An upward movement is a de-
preciation of the RER.
512 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
Pakistan
10
100 -
- Official RER ---- Parallel RER
Sudan
400
300
200-
100-
0
- Official RER ------- Parallel RER
Tanzania
800
600 -
400- -...
200-
0
- Official RER ------- Parallel RER
Zambia
1,200
1,000.I
800--
600-
400-
0 . .. ... .. . . .. . . en....
200
- Official RER ------- Parallel RER
Note: Quarterly figures with year marking fourth quarter. An upward movement is a de-
preciation of the RER.
THE PARALLEL MARKET RATE 513
To develop this argument, this section presents a simple partial-
equilibrium model to illustrate how the parallel market exchange rate is
determined in relation both to the official exchange rate and to the long-
run equilibrium exchange rate-that is, the rate that would produce
equilibrium in the balance of payments under normal, sustainable policy
conditions.7 There is no consensus regarding the most appropriate model
to use in explaining the parallel market rate, just as there is no agree-
ment as to which model best explains the movement of floating exchange
rates among industrial countries. The model illustrated below has the
advantage of being relatively straightforward and intuitive, while hope-
fully highlighting the most important features influencing the parallel
market rate.
Basic Setup
Consider a small open economy trading in two goods, a nondomestically
consumed export good and a nondomestically produced import; the
world prices of both goods are fixed and set to unity. To focus on devel-
opments in the external sector, we assume it to be small relative to the
domestic economy, so that the analysis describes the operation of the
parallel exchange market in partial equilibrium. Therefore, the output of
a nontraded good and its price are considered fixed as well. We assume for
convenience that the U.S. dollar is the only foreign currency traded.
Turning to the parameters of government policy, it is assumed that
monetary and fiscal policies are at their long-run, sustainable levels, and
moreover, for analytical convenience, that there are no tariffs, subsidies,
or other commercial policy interventions. (The role of import barriers
will be examined later.) The official exchange rate E (measured in terms
of domestic currency per dollar) is pegged at an overvalued level rela-
tive to the equilibrium rate. Therefore, at that level of the exchange rate,
the flow demand for U.S. dollars (to be elaborated below) exceeds their
flow supply. Unlike other models considered in this book, we assume
here that the overvaluation is supported by foreign exchange ration-
ing-that is, exporters are required to surrender their dollar earnings to
the central bank at the official rate E, and the central bank rations dollar
sales to importers, restricting them to the amount OS, based on the
amount of export revenues surrendered to the central bank OX, accord-
ing to a central bank rationing function as shown in equation 12.1:
(12.1) OS = OS (OX), OS'() > 0.
7. The model and its exposition are based on the analysis presented in Kamin
(1993, 1995).
514 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
Private capital flows are assumed to take place in the parallel market
with the central bank supplying foreign exchange only for imports to
the official market.
In response to the prevailing excess demand for dollars at the official
rate E, a parallel market for dollars priced at the parallel market rate EI
emerges. We follow the conventional stock-flow approach to exchange
rate determination in positing that in the long run, the parallel rate moves
so as to equate flow demands for dollars by importers with flow sup-
plies for dollars by exporters. That is, in the long run EI is set so as to
balance the private sector's current account. In the short run, in con-
trast, the parallel market rate is assumed to move exclusively to set the
portfolio demand for dollars equal to the stock of dollars outstanding, so
that at any given moment the private current account may be out of balance.
The Equilibrium Parallel Market Rate
We now analyze the determination of the parallel market rate when the
private current is in account equilibrium. The private-sector current ac-
count is defined as the difference between private dollar inflows or sup-
plies, S, and outflows or demands, D. We assume that foreigners hold
no domestic assets, so that changes in the stock of dollars held by the
private sector, B, occur exclusively through imbalances in the private
sector's current account, as shown by equation 12.2:
(12.2) dB=S-D.
The current account (or flow) demand for dollars is a derived de-
mand for imported goods. Arbitrage ensures that the price of the im-
port will be the same, whether purchased from a legal importer with
access to official foreign exchange or from a smuggler using dollars pur-
chased in the parallel market.8 In either case, the price of imports will be
set equal to its marginal cost, the parallel market rate El (since by as-
sumption, the foreign-currency price is set to unity). Therefore, the pri-
vate demand for imports, as indicated in equation 12.3 below, depends
(negatively) upon the domestic currency price of imports E relative to
the price of nontradables P".'
8. We assume that there are no tariffs and that restrictions on smuggling are
evaded at no cost. The latter assumption is relaxed below.
9. In principle, import demand is a function of income as well. Since, in this
partial equilibrium model, income is considered to be fixed, we do not include it
explicitly in the demand function.
THE PARALLEL MARKET RATE 515
(12.3) D = D (E/P") = D(el), D'() < 0
where eP is the real parallel exchange rate.
The current account (or flow) supply of dollars derives both from
underinvoiced dollar earnings-that is, export receipts not turned over
to the central bank-and from official dollar sales to importers, OS. Note
that while holders of import licenses have an incentive to overinvoice,
this does not add to the total supply of dollars to the private sector,
which is fixed by the central bank's rationing function (equation 12.1).
Let X represent the quantity of total exports and total dollar revenues as
well (since the world price is set to unity), whilef represents the share of
total export proceeds diverted to the parallel market. Then, as shown by
equation 12.4:
(12.4) S= X+OS(OX)= X+OS((1- )X).
Exporters maximize domestic-currency profits subject to rising mar-
ginal costs of production-which we assume to be related to the price of
nontraded goods-as well as rising costs associated with the
underinvoicing sharef. We can derive the supply curve for total exports
as a function of the weighted average of the real (nontradables price
deflated) official (e) and parallel (eP) market exchange rates as shown in
equation 12.5:10
(12.5) X = X (0 eP+(1-O)e), X'() > 0.
The underinvoicing sharef can be shown to positively depend upon the
real parallel market premium as indicated by equation 12.6:
(12.6) 0 = 0 (el - e), 0' () > 0.
For a given value of the real official rate e, a unique real parallel mar-
ket rate eP will equate dollar demands and supplies in equilibrium as
shown in equation 12.7:
(12.7) D (el)= p X + OS (OX).
This equation can be further simplified if we posit that, on average and
over a long enough time period, the central bank will have roughly stable
10. See Kamin (1993) for details.
516 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
international reserves. Therefore, we can assume that over a long time
period, the central bank will resell all surrendered export receipts OX =
(1 -f)X to licensed importers, after it extracts any foreign exchange needs
of the government (assumed to be invariant to the exchange rate), D *.n
This relationship is expressed in equation 12.8:
(12.8) OS (OX) = OX - DG = (1 - O)X - D.
Therefore, equation 12.7 can now be rewritten as 12.9:
(12.9) D(el)=0X+(1-4i)X-D =X-D"=X(0e7+(1-4)e)-D.
Figure 12.2 below depicts various different equilibria in the parallel
exchange market, depending upon the value of e set by the authorities.
The DD curve depicts equation 12.3, the private demand for foreign ex-
change as a function of the real parallel rate eo. The SS curve depicts the
supply of foreign exchange to the market as a function of eP; its location
also is a function of e, since both eP and e affect the total quantity of
exports supplied. The variable e* is the long-run equilibrium real ex-
change rate. It is the level of the real exchange rate that would clear the
market (that is, set total demands for foreign exchange equal to total
supplies) in a unified foreign exchange market. Note that when the offi-
cial exchange rate is set equal to e*, the parallel rate also must equal e*.12
In other words, when the official exchange rate is set at its equilibrium
value, there is no current account motive for the emergence of a parallel
foreign exchange market, since there is no excess demand for foreign
exchange at the official rate. We now consider the effects on the real
parallel rate of a real appreciation of the official rate. Assume that the
authorities allow the official rate e to appreciate to an overvalued level
e,< e*. Because this lowers the profitability of exports, the supply curve
SS shifts inward, creating an excess demand for foreign exchange at that
rate. This puts upward pressure on the foreign exchange value of the
dollar in the (now emergent) parallel market, causing the parallel ex-
change rate to depreciate from e* to eP.13
Hence, in cases in which the emergence of the parallel market reflects
the overvaluation of the official commercial exchange rate, the parallel
11. This formulation is consistent with the assumptions in Sheik (1976) and
Nowak (1984).
12. This equality must hold because if D(e*) = X(e*) - Dg in a unified exchange
market and if in a parallel market system D(ep) = X(fep + (1 - f)e*) - Dg, then it is
obvious by inspection that the second equation is satisfied for ep =e*.
13. This result is consistent with that found by Nowak (1984).
THE PARALLEL MARKET RATE 517
Figure 12.2 Flow Supply and Demand for Foreign Exchange in the
Parallel Market
eP D
S(e1)
S(e*)
ei ------------------------------
P
----- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- <
S
D
I.D-S
Note: An increase in eP is a depreciation.
market rate, on average, is likely to be more depreciated not only than
the commercial rate but probably also than the long-run equilibrium
exchange rate. Various factors are likely to determine the extent to which
the parallel rate is more depreciated than the equilibrium exchange rate.
As figure 12.2 makes obvious, the more overvalued the official exchange
rate-and so the greater the extent to which the SS curve shifts inward-
the greater will be the gap between the parallel rate and the equilibrium
rate. It also is straightforward to show that the more elastic exports are
and the less elastic imports are with respect to the exchange rate, the
greater the gap will be.
The extent to which export surrender requirements are enforced plays
a key role in determining the value of the parallel exchange rate as well.
Recall that total exports are a function of a weighted average of the real
official and parallel exchange rates. If foreign exchange regulations are
tightly enforced, underinvoicing of exports will be limited, reducing the
underinvoicing ratiof and thereby increasing the weight placed on the
official exchange rate. In this case, the overvaluation of the official ex-
change rate depresses total exports significantly, reducing the supply of
foreign exchange to the parallel market, and depreciating the real paral-
lel market exchange rate substantially relative to the equilibrium rate.
Conversely, if foreign exchange regulations are poorly enforced and
widely evaded, the underinvoicing ratio will be higher, the weighted
518 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
average exchange rate will be more favorable for exporters, and total
exports will not be as severely depressed. This will lead to less pressure
on the parallel market exchange rate and a smaller gap relative to the
equilibrium rate. At an extreme, as to some extent occurred in some
African countries, the official exchange rate becomes so widely evaded
that it becomes irrelevant to most economic decisions. In this context,
most trade is routed through the underground economy, and the paral-
lel exchange rate may become a reasonably accurate guide to the long-
run equilibrium rate.
Finally, the value of the parallel exchange rate in long-run equilib-
rium is likely to be influenced by the extent to which short-run barriers
to imports (above and beyond merely rationing official sales of foreign
exchange through exchange controls) are enforced.14 The above analysis
assumes that once importers acquire foreign exchange, whether officially
or from the black market, they may use that financing to freely import
goods. However, if the authorities temporarily impose high import bar-
riers and the barriers are well enforced so that smuggling is costly, these
barriers will reduce the demand for foreign exchange in the black mar-
ket-that is, the DD curve shown in figure 12.2 will shift inward and to
the left. This reduced demand, in turn, would cause the real parallel
exchange rate to appreciate relative to the long-run equilibrium value of
the real exchange rate. For sufficiently tight controls on imports, the real
parallel rate could even be more appreciated than the long-run equilib-
rium real rate.
The Parallel Market Rate in Short-Run Portfolio
Equilibrium
The results described above are likely, at best, to hold on average over
relatively long periods of time. In the very short term, the stock of dol-
lars held by the private sector is considered to be fixed, since it takes
time to accumulate or dissipate dollars through current account imbal-
ances. During this short run, the parallel market rate, at which all pri-
vate capital flows are assumed to take place, is conventionally modeled
as being determined by the portfolio-based demand for dollars. This
portfolio demand depends upon the relative expected rates of return to
holding dollars and domestic assets-which are influenced by antici-
pated inflation, other aspects of macroeconomic performance, and po-
litical events as well. The volatility of such expectations largely explains
14. We consider the case of short-run barriers only, since these leave the long-
run equilibrium real exchange rate e* unchanged.
THE PARALLEL MARKET RATE 519
the high volatility exhibited by most freely floating exchange rates, in-
cluding parallel market exchange rates.
For a simple theoretical exposition, assume that private-sector agents
hold two assets in their portfolio, dollars and domestic currency. Fol-
lowing Dornbusch and others (1983), the desired ratio of the domestic-
currency value of private-sector dollar holdings to the nominal domes-
tic money supply (M) is modeled as a function of the expected rate of
depreciation of the black market rate (the ' denotes percentage change),
as shown in equation 12.10:
EPB
(12.10) M= 0 (), O > 0
where B is the stock of dollars held by the private sector. Dividing the
numerator and the denominator on the left side of equation 12.10 by the
price of nontraded goods yields equation 12.11:
(12.11) elB=( ), where m=
m P
The notation for the rate of depreciation, P P, omits an expectational term
to reflect the assumption of perfect foresight. The portfolio demand for
dollars (when the parallel market rate is stable) traces out a downward-
sloping curve in (er, B) space as shown in figure 12.3. Given that B is
considered fixed at any one moment, the level of B determines the level
of eP at that moment.
In the long run, the parallel market rate and the private stock of dol-
lar holdings are determined by the requirements of both portfolio and
current account equilibrium. In addition to the portfolio equilibrium
condition described above, figure 12.3 depicts the locus of points for
which the private current account is in equilibrium, so that the stock of
dollars (B) held by the private sector is unchanging. This curve, denoted
dB = 0, is vertical, since for any given official exchange rate, a single
value of the parallel market rate eP clears the private current account.
The point where the two curves cross-the steady-state equilibrium-is
15. For simplicity, this analysis abstracts from the interest payments associ-
ated with net asset holdings, as well as from the wealth effects of asset holdings
on import demand. In the presence of interest payments or wealth effects, the
dB = 0 curve would not be vertical, since the value of the parallel market ex-
change rate that cleared the private current account would depend upon the
stock of dollar holdings B.
520 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
Figure 12.3 Current Account and Portfolio Equilibrium in the Parallel
Market
B
dB = 0
O e P
Note: An increase in er is a depreciation.
the only point at which both the current account is in equilibrium and
the stock of dollars held by the private sector equals its portfolio de-
mand. Finally, the vertical and horizontal arrows represent the direc-
tion of movement of B and eP outside of equilibrium, while the diagonal
line-the "stable saddle path"-indicates the path by which B and eP
converge toward equilibrium, should they start out outside of equilibrium.
We now consider the effects on the parallel market rate of a rise in
inflation-for example, from 0 to 20 percent-leading to higher rates of
nominal depreciation of the official and parallel exchange rates. This
example is an important one because many countries that imposed ex-
change controls experienced increases in inflation and other measures
of macroeconomic volatility at about the same time, particularly in Latin
America (and Turkey).
As shown in figure 12.4, the increased expected level of inflation-
and hence of nominal depreciation of the parallel market rate-leads
agents to desire to hold a higher ratio of dollars to domestic currency,
causing the portfolio balance curve to shift upward. Equilibrium dollar
holdings shift from Bo to B, while the equilibrium real parallel market
rate remains unchanged. However, in order to accumulate additional
dollars, the private current account must shift into surplus temporarily,
which in turn requires a temporary depreciation of the real parallel ex-
change rate. Hence, at the moment of increased inflation expectations,
THE PARALLEL MARKET RATE 521
the parallel market rate jumps from initial equilibrium at (1) to the new
stable saddle path at (2). After this, the accumulation of dollars through
the current account surplus reverses the depreciation of the real parallel
market rate until the system returns to equilibrium at (3).
In the example depicted above, the real parallel exchange rate be-
comes, for a time, more depreciated than its own equilibrium level, con-
ditional on the value of the real official rate. (As a result of these tempo-
rary capital outflows, the short-run equilibrium exchange rate in a uni-
fied market also would depreciate relative to its long-run equilibrium
level.) Since the equilibrium level of the parallel exchange rate is likely
(as shown above in the previous subsection) to be more depreciated than
the long-run equilibrium rate in a unified exchange market, the accu-
mulation of dollar balances during periods of macroeconomic volatility
and capital outflows will cause the parallel rate to be even more depre-
ciated at such times. Hence, during periods of macroeconomic volatility
and heavy capital outflows, the parallel rate is likely to be a particularly
biased guide to setting the appropriate level of the official exchange rate.
In fact, because of the asset market function of the parallel exchange
market, the parallel market rate can trade at a large premium over the
official rate, even when the official rate is close to its long-run equilib-
rium value-that is, the value that equilibrates the balance of payments
in "normal" macroeconomic circumstances. As noted above, during
periods of heavy capital outflows the short-run equilibrium real exchange
Figure 12.4 Effect of Increased Inflation on the Parallel Exchange Rate
B dB=0
B I - - - -- - - - (3)
PP= 20
Bo ------- (2)
eP
Note: An increase in eP is a depreciation.
522 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
rate in a unified exchange market may depreciate relative to its long-
run level. If the official exchange rate remains at its equilibrium long-
run level, a temporary excess demand for foreign exchange will develop
that will cause a parallel market premium to emerge. The Latin Ameri-
can countries' experiences with exchange controls may fit this scenario.
As will be discussed further below, in several of these countries a com-
bination of factors led to a balance-of-payments crisis in the 1980s. The
governments responded to this crisis by depreciating the official ex-
change rate, but because of the size of the capital outflows triggered by
the crises, the parallel market rates in these countries depreciated still
further.
Finally, we should underscore the fact that even if the real parallel
market exchange rate, on average over long periods of time, were a good
indicator of the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate, the value of
the real parallel market rate at any single point in time would likely be
an extremely unreliable proxy for that equilibrium rate. This is because
the parallel market exchange rate, like any other asset price, depends
upon highly volatile portfolio demands, and hence is itself highly vola-
tile. This volatility may be seen quite easily in the figures showing the
official and parallel exchange rates at the end of this chapter. Hence,
aside from the fact that the parallel rate is likely to be a biased indicator
of the long-run equilibrium exchange rate, it is also-unless averaged
over very long periods-likely to be a highly volatile and inaccurate indi-
cator of the equilibrium rate as well."
Trends in Official and Parallel Real Exchange
Rates
The theoretical model described above suggests that the parallel ex-
change rate is likely to be more depreciated than the long-run equilib-
rium real exchange rate unless (a) macroeconomic factors inducing capi-
tal flight are not present, (b) exchange controls are poorly enforced, or
(c) there are high import barriers that are well enforced. To evaluate
these hypotheses, we would, ideally, compare the path of the parallel
exchange rate in various countries to that of the long-run equilibrium
real exchange rate in order to gauge the extent to which the parallel rate
16. On the basis of an optimizing model of the parallel market exchange rate,
Montiel and Ostry (1994) come to much the same conclusion. They find that in
the transition between steady-state equilibria in response to a productivity shock,
the parallel market premium may move both above and below zero, and hence
is "an unreliable indicator of the sign and magnitude of real exchange rate mis-
alignment."
THE PARALLEL MARKET RATE 523
may serve as a useful guide to determining the equilibrium exchange
rate and, therefore, in setting the official rate.
Unfortunately, the equilibrium real exchange rate is a theoretical con-
struct that must be estimated, not a directly measurable quantity for
which data exist. Moreover, even in a unified market, the empirical esti-
mation of the equilibrium real exchange rate is no easy task. Estimating
the equilibrium rate is a highly involved process requiring strong as-
sumptions about the operation of the current and capital accounts, as
well as the estimation of stable trade and payments relationships
over time.
Estimation of the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate for a wide
set of countries, in order to compare those exchange rates to actual par-
allel rates, would go beyond the limited scope of this chapter. As a first
step toward identifying where parallel market rates stand in relation to
long-run equilibrium real exchange rates, however, it makes sense to
compare levels of the parallel rate to levels of the official rate, averaged
over long periods of time. This comparison may be informative, since
over sufficiently long periods, the balance of payments must on average
be at a sustainable level. Additionally, it may be useful to compare the
level of the real official exchange rate during periods in which exchange
controls are in effect-and hence parallel markets exist-to periods dur-
ing which exchange markets are unified. Such comparisons may shed
light on the factors that motivated the imposition of exchange controls,
which in turn may have implications for the relationship between the
parallel and equilibrium real exchange rates.
A complicating factor in using averages of actual exchange rates as
proxies for equilibrium exchange rates is that for most countries, the
process of development and structural change will cause the long-run
equilibrium real exchange rate to change over time." In that sense, a
long-period average of actual real exchange rates may yield, at best, an
average of long-run real equilibrium exchange rates over that period.
With this caveat in mind, however, we still believe that empirical com-
parisons of actual official and parallel exchange rates can yield useful
insights.
First, our analysis will focus on averages of exchange rates across a
large set of different countries. Therefore, even if long-run real equilib-
rium exchange rates follow particular trends in each individual coun-
try, the average long-run real equilibrium exchange rate for the sample
as a whole may be more stationary. Second, our analysis focuses upon
17. This problem is in essence the one, highlighted in Chapters 5 and 7 of this
book, of using PPP-based estimates of the long-run equilibrium real exchange
rate when the real exchange rate proves to be nonstationary.
524 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
comparison of different types of exchange rates-official and parallel-
during regimes with and without exchange controls. Therefore, our re-
sults will be vulnerable to misinterpretation if the timing of exchange
control periods in the sample coincide with particular movements in
long-run equilibrium real exchange rates. While we believe, as discussed
above, that exchange control periods are likely to coincide with system-
atic movements in short-run equilibrium real exchange rates, as a result
of temporary shocks to capital flows or the terms of trade we have less
cause to believe that exchange controls have been associated with par-
ticular trends in long-run equilibrium real exchange rates.
