Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum Development for Peace © 2021 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW Washington DC 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000 Internet: www.worldbank.org This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Rights and Permissions The material in this work is subject to copyright. Because The World Bank encourages dissemination of its knowledge, this work may be reproduced, in whole or in part, for noncommercial purposes as long as full attribution to this work is given. Any queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to World Bank Publications, The World Bank Group, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; fax: 202-522-2625; e-mail: pubrights@ worldbank.org. Attribution—Please cite the work as follows: Rogelio Granguillhome, Marco Hernandez, Samantha Lach, Takaaki Masaki, and Carlos Rodríguez-Castelán (2021). Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum: Development for Peace. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum Development for Peace Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace Contents Acknowledgmentsvii Executive Summary viii Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum 1 Rogelio Granguillhome (World Bank), Marco Hernandez (World Bank), Samantha Lach (World Bank), Takaaki Masaki (World Bank), and Carlos Rodríguez-Castelán (World Bank) 1.1 Introduction 2 1.1.1 Rationale 2 1.1.2 Road Map of the Report 5 1.2 Analytical Framework 7 1.3 Recent Socioeconomic Trends in the Lake Chad Region 10 1.3.1 Long-Term Demographics 10 1.3.2 Trends in Poverty Reduction 13 1.3.3 Local Economic Dynamics 15 1.3.4 Human Capital Outcomes and Access to Basic Services 15 1.3.5 Trends in Agriculture 18 1.3.6 Jobs and Labor Market Composition 22 1.4 Territorial Development within the Lake Chad Region 26 1.4.1 Density 26 1.4.1.1 Economic Density 26 1.4.1.2 Urbanization 26 1.4.1.3 Regional Convergence (Conditional Convergence) 29 1.4.2 Distance (Lack of Connectivity) 31 1.4.2.1 Market Accessibility 31 1.4.2.2 Poor Road Infrastructure 32 1.4.2.3 Digital Connectivity 33 1.4.2.4 Reducing Distance to Markets Matters for Local Economic Development 34 1.4.3 Division 37 1.4.3.1 Boko Haram 37 1.4.3.2 Crossborder Trade Barriers 38 1.5 Climate Change and FCV challenges 42 1.5.1 Climate Change and Harsh Environmental Conditions 42 1.5.2 Links between Climate Variability and Conflict 44 1.5.3 The Social and Economic Effects of Conflict 46 1.6 Policy Options 52 1.6.1 Connective Infrastructure 54 1.6.2 Trade Facilitation 58 1.6.3 Governance 59 1.6.4 Natural Resource Management 64 References68 Appendix 1.A: Supplementary Figures and Tables 77 iv Table of Contents Infrastructure Investment Scenarios Explored in the Technical Paper “Infrastructure and Appendix 1.B:  Structural Change in the Lake Chad Region” 79 Appendix 1.C: List of Technical Papers 80 Boxes Three institutional functions—commitment, coordination, and cooperation—to increase the Box 1.1:  effectiveness of public policies 55 Box 1.2: Alternative routing of the Douala-N’Djamena corridor 57 The importance of fiscal transfers for subnational governments in the Lake Chad region: the case Box 1.3:  of Nigeria 63 Box 1.4: Transboundary water management in Lake Chad 67 Figures  nalytical framework to identify opportunities to strengthen territorial development and Figure 1.1: A address fragility in the Lake Chad region 8  overty is more severe in the Lake Chad Basin than in other parts of the countries Figure 1.2: P 13  sset deprivation in the Lake Chad Basin versus other parts of the countries Figure 1.3: A 14 Figure 1.4: Literacy and primary school completion rates are lower in the Lake Chad region 17 Figure 1.5: Access to core public services in the Lake Chad region 17 Figure 1.6: Employment type across the Lake Chad region 22 Figure 1.7: Wage employment by gender across the Lake Chad region 23  istribution of employment by sector across the Lake Chad region (4-digit) Figure 1.8: D 24  istribution of employment by sector and age (youth versus adults) (4-digit) Figure 1.9: D 25 Figure 1.10: Total population effect of proximity to Lake Chad, 1940s–2010s 27 Figure 1.11: P opulation density is positively correlated with regional growth, 1990 29 Figure 1.12: Main correlates with local economic growth: Regression analysis 30 Figure 1.13: M arket accessibility index and regional growth 34 Figure 1.14: Trends in vegetation health (NDVI), temperature, and rainfall, 2001–18 43 Figure 1.15: Trends in the Standardized Precipitation-Evapotranspiration Index 43 Figure 1.16: The climate-conflict trap 45 Figure 1.17: Conflict events and fatalities over time across the Lake Chad region 47 Figure 1.18: B oko Haram effects by distance to the Boko Haram area post-2009 (Incl.) 48 Figure B1.3.1: N  igerian states in the Lake Chad region have lower revenues and expenditures per person than the average Nigeria state 63 Figure A1.1: Local markets in proximity to Lake Chad by type 77 Table of Contents v Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace Maps Map 1.1: Lake Chad area 3 Administrative definition of the Lake Chad region Map 1.2:  3 Map 1.3: The evolution of Lake Chad 11 Historical map of population growth, Lake Chad Basin countries, 1950s–2010s Map 1.4:  12 Map 1.5: Poverty in the Lake Chad region 14 Map 1.6: Growing economic gap, Lake Chad region and rest of the countries, 1992–2013 16 Map 1.7: Trends in cropland area: 1992–2000, 2000–09, and 2009–18 19 Map 1.8: Agricultural activities in the countries of the Lake Chad Basin 20 Map 1.9: Economic activity in the Lake Chad region, 2010 27 Map 1.10: Trends in city population around Lake Chad, circa 1965–2010 28 Map 1.11: Market and rural access in and around the Lake Chad region 32 Map 1.12: Digital connectivity in and around the Lake Chad region (2018–2019) 34 Map 1.13: Regional welfare impacts from transport corridor investments (left) with additional border reduction (right) - percentage change in regional welfare. 36 Map 1.14: The evolution of the number of Boko Haram violent events from 2009–2020 37 Map 1.15: Average rainfall, temperatures, and greenness (normalized difference vegetation index) 44 Map 1.16: Boko Haram Conflict in the Lake Chad region 48 Map 1.17: The evolution of market status in the Lake Chad region, 2014–20 50 Map 1.18: Restrictions on crossborder movement and trade 51 Tables Table A1.1: Socioeconomic Outcomes in the Lake Chad Region and Other Regions 78 vi Table of Contents Acknowledgments This report was prepared by a joint Macroeconomics, Trade, and Investment Global Practice and Poverty and Equity Global Practice team led by Marco Hernandez, Takaaki Masaki, and Carlos Rodríguez-Castelán. The authors of this report are Rogelio Granguillhome, Marco Hernandez, Samantha Lach, Takaaki Masaki, and Carlos Rodríguez- Castelán. Extended team members who prepared technical papers and databases include Remi Jedwab (George Washington University), Federico Haslop (George Washington University), Brian Blankespoor (World Bank), Mathilde Lebrand (World Bank), Peter Fisker (University of Copenhagen), and Peter Walkenhorst (American University of Paris). The report benefited from inputs and comments from Hiromi Akiyama, Luis Alberto Andres, Federico Antoniazzi, Abul Azad, Oliver Balch, Armel Castets, Olivia D’Aoust, Catherine Marie Rose Defontaine, Johanna Damboeck, Luc Gendre, Elaine Chee En Hui, Guillaume Laurent Marie Jeanrot, John Keyser, Aditya Khaparde, Jonathan William Lain, Jean Christophe Maur, Aimee Marie Ange Mpambara, Adrian Morel, Antonio Nucifora, Aissatou Ouedraogo, Vijay Pillai, Edward Rackley, Andrew Roberts, Aly Sanoh, Aboudrahyme Savadogo, Franck Taillandier, Issa Bitang A. Tiati, Emilija Timmis, Tara Vishwanath, and Albert Zeufack. The team is grateful to the peer reviewers for their excellent comments and suggestions: Nancy Lozano, Nicolas Perrin, and Siddharth Sharma. The team is also grateful to discussants of the technical papers during an author’s workshop: Erhan Artuc, Paul Brenton, Joanne Gaskell, Aparajita Goyal, Bob Rijkers, Emmanuel Skoufias, Hernan Winkler, and Roman Zarate. This project was conducted under the overall guidance of Deborah L. Wetzel (Director of Regional Integration for Africa), Abebe Adugna (Regional Director for Equitable Growth, Finance, and Institutions), Francisco Carneiro (Practice Manager for Macroeconomics, Trade, and Investment), Andrew Dabalen (Practice Manager for Poverty and Equity), Johan A. Mistiaen (Practice Manager for Poverty and Equity), and Pierella Paci (Practice Manager for Poverty and Equity). Rocio Manrique and Santosh Kumar Sahoo assisted the team, and the report benefited from editing by Robert Zimmermann. Acknowledgments vii Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace Executive Summary viii Executive Summary The context of the Lake Chad Regional Economic The underdevelopment or lagardness of the Lake Memorandum: Understanding underdevelopment. Chad region is best understood as an agglomeration The Lake Chad region is an economically and socially of interconnected factors. This memorandum identifies integrated area located in west-central Africa. Spanning and examines the interplay within and among long- Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, this semiarid standing structural factors (such as weak governance, lack region faces a combination of long-term, structural of access to basic services, limited market accessibility, barriers to development, layered on top of which are a limited connective infrastructure, and socioeconomic complex set of exacerbating, near-term problems. The exclusion), as well as with two exacerbating factors that result is a situation of acute fragility that is trapping the have become more prominent in recent decades: violent region’s 30 million inhabitants in a vicious cycle of low conflict and climate change. The report then seeks to growth and endemic poverty. In turn, these conditions are show the interconnections between these two distinct fueling violence, conflict, emigration and displacement, sets of challenges, namely, the long-term and structural land degradation, youth alienation, and a general sense challenges on the one hand and the more recent of dissatisfaction with government institutions. In a exacerbating factors on the other. The use of a spatial lens region with limited traditional data, this memorandum reveals a more granular and nuanced picture of the poverty presents new quantitative and qualitative evidence by trap in which the Lake Chad region has been caught. integrating and leveraging existing population censuses, This opens the door to holistic policy recommendations, household surveys, administrative data, and information holding out the hope that the vicious cycle of suboptimal derived through the application of big data techniques development and fragility in which the region is currently to previously untapped datasets, such as nighttime light caught can be broken and replaced with a virtuous circle intensity, remote sensing data, and other geolocated data. of economic growth, job creation, and poverty reduction. This research offers valuable new insights on the nexus between suboptimal territorial development, on one Three Ds help explain territorial development: distance, hand, and climate change and conflict, on the other. density, and division. In line with the interrelational nature of the Lake Chad region’s underdevelopment, this Development in the Lake Chad region is not only memorandum adopts a cross-cutting approach to the limited, but has shown few signs of historical analysis of the territorial hurdles faced by businesses and improvement. The metrics of the socioeconomic individual economic agents in the region. The first of the development of the region paint a challenging picture. three spatial lenses the report adopts is density, which, as The region is characterized by high rates of poverty, low applied here, is defined as the economic mass or output human capital, and poor access to key services. In the last per unit of land area (often measured as gross domestic three decades, economic activity and household incomes product [GDP] per square kilometer). Economically have been decreasing. The region has one of the highest active urban settlements are generally taken as a strong population growth rates in the world, and fertility rates indicator of density (and growth potential). However, average around 5 children per woman. Communities the Lake Chad region is lacking in this element. Except in the vicinity of the lake are lagging compared for the cities of N’Djamena in Chad and Maiduguri in with the socioeconomic standards in other parts of Nigeria, which, together, account for around two million Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, which are already inhabitants, the vast majority of urban settlements in the underperforming compared with other developing region have fewer than 20,000 people. Rural migration economies worldwide. For instance, in Nigeria’s North is an ongoing trend in the region, and, because people East, which flanks the lake to the southwest, poverty rates are being displaced by conflict, the region has witnessed are estimated at over 70 percent, almost double the rate refugee urbanization rather than urban dynamism. The in the rest of the country. second lens is distance, which is the ease or difficulty of transporting goods, services, labor, capital, information, ix Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace and ideas between two locations. The Lake Chad region’s to the displacement of an estimated 2.7 million people. record is weak on this measure. For instance, nearly two- In total, about 12.8 million people need humanitarian thirds of the region’s rural population live more than assistance. Nigeria’s North East has been particularly two kilometers from an all-season road. Couple this badly affected. As with the 3Ds, the 2Cs feed into each with low phone and internet connectivity, plus limited other. The reduction in yields and farmer incomes caused access to electricity and other basic services, and the by deteriorating climate conditions is lowering the effect on development is highly prejudicial. Completing opportunity costs of participating in violence. Likewise, the 3Ds is the concept of division, which is defined in the rising levels of violence are impinging on the capacity both physical and social terms. Division captures tangible of governments to undertake climate mitigation and barriers to growth, such as crossborder trade restrictions, adaptation measures. A positive temperature anomaly of and differences in access to services and economic one standard deviation increases annual conflict events in opportunities across population groups such as based the region by 17.6 percentage points. Similarly, conflict on sex, age, economic activity (for example, between events in the Lake Chad region rose by an average of pastoralists and farmers), as well as displaced individuals 8.9 percentage points in response to a negative anomaly of and other vulnerable groups. The effect of each of the 3Ds one standard deviation in a district’s degree of greenness. alone is a serious impediment to growth, but, together, Moreover, the impact of climate on conflict is strongest in they make up a major derailment along the track to the areas that are largely agrarian and more densely populated. inclusive growth of the Lake Chad region. Thus, this memorandum not only analyzes these three factors on The policy response needs to reflect the recognition their own, but also the interplay among them. that the development challenges in the Lake Chad region are interconnected. Given the extent of the Two Cs—climate change and conflict—are region’s socioeconomic challenges, a big push is required exacerbating the region’s fragility. The memorandum in policies and programs that can effectively promote also focuses on two interrelated factors that are deepening territorial development, while addressing the drivers underdevelopment in the Lake Chad region. The first is of fragility. This will require a strong consensus and climate change, a worldwide phenomenon that presents prioritization of measures at the community, local, state, significant, immediate, and unique challenges among national, and regional levels. Measures aimed at tackling people living in the vicinity of Lake Chad, at the center the region’s challenges in isolation are not likely to result of the Sahel. Across the Sahel, temperatures are rising in sustained progress. An implication of the analysis 1.5 times more quickly than the global average, leading in this memorandum is that an approach focusing to hotter general conditions and more erratic weather on holistic policy levers represents the best chance patterns. Droughts have become more severe and more of breaking the region’s vicious cycle of suboptimal recurrent in recent decades. The variability in the size of development and fragility. As exemplified by the analysis the lake—which shrank between the 1960s and the mid- of the 3Ds and 2Cs, the factors behind Lake Chad’s 1990s, but has been recovering since then—has affected stubbornly high poverty rates are intimately interlinked livelihoods. Given that the region’s agriculture is almost and profoundly self-perpetuating. For instance, weak exclusively rainfed, the rise in temperatures is associated connective infrastructure (large distance) is shown to link with major issues in food security and the incomes of to smaller economic agglomerations (low density), which farmers and herders. A second factor that is intensifying reduces opportunities for trade and social dialogue and fragility is represented by violence and conflict, notably, inclusion (high division). As all of this plays out against the destabilizing activities of Boko Haram, a militant the backdrop of climate shocks and violent conflict, the insurgency group that emerged in Nigeria in 2009 and vicious cycle is reinforced dangerously. then spread to the other three countries in the Lake Chad region. Between 2009 and 2019, conflict in the region led x Executive Summary This memorandum concludes with policy options Pathways to development and peace. The policy levers in four cross-cutting areas: infrastructure, trade, highlighted in this memorandum are associated with governance, and natural resource management. First, elements of the 3Ds and 2Cs and have the potential to investing in infrastructure would help close connectivity halt and reverse the self-reinforcing negative feedback gaps in the Lake Chad region, leading to higher loops of the vicious cycle. The goal is to inform the policy productivity and better-quality jobs, particularly in rural debate and build a consensus for integrative measures that areas. Important steps include improving road connectivity will enable greater local density in economic production between cities and rural areas, expanding the delivery (by agglomerating labor and capital), reduce the distance of basic services, and promoting digital infrastructure. to leading areas (increasing the flow of capital, labor, Second, enhancing trade and regional integration would goods, and services), and lower divisions (causing living serve to reduce distance and division, leading to stronger standards to converge), while addressing the conflict head- agricultural value chains, higher incomes, improved on (consequently increasing economic integration) and food security, and greater stability. Promoting fishing mitigating climate change (making income-generating and fish trading would be a timely step, as would be activities more productive and resilient). A holistic the gradual facilitation of crossborder trade, including agenda of this nature presents an immediate and realistic through tariff harmonization (by taking advantage of the opportunity to break the Lake Chad region’s cycle of opportunities inherent in the Africa Continental Free underdevelopment and fragility and kickstart a positive Trade Area) as well as the visa-free movement of people. cycle of more inclusive and resilient economic growth Third, strengthening the rule of law and the functioning that is supported by broad societal consensus, high-level of institutions through enhanced governance at the political commitment, and strategic and sustained policy community, local, national, and regional levels are crucial implementation. for promoting the better delivery of basic services, which in turn are pivotal to address persistent gaps in human capital outcomes, to mitigate the devastating effects of violence conflict on lives and livelihoods, and to promote social inclusion. Improving coordination between federal and subnational governments, mobilizing domestic revenues more effectively, improving data for evidence- based policy making, and investing in local government capacity is vital to restoring a positive government presence in the Lake Chad region, as are measures to restore social cohesion and trust between citizens and the state. Fourth, the report recommends a renewed focus on natural resource management, including efforts to strengthen the sustainability of food systems and more effective land and water management practices suited to local agroecological conditions. This would require a solid regulatory environment and targeted support for producers, such as through the provision of credit, inputs, and extension services, as well as investments in technological innovation and knowledge transfers. Given the key coordinating role of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), improvements to the organization’s operating capacity are also a priority. xi Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum Rogelio Granguillhome (World Bank), Marco Hernandez (World Bank), Samantha Lach (World Bank), Takaaki Masaki (World Bank), and Carlos Rodríguez-Castelán (World Bank) 1 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace 1.1 Introduction 1.1.1 Rationale An estimated 30 million people live in the Lake Chad region.3 The area consists of 10 national regions: the Far North Region in Cameroon; the Chari-Baguirmi, The region is noteworthy for important Hadjer-Lamis, Kanem, and Lac regions in Chad; the archaeological discoveries, its role in trans- Saharan trade, and its association with historic Diffa and Zinder regions in Niger; and Adamawa, Borno, African kingdoms... and Yobe states in Nigeria (see Map 1.1 and Map 1.2). The Chad basin contains the earliest evidence of The majority of the labor force is occupied in primary hominin occupation yet found in western Africa. sector activities—mostly agriculture, cattle herding and Gritzner (2021) fishing—and indirect employment in related activities, such as trade, transport, and manufacturing. These economic activities contribute to jobs and food security The Lake Chad region is an economically and socially among residents in the lake’s hinterlands and linked to the integrated area straddling four countries in West and two regional metropolises with seven-digit populations: Central Africa, namely, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and N’Djamena, the Chadian capital, and Maiduguri, the Nigeria. The lake is situated in an interior basin, which capital of Borno State in Nigeria. was formerly occupied by a much larger ancient sea, sometimes referred to as Mega-Chad.1 The region appears The population in the Lake Chad region is growing to have been continuously settled since 500 BCE.2 Today, at a rapid pace, putting additional pressure on the many social and economic indicators confirm that the area limited resources and basic services. Fertility rates are is a lagging region, though its rich natural resources and high, and the total population in the Lake Chad Basin young population point to untapped economic potential. countries is projected to double over the next 25 years.4 The Lake Chad region is a geographical crossroad and High population growth poses challenges in access to basic an epicenter in terms of the cultural, historical, and services, such as electricity and piped water; where access sociological characteristics of the local communities in rates are already among the lowest in the region, with the area. The historical economy of traditional livelihoods implications for human capital. Literacy and completion and trade around the lake has traditionally been mobile rates in primary education in the areas around the lake and crossborder. Despite the heterogeneity of structural are significantly lower than in the rest of the respective factors in the basin countries, the crossborder movement countries. Furthermore, rather than converging, the gap and trade across the basin and the cultural ties and in access to core services has been widening between the common identity in the area translate it into a distinct Lake Chad region and other parts of the countries. region. This region is currently facing shared security, economic, and climatic troubles. Lagging in social and economic indicators, the Lake Chad region is characterized by weak territorial development. Compared with other parts of the basin 1 Gritzner (2021). 2 Ibid. 3 World Bank calculations based on the proposed administrative definition of the Lake Chad region, Linard et al. (2012), and remote-sensing data of Population Counts (dashboard), WorldPop, University of Southampton, Southampton, UK, https://www.worldpop.org/project/categories?id=3. 4 UNFPA (2017). The term Lake Chad Basin countries is used indistinguishably with Lake Chad region countries throughout the report to denote the four countries of the study: Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. 2 1.1 Introduction Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum countries, the Lake Chad region exhibits significantly Map 1.1: Lake Chad area higher poverty rates, chronic human capital deficits, and a historical lack of access to basic services and N’guigmi infrastructure. It has experienced little economic progress C H A D over the past three decades. The declining water level of Northern basin the lake until the mid-1990s pushed people to migrate N I G E R from rural to urban areas (although, since then, the r water level has been recovering). Currently, the region r rie Bol is characterized by widening spatial gaps because urban Ba at re Southern basin agglomerations in the region are growing more quickly G than rural areas. Rural areas have limited access to connective infrastructure; people are twice as likely to be disconnected from main roads and thus from access N I G E R I A Guitté to markets and economic opportunities. In both urban and rural settings, women, youth, displaced persons, and CAMEROON other vulnerable groups face unequal access to services and to income-generating activities. Chari-Logone River N’Djaména The long-term suboptimal territorial development challenges are exacerbated by the interplay of conflict Source: Magrin, Lemoalle, Pourtier, 2015. Atlas du lac Tchad. and climate change. Ten years of conflict, driven by Source: Magrin et al. 2015. the Boko Haram insurgency, have left an estimated  dministrative definition of the Lake Chad Map 1.2: A 12.8 million people in need of humanitarian assistance region in the Lake Chad region, 2.7 million of whom are people displaced by the conflict.5 Human displacement and the disruption of markets and value chains because of the physical destruction of facilities and direct threats against traders have resulted in loss of productive assets and inputs. While the region has traditionally been a commerce hub connecting the four basin countries and providing ties with North Africa, crossborder trade and economic activities around Lake Chad have also been disrupted by the Boko Haram conflict. Counterinsurgency measures, such as border and road closures, restrictions on farming and fishing, and the movement of goods and people, have also put a damper on economic activity.6 The intensity of fighting has tapered off in recent years, but the conflict has spread from its original location in Nigeria’s North 5 Of the 12.8 million people in need of humanitarian assistance, 10.6 million are in the three most highly affected states, Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe, in Nigeria’s North East (USAID 2020). Sources: Masaki and Rodríguez-Castelán 2021; data of GADM Database of Global Administrative Areas, Environmental Science and Policy, University of California, Davis, CA, 6 UNDP and OCHA (2018). https://gadm.org/. 1.1 Introduction 3 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace East and currently affects all four countries surrounding draws insights from seven original technical papers that Lake Chad.7 speak to different facets of the interlinked developmental challenges in the region.8 Given the limited availability In addition, climate change is increasingly becoming of rigorous economic studies in the area, this research a significant risk to livelihoods and food security helps bridge an important knowledge gap. A better across the region. Rising temperatures and increasingly understanding of the interlocked challenges and erratic rainfall patterns have rendered precarious the mechanisms that have trapped the region in a low-growth, livelihoods of farmers and fishers who rely critically high-poverty equilibrium is essential to identifying policy on uncertain water resources. Moreover, the greater instruments to improve service delivery, provide stability, frequency of climate anomalies (e.g., rainfall shortages, and strengthen economic opportunities. rising temperatures, and aridification) has been associated with a rise in conflict activities in the region. One of the main contributions of this Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum (LCREM) is the The effects of conflict and climate change are painfully definition of a novel analytical framework to elaborate visible through remote-sensing technology. The a comprehensive diagnostic of territorial development economic effects of conflict can be seen from outer space. challenges in the presence of conflict and climate Areas directly or indirectly affected by Boko Haram change. The proposed analytical framework captures the are experiencing slower rates of growth (measured by vicious cycle between suboptimal territorial development nighttime lights). There is evidence of spillover effects. in the region and the systemic risks associated with the Thus, even at a time when Boko Haram activity was violent conflict and climatic shocks that the region faces only occurring in Nigerian territory, it was possible to and that negatively affect development outcomes. The observe the negative effects on the neighboring countries framework helps identify policies with the potential of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. There is also evidence to improve territorial development and reduce violent of the long-term negative effects of climatic factors on conflict and fragility, thereby allowing developing regions population growth and economic agglomeration. As to escape the self-perpetuating vicious loop that makes a result of the shrinkage of Lake Chad between the them diverge from their long-term potential. 1960s and the 1990s, areas near the lake experienced substantially slower population growth, particularly in Another key contribution of this LCREM is the Cameroon and Niger. This is likely explained by the production of an innovative data-driven diagnostic loss of economic opportunities, including because the on inclusive growth across the region in a context of receding lake offered less irrigation for agriculture and limited data availability. The LCREM integrates both cattle herding and lower incomes from fishing. Since the traditional and innovative sources of data to provide a late 1990s, the level of the lake has been recovering. rigorous economic analysis of the Lake Chad region. The ability to provide data-driven analysis is a particularly This project helps close a critical knowledge gap by important feat, given that the data environment in the identifying opportunities to promote sustainable and region is extremely poor. Primary data collection in the area inclusive economic growth in the Lake Chad region. is difficult because of tenuous security, access constraints, Existing policy research is extremely thin. The report and—more recently—the COVID-19 pandemic, 7 The nature and frequency of violent events in Lake Chad Basin countries can be tracked through ACLED (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project) (dashboard), Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, Austin, TX, http://www.acleddata.com/; GTD (Global Terrorism Database), National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), University of Maryland, College Park, MD, https://www.start.umd. edu/gtd/; UCDP (Uppsala Conflict Data Program) (database), Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden, http:// ucdp.uu.se/?id=1. 8 See Appendix 1.C for a list of the technical papers prepared for this report. 4 1.1 Introduction Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum which make in-person data collection unfeasible. In this around the world face a combination of territorial particularly difficult data environment, the LCREM has development challenges and a substantial risk of systemic performed extensive stocktaking and data-generation shocks and are often caught in suboptimal equilibriums. based on traditional sources of data, including household The analytical framework and approach depicted in surveys, censuses, and administrative data, and new this LCREM, which explicitly address the feedback sources of data from satellite imagery and remote-sensing mechanisms among the challenges in a solution-oriented technology. This data collection and generation process manner, can be useful beyond Lake Chad. It can help has involved digitizing historical census population inform policy interventions in settings experiencing data dating back to the 1950s and standardizing and a similarly vicious cycle to identify challenges and integrating existing micro-level household surveys opportunities for inclusive growth. In addition, because available for the Lake Chad Basin countries. The new the characteristically limited data on the Lake Chad sources of data—remote-sensing and satellite data— basin is also the typical setting of many lagging regions, leverage spatially and temporarily granular data on the methods for data integration and analysis used in various development outcomes, including local economic this report could also help inform evidence-based policy activities (for example, nighttime lights), agricultural making in numerous data-poor areas. productivity, conflict, climate (rainfall, temperature), and infrastructure (roads, electricity, digital infrastructure). 