

# Bringing the state back into the *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro:

Understanding changes in community life  
after the UPP pacification process

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## Acronyms

ADA	Amigos dos Amigos (Friends of Friends)
AISP	Áreas Integradas de Segurança Pública (Integrated Areas of Public Safety)
BOPE	Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais (Special Police Operations Battalion)
CBO	Community Based Organization
CEDAE	Companhia Estadual de Águas e Esgotos (Rio state water and sanitation company)
CESEC	Centro de Estudos de Segurança e Cidadania (Center for Studies of Security and Citizenship)
COMLURB	Companhia Municipal de Limpeza Urbana (Municipal Urban Sanitation Company)
CNPJ	Cadastro Nacional da Pessoa Jurídica (National identification number for Brazilian companies)
CSC	Community Safety Councils
CV	Comando Vermelho (Red Command)
DPO	Destacamento de Policiamento Ostensivo (Ostensive Policing Command)
EMOP	Empresa de Obras Públicas do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (Public Works Company of the State of Rio de Janeiro)
FAETEC	Fundação de Apoio à Escola Técnica (Technical School Support Foundation)
FIRJAN	Federação das Indústrias do Rio de Janeiro (Federation of Industries of Rio de Janeiro)
GPAE	Grupamento de Policiamento de Áreas Especiais (Police Group for Special Areas)
IBGE	Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (National Institute for Geography and Statistics)
IDS	Índice de Desenvolvimento Social (Social Development Index)
IETS	Instituto de Estudos do Trabalho e Sociedade (Institute for Labor and Society Studies)
IPP	Instituto Pereira Passos

IPTU	Imposto Predial e Territorial Urbano (Tax on urban land and property)
ISP	Instituto de Segurança Pública (Public Security Institute of Rio de Janeiro)
ONG	Organização não governamental (Non-governmental organization)
PAC	Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (Growth Acceleration Program)
PMERJ	Polícia Militar do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (Military Police of the State of Rio de Janeiro)
PPCs	Postos de Policiamento Comunitários (Community Policing Stations)
PT	Partido dos Trabalhadores (Worker's Party)
SEASDH	Secretaria de Assistência Social e Direitos Humanos (Rio de Janeiro State Secretary for Human Rights and Social Assistance)
SEBRAE	Serviço Brasileiro de Apoio às Micro e Pequenas Empresas (Brazilian Service to Support Micro and Small Enterprises)
SESCON	Sindicato das Empresas de Serviços Contábeis (Union Business Financial Services)
SESI	Serviço Social da Indústria (Industry' Social Services)
TC	Terceiro Comando (Third Command)
UPP	Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (Police Pacification Unit)

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## Table of Contents

<b>Acknowledgements</b> .....	9
<b>Executive Summary</b> .....	11
<b>Chapter 1. What does it mean to pacify the favelas?</b> .....	21
a. UPP: a chance to break with history .....	22
b. Objectives and methodology .....	24
<b>Chapter 2. Situating UPP in Rio's history with drug traffic</b> ...	29
a. Living under the drug traffickers' rule .....	30
b. Failed attempts to regain territorial control .....	34
c. UPP: a new beginning? .....	37
d. What makes the UPP different from previous policies? ....	41
<b>Chapter 3. History matters: situating the case studies</b> .....	47
a. Understanding favela trajectories .....	48
b. The favela of Chapéu .....	53
c. The favela of Pavão .....	56
d. The favela of Borel .....	57
e. Manguinhos: the "Gaza Strip" .....	60
<b>Chapter 4. Redefining community interactions</b> .....	65
a. The freedom to come and go and live without fear .....	66
b. Regulating community joy and leisure .....	69
c. Conflict mediation .....	73
d. Aspirations and role models .....	74
<b>Chapter 5. Pacifying the police?</b> .....	79
a. The good, the bad, and the ugly: Varieties of police behavior .....	80
b. The importance of police shifts .....	84
c. Will the UPP continue after the Olympics? .....	86

<b>Chapter 6. Integrating favela residents into the city(zenship)?</b>	91
a. Regularization of public services	92
b. Access to social programs and economic development opportunities	98
c. Symbolic integration –dealing with the stigma of the favela	103
d. Too much integration? or the fear of “remoção branca”	106
<b>Chapter 7. The effects of the UPP in areas without the UPP: The case of Manguinhos</b>	109
a. Immediate, concrete effects of UPPs	110
b. Talking (and silencing) about UPPs in Manguinhos	112
<b>Chapter 8. Policy and research implications</b>	117
a. Will the UPP lead to a new type of relationship between police and favela?	119
b. Will the UPP lead to a sustainable change in public security policy in Rio?	121
c. Will the UPP enable the integration of favelas with the rest of the city?	123
d. The need for a robust analytical agenda	127
<b>References</b>	128
<b>Annex I - Profile of Case Studies</b>	135

## Tables and Maps

Table 1. Criteria for Selection of Case Studies with UPP	26
Map 1. City of Rio de Janeiro and favelas with UPPs as of March 2012, in order of implementation	42

## Index of Boxes

Box 1. What is a Favela? .....	32
Box 2. GPAE: Community policing attempt in response to escalated conflicts in the 2000s .....	36
Box 3. UPP and Crime in the Favelas .....	39
Box 4. Two generations of community leadership in Babilônia, favela of Chapéu: Dona Percília and Palô .....	54
Box 5. A Qualitative study of regularization of mototaxis in the favela of Chapéu .....	97
Box 6. Bar do David.....	102





Illustration based on photos by Rich Press

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
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# Executive Summary



**F**or many years, Rio de Janeiro has held the dubious distinction of being one of the world's most beautiful cities, and at the same time, one of the most dangerous. The city's expansive beaches and five-star hotels sit alongside informal settlements (*favelas*) spread over the hills where, until recently, murder rates were among the highest in the world. With the rise in the global drug trade in the 1980s, many of Rio's *favelas* were taken over by drug gangs, who controlled virtually all aspects of economic and social life. Over several decades, the state of Rio de Janeiro tried, and failed, to establish a permanent presence in the *favelas* – always rolling in with a muscular offensive and, just as abruptly, retreating again.

**This report is the story of Rio's attempt to break with history and establish a new kind of state presence in its *favelas*.** In 2008, the state government of Rio de Janeiro launched the Police Pacification Units (*Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora, UPP*), with the aim of regaining control of the territories from organized crime, disarming the drug traffic, and enabling the social, economic, and political integration of *favelas* into the city. This pacification was intended to shift control of the *favelas* from the drug gangs and militias to the Brazilian state – literally from one day to the next – and provide their residents with the same kind of citizenship rights enjoyed by the rest of the city.

**This report documents how life in the *favelas* is changing as a result of the UPP pacification effort, as seen through the eyes of *favela* residents themselves.** Until now, studies of UPP have consisted largely of baseline surveys of quality of life at the entry of UPP or quantitative analyses about changes in crime and real estate prices, based on secondary data. This study aimed to fill gaps in understanding by documenting how the residents have experienced the arrival of UPP, and what they see the “UPP effect” has been. The findings are meant to inform the implementation of UPP as it is rolled out to additional *favelas* over the next couple of years. The report explores perceptions of change in three main areas: (i) social interactions and community life within the *favela*, (ii) the relationship of residents with police, and (iii) the integration of the *favelas* into the broader city in terms of public services, economic opportunities, and removal of stigma.

**This study used a qualitative, case-study approach and consisted of observations, focus groups, and key informant interviews in four *favelas*.** The fieldwork was conducted between February and October 2011. Among the four *favelas* selected as case studies, three




have received the UPP program at different times: Babilônia/Chapéu Mangueira, 2008; Pavão-Pavãozinho/Cantagalo, 2009; and Borel/Casa Branca, 2010. The fourth, Manguinhos, had not received an UPP by the time that the fieldwork was carried out and this report was concluded, and back then remained largely under the control of drug gangs, and was therefore included as a control case.<sup>1</sup> Hence, the report will still refer to Manguinhos as the case with no UPP. The case studies were selected to maximize variation in terms of (i) time of entry of UPP (to capture potential changes made in UPP strategy), (ii) geographical and socioeconomic context in which favelas were located (affluent South, middle class and poor North zones), and (iii) prior and current histories with public works projects.

**The study fits into the broader territorial approach to urban and social development that the World Bank has been supporting in both the State and city of Rio de Janeiro, and for which the historical alliance between federal, state and municipal governments in Rio has been crucial.** Through different financing mechanisms (e.g. Development Policy Loans, advisory services, technical assistance loans, etc.)<sup>2</sup>, the Bank has been helping Rio to reinforce an integrated, multi-sectoral approach to the sustainable growth of the territory. These projects have focused on strengthening planning and management of urban growth in the metropolitan region, promoting the provision of affordable housing with access to infrastructure and service, and supporting the implementation of a targeted, comprehensive social development program for the urban poor. Under the social development agenda, the Bank has been providing support to *Social UPP* since its design stage, in 2010, through technical assistance services to strengthen social governance and territorially-based monitoring and evaluation. These and other areas being supported by the Bank, such as education, financial literacy, gentrification, and lack of income generation opportunities, are related to the “second generation” of problems that are still present and/or still to come after favelas are pacified. In addition, the Bank has also been supporting the federal government on the “*trabalho social*” (social work) that is part of slum upgrading

1 Manguinhos was occupied by State forces on October 14<sup>th</sup>, 2012, and its UPP unit should be inaugurated by January 2013.

2 Recent or ongoing projects include, among others, Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Urban and Housing Development Policy Loan; Strengthening Public Sector Management Technical Assistance Project; Advisory Services for Integrated Urban Development in Rio de Janeiro State; *Poverty and Social Impact Assessment – Characterization of the favelas*; “*ICT for empowering the urban poor*”; and Strengthening Citizenship through Upgrading Informal Settlements.



initiatives. Finally, other analytical work is in progress to assess the overlays of the UPP program and *Social UPP* with the poverty levels and access to social services across the city.

## Life under UPP: What's the difference?

**Perceptions about UPP appear to be influenced by the history that each favela had with drug traffickers and the police before the arrival of the UPP.** Despite the many commonalities in people's perceptions about UPP across favelas, the fieldwork revealed some distinct patterns among favelas. In simple terms, when the recent history was dominated by conflict with drug traffickers, perceptions of UPP tended to be more positive (*Chapeu*). When it was dominated by conflict with the police, the more negative tended to be the perceptions (*Pavao*). When it was dominated by intense conflict with drug traffickers and the police, perceptions combined strong feelings of relief with strong apprehensions about the future and return of drug traffickers (*Borel*).

**Despite this variation there were a number of commonalities across favelas in terms of:**

### *(i) social interactions and community life within the favela:*

**The single most important change associated with life under UPP was that residents can now move about the favela much more freely.** Mothers said they were relieved to be able to walk to the school to pick up their children without worrying that they might walk into the crossfire between rival gangs or the police; fathers mentioned the new role models emerging for their kids, who can now walk around the favelas without being exposed to guns (in use) and violence. Others described how they are finally, for the first time in a long time, learning to sleep through the night without listening for gunfire, and being ready to hide their families under the bed.

**The pacification process has also redefined community life in many other ways – some intentionally, others accidentally or inevitably.** Among these is the regulation of community “fun” and leisure, which have divided opinions. On the one hand there is the youth population, unsatisfied with the lack of activities available after the famous *funk parties*, which for decades defined great


part of the favela culture, were banned; on the other, there are workers residents who welcomed the silent weekends. The study also found that UPP officers are often called to step into a role of conflict mediation between neighbors, previously taken by the drug traffickers. At the bottom of these issues is the still unclear definition of boundaries of what should be the legitimate UPP involvement in community affairs. Finally, there are also changes in cultural and social manifestations, with symbolic representations of violence and power being substituted by others of peace and citizenship.

### *(ii) the relationship of residents with police:*

**UPP holds the potential for improving the relationship of favela residents with the police and redefining Rio's police culture.** Perhaps the most important finding related to this topic is that, while for outsiders and the official narrative, the UPP represents an attempt to bring peace to the favelas, for most residents the UPP represents an attempt by the state to pacify the police. However, a few cases of abuse heard show that the new relationship has yet to be institutionalized. While residents in general acknowledge the difference in the behavior of the new police, they also emphasize that this new relationship “depends on the shift” of the individual officer and/or captain.

### *(iii) the integration of the favelas into the broader city:*

**The expectations of favela residents' full integration into the formal city seem to be gradually and slowly materializing.** In some dimensions, such as regularization of public services and access to social programs, changes are more evident. The pacification effort has created a more secure environment in which more and improved social services – from regularized provision of electricity and water, to childcare centers, schools and health clinics – can now operate, and where private sector investments can now flourish. There is still a need for better schools and more qualified teachers, for health clinics and for job creation, of course. But today's reality presents a clear improvement over the days under gang control when social services were minimal and subject to closure at the whim of the ruling drug lord. In others dimensions, however, they are still more incipient. There is some sense that UPP will bring increased economic and



development opportunities to the favelas, although it is still too soon to know with certainty. New businesses have opened and old ones have gained new consumers – from UPP and PAC workers, to tourists and other Rio residents, who now feel safe to climb up into the hills, whereas before these areas were no-go zones for the rest of the city. But residents were cautiously optimistic about this new influx representing the opening of a process whereby some of the stigma attached to them might be lessening.

**At the same time, the UPPs' efforts to "regularize" many informal businesses have also been received with mixed feelings, bringing the concern that regularization could represent a crackdown on one of the principle sources of employment for favela residents.** Some local street vendors, carpenters, small businesses, bars, beauty parlors, and other service providers, worry that they might be forced out of business if required to register and pay taxes. At the same time, the cost of everyday life in the pacified favelas is rising, as urban services – formerly available at minimal cost via pirated connections – are formalized. In addition to that, in some of these areas, real estate prices have started to escalate, reinforcing real fears of the perverse effects of gentrification – what residents call "*remoção branca*", or 'white removal'. The achievement of UPP goals that go beyond territorial control and safety, and aim for social and economic integration of the favelas, will depend to a great extent on whether jobs can be created that allow people to afford these new costs, and replace the former illicit sources of income – especially for youth.

**Skepticism about the state's attention span for the problems of the favela abounds, although more in some communities than others.** Manguinhos, the control case, served throughout the fieldwork as a fresh reminder of, first, what it means to be living in a place where freedom of expression is still curtailed by drug trafficking, and second, of the level of distrust in the police and the state that is still very ingrained in these communities. The future sustainability of the program and the consolidation of its goals, with the ultimate integration of favela residents into the rest of the city and the restoration of their citizenship, will depend on its ability to build and maintain this new relationship of trust.


***Some of the main policy implications are:***

- UPP should customize its approach to favelas according to the relationship that each territory has had with violence

(both drug traffic and police related) before UPP arrival.

- UPP should invest in improving selection, training, and monitoring of UPP policemen to minimize bad practices voiced by residents.
- For the UPP to be an irreversible process it needs to become a reference that inspires a broader public security policy reform, oriented towards citizens and communities. This broader public security reform will also need to address some of the remaining questions and challenges that have not been answered by UPP so far such as: what is the state doing with the “bad guys” who fled the favelas? And what are the government plans for the hundreds of favelas left to be “pacified”?
- In terms of political integration, government should strengthen the existing associational density in the pacified areas so that regular institutions can replace UPPs in the medium term.
- In terms of social integration, the state needs to give to programs like UPP Social the same level of attention and resources that it has given to the UPP. It also needs to prioritize the development of specific programs aimed at the “orphans of the drug trade”.
- In terms of economic integration, the government needs to minimize the threat of gentrification by scaling up and strengthening programs that foster job creation, income generation, and the formalization of old and creation of new small businesses.
- Putting in place a robust learning and evaluation agenda will greatly increase the chances of success of the pacification effort.

**UPP’s greatest accomplishment has been to open up a space for the imagination of daily life in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro that is not dictated by the powers of the drug trade.** The very endurance and improvement of the UPP in time and space will deepen this effect, encouraging favela residents to move on with their lives *as if* there were no drug trade and, in so doing, progressively undermining drug trafficking’s hold upon community life, livelihoods, and future expectations. The dream is that, as a result, Rio de Janeiro will one




day have the proud distinction of being not only one of the most beautiful cities in the world, but also one of the safest and most integrated ones.







# Chapter 1. What does it mean to pacify the favelas?




## a. UPP: a chance to break with history

**This report tells the story of a decisive moment in the life of Rio de Janeiro—the moment when peace and the rule of law have begun to return to its slums or *favelas*.** Rio de Janeiro—known as Brazil’s “marvelous city”—has long captivated the imaginations of people the world over. In recent decades, however, high rates of crime and violence, driven by a thriving drug trade, led Rio to be seen as a very dangerous and divided place. Much of this violence and crime concentrated in Rio’s *favelas* – informal settlements spread throughout the city. Over several decades, the Brazilian state sought – and largely failed – to exert its presence in the favelas through periodic police incursions.

**In 2008, Brazil broke with these past attempts and launched an ambitious proximity policing and disarmament program called the Police Pacification Units (*Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora, UPP*),** with the aim of regaining control of the territories from organized crime, disarming the drug traffickers and creating conditions for the social, economic, and political integration of favelas into the city. This report is the story of that initiative, as told by the favelas residents who are living with it every day.

**Life in the favelas has never been easy, but the rise of drug trafficking complicated it more than ever.** With the arrival of cocaine in Rio de Janeiro during the 1980s, drug trafficking emerged as a highly profitable enterprise in need of a domestic market and sites for re-packaging. Rio’s favelas, where the state presence had never been well established, were extremely desirable territories for drug gangs to set up business. The scaling-up of the drug business, which before had been minor and dealt primarily with home-grown marijuana, demanded a highly organized and hierarchical control over the territory in which a “*dono*”, (literally the “owner” of the community, the drug lord) enforces his own law over residents to protect the favela from infiltration by the police (Dowdney 2003).

**For over twenty-five years the dominance of these gangs has affected the livelihoods, access to services, social capital and outsiders’ perceptions of favela residents, diminishing their opportunities for social and spatial mobility** (Perlman, 2010). While the traffic provides occasional favors to individual residents to maintain goodwill, it has replaced the freely elected leaders of the Residents Associations and maintains dictatorial control over



the communities through excessive and arbitrary use of force. Punishment for suspicious or disloyal behavior, as well as for smaller crimes within the favela such as theft, is harsh and can range from expulsion from the favela, to a bullet in the hand or foot, to death (Arias 2006).

**The effects of this control have been devastating for most people living in these areas.** In a longitudinal study of life in the favelas over the last forty years, Perlman (2010) shows that, with the arrival of the drug gangs to their favelas, most residents felt more marginalized/excluded than ever and said they had less bargaining power than they did during the dictatorship. The greatest change in their daily lives was to have to live with the fear of dying in the crossfire among competing drug gangs or between the gangs and the police as the drug and arms trade escalated and fatal violence became a fact of daily life. Almost one in five people in that study reported that a member of their family had been a victim of homicide. The youth homicide rate in favelas is estimated at seven times that of the rest of the city (Perlman 2010).

**With Rio's successful bid to host the 2016 Olympics, Brazil the 2014 World Cup, and the prospect of the eyes of the world on the "marvelous city", it became a political priority to change this situation,** and overcome the infamous reputation of a beautiful but terribly violent place. In 2006 a group of key advisors to the state governor, the intelligence sector and influential leaders from the private sector began a serious discussion of potential solutions to the city's public security dilemma. After a year of studying successful public security management in other cities in the Americas, they concluded that to move forward, the first action would have to be a definitive *retomada* (retaking) of territories lost to the control of the traffic, followed by the installation of permanent, preventative policing.<sup>3</sup> The UPP was the result. The necessary collaboration between the local, state and Federal Government was possible due to a fortuitous alliance among the political parties at each level - a first, since the return of direct elections in 1985. The program was also met with strong support from the private sector and the media and with guarded optimism among the general public, fed up with the inability of the state to insure their personal safety and the obvious complicity between the gangs, the police and the judiciary.

<sup>3</sup> This back-story is not generally known. The research team discovered it through conversations in meetings with key people in the business community and government. As far as we know there is nothing written about this and no one discusses it or takes credit for it.


**Today there are 28 UPPs in the city, which include more than 100 communities and reach over 400,000 people. More than 3,500 police officers are currently part of the program.** The state government expects to have units operating in a total of 40 of these territories, reaching a total of 750,000 beneficiaries, and deploying a total of 12,000 police officers, by 2014. UPP Social, the social development phase of the program, designed by the state and municipal governments to coordinate social and urban development interventions in the favelas, is active in all of them.

**The UPP has been recognized so far, in Brazil and abroad, as a very promising initiative. This report points in the same direction.** However, in order to be consolidated as a successful policy, in the long term the program will have to address several challenging questions, several of which are discussed in this study. The program has inspired other countries where drug cartels extend significant control over territories and peoples' lives. Nevertheless, given the specific context of Rio's favelas, the 'follow-up' measures that will be taken with the UPP – to sustain peace and promote development, after the regaining of territory – will be the ones that can be replicated in other countries.

## b. Objectives and methodology

**This research project was conducted in early 2011 to explore the perspectives of favela residents regarding this bold new government initiative.** Specifically, the objective is to understand the transformations taking place in the living conditions of favelas of Rio de Janeiro after the implementation of the UPP by exploring the way the program is affecting the daily lives of favela residents and how they are dealing with the new situation. The study explored perceptions of change in three main areas: (i) social interactions and community life within the favela, (ii) the relationship of residents with police, and (iii) the integration of favelas into the broader city in terms of public services, economic opportunities, and removal of stigma. The fieldwork also probed about prospects for the future: expectations, hopes and fears about the future and their own ideas of what would be desirable.

**Research findings will provide inputs for UPP Social, which will inform the scheduled rapid rollout of UPPs to other favela communities over the next two years.** Several surveys and studies



have been commissioned using quantitative measures, but are unable to address the impacts of the program on the dynamics of the communities and the way that the policy played out in each one. Most of those that have been produced so far are almost all based on secondary data and look mostly at access to crime statistics, services and socio-economic indicators, but do not capture the views of favela residents. This research project was meant to fill that gap in understanding by describing the transformations taking place in the lives of favelas residents from their own perspective. The analysis follows a qualitative study designed for the express purpose of understanding the view from below.

