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# MYANMAR PAY, COMPENSATION, AND HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT REVIEW



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Ministry of Planning and Finance



WORLD BANK GROUP



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## FOREWORD

The Myanmar Pay, Compensation and Human Resource Management Review was undertaken in 2015-2017 in response to the Government of Myanmar's request for advice to inform compensation and human resource policies that reflect country-specific challenges. The analysis, generously supported by Denmark, Australia and UK-DFID, was jointly conducted by the Government of Myanmar and the World Bank.

In addition to the analysis, the review aimed to develop capacity of government agencies responsible for wage-bill and human resource management. We know that capacity development happens within institutions, and can only be effective, if government assumes strong ownership. In this context, the Union Cabinet established the "Pay, Compensation, and Human Resource Review Implementation Inter-Ministerial Committee" comprising key ministries to oversee the review. The World Bank team worked closely with a task team in the Ministry of Planning and Finance. Focal points in each of the ministries of the inter-ministerial committee also actively participated.

The main methods used to review the government's pay and compensation system included: i) review of government regulations; ii) analysis of administrative data; iii) focus group discussions and a small survey to assess civil servants' perception about pay and human resource functions; and iv) a model that simulates the impact of potential changes to pay and employment, customized to Myanmar's circumstances. This model can be applied by the Ministry of Planning and Finance for future wage-bill planning.

Specifically, the model helped highlight that size of the wage bill is not an immediate concern. Its rapid growth in recent years, as well as growing fiscal vulnerabilities from potential external shocks, demand closer attention to overall growth in the public-sector wage bill. Future salary increases may need careful targeting given the growing attractiveness of the private sector as a career option for young talent and professionals.

The review also drills down on the education sector. Constituting nearly 40 percent of the total workforce employed by the Union Government, the education sector makes up nearly one-half of the union budget's wage bill. The review also provides important context for teacher policy on employment and pay, and suggests reform options for managing teacher workforce for better education outcomes.

With this review, we hope to present a comprehensive picture of the Myanmar civil service pay, compensation and human resource management systems, including their strengths and challenges. The findings suggest a series of policy priorities for improving the performance of the civil service.

The report includes a wealth of findings and practical, realistic recommendations. However, it is only the first step on the long journey of evidence-based reforms to manage wage bill and performance of the Myanmar civil service. The Government of Myanmar and the Bank will continue to work together during implementation of the recommendations, and for future research and analysis.

We would like to thank all the dedicated government officials and World Bank staff who conducted this review.



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## ACRONYMS

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations	MNPED	Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development
ATEO	Assistant Township Education Officer	MOE	Ministry of Education
B.Ed.	Bachelor's Degree in Education	MOF	Ministry of Finance
CESR	Comprehensive Education Sector Review	MOLIP	Ministry of Labor, Immigration, and Population
Cert.Ed.	Certificate of Education	MOPF	Ministry of Planning and Finance
CSO	Central Statistical Office	MPLCS	Myanmar Poverty and Living Conditions Survey
DBE	Department of Basic Education	MTFF	Medium-term Fiscal Framework
DG	Director General	NEPC	National Education Policy Commission
DDG	Deputy Director General	NESP	National Education Strategic Plan
DTEC	Diploma in Teacher Education Competency	OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
DT.Ed.	Degree in Teacher Education	PAT	Primary Assistant Teacher
DTEO	Department Township Education Officer	PATC	Primary Assistant Teacher Certificate
DWT	Daily Wage Teachers	PRESET	Pre-Service Teacher Training
EC	Education College	PS	Permanent Secretary
FGD	Focus Group Discussion	REO	Regional Education Office
FY	Fiscal Year	SAT	Senior Assistant Teacher
GAD	General Administration Department	SEO	State Education Office
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	SITE	School-based In-service Teacher Education
ID	Identification	TEIs	Teacher Education Institutions
IDP	Internally Displaced Person	TEO	Township Education Officer
IOE	Institute of Education	UCSB	Union Civil Service Board
JAT	Junior Assistant Teacher	USA	United States of America
JATC	Junior Assistant Teacher Certificate	USD	United States Dollar
LAO PDR	Lao People's Democratic Republic		
LFS	Labor Force Survey		
MDEF	Multi-Donor Education Fund		
MMK	Myanmar Kyat		

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## SUMMARY

### Context

1. **The ability of Myanmar’s public sector to perform depends critically on its civil service.** The quality of the civil service depends, in turn, on an efficient compensation and human-resource management system able to attract and retain qualified personnel. This will be crucial to Myanmar’s public sector functioning in particular, and to Myanmar’s development trajectory more broadly. This context forms the backdrop of the Pay, Compensation, and Human Resource Review. Public sector reform is inevitably a difficult reform agenda in developing countries, but the Government of Myanmar has demonstrated sustained commitment to initiating the process of modernizing and enhancing the productivity of its public sector since 2010.
2. **There are four key pieces of legislation regulating the civil service in Myanmar:** the Constitution, promulgated in 2008; the Law on the Union Civil Service Board (UCSB) of 2010; the Public Service Personnel Act of 2013, codifying a unitary civil service comprising gazetted and non-gazetted officials; and Civil Service Rules and Regulations, 2014, guiding implementation of the Public Service Personnel Act.
3. **The legal framework governing the civil service is clear and comprehensive.** And yet, the ambiguity of the overall governance framework—first and foremost, the relations between central and local government levels—affects the management of the civil service. For example, there is a lack of clarity regarding the authority for deconcentrated agencies to recruit and select staff at the subnational levels.
4. **Under difficult circumstances, the Government of Myanmar has demonstrated a sound ability to manage basic human resource functions and to control the wage bill.** A series of pay adjustments have been introduced since 2010. In the past (between 1972 and 2010), the strategy to curtail public spending was to fix wages in nominal terms for long periods.
5. **Overall, three points concerning the management of the Myanmar civil service are significant.** First, no single central agency is responsible for civil service management in Myanmar. Functions are performed across several agencies. In practice, line agencies have a great deal of practical autonomy, to a degree that is unusual although not unique. As such, the authority for human resource management is centralized, yet fragmented, at the union level. Second, basic systems—for example, consolidated, centralized payroll and human-resource management systems (including a unique identifier for each civil servant, for example)—for civil service management are not in place, which is only to be expected in view of Myanmar’s development level and history. Third, trade unions are not recognized for collective bargaining by the Government of Myanmar.

### The objectives of the review

6. **In 2015, the Ministry of Planning and Finance (MOPF) requested technical support from the World Bank to undertake a pay and compensation study, and a human resource review.** Specifically, the Government of Myanmar asked for assistance to establish a robust analytical and empirical basis to inform compensation and human-resource management reforms. MOPF indicated a particular interest in the affordability, transparency, fairness, and competitiveness of compensation. In January 2016, the Union Cabinet established the Pay, Compensation, and Human Resource Review Implementation Inter-Ministerial Committee to oversee the review.<sup>1</sup>

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1 The Committee’s eight members include MOF; MNPED; UCSB; Ministry of Energy; Ministry of Health; Ministry of Education; Ministry of Labor, Employment, and Social Affairs; and Ministry of Home Affairs and its General Administration Department. (See Ministry of Finance, Union Minister Office, Notification No. 12/2016, 25 January 2016.)



7. **In parallel, the Ministry of Education requested assistance on a review to identify “the impediments to effective teaching”, many of which are thought to be related to the pay and employment regime.** Drilling down into the education sector makes sense for several reasons. The education sector constitutes nearly 40 percent of the total workforce employed by the Union Government, and makes up nearly one-half of the union budget’s wage bill. Retired teachers make up one-third of all union government pensioners. It also enables a close look at the link between pay, human resource management, and service delivery.

8. **Against this backdrop, the review was launched in response to the Government of Myanmar’s request for analytical support to make compensation and human resource policies more evidence-based.** Thus, the overarching objectives have been to provide the best possible analysis and to bring to bear international practice and expertise on Myanmar-specific problems. This approach reflects a fundamental value: policy decisions should be informed by robust evidence. It is up to Myanmar’s policy makers to weigh that evidence, take account of any other considerations, and make the choices that best serve Myanmar’s needs.

9. **The objectives of the review were distilled into three key themes**—1) pay and compensation, 2) human resource management, and 3) the case study of the education sector—based on consultation between the World Bank and the Pay, Compensation and Human Resource Review Implementation Inter-Ministerial Committee. The focus on pay and compensation centers on these questions in four key areas:

- 1) *Affordability*: How affordable is Myanmar’s wage bill?
- 2) *Transparency*: Is civil service compensation clear and easy to understand?
- 3) *Fairness (equity)*: Do equal jobs receive equal compensation?
- 4) *Competitiveness and adequacy*: How does civil service compensation compare to alternatives? Is it sufficient for a reasonable standard of living?

The focus on human resource reforms addresses these key functions:

- How does the Government of Myanmar undertake workforce planning and establishment control?
- How are civil servants recruited, selected and promoted?
- How are civil servants deployed, and what are the challenges for retaining public servants in the workforce and in remote and poor areas?
- How does the Government manage its staff for better performance through staff appraisals?

The focus on employment and pay in the education sector examines these questions:

- How attractive is the teaching profession in Myanmar and who enters the profession?
- How are teachers recruited, selected, promoted, retained and deployed?
- How are teachers supervised and managed?
- How does the Government of Myanmar undertake teacher workforce planning, and what are the projected needs of teachers?
- How does the system of ongoing teacher professional-development function, and what support and opportunities exist for teachers?

## Approach and methodology of the review

10. **The approach of the review has been to build ownership of the findings and develop capacity, underpinned by rigorous analysis.** The World Bank team was linked with a task team in MOPE. Focal points were also identified in each of the ministries comprising the review implementation inter-ministerial committee. The World Bank team aimed to develop capacity in the Government of Myanmar for taking on

new approaches to pay, workforce planning, and human resource management. Several deliverables, such as training sessions and guidance notes, were produced in the process. This served to build a mutual understanding between the Government and the World Bank team about the data required for the analysis, and to strengthen the systems for pay, compensation, and human resource management. Moreover, the Government of Myanmar has reviewed this report in such detail that it will be approved at the cabinet level. The review is the first diagnostic review of the Myanmar civil service.

11. **The Government of Myanmar and the World Bank jointly conducted the review.** The main methods used in this review were: 1) a review of government regulations; 2) analysis of government data; 3) small-scale qualitative research pilots, such as focus group discussions and a survey to determine civil servants' perception about pay and human resource functions; 4) a computer model that simulates the impact of potential changes to pay and employment, customized to Myanmar's circumstances; and 5) a review of other publications, such as analyses by development partners and media reports.

12. **The foundation for the Myanmar compensation review is an analytical framework that the World Bank uses in countries around the world.** Although discussions of compensation often focus narrowly on base salary, total compensation includes numerous components in addition to base salary, such as allowances, benefits, and intangible factors. It is important to consider all of these components in order to have the best possible understanding of total compensation. In Myanmar, as elsewhere, some components are provided in monetary form (such as its regional allowance for hardship areas), and others are provided in kind (e.g., free or subsidized housing for some Myanmar civil servants). Benefits that are often found in the public sector include annual leave and sick leave. Some compensation is provided now, while some is expected in the future (notably, pensions). Additionally, intangible factors—those that are not money, goods, or services—can also add to the attractiveness of a government job in Myanmar. These include the prestige of being a civil servant and job security, among others. (The analytical framework does not address informal or illicit income, nor does this review.)

## Affordability of Myanmar's current wage

13. **Although the size of the wage bill is not an immediate concern, there are growing fiscal vulnerabilities from external shocks that call for closer attention to the overall growth in the public-sector wage bill.** The size of the public sector wage bill in Myanmar is comparatively low in international terms, at 3.5 percent of gross domestic product in fiscal year (FY) 2015/2016. This finding, however, should be interpreted cautiously, as international wage bill comparisons are fraught with difficulties.

14. **The size of the wage bill, however, has grown significantly in recent years.** Starting from a low level in FY 2011/2012, the wage bill jumped significantly from FY 2014/2015 to FY 2015/2016, due to increases in base salaries and other monetary earnings. Therefore, this finding reinforces the importance of restraining excessive growth of the wage bill to meet the fiscal targets identified from the Government's medium-term fiscal framework. This report concludes that, in order to manage the wage bill, better systems for forecasting the wage bill expenditures need to be developed that take into account the three trade-offs: 1) higher pay versus more staff, 2) across the board pay increases versus target increases, and 3) wage expenditures versus other expenditures. The wage bill forecasting tool is one such instrument.

## Myanmar's current civil service compensation system

15. **The main monetary components of Myanmar's civil service compensation are base salary and the regional allowance for hardship areas.** These are, for the most part, clearly regulated, although the

criteria for classifying townships as hardship areas have not been published. Total monetary earnings increase in a clear, orderly manner as civil servants move from lower positions or pay grades up the scale—a positive feature that some developing countries fail to achieve. The base salary scale provides minimal pay progression within a given grade and, because the increment is set as a nominal kyat amount (rather than a standard percentage, which is the more usual practice), its relative importance declines as one rises in grade. For almost all civil servants, these monetary earnings are de facto exempt from income tax.

16. **Myanmar officials frequently expressed the belief that in-kind allowances vary substantially across departments and perceived this as unfair.** The senior management of each government department has the authority to make its own decisions, and practices differ substantially. Most allowances are awarded to gazetted posts, and the value typically increases as civil servants rise in grade. It is possible that the policy is formalized in written regulations or policies prepared by each department. However, officials interviewed for this review had never seen such documents and stated that employees simply know the practices in their own department (but not elsewhere). In response to these concerns, the review team requested and analyzed information on four in-kind allowance entitlements (housing, work vehicles, fuel allocation, and commuter transportation) from a sample of six ministries and UCSB (39 departments in total).

17. **Intangible factors also play a role in Myanmar’s civil service compensation.** These are, by their nature, difficult to quantify. However, both interviews and focus group discussions confirmed that civil service jobs continue to be valued for their stability and prestige.

18. **Rates for some operational expenses have become outdated.** Operational expenses are, of course, not part of formal compensation. But, if they are not properly managed, they may affect compensation and civil servants’ ability to do their jobs effectively. Myanmar has a number of expenses rates and regulations that are out of date or require re-evaluation to ensure they are effective. For example, regulations and rates for reimbursement of travel expenses for field visits (such as by health-care workers to patients’ homes or to outlying clinics) are of particular concern, since these can limit the delivery of critically important services to the population. To the Government of Myanmar’s credit, it has begun revising some of these rates.

## Competitiveness and adequacy of Myanmar’s civil service

19. **This report systematically analyzes competitiveness issues in Myanmar (within certain constraints) via an array of methods.** The World Bank analyzed the 2015 Myanmar Poverty and Living Conditions Survey (MPLCS) to provide a basis for putting civil service earnings into context. It also evaluated nationally representative household surveys (pending at the time of writing this report) and administrative data regularly collected by the Government of Myanmar (or submitted specifically for this review), pulled contextual analysis from prior studies and publicly-available information, and conducted early-stage qualitative research via interviews, a survey of civil servants, and focus group discussions with civil servants.

20. **The World Bank and Myanmar review team’s analysis of whether civil service compensation is adequate, given living conditions in Myanmar, shows that civil-service base salaries are not extreme outliers relative to prevailing conditions in the country.** For the gazetted grades, base salaries cover between 72 percent (staff officer level) and 138 percent (director general level) of average household consumption expenditures, as estimated from the 2015 MPLCS. As expected, the base salaries cover a lower percentage in higher-cost urban settings and a higher percentage in rural ones. For non-gazetted grades, base salaries cover between 34 percent (lowest grade) and 59 percent (police lieutenant grade) of estimated average household consumption expenditures.

## Comparison of Myanmar’s civil service compensation to “real world” alternatives

21. **The team’s ability to assess competitiveness was limited by the fact that Myanmar’s 2015 labor force survey (LFS) data had not been released at the time of writing.** Analyzing LFS data is presently the most appropriate method for comparing earnings and working conditions across sectors of the economy in Myanmar. In the absence of LFS data, the team used other sources to place the civil service in the broader context of Myanmar’s labor market and economy. The guiding questions explored were what the labor market looks like, what work opportunities exist, and how workers outside the civil service are treated. More detailed comparison of civil service compensation with the rest of the labor market will have to wait until the LFS data are released.

22. **Myanmar’s labor market is dominated by informal employment, where the vast majority of workers do not receive benefits.** The informal sector encompasses 71 percent of workers, with more than 50 percent of the labor force employed in the agriculture sector. Many workers face tenuous labor conditions. At present, only public sector workers—less than 5 percent of the population—receive pension benefits. Workers in the formal private sector are covered by a contributory social security scheme. For civil servants, Civil Service Rules 2014 stipulates various types of leave for illness, maternity/paternity, disability, and other conditions. Medical care appears to be provided to civil servants in some (but not all) government bodies and certain geographic locations.

23. **The lowest civil service grade earns substantially more than a minimum wage worker.** Myanmar’s first-ever minimum wage took effect on 1 September 2015, after lengthy negotiations. The official rate of MMK 3,600 per eight-hour day applies to all sectors, but not to businesses that employ fewer than 15 workers. Many workers continue to earn less than MMK 3,600 per day or have unstable incomes. In contrast, the lowest civil service grade earns MMK 120,000 per month (FY 2015/2016), substantially more than minimum wage workers (estimated at MMK 77,400 per month). This finding supports the observation that lower-level (or lower-educated) workers are often better off in the public sector. Since 13.9 percent of union-level civil service jobs are in the lowest grade, this group of beneficiaries is substantial.

## Ability of Myanmar’s civil service attract and retain the skills it needs

24. **Despite drawbacks, it seems that civil service jobs are currently considered attractive by many people.** Certainly, this may change over the medium-to-long term, as Myanmar’s economy develops and work opportunities in the formal private sector become more plentiful and appealing. Of course, compensation is only one of many considerations influencing these dynamics: job satisfaction, employment stability, dignity, opportunities outside of government, and other factors also play important roles.

25. **Routine administrative data from the Myanmar civil service revealed that voluntary resignations are low, with some differences across departments.** Retirement is by far the major reason for individuals to leave the civil service. Discussions with several civil service managers also confirmed that departures are at a modest level. Not surprisingly, dynamics appear to vary by sector, department and grade.

26. **Despite challenges, survey and focus group respondents value their civil service status, and most would recommend a civil service career to others.** Participants in the focus group discussions perceived substantial advantages to being a civil servant, while also sharing diverse views about the adequacy (or inadequacy) of their income and the factors that motivate individuals to join or leave the civil service. Of the respondents to the written survey, 88 percent had not made serious efforts to find work elsewhere (and

therefore leave the civil service) in the past 12 months, and 73 percent would recommend to other people that they seek a job in the civil service.

## Fairness and transparency in Myanmar's civil service compensation

27. **The main monetary components of compensation are clearly regulated, for the most part, but offer only small within-grade pay rises.** Progression up the base salary scale is orderly, with earnings in each higher grade always greater than in the adjacent lower grade. The minimal within-grade pay progression could, however, be seen as unfair or noncompetitive, in broad terms. The modest size of increments to base salary means that individuals see little growth in earnings over time, unless they win a promotion to a higher grade position or the entire base salary scale is adjusted. Furthermore, higher grade jobs (and workers with longer job experience) get a smaller relative increase in pay, since the kyat-denominated increment represents a smaller percentage of base salary. While people generally welcome any increase in their earnings, the prospect of only minimal pay rises over a 10-year horizon may weaken motivation.

28. **Nonmonetary allowances are far more variable and discretionary than monetary compensation.** In some countries, in-kind allowances may be de facto compensation (in part and under certain circumstances), as opposed to serving purely to enable work activities. The dividing line can be difficult to establish, but the issue is pertinent to Myanmar. (The team was not aware of any centralized documentation about these department-level decisions.) As a result, it is not easy to know the full compensation package that is provided to different positions and to individuals working in different departments, whether in similar or different jobs.

29. **The Myanmar civil-service housing allowance illustrates the difficulty of understanding who benefits from in-kind allowances and by how much.** In addition to an existing stock of government-owned or subsidized housing, some government bodies are building new, “affordable” housing, with government staff among the priority beneficiaries. The benefit to those who are able to purchase or rent such a unit is substantial, and large numbers of people apply for the relatively small number of opportunities. The value to individuals, however, is difficult to estimate because it would require assessing local supply and market prices for similar units, among other factors.

30. **The classification of jobs into grades deserves attention.** Although Myanmar appears to have a basic system of job families, the rationale underlying the grading structure is not evident. In the course of this review, it was not entirely clear how it is used in practice or, in particular, which criteria and processes determine how jobs are assigned to specific grades. While robust job descriptions are typically an important part of this process in other countries, the use and coverage of job descriptions in the Myanmar civil service vary significantly. Indeed, the variety of job titles that are grouped together in the same grade suggest a very wide spread in skill and responsibility levels within a given grade.

31. **Having a suitable grading structure is especially important to the health and education sectors, which deliver vital services to the public.** Due to the nature of professions in these sectors, an individual may spend an entire, decades-long career in the same line of work. It is important to provide professional advancement opportunities and pay rises that recognize the value of these career paths.

32. **The case of teachers in Myanmar's basic education system illustrates this point.** Myanmar's teachers must (and do) move to teaching higher grades to see any substantial increase in earnings, which concentrates the most experienced teachers in high schools and the least experienced in primary schools. It is not unusual in other countries for teachers of higher grades to earn more than teachers at lower levels of the education system, but all can see substantial growth in earnings over the course of their careers in any level. However, this is not the case in Myanmar.



## Key human resource functions and management of Myanmar's civil servants

33. **Strengthening human resource functions and adhering to the principle of merit within the civil service have a discernible positive impact on public sector performance.** The review examined these key human-resource functions: human resource planning, recruitment and selection, deployment and retention, promotion, and performance appraisal.

34. **Currently, overall human resource planning is governed by a two-thirds policy, which allows only two-thirds of the officially sanctioned posts to be filled.** Human resource planning is managed at the department level in each ministry, and there is no ministry-wide strategic unit managing this function. The administrative units in ministries are mostly in charge of maintaining human resource records and do not provide strategic analysis or input into human resource planning. While the two-thirds policy might have been helpful to manage fiscal constraints, a more flexible approach to work planning should be considered. Human resource planning in Myanmar follows a bottom-up approach to determine staffing needs. Units submit their requests for staff needs to their head of department, based on their roles, work functions, and work responsibilities, and according to their organizational structures. The Government of Myanmar currently reports, but does not analyze, employee turnover data.

35. **The available recruitment data suggest that there is excessive demand for government employment.** The number of applicants significantly exceeds the number of available positions. This finding is reinforced by the low turnover rates and suggests that—for now—the Government of Myanmar is able to attract and (in particular) retain staff. Recruitment is important because other human resource policies, such as training and deployment of civil servants, are dependent on the effectiveness of this process. In Myanmar, the open competition examination is a fundamental and major channel for selecting civil servants.

36. **The open competition examination system is intended to ensure the recruitment of talented and qualified young people.** The letter of the law does not discriminate, positively or negatively, among full citizens on the basis of sex or origin. The Myanmar civil service is a career system, which focuses on initial entry to the civil service, with established career tracks.

37. **The process for recruitment and selection managed by UCSB is well regulated by law, yet challenges remain.** There is a perception, according to civil servants, that the system is not recruiting the best people. The focus group discussions revealed a perception that there is too strong a focus on the written examinations and that the questions asked on the three themes—the Myanmar language, the English language, and general knowledge—are so broad that it is difficult to discern specific job competencies.

38. **Neither the Public Service Personnel Act nor the Civil Service Rules and Regulations, 2014, provide much detail on the policy for deployment of civil servants.** It is difficult for ministries to deploy the best person for the job. Among other things, this would involve a much stronger focus on matching the individual job requirements with the competencies of the person to be deployed.

39. **There is a perception among civil servants that the posting and deployment of staff is not always carried out in a fair and transparent manner.** While 49.7 percent of the survey respondents said that the posting and deployment of staff is carried out in a fair and transparent manner, 39.7 percent said that it is not fair and transparent, and that bias is often a significant factor.

40. **The challenges in deployment do not seem to affect overall retention in the civil service; however, retention of staff in poor and remote areas is the key binding constraint, even with the regional hardship allowance.** As evidenced in the extremely low turnover rates in the civil service, there is no overall problem of retaining civil servants once they are recruited into the system. There is, however, a profound challenge of keeping staff in poor and remote areas, which has a detrimental impact on service delivery. To address this, the Government of Myanmar introduced the regional hardship allowance—a monetary benefit for civil servants deployed to poor and remote areas. However, it is not clear that the allowance has produced the desired outcome.

41. **There is also a perception that political consideration influences the promotion process of civil servants.** In the 2016 UNDP civil service perceptions survey, 26 percent of gazetted officers and 34 percent of the non-gazetted officers of 2010 civil service personnel who participated in the survey stated that political considerations influence the promotion process of civil servants. As a consequence, 55 percent of gazetted officers and 25 percent of non-gazetted officers disagreed that the most qualified and competent person is promoted.

42. **Performance appraisals of civil servants are carried out by ministries and departments for purposes of staff promotion.** The Myanmar system puts more weight on traits than on performance, emphasizing personal characteristics (such as responsibility, competency, confidentiality, etc.), which are presumably related to job performance. One problem with trait rating is that the traits themselves are difficult to define and may be subject to varying, subjective interpretation by managers. The broader issue in the analysis of the performance appraisal systems is to make the tool more relevant in the civil service. This would imply a stronger use of performance appraisals in the promotion process. But first, managers need to be trained how to perform appraisals and how to use them to enhance the skills and competencies of their employees—and managers need to be allotted adequate time to conduct them.

## Management of the teacher workforce

43. **Teachers are the single largest category of civil servants, making up more than one-third of the total workforce employed by the Union Government and accounting for nearly one-half of the union budget's wage bill.** Also, retired teachers make up one-third of all union government pensioners. Teachers' salaries account for approximately 78 percent of the recurrent resources allocated to the basic education sector. Understanding the pay and compensation of the civil service in Myanmar can be enhanced by closely examining policies covering the more than 340,000 individuals who work as teachers.

44. **Over the last four years, Myanmar has introduced sweeping reforms to teacher policies, with more being planned.** The most important of these changes relate to the compensation of staff in the form of wages and allowances, and the introduction of a new practice of hiring a very large number of unqualified teachers (who lack teaching qualifications) as contract teachers. With the new contract teachers, the Ministry of Education has (in just three years) dramatically changed the composition of its teaching workforce in some very profound and, for Myanmar, uncharted ways. Firstly, the Ministry introduced the notion of employing uncertified teachers. Secondly, it decided to hire all these new teachers as “contract teachers”—introducing a new category of staff (daily wage teachers) within the school system. Thirdly, it allowed state and regional officers (of the Ministry of Education) a greater say in the hiring process.

45. **Gender differences for teachers and administrative staff are pronounced.** Women make up the (large) majority of teaching staff. However, women only make up 61 percent of head teachers, which is a significantly lower representation of females than in most other school positions. Recent reforms have tried to address the gender imbalance of teachers by raising salaries for all teachers and by lowering the selection criteria for men. In administrative positions at the township level, assistant township education officers are nearly all male.

46. **Entry requirements into the teaching profession are low, compared to other regionally high performing countries, and are as yet not equitable.** Currently the minimum requirement for entry into a teacher preparation program is high school graduation. Qualifications differ across all educational level. Currently, the minimum requirement for applying to be a high school teacher or an educational administrator is a bachelor's degree in education.

47. **The process of hiring civil servant teachers is centralized, while the hiring of daily wage teachers is more decentralized.** Every year, teacher vacancies are reported by all the township education officers, based on a request by the Department of Basic Education. Candidates from the Education Colleges are identified through an application process for those who earn certificates. But with daily wage teachers, an alternative process is used that has more involvement at the township level. These teachers lack teaching certificates, have differing qualifications (ranging from master's or bachelor's degrees to high school certificates), receive about a month's worth of training, and are employed at a lower salary scale without benefits. After a period of about one year teaching, they are eligible to become permanent staff.

48. **Deployment and retention issues in education highlight the need for better planning, use of data, and provision of appropriate incentives.** While the Ministry of Education collects data on teacher supply and demand, to date it has not been used to inform the design of a responsive teacher-deployment system. Current planning is inadequate to ensure a smooth supply of teachers to meet rapidly growing demand, as it is only cursorily linked to pre-service teacher education intakes. Retention at a system level is quite good, with less than 2 percent attrition. But, as is the case in many countries, there is difficulty in retaining teachers in hard-to-staff schools and certain specializations. While a hardship allowance exists, challenges of housing, transportation, and communication are acknowledged difficulties in attracting and retaining teachers in remote locations.

49. **Teachers' salaries have increased substantially over the last three years; however, questions remain as to how salaries affect teacher motivation, placement, career development, and performance.** When taking both salaries and allowances into account, base salaries of civil servant teachers have approximately doubled between FY 2012/2013 and FY 2015/2016. The salaries of daily wage teachers, on the other hand, are close to minimum wage level.

50. **Professional development for teachers in Myanmar, delivered through the in-service teacher training programs offered by Education Colleges and Institutes of Education, is inconsistent and has not been effectively institutionalized.** The Department of Education Planning and Training is reportedly understaffed and therefore unable to efficiently develop and organize regular in-service trainings. When training is provided, it is offered on an ad hoc basis and is expected to "cascade" outwards and downwards to other teachers. No data exists on whether these in-service trainings are equitably delivered, need-based, or standards based, or whether teachers are given any incentive to participate in professional development.

51. **The teacher progression and promotion system is one of the most critical areas of reform. The promotion system also interferes with staffing needs.** Due to the ascending salary system, once teachers start their careers (almost always at the primary level), they immediately look for a better position in a higher level school. Teachers have an immediate incentive to apply for promotion due to pay gaps in the school-level specializations (primary, middle, and high schools). This system is seen as detrimental in many respects: teachers transfer from schools frequently as they are promoted to different levels, and the best teachers tend not to remain in primary schools—arguably the level where the best teachers should be staffed. To address this issue, the new Government of Myanmar is proposing to restructure the progression and promotion systems to offer career tracks within all school levels and new incentives for teachers to specialize in one of the three levels. The design of this system is critical to ensure high quality experienced teachers remain at the primary level.

## Policy recommendations for the way forward

52. **This report presents as comprehensive a picture as possible of the Myanmar civil-service pay and compensation, and human resource systems—looking closely at the education system as an example—and their strengths and challenges.** Based on the diagnostic assessment in each chapter, the report details policy and reform options for the Government of Myanmar to consider. The recommendations, consolidated here, tailor good practice in civil service management to the Myanmar context, and the country's current problems and capacity constraints, from a forward-looking perspective.

53. **RECOMMENDATION 1: The wage-bill forecasting model could be integrated into the Government of Myanmar's and the World Bank's joint work on strengthening the medium term fiscal framework and human resource planning.** The wage bill forecasting model provides a more robust methodology than the existing practice of estimating future wage expenditures, which relies on simple percentage increases to the overall wage bill. Importantly, the wage-bill forecasting model can be used to strengthen human resource planning, give flexibility to the two-thirds policy by providing an accurate projection of the budgetary impact, and provide evidence to help answer such concerns as 1) whether current staffing reflects the priorities and performance targets of the Government, 2) what the greatest staffing priorities are going forward, and 3) how the Government can maximize the developmental impact of human resources.

54. **RECOMMENDATION 2: Department-level wage bill reports could be consolidated into one central database, which could be located at MOPF (for budget control) and a relevant ministry/department (for human resource planning).** For regular reporting of data to occur, a uniform template will be necessary to ensure consistency.

55. **RECOMMENDATION 3: The Government of Myanmar could also consider introducing an electronic centralized payroll system.** A centralized system (with unique identifiers for each civil servant) would capture the complete payroll data and have controls to minimize the possibility of errors. The benefits would also include efficiency gains by automating manual tasks, improving capacity to conduct payroll audits, and increasing ability to conduct wage bill analysis, as well as wage bill and pension forecasts.

56. **RECOMMENDATION 4: Analyze Myanmar's labor force survey (LFS) for insights into the adequacy and competitiveness of civil service compensation, and monitor developments over time. In other countries, large-scale survey data are commonly used to assess the competitiveness and adequacy of government compensation.** Once the 2015 LFS data is released, the Government of Myanmar could conduct this specialized analysis, with international guidance as needed.

57. **RECOMMENDATION 5: Review the rationale for in-kind allowances to establish clarity about objectives and parameters. To the extent that these allowances may supplement earnings (rather than serving only direct operational needs), they constitute a highly variable element in the compensation packages for these posts.** Since the leadership of each department decides the amounts that are awarded, as well as the posts or individuals that receive the allowance, the system is also highly discretionary. The review would produce guidelines that stipulate the justification, criteria, and the kyat amounts for any allowances that continue to be associated with all posts.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Such a review would examine fundamental issues such as 1) the purpose for each in-kind allowance; 2) the rationale for providing an item "in kind," rather than in monetary form; 3) the assignment of in-kind allowances to a post/individual or to the operational resources available to the relevant unit; 4) the degree of variation in allowances across departments or units; 5) the cost-effectiveness of existing arrangements and potential for more efficient options; and 6) the financial implications of any changes.

58. **RECOMMENDATION 6a:** The Government of Myanmar should begin systematically monitoring its ability to recruit the skills that it needs and to retain them where it needs them, especially in remote or hardship areas. The Government of Myanmar does not currently conduct such targeted monitoring, although it routinely collects data that could be used for this purpose. Monitoring is especially pertinent to the Government’s concerns about attracting and retaining certain categories of staff in hardship areas.

59. **6b:** The Government of Myanmar will need objective evidence to assess whether various measures aimed at retention in hardship areas are having an effect or not. The key is to understand how civil servants would respond to alternative incentives associated with working in remote areas. While the regional allowance is one incentive, the focus group discussions also highlighted that other mechanisms—such as direct recruitment from the remote areas (e.g., especially for auxiliary health-care staff), accelerated career opportunities, subsidized housing, and special transportation facilities (perhaps bundled together) —could be successful in attracting civil servants to remote areas and keeping them deployed there.

60. **RECOMMENDATION 7:** A small set of focused indicators would help the Government of Myanmar monitor and refine its compensation and human resource management policies. Indicators for staff retention include tracking 1) the percentage of vacant positions by type, geographic location, etc.; 2) the average time that employees remain in a job (by position) or geographic location (such as a hardship area); and the turnover rate by reason. Indicators of success in attracting workers with requisite skills include capturing not only the number of people who apply for each advertised job opening but the number of qualified applicants.

61. **RECOMMENDATION 8:** Review and update rates for the operational expenses that enable civil servants in Myanmar to do their jobs. Rates that are inappropriate have clear negative impacts. Unreasonably low rates waste the Government’s human resources, since civil servants are hindered from doing their work effectively. Rates that are too high also waste budgetary funds and reduce the effectiveness of civil servants’ work. Furthermore, when rates for operational expenses are inadequate, development partners, who fund projects, may introduce their own allowances in an uncoordinated fashion, thereby further distorting work incentives. It is thus important to set rates that are appropriate and to ensure that they are updated over time, when necessary, and follow a few guiding principles.

62. **RECOMMENDATION 9:** In the next round of LFS, the Government of Myanmar could usefully include more detailed occupation codes, to enable more nuanced comparisons. More detailed occupation codes will make it possible to do more detailed comparisons. This will be especially important as the economy and the labor market develop over time, and certain skills become more highly sought after (therefore potentially making it harder for the Government to attract and retain qualified people.)

63. **RECOMMENDATION 10:** Conduct a focused review of the criteria for each level of the grading structure and whether jobs are properly allocated to grades. There are questions about how effective Myanmar’s current grading structure is in 1) ensuring that jobs with a roughly equivalent assessed value are grouped into the same grade, and 2) facilitating a career path, especially for service delivery professionals in education and health.

64. **RECOMMENDATION 11:** It would be prudent if Myanmar does not undertake a jobs-based survey for the foreseeable future, but defers until the formal labor market is more developed. Such surveys are expensive and typically examine only a relatively small number of jobs. They are best suited for economies with a well-developed formal labor market, where the civil service is just one among many appealing career paths. Given the Government’s current position as a leading employer in the formal labor market and the lack of evidence of a “brain drain” of skills to other employers, this type of exercise should be deferred.



65. **RECOMMENDATION 12: The Government of Myanmar could consider establishing a human-resource management unit for each ministry.** The functions of such a unit could be expanded to include human resource planning, development, recruitment and selection, training and development, and management—with a particular focus on deployment and retention in underserved areas.
66. **RECOMMENDATION 13: Use job analysis as a tool for strengthening human-resources management functions, such as recruitment and promotion.** Job analysis involves three specific aspects: development of job descriptions (comprising a statement of purpose and specific responsibilities, activities, and references), a person specification (consisting of a statement of skills, abilities, knowledge and minimum education level required to perform the job), and performance indicators (listing quantifiable outputs from the job performance).
67. **RECOMMENDATION 14: Consider making the policy on deployment more explicit and transparent.** Based on the analysis above, the Government of Myanmar could consider developing a more specific policy on deployment.
68. **RECOMMENDATION 15: The Government of Myanmar might consider strengthening the format, implementation, and monitoring of performance appraisals.** This effort would be a synergetic, stronger use of job analysis, where the performance appraisal methods are job-related. In this context, the recommended job analyses must be conducted before selecting a performance appraisal system or method. Managers could be trained in conducting performance appraisals. In essence, this would entail making the performance appraisal matter, by linking it more productively to promotion and rewards, and possibly demotion.
69. **RECOMMENDATION 16: For recruitment and selection of teachers, key issues are managing the rapid expansion of teacher numbers and properly hiring both Education College candidates and daily wage teachers.** The relatively new process of selecting and credentialing daily wage teachers, in particular, holds many challenges. This wave will shape the teacher workforce for many years, and poor selection or lower standards can have serious implications. In addition to defining a process that recruits and selects high quality candidates, a support system is essential for them in their initial years. The new teacher mentoring system will play a critical role.
70. **RECOMMENDATION 17: In the deployment of teachers, data on teacher supply and demand has been collected, but to date it has not been used to inform the design of a responsive teacher-deployment system.** In particular, as the number of teachers expands rapidly and attempts are made to fill staffing gaps, reliable identification of schools (and locations) where teachers are needed is essential. However, a significant deployment challenge remains: many of the young, inexperienced teachers tend to be placed in the more remote schools.
71. **RECOMMENDATION 18: Regarding the progression and promotion of teachers, the key issues are minimizing the constant movement of teachers within the school system and keeping high quality, experienced teachers in primary schools.** The existing promotion system interferes with staffing needs. The significant pay-scale differences between primary (lowest pay), middle, and high school (greatest pay) levels encourage teachers to apply for promotion out of primary schools as quickly as possible. The way forward is to develop career tracks (specialization) and a promotion system within school levels, and to equalize salary structures across all levels. This involves creating cadres and separating the primary school teachers from the middle and secondary schools. It also involves changing the recruitment criteria for middle and secondary schools, possibly turning to competitive recruitment of only university graduates (at a minimum), with no weighting given to the primary school experience.

72. **RECOMMENDATION 19: In human resource planning for teachers, being able to forecast teacher supply and demand is critical and should be data-driven.** The Ministry of Education does gather data on teacher deployment. More robust forecasting and planning systems will be important elements in smooth navigation of the changing education landscape.

73. **RECOMMENDATION 20: The new teacher competency standards will be a core policy that underpins all aspects of teacher learning and development, as well as performance management and appraisal.** Often teacher standards are defined, but are then not linked to pre-service and in-service training, or to teacher progression and promotion. It will be critical to explicitly link the teacher standards throughout the system and have them tied to meaningful results.

74. **RECOMMENDATION 21: In-service professional development will also play a critical role in supporting teachers.** Myanmar's professional development program for teachers is fractured, however, and needs to be strengthened to provide consistent, coherent professional development opportunities, offered through school clusters and traditional training.

# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

**1. An efficient and high-performing civil service, with the compensation and human resource management system to attract and retain qualified personnel, will be crucial to Myanmar’s strategic attention to administrative performance in particular and to the country’s development trajectory more broadly.** Public administration performance reform is inevitably a difficult reform agenda in developing countries,<sup>3</sup> but since 2010 the Government of Myanmar has demonstrated sustained commitment to initiating the process of modernizing and enhancing the productivity of its public sector. This change is a building block in Myanmar’s triple transition toward democratic governance, a market-oriented economy, and peace. There are several factors affecting the overall performance of the Myanmar civil service—transparency and accountability throughout the public sector, including in revenue collection; the management of public expenditure; and public policy making—but the focus of this report is pay, compensation, and human resource management.<sup>4</sup> These factors, however, serve as a context for this analysis - for example, by determining what the evolution of a more vibrant private sector in Myanmar means for public sector pay.

**2. As Myanmar is modernizing its public-sector institutions and policies, it will have to start with “first things first.”<sup>5</sup> This means starting with the key constraints and problems that Myanmar is facing.** Rather than focus on any specific institutional blue print (e.g., how an independent Public Service Commission should be structured), the review required a closer look at the specific functions of the civil service system (e.g., how the Government of Myanmar rewards its employees and how it recruits and promotes staff). Understanding the specific problems also required a sound diagnostic of the Government’s systems for rewarding and managing its civil service. For example, if deployment of civil servants into poor and remote areas is impeding effective service delivery, policy makers need to know if a hardship allowance is working or if other drivers of retention, such as recruiting from the hardship areas, are more effective.

**3. Myanmar has demonstrated a remarkable ability to control the wage bill and the size of the public sector up to now, yet a series of pay adjustments have been introduced since 2010.** In the past, the strategy employed to curtail public spending was to fix wages in nominal terms over long periods of time. During the period 1972-2010, nominal wages<sup>6</sup> were only increased five times, coinciding with changes in government (in 1972, 1989, 1993, 2000, and 2006). In other words, this implied a freeze in nominal terms of salaries for these periods: 1972-88, 1989-93, 1993-2000, 2000-2006, and 2006-2010. This policy came to an end in 2011; in subsequent years, pay increases were provided across the board, although increases for fiscal year (FY) 2015/2016 have decompressed salaries.<sup>7</sup> These pay adjustments have been undertaken with only limited planning of the fiscal scenarios and link to the medium-term fiscal framework (MTFF).

3 The Independent Evaluation Group’s 2007 assessment of the World Bank’s public sector portfolio was particularly critical of the track record in civil service reform, pointing to a serious lack of robust analytical work in the area.

4 For a broader analysis of the drivers of public sector performance, see S. Mohib et al., 2016, “Participating in Change: Promoting Public Sector Accountability to All.”

5 M. Grindle, 2004, “Good Enough Governance: Poverty Reduction and Reform in Developing Countries”; and A. Schick, 1998, “Why Most Developing Countries Should Not Try New Zealand Reforms”, 123–31.

6 In other words, not adjusted for inflation.

7 Pay compression is usually defined as the differential between the highest and lowest earners in an organization. It is the view of the authors of this report that “compression ratios” remain a blunt tool. Despite claims to the contrary, there is no empirically supported “right” ratio. But, one can argue that extreme compression or decompression indicate potential concerns. A more complicated but meaningful approach is to focus on pay differentials between adjacent salary grades, as opposed to a compression ratio for the entire salary structure.

**4. In this context, the Ministry of Planning and Finance (MOPF) requested technical support from the World Bank to undertake a review of pay, compensation, and human resource management (HRM) in 2015.** Specifically, the Government of Myanmar asked for assistance in establishing a robust analytical and empirical basis to inform compensation and HRM reforms. MOPF indicated a particular interest in the affordability, transparency, competitiveness, and fairness of compensation. In January 2016, the Union Cabinet established the Pay, Compensation, and Human Resource Review Implementation Inter-ministerial Committee to oversee the review (Ministry of Finance, Union Minister Office, Notification No. 12/2016, 25 January 2016). The Committee’s eight members include the Ministry of Finance; Ministry of Planning and Economic Development; Union Civil Service Board (UCSB); Ministry of Energy; Ministry of Health; Ministry of Education; (former) Ministry of Labour, Employment, and Social Affairs; and Ministry of Home Affairs (General Administration Department).

**5. In parallel, the Ministry of Education requested assistance on a study to identify “the impediments to effective teaching,” many of which are thought to be related to the pay and employment regime.** Drilling down into the education sector makes sense for several reasons. The education sector constitutes nearly 40 percent of the total work force employed by the Union Government<sup>8</sup> and makes up nearly one-half of the union budget’s wage bill. Retired teachers make up one-third of all union government pensioners. This study enabled a close look at the link between pay and compensation and service delivery. As with the broader public sector performance, pay and employment are obviously only two of several factors affecting educational outcomes in Myanmar.

**6. Against this backdrop, this report seeks to answer specific questions for each element of the review:**

The focus on pay and compensation (chapters 3, 4, and 5) has four key elements:

- 1) *Affordability (fiscal plan and human resources):* How affordable is Myanmar’s wage bill?
- 2) *Transparency:* Is civil service compensation clear and easy to understand?
- 3) *Fairness (equity):* Do equal jobs receive equal compensation?
- 4) *Competitiveness and adequacy:* How does civil service compensation compare to alternatives? Is it sufficient for a reasonable standard of living?

The focus on human resource reforms (chapter 6) addresses these key functions:

- How does the government undertake work force planning and establishment control?
- How are civil servants recruited, selected, and promoted?
- How are civil servants deployed, and what are the challenges in retaining public servants in the work force and in remote and poor areas?
- How does the government manage its staff for better performance through staff appraisals?

The focus on employment and pay in the education sector (chapter 7) examines these issues:

- How attractive is the teaching profession in Myanmar, and who enters the profession?
- How are teachers recruited, selected, promoted, retained, and deployed?
- How are teachers supervised and managed?
- How does the government undertake teacher work force planning, and what are the projected needs of teachers?
- How does the system for continuous professional development of teachers function, and what support and opportunities exist for teachers?

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<sup>8</sup> Myanmar formally calls itself the Republic of the Union of Myanmar; hence, “Union” refers to the government proper, while “union” is comparable to “central government level.”

7. **Based on the specific problems and findings identified by the review, recommendations for the Government of Myanmar are proposed in each chapter, based on a distinction between short, medium, and long-term options.** It is the prerogative of the Government to decide on the specific policy actions.

8. **While the review recognized that pensions will be a critical component in analyzing total compensation and, in particular, future fiscal liabilities, it has not been possible to factor pensions into the quantitative analysis.** The Government of Myanmar is considering reforms to its civil service pension scheme. The design and operation of pension systems are distinct, highly specialized areas that lie beyond the scope of this study. A deeper examination of the pension liabilities is also difficult because Myanmar's civil servants do not have individual identification numbers via which to record crucial information, such as date of birth and date of entry into the civil service. It would involve a considerable effort to clean and systematize the pension data in order to inform the wage bill forecasting model, and the potential liabilities that might be incurred by changes to the civil-service compensation system. The Government of Myanmar and the World Bank are also providing technical assistance to the Pension Department of MOPF. Several policy notes and training courses have been undertaken. A dialogue between the Government and the World Bank for a substantial support package is ongoing.

9. **The review also recognized that relations between central and local government levels constitute a centerpiece in Myanmar's efforts to redefine the organization of the public sector.** This will also have a profound bearing on key civil service functions, such as establishment control; work force planning; and authority to recruit, select, deploy, and promote civil servants at various sub-national levels. While there have been some efforts to delegate authority to the region and state levels to manage the Myanmar civil service, it is still in essence a deconcentrated service, with functions remaining centralized at the union level. Against this backdrop, the review did not explore in depth the relationship between central and local government in terms of pay, compensation, and HRM. However, as this relationship evolves, a deeper analysis of the implications for the civil service may be warranted.

10. **The review addressed the Government of Myanmar's ability to attract and retain public servants and looked less at motivation.** The review placed less emphasis on motivation for two key reasons. First, it is very difficult to establish how motivation works across different categories of civil servants. Second, the quality of compensation and HRM can serve as proxies for motivation. For example, it is fair to assume that a compensation package that is perceived as competitive, transparent, and fair would motivate the civil service work force. At the same time, motivation is not a guarantee of strong performance. A civil servant can be motivated, but perform badly (and vice versa). An unfair or uncompetitive pay system can be a source of dissatisfaction and thus affect performance, but the pay system is not the primary driver for improving motivation: factors that provide satisfaction are. For example, recognizing achievement, rewarding responsibility, offering opportunities to do meaningful work, and involving employees in decision making can engender employees with a sense of importance to an organization. The review focused less on these issues, which may be an area where more research is needed.

11. **The approach of the review has been to build Myanmar's ownership of the findings and develop capacity, underpinned by rigorous analysis.** The World Bank team was linked with a MOPF task team to identify focal points in each of the ministries in the Pay, Compensation and Human Resource Review Implementation Inter-Ministerial Committee. The World Bank team aimed to develop capacity in the Government of Myanmar to take on new approaches to pay, work force planning, and HRM. Several deliverables were produced in the process, such as training sessions and guidance notes on how to apply the customized pay and work force modeling tool in the budgeting process and in preparations for the MTFF. This helped build a mutual understanding between the Government of Myanmar and the World Bank team about

the data required for the analysis and to strengthen the systems for pay, compensation, and HRM. Moreover, the Government has reviewed this report of the review in such detail that it will be approved at Union Cabinet level. It is the first diagnostic review of the Myanmar civil service.

**12. The report is structured to answer the questions posed by the Government of Myanmar in its request for the review, concerning affordability, transparency, equity and fairness of pay and compensation, HRM, and management of the teacher work force.** Chapter 2 introduces the laws and bylaws that regulate the Myanmar civil service as well as its management structures. Chapter 3 examines the affordability of the wage bill through a review of public sector employment, the wage bill forecasting model, and payroll management. Chapter 4 analyzes the way Myanmar pays its civil servants by looking at the components of compensation (i.e., base pay, allowances, and benefits), guided by a standard World Bank framework. Following the analysis of these basic components, Chapter 5 uses them to analyze the competitiveness, transparency, and fairness of civil service compensation. Chapter 6 analyzes the functions of human resource planning, recruitment and selection, deployment and retention, promotion, and performance management in the Myanmar civil service. Chapter 7 takes a deeper look into the education sector and how the teacher work force functions and is managed. Chapter 8 summarizes the policy options that the Government of Myanmar might consider for the way forward.

**13. The report uses international English terminology.** The technical terms in this report are regularly used in specialist discussions of civil service and public sector issues. As Myanmar increasingly engages in international communities of practice, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) civil-service meetings and the Public Expenditure Management Network in Asia, it will be helpful to use this terminology. A glossary is available in annex 1.




# CHAPTER 2

## THE MYANMAR CIVIL SERVICE IN CONTEXT

14. This chapter briefly introduces the Myanmar civil service. It outlines the legal framework regulating the civil service, looks at the relevant national structures governing the public service, and briefly introduces the various civil service functions reviewed in detail in this report.<sup>9</sup> Chapter 2 presents the formal framework of the civil service, whereas the following chapters analyze implementation and actual practices.

15. Before exploring these specific questions, the universe of the public sector in Myanmar needs to be defined. Figure 1 shows the overall framework and universe for defining public sector employment, and how public sector employment is defined in Myanmar. The grey boxes in figure 1 are the focus of this report. As the Myanmar public service is, in essence, a deconcentrated service, the distinction between the central and sub-national levels is not highlighted in figure 1.

Figure 1: General framework of public employment and review coverage



Source: The World Bank and Myanmar's Central Statistical Office (CSO), employment data 2015. Data on the police came from budget forms 2C and 2D (FY 2015/2016).

<sup>9</sup> This chapter does not discuss the Myanmar civil service from a historical perspective. For an excellent account of this, see D. Hook, Tin Maung Than, and Kim N.B. Ninh, 2015, "Conceptualizing Public Sector Reform in Myanmar," chap. 1.

**16. The Public Service Personnel Act defines a public servant as any person serving as a permanent employee in a public sector organization.** This includes both normal civil service personnel (see figure 1) and health and education personnel. The military and police are not covered by the Act.<sup>10</sup>

## Governing laws and regulations of the civil service

**17. There are four key pieces of legislation regulating the civil service in Myanmar:** the Constitution (promulgated in 2008); the Law on the Union Civil Service Board (2010); the Public Service Personnel Act (2013); and Civil Service Rules and Regulations (hereafter, Civil Service Rules 2014), issued in 2014 to guide implementation of the Public Service Personnel Act. Several other pieces of legislation relating to public financial management, and to central and local government relations in particular, also have a bearing on the performance and incentives of the civil service. Annex 2 presents a brief overview of the relevant pieces of legislation, as they relate to HRM functions.

**18. A number of constitutional provisions are relevant to the public service.** Overall, these constitutional clauses lay the formal foundation for a meritocratic civil service, with special emphasis on the fact that civil servants should be politically neutral. The clauses include these specific directions:

- Civil servants should be politically neutral (clause 26a).
- The president appoints and dismisses the heads of the civil service bodies (clause 208).
- The president appoints the chair and members of UCSB, who are accountable to the president. The terms of the chair and members are normally the same as the president's (clause 246).
- Armed forces and police personnel (who are also civil servants) are governed by the relevant military and police laws (clauses 291 and 292).

**19. The Public Service Personnel Act is comprehensive and regulates all key human resources.** The functions as embodied in the law include recruitment and selection, appointment, right to pay and compensation (including leave and pension entitlements), retirement, promotion procedures, discipline and accountability measures, and learning and capacity development.

**20. The Act also codifies a unitary public service.** All employees of public sector organizations across different branches of government are classified as civil servants, whether working at union or sub-national levels, and in any capacity. However, civil servants are distinguished from the military and the police, which are not covered by the Public Service Personnel Act.

**21. The Act further classifies civil servants into two categories:** six grades of gazetted officers and seven grades of non-gazetted administrative staff. 13 levels of civil service positions (6 gazetted and 7 non-gazetted) were identified in accordance with Union Government Notification No. 13/2015 on 19th March 2015. The six grades of gazetted officers (in order of seniority) are 1) police chief, directors general (DGs), managing directors, etc.; 2) deputy police chief, deputy DGs and general managers; 3) directors and deputy general managers; 4) deputy directors and assistant general managers; 5) assistant directors and managers; and 6) staff officers and assistant managers, etc.

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<sup>10</sup> See Public Service Personnel Act, chap. 1, sec. 2e.

**22. The non-gazetted administrative staff supports the gazetted officers via these positions.** The grades from highest to lowest are 1) inspectors, introduced in FY 2015/2016,<sup>11</sup> and office superintendents (e.g., supervisors); 2) branch clerks (e.g., assistant supervisors); 3) senior clerks (e.g., senior technicians); junior clerks (e.g., junior technicians); 6) senior assistants; and 7) junior assistants.<sup>12</sup>

**23. The non-gazetted positions include not only administrative staff but also what one would call “blue collar” or service staff—such as cleaners, drivers, and cooks.**

**24. Civil Service Rules 2014 further clarifies the pay, compensation, and human resource functions.** Civil Service Rules 2014, approved at the cabinet level for managing the civil service, spells out in detail how the authority for HRM is to be exercised. For example, recruitment and appointment of gazetted positions are the responsibility of UCSB, while the recruitment process for non-gazetted officers is the responsibility of selection boards in individual agencies.<sup>13</sup> Based on the general clauses in the Public Service Personnel Act, the disciplinary and accountability measures for public servants are also delineated in Civil Service Rules 2014. The rules and regulations, in particular in the context of pay and compensation, are further discussed in the following chapters.

