

Document of  
the World Bank

Report No: ICR1943

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT  
(TF-91947)

ON A

GRANT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR49.4 MILLION  
(US\$ 76.1 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

Republic of BENIN

FOR A

Education For All-Fast Track Initiative Program (P110576)

Dec 14, 2012

AFTEW  
Benin  
AFRVP

## CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(as of Nov 1, 2012)

Currency Unit	=	FCFA
505CFA	=	US\$1
\$US 00.649817	=	SDR 1

## FISCAL YEAR

January 1	–	December 31
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## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AFAM	Administrative, Financial and Accounting Manual
ABC	Budget Support ( <i>Appui budgétaire commun</i> )
AFC	<i>Arrangement de Financement Commun</i>
AFD	French Development Agency ( <i>Agence Française de Développement</i> )
AOI	International Competitive Bidding ( <i>Appel d’offres international</i> )
APL	Adaptable Lending Program
ASTER	Financial Accounting System
BCEAO	Central Bank of West-African States ( <i>Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest</i> )
CAA	<i>Caisse autonome d’amortissement</i>
CDD	Community-Driven Development
CEM	Country Economic Memorandum
CFAA	Country Financial Accountability Assessment
CGRES	Environmental Assessment Management Framework ( <i>Cadre de Gestion des Risques Environnementaux et Sociaux</i> )
CEAP	Teacher Certification
CMA	Contract Management Agency
CNRMP	<i>Commission Nationale de Regulation des Marchés Publics</i>
CPMC	<i>Cellule de Passation des Marchés Communaux</i>
CPMP	<i>Cellule de Passation des Marchés Publics</i>
CPAR	Country Performance Assistance Review ( <i>Rapport d’évaluation du système national de passation de marchés publics</i> )
CPPD	<i>Comité de Pilotage du Plan Décennal</i> (Ten-Year Program Steering Committee)
CPR	Resettlement Action Plan ( <i>Cadre de Politique de Réinstallation</i> )
CSPD	<i>Comité de Supervision du Plan Décennal</i>
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DIVI	Internal audit units
DO	Development Objective
DNMP	<i>Direction Nationale des Marchés Publics</i>
DOS	Document d’Orientations Stratégiques
DPEF	Regional Directorate of National Education ( <i>Direction du Projet Education et Formation</i> )

DRFM	Directorate for Financial and Material Management ( <i>Direction des Ressources Financières et du Matériel</i> )
EA	Environmental Assessment
ENI	Teacher Training Institute (Ecole Normale d'Instituteurs)
ETFP	<i>Enseignement Technique et Formation Professionnelle</i>
FCB	Pooled Fund ( <i>Fonds Commun Budgétaire</i> )
FCFA	Franc of the West-African Financial Community
FMa	Financial Monitoring Assessment
FMR	Financial Monitoring Reports
FTE	Full-time equivalent
FTI	Fast-Track Initiative
GBAR	Government's Policy Framework for Budget Management
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GER	Gross Enrollment Ratio
IAS	International Accounting Standards
ICB	International Competitive Bidding
ICT	Information and Communications Technologies
IDB	Islamic Development Bank
IFR	Interim Unaudited Financial Report
IGF-IGE	Central Internal Audit Office
INSAE	National Statistical Institute
ISR	Implementation Status Reports
KfW	German Cooperation Agency ( <i>Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau</i> )
MAPLN	Ministry of Literacy and National Languages ( <i>Ministère de l'Alphabétisation et de la Promotion des Langues</i> )
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MEPDAP	Ministry of Economy, Prospective, Development and Public Action ( <i>Ministère de l'Economie, de la Prospective, du Développement et de l'Action publique</i> )
MEMP	Ministère des Enseignements Maternel et Primaire
MESTFP	Ministry of Secondary Education and Vocational Training ( <i>Ministère de l'Enseignement secondaire et technique et de la formation professionnelle</i> )
MTEF	Medium-term Expenditure Framework
MIS	Management Information System
MOD	Delegation of works to contract management agencies ( <i>Maitrise d'ouvrage déléguée</i> )
NCB	National Competitive Bidding
OED	Operations Evaluation Department
PAAB	<i>Plan d'Action Annuel Budgétisé</i>
PAM	World Food Programme ( <i>Programme Alimentaire Mondial</i> )
PCA	<i>Programme de cours accéléré</i>
PCC	Program Coordination Committee
PEFA	Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
PIM	Project Implementation Manual
PNDCC	National Community-Driven Development Project
PPDSE	Plan Décennal de Développement du Secteur de l'Education

PRSC	Poverty Assessment Support Credit
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSR	Project Supervision Report
RESEN	State Report on National Education ( <i>Rapport d'étât sur l'éducation nationale</i> )
SBD	Standard Bidding Documents
SCRIP	Growth Strategy for Poverty Reduction
SFQC	Quality and Cost-Based Selection ( <i>Sélection fondée sur la qualité et le coût</i> )
SIGFIP	Integrated Financial Management Systems
SOE	Statement of Expenditures
SWAp	Sector-wide Approach
UGP	Program Management Unit ( <i>Unité de gestion du Projet</i> )
WFP	World Food Program ( <i>PAM</i> in French)

Vice President: Makhtar Diop  
 Country Director: Madani Tall  
 Sector Manager: Peter Materu  
 Project Team Leader: Hyacinthe Gbaye  
 ICR Author: Simon Thacker

**Country: BENIN**  
**Project name:**  
**Education for All – Fast Track Initiative Program**  
**(P110576)**

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A. Basic Information			
Country:	Benin	Project Name:	Education For All-Fast Track Initiative Program
Project ID:	P110576	L/C/TF Number(s):	TF-91947
ICR Date:	12/14/2012	ICR Type:	Core ICR
Lending Instrument:	SIL	Grantee:	REPUBLIC OF BENIN
Original Total Commitment:	USD 76.10M	Disbursed Amount:	USD 75.11M
Revised Amount:	USD 76.10M		
<b>Environmental Category: B</b>			
<b>Implementing Agencies:</b>			
Ministries of primary education and literacy			
<b>Co-financiers and Other External Partners:</b>			
FTI			

B. Key Dates				
Process	Date	Process	Original Date	Revised / Actual Date(s)
Concept Review:	03/14/2008	Effectiveness:	12/15/2008	12/16/2008
Appraisal:	03/07/2008	Restructuring(s):		06/17/2010 12/19/2011
Approval:	05/23/2007	Mid-term Review:		
		Closing:	06/20/2010	06/15/2012

C. Ratings Summary	
C.1 Performance Rating by ICR	
Outcomes:	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome:	Moderate
Bank Performance:	Moderately Satisfactory
Grantee Performance:	Moderately Unsatisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)			
Bank	Ratings	Borrower	Ratings
Quality at Entry:	Moderately Satisfactory	Government:	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Quality of Supervision:	Moderately Satisfactory	Implementing	Moderately

		Agency/Agencies:	Unsatisfactory
<b>Overall Bank Performance:</b>	Moderately Satisfactory	<b>Overall Borrower Performance:</b>	Moderately Unsatisfactory

<b>C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators</b>			
<b>Implementation Performance</b>	<b>Indicators</b>	<b>QAG Assessments (if any)</b>	<b>Rating</b>
Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	No	Quality at Entry (QEA):	None
Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	Yes	Quality of Supervision (QSA):	None
DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:	Moderately Satisfactory		

<b>D. Sector and Theme Codes</b>		
	<b>Original</b>	<b>Actual</b>
<b>Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)</b>		
Primary education	100	100
<b>Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)</b>		
Education for all	100	100

<b>E. Bank Staff</b>		
<b>Positions</b>	<b>At ICR</b>	<b>At Approval</b>
Vice President:	Makhtar Diop	Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili
Country Director:	Madani M. Tall	Antonella Bassani
Sector Manager:	Peter Nicolas Materu	Eva Jarawan
Project Team Leader:	Hyacinthe Gbaye	William Experton
ICR Team Leader:	Hyacinthe Gbaye	
ICR Primary Author:	Simon Thacker	

## **F. Results Framework Analysis**

### **Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)**

The proposed Grant will contribute to expanding equitable access to pre-school and primary education and to supporting the development of literacy programs, while improving quality and retention at primary level as well as the management of the sector.



## Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)

### (a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
<b>Indicator 1 :</b>	Primary Education Completion Rate (total/girls)			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	65/54%	85/79%	68/60%	71.5/65.8%
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/15/2012	06/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Revised end of project target surpassed			
<b>Indicator 2 :</b>	Gross Enrolment Rate (GER) in preschool			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	4.5%	10%	10%	12.3%
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/15/2012	06/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	End-of-project exceeded			
<b>Indicator 3 :</b>	GER in primary education			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	93%	104%	112%	119%
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/15/2012	06/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Revised end of project target surpassed			
<b>Indicator 4 :</b>	Repetition rates			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	7.5%	10%	10%	12%
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/15/2012	06/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	End of project target was not met. However, there was a significant improvement in the last year and it is expected that actions will continue			
<b>Indicator 5 :</b>	Female students			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	44%	47%	47.5%	46.9%
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/15/2012	06/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	End of project target was not met. However, there was a grow in the number of female students			

<b>Indicator 6 :</b>	Number of people to pass a test in initial literacy or post-literacy training			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	23613	65000	51000	108703
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/15/2012	06/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	End of project target surpassed. The number of people who passed successfully the initial test resulting from project intervention was 35181. 73522 persons were financed by the government with its own resources. PAD baseline value of 33769 was wrong			
<b>Indicator 7 :</b>	Direct project beneficiaries			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	New at restructuring	NA (New at restructuring)	1730401	1750000
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/15/2012	06/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	This is a CORE indicator which was introduced at the first restructuring. The baseline in June 2010 was 1606946. The target was reached			
<b>Indicator 8 :</b>	Female beneficiaries			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	New at restructuring	NA (New at restructuring)	48%	48.2%
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/15/2012	06/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	This is a CORE indicator which was introduced at the first restructuring. The baseline in June 2010 was 46%. The target was reached			
<b>Indicator 9 :</b>	Percentage of students enrolled in private schools			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	13%	12%	NA (dropped at restructuring)	14.6%
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/17/2010	06/30/2011
Comments (incl. % achievement)	The target was not achieved.			
<b>Indicator 10 :</b>	Student -teacher ratio (public)			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	47	49	NA (dropped at restructuring)	47.9
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/17/2010	06/30/2011
Comments (incl. % achievement)	End of project target exceeded in June 2011. Data for SY 2011/12 were not available			
<b>Indicator 11 :</b>	Percentage of schools with student teacher ratios higher than 70 or lower than 40 (public)			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	42	0	NA (dropped at restructuring)	44.5
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/17/2010	06/30/2011
Comments	There was no improvement in the teachers' allocation. The initial situation has			

(incl. % achievement)	worsened, far from the target.			
<b>Indicator 12 :</b>	Gap between the student- teacher ratios of the extreme departments (publics)			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	9	1	NA (dropped at restructuring)	Not available
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/17/2010	06/30/2011
Comments (incl. % achievement)	There was no follow-up of this indicator			
<b>Indicator 13 :</b>	textbook-student ratio (reading and math, public)			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	1.6	2	NA (dropped at restructuring)	1.93
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/17/2010	06/30/2011
Comments (incl. % achievement)	The target was almost reached in June 2011. Data of SY 2011/12 are not yet available			
<b>Indicator 14 :</b>	Percentage of qualified teachers			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	To be determined	To be determined	NA (dropped at restructuring)	60.1%
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/17/2010	06/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	The value of this indicator was 45.0% in 2006. 7971 teachers out of 9970 who received the three-year in-service training passed successfully the final exam in June 2012. This figure will be reflected in the 2012/13 data			
<b>Indicator 15 :</b>	Percentage of CP and CM1 student who receive passing grades in math, reading and writing			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	To be determined	To be determined	NA (dropped at restructuring)	In public (i) at grade 2 : 28 % in reading, , and 18 % in mathematics; and (ii) at Grade 5: 12 % in reading, and 11 % in mathematics
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/17/2010	06/30/2011
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Learning outcomes in primary education are very low in public schools. The situation is better in private schools according to available data			
<b>Indicator 16 :</b>	Percentage of the State budget for education			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	19.5%	24.4%	NA (dropped at restructuring)	31.1%
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/17/2010	12/31/2010
Comments (incl. % achievement)	End-of-project target exceeded. The education budget allocation has increased since 2010			