**The research design is based on four case studies of favelas at different stages of UPP implementation.** The data was collected through field research conducted from February through October of 2011. Three of the case study sites are part of the UPP program. The fourth case was included as a control case. It does not have a UPP posting and remains under the control of armed drug-traffickers, with homicide rates comparable with levels in the midst of civil wars and additional death tolls from crack cocaine.<sup>4</sup>

**The three favelas with UPP were selected on the basis of discussions with the government officials in charge of developing the UPP Social program<sup>5</sup>, at the time when this study was also being designed.** They were interested in seeing whether there were significant differences in the approach of the UPP or the reaction of the community according to when the UPP program had started in each of them. On that continuum we selected Babilônia/Chapéu Mangueira, as one of the early initiators (2008); Pavão-Pavãozinho/Cantagalo, as a mid-range case (2009); Borel/Casa Branca, which is more recent (2010); and Manguinhos, as the control community. This set of cases also provided: (i) variation in location (North and South zones); (ii) the type of neighborhood in which the favelas were located (up-scale to middle class to poor); and (iii) the prior and current engagement of public urban upgrading. On the latter, cases were selected to see if they could shed some light on the relationship of the UPP program and another massive favela oriented program in Rio, the *PAC-Favelas (Growth Acceleration Program in Favelas)*, showing

<sup>4</sup> See ROSALES, Kristina and BARNES, Taylor. *New Jack in Rio - Six years ago, crack cocaine was virtually unheard of in Brazil. Now it's out of control.* Foreign Policy, September 11 2011. ([http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/14/new\\_jack\\_rio](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/14/new_jack_rio))

<sup>5</sup> UPP Social is the social development arm of the UPP program that aims to coordinate social services and infrastructure provision in the pacified favelas and thereby help integrate them into the rest of the city. (see section 2.c)

whether and how these two programs – UPP and PAC – affect each other. We had the extreme case of Manguinhos, which had a large PAC housing and public works project underway but was not pacified; two cases, Chapéu Mangueira/Babilônia and Borel/Casa Branca, which had UPP posts but no PAC; and Pavão-Pavãozinho/Cantagalo, which has both UPP and PAC.

**This report uses a shorthand to refer to these favelas.** All of them are complexes that encompass more than one community, which is why they often have long names. To make it easier for the reader, we have used only the first word of the favela to refer to it (see Table 1).

**Table 1. Criteria for Selection of Case Studies with UPP**

<i>Waves of Creation of UPP</i>	<i>First wave (12/2008-06/2009)</i>	<i>Second wave (07/2009-12/2009)</i>	<i>Third wave (01/2010-06/2010)</i>	<i>Control Case</i>
<i>Cases</i>	Chapéu Mangueira/ Babilônia	Pavão-Pavãozinho/ Cantagalo	Borel/Casa Branca	Manguinhos
<i>Name used in the report</i>	Chapéu or Favela of Chapéu	Pavão or Favela of Pavão	Borel or Favela of Borel	
<i>Date of UPP installation</i>	(June 2009)	(December 2009)	(June 2010)	
<i>Location Region/neighborhood</i>	South/ Leme (upper/middle class neighborhood)	South/ Copacabana – Ipanema (upper/middle class neighborhood)	North/Tijuca (middle class neighborhood)	North/ Manguinhos (poor class neighborhood)
<i>Does it have PAC?</i>	No	Yes	No	Yes
<i>Prior urban upgrading program</i>	Bairrinho	Favela Bairro	Favela Bairro	

**Within each favela the study targeted four groups of particular interest: (i) community residents, (ii) community leaders, (iii) local businesses owners and (iv) youth.<sup>6</sup>** In each community, a great deal of time was spent gaining their trust and confidence. Prior to beginning the interviews, we spent time in the communities, engaging in informal discussions, eating at local hangouts, observing the interactions between the pacification police and community members, and attending community events. In some cases, the field coordinators had previous experience in the favela and where this was not the case, the community researcher facilitated the learning process and contact with locals. The teams interviewed a total of 97 people. The idea was to keep the sample small but ensure diversity of experience and perspective. People, whose homes were close to

<sup>6</sup> The group to which the resident belonged is identified in the quotes used in the report as (i) 'men/woman', for regular residents; (ii) 'community or religious leader', for community leaders; (iii) 'business owner' or shopkeeper, for people involved in business in these areas, either as owners or workers; (iv) and 'young man/woman' for youth.


the UPP headquarters in each favela or to the civil works of the PAC as well as those more distant, were included as well, as a mixture of those residing in the poorest to the best-off sections of each favela. In addition, five focus groups discussions, one per favela, with a total of 56 people, were carried out, including two separate ones for Pavão-Pavãozinho and Cantagalo. Each focus group included women, men, youth and elderly residents, some of whom had participated in one way or another in the traffic.

It is clear that the population of Rio's favelas, now estimated at 1.4 million people<sup>7</sup>, remains skeptical about the degree to which government in general and the police in particular can be trusted to keep their word and apply the rule of law equally to all citizens. Each failed attempt at proximity policing or community policing has added to this skepticism. There is now a window of opportunity to demonstrate that this time it is different. It is our hope that these research findings will help inform public policy and facilitate mid-course corrections as the UPP increases the scale of its activities.


<sup>7</sup> According to IBGE statistics, almost 1.4 million people, or 22 percent of the Rio's population, live in favelas, or "substandard' and irregular housing communities". When compared to the previous census of 2001, this number represents a 27.6% growth of the favela population in ten years – against 3.4% growth of the population in the rest of the city over the same period.







## **Chapter 2. Situating UPP in Rio's history with drug traffic**



## a. Living under the drug traffickers' rule

**The story of Rio de Janeiro and its favelas does not begin with drug trafficking; but the story of UPP does.** It is the story of the progressive appropriation of the favelas' physical space and social fabric of the favela by the drug trade, from the mid-1980s onwards; it can be told as the transition of the "*bocas de fumo*"<sup>8</sup> from drug sales points to an instance of sovereignty in the favela. The term "*boca*" originated to refer to the physical spot where drugs were sold.<sup>9</sup> In this case, the *boca* is simply an agglomeration of young men (who are armed to a greater or lesser degree, depending on the time of the day) that can easily scatter if the police appear. Prior to the 1980s, the *bocas* were small scale businesses yielding amateurish profits, and run by long-time community residents in their 30s and 40s whose family and affinity ties within the communities guaranteed a relationship of respect vis-à-vis the general population of the favela. For residents, this "respect" was evidenced by their willingness to conceal their weapons, their prohibition of drug consumption in the public spaces of the favelas and a role as benefactors in the community, for example by buying medication for the sick and elderly, helping families in dire economic need, and so forth.

**The encroachment of the cocaine trade upon existing criminal networks transformed the *bocas* and the power relations that constituted them, as a new generation of heavily armed and increasingly younger men, teenagers even, came to run a highly profitable business.** Disputes with enemy factions and violent police incursions led the drug trade to enhance surveillance within its territories to protect its markets. This new structuring of the drug trade and the turf wars that it provoked progressively came to impinge upon virtually every aspect of life in the favelas, including the organization of associational life, as is evident in their interference in residents' associations.

**The result of this new structure is the sense of a growing removal from public order and institutional politics.** From the 1990s onwards, violent takeovers of certain favelas by enemy factions potentialized the sense of estrangement between the drug trade and favela residents, particularly in areas where takeovers brought to

<sup>8</sup> The literal translation of *Bocas de fumo* is "mouths of smoke", an expression that maintains the original activity of the *bocas*, the sale of marijuana.

<sup>9</sup> There may be more than one *boca* in each favela, and they are usually located close to the areas where people enter the favela by foot.


power what residents term a “migratory” drug trade characterized by a total lack of affinity ties with the community, thus replacing old relations of “respect” by “predatory” ones. Thus we find a process of gradual disenfranchisement of favela residents in their communities: while in the “early days” the *bandidos* (criminals) used to hide their illegal activities, today they “flaunt” them; while the space of the favela formerly “belonged” to residents, today they live in the trade’s territory, abide by their rules and live under their authority (Cavalcanti 2007).

**The extent and scope of the drug trade’s authority is evident in the so-called “law of silence” in the favelas.** The law of silence developed as part of the historical process of securing the favelas’ boundaries in a way that the drug trade had full control of what happened within its turf. No stealing, no raping, no physical fights, no wife battering are rules that aim at maintaining the police safely at bay. They are reinforced by a prohibition on establishing relationships with menacing outsiders (*alemãos*) of any sort, in particular members of other drug factions or the police. Any breaches to these laws are dealt with at “the boca”, now meaning not only the physical site where drugs are sold, but also encompassing the parallel system of public order that has underpinned the social control of the favelas by the drug trade.<sup>10</sup>

**This parallel system effectively cuts off residents’ access to formal legal institutions, insofar as domestic or local disputes fall unequivocally under the jurisdiction of the trade.** To resolve conflicts “at the boca” is to bring complaints to the local boss, who judges who is “right” and distributes penalties to whomever he deems a perpetrator of the laws of the favela. Punishments are unfailingly exerted upon the body of the “offender” to serve as an example that reinforces the prohibitions. They can range from beatings to execution, and also include “warnings” that brand the “offender” with the visible marks of imposture, as in the case of thieves who are shot in the hand or foot. The extent to which punishments are spectacularized varies from favela to favela depending on the personal taste of the drug boss in charge.<sup>11</sup> That capital punishment was never really off the table in the favelas had two main effects:

<sup>10</sup> In Manguinhos, however, the drug trade has taken root to the extent that the bocas have become actual physical spaces, with couches and makeshift tents to shade the dealers who work literally behind the counter. There and in Jacarezinho, drugs are often sold in stalls originally meant for vendors to use in the weekly farmers markets in the city.

<sup>11</sup> Sociologist Luiz Antonio Machado da Silva uses the term “violent sociability” to name this “principle of interaction” (Machado da Silva 2008).



first, it did manage to virtually end certain types of crimes like rapes and robberies. But the harsh nature of punishment also meant that residents who did not wish for a violent end to minor conflict found themselves completely cut off from any possibility of conflict mediation.

**These general dynamics make for an extremely precarious and ever-provisional order – that is always subject to disruptions in the form of shootouts – between enemy factions or between drug dealers and the police.** Thus daily life unfolds also in the perennial anticipation of the next shootout, a situation that translates into an overarching sense of uncertainty. The constant shootouts yield the city's alarming statistics, which resulted from turf battles among competing drug gangs – mainly the Red Command (Comando Vermelho, CV), the Third Command (Terceiro Comando, TC) and the Friends of Friends (Amigos dos Amigos, ADA) – and from conflicts between the military police and these gangs. As more favelas fell under the influence of the drug gangs and militias<sup>12</sup>, many legitimately elected leaders of their Residents' Associations were killed or forced to move out. Consequently, Residents' Associations' elections frequently became an empty performance characterized by single ticket disputes and low voter turnout.

**In other words, the effect of the drug trade upon the favelas' daily lives is not just about oppression and prohibition but also about the cutting off of any sense of autonomy or agency of their residents.**

#### Box 1. What is a *favela*?

The same life under drug traffic control that shaped the collective memory of residents and the narrative of academic and policymakers created an ugly image of favelas to the world outside. Looking at it objectively today, it is difficult to identify what singles out them from other urban dwelling systems with lower-income housing in Rio de Janeiro, such as irregular lots and housing units. It is hard to find any truly objective criterion, whether the type of legal relationship with urban land, type of housing construction or socioeconomic characteristics of residents.

<sup>12</sup> Composed in part of corrupt police, firemen and prison guards, the militias were initially formed to fill the vacuum left by the state in favelas – and get an additional source for income for its members – by offering protection to residents and small business from drug traffickers. Overtime, they started charging for those services and ended up establishing the same – and sometimes even worse – type of territorial and brutal control of those territories and its populations.

In none of these hypotheses does the attempt to sustain the specificity of the favela resist an empirical test: favelas are not the only urban spaces occupied informally, and not all areas normally defined as favelas have informal housing; there are frequently higher poverty figures in lots situated on the periphery than in favelas situated in central areas of the city. Such non-differentiation between low-income spaces is due to urban development advances achieved by the favela while other spaces, including those in low-income neighborhoods, suffer degradation.

If the category “favela” is not a description of the objective physical and socioeconomic characteristics of a space, then it may be understood as a mix of representations. What does it mean, for example, when a person is accused of behaving like a ‘*favelado*’, a derogatory term commonly used to refer to a person from a favela? The more general element present in different meanings given to the terms favela and *favelado* is the absence – total or partial – of public order, i.e. of rules and rights sanctioned by the state, and among them, the rights to safety and freedom to come and go.<sup>13</sup> As Rio started to integrate these areas, segregated by these mix of representations, into the rest of the city, people outside also started to use the word “comunidade” – already used by residents – to refer to them.

According to the municipal government's urban planning institute Instituto Pereira Passos (IPP), there are 599 favelas in Rio de Janeiro, with a total of 954 communities. In addition, IPP considers that there are another 87 communities in the city that have been “urbanized”. The latest census from the National Institute for Geography and Statistics (*Instituto Nacional de Geografia e Estatísticas*, IBGE), on the other hand, released in 2011, identifies 763 of these territories in the city. IBGE defines favelas as “subnormal agglomerates”.


Left: View of Pavão-Pavãozinho, from Cantagalo; Right: View of Cantagalo, from Pavão-Pavãozinho.

(Photography: Rich Press)

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13 For a more in-depth view of this point, see “What’s in a Name,” by Janice Perlman - pp. 29–36 and “Toxic Terminology,” pps. 36-39 in *Favela* (2010), and “Favela, Conjuntos Habitacionais, Bairros Populares e Outras Formas Urbanas: por uma agenda de luta pela cidade”, by Marcelo Burgos, In: *Cidades Saudáveis*, Edfiocruz, Rio de Janeiro, *in press*.



## b. Failed attempts to regain territorial control

**Several attempts have been made to change the brutal state of affairs described above.** Over the past three decades, these policies have manifested in periodic, often violent, police incursions into the favelas, many of them organized around the hosting of international events. Until the UPP, these policies had largely failed to end traffic control within the favelas and establish a consistent state presence.

**Previous state initiatives in the favelas, whether through urban upgrading or public security programs, have improved living conditions in some areas but neither in taking back control of the these areas, nor in extending the rule of law or the protection of their residents.** Many favela-upgrading projects have been tried. The most ambitious of these was the Favela-Bairro Project, which began in 1994 and continued for three 5-year phases. This has now been subsumed under the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC, *Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento*) and the recently launched slum upgrading program Morar Carioca.<sup>14</sup>

**The proposal to create a different kind of police force in Rio has its roots in the post-dictatorship era, when the legacy of torture tainted the image of the police, especially in the favelas.** Early efforts to implement community policing were undertaken by state governor Leonel Brizola, but were met with harsh resistance from within the police force, and were compounded by the challenges of confronting an increasingly powerful drug trade in the favelas (Soares and Sento-Sé 2000, Soares 2002). The following years, under the Moreira Franco governorship, were marked by the intensification of conflicts and the return of police raids. As a response to the escalating crime rates between 1987 and 1990, Rio saw the consolidation of the policy of repression that held the respect for human rights as a secondary consideration (Soares and Sento-Sé, 2000:16; Ribeiro et al. , n/d).

**The early 1990s saw renewed efforts of community policing, and the creation of the Special Police Operations Battalion (BOPE),** designed to be the elite of the Military Police of the State of Rio de Janeiro (PMERJ). Policies in those years were consistent with the

<sup>14</sup> *Morar Carioca* is a municipal plan for the integration of favelas and other informal settlements into the “formal” city. It was launched in July 2010 as part of the legacy of the Olympic Games the municipal government plans to build. Its aim is to invest R\$8 billion and to urbanize all favelas in the city by 2025.




directive to respect human rights. In 1991, for example, the Center for Complaints was created, with the objective of reducing police criminality by means of anonymous reports of police violence coming from the community (Ribeiro, Silva and Silva 2010).

**Conflict between the growing drug trade in the favelas and police escalated with the massacres of Candelária and Vigário Geral,** which were heavily covered by the media, characterizing police brutality as a sign of the treatment inflicted on working-class areas by the police in Rio de Janeiro.<sup>15</sup> Subsequent policing policies such as the “Wild West gratuity” only added fuel to the fire. This financial incentive ranged from 50 percent to 150 percent of the monthly salary and is credited with a drastic increase in the number of people killed by the Military Police: between January and May of 1995, the average for civilian deaths at the hands of the Military Police stood at 3.2 people per month. Between June 1995 and February 1996, this average was 20.55 per month (Zaverucha 2001; Ribeiro, Silva and Silva 2010).

**Under Governor Anthony Garotinho's administration (1999-2002), the closest thing to a forerunner of the UPP was introduced, namely, the Group for the Policing of Special Areas (GPAE).** It emerged as a result of escalated tension and brutal episodes that drove significant media attention, with the goal of bringing the police (and the state, more generally) closer to the “community” by means of programs such as the creation of the *Delegacias Legais* (revamped police stations), integrated areas of policing and some specialized policing programs. However, as with earlier initiatives, the GPAE was eventually undermined by reports of police corruption, and its failure to put a stop to drug trafficking or the presence of armed dealers in the slums. Overall, GPAE, as the programs before it, was ineffective in controlling violence beyond a few months and many have even exacerbated the violence through collusion with the drug gangs or militias (ISER 2003; Arias 2006; Perlman 2010).

<sup>15</sup> The massacre of Candelária occurred in July 1993, when Military Police officers murdered six under-age youths and two adults who were sleeping in vicinity of the Candelária Church, in the center of Rio de Janeiro. The following month in the same year, in August, balaclava-wearing Military Police raided the favela of Vigário Geral and killed 21 people (including women, teenagers and men), none of whom had a criminal record. The massacre was attributed to a revenge motive for the death of four police officers at the hands of local narcotics dealers the previous day.



### Box 2. GPAE: Community policing attempt in response to escalated conflicts in the 2000s

The GPAE came as a replacement for the brief *Mutirão Pela Paz* (Joint Effort for Peace), which lasted a short 10 months. The *Mutirão Pela Paz* foresaw police occupation of the favelas, but also the mobilization of various government departments so as to meet the social demands of the occupied communities. The first GPAE, in Pavão-Pavãozinho/Cantagalo, was introduced after the killing of five youth of the community by the police, which brought protests onto the streets of Copacabana. The second GPAE, in Formiga/Chácara do Céu, was then implemented as a result of the intensification of the conflict between rival groups of drug dealers in the region. The death of journalist Tim Lopes of the Rede Globo network in 2002, while preparing a report in Vila Cruzeiro favela, led to the installation of the GPAE in this community (Ribeiro et al. n.d.). The Delegacias Legais Program was created as part of the GPAE initiative in January 1999 and entailed one of the biggest investments then made in the area of public security policy in a short period of time. The objective of the *Delegacias* was to seek greater efficiency and transparency in police work through modernizing the physical infrastructure of the police stations, as well as computerizing its information system and redefining some of its functions (Misse and Ferreira, 2010).

**The history of failed policies in specialized policing experiments in favelas not only served to deepen the chronic distrust of the inhabitants toward the police; it also paved the way for vigilante justice in the form of *milícias*.** For a while, this type of organization enjoyed a certain degree of support from the mainstream media, which saw in the militia a kind of solution-from-within for the problem of territorial occupation by the drug trade. However, it soon became evident that the *milícias* often took advantage of the communities. They extorted “taxes” in exchange for security, protection and other basic services, and often colluded with the drug trade. The expression “*milícias*” was adopted by the media and made official by the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry of the Legislative Assembly of Rio de Janeiro, held in 2008.<sup>16</sup>

**In order to move away from the tarnished legacy of repressive policing in Rio, the UPP program was built around a different concept** which emphasized, first, regaining territorial control of the favelas from the hands of the drug gangs and militias and, next,

<sup>16</sup> The acclaimed movie *Elite Squad: the Enemy* portrays the problem of the militias in the favelas.



reinstating the state's presence in these areas with a new type of police force.


### c. UPP: a new beginning?

**After so many trials and errors, the UPP model used the lessons learned from previous experiences and emerged to mark a clear shift in public security policy in the favelas.** The 'pacification stage' of UPP follows four basic steps. First, officers from the Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais (BOPE), the elite squad of Rio de Janeiro's military police, stage a massive, coordinated operation to retake control of the favela from the drug gangs. In the first favelas to be pacified, this phase, called the "*Retomada*," was carried out without warning. As a result, early operations involved heavy fighting between gangs and police, with significant casualties. This phase is now announced in advance by the police in order to give gangs an early warning to leave voluntarily or turn over their arms. The military incursion is followed by the *stabilization* stage, when the patrolling of the favela remains under responsibility of the BOPE. The *definitive occupation* is then consolidated with the control of the area by the newly inaugurated UPP unit. This is often accompanied by a "*choque de ordem*" ("shock of order") against various forms of informality, from precarious housing to street vending.



UPP Headquarters in Chapéu-Mangueira.  
(Photography: Rich Press)

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### *UPP Social: Bringing the State Back*

The “*post occupation*” phase of the UPP model comes with the entrance of UPP Social, the social development arm of the program that aims to coordinate social services in these areas and thereby integrate the favelas into the rest of the city.

**UPP Social began in August 2010 under the direction of the Rio de Janeiro State Department of Social Assistance and Human Rights (SEASDH),** two years after the first UPP pacification.<sup>17</sup> UPP Social emerged based on the recognition that the immediate success of UPP in disarming the drug traffickers in the favelas and giving people the freedom to come and go in safety, did not guarantee the creation of conditions for new economic, social, and political opportunities for favela residents to improve their lives. The UPP Social program therefore aims to consolidate the peace and promote the long-term social development of the favelas through the coordination of various social services.

**UPP Social follows a three-stage process.** The pre-implementation phase starts after UPP takes over the territory, and UPP Social enters with a group of local coordinators who spend up to three weeks talking to local associations, community leaders and the general population, to get a sense of the most pressing demands. This process is followed by a Rapid Participatory Mapping exercise, which provides a socio-economic assessment of each favela. Based on this initial diagnosis, a UPP Social Forum is held in each favela, bringing IPP president and staff, representatives from all key municipal secretariats (health, education, housing, etc.; an of average 15 to 20 sectors are usually present), local leaders, the local UPP police commander, and private sector representatives to discuss the main demands identified and possible responses. The entire community is invited. The results of these forums, including the list of demands, participants, and agreements, are made available to the public via UPP Social’s website.<sup>18</sup> Lastly, a team of UPP Social local coordinators (two or three, depending on the community’s size) is placed permanently in the communities, carrying out daily visits to be mediators between them, the government, and other services’ providers.

<sup>17</sup> The deployment of the UPP Social Program was delayed as a result of the reassignment of the team that had designed the program, from SEASDH to the municipal *Instituto Pereira Passos* (IPP), the city’s urban planning institute responsible for the handling of data and information concerning the city.


