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Prepared by          Reviewed by          ICR Review Coordinator Group
Ranga Rajan          Peter Nigel Freeman  Kavita Mathur       IEGSD (Unit 4)
Krishnamani          

2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

The Project Development Objective (PDO) as stated in the Financing Agreement (schedule 1, page 5) and in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD, page 5) was "to improve the safety, security and operations of the Goma International Airport".

This review is based on the two sub-objectives:
PDO 1. To improve the safety and security of the Goma International Airport;

PDO 2. To improve operations of the Goma International Airport.

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation? Yes

Did the Board approve the revised objectives/key associated outcome targets? No

c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken? No

d. Components

There were two components (PAD, pages 7 - 8):

1. Airport Infrastructure Investments. The appraisal estimate was US$40.00 million. The actual cost was as estimated. This component financed investments for improving the international safety and security standards of the Goma International airport and bringing its operational capacity to the pre-volcano level (discussed in section three). Activities included: (a) rehabilitating the runway, apron, electrical systems, passenger terminal and the internal service road; (b) providing a mobile control tower; (c) upgrading air navigation aids; (d) erecting the airport’s security fence; (e) supporting airport rescue and firefighting services; (f) laying out a cargo area; and (g) implementing an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment.

The project scope was modified during implementation. The Government had initially planned to finance removal of drainage water from the airport to Lake Kivu through a storm water collector line of about 1.7 kilometer (km) length. However, only 400 meters was built and additional government funds were not available for completing this activity. Because water coming from the airport was the cause of flooding and human suffering in the neighborhood bordering the airport, the Bank agreed to finance this activity.

During preparation, the design envisioned constructing a new mobile air traffic control tower for two reasons. One, a permanent control tower was deemed to be infeasible in the time period; and two, a permanent tower was not considered to be necessary for the urgent need of improving the airport's safety and security. However, early during implementation, the Bank with the Government decided that a permanent tower would serve the airport's long term need and could be constructed at a similar price under the standardized design available at that time. Hence, the design was modified to include construction of a permanent air traffic control tower.

The activities associated with supply and installation of equipment, rehabilitation of the existing passenger terminal and laying out a cargo area were dropped to finance the added activities.

2. Capacity Building and Project Implementation Support. The appraisal estimate was US$6.00 million. The actual cost was as estimated. Activities in this component included Technical Assistance (TA) for: (a) a priority airport rehabilitation program; (b) monitoring volcano risks; (c) strengthening the economic and social fabric of the communities around the airport; and (d) implementation support including through
provision of goods, consultant services, training and financing operating costs to support coordination, auditing and monitoring and evaluation.

The TA activities associated with preparing a priority airport rehabilitation program and strengthening the economic and social fabric of the communities around the airport were dropped during implementation.

e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

Project cost. The estimated cost at appraisal including contingencies US$52.00 million. The actual cost was US$52.75 million. The difference between the estimated cost at appraisal and actual cost was due to exchange rate changes during implementation.

Project financing. The project was financed by an IDA Grant of US$52.00 million and a Trust Fund (TF) of US$1.80 million. With this, financing for the project was US$53.80 million. US$52.75 million was disbursed (US$50.97 million of the IDA Grant and US$1.77 million of the TF).

Recipient contribution. Recipient contribution was not planned at appraisal. However, the government contributed to financing 400 meters of the storm water collection line.

Dates. The project was approved on March 13, 2015, became effective on September 30, 2015, and was scheduled to close on December 31, 2020. However, the project closed nine months behind schedule on September 30, 2021, to allow for work to be completed following the COVID-19 pandemic.

Other changes. The modifications to the project design (removal of drainage water from the airport to Lake Kivu through a storm water collector line and a permanent air traffic control tower) were added without a formal project restructuring.

The following changes were made through a level 2 restructuring on December 17, 2020.

- A key outcome indicator "Regulatory certification of safety and security at Goma International Airport" was replaced with an indicator "Conformity of the improved infrastructure at Goma International Airport with aeronautical regulations". The original indicator was revised as the project did not finance any certification activities. The certification activities were planned as part of another Bank-financed project (Multimodal Transport Project) and its results could not be attributed to this project.
- The closing date was extended by nine months from December 31, 2020, to September 30, 2021, for completing the ongoing activities that were delayed due to the restrictions following the COVID-19 pandemic.

