WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2023

MIGRANTS, REFUGEES, AND SOCIETIES

Concept Note
Contents

Acronyms ..................................................................................................................................................... 1


2. Mapping a Path to Better Mobility ....................................................................................................... 7

3. The WDR’s Three Themes ................................................................................................................... 10
   Theme 1: Development and the Drivers of Cross-Border Mobility ........................................................ 11
   Theme 2: Impacts of Mobility, Development Opportunities, and the Policy Trilemma ......................... 16
   Theme 3: Rethinking the Protection-Development Nexus and the Need for Collective Action .......... 23
   Policy and Operational Implications ....................................................................................................... 28

4. Consultations, Partnerships, and Timetable ...................................................................................... 31
   Internal Consultations ............................................................................................................................. 31
   External Consultations, Partnerships, and Field Visits ........................................................................... 31
   Timetable ................................................................................................................................................ 32

5. The Team ............................................................................................................................................... 33

Annex 1: Internal Advisory Committee .................................................................................................. 34
Annex 2: High-Level Advisory Panel ..................................................................................................... 35
Annex 3: Academic Advisory Committee ............................................................................................... 36
Annex 4: Glossary ..................................................................................................................................... 37

References .................................................................................................................................................. 39
### Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCFF</td>
<td>Global Concessional Financing Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNOMAD</td>
<td>Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFC</td>
<td>International Finance Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDGs</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBG</td>
<td>World Bank Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WDR</td>
<td><em>World Development Report</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHR</td>
<td>Window for Host Communities and Refugees</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
“The priestly leaders of the Parsis were brought before the local ruler, Jadhav Rana, who presented them with a vessel full of milk to signify that the surrounding lands could not possibly accommodate any more people. The Parsi head priest responded by slipping some sugar into the milk to signify how the strangers would enrich the local community without displacing them. They would dissolve into life like sugar dissolves in the milk, sweetening the society but not unsettling it. The ruler responded to the eloquent image and granted the exiles land and permission to practice their religion unhindered if they would respect local customs, and learn the local language, Gujarati.” (Parsi legend)

“As a global community, we face a choice. Do we want migration to be a source of prosperity and international solidarity, or a byword for inhumanity and social friction?” António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations (2018)

**Cross-border mobility is about people.** It has many faces and comprises many stories: a construction worker mixing concrete, a family fleeing war, a nurse at a retirement home, a Nobel Prize winner, and possibly many readers of this report. Mobility is a fundamentally human activity, and it has been supporting the economic and social progress of humanity ever since *Homo sapiens* first left the Turkana Valley.

**Mobility is an integral part of the development process.** It is a mechanism for reallocating labor across economic sectors and geographical areas. It enables adaptation to shocks, stresses, and imbalances. Most people move within their own countries, but some cross borders, with economic and social consequences for themselves, their communities of origin, and their destinations.

**Cross-border mobility primarily involves people from developing countries,** who make up a large majority of the 295 million people living outside their country of birth. In addition, developing countries are the destination for more than a third of the 260 million economic migrants and more than 85 percent of the 35 million refugees and asylum-seekers worldwide.

**Much has changed in recent times.** Cross-border mobility\(^1\) consists of a combination of steady flows driven by long-term trends and sporadic bursts generated by crises and natural disasters. Despite the disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, some of the long-term drivers of mobility have been strengthening, and they are expected to further intensify in coming decades. Diverging demographic trends, stresses caused by climate change, transformational new technologies, and rising inequalities within and between countries are among these forces. At the same time, violence, conflict, and despair have led to sudden and large movements, including out of Syria, South Sudan, Myanmar, Venezuela, and most recently Ukraine.

**Issues related to cross-border mobility are central to achieving the development mandate of the World Bank Group (WBG) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations (UN).** Cross-border mobility has proven to be a powerful force for development, improving the lives of hundreds of millions of migrants, their families, and their communities across the world. However, a significant number of migrants and refugees, their dependents, and many people in destination communities must overcome a range of vulnerabilities and they may require development support to do so.

---

\(^1\) For purposes of this Concept Note, “cross-border mobility” encompasses all those who move across state borders, temporarily or permanently, regardless of drivers or motivations. See Annex 4 – Glossary.
In many destination countries cross-border mobility is generating intense public debate about the costs and benefits of receiving migrants and refugees. These debates are often framed as part of a broader discussion on globalization, sometimes in highly polarized political environments. These debates reflect the concerns and preferences of political leaders and their constituents on both economic and social issues. Recent events—sudden and large inflows of refugees, continuing arrival of undocumented migrants, or the tragic circumstances under which some people travel—are fueling unease and raising questions on the effectiveness of governments’ migration policies. The terms of the debate have hence moved further away from the narrow scope of labor economics, and a fresh rethink is needed if the development outcomes of cross-border mobility are to be enhanced and kept sustainable.

A World Development Report (WDR) is the appropriate instrument for the WBG to articulate a comprehensive, evidence-based development approach to cross-border mobility. This WDR is being prepared against the backdrop of the adoption in 2018 of the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration and the Global Compact for Refugees. Considerable resources are being expended to manage cross-border mobility and address its impacts; what now demands attention is to build consensus around a common development framework. Building on the results from the recent acceleration of WBG engagement on forced displacement, and to a lesser extent on economic migration, and drawing from the burgeoning stock of high-quality, policy-relevant academic research, the WDR will contribute to the debate on how to better manage this complex global phenomenon that is integral to the development agenda.

The WDR will help to advance WBG priorities. In its 2016 Spring Communiqué, the Development Committee endorsed a WBG paper on Forced Displacement and Development, and International Development Association (IDA) Deputies have approved a dedicated Window for Host Communities and Refugees (WHR) under IDA replenishments 18, 19, and 20. Responding to forced displacement is also one of the four pillars of the World Bank Group Strategy for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence 2020–2025 and a central issue in the Bank Policy on Development Cooperation and Fragility, Conflict, and Violence, which was updated in August 2021. In annual briefings, the Board of Executive Directors has consistently encouraged the WBG to scale up its engagement, in both research and operations, on migration in general. The WDR is also aligned with the World Bank Group Climate Change Action Plan 2021–2025, and the

---

2 World Bank-IMF Annual Meetings 2016 Development Committee Communiqué.
3 IDA Guidance: IDA18 Sub-Window for Refugees and Host Communities: Dealing with Protection Issues.
4 IDA Guidance: IDA19 Window for Host Communities and Refugees: Dealing with Protection Issues.
5 IDA20 Special Theme: Fragility, Conflict and Violence.
7 Updated Bank Policy: Development Cooperation and Fragility, Conflict, and Violence.
Board briefing *Leveraging Economic Migration for Development*, among other important initiatives (Box 1).

**Box 1: Building on Past Reports and Linking to WBG Priorities**

This is the first WDR devoted directly to cross-border mobility, but it is difficult to discuss any development topic without addressing economic migration or forced displacement. The first WDR in 1978 noted the positive impact of the temporary migration of workers from developing to more developed countries on the growing prosperity of industrialized countries. Since then, nearly every WDR has discussed cross-border mobility as it relates to the development topic at hand. Yet no WDR has solely focused on the issue even as cross-border mobility has been increasingly a subject of debate and has been part of WBG programs throughout the world.

- *Governance and the Law* (2015) and *Trading for Development in the Age of Global Value Chains* (2020) discuss how opening borders can help countries attract more skilled workers and improve their competitiveness or their domestic governance.

