A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE USE OF ANTHROPOLOGY IN PROJECT OPERATIONS OF THE WORLD BANK GROUP

(This document is not for publication. The views expressed are solely those of the authors and should not be taken as necessarily representative of the opinions of any Bank Group Staff members. The usual caveats with respect to errors and responsibility also apply.)

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.01 We report here on the utility of adding an anthropological1 dimension to World Bank Group (WBG) projects and the methods by which such a dimension can be added.

1.02 This study was undertaken on the initiative of the researchers who believed that Project Operations might benefit from a greater degree of involvement with anthropology. Although there was an increasing awareness among Bank staff that more attention should be paid to the social aspects of projects, this awareness had not been translated into a uniform policy or a systematic method. Anthropologists had, on occasion, been employed as consultants but the approach was ad hominem. We believed that the identification of the social and cultural variables as significant factors in social development and their systematic inclusion in the identification, preparation, supervision and evaluation of projects would help in the attainment of project goals more easily, and with fewer problems, than at present.

1.03 These are very broad objectives and given the size of the institution, the scope of its operations, the time available, and our own resources, the study had to be reduced to manageable proportions. Our study seeks to answer the basic questions of utility and method firstly by examining the overall objectives of WBG and secondly by concentrating on a few interrelated aspects of WBG operations. The approach was as follows:

1. an examination of the WBG's experience with anthropology to date;
2. informing staff members about the potential of the discipline through talks, lectures, and consultations; and obtaining the reaction of

1 Quite early in this work at the Bank we found that our discipline and the nature of the work was understood more easily by some staff members if the word "sociology" was used. We have no particular objections to such use and it should be understood that we use the terms "anthropology"/"sociology" interchangeably in this study.
staff members to the introduction of the anthropological dimension in their work;

3. an analysis of the types of projects in which anthropology has something to contribute;

4. an assessment of the methods by which anthropological insights and data could be made available when required; and

5. recommendations on the most effective way to harness anthropology to the present and projected needs of the WBG operations.

1.04 The survey has convinced us not only of the necessity of adding an anthropological dimension to project operations but also of the fairly widespread recognition of such a need among staff members. This conviction would, it is felt, have gained in strength if we could have added the evidence of WBG mission practices.

1.05 This survey was carried out in a period of five months. The original intention had been to conduct a 15-month survey of WBG operations. In the course of this survey we proposed to examine mission practices including methods of collection of information relating to the proposed project in the field, and the way in which the collated data was written up. We were, however, informed in October 1972 that at the present stage it would suffice if a prima facie case for the systematic addition of anthropology to WBG operations were made and were requested to proceed to make the case. We do believe that this case has been made and hope that it will be acted upon.
II. THE BANK'S EXPERIENCE WITH ANTHROPOLOGY

2.01 The Bank has made very limited use of anthropologists. They have been employed, usually as consultants, in agriculture projects. Hopen in Nigeria, Vilakazi in Lesotho, Dyson-Hudson in Kenya, Reining among the Masai, Ingersoll in the Mekong. This means that the employment of anthropologists has been the result of individual initiative and preference, not of any settled policy. The fact that they have been employed only in the agricultural sector \textit{prima facie} confirms this.

2.02 Was the pattern of use the result of a belief that anthropologists serve only a very limited function and that their employment is beneficial only on special occasions of need? Enquiries disproved this: it was generally believed that anthropologists had something to offer and could be used in a wide range of projects. But although the reasons for the restricted use, then, lie elsewhere, there is something useful to be gained by examining the Bank's use of anthropologists.

2.03 One reason for restricted use was neatly summed up by a staff member: "How and where can we get good anthropologists?" There are other aspects to this question: the consulting "resources" of the Bank; secondly, the drafting of appropriate terms of reference and evaluation of the results; thirdly, the ability of anthropologists to understand the needs of the Bank and answer questions posed by Bank personnel in a manner that will have utility for specific projects.

2.04 In evaluating the resources of the Bank we examined the roster of consultants. It contains 26 names, only 13 of whom are active. Three of these 13 are neither anthropologists nor sociologists; six others are not specialists:
in development work. Further, the roster can hardly be considered "representative" in relation to Bank needs and having regard to the members of our discipline who are considered the leading exponents in their special fields within the discipline.

2.05 Lack of staff familiarity with the discipline results not only in a narrowing of choice among anthropologists but also in the possibility of selecting the inappropriate expert for the problem. Most staff members are unaware that while anthropologists usually obtain a training in the general background of the discipline, their training in depth is confined to one (or at the most, two) geographical areas and a specialization in a major branch of the discipline (medical anthropology, urban anthropology, are examples). This means, for instance, that if the Bank employs a medical anthropologist as a consultant to advise on a problem relating to rural development the advice received will almost certainly not be the best.

2.06 The lack of uniformity of procedures, the absence of in-house capacity, the wide divergence of opinions, has meant that the use of anthropologists by Bank staff is almost entirely the result of the personal initiative and attitude of the individual staff member. The Bank, on the other hand, usually needs an anthropologist in a hurry and requires the advice even more quickly. This limits the range of experts who can be contacted, and narrows further any choice among those experts who might be free.

2.07 In July 1972 we advised the then Projects Department to urgently consider the compilation of an international roster of consultants in anthropology/sociology, constructed on the basis of the Bank's present and projected needs. This advice was accepted and we were requested to proceed with the compilation. The roster will be compiled after January 1973.

2.08 In some of the projects we examined we found that consulting resources are not employed efficiently: In the Morondava Irrigation...
Development Project (Credit 322-MAC), for example, the consultant's fees are $2.2 million. The preliminary study by the consultants runs into many volumes and yet, from an anthropologists' point of view, does not answer what the discipline would consider to be crucial items in this resettlement scheme: what is the manner of selection of proposed settlers and why?

Another example is the consultant's report in the Gorgol Irrigation Project where, we were informed, a sociologist was a member of the consulting team. After perusing the report we were quite convinced that little data that could be considered socially operable had been produced. Finally, reference may be made to the SCET0 report on the proposed Bali Tourism Development Project. Here, too, an otherwise sensitive and detailed report did not set out the attitudes of the Balinese towards the proposed development of tourism; the role that the Balinese would play in such development; and the method, composition, and powers of an organization which could be set up to coordinate the development. These are key questions and will determine the success of the project. The examples underscore the fact that the Bank did not receive the product it was entitled to receive after fairly considerable expenditure.

2.09 The examples lead naturally to the second problem: how is the advice of an anthropologist/sociologist consultant to be considered? When we talked to staff members about their impression of the utility of the advice given by anthropologists they had consulted, opinions varied: some found the advice and appointment of these consultants useful; others did not agree. But the common theme in all these conversations was the difficulty in communicating to the consultants what was required of them and the dif-
ficulty in evaluating whether the advice received was really the "best" advice that could be obtained. Staff members often felt reluctant to comment on the quality of the advice received pleading that they knew little about anthropology/sociology and were therefore in no position to question the advice, or estimate its quality.

2.10 A related facet of this second aspect is that it is difficult to brief a consultant adequately without knowing the discipline. A major reason for this inability to instruct or question the advice is the absence of a general policy towards the discipline. Consultants usually complement existing kinds of expertise. In the case of the Bank the contributions of other sciences, and of economics, form part of the established procedures. There is a well-developed, professionally qualified staff capable of assessing their need and value.

2.11 A third contributing factor to the present unsystematic usage is, undoubtedly, the anthropologist. Most anthropologists are trained to be academics, for them Bank advice and consultancy would be merely peripheral to their main occupation: research and teaching. The work of the Bank is not well-known in the anthropological world, and Bank language is quite unfamiliar. When, therefore, the anthropologist is consulted, apart from the way in which he is trained, he is also unaware of the Bank's needs and the way in which his advice is to be couched. The anthropologist looks upon Bank work as supplemental which can be attended to during vacations or on a sabbatical.

2.12 These assessments were a valuable first step. Any recommendation had to deal with this problem: how to provide for the consistency, quality,
and relevance of the advice of anthropologists (assuming that they are to be consulted in the future).

III. INFORMING STAFF MEMBERS, COLLECTING REACTIONS

3.01 Every large organization that has existed for some years develops its own symbols of communication, its style, its hierarchy. The WBG is no exception. If an anthropological approach were, therefore, to be effective and create an awareness of the potential of anthropology, a first task would be to learn the language -- to learn "bankese". We had to be able to translate the substance of anthropological analysis into a form that would be meaningful to staff members.

3.02 Naturally, we spent the first few weeks finding our feet and talking to individuals. It was from July that we started out, with greater confidence in our ability to communicate, in talking to wider groups of staff members. Before the reorganization of the Bank we had addressed the Projects Directors, and the staffs of the Agricultural Projects Department, the East Asia and Pacific Department, the Industrial Projects Department, and Transportation Projects. Smaller meetings were held with the South Asia economists group, and the "5.30 Club". We thus reached an audience of several hundred individuals.

3.03 But talks were not going to be sufficient. Talks might create an awareness among staff members of the existence of two anthropologists on the Bank premises, they might also convey a general impression of what anthropology was all about and what anthropologists do. But the major questions that were raised at these meetings were: what relevance does the discipline have for Bank work? can anthropologists work within the same time framework that Bank staff members do? is anthropology any different from common sense?
3.04 If staff members were to learn about the potential (as well as the limitations) of anthropology we believed that it would be necessary for us to be involved in on-going projects. At the meetings we offered our services to staff members who believed that they had projects where we could be of assistance.

3.05 There were other reasons why we believed it necessary for us to be involved with on-going projects: Our analysis of "problem projects" had not proved to be fruitful. When staff members who had been concerned with these "problem projects" were asked about them we discovered that on many occasions the member primarily concerned with the formulation of the project had left the Bank; on others, he had been transferred and did not remember clearly the factors that had been taken into account in project design; on still others, we received conflicting answers. But the most important factor in our decision to move away from a concentration on ex post facto analysis was that the utility of anthropology could best be demonstrated when staff members could assess its workings in practice and within the same time frame that the Bank presently requires. This involvement would also afford the opportunity of determining the stage in project operations where an anthropological input could be most effective.

3.06 The "problems" that staff members brought us thereafter were varied and interesting. At times it was not possible to accept some, for choice had to be determined by the main framework of this study. Problems had to be illustrative of a general difficulty that was appreciated by staff members on a class of projects where anthropology could make a contribution not presently recognized. A majority of the projects we were consulted about, and the advice we gave, is set out in Annexes to this report.
3.07 It is not possible to measure, with any degree of precision, the operational significance and effect of these talks with staff members. However, we have come to two conclusions about this aspect of the work: First, we can say that the ability of staff members to identify a project which requires anthropological assistance is vital. Secondly, the attitude of senior staff members to the involvement of an anthropologist in a project is critical to the utilization of this assistance.

3.08 There is a constant pressure for the individual staff member to deal with projects as expeditiously as possible within the overall criteria laid down for lending. We found, however, in mining, agriculture, or resettlement projects, an individual staff member is quite willing to consider the social consequences of a project when it appears likely that such questions are relevant to the economic success of the project or may also be subject to questions by the Board. In these cases, the individual staff member usually takes the initiative, provided he feels that senior staff members will concur. There is a need for clear internal directives to be issued about the necessity and method of treating social issues. At present the appropriate response of staff members is dependent on individual initiative and recognition. This results in an unsystematic and uneven approach.

IV. THE ANALYSIS OF PROJECTS

4.01 Projects are the vertebrae of the Bank organization, the fruits of the action of several thousand staff members. Bank lending is generally for "specific projects". Since we were concerned with the operational significance of anthropology it was the identification, design, and operational aspects of projects that have been our basic concern.
4.02 The Bank is concerned with the "catalytic and demonstration effect" of projects; it is concerned with the "spread effect" of a project; the problems of the 'marginal man', unemployment, and the 'quality of life'. These are all factors in the formulation and selection of credit-worthy projects. We recognize that the choice of projects for which loans are made is influenced by the fact that Bank loans form a small percentage of the borrowers national budgets. This, we believe, makes it all the more imperative that the maximum possible attention and care be paid both to the selection of projects and their quality.

4.03 On the other hand, we have also been conscious, in our analyses, that the Bank is a living organization; that its policies are continually under review; that there is willingness to lend to-day for projects that would not have been considered credit-worthy a decade back. In our analyses, therefore, we have tried to avoid the evaluation of projects with the luxury of hindsight, and to assess them in the relationship and context of policies available at the time of their formulation. We are not suggesting that the features in which we are interested should have been examined. We simply point to what could have happened had this form of analysis been available at the time when the project was formulated.

The treatment of social issues in project operations

4.04 In project analysis we had to determine when, where and how social issues were considered relevant and so we initially tried to determine the criteria employed by the Bank to distinguish between a "successful" and an "unsuccessful" project. We could arrive at no standardized criteria. Economic tests are employed to justify project acceptability; appraisal reports of
projects (with the exception of population and education projects) contain careful analyses of the "economic rate of return" based on the assumed behavior of the project beneficiaries. But there is seldom any long-range retrospective analysis with respect to the appraisal calculations and project goals which would enable us to determine whether the appraisal projections of growth were met. Nor, in the absence of such analyses, can we be sure whether the original ideas about the "demonstration" or "spread" effects of a project were attained.

4.05 As anthropologists looking at appraisal techniques we were concerned to note that evaluation techniques concentrated almost entirely on what might be termed the official components of projects, the various dimensions used in the project cycle to assess the position of the innovative bureaucracy. Much less attention was paid to assessing the private component, the farmers as entrepreneurs whose attitudes were surely vital. Because of this emphasis we felt that important factors determining the success or failure of projects were not being sufficiently highlighted. We attempted to prove this through a series of tests.

4.06 When is a project deemed to be completed? In this too there appear to be some discrepancies: According to the Programming and Budgeting Department, a project is completed when all the disbursements have been made. Therefore, after the loan or credit has been fully disbursed the project is removed from the list of on-going projects. On the other hand, the Projects Department continued to classify a project as an on-going project if something remained to be done, notwithstanding complete disbursement. However, it will be realized that though this may lead to differences in enumeration, little can be learned of the degree of success or failure of a particular project.
4.07 We then turned to a negative test: under what circumstances would a particular project be classed as a "problem project"? What in effect are the type of "problems" recognized by the Bank as affecting the attainment of project goals?

4.08 There were two sources of information for this purpose: the "Problem Projects" files maintained by the former Projects Department (a task which we were informed has now devolved upon the Regions) and the "Quarterly Review of Projects" files. We examined these files over a period of 5 years: FY1968-FY1972.

4.09 Under the former there was one basis of classification until the report for the period of six months ending December 31, 1971, thereafter this classification was dropped and all projects with problems came to be classified as "problem projects" with no specific sub-classification. The earlier files provided a three-fold category of classification: first, problems arising out of the project; secondly, problems that were unconnected with, but affected, the project; and, finally, those projects that could be removed from the list of problem projects on the ground that the problem had been remedied or that satisfactory progress had been evidenced permitting such removal.

4.10 The "Problem Projects" files were based on the supervision reports and encapsulated in the "Quarterly Review of Projects". The "specific problem areas" provided for under the Quarterly Review files suggested three categories of problems: "technical", "financial" and "management". Although these were not exclusive classifications and staff were free to go beyond these categories, the majority of "problems" were subsumed under one or more of these three categories.
A few examples would suffice to show what types of problems the Bank presently recognizes:

1. A Lift Irrigation project in Ceylon (Credit 121-CE):
The project plan involved the development of low lift pump irrigation from existing canals to serve 6,500 acres in four different areas of Ceylon's dry zone. The project was "part of a massive effort to achieve self-sufficiency in food by the mid-1970s" and to "increase the production of high-value crops... saving $2-3 million in foreign exchange per year". The project was first classed as a "problem project" in the Problem Projects Report dated January 27, 1972. The specific problem identified by the Quarterly Review was "management".

Among the causes for the project now being "at least two years behind schedule", the Problem Projects reports (of January 27, 1972 and June 30, 1972) refer to: shortage of production credit, inadequate extension services, delays in procurement, election activities, political insurrection, "and inexperience on the part of the farmers in growing chillies and onions". Only 1,300 acres had been provided with pumps and irrigation canals but the area actually irrigated amounted to 600 acres. Research had also indicated that the water requirements were double those estimated at appraisal. The entire complex of problems were, however, classed as a "management" problem, though it might be more helpful to say that adverse "user reaction was a primary factor."
2. **Argentina Livestock Project (Loan 505-AR):**

This was described as a "project to demonstrate (the) effectiveness of increasing beef production through improved pasture and herd management. If successful, will serve as a model." The project has been classed as a "problem project" from the Problem Projects Report dated July 8, 1969. The reasons for the "problems" according to the Quarterly Review for the period ending March 31, 1972, are "Administration/Economic". And yet an early report identified "rancher conservatism" as one of the problems and suggested meetings "to bring about a better understanding of the potential benefits of the project" with the ranchers. Again the descriptive labels seem to blur what for us is an important area: "Administrative/economic" as a label must have different meanings in different societies and we need to have such things spelt out in detail if data which can be used prescriptively is to be obtained.

3. **Colombia Livestock Projects (Loans 448- and 651-CO)**

The two loans mainly provided for long-term credits to beef cattle, dairy cattle and sheep ranchers for on-farm investment. Both were classed as "problem projects" soon after their effective dates. The Quarterly Review summed up the main reasons for delays in implementation of the projects as being "uncertainty in Government policy" and "short-term credit" for Loans 448 and 651, respectively. The Problem Projects file, dated June 30, 1972, inter alia said the following:
The most serious constraint to lending progress is the present adverse climate for long-term investments in the agriculture sector caused by the lack of a clear Government policy which INCORA could follow in its land expropriation and to the general rural unrest. (emphasis ours)

4. Congo Brazzaville Potash Mining (Loan 480-COB)

By the date of the Problem Projects report of February 10, 1971, this project was described as "closed and fully disbursed". The report, however, sets out that not only was construction completed behind schedule but there was also a cost overrun. It continues:

Once operations commenced, the structure of the ore body was found to be folded and discontinuous, with steep inclinations, instead of flat and homogeneous as expected... Operations were also adversely affected by inadequacies in management, inefficiency of administrative controls and confusion in accounts... The company does not think that the project will ever become profitable.

The Quarterly Review for the same period identified the problems affecting the project as "technical, financial, management".

5. Cameroon Oil Palm Development (Loan 593-CM)

The targets of this project were the development of about 9,000 ha of oil palms; construction of two oil mills' and provision of infrastructure and ancillary facilities. The project, as described, "aims at diversification of Cameroon's agriculture and provides a nucleus for further development in the eastern state."

The Quarterly Supervision report for March 31, 1972, mentions the status of the project as "satisfactory" and the trend "stationary". The Problem Projects file of June 30, 1972, however, has the following:
A probable substantial cost overrun was identified in 1971 and was confirmed by a supervision mission in January 1972. The overrun stems from four major sources -- higher than anticipated land clearing costs resulting from an unsatisfactory soils and land use survey undertaken by consultants during project preparation; heavy inflation since appraisal in 1967; some cost underestimation; and devaluation of the U.S. dollar... Physical changes in the project are also proposed.

6. Pakistan Foodgrain Storage Project (Credit 83-PAK):

The project facilities were near completion when "civil disorders began in March 1971". This resulted in the destruction of one of the silo facilities and the evacuation of the contractors' personnel. The foreign exchange overruns on this project were estimated to be $800,000. The Quarterly Supervision report of September 30, 1971, describes the causes as "Political. Due to the outbreak of civil disturbances in East Pakistan."

It is not necessary to multiply examples to show that the Bank recognizes "management", "technical", "financial", "political", "economic" and "administrative" problems as causes for delay in project implementation. In the Ceylon project and the Colombia project noted above the "inexperience" of farmers and "general rural unrest" were also identified. In the former case, the Ceylon Government was expected to do something about extension work; in the latter case, little appears to have been done. It cannot, therefore, be said that the Bank does not recognize the existence of a "social" category. What appears to be more correct is that the Bank does not appear to have the mechanisms for looking into this aspect relating to its problem projects and that it does appear as a separate, accepted category. The present more descriptive categories do not convey all the facts that
could be considered important in trying to assess why this project in this society has problems at this point in time.

4.13 An unpublished study on the causes of time and cost overruns in projects, prepared for the Projects Department, includes a new subcategory under the general head of "technical/natural" reasons for overruns: "Refusal of local population to accept new technique". The categories in this study, however, overlap: management, for instance, is lumped together with organizational reasons for project overruns.

4.14 If it is possible to identify the "social" as a reason for project difficulties, it should also be possible to take into account the social factors during project identification and design. Social factors are in fact taken into account, for example, in population projects design.

4.15 The entire range of methods of assessment of success or failure now used seem to exclude social data, except in instances where these are explicitly acknowledged project goals. From the anthropological standpoint we believe that a number of issues could be seen in a new light if there were clear conceptual recognition that (i) a project which is financially or economically successful, depends on the successful integration of the sociological factors which underlie the terms "management", "administration", "institutions", and (ii) a project may be a financial success (or a success in terms of completion of the physical components, or the following of procedures of disbursement) and yet fail to meet social equity or social development goals. There is at present no systematic assessment of social equity issues.
Anthropology and social issues in project operations

4.16 Anthropology is concerned with making sense of human behavior in cultures -- our own and those very different from our own. The discipline assumes that economic, political, religious and kinship organizations and behavior, social attitudes and aspirations can be made meaningful when viewed in their own context and as part of a cultural system. It deals with what people want, and why they act the way they do, and what their likely response to innovation will be. This kind of information can be simply put. So simply put that, sometimes, staff members suggest that any sensible person familiar with that society could do just as well. But the real strength of the discipline lies in its command of a body of data concerning research already carried out, in the systematic nature of the enquiry, and in knowing what kinds of question to ask. We do not see this simplicity as a weakness but, rather, as an operational strength. Further, the things that anthropologists do are not now done on any systematic basis in the Bank.

4.17 An anthropologist's primary goal, then, in the analysis of projects is to assess the assistance that the discipline can give in the identification, formulation and design of projects -- qualitative and prescriptive assistance.

4.18 There are three basic tests that we as anthropologists apply to each project: firstly, for internal consistency: whether in terms of the society where the project is to be executed the project is well-designed and whether it can be executed. Secondly, what realistic social assessments can be made about the external or possible spread effect of the project. Thirdly, what is the potential contribution of the project in social terms -- that is, in terms of income distribution, employment, and the social goals of that society, insofar as these social goals are discernible.
4.19 Some clarification as to the meaning of "social goals" is necessary at this stage. By "social goals" in reference to a particular culture we usually refer to concrete things like health, food consumption, education, a job or welfare, and certain material comforts (such as clothing and shelter) considered minimal in that society.

4.20 Economic goals are meaningful in relation to a planner's ideas about an economy. Such measures are, in a sense, directed towards a society rather than an individual. Herein lies a possible and important difference between economic and social goals: the former we could say is concerned with the well-being of an economy, the latter, with the well-being of the individual. The economist, administrator or politician tends to interpret and make judgments or assessments about economic well-being; the citizen interprets social well-being. The difference can perhaps be appreciated if one keeps in mind the nature of "competition": economics is the allocation of scarce means to competing ends, but social development policies framed for the attainment of social goals implicitly aimed at the allocation of resources in such a way as to shield the disadvantaged from situations where they do not have the means to compete. Economic policies aim to maximize the returns from resource allocation from the point of view of an economy considered as a whole; social development policies seek to minimize the inability of individuals in society to enjoy life in ways that they consider meaningful in the light of new possibilities and potentialities brought about by processes of development.

4.21 A great deal of work has been done by social scientists in the construction of indicators to measure the progress towards or the distance
from these goals. A great deal more remains to be done in this regard. The
interrelationship between social indicators is often unclear, and in many
senses what is being measured is simply the social enjoyment of economic
well-being: the number of newspapers read, sunglasses worn, cars owned,
and so on.

