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IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(IDA-34360 IDA-3436A IFAD-04460)

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF

US\$ 66.7 MILLION EQUIVALENT

TO

BURKINA FASO

FOR A

COMMUNITY-BASED RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

IN SUPPORT OF THE FIRST PHASE OF THE

NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR DECENTRALIZED RURAL DEVELOPMENT

February 29, 2008

Agricultural and Rural Development Unit
Sustainable Development Department
Country Department AFCW1
Africa Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective February 2008)

Currency Unit = FCFA

US\$ 1.00 = 441 FCFA

FISCAL YEAR

January 1 to December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

APL	Adaptable Program Loan
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
CBRDP	Community Based Rural Development Project
CCP	Country Partnership Program
CCTP	<i>Cadre de Concertation Technique Provinciale</i> (Technical Provincial Consultative Group)
CPAR	Country Procurement Assessment Report
CPAM	<i>Commissions Provinciales d'Attribution des Marchés</i>
CNCPDR	<i>Cadre National de Coordination des Partenaires du Développement Rural</i>
CND	<i>Commission Nationale de la Décentralisation</i> (National Commission on Decentralization)
CNSFMR	<i>Comité National de Sécurisation Foncière en Milieu Rural</i>
CSLP	<i>Cadre Stratégique de Lutte contre la Pauvreté</i> (Poverty Reduction Strategy)
CVD	<i>Conseil Villageois de Développement</i> (Village Development Council)
CVGT	<i>Commission Villageoise de Gestion des Terroirs</i> (Village Land Management Committee)
CIVGT	<i>Commission Inter- Villageoise de Gestion des Terroirs</i> (Inter-Village Land Management Committee)
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DCA	Development Credit Agreement
DGCL	<i>Direction Générales des Collectivités Locales</i> (Department of Local Governments)
DGFROP	<i>Direction Générale du Foncier Rural et des Organisations Paysannes</i> (General Direction for Land Tenure and Producers Organizations)
EA	Environmental Assessment
ESMF	Environmental and Social Management Framework
ERR	Economic Rates of Return
FCFA	<i>Franc de la Communauté Financière Africaine</i> (West African Franc)
FMR	Financial Management Report
GEF	Global Environment Fund
ICR	Implementation Completion and Results Report
IDA	International Development Association

IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
ISR	Implementation Status Report
LIF	Local Investments Fund
LPDRD	<i>Lettre de Politique de Développement Rural Décentralisé</i> (Policy letter for Decentralized rural Development)
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NCU	National Coordination Unit
MAHRH	<u>Ministère de l’Agriculture, de l’Hydraulique et des Ressources Halieutiques</u> (Minsitry for Agriculture, Hydraulics, and Fisheries)
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NRM	Natural Resources Management
PACGL	<i>Projet d’Appui à la Concertation et à la Gouvernance Locale</i> (Support Project for Consultations and local Governance/UNDP)
PADDAB	<i>Projet d’Appui Danois au Développement du secteur de l’Agriculture au Burkina Faso</i> (Danish project to support to agricultural development sector in Burkina Faso)
PGT	<i>Plan de Gestion des Terroirs</i> (Land Management Plan)
PNDRD	<i>Programme National de Développement Rural Décentralisé</i> (National Program for Decentralized Rural Development)
PNGT	<i>Programme National de Gestion des Terroirs</i> (National Program for Land Management)
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
TOD	<i>Textes d’Orientation de la Décentralisation</i> (General Principles on Decentralization)
QAE	Quality At Entry
QAG	Quality Assurance Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Program

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BURKINA FASOCOUNTRY
Community-Based Rural Development Project
in Support of the First Phase of the
National Program for Decentralized Rural Development

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A. Basic Information			
Country:	Burkina Faso	Project Name:	COMMUNITY-BASED RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Project ID:	P035673	L/C/TF Number(s):	COFN-04460,IDA-34360,IDA-3436A
ICR Date:	02/29/2008	ICR Type:	Core ICR
Lending Instrument:	APL	Borrower:	GOVERNMENT OF BURKINA
Original Total Commitment:	XDR 50.5M	Disbursed Amount:	XDR 50.2M
Environmental Category: B			
Implementing Agencies: PNGT - Coordination Nationale			
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: International Fund for Agriculture Development (IFAD) United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) DANIDA			

B. Key Dates				
Process	Date	Process	Original Date	Revised / Actual Date(s)
Concept Review:	09/24/1998	Effectiveness:	12/21/2001	12/21/2001
Appraisal:	01/24/2000	Restructuring(s):		
Approval:	11/30/2000	Mid-term Review:	05/10/2004	11/18/2004
		Closing:	06/30/2006	06/30/2007

C. Ratings Summary	
C.1 Performance Rating by ICR	
Outcomes:	Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome:	Low or Negligible
Bank Performance:	Satisfactory
Borrower Performance:	Highly Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)			
Bank	Ratings	Borrower	Ratings
Quality at Entry:	Moderately Satisfactory	Government:	Highly Satisfactory
Quality of Supervision:	Satisfactory	Implementing Agency/Agencies:	Highly Satisfactory
Overall Bank	Satisfactory	Overall Borrower	Highly Satisfactory

Performance:		Performance:	
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C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

Implementation Performance	Indicators	QAG Assessments (if any)	Rating
Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	No	Quality at Entry (QEA):	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	No	Quality of Supervision (QSA):	None
DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:	Highly Satisfactory		

D. Sector and Theme Codes

	Original	Actual
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
General agriculture, fishing and forestry sector	15	16
General public administration sector	32	32
General water, sanitation and flood protection sector	15	22
Other social services	23	16
Roads and highways	15	14
Theme Code (Primary/Secondary)		
Decentralization	Primary	Secondary
Other environment and natural resources management	Secondary	Secondary
Participation and civic engagement	Primary	Primary
Rural services and infrastructure	Secondary	Primary

E. Bank Staff

Positions	At ICR	At Approval
Vice President:	Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili	Callisto E. Madavo
Country Director:	Ishac Diwan	Hasan A. Tuluy
Sector Manager:	Karen Mcconnell Brooks	Jean-Paul Chausse
Project Team Leader:	Emmanuel Y. Nikiema	Jane C. Hopkins
ICR Team Leader:	Amadou Oumar Ba	
ICR Primary Author:	Amadou Oumar Ba	

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)

The Project's development objective is to (i) increase the productive capacity of the rural sector and (ii) improve the effectiveness of public investments by developing the institutional and organizational capacity necessary to enable local communities to plan, implement, and manage their own development process. The participatory approach to reach this objective was implemented with success during the first NRM project (PNGT), and then extended extended to all country's provinces.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	Percentage of villages covered by the project have received capacity building support and adopted a local development plan.			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	0%	75%	None	148%
Date achieved	01/02/2001	06/30/2007	06/30/2007	06/30/2007
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Achieved behind target. 2961 villages (against 2000 targeted at appraisal) received capacity building and adopted their local development plans.			
Indicator 2 :	Percentage of villages have representative and participatory bodies (CVGTs) assuming their role in local development (planning, execution, and management of local projects).			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	0%	60%	None	149%
Date achieved	01/02/2001	06/30/2007	06/30/2007	06/30/2007
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Achieved above target. 2986 have their CVGTs established and have completed their development plans in a satisfactory manner. For 25 villages, the development plans were already elaborated by other partners.			
Indicator 3 :	Percentage of CVGTs that have substantially completed sub-projects identified in their local development plan.			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	0%	60%	None	98%
Date achieved	01/02/2001	06/30/2007	06/30/2007	06/30/2007
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Based on the project survey conducted during 2007 (which assessed intermediary results), 100 percent of surveyed villages have completed at least 98 percent of their micro-projects according to annual investment plans.			

Indicator 4 :	Percent of provinces with a functioning and representative coordination body.			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	0%	75%	None	100%
Date achieved	01/02/2001	06/30/2007	06/30/2007	06/30/2007
Comments (incl. % achievement)	The project has revitalized CCTPs in all 45 provinces, although targeting only 26 provinces. These CCTPs held 481 meetings thanks project's support, which is a good sign of well functioning bodies.			

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	percent of villages that have satisfactory completed their annual investment plan.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0%	75%	None	98%
Date achieved	01/02/2001	06/30/2007	06/30/2007	06/30/2007
Comments (incl. % achievement)	It is stated that 98% of surveyed villages have completed their annual investment plans.			
Indicator 2 :	percent of CVGT trained and functional.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	53%	75%	None	100%
Date achieved	01/15/2004	06/30/2007	06/30/2007	06/30/2007
Comments (incl. % achievement)	All villages covered by the project benefited adequate capacity building programs (with 5.5 million training days).			
Indicator 3 :	percent of micro projects that are technically sound and cost effectively implemented.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	75%	None	90%
Date achieved	01/02/2001	06/30/2007	06/30/2007	06/30/2007
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Total of 18250 micro-projects for US \$ 48,7 million implemented by the communities. Cost-efficiency analysis shows that CBRDP's unit costs were between 34 and 94 percent of sectoral comparators, with the largest efficiency gains in social infrastructure.			
Indicator 4 :	number of provincial coordinating bodies trained and functioning			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	not defined	None	45%
Date achieved	01/02/2001	06/30/2007	06/30/2007	06/30/2007
Comments (incl. % achievement)	12 training sessions were organized for all members of the 45 CCTPs.			

achievement)				
Indicator 5 :	number of service providers trained and providing services to communities.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	500	None	1337
Date achieved	01/02/2001	06/30/2007	06/30/2007	06/30/2007
Comments (incl. % achievement)	This result is 167% largely above target at appraisal.			


G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No.	Date ISR Archived	DO	IP	Actual Disbursements (USD millions)
1	06/28/2001	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.00
2	12/21/2001	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.00
3	05/09/2002	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	2.83
4	12/03/2002	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	3.41
5	05/31/2003	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	7.65
6	12/22/2003	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	15.23
7	05/28/2004	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	20.83
8	12/15/2004	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	33.56
9	06/29/2005	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	43.92
10	12/29/2005	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	53.83
11	06/30/2006	Highly Satisfactory	Highly Satisfactory	61.74
12	01/11/2007	Highly Satisfactory	Highly Satisfactory	71.40
13	07/21/2007	Highly Satisfactory	Highly Satisfactory	72.98

H. Restructuring (if any)

Not Applicable

I. Disbursement Profile



1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

Burkina Faso is a landlocked country covering 274,000 km² with a population of about 13.5 million people which implies a population density approaching 49 inhabitants / km² in average. Since 2001, economic growth is stable with an average of 6.3% per year (the highest in West Africa), however not enough to meet the high demand of the population growing at a rate of 3.1% per annum between 2000 and 2005. The government of Burkina Faso's stated main goal is to improve the revenues and living conditions of the rural population which represents more than 80 percent of the total country's population.

At appraisal, the country was in a process of defining and adopting key development strategies aimed at combating poverty and promoting decentralization in Burkina Faso. In 2000, the Government's first *Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper* (PRSP) was adopted. This paper put strong emphasis on improving the revenues and living conditions of the rural population, who account for more than 52% of the poor, by increasing access to socio-economic services and employment opportunities, and promoting good governance at the local level.

The '*Textes d'Orientation de la Décentralisation*' (TOD), promulgated in 1998, provided the guidelines for the decentralization process in Burkina Faso. Decentralization and participation were heralded as pillars of sustainable development in the Policy Letter for decentralized rural development ('*Lettre de Politique de Développement Rural Décentralisé*' - LPDRD) endorsed by the Government in 2000. To put this vision into action, the Government of Burkina Faso formulated a 15-year National Program for Decentralized Rural Development (PNDRD) supported by several development partners. The long-term vision of the PNDRD is one of participatory and representative local Governments and institutions planning and managing their own development programs and mobilizing the necessary resources through increased local revenues and Government fiscal transfers.

To this end, the World Bank assisted the Government in the preparation of a 15-year, three phase Adaptable Program Loan (APL) to support the implementation of the Policy Letter. The Community Based Rural Development Project (CBRD) was prepared in this context to (i) strengthen the capacity of villages and local Governments to prioritize, plan, implement, and maintain community-based investments; (ii) provide decentralized funding for demand-driven and community-managed rural infrastructure and services; and, (iii) support the ongoing decentralization process. This ICR pertains to the first phase of the APL. The second phase, approved on March 27, 2007, is under implementation.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators

The Project's development objective was to: (i) increase the productive capacity of the rural sector; and (ii) improve the effectiveness of public investments by developing the institutional and organizational capacity necessary to enable local communities to plan, implement, and manage their own development process. The participatory approach to reach this objective was implemented with success during the first NRM project (PNGT) preceding the PNDRD, and then extended to all country's provinces.

The project was designed as an Adaptable Program Lending (APL) to be implemented over a 15-year period, consisting of three 5-year phases. Each of these phases was designed flexibly to adapt to the country's decentralization choices, the pace of resulting institutional reforms, and the need to harmonize various approaches. The program was also built on the successful predecessor NRM project. The first phase (2002-2007) was to be focused on: (i) building local capacity to plan and implement rural development, accelerate the pace of public transfers for decentralized rural development; and (ii) supporting the implementation of the country's decentralization framework.

The following key PDO indicators were agreed:

- i. 75% of villages covered by the project have received capacity building support and adopted a local development plan;
- ii. 60% of beneficiary villages have representative and participatory bodies (CVGTs) assuming their role in local development (planning, execution, and management of local projects);
- iii. Percentage of CVGTs that have substantially completed sub-projects identified in their local development plan; and
- iv. 75% of provinces with a functioning and representative coordination body.

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

Not applicable

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

The primary beneficiaries of the project were the rural population living in the 2,000 villages covered by the project (scaled up to 3,013 in 2006), estimated at about 3.5 million people, representing about 35 percent of the rural population). Considering that strengthened capacity of broadly representative village organizations is a prerequisite for the equitable distribution of project benefits and the sustainability of results, capacity building for *Commissions Villageoises de Gestion des Terroirs* (CVGT) and support to their internal organizations and procedures was targeted as a key step in the emergence of capable rural municipalities.

Since the project played an important coordination role at the village, province and national levels, integrating the interventions of a large number of actors across a broad range of sectors and sub-sectors, other key beneficiaries included the CCTP (*Cadres de Concertation Technique Provinciale*) at provincial level, the services at the Ministry in charge of decentralization and the Ministry in charge of Agriculture at the national level, and the public, NGOs and private service providers involved in project activities.

The financial support of the project, along with that of parallel financing partner programs (e.g. the UNDP's program (PACGL) attached to the project) provided institutional support for the elaboration of the '*Code general des collectivités territoriales*', the functioning of the national forum (the CNCPDRD) and the revitalization of the CCTPs.