**25. The mandate and functions of UCSB is regulated through a specific law, yet by international standards the power of UCSB is relatively limited.** UCSB’s role and functions, as reflected in the 2010 UCSB Law (State Peace and Development Council Law No. 24/2010), are limited to recruitment, selection, training, and advising the Government of Myanmar on civil-service policy issues.

**26. Several other union ministries are also involved in the management of the civil service.** The Office of the President and the State Counselor’s Office (both ministry level), plus the Ministry of Home Affairs through its General Administrative Department<sup>14</sup> (GAD), play a leading role in carrying out the policy of administrative reform. MOPF has an important advisory role on pay levels and the organizational structures and staffing requirements of union ministries.

**27. The legal framework governing the civil service is clear and comprehensive.** However, the ambiguity of the overall governance framework—first and foremost, the relations between central and local government—affects the management of the civil service. For example, there is a lack of clarity regarding the authority for deconcentrated agencies to recruit and select staff. The grade system appears rational, but the inspector’s grade introduced in FY 2015/2016 is somewhat of an anomaly. This was a custom mini-grade, created just for this group of 5,000 officers in a civil service of over 1 million people.

## Relevant state structures for the management of the civil service

**28. The state administrative structure is set out in the Constitution.** The union level comprises 7 regions and 7 states, each with an average of 4-5 districts, for a total of 73 districts. Districts comprise, on average, 4-5 townships, with 330 townships in total. (Townships consist of wards and village tracts.) The administrative structure is illustrated in figure 2.

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
11 This new level was added in FY 2015/2016. It is said to encompass about 5,000 uniformed staff, mostly in the Ministry of Home Affairs and some state administrative offices, and includes such positions as local police officers and firearms instructors.

12 For a detailed overview of job titles for gazetted and non-gazetted staff by grade, see annex 4.

13 The human resource functions are further described and analyzed in chapter 6.

14 Predominantly at sub-national government levels.

Figure 2: The Structure of Myanmar’s union and sub-national administration



Source: Constitution (2008) and General Administration Department of the Ministry of Home Affairs (2017)

Note: Nay Pyi Taw is the capital of Myanmar.

**29. According to the 2008 Constitution, the members of the Government of Myanmar consist of the president of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, vice presidents, union ministers, and the attorney general.** In 2016, the members of government include the president, two vice presidents, the state counselor, 22 ministers, the attorney-general, and the chair of UCSB. The powers of the Union Government are codified in the Constitution.

**30. The president, as head of the government, takes ultimate responsibility for the functioning of government ministries.** The 2008 Constitution stipulates that three ministries report not to the president but to the commander of the armed forces: the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the Ministry of Border Affairs. A ministry is led by a high-ranking political appointee, the minister. One or more vice ministers can be appointed for their professional and technical skills. A permanent secretary system was re-introduced in 2015, after being abolished in 1962.

**31. Ministries are established on a functional basis and are organized into several departments, each one led by a director general or managing director responsible for an aspect of the ministry’s work.** Most of the permanent secretaries were elevated from director general positions. A large ministry, such as the Ministry of Education, includes departments for basic and higher education. The departments, where most of the work of government gets done, are further divided into divisions, branches, and sections. (Figure 3 lists all the ministries.)

Figure 3: Union Government ministries and offices

Ministries	
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Ministry of Electricity and Energy
Ministry of President's Office	Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population
Ministry of Home Affairs	Ministry of Industry
Ministry of Defense	Ministry of Commerce
Ministry of Border Affairs	Ministry of Education
Ministry of State Counsellor's Office	Ministry of Health and Sports
Ministry of Information	Ministry of Planning and Finance
Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture	Ministry of Construction
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation	Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement
Ministry of Transport and Communications	Ministry of Hotel and Tourism
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation	Ministry of Ethnic Affairs

Source: Ministry of Planning and Finance.

**32. Regions, states, districts, and townships are, in essence, deconcentrated levels of the Union Government and thus, as sub-national entities, do not have their own civil services.** GAD in the Ministry of Home Affairs runs an office in every region and state, known as the Government Office. This office supports region and state governments with public administration. Union ministries also have offices at the region and state level.

**33. The overall picture is that line ministries and even departments within ministries have considerable latitude to manage their own affairs, constrained only by rudimentary systems and central procedures, whose scope is more limited than in many countries.** The authority for the management of civil service functions are spread across several agencies.

**34. Roles and responsibilities of authorities for civil servant recruitment and structures lie mainly in the higher levels of government. The president and Union Government have these responsibilities:**

- Appoint the chair and members of UCSB
- Determine ministry and agency structures (Based on the advice from MOPF, the Union Government can make decisions on ministry and agency structures.)
- Approve requests from agencies for new posts and to fill vacancies, based on advice from MOPF.

Parliament has no explicit role, but has used its authority in the last few years to increase civil servants' pay and recommend that national civil-service entry examinations be conducted in regions and states, not just in Nay Pyi Taw.

MOPF advises on proposals with implications for the payroll and acts as accounting officer on payroll matters.

## UCSB

- Recruits for staff officer posts
- Approves agencies' promotion proposals for gazetted officers
- Assists the government in matters relating to the civil service
- Administers rules and regulations relating to all civil servants
- Provides basic training in order to improve skills of civil servants

Line ministries and agencies<sup>15</sup> initiate staffing requests to the Office of the President, including job descriptions, and manage their staffs' performance, promotion, and discipline.

The Ministry of Home Affairs and GAD play a key coordinating role in a public administration that is fragmented across the ministries at sub-national levels, and they are responsible for the appointment of administrators to the country's 330 townships.

**35. Ministries have a standard hierarchy up to the level of director general; one of the directors general is appointed as a permanent secretary-cum-director general in the union minister's office.** Since ministerial posts are political appointments by definition, this means that the president has personal authority over the administration, which is at variance with the classic doctrine of separation between politics and administration. However, in practice, ministers rely on advice from their permanent secretaries and directors general.

**36. The above structure of authority translates roughly into the following division of labor in terms of managing the civil service:**

- *Establishment control:* A ministry wishing to increase its establishment applies directly to the Office of the President and the Planning Department in MOPF. This creates situations where the Budget Department in MOPF hears of a change in a ministry's establishment only after the authorization to fill the position has been given.
- *Recruitment:* Line agencies determine their own staffing needs and make proposals to the Union Government with accompanying comments/remarks from the Ministry of Planning and Finance. They then recruit their own staff, apart from the "gazetted officer" posts which are UCSB's responsibility. Recruited non-gazetted and gazetted staff are registered at the Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population.
- *Pay and compensation:* Preparation of revisions to pay scales is a responsibility of the Budget Department in MOPF. The Cabinet submits the proposal (through annual budgets) to Parliament, which then discusses and approves the budget bill.
- *Promotion:* Line departments and agencies have the authority to promote personnel, subject to compliance with the general guidelines in Civil Service Rules 2014, right up to the level of director general. Directors general are appointed by the ministers and their deputy ministers. According to the 2008 Constitution, the President shall appoint and dismiss heads of civil service bodies. UCSB's role is merely to ensure that the rules have been followed.
- *Training and learning:* UCSB has the remit for training across the civil service. Its main activity is pre-service training for new civil servants. It is also tasked with in-service training and carries out a limited program. Some agencies have their own training arrangements. MOPF has established a public finance academy, while GAD and the Planning Department in the Ministry of Home Affairs have their own training centers.

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<sup>15</sup> See *Civil Service Rules and Regulations 2014*, chapter 3-4 and 15-20 in particular.



37. Overall, three points concerning the Myanmar civil service are significant. First, there is no single central agency responsible for civil service management in Myanmar. Functions are performed across several agencies. In practice, line agencies have a great deal of practical autonomy to a degree that is unusual, although not unique. (For example, Indonesia, Morocco, and Namibia have similar arrangements.) As such, the authority for HRM is centralized, yet fragmented, at the union level. Second, basic systems—such as consolidated, centralized pay roll management and an HRM system—for civil service management are not in place, which is only to be expected in view of Myanmar’s development level and history.

# CHAPTER 3

## HOW AFFORDABLE IS MYANMAR'S WAGE BILL?

**38. The overall size of the public-sector wage bill has important implications for fiscal policy in all countries.** In particular, the share of the wage bill in total government expenditure can impact a government's ability to implement counter-cyclical policies. Upward or downward adjustments to government spending during periods of economic recession or boom, respectively, become more difficult if nondiscretionary spending on wages consumes a large share of total expenditure. It is, of course, not impossible to adjust the wage bill (e.g., through hiring freezes, nominal wage cuts, and potential retrenchments), but this is usually the last resort when it comes to budget consolidation.

**39. Although the size of the wage bill is not an immediate concern for Myanmar, there are growing fiscal vulnerabilities from external shocks that call for closer attention to the overall growth in the public-sector wage bill.** Since FY 2015/2016, the Government of Myanmar has faced significant fiscal pressures, linked to declining commodity prices and prolonged pressures on the exchange rate. Gas receipts, which account for 15-20 percent of general government revenue, declined by an estimated 0.3 percentage points of gross domestic product (GDP) between FY 2014/2015 and FY 2015/2016. The weakening of the Myanmar kyat (MMK), on the other hand, increased operational costs in the power sector, requiring an estimated 0.7 percent of GDP in additional subsidies. These external pressures were exacerbated by growing losses amongst state economic enterprises outside of the power sector.

**40. In light of these developments, the public-sector deficit expanded from an estimated 1.1 percent of GDP in FY 2014/2015 to 3.2 percent in FY 2015/2016.** This in turn contributed to a sharp rise in inflationary financing of the deficit by the Central Bank of Myanmar, due to a lack of financing options. To deal with these challenges, the Government of Myanmar has made significant adjustments on the expenditure side, particularly on public investment, while trying to protect priority spending on education, health, and agriculture. After a 45 percent, nominal increase to the wage bill in FY 2014/2015—linked to higher pay and compensation and hiring of education and health workers—wage bill growth stabilized at 5 percent in nominal terms in FY 2015/2016.


**41. The size of the public-sector wage bill in Myanmar is comparatively low in international terms, at 3.5 percent of GDP in FY 2015/2016<sup>16</sup>** (see figure 4). This finding, however, should be interpreted cautiously, as international wage bill comparisons are fraught with difficulties. Firstly, to compare across countries, a common definition of the public wage bill is needed to ensure consistency. The general government wage bill<sup>17</sup> is the most commonly used definition, but many countries do not follow it. In Myanmar, for example, the armed forces and daily wage workers are not included, which artificially lowers the true size of the wage bill in international comparisons. Secondly, there is no universally accepted “correct” size of the public sector. The functions, size, geography, administration, and policies of a government differ across countries, which makes meaningful comparisons difficult without controlling for these factors. Thirdly, since GDP is calculated from the baseline prices of a weighted consumption basket, revising the year of the baseline prices can significantly increase the estimation of GDP. In this case, the wage bill to GDP percentage would be significantly lowered,

<sup>16</sup> IMF Article IV, 2015.

<sup>17</sup> “The general government sector consists of resident institutional units that fulfill the functions of government as their primary activity” (IMF Article IV, 2014).

although in reality the true impact on the budget would remain the same. For this reason, the wage bill as a percent of total expenditure may be a more appropriate comparator to denote the true resource constraint.<sup>18</sup> Finally, the size of the wage bill should not be considered in isolation from its impact on the overall budget balance.

Figure 4: Comparison of international wage bills, 2014 (percent of GDP)



\* 2013.

\*\* 2015.


Sources: IMF Government Finance Statistics Manual and IMF Article IV.

**42. The size of the wage bill has, however, grown significantly in recent years.** Starting from a low level in FY 2011/2012, the wage bill jumped significantly from FY year 2014/2015 to FY 2015/2016, due to increases in the base salary and other monetary earnings, including the regional allowance. (These changes are discussed in more detail in chapter 4.) With this latest increase, the wage bill has in total nearly tripled as a percentage of GDP and doubled as a percentage of total revenues and total expenditures during the past five years (figure 5). This pace of growth may not be sustainable in future years. Research by Eckardt and Mills in 2014<sup>19</sup> showed that growth in the wage bill over time is a much more significant determinant of a government’s budget deficit than the size of the wage bill in any given year. Therefore, this finding reinforces the importance of restraining excessive growth of the wage bill to meet the fiscal targets identified from the Government of Myanmar’s MTF.

18 See E. Baddock, P. Lang, and V. Srivastava, 2015, “Size of the Wage Bill: Government Wage Bill and Employment,” for additional challenges in measuring the public sector wage bill.

19 S. Eckardt and Z. Mills, 2014, “What Goes Up Must Come Down: Cyclicity in Public Wage Bill Spending.”

Figure 5: Wage bill growth in Myanmar, FY 2011/2012 to FY 2015/2016 (percent)




Source: IMF Article IV, 2015.

43. The majority of public employment is concentrated in the Ministries of Education, Home Affairs, and Health (see figure 6), which collectively accounted for 58.6 percent of the 1,104,960 recorded staff at the union, region, and state levels in FY 2014/2015.<sup>20</sup> The Ministry of Education had 442,807 employees; the Ministry of Home Affairs, 120,027 employees; and the Ministry of Health, 85,700 employees. Fifty-five percent of the total work force is female.

<sup>20</sup> Contract, temporary, and daily workers are not included.

## Public sector employment


Figure 6: Public employment in Myanmar, FY 2015/2016



Notes: This data was received from the CSO. The total number of employees for the non-civilian defense sector was not provided. Data in bottom graph line “other” include employees of the Ministries of Commerce, Ethnic Affairs, Hotel and Tourism, Foreign Affairs, Social Welfare, Border Affairs, Commerce, Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation, Religious Affairs and Culture, Construction, and Information.

44. **The overall size of the public work force has grown by approximately 10 percent since 2011** (see figure 7). The majority of this growth occurred in the service delivery sectors, such as the Ministries of Education and Health, which coincided with the priorities set by the 2011 Union Government after elections. Most of the growth has occurred in the last two years and has been consistent across ministries and state administrative organizations.<sup>21</sup>

Figure 7: Employment in ministries and state administrative organizations, 2011-2015



Source: CSO

21 State administrative organizations include UCSB, the attorney general’s office, the auditor general, and the Supreme Court.

**45. Almost all public employees are in non-gazetted or non-management posts, which comprise 92 percent of total employment.** This data was derived from budget forms 2C and 2D, which are the provisional budget estimates submitted by each government department for their anticipated staff at the union level for FY 2016/2017. (Region and state employees are not included.) Gazetted posts for senior managers and technical staff have significantly higher pay and follow a different recruitment process. The minimum monthly basic salaries are provided for the different grades in table 1, but additional compensation is provided through pay increments and allowances, which is detailed in chapter 5.

Table 1: Employment by base pay grade, FY 2015/2016

Type	Sample job title	No. of staff	Monthly base salary (in MMK)
<b>Gazetted posts</b>	Director general/managing director	268	500,000
	Deputy director general/general manager	833	380,000
	Director/deputy general manager	2,908	340,000
	Deputy director/assistant general manager	7,308	310,000
	Assistant director/manager	18,279	280,000
	Staff officer/assistant manager	43,682	250,000
<b>Non-gazetted posts</b>	Inspector (new level as of FY 2015/2016)	5,073	210,000
	Office superintendent/supervisor	25,564	195,000
	Branch clerk/assistant supervisor	99,842	180,000
	Upper division clerk/technician (grade 6)	279,802	165,000
	Lower division clerk/technician (grade 4)	284,656	150,000
	Record keeper/head peon	66,433	135,000
	Peon/sweeper	134,626	120,000
<b>Total</b>		<b>969,274</b>	


Source: MOPF, budget forms 2C and 2D, FY 2015/16.

Note: The data are provisional and do not include employees at the region or state levels, which is why the total number of employees is lower than the CSO employee data.


**46. There are no immediate indications that the wage bill is crowding out other expenditures, even though recent fiscal pressures have prompted consolidation of capital spending.** An accurate assessment of the wage bill impact on other expenditures is complicated by the lack of breakdown on defense wage expenditure, which is grouped together under “other recurrent” expenditure in figures 8-11. The non-defense wage bill for all ministries in Myanmar was estimated at around MMK 1.7 trillion, in a total budgeted expenditure of MMK 11.7 trillion, around 14 percent (figure 8). The share of the wage bill in total expenditure has steadily increased (figure 9) and has been an important part of overall spending growth (figure 10). However, even if it is generously assumed that the defense wage bill accounts for around 40 percent of other recurrent expenditure, stable sources of revenue (i.e., excluding oil and gas, and one-off payments) are sufficient to cover wage bill, pensions, and interest payments (nondiscretionary spending in figure 11). In other words, there seems to be some fiscal space within stable sources of revenue (also excluding financing items) for discretionary items of expenditure.




**Figure 8:** Breakdown of ministries' expenditure (in billions of MMK)




**Figure 9:** Breakdown of ministries' expenditure (% share)



**Figure 10:** Expenditure breakdown - contribution to growth (%)



**Figure 11:** Nondiscretionary spending vs. recurrent revenue (% of GDP)



Source: MOPF and World Bank staff estimates.

## Wage bill forecasting model

47. To help the Government of Myanmar strengthen its fiscal estimates of wage expenditures and inform key policy decisions, the World Bank and the MOPF Budget Department jointly developed a **wage bill forecasting model**. This forecasting tool will allow policy makers to accurately forecast the fiscal impact of changes in pay policy and employment, and allow authorities to consider different policy options to attain the proposed wage bill to GDP, domestic revenues, or public expenditure targets by a given year. The wage bill in Myanmar is a growing expenditure item in the budget; thus, its size and trend have a significant impact on the budget balance, public debt levels, and other macroeconomic indicators. The model builds upon

previous wage-bill development work that the World Bank has supported in other countries and was specially customized for the Myanmar civil-service pay structure. It is designed to be easy to use and can accommodate allowances, benefits, pay steps or increments, income tax, and pension contributions in its calculations. It will allow authorities to consider different policy options to attain the proposed wage bill target within MTF, and will also allow for more informed decision making in the following trade-offs:

- Higher pay versus higher levels of employment
- Higher wage bill versus more operational and maintenance expenditures
- Across-the-board wage increases versus more targeted wage increases

**48. The model is derived from the budget estimates in budget form 2C, which is the best payroll data that can currently be collected.** This form contains the total number of staff in each pay grade and the corresponding minimum base salary. Individual payroll records are currently not widely available, so the model had to use bulk estimates for each pay grade category. As a consequence, it was not possible to model changes at the individual level or actual basic salaries (including pay increments) and allowances at this stage.

**49. The wage bill forecasting model has progressed in development and now incorporates wage bill data from all 22 ministries (see box 1).** The development of the model was a lengthy process and significantly benefited from inputs and collaboration with the Government of Myanmar. The formation of the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Pay, Compensation, and Human Resource Management in December 2015 provided leadership and greatly advanced payroll data collection by the seven pilot ministries.<sup>22</sup> The Government task force team also provided continuous support to collect payroll data from the remaining ministries and to help the World Bank team understand the nuances of the payroll data and payroll management.

**Box 1:** Timeline for developing Myanmar's customized wage bill model

- **August 2015:** Training on "generic" version of wage bill model
- **December 2015:** Inter-ministerial Committee on Pay, Compensation, and Human Resource Management created
- **March 2016:** 1st Myanmar model version plus training
  - Available data cover 389,733 employees in the Ministry of Education Department of Basic Education
- **May 2016:** 2nd Myanmar model version plus training
  - Available data cover 435,932 employees in four of seven pilot ministries
  - Pilot of individual-level model\* (200 staff in MPOF Budget Department)
- **August 2016:** 3rd Myanmar model version plus training
  - Available data cover 630,000 employees from all seven pilot ministries
- **September 2016:** 4th Myanmar model version
  - Coverage of all 22 ministries, totaling 969,274 employees

\* The MOPF Budget Department provided individual payroll data that included actual base salary (including pay increments), date of birth, and date of entry into current post.

<sup>22</sup> The Inter-Ministerial Committee comprised representatives from MOF, MNPED, UCSB, Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Home Affairs, and Ministry of Labour, Employment, and Social Affairs.

50. For pay and employment increases, the model gives the flexibility to input across-the-board increases or distinct increases by each or any pay grade. In a hypothetical example (figure 12), if the Ministry of Education added 100,000 new teachers (20,000 high school teachers, 32,000 middle school teachers, and 48,000 primary teachers) over the next four years, holding all other staffing and pay policies constant, the model shows that the fiscal impact would be MMK 48.24 billion per year extra in base salary.

Figure 12: Hypothetical scenario if the Ministry of Education recruited 100,000 new teachers

Grade	Sample job title (Department/Enterprise)	Number of Staff	Monthly Basic Salary (average per employee)	2015-16 Monthly Basic Salary Expenditure (baseline)	Modeling: Changes in Staff Numbers				
					2016-17	2017-18	2018-19	2019-20	2020-21
		969,274	162,755	157,754,535,000					
13	Director General/ Managing Director	268	500,000	134,000,000					
12	Deputy Director General/ General Manager	833	380,000	316,540,000					
11	Director/ Deputy General Manager	2,908	340,000	988,720,000					
10	Deputy Director/ Assistant General Manager	7,308	310,000	2,265,480,000					
9	Assistant Director/ Manager	18,279	280,000	5,118,120,000					
8	Staff Officer/ Assistant Manager	43,682	250,000	10,920,500,000					
7	New level as of FY 2015-16	5,073	210,000	1,065,330,000					
6	Office Superintendent/ Supervisor	25,564	195,000	4,984,980,000					
5	Branch Clerk/ Assistant Supervisor	99,842	180,000	17,971,560,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	
4	Upper Division Clerk/ Technician grade (6)	279,802	165,000	46,167,330,000	8,000	8,000	8,000	8,000	
3	Lower Division Clerk/ Technician grade (4)	284,656	150,000	42,698,400,000	12,000	12,000	12,000	12,000	
2	Record Keeper/ Head Peon	66,433	135,000	8,968,455,000					
1	Peon/ Sweeper	134,626	120,000	16,155,120,000					

Type	2015-16 (baseline)	2016-17	2017-18	2018-19	2019-20	2020-21
Basic Salary Expenditures	1,893,054,420,000	1,941,294,420,000	1,989,534,420,000	2,037,774,420,000	2,086,014,420,000	2,086,014,420,000
Increments to Base Salary	--	12,804,192,000	25,608,384,000	38,412,576,000	51,216,768,000	64,020,960,000
Regional Allowance	8,859,516,000	8,859,516,000	8,859,516,000	8,859,516,000	8,859,516,000	8,859,516,000
Other Allowances	40,127,160,000	40,127,160,000	40,127,160,000	40,127,160,000	40,127,160,000	40,127,160,000
Military Wage Bill Expenditures						
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,942,041,096,000</b>	<b>2,003,085,288,000</b>	<b>2,064,129,480,000</b>	<b>2,125,173,672,000</b>	<b>2,186,217,864,000</b>	<b>2,199,022,056,000</b>

51. The model gives the flexibility to experiment with many different scenarios. In another hypothetical example (figure 13), if base pay was increased by 10 percent for each of the next five years, the fiscal impact would be MMK 3.25 trillion over the period. The fiscal implications from any combination of pay and staffing changes are possible through the model and should be aligned with M'TFF targets.

Figure 13: Hypothetical scenario of a 10 percent increase in base salary

Type	Grade	Sample job title (Department/Enterprise)	Number of Staff	Monthly Basic Salary (average per employee)	2015-16 Monthly Basic Salary Expenditure (baseline)	Modeling: Pay Increases to Basic Salary				
						2016-17	2017-18	2018-19	2019-20	2020-21
			969,274	162,755	157,754,535,000	10%	10%	10%	10%	10%
Gazetted Posts	13	Director General/ Managing Director	268	500,000	134,000,000					
	12	Deputy Director General/ General Manager	833	380,000	316,540,000					
	11	Director/ Deputy General Manager	2,908	340,000	988,720,000					
	10	Deputy Director/ Assistant General Manager	7,308	310,000	2,265,480,000					
	9	Assistant Director/ Manager	18,279	280,000	5,118,120,000					
	8	Staff Officer/ Assistant Manager	43,682	250,000	10,920,500,000					
Non-Gazetted Posts	7	New level as of FY 2015-16	5,073	210,000	1,065,330,000					
	6	Office Superintendent/ Supervisor	25,564	195,000	4,984,980,000					
	5	Branch Clerk/ Assistant Supervisor	99,842	180,000	17,971,560,000					
	4	Upper Division Clerk/ Technician grade (6)	279,802	165,000	46,167,330,000					
	3	Lower Division Clerk/ Technician grade (4)	284,656	150,000	42,698,400,000					
	2	Record Keeper/ Head Peon	66,433	135,000	8,968,455,000					
	1	Peon/ Sweeper	134,626	120,000	16,155,120,000					

Type	2015-16 (baseline)	2016-17	2017-18	2018-19	2019-20	2020-21
Basic Salary Expenditures	1,893,054,420,000	2,082,359,862,000	2,290,595,848,200	2,519,655,433,020	2,771,620,976,322	3,048,783,073,954
Increments to Base Salary	--	13,754,611,200	28,884,683,520	45,527,763,072	63,835,150,579	82,142,538,086
Regional Allowance	8,859,516,000	8,859,516,000	8,859,516,000	8,859,516,000	8,859,516,000	8,859,516,000
Other Allowances	40,127,160,000	40,127,160,000	40,127,160,000	40,127,160,000	40,127,160,000	40,127,160,000
Military Wage Bill Expenditures						
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,942,041,096,000</b>	<b>2,145,101,149,200</b>	<b>2,368,467,207,720</b>	<b>2,614,169,872,092</b>	<b>2,884,442,802,901</b>	<b>3,179,912,288,041</b>

52. Multiple training sessions were held on the model and a training manual was developed and translated into Myanmar language. The model will be handed over to MOPF with government staff trained to use it, completing a critical objective of building the model. Each stage of the model's development was shared with the Government's team. The training sessions provided numerous practice examples and hands-on training to all participants. Additional training was provided on Microsoft Excel and Pivot tables. The training manual contains detailed instructions on how to build, update, and use the forecasting model for policy decision making.

## Recommendations for managing the wage bill and the work force

53. **RECOMMENDATION 3.1: The wage-bill forecasting model could be integrated into joint work of the Government of Myanmar and World Bank on strengthening the medium-term fiscal framework.** The wage-bill forecasting model provides a more robust methodology than the existing practice of estimating future wage expenditures, which rely on simple percentage increases to the overall wage bill. The MTFE task force received training, and more training is available if requested.

54. A more robust wage-bill forecasting model could be developed if individual employee payroll data was collected more systematically.<sup>23</sup> The individual-level model will enable the Government of Myanmar to 1) forecast the wage bill with even greater accuracy than is possible with the existing version of the model, and 2) undertake certain aspects of human resource planning. Specifically, model users could easily analyze the age profile, time-in-post, increment costs, and expected retirement dates of civil servants (by department, grade, and possibly also by job title), and develop appropriate plans to cope with these factors. Sector-specific

23 These data include 1) job title; 2) date of birth; 3) date of hire in civil service; 4) date of hire for current post; 5) current base salary, including pay increment; and, 6) if applicable, regional allowance for hardship area.

models could also be created, for example, to assist with work force planning in the Ministry of Education, which would allow the Ministry to appropriately plan recruitment and distribution of teachers within their budget ceiling over the medium term.

## Payroll management

**55. At this stage, however, collecting individual employee data is challenging because payroll data is highly fragmented across Myanmar’s civil service.** Currently, there is no centralized database that contains individual payroll data. Each department in each ministry currently collects the wage bill data for budget form 2C, but this data is highly aggregated and not consolidated, even at the ministerial level. Important details, such as job titles, physical location of staff, retirement date, etc., are not captured, which makes it difficult to build the wage-bill forecasting model, conduct payroll audits, and undertake wage bill analysis.

**56. RECOMMENDATION 3.2: Department-level wage bill reports could be consolidated into one central database, which could be located at MOPF (for budget control) and GAD (for human resource planning).** For this regular reporting to occur, a uniform template will be necessary to ensure consistency. The World Bank proposed a template for the Government of Myanmar to consider, which would initially capture the information shown in figure 14.

Figure 14: Proposed template for collecting individual-level payroll data

Employee name	Ministry	Department	Section	Job title	Job location	Date of birth
xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx
Gender and education	Date of hire	Date of hire in current position	Official pay grade	Actual base salary, including increments		Regional allowance
xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx		xxx

MOPF could issue instructions to ensure that this individual-level payroll data is systematically collected in tandem with other monthly expenditure-reporting requirements. The Government of Myanmar would also need to consider how information would be stored efficiently, who would have access to it, and how regularly it would be updated.

**57. RECOMMENDATION 3.3: The Government of Myanmar could also consider introducing an electronic centralized payroll system.** A centralized system would capture the complete payroll data and have controls to minimize possibility of errors. The benefits would also include efficiency gains by automating manual tasks, improving capacity to conduct payroll audits, and providing greater ability to conduct wage bill analysis and both wage bill and pension forecasts. There are two main components of centralized payroll systems: personnel registry and payroll database. These databases are usually linked with other systems, such as HRMIS and FMIS, to maximize the benefits. A number of functional modules are included in the design of these systems to support operational requirements.

**58. A comprehensive needs assessment is the first step to automate the registration of personnel and collection of payroll data.** The needs assessment helps to further understand current practices and the legal and regulatory framework, identify gaps, and design a robust platform designed to meet the needs of Myanmar.

**59. The second step is usually to introduce a unique personnel identification (ID) for each civil servant, either by using one of the existing ID management systems (such as the national ID, voter ID, or tax ID) or by designing a new identifier.** This ID would stay with employees for their entire career, regardless of whether they switched ministries or departments. These IDs would be the linking identifier in the personnel registry to consistently record and maintain relevant data. The proper management of this registry—including its integrity, security, and reliability—is more important than its creation. If it is possible to develop a web-based centralized solution (benefiting from existing infrastructure) for the personnel registry and payroll database, this may reduce the complexity of proposed solutions. A decision on the introduction of unique personnel ID can be taken after a rapid assessment of existing ID management systems.<sup>24</sup>

**60. It is not, however, a trivial task to collect individual-level employee data and distribute ID cards for the initial creation of the personnel registry.** The collection of this data will be time intensive at first, but will become much easier; the payroll database can then be updated to reflect changes from month to month. This process could be automated with a properly designed system. Properly trained staff plus the necessary oversight mechanisms and funding are critical to ensure the sustainability of such a system.

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<sup>24</sup> The rapid assessment can be done using the Identification Management Systems Analysis tool that has been developed by the Identification for Development program. A World Bank team initiated such an assessment for Myanmar in autumn 2016, working with the Ministry of Labor, Immigration, and Population.



# CHAPTER 4

## HOW DOES MYANMAR PAY ITS CIVIL SERVANTS?

### Introduction of civil service compensation

**61. As Myanmar embarked on far-ranging reforms in recent years, changes in the public sector have extended to the structure and level of compensation for civil servants.** For four decades, the Government of Myanmar rarely updated its civil service base salary scale.<sup>25</sup> Since 2011, the Government has made more frequent adjustments to the base salary scale and to other aspects of compensation. This shift has opened up a discussion that involves four issues at the heart of compensation policy for any government: affordability, competitiveness, fairness (equity), and transparency:

- *Affordability*: How affordable is the present compensation system and any changes that may be considered for the future?
- *Competitiveness*: Does civil service compensation help attract and retain the skills that government needs? How does it compare to “real world” alternatives? Is it adequate, given the economic context?
- *Fairness (equity)*: Do equivalent jobs receive equivalent compensation?
- *Transparency*: Is civil service compensation clear and easy to understand?

**62. This report analyzes these issues, in an environment where data are often scarce or trapped in hard-to-access paper records.** Chapter 3 addresses the affordability theme, examining the “fiscal weight” of personnel-related expenditures and presenting a tool for modeling the fiscal impact of changes to the base salary scale. This chapter sets the stage by presenting the compensation system in effect at the time of the review (FY 2015/2016), and chapter 5 then tackles the three remaining themes: competitiveness, fairness, and transparency. This analysis leads to options proposed for improving Myanmar’s system in ways big and small, from near-term and longer-term perspectives.

### A few words about terminology

**63. As explained in the introductory chapter, this report uses international English terminology.** The technical terms in this text are regularly used in specialist discussions of civil service, public administration, and human resource issues, and in similar studies in other countries. However, within Myanmar, certain English words have acquired idiosyncratic meanings. Where possible, we point out such differences in the text, so that Myanmar readers can adjust to the international terminology. The report also includes a glossary that explains the meaning of common terms used for civil service and public sector issues (see annex 1).

**64. Two terms in particular require the attention of readers in Myanmar.** First, in this report, the word “compensation” has the meaning used in the field of HRM: “the total amount of the monetary and non-monetary pay provided to an employee by an employer in return for work performed as required. Essentially, it’s

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<sup>25</sup> From 1972 to 2010, the base salary scale was adjusted only five times—in 1972, 1989, 1993, 2000, and 2006. The next change, in 2011, marked the start of more frequent adjustments to base salary and other components of compensation.

a combination of your pay, vacation, bonuses, health insurance, and any other perk you may receive.”<sup>26</sup> Another English word that expresses essentially the same concept is “remuneration.” In Myanmar, however, the English word “compensation” is often associated with pensions and severance pay.<sup>27</sup> Second, Myanmar speakers of English often use the word “facilities” to refer to what, in standard English, is more typically called “in-kind” or “nonmonetary” compensation (i.e., something provided as material goods or services rather than money.) This report refers to vehicles, fuel, housing, and other goods or services that are provided to civil servants on a regular basis, as part of their employment, as “in-kind” or “nonmonetary” allowances.

## A simple analytical framework that helps explain compensation

**65. To understand and evaluate formal compensation in any country, a clear analytical framework is helpful. This ensures a shared understanding for all readers.** It also brings in international practice, including concepts and terminology that may differ from Myanmar conventions. Furthermore, clear and consistent use of concepts and terminology will help in making comparisons between Myanmar’s situation and international practice in general or other countries specifically.

**66. The foundation for the Myanmar compensation review is an analytical framework that the World Bank regularly uses in countries around the world.** Table 2 presents this framework, including some examples. It is important to note that these are examples, not necessarily recommendations. In fact, an overly complicated compensation structure with an excessive number of (or highly varied) allowances and in-kind benefits is difficult to manage.<sup>28</sup> It also does not satisfy important criteria such as transparency and fairness. Furthermore, an overly complex compensation system poses challenges for budget management, since some personnel-related expenditures may be hidden and difficult to control.

**67. As the analytical framework illustrates, compensation includes more than just base salary.** In many developing countries, including Myanmar, discussion of compensation focuses narrowly on base salary. However, the analytical framework and this review recognize that compensation has a number of components in addition to base salary, such as allowances, benefits, and other intangible factors. Some components are provided in monetary form (such as Myanmar’s regional allowance for hardship areas), while others are provided in kind (free or subsidized housing). Benefits that are often found in the public sector include annual leave and sick leave. Some parts of compensation are provided now, while others are expected in future (most notably, pensions). Additionally, intangible factors that are not money, goods, or services can also add to a job’s attractiveness. These include the prestige of being a civil servant, and job security. It is important to consider all these different components in order to have the best possible understanding of total compensation.

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26 See the definition from S. Heathfield, 2016, “How Is Compensation Determined for an Employee? Understanding Your Job Offer or Current Compensation,” online at <https://www.thebalance.com/compensation-definition-and-inclusions-1918085>.

27 Specifically, government regulations specify a “compensation pension.” As the World Bank’s pension team points out, this is in fact “a form of severance pay rather than a source of income support in old age. It has been utilized in the process of privatization and downsizing of government enterprises. The beneficiaries now represent a significant and potentially growing share of the total pensioner population” (World Bank, 2014, “Myanmar Civil Service Pension Reform”)

28 South Korea is an example of good practice, in contrast to Indonesia’s more complicated system.

Table 2: Analytical framework of common components of public sector compensation

		Explicitly agreed (contract, regulations, etc.)		Associated intangible factors
		Monetary	In-kind (non-monetary)	
Current	Base	Base wage/salary	Examples: health insurance, employers' pension contributions	Examples: job security, prestige, professional trips abroad, training, secondary employment opportunities
	Allowances	Examples: housing, telephone, hazard pay, cost of living	Examples: subsidized housing, meals, transportation, mobile telephone airtime	
	Benefits		Annual leave, sick leave	
Future expectations		Pension	Examples: housing, land	Examples: reputation, re-employment after retirement, job opportunities elsewhere

Source: Developed on the basis of <http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/civilservice/Mayseminar/Mukherjee.pdf>.

**68. The analytical framework does not address informal or illicit income, and neither does this review.** Informal income refers to extra payments or gifts that may, in some countries, be customary in certain situations (e.g., a small gift to a teacher).<sup>29</sup> In contrast, illicit income is obtained in violation of formal rules and ethics standards governing the workplace.

**69. Informal compensation is an important issue, and every government should take steps to sanction and eliminate its illicit forms.** This topic was, however, outside the scope of the review, the first in-depth examination of Myanmar's formal civil service compensation system.

## Myanmar's current civil-service compensation system

**70. The analytical framework guides this report's discussion of Myanmar's civil-service compensation system.** Table 3 presents an overview of the main components of compensation, and annex 2 describes each of the main entitlements in more detail. This information is drawn from the World Bank team's review of official regulations issued by the Ministry of Finance or other union-level bodies, and Civil Service Rules 2014. (A full list of documents consulted is available in annex 3.)

<sup>29</sup> For an example of informal practices elsewhere, see World Bank, 2015, "Lao PDR Civil Service Pay and Compensation Review: Attracting and Motivating Civil Servants."

71. **Table 3 does not capture other, more localized, practices.** It is possible that the management of an individual ministry, department, agency, or other unit decides on additional compensation practices. Information from interviews indicates that such practices do exist, ranging in value from fairly modest to significant compensation arrangements. More generally, several individuals who were interviewed for this study shared the perception that “rich” institutions provide more to their employees than other, less well-resourced bodies.

**Table 3:** Main components of compensation in Myanmar’s civil service (2015)

		Explicitly agreed (contract, regulations, etc.)		Associated intangible factors and opportunities for some (not all) staff
		Monetary	In-kind allowances and operational expenses	
Current	<b>Base</b>	Base salary	Free medical care for certain positions or bodies <sup>30</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Job security, stability</li> <li>• Prestige</li> <li>• Domestic or international training</li> <li>• Work-related travel abroad</li> <li>• Scholarships</li> <li>• Opportunities for secondary employment</li> </ul>
	<b>Allowances</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regional allowance for hardship area</li> <li>• “Awards” and “remuneration” for additional or special work</li> <li>• Shift allowances for health-care workers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In-kind allowances for some positions (decided by each department): Housing, vehicle, fuel allowance, telephone, and mobile phone airtime</li> <li>• Expenses for duty-related travel*</li> </ul>	
	<b>Benefits</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Tax exemptions on income</li> <li>• Tax deduction for life insurance premium for civil servant and spouse</li> <li>• Tax deduction for any social security payments</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Paid or partially-paid leave: earned (annual) leave, casual leave, special casual leave for rabies treatment, leave for donating blood, quarantine leave, medical leave, maternity leave, paternity leave, preparation leave for retirement, special disability leave for workplace injuries, hospital leave (in certain bodies), sick leave for shipboard staff, study leave, and long vacation leave (for teachers)</li> <li>• Leave without pay</li> <li>• Free minibus transport to/from work for certain positions or bodies</li> </ul>	
<b>Future expectations</b>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Superannuation pension</li> <li>• Early retirement and "relaxation" pensions</li> <li>• Invalid (disability) pension</li> <li>• Family (survivor's) pension</li> <li>• Termination benefit ("compensation pension")</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Re-employment after retirement</li> </ul>

Source: Review of official regulations conducted by World Bank and MOPF Budget Department.

\* Included in this table because, in some cases, they may supplement income in full or in part (e.g., a vehicle, if used for non-work travel).

<sup>30</sup> As an example, employees of the Social Security Board reportedly receive free health care, unlike staff of most departments. Staff at one ministry are said to receive bags of rice (an important dietary staple in Myanmar) by decision of senior management.

**72. Information shared by officials in small focus-group discussions is consistent with table 3.** As described in chapter 6 on HRM, in the course of this review, the World Bank team sponsored small-scale qualitative research to hear the views of civil servants themselves via focus group discussions. Box 2 summarizes what focus group participants had to say about compensation in the civil service.

**Box 2:** Looking beyond base salary - perceptions from focus group discussions

**Directors (discussed in one of two groups)**

- *Monetary:* Some departments have a welfare fund for "social matters," but others do not. Travel allowance was mentioned.
- *Nonmonetary entitlements:* These vary by rank, position, and department. They include free or subsidized housing, free or subsidized transportation, telephone, petrol, reduced fares for airlines, vehicles, computers, washing machines, and furniture.
- *The most important component of compensation* (other than base salary) was housing.

**Assistant directors (discussed in two of three groups)**

- *Monetary compensation:* The groups identified regional allowance for hardship areas, annual increment, stipends, supplements, pay in lieu of leave (under the new Civil Service Law), and travel allowance.
- *Nonmonetary entitlements:* This differed across ministries and departments, such as free housing in Nay Pyi Taw, subsidized housing in some regions and states, free transport to and from work in some areas, telephones for senior officials, mobile phones and airtime, vehicles and fuel, health care, and free lunch in some workplaces.
- *Most important components of compensation* (other than base salary) were free or subsidized housing, transport to and from work, and free health care.
- The groups noted that civil servants may also receive compensation when working on surveys, attending training, and attending ceremonies or celebrations held by senior staff. Travel was also perceived as a type of compensation.

**GAD (discussed in four groups)**

- *Monetary compensation:* Participants commented on travel allowance, which reimburses for actual cost of travel; regional allowance for hardship areas, cost of uniforms; minor expenses for staff who go abroad for training, graduate education or meetings; welfare support; allowance when attending training; food rations in the rainy season; and cash advances for emergencies.
- *Nonmonetary entitlements:* These were housing for nonlocal staff, free housing, cars and fuel for gazetted officers (depending on rank), motorcycle (in some areas, but not all) or bicycle for staff, telephone or mobile phone, and uniforms for office helpers.
- *The most important component of compensation* (other than base salary), noted in all four groups, was housing. One group mentioned motor vehicles, in addition to housing.

## Base salary and regional allowance as the main monetary components of compensation

73. **The main monetary components of civil service compensation are base salary and the regional allowance for hardship areas.** In recent years, the Government of Myanmar has taken a measured approach to adjusting the scales for the base salary, and to adjustments of the regional allowance for hardship areas. Table 4 shows the scales in effect as of late 2016.

74. **Some brief explanations can help readers from outside Myanmar navigate table 4.** First, unlike other countries, Myanmar does not use unique identifying codes for civil service grades. Instead, grades are referred to—in both writing and speaking—by stating the minimum, increment, and maximum pay in that order (for example, 250,000/4,000/270,000). Second, the job titles in the table are examples only. (A full list of job titles per grade as specified in official regulations is available in annex 4.) Finally, the regional allowance scale reflects the fact that there are no director general posts, and only a few deputy director general posts (under GAD) in hardship areas because Deputy Director General is the highest level in the Region/State GAD offices.

Table 4: Base salaries and regional allowances in FY 2015/2016 (MMK per month)

Example job title for grade	Base salary Section			Regional allowance for hardship areas			Up to Jan. 2016
	Minimum	Increment*	Maximum	From Feb. 2016 onward			
				Fairly hard	Hard	Hardest	
<b>Gazetted posts</b>							
Director general	500,000	--	--	--	--	--	--
Deputy director general	380,000	4,000	400,000	106,000	112,000	118,000	100,000
Director	340,000	4,000	360,000	106,000	112,000	118,000	100,000
Deputy director	310,000	4,000	330,000	96,000	102,000	108,000	90,000
Assistant director	280,000	4,000	300,000	86,000	92,000	98,000	80,000
Staff officer	250,000	4,000	270,000	76,000	82,000	88,000	70,000
<b>Non-gazetted posts</b>							
Police lieutenant**	210,000	2,000	220,000	58,000	64,000	70,000	52,000
Office superintendent	195,000	2,000	205,000	61,000	67,000	73,000	55,000
Deputy staff officer	180,000	2,000	190,000	64,000	70,000	76,000	58,000
Upper division clerk	165,000	2,000	175,000	67,000	73,000	79,000	61,000
Lower division clerk	150,000	2,000	160,000	70,000	76,000	82,000	64,000
Record keeper	135,000	2,000	145,000	73,000	79,000	85,000	67,000
Peon	120,000	2,000	130,000	76,000	82,000	88,000	70,000

Sources: MOF Notification No. 12/2016, 16 February 2016 (establishes revised scale for regional allowance); and MOF Notification No. 1058/2015, 10 April 2015 (base salary scale and initial regional allowance scale for FY 2015/2016).

\* Increment (step) is awarded every two years.

\*\* New grade as of FY 2015/2016, said to encompass about 5,000 staff mostly in Ministry of Home Affairs and some state administrative organizations.



**75. For almost all civil servants, these monetary earnings are de facto exempt from income tax.** The 2016 income tax law stipulates that, effective from 1 April 2016, earnings under MMK 4.8 million are exempt from income tax.<sup>31</sup> This provision applies to all workers, whether in the public or private sector. Taxpayers also receive an exemption of MMK 1,000,000 per year for each parent residing with them, another MMK 1,000,000 exemption for a spouse, and a MMK 500,000 per year exemption for each unmarried child under 18 residing with the taxpayer.

**76. The base salary scale has been increased in each of the last five fiscal years (see table 5).** The base salary scale alone, however, does not provide a complete picture. A special MMK 30,000 per month allowance was introduced in FY 2012/2013 and was paid to all civil servants through FY 2014/2015. (This and other compensation-related measures are shown in table 6.) The new base salary scale for FY 2015/2016 thus effectively consolidates the MMK 30,000 allowance into the new (higher) base salaries. It is typically considered good practice to provide the bulk of monetary compensation as base salary, rather than through multiple allowances that can be complicated to manage or nontransparent.

**77. The current base-pay scale provides minimal pay progression within a given grade.** The increments, in effect as of FY 2015/2016, mean that gazetted civil servants could achieve, at most, an MMK 20,000 increase in base salary (MMK 10,000 for non-gazetted staff) over the course of 10 years—unless they get promoted into a higher grade or the Government of Myanmar revises the salary scale. Because the increment is defined as a fixed kyat amount, rather than as a percentage of base salary, its significance relative to base salary diminishes as one rises in grade. (That is, MMK 4,000 is a larger relative increase for someone who enters the lowest gazetted grade at MMK 250,000 than it is for someone in the second-highest gazetted grade, which starts at MMK 340,000.)

**78. The regional allowance for hardship areas has been substantially redefined three times in as many years.** The Government of Myanmar initially set it at 100 percent of base salary and then changed to an interim kyat-denominated scale for FY 2015/2016. In February 2016, this changed again, to the three-tiered scale shown in table 4.<sup>32</sup> While the regulation establishing the new scale states that townships are classified according to criteria, it does not explain the specific criteria used or the rationale underlying the scale. The number of townships classified as hardship areas has increased from 87 (in 2012) to 110 (as of 2013).

**79. The redefinition of the regional allowance reflects careful deliberations led by a government committee.** The committee, chaired by the Ministry of Home Affairs, with numerous other bodies represented,<sup>33</sup> has examined the rationale for classifying a location as a hardship area, as well as the kyat amounts to award. After examining practices in other countries, the committee developed an approach they believed would suit Myanmar's particular circumstances. Nevertheless, questions remain as to how best to tackle recruitment and retention challenges in certain areas, and how to assess whether the various measures are effective.<sup>34</sup>

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31 This is equivalent to MMK 400,000 per month, which means that civil servants from deputy director general downward are exempt from tax on their base salary. For civil servants receiving the regional allowance for hardship areas, those in the assistant director grade and below are exempt. See Kyaemon Mirror, 2016, "Clarification on the assessed income tax that falls under the head salaries."

32 The kyat amounts in the interim scale did not constitute a linear progression, meaning that some lower grades received more than higher grades. However, when added to the base salary scale then in effect, the result was an orderly progression in total monetary earnings (base plus regional allowance).

33 The Minister of Home Affairs chairs the committee, with the director general of GAD serving as secretary. As of early 2016, members included MOPF and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and National Planning and Economic Development, plus the Border Affairs minister from the state- and region-level governments. Deputy ministers from the Ministries of Labor, Immigration and Population; Education; Health; Information; and Communications were also involved in the committee's work.

34 In March 2016, the World Bank prepared for GAD a note suggesting possible support on a range of issues, including recruitment and retention in hardship areas. This remains subject to discussion.

**80. The overall effect of these changes was to increase monetary earnings for all civil service grades.** In the shift from FY 2014/2015 (base plus MMK 30,000 allowance) to the FY 2015/2016 scale (larger base, cancellation of MMK 30,000 allowance), no one lost money in nominal terms.<sup>35</sup> The FY 2015/2016 scale provides a modest increase for lower grades, with the increase becoming more substantial as civil servants move to more senior grades. This dynamic of stretching the difference among lower and higher grades is called “decompression.” Civil servants who received the regional allowance also got an increase in monetary earnings between FY 2014/2015 and FY 2015/2016 in nominal terms. This increase was modest, however.

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<sup>35</sup> “Nominal” means that a value is not adjusted for inflation, in contrast to “real” terms, which are adjusted for the effect of inflation.

Table 5: Base salary scales for civil servants, FY 2012/2013 to FY 2015/2016 (in MMK per month)

Examples of job titles	FY 2015/2016			FY 2014/2015			FY 2013/2014			FY 2012/2013		
	Min.	Increment	Max.	Min.	Increment	Max.	Min.	Increment	Max.	Min.	Increment	Max.
<b>Gazetted posts</b>												
Director general	500,000	--	--	250,000	2,000	260,000	230,000	2,000	240,000	210,000	2,000	220,000
Deputy director general	380,000	4,000	400,000	220,000	2,000	230,000	200,000	2,000	210,000	180,000	2,000	190,000
Director	340,000	4,000	360,000	200,000	2,000	210,000	180,000	2,000	190,000	160,000	2,000	170,000
Deputy director	310,000	4,000	330,000	180,000	2,000	190,000	160,000	2,000	170,000	140,000	2,000	150,000
Assistant director	280,000	4,000	300,000	160,000	2,000	170,000	140,000	2,000	150,000	120,000	2,000	130,000
Staff officer	250,000	4,000	270,000	140,000	2,000	150,000	120,000	2,000	130,000	100,000	2,000	110,000
<b>Non-gazetted posts</b>												
Police lieutenant	210,000	2,000	220,000	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Office superintendent	195,000	2,000	205,000	105,000	1,000	110,000	85,000	1,000	90,000	65,000	1,000	70,000
Deputy staff officer	180,000	2,000	190,000	99,000	1,000	104,000	79,000	1,000	84,000	59,000	1,000	64,000
Upper division clerk	165,000	2,000	175,000	93,000	1,000	98,000	73,000	1,000	78,000	53,000	1,000	58,000
Lower division clerk	150,000	2,000	160,000	87,000	1,000	92,000	67,000	1,000	72,000	47,000	1,000	52,000
Record keeper	135,000	2,000	145,000	81,000	1,000	86,000	61,000	1,000	66,000	41,000	1,000	46,000
Peon	120,000	2,000	130,000	75,000	1,000	80,000	55,000	1,000	60,000	35,000	1,000	40,000

Source: MOPF notifications for relevant years.

Notes: 1) In FY 2012/2013, FY 2013/2014, and FY 2014/2015, all civil servants received an “additional allowance” of MMK 30,000 /month on top of base salary.

2) A new non-gazetted grade added for FY 2015/2016 contains about 5,000 uniformed staff in Ministry of Home Affairs and some state administrative bodies (e.g, police officers, firearms instructors).

3) The increment (step) is awarded every two years, not every year.

4) Allocation of positions to levels in the salary scale is done within each ministry and may vary across ministries. Listed positions are examples only.

**Table 6:** Additional compensation-related parameters for civil servants and others (in MMK)


Item	Item	Item	Item	Item
Permanent secretary salary (director general base salary + MMK 200,000 "honorary" allowance under budget line 0102)	700,000			
Additional allowance per month for civil servants	Cancelled	30,000 (continued)	30,000 (continued)	30,000 (established)
Daily wage for daily wage earners (8-hour day)	3,600*	2,000	1,700	1,100
Additional "grant/allowance" for daily wage earners	Cancelled	1,000 (continued)	1,000 (continued)	1,000 (established)
Daily wage for daily wage earners in hardship areas	5,000	--	--	--
Experts (rehired pensioners) monthly grant	250,000	80,000	60,000	
Additional allowance for advisors and experts	Cancelled	30,000 (continued)	30,000 (continued)	30,000 (established)
Official minimum wage per 8-hour work day, as of 1 September 2015	3,600	--	--	--
World Bank estimate of monthly earnings by minimum wage worker with a 5-day week	77,400	--	--	--

Sources: Rates for government workers are from various MOPF notifications.

\* Starting in December 2015.

81. A simplified chart of monetary earnings in the civil service by grade illustrates the most recent changes. Figure 15 shows the main monetary earnings (base salary and regional allowance), as of the end of FY 2015/2016 compared to FY 2014/2015.<sup>36</sup> The chart shows a clear, orderly increase in total monetary earnings from the lowest grades to the highest grades. This is a positive feature, which some developing countries fail to achieve.

Figure 15: Civil service monetary earnings, 2014-2016



82. The vast majority of civil servants are in the non-gazetted grades. As shown in table 7 earlier, 92.4 percent of civil servants in union-level bodies (excluding state or region bodies) were non-gazetted, as of FY 2015/2016. Gazetted posts comprised only 7.6 percent of the union-level total.

36 The figure shows the midpoint of the base salary range in each grade. For FY 2014/2015, when the regional allowance was set at 100% of base salary, the figure again shows the midpoint. By the end of FY 2015/2016, the new regional allowance scale included three tiers (fairly hard, hard, and hardest.) The figure uses the midpoint of that scale for each grade. There are very few deputy directors general in hardship areas (indicated in the figure by empty outlines), and no director general posts.

Table 7: Union-level civil service posts by grade, FY 2015/2016

Base salary scale	Sample civil-service job title	No. of posts	% of total
<b>Gazetted posts</b>			
500,000	Director general	268	0.03%
380,000/4,000/400,000	Deputy director general	833	0.09%
340,000/4,000/360,000	Director	2,908	0.3%
310,000/4,000/330,000	Deputy director	7,308	0.8%
280,000/4,000/300,000	Assistant director	18,279	1.9%
250,000/4,000/270,000	Staff officer	43,682	4.5%
	<b>Sub-total gazetted</b>	<b>73,278</b>	<b>7.6%</b>
<b>Non-gazetted posts</b>			
210,000/2,000/220,000	Police lieutenant	5,073	0.5%
195,000/2,000/205,000	Office superintendent	25,564	2.6%
180,000/2,000/190,000	Deputy staff officer	99,842	10.3%
165,000/2,000/175,000	Upper division clerk	279,802	28.9%
150,000/2,000/160,000	Lower division clerk	284,656	29.4%
135,000/2,000/145,000	Record Keeper	66,433	6.9%
120,000/2,000/130,000	Peon	134,626	13.9%
	<b>Sub-total non-gazetted</b>	<b>895,996</b>	<b>92.4%</b>
	<b>Total gazetted and non-gazetted</b>	<b>969,274</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

Source: MOPF and World Bank calculations.

