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Decentralization and Violent Conflicts: The Case of North Maluku, Indonesia

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Indonesia is in transition. One is a transition from autocracy to democracy. The other is a drastic political and administrative decentralization. These changes are currently increasing Indonesia's vulnerability to violence. The key question, therefore, is how to mitigate violent conflicts while ensuring a successful transition.

The World Bank's Support for the Social and Economic Revitalization Project (SERP) is an important initiative to mitigate violent conflicts at the community level. However, it has yet to investigate the interface of decentralization and violence. In order to strengthen SERP's objective, this study explores (i) the necessary conditions to successfully implement decentralization while preventing further violence in conflict-ridden areas, and (ii) how SERP can incorporate measures to foster those conditions.

The recommendations for SERP are in order of priority within each sector, guided by the following criteria:
- **Impact maximization:** Concentrate on areas where the impact of its intervention is the greatest. Build on its comparative advantages.
- **Duration of impact:** Invest in activities with long-standing impact. For example, invest in revitalizing inter-religious self-groups rather than sports competitions.
- **Cost-effectiveness:** Prioritize activities that have greater impact relative to investment.

The recommendations for the Government of Indonesia are prioritized based on their relevance and impact on SERP activities.

Recommendations for SERP and the Government of Indonesia

	SERP	Government of Indonesia
Justice & Security	• Create alternative avenues of redress • Hold law enforcement institutions accountable • Train paralegals & provide legal aid	• Improve performance with sticks & carrots • Improve quality of security personnel • Improve security forces' budget to curb rent-seeking & corruption
Governance & Participation	• Empower the community, especially the marginalized • Support BPD's political leverage • Engage & strengthen local governments • Equip local authorities with leadership skills	• Increase accountability of legislators & civil servants. • Enhance inter-governmental coordination • Introduce bottom-up socialization • Establish transparent standards & recruitment procedures • Promote collaboration between actors
Inter-Religious Reconciliation	• Foster inter-religious reconciliation through informal interactions • Invest in women and youths' inter-religious networks	
Institutional & Legal Framework of Decentralization		• Revise Law 22 to clarify functional assignments of government levels • Balance district government's fiscal capacity & consolidate funding channels • Establish clear criteria for creating regions

INTRODUCTION

PROBLEM STATEMENT

Indonesia is at a juncture of social, economic and political transformation. Years of authoritarian government, military repression, endemic corruption, and economic uncertainty have left the country fragile, bitterly divided and uncertain of its future. Following the fall of the Soeharto regime in 1998, the political situation remains volatile.

Under much uncertainty, Indonesia is going through a dual transition. One is the transition from autocracy to democracy. The other is a drastic political and administrative decentralization. The society is experiencing change which promises long term benefits. However, these changes are currently increasing the vulnerability to violence. While conflicts are necessary and inevitable for societal change, violent conflicts hinder sustainable development, destroy societal institutions, and undermine human security. Counteracting the negative impacts of this transition is thus a key policy issue.

The World Bank assists Indonesia's transition through governance reform and conflict mitigation.[1] Support for the Social and Economic Revitalization project (SERP) is a case in point. It aims to break the cycle of violence and support transition to longer-term development in major conflict areas by (i) improving relations between different groups and communities; (ii) institutionalizing relationships between the community and formal and informal institutions that can manage conflicts; and (iii) addressing the socioeconomic factors that provide the contexts in which conflicts can erupt.[2]

While SERP recognizes decentralization as a crucial impetus, it has yet to investigate how decentralization impacts community dynamics. Since decentralization realigns power and resources, redefines values and identities, and potentially induces more violence, its consideration is crucial for improving SERP's assistance strategy.

OBJECTIVES

To strengthen SERP's efforts, this study explores what conditions need to be met for implementing decentralization while preventing further violence in conflict-ridden areas. The study does not explore causality between decentralization and violence. Instead, it examines what factors are needed both for decentralization to take root and for violence to subside.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Our main research question is**: *what are the necessary conditions to successfully implement decentralization while preventing further violence in conflict-ridden areas?***

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[1] The World Bank (2003). "Country Assistance Strategy for Indonesia 2003-2007".
[2] The World Bank (2004). "Support for Social and Economic Revitalization Project Appraisal Document".

In order to answer this question, we ask the following subset of questions:
- What are the opportunities and threats of decentralization measures?
- What is the progress of decentralization at the district level?
  - o Does the progress differ between high and low violence districts?
  - o What contributes to the differences in decentralization progress?
  - o Has this process created or exacerbated conflicts? Or has it mitigated existing conflicts?
  - o Will these conflicts impact tensions at the community level? If so, how?
- What is the progress of decentralization at the village level?
  - o Does the progress differ between the high and the low violence villages?
  - o What contributes to the differences in decentralization progress?
  - o Which factors affect the different levels of violence?
  - o Has this process created or exacerbated conflicts? Or has it mitigated existing conflicts?

METHODOLOGY

The research focuses on North Maluku, one of SERP's target sites, where violent conflict erupted in 1999/ 2000. North Maluku was chosen as our target site because it is representative of the complex nature of conflicts in Indonesia. The conflict in North Maluku includes disputes over ethnicity, religion, natural resources, economic and political power struggle, and frictions between internally displaced persons (IDPs) and hosting communities.

The research consists of two steps: (i) secondary literature review on theories of decentralization and violent conflicts and (ii) field research in four villages consisting of in-depth interviews with government officials, local NGOs, local media, international donors, and different groups of villagers. We use the findings from the field research to verify the general theories and tailor our policy recommendations to the local context.

In conducting field research, we constructed a comparative analysis framework between high and low violence areas. The following criteria and process guided the selection of sites:

1) **Levels of violence**
   North Maluku is a high violence province. As Figure 1 illustrates, we chose one high and one low violence district for comparison. In each district, we chose two villages, one considered as relatively low and another as relatively high violence village.[3] This resulted in four villages, two in the high violence district and two in the low violence district respectively.

Figure 1: Selection of Village Sites

[3] In differentiating high versus low violence, we distinguish high violence as resulting in physical destruction, injuries, or deaths. Low violence, on the other hand, would involve minimal destruction of property, minimal injuries and no deaths.

2) **Types of existing disputes & dispute resolution mechanisms**
    In each of the four villages, we identify the types of existing disputes. Among those, we pick one case per village and conduct an in-depth study on the actors involved, outcomes (violent or non-violent), factors that differentiated the outcomes and the impact of the disputes. We explore the causes of variation in success and factors that contributed to the success or failure in managing disputes by examining:
    - Demographic characteristics (Do ethnic and religious mix matter?)
    - Economic factors (Do relatively affluent areas perform better?)
    - Social factors (Does the educational level of villagers make a difference?)
    - Geographical factors (Does geographical location matter?)
    - Institutional factors (How do formal and informal institutions impact disputes?)
    - Legacy of conflict (Do inter-religious reconciliation and IDPs have any impact?)
    - Levels and types of existing conflicts (Do they vary depending on levels of violence?)

3) **Relationship between disputes & decentralization**
    We then investigate whether the decentralization progress varies between high and low violence areas at both district and village levels, and if so which of the above factors account for the differences in progress. Concurrently, we study whether any conflicts have been aggravated/reconfigured/emerged or mitigated in the process of decentralization.

CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

- **Applicability:** Due to time and resource constraints, the study was limited to four villages. Since the selection of villages impacted the findings, it is difficult to apply our findings to other conflict-ridden areas within the region or the country. Nevertheless, the study enables us to see how violence contributes to the challenges of the decentralization process.

- **Scope:** The ultimate question is whether the decentralization process exacerbates violence or whether it mitigates it. Given our constraints, we could not draw a causal link between decentralization and violence. Therefore, our focus is not on making normative judgments about causality, but rather on identifying conditions for successful decentralization.

- **Language and Cultural barriers**: Since neither member of the research team speaks Indonesian, most interviews in the villages and at the district level were conducted through an interpreter. Therefore, the compiled responses may be biased by the interpreter's and the team's language abilities and cultural lens.

- **Association Bias:** The research team interviewed only those respondents that the team had identified and approached. On average, the respondents were people that provided a range of perspectives and were willing to answer the questions. As a consequence, the team did not interview those who were too busy or unwilling to meet, or those considered less relevant to the study. Therefore, the compiled answers may not be representative of certain parts of the populace.

I. DECENTRALIZATION POLICY IN INDONESIA

THEORIES OF DECENTRALIZATION & CONFLICT

More than 60 governments have undertaken some kind of decentralization reforms since the 1980s. Some of these attempts have succeeded while others have failed. Defined as the transfer of power from higher to lower levels in the political system, decentralization is often considered as a prerequisite for democracy.[4] Led by Tieubout, those in favor of decentralization argue that devolution of power leads to better service delivery tailored to the local populations[5] Toqueville points out the "civic dimension" of decentralization, which "increases the opportunities for citizens to take interest in public affairs" and "makes them get accustomed to using freedom." According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), decentralization is "the logical application of the core characteristics of good governance at the sub-national and local levels"[6]

Criticizing decentralization, Tanzi points out that imperfect local delivery of public services may undermine any potential benefits[7] According to Kalin, to successfully implement decentralization, local governments need a number of favorable conditions, including a certain level of security, sufficient resources and autonomy, accountable and transparent actions, and fair relationships with higher authorities.[8] If these conditions are not in place, decentralization has the potential to exacerbate existing tensions or create new tensions in the society. The danger is that effective service delivery can be threatened, that there can be "elite capture" risking good governance, and that stabilization might be jeopardized through inter-regional disparity and exacerbation of ethnic or religious divisions. Thus, Basta argues that decentralization may not be a prerequisite for good governance for states that are undergoing transition and are grappling with the simultaneity of structural reforms and the problem of efficient government policy. Basta argues that in such cases it is important to build flexibility into the system rather than "grand designs" that may not provide viable structures in the long term[9]

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

For a country as diverse as Indonesia, decentralization makes sense. Indonesia's diversity in geography, culture, natural and human resource endowment suggests the need for a mechanism to hold the society together while allowing diversity. Soeharto's New Order regime clearly did not do a good job at this. It built up a strongly centralized government that monopolized the country's resources and used extensive military force to impose order and national unity. Although the centralized government ensured a certain minimum level of welfare, it failed to address the large variety in the economic, political and social needs across the country.

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[4] Manor 1999; Blair 2000; Fung and Wright 2001.

[5] Tiebout, Charles (1956). "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 64, pp. 416-24.

[6] UNDP Decentralized Governance Programme, 1999. "Monograph on Decentralization," UNDP, New York.

[7] Tanzi, Vito (1996). "Fiscal Federalism and Efficiency: A Review of Some Efficiency and Macroeconomic Aspects," in M. Bruno and B. Pleskovic, eds., *Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1995*. World Bank, Washington, D.C.

[8] Kalin, Walter. "Decentralization – Why and How?"

[9] Basta,Lidija R.. "Decentralization – Key Issues, Major Trends, and Future Developments."

When Soeharto was ousted in May 1998, his successor President Habibie was facing an economic crisis, reemerged armed conflicts, and increased demands for democracy and accountable government. Strong public demands for democracy and accountability made it almost impossible to keep a centralized government system. Moreover, the central government's economic and administrative constraints and Habibie's political interests to obtain regional votes for his political party's advancement accelerated the move towards decentralization. As a result, drastic decentralization was launched on January 1, 2001.

MAIN FEATURES

The main goals of decentralization in Indonesia are five-fold: (i) to increase accountability of the local governments by bringing them closer to their constituents; (ii) to promote better service delivery that ensures greater equity; (iii) to empower the community and local governments through devolution of resources; (iv) to enhance community participation; and (v) to encourage and strengthen national integration by returning dignity and granting greater autonomy to the regions.