From the anthropologists' viewpoint, much of the work so far done
on social indicators often has two defects: First, and this is a general
comment, the items chosen are framed in such a way that in reality they
measure the progress towards, or the distance from, "western" ideas of
social well-being. Second, the indicators provide a universal and ostensibly
objective set of criteria so that one has no idea what the meaning of the
items is to the people concerned in a particular culture. Often undue reliance
for planning purposes on reference to social indicators can obscure the great
variation between various segments of a society.

Analysis of projects

The operational importance of systematic analyses of social issues
can be appreciated by reference to the projects which we analyzed in-depth
and/or where our advice was sought. These are schematically represented
below, classified by sectors:
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<th>INDUSTRY</th>
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<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>TOURISM</th>
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<td>India(^1/) *Bali(^1/)</td>
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<td>*Egypt(^1/) (cotton ginning)</td>
<td>*Ethiopia(^3/) *Kenya(^1/)</td>
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<td>Sierra Leone(^1/) (rural development)</td>
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\(^*/\) Projects for which our assistance was sought.
\(^1/\) Projects which are signed and effective.
\(^1a/\) Projects which are signed but where details of a scheme have to be worked out, or where further research is provided for.
\(^2/\) Green cover stage.
\(^3/\) Post-appraisal, yellow cover stage.
\(^4/\) Preappraisal stage.
\(^5/\) Identification

4.24 We now propose to summarize the major problems in these projects as we saw them and the methods we suggested for solving these problems. In the process of doing this one conclusion should be apparent: the necessity of tailoring each project in the light of the cultural patterns of the borrowers.

**Agriculture**

4.25 1. Resettlement: Two resettlement projects were studied by us, and the difference in the questions we asked should be noted. The first scheme was in Colombia (the Caqueta project: Loan 739-C0). The scheme was mainly directed to 6,300 farm families migrating from different rural areas
to the largely undeveloped, but accessible, areas in the Amazon. The agency administering this voluntary scheme was INCORA. Our analysis, *ex post facto*, was directed to enquiring whether certain key questions had been asked and answered before the Bank approved of the project.

4.26 The region was characterized by a recurring pattern of migration where the traditional form of agriculture was slash-and-burn coupled with the necessity of moving on in a few seasons when fire-resistant grass covered the plots. This suggested to us the possibility that the vacuum might be filled by wealthier ranchers at little cost to themselves. Another factor in this pattern of migration and low incentives to make any permanent improvements is the insecurity of tenure and the complex procedural requirements to obtain any security.

4.27 Thirdly, we noted the attitudes of the peasants: towards farming, housing, the government, and the agency. The basic theme was one of fatalism; the belief that religion and god are the *most* important determinants of success in the economic sphere. The attitude towards government, the agency, and any persons beyond the family, was one of suspicion and distrust. Fourthly, the spontaneous settlers -- and the literature we have summarized in the Annex is mainly about them -- were largely convinced that their new situation was no better than where they were before resettlement. Fifth, we questioned the group for whom the Bank project was directed: the Bank appeared to select only those who were already successful as participants in the project benefits.

4.28 What would the demonstration effects of such a project be? Since the participants were those who had already succeeded on their own, what evidence could be adduced to show that the example of the already successful could be made a precedent for those who had been unsuccessful and that the latter would follow this precedent? Why had the unsuccessful not been chosen?
And if these "marginal" people were to succeed would not special provisions be required?

4.29 The scheme appeared to have inadequate provision for extension. Further we doubted, on the basis of the literature, whether INCORA had the organisational capacity to deal with the scheme. It might be noted that the Bank is already aware of the credit and organizational restraints on INCORA which has been described as a "poor credit agency" (see Problem Project files, June 30, 1972: Colombia--Agricultural Credit Loan 624). Changing agricultural patterns, communication and acceptance of the necessity of change, security, the choice of the appropriate intermediary organization, are vital factors in the success of a resettlement program. They demand thorough social analysis.

4.30 In Malagasy (the Morondava project: Credit 322) the crux of the problem is not the relationship between ranchers and migrant peasants; or suspicion of government, agency, and non-relatives. Malagasy has a plural society where the blurring of ethnic differences by the French has not survived the attainment of independence. The provincial geography of Malagasy is matched by resident dominant ethnic groups. A firm of consultants had been appointed to study and advise on the project. The project as approved mirrors the consultant's report. The project is directed to the resettlement of and provision of services for about 2,100 families in the Morondava region.

4.31 The consultant's report is detailed (at times, we felt, too detailed: an example is the description and number of baby-weighing scales in the planned maternity room) but does not answer a crucial question in the proposed resettlement and why is the method to be adopted. In a resettlement scheme in a plural (or multi-group, as it is sometimes referred to) society this is a vital question. Cooperation is essential to the success of a resettlement scheme.
and if the proposed settlers do not form a homogeneous group, or are in conflict with each other, the scheme is on the way to failure.

4.32 Traditional village and lineage ties are strong in Malagasy and this means that before a plan can be drawn up for the physical facilities in the area of resettlement the planners must be quite clear about the persons who are going to be resettled, and whether this group of selected individuals is capable of acting in concert. If, after studying this question, the planners still decide to have a non-homogeneous group then the appropriate organisational set-up will have to be thought out, to provide among other things, for the areas of common decision that are the normal result of common residence.

4.33 The allocation of responsibilities and consequences of resettlement had not been worked out in a number of important areas. The project also lacked details about education extension — particularly education facilities for the children. Again, the land tenure scheme had not been fully worked out, nor the system of succession to land. Here too the planners do not appear to have considered the difference in traditional tenure systems that prevail in Malagasy — varying between systems that permit individual ownership to lineage-based systems where only the right to use the soil is recognized but there is no right to the ownership of the land used which is transferable or capable of inheritance. How are these systems to be reconciled in the new area? Land and the social structure of a group are interrelated. The inter-relationship is partly reflected in patterns of ownership and use of land, and partly in work patterns.

4.34 In Malagasy some groups are agriculturists; others, predominantly pastoralists. From which groups had the settlers been drawn? Even if they were drawn from among the agriculturists, the differences in ownership and
work patterns, and the differences in types of crops cultivated prior to resettlement had not been considered. Extension work would have to be related to this. Extension work for training in irrigated crop cultivation would also have to be planned, and this does not appear to have been carefully considered. The project provides for individual farms and state farms, with the labor of the settlers being divided between the two.

4.35 Historically, there had been a pattern of forced labor in Malagasy -- a system that came to be hated. We wondered whether work on the state farms might not be considered a revival of the forced labor system under a different guise. Could the settlers then be expected to be satisfied with work on the state farms and adopt cooperative profit-sharing? This question could have been answered quite easily with an attitudinal survey. We also noticed that work on individual farms appeared (from the figures supporting the project) to be more profitable than work on the state farms. Would this constitute an inducement to neglect the state farms? The choice of the settler group and the organisational framework are questions that could have been asked and quite easily answered.

4.36 A familiarity with the social structures and cultural background of the ethnic groups in Malagasy would have incited these questions. The physical planning could then follow. Unfortunately, the contrary procedure appears to have been adopted. This results in the attempt to mould human behavior to the physical facilities, a procedure that takes far longer (assuming that it is successful) and inherently contains the greater probability of problem occurrence -- problems which in a large measure could have been foreseen and reduced in effect.
4.37 In the Morondava project some of the details of the scheme were still left to be worked out after the Credit had been approved: for example, land consolidation and distribution, patterns of settlement. We brought our questions about the project to the notice of the staff members who sought our advice. The staff members, who were to proceed on a mission to Malagasy shortly after our meeting with them, stated that they would bring the points we had raised to the attention of the consultants and would see to it that the problems likely to arise would be ironed out and considered before occurrence insofar as that was now possible.

4.38 2. Livestock: Shortly after our talk to the then East Asia and Pacific Department we were asked to advise on a livestock project in Papua and New Guinea. Our comments were sought on the Appraisal Report (PA - 144) which had by then reached the "green cover" stage. After reading the report one of the first questions that occurred to us was "who will benefit from this project"? We raised this question because the design of the project appeared to ignore Melanesian cultural patterns in P.N.G., was unclear about the tenurial system, and assumed work patterns which did not exist. The project goals include the improvement and extension of pig and cattle herding. It assumed that Melanesians accepted cattle. It also assumed that the participants in the project would produce extra sweet potato for consumption of their pig herds. It further assumed that the participants had unused time which could be profitably employed in the cultivation of these increased amounts of sweet potato. These assumptions appeared incorrect.

4.39 Pigs are scavengers; their consumption is related to a ritual cycle which is triggered when the pigs become so numerous as to require food to be specially produced for them. Cattle were introduced by expatriates to keep down "brushing" costs in the coconut plantations, Melanesians fear them.
Most of the cattle are on expatriate ranches or plantations. The possibilities of increased sweet potato production assumes leisure and the ability to work in the fields almost twice as much than at present (the increased production being for the benefit of the pigs). This ignored the work pattern where the Melanesian cannot and will not spend more than 3 or 4 hours in the gardens each day. There is also the question of the ecological imbalances resulting from increased sweet potato production. With these patterns in mind, it did not seem likely that there would be widespread acceptance of the project goals, and the project we believed would have a minimal spread effect.

But the group that would accept and benefit by the project would be the expatriate and affluent Melanesians. We felt that even here the rate of return on the project would be substantially affected by the departure of the expatriate after independence. We therefore suggested that the project be altered in focus: that it be directed to the urban areas, that increased attention be paid to improving the local pig breed rather than the import of foreign breeds. We believed that at least with the altered focus the problem of urban malnutrition could be partially ameliorated. However, our main question remained: were there no other alternative projects considered especially when the livestock project as framed would benefit only a small section of the people, viz., the expatriate and the affluent, and appeared unlikely to have a spread effect?

When we discussed this analysis with the relevant staff members from the then Area Department we were informed that the project had gone too far to be modified and that, therefore, the points we raised would be borne in mind during supervision. We doubt whether these project deficiencies can be remedied.
during supervision and believe that this project will soon find its way into the "problem projects" file.

4.42 3. **Integrated Agricultural Development:** The Sierra Leone Integrated Agricultural Development project (Credit 323) is an example of the increasing Bank interest in integrated rural development, and of a project directed to smallholder agriculturists. The goals of the project are to increase the income and raise the living standards of about 2,500 smallholder farm families; increase rural employment; and give rise to a diversification of the economy. Our advice in this project might be termed "pre-consultative": there is a great lack of hard information about the project area and the country and we would, therefore, have recommended the appointment of a consultant-anthropologist to gather information on the points we had raised before formulation of the project.

4.43 Sierra Leone has a plural society. The three major groups are the Muslim Temnes of the north, the Mende of the south, and the Creole population of the West. In this project it is the first two groups that concern us. There are divisive conflicts between the north and south: agricultural development in the north has been neglected; political power rests with the southern descendants and relatives of paramount chiefs. Our first question with the project was that it appeared to continue this division and apparently re-inforce the political structure: the first benefits were to go to the south and the north would then receive extension workers trained in the project. Secondly, the development and marketing organizations proposed under the project would freeze private enterprise in a country where such enterprise flourishes and substitute a monopoly in its place. This would also stultify local entrepreneurial talent and direct the benefits of the project to wealthy traders. Besides this, the performance record of the proposed monopoly marketing
organisation had been poor and there were no grounds contained in the project which could lead us to suppose that this record would not continue.

4.44 One of the secondary goals of the project is the prevention of the rural-urban drift. The project does not identify the causes of this urban drift in the project area and it is therefore difficult to assess the potential success of this project hope.

4.45 An important lacuna in the project is the failure to provide any specific role for women. Women play an important role as "penny capitalists" in Sierra Leone (as in many other parts of West Africa) and have shown great organisational capabilities.

4.46 Once again the systems of land tenure prevailing in Sierra Leone do not appear to have been appreciated. An appreciation of these systems would, we believe alter the credit arrangements under the project.

4.47 Finally, the project paid far too much attention to created organisational structures and too little to the already-existing or potential voluntary organisations. There was no assessment of the role which local associations and local decisions could play in acceptance of, and participation in, the project by the people.

4.48 There is no suggestion in these observations that individual entrepreneurs are always preferable to monopolistic organisations; or that a voluntary association is, by its nature, better than a created association. What is suggested is that the literature on Sierra Leone does point to the existence of a successful pattern of individual entrepreneurship, of voluntary associations, of the petty exactions of chiefs. And it might have been preferable that before a choice was made between the organisational types there was an enquiry made. We would have recommended the appointment of a consultant
to gather evidence -- which would not have been difficult -- on the basis of anthropological observations before formulation of the project.

4.49 We discussed these observations with one of the staff members concerned with the project and were informed that after further analysis the staff would try to modify the project scheme (which has still to be worked out in detail) to accommodate our suggestions. However, we were informed that the proposed project for the north, which has yet to be formulated, may have an anthropological input before formulation.

Transport

4.50 1. Roads: The first example in the transport sector relates to the construction and maintenance of roads and the reorganization of a Road Maintenance Directorate in Afghanistan (Credit 158). We were consulted about this project after a talk to the Transportation Projects Division.

4.51 What anthropologists can say about roads does not relate to their method of construction, the engineering required, their methods of maintenance. Anthropological areas of expertise relate to the social effects of roads (and of feeder roads, in particular) and the organizational problems of maintenance. The problem in the Afghanistan project related to the latter aspect: how were the techniques of road maintenance to be transferred and how could the trained personnel be induced to remain at their jobs?

4.52 The problems, therefore, related to the choice of media and the methods of instruction, the availability of suitable training personnel, an appreciation of the problems facing the trainee, and of the cultural background of the trainees. The consultants employed in this project, partially financed by UNDP, had performed averagely well. Their performance could be the subject of constant supervision by the Bank. But more important was the
trainee: was the training he was getting such as to permit him to stay on in the reorganised department? We were informed that trainees tended to leave service after training and set up independent businesses.

4.53 Now, although there is mobility of residence in Afghanistan, the mobility is a group mobility. Service in the department resulted in transfers from one region to another. Individuals are reluctant to do this. This reluctance is connected with the pattern of residence: lineages (which are of some importance in Afghanistan) reside together in a village. The transferred individual is thus uprooted from his lineage ties on transfer. In addition to lineage residence, there is also the existence of lineage conflicts. This may result in the transferred individual being sent to an area where hostile lineages reside.

4.54 Training to be successful in terms of encouraging continued service with the Directorate must be localized. So too must the organisational set-up of the Directorate be localized. Transfer mobility is possible only in the higher echelons of the service -- an individual who is high in the organizational complex is respected and hardly likely to be interferred with. The lower ranks should not be transferred as a matter of course, but only as a matter of extreme urgency. Localization of the organisation should also include the delegation of local responsibility for maintenance. These suggestions are now being considered and put into effect by the staff concerned. It could have reduced the time involved and the expense on experts, however, if the social structure were taken into account when the training scheme was being devised.
4.55 2. River transport: The ties between the Bank and Burma were resumed after years of lack of contact. An economic/identification mission was sent out to Burma to identify credit-worthy projects. Among the projects that appeared to be credit-worthy was a river transport project: loans to the Government of Burma to purchase new boats, and to re-habilitate and recondition the existing fleet which appeared to the mission to be miraculously maintained. The problem, as it was posed to us for our advice was two-fold: (a) will the proposed project result in depressing/replacing the private sector in the area of river transport; and (b) how can economic growth be estimated on the basis of the survey we suggested?

4.56 The Inland Waters Transport Board (IWTB) is the government organization entrusted with the overall supervision of river transport. It also has a monopoly over passenger transport in routes that its boats ply. The private sector is limited to sharing the transport of goods in areas served by the IWTB boats and to passenger traffic in areas not served by the IWTB. The questions referred to above were raised in the light of this division of function.

4.57 After discussion of the problems with the project staff concerned we drafted an outline of a questionnaire which it was agreed should be administered by a member of the mission that was to proceed to Burma in September/October. We informed the staff member that the outline should be handed to, and studied by, the selected staff member well in advance and that we would brief the member as to the specific questions to be asked when he came to see us before departure. The administration of a questionnaire which aims to obtain reliable quantitative data is a sensitive matter; the
kinds of questions that can be asked are culture bound, and one must also be sensitive to exactly who is to administer what to whom.

4.58 Unfortunately, this was one of the projects where our advice was affected by subsequent Bank reorganization. We believe that the information that would have been gathered by the questionnaire would have value not only in affording conclusions about the likely growth of river transport passenger and goods traffic, but also in estimating whether the original fears which led to us being consulted were justified. An estimate of the potential growth of traffic and the type of service to be offered under a proposed project would have also assisted in arriving at the economic rate of return of the project.

**Industry**

4.59 Probably one of the most fruitful relationships in this research has been our relationship with the Industrial Projects Department. We were consulted in two of the projects that follow.

4.60 1. **Mining:** Botswana (Shashe Infrastructure and Preliminary Works Projects: Credit 172 and Loan 776). These two projects illustrate quite dramatically some of the features of mining and the problems that they raise are of concern to anthropologists.

4.61 Botswana is a land-locked nation; its public exchequer is dependent on external aid; its economy is dominated by its economically powerful neighbor, South Africa, with whom it shares its customs revenue. Like Mauritania, Guinea, and the Congo, Botswana is rich in mineral ores with a poorly developed economy. The UN has included Botswana in the "hard core" of the least undeveloped nations of the world. Botswana has one of the richest diamond
mines in the world, and a large vein of copper and nickel deposits. But the majority of its citizens are dependent on agriculture for their livelihood (about 88%), livestock being one of the major components. Herding is, however, mainly run along traditional lines. Commercial ranches, are expatriate-run and owned. Though these have been successful, commercial ranching has not been adopted by the Africans -- there has been little "spread effect". In line with the general imbalances in the economy, the expatriates, who number less than 1.5% of the population, own 20% of the cattle. The economy and services are dominated by expatriates. Expatriates own most of the fertile lands which are situated in the east. The educational system, which reflects nearly 70 years of existence as a British colony, is quite unrelated to developmental needs. A significant percentage of African wage labor is employed in the mines in neighboring South Africa.

4.62 Botswana is also a multi-tribal nation. The Bamangwato are the dominant and ruling tribe. Their traditional tribal territory is situated in the east and northeast of the nation. It is a territory in which both the Shashe mining and Orapa diamond complexes lie. The tribal differences are expressed in different systems of tenure, patterns of work, ownership, family, customs, and myths. The tribes range from the nomadic Bushmen hunters in the Kalahari, to the more settled cattle-herding Bamangwato. The tribal loyalties of the largest tribes (the Bamangwato, Bangwaketse, Bakawena, the Ngami) have been translated, after independence, into political parties.

4.63 In view of the economy of the nation, Bank financing cannot take the form of loans at the normal rates of interest, only concessionary financing by IDA would be feasible. What concerns the anthropologist, how-
ever, is not so much the form of financing but the objects of finance: What, briefly, is considered credit-worthy. Given the state of economic development there appears to be a great temptation to exploit mineral resources. This exploitation offers reasonably quick returns, the promise of balanced national budgets, the hope that the profits can then be diverted to other national developmental needs.

4.64 But there are deeper questions that lie in this strategy of choice: questions of the balance between economic and social benefit. What is the employment potential of mining development? What level of skills are required? Who will fill the skilled posts? Assuming that local people are employed and trained, how long can the skills they have acquired be used in the project, and, on the completion of the project and the exhaustion of the ore vein, can their skills be utilized elsewhere? Who will gain employment in the project? Who will benefit from it? Will the mining venture be in the nature of a "one-shot" enterprise -- after the ore has been mined, is there any other industry in which the employees can find employment? What is the location of the industry? Will its location accentuate geographical loyalties and differences? What provision for housing, health, and education has been made? Are these sufficient? How can the influx of people from the surrounding rural areas into the mining town be regulated? Can slum development, which appears to be an inseperable concomitant of mining development in South Africa, be controlled?

4.65 These questions can be applied to the Shashe project. The income originally estimated from the project at R. 10 million per year (the equivalent of US $14 million) was latter estimated at R. 3.5 million, and even this
appeared to be high. At the same time government expenditure had increased, and from an early estimate of 36% of total government development expenditure, the expenditure had increased to 43% of the total on the infrastructure of the mining complex. The total annual employment expected is 5,400 by 1980. The life of the mine is estimated at 25 years (taken from 1974). This employment figure could be compared with the 28,000 Batawanas who labor in the South African mines. Further, although the figure of 5,400 is estimated as an increase in employment, there is no estimate of whether the employees will be those drawn off from the Batawanas who are already working in South Africa. In any event, the mines will touch few citizens. Botswana has only a 15% share in the equity of the mining company, which is mainly expatriate owned and run. A WHO study had recommended a 350-bed hospital in the mining town, this had been reduced at appraisal stage to a 35-bed hospital. Finally, we are informed that the Shashe complex is now facing a recurrent problem in slum development.

4.66 The Bank has had five projects in Botswana: a road project in 1964 (Credit 63), a water supply project in FY 1971 (Credit 233), two mining infrastructure loans in FY 1970 and FY 1971, and one livestock project signed at the end of FY 1972, (Credit 325). Only the first has been completed. The location of the first four projects is in areas with the largest tribes, and mainly in the former Bamangwato "reserve". The benefits from these projects have been received mainly by the Bamangwato. This maldistribution of benefits does not appear to have been generally accepted: it could have influenced the fact that in the last elections, the BDP (a party mainly comprising a Bamangwato membership) lost 4 seats it had held in the earlier parliament and
its popular vote was reduced by 11.4%. More importantly, the anthropologist would also ask whether an enclave project, so out of balance with the rest of the economy, touching the lives of so few, resting on expatriate management and expertise, was worth it. There were far more pressing problems to be dealt with. And, even if a decision was taken to proceed with the Shashe project, the growth of slums could have been foreseen and provisions made for this contingency.

4.67 2. Cotton ginning in Egypt: Our advice as anthropologists was sought in this proposed project as a result of a memorandum by an ED who thought that the social consequences of unemployment resulting from the rehabilitation/modernization of the cotton ginneries would outweigh the advantage of modernization. The project illustrates some of the problems that could occur when modernization of industries is planned: the choice between labor-intensive or machine-intensive changes; the problem of economic gains (in terms, for instance, of efficiency, greater standardization of output, lower production costs) versus social losses.

4.68 The ginneries are in urgent need of rehabilitation if Egypt is to maintain her place in the world cotton markets. This is an economic necessity. The industry is seasonal, generally extending from the end of September to the end of March each year. The bulk of the employment in this industry is, therefore seasonal contract or weekly paid employment. Only a skeleton staff is permanent. The proposed program of rehabilitation would involve the construction of 11 new ginneries, the closure of 31 existing ones, and the rehabilitation of the remaining 42. The result of this program is that it will reduce the workforce in the ginneries by about 20,000 people. Most of the redundant labor would be contract and temporary employees.
A further aspect of employment in the ginneries is the age of the workers and the conditions of work. An estimated 17% of the workers are children below the age of 14. Most of the seasonal workers are employed as beaters, carriers, and feeders. They, including the children, work under unsuitable conditions, in a lint-filled atmosphere. The carriers are over-loaded. Most are not paid the legal minimum wage; most children are worked beyond legally prescribed limits. What we were asked to advise on was whether the loss of employment would cause greater hardship than and outweigh the benefits of reconstruction.

We thought that the question could best be answered after a random survey of employees was taken. We constructed a survey questionnaire to be administered by the consultants. The survey was designed to find out in particular whether the employees who were likely to be affected by the proposed project contributed significantly to their family budgets, what their attitudes were to their work, whether they had any preferred alternative employment, and their mobility in terms of work. The questionnaire has been annexed to this report, the results of the survey are presently being analyzed.