---

9 *Leveraging Economic Migration for Development: A Briefing for the World Bank Board.*

**WDR 2023 will also draw on a rapidly increasing body of WBG knowledge and analytical work.** The 2018 Policy Research Report, *Moving for Prosperity: Global Migration and Labor Markets*, addresses the tension between academic research and public discourse by focusing on the economic evidence of migration and noting its large but sometimes unevenly distributed economic gains. Activities carried out through the Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD) are generating and synthesizing knowledge on migration issues, including contributions to the migration-related Sustainable Development Goal (SDG 10, Target 10.7); development of technical tools to improve data collection and analysis; and analysis of the impact of migration and remittances in developing countries. The WBG is also engaged in a steady analytical workstream across regions and global practices to assess, for example, how migration is affecting certain African countries, the impact of remittances on Central America, and the benefits of economic migration in ASEAN countries. Parallel work has been carried out on forced displacement, starting with the 2016 report *Forcibly Displaced: Toward a Development Approach in Support of Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons, and Their Hosts*, and is continuing through research and analytical papers, at the global level under the *Building the Evidence on Forced Displacement* program and the *World Bank-UNHCR Joint Data Center on Forced Displacement*, and by country, such as *The Toll of War*, *The Mobility of Displaced Syrians*, and the IFC 2018 report on *Kakuma as a Market Place*. The WDR will also draw on research on related issues, such as the *Groundswell* reports on climate change, *Ebb and Flow, Volume 1: Water, Migration, and Development* on water availability, and IEG evaluations of *World Bank Group Support in Situations Involving Conflict-Induced Displacement (2019)* and *Improving Project Performance in Contexts of Migration (2020)*.

The WDR is expected to benefit from substantive WBG knowledge partnerships on migration and forced displacement. Examples include the KNOMAD platform, the Multilateral Development Bank Platform on Economic Migration and Forced Displacement, the PROSPECTS partnership, the close partnership with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), e.g., through the Joint Data Center, the relationships with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and many government partners.
2. Mapping a Path to Better Mobility

The WDR will chart a path toward better mobility by identifying approaches, policies, and programs that can optimize development outcomes in the face of the global forces shaping migration and forced displacement. Better mobility means increasing the development benefits and the prospects of achieving the SDGs for migrants, refugees, and all others who are affected by cross-border mobility, whether in origin, transit, or destination countries. It also implies the need to minimize the drawbacks and the risks to sustainable development.

The WDR will focus on cross-border movements while drawing, where appropriate, on insights related to internal mobility. Cross-border mobility raises distinct issues because migrants and refugees do not hold citizenship and its associated legal rights in their destination countries. This affects their opportunities and the development impacts of their mobility.10

The better mobility approach recognizes that mobility situations are heterogeneous. The issues to be addressed in the WDR vary considerably across contexts. The patterns and their impacts play out differently whether people move from developing countries to Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, or to other places in the Global South; whether they come through regular or irregular migration channels; or whether they are recognized as refugees. Each situation is unique and calls for a distinct response. There is no “one-size-fits-all” model or set of policies that apply across the globe.

The WDR and the better mobility approach will make two main contributions:

1. The WDR will shift from a narrow focus on economic migrants in labor markets and legal protection for refugees to a more holistic perspective (Figure 2.1). Better mobility recognizes that migrants and refugees are more than just providers of labor or victims to protect; they are persons with human capital, identities, cultures, and preferences. They are men and women who make often-difficult choices and deserve fair and decent treatment. Similarly, destination countries are more than just labor markets or sanctuaries. They are complex societies with diverse and at

---

10 World Bank 2021. Also, see Lucas (2021) for a recent analysis of internal migration in developing countries.
times conflicting interests, decision-making processes, and constituencies. As sovereign nations and as members of the international community, they design policies to further their own interests.

**Figure 2.1 From Labor Markets and Protection to a More Holistic Perspective**

2. **The WDR will recognize that the challenges and tensions associated with cross-border mobility arise because the choices and preferences of stakeholders are often misaligned.** They differ between people moving across borders and citizens of destination countries; among migrants and refugees; and among stakeholders and constituencies in both origin and destination societies. Market mechanisms to reconcile these competing interests are often missing. When people decide to move across borders, they create economic and social externalities in their societies of origin and destination. For some categories of people who are in high demand, market forces may lead to excess emigration from the standpoint of their origin society (e.g., brain drain). Conversely, for others, immigration flows may be larger than what destination societies would find optimal. Better mobility, therefore, requires policies in both origin and destination societies to address such mismatches and ensure improved economic and social outcomes for all.
The WDR will apply this framework to explore three dimensions of cross-border mobility, using analytics, case studies, and human stories:

1. **The complex interplay between the agency of migrants and refugees, the drivers of mobility, and the role of development.** The WDR will review the forces—shocks, stresses, and imbalances—that influence mobility, discuss what has changed over the last two decades, and identify how these forces translate into actual movements. The WDR will also analyze the evidence on the impact of development outcomes and programs on cross-border mobility.

2. **The economic and social impacts of mobility, which result from the interplay between the individuality—unique skills, gender, personal and cultural traits—of migrants and refugees, and the preferences of receiving societies.** The WDR will clarify how cross-border mobility is a powerful force for development. It will lay out how the interaction between migrants and their societies can translate into development opportunities for countries of origin and into a policy trilemma for destination countries. It will discuss the policies that both origin and destination countries can adopt in cooperation to promote safe, orderly, and regular migration so that development impacts are maximized, and the policy trilemma is mitigated in an effective manner.

3. **The interplay between the dignity and rights of migrants and refugees and the limitations of national approaches to cross-border mobility which leads to a collective action problem at the international level.** The WDR will discuss the nexus between international protection and development, recognizing that the strict distinction between “voluntary” economic migrants and refugees which underpins the global legal framework does not fully reflect the complexity of actual cross-border movements. The resulting gaps in policy have made it difficult to adequately address a range of situations, from refugees in protracted situations to undocumented migrants who undertake perilous and often fatal cross-border journeys. The WDR will discuss how the international community can best provide the corresponding global public good.

Finally, the WDR will seek to identify policy options for each group of stakeholders—migrants’ origin and destination countries, refugee-hosting countries, the international community, development actors, as well as the private sector and civil society—to deliver a system of “better mobility” in a transforming world. The WDR will discuss some of the related technical and political economy challenges and possible strategies for dealing with them.
3. The WDR’s Three Themes

Cross-border mobility is highly heterogeneous, and each situation requires a tailored approach (Box 2). There are wide variations across destination countries, among migrants and refugees (e.g., demographic characteristics, gender, and skills), and in terms of the conditions under which mobility takes place (e.g., whether the movement is temporary or permanent, regular or irregular, and what legal rights and status are provided). There is similarly a need to distinguish between destinations (see Box 2). The WDR will discuss issues related to data: definitions, availability, categorization, quality, limitations, and specific improvements that are needed. The WDR will point out that mobility is not just about physical movement but also about the political and legal constructs that shape individual decisions and the understanding of migration and forced displacement in terms of citizenship, the social contract, and the concept of international protection.

Box 2: Four Corridors for Cross-Border Mobility

- **The main cross-border migration corridors lead to the high-income OECD countries**—for about 40 million people from high-income countries and about 90 million from middle- and low-income countries. These numbers include both regular and irregular movements with different demographic characteristics. A sizable share of people move permanently. Recent debates have focused on the social impacts of mobility, on irregular migration (largely of low-skilled people), and on how to manage flows at the border while respecting the dignity of migrants and refugees.