1.1.2 Road Map of the Report The value of this LCREM also resides in its integral diagnostic of regional development challenges, This report sheds light on the interlocked long-term focusing on a particular territory nested within territorial development challenges and the recently several countries. Unlike a traditional Country realized systemic risks affecting the Lake Chad region. Economic Memorandum (CEM) produced by the World It summarizes the findings of seven technical papers, each Bank, which offers a country-level diagnostic of key investigating different aspects of the interlinked challenges development challenges and a policy agenda in a single faced by the region. These studies are accompanied by country, this LCREM presents a comprehensive analysis complementary research on labor market and geospatial of development challenges that are specific to the Lake socioeconomic trends, as well as by a review of the thin Chad region. And it identifies policy directions that the literature on economic development across the region. In Lake Chad Basin countries may pursue to facilitate their addition to presenting the main results of the technical growth. This regional or territorial focus is unique and papers, the report positions the findings in the broader particularly important in framing current policy debates context of an analytical framework depicting the feedback around inclusive growth because, around the world, mechanisms between the region’s territorial development poverty has become spatially concentrated and economic gaps and the self-reinforcing link to shocks, namely, progress highly uneven across space.9 Unlocking economic violent conflict and climate change. This analytical opportunities for lagging regions thus entails regional framework is presented in Section 1.2. The rest of the interventions and coordination across different countries. report is structured as follows. Given its novel framework and analytical approach Section 1.3 describes the main social and economic in a context of limited data availability and its focus trajectories in the region. It reviews long-term on a set of subregions across countries, this report demographic trends—suggesting that population growth represents a model for other, similar settings. Regions in the region is among the highest worldwide—and finds 9 See World Development Report 2009 (World Bank 2009). 1.1 Introduction 5 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace limited access to basic services in the areas surrounding from harsh environmental conditions. The region has the lake. Poverty and socioeconomic trends show that experienced a higher share of droughts compared with the region is lagging relative to other parts of the basin other areas in the basin countries, with implications countries, and local economic dynamics indicate that the for livelihoods and food security. More regular rainfall region has experienced little economic progress over the is associated with positive effects on local economic past decades. Agriculture is the main sector of economic growth. The section also shows that climate anomalies, activity in the Lake Chad region, accounting for the labor such as deteriorating vegetation, rising temperature, and of a large share of young workers, as shown by the analysis erratic rainfall are closely linked with conflict events in of labor market data. Wage employment is limited, and the Lake Chad region, suggesting that there is a climate- the gap in the quality of jobs in the region extends into conflict trap. Violent conflict has had significant negative gaps by sex. economic effects in the region by disrupting trade and shattering agricultural production. The downturn in Section 1.4 argues that the low-growth, high-poverty local economies is not only visible in the directly attacked equilibrium observed in the region is closely linked areas, but has also spilled over to neighboring regions. to the region’s economic geography. A low degree of The slump in economic activity is particularly harsh economic density (concentration of economic activity), in on less well developed and less well connected urban combination with great distance and wide divisions that areas, highlighting the link among gaps in territorial limit the ease of movement of people, goods, capital, and development, conflict, and suboptimal development ideas, appears to be derailing the region from a sustainable outcomes. track of growth. The region shows low levels of density and urbanization, whereby urban agglomerations tend to Section 1.6 presents policy directions structured grow more quickly than rural areas, with widening spatial around four crosscutting themes: infrastructure, gaps and a lack of regional convergence. Connectivity trade, governance, and natural resource management. gaps limit access to markets and economic opportunities The crosscutting nature of these themes encourages the among people, particularly in rural areas, with implications exploration of potential synergies across challenge areas. for local economic development. Over the past 10 years, The discussion in the section aims to inform policy- border closures in response to the Boko Haram conflict making efforts to strengthen territorial development and have limited mobility and the historically strong mitigate the impacts of conflict and climate change. Such crossborder trade in the Lake Chad Basin. In addition endeavors can increase the likelihood of breaking free to hampering trade, violent conflict has aggravated social from the self-reinforcing negative mechanisms and boost exclusion in the region, curtailing access to services and the potential return of the region to a path of stability and income-generating opportunities, particularly among inclusive economic development. vulnerable groups. Violent conflict has driven the forced displacement of people in the region, resulting in one of the worst humanitarian crises in 2019.10 Section 1.5 discusses how the impact of climatic variation and violent conflict experienced in the region interlink with and exacerbate the territorial development challenges. Highly dependent on agriculture, the Lake Chad region is at particular risk 10 OCHA (2019). 6 1.1 Introduction Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum 1.2 Analytical Framework Socioeconomic and governance challenges across the access to health care, food, religious education, and region are interlocked with issues of fragility, conflict, funding that is aimed at strengthening their position.15 and harsh environmental conditions, which have trapped the region in a low-growth, high-poverty This report proposes an analytical framework based cycle. The region faces multidimensional challenges on two main components: (a) a self-reinforcing link related to weak governance, low human capital, limited between suboptimal territorial development and market accessibility and economic opportunities, poor fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV) and challenges citizen security, regional instability, limited connective relating to climate change and (b) policy instruments infrastructure, and engrained social exclusion.11 The poor aiming at strengthening territorial development and quality of services in the region has been exacerbated by the mitigating risks. The report is guided by the analytical destruction of public and private infrastructure.12 These framework illustrated in Figure 1.1 that draws analytic mutually reinforcing challenges have resulted in a fragile elements from World Development Report 2009: Reshaping region characterized by conflict and violence, endemic Economic Geography (World Bank 2009), World poverty, limited economic opportunities, especially Development Report 2010: Development and Climate among youth, land degradation, insecurity, and general Change (World Bank 2010), and World Development dissatisfaction with public institutions. Climate change Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development (World and demographic trends—the rapid growth and young Bank 2011).16 Furthermore, this LCREM is aligned with age-structure of the population—amplify and exacerbate the World Bank FCV strategy’s two pillars of engagement: these threats. A lack of central government presence that (a) preventing violent conflict and interpersonal violence predates the ongoing crisis, particularly in rural areas, has and (b) mitigating the spillovers of FCV.17 The center of left a governance void in the region.13 Already weak, the the illustration in Figure 1.1 helps explain the outcomes social contract between citizens and the state has eroded observed in the region, including low growth, high in recent years, as governments are increasingly less able poverty rates, and a low human capital index. The to provide basic public services in the region as a result framework depicts the feedback between suboptimal of the widespread insecurity. This has reduced the trust territorial development and systemic risks prevalent of citizens in government, which also fuels the conflict, across the region, such as violent conflict, weather shocks, especially where a sense of exclusion exists.14 Armed rebel and resource scarcity. All these risks negatively affect groups have taken advantage of this gap in governance, development outcomes, which results in a vicious cycle. particularly in public service delivery, to provide valued This negative feedback loop deviates lagging regions from their long-term economic potential, leading to lower 11 Such as exclusion from local decision-making processes and capture (of policies, services) by elites (World Bank 2018). 12 Al Jazeera (2017); Obi and Eboreime (2017). Further details available under the ‘3.4 Human capital outcomes and access to basic services’ section, below. 13 Magrin and Perouse de Montclos (2018). 14 Magrin and Perouse de Montclos (2018). Horizontal inequalities—differences (real or perceived) in access and opportunities across groups—can create grievances among disadvantaged groups, making countries more vulnerable to conflict (United Nations and World Bank 2018). 15 Vivekananda et al. (2019). Local evidence suggests that the ISWAP faction of Boko Haram has sought to fill social service provision gaps and foster income- generation opportunities to try to win over Lake Chad Basin communities and secure its position. According to community members and security sources, ISWAP has set up state-like structures in the Abadam, Kukawa, Guzamala, Marte and Monguno local government areas in Borno State, north-east Nigeria (Samuel 2019). 16 The report is also informed by World Bank (2003, 2013b, 2017). 17 For more information, see World Bank (2020b). 1.2 Analytical Framework 7 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace  nalytical framework to identify opportunities to strengthen territorial development and address Figure 1.1: A fragility in the Lake Chad region Policies to improve territorial development • Supporting higher densities and agglomeration • Ensuring shorter economic and physical distances • Reducing divisions: (social, cultural, ethnic—thick borders) to facilitate regional convergence Suboptimal Territorial Fragility, Violence & Dimensions Development Link between challenges deviates Conflict Challenges of economic lagging regions from their long • Lack of economic term economic potential: • Violent conflict geography: agglomeration Lower: • Ineffective institutions • Density • Limited flow of factors • Climate change/harsh • growth • Distance of production environmental • poverty reduction human • Division • Lack of coverage development outcomes conditions (WDR 2009) (WDR 2010, 2011) Policies to reduce FCV • Service delivery (WDR 2004) • Risk management (WDR 2014) • Governance (Cooperation, Coordination, Commitment)(WDR 2017) Source: World Bank elaboration based on World Bank 2003, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2013b, 2017. growth, stagnant poverty reduction, and low human thick divisions and borders curb convergence in living development outcomes.18 The policy framework (top and standards, including through the unequal coverage of bottom of the figure) identifies policy options that can basic services and by hindering the spread of the benefits help strengthen territorial development and reduce FCV, of growth.19 Suboptimal development outcomes derived helping the region break this vicious cycle. from low density, long distances, and thick divisions tend to exacerbate FCV challenges, low government Territorial development challenges are understood capacity, and the scarcity of resources. These collectively through three dimensions of economic geography, create a negative feedback loop that leads to worsened the three Ds: density, distance, and division. A low development outcomes. local density of economic production limits the efficient agglomeration of labor and capital and, thus, the potential Territorial development challenges often intersect for economic growth. Economic and physical distance to with challenges related to the two Cs—conflict and leading areas restricts the flow of capital, labor, goods, climate change—thus exacerbating the gap between and services, and thus the opportunity for individuals lagging and leading areas. Areas with low economic and firms. Physical, sociocultural, ethnic, or other density (insufficient agglomeration to foster economies of 18 Given data constraints, alternative variables may be used as a proxy to illustrate these indicators; e.g. using nightlights as a proxy of economic growth, living standards for poverty reduction and malaria incidence for human development to show how due to challenges and shocks these indicators deviate from their optimal trajectory. 19 While the inverse—active crossborder dynamics, trade and mobility—can be a factor of resilience. 8 1.2 Analytical Framework Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum scale in production) and high unemployment tend to be a deterioration of infrastructure, further interrupting access fertile ground for illicit actives and violence.20 Enforcing to services and the erosion of assets. The inability to use the rule of law in areas distant and disconnected from assets productively and to access services can deepen markets is also more difficult for governments that are existing divisions and frictions among groups. limited in reach or lack relevant incentives. Violent conflict often leads to an overall increase in transaction Fragility and conflict pose challenges for public and costs, which raises physical and economic distance to private investment. This increases economic distance markets. Divisions also aggravate distance. For example, and lowers economic density, leaving affected areas differences in language, place of origin, and ethnicity are increasingly isolated.23 Discrimination can likewise be magnified by conflict over scarce resources and constitute reinforced by profound divisions, such as the social or strong barriers to internal migration.21 Economic political differences associated with persistent disparities distance, meanwhile, limits economic opportunities and in living standards. Unequal social and economic employment among a population, particularly among opportunities and the public perception of such inequality young people. This lowers the cost of engaging in illicit can adversely affect social cohesion by deepening economic activities and violent behavior. Rebellion is grievances and feelings of exclusion and marginalization, often perceived to offer a viable living to followers who which, if unaddressed, can lead to tensions and have no other source of livelihood.22 Violent regions, sometimes turn into violent mobilization. Additionally, for their part, tend to exhibit high levels of corruption, climate change and harsh environmental conditions can weak rule of law, and ineffective institutions, all of which limit opportunities in lagging areas, aggravating existing make them less successful at attracting economic activity. problems and perpetuating disparities. Lagging areas This demonstrates the close link between violence and that face difficult climatic conditions, lack access to basic economic isolation. Shocks to the system, such as violent services, and experience poor governance in a region conflict arising from adverse environmental conditions affected by insurgencies and conflict are often burdened because of human activity or from pandemics, can limit by violence. Lagging regions—lacking access to basic the flow of capital and labor, affecting income-generating services and the ability to use assets productively and activities and leading to lower growth and higher poverty subject to suboptimal economic and social development rates. outcomes—are thus as much a driver as a consequence of FCV, in a vicious cycle that makes escaping the fragility Conflict and climate change pose challenges to trap difficult for countries. household access to basic services and the ability of households to accumulate and use productive assets. G  uided by this analytical framework, the next sections Violent conflict in affected regions tends to interrupt synthetize the previous literature and policy reports, while public service provision or even render it impossible and also drawing on original policy research prepared for this typically leads to the depletion of household productive Regional Economic Memorandum that contribute new assets. It often also results in the forced displacement knowledge on the trends and drivers behind the region’s of people, including over national borders, and the low economic growth and high poverty rates. 20 Unemployment and idleness are cited as the most important factor motivating young people to join rebel movements in areas affected by violence, according to the 2011 Conflict, Security, and Development World Development Report. At the same time, the relationship between unemployment and violence has not been established as clearly through econometric analysis, likely due to poor data and/or because the link is indirect rather than direct (World Bank 2011). 21 World Bank (2009). A study of 11 Sub-Saharan countries showed that, while ethnicity was a strong predictor of differences in under-5 mortality, if combined with geography, it predicted the probability of survival among children (Brockerhoff and Hewett 2000). 22 World Bank (2011). 23 Isolation tends to result both in divided identity groups and in marginalization, as well as fewer economic opportunities. For example, the average GDP per capita of all landlocked developing countries is three-fifths that of their maritime neighbors (World Bank 2011). 1.2 Analytical Framework 9 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace 1.3 Recent Socioeconomic Trends in the Lake Chad Region 1.3.1 Long-Term Demographics Lac and Hadjer-Lamis regions of Chad are the exception: the average fertility rate is slightly lower than the average in other parts of the country (6.2 versus 6.5 children per Poverty rates, economic growth, and other core woman, respectively).26 socioeconomic indicators in the Lake Chad Basin trail the indicators in other areas of the countries. Some of the critical drivers behind demographic shifts in the Lake Chad region are related to climate and environmental factors. In the 1970s, the Sahel Population growth in the Lake Chad Basin countries experienced severe droughts that strained the livelihoods is among the highest worldwide. The population of of agriculturalists and pastoralists across a vast area. The Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria is forecast to double droughts reduced water levels dramatically, dividing Lake over the next 20 years. The Lake Chad region had an Chad into two separate bodies of water, the northern and estimated increase in population by 14 million between southern pools. By the 1980s, the water area had shrunk 2000 and 2020.24 While significant progress is being to 2,000 km2 (from 25,000 km2 in the 1960s). NASA made in other regions of Africa, countries in the Lake satellite pictures reveal a clear deterioration in the lake’s Chad Basin are still lagging in the demographic transition. surface area, decreasing by approximately 82 percent Indeed, the classic pattern of demographic transition—a since the 1960s (Map 1.3).27 The droughts drove some significant decline in under-5 mortality leading to a sharp people from the region to migrate toward the lake. Some drop in fertility—has not yet unfolded in the Lake Chad moved to the lake’s shore, but most chose to migrate to Basin countries. The average number of children per the numerous islands in the lake for their fertile farmland, woman in most Lake Chad Basin countries remains high, fishing opportunities, and pastures.28 at close to or above five children per woman, with no signs of a significant decline.25 Fertility rates are higher in the The historical population growth in the Lake Chad lake area than in the rest of the corresponding countries. region is rapid, but not especially more rapid than For example, the areas of Cameroon and Nigeria that in the other parts of the countries. An analysis of surround the lake present rates of 6.8 and 5.8 children historical population census data tracking total and per woman, respectively, compared with 4.8 and 5.3 urban population patterns at a fine spatial level from children per woman in the rest of these two countries. In the 1960s to the 2010s in three of the four Lake Chad Niger’s Diffa and Zinder regions, fertility rates are even Basin countries—Cameroon, Chad, and Niger—shows higher, at 8.2 children per woman compared with 7.5 how demographic dynamics have shifted in areas near children per woman in other parts of the country. The the lake.29 A simple comparison of the annual population 24 World Bank calculations based on 2020 data of Population Counts (dashboard), WorldPop, University of Southampton, Southampton, UK, https://www. worldpop.org/project/categories?id=3. 25 See https://wcaro.unfpa.org/en/publications/demographic-dynamics-and-crisis-countries-around-lake-chad. 26 Data on total fertility rates come from the latest Demographic and Health Surveys available in each country: Cameroon, 2018; Niger 2012; Nigeria, 2018; and Chad, 2014. 27 It has been estimated that Lake Chad lost about 90 percent of its surface water area (around 23,000 sq. km) between the mid-1960s and the mid-1990s. While its water level has been slightly recovering since the mid-1990s, it is still on average 80 percent less than it was in the mid-1960s. 28 See Vivekananda et al. (2019). 29 Nigeria was excluded from this analysis because of a long history of disputed census results. The results presented in this section are taken from Jedwab, Haslop, et al. 2021, technical paper for this report. 10 1.3 Recent Socioeconomic Trends in the Lake Chad Region Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum growth rate between the Lake Chad region and the other roughly the same (around 3.5 percent for both the Lake parts of the countries reveals that population growth in Chad region and rest of the country between 1951 and the two areas is roughly the same. In Cameroon, the 2017). annual rate of population growth in the Lake Chad region between 1956 (the earliest year of census data availability) The shrinkage of Lake Chad between the 1960s and and 2005 (the latest census year) is 2.8 percent, which mid-1990s—the level has been recovering since is slightly lower than the rate in the rest of country then—posed downward pressure on population (3.2 percent). In Chad, the annual population growth growth in areas proximate to the lake. This effect was rate of the Lake Chad region between 1948 and 2009 particularly pronounced in Cameroon and Niger, where (3.2 percent) exceeded the rate in the rest of the country areas close to the lake saw as much as a 40 percent relative (2.6 percent), whereas, in Niger, these numbers are slower growth in population. One explanation for this Map 1.3: The evolution of Lake Chad a. Satellite imagery, 1972 b. Satellite imagery, 2018 c. Total water surface, 1950–2020 sq km 30,000– Large Lake Chad phase Shrinking Lake Chad phase Recovering Lake Chad phase 25,000– 20,000– 15,000– 10,000– 5,000– 0– 1950 1956 1960 1963 1965 1968 1970 1972 1973 1977 1984 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2005 2008 2011 2012 2014 2019 2020 Sources: Panels a and b: UNEP/DEWA/GRID Geneva, based on NASA’s satellite images. Panel c: Olivry et al. 1996; S´edick, no date; FAO 2009; LCBC 2015; Okpara et al. 2016; Ighobor 2019. 1.3 Recent Socioeconomic Trends in the Lake Chad Region 11 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace  istorical map of population growth, Lake Chad Basin countries, 1950s–2010s Map 1.4: H a. Annual growth rate in population b. Absolute change in population Source: Jedwab, Haslop, et al. 2021, technical paper for this report. Note: This figure shows the annual population growth rate and absolute change in the size of population by historically consistent subdistrict boundaries reconstructed for Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Nigeria is not included because of data limitations. These three countries are divided into 113, 138, and 119 subdistricts, respectively. Lake Chad is shown in the center of the map. 12 1.3 Recent Socioeconomic Trends in the Lake Chad Region Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum relationship may be the loss in economic opportunities.  overty is more severe in the Lake Chad Figure 1.2: P Basin than in other parts of the countries As the water level receded between the 1960s and the mid- Poverty headcount rate (US$1.90 per day), percent 1990s, the lake shore moved farther from cultivated land, 100– increasingly limiting irrigation possibilities. A smaller 90– lake also reduces incomes in fishing communities. It can 80– likewise impact cattle herding (requiring proximity to 70– 72.3 the water and vegetation around the lake), an important 60– sector in the Lake Chad region, where herders typically 58.8 50– 51.6 sell their cattle to urban markets in Nigeria. Recent years 40– 45.4 43.4 39.8 39.1 have seen signs of the lake water level resurging from its 38.1 37.7 30– 30.7 lowest level (roughly 2,000 km2) in the 1990s to roughly 20– 26.0 18.8 14,000 km2. It remains to be seen whether this resurgence 10– in the water level will attract more people into the basin 0– Cameroon Chad Niger Nigeria areas by generating new economic opportunities.30 J Country J Lake Chad J Rest of country Source: Masaki and Rodríguez-Castelán 2021, technical paper for this report. Note: Data on poverty are based on the latest household surveys conducted in Cameroon (2014), Chad (2011), Niger (2014), and Nigeria (2018). Rest of country = outside the Lake Chad region; LCB = within the Lake Chad Basin region. 1.3.2 Trends in Poverty Reduction Given its high poverty rate, low human capital, and There is also a significant spatial gap in poverty within poor access to key services, the Lake Chad region is the Lake Chad region. Poverty is most prevalent in the characterized as a lagging region. An analysis of the parts of the Lake Chad region that lie within Nigeria. The most recent household surveys available for each country poverty rates in Adamawa and Yobe states reach as high as shows that households in the Lake Chad region are 74 percent and 70 percent, significantly higher than the poorer compared with households in neighboring regions national average of 38 percent (Map 1.5, panel b). These (Figure 1.2).31 The regional poverty rate in the Far North regions are also home to the largest number of the poor in Region of Cameroon (59 percent) is three times higher the Lake Chad region (Map 1.5, panel c). Kanem Region than the rate in the rest of the country (19 percent). in Chad has the lowest poverty rate (19 percent) across In Nigeria, the poverty rate in the Lake Chad region the Lake Chad region. (72 percent) is nearly twice as high as the rate in the rest of the country (38 percent); part of this spatial gap is Not only is the level of poverty high in the Lake Chad likely explained by the devastating impact of the Boko region relative to the other parts of the countries, Haram conflict in Nigeria’s North East.32 Chad is the but the pace of poverty reduction in the region is only exception. There, the poverty rate in the country’s slow. There is little sign that the spatial gap in poverty Lake Chad region (31 percent) is lower than the rate in between the Lake Chad region and neighboring regions is the rest of the country (40 percent).33 This is explained by narrowing. In Cameroon, for instance, poverty declined the fact that the areas in Chad around the lake are near by 4 percent in the Far North Region compared with the capital of the country, with a consequently higher a 6 percent decrease in the rest of the country between urbanization rate and a relatively high population density. 2007 and 2014. While Niger as a whole saw a reduction in poverty from 51 percent to 45 percent between 2011 30 Vivekananda et al. (2019). 31 The results presented in this section are drawn from Masaki and Rodríguez-Castelán (2021), technical paper for this report. 32 The country’s Borno state is excluded from the analysis given that there is no representative household survey for that state. 33 Mahmood and Ani (2018). 1.3 Recent Socioeconomic Trends in the Lake Chad Region 13 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace Map 1.5: Poverty in the Lake Chad region  overty rates in Chad, a. P  overty rates in the Lake Chad b. P  umber of poor in the Lake c. N Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria region Chad region Source: Masaki and Rodríguez-Castelán 2021, technical paper for this report. Note: Data are based on the latest household survey in Cameroon (2014), Chad (2011), Niger (2014), and Nigeria (2018). Poverty rates are calculated at US$1.90 per day (2011 purchasing power parity). Borno State is excluded given that there is no representative household survey for that state for security reasons. and 2014, the Lake Chad region in Niger experienced a  sset deprivation in the Lake Chad Basin Figure 1.3: A versus other parts of the countries slight increase in poverty, from 48 percent to 52 percent. This pattern of nonconvergence in welfare and poverty Percent of bottom 40 percent in the wealth index 100– is corroborated by data on the ownership of assets and 90– how they have changed in the Lake Chad region. The 80– 83.3 82.4 share of households that are relatively asset poor—or in 70– the bottom 40 percentile of asset wealth distribution in a 60– 64.1 given survey by country and year (the bottom 40)—shows 50– 53.3 52.6 no clear sign of convergence between the Lake Chad and 40– 46.7 44.2 41.9 non–Lake Chad areas of each country (Figure 1.3).34 For 30– 35.7 38.2 37.9 34.1 31.3 31.9 instance, in Niger and Nigeria, the share of asset-poor 20– households increased in the Lake Chad region, while, 10– in Cameroon, the share remained almost unchanged 0– between the two latest rounds of the Demographic CMR '11 CMR '18 NER '06 NER '12 NGA '13 NGA '18 TCD '14 J Lake Chad J Rest of country and Health Surveys. These findings suggest that wealth Source: Masaki and Rodríguez-Castelán 2021, technical paper for this report. gaps between the Lake Chad region and the rest of the Note: Data based on the latest two rounds of Demographic and Health Surveys in each country. CMR = Cameroon. TCD = Chad. NER = Niger. NGA = Nigeria. The year refers to the year the survey was conducted. countries may have worsened. 34 The wealth index was constructed for the latest two Demographic and Health Surveys in each of the Lake Chad Basin countries. Our wealth index is a composite measure of various household assets, including housing materials, access to electricity, cooking fuel, access to improved water, as well as ownership of various items such as televisions and bicycles. We applied a principal component analysis to generate the composite index. To make our wealth index comparable over time within the same country, we applied the same coefficients for use as weights across the two latest surveys. “Asset-poor” households refer to those households whose wealth index score is in the bottom 40 percent of distribution for the given survey country/year. 14 1.3 Recent Socioeconomic Trends in the Lake Chad Region Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum Food insecurity is also an increasing concern in distribution of people and economic activity (Map 1.6, the region. Undernourishment tends to be driven by panel a).38 Overall, nighttime light grew more quickly escalating conflict and competition over natural resources in areas that appear to be more densely populated or and by climate change and environmental degradation characterized by higher levels of economic activity (as spurred by population growth. The Lake Chad Basin was indicated by nighttime light), particularly in Nigeria’s recently characterized as one of three major food insecure North Central and South West (Map 1.6, panel b). hotspots in West Africa, where food insecurity is on the rise after having declined for several years, according to a Seen from space, the regions near Lake Chad in World Bank and FAO report.35 Between 2014 and 2019, Cameroon and Nigeria exhibit a relatively low level the number of undernourished people in West Africa rose of luminosity and lower rates of growth. The gaps in from 32 million to 56 million (that is, from 10 percent the intensity of nighttime light between the Lake Chad to 15.2 percent of the population). The highest numbers region and other parts of the countries are particularly were found in northern Nigeria (5.0 million), Cameroon stark in Cameroon and Nigeria, whereas, in Chad and (1.4 million), and Niger (1.4 million). The United Nations Niger, the average intensity of nighttime light is slightly Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs puts the higher in the Lake Chad region (Map 1.6, panel c). The number of people facing crisis and emergency levels of annual rate of growth in nighttime light is also slower food insecurity in Nigeria’s North East at 4.3 million, in the Lake Chad region compared with other parts of and 500,000 children are at risk of severe malnutrition.36 Cameroon and Nigeria. This implies that there has been Food insecurity is likely increasing because of COVID- no substantial regional growth in the areas around the related impacts. Five million more people were acutely lake. In Nigeria, in particular, increases in the intensity food insecure in West Africa in 2020 during the lean of nighttime light between 1992 and 2013 were much season between June and August, compared with the slower in the Lake Chad region compared with the rest of five-year average, that is, 17 million versus 12 million the country (Map 1.6, panels c and d). people, respectively).37 Between March and May 2021, 19.6 million people required immediate food assistance. 1.3.4 Human Capital Outcomes and Access to Basic Services 1.3.3 Local Economic Dynamics In addition to monetary poverty indicators and In addition to lagging in terms of core poverty economic growth, the Lake Chad region lags in key indicators, the Lake Chad region has experienced human capital indicators.39 The literacy rate (ages 15 little economic progress over the past three decades. or more) and the completion rate in primary education An analysis of local economic growth based on nighttime (ages 14–25) are significantly lower in the Lake Chad light intensity—which serves as a useful proxy for region compared with the national average (Figure 1.4). capturing both the size of local economic activities and Child health conditions in the region are also grim. For the change in this activity over time—shows that the instance, child stunting is roughly 10 percent–15 percent intensity of nighttime light is strongly correlated with the higher in the Lake Chad region compared with other 35 The other two areas are the Central Sahel and eastern Mauritania (World Bank and FAO 2021). 36 OCHA (2020). 37 World Bank and FAO (2021). 38 The analysis of nighttime light relies on Defense Meteorological Satellite Program–Operational Line-Scan System data that are intercalibrated by Li et al. (2020), allowing for a better comparison over time. The intensity of nighttime light is measured in a digital number ranging from 0 and 63 that represents an average of lights in all nights after sunlight, moonlight, aurorae, forest fires, and clouds have been removed algorithmically, leaving mostly human settlements. 39 The results presented in this section are drawn from Masaki and Rodríguez-Castelán (2021), technical paper for this report. 1.3 Recent Socioeconomic Trends in the Lake Chad Region 15 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace parts of the countries (see Appendix 1.A, Table A1). 