The project is an example of a problem that/mentioned earlier: economic development is seen from the point of view of an economy. In this sense, the project is a necessity. Social development is viewed from the point of view of the individual. Seen from the individual's perspective, loss of employment is neither meaningful nor necessary; social unrest may not be preferable to economic gain. The project raises the necessity of examining alternative avenues of employment for the affected, or weighing the problems that might result from unemployment.
4.72 3. Antalya Forest Project (Turkey): Anthropological assistance in the proposed project has been minimal; mainly limited to discussion with the concerned staff member of social aspects of the project that should be watched, and alternatives that could be built into the project. There are two reasons why we refer to this project: first, because it evidences the sensitivity of an individual staff member to the social effects of a project; secondly, because the project is an example of a rural industrialization scheme in which anthropologists have some interest.

4.73 The Antalya project is part of an overall scheme of reorganization and modernization of Turkish forestry and forest industry. Ultimately, the program will involve an expenditure of about $500 million, phased over a period of 10-15 years. The present proposed project includes the construction of a modern sawmill integrated with a pulp and paper mill. What struck the staff member on the pre-appraisal mission was the possible effect that this project would have on the neighboring villages and on the lives of the villagers. This induced the member to inquire whether the project had a potential for social development, what the villagers wanted, and whether the proposed project would assist in stemming the urban drift of the educated village youth. He came back from the mission with some partial answers.

4.74 We were consulted after the member had returned. Anthropological concerns were whether the project could generate sufficient incentives (in terms of what the people wanted) to induce them to remain in the village; secondly, to the discovery of the disorganization of life that the project might create. Was it possible to divert some of the project returns to the construction of schools and others which the villagers appeared to want?
Could training be given in forestry so as to create employment opportunities for the villagers? Could this training be adapted to different levels? What credit facilities would be made available to the villagers? What organization was envisaged? Did the villagers comprehend this proposed organization?

4.75 These questions are now being borne in mind before final formulation of the project and we were informed that we would be consulted again before that stage.

Education

4.76 We have not been as involved in education projects as we would have wished, more so since we believe that anthropology has extensive insights into traditional patterns of education. These comments, therefore, on the two education projects below are brief and we have taken the liberty of an extended note on education in the Annex.

4.77 1. Sudan Education Project (Credit 122): Anthropological interest is limited to two aspects of this project: first, the location of the project; secondly, some items in the project plans.

4.78 Sudanese identify themselves with the North or the South. This identification which is, in part, the result of historic colonization patterns, has resulted in continuing conflict between the two geographic areas. Since independence the North has dominated the South economically and politically. The southerners claim that this domination is extended into the sphere of education as well: Arabic is the main language of government and instruction; the South has hardly any representation in institutions of higher education which are mainly in the North.
4.79 This project appears to be directed solely to the extension of educational facilities in the North. And what has struck us is whether this has been done with full awareness of the divisions. How do the southerners view the project? Do they see the Bank as supporting and perpetuating the present allocation of power and rights?

4.80 Secondly, like the proposed Ethiopian project, which we refer to below, this project appears to extend facilities which are in themselves not best suited to developmental needs. This comment is limited to the development of agricultural institutes where rural needs could have first been assessed before training institutes were constructed.

4.81 2. The proposed Third Education Project in Ethiopia: These comments on this proposed project, like those on the Sierra Leone project, are in the nature of a pre-consultative note.

4.82 We believe that a novel approach -- working towards rural change through the Ethiopian church -- may not have been sufficiently thought out in terms of its social consequences. The project appeared to insufficiently appreciate the historic conservatism of the church and the difficulties in using this channel to spread a scientific approach to agriculture. We, therefore, recommended that part of the proposed training scheme which concerns the church be limited to incremental improvements in agriculture.

4.83 But the reason why it was concluded that if the proposed project had been sent to us at an earlier stage we would have recommended the appointment of a consultant-anthropologist was the lack of information in areas we consider vital to the formulation, and success of the proposed project: the reasons for the urban drift of the educated; the possible incentives
needed to motivate rural residents and students to remain and work in the rural areas; the necessity of designing jobs and types of training to fit the rural situation rather than the reverse.

Population

4.84 1. **India: A Population Project** (Credit 312-IN). This is the first Bank credit for a population project in India. It is experimental and innovative in design. Its purpose is to obtain information from the centers set up under the project in two Indian states which will enable the Indian government to ascertain the optimal levels of population program inputs and to translate this information into a national strategy. These worthy purposes spring from the desire to assist in a faltering national population program. The project provides for the appointment of one or more sociologists/anthropologists to assist in the execution of, and research related to, the program. Anthropological comment was limited to the design of the project.

4.85 There were two major reasons why we believe that the project was likely to be less than successful in attaining its goals: first, the selection of units of comparison; and secondly, the organizational set-up.

4.86 In the selection of units, the project had not chosen homogeneous units for comparison: population density, income levels were identified as differential but other significant variables had been ignored. In the formulation of the project the cultural patterns present even in the two States went unnoticed. These patterns are of prime importance not only for the communication of a population program, but also in assessing the results or effects of the program. A population program design would also be influenced
by the identification of these variables -- as, for instance, the number of castes, religious groups, ownership patterns, level of education, proximity to urban areas, means of communication. The project went further in neglecting the existence of regionalism in India. In effect the failure to construct homogeneous units for experimentation results in information of unreliable validity, which would be even more unreliable if translated into a national strategy.

4.87 Secondly, it was found that the organizational structure proposed for the execution of the project bore a marked resemblance to that tried out under the Community Development and Panchayati Raj programs in India. These programs have been found to be less than successful and one of the major reasons for the lack of success has been the organizational structure under these programs.

4.88 These apparent pitfalls in the design of the project could have been avoided if there had been an anthropological input into the project at the stage of formulation. Homogeneity of units would have provided information not merely about the level of the population program that was optimal, but also on the variables of greatest weight and of variables that could be considered idiosyncratic to a particular locality or region or state.

4.89 2. Proposed population project: Kenya: If in India castes, religions, land and region play an important part in the choice of units, in Kenya's multi-ethnic society it's tribes and tribal patterns that must be studied before population planning can be effective.

4.90 We were consulted about a proposed project in Kenya through which the Five-Year Kenya Family Planning Program is to be put into effect. Popu-
lation planning is an extremely sensitive area of social change. The success of such a plan depends to a critical extent on the prior identification of the belief and value systems of a group to whom the plan is directed. It is only after identification that a plan can be formulated, and organisation planned. To put it slightly differently, a successful plan will be one which takes into account the value systems and determines the most effective mode of changing these values (if they are to be changed) or building upon the existing value systems.

4.91 In Kenya the role of the family, the importance of children, the different prestige attaching to the sexes, varies even within a limited area. It varies even more between the different tribes. These have already been identified in the literature. The next step is the choice of the media of communication: how can the plan be most effectively communicated so as to gain the widest acceptance possible? An answer to this question would generally imply local level planning. The third question is the choice of the organization and personnel to communicate the plan, and to supervise its execution. The choice of personnel is of importance and the test for this choice should be: who can be the most effective and most acceptable person to translate the plan into local meanings. Finally, we have the choice of incentives -- which, again, would vary even locally.

4.92 These aspects were pointed out to the staff member concerned with the formulation of the project. A media consultant has been appointed and the project is to be formulated with governmental and university assistance. The concerned staff member is to consult with us about the draft outline of the project on his return from mission.
3. Proposed Philippine population project: This involved a proposal by a non-staff member to use legal measures as an incentive in a population program. The area suggested was a city in the Philippines. The actual proposal lacked clarity and depth and the staff member had already decided before we were consulted to ask for further clarifications.

It was the first attempt to use municipal powers to assist in the execution of a population plan. Incentives such as deferred wage bonuses have been tried out, as also special leave facilities and lump-sum payments. But the use of legal-administrative measures on a municipal level is still to be worked out thoroughly.

We believe that anthropology can be of great assistance in such a program: not merely in the identification of values and their resistance to change, but also in the framing of "developmental law". This would involve the choice of the legal-administrative framework related to the level of development and the social structure of the people concerned so as to induce direct change. We have often found that the choice of both the laws and the organizational framework framed and created to induce change have little relation to the social structure and cultural patterns of the people on whom these are imposed, and have even less meaning for these people. The laws and organization chosen usually employ western models and the result is that a constant avoidable problem is that they do not "work". This is not surprising to an anthropologist particularly since the models have no cultural fit.

The proposal had to be dropped and we will have to wait for a similar idea to be tried out in the future.
Tourism

4.97 1. Bali: proposed tourism project: Tourism, like mining, often offers the less developed countries a relatively easy opportunity of earning needed foreign exchange, in addition to a partial solution for imbalanced budgets. There are two major reasons for tourism: sites of natural or architectural beauty and antiquity, or an "exotic" culture (that is, exotic to the tourist).

4.98 Although anthropologists are concerned with the former aspect, it is the latter for which their expertise is most often required. In the case of the latter it is of the very nature of tourism that the culture ceases to be of interest when it is no longer exotic. The consequence is that an attempt is often made to continue the exotic nature of the culture, to keep the group from changing even though the meaning of those exotic aspects have been lost. Anthropologists have also noted the dangerous effects of unregulated contact between people belonging to different cultures: the resultant disorganization of the social fabric of the lesser developed (economically) peoples, the breakdown of their family systems, the loss of values, the increasing rootlessness. Further, we have often discovered that when tourism is mooted as a means of adding to a national exchequer, those who are most affected by tourism, that is the local people, are usually not consulted about the proposed tourism scheme.

4.99 The advice given on the proposed tourism project in Bali has attempted to take into account all the factors mentioned earlier in an island where both the reasons for tourism exist -- natural beauty and exotic culture.
4.000 We might also mention that the recommendation that an anthropologist be involved in the project as advisor and to monitor the project as well as to identify other credit-worthy development projects has been accepted. Tourism when regulated could be a financial boon, it could also and more importantly permit of directed change. Further when the local people participate in the project the chances of a successful project are immeasurably increased.

Urban

4.001 1. Senegal: Dakar Site and Service project (Credit 336): This project is the first of its kind to be assisted by the WB. The provision of services, technical assistance, and assistance in the acquisition of plots for about 156,000 people is innovative and worthwhile.

4.002 The project provided for a monitoring study in the first instance. We were consulted about a draft of the monitoring study outline. There were two reasons for this monitoring study: first, the project was the first of its kind and the experience and insights generated in its execution would prove valuable for the Bank; secondly, it was also hoped that the conclusions derived from the execution of the project could become the strategy of action and a model for other similar schemes in Senegal. In other words "the catalytic and demonstration" effects of the project were also considered of some importance.

4.003 Anthropological comments were confined mainly to the design of the study. First, we pointed out the need for a unit of comparison which would enable the Bank to assess the degree to which changes were the result of the Bank project. Secondly, we felt that it was necessary to establish
what was idiosyncratic to the project scheme so that what was non-idiosyncratic could then be capable of transfer to other similar projects. Third, we thought it necessary that the nutritional, and reproductive aspects, the communication processes, and the role of voluntary associations be carefully scrutinized and that any survey of the project area include questions relating to these aspects. In addition we refined to insights covering the type of personnel involved, the tenure arrangements, and the occupational alignments which the literature on Senegal disclosed.

4.004 The outline finally approved contains modifications in the light of these suggestions -- particularly the recognition of the need for a unit of comparison, the nutritional and population aspects.

Some observations on the above analysis

4.005 This analysis was designed to produce information on the utility of adding the anthropological dimension. We have been concerned with the quality and design of projects to take into account significant behavioural patterns which would affect both the design and the success of projects. In effect we have tried to demonstrate the greater probability of the attainment of project goals by noticing the social milieu in which projects are executed.

4.006 Clearly we have not dealt in depth with all the types of projects that the Bank undertakes; this has been a function of time and staff interest: apart from some projects which we analysed, arm-chair fashion, we assisted in projects where our help was sought. This merely emphasizes what we stated earlier, that at present and in the absence of any defined policy the introduction of an anthropological dimension is usually the result of individual initiative and sensitivity on the part of the staff member.
4.007 But does an anthropological approach have utility? Or, to put it differently, have we said anything new which would involve a re-assessment of project design. We believe that this is so. A few examples would suffice: Project calculations are arrived at on the assumed behavior of the project participants. This assumed behavior may mean that people are expected to accept new techniques, to follow prescribed work patterns, to accept the organizational structures provided under a project. It is on this basis that projects calculate an "economic rate of return". But if the assumptions are inaccurate because they have not taken into account social values and patterns (whether viewed as constraints or a baseline for action) how accurate would the rate of return be? The examples given show that there is a lower probability of attainment of project goals because of this failure to take into account the social dimension. Further, in many instances (for example in Burma, or Egypt, or in Colombia) it is not impossible to quantify this social data which would make the economic rate of return more meaningful. Again, it is not difficult to obtain the information required: in most cases there is a vast resource of literature already dealing with most of the problems, as we believe we have demonstrated. What is needed in most cases is a familiarity with the literature, the awareness of a problem, the ability to ask the right questions.

4.008 We believe we have gone some way toward demonstrating the necessary pragmatism. The approach has been preventive rather than remedial. We believe that this approach is far more effective: it is easier to re-design a project at the pre-appraisal stage than later. Experience with projects at varying stages merely confirms this belief.
4.009 But we are still left with an unspoken question: can anthropology assist in all projects? In other words, are there some types of projects in which no anthropological dimension need be added? It is impossible to deal with this question in the abstract. For instance, a telecommunications project may have an anthropological dimension when it deals with TV for villagers. It is easier to answer this question in two ways: by reference to actual projects; and, by reference to the questions anthropologists usually ask with regard to projects. The first aspect is dealt with below; the second, in the Annexes.

4.010 It would be incorrect to suggest that we only dealt with projects where we could demonstrate a successful anthropological input. One example comes to mind instantly: we thought that we could not be of assistance after perusing the papers in the proposed Dakar Ship Repair project, and informed the staff member concerned to this effect.

**Project Identification for an Anthropological Input**

4.011 It is necessary and useful to identify projects which we believe would *prima facie* need anthropological input. This exercise has been carried out with reference to projects signed for FY1968 through FY1972. We have only summarized the figures and set out the sectors below, the detailed names of the specific projects are in Annex II.
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Note: The figures in brackets denote projects classed as "problem projects".

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Note: The figures in brackets denote projects classed as "problem projects".
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Note: The figures in brackets denote projects classed as "problem projects".

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Note: 1/ In 54 of the above projects, the effective date fell after June 30, 1972.
2/ In 3 projects, the agreement was signed after June 30, 1972.
4.012 This *prima facie* identification could be expressed in a different manner, i.e. in relation to the total number of projects signed from FY1965 through FY1972:

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4.013 Although it might be said that these figures speak for themselves, we believe it useful to emphasize some conclusions that can be drawn from them: First, it will be noticed that the projects identified *prima facie* as meriting anthropological scrutiny increases over the five years both in absolute numbers and in relation to the number of projects signed for each year. This is primarily the result of the changing nature of Bank projects: the increasing involvement with projects that predominantly deal with human change, rather than the more physical items (dams, railways,
power plants). A corollary of this is that with the changing trend, which the projected projects plans over the next five years confirm, there will be a continued rise in the number of projects needing anthropological inputs.

4.014 Second, the nature of the anthropological scrutiny will necessarily vary. This should be obvious from the examples of our assistance rendered, and is dealt within Annexes to this report when we analyze the types of projects and refer to a general check-list of the questions that we ask.

4.015 Third, it should be noted that this enumeration does not exhaust the projects in which anthropological assistance may be necessary. There may be projects in which problems arise in which anthropological insights would aid towards solution. Some examples should clarify this statement. Our first example is the Sierra Leone Electricity Corporation expansion project (Loan 553-SL) which was not identified as requiring anthropological assistance *prima facie*. This was classed as a "problem project" from the Problem Projects file of July 28, 1970 (that is, soon after the project became effective). Some of the major problems identified as causes are "organizational problems" and "general lack of discipline". These are problems which to an anthropologist are the result of the choice of an organizational framework which may not have a good cultural fit.

4.016 Further, the problem of "lack of discipline" is viewed by us in a cultural context: what standards are set up for workers, are they comprehended, are they capable of being adhered to? If they are incapable of being adhered to, what alternative standards can be set up? This problem is often the result of imposing working standards that may be an acceptable standard in one country and expecting them to be equally applicable to another where the
work patterns are quite different. We touched on this problem in analysing the P.N.E. livestock project. Another example is that of the Sudan Roseires Power project (Loan 522-SU) which was also not identified as _prima facie_ requiring anthropological scrutiny. Here too the problem was mainly "organizational" and we would have asked similar questions.

Thus there may be projects which at first sight do not appear to require anthropological scrutiny but which are later found to need this. Once, however, projects like those of the SLEC and Roseires are found to require scrutiny, the store of knowledge through experience grows and a similar project will later be examined for such problem-causing potential.
V. THE WAYS IN WHICH ANTHROPOLOGICAL DATA COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE

5.01 How can the Bank add a social dimension to its project design, supervision and evaluation processes on a systematic basis? How can anthropological information be made available to a staff member in the form and within the time framework in which he needs it? Can this dimension be added without altering the present staff pattern, the Bank organizational set-up, or its practices? These are questions that must be dealt with, if this report is to have operational value. More analysis, or indication of areas of need, is insufficient.

5.02 There are, we have concluded after careful examination and weighing of the facts, five ways which if systematically and methodically carried out can improve the present position.

5.03 First, as this report evidences, the sensitivity of the individual staff member has been an important factor in the employment of anthropologists. It could be expected that this sensitivity would increase as more staff members were made aware of the role of anthropology, its capacities and limitations. And, in fact, this process of sensitization should continue. But we are again left with the problem that the employment of anthropologists is based on individual sensitivities which apart from the variance between individuals leaves the method as unsystematic as before. We are still left with the questions of when to employ an anthropologist, why, and who.

5.04 This problem could not be solved by the training of staff members on a regular basis. First, such a solution pre-supposes the existence of anthropologists on a regular basis within the Bank. Second, the next problem that would have to be dealt with is the content of the training: in which geographical area should the staff members receive training, and in what
branch (urban, medical, legal, for instance)? Does this mean that when the staff member is transferred to another department or another region he should be sent back for further training? Does it mean that when the staff member has been trained in-depth in one region he is never to be transferred from that regional department? Does the staff member have the time for this training?

5.05 In any event, is there any necessity for training? Is it possible that a sensitive, intelligent individual, who reads and pays a sufficient number of visits to the borrowing country could learn as much as an anthropologist could teach him? But then he could also become an economist, or an engineer, or an agronomist. Why must a person receive a training in those disciplines, in the sense of a formal set of courses? The dangers of untutored observation, slanted reading, and experimenting on the lives of people (for that is what social change is all about) are too great to need further statement. An individual becomes an anthropologist not merely when he has the capacity for empathy, but when that empathy is channelled and directed, when it is immersed in the studies already existing of a group of people, when he learns to ask questions that will give pragmatic answers. Anthropology deals with man in society, it studies the interaction and consequences of that interaction among various institutions: economic, religious, political, social. Development anthropology concerns itself with institution building. Directed training is, therefore, essential.

5.06 It is true that an unquantifiable percentage of Bank projects owe their design to the experience of many staff members who have spent years in some Part II countries. These staff members have brought their knowledge
of these countries to bear on project design, appraisal, and supervision. Unfortunately, we are faced here with a dwindling expertise: the result of the increasing percentage of nations that have attained independence, and also due to the retirement of these staff members. This expertise can, therefore, be counted upon to a diminishing degree in the future.

5.07 Second, would library resources, combined with the check-lists we have prepared suffice to add the social dimension? It will be recognized that the check-lists we have prepared are in the nature of guidelines, pointers to be noticed and applied during project preparation. The use of library resources presupposes a knowledge of the literature, which is often unavailable at the Bank, and the ability to separate the dross from the gold. The search would be too time-consuming, and not necessarily fruitful.

5.08 Third, we have urgently recommended construction of an International roster of consultants. Assuming a roster of consultants is constructed which is not merely representative but also related to the Bank's needs both present and projected, could this suffice in combination with aware staff members. The construction of a roster of consultants is not an automatic panacea. After construction there will still remain the problems of up-dating the list, the choice of the most appropriate anthropologist, the construction of terms of reference, the evaluation of the advice given.

5.09 The fourth point is a further factor of importance: Bank projects are changing, it can therefore be expected that new types of projects will be undertaken and new member countries will join the Bank. How does a staff member, with all the resources at his command decide that a specific new type
of project requires anthropological scrutiny or when a consultant should be called in? A necessary step is to move away from chance, from situations where the identification and treatment of crucial social issues is left to the attitude and for experience of the individual staff members. The method that can best help to avail this situation will be one which produces strong policy directors from top management which *inter alia* would insist on systematic professional treatment.

5.10 All these alternatives are fraught with difficulties which we believed will be resolved by the appointment of anthropologists as staff members. This is the fifth and final method. The reasons for this conclusion and the method by which the appointments can be made are the subject matter of the next chapter.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.01 Two questions remain unanswered: whether it is incumbent on the Bank to consider "social" factors and assess their effect in identifying, designing, and supervising credit-worthy projects? Secondly, whether this consideration and assessment can be efficiently and effectively carried out without altering existing resources and practices. That is, whether the existing personnel and practices followed by the Bank would be sufficient to introduce the analysis of the social dimensions and effects of a proposed or on-going project.

6.02 We believe that the answer to the first question is quite simple: yes. The Articles of Agreement of the IBRD provides that loans shall be made, inter alia, for "development." Similarly, with slightly more detail, the Articles of Agreement of the IDA provide for financing "to further development" and, in particular, for the financing of specific projects which are "in the opinion of the Association" of "high developmental priority".

6.03 An examination of the effect of these articles involves first, an assessment of the meaning of the term "development"; and, secondly, an opinion as to the obligations of the Bank in regard to the promotion of "development".

6.04 We do not intend to enter here into a philosophical discussion of the meaning of the term "development". It would suffice to point out that the term is flexible in connotation and that its meaning has widened considerably since the 1940's. This broadening of the context of the term is partly the result of the widespread adoption of social goals by nations--newly-independent and old. It stems in part from the realization that the distribution of the benefits of economic advance cannot be left to the will
and good sense of individual beneficiaries; that benefits received by the most powerful sections of a nation do not necessarily trickle down to the lower sections; that economic growth does not automatically denote equality of opportunity or access; that there must be a specific channelling of aid to the "weaker" sections of a nation; that economic growth can result in social poverty.

6.05 This changing meaning of the term is reflected in the changing nature of Bank projects: from power, water, and transport to a growing number of population, education, rural and urban development, and tourism projects. It can be seen in the enlarged range of projects in the agricultural field, and the creation of a new unit within that division: the rural development unit.

6.06 Again the altered connotation of the term "development" and the inclusion of social dimensions is explicit in several recent projects, and implicit in others.

6.07 It may, however, be argued, and it has been urged by some, that "the Bank is primarily a bank; it is concerned with lending money and seeing to it that the loan is returned with interest." Another way of expressing this view is that the Bank should not concern itself, or investigate, the social consequences of the loans it makes; that priorities are for the borrower to determine; that if the borrower believes that a mining project, for instance, is more creditworthy than a livestock project, then notwithstanding the Bank's own view of the matter, provided the mining project (in this example) is "credit-worthy" (that is will produce an "economic rate of return") the Bank is obliged to advance the amount the Bank believes can be given.
It has also been urged that for the Bank to enter into these "social issues" will result in uncoordinated and far too heavy a burden for the Bank to undertake, particularly in terms of increased personnel requirements and the quantum of time devoted to the formulation and design of projects.