- **A second set of corridors links developing countries to GCC countries**—for about 30 million people, mostly from low- and middle-income countries in Asia and the Middle East. By far most of these movements are managed through agreements between origin and destination countries based on limited-term contracts for individual migrants, which are strictly enforced when the contracts expire. Recent debates have focused on the working conditions of migrants, on remittances and migration costs, and on how countries of origin can maximize the development benefits of these temporary movements.

- **A third set of corridors comprises “South-South” movements**—for about 105 million people. These movements typically take place within sub-regions. These migrants vary greatly in terms of skills, demographic composition, and legal status. The destination countries differ considerably in terms of economic opportunities, social acceptance, and enforcement capacity. These movements have been relatively less studied, partly due to data limitations, with a focus on overall migration trends and their evolution, the living conditions of migrants, and their impacts on host country economies.

- **A fourth group is composed of refugees fleeing persecution, conflict, and violence who are entitled to international protection under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and related legal and policy
instruments—about 35 million people. Half of all refugees are children, and many other refugees have been made vulnerable by their experiences. Most refugees are hosted in low- or middle-income countries neighboring their countries of origin, and a growing share live in protracted situations of exclusion. Recent debates have focused on the humanitarian-development nexus, how responsibilities can be better shared across countries, and whether to extend international protection to other groups of migrants.

**Theme 1: Development and the Drivers of Cross-Border Mobility**

Cross-border mobility is one strategy individuals and societies use to adapt to stresses and geographic imbalances when their domestic options are limited—whether to seek refuge from conflict and violence, to find alternative places to live because of poverty or climate change, or to seize opportunities generated by economic and demographic divergences between countries. Some mobility is permanent, some is temporary, and some is circular, reflecting the heterogeneity of circumstances and opportunities.

Cross-border mobility reflects both steady pressures and sudden bursts. It is shaped mainly by long-term economic forces, which result from global inequalities, productivity and welfare differentials, demographic pressures, or climate change. Yet it is also marked by sudden flows of people responding to short-term shocks, such as conflict or natural disasters, which tend to be geographically concentrated and can result in crises. This duality is at the heart of many of the issues related to management of cross-border movements.

Gender norms are an important driver of mobility. Gender is a significant factor at every stage—from the decision to migrate, transiting across borders, to working or settling in the country of destination, or choosing to return home.11 Formal and informal norms and gaps (e.g., in education, skills, information) create constraints and opportunities that differ across genders. This shapes the responses of individuals to geographic imbalances and longer-term economic and social outcomes.

The WDR will review some of the forces that are expected to shape future cross-border mobility, starting with demographics. Wealthier developed countries are rapidly aging, and middle-income countries are starting or completing their demographic transition; meanwhile many lower-income countries have a growing pool of young people.12 Aging affects the labor markets of most high-income countries in two ways: a shrinking labor force and a scarcity of young workers. Aging populations and rising dependency ratios push up fiscal pressures and risk the solvency of social security systems as the working-

12 Vollset et al. 2020.
age population declines and the cost of caring for the elderly rises. Developing countries, on the other hand, have a youth bulge stemming from higher fertility and declining mortality.

**Productivity growth, the rates of technological change and automation, and the long-term implications of the COVID-19 pandemic will determine the extent to which demographic divergences between countries will translate into changes in the international labor market.** Recent evidence suggests faster productivity growth for poorer countries, often referred to as unconditional convergence.\(^{13}\) Yet there are also differences in how fast, if at all, poorer countries will be able to catch up, and if they do, how long it will take. Automation and labor-saving technological change can partly address labor supply shortages in aging economies, and the extent of such changes will determine the demand for migrant workers and the skills sought from them.\(^{14}\) A rise in remote work for high-skilled workers may reduce their need to physically migrate.\(^{15}\) A shift toward labor-saving technologies due to the pandemic could dampen demand for migrant labor.\(^{16}\) However, not all jobs can be automated. And while the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic for long-term international mobility are still largely unknown,\(^{17}\) the pandemic has already shown that migrant workers are vital for relieving labor shortages at all skill levels. This suggests that the demand for migrant labor will continue for years to come.\(^{18}\)

**What might climate change mean for cross-border mobility?** Water shortages, droughts, heat stress, sea-level rise, and extreme events like floods and tropical cyclones influence internal mobility and amplify existing vulnerabilities by affecting labor productivity and threatening local habitability.\(^{19}\) These patterns will have implications for the magnitude of cross-border mobility. The extent and nature of exposure will differ widely based on geography. A changing climate is likely to translate into a gradual intensification of migratory pressures, although to date most movements due to climate change have been internal. Rapid and radical action to mitigate climate change is needed to prevent a dramatic shift in both internal and cross-border migration patterns, as the world might still suffer temperature increases of 1.5°C and even 2°C.\(^{20}\)

---

\(^{13}\) Kremer, Willis, and You 2021.
\(^{14}\) Acemoglu and Restrepo 2022.
\(^{15}\) Baldwin 2020.
\(^{16}\) Autor and Reynolds 2020.
\(^{17}\) Ibid.
\(^{18}\) Fasani and Mazza 2020.
\(^{19}\) Clement et al. 2021.
\(^{20}\) IPCC 2022a; IPCC 2022b.
Beyond these economic forces, conflicts, persecution, and violence threaten the lives and livelihoods of individuals and damage the fabric of their communities, which can force them to seek safety and security across borders. The risk of violence makes staying at home untenable for millions of people. However, most forced displacement remains internal and refugees—persons forcibly displaced abroad—while making up 40 percent of the displaced population, represent about 0.5 percent of the world population. Nevertheless, most refugee situations are temporally and geographically concentrated, which puts sudden and intense pressures on a handful of host countries. The traumas experienced by those who have been forcibly displaced adds to the challenges of providing care. Risks associated with conflict, persecution, and violence also impact men and women differently, and in turn have gender-differentiated impacts on mobility patterns.

The WDR will also point out that despite pressures stemming from a combination of geographic imbalances (Figure 3.1), the level of voluntary international migration has been relatively stable for half a century. At about 3 percent of the global population, voluntary migration is far below the levels suggested by existing welfare differences across countries. Various policy and circumstantial barriers limit individual ability and willingness to seize the economic opportunities generated by geographic imbalances. Among these are the costs of migration, which are not simply financial; they also reflect the psychic costs of leaving one’s home and the psychological, at times also physical, toll associated with mobility.

There is also evidence that individuals respond differently to the same imbalances. Cross-border mobility decisions reflect considerations of living standards, the existence of co-ethnic and social networks, public services, and other amenities in destination countries. Social networks in both origin and destination locations alter the costs and gains to an individual from cross-border movement. Minorities, indigenous people, women, and LGBT+ people who face discrimination may find it beneficial to move to more inclusive societies.

---

21 See Annex 4 – Glossary.
23 Benhabib and Jovanovic 2012; Clemens, Montenegro, and Pritchett 2019; Clemens 2011; World Bank 2019a.
Cross-border flows are strongly shaped by policies in destination countries. Such policies are aimed at shaping inflows, which ultimately alter the costs of migration, both monetary and non-monetary. Restrictive migration policies have fostered an irregular migration sector that may incorporate smuggling activities and the underground economy. In contrast, some policies are designed to reduce mobility costs, especially for high-skilled individuals. How well migration policies regulate inflows should be weighed against their financial cost and the costs of incentivizing irregular migration.