Methodology
Our statistical analysis is based on the 24-country sample described in
the first section of this chapter on the essential characteristics of parallel
exchange markets. To meaningfully compare levels of exchange rates in
these countries over time, we first corrected the nominal (parallel and
official) exchange rate data for changes in prices by calculating real ex-
change rates. There are a number of different empirical definitions of
the real exchange rate as set out in Part I of this volume. Here we use the
bilateral real exchange rate between the country that we are examining
and the United States (units of local currency per U.S. dollar so that an
increase in the exchange rate indicates a depreciation). The consumer
price index (CPI) is used as a proxy for domestic prices, and the U.S.
producer price index is used for world prices.
(12.12) e P
P
where e is the real exchange rate; E, the nominal exchange rate, is the
local-currency value of U.S. dollar; Pus is the U.S. producer price index;
and P is the domestic CPI.18
The data used are end-of-quarter, for the period from 1970 through
1994. The real official exchange rate is indexed so that its value in the
first quarter of 1985 is equal to 100. The real parallel market exchange
rate is indexed so that its value in the first quarter of 1985 is equal to 100
plus the premium (in percent) of the parallel rate over the official rate in
18. It is possible that the use of a bilateral exchange rate, using the U.S. pro-
ducer price index as a proxy for world prices, may bias our results, in view of the
significant movements of the U.S. dollar relative to the currencies of other indus-
trial countries during the 1980s. Results of tests for sensitivity with respect to
choice of foreign price index are presented in the appendix for a subsample of
countries for the period 1979-94.
THE PARALLEL MARKET RATE 525
that base quarter. For each country, the mean and median average val-
ues are calculated for the following: e, the official real exchange rate for
the entire period; eP, the parallel real exchange rate for the entire period
of its existence, that is, when exchange controls were in effect; e"", the
nonunified official real exchange rate for the periods when exchange
controls were in effect and exchange markets were not unified; and e",
the unified official real exchange rate during, periods, if any existed, when
exchange markets were unified. A unification of exchange markets is
defined to have taken place if the absolute value of the parallel rate de-
viates by less than 3 percent from the official rate for at least four quar-
ters. The nonzero number is to take into account measurement errors,
since the official and parallel rates are from different sources (see tables).19
A cross-country summary of our calculations of the four real exchange
rate categories described above, based on mean averages of the exchange
rate data for each separate country, is presented in columns 1 through 4
of table 12.3. Results are presented in table 12.3 for the whole sample, as
well as two subsets. For the countries in each subset, we present the
mean, median, and standard deviation of the real exchange rate. In col-
umns 5 though 9 of table 12.3, we calculate various ratios of the data
shown in columns 1 through 4, and perform binomial sign tests to de-
termine whether these ratios differ significantly from one. The "Pr (H. is
true)" row indicates the probability that the observed configuration of
ratios would be observed, if the null hypothesis-that the ratio is equal
to 1-were true.
The regional groupings were chosen in order to test our hypotheses
concerning the different motivation and function of parallel markets in
different regions set out above in the section on the essential character-
istics of parallel markets. In Latin America and Turkey, exchange con-
trols were imposed, particularly in the 1980s, in situations of macroeco-
nomic and balance-of-payments crisis leading to strong capital outflows.
In these countries, pressures from capital flight are likely to have caused
the parallel rate to depreciate well above the long-run equilibrium real
rate, even if the official exchange rate was not especially overvalued
relative to its long-run equilibrium value. African and South Asian coun-
tries, in contrast, experienced much less macroeconomic distress. In those
countries, exchange controls were more likely to have arisen as a means
of rationing foreign exchange receipts in the context of a progressive
overvaluation of the official exchange rate. As described in the subsec-
tion above on the equilibrium parallel market rate, the parallel rate is
19. The official exchange rates and prices are from the IMF, International Fi-
nancial Statistics. The parallel exchange rates are from World Currency Yearbook
and International Currency Analysis, Inc.
Table 12.3 Average Official and Parallel Real Exchange Rates, 1970-94, for Sample Group Countries, Ratios, and Binomial Sign
Tests
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Cointry Official Parallel Official Official Ratio, Ratio, Ratio, Ratio, Ratio,
real ER Real ER ER with ER when eP/e e"/c el/e"" ePel ec,/e
1970-94 par. nkt. unified
e et' e 2/1 3/1 2 /3 2/4 3/4
Latin America and TIrkey
Mean 82.52 121.02 85.13 76.91 1.46 1.03 1.42 1.58 1.12
Median 69.10 115.01 69.43 64.66 1.24 1.06 1.36 1.32 1.10
Std Dev 26.17 24.29 47.71 27.28 0.36 0.26 0,34 0.39 0.16
Number < 1 n.a n.a na n.a 0 3 0 0 3
Number > 1 n.a n.a n.a n.a 12 9 12 12 9
Pr (H, is true) n.a n.a n.a n.a 0.0002 0.019 0.0002 0.0002 0.019
Africa and South Asia
Mean 120.04 222.82 117.94 195.24 1.82 0.98 1.85 1.05 0.65
Median 103.56 186.64 101.56 267.03 1.78 1.00 1.81 0.97 0.57
Std Dev 45.99 111.76 45.03 85.81 0.58 0.02 0.58 0.18 0.12
Number < 1 n.a n.a n.a n.a 0 12 0 3 5
Number > 1 n.a n.a n.a n.a 12 0 12 2 0
Pr (H, is true) n.a n.a n.a n.a 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.500 0.031
All countries
Mean 101.28 171.92 101.53 111.71 1.64 1.01 1.64 1.43 0.99
Median 91.38 131.33 91.10 86.24 1.52 1.00 1.54 1.36 1.07
Std Dev 41.60 99.81 40.40 74.67 0.50 0.04 0.51 0.38 0.25
Number < 1 n.a n.a n.a n.a 0 15 0 3 8
Number > 1 n.a na n.a n.a 24 9 24 14 9
Pr (H is true) n.a n.a n.a n.a 0.000 0.153 0.000 0.006 0.500
Sorce: IFS; World Currency Yearbook, and loternational Currency Analysis Inc., various issues; authors' calculations.
THE PARALLEL MARKET RATE 527
likely to be more depreciated than the long-run equilibrium rate in this
context as well, unless exchange controls are poorly enforced or well-
enforced import barriers effectively curtail the demand for foreign
exchange.
Comparisons of Period Averages
We now compare the real parallel rate eP to various proxies of the equi-
librium real exchange rate. The first possible proxy for the equilibrium
RER we consider is e, the average RER for a period of 25 years. As may
be seen in colun 5, ePle, on average, is greater than 1, with a mean of
1.64 for the entire sample. In fact, there is no country in our sample for
which the average real parallel market exchange rate was more appreci-
ated than the average real official rate (calculated for periods in which
the exchange market was unified as well as nonunified). To the extent
that the average official rate, when averaged over a sufficiently long
period, is a good proxy for the equilibrium real rate, this suggests that
the parallel rate is a biased indicator of the equilibrium rate.
However, using the average RER for the entire period may be mis-
leading, since it includes periods with exchange controls as well as peri-
ods in which the exchange market is unified. When exchange controls
are in place, the nominal price of foreign exchange is set by the authori-
ties, and access to foreign exchange is determined by quantitative ra-
tioning. Hence, the official real exchange rate during periods of exchange
control is likely to be more appreciated than the equilibrium real rate. It
may be more appropriate to use the RER averaged over periods of uni-
fied exchange markets-that is, e-as a proxy for the long-run equilib-
rium RER.
For the whole sample, the parallel rate is, on average, more depreci-
ated than the unified official RER; as indicated in column 8, the mean of
the ratio, eP/e" , is 1.43 for all countries. However, this result masks strong
differences between Latin America and Turkey, with a mean of 1.58, and
Africa and South Asia, with a mean value of 1.05 (which is not signifi-
cantly different from 1). Hence, to the extent that e" is a good proxy for
the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate, eP appears, on average, to
have been close to the long-run equilibrium exchange rate in Africa and
South Asia, but much more depreciated than the long-run equilibrium
level in Latin America and Turkey. This may seem surprising, given the
far higher average parallel premiums that have been observed in much
of Africa; as shown in column 7, the ratio of the parallel market rate to
the official rate during periods of exchange control averaged 1.85 for
Africa and South Asia but only 1.42 for Latin America and Turkey.
The strong differences in eP/e", the ratio of the parallel rate to the uni-
fied official rate, between Latin America and Africa appear to be related
528 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
to equally marked differences in the evolution of the official exchange
rate between the two regions. As indicated in column 9, in Latin America
and Turkey, the real official exchange rate tended to be more depreci-
ated during periods of exchange controls than during periods in which
the exchange markets were unified; the mean ratio of e-/eu was 1.12,
with 9 of the 12 countries having ratios greater than 1. This is consistent
with our view that in Latin America and Turkey, unsustainable policies
resulted in macroeconomic disequilibrium, which, in turn, triggered
capital outflows that depreciated the short-run equilibrium real exchange
rate (a relationship that would hold in a unified exchange market) rela-
tive to its long-run level. The government did depreciate the official ex-
change rate, but not by as much as the short-run equilibrium rate depre-
ciated. Therefore, an excess demand for foreign exchange developed,
causing the parallel rate to depreciate as well. As macroeconomic pres-
sures eased, capital outflows moderated and reversed themselves, lead-
ing to an appreciation of the short-run equilibrium exchange rate and
facilitating the unification of exchange markets.
In contrast to Latin America and Turkey, in the African and South
Asian countries in our sample, the real official exchange rate tended to
be more appreciated when exchange controls were in place than when
exchange markets were unified. As shown in colunm 9, for Africa and
South Asia, the ratio of e"/e" was only .65, with all five countries in this
grouping showing ratios less than 1. This evidence, while qualified by
the low number of observations in the subsample, supports our specu-
lation that the emergence of a parallel market in Africa and South Asia
was typically the result of an appreciation of the real official exchange
rate relative to the long-run equilibrium rate. Authorities chose, for a
variety of reasons, to ration foreign exchange while maintaining an over-
valued real exchange rate. As the extent of overvaluation increased, of-
ten foreign exchange rationing tightened, and the parallel market grew,
as did the premium.
Considering how overvalued the real official exchange rate was in
the South Asian and many African countries, relative to its long-run
equilibrium value, it is surprising that parallel rates in those countries
were not more depreciated compared with average official exchange rates
during the periods when exchange markets were unified. The subsec-
tion above on the equilibrium parallel market rate showed that, all else
being equal, the more overvalued was the official exchange rate, the more
undervalued would be the parallel rate relative to the long-run equilib-
rium rate. Therefore, unification presumably would have required Afri-
can and South Asian governments to devalue their official exchange rates
to a level that was not as depreciated as the prior level of the parallel rate.
THE PARALLEL MARKET RATE 529
In addressing this issue, it is important to point out that we have a
very small sample to examine-only five countries in our sample in the
subset consisting of Africa and South Asia unified their exchange rates.
In two of these five cases (Egypt and Tanzania), the ratio is greater than
1. Additionally, as pointed out earlier in the discussion of the equilib-
rium parallel market rate, there are factors that may lower the parallel
rate relative to the level predicted by the basic model. First, consider the
case when underinvoicing, f, is high because exchange controls are not
effective because enforcement is lackadaisical and evasion widespread.
Then, for all practical purposes, the relevant rate for the economy be-
comes the parallel rate, which may, in this case, be close to the equilib-
rium rate. Thus, when exchange markets are unified, the official rate
would need to be depreciated to the level of the former parallel rate,
and eP/e" would be close to one. Ghana is an excellent illustration of this
possibility (Chhibber and Shaffik 1991).
A second factor that might appreciate the parallel market rate rela-
tive to the level predicted by the basic model might be the strong en-
forcement of import controls. This would cause the premium to be low,
even if the official exchange rate is maintained at a substantially over-
valued level compared with the long-run equilibrium exchange rate,
since effective import controls reduce the demand for foreign exchange
and thereby appreciate the short-run equilibrium exchange rate. Then,
if unification is associated with import liberalization, thereby depreciat-
ing the short-run real equilibrium exchange rate, the official exchange
rate will have to depreciate by a large amount if excess demands for
foreign exchange are to be eliminated. This scenario would lead to a
ratio, ePle', that would be low compared with the predictions of the ba-
sic model outlined in the subsection on the equilibrium parallel market
rate. India is the best example of this scenario: unification of the ex-
change rate took place in 1993 as part of a larger liberalization effort,
requiring a greater devaluation of the official exchange rate than would
have been the case in the absence of import liberalization.
The Official Exchange Rate after Exchange Market
Unification
The issues related to unification can be further examined by consider-
ing what happens to the official exchange rate at that time. We have 20
observations of unifications. In some cases, a country has two episodes
of dual exchange rates, with a period of unified exchange rates in the
interim; these are treated as two separate observations. Some countries
have never unified, and therefore are not represented (see the appendix
530 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
for the complete list). The composition of the unification data set is quite
different from that used in table 12.1. First, three-quarters of the obser-
vations are from the experience of unification in Latin America; only 3
out of the 20 observations are for Africa, with the 2 South Asian coun-
tries completing the count. The small sample means that the subset results
are to be interpreted with caution for the Africa and South Asia subset.
In table 12.4, we look at the mean, median, and standard deviation of
three variables: the average official RER for the year before the unifica-
tion (column 10), the average official RER in the year following unifica-
tion (column 11), and the average parallel rate for the year preceding the
unification (column 12). We calculate two ratios of the postunification
official RER to the preunification RER, e;', /e'", and the ratio of the
postunification official (and sole) RER to the preunification parallel
rate, e t/e, . As before, we report the mean, median, and standard de-
viation for all variables as well as the results of binomial sign test for the
ratios.
The results are consistent with the findings reported in table 12.3.
The ratio of the post- to preunification official exchange rate, e" /e", is
approximately equal to 1 for the whole sample. Again, aggregation ob-
scures the difference in results between the two subsets. The ratio
e; 1/e'1 is (very) slightly less than I for Latin America and Turkey, sug-
gesting a small appreciation in the RER following unification. This is
consistent with the idea that capital inflows resumed as the macro crisis
was alleviated, appreciating the short-run real equilibrium exchange rate
and allowing the authorities to appreciate the real official exchange rate
while simultaneously unifying the exchange markets. The ratio is slightly
greater than 1 on average for Africa and South Asia, as the exchange
rate was devalued following unification. Again, this is consistent with
the observation that in these countries, official exchange rates during
the exchange control period were overvalued relative to their long-
run equilibrium rates, so that unification required the devaluation
of the official rate.
The relationship between the unified official rate and the prior paral-
lel rate also differs somewhat among the subsamples. The ratio eI /e[1
clearly is less than I for the entire sample, indicating that in general, the
official rate is not depreciated all the way to the level of the former par-
allel rate. With the exception of Ghana and Bolivia, the average ratio is
less than 1 for all countries. This result also is unambiguous for the Latin
America and Turkey subset. On the other hand, the ratio e; /e' does
not appear to be significantly different from 1 for the African and South
Asian sample, which is consistent with results described above-aver-
age unified official exchange rates appear to be close to the average level
of the parallel rate in South Asia and Africa.
Table 12.4 Unification Episodes-Statistics, Ratios and Binomial Sign Tests
Country 10 11 12 13 14
Official RER, Official RER, Parallel RER, eg1/e7,
year, unif- 1 year, unif + 1 year, unif - 1
e e, er, 11/10 11/12
Latin America and Turkey
Mean 85.15 85.62 109.31 1.00 0.83
Median 81.99 75.74 101.98 0.98 0.87
Std Dev 29.89 33.19 54.88 0.09 0.15
Number < 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. 9 15
Number > I n.a. n.a. n.a. 7 1
Pr (H is true) n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.576 0.001
w-~ Africa and South Asia
Mean 183.67 201.50 203.81 1.08 0.98
Median 172.71 155.21 180.99 1.11 0.94
Std Dev 71.92 87.56 85.81 0.12 0.13
Number < 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1 4
Number > I n.a. n.a. n.a. 4 1
Pr (H, is true) n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.188 0.188
All Countries
Mean 108.61 113.21 131.81 1.02 0.86
Median 99.42 83.77 118.08 1.00 0.90
Std Dev 60.60 71.42 75.28 0.11 0.16
Number < 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. 10 19
Number > 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. 11 2
Pr (H, is true) n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.500 0.0001
Source: IFS; World Currency Yearbook, and International Currency Analysis Inc., various issues; authors' calculations.
532 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
Summary and Conclusions
This section now summarizes the most important findings presented in
this chapter. To begin with, our theoretical analysis indicated that when
the emergence of a parallel exchange market is motivated by the over-
valuation of the official exchange rate relative to the long-run equilib-
rium real exchange rate, the parallel market rate is likely, on average, to
be more depreciated than the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate.
The gap between the parallel rate and the long-run equilibrium rate is
likely to be smaller to the extent that export receipt surrender require-
ments are not well enforced and to the extent that barriers to imports
and other commercial policies that tend to appreciate the short-run equi-
librium real exchange rate are well enforced.
Moreover, our theoretical analysis indicated that even if the official
exchange rate is set at its long-run equilibrium level, a parallel market
may arise in order to meet the demands of residents seeking to augment
their holdings of foreign assets. During the period in which foreign as-
sets are being accumulated-that is, when capital flight is occurring-
the parallel exchange rate will be more depreciated than its own equi-
librium value, and hence probably more depreciated than the long-run
equilibrium exchange rate for the economy as a whole. Additionally,
because the parallel market rate is an asset price, and exhibits the vola-
tility that is characteristic of all asset prices, the value of the parallel rate
at any given moment is likely to be a particularly poor indicator of the
long-run equilibrium exchange rate.
These considerations suggest that on balance, the parallel rate is likely
to be more depreciated than the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate,
and hence the official exchange rate in a unified exchange market will in
general best be set at a level that is more appreciated than the prior
parallel rate (averaged over a suitably long period).
In this chapter, we did not compare actual parallel exchange rates to
estimates of the long-run equilibrium rate in different countries, owing
to the difficulty of estimating equilibrium rates for a large sample. How-
ever, we compared multiyear averages of real parallel rates to real offi-
cial rates in a sample of 24 developing countries and made a number of
empirical observations.
First, we found that for the sample as a whole, the real parallel mar-
ket rate was generally more depreciated than the official exchange rate,
even when the official rate was measured only during periods in which
the exchange markets were unified. During periods in which the ex-
change market is unified and there are no exchange controls to bridge
the gap between supplies and demands for foreign exchange, the offi-
cial exchange rate is more likely to be close to the long-run equilibrium
rate on average. Hence, these two observations constitute partial evi-
THE PARALLEL MARKET RATE 533
dence that the parallel rate tends to be undervalued relative to the long-
run equilibrium exchange rate.
Second, we found important differences in the relationship between
parallel and official exchange rates among different subsets of our coun-
try sample. In Latin America and in Turkey, the emergence of parallel
exchange markets appears to have reflected a sharp depreciation of the
short-run equilibrium exchange rate relative to its long-run value, not
the appreciation of the official exchange rate from its long-run equilib-
rium value. In those countries, the parallel rate was clearly depreciated
compared with the official exchange rate during periods in which the
exchange markets were unified. However, the undervalued nature of
the parallel rate does not appear to have reflected the overvaluation of
the official exchange rate relative to the long-run equilibrium real ex-
change rate during periods of exchange controls, since the official ex-
change rate in this subset was on average more depreciated during the
periods in which exchange controls were in effect than in the periods in
which markets were unified.
We surmise that a combination of internal and external shocks led to
macroeconomic turbulence and capital flight in Latin America and Tur-
key, mainly in the 1980s. These developments, in turn, depreciated the
short-run equilibrium real exchange rate relative to its long-run level.
While the authorities depreciated their official exchange rates-possibly
even to levels more depreciated than the long-run equilibrium rate-
they did not do so by enough to resolve excess demands for foreign
exchange. That is, even if official exchange rates during the exchange
control period were undervalued relative to the long-run equilibrium
rate, they were overvalued relative to the short-run equilibrium rate,
thereby giving rise to parallel exchange markets. As a result, the parallel
rates probably were even more undervalued relative to the long-run
equilibrium rate than were the official rates.20
Third, we found that the African and South Asian countries in our
sample better fit our preconception that the emergence of parallel ex-
change markets reflects the overvaluation of the official exchange rate
relative to its long-run equilibrium value. Among the few countries in
this subset that experienced periods of unified exchange rates, the real
official exchange rate clearly was more appreciated during periods in
20. Although they were not included in our sample, the situation in the tran-
sition economies appears to have been similar to that in the Latin American coun-
tries with the parallel rates significantly undervalued relative to the long-run
equilibrium rate. Hence, a policy of unifying at the parallel rate would have led
to an initial RER that was significantly undervalued relative to the long-term
equilibrium. (Halpern and Wyplosz 1997).
534 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
which exchange controls were in effect than in periods in which exchange
markets were unified. This suggests that in contrast to the Latin America
and Turkey case, the real appreciation of official exchange rates in Af-
rica and South Asia, relative to long-run equilibrium values, was the
main factor underlying the emergence of parallel markets.
However, in Africa and South Asia, the parallel exchange rate was
not significantly more depreciated than the official exchange rate dur-
ing periods in which markets were unified-put another way, when
exchange markets were unified, the authorities had to depreciate the
official rate all the way to the level of the former parallel rate. The rela-
tive similarity of parallel and unified official exchange rates underscores
the fact that in the case of some African countries, exchange controls
may have been so poorly enforced that the parallel rate effectively mim-
icked the role of the official rate in a unified exchange market. Addition-
ally, in some Asian countries, well-enforced import barriers constrained
the demand for foreign exchange when exchange controls were in ef-
fect, thereby appreciating both the short-run equilibrium exchange rate
and the parallel rate; exchange markets were unified at about the same
time as import barriers were lowered, making it necessary to depreciate
the official exchange rate substantially in order to maintain the balance
of payments in a unified market.