6.08 A distinction must be drawn between the obligation to assess in terms of pointing to possible consequences or alternatives and the obligation to lend. It would be true to say that the Bank cannot, and should not, prescribe priorities for its borrowers. This non-prescriptive stance, which the Articles implicitly prescribe, does not extend to the obligation to assess which projects would lead to greater development—the very phase "high developmental priority" implies an ordered priority of projects, all of which may be "credit-worthy." This means that the Bank is in duty bound to investigate, and determine for itself at least which projects should rank higher on the list of lending obligations. In actuality, this is not a novel practice for the Bank: the Country Economic Reports are an investigation into the state of the economy of a country and of those sectors where assistance is most required.

6.09 In large measure the literature which could be used to add the social dimension is available, but untapped. Nor did it appear to us that the addition of this dimension would add to the time it now takes to process and prepare projects. The time framework in which we worked was the same as that prescribed for Bank Staff, and we found that it could be met.

6.10 There are three other aspects which lend support to the view that the Bank should systematize the inclusion of the social dimension in its project work. First, new nations are still applying for admission to the...
Bank. A survey of the developmental levels of most of these nations will show that these nations are often incapable of entering the field of social change unaided; that the type of problems that affect them differ quite radically from those of the more advanced nations. It is impossible to assist these nations without being aware of their aspirations and potential. A knowledge of their potential necessarily includes a study of their human potential—the beliefs, patterns, levels of knowledge, organization. This knowledge is essential also because planning must be realistically based.

6.11 Secondly, the Bank projects have as their goal institution-building. This necessitates an awareness of the constraints, the impediments to directed change; and a choice among alternatives of those means which will have the greatest catalytic effect.

6.12 Thirdly, although the Bank recognizes the existence of the social dimension as a factor in its "problem projects", this dimension has not been categorized or examined. The result of this exception is that problems are not classified in a manner that would enable identification and analysis of causes of problems in the "social" sphere.

6.13 This leads us to the second major question, to which a partial answer has been given in the previous chapter. To summarize that answer: the present resources and practices of the Bank are inadequate to deal with the social dimension of projects on a systematic basis.

6.14 There must, however, still be a justification for an anthropologist. The type of analysis that anthropologists do—which our examples evidence—is not now being done in the Bank, except on an irregular and uncoordinated basis. Further, there is a necessity for a trained individual to carry out
the identification, analysis, and supervision/monitoring of these social aspects. Again, the necessity for this trained individual stems from the fact that in large measure the problems that arise in projects are the result of a non-identification of the social constraints on institution building which, if identified, would have reduced problems, speeded up the completion of projects and improved their design. If anthropology is common sense, it appears to be very uncommon.

6.15 But anthropology is not mere common sense. Anthropology sees the economic behavior of man as being embedded in his social relationships, as being one aspect—albeit of an important aspect—of his interrelationships, influencing and influenced by other aspects of life, beliefs, and social organization. Even if the Bank desires to express development in quantitative terms—in terms of an "economic rate of return"—in its projects, which it does not in the case of education and population projects, the possibilities of attainment of that quantitative goal are limited, or fostered, within a social group.

6.16 The second strength lies in the anthropologist's familiarity with a body of data that is consistently overlooked. For the anthropologist has at his command a body of data that has been built up over the years and which he is capable of translating into operational terms. This data is adequate and comprehensive for most societies. It would be useful to base to some extent, social development policies on this useful resource.

6.17 The third factor is related to both the foregoing considerations and is also tied to the peculiar circumstances of the Bank. We have noted that the Bank has a declining experience profile, i.e., that it has relied
heavily on the overseas experience that many of its staff members had before they joined the Bank. But this trend is changing since many of the new entrants do not have that experience. And as the Bank moves into more and more projects which have a human dimension—more so than was the case with traditional infrastructural lending in public utilities and transportation and industry—there is a great need to ensure that projects do receive scrutiny from someone who know what conditions are like at the local level. This gap is going to increase because many of the post war entrants to the Bank are now retiring.

6.18 Fourthly, the employment of an anthropologist will alleviate the problems that arise in regard to the employment of consultants—problems of choice, of maintaining a roster, of terms of reference, of the evaluation of advice. We would, therefore, recommend that the social dimension be included as a significant variable in the preparation, identification, and supervision of projects through the employment of anthropologists in the Bank.

6.19 If this recommendation is accepted, there are two subsidiary questions that arise: how many anthropologists, how should the recruitment take place, and where should they be fitted in the Bank organization.

6.20 Our survey of projects over FY 1968 - FY 1972 indicated that prima facie there were 266 projects over those years which would require anthropological scrutiny. The Bank lending program for the next five years indicates not merely a greater numerical increase in projects, but also an increase in the projects where the social dimension would be of even more importance. We have already referred to this changing nature of Bank projects and it
seems unnecessary to go into this again. We have taken into account the average number of identification, supervision, and preparation missions. In addition, we have taken into consideration the present training of anthropologists in universities throughout the world: the general background training, and a training in-depth in one (or at most two) geographical areas combined with specialization in a branch of anthropology. Finally, we have considered the cultural conditions in the borrowing countries, and the Bank organization.

6.21 On the basis of all these considerations, we would recommend that the Bank employ 11 anthropologists in the manner and over a period of years which we set out below. The 11 anthropologists should be called "social development advisors" and distributed among the following divisions of the Bank:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Central Projects Division:</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. South Asia</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. EMENA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. East Africa</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. West Africa</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. South American and Caribbean</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The description as "social development advisors" will indicate the main purpose of the appointees in the Bank. It would also preclude some of the problems that are encountered in translating the nature and meaning of anthropology not only among Bank staff but in a few borrowing countries. It would also avoid a modification of titles that might otherwise be occasioned on the possible future appointment of other categories of social scientist.
6.22 The numbers suggested have been as we have just suggested arrived at after an estimation of the overall and regional work-loads, and the patterns of training and geographical specialization normally given to and achieved by anthropologists today. It is for these reasons that 2 anthropologists are recommended for appointment to South Asia, West Africa, South America and the Caribbean. These are formal structural recommendations attuned to existing spheres of organizational responsibility; special short term needs may also arise but at this stage we are concerned with the overall framework.

6.23 Any radical reduction of these recommendations would, in our professional opinion, result in a form of tokenism which might demonstrate concern for these issues though it would have a greatly reduced operational significance. It would be impossible to carry the burden of work we have identified; the ratio of consultant input to staff input would become grossly distorted. This could be expensive and inefficient. Therefore, we hope that any strong challenge to these recommendations will supply hard evidence rather than an enthusiastic though bare conviction that the situation is very different from that which we have described.

6.24 The recommendation as to the location of these social development advisors is mainly governed by the need to be operational. The most fruitful results can only be obtained through the addition of the social dimension in project preparation, design, appraisal, and supervision. Theoretical constructs arrived at out of project experience would be far more useful to the Bank at this stage than a mere formulation of theory without practical underpinnings.
We therefore recommend that the 3 advisors be in the office of the Vice President, Central Projects Division, and that the Regional Advisors be attached to the office of the Director, Country Projects in each region.

We recommend a phased implementation of these proposals since they are obviously not of the order of suggestions that are immediately implementable. This phasing is designed to secure proper selection on an equitable geographical basis, adequate training so that overall policies and necessary kinds of coordination can be achieved, further educative measures to ensure that when appointments are made they will be fully utilized, and complementary recruitment of Young Professionals so that future expansion needs and leave relief positions will be adequately catered for. A further advantage of this staging would be that it should be possible to have a continuous monitoring of our predictions so that if our growth calculations and estimates of needs prove incorrect, then expansion can be curtailed.

The first stage should see the appointment of the staff of the Central Projects Division. These appointees should be charged with four tasks. Firstly, with the identification of, and assistance in the preparation of, projects in which an anthropological dimension should be added until such time as the regional positions have been filled; secondly, to assist in the selection of regional social development advisors; thirdly, to continue educative and exploratory measures; finally, to train new appointees for both the position of social science advisor and also entrants to the Young Professional program. This stage would last approximately six months to a year. Our recommendation that the first appointees should be located in
the Central Projects Division is guided by the present organizational role of that Division, viz., of quality control and innovation.

6.28 During the second stage the new appointees would begin to fill regional positions. This may be a slow process because great care must be taken to ensure that the majority of the new appointees do not come from the developed countries. And while this stage is in progress the staff of the central unit would attempt as far as is practical to service the needs of regions for which appointments have not been made. This stage would last approximately one year.

6.29 The number of appointments to the Young Professional program would be approximately two in the first year and a further three in the second year. Thereafter recruitment would be determined by the volume of work.

6.30 By stage three both the regional advisors and the central planning unit should be functioning adequately and separately. However, at this point a further review should take place to iron out any kinds of difficulties that have occurred. Also, by stage three some attention will have to be given to building up library resources for the regional and the central unit. At the same time each of the regions and the central unit would be individually responsible for keeping the international roster of consultants.

6.31 We urge that urgent consideration be given to the selection of anthropologists and sociologists for the Young Professionals Program. We have already noted that there have been instances of political scientists being selected.

6.32 But the measures that we urge would have little impact unless the other recommendations that we make were followed. This is because the
recruitment of junior professionals where no senior professionals with a similar disciplinary background and experience exist must tend to be self-defeating. This is because the career prospects of such junior professionals require and demand that in order to succeed they gradually acquire the more widely acknowledged skills of the economist. Those who are not economists must gradually become economically orientated. The career and promotion structure patterns make this evident.

6.33 The strength of the proposal that we recommend is that as these junior professionals learn the work of the Bank, so they would be trained to make a meaningful contribution to social development. They could eventually act as leave reliefs for regional social development advisers, they could eventually become a part of the regional teams.

6.34 We are conscious of the scope of these recommendations but we are also conscious of the future needs of the Bank and of the dangers that may stem from the appointment of a fewer number of people than we recommend. The need for social analysis is growing and will continue to grow. An ad hoc or ad hominem approach will not suffice. It will be of no use to wait until these needs are so pressing that they must be met. Because, at that point, the Bank will have to begin to recruit and train to get people who can operate satisfactorily. All of this will occasion years of delay. What we are saying is that preparation should begin now. We estimate that it will take between four to five years before the system we recommend will become full operational. Why?

6.35 Neither anthropology nor sociology at present possess a class of persons who could enter into Bank positions and become effective in a matter
of weeks as might be the case with other professions. They must be trained in the Bank, and this will take time.

6.36 The goals of the Bank, and development anthropologists are the same: better projects. The systematic identification and assessment of the social dimension can only accelerate the attainment of those goals.
APPENDIX A

AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS

A. Resettlement Schemes

Resettlement schemes other than those which are a consequence of disasters are, from our point of view, often characterized by the need to create a new community and new forms of production. They affect communities more totally than other forms of development and since in this respect they present a somewhat clean sheet for development planners, the attraction of what could be achieved is not always duly anchored by an appreciation and respect for human constraints on development.

A starting point is the pattern of recruitment, the reasons for participating in such schemes and the kinds of satisfaction offered; the dissatisfied can often quite simply walk home. Disgruntled people who have not notably been successful in one community do not always have the potential for success in another. The best form of recruitment is the total community, that is the removal of a viable community from one area to another. But no matter what the method of recruitment we need to know what the settlers have been told they may obtain. Random selection of settlers has problems where these people come from different ethnic groups and communities. It may be difficult to achieve a new viable settler community. Will the resettlement be viewed as a lowering or raising of status? To what extent has the group been consulted before resettlement?

The next factor is the envisaged pattern of organization for the new community. Is there, a departure from traditional forms and if so, is there reason to believe that it will be in any way unattainable? Here we do not only envisage patterns of organization in the economic sphere but also the political, the social and the religious forms of organization that are
meld with other project considerations in an operational context. They are based on the kinds of baseline data now usually on record so that they do not require lengthy primary research. They are also related to the ends of Bank projects as we now envisage them and tailored to the resources that can be made available.

Schedule items do not form inert list. The items are often dynamic variables and we have to determine the manner of their arrangement in a project and the degree of weighting to be attached or attributed to each. But the action and interaction of these variables cannot fruitfully be reduced to a single number. And this is obviously a crucial difference between an economic rate of return and a social rate of return.

General Questions

When we first look at a project we must ascertain the peculiarly idiosyncratic cultural features of the milieu in which it is located. We thus establish the framework within which the endeavor will take place, the systems of value and belief which people in that society subscribe to and which in turn make life and events meaningful to them.

The next step involves an assessment of the position of individuals. How will a project affect them in terms of their position in society. Is the participation envisaged feasible in terms of the incentives offered. How will the success of this project affect usual relationships of power, wealth and status. We need to invent, if you will, an ego; we need to see things from his point of view; we need to be able to make the same kinds of calculations as he will. And for this there is a need to have an idea of what he knows. What kinds of conflict are there in the scheme? Can the conflict
be channelled along the proposed lines of development? Do the individuals view the scheme as involving a fundamental change in their role relationships? Would they, therefore, prefer the status quo? Are the risks involved in participation in the project foreseeable?

We then examine the associational context. Here we look at the family, at larger kinship groupings, at status and voluntary associations, that is, at the types of associations in that society in which the individual will participate. To what extent are processes of subordination and superordination affected by what is envisaged by the project? Do the kinds of association or organization called for by the project conflict too strongly with traditional ideas? What are the social consequences of the new organizational types? Does the project involve the creation of a new organization? To what extent will the new organization be viewed as a superimposition or an extension of the pre-existing organization?

Just as individuals have differing opinions so too is the case with communities and so we move from what might be termed the "worm eye" view to problems and views as they are perceived at regional and national levels. How far are national planning objectives perceived and appreciated at the local level and vice versa? If this is a plural society, what are the special problems with respect to allocation of resources? To what extent is the project perceived of as confirming the existing allocation of resources and the power structure?
APPENDICAL MATERIAL

I. PROJECT TYPES AND CHECK-LISTS TOGETHER WITH
ANALYSES OF REPRESENTATIVE PROJECTS

It is not every project that needs anthropological scrutiny. Further, even where this scrutiny is merited, the depth of scrutiny varies. This should be even clearer with our analysis of types of projects and the questions that we generally ask.

Breakdown into types could serve to alert staff members working on such projects about the possibilities of anthropological assistance and in this way the quality of projects can be helped. Thus we have assumed that not only must a type be congruent with stated project goals but that at the same time there ought to be a requirement that each project have some explicit assessment of its impact on social development. Analysis of projects is intended to be illustrative of the manner in which the types are used after preliminary identification by a staff member.

The parameters of the types are dictated by a need to envisage the impact of a quality project in the wider community. We continue to apply the three tests mentioned in our analysis of projects in chapter IV.

Within each sector we have designated a number of types of projects where our approach can be useful. The method of using these types is based on a need to be operational and that in turn dictates a requirement to work within the context of what is known rather than on speculative assertions about what might be known.

The method of dealing with each of these types involves the construction of a schedule of questions and issues that, in the experience of the discipline, are frequently encountered. The schedules that are given now are indicative rather than exhaustive. They are designed to provide information that can
common to the settlers' traditions. What is the relationship envisaged between the new community and the neighboring communities? Will the neighboring communities view the scheme, for instance, as an attempt to curtail their uncultivated (but cultivable) lands?

New settlements appear to present a golden opportunity to devise new systems of tenure which can overcome what are thought to be inappropriate features of traditional systems. But we need to appreciate that a tenure system is a reflection of a social system, it is not a capricious or arbitrary feature the alteration of which will be greeted with relief by settlers.

What are the functions of the traditional system, to what extent are these made redundant by resettlement. It is for us a matter of concern that the Bank has no expertise in this field. How is the area of resettlement obtained? Is the land acquired or purchased? From whom?

What is the nature of the residence patterns proposed under the resettlement scheme? Are the proposed patterns different from the preexisting patterns? Do they, for instance, envisage nuclear family residence as opposed to joint family residence? Will the new pattern result in an alteration of family relationships and authority? Will the new residence pattern lower the status of women? Will the new residence pattern increase the domestic burdens of some members of the family? Will the new residence pattern result in a diminished care for children through the dispersal of relatives formerly residing together? What types of house construction are envisaged? How is the house to be constructed, and by whom, and when owned? What will the effect of new residence and housing patterns be on reproductive behavior.
The key issues in any resettlement program cover the areas of communication, implementation, and continuity: They relate to the extent to which the scheme has been formulated after consultations with, and acceptance by, the group sought to be resettled; an assessment of the changes proposed and the means whereby such change can be effectuated; and, finally, the period over which the changes will take root. Continuity implies that the external assisting organization(s) do not depart when the aid funds are disbursed but do so only after the settlers themselves are in a position to continue their altered ways of life unaided.
## Project Summary & Description

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>IBRD</th>
<th>IDA</th>
<th>Rate of Return</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>$21.6</td>
<td>$8.1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>Administered by Agrarian Reform Agency (INCORA), and prepared with FAO assistance. Project follows a major conclusion of 1969 joint mission which gave emphasis to less capital intensive projects. Main purpose of project is to provide, in most accessible portion, largely undeveloped Amazon region, opportunities for 6,300 farm families migrating from traditional rural areas where subsistence farming predominates. Unlike other settlement schemes the farmer's decision to move into area is entirely voluntary. INCORA plans to extend scheme into adjacent areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land settlement scheme, including construction of 380 km penetration and access roads, 90 primary schools and 6 health centers; and medium- and long-term farm credit facilities.</td>
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**COLOMBIA: Analysis of the Caqueta Land Colonization Project (Loan 739-CO).**

**Summary of Data from the Literature written prior to appraisal**

**Patterns of Migration**

The settlers migrating to Caqueta were born in many parts of the country. Are they more satisfied in Caqueta and, therefore, less willing to move to other areas? This is a crucial question for supporters and planners of new land settlement.
A relatively high percentage (76 per cent) of the heads of household indicated they were more satisfied in Caqueta as compared to the area where they lived previously. Wives agreed with their husbands but with less enthusiasm. A smaller proportion (8%) of the settlers' wives were dissatisfied with Caqueta. Even though one may be more satisfied now than before this still does not mean there will be no further changing of residence. Each settler was asked to select one of the choices listed below to determine if he was satisfied enough to remain in Caqueta.

Degree of Permanence in Caqueta

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choice</th>
<th>Number</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anxious to leave</td>
<td>(5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Want to leave but not anxious</td>
<td>(10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indifferent</td>
<td>(3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Want to stay but not anxious</td>
<td>(31%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anxious to stay</td>
<td>(51%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Approximately 50 percent of the parcels in the colonization projects have been abandoned since the beginning of the project in the late 1950's. That is, there has been a turnover of about 260 families out of the over 500 parcels. Most abandoned parcels are assigned to new colonists after a short waiting period.

Available records on the abandoned colonists indicate that 20 per cent gave sickness as the reason for leaving. Most of those who left did so in 1960, shortly after the project was established. It appears there is a smaller rate of abandonment now.

The mean age for the head of household for the settlers was 44. The size of household averaged 7.2. It should be noted that the figures indicated above are not size of family but rather size of household.
In connection with the level of living score, each head of household was asked to compare his present earnings with what he had earned previously.

A Comparison of Present Earnings to Previous Earnings by the Settlers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Less (%:</th>
<th>Equal (%:</th>
<th>Greater (%:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is usually considerable discussion concerning the types of services which should be provided to a new settlement area, be it directed or spontaneous. The technique of paired comparisons was used for this study. This method allows not only the ranking of the items but also the attaching of weights to the items indicating their relative importance. Seven items were used: roads, school, church, credit, a better market, electric lights, and clean drinking water. A road was placed high by the settlers but tests showed that it was not on the same continuum as the other items. That is, when the settlers thought of a road they judged it by different attributes than they used to judge the other six items.

Availability of drinking water was considered important; however, neither group had a good knowledge of diseases which could be caused by impure drinking water.

Weighted Rankings of Selected Social Services by Importance

1.9 Water
1.6 Credit
1.4 Church
1.3 Market
1.3 School
0.0 Lights
Relations with Authority

A study of people's attitudes toward the government and toward other members of the society can give indications as to the effectiveness of a given program, be it directed colonization, surplus cooperative, or any other program. Sociologists have developed a scale which attempts to measure the extent of deviation from the accepted rules of the society. This is called anomie or nomadism.

The following statements were used as indicators for the scale of anomie:
1. One must be concerned about today and leave the things for tomorrow for tomorrow.
2. Nowadays one doesn't know whom he can trust.
3. Regardless of what others say, the situation is worsening and not getting better.
4. Most people don't care what happens to others.
5. Most governmental officials have no interest in the problems of the people. Each person was asked to indicate whether he (1) completely agreed, (2) agreed, (3) was indifferent, (4) disagreed, or (5) completely disagreed with each statement. An indifferent response to all statements would give a total score of 15. A smaller score would indicate agreement with the negative statements and a larger score, disagreement with the statements.

Settlers had a mean score of 10.6. The scale, with its indicators, has various limitations and inadequacies but it does furnish some measure of anomie. The scale has been tested by others in Colombia and was found to be valid and reliable.

It is quite clear that settlers have little respect for the government or for other people. The implications are obvious. An extension program, a credit program, or a colonization project will have to overcome these negative attitudes. The families who have migrated to Coqueta are highly suspicious of strangers and do not trust others outside their own group. Nor do they trust government officials. The underlying attitude which confronts any person interested in helping improve the settler's lot is that the settlers suspect his actions. The farmers feel the stranger has a hidden reason for asking questions or getting support and that this will be used against them later.

A high degree of anomie has also been found in other areas of Colombia. This implies that the settlers arrived in Coqueta with a relatively high level of anomie. All Colombians have witnessed a collapse of the social structure and norms due to the civil violence beginning in 1910 and continuing to the present. The government made promises to the directed colonists but these were not carried out. Life is still hard for the colonists in Coqueta in the region. Not only did they start with a negative attitude toward the government but it has been reinforced by the government in failing to live up to its promises.

Lands and Titles

The mean size of settler holdings was 75 hectares. Most of the boundaries between farms, in both groups, were marked by trails or by specially marked trees. For this reason, the farmers were able to closely estimate the size of their farms even though much of each farm may have still been in forest. Length of time on the farm was positively correlated to the size of farm for the spontaneous settlers with an \( r^2 \) or .08 at a significance level of .001.
length of residence explained only a small part of the variation, however. There
was no significant relationship between the age of the head of household and the
size of farm.

Many of the settlers in Caquetá exploit lands over which they have no
legal title or other legal guarantee. This situation of title insecurity dis-
courages investment and improvements on the farm. In addition, this can lead
to violence or extreme conflict if a second party attempts to prove ownership
and move the settler off the land. A farmer cannot obtain credit from the
Agrarian Credit Bank or commercial banks unless he has a registered land title.

At least 35 per cent of the settlers had no legal title to the land
they farmed, with another 43 per cent having a bill of sale but not a registered
title. Only 22 per cent had a registered fee simple title. A bill of sale is
made to protect the buyer. In a sense, the previous owner who actually occupied
the land turns the possession of the land over to the buyer. The bill of sale
records this transfer but it is not a registered legal document even though it
is respected by the farmers of the region.

The procedure for obtaining title to public land is quite different
from that for getting title to private property. That is, there is no adverse
possession or prescription over public domain.

To obtain title, a settler on public lands must follow the administrative
procedure set forth primarily in Law 97 of December 30, 1946. Law 135 of 1961
delegated powers of adjudication of public lands to INCORA which then partially
delegated this power to:

(1) All governors of departments as long as the area did not exceed
100 hectares.

(2) The Agrarian Credit Bank which adjudicated public lands within
the colonization fronts of Ariari (Department of Meta), Sarare,
Iebrija, Garare (Department of Santander) and Galilea (Departments
of Tolima and Huila).