30 percent, and community teachers (largely the parents Based on original analysis performed for this report, of pupils) generally stand in for trained teachers.40 In the these results are in line with other studies. For example, Chadian part of the lake, there is only one doctor for every according to the International Crisis Group, the gross 140,000 inhabitants, that is, a quarter of the national school enrolment rate in the lake area of Chad is below average.41 The low access and quality of education, health Map 1.6: Growing economic gap, Lake Chad region and rest of the countries, 1992–2013 a. Nighttime light intensity, 2013 b. Annual change, nighttime lights, 1992–2013 c. Nighttime light intensity, 2013 d. Change in nighttime lights Annual rate of change, 1992–2013, percent 3– 3– 2.87 2– 2– 1.50 1.38 1– 1– 0.99 0.90 0.87 0.80 0.79 0.78 0.70 0.60 0.63 0.60 0.59 0.43 0.37 0– 0– Cameroon Niger Nigeria Chad Cameroon Niger Nigeria Chad J Lake Chad J Rest of country J Lake Chad J Rest of country Source: Masaki and Rodríguez-Castelán 2021, technical paper for this report. Note: Panel a shows the mean of nighttime luminosity in 2013 based on stable Defense Meteorological Satellite Program intercalibrated nighttime lights data (Li et al. 2020) at a spatial resolution of 10 kilometers. Panel b shows the annual rate of growth in the mean of nighttime luminosity between 1992 and 2013 in percent. Panels c and d show the mean of nighttime luminosity and the annual rate of change in nighttime luminosity in percent during the same time period. The calculations for panels c and d were performed only on a subset of grid cells that are lit (with a positive value in digital number at some point between 1992 and 2013) thus excluding areas that are largely rural and unpopulated. 40 ICG (2017). 41 ICG (2017). The figure for Chad is much lower than in Cameroon’s Far North region (1/52,000) or Niger’s Diffa region (1/24,500), both close to the lake. 16 1.3 Recent Socioeconomic Trends in the Lake Chad Region Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum care, and other services in the region has been aggravated average rate of access to electricity in Cameroon, Chad, by the erosion of infrastructure, both public and private, Niger, and Nigeria is 62 percent, 8 percent, 14 percent, resulting from the conflict.42 and 59 percent, compared with an estimated 20 percent, 2 percent, 10 percent, and 38 percent in the Lake Chad Access to core public services in the Lake Chad Basin region, respectively. The Lake Chad areas of Cameroon is also among the lowest in the area. The national and Chad suffer from lower levels of access to improved Figure 1.4: Literacy and primary school completion rates are lower in the Lake Chad region a. Literacy rate b. Completion rate, primary education, 15+ Percent Percent 100– 100– 90– 90– 80– 83.7 80– 77.8 79.0 78.2 79.0 70– 71.9 72.4 70– 72.3 60– 60– 58.7 60.0 50– 50– 47.1 45.5 40– 41.6 40– 39.4 30– 33.0 34.0 32.8 30– 32.8 29.5 27.8 20– 20– 25.4 21.0 17.4 10– 10– 12.2 0– 0– Cameroon Chad Niger Nigeria Cameroon Chad Niger Nigeria J Country J Lake Chad J Rest of country J Country J Lake Chad J Rest of country Source: Masaki and Rodríguez-Castelán 2021, technical paper for this report. Note: Data on poverty are based on the latest household surveys conducted in Cameroon (2014), Chad (2011), Niger (2014), and Nigeria (2018). Rest of country = outside the Lake Chad region. Figure 1.5: Access to core public services in the Lake Chad region a. Access to improved water b. Access to improved sanitation c. Access to electricity Percent Percent Percent 100– 100– 100– 90– 90– 90– 80– 80– 80– 84.8 79.2 76.8 76.3 70– 70– 70– 74.8 74.1 74.0 70.4 68.8 68.4 66.9 66.7 65.5 65.1 60– 60– 60– 62.9 61.9 61.3 57.8 56.6 56.4 55.1 50– 50– 50– 48.9 40– 40– 40– 44.5 44.5 41.7 38.4 30– 30– 30– 30.8 30.2 28.5 20– 20– 20– 23.1 19.6 16.2 16.0 10– 10– 10– 14.3 13.7 12.8 10.0 10.4 2.4 9.0 6.0 5.7 0– 0– 0– '11 '18 6 '12 '13 '18 '14 '11 '18 6 '12 '13 '18 '14 '11 '18 6 '12 '13 '18 '14 '0 '0 '0 R R R R R R A A A D D D A A A R R R R R R CM CM CM NG NG NG NE NE NE NG NG NG CM CM CM TC TC TC NE NE NE J Lake Chad J Rest of country J Lake Chad J Rest of country J Lake Chad J Rest of country Source: Masaki and Rodríguez-Castelán 2021, technical paper for this report. Note: The figure shows the percentage of households with access to improved water and sanitation and electricity. Data on access to these core public services are taken from the two latest Demographic and Health Surveys in each country. CMR = Cameroon. TCD = Chad. NER = Niger. NGA = Nigeria. The year is the year in which the survey was conducted. 42 It is reported that, during the armed group’s eight-year rebellion, almost 1,400 schools have been destroyed in Borno and more than 57 percent of schools are unable to open because of damage or being in areas that remain unsafe (Al Jazeera 2017). Regarding health facilities: “Insurgents have destroyed about 788 health facilities in the region. In Borno 48 health workers have been killed and over 250 injured. The state has lost up to 40 percent of its facilities and only a third of those left in Borno state remain functional,” (Obi and Eboreime 2017). 1.3 Recent Socioeconomic Trends in the Lake Chad Region 17 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace water and sanitation facilities compared with other parts generates significant indirect employment in related of the countries (Figure 1.5). This gap is particularly activities such as trade, transport, and manufacturing (for pronounced in Cameroon, where the rate of access to example, food processing, leather industry, brewing).43 improved water and sanitation is, on average, about The main crops produced in the Lake Chad area include 36 percent lower in the Far North Region than in the rest subsistence crops (cassava, millet, rice, sorghum, and of the country. onions) and cash crops (cotton, groundnuts). Red peppers are also an important cash crop along the Yobe River in There are also signs of a widening gap between the Niger. Most of the farming in the Lake Chad Basin is Lake Chad region and the rest of the surrounding rainfed, harvested by hand, and cultivated without the countries in access to improved sanitation and use of fertilizers and other agrochemicals. Millions of electricity. In Cameroon, the share of households with people—particularly in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger— access to improved sanitation in the Lake Chad region depend on the lake for most of their economic activities declined from 42 percent to 31 percent between 2011 and livelihoods. The resulting pressure on the soil and and 2018, whereas the rest of the country experienced the depleting water resources pose serious sustainability a modest improvement (from 62 percent to 67 percent) problems for these activities.44 At the same time, rather over the same period. A similar divergence pattern than a homogeneous market, agriculture in the region is a emerges in Nigeria, where access to improved sanitation complex sector, encompassing both farming and herding. in the Lake Chad area decreased from 74 percent to The two modes of production sometimes compete over 55 percent between 2013 and 2018, a more rapid rate of resources and land. The competition over land between decline than in the rest of the country (where access fell farmers and herders is often cited as a source of conflict, from 66 percent to 56 percent). Progress in expanding which is exacerbated by climate change and the lack of access to electricity in the Lake Chad region has also land rights. Tenure insecurity can limit access to land, stagnated. In Niger, the regions of Diffa and Zinder investment in agriculture, and productivity. The limited saw access to electricity improve by 4 percentage points capacity of local customary and informal mechanisms (from 6 percent to 10 percent) between 2006 and 2012, of enforcement of land rights across the region do not a slightly lower increase than in the rest of the country appear to be sufficient to cope with competition among (where access improved by nearly 6 percentage points, farmers and herders.45 It is estimated that, in 2018, from 10.4 percent to 16.0 percent) (Figure 1.5). there were more than 1,800 deaths across Africa from transhumance-related conflict associated with the added pressures on access to land.46 1.3.5 Trends in Agriculture The Lake Chad region has seen an increase in arable Agriculture constitutes the main sector of economic or cropland areas over the past two decades, although activity in the Lake Chad region. According to the latest recent years have seen a slight decline. According to household expenditure survey available in each country, an analysis of geospatial data from the European Space the primary sector (agriculture, cattle herding, and Agency,47 the annual growth rate of cropland area inside fishing) accounts for about three-fourths of employment the study area near Lake Chad in the four countries started in areas near Lake Chad (Figure 1.9). Agriculture also at 0.31 percent during 1992–2000, fell to 0.24 percent 43 UNEP (2004). 44 Odada et al. (2005). 45 World Bank and FAO (2021). 46 Skah and Lyammouri (2020). 47 The results presented in this section draw on Blankespoor (2021), technical paper for this report. 18 1.3 Recent Socioeconomic Trends in the Lake Chad Region Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum Map 1.7: Trends in cropland area: 1992–2000, 2000–09, and 2009–18 Sources: Blankespoor 2021, technical paper for this report; data of ESA 2017. during 2000–10, and was slightly negative during 2010– method based on cross-entropy optimization that 19. The annual growth rate of cropland area outside the disaggregates administrative level agricultural GDP into study area in the four countries started at 0.48 percent grids depending on satellite-derived indicators of the during 1992–2000, fell to 0.33 percent during 2000–10, components that make up agricultural GDP, namely, and was slightly positive during 2010–19 (Map 1.7). crop, livestock, fishery, hunting, and timber production.49 Irrigated areas represented only about 5 percent of the The level of agricultural GDP in Nigeria is considerably cropland area inside the study area and about 3 percent higher compared with the other three Lake Chad Basin of the cropland area outside the study area between 1992 countries. Patterns of agricultural production also differ and 2019. The poor quality of irrigation—exacerbated by significantly within the Lake Chad region by crop. For the variability in the level of the lake and the associated instance, cotton production is spatially concentrated water resources as well as by the intensification of conflict in Adamawa in Nigeria and the Far North Region leading to the destruction of irrigation systems—has in Cameroon (panel b), whereas millet and sorghum made agricultural productivity in the region particularly production is more common in southern Niger and vulnerable to erratic rainfall patterns and climate change.48 northern Nigeria (panel c) and in northern Nigeria and Cameroon’s Far North (panel d), respectively. For the Most of the agricultural production within the Lake four countries, panel e illustrates dominant livelihoods Chad region is spatially concentrated in the three with similar patterns considering how people gain access states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe in Nigeria’s to food and income as well as markets. The northern North East. Map 1.8, panel a, illustrates the distribution areas of Chad and Niger are sparsely populated, with of subnational agricultural gross domestic product activities including salt, dates, and trading activities in (GDP) circa 2010, which is derived using a data fusion oases along with nomad pastoralism and transhumance. 48 FAO (2016). 49 For more details on the methodology, see Blankespor et al. (2021). 1.3 Recent Socioeconomic Trends in the Lake Chad Region 19 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace Map 1.8: Agricultural activities in the countries of the Lake Chad Basin a. Agricultural GDP estimates b. Cotton production c. Millet production 20 1.3 Recent Socioeconomic Trends in the Lake Chad Region Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum Map 1.8: Agricultural activities in the countries of the Lake Chad Basin (continued) d. Sorghum production e. Livelihoods Sources: Blankespoor 2021, technical paper for this report. Data of Blankespoor et al. 2021; FEWS NET (Famine Early Warning Systems Network) (dashboard), Washington, DC, https://fews. net/; Yu et al. 2020. 1.3 Recent Socioeconomic Trends in the Lake Chad Region 21 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace An agropastoral belt with millet and sorghum is located region, only accounting for 8 percent of jobs, versus twice in southern Niger, where most of the population lives. that rate (17 percent) in areas outside the lake basin. In Northern Nigeria has cultivated areas with diverse crops, the Lake Chad area in each country, wage jobs make including millet and sorghum as well as livestock. The up 5–10 percent of workers, from the lowest share in area nearby Lake Chad includes flood retreat cultivation Chad (5 percent) to the relatively larger rate in Nigeria and fishing activities. This belt has relatively higher local (10 percent) (Figure 1.6). Nonremunerated employment crop production value and contributes over US$1 million is also prominent in the region, representing 19 percent in local agricultural GDP (2010 US dollars). of jobs in the Lake Chad area of the four countries.50 Wage employment among women is particularly 1.3.6 Jobs and Labor Market limited in the Lake Chad region. The gap in the quality Composition of jobs is exacerbated by sex. At the national level, 11 percent of women have wage employment compared The labor market in areas near Lake Chad is with 22 percent of men in the four basin countries predominantly characterized by poor jobs—that (Figure 1.7). In the Lake Chad region, the share of is, self-employment and informal work. The overall women who have wage employment is one-fourth that employment rate among working-age individuals is of men (3 percent versus 12 percent, respectively). At high in the Lake Chad region, averaging 71 percent, the country level, the largest gap in wage employment compared with 72 percent in areas outside the lake is in Cameroon, where 2 percent of women have wage basin. Men are more likely to be employed (82 percent) employment in the areas near Lake Chad, compared with than women (60 percent). However, most working-age 15 percent of women in the rest of the country (Figure individuals hold relatively lower-quality jobs that are 1.7). The share of wage employment among men is also largely characterized by self-employment (particularly lower in the Cameroonian Lake Chad region (9 percent) farm self-employment) and unpaid employment. Wage compared with other parts of the country (34 percent). employment is particularly limited across the Lake Chad Overall, wage employment is skewed toward men. Figure 1.6: Employment type across the Lake Chad region Percent 100– 90– 80– 70– 60– 50– 40– 30– 20– 10– 0– National Rest of Lake National Rest of Lake National Rest of Lake National Rest of Lake National Rest of Lake country Chad country Chad country Chad country Chad country Chad Cameroon Chad Niger Nigeria Total J Self employed J Non-paid J Wage Source: World Bank calculations based on the latest household surveys available in Cameroon (2014), Chad (2018), Niger (2018), and Nigeria (2018). Note: Nigeria’s latest household survey does not differentiate between paid and unpaid employment. Thus, only for Nigeria unpaid employment is subsumed in self-employment. Includes only working-age individuals (ages 15–65). Rest of country = outside the Lake Chad region; Lake Chad = within the Lake Chad Basin region. 50 Nonremunerated employment includes apprenticeships and family workers. Nigeria’s latest household survey does not differentiate between paid and unpaid employment and the latter is subsumed in self-employment. Because of the sampling design of the Nigeria 2018 survey, distinguishing between unpaid and wage employment is not possible for this country. 22 1.3 Recent Socioeconomic Trends in the Lake Chad Region Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum Figure 1.7: Wage employment by gender across the Lake Chad region Percent 40– 35– 30– 25– 20– 15– 10– 5– 0– Rest of Lake Rest of Lake Rest of Lake Rest of Lake Rest of Lake National National National National National country Chad country Chad country Chad country Chad country Chad Cameroon Chad Niger Nigeria Total J Female J Male Source: World Bank calculations based on the latest household surveys available in Cameroon (2014), Chad (2018), Niger (2018), and Nigeria (2018). Note: Data Include only working-age individuals (ages 15–65). Rest of country = outside the Lake Chad region; Lake Chad = within the Lake Chad Basin region. Nigeria’s latest household survey does not differentiate between paid and unpaid employment. Thus, only for Nigeria, unpaid employment is subsumed in self-employment. The gender gap in access to wage employment is more 79 percent of workers are employed in the agricultural pronounced across young individuals ages 15–24. At sector compared with half that rate (39 percent) in the national level, 8 percent of young women engage the rest of the country. The proportions are slightly in wage employment (4 percentage points lower than less extreme in Nigeria, but still large, with 72 percent adult women) compared with 13 percent of young men of workers in agriculture in the Nigerian section of (11 percentage points lower than adult men) in the four the lake compared with 42 percent in the rest of the basin countries. In the Lake Chad region proper, the country (Figure 1.8). Chad and Niger do not exhibit share of young women who have wage employment is major differences in subnational areas given that most roughly one-third that of men (3 percent versus 8 percent, of the national economy is already heavily dependent on respectively). This gap more than doubles among agriculture in the two countries. The role that agriculture adult individuals, where 13 percent of men have wage plays in employment and the labor market highlights the employment, compared with 4 percent of adult women. importance of opening (and keeping open) agricultural These figures attest to low access to quality jobs across the trade and agricultural markets, which closed down as a Lake Chad region among young individuals, particularly result of the crisis. among young women. The service sector is the second largest source of Agriculture—including farming, fishing, and employment across the Lake Chad region, but the hunting— is the predominant sector of employment sector’s share is significantly higher in other parts of in the Lake Chad region. Around 72 percent of workers the countries. On average, 17 percent of workers are are employed in agriculture across the four countries in employed in the service sector in the Lake Chad region the Lake Chad region, employing 70 percent of men and (Figure 1.8). In Cameroon and Nigeria, the employment 73 percent of women.51 In Cameroon and Nigeria, the share in the service sector in the lake region stood at share of people in agriculture in the lake basin is much 11 percent and 20 percent, respectively, compared with higher compared with the rest of the respective countries 35 percent and 38 percent in other parts of the two (Figure 1.8). In the Cameroonian area of Lake Chad, countries. 51 Cameroon has the highest labor share of agriculture, at 78 percent of workers and Nigeria the less high, at 69 percent. 1.3 Recent Socioeconomic Trends in the Lake Chad Region 23 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace  istribution of employment by sector across the Lake Chad region (4-digit) Figure 1.8: D Percent 100– 90– 80– 70– 60– 50– 40– 30– 20– 10– 0– National Rest of Lake National Rest of Lake National Rest of Lake National Rest of Lake National Rest of Lake country Chad country Chad country Chad country Chad country Chad Cameroon Chad Niger Nigeria Total J Agriculture J Industry J Other J Services Source: World Bank calculations based on the latest household surveys available in Cameroon (2014), Chad (2018), Niger (2018), and Nigeria (2018). Note: Data Include only working-age individuals (ages 15–65). Rest of country = outside the Lake Chad region; Lake Chad = within the Lake Chad Basin region. Gender gaps within the service sector are also employment among women in commerce, which is less significant. In the service sector in the Lake Chad than half compared with areas outside the Lake Chad region, men are employed at a higher rate than women region. (20 percent and 14 percent, respectively). This pattern does not hold, however, in areas far from the lake, where A larger proportion of young workers engage in a larger share of women are employed in the service agriculture compared with adults. Agricultural jobs sector (40 percent), compared with men (30 percent). are concentrated among young workers (ages 14–25), Youth employment in the service sector in the Lake with 83 percent employed in the agricultural sector Chad region is roughly the same for men and women in the Lake Chad region, compared with 68 percent (10 and 9 percent, respectively). But differences exist among adults (Figure 1.9). The share of employment between the region and elsewhere: youth employment in in agriculture among youth is much lower outside the the service sector among women in the areas surrounding Lake Chad region. Among young individuals, the share the lake is less than half compared with the areas outside of agricultural employment decreases to 67 percent in the Lake Chad region, where it stands at 25 percent. A the rest of the country. A similar pattern is observed similar pattern is observed in adult employment among among adults (down to 41 percent). The country with women, for whom the share of employment in services the highest differential is Cameroon, where the share of in areas far from the lake is 44 percent, compared with youth employment in agriculture in areas near Lake Chad only 16 percent in areas near the lake. This gap is much is 86 percent, compared with 40 percent in the rest of the narrower among adult men, among whom there is only a country. A similar pattern is also observed among older 10 percentage point difference in employment in services workers. In contrast, in Niger, there is little difference between the lake and non-lake areas. Commerce accounts in the share of agricultural employment between areas for the largest share of service sector employment in the near Lake Chad and the rest of the country (Figure Lake Chad region. The share of employment in commerce 1.9). Considering the distribution of gender as well as is 10 percent among both men and women in the Lake age in areas near the lake, it emerges that 84 percent of Chad region. This is one-third the employment share young men are employed in agriculture, compared with in commerce in areas outside the region among women 66 percent of adult men. The gap between young people (nearly 31 percent), and lower than the share among men and adults is more acute among women, where 82 percent (at 15 percent). A similar pattern can be seen in youth of young women are employed in agriculture, compared 24 1.3 Recent Socioeconomic Trends in the Lake Chad Region Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  istribution of employment by sector and age (youth versus adults) (4-digit) Figure 1.9: D Percent 100– 90– 80– 70– 60– 50– 40– 30– 20– 10– 0– Lake Chad Lake Chad Lake Chad Lake Chad Lake Chad Lake Chad Lake Chad Lake Chad Lake Chad Lake Chad National National National National National National National National National National Rest of Rest of Rest of Rest of Rest of Rest of Rest of Rest of Rest of Rest of country country country country country country country country country country Adult Youth Adult Youth Adult Youth Adult Youth Adult Youth Cameroon Chad Niger Nigeria Total J Agriculture J Industry J Other J Services Source: World Bank calculations based on the latest household surveys available in Cameroon (2014), Chad (2018), Niger (2018), and Nigeria (2018). Note: Data Include only working-age individuals (ages 15–65). Youth includes individuals ages 15–24. Adult includes individuals ages 15–65. Rest of country = outside the Lake Chad region; Lake Chad = within the Lake Chad Basin region. with 70 percent of adult women in the lake areas. In areas away from the lake, the gap widens; employment in agriculture among young women stands at 61 percent, compared with 38 percent among adult women. 1.3 Recent Socioeconomic Trends in the Lake Chad Region 25 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace 1.4 Territorial Development within the Lake Chad Region 1.4.1 Density economic activities in the region are spatially concentrated among a few large cities. Two metropolitan cities have a population of over one million—N’Djamena and Economic stagnation in the region is linked to Maiduguri. A few other secondary cities contribute to the low levels of density and urbanization: urban agglomerations in the region have grown economy of the region, including Damaturu (Nigeria), more quickly, widening spatial gaps, while the Jimeta (Nigeria), Maroua (Cameroon), Mubi (Nigeria), shrinking of the lake between the 1960s and and Zinder (Niger). In Cameroon, most economic mid-1990s pushed people to migrate from rural activities in the Lake Chad region are concentrated in to urban areas. the southern part of the Far North Region, particularly around the city of Maroua.54 In Niger and Chad, the volume of economic activity in the regions around Lake Enduring poverty and slow economic growth in the Chad is small and tends to cluster around areas near the Lake Chad region have been linked to economic borders with Cameroon and Nigeria. geography. A combination of low economic density and great distance and wide division appear to be derailing the region from a sustainable growth track. Density refers 1.4.1.2 Urbanization55 to the economic mass or output per unit of land area. It can be measured as the value added or GDP generated The long-term shrinking of the lake observed until the per square kilometer of land.52 The concentration of mid-1990s had a negative impact on local population economic activity rises with development. Density tends growth. The analysis presented here takes advantage of a to characterize urban settlements, though it can be low novel dataset based on digitalized population censuses.56 even if population density is high, such as in low-income The dataset tracks population patterns at a granular urban enclaves. level between the 1950s and the 2010s, facilitating an assessment of local population growth. The findings of the analysis show that areas close to the lake experienced 1.4.1.1 Economic Density relatively slower total population growth after the lake began to shrink around the early 1960s up to the mid- The Lake Chad region is characterized by low economic 1990s.57 In Niger, for instance, a one standard deviation density and lack of agglomeration economies. While in proximity to the lake is associated with a 0.3 and 0.5 the Lake Chad region accounts for 17 percent of the area standard deviation decrease in log population by 1969 of the four neighboring countries, its economy makes up and 1988, respectively, relative to the population level as only 5 percent of the relevant GDP (Map 1.9).53 Most first recorded in 1962—a few years before the lake began 52 World Bank (2009). 53 Calculated based on Ghosh et al. (2010). 54 See UNHCR and World Bank (2016). 55 Due to data limitations, this report does not assess forced displacement in the Lake Chad region, which is certainly an important topic. 56 The results presented in this section are taken from Jedwab, Haslop, et al. 2021, technical paper for this report. 57 The observed shrinkage of the lake between 1960s and mid 1990s had to do with reduced rainfall in the Central African Republic, not local economic conditions, thus assuaging reverse causality concerns. The shrinkage of Lake Chad during those years thus offers a natural experiment to examine how long- term lake drying can affect both rural and urban communities. 26 1.4 Territorial Development within the Lake Chad region Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum Map 1.9: Economic activity in the Lake Chad region, 2010  stimated subnational real GDP (2006) in a. E  stimated subnational real GDP (2006) in the Lake b. E Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria Chad region Source: Masaki and Rodríguez-Castelán 2021, technical paper for this report. Calculations are based on data of Ghosh et al. 2010. GDP estimates are based on nighttime lights satellite imagery and LandScan population grids. Figure 1.10: Total population effect of proximity to Lake Chad, 1940s–2010s Water level loss of Lake Chad since 1965, percent Post-1965 effect, percent relative to latest pre-1965 year -10– – -10 -20– – -15 -30– – -20 – -25 -40– – -30 -50– – -35 -60– – -40 -70– – -45 -80– – -50 -90– – -55 -100– – -60 1967 1969 1976 1987 1988 1993 2001 2005 2009 2012 ▬ Water level loss Q Effect in Niger ´ Cameroon S Tchad Source: Jedwab, Haslop, et al. 2021, technical paper for this report. 1.4 Territorial Development within the Lake Chad region 27 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace to shrink (Figure 1.10). Negative population effects are In Niger, between 1965 and 2012, the number of small even larger in Cameroon, where a one standard deviation towns (at least 5,000 inhabitants) increased from 14 to in proximity to the lake is associated with a 0.7 and 1.0 161, while the number of (relatively) larger towns (at least standard deviation decrease in log population in 1976 20,000 inhabitants) rose from 4 to 26. In Cameroon, the and 1987, respectively, relative to the population level in number of small and large towns increased from 51 to 1963. In Chad, a one standard deviation in proximity to 173 and from 10 to 54 between 1965 and 2005, while, the lake is associated with a 0.9 standard deviation in log in Chad, the corresponding numbers rose from 11 to 94 population in 1993. Since the mid-1990s, the water level and from 4 to 23 between 1964 and 2009 (Map 1.10). in Lake Chad has been recovering. The shrinking of the lake observed between the 1960s There are few secondary towns or cities with more and the mid-1990s led to migration from rural areas than 20,000 inhabitants in the region, which to cities near the lake. The analysis finds signs of refugee could otherwise serve as a catalyst for generating urbanization in areas near the lake because of the lake’s agglomeration economies to foster economic growth. shrinkage during these years.58 As access to the rich water Map 1.10: Trends in city population around Lake Chad, circa 1965–2010 Source: Jedwab, Haslop, et al. 2021, technical paper for this report. Note: The map shows the location of 5,000+ and 20,000+ urban settlements circa 1965, when the lake started shrinking, and circa 2010, at the end of the period of study. It also indicates regionally important (20,000+) cities in the 1960s, such as Diffa, N’Guigmi and Zinder in Niger, N’Djamena in Chad, and Maroua and Garoua in Cameroon. It also shows paved roads, improved roads, and earthen roads, all circa 1965. 58 See Jedwab, Haslop, et al. 2021, technical paper for this report. 28 1.4 Territorial Development within the Lake Chad region Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum resources and economic opportunities provided by Lake  opulation density is positively correlated Figure 1.11: P with regional growth, 1990 Chad became increasingly limited, people in the region may have migrated to cities in search of better economic Annual rate of growth in NTL, 1992–2013 0.08– opportunities. This phenomenon was particularly visible in Niger, where the shrinkage of Lake Chad between the 0.06– 1960s and mid-1990s had a clear positive impact on the expansion of larger cities around the lake. Despite the 0.04– existence of many rural settlements and small towns close 0.02– to the lake, there were no small cities in eastern Niger and no large cities close to the lake in 1962. But two large 0– cities—Diffa and N’Guigmi—rose quickly in the area. -0.02– Diffa had fewer than 1,000 inhabitants in 1962; yet, by 2012, it had become Niger’s 11th largest city. N’Guigmi -0.04– was historically located on the shore of the lake, a center <50pc 50–75pc 75–95pc >95pc Source: Masaki and Rodríguez-Castelán 2021, technical paper for this report. for fishing communities. Its dramatic growth from 3,000 Note: Excludes outside values. The bottom of the rectangular box represents the lower quartile (25th percentile), and the top is the upper quartile (75th percentile). The people in 1962 to more than 25,000 today must have been horizontal line indicates the 50th percentile, which is provided for different initial levels of population density in 1990, ranging from the bottom 50 percentile (< 50 pc) to above the driven by the locality functioning as a refugee settlement top 95 percentile (> 95 pc). The analysis is performed based on the sample of 5,212 grid cells (at a spatial resolution of 0.1 degrees) defined over the Lake Chad Basin countries for individuals who had lost their rural livelihoods. As that were lit (with a positive digital number in nighttime light luminosity) at some point between 1992 and 2013. these two larger cities emerged, the need for smaller cities might have been reduced; hence, the negative effect even after controlling for other factors that led to their observed among these smaller locations. A similar pattern establishment in the first place.60 Urban agglomerations of refugee urbanization was also observed in Cameroon continue to grow more quickly than more sparsely during the years of the shrinkage of the lake, although the populated areas, and this has important implications for positive effects on city populations were much weaker in widening spatial gaps between core cities and the rest of Cameroon compared with Niger. In Chad, no such effect the countries. was observed. More densely populated urban agglomerations 1.4.1.3 Regional Convergence (Conditional continue to grow faster than less densely populated Convergence) areas, thereby widening spatial gaps in density. Controlling for the level of economic activity (as proxied The Lake Chad region as a whole does not show a clear by nighttime lights in 1992), the initial level of population sign of convergence with the rest of the countries in density is positively correlated with the annual rate of terms of local economic growth, thereby implying the economic growth measured by the intensity of nighttime perpetual nature of laggardness in the region. According lights (Figure 1.11). More substantively, a 1 percentage to a multivariate regression analysis exploring the main point increase in the initial level of population density drivers of local growth as measured by the annual rate of is associated with a 0.2 percent increase in the annual change in nighttime lights, the pace of local economic rate of growth in nighttime lights.59 The findings are growth in the Lake Chad region is not statistically consistent with other studies showing that the locations different from that of the other parts of the countries of urban agglomerations remain persistent over time, after one controls for other potential confounders 59 This relationship holds whether the analysis is performed for all the Lake Chad Basin countries or restricted to the Lake Chad region only. 60 Henderson et al.(2018); Jedwab et al.(2017). 