Our findings for some African and South Asian countries suggest
that in some cases, the parallel rate might indeed be reasonably close to
the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate that would prevail in a uni-
fied market. However, this finding cannot be relied upon to support the
use of the parallel rate as a proxy for the long-run equilibrium unified
rate more generally because somewhat special factors were operative in
these countries-specifically, very poorly enforced exchange controls in
some African countries, and very well-enforced import controls in some
South Asian countries. More generally, the parallel market rate would
seem to represent an upper bound, in terms of local currency per dollar,
on the appropriate level of the unified official exchange rate.
Appendix
Sensitivity of Results to
Choice of Real Exchange Rate
In order to simplify the calculations, the empirical analysis in this chap-
ter was carried out with bilateral RERs computed using the U.S. pro-
ducer price index as a proxy for world prices. This procedure may bias
the results, particularly for time periods in which movements in the U.S.
real exchange rate diverge significantly from those of other industrial
countries, as they did over much of the 1980s. We estimate the same
ratios as in table 12.3, using trade-weighted multilateral real exchange
rates (see tables 12.A.1 and 12.A.2 below).
Data were available in the International Financial Statistics database
of the IMF for only 10 of the 24 countries in our sample, for the time
period of 1979-94. While it would be possible to calculate multilateral
real exchange rates for all the countries in the sample, for the period
under consideration this computation would be a laborious process.
Further, this data set covers a shorter time period than the one used in
the study (1970 to 1994). However, the real U.S. dollar bilateral rate would
have diverged significantly from the trade-weighted multilateral rate
primarily in the 1980s; this data set includes the period of interest. There-
fore we use the smaller readily available data set to compare the values
obtained for the ratios we calculate using the bilateral real exchange
rate with those for available trade-weighted, multilateral real exchange
rates.
The use of multilateral exchange rates yields estimates of the ratios
under consideration that are remarkably similar to those obtained us-
ing bilateral results. The one result that is different is the binomial sign
test for the ratio e""/el. The probability that Ho is true is much higher
when the multilateral rate is used. This is probably due to the very small
sample: just five observations. The orders of magnitude do not differ
markedly for the measures of central tendency.
535
Table 12.A.1 Comparison of Bilateral and Multilateral Exchange Rates
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Official Parallel Official Official Ratio, Ratio, Ratio, Ratio, Ratio,
real ER real ER ER w/ ER when eel/ ee/e e&c' le"
1979-94 par. mkt. unified
Variable e e el" e" 2/1 3/1 2/3 2/4 3/4
Sunnary statistics
Mean
Bilateral 118.09 191.01 118.69 87.68 1.55 1.01 1.55 1.62 1.19
Multilateral 175.73 279.88 172.69 149.36 1.53 1.00 1.56 1.50 1.10
Median
0i Bilateral 106.28 168.57 104.21 72.18 1.36 1.00 1.36 1.60 1.19
Multilateral 132.80 186.09 124.66 103.88 1.38 1.00 1.40 1.54 1.12
Standard deviation
Bilateral 54.66 116.71 54.10 35.74 0.37 0.06 0.42 0.25 0.31
Multilateral 120.95 230.58 117.96 104.42 0.37 0.07 0.43 0.30 0.33
Binomial sign tests
Number <1
Bilateral n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0 6 0 0 2
Multilateral n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0 8 0 1 3
Number >1
Bilateral n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 10 4 10 6 4
Multilateral n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. to 2 10 5 3
Pr (H) is true)
Bilateral n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.0001 0.377 0.0001 0.0156 0.3438
Multilateral n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.0001 0.055 0.0001 0.1094 0.6563
Source: IFS, World Currency Yearbook, and International Currency Analysis, Inc., various issues; authors' calculations.
Table 12.A.2 Basic Statistics for All Countries in Sample
1 2 3 4 5 6 789
e: Official e"': Offical ER
real ER eP Parallel with parallel e": Official ER eP/e: e"'/e: eP/e": er/el: el"/el:
1970-94 real ER market when unified 2/1 3/1 2/3 2/4 3/4
Country ER Type median median median median median median median median median
Bolivia Multilateral 289.00 319.34 244.85 381.72 1.10 0.85 1.30 0.84 0.64
Bilateral 138.10 152.84 123.30 151.38 1.11 0.89 1.24 1.01 0.81
Chile Multilateral 136.00 151.50 136.56 91.01 1.11 1.00 1.11 1.66 1.50
Bilateral 90.36 101.73 91.50 59.75 1.13 1.01 1.11 1.70 1.53
Colombia Multilateral 157.97 186.99 176.03 102.45 1.18 1.11 1.06 1.83 1.72
Bilateral 121.17 145.01 133.40 74.55 1.20 1.10 1.09 1.95 1.79
W Ecuador Multilateral 141.94 182.46 141.94 None 1.29 1.00 1.29 n.a. n.a.
Bilateral 150.82 189.93 150.82 None 1.26 1.00 1.26 n.a. n.a.
Uruguay Multilateral 93.58 110.32 98.84 64.97 1.18 106 1.12 1.70 1.52
Bilateral 71.04 82.95 75.26 40.40 1.17 1.06 1.10 2.05 1.86
Venezuela Multilateral 143.79 268.09 114.39 181.20 1.86 0.80 2.34 1.48 0.63
Bilateral 111.29 231.37 100.74 139.19 2.08 0.91 2.30 1.66 0.72
Zambia Multilateral 104.58 162.84 104.58 None 1.56 1.00 1.56 n.a. n.a.
Bilateral 91.50 129.10 91.50 None 1.41 1.00 1.41 n.a. n.a.
Dom. Rep. Multilateral 102.28 115.52 100.32 102.86 1.13 0.98 1.15 1.12 0.98
Bilateral 67.31 84.22 67.71 67.21 1.25 1.01 1.24 1.25 1.01
Malawi Multilateral 113.53 156.98 113.53 None 1.38 1.00 1.38 n.a. n.a.
Bilateral 95.08 132.03 95.08 None 1.39 1.00 1.39 n.a. n.a.
Nigeria Multilateral 516.72 806.06 516.72 None 1.56 1.00 1.56 n.a. n.a.
Bilateral 252.61 435.02 252.61 None 1.72 1.00 1.72 n.a. n.a.
Source: IFS, World Currency Yearbook, and International Currency Analysis, Inc., various issues; authors' calculations.
538 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
The choice of a bilateral real exchange rate would not seem to affect
the results in any significant way. At the same time, using the bilateral
real exchange rate has other advantages. In particular, using the bilat-
eral rate permits analysis for a larger sample of countries for a longer
time period. However, there are some instances in which the differences
in the values using the different real exchange rates are more than trivial
(see table 12.A.2, particularly Uruguay and Nigeria (columns 8 and 9).
If the analysis is to be done for a single country, the use of the trade-
weighted multilateral real exchange rate would be preferable. For a
sample as large as the one in this study, the computational advantages
of using the bilateral real exchange rate are greater.
13
A Note on Nominal
Devaluations, Inflation,
and the Real Exchange Rate
Nita Ghei and Lawrence E. Hinkle*
Difficult as it may be to accurately estimate the degree of RER misalign-
ment, doing so is only the first step in designing the policies to correct a
misalignment. The RER is not a policy variable or instrument It is an
endogenous variable, the level of which is determined by other funda-
mental macroeconomic variables. Policy makers cannot change the RER
directly. Rather, they can only adjust the official nominal exchange rate
and other nominal variables, such as monetary and fiscal policy instru-
ments, that may affect the domestic price level.
In industrial countries with relatively low inflation and market-de-
termined exchange rates, short- to medium-term movements in both
nominal and real exchange rates are extremely hard to distinguish em-
pirically from driftless random walks. Nominal exchange rates are on
average six times more volatile than domestic relative prices. Nominal
and real exchange rates are also highly correlated so that there is a pro-
nounced tendency for the real exchange rate to follow the nominal one,
particularly in the short to medium term.'
* Ms. Ingrid Ivins provided research and computational assistance in the prepa-
ration of this chapter. The authors are grateful to Emmanuel Akpa, Steve Kamin,
Peter Montiel, Fabien Nsengiyumva, and three anonymous reviewers for very
helpful comments on the drafts of this chapter.
1. See Taylor (1995), p. 31; Frankel and Rose (1995); Stein, Allen, and Associ-
ates (1995), pp. 6, 84; Mark (1995); and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (1997).
539
540 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
In developing countries, however, the relationship between the nomi-
nal and real exchange rates may be complicated by large fluctuations in
the external terms of trade and domestic relative prices, by high or highly
variable inflation rates, and by relatively large and volatile capital flows.
Nevertheless, a devaluation of the nominal exchange rate appears em-
pirically to be a necessary condition for achieving a large depreciation
of the real exchange rate. In fact, empirical research has shown that vir-
tually all large real depreciations have required nominal devaluations.2
Wages and prices in the formal sector in developing countries generally
tend to be fairly rigid downward in nominal terms and at best tend to
decline only slowly in relative terms; and, in most circumstances, it is
unrealistic to assume a substantial decline in nominal prices and factor
costs. Hence, when a substantial depreciation of the RER is required,
nominal devaluations are often necessary to accelerate the adjustment
in relative domestic prices and factor costs.
A devaluation is not, however, a sufficient condition for achieving a
real depreciation as the effects of many devaluations have been quickly
eroded by inflation. In addition, in cases of small misalignments (10
percent or less) a devaluation may not be necessary For example, with a
fixed nominal exchange rate, overvaluation of the RER may be gradu-
ally eliminated over time if the domestic inflation rate is held below the
foreign inflation rate so that the actual RER depreciates to eliminate the
initial misalignment or if productivity rises faster at home than abroad
so that the equilibrium RER appreciates to eliminate the misalignment.
A devaluation can, nevertheless, facilitate the adjustment of the real
exchange rate to its equilibrium level under two conditions. First, the
RER must in fact be overvalued before a devaluation so that a devalua-
tion moves the economy toward equilibrium rather than away from it.
And, second, a devaluation must be accompanied by a stance of macro-
economic demand management policies that supports the required ad-
justments in absorption and relative prices rather than frustrates these
adjustments.
In many cases, a devaluation is likely to unleash general inflationary
pressures on domestic prices as a result of the rapid increase in the prices
of tradable goods. In addition, the exchange rate itself sometimes serves
as a nominal anchor for a country's monetary and price policies; and a
2. See Kiguel and Ghei (1993) and Goldfajn and Valdes (1996). Kiguel and
Ghei find that, for low-inflation developing countries, all large real deprecia-
tions were preceded by large nominal devaluations. Goldfajn and Valdes find
for a broad sample of 93 countries that 90 percent of real appreciations of 25
percent or more and 100 percent of real appreciations of 35 percent or more were
corrected by nominal devaluations.
NOMINAL DEVALUATIONS, INFLATION, AND THE RER 541
devaluation may affect the credibility of monetary policy. Hence, in or-
der to determine the size of a nominal devaluation required to correct a
given overvaluation of the RER, one needs to determine to what extent
a nominal devaluation will depreciate the RER (and bring about the
desired changes in relative domestic wages and prices) and to what ex-
tent it will simply raise, or be "passed through" to, the domestic price
level.
Achieving a successful depreciation of the RER through a devalua-
tion requires both raising the relative price of tradable goods and con-
taining the rise in the general price level. For a devaluation to succeed in
depreciating the external RER, the aggregate domestic price level must
rise less than the foreign price level rises in domestic-currency terms as
a result of the devaluation. To depreciate the internal RER, the price of
tradable goods must increase relative to the price of nontradables.
While a number of methodologies are available for determining the
change required in the RER as discussed in Part III, the literature on
developing countries has devoted much less attention to the problem of
determining the change required in the nominal exchange rate.4 The im-
portance of accurately determining the size of the required nominal de-
preciation, as well as the size of the required real depreciation, depends,
in part, upon the type of exchange rate policy that a country plans to
pursue after devaluing.
In cases in which a country will need to maintain its new nominal
exchange rate for a significant period after a devaluation, it is important
to establish accurately the size of the necessary nominal change as well
as that of the real change. Although the number of countries that are
able to sustain a fixed exchange rate policy has declined dramatically in
recent years because of increasing capital mobility and financial market
integration, there are still some cases, such as the CFA countries, of
adjustments from one fixed rate to another.' A reasonably accurate
3. See Chapters 2 to 4 for the definitions of the external and internal RERs and
a discussion of the theoretical and empirical relationships between them. As ex-
plained there, in general, the internal and external RERs will move in the same
direction unless there are significant changes in the terms of trade, commercial
policy, or relative productivity in the tradable and nontradable sectors.
4. The authors are aware of only three papers that deal with the problem of
determining the equilibrium nominal exchange rate. For developing countries,
Khan and Lizondo (1987) present a model that determines the equilibrium RER
and corresponding nominal rate. For industrial countries, Mark (1995) estimates
a monetary model of the nominal U.S. dollar, Canadian dollar, Deutschemark,
Swiss franc, and yen exchange rates using relative money stocks and relative
real incomes. A similar monetary model is employed in MacDonald (1995).
5. See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995).
542 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
estimate of a new equilibrium nominal rate is also required for exchange
rate-based stabilization programs, although in this case the new nomi-
nal rate may be easier to revise subsequently than when the new rate is
intended to be quasi-permanent.
For countries following a flexible postdevaluation exchange rate
policy (such as a managed float or a crawling peg), accurately determin-
ing the size of the required nominal change may be less critical. A coun-
try may simply devalue by the amount corresponding to the required
real depreciation, subsequently adjust the nominal exchange rate to off-
set any inflation in the prices of domestic goods, and thus maintain the
initial real depreciation. The stronger a country's monetary discipline
and the greater the tendency of its real rate to follow its nominal rate as
in industrial countries, the more advantageous such a policy will be.7
However, even in such cases accurate estimates of the initial changes
required in the nominal as well as the real exchange rate will facilitate
policy design and minimize unintended inflationary or recessionary
consequences of changes in the nominal exchange rate and other nomi-
nal policy variables.
Ideally, it would be desirable to have a macroeconomic model that
simultaneously determines both the real and nominal values of the equi-
librium exchange rate and other key variables in a full general-equilib-
rium setting. This approach is the one followed for industrial countries
6. Although the new exchange rates introduced under exchange rate-based
stabilization programs are often billed as permanent, Caramazza and Aziz (1998)
find that these new pegs have typically been short-lived, with a median dura-
tion of about 10 months.
7. Several plausible explanations of why the real exchange rate tends to fol-
low the nominal one in industrial countries have been suggested. Large imme-
diate effects of monetary policy on nominal exchange rates coupled with long
lags in its effects on domestic economic activity and prices is one such explana-
tion. Downward rigidities in nominal prices and wages could also cause the
speed of relative price changes to depend upon the inflation rate, contributing to
the observed greater relative price and RER variability in developing countries
with higher inflation rates and causing monetary policy to have persistent ef-
fects on some real variables in industrial countries. As noted in the chapters on
the external RER and trade flows, there is considerable empirical evidence that
the law of one price at best holds only loosely in industrial countries for trade in
differentiated products, and prices of traded goods respond only very slowly to
movements in the nominal exchange rate. Faruqee (1995) and Chari, Kehoe, and
McGrattan (1997) argue that such deviations from the law of one price for traded
goods and the resulting stickiness in domestic prices of traded goods could cause
changes in the nominal exchange rate-and hence in monetary policy, which
often drives these-to have long-lasting effects on the real exchange rate in in-
dustrial countries.
NOMINAL DEVALUATIONS, INFLATION, AND THE RER 543
in Williamson (1994), which uses existing large macroeconomic models
for the G-7 countries. However, the required models are not available
for most low-income countries; and neither the time nor the data needed
for developing them are typically available when a devaluation is being
considered. Even in industrial countries it is sometimes necessary to
adopt simpler approaches. For example, in estimating equilibrium bi-
lateral nominal exchange rates for the year 2000, Wren-Lewis and Driver
(1998) simply assume that inflation rates in the G-7 countries will be
roughly similar and that the nominal and real exchange rates will move
in parallel.
In the absence of a macroeconomic model that determines nominal
as well as relative prices, two sources of guidance are available on the
relative sizes of the nominal and real changes that are likely to follow a
devaluation: the experience of other developing countries that have de-
valued and the accounting relationships between the nominal and real
changes. This chapter examines the usefulness of these two sources of
information for estimating the relationship between changes in the nomi-
nal and the real exchange rates. It assumes that an estimate of the re-
quired change in the RER is available from one or more of the method-
ologies discussed in Part III and addresses the problem of how to make
practical empirical estimates of the size of a nominal devaluation re-
quired to achieve a given depreciation in the internal and external RERs
and how to establish consistent targets for the required adjustments in
nominal and relative domestic wages and prices.
The next section of the chapter begins by briefly reviewing the infla-
tionary experiences of developing countries after large devaluations and
summarizes the stylized empirical facts about the relationship between
nominal devaluations, inflation, and the external RER. The subsequent
section then sets out a simple accounting framework linking the nomi-
nal exchange rate, the internal and external RERs, the general price level,
relative prices of tradables and nontradables, and nominal and real wages
in domestic- and foreign-currency terms. The use of this framework is
illustrated by an analysis of the changes in wages, prices, the real ex-
change rate, and related variables in Cte d'Ivoire as a result of the Janu-
ary 1994 devaluation of the CFA franc. Although the accounting frame-
work is relatively simple, it can provide, in the absence of a more so-
phisticated methodology, a starting point for determining a realistic and
consistent set of nominal and real prices if reasonable assumptions can
be made about the postdevaluation behavior of a nominal anchor on
the basis of either the stylized facts from experience elsewhere or of the
specific policy program accompanying a devaluation. The final section
of the chapter concludes with a discussion of the advantages and limita-
tions of the accounting framework.
544 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
Devaluations, Inflation, and the External RER:
the Stylized Facts
As noted above, the domestic price level nearly always rises after a
devaluation of the nominal exchange rate as a consequence of higher
local-currency prices of both final and intermediate traded goods. In-
creases in the price level and the redistributional effects of changes in
relative prices are the reasons why devaluations are often approached
with trepidation.
Historically, devaluations have had a decidedly mixed impact on in-
flation and real exchange rate alignment in developing countries. Dur-
ing the 1950s and 1960s, a period of relatively low world inflation and
stable nominal exchange rates, devaluations were fairly successful in
depreciating RERs without excessive inflation. In the more inflationary
1970s and 1980s, on the other hand, inflation-devaluation-inflation cycles
that resulted in little change in the RER were much more common and
led to considerable pessimism (known as "nominal exchange rate pessi-
mism") about the usefulness of devaluations for realigning relative prices.
There are three sources of concern about devaluations and inflation:
(a) the relationship between the devaluation and the actual misalign-
ment, if any, of the exchange rate; (b) the effectiveness of a nominal de-
valuation in depreciating the internal RER by achieving the required
increase in the relative price of traded goods; and (c) the possible longer-
term impact of a devaluation on price stability and the trend inflation
rate. First, only if the RER is initially overvalued will a devaluation de-
preciate the RER toward its equilibrium level. If, in fact, the RER is cor-
rectly aligned initially, a devaluation will move the RER away from equi-
librium and create excess demand in the market for nontraded goods
(by reducing their relative price from the equilibrium level) that will
appreciate the RER back toward the original equilibrium. Second, even
if the exchange rate is initially overvalued, it is still often feared that an
increase in the price of traded goods due to a devaluation will also lead
to an increase in the price of nontraded goods as well through inad-
equate monetary and fiscal discipline, indexation of wages and prices,
or market power and demonstration effects. If the increase in the price
of nontraded goods is large enough to offset most of the impact of a
nominal devaluation on relative prices, a devaluation will then merely
result in raising the general price level, without achieving the desired
depreciation of the internal RER and change in relative domestic prices.
Third, even if a devaluation is successful in realigning relative prices, it
could, by changing expectations about the future path of prices, result
in a permanent increase in the trend inflation rate. A country could, in a
worst-case scenario, get trapped in an accelerating inflation-devalua-
tion spiral without ever depreciating its RER except temporarily.
NOMINAL DEVALUATIONS, INFLATION, AND THE RER 545
Since theoretically many combinations of changes in the general price
level and relative prices are possible after a devaluation, it is desirable
to have some measure of the effectiveness of a nominal devaluation in
achieving a real depreciation. To measure the effects of a devaluation
on domestic inflation and the external RER, both a "pass-through co-
efficient" and an "effectiveness index" are often calculated. The exter-
nal RER is defined in domestic-currency terms as shown by equation
13.1:
(13.1) ERERdc = EdC G
P
PGd
Assuming for convenience that the initial foreign price level is 1.0 and
log differentiating equation 13.1 above yields the following approxima-
tion (equation 13.2) for small changes in the variables:
(13.2) ERER, = EaC - Gd
where the hat operator ("A") applied to any variable x has the standard
meaning of Ax/x. Dividing by EC and rearranging the terms yields equa-
tion 13.3:
(13.3) ERERdC + 1
Edo Ed,
The first term RER, ldc is what Edwards (1989) defines as the effec-
tiveness index of a devaluation. It indicates how much of a nominal
devaluation is translated into a depreciation of the external RER. The
second term P, / Ed, is the pass-through coefficient. It indicates how much
of devaluation is simply reflected in increased prices.' Note that the term
"pass-through coefficient" is used in the literature with two slightly dif-
ferent meanings. Sometimes it is used, as here, to refer to the pass-through
8. Virtually all of the empirical work on devaluations and inflation has fo-
cused on the aggregate domestic price level and the external RER because data
on internal RERs, domestic relative prices, and wages are not readily available
for many developing countries. For this reason, the discussion of the stylized
facts in this section is also largely in terms of the external RER.
9. The additive linear approximation in equation 13.3 of the relationship be-
tween the pass-through coefficient and the effectiveness index is, however, only
valid for small (marginal) percentage changes. For "maxi" devaluations and other
large percentage changes in the variables, it is necessary to use the actual multi-
plicative relationship between the pass-through coefficient and the effectiveness
index.
