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The World Bank

Report No:ICR0000190

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(IDA-34960)

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 3.9 MILLION
(US\$ 5.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

GOVERNMENT OF SRI LANKA

FOR A

LAND TITLING AND RELATED SERVICES PROJECT

March 22, 2007

Sustainable Development Unit
South Asia Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

December 19, 2006

Currency Unit = Sri Lankan Rupees (Rs.)

1.00 = US\$ 0.0092

US\$ 1.00 = Rs 109.15

Fiscal Year

January 1 December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
CROLL	Comprehensive Review of Lessons Learned
CTS	Commissioner of Title Settlement
DO	Development Objective
ICR	Implementation Completion Report
IP	Implementation Performance
ISR	Implementation Status and Results Report
LDO	Land Development Ordinance
LGSPA	Land Grant Special Provisions Act
LIL	Learning and Innovation Loan
LSD	Land Settlement Department
MALLI	Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Land and Irrigation
MTR	Mid-Term Review
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PCU	Project Coordination Unit
PDO	Project Development Objective
PHRD	Policy and Human Development Grant
PSR	Project Supervision Report
QAG	Quality Assurance Group of the World Bank
RTA	Registration of Title Act
SD	Survey Department
SDR	Special Drawing Rights
USD	United States Dollars

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**Sri Lanka
Land Titling And Related Services Project**

CONTENTS

Data Sheet

- A. Basic Information
- B. Key Dates
- C. Ratings Summary
- D. Sector and Theme Codes
- E. Bank Staff
- F. Results Framework Analysis
- G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs
- H. Restructuring
- I. Disbursement Graph

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design.....	5
2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes	7
3. Assessment of Outcomes	13
4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome.....	16
5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance	17
6. Lessons Learned	20
7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners	21
Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing.....	22
Annex 2. Outputs by Component	24
Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis.....	26
Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes	27
Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results	30
Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results.....	31
Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR.....	32
Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders	33
Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents	34
MAP No. IBRD 31217	35

A. Basic Information			
Country:	Sri Lanka	Project Name:	Land Titling and Related Services
Project ID:	P050738	L/C/TF Number(s):	IDA-34960
ICR Date:	03/30/2007	ICR Type:	Core ICR
Lending Instrument:	LIL	Borrower:	GOVERNMENT OF SRI LANKA
Original Total Commitment:	XDR 3.9M	Disbursed Amount:	XDR 3.2M
Environmental Category: C			
Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Land and Irrigation			
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:			

B. Key Dates				
Process	Date	Process	Original Date	Revised / Actual Date(s)
Concept Review:	09/30/1998	Effectiveness:	07/13/2001	07/13/2001
Appraisal:	09/05/2000	Restructuring(s):		
Approval:	03/22/2001	Mid-term Review:		09/22/2003
		Closing:	12/31/2004	09/30/2006

C. Ratings Summary	
C.1 Performance Rating by ICR	
Outcomes:	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome:	High
Bank Performance:	Moderately Satisfactory
Borrower Performance:	Unsatisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)			
Bank	Ratings	Borrower	Ratings
Quality at Entry:	Satisfactory	Government:	Unsatisfactory
Quality of Supervision:	Moderately Satisfactory	Implementing Agency/Agencies:	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Overall Bank Performance:	Moderately Satisfactory	Overall Borrower Performance:	Unsatisfactory

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators			
Implementation Performance	Indicators	QAG Assessments (if any)	Rating
Potential Problem Project	No	Quality at Entry	None

at any time (Yes/No):		(QEA):	
Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	Yes	Quality of Supervision (QSA):	None
DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:	Moderately Satisfactory		

D. Sector and Theme Codes

	Original	Actual
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
Central government administration	96	96
Law and justice	4	4
Theme Code (Primary/Secondary)		
Land administration and management	Primary	Primary
Law reform	Secondary	Secondary
Rural markets	Secondary	Secondary

E. Bank Staff

Positions	At ICR	At Approval
Vice President:	Praful C. Patel	Mieko Nishimizu
Country Director:	Naoko Ishii	Mariana Todorova
Sector Manager:	Gajanand Pathmanathan	Ridwan Ali
Project Team Leader:	Edward C. Cook	Jessica Mott
ICR Team Leader:	Edward C. Cook	
ICR Primary Author:	Edward C. Cook	

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)

The Project Development Objective was to assess and build the methods, framework and capacity for making sustainable and comprehensive improvements in the land administration system (parcel-based cadastre, land titling and title registration). Its operational outputs comprised: * Operational testing and application of models to improve systematic titling and title registries, and * development of institutional framework (including legal, policy, communications, organizational, management and planning aspects), and capacity.

The key performance indicators of this development objective were:

(a) well functioning small-scale titling and title registry operations that provide increased tenure security, efficiency in titling and land transactions, land market choices, and fairness;

(b) confidence and knowledge to expand shared by the voting public, local leaders, implementing partners, and concerned professionals;

(c) a plan for a larger scale project that would be judged ready for appraisal according to the Bank's quality at entry standards or equivalent, and which provide an acceptable basis for commitments to finance this follow-on project

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)

The PDO was not revised, but the key indicators were modified between the No. 10 PSR (June 24, 2004) and the No. 11 PSR (December 21, 2004) as follows:

(a) Functioning of titling and title registry operations in a number of Districts with procedures to handle transactions within specified time limits and quality standards

(b) Viable institutional framework, including cohesive organizational structure and plan for staffing and human resource development

(c) Feedback, lessons and knowledge gathered from the field reflected in improved methods and adoption of new methodology.

(d) Plan for a larger scale Title Registration Program.

