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Rumours of Peace, Whispers of War

Assessment of the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants into Civilian Life in North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri Democratic Republic of Congo



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Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program

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February 2012

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List of Acronyms

ACDAKI	Action Communautaire pour le Développement Agro-pastoral de Kiliba
ACDK	Action Communautaire pour le Développement de Kalundu
ADF-NALU	Allied Democratic Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda
ANORI	Association des Négociants d'Or – Ituri
AODERPI	Association des Orpailleurs pour le Développement et la Reconstruction de Paix en Ituri
APCLS	Alliance pour un Congo libre et souverain
CI-DDR	Comité interministériel chargé de la conception et de l'orientation en matière de DDR
CNDDR	National Commission for Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration
CNDP	Congrès national pour la défense du peuple
CONADER	Commission Nationale de Démobilisation et Réinsertion
COOPEC	Coopérative d'Épargne et de Crédit
CPJP	Convention des patriotes pour la justice et la paix
DCR	Désarmement et Réinsertion Communautaire
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DDRRR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EJDP	Encadrement des Jeunes pour le Développement de la Pêche
FAC	Forces Armées Congolaises
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation
FAZ	Forces Armées Zaïroises
FARDC	Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
FDLR	Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda
FNI	Nationalist and Integrationist Front
FNL	Forces nationales de libération

FPJC	Front populaire pour la justice au Congo
FPLC	Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo
FRPI	Front de résistance patriotique de l'Ituri
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ILDELU	L'Initiative Locale pour le Développement de Luvungi
ILO	International Labour Office
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MDRP	Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program
MLC	Mouvement de Libération du Congo
MONUC	UN Organisation Mission in the DRC
MONUSCO	UN Organisation stabilisation mission in the DRC
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OKIMO	Office des mines d'or de Kilo Moto
PARECO	Patriotes Résistants Congolais
PNDDR	National Program of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
PRDR	National Programme on Disarmament and Reinsertion
RCD	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie
RCD-K-ML	RCD-Kisangani-Mouvement de Libération
RCD-N	RCD-National
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
SMI	Structure Militaire d'Intégration
TDRP	Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program
UFDR	Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
UNPDDR	Unité Nationale pour le désarmement, la démobilisation et la réintégration
UPC	Union of Congolese Patriots

Introduction

The eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is poised on the edge of a machete blade. Despite the achievement of considerable peace-building successes throughout much of this central African state in recent years, the current activities of armed groups and the Congolese armed forces in North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri, have the potential to further destabilise the eastern provinces, and possibly even neighbouring countries.

Former combatants are prominent in the security and stability equation in the eastern DRC. The reason is that if this section of society has not been effectively disarmed, demobilised and reintegrated into civilian life, then they have the potential to return to arms. In this region, over 100,000 ex-combatants have been demobilised over the past decade in successive waves of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) interventions.

Viable and contextually relevant income generation and livelihood opportunities are vital for the success of former combatant reintegration. That is, in order to encourage ex-combatants to not re-militarise, an alternative and appealing means of making a sustainable living should be available. In addition, if former combatants are able to make a constructive socio-economic contribution to the communities in which they settle, these communities are more likely to be receptive to their presence.

Assessments and speculation about the reintegration of ex-combatants in North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri have suggested that these individuals have become marginalised, and their reintegration into civilian society is precarious, thus making them vulnerable to further recruitment by armed groups. Some reports have even suggested that numerous former fighters have remilitarised in the mining areas in order to access mineral wealth.

Consequently, research on the socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants in the eastern DRC was undertaken by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), and funded by the Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP) of the World Bank. North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri were the three geographical areas of focus, given the volatility and potential pivotal role of these areas in promoting and consolidating peace in the eastern DRC. The specific objectives of the research were to:

- Assess the processes of the socio-economic reintegration of former combatants into civilian life;
- Analyze the causes and dynamics of the current security situation (or lack thereof) in the three areas, and the implications for current and future DDR processes; and
- Evaluate the extent to which demobilised former combatants have been re-recruited into armed groups, including motivating and resilience factors.

The research took place between February and September 2011, with the findings and analysis being presented in this report. In addition to a literature review and an assessment of published research and data on the subject matter, the project utilised a comparative case study field research method in each of the three geographical areas, which included:

- Semi-structured interviews with key DDR stakeholders;
- Focus group discussions with former combatants;
- Focus groups with affected community members wherein sizeable numbers of ex-combatants are residing;

- Semi-structured interviews with practitioners in agricultural, trade, commerce, mining and other economic sectors; and
- Semi-structured interviews with key informants in the same communities as ex-combatants.

This report is comprised of five sections. The first section provides an overview of the various armed conflicts that have occurred in the DRC since inde-

pendence, and subsequent peace-building processes. There is a general assessment of DDR programming to date in the second section. In the third section, the current security environment in North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri is assessed. The fourth section interrogates the manner in which the socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants has unfolded in the eastern DRC. The final section outlines possible recommendations for future action.

1. Post-independence conflict and peace-building in the DRC

1.1 The Congo wars

The DRC has a prolonged history of repression and armed conflict dating back to the era of European occupation. The Belgian monarchy and colonial elite used violence against the population of the DRC to maximise the extraction of natural resources in from the late 1800s. The DRC gained independence in 1960, and five years later General Joseph-Désiré Mobutu (later referred to as Mobutu Sese Seko) seized power through a military *coup d'état* with foreign backing (particularly the United States). The country was subsequently renamed Zaire in 1971. Mobutu ruled the Zairian state with an iron fist for more than three decades. Despite the 'strongman' approach to governance there was a severe lack of state investment in improving infrastructure and human development, exacerbated by endemic corruption. Government authority was not exercised over vast tracts of territory, particularly in the eastern Zaire. These dynamics contributed to the emergence of various opposition movements and armed groups.

Government armed forces, the *Forces Armées Zairoises* (FAZ) were routinely unpaid, and therefore soldiers often resorted to raiding and looting rural communities to sustain themselves, which was often condoned by the Mobutu regime.¹ Affected communities responded to the FAZ predatory behaviour and the other insecurities brought about by what Thomas Hobbes termed 'a state of nature'² by creating their own militarised structures and processes, typically in the form of militias. These armed groups, which were diverse in structure and membership, proliferated in the mid-1990s in response to heightened insecurity (mentioned below), and became commonly referred to as *Mai Mai*.

In 1994, in excess of one million refugees from Rwanda fled into eastern Zaire. Some (ethnic Tutsis) had crossed the border to escape the genocide in Rwanda that was being pursued against ethnic Tutsi and moderate Hutus. Later that year, with the imminent victory of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) rebels (ethnic Tutsi) over the Hutu-dominated government in Kigali, more Rwandese (mainly ethnic Hutu) also crossed the border fearing reprisals from the RPF. Refugee camps were subsequently established in Eastern Zaire. Amongst the refugee population were former soldiers from the Rwandan military, as well as the *Interahamwe*, which were those individuals that had directly perpetrated the mass violence in Rwanda. These individuals would later form the basis of the rebel group, *Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda* (FDLR). The *Interahamwe*, allegedly with material support from Mobutu, launched military assaults into Rwanda, as well as against Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge (ethnic Tutsi) communities resident in eastern Zaire.³

This series of events, combined with decades of simmering tensions between the Banyarwanda/Banyamulenge and other communities, and the disenfranchisement of the Banyarwanda/Banyamulenge, ignited a rebellion in 1996. The RPF provided strategic, mili-

1 Michela Wrong, *In the footsteps of Mr. Kurtz: living on the brink of disaster in Mobutu's Congo*, New York, HarperCollins, 2001.

2 This was a phrase used by Hobbes in his philosophical masterpiece, 'Leviathan', first published in 1651. Hobbes, building on the theology of Thomas Aquinas, described a state nature as being characterized by the absence of the state or government, where every person seeks to preserve their life through whatever means is at their disposal. According to Hobbes, human life would be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short".

3 Filip Reyntjens, *The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009.

tary and material backing to the rebellion, with added support from Uganda and Angola. The uprising harnessed the widespread discontent with the Mobutu regime, drawing in various militia and armed groups. As a result, within a matter of months, the rebels seized control of Kinshasa and forced Mobutu into exile. The country's name was changed to the DRC, and Laurent-Désiré Kabila, who had led the rebellion, became the head of state.⁴

Due to domestic pressures, Kabila sought to dilute the influence of the Rwandan and Ugandan military within the DRC government, and eventually expelled them. This development, in conjunction with continued attacks by the Interahamwe, motivated Rwanda and Uganda to instigate a second rebellion in the eastern DRC in 1998 through a military rebellion within the ranks of newly established DRC armed forces. A fledgling rebel movement, the *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie* (RCD) was then used as the vehicle (along with Rwandan soldiers) in an attempt to depose Kabila. The RCD marched on Kinshasa, but were prevented from overthrowing the Kabila government by rapid military support provided by Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe and a handful of other governments. The Kabila regime also enlisted some Hutu militia groups in the east to this war effort. Uganda supported the anti-Kabila alliance through another rebel group, the *Mouvement de Libération du Congo* (MLC).⁵

Leadership tensions and strategic disagreements within the RCD led to the rebel movement fracturing into three groups: the RCD-Kisangani-Mouvement de Libération (RCD-K-ML); RCD-National (RCD-N) and RCD-Goma. In June 1999 the Ugandan armed forces carved out a new mineral-rich “province” from part of the area it was controlling in eastern DRC, and referred to it as Ituri. The effective annexation of this region by the Ugandan military escalated ethnic tensions in the area that had been festering for decades into violent conflict, which was then perpetuated by various armed groups. The most prominent of such groups were the Nationalist and Integrationist Front (FNI) and the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC). The complexity of the military campaign combined with conflict over access to mineral wealth took its toll on the collaborative relationship between Rwanda and Uganda, with a number of armed confrontations and battles taking place between both militaries. In

addition, an array of other armed groups continued to contribute to the destabilisation of the region.⁶

1.2 Peace accords

A ceasefire was secured through the Lusaka Accords (1999) and a UN peacekeeping mission was deployed (MONUC) the following year, but despite these developments, the violence continued. In 2001, Laurent-Désiré Kabila was assassinated. Shortly thereafter his son Joseph was appointed head of state. In 2002 the Inter-Congolese Dialogue and a series of peace agreements between the principal warring parties resulted in an uneasy cessation of hostilities, and paved the way for the incorporation of many of the larger armed groups and militia into the *Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo* (FARDC). However, the FDLR and an unknown number of armed groups continued to operate in the eastern DRC. Democratic elections were held in 2006, with Joseph Kabila being elected president.

In late-2006 and early 2007, the *Congrès national pour la défense du peuple* (CNDP), led by Laurent Nkunda escalated tensions in the Kivu provinces by launching a military campaign against the FDLR. The CNDP was comprised of elements from one of the RCD splinter groups, as well as combatants formerly associated with militia and other armed groups, and had been operating as brigades within the DRC government armed forces, the FARDC. The CNDP withdrew from the FARDC and initiated a military campaign against the government forces. The violence was eventually restrained through a peace accord in 2009, with agreement that the bulk of the CNDP forces, as well as some militia groups, would be incorporated into the FARDC. However, sizeable areas of the eastern DRC continued to be unstable, with an assortment of armed/militia groups remaining active, particularly in mining areas.

4 Gérard Prunier, *Africa's world war: Congo, the Rwandan genocide, and the making of a continental catastrophe*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009.

5 Jason Stearns, *Dancing in the glory of monsters: the collapse of the Congo and the great war of Africa*, New York, PublicAffairs, 2011.

6 Gérard Prunier, *Africa's world war: Congo, the Rwandan genocide, and the making of a continental catastrophe*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009; Filip Reyntjens, *The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009.

2. DDR programming in the DRC

The DDR process that has unfolded in the DRC has arguably been the most complex and multi-faceted programme ever implemented in Africa. It was comprised of, among other elements, a national programme; programmes to disarm and repatriate foreign combatants and their dependants; processes for special needs groups (such as women, disabled ex-combatants and children); and projects to disarm members of militia groups and reintegrate them into civilian life. There was also a specific DDR programme for Ituri, which was located within the national DDR programme. The World Bank and the UN, predominantly through the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), were the main facilitators of the DDR process in the DRC, along with the DRC government.