1.5 Original Components

The project included five main components: (i) Local Capacity Building; (ii) Local Investment Fund; (iii) Institutional capacity Building (including support and advisory services); (iv) Land Tenure Security Pilot Operation; and (v) Project Coordination, Administration and Monitoring/Evaluation.

Component I. Local Capacity Building - (US\$ 11.38 million; IDA US \$ 5.46)

The objective of this component was to strengthen the technical and organizational capacity of the rural population so that they can prioritize, plan and execute the activities envisaged under the program, including the preparation and implementation of local development plans, and the organization into socially cohesive rural municipalities. This component is divided under three sub-components: (i) *Village level consultations* in form of awareness raising, including all communication, promotion and information activities; the aim was to disseminate the project's objectives, explain modalities for participation, and encourage regrouping of villages; (ii) *CVGT/CIVGT training programs* centered on the organizational, management and technical skills required for communities' organizations to successfully plan, implement, and maintain village level investments. Under this sub-component, there was also a specific HIV/AIDS training and awareness raising program, and an alphabetization program; and (iii) *Technical Support to Community organizations* provided to the CVGT and sub-committees for carrying out their annual investment plans, and help beneficiaries in setting up maintenance programs and mechanisms for cost-recovery.

Component II. Local Investment Fund (LIF) – (US\$ 54.79 million; IDA US \$ 33.75)

The objective of the LIF was to provide resources in two separate windows to communities for financing: (i) village and inter-village sub-projects, and (ii) to undertake larger structural works (infrastructure projects) at provincial level. Eligible subprojects included, among other, soil and water conservation works, reforestation and forest management, structural support for improving livestock production, structural support for improving agricultural production, water supply infrastructure works, roads infrastructure works, social and economic infrastructure, renewable energy, nutrition and health education and AIDS/HIV prevention and mitigation activities.

Component III. Institutional Capacity Building – (US\$ 26.52 million; IDA US \$ 12.73)

The specific objective of this component was to build institutional capacity at the local, provincial and national level by training and supporting field teams and other service providers, and promoting PNDRD activities to enhance rural decentralization processes. Thus, at the local level, the project aimed to train, contract, and equip field operators (NGOs, consulting firms, Government technical services), while at the provincial and regional levels, CCTPs and regional public planning units were targeted to strengthen their capacity to monitor decentralized rural development process. At the national level, the purpose was to support the CND and the DGCL in their efforts to design and gradually implement decentralized and participatory rural development. Proposed program under this component included: (i) a pilot project involving testing the social, economic, fiscal and institutional viability of five or six rural municipalities; (ii) training, information, communication targeting elected of new rural municipalities; (iii) support for rural decentralization planning to CND and DGCL for carrying out studies and action-research on specific aspects of rural

decentralization; and (iv) administrative support to CND and DGCL in terms of human and material resources and operating assistance.

Component IV. Land Tenure Security Pilot Operation – (US\$ 3.82 million; IDA US \$ 3.1)

The objective of this component was to help improve land tenure security and access for all users. It was intended to: (i) foster equity and social peace, (ii) encourage investment and raise agricultural productivity, and (iii) enhance the preservation of natural resources. This component was set-up to intervene in six test sites representing the principal systems of land uses and the ownership problems associated with them. Results expected from these pilot activities, included: (i) a practical methodological guide (toolbox) for use in improving the security of rural land tenure; (ii) a documentation system for information generated by the project's pilot operations; (iii) a preliminary national action plan for securing stable and fair land tenure; and (iv) a preliminary program of land tenure interventions for implementation in next phases of the PNDRD.

Component V. Administration, Monitoring and Project Coordination – (US\$ 10.94 million; IDA US \$ 5.46)

The objective of this component was to ensure sound and efficient management of the project and coordination of the overall program for effective harmonization of different programs and projects. The component included three sub-components: (i) support for the coordination office/office of the overall PNDRD; (ii) support for the coordination and management of the IDA-supported Project; and (iii) support for the program and project monitoring and evaluation. Envisaged results were: (i) establishment of a National Forum for the overall program; (ii) coordination of all activities under the project and providing funding to beneficiaries; and (iii) setting up an integrated M&E and management system for both the overall PNDRD and the IDA-supported project.

1.6 Revised Components

There was no change in the number and headings of the components. However, during the mid-term review (December 2004), it was recommended to adjust the implementation arrangements for **Component IV Land Tenure Security Pilot Operation**. There was no fundamental change in the conceptual design of this component. Given the implementation complexity at the beginning, and the fact that the results were not satisfactory enough at mid-term review, it was decided to rearrange implementation arrangements by grouping activities in two categories: (i) activities related to policy, institutional, legal and normative measures to enhance equitable and sustainable land tenure security in rural areas were devoted to the responsibility of the CNSFMR; while (ii) the project was accountable for activities to secure communities' investments in targeted pilot areas.

1.7 Other significant changes

Members of parliament conducted a field mission in 2004 to assess project implementation. Following their positive evaluation of achievements, the government requested that the project be expanded to cover all villages in Burkina Faso. Although project resources were insufficient to cover the entire country, a decision was taken at the mid-term review to cover all villages within the 26 (out of 45) provinces covered by the project. A reallocation of

project funds in January 2006 allowed the project to scale-up from the initial target of 2,000 villages to 3,013 villages by the end of the project in June 2007.

A UNDP program to enhance consultation and local governance was launched in 2004 and attached to the CBRDP. This program was implemented by the project coordination unit in support of Components 1 (Local Capacity Building) and 3 (Institutional Capacity Building) with the intent to: (i) stimulate consultation forums at all levels, (ii) develop planning tools and improve local development monitoring, and (iii) harmonize and capitalize the different sets of laws. This program allowed savings in the Capacity building components of the project that made it possible to increase the amount allocated to the Local Investments Fund (LIF).

The designated level of the Special Account was found to be insufficient to meet the increasing demand for the LIF as annual investment plans were approved. Hence, the project unit was facing immense difficulties in the timely transfer of funds to communities for micro-project implementation. Following a review of projected cash flow needs and the project's implementation and financial management performance, the credit agreement was amended in March 2003 increasing the designated level in the Special Account from 1.5 to 4.5 billion FCFA.

In addition the LIF formula was amended following the mid-term review. It was initially based on a fixed amount of 3000 FCFA per capita per village. During implementation it was noted that this amount did not allow smaller villages to finance basic priority infrastructure. This issue was discussed and resolved during the MTR when a decision was taken to modify the allocation formula as follows:

- Villages < 1000 inhbt: CFA 5 million
- Villages > 1000 inhbt: CFA 5 million + Surplus Inhbt x CFA 3,000/inhbt

Finally, based in large part on the project's success in demonstrating the capacity of rural communities to manage their own development process and in supporting the analysis and institutional framework necessary to advance decentralization, the *Code Général des Collectivités Territoriales* was adopted by the National Assembly and promulgated in April 2005. The Code defined the *Department* as the entry point for decentralization. Consequently, the notion of stimulating the emergence of rural municipalities by encouraging villages to engage in joint activities under a CIVGT lost its relevance and was therefore abandoned.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

Project preparation was conducted between 1998 and 2000. It took two years to finalize the project design and to bring the project to the board. The project design was appropriate for laying the foundation for achieving the long-term development goals of the overall program, which was agreed upon with the government of Burkina Faso for a harmonized decentralized rural development framework. The program design incorporated lessons learned from a previous project, the 'PNGT', that intervened in 8 provinces and 486 villages. In particular the PNGT's pilot experience in Kouritenga province had demonstrated that the responsibility for the execution of investment projects could be transferred to the beneficiary communities.

The design also took into account all relevant national strategies of the government, notably: (i) the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (particularly its second pillar “increasing the access of the poor to basic social services”); (ii) the *Programme National de Développement Rural Décentralisé* (PNDRD); and (iii) the *Lettre de Politique de Développement Rural Décentralisé* (LPDRD).

In addition, donor collaboration during the project preparation cycle was also optimal; at least two other donors (IFAD, DANIDA) agreed to pull together their financial support to contribute to the project as an initial step to build a national program on decentralized rural development. Although the announced Dutch commitment at preparation stage did not follow through, a UNDP program was developed and integrated into the project in 2004 to support the capacity building components.

Despite lengthy preparation, it still took considerable time to launch project activities. The project was approved by the board on November 30, 2000 after having been appraised in January 2000. Task team leadership was changed prior to appraisal and the appraisal mission resulted in changes to project design to increase the project’s role as an instrument to support the national decentralization strategy. This necessitated a follow-up “pre-negotiation” mission to revise implementation arrangements and the government’s Policy Letter which was not completed at the time of appraisal. Thus, although the project was appraised in January 2000, it was not negotiated until April. In addition, an initial EA was disclosed prior to appraisal, however substantial revisions were required following the ASPEN team review and the final revised document was not submitted to the InfoShop in time for a July board date. As a result, a management decision was taken to postpone the board date to November 2000 to satisfy the 120 day disclosure requirements of the Pelosi Amendment.

The Development Credit Agreement was signed on June 7, 2001 six months after board approval. The delay was due to difficulties (i) in sorting out *pari-passu* arrangements stipulated in the credit agreement with one of the financing partners and (ii) in coming to an agreement with the Government on the location of the Project Account (the minutes of negotiations stipulated that the account be located in a commercial bank; following board approval the Government challenged this condition and requested that the account be located in the Central Bank – the signing was delayed until the issue was resolved between the Ministry of Finance and the CMU).

The project became effective on December 12, 2001 – six months after signing the credit agreement and a year after board approval - the launch workshop was held in February 2002. A number of reasons can be cited for this lengthy process, and slow start-up of activities on the ground, some within and some outside the control of the project:

- The administrative and financial manual of procedures was not ready prior to the negotiations and thus became a condition of effectiveness. The process of hiring the consultant to finalize the manual took more time than expected and led to delays in effectiveness;
- The ratification of Development Credit Agreement after signature was delayed due to closing of the National Assembly June session; since the legal opinion (*avis juridique*) depends on DCA ratification by the National Assembly, this step was only possible after the opening of the next October session;
- Although all essential personnel were in place one month after the signature of the credit agreement, their deployment in the field was delayed due to long acquisition

process of project's vehicles and computer equipment: these materials were purchased through Côte d'Ivoire which was already experiencing its political problems.

2.2 Implementation

Shortly after the start up of project activities, the project faced high disbursement demands following the submission of annual investments plans to implement village and provincial micro-projects. This created a cash flow bottleneck and made it extremely difficult for the project to transfer local investment funds to communities in a timely manner so that planned micro-projects could be completed according to schedule. Most activities could be realized only during the dry season (4-5 months) when farmers were not held up by field occupation to participate and supervise micro-projects execution. It became obvious that the limited initial Special Account ceiling of F CFA 750, 000 was not sufficient to face the high seasonal demand. In addition, at that time withdrawal applications took an average of 45 days to be processed. Following exchanges on this issue, the initial deposit was raised twice during the project lifetime – first to F CFA 2.2 billion and then to F CFA 4, 5 billion – accompanied by a decrease in withdrawal delays. On the other hand, the initial deposit of the IFAD funding of F CFA 350,000 was never raised despite the project request. Nonetheless, by taking these measures the project was able to deal with the increasing demand for revolving funds for village investments.

Anticipated funding from Netherlands, promised during project preparation, did not materialize in the end. This contribution was dedicated to support activities to promote renewable energy as part of the local investments funds. The withdrawal of the Dutch financing ultimately reduced the opportunities to finance micro-projects in this crucial environmental field. The Dutch contribution to the program financing did not happen as anticipated during appraisal because of realignment of their development priorities in Burkina Faso.

Implementation of certain types of micro-projects posed challenges and to some extent was delayed for the following reasons:

- (i) lack of competent service providers at provincial level;
- (ii) high poverty rate of targeted villages causing difficulties to mobilize communities' contributions;
- (iii) provincial window of the local development fund posed high transaction costs due to complex procurement procedures at national level and low demand for structural inter-village sub-projects; and
- (iv) supervision costs of civil works at the beginning (which included a lot of travel expenses) were supported by communities themselves before being allowed to be included in the investment costs of the micro-projects.

During appraisal, it was decided that the functions of the project implementation unit would be retrenched after two years of implementation by handing over technical support to trained technical service providers. Despite, one of the triggers from phase 1 to phase 2 being "*Plans for decreasing the central administrative structure of the Project have been developed and partially implemented*" this could not be entirely realized, because of increased workload as the project evolved and was expanded after the mid-term review. The team also had to support the very challenging decentralization process.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

A Project Design Summary was prepared as an annex to the appraisal document. However, although outcome and output indicators were well identified, the project monitoring and evaluation system was not described in detail in the project design. The project took advantage of the already existing Danish project to support the government to develop a monitoring and evaluation system for the national program for decentralized rural development in which the CBRD was embedded. This component was run until mid-term review by the NRM component under the Danish financed project (PADDAB 1). This institutional position was nevertheless not judged as pertinent even by the Danish evaluation team. The Danish support was ended in 2005 with the consequence to readjust IDA financing to take over the related M&E costs. This reallocation of IDA funds did not however impact negatively activities related to village investments, since the local investments fund was not affected by this readjustment; the funds came mainly from the Capacity Building components supported by the later attached UNDP project which allowed funds savings.

Some external factors hampered the implementation of the M&E system. On the one hand, the time lag between approval of Danish financial support (February 2000) and the start up of the CBRD (April 2002), and on the other hand, the rapid evolution of the number of villages after mid-term review (more than 3000 villages against a target of 2000) caused delays on performance monitoring at the beginning. In addition, impact monitoring was also hampered by the cumbersomeness of monitoring committees' operation, combined with the difficulty to find qualified service providers. Shortcomings were also noted in the absence of baseline data for some key performance indicators and the slowness in developing participatory outcome evaluation. Therefore, it took considerable time to finalize the studies and the project noted some delays in validating the evaluation methodologies.

Despite these start-up constraints, the M&E system supported by the Danish funding achieved considerable results. The project unit was able to track and report regularly the evolution of output indicators. Personal was adequately trained at national and provincial levels. The project set three committees to monitor socio-economic, economic and environmental impacts. On the outcome side, the impact evaluation work was particularly good, and well documented with progress reports published each year, since 2005. Also, the project supported the government to conduct a national baseline survey in 2004 on living conditions, revenues and poverty of rural households in Burkina Faso². This survey serves as a baseline for the impact evaluation for the entire program.

¹ PADDAB: Programme d'Appui Danois au Développement du secteur de l'Agriculture du Burkina Faso

² MAHRH/PNGT2 : Les Conditions de vie, les Revenus et la Pauvreté des Ménages ruraux au Burkina Faso en 2004 : Résultats de l'enquête de base du PNGT2

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

According to the environmental and social assessment, the project was rated as a category 'B' project. An environmental assessment (EA) was carried out and identified mitigation measures to treat possible negative environmental impacts that may have occurred during implementation of some micro-projects. Two safeguard policies were triggered for the project at appraisal: (i) environmental assessment (OP 4.01) and (ii) natural habitats (OP 4.04). However, it took some time for the project to comply with these policies. Although the project was effective in December 2001 and implementation started in April 2002, the safeguard documents related to directives and methodologies for micro-projects selection in accordance with environmental and social management plans were elaborated only in August 2003.