1.4 Territorial Development within the Lake Chad region 29 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace (Figure 1.12).61 This implies that, conditional on various annual rate of growth in nighttime lights. This is perhaps socioeconomic and geographic factors, the Lake Chad not surprising given that nighttime lights are a function region is no different from the rest of the countries in the of both population density and economic activity.62 One pace of growth. However, what this analysis also shows is way to interpret these results is that urban areas that that the laggardness of the region is persistent over time, initially had low levels of development (or luminosity) with little economic dynamism in the region that might grew more quickly than other areas that exhibited high allow it to catch up with the rest of the countries. There levels of development, thus narrowing the gaps between are also some important differences across the Lake Chad lagging and more advanced cities if one controls for Basin countries. In particular, as seen in Map 1.6, panel population density and other socioeconomic factors.63 d, the spatial gap between areas near Lake Chad and the This finding echoes a well-established body of literature rest of the country is clearly deepening in Nigeria, with on regional convergence whereby poor economies grow areas near Lake Chad experiencing a slower rate of growth more quickly than rich economies.64 Another important in nighttime lights. factor that drives regional growth is access to markets (see the following section). Meanwhile, exogenous Two factors stand out as the key determinants of the geographical factors, such as land use (cropland or trajectory of local economic growth: the initial level of grazing land), elevation, and terrain constraints have no nighttime light luminosity and population. These two significant impact on regional economic growth. variables explain roughly 20 percent of the variation in the Figure 1.12: Main correlates with local economic growth: Regression analysis 0.01– 0.005– 0– -0.005– -0.01– -0.015– ion s y y ) s y ion s In) In) ity rid In) 1992 nsit sit 13) 13 ict In) In) sit int 9 2 ( d reg 9 0 ( dens015) ity g e x( i n d e d en 2 –20 2–20 sity onfl c t s ( ots ( den levat stra 9 9 d I 9 n c i i on 1 t in e C ha n 1 tion 90–2 tric in E SP plan plan d d 99 19 de H I (1 I ( d f B on fl ts/ r lan d E nc yi ec ss PE SPEplan er o H c rotes zing rai l igh Lak n sit pula (19to el acce C ro C ro S e o - B e r im e e n d n p cces o s rke t 2X e ag rag Cr um b n no ilian p Gra T i g htt a tio wth i A Ma n 199 A ver Ave X N r of i v N l i e c pu Gro EI mb ro f Po SP Nu mbe Nu Q Point estimate ▬ Confidence interval (95 percent) Source: Masaki and Rodríguez-Castelán 2021, technical paper for this report. Note: The results are based on the beta-convergence regression wherein the dependent variable is the annual rate of growth in nighttime light luminosity between 1992 and 2013 and regressed on a number of socioeconomic, demographic, and geographical variables. The analysis is restricted to areas that are lit at some point between 1992 and 2013 and thus exclude largely rural or unpopulated areas. For ease of comparison, all the variables are standardized so that the result shows the effects of a standard deviation in each variable on the annual rate of growth in nighttime lights. 61 Note that this analysis is restricted to areas that are lit at some point between 1992 and 2013 (indicated by a positive value in digital number of luminosity). 62 Henderson et al.(2018). 63 World Bank (2009). 64 See Barro and Sala-I-Martin’s and Bairro et al.’s (1995) seminal work on this topic. Our work is not the first to use nighttime light as an instrument to empirically test convergence. Gennaioli et al. (2015) and Chandra and Kabiraj (2020), for instance, also use nighttime light to explore how lagging regions may catch up to more advanced regions and find strong evidence of convergence. 30 1.4 Territorial Development within the Lake Chad region Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum 1.4.2 Distance (Lack of Connectivity) countries. The score of the rural access index—that is, the share of rural population living within 2 kilometers of an all-season road—is low for the region (Map 1.11, Closing connectivity gaps in the Lake Chad panel a).65 Nearly two-thirds of about 60 percent of the region can lead to higher productivity and higher-quality jobs, particularly in rural rural population in the Lake Chad region live farther areas, where people are twice as likely to be than 2 km away from an all-season road (proxied by disconnected from main roads, and thus from OpenStreetMap), that is, about twice the share in the non- access to markets and economic opportunities. lake parts of the basin countries (about 30 percent). Conflict and border closers have further distanced rural The Lake Chad region suffers not only from a lack populations from the market. For example, take-home of density, but also from long distance or lack of profits for small producers and sharecroppers reduced connectivity to the rest of the countries or to the by about 80 percent before and after the Boko Haram neighboring countries. Distance refers to the ease or crisis and its associated border closures.66 Sales volumes difficulty for goods, services, labor, capital, information have decreased while the cost of agricultural inputs has and ideas to traverse space. It measures how easily capital risen (as cheaper Nigerian imports are not available and flows, labor moves, goods are transported, and services are small farmers are unable to cross the river to purchase delivered between two locations. In this sense, distance small amounts). As a result, the crisis has decreased the is an economic concept not just a physical one, related potential of the dried red pepper market to act as a source to connectivity and access. An area is more likely to be of income for producers, and as a source of employment, lagging the farther away it is from leading areas since where producers report having to lay off daily laborers and greater distance-to density implies a lack of integration having less ability to offer sharecropping opportunities to into the economy. It also implies poorer access to the the poor. “thick” markets of capital, labor, goods, services and ideas, and the spillovers of knowledge and information The Lake Chad region and its vicinities host several they provide. As highlighted in this section, the Lake key cities (Maiduguri in Nigeria, Maroua and Kousséri Chad region exemplifies an area that lacks access to major in Cameroon, N'Djamena in Chad, and Diffa in markets due not only to its landlocked geography but also Niger) that can serve as trade hubs for driving the due to poor connective infrastructure and intensifying regional economy. The Market Access Index–a measure conflicts that make the flow of people and goods across of the size of population that can be reached within a the region extremely costly. certain travel time67–is relatively high in the Lake Chad region compared with some other parts of the countries (Map 1.11, Panel B). This indicates that, with proper 1.4.2.1 Market Accessibility connective infrastructure, people in the Lake Chad region could benefit from economic opportunities that Rural people in the Lake Chad region are twice as likely large markets—both within and around the region— to be disconnected from all-season roads (motorable can offer. Road transportation connects some key local year-round), compared with areas in the rest of the agricultural markets in and around the Lake Chad 65 An “all-season road” is defined as a road that is motorable all year round by the prevailing means of rural transport. Trunk, primary, secondary, and tertiary roads in OpenStreetMap are used as a proxy for all-season roads following the methodology by Azavea: https://rai.azavea.com/. 66 Sissons, Corrie and Clotilde Lappartient. 2016. "A Modified Emergency Market Mapping Analysis (EMMA) and Protection Analysis: Smoked Fish and Dried Red Pepper Income Market Systems - Diffa Region, Eastern Niger." Oxfam GB, Oxfam House, John Smith Drive, Cowley, Oxford, OX4 2JY, UK. 67 Estimated travel time to the closest city with a population of 500,000 or greater. 1.4 Territorial Development within the Lake Chad region 31 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace Map 1.11: Market and rural access in and around the Lake Chad region a. Rural access index b. Market access index Source: Masaki and Rodríguez-Castelán 2021, technical paper for this report. Note: Panel a shows the rural access index or the share of the rural population who live within 2 kilometers of all-season roads as proxied by OpenStreetMap. See appendix B for details on the construction of the index. Panel b shows areas that score very high (top 20 percentile), high (20–40 percentiles), medium (40–60 percentiles), low (60–80 percentile), or very low (bottom 20 percentile) in the market access index. See appendix B for details on how the index is calculated. region, including (a) Bol and N’Djamena in Chad, (b) costly. Access to the Lake Chad region from the exterior is Kousséri in Cameroon, (c) N’Guigmi and Diffa in Niger, at best poor, aside from a paved road in Chad (N’Djamena and (d) Bosso, Niger, along with Marte and Monguno to Karal), which is barely functional. The conditions via Madiguri in Nigeria. Maiduguri is an important of travel within and between the areas surrounding the connection for the trade corridors between Nigeria and lake are also difficult because of invasive vegetation on Cameroon.68 Yet, due to security concerns, many roads the body of water, which obstructs navigable channels, remain closed and border restrictions also further limit and due to the lack of maintenance of rural roads. the movement of people and goods across the region—a The northern basin and the north-east archipelago are topic that is discussed more in details in Section 1.4.3. landlocked, which slows down the diversification and intensification of the farming economy. Additionally, insecurity is reported as one of the main causes of 1.4.2.2 Poor Road Infrastructure concern for transporters, alongside the quality of road infrastructure, and excessive checkpoints and payments Poor road infrastructure—compounded by on routes.69 Better connectivity and mobility within the insecurity—undermines both intra- and inter- Lake Chad region—and also between the region and other regional connectivity. Connectivity across borders (or areas of the countries—have the potential to improve the between cities within national boundaries) is poor due living conditions of the population, by improving access to insufficient road infrastructure and a volatile security to basic services, jobs, and markets. situation, which make trade and transportation of goods 68 See Appendix 1.A for a map of local markets in the region. 69 WFP (2016a, 2016b). 32 1.4 Territorial Development within the Lake Chad region Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum 1.4.2.3 Digital Connectivity Sahara African average of 28 percent. However, the share of unique mobile internet subscribers in Lake Chad In addition to physical disconnectivity due to a lack of countries remains substantially below regional leaders, sound road infrastructure, the Lake Chad region also such as South Africa (52 percent). Chad registered a suffers from digital disconnectivity, further isolating unique mobile internet subscription rate of 17 percent the region not only from the rest of the Lake Chad of the population in 2020, compared with 34 percent Basin countries and also from the rest of the world. in Nigeria and 34 percent in Cameroon. On the other Access to the Internet is also limited in the Lake Chad hand, Niger has the lowest mobile internet penetration Basin countries. While digital infrastructure in Sub- rate across the Lake Chad region, and among the lowest Saharan Africa as a whole is lagging behind compared in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is important to identify the with the rest of the world,70 the Lake Chad countries main constraints to adopt internet services faced by have a particularly low level of internet penetration. individuals to fully harness the potential benefits of Approximately 12 percent of the population in the Lake digital technologies in the region. Chad countries reported using the internet, compared with 19 percent across Sub-Saharan Africa, on average.71 Digital infrastructure—mobile broadband internet There is heterogeneity within the region. Chad lies among in particular—is limited in the Lake Chad region.73 the countries with the lowest internet penetration rates A large swath of areas in the Lake Chad region have in the world, at 7 percent of the population, compared little connectivity to fiber optics transmission nodes with Cameroon, which at 23.2 percent ranks above the or 3G technology except for the Far North Region of regional average. Cameroon where there appears to be more comprehensive coverage.74 Access to the internet (either through fixed Mobile internet in the Lake Chad Basin countries has broadband or mobile broadband) can serve as a catalyst undergone a rapid expansion, although its pace still for poverty alleviation,75 improved labor outcomes76 and lags regional leaders like South Africa. Unique mobile the functioning of rural markets,77 specifically regarding internet subscribers across the Lake Chad Basin countries price information, access to inputs and consumers78 and increased almost twofold as a share of the population access to capital markets.79 Thus, together with a lack of between 2014 and 2020.72 In 2020, this figure stood at physical connectivity, poor digital connectivity presents 31 percent of the population, above the regional Sub- 70 World Bank (2019a). 71 Data of 2017, WDI (World Development Indicators) (database) (accessed on 04/07/2021), World Bank, Washington, DC, https://datatopics.worldbank.org/ world-development-indicators/. Internet users are individuals who have used the internet (from any location) in the last 3 months. The internet can be used via a computer, mobile phone, personal digital assistant, games machine, digital TV etc. 72 Given that consumers may use multiple SIM cards to take advantage of discounts or to avoid high charges for off-network calls, market penetration in terms of unique subscribers may provide a better picture of the degree of access to mobile services. GSMA defines mobile internet as the use of internet services by unique users on mobile devices at the end of a given period. Mobile internet services are defined as any activity that uses mobile data (that is, excluding SMS, multimedia messaging services, and cellular voice calls). See GSMA Intelligence (database), Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM Association), London, https://www.gsmaintelligence.com/. Accessed on April 7 2020. 73 Hjort and Poulsen (2019). 74 The nodes correspond to add or drop points (entrance or exit) in the long-haul fiber networks. Long-haul fiber networks are like motorways that have junctions (on and off ramps, that is, add and drop points) that feed smaller class roads (access fiber, wireline, and wireless networks). In the motorway scenario, even if a household is located close to the motorway, it may be a long drive to the nearest junction. The same applies to fiber-optic networks, in which the speed of fixed broadband Internet is determined by proximity to the transmission nodes rather than the network lines connecting the nodes. While second- generation (2G) technologies enable voice, SMS, and limited Internet access, third-generation (3G) technologies enable more rapid Internet browsing and data downloading. The 2G/3G coverage data should be treated with caution, however; see the note to map 1.12. 75 See Bahia et al. (2019) and Masaki et al. (2020). 76 See Hjort and Poulsen (2019); Paunov and Rollo (2014); Fernandes et al. (2019); Chun and Tang (2018); Viollaz and Winkler (2020). 77 See Kaila and Tarp (2019); Goyal (2010); Ritter and Guerrero (2014); Salas-Garcia and Fan (2015). 78 See Aker and Mbiti (2010); Aker (2011); Debo and Van Ryzin (2013). 79 See Hasbi and Dubus (2019); Alibhai et al. (2018). 1.4 Territorial Development within the Lake Chad region 33 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace an additional hurdle that prevents the region from 1.4.2.4 Reducing Distance to Markets Matters for tapping its full economic potential. Local Economic Development Not only is access to digital infrastructure limited, Market accessibility is among the key drivers for ownership of digital devices like cellular phones is regional integration and economic growth. Areas that also particularly low in the Lake Chad region. Cell are better connected to large markets experienced a faster phone ownership as a share of population in the areas rate of growth than other areas (Figure 1.13).80 Controlling near the lake in Niger stood at 13 percent compared with for the initial level of nighttime lights and population size 20 percent for the rest of the country. A similar pattern as well as other socioeconomic and geographic factors (as can be seen in Nigeria, where cell phone ownership is shown in Figure 1.12), market access is indeed one of the 5 percentage points lower in the regions near the lake. main determinants of local growth (approximated by the Chad is the only exception, where ownership is higher in intensity of night lights) in the four Lake Chad countries areas near the lake compared with the rest of the country as well as within the Lake Chad region itself (the areas (20 percent versus 16 percent, respectively). surrounding the lake).  igital connectivity in and around the Lake Map 1.12: D Figure 1.13:  Market accessibility index and regional Chad region (2018–2019) growth Annual rate of growth in NTL, 1992–2013 0.1– 0.08– 0.06– 0.04– 0.02– 0– -0.02– -0.04– -0.06– <50pc 50–75pc 75–95pc >95pc Source: Masaki and Rodríguez-Castelán 2021, technical paper for this report. Note: Excludes outside values. The results are based on the beta-convergence regression where the dependent variable is the annual rate of growth in nighttime light luminosity between 1992 and 2013 and regressed on a number of socioeconomic, demographic, and geographical variables. The analysis is performed based on the sample of 5,212 grid cells (at a spatial resolution of 0.1 degrees) defined over the Lake Chad Basin countries that were lit (with a positive digital number in nighttime light luminosity) at some point between 1992 and 2013. Sources: Africa Bandwidth Maps (dashboard), Hamilton Research, Bath, UK, http://www. africabandwidthmaps.com/; Mobile Coverage Maps (dashboard), Collins Bartholomew, HarperCollins Publishers, Glasgow, https://www.collinsbartholomew.com/mobile- coverage-maps/. Connectivity to regional hubs like N’Djamena and Note: Mobile coverage corresponds to 2018. Fiber optics correspond to 2019. The 2G/3G coverage data should be treated with caution, however, because the Collins Bartholomew coverage maps do not necessarily include all network providers in each country. Thus, this Maiduguri appears to be particularly important for coverage map should be treated as a lower bound of 2G/3G availability. growth in agriculture and livestock trade. For instance, fish routes were still supplying several tons of produce to the regional hubs of N’Djamena and Maiduguri with an annual estimate of 50,000 to 100,000 tons of fish 80 These results are drawn from Masaki and Rodríguez-Castelán (2021), technical paper for this report. 34 1.4 Territorial Development within the Lake Chad region Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum per year between 2010 and 2014.81 As noted above, the entire region.88 These findings imply that investments in livestock trade is vital for the region and crossborder trade enhancing connective infrastructure to improve market has long played a role in trade in livestock markets in access for the Lake Chad region does not guarantee gains Africa.82 Traditionally, livestock trade routes from Chad in agricultural expansion unless such investments are and Niger pass through Maiduguri on the way to regional made in tendon with complementary policies to secure markets.83 Sixteen out of 97 large livestock markets in the peace and security in the region or at least mitigate the four countries are located nearby Lake Chad, while more negative impact of conflict. than half of the livestock markets are within 100km of the border.84 Better access to connective infrastructure in the Lake Chad region is also associated with a shift away Improved access to markets serves to expand from agricultural jobs. Using data on the expansion agricultural activities. An analysis of access to markets of infrastructure and the sectoral composition of and land cultivation using over three decades of remotely employment at the subnational level, the analysis89 shows sensed and geospatial panel data shows that an increase in that access to paved roads is linked with diversification market access is associated with an increase in cultivated away from agriculture in the Lake Chad region. More land.85 Given the modest gain in length of paved road, substantively, having access to paved roads is associated the growth in population, which is a proxy for the size of with a 6 percentage point reduction in the employment the market, is the main driver for the increase in market share of agriculture, and a 4 percentage point increase access. A 1 percent increase in market access is associated in the employment share of manufacturing and a with a 3.9 percent increase in cropland area. Given the 2 percentage point increase in the employment share approximate total of cropland in the four countries of services. These effects are even larger in the districts is nearly 600,000 km2, this result implies a growth of neighboring Lake Chad, where having access to a paved around 23,400 km2 given a 1 percent increase in market road at the district level is associated with a 13 percentage access over 9 years.86 point reduction in the employment share of agriculture, a 8 percentage point increase in the employment share The positive impact of market access on agricultural of manufacturing, and a 5 percentage point increase in activities is constrained by conflict and insecurity. the employment share of services. In particular, road As discussed above, market access is associated with an connectivity appears to have particularly significant increase in cropland area. This result, however, does not impact in Cameroon, where access to paved roads is incorporate short-term shocks or uncertainty in traveling associated with a reduction in agricultural employment to markets, especially related to conflict.87 Indeed, the by 12 percentage points and roughly a 6 percentage same analysis shows that areas that are closer to conflict point increase in both manufacturing and service sector events experience slower cropland expansion over the employment, respectively. 81 Lemoalle and Magrin (2014). 82 de Haan et al. (1999). 83 WFP (2016a, 2016b). 84 Blankespoor (2021), technical paper for this report. 85 Specifically, the panel includes the following years: 1983, 1992, 2001, 2010 and 2019. 86 The harmonized night light series includes both the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program–Operational Line-Scan System and Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite satellites. 87 Travel time assumes the fastest route and does not include any measures of delays or roadblocks. Conversely, Van Der Weide et al. (2018) incorporate road closure obstacles in the travel time analysis to quantify the impact of market access on local GDP in the West Bank. 88 Blankespoor (2021), technical paper for this report. 89 The results presented in this section are taken from Lebrand (2021), technical paper for this report. 1.4 Territorial Development within the Lake Chad region 35 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace While structural transformation may directly by the World Bank: i) an alternative road transport contribute to poverty reduction in the long run, its corridor to Chad; and ii) the rehabilitation of the rail impact may be more nuanced in the short run. As line in Cameroon.90 The alternative road corridor links noted above in this report, despite having a relatively high N’Djamena, the capital of Chad, with Moundou, the share of non-agricultural employment, parts of the Lake second city in Chad and Ngaoundéré in Cameroon.91 Chad region of Nigeria and Cameroon still have relatively The investment project of the rail line in Cameroon high poverty rates. A transition away from agriculture consists of the renovation of the main rail line between per se does not necessarily guarantee immediate poverty Ngaoundéré, Yaoundé and Douala. Overall, those two reduction and complementary policies and investments transport corridor projects alone would not expect to yield are also needed to increase productivity for farmers— substantial welfare gains without any complementary which still account for a disproportionate number of the policies to reduce crossborder frictions. When combined poor in the region. with a reduction in crossborder frictions, regional real income (i.e. the sum of real incomes for the entire Overall, the welfare effects of the new transport population in a given region) is expected to increase— corridors are positive but modest unless combined with particularly in areas within the Lake Chad region where complementary policies to reduce border frictions. the overall welfare gain is estimated to be around a Map 1.13 graphically shows the estimated welfare gains 5 percent increase in the overall real income of people from two pipeline infrastructure investments financed living in the region. Map 1.13:  Regional welfare impacts from transport corridor investments (left) with additional border reduction (right) - percentage change in regional welfare. 10 10 5 5 0 0 Ndjamena Ndjamena −5 −5 Abuja Abuja −10 −10 Lagos Lagos Yaounde −15 Yaounde −15 Source: Lebrand 2021, technical paper for this report. Note: The maps show the welfare impact of the two proposed infrastructure investments with and without complementary policies to reduce border-crossing time by half. The model used to estimate expected welfare effects from the proposed infrastructure investments consider the combined effect of those investments with a reduction in travel time for crossing borders. The model assumes the effect of halving border-crossing time from 30 hours to 15 hours. 90 The model does not consider investments in electricity and internet. The plan for future research is to include those infrastructure sectors in the model and link it with the empirical analysis. 91 Because of insecurity in the Far North, road transporters now opt for this alternate route (rather than the more direct route through Maroua and Kousséri) and therefore the corridor is in need of investment to sustain the increase traffic. In 2015 alone approximately 500,000 tons of goods passed through this corridor compared with 40,000 tons through the previous corridor (CPCS-EGIS, 2019). 36 1.4 Territorial Development within the Lake Chad region Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum 1.4.3 Division creates the thickest borders. While borders in the rich world have become increasingly thin, hereby facilitating trade and the movement of people and capital, borders in The historically strong crossborder trade around many developing countries remain thick, as is generally Lake Chad has been disrupted by the Boko Haram conflict, a source of division in the region. the case in the Lake Chad region. At the same time, Yet, regional trade shows signs of resilience, borders in the areas around Lake Chad have historically and exploiting further trade opportunities could been characterized as relatively porous—with trade and have a direct positive impact on household social ties permeating borders. This mobility, however, incomes and employment. has subsided over the last decade with the hardening of borders and counterinsurgency measures as a response to the Boko Haram insurgency. Together with density and distance, the third important geographic dimension for territorial development is division. It applies at both national and international 1.4.3.1 Boko Haram scales. At the national scale, nations can be internally divided due to conflicts and tensions arising from The intensification of conflict in the Lake Chad region linguistic, ethnic, religious, cultural, or political divisions. since the rise of Boko Haram in 2009 has been a large At the international level, divisions mainly arise from so- source of division driving the laggardness of the region. called thick borders, i.e., the many restrictions countries While the group was fist founded in 2002, the insurgency impose on other countries regarding the flow of goods, is considered to have begun in full in 2009 in Nigeria. In capital, people and ideas.92 Thick borders limit trade 2014–15, it expanded into northern Cameroon, Niger and and the flow of factors of production. Interstate conflict Chad. Since then, the group has retreated into inaccessible Map 1.14:  The evolution of the number of Boko Haram violent events from 2009–2020 Sources: Blankespoor (2021). technical paper for this report. The elaboration is based on ACLED (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project) (dashboard), Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, Austin, TX, http://www.acleddata.com/. 92 Fratianni and Kang (2006). 1.4 Territorial Development within the Lake Chad region 37 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace areas, mainly along the borders, but has continued to well as a site of strong domestic trade in local (mostly carry out more frequent and sophisticated attacks.93 Boko agricultural) productions. Trade, however, has historically Haram has been aligned with the Islamic State of Iraq and been informal in the region, with official trade figures the Levant since 2015.94 It is not a unified group; in 2016 tending to underestimate actual flows. A recent study, it split into two factions: the Islamic State’s West Africa for instance, suggests that Nigeria exported more than Province (ISWAP) and Jama’atu Ahl al-Sunnah lil-Dawa 213,000 metric tons of nonfuel products to Cameroon wal-Jihad (JAS).95 At its peak—that is between 2010 and annually, i.e. over forty times the official estimates.97 The 2015—the group seized a large swath of territories in crossborder trade largely took place between the two largest Nigeria’s North East, including major cities, pushing the cities in the area, N’Djamena in Chad and Maiduguri government of Nigeria to declare a state of emergency (an in Nigeria, across secondary cities such as Maroua in action that was later followed by other governments in Cameroon and Yola in Nigeria, as well as between a the region). While most of the attacks between 2009 and growing number of smaller towns and market towns.98 2013 were geographically concentrated in a few states in There are also important trade flows between Zinder in the northeastern corner of Nigeria, the terrorist group Niger and Kano in Nigeria. Official crossborder trade is moved some of its activities to the neighboring areas the main source of public revenue collected locally for of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger (Map 1.14). Vigilante landlocked countries: tax revenue collected by customs groups have been created in response to the insurgency, funds most of the public services (including salaries of and these are becoming increasingly violent. civil servants, in some cases).99 Regional integration through crossborder trade has 1.4.3.2 Crossborder Trade Barriers been severely disrupted by road/border closures associated with the Boko Haram insurgency.100 The Lake Chad Region has historically been Both crossborder and inter-regional trade have been characterized as a system of (mainly informal) regional substantially affected by the conflict. In Nigeria and and crossborder trade. The Lake Chad region is heavily Cameroon, most trade took place through the corridor dependent on trade flows from neighboring areas, as a connecting Maiduguri in Borno State in Nigeria to landlocked area that is more than 1,300 km away (in the Kousséri or Maroua in Cameroon’s Far North Region.101 case of Maiduguri) from the main ports of Cameroon The lack of border infrastructure also constrains and Nigeria. Economic interdependence has historically crossborder trade. The only international city-to- manifested in strong (though largely unrecorded and city crossing is between Kousséri in Cameroon and informal) crossborder trade.96 Trade flows straddle the N’Djamena in Chad; while most manufactured goods in Lake Chad region both from east to west and north to Chad tend to arrive by road from Douala in Cameroon. south. The region serves both as a transit corridor as Intensification of the conflict since 2009, as well as the 93 Magrin and Perouse de Montclos (2018). 94 Vivekananda et al. (2019). 95 The indiscriminate targeting of civilians appears to have been a major point of disagreement. The extremist group ISWAP avoids harming civilians, focusing mainly on military and government targets (Samuel 2019). 96 See Magrin and Pérouse (2018). 97 World Bank (2013a). 98 Magrin and Pérouse (2018). 99 This claim was made regarding landlocked countries: Chad, Mali, Niger and CAR, in contrast to Cameroon and Nigeria: “le commerce transfrontalier est la principale source de revenus publics perçus localement: les recettes fiscales collectées par les douanes alimentent la majeure partie des activités des services publics (y compris les salaires des fonctionnaires dans certains cas)” WCO (2018). 100 WFP (2016a, 2016b). 101 Magrin and Perouse de Montclos (2018). 38 1.4 Territorial Development within the Lake Chad region Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum closing of land borders in Nigeria since 2019, and the Conflict has significantly shifted the pre-crisis trade state of emergency declared in Diffa and the Lac region in routes. A study for the Lake Chad Governors’ Forum Chad also in 2019 disrupted this trade flow. Banditry and discusses the resulting shifts in trade patterns.106 The use armed attack threaten the trucking routes, reducing the of major roads in the Borno State has been restricted107, circulation of vehicles. In the few places where physical with the situation only partially improving since 2015. border control exists, ‘thick borders’ arise due to conflict The overall volume of traded goods and services appears and insecurity102—suicide bombings occur regularly by to have declined. However, alternative functional trade pedestrians heading to the market, drivers of taxi motos, routes emerged.108 In these, trade has shifted away from even by children entering schools. Since Boko Haram the Borno State to safer courses through Niger and and its splinter groups tend to be viewed regionally as Cameroon.109 These routes, however, are often costlier a Nigerian problem, security and surveillance are largely in terms of time and distance.110 Displacement of trade concentrated along terrestrial borders with Nigeria.103 also has complex effects in terms of redistribution of economic activities. The corridors between Nigeria and Conflict and insecurity in the region have also raised Cameron South of the Far North Region in Cameroon the cost of regional trade. A survey of 305 transporters will benefit from the increased activity that has left the undertaken on behalf of the World Food Programme corridors of with Maroua and Kousséri. On the other in 2016 found that banditry and insecurity became the hand, the displacement of cattle herds to the Adamawa main cause of concern for transporters in two of the four and Northern regions of Nigeria and Cameroon, fleeing countries and the second constraint in Cameroon and insecurity in the Far North (and conflict in English- Niger behind road infrastructure, which also ranks high speaking regions), create potential source of conflict in Chad and Nigeria, offering a reminder that transport between farmers and herders as competition for resources was never easy in the region.104 The same survey found increases.111 that, with the crisis, supply routes for cereals in Borno State became subject to a particularly high number of In addition to the direct negative impact of Boko checkpoints (every 15 km) and a high total amount of Haram on regional trade, counterinsurgency measures payments, as in other regions, such as Diffa in Niger. adopted by the governments—such as border and Country policy decisions also continue to interfere with market closures—have also stymied the movement of trade such as the recent decision by Cameroon to ban people and goods in the region.112 Douala is the closest exports of cereals to neighboring countries.105 maritime port to the capital city of N’Djamena, with approximately 79 percent of imports passing through the 102 Porous borders attract informal cross border trade (ICBT) both to save on customs duties and to avoid security forces concentrated at official crossings to check vehicles and inspect declared goods. When ICBT shifts to open land and nighttime crossings, insurgents often follow, looking to extort protection payments or confiscate goods. It is argued that the frequency of border attacks by insurgents may also be stimulated by the absence of security forces, due to poor resource allocation and funding. 