Notes: Data are from budget form 2C and represent estimates submitted as part of the budget process. Data exclude civil servants at region/state levels, estimated at 85,000-90,000 in FY 2015/2016.

## Departments' provision of in-kind allowances to certain posts and locations

83. In some countries, practices related to in-kind allowances or expenses can blur the line between operational expenditures and income. Certain in-kind allowances (such as housing) clearly supplement monetary income, since they reduce or eliminate the employee's housing expenses. In other cases, in-kind allowances intended to enable work (such as vehicle fuel for field trips) may, in part, be appropriated by some individuals for personal activities or monetized informally (e.g., through reselling). When rates for operational expenses (e.g., travel per diems) substantially exceed actual reasonable costs, or regulations and decisions allow their over-use, these expenditures become informal supplements to income. The precise scope of such practices is difficult to determine in any given country. However, governments face a problem when substantial amounts of public funds are spent for uses other than intended, or when workers change their activities largely for personal gain (e.g., making trips that are not needed, in order to collect the per diem.)



**84. Myanmar officials frequently expressed the belief that in-kind allowances vary substantially across departments and the perception that this is unfair.** Senior stakeholders voiced these views in meetings, as did civil servants as in focus group discussions (see box 3). No one, however, had detailed information about the extent to which in-kind allowances differed. In response to these concerns, the World Bank team conducted research together with its government counterparts. This chapter presents those findings. (Chapter 5 discusses implications for transparency and equity.)

**85. The degree of variation is difficult to determine without further study.** The Government of Myanmar provides in-kind allowances to certain civil service posts, in certain locations. The senior management of each department has the authority to make its own decisions, and practices can differ substantially across departments. This may well reflect their different mandates and needs (e.g., for travel to facilities away from the office.) It is possible that the policy is formalized in written regulations or policies prepared by each department.<sup>37</sup> However, officials interviewed for this review noted that they had never seen such documents, and that employees typically simply know the practices specific to their own department (but not other departments). Thus, there appears to be a tradition of such practices, but little or no explicit statement on the objectives (including whether they are intended as compensation to individuals or for operational use), and no specific rationale for decisions about who receives each in-kind allowance, and no standard for how the items or amounts are decided.

**86. Our review systematically collected information about four common in-kind allowances: vehicles/transportation, fuel for vehicles, housing, and telephone.** Working closely with counterparts in the MOPF Budget Department and the Pay, Compensation, and Human Resources Review Implementation Inter-ministerial Committee,<sup>38</sup> the World Bank team requested 39 departments in 6 ministries and UCSB to fill in a table for each of these four allowances, specifying formal entitlements for each civil service grade. This appears to be the first ever attempt in Myanmar to compile this breadth and depth of information.

**87. Departments shared impressively detailed information.** Table 8 summarizes the information that was submitted.<sup>39</sup> Detailed tables for each allowance are presented in the annexes. Readers should bear in mind the following caveats to avoid misunderstanding what this information represents:

- As stated above, the extent to which these allowances cover operational needs versus serving to supplement income is usually difficult to determine.
- Information refers primarily to posts located in Nay Pyi Taw, the capital city.
- There are some indications that the amount of the formal entitlement may, in some instances, be adjusted before it is issued to the recipient.<sup>40</sup>
- Entitlements may also vary across individuals in the same grade or job, even within a department. Some departments stated that some individuals in a particular post received housing and fuel allocations, but others did not because the available supply was not sufficient.

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<sup>37</sup> There appears to be only limited mention of allowances in civil service-wide regulations. The 2013 civil service law establishes (chapter 4), civil servants' right to "salary appropriate for labour, skills, and service, stipend, travelling expenses and other allowances" (paragraph 11c) and to "allowances that are occasionally specified by Pyi Htaung Su Councils of Ministers" (paragraph 11r).

<sup>38</sup> The Committee was established by MOF Notification No. 12/2016, 25 January 2016.

<sup>39</sup> Information was collected via a written form that was drafted in English and translated into the Myanmar language. Most departments submitted their responses in Myanmar language, which the team then translated into English. In such circumstances, misunderstandings are always possible.

<sup>40</sup> A senior official in one ministry stated that the fuel allowance actually received, in at least one case, was greater than the official amount. Separately, a different individual suggested that the entitlement might be reduced.

**88. Allowances entitlements varied from modest to substantial, as evident from table 8.** The submitted information shows that most allowances are awarded to gazetted posts and that the value typically increases as one rises in grade. Non-gazetted posts in Nay Pyi Taw typically received only housing and, in many cases, free commuter transportation to work (usually on special buses). The following paragraphs discuss each allowance in turn.

**89. In the gazetted grades, management posts are typically assigned at least one passenger vehicle and sometimes up to three.** Of the 39 departments contacted, 90-100 percent listed a vehicle entitlement (car, truck, or van) for the four most senior gazetted grades.<sup>41</sup> The data submissions did not specify whether these vehicles are intended for work travel by the units or staff reporting to that post, or whether they are exclusively for the managers' use. Similarly, it is not clear whether vehicles are exclusively for work purposes or allowed for off-duty personal use as well. Some departments listed vehicle models dating to previous decades, which suggests that vehicle standards (and maintenance needs) vary substantially.<sup>42</sup> The lower gazetted grades seem to be entitled to commuter transportation to work by mini-bus (called "ferry" in Myanmar) or possibly a shared vehicle. Non-gazetted grades typically were entitled, at most, to commuter transportation to and from work—a necessity given Nay Pyi Taw's large area and the virtual absence of any public transit. As noted above, most submissions did not describe circumstances outside of Nay Pyi Taw.

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<sup>41</sup> Vehicles of this sort are still rare in Myanmar and predominantly an urban phenomenon. According to the 2014 census, "38.7 percent of all households have a motorcycle or moped. About 36 percent have a bicycle and 3.1 percent have a car, truck or van." Of households that have a car, truck or van, 72% are in urban areas (Ministry of Labor, Immigration, and Population, Department of Population, 2015).

<sup>42</sup> The Equipment Control Committee, associated with the former Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development, is said to handle vehicle issues.

Table 8: Main in-kind allowances reported by six ministries and UCSB in Nay Pyi Taw, 2016

Job titles	Director general		Deputy permanent secretary, Deputy director general		Assistant permanent secretary, Director		Deputy director		Assistant director		Staff officer		All non-gazetted grades
<b>Base pay grade, FY 2015/2016 (in MMK)</b>	<b>500,000</b>		<b>380,000-400,000</b>		<b>340,000-360,000</b>		<b>310,000-330,000</b>		<b>280,000-300,000</b>		<b>250,000-270,000</b>		<b>(no pay range)*</b>
<b>Assigned vehicles per officeholder or commuter transportation entitlement</b>													
No. of depts. submitting data	39		39		39		39		39		39		39
Percent awarding allowance	90%		100%		95%		92%		49%		33%		26%
Minimum no. of vehicles	2		1		1		1		1 or shared office vehicle or commuter bus ("ferry")		1 or shared office vehicle or commuter bus ("ferry")		
Maximum no. of vehicles	3		3		2		1		2		1		Commuter bus ("ferry")
<b>Monthly fuel entitlement per officeholder (in gallons) and estimated value (in MMK) at market prices, as of May 2016</b>													
No. of depts. submitting data	38		38		38		38		38		38		43
Percent awarding allowance	89%		97%		95%		97%		66%		11%		0%
	Gal.	Value	Gal.	Value	Gal.	Value	Gal.	Value	Gal.	Value	Gal.	Value	
Minimum	80	206,392	40	103,196	40	103,196	20	51,598	10	25,799	10	25,799	
Maximum	240	619,177	180	464,383	60	154,794	45	116,096	59	152,214	32	82,557	
<b>Monthly telephone entitlement</b>													
No. of depts. submitting data	38		38		38		38		38		38		42
Percent awarding allowance	45%		47%		42%		34%		16%		3%		0%
Minimum (in MMK)	<b>10,000</b>		10,000		10,000		10,000		10,000		10,000		
Maximum (in MMK)	<b>50,000</b>		40,000		25,000		20,000		15,000				

Job titles	Director general	Deputy permanent secretary, Deputy director general	Assistant permanent secretary, Director	Deputy director	Assistant director	Staff officer	All non-gazetted grades
<b>Housing entitlement per officeholder (Nay Pyi Taw)</b>							
No. of depts. submitting data	33	33	33	33	33	33	33
Percent awarding allowance	85%	88%	91%	91%	94%	91%	82%
Minimum	Apartment; some pay 10% of salary	Shared apt.; some pay 10% of salary	Dormitory or room in shared apartment	Dormitory	Dormitory	Dormitory	Dormitory
Maximum	2-story house, free	2 story house, some fees	Apartment, free	Apt., free	House/apt., free	House/apt., free	House/apt., free

Source: Department responses to customized form circulated by World Bank and MOPF Budget Department. Fuel values calculated from prices for Nay Pyi Taw posted on <https://maxenergy.com.mm/> on 11 May 2016.

Notes: Abbreviations used: “PS” = permanent secretary; “gal.” = imperial gallon; “apt.” = apartment.

1) Table excludes enterprises.

2) In addition to UCSB, respondents include MOPF and the Ministries of Education, Labor, Energy, Health, and Home Affairs.

3) Submitting departments are located in Nay Pyi Taw; allowance entitlements (especially for housing) may not apply to staff outside of Nay Pyi Taw.

4) Blank cells and departments that did not report data may mean that a) a position does not exist in that department or is vacant, b) there is no allowance for this position, or c) an allowance exists, but information was not provided. Departments often provided information only for gazetted positions and left non-gazetted cells blank.

5) Vehicles may be older models. For example, the Ministry of Labor listed vehicles from the 1990s or early 2000s.

6) Gallon amounts listed in the table are the sum of diesel and petrol entitlements.

7) Fuel value is calculated by multiplying the total allocation (diesel + petrol) by the average price of diesel and petrol, converted from liters to imperial (UK) gallons.

8) In some cases, officeholders receive a fuel allowance, but not a vehicle allowance.

9) In some cases, departments noted that official fuel allowance is not awarded to all officeholders in practice due to shortages.

\* For non-gazetted officers, the highest grade is paid a flat base salary of 500,000 with no increments, so there is no pay range.

**90. Most departments also provide vehicle fuel allocations to gazetted posts, although rarely to the most junior gazetted grade.** The fuel allocation is larger for more senior posts and, as with vehicles, also varies substantially across departments. In some cases, it is reasonable to assume that more than one vehicle or individual uses the fuel allocation, since the amount of the entitlement exceeds what one driver could use up in a month. For example, 60 gallons of fuel (the amount allocated by one department to its deputy director grade, with an approximate value of MMK 155,000) could reasonably enable a car to travel 1,200 miles (1,931 kilometers) or a motorcycle 2,700 miles (4,345 kilometers).<sup>43</sup>

**91. The vast majority of civil servants in Nay Pyi Taw receive free housing, but elsewhere circumstances are very different.** This should be understood in the special context of Nay Pyi Taw, since civil servants were moved there after the capital opened in 2006. An unknown number of civil servants left family members behind in other locations and may still maintain homes there.

**92. The type of housing allocated varies not only by department and grade but also by marital status. Outside Nay Pyi Taw, provision of housing varies significantly.**<sup>44</sup> A township officer outside Nay Pyi Taw noted that housing is provided for non-local gazetted staff; however, rent may be charged, for example, if a different department owns the building. Non-gazetted employees are usually local and continue to live in their family home. In regions and states, some health-care providers may receive free housing (e.g. in hospital compounds), but may be required to pay for water and electricity themselves. The housing allowance in the education sector—the single biggest employer of civil servants, with a workforce of well over 400,000—is highly variable. Housing is seen as one of the difficulties in attracting and retaining teachers in remote locations. (Chapter 5 on competitiveness, transparency, and equity of compensation contains further discussion of housing issues.)

**93. Mobile phone entitlements are awarded to a smaller proportion of gazetted posts.** Of the 39 departments, 34-37 percent reported a telephone allowance for the four most senior grades. This was typically offered as a pre-paid top-up card, reimbursement of bills, or sometimes as cash. The monetary value is far lower than for the fuel allowance, typically MMK 10,000-20,000. For the two most senior grades, some departments offered as much as MMK 40,000 or MMK 50,000.

**94. As described in the analytical framework earlier in this chapter, intangible factors also play a role in Myanmar's civil service compensation.** Interviews, as well as focus group discussions, confirmed that civil service jobs continue to be valued for their stability and prestige. (See box 5 in chapter 5.) Secondary employment opportunities are available to some staff, notably health and education service providers. Health care providers are allowed to undertake private work after hours. Teachers may provide after-school tutoring to small groups of students. In at least one health official's view, jobs in government facilities are seen as attractive due to training that is provided, as well as the opportunity to develop one's skills in treating diverse patients and conditions. On the other hand, a GAD township officer noted that work demands limit the time available to work elsewhere. Some highly skilled individuals who retire from the civil service may be asked to serve as advisors on contract, although this number is thought to be small.

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43 Fuel prices obviously vary over time and by location. The MMK 155,000 estimate is based on prices per liter for Nay Pyi Taw (posted on [www.maxenergy.com.mm/](http://www.maxenergy.com.mm/), 11 May 2016) and converted to imperial gallons (the unit used in Myanmar and the measure used in the fuel allocation data.) The distances estimates assume that a passenger car can travel 20 miles on 1 imperial gallon, and that a motorbike can travel 45 miles per gallon. These levels of fuel economy are fairly typical for 1990s models, as listed in online fuel consumption guides, such as Natural Resources Canada's fuel consumption search tool (<http://oec.nrcan.gc.ca/fcr-rcf/public/index-e.cfm>) and [www.totalmotorcycle.com](http://www.totalmotorcycle.com). (See annex 6 for details of calculation.)

44 Unmarried individuals are often allocated a private room within a shared apartment, while married employees get an apartment exclusively for their family.

## Outdated rates for some operational expenses

**95. Expenses payments are, of course, not part of formal compensation, but may be used to supplement it if not properly managed.** In some countries, rates for certain operational expenses are overly generous and poorly controlled. The result is that staff may undertake certain activities largely to collect the payments for expenses, not because the activity is needed. Examples include per diem and housing rates for domestic or international travel. Problems that have been observed in some other countries include staff making overly frequent domestic field trips, to the detriment of fulfilling their responsibilities in the office, and per diem rates for official travel to foreign countries far exceeding reasonable benchmarks; both of which obviously serve to supplement income. Related problems include poor administrative or managerial procedures (such as no requirement for receipts or other necessary documentation for reimbursement, and inadequate oversight of travel decisions.)

**96. In contrast, Myanmar appears to have a number of expenses rates and regulations that are out of date or require re-evaluation to ensure they are effective.** Interlocutors cited a number of expenses rates that they perceived as inadequate, including a few that were so outdated that the amount mentioned is virtually meaningless. One rather extreme example was a “uniform allowance” for nurses of MMK 8 per month. Per diem rates for domestic travel were thought to be inadequate for certain, higher-cost locations (for example, the city of Mandalay). On a somewhat related note, an official mentioned that an award for excellent service exists, but the amount is only MMK 3,000—a sum that may have been appropriate in the past, but is no longer. Concerns were also raised about overnight accommodation for official domestic travel.

**97. The example of health care providers illustrates the importance of appropriate policies for operational expenses.** Outreach and service provision to communities (such as immunization programs, and pre- and post-natal care for young families) requires site visits by health-care workers. These workers are often based in a larger village and are responsible for serving multiple villages within their area. Yet, current regulations reimburse only for travel beyond a five-mile radius from the worker’s duty station. Health experts consider the official reimbursement rates to be unrealistically low. Combined with other restrictions on certain expenses involved in such field visits, this becomes a disincentive to health workers to deliver care to their clients.

**98. To the Government of Myanmar’s credit, some of these rates are now being reviewed.** Suggestions for principles to incorporate into such a review are included later in this report.

## Personnel-related expenditures appearing under a number of budget lines

**99. The expenditures described in this chapter appear in various parts of the budget.** Earlier, chapter 3 on wage bill and affordability issues discussed the challenges involved in accounting for expenditures on compensation of personnel. Like many other countries, Myanmar’s expenditures on monetary compensation for civil servants are put in the wage bill line, whereas in-kind allowances and wages of non-permanent staff go elsewhere. For clarity, table 9 summarizes Myanmar’s allowance practices.



Table 9: Budget classification lines containing personnel-related expenditures

Expenditure line		Monetary compensation	In-kind allowances and operational expenses
<b>01 Pay and allowance honoraria, etc.</b>			
01	Pay	Base salary for permanent civil servants (gazetted and non-gazetted)	
02	Allowances	Salaries for ministers and deputy ministers Allowances paid to permanent secretaries, advisors, experts and technicians, academicians, professional secretary officers Regional allowance for hardship areas	
04	Overtime	Overtime payments to non-gazetted staff	
<b>02 Travelling allowance</b>			
01	Domestic travel- ling allowance		Domestic travel costs (such as attending meetings or workshops, transfers to a post in a different location)
02	Deputation and delegation expenses		Trips abroad on official business (includes airplane tickets, clothing allowance, and a modest sum per trip for "unexpected expenditure")
<b>03 Expenses of goods and services</b>			
01	Labor charges	Payments to nonpermanent workers or daily wage workers; one-time payments (Also included are, for example, teachers, drivers, etc., who are hired as daily wage workers, in contrast to permanent civil-service staff hires.) Payment to daily wage workers in the hardship areas shall be appropriated in accordance with the regulations set by the Union Government.	
06	Petrol, oil, and lubricants		Includes fuel allowance awarded to selected positions (decided by each department)
07	Postage, telegram, and telephone		Includes telephone and mobile phone allowances awarded to selected positions (decided by each department)
12	Uniform		Includes MMK 20,000 per year to messengers (peons) Not for all staff. Only for specific staff.
16	Medical expenses		For police (Ministry of Home Affairs) and staff of foreign missions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
<b>04 Maintenance charges</b>			
02	Building		Includes maintenance of staff housing (dormitories, apartments, etc.)
04	Motor vehicles		Includes maintenance costs for "assigned" vehicles, commuter buses ("ferry")
<b>05 Transfer payments</b>			
06	Education training		Includes training of new staff, as well as in-house training
04	Motor vehicles		Includes maintenance costs for "assigned" vehicles, commuter buses ("ferry")
<b>06 Entertainment and meal expenses</b>			
02	Meal expenses		Includes cost of meals provided to staff who work late during peak periods

Source: Budget classification documents and discussions with government officials.

# CHAPTER 5

## COMPETITIVENESS, TRANSPARENCY AND FAIRNESS OF CIVIL SERVICE COMPENSATION

### Assessing Myanmar's civil service compensation

**100. Previously, chapter 4 identified four core themes for civil service compensation: affordability, competitiveness, transparency, and fairness (equity).** Affordability was examined earlier in chapter 3; this chapter evaluates Myanmar's civil service with respect to competitiveness, transparency, and fairness, guided by these aforementioned questions:

- *Competitiveness*: Is civil service compensation adequate, given the economic context? How does it compare to “real world” alternatives? Does civil service compensation help attract and retain the skills that government needs?
- *Fairness (equity)*: Do equivalent jobs receive equivalent compensation?
- *Transparency*: Is civil service compensation clear and easy to understand?

These are complex questions in any country. They are particularly challenging to answer for Myanmar due to limited availability of data.

**101. Some simple ratios are sometimes used to describe and compare civil service compensation.** These have been popular because they are quick and easy to calculate, which is also why they are superficial and can be misleading.

- *Base salary to per capita GDP*: This is calculated using formal base-salary scales (or by dividing the wage bill by the number of civil servants to estimate average base salary), and then dividing by per capita GDP. However, as explained earlier, compensation comprises more than base salary (and may include monetary and in-kind allowances that are not always classified under the wage bill budget line.) It is not unusual for World Bank studies in other countries to find such a situation.<sup>45</sup> Furthermore, the relative importance of these other components of compensation can be difficult to quantify and most certainly varies across countries.<sup>46</sup> As a result, using this ratio to make comparisons over time, or to compare one country with others, is problematic.
- *Compression ratio*: This is roughly understood as the ratio of the salary at the top of the civil service to salaries at the bottom. However, various sources define and calculate it in different ways.<sup>47</sup> This

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45 For example, practices in another ASEAN country are described in World Bank, 2010, “Lao PDR Civil Service Pay and Compensation Review.”

46 Users should also bear in mind that estimates of per capita GDP include some uncertainty. In some countries, GDP data may not fully capture economic activity, may change rapidly due to economic crisis, or be adjusted for statistical reasons. For years other than census years, population figures are projections.

47 For example, OECD defines it as “the ratio between the medians of the first and ninth deciles of public sector pay levels” (OECD, 2007, “Towards Better Measurement of Government”).

means that, like the ratio described above, it is difficult to know how accurately the compression ratio captures compensation, thus making meaningful comparisons across countries very difficult. Furthermore, since countries define their civil service differently (e.g., some include low-level jobs, such as cleaners, while others do not), country-specific ratios may be using very different denominators. Despite some claims to the contrary, there is no proven “correct” compression ratio. A recent article on the World Bank’s governance website explains in more detail why compression ratios are unreliable.<sup>48</sup>

**102. It would be unwise to use these or other simple ratios as the primary basis for setting policy.** A more insightful approach entails collecting detailed qualitative and quantitative data, and analyzing it to develop a more complete and nuanced picture. Using multiple methods provides a more complete understanding, since it can identify issues that any one method alone might miss. It also helps test the validity of findings by seeing whether information from different methods is consistent or contradictory.

**103. The review used an array of methods to analyze compensation issues.** The main methods are analysis of nationally representative household surveys (pending at time of writing); analysis of administrative data regularly collected by a government or submitted specifically for this review; and contextual analysis that draws upon prior studies and publicly-available information, such as media reports. Finally, in addition to interviewing individuals who are knowledgeable about the day-to-day functioning of the civil service, the World Bank team also conducted early-stage qualitative research (see box 3).

**Box 3:** Listening to civil servants - pilot focus groups and survey

Responding to opportunities that arose part way through the review, the World Bank piloted a series of focus group discussions and a short written survey. The objectives were to probe civil servants’ views about how the civil service functions and what their own experiences as employees were.

Together with government partners in GAD and the former Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development (MNPED), the team organized seven focus groups. In these discussions, small groups of civil servants shared their views in a relaxed setting, guided by local facilitators and a set of discussion questions. The team also conducted a small written survey to which 190 civil servants responded. The focus group discussions and survey were carried out between January and May 2016, and included both gazetted and non-gazetted staff. To encourage a spirit of openness, all respondents were promised that their responses would be kept anonymous.

Given the circumstances, neither of these activities was intended to be full-scale, statistically representative qualitative research. Instead, they should be understood as pilots that are among the first attempts to systematically probe the views of Myanmar’s civil servants. Nevertheless, the findings provide valuable insights (including about civil service compensation) and are incorporated into this analysis. They also demonstrate the potential benefits that robust, in-depth qualitative research can offer as Myanmar tackles civil service and other public policy issues.

48 See W. McCourt and V. Horscroft, 2014, “Compression Ratios in Public-Sector Pay Reform: Time to Decompress the Discourse?”

## Competitiveness of Myanmar’s civil service compensation

**104. It is common for governments to monitor the “competitiveness” of their civil service compensation.** Having a compensation policy that is sufficient to attract and retain workers with the required skills is a common objective for many governments around the world. Indeed, even advanced OECD member countries monitor, analyze, and debate on an ongoing basis the extent to which the compensation they offer meets this objective.<sup>49</sup> Governments commonly use multiple types of evidence to examine whether they are attractive employers. This includes quantitative data on the civil service itself (such as turnover rates or the numbers of applicants per vacancy), statistical analysis of large-scale surveys, and other market research. Qualitative methods (such as written surveys, focus group discussions, and key informant interviews) can also provide helpful insights.

**105. Internationally, government policy typically does not aim to match private sector compensation.** It is widely recognized that employment in public service offers a number of advantages that are not always found elsewhere. Notable among these are health and pension benefits, job stability, and—for many people—the intrinsic appeal of working on public policy or other public sector activities. Even so, in practice it is not unusual to find that compensation for public sector jobs, especially at the lower end of the spectrum, exceeds what the private sector pays. (This dynamic appears to exist in Myanmar as well).<sup>50</sup> In contrast, for more senior posts or highly specialized skills (e.g., senior management or information technology experts), the pattern may be the reverse.

**106. A robust assessment of the competitiveness of civil service compensation in Myanmar requires systematic evidence.** In discussing civil service issues in Myanmar, it is not unusual to hear people express deeply felt opinions that civil service compensation is “too low.” Some individuals describe hypothetical improvements that they believe might occur if compensation were increased (e.g., better productivity or a reduction in rent-seeking behaviors). Others may cite anecdotes about private sector firms that reportedly offer substantially higher pay for jobs similar to those in the civil service (or to a particular individual who previously worked in the civil service). While such statements undoubtedly reflect the speakers’ concerns about the importance of attracting and retaining human capital for the civil service, there is no systematic evidence supporting these assertions.

**107. This report provides readers with a systematic analysis of competitiveness issues, within certain constraints.** As other studies have already noted, Myanmar is an environment where data are often scarce, inaccessible, or simply under-utilized. There are several reasons for this. Since records are often kept and shared on paper, rather than electronically, extracting and analyzing information can be too time-consuming to do regularly. In other instances, electronic data do exist, but may not be routinely shared. Finally, the analytical approaches used in this review are new to many people in Myanmar and have not yet been adopted into day-to-day practice (even though the underlying data may be recorded and thus available in principle).

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49 For example, the issues facing the US federal government are discussed in S. Condrey, R.L. Facer, and J.J. Llorens, 2014, “The Great Government Pay Debate.” An example of Ireland’s process is available in Government of Ireland, 2007, “Report of the Public Service Benchmarking Body.”

50 The phenomenon of higher pay in the public sector is known as the public-sector wage premium. A large volume of literature documents the existence of a public sector pay premium in countries around the world, including the pattern described here. For analyses of Europe and the United States, see R. Giordano et al., 2011, “The Public Sector Wage Gap in a Selection of Euro Area Countries”; and J. Poterba and K. Rueben, 1994, “The Distribution of Public Sector Wage Premia: New Evidence Using Quantile Regression Methods.”

Economic theories do not provide a unified view on how civil service wages might affect bureaucratic corruption, and the many limitations facing “real world” studies preclude a single, definitive answer. Robust compensation data that are comparable across countries are in short supply. Corrupt activities are, by their nature, often hidden from sight. And, of course, pay is only one of numerous factors that shape the working environment and individuals’ behavior.

Nevertheless, numerous studies have examined this relationship. Three examples illustrate the complexities. Readers are encouraged to review each paper in full for a deeper appreciation of the methodologies, limitations, and findings, which cannot be summarized easily.

After Ghana dramatically increased the salaries of police officers (but not other public employees), a study probed the impact on police requests for bribes from long-distance truck drivers. Compared to neighboring countries where police salaries had not changed, the study found that “...the salary policy significantly increased the police efforts to collect bribes, the value of bribes, and the amounts given by truck drivers to policemen in total.”\*

Another study examined the creation of semi-autonomous revenue authorities in two African countries, which entailed numerous reforms, including improved financial incentives for staff. In the early years after the reforms, tax revenues as percent of GDP rose sharply and corruption appeared to decline—but these positive developments were reversed within a few years.\*\*

Using publicly available, national-level data on wages and other variables in 31 low-income countries, one study found a statistically significant relationship between civil service wages as a proportion of manufacturing wages, on one hand, and corruption levels on the other hand. There was not necessarily a causal relationship, however, and the authors also concluded that “higher pay does not lead to lower corruption in the short run.”\*\*\*

\* J.D. Foltz and K.A. Opoku-Agyemang, 2015, “Do Higher Salaries Lower Petty Corruption? A Policy Experiment on West Africa’s Highways.”

\*\* O.-H. Fjeldstad, I. Kolstad, and S. Lange, 2003, “Autonomy, Incentives, and Patronage: A Study of Corruption in the Tanzania and Uganda Revenue Authorities.”

\*\*\* C. Van Rijckeghem and B. Weder, 2001, “Bureaucratic Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Wages in the Civil Service Affect Corruption, and by How Much?”

## Civil service in the context of living conditions in Myanmar

**108. Many countries use data from living standards surveys to inform their policy-making processes.** Living standards surveys typically interview a nationally representative sample of households and ask detailed questions about topics, such as education, health care, labor and employment, and household consumption expenditures. Analysis of these data provides a statistically sound description of living conditions within a country at a national level, in urban versus rural areas, and in specific geographic areas.<sup>51</sup> Such findings are

51 The World Bank and other development partners provide technical assistance to countries that wish to undertake such surveys. Information on the Living Standards Measurement Study is available on the World Bank’s website at <http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTLSMS/0,,contentMDK:21610833~pagePK:64168427~piPK:64168435~theSitePK:3358997,00.html>

useful inputs to policy deliberations in many government sectors. Specific to the objectives of the civil service compensation review, data on average household size and household expenditures on food and non-food items, for example, could be used to assess the adequacy of civil service compensation. This type of analysis was done in the World Bank's study of Lao PDR's civil service.<sup>52</sup> In the past, Myanmar conducted several living conditions surveys, most recently in 2015.

**109. Data from the 2015 Myanmar Poverty and Living Conditions Survey (MPLCS) provide an important perspective on living standards within the country, and a basis for putting civil service earnings into context.** Using a World Bank analysis of data from the 2015 MPLCS, the World Bank team further estimated average monthly consumption expenditures (food and non-food items, education, housing, and use of durable goods) for households nationwide, as well as separately for urban and rural areas. Table 10 shows the percentage of household expenditures that a civil service base salary covers, by grade. Data underlying these calculations and analysis are provided in annex 9.

**110. When reviewing annex 9, readers should bear in mind three important caveats.** First, the team's calculations slightly overstate household consumption expenditures. They are based on expenditures per adult equivalent, whereas a typical household includes children, whose consumption is lower. Furthermore, household size in Myanmar declines with income (non-poor households have fewer members than poor households), which suggests that civil servants' households are likely to be smaller than average. Second, given Myanmar's high labor-force participation rates (discussed later in this chapter), it is reasonable to expect that a household would have two or more income earners. Indeed, MPLCS data show that households have, on average, at least three members of working age (15-64 years). Thus a civil servants' salary would not necessarily be expected to cover all of a household's expenditures. Third, MPLCS data show that 15 percent of consumption expenditures at the national level (21 percent in urban and 10 percent in rural areas) is allocated to housing. As described chapter 4, gazetted civil servants typically receive free or subsidized housing, while some non-gazetted civil servants (primarily in Nay Pyi Taw) receive a housing benefit. Civil servants' expenditures are thus reduced accordingly; the same applies to any other goods or services that are provided in kind, such as free transportation to work, and so on.

**111. For the gazetted grades, base salaries cover between 72 percent (for staff officer level) and 138 percent (for director general level) of average household consumption expenditures, as estimated from MPLCS.** As is to be expected, they cover a lower percentage in higher-cost urban settings, and a higher percentage in rural ones. For non-gazetted grades, base salaries cover between 34 percent (at the lowest grade) and 59 percent (at police lieutenant level) of estimated average household-consumption expenditures. Individual circumstances vary, of course, and the factors cited in the preceding paragraph (notably, the value of any in-kind compensation) must also be taken into account. Yet, it seems from this perspective that civil service base salaries are not extreme outliers *relative to prevailing conditions* in the country.

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52 See World Bank, 2010, "Lao PDR Civil Service Pay and Compensation Review."



Table 10: Base salary as percent of estimated monthly household consumption expenditures

	Base salary (in MMK)	Average			Median		
		National	Urban	Rural	National	Urban	Rural
<b>Gazetted posts</b>							
Director general	500,000	138%	90%	n/a	183%	123%	n/a
Deputy director general	390,000	107%	70%	140%	143%	96%	161%
Director	350,000	96%	63%	126%	128%	86%	144%
Deputy director	320,000	88%	58%	115%	117%	79%	132%
Assistant director	290,000	80%	52%	104%	106%	71%	119%
Staff officer	260,000	72%	47%	94%	95%	64%	107%
<b>Non-gazetted posts</b>							
Police lieutenant	215,000	59%	39%	77%	79%	53%	89%
Office superintendent	200,000	55%	36%	72%	73%	49%	82%
Deputy staff officer	185,000	51%	33%	67%	68%	45%	76%
Upper division clerk	170,000	47%	31%	61%	62%	42%	70%
Lower division clerk	155,000	43%	28%	56%	57%	38%	64%
Record keeper	140,000	39%	25%	50%	51%	34%	58%
Peon	125,000	34%	23%	45%	46%	31%	51%

Source: World Bank staff analysis of 2015 MPLCS data and review team calculations.

Notes: Base salary is the midpoint of each grade. Household consumption is estimated as average household size x total consumption expenditures per adult equivalent, and is thus an overestimate since typical households include children, whose consumption is lower. Total consumption expenditures comprise spending on food, non-food items, education, housing and the value of use of durable goods.

## Civil service in the context of “real world” employment conditions

**112. How does Myanmar’s civil service compensation compare to “real world” alternatives?** There are two basic methods for such comparisons. The first, called the worker approach, compares the earnings of similar individuals (people of similar age ranges with similar levels of education). This analysis typically uses data from large-scale, nationally representative surveys. The second method, called the jobs approach, examines compensation for jobs that are deemed to be similar in content and level of effort required<sup>53</sup>. This analysis typically relies on the findings of small surveys of specially selected employers. Such surveys may be commissioned by employers who wish to determine whether the compensation packages they offer are suitable for the local market – they may also be commissioned by governments for similar reasons. The jobs approach requires technical care to ensure that the jobs being compared are truly equivalent in content and effort (and are not simply similar job titles). Furthermore, biases arise when surveys focus on elite or international firms (which are often “market leaders” that can afford to offer higher compensation), as opposed to employers that are more typical of the labor market.

53 For discussion of these two methods, and the findings of a “worker approach” analysis of Indonesia’s civil service, see D. Filmer and D. Lindauer, 2001, “Does Indonesia Have a ‘Low Pay’ Civil Service?”. Another paper that tackles similar issues applied to the case of Vietnam is S. Bales and M. Rama, 2001, “Are Public Sector Workers Underpaid? Appropriate Comparators in a Developing Country.”

**113. To assess the “competitiveness” of Myanmar’s civil service compensation, it is crucial to choose realistic comparators.** A guiding question asks what individuals might do if they could not (or did not wish to) work for civil service. Myanmar’s civil service, with approximately 1 million staff, is one of the most important providers of stable, full-time jobs in the country. For many people in Myanmar, the “real world” alternative to a civil service post would be work in the informal sector, in small and medium enterprises, or in agriculture. The types of jobs included in small-scale benchmarking surveys that have been commissioned by elite employers (e.g., multi-national corporations, multi-lateral or bilateral development agencies, international non-governmental organizations, or diplomatic missions) are not a realistic work alternative for the vast majority of Myanmar’s civil servants. Such organizations offer only a small number of jobs and seek out individuals with scarce skills and foreign language abilities. For this reason, analyzing data from a nationally representative large-scale survey is presently the most suitable method for comparing earnings and working conditions across sectors of the economy.

**114. Countries around the world use the labor force survey (LFS) as a valuable source of data on employment and earnings.** The International Labor Organization describes the LFS as “a standard household-based survey of work-related statistics”.<sup>54</sup> The survey typically selects a nationally representative sample of households and asks questions of each person living in those households. The questions probe each individual’s characteristics (e.g., age, gender, and highest level of education completed), as well as details of employment status. The employment questions ask for the following information:

- Main type of paid work (if any) that the respondent does
- Sector of the economy where the individual works
- Type of ownership of the place of work (e.g., public, private, joint venture)
- Benefits offered (e.g., pension, paid annual leave, medical)
- Type of contract, whether written or only a verbal agreement
- Duration of the working relationship (e.g., permanent, temporary, seasonal)
- Number of days and hours worked
- Amount of income in cash or in kind the person receives

The survey also gathers information about any secondary employment that individuals may undertake in addition to their main work.

**115. After a 25-year hiatus, Myanmar conducted a LFS in 2015. The sample comprised over 24,000 households (and everyone residing in them) around the country, and asked over 160 questions, including the questions above.** The plans for the civil-service compensation review included a comparison of civil service compensation with conditions in other sectors, based on analysis of the LFS database. However, at the time of writing this report, the database had not yet been released and, as a result, this analysis was not possible. Once the LFS data become available, the Government of Myanmar may wish to undertake the analysis itself.

**116. In the absence of LFS data, this report uses other sources to place the civil service in the broader context of Myanmar’s labor market and economy.** The guiding questions ask what the labor market looks like, what work opportunities exist, and how workers outside the civil service are treated.

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<sup>54</sup> As of October 2016, the International Labor Organization’s website listed LFS reports for over 170 countries and territories. Some countries conduct LFS on an annual, quarterly, or monthly basis, while other countries conduct it less frequently.

**117. Myanmar's labor market is dominated by informal employment.** Almost 71 percent of workers are in the informal sector,<sup>55</sup> and over 50 percent of the labor force is employed in the agriculture sector.<sup>56</sup> Many workers face tenuous labor conditions, as documented in studies and in the media.<sup>57</sup>

**118. At present, only public sector workers receive pension benefits.** The only workers in Myanmar who receive pension benefits are civil servants and other government-affiliated workers in state economic enterprises, the defense sector, and political personnel. This group constitutes less than 5 percent of the population.<sup>58</sup>

**119. Workers in the formal private sector are covered by a contributory social security scheme.** The existing scheme covers medical care and provides cash payments in case of workplace injury, death, maternity or paternity, and illness.<sup>59</sup> The 2012 Social Security Law includes provisions for expanding coverage to informal sector workers in the future, but the details are yet to be worked out. For civil servants, Civil Service Rules 2014 stipulates various types of leave for illness, maternity or paternity, disability, and other conditions (see annex 2). Medical care appears to be provided to civil servants in some (not all) government bodies or certain geographic locations.

**120. Myanmar's first-ever minimum wage took effect on 1 September 2015, after lengthy negotiations.** The official rate of MMK 3,600 per 8-hour day applies to all sectors, but according to the notification 2/2015 on 28th August 2015, not to businesses that employ fewer than 15 workers.<sup>60</sup> The new minimum wage has inspired controversy. Some factory owners claimed it would be unaffordable and called for a boycott, while workers' groups feared that they would see little gain because employers would reduce or eliminate other, more discretionary, components of compensation.<sup>61</sup> Many workers continue to earn less than MMK 3,600 per day or have unstable incomes.<sup>62</sup> However, since many workers want to earn more than MMK 3,600 per day, the national committee on minimum wage is reviewing the current official rate.

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55 World Bank, 2015b, "Strengthening Social Security Provision in Myanmar."

56 World Bank, 2015c, "Realigning the Union Budget to Myanmar's Development Priorities: Myanmar Public Expenditure Review 2015."

57 See, for example, World Bank, 2016a, "A Country on the Move: Domestic Migration in Two Regions of Myanmar." In spring 2016, reporting on labor issues by The Global New Light of Myanmar and the Myanmar Times newspapers included a march by factory workers seeking better conditions, an Arbitration Council ruling of abusive treatment at a steel factory, and accusations of widespread violations of labor laws by garment factories.

58 World Bank, 2015b, "Strengthening Social Security Provision in Myanmar." The pension scheme for these workers is a non-contributory, defined benefit plan: workers do not pay into it, and their pension is calculated as a percentage of their final salary. Although the 2012 Social Security Law mandates the creation of a contributory pension scheme for private sector workers, this appears to be some way off, since its parameters have yet to be decided.

59 Ibid.


60 Reuters, "Myanmar sets \$2.80 daily minimum wage in bid to boost investment," 29 August 2015. The minimum wage was seen as particularly important to promote investment in the garment industry, which has been expanding rapidly. In December 2015, the Government of Myanmar raised the rate for daily wage earners employed by government bodies to MMK 3,600 to match the minimum wage.

61 Myanmar Times, "New minimum wage sees workers sacked and struggling," 31 August 2015.

62 For example, female laborers on flower farms were paid MMK 2,000 per day, while men earned MMK 3,000 (The Global New Light of Myanmar, "Maymyo flower growers flourish," 14 March 2016). A self-employed vendor selling coffee in a downtown Yangon market earned between about MMK 3,000 and MMK 7,000 per day, according to a profile in Myanmar Times, "Keep calm and sell coffee: Mobile vendor meets market demand," 20 May 2016.

121. **In contrast, the lowest civil-service grade earns substantially more than a minimum wage worker.** The lowest civil service base salary is MMK 120,000 per month (FY 2015/2016), whereas a minimum wage worker would earn an estimated MMK 77,400 per month at the official rate of MMK 3,600 per eight-hour day. This estimate assumes 4.3 weeks per month and 5 days per week. (In reality, while government workers have a 5-day, 40-hour work week, non-civil servants typically work 5.5 days or possibly longer.) Figure 16 shows civil service monetary earnings (base salary, regional allowance), compared to those of a minimum wage worker.

Figure 16: Civil service monetary earnings compared with minimum wage worker, 2014-2016



122. **This finding is consistent with the earlier observation that lower-level (or less-educated) workers are often better off in the public sector.** Since 13.9 percent of union-level civil service jobs are in the lowest grade, this group of beneficiaries is substantial. More broadly, as the analysis in chapter 4 shows, over 90 percent of civil service posts in union-level bodies are in the non-gazetted grades. It is thus important to understand what employment prospects the individuals in these grades are likely to have outside the civil service. Data from the labor force survey may help shed light on this.

123. **More detailed comparison of civil service compensation with the rest of the labor market will have to wait until LFS data are released.** The exact analysis that is possible will depend upon the specifics of the Myanmar dataset. However, based upon studies in other countries, a worker approach analysis of LFS will provide data by sector or type of ownership, and for individuals with similar education levels. This data includes average monetary earnings from the primary, full-time job; percent of workers who receive paid annual leave; percent of workers who receive paid sick leave; percent of workers whose employment status is permanent, temporary, or seasonal; and percent of workers who undertake secondary employment in addition to their primary full-time job.

## Ability of the civil service to attract and retain skills

**124. The level of interest that individuals show in gaining (or retaining) civil service employment gives some insight into the civil service’s attractiveness as an employer.** As mentioned earlier, for this reason, many countries commonly track turnover rates and other data on human resources. These dynamics reflect multiple factors, of which compensation is only one. Nevertheless, they are valuable indicators. For example, a high turnover rate can suggest that individuals are leaving the civil service for better opportunities outside of government. Low numbers of qualified applicants for advertised job openings in the civil service may also indicate that a civil service career holds little appeal.

**125. This report examines Myanmar’s situation from three different perspectives.** First, the analysis sought out routine administrative data on personnel issues. Second, civil service managers, whose long careers give them insight into workplace dynamics, were interviewed. Third, the views of “regular” civil servants were obtained via the survey and focus group discussions.

**126. Ministries routinely collect data on personnel movements, but standard personnel indicators do not appear to be available.** Each department within a ministry prepares a monthly report that lists total staff numbers at the start and end of the period, the number of staff who left the civil service by reason (resignation, retirement, dismissal, death, and other), and internal movements (i.e., transfers from one department or government body to another). These reports are submitted to a unit within the former MNPED and, in principle, could be used to regularly monitor civil service-wide indicators, such as turnover rates. Such monitoring would enable the Government of Myanmar to detect changes in its ability to attract and retain staff. However, the World Bank team was unable to ascertain whether any such government-wide data and indicators are regularly generated.

**127. In order to calculate indicative turnover rates, the World Bank team requested 12 months of these reports from a sample of departments.** Turnover rates are calculated by department, separated by gazetted versus non-gazetted staff. (The results are presented in full in chapter 6 on human resource management.) Overall, the data reveal that voluntary resignations are at a low level, with some differences across departments. Retirement is by far the major reason for individuals to leave the civil service. Table 11 presents data for the nine departments (in the sample) that employ at least 1,000 staff. The resignation rates were under 1 percent in seven of these nine departments, both for gazetted staff and non-gazetted staff.

Table 11: Turnover in a sample of nine departments with at least 1,000 staff, 2015-2016

Department	Total staff	Resignations	Dismissals	Retirements	Deaths	Total departures as % of staff	Resignations as % of staff	New hires	Net transfers
<b>Gazetted staff</b>									
Internal Revenue	888	2	3	34	3	4.7	0.2	84	80
Customs	242	2	0	5	0	2.9	0.8	23	20
Labor Affairs	813	22	0	26	3	6.3	2.7	66	152
Social Security Board	347	13	0	11	1	7.2	3.7	52	16
Immigration and Population	723	5	0	36	5	6.4	0.7	1	334
Higher Education	11,075	27	1	191	25	2.2	0.2	139	2,429
Training and Vocational Education	825	3	0	5	0	1.0	0.4	0	152
Basic Education	6,553	0	4	489	23	7.9	0.0	0	1,162
GAD	1,461	2	6	29	2	2.7	0.1	262	35
<b>Non-gazetted staff</b>									
Internal Revenue	3,404	18	3	42	13	2.2	0.5	507	-75
Customs	1,452	12	7	25	12	3.9	0.8	26	-17
Labor Affairs	2,877	52	7	45	8	3.9	1.8	3	-109
Social Security Board	1,784	20	4	29	5	3.3	1.1	3	-70
Immigration and Population	5,740	40	13	57	36	2.5	0.7	25	-345
Higher Education	13,215	63	8	113	36	1.7	0.5	293	-2,462
Training and Vocational Education	2,902	14	11	12	5	1.4	0.5	0	-51
Basic Education	407,221	428	117	5,122	778	1.6	0.1	59,670	-1,077
GAD	31,800	297	54	408	117	2.8	0.9	867	-259

Source: Monthly reports from each department and World Bank calculations.

Notes: Data cover the 12-month period, October 2015-September 2016. Total staff is the average of employment at the start of each month. Net transfers equals transfers in from other government bodies minus transfers out to other government bodies.

**128. The World Bank team’s discussions with several civil-service managers also confirm that departures are at a modest level.** Not surprisingly, dynamics appear to vary by sector or department, and by grade. For example, officials within a department of the Ministry of Commerce noted that gazetted grades see little turnover, while non-gazetted staff are more likely to change jobs. The perceived reasons were that some individuals might accept non-gazetted jobs as a “stepping stone,” since experience in a well-regarded department enables them to pursue better opportunities (whether a gazetted post or a job in the private sector.) Interestingly, these officials believed that the FY 2015/2016 increase in the base salary scale had led to fewer departures because compensation now compared more favorably to private sector offerings. A township education officer remarked that it was rare to see teachers leave other than for health reasons or retirement. A



manager in the Ministry of Health noted that, although private practice might offer higher salaries, the public service offered more interesting opportunities for professional development. The nuances that these examples demonstrate are one more reason why regular analysis and monitoring of turnover—not only by department but also by grade and profession—would serve the Government of Myanmar well.

**129. Finally, despite challenges, survey and focus group respondents value their civil service status, and most would recommend a civil service career to others.** Participants in the focus group discussions perceived substantial advantages to being a civil servant, while also sharing diverse views about the adequacy (or inadequacy) of their income and the factors that motivate individuals to join or leave the civil service (see box 5). Despite its limited sample size, the written survey presented a very clear message. Although 87 percent of respondents believed that one civil servant's compensation alone was not sufficient to support an entire family, 88 percent had not made serious efforts to find work elsewhere in the past 12 months so as to leave the civil service, and 73 percent would recommend to other people that they seek a job in the civil service. (See annex 10 for detailed results for these survey questions.)

**130. These findings require careful interpretation. For one thing, a better question may have been whether a civil servant's income could cover half of a family's basic needs, since—according to Myanmar's 2014 census—85.2 percent of males aged 15-64 years and 50.5 percent of females aged 15-64 years are in the labor force.**<sup>63</sup> Furthermore, compensation is not the only consideration influencing these attitudes. Focus group members also mentioned factors, such as job stability, dignity, a perceived lack of opportunities outside of government, and other views related to an individual's specific circumstances. Despite drawbacks, it seems that civil service jobs are currently considered attractive by many people. Of course, this may change over the medium to long term, as the economy develops and work opportunities in the formal private sector become more plentiful and appealing. The Government of Myanmar would be well advised to collect further evidence (both qualitative and quantitative) through additional research and monitoring in future.

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<sup>63</sup> See Ministry of Labor, Immigration, and Population, Department of Population, 2015. The overall proportion of the population aged 15-64 years in the labor force is 67.0%. The 2014 census also found that 64.4% of the population aged 15-64 years is employed: 81.9% of males and 48.4% of females.

#### **Directors (discussed in two of three groups)**

- In one group, reasons mentioned for why people join the civil service included salary and benefits; dignity; pension; ‘not-rich, but not-poor’ lifestyle; and lack of other opportunities. In the other group, compensation was mentioned as an important reason, but respondents also felt that health-care benefits, subsidized housing, and the travel allowance should be increased. Pride and dignity were also important.
- Reasons not to join the civil service included higher salaries in private business and the perception that the private sector paid according to ability, while the civil service paid according to rank and position. In the other group, participants were not sure how much they would earn in other sectors for similar responsibilities. Even if pay were higher, other sectors would offer less job stability than the civil service.

#### **Directors plus deputy directors (one group)**

- Compensation was adequate for basic living needs for mid- to upper-level gazetted officers only. Pay might cover half of a family's expenses. Compensation of non-gazetted officers was sufficient only for one person, covering only a small portion of family expenses.
- To earn extra income, civil servants might run a shop from their home, sell things at the office, do additional work outside of their job, or rely on support from family. Some engage in behavior that breaks the rules.
- Reasons for quitting the civil service included running one's own business or working for a company (to earn more money), and other factors.
- If participants were not civil servants, options included working in their own business, for a non-governmental organization, or abroad. They felt strongly that they could earn more money elsewhere.

#### **Assistant directors (three groups)**

- Reasons people join the civil service included pension, compensation, benefits, and lack of enough money to start a business.
- Reasons not to join included higher pay in the private sector.
- Generally, they felt compensation was not a major factor in attracting people to the civil service. Compensation was not sufficient to support more than one person, so people would need to find extra work, in addition to their civil service jobs.
- Compensation was enough for a single person. It was not enough to support a family or parents, younger siblings, and other dependents.
- If a family had two or more children in school (higher education), then even two incomes were not enough.
- Civil servants could supplement their earnings by selling things, operating a car or motorcycle taxi, sewing, or tutoring.
- One of the main reasons people leave the civil service was the opportunity to earn a higher income in other sectors.

#### **GAD (four groups)**

- Reasons people join included job security, stability, dignity, better compensation than in other sectors, pension, lack of other opportunities, regular income, and overall stability of life.
- Reasons not to join included low income, income insufficient to raise a family's standard of living, separation from families if assigned to hardship areas, and no other income sources.

## Fairness and transparency of civil service compensation

**131. This report discusses fairness (equity) and transparency together, since they are closely related.** The concept of equity, or fairness, is often explained simply as “equal pay for equal work.” When compensation frameworks are not transparent (i.e., important components of compensation vary in value for reasons that are hard to determine, or some forms of compensation are hard to discern), it is obviously difficult to examine whether they achieve a reasonable degree of equity. However, the very condition of lacking transparency makes it possible for practices to arise that are not equitable, whether by intent or simply by circumstance.

**132. As described in chapter 4, the two main monetary components of compensation (base salary and regional allowance) are clearly regulated, for the most part.** Progression up the base salary scale is orderly, with earnings in each higher grade always greater than in the adjacent lower grade.<sup>64</sup> In FY 2015/2016, an MMK 30,000 allowance, introduced three years earlier, was consolidated into the new base salary scale, which improved the transparency of monetary compensation (although it also increased the Government’s future pension liabilities.) The scale for the regional allowance for hardship areas increases progressively with each higher gazetted grade. For non-gazetted grades, the scale favors lower grades, which receive larger amounts than do higher non-gazetted grades. (See table 4 in chapter 4 for the FY 2015/2016 scales.) This appears to reflect a conscious decision to increase the earnings of non-gazetted civil servants, who constitute the bulk of civil service posts. Nevertheless, total monetary earnings (base salary plus regional allowance) for non-gazetted grades still increase progressively with each higher grade. An additional transparency-related point is that the criteria used for classifying locations as hardship areas, and for determining in which of the three hardship levels an area belongs, are not stated in the regulation that establishes the scale and, to our knowledge, are not publicly available.

**133. The minimal within-grade pay progression could also be seen as unfair or un-competitive, in broad terms.** As discussed in the previous chapter, the modest size of increments to base salary means that individuals see little growth in earnings over time, barring promotion to a higher-grade position or an adjustment to the entire base salary scale. Furthermore, higher-grade jobs (and workers with more “on the job” experience) get a smaller relative increase in pay, since the kyat-denominated increment represents a smaller percentage of base salary. While people generally welcome any increase in their earnings, the prospect of only minimal pay raises over a 10-year horizon may weaken motivation.

**134. Other types of financial benefits get less attention.** Like other workers in Myanmar, civil servants receive generous income tax exemptions (described earlier). It is possible that some civil servants benefit from other privileges that offset their cost of living, whether to a lesser or greater degree. In a modest example, in 2016, during the busy travel period of the annual Thingyan water festival, private bus companies were required to sell a certain number of seats on each bus to civil servants at regulated prices.<sup>65</sup>

**135. Non-monetary allowances are far more variable and discretionary than monetary compensation.** As discussed in chapter 4, it has been observed in other countries that in-kind allowances may be de facto compensation (in part, and under certain circumstances), as opposed to serving purely to enable work activities. The dividing line can be difficult to establish, but the issue is pertinent to Myanmar. Individual departments make their own rules about which positions receive in-kind compensation (such as free or subsidized housing, vehicles, petrol, and telephone allowances.) Readers can get a sense of the variation across departments from

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<sup>64</sup> This assessment excludes any sector- or department-specific monetary allowances that may exist and also assumes that equivalent jobs are classified as the same grade level.

<sup>65</sup> See The Global New Light of Myanmar, “Special bus tickets available for government staff during Thingyan water festival,” 15 March 2016.

table 8 (chapter 4), which summarizes practices in six ministries and UCSB. More detailed tables for each allowance are available in the annexes. The World Bank team was not aware of any centralized documentation about these department-level decisions. As a result, it is not easy to know the full compensation package that is provided to different positions and to individuals working in different departments.

**136. Focus group discussions and the survey are consistent with this assessment.** Focus group participants noted that monetary compensation was mostly clear. However, they remarked that in-kind allowances varied across (or even within) departments. Some said that it depended on the manager, and that clearer rules were needed (see box 6). In the written survey, only 31 percent of respondents said that it was easy to understand the compensation (both monetary and in kind) for different civil service jobs; 40 percent said it was not easy; and the remaining 28 percent did not know, did not answer the question, or gave multiple answers. (See annex 10 for details.) Interestingly, a higher percentage of gazetted staff stated that it was not easy to understand. This may reflect their greater experience with in-kind allowances which, as explained earlier, vary substantially across departments and are awarded primarily to gazetted (rather than non-gazetted) staff.