(3) The governors of Antioquia, Boyaca, Cauca, Cordoba, Hulia, Magdalena,
Narino, North Santander, Santander, Tolima and the Cauca Valley to
adjudicate public domain up to 450 hectares.

The final authority rests with the general director of INCORA.

Law 135 fixes a maximum limit of 450 hectares for any grant of public
land and requires, at the same time, that no more than one-third of the land
adjudicated be unexploited. This maximum acreage limit can be extended by
INCORA to 1,000 hectares for land situated in regions far from centers of economic
activity as long as this condition exists. Flooded lands which cannot be econ-
omically seen to improved pastures fall under the same classification. Up to
3,000 hectares may be granted in the Eastern llanos for natural grassland which
cannot be seen to improved pastures.
The settler desiring a title must first present a petition for adjudication to the local alcaldé, to the Local Commission for the Adjudication of Public Domain, the territorial judge, or to the public official (Corregidor) of the intendencia or comisaría, whichever is appropriate for his area.

The public official then notifies the agent of the Public Ministry which is usually the Pueblano Municipal. At the same time, he must post a notice of the petition on the door of his office for 30 days, it must be published in an official publication of the department or in an official diary, and it must be posted during three consecutive market days.

Once the publication phase is completed the actual land area is visually inspected under the direction of the appropriate public official. If the land area is greater than 200 hectares it is a superior judge of the area. For smaller areas a municipal official directs the inspection. In the national territories the land judge and the Corregidor are responsible. In Cauca, for example, where there is a Commission for the Adjudication of Public Domain, the chief lawyer or his representative, along with the local alcaldé (trustee) or an INCORA representative, is in charge of the inspection.

Once the inspection is completed, a notice is posted at the office of the alcaldé for 10 days, during which time one may oppose the proposed adjudication by supplying written proof contesting it.

The petition is then submitted to INCORA or to the other designated agencies for a decision, providing the adjudication has not been contested. The agency reviews the petition with its technical information and determines if it meets the requirements of the law. If so, it recommends the issuance of a "Title of Domain." The entire packet is then sent to the office of Titling of Public Domain in Bogotá which makes a technical judgment of the request. It then passes to the Division of Public Domain to see if there are any other claims for the same area. A resolution is prepared, signed, and sent to the General Director of INCORA who awards the title. The original copy of the title is retained in the files of INCORA and a copy sent to the originating office. The applicant must then formally register the document at the local registry office.

In the areas of settlement various middlemen have emerged who provide the services of measurement and titling of lands. In Cauca, for example, the investigation revealed that there are at least three "lawyers" located in Florencia who carry out land adjudication for a fee.

The Commission for the Adjudication of Public Domain in Florencia has been concerned only with farms of 50 hectares or less, although the total land holding of a family is often more. The commission has handled up to four requests in the name of a family. There is evidence that families with large farms are using this method of applying for adjudication of areas of 50 ha. or less at a time to evade any size restrictions set forth by the government.

Even though many assert that campesinos (peasants) are not interested in getting title to land, the study did not support this view. The campesinos were interested in the adjudication of land but were unfamiliar with the procedures.
A more serious limitation for those not assisted by INCOGA was the cost of obtaining the title. The cost varied from one to two dollars per hectare. Then the settler spent an average of $5.00 per week for food, titling land became a heavy additional financial burden.

Some action has been taken by INCOGA in solving title insecurity but largely within project areas. In the case of the colonization projects the question has already been raised concerning the type of ownership security which the colonist has at the present. Most of the settlers were not aware of the service being provided by INCOGA for securing titles at a relatively low cost. This implies the need for more dissemination of information during market days and for providing periodic legal counsel at local centers of population.

Patterns of Cultivation

The common procedure for opening up new land is to begin clearing the underbrush in October when the heavy rains begin to subside. In the months of November to January the big trees are felled by ax and allowed to dry. It normally takes 6 to 12 men to clear one hectare in a day. The fields are burned leaving a tangled mixture of black, scorched tree trunks criss-crossing the plot. At the start of the rainy season in February or March, rice is planted in the fields. No attempt is made to remove the tree trunks.

At least two persons work together when sowing rice, one makes a hole in the ground with a pointed stick and the second comes behind placing a few kernels into the hole by hand. He then fills the hole with dirt using his bare foot. Rice planted in newly cleared areas is usually not weeded. If the land has been planted to crops previously, one or two weedicings must be made. The harvest begins around the middle of June. A second crop might be planted in a separate lot. The other crops, however, are often planted together in a field that has previously been in rice.

It is common for farmers to go into partnership where the owner prepares the land and provides the food. The partner sows and harvests the crop. Each then takes half of the field.

After the rice is harvested the land may be fallowed—brush is allowed to grow during the following period and is later cut before planting the land to other crops. The crops following the rice are usually inter-planted and grown on the same plot for only a couple of years since the yields drop rapidly after the first two years. The land is then placed into pasture. During this time new land is being cleared to replace the worn out soils planted to crops. No one has thought about what will happen then there is no more virgin forest land to use for cropping. When that time comes, food products will have to be imported from other areas or new practices such as fertilizing will have to be employed to improve the yields on the older fields.

Corn is the second most important cereal crop, and is usually inter-planted with the rice after the latter has germinated. It is harvested after the rice, usually in August. A second crop of corn is sometimes sown with the second crop of rice.
The other crops on the farm are planted throughout the year depending upon the weather and the labor force available. Sugar cane is planted on most farms to provide sugar for home consumption, with a few farmers growing a larger crop in order to sell pucca (crude sugar) on the local market. Cane can be cut about 15 months after planting.

Plantain and manioc (cassava) are interplanted with other crops any time of the year when the labor load permits, providing it is done at the correct time of germination (the period between full moon and the new moon). The farmers believe this is the best time to plant these crops. The plantain needs to be weeded every six months and will often produce for 10 to 25 years. Plantain is similar in appearance to the banana but is somewhat larger and starchier. It is usually cooked rather than eaten raw.

Manioc or yucca requires about one year to reach the harvest stage and can be planted almost anytime. The common planting time is in March when the rains begin. This crop must be weeded every four months.

Pineapple is planted in very small lots and requires a year-and-a-half to begin producing. A sweet pineapple with white meat is common to the region.

With the exception of rice, most of the crops are grown for home consumption with little being sold on the local market. When cash is needed for a special purchase or for commercial items like cloth, machetes, etc., a small amount of plantain or other crop is sold at the market.

It would be difficult to measure the amount of land allocated to each crop since there is a great deal of variation and most of the crops are interplanted making quantitative analysis virtually impossible.

Livestock

The ownership of cattle is considered very important by most Colombian farmers; Cauca is no exception. Even though cattle ownership is important for prestige, many farmers are unable to obtain cattle because they lack the needed finances. Almost 36% of the settlers had no cattle at all.

The cattle death loss in Cauca seems to be relatively high due largely to poor management. Much needs to be done to disseminate information on the proper care and management of livestock.

The second most important animal for the farmer was the horse or mule. Its importance was due to the need for transporting products to market. A farmer who owns horses or mules will often transport farm products on a contract basis for neighbors who can't afford animals. The animals are seldom or never used in the fields as draft animals.

The production of pork is common in the region but swine numbers are low. The settlers owned between three and four head per farm—the largest herd was 30 head. The animals must usually rummage food for themselves and few recommended management practices are followed.
Poultry was an extremely important source of protein for many families since they did not own any livestock. Almost every farm had at least a few chickens running around near the home. The chickens were also allowed to forage on their own in the search for food. Assistance is often given to the small chicks by providing feeding creeps. Grain is given to the older animals when available. The larger animals are often sold on the local market to provide cash for other needed purchases. Livestock serves as a form of savings for the settlers. Any surplus cash is invested in buying livestock or, in some cases, land.

Marketing

Instituto Nacional de Abastecimientos (INA), was established as a price control agency of the government. INA buys and sells grains to control seasonal and other price fluctuations. As shown by the study, only a few of the farmers sold directly to INA. The buying price for rice at INA was approximately 110 to 115 pesos per 250 lbs, but the farmer selling on the open market received from 60 to 90 pesos per 150 lbs. Even with the difference in price very few farmers sold directly to INA. The main reason given was that it takes about a month to receive the money from INA while one receives cash when selling on the market. It is likely that transportation costs make up some of the price difference although not all. It appears that middlemen have developed who buy from the farmer at a low price and then sell to INA at a higher price. Little more can be said concerning these middlemen. It is unknown whether the local INA office encourages such a marketing structure or not.

Regardless of INA’s policy, the result is quite evident. Any price advantage due to INA’s action is not received by the producer except, possibly, indirectly. Assuming no collusion on the part of INA and the middlemen, a set price by INA could also hold up open market prices if INA does not place a limit on the quantity it will purchase.

The colonists have little understanding of the cooperative and distrust its operation. They feel that the prices paid them for farm products are low and that they must pay higher prices than they pay commercially for items purchased in the store. The validity of such charges was not determined. Nevertheless, whether true or false, the effect will be the same. As the colonists have this feeling the cooperative will continue to receive limited support from the farmers.

Credit

The settlers interviewed were largely outside the influence of the extension program. Eighty-eight per cent of the settlers indicated the need for more technical help. The responses showed a limited understanding of technical information as such. Most of the farmers wanted money in the form of credit, help in buying tools, etc. Only a few said they wanted more technical assistance in agriculture.

The INCOFA “county agents” spend most of their time evaluating the need for credit. They are now making “micro-plans” for each farm which outlines goals
for the past few years and estimates the credit needs of the farmer. Unfortunately, the plan includes none of the needs and plans of the farmer.

The farmer living on a subsistence level is not able to accept risk-he must put his efforts into the production of crops which will at least keep his family on the same economic level that they are on now. This means producing the traditional crops of yuca, plantain, rice and corn. Any new crop must be risk free before the farmer will try it for if it were to fail he would have nothing.

It was found that the extension service was only a limited source for new agricultural information for the farmers in Caqueta. Were there other sources? Unfortunately, there were few. A high proportion, 76 per cent, of the spontaneous settlers had no source for learning about new agricultural practices. The radio was the main source, with 14 per cent of the settlers using it. The limited access to agricultural information sources was also reflected in the low adoption of new practices.

**Attitudes Toward Farming**

Each farmer was asked to make value judgments of selected items in order to obtain a ranking of items. Seven items were used: belief in God, experience in agriculture, the location of the farm, size of the family, farm acreage, ambition, and good government. Each farmer was asked to evaluate the importance of the time in exploiting his farm.

The new settler feels that belief in God is the most influential factor on his farm operation, that having previous experience, a large family, and a good location have somewhat lesser importance, and that acreage and high ambitions have little influence on farming in Caqueta. The Colombian farmer is often described as fatalistic. One must rely on powers outside his control—extreme effects on his part will have no appreciable effect on his economic improvement and betterment.

**Conclusions**

1. The governmental assistance program for colonists in Caqueta has not been effective.

2. Land was not the real limiting factor of production. Almost all the settlers in Caqueta had sufficient land yet their level of living was still very low. Receiving more land may be a necessary condition for many farmers in Latin America but it is not a sufficient condition for increasing the income level of the settlers. If a farm unit is too small to produce an acceptable level of income, even under advanced levels of technology, then reorganization or redistribution of the land is a necessary condition. Giving land will not by itself guarantee a higher income for the producer, however.
(3) Instability of ownership is found in Caqueta even though there is an abundance of land. Even the directed colonists have insecure ownership since obtaining a clear title depends on fulfilling a number of obligations set forth by the government.

(1) Farm labor productivity is extremely low and seriously limits production. It was found that as the size of the farm increases the per cent of land cleared decreases. The family labor supply is limited and can handle only a given amount of land. Outside labor cannot usually be hired because the production does not pay for the labor cost. Any difference in the number of hectares cleared and used is related to the type of operation. The farmers with less land cleared put their land to more intensive use, such as in crops. Those with more land cleared use the more extensive practice of livestock production.

(5) The manual methods used in Caqueta contribute to the low labor productivity. Even relatively advanced methods such as the use of scythes are not practiced by the settlers. The use of better production practices and improved methods could produce additional income. Many settlers own horses or mules but they are never used in the field. Using animal power would also enable the farmer to use more land effectively and thereby increase his income.

(6) There is great need for more effort in the field of technical assistance. The present extension workers know little about agriculture in general and even less about tropical agriculture. Effort in the field of credit is likely to be ineffective unless more are provided for increasing the productive level of the farm—that is, by providing more technical assistance. A second need is for more information on the potentiality of the various crops, the proper management practices which should be followed, and the effects of fertilizers and other modern techniques on production levels and cost.

(7) A road is one of the necessary social services needed in any new settlement area, be it directed or spontaneous. A road acts as a catalyst generating income by providing bus and truck service for moving products and people. The transporting of farm products by rail using mules or humans is time consuming, inefficient, and expensive—usually too expensive to make it profitable for the farmer to sell products on the market.

A credit program can be useful for assisting farmers in developing cattle programs since considerable experience has been gained in the region by large cattle raising operations. It is when the credit is granted for new crops or for increasing crop production that its chances for success are small. No new inputs are given to the farmer along with the credit to enable him to increase the productivity of his labor and land. It is here that the real need lies.
We have quoted somewhat extensively here with the object of showing that the literature often has a rich vein of insights which are relevant. This data is not impressionistic and includes attitude and opinion surveys giving a range of important attitudes and beliefs which have a bearing on the outcome of the venture. The data is capable of replication. The data shows that this project could meet a real need in rural Colombia. Our role is now designed to show how the project might have been improved.

In accordance with our specification of types the first point of interest is the settler himself: he has little reason to trust authority; he has a fatalistic attitude; his performance is related to his educational level; the majority of the people in his category are illiterate; his first concern is to feed his family. He will therefore resist the adoption of new techniques unless the foregoing extension campaign has been of an intensive and imaginative order.

There is no reason to doubt the comprehensive and the competence of INCORA extension work. The settler has little security of tenure unless he stays for five years and follows all INCORA directions which, incidentally, appear to fall below standards agreed on at the 1951 World Conference on Tenure. Farming operations are of a family nature and this seems to be the largest unit of association. But we have no real indication of the method of succession to the new lands when the original titleholder dies. Nor have we any idea of what kinds of pressure there may be for fragmentation and how such pressures will be dealt with. These are issues where we would have asked for additional clarification. This is an important observation not only in relation to tenure but also because of the tendency of shifting cultivators to keep moving or remigrate. It might have been useful to have these tenure arrangements clarified.

Sedentary agriculture is more labor-intensive than shifting cultivation. Therefore from the peasant’s point of view we must assess the strength of the forces that would tend to keep him in place. We would tend to conclude that the measures envisaged are geared toward the better educated and the more affluent. With respect to the latter group, the project calculations are probably entirely accurate.

The settlers have, in view of their past, a high degree of normlessness or anomie. One area which we feel would have been of importance in stabilizing the population is concerned with community organization. What kinds of association could have been created to fociize local attitudes and opinions and also to serve as an important channel of communication with official agencies? If the self-help measures in education and health are to be successful then the creation of such organizational infrastructures is very important. One of the key problems in any resettlement program, where colonists come from diverse backgrounds, is the need to create and foster a sense of community. We would have recommended that attention be paid to this aspect.
This project will help those that are in a sense really able to help themselves. If this trend is to be corrected, and a spread effect achieved, then extension methods must be geared toward the educational level, fatalism, and subsistence needs of the majority of people living in this area. Some of the data on which such programs might be based has already been given and many bottlenecks have been identified.

What will this project contribute toward the solution or realization of social goals? The contribution may not be as significant as the Bank would wish. Add to this the uncertain title to land and the need to obey an extension agency whose personnel are not respected. What may well happen is that some of the settlers will clear land and then move on because shifting cultivation appears to have more to recommend it than sedentary agriculture. In the second stage wealthy ranchers will acquire cheap cleared land that has already been made suitable for grazing. In fact some large tracts of land have already been acquired by ranchers near Florencia in this manner.

Land title measures might have been relaxed on occupied land and tightened on vacant land to avoid further expansion. Tied to this would be extension programs and the credit and infrastructural improvements envisaged in the project. The most crucial and pressing problem of the project is the need to ensure that the historic pattern of inequitable land use in Colombia does not reassert itself. That could only be guarded against by more intensive examination to tenure, land use, and extension habits. What is important
about this project is the fact that it may be successful in terms of the criteria used in the project cycle but may not be so successful in terms of the requirements of the broader social situation.

We came across this project when it was at the supervision stage. Our analysis with respect to the project calculations was not entirely agreed with by the agriculture projects department and we have learned a good deal from their criticisms. But our queries with respect to the relationship between the project and the wider social situation was not strongly contested.

Education

The level of education for the heads of households was quite low. The mean of the number of years of school attended was 2.2 years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Male (%)</th>
<th>Female (%)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 - 19</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 - 29</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td>30 - 39</td>
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<td>57</td>
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<tr>
<td>40 - 49</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 and up</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Economic and Social Well Being

Each family was asked to compare his present home to that in which he had lived previously. The results were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Worse (%)</th>
<th>Equal (%)</th>
<th>Better (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A number of items were selected and listed in the questionnaire to give an indication of the relative wealth of the family. The items listed included most of the material possessions found in the area with the exception of hand tools and essential household items.
The extension agency--INCORA--does not have a good record in the opinion of settlers and so it would appear that much of the success for this enterprise must be attributed to the settlers themselves. But the social characteristics of these successful settlers, the target group of this project, are not those of the mass of distressed people in this area. This brings in the second point of concern: the likelihood of significant spread effects.

If the most successful have been helped, i.e. those who are worthy of help because they have demonstrated superior performance then what measures are built into the scheme to ensure that those who were not able to do that will, in the long run, be able to catch up? Those who were able have been helped. But how are the other to qualify? Planning is mostly on the credit side, little is said about extension work. (See the Appraisal Report appendices on staff for credit vs. extension). We feel that this is a crucial element even though it may not appear so in view of the stated project goals.
References

Glynn Cochrane


R.H. Dix

1967 *Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change*

Ernest A. Duff


Parsons, Penn, and Raup,


Ronald L. Tinnermeier

B. Introduction of New or Improvement of old Crop Types.

Frequently schemes to introduce new types of crops pay insufficient attention to preexisting forms of social organization. The cultivation of certain types of crops entails a cycle of activities which have social and, possibly, ritual significance. Change may affect the whole division of labor, the utilization pattern of land and labor, the work patterns. Consequently patterns of leadership and the distribution of resources may be affected.

A first step is to examine the incentives from the individuals and then from the associations' points of view. Are changes in the design of the project called for?

Shifts in terms of the distribution of power, wealth and status and their effects on the group can be assessed. Do these suggest long term structural realignments within the group?

Are credit arrangements satisfactory? What will the consequences of the new income generation be in terms of increased purchasing power, increased leisure time? Will migration to cities be affected? Will crop specialization have any marked effect on nutrition and reproductive behavior?

What is the relationship between this project and the wider society? Is the project special to this region or this group of people? Are the results capable of emulation and are the necessary measures an explicit part of the project design?

What kinds of evidence are there that suggest that the project will be enthusiastically supported? What is the attitude of local leaders and opinion makers? What decisions are called for on the part of participants. Can the positive and negative features of these decisions be elucidated?
Given a basic concern with subsistence needs does the project alter the basic confidence of the participant to be able to provide for his family? If there is a reason to suspect that success depends largely on the quality of government or some other authorities' intervention, then what is the local opinion about and confidence in such types of intervention?

What contribution does this project make toward the solution of pressing social problems in that society? Are the benefits likely to be absorbed by increased reproduction, a demand for new services, new political tensions stemming from the resentment of those who have not benefited from the project?

What are the implications of the improvements for employment. What are the social consequences of the appropriate technology? What are the organizational requirements for obtaining the appropriate inputs when needed?
Project Summary and Description

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>IBRD</th>
<th>IDA</th>
<th>Rate of Return</th>
<th>Comment</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone Integrated Agricultural Development</td>
<td>$5.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$4.3</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>Project is first phase of program to raise income, living standards, about 2,500 smallholder farm families comprising some 13,000 people and conform to Government policy of increasing exports and expanding smallholder cropping.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project including establishment of project management unit; planting 510 acres in oil palm, constructing palm oil mill; smallholders credit to bring 6,000 acres into rice production, plant 750 acres of cocoa, plant 1,030 acres of oil palm; farmer training; agricultural studies; establishment of Agricultural Development Authority.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>An interesting feature of this project is a quite blunt reference to the fact that previous attempts to carry out large scale agricultural development have failed in a significant manner because of  &quot;political interference.&quot; But beyond this reference, we are not told exactly what the nature of this interference was and so we are not able to see how the present scheme will guard against the repetition of past experiences. Such political assessments are important and, in this respect, the position of Sierra Leone is unique in modern African development.</td>
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Appraisal of Integrated Agricultural Development Project - Sierra Leone (PA-1043; P-1096) (CREDIT 323)

As we do not have enough information to undertake a type analysis with respect to the three categories, we concentrate on issues that could have been sent to a consultant for further analysis and clarification.

An interesting feature of this project is a quite blunt reference to the fact that previous attempts to carry out large scale agricultural development have failed in a significant manner because of "political interference." But beyond this reference, we are not told exactly what the nature of this interference was and so we are not able to see how the present scheme will guard against the repetition of past experiences. Such political assessments are important and, in this respect, the position of Sierra Leone is unique in modern African development.

Sierra Leone contains three major groups, the Muslim Temnes of the north, the Mende of the south, and the Creole population of the west. It is the position of the first two groups that is important for this project. The north is dry and has had relatively little agricultural development. The south is tropical and has received a greater amount of agricultural assistance in the past. Political developments and tensions have followed these divisions. But Sierra Leone political developments have, as we stated, been unique in the sense that the new elites have not been entirely new since nearly all modern political leaders in Sierra Leone have been from the southern aristocracy being as they were related to paramount chiefs. In view of this history the strategy of the project may be unfortunate and could be seen by some as a reinforcement of the traditional position.
Although there has been, in the words of the project, "no (agricultural) research work of importance" in the north, this project caters in the first instance to the south. And in terms of extension the south will get the expatriate staffed scheme while the north will later receive the people who have been trained. How this proposed extension will be viewed in the north we do not know but it would be useful to have some assessment of this situation.

There is reason to doubt that the present proposals will be free from political interference. The Sierra Leone people, in particular the women, are natural traders, and yet they are largely excluded from such a function by what will be a monopoly. The project is designed in such a way that it must surely facilitate political interference because it is likely that only powerful and wealthy people will participate in the administration and in later marketing functions. The activities are so arranged that such entrepreneurial arrangements as there are may be taken up by wealthy traders. It would have been useful to see the full case for this monopoly. Government's desire to get its money back is one thing, but the freezing of private enterprise for the marketing of the project enterprise is quite another matter for which a very strong case should be made since it does not permit the fullest expression of local entrepreneurial talent.

Sierra Leone has had many expatriate-led schemes in the past and they have obviously not sparked a great deal of indigenous agricultural development. Therefore if one wishes to be awkward one must ask where the concrete evidence is that this project has elements which will produce a different long-term result? Where is the evidence to show that previously unsuccessful and unworkable marketing arrangements can now be considered a viable long term proposition? We suggest, in later paragraphs, that these may be culturally inappropriate arrangements.

There are other assumptions which may not be sufficiently tested or explored. The project is to prevent migration from rural areas to towns and it is assumed that those project developments may act as a counterbalance. Had the causes of migration been more fully identified it might have been easier to assess this project hope.