546 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
of the effects of a nominal exchange rate change to the general domestic
price level; and sometimes it refers more narrowly to the pass-through
of changes in foreign prices, tariffs, or the exchange rate just to the do-
mestic prices of traded goods.
Nominal Devaluation Pessimism
Pessimism about a nominal devaluation's effectiveness in achieving a
real depreciation was fed by the experiences of a number of developing
countries in the 1970s and 1980s-a period characterized by accelerat-
ing global inflation in which the initial depreciation of the real exchange
rate achieved by a devaluation often appeared to be eroded quite rap-
idly by inflation. The Philippines, for example, undertook large devalu-
ations in the early 1980s but achieved almost no depreciation in its RER
as most of the nominal devaluation was negated by domestic price in-
creases. In other countries such as Argentina, which experienced high
inflation and repeated devaluations, indexation or dollarization often
became widespread and changes in the exchange rate were quickly re-
flected in domestic prices.8
However, subsequent, more systematic analysis of the empirical evi-
dence produced less pessimistic conclusions. Kamin (1988) examined a
sample of about 70 large or maxi-devaluations of 15 percent or greater
that took place between 1953 and 1983 and for which data were avail-
able. Kamin found that, relative to nondevaluing countries, the RERs of
the devaluing countries were significantly more depreciated three years
after a devaluation.
Edwards (1989) reached similar conclusions. He examined a sample
of 29 devaluations under fixed exchange rate regimes and 9 devalua-
tions by countries that adopted crawling pegs after the devaluation.
Edwards defined a devaluation as successful if, after three years, it had
resulted in a depreciation of the external RER of 30 percent or more of
the nominal devaluation expressed in domestic-currency terms-that
is, if it had an effectiveness index of at least 30 percent or, equivalently, if
the pass-through coefficient was 54 percent or less.
Edwards found that about one-third (10) out of the 29 cases of stepwise
devaluations under fixed exchange rate regimes were successful and
that on average in these countries two-thirds of the nominal devalua-
tion was translated into a depreciation of the external RER (that is, an
average effectiveness index of 67 percent). However, in the other two-
thirds of the cases of devaluations under fixed exchange rate regimes
either the initial effect of the nominal devaluation on the external RER
10. See Inter-American Development Bank (1995), p. 234.
NOMINAL DEVALUATIONS, INFLATION, AND THE RER 547
was completely wiped out within three years or less (8 cases) or less
than 30 percent of the nominal devaluation was ultimately reflected in
the depreciation of the external RER (12 cases).
Countries with crawling pegs achieved larger real depreciations on
average, as one would expect, but this relative success was purchased at
the price of higher inflation. As in the case of fixed exchange rates, in
only one-third of the cases of crawling pegs was more than 30 percent of
the cumulative nominal devaluation translated into a real depreciation.
In the other two-thirds of the crawling peg cases, only a small real de-
preciation was achieved at the expense of accelerating inflation. Edwards
concluded by stressing the importance of monetary and fiscal discipline
and other accompanying measures to restrain inflation for successfully
translating a nominal devaluation into as large a real depreciation as
possible. n
Additional evidence suggests that, in the right circumstances, devalu-
ations can be quite effective in achieving a real depreciation. Kiguel and
Ghei (1993) examined the hypothesis that low-inflation countries might
be more successful in controlling the inflationary effects of large devalu-
ations because of the continuation of the very policies and institutional
arrangements that had led them to have low predevaluation inflation
rates to start with. They analyzed a sample of all 33 large or maxi-
devaluations (specifically, those between 20 percent and 200 percent in
domestic-currency terms) since the 1950s in low-inflation countries (spe-
cifically, countries with an annual inflation rate of 15 percent or less for
the three years preceding the devaluation). They found that about 60
percent of the initial depreciation in the external RER was maintained
three years after the event-about the same average effectiveness index
as in Edwards' cases of successful devaluations.
Most of the devaluation episodes in low-inflation countries took place
in the 1950s and 1960s, when fixed exchange rates were prevalent and
global inflation was low. Devaluations then were regarded as discrete
events and therefore appear to have had a higher probability of success
than in the more inflationary 1970s and 1980s. This relatively greater
success rate was partly due to less indexation of wages and other prices
then. The infrequency of devaluations at that time probably also meant
that they were not as likely to generate expectations of further devalua-
tions, and economic agents with market power did not act immediately
to offset the full impact of the devaluation by increasing prices. How-
ever, some of the episodes in Kiguel's and Ghei's sample of low-inflation
countries did take place in the higher-inflation 1970s (Pakistan in 1972
and Egypt in 1979) yet were still successful in depreciating the real
11. See also Kiguel (1992).
548 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
exchange rate. Experiences such as those of Chile and Morocco also sug-
gest that in successful devaluations 30 to 65 percent of the nominal de-
valuation is typically translated into a depreciation of the external RER,
with the overall increase in the price level offsetting anywhere from 20
percent to 55 percent of the devaluation.
Chhibber (1991) notes that nominal devaluation pessimism in Africa
resulted mainly from the experiences of Ghana and Zimbabwe although
he also cites some other cases. In simulations of devaluations, Chhibber
found that the pass-through effect of a devaluation on inflation is gener-
ally larger than the share of imports in GDP even for successful devalu-
ations. For Ghana, for which the share of imports in GDP is 0.20, Chhibber
found a pass-through coefficient of 0.40. On the other hand, Chhibber
also found that if the fiscal deficit is not kept under control, the resulting
additional inflation can completely wipe out the initial effect of the nomi-
nal devaluation on the external RER. In a best-case scenario with more
optimistic assumptions about postdevaluation fiscal performance and
supply response in Zimbabwe, Chhibber found that only one-third of a
nominal devaluation would be offset by inflation and a real deprecia-
tion of 50 percent would be achieved.
More recently, Kamin (1998) in a study of 38 Asian, Latin American,
and industrialized countries examines the relationships between ex-
change rate competitiveness, changes in the nominal exchange rate, and
inflation. Although Kamin is constrained by the size of his sample to
using an imperfect relative-PPP-based measure of misalignment, he does
find that, statistically, a depreciated (undervalued) RER leads to higher
inflation and an appreciated (overvalued) RER to lower inflation. This
tendency is particularly strong in Latin American countries with a his-
tory of higher inflation and rigidities to depreciating the RER, in which
the responsiveness of inflation to nominal depreciations is significantly
higher than in Asian and industrialized countries. Kamin also finds some
evidence that "prior inflation, by raising the sensitivity of institutions
and expectations to inflationary shocks, raises the responsiveness of in-
flation to exchange rate changes." Thus, high-inflation countries may
tend to have higher pass-through coefficients than low-inflation ones.
The Time Path of Inflation
Thus, some increase in the price level is usually unavoidable after a de-
valuation since the rise in the domestic-currency price of traded goods
12. See also Calvo, Reinhart, and Vegh (1995) for a further discussion of the
theory and empirical evidence that excessive devaluations and undervaluation
lead to higher inflation.
NOMINAL DEVALUATIONS, INFLATION, AND THE RER 549
to reflect the new nominal exchange rate leads to a one-time upward
shift in the general price level. What is the typical time profile of the
increase in prices? Kamin (1988) examined this question for all develop-
ing countries that implemented large devaluations, and Kiguel and Ghei
(1993) looked at the experiences of a subgroup of low-inflation coun-
tries. Although the beginning and ending inflation rates were, of course,
higher in the larger sample than in the subgroup of low-inflation coun-
tries, inflation followed a broadly similar pattern in both groups of de-
valuing countries as shown in table 13.1. The prices of final and inter-
mediate traded goods usually rise quickly after a devaluation; but wages,
other factor costs, and the prices of nontraded goods generally respond
with various lags to a devaluation. Most of the adjustment in prices typi-
cally takes place in the 12 months after the devaluation. The inflation
rate normally rises sharply right after the devaluation and remains higher
than the trend level for the two years after the devaluation as the changes
in domestic-currency prices of tradable goods work themselves through
the economy. The inflation rate then typically falls back toward histori-
cal levels by the third year after the devaluation. Some acceleration in
inflation is also likely in the year preceding a devaluation, particularly
if the devaluation is anticipated.
Effect on the Long-Term Inflation Rate
The evidence on the long-term impact of a devaluation on trend infla-
tion rates is mixed. Kamin (1988) found that the trend inflation rate in
devaluing countries increased. However, nondevaluing countries in
Table 13.1 The Time Path of Inflation after Large Devaluations in
Developing Countries
Median inflation rates in percent
Years Difference between years
Countries D-3 D-1 D D±3 D+3andD-3 D+3andD-1
All Devaluing 9.9 14.0 17.3 13.9 4.0 -0.1
Countries
Low-Inflation 3.6 4.7 5.6 5.1 1.5 -0.4
Countries
Sources: Kamin (1988) for all devaluing countries and Kiguel and Ghei (1993) for low-infla-
tion countries.
550 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
Kamin's control group also experienced rising inflation rates, and the
evidence from the study suggests that there was no difference in the
inflation performance of the two sets of countries. Kiguel and Ghei (1993)
find that the effect of a nominal devaluation on long-term inflation was
quite limited in low-inflation countries as the data in table 13.1 above
indicate. In their sample, inflation rates three years after a devaluation
were, on average, very close to those prevailing before the event.
The Importance of Disciplined Accompanying Policies
The effects of a particular devaluation on the real exchange rate and
inflation depend ultimately on the policies that accompany a devalua-
tion, not just on the devaluation itself. Hence, one's ability to predict the
outcome of a devaluation depends, among other things, on the ability
to predict the policies that will accompany it. If monetary growth is kept
in check, demand management (particularly fiscal policy) is appropri-
ate, and wage push is avoided, there is no reason why a devaluation
that moves the RER in the direction of its long-run equilibrium value
cannot result in a long-term depreciation of the RER without perma-
nently increasing the inflation rate. On the other hand, as experience
has shown, if these conditions are not met, inflation will quickly offset
the initial depreciation of the RER.
While it is important to find a firm nominal anchor for monetary
policy, and a fixed exchange rate may play this role, empirical evidence
suggests that neither the adoption of a flexible exchange rate policy nor
a devaluation under a fixed exchange rate regime by themselves neces-
sarily need trigger higher inflation. Edwards, Kiguel, and Ghei, and
Chhibber all conclude that the success of a devaluation ultimately de-
pends on the accompanying polices. Chhibber credits the low inflation
rates of the CFA zone countries not to their fixed exchange rate per se,
but to the monetary discipline imposed by the conditions of member-
ship in the zone. Similarly, the external RER tracked the nominal ex-
change rate closely in the 1980s and early 1990s in Malaysia, which had
a flexible exchange rate regime, because it also had disciplined macro-
economic policies and low inflation. In contrast, countries such as Zam-
bia and the Philippines in the 1980s that devalued often or moved to
crawling pegs typically failed to adopt disciplined monetary and fiscal
policies. The results were not surprising: higher inflation without any
marked reduction in the over-valuation of the real exchange rate.'3
13. The implications of fixed vs. flexible exchange rate regimes for inflation
and growth have also been a subject of continuing research interest. For a sum-
mary of the historical evidence, see Ghosh and others (1996), who use a
NOMINAL DEVALUATIONS, INFLATION, AND THE RER 551
Summary of the Stylized Facts
Both theoretically and empirically, any combination of RER realignment
and inflation is possible after a devaluation: a depreciation, an appre-
ciation, or no change in the external RER accompanied by an accelera-
tion of inflation or a return to predevaluation price trends. The empiri-
cal evidence shows that the effectiveness index and pass-through coeffi-
cient are both variables, not fixed parameters, that may take on quite
different values in different circumstances.
In general, the pass-through coefficient is likely to be higher, and the
effectiveness index lower, in high-inflation countries such as those in
Latin America than in lower-inflation countries such as those in Asia
and Africa. The key to a successful devaluation is monetary discipline
and appropriate demand management policies. The probability of suc-
cess is also higher in countries with a history of low inflation because of
the policy traditions and institutional arrangements that led these coun-
tries to have low predevaluation inflation rates in the first place. Suc-
cessful devaluations (those accompanied by appropriate macroeconomic
policies) in open developing economies have typically led to a deprecia-
tion of the external RER of 30 to 70 percent of the nominal devaluation
comprehensive database to study the link between exchange rate regimes, in-
flation, and growth. They find that: "Two sturdy stylized facts emerge. First,
inflation is both lower and more stable under pegged regimes, reflecting both
slower money supply and faster money demand growth. Second, real volatility
is higher under pegged regimes. In contrast, growth varies only slightly across
regimes, though investment is somewhat higher and trade growth somewhat
lower under pegged regimes. Pegged regimes are thus characterized by lower
inflation but more pronounced output volatility." Lane (1994) finds that infla-
tion is inversely related to openness (controlling for country size) and that more
open economies were more able to choose and more likely to maintain fixed
exchange rates. However, in an analysis of the recent experience with increasing
capital market integration and the replacement of fixed by flexible exchange
rates in the 1990s, Caramazza and Aziz (1998) find that the differences in infla-
tion and output growth between fixed and flexible regimes are no longer signifi-
cant. They also find that misalignment and currency "crashes" are equally likely
under pegged and flexible exchange rate regimes, in part because relatively few
developing countries have had truly floating exchange rates and some of those
that had an officially declared flexible policy were in fact pursuing an unofficial
target rate. Caramazza and Aziz conclude that: "The average inflation rate for
countries with flexible exchange rates has fallen steadily to where it is no longer
significantly different from that of countries with fixed rates. The perceived need
for greater [exchange rate] flexibility has probably resulted from increasing glo-
balization of financial markets-which has integrated developing economies more
closely into the global financial system. This in turn imposes an often strict disci-
pline on their macroeconomic policies."
552 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
in domestic-currency terms, with the RER depreciating on impact by
the full amount of the devaluation and then gradually appreciating as
the domestic price level shifts upward. The aggregate price level has
typically shifted upward by 20 to 55 percent of the amount of the nomi-
nal devaluation-two to three times the share of imports in GDP. Most
of the upward shift in the price level has occurred in the first year, with
the inflation rate dropping back to its trend level over the course of the
second year. No increase in the long-term trend inflation rate has typi-
cally resulted from successful devaluations.
Because of the numerous different possibilities, unsuccessful devalu-
ations are more difficult to characterize. They often lead to increased
inflation and a depreciation of the external RER that is less than 30 per-
cent of the cumulative change in the nominal exchange rate-and may,
under a fixed exchange rate regime, result in no change in, or even an
appreciation of, the external RER. The probability of success is lower in
high-inflation countries in which frequent devaluations have generated
expectations of further inflation, and devaluations and economic agents
with market power act immediately to offset the full impact of a
devaluation by increasing prices. In addition, in cases in which the ex-
change rate is appropriately aligned to start with, a devaluation will
move the RER away from, rather than toward, equilibrium and gen-
erate inflationary pressures tending to appreciate it back to its origi-
nal level.
An Accounting Framework for Determining
Consistent Nominal and Relative Prices
The above stylized facts indicate that a wide range of outcomes is pos-
sible after a devaluation and that the policies accompanying a devalua-
tion play a critical role in determining which of the many possible out-
comes actually occurs in a particular case. However, the stylized facts
say little about the changes in key nominal and relative prices that must
take place to realign the internal RER. Because of lack of data very little
empirical work has been done on the changes in internal relative prices
that take place after a devaluation.
Because of the multiplicity of factors affecting the pass-through coef-
ficient, the lack of time-series data for measuring many of these, and the
key role played by accompanying policies, it would be difficult to con-
struct a predictive model accurate enough for policy analysis in a range
of different country cases. Hence, the remainder of this chapter takes a
different approach: it sets out a simple accounting framework that can
be used for analyzing alternative policy scenarios and calculating con-
sistent sets of nominal and relative prices that will result from these.
NOMINAL DEVALUATIONS, ENFLATION, AND THE RER 553
The following section first summarizes the accounting framework, the
individual equations of which are discussed in more detail in the ap-
pendix. It then illustrates the use of this consistency framework for ana-
lyzing alternative devaluations and policy scenarios.
The Consistency Framework
The full accounting system is based on a two-good framework with a
tradable and nontradable sector. It is is composed of the following eight
equations (13.4 to 13.11) set out in the appendix.
1. The definition of the external RER:
(13.4) ERERdc = Ed '
PGd
2. The law of one price:
(13.5) PT = Edc (1+ Tf
where t is the average tariff on final goods..
3. The definition of the internal RER for traded goods expressed rela-
tive to the general domestic price level:
(13.6) IRERT, T -EdcTf(I+t)
PGd 9Gd
4. The definition of the general price index:
(13.7) PGd = r - Edc PTf (1t)+(1--r)Pd
where T is the weight of tradables in the index.
5. The allocation of the cost of nontraded goods between imported
inputs and domestic factor costs (F):
(13.8) P\.=-a -E, PTf(1 + tj+(1- a)F,
where a is the share of imported inputs in the cost of producing
nontraded goods.
6. The allocation of factor payments in the nontraded sector between
wages (W) and profits (7n):
554 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
(13.9) F\=A - W'+(1)-7
where A is the share of wages.
7. An assumption about the rate of increase in nominal wages and
profits after a devaluation:
(13.10)
8. The definition of the real wage:
(13.11) w=
PGd
The above system of 8 equations contains 14 variables, of which 4 are
exogenous and 10 endogenous. The 4 exogenous variables are the for-
eign price of traded goods, P,, the aggregate foreign price level, P,, and
the 2 home country trade tax rates on imports of final goods, t, and in-
puts, t,. The first 2 of the exogenous variables are determined by as-
sumptions about the international economic environment, and the lat-
ter 2 are policy variables.
The first 3 of the 10 endogenous variables are exchange rates: the
nominal exchange rate (E,), the external RER (ERERd), and the internal
RER (IRERT). The other 7 endogenous variables are the general domes-
tic price level (PGd), the domestic price of nontraded goods (Pd), the do-
mestic price of traded goods (PT), payments to domestic factors of pro-
duction (F ) in the nontraded sector, nominal wages (W), nominal prof-
its ()r), and the real wage (wG.
The above system also has three structural parameters-r, the weight
of traded goods in the aggregate home country price index; a, the share
of traded inputs in the cost of producing nontraded goods; and A, the
share of wages in value added in producing nontraded goods. The em-
pirical values of these in C6te d'Ivoire were estimated at 0.22, 0.11, and
0.7, respectively, as explained in the appendix. Variations in the struc-
tural parameters will cause a given nominal devaluation to have a greater
or lesser inflationary impact (and effect on real wages), depending upon
whether they are higher or lower. The sensitivity of the calculations to
different assumptions about these parameters is analyzed in scenarios 2
and 4 below.
Since the accounting framework has 8 equations but 10 endogenous
variables, the values of 2 of the 10 endogenous variables need to be speci-
fied to solve for the other 8 variables. A target for 1 real variable can be
NOMINAL DEVALUATIONS, INFLATION, AND THE RER 555
specified ex ante-for example, the postrealignment internal or external
RER. But a target for the RER is only enough to solve for relative prices.
A nominal variable-for example, the domestic price level, nominal wage
rate, or nominal exchange rate-also needs to be specified in order to
solve for nominal prices. Fixing the value of such a nominal variable is
the "nominal anchor" problem. Thus, the values of 2 variables need to
be determined outside the system to obtain a solution: a real variable
and a nominal anchor or 2 nominal variables (such as the nominal ex-
change rate and wage rate).
To briefly illustrate the interaction of the above equations, a nominal
devaluation (an increase in E.) will, other things being equal, raise the
domestic-currency price of traded goods relative to nontraded goods
and initially depreciate the internal RER accordingly. A 100 percent nomi-
nal devaluation would double the price of foreign exchange in domestic
currency and thus double the price of traded goods (both final and in-
termediate) in domestic currency if there are no changes in taxes and
subsidies on traded goods (equation 13.2). A reduction in import tariffs
or export subsidies would attenuate the domestic price increase. A de-
valuation would also result in some increase (equation 13.8) in the do-
mestic price of nontraded goods, proportionate to the share of traded
inputs, a, even if there are no changes in nominal profits and nominal
wages. The increase in the domestic-currency price of traded goods will
also raise the general level of domestic prices, proportionate to the share
of traded goods in output or absorption, T, (equation 13.7) and to the
share of traded goods as inputs in the production of nontraded goods, a
(equation 13.8). Any increase in nominal wages or profits will further
raise the price of nontraded goods and the general price level (equation
13.9), offsetting some or all of the rest of the initial depreciation in
the RER.
A key assumption underlying the use of the above framework is that
the RER is initially overvalued and the objective is to depreciate it
by no more than the amount required so that a devaluation and the
corresponding changes in relative prices will reflect a movement back
toward equilibrium. The behavior of nominal wages and profits in the
nontraded sector after a devaluation is also critical. Equations 13.9 and
13.10 assume that producers of nontraded goods can raise their prices
only to the extent that their costs increase. That is, they behave competi-
tively and do not have the market power to automatically increase the
price of nontraded goods by the full amount of the realignment in the
nominal exchange rate. A change in the relative prices of traded and
nontraded goods and a depreciation of the RER are not possible if nomi-
nal wages and profits in the nontraded sector rise in proportion to a
devaluation.