**137. The case of housing allowances illustrates the difficulty of understanding who benefits from in-kind compensation and by how much.** In 2016 alone, a number of government bodies announced plans to build what were described as “affordable” or “low cost” housing units for sale or for rent, with government workers among the priority beneficiaries.<sup>66</sup> In addition, existing rental units owned or managed by government ministries or departments were allocated to civil servants, often by lottery because of the large numbers of interested people.<sup>67</sup> It is difficult to ascertain the number of civil servants who access housing through such initiatives, however. Clearly, the benefit to those who are able to purchase or rent such a unit is substantial, since large numbers of people seek out these opportunities. The value to individuals, however, is also difficult to estimate because it requires assessing local supply and market prices for similar units, among other factors.<sup>68</sup>

**138. Access to government housing has also been the subject of well-publicized controversy in some cases.** For example, units in a development in the city of Mawlamyine in Mon State that were intended for sale to civil servants were instead reportedly purchased by business people and rented out.<sup>69</sup> Large numbers of apartments built in Yangon by the Government of Myanmar in past decades as subsidized rental housing for military personnel and civil servants have reportedly been transferred informally to other tenants, sometimes for significant sums of money. A government official suggested that this problem arose, in part, due to weak supervision by the responsible government authorities.<sup>70</sup> The media have also covered concerns about more recent developments.<sup>71</sup>

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66 Newspaper reports of new construction announcements include, for example, the Ministry of Education’s plan to build 55 “staff quarters” and 264 apartments in remote areas in FY 2015/2016 and FY 2016/2017, respectively; 420 apartments in Mandalay region with priority given to teachers; and a multi-purpose development in Yangon with housing for Myanmar Railway staff (The Global New Light of Myanmar, “Education Ministry vows to give priority to building staff quarters for teachers,” “Priority given to educational staff for low-cost housing,” and “High-rise car parking and hotels to be built on Myanmar Railway land,” 11 August 2016). An unspecified number of apartments being completed in southeast Yangon will be available to staff of the Inland Revenue Department (Myanmar Times, 3 May 2016, “Inland Revenue tackles its own corruption”).

67 Newspaper reports of completed housing government bodies include, for example, 400 units for sale by the city of Mandalay to civil servants with 25 years of service, which received over 9,000 applications; and a lottery for current and retired civil servants to allocate 64 rental apartments in Mawlamyine township in Mon state (The Global New Light of Myanmar, “The first affordable housing rolled out in Mon State,” 8 August 2016).

68 Indicatively, the “low cost” apartments built by the Mandalay City Development Committee for sale to civil servants were expected to sell for MMK 13.5-16.5 million (The Global New Light of Myanmar, “Priority given to educational staff for low-cost housing,” 11 August 2016). A separate newspaper article probing the unofficial transfers of residency in government-built apartments to third parties describes official rents that are substantially below market rates (Myanmar Times, “Govt signals crackdown on unauthorised occupants of state-owned apartments,” 15 March 2016).

69 The Global New Light of Myanmar, “The first affordable housing rolled out in Mon State,” 8 August 2016.

70 Myanmar Times, “Govt signals crackdown on unauthorised occupants of state-owned apartments,” 15 March 2016.

71 Myanmar Times, “Construction ministry targets source of housing request leak,” 22 March 2016.

**Directors (discussed in one of two groups)**

- Most respondents said that compensation system was easy to understand. Some said it was not transparent and that there was bias and discrimination.
- Some participants thought their compensation was fair; others did not.
- Monetary compensation may be fair, but non-monetary compensation varies. It depends on the department head, the specific ministry, and the workplace location.

**Directors plus deputy directors (one group)**

- Non-monetary compensation varies across departments, sometimes even within departments. Some departments provide lunch or food and supplies for the home, while other departments cannot.

**Assistant directors (discussed in two of three groups)**

- Compensation for the same amount of responsibility may be different in different workplaces. Base salary, overtime pay, travel allowance, daily allowance, and accommodation rates may differ.
- Respondents did not perceive salaries and benefits as fair. People with the same type of job, roles, and responsibilities may be compensated differently. It depends on the person who is in charge.
- The compensation system is not transparent. There are no specific rules and regulations, so it depends on the manager's discretion. There is a need to have clear rules for different levels and clarity about compensation of civil servants at union, region, and state levels.
- Participants wanted managers to be fair in assigning responsibilities and compensation/benefits to staff. They wanted the relevant authorities to give clear guidelines and instructions.

**139. A less visible factor related to equity has to do with the classification of jobs into grades.** Large employers in advanced economies use job evaluation and job families to create a systematic framework for the different types of jobs they offer. Definitions and practices differ somewhat across employers, but in general the terms refer to the following arrangements and processes. A job family is “a group of jobs involving similar types of work and requiring similar training, skills, knowledge, and expertise.”<sup>72</sup> Job families that contain many types of jobs may be further sub-divided into specializations.<sup>73</sup> Job evaluation is a process to assess the relative value of jobs within the organization, measured against explicit criteria. Job evaluation takes into consideration the content of job descriptions<sup>74</sup> for the jobs that are being evaluated, among other things. (See box 7 for a more detailed explanation.) Overall, this enables the employer to rank jobs according to their value, relative to each other (from lower relative value up to higher relative value), and also to understand which jobs have equivalent value, even though they may be in different job families or specializations. Positioning jobs in the grading system on this basis is fundamental to fairness, as expressed in the phrase, “equal pay for equal work.”

<sup>72</sup> Definition from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology human resource website, which has a clear explanation and example at <http://hrweb.mit.edu/compensation/job-evaluations/job-families>. Examples of other organizations' guidelines and practices can easily be found through an online search.

<sup>73</sup> For example, a job family for health care providers might be further divided into physicians, nursing, and so on. A job family for financial services might be divided into specializations, such as accounting, budget, etc.

<sup>74</sup> A job description is a concise written document that describes for a particular job its responsibilities, activities, reporting arrangements, and the competencies required of the job holder. In Myanmar, the term “job description” is often misunderstood to refer to an organizational chart (a diagram that displays the structure of an organization, its key positions, and its reporting arrangements).

Job evaluation is a process for defining the relative worth of jobs within an organization. It is independent of the process of setting pay scales.

Job evaluation has a number of purposes:

- Understanding the duties of each job are, using written job descriptions
- Providing a rational basis for the design and maintenance of a fair and transparent pay structure
- Helping manage the relativities existing between jobs in an organization
- Enabling fair and consistent decisions on grading and rates of pay, both now and in the future
- Enabling comparisons of the worth of different jobs, so that equal pay can be provided for work of equal value

Job evaluation employs these common methods:

- *Job ranking:* This is accomplished using job descriptions or job titles. Evaluators consider each job as a whole and rank it order, based on their sense of what is fair. The result is a table that ranks jobs from highest to lowest.
- *Paired comparisons:* Each job is compared as a whole with each other job in turn. Points (0, 1, or 2) are awarded according to whether the job’s overall importance is judged to be less than, equal to, or more than the other jobs.
- *Job classification:* The number of grades is decided first, then detailed grade definitions are produced. For each grade, representative (benchmark) jobs are evaluated to validate the definitions. After that, other (non-benchmark) jobs are assigned to grades, based on the relevant grade definitions.

There are more complex methods for job evaluation that are more time consuming. An example is “points rating,” which breaks down each job into a number of factors (e.g., skill, responsibility, and effort) and assigns points to each factor. The total number of points indicates that job’s worth. Comparing the points for different jobs gives an idea of their relative worth.

**140. Although Myanmar appears to have a basic system of job families, the rationale underlying the grading structure is not evident.** Provisions in *Civil Service Rules 2014* imply the job families and hierarchical structure shown in table 12. In the course of the review, it was not entirely clear how this is used in practice and, particularly, what criteria and processes determine how jobs are assigned to specific grades. While robust job descriptions are an important part of job evaluation, the use and coverage of job descriptions in the Myanmar civil service appear to vary significantly, as discussed in chapter 6 on human resource management. It is common in other countries to have guidelines that describe the features for each grade, such as the competencies or level of responsibility of jobs that are classified into that grade.<sup>75</sup> It is not clear that such guidelines exist (or are used effectively) in Myanmar. Indeed, the types of job titles that are grouped together in the same grade suggest a wide range of skill and responsibility levels.

<sup>75</sup> The specific way job guidelines are developed depends on each country or organization’s needs and approach. However, as a simple, illustrative example, a lower-level grade might be described as containing jobs that involve carrying out routine tasks that are repetitive and that do not require sophisticated skills. This might be accompanied by more detailed parameters for the required knowledge and competence, complexity of tasks, level of decision-making responsibility, and any supervisory component. A high-level grade for senior managers might be described (overall) as requiring the ability to plan and lead a large government division. More detailed parameters would then describe the knowledge and competence required, complexity, and so on.



Table 12: Job families implied in Civil Service Rules 2014

Base salary scale, FY 2015/2016	Professional	Administrative (economic)	Administrative (management and social)	Technical	Clerical	Office support
500,000						
380,000/4,000/400,000						
340,000/4,000/360,000						
310,000/4,000/330,000						
280,000/4,000/300,000	Professional 5	Administrative (economic) 4	Administrative (mgmt & social) 3			
250,000/4,000/270,000	Professional 4	Administrative (economic) 3	Administrative (mgmt & social) 2			
210,000/2,000/220,000	-	-	-	-	-	-
195,000/2,000/205,000				Technical 5	Clerk 4	
180,000/2,000/190,000	Professional 3	Administrative (economic) 2	Administrative (mgmt & social) 1	Technical 4	Clerk 3	
165,000/2,000/175,000	Professional 2	Administrative (economic) 1		Technical 3	Clerk 2	
150,000/2,000/160,000	Professional 1			Technical 2	Clerk 1	Helper 3
135,000/2,000/145,000				Technical 1		Helper 2
120,000/2,000/130,000						Helper 1

Source: World Bank synthesis of information in Civil Service Rules and Regulations 2014, table 1.

Note: Level numbering in this source is the reverse of the Union Government amendment of the “Job Titles of Government Officers and Employees” (Announcement Order No. 23/2015, 19 March 2015), which uses 5 for the lowest level and 1 for the highest.

**141. Having a suitable grade structure is especially important to the health and education sectors.**

There are several reasons for this. First, these sectors deliver vital services to the public. Second, they constitute an important share of public employment and the wage bill in Myanmar, just as in many other countries. (Chapter 3 on affordability presents overall sectoral data, table 13 shows employment numbers in key health-care providers, while table 14 looks closely at the different job levels, with number of staff and compensation within each, in Myanmar’s basic education system.) Third, due to the nature of professions in these sectors, an individual may spend an entire, decades-long career in the same line of work (e.g., teacher, nurse, midwife, and physician). Encouraging and recognizing the value of skill development over time requires providing opportunities for promotion within the same profession, accompanied by increases in earnings.

Table 13: Health workers by function, 2013-2014

Job title	Staff (preliminary actual)
Doctors	31,542
<i>Public</i>	13,099
<i>Co-operative and private</i>	18,443
Dental surgeon	3,219
<i>Public</i>	782
<i>Co-operative and private</i>	2,437
Nurses	29,532
Dental nurses	357
Health assistants	2,062
Female health visitors	3,467
Midwives	21,435
Health supervisor (level 1)	652
Health supervisor (level 2)	4,998
Traditional medicine practitioners	6,963
<i>Public</i>	1,048
<i>Private</i>	5,915
<b>Total</b>	<b>104,227</b>

Source: MOH website, www.moh.gov.mm; most recent data is as of November 2016.

**142. The case of teachers in Myanmar’s basic education system (primary, middle and high schools) illustrates this point.** Myanmar’s teachers must (and do) move to teaching higher grades in order to see any substantial increase in earnings. For example, as table 14 shows, primary school teachers who start at a base salary of MMK 150,000 will reach the maximum earnings potential in 10 years. With a pay increment of MMK 2,000 awarded every two years, this maximum salary is only 6 percent higher than the starting salary. These teachers will get no more pay increases (unless the entire salary scale is adjusted) for the rest of their careers—unless they become school heads or move to teaching middle or high school students. Middle school teachers face a similar incentive. At the top of the system, a high school teacher’s maximum base salary is only 5.6 percent higher than the bottom level (applied to a teacher who has just started their career) of the same grade.

Table 14: Teachers and school heads in basic education, FY 2015/2016

Job title	Number of posts (budget estimates)	Base pay grade, as of FY 2015/2016
<b>Gazetted staff</b>		
High school head	1,788	250,000/4,000/270,000
Middle school head	2,520	250,000/4,000/270,000
<b>Non-gazetted staff</b>		
High school teacher	34,059	180,000/2,000/190,000
High school teacher (PE)	1,268	180,000/2,000/190,000
Middle school teacher	78,668	165,000/2,000/175,000
Middle school teacher, junior	448	165,000/2,000/175,000
Middle school teacher 2	45,850	165,000/2,000/175,000
Middle school teacher (PE)	1,337	165,000/2,000/175,000
Primary school head	34,343	165,000/2,000/175,000
Primary school teacher	135,646	150,000/2,000/160,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>335,927</b>	

Source: Department of Basic Education, budget estimate forms for FY 2015/2016.

**143. The most striking feature in Myanmar is the very modest growth in teacher’s earnings *within* a given level of the education system.** It is not unusual in other countries for teachers of higher grades to earn more than teachers at lower levels of the education system. However, *within* a given level of an education system, teachers see substantial growth in earnings over the course of their career, which is not the case in Myanmar.<sup>76</sup> As discussed in chapter 7 on education, this means that teachers are motivated to move to higher grades as soon as they can, leaving teachers with the least experience to teach primary school students. As of 2016, the Ministry of Education is considering possibilities for addressing this problem by developing a better career path, including a separate base-pay scale for teaching staff.

## Managing compensation and recommendations for the way forward


**144. This section recommends policy and technical measures, based on the preceding analysis of compensation issues.** The review was launched in response to the Government of Myanmar’s request for analytical support. Thus the overarching objective has been to provide the best possible analysis and bring to bear international practice and expertise. This approach reflects a fundamental value: policy decisions should be informed by robust evidence. It is up to Myanmar’s policy makers to weigh that evidence, take account of any other considerations, and make the choices that best serve the country’s needs.

<sup>76</sup> For example, in most—but not all—OECD member states, teachers at higher grades of a school system earn more than those at lower levels; the degree of such pay difference varies across countries. However, within a given level of the education system, a teacher who reaches the top of the scale in the course of a career will earn substantially more than the starting salary for that level. According to the OECD, teachers at the top of the scale in primary education and lower secondary education earn 70% more than the starting salary for that level, on average; teachers at the top of the scale in upper secondary education earn 68% more than the starting salary for that level (OECD, 2016, “Education at a Glance 2016: OECD Indicators”). In countries where it takes several decades to reach the top of the scale, the difference may be even greater.

145. **Since budgetary resources are always limited, expenditure choices inevitably involve trade-offs.** Spending more on one item means having fewer resources to spend on other needs. Figure 17 illustrates three fundamental trade-offs around civil service compensation and employment policies. First, the wage bill is a significant part of every country’s budget and must be managed with a view to other competing expenditure needs (such as supplies for essential services and infrastructure). Second, adjustments to pay scales entail a choice between targeted adjustments (e.g, to any grades that are proven to be undercompensated, with resulting difficulties in attracting and retaining staff) versus a general, across-the-board increase to the entire pay scale. The third trade-off is between using limited funds to employ a large number of workers versus potentially financing higher pay levels for a smaller work force.

146. **While pension issues were outside the scope of the review, readers should bear in mind that Myanmar’s pension system amplifies these trade-offs.** Under the current noncontributory, unfunded system, pensions are paid directly from the budget. Thus, every increase to pensionable components of compensation represents an additional claim on the budget in future years, when current civil servants retire and begin to draw their pensions. Any increases in the number of civil servants would also increase pension liabilities in future budgets. Furthermore, the Government of Myanmar’s recent practice has been to increase the pensions that are paid to current retirees whenever the base salary scale is updated, which has an immediate impact on the budget.

Figure 17: Trade-offs - Expenditures and compensation



Source: World Bank, 2016b, “Wage Bill Modeling for Myanmar,” presentation.

147. **The Government of Myanmar is well aware of the need for pension reform and has sought technical advice from the World Bank and other partners.** One of the practical barriers to designing reforms, however, has been the lack of reliable data on individual employees. Such data are a key input to the actuarial analyses that ensure that the system’s design is financially sustainable. Chapter 3 lays out the considerations involved in creating integrated personnel and payroll systems that would generate such data.

## Recommendations for the immediate to near terms

**148. RECOMMENDATION 5.1: Analyze LFS and the living conditions survey to gain nuanced insights into the adequacy and competitiveness of civil service compensation, and to monitor developments over time.** Earlier sections of this chapter described how large-scale survey data are used to assess the competitiveness and adequacy of government compensation, including a “worker approach” analysis. This is a standard methodology applied in OECD countries, as well as in developing economies.<sup>77</sup> The review’s plans to analyze LFS data for Myanmar were suspended because data from the 2015 LFS had not been released at the time of writing. Once the 2015 LFS data are released, the Government of Myanmar could conduct the analysis on its own or with international guidance. Skilled statisticians can carry out such an analysis with relative ease, following the methodology described in working papers and other publications.<sup>78</sup> Since it is expected that Myanmar will conduct these types of large scale surveys periodically in future, this report recommends that the Government arrange for such analyses to be done for each future round of LFS, as well as for living conditions surveys.

**149. RECOMMENDATION 5.2: Review the rationale for in-kind allowances to establish clarity about objectives and parameters.** The main in-kind allowances (vehicles, fuel, housing, and telephone) appear to be awarded primarily to supervisory and managerial posts in the gazetted grades, which constitute a relatively small, yet important, portion of the civil service. To the extent that these allowances may be intended to supplement earnings (rather than service the direct operational needs of a particular unit), this constitutes a highly variable and discretionary element in the compensation packages for these posts—particularly since the leadership of each department decides the amounts that are awarded and the posts or individuals that receive them. If the Government’s aims include compensating civil servants in an equitable, transparent manner, then such a review would be worthwhile. It could commence in the near term, although reaching a decision for the way forward (and implementing it) may take a year or longer. Such a review would examine these fundamental issues:

- *What purpose is each in-kind allowance meant to serve?* In the course of the review, it was generally not evident whether the objective was a) to supplement individuals’ compensation packages, b) to enable the unit’s work duties to be carried out, or c) a mix.
- *What is the rationale for providing an item “in kind” rather than in monetary form?* If intended to be part of an individual’s compensation package, are there valid reasons to provide it in kind, rather than in monetary form (which provides greater clarity)?
- *Should in-kind allowances be assigned to a post or individual, or be incorporated into the operational resources available to the relevant unit?* If the objective is to enable a unit’s work, is there any rationale for defining it as an allowance for a post or individual, rather than as part of the operational resources for that unit?
- *What degree of variation across departments or units is justified?* Do the missions and operational needs (such as service delivery) of particular units require higher budgets for transportation (e.g., for agricultural outreach) and so on? Do current practices reflect operational needs or are they driven primarily by access to revenues?

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<sup>77</sup> Such reports can be found online. Examples for Ireland, Canada (province of Ontario), and the US federal government are listed in the references for this report.

<sup>78</sup> See Filmer and Lindauer, “Does Indonesia Have a ‘Low Pay’ Civil Service?” (2001); and World Bank, 2010, “Lao PDR Civil Service Pay and Compensation Review.”

- *How cost-effective are existing arrangements and are there more efficient options?* This is pertinent especially to vehicles, given the cost of operating and maintaining large fleets of cars.<sup>79</sup>
- *What would be the financial implications of any changes?* If indeed in-kind allowances supplement income (in whole or in part), then such income is currently nontaxable and nonpensionable. Converting any or all of the allowances into monetary income would affect the individual's income tax obligations, their future pension earnings, future government pension liabilities, and possibly other related costs. These implications would need to be evaluated.

**150. It is up to the Government of Myanmar to specify the mechanism for getting this review done well.** One possibility is to take an approach similar to deliberations around remote-area employment concerns and the regional allowance. That is, the Government could convene a committee comprised of key stakeholders, including MOPF, which should be involved in issues that have fiscal implications. The committee would set the agenda, arrange for the necessary technical analyses to be carried out, and propose recommendations.

**151. This process would produce guidelines that stipulate the justification, criteria, and the kyat amounts for any allowances that continue to be associated with posts.** Together with other compensation-related regulations, such guidelines could be compiled on a website or, as needed, in printed materials. Such online dissemination of civil-service compensation parameters is common practice. For example, the federal governments of the United States and Canada have extensive websites where laws and regulations are posted, along with explanatory texts and other guidance about compensation and the terms and conditions of civil service employment.<sup>80</sup> The information is openly accessible to the public, with no user registration required.

**152. RECOMMENDATION 5.3: It would benefit the Government of Myanmar to begin systematically monitoring its ability to recruit and retain the skills that it needs, where it needs them.** Earlier sections of this chapter described the array of tools that governments use to evaluate the suitability of the compensation they offer, which is one of numerous factors affecting their ability to attract and retain staff. As described in box 8, monitoring indicators are one such tool. The Government of Myanmar does not currently conduct such targeted monitoring, although it routinely collects data that could be used for this purpose.<sup>81</sup>

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79 Other countries have struggled to rein in the managerial and cost burdens of vehicle fleets, which have over time become entrenched and vulnerable to misuse or waste.

80 For Canada's federal public service, see the pay, pension, and benefits website, which provides "information about rates of pay, collective agreements, leave provisions, pension plans, and benefits for the public service," at [www.canada.ca/en/government/publicservice/pay.html](http://www.canada.ca/en/government/publicservice/pay.html). For the US federal government, see [www.usa.gov/benefits-for-federal-employees](http://www.usa.gov/benefits-for-federal-employees).

81 Each department currently prepares a monthly report on the number of staff who left the civil service by reason (e.g., retirement, resignation, etc.), as well as transfers to other government bodies. These could easily be used to calculate turnover rates, as this report's authors did.



Achieving effective policies requires understanding what is working, as well as what is not. Without a doubt, the insights that staff and managers gain through their work provide important perspectives on issues and potential solutions. Examining the experiences of other countries (via country cases, rigorous research, and multi-country analyses) is also valuable. Yet diagnosing the size and shape of a problem, and understanding the actual impact that a particular intervention has, also requires objective data.

Monitoring indicators can help by providing information that is specific, current, and comparable over time. Indicators can focus on specific concerns. For example, the ability to retain staff with certain skills or in certain geographic locations could be tracked by calculating the turnover rate (number of staff who leaves, relative to total staff) by reason and location.

The indicator should be calculated at an interval that provides meaningful information and enables a timely response. Depending on the specific issue, this might be every quarter, every six months, or once per year. The formula for calculating each indicator should be clearly defined and applied in the same way every time, so that the results can be compared over time or across locations. Indicators that are too general or poorly calculated will not be helpful.

**153. This is especially pertinent to the Government of Myanmar’s concerns about how to attract and retain certain categories of staff to “hardship areas.” Senior GAD officials emphasized that, although aware of practices in some other countries, they believed these could not easily be applied in Myanmar’s specific circumstances.** Instead, they have preferred “home grown” approaches, including the recent rounds of adjustments to the regional allowance for hardship areas. Whatever the approach, the question is how policy makers and managers know whether these policies and practices are having the desired impact. Bearing in mind that compensation in general and the regional allowance in particular are just part of the appeal of civil service postings, systematic monitoring would at least provide hard data to incorporate into these deliberations.

**154. A small set of focused indicators would help the Government of Myanmar monitor and refine its compensation and human resource management policies.** Putting this into practice would involve identifying a body to be responsible for calculating and distributing indicators at suitable intervals. Details (including formulas) would be worked out consistent with the principles described in box 9. As noted above, some indicators could be calculated from data already in hand, while others may require revising existing data collection practices or adding new reporting requirements. The following indicators would be worthwhile:

- *Ability to retain staff:* Monitoring indicators include a) percentage of positions that are vacant by type of position, geographic location, and so on)<sup>82</sup>; b) average number of months that employees (also by type of position) remain in a job or geographic location, such as a hardship area; and c) turnover rate by reason (i.e., the number of staff who leave their job due to resignation, transfer, retirement etc., as a percentage of the total employed in that type of post or location).
- *Ability to attract the requisite skills:* Potential monitoring indicators include a) number of people who apply for each advertised job opening, and b) number of qualified people (meeting the specified requirements for the job) who apply for each advertised job opening.

<sup>82</sup> Vacancy rate calculations will be meaningful only if the government of Myanmar revises its policy regarding the official establishment level. This would mean replacing the current practice that prohibits bodies from filling more than 2/3 of their official number of posts, with a new, realistic establishment number that bodies are entitled to fill.

**155. RECOMMENDATION 5.4: Review and update rates for the operational expenses that enable staff to do their jobs.** Expenses, such as transportation costs for site visits or per diem for domestic or international business trips, are not part of an individual’s formal compensation and should not be seen as such. However, as discussed earlier, rates that are too low or too high can create perverse incentives. For example, a health-care worker might visit a patient less often because transport expenses are not adequately reimbursed or, conversely, staff might undertake more business trips than needed in order to collect overly generous per diems. From this perspective, rates that are too low are a waste of a government’s human resources, since civil servants are hindered from doing their work effectively. (Rates that are too high also waste budgetary funds and reduce the effectiveness of civil servants’ work.) Furthermore, when rates for operational expenses are inadequate, the risk increases that development partners who fund projects will introduce their own allowances in an uncoordinated fashion, thereby further distorting work incentives. This dynamic is evident in a number of countries, notably Cambodia, and is difficult to reverse once it has taken hold.<sup>83</sup> It is thus important to set rates that are appropriate and to ensure that they are updated over time, when necessary.

**Box 9:** Adjusting to reality: Reforming operational expenses to improve service delivery

Reforming operational expenses that enable staff to do their jobs could have a direct bearing on services in the health sector. Under budget line 0201, frontline health-service providers (such as midwives and health assistants) are entitled to claim travel allowances, provided that the services delivered take place more than five miles away from their duty station.

This rule distorts the incentives for front-line service providers to serve areas inside the five mile limit. Moreover, the allowed travel rates are either outdated or set at the discretion of the GAD township administrator. The rates are not sufficient to cover actual operational expenses, and this might discourage midwives and health assistants from visiting remote areas. In addition, claiming travel allowances under budget line 0201 requires filling out several tedious forms and gaining clearance before and after travelling, even for very small amounts. Another budget line related to travel, 0306 (for petrol, oil, and lubricants), also deserves review and revision. As it stands now, basic health staff cannot claim the cost of petrol incurred during the course of delivering outreach services in the community, unless the vehicle in question (mostly motorbikes, in this case) is registered as property of the Ministry of Health. In most instances, the motorbikes are personal property of the health staff who, in the absence of public transport option in their areas, must use their own resources to deliver core public health services.

Another operational cost worth revisiting is the coverage of phone bills, regulated under budget line 0307. Because only government-owned land-line phones are covered, a midwife using a mobile phone cannot be reimbursed for top-up charges, even though mobile connections in Myanmar are rapidly expanding and offer huge opportunities to advance flexibility and timely consultation in emergency cases. Mobile phones are a crucial tool, in light of these facts: there are 13.4 million women of reproductive age. On average, 282 mothers die due to pregnancy-related causes for every 100,000 live births. Furthermore, on average, 62 children per every 1,000 live births do not live to see their first birthday.

All these rules might seem trivial. Yet, streamlining and rationalizing the rates and rules for operational expenses could have a profound impact on service delivery. Obviously, increased flexibility and discretion in operational costs should be supported by efficiency and accountability measures, such as auditing and disciplinary actions, to counter any potential for abuse to take place.

<sup>83</sup> For Cambodia’s case, see B. Nunberg and R. Talierno, 2012, “Sabotaging Civil Service Reform in Aid-Dependent Countries: Are Donors to Blame?”.

**156. Such reviews of operational expenses would follow a few guiding principles.** The Government of Myanmar has recently updated a few expenses rates and would benefit from continuing this activity. A few guiding principles, listed below, can also help. Given that each sector has its own dynamics (e.g., patterns of health-care delivery in rural areas) that need to be taken into account, it will be important for sector experts to play a leading role in these reviews. Additional suggestions for how to approach such a review are presented in annex 11, “Developing appropriate rates and regulations for operational allowances.”

- Rates should be sufficient to cover reasonable duty-related expenses, but should not be excessive.<sup>84</sup>
- All proposals should be costed to ensure that they are affordable within the budget.
- Administrative and oversight procedures should be effective enough to prevent abuse, but not so burdensome that compliance requires excessive staff time.
- Rates should be reviewed periodically to ensure that they remain appropriate as price levels change over time.

## Medium to long-term options

**157. RECOMMENDATION 5.5: In the next round of LFS, the Government of Myanmar could include more detailed occupation codes to enable more nuanced comparisons.** Since analysis of LFS is a valuable source of insight into how civil service compensation compares with other sectors (including private employers), more detailed occupation codes will make it possible to do more detailed comparisons. This will be especially important as the economy and the labor market develop over time, and certain skills become more highly sought after (and potentially harder for the Government to attract and retain.)

**158. RECOMMENDATION 5.6: The Government of Myanmar could conduct a focused review of the criteria for each level of the jobs grade structure, and check that jobs are properly allocated to grades.** A grading structure that is well managed and appropriate for the various types of careers within the civil service is one of the foundations for managing human resources, along with an equitable pay system that recognizes the relative worth of jobs and facilitates professional advancement. There are questions about how effective Myanmar’s current grading structure is at 1) ensuring that jobs with a roughly equivalent assessed value are grouped into the same grade (which should be above jobs that are deemed to have a lower value, and below those with a higher assessed value); and 2) facilitating a career path, especially for service delivery professionals in education and health.<sup>85</sup> Some of these features are nominally present in Myanmar’s civil service, although there are obvious shortcomings (e.g., the partial structure of job families implied in the *Civil Service Rules 2014*; job descriptions of variable quality for some posts, as described in the human resource management chapter; and the poor fit with the needs of the basic education system). The existing structure has remained in place for decades, despite its limitations, and has become entrenched. But if Myanmar’s objective is to improve fairness in compensation and HRM, and to provide career paths that encourage and reward staff for building their skills and delivering quality services, then there is room for improvement.

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<sup>84</sup> Information to guide domestic rates can be found with relative ease. For international travel, it may be helpful to examine rates used by other countries or organizations. Although these may exceed what the Government of Myanmar wishes to offer, such rates can serve as a guide, and a ceiling that should not be exceeded. Per diem rates for the United Nations and the US federal government can be found online.

<sup>85</sup> As described earlier, typically, a large employer (e.g., government, university, or corporation) has explicit parameters for each grade that describe the types of jobs (not simply job titles) within a given grade, as well as a system of job families. This is accompanied by written job descriptions that establish the requirements and responsibilities for individual jobs. These job descriptions can serve multiple purposes: to guide recruitment of suitably qualified individuals, to orient jobholders to their roles, and to give structure to performance evaluations.

**159. Such a review would be of limited scope, with a pragmatic approach that focuses on basics.** The starting point would be to clarify the parameters (criteria) that define each grade, and if these do not yet exist, to develop clear, written criteria for each grade. The second part would be to verify whether the current classification of individual jobs into grades makes sense—with respect to these criteria—or needs to be adjusted (i.e., whether some jobs belong in a different grade than where presently classified). Another part would examine the within-grade base salary increments to ensure that these provide a meaningful and systematic progression in pay, as discussed below.

**160. The emphasis, however, should be on a basic review with limited scope, not a lengthy (and expensive) exercise.** This review would also identify any other grading-related needs that may need to be addressed, plus a work program and timeline for addressing them. For example, there may be a need to devise more meaningful job descriptions for some posts.

**161. Devising appropriate grading and compensation regimes for education and health-service providers will require sector-specific expertise.** These two groups are obviously important, not least because they account for almost half of Myanmar's civil service as currently defined.<sup>86</sup> Furthermore, these sectors and the service delivery jobs within them have specific characteristics that need to be taken into account.<sup>87</sup> Indeed, many countries regulate education and health services separately from “white collar” office work for these reasons. Sectoral experts and their development partners will need to play leading roles in ensuring that these needs are met. In the education sector, some deliberations are already underway. In health, decisions about how health-care providers are compensated will have to be explored as part of complex decisions about health sector financing (e.g., whether facilities and providers are paid based on a specified fee for a given type of service, a per capita sum for each patient who registers to receive care at the facility, other methods, or a mix of various methods.)

**162. After the grading criteria and job classifications have been reviewed and adjusted, the next step will be to set salary ranges that are suitable for each grade, while also staying affordable given the budget.** This would include the initial base salary for each grade, as well as the size of the within-grade increments that are awarded, which may benefit from redesign.<sup>88</sup> Increments should be large enough to represent a meaningful progression in pay, without being excessive. In addition, they should represent a systematic increase in base salary. In contrast to Myanmar's system of defining increments as a fixed currency amount (MMK 4,000 for gazetted and MMK 2,000 for non-gazetted posts, as of FY 2015/2016), pay scales elsewhere define the increment as a fixed percentage of base salary. For example, the increment might be calculated as 1.5 percent of the current base salary, so that its relative importance (as a percentage of base salary) is the same for all individuals, regardless of how long they have been in the job or other factors.

**163. Any revisions to salary scales require that proposed salary ranges be subjected to rigorous fiscal impacts analysis.** Such testing should also include sensitivity analysis, to probe the impact of unexpected developments (e.g., if hiring exceeds expectations; if large numbers of daily wage workers are hired as temporary

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<sup>86</sup> As of 2015, education accounted for 40.0%, and health for 7.4%, of all civil servants employed at union, region, and state levels, based on CSO data of actual employment.

<sup>87</sup> For example, facilities such as hospitals need to provide services 24 hours a day, so staff may work in shifts (e.g., nights or days). Teachers not only work hours teaching in the classroom but also preparing lessons, correcting students' work, assessing students and communicating with parents.

<sup>88</sup> In the current base-salary scale, in-grade increments, awarded every 2 years, vary between 1% and 2% of the starting base salary in each grade. Since increments are defined in nominal kyat terms—MMK 2,000 for non-gazetted posts and MMK 4,000 for gazetted posts—the relative “weight” of the increment as a percentage of base salary decreases in importance as workers rise in grade.

teachers and later converted to civil service status; and so on). Pension costs would also need to be considered. This type of fiscal impacts analysis should be conducted whenever changes to the base salary scale are being considered.

**164. The wage bill forecasting model could be used for such fiscal impacts analysis.** In addition to the civil service-wide model described in chapter 3, the World Bank team also developed a more detailed model for the Ministry of Education's Department of Basic Education (DBE). The DBE-specific model enables forecasting employment and costs for each job title (not simply by grade), and was reviewed with DBE staff who also participated in training sessions for the civil service-wide model. With updated data and some modest adjustments, it could be used to test proposals for changes to teacher employment or for a teacher-specific grading structure, if the government wished to explore such an option. Subject to the availability of data and interest, customized models could also be prepared for any other sectors, such as health.

**165. RECOMMENDATION 5.7: Until the formal labor market is more developed, a jobs-based survey offers no advantage to the Government of Myanmar.** Jobs-based surveys aim to compare similar jobs, rather than similar workers. However, they have considerable methodological limitations and are expensive to implement. Above all, they are best suited for economies with a well-developed formal labor market, where the civil service is just one among many appealing career paths.<sup>89</sup> Given the Government's current position as a leading employer in the formal labor market and the lack of evidence of a "brain drain" of skills to other employers, this type of exercise should be deferred.

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<sup>89</sup> In countries with a large informal or agricultural sector, an individual's "real world" alternative to a civil service job may not in fact be the same type of job in the private sector, but rather, informal work. For example, the case of Vietnam and "real world" alternatives to formal employment is described in Bales and Rama, 2001, "Are Public Sector Workers Underpaid?".

# CHAPTER 6

## MANAGING HUMAN RESOURCES FOR BETTER PERFORMANCE

### Introduction

**166. Strengthening human resource functions and adhering to the principle of merit within the civil service have a discernible impact on public sector performance.** Around the world, such an approach has led to a positive effect on economic growth,<sup>90</sup> poverty reduction,<sup>91</sup> control of corruption,<sup>92</sup> and service delivery.<sup>93</sup> In this context, the review also analyzed Myanmar’s core human-resource functions. A review of the civil service legislation was undertaken and the actual practices assessed through focus group discussions and a small survey of civil servants (see annex 10).

**167. Sixteen focus groups, involving 148 gazetted and non-gazetted officers, were asked to discuss the key binding constraints for increasing work performance in the Myanmar civil service.** Discussions with ten focus groups of 100 non-gazetted officers and six focus groups of 48 gazetted officers, all in the Myanmar civil service, were conducted in late 2015.<sup>94</sup> The quantitative survey was conducted among 190 non-gazetted and gazetted officers. (See annex 10 for a summary and analysis of the survey.) The data from these two sources, along with existing background surveys and studies of the Myanmar civil service system, form the backbone of this chapter, which looks at these core areas (see figure 17) of HRM functions:

- *Human resource planning* involves determining future human resource needs and job requirements to ascertain the overall staffing needs of the public sector in general and each specific organization.
- *Recruitment and selection* induces qualified applicants to apply for work in the organization in order to select the most competent applicants to fill the vacant posts.
- *Deployment* is the movement of staff from one work assignment to another, to meet the operational needs of the organization.
- *Retention* refers to the ability of the organization to retain its competent staff and the degree to which the current employees remain with the organization over a given time period.
- *Performance management and appraisal* is the process of communicating the organization’s performance expectations to its employees and assessing the performance of the employees’ work quality, outcomes, and future work potential.
- *Promotion* is the appointment of a current employee to a position in a higher salary range (with increased responsibilities) than the one to which the employee is currently assigned.

90 P. Evans and J.E. Rauch, 1999, “Bureaucracy and Growth: A Cross-National Analysis of the Effects of ‘Weberian’ State Structures on Economic Growth.”

91 J. Henderson et al, 2002, “Economic Governance and Poverty Reduction in South Korea.


92 C. Dahlström, V. Lapuente, and J. Teorell, 2009, “Bureaucracy, Politics, and Corruption.”

93 World Bank, 2003, World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People.

94 The World Bank team also provided training to 32 focus group discussion moderators and assistant moderators from the Institute of Development Administration, GAD, and the Institute of Graduate Studies for Administration and Development.



Figure 18: Framework for diagnostic assessment of the Myanmar civil service HRM system



Source: Adapted from W. McCourt and D. Eldridge, 2003, Global Human Resource Management.

## Human resource planning and human resource systems

**168. Human resource planning is critically important to ensure that the right staff with the appropriate competencies is deployed to positions and areas of strategic priority.** Human resource planning should correspond to the development objectives of a country and be driven by a strong analytical base to guide policy making.

**169. Currently, Myanmar’s overall human resource planning is governed by a policy that allows only two-thirds of vacancies to be filled.** This policy started in the period of the State Peace and Development Council (previously, the State Law and Order Restoration Council)<sup>95</sup> to restrain the growth in the public wage bill. In 2010, however, the policy was relaxed for certain parts of the government, including GAD and the Ministries of Education and Health, to fill vacant positions at the township level, depending on the existing workload.

**170. Human resource planning is managed at the department level in each ministry, and there is no ministerial-wide strategic unit managing this function.** While there are administrative units in the ministries, they are mostly in charge of managing human resource records and do not provide strategic analysis or input into human resource planning. The Ministry of Health is one of the first ministries to set up a focused HRM unit and could serve as an example to other ministries.

95 GAD Record, 2010.

**171. Human resource planning in Myanmar follows a bottom-up approach to determine staffing needs.** Units submit their requests for staff needs to their head of department, based on their roles, work functions, and work responsibilities, and according to their organizational structures. Heads of departments, in turn, submit their staff requests to the director general of their ministry. At this stage, a ministerial committee, comprising its director general and directors, discuss and decide on the staffing requests for the ministry. The decision is compiled by the ministry’s administration division and submitted to the minister for approval. Once the minister has approved it, with the recommendation by the Project Appraisal and Progress Reporting and Budget Department, the request for staff needs of the ministry are submitted to the Union Government Office. When approved, the recruitment process is initiated (see figure 17).

**172. The Government of Myanmar currently reports, but does not analyze, employee turnover data.** Each department within a ministry prepares a monthly report that lists total staff numbers at the start and end of the period, the number of staff who left the civil service by reason (resignation, retirement, dismissal, death, and other), and internal movements (i.e., transfers from one department or government body to another). These reports are submitted to the Project Appraisal and Progress Reporting Department of the Ministry of Planning and Finance.

**173. The low turn-over rates suggest that—for now—the Government of Myanmar is able to attract, and in particular, retain staff.** The World Bank obtained this turnover data from the members of the Inter-Ministerial Committee, and the analysis shows that there is very little turnover in these ministries (see table 15).

**Table 15:** Turnover rates (October 2015-September 2016)

Ministry	Gazetted staff			Non-gazetted staff		
	Total employees (October 2015)	Resignations (percent)	Total turnover (percent)	Total employees (October 2015)	Resignations (percent)	Total turnover (percent)
Education	17,655	0.014	0.385	388,711	0.010	0.132
Energy and Electric Power	751	0.046	0.249	7,418	0.039	0.253
Home Affairs	2,060	0.011	0.277	38,434	0.064	0.205
Planning and Finance	1,967	0.031	0.343	6,695	0.083	0.254
UCSB	300	0.056	0.415	954	0.044	0.264

Notes: Percent values are derived from averaging the 12-month period between October 2015 and September 2016. This approach was chosen to account for the large recruitment in certain departments during this period.

## Recruitment and selection

**174. Recruitment is important because other human-resource policies, such as training and deployment of civil servants, are dependent on the effectiveness of this process.** In Myanmar, the open competition examination is a fundamental and major channel for selecting civil servants.

**175. For now, there appear to be strong incentives to join the civil service, according to the focus groups.** Choosing to enter civil service employment is, of course, based on more than compensation levels. In the focus group discussions, respondents mentioned a range of factors, linking compensation to personal motivations, as well as to broader views on the development of Myanmar. Some of the reasons offered by the focus groups for joining the civil service are job security, a stable and reliable compensation, prestige and dignity, pension benefits, opportunities to go abroad, service to the nation, and lack of opportunities for alternative employment. Job security and a reliable compensation were the most important reasons. The 2016 perception survey by UCSB and UNDP found that the three key reasons for joining the civil service are to “make a difference to society” (77 percent), “job security” (74 percent), and “good social status” (50 percent).<sup>96</sup>

**176. The open competition examination system is intended to ensure the recruitment of talented and qualified young people.** Applicants are given equal opportunity and are not discriminated against by sex, age, or origin, once they are qualified. The Myanmar civil service is a career system, which focuses on initial entry to the civil service, with established career tracks. This is in contrast to a job or position-based system, where the emphasis is on selecting the best candidate to perform specific job content, whether by internal mobility or external recruitment. Once recruitment has been completed, the Myanmar career civil service provides only limited opportunity for lateral entry.

**177. The available recruitment data suggests that there is excessive demand for government employment.** The number of applicants significantly exceeds the number of available positions (see table 16). There is, however, no data showing the number of qualified candidates. More women than men apply for gazetted posts.

**Table 16:** Recruitment data for civil service positions

Human resource management process/Items	Years					
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
<b>Recruitment and selection</b>						
Vacancies for gazetted posts	392	893	2,050	1,846	371	1232
Applicants for gazetted posts	16,386	9,689	26,146	28,956	13,844	41515
Female applicants for gazetted posts	5,683	6,335	19,414	20,209	8,707	29000
Applicants selected for gazetted posts	324	869	1,656	1,500	314	372
Females selected for gazetted posts	117	499	1,005	801	248	825


Source: Data provided to the World Bank team by UCSB.

<sup>96</sup> UCSB and UNDP, 2016, “Perception Survey on Ethics, Equal Opportunities, and Meritocracy in the Myanmar Civil Service.”

**178. The process for recruitment and selection is well regulated by law.** The Public Service Personnel Act (2013), *Civil Service Rules 2014* (which guide implementation of the Public Service Personnel Act), and the Law on the Union Civil Service Board (2010) clearly describe the process and roles and responsibilities of UCSB. For gazetted officers, UCSB is mandated to manage the recruitment and selection, as shown in figure 17.

**179. Ministries take at least seven months to inform UCSB about their staff recruitment needs for gazetted staff.** Prior to the actual recruitment process, a series of steps are required. First, departments submit their manpower needs to the minister’s office for approval. If the proposal is approved by the minister’s office, then the request is submitted to a ministerial committee, comprising the minister, the deputy minister, and directors general. In turn, the minister’s office checks with the Project Appraisal and Project Reporting Department in the Planning Department of MOPF to ensure that the position is approved, and with the Budget Department in MOPF to ensure that the position is budgeted for. Only then will the actual recruitment process start. (See “accept proposal” in figure 18.) The recruitment process, therefore, usually takes 15-18 months to complete.

**Figure 19:** The process flow of recruitment for gazetted officers



Sources: World Bank team’s interview with UCSB, 2016; and interview with UCSB officials, Meritocracy Course 2015.

**180. Non-gazetted officers can be directly recruited by the respective ministries and agencies.** *Civil Service Rules 2014* (chapter 3) presents the specific steps for recruiting non-gazetted officers. To a large extent, these procedures are the same as for gazetted officials:

- The selection board is formed in the respective ministry or department.
- The selection board prepares job descriptions, including the education, skills, and other data on the number of men or women for the post, and submits it to the head of department and ministry for approval.
- Vacancies are then announced in the newspapers for at least a month.
- Civil servants from other ministries or departments can apply, with the approval of their respective ministry or department.
- The selection board conducts a written test, interview, and skills test. The written test includes three areas: Myanmar language, English language, and general knowledge. A list of the applicants and their scores is submitted to the respective ministry and head of department.

**181. An effective recruitment and selection procedure normally follows a set of standard elements.** This is the general process used for the Myanmar civil service:

- A job analysis<sup>97</sup> leads to a written statement of the duties of the job—the job description, and the knowledge and skills that the jobholder needs—the person specification.<sup>98</sup> (Because job analysis underlies several HRM functions—notably recruitment, promotion, and performance appraisals—a special review was undertaken. See table 17.)
- The job advertisement is disseminated to eligible groups with a summary of the job analysis.
- Applicants fill out a standard application form.
- Applicants' qualifications are evaluated using a scoring scheme based on the person specification.
- A short-listing procedure can be employed to reduce applications, if necessary, to a manageable number.
- The final selection procedure is based on the person specification and includes a panel interview.
- The actual appointment of a candidate is based on the composite score from the written examination, the interview, and the skills test.
- Notification of results is sent to both successful and unsuccessful candidates.

**182. Job analysis is undertaken in Myanmar, but it is not systematically applied and the content varies.** A review of the job descriptions for 82 positions assessed the four standard metrics of a job description: purpose, responsibilities, activities, and reporting arrangements (table 17).<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> A job analysis is the process of gathering and analyzing information about the work content and the human requirements of a job. It involves the preparation of a job description and a person specification.

<sup>98</sup> A person specification is a statement of characteristics, qualifications, and competencies that are required for the satisfactory performance of a job's defined duties, tasks, and responsibilities.

<sup>99</sup> World Bank team review of job descriptions.

**183. The findings of the team review of job analysis and job descriptions offer several useful insights.** Firstly, it is positive that a mechanism for a job analysis is in place, even though it is not systematically applied or enforced in the Myanmar civil service. Job descriptions are also in place to guide the operation of organizations. Secondly, while responsibilities and activities are generally articulated clearly, this is not the case with descriptions of the purpose of the job. This is a weakness, since the purpose of the job is supposed to define the job activities and the job responsibilities. Reporting arrangements are also not clear. Thirdly, on average, more detail is provided in the job description as positions rise in seniority, which seems sensible: higher positions involve a higher degree of job complexity.

**Table 17:** Review of job descriptions in the Myanmar civil service

Ministry	No. of job descriptions reviewed	Specific characteristics included in job descriptions			
		Purpose	Responsibilities	Activities	Reporting arrangements
Education	88	71%	100%	98%	2%
Health	17	24%	88%	100%	47%

Sources: World Bank team review of job descriptions, and Ministry of Health Job descriptions, published in the Hospital Management Manual, Department of Medical Services, 2011.

**184. Vacancies are announced for gazetted and non-gazetted positions in daily newspapers and on the UCSB website.** The World Bank team reviewed 20 job announcements (see annex 11) and found a consistent pattern: all the vacancy announcements are general in nature and they list only brief information about the job content, such as name of department, number of vacant positions, and education qualifications required—not competencies. (See annex 12, “Sample of vacancy announcements.”) This makes it difficult for the recruitment panel and applicants to see if competencies match the job requirements.

**185. According to the UCSB/UNDP perception survey, the majority of respondents indicated that their jobs had been openly advertised.** But respondents commented that applicants still tend to rely on personal networks to access recruitment information: 60 percent said that their top source of information was “friends or colleagues,” and 42 percent noted it was government newspapers.<sup>100</sup>

**186. Fifteen examination centers are located in the capitals of seven regions and seven states, plus Nay Pyi Taw.** The examinations serve to reduce the number of applicants to a shorter list. Applicants can choose any of the examination centers throughout the nation. The examination questions cover three areas: the Myanmar language, the English language, and general knowledge. The answer forms are assigned coded roll numbers to ensure transparency. The applicants’ answers are graded, sorted by the composite scores (the total of the marks from each of the three areas), and submitted to UCSB. In 2016, UCSB reduced the number of exam centers to five, located in Yangon, Mandalay, Nay Pyi Taw, Magway and Mon State.

**187. UCSB selects a number of candidates for interviews, according to the number of vacancies, using the coded roll numbers.** Chapter 3 in *Civil Service Rules 2014* describes a general scoring scheme. But, since the person specification is very nonspecific—again due to the weak job analysis—it is challenging to

<sup>100</sup> UCSB and UNDP, 2016, “Perception Survey,” 5-6.



measure and operationalize the scoring scheme. The selection officials translate the coded roll numbers into names (according to their confidential records) and announce the successful candidates for interviews. They inform the candidates of the dates of interviews and a required psychological test.

**188. Members of the UCSB panel interview the successful candidates.** The documentation submitted to the UCSB panel includes the application, a letter of permission of the ministry concerned if the candidate is part of existing service personnel, degree certificates and other required documents, results of the psychological test, and basic facts about the post to be appointed.

**189. The UCSB panel, led by its chair, confirms the marks of each candidate from their interview and written examination and selects the successful candidates, according to the vacancies.** Reserve candidates are also selected at the same time. The director general of the Civil Service Selection and Training Department announces the successful candidates and sends letters of notice to the ministries, departments, and enterprises, informing them of the selection list (UCSB Law).

**190. Although the recruitment process is well regulated by law, several challenges persist.** The weak job analysis makes it difficult to match the recruited official with the best position. The focus group discussions revealed a perception that there is too strong a focus on the written examinations and that the three themes (Myanmar language, English language, and general knowledge) are so general that it is difficult to test for specific job competencies. This is compounded by the weak person specification—the statement of employee characteristics, qualifications, and competencies which are required for the satisfactory performance of a job’s *defined* duties, tasks and responsibilities. The too-general scoring scheme thus becomes difficult to measure and make operational.

**191. The perceptions reflected in the focus group discussions and the HRM survey tend to confirm these challenges—leading to questions about effectiveness and fairness.** Among gazetted staff, 47 percent did not think that the recruitment and selection system recruits the most qualified people for the civil service. This does not seem to be caused by gender challenges: more than 80 percent of gazetted and non-gazetted staff thought that the recruitment system provides equal opportunities for women and men. Some of the participants in the focus groups also voiced concerns about bias, stating that “highly-qualified employees should get hired without corruption” and that “highly-qualified employees within the department should get promoted without bias.”

**192. The ribbon campaigns in 2015 are also a reflection of this concern about lack of fairness and political neutrality in the recruitment system.**<sup>101</sup> In the UCSB/UNDP survey, 82 percent of respondents thought that the recruitment process is mostly fair. In contrast, however, 65 percent of respondents also said that “some” or “all” civil servants use their personal network to obtain positions. Discrimination did not arise as a major challenge in the UCSB/UNDP survey: 77 percent thought that the recruitment process is fair for men and women (gender); and 86 percent of respondents indicated that they believed that there is no discrimination against non-Bamar (ethnic) candidates.<sup>102</sup> A balanced ethnic representation in the civil service is worth monitoring.

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101 The “black ribbon” campaign in 2015 was an initiative launched by Ministry of Health Officials (see <http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/16629-black-ribbon-campaign-gains-new-momentum.html>) to promote stronger meritocracy in the civil service. Lawyers in Nay Pyi Taw defending the judiciary followed suit with a “yellow ribbon” campaign in September 2015 (<http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/nay-pyi-taw/16544-yellow-ribbon-campaign-expands.html>). In addition, local administrators in the Mandalay region started a “blue ribbon” campaign against assigning non-civil servants to district and township electrical power offices (<http://www.elevenmyanmar.com/local/electrical-engineers-mandalay-launch-blue-ribbon-protest>).

102 UCSB and UNDP, 2016, “Perception Survey,” 7 and 22 (figure 9). The number of non-Bamar respondents in the survey was too small to draw any firm conclusion regarding ethnicity. (Only 2% of the respondents defined themselves as ethnic minorities.)

## Deployment and retention

**193. The ability of a government to efficiently deploy its civil servants is critical to achieve service delivery objectives.** Deployment of civil servants in the Myanmar civil service can be defined as a move of a gazetted or non-gazetted officer from one position to another, within the same occupational group or to another occupational group. Retention of civil servants involves the ability to keep them in their positions, as long as desired, according to policy objectives and the needs of departments. Overall, the deployment of civil servants should be guided by the objectives of meeting operational needs, fulfilling the career development and individual needs of employees, and developing the skills and abilities required by organizations in the longer term—all in the context of the Government’s broader performance objectives.

**194. Neither the Public Service Personnel Act nor *Civil Service Rules 2014* provide much detail on the policy for deployment of civil servants.** *Civil Service Rules 2014* regulates the transfer between ministries. UCSB and the ministries,<sup>103</sup> from and to which the civil servant is being transferred, coordinate and agree on the transfer, starting with a letter from the ministry requesting the transfer. The transfer is then approved by the president and the Union Government Office. The limited information is again an issue: in the UCSB/UNDP survey, 41 percent of respondents indicated that they had limited information on the actual regulations for deployment of staff.

**195. There is relatively wide discretion for transferring staff to and from positions within the same ministry, and between union and sub-national levels, down to the townships.** This level of discretion could provide opportunities for rent-seeking, but the review was not tasked with investigating this. However, in light of the limited policy guidance, it is difficult for ministries to deploy the best person for the job (see table 18). Among other things, this would involve a much stronger focus on matching individual job requirements with the competencies of the person to be deployed. The Myanmar career civil service, with its emphasis on the point of entry, is also somewhat difficult to align with a focus on individual positions.

Table 18: “Best person” versus current practice in Myanmar

Implication of best person in the job	Implication of current practice
The focus is on individual jobs at all levels	The focus is on the point of entry
The appointee is the best candidate	The appointee is merely able to do the job
Posts are open to all eligible candidates	Posts are restricted to certain candidates
The appointment process is systematic, transparent, and challengeable	The appointment process may be arbitrary, secretive, and not challengeable

**196. These findings were also confirmed in the focus group discussions.** The perception among staff is that the policy on staff deployment depends on the respective ministry and department. From the survey findings, 43 percent of respondents said that there is no clear policy or criteria for the posting and deployment of staff in the ministries and departments. The focus groups commented that there is no comprehensive policy and precise specifications on staff deployment covering the whole civil service.

<sup>103</sup> See chapter 3, section 23(a).

**197. There is a perception among civil servants that posting and deployment of staff are not always carried out in a fair and transparent manner.** While 49.7 percent of the survey respondents said that the posting and deployment of staff is fair and transparent, 39.7 percent said that it is not. Some quotes from the focus group discussions reflect this:

“It is not fair; depends on the attitude of the head of department (the person who has authority).”

“The priority is given to the close relatives of the civil servants.”