<b>Indicator 17 :</b>	Percentage of the education budget for primary			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	47.5	47	NA (dropped at restructuring)	49%
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/17/2010	12/31/2010
Comments (incl. % achievement)	End-of-project target exceeded in 2010.			
<b>Indicator 18 :</b>	Survival rate			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	60%	77%	NA (dropped at restructuring)	Non available
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/17/2010	06/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	This indicator was no longer monitored			

**(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)**

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
<b>Indicator 1 :</b>	Number of classrooms built or rehabilitated ( resulting from project intervention)			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	2015	1926	2613
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/17/2010	06/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	End-of-project target exceeded .			
<b>Indicator 2 :</b>	Number of latrines constructed			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	440	324	486
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/17/2010	06/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	End-of-project target exceeded .			
<b>Indicator 3 :</b>	Number of girls and women literates in national languages			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	480245	28940	16448
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/17/2010	06/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	The original target included the total number of girls and women since the beginning of literacy training program in the country. At the restructuring, it was agreed to have indicator tied to project interventions. The revised target was not reached.			

<b>Indicator 4 :</b>	Number of overage children enrolled in accelerated programs (Programme de Cours Accéléré (PCA)			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	1800	NA (dropped at restructuring)	NA
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/17/2010	06/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Activity no longer included in the project			
<b>Indicator 5 :</b>	Number of new schools using multi-grade teaching			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	360	NA (dropped at restructuring)	NA
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/17/2010	06/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Activity no longer included in the project			
<b>Indicator 6 :</b>	Number of canteens receiving food supply financed by the program			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	180	501	501
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/17/2010	06/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Revised end-of -project target reached. Instead of creating new canteens , it was agreed to support a daily nutrition assistance in pre-primary and primary public schools in existing canteens after the end of other donors financing			
<b>Indicator 7 :</b>	Pre-school and Primary school students receiving one meal per day			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	NA (new at restructuring)	110000	127239
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/17/2010	06/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	End-of-project target exceeded.			
<b>Indicator 8 :</b>	Number of community teachers benefiting from training to obtain a CEAP (3-year training)			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	3940	10000	9916
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/17/2010	06/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	The government has decided to train all the community teachers. Therefore the indicator was revised at the restructuring. 99% of end-of-project target reached			
<b>Indicator 9 :</b>	Classes visited by Inspectors and Educational Advisers			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	6%	60%	40%	65.9%
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/17/2010	06/30/2011
Comments	Data of SY 2011/12 was not available. However, considering the SY 2020/11			

(incl. % achievement)	data, the target was reached			
<b>Indicator 10 :</b>	Schools having received learning materials			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	NA ( new at restructuring)	5763	8059
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/17/2010	06/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	This activity has been introduced at the restructuring. The end-of- project target exceeded			
<b>Indicator 11 :</b>	Number of classes experimenting with national language teaching			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	72	NA (dropped at the restructuring)	NA
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/17/2010	06/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	This activity has been dropped from the project at the restructuring			
<b>Indicator 12 :</b>	Number of schools using TIC , on an experimental basis			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	12	NA (dropped at the restructuring)	NA
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/17/2010	06/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	This activity has been dropped from the project at the restructuring			
<b>Indicator 13 :</b>	Number of literacy centers equipped with teaching materials			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	200	NA (dropped at the restructuring)	NA
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/17/2010	06/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	The literacy training has been delegated to NGOs. The equipment of the centers was part of the contract of the NGOs			
<b>Indicator 14 :</b>	Number of textbooks purchased and distributed			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	1580000	NA (dropped at the restructuring)	NA (dropped at the restructuring)
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/17/2010	06/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	This activity has been dropped from the project because at the restructuring the government provided more than 2 million of textbooks to students			
<b>Indicator 15 :</b>	In service teacher training			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	NA (new at the restructuring)	16000	52255
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/17/2010	06/15/2012
Comments	End-of-project target surpassed.			

(incl. % achievement)				
<b>Indicator 16 :</b>	Implementation of a computerized framework			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	No	NA (new at the restructuring)	Computerized framework set up	Computerized framework available
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/17/2010	06/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Revised end-of- project target reached			
<b>Indicator 17 :</b>	Implementation of an information management system			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	No	The environmental atlas of this system is realized	NA (dropped at the restructuring)	NA
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/17/2010	06/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	At the second restructuring this indicator has been changed by the implementation of a computerized framework considering the delay.			
<b>Indicator 18 :</b>	Number of central ministry staff trained			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	120	100	454
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/17/2010	06/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	End-of project target surpassed			
<b>Indicator 19 :</b>	System for learning assessment (primary level)			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	No	NA (new at the restructuring-CORE indicator)	Yes (in place)	Yes (in place)
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/17/2010	06/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	End-of- project target reached			
<b>Indicator 20 :</b>	Use of learning system (primary level)			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	No	NA (new at the restructuring-CORE indicator)	Yes (established and in use)	Yes (established and in use)
Date achieved	06/30/2006	06/20/2010	06/17/2010	06/15/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	End-of- project target reached			

## G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs


No.	Date ISR Archived	DO	IP	Actual Disbursements (USD millions)
1	06/24/2008	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.00
2	09/16/2008	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.00
3	12/04/2008	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.00
4	06/11/2009	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	21.32
5	12/23/2009	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	21.32
6	06/30/2010	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	24.85
7	01/19/2011	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	31.51
8	08/27/2011	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	46.40
9	12/20/2011	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	62.28
10	06/16/2012	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	69.81

## H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring Date(s)	Board Approved PDO Change	ISR Ratings at Restructuring		Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in USD millions	Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made
		DO	IP		
06/17/2010	N	MU	MU	21.32	The project design was too complex, calling on too many actors to work in coordination, and included too many activities to be carried out in the relatively short time frame of three years. The restructuring would enable the project to reach its objective and ensure the completion of the remaining activities. Two activities were introduced or modified and 5 activities were dropped from the project. As a result, some indicators have been dropped and new indicators introduced.
12/19/2011		MS	MS	62.28	Extra six months requested to finish activities; slight change in component 3



## I. Disbursement Profile





## **Section 1: Project Context, Development Objectives and Design**

### **Context at Appraisal**

#### **Country Context**

1. Located in West Africa in the Gulf of Guinea next to Nigeria, Benin is a small nation with a per capita income of US\$540 in 2006. A poor country, it was ranked 163 out of 177 countries according to the 2006 Human Development Report. The country's population of 7.6 million was characterized by rapid demographic growth (3.0%) and a young age structure: in 2006, the 0-14 year age group represented 44% of the total population.
2. Benin launched its first Poverty Reduction Strategy in 2003 laying out a strategy for private sector-led growth, strengthening governance and institutional capacity, human capital development, and participation of the poor in the development process. The World Bank supported this strategy with three PRSCs (PRSC 1-3). With regard to education, these PRSCs emphasized increased access, completion, and quality in the basic education program, as well as improving efficiency in the management of basic education services. Concrete measures addressed curriculum revision, teacher training and recruitment, and classroom organization, as well as education demand (through targeted programs for girls and the poor).
3. Under the leadership of President Dr. Thomas Boni Yayi, elected in March 2006 (and reelected in 2011), Benin has embarked on a series of reforms with a development strategy designed to modernize public services and provide a competitive environment for the private sector. Government has acknowledged the factors constraining the economy from reaching greater growth: a lack of competitiveness, an undiversified economy subject to external shocks, and a need for quality basic services to raise the caliber of human resources.

#### **Sector Issues**

4. In 2006, the Government endorsed a Ten-Year Education Plan (*Plan Décennal de Développement du Secteur de L'Education – PDDSE*) that provided the framework for achieving agreed education outcomes, using a common set of measurable benchmarks to track progress and harmonize donors' commitment to predictable long term financing. The main objectives of the Government's strategy included: (i) improving service delivery to increase access, equality, retention, and learning achievement in basic education, the promotion of girls' education, and the training and recruitment of qualified teachers; (ii) strengthening the governance and efficiency of the education system through a better management and redeployment of teaching staff, more efficient financing and management of schools, and better academic and administrative support; and (iii) re-orienting post primary education and training in order to better respond to the skills needs of a more diversified economy.

5. Preparatory studies showed that substantial progress had been made in primary education over the course of the years prior to the project. This progress is captured by increased access, with GER for primary improving from 90% in 2002 to 93% in 2006, and the percentage of female students rising from 42% to 44.4% in the same period, as well as vastly improved school completion rates (from 47 to 65% between 2002-2006 for all students, and 34-54% for girls). Additionally, the repetition rate dropped, from 21% of public school students in 2003/4 to 16% in 2005/6. These advances resulted from, among other things, regular budget increases for the sector, the hiring of new teachers in accordance with PRSC targets, and measures to ensure no school fees at the primary level.
6. Despite this progress, Benin continued to face difficulties regarding equity in access and quality of education. National figures masked significant disparities, by sex, geography and income level, due partly to the uneven distribution of human and material resources among schools. Furthermore, students' mastery of programs was weak, and data from 2004/5 learning assessments put Benin among the worst performers in the sub-region (average math grade for fifth graders was 32.6; average French grade was 28.2). The reasons for this include: (i) the use of under- or unqualified teachers, often paid by parents at the community level (community teachers comprised 36% of all teachers in 2005-6); (ii) the deterioration of the student-teacher ratio from 40 in 1992-3 to 47 in 2005-6; (iii) textbook-student ratios that fell short of targets (1.16 in 2006-5-6); (iv) lack of school inspection and performance monitoring; and (v) poor infrastructure (30.8% of schools made of non-permanent materials). These problems, which characterized the entire system, are especially relevant for girls, children in rural areas, and above all, the poor. Poverty remains the primary hindrance for children in accessing and completing primary education. The illiteracy rate remains high, especially among women and in poor areas, and adult education programs face severe problems of quality. Finally, the GER in pre-school (public, parochial, and private) was a mere 3.6% in 2005-6, with none but the wealthiest children having access. To get a clearer picture of these quality-related issues, a learning assessment of students was to be undertaken in 2009<sup>1</sup>, and repeated in 2011, to assess the progress made.
7. The system was also beleaguered by issues of poor management. Implementation capacity in the Ministries of Education – notably budget execution – was weak, and there was no functioning information management system or school map. As a result, there was little performance monitoring at school or student level, and teachers were inefficiently distributed: in 2005-6, for example, 40% of schools had student-teacher ratios that were either below 40 or above 70. Given the growth rate of the teaching staff – 1500 new teachers being hired every year – human resource management was becoming an increasingly critical issue.

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<sup>1</sup> The 2009 assessment could not be carried out.