<sup>18</sup> <http://www.uppsocial.org>

### Box 3. UPP and Crime in the Favelas

Initial reports on the effects of the program have been positive. The most comprehensive analysis carried out so far looked at eleven crime and violence indicators, from January 2006 to June 2011 (UERJ and FBSP 2012).<sup>19</sup> The study shows that violent deaths (e.g. homicides and deaths in encounters with the police) have decreased 78 percent in UPP areas over this period, while other non-violent crimes have substantially increased, such as threats (from 29.4 to 99 per 100,000 inhabitants), domestic violence (from 27 to 84.6 per 100,000) and rape (from 1.3 to 4.8 per 100,000). Coordinated by scholar Ignacio Cano, with decades of research experience in this area in Rio, the analysis argue that these types of crime could have increased either because now there is no “parallel” power of drug lords brutally enforcing the order upon favela residents and their relationships with neighbors and family members, or that crime reporting has increased with the arrival of the UPPs. Using data from the Institute of Public Security of Rio de Janeiro (*Instituto de Segurança Pública do Rio de Janeiro*, ISP) for 18 UPPs, their neighborhoods and border-neighborhoods, another study from Frischtak and Mandel (2012) shows that UPPs led to an overall decline of 10-25 percent of homicides and 10-20 percent decrease of robberies, with the estimates for the neighborhood where the UPP unit was based at the larger end of the range and the neighborhoods just closer to them (border neighborhoods) estimates at the lower end. They also show that the effects on crime are also heterogeneous across UPPs, going from 60-70 percent declines in homicide rates to close to zero.<sup>20</sup> At the city level, homicides and robberies have declined an average of 15 percent from mid-2009 to mid-2011. Using regression results to construct counterfactual crime rates and citywide statistics, the authors show that, without the UPPs, homicide and robbery rates would have fallen 14 and 20 percent less in Rio. The authors also found that inequality among residential prices decreased significantly because of the program. According to the study, the decline in crime benefited lower valued properties disproportionately, reducing inequalities among properties.

19 Universidade Estadual do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) and Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública (FBSP) (Coord. Ignacio Cano). 2012. “Os Donos do Morro: Uma avaliação exploratória do impacto das Unidades de Polícia Pacificadoras (UPPs) do Rio de Janeiro”. Rio de Janeiro: UERJ e Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública.

20 It is important to note that there has been a controversy in Rio with respect to its homicide statistics. A study by Cerqueira (2011) questioned the official data on the decline in the homicide rate in a post-UPP Rio de Janeiro, claiming that there have been a process of “pacifying the statistics” on state security since 2007. He observed that even though the number of homicides in the city fell from 7,099 in 2006 to 5,064 in 2009, the number of violent deaths caused by “indeterminate” external factors rose from 10 deaths (per 100 thousand inhabitants) in 2006 to 22 deaths in 2009. In general terms, for every 10 people killed by “indeterminate” violent external causes, eight were murdered.



### *Expansion of UPP*

**In its almost five years of existence, the UPP program has gradually earned support from different sectors of society.** It managed to unite political groups and figures that have traditionally played opposing roles regarding public security, social justice, citizenship and access to rights. In general, most left and right-leaning politicians, grassroots activists, intellectuals, community leaders, business entities and the media express public support of the program. The now-famous initials - UPP - have turned into a brand name; they are stamped on billboards and bus advertisements, marked on road signs, and sought after by different initiatives from the city and state governments.

**The first three favelas to receive the UPP - Santa Marta, Cidade de Deus and Batan - had been spatially spread out and represented three very different types of territorialities.** Despite this initial diversity, from there on out, the map of occupation proceeded along what has been informally called by the general public the “Olympic belt,” focusing on favelas located in strategic areas around the locations where Rio will host the final of the 2014 World Cup and the Olympic Games in 2016. Whereas initially the UPP entered one favela at a time, the strategy now focuses on occupying different favelas simultaneously.

**From the beginning, the UPP focused on the “retaking” of the territories that the state had lost in the favelas, but not necessarily on ending the drug trade in these areas.**<sup>21</sup> In the period since the Governor and the Department of Security began to announce the occupations in advance in the media, there have been fewer confrontations with drug gangs during the occupation process.

**This is not to say that the initiative has not met with resistance from the drug trade - quite the contrary.** In October 2009, a police helicopter was shot down while carrying out an operation on the favela of Morro dos Macacos in Vila Isabel, a middle-class neighborhood in the city’s North Zone. Two police officers were killed in the crash. The episode had the effect of speeding up the expansion of the UPP throughout the city – as well as furthering its acceptance by the general public. In the operation that followed, at least 10 alleged dealers were killed. However, with the continuous

<sup>21</sup> Mr. Beltrame, the State Secretary of Security since 2007, is quoted as saying that his “main goal is to rid the streets of weapons of war, not necessarily to end drug dealing”. (NYT, Oct. 11, 2010, p. A. 1).

and increasing pressure following the rapid expansion of the UPP presence, in November of 2010 dealers started to retaliate through a series of car robberies and car burnings.<sup>22</sup>

**UPP responded by invading the Complex of Alemão, where several of the dealers who had fled from favelas occupied by the UPP were believed to be hiding.** This was the second time in recent years that Alemão had been occupied, and the experience in this case could not have been more different. The first invasion of Complex of Alemão occurred in June 2007, immediately before Rio hosted the Pan-American Games and a year before the UPP Program was launched. The operation involved 1,200 police officers and 19 people were killed, many of whom showed evidence of having been executed. The second operation in Alemão, in 2010, was broadcast live on television, and featured 2,000 men, armored Navy ships, tanks and helicopters. This time, the occupation took place without any incident of note. With the takeover of Alemão, the challenge of occupying a large conglomeration of slums had apparently been overcome. The scale of this military occupation, its widespread media coverage, as well as the relatively peaceful way in which it played out, also served as a stimulus for furthering the policy of setting up UPP units, now with greater intensity.


**Throughout 2011 the “belt” of favelas with UPPs circling the North and South Zones was completed:** in the North Zone, with the occupation of Mangueira and the slums in the Engenho Novo district, such as Morro de São João; and in the South Zone by the most recent occupation of Rocinha and Vidigal by other Military Police battalions.

#### d. What makes the UPP different from previous policies?

**As described above, the UPP emerged out of decades of experimentation with different institutional models of police intervention in the favelas.** It aims to incorporate lessons from these previous attempts, and differs from them in several important ways. These include: an exclusive focus on expelling armed groups from the slums, the submission of the social agenda to the rationale of police

<sup>22</sup> There were at 120 instances of arson, which reduced to ash approximately 34 buses, six trucks, 84 cars and one property. “Alemão e Vila Cruzeiro: 200 ataques em nove dias desencadearam ocupação das favelas”. Extra, O Globo, November 24, 2011.






occupation, broad support from the media, and the mobilization of strong support from the business class.

***A more realistic ambition*** - One of UPP's most important differences in comparison to previous experiments is the break from the belief that the public security crisis might be solved by putting an end to drug trafficking and its associated commercial activities. This more realistic ambition has been present in several pronouncements made by authorities. The Secretary of Public Security Mariano Beltrame has been quoted in different interviews as saying that the main goal of the program is to rid the streets of weapons of war, not necessarily to end drug dealing.<sup>23</sup> The constant complaints concerning GPAEs' inability to end the drug trafficking, for example, had served to delegitimize them. By changing its goal from "ending drug dealing" to "ending arms circulation in the hands of drug-trafficking gangs," the UPP shifted the public security debate, disassociating the problem of combating drug dealing from the problem of the territorialization of the narcotics economy. The program could then focus on the "recovery of territories", effectively committing to an agenda geared more toward the emancipation of the inhabitants of these areas, although the permanence of the police presence certainly helps to inhibit some drug trade activities.

***Social after security*** - Another distinguishing feature of UPPs, when compared to former policies, is the complementation of the social agenda to the policing agenda. The fact that the UPP Social Program was so labeled according to a drafted agenda of initiatives to be followed in the aftermath of police occupation is a strong indicator of this. Access to social programs and social inclusion initiatives that multiply in UPP areas is thereby dependent upon a certain deconstruction of the favela as a locus par excellence for crime. The sequencing of the program is therefore crucial, with the expansion and intensification of a social development agenda only being able to be implemented after the policing phase – retake of the territorial – is concluded. At the same time, these same social initiatives are necessary in order to sustain the program's effects and achieve its ultimate goals.

***Media support*** - The third and most marked unique characteristic of the UPP experiment has been the support of the mainstream

23 "In Rough Slum, Brazil's Police Try Soft Touch", *New York Times*, October 11, 2010; "Não tenho pretensão de acabar com o tráfico, diz Beltrame", *Estadão.com.br*, November 30, 2010; "Favela da Rocinha já tem data para ser ocupada, diz secretário de Segurança - Beltrame diz que não tem pretensão de acabar com tráfico, mas policiamento dificulta", *R7 Notícias*, September 9, 2011.



media, which should not be taken as a “spontaneous” reflection of the program’s success and visibility, but rather as a key factor in its very formation. Proof of this has been apparent since the beginning, when shortly after the occupation of the first slum, Santa Marta, the media granted a disproportionate coverage to the UPP’s reach at the time.<sup>24</sup> This factor has been crucial for garnering strong public support in a short period of time. This in turn encouraged the authorities to present the one-off Santa Marta experiment as a new policy model for dissemination.<sup>25</sup> The media has also helped the government to receive solid support from civil society organizations (some of which have become more critical of the program throughout time, but still supportive of its overall strategy). This includes the public endorsement given by well known NGO Viva Rio, one of the most traditional CSOs in the city that works in the field of citizen security, who has become one of the key partners of the government in pacified areas.<sup>26</sup>

***An improved image for the police force*** - It is also worth highlighting the Secretary of Security’s effort to build a new image for the police through the media. This has been accomplished by continuously publicizing public investments in training for these new police officers as well as by bringing attention to “intellectual officers” among the police, who are officers that have also taken graduate courses and specialized in different social sciences disciplines. Former BOPE officers appear on the nightly news as public security specialists, and the role of women in charge of UPPs is widely publicized. Captain Priscila, of Santa Marta, recently received the newspaper *O Globo*’s “Faz Diferença” (*Makes a difference*) award. The idea of a young (i.e. new and without the same vicious reputation of the old force) and

24 Research carried out in 2010 by the CESEC/UCAM and UPP officers shows that the police themselves understand that the media hold the UPP in higher esteem than they do. The data was presented in a seminar open to the public.

25 A key moment for this media construct occurred in August 2009, when the influential newspaper *O Globo* published a series of special reports over the course of a week entitled “Democracy in the Favelas.” This material presented the UPP as a victorious police force and highlighted forecasts and projections of costs and the effects of implanting units throughout all of the city’s slums. What is even more notable, however, is the way in which this series is framed. It uses the discourse about favela inhabitants’ residents’ citizenship to analyze the importance of the UPPs, as opposed to the long-established images of the slums as a simply heaven of crime and of criminals, whether real or potential. This change in discourse can also be attributed to more than a decade of strong civil society organizations work focused on the rights of favela residents.

26 Viva Rio has been partnering with the state government and the Military Police of Rio de Janeiro (PMERJ) in the provision of a training course on Preventive Health Care and Assistance to the Population in Pacified Areas. The course was created for the police and focuses on preventing violence and assisting local residents. For more information, see [www.vivario.org.br](http://www.vivario.org.br).




gender sensitive (e.g. there should always be enough women officers to address and search women) police force is constantly reinforced. The program also emphasizes the 'community policing' aspects that should be incorporated by new officers, encouraging them, and above all the local commander, to build a close relationship with the community. For example, the local UPP captain is often present at community meetings and at every UPP Social Forum. Although the next chapters will show that this relationship varies substantially depending on the favela and the local officers, the overall message and government guidance is still one of building trust and respect between this new police and the community.

***Private sector support*** – Another unique characteristic of the UPP lies in the broad support it has received from the business sector, which is also effectively related to the support that has been provided by the mainstream media. As stated before, the UPP program was created and implemented in the midst of a Rio de Janeiro that was undergoing a transformation to become a stage for large international events. This context extends a new role to the business sector in the running management of the city, and therefore it follows that sections of the business class, such as those connected to the oil economy, real estate capital, tourism, and communications and services industries in general have gradually started to support the UPP. This support takes different forms, including financial contributions for maintenance and logistical support for the UPP. No less important is the support that the Federation of Industries of the State of Rio de Janeiro (FIRJAN) has lent UPP's Social initiatives.



## **Chapter 3. History matters: situating the case studies**



**The perception that residents have about UPP in a particular favela is influenced by the history of that favela with respect to the use of authority and public order (or lack thereof) and the particular juncture within that history at which the UPP intervenes.** This is mainly because the social relations and the role of mediation that the UPP seeks to break up (in the case of the drug trade) or foster (local associational movements) are themselves the result of decades of daily interactions that, over time, have crystallized relationships of authority and spaces of political agency unique to each community.

**At stake here are deeply embedded relations between agents of the state, the police, and local social actors.** Neither the UPP nor the PAC programs constitute the first contact of favela communities with the state. And the ways in which previous efforts played out in the past have very concrete impacts upon how residents receive and appraise the UPP program today. Different outcomes, in turn, reflect the path dependency of the reception of the UPPs to social relations constructed over time. Previous experiences, coupled with the memories of organized resistance to forced removals and days before the rise of the drug trade, also make up the social imagination and collective memory of the favela residents now confronted with the implementation of the UPPs.

**This chapter is organized in two main parts.** The first one presents a brief history of the trajectory of each favela in terms of urban consolidation, access to services, and associational life and local governance. The second one presents some basic indicators about the four favelas and analyzes the juncture at which UPP arrives in each and how this affects its reception by community residents.

## a. Understanding favela trajectories

**The importance of the distinct trajectory of relations with authority and with the state within each favela is best discerned by comparing/contrasting Chapéu and Pavão.** At a glance, both communities appear to share many features. Each is located at one extreme of Copacabana beach, one of the key tourist sites in the city. This privileged location allows for close proximity to the large and dynamic job markets, both formal and informal, of services in the southern zone, as well as facilitated access to public transportation to many other city regions. Chapéu and Pavão were settled at roughly

the same time, with the first shacks rising in the early decades of the twentieth century, and the onset of steady expansion from the 1930s and 1940s onwards, to a great extent fueled by the development of the neighborhood of Copacabana itself. Like most favelas in the southern zone of the city, Chapéu and Pavão housed the labor involved in the many services required to maintain the elite lifestyle that went with living in the southern zone. In this sense, the socio-demographic makeup of these favelas is quite different from those of Borel and Manguinhos, where historically factory workers made up a significant percentage of residents.

**This proximity to the surrounding formal neighborhoods is a distinguishing feature of favelas in Rio's southern zone.**

Whereas in the North Zone (Borel) and in the old industrial suburbs (Manguinhos), the development of a sense of political agency was deeply entwined with labor movements and unions, in the South Zone the bricklayers and construction workers who built the high rise buildings in which their wives often ended up working in as maids or nannies did not develop such associations. Instead, the political agency of these residents tended to find root in the community itself, often under the guidance and interested assistance of the Catholic Church (whose presence in all four communities was also key to their consolidation).

**The trajectories of Chapéu and Pavão also converge in terms of the general timeframe in which the progressive arrival of services took place.** Favelas in the South Zone functioned as laboratories for experimentation with social policies in favelas – as they did in the UPP program – precisely because of their small scale, and perhaps their spatial and social proximity to those who conceive the public policies in question. Both benefitted from the pilot urbanization programs of the 1980s such as Mutirão and *Mutirão Remunerado*. Chapéu was targeted by Bairrinho in the mid-1990s and Pavão underwent Favela Bairro interventions in the early 2000s.

**Given their similar trajectories of consolidation, history, social makeup and location in the city, one would expect residents' expectations and perceptions of UPP to be also similar. However, as the next chapters will show, residents' views in these two favelas were quite different.** Such differences could be explained by their particular relations with the state, and with the conflicting regimes of authority represented by the drug trade and the police in each case. Thus an imaginary continuum of the situation of daily life

in these favelas could be traced, from the perspective of its public order (or lack thereof). In this continuum, Chapéu would occupy one extreme, because of their historical relations with institutional politics and low level of violent conflict and Manguinhos, the other extreme. Borel and Pavão occupy the middle ground, as detailed in what follows.


### *Associational Life and Governance in the Favelas*

**In each favela, associational life assumes particular forms as a function of the historical characteristics of its leadership, or due to the opportunities that each context offers for advancing the process of collective organization.** These differences, however, arise from a largely shared trajectory of favela consolidation. In all three cases of favelas with UPPs we found community organization efforts to have developed historically as part of the struggle against removal of the favelas, then evolved into an agenda that incorporated demands for education, health and leisure facilities.

**In Manguinhos the situation was different.** Its settlement is also intricately connected to favela removal efforts since the 1940s. However, instead of being subject to removal efforts, it was an area *to which* people were relocated after they were removed from many razed favelas across the city over the course of the twentieth century. But in Manguinhos, too, the forging of collective rights soon came to revolve around collective demands for services and basic urban infrastructure as well as access to schools, health and leisure equipments.

**In all four cases, associational life underwent a period of subjugation to power in the 1960s,** in the context of the military regime, followed by a brief period of struggle for autonomy, especially during the 1980s, when a stronger but short lived associational movement flourished. In the 1990s however, the influence of the drug trade and the involvement of community leadership with political party machines led to a delegitimization of the associations in the eyes of the populations they are meant to represent.

**However, the fact that Residents' Associations have become internally discredited does not mean that their strategic role in the current political landscape of Rio de Janeiro can be underestimated.** Presidents of Residents' Associations remain the principal mediators in the implementation of public policies and state




services in the favelas: real estate transactions are formalized through a certificate of the association; mail is delivered at the association. Their attribution is therefore of a company organization. Any person or institution who intends to establish any sort of enterprise in the favela as a rule should contact the residents' association.<sup>27</sup> This is a role that is increasingly strategic with the upscaling of investments in recent public programs such as the combination of UPP, UPP Social and PAC. And while their legitimacy is considerably undermined in the view of their alleged constituency ("regular" residents), neither the state nor the drug trade can do without such a mediating body if public policies are to be implemented. This is not to say that all representatives of Residents' Associations are necessarily submissive to the drug trade, for many have been killed or banned from favelas as a result of their insubordination. Nevertheless, there is no question that there are limits to any association's autonomy and that any rightfully elected ticket can be ousted at any moment. The fact is that the key function of Residents' Associations of mediating between different powerbrokers, both legitimate and illegitimate, cannot be performed without the establishment of venues of deliberation, both in relation to the state and in relation to the drug trade. It follows that both the state and drug traffickers need the mediation of the Residents' Association. As long as this situation of co-dependency endures, the drug trade will make it its business to guarantee some leverage in the routine activities of Residents' Associations across the city.

**That residents of all four favelas tend to be almost universally critical of the performance of Associations' presidents does not mean that venues of political leadership or mediation have collapsed.** It does, however, signal that other sites of legitimization as an alternative to the associations have arisen<sup>28</sup>, mostly civil society initiatives and social programs. The legitimization of these "leaders" remains informal, but two groups of potential emergent leaders are readily available in any given consolidated favela. The first can be considered historical leaders. These leaders often are trade-union members or were active in residents' associations in the 1980s. The trajectories of these historical leaders vary, but there is a clear pattern of their migration to NGOs or even to the state, where they

27 It should be noted that this is a "rule" rooted in the sovereignty of the drug traffic over the territory of the favela: entering the favela by way of the residents' association is a security measure that recognizes and reinforces the drug trade's hold over the favela.

28 This is particularly visible in the Manguinhos case study, but similar processes were already underway in the favelas with UPPs.



find the leeway to politically impact daily life in the favela without having direct interactions with the drug trade.

**The second social group whose emergent leadership is largely recognized includes college graduates or students whose political or professional engagement in the community endows them with credentials and contacts that lends them an aura of respect.** Their emergence as potential community leaders lies in the public recognition of their accomplishments: while their trajectories reinforce their exceptionalism, insofar as they are exceptions to the general rule in the favela, their accomplishments also function as examples of new possibilities for youth in general. This may be the ingredient for the construction of alternative role models to the trafficker-police opposition whose strength, power and values are still measured by weapons and violent conflict.

**The sense of disconnectedness between a legitimate political agenda and the workings of Residents' Associations in all four favelas may account for the highly shared consensus that recent urbanization projects such as the PAC and *Morar Carioca* all lack effective mechanisms to ensure participation.** All these projects require demolition and temporary resettlement of some residents, and there is a general sense across favelas that the rules governing these interventions are neither clear nor open for discussion. Thus, despite the wave of investments that flowed into the favelas almost at the same time as the UPP's arrival, residents maintain a certain skepticism that varies in intensity from favela to favela, as detailed below.

**In order to fully understand the implications of this skepticism, however, it is necessary to turn to a second set of relationships that organizes the context in which daily interactions in the community take place – i.e., the way violence impinges upon the construction of collective demands and on the sense of agency and voice of favela residents.** The portrayal of these dynamics was made in Chapter 2.a. (living under the drug traffickers' rule) so we will not repeat it here.

Bearing these general questions in mind, we can now spell out how the particular histories and relationships in each context affected the reception of the UPPs by the residents of each community.



## b. The favela of Chapéu

**Chapéu received the fourth UPP in the city.** The process began in May 2009 when teams from the BOPE and the 19<sup>th</sup> Battalion of the Rio de Janeiro Military Police (Copacabana) occupied the two hills, making arrests and seizing drugs and arms.<sup>29</sup> The installation of the UPP occurred on June 10, 2009. The UPP headquarters is located in the higher reaches of Babilônia community, and it is staffed by 100 police officers. Considering that the affected population totaled around 3,740 residents, the ratio is 1 police officer per 37 residents.

Located in the South Zone of the city, in the upper/middle class neighborhood of Leme, neighbor of Copacabana, and along the Babilônia Hill (*Morro da Babilônia*), Chapéu has the best socioeconomic indicators among the four cases analyzed, with the higher Social Development Index (0.510, not so far from the 0.604 of the rest of the city).<sup>30</sup> It also has a quite developed infrastructure when compared to other favelas in Rio. There is almost 100 percent coverage of access to water, sewage (94% in Babilônia) and garbage collection in the two communities, and approximately 75% of residents are legitimate owners of their homes. In Chapéu community, only 4.3% of the population older than 15 is illiterate, while in Babilônia this percentage is significant higher, at 15.9%.<sup>31</sup>

**In Chapéu, drug trade-related conflicts were notoriously rare until the mid-2000s.** For much of the 1990s, the funk parties in Chapéu were frequented by middle class youths and the favelas' effect upon real estate markets in the small neighborhood of Leme had been minimal up until the mid-2000s.<sup>32</sup> Both these instances bear witness to what perhaps amounted to one of the most harmonic relations between a drug trade-dominated favela and its vicinity. When the favela suffered a series of attempted enemy faction invasions in recent years, and shootouts became increasingly frequent, relations began to sour, as residents recall.

29 *"Bope ocupa morros do Leme em busca de armas e traficantes"*, O Globo, 05/14/2009.

30 The Social Development Index (Índice de Desenvolvimento Social, IDS), is an indicator calculated by Instituto Pereira Passos based on data from the national census collected by IBGE. This indicator goes from 0 to 1, zero representing the least socially developed, and one the highest.

31 Data from Instituto Pereira Passos, based on IBGE census 2010. Available at [www.uppsocial.com.br](http://www.uppsocial.com.br).

32 In Borel, by contrast, in the mid-1990s, the real estate markets in the buildings facing the favelas directly had been virtually incorporated into the real estate markets of the favelas. See Cavalcanti, in press.

