Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR0000636 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-34370 IDA-3437A) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 133.7 MILLION (US$170 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA FOR AN EMERGENCY DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION PROJECT December 21, 2007 Sustainable Development Department Fragile States, Conflict and Social Development Department Africa Region CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective November 29, 2007) Currency Unit Birr 1.00 = US$ 0.11 US$1.00 = Birr 9.0405 FISCAL YEAR July 8 ­ July 7 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS CAS Country Assistance Strategy DC Demobilization Center DCA Development Credit Agreement DRP Demobilization and Reintegration Project EDRP Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project ENDF Ethiopian National Defense Forces ERP Emergency Recovery Project FPMU Federal Project Management Unit GoE Government of Ethiopia ICAS Interim Country Assistance Strategy ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross ISS Interim Support Strategy M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MoFED Ministry of Finance and Economic Development MoLSA Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs MoND Ministry of National Defense MIS Management Information System MTR Mid-Term Review NRC National Rehabilitation Center PDO Project Development Objective POC Prosthetic Orthotic Center PRSC Poverty Reduction Sector Credit PSNP Productive Safety Net Programme RG Reintegration Grant RPMU Regional Project Management Unit SDPRP Sustainable Development Poverty Reduction Programme TSS Transitional Subsistence Support UNMEE United Nations Mission to Eritrea and Ethiopia VCT Voluntary Counseling and Testing Vice President: Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Country Director: Kenichi Ohashi Sector Manager: Ian Bannon Project Team Leader: Ingo Wiederhofer ICR Team Leader: Malathi Jayawickrama Ethiopia Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project CONTENTS 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design....................................................................1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ...................................................................4 3. Assessment of Outcomes.................................................................................................................8 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome .............................................................................14 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..........................................................................15 6. Lessons Learned ............................................................................................................................17 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners................................19 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing...............................................................................................20 Annex 2. Outputs by Component ......................................................................................................21 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis......................................................................................29 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes..................................30 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results................................................................................................32 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results........................................................................38 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ....................................... 40- Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders............................................40 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents...........................................................................................41 A. Basic Information ET-Demob & Reinteg Country: Ethiopia Project Name: ERL (FY01) Project ID: P073196 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-34370,IDA-3437A ICR Date: 12/22/2007 ICR Type: Core ICR GOVERNMENT OF Lending Instrument: ERL Borrower: ETHIOPIA Original Total XDR 133.7M Disbursed Amount: XDR 127.8M Commitment: Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: Federal Project Management Unit Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual Date(s) Concept Review: 09/25/2000 Effectiveness: 02/22/2001 02/22/2001 Appraisal: 10/04/2000 Restructuring(s): 07/24/2003 Approval: 12/05/2000 Mid-term Review: Closing: 12/31/2003 06/30/2007 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate Bank Performance: Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Satisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Highly Satisfactory Government: Highly Satisfactory Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies: Satisfactory Overall Bank Overall Borrower Performance: Satisfactory Performance: Satisfactory C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments Performance Indicators (if any) Rating Potential Problem Project No Quality at Entry None i at any time (Yes/No): (QEA): Problem Project at any Quality of No None time (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA): DO rating before Satisfactory Closing/Inactive status: D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Other social services 100 100 Theme Code (Primary/Secondary) Conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction Primary Primary Social safety nets Primary Primary E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Callisto E. Madavo Country Director: Kenichi Ohashi Oey Astra Meesook Sector Manager: Ian Bannon Arvil Van Adams Project Team Leader: Ingo Wiederhofer Florian Fichtl ICR Team Leader: Malathi S. Jayawickrama ICR Primary Author: F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The objectives of the project are to: (i) demobilize and reintegrate 150,000 veterans; and (ii) support macro-economic stability in the country. The Project includes a quick disbursing mechanism that uses a positive list of emergency imports to generate counterpart funds to finance rapid project implementation. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) ii (a) PDO Indicator(s) Original Target Formally Actual Value Indicator Baseline Value Values (from Revised Achieved at approval Target Completion or documents) Values Target Years 1. Demobilization: Number of veterans demobilized in the first phase (Dec. 2000 Indicator 1 : - Dec 2001); Value quantitative or 0 60,000 Qualitative) Date achieved 12/15/2001 12/31/2005 Comments (incl. % achievement) Indicator 2 : 2. Demobilization : Number of veterans demobilized in the second phase Value quantitative or 0 90,000 Qualitative) Date achieved 12/15/2001 12/31/2005 Comments (incl. % achievement) Indicator 3 : 3. Number of Veterans who have received HIV/AIDS counseling. Value quantitative or 0 75% Qualitative) Date achieved 12/15/2001 12/31/2005 Comments (incl. % achievement) (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Original Target Formally Actual Value Indicator Baseline Value Values (from Achieved at approval Revised Completion or documents) Target Values Target Years 4. Reinsertion: Number of Transitional Subsistence Support payments made to Indicator 1 : Veterans. Value (quantitative 0 100% of those or Qualitative) demobilized Date achieved 12/15/2001 12/31/2005 Comments (incl. % iii achievement) 5. Reintegration: Number of Veterans who have received economic reintegration Indicator 2 : assistance Value (quantitative 0 100% of those or Qualitative) demobilized Date achieved 12/15/2001 12/31/2005 Comments (incl. % achievement) Indicator 3 : 6. Reintegration: Number of disabled Veterans who have received medical rehabilitation assistance (to be confirmed through sample survey) Value (quantitative 0 80% or Qualitative) Date achieved 12/15/2001 12/31/2005 Comments (incl. % achievement) Indicator 4 : 7. Reintegration: Employment status of Veterans. Value (quantitative 0 60% employed or Qualitative) Date achieved 12/15/2001 12/31/2005 Comments (incl. % achievement) G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs Actual No. Date ISR Archived DO IP Disbursements (USD millions) 1 06/14/2001 Satisfactory Satisfactory 27.52 2 01/04/2002 Satisfactory Satisfactory 60.51 3 06/17/2002 Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory 100.09 4 12/17/2002 Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory 123.78 5 06/10/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 124.75 6 11/26/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 125.49 7 05/26/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 142.29 8 10/27/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 143.38 9 05/23/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 144.83 10 12/19/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 145.35 11 06/19/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 154.41 12 12/14/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 163.04 13 06/14/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 168.76 iv H. Restructuring (if any) ISR Ratings at Amount Restructuring Board Restructuring Disbursed at Reason for Restructuring & Date(s) Approved Restructuring PDO Change Key Changes Made DO IP in USD millions Restructuring was to allocate US$35m of EDRP resources to 07/24/2003 N S S 124.87 provide supplemental financing to ERP-- a sister project to EDRP. I. Disbursement Profile v 1. PROJECT CONTEXT, DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES AND DESIGN 1.1 Context at Appraisal 1. The armed conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea erupted along their common border in May 1998 and continued for two years, displacing about 364,000 people in Ethiopia and either destroying or damaging infrastructure, including bridges and power supply in both countries. In Ethiopia, ninety two percent of the internally displaced were in the Tigray Region and the remainder in the Afar Region. About 110,000 people of Ethiopian origin who had been residing in Eritrea were deported to Ethiopia, with the majority depending on state support upon their return. An estimated 36,000 Ethiopian households lost their main breadwinner during the war. Both countries significantly increased the size of their respective armies in the course of the conflict. 2. As a result of the war, Ethiopia's economy faced severe internal and external imbalances. Defense spending, which had reached a low of 2.5 percent of GDP in 1996-97, rose to 8.7 percent in 1998-99, and to as high as 13.3 percent in 1999-2000. The fiscal deficit rose to 6.9 percent in 1998-99 and to almost 12 percent in 1999-00. Ethiopia had financed its defense expenditures largely through cuts in discretionary recurrent expenditure and capital expenditure. The latter, which had steadily grown to 10.4 percent in 1996-97, slipped to 6.7 percent by 1999-2000. Foreign exchange reserves declined by nearly US$100 million between 1998-99 and 1999-2000 to two months, or below the minimum level required for the country to withstand an external shock. Investor confidence and private sector activity, which had already been eroded by the burden of the conflict, economic uncertainty, and balance of payments constraints, was further impaired as the Government tried to prevent a sharp depreciation of the exchange rate through a number of controls and non-price barriers. 3. On June 18, 2000, the two governments signed an Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities. In late June, the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) sought Bank assistance, on an emergency basis, to finance a comprehensive post-conflict recovery program. The Bank's objective was to help Ethiopia deal as quickly as possible with the human, material and financial destabilization caused by the war, while simultaneously reengaging in core development issues. Bank support, articulated in the Interim Support Strategy (ISS) to help Ethiopia in the two years following the war, complemented activities of other international stakeholders who were also engaged in facilitating the peace process. The ISS included four emergency operations totalling US$700 million.1 The overall recovery program sought to demobilize and reintegrate veterans, rehabilitate and reconstruct infrastructure, facilitate the return of displaced civilians and deportees, and stabilize the economy. 4. The EDRP, in particular, was designed to link demobilization of veterans to reintegration needs in order to ensure sustainable social and economic reintegration, and help free up public resources for investment in the productive sectors. The EDRP was also expected to help GoE demonstrate its commitment to the peace process. Bank involvement was justified by the timing of the project and the amount of resources, its previous experience in financing demobilization and reintegration projects (DRPs), the need to monitor the macroeconomic impact of the recovery program, and its commitment to be responsive to a client appeal for emergency aid and poverty reduction. 1The four operations were: the EDRP (US$170 million); the Emergency Recovery Project (US$230 million); the Emergency Support Credit (US$250 million); and the Fertilizer Supplemental Credit (US$50 million). The Bank's Board approved the ISS (Report No. 21189-ET) and the EDRP on December 5, 2000. 1 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators 5. The Project's objectives were to assist GoE to: (i) demobilize and reintegrate 150,000 veterans; and (ii) support macroeconomic stability. Demobilization and reintegration involved: · helping an estimated 133,000 able-bodied veterans and 17,000 disabled veterans to rebuild their lives and resume productive economic activities; · rehabilitating about 17,000 disabled veterans through the provision of medical services; · facilitating the reallocation of public resources to priority social and infrastructure investments by reducing defense expenditures. Table 1: Key Performance Indicators Component Key Performance Indicator Demobilization · Demobilize about 60,000 veterans in Phase I and 90,000 veterans in phase II · Number of veterans who have received HIV/AIDS counseling Reinsertion · Number of transitional Subsistence Support (TSS) payments made to veterans Reintegration · Number of disabled veterans who have received medical rehabilitation assistance · Employment status of veterans. 1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification. No revision. 1.4 Main Beneficiaries. 6. The primary target group comprised 150,000 veterans (133,000 able-bodied veterans and 17,000 disabled veterans). As a special target group, about 17,000 disabled veterans, who otherwise would be largely dependent on Government and traditional support systems, were to receive rehabilitation support. 1.5 Original Components 7. The project had three components: (i) demobilization; (ii) reinsertion; and (iii) reintegration of veterans, plus special rehabilitation assistance to disabled veterans. 