## **Rationale for Grant**

8. On the basis of the Government's March 2007 application, the EFA-FTI Catalytic Fund Strategy Committee approved, in May 2007, a USD 76.1 million grant for Benin for the period 2007-2009. Benin's application to the Fund followed endorsement of the Government's PDDSE by local education donors (December 2006). During the endorsement process, some members of the donor group (DANIDA, AFD, and KfW) expressed interest in pooling their funds with those of the Catalytic Fund and moving toward sector budget support. The rationale behind this decision was that it would improve the efficiency of their support for the PDDSE, while also reducing transaction costs for Government, in line with the Paris Declaration of 2005.
9. The general objective of the FTI/FCB program is to contribute to the Government's program for ensuring education for all by 2015, while the greater goal of the program is, by strengthening the education system, to contribute to enhancing the value of human capital and so lay the foundations for medium- and long-term economic growth (SCR Pillar 3).

## **Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators**

10. "The proposed grant will contribute to expanding equitable access to pre-school and primary education and to supporting the development of literacy programs, while improving quality and retention at primary level as well as the management of the sector."

## **Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification**

11. In the second restructuring that extended closing by 6 months, from Dec 31, 2011 to June 15, 2012, though no changes were made to the PDO, changes were made to component 3. Given the imminent closing, the team proposed to modify the following activities under Component 3: (i) exclude from the project the external evaluation of the efficacy of certain pedagogical interventions; and (ii) reduce the number of activities related to the setting up of the entire Information Management System (IMS) to just those related to putting in place a computerized framework.. As a consequence, only one was kept, the establishment of the Information Management System (IMS). In addition, one PDO indicator was modified, the primary education completion rate, which was adjusted down from 72 to 68% and from 65 to 60% for girls. One intermediate indicator was modified as well, the implementation of an information management system, the indicator being changed from "Purchase of equipment and staff training completed" to "a computerized framework is in place."

## **Main Beneficiaries**

12. The total number of beneficiaries is given as 1,750,000 as of SY 2010/2011, 48.24% of which are girls. This figure is given in the latest 2012 GoB statistics (see *Annexe SE 4: Situation des indicateurs du programme FTI-FCB*). As no breakdown is given, one must

infer that this figure represents all primary students. However, since there are other beneficiaries, the following table summarizes beneficiaries of each project component.

	<b>Beneficiaries</b>
Component 1	<p>The pre-school and primary school students affected by the construction and equipping of 2,613 classrooms, 486 blocks of toilets annexed to schools, 45 literacy centers, and the rehabilitation of 54 classrooms in preschool and primary schools.</p> <p>Girls account for 48.24% of the 1,750,000 beneficiaries (844, 200); Number of girls and women having benefitted from literacy training stands at 16,448 as of SY 2011/12</p> <p>The estimated 13,500 students benefitting from the introduction of school cafeterias in the region of Zou and the estimated 113,500 students benefitting from canteens previously financed by the WFP</p>
Component 2	<p>Teachers and management personnel benefitting from training</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(i) In-service teacher training for 46,196 teachers;</li> <li>(ii) Specific certificate training for community teachers 9916 (7971 successfully obtain their CEAP);</li> <li>(iii) Training of primary-level school inspectors.</li> </ul> <p>The students in 8059 schools who benefitted from the transfer of subsidies intended to acquire learning materials;</p> <p>Training for 425 literacy trainers and 100 literacy-related personnel;</p> <p>Literacy training for 54040 adults using the 'faire-faire' approach.</p>
Component 3	<p>The 454 Ministerial staff directly benefitting from technical capacity strengthening, including those who were to set up the computerized framework.</p>

### **Original Components**

13. The project was divided into three main components: (1) Improving Access, Equity, and Retention; (2) Improving Quality of Teaching and Literacy Training; (3) Improving Management and Steering of the System. There were 12 subcomponents as follows:
14. **Component 1. Improving Access, Equity, and Retention (US\$48 million)** by: (i) constructing, rehabilitating, and equipping educational infrastructure (more than 2000 pre-school and primary classrooms, 45 literacy centers, and 12 alternative education centers), (ii) providing literacy training for girls and women, and developing national programs for girls' education and for children with special needs; (iii) supporting an experimental program for alternative accelerated education for overage children; (iv)

extending multi-grade teaching and the use of sub-cycles; and (v) developing new primary school canteens.

**15. Component 2. Improving Quality of Teaching and Literacy Training (US\$18.7 million)** by: (i) supporting implementation of programs based on the ‘competence approach’; (ii) strengthening the qualifications of teachers and management personnel with training and support to training institutions; (iii) introducing, on an experimental basis, national languages into the education system; (iv) purchasing and distributing textbooks, teachers’ guides, and school supplies for pre-school and primary school; and (v) improving literacy by elaborating new programs and materials, training literacy trainers and personnel, and providing literacy training to 52,000 adults using the ‘faire-faire’ approach (contracting out to NGOs).

**16. Component 3. Improving Management and Steering of the System (US\$9.5 million)** by: (i) improving pedagogical and institutional management with the use of student learning assessments, results-based management systems, and external evaluations of the efficacy of certain pedagogical interventions; and (ii) building management capacity within the PDDSE structures in order to improve the sector’s planning, programming, procurement, financial management, and monitoring and evaluation capacity, and putting in place an information management system with a school map.

### **Revised Components**

17. The project was restructured twice: In June 2010, a level two restructuring took place: the closing date was moved to December 31, 2011, and, though the PDO of the project remained unchanged, some components (considered unachievable) were dropped, and the excessive number of PDO indicators (14), which made it difficult to assess progress towards the achievement of the PDO, were reduced to six. These were more focused and closely aligned with project components.

18. In December 2011, the closing date was extended by another six months to June 15, 2012, and, though the PDO remained the same, changes were made to component 3. Given the imminent closing, the team proposed to drop all unachievable activities. As a consequence, only one was kept, the establishment of the Information Management System (IMS). In addition, one PDO indicator was modified, the primary education completion rate, which was adjusted down from 72 to 68% and from 65 to 60% for girls. One intermediate indicator was modified as well, the “Implementation of an Information Management System”, the indicator being changed from “purchase of equipment and staff training completed” to “a computerized framework is in place.”

### **Other significant changes**

19. During the first restructuring, the program was “refocused on the activities which contribute significantly to the achievement of the PDO and can be realistically achieved by the new closing date in order to reduce complexity and facilitate implementation.” (from ISR sequence No.6). While the changes involved the introduction of two new activities (the direct support to school operating costs and to nutrition assistance

programs), five others were eliminated (which would nevertheless continue to be covered by the program).<sup>2</sup>

## **Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes**

### **Section 2. Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry**

20. **Project Preparation.** Relevant counterparts in government worked closely with the Bank and partners to prepare this project. Adequate participatory processes were in place. Four factors can be cited in this context:
21. The **background analysis** supporting the project was good: the rationale for Bank intervention was sound, lessons learned from earlier projects were incorporated<sup>3</sup>, and thorough assessments of the Government's FM and Procurement capacity were carried out, both by Bank entities and by the EFA/FTI Catalytic Fund Office. While several important caveats were placed on the government's capacity in these two important domains, the systems were judged to be 'adequate', provided there was training and certain conditions were met (those in the conditions of effectiveness)<sup>4</sup>.
22. **Assessment of project design:** The objectives were sound and perfectly in line with government goals, the MDGs, and the programmatic approach agreed on by all donors in Benin. The three project components were appropriately identified. With the amount in question (US\$76.1million from the Bank alone), the WB project, as part of the larger harmonized program, was meant to be ambitious and include a number of activities in many education sub-sectors. However, what was not easy to anticipate was how this project would be received and acted upon by a Government that was understood to have weak implementing capacity, poor inter-ministerial coordination, and no experience of such sizeable projects. Critics might claim that the project design was in fact too complex,

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<sup>2</sup> The activities no longer included in the project are the following: (i) a national program for girls education and children with special needs; (ii) the experimental program for alternative accelerated education for overage children; (iii) the extension of multi-grade teaching and the use of sub-cycles; (iv) the introduction on an experimental basis of national languages into the education system; and (v) the provision of textbooks.

<sup>3</sup> Some of these lessons related to the use of project management agencies for construction, and the adoption of decentralized approaches for teacher training and canteens.

<sup>4</sup> The conditions for effectiveness included: A ministerial decree establishing the program management unit is signed, and the unit is fully staffed and operational; Conventions that are fully satisfactory to all donor partners are signed with the agencies to be used for school construction; an Operations Manual is validated by the Government and donor partners; The Designated Account is opened at BCEAO; Evaluation of the agencies proposed for school construction (for the agencies that have not yet been evaluated); The recipient has recruited the independent auditors for the program; The Joint Financing Agreement has been signed by Government and all donor partners. PAD, p.13.



calling on many actors to work in coordination and including too many activities to be carried out in the relatively short time frame of three years.

23. **Adequacy of government commitment.** Before the elections, the Government worked closely with donors to prepare the project; after it, however, the new government did not re-engage on this project -- at least not at first and not quickly enough. Only as the end of the project came into sight, did the Government seek ways to expedite all activities.
24. **Assessment of risks.** A number of risks were clearly and correctly identified in the PAD (p.11), all of which, but one, were rated as **substantial**; however, the measures put in place to mitigate them did not always succeed. These risks included the risk of political reorganization in ministries, the involvement and interaction of four ministries, weak financial management, weak (in procurement, financial management, and monitoring and controlling budget execution), weak absorption capacity of external funding, and weak capacity to monitor the quality of education and effectiveness of education activities. While measures were given to mitigate these risks, it takes great foresight and experience to establish successful measures. The risks to this project were great enough that these provisions should have been better planned, more realistic, and achievable.

## **Implementation**

25. Implementation was slow to begin. Once underway though, significant progress was made. On the side of government, exogenous factors, such as a change of government as the project began, and endogenous factors in the form of weak capacity of various sorts, would explain this; on the side of the Bank, one might fairly contend that the Bank did not do enough to assist the government in finding corrective measures to overcome many of the preliminary obstacles encountered. After all, delays of more than 12 months, at the outset of an operation, to allow a counterpart to put into place the relevant units, systems, and organizations that are needed is neither practical nor realistic given the project's initial timeframe (of three years), and becomes the responsibility of government and donors. That said, the Bank did show great determination in assisting government in resolving the procedural difficulties of various sorts that arose. At one point, for example, the Bank solicited the help of Benin's President's office to help move the agenda forward.
26. To be fair, significant disbursements (more than 70% for infrastructure) were made during the first year, but from the state budget instead of the project budget, and these did not align with accepted procurement procedures. As a result, these missteps caused government confidence to drop and commitment to implementation to falter. It took some time for stakeholders to correct these initial false starts.
27. During the period covered by the first three ISRs, overall project implementation was rated as Satisfactory. The author of this ICR must concur however with the manager's conclusion in the third ISR that this rating was unacceptable, given that no disbursement had begun, and so the rating should have been Unsatisfactory. In 2007, at the outset of the project, all those in government who had been involved in the design of the project were replaced following the national elections of 2006. Institutional memory was lost.