**The favela's inclusion in the UPP project appears as a result of a long history of the political articulation it maintains with public authorities,** and in particular with the Worker's Party (Partido do Trabalhadores, PT).<sup>33</sup> It is home to one of the city's first Residents' Associations, founded as a response to constant removal threats to Chapéu since the early 1940s (Burgos 1998). To confront these threats, the community mobilized to establish a minimum level of infrastructure, a task in which they had considerable assistance from the Catholic Church. In the beginning of the 1970s a portion of the community was transferred to another location on the city's outskirts, thus rekindling collective resistance. With re-democratization in the 1980s, leaders that emerged out of this movement came to the fore and remain important figures in their communities to this day. Examples are, Dona Percília of the Babilônia community (see Box 4) and, particularly, Benedita da Silva, who would later become an alderwoman, federal deputy, senator, minister, and interim state governor representing the Worker's Party.

**Box 4. Two generations of community leadership in Babilônia, favela of Chapéu: Dona Percília and Palô**

Mrs. Percília, honorary president of the Resident's Association of Babilônia community, in the favela of Chapéu, represents the typical favela leadership of a time prior to a formal state presence in these areas. When no slum upgrading programs had yet managed to bring any type of basic services to the favela, she would organize residents so that they could work together to provide improvements to the community, leading initiatives such as building stairs on the hills and creating water committees who built reservoirs and pipelines to provide water to the homes located far up in the hill (a system that still exists). Mrs. Percília was also responsible for the construction, in the early 1990s, of the first (and now only) primary school in the community, which was built in the headquarters of the Resident's Association. The school offers tutoring services, sports, singing, dancing, and other activities, and has received funding from a Swedish NGO and hotels around that area. She was also the one who called a meeting at the community when discussions about the UPP arrival were still up in the air. At this meeting, residents agreed not to sell or rent their houses in order to avoid the real estate speculation that could - and did, as the report will further demonstrate - result from the pacification process. According to Mrs. Percília' son, Carlos Antonio

33 The Workers' Party, founded in 1980 went on to become the main party of the Brazilian left. After a string of election victories in contests for mayoral and gubernatorial posts, the party took the presidency in 2002 with Lula's victory. Since then, it has stayed in power, now under the presidency of Dilma Rouseff.



Pereira, known as Palô, Mrs. Percília was “*that person who got her hands dirty to get things done.*” Palô is today the *de facto* president of the Association, dealing with its day-to-day organization, but Mrs. Percília remains an important symbolic figure for the community, present in all the important events.

**The impression that the favelas’ historical ties to formal politics were key to its early inclusion in the UPP program was reinforced by the fact that the police occupation coincided with an announcement that Chapéu would be one of the first to benefit from the municipal urbanization project Morar Carioca.** Perhaps even more significantly, the favela has been selected as the pilot site for the program, now renamed *Morar Carioca Verde*, as part of the government’s intention to showcase it at the Rio + 20 Conference. This choice indicates the degree of this favela leaders’ political articulation with public authorities, in this case facilitated by the fact that the Housing Secretary also belongs to the PT. To conclude the branding of Chapéu as a pioneer case, its UPP has also been renamed ‘UPP Verde,’ (Green UPP), in an effort to unify the message of increased state investments in this particular favela.

**These types of interventions in Chapéu also show that the pacification process has also helped to bring to the favelas a more integrated approach to urban revitalization,** being also pursued by the government elsewhere in the city and the State of Rio de Janeiro. It has allowed government and citizens to look at different risks and opportunities identified in the favelas and act upon them (environmental, related to natural disasters, etc.).

**Despite the accumulation of such privileges vis a vis the other case studies presented here, residents voice many complaints regarding the way in which this recent crop of state investments has been imposed,** rather than the result of public dialogue. In a favela that has benefited from the most public policies targeting favelas – whether urbanistic (*Mutirão*, *Mutirão remunerado*, *Gari Comunitário*, *Bairrinho*) or security driven (such as the GPAE of the early 2000s) – such a claim rings true. It is obvious from the community’s previous trajectory that its residents are no strangers to negotiations with the state.


### c. The favela of Pavão

**Pavão was home to the fifth UPP, inaugurated on December 23, 2009 with 176 police officers.** With a population of 10,338 residents between the two communities that compose the favela and the highest demographic density among all pacified favelas (808 residents per hectare), this UPP has a ratio of 1 police officer per 58 residents. Located between Copacabana and Ipanema, also in the South Zone, Pavão-Pavãozinho and Cantagalo communities have, respectively: 99.6% and 98.6% of adequate water supply; 99.4% and 98.9% of adequate sewage; and 99.9% coverage of garbage collection (in both cases); 54% and 68% of the residents own their homes. The illiteracy rate among the population above 15 years old is 7.1%, in Pavão-Pavãozinho, and 5.5% in Cantagalo. It has the second higher Social Development Index (0.492) among the four cases.<sup>34</sup>

**In a community where disputes between different gangs were never an issue, the collective memory of violence tends to foreground relations with the police.** In the case of Pavão the traumatic memory of the climax of violent conflict is linked to the period in which there was a GPAE unit in the community. The recollections of violent searches, occasional shootouts, and illicit – but ostensibly corrupt – relations between the drug dealers and the police render a predominantly negative view of the police. This impression was corroborated by the ways in which residents of Pavão perceived the implementation of the PAC works, underway in the favela since 2007. PAC invested R\$35.2 million in social and urban infrastructure works, which included the installation and expansion of the water supply system, sewer pipes and rainwater drainage; the recovery and construction of lanes and access routes to the hill; the building of two elevators for access; and investments in housing. The relationship between the PAC and the dealers who dominated the slum was marked by episodes of tension, and there were moments where work had to be interrupted.

**Nevertheless, the implementation of this massive upgrading program in the favela also contributed to opening more space for contact between the state and the drug trade,** since it required dialogue and negotiations between both parties. This had two outcomes. On the one hand, it fostered a sense of distrust in the government among residents, who saw the state as co-opted. At

<sup>34</sup> Data from Instituto Pereira Passos, based on IBGE census 2010. Available at [www.uppsocial.com.br](http://www.uppsocial.com.br).




the same time, its gangs became less engaged in hostilities, since it was necessary to let the works progress. Thus, in Pavão, more often than in the other case studies, we heard that the drug trade kept mainly to itself (*“the drug trade only messes with those who mess with it”*), and that it rarely hindered the circulation of people inside the community. If in Chapéu the UPP was immediately identified with the idea of pacification, as a result of the recent memory of an increase in violent conflict, in Pavão the police occupation was largely perceived as a break in a reasonably peaceful period.

**This overtly negative view of the state as prone to corruption schemes and illicit relations with the drug trade, both in its urbanizing version and in its police guise, fosters an atmosphere of mistrust around the UPP.** This is usually expressed in the suspicion that the inclusion of the community in the UPP program occurred as the result of external factors and interests concerning the favela’s location between Ipanema and Copacabana. Residents thus view the UPP with heightened skepticism, often claiming that pacification offers more protection to residents of surrounding neighborhoods than to those of the favela. Read against the background of a community wherein associational life is more fragmented than in Chapéu or Borel, and where the recent memory of state interventions does not include significant improvements in civic life, it is hardly surprising that the pacification program was immediately perceived as (yet another) initiative doomed to fall short of its promise to grant favela residents access to their basic rights.

## d. The favela of Borel

**Borel’s UPP was the eighth unit established in the city and the first one in the North Zone.** The unit currently is operated by approximately 380 police officers and serves about 12,815 inhabitants from seven different communities.<sup>35</sup> This means that it operates at a ratio of 1 police officer per 33 inhabitants. Socioeconomic indicators and availability of basic services vary among the different communities. For example, while in Borel, the largest one (7,551 inhabitants), 93,8% of residents receive adequate water supply, 83.5% have access to adequate sewage, and 98.2 benefit from garbage collection, in Casa Branca, the second largest (2,539 inhabitants), these percentages are at 100%, 82.4% and 100%, respectively.

<sup>35</sup> See Annex I for the list of communities.



Illiteracy is at 7%, in Borel, and at 4.6% in Casa Branca. Conditions of land occupation also varies, with 81% of Borel's residents being the owners of their properties against 72% in Casa Branca. The overall Social Development Index of the entire favela is 0.468, the worst among the four case studies.<sup>36</sup>

**Borel's story is quite different from the other two.** By the time the UPP arrived in this favela, its residents had already been anxiously awaiting the pacification program.<sup>37</sup> The actual UPP headquarters were established in Chácara do Céu on June 7, 2010 with other units later introduced in Tijuca and surrounding neighborhoods.<sup>38</sup> The reasons for the high expectations surrounding the arrival of the UPP in Borel derive from the centrality of violent conflict in the community's daily life prior to that. Borel has been in conflict with neighboring favelas for twenty years because of the division of territorial control between the main gangs across the different communities. The conflict, over time, developed certain rituals and routines: several observers, at different points in time, have noted periods in which shootouts between Borel and Casa Branca, or Borel and Chácara do Céu, developed their own regularities and predictability, which they call "shootouts at an agreed upon time".

**But the fact is that the long-standing conflict with the neighboring favelas had effects beyond the shootouts or violent invasions themselves.** It translated into a series of limitations to residents' mobility across the city. Disputes over the *bocas* of the region broke apart the communities of Borel and Chácara do Céu – the latter located right on the summit of Borel's slope. These communities that had once been perceived by their residents as extensions of one another also shared a long history of agendas of political mobilization, in part due to the social ties fostered in the factories scattered over the region. Nevertheless, they also shared a social life in the broadest sense of the term, spanning from family relations to the provision of services, to churches, parties and

36 Data from Instituto Pereira Passos, based on IBGE census 2010. Available at [www.uppsocial.com.br](http://www.uppsocial.com.br).

37 By 2010, the standard procedure for the implementation of UPPs already hinged on public announcements in the media by State Secretary of Security Mariano Beltrame. When in April of that year Mr. Beltrame declared that a new UPP was underway, residents of Borel were certain that their time had come – and they mostly welcomed it. When the BOPE occupied the Morro da Providência instead, disappointment was the dominant reaction among Borel residents. Borel would only receive the UPP a few months later.

38 The communities initially affected were Borel, Chácara do Céu, Casa Branca, Cruz, Indiana and Formiga. Formiga received its own UPP on July 1 of the same year, 2010, as did the favelas of Andaraí (July 28), Salgueiro (September 17), Turano (September 30), Macacos (November 30) and São Carlos (February 11, 2011).

community events in general. Because of faction wars, the close ties that had linked the six communities of this region of Tijuca (Borel, Chácara do Céu, Indiana, Casa Branca, Cruz, and Formiga) were initially frayed and progressively all but cut off once residents felt compelled to change their usual itineraries in order to avoid entering “enemy” territory. Faction disputes brand favela residents with an often-coerced gang identity that governs one’s comings and goings through gang territories.<sup>39</sup>

**One of the consequences of the intensification of violence in Borel upon associational movements was the reframing of organized demands from issues relating to infrastructure to a sharp focus on human rights.** The “Rede de Comunidades e Movimentos contra a violência”,<sup>40</sup> active in the city at large, figures among the most effective and visible social movements dealing with police brutality, founded in Borel. Originally initiated by mothers of youths killed by the police in the wake of the episode known as the *Chacina do Borel* (Borel’s Massacre), when the police executed 4 young students in 2003, this network remains as one of the key associational nodes of Borel. It operates largely at a distance from both the Residents’ Association and the institutions of the state within the favela.


**The coupling of a solid history of collective action with a context in which daily life was constantly pervaded and disrupted by violent conflict is key to understanding the ambivalence of Borel residents towards the UPP after it had been installed.** After the UPP, a series of initiatives started to be implemented in the favela. These activities included improvements to infrastructure and regularization of services, such as lighting and garbage collection; professional training courses and other activities related to entrepreneurship and income generation; incentives to legalizing businesses; promotion of sporting, cultural and leisure activities; and conflict mediation courses for the police. However, in spite of the positive reception at the moment of the UPP entrance, and of the influx of initiatives, Borel residents did not seem to feel enthusiastic about participating in events open to the public to discuss the future of the UPP.

**This turn of events – from a community avidly expecting its turn in the pacification program to a near indifference to the new “rituals” of citizenship and participation now orchestrated by a**

39 Such disputes spill over into the formal city, and come to incorporate spaces like public schools into the faction turf dynamic.

40 See <http://www.redecontraviolencia.org/Home>.





**wide range of social actors – can easily be traced back to the pre-UPP context of daily life in Borel.** The favelas' strong tradition of mobilization tends to intensify the local controversies that usually develop from any public policy implemented in the favelas. With the UPP, once the immediate relief that followed the end of constant shootouts subsided, the many challenges related to the fraying of public order, the discredit of the representativeness of the residents' association and the fragmentation of associational practices in Borel became acutely visible. Hence, in Borel the UPP has also become the object of internal disputes, which result in different efforts to articulate alliances with external institutions and the state itself.

### e. Manguinhos: the “Gaza Strip”

**The most visible differences between Manguinhos and the other cases included in this study is that it sits in the North suburbs of the city and has a flat landscape.** The Manguinhos Complex refers to a cluster of 15 favelas and housing projects inhabited by a population of 31,432, according to the household census undertaken by the PAC. This large conurbation is located close to other big favelas such as the Alemão Complex, Maré, and Jacarezinho and is located in a region that developed around the construction, in the 1940s, of an industrial zone in the city that has experienced steep decline for decades. In the flat landscape of Manguinhos, the favela does not contrast with the so-called formal city. Instead, it extends as far as the eye can see, with the typical construction of favelas enmeshed with the ruins of derelict and abandoned factories. Such factories often turn into “occupations” and are incorporated to the favela, like the housing projects built in the 1970s that have also been engulfed by the favelas surrounding them.

**On top of economic decline, from the mid-1980s onward came the intensification of the territorial-minded routines of violence and criminality associated with the drug trade.** Its location at the core of a vast region dominated by the Comando Vermelho secured the complex as a stronghold that held both the police and rival factions at a distance. Thus the boldness of the drug trade's appropriation of the public spaces of the favela here reached new heights when compared to the limited scope of drug-dealing activity in the South and North Zones. In Manguinhos, residents incorporate the media catchphrase “Gaza Strip” to name the region encompassed by the intersection




between the Dom Helder Câmara and Democráticos Avenues, along which the favela complex spreads out.

**From occasional public executions in highly visible public areas to police incursions aided by the *Caveirão* (“big skull”, as the BOPE’s armored vehicle is known, in reference to the group’s ‘logo’ – literally a skull), Manguinhos exacerbates the militarization of the space of the favelas.** Clashes with the police and the mundane dynamics of drug dealing are much more brazen than in the South Zone or in the middle class neighborhoods of the North Zone, as Borel. All activities related to the drug trade are more visible, from sales to surveillance to consumption. Sales and usage of marijuana, crack and cocaine take place openly in several areas across the favela complex, and concentrate on the sidewalks of bars and brothels where crack heads of all ages prostitute themselves, spilling out onto the pavement and the surroundings of the community itself. The heightened visibility of the drug trade here can be attributed to the community’s historical stability as an area of uncontested hegemony of the Comando Vermelho, the oldest drug faction in the city, where the gang leadership was least vulnerable to enemy invasions. The Comando Vermelho’s strategic operations such as the stockpiling of weapons and the regional distribution of drugs to the favelas of the southern zone were centered in the Alemão Complex.

**With the occupation of Alemão by the army in November 2010, Manguinhos unwittingly and unexpectedly entered the UPP era,** as it inherited many of Alemão’s strategic functions in the Comando Vermelho operations. As discussed at length in Chapter 7, the period that has been experienced in the other three case studies as pacification has, in Manguinhos, translated into an increase in the scale and visibility of the drug economy, as well as in the flows of strangers/migrants in the alleys and corners of the community. Thus in Manguinhos residents express a great deal of anxiety in what appears to be a world where power balances that were precarious to begin with are now overtly unstable.

**The sense that power balances have destabilized, is strengthened by recent spatial transformations in the community** brought about by the PAC works, which have had significant repercussions on the dynamics of the already fragmented and dispersed local associational life. Compared to the favelas of the South Zone, Manguinhos is a desert in terms of social projects, NGOs and associational practices. The unprecedented influx of PAC resources into Manguinhos



accelerated an ongoing process of the replacement of leaders linked to Residents' Associations left over from previous contexts of social movements connected with labor unions. The upscaling of the stakes involved in community associational life rendered it an attractive activity for the drug trade, and thus non-aligned leaders were swiftly replaced with new ones who perform the role of mediators between the drug trade and the state. This turn of events has produced a sort of "professionalization" of representatives of Residents' Associations in Manguinhos, with the emergence of new leaders, some of which do not even live in the complex.

**That is not to say that the PAC has not brought positive changes to daily life in Manguinhos.** Between March 2009 and May 2010, Manguinhos residents witnessed a series of introduction of public facilities constructed by the PAC: a high school, a large public library, a health clinic, a youth center, as well as housing projects for the residents relocated from "high-risk areas" within the complex or in other surrounding favelas.<sup>41</sup> A series of paving works were also carried out, along with the construction of public spaces in communities and the still ongoing elevation of the railway line, below which a park and a series of stores are to be built.

**The construction of public spaces has not as of yet, however, translated into a strengthening of public order.** The PAC works in Manguinhos lay bare some of the great challenges facing urban intervention projects in areas where illegality dictates the use of space, and mainly, for the actual maintenance of the works. The PAC works simply pushed drug consumption away from the outer sidewalks of the complex into the community's core. Now the *crackland* in Manguinhos sprawls out over three soccer fields (one of them constructed by the PAC), with addicts scattered over brand new sidewalks with garbage and the debris associated with crack consumption. At the edges of these fields, hundreds of men, women and youngsters openly consume the drug.

**These changes, along with the promise of the construction of a City of Police right in the core of the "Gaza Strip" generate a sense of uncertainty in the midst of rapid transformations** (see Chapter 7). Yet even amid such changes, one thing remains a

<sup>41</sup> Most of these facilities were constructed on a plot that had previously functioned as an Army Supply Deposit – the DSup. The DSup facilities do however only form a small part of the PAC's interventions in the region. The importance of the DSup and the public space it has produced should not be undermined. Without the DSup area, research for this project would have been more difficult and dangerous. The area – and the library in particular – offered a safe haven for researchers in between interviews and field visits.


constant in Manguinhos and elsewhere: residents' suspicion of the police. Thus while in communities like Borel, where disputes between rival gangs tend to cause a split in the resentments of "ordinary" residents between the violence of the drug trade and the brutality of the police, in Manguinhos, residents whose opinions diverge on almost every point, are unanimous in condemning the behavior of the police inside the favela. Significantly, Manguinhos residents can only conceive of the police as behaving appropriately "on the street," "on the pavement" "in the South Zone," and occasionally "in the UPP," but never in Manguinhos.

**One could argue that this impression of the police stems from lack of state presence – especially in terms of security - that characterizes daily life in Manguinhos,** where community policing attempts were never effectively implemented.<sup>42</sup> That is, Manguinhos residents' relations with the police are largely limited to the latter's violent "incursions" into the favela. Yet the obvious alternative to the "incursion" model – some sort of community or proximity policing – has not, in experiences prior to the UPP, yielded different results. In Borel and in Pavão, both communities formerly targeted by the GPAE, proximity to the police has only entrenched resentments of the police's arbitrary use of violent force and fostered contempt for their propensity to establish overtly corrupt relations with the drug trade. In Pavão in particular, the constant presence of UPP police officers triggers traumatic memories of the GPAE tenure in the community. These previous experiences are thus crucial to understanding how the arrival of the UPP is interpreted by the residents of each of the communities.

<sup>42</sup> The only community policing initiative in Manguinhos was the setting up of a *Destacamento de Policiamento Ostensivo*, DPO (Ostensive Policing Command) in the early 1990s, for a very brief period. Residents' recollections suggest that the experience was traumatic, in particular because many informally claim that the police were responsible for a surge in kidnappings, and that their hostages were kept in Manguinhos. The site where the DPO used to stand in Mandela remains empty, with a neat slab of concrete marking its limits.



## Chapter 4. Redefining community interactions





**The arrival of the UPP created a temporary vacuum with respect to many types of community decisions and forms of interaction that until then had been regulated by the drug lords' rules.** This vacuum was partly filled by the actions of UPP or by the initiative of residents or external actors. This chapter highlights changes along three dimensions of community life that took place after the arrival of UPP: (i) the freedom to move and live without fear; (ii) the regulation of leisure and community life; and (iii) the aspirations for the future.

### **a. The freedom to come and go and live without fear**

**Perceptions of greater freedom.** When asked if anything had changed in their lives as a result of UPP, there were two common responses: an increased freedom to “come and go” within and outside the favela (*liberdade de ir e vir*); and, closely intertwined, a reduced fear of being harmed due to armed violence. These changes had impacts on many different dimensions of welfare, from the access to and enjoyment of public spaces inside and outside the favela, to the possibility of enjoying a restful night's sleep. Many residents under 30 years old had never experienced the security of leaving home - whether for school, work, or just to hang out with their friends - without worrying that they might be killed in the crossfire during a police raid or a gang war. This is a drastic change in everyday life. The immense tension in non-pacified favelas, still under the control of drug gangs, such as Manguinhos are further reflection of the value residents place on this. The fact that people in the UPP communities are now sitting out on their front steps at night, listening to or playing music, congregating in the public areas and strolling around visiting friends or family after dark, is testimony to the enormous difference that disarmament has made to social life in the favelas.

**However, these perceptions varied across communities.** Residents of the favelas of Chapéu and Borel seemed to have greater appreciation for the changes in freedom of mobility than those in Pavão. Our hypothesis is that the historical trajectories of favelas pre-UPP mattered. As shown in Chapter 3, in Pavão there had been a less confrontational type of relationship established between traffickers and police in recent years, resulting in a reduced feeling of exposure to both the drug trafficker domination and the brutality of the police.

In the *favela of Chapéu* residents mentioned that this freedom allows them to do things they could not do when the drug gangs controlled the area:

**...Youth can go out at night...** *"It's a thousand per cent good for my daughters now. Because before... it wasn't good. (...) Now they can come home in the early hours (...). Now the UPP is here – to provide our safety. Years ago, I didn't even let them go out: there were criminals, shooting, a lot of stuff. Those things don't happen anymore. But before, I was scared even to sleep here."* (Woman, age 35, resident, Chapéu).

**...neighbors can visit each other and go around the community...** *"A lot has changed with the UPP arriving. Now I'm free to come home and go out when I want without worrying about a shoot-out. I think that most residents feel this way, but there's a percentage that disagree because of the police intervention methods. But they prefer the way it is today to how it was before. Now we don't live in fear as we did back then."* (Man, age 24, resident, Chapéu).