DDR was further complicated by two other developments. Firstly, security sector reform, a necessity brought about by peace accords, which paved the way for the formation of a new national army and the *Structure Militaire d'Intégration* (SMI). The SMI was the process by which the armed components of most of the significant armed groups would be incorporated into the FARDC. Secondly, stabilisation initiatives, and particularly those dealing with the various armed groups and their access to mineral resources.⁷

2.1 DDR institutional and financial considerations

The MDRP was launched in 2002 and was supported by a range of donor governments and agencies. Its geographical focus was the greater Great Lakes region of central Africa, with the specific countries be-

ing: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, the DRC, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda. The MDRP co-ordinated, and provided assistance to, close to 300,000 ex-combatants in these seven countries, and was concluded in June 2009.

The DRC was the most significant component of the MDRP, with 50% of the entire budget being devoted to DDR-related projects in this country. The final report of the MDRP also revealed that the DRC segment accounted for 36% of all demobilised beneficiaries; 41% and 22% of reinsertion and reintegration beneficiaries respectively; and four out of the five special projects for child soldiers were implemented in the DRC.⁸

In December 2003, the DRC government established an interdepartmental committee, the *Comité interministériel chargé de la conception et de l'orientation en matière de DDR* (CI-DDR) to oversee the National Program of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (PNDDR) (adopted May 2004). *The Commission Nationale de la Démobilisation et Réinsertion* (CONADER), with the support of UNDP, became the entity responsible for implementing the PNDDR. Regrouping Centres were set-up to implement the disarmament targets, and Integration and Training Centres were established for reintegration purposes.⁹ The DDR process in the DRC however, faced similar

7 UN DDR Resource Centre, Country Programme: DRC, <http://www.unddr.org/>.

8 MDRP, MDRP Final Report, Overview of program achievements, Washington DC, World Bank, July 2010, 9-24.

9 UN DDR Resource Centre, Country Programme: DRC, <http://www.unddr.org/>.

challenges to other African DDR processes, which included a lack of capacity, inefficiency, mismanagement, institutional rivalries and alleged corruption.¹⁰

MONUC played a key role in the DDR programme, assisting with the implementation of the national programme, and focused almost exclusively on disarmament. The main focus, however, was the dismantling and disarming of foreign armed groups, particularly the FDLR, which was pursued via the UN Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement (DDRRR) programme.¹¹

DDRRR interventions often included armed peacekeepers, which provided protection and security to those combatants that were voluntarily seeking to abscond from an armed group. The reason for this is that such combatants may have been violently assaulted or killed by their fellow fighters if their efforts to desert the armed group proved unsuccessful. Following surrender to MONUSCO, the former combatants were transported to the transit centres in Uvira, Bukavu, Beni, Dungen, and Goma, where they were provided with clothing and food. After three days these individuals were repatriated to their countries of origin where they received reinsertion and reintegration support.¹²

The SMI was established in 2004, and was linked to the DDR system through national legislation, with combatants being provided with the option of either joining the FARDC or undergoing DDR. The following armed groups (and their combatants) were identified for integration into the FARDC: *Forces Armées Congolaises* (FAC) (former DRC government military); FAZ; the three RCD factions, MLC; Mai-Mai; and a number of other armed groups. The first step of the SMI was that all combatants were assembled at FARDC-run *centres de regroupement* and then transferred to *centres d'orientation*, which were administered by CONADER, where combatants were required to select integration in FARDC or demobilization¹³.

2.2 Implementation of DDR processes

In response to the teething problems associated with the operationalisation of the national DDR programme, an emergency initiative, the *Désarmement et Réinsertion Communautaire* (DCR) was created. It sought to disarm and pacify those armed groups that were not party to ceasefire/peace accords, and were

considered to be a considerable destabilising force. The actions of armed groups were acutely problematic in Ituri, and consequently the focus of the DCR programme was in that region.¹⁴ The DCR contributed to the demobilisation of 15,811 combatants (which included 4,525 children). However, the reintegration support was described as “chaotic”, “half-hearted” and “problematic” due to prolonged implementation delays.¹⁵

The national DRC DDR programme sought to provide ex-combatants with assistance to facilitate their transition to civilian life, which included ‘safety transition allowances’, and reintegration support. Various donor governments provided considerable financial and technical support, with a total of US\$ 272 million being made available for DDR processes through the MDRP.¹⁶ Ex-combatants who underwent demobilisation received an initial payment of US\$ 110 (for transport, food and other expenses), and thereafter a monthly allowance of US\$ 25 for a year.

A variety of socio-economic support was made available to ex-combatants through nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), international organisations and UN agencies, such as the International Labour Office (ILO), the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), and Caritas. Targeted programmes for female ex-combatants and children were also offered. Reintegration training was provided in a variety of fields, including, but not limited to, agriculture, fishing, sew-

10 UN Security Council, Twenty-first report of the UN Secretary-General on UN Mission in the DRC, UN document S/2006/390, 13 June 2006, paragraph 50; MDRP, DDR in the Democratic Republic of Congo: program update, Washington DC, World Bank.

11 Public Information Division, MONUC, Briefing materials, August 2009.

12 MONUSCO, Collaboration and DDRRR process, <http://monusco.unmissions.org>.

13 Hans Rouw and Rens Willems, Connecting community security and DDR: experiences from eastern DRC, Network for Peace, Security and Development, April 2010, 9.

14 UN DDR Resource Centre, DRC, <http://www.unddr.org/country-programmes.php?c=25>.

15 Amnesty International, Democratic Republic of Congo: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Reform of the Army, London: Amnesty International, 2007, 17; T. Bouta, Assessment of the Ituri disarmament and community reinsertion programme, The Hague, Netherlands Institute for International Relations ‘Clingendael’, 2005, 28.

16 MDRP, MDRP factsheet: Democratic Republic of Congo, Washington DC, MDRP, March 2009.

ing/tailoring, woodwork, bricklaying, driving, and metal work.¹⁷

2.3 DDR outcomes

The MDRP concluded all its activities in the greater Great Lakes region in 2009. At this time, 102,014 former combatants had received both demobilisation and reinsertion support in the DRC, and 52,172 had received reintegration support.¹⁸ The Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP), managed by the World Bank and financed by the African Development Bank and a range of donor governments, has provided follow-up DDR assistance.

In July 2010, UN Security Council Resolution 1925 (2010) extended the UN operation in the DRC, with MONUC being relabelled the UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). The resolution also reaffirmed the UN objective of DDR with respect to Congolese armed groups, and the DDRRR of foreign armed groups, particularly the FDLR, Allied Democratic Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF-NALU), the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and *Forces nationales de libération* (FNL).¹⁹

MONUSCO, in cooperation with FARDC, has made steady progress in its DDRRR efforts over the past 18 months. This, despite the complexities and tremendous odds confronted the various interventions, particularly the history of poor governance and ongoing violence and activities of armed groups in the eastern provinces. However, further achievements have been

stymied by domestic political dynamics. For example, in December 2010 the UN Peace-building Fund allocated funds for the DDR of some 4,000 members of Congolese armed groups, but this programme was suspended by the DRC government, and consequently did not materialise.²⁰

Between 2002 and mid-2011, the DDRRR section of the UN mission in the DRC repatriated more than 25,000 foreign ex-combatants (58% of total repatriated) and their dependants and destroyed 1,435 arms and 46,006 rounds of ammunition. Rwanda was the destination of 80% of the total repatriated group. The table below provides further details on DDRRR activities (see below). A strategic success was the facilitation of the demobilisation and repatriation of some FDLR officers, including FDLR liaison officers from North and South Kivu, which reportedly interrupted the recruitment, logistical support, and illicit trading by the armed group.²¹

17 MDRP, DDR in the Democratic Republic of Congo: program update, Washington DC, MDRP.

18 MDRP, MDRP final report, overview of program achievements, Washington DC, July 2010, 24.

19 UN Security Council, Resolution 1925 (2010), UN document S/Res/1925/2010, New York, UN.

20 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the UN mission in the DRC, UN document S/2011/656, 24 October 2011, paragraph 55.

21 UN Security Council, Interim report of the UN Group of Experts on the DRC, UN document S/2011/345, 12 May 2011, paragraph 34.

3. Current state of security/insecurity in Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu

3.1 Overview

The level of human security in Ituri, North and South Kivu improved marginally in 2010 and 2011 compared to the period of 2008 to 2009. Nonetheless, there were variations in conditions of security between communities. In addition, recorded levels of violence and human rights abuse were exceedingly high, especially rape, assault, murder, looting and abduction. The main perpetrators are members of armed groups and militias, as well as FARDC soldiers.

An assortment of armed groups, both foreign and Congolese, continued to operate within many of the eastern provinces, targeting civilian communities and FARDC soldiers. The most prominent armed groups in 2011 were: the FDLR; the Ugandan ADF-NALU; *Mai-Mai Yakutumba*; *Mai-Mai Sheka*; *Alliance pour un Congo libre et souverain* (APCLS); *Front Patriotique pour la Libération du Congo* (FPLC), *Front populaire pour la justice au Congo* (FPJC); *Front de résistance patriotique de l'Ituri* (FRPI) and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). These armed groups were deeply immersed in the mining sector, and pursued a wide range of criminal activities, such as: the smuggling of valuable mineral resources and drugs; cattle rustling; ambushing of vehicles; extortion; and piracy (on Lake Tanganyika). During 2010 and the first half of 2011, the DDRRR process was linked to FARDC and MONUSCO military operations, reportedly contributing to the weakening of a number of armed groups.

Elements within the FARDC have been implicated in illicit mineral trade as a result of their occupation of strategic mining areas. Evidence also exists of in-

formal sector miners being subject to human rights abuses by members of the armed forces. For example, in September 2010, DRC President Joseph Kabila publicly condemned the *Mafioso* activities by some members of FARDC, and the Minister of Mines referred to “the manifest involvement of certain local, provincial, and national authorities, both civilian and military, in the illegal exploitation and illicit trade of mineral substances”.²²

A FARDC military reform and reconfiguration is in the process of being implemented, with the strategic objective of stabilising and reducing the levels of violence in the eastern provinces of DRC. Ironically, the manner in which the process has been implemented has been a cause of insecurity in these regions. That is, in 2011, military contingents were withdrawn from key areas, leaving communities vulnerable to attacks from armed groups. In addition, some former members of armed groups, dissatisfied with conditions and benefits within FARDC, deserted the government military. Some individuals reportedly rejoined armed groups, or established new ones.

3.2 Human rights abuses

The eastern DRC has become notorious for widespread sexual abuse in recent years, particularly mass rape. Such human rights abuses have been prevalent in the DRC for decades, but there was a significant escalation from the mid-1990s. By all accounts rape has

22 UN Security Council, Letter dated 26 October 2010 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004), New York, UN.

been used as an expression of dominance, conquest, punishment and terror. Some armed groups and elements with the government armed forces have been implicated in mass rapes, and in some instances, the dynamics and inadequacies of the FARDC integration process may have contributed to such incidents.