8. Demobilization of Veterans (US$32.5 million) involved the process of transforming the identity of military personnel to civilian status, and was to take place in two phases: Phase I (60,000, including 17,000 disabled veterans); and Phase II (90,000 veterans). Demobilization entailed: (a) establishment of Demobilization Centers (DCs); (b) transport of veterans from collection points to the centers; (c) activities such as registration, provision of identity cards, collection of socio-economic data, and health screening and counseling (including HIV/AIDS Voluntary Counselling and Testing (VCT); (d) transport to the veterans' area of origin; and (e) provision of a transport allowance to facilitate the veterans' return to their home communities. 9. Reinsertion (US$57.1 million) was to facilitate the veterans' reinsertion into their communities through the payment of Transitional Subsistence Support (TSS) cash grants of Birr 2,000 in the form of coupons. The TSS was the cash equivalent of a defined basket of basic goods and services designed to enable the beneficiary family unit to re-establish a civilian household. The basket consisted of goods such as household items, clothing and cooking utensils and made provision for children's education. The 2 TSS was calculated for a transitional period of 12 months and was to be provided in three installments. The regional Finance Bureaus, through the woreda administration, were expected to pay the TSS once veterans had relocated to their homes. The first payment was to be made within one month of the veterans' return. 10. Economic Reintegration (US$84.5 million) was to commence after veterans had exchanged their coupons into the TSS at woreda level. Reintegration activities were designed at the regional level based on the socio-economic profile of the veterans (obtained at the DCs) and locally available opportunities. A menu of options to support the economic reintegration of veterans was to be provided in urban and rural areas. This included upgrading of skills through training or apprenticeship schemes, provision of employment opportunities through referral services or grants to employers, and provision of micro- projects or selected agricultural inputs. Ideally after six months all veterans were entitled to receive the reintegration grant (RG) that varied from Birr 2,000 to Birr 6,000 depending on the category of recruitment status (militia, new regular, returnee, regular) for able-bodied veterans. Disabled veterans were eligible for additional financial assistance (up to Birr 11,000 for the severely disabled). TSS and RG assistance was provided in cash to minimize market distortions and maximize the choice of the recipients. 11. Reintegration also planned to provide substantial medical support to veterans with severe injuries. This included rehabilitating and equipping five regional prosthetic orthotic centers (POCs) and the construction of a new National Rehabilitation Center (NRC) in Addis Ababa. EDRP was also to finance training of prosthetic-orthotic technicians and physiotherapists. 1.6 Revised Components 12. A new Productive Safety Net Grant (PSNG) component was added to EDRP and approved by the Board on a non-objection basis on December 7, 2005 (see Section 2.2). By November 2005, EDRP had estimated cost savings of US$40.4 million.2 GoE requested restructuring EDRP to utilize the savings to finance supplementary reintegration assistance to food insecure woredas, in which an estimated 85,000 demobilized veterans (58 percent) had settled. GoE was concerned that the lack of food security in these communities, further aggravated by the major drought of 2002/03, would compromise sustainable reintegration. The additional investments sought to enhance sustainability by financing: (i) labor- intensive public works--grants to households whose adults participate in public works sub-projects at the community level; and (ii) direct support-- grants to households who are labor-poor and cannot undertake public works. The new component was implemented within the framework of an ongoing project--the Productive Safety Nets Project (PSNP), approved by the Board on November 3, 2004. 1.7 Other significant changes 13. The project's DCA dated December 21, 2000 was amended three times. On August 2, 2001, the DCA, including Schedule 3, was amended to permit additional procurement methods. In June 2003, EDRP was restructured and on July 24, 2003, the Bank accorded a second amendment in response to a GoE request to utilize US$35 million of EDRP resources to provide supplemental financing to the Economic Recovery Project (ERP, Cr. 3438-ET) to: (i) finance income generating activities and household rehabilitation activities for 29,000 deportees and internally displaced persons; (ii) reconstruct homes and businesses in Zalanbessa; and (iii) finance eligible expenditures under the Mille-Assab road 2Cost savings were a result of: (i) lower than planned costs of demobilization and reintegration, especially with respect to demobilization, civil works, technical assistance and operating expenses; (ii) non-utilization of US$16 million reallocated from the EDRP to finance ERP activities in June 2003; and (iii) significant exchange rate gains. 3 contract that was financed under the first IDA-financed Roads Rehabilitation Project (Cr. 2438-ET). The second amendment involved revising Schedules 1 and 2, however, it did not require Board approval as these were related activities under ERP--a sister project to EDRP (ERP ICR Report No.ICR350). By November 2005, US$16 million of the amount allocated for activities agreed in the second amendment was unutilized, and was reallocated to the new PSNG component. This modification required an amendment of the project description, procurement, Schedule 1 (Withdrawal of the Proceeds of the Credit), implementation arrangements, the financial covenants of the DCA, and also required Board approval (as discussed in Section 1.6 above). 2. KEY FACTORS AFFECTING IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOMES 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 14. GoE was strongly committed to the peace process, and had started planning for demobilization soon after signing the Agreement in June 2000. This helped to prepare EDRP in a brief time period of about four months. During preparation, the Government's Technical Team on demobilization and reintegration, under the overall guidance of the Deputy Prime Minister, collaborated closely with the Bank team in fine-tuning the project's design. This collaborative spirit prevailed throughout the project. 15. Several factors contributed to EDRP's sound design: (i) the Bank had substantial experience and had identified best practices in preparing and financing DRPs in several countries;3 (ii) GoE also had significant knowledge from implementing the demobilization of over 400,000 veterans following the conclusion of the civil war in 1991;4 and (iii) GoE had findings from a pilot demobilization of over 10,000 veterans, started in December 2000, to test the resilience and utility of proposed EDRP systems and procedures. GoE was flexible and modified the pilot's design, and took on board lessons for improving Phase I demobilization. 16. The project incorporated key recommendations from previous operations, such as the need to: (i) support the full transition from demobilization to reinsertion and reintegration to achieve the primary objectives; (ii) provide identification documents and collect socio-economic data during demobilization; (iii) provide a short-term social safety net to veterans (i.e. TSS payment), to assist in reinsertion; (iv) provide training, and information and referral systems to link veterans to local employment opportunities; and (v) decentralize implementation of reintegration assistance. During appraisal, GoE also highlighted the need to take comprehensive measures to reduce the risk of spreading HIV/AIDS. EDRP's three components fully supported the transition from demobilization to reintegration and were well linked to the PDOs. 17. The project's risk assessment was satisfactory. The resumption of hostilities or delays in the peace process was seen as the main external risk. However, both countries had adhered to the 3These include projects in Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Chad, Djibouti, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Uganda. 4A detailed analysis of the 1991/92 project for the demobilization of about 450,000 ex-Derg soldiers was at hand in a World Bank Study of 1996 (Case Studies in War-to-Peace Transition: The Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Ethiopia, by N.J. Colleta, M. Kostner, I. Wiederhofer). GoE also had relevant documents from a demobilization program implemented between 1996 and 1998. In addition, a UN-document was available-- Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peace-keeping Environment, Principles and Guidelines, Lessons Learned Unit, N.Y. 1999. 4 Agreement, and there was an ongoing deployment of UN observers in advance of the full peacekeeping force (United Nations Mission to Eritrea and Ethiopia, UNMEE). This was expected to lower the risk considerably. The DCA, however, included a provision for suspending the project if necessary. Also, IDA and the IMF agreed to monitor government expenditures under the IMF program and the Bank's planned balance of payment support to verify a reduction in defense expenditures. 18. Weak implementation capacity and the expected rapid pace of demobilization presented the main project risks, and related to: (i) the misuse of project funds; (ii) the possibility of leakages in reinsertion and reintegration cash payments; and (iii) the likelihood of accelerating the spread of HIV/AIDS via demobilization. EDRP took steps to mitigate (i) and (ii) by: establishing a dedicated Federal Project Management Units (FPMU) and Regional Project Management Units (RPMUs); and using existing implementation structures. The FPMU was responsible for central program coordination, while the regions conducted the day-to-day reintegration assistance operations of the project. The strategy to channel support programs through existing structures was not only cost effective, but also facilitated experience- and problem-sharing between the FPMU/RPMUs and government sector agencies at the federal and regional levels, and helped in the efficiency (timeliness, ease of access) of TSS and RG payments. EDRP had robust safeguards to prevent direct abuse of project resources and possible leakages of cash payments: first, there was a comprehensive internal system of verification at the zonal level and below via the use of coupons; second, the Management Information System (MIS) contained a comprehensive beneficiary list, and RPMUs were required to provide timely information on the status of payments; and third, regular ex-post verification of random beneficiary samples were to be conducted by independent experts. These measures contributed to effective implementation. 19. EDRP included steps to address the risk of spreading HIV/AIDS via demobilization--risks that had been documented in other countries. The assembly of veterans in DCs provided the opportunity to HIV/AIDS VCT. During the pilot phase, GoE evaluated the proposed counseling and testing procedures and made adjustments to project design and implementation arrangements to improve the quality of these services. VCT helped to increase awareness about HIV/AIDS prior to veterans returning home, and determine their HIV serostatus on a voluntary basis. VCT not only became an integral part of EDRP, but also paved the way to further prevention, care and support of veterans who tested positive. The project linked to the Ethiopia Multi-sectoral HIV/AIDS Project (EMSAP, US$60m, September, 2000) during the reinsertion and reintegration phases to ensure sustained support to the HIV seropositive veterans after return to their communities. 20. EDRP's design had two weaknesses: (i) the M&E was primarily geared towards measuring outputs (numbers demobilized/assisted, payments made) rather than program outcomes, and may have hampered the ability of the program to track reintegration outcomes in a sufficiently timely and rigorous manner; and (ii) the sequencing of training and payments. The M&E design may be attributed to the fact that EDRP was designed to support a process. The project's KPIs and data collected in the MIS were realistic and measurable. However, given that the project's specific objectives also aimed to help veterans "rebuild their lives and resume productive economic activities", the M&E system should have incorporated ongoing baseline socio-economic data and measurable outcome indicators to capture veterans' livelihoods over time.5 The DCA required a final project evaluation, and the teams also agreed to conduct several studies as part of the M&E program to shed light on outcomes (Section 3.2). The vocational and business training activities--an integral part of EDRP, could have been better designed. The timing of payment of the second RGs should have linked to the timing of training for those veterans interested in such training, to help them to make use of their second installment (Birr 2,000 or above) to 5This is not peculiar to Ethiopia. Such benchmarks are rare in DRPs developed at the time. (Beneficiary Assessment, p. 29) 5 establish themselves in productive activities related to the training. Failure to link these contributed to a number of veterans expending these resources before training activities were initiated (Section 6). 2.2 Implementation 21. Favorable Factors. GoE was familiar with the procurement arrangements required for the quick-disbursing component (US$120 million). These were sufficiently flexible to allow for full disbursement for financing this component within two years of project effectiveness. Implementation arrangements for the TSS and RG component through the woreda finance offices were also effective and efficient. GoE ensured the deployment of capable staff to facilitate project implementation at both federal and regional levels. The MoND was committed to completing demobilization activities rapidly. The demobilization phase of the project was completed by December 2002. Furthermore, GoE was able to disburse reinsertion and reintegration assistance to able-bodied veterans in a timely manner, enabling the project to complete reintegration assistance activities to able-bodied veterans by December 2004. 