28. The new members of government were not familiar with the project design or requirements and poor inter-ministerial coordination and weak capacity persisted. In addition, the creation of the Program Management Unit, one of the conditions for effectiveness, took time to staff and was at first misunderstood; it was believed to be an implementing agency, but its role was in fact to leverage government.
29. Other difficulties became apparent. The government began construction activities without first obtaining the necessary non-objections from the Bank, a course of action which was deemed to be out of line with acceptable procurement procedures. This misstep sapped initial confidence and took some time to overcome.
30. It was only in the second quarter of 2009 that disbursement began, amounting to approximately 28% of the total, a figure that would remain unchanged until mid-2010, during which time the rating given was Moderately Unsatisfactory. The reasons for this slow disbursement lie in the (i) excessive number of small activities, (ii) procurement related delays, and (iii) weak capacity in the ministries concerned. It was at this point that 'project at risk' status was conferred on the project in ISR 4 and 5.
31. The Bank and borrower found ways to overcome these challenges. As a result, in June 2010, restructuring was approved which allowed the project closing date to be extended to December 31, 2011. No mid-term review was carried out because of this. After being at 32.6%, disbursement then began to rise slowly in Q3 and Q4 of 2010 and it was in early 2011 that it finished by climbing steadily. It reached 61% by the end of August when the rating improved to Moderately Satisfactory. By the end of 2011, as disbursement hit 81.8%, a second restructuring was approved to allow closing to be moved back six months in order to allow as many activities as possible to be completed. By project close, 91.7% had been disbursed, a disbursement figure that has climbed to 98% (as of November 2012) as committed activities finish. Many reasons could be cited for this improved disbursement, but one important one was that all government units had begun to work well together. The rating was downgraded in the final ISR to Moderately Unsatisfactory because key indicators of quality and retention, which had already been downgraded at the second restructuring, were not met considering the SY 2010/11 statistical data.

### **Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization**

32. **M&E design in the context of pooled funding mechanisms.** In keeping with the FTI principle of donor harmonization, donors in Benin agreed to enter into a pooled funding mechanism to finance this program. This was one of the strong points of the project. Unlike other donors,<sup>5</sup> the World Bank insisted that attribution be possible -- that whatever FTI funds had financed remain identifiable entities distinguishable from others.

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<sup>5</sup> Other donors are not in a position to distinguish what their contribution has been spent on, except in the broadest terms of categories, and can only state their contribution as a percentage of the total program expenditure.

In addition, appropriate indicators for the FTI project components had to be developed, which became a subset of the greater SWAP program indicators.<sup>6</sup> So, all intermediate indicators are specific to this project. These were not meant to detract from the greater program nor defeat its purpose – and, by all accounts, they did not -- they simply had to be in place to respect WB procurement standards.

33. **Delays and M & E design.** Delays have slowed the monitoring and evaluation of the project,<sup>7</sup> with the result that statistics are not as up to date as possible. Delays at the outset of the program were also unfavorable to the project's intended M&E design. Two national student assessments were meant to be carried out in 2009 and 2011, but the 2009 national student assessment had to be cancelled because the supervising directorate was not in a position to manage it, thereby leaving only the 2011 assessment to be carried out. The 2011 results constitute nevertheless a strong baseline for the follow-up project.
34. Ideally, education data needs to be more precise, able to reflect individual student-, teacher-, class- and school-level variables. Without this, the impact of the project on outcomes cannot be determined accurately; only a broad outline of its impact can be inferred. For a more in-depth discussion see section 3.5 below. Clearly, interventions that aim to improve quality must be monitored closely.

### **Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance**

35. **Safeguard Compliance.** The project was rated 'satisfactory' in two areas -- compliance with the safeguards OP 4.01 Environmental Assessment and OP 4.12 Involuntary Settlement -- a rating that did not waiver over the course of the project. The overall safeguard compliance was rated in this way because the mitigation measures planned in the Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) had been implemented in sites visited during the supervision missions. In addition, the environmental audit was also rated in this way because the PNDCC and the Contract Management Agencies in charge of school construction had also taken measures to comply with the ESMF. An environmental audit was nevertheless requested (and is underway as of December 2012) to give an overall assessment. No other safeguard was impinged upon by the project.
36. **Fiduciary Issues.** Project supervision has regularly shown that the project's financial management arrangements have been adequate and are compliant with the Bank's financial management requirements. There have been concerns regarding weak procurement and so capacity building training was recommended and provided through workshops and conferences. This weakness was due to a number of factors: (i) in this project, procurement was carried out by education units who were not at first familiar with typical Government project management or FTI procedures, which caused

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<sup>6</sup> In this context, it is important to distinguish between 'project' which refers to the FTI project, while 'program' refers to the larger FTI/FCB program.

<sup>7</sup> Delays of up to 8 months were reported in ISR #10

significant delays <sup>8</sup>; (ii) poor inter-ministerial communication and coordination caused delays and bottlenecks (dossiers sent between Ministries, for instance, were not easily traceable); and (iii) complications caused by missing staff or staff turnover related to intergovernmental staff rotation. The WB team remained flexible in the face of these challenges by restructuring the project twice to try and refocus the project on essentials and to extend deadlines so that the implementing agencies could overcome accumulated delays.

37. **Audits and Disbursements.** Audits were carried out as defined in the Grant Agreement. They were qualified, but with qualifications only related to delays in accounting.

### **Post-completion Operation/Next Phase**

38. A follow-up GPE project is currently under preparation, and will be informed by the recommendations and evaluation of this ICR. The proposed components will continue to address access, equity, and retention, though more focus will be placed on sustaining and continuing to improve quality of education services. The follow-on grant would consider a simple project design, realistic objectives and results and implementation arrangements that better reflect the capacity constraints in the sector. The success of the programmatic approach, the work with other donors, deserves to be continued and strengthened.

## **Section 3: Assessment of Outcomes**

### **Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation**

39. The project has highly relevant objectives not only in term of current country strategies (as expressed in the Government's 10 year action plan), the MDGs, with regard to the Bank's CAS and PRSPs, and the donor community's programmatic approach.
40. **The project design exhibited several strong points:** it incorporated a common pool funding mechanism that was successfully implemented, encouraging donor harmonization and minimizing the government's transactional costs; it adopted, as well, the FTI program and procedures that, once understood and used, lent a structure and framework to the implementation of activities. If the design could be faulted, it would be that the design did not lend itself easily enough to implementation. It needed to be better streamlined in order not to contribute to delays. Given that the government had never worked on such a scale in this sector before, the design had to make more realistic assumptions about the adequacy of government capacity. Adding a complex layer of activities to an already busy bureaucracy turned out to be more than challenging.

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<sup>8</sup> As many as 41 steps were reportedly required to obtain approval and disbursement on an activity using traditional Government procedures. The Fast Track procedures curtailed the number of steps significantly, but the two systems co-existed poorly together.

41. If the implementation of this project proved to be onerous at first, the drive towards restructuring by the Bank and the borrower allowed the project to find a way to overcome these challenges: by many accounts, the restructuring was a success and many activities were ultimately achieved.

### **Achievement of Project Development Objectives**

42. The Development Objectives of this project – “to contribute to expanding equitable access to pre-school and primary education and to supporting the development of literacy programs, while improving quality and retention at primary level as well as the management of the sector” – were achieved in very great measure. Almost all indicators were met. This was in part thanks to the restructuring of the project in 2011, which extended the closing date of the project by six months (from December 31, 2011 to June 15, 2012) thereby allowing more components to be finished, and through the revision of component 3, most notably the elimination of certain elements of it that were no longer believed to be attainable, as well as their indicators.
43. **Overall results for the sector were positive, as significant progress was made.** After the second restructuring, there were eight indicators, some with revised targets, selected to measure achievement of the PDO: number of direct project beneficiaries, female beneficiaries (given as a percentage), number of people to pass a literacy test (initial or post literacy), number of female students in school as a percentage, primary education completion rate (total population/girls), GER for pre-primary, GER for primary, and repetition rates. The results can be seen as follows:
44. As we have seen, the project included three major sets of activities related to improving (1) access, equity, and retention; (2) quality of pre-school and primary education and literacy training; (3) management and steering of the system. For a complete review of the project components, sub-components, and activities completed, please see Annex 2.
45. **Component 1.** The overall goal of this component was to improve access to and equity and retention in the sector. Of the US\$ 56.3 million reserved, US\$55.6 million was spent.
46. **Access.** Improvement in access was to be measured by the revised indicator for student enrollment in primary education. Access indicators outpaced the targets set in the Government’s ten-year action plan: the gross enrolment rate (GER) in pre-school increased from 4.5% in 2006/7 to 12.3% in 2012, surpassing the 11% target, while the GER in primary education reached 119.72% in SY2011/12, which surpassed the target of 112%. It is estimated that the annual average growth rate of students in the primary cycle was 5.2% between 2006-7 and 2010-11, an increase of 0.3% from the period 2000-01 to 2005-6 when it lay at 4.9%. It is highly likely that the project contributed to this increase.
47. It might be thought that improved access to pre-school and primary was achieved through the construction of 2613 additional classrooms, (a figure, incidentally, that bettered the final project target of 2191). This may not necessarily be the case: most new classrooms

simply replaced semi-permanent classes (open-air lean-to constructions) that were already on-site at schools, so students simply enjoyed more permanent structures.<sup>9</sup>

48. **Equity.** Plans were in place to target several populations: girls, the poor, as well as illiterate adults. Girls' participation in primary school increased from 44.4% in 2007 to 48.24% in 2012.<sup>10</sup> The building of latrines and the provision of school feeding would have most likely encouraged families to send more girls to school. Provision was also made to offer literacy training for girls and women and to develop programs for girls in national languages: at project end, 28,940 were enrolled in such programs for a target of 29,200.
49. Access to education for the poor has improved throughout the country, generally speaking, albeit with some exceptions. The northern regions still face some difficulties: in the province of Alibori, for instance, the GER was 62% in 2008/09 – over 40% below the national average – and had only climbed marginally by project end. Socioeconomic disparities – while still substantial – have narrowed in recent years, with access to education increasingly democratized.<sup>11</sup>
50. Access to literacy centers was accomplished by building 45 literacy centers with 45 blocks of 2 unit latrines.
51. **Retention.** Retention was to be measured by three indicators: repetition, drop-out and completion rates. Repetition rates remained high through the course of the project and in fact increased at one point before dropping somewhat at project end: from 7.5% in 2006/07, it jumped to 16.4% in 2011, to finish at 12% -- 2% above the final target of 10%. Increases in access rates from lower socio-economic groups without improvements in quality could account for this, one might speculate. Dropout rates remained high as well, 14.4% in 2010/11.
52. Changes in completion rates were modest, though they spiked at the end. At baseline (SY 2005/6), the rate was 65% of which girls' completion rate was 54%. The final project-end target was adjusted down to 68% (girls 61%) from 72% and girls 65%. In 2010/11, these had not been reached, and yet in the final year, the results were positive, the final rate given being 71.5% (girls 65.8%). So, the general rate improved by 6.5 points and the girls'

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<sup>9</sup> The question to know how many new constructions replaced 'lean-to's' – whether this figure was recorded is not clear.

<sup>10</sup> It would be interesting to know what the rate of girl's participation before the project was. To what extent did the project help in any way?

<sup>11</sup> In 2000/01, poor children were five times less likely to finish primary school and start secondary school than their wealthier counterparts; in 2005/06, this was between 2.5-2.8. No figures are available at project end. See World Bank (2009) *Le Système Éducatif Béninois: Analyse Sectorielle pour une Politique Éducative Plus Équilibrée et Plus Efficace*. Washington, DC: World Bank

rate by 11.8%. Understanding the general stagnation in the overall completion rate during most of the project is a matter of speculation, as is the spike at project end. It could be due, potentially, to the high repetition and drop-out rates, problems which may have appeared as a consequence of increased access without increased quality and which could not be addressed adequately in the short term of this project. On the other hand, it could be that the improved completion at the very end of the project revealed that measures were beginning to have some impact.