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	Functioning of titling and title registry operations in a number of Districts with procedures to handle transactions within specified time limits and quality standards.			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	No functioning title registries. 0 Districts, no procedures.	3 Districts, full procedures of high quality and timely delivery.		6 Districts with full procedures
Date achieved	03/31/2001	12/31/2005		09/30/2006
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Quality of registry operation has not been verified.			
Indicator 2 :	Viable institutional framework including cohesive organizational structure and plan for staffing and human resource development			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	Organizational framework not viable	Elaboration of viable institutional framework,		Organizational plan put forward does not address key

		including staffing of key positions.		lessons learned.
Date achieved	03/31/2001	09/01/2006		09/30/2006
Comments (incl. % achievement)	The plan provided to the September 2006 supervision mission maintains most of the shortcomings that were evidenced during implementation.			
Indicator 3 :	Feedback, lessons gathered from the field reflected on improved methods and adoption of new methodology. Commensurate amendments made in the Registration of Titles Act and supporting regulations.			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	No feedback mechanism available.	1. The Comprehensive Review of Lessons Learned (CROLL) completed and field manuals reflect improved methodology based on lessons learned. 2. Improved methods successfully adopted by agencies. 3. Draft RTA amendments referred to Attorney General.		CROLL has been completed. Lessons have been incorporated in terms of simplification of field methods. Working relations among agencies remain cumbersome and delays are frequent.
Date achieved	03/31/2001	09/30/2006		09/30/2006
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Truly addressing weaknesses in methods and methodology will require adoption of amendments to the RTA, which remains pending.			
Indicator 4 :	Plan for a larger scale Title Registration Program			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	No realistic plan	Preliminary draft of a National Title Registration Program.		Basic plan for a national program has been prepared, focusing primarily on field survey work.
Date achieved	03/31/2001	09/30/2006		10/30/2006
Comments (incl. % achievement)	The plan is built around a simple calculation of number of field survey teams and number of parcels covered per team. It does not address the key bottlenecks identified during the LIL.			

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	New land policy framework established			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	not applicable	1.New policy framework approved and adopted by MALLI.		Discussion of land policy remains diffuse.
Date achieved	03/31/2001	09/30/2006		09/30/2006
Comments (incl. % achievement)	For all practical purposes, this issue was beyond the ability of the LIL to deal with.			
Indicator 2 :	Decision made on lifting market restrictions under the Land Development Ordinance and LGSPA.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	not applicable	Amendments prepared and approved by Cabinet.		Government has mandated amendments allowing lifting of restrictions on village expansion land. Amendments remain in draft preparation.
Date achieved	03/31/2001	09/01/2005		09/30/2006
Comments (incl. % achievement)	This issue is well beyond the scope of the LIL to handle.			
Indicator 3 :	Number of land parcels registered.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	22,000		5,228 title certificates issued 22,637 parcels 'registered', of which 14,676 State land parcels.
Date achieved	03/31/2001	06/30/2006		09/30/2006
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Original target referred to title certificates issued for private (non-State) land.			
Indicator 4 :	Average time period for completing titling in specific area			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	two years	7 months		PCU claims 7 months, delays from inaction by the CTS indicate that the actual

				figure is higher.
Date achieved	03/31/2001	12/31/2005		09/30/2006
Comments (incl. % achievement)	The figures above apply only to those parcels for which title certificates are issued. These represent only a minor share of the parcels in a specific land titling area. In effect, titling has not been completed in any of the project areas.			
Indicator 5 :	Average time period for completing titling in specific area			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	two years	7 months		PCU claims 7 months, delays from inaction by the CTS indicate that the actual figure is higher.
Date achieved	03/31/2001	12/31/2005		09/30/2006
Comments (incl. % achievement)	The figures above apply only to those parcels for which title certificates are issued. These represent only a minor share of the parcels in a specific land titling area.			
Indicator 6 :	Systematic titling cost per parcel reduced with improved methods.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	\$US 110	under \$US 40		
Date achieved	03/31/2001	12/31/2005		
Comments (incl. % achievement)				


G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No.	Date ISR Archived	DO	IP	Actual Disbursements (USD millions)
1	05/07/2001	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.00
2	08/09/2001	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.00
3	11/30/2001	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	0.00
4	03/14/2002	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.16
5	09/10/2002	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.79
6	10/21/2002	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.79
7	03/13/2003	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.79
8	06/26/2003	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	1.17
9	12/22/2003	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	2.01
10	06/24/2004	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	2.54
11	12/21/2004	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	3.45
12	06/10/2005	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	3.96
13	12/15/2005	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	4.25
14	06/08/2006	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	4.62
15	11/10/2006	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	4.64

H. Restructuring (if any)

Not Applicable

I. Disbursement Profile



1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

(this section is descriptive, taken from other documents, e.g., PAD/ISR, not evaluative)

1.1 Context at Appraisal

(brief summary of country macroeconomic and structural/sector background, rationale for Bank assistance)

The Project was linked to two elements in the CAS: (i) to promote sustainable private sector led growth and (ii) to improve fiscal discipline. It was seen that introduction of the land titling system, in combination with appropriate land policy changes, would enhance tenure security for farmers and other landholders, support improved land productivity and overall economic efficiency, leading to higher incomes.

The major share of land, including agricultural land, has traditionally been owned by the State. Under a series of programs, beginning with the Land Development Ordinance (LDO) of 1935, State-owned land, predominantly in rural areas, has been made available to private users, mainly for smallholder agriculture and settlement, with a number of restrictions on economic transactions. These included restrictions on leasing, mortgaging, sale, and inheritance. (This last restriction is in part tied to officially adopted minimum land parcel sizes.) The restrictions were put in place to protect against potential loss of land by beneficiaries and to ensure that land holdings did not become excessively fragmented. However over time, these limitations were seen as retarding agricultural growth by limiting: (i) access to land; (ii) the ability to leverage land as collateral for investment purposes; and (iii) incentives to invest in the land due to insecure land tenure. A PHRD-financed Land Markets Study during project preparation confirmed these views and showed that the value of LDO land was as much as 50 percent lower than comparable privately owned land.

For privately owned land, including most urban land, there were economic efficiency issues associated with insecure tenure and high transactions costs. Sri Lanka has had a deeds registration system which records transactions and serves as evidence of rights, but provides no guarantee of rights. For example, there could be multiple deeds in existence for a given property, or unregistered transactions. Further, there is not a clear linkage between the information in the registered document and the actual situation on the ground. This has contributed to a large number of land disputes, which often take years to resolve in the courts. It places a burden on the buyer to carry out a full investigation of the existing rights.

Putting in place a title registration system involves carrying out a comprehensive review of existing rights through a process of adjudication that includes an analysis of available documents and evidence gathered from the field. The information 'key' for a title registration system is the land parcel, and a reliable description of each land parcel must be provided. On this basis, a definitive decision is taken on rights for a given property,

which in turn is supported by a State guarantee of title.