22. Unfavorable Factors. A few areas of weakness marked program implementation: (i) lines of accountability and reporting between the FPMU/EDRP and various regional and woreda authorities were not sufficiently robust. Several regional and other local authorities created expectations regarding complementary reintegration assistance activities and/or implemented some of these. Yet, given the decentralized nature of these activities, overall oversight, quality control and evaluation were inadequate. The reported discrepancy between veterans' perceptions of what they were promised versus what they received underlines the importance of consistent communication and the management of expectations across all levels of Government to reduce the risk of beneficiary dissatisfaction; (ii) the turnover of FPMU/EDRP managers created information gaps in some areas; (iii) limited procurement capacity in the FPMU/EDRP led to delays in the completion of civil works rehabilitation activities in the NRC and the POCs; (iv) weak reporting systems from woreda finance offices up to MoFED led to delays in the reconciliation of TSS and RG payments; and (v) the M&E system, while initially sound, was neglected in the final three years of implementation, which focused largely on the provision of assistance to disabled veterans. There was only limited evaluation of process, cost and output/impact data during this time. 23. Mid-Term Review (MTR) and Restructuring. The MTR and restructuring were not in response to project implementation problems (Sections 1.6 - 1.7). The MTR consisted of a Government commissioned external MTR Report that largely confirmed the successful demobilization and good progress in the reintegration of veterans.6 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization 24. Design. The KPIs were largely focused on assessing project outputs without seeking to establish an explicit causal relationship between these indicators and the PDOs. The collection of process-oriented data with a qualitative focus would have provided the FPMU with timely information on progress, obstacles and effectiveness of EDRP assistance. Supervision missions highlighted these issues (February 2002), and their recommendations were followed to a certain degree, but it became clear that the initial design did not sufficiently allow for assessing program outcomes, particularly with respect to 6Mid-Term Review of Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project, Final Report, Development Studies Associates (DSA), Addis Ababa, July 2003. 6 the medium-term social and economic reintegration of veterans. As mentioned, several assessment studies shed light on outcomes; however, these were done towards the very end of the project in 2007. 25. M&E Implementation. Measurement of the agreed indicators was quite effective during the period 2001­2004, during which the project established a comprehensive MIS, and the M&E unit conducted a number of statistically robust payment verification surveys, as required in the DCA. Program reporting has also been reliable, with quarterly and annual progress reports submitted to GoE and the Bank in a timely manner. However, M&E activities have been less robust after 2004, when the provision of targeted reintegration assistance for able-bodied veterans came to an end, and M&E program staff departed. For example, M&E of the provision of medical rehabilitation services to disabled veterans has been uneven, with incomplete information on the numbers receiving rehabilitation assistance and the quality of the services provided. 26. Perhaps the single-most significant weakness in the design and execution of M&E was the lack of a program-wide results framework to assess progress toward full reintegration of the target population, as well as to assess what types of activities were contributing most to this goal. The M&E unit made efforts to develop a conceptual framework and indicator map to fill this gap, but a major challenge remained in terms of not only educating field staff on how to define and measure success, but also in how to translate the conceptual design into practical field activities and useful analyses for management and planning purposes. Another weakness in M&E was the lack of details of the diverse forms of complementary economic reintegration assistance provided by regional and local governments across the country (i.e. land for housing and businesses, business licenses, training and employment) within the framework of the program, but outside of IDA financing. This hampered the learning and adoption of positive and negative lessons across the program. 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 27. Overall, the project presented no significant safeguard or fiduciary compliance issues. EDRP was initially classified as environmental category C and as such anticipated no compliance issues. Such a classification is not uncommon to DRPs where reintegration activities (the one component that may warrant safeguards consideration) are usually small-scale and ex-combatant populations are widely dispersed. This was particularly the case in Ethiopia where regular reintegration support took the form of cash payments and limited training.7 28. Activities added to the project design after original approval--construction and operation of the NRC-- however, did pose unanticipated potential safeguard problems. Nonetheless, the consultant who supervised the new works indicated that EDRP: (i) abided by Bank environmental concerns and safeguards in constructing NRC; (ii) built well-designed medical waste collection facilities; and (iii) made the recommended construction changes to help ensure better accessibility. 29. EDRP was reclassified as a category B following its restructuring to support ERP in 2003 due to potential environmental impacts of ERP's housing and community infrastructure restructuring. Nonetheless, an ESA conducted during the first year of the ERP found "no appreciable negative 7 On the other hand, regional governments provided additional reintegration support to approximately 114,000 veterans (such as agriculture extension or provision of land) that may have warranted further environmental or social assessment. However, as these were not financed under EDRP, there would have been limited scope to apply Bank safeguard concerns. Furthermore, given that the veteran population did not exceed 0.4 percent of any region's total population (except in Tigray where the estimated population was around 1.5 percent of the total population), any possible negative impacts would have been marginal. 7 environmental and social impacts". These findings are confirmed in the ICR for the ERP (Report No. ICR350, June 21, 2007). 30. Fiduciary systems and controls were sound and were consistently rated satisfactory. EDRP included special arrangements to ensure that both fast-disbursing tranche payments were used according to the DCA, and that cash-payments were reaching the intended beneficiaries in a timely manner. Regular statistically valid beneficiary surveys confirmed the receipt of these payments by beneficiaries. The only serious issue noted by both FMS and independent auditors were the delays in reconciling outstanding advances to regional offices. While such advances, made primarily for TSS payments, have been progressively retired over the final course of the project, an outstanding balance of approximately US$817,000 (7.1m Birr) remained at the time of project closing. GoE is committed to accounting for this balance. There were some procurement delays related to critical operational equipment for the NRC and POCs, which delayed start-up of these facilities. There were no other serious procurement issues. 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 31. Physical Rehabilitation Services: Continued effectiveness of POCs and NRC will require allocation of sufficient budgets to pay and train technical and managerial personnel, procure material and maintain equipment, and maintain the facilities. With respect to the NRC, MoLSA, the Ministry of Education (MoE) and MoFED signed a tripartite Memorandum of Understanding outlining the responsibilities of each stakeholder in advance. MoE is to ensure the management of the facility through the Black Lion Hospital, to which NRC is affiliated, and MoFED is to ensure adequate budget for NRC's operation and maintenance. FPMU/EDRP of MoLSA completed a study that provided a detailed roadmap for operationalizing the NRC. GoE also established a Steering Committee comprising key stakeholders to ensure the full functioning of NRC. To maximize the potential of NRC, the study recommends that GoE seek a long-term partnership with an experienced international university or teaching institution in the field of physical rehabilitation. 32. The FPMU/EDRP of MoLSA also commissioned an assessment of the financial and clinical sustainability of the five POCs. Long-term sustainability would be best secured by developing a national policy framework and strategy for the physical rehabilitation sector. FPMU/EDRP has prepared a proposal to guarantee adequate resources, and to develop such a strategy to provide systematic long-term treatment for persons with disabilities in Ethiopia. 3. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOMES 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation 33. EDRP's objectives remain highly relevant under Ethiopia's development priorities set out in the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty--PASDEP, 2005-2010 and the Bank's Interim CAS, FY06-07. The PASDEP builds on GoE's Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP, July 2002) to sustain post-war economic reforms, accelerate growth, distribute gains to poor people, alleviate food insecurity, and boost private sector development. The CAS also emphasizes provision of basic services to the poor and the vulnerable and promoting pro-poor growth. 34. The purpose of EDRP was to release human and financial resources from the military to economic development and thereby reduce poverty. The project initially supported a safety net for veterans, followed by targeted economic reintegration assistance. This continues to make a positive contribution to veterans, their families and communities, and create an indirect demand for goods and services in local areas. The positive effects of additional money flows on the production environment in 8 rural areas seem to outweigh any negative effects (EDRP Final Evaluation, 2007). Overall, EDRP has provided GoE with the means to initiate the social and economic recovery following war-related setbacks by: (i) helping veterans to rebuild their lives and resume economic activities; (ii) helping to redirect defense expenditures to productive sectors; and (iii) facilitating private sector confidence and sustainable economic growth (Section 3.2). These goals remain relevant. 35. Other project objectives/components relevant to Ethiopia's current priorities include: · raising HIV/AIDS awareness in veterans, their families and in the general community through the provision of extensive education, testing and treatment; · enhancing food security through the Safety Net Grant Component under PSNP. PSNP is a key part of GoE's Food Security Program, within the framework of PASDEP, which is helping Ethiopia move towards the MDGs; and · strengthening the meager medical rehabilitation facilities to provide better care not only to disabled veterans, but also to other persons with disabilities. Achievement of Project Development Objectives 36. Section 1.2 lists the project's PDOs and KPIs. With reintegration gaining worldwide attention, there is considerable debate about what reintegration is, how to measure it, and when to consider it `successful'. The UN Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS, 2006) defines reintegration as the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration, however, consists of social and political elements, and is not simply about restoring income levels to pre- mobilization levels.8 Although EDRP did not monitor any economic, social or political outcome indicators, the project provided for several studies to shed light on project outcomes.9 In particular, the Final Evaluation of EDRP and the Beneficiary Impact Assessment (BIA) do a commendable task of identifying and testing a range of variables to measure the influence of EDRP benefits using focal groups and participatory surveys. This ICR focuses on these findings, and attempts to link the outcomes to Bank interventions, outputs and the achievement of PDOs (see Annex 2 for detailed Project Outputs by Component, and Annex 5 for Results and Conclusions of the two 2007 Assessments.) Outcomes under each Project Development Objective PDO 1: Demobilize and Reintegrate 150,000 veterans. KPI: (i) the number of demobilized veterans; (ii) the number receiving HIV/AIDS counselling. · OUTCOME 1: EDRP successfully demobilized 148,093 (99 percent) of the 150,000 veterans, including 17,000 disabled veterans, and contributed to enhanced macroeconomic stability (The fiscal impact is discussed under Outcome 8). 37. Demobilization commenced in late 2000, was well-organized, fast and cost-effective, and was completed by 2004.10 Phase I demobilization was increased from the planned 60,000 to 70,996. The MTR survey, which covered five regions (Tigray, Oromiya, Amhara, SNNPR and Addis Ababa) that 8Beneficiary Impact Assessment, p. 30. 9These include: the Mid-Term Review (July 2003), which included field-based surveys and veteran interviews to measure reintegration of urban and rural veterans using the pre-identified KPIs; the Training Impact Assessment Report (2004), to assess the importance of training in creating employment/self-employment; and two extensive assessments-- the EDRP Final Evaluation of June 2007, (which was also a DCA requirement); and the Beneficiary Impact Assessment (June, 2007). The latter two studies use the UN Standards to define and measure reintegration. 10Although GoE had initially estimated that 150,000 veterans would be demobilized, the Ministry of National Defense decided to retain the balance. 9 accounted for 95 percent of the demobilized veterans, indicates that the DCs performed their activities effectively and efficiently. Over 86 percent of the sampled veterans expressed satisfaction with the quality of services (ID card and coupon issuance, pre-demobilization orientation, HIV/AIDS sensitization). Reintegration outcomes are discussed below. · OUTCOME 2: EDRP ran one of the single largest HIV/AIDS VCT programs and was one of the first to start post-test counselling. All demobilized veterans received substantial HIV/AIDS sensitisation, booster education and materials in the DCs. 15,723 veterans participated in VCT. The rate of HIV prevalence among veterans who participated in the voluntary testing did not deviate from the estimates available at the time on HIV prevalence in the general population in Ethiopia. VCT not only became an integral part of EDRP, but also paved the way for further prevention, care and support of veterans who tested positive. The project linked to the Ethiopia Multi-sectoral HIV/AIDS Project (EMSAP, US$60m, September, 2000) during the reinsertion and reintegration phases to ensure sustained support to the HIV seropositive veterans after return to their communities. It is likely that Ethiopian veterans are better educated on the risks of HIV/AIDS than most Ethiopian civilians. Reinsertion. KPI: the number of TSS payments made to veterans. Reintegration. KPIs (in reverse order): (i) employment status of veterans; (ii) number of disabled veterans who have received medical rehabilitation assistance. · OUTCOME 3: Over 90 percent of the veterans indicate that the TSS payment--EDRP's single most important reinsertion activity--was critical in resuming livelihoods. 38. A verification survey followed each phase of demobilization to ensure that veterans received the TSS payments. About 80.3 percent of the veterans received their payment within two months after demobilization, 15.9 percent received it within three months, and a further 3.8 percent within four months. The loss of payment coupons by a small number of veterans caused some delays in their payment. The modality of TSS payment--one month from reaching destination, coupon arrangement, and making the payment at the woreda capital--was well received by the veterans (EDRP Final Evaluation, p. 51). 