In this respect it is useful to list some of the factors that have been thought responsible for increased urban drift in West Africa. These are: increased population without corresponding increases in food production; diversification of the economy which can mean that labor, enterprise and skill are marketable in their own right anywhere in the country; a desire to have cash for bridewealth or to buy material things; to obtain access to education or government offices; to visit the town as an essential part of one's experience since it is the center of "civilization"; to be free of punishments, fines, taxes, and what rural people consider to be the exploitation by chiefs. These migratory patterns may be seasonal or permanent. An "integrated" project could have assessed the strength of these variables. In this way the goal of arresting urban drift might have been more effectively addressed.
In the absence of information on the current political situation in the project area in terms of an assessment about the nature of the relationship between chiefs and followers, and the educational situation, we are left with two objectives: to say something about the need to increase the circulation of money in the project area; secondly, to say why and how the project might ensure the meaningful participation of as wide a number of people as possible.

Why cannot people produce and sell without the intervention of government? What the project's marketing arrangements overlook is a need to have the farmer handle his own money, pay his own way, and even do a little better than the man next door. If all farmers pay their loans in kind and all receive the same price for their produce which is, we are told, lower than the market price (in the case of cocoa) then incentive is dampened and a tendency may develop to trade illegally. Enforcement could be expensive. But is this really necessary since produce is for local consumption? Why not permit it as a matter of individual choice for farmers for loan repayment or milling or processing charges to be "tendered in kind or cash?"

This project really has no specific role for women. In West Africa women have displayed considerable organizational ability and it would be a pity not to recognize this in a project of this nature. If there is more circulation of money--and this ought to be an objective--then one can be sure that women will play a significant role. It might also have been possible to explore the role that women could play in other necessary kinds of development that must take place if the steady urban drift of the most able is to be halted or stemmed. They, that is the women, have been known to run, without government help, their own schools and health clinics. It may be thought that such things are outside the scope of the project but they are not outside the scope of the project's stated goals.

This project neglects the social importance of what has been called "penny capitalism." This can be seen in West African towns with their myriad traders; it needs to have the chance for expression in a project like this. There may be mistakes but legal remedies are at hand and these people are, it must be remembered, "penny capitalists" and therefore should not, perhaps, have a scheme which would be more appropriate for "penny socialism." And such a free enterprise system is not only in tune with their cultural past, but it is also a good way of making sure that chiefs and other powerful figures cannot put their hand in the till. It ensures local control and local initiative; it would also cut down on the heavy administrative costs of government organizations that few people really seem to want or to appreciate. These proposed project arrangements have a poor cultural "fit" and they open the door to political interference.

There is a way to ensure more widespread participation. There ought to be more legal provision and official encouragement for the emergence of voluntary associations during various phases of the project. Such kinds of association are common to the area and are multipurpose in function. Such organizations have been known to make loans, to receive repayment in kind, to market, and to perform a whole host of functions similar to those envisaged here for official entities. Such associations would be quite capable of operating mills and marketing. This would certainly provide an organizational base that would
be replicable elsewhere. There is perhaps too much emphasis on efficient project management and insufficient attention to less expensive and traditional self-help methods.

Good agricultural extension work will be necessary, of course, but with respect to the training element it might be advisable to ensure that some of the government's project trainees are from regions where the scheme is to be reduplicated. They ought not all be Kende people which may easily happen.

As with many agricultural projects, statements with respect to the traditional tenure system are inaccurate. This is not to be interpreted as a criticism since agricultural projects staff members do not have ready access to anyone trained to interpret the operation of traditional tenure systems. It is said in the report that,

"There is no individual ownership of land and allocation of usufruct rights is vested in the traditional tribal authorities. This is not a constraint on development since after a farmer is permitted to establish a tree crop or clear a swamp, he retains the right of usufruct until death, when such rights are transferable to his descendents."

In the first place this confuses categories of property since economic trees are considered to be separate and do not, as in Anglo-American law, form part of the realty. The "owner" of a piece of ground and the "owner" of trees that stand on the ground may be different persons. Tribal lands must be distinguished from new lands brought into cultivation by the efforts of one man. In such cases traditional rules do not apply and the individual may enjoy and transmit such property as he sees fit.

Secondly, with respect to succession, the transmission of rights to economic trees is not a matter of usufruct but of ownership and thus is not at the discretion of the traditional authority but at the sole discretion of the individual who planted the trees. With respect to the transmission of cultivational rights these are rights granted the individual quandiu si bene gesserint. They are not granted to the individual and the natural heirs of his body. The individual does not have an alienable interest at death and so passes nothing to his heirs. His children are not his heirs but the heirs of the juridically recognised lineage. Therefore it might be wise to extend credit to the lineage and to make clear that the members of the lineage be jointly and severally liable for repayment.

It is very important to have the tenure system clearly understood before substantial investment takes place. Such systems can change very rapidly under the impact of cash cropping and one needs to be able to estimate the changes and so the degree of danger in the measures proposed. We do not have sufficient data to make such a prediction now. This will be even more important when it comes to consideration of forest lands, a development mentioned in passing in the report.
If these comments appear somewhat inconclusive it is because insufficient data exist to enable a more positive approach. Prima facie, as we remarked at the outset, this is an instance which would have warranted appointment of a consultant who could have been briefed on the basis of the foregoing analysis.

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Projects to improve cattle, pigs, and occasionally sheep, form a major part of agricultural projects work. In many parts of the world traditional methods of animal husbandry appear inimical to the establishment of modern methods of livestock management.

The first enquiry relates to the social significance of the animals: are some sacred as in India, a source of wealth as in Ireland, an indication of social status as among the Masai, or a cheap form of keeping plantations brushed, as among many Pacific Islanders of the South Seas? What is the relationship between the social system of keeping animals and the kinds of changes called for with improved husbandry? Some may want to sell cattle, some may want to increase their number and so their prestige, some like the Nilotic Nuer may want to keep them to drink their blood.

A second point of interest concerns the ownership of livestock. Does ownership vest in men or women or in groups or even with the Gods? What are the group or individual rights regarding the ownership, maintenance, and consumption of livestock. Do these rights rest in one person or group to the exclusion of other individuals or groups, or are they dispersed through the society?

What happens to cattle when they die or are slaughtered? Are they a source of protein for the community? If so are there important questions of taste to be taken into consideration?

How are decisions made about castration, about calving; about the relationship between the number of cattle and pasture resources?
What human and human food resources are required for animal husbandry and what are the consequences for improvements in these factors? Has resistance to change been correctly identified and would it be possible to mount extension programs which took these concerns more into account?

What is the relationship between access to grazing and access to water and the improvements? Would improvement in livestock lead to a diminishing of other rights locally thought to be important? What is the pattern of inheritance, is the ownership of cattle a significant factor in the relationship between generations?
This report reached us at green cover stage, and then went to the Board though we would have wished to obtain additional information and assurances from the Australian Government during negotiations. There are a number of reasons for this sense of uneasiness.

The project will probably be less successful than anticipated. Here our first point of concern is with the project itself and as to whether it is socially feasible. The aim is to obtain income from livestock producers and food for local consumption.

Income yields for farmers for the first few years--see annex--are very thin. For example, some farmers will not earn much more than their laborers. It is not sufficiently realized that pigs and cattle are luxury items. It is extremely unlikely that ordinary Melanesians would have the money or the inclination to purchase meat on a regular basis. There is little data on urban wage levels but if it were obtained and then compared against selling prices, one can see that only a few people--mainly expatriates--could afford to purchase. A pound of meat will probably cost more than a man will earn in a day (see the meat prices vs. the wage for farm laborers). Would it be politically or socially acceptable to support this state of affairs when more equitable investment opportunities may exist?

Cattle were traditionally introduced, by expatriates, onto coconut plantations to keep down the "brushing" costs, and today this is still their major form of use. Melanesians are frequently afraid of cattle and where they have been introduced, there have been many instances of neglect. There is room to doubt whether there will be a significant departure from traditional practice. We are asked to believe that this is possible, but it is our feeling that most of the cattle in New Guinea are on expatriate ranches or plantations (the figures given bear this out). There is really very little data showing that this scheme will work, i.e. that what has been primarily a European enterprise will be adopted by a substantial number of Melanesians.

Pigs are usually kept to scavenge. When it becomes necessary to produce food which humans might eat for their consumption, and when the herds grow so large that there are significant fencing problems our data shows that this is normally the triggering mechanism for a feast and for a general slaughter of the herds. The cycle begins again. The central and essential idea of this project that the people will produce extra sweet potato to build up herd numbers is extremely doubtful. In our experience this has not happened. It may be logically possible, but it is socially unlikely. This is where supporting data from the administration is required.

Further the calculations about the possibility of increased sweet potato yields suppose that these people have unused time. They are going to have to spend almost double the effort normally expended on growing food for pigs. This is not so. Melanesians will not, and cannot, spend more than three or four hours in the gardens each day. To this must be added the ecological imbalance caused by growing more sweet potato. This is not a traditional crop,
it takes a good deal out of the soil, speeds up the traditional fallow cycle and, in time, this results in land pressure and tenure problems. We need more precise information on the location of the enterprises.

Improved varieties of pig, for example, have had an unhappy history. The large whites suffer from the sun. Then there is the important matter of taste—vital if one is supposed to be producing for a local market. Lean meat from imported and improved pig breeds is less popular than fatty traditional meat. We need more information on the social characteristics of potential buyers.

Many Melanesians prefer tinned meat and fish since this is the way most expatriates get their protein. In many urban situations they will pay exorbitant prices for tinned food while ignoring the possibility of purchasing fresh meat and fish. In the towns, meat has less ritual importance, but to eat it is a sign of social status. In rural areas meat is a luxury item which is eaten during feasting or at other important kinds of occasions.

The question of land tenure is one of the most dubious aspects of this project. The Bank cannot ask, this project suggests it will, that those who have been given credit receive preferential treatment when land adjudication takes place. The whole scheme may easily be in jeopardy due to tenure problems. The traditional tenure system is by group and the individual has no enforceable right. Cash cropping, when the individual gains a profit, has frequently led to claims that benefits be shared communally.

The 1965 T.P.N.G. Act has not worked simply because insufficient resources were devoted to the task of registration. The Bank ought to see that the majority of expatriate lands will have been registered. It ought to have made registration a condition. This would probably have confined the scheme to the more immediate urban areas, which is where it would have had more chance of success anyway. But the agreements mentioned in this project have no customary force and no legal standing. They may easily earn the Bank a great deal of unnecessary unpopularity.

What is the likelihood that this kind of scheme will have a significant spread effect beyond the immediate project itself? We believe this is unlikely. It will only attract the most outstanding entrepreneurs who are already close to urban centers. The market which is, after all, mainly expatriate is not particularly elastic and may even decline if a large number of expatriates leave the territory after independence. Problems over land and unsuitable topography may limit spread elsewhere.

That element in the project to improve local pig breeds would seem to be the most promising line. The idea of putting more cattle onto indigenous plantations would also appear to be promising. The extension capacity is there but it must be supplemented by more attention to land tenure problems. But the crucial fact is that this kind of scheme will not touch the vast majority of Melanesians who have a peculiarly conservative attitude toward innovation. It will benefit people who are already in a fairly good position to help themselves.
Finally we must consider the contribution the project could make to a very pressing social problem if altered in focus, that is, the growing level of malnutrition in urban areas. If this scheme could produce cheap protein for urban areas, it would have a very valuable function. But now it is directed toward the affluent. Would it not be possible to explore the possibility of canning these meats with meal additives? This might reduce costs. It would certainly solve some of the storage problems.

New Guinea is changing very quickly. This kind of project might have been supportable fifteen or twenty years ago, but is it not that when one envisions the types of problems that will come at independence that it should now be so far up the shopping list of the Australian Government. What all this adds up to is our feeling that because of the excellent extension work found in this region, the scheme will be made to work in a financial sense though the return will be less than anticipated. Our reservation is on the social side and is concerned with the fact that there does not appear to be the best allocation of scarce resources. When this analysis was discussed with staff members from the then Area Department, the conclusions and reservations were not strongly challenged. Instead, it was decided to deal with the points raised during supervision.

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D. Irrigation Schemes

We are concerned here with two main types of projects; the first relates to the opening up of new lands, the second to improvement of existing access to water. The degree of control and coordination required from all who are associated with such projects is exceptional. The engineering required to ensure the proper and timely supply of water is of an exacting nature, and the maintenance which is also required is no less difficult. The social problems are of equal complexity.

Rights to water access wherever they have arisen have usually gone hand in hand with the development of sophisticated legal systems required to regulate those same rights of access. These legal systems are part of the wider system of social control and they need to be thoroughly understood. Primarily they regulate access. And access is primarily a result of one's position in society. And any alteration of the preexisting social control of access to water must be most closely regarded.

It is frequently the case that access to water alters the social position of one or more individuals giving them a preeminent position and a possibility for control over others that was not traditionally their right. Very often the social consequences of redistribution have not been fully worked out.

Because irrigation schemes demand such close social control one of our concerns is to see the extent to which existing institutions can be utilized both in the supervision and in the collection of such charges as may be levied as well as in the arrangements that must be made for maintenance.
Of more basic concern is the question of whether the resources provided will actually be used. There are instances of tube wells in India, and irrigation schemes in Iran and Thailand where dams have been constructed and the waters are unused.

The form of agriculture, the disciplined coordination, the residence requirements, the relative inelasticity in terms of production are all facts of life that have only been mastered after many centuries of experience by hydraulic communities. Therefore, this type of project requires very thorough evidence that the social calculations are correct.
APPENDIX B

TRANSPORTATION PROJECTS

The Bank has pioneered studies in this area and we see our role as one of supplementing the kinds of data that are now available. Railways and roads in this sense present us with similar data problems. For this reason we have now developed two types: the first deals with improvements to existing transport system, the second is concerned with the initiation of new systems. In addition to the provision of supplementary data we are concerned with delineating the social consequences of these projects. Transportation systems tend to be evaluated in terms of their economic consequences but there is obviously a matter of assessing their contribution toward the achievement of social development goals; these may be seen in terms of increased political integration, an ability to provide services more easily than before.

**Type A: Improvement of Existing Services**
- a. Who uses these systems and how often? What are the exceptions?
- b. What are the reasons for travel?
- c. What kinds of demographic information are available?
- d. What goods are transported?
- e. What alternative systems of transport are available, which is preferred?
- f. Problem of transfer of techniques to local people and maintenance.

**Type B: Initiation of New Services.**
- a. What is the type of service (highway? feeder road?)
- b. Who can take advantage of the service?
- c. Proximity to agricultural/mineral resources.
- d. Will the service confirm the existing allocation of resources? Increase the gap?
- e. Choice of area to be served: Why our area and not another.
- f. Who is to run/maintain the service?
The outline questionnaires which follow are directed to what we understand are the main problems facing bank acceptance of a proposed project to add to the existing fleet of vessels of the LWB, viz., (a) will the project result in depressing/replacing the private sector in this area; (b) how can economic growth be estimated.

The Questionnaires

I  PASSENGER

Distinguish
By sex, age, residence, occupation (ethnic and religious affiliation).
Frequency and duration of visit; anticipation of future visits.
Opinions on cost, alternative routes.
Reasons for travel: market, employment, social (including religious and political).
Existing route, ultimate destination.

II  OPERATOR

Boat type; age of vessel, passenger and cargo capacity and type, tonnage.
Operator experience, competence (technical maintenance).
Route and frequency (marginal or optimal?).
Average load.
Perceived restrictions on new route development.
Area served.
Future prospects.
Whether operator occupied full or part-time (similar questions about his/her staff).

III  PUBLIC

Anticipated expansion of government service.
Role of private sector.
Estimate of future river traffic needs (including comparison with alternative road and rail traffic development).
Extent and nature of non-authorized traffic.
Licensing requirements and proposed changes, if any.

We would like to brief the mission member who will administer the questionnaires.
APPENDIX C
INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS

Location: Where should the industry be located? If the society has marked regional, political, or ethnic divisions what will be the effect of location in one area rather than another on group or regional relationship? How will the location affect the employment and income patterns, for instance will the location result in preventing qualified individuals from other regions or ethnic groups from applying for employment? Is the proposed industry to be located near existing settlements or at some distance from them?

Training/Organization/Appropriate level of technology: What training is envisaged for employees? How long is it estimated that this training will be needed? Will expatriates be necessary? What effect will the employment of expatriates have on local feelings, government attitudes? What are the expected duties of the expatriates? Will they include a provision for transfer of techniques to the local employees? How can this be supervised and later evaluated? Why is a particular level of technology suggested? Is there any other level which, though technologically less advanced, would be more easily accepted, and require less training of the local populace?

If the industry planned is an "enclave-type" industry, will the skills acquired by the employees or the training given be capable of being utilized in any other industry? Is there too wide a gap between the skills that the proposed industry requires and those which the borrower possess?
For example, a mining complex in an agriculturally-based society, with a high illiteracy level and a subsistence economy. Should consultants be employed? What skills do the consultants have in transferring technological expertise in societies with a similar level of development? What management and organization is planned? How will the industry affect traditional employment patterns? How does the proposed organization fit in with the normal work and authority patterns of that society? Can these traditional patterns be incorporated into the proposed project organization? Which would produce better results (that is, tend towards more effective transfer of technology, raise production)?

Other social considerations: Will the proposed project increase employment or make some employees redundant? If it is a new industry, will it affect traditional industries or crafts? How? What can be done for persons so affected? Are there existing employment opportunities? Where? Does this involve relocation of families? Can retraining facilities be found or created? Who will be employed: members of one ethnic group, from one caste, only from one region? Why? If employment is plural, what conflicts are envisaged? How will authority be maintained? If the industry is to be located at some distance from existing settlement areas: what means of transport is envisaged? What housing? Hygiene and health facilities? Does the industry separate the workers from their families, their social group? Are there any means for regulating the influx of non-employees to areas around the proposed industry?

General considerations: Will the proposed industry contribute more to social development than other alternative projects? Will it affect only the lives of a few, as compared with other projects which may not have such spectacular returns but may raise the level of life of many more people?
APPENDIX D
WATER AND POWER PROJECTS

From an anthropological viewpoint, these projects share much with industrial projects. Most of the questions asked in the case of industrial projects would also have to be asked in the case of water and power projects. We distinguish, for the purposes of this comment, between rural irrigation schemes (which are classed and dealt with under "agricultural projects") and water projects. Here we deal with projects designed to introduce or extend water facilities for human consumption.

One question, in addition to those mentioned under industrial projects, merits examination, viz. the rate structure that is usually contained in the Loan/Credit agreements. The rate structure provided for under water and power projects is usually related to calculations of the economic rate of return. It is essential, in fixing the rate structure, to examine the general income levels of the people in the project area. Quite often, the result of the fixation of a rate structure is to prevent those who cannot pay from receiving the benefits of the project. In effect, the accidental effect of the prescription of a fixed rate structure and covenants against subsidizing it, is to confirm benefits in favor of those who form the elite of a society. This serves to confirm the existing power structure.

Some recognition of this implicit effect has taken place in the Bank (see, for instance, Gabon: Appraisal of the Libreville Water Supply Project—Back—to-Office Report: July 10, 1972). But this recognition, in the manner of other projects where the "social" factor is taken into account, is the result of individual initiative, not of a systematic inclusion of the mechanism which would enable identification and assessment of the social effects.

A good example of the effect of an insistence on rate covenants and of organizational difficulties is the Botswana Water Project (Credit 233).
Because educational planning policy often seems less settled, in
the LDC's if not in the Bank, we had better spell out what our understanding
is of some of the issues involved. Educational planning in the LDC's has
only noticeably emerged since the close of the Colonial era and yet in that
short space of time it has gone through changes which bring the art quite
close to the interests of many of our colleagues. Initially, in the post
World War II period, there was an attempt to encourage agricultural education
in the rural areas which failed due to the fact that able pupils saw no real
future in agriculture. Then came the idea that education could be considered
an investment; the new focus on relationships between cost and benefit appeared
to be validated by examination of differential earnings. But these considera-
tions did not do sufficient justice to the fact that western-style education
was very expensive. The LDC's were beginning to plan from low enrollment
ratios, and since there was little capacity to absorb output, the phenomenon
of the "educated unemployed" began to appear. But there were other competing
ideas which had the effect of maintaining tension among educational planners.

UNESCO in its early days proposed universal primary education for
all LDC's, secondary enrollment quotas (roughly 35%), and university enroll-
ment quotas (roughly 5%). These proposals were produced without due regard
to the individual circumstances of various countries in terms of available
complementarities or opportunity costs. OECD, focusing more on the problems
of southern Europe, then attempted to develop methods which would integrate
educational planning into the entire framework of development objectives.
The model using a quite rigid rate of return method suggested that education,
occupation, and output could be meaningfully linked. This in some sense was different from ILO's manpower approach which had the primary objective of creating employment while paying less attention to rate of return calculations.

Though all those approaches had their respective merits and though they were pursued with a surprising degree of enthusiasm by the ILO's they had in common a philosophy that education was a matter of developing human capital. An example is an emphasis on a narrow vocational training. Thus they neglected ultimate objectives of education in the sense of developing human potential. This seems to be evident in some of the most recent UNESCO work, in particular the work of Edgar Faure and his associates (*Learning To Be*, UNESCO, April, 1972).

It now seems to be agreed that the experience of the west is not entirely relevant. It also appears to be agreed now that there is a great need for innovation and new methods, and alternative financing and that the attaining of continental or regional objectives ought to be made subordinate to a need to tailor plans closely to the circumstances of each country, and sub-areas within countries.

Because of the great variation between countries, it is very difficult to say what education is or should be in a particular society until economic and social objectives have been made clear. There is usually a tension caused by financial exigencies between an economic interpretation of education where an able few have the privilege of higher education conferred on them so that they may occupy important positions, and a social interpretation of education which would concern itself with the right of all citizens
to some basic kinds of instruction. But given the existence of these different objectives, the selective and the elective systems, corresponding in Europe to the gymnasium or vocational training, and in the United States to what one might term the Jacksonian as opposed to the Jeffersonian approach, what is the nature of the special contribution that our discipline can make?

The first point we would make is concerned with the transmission of culture, the fostering of desired forms of behavior, the inculcation of socially acceptable attitudes, beliefs, and values. We can say something about necessary cultural content in school curricula. We do not from the standpoint of our discipline see an educational institution as an isolate but as being an integral part of the entire field of human endeavor in the society wherein it is located (this is also true of education planners). In this sense educational systems tend to perpetuate existing kinds of social arrangements; we can examine the processes and methods by which this is done. Such perpetuation may be undesirable since traditional systems have seldom operated in such a way as to ensure widespread participation.

For example in western countries it is the children of professional parents who tend to do best and the children of unskilled parents tend to have the highest dropout rate. Therefore if one goal is to ensure maximum participation it may be necessary to speak of, and to plan for, systems which would enable differential class participation. Of importance in this respect is the language of instruction, the nature of instructional technology, the social position and attitudes of the teacher. Equally important too, is the process whereby pupils are selected, the forces which tend to encourage or discourage attainment of individual goals, the opportunity costs for
individuals, the attitudes of parents, the location of the schools, and the kinds of things that are taught.

Educational planning must not only be concerned with the transmission of culture, but it also presupposes realization, on the part of the planners, of a future state of society. Educational systems, somewhat like legal systems, can tend to lag behind social change. And it is probably true to say that social change in its broad sense is more easy to produce than educational change. We would tend to look at the institutional barriers to educational reform in terms of trying to spell out the value conflicts involved. For example, in many countries the educational system teaches that the highest expression of cultural values is to be found in a career in government, the church, or the army.

Reform of such a system may have to address itself to the problem of inculcating attitudes and values more conducive to business and commercial expansion. And the same is true in the LDC's where attempts must be made to have people remain in the rural areas. One must calculate the potential for social change inherent in proposed educational reforms.