The new policy of decentralization and regional autonomy is outlined in two key laws: One is Law No.22/1999 – the Regional Governance Law – that focuses on enhanced administrative and political decentralization. The other is Law No.25/1999 – the Fiscal Balance Law – that stipulates devolution of expenditure responsibilities from the center to the regions. Based on these two laws, the Indonesian government aims to change "the *balance* between top-down supply and bottom-up demand"[10] in the following five key elements:

1. Authority
Law No.22 devolves a big proportion of decision-making power and functions of the central government to districts and municipalities (hereafter referred to as "local governments"). This enables the local governments to be more responsive to people's needs, as decisions are made closer to the people. The central government now only retains control over: defense and security, justice, international relations, monetary and fiscal policies and religion[11] Other authorities were devolved to districts and municipalities while the provincial government's role was reduced considerably.[12] Provincial government merely coordinates among district governments and performs functions that affect more than one local government.[13]

2. Accountability
Law No.22 has strengthened the separation of power to hold the government more accountable at both local and village levels. Under this law, heads of local government would be elected by local parliament, whose members in turn are directly elected by the populace (as opposed to proportionate election before the introduction of the law). At the village level, the law introduced

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[10] Gillespie, Stuart (2003) "Scaling Up Community Driven Development: A Synthesis of Experience". International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, Washington D.C.

[11] International Crisis Group (2003) *"Indonesia: Managing Decentralisation and Conflict in South Sulawesi"*, ICG Asia Report No.60, Jakarta/Brussels.

[12] Local governments perform all functions except those assigned to the center and the province. They include health, education, public works, environment, communications, agriculture, industry and trade, capital investment, land, cooperatives, and manpower and infrastructure services. Law No. 22/1999 Chapter IV Article 11(1) and (2).

[13] This was Jakarta's strategy to prevent provincial governments from becoming too powerful to seek provincial disintegration, especially in areas like Aceh and Papua, where independence movements are already posing a challenge to the central government.

village councils (BPD) as the replacement for the former village assembly (LMD). The BPD members are elected by the villagers and they have the power to draft village legislation, approve the budget, monitor village government and propose to the district head the dismissal of the village head. Whereby the village chief and the village government used to be accountable only to the higher government, Law No.22 holds the village government accountable to the BPD and thereby indirectly to the village population.

3. Resource Distribution

Law No.22 and No.25 grant greater discretion over human and financial resources to the local government. The aim is to strengthen their operational capacity, improve service quality and address some economic grievances, especially of regions with rich natural resources.[14] Law No.25 recognizes the local governments' ability to generate their own revenues and allows them to retain a greater share of revenues generated from natural resources, namely oil, gas and forestry, as well as personal income tax.[15] It also allows villages to establish enterprises to generate revenues. Law No. 22 stipulates that local governments can recruit and dismiss civil servants according to their needs and budget.

4. Service Delivery

The two laws aim to improve the quality and efficiency of service delivery by devolving functions and resources to lower governments. While one provincial government had to cover all the districts before decentralization, now district governments only need to cover sub-districts, which enables faster and more responsive service delivery. Examples of subtle yet important improvements are that people no longer have to travel far to acquire certificates or ID cards, and civil servants' salaries are paid more speedily. Employment of teachers or health workers is gradually going to be implemented at the local level, too.

5. Participation

Law No.22 has provided greater opportunities to participate in governance, especially at the village level. BPD and LPM members are not appointed by the village head but directly elected by the villagers. This allows people's voices to be heard. The law also allows political democratization, in the form of freedom of speech and association. Before the introduction, no village groups aside from those allowed by the government could be formed. After decentralization, however, villagers are free to form any civil society organizations they see fit.[16]

While decentralization provides *de jure* promising reform, the *de facto* outcomes are far from perfect. The decentralization process was implemented rather hastily without sufficient input from lower levels of government and community. There are numerous imperfections that need to be addressed. This has created confusion on the ground, at times fueling existing tensions.

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[14] Critics point out that this change devolves the government's financial burden.

[15] Ahmad, Ehtisham and Hofman, Bert (2000) "Indonesia: Decentralization – Opportunities and Risks", IMF and World Bank Resident Mission Report, Washington D.C.

[16] Antlov, Hans (2001). "Village Governance and Local Politics in Indonesia". Paper presented at the session on *Decentralization and Democratization in Southeast Asia.* SOAS, London.

INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Before decentralization, both authority and budget flowed from top to bottom. After decentralization, however, provincial government's role and resources have been minimized, drastically increasing local government's discretion.

Figure 2: Institutional Arrangement of Decentralization

OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS

Two years into the process, decentralization has gotten off to a much better start than many had predicted. According to the World Bank economists Hofman and Kaiser, "surprisingly, little went wrong in the logistics of this radical, hastily prepared move born amidst the political turmoil in the aftermath of the New Order Government."

Decentralization, if done right, is expected to bring about positive changes by (i) improving administrative efficiency and accountability, (ii) enhancing local participation in governance, thus (iii) contributing to poverty reduction, and (iv) addressing grievances by devolving political and economic authority to the people, which (v) could stabilize the country and strengthen national unity.

Conversely, the negative impacts include: (i) creation or exacerbation of conflicts through devolution of political and economic resources, (ii) aggravation of inter-regional disparity, (iii) exacerbation of division along ethnic or religious lines through devolution of authority to redraw territorial boundaries, and (iv) elite capture over greater economic and political resources.

A number of challenges remain, with the conflict prone areas like North Maluku experiencing distinct issues from the rest of the country. Whether decentralization will benefit Indonesia or not depends on how the country handles this transition process.

II.   THE CASE OF NORTH MALUKU

HISTORY OF CONFLICT

Violence in North Maluku erupted in August 1999. The conflict, which resulted in over 2,000 deaths and displacement of over one fourth of the entire province, is known as a "religious" conflict between Muslims and Christians. However, such simplification is misleading. It started as a local territorial dispute between indigenous Kaonese and Makianese transmigrants. Muslim Makianese, natives of a small volcanic island situated off the west coast of Halmahera, were resettled by the government to a predominantly Christian Kao District, North Halmahera, in 1975 due to the fear of a volcano eruption. Competition for territorial control intensified in the early 1990s after a gold mine was discovered in Malifut, the new resettlement area for Makianese.[17] Cultural differences, forced transfer of traditional Kao land to the Makianese, and more employment opportunities granted to Makianese at the gold mine caused sporadic and small-scale clashes.[18]

Violence flared up when the provincial government decided to establish sub-district Malifut. For Kao people, it meant a permanent alienation of their land and gold mine revenues to the "outsiders". On the day of inauguration of the sub-district, Kaonese attacked the Makianese. The dynamics were altered completely as external actors with competing interests got involved. These included centuries-long political rivalry between the Sultans of Ternate and Tidore, political tensions related to the election of the new governor, and political rivalry between Muslims and Christians in Jakarta. The external actors framed the conflict with religious rhetoric. Involvement of Muslim militia, the *Laskar Jihad*, escalated the conflict province-wide. Violence in North Maluku intensified to such a degree that the Wahid government had to declare a state of civil emergency on June 27, 2000.[19]

CURRENT SITUATION

No major violence has erupted in North Maluku in the four years after the ceasefire. The Indonesian government lifted the civil emergency status in May 2003. Security responsibilities have been handed over from the military to the police. The government intends to complete the repatriation of as many as over 71,000 IDPs by the end of 2004.[20] At first glance, the situation in North Maluku seems to be returning to "normalcy." However, the conflict has polarized people along religious lines. The deep-seated mistrust between the Muslims and the Christians has created a vulnerable situation.

The drastic decentralization process has a potential to destabilize the still fragile situation. Decentralization entails changes such as realignments of power and resources. And this process inevitably causes conflicts. While conflict is not a negative phenomenon in itself, of concern is whether this conflict leads to further violence in North Maluku. It is thus critical to manage the decentralization process in a way that prevents further violence.

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[17] Smith Alhadar. 2000. "The Forgotten War in North Maluku" *Inside Indonesia* No.63 Jul – Sep 2000.

[18] Interview with local NGO in Ternate, July 2003

[19] For more details, see International Crisis Group. 2000. "Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku" *ICG Asia Report* No.10, Jakarta/Brussels.

[20] Ministry of Social Welfare North Maluku province, *Report on the Accelerated Repatriation Program Year 2002 and 2003,* February 2003.

KEY FINDINGS AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL

> 1. The decentralization progress varies between high and low violence districts. The process varies mainly because the high violence district is a newly established district.
> 2. Both the high and the low violence districts exhibit similar negative effects arising from decentralization, which directly impact the implementation of decentralization in the villages:
>   - Distortion of community development
>   - Strengthening of ethnic/religious divisions
>   - Aggravated elite capture and corruption
> 3. The issues are arising due to the following factors:
>   - Poor institutional and legal framework of decentralization
>   - Lack of justice and security
>   - Poor governance and participation

Variation in the Progress of Decentralization

The decentralization process is more advanced in the low violence district than in the high violence district. The process varies mainly because the high violence district is a newly established district where government structures are still being put in place. In contrast, the low violence district inherited the former district government's structure.

North Maluku has undergone a major restructuring. Maluku province was split into two - Maluku and North Maluku districts - in September 1999 in accordance with Law No.46/1999. In the course of decentralization, the government issued Law No.1/2003 on February 25, 2003 to further divide the districts. Whereas the North Maluku province initially consisted of only one district, it was split into four new districts in 2003.

Table 1: New Districts after 2003

Previous Division		New Division	
No.	District (Capital)	No.	District (Capital)
1	North Maluku (Ternate)	1	West Halmahera (Jailolo)
		2	North Halmahera (Tobelo)
		3	South Halmahera (Labuha)
		4	Sula Island (Sanana)

Source: UN Resource Center, North Maluku

Consequently, the North Halmahera government has not been functional until early 2003. West Halmahera currently acts as the core district. It maintains the legislative, administrative and financial authority over the new districts. Newly established districts have transitional district heads that are to be replaced in May 2004. Government officials in respective departments are being transferred or recruited. District parliament is yet to be established following the general elections in April 2004. The government of West Halmahera reallocates administrative budget for the three districts, and it is also planning next fiscal year's regional budget for all the districts. Once the district parliament is established, the members of parliament will elect the new district heads for the official five-year term. As a result, new districts will be legislatively, administratively and financially functional by late 2004

or early 2005. Until the North Halmahera government becomes fully functional, it is difficult to assess whether and how violence differentiates the decentralization progress in these two districts.

Main Issues and Risks Arising from Decentralization
The issues and risks emerging from decentralization are similar in both high and low violence districts. The following are the most relevant issues and risks at the district level that negatively impact decentralization and development at the village level.

1. Distortion of Community Development

> *"Local government misinterpreted the relationship between provincial and local governments. They think that there is no hierarchy between the two governments. But provincial government is the representative of the central government in this region. If local governments don't recognize us, that means they're neglecting the central government."*
>
> Head, Governance Division, Governor's Office

Unclear or lacking guidelines in Law No.22 on the relationship between the two levels of government and their functions has led to a bitter turf war.[21] The result has been duplication of development programs at the village level. With provincial government reluctant to relinquish its development budget, the communities at times receive development programs from both governments. In West Halmahera, for example, both governments funded the restoration of village offices and no one knows how the extra money was spent.

2. Strengthening of Divisions along Ethnic and Religious Lines

> *"The [Kao] land belongs to us. The five [Kao] villages in Malifut are ours. They don't want to be a part of Malifut. We will probably create a new kecamatan – kecamatan South Kao."*
>
> Head of Sub-district, Sub-District Kao

Devolution of authority to create new regions (*pemekaran*)[22] allows provincial and local governments to divide or merge existing administrative units, disrupting local communities. The rationale is to enhance delivery of services, facilitate democratization, enhance law and order, and improve communications between the center and the regions.[23] Nonetheless, *pemekaran* enables certain groups to create a homogenous community to address their grievances or fulfill economic interests.

One long-standing issue is the tension between Kao villages and Makianese villages in North Halmahera. Predominantly Christian Kao villages that were forced to merge with Muslim Makianese villages to create sub-district Malifut are trying to split away and create an ethnically homogenous sub-district. Even in relatively stable West Halmahera, a few hamlets emigrated to a different region to create a religiously homogenous community. *Pemekaran* thus has the potential to fragment communities along ethnic or religious lines.

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[21] Law No.22/1999 stipulates that provincial government coordinates among local governments and performs functions of inter-district governance, "as well as the authorities in other certain fields of governance." The province also covers "authorities that are not or not yet able to be conducted by local governments." But the law doesn't specify which areas these authorities could be. For more, see Law No. 22/1999 Chapter III Article 4(2).