556 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
The ability to make reasonably accurate assumptions about the
postdevaluation behavior of wages, profits, and prices is the key to the
usefulness of this framework empirically. Monetary and fiscal policies
also need to be designed to achieve the target value for the chosen nomi-
nal anchor and the required behavior of nominal wages. The approach
used in the devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994 was to make the change
in nominal wages the critical policy target of the economic policies ac-
companying the devaluation.4
The consistency framework, however, permits one to model the be-
havior of wages and prices in a number of different ways. For example,
nominal wages may be assumed to respond to movements in the do-
mestic price level, as shown in equation 13.12:
(13.12) AWd= pl dAP, O ! p, 1l
where p, is a reaction coefficient. When p, = 1, there is full indexation,
and no adjustment in the real wage is possible. For countries that have
undergone repeated nominal devaluations, nominal wages may be as-
sumed to respond to movements in the nominal exchange rate, as shown
by equation 13.13:
(13.13) AW= p - AE,,, O : p2 I
where p2 is again a reaction coefficient. Alternatively, the new real wage
may be specified as a percentage of the initial one (equation 13.14):
(13.14) p, -P
where P3 is the ratio of the new real wage to the initial one." Equation
13.10 can also be modified to allow for differential changes in wages
and profits. Numerous alternative scenarios can be analyzed, as
14. Standard methodologies exist for using monetary and fiscal policies to
target nominal variables such as the domestic price level or the nominal exchange
rate. In order to design an appropriate policy package to accompany a devalua-
tion, such a methodology is required to complement the consistency framework
presented here. A discussion of these methodologies, however, is beyond the
scope of this chapter. For an example of an application of such a methodology
for a CFA country, see Callier (1992).
15. The reaction coefficients could be estimated when data availability per-
mits doing so or assumed when it does not. Note that these coefficients could
take on quite different values in low- and high-inflation countries as suggested
by the stylized facts about devaluations and inflation.
NOMINAL DEVALUATIONS, INFLATION, AND THE RER 557
illustrated below, to explore different options and the range of possible
outcomes.6
The accounting framework set out above can be used in operational
applications to determine consistent sets of changes in the nominal ex-
change rate, the internal and external RERs, and key nominal and rela-
tive domestic prices and factor costs. Using a computer spreadsheet for
the accounting framework, numerous scenarios can be run quickly on
alternative assumptions. The key to getting reasonably accurate results
is the ability to make realistic assumptions about the reaction of wages
and prices to a devaluation.
Although the framework computes the immediate adjustments in the
endogenous variables in response to changes in the exogenous variables,
it does not allow for full general-equilibrium repercussions that might
occur over a longer time period. The framework is also one of compara-
tive statics and does not calculate the time path of the adjustments, al-
though it can be used iteratively. If reasonable assumptions can be made
about the time path of exogenous variables, then a time series for the
resulting adjustments in endogenous variables can be calculated.
Examples of Alternative Scenarios
There are two basic ways of approaching the question of how much to
devalue: a strictly technical approach and a political economy approach.
The technical approach is to estimate the size of the required real depre-
ciation using the methodologies set out in Part III of this volume and
then determine the size of the nominal devaluation that is necessary to
achieve this real depreciation under alternative assumptions about the
accompanying policies and the response of wages and prices. However,
many devaluations follow balance-of-payments crises when govern-
ments are forced, often against their will, to devalue. In such cases policy-
makers usually do not have the luxury of taking a strictly technical ap-
proach to the question of how much to devalue. Hence, the political
economy approach typically starts by identifying a specific nominal
devaluation that is both politically acceptable, given the crisis situation,
and large enough to be credible with financial markets. For this speci-
fied devaluation, one then explores how much inflation and real depre-
ciation are likely to result under alternative policy scenarios.
16. Alternatively, in a specific case an equation such as (13.11), (13.12), or (13.13)
could be included in the framework to endogenize an additional variable. This
approach has not been followed here, however, in order to preserve the flexibil-
ity of the framework for analyzing different possibilities about the
postdevaluation behavior of wages and prices.
558 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
The following subsections give examples of alternative scenarios
about the outcome of the 1994 devaluation in C6te d'Jvoire. The politi-
cal economy approach, assuming the nominal devaluation of 100 per-
cent in domestic-currency terms (50 percent in foreign currency) that
was actually implemented, is discussed first since the presentation of it
is more straightforward. In the discussion of both the political economy
and the technical approaches, a real depreciation in IRERT6 of 40 per-
cent in domestic-currency terms (29 percent in foreign currency) is as-
sumed to be optimal as was suggested by the analysis carried out before
the devaluation.
Because the consistency framework does not endogenously deter-
mine how wages and profits will react to a nominal devaluation, the
change in wages and profits, and hence in the overall price level, has to
be specified in some other way. There are several ways of handling this
problem, three of which are illustrated below. One way of pinning down
the behavior of wages and prices is to assume that the government adopts
accompanying economic policies that hold the percentage increase in
them to a given rate that is considered politically feasible. This rate is
then specified exogenously so that the resulting increase in the prices of
nontraded goods can be determined. Alternatively, equation 13.12 or
13.13 above may be used to relate the change in wages to either the
nominal devaluation or the resulting change in prices. Given any of these
assumptions about the postdevaluation behavior of wages and prices
and a specific nominal devaluation or targeted real depreciation, the
accounting framework may be used, as illustrated in the scenarios be-
low, to calculate a consistent set of nominal and relative prices.
The Political Economy Approach: Analyzing the Implications of a
Specified Nominal Devaluation
Table 13.2 examines the implications of a specified nominal devaluation
of 100 percent, the one actually implemented in C6te d'Ivoire, for the
RER nominal and relative prices. Four different scenarios are analyzed
to consider the effects of (a) a reduction in trade taxes, (b) alternative
distributions of the change in nominal factor payments between labor
and capital, (c) the responsiveness of wages to prices, and (d) the sensi-
tivity of the calculations to the assumptions about the size of the trad-
able sector.
Reduction in Trade Taxes. Scenarios l.a and 1.b look at the effects of a
reduction in trade taxes. The effects of a 100 percent devaluation are
shown with and without the planned reduction in the average tariff on
imported final products from 0.13 to 0.07 and in the average tariff on
imported inputs from 0.16 to 0.11. When trade taxes are held constant in
scenario 1.a, the external RER, EXRER,, and the internal RER, IRERTG,
NOMINAL DEVALUATIONS, INFLATION, AND THE RER 559
depreciate by the same amount, 50 percent. But, when trade taxes are
cut, the resulting somewhat smaller increase in the domestic price of
traded goods reduces the depreciation of the internal RER from 50 per-
cent to 44 percent. The effect of the trade tax cut on the external RER is
the opposite-the smaller increase in the domestic price of traded goods
reduces the increase in the general domestic price level from 33 percent
to 32 percent and increases the depreciation in the external RER from 50
percent to 51 percent." Since a reduction in trade taxes was actually
both planned and implemented at the time of the devaluation, all the
remaining scenarios assume a reduction in trade taxes.
A Freeze on Wages Profits. Scenarios L.a and 1.b also assume that nomi-
nal wages and profits are frozen. They illustrate the maximum potential
real depreciation that could be achieved with downward rigidity in nomi-
nal wages, one reason why a devaluation was needed to help guide the
economy back to a full employment equilibrium. Together scenarios L.a
and 1.b suggest that a real depreciation of 40 percent to 50 percent was
the largest that might be achieved by a 100 percent nominal devaluation
and, conversely, that a pass-through coefficient of 0.3 was the smallest
likely to be feasible.
Establishing a Target for Wages and Prices. As noted above, the key ana-
lytical problem in analyzing the effects of a nominal devaluation is to
determine how much it depreciates the real exchange rate and how much
it simply increases the price level. One way of pinning down the rate of
inflation is to establish an inflation target for the monetary fiscal poli-
cies accompanying the devaluation that seems plausible in light of both
the stylized facts about devaluations and inflation and the historical
experience of the particular country concerned. In the accounting frame-
work there are three domestic prices that could be targeted: the general
price level, the price of nontraded goods, and total domestic factor costs
(F ,). Of these, the price of nontraded goods contains the price of im-
ported inputs. The general price level contains the price of imported
final goods as well as the price of nontraded goods and, thus, of im-
ported inputs. Domestic factor costs, in contrast, are a pure measure of
domestic costs and prices. Hence, the following scenarios are based on
assumptions about the changes in nominal factor payments. In other
cases, however, one may wish to use the general price level instead of
nominal factor payments because data on the general price level are
more readily available or because it has been previously used for infla-
tion targeting in the country concerned.
17. This divergence is an example of the contrary movements in the internal
and external RERs that can be caused by changes in commercial policy or the
terms of trade as described in Chapters 3 and 4.
Table 13.2 Implications of a Nominal Devaluation of 100 Percent
Percentage change in variable
IRERTG ERER, Pc, P, PT W d W, Wd p. t.c.. e..
Scenario PGd N
1. Freeze in nominal factor payments with
a. No change in trade taxes 50.3 50.3 33.1 12.4 100.0 0.0 0.0 -24.9 -11.1 .33 .50
b. Reduction in trade taxes' 43.5 51.3 32.2 11.3 89.7 0.0 0.0 -24.4 -10.2 .32 .5
2. 15 percent increase in nominal factor payments
? with a reduction in trade taxesa
a. Equal percentage increase in wages and profits 35.7 43.0 39.8 24.5 89.7 15.0 15.0 -17.8 -7.6 .40 .43
b. Entire increase goes to capital 35.7 43.0 39.8 24.5 89.7 0.0 50.0 -28.5 -19.6 .40 .43
c. Entire increase goes to labor 35.7 43.0 39.8 24.5 89.7 21.4 0.0 -13.2 -2.4 .40 .43
3. Nominal factor payments increase by
50 percent of the increase in prices' 28.5 35.5 47.6 34.6 89.7 23.8 23.8 -16.1 -8.0 .48 .36
4. Sensitivity analysis of scenario 2a with a
50 percent larger traded-goods sector 21.3 27.9 56.4 29.7 89.7 15.0 15.0 -29.4 -11.4 .56 .28
(table continues on next page)
(table 13.2 continued)
Variables:
IRERT = Internal RER (relative to the domestic price of traded goods) i =Nomal profit rate
Wd = Nominal wage rate with respect to the general price level w
ERERd, = External RER in domestic-currency terms = Real wage in terms of the general price level
P
a P. =Domestic general price index
I= Domestic price of nontraded goods W
d Doetcpieo otae od Real wages in terms of nontraded goods
P, = Domestic price of traded goods Nd
e.i. = Effectiveness index p.t.c. = Pass-through coefficient
a. Assumed reduction in average trade taxes on final goods from 0.13 to 0.07 and in average trade taxes on imported inputs from 0.16 to 0.11.
Source: Computed using the equations given in the appendix.
562 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
Since a large real depreciation was required in C6te d'Ivoire and it
had been a low-inflation country, with a declining price level in the early
1990s, it was assumed in planning for the 1994 devaluation that the in-
crease in nominal wages and other domestic factor costs could be held
to 10-15 percent in the 12-18 month period after a 100 percent nominal
devaluation. Scenario 2.a illustrates this option." It predicts an increase
in the general price level of 40 percent, a real depreciation in IRERTG of
36 percent, and a decline of 18 percent in real wages if nominal pay-
ments to labor and capital both rise proportionately after a devaluation
(that is, if A is constant). Because of the increase in nominal factor pay-
ments allowed for in this scenario, the pass-through coefficient is 0.4
instead of the 0.3 that would result from the freeze in nominal wages
and profits under scenario L.a and Lb.
Alternative Distributions of the Increase in Nominal Factor Payments be-
tween Wages and Profits. However, to strengthen incentives for expand-
ing output and investment, it may be necessary for the relative return on
capital to increase.19 Hence, scenarios 2.b and 2.c retain the 100 percent
nominal devaluation and the 15 percent increase in nominal factor pay-
ments but drop the assumption that nominal factor payments change
proportionately (equation 13.10). These two scenarios are in effect a sen-
sitivity test of postdevaluation variations in the coefficient A, a param-
eter that may be difficult to estimate accurately in some countries be-
cause of lack of data, as explained in the appendix, or may vary consid-
erably with changes in economic policies and conditions. Scenarios 2.b
and 2.c illustrate the extreme possibilities. Scenario 2.b assumes that the
nominal wage remains fixed at its initial level so that the real wage falls
by 28 percent because of the price increases resulting from the devalua-
tion. The entire increase in nominal factor payments is here assumed to
accrue to capital, raising its nominal return by 50 percent and its real
return by 7 percent. Scenario 2.c illustrates the much smaller decline in
real wages (2 percent) that would occur if labor obtained the entire in-
crease in nominal factor payments; but this is largely hypothetical since
it would lead to an unrealistic decline of 28 percent in the real return to
capital.
Greater Responsiveneness of Wages to Prices. Scenario 3 assumes that
postdevaluation nominal wages rise by 50 percent of the increase in
18. Scenario 2.a is effectively the same as using equation 13.13 to determine
the change in nominal wages as a function of the nominal devaluation with the
reaction coefficient, p2., equal to 0.15.
19. See appendix B of Chapter 2 for a discussion of the relationship between
profitability and the RER.
NOMINAL DEVALUATIONS, INFLATION, AND THE RER 563
prices-that is, that wages respond to prices in accordance with equa-
tion 13.12, with the reaction coefficient, p,, equal to 0.5. This scenario
leads to a greater increase in nominal wages (24 percent instead of 15
percent), higher inflation (47 percent vs. 40 percent), a larger pass-through
coefficient of 0.5, and a smaller real depreciation. It illustrates the infla-
tionary effects of a large real depreciation when nominal wages are par-
tially but significantly indexed to prices.
Sensitivity Analysis. Scenario 4 is a sensitivity analysis of the estimated
size of the traded-goods sector as specified by the parameters'r (the share
of imports of final goods in the general price index, 0.22) and a (the
share of imported inputs in the cost of producing nontraded goods, 0.11).
As explained in the appendix and Chapter 3 on the two-good internal
RER, there are several ways of measuring the size of the tradable sector
and considerable uncertainty is involved in doing so. The tradable sec-
tor, whose prices are effectively determined by foreign prices, may be
significantly larger than the import sector, the size of which was used to
estimate the parameters T and a. Scenario 5 assumes that r and a are, in
fact, 50 percent larger than estimated (that is, 0.33 and 0.16, respectively)
and calculates the effect of a 100 percent nominal devaluation with a 15
percent increase in nominal factor payments. In this case, because of the
larger weight of traded goods in the price indexes, the effect of the de-
valuation on the price level is greater. Consequently, the pass-through
coefficient rises from 0.40 in scenario 2.a to 0.56 even though the in-
creases in nominal wages and profits are the same in the two scenarios.
The magnitude of the price increases and pass-through coefficient in
this scenario are similar to those that may be experienced during de-
valuations in very open small economies.
The Technical Approach: Determination of the Size of the Required
Nominal Devaluation
In addition to computing the amount of inflation and real depreciation
that would result from a given nominal devaluation, the consistency
framework can also be used to determine the size of the nominal de-
valuation required to achieve a given real depreciation. Again, the cen-
tral analytical problem is to establish the relationship between a nomi-
nal devaluation, the depreciation of the real exchange rate, and the change
in the domestic price level. Essentially, there are two ways of addressing
this problem: (a) by establishing a policy target for the inflation rate as
in scenario 2.a above or (b) by specifying an assumed relationship be-
tween the increase in prices and domestic factor costs as in scenario 3.
Scenarios 5 and 6 in table 13.3 compute the nominal devaluation re-
quired to achieve a 40 percent real depreciation in IRERTG under two
Table 13.3 Determination of the Nominal Devaluation Required to Achieve a 40 Percent Depreciation in the Internal RER
(IRERT )
Scenario E, ERER,c Qd PNd PTdd Vd Wd p.tdc di.
PC" P11
Gd Nd
5. 15 Percent increase in nominal wages 112.0 47.6 43.6 25.9 101.0 15.0 15.0 -19.9 -8.6 .39 .43
and profits with a reduction in trade
taxes'
6. Nominal wages and profits both 133.3 47.6 58.0 38.6 121.0 29.0 29.0 -18.4 -6.9 .44 .36
increase by one-half as much as
the general price level with a
reduction in trade taxesa
Variables:
E, = Nominal exchange rates in domestic currency terms r, Nominal profit rate
ERERde = External RER in domestic-currency terms
P = Domestic general price index P Real wage in terms of the general price level
d = Domestic price of nontraded goods Wd
PTd = Domestic price of traded goods Real wages in terms of nontraded
W = Nominal wage rate
p.t.c. = Pass-through coefficient e.. Effectiveness index
a. Assumed reduction in average trade taxes on final goods from 0.13 to 0.07 and in average trade taxes on imported inputs from 0.16 to =o11.
Source: Computed using the equations given in the appendix.
NOMINAL DEVALUATIONS, INFLATION, AND THE RER 565
such different assumptions about the postdevaluation behavior of wages.
Scenario 5 assumes the same increase in nominal wages and profits of
15 percent as in the base-case scenario, 2.a. It indicates that if trade tax
rates are reduced, a nominal devaluation of 112 percent rather than 100
percent would be needed to achieve the targeted real depreciation of 40
percent. Scenario 6 assumes, as in scenario 3, that nominal wages and
profits rise by one-half of the increase in the general price level. In this
case, a nominal devaluation of 133 percent would be needed because
nominal wages and profits would increase by 29 percent rather than by
the 15 percent assumed in scenario 2.a.
The Actual Outcome in Cte d'Ivoire
Since the devaluation of the CFA franc took place some time ago, it is
possible to compare the ex ante estimated price changes from the frame-
work with the actual outcome in C6te d'Ivoire. The programmed de-
valuation scenario, 2.a, involved two key assumptions, one of which
proved to be reasonably accurate but the other of which was far off.
The first assumption concerned the size of the nominal devaluation
and changes in foreign prices. While a nominal devaluation of 100 per-
cent relative to the French franc was implemented as envisaged in sce-
nario 2.a, C6te d'Ivoire's nominal effective exchange rate only depreci-
ated by 49 percent in domestic-currency terms between 1993 and 1997
because of movements in exchange rates with third countries. However,
the price level in competitor countries also rose by 30 percent rather
than remaining constant as assumed in scenario 2.a. Together these
changes in exchange rates and foreign prices raised the foreign price
level by 94 percent in CFA franc terms, an outcome that was not greatly
different from the 100 percent assumed in scenario 2.a.
The second key assumption was that since C6te d'Ivoire had been a
relatively low-inflation country, tight demand management and wage
policies would hold the increase in nominal wages between 10 percent
and 15 percent. These policies, however, turned out to be considerably
less restrictive than assumed. Only limited data are available on wages
in C6te d'Ivoire, but average government wages appear to have risen
by 38 percent between 1993 and 1997. National accounts data indicate
that the prices of domestic (nontraded) goods rose by somewhat more.
The estimated values of the parameters T and a may also have been
somewhat too low. Consequently the actual outcome after the devalua-
tion was an increase of 56 percent in the price level and a pass-through
coefficient of 60 percent, near the upper end of the range for successful
devaluations, rather than the 40 percent increase in the price level and
pass-through coefficient of 0.4 projected in scenario 2.a. As a result, the
external RER depreciated by only 24 percent rather than the projected
566 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
43 percent, and the reductions in real wages were also correspondingly
smaller.20
These results highlight two key features of the consistency frame-
work. First, accurate assumptions about the postdevaluation behavior
of factor costs are essential for making accurate projections. But second,
given accurate assumptions, the consistency framework will calculate
reasonably accurate estimates of the changes in key nominal and real
variables.
Implications of a Real Depreciation
The figures in tables 13.2 and 13.3 illustrate both a number of standard
patterns in the adjustments in relative prices accompanying a real de-
preciation and some of the policy implications of a real depreciation.
Standard Patterns in Relative Price Adjsutments
Four standard patterns in the adjustments in relative prices accompany-
ing a real depreciation are worth noting. First, because of the assump-
tion that the foreign price of traded goods changes by the same amount
as the foreign price level, the percentage change in IRERTG always equals
that in the external RER, ERERd, when trade taxes are not changed. If
this assumption is relaxed and the foreign price of traded goods increases
less rapidly than aggregate foreign price (for example, because of more
rapid productivity increases in the traded goods), then IRERTG, which
has the domestic price of traded goods in its numerator, would depreci-
ate by less than ERERdc, which has the aggregate foreign price level in its
numerator.
Second, when trade taxes are reduced, IRERTc also depreciates by
less than ERERdc as the reduction in trade taxes offsets part of the effect
of a devaluation on the domestic price of traded goods, somewhat para-
doxically decreasing the depreciation of the internal RER but increasing
the depreciation of the external RER.
Third, the price of nontraded goods, P, necessarily increases by less
than the aggregate domestic price level, Pcd, when the internal RER de-
preciates. Hence, other things being equal, the depreciation in the inter-
nal RER expressed relative to the price of nontraded goods, IRERT,
which has P , in its denominator, is always greater than the deprecia-
tion in IRERTG and ERERdC, which have PGd in their denominators.
20. As C6te d'Ivoire's terms of trade improved in the mid-1990s, appreciating
its equilibrium RER, the misalignment of its exchange rate was probably reduced
by somewhat more than the depreciation in the actual RER.
NOMINAL DEVALUATIONS, INFLATION, AND THE RER 567
Fourth, the size of the reduction in real wages depends upon the
numeraire. The reduction is always the largest in terms of foreign ex-
change and traded goods and is always the smallest in terms of nontraded
goods. The change in real wages in terms of the general domestic price
level falls between these extremes.
Policy Implications of a Real Depreciation
In considering the policy implications of the accounting framework, it
is worth reiterating in opening that the framework assumes that the tar-
geted real depreciation is designed to correct an initial overvaluation of
the RER and help guide the economy back to equilibrium. If a devalua-
tion, in fact, reflects a movement away from equilibrium, it will create
excess demand in the market for nontraded goods and other inflation-
ary pressure that will fairly quickly undo the effects of the devaluation.