39. EDRP provided financial assistance for reintegration six months after veterans received the TSS payment. Reintegration payments varied from Birr 2000 to 6,000 depending on the four categories of injuries/disabilities (1-most severely disabled, 2-seriously disabled, 3-modestly disabled, and 4-mildly disabled) and classification of military service status (militias, returnee, newly recruited and regular soldiers) (Annex 2). EDRP performed satisfactorily (for all categories of veterans and across regions) in terms of payment of the eligible amount, timeliness, and the ease with which it was done. In three years, EDRP provided reintegration assistance to veterans to help return to a productive urban and rural life in all eleven regions of the country. Verification surveys indicated that veterans utilized the TSS and RG grants for daily consumption expenditure and for economic reintegration (see Tables 2 and 3 in Annex 5). These cash payments have thus contributed directly to Outcome 4 below. · OUTCOME 4: Veterans have started different types of economic activities and their asset ownership and incomes have increased.11 40. Eighty five percent of the demobilized veterans were rural-based. Of these, the veterans who had access to land before mobilization (66 percent) were able to reinstate and retain their lands, use funds to 11FPMU and RPMU follow-up tracking surveys, Government ICR, p. 35. 10 develop their farms, purchase more livestock, repair their houses and resume their lives `as usual'. After demobilization, 80 percent indicated they owned land. The 'urban' veterans who saved the cash grants started petty trades, garages, restaurants, fruits and vegetable trade etc. Improvement in asset ownership -- The economic situation of the veterans improved quite considerably among the veterans demobilized into rural areas and urban areas.12 For example, in among rural veterans, 31 percent owned a house before mobilization, and 56 percent owned a house after demobilization. The percentage increases in ownership of different types of animals (cows, oxen, goats etc.) were also impressive. Agricultural land ownership increased from 43 percent to 50 percent. In urban areas, 7 percent of the veterans owned houses prior to mobilization and 37 percent owned houses after demobilization. Ownership of urban land increased from 4 percent to 23 percent. Increase in household income ­Assessing the total annual incomes derived from all sources (farm, non-farm, employment, rents, pensions, etc.), there has been a marked improvement in annual receipts. Part of this increase may accrue to pension payments. The mean income of rural veterans increased form 3,098 Birr (before mobilization) to 4,197 (after reintegration). For urban veterans, mean income increased from 3,895 Birr to 4,273 Birr (Final Evaluation, p. 58). · OUTCOME 5: EDRP activities have provided special care for the disabled veterans, and the project has significantly strengthened Ethiopia's overall capacity to care for the medical rehabilitation of the nation's persons with disabilities. 41. A significant number of disabled veterans suffering from locomotion disorder received prosthetic- orthopedic aids and devices and physiotherapy services. Overall, disabled veterans claim to be faring comparatively well and also when compared to community-level control groups. EDRP's considerable provisions appear to have led in many cases to a reasonably secure financial status, given also that almost all disabled veterans moved to apparent `urban' areas and have managed to earn additional income from assets (BIA, p. 11). (Annex 2 presents detailed outputs with respect to disabled veterans.) · OUTCOME 6: Training activities have helped veterans to diversity their incomes and improve their economic status. 42. Rural veterans seem to be in a better position to improve the performance of their day-to-day agricultural activities. 97.2 percent of the veterans in the Tigray and Amhara regions indicated that they acquired new skills from training. In these two regions, 85.8 percent and 79.8 percent of the veterans were able to diversify agricultural activities through training provided by EDRP. Most of them have applied modern techniques they received, and expect to improve their incomes (Training Impact Assessment Report, 2004). · OUTCOME 7: Social engagement of veterans both in rural and urban areas has increased significantly. 43. More than half of the rural veterans are members of development committees. Before mobilization, only a third of them were members. While veterans in rural areas seem to concentrate their engagement more in `official' organizations, veterans in urban areas seem to prefer engagement in traditional organizations (Final Evaluation, p. 59). 12See EDRP Final Evaluation, p. 56-58 for details on improvements in asset ownership and income. These results are also consistent with observations during the EDRP Implementation Support Mission of May 2003. 11 PDO 2: Support Macroeconomic Stability · OUTCOME 8: Fiscal developments following demobilization indicate significant improvements in macroeconomic stability (Table 2).13 Although EDRP did not include macroeconomic targets, following discussions with the World Bank and the IMF, the Government had committed to cutting defense expenditures significantly, from 13.3 percent of GDP in FY00 to about 5 percent of GDP by FY03.14 This reduction was to expedite economic recovery and allow GoE to restore expenditure levels in the social sectors in line with its poverty reduction strategy. Table 2: Post-war Trends in Government of Ethiopia Budget Allocation and Expenditure Sector\Fiscal year 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 Total Expenditure (million Birr) 16235 16,685 19,840 20,232 24,563 Total Recurrent Expenditure (million Birr) 11585 10,550 13,527 11,961 13,219 Total Recurrent Expenditure (% of total expenditure) 71.4 63.2 68.2 59.1 53.8 Defense (% of total recurrent expenditure) 31.4 27.2 17.3 20.5 22.1 Defense (% of total expenditure) 22.4 15.6 11.8 12.1 11.9 Education & training (% of total recurrent expenditure) 13.6 16.8 16.8 21.0 22.6 Health (% of total recurrent expenditure) 1.4 5.0 3.9 4.4 5.3 Agriculture & natural resource (% of total recurrent expen.) 5.7 6.4 5.4 7.3 8.8 Total Capital Expenditure (million Birr) 4649 6,134 6,313 8,272 11,343 Total Capital Expenditure (% of total expenditure) 28.6 36.8 31.8 40.9 46.2 Economic Development (% of capital expenditure) 65.5 64.0 65.3 57.7 67.6 Agriculture (% of total capital expenditure) 11.2 15.5 14.7 22.7 25.5 Natural resources (% of total capital expenditure) 7.5 8.1 9.4 4.9 9.8 Road Construction (% of total capital expenditure) 29.2 28.7 30.0 22.2 23.2 Source: Ethiopia: Building on Progress, A Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP), Volume I: Main Text. MoFED, September 2006, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. · Defense expenditure fell to 4.2 percent of GDP in 2003 and to 3.6 percent of GDP in 2004.15 The reduction in force in the ENDF helped to facilitate a shift of government expenditures from the defense sector to other social and economic development priorities, with recurrent expenditures on defense falling from 31.4 percent of government recurrent expenditures in 2000/01 to 17.3 percent of recurrent expenditures in 2002/03. Total recurrent expenditure and total capital expenditure as shares of total expenditure also evolved favorably. Expenditure on poverty-oriented sectors increased and the combined recurrent expenditure share of education and health increased from about 21.8 percent in 2001/02 to 31 percent in 2005/06. Capital expenditure on the economic development sector increased from 65 percent to 74 percent during the same period, with a proportional growth in the capital expenditure allocated to agriculture, natural resources and road sector development. 13See Annex 2 for further on macroeconomic stability. 14The Memorandum of Agreement on the IMF Program (November 2000), paragraph 56. 15Source: MoFED. These are based on the Government fiscal year ending July 7. 12 · EDRP certainly contributed to the reduction in defense expenditures. Ethiopia's overall macro improvements, however, are a cumulative outcome of several programs implemented in the aftermath of the war, including the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) and the SDPRP. · OUTCOME 8: EDRP assisted in consolidating peace, which in turn helped to retrieve private sector confidence. The conflict had exerted a toll on private sector development. New investments fell from a high of 2.9 billion Birr in 1997­98 to 1.1 billion Birr in 1998­99 and to 0.5 billion Birr in the first nine months of 1999­2000.16 The demobilization process was accompanied by little social unrest, and there was no evidence of escalated criminal activities in areas of reintegration (BIA, p. 56). Foreign direct investment since demobilization has tripled, increasing from about US$100 million in 2002/03 to US$365 million in 2005/06. 3.3 Efficiency Not Applicable for emergency operations. 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Satisfactory 44. The PDOs were very relevant to the emergency response, and the PDOs, design and implementation remain highly relevant to Ethiopia's current development priorities and the Bank's Interim CAS FY06-07 as discussed in Section 3.1. In two areas, EDRP is considered a model: (i) the project's attention to the disabled veterans, and its continued emphasis on improving facilities for Ethiopia's often neglected disabled population; and (ii) the project's important accomplishments in terms of the awareness it created directly and indirectly about prevention and control of HIV/AIDS.17 There were some shortcomings in the M&E system; however, several studies (that had not been planned originally) were conducted to help shed light on project outcomes. Overall, EDRP fully achieved its development objectives.18 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development 45. Improvements in asset position indicate poverty reduction and livelihood enhancement (Section 3.2, Outcome 4). We can also assume that EDRP has contributed to reducing poverty and food insecurity among veterans who had returned to food insecure woredas. Poverty in these areas was aggravated by the major drought that struck Ethiopia in 2002/03. This was one of the reasons why EDRP resources (US$40.4 million) were transferred to PSNP (WB EDRP Implementation Support Mission April 2005). Activities under this new component most likely benefited veterans and other vulnerable groups in these communities. 16Source: Ethiopian Investment Authority, EDRP Final Evaluation, p. 15. 17"The Assessment found that assistance issued to (severely) disabled veterans was well-received, appropriate and continued to generate a positive impact on the self-reliance of physically impaired individuals and their families. Where evidence was available, the assessment also found that the HIV/AIDS awareness programme among veterans, and the subsequent treatment available to those (voluntarily) testing positive, was effective. In these two respects, the EDRP can be considered something of a model", Beneficiary Assessment, p. 9. 18Outcomes of ERP are reflected in the ERP ICR (Report No. ICR350). 13 46. Compared to their male comrades, female veterans generally had skills that appeared more marketable, (i.e. nursing). Consequently, it is said that female veterans found it easier to reintegrate economically (Final Evaluation, p. 21). About 20 percent of the demobilized female veterans received priority in the employment-oriented vocational program. The Tigray Region, which received a substantial number of demobilized female veterans, provided targeted support through the EDRP sub project fund in business skill training (to 725 veterans), kindergarten teaching (to 120 veterans) and telephone operation training. The regional Government offered a course on junior nursing to 80 female veterans, which helped 262 female veterans to obtain jobs in medical services. Altogether, 1186 or 61.1 percent of female veterans in the region received varied additional reintegration support. The Amhara Region and the Addis Ababa Administration also provided employment opportunities that particularly targeted female veterans. In the former, 161 female veterans obtained jobs through project facilitation, and 73 obtained computer training. In Addis Ababa, 40 female veterans were given employment through the project. Female veterans, in addition to the targeted interventions, were the favored recipients of the various region-based non-cash reintegration support, especially in the urban areas (MTR, p. 48). (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening 47. EDRP's investments substantially enhanced service delivery capacity to rehabilitate persons with physical disabilities in Ethiopia. This included: (i) the rehabilitation of orthotic, prosthetic and physiotherapy support facilities at five POCs in different parts of the country; (ii) construction of the NRC in Addis Ababa; (iii) the provision of training to 20 new prosthetic-orthotic technicians (in partnership with ICRC); (iv) the upgrading of the skills of 19 existing orthopaedic technicians serving in POCs; and (v) the training of 10 physiotherapists to BSc level at Gonder University and the training of 25 physiotherapy technicians. 48. The NRC constructed in the compound of the Black Lion Hospital in Addis Ababa is to serve three major purposes: (i) a national referral center for providing physical rehabilitation services in Ethiopia; (ii) a training facility for physiotherapy, orthopedics and prosthetics to mitigate the shortage of skilled human resources in this sector; and (iii) a research facility. The Center is has been constructed and equipped, but it is not yet fully operational though this is envisaged by January 2008. The facility has the potential to become a regional center of learning and excellence if managed and resourced effectively. 49. The project has also enhanced the capacity of the Government to undertake the planning and implementation of demobilization and reintegration activities in the future. A number of government personnel have gained useful experience in the management of such activities, and project planning, and M&E reports will remain available to Government. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) - None 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops - See Annex 5 4. ASSESSMENT OF RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME Rating: Moderate In the narrow sense of EDRP's PDOs, the risk to development outcomes is considered moderate. However, in terms of the higher order country-level objectives, the risk to development outcomes may be significant as described under Peace-Building below. 