It has been alleged that until recently, FARDC soldiers have been able to commit sexual abuse with relative impunity, as senior commanders have often not taken disciplinary actions against soldiers who commit such crimes. Added to this, the incapacitated system of military justice has resulted in only a handful of soldiers being prosecuted for rape and sexual abuse. According to Human Rights Watch, FARDC soldiers are “the single largest group of perpetrators” of human rights abuse in North and South Kivu.²³

In June 2011, a FARDC colonel, Kifaru Niragiye and contingent of about 150 soldiers deserted from FARDC and reportedly raped 100 women and girls and looted villages close to Fizi in South Kivu. The group had previously been part of an armed group, the *Patriotes Résistants Congolais* (PARECO). Niragiye had allegedly absconded as a result of being demoted following his completion of FARDC integration training course. This group had a history of such violence, as in February 2011 nine of Niragiye’s men were convicted of ‘crimes against humanity’ for raping 60 women in Fizi a month earlier.²⁴ There were similar incidents in Kasongo-Lunda region between April and September 2011, where a FARDC officer and demobilised soldiers allegedly raped and tortured 82 women in more than 20 villages.²⁵

Another mass rape, in addition to other gross human rights abuses, took place in Walikale territory (North Kivu) in 2011. Eighty individuals were raped or sexually abused, allegedly by members of *Mai-Mai Sheka* and the *Alliance pour un Congo libre et souverain* (AP-CLS). The previous year, 387 non-combatants were reportedly raped in the same area, including women, men, girls and boys in coordinated operation by various armed groups, notably *Mai-Mai Sheka* and the FDLR.²⁶

Other forms of human rights abuse were prevalent throughout the eastern DRC. According to Amnesty International’s 2011 Annual Report, armed groups, such as the LRA, FDLR and *Mai-Mai Sheka* were implicated in unlawful killings, abductions and looting

of civilian communities.²⁷ Many armed groups have used, and continue to use human rights abuse as a means of revenge. In 2009, for example, in response to a FARDC/Rwandan armed forces/MONUSCO military operations (operations *Umoja Wetu* and *Kimia II*), the FDLR attacked and killed more than 700 civilians in North and South Kivu as retribution. Many were murdered with machetes and hoes, while others were shot or burned. During these two operations FARDC soldiers were implicated in various human rights abuses against civilians.²⁸

3.3 Military reform

From 2010, a military reform plan (brought about through new defence legislation) re-engineered the structures and chains of command within FARDC. The central objective of this process was to dissolve parallel command systems and allegiances that had emerged through the incorporation into the FARDC.²⁹ This resulted in many of its forces that had been deployed in volatile areas being recalled to urban centres for the restructuring process. The objective of the plan was to address many of the institutional flaws through rearranging the organisational and territorial chains of command, as well as the provision of training.³⁰

The main unintended consequence of this reform endeavour was that those armed groups that had been restricted by the presence and actions of the govern-

23 Human Rights Watch, *Soldiers who rape, commanders who condone*, New York: Human Rights Watch, 16 July 2009.

24 Amnesty International, *New mass rapes in DRC are result of horrific failure of justice*, 23 June 2011, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/new-mass-rapes-drc-are-result-horrific-failure-justice-2011-06-23>.

25 UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Organisation stabilisation mission in the DRC*, UN document S/2011/656, 24 October 2011, paragraph 43.

26 MONUSCO and UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, *Final report of the fact-finding missions of the UN Joint Human Rights Office into the mass rapes and other human rights violations committed by a coalition of arms groups along the Kibua-Mpofi Axis in Walikale Territory, North Kivu, from 30 July to 2 August 2010*, July 2011.

27 Amnesty International, *Democratic Republic of the Congo, Annual report 2011, the state of the world’s human rights*, London, Amnesty International, 2011.

28 Human Rights Watch, *You will be punished*, New York, Human Rights Watch, December 13, 2009.

29 UN Security Council, *Interim report of the UN Group of Experts on the DRC*, UN document S/2011/345, 12 May 2011, paragraph 50.

30 UN Security Council, *Thirty-first report of the Secretary-General on the UN mission in the DRC*, UN document S/2010/164, 30 March 2010, paragraph 41.

ment soldiers, were then better placed to flex their military muscles. Consequently, some armed groups intensified their recruitment and operations, such as the FDLR³¹, *Mai-Mai Yakutumba* and the Burundian armed group, the FNL, while others, like the Ugandan ADF-NALU consolidated and/or expanded their spheres of control. The security sector reform process also negatively reverberated throughout the DDR and DRRR processes, hampering progress.³²

The FARDC organisational changes lead to a reconfiguration and realignment of relationships of influence and power within the government armed forces. This had two critical consequences. Firstly, it contributed to a significant number of desertions and incidents of insubordination by former armed group combatants in both North and South Kivu. Examples included: the *Patriotes résistants congolais*, the *Congrès national pour la défense du peuple* and the *Forces républicaines fédéralistes*. Some of these individuals, or groups of individuals subsequently preyed on various civilian communities.³³ Secondly, there have been allegations that some senior FARDC officers who had been outmanoeuvred in the FARDC reconfiguration were covertly collaborating with, and manipulating, *Mai Mai* groups to engage in destabilising activities against the FARDC.

3.4 Armed groups

As indicated above, armed/militia groups, both foreign and Congolese, have continued to be entities of insecurity in North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri. The DRC government, along with MONUSCO, has adopted a dual strategy in an attempt to contain and reduce the threats posed by armed groups. Firstly, 'sensitisation' campaigns have been launched, where rebel group leaders and the rank-and-file have been encouraged to be either incorporated into the FARDC or to undergo DDR (if Congolese), and demobilisation and repatriation (if from a foreign armed group). Secondly, intensive military campaigns against some of the more destabilising groups, at times in partnership with the Rwandan and Ugandan militaries, have been undertaken. The approaches appear to have been mutually reinforcing, as in some circumstances, the military campaigns have motivated armed groups to integrate into the FARDC or demobilise.

The size and reach of the armed groups have varied considerably, ranging from small ragtag militias based within a village, to well-armed rebel troops operat-

ing across multiple provinces. The membership, and even the existence, of a number of the groups have been characteristically fluid. That is, some groups or components of groups have opted for incorporation into FARDC, but then have had a change of heart and absconded. The original group has then either been re-established or an entirely new group (with a new name) constituted. In some circumstances, leadership conflicts have led to groups fragmenting into sub-groups, as was the case with the RCD. Many of the armed groups have recruited members, voluntarily and forcefully. These dynamics have made the tasks of monitoring and responding to armed groups in the eastern DRC particularly challenging. Figure 1 lists the principal armed groups (Congolese and foreign) that have been active in the eastern DRC in 2010 and 2011.

These armed groups have been able to sustain themselves by three main sources: (i) extracting resources and income through the control of mining operations, as well as transport links from the mining areas to urban centres; (ii) engaging in illicit activities, such as smuggling, looting and extortion; and (iii) sourcing external funding (remittances from diasporas and state sponsorship). Some recent examples are outlined below.


The *Mai Mai Yakutumba* has financed its operations through: extortion/theft in mining areas; the smuggling of minerals, such as gold, copper and cassiterite; ambushing of vehicles on the Misisi-Uvira axis; abducting Congolese officials; cattle raiding; and piracy on Lake Tanganyika. The ADF-NALU has reportedly used taxation of natural resources, such as gold and timber as a means to generate income. The FDLR, apart from exploiting the trade in minerals (75% of its income), has penetrated the timber, charcoal and cannabis sectors. Some foreign armed groups, particularly the ADF-NALU and the FDLR, acquired funding from diasporas, but in the case of the FDLR the arrest

31 According to the May 2011 interim report of the UN Security Council Group of Experts on the DRC, a FDLR contingent launched an assault on a FARDC training base in Luberizi in January 2011, and seized six heavy machine guns and eight grenade launchers in the process.

32 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Organisation stabilisation mission in the DRC, UN document S/2011/656, 24 October 2011, paragraph 14.

33 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Organisation stabilisation mission in the DRC, UN document S/2011/656, 24 October 2011, paragraphs 14, 16 and 17.

Figure 1: Key active armed groups in the eastern DRC



of key members of the FDLR leadership in Germany and France in 2009 and 2010, curtailed this income stream.³⁴

When required, both foreign and domestic armed groups have established alliances amongst themselves, and in some circumstances, with FARDC elements. For example, the FDLR has regularly formed alliances with Congolese armed groups in its military campaign against FARDC. However, reprisal attacks have often occurred if one of the FDLR alliance partners defects to the FARDC.

Throughout 2010 and 2011 FARDC undertook military operations against FDLR (the most prominent armed group in the eastern DRC), the ADF-NALU, and the FNL and a number of other Congolese armed groups. MONUSCO provided military support to some of the operations, and the Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF) was prominent against the LRA in Orientale province.³⁵

In an attempt to reduce the exploitation of mining areas by armed groups and criminal entities (along with other motivations), the DRC government placed a temporary ban on artisanal mining in North Kivu, South Kivu and Maniema for the period 11 September 2010 to 10 March 2011. According to the UN Group of Experts, despite the mining suspension, artisanal mining continued in some areas, but the production and trade in cassiterite, coltan and wolframite was reduced.³⁶

Internationally, there have been efforts to restrict the illicit trade in DRC minerals through supply-chain due diligence, and certifying minerals from demilitarised areas. Examples include: the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) due diligence guidance for responsible supply chains of minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas; and Section 1502, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer

Protection Act (United States - April 2011). Some of the practical measures have included the tagging of certain minerals.

Some Congolese armed groups perceived the November 2011 elections to be a legitimisation opportunity. For example, the leader of the *Mai Mai Sheka* indicated that he would run for office, and registered his candidacy for the national legislative elections.³⁷ However, his name was withdrawn from the electoral list following a public outcry.

34 UN Security Council, Interim report of the UN Group of Experts on the DRC, UN document S/2011/345, 12 May 2011; MUNUSCO and UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Final report of the fact-finding missions of the UN Joint Human Rights Office into the mass rapes and other human rights violations committed by a coalition of arms groups along the Kibua-Mpofi Axis in Walikale Territory, North Kivu, from 30 July to 2 August 2010, July 2011; UN Security Council, Letter dated 26 October 2010 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004), New York, UN; IRIN, DRC: Who's who among armed groups in the east, 15 June 2010, <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=89494>.

35 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Organisation stabilisation mission in the DRC, UN document S/2011/20, 17 January 2011, paragraphs 17 and 18; UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Organisation stabilisation mission in the DRC, UN document S/2011/656, 24 October 2011, paragraphs 21-23.

36 UN Security Council, Interim report of the UN Group of Experts on the DRC, UN document S/2011/345, 12 May 2011, paragraph 67.

37 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Organisation stabilisation mission in the DRC, UN document S/2011/656, 24 October 2011, paragraph 15.

3.5 Security climate in Ituri

Compared to the 2002-2004 period, the current security climate in Ituri is stable, but fragile. FARDC, with the support of MONUSCO, undertook numerous operations against the resident armed groups, the FPJC and the FRPI, and reportedly weakened the military capabilities of both groups.³⁸ The UN Secretary-General has expressed concern over the delayed implementation of the *Désarmement et Réinsertion Communautaire Ituri programme*, in that five years after the initiation of the programme, 8,000 demobilised ex-combatants were still awaiting reintegration assistance. He warned that this state of affairs “could swell the ranks of residual armed groups”.³⁹

Despite these concerns, the security situation in Bunia was relatively peaceful at the time of the research. According to Bideko Murhabazi Juvenal, the Bunia police chief:

“When I arrived here 16 months ago, armed crime was a serious problem. After 6pm, no one was moving and there was always shooting at night. There were ten armed robberies a night. Now it’s more like one every three months... Much of this criminality was coming from ex-combatants, though there was also involvement of the FARDC and even police officers. But in collaboration with MONUSCO, we have controlled the situation, largely through extensive patrolling, and at

this stage I would say Bunia is the most secure town in eastern DRC, particularly when compared to Goma.... I will not pretend there is no banditry. The criminals have been weakened but not defeated, and they have not surrendered their arms. They still use their weapons, but to threaten, not to shoot. These days you hardly hear any shooting.”⁴⁰

Other interviewees confirmed the police chief’s thesis, noting that armed criminality had greatly declined since 2009. There was a similar situation in Mongbwalu, where representatives of an artisanal mining association reported:

“People do fight sometimes but they don’t use arms for their fights. We don’t have a problem of armed criminality. In Bunia we hear that there is this problem, but not here in Mongbwalu.”⁴¹

38 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Organisation stabilisation mission in the DRC, UN document S/2011/20, 17 January 2011, paragraphs 17 and 18; UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Organisation stabilisation mission in the DRC, UN document S/2011/656, 24 October 2011, paragraphs 21-23.