**...and feel more like citizens ...** *"The UPP has restored our right to go about our business. Today, if I want to go to a distant corner of Chapéu, I can go without problems because I know I won't run into an armed group. If I want to go up to the top of Babilônia, I can, because I know there's no danger of a shoot-out. This freedom to come and go, the freedom of the community to retake the sidewalks, the alleyways which were occupied by other groups before (...)." (Man, age 49, resident, Chapéu).*

**...with people feeling a certain "restoration" of how things used to be before the traffic...** *"The first thing was the feeling of freedom. You feel freed! I see in all the initiatives, parties, and soccer, everything that's happening with art, culture, sport...that sensation of freedom! Because we lived a long time....because there are young boys and girls who've never lived outside the coercion of traffickers."* (Man, age 62, resident, Chapéu).

*"We didn't have the freedom to walk the streets because of the parallel power of the traffickers. I myself lost several friends. And so I couldn't go out much. My parents didn't let me, I couldn't. If my mother knew I'd been on the block, I'd get my ass kicked when I got home. Why? Because the traffickers were around. They've been around since I was a kid, 30 years ago. It was*





***a harmonious coexistence, but a false sense of peace and protection.***" (Man, age 37, shopkeeper, Chapéu).

In the *favela of Borel*, the trauma inflicted by the constant shootouts between drug factions and the regular police incursions also influenced resident perceptions on this topic:

**...UPP allowed some mothers to let their daughters come back from school on their own...** "Now I take my daughter to school and she comes home on her own. Before, at four o'clock in the afternoon – it was like they knew what time to start shooting. It was the most difficult time because we had to pick the kids up from school and we couldn't." (Woman, age 32, resident, Borel).

"For me, it [the UPP] brought enough peace. No more shootings, and that enabled the children of today, the new generations, be created in another environment. **Before the children were afraid of the police**, they saw it another way, because when the police arrived on the hill, killing people, was that an exchange of gunfire, and that was at the time that children were leaving school." (Focus Group, Borel)

**In the *favela of Pavão*, in contrast, the tendency among interviewees was to play down the intimidating effect that trafficking activity previously had on the circulation of people in the community.** For some, life under the drug trafficking was not as bad and oppressive as for others, and so the contrast was lower. "The drug trafficking only messes with whoever messes with it". This isn't to say that residents do not acknowledge that trafficking "oppressed" their community, but rather that its presence never quite prevented people from carrying out their daily lives with a certain degree of normalcy. Others made it look as if the UPP was only having a circumscribed impact... **"As far as I'm concerned the only thing that's changed is that we don't see the guns any more, but that's it"**. (Focus Group, Pavão).

**Manguinhos, our control case, was a fresh reminder of what it means to be living in a place where freedom of expression is curtailed by drug trafficking.** The freedom that residents of the three UPP cases emphasized when talking about the program, whether criticizing or praising it, showed that a new space for expressing opinions about life in the favela has been created. In Manguinhos, in contrast, it was clearly easier to openly speak out against the UPP than to come to its defense. Interviewees generally preferred



not to respond to questions about the UPP – at all. On hearing mention of UPP, one retailer who had told us about constant shoot-outs in a bar in recent times, sighed: *“now for the tricky questions”* and refrained from giving an opinion on the possible scenario of a UPP in Mangueiros. Another trader who gave an interview strongly criticizing state action in the process of expropriation of his bar also fell silent when asked what he thought about the possible arrival of the UPP: *“I don’t know, because there’s nothing here.”* Despite the obvious reticence, there was a certain level of approval – if a little timid and indirect – of the UPP. When asked about what was happening in Alemão (the neighboring favela complex) the first trader stated: *“It’s starting to revive.”* Small business owners seemed to be among those mostly in favor of the UPP, especially in Chapéu and Borel, where the pacification process has clearly opened space for their ‘markets’ to grow (see Chapter 6 for more detail).

**Interestingly, fieldwork in Mangueiros also showed that the UPP can have an effect in terms of mobility even in favelas where the program has not arrived yet (see Chapter 7).**

## b. Regulating community joy and leisure

**One of the most contentious changes in community life that came with UPP was the regulation of community “fun” and leisure.** While the presence of UPP was mostly welcome in terms of the freedom to come and go without fear, its impact on other areas of community life had much more mixed reviews in the eyes of residents. The withdrawal of the drug lords left a vacuum with respect to many community issues that had previously been regulated by them, such as those related to community parties and other recreational activities. The UPP police, intentionally or unintentionally, stepped into this vacuum, creating its own set of rules, which were often highly contested by the residents. Interviewees talked about several situations in which the police acted in a kind of gray zone where the limit between arbitrary discretion and legitimate authority is extremely tenuous.

**Of all leisure activities, *funk parties* were at the center of controversies.** Because of the prominent role they played under the pre-UPP regime and its close symbolic ties with drug trafficking, regulating funk parties became part of a sort of “cultural war” around the definition of what was legal and legitimate fun in a post-traffic world. *Baile Funk*, or funk party, has traditionally been associated



by the police in Rio de Janeiro with all-night dance parties thrown by drug traffickers in the favelas, with weapons on display, drugs for sale and lyrics that glorified the life of the drug lords, wanton sex, and drug use. When UPP police came to a favela, it banned funk parties, and set limits for the time at which the party should end and level of noise that was acceptable. *Funk* is a music genre that started gaining popularity in Brazil linked to Rio favelas – *Funk carioca* – in the 1980s. The rhythm and its parties became a phenomenon in the 1990s, mainly in favelas and lower income neighborhoods of Rio, and in the 2000s also started reaching the rest of the city and other parts of the country. The links to drug trafficking were often evident from the lyrics themselves, and from the fact that the parties would be hosted at the favelas that were under drug trafficking domain.

**UPP said that it was enforcing state regulations and protecting the rights of those residents who also wanted silence on weekends to be able to rest.** State legislation passed in 2008, a few months before the first UPP was implemented, created requirements that made it virtually impossible for favelas residents to host such parties. The law established, among other things, the following: the need to request an authorization from the government 30 days in advance; the installation of cameras and bathrooms for men and women at the venue; a curfew of 12 am; and a series of personal documents from the requester. After a year of strong lobbying by *funkeiros*, musicians and some civil society organizations, who argued that there was an open discrimination against the music modality, this legislation was revoked and another was passed, recognizing *funk* as a legitimate cultural manifestation.<sup>43</sup> Parties are slowly starting to happen again in some pacified communities. This shows an important lesson learned throughout the implementation of the program. However, they are still much more restricted than they used to be. The recent impact evaluation led the State University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ and FBSP 2012) recommends that the UPP police should no longer repress drug-related cultural manifestations such as funk dances, treating them as if they were a representation of the “enemy”. The study argues that this would help them to gain the trust of young people, who, as our report confirms, often consider the UPP actions arbitrary and unjust.

43 In June 2008, Governor Sérgio Cabral approved Law nº 5265, regulating funk and rave parties in the state. With the approval of Law nº 5.543, in 2009, the previous one was revoked and the funk was established as a legitimate musical expression and cultural patrimony.

**It is also important to note that funk parties were not the only fun activities that were initially banned or more strictly regulated.**

A study carried out by think tank ISER in 2012, which involved the participation of its researchers in a series of *Baile Funks* from three different favelas with UPPs, showed that State Resolution 013 of 2006, which regulates the volume of sound and curfews for parties in the State, was being used to control these and other types of parties in the favelas. According to this study, in practice, the specific regulation of *funk* parties varies according to the captain of the UPP, and therefore in some communities they are still banned. The authors argue that the regulation of this cultural activity should follow an approach of establishing local pacts between each community and the UPP, instead of that of prohibition and pure control. This approach would also help to rebuild the historical relationship of distrust between the two, especially the youth and the police.<sup>44</sup>

**While most young people complained about this change, many adults and the elderly welcomed the regulation.** Residents that opposed it saw it as an arbitrary imposition, an encroachment by the police on community autonomy, and disrespectful of their basic rights. They resented that this practice was negating one of the few sources of enjoyment in the community, and that it was not always easy or practical to look for other leisure options outside the favela for financial and stigmatization reasons. Still, there were other voices which appreciated the sense of order and fairness that having rules brought, especially for those residents that needed to rest and could not do so because of the noise coming from the parties.

**Positions about UPP's role in regulation of funk parties did not seem to change across favelas.** Criticisms arose even among those that responded more positively towards UPP's presence, as can be gleaned from these excerpts from interviews in the favela of Chapéu:

*"In my opinion, the UPP is a necessary evil. But I think they are annoying, because they get in the way of other peoples' lives, they don't allow parties. I mean, **it's good for safety, but they think they own the community.** (...) Before, parties didn't have a time to end. Now they come by the door of the house and tell people to stop the party. I think they're very over the top as well, they search everyone." (Young Man, age 15, Chapéu).*

*"Now we can't have anything, it's all forbidden! Parties, 'enjoyment', can't do anything; to the point that you have to leave*

44 ISER. 2012b. *O Funk está "pacificado"?*. Rio de Janeiro: ISER.



*here, go to another community if you want to go to a party and listen to music, or to dance.” (Man, age 25, resident, Chapéu).*

**And in favelas that were otherwise lukewarm towards UPP, some residents expressed their full support towards measures like the regulation of parties, and the creation of the ‘pacification version’ of the “Law of Silence”** – now with a different and actually legal meaning, as opposed to the previous “Law of Silence” that referred to the unspoken agreement within communities that nobody would talk about the drug traffic (see Chapter 2). This new law, they said, preserved the individual rights of those that preferred to have a little silence.

*“In my opinion, a lot has improved. I think that now we have a little more privacy, we didn’t have that before. The silence, you know, because the Silence Law exists, you see? Like, you need to work and get some rest. (...) Before it was all done in a disorganized manner, there was no way of containing it all. For me, there was a lot of disrespect among people. The kids with other residents, those guys were thinking they could do anything they wanted, there was a lack of respect, telling people to go take it up the I-don’t-know-where, and they stuck their guns in your face, said that they knew and decided everything. That doesn’t happen anymore...get it?” (Focus Group, Pavão).*

**Still, for some residents, the situation in the favela pre-UPP seemed to color the way they interpreted the end of funk.** In the **favela of Borel**, for instance, where the conflict between factions was so tense, some residents said it was a price that they were willing to pay in exchange of peace:

*“There are no leisure activities here anymore. When the traffickers were here there was – the funk party – that doesn’t happen anymore. A lot of residents are complaining because Borel is dead now.*

***At the end of the day, being dead is good, better than it was before.” (Woman, age 32, resident, Borel).***

**UPP rules extended beyond parties to other types of events and even the use of community spaces.** In Borel, for instance, a 16-year-old young man said that *“to put an event on, you have to go to the captain a week in advance so he can give the go-ahead, and it has to finish early, like 3-something, almost four o’clock.”* In the favela of Chapéu, rules for accessing a sports court elicited controversy. Previously a public

community space unmanaged by any agency, the court was revamped and now houses the technical college FAETEC<sup>45</sup> facilities. Several courses and activities started to run at the site, whose target public is, essentially, favela dwellers. Nevertheless, complaints about use of the court, and the need to request authorizations from FAETEC and the UPP, were very common. Local FAETEC management defends itself by saying that now there is only organization, that what prevailed before was “the law of the strongest,” where children, as a rule, could not use the court because they were sent out by older people.

### c. Conflict mediation

**UPP police are also often called to mediate conflicts between neighbors or within families that had been previously been managed or suppressed by traffickers.** For instance, in the favela of Borel, there was fierce rivalry between the Borel and Casa Branca communities, whereby residents from one area knew that they could not cross to the other, enforced by the faction dominating each part of the favela. With the advent of the UPP and the breakdown of this invisible barrier, there has been a gradual renewal of contact between such residents, and an apparent revival of old animosities, requiring conflict mediation by the police.

**At its core, all these issues relate to the definition of what is the legitimate involvement of the UPP in community affairs.** In addition to their intended role of enforcing the rule of law and maintaining disarmament, the UPPs have assumed the de facto roles of local government, dispute mediation, conflict resolution, ombudsmen and ultimately decision-makers in most matters regarding community life. This is an awkward situation at best. By their own admission, the UPPs are ill-prepared and ill-suited for these tasks. From some residents’ perspective, above all those of youth, there are not sufficient limits to UPP power. This leads to suggestions that there has just been a shift in the uniform of those who hold power, and that favela residents now suffer the same type of abusive control under the UPP previously imposed by the drug traffickers’ rule. However, while positions vary within each favela, again there seems to be an interesting trend in which pre-UPP trajectory matters.

<sup>45</sup> Fundação de Apoio à Escola Técnica (FAETEC) (*Technical College Support Foundation*), linked to the Rio de Janeiro State Science and Technology Department (SECT).



**In Borel, where Associations were influenced by drug trafficking, some residents did not question having a third party deciding** and said they prefer the police to the traffickers rule: “(...) *Previously we went to the people we had to go to (traffickers) and couldn’t get anything resolved – now, we go to the captain, speak with him and he always gives us advice, solves a small issue, and we never come away from there with a ‘no’*”. (Woman, age 32, resident, Borel).

**In Chapéu, despite their overall satisfaction with the UPP, residents were concerned about setting limits to UPP and what they saw as the risk of the UPP having too much power.** Chapéu was characterized by a strong associational life, very independent from the traffickers. As such, the neighborhood associations had been able to preserve many of their traditional roles such as conflict mediation, which had been weakened in other favelas by the power of the drug traffickers. Residents expressed concern about UPP replacing the community association in mediating conflicts and regulating community life as well as their losing personal power to, as individuals and neighbors, resolve their problems through dialogue instead of calling the police.

*“The UPP officers are another issue. **I am against militarization of communities.** (...) We have debated about the UPP now doing the work of the Residents’ Association. They have to keep order, and social work has to be done by the associations.”* (Man, age 62, community leader, Chapéu).

*“(...) **On many occasions, the UPP takes the place of the parallel power but then also ends up exercising parallel power.** Instead of being the police, they want to become judges.”* (Man, age 57, community leader, Chapéu).

*“The role of the UPP is not to dictate rules but create regulations for co-existence without changing community life, because the community has its own life.”* (Man, age 49, resident, Chapéu).

## d. Aspirations and role models

**As a result of the UPP, the symbolic and cultural representations produced by and around the favela are being redefined.** This redefinition manifests in the conversations people have within the favela and in terms of the role models and aspirations people have

about the future. As shown in Chapter 3, for a long time the drug lord was the cultural reference for social mobility in the favela—money, women, power, were all associated with this figure. With the arrival of the UPP, those cultural references suddenly vanished from the public space. Instead, they were replaced by the UPP policemen and policewomen.

**Public conversations appear to be changing.** *“You don’t hear about trafficking any more. These days, people are having other kinds of discussions in the streets and in the houses. Before, there’d be a guy in a bar talking about a war someplace [in reference to drug activity and rivalries], that John Doe got hit, that there’d be an invasion. You hear that a lot less now”. (Man, age 62, community leader, Chapéu).*

**The role models available to children and young people from the world of adults, also appear to be shifting,** as can be seen from this dialogue between two women in the focus group of Borel:

*“I have two sons, one is 12 and the other one is 9 years old. [...] **Previously, before the UPP, on Christmas my kids would ask me for a revolver, a weapon.** We are the ones who educate our children, they follow the way you tell them to go, but if they saw drug traffickers with pistols, rifles they wanted to be the same because they were the ones who controlled everything. **Now they ask for police officers’ uniforms.**”*

*“You see? The generations to come will now be totally changed.”*

A young woman from the favela of Chapéu shared the same perception:

*“**The kids no longer have the example of wanting to be a criminal - on the contrary, they want to study, it’s changing** (...) there’s college, SESI [Industrial Social Services], I’m finishing high school. Everybody wants to study! There’s even a waiting list.” (Woman, age 26, resident, Chapéu).*

When we asked people about their aspirations for the future, they reinforced their expectation that **drug trafficking had ceased to serve as a reference for the young people in the favelas:** *“There’s another situation as well. The situation of young people in the medium and long term is that there is the aspect of opportunity. In the short term, there’s the question of the drug dealer is a hero, in the medium term this will be fading away, and in the long term this figure will not exist. (...) **The youth no***





***longer have the mirror that they used to! Today they have the mirror of the classroom, a vision of the classroom.***" (Man, age 62, community leader, Chapéu).


This young man from the same favela echoed the same message of hope:

*"Now young people will have more opportunities without having to enter drug trafficking."* (Young man, age 15, Chapéu).

Even in Manguinhos, where the UPP is lacking, some residents refer with optimism to a potential future legacy of the UPP:


*"I think that the thing with the negative media will decrease because where there are UPPs we are certain that it doesn't end the drug trade, but the drug trade is changed. (...) If people say that there are no drugs where there are UPPs, that is a lie! There are [drugs]! Now, what I gather from talking to old leaders from the 1970s, 1980s from Cidade de Deus and other places is that the objective violence decreases. You don't see anyone bearing weapons... you don't see people yelling out the price of drugs... So that brings an impact. Children don't see it anymore It is more discreet."* (Man, early 40s, Manguinhos).








## Chapter 5. Pacifying the police?





**H**istorically, the regulation of violence within favelas was marked by the relationships between three categories of actors: the military police, drug traffickers, and favela residents. The UPP brought into this triangle a potential fourth actor: the “new police” or “UPP police”. The perceptions that residents have about this “new police” and its relationship to the “old police” are fluctuating, unfolding, and shaped by forces from within and outside the favela. Our fieldwork tried to capture some chapters of this ongoing story. The fieldwork did not ask residents specifically what they thought about UPP police, but these perceptions inevitably came up as they described the changes in daily life in the favelas under the UPP.

**Perhaps the most important insight gained on this topic is that while for outsiders and the official narrative the UPP represents an attempt to pacify the favelas, favela residents wonder whether the UPP is a (genuine) attempt by the state to pacify the police.** More interestingly, residents seem to be developing a more nuanced understanding of the role of the police that captures differences in police styles and approaches, and values the possibility of what a different, more community-oriented policing, could look like. These understandings differ in important ways, depending on the history of the community pre-UPP.

### a. The good, the bad, and the ugly: Varieties of police behavior

**Is this a new police? The overall sense from the interviews is that the jury is still out.** Some residents felt that the UPP was indeed a new kind of police force. Others confirmed the pre-existing views of the UPP as “more of the same”. This research heard a few stories of UPP misconduct and sometimes of brutality, and others of kindness and generosity from officers. Without a doubt, there has been vast improvement as compared with the military police in the past. Still, that past is not so far distant—three years at most. Many who entered the police academy did so for the thrill and power of using lethal force. They may come from similar backgrounds as the favela residents, but they often treat community residents with disrespect and disdain as a way to assert their new status. Some are frustrated by their role as “social workers”. In their criticisms, residents also mention police officers’ young age and lack of preparation to be in the favela. On the

other hand, according to some residents other officers seem to be happy to be now integrated with the communities.

These excerpts illustrate the broad range of opinions:

**...some residents discovered that the police are not necessarily “monsters.”** *“We’re seeing the human side of the police officer, because he stops, chats, talks about soccer. We see the human being under the uniform. It’s much better.”* (Man, age 37, shopkeeper, Chapéu).

**...others said they are worse than the drug traffickers.** *Before, the traffickers took people aside and demanded things, now they don’t do that, it’s the police themselves who do that. They hit residents; go into other peoples’ houses to turn off the sound system and to steal things.”* (Focus Group, Pavão).

**...while others were critical of the police, but still liked that they could complain about them if they didn’t like the way police behaved.** *“When you [another resident] say the bandit and the cop are the same thing, in some respects it is true. But before, when the bandit said something, everybody respected him. Now when the policeman does, a lot of people will go to the police station to complain. So some things have improved, some things. We have more freedom to do certain things, guys.”* (Focus Group, Pavão).

**The complaints about police action ranged across a broad spectrum of gravity:**

**...some told stories of minor abuse.** *“An officer stopped at the bakery to have a drink, I was coming back with a bunch of stuff from there, and he parked on the passageway to my house. I asked him to remove his car and he didn’t even look at me.”* (Woman, age 62, resident, Chapéu).

**...other times a bit more serious.** A 17-year-old boy, married to a girl aged 16, with a one-year-old baby, states he was approached aggressively by two police officers, and reacted by trying to punch one of them. According to him, the police search was carried out in an abusive manner.

**...still others, were stories that verged on criminal responsibility.** The most notable happened in the favela of Pavão, involving a 35-year-old male resident of Cantagalo who was shot in the back following an argument between residents and police officers who had arrived at a



*samba* school court to put a stop to birthday celebrations. This case was fully covered by the press. The man is alleged to have argued with officers, but then moved away from the crowd, which formed after police used pepper spray to disperse members of the public. At this moment he is said to have been hit in the back by a bullet which, according to him and other witnesses, was fired by a police officer.

The victim stated in an interview to *O Globo* newspaper that he was in his bar when police officers knocked on the door and asked to search the room. *"Because one of them was impolite, I took issue with him. The officer wanted to handcuff me to take me to the police station for contempt. I refused to be cuffed and walked off towards the police station to make a complaint of abuse of authority" ... "According to his version, just before falling on the floor, now having been shot, three police officers passed him, one of them extending his foot so that André would fall. Although he did not see where the shot came from, he believes that a police officer pulled the trigger"..."According to the four police officers' version, there was an exchange of bullets during investigation of a complaint that armed traffickers were in the favela."*<sup>46</sup>

Although police intervention procedures observed by our team were always within the limits of the law, the overriding climate of distrust seems to lead any police excesses that inhabitants perceive to quickly become stories told and retold among various community social groups.

**When residents tried to make sense of why police behaved improperly, they referred...**

**...either to "the power of the uniform"** *"The police are practically in the same social class as the resident, but when they put on their uniforms they feel superior, and sometimes don't respect people. (...)." (Man, age 62, community leader, Chapéu).*

**...or to the "prejudices" police held toward favela residents:** *"We're a community. If the police did their job like they should, they'd have to have the conscience and understanding that not everyone within the community is as they think they are, in other words, people with a messed up life, so to speak." (Focus Group, Pavão).*

<sup>46</sup> "Morador atingido no Cantagalo afirma que não houve tiroteio na favela", *O Globo*, July 6, 2010.

**However, prejudice seems to cut both ways.** For some residents, it is hard to shed the ingrained perception that police and traffickers are the same, and are prone to be critical and dismissive of UPP achievements. This perception traces back to the history of conflictive relationships between the communities and the police, with residents holding onto the idea that police officers and traffickers practice equally offensive actions, **“with the only difference being the color of the uniform.”** This is discussed at length in ethnographic work carried out at the end of the 1990s, which identified that the difference between police officers and traffickers for residents was exclusively marked by the colors which identified them: blue for the police and red for the main trafficking faction Comando Vermelho (Alvito 2001).

**The communities’ histories pre-UPP also seemed to matter.** The Cantagalo incident where UPP police shot the resident in the back appears to have fueled animosity between residents of Pavão and the police that is not seen in the other two cases. In Borel, opinions seem to be informed more by the fact that conflict between drug factions is more recent and drug trafficking is so embedded in the favela.