14 50. Peace-Building. The sustainability of program outcomes should be measured at several levels. Whilst not an explicit objective of the EDRP, World Bank post-conflict recovery assistance to both Ethiopia and Eritrea following the cessation of hostilities in June 2000 and the Algiers Agreement of December 2000 was premised on the assumption that the governments would implement the provisions of the peace agreement in a timely and cooperative manner. However, by November 2007, implementation of the Agreement's provisions, especially with respect to the demarcation of the contested border, has stalled. Relations between the Governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea remain tense, with the borders officially closed at significant economic costs to both countries. The risk of a renewed conflict that could lead to re-mobilization and macroeconomic instability persists, and represents a significant risk to the outcomes of EDRP. While similar recovery investments were financed in Eritrea, it is not clear whether World Bank management put in place mechanisms to ensure exchange of information across project teams working on related activities in the two countries or has adopted a regional approach in support of longer-term reconciliation and recovery. 51. Reintegration. Longer-term reintegration of veterans is largely an individual process affected by a number of factors described in Annex 5. Surveys suggest that social and economic reintegration of veterans has overall been successful in terms of community acceptance as well as an improvement in ownership of assets and income. However, a significant proportion of veterans express dissatisfaction with respect to their current economic status in relation to their expectations. It is not clear whether this dissatisfaction is due to unrealistic expectations generated by military and local officials at the time of demobilization or because of general reintegration challenges in a difficult economic environment. 52. Physical Rehabilitation Services; The Government has shown commendable commitment to providing extensive medical rehabilitation and reintegration assistance to disabled veterans through EDRP, and to making significant capital investments in human and physical resources for this historically neglected sector. However, there are some concerns with respect to GoE's commitment to ensure the sustainability of investments in the physical rehabilitation sector. The continued effectiveness of POCs and the NRC will require the allocation of sufficient budgets for activities discussed in Section 2.5. These activities could in principle be financed from disbursed project resources that remain available at the date of Project Closing. However, it is not clear at this time that MoFED will guarantee the availability of resources for these activities. There is thus a risk that the investments made in this sector under EDRP will erode over time, and that Ethiopia will miss an opportunity to establish a sustainable national physical rehabilitation system. 5. ASSESSMENT OF BANK AND BORROWER PERFORMANCE 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Highly Satisfactory 53. In addition to the speed with which the project was prepared (Section 2.1), the Bank team drew upon existing expertise and the operation benefited from lessons learned from Bank and other recent DRPs (Section 6). The project's design supported the full transition from demobilization to reintegration and the three project components and activities were well linked to the PDOs. EDRP is considered a model in terms of its attention to disabled veterans and its design of the HIV/AIDS awareness and control activities. The Task Team Leader (TTL) at appraisal had just completed a similar program in Sierra Leone and key team members (and future TTL) were specialists in the field. 15 (b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Satisfactory 54. EDRP benefited from regular and substantive supervision throughout the life of the project. Action plans were prepared and used for follow-up in subsequent missions. The composition of the task team remained relatively stable during the life of the project, with the original TTL being replaced by a team member in 2003 who remained the project TTL until the end of EDRP. FM and procurement staff remained on the project almost through its entire life and key technical consultants for M&E, disabilities and construction were retained over the course of several missions to ensure continuity in these key areas. Finally, the Bank team worked hard with the client to redesign the project in response to changing needs and savings under the project. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Satisfactory 5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Highly Satisfactory 55. The Government moved very quickly to prepare and implement measures to reduce security-related public expenditures, assist war-affected populations, and restore macro-economic stability. GoE assigned a dedicated team of well-qualified Government personnel for preparing and implementing the project both at national and regional levels. The rapid reduction in force of the ENDF facilitated a significant reduction in recurrent expenditures for defense, and supported the reintegration of 148,093 veterans into civilian life. The flexibility afforded by the retroactive financing provision enabled GoE to demobilize over 30,000 soldiers before Credit Effectiveness. GoE disbursed the quick-disbursing resources made available under EDRP in a sufficiently timely manner to demobilize over 120,000 soldiers by December 2001, and begin the reversal of the negative macroeconomic impacts of the conflict. 56. Given the wide variation in economic and social reintegration environments in Ethiopia, the Government rightly pressed for greater devolution in implementation arrangements. The coordination arrangements at the center (especially the FPMU) were vested with sufficient oversight authority to guide implementation of project activities effectively. Timely and adequate staffing was assured throughout project implementation. 57. The Government's commitment to provide extensive resources to assist the disabled was commendable, as discussed above. GoE needs to act on the recommendations on financial and clinical sustainability and the detailed start-up plan NRC in order to sustain further investments and the substantial investments made under the EDRP in the past six years. (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Satisfactory 58. The Emergency Recovery Project Management Unit (ERPMU) of MoFED oversaw overall implementation of the EDRP. MoND was responsible for pre-demobilization activates and for HIV/AIDS sensitization and VCT activities in the DCs. The FPMU/EDRP of MoLSA at the federal level, and RPMUs under the Bureaus of Labour and Social Affairs (BOLSA) in the regions implemented most Program activities. RPMUs were established from early 2002-June 2004 to support veteran reintegration activities. In regions with a high concentration of veterans (Tigray, Amhara, SNNPR), Zonal Project Management Units (ZPMUs) were set up to further strengthen reintegration efforts. At the woreda level, there was usually a focal person who followed up on issues raised by veterans. 16 59. In general, program implementation was characterized by an extraordinary degree of political will and cooperation among Government stakeholders. GoE ensured that relevant ministries cooperated closely during the rapid initial demobilization phase, and that regional and woreda structures welcomed returning veterans appropriately. 60. Woreda finance bureaus were tasked with the disbursement of TSS and RG payments. In addition, regional and local governments provided extensive supplementary reintegration support to veterans in the form of business licences, access to land for housing and businesses, training and employment opportunities. Beneficiary surveys in the course of implementation indicate that 96 percent of veterans received their TSS and RGs in a timely manner. There were a few areas of weakness in project implementation (Section 2.2). (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Satisfactory 61. Against the backdrop of an on-going emergency, GoE put together a highly relevant project, which achieved its planned outcomes. While there were a few weaknesses in relation to implementation and fiduciary processes, some of these apparently represented generic (or system-wide) weaknesses, which could not feasibly be addressed within the short, urgent operating horizon of this operation. 6. LESSONS LEARNED 62. Positive Lessons Project Management: Flexible planning and implementation were vital to EDRP's success, and are important to successful demobilization and reintegration programs. EDRP planners were constantly on the lookout for the unexpected and accommodated changes in a timely manner. For example, during demobilization, the number of veterans to be demobilized in the two phases was adjusted, and it was also found necessary to carry out Phase II in several rounds. Unlike in the first round of Phase I demobilization, veterans were made to leave the DC in civilian clothes rather than in their military fatigues to minimize the risk of abuse of uniforms. The provision of medical rehabilitation support to disabled veterans under the EDRP merits special mention. The disabled were brought to a relatively better equipped and more favorably located Center to recuperate, and they were also provided with skill training to help them earn an income when they eventually reintegrated. The benefit package for each of the severely disabled veterans included a residential house, a cash grant of Birr 11,000 and additional skills training. None of this was included in the original project plan. Rather, it was developed in response to the difficulties in providing satisfactory Center-based care to severely disabled veterans and to respond to the preferences of veterans with disabilities. The important lesson is that EDRP was responsive and flexible in accommodating changes considered necessary to achieve the objectives. Financing: Innovative use of emergency financing arrangement allowed for timely, rapid and flexible availability of financing. The EDRP included a quick-disbursing component for a positive list of imports that provided in three tranches (of USD 60 million, 40 million and 20 million) a large injection of local currency that allowed the project to: (i) finance cash-payments otherwise ineligible under normal Bank financing, and (ii) provide sufficient cash-flow to manage these payments in a timely way as replenishments of special accounts for these tranche payments were not required. These resources also contributed to enhancing GoE's access to foreign exchange. The use of the 17 retroactive financing provision also enabled the GoE to initiate demobilization activities in November 2000, three months before project effectiveness. The flexibility of the use of IDA credit was also responsive to the long-term capacity building needs in the physical rehabilitation sector. IDA's allocation of a substantial sum of the credit proceeds to the NRC is a case in point. Decentralized management and decision-making was another feature of EDRP's success and an experience worthy of emulation in project management in large countries such as Ethiopia. The Government strategy to channel the reinsertion and reintegration financial, technical, counselling, referral, and other support programs through the existing regional government structures and systems was not only cost-effective, but it also facilitated experience- and problem-sharing among EDRP stakeholders, and improved the timeliness of TSS and economic reintegration payments. Demobilization: The assembly of veterans in DCs provides a good opportunity for effective HIV/AIDS education and VCT. Cash Payments: The disbursement of cash payments only after veterans' return to their communities of settlement reduced potential loss, theft or wastage of this resource before veterans' settlement. Veterans valued the cash payments more than any other assistance provided under the project, and these payments contributed significantly to the reinsertion and initial reintegration of veterans. Verification surveys indicate that the majority of veterans utilized these payments for productive social and economic purposes. Use of intermediate survey tools was an important lesson learned and subsequently applied. EDRP conducted several quick surveys related to cash payments (from a programmatic aspect rather than from an audit aspect) and to demobilization, including the MTR assessment. These were useful tools in evaluating whether beneficiaries were receiving their benefits in a timely manner and in accordance with procedures, and also to assess utilization of this assistance. This type of survey has been applied in subsequent Bank DRPs. Where more could have been done Linkages to Peace Process: Given the political risk and moral hazard associated with post- conflict DRP, the EDRP was not linked sufficiently with other elements of the peace process - and hence Bank investments have not been linked to ex-belligerents' commitments to consolidate peace. Without a regional approach the Bank has not been able to use its leverage along with other key actors, including the UN, to strengthen the peace process on both sides (conflict prevention practice suggests that individual conflict-mitigating interventions can only be strengthened if linked with overall military/ political/ development approaches). Managing Expectations: Timely and conservative management of veterans' expectations is critical during DRPs. Veterans expressed significant dissatisfaction with their economic status due to a disconnect between perceived promises made by military and local government officials during and after demobilization (especially with respect to land, employment and shelter), and actual support provided at local level. The exaggerated expectations about reintegration assistance to be provided by Government may have led some veterans to utilize their cash payments in a sub-optimal manner. It has also harmed the credibility of the program and Government in the eyes of some veterans. Cash Payments: Additional counseling on the investment of veterans' cash grants could have enhanced their use of these resources, as suggested by a number of local government officials and veterans. Further, surveys indicate that a harmonization of vocational and business skills training, and the provision of the training immediately before or after payments could have possibly 18 increased the allocation of the financial assistance for non-consumption purposes. Alternatively, the program should have considered the provision of additional targeted post-training toolkits and working capital. This is a useful lesson for future programs. Sustainability of Physical Rehabilitation Investments: Future programs should address issues such as the sustainability of physical rehabilitation investments earlier, during project planning and implementation. Notwithstanding the conclusion of a MOU concerning management of NRC and the recently-commissioned studies to inform strategies to ensure the clinical and financial sustainability of the POCs and NRC, concerns remain regarding the ability of these institutions to maintain their current quality and quantity of service, especially in the absence of a comprehensive and clear national policy framework and strategy. Monitoring and Evaluation: The project's M&E system should have focused on outcomes, especially with respect to the status of social and economic reintegration (including the effectiveness of business skills and vocational training, employment and income status). This could potentially informed Government decisions about the utilization of cost savings after 2003, and the need for additional targeted reintegration assistance. 