International experience shows that a well-functioning land title registration system can support broader improvements in land administration through introduction of an appropriate schedule of fees for service and upgrading, or establishing, a land cadastre data base. It was expected at appraisal that the project would build the foundation for a long term program that would lead to an improved land administration system in the country.

The Government of Sri Lanka had initiated its own land titling pilot project in 1996 and begun a dialogue with the donor community on this subject. By March 1998 a primary piece of legislation, the Registration of Title Act (RTA) was adopted. Review of both the RTA and the experience with the initial piloting effort indicated that there were serious weaknesses that needed addressing. Given its established international experience with land administration projects, the World Bank was a natural partner to turn to for this assistance.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved)

The Project Development Objective was to assess and build the methods, framework and capacity for making sustainable and comprehensive improvements in the land administration system (parcel-based cadastre, land titling and title registration). Its operational outputs comprised: (i) Operational testing and application of models to improve systematic titling and title registries; and (ii) development of institutional framework (including legal, policy, communications, organizational, management and planning aspects), and capacity.

The key performance indicators of this development objective were:

- (a) well functioning small-scale titling and title registry operations that provide increased tenure security, efficiency in titling and land transactions, land market choices, and fairness;
- (b) confidence and knowledge to expand titling activity shared by the voting public, local leaders, implementing partners, and concerned professionals;
- (c) a plan for a larger scale project that would be judged ready for appraisal according to the Bank's quality at entry standards or equivalent, and which would provide an acceptable basis for commitments to finance this follow-on project.

1.3 Revised PDO and Key Indicators (as approved by original approving authority), and reasons/justification

The PDO was not revised, but the key indicators were modified between the No. 10 PSR (June 24, 2004) and the No. 11 PSR (December 21, 2004) as follows:

- (a) Functioning of titling and title registry operations in a number of Districts with procedures to handle transactions within specified time limits and quality standards.
- (b) Viable institutional framework, including cohesive organizational structure and plan for staffing and human resource development.
- (c) Feedback, lessons and knowledge gathered from the field reflected in improved methods and adoption of new methodology.
- (d) Plan for a larger scale Title Registration Program.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries, original and revised

(briefly describe the "primary target group" identified in the PAD and as captured in the PDO, as well as any other individuals and organizations expected to benefit from the project)

N/A

1.5 Original Components (as approved)

The Project included the following components and sub-components:

- 1. Improvement of field operation methods
 - (a) Titling methods
 - (b) Title registries
 - (c) Land records maintenance
- 2. Development of institutional framework and capacity
 - (a) Legal framework
 - (b) Policy formulation and project-wide learning

(c) Organizational development, project management, and program planning.

Component one focused on titling and registry operations in the field, and the testing of technologies, procedures, and processes. It was to include testing of a variety of implementation arrangements, including the use of private contractors, and focus on building capacity. The component was to allow for demonstrating improved efficiencies in the field with respect to time and cost of registration, reducing the number of parcels with unresolved issues that prevent titling, minimize legal challenges on titles issued, and increase public confidence in the titling activities.

Component two focused on the key legal, policy, and institutional framework for the project and provided the foundation for the operation of the first component. It was in this component that improvements in existing legislation and regulations were to be made, including revisions to the LDO and the RTA, and that institutional arrangements would be tested and a viable long-term organizational arrangement identified. This component also included policy formulation, stakeholder communications, human resource development, monitoring and evaluation, and development of an information management strategy.

1.6 Revised Components

N/A

1.7 Other significant changes

(in design, scope and scale, implementation arrangements and schedule, and funding allocations)

The only significant change after Appraisal was the granting of two closing date extensions, totaling 21 months, reflecting accumulated delays in project implementation.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

(including whether lessons of earlier operations were taken into account, risks and their mitigations identified, and adequacy of participatory processes, as applicable)

The Bank task team did a good deal of work in the preparation phase of the Project on analysis of the issues bearing on project design. This included the PHRD-financed Land Markets Study, analysis of the institutional framework, and careful review of the Registration of Title Act (1998). The Bank missions during the project preparation were well rounded, with a good range of skill mixes.

The critical decision made during preparation was to go with a Learning and Innovation

Loan (LIL). This was based on the fact that the Government had already begun piloting title registration work which had turned up the need for new approaches, but which also indicated that Sri Lanka was far from ready for a full-scale land titling program. In the Bank's view, the use of a LIL was more appropriate for the risks involved and would allow time for the outstanding issues to be addressed and resolved. The hope was that the potential of future financing support for a larger scale project would constructively engage key implementers and stakeholders, and help to leverage the necessary political will and actions required for successful implementation of the LIL.

The LIL was set up on the basis of the ongoing government program, incorporating the same three geographical locations. Because these locations were not fully representative of the range of operating conditions, half way through project implementation, two additional locations were included, which were believed to provide a broader sample of the land issues that the LIL was aiming to address.

The preconditions for moving forward with the LIL were kept to a minimum and grounded in a careful consideration of project alternatives. The Bank team concluded that this would offer the best opportunity to address the demonstrated weaknesses on the legal and institutional fronts that would need to be resolved before consideration could be given to a full land administration project. The RTA was weak as a legal basis for title registration and would need to be amended substantially. The institutional arrangement for large-scale titling was not clear and a reliable solution would need to be proven.

At the design stage, full responsibility for project implementation was given to the Land Settlement Department of the Ministry of Agriculture, which was leading the Government program at that time. There were inherent problems with this arrangement, as the Land Settlement Department (LSD) took the position that the title registration system would be a completely new and separate institution, with no links to the Deeds Registry at all. To be successful, the program had to incorporate a wider range of institutional players, which began early in the implementation stage. At appraisal, the lead position of the LSD was confirmed. Subsequently, the decision was made to establish the Project Coordinating Unit (PCU) in the Ministry of Agriculture, but it de facto came under the control of the Survey Department, while the influence of the LSD on project coordination was greatly reduced.