53. Another measure taken by the project to help improve retention was the school feeding programs that served 121 000 students in the country's poorest areas, exceeding the 110,000 student final target. In addition, the building of permanent classrooms – to replace lean-to's -- probably improved retention, as well. Although a more in-depth study is needed to demonstrate this, it is likely that permanent constructions, since they better shelter students during inclement weather (during the rainy season), would promote retention. The same could be said of the 486 new blocks of latrines, as well -- that better sanitation facilities promote retention as well.
54. **Component 2.** The overall objective of this component was to improve the quality of pre-school and primary education and literacy training. Of US\$14.1 million, US\$14 million was spent.
55. Quality was to be measured by the national assessments of 2009 and 2011. The 2009 testing could not be performed, however, and the 2011 results were considered weak.<sup>12</sup> Instead, primary completion rates were used as an indicator of quality instead, although they too were disappointing (see above in section on retention).
56. Quality was also measured through intermediate indicators for improved teacher and management personnel training. Progress was made on these counts: the training of 9979 community teachers to pass the CEAP exam was carried out (7971 passed) and 46,196 teachers benefitted from in-service training (on, in part, competence-based pedagogical approaches).
57. A greater number of qualified teachers -- up from 51.3% to 55.1% -- were hired to stabilize the student-teacher ratio at 47.9 to 1 in an attempt to maintain quality in the face of increasing access rates. An increase in the number of inspectors and education advisors

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<sup>12</sup> The 2011 assessment results, considered weak, were the following: the combined scores in Math and French were 40 out of 100 for 2<sup>nd</sup> year primary students (*CM*) and 31.85 out of 100 for 5<sup>th</sup> year primary students (*CPI*). These results could not be compared easily to any other test. Hence the disappointment related to the dropped 2009 test. The precedent international evaluation done by the PASEC group in 2005/6, for example, rated students in terms of being in difficulty. The scores for Benin were 38.5% and 44.8% of students faced difficulties in Math and French at the end of the primary school cycle -- a level which placed Benin at the next to last spot in the regional rankings, only ahead of Chad.

was also noted, with the proportion of classes visited by the inspectorate reaching 65.9% in 2010/11 (target 40%).

58. Further, the purchasing of learning material by pre-school and primary school was accomplished through the transfer of subsidies to 8059 schools (reported government figures).
59. Literacy was to be tackled by elaborating new programs and materials, training literacy trainers and personnel, and providing literacy training to 52,000 adults using the 'faire-faire' approach (by contracting out to NGOs). As it turns out, the training was in fact completed for 107,401 adults.
60. **Component 3.** The aim of this component (for which US\$5.7 million was devoted) was to improve the management and steering of the education system as a whole. Two major sub-components were planned, one to do with improved management and one with improved capacity.
61. As far as the first sub-component is concerned, the aim was to improve pedagogical and institutional management with the use of student learning assessments and results-based management systems. Two intermediate indicators reveal that the student learning assessment of 2011 was (i) put in place and (ii) then rolled out. Another intermediate indicator shows that the proportion of classes visited by the Inspectorate rose to 65.9% above the project target of 40%, which is a very strong result. The only shortcoming is the implementation of the computerized Information Management System, which at project close had not been put in place, though the preliminary framework was.
62. Building management capacity within the PDDSE structures in order to improve the sector's planning, programming, procurement, financial management, and monitoring and evaluation capacity, and putting in place an information management system with a school map was the second sub-component. While annual work plans, an operations manual, training of 454 central ministry staff in particular technical knowledge and skills (as the intermediate indicator discloses), and other tangible outputs can indeed be identified, the actual management structures and systems that were put in place for the project remain to be perfected. Procurement and FM capacity training was also carried out and the rating given to them was satisfactory but the position of these two vital activities in the project activities cycle remains somewhat problematic.
63. In conclusion, all indicators were met and it is highly likely that in terms of impact the project contributed significantly to the achievement of the overall project -- and indeed program -- objectives (as it represented approximately 75% of the program budget US\$76.1 million out of just over US\$100 million). Clearly, a significant influx of non-recurrent budget has had a positive effect in the sector.

### **Efficiency**

64. The internal efficiency of the system has improved modestly over the course of the project for several reasons. On the one hand, government spending increased, as did



access to schooling and yet, on the other, repetition rates did not decrease (until the end) and drop out remained high. Several activities of the project stand out nonetheless for their cost-effectiveness.

### **Recurrent and non-recurrent Expenditure increases**

65. At the outset of the project, in 2006, Benin spent 3.8% of GDP and 18.03% of total government expenditure on education (9.6% of total government expenditure on primary). By 2010, according to UIS figures, public expenditure on education had risen to 4.5% as a percentage of GDP and 18.2% of total government expenditure (10.5% total government expenditure on primary).
66. During the period 2006-2010, current expenditure in education represented 16.7% of the state's resources, a figure which is below that the threshold of 20% recommended by the Fast Track Initiative.
67. The influx of non-recurrent expenditure was exceptionally elevated. Donors played a critical role in Benin's education reform, with aid to the sector increasing steadily, from an annual average of \$49 million per year in 1999 and 2000 to \$83 million per year in 2006 and 2007, topping out at over \$100 million for the combined FTI/FCB program. It is certain that this trend cannot continue.
68. **Unit costs.** In 2006, fees were abolished for all students in primary and pre-primary school, leading to a surge in first grade enrolment. Fees were replaced by block grants paid to schools. However, these are frequently insufficient to cover costs: parents must pay for schoolbooks and uniforms, and frequently contribute to school-related construction projects.
69. According to figures to be released in the latest RESEN, the unit costs per child per year of primary schooling have gone up from 45,4 thousand in 2006 to 49.8 thousand in 2010 (figures given in 2010 constant CFAs), which corresponds to a rise from 13.1% to 13.5% GDP per inhabitant over the period.<sup>13</sup>
70. What is troublesome is the suggestion that, upon closer study, one can find little difference between pre-and post- project results in the allocation of resources (i.e. teachers to school, and so on) on levels of student achievement: there seems to be no correspondence between the two.<sup>14</sup> In other words, the rise in unit costs has not been accompanied by a rise in student performance.

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<sup>13</sup> RESEN, 2012 (*Rapport d'état sur l'éducation nationale*) section 3.2.

<sup>14</sup> RESEN, 2012, section 7.4

## **Internal Efficiency**

71. As access increased, important measures were taken to maintain and improve the quality of education (through teacher/student ratio, teacher training, acquisition of materials, and so on). However, the repetition rate rose from 7.5% in 2006/07 to 16.4% in 2011 (and was as high as 19% in grade 2), closing at 12%, above the final target of 10%. The dropout rate remained high. Completion rates for the total student population remained below targets during most of the project -- until the very end.
72. Taking into account the cumulative frequency of repetition and drop-out in the primary cycle leads to a global coefficient of internal efficiency of 52.8<sup>15</sup> in 2010/11. This means that just less than half (approximately 47.2%) of the resources mobilized for this level of education are in fact wasted. The situation has thus worsened since 2006-07 when one third (approximately 32.2%) of the resources mobilized were wasted and when the global coefficient for internal efficiency stood at 67.8. However, that said, there has been some improvement in the SY 2011/12 considering the PCR has risen to 71.6%.

## **Cost effectiveness through decentralization and the use of the private sector**

73. Several project activities stand out for their cost effectiveness. While most activities were implemented following Government procedures, three that did not -- in (i) construction, (ii) school feeding program, and (iii) the training of the teachers -- were much more cost effective.
- (i) For the construction of classrooms, 28% of the works were carried out using a CCD approach which offered the least unit cost in the country and which, in addition, was fastest. Other construction was delegated to two Contract Management Agencies (CMA), also offering faster building times, but their unit construction cost was comparable to that of construction carried out by the Ministry. However the additional fees of the services provided by the CMA and the firms recruited to supervise the works increased the unit cost.
  - (ii) The school canteens were run by community mothers with a unit cost of US \$ 0.25 per meal, a unit cost that was significantly less than the cost incurred using public canteens run by the administration.
  - (iii) For teacher training, an agreement was reached with the government to use per diem meal rates of US\$5 instead of the usual US\$30, given the number of teachers involved. This was a cost savings that drove expenses down considerably.

In conclusion, despite these successes, the efficiency of the project can only be rated as **modest**.

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<sup>15</sup> RESEN section 4.1.2

## Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

74. The overall outcome rating of **Moderately Unsatisfactory** is meant to reflect two contrasting aspects of this project. On the one hand, the project was relevant because it was aligned with the government's overall education program and the PDOs were in fact achieved; on the other, the project efficiency was modest -- largely due to two factors: (i) the internal efficiency of the system remained generally weak and (ii) implementation, extremely slow to begin, was beset with delays.

Project Relevance	Achievement of PDO	Efficiency	Overall Rating
Substantial	Moderately Satisfactory	Modest	Moderately Unsatisfactory

## Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

### Poverty

75. There are many key indicators to analyze the evolution of poverty. The latest RESEN 2012 (*Rapport d'état sur l'éducation nationale* (yet to be published)) indicates that poverty in rural and urban zones has dropped between 2006 and 2011 (roughly, the beginning and end of the project) from 40.6% and 34.3% to 39.7% and 31.4% for rural and urban zones, respectively.
76. In education projects, the most relevant indicators of poverty reduction are those that indicate the intake rate in schools by region (disaggregated by gender), the primary completion rates by region (also disaggregated by gender) and literacy rates. Although proxies, these would show whether more students (particularly girls) are entering primary schools in the poorest areas and are being retained there.
77. **Literacy.** Literacy Rates are improving, as revealed in the table below, taken from UIS sources.

Literacy (by percentage of indicated population)		
Adult (15+)		
	2002	2010
Total	34.7%	42.4%
Male	47.9%	55.2%
Female	23.3%	30.3%

Youth (15-24)		
	2002	2010
Total	45.3%	55%
Male	59.2%	65.6%
Female	33.2%	44.6%

**78. Gender.** The project has helped to address gender inequalities in the student population and, to some extent, the teaching profession as well. Before the launch of the program, gender inequality among primary students clearly existed on the national scale – and was particularly prevalent in rural areas. Girl’s participation was particularly low from the poorest families in rural Benin. As of 2012, data indicate that girls represent 48.24 percent of all those enrolling in primary schools across the country. Modest gains have been made in the gender parity index for gross enrolment at the primary level, rising from .89 to .92 in 2011. However, without more precise data, it is difficult to pinpoint why this rise occurred and what in fact the project’s contribution to this increase has been. Clearly, more research is needed to understand what is driving this.

**79.** One unanticipated outcome in this regard, worthy of note, is the rise in the number of women entering the teaching profession, a phenomenon that has led to a slight rise in female teaching staff (from 17 to 19% according to the UIS).

### **Institutional Change/Strengthening**

80. In 2007, the Ministries involved in this project exhibited many of the characteristics of large administrations with obsolete management systems -- stratified along strictly hierarchical lines, with poor communication among the various entities. Aware of this from the extensive capacity assessments carried out,<sup>16</sup> a key challenge for reform was to move away from this highly centralized rules-based system towards one that, by being better organized and trained at the central level and by being more decentralized and based on local decisions made by highly competent professionals, would become more responsive, effective, and efficient.

81. The introduction and use of FTI procedures for each activity in this project has brought with it some benefits in this regard. Even if (i) it was a challenge to have this approach accepted and (ii) it took time to learn and fully understand it, the exercise came to be appreciated because it introduced principles, an explicit framework, and rigor into government procedures. It helped formalize and rationalize the execution of activities and introduced accountability into the process.

Despite this, an appreciation of the Ministry’s *functional capacity* remains, for the moment, guarded. For instance, the last supervision mission for the project indicates that recurrent challenges persist in the Ministries in terms of: (i) strengthening institutional capacity to coordinate, combine, and deploy resources to reach target results, (ii) improving procurement, and (iii) efficiently coordinating the basic education sub-sector as a whole. These conclusions are disappointing, coming after the project devoted considerable resources to institutional capacity building.