**...in Borel, residents know that some of the drug traffickers still operate in the community.** *“I’m afraid the UPP will leave and we will die. [...] I’m afraid of the following, and sorry about the honesty, but even with the UPP the traffic still happens. So there are many people that are looking at what everybody else is doing. The same way that we have the police investigation, we have theirs [traffickers investigating].”* (Focus group, Borel)

**...and they fear being seen as supporters of the UPP.** The owner of a coffee shop in Borel said: *“I’m on the list [black list of drug traffickers], my husband and I, because my husband has a small business. They think the police cannot enter the coffee shop, cannot stop and say good morning. We have a Bradesco ATM inside. We had an opening event and the Bradesco manager called the [police] captain but he could not go and he sent another guy on his place. I forgot his name ... Oh then we took a photo with him, and when we did that, that is it. It is as if we had put our foot in the grave.”*

**...which leaves them puzzled and “trying to understand” what the new situation is about:** *“Before, no residents wanted any contact with the police, not me or anybody else because we had another power in the community. Now what I see is that there*



*are some residents who get on so well with the police... I don't know, I'm still trying to understand after almost a year of the UPP."* (Woman, age 40, religious leader, Borel).

#### UPP Police in Borel.

(Photography: Rich Press)



### b. The importance of police shifts

**The distinctions that residents made related to the police were less between the UPP and the traditional police and more between different UPP officers and shifts.** There is an obvious tendency among communities to value the idiosyncrasies and style of each officer as a key parameter for assessing the attitude of UPP police and distinguishing them from the regular police. This suggests that the relationship with the police is still not institutionally consolidated.

**Many remarked that the UPP officers were younger.** *"Some of them [from the other battalion] are aggressive. They're the older ones, more full of themselves. The newer ones, with the lighter-colored uniforms, aren't like that (...). The UPP guys are younger, all like little boys."* (Woman, age 32, resident, Borel).

**Yet, consistently mentioned in all favelas were the distinctions among individuals on the force, who work different shifts.** In Borel, for instance, this community leader states:

*"Then we understood the matter of shifts. There's the shift that's got the really good guys, those that are cool and the ones that are impolite. Depending on the shift, some officers are good, they*



*talk. That's a fact, not just our impression. For example, there are officers who don't know how to approach a resident, they go on the offensive; they want to show that they have the power. In bars, sometimes people are talking, having fun, and one of them might come in and ask for silence out of the blue, without reason (...)."*  
(Woman, age 40, community leader, Borel).

**Similar statements were made in Chapéu**, where a young male resident points out the more brutish profile of a certain police officer: *"'X' is a guy who likes to abuse everyone. He likes to hit, to hurt; everyone disappears when he's around! We can't put any event on during his shift. Because 'X' puts a stop to parties, he says that the Association has no say in anything! 'I give the orders around here!' With other shifts, everything is discussed!"* Conversely, the positive qualities of a captain were highlighted in the same favela – praised in the interviews as *"very accessible to residents, rarely seen with weapons on show."*

**Pavão is where the issue of "shift changes" became even clearer.** This part of the focus group is significant in such respect, revealing a trend among the population to **reproduce in its relationship with the police a similar attitude to its relationship with traffickers**, not only in attempting to capture aspects of the officer's personality – such as it was with the local "big boss" – in order to anticipate his behavior, but also by being constantly alert to the signs – not always evident – of a change in his mood:

[Moderator] What good has come besides the reduction in violence? Because you said before that there was armed violence before, and that's the only thing that's stopped, is that right?

**A-"One type of violence has gone and another has started, that's what happened."**


**B-"And this [the incoming type of violence] has the power of official authority. I don't mean that they're all like that, because as I said there are good police officers here."**

[Moderator] Does it depend on the shift?

**A-"It depends on the shift! Now you hit the nail on the head."**

**B-"It really does depend on that, because there are shifts that come in here wanting to stir up trouble."**

**C-"Yes, there really are some awful shifts. But there are good shifts too! Like, when you have an emergency, as I've had several**



*times. (...) If someone gets sick and needs to go to Miguel Couto or another hospital, they give people a ride and help. (...) What happens is there's this one group that gives them a hard time, so they think everyone is the same. The thing he said about the sound, there's a time to turn off the sound system, that's what I hear. But there's a bunch of kids who don't want to accept that. As I see it, when the sound system goes off, go home! But they [the kids] don't, they want to stay there in the crowd, in the fighting."*

**The shift profile does, however, appear related to a kind of high - or low - visibility style practiced by officers, so that residents appear to try and establish a relationship between the characteristics of the officer and the decision to approach residents more frequently.**

The police search has, particularly in Pavão, been a constant source of tension, as demonstrated in the previous section. This account, taken from a participant in the focus group discussion, emphasizes that:

*"I honestly believe that before, when there were criminals here, it was better. Because they only bothered people who owed them money or were like themselves, they didn't mess with people who had nothing to do with it. But on this officer's shift, they give anybody a hard time. My poor husband, they had a thing with him, they're always in his face, searching, verbally abusing. This police officer is terrifying!"* (Focus Group, Pavão).

**The importance of police shifts was also picked up by local business owners, who adjusted their behavior accordingly.** A qualitative study on the impacts of the UPP on local mototaxi services in Chapéu found that UPP shifts influenced the way these drivers carried out their business. According to nearly all the 62 drivers, residents and business owners interviewed by the study, officers from specific shifts turned a blind eye on those not following the rules as long as they paid a regular "toll" (such as buying them lunch). (ISER 2012 – see Box 5 in Chapter 6 for more details).

### c. Will the UPP continue after the Olympics?

**The main concern of the residents in the three favelas had to do with the uncertainty about the permanence of the UPP,** as they think that it may be discontinued after the Olympic Games in 2016, leaving them in the hands of the narco-traffickers once more. They fear that anyone who becomes too involved with the UPP will suffer severe

consequences once the gangs return, as demonstrated by several quotes in the previous sections. Their assumption is that the kingpins who fled to other favelas will bide their time, continue selling drugs, maintain their sophisticated weaponry, bribe whomever they need to and return as soon as the UPPs leave. This is not an unwarranted fear. They have seen it before in the previous failed public attempts to solve this problem, as described in Chapter 2 and 3. When asked how long it might take for the dealers to return after the UPP leaves, one man answered, ***“They will pass each other on the way out”***.

This uncertainty is evident in Borel, as can be seen in this excerpt from the focus group: *“We also want to know (about the continuity of the UPP). We wonder what is going to happen. The question is this: is this going to happen until the 2014 World Cup and max until the 2016 Olympics, or is this a long-term program?”*

**Perhaps this fear regarding the discontinuation of the UPP is the strongest statement of the interest by the residents for its permanence.** Even though without conviction as to what will happen, what this resident of BCB says summarizes well the dominant feeling in this favela: *“My desire is that they stay, and I think they will because my desire is very great. But the people don’t think that they will stay.”* (Woman, age 40, community leader, Borel).

In fact, even in a favela like Chapéu, where, as we have seen throughout this report, the enthusiasm for the UPP is very evident, most residents seem to have no hesitation in identifying a causal relationship between the UPP and the international events that Rio will host in the next years. And in Pavão, of course, the understanding seems to be the same. That’s why in all three favelas they are afraid that once the Olympics are gone, the UPP would lose its reason for existence.

***“They changed things because they know that in three years it is going to be those living in the favelas that will work for the World Cup. The UPP has only come up because of this—2014 and 2016! Then it’s done with. This is something that I and the others have to fight against so that drug trafficking doesn’t come back. It’s more than certain that it will end. Little by little (...). After the Olympics it’s going to be just like South Africa [host of the 2012 World Cup]—everything back to how things were.”*** (Man, age 26, Chapéu).




This dominant perception that the UPP is part of the preparation of Rio to host major international events highlights relevant issues behind the decision process that triggered the first UPP and the decision of the program to create a kind of *Olympic belt*, favoring favelas located in strategic regions. However, this same general perception also puts in evidence an **ongoing process of “adopting the UPP”**, which may turn the program into a social good for which residents themselves are willing to fight for when the Olympics are over. This would represent a profound shift in the relationship of the favela’s world with the police, and therefore, of their own relationship with rights. These statements by community leaders from Chapéu illustrate this sentiment:

*“This time it’s going to be different. **They may even think that it’s just for show, but society has already taken ownership of this project, and it’s not going to want to lose it now.** (...) It’s no longer a question of one government administration or another, or about a political project. For us, it’s a social issue!”* (Man, age 48, community leader, Chapéu).

*“It’s only going to change if education is made stronger, improving the quality of schools and health—then things will get better. **If it’s just talk and the police carrying big guns, we already know a lot about that (...)** But at any rate, for the children and adolescents, it is good to have this perspective of things getting better, of a future! But we also need to keep in mind that it is no favor in what the state is doing. **They need to remember that we have rights!**”* (Woman, age 50, community leader, Chapéu).

The discussion of rights takes us directly into the topic of our next chapter.










# Chapter 6. Integrating favela residents into the city(zenship)?





**Bringing peace to the favelas** was seen by many as a first step towards their full integration into the *asfalto* (formal part of the city). This was seen as a kind of pre-condition that would facilitate the transition from the *cidade partida* (split city) to the *cidade integrada* (integrated city), and from the stigmatized resident to citizenship with rights. How would this transition take place and along what dimensions? This chapter captures the incipient processes of change that can be observed along four dimensions: (i) regularization of public services, (ii) access to social programs and economic development opportunities, (iii) the removal or redefinition of the favela stigma, and (iv) the gentrification effects of the pacification process. The focus is not on measuring these outcomes but on describing the changes that are taking place in the favelas and capturing the voices and perspectives of residents about them.

## a. Regularization of public services

Bringing the “rule of law” to the favelas meant not only guaranteeing residents’ enjoyment of rights but also the need to comply with a set of obligations. These obligations had to do with formalizing residents’ access to public services and complying with public regulations. Soon after the UPP, a number of public utilities (electricity, cable, garbage collection, etc) began to formalize the provision of its services by providing special plans to encourage regularization. In addition, local forms of public transport (such as *mototaxis* and *kombis*) as well as local businesses had to comply with public licenses and regulations. Finally, efforts to support land titling were introduced. In this section, we describe these efforts and then present residents’ perspectives on them.

One of the first services to be regularized was electricity, which used to be provided through illegal connections known as “*gatos*”. Light, the private company in charge of energy distribution in the state of Rio de Janeiro, was one of the most benefited with the new markets. Today the company provides energy to approximately 32,000 families’ UPP areas<sup>47</sup>, although we could not find data for the pre-UPP era for all favelas. In communities such as Chapéu and Santa Marta, where regularizations started in 2008, more than

47 “Light - Relatório de Sustentabilidade 2010”, available at <http://relatoriolight.riweb.com.br>.


90 percent of energy distribution is now regularized.<sup>48</sup> The most significant reduction of illegal connections has been registered in Santa Marta, home to the first UPP. Before the police entrance, 90 percent of the energy provided in this community was illegal. Among the 10 percent who received the service legally at that time, represented by 73 residents, only 15 percent used to pay their bills. After decades of “free service”, the arrival of formal distribution had to be accompanied by outreach campaigns to raise awareness about the importance of being efficient about energy use and of having regularized services.

***“The cable company comes inside the elite police squad truck” [A Sky já vem dentro do caminhão do BOPE] is a joke often heard in the favelas.*** Before the entrance of the UPP, cable access was provided through the “*gatonet*” system, the nickname given to the illegal connection to cable system. As the joke implies, the Sky company, one of the main cable providers in Brazil, was quick in trying to gain consumers as soon as the pacification process began. Sky saw the potential of the new markets emerging with the pacification and launched in 2010 the *Sky UPP*. The program offers residents in communities with the UPP a package of 89 channels for less than US\$ 25 per month, almost half the regular price charged for the rest of the city. In 2011, the telecom company Embratel also launched a special cable TV package, *Via Paz*, for residents of Borel, Mangureira and Alemão, offering 96 channels for US\$ 15.

**Given the favela’s topography, mototaxis and kombis (vans) are a usual means of local transport for favela residents, and in the past also for drug traffickers.** The inclined hills, narrow streets and unpaved roads that compose the landscape of many favelas make transportation in these areas naturally difficult. People still use mototaxis and kombis, above all the elderly and women at night.<sup>49</sup> These informal services are provided most of the time by local residents, who make their living through these activities. In many cases they used to be also managed by the local drug lord to go up and the down the hills. For the police, mototaxis and kombis have always had a strong relationship with the traffic, especially as a means to transport drug users. With infamous nicknames such as “*mototráfico*” or “*Disque-drogas*” (drugs hotline) coined in the past, drivers in pacified favelas still struggle to break with this stigma. Mototaxi

48 “Light já reduziu em 90% gatos de energia em cinco comunidades com UPP”, O Globo newspaper. January 2, 2012.

49 ISER 2012a.



and kombis have not been formally regularized (i.e., owners are not formally registered as businesses/service providers). Nevertheless, with the entrance of the UPP, whose officers also recognize these services as legitimate, basic traffic rules (valid driver's license and plate, use of helmets, maximum number of passengers, etc.) are now applied and monitored. Upon the establishment of each unit, officers register all drivers, largely in an attempt to identify which ones were connected to drug traffickers.

**The UPP has also started to pave the way or has accelerated the implementation of initiatives to promote the regularization of communities by granting property titles to residents who own their homes.**<sup>50</sup> One example from the favela Pavão is *Projeto Cantagalo*, which aims to provide land tenure for almost 1,500 families in Cantagalo community. The program was created in 2009, and is implemented through a partnership between the state government, NGO Instituto Atlântico, the Cantagalo Residents' Association, and Projeto Segurança de Ipanema. However, residents in Pavão (specifically in Cantagalo community) demonstrated skepticism towards this type of initiative, concerned about the costs that may come with it. At the same time, others in Chapéu were more positive about it, acknowledging that paying taxes is also part of the process of acquiring full citizenship, which includes rights but also duties.

**Other initiatives encouraged the regularization and sustainable development of small informal businesses.** *Empresa Bacana* ("Cool Company"), for example, offers support to any small business that makes up to R\$36,000 per year (approximately US\$ 20,000) to be formalized and receive all the necessary documentation. The whole process is carried out in the community, for free, and can be completed in one day, with no bureaucracy. The project also offers technical assistance and lectures for local entrepreneurs, who then understand that the formalization allows access to bigger and cheaper suppliers, to credit lines with different conditions, and to social security benefits. The program was launched in August 2010, and just in 2011 facilitated the formalization of more than 1,500 small businesses in 14 pacified areas, including Borel, Chapéu and Pavão. The project was launched in 2009 by the municipal government in the favela of Cidade de Deus, and is now offered in all pacified areas. It is coordinated by Instituto Pereira Passos (IPP) and implemented in partnership with the municipal secretariats of Labor and Public Order, federal agency

<sup>50</sup> This issue is very controversial in the favelas, where the residents' situation regarding vary substantially. Many residents own their homes, for example, but not their land.

for small business development SEBRAE (Serviço Brasileiro de Apoio às Micro e Pequenas Empresas), and the union of companies that provide financial services SESCOB (Sindicato de Empresas de Serviços Contábeis).

From the field interviews with business owners and family members of owners, there are still mixed feelings about these processes. While some see the benefits of regularization outweighing the new tax obligations, others fear not being able to sustain their businesses in the longer run.



Electric utility workers prepare to upgrade electrical distribution equipment in the Borel.


(Photography: Rich Press)

<

**What did residents say about all these changes?** While some residents complained about the costs of the bills, or the quality of the services, and the fact that they had to now be more economical in their energy consumption, others were happy with fewer electricity problems and blackouts, which had tended to occur with frequency:

**...some of them complain about having to change their habits...** *"I'll sell everything and just stick with the cell phone, not to pay for electricity (...). We have two computers and four televisions at home, and now we have to keep all of them turned off not to be expensive."* (Focus Group, Borel).

**...others suspect that titling is motivated by the desire to tax...** *"They put a place for you to go get the titles of the houses, people had no documents. But for what? To charge after, right! Everyone who had the old house was there to pick up the documents, all right. But they just did it to make these people pay taxes. Nobody*



thinks it was free, *granted*.” *Because this UPP thing, debts are also coming. It’s a give and take!*” (Focus Group, Pavão).

**...and that it could lead to gentrification...** *“One thing that will send people away is to put electricity, water, gas and telephone, and they are putting all of that here. They have already put electricity there at [Canta]Galo, but nobody can pay the electricity bill. And they are still going to put water, we will have IPTU [tax on urban land and property]”.* (Focus Group, Pavão) Some of the interviewees said their electricity bills was now more than R\$ 50 per month, with a few cases of residents saying they had received in the beginning bills of more than R\$ 100. In a survey carried out by the Secretary of Labor (Secretaria Municipal do Trabalho) released in 2011, residents from the three UPP case studies declared to pay something between R\$ 35 to R\$ 41 (approximately US\$ 20) per month.<sup>51</sup>

**...but despite all the problems, some are starting to regain their trust in public institutions.** *“The residents don’t see anything! They accept the services. It is new for these people who have never been treated kindly (...) The remodeling of the electric company, (Light), first, though it was poorly done and not the quality service that is done elsewhere, but since we have lived so many years being ignored, we think it is a good service (...) The water company (CEDAE) has not arrived yet. Only Light since it is mostly interested in collecting its fees (...) I don’t know, only time will tell now to see just what happens. But there is a good side, and that is **that people are coming back to believing in something: in the president, in the judge.**”* (Woman, age 50, community leader, Chapéu).

**...and acquiring a greater sense of state responsiveness and citizenship:** *“I think the coming of the electricity company is good. Before no one was paying, but when the lights would go out, they would only come out to fix it if it was a general problem—if the whole hill was without electricity! Then they would come! But now, the guys get here quickly! **But before we would stay a couple of days without electricity.**”* (Man, age 25, young person, Chapéu).

**...but there is still work to be done with some UPP policemen who have a hard time understanding that residents could be legitimate owners and consumers of certain services.” (...)**

51 Secretaria do Trabalho and Endeavor Brasil. September 2011. “Análise das Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora”. Governo do Rio de Janeiro.




*Our internet is shared, and I don't know why they went to the house of the person with whom I share the internet and simply cut the wires, didn't even talk to us. Because there is a lot of "gato" and wiring of electricity, they thought we had "internet gato". And the girl proved to them that she had a modem at home, with four entrances to the wire. And they did not return the wires or helped to reinstall internet (...)." (Focus Group, Chapéu).*

### **Box 5. A Qualitative study of "regularization" of mototaxis in the favela of Chapéu**

One of the many legacies left by decades of drug trafficking control over lives in the favelas has been the ambiguous relationship between what is considered legal and illegal, the irregular/informal and the legitimate. Services and cultural practices that used to be linked to the drug trade were consolidated throughout time as part of communities' daily life and culture, composing the social imagination about favelas and their residents. With the return of the state presence to these areas, some of these 'local norms' were changed. Strict rules first imposed by the UPP had to be later renegotiated with the communities. One of these social dynamics that was affected by the UPP was the mototaxi services. The mototaxi services have been operating in Chapéu for approximately ten years, with approximately 25 to 30 mototaxi drivers. Despite their irregular status, these services survived the arrival of UPPs because of the critical need that they filled and their established legitimacy within the communities. The study *"Histórico e Usos de Mototaxi no Chapéu Mangueira e Babilônia: Um Olhar sobre os Impactos da Política Estadual de Pacificação"* carried out focus groups and individual interviews with 13 drivers, 34 residents, 15 business owners and 15 UPP police officers in Chapéu Mangueira and Babilônia communities (ISER, 2012). The study shows that there were conflicts in the beginning of the pacification process, with some drivers being arrested. Now UPP officers believe the relationship of mototaxis with the drug gangs is in the past. However, it also reveals that most drivers and community residents do view positively UPP's changes to mototaxi operations because of the new obligations and "oversight" imposed over their services. Drivers had a period of three months to register with the officers and have their driver's licenses and plates regularized, which led some young men, for example, to look for other jobs. Their station, which had been located on the corner of the street that marked the end of the Leme neighborhood and the beginning of the favela, was moved to the entrance of the community. Other basic traffic rules, such as the requirement to use helmets and maximum capacity of passengers, started to be applied and monitored.<sup>52</sup> The

<sup>52</sup> Some policemen interviewed by the study said the UPP "regularized" the service, although several of the rules established differ from those required by the federal law Federal





requirement that drivers wear vests, however, which had been applied at the beginning in order to identify who entered and left the favela, was later dropped.

Source: ISER 2012.

## b. Access to social programs and economic development opportunities

**With the pacification process also came the expectation that there would also be social programs and initiatives to provide residents with new social and economic development opportunities.** The initial strategy for the integration of the favelas into state and society was that the military police component would serve to make the communities safe for the entrance of social, cultural, educational and health programs. Investing in human capital, particularly in job creation, job training and job readiness, was recognized as the key to integration between the morro and the asfalto and the key to creating a strong civil society able to sustain the peace once the UPPs left. If the state can deliver on the day-care centers, health centers, social centers, recreation areas and linking training to actual jobs, the prospects for the future will be much brighter. Again, the concern is first and foremost for “youth in limbo.” There does not appear to be consensus among perceptions regarding changes in the arrival or the improvement of these types of initiatives, and it is hard to tell the extent to which such benefits are already materializing, especially regarding income generation opportunities.

**The number of social programs in partnership with the private sector in favelas has increased exponentially in recent years.** A rapid assessment carried out at the end of 2011 identified, for example, 95 interventions being implemented by the private sector in partnership with governments and NGOs, of which only 7 were already ongoing before the arrival of the UPPs in 2008.<sup>53</sup> The stocktaking also showed that the number of interventions has been growing gradually as the program progresses, not only because the number of areas pacified

Law 12009/2009, which regulates the services of *mototaxistas* and *motoboys* in Brazil.

53 In response to a demand from UPP Social, in November 2011 the World Bank hired a local consultant to carry out a rapid assessment of private sector engagement in pacified favelas. The document was not formally published but has been used by Instituto Pereira Passos in its mapping and coordination efforts in UPP areas.


are increasing, but also because the involvement of one firm creates the incentive for others to invest as well.

**Several of the new programs developed in partnership with the private sector focus on capacity building and professional training, aiming at preparing favela residents, especially the youth, to join the formal labor market.** One example of these initiatives is *SESI Cidadania* (Citizenship Sesi), mentioned by some of the interviewees. Financed by FIRJAN, and implemented in partnership with the State and municipal government, as well as local organizations, the project involves a series of activities focused on education, culture, sports and leisure. It was launched in August 2010 and, according to FIRJAN, has since then benefited 110,000 people. The *Coletivo Coca-Cola* (*Collective Coca-Cola*) is another example of this kind. Promoted by Coca-Cola company in all pacified areas and implemented in partnership with local NGOs and UPP Social program, the program offers, among others, entrepreneurship education and training and courses on retail markets (sales, management, consulting training, etc.) for youth between 15 and 25 years. A survey conducted by the Secretary of Labor in late 2011 showed that in Chapéu, Borel and Pavão, respectively, 70 percent, 65 percent and 58 percent of the population interviewed would like to own their own business.<sup>54</sup>

**Many residents mentioned recreational activities for adults...** *"They are coming [projects], but it's coming now. There are projects coming for the elderly, such as gymnastics, soccer for kids." "Has my life has improved? Yes it has improved! Because, as the girls said, now we have fitness classes, and before we didn't. I'm actually not going there these days because I broke my arm, and I do physiotherapy at church São José down there. There you have the school I'm studying too, I learned to write my name. For me it has improved. And now the doctor comes up here on Thursdays."* (Focus Group, Borel)

**...and opportunities for their children...** *"Today my daughter is part of several projects. She takes courses, dances, she is in a project where she learns ballet, fashion, hair ornaments, crafts. [...] Prior to this (pacification), the children studied, went to school (...), but it was very dangerous because a shot could go off at any time, and we were always worried. They had to go straight home. Not now. (...) They can come home at six o'clock. (...).*

54 Secretaria do Trabalho and Endeavor Brasil. September 2011. "Análise das Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora". Governo do Rio de Janeiro.