7. COMMENTS ON ISSUES RAISED BY BORROWER/IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES/PARTNERS (a) Borrower/implementing agencies Not available yet. (b) Cofinanciers None (c) Other partners and stakeholders None 19 ANNEX 1. PROJECT COSTS AND FINANCING (a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent) Appraisal Estimate Actual/Latest Components Percentage of (USD millions) Estimate (USD millions) Appraisal DEMOBILIZATION 26.8 9.67 36.08 REINSERTION 53.2 34.38 64.62 ECONOMIC REINTEGRATION 80.00 50.63 63.29 OPERATING AND ADMINISTRATION 14.1 4.08 28.94 Total Baseline Cost 174.1 98.76 56.73* Physical Contingencies 0.00 0.00 0.00 Price Contingencies 0.00 0.00 0.00 Total Project Costs 174.1 98.76 56.73 Project Preparation Fund 0.00 0.00 .00 Front-end fee IBRD 0.00 0.00 .00 Total Financing Required 0.00 0.00 * Demobilization was very cost effective due to the national commitment and effective collaboration. For example, the cost of transporting veterans from the collection to the DCs was to come from EDRP, but it was covered by MoND in a much more cost-effective manner. With respect to reinsertion, the actual payment was lower than the planned payment due to adjustments in the basket of goods. The costs of reintegration were lower as the Government provided complementary support (i.e. land, licenses etc.) that was originally to be financed by IDA. (b) Financing Appraisal Actual/Latest Source of Funds Type of Percentage of Cofinancing Estimate Estimate (USD millions)(USD millions) Appraisal Borrower 3.5 0.00 .00 International Development Association (IDA) 170.60 170.60 .00 20 ANNEX 2. OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT Component 1: Demobilization · The Project successfully demobilized 148,093 (98.73 percent) veterans by end-2003. Demobilization was done in two phases. Phase I (70,996 veterans), from November 2000 to July 2001; and Phase II (77,097 veterans) during July 2001 ­ to December 2003 (Table 1). The number of demobilized veterans in Phase I increased from the planned 60,000 to 70,996 as at the end of July 2001. The demobilization process was started in the pilot demobilization center (DC) at Mykinetal in November 2000 with 10,710 soldiers. After gaining experience from a day-to-day evaluation of activities in the pilot DC, demobilization in the other DCs was implemented immediately after the pilot's completion. Demobilization activities under EDRP commenced in the DCs. In this regard, the project established Regional Project Management Units (RPMUs) in eight regions (Tigray, Oromia, Amhara, SNNP, Addis Ababa, Afar, Somali and Dire Dawa), and Zonal offices in Tigray, Oromia, Amhara, SNNP, Afar, and Somali. Focal persons were assigned at woreda level too. The major outputs/tasks at this stage of the process included: · Establishing six DCs in Phase I for the demobilization of able-bodied veterans, while disabled veterans were discharged from two medical facilities (discussed further below); · Providing the basic needs (food, water, and health services) to the veterans in the DCs; · Preparing and issuing individually numbered identification cards to each veteran containing a photograph, address, name of person to be contacted in case of emergency, signature, and two stamps to facilitate reinsertion and reintegration; · Collecting socio-economic data using a structured survey instrument for subsequent computer processing of the data; · Building on program sensitization and on the benefit package initiated earlier during the pre- discharge orientation; · Organizing and delivering sensitization programs on HIV/AIDS VCT. All demobilized veterans received HIV/AIDS sensitization/booster education, materials and condoms prior to the return to their home communities. Voluntary testing was offered to over 110,000 veterans demobilized after March 2001. Of these 15,723 veterans volunteered for testing. Intensive post-test counseling was also given to both HIV/AIDS positive and negative demobilized veterans. At the MTR, 85 percent of those sampled had received HIV/AIDS sensitization/booster education and 70 percent had obtained VCT while in the DCs (MTR, p. 15). To link and coordinate EDRP HIV/AIDS activities at community level, a committee was established under the National AIDS Secretariat. Generally, the VCT program carried out at DCs was the largest in its type in Ethiopia and was appreciated by different stakeholders including the World Bank;19 · Distributing TSS coupons to the veterans for redemption at agreed times later on in the process; · Arranging transport for veterans to their respective zone capitals and providing a per diem and a transport allowance to enable them to return to their communities from the zone capitals; and · Compensating the veterans with a cash provision to buy clothes to replace the fatigues (not an activity in Phase I). 19It is worth noting that the HIV/AIDS sensitization and VCT built upon an existing HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment program developed by the ENDF for active service personnel. 21 Table 1: Number of Demobilized Veterans by Region Region First Phase Second Phase Total No. No. No. % Tigray 45,907 17,753 63,660 42.44 Afar 198 445 643 0.43 Amhara 8,280 20,173 28,453 18.97 Oromia 8,673 19,716 28,389 18.92 Somale 1.408 1,668 3,076 2.05 Benishangul Gumuz 354 836 1,190 0.79 SNNP 4,258 11,567 15,825 10.55 Gambella 181 350 531 0.35 Hareri 179 481 660 0.44 Addis Ababa 1,452 3,661 5,113 3.41 Dire Dawa 106 447 553 0.37 Grand Total 70,996 77,092 148,093 98.73 Source: EDRP 2007 Second Quarter and Annual Progress Report (April ­ June 2007) Component 2: Reinsertion · To facilitate the veteran's reinsertion into their communities TSS payments of Birr 2,000 were provided to 148, 010 veterans (including able bodied and disabled).20 In addition to the Ethiopian Birr 2,000 (ETB), a marginal amount was added to disabled veterans to cover medical expenses. The amount varies based on the level of disability. · At the discharge centers, coupons were given to each beneficiary that entitled him/her to receive the specified amount upon return. Demobilized veterans received payments upon arrival to their communities. According to the Beneficiary Survey, about 96.8 percent of the demobilized veterans received the specified amount within one month time and only 3.2 percent received within two months after demobilization. These delays were mainly attributable to losses of coupon and/or ID cards. · Payments were delivered by Woreda finance bureaus using the government structures. This contributed to timely delivery of the payments and efficient reporting between the different levels of project management. Component 3: Reintegration Economic Reintegration: Grant Outputs The reintegration of veterans commenced after they had exchanged their coupons into the TSS at woreda level. After six months all veterans were entitled to receive a reintegration grant which, varied from Birr 2,000 to Birr 6,000 depending on the categories of able-bodied, injuries/disabilities and classification of recruitment status (Table 2). 20Planned demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration involved 150,000. Of the 148,093 demobilized, 148,010 were reinserted and 148,000 received reintegration payments. About 80 veterans lost their coupons, hence the differences in numbers. 22 Table 2: TSS and reintegration grants Type of Army Amount of cash in Birr by disability category Category 4 Category 3 Category 2 (able bodied and mildly (moderately disabled) (seriously disabled) disabled) TSS Reintegration Total TSS Reintegration Total TSS Reintegration Total Militia 2000 2000 4000 2000 3000 5000 2000 6000 8000 New Regular 2000 2000 4000 2000 3000 5000 2000 6000 8000 Returnees 2000 3000 5000 2000 4000 6000 2000 6000 8000 Regular 2000 4000 6000 2000 5000 7000 2000 6000 8000 Note: Severely disabled veterans belong to category 1 (special category) To make the social reintegration easier, veterans in the DCs were advised to return to their original place where they have extended family networks. Moreover, PMUs Regional Administrations at all levels provided counseling services to demobilized veterans at local level and also monitored the utilization of project financial assistance. RPMUs and regional governments carried out public awareness and sensitization about the project. The socio-economic data collected by the FPMU at the DCs were entered into the MIS and disaggregated by regions and by different variables and submitted to all administrative regions of veterans' destinations. Furthermore, national level socio-economic profiles of demobilized veterans were prepared and distributed to regions on the basis of veterans' information. The following were general principles and possible options to support the veterans' economic reintegration. The final menu for the reintegration support was based on: (i) the specific situation in different regions of returnees; and (ii) the needs, characteristics and aspirations of the returnees. As seen in Table 2, able-bodied veterans were all eligible for a similar amount of assistance irrespective of their reintegration choice from the available menu of options. Reintegration assistance was planned to minimize market distortions and maximize the choice of the beneficiaries. RPMUs used the on going activities in regions rather than develop new service provision capabilities. It prioritized components (the income generating activities) by simplicity to ensure rapid implementation. All veterans received information on: economic opportunities; counseling on career paths and job seeking strategies; referral to jobs, projects preparation, and training. The economic reintegration undertaken in the rural and urban areas were different. 23 Table 3: Number of Demobilization Veterans that Received Complementary Reintegration Assistance by Type of Support and Region Type of Total Tigray Afar Amhara Oromia Somali B.Gumuz SNNP Gambella Harari A.A Dire Support Dawa Farming 41401 3543 3203 4410 land Agricultural 21535 20083 163 975 314 extension service Job 9213 930 60 4040 1583 350 1345 18 64 762 61 opportunity Commercial 1862 989 87 776 10 643 houses Higher 865 503 123 44 195 86 education Land for 15244 5270 3332 3494 36 242 2680 89 101 residential premise urban Land for 3770 1764 891 891 54 170 business premises Residential 6288 131 38 1359 3407 10 909 5 18 411 houses Credit and 2043 449 1069 41 91 100 393 saving facilities Rural land 4842 2883 1959 73 for housing Material 7792 356 512 1041 1285 0 4139 459 and financial Return to 245 0 245 0 former jobs Others 26291 8097 40 7940 4177 45 4253 32 84 1115 593 Total 114391 44,998 98 24923 19674 1671 252 14261 144 166 6698 1506 Source: FPMU/EDRP Special Support to Veterans with Disabilities Approximately 17,000 veterans with physical disabilities received prosthetic-orthopedic aids and devices as well as physiotherapy services (see Strengthening of POCs below). Assistance to the Severely Disabled Veterans. EDRP provided Center-based services to 345 severely disabled veterans in Mickey Leland Center in Addis Ababa from late 2001 onwards (initially these veterans had been moved to a center in Alage, south of Addis Ababa, which was, however, found not to be suitable for their treatment and accommodation). The veterans received basic necessities like 24 food, clothing, shelter, medical treatment including referral services, orthopedic services and prosthetic- orthopedic aids (for the severely disabled), physiotherapy treatment, counseling and other entertainment activities in the Center. This Center-based rehabilitation assistance was given until they were fully rehabilitated and able to return to their families. Most veterans preferred to return to their families rather than remain at the Center. By June 2007, 322 of the disabled veterans had returned to their communities with the support of the Project (The Quarterly Report for EDRP, April-June 2007). The Project constructed houses for all of these severely disabled veterans to facilitate their sustainable reintegration. Provision of Training to Severely Disabled Veterans. Provision of training both in vocational and business skill to the severely disabled veterans was one of the major activities performed by FPMU. All 345 received vocational training in Addis Ababa ­ including business skills, photography, music, electronics, or training in sewing ­ and 283 received further training upon return to their regions. This training was aimed at helping the veterans to acquire vocational skills after their engagement in practical activities. Overall Reinsertion and Reintegration of Severely Disabled Veterans. The Government has allocated substantial funds for the reinsertion and reintegration of each severely disabled veteran Birr 50,000 (Birr 35,000 for the construction of residential houses, Birr 2,000 for reinsertion, Birr 9,000 for economic reintegration, Birr 3,000 for vocational training and Birr 1,000 for transportation) was allocated. To date, Birr 11.66 million was transferred to Regional Finance Bureaus for the construction of 333 houses for severely disabled veterans. Over 98% of planned houses for severely disabled have been constructed and completed by Project closing. Strengthening of POCs. In response to the surge in prosthetic-orthopedic and physiotherapy care needs for the 17,000 disabled veterans, GoE financed the rehabilitation of five regional POCs. The Government included the program of strengthening the existing five POC's, which were located in five administrative regions (Mekele, Dessie, Assella, Arbaminch and Harar) with the aim of providing rehabilitation services to disabled veterans. This included new constructions, and maintenance and modifications to old buildings. The construction included buildings for orthopedic workshops, physiotherapy rooms, offices, dormitories, and store and metal workshops. Overall, construction performance was estimated to be fully executed for the five POCs (Mekele, Dessie, Assela, Arbaminch, and Harar). All necessary medical and other equipment and furniture have been installed and offices furnished. With the exception of the Harar POCs, the Centers are generally providing intended services for veterans and other persons with disabilities. The performance of the Harar POC has been sub-optimal due to persistent management weaknesses. EDRP also assisted the Government to enhance the capacity of the five POCs to deliver intended services. Newly trained Physiotherapists (25) and technicians (20) have been deployed to the POCs to serve the disabled and other civilians who need these services. Physiotherapists (10) trained for four years at Gonder University have also been assigned to the POCs and the NRC. Construction of National Rehabilitation Center (NRC)/ Black Lion Hospital. In Ethiopia disability tends to have much higher prevalence because of recurrent conflict, high rates of road traffic accidents, low access to immunization, and