Until mid-term review, the project experienced difficulties to implement activities of the ESMF due to lack of capacity of different agents/players in charge of its execution. Following recommendations of the mid-term review in December 2004, a capacity building workshop on environmental safeguard policies was held on January 2006 for the different concerned CBRD staff. This workshop allowed a better understanding of the ESMF and the WB environmental and social safeguard policies, and helped the project unit to set up a strategy to speed up the implementation of the safeguard policies triggered during appraisal.

Soon after this workshop, different training sessions were organized by the national coordination unit benefiting all other players within the provinces involved in the application of the safeguard policies. Criteria to guide the screening process were also developed. Thus, starting 2006, screening criteria for micro-projects were integrated in every new co-financing agreement with the CVGTs, and all ongoing investments in the villages before the implementation of the ESMF (between 2003 and 2005) were also regularized.

Concerning fiduciary compliance, audit reports were delivered on time and were not qualified. The first Financial Management Reports (FMR) were submitted on September 30, 2004 and were deficient since they did not include the physical execution of project activities. Since then, they have been complete and submitted on a regular basis and generally on time.

Procurement initially faced a number of constraints generally associated with a poor understanding of World Bank procurement procedures. At the central level, the first difficulties were related to the definition of the relative weight applicable to the different evaluation criteria. At the provincial level, the *Commissions Provinciales d'Attribution des Marchés* (CPAM) had at the beginning difficulty to understand and comply with the procedures, causing some delays in contract awards. The unavailability of qualified service providers at provincial level was another source of delay for the contracts' awards leading to frequent unfruitful bids. In addition, the CPAMs experienced also repeated staff changes in their administrative personnel with negative effects on the quality of the procurement commissions' evaluations, before the new staffs got the opportunity to be trained. At CVGT level, simplified community procurement procedures were well executed by most of villages; the low literacy rate of the communities remained however one the major issues that hindered good quality of the supporting documents.

It is important to note that the project contributed largely to raise the capacity at village level to deal with procurement issues. The development of simplified procedures for local procurement and the training of a large number of persons at provincial and village level in basic procurement principles contributed to good governance capacity at local level.

Over time the procurement issue became a minor concern and was mastered by the project unit. At the community level, it is worth noting that the CVGTs were able to comply quite easily with project procedures for micro-projects implementation. The good quality and timely execution of the infrastructures at village level is a good indicator. The costs of the investments were also at acceptable level compared to investments financed by other sources of funding using different implementation procedures.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

The institutional challenges of the decentralization reforms and the necessarily gradualist approach to capitalize on project implementation experience led the Government to formulate a 15-year national program (2001 to 2015). This *Programme National de Développement Rural Décentralisé* (PNDRD) is supported by an Adaptable Program Loan (APL) divided into three phases of five years each. Each of the phases will be designed flexibly in order to adapt to the country's decentralization choices, the pace of resulting institutional reforms, and the need to harmonize various approaches.

The *Community-Based Rural Development Project* – phase I of the APL - initiated the process. It focused on capacity building aspects at village/community level and the institutional strengthening of government bodies to support the decentralization agenda and land tenure regulations in rural areas. Thanks to project assistance and the input from its parallel financing partners (e.g. the UNDP) the government was able to advance its decentralization agenda before the end of the first phase.

The second five-year phase of the APL was approved by the board on March 27, 2007 and became effective on July 13, 2007. It builds on the successful achievements of the first phase and will scale-up to national coverage by targeting the recently created 302 rural communes nationwide and benefiting a population of over 6.5 million. One of the greatest challenges during this phase will be to build rural municipalities that are truly participatory and accountable to their population. Phase II will place more emphasis on sustainability and reinforcing capacities of communities, local and central government institutions to enhance operation and maintenance arrangements of infrastructure and it will continue to support as institutional reforms. Phase III will consolidate what has been achieved and prepare an exit strategy.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

Objectives, design and execution of the CBRD are entirely consistent with the major orientations of the government as well as the operational mechanism for the implementation of the decentralized rural development strategy as spelled out in the Policy Letter for Decentralized Rural Development. The project effectively assisted the government in setting up the concrete design of the decentralized rural development mechanism at all levels (village, provincial and national levels).

At village level, the establishment and strengthening of village associations, the CVGTs through local capacity building programs and the introduction of a participatory planning process were undoubtedly essential steps to initiate the government's local and decentralized rural development agenda. In addition, the funding and implementation of community micro

projects gave the CVGTs the opportunity to exercise planning, control, management and maintenance functions. At the provincial level, the project, with support from the UNDP program, was a key player in the institutional capacity building in revitalizing the role of the *Cadres de Concertation Technique Provinciaux* (CCTP), and improving the competences of private and public service providers. At the national level, the project initiated and supported the establishment of the CNCPDR (*Cadre National de Coordination des Partenaires du Développement Rural*), and the CNSFMR (*Comité National de Sécurisation Foncière en Milieu Rural*), in charge of land tenure issues in rural areas and now piloting the corresponding component in the second phase of the project.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

The project development objective was largely achieved. The CVGTs have acquired over the years through project assistance substantial aptitudes in planning, execution and monitoring of micro-projects derived from local development and annual investments plans. A technical audit with regards to the intermediary results conducted at CVGT level, and a beneficiary assessment study regarding the impacts of project's activities provide evidence of positive project outcomes.

The beneficiary assessment study³ highlighted some significant impacts in terms of social capital building (organizational and capacity development, self confidence), sustainable land management, agricultural productivity increase, and improved access to social services. The organization around the CVGTs is perceived as an inclusive tool bringing the beneficiaries to organize themselves around common goals and manage their resources differently. Also, productive and NRM investments led to increased productivity and reduced land degradation combined with higher awareness for sustainable resources management (see annex 3 for more detail). Realized infrastructures are found generally operational, even though there is a need for more awareness regarding maintenance. Therefore, operation and maintenance fees should be collected on a regular basis to assure sustainability of village investments. These impacts are reflected in the assessment of the key performance outcome indicators.

There are seven key performance outcome indicators for the achievement of the project development objective as stated in the Project Design Summary. Out of these seven, five were fully achieved and even above target. The remaining two indicators (*regrouping into inter-village structures; and decreasing of central administrative structure*) were hampered by unexpected changes in the decentralization policy and the expanded project coverage. Below is the assessment for each outcome indicator with linkages to corresponding outputs. For detail see Appendix 1 of the Annex 2 (Outputs by components).

- ***At least 75% of villages targeted in the first phase have received capacity building support and adopted a local development plan.*** This indicator is fully achieved and largely above target. In total, 2961 established CVGTs with project assistance (more than the 2000 targeted) benefited from a wide range of capacity building programs and were able to elaborate successfully their local development plans, and implement them effectively. At least 98 percent of planned micro-projects were completed according to annual investment plans, thus surpassing widely the target of 75 percent.

³ This survey was conducted in 8 provinces and 40 villages.

- ***At least 60% of beneficiary villages have representative and participatory bodies assuming their role in local development.*** This second indicator has also been satisfactorily met. In fact, all beneficiary villages have their representative and participatory bodies through well established and functioning CVGTs, and are assuming adequately their role. The survey results published in June 2007 revealed that, between 2002 and 2006, 88 percent of the CVGTs were able to elaborate their annual investments plans subsequently, and 71 percent held regularly their self evaluation forums in the same period. This is in addition to the 98 percent completion rate of micro-projects implementation.
- ***At least 30% of villages have been regrouped into inter-village development structures that have already undertaken sub-projects in common.*** There was an attempt to regroup certain villages into inter-village structures called CIVGT. This concept was however abandoned due to the change in the government's concept regarding rural decentralization policy. Despite of this institutional change, some villages were able to undertake common sub-projects financing.
- ***75% of target provinces have a functioning representative coordination body providing sound coordination of available resources and quality services to support local development efforts.*** This outcome was fully achieved. Starting in 2002, all 45 provincial coordination committees were revitalized and trained in various relevant themes. Due to the project intervention, the CCTPs have become vital ingredients in Government's decentralization and planning strategy at the local level. There is strong acknowledgement that the majority of the CCTPs are still functioning well; nevertheless the question of sustained financing of these representative coordination bodies beyond project support remains a somewhat of a concern that needs to be tackled during the second phase.
- ***The decentralization law is being implemented satisfactorily.*** This outcome was entirely achieved. The project support was fundamental in the revision of the decentralization law and the installation of the new communes. The project was an excellent opportunity for the elaboration and validation of a tool-kit for Communal development planning in preparation of the rural decentralization process. Thanks to this process, as led by the ministry in charge of Decentralization (which highly valued the project contribution), rural communes were successfully put in place with well conducted communal elections held in April 2006 in the entire country.
- ***A functioning national forum has made substantial progress towards harmonization of rural decentralized development approaches.*** The outcome indicator related to the establishment of a functioning national forum was successfully met. The project was instrumental in initiating a national forum for consultations among development partners on decentralized rural development in Burkina Faso. The CNCPDR was created with project support and held regular meetings to harmonize views among partners on the decentralized rural development agenda. This led to the setting up of three technical committees to monitor socio-economic, environmental and institutional impacts.
- ***Plans for decreasing the central administrative structure of the Project have been developed and partially implemented.*** This outcome could not be achieved due to the extended national project coverage following the mid-term review, from 2000 villages to

more than 3000 villages. This government request, as the result of a satisfactory parliamentary assessment of the project put more pressure on the central coordination structure and provincial units to meet one of the most important output indicators aimed at decreasing the time lag between CVGT contract and disbursement of annual investment fund. In addition, the decrease of personnel was linked to the accomplishment of the decentralization process (creation of rural communes) which was delayed during the first phase. To avoid any risk in the proper project supervision, it was therefore agreed to maintain the central unit in its initial form and shape over the project lifetime.

3.3 Efficiency

The CBRD experience has shown that communities generally choose investments with very high rate of return and are sustainable. Through a decentralized decision-making process, it has been proven that the investment costs are low compared to similar micro-projects realized by different partners or government institutions. Economic and financial analysis undertaken for the diverse types of investments, although showing different rates of return, clearly demonstrate cost efficiency and high responsiveness of service delivery, which are essential for poor communities (see Annex 3).

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

Rating: *Achievement of the overall project objective is rated as satisfactory*

The project appraisal document specifies that all seven key performance outcome indicators of the first phase were at the same time the Performance Triggers for the subsequent moving to the second phase of the program. It is worth noting that, except for the two indicators that were not met due to reasons outside the control of the project, all outcome indicators were met at satisfactorily level or higher, and thus the project development objective is considered as achieved: the project contributed to develop the capacity of the rural population to sustainably manage its own resources and facilitated the emergence of rural municipalities.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

Through the project activities, different segments of the rural population have been reached, particularly the poorest by supporting small scale and inexpensive micro-projects on a priority basis. The poverty orientation of the project was also put in practice through the participatory process at the community level which ensured appropriate representation of priorities of the poor in the selection of activities to be funded.

According to the survey conducted, the beneficiaries of project activities perceived significant changes in gender-related issues. The situation of women has considerably improved due to water and health infrastructures realized, as well as associated sensitization programs in hygiene and family planning. In addition, the support for revenue generating activities have given women beneficiaries more opportunities to some financial autonomy. At the same time, the implementation of the program has opened furthermore the way for women to integrate village associations as equal partners like men and so to share the decision-making process at the community level. Project activities have also had positive effects on inter-communities and intergenerational relationships. These consist of peaceful conflict management between

social groups with different interests and the promotion of youth involvement in decision making process, both contributing to more social equity and inclusion.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

In general, different important changes were recorded by the beneficiaries due to project activities. These are related to: (i) capacity strengthening of various local stakeholders in rural areas, (ii) quality of financed micro-projects and their impact on agricultural production and living conditions, and (iii) improvements in local governance at the bottom of a successful ongoing decentralization process. More specifically, very important institutional change and institutional strengthening happened during project implementation period as well as at central, provincial and local levels, including:

- The project supported successfully the decentralization process in Burkina Faso by assisting the government in the elaboration and adoption of the new law on decentralization and to put in place the new rural communes and their representative village level organizations, the CVDs (*commissions villageoises de développement*). The project experience in the constitution of the CVGTs as well as in local implementation of micro-projects has been influential in shaping the newly established CVDs and their attributions. Most of CVGT members trained by the project were elected in the new decentralization bodies and structures.
- Different national structures were created: (i) the CNCPDR as a consultation forum among partners around the decentralized rural development agenda, and (ii) the CNSFMR, which led to a policy on land tenure security and the emergence of the DGFROP as institutional body to manage land tenure issues in rural areas in a sustainable manner; Regarding land tenure, the project aimed at the beginning to address technical questions with pilot operations in six regions. However, the mid- term review found that this approach was not working as technical issues appeared very difficult to be addressed before the policy side is fixed. Therefore the project shifted its approach to support the government in setting up an enabling policy framework for land tenure, and pursued at the same time its initial target on land tenure security pilot operations.
- The revitalization of the *Cadres de Concertation Technique Provinciaux* (CCTP) at provincial level has been an important step for the capacity strengthening of different public and private service providers devoted to assist communities in the planning, execution and monitoring of their development programs.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

The overall program was indeed designed to support the government strategy as spelled out in the Policy Letter for Decentralized Rural Development. The project was accordingly considered by the different development partners as an opportunity to pull their support together for improved aid effectiveness. At least three other donors supported the program at the same time with additional financing: (i) the IFAD as a co-financier, (ii) the UNDP and (iii) DANIDA as parallel financiers. The UNDP support to the component 1 and 3 (capacity building) was particularly beneficial since it allowed to increase IDA funds to the component Local Investments Funds for more micro-projects. Due to these joined efforts, the program was able to harmonize interventions in certain provinces through the revitalized CCTPs under the guidance of the High commissioner. Based on this positive experience, the UNDP is now financing a new project to support decentralization while capitalizing on the CBRD results.

Also worth noting is the elaboration of a local planning guide with support from the UNDP program. Although this activity was not planned at the beginning, it became a great opportunity for the project to test future interventions at rural commune level⁴. This unintended result will allow scaling-up to communal development plans in the new rural communes in Burkina Faso during phase 2 of the CBRD.