39 UN Security Council, Thirty-first report of the Secretary-General on the UN mission in the DRC, UN document S/2010/164, March 2010, paragraph 24.

40 Interview with Bideko Murhabazi Juvenal, *inspecteur principal, commandant district de l’Ituri*, Police Nationale Congolais, Bunia, 1 April 2011.

41 Interview with Isidore Tamile, administrative secretary, and Ucima Sylva, vice-president of *Association des Orpailleurs pour le Développement et la Reconstruction de Paix en Ituri* (AODERPI), *op cit*.

4. Reintegration of former combatants in North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri

This section provides an assessment of the socio-economic reintegration of former combatants in South Kivu, North Kivu and Ituri. An analysis of the DRC economy is provided as a backdrop to understanding ex-combatant behaviour. As this section reveals, the vast majority of ex-combatants, similar to most of the DRC's economically active population, have interacted with the informal sector of the economy in order to sustain themselves. The most financially viable activities have been in the small business, fisheries, transport and extraction (mining) sectors.

4.1 DRC economic overview

The main GDP source in the DRC is agriculture, which contributes more than 40% (including the forestry sector). Mining adds more than a quarter to GDP, with other significant contributors being industry (16.1%) and services (31.8%). Between 2006 and 2010 there was an average real GDP growth of 6.5%. Mining has been identified as a major growth area for the country, given the substantial reserves of cobalt ore copper, coltan, tantalum, tin and diamonds.⁴² The World Bank has suggested that mining could contribute as much as 25% to GDP.⁴³ Estimated mineral exports were in the region of US\$6.6 billion in 2008. Cobalt accounted for more than a third (38%) of the total value of mineral exports; copper, 35%; crude petroleum, 12%; and diamonds, 11%.⁴⁴ Nonetheless, agriculture will continue to be the bedrock of economic and livelihood security of the DRC in the foreseeable future.

The mineral (extractive) sector in the DRC has typically been dominated by state-owned industrial mining enterprises, but sustained war, poor governance and neglect effectively rendered them “moribund and

producing a fraction of the production of previous years”.⁴⁵ Consequently, government revenues from mining are substantially lower than they should be. Processes to restructure state mining companies are underway, with a number of foreign mining companies investing in the DRC, such as Australia, Canada, China, South Africa and the US. The involvement of the military and armed groups in the mining sector in the east, however, has constrained the contribution of mining revenues to improving human security. The artisanal mining sector critically produces the highest volume of mineral commodities in the DRC. For example, this sector was responsible for approximately 70% of the total DRC diamond extraction.⁴⁶

DRC forested areas are estimated to be 145 million hectares in size, of which 20 million hectares were granted as timber concessions to about 60 formal sector companies, but “only about a dozen companies are in operation”.⁴⁷ The formal sector production is primarily for export purposes, and exports are typically

42 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country report: Democratic Republic of Congo, London, September, 2011.

43 World Bank, Oil/Gas, Mining and Chemicals Department, AFCC2, Africa Region Democratic Republic of Congo, Growth with governance in the mining sector, May 2008, 4.

44 U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, 2009 Minerals yearbook, Congo (Kinshasa), May 2011, 11.1.

45 World Bank, Oil/Gas, Mining and Chemicals Department, AFCC2, Africa Region Democratic Republic of Congo, Growth with governance in the mining sector, May 2008, 6.

46 World Bank, Oil/Gas, Mining and Chemicals Department, AFCC2, Africa Region Democratic Republic of Congo, Growth with governance in the mining sector, May 2008, 6-7; Business Monitor International, Democratic Republic of Congo mining report Q1 2010, January 6, 2010.

47 Forests Monitor, The timber sector in the DRC: a brief overview, Cambridge, 2007.

in the form of logs.⁴⁸ Between 1995 and 2010, timber production increased by 27.7%.

4.2 Ex-combatant socio-economic reintegration

Ex-combatants have pursued a wide variety of livelihood strategies in the three areas, with most engaging in small businesses, artisanal mining, transport, and fishing. A significant number of ex-combatants undertake a variety of economic activities in an effort to improve their income-generating potential. Former combatants with families/dependents generally opted for more stable livelihood options. Ex-combatants without the skills, networks and start-up capital for small businesses typically opted for livelihood options such as artisanal mining, subsistence agriculture and casual labour. It appeared that younger former armed group members were more vulnerable to being recruited into armed groups and/or engaging in criminal activities. Such endeavours included: smuggling of gold; armed robbery; drug trafficking; and gun-running. In some cases, ex-combatants used income derived from licit activities to invest in illicit activities, and vice versa.

Some ex-combatants used their reinsertion/reintegration kits to enhance their income generating potential, while others sold the disposable components of the kits to invest in business ventures or for short-term consumption. Those kits that were sold did not go to waste, but arguably contributed to the recapitalisation of the urban economy in the eastern DRC. Money, livestock, seeds, foods and equipment (from the kits) were injected into the local economy in a widely dispersed manner. These kits that were then bought by others presumably better placed to make use of them.

A common theme among interviewees was that DDR kits were best utilised when recipients re-entered professions they had pursued before they took up arms, and initiated viable businesses, capable of generating incomes over not just the short but also the medium term. According to Dziju Malozi Jacqueline of the *Fédération des Mamans de l'Ituri*, a Bunia-based NGO founded in 2001, this has worked with large numbers of ex-combatants, and particularly women:

“Fewer women ex-combatants than men sold their kits. In my view, this is because the main

responsibility for keeping households going falls on women, so they have had more motivation to keep the materials that were given them, and to make good use of them.”⁴⁹

However, Malozi complained that ex-combatant women had been unfairly discriminated against in the DDR process, and had consequently received fewer demobilisation kits than they should have:

“The circumstances of women ex-combatants were not taken into account properly during the process. To get the demobilisation package you needed to surrender a weapon. But women ex-combatants often did not have weapons. Where they had weapons, often their commanders took them off them, so they were unable to present a weapon at the demobilisation camps. And others did not have weapons to start with, since they were performing other tasks, such as carrying messages, providing sex, and cooking. Another issue was that with some women who did receive kits, their husbands or their families stole them.”⁵⁰

The most common complaint about the kits, voiced by numerous interviewees, was that they were insufficient, in terms of funds and equipment. NGO representatives also voiced frustrations that the kits they had distributed were inadequate, though some acknowledged that had the kits been more generous, the resentment of non-ex-combatants, many of which had suffered greatly during the war at the hands of the very fighters apparently being rewarded for their violence, would have been far greater. A sense of gratitude for the reinsertion/reintegration support was notably absent.

4.2.1 Small businesses and cross-border trading

As with most economies in the Great Lakes region, there is a significant small business component in the DRC. Many households, particularly in urban areas

48 L. Debroux et al (Eds.), *Forests in post-conflict Democratic Republic of Congo - analysis of a priority agenda*, Center for International Forestry Research, Jakarta, February 2007.

49 Interview with Dziju Malozi Jacqueline, *Fédération des Mamans de l'Ituri*, Bunia, April 1st, 2011.

50 Interview with Dziju Malozi Jacqueline, op cit.

derive an income for running market stalls, however, most consumer goods that are sold in marketplaces, including agricultural produce, are imported from other countries. As there are considerable costs associated with importing goods in the formal sector economy, there is consequently a vibrant informal trade between the DRC and its neighbours.⁵¹ Small businesses have been a popular means of income generation for the more entrepreneurial ex-combatants, particularly in North and South Kivu. Individual examples of ex-combatant experiences are outlined below.

However, the small business sector has been constrained by excessive bureaucracy and taxation. For example, female business owners have reported that they are required to pay as many as 24 different taxes/fees to a variety of government officials and military personnel, from those responsible for overseeing local markets to the *Administrateur du Territoire*.⁵² The owners of businesses are taxed on their business income as well as their net profit. Small informal businesses are required to pay a site tax. Other taxes are levied at a variety of levels of government. There have also been numerous allegations of corruption associated with the system of taxation.⁵³

In Luvungi (South Kivu), Paul Mukeba, a former combatant, established a small kiosk after demobilisation (2005) with a US\$ 60 loan from his sister (who was employed as a tailor in Bukavu at the time), and sold cigarettes and beans. In 2007, he set-up a second-hand clothing business with Issa Kagera, a non-combatant neighbour, in which they would buy clothing in Bujumbura and then resell it in Luvungi at a profit.⁵⁴ The rationale for the joint venture was that Mukeba did not have the necessary identity document to cross the border into Burundi (due to his previous combatant status). Kagera on the other hand was able to travel to Bujumbura legally. In 2008 two newly demobilised ex-combatants joined them in their business venture with contributions of US\$ 310 (which was part of the reintegration support), and kit provided by Caritas.

Thereafter, a Caritas agricultural extension officer encouraged the four businessmen to create a self-help group that would open up their business to investments from more ex-combatants and others. The motivation was that this would in turn enable them to diversify into other areas such as cattle rearing. The entrepreneurs consequently established a self-help

group called *L'Initiative Locale pour le Développement de Luvungi* (ILDELU). With a collective saving of US\$ 1,500, the four bought three cows, and the remaining US\$ 620 was reinvested in the trading business. The agreement under ILDELU was that heifers produced by the cows would be shared between the members of ILDELU, while the breeding cows remained the property of the association. At the time of this interview, ILDELU had a total of eleven members, with seven having received their share of heifers. The association also had a stock of second hand clothes, beans, corn and cassava estimated at US\$ 3,400.⁵⁵

In Kiliba location (South Kivu), 22 ex-combatants teamed up with 17 other individuals in 2009 to form a self-help group called *L'Action Communautaire pour le Développement Agro-pastoral de Kiliba* (ACDAKI). ACDAKI approached Caritas for support in the form of training and start-up capital. Caritas subsequently provided agricultural training, including livestock keeping, after which it leased three acres of land to ACDAKI for a once-off single harvest period as a start-up package. The group grew maize, cabbages and beans, and generated US\$ 3,280 in income from the first harvest.⁵⁶

Lualua Josue was demobilised in Kitona in 2006 and used his reintegration package for short-term consumption. In 2007 he borrowed US\$ 80 from his brother (who made a living baking bricks near Bukavu) to start a sugarcane business. He then used the proceeds from his sugarcane enterprise to purchase a kiosk in Panzi location. He reportedly made a profit of between US\$ 120 – 150 a month.⁵⁷

Kambamba Makenga, an ex-FRFP (*Forces républicaines*

51 See Bank of Uganda, Informal Cross Border Trade Survey Report 2009-10, Kampala, 2011: For example, the DRC was the second largest destination for Ugandan informal sector imports in 2009 and 2010

52 Jennifer Smith with Edward Bell, Governance in mining zones in North and South Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo, London, Initiative for Peacebuilding, March 2010, 9.

53 Thaddée Hyawe-Hinyi, DRC: the slow march towards a tax agreement, Afronline, 8 August 2010, <http://www.afronline.org/?p=9255>

54 Focus group discussion with ILDELU members. Luvungi, 30 May 2011.

55 Focus group discussion with ILDELU members, *ibid*.

56 Interview with Munyereza, the chairperson of ACDAKI. Kiliba, 30 May 2011; Focus group discussion with ACDAKI members. Kiliba, 30 May 2011.

57 Interview with Lualua in Panzi, Bukavu, 1 June 2011.

fédéralistes) combatant used the approximately two kilograms of gold he had amassed from the mines in Shabunda whilst a member of the armed group to finance a second-hand clothing business. At the start he bought bags of used clothing from wholesalers and hawked them around Goma (North Kivu) until he secured a trading space on a street corner. According to Makenga:

“Since I got to this location in February 2010, I have built confidence in my customers because they know they can always find me here as opposed to when I used to roam around. In a week I get to sell between three to five bags, which earns me a profit of about US\$ 50 week...I have two friends who handle the [three] *chukudus*... and they go out to look for businesses around those hardware stores and nearby market places...These *chukudus* are a lifesaver; unlike motorcycles and bicycles, they cost almost nothing to maintain, and don't require petrol to run. If I make more money I will buy more of them.”