103 WCO (2018). 104 WFP (2016a, 2016b). 105 Data on Cameroon, FEWS NET (Famine Early Warning Systems Network) (dashboard), FEWS Net, Washington, DC, https://fews.net/. 106 Caestens (2019). 107 An estimated 750 commercial vehicles were attacked by armed groups mainly in Borno (Mercy Corps et al. 2017). 108 Sissons and Lappartien (2016) report that traders had to take alternate routes instead of the direct 125 km route between Diffa and Maiduguri, the main market for red pepper in Northern Nigeria, resulting in an increased distance of 430 km for traders (in the best of case). 109 Two of these routes suitable for crossborder exchange are between Yobe State in Nigeria and Diffa in Niger (Geidam/Nguru – Diffa) and between Adamawa State in Nigeria and Garoua in Cameroon (Yola/Mubi – Garoua). 110 World Bank (2018). 111 Data on Cameroon, FEWS NET (Famine Early Warning Systems Network) (dashboard), FEWS Net, Washington, DC, https://fews.net/. 112 Magrin and Perouse de Montclos (2018). 1.4 Territorial Development within the Lake Chad region 39 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace port.113 However, the deteriorating security situation on Lake Chad, Chadian traders went to the Niger customs the Northern segment of the Douala-N’Djamena corridor to negotiate the way in which their goods—which would has been a serious concern for transport operators, who now transit through Niger on their way from Nigeria to have explored the use of alternative transport routes. Chad—should be declared.115 The road that avoids the Far-North of Cameroon, going through the Chadian territory has gained interest and Enhanced crossborder trade can have positive effects traffic, and the Chadian authorities and their developing on income and employment, particularly if it builds partners are considering upgrading the road.114 Instead on the existent strong informal trade. Crossborder trade of going from Ngaoundéré via Garoua and Maroua provides basic needs to populations living far from capital (Cameroon) to N’Djamena, the new corridor would run cities and national points of entry. People living in the from Ngaoundéré East to Koutéré (Cameroon) and then areas surrounding Lake Chad are characterized by having continue North to Moundou (Chad) and N’Djamena strong trade, ethnic, cultural, and political ties, making (about 600 km). Parts of the road still need to be these administrative areas economically interdependent. reconstructed or rehabilitated to make this alternative Exploiting opportunities for crossborder trade is likely to branch capable of sustainably handling the substantial have a direct impact on incomes and employment in the increase in traffic. region, particularly if the extensive informal trade relations can be capitalized on. The growth of regional value-chain, While crossborder trade has decreased as consequence especially in agricultural products and food processing, of conflict, it shows signs of resilience, including could be a key mechanism for enhancing economic through the strength of social networks. The extent opportunities within the region and beyond. Currently, of economic interdependence among the different poor trade facilitation and weaknesses in institutions, areas of the Lake Chad region is manifested in (mainly regulations, and monetary policy management exert unrecorded) strong crossborder trade. While the volume significant costs on intraregional trade in some countries. of goods and services traded has been impacted by the For instance, the trucking industry in West and Central security situation, some trade routes remain functional Africa is characterized by the presence of cartels offering and new ones have emerged, as outlined above. The high prices and low service quality. networks of family relationships, inter-connected border communities, and local alliances have bypassed many of Smuggling is commonplace in the Lake Chad region. the official restrictions on trade and movement of people, Smuggling tends to occur in border zones, particularly as well as conflict areas, and so borders in the Lake Chad where varying levels of subsidies and tax regimes exist region remain relatively permeable. The social structure between borders. One of the forms of contraband is based of local traders has been noted as beneficial to their around the subsidized price differentials of commodities adaptation to the conflict, including by negotiating new between oil-producing states and their neighbors, in the trade routes with state officials. For example, Bol traders form of trade from North African states to communities in Chad routinely send someone to foreign ports or cities along their southern borders in Chad, Niger and Mali.116 to trade on behalf of other traders, and they consolidate Illegal smuggling has an added economic incentive where their cargoes by means of transport. When the presence of import duties are high, often the case in resource-poor Boko Haram led to the end of the circulation of boats on countries neighboring large petroleum producers.117 Even 113 Taniform (2014). 114 United Nations and World Bank (2018). 115 WCO (2018). 116 Shaw and Reitano (2014). 117 For descriptions of this dynamic in the Maghreb, please refer to Ayadi et al. (2014). 40 1.4 Territorial Development within the Lake Chad region Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum margins on licit consumer goods can be significant. Fuel sold in Nigeria is subsidized, which reduces its price and makes its trafficking to neighboring countries attractive. Fuel trafficked out of Nigeria is also sourced from millions of liters of crude oil either stolen or diverted to be refined in artisanal distilleries. This fuel feeds contraband, both nationally and regionally, to the neighboring countries.118 Furthermore, smugglers of small quantities of black- market gasoline tend to be profiled as Boko Haram enablers and are detained or arrested. 118 Assanvo et al. (2019). 1.4 Territorial Development within the Lake Chad region 41 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace 1.5 Climate Change and FCV challenges 1.5.1 Climate Change and Harsh More frequent climate anomalies—rising Environmental Conditions temperatures, and aridification in particular— are associated with a rise in conflict activities The Lake Chad region has historically been subject in the region. to various climatic and environmental risks, such as recurrent droughts, rising temperatures and increasingly erratic rainfall patterns. Between the Territorial underdevelopment—rooted in low 1960s and the mid-1990s, the Lake Chad shrank due economic density coupled with high distance and to severe and recurrent droughts, which resulted in lost division (3Ds)—is intricately linked to another layer economic opportunities and displacement of people of risks that are characterizing the region: conflict and in search of new ways of life.123 Looking at patterns of climate change (2Cs). On the one hand, suboptimal climatic conditions over the past two decades, there is a territorial development can be a direct source of fragility sign of rising temperature in the Lake Chad region (Figure and conflict. A well-established body of literature exists 1.14).124 Across the Sahel, temperature is increasing that highlights the primary role that poverty and low 1.5 times faster than the global average. Furthermore, economic development play in fueling conflict and temperature is predicted to increase by 0.65–1.6°C and instability.119 On the other hand, conflict and fragility precipitation is estimated to decrease by 13–11 percent also perpetuate underdevelopment, the feedback loop in the next two decades (that is, 2016–2025 and 2026– that is commonly referred to as a conflict trap.120 The 2035) relative to 1961–1990.125 Analysis of patterns in ongoing conflict in the Lake Chad region can also be seen the standardized precipitation-evapotranspiration index as a manifestation of long years of underdevelopment.121 (SPEI)—which measures the extent to which the amount Furthermore, increasingly erratic climate conditions in of rainfall in a given location deviates from its historical the Lake Chad region have intensified competition for average after taking into account the ability of the soil to limited resources and triggered conflict and violence, retain water—reveals that rainfall shortages appear to be which have in turn stymied the economic progress of increasingly common in the Lake Chad region (Figure the region.122 As highlighted in the analytical framework 1.15).126 These increasingly erratic climate conditions are (Figure 1.1), it is this nexus between suboptimal territorial making the livelihoods of people in the Lake Chad region development and deepening fragility and climate risks more uncertain and vulnerable. that entrenches the laggardness of the region. Increasingly erratic climate and its impact on the hydrology of the lake present a significant risk to livelihoods and food security across the region. The 119 See, for instance, Hess and Orphanidis 1995; Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Collier et al. 2003; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Sambanis 2004; Blomberg et al. 2006. 120 Collier et al. 2003. 121 Tayimlong 2020. 122 GEOGLAM 2020. 123 Vivekananda et al. (2019). 124 The results presented in this section come from Fisker (2021) “Conflict and Climate in the Lake Chad Region”, technical paper for this report. 125 Mahmood et al. (2019). 126 The calibration period for the SPEI is January 1950 to December 2010. 42 1.5 Climate Change and FCV challenges Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  rends in vegetation health (NDVI), Figure 1.14: T  rends in the Standardized Precipitation- Figure 1.15: T temperature, and rainfall, 2001–18 Evapotranspiration Index Standard deviations from the mean 3– 3– 2– 2– 1– 1– 0– 0– -1– -1– -2– -2– -3– -3– 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 ▬ Vegetation health ▬ Temperature (day) ▬ Temperature (night) ▬ Rainfall Source: Fisker 2021, technical paper for this report; normalized difference vegetation Source: Fisker 2021, technical paper for this report; SPEI (Standardised Precipitation- index (NDVI): MODIS (Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer) (dashboard), Evapotranspiration Index) (dashboard), Spanish National Research Council, Zaragoza, Terra, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington, DC, https://terra.nasa. Spain, https://spei.csic.es/index.html. gov/about/terra-instruments/modis; rainfall and temperature: WorldClim, https://www. Note: The figure shows SPEI values (6 months) over the past seven decades. worldclim.org/. Lake Chad region contributes to the food security of are unsure of what crops to specialize in, and when to 13 million people within a range of 300km, considering switch from one occupation onto another. connections with regional towns127 and the Sahel region as a whole, which relies on resources from Lake Chad.128 Climate conditions are key determinants of local Droughts and human activities appear to have altered the economic growth in the LCB countries where hydrology of the lake through stream flow modification agricultural remains the most dominant economic and water diversion129, contributing to the water scarcity sector. Climate conditions play an integral role in and fragility of the region.130 Droughts can challenge determining local economic growth particularly in agricultural production (in addition to being linked with agrarian areas whose livelihoods rely critically on weather increases in violence against civilians).131 The fluctuations conditions. Between 1992 and 2013, higher-than- in inter-annual and seasonal water can also impede the normal rainfall amounts had greater positive effects on development of stable resources exploitation rights and local economic growth in areas that are largely agrarian the administrative management of a transboundary (and dependent on rainfall) as indicated by a positive resource.132 Uncertainty over the timing, longevity, interaction term between the SPEI and cropland density and strength of rainfall has coincided with increasing (see Figure 1.12). These findings suggest that the impact temperature and wind speeds.133 These shifts are making of climate shocks is not spatially uniform. Thus, assessing it more difficult to understand what land is suitable for the potential risks that erratic weather conditions may agriculture and pastoralism, and to sustain fish catches. pose to local agricultural economies need to be carefully Individuals that rely on the lake for income generation evaluated. 127 Galeazzi et al. (2017). 128 United Nations and World Bank (2018). 129 Lemoalle et al. (2012). 130 Okpara et al. (2015). 131 Begozzi et al. (2017). 132 Sarch (2001). 133 Vivekananda et al. (2019). 1.5 Climate Change and FCV challenges 43 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace 1.5.2 Links between Climate Variability productivity (proxied by greenness) lead to an increase and Conflict in conflict activity.136 For instance, a positive temperature anomaly of one standard deviation is associated with a Conflict dynamics and climate change are closely 17.6 percentage point increase in the yearly number of interlinked in the Lake Chad region. There is a well- conflict events taking place in a given district (at the established body of literature showing the link between second level administrative unit). Conflict events are violent conflict and climate change. Rising temperatures also more likely in areas that experience lower-than-usual and increasingly erratic rainfall patterns due to climate levels of greenness, measured by the NDVI (which also change reduce the opportunity cost of fighting by means lower agricultural productivity). Here, a negative lowering agricultural productivity, weakening state anomaly of one standard deviation leads to an increase in capacity by tightening its fiscal envelope, and intensifying the number of conflict events of 8.9 percentage points. resource competition through displacing people.134 In the The effects of climate factors on violent conflict are Lake Chad region, increasingly erratic climate conditions particularly pronounced in areas that are largely agrarian are also directly linked to conflict events.135 As shown in and more densely populated. Map 1.15, the Lake Chad region is home to a variety of different climate conditions. A large swath of lands in the Increasingly erratic climate conditions make northern parts of Niger and Chad is characterized largely communal violence more likely. For example, in as a desert, with little annual rainfall. Conversely, the Cameroon, livestock transhumance-related conflicts southern parts of the region are home to more vegetation between farmers and pastoralists are an increasing concern (as indicated by higher values in NDVI), enjoying in the country’s Far North Region. Between November higher annual rainfalls. These climatic conditions are and December 2020, the International Organization closely linked to conflict proneness. Based on remote for Migration registered more than 320 transhumance sensing data, the analysis shows that higher-than-usual conflicts. Insecurity and climate variability have forced temperature/rainfall and lower-than-usual agricultural shifts in the seasonal migratory routes of transhumant  verage rainfall, temperatures, and greenness (normalized difference vegetation index) Map 1.15: A Source: Fisker 2021, technical paper for this report. 134 See Burke and Leigh (2010); Brückner and Ciccone (2011); Chaney (2013); Eberle et al. (2020); Fetzer (2020); Harari and La Ferrara (2018); Hidalgo et al. (2010); Miguel et al. (2004). 135 Onuoha (2014); Vivekananda et al, (2019). 136 The results presented in this section come from Fisker (2021) “Conflict and Climate in the Lake Chad Region”, technical paper for this report. 44 1.5 Climate Change and FCV challenges Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum Figure 1.16: The climate-conflict trap Source: Vivekananda et al. (2019). movements, which in turn, contribute to fuel the extreme and more intense weather events in recent years in crisis. The International Crisis Group (Africa Briefing Lake Chad is increasing livelihood insecurity and natural 105) has argued that “There is a danger that traditional resource conflicts and decreasing the coping capacity of transhumance will make the crisis worse than it would individuals and communities to deal with shocks. People otherwise have been.” These community-based conflicts are caught between extremes—conditions are too wet or have led to the formation of militias to protect resources too hot and dry—and those already escaping from violence (as well as to offer protection from armed groups), who are may be uprooted again by droughts or floods. Agriculture then drawn into conflict themselves.137 That said, while it and fishing activities that support most people in the Lake is a potential source of conflict, however, greater mobility Chad region are increasingly subject to weather shocks, can also be a source of resilience, allowing people to move soil degradation, and livestock diseases. Projections toward available resources, regulating social pressures and indicate that weather conditions will only become more generating income by facilitating trade. extreme and unpredictable. Moreover, conflict hinders the ability of communities in the Lake Chad region to Communities in the Lake Chad region are vulnerable adapt to climate change, creating a climate-conflict trap to a “climate-conflict trap.” The size and frequency of that has “fragmented social bonds among families, among 137 In Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Mali and Northern Nigeria, militia groups originally created for self-defense have played a strong role in driving conflict (ICG 2018; United Nations and World Bank 2018). 1.5 Climate Change and FCV challenges 45 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace generations, among ethnic groups and between displaced of conflict: battles, riots, protests and violence against people and host communities, making it harder for civilians. Based on these data, the findings presented here people to cope with and adapt to climate impacts than show that the number of conflicts has increased across in the past.”138 all types of conflict in the region, particularly since the rise of Boko Haram in 2009.140 The number of fatalities Together, conflict and climate change pose a direct from conflict follows a similar pattern. Fatalities began to threat to territorial development, and vice versa. increase since 2009, and peaked around 2014 and 2015, Climate change has made weather increasingly variable at around 1,000 per year, before plateauing from 2016 within the Lake Chad as well as in the surrounding onward (Figure 1.17). countries. The highly volatile security situation created by Boko Haram, negatively associated with the pace of local The decade-long Boko Haram insurgency, which first economic growth, poses another significant economic rose in Northeastern Nigeria, has taken a devastating threat. Mitigating security and climate risks should humanitarian toll in the Lake Chad region. The region remain among the top priorities for ensuring sustainable has 2.7 million internally displaced people, 257,000 growth in the region. refugees, and 5.3 million people who are facing severe food insecurity as of 16 September 2020.141 While other conflicts exist in the area142, the Boko Haram insurgency 1.5.3 The Social and Economic Effects of has been among the chief drivers for a record level of forced Conflict displacement in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin.143 Assuming that displaced people do not return to their places of origin, the accumulated cost of displacement The Boko Haram insurgency has caused a rapid— between 2013 and 2022 would be around N465 billion and lasting—decline in the level of economic activities across the region, particularly affecting (US$2.3 billion), even if further displacement were less developed and less connected urban areas. to be stopped. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, nearly 50 percent of the population in the Diffa region in Niger is in need of Despite government efforts to establish peace and humanitarian assistance, and nearly 20 percent are facing stability, the number of conflicts and conflict-related issues of food security.144 In the case of Nigeria, per the fatalities has been on the rise in the Lake Chad region. same report, nearly 70 percent of the population living in Historical marginalization, exclusion from centers of areas near the lake is in need of humanitarian assistance, power and decision-making processes, and a persistent with 43 percent facing issues of food insecurity. lack of access to services are all structural drivers of fragility in the region, which have made fertile ground The Boko Haram conflict has also eroded the social for the emergence and expansion of Boko Haram.139 fabric of the Lake Chad region. The negative impact The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project of the violent conflict on women and youth tends to (ACLED) (Raleigh et al. 2015) records four different types be disproportionate on these groups’ higher existing 138 Vivekananda et al. (2019), p.10. 139 A lack of state presence in the region and elite capture have been associated with the rise of the insurgency: “The group itself is an effect and not a cause; it is a symptom of decades of failed government and elite delinquency finally ripening into social chaos,” (Felter 2018; Mahmood and Ani 2018). 140 The results presented in this section come from Fisker (2021) “Conflict and Climate in the Lake Chad Region”, technical paper for this report. 141 OCHA (2020). 142 Notably in Burkina Faso, Sudan, the Central African Republic and Mali. 143 UNHCR and World Bank (2016). 144 FAO (2017). 46 1.5 Climate Change and FCV challenges Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum Figure 1.17: Conflict events and fatalities over time across the Lake Chad region Number of events, 2001–2018 100,000– 10,000– 1,000– 100– 1– 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 ▬ Battles ▬ Riots ▬ Protests ▬ Violence … Fatalities Source: Fisker 2021, technical paper for this report. vulnerability.145 The conflict has also reinforced distrust, as well as the destruction of private and public assets.147 whereby people are wary of anyone who may be former The Institute for Economics and Peace put the annual or active Boko Haram combatants. It has eroded social cost of violence in 2019 in Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and cohesion between groups following kidnappings and Nigeria at 6 percent, 7, percent, 8 percent, and 8 percent attacks against entire villages, as well as within villages, of GDP, respectively.148 Between 2011 and 2015, the where the families of members of Boko Haram reside northeastern part of Nigeria—one of the most affected among other people. Heavy handed counter-insurgency regions—suffered an estimated accumulated output loss measures have also contributed to the erosion of social of N1.66 trillion (US$8.3 billion).149 In 2015 alone, cohesion and trust in the State, limiting future rebuilding close to 800,000 individuals in the same subregion lost efforts by governments. their income as a consequence of the forced displacement caused by Boko Haram.150 This resulted in estimated Violent conflict and insecurity have also taken a losses of about N90 billion (US$250 million). significant toll on the regional economy. The level of violence in the region has intensified since 2009 when The rise of Boko Haram has had significant negative state security forces killed 800 of Boko Haram members, spill-over effects undermining the economies of including its founder M. Yusuf.146 At its peak (2015), the neighboring countries. The reduction in nighttime group seized a large swath of territories in Northeastern light could be as high as 20 percent in areas within Nigeria, including major cities. The conflict has led to 200 km from the epicenter of the conflict. It was not the disruption of economic activity and social networks, until 2014 that Boko Haram expanded more formally 145 For example, higher exposure to the risk of violent extremism and criminal activity in the context of high youth unemployment; or increased risk of gender- based violence. 146 Kimenyi et al. (2014). 147 Vivekananda et al. (2019). 148 Estimates include direct and indirect costs of violence. Direct costs of violence are those costs to the victim, the perpetrator, and the government (e.g., military and medical expenditure and cost of policing). Indirect costs of violence are those that accrue after a violent event takes place, and include indirect economic losses, physical and psychological trauma to the victim, and loss of productivity. Estimates exclude spillover effects from conflict and violence, cost of crime to business, judicial system expenditure, domestic violence, and out-of-pocket spending on safety and security by households. Estimates are conservative and should be taken with caution given these exclusions. Methodology includes 19 variables across three domains: 1) Violence Containment; 2) Armed Conflict; 3) Interpersonal and Self-Inflicted Violence. IEP (2020). 149 See World Bank (2015b). Within the region, Borno State suffered from the largest loss in output, which fell by N708.18 billion (US$3.54 billion). 150 Pardo and Rossiasco (2016). 1.5 Climate Change and FCV challenges 47 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace Map 1.16: Boko Haram Conflict in the Lake Chad region a. Boko Haram Area and the Three Countries of Study b. Number of Boko Haram Events, 2009–2018 700– 600– 500– 400– 300– 200– 100– 0– 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Period of analysis After period of analysis J Cameroon J Chad J Niger J Nigeria Source: Jedwab, Blankespoor, et al. 2021, technical paper for this report. its terrorist activities outside Nigeria and into the Figure 1.18:  Boko Haram effects by distance to the Boko Haram area post-2009 (Incl.) territory of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger (Map 1.16, Panel B). Yet between 2009 and 2013—years for which Estimated post-2009 effect (incl.) for each bin 0– temporarily comparable data on nighttime light are available—proximity to the Boko Haram conflict was -0.05– already strongly associated with relative declines in local economic activities in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. -0.1– The analysis indicates that there is a significant effect of Boko Haram in urban areas within a range between 25 -0.15– and 200 km from the insurgency’s activities. The average effect within 50 km suggests that the rise of Boko Haram -0.2– reduces nighttime light luminosity by 15 percent. The effects for 50–100 km, 100–150 km, and 150–200 km -0.25– are -15, -11 and -7 percent, respectively. Within the 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250 Distance bin (Km; to Boko Haram area) 200 km range, the effect suggests an average decrease of Source: Jedwab, Blankespoor, et al. 2021, technical paper for this report. -12 percent (Figure 1.18). These negative spillover effects Note: The figure shows the post-2009 Boko Haram effect for each distance (to the Boko Haram area). Bin 25 corresponds to 0–25 kilometers; bin 50 corresponds to 25–50 kilometer, and so on. *p < .10 **p < .05 ***p < .01 persisted and became even larger post-2013, reaching -35 percent by 2015 and -50 percent by 2018. effects were not seen in urban areas that initially had The negative spillover effects of Boko Haram activities relatively more robust economies (as measured in are particularly significant in urban areas initially less nighttime light intensity) or that had better access to developed and less connected to other markets. The other major markets. The fact that those areas were more opposite is true for more connected towns. Negative resilient and less affected by the Boko Haram conflict is 48 1.5 Climate Change and FCV challenges Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum likely due to their more diversified economies and their decline of 72 percent.157 The loss of mobility required to ability to trade with markets other than those in Northern reach markets has also made for sizable trade losses.158 Nigeria, which became inaccessible with the conflict. Many markets in the Lake Chad region have closed Conflict has significantly disrupted production in the due to security concerns. The ongoing conflict poses primary sector in the Lake Chad region. In Cameroon, significant challenges to economic activities including after Boko Haram extorted farmers in the lake area as a through the closing of markets. Map 1.17, below, provides source of revenue, the army banned the production of a visual description of the number of markets in the region millet and maize (including in certain nonborder areas), that have remained either closed or been operating at a which led to a decline in the agricultural production of low capacity.159 Many markets in Northern Nigeria where cereals and to displaced farmers.151 Estimates suggest most of the Boko Haram attacks took place, were not that, crop yields in Northern Nigeria could have operating between 2014 and 2016. This was partly due been down by 50 percent or more at the height of the to the Nigerian government’s mandate for some markets conflict, compared with pre-Boko Haram times.152 In to close given that these were frequent targets of Boko Chad, cereal production in 2016 was 11 percent lower Haram attacks. Between 2017 and 2020, several markets than in the previous year; while in Cameroon it fell by on the fringe operated with a slightly below or normal 25 percent in the Far North Region.153 The World Food status. However, markets in close proximity to Lake Chad Programme reports that the insurgency likely contributed were well below or not operating at all. More recently, in to the reduction in the production of sorghum and 2020, markets in Chad near the border with Cameroon millet in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states in Nigeria and Nigeria were not operating. by forcing farmers to leave.154 Fishing activities constitute an important source of employment and income in the Crossborder livestock trade has declined as a result region with an estimated value of US$54 million to of the insurgence. Conflict has affected production and US$220 million.155 These activities have been disrupted trade directly, as well as indirectly, through the counter- by the insurgency looking for a source of revenue, as well insurgency measures that restrict movement and put as by the embargo from the Nigerian armed forces to bans on farming and trade.160 Transit flows of livestock stop the insurgents.156 In the Diffa Region in Niger, the seem to be declining. The transit of cattle to Nigeria from revenue of fishers selling smoked and dried fish fell from Chad and Cameroon decreased by 39 percent between US$1,515 yearly before the crisis to US$420, that is, a 2015 and 2016–2017, as shown by customs data from the Yagoua livestock crossing point.161 The deteriorating 151 World Bank (2018). 152 Macaulay (2014). 153 FAO (2017). 154 WFP (2016a, 2016b). 155 FAO (2017). 156 FAO (2017). 157 Oxfam (2017). 158 An anecdotal, yet common example of market and petty trade disruption refers to the Baga fish trade, with an estimate value of US$19 million in annual sales in 2001. Given its profitability and strategic location as a border town on Lake Chad, Boko Haram insurgents overrun the fishing town twice, taking overfishing activities. The securitization response to Boko Haram included the implementation of administrative and security barriers to prevent the insurgents from benefitting from the large revenue stream. Fishing trade fell to a fraction of its previous levels. The security-related road closures also meant that those allowed to fish were not able to transport their fish to markets without military escort. The price of transporting fish increased from approximately N700 precrisis to around N2,000–N2,500 (UNDP 2020). 159 These results are taken from Blankespoor (2021), technical paper for this report. 160 UNDP and OCHA (2016). 161 World Bank (2018). 1.5 Climate Change and FCV challenges 49 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace impact that the conflict has had on Chad’s livestock crops to markets in Northern Nigeria have had to find exports to Nigeria is even more poignant considering that alternative destinations for exports within their own these exports are the country’s second source of foreign country. Restricted access to key strategic trade centers revenue after oil.162 In Cameroon, estimates suggest that in Northern Nigeria (for instance, Baga in Nigeria) have Boko Haram has stolen US$6 million worth of cattle, posed a significant loss for people in the region whose sheep, and goats since 2013.163 Market infrastructure has livelihoods depended critically on crossborder trade (Map also been subject to physical damage. For example, in 1.18).165 Damaturu in Yobe, Nigeria, over 650 shops have been reported to have been damaged.164 Insecurity and restrictions on trade are also affecting prices, exerting upward pressure on food prices while Border crossings have been significantly reduced due to depressing the price of tradeable such as livestock. the heightened insecurity situations surrounding the Security measures, such as the banning of large vessels region. Farmers in Cameroon who previously exported in Lake Chad by the Chadian government led to an Map 1.17: The evolution of market status in the Lake Chad region, 2014–20 Sources: Blankespoor 2021, technical paper for this report; data of FEWS NET (Famine Early Warning Systems Network) (dashboard), FEWS Net, Washington, DC, https://fews.net/; Van Den Hoek 2017. Note: This panel set of maps shows trends in market status in and near Nigeria’s North East, with a selection for each year from 2014 to 2020 during the same month of the publication of the report. 162 World Bank (2015a). 163 World Bank (2018). 164 Mercy Corps et al. (2017). 165 Vivekananda et al. (2019). 50 1.5 Climate Change and FCV challenges Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum Map 1.18: Restrictions on crossborder movement and trade Source: Vivekananda et al. 2019. Note: The map shows a selection of restrictions for illustrative purposes rather than a comprehensive assessment. The selection is based on field research. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by Adelphi or any of the funding parties. automatic increase in the price of transport and goods. Boko Haram also plays an active role in smuggling in According to residents of the city of Bol in Chad, the the region. Like other terrorist groups in the Sahel, Boko price of basic goods increased by 30 percent since the ban Haram works in connection with local criminal groups on vessels came into force.166 Data from the IMF show a to control smuggling routes around the Lake Chad Basin. surge in food prices and inflation in Chad, associated with The insurgency provides young people with motorcycles, lower agricultural production and security disruptions expecting them to monitor the positions of the defense to the crossborder trade flows with Cameroon and and security forces (DSFs), allowing Boko Haram to plan Nigeria.167 Prices in the northeastern part of Nigeria rose attacks or change the routing of contraband transfers as by 5.4 percent annually during 2011–15, while prices for needed. The collaboration tends to be more transactional food items rose by 7.5 percent annually.168 Staple food than ideological, and the proportion of recruited youth is prices in Niger are estimated to have risen steeply in the small.171 Nonetheless, for many youths in the Lake Chad affected areas because of insecurity and the increased region that lack economic opportunities, Boko Haram cost of transport.169 At the same time, the inability to offers potential material and social advancement.172 trade across borders is putting downward pressure on previously traded goods. The prices of livestock in Chad and Cameroon have dropped by 30 to 50 percent, given the countries’ inability to export to Nigeria.170 166 Cantens and Raballand (2017). 167 IMF (2016). 168 World Bank (2015b). 169 WFP (2016a, 2016b). 170 FAO (2017). 171 Lierl (2020). 172 Gaye (2018). 1.5 Climate Change and FCV challenges 51 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace 1.6 Policy Options The analyses collated in this regional economic started recovering since—had a permanent impact on memorandum present a comprehensive diagnostic of local population growth, forcing people to migrate to the Lake Chad region, taking as a basis the feedback urban areas. Both urban and rural settings, however, often cycle between suboptimal territorial development, on lack access to basic services, infrastructure, and income- one side, and FCV, on the other. The memorandum generating opportunities, particularly for women, youth, shows that over the last decades, the Lake Chad region displaced people, and other vulnerable groups. The has displayed little progress in social and economic historically strong crossborder trade in the Lake Chad development, with areas around the lake trailing behind region was disrupted by the Boko Haram insurgency, the rest of the basin countries in terms of poverty which has become a source of social division in the reduction, human capital indicators, and economic region. The combination of low economic density, and growth. Limited access to basic services as well as to high economic distance and division has contributed to markets, infrastructure, and economic opportunities— prevent the region from realizing its potential as a diverse particularly for youth, women and vulnerable groups— and vibrant agricultural and commerce hub, strategically has rendered people unable to accumulate and use assets placed within West-Central Africa, and to lay down productively. At the same time, the region has been foundations toward its structural transformation. stricken by violent conflict and harsh climatic variations. This intersection is at the heart of this memorandum, Violent conflict and climatic change are aggravating which poses that the lag in territorial development is the region’s territorial development challenges. The as much an outcome as a driver of FCV. Specifically, findings illustrate the interlocking links between climate the analysis shows how low economic density and high change and economic progress and stability: from the distance and division—the ‘3Ds’—interact with and negative effect of the variability in the level of Lake Chad potentiate conflict and climate change—the ‘2Cs’—in the on population growth and urbanization, to the more region, with negative impacts on development outcomes, recent variations in rainfall, vegetation and droughts in a self-reinforcing cycle. Breaking free from this cycle and their impact on driving violent conflict and regional toward an inclusive and stable growth path requires instability. Areas near the lake have experienced a higher promoting territorial development as well as reducing share of drought than other parts of the basin countries, systemic risks, strengthening governance, and improving putting livelihoods and food security at risk. Droughts service delivery (See Figure 1.1 in Section 1.2). and human activity appear to be contributing to the scarcity of natural resources, which in turn, is a trigger of Longstanding challenges to territorial development conflict, notably among pastoralists and farmers. There partly explain the Lake Chad region’s enduring are signs of a climate-conflict trap, suggested by the poverty and sluggish economic growth. The region is association between climate anomalies—such as rising characterized by low economic density and the absence of temperature, and erratic rainfall—and violent conflict agglomeration economies, where urban areas are growing in the region. The Boko Haram conflict has affected faster, with widening spatial gaps, and a lack of regional agricultural production, limited mobility and hampered convergence. Connectivity gaps in the region are severe, crossborder trade in the basin. In addition, the conflict particularly in rural areas, which limit people’s access has aggravated social exclusion, curtailing access to to markets and higher-quality jobs. The variability in services and income-generating opportunities, and driven the water level of Lake Chad—whose surface decreased the forced displacement of people. The economic impacts significantly between the 1960s and mid-1990s but has are not limited to the areas directly impacted but have 52 1.6 Policy Options Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum spilled over to neighboring regions. The memorandum complement connective infrastructure. Improvements in shows that less well-connected and developed urban areas transfer systems and local capacity can help strengthen are more affected by the conflict. This underlines the self- the provision of local infrastructure and services. Easing reinforcing link between economic geography challenges, the movement of goods and labor by reducing trade and conflict and suboptimal development outcomes. Policies information barriers can help facilitate trade. By building with the potential to improve territorial development social cohesion, increased citizen participation can help and reduce conflict and the impact of climate variations restore government presence. And, coordinated resource can help break the vicious loop that is making the region management, information and technology transfer can diverge from its long-term potential. help reduce divisions. In this context, there are several policy implications A third implication is that the needed interventions that this memorandum offers. First, as an overarching must generate a ‘big push’, strong enough to alter the matter, it is urgent to address insecurity and conflict existing dynamics in the region. Marginal interventions and restore the rule of law in the Lake Chad region. are unlikely to break or revert the self-reinforcing cycle Notwithstanding progress, violent conflict and insecurity that has kept the Lake Chad region in a suboptimal continue to undermine the stability for the inhabitants equilibrium. It is not that measures that go in the right of the region, and impede advancement in other direction will not have a positive impact on development development areas. Concerted and bold efforts are needed outcomes, but rather, that these single interventions to secure peace as a first step to inclusive and sustainable would be limited in what they can achieve given the growth. complexity of the challenges involved.173 A second implication of the analysis is that for the Fourth, it is important to identify entry points, Lake Chad region to escape its vicious cycle of weak or policy levers, that can help break or revert the territorial development and fragility, actions on several cycle of weak territorial development and climate fronts will be required. Looking for a single action or change and conflict. Breaking this cycle will require policy to act as an engine of security and development a concentrated focus on improved natural resource is insufficient. Addressing the challenges emerging from management and strengthened governance to reduce territorial development and leaving aside those related the high social and economic costs imposed by climate to FCV would risk maintaining the status quo. This is change and conflict. Interventions aimed at mitigating not to say that a single policy implemented in isolation the negative effects of climatic risks can reduce the stress will not have a positive development impact. Yet, when over the primary sector and other economic activities, the objective is to dramatically alter the development but also reduce potential conflicts between pastoralists dynamics in the Lake Chad region, a holistic and and farmers over diminishing land and water resources. coordinated effort along different fronts has the most These policies, coupled with interventions aimed at potential. In this context, a multisectoral approach improving governance and service delivery in the region, for policy implementation, that uses complementary can further reduce conflict and fragility to enhance interventions, is needed to address the interaction between economic prospects and improve the credibility and climate change, violence, and laggardness. For example, legitimacy of governments in the region. The poor stand investments in local public goods and services can to gain the most from a reduction in conflict since they 173 This is also well anchored in the World Bank’s Crisis Response to COVID-19 and Climate Change, which, as discussed in the Development Committee Paper, lays out a broad framework for supporting green, resilient, and inclusive development (GRID) in IDA and IBRD countries. Integrated, longer-horizon GRID strategies are needed to repair the structural damage caused by COVID-19 and accelerate climate change mitigation and adaption efforts while restoring momentum on poverty reduction and shared prosperity. 1.6 Policy Options 53 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace are often the victims. Less conflict implies reductions in The level at which policies are designed and production costs, decreasing spending associated with implemented matters, as well as the understanding protection and elevated transportation costs. A reduction of the institutional function they are serving. The in violence would also create stronger value chains, implementation of the following policy options would potentially contributing to an increase in trade and open benefit from taking into consideration whether they space for other areas of economic activity to grow. It are to be designed and implemented at the regional, would also reduce out-migration from the Lake Chad national, subnational, or community levels. Actions with region and incentivize migrants and displaced people to potential to enhance security, trade, and natural resource return and invest. These policies can lead to an increase management (land, water, climate change) require in productivity for farmers, herders, fisherfolk, and regional coordination and cooperation. On other hand, micro and small enterprises, leading to overall territorial while investments in human capital can have positive development. spillovers onto neighboring regions, improving service delivery and social protection mainly requires robust The policy discussion, next, is organized around policies at the national and local levels (that can also help four crosscutting policy areas: infrastructure, trade, strengthen each country’s social contract). Considering governance, and natural resource management. Policies the different agents and tractions at play, including at the and programs across these four dimensions, which are subnational level, are also key to define whether policies grounded in the analytical framework174, would help would be better implemented through a top-down or strengthen territorial development and reduce FCV, bottom-up approach. It is also useful to consider the three thus helping the region to break free from its current core functions of institutions—and the challenges they low-growth and high-poverty trap. First, investing in address—that can ensure that rules and resources yield the infrastructure can help close connectivity gaps in the desired outcomes, notably: commitment, coordination Lake Chad region, leading to higher productivity and and cooperation (Box 1.1). Under this lens, security better-quality jobs, particularly in rural areas. Second, could be viewed as a commitment problem, requiring enhanced trade and regional integration are associated the appropriate incentives whereby all parties stand to with stronger agricultural value chains, higher incomes, lose if they default on an agreed arrangement. Improved improved food security, and greater stability. Third, coordination between subnational governments— enhancing governance at the local, national, and regional building on the region’s crossborder ties—could help levels is crucial to strengthen the rule of law which is facilitate trade, potentially leading to a better equilibrium needed to mitigate the devastating effects of violent for all parties. The sustainable management of natural conflict on lives and livelihoods and to ensure the resources in Lake Chad and climate change mitigation, delivery of quality services (e.g., access to schools, health on the other hand, will likely require explicit cooperation, facilities, electricity, safe water/sanitation) that would with checks and balances, between the four countries. promote social inclusion and reduce divisions. Finally, improved natural resource management, including more effective land and water management practices suited to 1.6.1 Connective Infrastructure local agroecological conditions, would help mitigate the negative impacts of weather shocks, natural hazards, and A strategy to promote economic agglomeration in climate change on productivity and livelihoods. cities in the Lake Chad region would need to consider establishing better links with rural areas. Density, in the form of economic agglomeration and/or urbanization, 174 Which draws elements from the World Bank (2003, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2013b, 2017). 54 1.6 Policy Options Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  hree institutional functions—commitment, coordination, and cooperation—to increase the Box 1.1: T effectiveness of public policies In insecurity settings, commitment is key to reach credible agreements. Commitment is achieved by establishing institutional arrangements that provide sufficient incentives for all key groups to work within the rules. The commitment is credible because all parties stand to lose if anyone reneges on those arrangements. Coordination can also enhance policy effectiveness for security, growth and equity. For investment and innovation, agents must believe that others will also invest. Institutions can help solve market failures by coordinating both the investment decisions and the expectations of participants. Finally, policies to achieve equitable development require cooperation. Among others, cooperation problems are often seen in the provision of public goods or solving environmental concerns related to overexploitation of natural resources. In coordination problems, multiple equilibriums exist, and policy is a matter of helping make the jump to the optimal one. Solving cooperation problems, by contrast, typically requires credible rewards or penalties to prompt actions that lead to the jointly preferred outcome. Enhancing policy effectiveness Designing policies to improve security, growth, and equity also requires understanding the balance of power among different actors. In the presence of powerful actors who can block or undermine policies, optimal policies from a strict economic standpoint (first-best policies) may not be the optimal implementable policies (second-best but feasible). Adopting an implementable second-best design could therefore be more effective than choosing the seemingly first-best but less-feasible policy. Power sharing and resource redistribution can reduce exclusion and the incentives to engage in violence. Just as exclusion may lead to violence, mechanisms that encourage power sharing—such as legislatures that guarantee the representation of all groups—can reduce the incentives to engage in the use of force by raising the benefits of security. Controlling clientelism can help solve problems related to delivering on redistributive policies. In clientelistic settings, the provision of public spending and services is often used for political purposes, for example favoring certain groups, while more vulnerable groups are excluded from resources. Mechanisms that control clientelism can enhance equity and make commitment to long-term objectives credible. Source: Adapted from the World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law (World Bank 2017). is associated with economies of scale in production and or at least increase their proximity to urban areas. Firms an efficient accumulation of labor and capital, and thus located closer to each other can reduce transaction costs with their potential for economic growth. A large share of and facilitate the exchange of knowledge to improve the rural population in the Lake Chad region, however, productivity, with a higher concentration of jobs. Policy is disconnected from the main road networks, making interventions that improve connectivity between rural it difficult for people to benefit from the agglomeration and urban areas in the Lake Chad region can, in this way, that larger cities offer. Better links with rural areas can promote the growth of cities and reduce marginalization. help low-density areas build up their economic densities Agglomeration in cities would also facilitate public service 1.6 Policy Options 55 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace delivery, presenting possible savings in water, sanitation, previous branch (Ngaoundéré-Garaoua-Maroua). Cost- electricity, and road infrastructure, as well as making it benefit analysis and risk assessments can complement the easier to monitor violence and insecurity, all of which resources and technical expertise necessary to reconstruct are needed to spur economic transformation to boost damaged infrastructure and markets instrumental for re- inclusive growth in the Lake Chad region. launching regional trade. Investing in road infrastructure and connectivity is Investing in digital infrastructure and improving a priority for reducing economic and social distance access to electricity would significantly reduce distance and division. Economic and physical distance hinder and division. As discussed in the report, the Lake Chad the flow of capital, labor, and goods and services. region lags in terms of digital infrastructure, access to Improving connectivity, both within the Lake Chad digital technologies, and access to electricity. Access to region as well as between the region and other areas of electricity, cell phone coverage and broadband internet the respective countries, would improve welfare through infrastructure are drivers of economic growth, with the more income-generating opportunities and better—and potential of higher wages due to the lower costs faced more equitable—service delivery (which can, in turn, by workers and firms, increased earnings of firms and help minimize social divisions). The evidence presented household enterprises, higher consumer surplus derived in this report suggests that access to a paved road is from lower prices, and higher quality of services. Unlocking associated with diversification away from agriculture in private capital and competition to fuel expansion in the Lake Chad region. This is because roads enhance digital and electricity connectivity, particularly in rural access to markets and competition from other locations. areas, hinges on governments building frameworks that Improvements in connectivity can have a catalytic impact promote private sector participation. For instance, public- for improved access to basic services. New investments private partnerships can help engage nonpublic actors to need to take into account existing infrastructure to assume risks and increase the efficiency of infrastructure take advantage of complementarities, and importantly, investments. For digital and electricity services, where making sure that existing roads are safe to travel. cost recovery is possible, it is important to ensure cost- reflective tariffs across the region, and at the same time, A connectivity strategy for the region needs to consider leverage the regulatory capacity of national governments revitalizing damaged infrastructure and markets and (e.g., through competition authorities) to ensure market investing in maintenance and security. Insecurity and contestability and improved service delivery. This is to say poor road infrastructure make up the main impediments that investments in digital and electricity connectivity to trade and transport in the Lake Chad region. need to be accompanied by investments in institutional Revitalizing infrastructure can include the rehabilitation capacity. of roads that provide safe alternative transport routes. Box 1.2 describes an alternative Eastern branch of the Douala- Policies that support urbanization and agglomeration N’Djamena corridor, which has the potential to become a need to take into account associated risks and include more secure route (Ngaoundéré-Koutéré-Moundou) for mitigation measures. By increasing competition, transport operators. To enable this corridor, parts of the urbanization and agglomeration could lead to aggravated road would need to be reconstructed and/or rehabilitated social and communal divisions or entrenching patterns of to ensure that the route can handle a substantial increase exclusion in the short term. In Maiduguri, for example, in traffic—and subsequently be well maintained and the influx of refugees may have contributed to fuel monitored for safety, for which it is important to enhance segregation and communal tensions. Interventions that mechanisms for coordination between local, national, support urbanization and agglomeration could also be and regional agencies. One risk, however, is that once perceived as favoring ‘settled’ farming over nomadic the conflict is mitigated, traffic may not return to the pastoralism. The opportunities and risks of efforts to 56 1.6 Policy Options Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum Box 1.2: Alternative routing of the Douala-N’Djamena corridor Almost 80 percent of Chad’s imports enter the country through the Douala-N’Djamena corridor. The deteriorating security situation and attacks by Boko Haram on the Northern segment of the corridor are a serious concern for transport operators, who have explored the use of alternative transport routes to N’Djamena. In particular, a passage that avoids the Far North of Cameroon and runs on Chadian territory has gained interest and traffic. Instead of traversing from Ngaoundéré via Garoua and Maroua to N’Djamena, the alternative route would run from Ngaoundéré East to Koutéré and then continue North to Moundou and N’Djamena (see figure). In 2015 alone approximately 500,000 tons of goods passed through this corridor compared with 40,000 tons through the previous corridor.a Parts of the road still need to be reconstructed or rehabilitated to make this alternative branch capable of handling a substantial increase in traffic, but corresponding preparations and works are in progress. Source: World Bank elaboration using ARCGIS Pro. The new Eastern branch of the Douala-N’Djamena corridor would provide transporters with an alternative, more secure route to ship their goods to N’Djamena. This would help mitigate against the risk of Chad being cut off from international markets by the Boko Haram attacks in the Far North of Cameroon. On the other hand, the re-routing would drain traffic from the Ngaoundéré-Garaoua-Maroua branch, potentially depriving the population along the corridor of business opportunities. And, there is significant risk of a hysteresis effect. Once the risk of Boko Haram is mitigated and the Far North of Cameroon is safe again, it is unclear that all previous traffic would return to the Ngaoundéré-Garaoua-Maroua branch. The long-term effects of the emergency development of the Ngaoundéré-Koutéré-Moundou branch thus need to be assessed and mitigated to prevent the risk of further economic depression and isolation in the region. Source: Walkenhorst 2021, technical paper for this report. 1.6 Policy Options 57 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace concentrate higher economic density of labor and capital markets, especially near or at borders that are instrumental may play out differently across time, with the benefits of for re-launching regional trade in the medium term. agglomeration being realized in the longer term. While complex to implement, another aspect that could bear benefits is contributing to ensure that local security forces enable roads that are passable to work properly as a 1.6.2 Trade Facilitation route for the transport of goods, without excessive police roadblocks or red tape. Improved customs operations The effectiveness and efficiency of economic and trade is key to revitalize long-distance trade corridors. In the measures intended to counter Boko Haram must be immediate term, however, borders are closed, transport regularly assessed, including at the regional level, as routes have been abandoned, and several markets have these measures often affect the livelihoods of export been disrupted or closed. In this context, it is important producers and traders. This includes considering ways to to provide support for communities that have been allow gradual and safe access to parts of Lake Chad to renew deprived of their traditional export production so that fishing and fish trading, and opening borders. Another they can support infrastructure rehabilitation efforts. important step is to re-evaluate the current restrictions on movement and access to farmland, balancing the need to A key step to recover regional trade is facilitating contain and suppress Boko Haram with the desirability to crossborder trade between the Economic Community restart the local economy. Leveraging spatial data would of West African States (ECOWAS) and Central African help in this regard. Crossborder agricultural trade can be a Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) source of food security and resilience, where weather-and members, taking advantage of the opportunities insecurity-patterns are not neatly confined to national offered in implementing the newly signed the Africa borders, and often the closest source of food supply is Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The four Lake across a border. Given the urgency to boost food security Chad countries are members of different regional trading and restore commercial ties in the wake of COVID-19, blocs: Cameroon and Chad are members of CEMAC it would be important that initiatives aimed at boosting and CEEAC (Economic Community of Central African trade build on the strong informal crossborder trade States), while Niger and Nigeria are part of ECOWAS. practices. Historic ties binding the region are a potential This means that trade is not duty-free between the strength. Elements in the policy levers of trade could two blocs and trade regulations are not harmonized. leverage the resilience of trade networks in the region— For example, the import tariffs applied by Cameroon family relationships, connected border communities, and are generally higher than those charged on imports local alliances—and be designed with a view to better into Niger and Nigeria. Differences in tariff and taxes leverage this social capital (the same could also be applied create incentives for trade diversion and smuggling. in terms of natural resource management). In addition, The recent signing of the AfCFTA agreement and its an aim to manage the crisis, minimizing the potential implementation would eliminate tariffs within the region for additional harm, can benefit from considering short, and offer the opportunity to align other policies. Gains medium, and longer-term priorities. from trade facilitation, in particular, the reduction of nontariff barriers under the AfCFTA are expected to be Functional roads and markets are instrumental to large.175 Trade facilitation and integration measures in recover regional trade and contribute to close divisions. the Lake Chad region could involve, among others, the There is a strong case to focus resources and technical visa-free movement of persons as well as the exemption expertise on reconstructing damaged infrastructure and for agricultural and livestock products and handicrafts 175 See World Bank (2020a). 58 1.6 Policy Options Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum of the requirement to be accompanied by a certificate 1.6.3 Governance of origin.176 Complementary trade facilitation measures would also enhance the benefits of transport corridors. Restoring a positive state presence in the Lake Chad For example, reduced border frictions (smaller transport region is paramount. Improving the delivery of basic waiting times) would have positive economic effects, as public services is a foundational aspect of restoring state shown in this report, including positive spillover effects presence, not only because of the need for basic services on nearby countries. but as a cornerstone to start rebuilding government legitimacy in the region. Improved accountability Investing in economic infrastructure to support the and transparency of state structures are also necessary collection of data on economic activity and trade can to rebuild government legitimacy, which can help provide policymakers with a better information base. improve—and sustain—security in the area. Addressing More and better data on traded quantities in markets and the attrition of public institutions can provide a better the sources of supplies could be collected and monitored, foundation for peace than a focus on a rapid exit from as well as more comprehensive and consistent market price asymmetric conflict. Strengthened institutions that can data than those currently available. Novel data gathering create incentives both to reach agreements and to enforce techniques (e.g., remote sensing, border surveys, cell them can create the foundations for peace and stability.178 phone data records) would help better understand the Promoting inclusive decision-making processes at the complexity of trade and smuggling in the Lake Chad local level can help increase the participation of citizens region, and how these are evolving. Priorities in this in the development of their communities, which can regard include improving the collection of information also increase legitimacy and the sustainability of efforts. along points of entry/exit and trade routes, for instance In some cases, effective state presence may also imply by attaching geospatial data (locations, roads) to customs striking a balance between governments’ decentralization declarations, intelligence reports, and fraud cases. processes while strengthening local governments to ensure they have the sufficient capacity to carry out their Having substantive input from borderland functions. communities for economic development strategies, including trade, can help with the sustainability of Increasing the opportunity cost of engaging in violence efforts. Research suggests that strict border controls and providing economic opportunities to younger negatively affect borderland communities, increasing populations is needed to mitigate conflict. Engagement unemployment, crime, and outmigration.177 Rather than in decision-making structures can contribute to reduce relying solely on security institutions as the dominant state youth vulnerability and exclusion, while better economic representatives in borderlands, border security practices opportunities can discourage engaging in violence by can benefit from increased participatory local governance increasing the relative opportunity cost of fighting. and state-sponsored people-to-people dialogue at the This report shows that droughts and abnormally high border. temperatures correlate with higher incidence of conflict possibly by lowering the opportunity cost of fighting. It is therefore crucial to provide alternative sources of livelihoods to people living in areas struck by heatwaves and droughts. In some cases, encouraging migration to 176 These measures are already part of the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme and could possibly be applied at ECOWAS-CEMAC borders on a reciprocal basis. 177 Ayadi et al. (2014). 178 United Nations and World Bank (2018). 1.6 Policy Options 59 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace urban or more fertile areas could be applicable (where institutions; fostering community-level reconciliation recipient areas, with basic service provision and income- and the establishment of institutional mechanisms for generating opportunities in place, have the potential to conflict resolution, in addition to the disarmament, absorb migrants). demobilization, de-radicalization and reintegration of ex- insurgents. Another key aspect to mitigate the violent conflict is to restore social cohesion and trust between citizens Investments in both local government capacity and and the state, as well as between communities. The community voice in the Lake Chad region hold great Boko Haram insurgency in the region has led to the potential to improve the quality and inclusiveness disruption of social bonds, the decline of social capital of service delivery, as well as government legitimacy. and the erosion of the social contract. Growing distrust, Strengthening state authority and institutional capacity, fear and anger toward people of different ethnic, religious with adequate financial and human resources, to enhance and political persuasion and geographical origin, as well the scope and improving the quality of social service as toward those suspected of any association with the delivery at the local level is a key element of restoring the insurgency are being reflected in everyday life—such as social contract.183 Restoring state presence also implies in the avoidance of previously used markets.179 Social responding to the root causes of the insurgency—such as divisions are also frequent among displaced people, who through the provision of quality services in areas where face barriers to integrate into local communities. There is there were no public services before—as well as taking evidence of discrimination and limited access to services advantage of new opportunities, such as formalizing the (education, health care, social assistance, and access to new markets provided by new population concentrations. land and livelihoods) in the region, including in urban Real and perceived state neglect and grievances related to areas that have grown rapidly and unplanned as a result the exclusion of certain regions or groups from services of this displacement.180 In parallel to the disruption of and opportunities can be important drivers of conflict social bonds, the population has also lost confidence in and violence.184 In such contexts, how investments and the government’s capacity to take effective public action, services are delivered matters just as much as what is further eroding the social contract.181 Both social divisions delivered. A key aspect to the sustainable repair of social and loss of confidence in the government contribute to division in Lake Chad is ensuring equity in the provision fuel the ongoing conflict. of public infrastructure and services and employment opportunities by balancing social diversity. Addressing Participatory and inclusive approaches can maximize existing imbalances in access (distance) to services, markets the conditions to repair social divisions.182 Supporting and economic opportunities across different socio- joint social, planning, and development initiatives economic and demographic groups (division) can have between displaced and host communities can help reduce significant implications on employment, poverty and stigma and mistrust. Locally specific projects—that take welfare. Community-driven development mechanisms into account the circumstances of vulnerable groups— can also be a useful step toward repairing service delivery and conflict-sensitive programming help mitigate further in remote, conflict-affected regions where the state is violence. Well-known and trusted strategies to rebuild absent and/or lacks capacity. social capital include supporting and rebuilding local 179 UNHCR and World Bank (2016). 