There is a growing debate in the development community about “addressing root causes” of cross-border mobility. Yet, as the WDR will explore, cross-border mobility is both a cause and a consequence of development. Those most likely to move across borders are individuals from middle- and upper-middle-income countries, most of which have at least begun if not yet completed their demographic transition.
Development levels also affect destination choices (Figure 3.2): the rates of emigration are highest not when income gaps between countries are high or low but when they are at intermediate levels.\textsuperscript{24}

**Figure 3.2 Economic Development and Cross-Border Mobility: A Complex Relationship**

Unpacking the relationship between income gaps and cross-border mobility is critical to understanding the possible impact of economic development on cross-border mobility. Economic development can be the source of new opportunities for those remaining at home but it can also increase the economic returns for those migrating abroad. For example, education policies, capital investments, technology adoption, and trade agreements could increase domestic labor productivity and incomes. Green policies, by building climate-resilient communities, protect their habitability against climate change while mitigating the concomitant decline in agricultural productivity. Yet while these policies improve domestic prospects, they also raise incomes and allow physical and human capital to accumulate, thereby increasing the economic returns of cross-border mobility.

\textsuperscript{24} Clemens and Mendola 2020.
Economic development in the country of origin is likely to affect the level but also the composition of migration flows. With the increased human capital and economic opportunities that development brings, migration is chosen by people who have better options and are thus in a better position to maximize the returns of their mobility decisions. Economic development thus changes the profile of who migrates and the benefits for not only migrants but also their origin and destination countries.

**Theme 2: Impacts of Mobility, Development Opportunities, and the Policy Trilemma**

While cross-border mobility is a powerful force for welfare gains and an effective response to shocks, the magnitude and distribution of its impacts depend on the characteristics of migrants and refugees and on the policies of origin and destination countries. Those who move across borders differ in their personal, demographic, human capital, and cultural attributes, their destination choices, the conditions in which they move, how long they stay, and when or whether they are able to return home. One of the main themes in the WDR is that these attributes, especially those that are personal and cultural, are inseparable from the individual’s economic characteristics. This is what Swiss novelist Max Frisch meant in his famous quote “We wanted workers…but we got people,” referring to the guest workers who arrived in Europe in the 1950s and 1960s.25

A fundamental observation in the academic literature is that migrants and refugees are not randomly selected from the populations of their home countries.26 Opportunities, policies, and demand factors in destination countries shape the composition of the flows. Moreover, even within the same destination country, the economic and social characteristics of communities differ considerably. All these factors, plus the individual attributes of the migrants, culminate in a range of differentiated economic, social, and cultural impacts on migrants, their families, and their origin and destination communities.

On average, migrants, refugees, and their families benefit from cross-border mobility, whether from immediate wage gains or an escape from peril. The economic gains depend on the education, gender, age, and language abilities of each migrant, and on the labor markets in destination countries. They also depend on such less-readily-measured traits as motivation, entrepreneurship, and risk preferences. Relative income gains tend to be larger for low-skilled than for higher-skilled migrants—but so are the financial costs of and legal barriers to migration. Wage gains for women are influenced by gender wage gaps and

---

25 Borjas’s book with the same title explores these themes. See Borjas 2016.
26 World Bank 2019a.
gender discrimination in both origin and destination labor markets. Refugees and asylum-seekers are further disadvantaged when they face barriers, whether de jure or de facto, to access the labor market.

These gains rise substantially in the long run when migrants enjoy certain socio-economic rights, defined as the ability to engage in economic activity and to access services in a manner that is broadly comparable to nationals in similar situations. Migrant and refugee outcomes—their wages, job quality, and other economic metrics—generally converge with those of destination country nationals if its policies grant them legal status, formal employment rights, and other labor market privileges. Those lacking legal status have significantly worse outcomes, especially in the longer term, because their rights are not protected, they lack access to health and education services, and they cannot enter occupations that have higher economic potential and social status. Moreover, poorer prospects reduce incentives for migrants and refugees to invest in location-specific human, physical, and social capital, which negatively affects outcomes for both migrants and destination countries.27

In addition to personal income gains, many people move across borders to provide a better future for their families. This is especially true for migrants moving from lower-income countries where they have fewer health and education opportunities. The impact on migrant children as well as the second and third generation is generally positive, especially if the child adapts to the new environment and has access to health and education services.28 The gains in terms of physical safety and health outcomes for refugees and other people escaping from vulnerable, even life-and-death, situations can be especially dramatic and will be emphasized.29

The development benefits of mobility are transmitted to migrants’ families and communities back at home through remittances, knowledge transfers, financial resources, and increased integration into the global economy, although there are marked variations across situations. Remittances provide a stable source of income for migrants’ families, absorbing shocks and supporting macroeconomic stability (Figure 3.3). Remittances also enable families to increase their investments in new businesses and human capital, especially through the education of their children, enabling them to improve their long-term economic outcomes. Migrants, diaspora communities, and returnees can become agents of change as they transfer knowledge and technology, spurring new enterprises and job creation. Financial sector development is crucial; inclusion of the families of migrants into the formal financial system increases the

---

27 Orrenius and Zavodny 2015.
28 Smith 2015.
29 See Nakamura, Sigurdsson, and Steinsson (2021) on intergenerational returns to migration.
development impact of remittance and knowledge flows. Cross-border migration also reduces the labor supply in countries of origin, alleviating un(der)employment pressures, so that wages are higher for those who remain.

**Migrants are a source of economic growth and increased efficiency in destination economies, especially over the long term.** By easing labor market constraints, they expand the supply and lower the prices of many services and goods. Low-skilled migrants perform many of the jobs that locals are unwilling to take. High-skilled migrants—nurses, engineers, professional athletes, scientists—generate local, sectoral, and national efficiency spillovers and boost the productivity of their co-workers. The long-run dynamic benefits of immigration, even though harder to quantify, include productivity spillovers, promotion of entrepreneurship, innovation, and enhanced provision of such critical services as education and health care.

**The private sector plays a critical role in both countries of origin and destination by shaping cross-border mobility patterns, especially through labor market demand.** The private sector is the main engine of job creation, accounting for 90 percent of jobs globally. In destination countries, the private sector is the main employer of migrant workers; private-sector dialogue with the government is crucial to shaping the scale and scope of admission policies and accurately calculating the economic costs and benefits of labor mobility. In origin countries, a strong and dynamic private sector creates strong labor demand, changing migration dynamics and their development impacts, especially for higher-skilled workers.

---

30 Understanding the costs of remittances is especially critical to maximize their development impact. The Remittance Prices Worldwide database, maintained by the World Bank, provides important insights on levels and heterogeneity by corridor. World Bank 2019a.

31 These are sometimes referred to in the literature as “dirty, dangerous and demanding” jobs. Orrenius and Zavodny 2009.