[22] Regions include districts, sub-districts and municipalities.

[23] ICG *"Indonesia: Managing Decentralisation and Conflict in South Sulawesi"*.

Inter-regional fiscal disparity can be subsumed by ethnic or religious rhetoric, too. There is a growing concern on the part of the West Halmahera district that decentralization induces inter-regional disparity. Much of the concern stems from the natural resource revenue sharing arrangement.[24] North Halmahera is well endowed with gold mines, fishery, forestry and coconut plantation, and can now retain a greater portion of revenues. For West Halmahera which has no gold mines and fewer other natural resources, this arrangement seems "unfair". Consequently, the contestation over the gold mine is intensifying. Natural resource poor West Halmahera district is claiming that part of the gold mine in North Halmahera falls within their boundaries. Political interest of the West Halmahera government can provoke the already sensitive Kao-Malifut situation.

3. Aggravated Elite Capture and Corruption – "Small Kings"

"Decentralization won't bring welfare to people for at least 15 years. In the past there was corruption but only among legislators. Now bureaucrats are also corrupt."

Chief Editor of Weekly Tabloid, Ternate

Public perception of government's accountability is mixed. While many hope that decentralization measures will improve accountability, they can also create a new system of power relationships. The result would mean "small kings," creating more corruption and misuse of power at the local level. In both North and West Halmahera, the elites still monopolize information, which grants them power. The government's budget planning process is strictly confidential. Obtaining budget proposals and documents is almost impossible. Villagers complain that the government only "informs" them of development projects once a decision has been made. Even when occasional bottom-up development planning meetings take place, only local elites are invited. The ordinary public, therefore, has no institutionalized channels to voice their needs other than through petitions or demonstrations. With more emergency development funds flowing in from the central government, local government officials have ample opportunity for corruption.

Why are Negative Effects of Decentralization Emerging?

1. Poor Institutional and Legal Framework of Decentralization
Division of decision-making authorities and assignment of responsibilities between provincial and district governments remain unclear. In addition to the vague text, the law specifically mentions that there is no hierarchical relationship between the province and the local level. This has led to a turf war, which has resulted in the duplication of development programs, more corruption and increased sense of injustice.

The local revenue sharing arrangement is not coupled with a sufficient equalization mechanism and has led to inter-regional disparity between North and West Halmahera. If West Halmahera's political interest to claim a part of the gold mine is subsumed by religious or ethnic rhetoric (as in the previous conflict), conflict might intensify at both village and district levels.

2. Lack of Justice and Security
Rule of law and its enforcement are very weak in North Maluku, which undermines the legitimacy of the government and strengthens people's sense of injustice and insecurity. Stories of police and

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[24] Law No.25 aimed to accommodate long-standing dissatisfaction of natural resource rich regions, who felt that "Jakarta" took their resources, by allowing them to retain a greater portion of revenue share.

military misbehaviors abound, especially in North Halmahera. The special police force (*Brimob*) from Makassar, Sulawesi is notorious for violent abuses. In 2003 *Brimob Makassar* arrested three young Muslim youths from Gorua village for getting drunk and killing a Christian priest. Following its established pattern of brutality, *Brimob Makassar* broke one man's backbone during interrogations. *Brimob* is also suspected to be behind over 20 bombings that broke out in Tobelo during Ramadan last year. Some people suspect that the *Brimob* is deliberately trying to increase the tension between Christians and Muslims to remain stationed in the area.

The sense of injustice extends to the relationship between elites and non-elites. Since police fail to keep elites accountable for corruption and nepotism, those who lack power are consistently marginalized. Thus, the objective of creating more accountability through decentralizing is threatened by law enforcement that does not keep elites accountable.

The dysfunctional court system aggravates the perception of injustice. People view the district courts as costly and ineffective. Physical and psychological inaccessibility of courts also lead people to rarely use them. When asked why, they asked back, *"Why should we when all they do is eat our time and money?"* The ineffective court system forces the communities to solve disputes by themselves, through village leaders or at community meeting (*mushawarah desa)*. As a consequence, villagers can be susceptible to unfair dispute resolution in a politicized local context.

3. Poor Governance and Participation

In both districts, devolution has given local elites opportunities to capture the benefits while sufficient checks and balances are lacking to hold them accountable. Currently, internal checks and balances in the government hardly exist. Lack of incentives to improve accountability aggravates the problem. There is no performance-based evaluation in civil administration. Wages and promotion are standardized based on seniority. Unless they engage in illegal acts, civil servants do not get fired. Civil servants benefit from privileges such as pension funds, favorable interest rates on loans, subsidized housing and so forth. The basic work ethic, therefore, is "do no harm and stay in the system until retirement."

Legislators currently do not function as a safeguard either, since benefits from collusion and corruption trump the costs of violating the law. First, ineffective law reduces the chances of getting caught. Second, because they were chosen through a representation system, current legislators are more loyal to their political parties' interests rather than those of local constituents. The latter could improve once direct and representational elections take place in May 2004.

Lack of an institutionalized participatory mechanism where civil society or communities can get involved also offers opportunities for corruption. Opportunities of community participation have increased in both districts, but these meetings tend to be either (i) a ritualistic participatory process where people are allowed to be present and "listen" but not talk, and/or (ii) a representation by only a small fraction of the relevant constituency - the rich educated elites.

KEY FINDINGS AT THE VILLAGE LEVEL

1. The level of violence does not vary across villages within respective districts. Both villages in the high violence district exhibit high levels of violence relative to those in the low violence district.
2. The decentralization progress varies significantly between high and low violence villages. While high violence villages have made no progress, low violence villages have implemented some decentralization measures.
3. The level of violence in itself does not determine the progress of decentralization. However, violence erodes the following key factors, which in turn increase the chances of further violence and impede the decentralization progress:
   - Low level of inter-religious trust and reconciliation
   - Lack of justice and security
   - Poor governance and participation

No Variation in *Intra*-District Violence

Contrary to our initial intention, it proved impossible to identify villages that varied in degrees of violence within each district. Since both villages in the high violence district had fairly similar patterns of conflict and violence, neither village could be branded as more violent than the other. As a result, the only meaningful comparison for the study became the comparison between the two high violence villages in the high violence district versus the two low violence villages in the low violence district. In the high violence villages, tensions tend to result in violent incidents, involving destruction of property and physical injuries. While various tensions exist in the low violence villages, disputes do not tend to turn violent.

Variation in Decentralization Progress

The decentralization progress varies considerably between the two sets of villages. No decentralization measures have been implemented in the high violence villages, and many villagers are not aware that decentralization should be taking place. In the low violence villages, village council elections have taken place and most villagers are aware of decentralization and the changes it entails. Whether villages belong to a newly established district or not does not seem to affect the progress of decentralization. The implementation of decentralization is not contingent on district government, since villages initiate most of the needed changes. To establish the BPD, for example, a village does not need to wait for the completion of decentralization at the district level. Following socialization of basic instructions by the district, which all village leaders have already received, each village government can inform its villagers and organize BPD elections. Transfer of funds is also not a major impediment. In West Halmahera, where a functioning district government exists, villages bore the cost through community member's contributions.

Main Factors that Differentiate the Levels of Violence

Why are the high violence villages so unsuccessful in implementing decentralization while those with lower levels of violence are making progress? To answer this question, we first lay out some basic characteristics of the four villages and then analyze which factors are more relevant in distinguishing the two sets of villages. We then investigate one case per village to study how the relevant factors contribute to how violence emerges and is dealt with.

Table 2: Main Village Characteristics

Main Village Features	North Halmahera High violence district		West Halmahera Low violence district	
	Seki	**Bale**	**Gam Ici**	**Talaga**
Demography	182 households Muslim and Christian, mixed. Ethnically homogenous.	212 households Muslim and Christian, separated. Ethnically homogenous.	219 households Muslim Ethnically homogenous.	199 households Muslim Ethnically homogenous.
Economy	Poor, mostly farmers No major natural resource	Poor, mostly farmers No major natural resource	Poor, mostly farmers No major natural resource	Poor, mostly farmers No major natural resource
Education Level	Middle to high school	Middle to high school	Middle to high school	Middle to high school
Geographical Location	Coastal 30 min. by car to capital.	Coastal 30 min. by car to capital.	Coastal 15 min. by car to capital.	Coastal 15 min. by car to capital.
Formal and Informal Institutions	Weak adat. Apathetic leaders. Ineffective and biased law enforcement.	Weak adat. Apathetic leaders. Ineffective and biased law enforcement.	Stronger adat. More active leaders. Biased but more effective law enforcement.	Weak adat. More active leaders. Biased but more effective law enforcement
Legacy of Conflict	High violence and physical destruction. IDPs still returning.	High violence and physical destruction. IDPs still returning.	Less violence and physical destruction. IDPs returned.	Less violence and physical destruction. IDPs returned.
Inter-Religious Reconciliation	Poor. Inter-religious tension and mistrust.	Poor. Inter-religious tension and mistrust.	More advanced. Strong sense of repentance.	More advanced. Strong sense of repentance.
Levels and types of conflict	Inter-religious (Christians vs. Muslims) High violence: beating and bombings.	Inter-religious (Christians vs. Muslims) High violence: shooting.	Intra-communal (Elite vs. Non-elites) Low violence: corruption, elite capture, youth fights.	Intra-communal (Elite vs. Non-elites) Low violence: youth fights corruption, elite capture.
Decentralization	None.	None.	Some progress.	Some progress.

Overview of Differentiating Characteristics

The table illustrates that the two sets of villages (high vs. low violence) are similar in terms of population size, education, level of economic development and geographic features. Nonetheless, they demonstrate contrasting features in the following three areas:

- *Religious Mix and Legacy of Conflict*

Low violence villages are Muslim, and the division within the village is between "elites" and "non-elites." In contrast, both high violence villages are religiously heterogeneous and the community is divided along the religious line. While class divisions also exist in high violence villages, the religious division obscures them.

- *Law enforcement*

Police and security forces are weak and partial in high violence villages. They are biased but more effective in the low violence villages, helping solve conflicts nonviolently and increase perceptions of justice.

- *Village government and local institutions.*

Apathetic and ineffective village leaders and poorly functioning institutions contribute to the lack of peaceful resolution in high violence villages. Low violence villages exhibit stronger institutions and more effective and engaged leaders.

Village Case Studies

Location		Cases	Main Actors	Outcome
North Halmahera ⇩ **High violence district**	**Seki**	**Beating & bombing**: Living in a religiously mixed village and without a television set, the Christian teacher watches television every night at his Muslim friend's house. Following a misinterpretation of the teacher's question about the duration of the prayer, the Muslims in the village panic and spread false rumors about an impending attack by the Christians. A group of youth attacks the teacher and beats him up on a street corner. The Muslim village head and two Christian leaders call the police and the military. The security forces arrive and arrest three youths but release them the next day. That same evening, two bombs explode at the houses of the two Christians who helped report the beating. The security forces come to investigate but make no arrests. No village-wide meetings occur after the incidents. The Christian teacher flees to the neighboring town, refusing to return.	Victim: Christian teacher, church leader and former head. Perpetrators: group of village youth. Others: police, military, village government & village head.	No resolution. Security forces fail to investigate, although perpetrators are known.
	Bale	**Shooting**: A poor Christian farmer is shot in the field while processing copra. The security forces come to investigate but fail to find the perpetrator. Nobody in the village can think of a reason why the poor farmer was the target. Following the shooting, the village government and other leaders refuse to convene a village-wide meeting. Each religious side is waiting for the other to take the first step and start dialogue. The gap between the Christian and the Muslim side of the village increases. The two groups stop inviting each other to weddings, funerals, and other holidays, and they limit their interactions to the essential tasks of buying groceries or borrowing farming tools.	Victim: poor Christian farmer. Perpetrator: unknown. Others: police, military, village head and village government.	No resolution. Perpetrator not found.
West Halmahera ⇩ **Low violence district**	**Gam Ici**	**Corruption of external aid**: Suspicion by a group of villagers over the amount of donor funds that were used to construct a water system for the village reveals possible corruption by a group of village leaders. The village receives two separate sums to build the water system from the World Bank and CARDI (international NGO). After the water system is constructed, the village head, the LKMD chief and the village secretary announce that all the funds have been spent, even though the amount received was well above the needed sum. A group of 7 male villagers report the crime to the district police who arrest the three village leaders but release them a few weeks later. The villagers have not heard from the police since about the status of the case. The incident has divided the village into the pro and the anti-village head groups, with some wanting to forget the matter and others adamant to seek justice. A group of men are planning a trip to the police headquarters to inquire about the status of the case.	Victim: village community. Perpetrator: Village head, village secretary, and LKMD head. Others: 7 male villagers, district police.	Pending. Crime reported and men arrested but released without announcement of guilt. Resolution unclear.
	Talaga	**BPD & monopoly of power**: After being elected by the village to be the BPD chairman, the schoolteacher is deposed by the village head. The election process was fair and the villagers gave the most votes to the teacher, making him the BPD chairman. A few months later, however, the village head tells the teacher that a letter from the *camat* has instructed him that the BPD chairman should be the eldest elect, not the one with the most votes. Unlike the teacher, the eldest member of the BPD is the head's family member who is supportive of his policies. The village head refuses to show the letter to the teacher. The teacher who has no leverage finally resigns.	Victim: schoolteacher/ BPD chairman. Perpetrator: village head. Others: oldest member of BPD.	No resolution. Case never reported to police. Teacher deposed from post and broods in silence.