This finding is confirmed by the UCSB/UNCP perception survey, where less than half of respondents felt that deployment was merit-based.

**198. While these statements are not necessarily representative for the whole population of civil servants, they do indicate that there are challenges.** Civil servants cannot choose where they want to be posted or deployed. The UCSB/UNCP survey found that 90.5 percent of respondents said that civil servants cannot choose where they want to be posted or deployed, while 7.9 percent said that they can.

**199. The challenges in deployment do not seem to affect overall retention in the civil service.**<sup>104</sup> Retention of staff in poor and remote areas is the key binding constraint. As evidenced by the extremely low turnover rates in the civil service (see table 14), there is no overall problem of retaining civil servants once they are recruited into the system. Rather, and hardly surprisingly, there is a profound challenge of keeping staff in poor and remote areas, which has a detrimental impact on service delivery. As reflected in chapter 7 (on the education sector), it is a problem to retain experienced teachers in poor and remote areas. Asked if “you have a chance to choose a place to teach,” only around 15 percent of teachers answered that they would like to serve in remote areas. (See figure 24 in chapter 7.)

**200. To address the overall challenge of retention, the Government of Myanmar has introduced the regional allowance.** However, it is not clear that the allowance has produced the desired outcome. The regional allowance, described in previous chapters, was introduced to attract and retain public servants in poor and remote areas. The survey and the focus group discussions consistently found that the perception among civil servants is that the allowance does not have a discernible impact by itself.

**201. Around 66 percent of both gazetted and non-gazetted officers in the survey said that the regional allowance is not enough to keep civil servants assigned to poor and remote areas.** The focus groups agreed that the regional allowance is not attractive enough because of other factors in these areas, such as a lack of security, high commodity prices, weak educational and healthcare services, and difficulties in transportation.

## Promotions

**202. The criteria and procedures for promotion are provided in *Civil Service Rules 2014*.** Staff who are “qualified in terms of education, rank of position, skills, official position in service, and duration of service, and are able to undertake the duty of the position on promotion are eligible for promotion.”<sup>105</sup> *Civil Service Rules 2014* specifies an examination board and a qualifications assessment process to govern promotions:

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104 See, for example, Ministry of Education, with JICA, 2014. “Comprehensive Education Sector Review (CESR) Phase 2 Report on Teacher Education.”

105 Civil Service Rules 2014, chapter 4.

- *Qualification Examination Board (QEB)* — The QEB is comprised of suitable officers from the respective ministry and head of UCSB, and is responsible for the entire promotion process, including conducting the written and practical examinations, scoring a candidate based on performance appraisals and years of service, and scheduling the personal interview.
- *Qualification testing and assessment* — The qualifications test includes written examinations, a score that captures performance appraisal and years of service, and a personal interview. The rules state that the written and practical tests, as well as the personal interview, may not be required and may be left to the discretion of the QEB. Table 19 shows how elements are assessed (and points awarded) by the scoring system.

**Table 19:** Myanmar promotion assessment system

Assessment method	Points
1. Written and practical tests - Written examination (40 pts) plus practical testing (60 pts) - Only written examination or practical test (100 pts) - Other testing method (100 pts)	100
2. Performance appraisal	100
3. Years of service*	100
4. Personal interview**	50
<b>Total score</b>	<b>350</b>

Source: *Civil Service Rules 2014*, chapter 4.

\* For years of service, three points are awarded per year in current position rank; two points are awarded per year for time in a position one level lower in rank; one point is awarded per year of service in a position two levels lower; and half a point is awarded per year of service for every year in any lower position.

\*\* The QEB is responsible for the personal interview and awards a maximum score of 50 points, based on the following: 1) 20 points for competency for the job, 2) ten points for being active and clear, 3) ten points for good insight, and 4) ten points for general knowledge.

**203. The QEB then produces a ranked list, based on the total scores from the assessments.** If there is tie for the highest score, the person with more years of service is prioritized. If the QEB cannot conduct a written examination and practical test, the final scores are derived from years of service and the performance appraisal.<sup>106</sup>

**204. There are several possibilities, described in *Civil Service Rules 2014*, to circumvent the normal promotion process.** For example, it is possible to promote lower-level civil servants, if there is a vacancy and if they are in compliance with the minimum requirements for years of service and performance appraisal. In addition, the head of the respective civil service body is given the authority to promote civil service employees, if they are deemed to perform well.<sup>107</sup>

<sup>106</sup> In the UCSB/UNDP perceptions survey, there were several references to the written examinations and how they were not appropriate. For example, some employees noted the challenges in finding time to study, due to the demands of their work. They also commented that underemployed or nonperforming staff would have more time to study.

<sup>107</sup> The respective civil service body coordinates the promotion of a gazetted officer with UCSB under this process.

**205. There is a perception that political considerations influence the promotion process of civil servants.** In the UCSB/UNDP perceptions survey, 25.6 percent of gazetted officers and 34 percent of the non-gazetted officers stated that political considerations play a role in the promotion process of civil servants. As a consequence, 55.1 percent of gazetted officers and 25.3 percent of non-gazetted officers disagreed that the most qualified and competent person is promoted. Another finding was that around 50 percent of respondents thought that their managers follow rules and regulations, and assign promotions based on performance and merit, while 25 percent thought that promotions are given based on friendships and bribes.

## Performance appraisals

**206. Performance appraisals are carried out by ministries and departments for purposes of staff promotion.** The performance assessment criteria contained in *Civil Service Rules 2014* (chapter 4) are stated in general terms and are prone to subjective interpretation by the assessors in the performance appraisal process. The performance criteria look at the following elements in table 20.

**207. Staff are assessed once a year by the head of their department, with four possible outcomes: below average, average, above average, and outstanding.** Each of the performance criteria are assessed, and points are awarded as follows: below average, up to 3 points; average, 4-6 points; above average, 7-8 points; and outstanding, 9-10 points. Below average and outstanding levels require an explanation on the appraisal form. The assessment criteria (which were issued in January 2017) are all sub-divided into detailed elements.

Table 20: Myanmar performance appraisal system

#	Clerical Staff to Assistant Director		Deputy Director to Deputy Director General	
	Performance criteria	Points	Performance criteria	Points
1	Responsibility	10	Leadership	20
2	Competency	10	Confidentiality	20
3	Confidentiality	10	Skill	20
4	Learning	10	Duties undertaken willingly	20
5	Diligence	10	Decent social relationship	20
6	Creativity	10		
7	Good discipline	10		
8	Voluntary service	10		
9	Good relationship	10		
10	Leadership	10		
<b>Total</b>		<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: *Civil Service Rules 2014*, chapter 4.

**208. The performance appraisal system puts more weight on traits than performance.** As reflected in table 20, the performance appraisal system emphasizes personal characteristics and traits, such as responsibility, competency, confidentiality, etc., which are presumably related to job performance. One problem with rating traits is that they are difficult to define objectively or to a standard, and thus are at risk of varying interpretations by managers. A gradual move to a more results-based appraisal system, linked to organizational performance and service delivery targets, would be beneficial. Because current job descriptions only weakly specify deliverables, applying a more results-based system would need to be linked to upgraded and revised job descriptions.

**209. Supervisors seldom discuss performance appraisals with their staff.** In the civil service survey, 67 percent of gazetted officers and 68 percent of non-gazetted officers reported that their supervisors discussed their performance appraisal report and gave them feedback about their job performance. This is confirmed by the UCSB/UNDP perception survey, where only 26 percent of survey respondents said that they were adequately informed about the performance appraisal system, and 63 percent were not aware that the performance appraisal took place annually. Thus, the performance appraisal is not linked to the improvement of individual civil servants' skills and competencies. For example, there are no requirements for coaching or training, for either managers or employees, on the performance appraisal.

**210. In the civil service survey, 56 percent of gazetted officers and 19 percent of non-gazetted officers stated that the performance appraisal system for promotion is not fair and transparent.** The focus group discussions yielded the following statements:

“The performance appraisal system is not transparent and fair because high scores are given to their own staff based on personal social relationships.”

“There is poor job assessment because of personal bias.”

“Performance appraisal for promotion should include higher qualifications, and experienced and competent employees should be evaluated without corruption and bias.”

In sum, the broader question in the analysis of the performance appraisal system is how to make the tool more relevant for the management of the civil service. This would imply increased use of performance appraisals in the promotion process, and using the performance appraisal to enhance skills and competencies. For a start, annual appraisal and development consultations between manager and staff could be introduced.

## Options for managing human resources

**211. In the absence of an overall strategy for civil service reform in Myanmar, the most viable reform path will be to address some of the basic shortcomings in human resource functions.** For some of the options considered for civil service reform, more evidence would be needed, such as a better understanding of what drives bad and good performance, and more in-depth examination of the strengths and weaknesses in civil service recruitment and its processes.

**212. Gazetted officers constitute around 8 percent of total civil service employment, but they play a key role in the drafting and implementation of rules and regulations.** Consequently, more research would be required on this group of officials.

**213. Reforms in some of the key HRM functions would also have a more immediate impact on performance and service delivery.** Strengthening the deployment and retention of midwives and auxiliary health workers, for example, would help reduce birth mortality rates.



**214. RECOMMENDATION 6.1. The Government of Myanmar could conduct regular monitoring to assess the size of work force problems and measure progress.** It is noteworthy that the Myanmar civil service does not seem, for now, to have any difficulty attracting and retaining staff, apart from those assigned to poor and remote areas. Measuring key features on an annual basis can show if things are getting better, getting worse, or staying the same. Monitoring indicators should focus on specific concerns, such as recruitment difficulties for specific skills, positions, or locations; or greater ethnic representation in the civil service. The calculations should be clear and done the same way every time. Indicators that are too general or poorly calculated will not be helpful. In very practical terms, the review demonstrated that it is possible to compile, consolidate, and analyze information regarding turnover rates that, in turn, could inform specific HRM interventions in the Myanmar civil service.

**215. RECOMMENDATION 6.2. The Government of Myanmar could consider establishing a human resource management unit for each ministry,** whose functions could be expanded to include human resource planning, development, recruitment and selection, training and development, and management—with particular focus on deployment and retention in underserved areas. The customized wage bill and work force planning could inform the various policy choices that the ministries would have for staff deployment.


**216. RECOMMENDATION 6.3. The wage bill forecasting model can be used to strengthen human resource planning** and give flexibility to the two-thirds policy by providing an accurate projection of the budgetary impact. It can also help answer these specific questions:

- Does current staffing reflect the priorities and performance targets of the Government?
- What are the greatest staffing priorities going forward?
- How can the Government of Myanmar maximize developmental impact of human resources?

A regular report on human resource issues could also be considered in order to provide the following information, depending upon management needs:

- Regular analysis of turnover data to inform human resource planning (this could be done through a joint working group led by MOPF and UCSB, since these agencies have the available data. It would be useful to include GAD and some of the big ministries, such as health, education and labour, immigration and population.)
- Number and distribution of staff by job title in priority or underserved areas
- Staff per ministry and the staffing composition for each department
- Staff ratios, such as the number of technical staff per manager and the number of support staff per technical staff
- Demographic information, such as the number of teachers per pupil by township or school, and the number of nurses per population by township
- Salaries as a percentage of the total budget of the ministry

Figure 20: Recruitment and human resource functions through job analysis and use of job descriptions



Note: Red circles are areas of priority.

**RECOMMENDATION 6.3.** To support a gradual move to a more position-based system in general and to provide the micro-evidence for recruitment, the Government of Myanmar can consider using job analysis as a specific tool. Job analysis involves three specific aspects: 1) development of job descriptions that include a statement of purpose, responsibilities, activities, and reference; 2) a person specification that clearly enumerates the skills, abilities, knowledge, and minimum education required to perform the job; and 3) performance indicators that measure quantifiable outputs from the job performance. The approach could be gradually rolled out, starting with pilot ministries. This would also be synergetic with the proposal in chapter 5 to review the rationale and suitability of the civil service grade structure (recommendation 5.6). A practical use of job descriptions, for example, can strengthen several of the human resource functions highlighted in figure 19. Those functions in red indicate priority consideration. Key agencies to lead this initiative would be UCSB and the Office of the Ministries. The move to a more position-based system would have to start within the career-based civil service.

218. **RECOMMENDATION 6.4.** Consider making the policy on deployment more explicit and transparent. Based on the analysis above, the Government of Myanmar could consider developing a more specific policy on deployment. They should be made in a fair, reasonable, and transparent manner, taking into account not only the needs of the organization but the legitimate career interests and aspirations of employees. The policy could, as a next step, be operationalized and monitored against a backdrop of very specific criteria. Introducing such a policy would be a relatively minor endeavor, whereas implementation would require developing capacity at the ministerial level and monitoring its enforcement. Key agencies involved in the drafting of this policy could be UCSB, the Union Government, the Office of the President, and some of the larger sector ministries.

**219. RECOMMENDATION 6.5. A bundle of different incentives, based on evidence, might be considered in order to strengthen the retention of civil servants in poor and remote areas.** The key is to understand what types of incentives might attract (or encourage) civil servants to choose to work in remote areas.<sup>108</sup> The regional allowance is already offered as an incentive, but the focus groups also highlighted that such mechanisms as directly recruiting from the remote areas (e.g., auxiliary health staff), accelerating career opportunities, offering housing support, and setting up special transportation facilities, etc., could also be used to strengthen retention in remote areas. It will, however, be important to monitor these incentives to ensure their efficient, effective, and consistent application.

**220. RECOMMENDATION 6.6. The Government of Myanmar might consider strengthening the format, implementation, and monitoring of performance appraisals.** This effort would mesh well with a gradual move to a more position-based system, where performance appraisal methods are job-related. In this context, the recommended job analyses must be conducted before selecting a performance appraisal process. Managers could also be trained to conduct performance appraisals. The proposed human-resource units in each ministry could be in charge of this, relying on overall guidelines issued by UCSB. A reporting system to ensure that appraisals are conducted on a timely basis and follow the guidelines should underpin the process. It also needs a means of maintaining performance appraisal records for individual employees. In essence, this would entail making the performance appraisal matter, by providing stronger links to promotion, rewards, and even demotion.

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108 One possible approach to establish this policy evidence is through a so-called discrete choice experiment, a quantitative research method that can measure the strength of preference and trade-offs of civil servants for different job characteristics, which can influence their decision to apply for and stay in rural postings. See, for example, M. Ryan et al., 2012, “How to Conduct a Discrete Choice Experiment for Health Workforce Recruitment and Retention in Remote and Rural Areas.”

# CHAPTER 7

## HOW DOES THE GOVERNMENT MANAGE AND COMPENSATE ITS TEACHER WORK FORCE?

### The importance of the education sector in the context of pay and compensation

**221.** This chapter takes an in-depth look at Myanmar’s education sector to explore pay and compensation, and management issues, through a sector-specific lens. It focuses on how the teacher work force is managed and functions. As with the overall report, this chapter examines key areas: 1) recruitment and selection, 2) deployment and retention, 3) management and supervision, 4) human resource planning, 5) pay and compensation, 6) professional development, and 7) performance and appraisal.

**222.** Teachers are the single largest category of civil servants, making up more than one-third of the total work force employed by the Government of Myanmar, and accounting for nearly one-half of the union budget’s wage bill. Also, retired teachers make up one-third of all government pensioners. In the budget for FY 2016/2017, teachers’ pay made up 66 percent of the recurrent resources allocated to the basic education sector. Understanding the pay and compensation arrangements of the civil service in Myanmar can be enhanced by closely examining the policy covering the more than 340,000 individuals who work as teachers.

**223.** The last four years in Myanmar have seen the introduction of sweeping reforms to teacher policies, with more being planned. A legal framework was laid out in the 2014 National Education Law and the 2015 National Education Law Amendment (which includes a quality framework). It requires teachers to complete basic pre-service teaching qualifications and also requires the Ministry of Education to ensure that teachers have access to quality, ongoing professional development. Key provisions related to teachers are listed in box 10.

#### Box 10: The National Education Law and teacher management

The National Education Law (passed in September 2014) sets out the following provisions related to teacher education and management:

##### Provisions relevant to pre-service teacher education:

- Teachers must have a teacher education diploma, certificate, or degree (chap. 9, art. 50.c).
- Teacher education and admission, curriculum, and course duration are to be defined in the regulations (chap. 5, art. 20.b).
- Higher education must be available at universities, Education Colleges, Institutes of Education, and the equivalent level schools within these institutions (chap. 5, art. 25).
- Autonomy in learning and management systems must be applied in higher education institutions (chap. 5, art. 26).

##### Provisions related to teacher professional development:

- The Ministry of Education and other ministries are to arrange for the improvement of teachers’ skills and international exposure (chap. 9, art. 52).
- The Ministry of Education and line ministries must provide opportunities and take responsibility for the professional development of teachers (chap. 9, art. 53).
- The National Quality Assurance Commission must define assessment standards, and ways to measure quality assurance (chap. 10, art. 54.c).

**224. Some of the most important reforms focus on teacher and staff compensation, and a new practice of hiring uncertified teachers in large numbers.** In terms of compensation, the wage bill has increased substantially. In the past, the wage bill (of all civil servants) was tightly managed: civil servants were on a single wage grid, which was unchanged for extended periods of time in nominal terms, except for small annual increases—MMK 1,000 or MMK 2,000—“within” that grid. Specifically, during the period 1972–2013, nominal wages were only increased six times.<sup>109</sup> In FY 2013/2014 and FY 2014/2015, annual nominal wage increases of MMK 20,000 were made to the wage grid.

**225. Important changes have also taken place in recent years for allowances.** A monthly allowance for all civil servants of MMK 30,000 was introduced in FY 2012/2013, but cancelled for FY 2015/2016. A regional allowance for all civil servants working in hardship areas was introduced to give them an incentive to seek employment and stay in the more remote locations. The allowance in FY 2012/2013 was equivalent to double the base salary, but was modified in FY 2015/2016 to include set amounts, based on the designation of the hardship area as “fairly hard,” “hard,” or “hardest.”<sup>110</sup> In the education sector, approximately 6 percent of all teachers worked in 87 hardship areas in 2012.<sup>111</sup> Since then, the number of hardship areas has increased to 110, and the percentage of teachers in hardship areas had risen to 13 percent by 2015.<sup>112</sup>

**226. With its new practice of hiring contract teachers, in three years, the Ministry of Education has dramatically changed the composition of its teaching work force in some very profound and (for Myanmar) uncharted ways.** First, the Ministry introduced the notion of employing uncertified teachers: these teachers have completed a bachelor’s or master’s degree at a university, but have not trained at one of the 22 education or teacher-training colleges. Recruitment also included high school graduates, who agreed to work in hard-to-staff schools. Second, the Ministry decided to hire all these new teachers as “contract teachers,” known as daily wage teachers (DWT), which introduced a new category of staff into the Myanmar school system. Third, it allowed state and regional education officers (of the Ministry) a greater say in the hiring process. By themselves, each of these modifications represents important policy changes that would have benefited from pilot tests and careful assessment of their impact on motivation, performance, and quality of the people recruited. Since 2013, an additional 72,000 teachers (representing nearly one-quarter of all teachers employed) have been recruited and deployed in this way.<sup>113</sup> There are also plans to hire 29,688 DWTs per year in the 2016–2017 and 2017–2018 school years.

**227. A major policy requiring at least five teachers per primary school is driving the need for more teachers and reshaping the teacher work force.** While the number of students is increasing, the number of teachers is increasing at a faster rate. The five-teacher policy was introduced in 2012. This has been a key driver in the extraordinary increase in teacher hiring and has important implications because of the large number of small schools in Myanmar. Also, while the impact has not begun yet, the Myanmar school system is expanding the number of years of education. Kindergarten was introduced in 2016, and grade 12 will be introduced by 2028. These policies are discussed in more detail later in the chapter, in relation to teacher management and teacher supply and demand.

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109 The wage structure was fixed in nominal terms during the following periods: 1) 1972–88, 2) 1989–93, 3) 1993–2000, 4) 2000–2006, 5) 2006–2009, and 6) 2010–2013, and 7) 2013–2014.

110 It is important to note that, while the hardship allowance decreased, at the same time the base salaries increased, so teachers in hardship areas still had compensation increases overall.

111 National Education Strategic Plan (NESP) 2016–2021, p. 38.

112 In the 2015–2016 school year, 45,053 teachers worked in hardship areas.

113 Ibid.

**228. Of particular policy relevance for the education sector is the recently released National Education Strategic Plan (NESP) for 2016-2021.** In relation to teachers, NESP identifies three key areas: 1) management mechanisms for the development and retention of quality teachers, 2) quality improvement in pre-service education, and 3) access to quality in-service teacher professional development.

## Overview of the education system and teachers

**229. The current basic education system now comprises kindergarten, five years of primary education (grades 1-5),<sup>114</sup> four years of lower secondary (grades 6-9), and two years of upper secondary education (grades 10-11).** Kindergarten was introduced in 2016 and is being implemented in all primary school sites. Grade 12 will be introduced by 2028. In the 2015-2016 school year, there were 47,363 basic education schools in Myanmar, staffed by 340,995 teachers, reaching approximately 9.26 million students.<sup>115</sup> The majority of these schools are managed by the Department of Basic Education (DBE).<sup>116</sup> The education system has seen rapid expansion in recent years. Compared to the 39,100 basic education schools, 216,039 teachers, and 6,906,065 students in the 2001-2002 school year, the number of schools has increased by 21 percent, teachers by 58 percent, and students by 34 percent. It is important to note that the rate of teacher increase is greatly outpacing the student increase, which has improved the student-teacher ratio.

**230. In considering pay and compensation issues, it is useful to first examine relevant dimensions in the makeup of the teacher work force.** While this report is not intended to give a full picture of the teacher work force, the following aspects provide important context for teacher policy on employment and pay.

**231. Gender differences for teachers and administrative staff are pronounced.** Figure 21 compares the gender distribution across the main school positions, taken from a 2015 school survey.<sup>117</sup> The results show that women make up the (large) majority of teaching staff. However, women make up only 61 percent of head teachers, which is a significantly lower representation of females than in most other positions. Recent reforms have tried to address the gender imbalance of teachers by raising salaries (for both men and women) and lowering the selection criteria for men. Since the promulgation of the 2011 policy to recruit more men, matriculation of students in at least one of the Institutes of Education (IOE) has been fixed at 60 percent for men and 40 percent for women.<sup>118</sup> For administrative positions at the township level, however, assistant township education officers (ATEOs) are nearly all male.

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114 It is important to note that with the introduction of kindergarten in 2016, there was not a wave of first-grade children. In the next school year, there will not be a second-grade group. This ripple effect is discussed in more detail later in the chapter.

115 NESP 2016-2021, p. 32.


116 Until 2014, there were three separate Departments of Basic Education, namely DBE1 (Lower Myanmar), DBE2 (Upper Myanmar) and DBE3 (Yangon Division). Now a single DBE operates.

117 The World Bank and Ministry of Education conducted a 2015 Myanmar school survey of 800 nationally representative schools across 80 townships.

118 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), 2013, "Data Collection Survey on Education Sector: Final Report."




Figure 21: Breakdown of school positions by gender



Source: World Bank and Ministry of Education Myanmar school survey, 2015.

**232. On average, teachers have 11.9 years of total experience as teachers and six years working in their current school.** More experienced teachers are found in middle and post-primary schools, and urban school teachers have twice as much experience as their rural school counterparts. Figure 22 shows that in the category A (least remote) schools, teachers average 19.5 years of experience, compared to 5.6 years in category E schools (the most remote). These gaps are likely a result of experienced teachers from rural and remote areas using the promotion and transfer system to obtain urban jobs, which prompts the Ministry of Education to deploy less experienced teachers to these schools.

Figure 22: Teachers' level of experience by school remoteness category




Source: World Bank and Ministry of Education Myanmar school survey, 2015.

Note: Categories A and B are urban, while C, D, and E are rural (in increasing order of remoteness).

**233. Geographic location is also a striking difference for teachers with 0-3 years of experience.** New teachers tend to be placed in the most remote schools: 83 percent of all new teachers are in categories C, D, and E schools (rural to highly remote). In contrast, 41 percent of teachers with more than 3 years' experience are in category A (highly urban) schools (figure 23).

**Figure 23:** Primary teachers' level of experience (percent) by school remoteness categories




Source: World Bank and Ministry of Education Myanmar school survey, 2015.

Note: Categories A and B are urban, while C, D, and E are rural (in increasing order of remoteness).


**234. Due to a recent hiring wave of teachers, a large proportion of teachers have only three (or fewer) years of teaching experience.** Among all teachers, 31.4 percent have 0-3 years of experience, compared with 28.3 percent of teachers with 21 or more years of experience. Figure 23 shows the breakdown of teacher experience, and figure 25 shows teacher experience by school level. Primary schools have the highest percentage of teachers with only 0-3 years of experience (40.8 percent), followed by post-primary (22.4 percent) and middle schools (17.6 percent). It is important to note that at all school levels, there is a sizeable group of very experienced teachers (those who have taught for more than 20 years), which makes up just under 30 percent of the total work force.

**Figure 24:** Teachers' experience by year range (all teachers)



Source: World Bank and Ministry of Education Myanmar school survey, 2015.


Figure 25: Teachers' experience by year range and school level



Source: World Bank and Ministry of Education Myanmar school survey, 2015.

235. There is a big contrast in the number of teachers with 0-3 years of experience who have education-specific diplomas and certificates, and teachers with more experience. As shown in figure 26, only 32 percent of new teachers have a teacher education degree (or higher qualification) compared to 96 percent of experienced teachers. Significantly, a large number of new teachers have the one-year certificate of teacher education from an education college, which only qualifies them to teach at primary level.

Figure 26: Education degrees of new teachers versus experienced teachers at primary school level



Source: World Bank and Ministry of Education Myanmar school survey, 2015

Notes: Abbreviations used in figure—DWT = daily wage teacher; certificate = certificate of education (Cert.Ed.); DT. Ed. = degree in teacher education; PATC = primary assistant teacher certificate; JATC = junior assistant teacher certificate; and university = diploma in teaching, (B.Ed. or higher).

## Recruitment and selection


### Candidates for the teaching profession in Myanmar

236. **Before recruitment and selection can take place, a pool of candidates must be attracted to the profession, making it important to understand what type of candidates it is attracting.** A British Council study<sup>119</sup> provides useful insights on candidates to become teachers. It used a mixed-methods approach, which included a sample of 2,006 teacher trainees studying in 20 education colleges,<sup>120</sup> to explore who becomes a teacher and why. This section highlights key results in relation to background, motivation, expectations, satisfaction, and difficulties.

237. **Looking at the background of teacher trainees in Myanmar, slightly less than two-thirds come from the middle class.** About 40 percent of respondents had a father involved in manual labor or agriculture, and 57 percent had a father in a middle-class profession. (Of this group, 6 percent had a father who was a teacher or employed by the education department.) Almost 50 percent of students had mothers who were housewives, and 27 percent had mothers who worked as manual laborers or in agriculture. However, 26 percent had mothers with a middle-class job (of which 8 percent were teachers) or were self-employed.

238. **Almost half of the students said that their main motivation in wanting to become a teacher was to serve their country or contribute to society.** This was followed by 17 percent who wanted to earn a regular salary (figure 27).

Figure 27: Students' primary motivations for entering the teaching profession



Source: Lall, 2015, "Becoming a Teacher in Myanmar."


Note: Sample size for figure was 2,006 respondents.

119 M. Lall, 2015, "Becoming a Teacher in Myanmar."

120 The sample surveyed approximately 100 trainees in each college.

**239. Reflecting the motivation of wanting to serve their country, almost 70 percent were happy to accept the location where they were sent by the Government of Myanmar.** Respondents were asked where they wanted to teach once qualified, and asked to choose between where their family was located and where the Government needed them (figure 28). The large percentage who wanted to go where needed seems related to an overarching sense of nationalism and personal responsibility toward the development of their country. While these responses should encourage the Ministry of Education regarding deployment needs, many hardship areas still require incentives to place and retain teachers. This is touched upon later in the chapter.

**Figure 28:** Trainees' choice of location between family and government need (percent)




Source: Lall, 2015, "Becoming a Teacher in Myanmar."

Note: Sample size for figure was 2,003 respondents.

**240. When asked to specify what their personal location of choice would be, one-third chose small urban areas and nearly one-third chose rural areas.** The remaining candidates had a preference for large urban (19 percent) and remote (14 percent) areas, while only 4 percent indicated a preference to serve in ethnic or border areas (figure 29). Although the differences between male and female respondents was not large, a higher proportion of women (21 percent) preferred large cities, compared to 16 percent of men; while slightly more men than women chose remote areas (17 percent against 13 percent).

Figure 29: Students' personal preference for location of school (percent)



Source: Lall, 2015, "Becoming a Teacher in Myanmar."

Note: Sample size for figure was 1,987 respondents.

## Entry requirements for teaching

**241. Entry requirements into the Myanmar teaching profession are low, compared to other regionally high-performing countries, and as yet are not equitable.** Currently the minimum requirement for admission into a teacher preparation program is high school graduation. However, schooling in Myanmar starts early (at age five) and ends at grade 11. This means that students begin their teacher training at a younger age than other countries in the region. The length of teacher preparation for primary teachers is also very short, with a minimum requirement of only one year of training to qualify for a certificate in teacher education (primary school level). Most teachers at the 20 Education Colleges and the two Institutes of Education, and the brightest students from the University for the Development of National Races for the Union, go on to a second year of training to qualify for a university diploma in teaching. These requirements are comparably very low; most neighboring countries require four years of training. As a result, they could potentially challenge educational goals of increasing teacher quality with the influx of very young, inexperienced teachers into the system. Additionally, there are two states without education colleges, Chin State and Kayah State, which makes it difficult for students from these states to attend one.<sup>121</sup>

**242. Qualifications differ by education level.** Currently, the minimum requirement for applying to be a high school teacher (senior assistant teacher level) or an educational administrator is a bachelor's degree in education. This degree is only offered to people in lower Myanmar at the Yangon Institute of Education and to those in upper Myanmar at Sagaing Institute. Both Institutes are under the control of the Department of Higher Education in the Ministry of Education.

121 JICA, 2013, "Data Collection Survey on Education Sector: Final Report."



**243. Those who obtain either a certificate of education or a primary assistant teacher certificate are qualified primary school teachers.** Those who obtain a two-year degree in teacher education, a one-year diploma in teacher education competency, a junior assistant teacher certificate, and a postgraduate diploma in media of art are qualified middle school teachers, although they start their career as primary assistant teachers after graduation. After five years as primary school teachers, they can apply for promotion to junior assistant teachers at the middle school level. Lastly, those who obtained a bachelor's degree in education or a higher degree from an Institute of Education are eligible to apply to be a senior assistant teacher at the high school level, or a township or assistant township education officer (TEO and ATEO, respectively) or higher.

**244. While the teaching qualification periods needed for Myanmar's primary and junior secondary schools are short by international standards, there are plans to increase them from the current one year (primary) and two years (junior secondary) to four years.** This will require restructuring the curriculum at the Education Colleges. Teacher degree courses have been extended to five years, with the additional year focused on instructional skills.

## The process of recruitment and selection

**245. The selection process of teacher candidates has undergone changes in recent years, in part due to restructuring of departments.** Whereas previously the (now defunct) Department of Planning and Training played a central role, the Department of Teacher Education and Training (DTET) has now taken up many of its responsibilities. Education Colleges and Institutes of Education send their list of candidates to DTET for certification. A full list of newly certified teachers is compiled and given to DBE. The Educational Committee, formed by DBE and chaired by the director general, deploys (where needed) the newly certified teachers. Region and state education offices (REO and SAO, respectively) deploy teachers to each township education office by May, with an official appointment letter, so that they can start teaching at the beginning of the academic year (1 June).

**246. There is a process for issuing education (or teaching) certificates.** After completing the teacher training courses (for a two-year degree in teacher education or a one-year diploma in teacher education competency) at one of the Education Colleges, the trainees are evaluated by the Education College Board, chaired by the director general of DTET. Based on the results from the final examination (worth 40 percent) and other criteria such as bloc teaching, course attendance, and practical assessments (worth 60 percent), DTET issues teaching certificates to the students. A list of newly certified teachers is sent to DBE. Of 7,000 trainees who graduate from the Education Colleges every year, the top 500 with the highest marks (7 percent of the total) are recommended for admission to the two Institutes of Education.

**247. Another means of entry into the teaching profession is as a daily wage teacher.** These contract teachers are uncertified and variously qualified—from having a bachelor's or master's degree to just having graduated from secondary school. They receive about one month of training and are employed at a lower salary without benefits. After about one year of active teaching, they are eligible to become permanent staff, as has happened with the DWTs hired in 2013 and 2014. While state and regional education officers have a greater say over in the hiring and dismissal process of DWTs, their entry into the profession is markedly easier than those who opt for teacher preparation programs.

**248. The recruitment process for daily wage teachers was undertaken at the respective regional, state, and division education offices, in cooperation with local government and the Department of Basic Education.** The minimum qualification to apply to urban area schools was a graduate degree, or a secondary-school certificate for rural and remote areas. Assignments to schools were proposed by state and township education offices, in consultation with the regional and division education offices. The proposal was then submitted to DBE, which issued the orders for teacher assignments.

**249. There are also important specialized categories of teachers.** A program of local language teachers began in the 2014–2015 school year and, by the 2016–2017 school year, there were a total of 20,006 local language teachers covering 31 of Myanmar’s 49 main local languages. They earn MMK 30,000 per month for 10 months of the year. Another small but important category is voluntary teachers in the internally displaced person (IDP) camps of Rakhine. These teachers were previously under the Ministry of Border Affairs, but are now the responsibility of the Ministry of Education. There are 337 teachers in 29 IDP camps, with 291 primary level teachers for 224,442 students, 33 junior secondary teachers for 285 students, and 13 senior secondary teachers for 18 students. Primary school teachers receive a salary of MMK 150,000 per month, middle school teachers receive a salary of MMK 165,000 per month and high school teachers receive a salary of MMK 180,000 per month.

**250. There are also teachers who are financed by the community, who do not go through a formal hiring process run by the Ministry of Education.** They are not included in the standard set of statistics because the Government of Myanmar is interested in how many teachers it has to pay. From the 2015 school survey by the World Bank, the percentage of community teachers was approximately 3 percent.

## Deployment and retention

### How teachers are deployed

**251. While the Ministry of Education collects data on teacher supply and demand, to date the data have not been used to inform the design of a responsive teacher-deployment system.** And while the current teacher management and promotion system treats men and women equally, men are more likely to progress to senior management positions, despite the preponderance of women in the teaching profession.<sup>122</sup> Furthermore, there is widespread consensus among senior Ministry officials that the planned reforms for kindergarten through grade 12 will require additional teachers, who are placed using an evidence-based teacher management, planning, and deployment system.

**252. The National Education Strategy Plan acknowledges that the Government of Myanmar must increase—and upgrade—its capacity to recruit, train, deploy, and promote teachers.** It further emphasizes that particular attention must be paid to the status of primary school teachers, most of whom are women. In secondary education, progression and promotion should “be made within a school level, based on experience and performance and with equal recognition given to teachers specializing in each school level and subject.”<sup>123</sup>

**253. The CESR report on teacher education in secondary education recommends that “the system of teacher supply (initial training, recruitment, and deployment) [be] strengthened and matched to demand, alongside improved methods of projection, quality assurance and performance monitoring.”** However, any efforts to address current teacher deployment and promotion policies, and disparities in teacher supply across rural areas, need to be preceded by further detailed analysis of teacher “qualification and deployment by school type, by subject, by school size, by gender, and by urban/rural differences.”<sup>124</sup>

**254. Currently, teacher deployment and promotion are not linked to performance, but instead are based on years of experience.** This results in an inequitable and inefficient system that drains quality teachers from primary schools where they are needed the most. (The career development of teachers is specified in more detail below.)

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<sup>122</sup> The 2008 Myanmar Constitution states that men and women have equality in almost all civil service professions (chap. 8, arts. 350 and 352).

<sup>123</sup> Ministry of Education, 2014a, “Comprehensive Education Sector Review (CESR) Phase 2 Report on Primary Education.”

<sup>124</sup> Ibid.

**255. Myanmar’s retention rate of teachers overall is very high, but there are challenges with retaining teachers in specific geographic locations and managing the high rate of transfers across school levels.** Recorded teacher attrition rates vary widely across countries. In OCED countries, the teacher attrition varies from 2 percent to 14 percent per year.<sup>125</sup> As indicated in table 11 (chapter 5), only 1.6 percent of non-gazetted staff in basic education (the large majority of which are teachers) left the civil service.<sup>126</sup> Of these departures, 79 percent was due to retirement and only 7 percent was due to resignations. There are challenges in retaining teachers in remote and hardship areas, and managing the movement of teachers to different levels, exacerbated by the existing promotion system.

**256. As is the case in many countries, retaining teachers in hard-to-staff schools and in certain specializations can be difficult.** Housing, transportation, and communication difficulties are some of the obstacles to attracting and retaining teachers in remote locations. Most teachers deployed to remote schools stay only as long as it takes to get a promotion elsewhere in the system. Further, shortages of bilingual teachers who can teach in areas with ethnic populations or teachers who are proficient in specific disciplines, such as English language or early childhood development, suggest that the teacher supply is not meeting the demand.

**257. The regional allowance for hardship areas is one incentive provided by the Government of Myanmar to keep staff (including teachers) in challenging areas.** While the allowance does help compensate for a difficult area, it is yet to be seen how effective it is in retaining teachers. Further measures are likely to be needed. Beyond incentives, other countries have improved placement by targeting and programs to recruit and train local candidates from the hardship area as teachers.

**258. The promotion system also interferes with staffing needs.** Teachers almost have no other incentive but to apply for promotion from primary to middle to high school specializations, given the pay disparities between these levels. This promotion system is seen as detrimental in many respects. Teachers must move schools frequently in order to be promoted, and the best teachers tend not to remain in primary schools, which is arguably where the best teachers should be staffed. To address this issue, the new Government is proposing to restructure the progression and promotion system by establishing career tracks within levels and offering new incentives to teachers to specialize in specific school levels.

## Human resource planning

### Teacher supply and demand

**259. Teacher turnover is low, but system expansion and school staffing policies have created a high demand for teachers.** The total annual personnel turnover of the Department of Education is 5,177, which consists of 1,078 high school teachers, 3,431 middle school teachers and 665 primary school teachers. But the number of children enrolled in basic education schools increased by approximately 400,000 students (from 8.2 million to 8.6 million) between 2011 and 2014. Enrollment is increasing largely due to the government’s free and compulsory education program that was introduced successively starting with primary education in 2011-2012, middle school education in 2012-2013 and high school education in 2015-2016.<sup>127</sup> In addition, the government implemented a policy on the minimum number of teachers per primary school (discussed below). These factors have created an increased demand for teachers.

125 UNESCO, 2010, “Teacher Attrition in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Neglected Dimension of the Teacher Supply Challenge.

126 This percentage is from the period October 2015-September 2016.

127 National Education Strategic Plan (NESP) 2016-2021, p. 36.

**260. The system produces and upgrades teachers through various programs.** In FY 2015-2016, there were 9,172 trainees in Pre-service Primary Teacher Training (PPTT), 5,798 undertaking a Diploma in Teacher Education (DTEd), and 24,746 in distance education for primary school teachers. In FY 2016/2017, there were 5,517 in PPTT, 6,028 in DTEd, 22,361 in distance education for primary school teachers and 9,201 in distance education for middle school teachers. Trainees are produced in order to fulfill the number of teachers needed by the Department of Basic Education. Based on the capacity of education colleges, teachers force, training buildings and canteens, trainings are conducted in 22 education colleges.

**261. Selection of applicants includes targeting for particular needs.** The current plan of the Ministry of Education is to fulfill the demand for teachers and to prioritize applicants from ethnic groups (e.g., Shan, Kayah, Kayin and PaO) for the DTEd and PPTT trainings. With the recommendation from the region/state, applicants are selected based on their results. Regarding applicants with disabilities, in FY 2016/2017, partially-disabled applicants were selected. Overall, 40 percent of successful applicants are male and 60% are female. In PPTT, 30% are male and 70% are female.

**262. Additionally, daily wage basis teachers are hired three times per year, but these teachers require additional training.** In order to solve the problem of the increasing number of teachers without certificates, training-of-trainers sessions on “one-month township-based primary school teacher training” are conducted by trainers from education colleges, senior teachers from high schools, and head masters of middle schools. Trainees can join the one-year distance education course on primary school education after completion of the township based training. These trainees then received a Diploma in Teacher Education. Trainees also have to undertake practical exercises in classrooms. The distance education for middle school teachers is a diploma program for those who have not obtained teaching certificates. They can join the course only after completion of the distance education for primary school teachers course. After the completion of the distance education for middle school teachers, they can attend a two-year program at the University of Education to obtain B.Ed.

**263. The Education Colleges cannot currently produce the number of teachers demanded.** In particular, with the rapid increase in teacher hiring since 2013, the Education Colleges have not been able to produce sufficient numbers of graduates. In 2014, the number of graduates was approximately 8,115, but the number of teachers hired in recent years has been over 40,000 a year. This prompted the hiring of 73,000 DWTs between 2013 and 2015, who did not go through the education colleges. The Ministry of Education opened new Education Colleges in Lashio (Northern Shan State) in 2014 and in Loikaw (Kayah State) in 2015, to increase the number of trained teachers for basic education schools. Still, the numbers of graduates will fall short of the total number of teachers needed over the next two years, so more DWTs will be hired to fill the gap. Within two to three years, the teacher work force should stabilize and large batch hiring will no longer be necessary.


**264. A key driver in the need for more teachers is the policy of having at least five teachers in every primary school.** An extensive analysis in 2014 of teacher need, based on the policy, found that 61.3 percent of the 42,636 schools in Myanmar that had primary school students fell short of the five-teacher policy.<sup>128</sup> Half of the schools had 60 or fewer students, and 81.3 percent were schools with 100 students or fewer. The estimated shortfall in these schools was calculated to be 65,785 teachers—far more than the 30,000 DWTs and 8,115 Education College graduates hired in 2014, but there has been subsequent hiring to reduce the shortfall further.

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128 Muta, 2014, “Supply and Demand of New Teachers.”

**265. The policy of five teachers per primary school has trade-offs.** The policy certainly meets its intended goal of providing more teachers to remote and understaffed schools, and giving students more personalized attention by lowering the student-teacher ratio. It also reduces the need to undertake multi-grade teaching. But all this comes at a cost. As figure 30 illustrates, most schools in Myanmar are very small. The average primary school has only 121 students, and the median number of students is 85. Staffing the small schools with at least five teachers means that many schools will have extremely low student-teacher ratios. In figure 30, there are 11,000 schools with 50 students or fewer, meaning that they have student-teacher ratios of 10 to one or less. From a staffing measure, this is inefficient and has budget and affordability implications. There is an additional challenge when teachers get placed in the smaller, more remote schools: they tend to be DWTs or inexperienced teachers. This is not to say the policy should be changed, but rather that the costs should be recognized and policies revisited in order to ensure that schools are staffed with quality teachers.

Figure 30: Allocation of primary schools by size category



Source: Muta, 2014, “Supply and Demand of New Teachers.”

**266. The teacher promotion system also impacts supply and results in “a constant loss of competent primary school teachers to middle schools.”**<sup>129</sup> As a Japan International Cooperation Agency report notes, “under the current teacher development model in Myanmar, it is difficult for the government to keep experienced and highly motivated teachers working in primary education.”<sup>130</sup> This can be seen in the gap in average years of experience, with primary teachers having only 5.5 years of experience on average compared to 14.4 years for junior secondary teachers.<sup>131</sup> At the same time, it is recognized that “there is a shortage in supply of secondary school teachers and this is anticipated to increase as enrolment in middle and high school increases.” Secondary schools also generally face a mismatch in the supply of teachers by subjects required (e.g., math and English language).<sup>132</sup>

129 Muta, 2015, “Regional Disparities.”

130 Ministry of Education (with JICA), “CESR Phase 2 Report on Teacher Education.”

131 Results from the 2015 World Bank and Ministry of Education Myanmar school survey.

132 Ministry of Education, 2014b, “Secondary Teacher Education and Continuing Professional Development.”

## Expansion of kindergarten and grade 12, and the impact on human resource planning

**267.** With the introduction of kindergarten in 2016, the Government of Myanmar is introducing an unusual step for five-year-old students, who would have started grade 1 under the previous structure. This means that there will not be a cohort of grade 1 students in this initial year. All schools will have a kindergarten added, and teachers from grade 1 will teach kindergarten. In effect, in 2016, no new teachers are required to fill the kindergarten positions.

**268.** There will be two additional grades, which (although they are not starting immediately) will need to be staffed with additional teachers. The planning to address this unusual implementation requires careful planning, following key assumptions. The Ministry of Education currently does not have a strong system for forecasting, but this introduction of kindergarten and grade 12 will make effective planning and projecting even more crucial.

**269.** In addition, restructuring the secondary education system will have an impact on tertiary level education, as there will potentially be two years with no high school graduates to enroll in pre-service teacher education programs. The first “zero” year is when grade 12 is introduced, and the second zero year is one year before the first kindergarten cohort graduates.<sup>133</sup>

## Teacher working hours

**270.** A comparison of the hours that teachers work per week demonstrates that Myanmar tends to be in line with other ASEAN countries. As can be seen in table 21, the hours that Myanmar teachers work in grade 3 and grade 11 are below average, but above average for grades 5 and grade 9. Vietnam and Indonesia generally have lower total hours than Myanmar, while Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand generally have more hours.

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133 Ibid.



Table 21: Teachers' hours per week across ASEAN countries

School grades	Subjects	Average	Myanmar	Cambodia	Indonesia	Lao PDR	Malaysia	Singapore	Philippines	Thailand	Vietnam	Japan
G3	Core subjects	937	930	920	980*	455	990	1230	1500	960	700	746
	Co-curricular	362	270	280		525	390	240	300	540	245	469
	Total	1267	1200	1200	980	980	1380	1470	1800	1500	945	1215
G5	Core subjects	910	1120	920	595	560	840	1170	1500	900	735	759
	Co-curricular	425	280	280	525	600	480	300	400	600	280	501
	Total	1335	1400	1200	1120	1160	1320	1470	1900	1500	1015	1260
G9	Core subjects	1092	1260	1400	800	1170	1080	1160	1440	960	700	950
	Co-curricular	475	315	350	480	450	480	440	540	840	350	500
	Total	1567	1575	1750	1280	1620	1560	1600	1980	1800	1050	1450
G11	Core subjects	1080	1350	1500	1215	1215	n/a**	800	n/a**	640	840	n/a**
	Co-curricular	564	225	100	540	405		800		1160	720	
	Total	1644	1575	1600	1755	1620		1600		1800	1560	

Source: JICA, 2013, "Data Collection Survey on Education Sector: Final Report," table 3-27, "Teaching Hours per Week among ASEAN Countries and Japan."

\* The Government of Indonesia defines total teaching hours only in lower primary level. Each School decides core subjects and co-curricular subject distribution.

\*\* Malaysia, the Philippines, and Japan use a credit system in the upper secondary level, so that the school curriculum varies in each school.

## Managing pay and compensation

### Amounts and trends in teacher pay and compensation

**271. Teacher salaries have increased substantially over the last three years; however, questions remain as to how the salary scale affects teacher motivation, placement, career development, and performance.** Table 22 shows teachers' salaries in public schools (in MMK per month) for FY 2015/2016. Teachers are paid on the same scale as other civil servants (see chapter 4). Primary teachers, who make up the highest proportion of teachers in Myanmar, have a base salary of between MMK 150,000 and MMK 160,000 per month. Those teachers working in remote areas make between MMK 70,000-82,000 more than their base salary thanks to the regional allowance for hardship areas.

**Table 22:** Base salaries and regional allowances for teachers, head teachers, and township education officers, FY 2015/2016

Staff (public school)	Base salary			Regional allowance for hardship areas			
				From Feb. 2016 onward			Up to Feb. 2016
	Minimum	Increment*	Maximum	Fairly hard	Hard	Hardest	
<b>Teachers</b>							
Primary assistant teacher	150,000	2,000	160,000	70,000	76,000	82,000	64,000
Junior assistant teacher	165,000	2,000	175,000	67,000	73,000	79,000	61,000
Senior assistant teacher	180,000	2,000	190,000	64,000	70,000	76,000	58,000
<b>Head teachers</b>							
Primary head	165,000	2,000	175,000	67,000	73,000	79,000	61,000
Junior head	250,000	4,000	270,000	76,000	82,000	88,000	70,000
Senior head	250,000	4,000	270,000	76,000	82,000	88,000	70,000
<b>Education officers</b>							
Assistant township education officers	180,000	2,000	190,000	64,000	70,000	76,000	58,000
Department township education officers	250,000	4,000	270,000	76,000	82,000	88,000	70,000
Township education officers	280,000	4,000	300,000	86,000	92,000	98,000	80,000

Sources: Ministry of Finance Notification No. 12/2016, 16 February 2016, establishes revised scale for regional allowance); Ministry of Finance Notification No. 1058/2015, 10 April 2015, establishes base salary scale and initial regional allowance scale for FY 2015/2016.

\* Increment (step) is awarded every two years, not every year.

**272. Daily wage teachers are paid MMK 3,600 per day for working days only, with no leave benefits.** This is equivalent to the official minimum wage per eight-hour work day, as of September 2015. DWTs in hardship areas earn MMK 5,000. Their monthly payment is charged to budget code “0301 labor charges,” under the “03 goods and services” budget line, which is not the usual budget code for the wage bill (“0101 pay and allowances”). The World Bank estimate of monthly earnings for a minimum wage worker with a five-day week is MMK 77,400, which is significantly lower than the entry-level civil service salary of MMK 150,000 for a primary school teacher.

**273. Teachers are public servants with salaries that are determined by the civil-service wage scale.** As such, the decision regarding teachers’ salaries remains a highly centralized one. The wage scale includes increments related to years of service or placement, the school level at which one teaches, and placement at hard-to-staff schools. As a large proportion of the teacher work force is comprised of women, information on how teacher salaries compare to other similar professions and to other civil servants across different sectors of the Myanmar government will offer a better sense of gender equity, with regards to compensation in the civil sector.

**274. With the recent annual increases, teacher salaries have risen substantially.** As of 2013, Myanmar's extraordinary practice of rarely changing wage amounts has been replaced with annual nominal increases to the wage grid. As can be seen in table 23, salaries have steadily increased. The large increase in FY 2015/2016 is due, in part, to incorporating the MMK 30,000 additional allowance (introduced in FY 2012/2013 and provided through FY 2014/2015). Taking this incorporation into account, salaries still approximately doubled within three years.

**275. Unfortunately, there is little rigorous analysis on wages, including how teacher wages compare to other professions requiring the same level of qualifications and years of experience.** As mentioned in chapter 5, the 2015 labor force survey, which Myanmar conducted after a 25-year pause, could shed light on how teacher salaries compare with other professions. At the time of writing, the database had not yet been released and as a result analysis was not possible.

Table 23: Base salary scales for civil servants in education, FY 2012/2013 to FY 2015/2016 (in MMK per month)

Positions	FY 2015/2016			FY 2014/2015			FY 2013/2014			FY 2012/2013		
	Min.	Increment	Max.	Min.	Increment	Max.	Min.	Increment	Max.	Min.	Increment	Max.
<b>Teachers</b>												
Primary assistant teacher	150,000	2,000	160,000	87,000	1,000	92,000	67,000	1,000	72,000	47,000	1,000	52,000
Junior assistant teacher	165,000	2,000	175,000	93,000	1,000	98,000	73,000	1,000	78,000	53,000	1,000	58,000
Senior assistant teacher	180,000	2,000	190,000	99,000	1,000	104,000	79,000	1,000	84,000	59,000	1,000	64,000
<b>Head teachers</b>												
Primary head	165,000	2,000	175,000	93,000	1,000	98,000	73,000	1,000	78,000	53,000	1,000	58,000
Junior head	250,000	4,000	270,000	140,000	2,000	150,000	120,000	2,000	130,000	100,000	2,000	110,000
Senior head	250,000	4,000	270,000	140,000	2,000	150,000	120,000	2,000	130,000	100,000	2,000	110,000
<b>Education officers</b>												
Assistant township education officer	180,000	2,000	190,000	99,000	1,000	104,000	79,000	1,000	84,000	59,000	1,000	64,000
Department township education officer	250,000	4,000	270,000	140,000	2,000	150,000	120,000	2,000	130,000	100,000	2,000	110,000
Township education officer	280,000	4,000	300,000	160,000	2,000	170,000	140,000	2,000	150,000	120,000	2,000	130,000

Source: Ministry of Finance notifications for relevant years.

Notes: 1) In FY 2012/2013, FY 2013/2014, and FY 2014/2015, all civil servants received an “additional allowance” of MMK 30,000/month, on top of base salary. In FY 2015/2016, this amount was incorporated into the base salary and the allowance discontinued.

2) The new non-gazetted grade added for FY 2015/2016 contains about 5,000 uniformed staff in the Ministry of Home Affairs and some state administrative offices.

3) The increment (step) is awarded every two years, not every year.


4) Allocation of positions to levels in the salary scale is done within each ministry, and may vary across ministries. Listed positions are examples only.

## Customized tool for pay and work force planning to estimate impact

276. The wage-bill modeling tool developed in this study can be used to analyze important budget considerations, such as the Ministry of Education’s plans to continue hiring a large number of new teachers. The tool (discussed in chapter 3) allows for analysis and forecasting in order to determine impacts of desired hiring scenarios. This is particularly relevant for education-sector budget projections, its wave of large-scale hiring over the past three years, and its plans to continue hiring.

277. As an example, the tool can calculate the impact of further large-scale hiring of teachers on Myanmar’s education system. There are further plans to hire approximately 80,000 teachers in the 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 school years. Preliminary estimates using the work force model tool indicate that this would increase total salary expenditure by 17 percent by 2017-2018. As figure 31 illustrates, the wage bill to expenditure estimate would increase to 3.57 percent, compared to the 3.01 percent baseline.

Figure 31: Preliminary wage bill to expenditure estimate of hiring an additional 80,000 teachers



Source: Pay and work force model developed by UNESCO in conjunction with the Ministry of Finance.

## Electronic payments system

278. The Ministry of Education is in the process of developing an innovative electronic payments system. Currently, heads of schools have to travel to townships to receive cash and disburse funds. There are delays (especially for remote schools during the rainy season) and unpredictability in delivery. There are also concerns that 100 percent of salary may not be reaching the teachers. A system is being designed to pay teachers through bank accounts (formal banks, branchless banks, or other financial solution providers) with the objective of increasing the transparency and convenience of payment to teachers. This builds on an ongoing initiative to pay some 5,000 teachers through Kanbawza Bank (KBZ), a private commercial bank in Myanmar.

## Learning and development

### Standards of teacher competency and other policies relating to teacher quality

**279. The Ministry of Education, in conjunction with UNESCO, recently developed a teacher competencies framework and professional standards.** They describe and explain what are considered to be the key characteristics and attributes of good teaching, and what is expected of teachers' professional practice at various stages in their professional development. The domains include professional knowledge and understanding, professional skills and practices, professional values and dispositions, and professional growth and development.

**280. The framework and standards are being field tested and are expected to be completed in early 2017.** Lack of professional standards makes long-term goals of teachers unclear, which increases the difficulty of figuring out a framework for continuing professional development. The implementation of the teachers' competencies framework and professional standards will play a critical role in shaping teacher quality in Myanmar. The Education Promotion Implementation Committee also recommends implementing a promotion system based on teacher qualifications and experience, continuing education, and achievement of competency standards.

