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**PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT**

**ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT**

**BASIC EDUCATION IMPROVEMENT PROJECT  
(CR. 2476)**

**EDUCATION ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM PROJECT  
(CR. N008)**

**JUNE 25, 2008**

*Sector Evaluation Division  
Independent Evaluation Group*

## Currency Equivalents (annual averages)

*Currency Unit = (Egyptian pounds)*

As of April 1996 (Year of Approval)

LE 1 = US\$0.29

US\$1.00 = LE 3.4

As of February 2003

LE 1.00 = US\$0.18

US\$1.00 = LE 5.70

## Abbreviations and Acronyms

BEIP	Basic Education Improvement Project
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
DFID	United Kingdom Department for International Development
EEP	Education Enhancement Project
EFA	Education for All
EU	European Union
FTI	Fast-Track Initiative to achieve Education for All
GDP	Gross domestic product
ICR	Implementation Completion Report
IDA	International Development Association
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group
IIEP	International Institute for Education Planning (UNESCO)
MIS	Management information system
MoE	Ministry of Education
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PCU	Project Coordination Unit
PISA	Programme for International Student Assessment
PIRLS	Progress in International Reading Literacy Study
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
PHRD	Policy and Human Resources Development
PPAR	Project Performance Assessment Report
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
QAG	Quality Assurance Group
SAR	Staff Appraisal Report
TIMSS	Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization

## Fiscal Year

Government: January 1 — December 31

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### **About this Report**

The Independent Evaluation Group assesses the programs and activities of the World Bank for two purposes: first, to ensure the integrity of the Bank's self-evaluation process and to verify that the Bank's work is producing the expected results, and second, to help develop improved directions, policies, and procedures through the dissemination of lessons drawn from experience. As part of this work, IEGWB annually assesses about 25 percent of the Bank's lending operations. In selecting operations for assessment, preference is given to those that are innovative, large, or complex; those that are relevant to upcoming studies or country evaluations; those for which Executive Directors or Bank management have requested assessments; and those that are likely to generate important lessons. The operations, topics, and analytical approaches selected for assessment support larger evaluation studies.

A Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) is based on a review of the Implementation Completion Report (a self-evaluation by the responsible Bank department) and fieldwork conducted by IEGWB. To prepare PPARs, IEGWB staff examine project files and other documents, interview operational staff, and in most cases visit the borrowing country to discuss the operation with staff of the Bank and the government, other stakeholders, and beneficiaries. The PPAR thereby seeks to validate and augment the information provided in the ICR, as well as examine issues of special interest to broader IEGWB studies.

Each PPAR is subject to peer review and IEGWB management approval. Once cleared internally, the PPAR is reviewed by the responsible Bank department and amended as necessary. The completed PPAR is then sent to the borrower for review; the borrowers' comments are attached to the document that is sent to the Bank's Board of Executive Directors. After an assessment report has been sent to the Board, it is disclosed to the public.

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**Outcome:** The extent to which the operation's major relevant objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently. The rating has three dimensions: relevance of objectives, efficacy, and efficiency. *Relevance of objectives* is the extent to which the project's objectives are consistent with the country's current development priorities and with current Bank country and sectoral assistance strategies and corporate goals (expressed in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Country Assistance Strategies, Sector Strategy Papers, Operational Policies). *Efficacy* is the extent to which the project's objectives were achieved, or expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance. *Efficiency* is the extent to which the project achieved, or is expected to achieve, a return higher than the opportunity cost of capital and benefits at least cost compared to alternatives. The efficiency dimension generally is not applied to adjustment operations. *Possible ratings:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

**Risk to Development Outcome:** The risk, at the time of evaluation, that development outcomes (or expected outcomes) will not be maintained (or realized). *Possible ratings:* High Significant, Moderate, Negligible to Low, Not Evaluable.

**Bank Performance:** The extent to which services provided by the Bank ensured quality at entry of the operation and supported effective implementation through appropriate supervision (including ensuring adequate transition arrangements for regular operation of supported activities after loan/credit closing, toward the achievement of development outcomes. The rating has two dimensions: quality at entry and quality of supervision. *Possible ratings:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

**Borrower Performance:** The extent to which the borrower assumed ownership and responsibility to ensure quality of preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, towards the achievement of development objectives and sustainability. The rating has two dimensions: government performance and implementing agency performance. *Possible ratings:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.



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<p>This report was prepared by Helen Abadzi, who assessed the projects in November 2007. Marie-Jeanne Ndiaye provided administrative support.</p>
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## Principal Ratings

	<i>ICR*</i>	<i>ICR Review*</i>	<i>PPAR</i>
<b><i>Basic Education Improvement Project (Cr.2476)</i></b>			
Outcome	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome** (Sustainability)	Likely	Likely	Moderate
Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Borrower Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory
<b><i>Education Enhancement Program Project (Cr. N008)</i></b>			
Outcome	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome** (Sustainability)	Likely	Likely	Moderate
Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory
Borrower Performance	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory

\* The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) is a self-evaluation by the responsible operational division of the Bank. The ICR Review is an intermediate IEG product that seeks to independently verify the findings of the ICR.

\*\* According to the 2006 harmonization guidelines, sustainability has been replaced with a "risk to development outcome" rating.

## Key Staff Responsible

	<i>Task Manager/ Leader</i>	<i>Division Chief/ Sector Director</i>	<i>Country Director</i>
<b><i>Basic Education Improvement Project (Cr. 2476)</i></b>			
Appraisal	Melhem Salman	Douglas Keare	Ram Chopra
Supervision	Mae Chu Chang	Regina Bendokat	Inder Sud
Completion	Mahmoud Gamal El Din	Michal Rutkowski	Mahmoud Ayub
<b><i>Education Enhancement Program Project (Cr. N008)</i></b>			
Appraisal	Mae Chu Chang	Jacques Beaudouy	Inder Sud
Supervision	Mae Chu Chang	Mae Chu Chang	Michael Rutkowski
Completion	Michel Welmond	Mourad Ezzine	Emmanuel Mbi





## **Preface**

This is the Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) on two education projects in Egypt.

The Basic Education Improvement Project (Cr. 2476) was approved for a credit of US\$55.5 million equivalent in March 1993. The credit closed on December 31, 2003 after an extension totaling 12 months, and US\$0.5 million equivalent were cancelled.

The Education Enhancement Program Project (Cr. N008) was approved for a credit of US\$75 million equivalent in December 1996. The credit (financed through an interim trust fund) closed on August 31, 2006 after extensions totaling 44 months, and US\$4.1 million were cancelled. The European Union provided cofinancing of US\$125 million.

The PPAR was conducted to assess the outcomes of large and long-lasting projects in a country that has seen much economic development. The PPAR is based on the following sources: Implementation Completion Reports (ICRs), Staff Appraisal Reports (SARs), Loan Agreements for the projects, and project files, particularly the supervision reports. Also, IEG consulted the research literature, reports on Egypt, and data on schooling trends. An IEG mission visited Egypt in November 2007 to interview officials, donors, and beneficiaries, observe instruction in schools, and collect other pertinent information. Field visits took place in the governorates of Kaliubeya, Qena, Luxor, and Cairo. The author thanks the government officials who received the mission for their extensive cooperation.

Following standard IEG procedures, copies of the draft PPAR were sent to government officials and agencies for their review and comments. The Borrower's response was taken into account in the text and is presented in Annex D.



## Summary

This document reviews the performance of two projects in Egypt: (i) the Basic Education Improvement Project (Cr. 2476, approved in FY93, and (ii) the Education Enhancement Program Project (Cr. N008; approved in FY97). Overall, these aimed to improve access to basic education in underserved areas and for girls, improve quality, and enhance the efficiency of the educational system. The European Union cofinanced the second project.

Despite initial delays and an implementation period of 9-10 years, most project activities were concluded and funds were almost completely disbursed. Most expenditures were directed towards civil works and furniture, but a lot of teacher training activities also took place. Innovative efforts were made to improve learning outcomes, such as a school effectiveness subproject that aimed to develop school-level goals through community involvement. Several evaluative and sector studies were also conducted. However, implementation focused on acquisition of hardware and management information systems rather than their use, so the institutional development objectives of the projects were only partly met. During the project implementation periods, the government did not focus on policy changes that would decentralize the system and improve equity in learning outcomes. (According to the Borrower's response shown in Annex D, changes have moved slowly but many have taken place after completion.) Also, the Ministry of Education did not assume direct responsibility for implementing all World Bank-financed projects, and a project implementation unit remained in force. According to staff interviewed by the IEG mission, this arrangement may have limited interactions between the Bank and some beneficiaries, limited dissemination of study findings, and reduced the learning of lessons from project experiences.

Evaluations suggest that the access objective was fulfilled and the gender gap in primary and secondary education was reduced. Overall, learning outcomes seem to have improved since the two assessed projects became effective, but effect sizes were small, and findings were at times contradictory. Extensive teacher training was provided, but there was no measure of improvement in the quality of teaching. Overall, no clear line of reasoning was established to attribute outcomes to specific project activities and to measure intermediate conditions (such as the amount of instructional time used for learning.) The IEG mission found several children in the advanced primary grades of periurban areas who could not read fluently and who therefore would probably have low test scores. Reading instruction and language issues in the lower grades may pose challenges for the schooling of the poor, who cannot afford private tutoring. The Egyptian system is capable of providing quality education, but more attention must be given to ensuring that the poor benefit from it.

The objectives of the two projects were highly relevant to the needs of the country. The outcomes of both projects are rated *moderately satisfactory* in light of high relevance, modest efficiency and modest efficacy; despite the completion of many activities, learning outcomes did not improve significantly, and important institutional development policies were not implemented. For both projects, risk to development outcome is rated *moderate*; the enrollment expansion has proved resilient over time, and

quality-oriented inputs are likely to be sustained; but if teacher salaries remain low and policy changes are slow, services to the poor may be limited. For the Basic Education Improvement project, Bank is rated *satisfactory*, and borrower performance is rated *moderately satisfactory* due to limited policy reforms; for the follow-on project Bank and Borrower performance are rated *moderately satisfactory*.