Furthermore, even when an exchange rate is significantly overvalued,
this misalignment may not be a policy problem; and, if it is a policy
problem, a devaluation may not be the appropriate policy response. In
some cases of misalignment-for example, when macroeconomic poli-
cies are appropriate and the misalignment is due to short-term cyclical
factors-no policy response may be required. In other cases of real over-
valuation, a policy response other than a devaluation may be appropri-
ate-for example, reduction of an excessive fiscal deficit.21
Even when a devaluation represents a movement toward equilibrium
and is the appropriate policy response to an overvaluation, a country
still does not want to lose control of its general price level in the process
of making the required realignment in relative domestic prices. Unfor-
tunately, there are no simple nominal exchange rate rules that provide a
reliable basis for postdevaluation monetary policy22 Increasing finan-
cial market integration and highly variable capital flows pose serious
problems for macroeconomic management with a fixed exchange rate?
Hence, targets for inflation or monetary aggregates are increasingly re-
placing fixed exchange rates as nominal anchors for economic policy.
Furthermore, estimates of both the required change in the real exchange
rate and of the corresponding change in the nominal exchange rate may
21. See Isard and Faruqee (1998) for a further discussion of the interpretation
of exchange rate misalignment.
22. Except for currency board or monetary union arrangements, which are
applicable only in special circumstances. See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), pp.
92-94.
23. See, for example, World Bank (1997), p. 43. Goldfajn and Valdes (1996)
also find that excessive real appreciations are more likely to occur under fixed
rate regimes.
568 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
have significant margins of error, a situation that increases the opera-
tional advantages of a flexible postdevaluation exchange rate policy.
In order to depreciate the internal RER, a one-time structural increase
in the relative prices of traded goods must take place. Without such a
structural shift in relative prices, no real depreciation is possible.24 If
nominal wages and other nominal factor costs are rigid downward (or
only decline very slowly), an upward shift in the aggregate price level
must necessarily accompany the structural increase in the relative price
of traded goods. Monetary and interest rate policy must be designed to
accommodate this upward shift in the general price level, or it will pro-
voke a lengthy recession with little ultimate impact on the downwardly
rigid prices of nontraded goods. For designing the policy measures to
accompany a devaluation and monitoring events afterwards, it is also
desirable to have a consistent set of targets both for an acceptable in-
crease in the general price level and for the necessary adjustments in
relative prices and factor costs that are required to depreciate the
internal RER.
On the one hand, demand management policy needs to minimize
secondary inflationary pressures of a devaluation by keeping the fiscal
deficit under control and constraining wage increases. Any increase in
nominal wages and other domestic factor costs after a devaluation will
only create additional inflation that will erode part of the initial real
depreciation. A corresponding decline in real wages is an inevitable con-
sequence of a real depreciation. On the other hand, some increase in the
demand for nontradables and factor costs is often inevitable as produc-
tion and income expand in the traded-goods sector. Hence, to limit the
inflationary impact of a devaluation, demand management policies need
to ensure that factor costs and nontraded-good prices increase no more
than necessary while the prices of traded goods rise as needed to raise
the relative prices of traded to nontraded goods and depreciate the in-
ternal RER. Keeping increases in nominal factor costs and the price of
nontraded goods to the minimum necessary maximizes the gain in com-
petitiveness from a given nominal devaluation. Thus, while monetary
and interest rate policy must accommodate the necessary upward struc-
tural shift in the aggregate price level, it must still be tight enough to
avoid wage and price increases driven by inflationary expectations and
to ensure that there is not excessive demand for nontraded goods that
would drive up their nominal prices beyond the minimum necessary.
In addition to the upward shift in the aggregate price level, a second
likely consequence of the structural increase in the relative price of traded
24. Such a structural shift could occur gradually in a country with a crawling
peg that depreciates steadily in real terms.
NOMINAL DEVALUATIONS, INFLATION, AND THE RER 569
goods is that real wages will normally fall in terms of both foreign ex-
change and traded goods.25 Real wages will usually also decline in terms
of nontraded goods to the extent that imported inputs are used in pro-
ducing them. The accompanying decline in real wages is one reason
why devaluations are often resisted and why full indexation of wages
(real wage rigidity) usually makes it impossible to achieve a real depre-
ciation without structural reforms in the labor market. This aspect of a
real depreciation may be problematic politically, but it is an economic
reality. However, the structural reduction in real wages in terms of the
average price level will be smaller; the smaller is , the share of traded
goods in the general price index, and the more nontraded goods are
substituted for traded goods in consumption after the depreciation of
the RER. The decline is also just a one-time downward shift-if growth
resumes after the depreciation of the RER, labor incomes should also grow.
In the aftermath of a major devaluation like that of the CFA franc, the
price situation is often very confusing. The general price level is a
weighted average of the prices of tradable and nontradable goods. Move-
ments in it after a devaluation may reflect the desired increase in the
prices of tradables or an undesired increase in the prices of nontradables.
Hence, it is difficult to determine solely from the movement in the gen-
eral price level to what extent the RER is depreciating as desired and to
what extent the general price level is simply increasing without any
change in domestic relative prices.
If the required data are available in the 12- to 24-month period after a
large nominal devaluation, it may be easier to judge whether monetary
policy is too tight or too loose by analyzing what is happening to wages-
which are the largest and most easily monitorable component of do-
mestic factor costs-and the prices of nontraded goods rather than by
looking only at the aggregate price level. Although price indexes for
traded goods can often be constructed from data on export and import
prices, current price indexes for nontraded goods are usually not readily
available. The availability of data on wages is also often spotty in low-
income countries such as those of the CFA zone. Hence monthly data on
these variables, if not available in a particular developing country, should
25. Strictly speaking, from equations 13.8 and 13.9, it is real factor payments
(the total of wages and profits), rather than real wages per se, that must fall in
terms of foreign exchange and traded goods. It is possible to imagine hypotheti-
cal situations similar to scenario 2.c above in which the entire reduction in real
factor payments would be in profits. Empirically, however, in nearly all cases
real wages are likely to have to fall since the profit rate will usually need to be
maintained or increased to provide incentives for expanding output and invest-
ment.
570 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
be a priority for data collection efforts. In cases in which these data are
not available, one is limited to analyzing the inflation in the CPI to as-
sess (a) whether the initial inflationary bulge from the devaluation is
fading away and (b) how much higher inflation is than would be ex-
pected on the basis of the increase in import costs alone.26
Conclusion: Advantage and Limitations of the
Consistency Framework
This chapter has set out the stylized facts concerning devaluations and
inflation and presented a simple consistency framework for examining
the linkages between a nominal devaluation, a real depreciation, prices,
and wages. In the absence of a more sophisticated methodology, the
stylized facts and accounting framework provide starting points for
analyzing the impact of a devaluation on prices and wages.
The accounting framework can be used to illuminate the implica-
tions of different policy choices and provides a means for ensuring con-
sistency among them. It quantifies, in a fairly transparent way, the
changes in the key relative prices that must take place in order to depre-
ciate the RER. Some of this clarity may be politically awkward (for ex-
ample, the likely reduction in real wages), but the quantitative relation-
ships reflect the economic reality that a real depreciation entails. A ma-
jor advantage of the framework is its limited data requirements and
simple structure with only three parameters to be estimated. These make
it a practical tool for policy analysis at times of balance-of-payments
crises in developing countries when the availability of time and data are
often limited.
26. Similarly, the upward structural shift in the aggregate price level will give
a distorted picture of what is happening to real interest rates during the 12- to
24-month period of adjustment in relative prices. Like real wages, real interest
rates can be expressed in terms of the prices of traded and nontraded goods or
the aggregate price level. As in the case of real wages, these measures will change
by different amounts when the internal RER depreciates and may give very dif-
ferent impressions of what is happening to real interest rates. A monetary policy
that accommodates the upward structural shift is likely to lead to real interest
rates that appear excessively negative unless the effects of the upward shift in
the price level are excluded from the inflation measure. During this period, real
interest rates should be computed using the rate of inflation in the price of
nontraded goods rather than by using the rate of inflation in the aggregate do-
mestic price level. If data on the price of nontraded goods are not available, a
weighted average of the rate of inflation in foreign prices and of the inflation in
nominal wages (and other domestic factor costs, if available) could be used as a
proxy for the rate of inflation in the prices of nontraded goods.
NOMINAL DEVALUATIONS, INFLATION, AND THE RER 571
However, the consistency framework's advantage-its simplicity-
is also its limitation. First, the usefulness of the framework depends criti-
cally upon one's ability to make reasonable assumptions about the
postdevaluation behavior of nominal wages and prices of nontraded
goods-either on the basis of experience elsewhere or of the economic
structure and likely postdevaluation policies of the country concerned.
But the framework itself does not shed much light on the likely behav-
ior of nominal wages and prices. In cases in which postdevaluation wage-
price behavior is unpredictable or uncontrollable, so too will be the out-
come of a devaluation. The data required for estimating the parameter
;, the share of labor in value added in the nontraded goods sector, may
also be hard to come by in some cases.
Second, the accounting framework assumes that import shares in
absorption and in the production of nontraded goods are constant and
that these are reasonable measures of the size of the tradable-goods sec-
tor. Such assumptions may not be realistic in some cases. The tradable-
goods sector, whose prices are effectively determined by foreign prices,
may be significantly larger in very open economies. Moreover, there is
usually some substitutability in consumption between imports and do-
mestic goods. Similarly, a large increase in the price of imported inputs
as a result of a substantial real depreciation will provide an impetus for
domestic producers to look for domestic substitutes for suddenly ex-
pensive imported inputs. The uncertainty in measuring the size of the
tradable-goods sector and the possibility of substitution of tradable and
nontradable goods in consumption and production after a devaluation
suggest that the model's calculations should be interpreted with cau-
tion. They should be considered as rough first approximations of what
changes in prices to expect. A sensitivity analysis, as illustrated in sce-
nario 4, is therefore desirable to explore the likely range of probable
outcomes.
Third, a more elaborate framework with three goods is required in
order to take into account the differences between exports and imports.
Such a framework would permit examining the differential impact of
changes in terms of trade and trade policy on exports and imports, and
the links between wages in the export sector and those in the nontraded-
goods sector.27
Finally, in countries in which monetary policy does not target the
inflation rate, quantitative estimates are needed for the time path of both
prices and output to determine appropriate monetary targets. The ac-
counting framework, as noted above, can provide the estimates for prices.
27. A note outlining such a framework is available from the authors.
572 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
However, the accounting framework will determine neither the supply
response to a devaluation nor the time path of real output. Variations in
real output in the first two years after a devaluation are often small com-
pared with the changes in prices and hence have less overall impact on
the changes in the nominal value of output, which is usually used in
determining monetary targets. Nevertheless, variations in real output
may still differ considerably among countries, depending upon the situ-
ation in the country concerned, and they need to be taken into account
in designing monetary, fiscal, and other accompanying policies.?
28. For a discussion of the supply response to changes in the RER, see Chap-
ter 11 on the RER and trade flows.
Appendix
The Accounting Framework
for the Two-Good Internal RER
This appendix discusses in detail the individual equations in the two-
good accounting framework with traded and nontraded sectors that is
summarized on pages 553-57 of the text.,9
The Internal RER: Empirical Definition
The internal RER, typically defined theoretically as the domestic rela-
tive price of traded goods to nontraded goods, can alternatively be de-
fined in terms of the general price level in the home country. Using the
subscript "G" to indicate that the general price level is in the denomina-
tor, this concept of the internal RER, denoted IRERTG, is defined as shown
in equation 13.A.1:
(13.A.1) IRERTG _ Td = 7d
PGd PGd
where PTd is an index of the domestic price of traded goods, PT, is an
index of foreign prices of traded goods, and PGd is the general domestic
29. The choice between a two-good and a three-good framework is quite im-
portant analytically. Both the level and the changes in the RERs for imports,
exports, and traded goods can vary quite substantially as a result of terms-of-
trade shocks. A three-good model is needed to fully incorporate the impact of
such shocks on the RER as discussed in Chapter 4. The presentation in this ap-
pendix is, however, restricted to a two-good model, in which all goods are clas-
sified as traded or nontraded. The use of a two-good framework simplifies the
analysis and focuses the discussion on the impact of a devaluation on prices and
real wages. An outline of an extended three-good framework, which could be
used to analyze the impact of terms-of-trade shocks occurring separately or in
combination with a devaluation of the nominal exchange rate or of differences in
trade policies affecting imports and exports, is available from the authors.
573
574 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
price index in domestic-currency terms. Traded goods are assumed to
behave in accordance with the law of one price so that equation 13.A.2
holds:
(13.A.2) P, = Edc PTf
P is a weighted average of the prices of traded and nontraded goods
and is discussed in more detail below. As long as the weights of traded
and nontraded goods in the general price index remain constant, or new
values can be calculated for them, then the standard version of the two-
good internal RER (the ratio of the domestic prices of traded and
nontraded goods) can be calculated from IRERTG and vice versa. For
empirical reasons, IRERTG is used in the presentation that follows.-"
Domestic Prices
The Aggregate Price Level
As noted above, the general price level in the home economy, P, is a
weighted average of the prices of traded and nontraded goods and ser-
vices. The general price level may be measured in terms of either pro-
duction, in which case traded goods are exports, or expenditure (ab-
sorption), in which case traded goods are imports. Since nontraded goods
are both produced and absorbed entirely within the home economy, their
price index is the same whether measured on the production or the ex-
penditure side. The simplest formulation of the domestic price level is
given in equation 13.A.3:
(13.A.3) PGd = CPTd + (1- Z)PNd = TEdc PTF + (1-P
where T is the share of traded goods in total domestic output or expen-
diture (that is, the share of export value added in GDP or the share of
imported final goods in total domestic absorption).31
30. IRERTG is more comparable with the common external real effective ex-
change rate (REER) indexes, which are expressed in terms of the general price
level and are often used as empirical proxies for the internal RER. The use of
IRERTG is also more consistent with most empirical work on trade elasticities,
which utilizes elasticities expressed relative to the general domestic price level.
As explained in appendix A of Chapter 7 on the trade-elasticities methodology,
use of trade elasticities expressed relative to the general price level yields esti-
mated changes in the RER that are also expressed relative to the general price level.
31. In principle, it is better to use a geometric average in calculating PGd since
it treats increases and decreases symmetrically and rates of change in a geomet-
ric index are not affected by rebasing. However, an arithmetic average has been
used here to simplify the presentation.
NOMINAL DEVALUATIONS, INFLATION, AND THE RER 575
The implicit assumption in adopting a fixed value for r is that there is
no substitution between traded and nontraded goods in consumption.
If the share of traded goods in consumption falls when the relative price
of traded goods rises, the increase in the price level will be smaller than
that given by equation 13.A.3, which assumes no change in the compo-
sition of consumption.32
In addition, there are at least two different empirical measures of T,
depending on whether the term "traded goods" refers to exports or im-
ports. If the measure of T is based on the concept of traded goods in
output, T should be computed as the share of value added in exporting
in GDP excluding the imported inputs that are used directly in produc-
ing exports (and also excluding re-exports of imports). This measure is
labeled TO." Alternatively, if r is based on the concept of traded goods in
expenditure, it should be computed as the share of imports of final goods
(excluding imported inputs and re-exports) in expenditure; this mea-
sure is called a. There is no reason, a priori, that these two alternative
measures of T should be equal. In fact, such an outcome is unlikely,
since a country's exports seldom equal its imports. An additional em-
pirical complication is that when the terms of trade change, import
and export prices, and the GDP and absorption deflators, can be-
have quite differently."
In order to calculate T, it is necessary to estimate the share of imports
used directly in producing exports, the value of which should be sub-
tracted from either exports or imports in calculating the alternative mea-
sures of r. These measures of r are lower bounds for either concept of T
because they are based on traded, rather than tradable, goods. Since the
empirical measures of T are most probably underestimates, the result-
ing estimated increases in the general price level and the reduction in
the real wage needed to achieve a specified depreciation in the internal
RER are probably somewhat underestimated as well. In view of the vari-
ous difficulties in estimating T, the sensitivity of the results to alterna-
tive estimates of T is discussed further in scenario 4.
In a three-good framework with exports, imports, and nontraded
goods, To should be used for the production side of the economy and ;
32. The resulting decline in the real wage (in terms of domestic prices) may
also be correspondingly smaller (see the text below).
33. Another way of measuring r, on the production side of the economy would
be as the ratio of exports, including imported inputs to the total value of final
output-in other words, to the sum of value added and imported inputs.
34. See Chapter 3 on the two-good internal RER for a further discussion of
ways of measuring the size of the nontraded-goods sector and the uncertainties
involved in doing so.
576 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
for the expenditure side. However, in a two-good framework with only
one aggregate traded good, one is forced to chose between using one
measure of r or the other, or some average of them. For consistency, one
should use the expenditure-side measure of T (T,) when working with
an expenditure price index and the production-side measure of T (')
when working with a production price index or value-added deflator.
In the presentation below, the absorption measure for T is used since
expenditure price indexes are more commonly used in analyzing RERs
than in production price indexes and imports, which tend to be more
diversified and their prices more broadly representative of international
price trends than exports, which are incorporated in expenditure price
indexes. In instances in which export prices diverge significantly from
import prices and changes in the terms of trade are important analyti-
cally, one should in any case switch to a three-good framework as ex-
plained in Chapter 4.
The Price of Nontraded Goods.
The domestic production of nontraded consumer and investment goods
typically requires both imported inputs and domestic factors of produc-
tion, and the imported content of domestically produced nontraded
goods is included in their price. If the home country's economy is rea-
sonably competitive and the prices of nontraded goods reflect their pro-
duction costs, the price of nontraded goods is given by equation 13.A.4:
(13.A.4) &Vd = aEdc PTf +(1-a)
where a is the share of imported goods (both imports of intermediate
inputs and capital equipment) in the cost of producing nontraded goods
and services.5 PTf is the foreign-currency price of imports used as inputs
in producing nontraded goods and services.6 (1 - a) is the share of do-
mestic factors of production in the cost of producing nontraded goods,
35. The ratio of intermediate and capital goods imports to GDP is used below
as an estimate for a on the assumption that imported inputs account for the
same share of the production costs of both traded and nontraded goods.
36. The foreign price indexes for final imported goods and for imported in-
termediate and capital goods are all assumed here to be the same. That is,
P,[f= Pf = Pf where PF is the index of foreign prices of imported final goods and
P,'f is the index of foreign prices of imported intermediate and capital goods.
This assumption is made to simplify the presentation since the analysis here is
concerned with a change in the nominal exchange rate rather than with changes
in the relative prices of different categories of imported goods.
NOMINAL DEVALUATIONS, INFLATION, AND THE RER 577
and F is the cost per unit of output of domestic factors of production
used in the nontraded sector.37
Fixed factor proportions in the production of nontraded goods are
also assumed. If substitution between imported inputs and domestic
factors is possible, an increase in the relative domestic price of imported
inputs may result in a fall in their share, a. Such substitution, in turn,
would imply a smaller increase in the price of nontraded goods after a
nominal realignment than given by equation 13.A.4.3
Domestic Factor Costs
Factor Payments
The index of total payments to domestic factors of production (F") per
unit of output in the nontraded-goods sector is in turn composed of
payments to labor and capital, as shown in equation 13.A.5:
(13.A.5) F, = . Wd
where / is the share of labor in factor payments, W, is the nominal wage
index in domestic currency (and is an average of the formal and infor-
mal sector wages), 1 - 2A is the share of capital, and 7r is an index of the
average rental rate of a unit of capital employed in the nontraded sector.19
If nominal wages and prices are assumed to change proportionately
in the nontraded sector after a devaluation so that the relative shares of
labor and capital remain constant, then equation 13.A.6 will hold:
(13.A.6) = An
If the nominal returns to the labor and capital change proportionately,
then the percentage change in the nominal wage is also equal to the
percentage change in total factor payments, F . The assumption of pro-
portional changes is plausible for many low-income developing coun-
tries in which a large segment of the labor force is self-employed. In
such cases, ownership of the factors of production is embodied in a single
individual or household, and it is virtually impossible to determine
37. We assume here that producers of nontraded goods behave competitively.
38. Scenario 4 in the text gives a sensitivity analysis of assumptions about a.
39. Capital is defined here to include natural resources as well as the man-
made capital stock.
40. Note, however, that, if equation 13.A.6 holds, the value of A does not af-
fect the results; and no estimate of I is required.
578 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
returns to individual factors separately Thus, the assumption that any
change in factor returns is distributed proportionately is reasonable as
an initial starting point for the analysis. If wages need to decline relative
to profits to raise the domestic saving and investment rates, equation
13.A.6 can be modified to provide for a smaller relative increase in nomi-
nal wages.4
The real wage is simply the nominal wage divided by the price level.
In this model, there are three possible price levels or numeraires: the
aggregate price level, the price of traded goods, and the price of
nontraded goods. Equation 13.A.7 gives the real wage (wG) expressed in
terms of aggregate price level, the most common numeraire:
wd
(13.A.7) WG = .
pG6d
The real wage may also be expressed in terms of the prices of traded
goods (w,), as shown in equation 13.A.8:
(13.A.8) wT-= - =
PTd E, 'PTf
or nontraded goods (w,), as shown in equation 13.A.9:
Wa
(13.A.9) W = .
In analyzing external competitiveness, it is often common to measure
nominal wages in foreign currency terms (W), as shown in equation
13.A.10:
w
(13.A.10) WF = Wd
Edc
If a real depreciation is to take place, the real wage must fall in terms
of traded goods and foreign exchange. However, since the prices of traded
and nontraded goods and the aggregate price level will change by dif-
ferent amounts when the internal RER depreciates, the three measures
of real wages will also change by different amounts and may give dif-
ferent impressions of the decline in real wages. Because the price of traded
41. Scenario 2 in the text considers the case of differential increases in the
nominal payments to labor and capital.