The Project Development Objective was ambitious, but consistent with the underlying rationale for the Project. The basic component design was likewise consistent with achievement of this PDO design, straightforward, and in keeping with good practice for land administration. However, the sub-components (particularly for component 2) were built to take on a broad set of activities that pushed the envelop quite hard in comparison with the demonstrated weaknesses of the existing titling program and the operational concerns mentioned above. This included taking on the issue of reforming the LDO program and the broader land policy framework, pushing private sector

development, and putting in place a strong program of stakeholder outreach and communication. These activities were added at the behest of the Bank. While this package fit together as a coherent whole, it placed a great deal of weight on a relatively modest operational vehicle.

A preparation process involving a core team of key implementing agency heads appeared to cultivate inter-agency collaboration at the conceptual level, and what appeared to be good ownership at the technical level of the project design. However, unspoken tensions involving differences in social status, inter-agency conflicts of interest, and ambitions of various Government professions were not explicitly addressed. Furthermore, it may not have been appreciated at this time how sensitive project implementation would be to changes in the persons occupying these core team positions. Poor inter-ministerial collaboration and poor commitment of the ministries outside the Ministry of Land were major factors that affected the success of implementation. While this risk was recognized at appraisal, its central importance to overall project risks was not fully appreciated.

While there was strong collaboration between the Bank team and some officials that existed at the technocratic level, interaction with high levels of Government was limited, including on the important land policy issues. This may have been due to the fact that the lending instrument was a LIL and the total amount of the credit was relatively modest. Constant ministerial restructuring during this period also inhibited the establishment of high-level dialogue. In this context, there may have been limited options available for getting firm understandings on the key land policy issues. One option that could have been pursued would have been a national level public consultation process, particularly in relation to LDO lands. The inability to engage at high levels of Government, combined with the minimal up-front requirements to resolve the legal and institutional issues, meant that the Project went forward with little demonstrated commitment from Government beyond that which existed with the members of the core team, as well as the fact that a pilot land titling effort was underway and the Registration of Title Act (1998) had been passed.

2.2 Implementation

(including any project changes/restructuring, mid-term review, Project at Risk status, and actions taken, as applicable)

The project was affected by delays in implementation early on resulting from a change in the Minister of Agriculture and an erosion of political support for land titling. The Project Launch Workshop was held nearly one year after effectiveness, and was made possible following a change in Government and appointment of a new Minister with strong commitment to the Project. It was during this period that de facto control of the

Project was shifted from the Land Settlement Department to the Survey Department. The Project was never able to make up for this slow start, and over time wound up falling further behind the original implementation schedule. For the initial delays in project implementation, the IP rating of the Project was lowered to 'unsatisfactory'. Once implementation got underway in earnest, this rating was raised to 'satisfactory', where it remained.

During project implementation, counterpart ownership wavered depending not only on shifts at the Minister level, but on shifts in persons occupying lead positions in the implementing agencies. Over time, ownership was revealed to be stronger for component one -- focusing on the field work, record keeping, and operation of the titling offices, than for component two -- focusing on the policy, legal and institutional framework for titling. Progress was being made in testing and improving the field procedures, and eventually in reducing the number of steps involved in the titling process from eleven to seven. But even within component one, true ownership was evident only for the parcel survey activities, rather than for the adjudication and titling functions.

For the key issues of amending the RTA, identifying and resolving weaknesses in the institutional arrangement for implementation, and taking on the broader land policy framework, progress was very slow. In particular, issues that had been identified with the RTA as early as 1998 were still under discussion in 2004. These implementation problems were due to a combination of the complexity of the vested interests involved and a lack of commitment of Government including the implementing agency to deal with these head on or on a priority basis. In particular, there were no champions in the high level political and policy making arenas to spearhead solving of the outstanding project issues.

The decision for the Survey Department to play a dominant role in the operation of the PCU contributed to the fact that the parcel survey aspects of the Project were handled well and did not represent a constraint on achievement of the project's development objectives. But it was the Land Settlement Department and the Commissioner of Title Settlement (CTS) that were central to achievement of the PDO, and by not having the important functions of these agencies more mainstreamed in implementation, the Project suffered much more than it gained through subordination to the SD. Bottlenecks at the CTS in taking timely action on prepared title certificates were particularly telling on project performance. Beyond this though was the fact that without a basis for getting full cooperation from all involved agencies, any of the possible implementation options would have come up short.

Cases with any sort of question about the status of land rights were not dealt with, but rather left unaddressed where the only recourse was the existing court procedures that were usually costly and time consuming. While on the one hand the Project was handicapped by the existing RTA in how it could deal with some of the problem cases,

the Project shied away from pro-actively helping people in the field work out their problems, and saw problem parcels as obstacles to reaching targets. In a number of cases, particularly those involving state or LDO land, resolution of problems would have required working closely with Divisional Secretaries and Provincial Land Commissioners, who hold the power to regularize encroachments or formalize informal transactions. The Project simply never developed an effective collaboration with these actors, despite repeated discussion of this issue.

The Mid-Term Review (MTR) identified various impediments to project implementation and to achievement of the PDO. While implementation generally improved in the second half of the Project, these gains were not significant enough to result in achievement of the PDO. The Project would have benefited from focus on solving the pressing issue of a reliable institutional framework. The frequent lack of coordination among agencies, and the ultimate lack of institutional accountability was the central factor in the failure of the Project to achieve its objectives.

It was in the second half of implementation that most progress was made in preparing amendments to the RTA, as both the implementing agency and the Bank focused increased attention on this and on the need to get the process under the control of professional legal expertise rather than technical survey interests.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

The Monitoring and Evaluation was designed in a way that made it difficult to track incremental progress on achieving the PDO during project implementation. The PDO indicators were qualitative and sufficiently general that gauging their attainment or lack of attainment could not be done until the Project was drawing to a close. This contributed to a situation where the PDO rating remained 'satisfactory' until very late in the process.

The output indicators were well designed, but probably too numerous. The PAD had 17 output indicators. At the time of conversion from the PSR to the ISR reporting framework, the output indicators were transformed into ten 'intermediate outcome' indicators with generally good continuity of the content of the original output indicators.

In addition to the project indicators, there were a number of socio-economic monitoring studies and surveys that were to be undertaken that would contribute to the learning element of the LIL. These included baseline and follow up social and economic assessments detailed in the Borrower's Project Implementation Plan.