inadequate health and rehabilitation care. However, it was not possible to set the exact number of persons with disabilities and patients that are in need of physical rehabilitation services. It was important that war disabled veterans were brought back to the meaningful life, since without this service neither vocational training nor integration with society could be achieved. For establishing the NRC, Government made a proposal to the World Bank to use the loan given for rehabilitating the demobilized disabled veterans and others who need the service. The establishment of 25 the center included the civil works and procurement of goods and equipment. The construction of NRC is complete and the Center inaugurated. The Center will be managed by the Ministry of Education, and plans to commence services in early 2008. Provision of physiotherapy/Orthopedic Supports to Severely Disabled veterans. The project has provided orthopedic and physiotherapy support to severely disabled veterans. The service included maintenance of old and provision of new Orthopedic and physiotherapy appliances. Training of Veterans According to the Training Impact Assessment Report, a total of 52,799 veterans took various types of skill training in the areas of Small Business Management, Vocational Training and Agriculture Training (Table 3). Out of the total trained veterans, 57.9 percent, 23.8 percent and 18.3 percent were trained in Agriculture, Vocational, and Small Business Skill Development training respectively. The majority of veterans in all training areas were literate. The rate of literacy in Business Skill Development and Management was 99.5 percent. In Vocational and in Agriculture it was 99.8 percent and 96.8 percent respectively. This means that the veterans had an adequate educational preparation that enabled them to take notes and easily follow their training. The majority of veterans (76.3 percent) that took business skill development and management training have already been in business activity. Therefore, the training would help them in improving the performance of their day to day business activities. This was also attested by the survey result that showed that in the views of veterans, 73.7 percent, 80.1 percent and 63.8 percent of the veterans said that they have already started to keep records of each business activity, been able to record the unit cost of each item and determine the price of each product, and started to differentiate their business from their own life. The survey result proved that the economic status of the veterans had improved after the training. To substantiate this, the numbers of veterans that are found in the highest income brackets have increased in all training areas after the training. Social and Political Reintegration There is limited data available to indicate outputs of counseling to veterans and support to help veterans establish or take part in community associations. However, several of surveys indicated that veterans are warmly received by the local community they reintegrated and faced no significant problem to participate in social as well as political activities. Female veterans The majority of demobilized female veterans were from Tigray region. The Tigray regional government provided targeted support to female veterans. These included business skill training, in which 725 veterans benefited, training to be kindergarten teachers, where 120 veterans benefited, and training in telephone operation. Additionally, the regional Government offered a course on junior nursing to 80 female veterans. This facilitated the job search and as a result 262 female veterans obtained jobs in medical services. Altogether, 1186 or 61.1 percent of female veterans in the region received varied additional reintegration support. Targeted employment opportunities were also given to 40 and 161 veterans in Addis Ababa and Amhara region respectively. Compared to their male comrades, female veterans generally had skills that appeared more marketable (i.e. nursing). Consequently, it is said that female veterans found it easier to reintegrate economically (Final Evaluation, p. 21). 26 Table 4: Number of Trained Veterans by Type of Training and Region al l al of & + na & noit o) & y on l ta urt Skills driving ort diar phy pha ding + ra Regi To pp uterp cainu Skills ontia Training su Typing Security og metology Agricul Voc neo Catering Business Handicrafts Training Trainers Educatio Com Guar Vehicle mmoC (ph Phot Videogr Cos Tigray 9684 5771 2721 710 150 - 72 50 100 60 50 - - Afar 200 - 40 60 100 - - - - - - - - Amhara 7118 3703 1619 1500 160 - - 73 63 - - - - Oromiya 3917 120 500 2888 - 408 1 - - - - - - Somali 500 - - 500 - - - - - - - - - Beneshangul- Gumuz 479 158 45 185 15 76 - - - - - - - SNNPR 2234 - 1100 950 - 80 50 34 - - 10 10 - Gambella 30 - - 30 - - - - - - - - - Harari 56 - - - 30 - 8 18 - - - - - Addis Ababa 1808 - 1200 38 263 110 43 - - 58 34 30 32 Dire Dawa 143 - - 124 - - 19 - - - - - - Total 26169 9752 7225 6985 718 674 193 175 163 118 94 40 32 Source: Training Impact Assessment Report, 2004. Macroeconomic Situation before and after Demobilisation Ethiopia's economy had been performing well since 1992. Consumer price inflation averaged 3.3 percent a year during 1992-99. The fiscal deficit (including grants) fell from 7.8 percent of GDP during 1991-92 to 3.6 percent during 1997-98. This period was also characterized by a major reorientation of public expenditures from defense to social sectors and vital infrastructure development. These favorable trends relapsed after the outbreak of conflict in May 1998. Defense spending, which had fallen to 2.5 percent of GDP in 1996-97, rose to 8.7 percent in 1998-99 and reached 13.3 percent in 1999-2000. The ENDF increased significantly in size. Consequently, the fiscal deficit rose to 6.9 percent of GDP in 1998-99 and to 10 percent in 1999-2000. The preemptive demands of defense expenditure during the war were financed by cuts in discretionary recurrent and capital expenditure. Capital expenditure, which had steadily grown to 10.4 percent of GDP in 1996, slipped to 6.7 percent in 1999-2000. The conflict also led to balance of payment deterioration and reduced private investment. New private investment, which was about Birr 2.9 billion in 1997-98, fell to 1.1 billion in 1998-99 and to 0.5 billion in the first nine months of 1999-2000. Foreign exchange reserves declined by nearly USD 100 million between 1998-99 and 1999-2000, bringing import cover to two months. Sections 3.1, Outcome 8 describe the improvements in Ethiopia's economy since the start of EDRP. 27 Table 5: Performance Indicators of the Ethiopian economy in the pre-conflict and conflict period Selected Indicators 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 GDP21 per Capita 248 253.2 242.8 250.6 256.7 Inflation (%) 0.9 -6.4 2.3 4.8 4.2 Total Education Expenditure as % of GDP 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.2 Total Health Expenditure as % of GDP 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.0 Total Road Expenditure as % of GDP 1.8 2.3 2.2 2.5 1.7 Defense Expenditure as % of GDP 2.0 2.0 4.9 8.7 13.1 Recurrent Expenditure as % of GDP 15.5 13.8 15.8 20.8 26.4 Capital Expenditure as % of GDP 9.4 10.1 9.2 9.8 6.6 Total Expenditure as % of GDP 24.9 23.9 25.0 30.6 33.0 Source: Development and Poverty Profile of Ethiopia, Welfare Monitoring Unit, MoFED, March 2002. Table 6: Key Public Expenditure Data & Macroeconomic Indicators (ETBirr Million) Descriptions 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 Govt Economic Development Expenditure 3045 3926 4124 4774 7672 - Agriculture 523 950 929 1876 2889 Govt Defense Expenditure 3642 2610 2341 2452 2920 Govt Social Expenditure 896 1433 1745 2233 3290 - Education 601 730 1017 1666 1896 - Urban Devt and Housing 116 163 210 165 828 - Health 165 522 488 346 505 - Culture and Sport 11 11 20 29 37 - Social Welfare 3 7 10 26 24 Share of social expenditure in Government Expenditure 5.5 8.6 8.8 11.0 13.4 Inflation (% p.a.) - General -5.2 -7.2 15.1 8.6 6.8 - Food -10.6 -12.7 24.8 11.8 7.7 - Non-Food 4.9 1.6 1.6 3.2 5.4 Current Account Balance (US$m) -629 -781 -709 -969 -1,521 Exchange Rate (Birr/US$) 8.33 8.54 8.58 8.62 8.65 Imports of: - Agricultural Capital Goods 8.0 7.0 5.9 10.8 24.4 - Cereals 78.0 155.2 189.2 206.1 160.0 - Other Foods 32.0 53.3 42.5 62.9 87.0 Source: MoFED, 2007 data. 21 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Industrial Origin at 1980/81 Constant Factor Prices. 28 ANNEX 3. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ANALYSIS Not Applicable 29 ANNEX 4. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION PROCESSES (a) Task Team members Names Title Unit Responsibility/ Specialty Lending Elizabeth Adu Lead Counsel LEGAF Lawyer Nat Colletta Head, Post Conflict Unit SDVPCU Demob/Inte. Spec. Siaka Bakayoko Senior Financial Management Specialist AFTFM Financial Mnmt. Subhash Dhingra Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPC Procurement Spec. Eyerusalem Fasika Research Analyst AFTP2 Economic Analysis Florian Fichtl Senior Social Protection Specialist, Task Team Leader (2000 ­ 2003) AFTH3 DRP Specialist Jean-Pierre Manshande Senior Health Specialist AFTH3 Health Issues Sudeshna RoyChoudhury Consultant -- Operations Surjit Singh Lead Operations Officer AFCE3 Operations Helen G. Tadesse Program Assistant AFTH3 Program Assistance Mathew Verghis Senior Economist AFTP2 Economic Analysis Ingo Wiederhofer Consultant, Post Conflict AFTCS DRP Specialist Supervision/ICR Richard Coppinger Consultant, Civil Works -- Civil Engineering Marcelo Jorge Fabre Consultant, M&E -- M&E Specialist Florian Fichtl Senior Social Protection Specialist, Team Leader (2000 ­ 2003) AFTH3 DRP Specialist Samuel Haile Selassie Sr Procurement Spec. AFTPC Procurement Rahel Lulu Program Assistant AFMET Program Assistance Jean-Pierre Manshande Sr Health Spec. AFTH3 Health Issues Mulat Negash Tegegn Consultant, Financial Management AFTFM Financial Mnmt. Almaz Teklesenbet Program Assistant AFTAR Program Assistance Ingo Wiederhofer Senior Operations Officer, Task Team Leader (2003 ­ 2007) AFTCS DRP Specialist Sara Yirga Woldegerima E T Temporary AFCE3 Program Assistance Eshetu Yimer Sr Financial Management Specialist AFTFM Financial Mnmt. Olivier Jadin` Consultant -- Disability Issues Sean Bradley Senior Social Development Specialist AFTCS DRP Specialist Malathi Jayawickrama Operations Officer, ICR Team Leader AFTAR ICR Team Leader 30 (b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs) Lending FY01 12 81.35 FY02 0.00 FY03 0.00 FY04 0.00 FY05 0.00 FY06 0.00 FY07 0.00 Total: 12 81.35 Supervision/ICR FY01 10 43.68 FY02 21 156.22 FY03 24 125.34 FY04 16 94.81 FY05 14 31.81 FY06 11 33.73 FY07 6 27.21 Total: 102 512.80 31 ANNEX 5. BENEFICIARY SURVEY RESULTS General Overview The Government of Ethiopia commissioned an independent Final Evaluation (FE) and a Beneficiary Impact Assessment of the EDRP. The FE's purpose was to critically assess if EDRP's performance and results at the national and individual beneficiaries' level were consistent with the project objectives. The BIA focused on examining the impact of EDRP on the socioeconomic reintegration of demobilized veterans, rehabilitation of disabled veterans, and reduction in defense expenditures. In assessing project impacts and performance the reports draw primarily on the perceptions of project beneficiaries, project staff and government officials (at all levels) and quantitative data from project reports.22 Final Evaluation (FE) of EDRP The evaluation regarded the design of the demobilization and reintegration project as an iterative process through which each war veteran had to pass, and separately assessed each project component, and how the component was able to facilitate the veterans move from one stage to the next in their return to civilian life. The assessment team collected both quantitative and qualitative data/information relating to EDRP implementation. The methodologies followed in the study were deskwork and consultations, in- depth interview of resource persons/ key informants, focus group discussions, site observation and interview of sample beneficiary veterans. The assessment also conducted interviews with informed officials from various government ministries and other relevant organizations at national, regional, zonal and woreda level. The structured interviews of sample demobilized war veterans were conducted in the five regions (see below) to which the vast majority returned. The sample consisted of 857 veterans -- 8 percent militia, 17 percent returnees, 28 percent new regulars, and 47 percent regulars. The veterans interviewed came from Tigray (44 percent), Amhara (20 percent), Oromia (20 percent), SNNP (12 percent), and Addis Ababa (4 percent). Of the total sampled, there were 61 female veterans comprising 11, 6, 1, 0, and 27 percent in the five regions respectively. The sample size is believed to furnish national level data/ information of reasonable precision (confidence level 95 percent) (See FE for Methodology). Beneficiary Impact Assessment (BIA) of EDRP Drawing on previous assessments and international best practice, the BIA developed a conceptual framework for measuring reintegration that spanned a range of economic, social and political aspects. It further stratified veterans into `urban', `rural', `disabled' female and HIV-infected categories. The Assessment started from the premise that the heterogeneity of veterans and of reintegration experiences must be explicitly acknowledged if reintegration effectiveness is to be appropriately measured and lessons learned. The Assessment noted the difficulty in isolating specific causal linkages between entitlements (such as the EDRP's TSS, cash grants and training), and productive livelihoods and ultimately self reliance, as the heterogeneity extended not only to veterans, but also to other areas. For example, changes brought about by the EDRP entitlements and the effectiveness of veteran reintegration will also depend on at least other three factors: (i) the absorptive capacity of areas of return; (ii) the endowment set (i.e. level of education, assets, prior work experience) of reintegrating veterans themselves; and (iii) the quality and quantity of entitlements provided (BIA, p. 29).23 22The BIA draws on the primary data and beneficiary perception data collected by the Final Evaluation. Therefore this summary mainly refers to the findings of the FE with regard to beneficiary perception. 23The studies acknowledge several biases in their results, including: the self-selection bias, owing to how veterans were chosen to participate; and the urban bias--the predictably greater number of veterans from urban or peri-urban who presented themselves and those from rural areas who were often within only two hours walking distance from town. Therefore, veterans from more remote areas are not represented. 