This assessment provides a number of lessons for the education sector:

- Governments may carry out project activities as expected in lending documents but hesitate to implement policies at the agreed pace. Donors who finance hardware activities in expectations of policy changes may face difficult decisions. The donor community may use study results and other information to invite wider public debate on necessary policy changes (para. 4.11);
- In all sectors, a line of reasoning is necessary for linking expected outcomes with activities undertaken during implementation. A clear line of reasoning and attribution of causality is critical in complex projects with multiple components. Efforts must be made to measure intermediate outcomes (such as instructional time use or reading fluency in education) in order to test hypotheses and determine which activities contribute the most to development outcomes (para. 4.15);
- During appraisal and implementation, emphasis is often on the “big picture” and on global indicators of development objectives. To achieve the expected effects, however, the Bank should pay closer attention to execution of the details, the “pixels” which constitute the big picture. State-of-the-art sectoral knowledge and local language knowledge are important in monitoring the degree to which basic skills are achieved;
- Targeted awareness campaigns make it possible to increase female enrollments even in areas that are hard to reach. However, mere enrollments may not be sufficient to help girls’ labor market outcomes. Quality education is necessary to increase educational attainment among the poor and disadvantaged (para. 3.4); and
- Donor coordination is important in the financing of activities that are to benefit the poor. Complementary skills among donor staff can result in improved project performance in ways that can benefit large and complex countries, like Egypt (para. 4.8).

Vinod Thomas  
Director-General  
Evaluation

## 1. Background


1.1 Egypt is a country of 74 million people with a per capita income of about US\$1,250 (GNI, Atlas method) in 2005. Governments have consistently shown strong concern for social equity and political stability, and significant public resources have been allocated to social-spending items. In the last decade, Egypt has made sustained progress toward achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) related to poverty reduction, water and sanitation, infant and child mortality, and maternal mortality. To become a competitive member of the global economic community, however, Egypt faces the challenge of improving its human capital. In many respects, there has been strong educational progress in the last decades. Just in the first half of the 1990s, the educational system expanded by over 170,000 students, or about nine percent per year.<sup>1</sup> The traditional large gender imbalance has been gradually mitigated. Adult literacy has expanded among the women and the poorer populations and stands at about 71 percent.<sup>2</sup> However, there is still a gap in the opportunities and quality of life between Upper and Lower Egypt. The educational system perpetuates income inequalities by rewarding through a series of high-stakes examinations those who are better off and can afford private tutoring. As a result, approximately 60 percent of secondary education students end up in vocational education tracks that in fact offer little professional development so graduates are not even eligible to become primary school teachers.<sup>3</sup> This and other issues related to equity and quality of education have been the focus of the Bank strategy.

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<sup>1</sup> Education Enhancement Project Staff Appraisal Report, 1996, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Country at a Glance 2006

<sup>3</sup> World Bank 2007 (Education Sector Policy Note). In the 1991-92 school year, during the appraisal of the Basic Education Improvement project, 6.4 million students were reportedly enrolled in public primary schools and 3.5 million in lower secondary (preparatory) schools nationwide. These enrollment levels represented a total increase of 1.9 million students since 1984-85 at an average annual rate of 3.3 percent (1.1 percent per year at the primary stage and 7.9 percent at the preparatory stage), which was, higher than the population growth rate. However, dropout was nearly 15 percent of the age cohort by the end of primary and an additional 10-15 percent by the end of the lower secondary stage, creating a cumulative dropout of 72 percent (World Bank 1993, BEIP Staff Appraisal Report, p. 8). In recent years, promotion from grade 1 to 2 has become automatic, reducing this rate to some extent. The Borrower's response states that before the currently implemented Secondary Education Project, 70 percent were in technical education; there are plans to reduce inequities further (Annex D).



### Bank Sector Strategy

1.2 Lending for education in Egypt started in 1977, and six projects were completed before the two that are the subject of this report. The early projects focused on manpower development through vocational, technical, and agricultural education (Table 1.1). Completion reports show that overall project objectives were fulfilled albeit with difficulties in institutional development. Delays in completing various activities became progressively longer, and projects approved in 1983 onwards required 8-10 years for completion. Some of the projects did not meet conditionalities or abide by policy agreements, and this pattern continued on to the projects assessed in this document.

1.3 In 1990, Egypt embarked on an economic reform program consisting of macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment programs supported by an International Monetary Fund (IMF) Standby Arrangement and a World Bank Structural Adjustment loan. The international community gave additional support, including debt relief from the Paris Club and other creditors. Projects aimed at improving conditions in the social sectors were also implemented. For the first time, primary education was supported through the two projects that are assessed in this document. For the education sector, the government prepared a fifteen-year plan that was to be supported by a series of operations over 10-15 years. The plan was to improve conditions particularly in the poorer governorates of Upper Egypt. The Education Enhancement Project (EEP) represented a five-year slice of this timeframe.<sup>4</sup> In addition, a series of 'enhancement' projects were negotiated that covered specific activities in all subsectors, from preschool to higher education. All but one of these projects was still under implementation at the time the current assessment took place.

1.4 Since 2000, the Bank has carried out much sector work on the Egyptian education system that included a sector review, strategic options for early childhood education, a public expenditure review, and skills training. These reports were appreciated but they received little publicity. According to staff interviewed by the IEG mission, they had a

<sup>4</sup> World Bank 1996 (Education Enhancement Program Staff Appraisal Report, p. 5).

limited impact, but according to the government some changes were made based on their findings.<sup>5</sup>

1.5 *Other donors.* Several donors have invested extensively in Egyptian education. The largest are US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the European Union (EU)<sup>6</sup>, UN specialized agencies, and a number of bilateral donors, especially Canada and DFID (United Kingdom Department for International Development.) The donor group meets regularly and exchanges information, although large-scale multidonor projects in education have not yet been undertaken.

**Table 1.1: World Bank - Education Lending in Egypt**

<i>Projects</i>	<i>Project ID</i>	<i>Approval FY</i>	<i>Closing</i>	<i>Credit amt US\$m</i>	<i>Project Cost US\$m</i>	<i>Cancelled US\$m</i>	<i>IEG Ratings Outcome</i>
<i>Completed</i>							
Education I (Cr. 681)	P005003	1977	12/1981	25	54.2	1.67	Satisfactory*
Education II (Cr. 868)	P005014	1979	03/1985	40	104.13	3.45	Moderately satisfactory*
Education III (Cr. 1069)	P005029	1981	12/1987	40	48.96	0.2	Satisfactory*
Vocational Training (Cr. 2264)	P005041	1983	03/1993	38	45.8	2.6	Satisfactory*
Vocational Training - Electricity (Ln. 2594)	P005055	1985	06/1994	19	49.2	1.2	Satisfactory
Engineering & Technical education (Cr. 3137)	P005140	1990	12/1998	31	38.6	0.8	Marginally satisfactory
Basic Education Improvement Project (Cr. 2476)	P005161	1993	12/2003	56	69.4	4.4	Satisfactory
Education Enhancement Program (Cr. N008)	P005169	1997	08/2006	75	2,350.2*	0.5	Moderately satisfactory
<i>Ongoing</i>							
Secondary Education Enhancement Project (Cr. 3194)	P050484	1999	06/2008	50	250		
Higher Education Enhancement Program (Cr. 4658)	P056236	2002	12/2008	50	60		
Skills Development project (Cr. 7189)	P049702	2004	06/2008	6	12.5		
Early Childhood Education Enhancement (Cr. 7274)	P082952	2005	12/2010	20	108.61		
<b>Total</b>				450	3191.6	14.82	

\*Note: Ratings for these older projects were imputed from statements in completion reports; the project cost of the Education Enhancement Project reflects expenditures in the entire subsector.

<sup>5</sup> E.g. World Bank 2002, 2005a, 2005b, 2007. The Borrower's response states that certain textbook policies and construction procedures were changed as a result of the studies (Annex D).

<sup>6</sup> The IEG mission coincided with an EU evaluation mission of the Education Enhancement project and in particular the components cofinanced by the EU. One joint field trip was undertaken, and the two missions interacted extensively.

## 2. Project Objectives and Implementation

2.1 The two projects largely overlapped and lasted 9-10 years. Bureaucratic limitations and delays in making important decisions were prominent reasons for the long implementation periods. Prior experiences with the duration of projects in Egypt were taken into account for the first project (BEIP), but not for the second (EEP) one. As a result, the latter required extensions totalling 44 months. Both projects were implemented essentially as designed, with limited revisions.

2.2 *Policy goals.* Project documents describe a variety of activities, but both operations to a large extent focused on construction of schools and training centers.<sup>7</sup> Various sections of the appraisal documents in both projects discussed the importance of promoting policies like decentralization and improved financial management of the sector.<sup>8</sup> The BEIP included a set of studies that should lead to implementation of various decisions, while the EEP extensively discussed decision-making issues and private gains of teachers through tutoring. Aside from studies however, few actions were taken under the projects with the aim of policy change. Therefore important policy issues received limited attention during implementation. However, government staff interviewed during the mission stated that the projects acted as change agents for progress that took place after completion.

2.3 Both projects benefited from trust funds. The BEIP was appraised through a UNDP grant of US\$700,000, while the EEP used an interim trust fund (in lieu of IDA funds that at that time were unavailable) and a grant from the European Union for implementation. A project implementation unit (PIU) was formulated to execute this series of projects as well as the follow-on secondary education project. During the later stages of EEP, the Bank promoted the policy of abolishing the PIU and empowering the Ministry of Education to undertake activities directly. However, the Ministry lacked the administrative flexibility to assume many of the PIU functions, and this issue remained an important point of long-term debate.

2.4 The BEIP targeted seven priority governorates (Cairo, Sharkeya, Ismailia, Menofeya, Assiut, Sohag and Qena). Its initial objectives were complex and unclear (Table 2.1), and they were simplified in the Loan Agreement. However, the simplification (which is the version valid for legal purposes)<sup>9</sup> left out the equity goal of the first objective and rendered curricular revision in the second objective ambiguous. This has created difficulties in evaluating the extent to which these objectives were attained.

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<sup>7</sup> Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for BEIP, p. 4, 2004

<sup>8</sup> The policy content of the BEIP is discussed in the Staff Appraisal Report (p. 9, para 2.29 on policies, p. 14 on capacity in policy analysis and development of options) as well as in the legal documents. Similarly the EEP Project Appraisal Document shows expectations to reform decisionmaking (p. 8) and mentions the existing decisionmaking mechanisms as a risk to project outcomes.

<sup>9</sup> The simplified objectives of the BEIP were to: (a) improve access to basic education through a program of school construction and maintenance; (b) improve teaching quality and curricula design; (c) enhance the Ministry of Education's capacity in the areas of management, planning, and policy analysis; (d) assist in the formulation of options for addressing priority basic education issues.