Jacques Kaembe, a graduate of the Tumaini centre⁵⁸ (North Kivu) established his own masonry business (employing five other masons) as he was unable to secure employment with construction companies. At the time of the research he was employing five other masons and in July 2011 they got contracts to construct two maisonettes. To Kaembe, it takes an individual ex-combatant's own initiative to break the legacy of the war and embark on economic progress.

The village of Kibumba in North Kivu is close to the border with Rwanda and is located on the slopes of the volcanic Mt Nyiragongo. However, Kibumba has perennial water scarcity due to the difficulty in drilling boreholes through the multiple layers of lava that have formed as a result of frequent eruptions. Some



Makenga's small business and chukudus

ex-combatants in the area established businesses to address the demand for water. For example, Tumaini Hamisi, an ex-combatant⁵⁹ entered into business partnership with a friend to transport water from the Rwandan side of the border to Kibumba on his *chukudu*⁶⁰. According to Tumaini, the pair would generate a daily income of between US\$ 10 to US\$ 15, of which Tumaini would be paid an average of US\$ 5 a day. Through saving, Tumaini was able to invest in other trading endeavours and purchase additional equipment, steadily expanding his business. At the time of the research he owned five *chukudus* of which he leased out four (at US\$ 20 each per month) and operated the fifth himself. His monthly income reportedly ranged between US\$ 100 and US\$ 120.

58 Tumaini Centre is located in the Commune de Karisimbi, in Goma. It offers training to child-ex-combatants. The centre is the only one of its kind in North Kivu Province. However, due to overwhelming demand, the centre also offers training even to adult ex-combatants in search of skills.

59 Tumaini Hamisi fought on the side of RCD-Goma during the 1998 war and later for the CNDP in the 2008 and did not receive any DDRRR support.

60 A *chukudu* is a wooden, non-mechanised means of cargo transportation. It resembles a large wooden scooter, and is arguably the backbone of the urban informal economy in North Kivu. The symbolic importance of *chukudu* is immortalized in a golden statue located on Boulevard Kanyamuhanga in the centre of Goma.

4.2.2 Mining

Artisanal and small-scale mining are arguably the most important components of the informal economy in the DRC. The reason for this is that low-level mining is estimated to provide direct and indirect livelihood support to 10 million people in the DRC, with women and children reported to constitute 20% and 40% respectively of the artisanal mining community. This sector is often considered to be the “backbone of the trading economy in the DRC”.⁶¹ As with the informal timber sector, output from the informal mining sector is substantially higher than the output from the formal (large-scale, commercial) sector, especially in the eastern provinces, where large-scale mining operations are yet to gain momentum. It is estimated that artisanal mining accounts for 90% of mineral production in the DRC.⁶²

Artisanal (subsistence) miners are typically individuals who are not legally employed by mining companies, and who use low technology (often merely hand tools) to mine for valuable minerals. Small-scale mining, usually takes the form of a collection of artisanal miners who either collaborate in a joint mining venture, or are employed by an entrepreneur. More advanced technology, compared to artisanal mining, is often utilised.⁶³

Artisanal miners are involved in extracting a wide spectrum of valuable minerals, such as gold, diamonds, copper, cobalt, cassiterite and coltan (with diamonds being the most popular). These miners generally settle in camps with their dependents on or near the mining site, and living in conditions characterised by abject poverty and insecurity. Many artisanal miners operate on concessionary land that has been allocated to large-scale mining companies. This effectively means that such mining activities are illegal, and that the livelihood of these subsistence miners are tenuous. In mining camps women who do not engage in digging often generate an income through the transportation, washing, sorting, and grading of minerals, as well as trading in consumable goods, tools and materials. Some have established restaurants, while others have entered the sex trade.⁶⁴

According to the DRC Mine Law (2002): small-scale mining permits and “diggers” cards should be made available; and artisanal mining zones should be established. Nonetheless, the implementation of this legis-

lation has been feeble, and there is consensus that the legal protection afforded to informal sector miners is woefully inadequate. Only a minority of miners secured “diggers” card, as the annual cost of US\$25 and time required to respond to the bureaucratic requirements are perceived to be excessive. In addition, the DRC government has not been able consistently protect the concession rights provided for in the permits and cards. However the DRC government has had some success in providing technical support through the Small-Scale and Artisanal Mining Extension Service (SAESSCAM).⁶⁵

Due to poor infrastructure in most mining areas, there have been numerous reports of miners being exploited and fleeced by government officials, intermediaries (*négociants*), militias/armed groups, soldiers and criminal organisations that have preferential access to transport networks. In many cases, miners have only been paid a fraction of the market value of the minerals they mined. The relationship with the *négociants* is however complex, as these incendiaries often provide the capital to artisanal miners.⁶⁶

Ituri is rich in gold, and gold mines have been in operation in the area since the early 20th century. Ituri’s gold mines were nationalised during the presidency of Mobutu Sese Seko, and the *Office des mines d’or de Kilo Moto* (OKIMO) was established. Like other nationalised mines during the Mobutu era, poor management, and excessive theft, resulting in chronic

61 World Bank, Oil/Gas, Mining and Chemicals Department, AFCC2, Africa Region Democratic Republic of Congo, Growth with governance in the mining sector, May 2008, 56-58; Karen Hayes, Women in artisanal mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo Pact Congo, Lubumbashi, Pact DRC, 2007.

62 World Bank, Oil/Gas, Mining and Chemicals Department, AFCC2, Africa Region Democratic Republic of Congo, Growth with governance in the mining sector, May 2008, 56; U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, 2009 Minerals yearbook, Congo (Kinshasa), May 2011, 11.1.

63 Karen Hayes, Artisanal & small-scale mining and livelihoods in Africa, Amsterdam, Common Fund for Commodities, 2008, 7.

64 Ruben de Koning Artisanal mining and post-conflict reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, SIRPI background paper, Solna, October 2009, 6-8.; Karen Hayes, Artisanal & small-scale mining and livelihoods in Africa, Amsterdam, Common Fund for Commodities, 2008, 11.

65 World Bank, Oil/Gas, Mining and Chemicals Department, AFCC2, Africa Region Democratic Republic of Congo, Growth with governance in the mining sector, May 2008, 60-61.

66 World Bank, Oil/Gas, Mining and Chemicals Department, AFCC2, Africa Region Democratic Republic of Congo, Growth with governance in the mining sector, May 2008, 60-61.

under-investment, beleaguered OKIMO. As gold output fell, and OKIMO's ability to generate employment declined, artisanal gold mining increased, with output typically sold by diggers to *négociants*, who then consolidated the material and sold it on. Most of the gold was then smuggled across the DRC's eastern borders, usually to Uganda and Kenya, and then onto to Dubai.

Mobutu's government authorised artisanal gold mining in Ituri in 1982.⁶⁷ By the turn of the century, industrial gold production had ceased entirely in Ituri, while artisanal gold mining had become entrenched, employing tens of thousands of people as diggers and crushers, and a smaller number as *négociants* and traders. International mining companies entered into joint ventures with OKIMO to revive the Kilo Moto gold mines in the early 2000s, and have since carried out extensive exploration, but none have yet started large-scale production.

The strong presence of ex-combatants among the artisanal miners of Ituri was extensively documented in a useful 2009 study, conducted by Channel Research. The study found that while some ex-combatant artisanal miners had been miners before the Ituri conflict, the majority turned to mining after the fighting, attracted by its 'high risk and high return' profile, which mirrored their military experience. The study further found that ex-combatant miners from different militia and different ethnic groups worked together on mining sites side-by-side, without conflict. Importantly, the study also concluded that roughly half of all demobilised ex-combatants in Ituri were artisanal miners.⁶⁸

Interviews for this report confirmed the main findings of the Channel Research report. According to one NGO worker who works with ex-combatants in Mongbwalu: "Most of the demobilised in Mongbwalu are artisanal miners."⁶⁹ According to the Mongbwalu representatives of the *Association des Orpailleurs pour le Développement et la Reconstruction de la Paix en Ituri* (AODERPI): "There are so many of us demobilised fighters in the mines. There is no other work for us to do."⁷⁰ AODERPI, and NGO representatives working with artisanal miners, agreed that members of different militia mined side by side without conflict. According to AODERPI:

"We have members of all the militias in our

association. UPC, FNI, PUSIC... but that is over. We have reconciled. Our hate was manipulated. I don't think we will fight again. Some people have tried to stir us up, but they failed."⁷¹

There was concurrence among AODERPI representatives and NGO workers that it was unfortunate that there had been no demobilisation kits aimed at artisanal mining. According to one NGO worker:

"Because most of the demobilised round here are diggers, I proposed that the demobilisation kit system be adapted to this truth. It would have been a very good idea if there had been a kit for diggers. That would be adapted to the reality here. Instead, everyone round here just sells their kits. None of these miners want bicycles..."⁷²

AODERPI and NGO representatives also concurred that most ex-combatants that had taken up artisanal mining had not disarmed, even though many had surrendered weapons in order to receive demobilisation kits. This consequently posed a risk to industrial mining companies, who were planning to evict artisanal miners from their concessions, in preparation for industrial development.⁷³

In late 2010, OKIMO gave permission for its gold tailings at Galayi, about 50 kilometres from Mongbwalu, to be exploited by artisanal diggers. Despite poor transport connections between Mongbwalu and Galayi, and no mobile phone reception at the site, within

67 Interview with Jacques Kalumi, secretary of the mining *comité de pilotage*, Mongbwalu, 30 March 2011.

68 *Étude sur les vecteurs, contraintes et relations des ex-combattants dans les mines artisanales en Ituri. Concessions 39 et 40, Rapport Final.* Channel Research, Brussels, 2009.

69 Interview with Pascal Kahindo, CARITAS, Mongbwalu, 30 March 2011.

70 Interview with Isidore Tamile, administrative secretary, and Ucima Sylva, vice-president of *Association des Orpailleurs pour le Développement et la Reconstruction de la Paix en Ituri* (AODERPI), Mongbwalu 30 March 2011.

71 Interview with Isidore Tamile, administrative secretary, and Ucima Sylva, vice-president of *Association des Orpailleurs pour le Développement et la Reconstruction de la Paix en Ituri* (AODERPI), op cit.

72 Interview with Pascal Kahindo, op cit.

73 Interview with Isidore Tamile, administrative secretary, and Ucima Sylva, vice-president of *Association des Orpailleurs pour le Développement et la Reconstruction de la Paix en Ituri* (AODERPI), op cit.

only a few months hundreds of artisanal diggers had settled in Galayi. A small town emerged in the forest clearing, complete with bars, shops and brothels. By March 2011, there were, however, no schools or clinics. The site was controlled by CECOKI, which presented itself as a cultural association, though its detractors have claimed it is a front for the business interests of powerful politicians and military commanders.⁷⁴ According to a CECOKI representative, more than half of the residents are ex-combatants.⁷⁵

There were eleven *négociants* in Galayi, who buy the gold the diggers produce, which was then subjected to a 30% tax by CECOKI. According to Mapa Majo, the president of the Galayi *négociants*:

“I buy about 30 grams of gold a day. So far, I have had no security problems. There is no banditry. The military are invested in the pits here. That is why they do not bother us... None of the *négociants* here in Galayi are ex-combatants. I don't know why, but that is how it is.”⁷⁶

There are reported to be between 60 and 70 gold *négociants* in Mongbwalu. Very few of them, it seems, are ex-combatants:

“I have been a *négociant* here in Mongbwalu for 17 years. I am not an ex-combatant, and neither are most of the *négociants* here. There are some though... I buy from the small *négociants*, since I am a big *négociant*. I then sell to the OKIMO *comptoir* here, or in Butembo. Sometimes I sell in Bunia. I also have a pit at Pili Pili⁷⁷ where I have 346 ex-combatants working for me. I don't care which militia they used to be in.”⁷⁸

As in Monbwalu, there are a few ex-combatants among the gold *negociants* of Bunia, though the majority are not, according to the *Association des Négociants d'Or – Ituri* (ANORI):

“There are 45 *négociants*, big and small, in our association. ANORI was created two years ago, after the wars here, to regroup *négociants* in a peaceful way, so that diggers can sell gold peacefully, regardless of their tribe. We have also disseminated the mining code, to persuade *négociants* to sell legally. It is thanks to ANORI that there are now two gold buying

comptoirs in Bunia, though it is true that not all our members sell all their material to them. The problem is that the *comptoirs*' prices are too low, and taxes are too high. This encourages smuggling.”⁷⁹

The mineral sector is also a key component of both the North and South Kivu economy, with coltan, cassiterite and gold being actively mined by artisanal miners. In addition, some of the main *comptoirs*, the trading houses that buy, sell and export minerals mined in the eastern Congo, are based in Bukavu. A significant number of former combatants have pursued a livelihood from mining in these provinces, and their role in this sector has been diverse. The FDLR and armed groups in the mining areas have exploited some former combatants, while others have been fortunate to avoid the predatory activities of these groups. However, some ex-combatants have been implicated in human rights abuses and illegally taxing other miners.⁸⁰

4.2.3 Transport

Operating a motorcycle taxi is a popular means to generate an income for young, able-bodied urban men. This sector is an essential component of the post-war informal urban transport system, ferrying workers between their homes, places of work and marketplaces. This industry has attracted ex-combatants in all three areas, most notably Ituri.