This leads us to look at the social realism involved in educational planning against the background of beliefs and values in that society. The question becomes, "Education for What?" Will the system satisfy local aspirations as well as produce people who are motivated to work in certain key positions and will they remain in those positions for some time? What will be the structural consequences of the new system in terms of the creation of new roles, effects on social stratification, and results in terms of newly emergent forms of access to power and status? Is there a good fit between
the educational environment and the social environment or is the system producing too many people for the limited number of positions available. Educational systems can—and have in many societies—created more social distress than they alleviate. With the concepts of culture and subculture, class and stratification, role and organizational analysis, we can point to possible developments and at the same time help to identify possible solutions. Something should now be said about nonformal processes.

With formal education one has a more or less captive audience, a fair degree of consensus among administrators and administered about what education is or ought to be, a definite time period for instruction, a possibility for feedback, and an assumed motivation to learn on the part of the student. Many of these features may be missing in nonformal education (which we distinguish from nonformal processes) even though in some societies the nonformal is quite formalized.

But then we view the taxonomic distinction between formal and nonformal as being somewhat misleading in terms of the view it gives of real requirements since a formal view encourages an image of education as a kind of separate process whereas we would like to emphasize it as a sort of concentration in the field of development, there being no qualitative difference between the two types although there is often the latent implication that the nonformal is inferior and supplementary. The fact is that many educators in the LDC's know a great deal about educational technology from experience in a particular culture but perhaps not enough about development work in general and the question of where and how their contributions relates to the work of others. An interest in nonformal processes has virtue in that
it deals with the broad spectrum and forces attention on a host of previously unrecognized or insufficiently weighted factors.

Educational goals must be meaningful to participants, they should probably be capable of short term realization, and aimed at people seeking improvement of their existing positions rather than those seeking entirely new positions. Since the traditional classroom situation is not usually replicable on the desired scale, there is often heavy use of mass media. These can serve to focus attention and raise aspirations while at the same time indicating the means for achieving wish fulfillment. This being the case, it is axiomatic that media messages have a good cultural fit. The need for continuous monitoring and adjustment is a first requirement.

In formal education there is an emphasis on acquisition of knowledge and insufficient attention has been paid to ways in which values and attitudes are inculcated; but, in nonformal education a major emphasis must be placed on changing behavior. Nonformal education for rural life must be looked at in terms of agriculture and small scale economic activities, health and nutrition, and population control. These diverse programs and objectives must be made coherent, comprehensive and meaningful from the standpoint of potential recipients. The same can be said about nonformal education in urban areas: the urban slum and "squatter settlement". To do this, traditional forms of education must be examined. How is knowledge passed on and who is responsible for this process? What are the aims and objectives of traditional education? Who is responsible for what kinds of instruction? Is instruction by example, by practice, through discussion, or writing? What are the rules for participation with respect to age, sex, parental constellation, or belief?
New programs must be grafted as far as is cognizant with their objectives onto what is already done rather than attempting to introduce entirely new and untested forms of instruction. Formal education may have relevance to a future state of society but nonformal instruction must have relevance to contemporary society. Where western style education was missing there has been a tendency to ignore the traditional educational processes.

Since the annual volume of educational projects is not yet great we have, at this stage, specified only two types. Unsurprisingly they are concerned with formal education in the first instance, and with nonformal education in the second instance. Naturally these cover a great deal of ground but we believe that the kinds of things we are interested in can usefully be asked of a wide number of educational projects even though those projects themselves may be quite different.

Type A: **Formal Education**

1. What are the social characteristics of actual or potential pupils in terms of sex, age, parental constellation, religion and ethnic or tribal origin? What are the mechanisms making for exclusion or inclusion of particular groups?

2. What are the social characteristics of the teachers, in terms of the language of instruction, and their likely attitudes toward a selected series of occupations and roles?

3. In the case of nonresidential institutions, what is the degree of reinforcement attained by different home backgrounds during non-school periods? Are instruction methods culturally relevant or are failing to maximize the development of potential?
1. Does content analysis of instruction methods indicate the existence of value conflicts or does it tend to downgrade use of training in occupations considered key in the development of the economy?

5. What are processes and influences at work when students select the kinds of career they want? Is choice primarily a result of access to particular kinds of information, the example of parents and their peer group, teacher attitudes, or media presentations?

6. What are the structural consequences—creation of new elites, social distinctions based on educational attainment—of education for new jobs? What are the socially conceived components for a successful position and is it possible to attach these components to sectors of the economy where there is a demand for high level manpower? What does it mean to be illiterate or without education in urban and rural areas?

7. What are the political consequences of education in terms of effects on tribal or religious tensions? Is education seen as a way to promote national integration? What are the consequences of promoting denominational education?

8. What is the relationship between new methods and traditional forms of instruction is too great a break presupposed? Is it possible to reform and build on the traditional methods?

9. What is the local perception of education in terms of what it should do, who it should provide for, what should be taught, how it should be financed and controlled? Is the system, or can it be, responsive?
Type B: Nonformal Education

1. What are the social characteristics of the audience? Is instruction or advice being directed to the right groups and the right people in those groups? Is the traditional division of labor appreciated and are the social reasons behind that division appreciated? Is the message too broad in its design to have necessary local impact?

2. What is the actual or assumed motivation on the part of recipients? Is instruction relevant to the point where it will focus attention and raise aspirations? Is regional or tribal variation required?

3. Are both the time allotted and the place of instruction relevant in terms of likely success?

4. Is the message cognitively relevant and is it likely to be understood by the average person in the target area? Does it pay sufficient attention to what people already know and feel about the subject matter?

5. Where media are employed, have the right kinds of media been used and is there sufficient provision for feedback? Has the message a good balance between sufficient repetition and demonstration to ensure learning and prevent so much repetition that people become bored?

6. Has attention been paid to the necessity for organizing community associations and for asking and taking their advice into consideration? Does the message take into account existing forms of organization and ways of doing things?
7. What is the local perception of media, are they thought to be unduly political or biased? Is there a possibility that media can succeed though necessary backup and supporting organizations may fail thus imperilling future work?

8. Where local people are to be trained as teachers, has sufficient attention been paid to ensuring that they have personal characteristics and a social background which promises wide access to all members of their community after training?
ETHIOPIA: A Comment on the Proposed Third Education Project

Ethiopia's existing educational system appears to be unsuited to its developmental needs. The proposed project attempts to undertake meaningful reform of the system to bring it in conformity with these needs. The methods by which the project proposes to do this are through infrastructural improvements in the existing system (the improvement or expansion of existing training facilities) and through the Ethiopian church.

In this comment we are mainly concerned with the latter strategy: the plan to induce rural change through the network of village schools maintained and run by the church. The process by which this is to be attained is indirect: first, through the education of selected priests-teachers in more modern techniques of agriculture and extension. It is then assumed that these retrained priests will spread the new techniques among their pupils in the village schools; that the village church school will become the focal point of rural change.

Is this strategy likely to succeed? What problems do we envisage?

The plan has some obvious merits: priests are focal points in their communities; a liaison with the church, which has been one of the greatest impediments to agricultural reform in Ethiopia, would be useful. But these advantages do not apply to Eritrea, the non-Amhara-speaking peoples, and the Muslims. What does the project propose to do about these?

Secondly, the church has been extremely conservative and not an enthusiastic supporter of higher education—it was the university students who revolted against the Emperor a decade ago. In terms of the project plans, the consequences that follow from this are:

a. The need for care in the formulation of a curriculum for the proposed training of priests. The curriculum should blend in with church teaching about agriculture—a contradiction between the religious and scientific would not be easily suffered, by priest or pupil. Van Rensburg's study in Botswana, for example, has shown how long it takes for a rural pupil to accept scientific rationalism.

b. Because of the resistance to a scientific input and the length of time involved, it is suggested that the proposed training scheme aim at incremental improvements in agriculture. Any attempt to employ priests beyond the demonstration of basic agricultural techniques and the provision of leadership would possibly meet with resistance and failure.

c. The need to guard against the inoculation of those values which have led to the present maldistribution of power. The church and the priests have tended to produce students oriented towards careers in the church, the army, and the civil service. This is the state of affairs which the project seeks to change.
Thirdly, we believe that some informational inputs are necessary which could substantially alter the proposed project before final approval: Does the present educational system compel the educated to leave rural areas because they are overeducated for the tasks that can be performed in the rural sector at present? What are the problems experienced in motivating students to work in rural areas? Could changes in teaching staff, textbooks, or financial inducements produce different results? Can rural appointments be given equivalent (or even greater) prestige than that attaches to urban appointments? Would it be possible to design training and certain categories of jobs to fit the rural situation, rather than work the other way around?

Fourthly, manpower studies for Ethiopia point to the unfavorable distribution of human resources in the country: the urban concentration of medical personnel, the concentration of the educated in the civil service or the army, the preponderance of expatriate teachers. We believe that this concentration is the result of the values imparted by the present educational system—a pattern that has a curiously 19th century British tinge. We find it disturbing that even though the appraisal report notes these facts it proposes expansion of the existing system to meet rural (as well as other) needs. Unless reform of the system is thorough, would this not result in continuing the same patterns of employment? The change, as one anthropologist put it, must be of "a system that offers as a reward for success to the good scholar the opportunity to permanently leave his home environment."

In view of our comments, we have misgivings about the success of this project as presently conceived. It is an extremely important project. One where we would have recommended the employment of a consultant anthropologist before formulation.

REFERENCES

APPENDIX F

POPULATION PROJECTS

Population projects are among the most sensitive projects—politically and socially—undertaken by the Bank. The Bank has already recognized this sensitivity and the need for understanding of and inquiry into the cultural factors in the area where the project is designed to operate.

Because of the size of the population problem, the Bank can only lend for projects that can have a catalytic effect. We have found four types of lending in this field: first, for construction; secondly, for research; thirdly, for experimentation; and finally, for training and organization-building. Each project usually covers one or more of these types. There has been a growing trend in the projects we have seen to move away from mere lending for construction of facilities to research— and experiment-oriented projects. We believe that this trend should continue, and that the Bank can be more effective in projects that are innovative and experimental.

We feel, however, that one of the major constraints on the Population Projects Department is the lack of linkages with the Urban and Rural projects departments of the Bank. We see this as a constraint because we view population problems and patterns as inextricably embedded in the social patterns of an area, and if the project is to be satisfactorily designed, and be effective, a coordinated rural-population, urban-population approach appears to be vital.

1. Design of the project: This needs the greatest care and scrutiny in preparation. What units are chosen for the project application? Why? Location of facilities? Access to facilities of local participants? Flexibility of design?
2. Organization and training: Choice of personnel—administrative, field, medical? Acceptance of personnel by project participants? Training of personnel? Levels of training? Local systems of medicine? Community organizations—voluntary, created? Planning, implementation, experimentation— links between organizations, facilities for local involvement, links with statutory organizations, which should be the determining body? Flexibility of organization, what procedures unnecessary?


4. Incentives and controls: voluntary, administrative, legal? Cash or facilities (leave, housing preference, consumer goods)? Possibilities of enforcement of controls?
**Project Summary & Description**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>IBRD</th>
<th>IDA</th>
<th>Rate of Return</th>
<th>Comment</th>
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<tr>
<td>Establishment of two population centers (at Bangalore, Lucknow); implementation of experimental research-oriented population project in 5 Mysore, 6 Uttar Pradesh districts, including 1,500 buildings with equipment and furniture for administration, training, family planning services; about 230 vehicles; technical assistance;</td>
<td>$31.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$21.2</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Credit is first Bank Group support of India family planning program. Principal objective is to make detailed evaluation of the Indian family planning program to develop new approach in the program will analyze motivation. Rural program will focus on newly delivered mothers. Nutrition component will test effect on infant mortality. Expected to prevent 1 million births between 1973 and 2000.</td>
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**INDIA : POPULATION PROJECT**

IDA and SIDA: SUS 31.8 million. May/June 1972 (Credit 312)

India has a population problem and a program to solve it. The program has declined in effectiveness in recent years despite increasing financial outlays. The program needs assistance. The Bank (IDA) in association with SIDA has agreed to assist. The project here analyzed is the first operation of the World Bank Group (IBRG) in support of the program.

**I. The Project**

The project is essentially experimental and innovative. This is not merely the result of its novelty among IBRG projects in India. The goals of the project have affected the design: the need to correlate and coordinate the disparate, and

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2 What follows is essentially a summary, influenced by the considerations of the analysis undertaken. The details may be obtained from the above Reports.
and often conflicting, data that have emerged from the operation of the program; the necessity of testing the effectiveness of the program with different levels of inputs; the recognition that "socio-economic differences play a significant part in the effectiveness of the program and the consequent necessity of adopting the program to take these variations into account; and, finally, the need to develop an overall strategy on the basis of data emerging from the project that could be translated into a national plan.

1. the project components

There are four major components in the project: (a) policy formulation, research and evaluation; (b) training; (c) implementation; and (d) construction.

The first component includes the setting up of a decision-making structure, the creation of Population Centers, the link between these Population Centers and Management Institutes. This component is to provide the bases for continuing assessment of project effectiveness, for modifications to increase effectiveness, and for reception of reports based both on field experience in implementation and on research.

The second, covers the training of personnel in teaching, research, and in the implementation of the project.

The third aspect includes part of the organizational structure and the recruitment and operation of personnel (medical, para-medical and administrative) for the implementation of the project.

Finally, the fourth component, includes the provision of physical facilities for the operation of the project.

2. the organizational structure

The structure is designed to eliminate bottle-necks and provide for the greatest impact. At the apex is the Governing Board, with the Chief Secretary of the State as Chairman. The State Secretary for Health is alternate Chairman. Other members of the Board include a representative of the Department of Family Planning, the Director of State Health Services, the State Architect, the Chief Engineer, the Director of the Population Center, the Project Family Planning Officer, the head of the Project Construction Unit, and the Project Coordinator (who will also act as secretary to the Board). These members are not only high-level personnel but also actively connected with project implementation. The Board's sphere of activities are supervisory: the formulation of policy and policy modification as data arising out of project implementation is received.

At the lower levels of the organizational hierarchy—the Population Centers, the Urban and Rural programs, the nutrition component, and the construction program—the project activities will be coordinated by a Project Coordinator.
The Population Centers are considered to be the "most critical" aspect of the project. Structurally, they occupy a position both within and parallel to the main organizational set-up: they are designers of the detailed plan and, at the same time, given the task of assessment of performance and modification, if necessary, of the plan design. In these activities they are linked with Management Institutes. Included in the plan design is the training component.

The Urban and Rural programs are supervised by a Project Family Planning Officer. In both these programs the existing organizational set-up envisaged by the Government of India (GOI) is not sought to be altered, only strengthened and, in the case of the intensive program, expanded. The nutrition component is to be supervised by a Nutrition Project Officer. The construction component will be under the overall supervision and guidance of the Chief Architect, Central Public Works Department, GOI, and at the State level, under the Superintending Engineer.

With the exception of the Population Centers, the lower levels of the structure are not concerned with the formulation of policy and planning, but with implementation and the transmission of information relating to plan execution to the upper levels.

3. the physical components

This component comprises the buildings, equipment, and vehicles, to be constructed or bought under the project: two Population Centers, a Regional Family Planning Training Center, 14 Urban Maternity Homes, 13 Auxiliary Nurse-Midwife Schools, 11 Buildings for Program Administration, 19 Sterilization Annexes, 41 Primary Health Centers, 41 Family Planning Annexes, 20 Primary Health Center Maternity-Sterilization Wings, 1,316 Sub-centers, vehicles, equipment and commodities for the nutrition component.

4. operational segments

The project is divided into three segments: urban, optimal, and intensive. The "optimal" segment refers to the level of inputs which the GOI deems sufficient under its population program. The "intensive" segment is the level of inputs on a greater scale than the optimal, intended to be carried out in selected areas under the project. It is believed that the comparative efficiency of the inputs--optimal and intensive--will be deduced from this variation.

5. the project areas

The project is to be carried out in selected districts of two States: the northern State of Uttar Pradesh, and the southern State of Kysore. The rationale behind this choice is the "socio-economic differences" between the two States: the former state is the largest and "one of the poorest," the latter being about representative, in terms of economic development, of the average Indian State with the exception of its southern part which is above the average.
In Uttar Pradesh the urban segment will be implemented in Lucknow, the optimal program in 4 districts, and the intensive in 2 districts. In Mysore the three segments will be carried out in Bangalore, 3 districts, and 2 districts, respectively. To control for results, in each State it is proposed to implement the project in at least one relatively socio-economically advanced and one relatively backward district. Further, similar intra-district controls are to be employed.

6. assumptions

There are several assumptions, explicit and implicit, in the project design. The most important of these are:

i. There are both intra- and inter-State "socio-economic" differences. These differences are to be found mainly in levels of income, education, and density of population.

ii. A corollary is that given these differences the implementation package of the project must be adapted to each area.

iii. However, given these "socio-economic differences," areas of the same socio-economic level are interchangeable both in terms of results and of inputs.

iv. The degree of effectiveness of the program is directly related to the level of input—expressed in terms of facilities (personnel, equipment, buildings, and finance) applied.

v. An organizational structure composed of officials of high rank at the apex and providing for similar officials at the lower levels will lead to greater project effectiveness.

vi. An essential component of the project is the social science input evidenced in the suggested qualifications of personnel, and in the training program and research design.

7. goals

For analytical convenience the project goals can be divided into:

(i) immediate and (ii) ultimate goals.

i. The immediate goals are three-fold: a. completion of infrastructure, training facilities, and equipment up to the level adopted by the GOI, in the project areas together with the testing of alternative inputs: the intensive phase, and the nutrition component.

b. creation of two Population Centers to plan, evaluate, alter design, extract information, secure implementation.

c. the provision of technical assistance for the project, and financial aid to meet recurrent costs.
The ultimate goal, which is far more important, is the creation of a Management Information Evaluation System (MIES) which will gather information from the working of the project. It is hoped that the results of this continuous monitoring and information collection, together with input variation in different areas, will "have demonstration value throughout India." It is, further, expected that the conclusions deduced from this experimental project can be "translated into a national strategy."

II. Analysis

This analysis is limited to the design of the project. The analysis will keep in mind the following questions which are considered crucial: first, whether any other information relating to the type of project and the areas of implementation in particular was available. Second, whether this information, if any, should have been utilized. Third, if the information had been utilized, whether the project design would have been modified—-in terms of areas, inputs, organizational structure, or physical components, for instance. Finally, whether the altered design would be more efficient than the existing design. That is whether, for instance, the modified design would be cheaper in terms of costs, whether it would facilitate goal attainment.

1. points of criticism .............

The Reports recognize the need for a social science input. The project has been designed to provide for this. The design, however, tends to perpetuate and reduplicate structures that have given rise to problems of implementation and have been the subject of widespread criticism. Further, the areas selected do not appear to warrant their choice for the reasons suggested.

More specifically:

i. The proposed organizational structure is top-heavy and bureaucratic.

ii. The structure at the apex creates a parallel structure to that already in existence and is likely to lead to overlapping of function, duplication, and friction.

iii. The planning pyramid appears to draw a sharp line between policy formulation and planning on the one hand, and implementation on the other. The former is confined to the upper levels of the organizational ladder, the latter, limited to the lower. There is, therefore, little scope for local level formulation of plans and their execution with local participation in the process as an essential ingredient.

iv. The variables considered for differentiation of one State from another, and one district from another, are too few and unlikely to result in close similarity of compared units with different inputs.

v. There is no apparent reason for the selection of different project districts within each state and it is, therefore, assumed that these districts were selected arbitrarily, rather than through statistically random selection. The consequences of this and the foregoing point is that any "conclusions" from the implementation of the project are likely to be misinterpreted, misapplied, and invalidly generalized.
vi. The stipends and salaries proposed to be paid to trainees during training and tutors under the project are comparatively much higher than salaries and stipends paid to personnel of similar status in similar occupations. This is likely to raise the status of the personnel under the project to that of an elite and to cause conflict between them and the regular medical and para medical personnel. Further, it is not clear whether on completion of the project in 1978 the same salaries and stipends will continue to be paid.

vii. Trainees under the project who are later employed under the program have no defined civil service status vis-a-vis other civil servants. This lack of definition is likely to affect the working of the program, and the motivations of the trainees employed. The numbers of applicants will gradually decline thereby putting the entire project in jeopardy.

viii. There is no assurance of continuity of posting of trainees/employees to one project area. This absence of any assurance, and the normal civil service practice of rotation of postings, will result in discontinuities of project implementation, inefficiency of data collection, and lack of rapport between project personnel and residents in the project areas.

ix. Assuming that the intensive input is more efficient, there is no evidence to assume that the GOI will have the financial basis to adopt, continue, or extend the program. The same can be said of the optimal program.

x. The assurance given by the GOI that financial commitment to the project areas will be given top priority is likely to cause diversion of resources from other areas of need, and conflict as a result of "special preference" being accorded to the project areas. The project, therefore, may be, in one sense, "a success," but at the same time "social failure."

xi. The project provides no assured or even tentative method for ensuring the presence, in adequate numbers, continuously, or of the future supply, of the vital links in the entire program: the doctors.

xii. The assumption that greater inputs lead to more widespread adoption of family planning methods is questionable in view of the figures supplied with regard to the two project States. Further, these figures are in the nature of State-wide averages disclosing neither district nor differential fertility rates. The lack of the latter appears to render the choice of specific project areas even more speculative.

2. data in support .................

The design is a fait accompli; the problem is one of predicting, and trying to reduce the risks inherent in implementing the project. The goal is
to obtain transferable conclusions of all-India applicability. If the conclusions are to be transferable the data must be collected from a representative sample, significant variables identified, and appropriate loadings given.¹

First, the statement that Uttar Pradesh is the poorest State and Mysore about average in terms of economic development and in "the distribution of poverty" (ours) does not appear to be borne out by a fairly recent study.² This study, and the papers published thereafter in the same periodical, could have led to the choice of States other than those chosen for project application.

Second, and more importantly, assuming that Uttar Pradesh and Mysore are the poorest and average, respectively, in terms of economic development, the selection of areas of project implementation depends on identified significant variables. The development of controls and comparison of input efficiency depends on the homogeneity of the units compared at different levels of inputs. Although the Report mentions the existence of different religious groups in India, and of "socio-economic" differences, the variables identified appear to be: degree of industrialization, educational levels, average income levels, density of population. These are important variables but they are not all that could have been identified. If more significant variables had been identified, the units selected for project implementation would have been more homogeneous.

This identification is of crucial importance since it is only then that effect of input differences on similar units lead to valid comparisons and conclusions. Only such conclusions are transferable and capable of generalization.

Districts in India vary in more factors than those identified. Other factors include proximity to urban areas, the number and distribution of caste and religious groups, the means of communication, the relative possession of wealth and power, the system of land tenures, the age distribution of the population, and the type of crops grown. It might be suggested that this exercise is too time-consuming for the project under review. But the "exercise"

¹The variables that are identified are a function of information which, in the instant case, is equated with the literature available. The phrase "literature available" refers to what is available in the Joint Library of the Bank published prior to January 1, 1972 (to allow six months for project formulation) and, in particular, mainly one periodical: The Economic and Political Weekly. The choice of this periodical is arbitrary.

has been conducted. Reliance is not being placed on the Indian Census Reports, 1961, which provide district-wise data, nor on the Indian Census Reports, 1971, as the former appear to be incompletely available in the Bank Library, and the latter have not yet been published in detail. There is at least one article which could have been consulted to arrive at a choice of these homogeneous units. This article conclusively proves that, at least in the case of Kysore, the units selected for project implementation and comparison are not homogeneous or comparable.

Third, the organizational structure under the project bears a remarkable similarity to that set up under the Community Development Projects (CDP) and Panchayati Raj in India. Past experience and many evaluations should have pointed out the defects in setting up a similar organizational structure and the pitfalls to be avoided. Unfortunately, this literature does not appear to have been considered. While subscribing to the idea of local level planning the project sets up an organization that does not provide for this. The result is likely to repeat the history of CDP in India.