NOMINAL DEVALUATIONS, INFLATION, AND THE RER 579
goods will increase by more than the price of nontraded goods and the
aggregate price level, the real wage will fall the most in terms of traded
goods. The nominal wage expressed in foreign currency terms, which is
often used as a measure of the international competitiveness of labor-
intensive industries, will fall as the result of a devaluation unless do-
mestic wages increase by the full amount of the devaluation. If the for-
eign price level does not change at the time of a devaluation? the change
in the real wage in terms of traded goods, equation 13.A.8, will equal
the change in the nominal wage expressed in foreign currency, equation
13.A.10, and international competitiveness will improve accordingly.
Because the price of nontraded goods will rise the least when the inter-
nal RER depreciates, the purchasing power of wages in terms of
nontraded goods will fall the least. The reduction in the real wage in
terms of aggregate price level, which is an average of the prices of traded
and nontraded goods, will fall between these two extremes.
Wage Differentials
Any analysis of the impact of a nominal devaluation on real wages and
wage differentials is considerably complicated by the imperfections in
the labor market that typically exist in developing countries. The wage
level in equation 13.A.6 is the average for the economy. However, labor
markets tend to be segmented into formal and informal sectors, and the
wage differentials between these sectors may be quite large. Formal sec-
tor wages are often influenced by the existence of labor unions, the pres-
ence of some large firms with market power in the import-substituting
and nontraded sectors, and government regulations and wage-setting
practices. Hence, the wage-setting process in the formal sector may be
very different from that governing wages in the more competitive infor-
mal sector, and formal-sector wages need not be closely linked to either
labor productivity in the formal sector or to prevailing demand and sup-
ply conditions in the labor market. Consequently, substantial wage dif-
ferentials may exist between the formal and informal sectors. It is pos-
sible that these differentials could decrease after a devaluation if firms
in the noncompetitive parts of the nontraded and import-substituting
sector are not able to fully pass along increased labor costs. Alterna-
tively, labor in the formal sector may be able to exert enough pressure to
maintain the previous wage differentials. The ultimate result, with re-
gard both to the average real wage and wage differentials across sectors,
will depend in large part on the policies that accompany a devaluation.
42. If trade policy is also changed at the time of a devaluation, the domestic
price of traded goods will not change by the same amount as the foreign price.
580 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
Unless nominal wages increase by the full amount of the devalua-
tion, preventing any depreciation of the RER, wages expressed in foreign-
currency terms will usually fall across the board as a result of a devalua-
tion. However, the impact of a devaluation on relative wages in domestic-
currency terms may vary between the export and nontraded-goods sectors.
Returns to labor in domestic-currency terms in export sectors will increase
initially after a devaluation because of higher export prices in domestic
currency, particularly if much of export production is by households,
not corporations. The real wage will fall in the nontraded-goods sector,
as domestic prices rise, as long as the cumulative increase in nominal
wages (if any) is less than the increase in the general price level. Hence,
a devaluation is likely to result initially in a wage differential between
the export and nontraded sectors. As labor moves to the export sector,
in which returns are higher, downward pressure will be put on wages
there. Labor movements could, in turn, result in increasing wages in the
nontraded sector. Hence, there would be market pressure to reduce the
initial wage differential and equalize wages in the export and nontraded
sectors in the longer run. However, the eventual outcome is difficult to
predict without detailed information about the nature of the labor mar-
ket in the country concerned.
Trade Taxes, Subsidies, and Administered Prices
In order to simplify the presentation, the foregoing analysis has not taken
into account the possibility of differential taxes being levied on traded
goods. However, countries often levy taxes on traded goods-commonly
on imports and sometimes on exports. Usually, the tax rates on exports
and imports are different. Sometimes the prices of traded goods are sub-
sidized (the taxes on them being, in effect, negative)-export subsidies
are not uncommon, and imports of key consumer goods are sometimes
subsidized for political or social reasons. Marketing board arrangements
for exports, and occasionally for imports, and administered prices may
also cause the domestic price of traded goods to differ from the domes-
tic-currency equivalent of the border price. The differential taxation of
traded goods through tariffs, subsidies, marketing arrangements, or
administered pricing can have an impact on all prices, including the
exchange rate. When these distortions are present, changes in border
prices may no longer necessarily be fully, or even partially, passed
through to domestic prices. This section modifies the formulation of the
consistency framework to allow for the effects of differential taxation of
traded goods. The analysis in the main text of this chapter uses the defi-
nitions of the RER and domestic price indexes including trade taxes set
out below.
NOMINAL DEVALUATIONS, INFLATION, AND THE RER 581
The definition of the internal RER can be revised to take into account
differential taxation (net of subsidies) of traded goods. It will then have
the form shown in equation 13.A.11:
(13.A.11) IRERTG = EdC.PT(1+t)
PGd
where r is the average ad valorem tax on traded goods. The variable T in
this equation is a broad measure of the average net effect of taxes, subsi-
dies, marketing board margins, and administered pricing policies on
the prices of traded final goods.'
Exports are typically taxed at different rates from imports in devel-
oping countries. In order to analyze the effects of differential taxation of
exports and imports, traded goods must be disaggregated into imports
and exports. Such a disaggregation requires a three-good framework as
explained in Chapter 4.
Even in the simpler two-good framework used here, the inclusion of
trade taxes necessitates modifying the definitions of the domestic price
indexes to reflect them. The tariff regimes in many developing countries
tend to sharply differentiate between imports of final (consumer) goods
and those of raw materials, intermediate inputs, and capital goods. Typi-
cally, tariffs on imported final goods are substantially higher than those
on imported intermediate and capital goods. Thus, at least two import
taxes need to be distinguished: those levied on final goods and those on
intermediate goods.
The index for the general price level (equation 13.5) revised to reflect
the inclusion of tariffs is given in equation 13.A.12:
(13.A.12) PGd =, - Ed,c'Prfy(1 +t) +(1-0P)
43. Taxes and subsidies on traded goods have asymmetric effects on the do-
mestic prices of imports and exports. The domestic-currency price of imports
increases and that of exports decreases when import and export taxes are im-
posed. Similarly, a subsidy on imports lowers the consumer price inclusive of
the subsidy, whereas an export subsidy raises the producer price inclusive of the
subsidy. Hence, taxes and subsidies on imports and exports must be entered
with opposite signs in equations 13.A.11 and 13.A.12. A value-added tax (VAT)
or excise tax may also be levied on import or exports. If these taxes are levied at
the same rates on domestic and imported products, they will affect the overall
price level but not the relative prices of traded and nontraded goods. If a VAT or
excise tax is levied at differential rates on domestic and imported products, the
differential is, in effect, a tax on traded goods and should be taken into account
in calculating it.
582 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
where t is the average tariff on final traded goods. If the absorption ap-
proach for measuring z is used as earlier, the average tariff (net of subsi-
dies) on imports, t, is the appropriate rate to use for t. Equation 13.A.4
will now have the revised form shown in shown in equation 13.A.13:
(13.A.13) PNd E PTf m +
where t m is the average tariff on imported inputs used to produce
nontraded goods.4
Some countries that choose not to devalue an overvalued currency
adjust trade taxes instead to attempt to mimic the effects of a devalua-
tion. Such adjustments typically take the form of increased import tar-
iffs and export subsidies. Increased tariffs make imports more expen-
sive for consumers; subsidies make exports more profitable to domestic
producers. These effects on the relative prices of exports and imports
are like those of a devaluation. Similarly, a tariff cut reduces the domestic-
currency price of imports, the opposite of the effect of a devaluation.
Thus, a reduction in import tariffs and export subsidies that takes place
simultaneously with a devaluation will effectively offset a part of the
devaluation.
Countries often reform trade policies at the same time as they de-
value in order to achieve a more neutral structure of incentives for pro-
ducing different categories of traded goods. A tariff reform designed to
reduce the dispersion in tariff rates and produce a more uniform struc-
ture of protection may result in an increase, a decrease, or no change in
revenues and in the average effective tariff-depending upon how much
of the revenue loss from cutting rates on high-tariff items is offset by
increases from eliminating exemptions and raising rates on zero- and
low-tariff items. In order to keep the fiscal deficit from widening and
putting inflationary pressure on domestic prices, any decline in govern-
ment revenues as a consequence of tariff cuts generally needs to be off-
set either by reducing expenditures or by finding alternative sources of
revenue (for example, by raising direct taxes or by increasing indirect
taxes on all goods, both traded and nontraded) in a way that does not
distort the relative prices between traded and nontraded goods. To sim-
plify the analysis, it is assumed here that any revenue loss from reduc-
tions in trade taxes is offset through other measures that do not affect
44. When the effects of taxes on traded goods are taken into account, the
initial values of the indexes for the domestic prices of traded and nontraded
goods, the average domestic price level, and the internal and external RERs are
no longer 1.0.
NOMINAL DEVALUATIONS, INFLATION, AND THE RER 583
the relative prices of traded and nontraded goods. The effects of such
compensated changes in trade taxes are illustrated in scenario 1, in which
the impact of a devaluation is estimated both with and without a reduc-
tion in trade taxes.45
The Complete Framework for Estimating Consistent
Nominal and Relative Prices
This section summarizes the accounting framework for estimating con-
sistent changes in nominal and relative prices after a currency realign-
ment. In the summary of the formulas below, a subscript "0" indicates
the prerealignment value and a subscript "1" indicates the postrealig-
nment value of a variable.
To minimize the data required and simplify the presentation, indexes
with an initial value of 1.0 are used for all variables. All changes are
measured with respect to the initial values of each variable and are ex-
pressed as percentages. Hence, the initial (prerealignment) value of the
nominal exchange rate (Ed0), the foreign price of traded goods (Pr,o), the
aggregate foreign price level (PGro), the return to capital (n-o), and the nomi-
nal wage (W,d) indexes are assumed to be 1.0. That is, as shown in equa-
tion 13.A.14:
(13.A.14) EdcO PTfo =PG60 0 = 1.0.
In addition, we also assume that both the foreign price of traded goods
and the aggregate foreign price level do not change. Hence, we obtain
equations 13.A.15 and 13.A.16:
(13.A.15) Pfo = P7, = 1.0
(13.A.16) P =PGl 1.0
These assumptions are made only to simplify the presentation-both P,
and Pcf can easily be treated as exogenous with assumed postrealignment
45. In addition, since the focus of this chapter is on the exchange rate and
related taxes on international trade, for simplicity it is further assumed that there
are no other changes in either indirect domestic taxes on nontraded goods or in
direct taxes on factor payments that affect the relative prices of traded and
nontraded goods. It is assumed also that the effects on the fiscal deficit of any
other tax or expenditure changes are offset by other measures that do not change
the relative prices of traded and nontraded goods. If such changes in taxes or
expenditures affecting relative prices do occur, their effects should be taken into
account in estimating t and t..
584 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
values. However, if there is a change in the relative foreign prices of the
home country's imports and exports, the analytical problem is more
complex. A three-good model is then needed to analyze the impact of
the change in the home country's terms of trade.
The initial values of average trade taxes on imported inputs, tm, and
on final goods, t, were 0.16 and 0.13, respectively, in the C6te d'Ivoire
example. Because of these trade taxes, the initial values of the domestic
prices of traded and nontraded goods, the aggregate domestic price level,
the internal and external RERs, and the real wage and profit rates are no
longer 1.0 as in the case in which there are no trade taxes. These initial
values can be readily calculated using the above equations.
The full system is composed of the eight equations, 13.A.17 through
13.A.24, summarized in the main text and reproduced below for reference:
P
(13.A.18) PT = E, - (1+ t) - P,f
Ed PTf(lH
(13.A.19) IRERT, =
PGd
(13.A.20) PGd=r E,c'PTf(1+t)+(1-T)P,
(13.A.21) Pd = a -E,-P ,(1 +tQ)+(1 -a)T
(13.A.22) A + W +(1-A),r
(13.A.23) l A
Wd 7
(13.A.24) w = d
pGd
Parameter Estimates
The above accounting framework requires estimates for three parameters:
t = the share of imports of final goods in total absorption;
a = the share of imported inputs in the cost of producing nontraded
goods; and
I = the share of labor in value added in the nontraded-goods sector.
NOMINAL DEVALUATIONS, INFLATION, AND THE RER 585
The following estimates of these parameters were used in the Cte
d'Ivoire example in the text:
r= 0.22
a = 0.11
A =0.70
The values of T and A can usually be estimated from a country's trade
statistics. In the Cte d'Ivoire case, T was calculated as the ratio of im-
ports of final goods to absorption. In estimating a, we assumed that
imported inputs were used in the same proportion in the production of
traded and nontraded goods. a, then, was the ratio of imported inter-
mediates to GDP. Both r and a were estimated from balance of pay-
ments and national income statistics for 1993. Since imports were larger
than exports in 1993, the absorption approach gives a larger estimate of
the size of the tradable-goods sector than using the value-added ap-
proach and exports would.
Estimating the value of A may be more problematic. For countries
with complete national income and product accounts, A can usually be
estimated directly from these. However, a number of low-income coun-
tries have only partial national income accounts, with the breakdown of
national income into wages, profits, and other factor returns often miss-
ing. In these cases, one may be forced to rely on parameter estimates for
similar countries and adjust these in light of whatever fragmentary data
may be available for the country concerned on the shares of labor and
capital. In Cte d'Ivoire, the share of wages in total value added was
estimated by World Bank staff at 70 percent and the share of capital at 30
percent. On the assumption that labor and capital are used in the same
proportions in the production of both traded and nontraded goods, A
equals 0.7. Note that A is only needed for those scenarios in which the
nominal returns to labor and capital change by different amounts.
Because of the difficulties involved in obtaining accurate estimates
for the parameters r, a, and A, it is important to carry out sensitivity
analyses of these similar to those in scenarios 2 and 4 in the text.
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Index
Absolute PPP, 73-74, 80 Africa, 510-512, 533-534
Absorption approach, 469 C6te dIvoire, 91
Adjusted resource balance, 333-335 Latin America, 507-509, 533
procedures, limitations, 341-342 South Asia, 510-512, 533-534
Adjustment speed, 442 Turkey,507-509,533
single-equation estimation, 438-440 Bonds, 268
Africa, official and parallel bilateral real Border prices
exchange rates, 510-512, 533-534 domestic prices vs., 204
Agenor and Montiel, lnl internal ERs, excluding taxes, 184-186,
Aggregate cost level, 88 188
Aggregate domestic price index, home Bretton Woods system, 1
country, 142-144 Bubbles, 221, 226
Aggregate export See also Rational bubbles; Speculative
elasticities, 486-488 bubbles
supply, price elasticity, 495 Budget constraints, 275
Aggregate price indexes, 161-162 Burkina Faso, 25-26
Aggregate price level, 88, 574-576 long-run parameters, 438, 440
devaluation and, 568-569 parameter estimates, 439
Aggregate production cost version of the tER, 448, 449, 451
external RER, 76-79, 95 short-run dynamics, 439, 440-443
Aid-dependent countries, noncredit- variables, 428-430, 434-435
worthy, 327-328
Alternative "equilibrium" RERs, 11 Capital flows, composition, 330-332
Alternative estimators, single-equation Capita] inflows, 282-283, 376
estimation, 433-434 Capital mobility 386
Analytical framework for determinants of CFA franc, 2-3, 122, 300, 421
LRER, 266-274 defined, 2n3
Asset market function, 521-522 devaluation, DLR model, 21-22
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests, 427 CPA zone, 359, 361
DLR mnodel, 365-372
Balassa-Samuelson effect, 12, 138, 139, 203, Cocoa, supply elasticities, 490
238-239, 256, 284-285, 289, 306 Coffee, supply elasticities, 490
See also Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson Cointegration, 236
approach equations, 237-260
Base year, 16-17, 19-20, 365 rank, determining, 432-433
DLR model sensitivity to choice, relationships, 431n24
372-374 Combination of RER measures, 206-208
estimates, equilibrium RER, 297-301 Commercial policy, 13, 205, 288-289, 290
Beveridge-Nelson decomposition, 448 Commodity exports, 495
Bilateral real exchange rates (BRER), Competition, 65-69
45-49, 50, 51, 54, 133-134, 524-527, imperfect, 130-131
535-538 Competitiveness, 7
605
606 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
external, 131-132 trade patterns, 63
external RERs and, 86-88, 105-107 two-good internal RER for total trade, 189
internal, 131 unrecorded trade, 69-70
internationally traded goods, 304-305 value added deflators, 126-127,161, 165,
law of one price and, 129-132 168-173
relative aggregate production cost and variables, 428-431
price indexes, 110-112 Counterfactual estimates, 445-446
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) Counterfactual simulations, 422
models, 360 ISHARE, 463
Conditioning, 420, 456-458 OPENI, 463
Consistency framework, 553-557, 558 RESGDp, 461-463
advantages and limitations, 570-572 Country weights, appropriate, 70-72
parameter estimates, 584-585 CpI. See Consumer price index
Consolidated public sector, 272 Credit
Consumer price index (CPI), 75, 89-90, 93, ceilings, 411-412
123, 144, 204 expansion, 394
domestic, 152 Creditworthy countries, 328-333
foreign, 151 indicators, 329-330
see also WPI Currency terms, domestic vs. foreign, 44
Consumption, household, 269-272 Current account
Costs of misalignment, 2 balance, 321
C6te d'Ivoire, 25, 26, 43 deficits, DLR model, 376
adjustment speed, 442 sustainability, 332-333
base-year estimates of the equilibrium
RER, 299-300 Data
bilateral RERs, 46-49 description, 459-460
data, 125 requirements, 208
devaluation outcome, 565-566 single-equation estimation, 425-427
expenditure-based estimates of the two- Debt crisis, 364
good internal RER, 128 Demand
expenditure-based price deflators, 123 external, 396
export price deflator, 146 fundamentals, 240-241
exports, 183 Demand-side calculation of internal RER,
external and internal RER, 137-139 163-164
import price deflator, 147 Depreciation, policy implications, 567-570
imported inputs, 16, 165-169 Desired equilibrium real exchange rate
imports, 183 (DEER), 247-250
internal RER for exports, 188, 308 Devaluation, 2, 451
internal RER for imports, 188, 199-200, balance-of-payments, 537
307 CFA franc, 359-360
internal RER for total trade, 182-183 concerns, 544
International Comparison Program exports and, 486-487
(ICP) data, 310-312 HLM model, 391-392
likelihood test, 432 RER and, 539-585
long-run parameters, 438, 440 technical approach, 557, 563-565
multilateral RER, 58-59 see also Nominal devaluation
NEER, 71, 309 Dickey-Fuller (DF) tests, 427
parallel markets and, 56, 58 Differentiated goods, imperfect competi-
parameter estimates, 435-438 tion and, 130-131
price deflators, 90, 171, 183, 185 Direct estimates of the RER, 120-129
production-based estimates of the two- from national accounts, 155-173
good internal RER, 128 proxies vs, 204-205
real effective exchange rate, 300, 301 Direct expenditure-based estimates of
REER, 59, 62, 64, 71, 91, 304, 307-309 internal RER for tradable goods, 120,
RER, 448, 449-450 121-123
short-run dynamics, 437, 440-443 Direct production-based estimates of the
terms of trade, 309 internal RER for tradable goods, 120,
total trade, 183 123-129
INDEX 607
Disaggregated analysis of the RER, 181 Equilibrium real exchange rate (RER), 22
DLR method, 21 base-year estimates, 297-301
application to pre-1994 CFA zone, estimation, 4
365-372 misalignment and, 447-451
extensions, 376-378 modeling, 407-418
model, 361-380 trend estimates, 303
sensitivity analyses, 372-375 Exchange controls, adverse effects, 503-
Domestic credit shock, 393-394 504
Domestic currency Exchange rate
internal RER, 116 appreciation, depreciation, and mis-
terms, 7-8 alignment formulas, 356-358
terms, vs. foreign currency, 44 domestic prices and, 473475
Domestic factor costs, 577-580 international comparison program,
Domestic goods, 119n10 99-104
DLR model, 361, 363-365, 368 misalignment degree of, 405