Main Factors Differentiating the Levels of Violence and Decentralization Progress

1. Low Level of Inter-Religious Trust and Reconciliation

Low levels of inter-religious trust and reconciliation increase the likelihood that disputes will escalate to violence, while higher levels of inter-religious trust lead villagers to solve problems non-violently.

High Violence Villages – Seki and Bale

"They [Muslims] put a false accusation on me. I just asked what time the prayer would be over, so that I could go to my [Muslim] friend's house to watch TV. But some Muslims thought I wanted to know the specific time because I had 'certain intentions'."
                                                                    Christian Victim of Beating case, Seki

"How could he [the victim] not know what time the prayer ends when he has lived here for more than 20 years? That's why rumors [that he was trying to attack the Muslims] quickly spread. People reacted carelessly because there is still trauma between the Christians and the Muslims."
                                                        Muslim Youth Leader and Beating Perpetrator, Seki

"The relationship between Muslims and Christians was getting better. But after the shooting, the gap has reemerged. Some Christians got afraid and left the village."
                                                                        Christian Religious Leader, Bale

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Since the high violence villages are religiously mixed and they have a more intense conflict legacy, they have higher inter-religious tensions than the low violence villages. The violent incidents in Seki and Bale occurred after months of relative peace, and they coincided with the return of the latest wave of IDPs. Christian IDPs have recently started returning, keeping the situation in high violence villages unstable. The influx of IDPs has changed the power dynamics in the villages and intensified competition over housing assistance. Due to the conflict legacy, there is a great psychological gap between the two religious groups, and small incidents spur rumors. The beating in Seki is a case in point. Although both religious groups are seemingly "back to normal" on the surface - watching TV together - the distrust runs deep.

Inter-religious tensions and mistrust are perpetuated by lack of inter-religious interaction. When the violent conflict subsided in 2001, villagers failed to resurrect inter-religious groups and farming associations, lowering chances for interaction. For example, while Bale used to have an inter-religious women's group before the conflict, Muslim and Christian women now have separate groups. The two groups met together when the village received a coconut scraper machine from an external donor in 2003, yet they continue to conduct separate activities. In both Seki and Bale, minimal inter-religious interaction is increasing fears and potential for rumors to escalate. Following the violent incidents, the Muslim and the Christian communities in both villages broke off all nonessential contact with each other. There were no village wide meetings, and therefore no way for the villagers to interact and to dispel each other's fears. Since the security forces failed to secure justice, the two sides remain suspicious of each other.

The complete geographic segregation of the religiously mixed community in Bale is making reconciliation more difficult, as there are no opportunities for the different sides to interact and decrease their feelings of mistrust. Conversely, even though the conflict in Seki was of an intra-communal nature, the fact that the religious groups are geographically mixed may be more conducive to reconciliation and conflict mitigation in the long term as the villagers get together,

discuss the incident, and over time bridge their differences. The vacuum of interaction in Bale, on the other hand, necessitates a more progressive approach and efforts to bring the two sides together in formalized events such as sports competitions or village meetings. Thus, complete segregation may prevent inter-religious violence but it also breeds mistrust and leads to lack of interaction. The segregation also formalizes separation and the notion of two different groups, increasing the need for formal groups as opposed to having informal daily interactions.

> **Low Violence Villages – Gam Ici and Talaga**
>
> *"Memories of conflict are hard to overcome, but that's fate. Perpetrators were outsiders because it all started when IDPs from other areas came to Ibu. They influenced people's sentiments."*   Village head, Gam Ici
>
> *"Even if there are any problems, they shouldn't provoke another conflict. During the conflict [in 1999], everyone suffered."*   Female farmer, Talaga

In the low violence villages, less intense conflict has resulted in a more progressed reconciliation process between the two groups. The 1999 conflict in the West Halmahera district was less violent, and all IDPs returned by the end of 2001. Since low violence villages are religiously homogeneous, there have been no inter-religious disputes in the villages. Due to the legacy of conflict and good reconciliation, Muslim villagers maintain a good relationship with the neighboring Christian villages. The villagers have both formal and informal interactions with their neighbors. They invite each other for festivities, walk to the field together, chat around the markets, and lend and borrow tools or carts. Various people noted that both Christians and Muslims suffered from the conflict and that everyone was a victim.

The main division in these villages is along class lines. Corruption, elite capture of external aid, and monopoly of power dominate village dynamics and separate elites from non-elites. The corruption case in Gam Ici and the BPD case in Talaga illustrate the high degree of elite capture and power grab, which creates a significant psychological gap between elites and non-elites. The poor people do not join village groups and are marginalized. Ordinary (non-elite) villagers and male youths tend to share a strong sense of injustice. Youths expressed their frustrations that their opinions were easily discarded. Community leaders are often village head's allies and hence are seen as partial. Some in Gam Ici mentioned that the village head discriminates in favor of "his" people in dispute resolution. The planning of projects is done by the elites, namely the village head, village government staff and other community leaders. Villagers are only "informed" of the projects after the decision has already been made. The case of the *sagu* machine in Talaga illustrates this point. In order to finance a soccer competition, the village head decided to sell the *sagu* machine that belonged to the women's group despite their protests. According to a village teacher, "the women were trying to defend the machine, but they couldn't do much in the end."

However frustrated some villagers may be, their frustration has not led to violence. The strong sense of repentance for the conflict plays a significant role in preventing violent outbreaks. While ordinary incidents in high violence villages often result in physical injuries and destruction, the villagers in low violence areas are very hesitant to resort to violence. Male youths and men, who are most likely to get agitated, said that they would rather tolerate injustice than risk triggering another conflict. These contrasting cases indicate that a low level of inter-religious trust increases the likelihood of violence, while progressed reconciliation and strong repentance for the conflict deter violence.

2. Lack of Justice and Security

Lack of justice is widespread in high violence villages, while justice is served more frequently in low violence villages. While the high violence villages suffer from ineffective and biased security forces, law enforcement institutions are more effective at helping the villagers solve problems and pursue justice in the low violence villages.

High Violence Villages – Seki and Bale

"After the shooting, security forces came to the village and promised to investigate, but they still haven't found the killer. As long as the perpetrators are not found, it will be hard to rebuild trust and go back to the way things were."

Widow of Shooting Victim, Bale

"After the bombing occurred, I spoke with the police and told them who did it. So far, the police have done nothing about it. Maybe they didn't act because I'm Christian and the police are partial to Muslims."

Victim of Bombing, Seki

In both Seki and Bale, security forces failed to prosecute the perpetrators in the shooting, the bombings, and the beating case. In Seki, the police have not penalized the perpetrators even though all the villagers are fully aware of who they are. Police inaction has increased the Christians' sense of injustice. They feel that they are being discriminated against because security forces favor their fellow Muslims and that the Muslim villagers can engage in acts of aggression without threat of punishment.

The ineffectiveness of security forces contributes to higher violence in various ways. First, it induces a sense of injustice that mounts to further tensions. Second, the notion that people cannot turn to security forces or trust them potentially leads to vigilantism. Third, by failing to pursue justice, the security forces signal to the people that they can violate the law without being punished.

Low Violence Villages – Gam Ici and Talaga

"The police are responsive to violence and crimes in general. But when it comes to issues related to village government, they're very slow."   Elected BPD member, Gam Ici

"When we realized that this was a case of corruption, I went with six other men to the police headquarters in Ternate. They began investigations in February 2003, but the village head is still in power because he has a strong relationship with the police."   Farmer, Gam Ici

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In low violence villages, security forces are biased but effective, helping prevent disputes from turning violent. Although the villagers admit that security forces discriminate in favor of village government, they still agree that they are effective in enforcing the rule of law and providing security, especially for inter- or intra-communal disputes. Ordinary villagers know that they would get punished for their deeds, and the fear of being held accountable by the security forces restricts them from resorting to violence. A BPD member in Gam Ici explained that police is "very responsive to violence" and would punish any violent acts. Most security forces are susceptible to bribery and

personal connections, which elite villagers use to circumvent the rule of law. Most villagers in Gam Ici believe that the village leaders skimmed off funds for the water system, but that bribery was enough for the police to ignore their guilt.

In both Gam Ici and Talaga, villagers are bitter about the village government's misbehaviors, but the government normally gets away without being held accountable, let alone confronting any violent reactions. When asked why this is the case, villagers responded that people "often feel intimidated to voice their complaints since they lack education." Villagers in Talaga noted that even if they went to higher authorities such as the sub-district head or the police, the village head would blame them. Higher authorities would trust the village head because of his legitimacy and working relationship with them. Thus, although villagers are frustrated with the government, they tolerate it because the police are partial, and because protests might bring about only further trouble.

3. Poor Governance and Participation

There are several formal and informal institutions in the villages that could serve as important intermediaries in resolving disputes. Whether these institutions have the legitimacy, willingness and capacity to intervene and settle issues is a key factor in determining the escalation of violence.[25]

Box 1: Village Government and Local Institutions

> This report uses the terms 'village government and local institutions' to refer to:
> - **Village head (kepala desa):** elected, prior to decentralization appointed.
> - **Village government**: formerly LMD and LKMD. Following decentralization, BPD (see table 3).
> - **Traditional (*adat*) leader**: the traditional law used to a varying degree in villages across Indonesia. *Adat* rules can vary greatly across regions and include prescribed rules for behavior and punishments for crimes.
> - **Religious leaders**: *Imams* and church leaders, formal and informal.
> - **Village groups and forums**: PKK (Women's Empowerment Group), youth groups, farming, loan or crafts cooperatives, prayer groups, and forums organized by external donors who fund projects.

While village government and local institutions are extremely fragile or dysfunctional in the high violence villages, they are relatively more functional and effective in the low violence villages. Lack of effective informal or formal institutions makes it difficult for villagers to voice their claims and monitor or keep leaders in check. Without village groups and forums, the villagers have fewer opportunities to interact and build mutual trust.

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[25] Barron, Patrick, Claire Q. Smith and Michael Woolcock (2004). "Understanding local level conflict pathways in developing countries: theory, evidence, and implications from Indonesia" Mimeo.

In high violence villages, village government and institutions function poorly, if at all. Since many IDPs have yet to return, village government does not function properly in either Bale or Seki. Partial village government, lack of strong *adat* leaders and lack of trust towards other established authority figures, including the village head and religious leaders, means that people have no one to turn to for help in solving problems. In the shooting case in Bale and the beating/bombing incident in Seki, resolution and reconciliation between the two religious communities is made more difficult by the vacuum of institutions or intermediaries that the villagers could turn to discuss their fears and concerns. Consequently, inter-religious tension remains high.