The above factors, if considered at the stage of project formulation, would have resulted in a different design. Further, the altered design would have given a greater reliability to the conclusions sought to be deduced from the project.

III. An Alternative Model

The above analysis proceeded on the basis of literature available at the Bank. The alternative design now proposed takes into additional consideration literature which is not available at the Bank.

The project is designed on the assumption that the differences between States in India are largely (or only?) socio-economic differences. Therefore, an equation of States on the same socio-economic level is possible. Such an


approach is based on two further implicit assumptions, first, that there is a
unity of Indian culture; and, second, that a State and a region are one and the
same thing. Both these assumptions are inaccurate. Barriers—historical,
geographical, linguistic—have given India a checkered pattern that is masked
by a superficial political unity. Over the last century regional blocs have
developed that overspread single states. Although in recent years there has
been some attempt, through the creation of linguistic states, to confine a
cultural area within single state boundaries, this process is neither complete
nor perfect.

If, then, so sensitive a project as the one under review is to have some
hope of success; regional variations must be taken into account. Here again
literature on regions in India, regional patterns and variations, can be
obtained.1

Once the regions—which we might call "culturo-geographic" regions—
have been demarcated, then, applying the tests mentioned above, similar units
for the application of the project packages can be selected and graded on a
developmental scale.

Pairs of units should be selected so that the effect of different input
levels can be reliably and validly assessed. The data collected from these
experiments can then be transferred and generalized to similar units within
the region.

The next stage would be the collation of regional data which can form
the basis of a national strategy.

What is being submitted here is that there are levels of strategy and that
we proceed from the more specific to the more general plan.

To assume, and the Reports do not, that one part of India is like any
other, and that, as a consequence, what is "successful" in one area guarantees
the automatic success of an identical input in another area is to repeat the
tragic mistake of the over-hasty extension of CDP because of its initial success
in some areas.

The alternative design would then involve the following steps:

1. random selection of a few regional areas.

2. choice of pairs of areas within the region, with similar char-
acteristics and developmental standing. One of each pair can be held
as control. Let us assume that "control" for the purposes of this
design, means the "optimal" level as earlier defined. In every State
there are some areas that have received the optimal input. If none

1See for example, Robert I. Crane, ed., Regions and Regionalism in South
Joseph Schwartzberg, "Caste Regions of the North Indian Plain:
IN M. Singer and B. Cohn, eds., Structure
and Change in Indian Society. (Chicago:
have, then the first part of the experiment should proceed to implement the optimal input in pairs. When this has been reached, one unit of each pair so treated should then receive the intensive package.

3. ongoing motivational studies and research design to tailor the package to local conditions. In this local participation is essential.

4. collection of data and re-classification.

5. training of personnel to work in specific areas throughout the project period.

6. definition of status and salaries of personnel involved.

7. utilization of existing organizational structure throughout, except that the level at which specific plans are formulated be lowered.

8. arrangement with educational institutions and organizations dealing with training of medical personnel for the continuous presence of doctors.

9. estimation of financial resources which must be continued at levels selected throughout the program and appear likely to continue thereafter.

The time-scale involved in carrying through these various steps may be longer, but not necessarily so, than the present project estimate. The advantage, however, is the gain in the reliability and validity of the data. Further, a fairly satisfactory amount of data already exists. It has not been utilized.

IV. Conclusion

Throughout this analysis one assumption has been taken for granted: that there is a need for the HTES. We agree that this is not only needed but is essential for the revival of a faltering Indian population program. The project design, however, does not meet the need. What could be a catalytic demonstration vital to the program may very well be headed towards becoming a "problem project."
The world wide growth of tourism presents a uniquely sensitive and unusual set of problems which we have broadly categorized into two main types of projects. Both are concerned with the impact of tourism on local cultures but their perspectives are different. In type A the local culture is extraneous to the scene because it is the physical aspects of the location that are the primary attraction and the local resort aims at being self-sufficient save for employment prospects. In type B it is not simply the physical attractions that inspire resort attendance but the exotic nature of the local culture. But before going on to discuss the separate problems, something must be said of the features common to both types.

Tourism is capable of embodying the worst features of culture contact. The wealthy, affluent, transitory tourists come into contact with the economically, and perhaps socially, deprived locals. For local people, the gap between their wants and the means of their satisfaction is wide but the fact of tourism tends to define and broaden that gap. There are few ways to narrow the gap and the fact of employment can simply serve to further heighten material aspirations. The generation of resentment in such situations is not difficult to understand. This resentment may manifest itself in crimes against individual tourists, blatant overcharging, and an attempt to make tourists pay for, or even to bar from, the enjoyment of a whole range of rights that have been traditionally regarded as a free good in that society. From the point of view of the sponsors of a tourism project, the concomittant effect of these abrasive contacts can serve to weaken the economic impact of their enterprise.

From the standpoint of the local community the effect can be equally serious. Traditional economies depend on the coordinated cooperation of all sections, sexes and age groups. Wage labor offered by tourism has the effect
of dislodging the young and able-bodied and this in turn can leave large numbers of people without the resources to secure their livelihood. Impoverishment and malnutrition can appear. Nor is it true to say that the wages earned are a benefit since the employee may adopt clothing and expenditure patterns modelled on those he works for rather than in conformity with his home situation.

Traditional cultural forms may be despised as being an indication of backwardness: traditional elders not possessing monetary power tend to lose control over the actions of the younger generation. Traditional rituals and the making of artifacts become routinized and stylized and the standard and meaning of traditional forms become lost. Local people are in these ways forced to conform to the pattern of tourism though they do not have the opportunity to participate as equals. They are forced to appreciate with growing distinctness the gap that exists between their situation and that of the affluent tourist. The attractions of wage labor and the desires that such work engenders cannot be satisfied in the home community so that processes of migration to urban areas may be accentuated.

Remedial measures must initially begin by supposing that tourism is designed as part of a coordinated series of actions to develop a community rather than a resource whose benefits are to be appreciated entirely from a national point of view. Planning for tourists must go hand in hand with planning for local people. It is not enough to design hotels, designate beaches and so on, attention must also be paid to educational and recreational facilities for local people. The aim must be to reduce visible disparities as much as possible. These measures are best illustrated by reference to the types we have identified.
A. Where the local community is extraneous to the Project.

Our first concern is with the nature and type of the contact between the local community and the tourist area. Are rights of access to land or fishing affected? What kinds of employment are envisaged for local people? What are the social consequences which may be expected to arise from these contacts? Will the patterns of food production and consumption be affected? Is advice on nutrition required since it is frequently the case that people who become wage earners for the first time do not allocate their earnings in such a way as to ensure a balanced diet. Close attention should be paid to the fact that the local authorities may have to mount extension programs to ensure that food production and consumption are not prejudiced by the presence of the project.

What are the market effects of the project in terms not only of wage labor but also in terms of the possible sale of local produce to hotels and shops?

What are the possibilities of establishing work programs which though they may be unjustifiable in terms of their economic rate of return may be thought necessary if local communities are to survive?

Tourist and hoteliers have a responsibility to the community in which they are located. What steps are to be taken to alert these people to desirable forms of conduct?

Has the nature and the possible impact of the program been discussed with local community leaders and have their wishes or fears been taken into account?

What degree of control is vested in the local community and to what extent will they have a say in future developments?
Can the culture of the local community which may be in strong contrast to the culture of the tourist area by made more viable always bearing in mind that social change always has a price tag though at the same time realizing that the effects of change can often be minimized?

B. Where Local Culture is the Tourist Attraction.

Here the same concerns as in type A are relevant and the additional feature is the problem of ensuring the survival of exotic rituals and perhaps, the manufacture of traditional artifacts for sale to tourists. The tourist in this instance is a visitor, a spectator, and a learner.

The last is by way of caveat against the trend all too often seen to attempt to change traditional rituals to make them conform more closely to western tastes and experience. In the long run the rituals become as meaningless and stylized as those of Hawaii are when compared to more vigorous outposts of Polynesian culture. Rituals are not something to be put on, they form an integral part of a whole social cycle and they derive their meaning, their longevity and their vitality from this association. To preserve traditional cultures one must preserve a traditional community. Where this cannot be done then serious educational efforts must be made to ensure that oncoming generations are aware of their heritage. This demands not only the education of local people but also an emphasis on the fact that tourists must also learn since the process of translation may ruin the very thing that they wish to appreciate.
The same is also true of the manufacture of artifacts. As India has discovered, there the twin objectives of obtaining a source of income for craftsmen and ensuring the preservation of traditional skills have been served by the creation of an all India Handicrafts Board. The functions of this board could with profit be incorporated into the planning of many tourist enterprises.

Decisions that have to be taken can only take place when the nature of the resources that can be devoted to preservation is appreciated and when one has determined which items of cultural behavior are crucial and which are not. It is not the case that change is unavoidable, and it is not the case that all rituals would be missed. But many represent what we term core values and beliefs and their enactment is a method of reinforcing commonly held beliefs and values much in the same way that Occidental religious ceremonies have the function of promoting solidarity among peoples who share common beliefs.

Thus we have to determine the function played by these rituals and so to be able to estimate even roughly the effects of their failing to survive as a consequence of a tourism project. At the same time when the relative importance of the rituals is assessed it should be possible to say which should be supported and in what manner this support should be rendered and which rituals and ceremonies may safely vanish entirely.
The study is a careful and sensitive document which covers nearly all the problems of the touristic development of Bali within the framework of the terms of reference.

The weaknesses of the Report, and the aspects which have been omitted are:

1. An examination of the patterns of land ownership and the principles relating to its transfer and inheritance.

2. An assessment of alternative modes of transport facilities for tourists to Bali, other than air transport.

3. An enquiry into whether major airline companies could be induced to join in the touristic development of Bali.

4. The effects of the proposed development of touristic sites on agriculture.

5. An enquiry into the attitudes of the Balinese towards tourists and the development of tourism.

6. The provision of a scheme for the resettlement of the villagers of Buala who will be affected by the proposed development of Nusa Dua.

These six aspects are related to the major recommendations of the study.

No development anthropologist could quarrel with the principles on which the recommendations are based (see pages 122, 129, and 131 of the Report).

Briefly these are:

1. Bali will change.

2. If change is to result in a minimum of social disruption and grow out of Balinese culture, the Balinese must be involved both in the selection of the direction in which changes are to be made and in the execution of development plans.

3. The basic organizations necessary to carry out this directed change exist in the Balinese social structure: the bandjar, subak, and desa. These organizations should, therefore, be utilized both for the formulation and execution of developmental plans.

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1 The comment and recommendations are based on an analysis of only one volume of the above study: "The-Master Plan" (Vol. 2: January, 1971).
However, since the bandjar, subak and desa are limited in their territorial effectiveness to hamlets, the primary recommendation of the Report is that the overall development of tourism should be coordinated and controlled by the creation of the Bali Tourism Development Association (BTDA).

The creation of this Association is one which appears to be essential if the development of tourism in Bali is to steer between the alternatives of total disruption of Balinese culture and social disorganization on the one hand and the static preservation of Balinese life as museum pieces for the amusement of visitors on the other. Unfortunately, there are some deficiencies in the proposal to create the BTDA: the Report does not contain recommendations on the methods by which the BTDA can be set up, what should be its powers and authorities, and who should comprise its membership.

Any recommendations on the BTDA must be viewed in the light of the principles which the Report sets out (which have been summarized above) and conditions in Bali. The two key conditions which may be referred to are, first, the existence of the basic decision-making organizations (the bandjar, subak, desa, and the regular meetings of hamlet members\(^2\)). Secondly, land is individually owned and can be transferred. On this second aspect, the Report is singularly lacking, although it does point to the fact that there is no national legislation controlling the ownership, sale and purchase of land; and that land speculation has already commenced. If the BTDA is to be an effective organization both these key conditions must be taken into account.

**Recommendations:**

1. The proposed BTDA should be created as it is essential to the integrated development of tourism in Bali.

2. It is recommended that the proposed BTDA have the following composition, powers and authorities:

   a. The BTDA should be an autonomous organization managed by a Board comprised of representatives of the hamlets of Bali, nominated by the villagers.

   b. Since absolute autonomy (from the Federal Government) would be neither possible nor feasible, the Chairman of the BTDA could be the Governor of the island.

   c. The BTDA should adopt an outline Master Plan for development in Bali which mainly provides for zones of proposed touristic development. The detailed developmental plans should be explained to, and approved of, by the villagers who will be affected by the proposed plans.

   d. After publication of the Master Plan (but before adoption and approval by the villagers) all sales and transfers of land (except by succession) in the proposed touristic zones should be frozen.

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e. After approval of the Plan, all sales in the touristic zones should be subject to the approval of the BTDA prior to sale. All such approvals should be in the form of a certificate of approval without which any transfers of land in the touristic zones should be treated as invalid and for which registration should be refused.

f. The powers and authorities of the BTDA should, inter alia, consist of the power to identify touristic areas; define zones; the authority to develop, control and coordinate tourism in Bali; approve of transfers of land; prescribe and collect rates, cesses, and taxes; remove unauthorized trespassers and constructions; allocate funds for development.

g. To provide for financial stability (and some measure of autonomy) for the BTDA it is suggested that the BTDA levy a fee for investigation of applications for the approval of proposed sales, and that, if the sale is approved, a further fee be charged (based on a sliding scale in relation to the value of the transaction) both for approval of the transaction and for (and on each occasion of) further development on the property transferred.

3. To assist in the formation of the BTDA, the process of consultation with the Balinese, and the formulation of detailed developmental plans, it is recommended that an advisor be appointed. It is suggested that this appointment be in the nature of an advisory position to conform to the principles of development referred to earlier in this note. The advisor should have a knowledge of Balinese culture and social structure (and, preferably, of the language as well) and be willing to reside in Bali during the continuance of the project. The advisor should also be charged, in addition to the monitoring of the project, and with the identification of other developmental projects in Bali (whether arising out of the proposed tourism project or not).

4. It is finally recommended that some of the funds accruing from the tourism project be earmarked for developmental projects other than tourism.
There is a certain settled hopelessness about urban projects in the LDC's. The resources that can be allocated are so far short of those available in more developed countries, the problem worsens with the ever increasing urban drift, the migrants are uneducated and unskilled. The living conditions seem appalling; breeding grounds for a vicious circle of crime, malnutrition, increasing poverty, and population increase. Anthropologists have in recent years looked at these overcrowded areas and at areas of "squatter settlements" in terms that are applicable to any other group of people. That is to say that they have studied urban areas in terms of their forms of social organization, the kinds of social interaction that take place, the hopes, fears and desires of these urban people. What has appeared untenable often after study turns out to be a viable social system. It is a way of life that despite its manifest appearance still appears preferable to thousands of new migrants each year.

Within the context of these observations development could be posed not simply in terms of the tremendous gap between their conditions and life in urban areas that we know but in terms of incremental changes that would be meaningful to these people and which would not at the same time destroy the kind of life that they had found attractive. All of this demands a functional approach, an approach which addresses itself to the elimination of the more extreme kinds of distress that both donor and recipient agree are bad.

There are obviously vast unsolved problems; urban drift has not been solved even in very regulated socialist societies; there simply are not the resources to completely transpose conditions. All that can be envisaged is a more modest strategy that can, in view of the resources available, make things a little
better. To date we have developed only one type, the site and service scheme, excluding our separate observations on industry, power, water and transport.

It has seemed paramount to us that such schemes must be capable of emulation; that they must be capable of doing something about nutrition and population; that they must be capable of presenting an attainable standard of life to their clients, a standard which ought to be desirable to others as well. They must not be too far in advance of local conditions and they must preserve the prevailing urban culture. Our anxiety comes from the fact that these schemes must not simply be aimed at the provision of better housing, they, above all projects, must be directed toward the other pressing problems of population and nutrition—they must be integrated. And if they are not now integrated, then this is not because such approaches are not warranted, it is because the Bank has not yet developed an integrated methodology.

Type: Site and Service:

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Type: Site and Service:

Senegal

Acquisition, preparation of about 1,140 acres in Dakar, Thies with provision for 15,600 lots; extensions to primary road, water, power, water, sanitation facilities within new settlements; construction and equipping of 1\4 primary and \2 secondary schools and 5 health centers; technical assistance; in situ improvement study and pilot project to improve 25 acres of squatter settlements in Dakar.

Project Summary & Description

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<td>Project is first of its kind to be assisting Bank Group and consists of preparation of sites and provision of services for purchasers to build the own dwellings accommodating an estimated 140,000 people in Dakar and 16,000 in Thies. Project will upgrade dwellings and infrastructure which lags behind rapidly growing population. Will benefit the low income ($40-620 per family month) and also benefit low income groups through rental. It will provide substantial employment and improve environment. There will be an income redistribution effect of public investment in project. Project will provide financial basis for a national site and service program.</td>
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Comment on the Senegal Site and Services

Project Monitoring Study (Credit 336)

1. This is socially worthwhile project. However, if the Bank's objectives are to be achieved we believe that certain changes in the research design may be worthwhile.

2. The constraints of time and other work have not given the best opportunity for our analysis. But what is now said can form a basis for discussion and/or expansion if desired.
3. We assume that the questionnaire builds on the work of L. Marsse (see attached bibliography). But that work requires modification in the present instance if data of a sufficiently representative and qualitative nature is to be achieved. The draft will be examined page by page, for convenience. But let us now give our main suggestions:

(a) To know what changes have been made, there must be inserted into the scheme another unit of comparison. We suggest that you also make provision to monitor a small evolving unimproved urban section. Beside the virtue of comparison and trial it will also yield an opportunity to monitor the ways in which news of your successful project spreads to other areas. It should show how this necessary demonstration effect can be improved. This will provide an actual situational baseline for evaluation.

(b) A second necessary baseline lies in the existing literature about this region and its urban problems. We have found, in a short space of time, a considerable volume of work. This is also necessary because if you are to get from this scheme something that is transferable elsewhere than you must establish what is culturally idiosyncratic to Dakar. (The Principal must know Dakar).

(c) It will also be necessary to examine nutritional aspects since the literature suggests that this has been a general problem of African urbanization. Here again the need for another unit of comparison, as suggested above, is crucial, adequate calibration, is to be achieved.

(d) A series of questions on reproductive behavior ought to be inserted. Data that could come from such an enquiry will be vital for planning purposes.

(e) Communication processes must be examined. What kinds of media are used? How widespread are they? How does information transferral take place? These kinds of data are vital for demonstration purposes.

(f) The role of voluntary associations has been seen by many observers as crucial in W. Africa. Their origin and growth must be examined. Therefore the timing of the community development processes should be altered. This survey must commence as soon as possible.

4. The experience of many sociologists in this part of the world leads us to doubt the emphasis placed on the ability of questionnaires and quantitative techniques to achieve the desired data. The data must be obtained but we think that the strategy presently advocated will run a high risk. The following are the reasons for this opinion:

(a) The researchers will be openly attached to a government agency. They are asking for quite sensitive financial information. Many people will tend to be quite suspicious as to why this information is being collected. Is it for tax purposes? Will their rents be raised if they appear too wealthy?

(b) If there is too much stress on data collection less attention may be paid to why these kinds of results have been achieved. You need to have some idea of the kinds of value, belief, and attitude, which have given rise to these kinds of response.
5. We would suggest that one team concentrate on the official element while the other does fieldwork in the two urban control areas. Adequate information on the urban areas will only be achieved if good rapport can be established. Here we suggest representative random sampling and in-depth fieldwork. The present number of households is much too high if data of quality are to be achieved.

6. Additionally, if you wish to transfer this scheme researchers must be trained to do this kind of thing for other areas. The Senegalese do not need expensive experts for every such scheme and the Bank needs a blueprint. Therefore some kind of training element must be built in so that you get a research kit which can easily be plugged into other country situations and they get people who can work in other areas.

7. The tenure arrangements are a matter of some concern. What is the best method for succession? What are the problems and virtues of a range of methods for transferability of interest? Is there a relationship between the tenure arrangement and credit and also the family's willingness to improve their living arrangements on an incremental basis?

8. Dakar has special problems of occupational and status rigidity. Will such schemes produce a structural realignment and a demand for a new division of labor as has been noted in the literature? (Have problems been exacerbated by the method of recruitment?)

9. We would argue for an integrated development approach, i.e. with population, educational, nutritional, etc. aspects so that a transferable blueprint, which is within the capacity of most LDC's to implement, without largescale assistance, can be produced.

Other Items of Interest

1. Any successful Social Science research paradigm for a scheme of this nature must commence by being broad. This has the virtue of pointing eventually to interrelations between kinds of data. It has also the virtue that the researcher's address themselves to questions which are not the immediate object of enquiry, though if, at a later point, new questions become necessary they then will have something to work on.

1 Training component in scheme seem to be for lower echelon staff.

2 Housing code regulations seem unduly rigid and also require assessment.
The whole area must be initially surveyed to ensure that the later sampling is representative in terms of not only location but also religion, origin, age, sets, ethnic groups, political views, successfulness, failure, occupation. Some attention must be paid to covering various age sets and both sexes. The emphasis must initially be on breadth. Only when the full extent of the problem has been delineated can it be determined what is significant.

Secondly, unless this initial breadth has been achieved it will not be possible to know how the questionnaires are to be constructed. One cannot simply ask for data. One must know, for that culture, what kinds of questions people will answer. It is pointless to do a questionnaire until this preliminary work has been done. People may not otherwise or they may "fudge" the data.

2. The medical and population components must be provided for in such a way as to ensure that their contribution can be integrated into the main research.

Special care must be taken in the recruitment of the Senegalese assistants that their social position and kinds of outlook do not prevent them from moving freely among the kinds of people that will be in the urban area projects.

3. Since it seems to be the case that the "foreign research assistants" who, the project states, may use this experience to work for higher degrees will be from developed countries, we do not much like the idea that these funds will go to train people whose educational furtherance should really be paid for by their own governments. Cannot these researchers be taken from an LDC, and preferably from a country where the Bank later intends to do a similar scheme?

4. It would be useful to put in here the urbanites' perception of the innovative organization. Secondly, considerable attention must be paid to what kinds of innovation are suggested by the people themselves. It is all too often supposed that we, the "developed", have most of the bright ideas (credit, community organization, housing construction, maintenance).

5. More data of a social nature must be collected here. You need to know about status and why people seek it; you need to know about power and how it is acquired and distributed; you need to know about the evolution of decision-making processes. What is the meaning of education? Why do people want education for their children? What kinds of ambition do various segments of the population have? Is there a very wide gap between their wants and the means of their satisfaction? Can this be narrowed in some socially meaningful way?

13. These costs do seem to be very high though it is probably the case that certain conventions and standards must be adhered to. If these standards must be adhered to then would it be possible to use nationals from LDC's in the manner that was earlier mentioned?
Alternatively costs could be reduced and a more direct contribution to LDC's made if a contract were made directly with an LDC institution. This would have the virtue of making sure that funds develop an academic institution and it would also create a reservoir of experience.

The researcher, if U.S., should have a period for library research prior to departure. Funds are required for this.
The Following are Some Useful References That have been Found in the Course of Preparing this Brief and might be Brought to the Attention of Whoever Carries out the Research. (in addition to those quoted in Appraisal Report).


Also enclosed were some pages from the literature which indicate some of the variables that ought to be worked into this study.
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* Denotes a project classified as a "problem project".
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<th>Transport</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Power</th>
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<th>Population</th>
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<td>East Asia &amp; Pacific</td>
<td>PHILIPPINES (trees &amp; reservoir)</td>
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<td>CHINA (Expansion: schools, colleges; curriculum dev./ educ. planning)</td>
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<td>South Asia</td>
<td>PAKISTAN (coconuts; red palm oil)</td>
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Note: The table contains information on various projects and initiatives across different regions, including agricultural, educational, and health-related activities.
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<td>TUNISIA (Credit: Libya &amp; Senegal: Addis Ababa)</td>
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