<b>Table 2.1: Egypt Education Projects Assessed</b>	
<i>Objectives</i>	<i>Components</i>
<b>Basic Education Improvement Project (BEIP - Cr. 2476)</b>	
<p>Specific project objectives were to:</p> <p>(a) Improve access and equity to basic education through a well-designed program of school construction and maintenance that would be used as a model by MOE;</p> <p>(b) Improve the quality of teaching and consolidate advancements in curricular design through reinforcement of the in-service teacher training system;</p> <p>(c) Enhance the Ministry of Education's capacity in the areas of management, planning, and policy analysis through training of MOE staff and further development and efficient use of an education management information system (EMIS);</p> <p>(d) Help define policy options and alternatives in addressing two selected priority education issues through studies to complement ongoing Bank-sponsored public sector investment and human resource development studies.</p>	<p>⇒ <b>School construction</b> and maintenance (US\$50.5 million at appraisal, US\$48.7 million actual).</p> <p>⇒ <b>In-service teacher training</b> (US\$17 million at appraisal, US\$15.3 million actual).</p> <p>⇒ <b>Institutional development</b> in management, information, and planning in MOE (US\$6.9 million at appraisal, US\$6.5 million actual).</p> <p>⇒ <b>Related policy-oriented studies.</b> US\$0.1 million at appraisal, US\$0 actual).</p>
<b>Education Enhancement Program Project (EEP - Cr. N008)</b>	
<p>(a) Increase access, particularly for girls (increase annual enrollment for girls and boys by 2% and 1.2%) respectively; and provide second-chance education for children up to 14 years old, particularly for girls;</p> <p>(b) Improve the quality of student learning (reduce repetition and drop-outs; improve quality of teaching and learning to ensure that students attain basic skills; improve quality of pre-service training; and build capacity of implementing agencies);</p> <p>(c) Enhance the efficiency of the education system (improve efficiency of resource use; improve data accuracy and relevance; introduce mechanisms to improve teacher motivation and accountability; ensure effective program management; strengthen implementation at the central and governorate levels through annual work plans; integrate the governorate level in planning and implementation; and establish feedback mechanisms for ongoing assessment and program adjustment).</p>	<p>⇒ <b>Improving access</b> (appraisal cost US\$448.5 million, of which IDA US\$17.5 million; actual US\$1075.9 million) for school construction in targeted areas to reach girls and students with disabilities and for technical assistance to (i) improve surveying capacity, to conduct needs assessments at the local level, and (ii) review education materials.</p> <p>⇒ <b>Improving quality of student performance</b> (appraisal cost: US\$359 million, of which IDA US\$51.6 million, actual US\$2350.2 million) for construction of additional schools to reduce class size and multiple shifts, equipment, training of teachers, and technical assistance</p> <p>⇒ <b>Improving system efficiency</b> (total cost: US\$28.0 million, of which IDA US\$5.9 million, US\$47.1 million actual) for technical assistance to reform decision-making process, build capacity in participatory planning and management, monitoring and evaluation, and areas related to pedagogy. Strengthening the Ministry of Education (MOE) agencies would occur at both the central and governorate levels, including the funding and staffing of the program planning and monitoring unit.</p>

2.5 With a PIU already set up, the hardware-related activities of the EEP were implemented more efficiently. Special implementation units were set up at the governorates where the projects were implemented. The project targeted 15 governorates

(Fayum, Sharkia, Qena, Al Behera, Bani-Swaf, Menia, Luxor, Aswan, Garbia, Dumyat, Kaliubeya, Sohag, Kafr El Sheikh, Dakahlia, and Ismailia). The EU worked mainly in the 15 governorates, whereas Bank funds were used throughout the country. The EU funds of US\$125 million were disbursed in tranches and were used to finance all activities eligible against Guiding Criteria and Indicators agreed with the Government. Over the years, the government counterpart increased from US\$835.5 million to US\$2,2350.2 million. Thus, much more infrastructure was built with government counterpart funds than initially expected.

### 3. Achievement of the Project Objectives

3.1 This section presents results and evidence regarding efficacy that is the extent to which project activities and inputs may have contributed to outputs, outcomes, and impacts.

#### **OBJECTIVE: IMPROVING ACCESS (SUBSTANTIAL FOR BOTH PROJECTS)**


3.2 The *Basic Education Improvement Project* (BEIP) built new schools and extra classrooms in the areas of seven needy governorates where there were no facilities, girls' enrollment was low, schools were overcrowded, or there were multiple shifts. Approximately 270 primary and lower secondary schools were to be built, but an earthquake in October 1992 damaged several schools and necessitated an improvement in construction standards that raised costs. Initially the number was scaled down to 146 but as cheaper designs developed, 159 were constructed (Annex B Table B-1). The *Education Enhancement Project* (EEP) had a larger construction impact; it built about 404 schools based on the above-mentioned criteria to house an additional 106,000 students. The school construction program as conceived in the appraisal documents did not fulfil all the country's needs, so the government made additional investments. In fact the Bank financed only about 2-5 percent of the school construction needed for the project period.<sup>10</sup> Considerable training was given in preventive maintenance and inspections, although its long-term sustainability has been uncertain. Communities were asked to contribute land for the schools. Attention was given to design and supervision issues. The executing agency was the Government Authority for Educational Buildings. For both projects, the National Investment Bank provided construction supervision and oversight to buildings built by contractors.

3.3 Enrollment data suggest that in the targeted areas the infrastructure provision had an impact. In about 80 percent of the districts where BEIP constructed schools, enrollments significantly increased. According to a project-financed evaluation,<sup>11</sup> enrollment in the catchment areas of the new schools increased by 7-26 percent in some sites (5-21.5 percent for boys and 9-30.5 percent for girls). The results suggested that

<sup>10</sup> BEIP Staff Appraisal Report, p. 15. The Public Expenditure Review (and EEP ICR, p. 22) states that school construction costs were not reduced for the long term and in fact were higher than other countries. However, more data were not available on this issue. For EEP, the Borrower's response states that 404 schools were built, whereas the ICR (p. 9) states that 229 were built.

<sup>11</sup> El Sheikh et al. 2004

girls benefited more than boys. In 81.2 percent of the school districts, enrollment significantly increased for girls, and in 78.1 percent of the school districts, enrollment significantly increased for boys after establishing the project schools. Overall, gross and net enrollment ratios have risen (Figures 3.1-3.4). According to project documents, from 1991/92 to 2002/03, the gross enrollment rate (GER) for primary education increased from 80 percent in 1991/92 to 105 percent in 2002/03.<sup>12</sup> Thus, there was a 25 percentage point increase in the overall national gross enrollment ratio, of which the BEIP accounted for 6.6 percent (about 70,000 students).<sup>13</sup> Most of the enrollment increases took place during the period of the BEIP; EEP enrollments essentially kept up with population increases.




3.4 *Gender gap.* Statistical information during the life of the project suggests that the BEIP similarly influenced enrollments positively. Overall, primary school net enrollment ratio for girls rose 9.1 percentage points (from 87.5 to 96.6 percent), and an increase for boys of 8.8 percentage points, from 90.9 to 99.7 percent. At the lower secondary level, there was an increase for girls of 22.2 percentage points, from 59.5 to 81.7 percent; and for boys an increase of 21.6 percentage points, from 62.7 to 84.3 percent. (Primary-level targets were 95 percent for girls and 98 percent boys; secondary-level targets were 77 percent girls, 78.6 percent boys.) The gender gap in enrollment ratios was reduced from 12.9 percent in 1992/93 to 2.8 percent in 2002/03. Although the gender gap was not included as one of the outcome indicators of the project, there has been a significant improvement in closing this gap. These increases in enrollment have reduced the gender parity index from 93.6 in 1996 to 95.3 in 2005 for primary and from 94.8 to 96.4 to secondary. Egypt should attain 100 percent net primary school enrollment in the next few years. Progress in girls' enrollments may be partly due to the awareness campaigns that accompanied school construction in rural areas.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup> The baseline figures are provided in the BEIP Staff Appraisal Report.

<sup>13</sup> BEIP ICR, p. 4

<sup>14</sup> In the 2004 Global Learning Conference in Shanghai, the Egyptian experience with girls' education was one of the eight models that were showcased.



3.5 One result of the infrastructure expansion was the prevalence throughout Egypt of single-shift schools that are not used in the afternoons. The school authorities interviewed by the mission consider this a worthwhile objective, because the number of instructional hours in lower secondary schools is high, and in many areas it becomes dark before students leave. Some also stated that single-shift schools save electricity bills. However, project documents do not show that any discussion of the relative costs and benefits took place before this large-scale school expansion. School maintenance has costs. Maybe electricity and school guards would have been more effective solutions in some areas.

#### OBJECTIVE: IMPROVING QUALITY (MODEST FOR BOTH PROJECTS)

3.6 The BEIP mostly focused on the design, delivery and quality of the in-service teacher training as a means to improved teaching and learning outcomes. In addition to these activities, EEP developed capacity to conduct examinations, and carried out several innovative activities in a number of schools, aimed at improving learning outcomes. These included an “effective schools” subproject, introduction of “active learning” classroom activities, and “smart school”, an emphasis on computer use in schools.<sup>15</sup> Second-chance schools focused on bringing back to school about 900 girls who had dropped out to be educated in accelerated classes.

3.7 **Teacher training.** Both projects financed extensive teacher training activities (Tables B-1 and B-2). A team of Egyptian experts was trained to design distance learning packages that included videocassettes, and distance education allowed the government to reach vast numbers of teachers at a reasonable cost. About 127,000 teachers in 10 governorates received training in various subjects (science, math, English, computer basics), mainly through distance education. Training and evaluation units were established in all schools. A survey of teachers showed high levels of satisfaction and a

<sup>15</sup> More than half the students surveyed believed that although internet connections were largely available, computers were not used effectively. (El Sheikh and Kazem 2004, p. 162)

survey showed that 88 percent of the students believed that project-trained teachers performed better than those who had not received the training.<sup>16</sup>

3.8 EEP continued to provide in-service training to large numbers of teachers in various subject areas. For example, 13,253 trainers, 501,439 teachers and 4,701 inspectors were trained in topics that included technology use in the classroom, effective teaching methods; fundamental computer skills; dealing with learning difficulties; cumulative evaluation. About 55,000 school managers and principals were trained on modern approaches of educational management. According to officials interviewed, the multiple inputs to schools resulted in reduced repetition to less than 4 percent in primary education and 8.5 percent in lower secondary education. (Target was an 8 percent reduction.) However, teachers were not tested to find out what they had learned, and the content of materials was not assessed in detail. The scores of students whose teachers had received training showed some increases, but the effect was weak. Overall the contribution of training to teacher performance was considered “average.”<sup>17</sup> However, a longitudinal study showed high variability of test scores at the classroom level, suggesting that teachers in Egyptian schools have a stronger role than in other countries; in the sample of schools used for the longitudinal study (see below), teacher training exerted a strong positive effect on student achievement.<sup>18</sup>

3.9 **Faculty of Education reforms.** The EEP also supported a comprehensive, institutional reform of the 26 Faculties of Education and provided for new teaching methodologies and upgraded facilities (including the establishment of data resource centers, education technology centers, electronic libraries, multi-media study centers, and a wide variety of computer laboratories). Staff who were interviewed expressed satisfaction with the provision of equipment and books, but could not give clear examples about the extent to which these improved teaching curricula and student-teachers’ learning. The ongoing Higher Education Enhancement Project continued to provide support for this activity, supporting for example the creation of course descriptions for the first time.