government spending, 394-395 official, after exchange market umifica-
price deflators, 159-165 tion, 529-531
Domestic policy shocks, 391-395 regimes, fixed vs. flexible, 550n13
Domestic prices, 574-577 setting, parallel market rate and, 497-
border prices vs., 204 538
exchange rates and, 473-475 unification, 504-505, 529-531
internal RERs, 182-183, 188 Exogeneity requirements, 422
Domestic supply-side factors, 12, 289 Exogenous variables, 226-227
Drought variable, 433n35 internal RERs, 349
Dual exchange rater (DER) system, 500 Expectations, 387
Expenditure-PIT
Econometric analyses, devaluation, 488, external RER, 73-76
489 version of the RER, 96-97
Econometric methodology, 424 Export, 18, 120,183,187
Elasticities, 366, 453 adjustments, 335-341
aggregate export , 486-488 deflators, 160,161
DLR model sensitivity to, 374-375 demand pessimism, 468, 482-485, 495
export supply, 316 devaluation and, 486-487
foreign exchange supply, 352-353 DLR model, 361-363
import demand pessimism, 468, 494 econometric analyses, 488, 489
income elasticity of demand, 354-355 external RERs and, 196-199
numeraire, 351-253 internal RER, 192,196-199, 203, 308
pessimism, 29 manufacturing, 491
price, 475-477, 478, 495 nontraditional, 490-493
RER and, 351-352 price deflator, 146, 159-165, 184
RER elasticity pessimism, 494-496 price elasticity, 495
substitution, 366 repression, 485
supply price, 488, 490, 493n37, 495 RER for, 170, 377
synthetic aggregate, 479-480 response, overall, 493-494
see also Price elasticity; Trade elasticity subsidies, 288-289
Empirical estimation, 16 three-good internal RER, 176-186
Empirical general-equilibrium models, transformation, 366
34-35 see also Aggregate export elasticities
Empirical models, specifying, 416-418 Export supply
Empirical results, single-equation elasticities, 316
estimation, 435-437 functions, 18
Engle-Granger method, 433-434 pessmism, 495
Equilibrium response to RER, 485-494
conditions, 273-274 Extensions, DLR model, 376-378
nontraded goods, 273-274 External balance, 4, 11-12, 29, 230, 408-409
parallel market rate, 514-518 External competitiveness, 131-132
PPP value, 297 External proxies, three-good RERs, 199-
value, 18 201
608 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
External REERs, 197, 198 Geary-Khamis method, 102
External real exchange rate (RER), 6-8, 72- General analytical framework, 316-318
73, 141, 186-201, 553 General equilibrium fundamentals
aggregate production cost version, approach,21,22-23
76-79 models, 25,
competitiveness and, 86-88 LRERs and, 247-254
computation, 44-54 General price index, 553
factors affecting, 96-98 General-equilibrium, 553
imports and, 209-211 Government spending
indexes, 43-92 domestic goods, 340-341, 394-395
internal RERs and, 115, 152-154, 196- LRER, 280
201, 205-206, 209-211 Gross domestic product (GDP), 100, 103-
measurement, 42, 86-96, 114, 206-208 104,368-370,372
profitability and competitiveness, 105- single-equation estimation, use in, 426-
107 427
terms of trade and, 193-196, 209-211 Gross domestic product (GDP) deflators,
traded goods, 79-86, 91 68,89-90,95,370-371
two-good internal RER and, 129-141 overvaluation, 370
two-good internal RER, as proxies for,
141-151 Haque-Lahiri-Montiel (FLM) model, 381-
unit labor costs, 107-110 404
External shocks. See Shocks description, 383-391
neutrality to nominal shocks, 390-391
Factor payments, 553-554, 577-579 steady-state properties, 387-390
First-pass estimates, 32 structure, 384-386
Fiscal deficit Thailand, 402-404
reduction, 280-281 Haque-Montiel simulations, 24-25
resource balance and, 326 Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson (FBS) approach,
Fiscal policy, 12, 279-281, 289 413-414,426
Fixed weight averages, 97-98 proxy (HBS3), 460
Floating rate, 30 see alse Balassa-Samuelson effect
Flow approach, 231-232, 409, 412 Homogeneity, 440
supply, parallel market, 517 Homogeneous goods, law of one price
Foreign credit, rationing of, 411-412 and, 129-130
Foreign currency, 116-117 Household behavior, 268-272
competitiveness and, 132 Hyperinflation, 69-70
domestic currency vs, 44
terms, 7-8 ICP See International Comparison Program
Foreign demand, 396, 397 IFS,82
Foreign direct investment (FDI), 258 weights, 69, 70
Foreign exchange Imperfect competition, differentiated
demand, and parallel market, 517 goods and, 130-131
supply, elasticity of, 352-353 Import, 120,170-171,183,187
Foreign price level (PFOR), 460, 461, 566 adjustments, 335-341
Foreign real interest rate, 396, 397 compression, 118, 485
Foreign trade, 124-125, 131-132 compression syndrome, 471-473
Four-good framework, 180-181 consistency framework, 571
French franc, 421 deflators, 147,160-161, 185
Fundamental equilibrium real exchange depreciation and, 470-482
rate (FEER), 247-250 DLR model, 361-363
Fundamentals, 23, 26-27, 35, 382-383, 399- external RERs and, 196-199
401, 411, 424, 452 income elasticity of demand, 354-355
determining, trade-equations methodol- intensity of absorption, policies and,
ogy, 344 339-341
sustainable, 422, 443-446 internal RERs, 189-192, 203, 307, 348
testing the role of, 237-241 overall, 481-482
price deflators, calculation, 159-165
GDP. See Gross domestic product price elasticity of demand, 315, 318-319,
INDEX 609
346, 473-482, 495 International Comparison Program (ICP),
quotas, 481n21 101-103
RER for, 377 data, :310-312
response speed, 481 exchange rate, 100-104
response without import compression, empirical uses, 103-104
473-477 International economic environment
structure, developing countries, 477-480 changes, 12-13, 290
substitution elasticities, 366 International financial conditions, changes
tariff, 364-365 in, 282-284
three-good internal RER, 176-186 International prices, projected external,
Import demand pessimism, 468, 494 337-338
depreciation and, 470-482 International transfers, changes in the
price elasticity and, 475-477, 478, 495 value of, 281-282
Imported inputs, 165-169 Investment, 426
Imported intermediate goods, 156-159 in CDP, 440
Inappropriate exchange rates, 224 Investment share (ISHARE), 440, 443, 460,
Income elasticity of demand for imports, 463
representative estimates, 354-355
Incremental capital-output ratios (ICORs), J-curve effect, 496n40
246 Johansen procedure, 434
Inflation rate, 410-411
concerns, 544 Labor compensation, CFA economies, 84
long-term, 549-550 Labor costs, 87-88, 95-96
monetary policy and, 571-572 traded goods and, 107-110
parallel market rate, 520-521 Latin America, official and parallel
RER and 539-585 bilateral real exchange rates, 507-509,
time path, 548-549 53:3
Inflexibility in import structure, 478 Law of one price, 9, 10, 92, 124, 127-130,
Integration, determining the order, single- 136,153-154,180,195,343,553
equation estimation, 427-431 competitiveness and, 129-132
Interest rate, 13, 238N26, 240, 244, 252-253, Likelihood ratio tests, 432-433
259, 275, 278, 290, 324, 410 Limited information, 420
external, 273, 400-401 Liquid private portfolio investment, 332
increase in external real, 396, 398 Long-period mean and trend PPP estimates,
Internal balance, 13, 231-232, 287, 408 300-303
Internal competitiveness, 131 Long-run equilibrium real exchange rate
Internal RER, 41-42, 349-350, 553, 581 (LRER), 2, 3-4, 25, 36-37, 219-263
border prices, 184-186, 187, 188, 204 analytical model, 12-13, 264-290
computation, 114 application, 229-233
concepts, 201-205 calculation, 274-278
definition, 346-347, 573-574 conceptual issues, 220-233
depreciation, 568 definition, 10-11, 298
direct estimation from national accounts determinants, 10-13, 264-290
data, 155-173 developing countries, empirical esti-
domestic prices, 182-183, 188, 204 mation, 254-260, 381-404
exports, 186-201, 192, 308, 348 duration, 11
external RER and, 115, 152-154, 196-201, empirical measurement, 233-254, 254-
205-206, 209-211 260,260-263,381-404
imports, 189-192, 199-200, 209-211, 307, estimation, 2, 293-358
348 general equilibrium models, 247-254
measurement, 201-205 industrial countries, empirical esti-
PPP-based analyses and, 305-306 mation, 233-254
solution for, 348-350 measurement, 10-11
terms of trade and, 193-196, 209-211 meffodologies for estimation, 4, 14-28
two-good framework, definition, 116-118 once-and-for-all changes, 23
WPI-CPI proxy for, 147-151 structural models, 241-247
see also Three-good internal RER; Two- value estimation, 2
good internal RER variables, 26-228
610 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
Long-run fundamentals, 264-265, 278-289 50-53,309
Long-run homogeneity, 440 Nominal exchange rate, 117, 410-411
Long-run parameters, single-equation changes, 4
estimation, 425, 438-440 determining the appropriate, 54-59
LRER. See Long-run equilibrium real devaluation, 391-392
exchange rate pessimism, 469
setting, 31-32
Macroeconomic balance approach, 244-245 Nominal factor payments, distribution of,
Macroeconomic model for developing- 562
country, 381-404 Nominal prices
Manufacturing accounting framevork for determining,
deflators, 95 552-570
exports, expansion, 491 complete framework for estimating,
unit labor costs, 82-83 583-584
value added deflators, 84-85 Nominal rigidities, 414-415, 416
Marshall-Lerner condition, 317 Nominal shocks. See Shocks
Means for long time periods, 302-303 Nominal variables, 24
Misalignment, 32-33 Nominal wages, 578
degree of, 405 Noncreditworthy countries, 327-328
estimates, 359-380, 446-447 Nonfactor service receipts and payments,
formulas, 356-358 350n57
interpreting, 415-416 Nontradables
LRER, 224-226 measuring the prices of, 118-120
statistical indicators, 309-310 two-good internal RER, 116-129
Monetary discipline, 550 see also Tradables
Monetary policy, inflation rate and, 571- Nontraded goods, 553
572 changes in government spending, 279-
Money 280
demand for, 386 equilibrium, 273-274
holdings, and parallel market rate, 519 prices, 566, 576-377
supply, 389 see also Traded goods
Multi-good approaches, 180-182 Nontraditional exports, 495-496
Multilateral RER. See Real and real effec- role, 490-493
tive exchange rate Notional equilibrium value, 11
Mundell-Fleming model, 76-79 Numeraire, trade elasticities and the RER,
industrial countries, 314-316 351-352
production structure, 18, 21
RER, 95 Objectives, 3-4
Openness (OPEN), 459-460, 463
Naira/US$ exchange rates, 57 Operational techniques for estimating
National accounts LRER, 14-22, 293-358, 359-380
estimation of internal RER, use in,
155-173 Parallel exchange markets, 55-56, 206, 499
identities, 156-159, 322-324 1990s,503-505
Natural equilibrium real exchange rate characteristics, 499
(NATREX), 250-254 concepts, 499-502
NEER. See Nominal effective exchange equilibrium, 514-518
rate illegal, 500-501
Net capital inflows, 231-232 management, 502-503
cointegrating equations, 238 methodology 524-527
sustainable, 243 model, 505-522
Net real capital gains or losses, 269 period averages, 527-529
Neutrality, 222n5 premium, 4, 29-31, 506
Nominal devaluation, 441 rate, 30-31, 97, 199-200, 295, 476-538
100%, 560-562 rate, short-run portfolio equilibrium,
pessimism, 546-548 518-522
see also Devaluation real exchange rates, 181-182
Nominal effective exchange rate (NEER), trends, 522-531
INDEX 611
Partial-equilibrium relative price approach, Production, 267-268
469 Productive capacity, underutilized, 335-336
Partial-equilibrium trade-equations Productivity, 89, 412-414
approach, 20-21, 241-247 differential, 286
Pass-through coefficient, 551 growth, 135-136, 138, 205, 239
Payments restrictions, 501, 502 Profitability, external RERs and, 105-107
Permanent values, 35 Profits, 554
Pessimism, RER and trade flows in devel- Projected external prices, 337-338
oping countries, 467-496 Proxies, 3, 5
Philips-Perron (PP) tests, 427 direct estimates vs., 204-205
Policy, 452 external, for the price of traded goods,
adjustments for, 338-341 144-147
devaluation, 568 three-good internal RER, 199-201
import intensity of absorption and, 339- three-good internal RER, possible addi-
341 tional, 212-215
inflation and, 550 two-good internal RER, 147-152
operational considerations, 28-32 see also WPI-CPI proxy
real depreciation and, 567-570 Public borrowing, 331
RER and, 550 Purchasing power parity (PPP), 12, 14, 260,
variables, 227-228 261-262,294,419,451
Political economy approach, 558-563 absolute, 73-74, 80
PPP. See Purchasing power parity analysis, 309-310
Predetermined variables, 220-222, 228 base-year approach, 363, 411n6
Price deflators, 90, 122, 126, 128, 169, 171, 183 cointegrating equations, 257
calculation, 159-165 estimates, long-period mean and trend,
Price elasticity, 352-353, 484, 468 300-303
aggregate export supply, 495 meaning Of, 100-101
assumptions, 375 relative, 74-76, 93
demand, 317 single-equation estimation and, 423-425
developing countries, 476-477 tests for, 234-237
export demand, 495 theory, 41, 42, 43
import derVand, 495 see also Relative PPP-based approach
industrial countries, 475-476
Price indexes, 5, 6, 8, 121, 136 Quantity changes, 335-337
aggregate domestic price index, home exogenous, 336-337
country, 142-144
competitiveness and, 110-112 Rational bubbles, 221
domestic goods, calculation, 162-165 see also Bubbles
Prices, 5, 91-92, 310-311, 364-369, 376, 379, Real depreciation, policy implications,
387, 414-415, 483 567-570
adjustments, patterns, 566-567 Real effective exchange rate (REER), 60-72,
administered, 139-141, 580-583 45,49-54,300,301,304,307,308,309
changes, 469 calculation, 50-54
data, 6 Cbte d'lvoire, 59, 62, 64,91
foreign, 389 indexes, 6
goods, 79-80 parallel markets and, 56, 58
level, devaluation and, 544 see also Real exchange rate, multilateral
measuring,118-120 Real exchange rate (RER), 4-10, 41, 459
misalignment, sensitivity to elasticity aggregate production cost, 6, 75-78, 82, 93
assumptions, 375 calculating, 2-3, 7, 43-53
nontraded goods, 576-577 changes, lagged effects, 337
target, 559, 562 cost-based, 6-7
tradables and nontradables, 118-120 definitions, 3,5, 6
wages and, 562-563 devaluation and, 539-585
see also Domestic goods disaggregated analysis, 181
Private spending, 276 elasticity pessimism, 494-496
Problems, 5 empirical role, 4, 467-496
Product price, 172 expenditure-based, 7
612 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
exports, 170 behavior, 340n43
imports, 170-171, 470-471 Sensitivity analysis, 372-375, 535-538, 563
inflation and, 539-585 Shadow exchange rate, 30
measurement, 3 Shocks, 417
measures, 94 domestic credit, 393-394
methodology, 524-527 domestic policy, 391-395
multilateral, 45, 58-59, 535-538. See also external, 395-398
REER government spending on domestic
nonstationarity, 33 goods, 394-395
numeraire and trade elasticities, 351-352 HLM model, 390-391
problems in calculating, 2-3 nominal, 298
sensitivity of results to choice of, 425- productivity, 413
426, 535-538 response, 3
theories, 5-6 see alse Terms of trade shock
three-good internal, for exportables and Short base periods, means for, 300-301
importables, 9-10, 176-178, 179, 200-201 Short-run dynamics, 414-415, 437, 439,
traded-goods version, 95 440-443
trade-equations approach, 313-320 single-equation estimation, 440-443
trade flows and, 467-496 Short-run equilibrium lER (SRER), 11,
trends, 303, 522-531. See also Balassa- 221-222
Samuelson effect Short samples, 419-420, 454-455
two-good internal, for tradables and Short-term debt, 331-332
nontradables, 8-9 Single-equation reduced-form approach,
Real wages, 82-83, 554, 578 35-36,263,405-464
devaluation and, 568 adjustment speed, 438-440
see also Wages alternative estimators, 433-434
Reduced-form general-equilibrium calculation, 443-451
approach, 26-28 central insight, 417-418
see also Single-equation approach cointegrating rank, determining, 432-433
REER. See Real effective exchange rates data, 425-427
Relative aggregate production cost, empirical results, 435-437
competitiveness and, 110-112 estimation, 425-443
Relative domestic price, 118 integration, determining the order, 427-
Relative expenditure PPP, 74-76, 93 431
Relative PPP-based approach, 14-17, 33, long-run parameters, 425, 438-440
74-76, 80, 296-313, 524-527 LRER, 234-241
advantages and limitations, 312-313 motivating, 418-425
analyses, 303-312 short-run dynamics, 440-443
internal RER and, 305-306 see also Reduced-form general-equili-
Relative prices brium approach
changes in, 337-338 Small samples, 419-420, 454-455
complete framework for estimating, Smithsonian agreement, 1
583-584 South Asia, official and parallel bilateral
RER. See Real exchange rate real exchange rates, 510-512, 533-534
Resource balance, 19, 22, 293n1, 347-348, 467 Specitication and estimation, theory of, 325
adjustment, 333-342 Speculative bubbles, 226
equation, 347-348 see a/so Bubbles
fiscal deficit and, 326 Spending,426
GDP ratio (RESGDP), 460, 461-463 government, domestic goods, 394-395
limitations, 341-342 government, LRER, 280
trade-equations approach, 313-320 private, 409
see also Target resource balance Stationary fundamentals, 17, 298, 423-425,
Revised minimum-standard model 427-429
(RMSM-X), 326 Stationary and non-stationary variables,
419, 421, 427, 428, 554
Saving-investment balance approach, 245- I(O) case, 434-435
246, 324-326 l(l) case, 430-431
Savings,268-269 State of the art, 36
INDEX 613
Statistics, stationarity, 428 calculation, 169-171
Status, 4 definition, 176-178
Steady state, 247, 417 external proxies for, 199-201
see also Long-run equilibrium RER; Pre- imports and exports, 9-10, 176-201
determined variables; Sustainability measurement, direct, 182-186
Stock equilibrium, 412 possible proxy, 212-215
Structural breaks, RER, 306-308 two-good framework, vs, 178-180, 201,
Structural general-equilibrium approach, 203-204
22-26, 381-404 Total factor productivity (TFP), 259
Structural models, LRERs, 241-247 Total trade, 119n10, 173, 183
Subsidies, 580-583 Total unit factor productivity and costs, 87
see also Taxes Tradables, 144-145
Supply classification, 124-125
elasticities, 488, 490, 493n37 direct expenditure-based estimates of
funds, 273, 274 internal RER, 120,121-123
Supply-side calculation of internal RER, direct production-based estimates of the
162-163 internal RER, 120, 123-129
Sustainability, 10-12, 17 measuring, 118-120
external balance, 230 two-good internal RER, 116-129
fundamentals, 443-446, 461-464 value added deflators, 126
practice, 226-229 see a(so Balassa-Samuelson effect; Law of
theory, 220-224 one price; Traded goods
values, 10-12, 17 Trade
Sustainable capital flows effects of fluctuations, 88-92
approaches, 327-332 flows, real exchange rates and, 467-496
DLR model, 376 patterns, 60-61
Synthetic aggregate elasticities, 479-480 policy, 98, 364, 412-414, 426-427
shares of, 61-65
Targeting taxes, 139-141, 148-150, 205, 338-339,566,
adjustments for, 338-341 580-583,558-359
alternative approaches, 322-324 unrecorded, 69
Target resource balance, 19 Trade"balance, 132, 409, 468
determining, 321-333 merchandise, 469
internal RERs, 349 Trade deflators, 148
Tariffs, 89 Trade elasticities, 243-244, 467-468
see also Taxes, trade definition, 345-346
Taxes, 269 empirical estimates, 28-29
trade, 139-141, 148-150, 205, 338-339, 566, numeraire, 351-352
580-583, 558-559 pessimism, 467-496
Technical approach, 557, 563-565 Trade-elasticities approach, 318-320
Terms of trade (TOT) derivation, 345-33
changes in, 285-288 parameter estimates, 350-351
internal and external RERs and, 193-196, Trade-equations approach, 17-22, 33-34,
209-211 241-247,294-295,333-335
shocks, 185, 186-201, 205, 309, 363-364, advantages and limitations, 342-344
375, 379, 412-414,438,459, 461 RER and resource balance, 313-320
Thailand, 25 Trade equations-elasticities methodology,
HLM model, 402-404 294-295
Third country competition, 65-69 Traded goods, 5, 119n10
Three-good approach changes in government spending, 279
developing countries, 316-320 external RER, 79-86, 91
framework, 21 internal RER, 203
internal vs external RERs, 186-189 international competitiveness, 304-305
specific methodology, 318-320 price, external proxies for, 144-147
trade-equations methodology, 343 RER, 95
two-good approach vs, 178-180, 201, unit labor costs and, 107-110
203-204 see also Balassa-Samuelson effect; Law
Three-good internal RERs, 9-10, 175-215 of one price; Traded goods
614 EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT
Traditional reduced-form studies, 255-257 Unification exchange rate, 504-505, 529-531
Traditional trade equations, 261 Unit factor cost (UFC), 87, 108
Trend estimates, equilibrium RERs, 17, 303 manufacturing, 82-83
Trend growth rate of GDP, return to, 335-336 Unit-root econometrics, 35, 263, 405-455
Turkey, official and parallel bilateral real
exchange rates, 507-509, 533 Value added deflators
Two-good internal RER, 8-9, 113-173 manufacturing, 84-85
accounting framework, 573-585 trade, 126, 127, 161, 165, 168- 173
computation, 171-173 Value added price indexes, 158
direct expenditure-based estimates for Variance ratio tests, 429, 430
tradable goods, 120, 121-123
direct production-based estimates for Wage differentials, 579-580
tradable goods, 120, 123-129 Wages, 82-83, 414-415, 567
empirical measurement, 118-129 freeze, 559
estimation, direct methods, 120-129 prices and, 562-563
external RER and, 129-141 target, 559
external RERs as proxies for, 141-151 see afso Nominal wages; Real wages
measurement, 152 Weak exogeneity, 421, 434, 42-43, 456458
three-good framework vs, 178-180, 201, Weighting schemes, REERs, 60-61
203-204 Wholesale price indexes (WPIs), 75-76,
total trade at domestic and border 83-84
prices, 189 foreign, 144-146, 148, 151, 152
tradables and nontradables, 8-9 World real interest rates, 13, 282-283
value added deflators, 126 WPI-CPI proxy, 147-151, 199-201, 204-205
fa'wll
r r .e Rate -
MISALIGNMENT
Detecting and measuring exchange rate misalignment is an indispensable step
in avoiding exchange rate crises. Exchange Rate Misalignment provides a
comprehensive treatment of the theoretical and empirical issues involved in
measuring exchange rate misalignment in developing countries. It contains:
Assessments of the numerous alternative empirical measures of the internal
and external real exchange rates;
Analyses of the concepts, theory, and research on exchange rate misalignment;
Detailed presentations, evaluations, and applications of the currently available
methodologies for empirically estimating the equilibrium exchange rate in
developing countries; and
Synthetic reviews of important related issues concerning the relationships
between real exchange rates and trade flows, between parallel and equilibrium
exchange rates, and between nominal devaluations and inflation.
This book is intended primarily for use by policy analysts, applied researchers,
and students concerned with exchange rate management in developing countries,
although much of its analysis is also applicable to small open industrial
economies.
Oxford University Press 90000
9 780195"21269
ISBN 0-19-521126-X