On the other hand, the withdrawal of the DANIDA funding following the ending of their financing before project closing date was unexpected by the project team. This fact could have affected to some extent the continuity of the just started monitoring and evaluation activities. To face the situation and avoid any interruption in the system, the project unit successfully increased IDA funding to this component to avoid any shortcomings.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

The beneficiary assessment of the project was generally positive. The beneficiaries demonstrated to have a good knowledge of the objectives and project activities and they appreciate very well the positive changes occurred in their daily life due to project activities. Beneficiary's perceptions can be summarized as following:

- *Importance of the CVGTs and the planning process.* The entire process of setting up of CVGTs, the elaboration of village development plans, and the execution of local investments funds was perceived by the communities as a good vehicle for the promotion of local development. The CVGT is accepted as the federative structure of the village and is presented as such to all other partners to coordinate their interventions (the village entry point). The villagers regret only the lack of financial support for operational costs related to the monitoring of project activities by the CVGTs' members.
- *Highly valued mechanisms to implement the local investments fund (LIF).* The project eligibility criteria to access the local investment fund are appreciated positively by the communities. These stated procedures enabled more communities' empowerment, assured transparency in the management, and reinforced the beneficiaries' ownership of investments. The principle of co-financing contributed considerably to increase the level of responsibility of the beneficiaries. Despite of this positive perception, some deficiencies were also noted by the communities in the implementation of the LIF. They relate to: (i) the limited amount of resources allocated per village, (ii) the difficulty to mobilize the financial contribution of villagers in some cases due to extreme poverty, and (iii) the lack of capacity of certain service providers with negative effect on part of realized investments.
- *Adequate institutional capacity building at local and provincial level.* The beneficiaries appreciated well the fact that the contracts were signed with the CVGTs with positive impact on the performance of the service providers. The availability and listening capacity of provincial coordinating teams were considered critical to empower the communities and give them opportunity to define and implement their micro-projects

⁴ A test was jointly financed (with UNDP program) in 12 prefectures with 12 Communal Development Plans as an output.

according to their priorities. On the other hand, the lack of sufficient human capital of the technical service providers and the provincial coordination units was perceived as a limit to the expansion of the project activities within the provinces. In some cases, the provincial coordination units were found too involved in the community procurement process.

- *Appropriate land tenure security pilot operation as means to promote and secure village investments.* This pilot operation contributed to raise awareness on the issues related to land tenure security in rural areas. The communities are conscious of the importance of this formalized procedure to allocate land to secure village investments. They appreciate well the establishment of the village commission for conflict resolution. Two main deficiencies were signaled: the absence of compensation mechanism to the land owner and some assigned surfaces were found too big for given investments.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

Rating: *Low*

Risks to development outcome and sustainability of project achievements are assessed against institutional, economic/financial, environmental and social criteria. Overall, risk to development outcome is evaluated as low, given: (i) the high ownership of project at all institutional levels (by government and beneficiaries through their organizations), (ii) the moderate financial risks linked to sustainability of the different investments, (iii) the relatively minor negative environmental impacts associated with the kinds of implemented micro-projects and (iv) the high social significance of project activities (targeting poverty issues, inclusion of vulnerable groups, and balanced gender equity).

The institutional risk to development outcome is low. During this first phase, the project was able to push for institutional capacity building at governmental level to support the national program for decentralized rural development. The ministry in charge of Decentralization benefited from project assistance to elaborate and adopt a new law on decentralization in Burkina Faso. This law was implemented and rural communes were installed in 2006 partly rooted on the existing CVGTs, now becoming CVD (*Commissions Villageoises de Développement*). The decentralization scheme was adopted before project closing date. The 302 rural communes installed, following successful elections held in April 2006, are now targeted during the second phase of the project and will benefit from institutional capacity building. At the provincial level, the reinforcement of the CCTPs leading to the enhancement of provincial and local coordination among different partners is another positive impact minimizing institutional risk to the development outcome. In addition, the creation of the national forum for consultations among development partners on decentralized rural development (the CNCPDR) and the emergence of the DGFROP as the institutional body for land tenure issues in rural areas will certainly strengthen the empowerment of all actors at national as well as provincial and local levels.

The economic and financial risk to development outcome is moderate. At appraisal, three major risks were identified that could jeopardize achievement of outcomes: (i) government deviation from effective promotion of decentralization, (ii) possible fraud and transparency in funds management at local level, and (iii) lack of equitable and representative decision-making process. It is worth noting that none of these threats did materialize during project execution. First, the government maintained its commitment for effective promotion of

decentralization by passing and implementing a new law and holding successful elections for rural communes. Second, technical and financial audits were carried out periodically on a random sample of CVGTs and uncovered only four cases of mismanagement out of 3013 villages. Also all financial audit reports were without reserve and Bank supervision of the project financial management system consistently rated the component either satisfactory or highly satisfactory in the ISRs. And third, communities identified themselves with the representative bodies at local level through the elected CVGTs. It is also proven that the kinds of projects financed under the LIF were well targeted, inexpensive and require low O&M costs. Cost-Benefit analysis showed that socio-economic sub-projects (education, health, water) are highly appreciated, and productive investments (such as soil and water conservation infrastructures) have high net present values. Nevertheless, emphasis should be put during the second phase on beneficiary's contribution for maintenance of infrastructures to ensure long term sustainability.

The environmental risk to development outcome is low. According to the environmental and social assessment, the project was rated as a category 'B' project. Although two safeguard policies were triggered (the environmental assessment [OP 4.01] and the natural habitats [OP 4.04]), project activities and selected types of sub-projects have only negligible environmental effects, while the project has been implementing the environmental and social management framework (ESMF) in satisfactory fashion once it got over initial start-up problems.

The social risk to development outcome is low. The CBRD has played a major role in creating social capital in the concerned villages and has been instrumental to mainstreaming gender and social equity in the local development agenda. However, traditional social structures continue to hamper these positive developments, and women's participation in the decision-making process still remains to be improved. The project's contribution to revitalizing the provincial coordinating structures (the CCTPs) and enabling full participation of all social groups in planning, implementation and control processes have created a positive dynamic for good governance and social accountability mechanisms in managing the local investment fund (LIF).

Based on these assessments, the overall risk to development outcome is rated as low.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

Rating: *Quality at entry is rated as moderately satisfactory.*

Although building on the experience and achievements of the successful Natural Resource Management project (the PNGT), the preparation period for the CBRD still took two years. As indicated above, this was in large part due to the decision taken at the time of appraisal to build a national program that placed a stronger emphasis on the capacity building and institutional support necessary at all levels to support the rural decentralization agenda. This decision turned out to be the right one since it allowed the project to have a greater institutional impact, even though it contributed to implementation delays in the start-up of project activities. In preparing this operation, the Bank put in place a PPF and mobilized

substantial qualified human resources to cover all required technical and institutional fields of expertise for such kind of project. The Bank team reviewed all existing national strategies and programs and designed the project to comply with these strategies and government vision on decentralization. There were also good coordination efforts with other donors leading to effective collaboration and co-financing (Danida, IFAD, UNDP) to support the government program through the CBRD.

However, despite of these achievements, the time between board approval and project start up was too long. The board approved the project on December 2000 and, it took almost six months to sign the Credit Agreement on June 2001. Although essential personnel were in place just one month after signature, the project was effective only in December 2001 and fully operational by April 2002. There are two reasons at least to explain this discrepancy: (i) the deferred ratification of the signed Credit Agreement by the National Assembly, since there was no session between June and October, and (ii) the delayed preparation of the project manual of financial management procedures due long recruitment procedures of the consultant. In addition, the deployment of personnel at provincial level was furthermore postponed due to the late acquisition of the equipments and vehicles because of the Ivory Cost crisis. All project equipment was procured through Ivory Cost which was already experiencing its first political problems with huge economic effects on Burkina Faso.

The Quality at entry was rated by QAG 2001 as marginally satisfactory (3 on a 4-point scale) which was mapped to moderately unsatisfactory (4) on the new 6-point scale adopted in 2006. The team feels that a moderately satisfactory rating is more appropriate given that most of the reasons for delayed implementation were outside control of the team.

(b) Quality of Supervision

Rating: *Quality of supervision is rated as satisfactory*

Project supervision was carried out regularly during the project lifetime with adequate skills mix, except for the period before MTR. During this period, the Bank team did not include a safeguard specialist; this explains why activities of the ESMF to mitigate eventual environmental and social impacts were not carried out properly initially. Problems were identified during supervision missions and adequate remedial measures were taken to boost project performance and improve achievements of indicators. A good example is the adjustment of the Land Tenure Security Pilot Operation after MTR to refocus the objectives of the component and adapt implementation responsibilities in line with competencies and capacity of each responsible agency.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance

Rating: *Satisfactory*

The overall rating for Bank performance can be rated Satisfactory, even though the quality at entry was moderately satisfactory due to slow start up process. After implementation start, the Bank team paid great attention to the quality of project supervision and made each time appropriate recommendations to improve implementation. The mid-term review was essential to take sound decisions on particular activities. Supervision of the project from the field contributed to a hands-on approach and rapid problem solving.

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance

Rating: *Government performance is rated highly satisfactory*

There was a high level of ownership on the part of the Government of Burkina Faso during the preparation phase of the project. The Government was very active and committed during this critical stage and did everything needed to prepare the different components of the project. The Government made available resources for the project teams from various agencies to participate actively in designing and preparing the project throughout the long preparation period. All Government strategies (PRSP, PNDRD, LPDRD) important for the project design were ready, and the authorities maintained the course on the decentralization agenda all along project implementation. Key Government institutions responsible for the Decentralization policy and Land Tenure regulations worked closely with the project to ensure sound implementation of the project.

Box 1: Counterpart funding

At appraisal, the government contribution was estimated at US \$15.41 million. However, during the first year of implementation, a national portfolio review conducted jointly by the government, the World Bank and other donors concluded that the cumulated counterpart funding for all projects was a reason that hampered projects' disbursements. This was due to three economic shocks the country did face the same year: (i) the break out of the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, (ii) the decline of cotton price, the country's main export product, and (iii) the deficit of rainfall. Based on this fact, the Government of Burkina Faso requested and obtained a revision of the amount of the counterpart funding to the project. In 2003, the DCA was revised accordingly. The new agreed amount was brought down to the amount of US \$7.41 million which the government paid timely all along the project lifetime.

Despite of effectiveness delays, the government appreciated the project and conducted it in a sound manner so that the development objective was met. Furthermore, the government demonstrated its commitment by negotiating for more funding for the second phase. Also noteworthy is the regular and timely Government financial contribution to the project implementation in compliance with the Credit agreement.

Soon after the first implementation year, the counterpart funding evolved from US \$15.41 million to US \$7.41 million according to the economic situation the country was facing at that time. The Development Credit Agreement was then amended accordingly (see Box 1 above).

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance

Rating: *Implementing Agency performance is rated highly satisfactory*

The implementing agency is subdivided into the national coordination unit and the provincial coordination entities. The national coordination unit was well staffed with competent and dynamic experts with a minimal turnover of staff which was advantageous for continuity. During the project implementation period, there was no report of financial mismanagement or any misprocurement issue at national or provincial level. The implementing agency was also able to establish a sound and comprehensive M&E system to track project activities and progress against output and outcome indicators. The implementing agency was able to disburse on time the entire credit and to timely close the financial statement before the grace

period. Given the fact that there were no shortcomings in the project's fiduciary management all along the period, the overall performance rating is assessed as highly satisfactory. This is also in line with ISR ratings on financial and project management.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance

Rating: *Overall Borrower Performance is rated highly satisfactory*

The Borrower's overall performance is rated highly satisfactory. It demonstrated a high level of commitment to project's objectives by staying the course on the decentralization agenda and making needed resources available. In addition, the Borrower proved a high level of ownership by initiating a project review mission by a parliamentarian delegation which led to an expansion of project activities benefiting to 50% more villages than initially planned. All financial audits were submitted timely (before June 30 every year) and were without reserve and the project complied satisfactory with all legal covenants.

6. Lessons Learned

The major lessons drawn from the implementation and outcome of this operation, as already incorporated in the design and implementation arrangements for phase II, can be summarized as following:

High ownership of project activities. The project approach and the implementation procedures of the local investment fund (LIF) were very critical to give more responsibility to the different actors, those of government institutions, but particularly at the community level. This allowed a better ownership of local investments and will therefore increase awareness for appropriate maintenance and sustainability. The approach has proven that if local communities have been given the opportunity, they are capable to manage their own development and be at the center of the decision-making process. In addition, the active involvement of the government institutions in the project implementation contributed widely to their capacity development and will ensure the sustainability of the results achieved.

Adaptability and flexibility of project implementation are essential for such kinds of projects. The execution of community based programs necessitates a good knowledge of local conditions and the adoption of simple management procedures. Without a minimum of flexibility regarding for example the direct transfer of funds to communities and the confidence on self control mechanisms on funds disbursement, it would not be possible to execute a large number of micro-projects in a short term period.

Strong investment in capacity building at all levels is essential to foster local development. The implementation of such a program requires the development of capacities of all institutional and technical actors on the field. This program was essential to enable the adherence of state decentralized structures, and beneficiary communities to the project approach and enhance information and communication among stakeholders. It is also important to note that information and communication enhancement among stakeholders is mainly the merit of the Project's M&E system, indicating that investing in M&E can be very useful and worthwhile.

Effective harmonization is critical to maximize local development impact and government leadership is key. The program has shown that pulling together funds can be critical to make

a difference at beneficiary level. As a multi-donor financed program, the CBRD was in a position to improve donor coordination through joint missions, concerted interventions, and support for a national program. However, despite donor commitment to the Paris Declaration, and the creation of a national consultative framework (CNCPPDR) between partners on rural development, donors were not able to agree on a common approach for all decentralized rural development interventions and the harmonization agenda didn't advance as expected. One of the reasons may have been due to lack of political will and institutional and human capacity to lead such a national initiative towards harmonization. Better results seem to have been achieved at provincial level through the CCTPs, where there was strong buy-in of local administration and donors. The implementation of this program in collaboration with different partners has shown that without strong government leadership, alignment of intervention modalities and harmonization cannot be fully achieved.

7. Comments on Issues raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/ Partners

(a) Borrower/Implementing Agency

Comments from the Borrower were received (see Annex 7) and relevant issues taken into account.

(b) Co-financiers and Other partners and stakeholders

Comments were received from IFAD (in form of track changes in the main document), UNDP and DANIDA (see Annex 8). Relevant comments from these partners were incorporated in the final document.