32 The two assessments examined the following indicators: · Economic integration--formal/informal income streams (measured as consumption/expenditure patterns), land/house/asset ownership before and after reintegration, quantity/quality of employment and other forms of savings; · Social integration --acceptance by family/community of return, membership in local associations, repeat access to social services, quantity/quality of disability entitlements ­ including care as well as referral and related services for HIV+; and · Political integration--involvement in local political/bureaucratic structures, voting patterns and other forms of political discrimination and expression (BIA, p.32). · Summary of Final Evaluation and Beneficiary Impact Assessment Demobilization · Respondents stated that the project provided sufficient demobilisation support to ensure reinsertion to their communities. The support had a positive impact on the `smooth' transition to a civilian life. · Demobilized veterans confirmed the provision of adequate support to prepare for reinsertion. Table 1: Did you get proper support in the following during the process of demobilization? Description of support type Total Demobilized Veterans Responding Number Percentage of those who indicate they received this assistance Registration 806 94 Identification card/ID 810 95 Orientation about the purpose of demobilization 759 89 Sensitization about HIV/AIDS 748 87 Pre and post VCT counselling service 614 72 Money for photograph 341 40 Transport allowance 654 77 Money for the purpose of civilian cloth & blanket 283 33 Source: Final Evaluation, p. 52. · The pre demobilisation orientation on the reasons for demobilisation and benefits of the project contributed to raise interest among veterans to take part in the implementation of the subsequent project activities (reinsertion and reintegration). Macroeconomic Stability · Macroeconomic results are detailed in Annex 2. The accelerated implementation timeframe had considerable budgetary benefits and demonstrated GoE's commitment to the peace process. Immediately after cessation of hostilities GoE started planning for demobilization and committed itself to cutting military expenditure significantly. The cutback in defense expenditure was successfully achieved by reducing the size of the ENDF through the demobilization of soldiers and their reintegration into civilian society. GoE also increased social sector expenditures. 33 Reinsertion · Respondents stated that the TSS payments were largely delivered on time and regard the delivery mechanism (coupons) as effective. A verification survey followed each phase of demobilization to ensure that veterans received the TSS payments. About 80.3 percent of the veterans received their payment within two months after demobilization, 15.9 percent received it within three months, and a further 3.8 percent within four months. The loss of payment coupons by a small number of veterans caused some delays in their payment. The modality of TSS payment--one month from reaching destination, coupon arrangement, and making the payment at the woreda capital--was well received by the veterans (EDRP Final Evaluation, p. 51). The TSS helped veterans cope with immediate financial needs after return to their local communities Reintegration · Reintegration Grants (RGs) were reported to be paid on time with no significant delays. · About 96.1 percent of demobilized veterans received their reintegration assistance within the specified period of time, and 3.9 percent had not received their reintegration on time due to various reasons, such as loss of payment coupons, mistakes in name lists and in some woredas, delays in transfer of name list and others. · All respondents had received their RGs at the nearest finance office (in most cases at Woreda Finance Offices). Veterans demobilized in both phases had received the eligible amount of reintegration benefits, in convenient places, smoothly and within a reasonable period of time. Most veterans had used the RGs for economic integration and for daily consumption expenditure · Due to limitation of urban and rural lands and government and kebele houses, only a few veterans indicated they obtained such access to houses and lands. Similarly, despite the employment priority given to veterans in all government offices and kebeles, only a few were employed as security guards while most veterans were engaged in causal work. · Rural veterans who had land before mobilization re-stated and retained their lands, used the funds to develop their farms, purchased more livestock, repaired their houses and resumed normal lives. · Urban veterans were provided with significantly more support than those veterans reinserted into rural areas. · Generally, the economic situation of urban as well as rural veterans improved after demobilization. Number of assets owned as well as income increased as a result of the reintegration support provided. 34 Table 2: Purposes for which the Demobilized Veterans (rural) spent the Reintegration Grants they received (multiple answers were possible) Purpose of expenditure/use Total Demobilized Veterans Responding No. responding Percentage Personal consumption 191 89 Clothing 165 81 House repairs & construction 117 57 Ox/oxen 91 45 Medical treatment 87 44 Repay debts 62 30 Fertilizers & seeds 58 30 Farm implements 55 28 Goats & Sheep 53 27 Cows & heifers 49 25 Establish small business/handicrafts/shops 22 12 Wedding & funeral expenses 20 10 Saving 11 6 Young bulls 6 3 Source: Final Evaluation, p. 54. Table 3: Purposes for which the Demobilized Veterans (urban) spent the Reintegration Grants they received (multiple answers were possible) Purpose of expenditure/use Total Demobilized Veterans Responding No. responding Percentage Personal consumption 516 85 Clothing 462 77 Medical treatment 281 48 House repairs & construction 214 36 Establish small business/handicrafts/shops 186 31 Repay debts 108 18 Wedding & funeral expenses 77 13 Saving 53 9 Ox/oxen 46 8 Cows & heifers 43 7 Goats & Sheep 38 7 Fertilizers & seeds 24 4 Farm implements 25 4 Young bulls 10 2 Source: Final Evaluation, p. 55. · 55 percent of the respondents claimed that their integration has been not as successful as it should have been compared to their initial expectations at the DCs. Of these, 48 percent of rural veterans and 68 percent of urban veterans named the lack of employment opportunities as the major factor. · Social engagement of the veterans both in rural and urban areas has significantly increased. More than half of the rural veterans are now members of development committees. Before mobilization only one third of them were members. While veterans in rural areas seem to concentrate their 35 engagement more in 'official' organisations veterans in urban areas seem to prefer engagement in traditional organisations · Table 6 shows the reintegration amounts that were paid to the various categories of disabled veterans. In addition to these grants veterans were provided with certain benefits and additional supports from the Government (i.e. from Government hospitals), regional offices, zonal offices, woredas and kebeles. The provision of medical services has got by far the highest count. On the other hand, only 38 injured veterans have stated obtained advice and assistance on how to start income generating activities. Table 4: Changes in the Assets Owned by Demobilized Veterans before Mobilization and after Demobilization (rural) Description of asset type (ranked by Changes in assets owned (Percentage rounded) change) Before After Change House 31 56 25 Ox/oxen 28 39 11 Cows 27 37 10 Goats & sheep 17 27 10 Horses/mules/donkeys 10 19 9 Chicken 26 34 8 Young bulls 7 14 7 Heifers 10 17 7 Agricultural land 43 50 7 Farm implements 36 41 5 Watch 37 42 5 Camel 3 4 1 Source: Final Evaluation, p. 57. Table 5: Changes in the Household Assets owned by Demobilized Veterans before Mobilization and after Demobilization (urban) Description of asset type (ranked by Changes in assets owned (Percentage rounded) change) Before After Change Equipment 13 45 32 House 7 37 30 Urban land 4 23 19 Watch 28 46 18 Shops 4 19 15 Telephone line 3 18 15 Bicycle 4 10 6 Farm implements 36 41 5 Watch 37 42 5 Source: Final Evaluation, p. 57. · Disabled veterans were offered more training opportunities than able-bodied ones. While only about 8 % of the able-bodied were offered skill/vocational training about one fifth of the disabled were offered a chance. The trainings received by them seem to have not been adequately adapted to the needs of this group. 82% of the disabled interviewees answered with "no" to the question "Have you benefited from the skill/vocational training you have undertaken". Even in Addis 36 where trainings were far more easily to organize than for veterans in rural areas, 74% of those disabled veterans who had received any kind of training answered with "no". The veterans mainly answered with "no" because they felt that the trainings were too short. They had also hoped for time-sequenced follow-up trainings to strengthen the knowledge acquired in the first trainings to reach a certain confidence level in their chosen vocation. · Provision of training both vocational and business skill to the severely disabled veterans is one of the major activities performed by EDRP-FPMU. The objective of providing such kind of training is to help disabled veterans to acquire civilian skills. Accordingly, from the beginning of the project up to the end of 2006, 354 severely disabled veterans from Mikey Leland Center received different vocational and business skill training. (2006 Fourth Quarter & Annual Progress Report, EDRP-FPMU) Table 6: If special assistance was given to you as an injured veteran, please indicate what has been given to you (Multiple answers were possible) Assistance (ranked) Count Percentage (rounded) Medical service 411 91 Money 100 24 Social counseling 92 22 Urban land 81 19 Advice to get skill/vocational training 80 19 Artificial part of body 45 11 Residential house for dwelling 42 10 Assistance to get employment 40 10 Advice on and assistance to start income generating activities 38 9 Admittance to school 23 6 Agricultural land 11 3 Source: Final Evaluation, p. 69. 37 ANNEX 6. STAKEHOLDER WORKSHOP REPORT AND RESULTS None 38 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR SUMMARY The Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (EDRP), was a comprehensive package designed to cope up with the aftermath of the Ethio-Eritrea conflict. The Project had three components namely: Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration. The total number of veterans demobilized through out the project life reached 148,093 or 98.73 %; Reinserted 148,093 or 98.73% and Reintegrated 148,093 or 98.73 % and the achievement of the objectives (Original plan being 150,000 veterans) were highly satisfactory. The EDRP fulfilled its major goal of macro-economic stability. Since the initiation of the EDRP, defense expenditure declined from 40% to 17% of recurrent Government expenditure, and similarly the share of defense expenditures as a percentage of GDP reduced from 13.2 % in 2000 to 3% in 2004/5. On the other hand, the share of social services which was 15.3% of the total expenditure in 1999/00 has increased to 22.5% in 2001/2002 fiscal year. Reinsertion is a process where by veterans transformed from military to civilian life. In this regard the government has allocated Eth. Birr 2000 TSS (Transitional Subsistence Support) to each veteran to cover the initial economic needs of demobilized veterans upon return to the communities of their choices. The demobilized veterans reinserted into their communities of origin have started living their normal life. Those reinserted in urban and rural areas have reunited with their families and started participating in economic and social activities of their communities All demobilized veterans have received different types of reintegration assistances from the project and from regional governments such as cash for starting business, training in various fields, land for agriculture and housing construction, employment opportunities in public and private sectors, agricultural extension services, rental of residential and business houses, etc. EDRP also provided center-based services to 345 severely disabled veterans at Mikye Leland Disabled Veterans' Care Center in Addis Ababa. The services include medical treatment (including referral services), supply & maintenance of physiotherapy & Orthopedic appliances, counseling, shelter, clothing, food, entertainment, physical supports provisions and others. Vocational & Business Skill Training was provided to 354 severely disabled veterans at a cost of ETB 195,276. The No. is 354 because some veterans took more than one type of training. Out of the 148,093 demobilized veterans, about 17,000 of them have different types of disabilities mild to severely disabilities. In addition, it is estimated that there are more than 7 million people in the country with various types of disabilities. All these need physical rehabilitation services (prosthetic-orthotic centers/POCs) namely Mekele, Dessie, Asella, Arbaminch, Harar & Jijiga in terms of buildings that consist of orthopedic workshops, physiotherapy rooms, offices, dormitories, store & metal workshops, machineries, equipment & trained manpower. Furthermore, a New National Rehabilitation Center that is new in its kind in East Africa was built, well equipped in terms of machineries, furniture, computers, laundry & kitchen equipment, etc. & trained manpower. The Center will serve a referral of physical rehabilitation a training & research center in the field. 39 ANNEX 8. COMMENTS OF COFINANCIERS AND OTHER PARTNERS/STAKEHOLDERS No comments available from the Borrower at this time. Borrower has indicated that comments will be provided. These will be filed in IRIS for reference once received. 40 ANNEX 9. LIST OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS World Bank Documents · EDRP Memorandum of the President (MOP), Report No. 17794-ET, November 2, 2000 · EDRP, Technical Annex, Report No. T7405-ET, November 9, 2000 · EDRP Development Credit Agreement (DCA), Report No. 3437-ET, December 21, 2000 · EDRP, Aide Memoires and Back-to-Office Reports of Supervision Missions, FY01 ­ FY07 · Project Status Reports (PSRs) and Implementation Status and Results Reports (ISRs), 2000 ­ 2006Ethiopia: Interim Country Assistance Strategy, Report No. 21189, November 9, 2000 · Ethiopia: Public Expenditure Review, June 2004, Report No. 29338-ET · Ethiopia Emergency Recovery Project Implementation Completion and Results Report, Report No. ICR350, June 21, 2007 · Ethiopia Emergency Drought Recovery Project Implementation Completion and Results Report, Report No. ICR509, June 22, 2007 Government of Ethiopia Documents · Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: Implementation Completion and Results Report, November 2007. · MoLSA, MoFED: Beneficiary Impact Assessment Report, September 2007. · MoLSA, MoFED: Final Impact Evaluation Report, September 2007 · MoLSA: Training Impact Assessment Report, 2004 · MoLSA, MoFED, MOE: Operationalization of the National Rehabilitation Center at the Addis Ababa Faculty of Science Black Line Teaching Hospital, June 2007 · MoLSA: Conceptual Framework for the Development of a National Plan for the Physical Rehabilitation Sector in Ethiopia, June 2007. · MoLSA: Mid Term Review of the EDRP, July 2003. · MoLSA: EDRP Quarterly Progress Reports from July 2000 to September 2007. · MoLSA: EDRP TSS Payment Verification Report, August 2001 · MoLSA: A Project to Strengthen the Service Provision of physical Rehabilitation in Ethiopia, October 2007 41