Split rating. This review is not based on a split rating of objectives, given that the PDO remained unchanged, project scope did not materially change, and the key PDO indicator was modified to reflect the achievements that could be attributed to this project.

3. Relevance of Objectives
Rationale

**Country context.** With a land surface area of 2.3 million square kilometers (km), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is one the poorest countries in the world, with 64% of its population living below the poverty line of US$1.25 per day. Over the past decade, excepting for some parts of the Eastern Provinces (North Kivu), DRC was at peace. Since 1960, the Eastern Provinces has been afflicted by a mix of factors, including poor governance, weak capacity and periodic recurrence of armed conflicts. As a result, the World Bank classifies the DRC's Eastern Provinces as a "fragile" state.

**Sector context and Government Strategy.** Air transport has not able to fulfill its role in DRC due to the dilapidated airport infrastructure and extremely weak technical and safety regulations. The Goma International Airport - Eastern DRC's main international gateway - was especially in dire condition. While decades of conflict and frequent rebel control of the airport had contributed to its poor operations, the volcanic eruption in 2002 caused significant damage to its key infrastructure. The lava flow from the volcano buried 1,150 meters of the runway (one third of the 3,000 meters runway). The remaining section of the runway rendered the airport operational for only small aircrafts. Humanitarian aid flows, United Nation (UN) operations and passenger and cargo transport were constrained due to the limited airport capacity and its poor safety and security standards. Re-establishing the airport's operations to its pre volcanic condition and improving the airport's safety and security was a top priority for the Government strategy. The PDO was consistent with the Government's Second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP - 2), which explicitly highlighted the need for addressing the challenges of stabilization and peace consolidation in DRC's Eastern Provinces.

**Bank strategy.** The PDO is well-aligned with the Bank strategy. At appraisal, the second objective of the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for 2013-2016 articulated the need for "boosting the competitiveness of the country by accelerating private sector-led growth" through among other things, improving connectivity and access to transport infrastructure. The PDO was aligned with the Bank's 2013 regional strategy for supporting peace and stability in the Great Lakes Region (Burundi, DRC, Rwanda and Uganda). The PDO is well-aligned with the current Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for 2022 - 2025. The Focus Area one of the CPF underscored the need for strengthening stabilization efforts and reducing the risk of conflict and violence through: (i) improving interconnectedness between countries and within the country; and (ii) strengthening regional integration between the Great Lakes countries.

**Bank experience.** The Bank has supported projects in the Eastern Provinces of DRC. These included: (i) the Eastern Recovery Project (2014) aimed to improve access socio-economic infrastructure to the vulnerable communities in Eastern Provinces; (ii) the Great Lakes Emergency Sexual and Gender-based violence and Women's Health project (2014); (iii) the Prevention and Mitigation of Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in North and South Kivu Project (2014); and the ongoing Pro-Route Program.

This project aimed at improving the safety and security standards of the Goma International Airport and improving its operational capacity. The project was designed as an emergency project as it was in an area of conflict and the poor airport condition following the volcanic eruption. Given that the PDO was relevant to the Government strategy and the Bank strategy for DRC as well and the Bank strategy for the Great Lakes region, the relevance of the PDO is **high**.

**Rating**
4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

OBJECTIVE 1

Objective
To improve the safety and security of the Goma International Airport.

Rationale

Theory of change. The causal links between project activities, outputs and outcomes were logical. Airport infrastructure investments such as rehabilitating the runway, apron, the electrical system, constructing the security fence, a control tower, a drainage system linking the airport with the city drainage system, a cargo area, the airport's rescue and firefighting services and upgrading its navigation aids, were likely to improve the airport's safety and security standards. The results framework assumes the following; (i) the volcanic activities in the area remains under control; and (ii) the security, the political and the governance situation will be stable in North Kivu.

Outputs (ICR, pages 13 - 15).

The following activities were completed as targeted.