### Professional development and support opportunities for teachers

**281. Professional development in Myanmar is inconsistent, delivered on an ad hoc basis, and has not been effectively institutionalized.** Professional development is delivered through the in-service teacher training program, offered by Education Colleges and Institutes of Education. However, criticisms of the program emerged from the rapid assessments undertaken for the CESR. DTET, under whose authority most of the Education Colleges operate, is reportedly understaffed and unable to effectively provide or oversee regular in-service trainings. They are offered on an ad hoc basis (when provided at all) and are expected to “cascade” outwards and downwards to other teachers.<sup>134</sup> No data exists on whether these in-service trainings are equitably delivered, needs-based, or standards-based, and whether teachers are given any incentive to participate in professional development.

**282. In-service training for teacher certification is possible, helping to reduce the number of uncertified teachers in the system; however, the quality of the programs remains questionable.** Teacher certification is a one-time occurrence, with no requirements for teachers to update their qualifications within areas of specialization. A system exists to monitor and evaluate the performance of head teachers and assistant township education officials, but there are persistent issues around adequate time, support, and proper training to conduct teacher evaluations. As such, evaluations are rushed and summative, leaving teachers to fend for themselves in terms of developing the skills to adjust to contextual or pedagogical issues.<sup>135</sup> Further, the process for dismissing teachers for poor performance at work remains unclear.

**283. Another issue in teacher career development is the absence of a teacher education policy, which contributes to the lack of professional standards in the education sector regarding experience, responsibility, level of school, etc.** In addition, a teacher appraisal system is also missing in Myanmar's education system. A further problem is that only township education officers have the authority to report outstanding or underperforming teachers to higher authorities.

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<sup>134</sup> W. Aung, F. Hardman, and D. Myint, 2013, “Development of a Teacher Education Strategy Framework Linked to Pre-Service and In-Service Teacher Training.”

<sup>135</sup> Ibid.



**284. Sector reports recommend that the Ministry of Education overhaul its in-service teacher development model.** One report noted that basic education teachers “are conscious of the necessity [of further training] and keen to attend it.”<sup>136</sup> Suggested reforms include developing a school-based, in-service training model, establishing a national center for teacher professional development,<sup>137</sup> and possibly creating in-service teacher education units in each region and state that can provide regular courses.<sup>138</sup> Teacher professional development should also be linked to promotion and salary scales.

**285. In 2014, to address the lack of systematic provision of continuing professional development programs, the Ministry of Education, UNICEF, and its Myanmar Multi-Donor Education Fund partners designed and implemented a number of in-service teacher training programs, focused on strengthening teacher performance and increasing student learning.** Among these pilot programs is the school-based in-service teacher education, or SITE, model. SITE provides a framework for professional development that uses a blended learning approach. It combines school-based sessions (organized by the head teachers), teachers’ own outside reading and reflection on teaching practices, and experiential learning.

**286. New teachers, in particular, require an intense amount of support during their first few years of teaching.**<sup>139</sup> School meetings offer a unique opportunity for timely in-service trainings, but currently these meetings are generally used to convey information from the Ministry of Education or DBE.

**287. In 2016, the Ministry of Education began a program of teacher mentoring to support new teachers.** Professional, full-time mentors are hired by township education officers to visit multiple schools in the township, working individually with the new teachers, observe their lessons, help them set goals, and provide guidance and support. This program is being implemented in 40 townships and is scheduled to be phased in nationally within four years.

**288. The planned introduction of the new curriculum, over a fast-tracked timeframe of six years, will demand that a quality, cost-effective, in-service training program that reaches all teachers be implemented.** In addition, both pre-service and in-service teacher education also require longer-term reforms to enable teaching that bridges theory and practice, and encourages teachers to read and reflect on their own, and apply what they read to their teaching practices.

## Progression and promotion

### Teachers’ career progression and the education promotion system

**289. Before 1998, the basic teacher career path was linear, from primary, to junior, to senior-assistant teacher and on.** After years of teaching experience and further study to upgrade teaching certificates and degrees, teachers advanced in their careers and increased their salaries. While the same linear path still exists, the teacher career path has become more flexible and complicated through the introduction of several entry points to the teaching profession. It is assumed that university graduates still face difficulty in getting a job, compared with students from the Institutes of Education and Education Colleges, who are assured of getting a teaching job if they accept deployment to any area.

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136 Ministry of Education (with JICA), 2014, “CESR Phase 2 Report on Teacher Education.”

137 Ibid. The Ministry of Education and JICA’s report suggests that this national center could perhaps be based at the existing Basic Education Resource Development Center.

138 Ibid.

139 E. Vegas et al, 2012, “What Matters Most for Teacher Policies: A Framework Paper.”

**290. Due to the ascending salary system, once teachers start their careers, they immediately begin looking for a better position in a higher level school.** Every time a teacher moves to a higher position, the teacher is expected to take training courses to upgrade knowledge and skills. For instance, a primary assistant teacher takes a diploma course at an Education College to qualify as a junior assistant teacher, and then takes a degree course at an Institute of Education to become a senior assistant teacher or other position. Unfortunately, the chance to practice educational theory in class only comes through teaching the bloc curriculum. If the curricula of the Education Colleges and Institutes of Education do not meet teachers' needs, and teachers are (in effect) taking classes just to move to a higher salary status, pedagogical improvement will not be possible, even after 2-5 years of the program. NESP is reviewing the Education College and Institute of Education curricula to meet the needs of teaching in class.

**291. The number of teaching posts at middle and secondary schools are about one-third the number of posts in primary schools (this does not take into account Institute of Education graduates employed as higher secondary-school teachers).** Transferring to a higher school is not easy, and many teachers are forced to stay at primary schools, even though they have teaching certificates that qualify them for a higher teaching position and salary.

**292. The promotion system has various negative consequences and is in dire need of reform.** To address this issue, the new Government of Myanmar is proposing to restructure the progression and promotion system, but it must ensure that high quality, experienced teachers remain in primary schools. This requires a progression and promotion system with salary structures that are equalized in all school levels. It involves creating teacher cadres and separating the primary school teachers from the middle and secondary schools. It also involves changing the recruitment criteria for middle and secondary schools. It may make sense to recruit only via competition among university graduates, with no weight given to primary school experience.

## Teacher performance management and appraisal

**293. The teachers' evaluation system is not yet established enough to promote effective practice.** The current system puts the onus of teacher evaluation on head teachers and assistant township officers, who may or may not have the time, support, and training for it. They often complain of having to deal with a host of maintenance and budget issues, which leaves little time for teacher evaluations. Further, institutional support for teacher evaluations does not yet include a proper format for the evaluation (including aspects of the child-centered approach, etc.), or guidance and training for head teachers and assistant township officers on how to use teacher evaluations to monitor and improve teaching practices.<sup>140</sup>

## Overall education policy

**294. Clearer, more formal policies on teachers and overall education policy are necessary.** A System Approaches for Better Education Results (SABER) teacher workshop,<sup>141</sup> held in October 2015, discussed key teacher issues and policy goals. One of the most important general findings was that education policy in Myanmar has often been treated informally, without clearly defined laws, regulations, decrees, and other policy instruments to document policies and make them widely available. A key recent step was the establishment of a National Education Policy Commission in September 2016, which will play a key role in not only defining but also formalizing policy.

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<sup>140</sup> M. Lall et al., 2013, "Teachers' Voice: What Education Reforms Does Myanmar Need?"

<sup>141</sup> The SABER teacher workshop was attended by representatives of all key Ministry of Education departments, as well as development partners and members from CESR.

## Education sector options for the way forward

**295. Many positive steps have been taken by the Government of Myanmar in recent years with regard to teachers.** Salary increases and efforts to strengthen the work force numbers, development of teacher standards (which are now being field tested), and establishment of the National Education Policy Commission are just a few of the key steps which are laying the foundation for the teaching profession of the future. Major reforms of teacher education will continue in the coming five years, through the implementation of a new education law, with updated rules and regulations, and the NESP for 2016-2021. Among other things, the reforms include introducing a new curriculum (kindergarten and grade 12), revising student assessment, updating teaching pedagogy, and establishing a school-level quality assurance system.

**296. RECOMMENDATION 7.1: Reforming the teacher progression and promotion system should be a top priority.** The key issue for retaining teachers has less to do with keeping them in the system and more with ameliorating the constant movement of teachers within Myanmar's education system. The promotion system interferes with staffing needs because it forces teachers to move frequently as they apply for quick promotion from primary schools to middle and high schools, where the salaries are higher. This system also means that the best teachers tend to not remain in the primary schools, which arguably is the most crucial level. The way forward is to have a system of career paths and promotions, and equal salary structures in all levels. A system of directly hiring teachers into middle schools is also required to solve the constant movement of primary teachers to middle schools.

**297. RECOMMENDATION 7.2: A key issue to focus on is managing the rapid increase in teachers and properly hiring both Education College candidates and daily wage teachers.** The relatively new process of DWT recruitment and selection, in particular, encompasses many difficulties. This wave of new teachers will shape the teacher work force for many years, and poor or lower standards for selection can have serious implications. In addition to defining a process that recruits and selects high quality candidates, a support system for new teachers is essential. The new teacher mentoring system will play a critical role.

**298. RECOMMENDATION 7.3: While the Government of Myanmar collects data on teacher supply and demand, to date it has not used the data to inform responsive deployment of teachers.** Particularly, as the number of teachers expands rapidly and attempts are made to fill in staffing gaps, proper identification of needs and placement is essential. It is a specific deployment challenge that many young, inexperienced teachers (often DWTs) tend to be placed in the more remote schools. The teacher mentoring program will be critical in supporting these new teachers to boost their morale, as well as for skills building.

**299. RECOMMENDATION 7.4: Being able to forecast teacher supply and demand is critical.** Current planning is inadequate to ensure a smooth supply of teachers to meet growing demand, as it is only cursorily linked to pre-service teacher education intakes. The addition of kindergarten and grade 12 will also have an impact on tertiary education, as there will be two separate years when no graduates enter the tertiary education level. More robust forecasting and planning systems will be critical to smoothly navigate the changing education landscape.

**300. RECOMMENDATION 7.5: The Government of Myanmar needs to be able to strike a balance between higher pay and more staff, between across-the-board pay increases and targeted increases, and between wage expenditures and other expenditures.** Recent salary increases have significantly boosted teacher pay, but the perception continues that teachers' pay is low. More thorough analysis is needed to determine whether teacher pay is actually high or low, in order to inform decisions on the trade-offs mentioned. The impact of the increased hiring of DWTs must be carefully considered: although they are paid less, they are typically converted to regular teachers after one year. Currently the increase in teaching staff, along with higher

pay, means trade-offs in wage expenditures versus other expenditures. (See chapter 5, figure 16, “Trade-offs: Expenditures and compensation.”)

**301. The customized tool for pay and work force planning can play a key role in projecting scenarios and determining the impact of policies and decisions related to pay and hiring, and their costs relative to overall education spending.** The scenarios of higher pay versus more staff can be analyzed and the impact of the wage bill on other education spending can be explored.

**302. RECOMMENDATION 7.6: New teacher competency standards will be a core policy that will link to all aspects of teacher development, as well as performance management and appraisal.** Often teacher standards are defined, but are then not linked to pre-service and in-service training, or to teacher career progression and promotion. It will be critical to link the teacher standards throughout the system and have them tied to meaningful results.

**303. RECOMMENDATION 7.7: In-service professional development will also play a critical role in supporting teachers, particularly the daily wage teachers.** Support in the form of teacher mentoring will be essential for teachers in their early years. The teacher professional development program is fractured and needs to be strengthened in order to provide consistent, coherent, professional development opportunities, working both through school clusters and traditional training.

**304. RECOMMENDATION 7.8: The current system is not yet well established in terms of promoting effective practice.** It relies on the assistant township officers and head teachers, but faces many issues in terms of adequate time, support, and proper training to conduct teacher evaluations. Getting the system to function will require capacity building on the part of the assistant township officers and head teachers, as well as allocating priority time and training to teacher evaluations.

**305. RECOMMENDATION 7.9: Clearer, more formal policies on teachers and overall education policy are necessary.** Education policy in Myanmar must be treated more formally, defining clear laws, regulations, decrees and other policy instruments to document policies, and making them widely available. The newly established National Education Policy Commission can play a key role in not only defining, but also formalizing policy.

**306. The teacher situation in Myanmar is dynamic and presents many positive opportunities, but also many challenges.** Issues of pay, compensation, and human resource management will shape the future of the educational system. Trade-offs must be weighed and links across policy areas must be made in order to have a robust system that supports teachers and the education system as a whole.

# CHAPTER 8

## THE WAY FORWARD: OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

**307. This review was launched in response to the Government of Myanmar’s request for analytical support to make compensation and human resource policies more evidence-based.** Thus the overarching objective has been to provide the best possible analysis and to bring to bear international practice and expertise on Myanmar specific problems. This approach reflects a fundamental value: policy decisions should be informed by robust evidence. It is up to Myanmar’s policy makers to weigh that evidence, take into account any other considerations, and make the choices that best serve the country’s needs.

**308. This review has presented as comprehensive a picture as possible of the Myanmar civil-service pay and compensation, human resource system, and their strengths and challenges.** It has laid out the broad features of how the civil service is managed and how it functions (chapter 2). It has analyzed the affordability of the macro wage bill. As an emerging policy issue, stronger tools and systems are needed to guide and monitor affordability. In this context, the World Bank team has developed a customized wage bill modeling tool with its counterparts in the Government (chapter 3). The report has reviewed in detail the Government of Myanmar’s current civil-service pay and compensation structure, and provided a comprehensive assessment of the total compensation packages, including both monetary and non-monetary components, for civil servants across grades (chapter 4). It has analyzed—as far as available data allowed—the competitiveness, transparency, and fairness of civil service pay (chapter 5), and laid out the methodologies for analyzing these. The human resource management functions were reviewed, based on existing civil service regulations—in essence, the 2008 Constitution, the “Public Service Personnel Act, and Civil Service Rules and Regulations 2014—against the actual practices (chapter 6). Finally, it undertook a focused look into education, one of the most important sectors in terms of public sector employment and service delivery (chapter 7).

**309. Based on the diagnostic assessment in each chapter, detailed policy and reform options for the Government of Myanmar were recommended.** The options tailor good practice in civil service management to the Myanmar context and the country’s current problems and capacity constraints. Turning to a forward-looking perspective, table 24 summarizes these practical policy and reform options that the Government of Myanmar could take on, including a suggestion for the responsible agencies to lead policy development and implementation of these reform options (see “Key agencies” in table 20).

Table 24: Sequencing reform options for pay, compensation, and human resource reform

Reform options	Timeline	Key agencies
<b>Managing affordability of the wage bill</b>		
Consider using the wage-bill forecasting model in MTFE estimates for wage expenditures.	Next fiscal year	MOPF
Consider collecting individual employee payroll data using the proposed template.	Within 6 months	Piloted in member ministries of inter-ministerial committee
Consider developing a centralized electronic payroll with possible linkages to IFMIS and HRMIS.	2-3 years	Union Government (lead), with all agencies

Reform options	Timeline	Key agencies
<b>Ensure competitiveness, transparency, and fairness in compensation</b>		
<i>Competitiveness:</i> conduct and analyze labor force and living conditions surveys for nuanced insights into the adequacy and competitiveness of civil service compensation, and to monitor developments over time.	Within 1 year	MOPF, MOLIP
<i>Transparency and fairness:</i> the rationale for in-kind allowances could be reviewed to establish clarity for objectives and parameters.		Office of the President and Union Government Office
The Government of Myanmar could begin systematically monitoring its ability to recruit and retain the skills that it needs, and deploy personnel where it needs them.	Next fiscal year	MOPF and UCSB
The Government of Myanmar could review and update rates for the operational expenses that enable staff to do their jobs.	Next fiscal year	Office of the President, Union Government Office, MOPF
<b>Managing human resources for better performance</b>		
<i>Strengthening monitoring of human resource management:</i> conduct regular monitoring to assess the size of human resource problems and measure progress (e.g., loss of certain skills sets, turnover rates, and performance appraisals).	1-2 years	MOPF, UCSB
Establishing a human resource management unit in each ministry. Functions should include human resource planning, development, recruitment and selection, training and development, and management—with particular focus on deployment and retention in underserved areas.	1-2 years	Office of the President, UCSB, MOPF
<i>Human resource and work force planning:</i> the wage bill forecasting model can be used to strengthen human resource planning and give flexibility to the two-thirds policy by providing an accurate projection of the budgetary impact.		Office of the President, Union Government Office, all agencies
Consider using job analysis to inform human-resource management functions, such as recruitment and performance appraisals. (This would also serve a possible pay and grading reform suggested above.)		Office of the President, Union Government Office and all agencies
Make the policy on deployment more explicit and transparent.		Relevant ministries
Strengthen retention in poor and remote areas through a bundle of different incentives based on evidence.		Relevant ministries
Strengthen the format for, implementation of, and monitoring of performance appraisals.		UCSB and relevant ministries



Reform options	Timeline	Key agencies
<b>Managing human resources for better education outcomes</b>		
In human resource planning, forecasting teacher supply and demand is critical. This can be done through a teacher-customized version of the wage-bill forecasting tool.	1 year	DERPT, DBE, DTET, SEOs, REOs, TEOs
Pay and workforce planning: conduct an analysis to strike a balance on higher pay versus more staff, across-the-board pay increases versus targeted increases, and wage expenditures versus other expenditures.	Next budget year	DBE
Recruitment and selection: manage the rapid expansion of teacher numbers and proper hiring of both Education College candidates and daily wage teachers.	Begin within 1 year (next cycle)	DHE, DBE
To improve deployment, the Government of Myanmar should make stronger use of the data on teacher supply and demand to inform the design of a responsive teacher-deployment system.	1 year	DHE, DBE
Restructure the progression and promotion system to have tracks within levels and better incentives for teachers to specialize in a specific school level. (This policy is already a part of the Government's agenda.)	1-2 years	DHE, DBE
To strengthen learning and development of the teacher workforce, the competency standards will be a core policy that will link to all aspects of teacher development as well as performance management and appraisal.	1 year	DHE, DBE
To strengthen performance management and performance appraisals, consider strongly focusing on capacity development of the assistant township education officers and head teachers, as well as considering the time they need to allocate to fulfill their tasks.	2 years	DHE, DBE, DHREP

Notes: Abbreviations used are MOPF = Ministry of Finance and Planning; MOLIP = Ministry of Labor, Immigration, and Population; UCSB = Union Civil Service Board; GAD = General Administration Department (in MOPF); MOE = Ministry of Education; MOH = Ministry of Health; DERPT = Department of Education Research, Planning, and Training (in Ministry of Education); SEOs = state education offices; REOs = regional education offices; TEOs = township education offices; DBE = Department of Basic Education (in Ministry of Education); DHE = Department of Higher Education (in Ministry of Education); DTET = Department of Teacher Education and Training (in Ministry of Education).



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# ANNEXES

## Annex 1 Glossary

Table A1: Glossary

Term	Explanation in English	Source
Accountability	Accountability refers to the obligation on the part of public officials to report on the use of public resources and answerability for failing to meet stated performance objectives.	UNPAN
Allowances	Current rewards other than base pay. These can be provided as part of the employment contract (e.g., transportation, housing, meals, telephone, travel, cost-of-living), provided on a non-contractual basis, or provided as intangible rewards (e.g., trips abroad or training).	World Bank1
Armed forces (employment category)	All enlisted personnel (including conscripts) and professional military. Administrative employees of the Ministry of Defense are generally excluded from this category and accounted for as civilian central government employees.	World Bank1
Audit	An independent, objective assurance activity designed to add value and improve an organization's operations. It helps an organization accomplish its objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to assess and improve the effectiveness of risk management, control, and governance processes.	OECD3
Base pay or base wage	The salary or wages that every civil servant receives regularly (usually fortnightly or monthly) from the government by virtue of being on the payroll. Base pay is usually linked to an employee's position and is uniform across similar positions. The base wage is often cited to compare wages in the public and private sectors. It is, however, only one component of civil servants' total rewards.	World Bank1
Benchmarking	The establishment of quantitative standards for comparing one organization with another as a means of improving performance. Process benchmarking is the study and comparisons of the processes and activities that turn inputs into outputs. Results benchmarking compares actual performance of organization using performance indicators or measures.	OECD2
Budget	A comprehensive statement of government financial plans including expenditures, revenues, deficit or surplus, and debt. The budget is the government's main economic policy document, indicating how the government plans to use public financial resources to meet policy goals.	OECD5
Budget classification	A budget classification system constitutes a normative framework for the day-to-day administration and monitoring of budget execution, policy formulation, and analysis, to ensure accountability, provide information to parliament and the public, and create the basis for budget authorization (or the level of parliamentary authorization).	IMF1
Budget cycle	All the major events or stages in making decisions about the budget, and implementing and assessing those decisions. It usually has four stages: formulation, approval, execution, and audit.	OECD2



Term	Explanation in English	Source
Capacity	Capacity building refers to augmenting staff ability and increasing staff or physical resources in situations where there is none—for example, post-conflict reconstruction of public administration (UNDP, 2002). Capacity is used —to evaluate and address the crucial questions related to policy choices and modes of implementation among development options, based on an understanding of environment, potentials, limits, and needs perceived by the people of the country concerned. It encompasses the country’s human, scientific, technological, organizational, institutional, and resource capabilities.	UNPAN
Central agencies	These organizations are part of the executive branch to co-ordinate the activities of, and provide guidance to, the operating ministries and agencies. Terminology varies widely from country to country, but central agencies generally include the Ministry of Finance; the cabinet office/chancellery or the ministry assisting the prime minister or the council of ministers in the development and co-ordination of policy; the ministry or agency responsible for developing and coordinating policies in relation to human resource management within the public sector; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in certain areas of work such as European integration policy	World Bank1
Civil Service	Body of government employees entrusted with the administration of the country and mandated to carry out the policy of the government of the day.	UNDP
Civil service (as employment category)	<p>Distinctive employment status for some public servants, generally defined by law and usually with four characteristics:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Civil servants are "appointed" by decision of an authorized public institution in accordance with the civil service law. A decision by a representative of the State to "appoint" a civil servant must conform to established rules that structure the hiring process.</li> <li>2) Once appointed, there are many constraints on dismissal. This is because civil servants are not simply employees of the state; they also have a constitutional role. The intent of civil service legislation is to balance the requirement these employees be responsive to the government of the day, with the parallel requirement that they respect and maintain state institutions over time. In other words, additional job security is provided in order to prevent short-term political pressures from leading to inappropriate personnel changes.</li> <li>3) There are more constraints on the actions of civil servants than on other groups. Again, this is because of the strategic and constitutional role of civil servants.</li> <li>4) Civil servants are part of the employment categories of civilian central government or subnational government. These two categories generally exceed the number of staff defined as civil servants.</li> </ol> <p>There are other employment arrangements in the public sector that provide something akin to civil servant status. For example, the judiciary can often be employed under arrangements that provide constitutionally-based constraints on dismissal. Yet, members of the judiciary are rarely known as civil servants.</p>	World Bank1

Term	Explanation in English	Source
Compensation	Non-salary compensation includes expenditure by employers or public authorities on retirement programs, health care or health insurance, unemployment compensation, disability insurance, other forms of social insurance, non-cash supplements (e.g., free or subsidized housing), maternity benefits, free or subsidized child care, and such other fringe benefits as each country may provide. This expenditure does not include contributions made by the employees themselves, or deducted from their gross salaries.	OECD6
Decentralization	The transfer of responsibility to democratically independent lower levels of government, thereby giving them more managerial discretion, but not necessarily more financial independence.	OECD1
Deconcentration	The transfer of responsibility from central ministries to field offices or more autonomous agencies, thereby becoming closer to citizens while remaining part of central government. Frequently in unitary states.	OECD1
Education (employment category)	Primary and secondary public school teachers. Administrative employees of the Ministry of Education and local school administrators are generally excluded from this category and accounted for as civilian central government employees.	World Bank1
Effectiveness	The extent to which policy objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.	OECD3
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results.	OECD3
Entitlement	Any spending program where expenditure is open-ended (usually transfer/grant payments) and where recipients must be paid or given transfers/grants, if they meet certain criteria. Some common examples are found in social security programs, unemployment programs, and poverty programs. (Program examples in the United States include Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and food stamps.)	IMF1
Establishment control	The formal process for matching information on funded posts in an organization to the details of the staff currently employed in those posts.	Review Team
Fiscal policy	Government actions with respect to aggregate levels of revenue and spending. Fiscal policy is implemented through the budget and is the primary means by which the government can influence the economy. Permanent constraints on fiscal policy, typically defined in terms of an indicator(s) of overall fiscal performance, such as the deficit/GDP (gross domestic product) ratio and the debt/GDP ratio.	OECD2
Fiscal weight of public employment	The public sector wage bill as a percentage of GDP.	World Bank1



Term	Explanation in English	Source
General government (employment category)	<p>Employment in "all government departments, offices, organizations, and other bodies that are agencies or instruments of the central or local authorities, whether accounted for, or financed in, ordinary or extraordinary budgets or extra-budgetary funds. They are not solely engaged in administration but also in defense and public order, in the promotion of economic growth and in the provision of education, health, cultural, and social services" (International Standard of Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities [ISIC], Series M, no. 4, rev. 3- 1990).</p> <p>There are six mutually exclusive categories of employment within general government:</p> <p>Employment in "all government departments, offices, organizations, and other bodies that are agencies or instruments of the central or local authorities, whether accounted for, or financed in, ordinary or extraordinary budgets or extra-budgetary funds. They are not solely engaged in administration but also in defense and public order, in the promotion of economic growth and in the provision of education, health, cultural, and social services" (International Standard of Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities [ISIC], Series M, no. 4, rev. 3- 1990).</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Armed forces</li> <li>2) Civilian central government (excluding education, health, and police)</li> <li>3) Subnational government (excluding education, health, and police)</li> <li>4) Health employees</li> <li>5) Education employees</li> <li>6) Police</li> </ol>	World Bank1
Good practice	<p>A good practice is a process or a methodology that represents the most effective way of achieving a specific objective. A good practice is one that has been proven to work well and produce good results, and is therefore recommended as a model. It is a successful experience, which has been tested and validated in the broad sense, and has been repeated and deserves to be shared so that a greater number of people can adopt it.</p>	CHRODIS
Governance	<p>Governance is "the exercise of economic, political, and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels. It comprises the mechanisms, processes, and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations, and mediate their differences" (UNDP, 1997).</p>	UNDP
Government	<p>In most parliamentary and semi-presidential systems, this term refers to the entire executive branch of the state or to the members of governments (usually termed "ministers," but occasionally called "secretaries") selected by the legislature or appointed by the head of government to run the executive branch. In the United States, the term "government" is used in a variety of ways. It can refer to the entire executive branch of the federal government, to the federal government generally, and sometimes to federal, state, and local governments combined.</p>	World Bank1
Gross domestic product (GDP)	<p>The total value of final goods and services produced in a country during a single year. Economic growth is measured by the change in GDP from year to year.</p>	OECD2

Term	Explanation in English	Source
Health employees (employment category)	Medical and paramedical staff (doctors, nurses, and midwives) and laboratory technicians employed in government hospitals and other government health institutions at all levels of government. Administrative employees working in the health sector are generally excluded from this category and accounted for as civilian central government employees.	World Bank1
Indicator	Quantitative or qualitative factor or variable that provides a simple and reliable means to measure achievement, to reflect the changes connected to a policy intervention, or to help assess the performance of an agency.	OECD3
Inputs	Inputs are the resources of a reporting entity used to produce outputs in delivering its objectives. These may take the form of financial, human, and technical resource inputs.	OECD3
Labor force	Total labor force comprises people who meet the International Labor Organization (ILO) definition of the economically active population: all people who supply labor for the production of goods and services during a specified period. It includes both employed and unemployed people. While national practices vary in the treatment of such groups as the armed forces and seasonal or part-time workers, in general, the labor force includes the armed forces, unemployed persons, and first-time job-seekers, but excludes homemakers and other unpaid caregivers and workers in the informal sector.	World Bank1
Medium-term fiscal (or financial) framework (MTFF)	A multi-year aggregate projection of revenue, expenditure, and financing. MTFF is a transparent planning and budget formulation process within which the central government establishes credible contracts for allocating public resources to their strategic priorities while ensuring overall fiscal discipline.	OECD2
Monitoring	A continuing function that uses systematic collection of data on specified indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders of an ongoing policy intervention with indications of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives and progress in the use of allocated funds.	OECD3
Outcomes	<p>Outcomes describe the impact of a government program on social or economic indicators. Examples of outcomes include the change in student test scores following an increase in hours taught, the change in the incidence of a disease following an immunization program, or the change in income inequality following the introduction of a new welfare payment. Outcomes are a broader performance metric than outputs and are harder to measure.</p> <p>Outcomes are the effects on society of outputs from governmental entities. Outcomes—whether intended or unintended—are not usually completely controllable by governments. The degree of control depends on the influence of extraneous factors on the goal in question, the effectiveness of implementation, and the quality of the policies for reaching the goal.</p>	OECD3
Outputs	Outputs are defined as goods and services provided by government agencies. Some examples include teaching hours delivered, immunizations provided, or welfare benefits paid. Outputs tend to be easier to measure than outcomes.	OECD2

Term	Explanation in English	Source
Pension	Payment made to a pension-fund member (or dependents) after retirement.	OECD1
Performance indicator	Performance can be monitored and assessed through measures or indicators—particular value(s) or characteristic(s) used to measure output or outcome. Measures correspond to direct records of inputs, outputs, and outcomes. (For example, the number of police patrols carried out in a given period is an output measure.) Indicators are used as a proxy when direct measures are difficult or costly to obtain (For example, the “street” price of illegal drugs is an indicator of the outcome of an anti-drug program.) In practice, however, the terms “measures” and “indicators” are often used interchangeably. “Performance indicators” may be used to evaluate inputs, processes, outputs, and outcomes.	OECD2
Performance management	Generally understood to be the management of the performance of government organizations as a whole, their chief executives, and their staffs.	World Bank1
Performance targets	Specific and measureable outputs or outcomes that are set ex-ante with the goal of being achieved by a government policies, programs, and/or organizations within a pre-specified amount of time. Performance, as measured against performance targets, compares the initial output/outcome goals set with those actually achieved (e.g., 200 trainees to be trained in 12 months time). Progress can be monitored against the defined targets.	OECD4
Police (employment category)	All personnel—whether military, paramilitary or civilian—that exercise police functions, including corps like the gendarmerie in France and carabinieri in Italy.	World Bank1
Policy	A decision determined by the government to address 1) socio-economic challenges in a country (or, in the case of foreign policy, in the country’s relations with other countries) and 2) usually also decisions on how these challenges will be addressed. Policies are typically expressed in laws/regulations, official policy statements or guidelines, and institutions, which then result in programs and specific initiatives financed and/or conducted by government organizations to address these challenges. Policy can also be a set of activities, which may differ in type and which may have different beneficiaries, but that are directed towards common general objectives or goals. In contrast to a program, a policy does not have necessarily a delimited budget.	OECD4
Position-based systems	Position-based career systems in the civil service place an emphasis on selecting the best-suited candidate for each position to be filled, whether by external recruitment, internal promotion, or mobility. Position-based systems are characterized by relatively open access to positions at all levels, where lateral entry is relatively common. This is in contrast to closed career systems in the civil service, where the recruitment arrangements ensure that initial entry to the civil service is usually based on a relevant university degree or academic credentials. In those systems, appointments tend to be made via promotion within the civil service. Closed career systems are sometimes referred to as "mandarin" systems.	World Bank1

Term	Explanation in English	Source
Public administration	<p>According to UNDP, public administration has two closely related meanings:</p> <p>1) The aggregate machinery (policies, rules, procedures, systems, organizational structures, personnel, and so forth) funded by the state budget and in charge of the management and direction of the affairs of the executive government, and its interaction with other stakeholders in the state, society, and external environment</p> <p>2) The management and implementation of the whole set of government activities dealing with the implementation of laws, regulations, and decisions of the government and the management related to the provision of public services</p>	UNDP
Public financial management	Public financial management is the system by which financial resources are planned, directed, and controlled to enable and influence the efficient and effective delivery of public service goals.	CIPFA
Public servants	A wider group of employees than civil servants. For example, teachers and doctors in publicly owned schools and health facilities may or may not legally be civil servants, but they are always public servants if employed by budget-funded organizations.	World Bank1
Public service	Service provided by government to citizens, such as health care, education, waste management, infrastructure, etc.	World Bank2
Remuneration	Remuneration includes any payment made under a contract for services.	HRINZ
Remuneration-in-kind	Remuneration-in-kind occurs when an employee accepts payment in the form of goods and services instead of money.	OECD1
Service delivery	Provide public sector services that comply with government legislation, principles, and priorities.	NZQA
Stakeholders	<p>Agencies, organizations, groups, or individuals who have a direct or indirect interest in the policy intervention or its evaluation. Stakeholder groups may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries from the target group, decision makers, and activity staff;</li> <li>• those with an interest in the activity (e.g., advocacy groups and central agencies); and</li> <li>• those who are adversely or unintentionally affected by the intervention.</li> </ul>	OECD3
State-owned enterprise (SOE) employees	Employees of enterprises that are majority-owned by government	World Bank1
Strategy	<p>A comprehensive set of goals and plans for their achievement.</p> <p>The approach to be used to supply appropriately and consistently with the entity's corporate goals. It is based on the requirements from needs analysis and review of present provision.</p>	DFAT Australia

Term	Explanation in English	Source
Subnational government (excluding education, health, and police) (employment category)	All general government employees who are not members of the armed forces or directly funded by the central government. This includes municipalities, as well as regional, provincial, or state (in federal systems) employment. The distinction between central and subnational government employment categories is budgetary, not geographic. If central government agencies are geographically dispersed, but without changing their ultimate sources of finance, then the staff in those agencies are included in the employment category civilian central government.	World Bank1
Total civilian central government (employment category)	All general government employees who are not members of the armed forces or directly funded by subnational government. The distinction between central and subnational government employment categories is budgetary, not geographic.	World Bank1
Total compensation	Personal emoluments plus in-kind benefits and allowances, such as health insurance, transportation, meals, or travel.	World Bank1
Total public employment	State-owned enterprise (SOE) employees plus general government	World Bank1
Total rewards	Total compensation plus non-contractual/intangible rewards and allowances, such as job security, prestige, social privileges, and future expectations, such as pension or anticipated housing or land grants.	World Bank1
Transparency	Transparency refers to an environment in which the objectives of policy, its legal, institutional, and economic framework, policy decisions and their rationale, data and information related to monetary and financial policies, and the terms of agencies' accountability, are provided to the public in a comprehensible, accessible, and timely manner.	IMF2

Sources:

CHRODIS—Addressing Chronic Diseases and Healthy Aging across the Life Cycle, Glossary <http://chrodis.eu/resources/glossary/>  
DFAT Australia—Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Australia: “Annual Report 1999-2000,” “Glossary of Terms”  
DFID—Department for International Development: “Glossary 2002”  
HRINZ—Human Resource Institute of New Zealand (<http://www.hrinz.org.nz/>, <http://www.nzqa.govt.nz/framework/explore/domain.do?frameworkId=76113>)  
IMF1—B. H. Potter and J. Diamond, 1999, “Guidelines for Public Expenditure Management” (International Monetary Fund)  
IMF2—Supporting document to the “Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies, Part 1: Introduction,” 2004.  
NZQA—New Zealand Qualification Authority  
OECD1—“Glossary of Statistical Terms”  
OECD2—“Public Expenditure Management Handbook for Transition Countries”  
OECD3—“Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-based Management”  
OECD4—“Glossary of Key Terms for Completing the 2012 OECD Budgeting Practices and Procedures Survey”  
OECD5—“Budget Practices and Procedures Database, Phase II: Final Glossary,” 19 December 2006  
OECD6—“Education at a Glance,” Paris, 2002  
UNDP—“UNDP Public Administration Reform Glossary”  
UNPAN—United Nations Public Administration Network, <http://www.unpan.org>  
World Bank1—“General Public Administration and Civil Service Terms”  
World Bank2—“Public Expenditure Review: Myanmar,” 2015

## Annex 2 Myanmar's Compensation-Related Entitlements

This annex describes components of Myanmar's civil service compensation system, based on review of official regulations, discussions with government officials, and other sources as cited.

### Monetary compensation

1. *Base salary*: Base salary rates for the 13 grades are specified in notifications issued by the Ministry of Finance. Civil servants except Director General and Managing Director receive a pay increment every two years.
2. *Regional allowance for posts in hardship areas*:<sup>142</sup> Approximately 108 of Myanmar's 335 townships are classified as hardship areas.
3. *Additional allowance for civil servants*: This was cancelled at the start of FY 2015/2016. An allowance of MMK 30,000/month was established in Ministry of Finance Notification No. 100/3012, 14 March 2012, Nay Pyi Taw, 7th Waning Day of Tabaung, 1373 ME.
4. *Tax exemption for family members residing with taxpayers*: Individuals receive a MMK 1,000,000 per year tax exemption for the spouse at home and each parent residing with the civil servant. For each unmarried child under age 18 (or over 18 if in full-time studies) residing with the civil servant, the individual receives a MMK 500,000 tax exemption per year.<sup>143</sup>
5. *"Awards" and "remuneration"*: These are given to individuals for additional or special work beyond regular duties, or for examination results.<sup>144</sup> These two payments are funded from the union budget or other sources, respectively. While this is stipulated in the Civil Service Rules 2014, it is not clear whether any such payments are made in practice.
6. *Shift allowance*: This is seen only in the health sector.

### In-kind allowances and benefits

For each of the allowances below (except daily allowance and travel allowance), the information from a sample of departments in six ministries and UCSB is provided in other annexes.

1. Vehicle: decided by each department; practices vary
2. Gasoline allowance: decided by each department; practices vary
3. Telephone allowance: decided by each department; practices vary
4. Housing benefit: varies across bodies, geographic locations and grade
5. Free transportation to work: free transportation provided only in some cases, depending on the department and location (in Nay Pyi Taw, departments provide free shuttle buses to take staff to and from work.)
6. Daily allowance and travel allowance for duty-related travel: when this simply pays for work-related expenses, it is not part of a worker's compensation package. However, depending on actual practice and rates, some portion of per diem may in certain cases become *de facto* compensation. Daily allowance rates (per diem) in Myanmar are described as modest, possibly not covering actual reasonable expenses.
7. "Fixed outfit allowance and impress money" (as translated from original Myanmar text).

142 *Civil Service Rules and Regulations 2014*, chap. 12.

143 These exemptions are established in the Ministry of Finance, Internal Revenue Department's "Procedures for Calculating Income Tax Under the Salary for 2015-2016 Fiscal Year," distributed by the Minister of Finance, Register No. BaKha-2/11 (2893/2015), date 10 April 2015, in "Dissemination of Income Calculation Procedures from Income Title for 2015-2016 Fiscal Year."

144 *Civil Service Rules and Regulations 2014*, chap. 6.



## Leave benefits<sup>145</sup>

Civil servants are entitled to be absent from work under the following circumstances.

1. Annual leave (“earned leave”): staff members earn one day of annual leave for every 11 days of work, maximum up to two months.
2. Long vacation leave: applies to teachers during school holidays more than 15 consecutive holidays in a calendar year.
3. Casual leave: for sudden illness or personal needs, up to 10 days per calendar year.
4. Special casual leave for rabies treatment: up to one month with medical approval
5. For donating blood: on the day of donation plus the day immediately after
6. Quarantine leave: if household members have contagious illness, 21-30 days with medical approval
7. Medical leave: at half pay, with medical approval; limited to 12-18 months over a career
8. Maternity leave: six months (plus additional six weeks for twins) with full pay
9. Paternity leave: two weeks with full pay
10. Preparation leave for retirement: up to four months
11. Special disability leave for workplace injuries: with medical approval, up to 24 months (at first the person receives full pay, but this is reduced over time.)
12. Hospital leave: at full or half pay for work-related illnesses for staff of certain bodies, not to exceed three months per three-year period
13. Sick leave for shipboard staff: at full pay with medical approval, not to exceed three months per three-year period
14. Study leave: at full pay
15. Leave without pay
16. Job transfer leave: five days, up to 30 days

## Pension benefits<sup>146</sup>

1. Superannuation pension scheme: Gratuity is paid to retirees with less than 10 years’ service (who are not eligible for a monthly pension), as well as those with 10 or more years of service who will receive a monthly pension. Formulas are in the Pensions Department’s March 2013 unpublished note “Pension Rules and Regulation: Conditions of Qualification.” All pensions are a defined benefit, non-contributory, and funded from the Government of Myanmar’s budget.
2. Early retirement or “relaxation” pensions: Regular pension is payable at age 60, with 1- years vesting; replacement rate is 50% of final basic salary for those with 35 years of service. Early retirement is at age 55, with 30 years vesting; “relaxation” pension is at age 55 with 20 years, or age 50 with 25 years.
3. Disability pension: With at least 10 years’ service and if medically certified as unable to return to work. (See *Civil Service Rules and Regulations 2014*, paragraphs 95 and 233.)
4. Family pension (survivors benefit)
5. “Compensation pension” at abolition of post or closure of state economic enterprise: This is labeled as a pension in Myanmar. However, it is in fact not a pension, but rather a termination benefit.

<sup>145</sup> As stated in the *Civil Service Rules and Regulations 2014*.

<sup>146</sup> As described in *Civil Service Rules and Regulations 2014*, and World Bank, 2015, “Strengthening Social Security Provision in Myanmar.”

## Annex 3 Civil Service-Related Regulations Reviewed

The following are among the civil service-related regulations reviewed for this study.

### 2016

1. Ministry of Finance, Notification No. 12/2016, 8th Waning Day of Tapotwe, 1377 ME, 16 February 2016. Subject: Stipulation of higher hardship regional allowances for civil servants who are working in remote areas.

### 2015

2. Ministry of Finance, Office of the Minister, Notification No. 388/2015, Nay Pyi Taw, the 8th Waning Day of Tapotwe 1376 ME, (11 February 2015). Subject: Increasing the basic salaries of the cook, house helper, gardener, and driver appointed for the persons who were serving for the State, taking huge responsibilities during the rule of the former State Peace and Development Council.
3. Ministry of Finance, Office of the Minister, Notification No. 389/2015, Nay Pyi Taw, the 8th Waning Day of Tapotwe 1376 ME, (11 February 2015). Subject: Increasing the basic salary of the personal assistant, store keeper, waiter, chief cook, launderer, cook, house helper, gardener, and driver, who are appointed according to the Law Relating to the Emoluments, Allowances, and Insignia of the Union Level Persons, Region, or State Level Persons, Chairperson, and Executive Committee Members of the Self-Administered Division or of the Self-Administered Zone, and Chairperson and Council Members of the Nay Pyi Taw Council.
4. Union Government, Announcement Order No. 23/2015, 19 March 2015, Amendment of the Job Titles of Government Officers and Employees.
5. Ministry of Finance, Office of the Minister, Register No. BaKha-2/11 (2893/2015) 10 April 2015. Subject: Dissemination of income calculation procedure from income title for 2015-2016 Financial Year.
6. Ministry of Finance, Office of the Ministry, Notification No. 1058/2015, Nay Pyi Taw, the 7th Waning Day of Tagu 1376 ME (10 April 2015). Subject: Temporary amendment to the Hardship Duty Locations Pay to the civil service personnel who are serving in remote areas.
7. Ministry of Finance, Office of the Ministry, Notification No. 1059/2015, Nay Pyi Taw, the 7th Waning Day of Tagu 1376 ME, 2015 April 10. Subject: Increasing the pension for retired civil service personnel.
8. Ministry of Finance, Office of the Ministry, Register No. BaKha- 1/310 (1617/2015), 10 April 2015. Subject: Defining daily-basis wage for workers in governmental departments and agencies.
9. Ministry of Finance, Office of the Minister, Notification No. 1298/2015, Nay Pyi Taw, the 2nd Waxing Day of Nayone 1377 ME, 19 May 2015. Subject: Defining wage for daily-basis workers who are serving in townships in which hardship duty locations pay is entitled.
10. Ministry of Finance, Office of the Ministry, Notification No. 1300/2015, Nay Pyi Taw, the 2nd Waxing Day of Nayone 1377 ME, 19 May 2015. Subject: Increasing the basic salary of the personal assistant, store keeper, waiter, chief cook, launderer, cook, house helper, gardener and driver, who are appointed according to The Law Relating to the Emoluments, Allowances, and Insignia of the Union Level Persons, Region, or State Level Persons, Chairperson, and Executive Committee Members of the Self-Administered Division or of the Self-Administered Zone, and Chairperson and Council Members of the Nay Pyi Taw Council.
11. Ministry of Finance, Office of the Minister, Notification No. 1513/2015, Nay Pyi Taw, the 1st Waxing Day of First Warso 1377 ME, 17 June 2015. Subject: Increasing monthly honorarium to scholars.

12. Ministry of Finance, Office of the Ministry, Notification No. 1514/2015, Nay Pyi Taw, the 1st Waxing Day of Warso 1377 ME, 17 June 2015. Subject: Increasing monthly allowance for experts
13. Ministry of Finance, Internal Revenue Department, Procedures of Calculating Income Tax under the Salary for 2015-2016 Financial Year (undated).
14. Ministry of Finance, Office of the Minister, Notification No. 3006/2015, Nay Pyi Taw, 14th waning day of Tazaungmone 1377 ME, 10 December 2015. Subject: Stipulation of wage for daily wage earners in the Government departments and organizations

## 2014

15. Union Civil Service Board, Republic of the Union of Myanmar, “Civil Service Rules,” 26 March 2014.
16. Ministry of Finance, Office of the Minister, Notification No. 587/2014, Nay Pyi Taw, the 5th Waxing Day of Tagu 1375 ME, 14 April 2014. Subject: Increasing the rate of salary, pension, and wages of the civil service personnel.
17. Ministry of Finance, Office of the Minister, Notification No. 588/2014, Nay Pyi Taw, the 5th Waxing Day of Tagu 1375 ME, 4 April 2014. Subject: Increasing monthly allowance for experts.
18. Ministry of Finance, Office of the Minister, Notification No. 589/2014, Nay Pyi Taw, the 5th Waxing Day of Tagu 1375 ME, 4 April 2014. Subject: Increasing honorarium to scholars.

## 2013

19. Public Service Personnel Act, 2013.
20. Ministry of Finance, Office of the Minister, Notification No. 544/2013, Nay Pyi Taw, 6th Waning Day of Tabaung, 1374 ME, 1 April 2013. Subject: Increasing salary, pension, and wages of civil servants.
21. Ministry of Finance, Office of the Minister, Notification No. 545/2013, Nay Pyi Taw, 6th Waning Day of Tabaung, 1374 ME, 1 April 2013. Subject: Setting monthly grant for experts.
22. Ministry of Finance, Office of the Minister, Notification No. 546/ 2013, 6th Waning Day of Tabaung, 1374 ME, 1 April 2013. Subject: Increasing honoraria for scholars.
23. Ministry of Finance, Office of the Minister, Register No. BaKha – 1/310 (1799/ 2013), 9 April 2013. Subject: Permission to increase pension.
24. Ministry of Finance, Office of the Minister, Register No. BaKha – 1/310 (4029/2013), 26 July 2013. Subject: Increasing honoraria for scholars.

## 2012

25. Ministry of Finance, Office of the Minister, Notification No. 100/2012, Nay Pyi Taw, 7th Waning Day of Tabaung, 1373 ME, 14 March 2012. Subject: Allowance of additional grant for civil servant serving for the country within the country.
26. Ministry of Finance, Office of the Minister, Notification No. 150/2012, Nay Pyi Taw, 6th Waxing Day of Kasone 1374 ME, 26 April 2012. Subject: Allowance of additional grant for advisors and experts serving for the country from within the country.
27. Ministry of Finance, Office of the Minister, Notification No. 208/2012, Nay Pyi Taw, 6th Waning Day of Kasone, 1374 ME, 11 May 2012.

## 2011

28. Ministry of Finance, Office of the Minister, Notification No. 106/ 2011, Nay Pyi Taw, 14th Waning Day of Nayon, 1372 ME, 30 June 2011. Subject: Increasing pension for civil servants.
29. Ministry of Finance, Office of the Minister, Register No. BaKha – 1/310 2059/ 2011, 30 June 2011. Subject: Increasing pension for civil servants.

## 2010

30. The Law on the Union Civil Service Board (2010),
31. Ministry of Finance, Office of the Minister, Register No. BaKha 1/195 (2010), 28 September 2010. Presentation to the Government of the Union of Myanmar. Subject: The amendment of daily travel allowance rates mentioned in bylaw.
32. Ministry of Finance, Office of the Minister, Notification No. 216/ 2010, Nay Pyi Taw, 7th Waning Day of Tawthalin, 1372 ME, 30 September 2010. [Document untitled, concerns amendment to daily travel allowance]

## 2008

33. The Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2008.

## Annex 4 Civil Service Job Titles by Grade

**Table A2:** Civil service job titles by grade

Note: The number following a specific job title refers to a grade within that job.