The record of M&E implementation was mixed. Quarterly project monitoring reports were maintained throughout implementation, structured in accordance with the PDO and output indicators agreed at appraisal. There was a good deal of information contained in

these reports, but the quality of the information was impacted by a number of factors. First, those responsible for supplying data from the field were under the authority of the various line departments. The PCU had limited control over their work. Second, the qualitative assessments of progress were from time to time excessively optimistic or open to misinterpretation, for example, the reporting of progress toward getting the RTA amendments finalized.

The large number of indicators meant that the monitoring reports were lengthy. Without a mechanism for focusing on key developments, such as an executive summary, important information could get lost in the mass of detail.

Monitoring of the number of parcels making their way through the titling process was done well. However, there were differences in how these data were related to the output indicators. One indicator that was added after the MTR was the number of parcels being titled. The text of the PAD had referred to a target of 22,000 parcels registered. While it was clear that this was the number of private land parcels titled, the project counterparts took this to mean preparation of a parcel for issuing a title certificate for both private and public lands, which allowed for a much higher number to be reported.

Following the MTR, the M&E capacity of the PCU was enhanced through establishment of a unit dedicated to this work and through bringing on board the requisite skills. However, little of the planned monitoring studies and surveys was carried out. Some initial impact study and socio economic studies were done, but there were not of high quality and added little value to the project M&E and implementation.

The Project Steering Committee was the key organization responsible for acting on the information that was being provided and on setting priorities. It was ineffective in carrying out this responsibility, either by agreeing to take action directly and following up, or by emphasizing key problems to higher levels of Government for resolution. The PCU for its part made efforts to address issues identified through the M&E system, particularly in the latter stages of project implementation, but had limited authority to deal with these by itself.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

(focusing on issues and their resolution, as applicable)

N/A

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

(including transition arrangement to post-completion operation of investments financed by present operation, Operation & Maintenance arrangements, sustaining reforms and institutional capacity, and next phase/follow-up operation, if applicable)

At the time that the second project extension was being considered in December 2005,

the Bank laid out what it considered to be a necessary foundation for beginning work on a national roll-out of the land titling effort. This reiterated points that the Bank had made in the PAD and throughout project implementation, focusing on the need for establishing a legal and institutional basis. The Bank continues to adhere to this position.

At closing, the final implementation support mission found that this framework is still not in place. The Bank has formally communicated this position to Government. The Bank also expressed its interest in remaining engaged with Government on the outstanding issues.

Government has provided bridge financing to keep the PCU functioning and field work underway. It will be up to Government to decide how it would like to proceed with the land titling effort beyond this timeframe.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

(to current country and global priorities, and Bank assistance strategy)

The PDO has remained relevant to the Bank's strategy of assisting Sri Lanka. Achievement of the PDO for the LIL would lead to establishing a system for clarification of rights in land, strengthening security of tenure, and facilitating the operation of markets in land. Government priority for the PDO, at least on paper, was evident both at the time of preparation and at the present. Government ownership of the PDO, as demonstrated by actual practice, however, has wavered over time, and in general has been too weak to support achievement of the development objective.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

(including brief discussion of causal linkages between outputs and outcomes, with details on outputs in Annex 4)

While there have been positive results from the Project, the PDO has not been achieved. This has to do with the inability to define and put in place the legal, regulatory, and institutional framework consistent with a large-scale land titling program and the efficient operation of a land administration system. On the institutional side, critical lessons learned during the Project have not led to revising the existing complicated and counterproductive implementation roles and arrangements, most likely due to the opposition of vested interests to institutional change. In comparison with the lack of real movement on the institutional side, there was definite progress on the legislative side. Toward the end of the Project, amendments to the RTA that would address serious weaknesses in the existing legislation finally began to take definite shape, which was made possible by the two extensions of the closing date. If and when adopted, the proposed amendments to the RTA would substantially meet this aspect of the Project's DO. However, at Project closing the legal drafting process was not yet completed, and the finalized draft had not been circulated for comment nor

approved by Cabinet and submitted to Parliament. The necessary capacity building to support a broad national program of titling has also not taken place.

The Project failed to deal with titling of land parcels where there was uncertainty about existing rights. The land parcels for which land titles were issued were almost entirely those for which clarity of rights and security of tenure were already high under the existing system of registration of deeds. The value added of titling these parcels is limited and does not support the investment expense required to undertake a program of systematic title registration. Under this Project, only a small percentage of land parcels that were included in a systematic titling area were actually titled. This is inconsistent with good practice and points to failure if attempts were made to roll this out on a broader scale.

It appears that the central importance of adjudication of rights to a systematic titling program is still not understood or appreciated. Rather, undue focus has been put on the survey of land parcels. The orientation to survey was reinforced by the composition of the international Technical Assistance (TA) team. For a successful titling program, emphasis will need to be placed on full registration of parcels, including resolution of existing uncertainties in rights rather than merely on the number of parcels for which a boundary survey has been completed.

Within the confines of the existing legal and institutional framework, there has been significant learning and assessment with respect to the organization and management of the field teams and testing and revising of field procedures. However the objective expressed at appraisal of combining the survey and adjudication teams, which is a standard international good practice, was never attempted, which left possible efficiency gains in field work. There has been important learning with respect to the program of interaction with stakeholders at the local level. Communication with professional groups, especially lawyers, has improved.

The international TA team composition was aimed primarily at Component 1, which reinforced inherent biases in this direction. There were no systematic arrangements to acquire and transfer skills from the international TA to the related implementing agencies.