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Components	Appraisal Estimate Total (USD millions)	Appraisal Estimate IDA (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage Appraisal IDA
Local Capacity Building	11.38	5.48	7.48	136.97
Local Investment Fund (LIF)	54.79	33.75	48.70	144.29
Institutional Capacity Building	26.79	12.73	11.15	87.55
Land Tenure Security Pilot	3.82	3.10	0.85	27.33
Project Coordination, Administration, M&E	0.00	10.30		
PPF			1.84	
Total Baseline Cost	107.45	60.50	74.39	122.95
Physical Contingencies	0.90	0.80		0.00
Price Contingencies	6.50	5.40	0.00	0.00
Total Project Costs	114.85	66.70	74.39	111.52

(b) Financing

Source of Funds	Type of Cofinancing	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
Borrower	Counterpart funding	15.41	7.47	48.46% ⁵
Local Communities	Contribution	10.96	15.93	145.38%
DENMARK, Govt. of	Parallel Financing Grant	3.96	3.88	98.08%
International Development Association (IDA)	Credit	66.70	74.39	111.53%
International Fund for Agriculture Development	Credit	14.75	12.56	85.14%
UNDP	Parallel Financing	3.07		0.00
Total		114.85	114.23	99.46%

⁵ Government contribution was decreased after the first implementation year (For details, see Box 1 above)

Annex 2. Outputs by Component

Component 1: Local Capacity Building

Achievements under this component are rated satisfactory.

This component is composed of three sub-components: (a) Village level consultations, (b) CVGT/CIVGT training programs, and (c) Technical support to community organizations. Three key performance indicators were specified under this component: (i) the number of beneficiaries with at least 75% of their annual investment plan satisfactorily completed (quantity and quality); (ii) the number of representatives and participatory CVGT/CIVGT established, trained and satisfactorily functioning; and (iii) the number and type of beneficiaries having received literacy training.

All three indicators have been met in a satisfactory manner. For the first indicator, the project succeeded in supporting targeted rural communities to establish 2961 CVGTs on a participatory basis. This is more than the planned objective of 2000 villages at appraisal. This was conducted through a process of village sensitization campaigns, participatory planning resulting in the elaboration of village development plans (*plans de gestion des terroirs*). A total of 2986 villages have adequately implemented their annual investment plans with project support. For 25 villages, the development plans were already elaborated with support of other partners (French and Dutch cooperation) with whom the project collaborated well. Based on the project report conducted during 2007⁶ (which assessed intermediary results), 100 percent of surveyed villages have completed at least 98 percent of their micro-projects according to annual investment plans, widely above the target of 75 percent.

With regard to the second indicator, all CVGTs benefited also from a wide range of training sessions centered on organizational, management and technical issues. However the constitution of the CIVGTs was abandoned following the change in government's policy option regarding rural decentralization in the country. According to the same study mentioned earlier, 88.20 percent of the CVGTs were able to elaborate their annual investments plans subsequently to the *plan de gestion des terroirs* between 2002 and 2006, and 71.48 percent held regularly self evaluation forums in the same period. These facts are tangible indications for good functioning village councils. On HIV/AIDS, a specific awareness raising program was successfully conducted in 12 provinces not benefiting from support of the CNLS. Thus, 231 departmental and village committees against AIDS were put in place and around 2000 persons (counting systemically women) were mobilized and trained.

Concerning the third indicator, the project contributed to build 882 new literacy training centers and equipped 629. Overall, 58 205 beneficiaries attended initial literacy training courses, and 35 801 received a complementary in-depth training session. In addition, the program supported training for 235 potential "encadreurs".

This component is rated satisfactory because all indicators have been met, and even some above target.


⁶ PNGT, Deuxième rapport de suivi des résultats intermédiaires du PNGT2, June 2007

Component 2: Local Investment Fund (LIF)

*Achievements under this component are rated **highly satisfactory**.*

This is a key component of the project (about 48 percent of total financing) and the most successful one. It is composed of two windows: (i) funding for village and inter-village sub-projects (< US\$ 30,000); and (ii) resources dedicated to provinces (> US\$ 30,000 - < US 150,000) for critical structural infrastructure works benefiting a large number of villages. Key performance indicator under this component is that 75 percent of local investments realized are technically sound and cost effectively produced.

Altogether 9,622 contracts were signed between the project and CVGT/CIVGT and funds transferred into village council accounts opened in local financing institutions. A total of 18,250 well-documented micro projects were designed and implemented through a proven participatory approach between 2002 and 2007. In total US\$ 48,700,000 were disbursed under this component (65.5 percent of total project cost). A total of 3,013⁷ villages benefited from these investments which covered numerous activities including: (a) social infrastructures (health, education, and water supply infrastructures); (b) productive and economic investments for improving agricultural and livestock production; and (c) NRM activities, including soil and water conservation technologies as well as reforestation and forest management techniques.



The project achieved substantial results in terms of number and diversity of productive and socio-economic village investments financed under this component. It is obvious that the major concerns of the rural population were taken into account, notably: potable water supply facilities, social infrastructures (schools, health facilities, literacy centers), and soil and water conservation activities for agriculture and livestock, including investments in NRM.

The majority of infrastructures realized under this component were found technically in good condition according to the recently conducted survey as part of the ICR. By and large, almost 90% of the facilities are technically sound and regularly used by the beneficiaries. This is particularly true for 100% of health facilities, 87.5% of schools, 98.6% of non-formal education facilities, 91.8% of water supply infrastructures, 93.4% of storage facilities, and 98.7% of cattle vaccination facilities.

With regards to 'social and economic infrastructures', the investments funded under this component were related mainly to human capital building, social infrastructure, and water supply. The most significant physical outputs were as follows: 103 health facilities, 1066 training facilities (184 class rooms, 882 literacy and village training centers), 2,132 bore wells equipped with pumps (1,088 new and 1,044 improved), 641 wells (535 new and 106 improved); in addition 3 village mini-water supply systems, 73 *small dams*, and 4 water reservoirs were installed.

⁷ The difference between the number of villages having benefited from investments (3013) and the number of established CVGTs (2961) is due to the fact that 52 CVGTs were already established by other partners, and became eligible to the FIL.

With reference to ‘productive investments for improved agricultural and livestock production’, the project supported also the realization of 248 cattle vaccination facilities, 713 ha of lowland, and about 300 ha vegetable gardens/horticultural perimeters, 48 ha irrigation perimeters, and 486 km of feeder roads/pasture ways.

Under ‘NRM activities’, the most significant outputs were related to soil and water conservation activities which included: nearly 122 378 *fosses fumières*, 42 122 ha improved land through stone bunds and *zai* technique, and about 42 000 m revitalized small dykes (*couverture végétale de diguettes*). In addition, the project supported also activities related to reforestation and natural resource protection: about 34 000 seedling plants produced, 17 286 ha reforested, and about 220 km river banks protected.

Beyond physical realizations, the project succeeded also in spreading out and successfully transferring appropriate agricultural technologies related to soil and water conservation techniques that contributed to yields and agricultural revenues’ increase. More than 97% of farmers have confirmed that they now use these techniques widely, and one can say these are becoming very common among all producers throughout the country.

Economically, the investments realized are generally justified. While for water supply facilities and vaccination parks, economic and financial rates of return tend to be marginal, micro-projects related to soil and water conservation activities demonstrate very positive trends. In fact, most of social and economic infrastructures include tangible social benefits with a direct contribution to improvement of living conditions in rural areas. At the same time, the investments costs realized under the project were largely below the country’s norms for the same kind of investments. For example, costs for school construction under the project were 30 percent lower than for other programs (government structures, NGOs, etc.).

Through the Local Investment Fund, the project has been able to contribute effectively to the program development objective to increase the productive capacity of the rural sector and improve the effectiveness of public investments by developing the institutional and organizational capacity necessary to enable local communities to plan, implement and manage their own development process. For this reason this component was assessed as *highly satisfactory*.

Component 3: Institutional Capacity Building

Achievements under this component are rated highly satisfactory.

This component was designed to provide institutional support to local, provincial, regional and national institutions with the aim to reach the three following outputs: (a) provincial coordination committees established and/or revitalized; (b) capacity of service providers strengthened; and (c) a functioning communication and knowledge sharing network between local, provincial and national level established. Five key performance indicators were identified under this component: (i) number of representative and participatory provincial coordination committees established, trained and functioning; (ii) number of service providers trained and ‘in-demand’; (iii) at least 75% of the villages covered by the project have received sound capacity building support; (iv) number of thematic working groups functioning effectively to build and share knowledge on approaches to decentralized rural development; and (v) percentage of stakeholders (NGOs, donors, CCTP, CVGT, ministries)

satisfied with the quality and accessibility of information services provided/managed by the project. All five indicators have been met with satisfaction.

For the first indicator, 45 provincial coordination committees (the ‘CCTPs’) were revitalized and trained. A total of 481 meetings were held by the CCTPs since their establishment in 2002. A total of 12 training sessions were organized for the CCTPs involving various themes. Overall, it is estimated that most of these CCTPs are still functioning. However, the question of sustained financing of these CCTPs beyond project support still remains to be resolved. Undeniably, the project intervention has been crucial to revitalize the provincial coordination committees in close cooperation with the UNDP funded Governance project⁸. These CCTPs have been very instrumental for a better consultation/communication between public services, development partners and other actors intervening in the provinces. The project contribution to maintaining the committees functioning was very crucial, and officials acknowledged that the CCTPs have become vital ingredients in Government’s decentralization and planning strategy at local level.

Concerning the second indicator, overall 1,337 service providers were trained with project support. These service providers included consultant firms, local enterprises and local amateurs engaged to assist the CVGTs in the elaboration and implementation of their local development (PGT) and annual investment plans. All trained service providers are involved in project supported activities, since this capacity building program was a response to existing demand.

The third indicator was largely met. Accordingly, one hundred percent of villages covered by the project (3,013) benefited from adequate capacity building programs: almost 5.5 million training days were delivered to targeted beneficiaries. In particular, 13 518 CVGTs’ members were trained on elaboration and implementation of micro-projects.

As to the fourth indicator, the project initiated the establishment of a national forum for consultation among development partners on rural development and set up three technical committees to monitor socio-economic, environmental and institutional impacts. The project’s contribution has been most successful on the production and test of the manual for communal development planning in preparation of the rural decentralization process. The validation of this tool-kit for the Communal development Plan intended to rural communes has been an important achievement. There is no doubt that the project made a valuable contribution to the decentralization policy in the country, as stated by the ministry in charge of Decentralization itself considering the CBRD as “*a launching ramp for decentralization*” in Burkina Faso.

Regarding the fifth indicator, there was no direct measurement on opinion of various stakeholders a propos quality and accessibility of information services provided/managed by the project. However, the beneficiaries’ survey conducted by the project indicated that the provincial technical services were satisfied with the project’s role in the revitalization of the CCTPs. There was also mention of satisfaction of the parliamentarians who conducted a review mission on the ground as well as the Project steering committee on the project results.

⁸ PACGL: Projet d’Appui à la Concertation et à la Gouvernance Locale

Under the Institutional Capacity Building component, it was planned to include a pilot to support the decentralization process and test the social, economic, fiscal and institutional viability of about 5-6 rural municipalities, specially in the areas of fiscal and financial decentralization. This could have been possible, had the government been able to put in place the rural communes early enough before the end of the first phase. Nevertheless, the authorities failed to realize beforehand this commitment. Elections for rural municipalities were only held in mid-2006, only a half year prior to official project closing date. As a result, it was too late for the project to comply with this engagement.

Component 4: Land tenure Pilot Operation

Achievements under this component are rated satisfactory.

This component was designed to help improve land tenure security and access for all users by generating the following outputs: (a) a practical methodological guide (toolbox) for securing land tenure developed; (b) a functioning forum established for building knowledge and sharing experiences on approaches to tenure security; and (c) a national strategy/action plan for land tenure security drafted. Two key performance indicators were identified under this component: (i) heightened awareness of the constraints and possible solutions to tenure security at the provincial and national levels; and (ii) percentage of stakeholders within pilot zones with a perception of increased tenure security.

Activities under this component were delayed due to the complexity of implementing these tasks. Until project mid-term review, results obtained were not satisfactorily. As a result, a decision was made to simplify and streamline implementation by:

- (i) transferring the output related to ‘knowledge building and capitalization’ to the national committee in charge of land tenure security in rural area, the CNSFMR (*Commission Nationale de Sécurisation Foncière en Milieu Rural*- see Box 2 opposite); and
- (ii) (ii) narrowing the scope of activities for which the project would be held accountable by (a) focusing only on the promotion of land tenure security of vulnerable groups benefiting from project investments; and (b) contributing to the national debate led by the CNSFMR to promote political, institutional and legal context of rural land tenure management.

Box 2: The CNSFMR
 The CNSFMR, *Commission Nationale de Sécurisation Foncière en Milieu Rural*, was put in place in September 2002 by the Government within the Ministry of Agriculture, Hydraulics and Fisheries. This commission regroups all ministries concerned by the land tenure issue in rural areas, as well as representatives of NGOs, municipalities, associations and private sector involved in this question and is chaired by the General Secretary of the Ministry in charge of Agriculture. The commission meets on regular basis to work on the coherence of the different texts related to the management of rural land tenure. The secretariat of the CNSFMR is ensured by the DGFROP which creation was in fact recommended by the commission itself. The project support enabled the meetings to be held regularly.

Following these adjustments, both key performance indicators were subsequently met. For the first indicator related to ‘heightened awareness’, the project contributed to: (i) setting-up the national committee in charge of land tenure security in rural areas (CNSFMR) and facilitate local commissions for conflict management between farmers and herders in certain provinces (more than 40 of such commissions were put in place); (ii) elaborate the draft national policy framework on land tenure security which, following consultations at national

and regional levels, was officially adopted by the Government; and (iii) enable the signature of the ‘*PV de cession*’⁹ to secure communities’ investment sites (3,388 infrastructures were concerned). Concerning the second indicator, 100 percent of the communities’ investment sites in all pilot zones within 6 provinces have been secured through 202 signed ‘*PV de palabre*’¹⁰.

The revision of the component after mid-term review reflects undeniably the difficulties encountered in implementing this component. Indicators according to the reassigned responsibilities under the revised component were certainly met, nonetheless the experiences conducted on securing user rights, initiating the formalization of customary systems, and resolving conflicts between different land users on pilot sites haven’t been capitalized on yet. On the other hand, it is admitted today in Burkina Faso that the implementation of this component was a unique opportunity to launch and maintain a national debate on this very sensible and complex topic.

The government Law on Agrarian and Land Tenure Reform, elaborated in 1984, was difficult to implement because of the co-existence of two different land tenure regimes, the modern regime and the traditional non-written custom recognized by all citizens. The project helped implementing successfully this Law by using project investments to be secured within six pilot regions.

Parallel to establishing concrete experience on land tenure security, implementing this component led also to the elaboration of a new law on Decentralization (Law No. 055-2004)¹¹ in Burkina Faso to advance government the decentralization agenda. The adoption of this new Law was influential to expand the decentralization to the entire country covering 302 rural communes (targeted by the phase 2 of the CBRD), 13 regions organized as territorial collectivities, and 49 urban communes. One should mention that before the adoption of this Law, there were no rural communes in Burkina Faso. The project was then very successful in supporting the government in this issue.