- The existing runway was rehabilitated. The 335 meters needed to restore the runways total length to the original 3,000 meters were reconstructed. Two Runway End Safety Areas (RESAs) were constructed, one at each end of the runway to reduce the risk of damage to an aircraft, improve aircraft deceleration and facilitate movement of rescue and fire vehicles. Before the project, airport safety operations were endangered due to the lava flows at the end of the runway. The project contributed to a safer runway by removing the lava rock from its norther end.
- A new control tower (25 meters) was constructed, allowing controllers a better view of the entire airport (before the project, the existing control tower (6 meters) was low and did not allow a full view of the aprons, taxiways and runaways). Although the control tower was not completed at project closure, the tower was operational by November 30, 2021 with government funding (ICR, paragraph 61).
- A 5,450 meters fence surrounding the airport was constructed for protecting restricted areas and preventing access to unauthorized personnel. After completion of the fence, the number of people crossing the runway dropped from 2,000 people before the project to none, and the number of complaints related to theft of property in the compound reduced from around 40 per month to none.
- The airport's power plant building was rehabilitated and new electricity supply equipment were provided. With the equipment, the airport has electricity twenty four hours, seven days a week. The new control tower was supplied with electricity from the airport powerplant.
- The rescue and firefighting services were equipped with tools, parts, and supplies.
- The activity associated with the stormwater collector was not fully complete when the project closed. The activity nevertheless resumed using local provincial government funding. As part of this sub-component, the project provided additional benefits to the surrounding population through constructing 14 standpipes in five neighborhood districts near the airport.
• The project provided TA to the Goma Volcanic Observatory (OVG) to monitor volcano risks and to strengthen the preparedness of the airport and surrounding communities by: (i) developing knowledge and tools (geospatial information dataset) for better monitoring of the Nyiragongo volcano; (ii) developing and distributing risk management plans (a contingency plan, an evacuation plan, a lava flow risk map for Goma city in the event of an eruption of the Nyuragongo volcano; (iii) training OVG researchers, technicians and North Kivu Civil Protection Agents; (iv) providing materials and equipment for civil protection; (v) undertaking awareness campaigns on volcanic risks; and (vi) establishing focal points for volcanic crisis management.

• Sensitization campaigns on Gender-Based Violence (GBV) were held in seven neighborhoods bordering the airport. A gender-sensitive Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM) was also set up to raise awareness of the population. Forty-two members of the community were trained for managing the complaints on GBV. 31 women out of 584 employees worked directly on the project.

The following activities were dropped.

• The supply and installation of equipment to upgrade air navigation aids.
• The rehabilitation of the existing passenger terminal (the upgrading of the air navigation aids and rehabilitation of the existing passenger terminal would have further reinforced the safety of the airport).
• Laying out of a cargo area.
• Preparing a priority airport rehabilitation program.
• Technical Assistance to strengthen the economic and social fabric of the communities around the airport.

Outcomes.

The original outcome indicator to monitor performance of this PDO was 'regulatory certification of safety and security at Goma International Airport'. This indicator was unachievable, as the project did not finance activities pertaining to the airport's regulatory certification. The indicator was consequently replaced with the indicator 'conformity of the improved infrastructure at Goma International Airport with aeronautical regulations'. According to the DRC's Civil Aviation Authority (AAC), the airport's infrastructure complied with aeronautical regulations and that the required technical specifications were added in the works' contracts and the engineer's terms of reference. The restructuring paper did not however explain the methodology for monitoring this indicator.

Although there is no concrete evidence, this review concludes that this was due to the lack of an appropriate indicator. However, given that project interventions were in the context of a fragile environment and that the outputs would have helped in improving the safety and security of the Goma International airport, this review concludes that the project significantly contributed to realizing the PDO. The most significant safety and security improvements are improving safety at the runway, securing the airport by enclosure, having a more safe and adequate air traffic control, securing the electricity supply, improving the drainage network inside the airport, improving the capacity of rescue and firefighting services, and improving the monitoring of volcano risks.

Rating
**OBJECTIVE 2**

**Objective**
To improve operations of the Goma International Airport.

**Rationale**

*Theory of change.* The outputs of activities described above were likely to improve the operational capacity of the Goma International Airport and restore it to the pre-volcano level. The causal links between the project activities, outputs and outcomes were logical. The intended outcomes were monitorable.