3.10 **The “effective schools”** subproject started in 2004 and helped form boards of trustees in 300 planned schools of 10 governorates. With technical assistance, parents and teachers were directed to develop a mission and vision for their school. Logos were also developed for each school, aiming at improving its image and fostering pride. Schools that became ‘effective’ trained others. Boards of trustees were established in 296 out of 300 schools, many of which succeeded in obtaining donations from the community as a result of this sensitization. A longitudinal study (see next section) showed very small but statistically significant differences in learning outcomes favoring schools that had undergone the effective schools methodology.<sup>19</sup> However, project documents and mission interviews with officials who were involved in the project did not clarify how outcomes would be obtained. The school vision and mission did not always lead to

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<sup>16</sup> Khuzam 2006

<sup>17</sup> El Sheikh and Kazem 2004

<sup>18</sup> Kazem et al 2004

<sup>19</sup> O’Sullivan and Higab 2006.

concrete actions somehow linked to learning outcomes (e.g. increased instructional time, catch-up classes for those falling behind, parental interest leading to vigilance during homework, or other inputs that would result in increased information processing by students). Furthermore, important aspects may be missing, such as elimination of private tuition that is a major burden for parents. (See example of a school vision statement in Box 3-1.)

**Box 3-1: Sample from an Effective School vision in the Kaliubeya governorate**


**An effective School Teaches the Essential knowledge and Skills**

- Increase in the rate of upgrading to higher level and decrease the repetition rate;
- Develop the building and overcome the problems caused by a lack in resources and equipment;
- Achieve a more effective role for the local society that surrounds the school to achieve participation;
- Take into consideration the international standards and academic dependence;
- Provide the means for computer education and make use of it;
- Provide equal opportunities to achieve everyone's individuality;
- Achieve the students' participation in the school management and in decision-making processes affecting them and their school development;
- Provide a safe school environment to achieve the school vision and mission;
- Develop leadership among those who are promising;
- Ask employees to self-evaluate their performance on a regular and continuing basis;
- Enable employees to effectively deal with the different sources of knowledge;
- Develop employees' skills to assess ability of every student to achieve the concept of individualized education; and
- Communicate with parents and improve communication system.

3.11 The “**active learning**” subproject has been an attempt to change student-teacher interactions from merely repeating material memorized by rote in grades 1-3 to using comprehension and analytical thinking. Local officials explained to the IEG mission that students should learn how to learn by themselves and that the teacher should merely be a facilitator.<sup>20</sup> Teachers are trained to carry out a set of 13 activities that include showing students cards with words, setting up games for language and math, undertaking projects. Each classroom has two teachers (one is an aide to help manage all the activities) and supervisors who work specifically with active learning schools. The mission observed “active learning” classes in Qena, where grade 1 students were also learning to read without vowels and to identify unvoiced words (Figure 3.5). The intentions are laudable, but the cost-effectiveness of this approach is dubious; some of the methods introduced (such as whole-word reading) have been shown to be ineffective in other countries and schools.<sup>21</sup> Others may facilitate long-term consolidation and indeed help make learning more efficient. However, more research is needed to determine which ones are worth keeping, and it has not been undertaken.

<sup>20</sup> Considerable research has shown that approach is ineffective for the poor and the weaker students and may be conducive to lower outcomes (see Kirschner et al. 2006 for a review).

<sup>21</sup> Pelli and Tillman 2006; for a review see Abadzi (2006).



3.12 To observe the use of project inputs, the IEG mission visited seven schools in the governorates of Luxor, Qena, and Cairo.<sup>22</sup> In addition to interviews with teachers and directors regarding project inputs and related outcomes, the mission informally tested the oral reading fluency of 22 students in grades 2-6 (an Egyptian government staff asked comprehension questions.). Overall, the schools were well maintained, and students were engaged in learning activities. However, most of the sampled students were unable to read fluently before grade 4. In two semi-rural schools outside Luxor, many students of grade 5 and about 20 percent of students in grade 6 could not read fluently. Also, students read haltingly in English, despite the number of years devoted to this subject. These empirical findings are based on a small and non-random sample, and they are merely illustrative. But they suggest that despite much training and emphasis on achievement, teachers had limited knowledge about teaching basic reading or an understanding of its importance. This is frequently seen in other countries, and in Egypt

<sup>22</sup> Schools visited were: Integrate primary school of Qena, girls' lower secondary school in Mahdam (Qena governorate), Qena Teacher Training Center, Mustafa Kamal Primary School (Luxor), Ali Ibn Ali Talib Primary School (Luxor), Baltan Primary School (Kaliubeya), Khalid Ibn Walid Primary School (Kaliubeya), Amin Salem Basha Preparatory School (Cairo). Some field visits were conducted jointly with the EU evaluator. School visits could not be conducted at random. They had to be approved in advance by local authorities who sometimes proposed the better schools. The approval process in Cairo was time-consuming, the government required security arrangements. As a result few schools were visited, and observations cannot be considered random or representative.

it may be one reason for the persistent need for private tutoring. One problem with the reading fluency outcome is that the first grade textbook focuses on communication and on recognition of entire words (Figure 3.6). It does not really teach letter values, which students need in order to recognize new words.<sup>23</sup> Some teachers and staff stated that students should have learned letters in kindergarten, but only about 17 percent of Egyptian students attend kindergarten. (See Issues section).

**3.13 Assessments and examinations.** The projects supported training in state-of-the-art psychometric procedures and research design. The National Center for Educational Examinations and Evaluation developed sample-based learning assessments in Arabic, math, and critical thinking that were administered to 1700 schools in 11 governorates. This process was complex and highly technical, and the institution made much effort over several years to carry it out. Overall, for 5th graders, Arabic scores increased from 52.2 to 58.9 percent; math scores from 43.2 to 50.2 percent, and critical thinking scores from 48.4 to 50.8 percent. For 8th graders, Arabic scores increased from 55.5 to 59.8 percent; math scores from 43.8 to 48.6 percent and critical thinking scores from 56.3 to 57.1 percent. The target was not a specific number, but 'statistically significant' improvement from baseline, which with large samples can be obtained with little change. Improvements in critical thinking were the weakest in both grades (Table 3.1).

**Table 3.1: Changes in student test scores during project implementation**

Courses	5 <sup>th</sup> grade		8 <sup>th</sup> grade	
	1997	2003/04	1997	2003/04
Arabic	52.2	58.9	55.5	59.8
Mathematics	43.2	50.2	43.8	48.6
Critical Thinking	48.4	50.8	56.3	57.0

**3.14** Test scores have been used in a three-stage longitudinal study of learning outcomes with multilevel analyses. Two stages were complete at the time of the PPAR mission. The studies show patterns that are not very clear and outcomes that are somewhat confusing. Students in the governorates that were included in the EEP showed better performance than students in the control group schools, but only in lower-secondary education and for 4 out of 5 school subjects. In Arabic there were no differences between project and non-project schools. In primary education, apart from English, where there seemed to be no difference between the achievements at project and non-project schools; in fact the non-project schools performed significantly better than the project schools in mathematics, Arabic, science, and social studies. Also, girls performed better than boys in all subjects except for science and math, where there was no difference. Lower Egypt performed better than Upper Egypt, and the poor in lower secondary schools were particularly disadvantaged. The study also found that private tutoring has a significant effect on student achievement, but parental tutoring, when parents can help, has an effect that is at least as strong.<sup>24</sup> No school leadership effects were found. The second phase of the study found a similar patchwork of effects, which are summarized in Table 3.2.

<sup>23</sup> For a review, see Abadzi 2006, Chapter 5.

<sup>24</sup> EEP ICR p. 27-28



Table 3.2: Results of the second phase of the longitudinal study


Question	Significant Findings 6 <sup>th</sup> Grade	Significant Findings 9 <sup>th</sup> Grade
1. To what extent has the ESP project impacted on pupil attainment, compared to other EEP non-ESP schools and also to non EEP schools?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Small but significant positive impact across all five subject areas – particularly for English.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Very small but significant positive impact across all five subject areas – again in particular for English.</li> </ul>
2. Is there a systematic programme effect to be found across the participating School Districts?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ A very small though significant positive impact on pupil achievement found for all subject areas.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Only one School District contained schools in which all three conditions were found. We were unable to answer this question for this Grade.</li> </ul>
3. Is there any gender or location effect?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Urban boys benefited most from ESP</li> <li>▪ Girls benefit from both programs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Little effect on rural schools</li> <li>▪ Urban pupils (boys &amp; girls) gain most from ESP</li> <li>▪ For Arabic and Science, urban girls made greater gains than urban boys.</li> </ul>
4. Is there any effect on pupil perception of school environment – taking into consideration pupil gender and school location?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Very high levels of satisfaction reported</li> <li>▪ Rural pupils lower for EEP &amp; ESP</li> <li>▪ Urban pupils slightly higher.</li> <li>▪ Systematic link between degree of satisfaction and achievement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Very high levels of satisfaction reported</li> <li>▪ EEP Boys positively affected and girls negatively affected</li> <li>▪ For ESP schools, the situation is reversed.</li> <li>▪ No systematic link observed between pupil achievement and satisfaction with school environment.</li> </ul>
5. Is there a programme effect by teacher job satisfaction by teacher perception of school leadership on student attainment?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ ESP Science teachers significantly higher performance</li> <li>▪ ESP significantly and positively impacted on Teacher Performance for all subject areas.</li> <li>▪ For English teachers a negative impact on performance for high levels of Leadership Satisfaction.</li> <li>▪ No program effect on Job Satisfaction</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ ESP Math teachers significantly higher performance</li> <li>▪ ESP Science and Social Studies teacher positive effects for Leadership Satisfaction</li> <li>▪ ESP significantly and positively impacted on Teacher Performance for all subject areas.</li> <li>▪ For Social Studies teachers a negative impact on performance for high levels of Leadership Satisfaction</li> <li>▪ No program effect on Job Satisfaction</li> </ul>

Source: O'Sullivan and Higab 2007. ESP refers to the Effective Schools subproject

3.15 Overall, test scores in the system seem to have risen since the inception of the two projects, but it is difficult to attribute this improvement to the projects and to their various activities. More important, the intrinsic value of these test scores is unknown vis-à-vis performance in the high-stakes examinations that determine students' future. It is unknown how the two sets of scores compare and whether project activities aimed at improving quality have also raised the pass rates of the high-stakes examinations or reduced tutoring hours or expenses.