Box 3: The DGFROP

The DGFROP, the *Direction Générale du Foncier Rural et des Organisations Paysannes*, is a technical department within the Ministry in charge of Agriculture, created in June 2006. The department following missions:

- Coordinate at central level all activities of different government entities dealing with all Land Tenure issues in rural areas in order to harmonize legal, technical, and administrative aspects of such interventions;
- Coordinate and animate activities related to the elaboration of the legal and regulatory framework on land tenure security issues in rural areas;
- Follow-up the implementation of the Land tenure Security Policy in rural areas; and
- Ensure the technical and administrative secretariat of the CNSFMR.

The project supported this department by making available resources in 2006 and 2007 (CFA 300 million) to contribute to the preparation of the Land Tenure Policy, the organization of diverse workshops, as well as a national Forum to adopt the policy before submission to the National Assembly. For the second phase, a total of US \$ one million has been allocated to the DGFROP for the next five years.

⁹ ‘*PV de cession*’ means consentement des propriétaires coutumiers à céder une partie de leurs patrimoine foncier pour abriter les investissements communautaires par la signature d’un acte.

¹⁰ ‘*PV de palabre*’ refers to a similar procedure validated by the administrative authority, the prefect departmental. This concerns only the 6 pilot provinces on land tenure

¹¹ Loi No.055-2004/AN portent Code Général des Collectivités Territoriales (CDCT) au Burkina Faso du 24 Décembre 2004, promulguée le 14 Avril 2005

Finally, the Land Tenure component has in fact been instrumental and the most challenging one in term of policy change. As a result, the government advocated keeping up this activity for the second phase as an independent component executed by the accountable unit within the ministry, the *Direction Générale du Foncier Rural et des Organisations Paysannes – DGFROP* - see Box 3 above).

The project assisted this unit become operational very quickly. In addition, as mentioned earlier, the DGFROP was also created following the different debates held at regional and national levels on land tenure policy. This unit will be responsible for executing the component during the second phase.

Under the DGFROP, were also elaborated (i) the National Policy for Land Tenure Security for rural areas adopted in March 2007, and (ii) the draft Law on Land tenure Security, as well as its implementation texts to adopted in March 2008 by the National Assembly.

For these different reasons, the overall achievement under this component can be rated as *satisfactory*.

Component 5: Administration, Monitoring and Project Coordination

Achievements under this component are rated highly satisfactory

The component was designed as support for: (a) the coordination office/forum of the overall program (the PNDRD – *Programme National de Développement Rural Décentralisé*); (b) the coordination and management of the IDA-supported project (the CBRD); and (c) the program and project monitoring and evaluation. Three key performance indicators were identified under this component: (i) decrease in the time lag between CVGT contract and disbursement of annual investment fund; (ii) number of service provider contracts satisfactorily completed within the given time and budget frame; and (iii) decrease in the ratio of administrative costs to local investment.

For the first sub-component related to the overall program (PNDRD), the project administration unit was able to carry out an impressive deployment of the diverse activities throughout the country and to coordinate its efforts (approaches, resources) with other partners. To foster harmonization on decentralized rural development among all partners and facilitate effective national coverage of the program, a National Forum (the *Cadre National de Concertation des Partenaires au Développement*) was put in place in 2005 and is still functioning. Since its creation, the Forum held two general assemblies in June 2006 and 2007 under the coordination of the permanent secretariat at the Ministry of Economy and Finance. The secretariat is funded with the contributions of all partners. This forum includes representatives of the government, civil society and development partners. The project teams were also able to collaborate and coordinate effectively with other stakeholders operating in the provinces.

Regarding the second sub-component on coordination and management of the IDA-supported project, the project coordination unit demonstrated over the years a high ability and autonomy to manage and carry out the entire program. The project coordination unit was able to provide timely funding to beneficiaries within the established deadlines to realize their micro-projects. In total, 30 billion FCFA were disbursed to communities, meaning an average of 6 billion FCFA per annum over the five years project lifetime. All agreed key performance

indicators under this sub-component were achieved: (i) the time lag between CVGT contract and disbursement of annual investment fund was decreased from 120 days to 45 days between 2002 and 2004, following the increase of the initial deposit from F CFA 750 million to F CFA 4.5 billion; (ii) 98 percent of service providers contracts were satisfactorily and timely completed within the budget frame; and (iii) the ratio of administrative costs to local investments decreased from 2.8 to 0.10 from 2002 to 2006. One should also acknowledge the very good disbursement of the project, as well as the successful and timely financial closing statement before the grace period.

As to the third sub-component on program and project monitoring and evaluation, a sound M&E system was put in place taking into account the regular monitoring of economic, environmental and institutional program and project impacts. All three specialists were recruited timely and demonstrated high competency¹². A manual of procedures for implementing the project M&E was elaborated in 2002. The project M&E system was built with support of the Danish cooperation with following results: (i) establishment of methodologies for monitoring of the three aspects (economic, environmental and institutional); (ii) baseline studies (environmental study in 2002, and economic and institutional studies in 2004;); and (iii) intermediary studies showing results and impacts (environmental studies in 2003 through 2006; economic studies in 2005 and 2006). The information system built through the M&E was able to furnish data for management and monitoring purposes. The system succeeded to provide real-time monitoring to capture physical and financial execution of the project. At the same time financial audits were carried out on regular basis, and audits reports submitted yearly before deadline (June 30).

¹² The chief of the M&E unit was recruited by the Bank as Operations Officer at the Burkina Country Office

Appendix 1 (Annex2): Project key performance indicators (as stated in the DCA dated June 7, 2001)

<p>PDO as stated in the Document of Credit agreement: <i>the objective of the project is to (i) increase the productive capacity of the rural sector and (ii) improve the effectiveness of public investments by developing the institutional and organizational capacity necessary to enable local communities to plan, implement, and manage their own development process.</i></p>		
Indicator Reference	Performance Indicators (Baseline/Target)	Status as of June 30, 2007
<p>A. Sector related CAS Goal: Reduce poverty and improve the living conditions and productive potential of the rural population</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incidence of rural poverty • Human development indicators 		

<p>B. En-of-Program Indicators</p> <p>Sustainable improvement in the productive capacity of rural resources (natural, physical, human, financial) and the emergence of a more dynamic local economy through empowered rural communities leading their own local development process</p> <p>Program phasing:</p> <p><u>Phase 1:</u> Local organizations and institutional mechanisms established/strengthened and refined</p> <p><u>Phase 2:</u> Accelerated emergence of representative and participatory rural municipalities and increased local economic growth</p> <p><u>Phase 3:</u> Program consolidation and transition to a sustainable system of fiscal transfers</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase in household income at all socio-economic levels • Improvement in the status of the natural resource base (soil fertility, vegetative cover, ...) • Increase in yields of basic food and cash crops • Evolution towards sustainable land use patterns • Increase in the % of the rural population benefiting from access to basic services • Evolution in the volume and diversity, quality and cost of service provided at local level • Rural municipalities established with successful mechanisms of sustainable resource mobilization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased communities' awareness in management of the natural resource base • Sustained yield increases in the agricultural sector due to improved agricultural practices and introduction of new technologies; • New land tenure policy adopted by the government • Almost 35% of rural population benefit now from better access to basic services due to project activities • At least, in each village 5 types of micro-projects (social, economic and environmental) realized and providing quality and cost effective services to the communities • 302 rural municipalities established before phase 1 closing date: Phase 2 target
<p>C. Outcome / Impact Indicators</p> <p>Participatory local development plans designed and implemented by a large number of local communities progressively allowing the emergence of rural municipalities with support from functioning provincial level coordination</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At least 75% of villages targeted in the first phase have received capacity building support and have adopted a local development plan • At least 60% of beneficiary villages have representative and participatory bodies assuming their role in local development (planning, execution and management of local projects) and have substantially completed their development 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Achieved above target. 2961 villages (against 2000 targeted at appraisal) received capacity building and adopted their LDPs (148%) • Achieved above target. 2986 have their CVGTs established and have completed their development plans in a satisfactory manner. For 25 villages, the development plans were already elaborated by other partners (149%)

<p>forums and facilitating regulatory, institutional, and fiscal framework at the national level.</p>	<p>plan in a satisfactory manner (economically and socially)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At least 30% of villages have been regrouped into inter-village development structures that have already undertaken sub-projects in common. • 75% of target provinces have a functioning representative coordination body (bringing together the state, representatives of the local community and development partners) providing sound coordination of available resources and quality services to support local development efforts. • The decentralization law is being implemented satisfactorily. • A functioning national forum has made substantial progress towards harmonization of rural decentralized development approaches. • Plans for decreasing the central administrative structure of the project have been developed and partially implemented 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not achieved. This option was abandoned following the change in government's decentralization policy • 45 CCTPs in all 45 provinces were revitalized and well functioning through project intervention. Since the project intervenes only in 26 provinces, this indicator is considered as achieved. • Entirely achieved. A new decentralization Law has been adopted and is being implemented successfully. Rural communes were put in place in April 2006. • Achieved. The project has initiated the creation of the <i>Commission Nationale de Concertation des Partenaires du Développement Rural –CNC-PDR</i>, with regular meetings. • Not met. This indicator couldn't be achieved due to extended project national coverage after MTR with an increased demand on supervision.
<p>Output Indicators from each component</p>		

<p>(1) Local capacity (organizational, managerial, financial, and technical) improved</p>	<p>(1) Local capacity</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • # of beneficiaries villages with at least 75% of their annual investment plan satisfactory completed (quantity and quality) • # of representative and participatory CVGT/CIVGT established, trained and satisfactorily functioning • # and type of beneficiaries having received literacy training 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2986 beneficiary villages with (i) 88% capable to elaborate their annual investment plans, and (ii) 98% being able to complete their investments plans; • 13 518 members of all established CVGTs (2986) benefited from a wide range of training sessions on organizational, management and technical issues. The concept of CIVGT was abandoned. Therefore no training at this level • 58 205 representatives of beneficiaries attended literacy training sessions and 35 801 received complementary in-depth trainings; Special training for 235 potential encadreurs
<p>(2) Local investments funds realized and sustainably managed</p>	<p>(2) Local investment fund</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 75% of local investments realized are technically sound and cost effectively produced 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • About 90% of local investments realized are technically sound and cost effective (a total of 18250 micro-projects for an amount of US \$ 48,7 million implemented by the communities)
<p>(3) Institutional capacity built at provincial and national levels for decentralized rural development</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Provincial coordination committees established and/or revitalized ○ Capacity of service providers strengthened ○ A functioning communication & knowledge sharing network between 	<p>(3) Institutional capacity building</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • # of representative and participatory provincial coordination committees established, trained and functioning • # of service providers trained and “in-demand” • At least 75% of the villages covered by the project have received sound capacity building support • # of national thematic working groups functioning effectively to build and share knowledge on 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 12 training sessions organized for all member of the 45 CCTPs, and 481 meetings were held by the CCTPs since their revitalization • 1337 service providers trained • Largely met. 100% of villages covered by the project benefited adequate capacity building programs with 5.5 million training days • Three (3) national technical committees set up with project support to monitor socio-economic, environmental and

<p>local, provincial and national level established</p>	<p>approaches to decentralized rural development</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • % of stakeholders (NGOs, donors, CCTP, CVGT, ministries) satisfied with the quality and accessibility of information services provided/managed by the project 	<p>institutional impacts</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No direct measurement of this indicator. However provincial technical services very satisfied with the revitalization of the CCTPs
<p>(4) Land tenure pilot study</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A practical methodological guide (toolbox) for securing land tenure developed • A functioning forum established for building knowledge and sharing experiences on approaches to tenure security • A national strategy / action plan for land tenure security drafted 	<p>(4) Land tenure pilot operation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Heightened awareness of the constraints and possible solutions to tenure security at the provincial and national levels • % of stakeholders within pilot zones with a perception of increased tenure security 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Achieved. Set up of a national committee (CNSFMR) + 40 local commissions for conflict management between herders and farmers, and elaboration of the national policy framework for land tenure security • Achieved. 100% of stakeholders within 6 pilot zones with secured infrastructures sites through 202 signed 'PV de palabre' for 3388 infrastructures
<p>(5) Administration, monitoring and coordination of project</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The administrative capacity to manage a national coverage, "faire faire" program • A functioning information system effectively used for project management and monitoring purposes 	<p>(5) Project management and monitoring</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decrease in the time lag between CVGT contract and disbursement of annual investment fund • # of service provider contracts satisfactorily completed within the given time and budget frame • Decrease in the ratio of administrative costs to local investment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Achieved. Time lag decreased from 120 days to 45 days between 2002 and 2004 • Achieved. 98% of service providers contracts satisfactorily and timely completed with the budget frame • Achieved. Decrease in ratio of administrative costs to local investments from 2.8 to 0.10 from 2002 to 2006

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis

The PAD did not attempt a detailed economic and financial analysis of the overall project. It was admitted at appraisal that for APL operations of this nature, such detailed analysis was required for the first phase; however operations under this phase were largely directed towards institutional strengthening and provision of basic infrastructure through demand-driven community funds. Under the project's approach, as already indicated, each community concerned made its final choice about investments undertaken, based on its own goals and ecological constraints. This demand-driven and adaptable nature of the program did not lend itself to standard financial analysis.

For the second phase of the project, an economic and financial analysis was conducted for the investments made under the CBRD as a proxy for the future economic benefits and costs. It was admitted that this analysis could serve as an **Ex-Post Economic Analysis of CBRDP 1 Experience**.

Economic Rates of Return. The types of sub-projects financed include a mix of productive and social investments. For certain types, economic rate of return analysis is possible. For others, cost effectiveness analysis is more appropriate because benefits cannot be measured fully in monetary terms or measurement is difficult or can only be done over a very long term. The overall portfolio ERR depends on the relative weight of certain sub-project types. The distribution of investments under Phase I is presented in the Table below. Eight main sub-project types account for 80 percent of investments.

SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF CBRDP INVESTMENTS 2002-2006

Sub-Project Category	Percentage of investments 2002-2006	Of which main sub-project types	Share in total portfolio
Water Supply	40.63	Potable water investments	34.0
Social Infrastructure	29.68	Literacy centers	10.5
		Health infrastructure and equipment	7.2
		Classrooms and teacher housing	7.1
Environmental Management	15.79	Cordons pierreux	7.1
		Fosses fumières	7.8
Support for Animal Production	4.43	Vaccination facilities	4.0
Support for Crop Production	4.07	Aménagement Bas Fonds	2.0
Renewable energy	1.52		
Reforestation	1.46		
Road Infrastructure	1.40		
Other*	1.01		
Total	100.0		79.1

* Includes training and operational research, microfinance, HIV-AIDS prevention and other sub-project types that each represent less than 1 percent of the portfolio.