Gazetted positions	
Base salary 2015-2016 (in MMK)	Job titles
500,000	Permanent secretary ~ director general-in-charge ~ director general ~ managing director ~ director general of the peoples' police force ~ chief ambassador ~ rector ~ principal ~ deputy air force department head ~ chief pilot ~ pilot-in-command
380,000/4,000/400,000	Deputy permanent secretary ~ deputy director general ~ director ~ general manager ~ chief police officer ~ ambassador ~ pilot ~ rector ~ deputy rector ~ professor (medical practice) ~ principal ~ vice-principal ~ chief engineer ~ head of factory ~ medical superintendent ~ deputy managing director
340,000/4,000/360,000	Assistant secretary ~ director ~ deputy director ~ general manager ~ deputy general manager ~ chief department head ~ department head ~ chief police officer ~ chief ambassador ~ chief consulate general ~ chief engineer ~ professor ~ vice-professor ~ principal ~ vice-principal ~ medical superintendent ~ factory head ~ deputy factory head ~ chief marine department head ~ chief markers or buoys ~ chief watercraft ~ chief watercraft architect ~ port officer ~ chief editor ~ librarian ~ researcher ~ chief engineer ~ deputy chief engineer ~ chief accountant
310,000/4,000/330,000	Deputy director ~ assistant director ~ deputy general manager ~ assistant general manager ~ manager ~ department head ~ ambassador ~ deputy chief police officer ~ vice-professor ~ assistant professor ~ lecturer (PhD) ~ principal ~ vice-principal ~ medical superintendent ~ specialist ~ deputy director general of engineering ~ chief engineer ~ deputy chief engineer ~ factory head ~ deputy factory head ~ assistant factory head ~ deputy marine department chief ~ watercraft engineer ~ chief watercraft ~ deputy chief watercraft ~ port officer ~ geology officer ~ geology and physics officer ~ executive editor ~ researcher ~ deputy department officer ~ material controller ~ deputy chief civil engineer ~ deputy chief accountant
280,000/4,000/300,000	Assistant director ~ deputy director ~ manager ~ department head ~ subdepartment head ~ police officer ~ first secretary ~ lecturer ~ registrar ~ principal ~ education officer ~ medical superintendent ~ specialist ~ doctor ~ chief engineer ~ factory head ~ deputy factory head ~ assistant factory head ~ workshop head ~ deputy pilot ~ assistant marine department head ~ chief marine engineer ~ watercraft engineer ~ watercraft chief ~ watercraft officer ~ watercraft architect ~ geology officer ~ geology and physics officer ~ geology and chemistry officer ~ executive editor ~ editor ~ museum in-charge ~ librarian ~ chief nurse ~ chief researcher ~ deputy researcher ~ research officer ~ deputy chief editor
250,000/4,000/270,000	Assistant manager ~ department head ~ subdepartment head ~ collective department head ~ personal officer ~ deputy police officer ~ vice-secretary ~ third secretary ~ assistant lecturer ~ principal ~ vice-principal ~ registrar ~ assistant registrar ~ training officer ~ vice-medical superintendent ~ assistant doctor ~ assistant engineer ~ factory head ~ deputy factory head ~ deputy workshop head ~ subworkshop head ~ assistant pilot ~ marine officer ~ assistant marine officer ~ watercraft engineer ~ assistant watercraft engineer ~ watercraft head ~ assistant watercraft head ~ watercraft officer ~ assistant watercraft architect ~ assistant geology officer ~ assistant geology and physics officer ~ assistant geology and chemistry officer ~ editor ~ assistant editor ~ chief reporter ~ chief sportsman ~ assistant librarian ~ research officer ~ assistant research officer ~ chief officer ~ nurse chief ~ flying officer ~ work officer ~ assistant museum officer ~ collective department officer1 ~ collective department officer2 ~ office chief ~ diving officer ~ assistant port officer ~ deputy education officer ~ literature editor

Non-gazetted positions	
Base salary 2015-2016 (in MMK)	Job titles
210,000/2,000/220,000	Inspector
195,000/2,000/205,000	Chief officer ~ office head ~ supervisor ~ accountant1 ~ auditor1 ~ cashier1 ~ materials controller1 ~ security officer1 ~ storage officer1 ~ machine operator1 ~ electric expert1 ~ machine operator1 ~ electronic expert1 ~ collective workshop officer ~ industry manager1 ~ industrial expert1 ~ handicraft expert1 ~ welding1 ~ assistant researcher1 ~ laboratory expert 1 ~ chief watercraft1 ~ chief engine room1 ~ steerman1 ~ sailor1 ~ bosun (foreign/coastal) ~ chief engine room (foreign/coastal) ~ chief watercraft communication officer ~ diver1 ~ measurer1 ~ chief station master ~ engine driver1 ~ upper male/female flight attendant ~ communications officer1 ~ driver/mechanic1 ~ driver1 ~ petroleum expert1 ~ assistant geology officer1 ~ assistant geology and physics officer1 ~ assistant mineralogy officer1 ~ assistant mines officer1 ~ junior engineer1 ~ drawing1 ~ printing1 ~ prediction1 ~ carpenter1 ~ mason1 ~ seller1 ~ chef1 ~ waiter1 ~ usher1 ~ baker1 ~ tour guide1 ~ glasses expert1 ~ butcher1 ~ washer1 ~ decorator1 ~ tailor1 ~ room control1 ~ saw sharpener1 ~ knife sharpener1 ~ wood checker1 ~ wood accountant1 ~ wood carpenter1 ~ wood buyer ~ materials buyer ~ boiler controller1 ~ animal controller1 ~ veterinarian officer ~ land surveyor1 ~ saw dust machine operator1 ~ tractor driver1 ~ expert fisherman1 ~ senior trainer ~ medical officer1 ~ pharmacy expert1 ~ compound medicine1 ~ nurse1 ~ assistant insect officer1 ~ printing expert1 ~ assistant literature officer1 ~ senior reporter/assistant librarian1 ~ photography expert1 ~ broadcast expert1 ~ motion picture expert1 ~ artist1 ~ traditional flower arrangement1 ~ assistant museum officer1 ~ social welfare officer1 ~ assistant religious officer1 ~ senior investigation officer ~ head of market1 ~ translator1 ~ investigator1 ~ budget officer ~ censor officer1 ~ assistant registrar1 ~ deputy police officer ~ distributor1 ~ expert1 ~ assistant geology and chemistry officer1 ~ embassy head ~ video expert1 ~ lead line head ~ senior typist
180,000/2,000/190,000	Deputy chief officer ~ deputy supervisor ~ collective department head ~ assistant junior clerk ~ subdepartment clerk ~ junior typist ~ accountant2 ~ auditor2 ~ cashier2 ~ materials controller2 ~ security officer2 ~ storage head2 ~ machine operator2 ~ engine driver2 ~ electronic expert2 ~ electricity expert2 ~ computer censorship officer ~ demonstrator ~ computer officer ~ workshop head ~ industrial manager2 ~ industrial expert2 ~ production expert2 ~ handicraft expert2 ~ welder2 ~ assistant researcher2 ~ laboratory expert2 ~ watercraft chief2 ~ engine room chief2 ~ steerman2 ~ sailor2 ~ chief watercraft communication officer ~ junior engine room officer (foreign/coastal) ~ diver2 ~ measurer2 ~ station master ~ engine driver2 ~ flight attendant ~ communicator2 ~ driver/mechanic2 ~ driver2 ~ assistant geology officer2 ~ assistant geology and physics officer2 ~ assistant geology and chemistry officer2 ~ petroleum expert2 ~ assistant mineralogy officer2 ~ assistant mines officer2 ~ junior engineer2 ~ drawing2 ~ printing2 ~ prediction2 ~ carpenter2 ~ mason2 ~ seller2 ~ chef2 ~ waiter2 ~ usher2 ~ baker2 ~ tour guide2 ~ glasses expert2 ~ butcher2 ~ washer2 ~ decorator2 ~ warden ~ mahout ~ tailor2 ~ room control2 ~ saw sharpener2 ~ knife sharpener2 ~ wood checker2 ~ wood accountant2 ~ wood2 ~ wood buyer2 ~ materials buyer2 ~ boiler controller2 ~ animal controller2 ~ deputy veterinarian officer ~ land surveyor2 ~ saw dust machine operator2 ~ tractor driver2 ~ expert fisherman2 ~ livestock breeding officer ~ bee station-in-charge ~ trainer ~ editor ~ assistant education officer ~ high school teacher ~ distributor2 ~ medical officer2 ~ pharmacy expert1 ~ expert2 ~ compound medicine2 ~ nurse2 ~ assistant insect officer2 ~ printing expert2 ~ assistant literature officer2 ~ junior reporter ~ assistant librarian2 ~ photography expert2 ~ broadcast expert2 ~ motion picture expert2 ~ artist2 ~ traditional flower arrangement2 ~ assistant museum officer2 ~ social welfare officer2 ~ immigration officer ~ assistant religious officer2 ~ investigation officer ~ head of market2 ~ translator2 ~ chief jailor ~ censor officer2 ~ assistant budget officer ~ assistant registrar2 ~ police warrant officer ~ demonstrator ~ surveillance officer ~ tax officer ~ embassy clerk ~ video expert2 ~ medical public relations officer



Non-gazetted positions	
Base salary 2015-2016 (in MMK)	Job titles
165,000/2,000/175,000	Assistant chief officer ~ assistant supervisor ~ senior clerk ~ senior typist ~ accountant3 ~ auditor3 ~ cashier3 ~ materials controller3 ~ security officer3 ~ storage head3 ~ assistant fire department head ~ machine operator3 ~ engine driver3 ~ electronic expert3 ~ electricity expert3 ~ assistant computer censorship officer ~ assistant demonstrator ~ assistant computer officer ~ industrial manager3 ~ industrial expert3 ~ production expert3 ~ handicraft expert3 ~ welder3 ~ assistant researcher3 ~ laboratory expert3 ~ watercraft chief3 ~ engine room chief3 ~ steerman3 ~ sailor3 ~ chief watercraft communications officer ~ junior engine room officer ~ diver3 ~ measurer3 ~ station master ~ engine driver3 ~ communicator3 ~ driver/mechanic3 ~ driver3 ~ assistant geology officer3 ~ assistant geology and physics officer3 ~ assistant geology and chemistry officer3 ~ petroleum expert3 ~ assistant mineralogy officer3 ~ assistant mines officer3 ~ junior engineer3 ~ drawing3 ~ printing3 ~ prediction3 ~ carpenter3 ~ mason3 ~ seller3 ~ chef3 ~ waiter3 ~ usher3 ~ baker3 ~ tour guide3 ~ glasses expert3 ~ butcher3 ~ washer3 ~ decorator3 ~ warden ~ mahout ~ tailor3 ~ room control3 ~ saw sharpener3 ~ knife sharpener3 ~ wood checker3 ~ saw machine operator ~ wood accountant3 ~ wood carpenter3 ~ wood buyer3 ~ materials buyer3 ~ boiler controller3 ~ animal controller3 ~ assistant veterinarian officer ~ warden ~ creek-in-charge ~ mahout ~ forest-in-charge ~ land surveyor3 ~ saw dust machine operator3 ~ tractor driver3 ~ expert fisherman3 ~ deputy livestock breeding officer ~ deputy bee station-in-charge ~ co-trainer ~ deputy editor ~ primary school principal ~ middle school teacher ~ medical officer3 ~ pharmacy expert3 ~ compound medicine3 ~ nurse3 ~ assistant insect officer3 ~ printing expert3 ~ assistant literature officer3 ~ assistant librarian3 ~ photography expert3 ~ broadcast expert3 ~ motion picture expert3 ~ artist3 ~ traditional flower arrangement3 ~ assistant museum officer3 ~ social welfare3 ~ deputy immigration officer ~ assistant religious officer3 ~ deputy investigation officer ~ head of market3 ~ police sergeant ~ translator3 ~ chief jailor ~ checking officer3 ~ censor officer3 ~ assistant registrar3 ~ demonstrator3 ~ expert3 ~ deputy surveillance officer3 ~ deputy tax officer ~ assistant budget officer ~ video expert3 ~ deputy medical public relation officer ~ record keeper
150,000/2,000/160,000	Assistant deputy chief officer ~ assistant deputy supervisor ~ junior clerk ~ junior typist ~ accountant4 ~ auditor4 ~ cashier4 ~ materials controller4 ~ security officer4 ~ fire sergeant ~ copier machine operator ~ machine operator4 ~ engine driver4 ~ electronic expert4 ~ electricity expert4 ~ assistant deputy computer censorship officer ~ assistant deputy demonstrator ~ industrial manager4 ~ industrial expert4 ~ production expert4 ~ handicraft expert4 ~ welder4 ~ assistant researcher4 ~ laboratory expert4 ~ watercraft chief4 ~ engine room chief4 ~ steerman4 ~ sailor4 ~ diver4 ~ measurer4 ~ deputy station master ~ engine driver4 ~ communicator4 ~ driver/mechanic4 ~ driver4 ~ assistant geology officer4 ~ petroleum expert4 ~ assistant mineralogy officer4 ~ assistant geology and physics officer4 ~ assistant geology and chemistry officer4 ~ assistant mines officer4 ~ junior engineer4 ~ drawing4 ~ printing4 ~ prediction4 ~ carpenter4 ~ mason4 ~ seller4 ~ chef4 ~ waiter4 ~ usher4 ~ baker4 ~ tour guide4 ~ glasses expert4 ~ butcher4 ~ washer4 ~ decorator4 ~ tailor4 ~ room control officer4 ~ creek-in-charge ~ mahout ~ raft controller ~ saw sharpener4 ~ knife sharpener4 ~ wood checker4 ~ wood accountant4 ~ assistant wood machine operator4 ~ wood combine4 ~ wood buyer4 ~ materials buyer4 ~ boiler controller4 ~ warden ~ animal controller4 ~ land surveyor4 ~ saw dust machine operator4 ~ tractor driver4 ~ dam security ~ gardener ~ assistant livestock breeding officer ~ assistant bee station-in-charge ~ expert fisherman4 ~ assistant trainer ~ assistant editor ~ primary school teacher ~ medical officer4 ~ pharmacy expert4 ~ compound medicine4 ~ nurse4 ~ assistant insect officer4 ~ printing expert4 ~ assistant literature officer4 ~ assistant librarian4 ~ photography expert4 ~ broadcast expert4 ~ motion picture expert4 ~ artist4 ~ traditional flower arrangement4 ~ assistant museum officer4 ~ social welfare officer4 ~ assistant immigration officer ~ assistant religious officer4 ~ assistant investigation officer ~



Non-gazetted positions	
Base salary 2015-2016 (in MMK)	Job titles
150,000/2,000/160,000	assistant jailor ~ prison sergeant ~ head of market <sup>4</sup> ~ municipal worker <sup>1</sup> ~ animal shelter worker <sup>4</sup> ~ translator <sup>4</sup> ~ police sergeant ~ checking officer <sup>4</sup> ~ censor officer <sup>4</sup> ~ assistant surveillance officer ~ assistant registrar <sup>4</sup> ~ assistant tax officer ~ storage head <sup>4</sup> ~ distributor <sup>4</sup> ~ expert <sup>4</sup> ~ video expert <sup>4</sup>
135,000/2,000/145,000	Materials controller <sup>5</sup> ~ security <sup>5</sup> ~ fire sergeant ~ office helper/mail-in-charge ~ worker head ~ copier machine operator ~ cleaner/machine operator <sup>5</sup> ~ driver/mechanic <sup>5</sup> ~ driver <sup>5</sup> ~ electronic expert <sup>5</sup> ~ electricity expert <sup>5</sup> ~ industrial manager <sup>5</sup> ~ production expert <sup>5</sup> ~ handicraft expert <sup>5</sup> ~ industrial expert <sup>5</sup> ~ welder <sup>5</sup> ~ assistant researcher <sup>5</sup> ~ laboratory expert <sup>5</sup> ~ watercraft chief <sup>5</sup> ~ engine room chief <sup>5</sup> ~ steerman <sup>5</sup> ~ sailor <sup>5</sup> ~ diver <sup>5</sup> ~ communicator <sup>5</sup> ~ measurer <sup>5</sup> ~ assistant station master ~ engine driver <sup>5</sup> ~ petroleum expert <sup>5</sup> ~ assistant geology officer <sup>5</sup> ~ assistant mines officer <sup>5</sup> ~ assistant mineralogy officer <sup>5</sup> ~ assistant geology and physics officer <sup>5</sup> ~ assistant geology and chemistry officer <sup>5</sup> ~ drawing <sup>5</sup> ~ printing <sup>5</sup> ~ prediction <sup>5</sup> ~ carpenter <sup>5</sup> ~ mason <sup>5</sup> ~ seller <sup>5</sup> ~ chef <sup>5</sup> ~ waiter <sup>5</sup> ~ usher <sup>5</sup> ~ baker <sup>5</sup> ~ tour guide <sup>5</sup> ~ glasses expert <sup>5</sup> ~ butcher <sup>5</sup> ~ washer <sup>5</sup> ~ decorator <sup>5</sup> ~ tailor <sup>5</sup> ~ room control <sup>5</sup> ~ mahout/ drum circle member ~ assistant raft controller ~ saw sharpener <sup>5</sup> ~ knife sharpener <sup>5</sup> ~ woods checker <sup>5</sup> ~ woods accountant <sup>5</sup> ~ woods combine <sup>5</sup> ~ wood buyer <sup>5</sup> ~ materials buyer <sup>5</sup> ~ boiler controller <sup>5</sup> ~ assistant insect officer <sup>5</sup> ~ woods sergeant ~ animal controller <sup>5</sup> ~ land surveyor <sup>5</sup> ~ saw dust machine operator <sup>5</sup> ~ tractor driver <sup>5</sup> ~ dam security helper ~ gardener ~ taxidermy ~ expert fisherman <sup>5</sup> ~ medical officer <sup>5</sup> ~ pharmacy expert <sup>5</sup> ~ compound medicine <sup>5</sup> ~ nurse <sup>5</sup> ~ printing expert <sup>5</sup> ~ assistant literature officer <sup>5</sup> ~ assistant librarian <sup>5</sup> ~ photography expert <sup>5</sup> ~ broadcast expert <sup>5</sup> ~ motion picture expert <sup>5</sup> ~ artist <sup>5</sup> ~ traditional flower arrangement <sup>5</sup> ~ assistant museum officer <sup>5</sup> ~ head of market <sup>5</sup> ~ social welfare <sup>5</sup> ~ prison sergeant ~ deputy prison sergeant ~ clerk ~ municipal worker <sup>2</sup> ~ assistant animal shelter worker ~ tax collector ~ translator <sup>5</sup> ~ deputy police sergeant ~ checking officer <sup>5</sup> ~ censor officer <sup>5</sup> ~ assistant registrar <sup>5</sup> ~ deputy assistant tax officer ~ distributor <sup>5</sup> ~ accountant <sup>5</sup> ~ expert <sup>5</sup> ~ video expert <sup>5</sup>
120,000/2,000/130,000	Security ~ fireman ~ office helper/postman ~ worker ~ cleaner helper ~ watercraft worker (rudder) ~ sailor helper ~ prison private ~ municipal worker 3 ~ bobby ~ tax controller

Source: Union Government, Notification no. 23/2015, 19 March 2015, Amendment of Job Titles of Government Officers and Employees

## Annex 5 Number of Assigned Vehicles by Department and Grade, 2016

Table A3: Number of assigned vehicles by department and grade, 2016

Base pay grade, 2015-2016, (in MMK)	500,000 + 200,000	500,000	380,000/4,000 /400,000	340,000/4,000 /360,000	310,000/4,000 /330,000	280,000/4,000 /300,000	250,000/4,000 /270,000	Non-gazetted, all grades
Job titles (examples)	Perma- nent secretary	Director general	Deputy permanent secretary, Deputy director general	Assistant permanent secretary, Director	Deputy director	Assistant director	Staff officer	All non- gazetted
<b>Overview</b>								
Total number of submissions		39	39	39	39	39	39	39
No. awarded allowance		35	39	37	36	19	13	10
% awarded allowance		90%	100%	95%	92%	49%	33%	26%
Minimum allowance (no. of vehicles)		2	1	1	1	1 or shared office vehicle or commuter bus ("ferry")	1 or shared office vehicle or commuter bus ("ferry")	
Maximum allowance (no. of vehicles)		3	3	2	1	2	1	Commuter bus ("ferry")
Ministry and Department	No. vehicles	No. vehicles	No. vehicles	No. vehicles	No. vehicles	No. vehicles	No. vehicles	No. vehicles
<b>Ministry of Education</b>								
Office of the Minister of Education	2		2	1	1	1		Commuter bus ("ferry")
Teacher training (head office)		3	2	1	1	1		

Base pay grade, 2015-2016, (in MMK)	500,000 + 200,000	500,000	380,000/4,000 /400,000	340,000/4,000 /360,000	310,000/4,000 /330,000	280,000/4,000 /300,000	250,000/4,000 /270,000	Non-gazetted, all grades
Myanmar language education		2	2	1	1			
Myanmar examiner dept.		2	2	4 vehicles (no. of staff not clear)	7 vehicles (no. of staff not clear)	3 vehicles (no. of staff not clear)	2 vehicles (no. of staff not clear)	Commuter bus ("ferry")
Human resource and education project		3	2	(Vacant)	1			
Higher education		2	2	1				
Myanmar education research		3	2	2	3 vehicles (no. of staff not clear)	2	1	
Basic education		2	2	1	1	1		
<b>Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population</b>								
Office of the Minister of Labor	3		2	1	1	Commuter bus ("ferry")	Commuter bus ("ferry")	Commuter bus ("ferry")
Social Security Board		2	2	1	1	Commuter bus ("ferry")	Commuter bus ("ferry")	Commuter bus ("ferry")
Labor		3	1 & 2 (2 incumbents)	1	1	Commuter bus ("ferry")	Commuter bus ("ferry")	Commuter bus ("ferry")
Factories and General Labor Laws Inspection Dept. (FGLLID)		3	2 vehicles (no. of staff not clear)	1	1	Commuter bus ("ferry")	Commuter bus ("ferry")	Commuter bus ("ferry")
Labor relations		2	1		1	Commuter bus ("ferry")	Commuter bus ("ferry")	Commuter bus ("ferry")

Base pay grade, 2015-2016, (in MMK)	500,000 + 200,000	500,000	380,000/4,000 /400,000	340,000/4,000 /360,000	310,000/4,000 /330,000	280,000/4,000 /300,000	250,000/4,000 /270,000	Non-gazetted, all grades
<b>Ministry of Electricity and Energy</b>								
Office of the Minister of Energy	2		1	4 vehicles for 5 posts	6 vehicle for 7 posts	2 vehicles for 6 posts		
<b>Ministry of Health and Sports</b>								
Office of the Minister of Health		2	2	1	1	1 motor cycle	1 motor cycle	
Medical services		2	2	1	1			
Medical research		2	2	1	1	1	1	
Human resources for health		3	1	1	1	1		
Traditional medicine		2	2	1	1			
Food and drug administration		2	2	1	1			
Public health		2	2	1	1			
Sports and physical education		3	2	1	1			
<b>Ministry of Home Affairs</b>								
General Administration Dept. (GAD)		2	2	1	1	Various		
<b>Ministry of Planning and Finance (MOPF)</b>								
Office of the Minister of MOPF		3	3	1	1			

Base pay grade, 2015-2016, (in MMK)	500,000 + 200,000	500,000	380,000/4,000 /400,000	340,000/4,000 /360,000	310,000/4,000 /330,000	280,000/4,000 /300,000	250,000/4,000 /270,000	Non-gazetted, all grades
Budget dept.		2	1	1	1	Commuter bus ("ferry")	Commuter bus ("ferry")	Commuter bus ("ferry")
Central Equipment, Statistics, and Inspection Dept. (CESID)		2	2	1	1			
Central Statistical Organization (CSO)		2	2	1	1			
Customs		2	2	1				
Directorate of Investment and Company Administration (DICA)		2	2	1	1			
Foreign Economic Relations (FERD)		2	2	1	1 (some may get 2)	1 micro-bus 9-seater (assumed commuter vehicle)	Commuter bus ("ferry")	Commuter bus ("ferry")
Internal Revenue Dept. (IRD)		2	2	1	1			
Pension		2	2	1	1	Commuter bus ("ferry")	Commuter bus ("ferry")	Commuter bus ("ferry")
Revenue appellate tribunal		3	1	1	1	Commuter bus ("ferry")		
Treasury		2	2	1	1			
<b>Union Civil Service Board (UCSB)</b>								
UCSB - Office			2	1	1			
Civil Service Affairs Dept. (CSAD)		3	2	1	1			

Base pay grade, 2015-2016, (in MMK)	500,000 + 200,000	500,000	380,000/4,000 /400,000	340,000/4,000 /360,000	310,000/4,000 /330,000	280,000/4,000 /300,000	250,000/4,000 /270,000	Non-gazetted, all grades
Civil Service Recruitment Training College		3	2	2	5 vehicles, 6 posts			
Central Institution of Civil Service (Paung Gyi)		2	1	1	1		1	
Central Institution of Civil Service (Upper Myanmar)		2	1	1				

Source: Compiled from department responses to customized form circulated by World Bank and MOPF Budget Department.

Notes: Abbreviations used: PS = permanent secretary; asst. = assistant; dept. = department.

1) Table excludes enterprises.

2) Submitting departments are located in Nay Pyi Taw; allowance entitlements may not apply to staff outside of Nay Pyi Taw.

3) Blanks and non-reporting by departments may mean that a) position does not exist in that department or is vacant b) no allowance for this position or (c) allowance exists but information was not provided. Submissions often provided information only for gazetted positions, and left non-gazetted cells blank.

4) Vehicles may be older models. For example, Ministry of Labor listed vehicles from 1990s or early 2000s.



121 **Annex 6 Monthly Fuel Allowance and Estimated Kyat Value by Department and Grade, 2016**

**Table A4:** Monthly fuel allowance and estimated kyat value by department and grade, 2016

Base pay grade, 2015-2016, (in MMK)	500,000 + 200,000		500,000		380,000/4,000/ 400,000		340,000/4,000/ 360,000		310,000/4,000/ 330,000		280,000/4,000/ 300,000		250,000/4,000/ 270,000		Non- gazetted, all grades
Job titles (examples)	Permanent secretary		Director general		Deputy permanent secretary, Deputy director general		Assistant permanent secretary, Director		Deputy director		Assistant director		Staff officer		All non- gazetted
<b>Overview</b>															
Total number of submissions			38		38		38		38		38		38		43
No. awarded allowance			34		37		36		37		25		4		0
% awarded allowance			89%		97%		95%		97%		66%		11%		0%
Minimum allowance (gallons / kyat)			80	206,392	40	103,196	40	103,196	20	51,598	10	25,799	10	25,799	
Maximum allowance (gallons / kyat)			240	619,177	180	464,383	60	154,794	45	116,096	59	152,214	32	82,557	
Ministry and Department	Gal.	Est. value	Gal.	Est. value	Gal.	Est. value	Gal.	Est. value	Gal.	Est. value	Gal.	Est. value	Gal.	Est. value	
<b>Ministry of Education</b>															
Office of the Minister of Education	130	335,388			120	309,589	55	141,895	45	116,096	30	77,397			
Teacher training (head office)			120	309,589	70	180,593	45	116,096	37	95,457	20	51,598			

Base pay grade, 2015-2016, (in MMK)	500,000 + 200,000		500,000		380,000/4,000/ 400,000		340,000/4,000/ 360,000		310,000/4,000/ 330,000		280,000/4,000/ 300,000		250,000/4,000/ 270,000		Non- gazetted, all grades
Myanmar language education			170	438,584	120	309,589	45	116,096	40 & 45	103,196 & 116,096					
Myanmar examiner dept.			80	206,392	80	206,392	42 & 64 & 75	108,356 & 165,114 & 193,493	42 & 45	108,356 & 116,096	42 & 54	108,356 & 139,315	30 (2 staff)	77,397	
Human resource and education project			180	464,383	120	309,589			45 & 50	116,096 & 128,995	20	51,598			
Higher education	-- no information received --														
Myanmar education research			177	456,643	65 & 75	167,694 & 193,493	51	131,575	info not clear		59	152,214	32	82,557	
Basic education			80	206,392	70	180,593	55	141,895	45	116,096	30	77,397			
<b>Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population</b>															
Office of the Minister of Labor	120	309,589			100	257,991	50	128,995	40	103,196	10	25,799			
Social Security Board			120	309,589	vacant		50	128,995	35	90,297	15	38,699			
Labor			138	356,027	80	206,392	50	128,995	0 & 10 & 40	0 & 25,799 & 103,196	0 & 10	0 & 25,799			
Factories and General Labor Laws Inspection (FGLLID)			130	335,388	80	206,392	42	108,356	35	90,297	10	25,799			

Base pay grade, 2015-2016, (in MMK)	500,000 + 200,000		500,000		380,000/4,000/ 400,000		340,000/4,000/ 360,000		310,000/4,000/ 330,000		280,000/4,000/ 300,000		250,000/4,000/ 270,000		Non- gazetted, all grades
Labor relations			109	281,210	50	128,995			40	102,336					
<b>Ministry of Electricity and Energy</b>															
Office of the Minister of Energy	50	128,995			40 & 50	103,196 & 128,995	38 & 45 & 50	98,036 & 116,096 & 128,995	36 & 38 & 45 & 50	92,877 & 98,036 & 116,096 & 128,995	45	116,096			
<b>Ministry of Health and Sports</b>															
Office of the Minister of Health			120	309,589	110	283,790	45	116,096	24	61,918	10	25,799	10	25,799	
Medical services			160	412,785	120	309,589	45	116,096	35	90,297	18	46,438			
Medical research			100	257,991	43	110,936	Info unclear		45	116,096					
Human resource for health			100	257,991	65	167,694	45	116,096	25	64,498	15	38,699			
Traditional medicine			160	412,785	120	309,589	45	116,096	35	90,297	18	46,438			
Food and drug administration			160	412,785	120	309,589	45	116,096	35	90,297	18	46,438			
Public health			160	412,785	120	309,589	45	116,096	35	90,297	18	46,438			
Sports and physical education			120	309,589	100	257,991	50	128,995	30	77,397	20	51,598			
<b>Ministry of Home Affairs</b>															
General Administration Department (GAD)			120	309,589	40	103,196	40	103,196	40	103,196					

Base pay grade, 2015-2016, (in MMK)	500,000 + 200,000	500,000	380,000/4,000/ 400,000	340,000/4,000/ 360,000	310,000/4,000/ 330,000	280,000/4,000/ 300,000	250,000/4,000/ 270,000	Non- gazetted, all grades						
<b>Ministry of Planning and Finance (MOPF)</b>														
Office of the Minister of MOPF		180	464,383	180	464,383	60	154,794	40	103,196					
Budget		150	386,986	140	361,187	50	128,995	25	64,498					
Central Equipment, Statistics, and Inspection Department (CESID)		120	309,589	110	283,790	50	128,995	40	103,196					
Central Statistical Organization (CSO)		240	619,177	120	309,589	60	154,794	40	103,196	12	30,959			
Customs		80	206,392	110	283,790	40	103,196							
Directorate of Investment and Company Administration (DICA)		120	309,589	100	257,991	50	128,995	30	77,397	10	25,799			
Foreign Economic Relations Dept. (FERD)		120	309,589	90	232,192	40	103,196	25	64,498	27	69,657			
Internal Revenue Dept. (IRD)		80	206,392	84	216,712	41	106,464	30	77,397					
Pension		100	257,991	84	216,712	50	128,995	30	77,397	20	51,598			
Revenue Appellate Tribunal		130	335,388	70	180,593	55	141,895	45	116,096	25	64,498			
Treasury		150	386,986	90	232,192	50	128,995	30	77,397					

Base pay grade, 2015-2016, (in MMK)	500,000 + 200,000	500,000	380,000/4,000/ 400,000	340,000/4,000/ 360,000	310,000/4,000/ 330,000	280,000/4,000/ 300,000	250,000/4,000/ 270,000	Non- gazetted, all grades					
<b>Union Civil Service Board (UCSB)</b>													
UCSB - Office			116	299,269	60	154,794	40	103,196					
Civil Service Affairs Dept. (CSAD)		108	278,630	92	237,351	58	149,635	38	98,036	10	25,799		
Civil Service Recruitment Training College		130	335,388	100	257,991	58	149,635	38	98,036	10	25,799		
Central Institution of Civil Service (Paung Gyi)		100	257,991	60	154,794	45	116,096	30	77,397			30	77,397
Central Institution of Civil Service (Upper Myanmar)		100	257,991	60	154,794	40	103,196	20	51,598				

Source: Compiled from department responses to customized form circulated by World Bank and MOPF Budget Dept.

Notes: Abbreviations used: PS = permanent secretary; asst. = assistant; dept. = department.

1) Table excludes enterprises.

2) Submitting departments are located in Nay Pyi Taw; allowance entitlements may not apply to staff outside of Nay Pyi Taw.

3) Blanks and non-reporting by departments may mean that a) position does not exist in that department or is vacant, b) there is no allowance for this position, or c) allowance exists, but information was not provided. (Submissions often provided information only for gazetted positions, and left non-gazetted cells blank.)

4) Gallon amounts listed in table are sum of diesel plus petrol entitlements.

5) Fuel value is calculated by multiplying the total allocation (diesel + petrol) by average price of diesel and petrol, converted from liters to imperial (UK) gallons.

6) In some cases, officeholders receive a fuel allowance, but not a vehicle allowance.

7) In some cases, departments noted that official fuel allowance is not awarded to all officeholders in practice due to shortages.

8) "gal." refers to imperial gallons.

**Table A5:** Estimated travel distance per fuel amount

Gallons (imperial)	Distance automobile can travel		Distance motorcycle can travel	
	Miles	Kilometers	Miles	Kilometers
240	4,800	7,725	10,800	17,380
220	4,400	7,081	9,900	15,932
200	4,000	6,437	9,000	14,484
180	3,600	5,793	8,100	13,035
160	3,200	5,150	7,200	11,587
140	2,800	4,506	6,300	10,139
120	2,400	3,862	5,400	8,690
100	2,000	3,219	4,500	7,242
80	1,600	2,575	3,600	5,793
60	1,200	1,931	2,700	4,345
40	800	1,287	1,800	2,897
20	400	644	900	1,448
10	200	322	450	724

Sources: For conversion and 2016 figures, see 2016 Fuel Consumption Guide, Natural Resources Canada, <http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/energy/efficiency/transportation/cars-light-trucks/buying/7487> (accessed 13 August 2016). For second hand cars, see Fuel Consumption Ratings Search Tool, Natural Resources Canada, <http://oee.nrcan.gc.ca/fcr-rcf/public/index-e.cfm> (accessed 13 August 2016). For motorcycles, see Total Motorcycle at <http://www.totalmotorcycle.com>; and Total Motorcycle's Fuel Economy Guide v4.0, <http://www.totalmotorcycle.com/MotorcycleFuelEconomyGuide/index.htm> (accessed 13 August 2016).

Note: Because fuel consumption depends on many different factors, it is not possible to give a global estimate of how far a vehicle can travel on one gallon. The above estimates are based on fuel consumption data for older-model cars and motorcycles. The table assumes moderate fuel efficiency of 20 miles per gallon for a car, and 45 miles per gallon for a motorcycle. Estimates are for imperial gallons, the unit of measure used in Myanmar.

One mile = 1.6093 kilometers.

188 **Annex 7 Monthly Telephone Allowance by Department and Grade, 2016 (in MMK)**

**Table A6:** Monthly telephone allowance by department and grade, 2016 (in MMK)

Base pay grade, 2015-2016, (in MMK)	500,000 + 200,000	500,000	380,000/4,000/400,000	340,000/4,000/360,000	310,000/4,000/330,000	280,000/4,000/300,000	250,000/4,000/270,000	Non-gazetted, all grades
Job titles (examples)	Permanent secretary	Director general	Deputy permanent secretary, Deputy director general	Assistant permanent secretary, Director	Deputy director	Assistant director	Staff officer	All non-gazetted
<b>Overview</b>								
Total no. of submissions		38	38	38	38	38	38	42
No. awarded allowance		17	18	16	13	6	1	0
% awarded allowance		45%	47%	42%	34%	16%	3%	0%
Minimum allowance (in MMK)		10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	
Maximum allowance (in MMK)		50,000	40,000	25,000	20,000	15,000		
Ministry and Department	Allowance (in MMK)	Allowance (in MMK)	Allowance (in MMK)	Allowance (in MMK)	Allowance (in MMK)	Allowance (in MMK)	Allowance (in MMK)	Allowance (in MMK)
<b>Ministry of Education</b>								
Office of the Minister of Education	30,000		20,000	20,000				
Teacher education (head office)		None	None	None	None	None	None	
Myanmar language education		30,000	25,000					



Base pay grade, 2015-2016, (in MMK)	500,000 + 200,000	500,000	380,000/4,000/ 400,000	340,000/4,000/ 360,000	310,000/4,000/ 330,000	280,000/4,000/ 300,000	250,000/4,000/ 270,000	Non- gazetted, all grades
Myanmar examiner dept.		20,000		20,000	20,000			
Human resource and education project		20,000	20,000					
Higher education		Actual expenses paid (up to 100,000)	Actual expenses paid (up to 100,000)	Actual expenses paid (up to 100,000)	Actual expenses paid (up to 100,000)			
Myanmar education research		50,000	30,000	10,000	10,000	10,000		
Basic education		None	None	None	None	None	None	
<b>Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population</b>								
Office of the Minister of Labor	Landline + mobile bills reimbursed		Car phone bill paid + mobile up to 10,000	Car phone bill paid + mobile up to 10,000	Car phone bill paid + mobile up to 5,000			
Social Security Board		Landline bill paid and + mobile up to MMK 50,000	vacant	Landline bill + mobile up to 20,000	Landline bill + mobile up to 5,000			
Labor		Landline + mobile bills reimbursed	Landline + mobile bills reimbursed	Mobile bill reimbursed (unclear whether each staff has own mobile or shares a mobile)				

Base pay grade, 2015-2016, (in MMK)	500,000 + 200,000	500,000	380,000/4,000/ 400,000	340,000/4,000/ 360,000	310,000/4,000/ 330,000	280,000/4,000/ 300,000	250,000/4,000/ 270,000	Non- gazetted, all grades
Factories and General Labor Laws Inspection (FGLLD)		Actual expenses paid for 2 mobiles + 2 landlines	Actual expenses paid for 2 landlines	Actual expenses paid for shared landline	Actual expenses paid for shared landline			
Labor relations		2 home landlines, bills reimbursed	1 home landline, bill reimbursed		Home landline bill up to 5,000	Home landline bill up to 5,000		
<b>Ministry of Electricity and Energy</b>								
Office of the Minister of Energy								
<b>Ministry of Health and Sports</b>								
Office of the Minister of Health		None	None	None	None	None	None	None
Medical services		None	None	None	None	None		
Medical research		None	None	None	None	None	None	
Human resource for health								
Traditional medicine		None	None	None	None	None		
Food and drug administration		3 phone cards ( 10,000 per card)	2 cards (10,000 per card)	1 card ( 10,000)	1 card ( 5,000)			
Public health		None	None	None	None	None		
Sports and physical education		--	25,000	25,000	15,000	15,000		

Base pay grade, 2015-2016, (in MMK)	500,000 + 200,000	500,000	380,000/4,000/ 400,000	340,000/4,000/ 360,000	310,000/4,000/ 330,000	280,000/4,000/ 300,000	250,000/4,000/ 270,000	Non- gazetted, all grades
<b>Ministry of Home Affairs</b>								
General Administration Dept. (GAD)				None	None	None	None	None
<b>Ministry of Planning and Finance (MOPF)</b>								
Office of the Minister of MOPF		20,000	20,000	15,000	12,000	10,000		
Budget		None	None	None	None	None	None	None
Central Equipment Statistics and Inspection Dept. (CESID)	-- No information received --							
Central Statistical Organization (CSO)		10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000		
Customs		None	None	None	None	None	None	None
Directorate of Investment and Company Administration (DICA)		50,000	40,000	15,000	10,000			
Foreign Economic Relations Dept. (FERD)		None	None	None	None	None	None	None
Internal Revenue Dept. (IRD)		None	None	None	None	None	None	None
Pension		None	None	None	None	None	None	None

Base pay grade, 2015-2016, (in MMK)	500,000 + 200,000	500,000	380,000/4,000/ 400,000	340,000/4,000/ 360,000	310,000/4,000/ 330,000	280,000/4,000/ 300,000	250,000/4,000/ 270,000	Non- gazetted, all grades
Revenue Appellate Tribunal		Home phone paid; advance payment for mobile airtime	Home phone paid; advance payment for mobile airtime	Advance payment for mobile airtime				
Treasury		None	None	None	None	None	None	None
<b>Union Civil Service Board (UCSB)</b>								
UCSB Office			40,000 (cash)	30,000 (cash)	10,000 (cash )	10,000 (cash )	10,000 (cash )	
Civil Service Affairs Dept. (CSAD)		50,000 (cash)	40,000 (cash)	30,000 (cash)				
Civil Service Recruitment Training College		response unclear	response unclear	response unclear				
Central Institution of Civil Service (Paung Gyi)		None	None	None	None	None	None	None
Central Institution of Civil Service (Upper Myanmar)		50,000 (cash)	50,000 (cash)					

Source: Compiled from department responses to customized form circulated by World Bank and MOPF Budget Department.

Notes: Abbreviations used: PS = permanent secretary; asst. = assistant; dept. = department.

1) Table excludes enterprises.

2) Submitting departments are located in Nay Pyi Taw; allowance entitlements may not apply to staff outside of Nay Pyi Taw.

3) Blanks and non-reporting by departments may mean that a) the position does not exist in that department or is vacant, b) there is no allowance for this position, or c) an allowance exists but information was not provided.

4) Submissions often provided information only for gazetted positions and left non-gazetted cells blank.

## Annex 8 Housing Benefit by Department and Grade, 2016

Table A7: Housing benefit by department and grade, 2016

Base pay grade, 2015-2016, (in MMK)	500,000 + 200,000	500,000	380,000/4,000/ 400,000	340,000/4,000/ 360,000	310,000/4,000/ 330,000	280,000/4,000/ 300,000	250,000/4,000/ 270,000	Non-gazetted, all grades
Job titles (examples)	Permanent secretary	Director general	Deputy permanent secretary, Deputy director general	Assistant permanent secretary, Director	Deputy director	Assistant director	Staff officer	All non-gazetted
<b>Overview</b>								
Total no. of submissions		33	33	33	33	33	33	33
No. awarded allowance		28	29	30	30	31	30	27
% awarded allowance		85%	88%	91%	91%	94%	91%	82%
Minimum allowance		Apt., some pay 10% of salary	Shared apt., some pay 10% of salary	Dormitory or room in shared apt.	Dormitory	Dormitory	Dormitory	Dormitory
Maximum allowance		2-story house, free	2 story house, some fees	Apt., free	Apt., free	House/apt., free	House/apt., free	House/apt., free
<b>Ministry and Department</b>	<b>Housing</b>	<b>Housing</b>	<b>Housing</b>	<b>Housing</b>	<b>Housing</b>	<b>Housing</b>	<b>Housing</b>	<b>Housing</b>
<b>Ministry of Education</b>								
Office of the Minister of Education	Duplex, free		2 rooms/4 floors, free	4 rooms/4 floors, gazetted housing, free	4 rooms/4 floors, gazetted housing, free	4 rooms/4 floors, gazetted housing, free	4 rooms/4 floors, gazetted housing, free	4 rooms/4 floors, non-gazetted housing, free
Teacher training (head office)		None	3 units/2 story (3 beds), free	4 units/4 story (3 beds), free	4 units/4 story (3 beds), free	4 units/4 story (3 beds), free	6 units/4 story (2 beds), free	6 units/4 story (2 beds)

Base pay grade, 2015-2016, (in MMK)	500,000 + 200,000	500,000	380,000/4,000/400,000	340,000/4,000/360,000	310,000/4,000/330,000	280,000/4,000/300,000	250,000/4,000/270,000	Non-gazetted, all grades
Myanmar language education		Duplex, free	4 units/4 story (3 beds), free	4 units/4 story (3 beds), free	4 units/4 story (3 beds), free	4 units/4 story (3 beds), free	4 units/4 story (3 beds), free	4 units/4 story (2 beds), free
Myanmar examiner dept.		Apt.	None	Room in apt.	None	4 units/4 story (3 beds)	4 units/4 story (3 beds)	2 units/4 story (2 beds)
Human resource and education project		House	3 units/2 story (3 beds)	4 units/4 story (3 beds)	4 units/4 story (3 beds)	4 units/4 story (3 beds)	6 units/4 story (2 beds)	None
Higher education		2 story house, fees collected per school mgmt. committee decisions and defined rates	2 story house, fees collected per school mgmt. committee decisions and defined rates	2 units/1-story gazetted housing, 3 units/4-story and teachers' dormitories; fees collected per school mgmt. committee decisions and defined rates				Staff and 4 units/4 story non-gazetted housing, depending upon position Fees collected per school mgmt. committee decisions and defined rates
Myanmar education research		Duplex, free	1 vice-director: 4 units/4 storey (3 beds), free; 1 vice-director: 2 units/3 story (3 beds), free	6 units/4 story (3 beds), free	4 units/4 story (3 beds), free	4 units/4 story (3 beds), free		4 units/4 story (2 beds), free
Basic education		Apt.	Have not yet received housing (apt.)	Have not yet received housing (apt.)	Apts. and dormitory rooms; 5 housed, 10 not yet	Apts. and dormitory rooms; 3 housed, 25 not yet	Apts. and dormitory rooms; 3 housed, 55 not yet	Apts. and dormitory rooms; none are housed

Base pay grade, 2015-2016, (in MMK)	500,000 + 200,000	500,000	380,000/4,000/ 400,000	340,000/4,000/ 360,000	310,000/4,000/ 330,000	280,000/4,000/ 300,000	250,000/4,000/ 270,000	Non- gazetted, all grades
<b>Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population</b>								
Office of the Minister of Labor	--- No information provided ---							
Social Security Board							Avg. cost: MMK 9,474 per month	Avg. cost per month: office head, MMK 30,000; vice- supervisor, MMK 60,000; senior clerk MMK 6,000; junior clerk MMK 9,714; driver MMK 6,000; office helper MMK 6,000
Labor	--- No information provided ---							
Factories and General Labor Laws Inspection Dept.	--- No information provided ---							
Labor relations	--- No information provided ---							
<b>Ministry of Electricity and Energy</b>								
Office of the Minister of Energy	--- No information provided ---							
<b>Ministry of Health and Sports</b>								
Office of the Minister of Health	Staff in Nay Pyi Taw lives rent free in housing provided according to their position --							
Medical services	Staff in Nay Pyi Taw lives rent free in housing provided by Nay Pyi Taw Municipal Council; housing type varies according to position.-							



Base pay grade, 2015-2016, (in MMK)	500,000 + 200,000	500,000	380,000/4,000/ 400,000	340,000/4,000/ 360,000	310,000/4,000/ 330,000	280,000/4,000/ 300,000	250,000/4,000/ 270,000	Non- gazetted, all grades
Medical research	Staff in Nay Pyi Taw lives rent free in housing provided according to their position.							
Human resource for health	Staff in Nay Pyi Taw lives rent free in housing provided according to their position.							
Traditional medicine	Staff in Nay Pyi Taw lives rent free in housing provided by Nay Pyi Taw Municipal Council; housing type varies according to position.							
Food and drug administration	Staff in Nay Pyi Taw lives rent free in housing provided by Nay Pyi Taw Municipal Council; housing type varies according to position.							
Public health	Staff in Nay Pyi Taw lives rent free in housing provided by Nay Pyi Taw Municipal Council; housing type varies according to position.							
Sports and physical education	Staff in Nay Pyi Taw lives rent free in housing provided according to their position.							
<b>Ministry of Home Affairs</b>								
General Administration Dept. (GAD)		House, free	House/apt., free	House/apt., free	Apt., free	House/apt., free	House/apt., free	Apt., free - or own arrangements
<b>Ministry of Planning and Finance (MOPF)</b>								
Office of the Minister of MOPF			Apt., free	Apt., free	Apt., free	Apt., free	Apt., free	Apt. or dormitory, free
Budget	Staff lives rent free in government-provided housing according to their position --							
Central Equipment Statistics and Inspection Dept. (CESID)	-- No information provided --							
Central Statistical Organization (CSO)		1-story house	2 units/3 story	2 units/3 story	4 units/4 story	4 units/4 story	Married staff in 4 unit 4 storey, single staff in dormitory (for staff based in Nay Pyi Taw)	

Base pay grade, 2015-2016, (in MMK)	500,000 + 200,000	500,000	380,000/4,000/ 400,000	340,000/4,000/ 360,000	310,000/4,000/ 330,000	280,000/4,000/ 300,000	250,000/4,000/ 270,000	Non- gazetted, all grades
Customs		House; pay 10% of salary	Unit apt.; pay 10% of salary	Unit apt.; pay 10% of salary	Unit apt.; pay 10% of salary	Unit apt.; pay 10% of salary	Unit apt.; pay 10% of salary	Unit apt.; pay 10% of salary
Directorate of Investment and Company Administration (DICA)		None	None	None	None			
Foreign Economic Relations Dept. (FERD)		2-story house, free	2 units/2 story, free	4 units/4 story, free	2 units/3 story, or 4 units/4 story	4 units/4 story	4 units/4 story, or 6 units/4 story	For supervisors & deputy supervisors - 6 units/4 story, or 24 units/2 story
Internal Revenue (IRD)		2-story house, free	2 units/2 story, free	2 units/3 story, free	4 units/4 story, free	4 units/4 story, free	4 units/4 story, free	Dormitories, free
Pension		2-story house, free	2 units/3 story, free	2 units/3 store or 6 unit 4 story, free	6 units/4 story, free	6 units/4 story, free	6 units/4 story, free	6 units/4 story or 24 units/2 story, free
Revenue Appellate Tribunal		2-story house, free	2 units/3 story, free	2 units/3 story, free	4 units/4 story, free	4 units/4 story, free	4 units/4 story, free	6 units/4 story or other, free
Treasury			2 units/3 story	2 units/3 story or 4 units/4 story	4 units/4 story or 6 units/4 story	4 units/4 story or 6 units/4 story or 24 units/2 story	4 units/4 story or 6 units/4 story or 24 units/2 story	6 units/2 story, 4 units/4 story, or 24 units/2 story
<b>Union Civil Service Board (UCSB)</b>								
UCSB - Office	Staff in Nay Pyi Taw lives rent free in housing provided by Nay Pyi Taw Municipal Council; housing type varies according to position.							

Base pay grade, 2015-2016, (in MMK)	500,000 + 200,000	500,000	380,000/4,000/ 400,000	340,000/4,000/ 360,000	310,000/4,000/ 330,000	280,000/4,000/ 300,000	250,000/4,000/ 270,000	Non- gazetted, all grades
Civil Service Affairs Dept. (CSAD)	Staff in Nay Pyi Taw lives rent free in housing provided by Nay Pyi Taw Municipal Council; housing type varies according to position.							
Civil Service Recruitment Training College	Staff in Nay Pyi Taw lives rent free in housing provided by Nay Pyi Taw Municipal Council; housing type varies according to position.							
Central Institution of Civil Service (Paung Gyi)	Staff lives rent-free in staff housing; type varies according to position.							
Central Institution of Civil Service (Upper Myanmar)	Staff lives rent-free in staff housing; type varies according to position.							

Source: Compiled from department responses to customized form circulated by World Bank and MOPF Budget Dept.

Notes: Abbreviations used: PS = permanent secretary; asst. = assistant; dept. = department, mgmt. = management.

1) Table excludes enterprises.

2) Submitting departments are located in Nay Pyi Taw; allowance entitlements (especially for housing) may not apply to staff outside of Nay Pyi Taw.

3) Blanks and non-reporting by departments may mean that (a) the position does not exist in that department or is vacant, (b) there is no allowance for this position, or (c) an allowance exists but information was not provided. Submissions often provided information only for gazetted positions, and left non-gazetted cells blank.

4) Abbreviation "apt." stands for apartment.

5) Housing descriptions: "Duplex" means a single-family house with two stories. Descriptions, for example, "6 units/4 story (3 beds)" mean a three-bedroom apartment in a four-storey building that has six units in each storey, and so on. In shared apartments, single employees each get a private bedroom. Employees with families typically receive an entire apartment for the family, which is not shared.

## Annex 9 MPLCS Data and Comparisons with Civil Service Base Salaries

Table A8: Selected data from the 2015 MPLCS

	National	Urban	Rural
<b>Total consumption expenditures per adult equivalent, MMK/day</b>			
Mean expenditures	2,176	3,215	1,684
Median expenditures	1,631	2,360	1,471
<b>Consumption expenditure by quintile</b>			
First	845	1,186	779
Second	1,246	1,732	1,142
Third	1,631	2,361	1,472
Fourth	2,193	3,230	1,913
Fifth	3,511	5,476	2,793
<b>Household composition</b>			
Household size	5.50	5.68	5.43
Household members of working age	3.42	3.82	3.27
<b>Household size by quintile</b>			
First	6.47		
Second	5.54		
Third	5.14		
Fourth	5.12		
Fifth	4.77		

Source: Report of 2015 MPLCS

Notes: Consumption expenditures are in January 2015 prices and comprise spending on food, non-food items, education, housing, and the value of use of durable goods.

**Table A9:** Estimated total consumption expenditures per household, MMK/month

	National	Urban	Rural
Mean	363,607	554,886	277,849
Median	272,616	407,255	242,805
<b>Estimated consumption expenditure by quintile</b>			
First	141,278	204,618	128,550
Second	208,134	298,986	188,375
Third	272,616	407,389	242,886
Fourth	366,404	557,448	315,626
Fifth	586,736	945,108	460,817

Source: 2015 MPLCS data and World Bank calculations

Notes: Household consumption is an overestimate, calculated as average household size x total consumption per adult equivalent, as opposed to per capita. Calculations assume 30.4 days per month. Consumption expenditures are in January 2015 prices.

**Table A10:** Base salary as multiple of monthly total consumption expenditures per adult equivalent

	Base salary (in MMK)	Mean			Median		
		National	Urban	Rural	National	Urban	Rural
<b>Gazetted posts</b>							
Director general	500,000	7.6	5.1	n/a	10.1	7.0	n/a
Deputy director general	390,000	5.9	4.0	7.6	7.9	5.4	8.7
Director	350,000	5.3	3.6	6.8	7.1	4.9	7.8
Deputy director	320,000	4.8	3.3	6.3	6.5	4.5	7.2
Assistant director	290,000	4.4	3.0	5.7	5.8	4.0	6.5
Staff officer	260,000	3.9	2.7	5.1	5.2	3.6	5.8
<b>Non-gazetted posts</b>							
Police lieutenant	215,000	3.3	2.2	4.2	4.3	3.0	4.8
Office superintendent	200,000	3.0	2.0	3.9	4.0	2.8	4.5
Deputy staff officer	185,000	2.8	1.9	3.6	3.7	2.6	4.1
Upper division clerk	170,000	2.6	1.7	3.3	3.4	2.4	3.8
Lower division clerk	155,000	2.3	1.6	3.0	3.1	2.2	3.5
Record keeper	140,000	2.1	1.4	2.7	2.8	2.0	3.1
Peon	125,000	1.9	1.3	2.4	2.5	1.7	2.8

Source: 2015 MPLCS data and World Bank calculations.

Notes: Base salary is mid-point of each grade. Calculations assume 30.4 days per month.

## Annex 10 Compensation Questions from a Small Survey of Civil Servants

This table presents results from the compensation section of the pilot survey of civil servants, administered between February and May 2016. Jeffery Marshall (consultant) carried out statistical analysis of the survey results.

Table A11: Compensation questions from a small survey of civil servants

Survey questions	% of all staff	Staff subsamples	
		Gazetted	Non-gazetted
<b>S7Q1.</b> It is easy to understand how much compensation (monetary and nonmonetary) is paid for different jobs in the civil service.			
No	40.5	52.2	30.0
Yes	31.1	28.9	33.0
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	28.4	18.9	37.0
	<i>p=0.00*</i>		
<b>S7Q2.</b> The official compensation in the civil service (including monetary and nonmonetary allowances) is sufficient to attract and retain qualified and skilled people.			
No	65.8	75.7	57.0
Yes	22.6	17.8	27.0
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	11.6	6.7	16.0
	<i>p=0.02*</i>		
<b>S7Q3.</b> The official earnings in the civil service (including monetary and nonmonetary allowances) are sufficient to cover the basic living expenses (accommodation and food) of a family.			
No	86.8	80.0	93.0
Yes	11.6	17.8	6.0
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	1.6	2.2	1.0
	<i>p=0.03*</i>		
<b>S7Q4.</b> In addition to my civil service job, I regularly undertake/do other paid work.			
No	86.1	81.6	90.0
Yes	12.8	17.2	9.0
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	1.1	1.2	1.0
	<i>p=0.24</i>		

Survey questions	% of all staff	Staff subsamples	
		Gazetted	Non-gazetted
<b>S7Q5.</b> The compensation system in the civil service (including monetary and nonmonetary allowances) is fair and equitable. Jobs that have similar levels of responsibility are compensated equally.			
No	41.1	50.0	33.0
Yes	32.1	28.9	35.0
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	26.8	21.1	32.0
	<i>p=0.05*</i>		
<b>S7Q6.</b> Civil servants resign from their jobs because of insufficient income.			
No	48.2	45.7	50.5
Yes	41.3	43.3	39.4
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	10.6	11.1	10.1
	<i>p=0.79</i>		
<b>S7Q7.</b> In the past 12 months, I have made serious efforts to find full-time work elsewhere, so that I can leave the civil service.			
No	88.4	86.7	90.0
Yes	6.8	8.9	5.0
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	4.7	4.4	5.0
	<i>p=0.57</i>		
<b>S7Q8.</b> I would recommend to other people that they seek a job in the civil service.			
No	23.8	27.0	21.0
Yes	73.0	67.4	78.0
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	3.2	5.6	1.0
	<i>p=0.10</i>		



## Annex 11 Developing Appropriate Rates and Regulations for Operational Allowances

Myanmar government officials and World Bank sector specialists are concerned that certain operational allowances are inadequate to cover costs, and that the rules concerning which types of expenses (e.g., trips and distances) are covered discourage workers from undertaking tasks when costs are not reimbursed. This seriously limits the ability of the staff to do their job effectively, including providing services to people.

This issue affects multiple sectors, most notably health and education, which are on the front line of delivering basic services and employ large numbers of staff. As an example of the gravity and detrimental impact of some of the current allowances, consider health-care outreach workers who must visit clients (e.g., midwives who provide care to pregnant women in rural areas), but must either pay transportation costs from their own funds or skip visiting clients if the trip cost is not covered.

Subject to the Government of Myanmar's interest, the World Bank could provide hands-on analytical support, aiming to gather a reasonable set of data and provide practical analysis and projections with minimal delay. Sector specialists are best positioned to lead this assistance, since they know the nuances and dynamics of service delivery in their sectors and have the necessary relationships with government and other partners. Financial management and budget experts would help as needed.

Below are questions proposed for data gathering, analysis, and projections. This is a first set of ideas, which can be elaborated if there is interest:

- Establish a starting point.
  - Determine if the Government wants this type of assistance.
  - Determine what approach the Government is following at present to update rates and rules (e.g., data, assumptions, analysis, etc.).
  - Evaluate if the approach can be improved and whether it is sufficient.
- Gather detailed data on existing allowances, not only for the rules and rates, but also for other areas.
  - Which types of positions or what staff must travel as part of their work?
  - How many trips (if necessary) does each staff member typically make in a month or other relevant period?
  - What areas are staff required to travel to (e.g., rural or urban) and how far must they typically travel to or within these areas?
  - What types of expenses do such trips entail (e.g., transportation, accommodation, meals, communication)?
  - What is the total budgetary cost per month (or other relevant period) of the current system (i.e., current rates, current numbers of trips, etc.)?
- Project rates, usage, and costs for any proposed changes to existing rates and rules.
  - How can the Government estimate typical costs for the above expense items?
  - How do these costs vary (e.g., rural versus urban, regional versus local differences, such as Yangon or other high cost locations)? Is there a need to have differentiated rates to reflect such variations or is a single rate adequate?
  - Is the current usage (e.g., number of trips) lower than needed because reimbursement is inadequate?

If so, how much would usage increase if reasonable reimbursement rates were offered? What other factors would increase/decrease travel costs (e.g., new services or outreach efforts that require travel or use of video or cell phone facilities that reduce need for travel, etc.)?

- What would the cost implications be for ministry or facility budgets? (This would involve creating a “mini-model” spreadsheet that can be adjusted to reflect a range of assumptions about rates and other factors that affect costs.)

## Annex 12 Human Resource Management System Survey

### Introduction

This document provides a brief summary of the human resource management (HRM) survey data<sup>147</sup> that were recently collected in Myanmar. The database includes 190 government staff, divided into 90 gazetted and 100 non-gazetted officers. The results are presented using the same subsections that are included in the survey questionnaire. This begins with questions related to background of the respondent (“part A”) and then, in part B, the survey includes seven subsections of questions related to specific human resource management topics. There are 32 questions in part B.

The results are divided into two sections. Section 2 provides a descriptive summary of all of the questions from parts A and B in the HRM survey. The answers for each question are summarized using frequencies for the entire sample (190 staff), and also separately by gazetted and non-gazetted officers. Also, the specific comments written in by respondents are summarized for several of the questions in part B of the survey.

Section 3 provides a summary of some initial reliability and factor analyses that were conducted with the part B questions, both within each subsection and across all 32 survey questions. This section also presents the results for an overall index of the responses in part B, and provides some additional comparisons of the index results by respondent characteristics.