3.16 Unfortunately, the projects did not attempt to improve the psychometric features of the high-stakes tests. Consequently the high-stakes examinations continue to have limited statistical validity and reliability, and results cannot be compared from year to year. (The regionally administered 9<sup>th</sup> grade examination that determines entry into general or vocational secondary schools determines the fates of the students and would be in urgent need of revisions.) The Bank has conducted policy dialogue on the problem on the curricular and social issues affecting high-stakes tests. But as in other countries, it has

**Figure 3.7: Results of 2003 TIMSS**



Source: Welmond and Joshi 2007

not focused on the psychometric issues of high-stakes tests.

3.17 **TIMSS.** In 2003 Egyptian 8<sup>th</sup> graders participated in TIMSS (Trends in Mathematics and Science Study). Egypt scored lower than the international average and lower than Jordan, but higher than Tunisia (Figure 3.7). However, its per capita income is also lower than that of many area countries, and this may account for the results to some extent.

**OBJECTIVE: INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY ENHANCEMENT (SUBSTANTIAL FOR BEIP AND NEGLIGIBLE FOR EEP)**

3.18 BEIP aimed at enhancing MOE institutional capacity for policy analysis, management and educational planning. A council was established that decided the most appropriate actions to take, and a PIU was established with the expectation that the Ministry of Education would take over its functions at the end of the project. However, performance indicators did not focus on various aspects of improved management. They mainly focused on inputs, such as training and provision of computer equipment and software. These activities were carried out satisfactorily (Annex B Table B-1). School mapping helped select sites for new construction. A unified management information system (MIS) containing all major educational measures was created and is fully automated at the central, governorate, and district levels. It is also updated frequently and data are available on CDs as well as online. Personnel data are also available and can be easily retrieved for personnel decisions. As a result, enrollment data are often transferred electronically between schools and district offices as well as to central databases. These functions have been made possible by telephone lines financed through the project, which ensured that directorates had dedicated computer lines. The management information system has been sustainable, but it is unclear whether these data have helped improve sectoral policies (see section on monitoring and evaluation).

3.19 The EEP continued to strengthen the Ministry's management information system, and as a result, the country was able to participate in TIMSS (Figure 3.7). About 897 senior civil servants received training, and about 600 of them went abroad. The beneficiaries gave high marks to the training provisions.<sup>25</sup> However, project documents suggest that training was a means to important policy changes through important decisions based on the data produced by the system. Institutional development was to result in increased autonomy and to transfer strategic management responsibilities to the Ministry of Education. Despite the inputs, however, these changes were not made. The PIU continues to be the implementing agency of most Bank projects and acts as a go-between the Ministry and the Bank on one side, and the agencies that receive funds on the other.<sup>26</sup> Structural limitations continue to affect MOE capacity to respond with flexibility and innovation. Overall, the management and planning capacity of the Ministry of Education has not improved.

**OBJECTIVE: CONDUCTING POLICY STUDIES (MODEST FOR BEIP)**

3.20 The fourth objective of the BEIP was to conduct two policy-oriented studies. The project supported eight policy-oriented studies and the development of a comprehensive strategic framework for basic education which was the basis for the follow-on project Education Enhancement Program. However, the effects of the studies that were conducted are unknown. Some were written by consultants only in English, and therefore may not have been dealt with at depth by the MOE. There have been few dissemination activities of study findings.

3.21 Along with the studies financed by the assessed projects, donors financed a large number of studies on various aspects of the Egyptian educational system. (See references.) However, dissemination inside Egypt has remained very limited. Some of these studies exist only in the English version. This is an indication that at least some were undertaken to satisfy donor requirements rather than to learn from them.

3.22 Partly as a result of limited dissemination, there has been little or no progress in issues raised by the studies: eliminating the technical secondary schools that track the lower-scoring students and teach limited skills, targeting the policy of universally free textbooks to reach only the poor, or revising the curricular system that leads to high-stakes examinations. Dissemination could have helped build a broader consensus for reforms by objectively informing the public about the current educational system and the available options. (An encouraging start was made through a conference in May 2008.)

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<sup>25</sup> A large-scale strategic plan developed in 2006/07 with UNESCO/IIEP support suggests that the Ministry has the capacity to plan, but not necessarily the political will to implement plans.

<sup>26</sup> The Borrower (Annex D) has clarified that the Bank has dealt directly in many instances with agencies dependent on the Ministry of Education as well as with training programs.

## 4. Ratings

### PROJECT OUTCOMES

4.1 The human resource development strategy for Egypt was relevant to the country's economic needs. It aimed to improve access and quality of education particularly in the poorer governorates of Upper Egypt and help girls benefit from educational opportunities. Project objectives were substantially relevant in the 1990s and remained relevant in 2007. Both projects supported the priorities set by the government's Strategic Plan and fifteen-year program for the education sector. They also responded to one of the key themes in the 1994 Egypt Country Assistance Strategy (No. P-6263- EGT) regarding the development of human capital to foster economic growth. The government's plan constituted a fifteen-year program to which the project was to contribute during the first phase of five years.

4.2 The projects met or exceeded numerical targets in the implementation of most activities. For BEIP efficacy is rated modest. The project focused on hardware and inputs and had limited policy content. Inputs are certainly necessary, but the mission did not find sufficient evidence to confirm improved teaching quality or improved management capacity on the basis of inputs. Also, there was no clear evidence regarding advancements in curricular design that this project aimed to achieve. For EEP, efficacy is also rated modest. Learning outcomes were ambiguous, and the extent to which teachers were indeed trained in relevant material proved hard to establish. Furthermore, MOE did not manage the sector better as a result of the investments.<sup>27</sup>

4.3 BEIP executed activities with modest efficiency. Efforts were made to reduce building costs, and a great deal of training was conducted relatively inexpensively through distance education. However, no documented evidence was collected regarding the extent to which teachers learned the material and improved their ability to transmit it to students efficiently. Overall, the construction activities were successfully carried out and had an impact on enrollments, but the instructionally oriented activities were rather poorly defined and unmeasured in part; thus it is unclear whether the instructional time was used well and whether inputs were delivered efficiently to help improve learning outcomes.

4.4 The efficiency of EEP is also rated modest. An expenditure review has raised questions, because unit costs expected to be under control through this project have not fallen over the last decade, and the ratio of administrative staff to teachers continues to remain high. Despite adequate space in many schools that now have one shift, classes are large and teachers who could teach more hours do not. Despite efforts to reduce costs through this project, textbooks in Egypt are more expensive than in other countries. EEP and donors such as USAID and KfW have made efforts to strengthen maintenance guidelines; but school maintenance is underfinanced, and there are conflicting data regarding the average cost of school construction. The expenditure review found that

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<sup>27</sup> The Implementation Completion Report of EEP discusses extensively the institutional issues (World Bank 2007a).

costs remained high relative to other countries because construction methods are inefficient, whereas the government claims that a needs-based strategy has reduced unit costs relative to the past.<sup>28</sup>

4.5 Overall, outcome is rated *moderately satisfactory* for both projects.

#### **RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME**

4.6 Overall, risk to development outcome for both projects is rated *modest*. The government has strong commitment, donor funds continue to flow, and the existing programs are likely to continue. It is possible that many one-shift schools will revert to two shifts as the population increases, but under conditions of student security and electric lights, students may be able to complete a full second shift in Egypt as it happens elsewhere. However, teacher salaries are low by international standards, and some teachers may spend significant time providing private tuition rather than teaching all students.

#### **BANK PERFORMANCE**

4.7 Bank performance is rated *satisfactory* for BEIP. Quality at entry was satisfactory. The Bank's Quality Assurance Group evaluated project supervision in year 2000 and found it also to be satisfactory. However, the initial project objectives were complex and unclear (Table 2.1), and no efforts were made to express them correctly in the loan agreement. Furthermore, the Bank did not extensively discuss or question the need for single-shift schools throughout the country or demand evidence that these buildings would help improve learning outcomes. Arguably building single-shift schools may not constitute the best use of IDA funds, particularly since Egypt is now a middle-income country.

4.8 Bank performance for EEP is rated *moderately satisfactory*. Quality at entry was unsatisfactory. Project risks were underestimated at appraisal particularly with regards to systemic efficiency. The Bank appraised a complex and unusually large project for the education sector that had unrealistic deadlines and few real assurances about the viability of the expected policies. Efforts were made to improve its performance during implementation. During supervision, the Bank's task team worked in close cooperation with the European Union and attempted to deal with the many operational issues that arose. Mission findings were well-documented and relayed to the government, but there was limited follow-up on complex policy issues. The Quality Assurance Group reviewed supervision effectiveness twice, and it rated it initially satisfactory and subsequently 'moderately satisfactory'. European Union's staff interviewed by the mission were of the opinion that the collaboration facilitated the fulfilment of project objectives and that the two institutions had complementary strengths.

4.9 The opinion of borrower staff about Bank performance has been positive. Bank staff had a consultative stance and did not pressure hard on issues that the government

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<sup>28</sup> World Bank 2005a (Public Expenditure Review).

was unable or unwilling to deal with. The willingness to be consultative, however, may result in limited outcomes when perhaps a more proactive attitude might help. The sector work that the Bank produced was of excellent quality but the Bank did not focus on dissemination and public debate on burning issues, like the extensive private tuition needs. Project documents also suggest that staff (generalists and education specialists) lacked up-to-date knowledge about quality-oriented activities: curricula, teacher training content, or the contents of questionnaires used for evaluation studies. Language limitations were to some extent responsible, and this problem resulted in very limited-first hand knowledge of the details that determine learning outcomes.

## **BORROWER PERFORMANCE**

4.10 The borrower is committed to education (on which it spent 5.9 percent of GDP and 19 percent of total public spending in 2002/03). The Egyptian government has been energetically spending the large amounts that the various donors have made available for various activities. Construction and hardware acquisition have received the most attention particularly during BEIP. Until the mid-term review of this project, the government focused on school construction, and the other components did not progress at the same speed. During EEP in particular, the government also showed considerable willingness to adopt instructional methods on a pilot basis, such as an effective schools model, “active learning”, critical thinking measurements, leadership training, and the complex longitudinal study of learning outcomes.