There is one motorcycle taxi association in Ituri, called the *Association des Chauffeurs du Congo/Moto-Ituri*. There are however several hundred other motorcycle taxi drivers in Bunia that were not members of the association. The association began as an independent organisation, but became affiliated to the national association in 2005. The association claimed 2,475 members in Bunia town, which has an estimated pop-

74 Interview with NGO workers, Mongbwalu, 29 March 2011.

75 Interview with Pascal Baseyembise, CECOKI representative, Galayi, 29 March 2011.

76 Interview with Mapa Majo, Galayi, 29 March 2011.

77 An artisanal gold mining site on Anglo Gold's concession, a few kilometres from Mongbwalu.

78 Interview with Fai Avon, Monbwalu, 29 March 2011.

79 Interview with Lomema Batsi Mukwa Christophe, ANORI, Bunia, 1 April 2011.

80 Global Witness, *Faced with a gun, what can you do? War and the militarisation of mining in the eastern Congo*, London, 2009, 50.

ulation of 330,000. Members pay a US\$ 20 joining fee, and then US\$ 5 per year thereafter. Ninety percent of the members are under 30, and in excess of 90% are ex-combatants. The association includes ex-combatants from all the Ituri militias, as well as a number of deserters from the FARDC. According to the president and vice-president of the association:

“In our association, everyone’s objective is to earn a living. So we are not fighting each other. You see how that helps us mentally? Some of our members were colonels, or majors in the armed groups. But they are leaving behind their dreams of that, and are working to make a living...”⁸¹

According to ex-combatants, part of the appeal of motorcycle taxi driving was that it requires no academic qualifications, nor any workplace skills except driving, and ‘courage’. Few ex-combatants in Ituri attained academic qualifications, and consequently struggled to secure government or formal sector employment, where these qualifications are required. Another aspect of the appeal was: “It is *à la mode*. Young women think you have good money if you drive a taxi, so we always have girlfriends.”⁸²

There were three types of taxi drivers: those who work for themselves; those who work for others; and those who work temporarily (by contract). The association reckons that among its members, half own their own motorcycles, 30% work for the motorcycle owners, and the balance work by contract. Owning a motorcycle is the most profitable of the three options, and those who do not own their own bikes are reported to aspire to do so. Those driving for others must remit all their earnings to the motorcycle owners for the Monday to Friday trade, and are only permitted to retain Saturday’s takings.

Virtually all the drivers drive Chinese motorcycles, which at the time of research retailed for US\$ 600. This was considerably cheaper than the Japanese motorcycles available for purchase, but drivers readily conceded that the Chinese motorcycles, when subjected to Bunia’s poor roads of those of the surrounding areas, and persistent over-loading, generally only lasted up to eight months. Drivers preferred the Chinese bikes nonetheless because of their allegedly superior carrying capacity, which meant they were more profitable to drivers despite their short lifespan. Although

inexpensive compared to Japanese bikes, the cost of Chinese bikes far exceeded the amount given to ex-combatants for their demobilisation packages, and it appears that very few, if any, ex-combatants used the packages to purchase motorcycles.

There appeared to be a strong association between motorcycle taxi drivers and artisanal miners in Ituri. The main reason, according to miners and taxi drivers was that ex-combatants dominated both economic activities. Additionally, artisanal miners used motorcycle taxis to travel between Mongbwalu and other digging sites to Bunia and back, and often invest their profits in motorcycles.

Like most Congolese entrepreneurs, Bunia’s motorcycle taxi drivers consider themselves to be excessively taxed, though it seems they actually pay a lower proportion of their income than most economically active resident of the town. According to representatives of the motorcycle taxi association, operators must pay a US\$ 6 tax to the mairie and a US\$ 20 fee to the province annually. In addition, they are required to pay US\$ 74 for insurance and US\$ 85 for a vehicle licence each year.⁸³

Despite the popularity of motorcycle taxis among ex-combatants in Bunia, the involvement of international agencies distributing DDRRR kits in this and related activities has been minimal. UNDP provided motorcycles to a small number of ex-combatants, as did a local NGO, the *Fédération des Mamans de l’Ituri*. These interventions were ineffective, as the bikes were not donated to individuals, but to groups of ex-combatants, resulting in ownership disputes between the members. As a result, the groups disbanded and the bikes passed to individual owners.⁸⁴ Due to the popularity of motorcycles among ex-combatants in Bunia, there has been considerable demand for motorcycle mechanics. A number of ex-combatants indicated that they would have chosen to train in mechanics had it been available as one of the DDRRR support options.

81 Interview with Willy Musingo, president of the Association des Chauffeurs du Congo – Section Moto-Ituri, and John Paul Lodda Lossa, vice-president of the same association, Bunia, 26 March 26, 2011.

82 Interview with Willy Musingo, 26 March 2011.

83 Interview with Willy Musingo and John Paul Lodda Lossa, op cit.

84 Interview with Willy Musingo and John Paul Lodda Lossa, op cit, and interview with director of local NGO, Bunia, 26 March 2011.

As with other towns in the eastern DRC, the motorcycle taxi sector in the urban centres of South Kivu and North Kivu are relatively vibrant. A number of ex-combatants, particularly young men, have derived an income from this trade. For example, Byamungu Kambaza benefitted from a US\$ 600 loan from the cooperative credit society in Kalundu, the *Coopérative d'Épargne et de Crédit* (COOPEC), and purchased a second-hand motorcycle, which he subsequently used as a taxi to ferry people between Uvira and Baraka. In the dry season Kambaza undertakes a return trip from Uvira to Baraka every day, a total distance of approximately 180km, in which he transports both passengers and cargo. He charges between US\$ 10 and US\$ 20 per trip depending on the size of cargo and the number of passengers. Passengers sharing the motorbike pay less compared to single passengers. In a week Kambaza makes a profit of between US\$ 60 and US\$ 80. According to Kambaza,

“The biggest threat to my business is the ambushes that armed groups such as the Mai Mai Yokutumba stage along the Baraka-Uvira road. Two weeks ago armed men attacked Lupofu, a motorcyclist friend of mine and took away his bike and the passenger’s goods. The mama and Lupofu were left to trek from Vitobola where the attack took place, to Lweba...I always fear for myself, but I cannot abandon the job, as it is my only means of survival. Twice, armed rebels have intercepted me. The first time by two people whom I thought were FNL elements from Rokoko swamp and another time by a group of Yokutumba rebels.”⁸⁵

To discourage ambushes, Kambaza and three other motorcycle taxi drivers made their trips in convoy. Unlike Kambaza who owns his bike, his three colleagues were renting theirs from a local businessman. The agreement was that the drivers could retain all proceeds over-and-above the US\$ 40 rental cost per day and fuel costs.⁸⁶

Ex-combatants have also been involved in water transportation. For example, in Mboko town, which is located in Tanganyika District (South Kivu), on the shores of Lake Tanganyika, ex-combatants have been operating boats to transport timber, minerals and other goods to Rumonge (Burundi) on the other side of the lake. One such ex-combatant business was

comprised of eight former Mai Mai ex-combatants who voluntarily demobilised when their group joined FARDC. The group owned two canoes (one of which was motorised).⁸⁷

4.2.4 Fishing

Inland fisheries contribute between 25% and 50% of the population’s protein intake. In addition, it is estimated that more than 600,000 people derive a livelihood (both directly and indirectly) from the fishing sector (capture, possessing, marketing, fishing supply, transportation, boat construction and equipment repairs) with most fish being caught in lakes and rivers (inland fisheries).⁸⁸ However communities that are located in close proximity to the inland fishery areas are amongst the poorest in the DRC.⁸⁹ Ex-combatants located in close proximity to lakes have had some success in the fishing business. Some individual examples are provided below.

In Ituri there is the *Encadrement des Jeunes pour le Développement de la Pêche* (EJDP), an association of 25 fishermen in Kasenyi, on the western shore of Lake Albert. The EJDP’s membership included ex-combatants from several Ituri militia groups, but there have, reportedly, been no tensions or conflict between the ex-combatants. Besica-Duku Tchekedis, EJDP president, reported that the EJDP had received a boat with an outboard motor, a fridge and a generator from the UNDP, and its members had used their own kits to purchase a net and a motorcycle. The EJDP was said to be a successful business because:

“We were all fishermen before and know what we are doing. Fishing is not an easy business, and many of the ex-combatants who chose it had no experience in it before. They have all failed, while we have succeeded.”⁹⁰

However, obstacles affecting the fate of donor-assist-

85 Interview with Kambaza, Uvira, 27 May 2011.

86 Interview with Kambaza’s colleague. Uvira, 27 May 2011.

87 Interview with former Mai Mai ex-combatant, Mboko, 29 May 2011.

88 FAO, Vue générale du secteur des pêches national, République du Congo, Août, 2009.

89 FAO, Vue générale du secteur des pêches national, République du Congo, Août, 2009.

90 Interview with Besica-Duku Tchekedis, president of EJDP, Kasenyi, 31 March 2011.

ed fishing projects for ex-combatants on Lake Albert include: poor road infrastructure between the lake and Bunia; no electricity in the lakeside settlements (caused by destruction of power lines during the period of armed conflict; and looting of replacement power lines after it); and increasingly problematic over-fishing in the lake, including in the fish breeding grounds.⁹¹

Very few of those interviewed for this study made any use of banking services, though there appears to be considerable latent demand for them. In addition, there were numerous references to the lack of availability of affordable credit. Related to this, a common complaint among DDR kit recipients was that excessive taxation was damaging their business prospects. According to Tchekedis:

“We pay so many taxes. You would be amazed. The FARDC takes two kilograms of fish from each of our boats, every day. That is illegal, but what can we do? Then we pay a \$25 per year tax on our motor, another US\$ 25 on our boat, and then there is the tax we pay to the *collectivité*. We pay another tax on our fish. And another one for our fishing permit. Then there is the provincial tax, and a hygiene tax... This is why we are not progressing. We pay so much tax.”⁹²

In North Kivu, Bahati Kahimbi and two ex-combatant colleagues sustained themselves by fishing on Lake Kivu after leaving the CNDP rebel group in 2009. They established a commercial fishing venture called the Kawaida Group, which was comprised of eight fishermen. They fished at night and then sold their catch to restaurants and hotels, and generated a daily average income of between US\$ 120 and US\$ 160. According to Kahimbi:

“This is a skill that we acquired during the



Kawaida Fishing Group on Lake Kivu, North Kivu

war. We used to go fishing to supplement our food in the bush... We used to hijack civilian canoes including their catch...”