Apathetic and untrustworthy village leaders contribute to the lack of reconciliation and the high levels of violence. Authority figures on the Muslim and the Christian side failed to reach out to the other religious group or to bring together the community in the incidents we investigated. According to the village head in Bale, it was the "responsibility of the higher government" to direct the villagers, convene a village meeting, and help the reconciliation process. The Muslim cleric (*imam)* and the Christian church leaders made announcements after prayers cautioning people to remain calm. Yet, the leaders did not meet with each other, and they remained on their own side of the village. The beating case in Seki illustrates the danger that village leaders face even if they do become involved in solving problems. Following the bombings and the beating incident, the Muslim village head helped the Christians report the crime to the police and tried to calm the Christians. As a result, some Muslim villagers accused him of favoring Christians, and they are vowing not to reelect him. Thus, even when trying to help the marginalized community, the village leadership is in danger of losing its authority for being perceived as biased.

In the low violence villages, functioning institutions and more engaged village leaders contribute to the peaceful resolution of disputes. Most villagers interviewed indicated that they felt they could turn to their leaders if they had problems. In Talaga and Gam Ici, villagers have elected their representatives for village government and the village council, and village meetings take place periodically. The village head, religious leaders, *adat* leaders or other community leaders are usually involved in solving disputes. In addition, the West Halmahera district is known for a peace initiative that involved a group of village leaders from across the district. The initiative, called Team 30, involved 30 Muslim and Christian leaders who met in early 2000 and crafted 14 points of agreement

to help the reconciliation process. Each village leader brought the 14 points agreement back to his village and spread the message in the community. Villagers acknowledge that this initiative greatly enhanced the reconciliation process.

However, the gap between community elites and ordinary villagers increases tensions and marginalizes non-elite villagers. Mechanisms to hold elites accountable are poor or nonexistent. Collusion of village elites with security forces and higher government authorities as well as lack of civil society organizations or media restricts villagers' avenues to channel their complaints. *Adat* leaders, religious leaders or community leaders are often part of the village elites. Without a functioning elected village council (BPD) or elected community development committee (LPM), there is no separation of power in the village. The corruption of World Bank funds by the village elites in Gam Ici illustrates this dynamic. Even though the village head and two other village government officials seem to be clearly at fault for skimming off funds for the water system, they have not been formally punished. The police released them from prison and has not informed the villagers about the status of the case, prompting the skeptics to suspect police bribery. Following the incident, the village has been further divided between pro- and anti-village government groups. The result has been reduced interactions between the two groups, increased exclusion of the poor, increased elite capture, and increased animosity by the poor towards the village government.

While low violence villages have better institutions and leaders, women still have few channels for seeking advice or help. Due to cultural sensitivities of discussing personal problems with male leaders, women tend to keep problems to themselves or seek advice from female leaders. The lack of avenues to channel women's voices has perpetuated problems like domestic violence. When asked what women would do if their husbands hit them, women in Bale said that they would solve the problem within the family.

In addition, women are underrepresented in both decision-making structures and at village meetings. In the villages we visited, women attend village meetings but tend to remain silent. Claiming that they are "too shy to talk," women leave participation to their husbands. None of the four village governments had female members. As a result, women remain marginalized and unable to express their views.

Decentralization in the Villages
As a result of the above-analyzed factors and the differences in the levels of violence, decentralization is making slow progress in the low violence villages but has not been even initiated in the high violence villages. The incidents in low violence villages indicate what could follow once decentralization takes root in high violence villages. Thus, while decentralization opens up space for greater democracy and increased accountability, it increases tensions when sufficient mechanisms of checks and balances are lacking. The following table illustrates the changes in laws that will most immediately affect the villages.

Table 3: Changes in Village Governance Structure

	Law 5/1979	Law 22/1999
Village Institutions	LMD: appointed village consultative assembly. LKMD: village resilience board. Both under village head's authority.	BPD: elective village representative boards, with far reaching rights and autonomy. Other institutions can be established by need.
Village Government	Head and LMD, inseparably.	Head and BPD, separate entities but partners.
Village Head	Appointed and accountable to district. Maximum term of office 16 years.	Appointed by and accountable to BPD, after district approval. Maximum term 10 years.
Dismissal of Head	Proposed by sub-district, approved by district.	Proposed by BPD, approved by district.
Village Officials	Appointed by head, approved by district.	Elected or appointed, approved by BPD.
Village Legislation	Drafted by village head and LMD, approved by sub-district.	Drafted and approved by BPD and village head.
Village Budget	Drafted by village head and LMD, approved by district.	Drafted and approved by BPD and village head.

Source: Antlov, Village Government and Rural Development in Indonesia: the New Democratic Framework.

High Violence Villages – Seki and Bale

"We have received instructions to form the BPD but we have not implemented them. We are waiting for the IDPs to return before we organize elections."

Village Head, Seki

"The village head does not want to form the BPD because it would constrain him. The District Head (Bupati) told the villagers that it should not be a problem to form the BPD now since a lot of IDPs commute, but the village head does not want to be held accountable."

Youth leader, Seki

High violence villages have implemented no decentralization measures, and therefore existing disputes have not been affected by decentralization. With a large number of Christian families and Christian members of the village government still outside the villages, the village leadership will have to wait for all IDPs to return before organizing BPD elections. Apart from prominent leaders and authority figures, most villagers are not aware that village government will have to change due to decentralization.

When we explained the concept and asked what they thought about the BPD, most villagers said that it would bring about positive changes by enabling a separation of powers. By monitoring village government and approving the budget, villagers believe that the BPD would keep the village head accountable. The youth leader in Seki believes that the BPD would increase incentives to distribute future development assistance more equitably and handle village conflicts more fairly. However, the *Imam* from Bale expressed some concern, arguing that religious tensions might lead villagers to vote for BPD members along religious lines. The result would bring about a village government dominated by the majority religious group, leading the religious minority to feel threatened.

The low violence villages have already implemented some decentralization measures. They indicate that decentralization is opening space for greater democracy and increasing accountability of village authorities. People's awareness about transparency and accountability has grown, which puts a stronger pressure on the elites. In both Talaga and Gam Ici, BPD members tend to be non-elite, ordinary villagers, such as farmers, public motorbike (*ojek)* drivers, carpenters, and teachers. In Gam Ici, the BPD election was conducted fairly (votes were counted in front of the community), and four out of five elected members are ordinary villagers unrelated to the village head. While no women were elected for the BPD, one female did run in Talaga, indicating that if given a chance, some women would actively participate. The BPD thus has the potential to increase female political participation. Overall, many villagers expressed strong hopes that the BPD would enhance transparency in the village government.

Yet, lack of an effective checks and balances mechanism to ensure proper implementation leads to an increase in tensions. The incident over the BPD election in Talaga illustrates the many tensions that the decentralization process could create. The village head replaced a democratically elected teacher with his relative. The elected teacher was seen as a threat because he was one of the few people who had dared to accuse the village head of misusing village assets. This incident has created a sense of disillusionment among the villagers over possible changes that the BPD could bring about. Villagers feel disempowered vis-à-vis the village authority. As one youth noted, people feel like "there is no way out."

On the positive side, the fact that villagers are even able to voice their complaints and expose the extent of elite capture indicates progress. While the corruption case in Talaga still awaits resolution, the fact that seven ordinary villagers took initiative and reported the crime to the police is a positive sign. If appropriate channels for villagers' complaints are secured, decentralization could enhance the accountability of village authorities. However, the lack of a bottom-up complaint mechanism means that an effective checks-and-balances system has yet to be institutionalized. Without such a mechanism, decentralization may induce more tensions.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

At the district level, the decentralization process is causing negative repercussions that spill over to the villages due to the following factors: (i) poor governance and participation; (ii) lack of justice and security; (iii) weak institutional and legal framework of decentralization.

At the village level, violence erodes the following key factors that increase the chances of further violence and impede the decentralization progress: (i) level of inter-religious trust and reconciliation; (ii) justice and security; (iii) governance and participation.

We thus conclude that similar conditions hinder the process of decentralization at both the district and the village level. The necessary conditions to successfully implement decentralization while preventing further violence in conflict-ridden areas include:
- Inter-religious trust and reconciliation
- Effective justice and security
- Proper institutional and legal framework of decentralization
- Good governance and participation

Figure 3: Necessary Conditions for Decentralization

III.   POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

SCOPE OF THE POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Both top-down systemic reform and bottom-up locally tailored reform are indispensable to create an enabling environment for decentralization. The impetus for reform has to be both endogenous and exogenous. Reform is not feasible without ownership of the Indonesian people. But external pressure and support are crucial to overcome the internal lack of willingness and capacity. SERP is a process-oriented bottom-up project. This implies that SERP is neither aiming to nor suitable for top-down policy reform. However, given the importance of a comprehensive approach, we put forth two sets of recommendations. One is a set of recommendations for SERP that builds on its comparative advantages. The other is a set of recommendations that the WB should advocate to the Indonesian government. The latter focuses on minimal requirements to create an environment for successful SERP interventions.

The recommendations are in order of priority within each sector, guided by the following criteria:
- **Impact maximization:** Concentrate on areas where the impact of its intervention is the greatest. Build on SERP's comparative advantages.
- **Duration of impact:** Invest in activities with long-standing impact. For example, invest in revitalizing inter-religious self-groups rather than sports competitions.
- **Cost-effectiveness:** Prioritize activities that have greater impact relative to investment.

The recommendations for the Government of Indonesia are prioritized based on their relevance and impact on SERP activities.

Recommendations for SERP and the Government of Indonesia

	SERP	Government of Indonesia
Justice & Security	- Create alternative avenues of redress - Hold law enforcement institutions accountable - Train paralegals & provide legal aid	- Improve performance with sticks & carrots - Improve quality of security personnel - Improve security forces' budget to curb rent-seeking & corruption
Governance & Participation	- Empower the community, especially the marginalized - Support BPD's political leverage - Engage & strengthen local governments - Equip local authorities with leadership skills	- Increase accountability of legislators & civil servants. - Enhance inter-governmental coordination - Introduce bottom-up socialization - Establish transparent standards & recruitment procedures - Promote collaboration between actors
Inter-Religious Reconciliation	- Foster inter-religious reconciliation through informal interactions - Invest in women and youths' inter-religious networks	
Institutional & Legal Framework of Decentralization		- Revise Law 22 to clarify functional assignments of government levels - Balance district government's fiscal capacity & consolidate funding channels - Establish clear criteria for creating regions

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SERP

1. **Justice and Security**

- **Create Alternative Avenues of Redress for Abuse of Power & Law Violation**
  When formal law enforcement institutions are ineffective, partial and/or unwilling to solve disputes, the only options left for communities are to solve disputes between families, through village government, community leaders or at community meetings. This makes villagers susceptible to unfair dispute resolution in a politicized local context. As found in the case studies, village institutions are not functional in fighting elite capture. Creation of alternative avenues of redress is therefore necessary. One option is to broaden SERP or KDP's complaint mechanisms and allow villagers to file anonymous complaints other than those related to the project. The neutral third parties (SERP consultants and NGOs) who review the complaints can handle issues directly or pressure village authorities to take appropriate actions. Another option is to link neighboring villages so that they can mobilize themselves against village governments. This can be done through funding of inter-village projects or inter-village activities. Revitalizing or strengthening the traditional *adat* system is another option, though SERP must ensure they don't lock in endogenous imperfections such as discrimination against women.

- **Institute Measures to Hold Formal Law Enforcement Mechanisms Accountable**
  Strengthen civil society watchdogs and media who can put public pressure on courts, prosecutors, and security forces' misbehaviors or inaction. Assist these organizations in capacity building and coalition building to avoid possible threats or intimidations, especially from the security forces. SERP's entry point will be the project facilitators, NGOs and independent media which they contract to carry out its other activities. Their advantage is their coverage of both village and district levels. Allow them to monitor activities other than those directly under SERP. Their links with the national government and the World Bank safeguard them against threats or intimidations.

- **Train Paralegals and Provide Legal Assistance to the Community**
  SERP opens up space for community justice by providing better access to formal legal services and strengthening informal dispute resolution. Training a paralegal establishes a new dispute resolution mechanism. The trainee must be carefully chosen. S/he should be someone old enough to gain legitimacy, but not one of the elites to ensure impartiality. Ideally, these paralegals should be a set of both male and female, so that women will not hesitate to reach for assistance. If neutrality is difficult to secure in a highly politicized or fragmented society as in North Halmahera, an outsider could be brought in. But this person should work closely with the local villagers so that the assistance does not distort the tradition too much. Collaboration with traditional dispute resolution mechanisms such as *adat* institutions can also be beneficial.