As part of Project preparation of the second phase and the ICR exercise, an economic analysis of CBRD I's 2002-2006 portfolio was carried out, covering 71 percent of the 2002-2006 portfolio, including water supply (potable not agricultural), literacy centers, stone fences

(*cordons pierreux*), compost pits (*fosses fumières*), animal vaccination facilities, teacher housing and classrooms. Ex-post field work was carried out in 30 villages covering six provinces, with a total of 69 sub-projects analyzed. Rates of return could be calculated on water supply, fences and compost pits and animal vaccination facilities, which account for about 53 percent of the previous portfolio. The sample from the study is indicative, so results should be interpreted with caution, but they point to **high rates of return on the portfolio overall, equivalent to 74% for the portfolio under review:**

Weighted Average of Portfolio Applicable to Rate of Return Analysis

Sub-sector	Average ex-post rate of return	Weight in 2002-2006 portfolio	Weight in Portfolio under review	Weighted contribution to Portfolio ERR
Potable Water:				
Bore holes (<i>forage</i>)	39%	27%	51%	20%
Wells (<i>puits</i>)	56%	7%	13%	7%
Stone Fences	50%	7%	13%	7%
Compost Pits	265%	8%	15%	40%
Vaccination Parks	3%	4%	8%	0%
Total		53%	100%	74% (ERR)

Source: World Bank estimates derived from Konate, S. “*Analyse Economique des Investissements Communautaires*” February, 2007.

Cost-Efficiency Analysis – Unit Cost Comparisons. An initial comparison of unit costs was carried out as part of the ex-post economic analysis study. While comparative data is scant and often difficult to standardize across highly variable investments, an initial indication shows that **CBRDP I’s unit costs were between 34 and 94 percent of sectoral comparators**, with the largest efficiency gains in social infrastructure:

Infrastructure Comparative Unit Costs

Project Type	CDBRP I (PNGT)	Ministère de l’enseignement de base et de l’alphabétisation	Ministère des ressources animales	%
Classrooms	3 603 721	10 500 000		34%
Vaccination parks	5 631 730		6 000 000	94%
Teacher housing	4 234 409	8 700 000		49%
CPAF	3 078 909	4 000 000		77%

Source: Konate, S. “*Analyse Economique des Investissements Communautaires*” February, 2007.

Sub-sector economic analysis is further detailed below:

Water supply. Access to clean water improves the health of rural population and reduces time spent (especially by women) in collecting water. The benefits of improved water supplies (quantity and quality) on health outcomes are well documented. These health benefits in turn lead to labor productivity and income gains via a variety of direct and indirect pathways. The economic rates of return on the water investments quantified only the benefits in time savings and value of additional water, not the health benefits. The ERR for the 7 bore

hole sub-projects studied ranged from 9 percent to 70 percent with an average of 39 percent. For the 3 wells reviewed, the ERR ranged from 55 Percent to 58 percent. Sensitivity analysis found that for bore holes, a 20 percent increase in costs and decrease in benefits would have resulted in a negative rate of return on only one of the sub-projects and a reduction of the average ERR to 21 percent, still an acceptable level. For wells, a 20 percent increase in costs and decrease in benefits would result in a ERR of 34 percent.

Natural Resource Management. Local benefits expected from better natural resource management include (a) increased productivity of crops and livestock, (b) better ability to manage the volatility and risks associated with the drought and insect-prone Sahelian environment, and (c) greater sustainability of resources as depleted assets are restored. In the Burkina Faso context, for example, national experiences in building rock protective fences (*cordons pierreux*) reduces soil loss by between 21 and 61 percent with production gains of between 58 and 343 percent in low rain years. In the ex-post economic analysis, 7 rock fence sub-projects were analyzed, with an average ERR of 50 percent, and with average ERR of over 30 percent even when assumption of cost and benefits were changed by 20 percent. Compost sub-projects studied had extremely high ERRs, over 200 percent. However, the rates of return on vaccination facilities was low, averaging 3 percent, with sub-projects that performed less than 3,000 vaccinations per year showing a negative rate of return.

Beyond the local impacts, environmental rehabilitation has global benefits. The immediate environmental effects of carbon sequestration from reforestation can be analyzed in economic terms. Under the assumption that each ha sequester 6tCO₂/yr, the reforestation subprojects (16 638 ha total) sequester 99 828 tCO₂ annually or 2 495 700 tCO₂ over the next 25 years.¹³ In addition, with a price of 5 USD for a tCO₂ (current price on the European CO₂ market), annual benefits are almost 500 000 USD. With a project life of 25 year, the benefit/cost ratio is 9.3 (10% discount rate) or 14.5 (5% discount rate). The associated economic internal rate of return is 103%.

Education. Social rates of return of education estimated for Burkina Faso in 1985 found a rate of return of 20.1 percent for primary education, 14.9 percent for secondary and 21.3 percent for higher education.¹⁴ Private returns to schooling were estimated in 2003 at 9.1 percent for primary, 15.3 percent for secondary and 20.7 percent for higher education.¹⁵ Given the high positive externalities associated with a literate population, including reductions in family size as girl's education attainment rises and a more informed citizenry, the Government has adopted the Education for All and MDG goals of 100 percent primary school completion. In terms of specific education investments, the ex-post economic analysis studied literacy centers, classrooms and teacher housing:

¹³ The assumption is based on similar reforestation projects in Mali and Niger
<http://ecocarbhone.free.fr/projets/projets.html>

¹⁴ Pscharopoulos and Woodhall « Education for Development: An Analysis of Investment Choices”, World Bank 1985.

¹⁵ Kazianga, H. « Schooling Returns for Wage Earners in Burkina Faso: Evidence from the 1994 and 1998 Priority Surveys”, 2003.

- Literacy Centers: While an ERR calculation is not applicable, the study found generally low levels of utilization of these centers.
- Classrooms and Teacher Housing: ERR calculation is not pertinent for such kind of social investments aimed by the Government to decongesting overcrowded classrooms and provide an incentive for stabilizing teaching force to reduce lost days of schooling. A cost-efficiency analysis based on infrastructure comparative costs carried out indicates high efficiency gains for CBRD's social investments with unit costs between 34 and 49 percent lower than other sectoral comparators for these two types of investments (see table above).

Health. Economic benefits from health investments are well-documented: the direct impacts of increased labor productivity and avoidance of the potential death of productive family members. Health shocks to the household are closely related to predict future poverty. And indirectly, better health results in fewer days lost to schooling, higher birth weights of newborns and so on.

Maintenance and rehabilitation of rural roads: Few roads investments were made under the previous Project. Demand may increase as rural local governments play a greater role. Due to limits on sub-project size, most road investments are anticipated to be small-scale rehabilitations and upgrading of existing rural feeder roads. Better roads will increase access to markets and social services, such as health and education and reduce transport time and cost for villagers. Experience from the road sector in Burkina Faso shows that full rate of return analysis is not carried out on rural feeder roads. Instead, transport sector policy calls for cost effectiveness indicators to be used for the ranking of rural secondary roads. Under the existing World Bank-Financed Transport Sector Project, least-cost analysis caps rural road investments at 2 million FCFA per kilometer. A cost-efficiency analysis-based ranking of all local projects presented at the provincial levels is being carried out and will inform sub-project screening.

Other economic benefits: The Project contributed to employment and income generation in rural areas: (i) *directly*, through improvement of the productive capacity of the natural resource base and involvement of local artisans and village workers in the construction of basic infrastructure funded under the LIF; and ii) *indirectly*, through the new and/or additional economic opportunities generated by road improvement and improved capacity for economic activity due to better health and water supply. Growth multiplier research in West Africa indicates that each dollar of additional income generated in the agricultural sector will generate an additional US\$1.90 of income in the local economy through the stimulative impact of spending on local goods and services (Delgado, Hopkins and Kelly, 1998).

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names	Title	Unit	Responsibility/ Specialty
Lending			
Jane C. Hopkins	Senior Agricultural Economist	AFTAR	Task Team Leader
Emmanuel Nikiema	Natural Resource Management Specialist	AFTAR	Co-TTL
Andrea Vasquez/ Basra Abdillahi-Chire	Task Team Assistants	AFTFP	Task Team Assistants
Mamadou Yaro	Financial Management Specialist	AFTFM	Financial Management Specialist
Francois Gadelle	Irrigation Specialist		Irrigation Specialist
Dirk Prevoo	Operations Officer, Procurement accredited	AFTEN	Operations Officer, Procurement accredited
Renée Desclaux	Disbursement Officer		Disbursement Officer
Pascale Dubois	Senior Legal Counsel	LEGAF	Senior Legal Counsel
Ibrahim Nebie	Agricultural Services Specialist	AFTEN	Agricultural Services Specialist
Yves-Coffi Prudencio	Soil Fertility Specialist		Soil Fertility Specialist
Rémi Kini	Environmental Economist	AFTEN	Environmental Economist
Matthieu Koumoin	Traditional Energy Specialist		Traditional Energy Specialist
Ibrahim Magagi	Health Sector/AIDS		Health Sector/AIDS
Celestin Bado	Operations Officer	AFTPR	Operations Officer
Arnaud Desmarchelier	Rural Roads Specialist	AFTTR	Rural Roads Specialist
Supervision/ICR			
Jane C. Hopkins	Senior Agricultural Economist	AFTAR	Task Team Leader
Emmanuel Nikiema	Natural Resource Management Specialist	AFTAR	Task Team Leader
Andrew Osei Asibey	Sr Monitoring & Evaluation Specialist	AFTRL	Monitoring & Evaluation
Bepio C. Bado	Sr Operations Officer	AFTPR	Sr Operations Officer
Gwladys Nadine Isabelle Kinda	Team Assistant	AFMBF	Team Assistant
Julien Bernard Labonne	Consultant	SDV	Impact Evaluation
Daniel Moreau	Sr Agriculturist	AFTS4	Sr Agriculturist
Daniel Murphy	Consultant	SDV	Consultant
Ibrahim B. Nebie	Sr Agric. Extension Specialist.	AFTS4	Sr Agric. Extension Specialist.
Oumar Ouattara	Consultant	AFMBF	Consultant
Dirk Nicolaas Prevoo	Senior Operations Officer	AFTS4	Senior Operations Officer
Aguiratou Savadogo-Tinto	Operations Officer	AFTTR	Operations Officer
Abdoul-Wahab Seyni	Social Development Specialist.	AFTS3	Social Development Specialist

Abdoulaye Toure	Senior Rural Development Specialist	AFTS4	Senior Rural Development Specialist
Mamadou Yaro	Sr Financial Management Specialist	AFTFM	Sr Financial Management Specialist
Amadou Oumar BA	Sr Agricultural Specialist	AFTAR	ICR Team Leader

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)	
	No. of staff weeks	USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)
Lending		
FY98	Not available	77.53
FY99	Not available	221.21
FY00	114	361.57
FY01	35	132.00
FY02		0.00
FY03		0.00
FY04		0.00
FY05		0.00
FY06		0.00
FY07		0.00
Total:	149	792.33
Supervision/ICR		
FY98		0.00
FY99		1.06
FY00		4.62
FY01	16	64.88
FY02	30	92.67
FY03	52	124.54
FY04	33	65.63
FY05	36	65.84
FY06	31	55.99
FY07	20	40.57
FY08	8	15.58
Total:	226	531.41

Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results

A beneficiaries' perception study of the CBRD impacts was conducted in 2005. The objective of this study was to collect views from different stakeholder groups on the impacts of activities realized under the project support. The approach was more theoretical and conceptual based on qualitative assessment made by the different beneficiaries of the diverse project interventions.

Even if the impacts of the CBRD activities are difficult to differentiate from the global impacts of other programs, it is obvious that the concerned populations are able to appreciate very well the direct effects of such activities and can link them to the project interventions. On this basis, the study was executed through a survey conducted in 40 villages within 8 provinces which benefited from the project direct support. The survey was administered to households, specific groups organized in focus groups, and opinion leaders.

The main conclusions of this survey are summarized as follows:

- The project is very well known by the populations who are aware of its mission and strategies. The general perception of the project's mission is articulated around the idea of improving the communities' wellbeing in rural areas, which raises many expectations among the beneficiaries.
- Beneficiaries appreciate considerably the project participatory approach and strategies based on regular consultations with the populations and capacity building programs to identify their needs and look for appropriate solutions.
- Organization and capacity development are key factors to foster local development. Communities are aware that the transfer of money from the project is indeed important to realize needed investments; however the social capital building represents another major sustainable impact at village level due to project interventions.

1) Beneficiaries' perception of changes occurred in their life due to project interventions.

The perceptions of the populations are similar independently from location:

- The process of land degradation has been slowed down due to investments made on stone bunds, reforestation and 'aménagement de berges'. Sensitization actions led to awareness building regarding natural resources protection.
- Conflicts between farmers and herders have been considerably reduced thanks to targeted activities in favor of livestock such as construction of cattle trails, fodder cultures that reduced the overgrazing practices.
- The systematic use of organic manure by farmers due to wide dissemination of 'fosses fumières' and the installation of stone bunds allowed a considerable increase of the agricultural productivity and reduced at the same time the production costs by cutting down the expensive use of chemical fertilizers.

2) Beneficiaries' perception on local governance.

- The CVGTs are perceived as federative structures in the villages bringing all existing associations together to exchange around development opportunities of the village. The CVGTs are real opportunities to organize people and help them manage their resources differently.
- Even if the concept of CVGTs is not yet widely present, it is already successfully introduced in significant number of villages, and could be therefore disseminated throughout the country.

Despite of these positive views, the study revealed some shortcomings related to followings:

- (i) women remain to be marginalized due to socio-cultural dimensions at village level;
- (ii) in certain villages, the CVGTs are perceived as project owned structures;
- (iii) the non financing of individual revenues generating activities where women are more present.

Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results

From September 21 to October 6, 2006, a series of stakeholder workshops were organized in 6 different provinces. Each provincial workshop was held in a two-day session regrouping representatives of the beneficiaries in the concerned provinces covered by the project. Objective of these workshops was to collect the perceptions of the partners and beneficiaries on the project activities and its implementation. These perceptions will be used for suggestions and to draw lessons from this experience for future actions.

More specifically, the regional stakeholder workshops allowed to:

- describe the successes and strengths for each component;
- identify implementation weaknesses and difficulties for each component; and
- draw useful lessons while suggesting improvements for future programs.

The main perceptions of the representatives of the CVGTs and the CCTPs relate mainly to (i) the creation of the social capital at local level including the local development planning processes involving all stakeholders, (ii) the importance of capacity building of the various actors, (iii) the local development financing through the transfer of funds and its proper management by the communities, and (iv) the consultation and coordination with the various partners through the CCTPs as a fundament to ensure coherence of the development actions.