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<sup>16</sup> Reported in the PAD and in other Program documents.

## **Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)**

82. Worth noting in this regard are two project activities that have had unintended outcomes: the community development programs for school construction and the introduction of FTI procedures. As we saw above, for the construction of classrooms, 28% of the works were carried out using a CCD approach which offered the least unit cost in the country and which, in addition, was fastest. Secondly, the introduction of and insistence on using FTI procedures for each activity in this project brought with it unanticipated benefits, as we saw in the previous section.

## **Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops**

Please see Annex 5

## **Section 4: Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome**

Rating: **Moderate**

83. The project objectives continue to be relevant to country needs as reflected in the Education Sector Plan (ESP), the Bank Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) and the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) which all give high priority to the education sector as one significant engine for promoting growth and reducing poverty. In addition, while key indicators of quality and retention were slightly lower than expected at project close, substantial progress was made in access and equity. These key actions are highly likely to continue to have an impact on development outcomes after project closure, provided that the reforms, particularly those related to quality, are sustained. Indeed, two risks threaten the sustainability of these outcomes: government commitment and government capacity, both of which have fluctuated over the course of this project to its detriment. The risk of this occurring again is fair and so the rating is moderate.

## **Section 5: Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance**

84. As outcome targets of this project were formally revised in the second restructuring, the project could *in principle* be divided into two parts and the two parts be weighted, following the calculations in Appendix B of the ICR guidelines. However, since (i) the PDO was not formally revised and the change was to just one of the seven PDO level results indicators (a slightly downgraded target was given for Primary Education Completion Rate) and (ii) the restructuring came at the very end of the project (the closing date was extended by just six months), the ICR team has decided not to divide the project up<sup>17</sup>. A very evenhanded evaluation of this project is possible without doing so.

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<sup>17</sup> If the project were divided according to ICR guidelines, there would be two confounding issues: (i) the division is relatively arbitrary in the context of the project (because disbursement was increasing at a constant rate both before and after the proposed division) and (ii) the weights of the pre-restructuring and post-restructuring periods would be about 6.5 to 1 -- weights which do not actually reflect the relative importance of each of the periods in the life of the project.

## **Bank Performance**

### **Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry**

Rating: **Moderately Satisfactory**

85. As examined in detail in section 2.1., the Bank ensured quality at entry in the following four ways:
86. **Soundness of background analysis.** The background analysis supporting the project was generally good, lessons learned were incorporated into the project, and the rationale for Bank intervention was sound.
87. **Assessment of project design:** The objectives were sound and perfectly in line with government goals, the MDGs, and the programmatic approach agreed on by all donors in Benin. The three project components were appropriately identified. With the amount in question (US\$76.1 million from the Bank alone), the WB project, as part of the larger harmonized program, was meant to be ambitious and include a number of activities in many education sub-sectors. However, what was not easy to anticipate was how this project would be received and acted upon by a Government that was understood to have weak implementing capacity, poor inter-ministerial coordination, and no experience of such sizeable projects. Critics might claim that the project design was in fact too complex, calling on many actors to work in coordination and including too many activities to be carried out in the relatively short time frame of three years.
88. **Adequacy of government commitment.** Before the elections, the Government worked closely with donors to prepare the project; after it, however, the new government did not re-engage on this project -- at least not at first and not quickly enough. Only as the end of the project came into sight, did the Government seek ways to expedite all activities.
89. **Assessment of risks.** A number of risks were clearly and correctly identified in the PAD (p.11), all of which, but one, were rated as substantial; however, the measures put in place to mitigate them did not always succeed. These risks included the risk of political reorganization in ministries, the involvement and interaction of four ministries, weak financial management, weak (in procurement, financial management, and monitoring and controlling budget execution), weak absorption capacity of external funding, and weak capacity to monitor the quality of education and effectiveness of education activities. While measures were given to mitigate these risks, it takes great foresight and experience to establish successful measures. The risks to this project were great enough that these provisions should have been better planned, more realistic, and achievable.

## **Quality of Supervision**

Rating: **Moderately Satisfactory**

90. There were some shortcomings in the Bank's response to resolving problems at the outset of the project. The delay of more than 12 months that was required by the GoB to put into place the relevant systems and organizations for the project was neither practical nor

realistic given the project timeframe (of three years). Some of these issues were, of course, beyond the purview of the Bank's supervision, some were not; nevertheless, at some point, such a delay must become the Bank's responsibility as much as Government's. The Bank was active in interceding when it could. As a case in point, the Bank did solicit the help of the President's office in Benin to overcome Ministerial inertia at one point.

91. Once implementation began, subsequent Bank supervision was very good as the Bank regularly followed up with counterparts, interceding actively when necessary, to help project execution flow as smoothly as possible. At times, the TTL raised issues with management and management interceded. This positive approach characterizes fine project supervision and is to be commended.

#### **Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance**

Rating: **Moderately Satisfactory**

92. As Bank performance in ensuring quality at entry is rated **Moderately Satisfactory** and the quality of the Bank's supervision is rated **Moderately Satisfactory**, the rating for Overall Bank performance is also **Moderately Satisfactory**.

#### **Overall Borrower Performance**

Rating: **Moderately Unsatisfactory**

93. For the purposes of this ICR, no distinction will be made between 'government' and 'implementing agency.' This is because four Ministries and numerous directorates within these Ministries were involved in the project, working in various capacities, both in the administration and execution of the project. It is true that there was a PMU put in place as a condition of effectiveness, but it was an extra-governmental entity created to help leverage government execution of the project; it did not act as an implementing agency *per se*.
94. As discussed in greater detail in earlier sections of this report, borrower performance was affected by a number of factors including:
- Poor initial commitment
  - Ineffective management
  - An unrealistic implementation schedule
  - Inefficient administrative procedures
  - Implementation delays
  - Inefficient procurement and disbursement
  - Weak M&E
95. Government ownership and commitment went from being very poor at the outset of the project to very strong by the end of it. One could make reference to various Government entities that were fully committed to the project. So, for example, the PMU worked tirelessly to make this project a success, while the Minister of Finance's Cabinet, recognizing the urgent need to intervene as the project faltered, found a way to bring all

government units together on a regular basis to create an ad-hoc taskforce to oversee the project. These were impressive moments in the project. Other units, on the contrary, that were meant to lead the project, did not rise up to the challenge.

96. A suitable institutional environment was not in place; at the outset, the government was simply not ready. As the project advanced, the timely resolution of implementation issues remained a constant issue. The project did finish by disbursing well above 98% of the allocated FTI funds (as of November 2012), but this was in great part due to extensions in project closing dates.

97. So, despite the fact that the project met its objectives, the general picture of borrower performance that emerges is one that is mixed. There were significant shortcomings; hence, the rating of **Moderately Unsatisfactory**.

#### **Section 6. Lessons Learned**

98. The lessons below are given in three sets: to do with (A) the Bank/Partners, (B) the Project, and (C) the Government.

#### **Bank/ Donors**

**99. Realism is required.** Serious challenges in capacity and coordination had been recognized before the project began<sup>18</sup> and needed to be thoroughly addressed; they were not in their entirety and, as a result, their effect was felt throughout the course of the project. In any new project, greater realism is required. The capacity constraints identified in this ICR cannot be overlooked in the new project. Recommendations are given below.

**100. Work with the donor community.** Collaboration with donor partners in this project led to the success of the pooled funding mechanism. This deserves to continue, so the Bank should invite the donor community to participate in future meetings.

#### **The Project**

**101. Complexity versus quantity of components.** The project was judged to be ‘too complex’ for a government of weak capacity with poor inter-ministerial coordination, and was perceived by many to have too many components, with the result that the project was seen as a ‘scattering of resources’ (*saupoudrage*), which placed priority on quantity rather than the quality of the intervention. The obvious lesson would be to stress the importance of keeping design simple and components achievable. The superposition of a rich layer of activities onto an already busy bureaucracy is a challenge, certainly.

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<sup>18</sup> For the FM assessment recommendations, see PAD, p.43 and for the Procurement Capacity, see EFA/FTI Procurement Capacity review of the MEPALN, p.6.



- 102.** Despite this observation, most components of this project were in fact achieved -- albeit with a few exceptions and some project re-arrangement. The problem was not one of complexity but rather, in this assessor's opinion, one of streamlining. Had the project started more swiftly (the next project should, incidentally), there would have been more leeway to sort out the various implementation challenges that commonly arise in ambitious projects such as these, such that all components would have indeed been accomplished. An FTI contribution, it should be recalled, is an exceptional event, one for which all parties must be well prepared. And well prepared to adapt.
- 103.** In addition, a multitude of factors constrain the education sector in Benin; many are interrelated. Adopting a simpler approach may facilitate the GoB's task, but may not be sufficient to address the web of issues that arise together in the sector, all of which need to be addressed. Ultimately, the new project must address the complexity of these issues while its design remains simple to implement.
- 104. M&E design in the context of pooled funding mechanisms.** In keeping with the EFA principle of donor harmonization, country partners in Benin agreed to enter into a pooled funding mechanism to finance this program. Unlike other donors,<sup>19</sup> the World Bank insisted that attribution be possible -- that whatever FTI funds had financed remain identifiable entities distinguishable from others. In addition, appropriate indicators for the FTI project components had to be developed, which became a subset of the greater SWAP program indicators. This is a strong point of the project that has allowed the WB to commit to pooled funding mechanisms and still respect its M&E obligations.
- 105. Good impact evaluation is critical.** The new project must include M&E that clearly demonstrates project impact.
- 106. CDD approaches for Construction.** Schools in this project built by communities have been built quickly and more inexpensively than those built by CMA's or the Government. Other initiatives in decentralization should be explored in the new project to take advantage of this benefit.

## **Government**

- 107. Ministerial coordination** was weak and caused delays. While two inter-ministerial bodies were created to oversee the GoB's ten-year education sector plan, they did not always concern themselves with the various challenges that the particular project activities could create. A task-force that is officially endowed with the requisite power and credibility to overcome these bottlenecks must be put in place and remain in place.

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<sup>19</sup> Other donors are not in a position to distinguish what exactly their contribution has been spent on, except in the broadest terms of categories, and can only state their contribution as a percentage of the total program expenditure.

108. **A dedicated taskforce.** The management structure put in place for the project did not function as planned, so an ad-hoc management team formed and, in conjunction with the PMU, drove the project forward. In the new project, it will be important to formalize this taskforce/management unit. It will be critical to have:

- A formal mandate from Government to move this agenda forward;
- A streamlined management unit that:
  - is tasked with this mandate,
  - includes all relevant ministerial stakeholders (directorates and so on),
  - identifies, at the outset, their roles, responsibilities and working relationship,
  - acts as a dedicated taskforce, meeting on a regular basis, to address the ongoing challenges that will be encountered with a project of this scale,
  - and maintains a pragmatic sense of realism about attaining objectives within the given timeframe.
- Capacity strengthening in FM, procurement, and so on (see below);
- Solid technical support from donors.

109. **Independence of the Project Management Unit.** The project manager was appointed from outside of government, which turned out to be a good choice because this person was able to make use of his autonomy -- which an appointed civil servant might not have enjoyed -- to leverage government action.

110. **A focus on building the capacity of systems, not individuals.** This project both benefitted -- and suffered -- from the contribution of certain individuals. Progress should be achieved however through systems having been put in place, not from any one participant. This is particularly pertinent in Benin where civil servants rotate between posts on a regular basis. The introduction of, and insistence on using, FTI procedures (that included terms of reference, detailed activity sheets, and so on) for each activity in this project went a long way towards accomplishing this objective. Even if (i) it was a challenge to have this approach accepted and (ii) it took time to learn and fully understand it, the exercise came to be appreciated because it introduced principles, an explicit framework, and rigor into the procedure. It helped formalize and rationalize the execution of activities and introduced accountability into the process. The clear lesson is that this approach -- promoting FTI procedures -- must be carried through to the next project. The familiarity with the procedures must not be lost. Early on in the new project, training or retraining should be put into place to ensure this.