32 World Bank 2012.

33 Dos Reis, Koser, and Levin 2017; Orrenius and Zavodny 2020.
But the downsides for migrants and societies of origin and destination need to be identified, acknowledged, and mitigated. The economic gains from cross-border mobility are not uniformly distributed and vary widely, including across education categories, age groups, and genders. Discrimination against women, ethnic, or demographic groups can be both a driver of cross-border movement and a barrier to realizing its full potential. Occupational segregation often leads migrant workers to be disproportionately exposed to risk. Many migrants, especially women, work in the informal sector or in occupations that are excluded from protections afforded by labor laws and regulations.\textsuperscript{34} Migrant women employed in stereotypically female occupations (such as live-in care and domestic work) are often isolated and therefore more vulnerable to exploitation, violence, and abuse.\textsuperscript{35} In countries of origin, remittances may increase existing inequalities by disproportionately benefitting the better-off, because the poorest must overcome barriers to mobility like high upfront migration costs, weak migrant networks, or incomplete information.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{34} Holliday, Hennebry, and Gammage 2018.
\textsuperscript{35} UNDP 2020.
\textsuperscript{36} Brown and Jimenez-Soto 2015; Borjas 2014.
Emigration of high-skilled people may create a “brain drain” effect for countries of origin. Emigration rates are higher for high-skilled than for low-skilled workers, especially in the smaller and poorer countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific that already suffer from human capital shortages. Similar effects are observed in middle or upper-middle-income countries like those in Eastern or Central Europe, whose labor markets are integrated with neighboring higher-income countries that provide attractive economic opportunities to higher-skilled workers. The loss of human capital and the associated public investment in education can reduce productivity spillovers and create shortages of healthcare and education services. Yet the extent of brain drain effects depends on skills complementarities, economic conditions, and a conducive business environment in countries of origin.37 The WDR will review current data, other evidence, and relevant policies to identify where the gaps and needs are.

Cross-border mobility may have distributional consequences, especially in the short run, in destination countries. Workers whose skills compete with those of the migrants—generally the lower-skilled—may face negative wage and employment effects in some environments (Figure 3.4). In contrast, workers with complementary skills and consumers of goods and services produced by the migrants tend to benefit considerably. But the distributional effects are smaller than for other shifts in labor markets, such as directed technological change or demographic transitions, and can be mitigated through redistribution policies. In the long run, reallocations of labor and capital and other adjustment mechanisms increase the wages of the lower-skilled so that, on average, the gains significantly outweigh the losses.

37 Kerr et al. 2016; Docquier and Rapoport 2012.
The main public and political debates in destination countries are often about social and cultural, rather than economic, factors. Social impacts play out in a range of areas in distinct ways. Some amenities are more susceptible to negative congestion effects, such as housing, and the provision of public education and healthcare. Others relate to political dynamics: participation, social cohesion, social inclusion, and integration. In many countries, discussions about national identity are framed by the definition of “the other.” Social impacts are complex, under-researched, and dependent on multiple factors that evolve over time. Especially relevant are the timing, composition, and concentration of migration flows, as well as the legal system, the current economic environment, and the social contract in the destination countries. Moreover, destination societies continually change, and cross-border mobility is but one of the forces that drive their evolution, such as technological progress, aging and demographic transition, and changing gender and family roles.

The WDR will explore the potential trade-offs and policy options that present themselves in societies of origin and destination, in order to maximize the positive impacts and mitigate the negative ones. It will draw on lessons from a wide range of migration corridors and experiences, discuss strengths and shortcomings of various policies, and review possible approaches to ensure better outcomes.

Source: Dustmann, Frattini, and Preston 2013. 38

38 Dustmann, Frattini, and Preston 2013.
For countries of origin, the aim is to actively manage emigration and to recognize it as a powerful force for development. The challenge is to enhance the benefits of emigration for the origin society through multiple policy approaches. These include promoting regular and skilled emigration to maximize remittances and knowledge transfers, supporting emigrants while they are abroad, alleviating the negative social impacts (e.g., brain drain effects), and taking advantage of the financial resources and skills that migrants bring back when they return home. The experiences of several countries demonstrate that well-designed programs can have a significant impact, regarding, for example, development of skills in high demand on the global labor market, adoption of professional and educational standards such that the qualifications are recognized globally, active job placement and matching programs in the destination labor markets, effective protection of the migrants’ social and economic rights while abroad, long-term active diaspora engagement programs, and facilitation of emigrants’ return and re-entry into the economy in a manner that optimizes their economic and social contributions.

For destination countries, the policy challenge is to manage complex trade-offs. These countries typically set their migration policies with a view to maximizing economic and social gains by selecting the pool of individuals that they consider will produce the most benefits to their society. The admission criteria often focus on the skill and demographic composition of immigration flows; some criteria also reflect prejudices related to cultural backgrounds and countries of origin. To maximize migrants’ contributions, destination countries also need to grant them a range of socio-economic rights once they enter the country. Yet, destination countries often face migration pressures that exceed their demand for immigrant labor in some segments of the economy. Thus, they need restrictive policies to regulate entry. In some cases, such measures have led to inhumane situations for migrants at the border as well as inside the country. The overarching policy challenge arises from the tension between objectives that cannot be achieved simultaneously. The better the economic and social conditions for migrants in the country, the higher the migration pressures and the more restrictive the entry policies need to be in order to obtain the composition of migrants the country is targeting. The worse the conditions for migrants, the higher the threats to their dignity and the lower the economic and social benefits for the destination society. This is the “policy trilemma” for destination countries: it is difficult to simultaneously maximize the economic and social impacts of migration, to provide migrants already in country with optimal socio-economic rights, and to fully respect the dignity of would-be migrants who are denied entry—all at the same time. Reducing migration pressures is critical to easing this trilemma. This can be done by expanding pathways for legal entry and by supporting programs that can alter the composition of the migration flows to ensure a better balance of labor supply and demand.
The WDR will also explore the scope for policy cooperation between origin and destination countries to maximize the gains of cross-border mobility. There have been successful experiences in better matching demand and supply of labor across borders, for example by negotiating mutual recognition of credentials, facilitating the employment of qualified workers for sectors and occupations with shortages, and managing the brain drain effects on countries of origin. Bilateral, regional, and multilateral coordination has proven effective in protecting migrant rights and safety, and in managing the consequences of undocumented migration, in both origin and destination countries. Policy cooperation can also help in both offering viable domestic alternatives and enabling migrants to improve their skills to better match the demands of the global labor market.

Theme 3: Rethinking the Protection-Development Nexus and the Need for Collective Action

The international legal and policy framework for cross-border mobility is both fragmented and incomplete. At its core is sharp normative distinctions between “economic” or “voluntary” migrants and “forcibly displaced” refugees and between different groups within these categories. These differences shape the international institutional architecture and radiate through national laws, policies, and regulations, which are operationalized by national immigration bureaucracies. Providing international protection to those who need it is central to “end[ing] poverty in all its forms everywhere” (SDG 1), but most countries have the opportunity to free-ride, creating a collective action problem at the international level. There is a widely accepted international legal framework for refugees, underpinned by the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and subsequent international and regional instruments. This framework provides legal status to refugees and creates an obligation for signatory countries not to send refugees back to places where their life or freedom would be threatened (known as “non-refoulement”). For voluntary migrants, bilateral agreements offer some protection and standards, but there is no specific, universal legal framework nor global standards. Most migration policies therefore reflect national political choices, and there are stark differences on a range of such issues as legal pathways to residency and citizenship, treatment of families and children, and basic rights. The fragmented global approach to cross-border mobility has enormous human costs and imposes significant economic burdens on migrants, refugees, and their host or destination communities.