2. **Inter-Religious Trust and Reconciliation**

- **Foster Inter-Religious Reconciliation through Informal Interactions**
  Formal reconciliation meetings or sports competitions hosted by donors, NGOs and the government, are important platforms for normalizing villagers' relationships. However, true reconciliation takes place only when neighboring communities cooperate in vital activities. SERP should therefore focus on building on daily inter-religious interactions. Possible assistance include rehabilitation or construction of inter-religious market facilities, health facilities, schools, cultural houses that can host festivities, resurrection of inter-religious self-help groups,

establishment of revolving funds for production of cash crops or collectively owned production tools. The village head in Talaga suggested expanding and merging rice fields so that neighboring communities can work together. Developing idle lands like space around the lake for recreation for both communities would also foster interactions.

- **Invest in Women and Youths' Inter-Religious Networks**
  SERP should tap into women as a resource with high peace-making potential. Empowering them with income generating activities and encouraging women's inter-religious cooperation can be an important step towards decreasing tensions. Women's inter-religious cooperation might prove easier than it would with men, since women are less politicized and thus more likely to participate in such activities.

  SERP should also recognize the importance of involving youths in its projects. Idle male youths often instigate violence. Most of the violent disputes arise between drunk male youths, which can escalate to inter-village disputes. Keeping them engaged is therefore important for lowering tensions. Projects could include funding joint youth self-help groups, vocational training, cultural events, activities to build common areas by the lake or the beach for future use, sponsoring the materials for building together boats or a youth culture house.

3. **Governance and Participation**

- **Empower the Community, Especially the Marginalized**
  SERP can strengthen the community's bargaining power vis-à-vis the local authorities by linking villagers from neighboring villages as well as providing them organizing and leadership skills. Lack of participation of the marginalized, such as women, youths, the poor, religious minorities, and returnees endangers further elite capture and risks turning frustrations into violence. Separate discussions or strong facilitation is necessary to have their voices reflected onto collective decision-making. One solution is to enable these groups to submit project proposals independent of their communities. Such measures have been institutionalized for women in KDP, so a broader rule can be applied to SERP. The preparation process itself equips them with organizing and presentation skills, which would raise their awareness and confidence. Their being a potential source of funds for the village will increase their bargaining power and politically empower them in the villages.

- **Strengthen Village Council's (BPD) Political Leverage**
  Strengthening local village councils is essential to ensure proper implementation of decentralization. A functioning and strong village council can ensure the separation of power in the village and thereby help institute an effective system of checks and balances. SERP should devise programs for political education for BPD members/elects such as legal drafting, budgeting, advocacy and leadership skills. Target assistance for women and the marginalized to politically empower the incumbents and to encourage them to run for office. A stronger and more diverse BPD will benefit SERP by helping keep village elites in check, thereby decreasing corruption of SERP assistance.

  Simultaneously, SERP should promote coalition building among BPD members from different villages to boost their political leverage vis-à-vis the executive branch. This also enables to prevent collusion between village and higher levels of government. Linking BPD members with

SERP contracted media and civil society organizations can provide them another avenue of redress. This linkage, in turn, encourages higher government's acknowledgement of BPD.

- **Engage and Strengthen Local Governments**
  Government interference in community development could be a major risk, especially where governments are corrupt and inefficient. Nevertheless, their buy-in to SERP is beneficial for gaining political support and financial sustainability of the project once SERP funds are over. To ensure their positive involvement, helping resurrect and strengthen their capacity is essential, especially in conflict-ridden areas that experience a break-down in such institutions. SERP should incorporate capacity building and participatory development planning training for district and village governments. Specific skills include: coordination of government-funded development programs and SERP projects, management skills especially financial, personnel and record management, organization and facilitation skills, and mediation skills for dispute resolution.

- **Equip Formal and Informal Authorities with Leadership Skills**
  Active, engaged, and well-trained local authorities are crucial for bringing together the communities, helping solve problems as well as implementing decentralization measures. SERP can contribute by providing training on mobilizing, facilitation and mediation skills. Village authorities frequently think that they do not have the responsibility or that impetus for action should come from higher government levels. Therefore, training programs need to instill a sense of responsibility to take initiative and bring the community together rather than waiting for action from higher government authorities. Programs should educate and encourage village leadership to become proactive, initiate dialogue within community in case of disputes and to promote the use of non-violent means. Raising awareness of *all* prominent figures enables them to take collective action on divisive issues, protecting them from intimidation.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT

1. Institutional and Legal Framework for Decentralization

- **Revise Law No.22 to Clarify Functional Assignments of Different Levels of Government1**
  The long-term goal is to revise Law No.22/1999 and implementing regulations to clarify the functional assignments for different levels of government. The revisions should clearly state the hierarchy of provincial and local governments and the flow of funds. In so doing, the government must ensure substantial consultations with all stakeholders, including local governments, local parliaments, civil society and academics.

- **Balance District Government's Fiscal Capacity and Consolidate Funding Channels**
  The central government should improve its equalization mechanism to prevent regional disparities. The goal is to let richer districts take care of themselves by allowing a greater regional tax base while providing the poorer ones with more subsidies. This mitigates the fierce competition over natural resources like the one between North and West Halmahera. In so doing, the government should prevent improper taxation by the districts. One option for the central government is to introduce an enlarged list of possible regional taxes while allowing the districts to set the tax rates within a prescribed range.

  The central government should also consolidate the development budget channels. To avoid duplication or mis-coordination between different levels of government, the development budget should be directed to the district government, so that they can determine programs according to local needs. Strong accountability measures are needed to avoid further corruption.

- **Establish a Clear Set of Criteria for the Creation of New Regions**
  Because creation of new regions is increasing the risk of fragmentation of the country along the ethnic or religious divisions, a more strict set of criteria for approval should be established. The central government should consider the political, economic and social consequences of administrative division more closely. Setting a minimum size of the population and introducing weighted allocation of general funds could prevent creation of unnecessarily small regions driven by private interests of specific groups.

2. Governance and Participation

- **Increase Accountability of Legislators and Civil Servants**
  To increase the accountability of legislators, the Indonesian government should strengthen the direct election system that will hold them more accountable to the populace. The effort can be further helped through information disclosure of record of legislative sessions, and holding of more public hearings. In addition, legislators should be trained on their duties to hold the executive branch accountable.

  In regards to civil servants, the government should provide capacity building programs to improve performance. Lack of incentives due to seniority-based promotion and standardized wages hinder them from addressing flaws within their institutions. The government should therefore reform the system so that poor performance and corruption are sanctioned, good performance and integrity is rewarded, and promotion is more transparent. To strengthen

information disclosure, the government should improve public access to records and encourage information sharing between and within agencies.

- **Enhance Better Inter-Governmental Coordination**
  For decentralization to succeed, cooperation rather than competition between different levels of government, especially between provincial and district governments, is necessary. Institute inter-governmental coordinating roundtables, workshops, and forums to share information and coordinate their programs.

- **Introduce Bottom-Up Socialization Process**
  Surprisingly few villagers are aware of what changes and benefits decentralization entails. One obvious reason is because higher governments use a cascade system where they socialize to village leaders, who in turn are supposed to disseminate information in the villages. However, only limited information is passed on, and usually to a specific group of people. Therefore, higher governments themselves should socialize directly to the community. The government should clarify the intentions of decentralization, changes it brings to local governance structure, and people's rights and duties.

- **Establish Transparent Standards and Recruitment Procedures for Local Civil Servants**
  The central government should develop minimum requirements for civil servants' qualifications and transparent recruitment procedures. Simultaneously, the government should consider the introduction of affirmative action for more diverse religious, ethnic and gender representation. This measure would address people's grievances and empower economically, politically and socially disadvantaged groups. This reform is highly controversial and is likely to encounter strong opposition from elites. However, the reform presents an opportunity for the central government to market itself to the international community as a truly democratized country.

- **Promote Collaboration with External Actors**
  The governments tend to view the media and civil society organizations as their adversaries rather than potential allies. The district government should invite media, international donors, NGOs and civil society organizations to share information and enhance mutual understanding. Government officials should be encouraged to be responsive to media requests fro information. A constructive relationship is beneficial for the government in disseminating their policies and demonstrating their attitudes for higher accountability.

3. Justice and Security

- **Improve Performance through Provision of Sticks and Carrots**
  The government should institute a strict monitoring system for courts, prosecutors and the police. This can be achieved by utilizing external sources such as media or civil society organizations to monitor their performance, or by instituting stronger information disclosure regulations. Disclosure of performance records such as number of cases handled, length of court processing, length of investigation, and the number of cases settled, would increase law enforcement institutions' transparency and accountability. Sanction them for obstructing or failing to investigate cases, but reward them for outstanding performances.

- **Improve the Quality of Security Personnel**
  There are two ways to achieve this One is to provide training on human rights to raise their awareness especially about human rights violations. The second is to set higher standards for personnel recruitment. The special police forces (*Brimob*), which are notorious for violent actions, are often comprised of poorly educated rural teenagers. The government should increase the salary to attract more qualified personnel. This requires strict internal fiduciary control.

- **Improve Security Forces' Budget to Curb Rent-Seeking & Corruption**
  Lack of sufficient operational budget leads to security forces' rent-seeking and makes them more susceptible to elite bribery. The main reason is that security forces have to cover significant portion of their local expenditure. If the central government is serious about improving law enforcement, more operational budget should be allocated for the security forces.

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APPENDICES

- **Appendix 1: Definitions**

- **Appendix 2: Acronyms**

- **Appendix 3: Main Village Characteristics**

- **Appendix 4: Questionnaire**

- **Appendix 5: List of Key Informants by Sector and Government Level**

- **Appendix 6: List of Key Informants by Organization**

Appendix 1: Definitions

In this paper, we distinguish the terms such as conflicts, disputes, social tensions and violent conflicts. We adopt the following definitions defined by the World Bank conflict research team in Indonesia[26]:

Conflict: Conflict is characterized as disagreement or clash of interests between groups or individuals. Conflict arises whenever political, social or economic changes or progressions take place because "it involves realignments of power and resources as well as challenges to existing interests and values." Conflict is thus not a negative phenomenon.

Violent Conflict: Violent conflict, on the other had, entails negative effects. It is one that causes physical destruction or injuries that threaten people's security as well as welfare. We give specific focus on tensions or conflicts that lead to violence, and what measures can be installed to prevent violent conflicts from arising. In differentiating high versus low violence, we distinguish high violence as resulting in physical destruction, injuries, or deaths. Low violence, on the other hand, would involve minimal destruction of property, minimal injuries and no deaths.

Social tensions: According to Barron et al., social tensions are "the forces that underlie situations of conflict", that could take the form of contestation over resources and/or values. We will use tensions as the underlying context from which conflicts arise.

Dispute: It is a "particular incident of conflict", where the actors involved, time and location can be identified. A conflict or social tension can be manifested in several 'disputes'. As such, our cases will be 'disputes' that stem from a broader and wider conflict and/or social tensions.

Community: In the context North Maluku, we use the term 'community' to indicate a group of people that share the same "religious beliefs" and are geographically concentrated. A village can consist of two communities i.e. - Muslim and Christian communities. We refer to 'inter-religious' as interaction between these two religious groups, whether they be from one village or more.

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[26] For details, see Barron, Smith and Woolcock (2003) *KDP & Community Conflict Negotiation Study,* the World Bank.