## **7. Comments on Issues Raised by Grantee/Implementing Agencies/Donors**

### **(a) Grantee/Implementing agencies**

### **(b) Co-financiers/Donors**

### **(c) Other partners and stakeholders**

*(e.g. NGOs/private sector/civil society)*

## ANNEX 1. PROJECT COSTS AND FINANCING

### (a.) Cost Table

	<b>Pooled Fund (US\$ millions)</b>	<b>Of which FTI (US\$ millions)</b>
<b>1. Improving Access, Equity, and Retention</b>	<b>68.3</b>	<b>48.0</b>
1.1 Improving education-related infrastructure	56.9	41.2
1.2 Improving schooling and literacy training for girls and children with special needs	4.3	2.5
1.3 Developing mechanisms by which over-age children can gain access to education	1.1	1.1
1.4 Strengthening multi-grade teaching and establishing sub-cycles	1.0	0.5
1.5 Developing new school cafeterias	4.5	2.6
<b>2. Improving Quality of Teaching and Literacy Training</b>	<b>26.4</b>	<b>18.7</b>
2.1 Strengthening implementation of programs based on the 'competence approach'	1.1	0.9
2.2 Introducing national languages into the system	1.0	1.0
2.3 Strengthening the qualifications of teachers and management personnel	15.0	9.9
2.4 Acquiring educational materials and equipment	5.0	4.6
2.5 Literacy	4.3	0.0
<b>3. Improving Management and Steering of the System</b>	<b>15.1</b>	<b>9.5</b>
3.1 Improving pedagogical and institutional management	3.3	1.7
3.2 Building management capacity within the PDDSE and the information system	11.8	7.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>109.7</b>	<b>76.1</b>

Source: Government of Benin, March 2008; Exchange rate: 415 FCFA/1 USD

### (b) Financing

<b>Source of Funds</b>	<b>Type of Co-financing</b>	<b>Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)</b>	<b>Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)</b>	<b>Percentage of Appraisal</b>
Trust Funds		0.00	0.00	
Education for All - Fast Track Initiative		76.10	0.00	.00

## ANNEX 2. OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT

Sub-Component	Principal Activity	Initial State (Year)	Expected result from activity	Date of completion	State of Progress
<b>Component 1. Improving Access, Equity, and Retention</b>					
1.1 Improving education-related infrastructure	Constructing, rehabilitating, and equipping educational infrastructure		Constructing and equipping 2191 class rooms and 428 blocks of latrines	06/15/12	2613 classrooms built and equipped and 486 blocks of latrines
1.2 Improving schooling and literacy training for girls and children with special needs	Constructing and equipping literacy centers		Constructing and equipping 45 literacy centers	06/15/12	45 centers built and equipped; 45 blocks of 2 latrines
1.5 Developing new school cafeterias	Developing school canteens		Support offered to 501 schools that had previously had canteens offered by the WFP	06/15/12	501 schools supported; 113 500 beneficiaries
<b>Component 2. Improving Quality of Teaching and Literacy Training</b>					
2.1 Strengthening implementation of programs based on the 'competence approach'	Supporting implementation of programs based on the 'competence approach'		Creation of curricula and supporting documentation	06/15/12	Discovery learning activities for ECD and corrective measures taken for the curricula in the teaching of French, Math, home Economics, Science, Arts and Sports have been taken.
2.3 Strengthening the qualifications of teachers and management personnel	Certification of current teachers		The training of 3940 community teachers to take the CEAP exam	31/05/12	10,000 community teachers were offered this three year course while they continued to teach. 8156 passed the exam and received the CEAP; 3244 contractual teachers recruited in 2007 were offered 20 days of training to sit the CEAP or CAP exams
	In-service training		The training of 12 591 primary teachers	10/06/12	35 inspectors received training; 46,196 primary teachers received 6 days of

					training; 43,000 teachers received 4 days of training in specialty fields; 1593 assistants and 1213 pre-primary teachers received 10 days of training discovery learning activities.
Sub-Component	Principal Activity	Initial State (Year)	Expected result from activity	Date of completion	State of Progress
2.4 Acquiring educational materials and equipment	Purchase of educational materials and equipment by each school		Schools equipped with a minimum learning materials according their needs	31/12/11	Schools equipped with a minimum learning materials according their needs
2.5 Literacy			Improving literacy by elaborating new programs and materials	31/12/12	Framework document for the implementation of the strategy to be developed Communication plan on the procedure of the strategy to do Inventory of programs and tools, conceptual framework for the development of new literacy programs and adult education and literacy development tools and adult education developed
			Training literacy trainers and personnel	31/10/12	142 CCA supervisors and NGOs trained for 6 days for the supervision and monitoring of literacy centers 1855 literacy teachers trained for 10 days.
			Providing literacy training to 52,000 adults using the 'faire-faire' approach (by contracting out to NGOs).	15/05/12	Recruitment of 30 NGOs to ensure the implementation of the 'faire-faire' strategy to be defined in territorial units; 1860 literacy centers opened and evaluated; 51,073 registered of which

					38,381 people (approx. 75%) participated in the assessments; This corresponds to a drop-out of 12,692 people; 34,141 people passed the test (a success rate of 67%).
Sub-Component	Principal Activity	Initial State (Year)	Expected result from activity	Date of completion	State of Progress
<b>Component 3. Improving Management and Steering of the System</b>					
3.1 Improving pedagogical and institutional management			Improving pedagogical and institutional management with the use of student learning assessments, results-based management systems	06/15/12	Student learning assessment has been carried out
			Strengthening the system of statistical production and preparation of a computerization framework	06/15/12	Blueprint EMIS developed. General census of students and database available
3.2 Building management capacity within the PDDSE and the information system			.Audits  Strengthening capacity of 100 staff	06/15/12	Audit grants 2008/2009 achieved Various audits (financial, technical and market) Audit transfers to schools and environmental audit conducted 423 officials of different ministries in charge of education trained in various fields. Six executives whose APM and PMU DCF / MEMP trained for three weeks in procurement Senegal.

## ANNEX 3. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

1. This economic analysis shows that the invested resources were spent in a modest efficient manner. The economic and financial analysis in the PAD presents an overview of public and household spending on education in Benin, an assessment of student-teacher ratios as well as salary costs for teaching personnel. Due to lack of data on costs and benefits of the separate components of this project, this annex only provides an economic assessment on efficiency of part of component 1. Component 2 and 3 are not covered by the economic analysis. Finally, a short financial analysis is presented.

2. The project consists of three components: 1) Improving access, equity, and retention, 2) improved quality of teaching and literacy training, and 3) improving management and steering of the system.

### Economic Analysis

3. The project completed 2,613 classrooms compared to a target of 2,191 classrooms. Out of the 2,613 classrooms, 732 (28%) were built using a Community-Driven Development (CDD) approach, and the resulting 1881 classrooms were appointed to Contract Management Agencies (CMA). Data on construction costs is available for most of the classrooms built (327 using the CDD approach and 1602 using the CMA approach).

4. The lowest unit cost was achieved using the CDD approach with an average unit cost of US\$ 12,931 (2012-prices) including costs of furniture. The unit costs of classrooms (excluding furniture) built by CMA range from around US\$ 13,500 to above US\$ 20,000 (2012-prices) depending on contract and management agency, cf. Table 1.

**Table 1 Average unit costs for classrooms built by CMA<sup>20</sup>**

Agency	Year	Number of classrooms	Avg. unit cost CFA current prices	Avg. unit cost US\$ 2012-prices
AGETUR	2008	427	8,581,116	20,418
AGETIP	2008	354	8,658,948	20,603
AGETIP	2009	276	8,351,976	18,908
AGETUR	2010	276	8,823,626	18,737
AGETUR	2012	150	6,837,356	13,539
AGETIP	2012	119	7,536,167	14,923

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<sup>20</sup> Data on costs have been provided by the Government. All costs include taxes. Costs are converted from FCA current prices to US\$ current prices using exchange rates from the World Bank Databank (2008-2011) and the ICR official exchange rate (2012). Costs in current prices are then converted to constant 2012-prices using IMF inflation rates (incl. estimate for 2012).

5. The average unit cost of classrooms across both CMA is 17,855 US\$ (2012-prices), which is somewhat higher than the prices obtained in other construction projects undertaken in Benin within the same period of time. The average unit costs of classrooms built under three other projects (PCRESC-EPP, ZOFROLA, and PROCEDE) are US\$ 15,584, US\$ 16,936, and US\$ 14,907 respectively (all prices are 2012-prices).<sup>21</sup> These projects did not make use of CMA, but contracts were made directly between the Ministry and the construction firms. Except for the difference in procurement type, prices are directly comparable to those built by the CMA, as the classrooms were built in equally accessible areas and are of the same type and size. Thus, the classrooms built by the CMA the EFA-FTI project come out as slightly less cost efficient compared to those built in other projects. However, on the positive side, classrooms built by the CMA under the EFA-FTI project were built much faster (in 4-5 months) than classrooms built by the other projects (1-3 years), which enables communities to benefit from the new constructions earlier. The expeditious process is explained by a fast recruitment process of firms as well as close supervision of the works by the CMA.

6. A comparison of construction costs across countries and over time shows that unit costs differ substantially across projects and according to management methods. Examples of projects managed by CMA show unit costs between around US\$ 11,000 in Senegal in 1992 and US\$ 17,700 in Chad in 1993 (all costs are 2012-prices). Thus, compared internationally the average unit cost of classrooms built by this project is also on the high end.<sup>22</sup> However, it is difficult to systematically compare efficiency across these projects as constructions vary in standards, quality, common premises included etc.

7. Indicators on access to school improved during the period of implementation and the GER for primary education reached almost 120% in the school year 2011-2012.<sup>23</sup> Although this project is expected to have a significant positive effect on access to education, it is not possible to quantify by how much the project contributed. Primary school fees were abandoned in 2006-7, which presumably have had a great positive effect on enrollment as well.

8. Most of the new permanent classrooms replaced already existing semi-permanent classrooms structures, which may result in a lower increase in access for these areas. Thus, although the new construction has increased access in some areas, this is not necessarily the case in all areas. However, the new permanent structures are expected to increase learning outcomes for students in all of the covered areas, as a number of studies show a positive effect from quality of school buildings on learning achievement.<sup>24</sup> Furthermore, the permanent structure of the classrooms is expected to bring financial savings to the communities, as communities will no longer have to rebuild semi-

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<sup>21</sup> Data provided by the Government. Costs are subsequently converted into US\$ 2012-prices.

<sup>22</sup> Serge Theunynck, *School Construction Strategies for Universal Primary Education in Africa - Should Communities Be Empowered to Build Their Schools?* World Bank, 2009.

<sup>23</sup> Source: School data 2011/12- DPP/MEMP.

<sup>24</sup> The World Bank, *Education in Sub-Saharan Africa – A comparative Analysis*, 2012.



permanent classroom structures. Unfortunately, as data is not available on either conditions of prior constructions or costs associated with rebuilding this saving cannot be quantified.