The main purpose of this report is to provide a detailed descriptive overview of the survey questions with some comparisons, rather than a detailed analysis of the results themselves. The main work related to interpretation can be filled in later by the survey questionnaire designers.

### Descriptive overview of HRM survey

This section summarizes all of the part A and B questions that are included on the HRM survey. As described above, this is done for the entire sample (190 staff), and also separately by gazetted and non-gazetted officers. Tests of significance are included to determine if the responses between gazetted/non-gazetted officers are significantly different. For the 32 yes/no (or agree/disagree) questions in part B, the answers are summarized using three responses: 1) “no/disagree,” 2) “yes/agree,” and 3) a combined category for “don’t know/multiple answers/ didn’t answer.” Since these categories are not ordered, a simple chi-square test is used to determine if the answers are significantly different between gazetted and non-gazetted staff. The p-values for these tests are included below each question summary, with  $p \leq 0.05$  considered significant (flagged by \*). It should be noted that the categorical responses preclude the calculation of standard deviations for individual questions as part of the descriptive summary.

The comparisons are restricted to gazetted versus non-gazetted officers because this appears to be the main strata incorporated in the survey. In section 3, some additional comparisons are incorporated, but given the relatively small sample size—and lack of information on the sampling properties (i.e., how large is the population, etc.)—some caution is required with the comparisons. This may be something that can be expanded in later iterations of this report.

Finally, the survey also allowed respondents to add in comments for each question. In general, relatively few additional comments or observations were added by the respondents. But there are some variables where more comments were provided, so these individual variable comments are listed within the relevant subsection below.

147 J.H. Marshall, May 2006, unpublished memo, World Bank (summary data available upon request).

## Part A, background information

Table A12 provides a summary of the background characteristic indicators that are included in part A of the survey. The results are presented as frequencies, meaning that each figure is a percentage of the total. For example, the question for age asked respondents to choose an age category, so the results show the percentage of respondents in each category. (The answers sum to 100 percent.)

These are the main results for the part A questions:

- All of the non-gazetted staff is female, compared with a 57:43 female to male percentage breakdown among gazetted staff.
- Overall, most respondents are in the 31-40 year range (55.3 percent), but the age profiles are very different between gazetted and non-gazetted staff. About 80 percent of gazetted staff is older than 40 years, compared with only 1 percent of non-gazetted.
- The non-gazetted staff all report the same salary scale (MMK 180,000-190,000), whereas among gazetted staff there is a wider range of salaries reported.
- The experience results are similar to age, with a large concentration of high experience among gazetted staff, and relatively low experience among non-gazetted.
- Most of the gazetted staff is union or region level, whereas the non-gazetted staff is drawn mainly from regional and township offices.
- The only part-A variable that is not significantly different between gazetted and non-gazetted staff is the 28.9 percent of survey respondents who reported working in a hardship zone.

**Table A12:** Summary of part A - respondent background characteristics

Survey questions	All staff	Staff subsamples	
		Gazetted	Non-gazetted
Staff is gazetted (percent)	47.4	----	----
Male (percent)	20.5	43.3	0.0
		<i>p=0.00*</i>	
<b>Age by category</b>			
Less than 30 years	6.3	1.1	11.0
31-40 years	55.3	19.0	88.0
41-50 years	17.4	35.6	1.0
51-60 years	21.1	44.4	0.0
61 years or older	0.0	0.0	0.0
		<i>p=0.00*</i>	

Survey questions	All staff	Staff subsamples	
		Gazetted	Non-gazetted
<b>Salary level (in MMK)</b>			
180,000-190,000	52.6	0.0	100.0
250,000-270,000	4.2	8.9	0.0
280,000-300,000	14.7	31.1	0.0
310,000-330,000	6.3	13.3	0.0
340,000-360,000	22.1	46.7	0.0
	<i>p=0.00*</i>		
<b>Level of experience</b>			
Less than 5 years	2.7	1.1	4.0
5-10 years	12.8	5.7	19.0
11-20 years	53.7	27.3	77.0
21-30 years	23.4	50.0	0.0
More than 30 years	7.5	15.9	0.0
	<i>p=0.00*</i>		
<b>Level of employment</b>			
Union level	36.9	75.9	3.0
Regional/state level	31.6	23.0	39.0
District level	0.5	1.2	0.0
Township level	31.0	0.0	58.0
	<i>p=0.00*</i>		
<b>Hardship zone</b>			
Work in a hardship zone?	28.9	24.7	32.7
	<i>p=0.23</i>		
<b>Sample</b>			
Sample size	190	90	100

Source: HRM Survey 2015

Notes: Numbers are frequencies (percentages) of responses, and sum to 100% for each question by sample. P-values refer to tests of significance (chi-square) comparing all responses within each question between gazetted and non-gazetted staff.

\* P-value  $\leq 0.05$

One potential complication for the survey analysis is the concentration of select characteristics within each of the gazetted and non-gazetted categories. For example, the only comparisons that can be made for salary level are within the gazetted staff category, since all non-gazetted staff receives the same salary level. The same is true for gender, since all non-gazetted staff is female.

Table A13 summarizes the survey respondent breakdown by region. The results show that the gazetted staff is concentrated in Nay Pyi Taw, whereas the non-gazetted staff is more evenly divided across all of the regions.

**Table A13:** Breakdown of gazetted and non-gazetted samples by region

Region	Non-gazetted staff	Gazetted staff	Total
Ayeyarwaddy	17	0	17
Bago	7	5	12
Chin	2	0	2
Kachin	4	0	4
Kayah	0	1	1
Kayin	4	0	4
Magway	9	2	11
Mandalay	11	3	14
Mon	5	0	5
Nay Pyi Taw	5	67	72
Rakhine	4	0	4
Sagaing	6	1	7
Shan	14	1	15
Tanintharyi	4	0	4
Yangon	8	9	17
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>189</b>

## Part B, survey responses

Tables A14 through A20 summarize the responses for each of the seven part B sub-sections. The presentation strategy is the same as in A12, with an overall sample breakdown of the responses, followed by comparisons of gazetted and non-gazetted categories. Tests of significance are used to determine if the overall frequencies of responses (by question) are different between gazetted and non-gazetted staff. (Significant differences are flagged with an asterisk.) These results are not analyzed in detail here. Nevertheless, a handful of findings stand out across the seven tables.

- For some questions, there are substantial proportions of respondents who did not answer, marked multiple answers, or selected “don’t know.” The response rate by question is potentially useful, especially if there are certain kinds of questions that respondents are less likely to answer. But the missing answers do complicate certain aspects of the statistical analysis (discussed in section 3).

- Overall, the respondents were generally positive about their working environments. The percentage of positive responses (“yes” or “agree”) was above 50 percent in 19 of the 32 part B survey questions.
- However, the results are very different between staff categories. In general, the non-gazetted officers are more positive about their working experience and environment. More specifically, non-gazetted staff reported significantly higher satisfaction than their gazetted counterparts in 17 of the 32 part B questions.
- The survey areas, “Deployment and Retention” (section 3) and “Pay and Compensation” (section 7), have the fewest significant differences between gazetted and non-gazetted staff.

**Table A14:** Survey section 1 - establishment management and control

Survey questions	All staff	Staff subsamples	
		Gazetted	Non-gazetted
<b>S1Q1.</b> My ministry/department has enough staff to carry out its functions effectively and efficiently.			
No	35.1	58.0	15.0
Yes	58.5	36.4	78.0
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	6.4	5.7	7.0
	<i>p=0.00*</i>		
<b>S1Q2.</b> My ministry/department has a specialized human resource management/personnel unit with qualified staff who are technically competent to plan and manage human resource management matters.			
No	32.6	61.1	7.0
Yes	59.5	37.8	79.0
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	7.9	1.1	14.0
	<i>p=0.00*</i>		
<b>S1Q3.</b> Job posts are created based on an analysis of the manpower needs of the respective department/division/section in my ministry.			
No	12.7	25.8	1.0
Yes	81.5	70.8	91.0
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	5.8	3.4	8.0
	<i>p=0.00*</i>		
<b>S1Q4.</b> There are written job descriptions for all the staff positions in my ministry/department/section.			
No	7.9	15.6	1.0
Yes	84.7	76.7	92.0
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	7.4	7.8	7.0
	<i>p=0.00*</i>		

Source: HRM Survey 2015.

Notes: Numbers are frequencies (percentages) of responses, and sum to 100% for each question by sample. P-values refer to tests of significance (chi-square) comparing all responses within each question between gazetted and non-gazetted staff.

\* P-value <=0.05



Table A15: Survey section 2 - recruitment and selection

Survey questions	All staff	Staff subsamples	
		Gazetted	Non-gazetted
<b>S2Q1.</b> The recruitment and selection system in Myanmar is successful in recruiting the best qualified people for its civil service.			
No	29.3	46.6	14.0
Yes	58.0	40.9	73.0
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	12.8	12.5	13.0
	<i>p=0.00*</i>		
<b>S2Q2.</b> The recruitment process provides equal opportunities for male and female job applicants.			
No	15.9	14.6	17.0
Yes	83.1	84.3	82.0
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	1.1	1.1	1.0
	<i>p=0.09</i>		
<b>S2Q3.</b> The recruitment process provides equal opportunities for job applicants from different ethnic groups/races.			
No	6.5	9.0	4.0
Yes	91.5	87.6	95.0
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	2.1	3.4	1.0
	<i>p=0.19</i>		
<b>S2Q4.</b> It is easy to attract qualified job seekers to apply for employment in the civil service of Myanmar.			
No	30.5	46.7	16.0
Yes	60.0	46.7	72.0
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	9.5	6.7	12.0
	<i>p=0.00*</i>		

Source: HRM Survey 2015.

Notes: Numbers are frequencies (percentages) of responses, and sum to 100% for each question by sample. P-values refer to tests of significance (chi-square) comparing all responses within each question between gazetted and non-gazetted staff.

\* P-value <=0.05

Table A16: Survey section 3 - deployment and retention

Survey questions	All staff	Staff subsamples	
		Gazetted	Non-gazetted
<b>S2Q1.</b> Civil servants can choose where they want to be posted or deployed.			
No	90.5	87.8	92.9
Yes	7.9	11.1	5.1
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	1.6	1.1	2.0
	<i>p=0.28</i>		
<b>S2Q2.</b> The regional allowance (hardship allowance) is enough to attract and keep civil servants to work in poor and remote areas.			
No	63.7	61.1	66.0
Yes	21.6	23.3	20.0
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	14.7	15.6	14.0
	<i>p=0.78</i>		
<b>S2Q3.</b> There is a clear policy and criteria for the posting and deployment of the staff in each ministry/department.			
No	23.7	36.7	12.0
Yes	57.4	51.1	63.0
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	19.0	12.2	25.0
	<i>p=0.00*</i>		
<b>S2Q4.</b> The posting and deployment of staff is carried out in a fair and transparent manner.			
No	39.7	56.2	25.0
Yes	49.7	39.3	59.0
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	10.6	4.5	16.0
	<i>p=0.00*</i>		

Source: HRM Survey 2015.

Notes: Numbers are frequencies (percentages) of responses, and sum to 100% for each question by sample. P-values refer to tests of significance (chi-square) comparing all responses within each question between gazetted and non-gazetted staff.

\* P-value  $\leq 0.05$

Table A17: Survey section 4 - performance appraisal

Survey questions	All staff	Staff subsamples	
		Gazetted	Non-gazetted
<b>S4Q1.</b> I am given feedback about my job performance by my supervisor on a regular basis (daily/weekly/monthly).			
No	33.9	43.5	23.5
Yes	63.4	50.0	75.5
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	2.7	4.6	1.0
	<i>p=0.00*</i>		
<b>S4Q2.</b> There is a formal system in my ministry/department for a staff's job performance to be monitored and appraised every year.			
No	30.5	51.1	12.0
Yes	64.7	43.3	84.0
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	4.7	5.6	4.0
	<i>p=0.00*</i>		
<b>S4Q3.</b> My supervisor discusses my performance appraisal report with me to provide feedback about my job performance.			
No	67.7	67.4	68.0
Yes	29.1	30.3	28.0
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	3.2	2.3	4.0
	<i>p=0.76</i>		
<b>S4Q4.</b> The performance appraisal system for promotion is fair and transparent.			
No	36.5	56.2	19.0
Yes	59.3	41.6	75.0
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	4.2	2.3	6.0
	<i>p=0.00*</i>		

Source: HRM Survey 2015.

Notes: Numbers are frequencies (percentages) of responses, and sum to 100% for each question by sample. P-values refer to tests of significance (chi-square) comparing all responses within each question between gazetted and non-gazetted staff.

\* P-value <=0.05

Table A18: Survey section 5 - promotion

Survey questions	All staff	Staff subsamples	
		Gazetted	Non-gazetted
<b>S4Q1.</b> Rules and procedures are followed closely by the ministry/ department in the promotion of the staff.			
No	17.4	23.3	12.0
Yes	75.3	68.9	81.0
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	7.4	7.8	7.0
	<i>p=0.11</i>		
<b>S4Q2.</b> The most qualified and competent person is promoted in the ministry/department			
No	39.4	55.1	25.3
Yes	55.9	39.3	70.7
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	4.8	5.6	4.0
	<i>p=0.00*</i>		
<b>S4Q3.</b> My ministry/department provides training and staff development programs to prepare the staff for promotion.			
No	16.4	28.1	6.0
Yes	80.4	67.4	92.0
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	3.2	4.5	2.0
	<i>p=0.00*</i>		
<b>S4Q4.</b> There is political consideration in the promotion process of civil servants.			
No	45.8	58.9	34.0
Yes	30.0	25.6	34.0
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	24.2	15.6	32.0
	<i>p=0.00*</i>		

Source: HRM Survey 2015.

Notes: Numbers are frequencies (percentages) of responses, and sum to 100% for each question by sample. P-values refer to tests of significance (chi-square) comparing all responses within each question between gazetted and non-gazetted staff.

\* P-value  $\leq 0.05$

Table A19: Survey section 6 - learning and development

Survey questions	All staff	Staff subsamples	
		Gazetted	Non-gazetted
<b>S4Q1.</b> All civil servants are given equal access to learning and development opportunities.			
No	22.8	34.8	12.0
Yes	74.1	59.6	87.0
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	3.2	5.6	1.0
	<i>p=0.00*</i>		
<b>S4Q2.</b> My ministry/department has a training plan to develop the job competencies of all the staff on a short term and long term basis.			
No	7.4	14.6	1.0
Yes	87.3	80.9	93.0
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	5.3	4.5	6.0
	<i>p=0.00*</i>		
<b>S4Q3.</b> Training programs have been effective in improving job performance and public service delivery in the civil service.			
No	10.5	18.9	3.0
Yes	86.8	77.8	95.0
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	2.6	3.3	2.0
	<i>p=0.00*</i>		
<b>S4Q4.</b> There is sufficient budget and qualified staff to provide training and learning opportunities to all the civil servants.			
No	58.7	62.2	55.6
Yes	31.2	28.9	33.3
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	10.1	8.9	11.1
	<i>p=0.64</i>		

Source: HRM Survey 2015.

Notes: Numbers are frequencies (percentages) of responses, and sum to 100% for each question by sample. P-values refer to tests of significance (chi-square) comparing all responses within each question between gazetted and non-gazetted staff.

\* P-value <=0.05

Table A20: Survey section 7 - pay and compensation

Survey questions	All staff	Staff subsamples	
		Gazetted	Non-gazetted
<b>S7Q1.</b> It is easy to understand how much compensation (monetary and nonmonetary) is paid for different jobs in the civil service.			
No	40.5	52.2	30.0
Yes	31.1	28.9	33.0
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	28.4	18.9	37.0
	<i>p=0.00*</i>		
<b>S7Q2.</b> The official compensation in the civil service (including monetary and nonmonetary allowances) is sufficient to attract and retain qualified and skilled people.			
No	65.8	75.7	57.0
Yes	22.6	17.8	27.0
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	11.6	6.7	16.0
	<i>p=0.02*</i>		
<b>S7Q3.</b> The official earnings in the civil service (including monetary and nonmonetary allowances) are sufficient to cover the basic living expenses (accommodation and food) of a family.			
No	86.8	80.0	93.0
Yes	11.6	17.8	6.0
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	1.6	2.2	1.0
	<i>p=0.03*</i>		
<b>S7Q4.</b> In addition to my civil service job, I regularly undertake/do other paid work.			
No	86.1	81.6	90.0
Yes	12.8	17.2	9.0
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	1.1	1.2	1.0
	<i>p=0.24</i>		
<b>S7Q5.</b> The compensation system in the civil service (including monetary and nonmonetary allowances) is fair and equitable. Jobs that have similar levels of responsibility are compensated equally.			
No	41.1	50.0	33.0
Yes	32.1	28.9	35.0
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	26.8	21.1	32.0
	<i>p=0.05*</i>		

Survey questions	All staff	Staff subsamples	
		Gazetted	Non-gazetted
<b>S7Q6.</b> Civil servants resign from their jobs because of insufficient income.			
No	48.2	45.7	50.5
Yes	41.3	43.3	39.4
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	10.6	11.1	10.1
	<i>p=0.79</i>		
<b>S7Q7.</b> In the past 12 months, I have made serious efforts to find full-time work elsewhere, so that I can leave the civil service.			
No	88.4	86.7	90.0
Yes	6.8	8.9	5.0
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	4.7	4.4	5.0
	<i>p=0.57</i>		
<b>S7Q8.</b> I would recommend to other people that they seek a job in the civil service.			
No	23.8	27.0	21.0
Yes	73.0	67.4	78.0
Don't know/No answer/Multiple answers	3.2	5.6	1.0
	<i>p=0.10</i>		

Source: HRM Survey 2015.

Notes: Numbers are frequencies (percentages) of responses, and sum to 100% for each question by sample. P-values refer to tests of significance (chi-square) comparing all responses within each question between gazetted and non-gazetted staff.

\* P-value  $\leq 0.05$



## Part B, open question (comment) responses

The respondents were free (in each question) to provide additional details in the form of comments. In most cases, very few comments were provided. However, for a handful of variables, there were at least five comments provided, and these comments may provide some additional useful detail for the analysis. They are summarized in box A1, by the question where comment was made. If necessary, summaries of comments from other questions can be provided, but few others were made.

### Box A1: Summaries of respondents' comments on selected survey questions

#### Comments on S1Q1 (“Ministry/Department has enough staff.”)

- “It [staffing] is more than enough in some places, but not enough at all in some places.”
- “It exceeds in some departments and some others don’t have enough.”
- “Junior clerks are not enough.”
- “Enough staff, but not qualified.”
- “Staff is enough, but it needs to manage [to assign] the right person in the right place.”
- “They are filling the free and missing positions.”
- “There is only half the number of staff.”

#### Comments on S3Q1 (“Civil servants can choose posting.”)

- “Cannot choose. Currently, I have been transferred to the working group under the Ministry Department.”
- “But, it is not certain to be assigned to that chosen place.”
- “There is a voting system for posting and sometimes, they were transferred to the new posts for the requirements.”
- “Have to go to assigned areas.”
- “Can choose if the post is free. Prefer to post the civil servants with no retribution at their own local region.”

#### Comments on S5Q2 (“The most qualified and competent persons are promoted.”)

- “Direct supervisor's recommendation is only important.”
- “Other factors of the Ministries are also essential.”
- “There are some exceptions, such as promotion [going] to the one with the longest service years without [the] qualifications.”
- “Sometimes yes, sometimes no.”
- “75% is right. 25% is exception.”

**Comments on S6Q4 (“[There is] sufficient budget and staff to provide training to civil servants.”)**

- “There is support from UN, INGOs, and the Government’s budgets for the trainings.”
- “Just average.”
- “Have qualified staff, but no sufficient budget.”
- “Not sufficient budget.”
- “There are many qualified civil servants with money hardships.”

**Comments on S7Q3 (“Official earnings are sufficient for basic living expenses.”)**

- “Spend money with limits. But it is not enough for living expenses. Don’t have the personal house (do not own yet) until today.”
- “No. Can only afford to buy and eat the rice from the lowest price range.”
- “Only cover for basic Food expenses.”
- “Even though the State is supporting as much as they can, there are still necessities.”
- “It is only enough for food, shelter, and clothing. Not enough for health care and children’s education.”
- “Not sufficient for the children.”
- “Not sufficient for the whole family.”
- “Not sufficient to cover basic living expenses”
- “Goods prices are high and not enough income.”

**Comments on S7Q8 (“I would recommend to people to seek job in civil service.”)**

- “Even though a civil servant in life has to struggle with hardships, there a pension that can secure the life after retirement. Have to be proud in society, such as among family, friends and relatives.
- Therefore, we want to recommend to others though we don’t like [it] ourselves.”
- “Encourage the people who are really interested to sacrifice for the public’s well beings without having personal interests.”
- “Don’t want to encourage at present.”
- “Individual's choice is the main [thing].”
- “Have a pension.”
- “To get a secure life.”

One interesting observation about the comments made on S7Q3 in figure A1 is that only two of them came from non-gazetted staff; all of the rest were by gazetted staff. Also, almost half of the comments from gazetted staff came from the staff members who report being in the highest salary range.

## Statistical analysis

This section briefly summarizes the results from three additional analyses that were conducted using HRM survey data. This includes reliability and factor analysis, and analysis of a summary index that was created using all of the data in part B. These results are very preliminary and may be of limited use, although they can be extended if needed.

### Initial reliability and factor analysis

Reliability and factor analysis are commonly used with attitudinal data, such as the questions in part B. Since the 32 questions touch on multiple aspects of civil service, it is important to know whether or not these questions appear to come from a single, general construct (or dimension), or if they are related to multiple dimensions. Reliability measures (e.g., Cronbach's alpha) provide a basic indication of how similar the questions are, with higher values (over 0.90) indicating high degrees of similarity (or reliability) in the questions. Factor analysis is a more complicated activity that gives loadings (or weights) to individual questions and allows for the questions to load onto more than one factor (or dimension).

Both of these analyses (reliability and factor) are related to the concept of dimensionality. For example, it may be that all of the questions in part B basically measure a general dimension among civil servant staff, which could be called "civil servant job satisfaction," for example. However, it is possible that some of these questions—or even entire sections of questions—are measuring different dimensions. There is also the possibility that some of the questions are poorly worded or the respondents did not understand them. Reliability and factor analysis can be useful for flagging questions that appear to be functioning differently than the other questions.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to explore this issue of dimensionality across the entire part B survey for two reasons. First, there are a substantial number of "don't know/multiple answer/didn't answer" responses to the 32 questions, which were treated as missing values in a combined factor analysis across all questions. As a result, the factor and reliability analyses can only be done for a very small subset of respondents who chose "yes-no" answers to all (or almost all) of the questions. Second, the polychoric factor method—which is appropriate for dichotomous responses—does not properly converge because of the relatively high number of questions for a relatively small number of cases. Convergence is only achieved when dropping multiple questions, but this limits the utility of the analysis.

As a preliminary step, the reliability and factor analyses were applied to each of the seven blocks of questions in part B. (The results are presented in subsection 3.3, "Reliability and factor analysis.") The main finding from this initial analysis is that no major problems were found with any of the survey questions. However, the details from this analysis are not particularly important, so they are not presented in detail. These preliminary steps do, at a minimum, provide some initial results that can perhaps be added to in future iterations of this study.

### Overall index

Because of the complications of incorporating factor analysis to create a measure (or measures) for the responses in part B, a simple index was instead created. The index measures the percentage of "yes/agree" answers across all 32 part B questions.<sup>148</sup> This is done for respondents who have fewer than five missing answers, which results in a sample of 162 respondents. This index can be treated as a rough measure of civil servant worker

<sup>148</sup> Before this index was created, three variables were recoded so that the "yes/agree" response reflects a positive attribute of the job. For example, the variable "looking for other job" (in section 7 of the survey) is now coded 1 ("yes/agree") meaning that the respondent is not looking for another job. This recoding is not critical for the construction of the index, but it does insure that all 32 questions are coded in the "same direction."

satisfaction. For example, a respondent with an index score of 90 indicated a positive response in 90 percent of the questions, whereas a respondent with an index score of 30 only answered positively in 30 percent of the questions. Unlike factor analysis, the simple index gives all questions the same importance. (There are no loadings or weights.)

Figure A1 shows the histogram for the index for the final sample of 158 respondents. The distribution is skewed to the right, meaning that there are more positive responses than negative ones. This is consistent with the descriptive summary provided in section 2. However, it is important to note that there is a significant amount of variation in the index score across the 162 respondents.

**Figure A1:** Histogram summary of civil servant work environment index





Figure A2 compares some of the index results across different categories of respondents. As noted above, some caution is required when making comparisons across the sample categories. The results show that non-gazetted respondents have an overall index score of 70.7, compared with just 52.9 for gazetted officers. The overall sample average is 61.8 (with a standard deviation of 19.0). Focusing just on gazetted staff, the officers with the highest index scores are in the middle salary ranges, whereas gazetted staff in the lowest (250,000-270,000) and highest (340,000-360,000) have lower satisfaction levels. These results are somewhat counter-intuitive: comparisons cannot be made by salary with non-gazetted staff because all of them are in the 180,000-190,000 category.

Figure A2: Comparison of overall index score by respondent characteristic



## Reliability and factor analysis

The reliability and factor analyses are incorporated separately within each of the seven sections of part B. The results are displayed in tables A21-A27. For each question within the seven survey sections, the results are first summarized in terms of “yes/agree” versus “no/disagree.” This ignores the “don’t know/multiple answer/didn’t answer” responses, which means leaving out a large number of respondents for some of the survey questions. An overall alpha statistic is reported within each of the question blocks (seven in all). Higher values of alpha mean that the questions are related to the same underlying dimension. Since the subsections include relatively few questions (usually four), the alpha values are not high by conventional standards (always below 0.70). The alpha statistic is also reported for each of the individual questions within each subsection, but this has a different interpretation than the overall alpha. The individual alphas refer to the value of the overall alpha if this specific question is removed. When the individual alpha for a specific question is much lower than the overall alpha average, it means that the individual question is strongly related to the dimension that these questions appear to be measuring.

Next to the alpha statistics for each individual question (within each subsection), there also appear factor loadings from an initial factor analysis. Higher loadings suggest that the individual question is a more important element of the dimension that is being measured in the block of questions. This additional analysis concludes with a comparison of the factor scores between gazetted and non-gazetted staff, based on the questions within each individual subsection. The factor is obtained using a polychoric factor analysis function due to the reliance on 0-1 dichotomous variables.

**Table A21:** Survey section 1 - establishment management and control, item summary

Survey questions	All staff	Staff subsamples		Alpha	Factor loading
		Gazetted	Non-gazetted		
<b>Percentage “yes”</b>					
S1Q1	62.5	38.6	83.9	0.61	0.22
S1Q2	64.6	38.2	91.9	0.48	0.23
S1Q3	86.5	73.3	98.9	0.60	0.10
S1Q4	91.5	83.1	98.9	0.65	0.07
Overall alpha (for block)	----	----	----	0.66	----
Factor score (for block)	-0.19	-0.79	0.46	----	----

**Table A22:** Survey section 2 - recruitment and selection, item summary

Survey questions	All staff	Staff subsamples		Alpha	Factor loading
		Gazetted	Non-gazetted		
<b>Percentage “yes”</b>					
S2Q1	66.4	46.8	83.9	0.50	0.23
S2Q2	84.0	85.2	82.8	0.62	0.11
S2Q3	93.5	90.7	96.0	0.62	0.06
S2Q4	66.3	50.0	81.8	0.47	0.22
Overall alpha (for block)	----	----	----	0.63	----
Factor score (for block)	-0.19	-0.49	0.09	----	----

**Table A23:** Survey section 3 - deployment and retention, item summary

Survey questions	All staff	Staff subsamples		Alpha	Factor loading
		Gazetted	Non-gazetted		
<b>Percentage “yes”</b>					
S2Q1	8.1	11.2	5.2	0.58	0.35
S2Q2	25.3	27.6	23.3	0.57	0.29
S2Q3	25.8	58.2	84.0	0.32	0.22
S2Q4	55.6	41.1	70.2	0.24	0.30
Overall alpha (for block)	----	----	----	0.53	----
Factor score (for block)	-0.57	-0.80	-0.31	----	----

Table A24: Survey section 4 - performance appraisal, item summary

Survey questions	All staff	Staff subsamples		Alpha	Factor loading
		Gazetted	Non-gazetted		
<b>Percentage “yes”</b>					
S4Q1	65.2	52.4	76.3	0.60	0.26
S4Q2	68.0	45.9	87.5	0.58	0.25
S4Q3	30.1	31.0	29.2	0.68	0.44
S4Q4	61.9	42.5	79.8	0.62	0.27
Overall alpha (for block)	----	----	----	0.69	----
Factor score (for block)	-0.19	-0.65	0.23	----	----

Table A25: Survey section 5 - promotion, item summary

Survey questions	All staff	Staff subsamples		Alpha	Factor loading
		Gazetted	Non-gazetted		
<b>Percentage “yes”</b>					
S5Q1	81.3	74.7	87.1	0.32	0.13
S5Q2	58.7	41.7	73.7	0.23	0.30
S5Q3	83.1	70.6	93.9	0.33	0.12
S5Q4	39.6	30.2	50.0	0.59	-0.07
Overall alpha (for block)	----	----	----	0.46	----
Factor score (for block)	-0.23	-0.52	0.11	----	----

Table A26: Survey section 6 - learning and development, item summary

Survey questions	All staff	Staff subsamples		Alpha	Factor loading
		Gazetted	Non-gazetted		
<b>Percentage “yes”</b>					
S6Q1	76.5	63.1	87.9	0.41	0.19
S6Q2	92.2	84.7	98.9	0.48	0.07
S6Q3	89.2	80.5	96.9	0.46	0.10
S6Q4	34.7	31.7	37.5	0.65	0.31
Overall alpha (for block)	----	----	----	0.57	----
Factor score (for block)	-0.15	-0.47	0.14	----	----



Table A27: Survey section 7 - pay and compensation, item summary

Survey questions	All staff	Staff subsamples		Alpha	Factor loading
		Gazetted	Non-gazetted		
	<b>Percentage “yes”</b>				
S7Q1	43.4	35.6	52.4	0.45	0.27
S7Q2	25.6	19.0	32.1	0.45	0.28
S7Q3	11.8	18.2	6.1	0.50	0.17
S7Q4	13.0	17.4	9.1	0.51	----
S7Q5	43.9	36.6	51.5	0.39	0.29
S7Q6	46.2	48.8	43.8	0.48	-0.08
S7Q7	7.2	9.3	5.3	0.49	----
S7Q8	75.4	71.4	78.8	0.46	0.10
Overall alpha (for block)	----	----	----	0.50	----
Factor score (for block)	-0.92	-1.10	-0.69	----	----

## Annex 13 Analysis of Civil Service Job Descriptions (from Ministry of Education)

Table 28: Analysis of civil service job descriptions

No.	Job title (in Myanmar)	Job title (in English)	Job description specifies: (1 = yes, 0 = no)				No. of features covered	Job descriptions (no. of pages)
			Purpose	Responsibilities	Activities	Reporting arrangements		
		<b>Specified in no. of job descriptions</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>2</b>		
1	ညွှန်ကြားရေးမှူးချုပ်	Director general	1	1	1	0	3	0.75
2	ဒုတိယညွှန်ကြားရေးမှူးချုပ် (စီမံကိန်း)	Deputy director general—planning	1	1	1	0	3	0.75
3	ဒုတိယညွှန်ကြားရေးမှူးချုပ် (လေ့ကျင့်ရေး)	Deputy director general—practice	1	1	1	0	3	0.75
4	ဒုတိယညွှန်ကြားရေးမှူးချုပ် (သုတေသန)	Deputy director general—research	1	1	1	0	3	0.75
5	ဒုတိယညွှန်ကြားရေးမှူးချုပ် (စီမံ၊ ဘဏ္ဍာ)	Deputy director general—admin, finance	1	1	1	0	3	0.75
6	ညွှန်ကြားရေးမှူး (စီမံကိန်း)	Director—planning	1	1	1	0	3	0.75
7	ညွှန်ကြားရေးမှူး (စာရင်းအင်းနှင့် သတင်းအချက်အလက်)	Director—statistics and information	0	1	1	0	2	0.75
8	ညွှန်ကြားရေးမှူး (လေ့ကျင့်ရေး)	Director—practice	1	1	1	0	3	1
9	ညွှန်ကြားရေးမှူး (သင်ရိုး)	Director—curriculum	1	1	1	0	3	1
10	ညွှန်ကြားရေးမှူး (သုတေသန)	Director—research	1	1	1	0	3	1
11	ညွှန်ကြားရေးမှူး (နိုင်ငံတကာဆက်ဆံရေးနှင့် ပညာသင်ရေးရာ)	Director—international relations and study abroad	1	1	1	0	3	0.75
12	ညွှန်ကြားရေးမှူး (စီမံ)	Director—administration	1	1	1	0	3	1
13	ညွှန်ကြားရေးမှူး (ဘဏ္ဍာ)	Director—finance	0	1	1	0	2	1
14	ဒုတိယညွှန်ကြားရေးမှူး (စီမံကိန်း)	Deputy director—planning	1	1	1	0	3	1

No.	Job title (in Myanmar)	Job title (in English)	Job description specifies: (1 = yes, 0 = no)				No. of features covered	Job descriptions (no. of pages)
			Purpose	Responsibilities	Activities	Reporting arrangements		
15	ဒုတိယညွှန်ကြားရေးမှူး (စာရင်းအင်းနှင့် သတင်းအချက်အလက်)	Deputy director—statistics and information	0	1	1	0	2	1
16	ဒုတိယညွှန်ကြားရေးမှူး (လေ့ကျင့်ရေး)	Deputy director—practice	1	1	1	0	3	1
17	ဒုတိယညွှန်ကြားရေးမှူး (သင်ရိုး)	Deputy director—curriculum	1	1	1	0	3	0.75
18	ဒုတိယညွှန်ကြားရေးမှူး (သုတေသန)	Deputy director—research	1	1	1	0	3	1
19	ဒုတိယညွှန်ကြားရေးမှူး (နိုင်ငံတကာဆက်ဆံရေးနှင့် ပညာသင်ရေးရာ)	Deputy director—international relations and study abroad	0	1	1	0	2	1
20	ဒုတိယညွှန်ကြားရေးမှူး (စီမံ)	Deputy director—administration	1	1	1	0	3	1.75
21	ဒုတိယညွှန်ကြားရေးမှူး (ဘဏ္ဍာ)	Deputy director—finance	1	1	1	0	3	1
22	လ/ထည့်နှံကြားရေးမှူး (စီမံကိန်း)	Assistant director—planning	1	1	1	0	3	1
23	လ/ထည့်နှံကြားရေးမှူး (လူ့စွမ်းအားရင်းမြစ် ဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေး)	Assistant director—human resource development	1	1	1	0	3	1.25
24	လ/ထည့်နှံကြားရေးမှူး (လေ့လာကြီးကြပ်အကဲဖြတ်)	Assistant director—monitoring and evaluation	1	1	1	0	3	1
25	လ/ထည့်နှံကြားရေးမှူး (စာရင်းအင်း)	Assistant director—statistics	0	1	1	0	2	1
26	လ/ထည့်နှံကြားရေးမှူး (သတင်းအချက်အလက်)	Assistant director—information	0	1	1	0	2	1
27	လ/ထည့်နှံကြားရေးမှူး (ဝိဇ္ဇာ)	Assistant director—arts	1	1	1	0	3	1
28	လ/ထည့်နှံကြားရေးမှူး (သိပ္ပံ)	Assistant director—science	1	1	1	0	3	1
29	လ/ထည့်နှံကြားရေးမှူး (သင်ရိုးအကဲဖြတ်)	Assistant director—curriculum evaluation	1	1	1	1	4	0.75
30	လ/ထည့်နှံကြားရေးမှူး (လုပ်ငန်းခွင်ဆရာအတတ်သင်တန်း)	Assistant director—in-service teacher training	1	1	1	0	3	0.75

No.	Job title (in Myanmar)	Job title (in English)	Job description specifies: (1 = yes, 0 = no)				No. of features covered	Job descriptions (no. of pages)
			Purpose	Responsibilities	Activities	Reporting arrangements		
31	လ/ထည့်နှံကြားရေးမှူး (လုပ်ငန်းခွင်ပညာရေး ဝန်ထမ်းများသင်တန်း)	Assistant director—in-service education staff training	1	1	1	0	3	0.75
32	လ/ထည့်နှံကြားရေးမှူး (နိုင်ငံတကာဆက်ဆံရေး)	Assistant director—international relations	1	1	1	0	3	0.75
33	လ/ထည့်နှံကြားရေးမှူး (ပညာသင်ရေးရာ)	Assistant director—study abroad	0	1	1	0	2	0.5
34	လ/ထည့်နှံကြားရေးမှူး (သုတေသန) (အခြေခံ)	Assistant director—research, basic education	1	1	1	0	3	1.25
35	လ/ထည့်နှံကြားရေးမှူး (သုတေသန) (အဆင့်မြင့်/ ဆရာအတတ်ပညာ)	Assistant director—research, higher education, teacher training college	1	1	1	0	3	1.25
36	လ/ထည့်နှံကြားရေးမှူး (သုတေသန) (TVET/ NFE)	Assistant director—research, TVET/ NFE	1	1	1	0	3	1.25
37	လ/ထည့်နှံကြားရေးမှူး (စီမံ)	Assistant director—administration	0	1	1	0	2	0.5
38	လ/ထည့်နှံကြားရေးမှူး (ဘဏ္ဍာ)	Assistant director—finance	1	1	1	0	3	1
39	ဦးစီးအရာရှိ (စီမံကိန်း) (၄ ဦး)	Staff officer—planning (4 persons)	1	1	1	0	3	1
40	ဦးစီးအရာရှိ (HR စီမံကိန်း) (၄ ဦး)	Staff officer-human resource planning (4 persons)	1	1	1	0	3	1.5
41	ဦးစီးအရာရှိ (လေ့လာကြီးကြပ်အကဲဖြတ်) (၄ ဦး)	Staff officer—monitoring and evaluation (4 persons)	1	1	1	0	3	1
42	ဦးစီးအရာရှိ (စာရင်းအင်း) (၄ ဦး)	Staff officer—statistics (4 persons)	0	1	1	0	2	1
43	ဦးစီးအရာရှိ (သတင်းအချက်အလက်) (၄ ဦး)	Staff officer—information (4 persons)	0	1	1	0	2	1.5
44	ဦးစီးအရာရှိ (ဘာသာစကား)	Staff officer—language	1	1	1	0	3	0.75
45	ဦးစီးအရာရှိ (စာရိတ္တနှင့် ပြည်သူ့နိတိ၊ သမိုင်း)	Staff officer—moral and civics, history	1	1	1	0	3	0.75

No.	Job title (in Myanmar)	Job title (in English)	Job description specifies: (1 = yes, 0 = no)				No. of features covered	Job descriptions (no. of pages)
			Purpose	Responsibilities	Activities	Reporting arrangements		
46	ဦးစီးအရာရှိ (ပထဝီဝင်၊ စိုက်ပျိုးရေး)	Staff officer—geography, agriculture	1	1	1	0	3	0.75
47	ဦးစီးအရာရှိ (သူငယ်တန်း၊ ဘောဂဗေဒ၊ အိမ်တွင်းစီးပွား)	Staff officer—kindergarten, economics, home economics	1	1	1	0	3	0.75
48	ဦးစီးအရာရှိ (သင်္ချာ၊ ရူပဗေဒ၊ ICT)	Staff officer—math, physics, ICT	1	1	1	0	3	0.75
49	ဦးစီးအရာရှိ (သိပ္ပံ၊ ဓာတုဗေဒ၊ ဇီဝဗေဒ)	Staff officer—science, chemistry, biology	1	1	1	0	3	0.75
50	ဦးစီးအရာရှိ (ကာယ၊ ဘဝတွက်တာ)	Staff officer—physical education, life skills	1	1	1	0	3	0.75
51	ဦးစီးအရာရှိ (ပန်းချီ၊ ဂီတ)	Staff officer—arts, music	1	1	1	0	3	0.75
52	ဦးစီးအရာရှိ (သင်ရိုးအကဲဖြတ်) (၂ ဦး)	Staff officer—curriculum evaluation (2 persons)	1	1	1	1	4	0.75
53	ဦးစီးအရာရှိ (လေ့ကျင့်ရေး) (လုပ်ငန်းခွင်ဆရာ အတတ်သင်တန်း) (၂ ဦး)	Staff officer—practice, in-service teacher training (2 persons)	1	1	1	0	3	0.75
54	ဦးစီးအရာရှိ (လေ့ကျင့်ရေး) (လုပ်ငန်းခွင်ပညာရေး ဝန်ထမ်းများသင်တန်း) (၂ ဦး)	Staff officer—practice, in-service education staff training (2 persons)	1	1	1	0	3	0.75
55	ဦးစီးအရာရှိ (သုတေသန) (အခြေခံ) (၄ ဦး)	Staff officer—research, basic education (4 persons)	1	1	1	0	3	1
56	ဦးစီးအရာရှိ (သုတေသန) (အဆင့်မြင့်/ဆရာအတတ်ပညာ) (၄ ဦး)	Staff officer—research, higher education, teacher training college (4 persons)	1	1	1	0	3	1.5
57	ဦးစီးအရာရှိ (သုတေသန) (TVET/NFE) (၄ ဦး)	Staff officer—research, TVET/NFE (4 persons)	1	1	1	0	3	1.25
58	ဦးစီးအရာရှိ (နိုင်ငံတကာဆက်ဆံရေး)/ ဦးစီးအရာရှိ (ပညာ/ကျန်းမာ)	Staff officer—international relations; staff officer—education/health	1	1	1	0	3	0.75


No.	Job title (in Myanmar)	Job title (in English)	Job description specifies: (1 = yes, 0 = no)				No. of features covered	Job descriptions (no. of pages)
			Purpose	Responsibilities	Activities	Reporting arrangements		
59	ဦးစီးအရာရှိ (ပညာသင်ရေးရာ) (၂ ဦး)	Staff officer-study aboard (2 persons)	0	1	1	0	2	0.5
60	ဦးစီးအရာရှိ (စီမံ) (၂ ဦး)	Staff officer—administration (2 persons)	0	1	1	0	2	0.5
61	ဦးစီးအရာရှိ (ဘဏ္ဍာ) (၁ ဦး) ဦးစီးအရာရှိ (ငွေစာရင်း) (၁ ဦး)	Staff officer—finance; staff officer-budget (1 person each)	1	1	1	0	3	1
62	ဦးစီးအရာရှိ (ညွှန်ချုပ်ရုံးအဖွဲ့)	Staff officer—director general's office team	0	1	0	0	1	0.25
63	ဒုတိယဦးစီးမှူး (စီမံကိန်း) (၈ ဦး)	Deputy staff head—planning (8 persons)	1	1	1	0	3	1
64	ဒုတိယဦးစီးမှူး (HR စီမံကိန်း) (၈ ဦး)	Deputy staff head—human resource planning (8 persons)	1	1	1	0	3	1
65	ဒုတိယဦးစီးမှူး (လေ့လာကြီးကြပ် အကဲဖြတ်) (၈ ဦး)	Deputy staff head—monitoring and evaluation (8 persons)	1	1	1	0	3	1
66	ဒုတိယဦးစီးမှူး (စာရင်းအင်း) (၈ ဦး)	Deputy staff head—statistics (8 persons)	0	1	1	0	2	1
67	ဒုတိယဦးစီးမှူး (လေ့ကျင့်ရေး) (လုပ်ငန်းခွင် ဆရာအတတ်သင်တန်း) (၄ ဦး)	Deputy staff head—practice, in-service teacher training (4 persons)	1	1	1	0	3	1
68	ဒုတိယဦးစီးမှူး (လေ့ကျင့်ရေး) (လုပ်ငန်းခွင် ပညာရေးဝန်ထမ်းများသင်တန်း) (၄ ဦး)	Deputy staff head—practice, in-service education staff training (4 persons)	1	1	1	0	3	0.75
69	ဒုတိယဦးစီးမှူး (သင်ရိုး) (၈ ဦး)	Deputy staff head—curriculum (8 persons)	1	1	1	0	3	0.75
70	ဒုတိယဦးစီးမှူး (သင်ရိုးအကဲဖြတ်) (၅ ဦး)	Deputy staff head—curriculum evaluation (5 persons)	0	1	1	0	2	0.75

No.	Job title (in Myanmar)	Job title (in English)	Job description specifies: (1 = yes, 0 = no)				No. of features covered	Job descriptions (no. of pages)
			Purpose	Responsibilities	Activities	Reporting arrangements		
71	ဒုတိယဦးစီးမှူး (သုတေသန) (၃၆ ဦး)	Deputy staff head—research (36 persons)	1	1	1	0	3	1
72	ဒုတိယဦးစီးမှူး (နိုင်ငံတကာ ဆက်ဆံရေး) (၂ ဦး)	Deputy staff head—international relations (2 persons)	1	1	1	0	3	0.75
73	ဒုတိယဦးစီးမှူး (ပညာသင်ရေးရာ) (၂ ဦး)	Deputy staff head—study abroad (2 persons)	0	1	1	0	2	0.5
74	ကွန်ပျူတာလုပ်ဆောင်ရေးမှူး (၇ ဦး)	Chief computer officer (7 persons)	0	1	1	0	2	1
75	ဒုတိယဦးစီးမှူး (စီမံ) အင်ဂျင်နီယာ-၂	Deputy staff head—administration; engineer2	1	1	1	0	3	0.5
76	စာရင်းကိုင်-၂/ ငွေကိုင်-၂	Accountant2; cashier2 (1 person each)	0	1	1	0	2	0.5
77	ဒုတိယဦးစီးမှူး (ညွှန်ချုပ်ရုံးအဖွဲ့)	Deputy staff head—director general's office team	0	1	1	0	2	0.25
78	သင်ရိုးကျမ်းကျင်-၃/ သင်ရိုးကျမ်းကျင်-၄ (၁၃/၁၃=၂၆) ဦး	Curriculum expert3; curriculum expert4 (13/13 persons)	0	1	1	0	2	0.25
79	လ/ထ ကွန်ပျူ/ အကြီးတန်းစာရေး/ အငယ်တန်းစာရေး (ကွန်ပျူတာ) (၂၂/၃၃/၄၂/၄) ဦး	Assistant chief computer officer; senior clerk-computer; junior clerk-computer (22/33/42/4 persons)	0	1	1	0	2	0.25
80	စာရင်းကိုင်-၃/ ငွေကိုင်-၃/ စာရင်းကိုင်-၄/ ငွေကိုင်-၄ (၁ဦးစီ/ စုစုပေါင်း ၄ ဦး)	Accountant3; cashier3; accountant4; cashier4 1 person each	0	1	1	0	2	0.25
81	ယာဉ်မောင်း-၅ (၂၅ ဦး)	Driver5 (25 persons)	0	1	0	0	1	0.1
82	ရုံးအကူ/ သန့်ရှင်းရေး/ အစောင့်/ ရေစက်မောင်း (၁၃ ဦး/ ၈ ဦး/ ၄ ဦး/ ၁ ဦး)	Office helper; cleaner; guard; water pump operator (13/8/4/1 persons)	0	1	1	0	2	0.1



# Annex 14 Sample Vacancy Announcement

Figure A3: Sample vacancy announcement



**ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံတော်**  
**ပြည်ထောင်စုရာထူးဝန်အဖွဲ့**  
**Union Civil Service Board**  
 လျှောက်လွှာခေါ်ယူခြင်း  
 ကြော်ငြာစာအမှတ်၊ ၂/၂၀၁၅  
 ၁၃၇၇ ခုနှစ်၊ ကဆုန်လဆန်း ၁၁ ရက်  
 ( ၂၀၁၅ ခုနှစ်၊ ဧပြီလ ၂၈ ရက် )

၁။ ကျန်းမာရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ ဆေးဘက်ဆိုင်ရာလူ့စွမ်းအားအရင်းအမြစ်ဖွံ့ဖြိုးတိုးတက်ရေးနှင့် စီမံခန့်ခွဲရေး ဦးစီးဌာနတွင် လစ်လပ်လျက်ရှိသော အောက်ဖော်ပြပါရာထူးအတွက် လျှောက်လွှာတင်သွင်းနိုင်ပါသည်-

ရာထူး	လစ်လပ်	ပညာအရည်အချင်း
ဦးစီးအရာရှိ(ငွေစာရင်း)	၄	ဝါဏီဇွဲဘွဲ့/ဝါဏီဇွဲဘွဲ့ရရှိပြီးလက်မှတ်ရပြည်သူ့စာရင်းကိုင် အောင်လက်မှတ်ရရှိသူ/စာရင်းကိုင်ပညာဘွဲ့

၂။ လျှောက်ထားသူသည်-

- (က) ပြည်ထောင်စုသမ္မတမြန်မာနိုင်ငံသားဖြစ်ရမည်၊
- (ခ) ၂၈ - ၅ - ၂၀၁၅ ရက်နေ့တွင် အသက် ၃၅ နှစ် (ဝန်ထမ်းဖြစ်ပါက အသက် ၄၀ နှစ်)ထက် မကျော်လွန်သူဖြစ်ရမည်၊
- (ဂ) ကျန်းမာရေးကောင်းမွန်သူဖြစ်ရမည်။

၃။ လျှောက်လွှာကို ပြည်ထောင်စုရာထူးဝန်အဖွဲ့၊ နှဲအမှတ်(၁၇)နေပြည်တော်(သို့မဟုတ်)သက်ဆိုင်ရာ တိုင်းဒေသကြီး/ပြည်နယ်အစိုးရအဖွဲ့၊ ရုံးများ၌ ဝယ်ယူလျှောက်ထားနိုင်ပြီး ၂၈-၅-၂၀၁၅ရက်နေ့ အရောက် လူကိုယ်တိုင်(သို့မဟုတ်)စာတိုက်မှတစ်ဆင့် နေပြည်တော်(သို့မဟုတ်)သက်ဆိုင်ရာတိုင်းဒေသကြီး/ပြည်နယ် အစိုးရအဖွဲ့၊ ရုံးတို့ထံ ပေးပို့လျှောက်ထားရမည်။ လျှောက်ထားရာတွင် မိမိတို့အမှန်တကယ် ရေးဖြေစာမေးပွဲ ဖြေဆိုမည့် နေပြည်တော်(သို့မဟုတ်) သက်ဆိုင်ရာတိုင်းဒေသကြီး/ပြည်နယ်စာစစ်ဌာနကို တိတိကျကျဖော်ပြ လျှောက်ထားရမည်ဖြစ်ပြီး အဆိုပါစာစစ်ဌာန၌သာ ရေးဖြေစာမေးပွဲကို ဖြေဆိုခွင့်ပြုမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ လျှောက်လွှာပီတိရက်ထက်ကျော်လွန်ပေးပို့လာသောလျှောက်လွှာများကို လက်ခံမည်မဟုတ်ပါ။

၄။ လျှောက်လွှာတွင် ဖော်ပြရမည့်အချက်များ၊ ပူးတွဲပါရှိရမည့် စာရွက်စာတမ်းများ၊ ဝင်ကြေးငွေ ၅၀၀/- ဒေသဒင်္ဂါးရမည့်နည်းလမ်း ရေးဖြေ၊ နှုတ်ဖြေစစ်ဆေးမှုအတွက် လေ့လာရန် လိုအပ်ချက်များနှင့်စပ်လျဉ်း၍ ဤအဖွဲ့၏ ၃-၃-၂၀၁၄ ရက်စွဲပါစာအမှတ်၊ ၂၂၁ / ရွှေ့ချယ်ရေး (အဓိက) ၂၀၁၄ ဖြင့် ထုတ်ပြန်ထားသော ပြည်ထောင်စုရာထူးဝန်အဖွဲ့က ကြော်ငြာခေါ်ယူသောရာထူးများအတွက် လျှောက်လွှာတင်သွင်းသူများ လိုက်နာရန် လမ်းညွှန်ချက်စာစောင်ပါ သတ်မှတ်ချက်များနှင့်အညီ လိုက်နာဆောင်ရွက်ရန်ဖြစ်သည်။

၅။ ဝန်ထမ်းများသည် မရင်းလျှောက်လွှာတစ်စောင်ကို မိမိတာဝန်ထမ်းဆောင်သည့် ဌာနအကြီးအကဲမှ တစ်ဆင့် သက်ဆိုင်ရာဝန်ကြီးဌာန၏ ခွင့်ပြုချက်ရယူပြီး ပြည်ထောင်စုရာထူးဝန်အဖွဲ့၊ နှဲအမှတ်(၁၇) နေပြည်တော်သို့ ပေးပို့ရမည်။ ကြိုတင်လျှောက်လွှာတစ်စောင်ကို ဓာတ်ပုံအပိုတစ်ပုံနှင့်အတူ ပြည်ထောင်စုရာထူးဝန်အဖွဲ့သို့ဖြစ်စေ၊ မိမိစာမေးပွဲဖြေဆိုမည့် တိုင်းဒေသကြီး/ပြည်နယ်အစိုးရအဖွဲ့သို့ ဖြစ်စေ ၂၈-၅-၂၀၁၅ရက်နေ့အရောက်ပေးပို့ရမည်။

၆။ ရေးဖြေစာမေးပွဲကို နေပြည်တော်နှင့် တိုင်းဒေသကြီး/ပြည်နယ်စာစစ်ဌာနများတွင် ကျင်းပမည်။ ၂၆-၉-၂၀၁၅ရက်(စနေနေ့)တွင် မြန်မာစာနှင့် အထွေထွေဗဟုသုတဘာသာများကိုလည်းကောင်း၊ ၂၇-၉-၂၀၁၅ရက်(တနင်္ဂနွေနေ့)တွင် အင်္ဂလိပ်စာဘာသာကိုလည်းကောင်းဖြစ်ဆိုရမည်။

၇။ စာမေးပွဲဖြေဆိုခွင့်ကတ်ပြားများကို ၂၄-၉-၂၀၁၅ ရက်နေ့မှစ၍ နေပြည်တော်နှင့် သက်ဆိုင်ရာ တိုင်းဒေသကြီး/ပြည်နယ်အစိုးရအဖွဲ့၊ ရုံးများတွင်ထုတ်ပေးမည်။

၈။ အခြားစုံစမ်းမေးမြန်းလိုချက်ရှိပါက ပြည်ထောင်စုရာထူးဝန်အဖွဲ့၊ နှဲအမှတ်(၁၇) နေပြည်တော် (တယ်လီဖုန်းအမှတ်၊ ၀၆၇ - ၄၀၉၀၅၂ နှင့် ၀၆၇ - ၄၀၉၄၃၀) (သို့မဟုတ်) သက်ဆိုင်ရာတိုင်းဒေသကြီး/ပြည်နယ်အစိုးရအဖွဲ့၊ ရုံးများသို့ လူကိုယ်တိုင်ဖြစ်စေ၊ တယ်လီဖုန်းဖြင့်ဖြစ်စေ ဆက်သွယ်စုံစမ်းမေးမြန်းနိုင်ပါသည်။

၉။ ဤကြော်ငြာနှင့် လျှောက်လွှာတင်သွင်းသူများ လိုက်နာရန် လမ်းညွှန်ချက်စာစောင်ကို ပြည်ထောင်စုရာထူးဝန်အဖွဲ့၏ Website များဖြစ်သော [ucsb.imis.com.mm](http://ucsb.imis.com.mm) နှင့် [www.ucsb.gov.mm](http://www.ucsb.gov.mm) တွင်လည်း ဖော်ပြထားပါသည်။

Source: Union Civil Service Board.







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