3.3 Efficiency

(Net Present Value/Economic Rate of Return, cost effectiveness, e.g., unit rate norms, least cost, and comparisons; and Financial Rate of Return)

N/A

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

(combining relevance, achievement of PDOs, and efficiency)

Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

While the Project failed to achieve its development objective, some important learning has taken place, as noted above. There is a good chance that the legal basis for title registration will eventually be improved with adoption of the proposed amendments to the RTA, though this cannot be said for certain at present. The Project was successful in linking title registration with deeds registration through the Registrar General's office. This is a key institutional step that will facilitate the coordination of the two systems and the possible eventual move to a title based system. Despite its failings, the LIL has served to raise a number of very relevant questions for Sri Lanka on how it wishes to proceed with land administration, and has initiated a number of critical steps which if followed through on would improve the foundation for a large scale title registration program. In this sense, the LIL resulted in some learning and innovation, though not enough to allow for successful scaling up of the titling program without further developments on both the legislative and institutional fronts.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(if any, where not previously covered or to amplify discussion above)

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

The draft RTA amendments will make it easier to recognize and formalize rights of those who have weak documentary claims to their land, which are disproportionately the poor. Field procedures used by the adjudication teams have emphasized equal representation of spouses in the verification of rights and their reflection in the registry.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

(particularly with reference to impacts on longer-term capacity and institutional development)

Institutional change and strengthening was a key element of the Project. As noted above, the determination of a sound institutional arrangement for implementation of a titling program was not achieved. In addition, the institutional capacity building foreseen in the PAD also went largely unmet, due in part to the neglect of the planned training program.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative, if any)

N/A

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

(optional for Core ICR, required for ILI, details in annexes)

Work on impact and social assessment of the project results, as outlined in the PAD, was greatly scaled back in practice. One study was commissioned toward the end of the Project which analyzed the early effects of the utilization of land title certificates. It confirmed that titles were being issued almost entirely to those parcels that were free of uncertainties or disputes in land rights. Titles were being utilized about as frequently as registered deeds for obtaining mortgage credit, but the time required for obtaining credit was less in the cases where titles were available. The use of titles also reduced the time required for completing sales transactions.

The study did not find any significant increase in investment in the land as a result of receiving title. The study concluded that greater investment in the land as a result of titling could be expected if the titles were provided to those land parcels for which current rights were unclear or in dispute.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

Rating: High

The assumption at the time of appraisal was that a large scale land titling program could be designed, which would make economic sense for Sri Lanka in that the costs and necessary steps to implement and maintain such a system could be justified by the economic benefits accruing. What the Project has shown is that given the socio-cultural, policy and institutional framework, this assumption may not be justified. This is an issue which the Government will need to consider further. There is a risk that consideration of this question will be allowed to lapse.

There is the option of a gradual conversion of deeds to title on a demand-driven basis. Under this approach, transactions trigger the conversion of the deed to a title, with the land rights holders bearing the costs of such conversion according to a schedule of fees as determined by Government. This is the approach that has been applied in most land titling programs in Western countries. A disadvantage is that because it is implemented on a piecemeal basis, the per parcel costs are usually higher, which makes registration less accessible to the poor. Since there is not the same attention given to information campaigns, high-profile public consultations and the like, there is a greater danger that influential people can exploit their superior knowledge of the process to their own advantage. The 'sporadic' approach would require a program of opening title registry windows or title offices in conjunction with the existing deeds registry offices. It is not clear whether there is sufficient ownership in the Registry Department or the Government in general to pursue this option.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

(relating to design, implementation and outcome issues)

5.1 Bank

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

(i.e., performance through lending phase)

Rating: Satisfactory

The Bank was very active in the preparation of the Project. Preparation teams were well staffed and covered key questions of project design well. The Bank engaged with a core group of counterparts – heads of the five key agencies involved – in developing and elaborating the Project design. The Bank team pushed the envelope fairly hard with respect to social aspects, needed land policy change, and the breadth and depth of testing of approaches and feedback. This was a conceptually coherent package with potentially significant developmental implications. Fiduciary aspects, as well as the plan for monitoring and evaluation were well prepared.

There was a period of roughly a year following pre-appraisal before the Bank team concluded that conditions were ready to conduct appraisal. During this period, the Bank team was seriously considering halting further work on the Project. While the team identified the key risks in the PAD, it did not reflect their predominance in the project's overall risk assessment, which was rated as 'moderate'. In hindsight, the overall risk context for the Project was substantial to high.

There were a number of things that the Task Team could have done to improve the quality at entry, given the difficulty engaging high levels of Government. One possibility could have been to more actively engage non-government stakeholders on key issues of land titling, and the controversial land reform measures that were included in the overall project package. The other would have been to scale back the range of project activities. Bank management, however, was in favor of going forward with the full package.

(b) Quality of Supervision

(including of fiduciary and safeguards policies)

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

Supervision teams were likewise well staffed and provided needed inputs for the work at hand. A crisis was faced early in project implementation when Government support for land titling took a significant downturn, which delayed the project launch mission by one year. Subsequently, the Bank teams continued to draw attention to key issues bearing on project implementation. Fiduciary aspects were well managed. Supervision reports were detailed and broad in coverage, and strong on substance.

In retrospect, the Bank erred on the side of optimism in both the IP and DO ratings. The IP rating was 'unsatisfactory' in the hiatus between effectiveness and project launch, but

was then raised to ‘satisfactory’, where it remained. The DO rating was ‘satisfactory’ until very late in project implementation. While assessment of issues by the Bank team was done well, the critical impediments to achievement of the development objectives were not faced directly enough in dialogue with Government (though it must be admitted that part of the difficulty in engaging Government was the lack of ownership of the project at high levels). The Bank also did not make full use of opportunities to provide honest criticism of the implementing agency in its dialogue with Government, though it was aware that there were serious problems in performance.

The PCU eventually started paying attention to problem parcels after a great deal of persuasion on this, and produced some reports that tried to categorize them and explore solutions (including where necessary, going back to “root” causes), and there was even some unsystematic and under-substantiated testing of solutions. This, however, came late in the day and was always viewed as secondary to the main mission of the PCU of learning to do the easy parcels as fast as possible. As a result, the project missed out on an opportunity to learn lessons about solving problems, lessons that could have been learned even in the current legal and institutional setting and would have continued to be relevant even with a vastly improved legal framework.

With respect to the RTA amendments, real activity got started after the MTR consistent with the principle that the amendments should incorporate learning from the LIL. While the steps involved in getting the agreements drafted and submitted to Parliament were understood, there could have been more careful consideration of a realistic timeframe to carry these steps out and agreement reached with the counterpart on following through that would then have been a key focal point for supervision.

While lessons were being accumulated about the shortcomings of the existing institutional roles for project implementation, there seemed to have been continued uncertainty on the Bank’s side about what sort of institutional schemes would allow for successful roll out of the LIL and some reluctance to take the lead in proposing solutions. Bank experience has consistently shown the correlation between simplicity of institutional arrangements and the success of implementation of land titling and registration projects, with the best practice being a single-agency model where cadastral and registration functions are handled in one organization, and pragmatic procedures for adjudication are in place (see Lessons Learned, below).