**Outputs** (ICR, pages 15 -17).

In addition to the outputs described above, the following outputs were relevant to this objective.

- The 335 meters of the runway were reconstructed. This brought the runway's total length to the original pre-volcano level of 3,000 meters. This activity along with the rehabilitation of the apron increased the capacity to accommodate larger aircrafts. Before the project, Boeing 767 aircraft could no longer land at the airport. At project closure, Boeings 767, 777 and 787 could all safely take off and land at the airport.
- The number of airlines companies that can perform at least one flight per week increased from 20 companies before the project to 34 after the project. Aircraft movements by night on an annual basis increased to 178 at project closure as compared to none before the project. The capacity of the apron to accommodate originally designated type of aircraft (Boeing 767/Airbus) increased from three at the baseline to five.

**Outcomes.**

The outputs described above were aimed to improve the operational capacity of the Goma international airport to its pre-volcano levels. As indicated above, the capacity of the airport to accommodate larger aircrafts increased significantly due to the project interventions. The other outcomes were;

- The number of passengers through the Goma international airport increased from 140,000 in December 31, 2014, to 277,730 by December 31, 2019 (the numbers are based on December 31, 2019, due to the restrictions following the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021). Air freight grew from 14,941 in 2014 tons to an estimated 28,000 tons in 2019, representing an average growth of 11% during this period. The number of aircraft movements grew from 17,625 in 2014 to 23,047 in 2019, representing an average growth of 6.93%.
- Annual revenue of the airport increased from US$2.5 million in 2014 to US$4.9 million in December 31, 2019, exceeding the target of US$4.5 million.

In sum, the efficacy of this PDO is substantial.

**Rating**

Substantial
OVERALL EFFICACY

Rationale
Given that outcomes were realized for the most part, overall efficacy is substantial.

Overall Efficacy Rating
Substantial

5. Efficiency

Economic analysis. A Benefit-Cost analysis was conducted for infrastructure investments. These activities accounted for 77% of the project cost. The benefits were to come from time savings for passengers, reductions in aircraft operating costs for cargo carriers, the use of larger aircraft and the lifting of restrictions on aircraft take off. The Net Present Value (NPV) at 12% at closure was US$6.78 million, as compared to the NPV of US$9.8 million at appraisal using the same discount rate. The ex-post Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) was 13.4%, as compared to the ex-ante EIRR of 15.1%. The actual EIRR was lower due to a combination of factors including differences between the passenger and freight movements when the project closed, as compared to the movements at appraisal. Some of this lower return was undoubtedly due to the impact of Covid-19.

Financial analysis. A financial analysis undertaken at appraisal showed a Financial Internal Rate of Return (FIRR) of 11.4%. The Bank deemed this FIRR as acceptable for an investment program in a region marred by decades of conflict and instability (PAD, paragraph 35). An analysis was not conducted at closure because actual historical data on aeronautical and non-aeronautical revenues and annual maintenance, operating and administrative expenses were not available likely due to the Covid-19.

Administrative shortcomings. The actual cost of activities (such as, the rehabilitation of the runway, apron, airport's electrical system, supply and installation of the new control tower, construction of the airport's security fence and rehabilitation of the internal service road), were higher than estimated at appraisal. The termination dispute with the company in charge of runway and storm water collection work resulted in a significant unplanned payment from the project's funds of US$3.2 million for dispute settlement. The decision to use direct contracting for runway rehabilitation due to the poor performance of the contractor, led to a dispute settlement because the contractor claimed that not all of the realized works had been paid. Actual administrative costs were about US$1.30 million higher than expected. Although at the project level the project was implemented within the budget, this was due to a combination of factors including, contingency funding in project financing, and cost savings from a number of activities that were dropped that would have reinforced the safety and security standards of the airport (discussed in the previous section). The delays in completing the works (construction of the power plant and control tower) were exacerbated by factors over which the project had no control such as the physical restrictions in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and eruption of the Nyiragongo volcano on May
23, 2021. The team clarified that the power plant and control tower have been completed since then. The reduced scope of project activities was completed with a nine-month extension of the project closing date.