4.11 During the implementation period of the two projects, the government showed limited willingness to adopt policy changes stated in the appraisal documents that would save money, improve decision-making changes at the central and local levels, or give greater latitude to local initiatives. The paltry policy outcomes have caused fatigue and disappointment among donors. Staff of donors’ agencies have expressed concern that the government implements activities but does not change policies as a result of donor advice or conditionalities.

4.12 Structural limitations continue to limit the implementation capacity of the Ministry of Education, and the PIU continues to implement projects. Many discussions on this issue have resulted in delays and failure to close the PIU that executes the Bank and European Union projects. (This failure resulted in a rating of the EEP outcomes as moderately satisfactory by the Bank.) The continuation of the PIU has caused some internal problems with MOE staff who perceive that others doing the same job are paid better as well as with agencies in the system (like the National Center for Examinations and Evaluation) that want to manage their share of donor funds on their own. But the PIU also functions as a parallel organization to the Ministry that, according to some donor staff, filters donor messages to the government and citizens. One example is the limited dissemination of the studies, some of which exist only in English.

4.13 As a result of inattentiveness to policy issues, the system is still inequitable for the poor,<sup>29</sup> who may enter school but remain illiterate for years; it is also unsatisfactory for

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<sup>29</sup> In 2002, the poorest population quintile represented 25 percent of all primary school students, but only 14 percent of secondary school students and only 4 percent of higher education students. Also, spending on

the middle class parents, who shape government's decisions. Discussions of the Country Assistance Evaluation missions with government officials outside the sector suggest that middle-class parents see limited benefits from Bank-financed projects. Since the Egyptian educational system is sophisticated, the value-added of Bank projects would be in policy interventions that would lighten the financial load on parents obliged to pay for private tuition for years on end.<sup>30</sup> Only after project completion has the government shown willingness to engage in a broad dialogue on the needed policy changes. For these reasons, Borrower performance is rated *moderately satisfactory* for both projects.<sup>31</sup>

#### MONITORING AND EVALUATION DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION, AND UTILIZATION

4.14 For BEIP, monitoring and evaluation design is rated *modest*. The project was appraised at a time when monitoring indicators were not necessary. The staff appraisal report (SAR) only had performance indicators (targets) for objectives 2 and 3, and an evaluation system was retrofitted. A monitoring study of 64 schools used questionnaires to ask stakeholders about project effects rather than assess them directly.<sup>32</sup> Overall this project could show only a limited evidence of project outcomes.

4.15 Technical capacity has improved through time, and the government became more competent in research design and complex analyses. EEP had extensive monitoring indicators and a longitudinal study aiming at tracking learning outcomes and disentangling the various sources of variance. In addition, the project produced evaluations of components such as the effective schools program.<sup>33</sup>

4.16 Though for both projects teacher training was a large component, none of the projects collected evidence of actual learning or teacher training effects. Instead, the ICRs and other project documents refer to teachers and principals who attended training events as "trained". (Officials interviewed by the IEG mission stated that teachers were supervised and that supervisors wrote reports, but it's unclear how these were used.) There is only evidence that teachers received training. Course content, mastery, and extent of behavioural changes are unknown.

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education is unequally distributed across households, with the poorest population quintile receiving about 15 percent of total spending and the richest population quintile receiving about 24 percent of total spending (World Bank 2002).

<sup>30</sup> Dang and Rogers 2007; World Bank 2002, p. 36

<sup>31</sup> The BEIP ICR had rated borrower performance satisfactory. According to staff interviewed by the IEG mission "moderately satisfactory" would have been more appropriate given the limited policy and monitoring effects, but the rating was not available at that time. The Borrower states that recently several policy changes have gradually been made "such as the teachers' cadre, the teachers' academy and the national quality assurance and accreditation authority as well as the very recent secondary education reform conference which was presided by President Mubarak.." A strategic plan was newly established as an effective planning tool, and a decentralization scheme for local planning activities is being piloted in some governorates. Also, a secondary education reform conference in May 2008 may result in future changes. (see response in Annex D).

<sup>32</sup> El-Sheikh and Kazem. 2004

<sup>33</sup> Kazem and El-Sheikh, 2004, Ragheb 2005, Bakr 2006

## 5. Issues in Sectoral Strategy

### NEED TO ESTABLISH A LINE OF REASONING FOR ATTRIBUTING PROJECT EFFECTS

5.1 The government has implemented many activities aimed at improving the quality of education (including pilots for innovative methods). However, Bank and government staff have failed to establish a clear line of reasoning that would link interventions with outcomes. To improve learning outcomes, the innovations must somehow influence students' information processing and increase the amount of durable learning that they acquire in school. This can be done by making information more 'memorable' and/or by increasing instructional time during class or after-hours.<sup>34</sup>

5.2 It is unclear how the various activities have influenced these variables. For example, the effective schools subproject focused on peripheral changes that could not have easily affected the above variables and did not monitor intervening events such as instructional time use. The ambivalent and fragmented results of the longitudinal study also make it impossible to attribute effects to specific project interventions and then maximize those. Without measurement of intervening variables (e.g. instructional time use) the researchers often arrive at the conclusion that the effects can only be shown after several years (e.g. Ashraf Bakr 2006). Such vague conclusions only serve to perpetuate inefficient or ineffective interventions in the education sector. Greater specificity is needed on showing how various interventions will modify students' memory consolidation processes.

### IMPROVING LEARNING OUTCOMES: ACCELERATING READING FLUENCY AND COMPREHENSION OF STANDARD ARABIC

5.3 As discussed in para. 3.12, reading fluency may be a significant problem among poorer and rural populations of Egypt. This issue has not been documented extensively, so its incidence remains unknown. (A major donor is preparing a reading fluency study.) A more extensive discussion on the research related to this issue appears in Annex A.

## 6. Lessons

6.1 This assessment provides a number of lessons for the education sector:

- Governments may carry out project activities as expected in lending documents but hesitate to implement agreed policies. Donors who finance hardware activities in expectation of policy changes may face difficult decisions. The donor community may use study results and other information to invite wider public debate on necessary policy changes (para. 4.11);

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<sup>34</sup> For a review see Abadzi 2006, chapters 4, 8 and 10.



- In all sectors, a line of reasoning is necessary for linking expected outcomes with activities undertaken during implementation. A clear line of reasoning and attribution of causality is critical in complex projects with multiple components. Efforts must be made to measure intermediate conditions (such as instructional time use or reading fluency in education) in order to test hypotheses and determine which activities contribute the most to development outcomes (para. 4.15);
- During appraisal and implementation, emphasis is often on the “big picture” and on global indicators of development objectives. To achieve the expected effects, however, the Bank should pay closer attention to execution of the details, the “pixels” which constitute the big picture. State-of-the-art sectoral knowledge and local language knowledge are important in monitoring the degree to which basic skills are achieved (para. 4.9 ); and
- Targeted awareness campaigns make it possible to increase female enrollments even in areas that are hard to reach. However, mere enrollments may not be sufficient to help girls’ labor market outcomes. Quality education is necessary to increase educational attainment among the poor and disadvantaged (para. 3.4); and
- Donor coordination is important in the financing of activities that are to benefit the poor. Complementary skills among donor staff can result in improved project performance in ways that can benefit large and complex countries, like Egypt (para. 4.8).

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


## ANNEX A. IMPROVING LEARNING OUTCOMES: ACCELERATING READING FLUENCY AND COMPREHENSION OF STANDARD ARABIC

Research shows that students need a minimum reading speed of 45-60 words per minute in order to understand very simple text; if they read more slowly or make mistakes, by the end of the sentence they forget the beginning. More complex and advanced text requires faster reading speeds, so that students have more time within the limits of their short-term memory to understand the text. Unvoweled Arabic requires fast reading early on because students must maintain a list of alternative pronunciations in their short-term memory in order to make sense of the text.

Students become fluent readers faster if they learn the unambiguous values of individual letters. The brain is set up to recognize simple patterns most easily and to pair them up consistently with specific sounds. This can be easily achieved with voweled Arabic. However, innovative reading methods focus on teaching students entire and unvoweled words (Figure A.1). MOE has a strategy of focusing the book content of the early grades on “communication” rather than efficient decoding that will produce learning outcomes later on. Thus, patterns become large and complex, and students merely learn to recognize entire configurations rather than learn the alphabetic principles and particular sound values.<sup>1</sup> Middle-class students who get help from parents may have no problem, but the poorer and rural populations may lack parental help. Textbooks should explicitly teach letter values, and MOE could track fluency. To accommodate the many students who cannot read fluently for years, textbooks might maintain the vowels in all grades of primary school.

**Figure A 1: Expectation that first graders can decode letters that have not been taught**



Source: MOE textbooks

Spoken Egyptian Arabic differs from written standard Arabic in certain aspects. However, textbooks from grade 1 do not acknowledge differences, and do not explicitly teach students these differences. Thus, first and second graders read vocabulary and grammatical conjugations that may be quite different from the language used at home. This may affect students' ability to acquire reading fluency and gain better understanding of the texts they read.

<sup>1</sup> For a review of reading issues in Arabic and other scripts see Abadzi (2006), Chapter 5.