40 This includes distinction between the norms that apply to regular and irregular migrants. See Chetail 2019.
41 See United Nations (1951), Article 33. See also McAdam and Wood 2021.
Though the refugee protection system has provided safety and legal protection to tens of millions of refugees, it has failed to deliver sustainable long-term solutions. Given the forced nature of their movements, refugees often find themselves in places with limited economic opportunities so that the potential economic benefits of cross-border mobility cannot materialize.43 Many refugees have become dependent on humanitarian assistance while relief instruments meant for short-term support are increasingly being used to finance medium-term aid programs. Without durable solutions at scale which include return, local integration, or resettlement, the number of refugees continues to grow, with many of them trapped in protracted situations of exclusion (Figures 3.5 and 3.6).44 Refugees are also heavily concentrated in a few countries that typically neighbor their countries of origin. Because most refugee-hosting countries are low- and middle-income, they have limited capacity to provide the assistance needed for such large numbers of refugees, and many have denounced the uneven and indefinite burdens placed on them.

There is a broad consensus, articulated in the Global Compact on Refugees, on the need for stronger responsibility-sharing and for development approaches to support refugees and their host communities.45 The WDR will take stock of the WBG’s and other development partners’ experiences in supporting refugee-hosting communities in their own development efforts and in addressing refugees’ socio-economic vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities include loss of assets and trauma, and they are often exacerbated by the limitations on rights, lack of economic opportunities, and limited planning horizons. The WDR will also highlight the importance of improved mechanisms for responsibility-sharing to achieve better development outcomes.

43 World Bank 2017a.
44 UNHCR 2021.
Figure 3.5 Number of Refugees over Time

Data source: UNHCR.

Figure 3.6 Average Duration of a Refugee’s Exile, 1991–2015, Years

Data source: UNHCR.
The complexity of cross-border movements also transcends the simple distinction between migrants and refugees. The assumption underlying the binary approach—that movements driven by violence are involuntary while movements driven by economics are voluntary—is often challenged by reality. Large numbers of people move across borders for economic (purportedly “voluntary”) reasons, but they take such extreme risks that their actions suggest an absence of genuine choice. Others try to use asylum channels to overcome entry restrictions, and in the process jeopardize the asylum system. While the legal distinction between refugees and economic migrants remains critical to providing life-saving asylum, it is important to recognize the need for policy nuances that respond to the specific situations of all people who move across borders.

There is increasing global awareness of the plight of people who are moving across borders out of necessity but who do not meet the definition of refugees and hence do not have the same legal protections. The WDR will refer to these groups as “flee-ers of necessity”. These people are often pushed by a combination of desperation, extreme poverty, or personal circumstances. Their journeys are typically harrowing, putting them at risk of trafficking and mistreatment. Such movements are not new and they represent only a small fraction of the people crossing borders, but they have become more visible and the subject of controversies, especially where politics are highly polarized. Gender-based violence is also elevated in such situations and so are risks of sexual exploitation and abuse, forced marriage, and domestic servitude for women and girls. The WDR will review the trends, main routes, socio-economic circumstances, prospects upon arrivals, and the welfare outcomes for these people.

These flee-ers of necessity are very diverse, and a variety of policy approaches are required to respond to their situations including in some cases collective responses to close gaps in international protection. The WDR will contribute to the debate by disaggregating the general flows into groups with shared characteristics that require distinct responses. This analysis will be based on each group’s proximity to circumstances typically associated with a need for international protection and collective action—for example, refugees in secondary movements, people fleeing other forms of violence, unaccompanied minors, people having experienced trauma while traveling, and other irregular migrants. Such disaggregation will be instrumental in shifting perspectives and moving from the current uncertainties over how best to deal with these composite flows in order to tailor approaches to the specific circumstances of each group.

47 McAdam and Wood 2021.
There is also a role for the private sector in forced displacement or similar situations. Whether they live in temporary shelters, slums, settlements, or rural or urban communities, refugees and flee-ers of necessity are economic agents who have skills, talents, and aspirations. They interact with the market as consumers, producers, buyers, sellers, borrowers, lenders, employers, employees, and entrepreneurs. With the right investments and policy interventions, the private sector can help them achieve their potential and create positive economic impacts in their host communities.

There is a renewed, yet fragile, impetus for international collective action to safeguard dignity and enable development for all people who move across borders. Following the adoption of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the momentum for universal collective action diminished. Regional solutions, such as the Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, have partly filled the gap. Pragmatic practices like complementary, subsidiary and temporary protection, have also emerged at the national and multilateral level. Yet these efforts remain limited and insufficient to bring about the necessary level of universal collective action. The Global Compact on Refugees and the Global Compact for Migration marked an attempt to revive collective initiatives. The Compacts were successful in reinforcing states’ commitments toward safe, orderly, and regular migration as well as international protection and durable solutions for migrants and refugees. They have helped to revive the debate on responsibility-sharing in relation to international protection and over time they could yield new normative principles and practices. Yet, in a world of increased geopolitical tensions, they may need to be underpinned and complemented by strong mechanisms for regional cooperation and solutions.

A revival of collective action would need to address issues that are critical for development outcomes for refugees and flee-ers of necessity as well as their host countries and communities, in line with the global public good nature of international protection. This includes reimagining the concept of protection from a development perspective to address some of the shortcomings faced by refugees and flee-ers of necessity in terms of their social and economic needs. Examples are strengthening the arrangements for international responsibility-sharing, codifying good practices, better articulating legal and development approaches, and expanding new forms of support, such as subsidiary and temporary protection or partial protection for certain groups. It would also include developing harmonized international norms and protection standards applicable to all those who cross borders, including through regional approaches where

48 Betts, Cuéllar, and Surendra 2016.
49 Kluge, Docking, and Edelman 2018; Verme and Schuettler 2021; Betts 2021.
50 Goodwin-Gill 2021.
51 Türk 2018; Kälin 2018.
appropriate. The welfare gains likely to result for refugees, flee-ers of necessity and their hosts are substantial.  

*Policy and Operational Implications*

The WDR will outline key considerations to operationalize the three themes of the better-mobility agenda. It will focus on recommendations for each group of stakeholders—e.g., migrants’ countries of origin and destination, refugee-hosting countries and communities, the international community, development institutions, the private sector, and civil society—while recognizing that approaches must be tailored to each situation.

The main objective of the proposed policies is to pursue SDG #1, “End[ing] poverty in all its forms everywhere,” by (1) making global labor markets work better for both origin and destination countries and the migrants themselves; and (2) improving collective action at the international level to craft non-market solutions. The WDR will thus discuss such issues as (1) the global architecture governing migration and forced displacement, the role of institutional actors, and the necessity of regional approaches and bilateral cooperation; (2) the importance of sound migration policies in destination countries and in refugee-hosting countries for global development; (3) the steps countries of origin can take to maximize the impact of migration; and (4) the role of development actors throughout.

Recommendations are expected to largely focus on three areas: (1) human capital and skills development, to facilitate migrants’ inclusion into the receiving economy and their contributions to the origin society, and to support the achievement of durable solutions for refugees; (2) socio-economic rights, both to enhance the impacts of cross-border mobility and to safeguard the dignity of migrants and refugees, such as predictability and security of legal status, rights to work and rights at work, and access to justice and to basic services; and (3) international cooperation through global, regional, and bilateral arrangements. Because each situation is different, the WDR will highlight that this core agenda often needs to be complemented by additional measures in other policy areas.

The WDR will also touch on political economy challenges. In an area as controversial as cross-border mobility, such considerations often dictate the extent to which reforms can be implemented. Migrants’ voices, particularly those of migrant women are often absent from policy discussions that concern them,

---

52 Verme and Schuettler 2021.
and it is increasingly recognized that their active participation is necessary. While addressing the underlying political, social, and cultural issues goes beyond a development mandate, the WDR will aim to identify key elements to consider, and to review lessons from country-level experiences so that better mobility policies can be designed and implemented.