In South Kivu, former combatants established the *Action Communautaire pour le Développement de Kalundu* (ACDK) in Uvira in 2008. They subsequently approached several potential donors for assistance and eventually received support from national DDR programme through Caritas, an international NGO. This financial support enabled ACDK to buy fishing nets and a *pirogue* (canoe), which they used to fish on Lake Tanganyika. They would fish overnight and sell the bulk of their catch at the port of Kalimabenge (Uvira) the following morning. A small portion of the catch was reserved for family consumption, and was shared equally among the families.⁹³

With the savings made from fish sales, the ACDK

91 Interview with Muzungu Tabaro Janvier, administrative secretary of Kasenyi, and Samuel Singh N’ku, fishing officer, ministry of the environment, Kasenyi, 31 March 2011.

92 Interview with Besica-Duku Tchekedis, op cit.

93 Focus group discussion with ACDK self-help group, of which Mazembe is member. Kalundu, 29 May 2011; Interview with Bushobzi, the Chairman of ACDK, Uvira, 30 May 2011.

purchased an additional pirogue, lamps (used for attracting fish at night), and nets. ACDK also diversified its activities, and from January 2011 the members divided themselves into three categories: eight focusing on fishing; 15 on crop farming; and five on livestock rearing. However, the cost of renting agricultural land was prohibitive to ACDK, and they subsequently only undertook small-scale 'kitchen' (subsistence) farming. At the time of this research, ACDK had 34 members (eight of which were not former combatants), of whom four were women and 30 men. ACDK's daily fish sales were on average between US\$30 and US\$ 40.⁹⁴

The ACDK also opened a bank account with COOPEC, into which they deposited their savings. The advantage was that COOPEC administered a micro credit facility that ACDK members could access on relatively favourable terms. The savings account also came handy during the *Saison Ndenga*, when the moon is too bright to effectively fish at night. Consequently, fish catches are substantially reduced, with ACDK barely being able to acquire sufficient fish for their own subsistence during this period.⁹⁵

Most ACDK members, for example, established their own small businesses through the loans accessed from COOPEC. The businesses included the selling of petrol on the roadside (commonly referred to as 'le quadaffi'), welding, motorcycle transportation and kiosks. Others generated an income as dockworkers and porters. Two specific individual examples include:

- Mokili wa Bongo travels to Bujumbura every Saturday to buy fuel so that he can resell it in Uvira for a profit. Mokili hires a motorbike for US\$ 20 and then transports two 20-litre containers of petrol from the Burundian capital. He makes a profit of between US\$ 35 and US\$ 50 per 20-litre container.⁹⁶
- Mafikiri ya Nzoni, accessed a loan from COOPEC, and set up a kiosk in Uvira. He used the bicycle he received as part of the reinsertion kit for transporting merchandise to his kiosk. He currently makes a profit of between US\$ 30 and US\$ 40 USD per month.⁹⁷

4.2.5 Agriculture and hunting (bush meat)

Agriculture provides the greatest contribution to GDP in the DRC in terms of productive sectors, and it has

been estimated that close to 60% of the economically active population derive a livelihood from the agricultural sector,⁹⁸ with both subsistence and commercial (predominantly for export) agricultural production.⁹⁹ Nonetheless, only 10% of land in the DRC is used for agricultural purposes, and agriculture only receives 0.64% of the total national budget.¹⁰⁰ The principal subsistence crops include: cassava, plantains, maize, groundnuts, and rice.¹⁰¹

As indicated above, some ex-combatants pursued agricultural ventures, but were typically not highly profitable. According to representatives of the FAO in Bunia, those who were farmers before the conflict proved more likely to succeed and make use of their agricultural kits than those who were not. Access to land for farmers, however, was a constraining factor.¹⁰² Many ex-combatants have engaged in subsistence agriculture as a part-time activity, in order to produce food for themselves and their dependents.

Meat, particularly bush meat, is a noteworthy commodity in DRC, as the prevalence of disease restricts animal husbandry in the forest areas (which make up 68% of the territory of the DRC). A significant number of households, including ex-combatant households, survive and/or derive a livelihood from hunting wild animals, such as duikers, monkeys, rodents, wild pigs, buffaloes, reptiles and birds.¹⁰³ In some of the more isolated areas, bush meat is one of only products "that

94 Interview with Ndegeya Ndakurundi, advisor to ACDK. Uvira, 27 May 2011

95 Interview with Ndegeya Ndakurundi, advisor to ACDK. Uvira, 27 May 2011.

96 Interview with Mokili, Kalimabenge bridge. Uvira, 28 May 2011; Group interview with self-employed ex-combatants (among them Mokili). Uvira, 1 June 2011.

97 Interview with Mafikiri at his kiosk in Kalundu, 29 May 2011.

98 FAOSTAT, FAO of the UN, Accessed on June 23, 2011, <http://faostat.fao.org/site/550/default.aspx#ancor>

99 FAOSTAT, FAO of the UN, Accessed on June 23, 2011, <http://faostat.fao.org/site/377/default.aspx#ancor>

100 African Economic Outlook, Congo, Dem. Rep. 2011, OECD Development Centre, Issy les Moulineaux, 2011, 12

101 FAOSTAT, FAO of the UN, Accessed on October 7, 2011, <http://faostat.fao.org/site/342/default.aspx>

102 Interview with Benjamin Ambura and Faustin Mitumba, FAO, Bunia, 28 March 2011.

103 Emmanuel de Merode, Katherine Homewood and Guy Cowlishaw, Wild resources and livelihoods of poor households in Democratic Republic of Congo, ODI wildlife policy brief, No. 1 November 2003.

can provide income that outweighs transportation costs”.¹⁰⁴

Typically hunters catch and slaughter wild animals in the deep forest areas, then transport it to urban marketplaces. In some cases the meat is smoked (to preserve it) prior to transportation. However, the trade is allegedly subject to numerous informal fees, which results in the relatively high cost of the meat in the urban marketplace. For example, bush meat sold in Kinshasa has reportedly been as much as five times than the sum the hunters received.¹⁰⁵

4.2.6 Forestry

The Congolese Association of Small Scale Loggers has estimated that on average there are 8,000 active logging companies (rough estimate) operating in the informal sector in the DRC, commonly referred to as *scieurs de long*. These logging companies primarily engage in pit sawing for both the domestic (for furniture and construction) and export markets. Included in this number are part-time and full-time enterprises, with personnel numbers varying between businesses. The common feature, however, is that these entities generally operate without licenses from the national government. However, they pay taxes and royalties to local authorities and traditional leaders.¹⁰⁶

In 2007, annual timber production from this sector was estimated to be between 1.5 and 2.4 million square metres, which equated to about half a million square metres of sawn wood. In addition, it has been suggested that the output of informal sector exceeds the formal sector close to 1000%. The reason for this was that the informal sector was more adaptive to conditions of armed conflict, due to low levels of technology, small business entities and its ability to cope with adverse infrastructural conditions. Included in the informal timber sector are artisanal businesses (such as carpentry and furniture making) and fuel wood consumption (charcoal production and use and trade). Charcoal, as in many other underdeveloped African countries, is the primary energy source for households in DRC, and is estimated to constitute 72 million cubic metres of timber per year.¹⁰⁷ There have been reports of ex-combatants pursuing livelihood in the forestry/timber sector and related industries, especially carpentry.

4.2.7 Criminal/smuggling activities

Some ex-combatants have generated income from trafficking of minerals, drugs and armed criminality. This was the case with Claude Bulukwa and two friends who opted for demobilisation when the CNDP rebel group integrated into the FARDC. According to Bulukwa:

“Life of a demobilised soldier is the most difficult thing here. We can hardly get employment and therefore we have to fend for ourselves in any way possible. The easiest way out has been to revive our contacts with our friends who were reintegrated into FARDC, and who are deployed in mining locations [Shabunda, Mwenga and Walungu territories]. This way, they channel the minerals through us to the markets in Bukavu, Uvira and Bujumbura... However, the danger is that often we get intercepted by armed groups such as FDLR and Mai Mai and have to part with the entire ‘tola’ (pack of minerals, notably gold).”¹⁰⁸

Katamba Bisheko, an ex-combatant, had previously served as a major in the FDLR and then surrendered to MONUC. He was then transferred to *Centre d'appuis aux jeunes démobilisés* (Centre for Demobilised Youth), where he was provided with clothing. At the Centre he was promised reintegration training, but this did not materialise, and Bisheko subsequently returned to his home village. Bisheko claimed there were little in the way of economic opportunities in the village, so he and two other ex-combatants formed an armed gang. The gang targeted gold smugglers and then sold the loot onto senior FARDC commanders. Bisheko and his colleagues also trafficked in cannabis for soldiers and armed groups. According to Bisheko:

104 Center for International Forestry Research, *Forests in post-conflict Democratic Republic of Congo: analysis of a priority agenda*, Center for International Forestry Research, Jakarta, 2007, 7-9.

105 L. Hart Debroux et al (Eds.), *Forests in post-conflict Democratic Republic of Congo - analysis of a priority agenda*, Center for International Forestry Research, Jakarta, February 2007, 8-9.

106 L. Hart Debroux et al (Eds.), *Forests in post-conflict Democratic Republic of Congo - analysis of a priority agenda*, Center for International Forestry Research, Jakarta, February 2007, 7.

107 L. Hart Debroux et al (Eds.), *Forests in post-conflict Democratic Republic of Congo - analysis of a priority agenda*, Center for International Forestry Research, Jakarta, February 2007, 7.

108 Interview with Claude, a former CNDP rebel, now demobilised. Lemera Plateau, 01 June 2011.

“Soldiers exchange cannabis for ammunition and minerals with rebels, who occupy mines and possess plantations of cannabis in the high plateaux, deep in the forest. Everyone in the trade abides by the same rules, and betrayal is often met with death”.

Bisheko reportedly spent eight months with the armed gang until one of the gang members killed a childhood friend of his. According to Bisheko:

“If some form of economic support had been availed to me when I quit the rebel life, I would never have joined that murderous gang. Besides, people in my village know about my former affiliation with the armed groups and therefore treat me with a lot of fear...I had to struggle within my own means to get this *chukudu* in order to quit that criminal life. Although what I earn is pittance compared to life with a gun, I am much more at ease, and able to support my wife and child”.

At the time of the research Katamba was operating a small trading business (with a *chukudu*) in Masisi territory (North Kivu).

The research revealed that some former combatants have weaved in-and-out of the illicit economy in order to generate quick profits, which are then invested in more legitimate business ventures. For example, Maisha Bora, an ex-combatant from FDLR received six months of carpentry training at Tumaini centre (North Kivu) as part of a DDR package. After graduating Maisha worked for nine months as a carpenter in Mabanga suburb of Goma (North Kivu), where he earned between US\$ 30 and US\$ 50 a month. However, according to Bora:

“When I got married I was compelled to look



Katamba Bisheko at work with his chukudu

for alternatives, as the earnings from carpentry could not make my ends meet. I almost went back to the bush; although dangerous, life was easier there with a gun. One day an old friend with whom I served in the war, informed me of his flourishing gold business. He bought gold from old friends in Walikale and sold it in Rutshuru”.

Bora subsequently used the US\$ 150 he had saved from carpentry, and accompanied colleague on two occasions to buy gold in Walikale. From the two trips (made mostly at night), he generated US\$ 2,500. He discontinued his involvement in the gold trade after his colleague was shot and killed. Thereafter Bora bought a motorcycle in January 2011 at a cost of US\$ 1,550 to use as a taxi. He then provided a taxi service along Rutshuru-Ishasa road (despite the activities of the FDLR rebels in the Virunga National Park), carrying two or three passengers a trip, for which he charged US\$ 5 per passenger. According to Bora:

“In January [2011] when I bought the *moteur* [motorcycle] I used to make between US\$ 20 and US\$ 30 per day after subtracting fuel costs, but now there are too many *moteurs*, making the competition too stiff. Also, accidents are too many, which makes me fear all the time. I

now make between US\$ 15 and US\$ 25 a day, which I still find better than carpentry and less risky than gold smuggling...”