Appendix 2: Acronyms

BAPPEDA	Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah (Regional Development Planning Board)
BPD	Badan Perwakilan Desa (Village Parliament)
BRIMOB	Police Mobile Brigade
CARDI	The Consortium for Assisting the Refugees and Displaced in Indonesia
CDD	Community Demand Driven Development
CordAid	Catholic Organization for Relief and Development
DAK	Special Allocation Fund
DAU	General Allocation Fund
DISPENDA	Regional Revenue Office
DPRD	District Parliament Budget Commission
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
ICG	International Crisis Group
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IRD	International Relief and Development
KDP	Kecamatan Development Program
KKN	Corruption, Collusion, Nepotism
KPU	Komisi Pemilihan Umum (Elections Commission)
LKMD	Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa (Village Community Resilience Council)
LMD	Lembaga Musyawarah Desa (Village Consultative Council)
LPM	Community Development Sommittee
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
PKK	Program Kesejahteraan Keluarga (Family Welfare Program)
PMD	Ministry of Home Affairs
PROPEDA	Regional Development Program
Satkorlak	Emergency Relief Coordination Committee
SD	Elementary School Teacher
SERP	Support for the Social and Economic Revitalization project
UNDP	United Nations Development Fund
UNSFIR	United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery

Appendix 3: Main Village Characteristics

	Seki, Galela	Bale, Galela	Gam Ici, Ibu	Talaga, Ibu
Main problems that cause violence	- beating and bombing - aggressive youth resorting to violence	- shooting – perpetrator unknown	-Drunken male youth fights (inter-village) though rare.	-drunken male youths fights (inter-village)
Dominant problems (violent and non-violent)	-Village leadership rivalry (chief vs. angry Muslims)- tensions between village head and central part of village -mistrust between Muslims and Christians -Aggressive youth -Unequal distribution of housing aid -Lack of effective security protection	-Lack of inter-religious communication – mistrust - Unequal distribution of housing aid -Lack of effective security protection	-Elite capture/corruption of external assistance (KDP/CARDI) -Monopoly of power by village head (lack of accountability) -Unequal distribution of housing assist.	Elite capture of external assistance (FAO, housing) Monopoly of power by village head eg. Inappropriate replacement of BPD chair
Types of Leadership	Village head, Youth leaders, Weak adat leader, Weak imam and Christian leaders	Village head, Youth leaders, Strong religious leaders, No adat Strong female Christian leaders	Village head Religious leaders Informal women leaders Many adat leaders	Village head Religious leaders Youth leader Informal women leaders No adat leader
Dispute resolution mechanisms	- Consult village head - weak adat (for weddings, funerals, rapes, affairs, land disputes)-if fail consult village head, police - resort to violence-no intermediary	- Consult village head - no adat leader -religious conflict: village head, police/military-camat	- Adat probs → adat leaders eg. When men disturb other men's wives - Crimes → security - Land → RT heads→ village chief→camat→police - Youth fights→ village head→ camat→ police - Inter-communal youth fights→ RT heads or 2 village heads - Marital prob → religious leader →kedesa → camat→ police - Thefts→ village head Domestic violence→ police	- Marital probs & inheritance → religious leaders - Crimes & land disputes → village head→ police -Youth fights → youth leader, village head, village govt, families -Other → village head, elders, BPD

	Seki, Galela	Bale, Galela	Gam Ici, Ibu	Talaga, Ibu
Village government/ structures	BPD – not elected yet LMD: not functional, was religiously mixed. 5 members appointed by village head – same as village govt, all male. LKMD: 10 members, 6 Christian, 4 Muslim, appointed by village head and staff but some still away. Village head: last election in 90	BPD: not elected yet LMD: not functional, members scattered around. Had 2 Christians and 2 Muslims, + head, elected by village leaders, all male. LKMD: not Village head: last election in 95	- Village head ('90-) - Village govt (5 members appointed by the head, approved by LMD) - BPD (5 members, 4 men 1 woman all ordinary) - LPM unestablished.	- Village head (Mar 01) - Village govt - BPD (5 members, all men) - LPM (4 members, all men) Youth org.
IDPs	- Not all Christians returned, latest wave scheduled for January 20, 04 and expect 40 families to return. Most returned in 03. Ca. 170 Christian families still in Tobelo.	-All Muslims back but not all Christians, latest wave came back 2-3 months ago	- All returned during Apr. to Dec. 2001. - Everyone got in-kind assist., but unequal contents. - Village head decided who returns first.	- Returned Jul. 2001 or all returned by 2002. - Everyone got assist. - Skepticism about corruption on assist (village head etc. created fake names to get additional assist.) - Rp.500,000/HH
Military/ Police	- No military post in village - Lack of trust in military and police to enforce law. Perceived by Christians as biased towards Muslims.	- No military post in village. Post offer rejected by village leaders - Military and police not helpful in solving shooting case and community mistrustful. Perceived by Christians as biased towards Muslims.	- Some think kec police too close to village govt. - Fairly responsive about other issues except for issues related to village govt. - No violent punishments.	- no military posts now. (pulled out b/c leaders and kec govt said it was better not to have for reconciliation purposes)
Gender	-PKK not functioning because not all IDPs are back. -Few women go to village meetings -no longer activities with Christian women	-PKK not functioning -Few women go to village meetings	- All participate in village mtgs. Some talk more than men especially re: daily life issues. - Before the conflict, there was a woman's farmers group that planted peanuts or vegetables. Now no longer due to lack of capital. - PKK, spontaneous women's group of 35. - no PKK activities after conflict. All women participate. - Poor women excluded from women's group.	- 3 informal women leaders. - Female candidates for BPD. - PKK, 2 saving groups (Oct 03), KDP - Darmawanita - All participate in comm. Mtg, but only a few speak up. - Poor women excluded from women's groups.

	Seki, Galela	Bale, Galela	Gam Ici, Ibu	Talaga, Ibu
Inter-religious interaction/ reconciliation	- Village religiously mixed, with no geographic separation -Activities between religious groups decreased - watch TV together -mixed religious youth hang out together in central part of village and organize sports events -cleaned village together	- Village geographically segregated into Christian and Muslim side. Interactions since shooting minimal and include buying groceries, borrowing tools. Go to other side of village only if have to -cleaned together village, organized by govt -no community initiatives for rebuilding trust, think that initiative should come from govt -several meetings done by kecamatan galelo inviting both sides to talk about conflict resolution -used to be invited to weddings, funerals, holidays but no longer	- Team 30 - Another spontaneous reconciliation mtg in Manado in Mar. 2000. - inter-village competition where all villages compete over cleanliness of villages. Organized by kec govt once a year. - No inter-village groups. - Frequent daily interactions. People chat, borrow things (tools, cattle, carts), visit each other for festivities, talk in the fields, markets, streets. - Help each other in coconut harvesting. - Relationship now is better than before the conflict, probably b/c people regret what happened. - No fear. - All from one big family.	Team 30 Informal fishermen's group b/w Bataca, initiated by janitors. 10 men. Senior HS for neighboring village kids Shared health facility in Talaga & market in Bataca. Visit each other for festivities, funerals, sports games. Joint savings group for civil servants Intermarriages before conflict. No fear, but interaction less than before conflict.
External Development Assistance	-Government Housing aid: separate for Muslims and Christians. some Muslims (incl. youth leader) unhappy over distribution and protested in 02 & attacked head's house. Village head in charge of drawing up list of needy people for Muslims. -World Vision housing aid	- Government Housing aid: separate for Muslims and Christians. First Christian coordinator of IDP aid replaced because had caused problems. 60 families still got no aid. For Muslims, head in charge and perceived as unfair. -World Vision: housing aid, education & reconciliation -UNDP: failed water-tank	- KDP (water system) - CARDI (water system) - Ausaid (materials for school renovation) Programs decided by head and staff.	KDP FAO (agr tools, boats & fishing nets, training) CARDI (soccer game) Min. of Agriculture Min. of Fisheries Min. of Industries (Sagu machine)
KDP	Not introduced	Not introduced	- 2nd village mtg. Just held & preparing proposals. - Public toilet, gutter, recruitment of primary teachers, scholarships (women), loan group for women. - Previous funding for water system stolen.	- Began 3,4 months ago, just finished mixed village mtg and preparing proposals. - Micro credit, water system (women), gutter - No previous funding

	Seki, Galela	Bale, Galela	Gam Ici, Ibu	Talaga, Ibu
Marginalized groups	Poorest, women, Christians	Poorest, women, Christians	- The poor (no group participation, KDP mtg participation) - The non-elites (i.e.- except wealthy, educated, comm. Leaders, teachers)	- the poor (no group participation) - youths (opinions not reflected in village decision-making)
Participation	-meetings mostly for village leaders, usually 1/month and village wide meetings according to need -few women participate or invited	- village meetings according to need, every 2-3 months for the entire village -few women participate, to some meetings invited PKK leaders, teachers and church group leaders, but mostly too shy to participate	- KDP mtg held once a month, RT mtg 3 times a month, village-wide only when there are special issues. - All comm. Voted for BPD.	- All comm. Vote for village head & BPD elections. - Most attend comm. Mtg, scheduled every 2 months. (Announced at the mosque). No mtg for 5 months.
Village Groups	Association of women civil servants Prayer Groups Women's farming group, separated by religion	Muslim and Christian religious groups Religiously separate cooking oil group	- 6 farmers' groups, only for men. - 4 women's farmers groups. - Sports teams - 4 savings groups(2 mixed, 1 men, 1 women) - 6 livestock group for men - Prayer groups (also for women and children, unactive) - 1 fishermen's group - PKK (not active)	- Farmers group (men) - Fishermen's group (men) - Loan group (men) - Youth group (men & women) - Darmawanita (civil servants' wives & female civl) - PKK
Youth	- Aggressive youth leader perpetuating violence -frequent mixed sports competitions, soccer and volleyball -youth mingle together in central part of village	-one youth org for two sub-villages, soccer and volleyball competitions -youth do not mingle together outside school -mixed elementary school	- Youth group (men & women) - clean the village, soccer, volleyball. Sometimes girls and boys play together. Play with other villages, too. - Youths speak at village mtgs. - Avg. senior HS grads	- Youth organization (men & women) - Youth leader - Mostly farmers, fishermen - Speak at village mtg but feel neglected. - Strong sense of unfairness/elite capture by elders. - Mostly junior HS grads or senior HS dropouts.
Decentralization	BPD not elected Invited to kecamatan for socialization Delay in teacher's salary	BPD not elected Invited to kecamatan for socialization School budget now smaller and receive salary earlier	- BPD members elected in 2002, awaiting Bupati's confirmation. - Head invited to camat's office, and then socialized to the village. - Village budget decreased.	- BPD & LPM elections held already in Mar 03. - Socialization by prov. Govt at kec office.

Appendix 4: Questionnaire

<u>**Key questions**</u>
- What has changed in the decentralization process?
- Which factors are relevant to make decentralization process more successful?
- Does successful decentralization contribute to strengthening conflict resolution? How? (Or does it create more space for violent conflicts to emerge?)
- Which conflict resolution mechanisms are considered effective by the people?
- How does decentralization affect these mechanism?
- Does KDP contribute to better conflict resolution? Why and how?

<u>**Things to watch out for…**</u>
- Institutional change
- Change in service delivery/quality
- Corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN)
- Stakeholder's understanding of local autonomy
- Stakeholder's judgment on local autonomy implementation
- Level of conflict
- Level of participation

<u>**Institutional Changes & Service Delivery**</u>
1. What are the key changes after decentralization on district/sub-district/village level: New institutions established? New election mechanism such as direct election of bupati? New budget allocation system? New recruitment/promotion system?
2. What are the key sectors that have been decentralized? (health, education…) How?
3. What are the positive effects of decentralization so far?
   - Increase community wealth
   - Increase quality of public service performance
   - Facilitate community participation
   - Decrease corruption (KKN) practices
   - Improve the effectiveness of law enforcement
   - Improve service delivery
4. What do you think of the process so far? Has it been fair and smooth? What have been the main difficulties?
5. What have been the main obstacles to implementing decentralization?
   - Limited budget
   - Limited personnel
   - Limited office supplies
   - Limited knowledge
   - Less concerned local government
   - Less concerned local parliament
   - Political frictions between the parliament & government
   - Political frictions between different levels of government
   - Low participation of the villages/communities
   - Limited network with other institutions (NGOs, other line ministries etc.)

6. How has the plan to hand over administrative and budgetary authorities worked? Why (not)?
7. Do you think that local government institutions work now better or worse than they did before decentralization? Why (not)?
8. Have local revenues increased or decreased? What are the main sources of local revenues?
9. What is the plan for transition of new districts? Has the plan worked so far?
10. How do people in the region select leaders, elections or appointments? Who gets elected by whom? Village heads, village parliament members, adat leaders etc. Do you think that this is a fair process?
11. Is there more money politics as a consequence of direct elections? Which election suffers the most? E.g.- Bupati, head of DPRD & DPRD commissions, village head, village parliament members.
12. Who decides the budget of the villages?
13. Is there a specific person/group who is now the most influential in the local government in budget/development/service delivery/personnel?
14. What makes someone influential? E.g.- political affiliation, economic power, ethnicity, religion, kinship etc.?
15. Do you think that the process has created more or less corruption? Which offices have more corruption? What are the major corruption practices (e.g.- election, recruitment, project bidding, local regulation formulation, local budget formulation)? Have there been any specific measures to combat corruption?