Finally, the WDR will discuss the question of instruments. Many development institutions have a country-based operational model, in line with the principles put forward in the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action. Yet, by definition, migrants and refugees do not live in their own countries. This mismatch is severely limiting the scope of possible development support. The WDR will review the approaches that have been developed to overcome these issues and the lessons that have been learned in the process. This will include technical assistance and operations to help better manage migration, as well as projects in support of refugees and host communities that have been financed under the IDA Window for Host Communities and Refugees and the Global Concessional Finance Facility (GCFF).

---

53 Noor 2021.
Box 3: Main topics expected to be covered under the WDR

Overview: Toward Better Mobility

Background

- Mobility in a historical context
- Patterns and dimensions of heterogeneity
- Data sources and shortcomings

Part I: Development and the Drivers of Cross-Border Mobility

- Long-term trends: demographic divergence, climate change
- Shocks stemming from conflict, violence, and natural disasters
- Root causes, development, and cross-border mobility

Part II: Impacts of Mobility, Development Opportunities, and the Policy Trilemma

- Economic impacts on migrants, societies of origin and destination
- Social impacts in societies of origin and destination
- The challenges of migration policies: development opportunities, “policy trilemma”, and international cooperation
- Spotlight on migrant return

Part III: Rethinking the Protection-Development Nexus and the Need for Collective Action

- Development approaches to forced displacement
- Closing the protection gap for flee-ers of necessity
- Structures for collective action
- Spotlight on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

Part IV: Policy Recommendations
4. Consultations, Partnerships, and Timetable

Internal Consultations

The WDR team has been holding internal consultations with Regions, Global Practices, corporate units, and technical colleagues. The team has also made presentations to the Council of Chief Economists and to the Migration Steering Committee.

Throughout preparation of the Report and beyond, the team will continue to work closely with all Practice Groups (especially Human Development; Equitable Growth, Finance and Institutions; and Sustainable Development), with Global Theme Departments (Fragility, Conflict, and Violence; Climate Change; and Gender), and with corporate Vice-Presidencies (including Legal, Operations Policy and Country Services, and External and Corporate Relations).

The WDR team includes core members from several departments and vice-presidencies across the WBG, including the Development Economics Vice-Presidency; the Poverty and Equity Global Practice; the Social Protection and Jobs Global Practice; the Environment, Natural Resources and Blue Economy Global Practice; the Climate Change Group; the Fragility, Conflict and Violence Group; the Legal Vice-Presidency, and the External and Corporate Relations Vice-Presidency. The WDR team will also work closely with relevant departments to prepare background papers or companion reports on migration and forced displacement.

The WDR team has also formed an Internal Advisory Committee, spanning seven Global Practices and the IFC. Committee members are listed in Annex 1. The team had its first consultation with the committee on February 23.

External Consultations, Partnerships, and Field Visits

Since the report topic was announced, the WDR team has had preliminary engagements with a range of external stakeholders, among them:

- Development partners, such as the governments of Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as the European External Action Service, and the European Commission’s Directorate-Generals for Climate Action, International Partnerships, Migration and Home Affairs, and Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations.
- **Delegations from client countries:** The team met with delegations from several client countries during and after the Spring Meetings, such as Armenia, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guatemala, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Tunisia, among others.

- **International and regional organizations,** such as the UN Economic Commission for Africa, ILO, Inter-American Development Bank, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IOM, OECD, and UNHCR.

- **Leading academics and researchers,** including scholars with expertise in economics, international refugee law, climate and migration, and related topics.

- **Civil society representatives,** including through two round tables organized by Refugees International, on March 16, 2022, and by the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) and InterAction, on April 4, 2022.

- **Think tanks,** including the Center for Global Development and the Overseas Development Institute.

The WDR team will pursue and expand these engagements throughout preparation of the report, including with relevant private sector organizations and foundations, and other regional organizations. To the extent possible given COVID-19 circumstances, it will seek the views of migrants and refugees themselves through migrant- and refugee-led organizations, including women-led organizations. It will aim to organize consultations with key counterparts and stakeholders in origin and destination countries for migrants and in refugee-hosting countries.

The WDR will also benefit from advice and guidance from a **High-Level Advisory Panel** of leading policymakers and other experts, convened by Carmen Reinhart, Senior Vice President and Chief Economist, Development Economics Vice-Presidency (see Annex 2).

The team has also formed a multidisciplinary **Academic Advisory Committee** that it intends to consult with throughout the preparation of the report (see Annex 3).

**Timetable**

Following the Bank-wide review on March 21, 2022, the Concept Note was informally discussed by the Board on May 12, 2022. Bank-wide review of the full draft report is planned for October 2022, and a Board discussion is planned for December 2022. The WDR 2023 will be published in March 2023.
5. The Team

Xavier Devictor (FCV), Quy-Toan Do (DEC), and Caglar Ozden (DEC) are Co-Directors for the Report, and Joyce Ibrahim (DEC) is the Task Team Leader. The core team comprises Paige Casaly (LEG), Viviane Clement (SD), Vikram Raghavan (LEG), Kanta Rigaud (ENR), Sandra Rozo Villarraga (DEC), Zara Sarzin (FCV), Kirsten Schuettler (SPJ), Ganesh Seshan (EFI), Maheshwor Shrestha (SPJ), Mauro Testaverde (SPJ), Solomon Walelign (DEC), Christina Wieser (POV), and Soonhwa Yi (SPJ). Laura Caron, Narcisse Cha’ngom, Jessica Dodo Buchler, Sameeksha Khare, Matthew Martin, Elham Shabahat, Samikshya Siwakoti, and Adesola Sunmoni serve as research analysts. Shane Romig (ECR). Caroline Sergeant (FCV), and Thamesha Tennakoon (FCV) are part of the extended WDR team. Selome Paulos is providing administrative support. Bruce Ross-Larson assisted with content planning and Anne Grant edited the concept note.