*My daughter can be a child. (...) This difference came with the pacification. I even say that the pacification was made for the children.” (Woman, age 36, salesperson, Borel).*

**...particularly education...** *“Today we have a lot of courses. I say this to my daughters: today there are courses for free, school is free—which didn’t exist in my time. Today things are different! Everything is easier. (...) I don’t know who it was that brought these things here, but they arrived, and many people have finished the courses”. (Woman, age 35, resident, Chapéu).*

**Today virtually every large regional, national or multinational company present in Rio has some type of activity in UPP areas.**

More than an increase in the numbers and size of private investment, there has been also an important shift in the previously mainly “assistentialist” way in which the private sector used to invest in these areas. From the largest Banks to telecom companies, Coca-cola, and cosmetics brands, the private sector has now realized that with the pacification, investments in these communities mean building access to new consumer markets. In addition, they have started to see in these areas the potential of training workers for the booming sectors of the economy, such as tourism, industry, and services, which are in high demand for more human capital.

**...but residents also complained that often projects did not consult the community or considered the local demands.**

*“Projects come already made, ready. Soccer, then, comes ready.”  
“Do you know which project [social] we have the most in the community? Soccer. Just soccer. Other than that, we take the kids here to take the test in Recreio and there was one boy who went to play in the United States. This was the only one I’ve seen go out to play soccer.” (Focus Group, Borel)*

**Others say that the main problem is the lack of information available about these programs and courses.**

UPP Social now offers a list of all services provided in or around the pacified communities, including their contact information, in its recently launched new website.<sup>55</sup> They also use posters, flyers, the Residents’ Associations

<sup>55</sup> The new website launched by UPP Social on May 10, 2012 - [www.uppsocial.org](http://www.uppsocial.org) - contains a database with basic information about all communities included in the pacification process. That includes basic socioeconomic data, maps, news and events, and a list of program and initiatives promoted by the public and private sectors and civil society organizations. According to the database, Borel has today 5 centers for social assistance, 6 health centers and one hospital, 7 childcare centers, and 8 public schools; Chapéu has 4 centers for social assistance, 4 health centers and one hospital, 3 schools; and Pavão has 3 Centers of social assistance, 1 health center and 1 hospital, 1 childcare center, and 6 public schools.

and local blogs and websites to advertize meetings and courses or competitions, but many residents interviewed were still not yet aware about several programs or about the UPP Social itself.

**One of the most glaring gaps in social assistance concerns the so called “orphans of the drug trade”.** The state Secretary of Social Assistance estimates that there could be more than 3,500 extra-trafficers operating in UPP and military controlled favelas, and many more in those areas the UPP has not yet reached. Many young people who dropped out of school to join a gang now have no education, no income and no job experience or skills. It is openly known that the sale of drugs continues in the pacified favelas but at a reduced scale, such that many of the informal jobs performed by the lower rungs of the hierarchy have disappeared. In a study carried out with this specific population, Ramos (2011)<sup>56</sup> shows that many of these teenagers and young adults are now called “orphans of the drug trade”. Her study shows that, in addition to the income lost, many of these youth are now stigmatized by the community itself, and wander around all day in the favelas, with nothing to do, “like zombies”, as one of her interviewees put it.

**With regard to opening up new businesses and opportunities for access to income, our fieldwork captured a trend, albeit vague, of optimism.** This is more evident in the South Zone favelas of Chapéu and Pavão than in Borel, largely due to their location, which attracts tourists. In addition, these favelas are undergoing urbanization projects - Morar Carioca and PAC, which are adding to the numerous other actions that have started to be implemented after the UPP in these favelas, helping to bring a considerable influx of people working and consuming in these neighborhoods.

**In Chapéu, there are clear signs that the UPP is promoting new businesses.** Several small businesses located near the entrance of the community have received the Municipal Secretary of Housing (Secretaria Municipal de Habitação, SMH) “stamp”, which shows that they have been assessed and approved by the municipal government. Today, many of them are quite busy because of the increased number of workers in the community and external visitors brought by the pacification efforts. One of the most publicized cases of new economic opportunities was the “Bar of David,” the first bar located in a favela to compete in the *Comida di Buteco* Festival (see Box 6).

56 Ramos, Sílvia. Trajetórias no tráfico: jovens e violência armada em favelas cariocas. Trivium [online]. 2011, vol.3, n.2, pp. 41-57.



(Photo by Mario Brum)



### Box 6. The “Bar do David”

The “Bar of David” is the first bar located in a favela to compete in the well-known food festival *Comida di Buteco*. The competition brings together bars from different parts of Rio and takes into consideration various items from their menus, among them the best snacks. This bar in Chapéu took third place. According to one of the festival’s producers, the selection of a snack from *Bad do David*, which met all the festival criteria, was only possible because of the peace process, and at the same time an effort to contribute to the success of the pacification program.

The event gave public exposure to this bar across the city, with several stories in major media print and broadcast outlets. According to David, some of the new customers were people who had never stepped into a favela before: *“Most of the clientele who have now been coming here are people from outside. (...) It is gratifying to see people go to a place that was always broken”*. During and after the festival, David had to start opening the bar also on Sundays to meet the higher demand of customers. As a result of the increased movement, his cook asked for a much higher salary, and he replaced her. She ended up opening a new establishment herself, in Babilônia community.

However, many of local business owners in Chapéu including David, still consider the future of their businesses “uncertain”, and demand support from the local government to maintain and improve local infrastructure. With a good sense of opportunity, David emphasized the “favela identity” of his bar, using the tablecloth commissioned especially during the festival, and highlighted his participation in the *Comida di Buteco* Festival.



**In Borel, the effects were less clear, even though there were some references to an increase in the diversity of the kinds of businesses.** This young entrepreneur, for example, opened his Internet café one week after the arrival of the UPP: *“Yes, there are more business opportunities. Services that didn’t exist before such as needing to get a photocopy of a document, or people who did not come here and now do.”* (Man, age 24, business owner, Borel, Chácara do Céu community).


**...access to banking services...** *“Down the hill we have Banks now. This is because of the UPP, because Bradesco bank, for instance, if it were not for the UPP, would never come up here. We also had, after the UPP, the CNPJ [Cadastro Nacional da Pessoa Jurídica, the identification number for Brazilian companies].”* (Focus Group, Borel).

### c. Symbolic integration – dealing with the stigma of the favela

**As mentioned before, the category “favela” is less a description of the objective characteristics of a space, and more a mix of social and cultural representations.** The stigma of the *‘favelado’*, a derogatory term commonly used to refer to a person from a favela, refers to perceptions of places and people that live in the absence – total or partial – of public order, i.e. of rules and rights sanctioned by the state. It is then important to discover the perception of the UPP by favela residents with respect to the type of impact the UPP may be having on its image from the outside.

**The three UPP cases studied are of favelas set in upper and middle-class neighborhoods.** This is an ecological situation, which, on one hand, favors widespread access of favela residents to the surrounding domestic services, retail and leisure markets, and use of communal facilities such as health centers and public schools. On the other hand, paradoxically, it also favors the development of a cultural-type urban segregation brought about by the fact that physical proximity between low-income and middle-class spaces is contrasted by negative social representations about the favela, which work as a powerful mechanism to produce social distance between the two urban spaces. In this sense, one of the most expected effects of the UPP is that, by expelling armed drug traffickers – characters representing urban violence who in recent decades have come to





be confused with the meaning of the word favela itself – the favelas could gradually establish new relationships with their surroundings, thus overcoming the current situation of segregation.

**It is also important to highlight, however, that urban segregation of favelas precedes the cycle of open trafficking activity within them, and therefore expulsion of its agents will certainly not bring about automatic desegregation or full integration of favelas into the neighborhood.** Nevertheless, given the significant role played by trafficking in producing a specific form of segregation, largely centered on labeling the favela and its residents as the bearers of a “culture of violence”<sup>57</sup>, the UPP “pacification” may be expected to produce, at minimum, important changes to its image as viewed from outside and, therefore, to the current state of segregation.

**The fieldwork suggests that the UPPs are bringing about a change in the self-image of residents, which seems to reflect what they see as a change in the perception that outsiders have of them.** As expected, such responses to the UPP effect were evidenced particularly in the case of the favela of Chapéu. As demonstrated by the many accounts from residents in this favela, the UPP would appear to be contributing to redefine the favela dweller’s status, which may ultimately lead to greater participation in the civic and political life of the city.

**They feel more appreciated by the neighbors from the “asfalto”...** *“They talk differently now, give support to people here, they like it here because it’s peaceful. The outlook is much better today. It’s peace, calm. All that mess, those cars going up, it doesn’t happen anymore. Now people say to me: ‘Wow, you live up there? It’s really good there, huh?’ Now it’s good! So, for me it’s great!”* (domestic employee Woman, age 35, resident, Chapéu).

**...bringing economic benefits to both sides...** *“Everyone says on the street that there are no shots any more, stuff like that. I know that the people [of Leme neighborhood] like it, everyone is praising it! Apartments were losing their value, they’re not any more. When they say good things about the community, I feel more respected. A lot of girls couldn’t get work as daily cleaners down here. You couldn’t live here if you wanted to get work. I think they weren’t hiring because they thought everyone was involved in trafficking.”* (Woman, age 58, resident, Chapéu).

57 For more on the “culture of violence,” see Machado (2008).



**...more friends from outside are coming...** *"All my girlfriends live down there in Copacabana. Before, they didn't come here because I was ashamed and afraid."* (Girl, 15, youth, Chapéu).


**...service providers dare to come in too...** *"Oh, it's changed! Now it's much better! You see...people are visiting the community. Today, going up to deliver things from the drugstore, supermarket, it's fine! Anytime at night."* (Woman, age 51, resident of Chapéu).

*"City people are coming into the community for everything. The fact is, the city is getting to know the community (...) Back then, all they heard about was a violent community, but not now, they talk about improvements, better days."* (Man, age 49, resident, Chapéu).

**...making residents feel proud...** *"They no longer think everyone is a criminal, people from down there see us with other eyes, in a different light. (...) Before, down at the bottom of the hill, it was shooting all the time. Now, thank God, people walk around with their heads up, others see you in a different way, they come up to the favela."* (Man, age 25, resident, Chapéu).

**...but they are quite realistic that these changes are difficult...** *"I think that the stigma is still there, the prejudice. Exactly the same! Prejudice will always exist (...)." (Woman, age 62, resident of Chapéu).*

**In the other two case studies, however, skepticism about the end of this segregation is stronger.** In Borel, the majority of interviews converged on the view that prejudice against the favela will continue, which was evident in responses collected by the focus groups with favela residents. On being questioned if there had been changes in the relationship between "favela and city," some residents answered that nothing had changed. In Pavão, although the fieldwork found that many residents believed that people from surrounding neighborhoods were looking at the favela with *"more respect"*, the UPP seemed to stir up suspicion of its ultimate motivations, which for many were more related to protecting city residents than favela residents.



## d. Too much integration? or the fear of “remoção branca”

**The pacification effort had a significant effect on property prices within the favela and in the surrounding neighborhoods, particularly in the favelas of the South.** In the case of the favela of Chapéu, for example, an article in the newspaper *O Globo* reported that the highest monthly rent prices were found in the low part of Chapéu: R\$ 4,000 (approximately US\$ 2,230) for a store and R\$ 2,000 (US\$ 1,115) for two bedrooms. A two bedroom house was also reported to be on sale for R\$ 50,000 (US\$ 27,700), 66 percent higher than in year previous to the UPP.<sup>58</sup> Looking at 18 UPPs and retail prices in their surrounding areas between November 2008 and November 2011, Frischtak and Mandel (2012) also found that, conditional on being in the neighborhood of a UPP unit, property prices increased by 5.8 percent more than in the rest of the city after the UPP was announced. The study also shows significant heterogeneity across UPPs, with estate price increases ranging from 6 percent following the Batan UPP to 21 percent following the initiation of the Chapéu UPP.<sup>59</sup>

**The rise in real estate values around and within the pacified favelas represents a real and present danger to the residents and their way of life.** For those who are renters, it will be hard to compete with offers of much higher rents from people coming in from outside. And those who are owners will be caught between pressure of having to deal with the increased land tax expenditures, on one hand, and service fees on the other. This raises the issue of what Brazilians call “*white expulsion*” to distinguish it from the direct favela removal of earlier eras.<sup>60</sup> In the favela of Chapéu, specifically in the case of Babilônia community, this was obvious from the time they learned that the UPP would be established there. The Residents’ Association held several community meeting where this was discussed and it was agreed that no one would rent or sell to outsiders, in order to preserve their community.

58 “Real estate in favelas with UPP rise up to 400%”, *O Globo*, 05/30/2010.

59 In Rocinha, there was a 50% valorization of the households located in the most attractive zones within three days of the pacification. For full details, see <http://oglobo.globo.com/rio/em-tres-dias-preco-de-imovel-na-rocinha-aumenta-50-3255212>


60 Favela Bairro did not create the anticipated gentrification or “white expulsion” because it did not confront the problem of violence and drug traffic. The dealers went away during the construction phase and returned when it was over. Architecture, design and engineering improvements did not weigh heavily enough in the real estate market to counter the continued threat of violence.

**Favela residents are well aware of this trend and have mixed feelings about it.** Although seen as a positive development, residents also perceive the increases in property prices as a threat. The actions for the legalization of public services, such as access to water and electricity, and the occasional need to pay property tax, have also been the object of a mixed reactions on the part of residents. This uncertainty appears with more strength in the favelas of the South Zone where the rising prices in the housing market in the favelas are even more significant.


*“The problem here is that if the ‘other side’ begins to take advantage of all of this, they take advantage of the community to do what they want! (...). To take advantage I mean, because it’s a community, but it’s in the South Zone! They end up using the community and all they are doing for their own benefit. In what way? We run the risk of ending up not being able to pay the electricity bill, property tax, these fees, and be forced out. (...) There is this fear in many of the people here of not being able to stay in the community. We don’t know what is going to happen.”*  
(Woman, age 50, community leader, Chapéu).

**This seems to suggest that for some residents, stigma could be a “good” thing since it would protect them from gentrification.** Residents of favelas located in prime real estate areas tend to have this constant fear that any reduction in segregation may bring about the gradual expulsion of poorer people by the middle classes. This process would therefore become another kind of removal, no longer through violent state intervention, but rather by the invisible powers of the market.





# **Chapter 7. The effects of the UPP in areas without the UPP: The case of Manguinhos**



**When the fieldwork for this study was completed, Manguinhos had no UPP, but the UPP had had clear effects upon daily life and expectations of its residents.** Hence, this case will be discussed in that context. As discussed below, there is a widespread sense that the UPPs are closing in on the Manguinhos Complex. The reigning anxiety in Manguinhos is not without grounds. The current spatial distribution of the UPPs in the city leaves only the Manguinhos/Jacarezinho region and the Complexo da Maré as large spreads of favelas in the city core without UPPs. Yet both these favela complexes already experience the anticipation of some sort of police presence. In Maré, the construction of the new BOPE headquarters is already underway.

**Right at the core of the “Gaza Strip”, Manguinhos residents have witnessed, for more than a year now, the construction of the City of Police, a large complex that is intended to concentrate specialized police forces in one location.** Its location leaves no doubt as to the symbolic message it conveys. The government refers to it as one of three large headquarters for police operations currently under construction within what is to become a Security Complex. This complex encompasses the already mentioned BOPE headquarters and the Center for Command and Control, that is to host surveillance and intelligence related police activities. So despite the lack of any formal announcements for a UPP in Manguinhos, a steady stream of rumors involving the City of Police or even a UPP pervades daily conversations.

**Thus the UPP’s effect upon Manguinhos is twofold: on the one hand, Manguinhos experienced immediate, concrete effects of the UPP, most notably the migration of drug dealers and drug users ousted from UPP occupied areas. On the other hand, UPP has effects upon residents’ perceptions of the structuring relations between residents, the police, and drug dealers.**

### a. Immediate, concrete effects of UPPs

**The first effect was the migration of drug traffickers from Alemão to Manguinhos.** Many of these newcomers had already fled to Alemão on the occasion of the occupation of their communities of origin, in the south and north zones. The subject was brought up in several informal conversations, always as a source of anxiety. According to a 26 year old mother of four, “*things are getting worse*” because “*we*

*keep hearing of some John Doe or another who came from places where UPPs have been set up".* When the favela of Mangueira was occupied during the course of our field research, the same dynamics unfolded, if on a smaller scale. We can thus speculate that both Alemão and Mangueira had also experienced similar migration waves before their own occupation.

**The second concrete effect of the UPP program was that Manguinhos absorbed many of the drug customers of Alemão.** This effect is mainly discernible in the overnight increase of crack users that expanded and multiplied the so-called *cracolândias* (areas where crack cocaine is consumed) in Manguinhos. Our team member who had been conducting field research on crack users in Alemão found that her field site had moved overnight to Manguinhos and Jacarezinho.

**When read together, these two transformations amount to a local upscaling of the drug business.** And yet the UPP effect extends well beyond these two concrete and direct consequences of UPPs located elsewhere; it impinges, first and foremost upon residents' imaginations of what the UPP is, and produces a certain anticipation of its potential arrival in Manguinhos.

**Residents also report a decrease in the visibility of weapons during the day.** In favelas like Chapéu, Pavão, and Borel, the routines of the drug trade differ during the day and after nightfall. As a rule, in these and other favelas, the drug trade tends to be more discreet during the day, and it was only after dark that weapons, drugs and members of the trade came into full-blown view. In Manguinhos the drug trade was more evident by day and by night. With the expansion of the UPP, however, the drug trade in Manguinhos maintained its highly apparent bocas during the day, but the weapons were concealed. This may also be a widespread consequence of the UPP program, since reports from Rocinha, Vidigal, and other favelas before their occupation were strikingly similar to the accounts from Manguinhos.

**That guns are less visible does not mean that the drug trade has lost strength, in the view of residents.** If one examines how residents talk about the UPP, as we do next, it becomes clear that the absence of guns in public view by day is one more element that contributes to the idea that major conflict still lies ahead.



## b. Talking (and silencing) about UPPs in Manguinhos

**The occupation of Alemão and Mangueira made the idea of the UPP more tangible for Manguinhos residents.** The spatial proximity between Manguinhos and these two communities brought the UPP home, in many ways. First, because Manguinhos residents' social and family networks tend to incorporate residents of both Mangueira and Alemão. Thus Manguinhos residents were and continue to be quite familiar with the territory of these neighboring favelas and with the particularities of the drug trade in each one of them. Friends' and relatives' accounts of life under the UPP colored their own perceptions of the UPP-related recent changes in Manguinhos. Take the following exchange among youngsters attending the focus group discussion:

*A - "Wow, the flow of cars, motorcycles and drugs has increased a lot. I don't know whether it has anything to do with the UPP but my guess is that it does. If they are not arresting everyone [involved in the drug trade in UPP communities], there must be a lot of people getting away, fleeing to where the UPP has not arrived yet."*

*B - "For sure the drug trade has increased. Just think of those who escaped Alemão, they must have come here mostly. And the others... You can tell that the trade has increased, but there has not been a war because of it, not yet."*

*C - "They're all coming to Manguinhos, to Mandela [one of the housing projects that make up Manguinhos]. It's true!"*

One evangelical pastor who was clear in his support for the program sums up well the sources and rationale for this anticipation: *"As far as I know, it is already coming here. The next one to be pacified is Mangueira, right? Which is very close to here. They are creating the City of Police, over there, in Jacarezinho, in Manguinhos. The state government is working [...] on dominating this entire community here, this whole place, all of Rio, right?"*

**These statements suggest the idea of the closing in of the UPPs, which amounts to a perception of the UPPs as a process that unfolds in time and space and is approaching Manguinhos.** An old resident of Manguinhos used the future tense in his description when asked whether he thought the UPP was coming to Manguinhos: *"There will be no weapons. The drug*

*trade will be more discreet.” The same resident acknowledged the difficulty in envisioning a different image of the police: “We will need to gather the children, show the young what the police are about... that they do not just come in to cause shootouts and arrest people. They need to see the policeman as someone who can help, not as a predator.” (Man, 37, Manguinhos).*

This last statement seems especially insightful, particularly if one takes into account the reactions of the youngsters who attended the Manguinhos focus group. Drawing on second hand accounts of favelas with UPPs and on their own impressions of the police, they voiced an extremely critical position of the existing UPPs:


*A - [mocking laughter] “My cousin lives on the lower part of Providencia. She says they [the UPP officers] are worse than the drug traffickers, that they call women whores, or worst. The drug traffickers don’t beat you up for no reason. They don’t mess with you, if you don’t mess with them. They do their thing over there and we stay here.”*

*B - “They say they [the UPP officers] go into the community thinking that everyone is a drug dealer. They treat everyone like that, they don’t respect residents, workers. Because they don’t know who is who, and I don’t know whether they care to find out!”*

*C- “I think that these days, if you don’t mess with them [drug traffickers], they won’t mess with you. Everyone gets along. But when the UPP comes along no one knows who is who anymore, so no one can be trusted. You can’t trust the new policemen, they don’t trust residents, who might be part of the drug trade. Because you know what it’s like, the drug trade does not end, it just hides. So I think there is no use in setting up a UPP!”*

*D - “It seems it is horrible, that one can’t leave one’s door open because when residents come back home, a lot of stuff has been stolen. If they [UPP officers] see a flat-screen TV in someone’s home they say it was bought by the drug trade and take it for themselves. Just like that. It wasn’t like that before, there were no robberies, muggings or rapes in the favela. Here, to this day I leave my door open with no fear of having my things stolen.”*

**Manguinhos residents read and hear about the UPP without being directly exposed to it. Thus they project on the favelas that are now under the UPP the same police force with which they coexist, thereby justifying their skepticism when considering**



**this type of police occupation.** The blunt words of this woman, age 32, who has just moved from Manguinhos, sum it up: *“I don’t know if having the UPP is going to help because in the other places we still see some things, some conflicts, some things that are not working. I don’t know if it’s going to work in Manguinhos. I can’t say. Really don’t know. I just don’t have a good feeling about it because you never know what the police are going to do. We don’t know if the police are really going to provide the security that the people need or if they will be corrupted too, or whether they are going to try to give a false sense of security by another legal side. I don’t know. I feel really insecure about it all. The UPP doesn’t give me any peace.”*

**And yet such blunt rejection of the UPP should be read with some caution.** As mentioned in Chapter 4 one clear pattern that emerged from interviews and informal conversations in Manguinhos was that “regular” residents were more at ease criticizing the UPP in public – and particularly with the tape recorder on – than in praising the program. Conversely, community leaders in general, but particularly members of Residents’ Associations, expressed their support of the idea of a UPP in Manguinhos.