### **Financial Analysis**

9. Public spending on education in Benin has experienced strong growth from US\$ 141.1 million (FCFA 69.6 billion, 2010-prices) in 2000 to US\$ 351.7 (FCFA 174.2 billion, 2010-prices) in 2010, which corresponds to an increase of 149%. In 2010 the resource allocation to the education sector accounted for 5.4% of GDP and 24.8% of government expenditure.<sup>25</sup>

10. The majority of the budget allocated to education goes to basic education, and thus 52.3% of public expenditure on education went to the Ministry of Pre-primary and Primary School (MEMP) in 2010. 30.6% of the budget was allocated to the Ministry of Secondary, Technical and Vocational Training (MESFTP), and 16.8% for higher education (MESRS).<sup>26</sup>

11. The fiscal impact of this project primarily stems from the higher cost of the expanded school infrastructure, i.e. the recurrent costs associated with the additional number of students accommodated in the new classrooms as well as with the new literacy centers. However, for the new classrooms that are replacing semi-permanent classrooms, the recurrent costs are only expected to be higher than prior costs to the extent that the permanent buildings lead to a higher enrollment of children in primary education. It is also possible that the permanent classrooms result in a fiscal saving due to lower maintenance costs. Furthermore, replacement of furniture and maintenance costs for the new classrooms is expected. Due to lack of data on change in enrollment and recurrent spending prior to and after the investments, the direct fiscal impact from the project is not calculated.

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<sup>25</sup> Forthcoming CSR ch. 3.

<sup>26</sup> Forthcoming CSR ch. 3.

## ANNEX 4. GRANT PREPARATION AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT / SUPERVISION PROCESSES

### (a) Task Team members

Names	Title	Unit	Responsibility/ Specialty
<b>Lending/Grant Preparation</b>			
<b>Supervision/ICR</b>			
Itchi Gnon Ayindo	Senior Procurement Specialist	AFTPC	
Hyacinthe Gbaye	Education Economist	AFTED	
Mathias Gogohounga	E T Consultant	AFTPC	
Alain Hinkati	Financial Management Specialis	AFTFM	
Abdoul-Wahab Seyni	Senior Social Development Spec	AFTCS	

### (b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)	
	No. of staff weeks	USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)
<b>Lending</b>		
FY08		78.61
<b>Total:</b>		78.61
<b>Supervision/ICR</b>		
<b>Total:</b>		0.00

## **ANNEX 5. BENEFICIARY SURVEY RESULTS**

Note: This is a summary of the Beneficiary Survey

1. As part of the implementation of the Fast Track Initiative Program Common Fund budget, a survey of stakeholders and beneficiaries was sponsored by the Department of Maternal and Primary Teaching. The overall objective of the mission was to assess the satisfaction of both actors and beneficiaries of the program to enable the ministries in charge of education to gather lesson learned in order, ultimately, to build on the achievements of this program. Specifically, the mission aims to:
  - recognize the degree of satisfaction among stakeholders and beneficiaries of the FTI/FCB activities;
  - assess the degree of ownership of stakeholders and the participation of beneficiaries in the implementation of the FTI-FCB (for project identification and implementation);
  - analyze the strengths and limitations of the implementation of the program as expressed by stakeholders and beneficiaries;
  - share stakeholders' satisfaction with respect to the financing of the program and the procurement process municipal and community with accurate statistics;
  - identify proposals advocated by stakeholders to improve the performance and modalities of implementation;
  - analyze approaches to solutions proposed by stakeholders and beneficiaries;
  - and present a list of key lessons and propose actions to policy-makers in the departments in charge of education.
2. To achieve these objectives, a participatory methodological approach involving all FTI / FCB stakeholders was adopted by the team in charge of the mission. It basically includes the methods and strategies of intervention, the preparatory phase, sampling, data collection, processing and analysis of data.
3. As the investigation necessarily included various types of actors distributed across the country, the choice of the survey sample was not easy. Indeed, the survey had to cover a representative sample of the different categories of stakeholders of the program. To do this, clusters were formed in the population according to categories. Seven clusters were, in fact, formed namely stakeholders, parents, teachers, alpha, students, partners and CP inspectors. Collection tools have been developed accordingly to survey each group of actors.
4. With this approach, several difficulties were encountered, which include:
  - the delay in processing the survey;
  - the unavailability of electronic versions of the documents provided by the PMU.
  - the period chosen (the holidays were a real headache for investigators / controllers due to the unavailability of those to be surveyed);
  - Computers without available anti-virus programs led to delays in capturing data and complications in merging tasks, thus lengthening the processing time.

5. Nevertheless, with both determination and commitment, the national team in charge of the mission overcame these difficulties to capture the following:

### **Stakeholders**

6. Stakeholders at the middle school level are 88.05% satisfied with program activities (36.96% are very satisfied and 51.09% are quite satisfied). For primary school stakeholders, 45.97% are very satisfied with the program, and 36.97% are somewhat satisfied, with the combined result that 82.94% of the total primary stakeholders being satisfied with the overall program. In short, these stakeholders are satisfied with a number of criteria.

### **Literacy**

7. The majority of learners (82.71% of respondents) are satisfied with the program activities in literacy.

### **Teachers**

8. The overall assessment of teachers (carried out by level of education) on the FTI/FCB program seems satisfactory. Of 235 primary school teachers interviewed, over 90% report being satisfied. Approximately 88.61%% of secondary teachers are satisfied with the overall activities of the FTI / FCB program.

### **Parents (indirect beneficiaries)**

9. The proportion of satisfied parents is greater at the primary education level than at the secondary level.

### **Students**

10. 679 students appear to be favorable to the program continuing. There is a tendency to believe that the program was not well understood by these beneficiaries, but they nonetheless want the program to intervene in their locality. The program is very much appreciated by students or 72% of the total surveyed.

### **Partners**

11. Donor partners are indifferent about many of the points on which they were interviewed. It seems evident that the guide was sent to various (perhaps poorly chosen) categories of people and so, because of this, their understanding of the issues is not necessarily the same. The degree of involvement of respondents is not of the same order and the same nature. Nevertheless, issues such as the exemption of fees for girls, school canteens, and school infrastructure are topics of interest to many surveyed.

### **CP and inspectors**

12. The CPs (*conseil pédagogique*) and inspectors condemn the short teacher training periods as inappropriate. Some believe that politics is involved in the matter to the point where

unionism has taken over professionalism. Almost all inspectors and pedagogical advisors agreed that the in-service teacher training has improved teachers' professional and content knowledge, which has justified massive numbers of these teachers passing the various professional examinations (CAP / CEAP). For the majority of CP and inspectors, their own in-service training has strengthened their capacities and helped them transfer skills to teachers. Conversely, for some inspectors and CP, the skills acquired during training remain to be strengthened. Support for canteens developed by the program was highly appreciated by the inspectors and CP. Generally speaking, inspectors and CP greatly appreciated the various infrastructure improvements made by the FTI / FCB. For them, this infrastructure has provided a better working environment for both teachers and students.

### Lesson Learned

13. Regarding lessons learned, many are currently available to be used in the improvement of the next program. It is important to take the suggestions of various different types of beneficiaries seriously, as a first step. Second, it is important to note that it is possible to derive a high degree of satisfaction from beneficiaries through actions that do not cost anything. For example, the commitment of different actors was one of the points raised quite often by beneficiaries. Similarly, the monitoring of construction should not normally have been an [extra] financial cost. Improvements in these two areas would revitalize and strengthen existing management and operation structures (with the technical support of local councils), making them more efficient.
14. Beneficiary satisfaction is particularly favorable to the funding made available by the FTI / FCB program. This is encouraging but much remains to be done. Information dissemination will be important for the next program in order that all recipients receive the same amount of information. This will allow them to be more effective, by having a better understanding of goals and a better understanding of their role.
15. The disabled, meanwhile, benefited from an induction program in urban areas, but this program does not seem to have taken root. The ambitions of the program are noble and desirable nevertheless: that parent 'stakeholders' become more involved in this process to help this special social group become visible.
16. In the table below, a general assessment of all activities is given:

	Not at all satisfied		Little satisfied		Quite satisfied		Very satisfied		Total
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	
<b>Literacy</b>	3	4.29%	7	10.00%	25	35.71%	35	50.00%	70
<b>Teachers</b>	6	1.92%	15	4.79%	150	47.92%	142	45.37%	313
<b>Parents</b>	5	1.92%	19	7.31%	103	39.62%	133	51.15%	260
<b>Stakeholders</b>	7	2.31%	40	13.20%	125	41.25%	131	43.23%	303
<b>Students</b>	10	1.86%	48	8.91%	138	25.60%	343	63.64%	539
<b>Total</b>	31	2.09%	129	8.69%	541	36.43%	784	52.79%	1485

Source: Données enquête MEMP/ STP PDDSE, septembre 2012

17. At the end of this investigation and in light of the data contained in this table, on the one hand, and the realities on the ground, on the other we can conclude that almost all players are satisfied (89.23%) with the FTI/FCB program activities.

## 18. **RECOMMENDATIONS**

19. In light of the various criticisms made by beneficiaries and the revelations garnered from the surveys, it will be important for the next program to involve community stakeholders better in all phases of the program. This will include the selection of contractors and the selection of contracting authorities delegated so as to ensure the quality of infrastructure built through rigorous monitoring and control activities.
20. Due to the low level of knowledge of the program and its objectives among stakeholders, it is essential that the new program has a communication structure to make its operations visible. A lack of information can be construed as the confused actions of political power.
21. In terms of program management, it is essential to review the procedures for the disbursement of funds which is a very important step that is not without impact on all levels of program activities. This effect is often manifested in implementation delays that slow construction, and delay the start of canteens at the beginning of the year.
22. As for latrines, it is recommended that they are not only equipped with sinks but that they are also built in sufficient numbers and by qualified contractors.
23. Regarding canteens supported by the program, it is necessary that actors at the grassroots-level -- including parents -- be more involved in plans for their future modernization, which could lead to the construction of real canteens in schools. On the other hand, the low participation rate of children must be improved through improvements in the quality and quantity of meals served.
24. In addition, depending on the availability of program resources, it would be desirable to consider extending the exemption of fees to all girls and even boys. In other words, we need completely free education in Benin.
25. Satisfaction depends on the type of beneficiaries. Secondary school teachers for example are significantly less satisfied than primary. And this is not without some inconvenience to the educational system. The program, because of its focus on primary education, could destabilize the education system by overly-promoting primary school teachers. The action taken at the secondary level was appreciated, but we should point out that nothing was done at the level of technical education and vocational training, though it is a component of the same sub-sector.
26. Stakeholders are important actors in a chain. The program should attempt to benefit more from the involvement of parents in all steps so that problematic management issues, lack of transparency, and management questions become things of the past. Note that a greater involvement of grassroots actors can correct many imperfections.

27. Partners who were a target of this investigation also appreciated the program. The survey conducted at that level is quite rewarding. We note simply that at the level of municipalities, the program is known but there is a real need to strengthen agents / managers directly involved in the program. In the future, the program must make known all its components to the beneficiaries.
28. Finally, it will be important to evaluate the pilot phase of the program to integrate disabled children into schools in urban areas (implemented by the NGO Iseh) in order to see whether this idea should be extended to have national coverage.

**ANNEX 6. STAKEHOLDER WORKSHOP REPORT AND RESULTS**  
*n/a*



**ANNEX 7. SUMMARY OF GRANTEE'S ICR AND/OR COMMENTS ON DRAFT ICR**  
Not received as Nov 30, 2012

**ANNEX 8. COMMENTS OF CO-FINANCIERS AND OTHER PARTNERS/  
STAKEHOLDERS**

Not received as Nov 30, 2012

## **ANNEX 9. LIST OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS**

Project Concept Note

PAD

ISRs

Aide Memoires

Procurement Assessment of FTI/FCB program

Beneficiary Survey

RESEN *Rapport d'état sur l'éducation nationale 2012*