The report is sponsored by the Development Economics Vice-President. Carmen Reinhart, Senior Vice President and Chief Economist, and Aart Kraay, Deputy Chief Economist and Director of Development Policy, will oversee its preparation.
Annex 1: Internal Advisory Committee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dina Abu-Ghaida</td>
<td>Lead Economist, Education, Middle East and North Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caroline Bahnson</td>
<td>Senior Operations Officer, Fragile, Conflict and Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michel Botzung</td>
<td>Manager, Africa FCS Initiative, IFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calogero (Gero) Carletto</td>
<td>Manager, Data Production and Methods, Development Economics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ximena del Carpio</td>
<td>Practice Manager, Poverty and Equity, Latin America and Caribbean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephane Hallegatte</td>
<td>Senior Climate Change Advisor, Sustainable Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David McKenzie</td>
<td>Lead Economist, Development Research Group, Development Economics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pia Peeters</td>
<td>Practice Manager, Social Sustainability and Inclusion, Middle East and North Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dilip Ratha</td>
<td>Lead Economist, Social Protection and Jobs, Human Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Annex 2: High-Level Advisory Panel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>INSTITUTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part II Countries</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alejandro Botero Barco</td>
<td>Director General, National Planning Department</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karl Chua</td>
<td>Secretary of Socioeconomic Planning, National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA)</td>
<td>The Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esther Anyakun Davinia</td>
<td>Minister of State for Relief, Disaster Preparedness and Refugees</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reha Denemeç</td>
<td>Former Deputy Minister of National Education</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiébilé Dramé</td>
<td>Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Former Member of Parliament</td>
<td>Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuba Raj Khatiwada</td>
<td>Former Minister of Finance, Former Minister of Planning and Former Central Bank Governor</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mary Kawar</td>
<td>Former Minister of Planning and International Cooperation</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part I Countries</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlos Gutierrez</td>
<td>Former Secretary of Commerce</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janez Lenarčič</td>
<td>Commissioner for Crisis Management</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Organizations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filippo Grandi</td>
<td>High Commissioner</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guy Ryder</td>
<td>Director-General</td>
<td>International Labour Organization (ILO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volker Türk</td>
<td>Under-Secretary-General for Policy</td>
<td>Executive Office of the Secretary-General, United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>António Vitorino</td>
<td>Director General</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration (IOM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civil Society Organizations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Miliband</td>
<td>President and CEO</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asif Saleh</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>BRAC Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Annex 3: Academic Advisory Committee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>INSTITUTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ran Abramitzky</td>
<td>Professor of Economics</td>
<td>Stanford University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emmanuelle Auriol</td>
<td>Professor of Economics</td>
<td>Toulouse School of Economics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander Betts</td>
<td>Leopold Muller Professor of Forced Migration and International Affairs</td>
<td>University of Oxford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Clemens</td>
<td>Senior Fellow and Research Manager</td>
<td>Center for Global Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander de Sherbinin</td>
<td>Associate Director for Science Applications and Senior Research Scientist at the Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN)</td>
<td>Columbia University Climate School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frederic Docquier</td>
<td>Professor of Economics / Research Director of Crossing Borders</td>
<td>Catholic University of Louvain / Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esther Duflo</td>
<td>Abdul Latif Jameel Professor of Economics</td>
<td>Massachusetts Institute of Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filiz Garip</td>
<td>Professor of Sociology and Public Affairs</td>
<td>Princeton University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guy Goodwin-Gill</td>
<td>Barrister and Professor of Public International Law</td>
<td>University of Oxford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jennifer Hunt</td>
<td>Professor of Economics</td>
<td>Rutgers University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ana Maria Ibáñez</td>
<td>Principal Economics Advisor / Professor of Economics</td>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank / Universidad de los Andes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anna Maria Mayda</td>
<td>Professor of Economics</td>
<td>Georgetown University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Susan Martin</td>
<td>Donald G. Herzberg Professor Emerita of International Migration</td>
<td>Georgetown University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Miguel</td>
<td>Oxfam Professor of Environmental and Resource Economics</td>
<td>University of California, Berkeley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mushfiq Mobarak</td>
<td>Professor of Economics</td>
<td>Yale University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celestin Monga</td>
<td>Professor of Public Policy</td>
<td>Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giovanni Peri</td>
<td>Professor of Economics</td>
<td>University of California, Davis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lant Pritchett</td>
<td>RISE Research Director at the Blavatnik School of Government</td>
<td>University of Oxford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaya Ramji-Nogales</td>
<td>I. Herman Stern Research Professor</td>
<td>Beasley School of Law, Temple University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hillel Rapoport</td>
<td>PSE Chair Professor of Economics</td>
<td>University of Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne and Paris School of Economics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackie Wahba</td>
<td>Professor of Economics</td>
<td>University of Southampton</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Annex 4: Glossary**

This glossary defines key terms for the purposes of this Concept Note. It should not be construed to define terms for use outside of the Concept Note.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Asylum</strong></td>
<td>The grant, by a state, of protection on its territory to persons outside their country of nationality or habitual residence, who are fleeing persecution or serious harm or for other reasons. Asylum encompasses a variety of elements, including protection against refoulement, legal status and permission to remain on the territory of the asylum country, and certain rights and standards of treatment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Asylum-seekers</strong></td>
<td>A general term for persons who are seeking international protection outside their country of origin or habitual residence. This includes those who have applied for refugee status under domestic legislation but have not yet received a final decision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Complementary or subsidiary protection</strong></td>
<td>Various mechanisms used by states or regions to regularize the stay of persons falling outside the scope of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, but who are nevertheless in need of international protection (see “persons in need of international protection”). Such protection (which may also be referred to as “temporary protection,” “humanitarian stay arrangements,” etc.) varies in substance but is generally meant to translate the principle of non-refoulement into some sort of legal status (other than refugee status) under domestic law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cross-border mobility</strong></td>
<td>Human movement across state borders, temporarily or permanently, regardless of drivers or motivations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic migration</strong></td>
<td>Movement of people away from their habitual residence solely or primarily motivated by economic opportunities. For purposes of this Concept Note, “economic migration” is primarily used to indicate an approach to migration that focuses on economic and labor drivers and characteristics, while excluding refugees and forcibly displaced persons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Emigrants/emigration</strong></td>
<td>From the perspective of the country of departure, persons who move from their country of nationality or usual residence to another country, so that the country of destination effectively becomes his or her new country of usual residence. For purposes of this Concept Note, “emigrant” is presumed to exclude those who are forcibly displaced across borders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Forced displacement</strong></td>
<td>The movement of persons who have been forced or obliged to leave their homes or places of habitual residence and move across an international border as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Immigrants/immigration</strong></td>
<td>From the perspective of the country of arrival, persons who move into a country other than that of his or her nationality or usual residence, so that the country of destination effectively becomes his or her new country of usual residence. For</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
for purposes of this Concept Note, “immigrant” is presumed to exclude those who are forcibly displaced across borders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>International protection</strong></td>
<td>Protection afforded by the international community to certain individuals or groups (see “persons in need of international protection”). The international community provides international protection to individuals and groups through states (notably via asylum and complementary or subsidiary protection) and international organizations in accordance with their mandates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Irregular migrants/Migrants in an irregular situation</strong></td>
<td>Persons who move across an international border and are not legally authorized to enter or to stay in a state pursuant to the law of that state and to international agreements to which that state is a party. These persons are also referred to as “undocumented migrants.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Migrants/ migration</strong></td>
<td>General colloquial term referring to people who move away from their place of habitual residence, temporarily or permanently, for a variety of reasons. For purposes of this Concept Note, “migrant” presumes movement across an international border and does not include those who move in a forced or voluntary manner unless otherwise specified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Migrant workers</strong></td>
<td>Persons who are to be engaged, are engaged or have been engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which they are not nationals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Persons in need of international protection</strong></td>
<td>Persons outside their country of origin or habitual residence who are unable to return because they would be at risk there, and whose country of origin is unable or unwilling to protect them. Risks giving rise to a need for international protection include persecution or other threats to life, freedom, or physical integrity arising from armed conflict, serious public disorder, or situations of violence, as well as disasters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Refugees</strong></td>
<td>Persons outside their country of origin or habitual residence who are in need of international protection because of feared persecution or a serious threat to life, physical integrity, or freedom as a result of persecution, armed conflict, violence, or serious public disorder, and whose country of origin is unwilling or unable to protect them. Legally, the term refers to any person who meets the eligibility criteria under an applicable definition as provided for in international and regional legal instruments, UNHCR’s mandate, or national legislation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
References


Vollset, Stein Emil, Emily Goren, Chun-Wei Yuan, Jackie Cao, Amanda E. Smith, Thomas Hsiao, Catherine Bisignano, Gulrez S. Azhar, Emma Castro, Julian Chalek, Andrew J. Dolgert, Tahvi Frank,