180 UNHCR and World Bank (2016). 181 Magrin and Perouse de Montclos (2018). 182 UNHCR and World Bank (2016). 183 UNHCR and World Bank (2016). 184 United Nations and World Bank (2018). 60 1.6 Policy Options Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum Institutions and social relations (including between rural electrification, taking advantage of solar energy the government and the governed) need to be rebuilt where possible.188 Other priority activities include alongside physical infrastructure, with the engagement education adapted to mobile populations and health of local communities. Greater engagement of citizens initiatives, such as local health stations; construction in planning, budgeting and service delivery can help of regional hospitals, epidemics prevention, and family promote accountability and transparency. Ensuring planning support.189 that historically marginalized groups are represented in discussions on local development decisions would help Improved governance and transparency can contribute address existing divisions, instead of entrenching them. to garner local resources toward public investment. Local governments have a crucial role to play. Central The decline in oil revenues in addition to the negative governments can help create conditions for effective impact from the violent conflict and climate change have local governance, including through the transfer of weakened resources in the region, already experiencing responsibilities and regular financial resources to local weak fiscal management. In addition to support from the governments, and through a more efficient distribution international community, local resources can contribute of roles between local government and government to the sustainability of recovery efforts. Strengthened agencies.185 The consolidation of oversight and check- governance and the provision of services can improve and-balance mechanisms, at both central and local levels, government legitimacy, encouraging citizens to support can help reduce corruption and improve the quality of local development through cofinancing and the joint public services. More transparent and more legitimate management of local investments and the payment of local governments can also be more accountable for their local taxes. budgets and activities.186 Enhancing fiscal space can help support social Public investment in core infrastructure and basic protection efforts. Social protection is important to public services can be an engine for inclusive growth. addressing the need of inhabitants living in poverty. In Evidence from this report shows that access to electricity parallel to creating fiscal space to support social safety in the Lake Chad region is lower than in the rest of the nets (see Box 1.3), priorities for social protection include respective countries, and the gap is widening both for establishing a fiscally sustainable social assistance system access to improved sanitation and electricity. The lack of and leveraging existing partner-financed programs. quality infrastructure and basic public services makes the This could be achieved through better channeling fiscal Lake Chad region less competitive and an unattractive revenues; strengthening coordination and alignment destination for firm entry and job seekers. The low level of across the regional, federal, state, and local levels (for service provision is further compounded by the conflict, example, by leveraging data collection efforts, including which has driven people away from the region. Investing registry databases); building local capacity for program in core services and infrastructure—including, but not delivery; and developing a common delivery platform limited to, roads, water and sanitation services, and digital for programs implemented by different ministries and technology—is critical to unleashing the agglomeration agencies and at different levels of government. Well- potential of the region.187 Public investments can improve designed targeted safety net programs could address the rural and urban water supply and sanitation, as well the specific vulnerabilities of excluded groups, such 185 Magrin and Perouse de Montclos (2018). 186 Magrin and Perouse de Montclos (2018). 187 World Bank (2003). 188 LCBC (2015). 189 LCBC (2015). 1.6 Policy Options 61 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace as adolescent girls out of school, youth, and newly challenges and opportunities of the Lake Chad region poor affected by violent conflict and climate change. remain inadequately studied and are most often looked In the context of the Lake Chad region, improving at through a national lens, whereas effective and the performance of social assistance programs would durable solutions tend to be regional and spatial. Data require specific design and implementation efforts collection and analysis are insufficiently harmonized and to gather and use credible, up-to-date, and relevant coordinated, and subnational data on key socioeconomic information to deliver well-targeted benefits, as well as and governance aspects are often lacking. Backing existing to link cash-transfer and youth employment programs regional initiatives that support better access and quality with other programs for nutrition, education and life of development data, local research capacity, and regional skills, and health services, including at the community policy dialogue would promote evidence-based policy level. Complementarity between health and education making. services and social protection can enhance the impact of interventions. For example, health care, education, and Given the shared and interlinked challenges and social protection services that are effectively combined opportunities across boundaries in the region, can serve as a stepping stone for rapid and successful coordinated approaches and regional bodies can urbanization.190 enable the emergence of a common vision for the development and stability of Lake Chad. Shared Subnational governments are responsible for delivering strategies, with equitable cost-sharing, hold great basic services; yet, they are highly dependent on fiscal potential to address the interlinked security, economic transfers from the national governments to finance and climatic challenges in the lake basin. Under the these services. Box 1.3 shows the case of Nigeria. At the supervision of the African Union (AU), two regional national level, Nigeria, like the other three countries of consortia have been tasked with counterinsurgency and the Lake Chad region, struggles to mobilize domestic regional development, and made mutually accountable. revenues. As a result, there are limited resources to On the security side, the Multinational Joint Task Force transfer to subnational governments. Moreover, because was authorized by the African Union to combat Boko Nigeria depends on volatile oil revenues, fiscal transfers Haram in 2014, under the civilian oversight of the Lake to local governments tend to be not only low but also Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) (see Box 1.3).191 On unstable, to the detriment of basic services. Mobilizing the development side, the LCBC was initially formed domestic revenues and advancing fiscal decentralization, in 1964 to oversee and coordinate national decisions underpinned by enhanced public financial management, affecting the shared transboundary water resources—the is thus a critical priority for national and subnational lake, its tributaries and groundwaters. It was later tasked governments in the region. with security oversight, hence its supervision of the Multinational Joint Task Force today. Given the region’s Investing in data collection and analysis is a tense political economy and history of fractious inter- recommendation that cuts across all policy areas. state relations, translating the aims of these two regional This report highlights the value of data and analysis to institutions into reality is a work in progress. Coordinated inform policy making and development programming, and jointly executed action—for example, border especially disaggregated data that highlight differences cooperation—remains one of the main cornerstones for across groups and territories and that help identify stabilization and economic recovery. patterns of social marginalization and exclusion. The 190 World Bank (2009). 191 Eight member states are represented in the LCBC: Algeria, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Libya, Niger, Nigeria, and Sudan. Parties commit to a shared use of the basin's natural resources. 62 1.6 Policy Options Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  he importance of fiscal transfers for subnational governments in the Lake Chad region: the Box 1.3: T case of Nigeria State governments in Nigeria are responsible for basic service delivery. Together with their respective local governments (774 in total), the 36 Nigerian state governments are responsible for basic education, as well as adult and vocational education, health services, agricultural development, and basic physical infrastructure (sanitation, roads, and other public facilities). The majority of revenues received by the Nigerian state governments (about 70 percent in 2018–2019) come from federally collected oil and nonoil revenues, distributed based on a formula. These revenues originate from customs, corporate taxes, and value-added taxes. They are distributed based on a revenue-sharing formula across the three tiers of government (federal, state, and local). These ‘gross statutory allocations’ are often volatile due the dependence on oil-revenues, which are sensitive to global price fluctuations. States can collect internally generated revenues, which include personal income, property, and road taxes, as well as other fees and levies. These internally generated revenues contribute, on average, about 30 percent of states’ government revenue envelope. States can also borrow, including externally, with a federal government guarantee. Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe—the three Nigerian Figure B1.3.1: N  igerian states in the Lake Chad states in the Lake Chad region—have below-average region have lower revenues and expenditures per person than the total revenues per person, depending thus heavily average Nigeria state on revenue transfers from the federal government. Revenues and expenditures, US$ per capita, 2019 These three states collect less than half the national 70– 66 average in independently generated revenues per 60– 61 capita. As a result, they are more dependent on federal 50– revenue transfers than the national average. Borno, 51 for example, relies on federal transfers for more than 40– 43 80 percent of its revenues. The total annual revenue 30– per capita is equivalent to US$34 in Borno, US$43 20– in Adamawa, and US$52 in Yobe. These figures are between 16–45 percent below the Nigerian 10– state average of about US$60. Consequently, Yobe, 0– Revenue per capita Expenditure per capita Adamawa, and Borno have below-average public J Lake Chad states J All 36 states spending per capita despite the high development Source: World Bank calculations based on data from Nigerian authorities. needs and security issues in these states. A weighted average nondebt public spending per person across Nigerian state government (excluding local governments due to lack of data) is US$66 per year (2019). In contrast, per capita spending in Adamawa (US$49) and Borno (US$40) is well below the national average. The budgetary state spending in Yobe, at US$64 per person per year, comes just below the national average. Insecurity in the Lake Chad states in Nigeria is potentially influencing the composition of state public spending. Yobe, Adamawa and Borno allocated relatively more budgetary resources to recurrent spending components. Although the three states allocated a relatively higher proportion of their scarce budget resources to education and health in 2021 than the average state in Nigeria, they also allocated below average resources for expenditures 1.6 Policy Options 63 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace Box 1.3 continued in the economic affairs segment (which includes agriculture, transport, and other core physical development components), which may undermine their long term economic growth prospects. All Lake Chad states are making efforts to improve their fiscal sustainability. Notably, they are participating in the Federal Government’s States Fiscal Transparency, Accountability, and Sustainability Program for Results, which is supported by the World Bank. This program rewards (through grants) substantive improvements in states’ fiscal and financial management, including revenue and debt management, procurement, and citizen engagement. In fact, Yobe is the top performer across all 36 participating states in Nigeria since the inception of the program, achieving the highest results. All three Lake Chad states also achieved the new COVID-responsive results introduced in 2020 to help marshal fiscal resources to the states amidst the pandemic. 1.6.4 Natural Resource Management Expanding support for producers—in the forms of credit, inputs, extension services as well as investment Strengthening the sustainability of food systems is in infrastructure—is essential to the productivity and a priority. Interventions at the regional level can help resilience of food production systems.194 In addition, strengthen the capacity of food systems to ensure food securing the access of vulnerable populations to land, security. Three areas of focus, identified by a World Bank pasture, and fishing resources (in an inclusive way, and FAO report on West Africa, refer to strengthening promoting coexistence with other producers in the area) the sustainability of the food system’s productive base; can prevent conflict and enable intensification. At the promoting an enabling environment for intraregional same time, initiatives to support agricultural production value chain development and trade facilitation; and may benefit from explicitly recognizing the coexistence of enhancing regional risk management architecture and different—and, at times, competing production models— farmer decision support tools.192 On this last element, such as those of farmers and herders. Agriculture is not risk management tools—such as improved information a homogeneous sector, and understanding the potential and crop and rainfall insurance—can help people tensions between modes of production can shed light on mitigate risks.193 This ability, in turn, can allow people, a core issue of conflict dynamics. particularly the poor, to be more willing to take on risk in search of higher yields and productivity. At the same Securing land rights in the Lake Chad region may time, social protection programs and safety nets can help enhance productivity as well as stability in the help reduce target populations’ vulnerability in hotspot region. The formalization of land rights has the potential areas. Notwithstanding the importance of these tools, the to improve agricultural productivity by incentivizing implementation of these interventions in the Lake Chad farmers to make long term investments.195 Formalizing region needs to be evaluated in the context of limited land ownership may also help reduce friction and conflict fiscal space and considering the time dimension, as well between farmers, pastoralists and fishers vying for limited as—in the case of safety net programs—their potential access to land and water resources in and around the lake implications and interactions relative to the armed basin. This can be particularly important in a context conflict. where increasingly erratic climate has introduced a greater 192 World Bank and FAO (2021). 193 World Bank (2013b). 194 LCBC (2015). 195 World Bank and FAO (2021). 64 1.6 Policy Options Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum degree of uncertainty to the availability of such land and matching mechanism between farmers and agricultural water resources.196 inputs adapted to their climatic and social context.198 Setting up a knowledge dissemination campaign in local There are substantial expected gains from context- languages can raise awareness among local producers of specific natural resource management interventions the potential climatic risks and novel agricultural inputs that take into account the specific circumstances of and techniques available.199 a given population or territory. A key aspect of these interventions is taking into account the cases for which Preventive rather than reactionary policies can more place-based policies—i.e. territorial development—are successfully mitigate risks stemming from climate likely to have a positive outcome, and in which cases change and build local adaptive capacity. Shifting people-based policies—more focused on efforts in urban from ex-post responses to proactive, ex-ante, sustained, areas to better absorb migrants—can be a better alternative. and integrated risk management is no easy feat. Yet, it In the case of the latter, coordinated efforts to strengthen is well documented that the benefits of proactive actions services and employment opportunities in urban areas far outweigh the cost of “risk inaction.” Facilitating an can help ensure that poverty is not merely being displaced environment for coordinated action and risk-sharing in from rural to urban areas. In the case of the former, efforts the region can enable this process while ensuring that to support producers, including vulnerable groups, vulnerable stakeholders are not overlooked. Knowledge considering local tensions and dynamics can bring about sharing and dissemination can help reduce the sustainable productivity improvements, as mentioned uncertainties faced by people living near Lake Chad, for above. Context-specific discussions are thus essential to example, by setting up a regional early warning system inform effective natural resource management. to better cope with natural disasters, such as floods and droughts.200 Overreliance in reactionary policies Investing in sustainable agricultural management discourages investments in adaptive capacity across through technological innovations can help increase poorer households, making them more vulnerable to output and harness existing natural resources. future climate-related shocks, perpetuating the current Technology and innovation can reduce climate conflict-poverty trap. uncertainty among farmers and enable better decision- making, increase yields and reduce waste.197 The optimal Water stress and climate vulnerability validate the use of natural resources driven by technology can be key continued engagement of the LCBC on shared water in reducing environmental degradation and mitigating management, while enhanced participation may be risks stemming from volatile temperature and water needed. Development partners can invest strategically levels. The support from governments in the Lake and ensure a higher standard of donor coordination and Chad region to facilitate this transfer of technology, in harmonization at the regional and basin level, particularly tangent with the international community, can help as climate finance increasingly comes into play (Box 1.4). enable vulnerable populations to benefit from access Member states actively promote and seek funding for to technology. Efforts could include bringing together regional infrastructure for an interbasin transfer, yet lag agricultural research centers and setting up an optimal on the more basic levels of regional cooperation. External 196 See more discussion on the linkage between land rights (or lack thereof ) and conflict in the Lake Chad Basin: https://climate-diplomacy.org/case-studies/ local-conflicts-over-resources-around-lake-chad. 197 World Bank (2019b). 198 LCBC (2020). 199 LCBC (2020). 200 LCBC (2020). 1.6 Policy Options 65 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace support needs to follow the logic of domestic incentives, commitment at the highest level. The priorities identified and design aid so that it promotes—when possible— in this Regional Economic Memorandum seek to help long-term development and conservation focusing on guide policy for breaking this cycle and bridging the gap the southern tributaries of the lake. Examples from other between potentials and actuals. regions suggest that technical cooperation can, in the long run, incentivize member states to take water cooperation more seriously. Strengthening the administrative and institutional capacity of the LCBC could help the organization more effectively manage water resources and climate- response policies. An insufficient clarity of roles and competencies, as well as a lack of investment and interest by member states, emerge as some of the current institutional constraints faced by the commission and the Multinational Joint Task Force (see Box 1.4).201 Enhancing the operational capacity of the LCBC could include regular meetings, data- and information-sharing, and sustainable financing. Establishing viable systems for information and data collection and exchange may pave the way for gradual buy-in and trust-building in the future. Reliable data and hydrological modeling are an urgent concern, especially as plans for major infrastructure works, including those for an interbasin transfer remain on the agenda. National statistical offices could facilitate the standardization of agricultural data collection and set up a readably available database that feeds into early warning forecasting models. The Lake Chad region has vast development potential; unlocking this potential will foster the creation of greater opportunities for its citizens. The region has a young population, is rich in natural resources, and in the past has seen important trade flows. Yet, it is also a region facing long-term and pressing challenges, particularly a self-reinforcing vicious cycle between suboptimal territorial development and FCV. Throughout discussions with stakeholders in the region, there was broad consensus on the need to break the cycle. Doing so will require sustained implementation of a holistic agenda and thus broad societal consensus and a long-term political 201 Assanvo, Abatan, and Sawadogo (2016); Galeazzi et al. (2017). 66 1.6 Policy Options Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum Box 1.4: Transboundary water management in Lake Chad Transboundary water management may serve to consolidate regional interests and prevent resource-related tensions from turning violent. In the Lake Chad region, effective water management of the lake and its tributaries can help foster greater coordination among the four basin countries. While the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) has thus far prevented nonconsensual action by a member state, such as upriver damming, it scores relatively low among other African transboundary water agreements. The efficacy score is based on the degree of transboundary cooperation, or water cooperation quotient, an indicator combining criteria, such as the existence of river basin agreements, a river basin authority, current and planned investment in water infrastructure, political commitment, economic cooperation, and so forth.a As assessed by the Strategic Foresight Group (2017), Senegal, the Gambia, and the Niger river basins ranked highest, meeting 100 percent of the criteria, among 231 transboundary watercourses. In contrast, the LCBC scored 53 percent. The LCBC was initially formed in 1964 to oversee and coordinate national decisions affecting the shared transboundary water resources, including the lake, its tributaries, and groundwaters. Eight member states are represented in the LCBC: Algeria, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Libya, Niger, Nigeria, and Sudan. Parties commit to shared use of the basin's natural resources. The multidonor joint fund, the Sahel Alliance, has undertaken an economic recovery program covering conflict-affected regions of the Lake Chad Basin, though most of its investments are concentrated in the Western Sahel. The Lake Chad Basin Authority’s charter was developed in 2012 to foster the shared management and sustainable exploitation of Lake Chad. As with other progressive water agreements and regional charters, it has not yet entered into force. In 2015, faced with increasing and new forms of insecurity and the absence of a dedicated regional bloc, the LCBC’s mandate increased to include oversight of regional security cooperation through the task force. Yet, in its transboundary water management capacity, LCBC’s leverage over member state interests to deliver coordinated water management is limited. The performance of LCBC is mixed not least because mechanisms and tools to monitor and control the use of water resources are not fully operational. This partly derives from the insufficient clarity of roles and competencies, but also from an apparent lack of political interest and investment among member states. The main players, including Nigeria, have invested some political capital in the organization, but tend to favor more politically visible interventions. For example, the massive proposed transnational inter-basin investment to transfer water from the Congo River Basin to Lake Chad is favored over structural interventions to address the environmental decline and agricultural transformation in the wider basin area, particularly around the southern tributaries of the lake. While technically feasible, the massive infrastructure project is estimated to have an extremely high cost. It has been criticized for potential adverse effects on the ecosystems of both basins as well as possible negative effects on the flow of the Congo basin. The World Bank, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, and other major donors do not endorse the large-scale hydro infrastructure as a Lake Chad basin management solution. These entities have funded multiple studies and proposals for the collective management of the lake resources through the Lake Chad Development and Climate Resilience Action Plan, which funded €6 million worth of feasibility studies for the inter-basin water transfer proposal. UNESCO sponsored the International Lake Chad Conference in 2018 in which LCBC countries endorsed an Italian proposal, Transaqua, as their preferred option for the inter-basin water transfer project.b a. Strategic Foresight Group (2017). b. See PAMACC (2018); Sayan, Nagabhatla, and Ekwuribe (2020). 1.6 Policy Options 67 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace References Afifi, Tamer. 2011. “Economic or Environmental Migration? The push Factors in Niger.” International Migration, 49: e95-e124. Ahmadu, Hamman J. 2011. Farmer-Herder Conflict: Exploring the Causes and Management Approaches in the Lake Chad Region Nigeria [PhD Universiti Utara Malaysia]. http://etd.uum.edu.my/3399/ Aker, Jenny C. 2011. “Dial ‘A’ for Agriculture: A Review of Information and Communication Technologies for Agricultural Extension in Developing Countries.” Agricultural Economics 42 (6): 631–47. Aker, Jenny C. and Isaac M. Mbiti. 2010. “Mobile Phones and Economic Development in Africa.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24 (3): 207–32. Al Jazeera. September 2017. "More than half of Borno schools closed over Boko Haram." Al Jazeera. https://www. aljazeera.com/news/2017/9/29/more-than-half-of-borno-schools-closed-over-boko-haram. Alibhai, Salman, Niklas Buehren, Rachel Coleman, Markus Goldstein, and Francesco Strobbe. 2018. Disruptive Finance: Using Psychometrics to Overcome Collateral Constraints in Ethiopia. Washington, DC: World Bank. Argus Consulting Services. 2016. "The War on Error: Will restricting Nigerian urea stop the threat of fertilizer-based explosives in Africa?" London. Assanvo, William, Ella Jeannine Abatan, and Wendyam Aristide Sawadogo. 2016. “Assessing the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram.” West Africa Report 19 (September), Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria. Assanvo, William, Baba Dakono, Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni, and Ibrahim Maïga. 2019. “Violent Extremism, Organised Crime, and Local Conflicts in Liptako-Gourma.” West Africa Report 26 (December), Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria.Awodola, Bosede and Agyeno Oboshi.2015. “Terrorism in Northern Nigeria: A threat to food security in Maiduguri.” Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 6 (3 S2), 11–11. Ayadi, Lotfi, Nancy Benjamin, Sami Bensassi, and Gaël Raballand. 2014. "An Attempt to Estimating Informal Trade Across Tunisia’s Land Borders." Journal of Urban Research 10. Babajide Milton Macauley, “Land degradation in Northern Nigeria: The impacts and implications of human-related and climatic factors,” (2014). Bagozzi, Benjamin E, Ore Koren, and Bumba Mukherjee.2017.“Droughts, land appropriation, and rebel violence in the developing world.” The Journal of Politics, 79 (3), 1057–1072. Bahia, Kalvin, Pau Castells, Genaro Cruz, Takaki Masaki, Xavier Pedrós, Tobias Pfutze, Carlos Rodríguez-Castelán, and Hernán Jorge Winkler. 2020. “The Welfare Effects of Mobile Broadband Internet: Evidence from Nigeria.” Policy Research Working Paper 9230, World Bank, Washington, DC. Barro, Robert J., and Xavier Sala-I-Martin. 1992. Convergence. Journal of Political Economy, 100(2), 223–251. Barro, Robert. J., Gregory N. Mankiw, and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. 1995. Capital Mobility in Neoclassical Models of Growth. American Economic Review, 85(1), 103–115. Béné, C., Neiland, A., Jolley, T., Ovie, S., Sule, O., Ladu, B., Mindjimba, K., Belal, E., Tiotsop, F., Baba, M., Dara, L., Zakara, A., & Quensiere, J. (2003). Inland Fisheries, Poverty, and Rural Livelihoods in the Lake Chad Basin. Journal of Asian and African Studies 38 (1): 17–51. https://doi.org/10.1177/002190960303800102. Berg, Claudia N., Brian Blankespoor, and Harris Selod. 2018. “Roads and Rural Development in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Journal of Development Studies 54 (5): 856–74. Blankespoor, Brian. 2021. "Building Rural Development in the Lake Chad Region." Technical paper, “Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum,” World Bank, Washington, DC. 68 References Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum Blankespoor, Brian, Yating Ru, Ulrike Wood-Sichra, Timothy S. Thomas, Liangzhi You, and Erwin Kalvelagen. 2021. “Gridded Agricultural GDP of the World.” World Bank, Washington, DC. Blattman, Christopher, and Edward Miguel. 2010. "Civil War." Journal of Economic Literature, 48 (1): 3-57. Blomberg, S. Brock, Gregory D. Hess, and Siddharth Thacker. 2006. “On the Conflict-Poverty Nexus.” Economics and Politics, 18 (3): 237-67. Brockerhoff, Martin and Paul C. Hewett. 2000. "Inequality of Child Mortality among Ethnic Groups in Sub-Saharan Africa." Bulletin of the World Health Organization 78 (1): 30–41. Brückner, M. and Ciccone, A. 2011. “Rain and the Democratic Window of Opportunity.” Econometrica 79: 923-947. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA8183. Burke, Paul J. and Andrew Leigh. 2010. “Do Output Contractions Trigger Democratic Change?” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 2 (4):124–57. Caestens. 2019. ‘Discussion Paper on Cross-Border Trade and the Regional Economy’ prepared for Second Meeting of the Lake Chad Governors’ Forum on Stabilization, Peacebuilding and Sustainable Development in Niamey, July 16–18, 2019. Cantens, Thomas and Gaël Raballand. 2017. "Cross-Border Trade, Insecurity and the Role of Customs: Some Lessons from Six Field Studies in (Post-) Conflict Regions." Working Paper 67, International Center for Tax and Development, Brighton, U.K. Chamberlin, Jordan, TS Jayne, and Derek Headey. 2014. “Scarcity amidst abundance? Reassessing the potential for cropland expansion in Africa,” Food Policy 48, 51–65. Chandra, Areendam, and Sujana Kabiraj. 2020. “Shedding light on regional growth and convergence in India.” World Development 132: 1-18. Chaney, Eric. 2013. “Revolt on the Nile: Economic Shocks, Religion, and Political Power.” Econometrica 81 (5): 2033–53. Chun, Natalie and Heiwai Tang. 2018. “Do Information and Communication Technologies Empower Female Workers? Firm-Level Evidence from Viet Nam (May).” ADBI Working Paper 545. Cohen, Corentin. 2015. "Boko Haram, une impossible sociologie politique ?" Afrique contemporaine 3 (255): 71-87. Collier, Paul. and Anke Hoeffler. 2002. “Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars.” Working Paper 2002-01, Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford, UK. Collier, Paul, V. L. Elliot, Havard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, and Nicholas Sambanis. 2003. Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. World Bank and Oxford University Press. Dardel, Cécile, Laurent Kergoat, Pierre Hiernaux, E Mougin, Manuela Grippa, and C.J Tucker.2014. “Re-greening Sahel: 30 years of remote sensing data and field observations (Mali, Niger),” Remote Sensing of Environment, 140, 350–364. de Haan, Leo, Paul Quarles van Ufford and Fred Zaal. 1999. “Cross-border cattle marketing in Sub-Saharan Africa since 1990: geographical patterns and government induced change.” In Agricultural Marketing in Tropical Africa, edited by Laurens H. van der Laan, Tjalling Dijkstra, and Aad van Tilburg. Research Series 15. Leiden: African Studies Centre Leiden. Debo, L. and G. Van Ryzin. 2013. “Leveraging Quality Information in Stock-Outs.” Research Paper No. 13–58, University of Chicago Booth School of Business, Chicago, IL. Déby Itno, I., L. Fabius, Jean-Paul Moatti, N. Pourtier, and Christian Seignobos, Atlas of lake Tchad, Vol. number spécial 183 2015. References 69 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace Defourny, Pierre, S. Bontemps, C. Lamarche, C. Brockmann, M. Boettcher, J. Wevers, and G. Kirches. 2017. Land Cover CCI: Product User Guide Version 2.0. Available at http://maps.elie.ucl.ac.be/CCI/viewer/download/ ESACCI-LC-PUG-v2.5.pdf ESA (European Space Agency), 2017. Land Cover CCI, Product User Guide Version 2.0. Document CCI-LC-PUGV2 (April 10). Harwell, UK: ESA Climate Office, European Space Agency. FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). 