In sum, efficiency is rated as modest in view of the many administrative shortcomings.

**Efficiency Rating**

Modest

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

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* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

6. Outcome

Relevance of the PDO to the Government strategy, Bank's strategy for DRC and the Bank's regional strategy is High. Overall efficacy is substantial. Efficiency is modest. Overall outcome is moderately satisfactory.

a. **Outcome Rating**

Moderately Satisfactory

7. Risk to Development Outcome

**Government commitment.** There is a a moderate risk that the development outcome could be undermined due to inadequate support from the local provincial government. To reduce the flooding in the communities surrounding the airport, the project financed the evacuation of drainage water from the airport to Lake Kivu through a stormwater collection line. When the project closed, this activity was not complete, but had resumed using funds from the local provincial government. There is the risk that this activity may not be completed due to inadequate funding from the local provincial government.

**Natural disaster risk.** The last eruption of the Nyiragongo volcano on May 23, 2021 did not impact the Goma International airport. There is a moderate risk that a new eruption could damage the airport infrastructure and jeopardize the operations of the airport. To mitigate this risk, the project provided a
technical assistance to OVG to better monitor the volcano risks and strengthened the preparedness of the airport and surroundings communities.

8. Assessment of Bank Performance

a. Quality-at-Entry

Given the urgent need in a fragile environment, the Bank expedited the preparation of this project: it was prepared in just five months and approved on March 13, 2015. The ICR (paragraph 87) noted that the project was prepared by an experienced team who had worked on projects in similar challenging contexts, and had managed the Bank-financed Multimodal Transport Project.

The Bank prepared this project based on the experiences from previous Bank-financed projects in DRC and other fragile countries. The lessons incorporated included: (a) recognizing that design needs to be simple in fragile environments, the design had one large component that was limited to the airport, and a small component supporting implementation; (b) recognizing that even with a simple design, investment projects can be used to leverage interventions that can benefit peacebuilding, the design provided support for strengthening the management of the volcanic risk in the Goma area: and (iii) given that previous projects providing investments in fragile settings have had mixed results when they attempted to address the broader issues of institutional and financial sustainability, the project design did not have any activity aimed to address such issues.

The implementation arrangements made at appraisal were appropriate. This included: (i) the Ministry of Transport (MOT) in charge of coordination: (ii) the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) in Kinshasa created for the ongoing Multimodal Project was to be in charge of day-to-day implementation; and (iii) the National Airways Management Agency (RVA) to be responsible for technical oversight. During implementation, the PIU was relocated from Kinshasa to Goma to provide better oversight and monitoring.

The Bank identified several risks at appraisal including political and governance risks, macroeconomic risk, weak implementation capacity risk, fiduciary risks and the risk that the achievements could be undermined by adverse external risks. Mitigation measures included, having a small number of implementing entities which had demonstrated capacity with the previous project, a mitigation plan for fiduciary risks and the strengthening of volcano monitoring and the preparation of contingency plans for the airport. Even with these measures, the overall risk was assessed as high at appraisal (PAD, paragraph 35). The arrangements made at appraisal for safeguards and fiduciary compliance were appropriate (as discussed in section 10).

There were several shortcomings at Quality-at-Entry: (i) although the overall project cost was within the budget, costs of some activities were underestimated at appraisal; (ii) the design options for the control tower were not fully explored and the preparation team did not check that the funding was in place from the Government for the drainage system; (iii) using the direct contracting system proved to be inappropriate because the chosen contractor was overloaded; and (iv) there were shortcomings in M&E design (discussed in section 9).
Quality-at-Entry Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

b. Quality of supervision
The ICR (paragraph 90) notes that the Bank carried out an average of one formal supervision mission a year during the project lifetime. The team clarified that in addition to the formal supervision missions, the team conducted one informal supervision mission every two months from April 2018 until the beginning of the travel restriction in April 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The missions were complemented by fiduciary and safeguards specific missions and frequent site visits. The support provided by the team aided in fiduciary and safeguards compliance (discussed in section 10). The Bank supported the decision to relocate the PIU from Kinshasa to Goma which led to better results on the ground. The supervision team had to make a judgement call on dropping certain activities to ensure the drainage problem was sorted out. The team clarified that there were four task team leaders (TTLs) and one co-TTL during the project lifetime and the last TTL was based in DRC from April 2018. The quality of supervision was satisfactory.