The overall workshop results can be summarized as follows:

- CVGTs representatives acknowledge the relevance of the strategy and the implementation approach of the project. This approach was appropriate to their needs and contributed to reinforce their ownership on development activities.
- CVGTs found that the PGT is a good instrument that enhances organization and planning activities for the community's development.
- CVGTs representatives appreciated the capacity building activities devoted to the communities in all local development issues, and recommended their continuation.
- CCTPs representatives acknowledged the crucial role played by the project in supporting the consultation process at provincial level among the diverse stakeholders. They all recognized the importance of the consultation for the benefit of the coordination and harmonization of activities of different partners at provincial level. This consultation process deserves to be reinforced.

Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

MINISTRE DE L'AGRICULTURE
DE L'HYDRAULIQUE ET DES
RESSOURCES HALIEUTIQUES

SECRETARIAT GENERAL



BURKINA FASO
Unite-Progrès-Justice

Ouagadougou, le 20 FEB :331

No ... 0251../MAHRH/SG/CN-PNGT2

Le Secrétaire Général

A

**Madame Ia
Représentante
Résidente de la Banque
Mondiale
Ouagadougou**

**Objet : Observations sur le
rapport de fin
d'exécution du
Deuxième
Programme de
Gestion des Terroirs
(PNGT2)**

Madame la représentante.

J'accuse réception du rapport de fin d'exécution du Deuxième Programme de Gestion des Terroirs (PNGT 2). qui du reste. Présente la mise en œuvre des différentes composantes, le niveau atteint par les indicateurs ainsi que les difficultés rencontrées tout au long de l'exécution de ce projet.

Je voudrais par la présence souligner la bonne qualité de ce rapport qui rend compte fidèlement des activités menées entre 2002 et juin 2007 dans la zone d'intervention du PNGT 2. Nous relevons simplement que :

- Un appui de la coopération danoise a pris fin en 2005 et non en 2004.
- La contrepartie de l'Etat de 7.47 millions de dollars représente la contrepartie décaissable. La contrepartie non décaissable constituée des taxes est de 6.13 millions de dollars, soit. une contrepartie totale de l'Etat de 13,6 millions de dollars.

Cependant, nous souhaitons partager avec vous quelques leçons apprises au cours de la conduite de cc projet. Il s'agit entre autres de :

- la non adaptation du système de DRF aux projets de développement communautaire comme le PNGT 2.
- La nécessité pour l'ensemble des bailleurs de se concerter afin de trouver un format unique de rapportage avant le démarrage du projet pour faciliter le travail de la cellule du projet. Au de l'exécution du PNGT 2 l'équipe du projet en a souffert dans la mesure où elle devrait produire trois types de rapports et à des périodes différentes destinés aux bailleurs. Il en est de même pour les audits qui ne sont coordonnés et au chaque bailleur envoie ses auditeurs.
- La nécessité d'harmoniser les missions de supervisions des différents bailleurs de Fonds pour une meilleure prise en compte de l'ensemble des suggestions et recommandations émises pour la bonne exécution du projet.

Outre ces quelques points nous vous faisons tenir à toute fin utile le rapport sur la perception des bénéficiaires avant la clôture du projet.

Vous en souhaitant bonne réception, veuillez agréer, **Madame la Représentante Résidente**, l'expression de mes salutations distinguées.

P.J.:

- rapport sur la capitalisation sur la perception
Des bénéficiaires sur l'exécution du
PNGT2

Ampliations :

-PNGT2

Le Secrétaire Général P.I


Barou Oumar OUEDRAOGO

Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

The team sent the draft ICR to the different partners involved in the project implementation: IFAD, UNDP and Danish cooperation.

The team received feedback from:

- IFAD, in form of suggestions and comments directly inserted in the original text, and including:
 - (iv) the mentioning of some fraud reports at community level, even if these cases are isolated;
 - (v) the need to substantiate the claim on Gender mainstreaming;
 - (vi) the fact that capacity development should not only include contractors working on the “software” side but also contractors working on the “hardware” side;
 - (vii) the usefulness to point out the merit of the M&E system on information and communication among stakeholders; and
 - (viii) the importance to draw lessons from the efforts made on the Harmonization agenda.
- UNDP in form of comments directly inserted in the original text and also general comments (see Appendix 1 below). Globally, UNDP comments were related to:
 - (i) supporting the general assessment of the report which they found very objective and well documented;
 - (ii) the low visibility in the report of the other partners’ role (UNDP and DANIDA); therefore, the need to highlight more the impact of the UNDP contribution to the project success which they found underestimated in the report; and
 - (iii) a suggestion to consider the government as a main beneficiary as well, with supporting arguments.
- Danish Cooperation (DANIDA) in form of comments (see Appendix 2 below) related to lessons that can be drawn from this experience, notably:
 - (i) Weak analyze regarding the weaknesses and successes of the Concerted Intervention Initiative with other development partners (AFD, Netherlands and DANIDA);
 - (ii) Lack of critique and objectivity of the report concerning the elaboration of the village development plans by private consultants due to standardized method;
 - (iii) Insist on the risk of corruption in rural areas with regards to the massive transfer of funds to realize investments;

- (iv) The need to substantiate the claim on capacity development, since other partners did also work on this issue.

For all three partners, the team took into account the comments in finalizing the report.

Appendix 1 (Annex 8): UNDP Comments (in French)

1- D'une manière générale l'évaluation du PNGT2 a été bien faite et est très objective et positive. Elle rend justice aux efforts déployés par le Gouvernement et à la coordination nationale du projet pour atteindre les excellents résultats.

2- Le rapport est très bien documenté et très bien rédigé mais malheureusement en anglais, ce qui a limité son exploitation et peut être conduit à une interprétation erronée de certains passages du rapport. Nous partageons l'appréciation positive des résultats obtenus par le PNGT2 auxquels ont contribué les autres partenaires du PNGT2 ainsi que l'appréciation positive de la gestion du programme.

3- Le principal reproche que l'on peut faire au rapport, c'est de n'avoir pas suffisamment assuré la visibilité des autres partenaires (PNUD ET DANIDA) dans le rapport. Le rapport a quasiment occulté les Contributions du PNUD et de DANIDA à l'atteinte des résultats au PNGT2. Au niveau des résultats, on ne les cite nommément qu'au niveau des effets induits en page 13 au paragraphe c. Pourtant l'apport du PNUD à travers le PACGL a contribué à l'atteinte des produits phares du PNGT2 tels que la dynamisation des 45 CCTP (dont 25 l'ont été de 2004 à 2006 par le PACGL) et la formation de leurs membres, la concertation /coordination devenue indispensable en milieu rural, la loi sur la décentralisation (CGCT), la mise en place et l'opérationnalisation du SP/de la CNCPDRD, le guide méthodologique de planification locale dont l'élaboration n'était pas prévue parmi les activités du PNGT2, mais parmi celles du PACGL, le partenariat public/privé développé lors de l'élaboration des 12 PCD de la phase test du guide, etc.

4- Nous suggérons de considérer le Gouvernement comme un bénéficiaire principal du PNGT2 ET DU PACGL car :

- l'appui financier et technique du PNGT2 PHASE 1 et du PACGL ont permis au gouvernement de d'élaborer le CGT, de mettre en place et rendre opérationnel le SP/du CNCPDRD, de dynamiser les CCTP et de rendre indispensable la concertation /coordination en milieu rural.
- Le PNGT2 a servi de rampe de lancement au processus de décentralisation
- Etc.

5- L'élaboration du guide de planification locale n'était pas prévue parmi les activités du PNGT2. Mais grâce à l'élaboration du guide de PCD et à son test au niveau de 12 préfectures, futures communes rurales, le PNGT2 a pu intervenir au niveau communal. Cela pourrait être cité comme effet induit.

Appendix 2 (Annex 8): DANIDA Comments (in French)

Commentaires sur la version provisoire du rapport d'achèvement de la première phase du PNGT 2

Le document est bien rédigé et comporte l'essentiel d'un rapport d'achèvement. Il me semble toutefois qu'il manque d'analyse et de détails souvent utiles pour tirer des leçons pour des interventions futures. On peut souligner:

- l'intervention concertée avec d'autres PTF notamment l'AFD, les Pays Bas et le Danemark. Le rapport n'a pas suffisamment analysé les faiblesses et les acquis de l'intervention concertée. A ce sujet la volonté y était tant du côté de la Banque Mondiale que du côté des autres PTF. Cependant les procédures de la Banque sont telles qu'une vraie harmonisation était difficile voire impossible. Une des raisons est que la Banque avait pu « négocier » avec le Ministère des finances des procédures spécifiques pour la mise en œuvre du PNGT 2. A cette négociation les autres PTF acteurs de développement n'étaient vraisemblablement pas associés
- le rapport a manqué de critique et n'a pas été assez objectif sur l'élaboration des plans villageois de développement par des bureaux privés. Pour bon nombre de ces plans, la méthode a été standardisée si bien qu'ils manquaient d'originalité et de spécificités. Il faut reconnaître que les bureaux d'études ont manqué du sérieux dans le travail qui leur avait été confié
- contrairement à ce qu'affirme le rapport, je ne suis pas convaincu que les CVGT aient acquis les capacités de suivi et contrôle des infrastructures réalisées dans les villages (page 9, § 2 du 3.1)
- il semble que l'approche, méthodes et outils développés par le PNGT sont plus adaptés au milieu rural sédentaire que les régions pastorales ou les réalités foncières de l'occupation des terres et de l'utilisation des ressources sont assez spécifiques et requiert une originalité d'intervention
- le § 2 de la page 11 est critiquable. Il est difficile d'affirmer qu'une vraie harmonisation des interventions des PTF est établie en milieu rural
- le rapport souffre d'une analyse objective du CNCPDR dans sa structuration actuelle en tant que forum efficient et instance pérenne. Il me semble qu'il manque une volonté politique réelle, mais surtout une capacité humaine et institutionnelle de la part de l'Etat pour porter une telle initiative et l'animer
- au nombre des risques (pages 14 à 16), il est pertinent de citer le risque de corruption du milieu rural par tant d'argent injecté pour financer les micro-projets. La situation a été vécue ailleurs (Ouganda), il n'y a pas de raisons que le Burkina y échappe si des réflexions ne sont pas menées et des mesures prises
- en page 19 au § 3, il me semble que le rapport est tendancieux pour parler d'unique opportunité de capacité de développement. D'autres PTF ont développé des initiatives de développement de capacités au niveau local qui sont efficaces et pérennes, telles le comité d'octroi de fonds, véritables instances démocratiques dont le travail témoigne de la bonne gouvernance.

Ignace Ouédraogo, chargé de programme

Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

1. Project Concept Note, [September, 1998]
2. Environmental Data sheet for Projects in the IBRD/IDA Lending Program; janvier 2000.
3. CBRD 1: Project Appraisal Document; August 2000.
4. Aide Mémoire Mission Développement Rural (29 Octobre au 10 Novembre 2001)
5. Aide Mémoire Mission Revue du portefeuille des opérations dans le secteur du développement rural (26 Février au 14 mars 2001)
6. Aide Mémoire de la première mission d'appui à l'exécution du PNGT2 (4 au 13 juin 2002)
7. Aide Mémoire Mission de supervision du PNGT2 (25 Novembre au 13 Décembre 2002)
8. Aide Mémoire Mission de supervision du PNGT2 (31 Mars au 12 Avril 2003)
9. Aide-mémoire de Mission de supervision du deuxième Programme National de Gestion des Terroirs (17 mai au 05 juin 2004).
10. Aide-mémoire de Revue à mi-parcours du PNGT2 (du 22 novembre au 10 décembre 2004).
11. Aide-mémoire de la mission de supervision du PNGT2 et du SILEM (21 novembre au 04 décembre 2005).
12. Mission de supervision du PNGT2 et du SILEM (05 au 23 mai 2006) : Note technique sur la fonctionnalité du dispositif de suivi-évaluation du PNGT2, 2002-2006 ; juin 2006.
13. Aide-mémoire Mission de supervision finale du PNGT2 et de revue à mi-parcours du projet SILEM (13 au 29 Mai 2007)
14. Revue à mi-parcours du PNGT2 : Note sur les mesures 'atténuation des impacts environnemental et social (06- au 13 décembre 2004)
15. Revue à mi-parcours du PNGT2 : Notes techniques ; novembre 2004.
16. Perception de l'impact des activités du PNGT2 par les populations ; mars 2005.
17. Loi N° 055-2004/ AN portant Code général des Collectivités Territoriale au Burkina Faso
18. Evaluation des conventions de cofinancements, Année 2003 ; mai 2005.
19. Guide méthodologique de planification locale : Comment élaborer un Plan Communal de Développement ; mars 2005.
20. Guide méthodologique de planification locale : Comment élaborer un Plan régional de Développement ; mars 2006.
21. Etat d'exécution du PNGT2 de 2002 au 31/03/2006 ; Mai 2006, Février 2007.
22. Suivi des effets intermédiaires du PNGT2 : Rapport N°1/ 2002-2004 ; septembre 2006.
23. Note synthétique sur l'état de mise en œuvre du cadre de gestion environnemental et social du PNGT2 ; septembre 2006.

24. Ateliers régionaux sur la perception des acteurs et des bénéficiaires des interventions du PNGT2 : Rapport de synthèse. Document de synthèse des concertations avec les représentants des CVGT et des CCTP ; octobre 2006.
25. PNGT2 : Perception de l'impact des activités du PNGT2 par les populations ; mars 2005
26. PNGT2 : Rapport de suivi des effets intermédiaires du PNGT/Rapport No1 2002-2004
27. PNGT2 : Deuxième Rapport de suivi des effets intermédiaires du PNGT, Juin 2007
28. PNGT : Rapport concernant l'enquête sur les conditions de vie, les revenus et la pauvreté des ménages ruraux au Burkina Faso en 2004 – Résultats de l'enquête de base du PNGT2 – Version finale, Mars 2006
29. Salifou Konaté : Analyse économique et financière des investissements communautaires du PNGT 2, Rapport final, Avril 2007
30. CBRD : Development Credit Agreement between Burkina Faso and IDA, June 2001
31. CBRD 2: Project Appraisal Document; February 2007
32. DANIDA : Appui au suivi-évaluation du PNGT2 – Rapport de Clôture (version préliminaire), Avril 2005
33. QAG Results, November 2006
34. Quality At Entry Assessment (July 2001)
35. OPCS : Guidelines for Implementation Completion and Results Report, August 2006


BURKINA FASO COMMUNITY-BASED RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT(PNGT2) INTERVENTION AREAS

0 50 100 150 200
KILOMETERS / KILOMETRES

MALI



- PNGT2 DIRECT INTERVENTION
- PNGT2 INDIRECT INTERVENTION
- NATIONAL CAPITAL
- PROVINCIAL CAPITALS (before 1997)
- RIVERS
- PROVINCE BOUNDARIES (after 1997)
- INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES
- PAVED ROADS
- UNPAVED ROADS ALL WEATHER USE
- UNPAVED ROADS INTERMITTENT USE



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