2009. “Adaptive water management in the Lake Chad Basin. Addressing current challenges and adapting to future needs”. In: FAO Water Seminar Proceedings of the World Water Week. FAO, Rome, Italy. FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). 2016. Food insecurity in the Lake Chad Basin. FAO Regional Office for Africa, Rome, Italy. FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). 2017. Lake Chad Basin crisis Response strategy (2017- 2019) Mitigating the impact of the crisis and strengthening the resilience and food security of conflict-affected communities: Cameroon, Chad, the Niger and Nigeria. FAO, Rome, Italy. Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 2003. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. American Political Science Review 97 (1): 75-90. Felter, Claire. 2018. "Nigeria’s Battle With Boko Haram." Council on Foreign Relations, New York, NY. https://www. cfr.org/backgrounder/nigerias-battle-boko-haram Fernandes, A. M., A. Mattoo, H. Nguyen and M. Schiffbauer. 2019. “The internet and Chinese exports in the pre-ali baba era.” Journal of Development Economics 138: 57-76. Fetzer, Thiemo. 2020. “Can Workfare Programs Moderate Conflict? Evidence from India.” Journal of the European Economic Association 18(6): 3337–3375, https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvz062. Fisker, Peter. 2021. "Conflict and Climate in the Lake Chad Region." Technical paper, “Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum,” World Bank, Washington, DC. Fratianni, Michele and Heejoon Kang. 2006. "International Terrorism, International Trade, and Borders." Working Paper No 2006-13, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy. Galeazzi, Greta, Alfonso Medinilla, Tarila Marclint Ebiede and Sophie Desmidt. 2017. "The Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC): Water and Security at an Inter-Regional Cross-Roads.” Policy Brief (December), European Center for Development Policy Management, Maastricht, the Netherlands. Gaye, Serigne Bamba. 2018. Connections between Jihadist groups and smuggling and illegal trafficking rings in the Sahel. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Peace and Security Centre of Competence Sub-Saharan Africa, Dakar, Senegal. Gennaioli, Nicola, Rafael La Porta, Florencia Lopez De Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. 2014. Growth in regions. Journal of Economic growth, 19(3): 259–309. GEOGLAM (Global Agricultural Monitoring). 2020. "Lake Chad Basin: Conflict and Food Insecurity." Conflict Report. Ghosh, Tilottama, Rebecca L. Powell, Christopher D. Elvidge, Kimberly E. Baugh, Paul C. Sutton2, and Sharolyn Anderson. "Shedding Light on the Global Distribution of Economic Activity." The Open Geography Journal, 3, 147-160. Goyal, A. 2020. “Information, direct access to farmers, and rural market performance in central India.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2(3): 22-45. Gritzner, Jeffrey Allman. 2021. "Lake Chad." Encyclopedia Britannica, February 14, 2021. https://www.britannica. com/place/Lake-Chad. 70 References Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum Harari, Mariaflavia and Eliana La Ferrara. 2018. "Conflict, Climate, and Cells: A Disaggregated Analysis." The Review of Economics and Statistics 100 (4): 594–608. Hasbi, M. and A. Dubus, 2019. "Determinants of Mobile Broadband Use in Developing Economies: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa," Working Papers hal-02264651, HAL. Henderson, Vernon J., Tim Squires, Adam Storeygard and David Weil. 2018. "The Global Distribution of Economic Activity: Nature, History, and the Role of Trade." The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 133, Issue 1, February 2018, Pages 357–406. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjx030. Hess, Gregory D., and Athanasios Orphanides. 1995. “War Politics: An Economic, Rational-Voter Framework.” American Economic Review, 85: 828-846. Hidalgo, F. Daniel, Suresh Naidu, Simeon Nichter and Neal Richardson. 2010. “Economic Determinants of Land Invasions.” Review of Economics and Statistics 92(3):505-523. Hjort, Jonas, and Jonas Poulsen. 2019. “The Arrival of Fast Internet and Employment in Africa.” American Economic Review 109 (3): 1032–79. ICG (International Crisis Group). 2017. “Fighting Boko Haram in Chad: Beyond Military Measures.” Africa Report 246 (March 8), ICG, Brussels. ICG (International Crisis Group). 2018. “Cameroon’s Far North: A New Chapter in the Fight against Boko Haram.” Africa Report 263 (August 14), ICG, Brussels. IDS (Institute of Development Studies). 2017. “Cross-Border Trade, Insecurity and the Role of Customs: Some Lessons from Six Field Studies in (Post-)Conflict Regions.” IEP (Institute for Economics & Peace).2020. Global Peace Index 2020. IEP, Sydney, Australia. Ighobor, Kingsley. 2019. "Developper le bassin du lac Tchad." Afrique Renouveau. URL:https://www.un.org/ africarenewal/fr/magazine/d percentC3 percentA9cembre-2019-mars-2020/d percentC3 percentA9velopper- le-bassin-du-lac-tchad. (Accessed: 11.26.2020). IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2016. Chad IMF Country Report No. 16/274. Article IV Consultation. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. Jedwab, Remi, Brian Blankespoor, Takaaki Masaki, and Carlos Rodríguez-Castelán. 2021. "Estimating the Spillover Economic Effects of Foreign Conflict: Evidence from Boko Haram." Technical paper, “Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum,” World Bank, Washington, DC. Jedwab, Remi, Federico Haslop, Takaaki Masaki, and Carlos Rodríguez-Castelán. 2021. "Climate Change, Rural Livelihoods, and Urbanization: Evidence from the Permanent Shrinking of Lake Chad." Technical paper, “Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum,” World Bank, Washington, DC. Jedwab, Remi, Edward Kerby, and Alexander Moradi. 2017. "History, Path Dependence and Development: Evidence from Colonial Railroads, Settlers and Cities in Kenya." Economic Journal 127 (August): 1467–94. Kaila, H. and F. Tarp. 2019. “Can the Internet Improve Agricultural Production? Evidence from Viet Nam”. Agricultural Economics, 675-91. Kimenyi, Mwangi, Jideofor Adibe, Moussa Djir e, Abigail J. Jirgi, Alpha Kergna, Temesgen T. Deressa,Jessica E. Pugliese, and Andrew Westbury. 2014. “The impact of conflict and political instability on agricultural investments in Mali and Nigeria,” Working Paper 17, The Brookings Institute, Washington, DC. Koussou, Mian Oudanang and Guillaume Duteurtre. 2013. "Le rôle de la zone soudanienne dans le commerce des bovins sur pied en Afrique centrale." Journal of Animal & Plant Sciences, Vol.20, Issue 1: 3026-3033. LCBC (Lake Chad Basin Commission). 2015. “Lake Chad Development and Climate Resilience Action Plan.” Report 102851 v2 (November 13), World Bank, Washington, DC. References 71 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace LCBC (Lake Chad Basin Commission). 2020. “Regional Strategy for Adaptation to Climate Change, Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries.” LCBC, N’Djamena, Chad. Lebrand, Mathilde. 2021. "Infrastructure and Structural Change in the Lake Chad Region." Technical paper, “Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum,” World Bank, Washington, DC. Lemoalle, Jacques and Géraud Magrin, eds. 2014. "Le développement du lac Tchad: Situation actuelle et futurs possibles." IRD Éditions. Lemoalle, Jacques, Jean-Claude Bader, Marc Leblanc, and Ahmed Sedick. 2012. “Recent changes in Lake Chad: Observations, simulations and management options (1973–2011).” Global and Planetary Change, 80, 247– 254. Li, Xuecao, Yuyu Zhou, Min Zhao, and Xia Zhao. 2020. "A harmonized global nighttime light dataset 1992–2018". Scientific Data 7. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41597-020-0510-y. Lierl, Malte. 2020. "Growing State Fragility in the Sahel: Rethinking International Involvement." German Institute of Global and Area Studies, GIGA Focus Africa, 7, Hamburg. Linard, Catherine, Marius Gilbert, Robert W. Snow, Abdisalan M. Noor, and Andrew J. Tatem. 2012. “Population Distribution, Settlement Patterns, and Accessibility across Africa in 2010.” PloS One 7 (2): e31746. Liu, Xiaoxuan, Le Yu, Wei Li, Dailiang Peng, Liheng Zhong, Le Li, Qinchuan Xin, Hui Lu, Chaoqing Yu, and Peng Gong. 2018. “Comparison of country-level cropland areas between ESA-CCI land cover maps and FAOSTAT data.” International Journal of Remote Sensing, 39 (20), 6631–6645. Magrin, Géraud, Jacques Lemoalle, and Roland Pourtier. 2015. Atlas du lac Tchad. Passages 183. https://horizon. documentation.ird.fr/exl-doc/pleins_textes/divers21-02/010064578.pdf. Magrin, Géraud and Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos, M. (Eds.) 2018. Crisis and Development the Lake: The Chad Region and Boko Haram. AFD, Paris. Mahmood S. Omar and Ndubuisi Christian Ani. 2018. "Responses to Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Region: Policies, Cooperation and Livelihoods." Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa. Mahmood, Rashid, Shaofeng Jia, and Wen bin Zhu. 2019. "Analysis of climate variability, trends, and prediction in the most active parts of the Lake Chad Basin, Africa." Scientific Reports 9, Article number: 6317. Marshall Burke, Solomon M. Hsiang, and Edward Miguel. 2015. "Climate and conflict." Annual Review of Economics, 7(1):577–617, 2015. doi: 10.1146/annurev-economics-080614-115430. URL https://doi.org/10.1146/ annurev-economics-080614-115430. Masaki, Takaaki, Rogelio Granguillhome Ochoa, and Carlos Rodríguez-Castelán. 2020. “Broadband Internet and Household Welfare in Senegal.” Policy Research Working Paper 9386, World Bank, Washington, DC. Masaki, Takaaki, and Carlos Rodríguez-Castelán. 2021. “Socioeconomic Trends in the Lake Chad Region.” Technical paper, “Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum,” World Bank, Washington, DC. Maystadt, Jean-François, Valerie Mueller, Jamon Van Den Hoek, and Stijn Van Weezel. 2020. “Vegetation changes attributable to refugees in Africa coincide with agricultural deforestation.” Environmental Research Letters 15 (4), 044008. Mercy Corps, USAID, Oxfam, Action against Hunger, CRS, Rescue and COPI. 2017. The North-East Nigeria Joint Livelihood and Market Recovery Assessment. Mercy Crops, Portland, Oregon. Miguel, Edward, Shanker Satyanath and Ernest Sergenti. 2004. “Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach.” Journal of Political Economy 112 (4): 725–53. Moneke, Niclas. 2020. “Can Big Push Infrastructure Unlock Development? Evidence from Ethiopia.” Paper presented at the STEG Theme 3 and 4 Joint Online Workshop, Structural Transformation and Economic Growth, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, September 14–15, 2020. 72 References Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum Obi, Felix A. and Ejemai Eboreime. May 2017. "How Boko Haram is devastating health services in North-East Nigeria." The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/how-boko-haram-is-devastating-health-services- in-north-east-nigeria-65751. OCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). 2019. “Global Humanitarian Overview 2020.” OCHA, Geneva. OCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). 2020. “Lake Chad Basin Humanitarian Snapshot.” Infographic (November 23, 2020, OCHA, Geneva. Odada, Eric O., Lekan Oyebande, and A.J. Oguntola. 2005. “Lake Chad: Experience and Lessons learned Brief.” International Lake Environment Committee Foundation (ILEC), Kusatsu, Japan. Okpara, Uche T, Lindsay C. Stringer, Andrew J. Dougill, and Mohammed D. Bila.2015. “Conflicts about water in Lake Chad: Are environmental, vulnerability and security issues linked?” Progress in Development Studies, 15 (4), 308–325. Okpara, Uche T., Lindsay C. Stringer, and Andrew J. Dougill. 2016. “Lake drying and livelihood dynamics in Lake Chad: Unravelling the mechanisms, contexts and responses”. In: Ambio 45(7), pp. 781–795. Olivry, J., et al. (1996). Hydrologie du Lac Chad. Institut de Recherche pour le Développement en Coopération, Orstom Editions, Paris, France. Onuoha, F., (2010). “Climate change, population surge and resource overuse in the Lake Chad area Implications for human security in the north-east zone of Nigeria.” In Mwiturubani, D., and van Wyk, Jo-Ansie (Eds). Climate Change and Natural Resources Conflicts in Africa. Institute for Security Studies. Oxfam. 2016. A Modified Emergency Market Mapping Analysis (EMMA) and Protection Analysis. Smoked fish and dried red pepper income market systems. Diffa Region, Eastern Niger. Oxfam. 2017. Red gold and fishing in the Lake Chad Basin. Briefing note, February 2017. Oxfam, Cowley, Oxford, United Kingdom. PAMACC (Pan African Media Alliance for Climate Change). 2018. “Analysis of Transaqua.” PAMACC, Nairobi. https://savelakechad.com/analysis-of-transaqua.html. Pardo, Oliver and Paula Andrea Rossiasco. 2016. “The Economic Cost of Forced Displacement in North-East Nigeria” (Appendix D) in Forced Displacement by the Boko Haram Conflict in the Lake Chad Region. UNHCR and Worldbank. Paunov, C. and V. Rollo, 2015. “Overcoming Obstacles: The Internet's Contribution to Firm Development.” World Bank Economic Review 29 (supplement 1): S192–S204. Purokayo, Suleiman G.2017. “Mobility Challenges and Border Routes: The Rise of Regional Conflicts in the Lake Chad Basin.” European Journal of Social Sciences Studies, Volume 2, Issue 9, pp. 192-206. Raji, Aminu. 1993. “The past history and present trends in the fisheries of Lake Chad,” In: 10th Annual Conference of the Fisheries Society of Nigeria (FISON) , 16-20 November , Abeokuta, Nigeria, pp. 213-225. Raleigh, Clionadh, and Caitriona Dowd. 2015. “Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook.” https://www/acleddata.com/wp-contnet/uplodas/2015/01/ACLED_Codebook_2015.pdf. Ritter, P. and M. Guerrero. 2014. “The Effect of the Internet and Cell Phones on Employment and Agricultural Production in Rural Villages in Peru.” Working paper, University of Piura, Piura, Peru. Sedick, Ahmed (n.d.). “Le Lac Tchad et ses tributaires.” Salas Garcia, Vania B. and Q. Fan, 2015. "Information Access and Smallholder Farmers’ Selling Decisions in Peru," 2015 AAEA & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting, July 26-28, San Francisco, California 205380, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association. References 73 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace Sambanis, Nicholas. 2004. “Poverty and the Organization of Political Violence.” The Brookings Institution, Brookings Trade Forum on Globalization, Poverty, and Inequality: 165-211. Samuel, Mali. 2019. "Islamic State West Africa Province is proving its economic resilience by generating income from obliging local communities." Economics of terrorism in lake Chad Basin, ISS Today, Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/economics-of-terrorism-in-lake-chad-basin. Sarch, M-T.2001. “Fishing and farming at Lake Chad: Institutions for access to natural resources.” Journal of Environmental management, 62 (2), 185–199. Sayan, Ramazan Caner, Nidhi Nagabhatla, and Marvel Ekwuribe. 2020. “Soft Power, Discourse Coalitions, and the Proposed Interbasin Water Transfer between Lake Chad and the Congo River.” Water Alternatives 13 (3): 752–78. Shaw, Mark and Tuesday Reitano. 2017. “Global Illicit Flows and Local Conflict Dynamics: The Case for Pre-Emptive Analysis and Experimental Policy Options,” Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime and S Jesperson, “Conflict Obscuring Criminality The Crime-Conflict Nexus in Nigeria,” (2017). Skah, Maha and Rida Lyammouri. 2020. “The Climate Change-Security Nexus: Case study of the Lake Chad Basin.” Policy Center for the New South, Research Paper 20/08, Rabat, Morocco Smith, David and Stephanie Wolters. 2017. Radio, Social Media and Language as an Agent in Conflict: A Case Study of Dandal Kura Radio International in the Lake Chad Basin. In P. Aall & C. A. Crocker (Eds.), The Fabric of Peace in Africa: Looking beyond the State (pp. 273–288). McGill-Queen’s University Press. http://www.jstor. org/stable/j.ctt1pq33ws. Sissons, Corrie and Clotilde Lappartient. 2016. A Modified Emergency Market Mapping Analysis (EMMA) and Protection Analysis. Smoked fish and dried red pepper income market systems. Diffa Region, Eastern Niger. Oxfam, Cowley, Oxford, United Kingdom. Strategic Foresight Group. 2017. Water Cooperation Quotient 2017. Mumbai: Strategic Foresight Group. https://www. strategicforesight.com/publication_pdf/Water percent20Cooperation percent20Quotient percent202017. pdf. Suri, Tavneet, and William Jack. 2016. “The Long-Run Poverty and Gender Impacts of Mobile Money.” Science 354 (6317): 1288–92 Taniform, Peter Ngwa. 2014. Project Information Document (Appraisal Stage) - Cameroon - Multimodal Transport Project - P143801 (English). Washington, DC: World Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/ en/686271468003352456/Project-Information-Document-Appraisal-Stage-Cameroon-Multimodal- Transport-Project-P143801. Tayimlong, Robert A. 2020. “Fragility and Insurgency as Outcomes of Underdevelopment of Public Infrastructure and Socio-Economic Deprivation: The Case of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin,” Journal of Peacebuilding & Development. doi:10.1177/1542316620950188 Thomas Brinkhoff: City Population, http://www.citypopulation.de. UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2020. Measuring the Economic Impact of Violent Extremism Leading to Terrorism in Africa. UNDP, New York. UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) and OCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). 2018. “Resilience for Sustainable Development in the Lake Chad Basin.” Technical paper (August), UNDP, New York. UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme). 2004. "Global International Waters Assessment: Lake Chad Basin, GIWA Regional Assessment 43." UNEP, Nairobi, Kenya UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund). 2017. “Demographic Dynamics and the Crisis of Countries around Lake Chad.” West and Central Africa Regional Office, UNFPA, Dakar, Senegal. 74 References Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) and World Bank. 2016. Forced Displacement by the Boko Haram Conflict in the Lake Chad Region. Washington, DC: World Bank. United Nations and World Bank. 2018. Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict. Washington, DC: World Bank. USAID (United States Agency for International Development). 2020. “Lake Chad Basin: Complex Emergency.” Fact Sheet 4 (September 30), USAID, Washington, DC. Van Den Hoek, Jamon. 2017. “Agricultural Market Activity and Boko Haram Attacks in Northeastern Nigeria.” West African Paper 9 (September), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris. van der Weide, Roy, Bob Rijkers, Brian Blankespoor, and Alexei Abrahams. 2018. "Obstacles on the Road to Palestinian Economic Growth." World Bank, Washington, DC. Vedeld, T. 2000. “Village politics: Heterogeneity, leadership and collective action.” Journal of Development Studies 36 (5): 105–34. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220380008422648. Viollaz, M. and H. Winkler. 2020. “Does the Internet Reduce Gender Gaps?: The Case of Jordan." The Case of Jordan (March 13, 2020). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 9183. Vivekananda, Janani; Martin Wall, Florence Sylvestre and Chitra Nagarajan. 2019. Shoring up stability: Addressing climate and fragility risks in the Lake Chad region. Adelphi, Berlin. Walkenhorst, Peter. 2021. "Trade Patterns and Trade Networks in the Lake Chad Region." Technical paper, “Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum,” World Bank, Washington, DC. WCO (World Customs Organization). Améliorer le rôle des douanes dans les frontières fragiles - Renforcer la coopération régionale pour la gestion des frontières. World Customs Organization, Brussels, Belgium. WFP (World Food Programme). 2016a. “Assessing Gender and Markets in the Lake Chad Basin Region.” VAM Gender and Markets Study 2, 2016–2017, Regional Bureau, WFP, Dakar, Senegal. WFP (World Food Programme). 2016b. “Lake Chad Basin Crisis: Regional Market Assessment.” VAM Report, Regional Bureau, WFP, Dakar, Senegal. World Bank. 2003. World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People. Washington, DC: World Bank; New York: Oxford University Press. World Bank. 2009. World Development Report 2009: Reshaping Economic Geography. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. 2010. World Development Report 2010: Development and Climate Change. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. 2011. World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. 2013a. “Cross-Border Trade between Nigeria and CEMAC Countries: Estimating Trade Flows, Describing Trade Relationships, and Identifying Barriers to Cross-Border Trade between Cameroon and Nigeria.” Report ACS2876, World Bank, Washington, DC. World Bank. 2013b. World Development Report 2014: Risk and Opportunity, Managing Risk for Development. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. 2015a. “Country Partnership Framework for the Republic of Chad for the Period FY16–20.” Report 95277-TD (November 3), World Bank, Washington, DC. World Bank. 2015b. Synthesis Report. Vol. 1 of North-East Nigeria. Recovery and Peace Building Assessment. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. 2017. World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. 2018. Breaking Down the Barriers to Regional Agricultural Trade in Central Africa. August. Washington, DC: World Bank. References 75 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace World Bank. 2019a. Africa’s Pulse: An Analysis of Issues Shaping Africa’s Economic Future. Vol. 19 (April). Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. 2019b. Future of Food: Harnessing Digital Technologies to Improve Food System Outcomes. Washington, DC: World Bank World Bank. 2020a. The Africa Continental Free Trade Area: Economic and Distributional Effects. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. 2020b. World Bank Group Strategy for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence 2020–2025. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank and FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). 2021. A Blueprint for Strengthening Food System Resilience in West Africa: Regional Priority Intervention Areas. Washington, DC: World Bank. Yu, Qiangyi, Liangzhi You, Ulrike Wood-Sichra, Yating Ru, Alison K.B. Joglekar, Steffen Fritz, Wei Xiong, Miao Lu, Wenbin Wu, and Peng Yang. 2020. “A Cultivated Planet in 2010, Part 2: The Global Gridded Agricultural Production Maps.” Earth System Science Data 12 (4): 3545–72. 76 References Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum Appendix 1.A: Supplementary Figures and Tables Figure A1.1: Local markets in proximity to Lake Chad by type Source: Blankespoor 2021, technical paper for this report. Appendix 77 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace Table A1.1: Socioeconomic Outcomes in the Lake Chad Region and Other Regions Cameroon Chad Niger Nigeria Lake Chad Lake Chad Lake Chad Lake Chad National National National National country country country country Rest of Rest of Rest of Rest of region region region region Poverty and Human Capital (percent) Poverty 26.0 18.8 58.8 38.1 39.8 30.7 45.4 43.4 51.6 39.1 37.7 72.3 Literacy (15+) 77.8 83.7 47.1 41.6 45.5 21.0 33.0 32.8 34.0 71.9 72.4 58.7 Primary Completion 72.3 79.0 39.4 29.5 32.8 12.2 25.4 27.8 17.4 78.2 79.0 60.0 (14–25) Child stunting 28.9 26.9 37.3 39.9 37.0 51.0 43.9 41.7 52.2 36.8 35.8 48.0 Employment (percent) Agriculture 45.9 39.0 78.0 76.2 77.0 72.2 74.7 75.5 68.5 43.2 42.2 43.2 Industry 15.6 17.1 8.7 7.0 6.9 10.2 7.9 7.2 7.5 9.4 9.5 9.4 Service 31.0 35.3 10.9 13.6 12.8 17.0 15.6 15.2 20.4 37.1 37.7 37.1 Access to Public Services (percent) Piped Water 35.6 39.6 14.8 15.9 16.4 13.8 31.8 34.7 23.5 11.2 10.4 20.7 Improved Sanitation 61.1 66.9 30.8 14.1 16.2 5.7 24.8 28.5 14.3 56.3 56.4 55.1 Electricity 62.2 70.4 19.6 7.7 9.0 2.4 14.4 16.0 10.0 59.4 61.3 38.4 Source: World Bank calculations based on data of the national authorities. Note: Data on education (literacy and primary education), and employment are based on the latest household surveys conducted in Cameroon (2014), Chad (2018), Niger (2018), and Nigeria (2018). Job category by industry includes only working-age individuals (ages 15–65). Data on poverty are based on the latest harmonized household surveys conducted in Cameroon (2014), Chad (2011), Niger (2014), and Nigeria (2018). Poverty rates are based on the US$1.90 international poverty line (2011 purchasing power parity). Data on child health (child stunting) and access to public services are drawn from the latest Demographic and Health Surveys available in each country: Cameroon (2018), Chad (2018), Niger (2012), and Nigeria (2018). Rest of country = outside the Lake Chad region; LCB = within the Lake Chad Basin region. 78 Appendix Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum nfrastructure Investment Scenarios Appendix 1.B: I Explored in the Technical Paper “Infrastructure and Structural Change in the Lake Chad Region” New transport infrastructure in the Lake Chad region New rail line in Cameroon:  The renovation of the rail line between Ngaoundéré, Yaoundé and Douala in Cameroon is going through several steps. The World Bank participates in the financing of the southern part of the project for the segment between Douala and Yaoundé, while the EU and European Investment Bank finance the northern part. We assume that the two rehabilitations will happen at the same time; so we consider the whole segment. The government is currently planning to renovate the most used segment between Yaoundé and Douala, the condition of which has deteriorated in the last years. The northern segment between Ngaoundéré and Yaoundé is the most deteriorated. We assume the speed is low on the whole line in the baseline. New road corridors in Chad:  There are several historical corridors between Cameroon and Chad. Tensions in the Far North Region have closed the corridors passing by the Northern part of Cameroon and opened the possibilities for other corridors to develop. The World Bank is currently assessing the possibility to invest in a new corridor in Chad. The proposed corridor links the capital of Chad with Moudoun, the second most important city in Chad, which increases the relevance of the project as it increases domestic connectivity between the main two cities and the regional/ international connectivity of Moudoun. Complementary policies:  Border frictions We assume that trade across locations from a same country only face transport costs while traders across countries have to wait an additional 30 hours to be able to cross the borders. Give the lack of data, we assume a level of 30 hours by default. In the forthcoming counterfactuals, we add a reduction of half border time to the transport investments. Appendix 79 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace Appendix 1.C: List of Technical Papers Seven original technical papers were produced to inform the preparation of this report. Title: “Socioeconomic Trends in the Lake Chad Region” Authors: Takaaki Masaki (World Bank) and Carlos Rodríguez-Castelán (World Bank) Abstract: This paper offers a descriptive snapshot of recent socioeconomic trends in the Lake Chad region. It finds that areas around the lake exhibit significantly higher poverty rates compared with other parts of the corresponding countries. The region presents chronic human capital deficits, a historical lack of access to basic services and infrastructure, and— particularly since the onset of the crisis—limited access to large markets. The study also highlights how the level of economic density is especially low in the Lake Chad region relative to other areas, while a chronic lack of connective infrastructure (large distance) and perpetuation of conflict (wide divisions) may delay regional economic progress. Title: “Climate Change, Rural Livelihoods, and Urbanization: Evidence from the Permanent Shrinking of Lake Chad” Authors: Remi Jedwab (George Washington University), Federico Haslop (George Washington University), Takaaki Masaki (World Bank), and Carlos Rodríguez-Castelán (World Bank) Abstract: Many of the world’s lakes are disappearing. Despite an extensive literature on the economic consequences of climate change, the economic effects of diminishing lakes have not been widely investigated. We focus on Lake Chad, a vast African lake that lost about 90 percent of its surface area between 1965 and 1985. For Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, we construct a novel dataset tracking total and urban population patterns at a fine spatial level from the 1950s to the 2010s. We then exploit a difference in differences strategy to estimate the causal effects of the shrinking of Lake Chad between the 1960s and the 1990s on nearby communities. We find relatively slower total population growth in the proximity of the lake, but only after the lake started shrinking. We also find nonnegative effects of the lake shrinking on city population growth nearby, which suggests that climate change might induce refugee urbanization locally. Title: “Estimating the Spillover Economic Effects of Foreign Conflict: Evidence from Boko Haram” Authors: Remi Jedwab (George Washington University), Brian Blankespoor (World Bank), Takaaki Masaki (World Bank), and Carlos Rodríguez-Castelán (World Bank) Abstract: What are the spillover effects of foreign terrorism and conflict on regional economies? Adopting a difference in differences framework to leverage the unexpected rise of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria’s North East in 2009, we study its effects in neighboring areas in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. We find strong negative effects on regional economic activities (proxied by reductions in nighttime lights), particularly among areas within 200 kilometers of the Boko Haram area. Our findings suggest that this negative impact is concentrated in urban areas and is pronounced among those areas that were initially less developed, for example, in infrastructure, and less well connected to other markets (indicating a lack of trade diversification). We also find that the rise of Boko Haram results in more agricultural burning, a local agricultural practice that is profitable in the short term, but typically leads to long- term environmental and economic losses. Overall, these findings attest to both the short-term and long-term negative impacts of foreign conflicts on regional economies. 80 Appendix Part I: Overview of the Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum Title: “Infrastructure and Structural Change in the Lake Chad Region” Authors: Mathilde Lebrand (World Bank) Abstract: Access to infrastructure supports economic development through structural transformation. Roads provide access to markets, while electricity and internet allow for modern production technologies. This paper investigates the links between investments in electricity, internet, and road infrastructure, in isolation and bundled, and economic development in the Lake Chad region. Using data on the expansion of the road, electricity, and internet networks, we provide reduced-form estimates of the impacts of infrastructure investments on the sectoral composition of employment. Using a series of instruments, we estimate a large impact of infrastructure investments, especially from the combination of paved roads and electricity. We then use a spatial general equilibrium model, based on Moneke (2020), to quantify the impacts of future regional transport investments and trade facilitation on economic development. Better regional transport connectivity along the Douala-N’Djamena corridor will bring relatively large welfare gains for the Lake Chad area and lead to increased specialization in manufacturing in southern Cameroon and in agriculture or nontradable services elsewhere. Title: “Conflict and Climate in the Lake Chad Region” Authors: Peter Fisker (University of Copenhagen) Abstract: This paper investigates determinants of conflict across districts and grid cells in the Lake Chad region, which covers parts of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. Information on conflict incidence and intensity is combined with remote sensing data on greenness, temperatures, rainfall, and the standardized precipitation-evapotranspiration index (SPEI) in all years between 2001 and 2018. The results indicate that conflict in the Lake Chad region is affected by climate anomalies: higher-than-usual temperatures lead to an increase in conflict activity measured at the district and grid cell levels. Greenness anomalies also affect conflict negatively, but more strongly if one focuses on the growing season in cropland areas. However, rainfall and the SPEI do not exhibit similar relationships with conflict. Possible reasons for this may be that (a) temperature anomalies are more important than agricultural drought as predictors of conflict or (b) measurement errors in the rainfall and SPEI data under analysis. Title: “Building Rural Development in the Lake Chad Region” Authors: Brian Blankespoor (World Bank) Abstract: Agriculture is the main sector of economic activity among individuals and households in the Lake Chad region. However, limited market accessibility and, more recently, conflict hinder agricultural activity and therefore pose major challenges to the economic recovery and development of the region. This paper uses panel methods to examine the relationship between access to markets and land cultivation in the region over the past three decades using recent satellite and spatial data following the framework of Berg, Blankespoor, and Selod (2018). The results provide evidence that an increase in market access is associated with an increase in cultivated land and is positively associated with an increase in local agricultural gross domestic product (GDP). Even so, conflict because of the rise of Boko Haram in the past decade may attenuate gains because the proximity to conflict events in the previous year is associated with less cropland across the entire region and less nighttime lights for a panel of 104 local markets near Lake Chad. Title: “Trade Patterns and Trade Networks in the Lake Chad Region” Authors: Peter Walkenhorst (American University of Paris) Abstract: This paper synthesizes existing evidence on trade patterns and trade networks in the Lake Chad region and on the significant disruptions encountered by trade flows in the region. It argues that conflict and the corresponding mitigation measures have affected trade flows in multiple ways. First, they affect important local production and markets, such as lake and river fish (Maiduguri is a hub of the trade), and food staples, such as sesame, onion, and Appendix 81 Lake Chad Regional Economic Memorandum  |  Development for Peace pepper. Second, they also impact significant trade flows passing through the region. From the north to the south, the cattle trade that historically passed through the region on both the northern and southern shore of the lake now heads eastward toward Central Africa instead. From the south to the north, important transit trade, such as along the Douala-N’Djamena corridor, is now diverted through Moundou. Third, they affect trade with the two large economies, Cameroon and Nigeria, which has relocated from the conflict-ridden northern regions to safer border areas. 82 Appendix Ornaments by Maryam Umar Maigida (Nigeria) Le Pecheur de Kotoko (The Fisherman from Kotoko) by Abacar Abali Liman (Cameroon) Sultanate in breakdown by Alichina Allakaye (Niger) The Tears of a Lake by Djitara Tendjibaye (Chad) People forge ideas, people mold dreams, and people create art. To connect local artists to a broader audience, the cover of this report features art from the Lake Chad region.