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

While overall, the technical input and guidance provided by the Bank was sound, the Bank could have done better in picking up warning signs during preparation of the threats

to successful project implementation. Given the demonstrated lack of ownership, the Bank pushed too hard on the social and policy reform elements. The Bank should also have been more frank concerning the Project ratings, which were too often ‘satisfactory’, when in fact both the IP and DO were moderately or fully unsatisfactory

5.2 Borrower

(a) Government Performance

Rating: Unsatisfactory

There was little evidence of Government commitment to meeting the development objectives of the Project. Although the Government agreed to go ahead with the Project, it was not viewed as being a sufficiently high priority to devote sufficient time or attention to resolve problems in performance. There was inadequate intervention from the high levels of the Government to streamline the project implementation, when it was affected from time to time by the changes in the policy leadership and changes of the Government. The commitment and attention of the high levels of the Government to the policy, institutional and legal framework of the Project was poor. Virtually all issues of importance were left to the Project Steering Committee to deal with. The Project Steering Committee was composed of representatives of agencies involved in implementation. Because of the rather complicated institutional arrangements, the Committee had a relatively long list of members and difficulty in resolving problems in cases where unanimity of views among the members did not exist. As a result, many problems did not get resolved. In cases where the needs of the Project were in opposition to vested bureaucratic interests, the former suffered. The implementing agencies never worked as one team to achieve the project implementation targets and to complete the actions that were agreed as part of the implementation review missions.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance

Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

Implementing Agency

Performance

Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Land and Irrigation

There was a natural affinity within the implementing agency for component one, much less so for component two. Over the life of the Project a good deal of effort and energy went into project implementation, concentrated in the PCU, but evidenced also in the activities of the involved line departments. Ultimately, though, the implementing agency saw the project as primarily a technical activity centered on the field survey work, and accepted this as sufficient justification for the project investment. There was less appreciation for whether in fact there were economic returns being generated by this

work, the importance of resolving disputes for land owners, and the need for systematic and objective feedback from project beneficiaries themselves. The political leadership of the Ministry changed hands several times during project implementation. There was no consistent political support for the Project. These changes created tensions and affected working relationships within the PCU and other implementing agency staff. These changing environments created implementation bottlenecks, undermined the decision making authority of the PCU on operational matters and consequently affected the project implementation seriously at times.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance

Rating: Unsatisfactory

In sum, the Borrower failed to make use of opportunities provided by the Project to establish the foundation for an expanded land titling program. Due to lack of clear priority from high levels of Government, the fate of the Project was subject to changes in leadership of the involved agencies. Identified problems too frequently went unaddressed or were not tackled head on, especially when they required taking controversial decisions or decisions that threatened vested interests.

6. Lessons Learned

(both project-specific and of wide general application)

The major lesson to be drawn from the Project is that in this case a LIL proved to be an inappropriate vehicle for taking on important and contested legal, policy, and institutional issues, particularly in light of the lack of project ownership at sufficiently high levels of Government. It is generally recognized that the legal and institutional framework for a titling and registration system needs to be resolved in the project preparation stage. The hope with this Project was that a LIL would provide more latitude to work out these issues in an admittedly difficult environment. The results indicate that if there are serious issues precluding movement to a full land titling and registration project, a LIL cannot get around the lack of Government ownership.

Looking forward, the Government should make a careful assessment of where a title-based registration system fits within its broader land administration and land policy framework. In that context, it needs to be clearly aware of the relatively large costs of carrying out a systematic land titling program on a broad scale. The experience from this Project with respect to a roll-out of the title registration effort points to the following key lessons:

- recognize the central importance of pragmatic adjudication of rights through the systematic titling program if the investment is to bring desired economic benefits
- recognize the need for full coverage of land parcels in a given territorial area where the systematic titling is being carried out
- pay more attention to the long-term operation of the title registry relative to the initial land titling program
- focus on ways to further reduce the per parcel costs of land titling
- put clear focus on the outputs and development objectives rather than inputs and processes
- ensure that there is regular and reliable feedback from intended beneficiaries and other stakeholders to verify that the objectives are in fact being achieved.

The amendments to the Registration of Title Act prepared under the Project and now in their final stage of drafting, will help in addressing some of these lessons, and will provide a very good overall legal basis for land titling and operation of the title registry to move forward.

A realistic institutional arrangement, consistent with the lessons learned, would need to be put in place. Good practice shows that this should be a unified agency for the land title registry. Further, this would be a closed agency of career professionals not subject to regular political and administrative rotations. The Bank is prepared to provide more information on institutional solutions for land registration internationally that have worked well, as well as those that have not.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners

(a) Borrower/implementing agencies

none

(b) Cofinanciers

N/A

(c) Other partners and stakeholders

(e.g. NGOs/private sector/civil society)

none

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing


(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Components	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
1A. TITLING METHODS	3.30	3.78	115
1B. TITLE REGISTRIES	0.11	0.09	82
1C. LAND RECORDS MAINTENANCE	0.17	0.13	76
2A. LEGAL FRAMEWORK	0.03	0.01	33
2B. POLICY FORMULATION AND PROJECT-WIDE LEARNING	0.21	0.01	5
2C. ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, PROJECT MANAGEMENT, AND PROGRAM PLANNING	2.00	2.39	119
Total Baseline Cost	5.82	6.41	110
Physical Contingencies	0.45	0.00	0.00
Price Contingencies	0.52	0.00	0.00
Total Project Costs	6.78	6.41	
Project Preparation Fund	0.00	0.00	.00
Front-end fee IBRD	0.00	0.00	.00
Total Financing Required	6.78	6.41	95

(b) Financing

Source of Funds	Type of Cofinancing	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
Borrower		1.78	2.00	112
International Development Association (IDA)		5.00	4.85	97

(c) Disbursement Profile



Annex 2. Outputs by Component

Component 1. The output from this component was in part constrained by problems with implementation of component 2, for example with improvements in the field methods and the number of parcels titled. Within these constraints, this component performed reasonably well. Some simplifications were introduced in the field procedures which allowed for the cost per parcel titled to come down. It was also reported that the time required to complete the titling process was reduced, though problems with the operation of the office of the Commissioner of Title Settlements could well have counteracted this, particularly in the last year of project implementation. The Project made little progress in testing and improving methods of adjudication and dispute resolution (tied at least in part to failure to amend the RTA), which meant that critical testing of problematic cases never took place. The project also failed to deliver intended outputs for the land records maintenance activity, which was geared to the operation of the existing deeds registry archive under the Registrar General's Department.