## ANNEX B. IMPLEMENTATION OF PROJECT COMPONENTS

**Table B 1: Basic Education Improvement Project**

<i>Components/ subcomponents</i>	<i>Activities</i>	<i>Targets to be achieved</i>	<i>Outputs</i>	<i>Outcomes Info obtained during mission</i>
School construction and maintenance	Construction and equipping of schools where none exist	Approximately 130 primary and 110 preparatory schools in 7 target governorates;	Total 159 schools built, number reduced due to an earthquake and increased safety standards; 82% in rural areas	Schools are used, and most accommodate just one shift. Those visited by the IEG mission were found in fair condition.
		Communities to pay 5% of costs and give land	Communities gave land but were less able to pay for actual construction	Schools developed by communities were reportedly functional (none visited by IEG)
		Develop sustainable methodology	Methodology developed; the savings generated made it possible to build 13 more	Sustainable methodology has continued to be used
	Establishment of a maintenance program for schools	Series of workshops Train 1000 maintenance specialists 200 trainers	Targets exceeded; 287 maintenance staff, 805 newly appointed engineers, 493 technicians, 2473 specialist engineers 2523 headmasters 4918 maintenance staff	School improvement fund was given to 40 schools for maintenance. Some schools reported that inspections of the physical plant are not regular, but maintenance is available when needed
	Equipment and technical assistance for planning and supervising construction work	targets not specified	Materials testing laboratory Mobile soil-testing truck Computers, other equipment	Reportedly operational
In-service teacher training	4 units in in-service training directorate Design, production, evaluation, distance education	70 trainers 3800 supervisors 120,000 teachers of math and science (gr. 4-8), English (gr. 6-8)	Trainee numbers attained, but learning outcomes were unknown	Impact unknown
		New construction at Mashiat al Bakri; Regional center in Qena, upgrade 6 other centers Equipment-supplies	Buildings rehabilitated in Fayoum, Garbeya, Qena, Qena videoconference building for 300 trainees Technological equipment for Mashiat al Bahri	The equipment and installations are used extensively

<b>Components/ subcomponents</b>	<b>Activities</b>	<b>Targets to be achieved</b>	<b>Outputs</b>	<b>Outcomes Info obtained during mission</b>
		TA (80 staff months) Fellowships (96 staff months)	126,707 teachers received training, i.e. 22% of all basic education teachers. 80-90% of teacher training target met	92% reported satisfaction with training, while 88% believe that it should be further improved. A sample of students surveyed believed that teachers' performance had improved. But teachers were not tested for acquired knowledge.
Institutional development in management, information, and planning in MOE	A training program to strengthen planning, management and policy analysis (continued USAID work)	TA (64 months) Training (unspecified nos.) Short-term training for central and local staff Medium-term training abroad	About 1800 staff were trained in management and planning Videoconferencing network reaches 58 locations 10,000 phone lines to schools for data transfer	MOE data now updated frequently rather than once a year
	Space for facilities and hardware		101 computers and peripherals to MOE 10,000 telephone lines to schools and directorates	Computers received and operational for management information system
Policy-oriented studies	Teacher salaries and preparation Resource allocation	2 studies	8 studies	The extent to which most studies were used is unknown Strategic framework study was basis for follow-on project

Source: Project documents and information obtained during the PPAR mission



Table B 2: Education Enhancement Program Project

<i>Components/ subcomponents</i>	<i>Activities</i>	<i>Targets to be achieved</i>	<i>Outputs</i>	<i>Outcomes Info obtained during mission</i>
Improving access in basic education	Governorates to choose from menu of school construction sites based on community surveys	No specific school construction targets were set	404 schools built, 2723 classrooms for an additional 109,000 students, 15% of total net enrollment increase	In most of the schools constructed there is only one shift operating. Schools visited seemed to be well maintained.
	Strategies to increase girls' education	Measures to increase the education of the excluded	About 1000 awareness campaigns School uniforms and stationery Software for blind students	Awareness campaigns probably increased female enrollments, though no data separate their effect
	Studies on how to serve unserved populations	No specific targets	A study were conducted about female students	Effect of the study unclear
Improving student performance in basic education	Reduce wastage	Reduce class size Reduce multiple shifts through school construction	Class size remains not significantly reduced, though number of shifts have been reduced.	Time on task has not been considered
	Improve quality of teaching and learning	Effective use of information technology and distance education	Distance education technology used extensively	Results on teacher performance are unclear
		Institute learning assessments	Baseline assessments in Arabic, math, critical thinking in 11 governorates -2 phases of a longitudinal study 2005-2006 -community participation qualitative evaluation - Impact of middle management training abroad -effective schools project assessment - TIMSS participation	No clear rationale linking various programs (e.g. effective schools) with learning outcomes.
		Improve quality of preservice programs	Wide-ranging reform of 26 faculties of education with respect to curricula, methods, and equipment	Effects unknown

<b>Components/ subcomponents</b>	<b>Activities</b>	<b>Targets to be achieved</b>	<b>Outputs</b>	<b>Outcomes Info obtained during mission</b>
		Introduce quality assurance systems for experienced teachers	Egyptian National Standards 400 schools in 10 governorates	National standards have been introduced, but effects on performance are still unclear
		Improve preservice training quality – regular school inspections	41 training programs for various specialties and modalities	Training centers reported regular inspections but feedback value unclear
Improving system efficiency		Decentralization	Limited actions during implementation Boards of Trustees created and functioning adequately in 296 of 300 schools in 10 governorates; school funds created and managed by the boards	The efforts have produced fund-raising outcomes by the community. Other effects are unknown Decentralization pilot underway after project completion.
	Low teacher pay issues		Teachers in remote areas receive 100 Egyptian pounds additional salary; new health insurance facilitates hospital use	Effects of the salary increase are unknown
	Build capacity of implementing agencies key to this area	Leadership training overseas	No clear numerical targets, total numbers unknown	Program has received very positive reviews from its participants

Source: Project documents and information obtained during the PPAR mission

## ANNEX C. BASIC DATA SHEET

### Basic Education Improvement Project (Cr. 2476-0-EGT)

#### Key Project Data (amounts in US\$ million)

	Appraisal estimate	Actual or current estimate	Actual as % of appraisal estimate
Total project costs	73.8	68.6	93%
Credit amount	55.5	51.2	92%
Cofinancing <sup>1</sup>	18.3	17.5	96%
Cancellation <sup>2</sup>		4.3	

#### Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements

	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	FY02	FY03	FY04
Appraisal estimate (US\$M)	2.0	10.2	23.4	36.2	47.4	53.4	54.2	55.0	55.5		
Actual (US\$M)	0.0	2.5	7.3	22.8	38.5	41	43.8	46.9	47.5	48.8	50.9
Actual as % of appraisal	0.0	24.5	31.1	62.9	81.2	76.8	80.8	85.3	85.6	0.0	0.0

#### Project Dates

	Original	Actual
Initiating memorandum <sup>3</sup>		04/12/1991
Negotiations	02/16/1993	02/16/1993
Board approval	03/25/1993	03/25/1993
Signing	08/13/1993	08/13/1993
Effectiveness	03/18/1994	03/18/1994
Closing date	12/31/2002	12/31/2003

<sup>1</sup> Government's contribution. There is a cofinancing (Institutional Development) in the amount of US\$700,000 mentioned in Table 3 of Annex 2 of the ICR but not specified in Table 4.03, page 28, Financing Plan of the SAR. However, in Para 2.36 and 4.11 of the SAR the grant is mentioned as provided by UNDP to fund a Technical Secretariat in the office of the Minister of Education.

<sup>2</sup> Due to fluctuation between Egyptian Pound and US\$ exchange rate (local currency much stronger at appraisal than at project closing), and fluctuation between SDR and US\$ exchange rate.

<sup>3</sup> Concept Review

**Staff Inputs<sup>4</sup>** (staff weeks)

	<i>FY92</i>	<i>FY93</i>	<i>FY04</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>FY</i>	<i>FY</i>	<i>Total</i>
Identification/Preparation	80						80
Appraisal/Negotiations		73					73
Supervision			192				182
Total							345

**Mission Data**

	<i>Date</i> <i>(month/year)</i>	<i>No. of</i> <i>persons</i>	<i>Staff</i> <i>days</i> <i>in</i> <i>field</i>	<i>Specializations</i> <i>represented</i>	<i>Performance</i> <i>rating</i>	<i>Rating</i> <i>trend</i>	<i>Types of</i> <i>problems</i>
Identification/ Preparation	9/1991	2		TTL/Op. Officer, Educ. Spec			
	1/1992	7		TTL, Sr. Gen. Educ, Mgmt Info Spec, Op. Officer, Inst. Dev. Spec, Teacher Training Spec, Research Assistant			
	5/1992	6		TTL, Mgmt Info. Spec, Sr. Gen. Educ., Inst. Dev. Spec., Architect, Program Assistant.			
Appraisal/Negotiation	10/1992	9		TTL, Sr. Gen. Educ, HD Spec., Mgmt Info. Spec., Architect, Facilities Planner, Engineer, Inst. Dev. Spec., Teacher Training Spec., Research Assistant			
	12/93	3		TTL, Engineer/Architect, Op. Officer			
Supervision	4/1994	6		Project Launch- TTL, Sr. Gen. Educ., Inst. Dev. Spec., Architect/Facilities Planner, Mgmt. Info. Spec., Op. Officer			
	6/1994	3		Res. Msn. Cons. Engineer, Sr. Op. Officer, Op. Officer			
	1/1995	3		Cons. Technology SP., Op. Officer, Engineer Res. Msn.			
	6/1995	3		Sr. Educ., Res. Msn. Proc. Spec., Op. Officer	S		1

<sup>4</sup> For old projects it is difficult to get budgeting data previous to 2000 because they were stored in FACT which has been phased out. Information was not transferred to the legacy system (SAP). Our research shows SW 84.41 from FY00-05 for SPN

<i>Date (month/year)</i>	<i>No. of persons</i>	<i>Staff days in field</i>	<i>Specializations represented</i>	<i>Performance rating</i>	<i>Rating trend</i>	<i>Types of problems</i>
12/1995	4		Sr. Gen. Educ., Sr. Educ. Spec., Op. Officer, Proc. Spec	S	S	
6/1996	2		Op. Officer, Proc. Spec.	S	S	
1/1997	3		Op. Officer, Sr. Gen. Educ., Proc. Spec.	S	S	
4/1997	3		Op. Officer, Impl. Spec., Proc. Spec.	S	S	
12/1997	3		TTL/Sr. Educ. Spec., Op. Officer, Proc. Spec.	S	S	
5/1998	3		TTL, HR Spec, Op. Spec.	S	S	
10/1998	4		Mission Leader, Prog. Officer, Impl. Spec., Architect	S	S	
6/1999	6		Principal Educ, Op. Officer, Mgmt Info. Spec., Proc. Spec, Teacher Training Spec., Classroom Tech. Spec.	S	S	
8/1999	8		Cluster Leader, Op. Officer, Program Assistant, Educ. Mgmt Spec., Architect, Distance Learn. Spec., Project Direct., FMS	S	S	
11/1999	5		TTL/Sr. Educ. Spec, Educ. Mgmt Spec., Architect/Facilities Planner, Proc. Spec., Team Assistant	S	S	
7/2000	1		TTL/Sr. Impl. Spec./PAS	S	S	
1/2001	1		TTL/Sr. Impl. Spec./PAS	S	S	
7/2001	1		TTL/Sr. Impl. Spec./PAS	S	S	
4/2002	2		TTL, Consultant	S	S	
12/2002	3		TTL/Sr. Impl. Spec./PAS, Sr. FMS, Program Assistant	S	S	
12/2003	5		TTL/Sr. Impl. Spec./PAS, Lead Gen. Educ., Sr. FMS, Consultant, Team Assistant	S	S	
Completion	4/2004	4	TTL/Sr. Impl. Spec./PAS, FMS, Consultant, Team Assistant	S	S	

## Education Enhancement Program (Cr. N008-0-EGT)

### Key Project Data (amounts in US\$ million)

	<b>Appraisal estimate</b>	<b>Actual or current estimate</b>	<b>Actual as % of appraisal estimate</b>
Total project costs	835.5	2,350.6	281%
Credit amount	75.0	77.1 <sup>5</sup>	103%
Cofinancing	125.0	123.4	99%
Government Contribution	635.5	2,150.1 <sup>6</sup>	339%
Cancellation		0.5	

### Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements

	<i>FY97</i>	<i>FY98</i>	<i>FY99</i>	<i>FY00</i>	<i>FY01</i>	<i>FY02</i>	<i>FY03</i>	<i>FY04</i>	<i>FY05</i>	<i>FY06</i>	<i>FY07</i>
Appraisal estimate (US\$M)	10.0	20.0	35.0	55.0	65.0	75.0					
Actual (US\$M)	0.0	3.2	5.5	17.6	25.2	31.1	37.0	45.6	54.6	64.4	70.9
Actual as % of appraisal											

### Project Dates

	<i>Original</i>	<i>Actual</i>
Initiating memorandum <sup>7</sup>	1/31/1996	01/31/1996
Negotiations	9/16/1996	9/16/1996
Board approval	12/24/1996	12/24/1996
Signing	5/09/1997	5/09/1997
Effectiveness	7/03/1997	7/03/1997
Closing date	12/31/2002	08/31/2006

<sup>5</sup> Because of the depreciation of the US\$ against the SDR, the amount of the credit in US\$ increased, resulting in a greater than 100 % actual disbursement in US\$ terms.