From the profits generated out of the motorcycle transport, he opened a *quaddaffi* (petrol) selling point outside his house in Rutshuru town in March 2011, which his wife was managing, as well as selling cell phone vouchers. The *quaddaffi* business generated a weekly profit of approximately US\$ 25. He indicated that these earnings provided him with the resources to pay school fees for his two children and meet the daily living expenses.

4.2.8 Recruitment into armed groups

There have been reports of demobilised ex-combatants (who benefited from DDR initiatives) becoming associated with, or rejoining armed groups, mainly in some mining areas. The ‘recycling’ of demobilised combatants has been particularly problematic in relation to the FARDC integration process. As discussed in the section of this report on the security environment in the eastern DRC, dissatisfied former armed group members who had been incorporated into the government armed forces, deserted and returned to their previous armed group or joined/created a new one.

Some of contributing factors to the desertion and re-recruitment phenomenon are as follows:

i) Perceived discrimination within FARDC

There has been a perception amongst some factions within FARDC that soldiers from certain former armed groups (that are ethnically-aligned) had received preferential treatment in the allocation of benefits, particularly military grades and ranks. This had prompted some of the aggrieved soldiers to desert FARDC. For example, the Mai Mai Yokutumba, whose membership is predominantly drawn from the autochthon ethnic groups of South Kivu, such as the Babembe and Bashi, attracted FARDC deserters from similar ethnicities. These renegades have alleged that a disproportionate number of members of groups with close affiliations with Rwanda, such as the CNDP, FRF and PARECO Lafontaine, had received senior officer ranks in FARDC. According to ‘Major Mali Kidogo,’¹⁰⁹ a FARDC soldier and a Mai Mai Yokutumba sympathiser (and a former a Mai Mai fighter):

“If you observe any operational units of FARDC in south Kivu, the first thing you notice is that those carrying walkie-talkies are of Rwandan origin. They are usually the commanders, while the rest of us...the owners of the land, are mere soldiers; some with no ranks at all. How would you take that, if you were a Bembe like me? If I did not have a rank I would not hesitate to quit FARDC.”¹¹⁰

In addition, interviews with civil society organisations in Baraka, Fizi Territory, which was one of the areas worst affected by the actions of the Mai Mai Yokutumba, indicated that the access of armed groups to mining areas, was an additional motivating factor for many FARDC soldiers to abscond from the Congolese military and participate in mining activities.¹¹¹

ii) Loss of access to lucrative mining sites by FARDC factions

Many FARDC battalions were deployed to mining areas, where some FARDC officers had established economic relations with local artisanal miners, providing the miners with security assurances in exchange for ‘taxes’. Over time many of the FARDC officers and/or battalions involved began to feel a sense of entitlement to the mining zones in which they were deployed. Therefore, when the FARDC senior command ordered these FARDC battalions to redeploy to other non-mining areas, the order was often viewed as a “punishment”, and many of the soldiers in these situations either disobeyed the order or absconded.

In South Kivu, for example, Col. Makenga, a FARDC commander, has maintained his troops in gold mining areas, as well as in a section of Lake Kivu port, in order to facilitate their profiteering out of illegal mineral trade in the area. Col. Makenga has resisted several efforts by the FARDC senior command to have him and his troops transferred to other operational zones.¹¹²

109 His real name is concealed for security reasons, as the individual is a serving FARDC officer.

110 Interview with Major “Akili Mali” in Fizi Centre, South Kivu, 23 May 2011.

111 Interview with a staff member of Arche d’Alliance, Baraka town, South Kivu, 23 May 2011.

112 Interview with a logistics commander at FARDC Camp Saio, Bukavu, 28 May 2011.

iii) Legal transformation of mining areas

As indicated above, the government placed a ban on all mining activities in Maniema, North and South Kivu from September 2010 to March 2011, both as a means of combating illegal mining, and reforming the army through the diluting its access to mining sites. Consequently, FARDC soldiers were ordered not to deploy in mining areas. However, numerous individuals defied the mining ban and instructed their proxies in mining sites to continue mining, but mainly at night in order to avoid detection.

For example, in response to the mining ban, a number of FARDC officers in Shabunda (South Kivu) and Walikale (North Kivu) gold mining areas openly declared to their colleagues that "...we have no business remaining in FARDC when we earn pittance compared to what we earn from the mines."¹¹³ The feeling among many FARDC soldiers was that had the mining ban been maintained, there would have been numerous cases of defiance within the FARDC.

iv) Flawed security sector reform process

When armed groups negotiated integration into FARDC, one of the contentious issues was the distribution of military grades and ranks. The number of armed combatants that were under a "commander's" authority largely determined the bargaining power of an armed group. The larger the number of combatants, the greater the bargaining power an armed group had in securing higher military grades and ranks. In an effort to bolster their numbers,

"...some armed groups attracted their former fighters such as those who had been demobilised and those who had already been integrated into FARDC to join their earlier

armed groups in order to inflate the group's numbers and therefore raising the bargaining stakes. Armed groups such as FRF, PARECO Lafontaine and FPLC rerecruited even child soldiers with the aim of inflating their battalion figures."¹¹⁴

Therefore, after the reintegration of these armed groups, some of those who had been artificially included in the FARDC integration process deserted, and either reverted to the armed group or a non-combatant lifestyle.

v) Allure of the armed group

Some demobilised ex-combatants, particularly young men who had struggled to adapt to civilian life and/or establish a satisfactory (self-defined) livelihood, joined, or were recruited into armed groups. The security, status, sense of belonging and income-generating opportunities associated with armed groups were key motivating factors in this regard. For example, according to ACDC officials:

"... Many former fighters who underwent DDR processes sometimes never got to the reintegration stage. They get demotivated by the pitiful lifestyle that their predecessors [fellow former combatants] lead, in comparison to those still in the bush wielding arms. To a former fighter, unemployment is one of the most common catalysts to re-recruitment."¹¹⁵

113 Author interview with an FARDC commandant, Uvira, South Kivu, 20 May 2011.

114 Interview with the administrators of the Bureau pour le Volontariat au Service de l'Enfance et de la Santé (BVES). Bukavu, 2 June 2011.

115 Interview with an official of ACDC, Uvira, 28 May 2011.

5. Conclusion and recommendations

5.1 Conclusion

Sustainable peace is within the grasp of the residents of the eastern DRC. However, the actions of FARDC, particularly with respect to the integration of Congolese armed groups into its ranks, and behaviour of its soldiers will be a central determining factor for this outcome. If the process of integration of armed groups into the government armed forces continue to contribute to desertions by former non-state fighters (who once again become a destabilising force); and if the abusive actions of FARDC soldiers are not curtailed, then an escalation of violence is inevitable.

The military response to foreign armed groups in the eastern DRC, combined with international efforts to restrict the ability of such groups to generate and access income streams, has yielded positive results. Nonetheless, more concerted efforts are required to protect civilians from harm from both members of armed groups and FARDC soldiers. In addition, further demilitarisation of mining areas in North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri, and other areas, is essential.

Despite the implementation challenges of the DDR process and severe limitations of the DRC economy, it appears that a significant number of former combatants in the eastern DRC have been able overcome a key hurdle to reintegration. That is, many demobilised combatants are pursuing stable, civilian livelihoods, relative to the majority of the DRC's economically active population.

The research that was undertaken for this report suggests that the livelihood choices of individual ex-combatants were directly informed by their personal

circumstances, experiences, family responsibilities, skills and livelihoods/income generating experience. The accessibility of individual networks that could be utilised for economic purposes (such as accessing loans, business partners, investors and markets) was a key ingredient to securing sustainable livelihoods.

A remarkable finding of the research was that many ex-combatants had entered into business arrangements with individuals and networks that did not have military backgrounds. Another positive finding was that in some cases, those ex-combatants from armed groups that were previously at war with each other, appeared to be able to work alongside each other relatively peacefully in a range of professions, including artisanal mining, motorcycle taxi driving, small business and fishing.

There seemed to be a correlation between ex-combatants livelihood choice and marital/family status. In many cases, if a male ex-combatant was married and had children, then the livelihood option was often stable and legitimate. A similar dynamic existed for female ex-combatants, particularly those who were unmarried and had to provide for their dependents. In the case of young male ex-combatants, riskier livelihood options were often pursued, such as artisanal mining, mineral smuggling, operating motorcycle taxis, and in some cases, criminal activities.

The manner in which ex-combatants used the reinsertion/reintegration kits provided to them varied. Some used them directly for income generation activities. A significant number sold the kits, with some using the proceeds for short-term consumption, while oth-

ers invested the funds in an economic venture which they determined as being more appropriate to their personal circumstances. It was interesting to note that virtually no reintegration support was provided for certain types of income generating activities that were popular among ex-combatants, such as artisanal mining and motorcycle taxis. Some former combatants employed the skills and expertise acquired from the period of conflict or prior to the conflict to generate an income.

It is noteworthy that ex-combatants often undertook a variety of income generating activities in order to save funds and provide for themselves and their families. In some cases ex-combatants were running multiple

small businesses, usually employing family members to assist. In many cases ex-combatants had sought to improve their socio-economic status by changing and adapting the manner in which they generated an income. For example, some ex-combatants often started working in menial jobs, accumulated savings and then invested in more profitable ventures. There was often a positive, upward spiral process. Given these positive dynamics, it may be possible to advocate that ex-combatants are increasingly becoming implicit agents of peace.

5.2 Recommendations

The recommendations of the research are as follows:

Institution	Recommendations
FARDC & MONUSCO	<p>The existing process of integrating armed groups into the FARDC has not been sustainable with respect to certain armed groups, who have deserted, and then perpetrated human rights abuses against civilian communities. Therefore, it is recommended that FARDC (with the support of MONUSCO) investigate the reasons for the desertions, and then make the appropriate remedial amendments to the process.</p> <p>The reduced FARDC deployment in a number of volatile areas in the eastern DRC, due to internal restructuring, has resulted in civilian populations becoming more vulnerable to violent attacks by armed groups. Therefore, it is recommended that the military reform process be concluded as a matter of urgency, and the appropriate military forces redeployed to key 'hot-spots'.</p> <p>FARDC soldiers have frequently been implicated in human rights violations by DRC residents and human rights watchdogs. Therefore, it is recommended that comprehensive internal processes to hold soldiers to account for their actions, in addition to appropriate disciplinary procedures and actions, be rigorously pursued.</p> <p>It was reported that many ex-combatants still possess firearms and ammunition. Consequently, it is recommended that the feasibility of further disarmament processes be considered.</p>

TDRP, UNDP, MONUSCO & other bodies that provide reintegration support

Given the considerable extent to which ex-combatants sold their reinsertion and reintegration kits, and then used the funds to invest in other unrelated livelihood options, MONUSCO, UNDP and other institutions and organisations associated with designing and delivering the kits, should investigate the practicability of providing ex-combatants with benefits of greater liquidity. This should especially be the case for ex-combatants who do not display a clear aptitude for the training/support provided.

Many ex-combatants have been pursuing livelihood options for which there was no official support and training provided. Examples included artisanal mining and motorcycle taxis. Therefore it is recommended that TDRP, UNDP and other key organisations involved in facilitating reintegration support undertake feasibility studies into the viability and impact of offering support in these two areas.

Numerous ex-combatants have displayed the ability to multi-task in terms of income generation. Therefore it is recommended that the designers and implementers of reintegration consider the possibility of amending reintegration support to more effectively take account this dynamic.

Processes to demilitarise mining areas and legitimise certain mining operations (such as through the OECD/US due diligence exercises) provide extensive opportunities for enhancing the reintegration of those ex-combatants that are engaged in artisanal mining. The TDRP, UNDP and other relevant agencies should investigate how ex-combatant artisanal miners can be encouraged to work in those mining areas that are being demilitarised.

The excessive and bureaucratic nature of taxation, combined with inadequate access to credit, hampers the growth and sustainability of small businesses, including those of ex-combatants. Those involved in the DDR sector should intensify their advocacy for tax relief and incentives for small business development, as well as easier access to credit.