**The dilemma between fear of policing carried out by a police force that one cannot trust, and the horror of having to continue to live under the oppression of trafficking, places the residents of Manguinhos in a challenging position, especially when it calls into question the sensitive issue of their children’s physical safety.** The following debate, played out by a mother (63 years old) and daughter (43), shows the full extent of the issue. The mother begins by evoking the memory of three teenage nephews killed by the police:

*“They were coming back from the party close to my house. They [the police] stopped them and told them to put their hands against the wall. One was blonde. His hair ended up like this on the wall. You understand? What cowards! I can’t ever talk about the police. You can’t have, you don’t have, I don’t have ... peace of mind with police around. I really don’t. I hate them—hate ‘em! (pause).”* When asked whether the UPP officers might be different, she disdainfully replied *“they are all the same”* and moved on to talk about reports of police disrespect in the Alemão Complex.

Her daughter, however, disagrees. As a mother herself of a teen active in the drug trade of Jacarezinho, she sees the possible arrival of the UPP as the answer to all her prayers: *“I swear to you that I’m crazy about them coming here. I really am. You know! I have to tell you that I really am (...) I’m going to have my son for myself. I’m not going*


*to have to put my head on the pillow and think, "Gee, my son might mess up. Someone might catch him and beat him up." Two days ago they [the drug trade] were beating someone up here (...). I've seen many kids and mothers here crying, pleading for their children(...). I can just see my son out there. And if it's my son, I'm going to beat them up. I'm going to die because they will kill me. I swear [...]. If they even touch my boy, I'm not going to have pity on anyone. I'll kill them."*

**In short, the silences that suggest approval of the UPP, coupled with their loud approval by community leaders and the loud voices that spoke against it, teach us less about how residents perceive the UPP than about how Manguinhos' residents' speech and voice remain curtailed by the drug trade.** It is thus not surprising that it is only as a mother that this resident finds the courage and legitimacy to voice her desire for a UPP of her own.



# Chapter 8. Policy and research implications





**This report presents a snapshot of the UPP pacification effort, as seen through the eyes of favela residents.** It is limited to four of the more than hundreds of favelas in the city. And it captures the early stages of a program that, after the fieldwork ended, has continued to expand in scale and scope through the complementary interventions of UPP Social.<sup>61</sup> The report, therefore, does not claim representativeness or assessing impacts of the UPP program as a whole. Instead, it aims to capture the initial stages of this experiment, documenting the multiple ways in which it is being experienced by residents, and hinting at some of the factors that appear to be driving some of these differences.

**Most residents recognize the transformational benefits of the pacification process.** The newfound freedom of mobility often expressed as the “liberty to come and go” and manifested in many realms, such as the relieved mothers who can let their children walk back from school without worrying that they might walk into the crossfire between rival gangs or the police. The opening up of the communities to state, local, non-profit and business enterprises and services as illustrated by the story of Bar do David. The feeling among residents that their neighbors from the “*asfalto*” are more accepting of them as equals, creating a perception of fuller citizenship. These, and similar changes highlighted in the report, suggest that a more inclusive social order in Rio may be under construction.

**Most residents, however, also have concerns about certain aspects of the UPP implementation and its future prospects.** They question the heavily armed presence of UPP police and the heavy handed techniques of some policemen, as well as the excessive regulation of certain community activities and the risk of taking over the legitimate role of community associations. They question the program’s ultimate intentions, and suspect that it caters to a larger city planning project centered on creating the conditions necessary to host global events such as the 2016 Olympic Games. They also express apprehensions related to the effects of formalization of property, business, and services.

**These, and other concerns summarized below, seem to vary according to a number of distinct factors:** the history of the favela with drug traffic and police before the arrival of the UPP, the age and

<sup>61</sup> When this research project was conceptualized, in late 2010, there were 12 UPPs covering 35 communities, and UPP Social had recently been announced; by the end the fieldwork, in mid 2011, there were 17 UPPs, and the UPP Social Forum had only happened in a few of them. Today, there are 28 UPPs covering more than 100 communities, and UPP Social is present in all of them.




gender of the interviewees, and the type of behavior that police shifts used in their interactions with favela residents. Findings about the way residents are experiencing the pacification effort, and factors affecting these perceptions, should serve to inform possible mid-course adjustments to the program. Three main issues stand out as sources of concern and uncertainty, all of them with important policy implications:

- Will UPP lead to a new type of relationship between police and favela residents? What changes does UPP need to make to consolidate a new equilibrium? How to prevent the UPP from being another failed attempt?
- What is the long term vision for UPP? What are the implications for the broader public security policy reform? and,
- Will UPP enable the integration of favela with the rest of the city? What are the key interventions that will influence the character of this integration?

### a. Will the UPP lead to a new type of relationship between police and favela?

**Not everyone sees the arrival of the UPP as the “liberation” portrayed by the media; many residents feel that the occupation of their communities by drug gangs has simply been replaced by the occupation of the Military Police.** They question the need for the pacification police to be visibly and heavily armed when the drug traffickers have been disarmed. That UPP officers tend to occupy the same sites of the community that the *bocas* did before only reinforces this general impression. Research also uncovered several stories of UPP misconduct and sometimes of brutality. Being subjected to the whims and moods of men bearing heavy weaponry is an experience favela residents know well and dread: they have had ample experience in this regard, be it through the oppression of the local drug lord or the “old” Military Police who entered the favela in violent incursions in their armored vehicle shooting randomly for no apparent reason.

**Many others, however, see UPP as the arrival of a new type of police, and hope that UPP is not only the “pacification” of the favela but also the “pacification” of the police.** When comparing the perceptions of those living in favelas with UPPs with those who



live without it, we find that the UPP can be read as a *small-scale experience of a police force reform*. Thus residents acknowledge the shift; they recognize and value the new police practices of the UPP, and reiterate its difference vis-à-vis the traditional police force. This represents an important accumulation of political capital for the UPP, which makes it a sought-after program by other favelas. The future sustainability of the UPP, and its capacity to prevent another failed attempt to break with the historical patterns of violence in Rio, will be conditioned on the state's ability to maintain this trust, as so many programs before were not able to do.

**These disparate views seem to be influenced, at least, by three factors:**

- **The history of the favela with drug traffickers and police before the arrival of the UPP.** In simple terms, when the recent history was dominated by conflict with drug traffickers, perceptions of UPP tended to be more positive (*Chapeu*). When it was dominated by conflict with the police, perceptions tended to be more negative (*Pavão*). When it was marked by intense conflict both with drug traffickers and the police, perceptions about UPP combined strong feelings of relief about life without violence with strong apprehensions about the UPP police and the possible return of drug traffickers (*Borel*).
- **Age and gender seem to matter, since young males tend to be the most critical of the UPP.** They deal with suspicion of UPP officers on a daily basis, as they are the most prone to be searched or to become involved in incidents of abuse that only reinforce the impression that respecting their rights is not the UPP's top priority. This perception is fueled by the restrictions imposed upon their preferred leisure activities, in particular parties and funk music.
- **The extent to which UPP policemen have adopted and embraced the community police philosophy.** When talking about UPP policemen, residents made clear distinctions between different police shifts, between the polite and community-oriented vs the aggressive and authoritarian, between the ones that respected the role of community leaders and the ones that imposed their views, taking over community governance roles that do not belong to the police. Residents, thus, often found it more difficult to

make general statements about UPP as a whole and instead preferred to talk about police x or the police shift y.

**If the UPP wants to become an irreversible process in its transformation of the police behavior, and consolidate a new relationship with favela residents, there are a number of changes that it should include in its UPP approach:**

- **Customize its approach to favelas according to the relationship that each territory has had with violence (both drug traffic and police related) before UPP's arrival.**

This suggests the need for the UPP to develop diagnostic and intervention methods and tools that allow it to do this fine-tuning of its approach during the planning and implementation phases.

- **Improve selection, training, and monitoring of UPP policemen.** UPP cannot afford the few bad practices voiced by residents and seen in media reports. Being an UPP officer requires the ability to deal constantly and directly with citizens who for decades have had a visceral distrust and fear of the police. More and constant training on issues such as community policing, human rights, conflict resolution and mediation is necessary to prepare – and maintain – this new contingency of officers to be the example that the new police needs to set for the entire city and state. The state government has already announced its intention to train thousands more officers in the next few years. Given the fast pace of the implementation of the program, and the different types of challenges faced on the ground, adequate resources and time will have to be allocated to ensure this permanent training.

## **b. Will the UPP lead to a sustainable change in public security policy in Rio?**

**The most frequent concern voiced in interviews and informal discussions with residents is that once the Olympic Games are over, the UPP will disappear, leaving them in the hands of traffickers yet again.** This concern is legitimate, given the history of failed attempts, and should be taken very seriously. Residents fear that anyone who becomes too involved with the UPP will suffer the



consequences if and when the gangs return. Residents' assumption is that the kingpins who fled to other favelas will bide their time, continue selling drugs, maintain their sophisticated weaponry, bribe whoever they need to and return as soon as the UPPs leave. They have seen it before. When asked how long it might take for the dealers to return in case the UPP leaves, one man answered, *"they will run into each other on the way out"*.

**For the UPP to be (and be perceived) as an irreversible process, it needs to link with a broader public security policy reform.** The UPP is, above all, a reorganization of the logic of police behavior. Although limited to favelas, it has the potential to establish the conditions for the eventual construction of a permanent public security policy, oriented towards citizens and communities. This goes beyond the impacts of the UPP on violence reduction. It encompasses transformations in the larger political culture, and changes of this nature require time.

**This broader public security reform will also need to address some of the remaining questions and challenges that have not been answered by UPP so far:**

- **What is the state doing with the "bad guys" who fled the favelas?** After the UPP's arrival began to be announced, with residents knowing the exact day that BOPE would come, the fear of traffickers' diversion to other favelas, such as Mangueiras (as reported by some of the residents heard by the study), and even surrounding municipalities, started to increase. Although there are no studies available or hard evidence of crime displacement yet, the destiny of leaders and traffickers who fled the pacified favelas remains a key question for the state government to address. As this study has shown, uncertainty regarding the destinies of former drug lords fuels suspicion in the favela as to who is, in fact, in charge. The specter of a possible return of the drug lords ousted by UPP is one of the sources of residents' views of the UPP as a frail experiment. Thus neutralizing their influence upon the daily life and the imagination of favela residents is the key to building trust in the program.
- **What are the government plans for the hundreds of favelas left to be "pacified"?** In addition to the issue of capacity to scale the program to achieve at least the most "dominated ones", the UPP still has to deal with the militia-


controlled favelas, which are mostly located in the West Zone of the city, and also present high levels of violence, including the highest homicide rates in the city. Of the 22 favelas under the pacification program so far, only one, Batan, was controlled by militias. In 2006, at least 55 favelas were dominated by militias (Braga, Fernandes and Silva 2009). The strategy to enter these areas, however, will need to be different. These organizations are usually more structured than drug traffickers (more 'entrepreneurial'), with higher economic power and political connections, but most of the time smaller in scale (Cano, 2009).

### c. Will the UPP enable the integration of favelas with the rest of the city?

**The challenge of integrating favelas with the rest of the city** was well captured by the Brazilian economist Andre Urani: *"security measures [are] only the first step....The day after the police gets inside the community, you still have all the fundamental issues that threw these communities into the hands of the gangs."*<sup>62</sup> The integration of favelas with rest of the city is a process that unfolds along political, social, and economic dimensions. In each of these dimensions, this study has revealed a number of challenges that point to the need for urgent action on the state side.

- **In terms of political integration, the question remains as to how to rebuild the path towards the institutionalization of legitimate, democratic representation in the favelas that does not involve men bearing weapons.** In addition to their intended role of establishing the rule of law and enforcing disarmament in the favelas, the UPPs have assumed other de facto roles of local government, dispute mediation, conflict resolution, ombudsmen and ultimately decision-makers in most matters regarding community life. The definitive success and sustainability of the UPPs will be determined largely by ensuring the conditions of restoring entities of political mediation and representation that are not tainted by drug traffic coercion. This requires strengthening the interaction between the community and the UPP police, so

62 Stuart Grudgings, Washington Post – Reuters News Service, Sunday, January 23, 2011.



that residents can feel part of the transformation process as well. Also, it requires promoting community participation and engagement in the decision-making of the new rules and new order, helping to fill the authority vacuum left by drug traffickers with support from residents. **The main recommendation in this area is to strengthen the existing associational density in the pacified areas so that regular institutions can replace UPPs in the medium term.** In order to make UPP impacts sustainable, Rio de Janeiro government will have to build a more long standing and “regular” institutional structure, the same that exists in the rest of the city and state, in the favelas. This structure will have to fill in the vacuum in local governance left by the drug traffic, now temporarily occupied by the UPP. The permanent presence of the police to restore and maintain order cannot, should not, and will not last forever. The main challenge ahead lies in the government’s capacity to help normal institutions establish and take root in the favelas. UPP Social is a good effort in that direction. But unless that happens, the pacification effects of UPP will not be sustainable over time; neither will the full integration of favela residents into the formal city be materialized.

**In terms of *social integration*, UPP faces a dual challenge. The first one is promoting broad processes of social inclusion that address fundamental issues that led to decades of drug trafficking control over favelas.** These are related to the lack of basic social services and economic opportunities that have shaped residents’ lives in the favelas and to a large extent allowed so many youth to fall into the drug trade, in search of income generation alternatives, and for communities to support drug lords who many times would provide for them.

- **The main recommendation is that the state needs to give programs like UPP Social the same level of attention and resources that it has given to the UPP.** So far, UPP Social has had a difficult time in establishing a robust presence in the favelas, partly hindered by the transition from state to municipal spheres of government. In addition, the state government has recently launched (in January 5, 2012) its own program for pacified favelas called “Centers for the Prevention of Violence and Promotion of Security”. According to the press release, these centers

will serve as *“catalysts for interaction and coordination between governmental and non-governmental organizations within communities”*, will have local community managers and will be staffed with multidisciplinary teams tasked with *“the management and mediation of social conflict in the communities, and the promotion of human rights and citizenship.”*<sup>63</sup> It remains to be seen how this will be implemented, and how it will coordinate with the municipal level UPP Social.

**A second challenge is the re-socialization of those who were somehow involved with drug gangs and remained in the favelas (“the orphans of the drug trade”).** In general, government has been “lacking proactive approaches to absorb young people who are simply dabbling in the drug trade and who are not in the police’s radar” (Barnes and Rosales, forthcoming).<sup>64</sup> These scholars estimate that in a given community with 50 traffickers, 40 are not on the police’s ‘black list’, and could therefore leave crime more easily.

- **The main recommendation is for the government to prioritize the development of specific programs aimed at this target population.** The needs of this population cannot be solved by programs like UPP Social that mostly coordinate existing government programs. This group requires the deployment of an intensive array of services that address their multiple needs. There are some small scale NGO programs that can provide hint on how to design a government program of this kind, such as Afroreggae’s “Employability Project”, the only program identified by Barnes and Rosales in Rio that directly seeks to reinsert ex-traffickers into the formal labor market. There is also a significant group of programs in the US aimed at rehabilitation of gang members that could serve as a reference for Rio.

**In terms of economic integration, the main challenge is the threat of gentrification.** One of the immediate effects of UPPs in favelas has been an instant increase in the porosity of previously well delimited boundaries. Residents of favelas with UPPs have witnessed over the

63 The article by Eliza Preston, January 10, 2012, is titled: “Next for Rio’s Pacified Favela Communities.” For the full text- <http://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/rio-politics/next-for-rios-pacified-favela-communities/>

64 Rosales, Kristina, and Barnes, Taylor. 2012. “Rio de Janeiro reintegration policies for ex-traffickers”. Foreign Policy magazine, forthcoming.





course of the past few years a steady increase in the flow of visitors, tourists, social workers, and middle class residents entering the favela. This is a largely welcome change, as this newfound mobility may be a pathway to renegotiating entrenched stigmas regarding the favela and its residents.

**Even if formalization is met with mixed reactions, it is nonetheless recognized as part of the extension of citizenship into the favela.** The regularization of service delivery in the post-UPP favelas (electricity, water, sanitation, solid waste management) is an old political demand for favela residents. Its granting, however, has been accompanied by the crack-down on informal conventions for accessing “public” services (including cable TV and internet), running local businesses and managing local transportation that has raised the cost of living and doing business in the favela. As formalization creeps in, the local street vendors, carpenters, repair shops, stores, bars, restaurants, beauty parlors, and other service providers who operate at a very low profit margin express well-grounded concerns regarding the cost of living in the favela. People interviewed feared they would be forced out of business if required to register and pay taxes. As urban services are formalized, family budgets are being strained to pay water, electricity, cable television and internet bills, formerly available free or at minimal cost by pirating and tapping into municipal services. But this situation, in some cases, fuels doubts regarding the long-term sustainability of well-located favelas such as Chapéu, Pavão, and Borel as homes to low income citizens. **In other words, if the favela loses the central features that historically defined it as such – informality, illegality, deficient services, and violence – what is to keep the market from driving the poor away into the periphery?**

- **The main recommendation is to scale up and strengthen programs that foster job creation, income generation, and the formalization of old and creation of new small businesses.** Initiatives such as *Empresa Bacana* and *Coca-Cola Coletivo*, discussed in Chapter 6, are good examples of such programs, which will help to strengthen economic opportunities within communities. By providing more and improved sources of income such programs will also help to counterbalance real estate price increases and new expenses brought by formalization and regularization.

## d. The need for a robust analytical agenda

**Putting in place a robust learning and evaluation agenda will greatly increase the chances of success of the pacification effort.**

The ultimate outcome of *the pacification effort will not be known* for many years and will probably take distinct forms depending on the type of place and individuals affected by the program. A robust monitoring and evaluation program should allow government to identify early on the challenges and problems faced by the program, experiment alternative responses, and adjust its intervention tools and methods. This study has tried to make a modest contribution. It has identified a number of hypotheses that should be tested through more systematic and rigorous analytical tools. Both state and municipal governments are making substantial efforts in this direction, partly with the support of the World Bank, and they include a follow up survey to the UPP impact evaluation baseline, as well as the development of a territorially based monitoring and evaluation system. These instruments should incorporate some of the findings identified in this report.

### *As a corollary of the report...*

**We would like to highlight what has arguably been UPP's greatest accomplishment—i.e., opening up a space for the imagination of daily life in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro that is not dictated by the powers of the drug trade.** The very endurance and improvement of the UPP in time and space will deepen this effect, encouraging favela residents to move on with their lives *as if* there were no drug trade and, in so doing, progressively undermining drug trafficking's hold upon community life, livelihoods, and future expectations. The dream is that, as a result, Rio de Janeiro will one day have the proud distinction of being not only one of the most beautiful cities in the world, but also one of the safest and most integrated ones.

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## Annex I - Profile of Case Studies<sup>65</sup>

Favela	Pavão-Pavãozinho / Cantagalo	ChapéuMangueira / Babilônia	Borel	Complexo de Manguinhos
Location (neighborhood/Zone)	Ipanema & Copacabana // South Zone	Leme // South Zone	Tijuca // North Zone	Manguinhos, Benfica, Bonsucesso, Bairro Oswaldo Cruz // North Zone
Population	10,338 (IPP, 2000); 9,000 (community estimate)	3,740 (IPP, 2010) 6,000 (community estimate)	12,815 (IPP, 2010)	31,432 (PAC household census, 2010)
Social Development Index (IDS) <sup>67</sup> [2010]-*Reference: City of Rio de Janeiro 0.604	0.492	0.510	0.468	0.473 (data from IBGE 2000)
Size	125.000 m <sup>2</sup>	124.000 m <sup>2</sup>	362.000 m <sup>2</sup>	2.128.000 m <sup>2</sup>
Urban Growth Rate	4.76%	1.53 % (Chapéu) // 0.98 % (Babilônia)	-0.9 % (community decreased in size)	As a complex of favelas, individual communities have grown and reduced in size over the past decades.
Topography	Hillside	Hillside	Hillside	Flat
Date of Settlement	1907 (Cantagalo) / 1931 (Pavão-Pavãozinho)	1911 (Babilônia) & 1920 (Chapéu)	1921	Earliest settlement in 1901, most recent in 2002. Most between the 1950s and 1980s.

UPP	Pavão-Pavãozinho / Cantagalo	ChapéuMangueira / Babilônia	Borel	Complexo de Manguinhos
UPP starts	December 23, 2009	June 10, 2009	June 7, 2010	
Details of BOPE occupation	BOPE entered the community Monday November 30, 2009 with <i>caveirões</i> , two helicopters, and gunfights. Tuesday afternoon the traffic gave orders to surrounding commerce in Copacabana and Ipanema to close, a bus was burned on Avenida Nossa Senhora de Copacabana, and a handmade bomb or grenade was set off in Copacabana close to police officers.	BOPE entered the community on May 15, 2009. The occupation lasted almost one month.	Not violent. Notice was given that BOPE would enter to create a UPP.	

65 The Social Development Index (*Índice de Desenvolvimento Social*, IDS) is an indicator calculated by Instituto Pereira Passos based on data from the national census collected by IBGE. The indicator is composed of data related to (i) access to adequate water system, (ii) access to adequate sewage system, (iii) garbage collection, (iv) conditions of land occupation (% of homes owned), (v) and education (% of illiterate population above 15 years old). This indicator goes from 0 to 1, zero representing the least socially developed, and one the highest.

UPP	Pavão-Pavãozinho / Cantagalo	Chapéu Mangueira / Babilônia	Borel	Complexo de Mangueiras
Number of officers	176	100	380 (across 7 communities with 20,000 residents)	
Communities served by the UPP in this favela	Pavão-Pavãozinho/ Morro do Cantagalo	Chapéu Mangueira/ Babilônia	Borel, Indiana, Morro do Cruz, Bananal, Casa Branca, Chácara do Céu, Catrambi	
Launch of UPP Social (date of UPP Social Forum)	August 26, 2011	August 12, 2011	July 7, 2011	
Prior and current urban upgrading programs	<i>Favela Bairro</i> PAC (2007)	<i>Bairrinho</i>	<i>Favela Bairro</i>	One favela in the complex, Comunidade Agrícola de Higienópolis had <i>Bairrinho</i> . PAC (2008)
Faction that commanded the favela	Comando Vermelho	Comando Vermelho	Mixed across 7 communities	Comando Vermelho