In other respects the component largely delivered what was intended. This included the program of stakeholder communication, records searching, and operation of the title registry offices. This component also allowed for rectification of the Government's pre-Project titling efforts, and most likely helped the Government to avoid legal challenges stemming from the initial quality of that program. The project met expectations in designing methods for urban areas, dry irrigated tracts, and other situations.

Component 2. This component suffered a major shortfall in the delivery of intended outputs. On the legal framework, draft amendments to the RTA are close to completion, but there is no telling if and when these amendments will be adopted, or what detrimental changes may be introduced. There was little movement on the intended changes in the policy framework, and on carrying out underlying studies to inform the policy making process. While initial short-term project activities related to communications, information technology development, and impact assessment appeared consistent with the project design, follow-through was weak. Communications with national level stakeholders appears to have been weak, though relations definitely improved between the PCU and the Bar Association. The intended work in the area of organizational and human development was weak. Domestic training programs were carried largely as scheduled, though the Government chose not to carry out the international training that was planned. The M&E work focused on tracking inputs and processes and was not well focused on impact and participatory social assessments. The M&E program was not able to provide what was needed for designing a national roll-out program (cost-benefit analysis, establishment of baselines, etc.).

The early decision to locate the title registries within the Registrar General's Office represents a very positive step, but further actions are required to address constraints in staffing, facilities, and inter-agency relationships that affect title registries. The project

management was subject to leadership problems and other issues, but was strong for the final period of implementation.

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis (including assumptions in the analysis)

N/A

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names	Title	Unit	Responsibility/Specialty
Lending			
Supervision/ICR			
Gavin P. Adlington	Sr Land Administration Special	ECSSD	
Edward C. Cook	Sr Land Administration Special	SASAR	
Deepal Fernando	Sr Procurement Spec.	SARPS	
Nihal Fernando	Senior Rural Development Speci	SASAR	
Isabelle Girardot-Berg	Consultant	MNSIF	
Anthony John Lamb	Consultant	ECSSD	
Isabel G. Lavadenz Paccieri	Senior Land Policy Specialist	SASAR	
Jonathan Mills Lindsay	Sr Counsel	LEGEN	
Seenithamby Manoharan	Rural Development Specialist	SASAR	
Jessica Mott	Sr Natural Resources Econ.	ECSSD	
Sumith Pilapitiya	Lead Environmental Specialist	SASES	
Barbara Verardo	Senior Rural Development Speci	SASAR	
Jiwanka B. Wickramasinghe	Financial Management Specialis	SARFM	
Harini Wijesundara	Team Assistant	SACSL	
Miriam Witana	Operations Officer	SACSL	
Johannes Woelcke	Economist	AFTS2	

(b) Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No.	Date ISR Archived	DO	IP	Actual Disbursements (USD M)
1	05/07/2001	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.00
2	08/09/2001	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.00
3	11/30/2001	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	0.00

4	03/14/2002	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.16
5	09/10/2002	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.79
6	10/21/2002	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.79
7	03/13/2003	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.79
8	06/26/2003	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	1.17
9	12/22/2003	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	2.01
10	06/24/2004	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	2.54
11	12/21/2004	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	3.45
12	06/10/2005	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	3.96
13	12/15/2005	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	4.25
14	06/08/2006	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	4.62
15	11/10/2006	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	4.64

(c) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)	
	No. of staff weeks	USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)
Lending		
FY97		29.95
FY98		78.42
FY99		203.12
FY00	16	96.17
FY01	29	60.26
FY02	1	0.11
FY03		0.00
FY04		0.00
FY05		0.00
Total:	46	468.03
Supervision/ICR		
FY97		0.00
FY98		0.00
FY99		0.00
FY00		0.00
FY01		0.00

FY02	16	65.40
FY03	22	97.68
FY04	23	87.80
FY05	35	199.67
Total:	96	450.55

Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results (if any)

Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results (if any)

Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR



Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

1. Project Appraisal Document, Sri Lanka Land Titling and Related Services Project, World Bank, Report No. 22020 CE, March 22, 2001.
2. Development Credit Agreement, Sri Lanka Land Titling and Related Services Project, Credit No. 3496 CE, April 18, 2001.
3. Land Titling and Related Services Project, Review of Lessons Learned, Project Coordination Unit, July 26, 2005.
4. Comprehensive Review of Lessons Learned, Project Coordination Unit, March 31, 2006.
5. Study on the Early Effects of the Utilization of Land Title Certificates, W.G. Jayasena, D. Gamage, G.M. Henegedara, J.K.M.D. Chandrasiri; Hector Kobbekaduwa Agrarian Research and Training Institute, December 2005 (commissioned project study)
6. Sri Lanka Land Titling and Related Services Project Addendum Report to the Mid-Term Review, Project Coordination Unit, October 15, 2003
7. Sri Lanka Land Titling and Related Services Project Mid-Term Review Mission Report, October 2003.
8. Establishing a Land Registry under the Registration of Title Act 1998, Tony Lamb, FAO, January 2001.
9. Registration of Titles: Final Recommendations Report for the Legislative Framework, DOLA, Government of W. Australia, AusAID, November 1998.
10. Preparation and Implementation Support Aide Memoires of the World Bank.
11. Quarterly Project Performance and Evaluation Reports of the Project Coordination Unit.
12. Draft amendments to the Registration of Title Act 1998, various versions

SRI LANKA LAND TITLING AND RELATED SERVICES PROJECT

- PROJECT AREAS
- MAIN TOWNS
- DISTRICT CAPITALS
- PROVINCE CAPITALS
- NATIONAL CAPITAL
- MAIN ROADS
- RAILROADS
- RIVERS
- RESERVOIRS
- DISTRICT BOUNDARIES
- PROVINCE BOUNDARIES



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