Participation

1. Are people more involved today in local government than before decentralization? If there is change, is this change for better or worse?
2. What kind of measures does the government use to induce community participation? E.g.- community meetings, mailbox, field survey, media etc. How often?
3. Which measure has been more effective and why? If no measures, why aren't there any institutionalized measures?
4. In which areas do you seek community's views? E.g.- local budget, formulation of development projects, formulation of local regulations etc.
5. Why aren't some issues discussed with the community? E.g.- budget, audit etc.
6. Who are the main groups of people that are involved in such consultations and why? How do you disseminate information on community/public meetings, for example?
7. Are there any measures to include the marginalized people? E.g.- women, youth, the poor, ethnic/religious minority.
8. To what extend is mass media/civil society organizations involved in decision-making? Which type of media/CSO and why? Do they have any influence on the decision making process?

Community Perception

1. Are you aware that the government has taken efforts to decentralize? If yes, how did you find out (source of information)?
2. What do you know about decentralization? E.g.- greater local authority in development, greater income etc.
3. Do you have a BPD already? How were the members chosen? Village head?
4. Do you think the village head and members of BPD are helpful, or only to a certain group of people?
5. Do you prefer LKMD or BPD? Why?

6. Was there a lot of money politics or frictions for the elections? Did everyone vote?
7. Which election do you care the most about? Presidential, DPRD I & II, Bupati, Village head, BPD etc. Why?
8. Which leader is the most responsive? Why? Which leaders are useless?
9. Do you think health/education/ID card acquisition/security/land certification etc. has improved? What is the worst serviced area? E.g.- health, education, police, village office etc.
10. Do you think that only a certain group of powerful people are benefiting more? Why (not)?
11. Do you think that people care more about religion/ethnicity/political affiliation now than before? Why (not)?
12. What are the major government-funded community participatory programs? Have the numbers increased or decreased after decentralization?
13. Are there more community meetings held by the government? How do you hear about them? Who normally participates in those meetings?
14. Are there any youth groups, women's groups, other civil society organizations in your area? What do they do? How do they organize?

Conflict
1. Tell me about some disputes that have occurred after 1999 in this region/village? What have been the main reasons for them? Who were the main actors involved?
2. How were these disputes resolved? Which institutions/individuals played a role?
3. Whom do people turn to when they have problems (formal and informal institutions or individuals)? Why? Has this changed in the past few years following decentralization?
4. Do you know of some disputes or problems that arose out of the process of decentralization? Tell me about them. How could these disputes have been prevented?
5. Do you trust bupati, village heads, BPD members more now that they're directly elected? Do they play a bigger role now? Why (not)?
6. What is the best way to resolve disputes? E.g.-through mushawarah, just wait till things cool down, resort to violence, have adat or religious leaders mediate.
7. What role do security forces play when there are disputes?
8. What mechanism do you think is important to prevent disputes (intra/inter-village)?
9. Does KDP meetings help generate culture of negotiation? Do you think this helps prevent violent disputes?
10. Are there any inter-kecamatan, inter-village meetings/groups?

Marginalized Groups
1. Have some people (women, IDP's,…) fared worse than others as a result of the change in government structures? Why?
2. What is the composition of the local government structures (ethnic, religious, gender)?
3. Are there any specific measures to include these people? Why (not)?
4. How many women/ other marginalized groups hold office and what are their duties?
5. Why do you think there are (not) more women/ other marginalized groups in positions of power?
6. Does it make a difference if women / other marginalized groups are part of the local government? Is it important to include these groups? Why?
7. Are there any economic assistance programs in place for the poor/disadvantaged? How do they function? Who benefits from them?

Steps for Improvement

1. What are the main steps you think the government needs to take to improve the process of decentralization?
2. What are the most important areas you think that need to be addressed?
3. What can be done to include more women/ other marginalized groups in local government?
4. What can be done to make local government more accountable to the people and less corrupt?
5. How can the government improve service delivery?

Appendix 5: List of Key Informants by Sector & Government Level

Government	Non-Government	KDP
Province		
• Min. of Planning (Bappeda) • Min. of Home Affairs (PMD) • Decentralization & Pemekeran Sub-division, Bureau of Governance, Governor's Office • District Head (Bupati/Sekda) • District Parliament (DPRD II) Budget Commission • Satkorlak (Emergency Relief Coordination Committee)	• Local media (Aspirasi) • UNDP • Cordaid • CARDI • World Vision Indonesia • Int'l Relief & Development: IRD	• Regional Manager
District **(North & West Halmahera)**		
• First Assistant of Bupati (N.Hal) • Election Committee (N.Hal) • Min. of Planning (W.Hal) • Min. of Home Affairs (W.Hal) • Regional Revenue Office (DISPENDA, W.Hal) • Budget Sub. Div, Finance Div, Bupati Office (W.Hal)		
Sub-district (Kec. Galela & Ibu)		
• Sub-district Head (Camat)		• Kecamatan Facilitator
Village (Desa)		
• Village head • Secretary of Village government • Head/Members of BPD/LKMD • Members of LPM	• (Un)Educated Women • (Un)Educated Men • Youths • Elders • Religious leaders • Traditional leader (Adat) • Community leaders • Women leaders • Youth leaders • Teachers • Health workers/Midwives • Victims of shooting/bombing	• Village Facilitator

Appendix 6: List of Key Informants by Organizations

Time period: January 2004
Interviewed by: Makiko Watanabe and Jozefina Cutura
Translator: Widya Setiabudi

Name/Title	Organization	Date/Location
George Conway *Programme Specialist*	UNDP	Jan. 9, Jakarta
Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin *Research Associate*	UNSFIR	Jan. 9, Jakarta
Karen Janjua *Area Projects Manager*	UNDP	Jan. 9, Jakarta
Leni Dharmawan *Consultant*	World Bank	Jan. 9, Jakarta
Halid Andisi *KDP and Appropriate Technology Division*	Provincial PMD (Department of Home Affairs)	Jan. 11, Ternate
Murid Toneiro *Head Editor*	Aspirasi (weekly tabloid)	Jan. 11, Ternate
John Holmes-Ievers *Field Coordinator, North Sulawesi*	CARDI	Jan. 11, Ternate
Deputy	Provincial Bapeda	Jan. 12, Ternate
Sharif *Head*	Provincial PMD	Jan. 12, Ternate
Ibu Heni *Deputy*	West Halmahera PMD	Jan. 12, Ternate
Nurbeti Hasanah *Head*	BAPPEDA (Regional Planning Agency – kabupaten West Halmahera)	Jan. 12, Ternate
Ahmad Kamel *Head*	DISPENDA - Regional Revenue Office	Jan. 13, Ternate
Achmad Kamel *Head of the Budget Subdivision Finance Department*	Bupati Office, (W. H)	Jan. 13, Ternate
David Hangeva *Camat*	Kecamatan Government	Jan. 14, Tobelo
Fauzi Daga *Head of the District Election Committee*	KPU – Elections Commission	Jan. 14, Ternate
Ibrahim Kadim *Village Head*	Village Government	Jan. 14, Garua, Galela
Herman Midja *Principal*	SD	Jan. 14, Garua, Galela
Kampona *Teacher*	SD	Jan. 14, Garua, Galela
Wife of Village Head/PKK head	PKK, Village Government	Jan. 15, Seki, Galela
Gabriel Lefara *Ex-Village Head/Bombing Victim*	Village	Jan. 15, Seki, Galela
Yasin Wiludu *Village Secretary*	Village Government	Jan. 15, Bale (Ori), Galela
Church Leader	Village	Jan. 15, Bale (Bale), Galela
Supriyadi *Imam*	Village	Jan. 15/16, Bale (Ori), Galela
Group of Women, Farmers and Housewives	Village	Jan. 16, Bale (Bale), Galela

Name/Title	Organization	Date/Location
Youth Leader/Village Office Staff	Village government	Jan. 16, Bale (Bale), Galela
Teacher	SMK	Jan. 16, Bale (Bale), Galela
Salomina Suntaki *Farmer/Wife of Shooting Victim*	Village	Jan. 17, Bale (Bale), Galela
Benja Madi *Bombing Victim/Teacher*	Village	Jan. 17, Seki, Galela
Village Head	Village Government	Jan. 17, Seki, Galela
Nikodemus Koja *Teacher/Beating Victim*	SD	Jan. 17, Tobelo
Thamrin T. *Village Head*	Village Government	Jan. 18, Bale (Ori), Galela
Amarula Amar *Youth Leader/Perpetrator of Beating*	Village	Jan. 18, Seki, Galela
Anete Lefara *Farmer*	Village	Jan. 18, Seki, Galela
Female Farmer	Village	Jan. 18, Seki, Galela
Haji Etno *Trader/Businessman/Religious Leader/Village Staff*	Village Government	Jan. 18, Seki, Galela
Nomensen Kharim *Adat Leader*	Village	Jan. 19, Seki, Galela
Abdullah *Imam*	Village	Jan. 19, Seki, Galela
Hasna *Midwife*	Village	Jan. 19, Seki, Galela
Eruaeda Sugi *Female Teacher*	Village	Jan. 19, Seki, Galela
Simon Kotu *Christian Community Leader*	Village	Jan. 20, Tobelo (from Bale)
Asser Kadato *First Assistant to Bupati*	Kabupaten - Bupati's Office	Jan. 20, Tobelo
Adam Do Jusuf	Camat	Jan. 21, Tongote Ternate, Ibu
Wife of Village Head + Widow	Village	Jan. 21, Talaga, Ibu
Village Head	Village Government	Jan. 21, Talaga, Ibu
Haji Hatab *Team 30 Member/LKM Chief*	Village Government	Jan. 21, Talaga, Ibu
Zahra *FD Facilitator*	KDP	Jan. 21, Talaga, Ibu
Amir *Village Chief*	Village Government	Jan. 22, Gam Ici, Ibu
Rajab Umar Community Leader/Adat *Leader/Ex-village Chief*	Village	Jan. 22, Gam Ici, Ibu
Juff Fri *Religious Leader*	Village	Jan. 22, Gam Ici, Ibu
Anas Sanajai *Teacher/Vice President of BPD*	Village Government	Jan. 22, Talaga, Ibu
Abu Bakar Haji Ali *Youth Leader/LPM Secretary*	Village Government	Jan. 22, Talaga, Ibu
Umi *Poor Female Farmer*	Village	Jan. 22, Talaga, Ibu
Adat Leader	Village	Jan. 23, Gam Ici, Ibu
Mariani *Female FD*	KDP	Jan. 23, Gam Ici, Ibu

Name/Title	Organization	Date/Location
Ratna Hasijarutin *Teacher*	Private SD	Jan. 23, Gam Ici, Ibu
Jofery *Imam*	Village	Jan. 23, Talaga, Ibu
Hubais Jumaati *Poor Male Farmer*	Village	Jan. 23, Talaga, Ibu
Mahmud Hamza *Farmer/One of 4 Looters*	Village	Jan. 24, Gam Ici, Ibu
Sarini Umar *Female University Student*	Village	Jan. 24, Gam Ici, Ibu
Masjud Batang *Farmer/One of 3 Accusers*	Village	Jan. 24, Gam Ici, Ibu
Ade Dayan *Former FD*	KDP	Jan. 24, Gam Ici, Ibu
Tuni Liputo *Village Secretary*	Village Government	Jan. 24, Gam Ici, Ibu
Jenny Zebedius *Regional Coordinator*	KDP	Jan. 25, Ternate
Halid Andisi *Secretary of KDP Coordination Team*	KDP	Jan. 26, Ternate
Rachel *Program Officer*	IRD	Jan. 26, Ternate
Zainal M. Taher *Head of Governance Division*		Jan. 26, Ternate
Hans Antlov *Program Officer*	The Ford Foundation	Jan. 28, Jakarta