<sup>6</sup> Initial projection was for a five-year period. Credit closing date being extended to 2006, project lasted over a nine-year period. Thus, Government contribution increased.

<sup>7</sup> Concept Review

**Staff Inputs (staff weeks)**

	<i>FY</i>	<i>FY</i>	<i>FY07</i>	<i>Total</i>
Appraisal/Negotiations				
Supervision			228.2 <sup>8</sup>	228.2
Total			228.2	228.2

**Mission Data**

	<i>Date (month/year)</i>	<i>No. of persons</i>	<i>Staff days in field</i>	<i>Specializations represented</i>	<i>Development Objective Rating</i>	<i>Implementation Progress Rating</i>	<i>Types of problems</i>
Identification/ Preparation							
Appraisal/Negotiation							
Supervision	12/18/1997	3		TTL, Op. Officer, HD Spec.	S	S	
	5/6/1998	4		TTL, HR Spec., Op. Officer, FMS	S	S	
	10/16/1998	4		TTL, ED. Policy & Admin. Spec., Program Officer, Impl. Spec.	S	S	
	7/14/1999	6		Principal Educator, Educ. Spec., Proc. Spec., Research Analyst, Educ. Mgmt Spec., Impl. Spec.	S	U	
	08/30/1999	4		Principal Educ., Op. Officer, FMS, Teacher Training Spec.	S	S	
	12/10/1999	7		Cluster Leader, Educ. Mgmt, Architect, Program Assistant, Op. Officer, FMS, European Union Specialists	S	S	
	6/15/2000	5		Cluster Leader, Sr. Educ. Spec., Consultant, Team Assistant, Op. Officer	S	S	
	11/28/2000	2		Op. Officer, FMS	S	S	
	5/31/2001	3		TTL, Cluster Leader, FMS	S	S	
	2/21/2002	1		TTL	S	S	

<sup>8</sup> Data (Staff Weeks) are available starting from FY2000 when SAP was put in place. Prior to that date FACT was used as a budget monitoring system which is now phased out. Unfortunately data were not transferred to SAP.

<i>Date (month/year)</i>	<i>No. of persons</i>	<i>Staff days in field</i>	<i>Specializations represented</i>	<i>Development Objective Rating</i>	<i>Implementation Progress Rating</i>	<i>Types of problems</i>
11/27/2002	6		TTL, FMS, Logistic Support, Consultant (3)	S	S	
7/12/2003	6		Cluster Leader, TTL, Op. Analyst, Teacher Training Spec (2), Team Assistant	S	S	
3/06/2004	7		Lead Gen. Educ, Monitoring Spec., Standard Spec., Sr. Op. Officer, Sr. FMS, TTL, Educ. Finance Spec.	S	S	
10/14/2004						
<b>Completion</b>						



## ANNEX D. BORROWER'S COMMENTS

The report, in general, provides some good insights in some aspects of the two projects, however, it went beyond reasonable analysis on some of its conclusions. Besides, attempting to evaluate a project like BEIP after more than four years of its closing seems very difficult and would not necessarily lead to reasonable conclusions.

Moreover, the report completely neglected all the recent reforms which were undertaken by GOE and MOE such as the teachers' cadre, the teachers' academy and the national quality assurance and accreditation authority as well as the very recent secondary education reform conference which was presided by President Mubarak. In addition, the report neglected the mention of the newly established strategic plan as an effective planning tool, as well as the piloting of decentralization in some governorates in the local activities to plan.

Our main comments are as follows:

- The rating of BEIP in the ICR for the Borrower's performance was "satisfactory" while under the PPAR was lowered to "moderately satisfactory" with no justification.
- In the Preface page No. vii, the report states that US\$ 4.1 million were cancelled from EEP while the actual amount cancelled was SDR 377,000 (which is equivalent to US\$ 500,000).
- On page ix under "Summary", the report states that the government did not focus on policy changes which, in our opinion, is not accurate as the government has made major changes in 1995 by beginning the reforms in all stages which was not the case before 1995. We believe that cooperation with the World Bank through these projects and also other donors such as USAID and EU led to such results. Reforms moved since that time on all fronts (may be slowly) but led to having now: a strategic plan for the first time for MOE; a cadre for teachers which started in July 2007, an academy for teachers is being established and a national quality assurance and accreditation authority has been established and is currently designing the criteria of accreditation/certification of schools and universities. Also a conference to reform secondary education has been held in May 2008 and its results will be felt in the coming few years. While it was a conference for secondary education, the results will affect the whole education system.
- In the same paragraph the mention of PIUs came along. We would like to clarify that establishing PIUs was the Bank's way of doing business at that time and we abided by the Bank's conditions thinking that they were suitable for Egypt.

- In same paragraph the issue of interaction between the Bank and beneficiaries was raised. The interaction, in our opinion, was at a very good level. The Bank dealt directly in many instances with NCEEE, CCIMD, NCERD and GAEB as well as CDIST for the training programs, the Technology Development Center (TDC) and the EMIS department in the ministry of education and participated in capacity building activities with other donors for these departments and entities.
- Regarding the comment at the end of the page (ix) on teachers low salaries, we have already answered this concern as the new cadre of teachers has started in July 2007. We believe that this cadre if implemented successfully will answer the above-mentioned concern.
- Policy changes do not come over night. It took GOE and MOE some time to actually start the policy reforms as stated above. While the projects did not lead directly to such reforms, they definitely played an important role as change agents.
- On the decentralization front, we would like to clarify that most of the serious actions needed (as in fiscal and administrative decentralization) are the responsibility of the government as a whole and not MOE. There is an experiment for decentralization in education been attempted.
- On page 1 under “back ground”, the report states that 60% of secondary education enrollment is in the technical branch. We want to clarify that the ratio was 70% before SEEP which means that there has been an improvement of 10% and it is still improving trying to reach 50% during the current five-year plan. Also, MOE is trying to get the two streams of secondary education closer through having a joint trunk for both streams in grade 10 (first secondary).
- Paragraph 1.4 (page 2): the PER reports of the Bank were not only well received but actually used in the areas of textbooks and construction. In the area of textbooks, many of MOE books were revised, reformulated and reprinted in accordance with the recommendations of the PER. Also many books were dropped from the list and only few numbers were printed for every school and not for every student as was the case. In the school construction area, some procedures changed as a result and others were enforced. Also PPP was initiated during the same year as a result of the PER.
- Table 1.1 on page 3: Please change the cancelled amount of EEP from 4.1 to 0.5 US Dollars as explained earlier.
- Paragraph 2.5, page 5, the project targeted 15 governorates and not 11. The missing governorates are: Sohag, Kafr El Sheikh, Dakahliya and Ismailiya. While EU worked mainly in the 15 governorates and financed the 15 GPPMUs, the Bank worked in all governorates (26 plus Luxor City).

- Paragraph 3.2, page 6: The number of schools financed by EEP was 404 (at 30%). We do not understand where the figure 15% of the country's needs came from. EEP was considered as a program with government plus the projects of EU and WB. Therefore, all schools built during this period are considered contribution of EEP. Also, this explains why the government contribution exceeded the original amounts.
- Paragraph 3.5, page 6: There was no adequate maintenance before GAEN and there was no plan for it. However, after GAEB's establishment, a school maintenance plan was made and financed by GOE and also donors especially USAID and KFW. GAEB also prepared maintenance guides and BEIP provided extensive training to GAEB engineers and school headmasters and teachers.
- Paragraph 3.9, page 9: the report mentions that there were no clear examples for improvement in the faculties of education. May be these improvements are not felt yet but it is worth noting that most of the 26 FOEs have joined the reform efforts and for the first time, course descriptions for subjects have been prepared.
- Paragraph 3.17, page 14: please note that while Jordan scored more than Egypt in both science and math, Egypt scored higher than Lebanon and Tunisia in science and is equal to Tunisia in math.
- Paragraph 3.19, page 15: Please correct the number of middle management staff who received training to be 897 of which 600 travelled abroad.
- Paragraph 3.19, page 15: Please note that MOE is implementing ECEEP without a PIU since 2005. We would like also to clarify that the capacity of MOE has improved substantially as it has managed to prepare its first strategic plan which is currently under implementation.
- Paragraph 3.22, page: As explained earlier, the secondary education reform conference was held in May 2008 and actually discussed such concerns (as they review all related issues) such as high-stakes exams and revising the curriculum and examination systems which suggests that the policy studies were of some use.
- Footnote No. 26 on page 16: We could not verify that PPAR has rated BEIP as "satisfactory" in its outcome as illustrated in the footnote. In page v it was rated "moderately satisfactory". Again in paragraph 4.3 the report talks again about modest efficiency. Please clarify.
- Paragraph 4.4, page 17: We believe that the cost of school construction in Egypt is less than the neighboring countries such as Yemen, Lebanon and Jordan.

- Paragraph 4.11, page 18: Please refer to our previous comment on policy changes which were adopted recently by MOE such as the teachers' cadre, the teachers' academy and the national quality assurance and accreditation authority, etc.
- Paragraph 4.13, page 19: the report mentions one more time that the government was not willing to engage in a broad dialogue on policy changes. We have already clarified that this statement is not accurate.