In sum, overall Bank performance is rated as moderately satisfactory, in view of the shortcomings at Quality-at-Entry.

Quality of Supervision Rating
Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

a. M&E Design
The Project Implementation Unit in coordination with the DRC National Airport Management Agency (RVA) was responsible for collecting the data required for monitoring performance.

Of the two key outcome indicators, the indicator for PDO 2 "capacity of the runway infrastructure at the Goma International airport to accommodate the original design aircraft" was more or less appropriate, given the project context (to restore the operational capacity of the airport to pre-volcano level). PDO 1 "regulatory certification of the safety and security at the Goma International airport" was unachievable, as the project did not have any activities for supporting the certification process. This indicator was replaced with the indicator "conformity of the improved infrastructure at the airport". While the revised indicator did reflect the project activities, it lacked clarity either about the entity which should confirm the safety and security standards of the airport or the methodology for confirming safety and security standards. It would have been more appropriate to have an independent third-party assessment of the safety and security standards of the airport.
The targets for some intermediate indicators were inappropriate. For example, the indicator related to the "number of Goma International airport passengers" was achieved even before implementation of project activities. This was due to two factors: (i) the wrong baseline at project preparation; and (ii) inaccurate projections of traffic growth.

b. M&E Implementation

The ICR (paragraph 77) noted that the PIU coordinated with the RVA for collecting the data required for monitoring performance. The ICR notes that data collection was not straightforward, with RVA taking a lot of time for collecting the required data.

c. M&E Utilization

The project's results framework was used for monitoring progress. The ICR (paragraph 80) notes that the intermediate indicator on runaway progress, helped the PIU and the Bank to take the decision to relocate the PIU to Goma. This helped in improving supervision and implementation of the civil works.

In sum. overall M&E is rated as modest, in view of the significant shortcomings in M&E design.

M&E Quality Rating

Modest

10. Other Issues

a. Safeguards

The project was classified as a Category B (partial assessment) project under the World Bank safeguards policies. Three safeguard policies were triggered at appraisal: Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01); Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4.11); and Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12) (PAD, pages 16 and 17).

The ICR (paragraph 82) notes that a draft environmental and social screening report was prepared and publicly-disclosed in January 2016. Subsequently seven Environment and Social Management Plans (ESMPs) were developed to address environmental and physical cultural resources issues.

The project's performance on safeguards was rated as moderately satisfactory in the ISRs (ICR, paragraph 82). The ICR (paragraph 83) notes that there were six Occupational Health and Safety incidents during implementation. Of these, one was classified as severe. None were classified as serious and five were classified as indicative. All incidents had been resolved by project closure. The project had an operational Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM) in each district with project works. 815 complaints were received by the GRM. 813 complaints were resolved when the project closed. The team clarified that the remaining two cases had been resolved to date. The project also supported measures to better manage environmental
and social risks. The ICR (paragraph 84) notes that the project successfully developed standard operating procedures for managing unexploded landmines in DRC.

Regarding involuntary resettlement, the ICR (paragraph 82) notes that 260 Project Affected Persons (PAPs) were compensated for the construction activities of the fence wall and the stormwater collector.

b. Fiduciary Compliance

**Financial management.** The Bank conducted a financial management assessment of the PIU at appraisal. The PIU had executed the previous Bank-financed project and its arrangements were deemed to be satisfactory (PAD, paragraph 41). The financial risk was rated as substantial at appraisal. The financial management during implementation was rated as moderately satisfactory during implementation (ICR, paragraph 85). There was one case of over-use of project funds leading to lack of funds for some activities and one case of ineligible expenses. The team clarified that audits were unqualified.

**Procurement.** The Bank conducted a procurement assessment of the PIU at appraisal. The procurement risk was rated as substantial at appraisal (PAD, page 36). The ICR (paragraph 86) notes that procurement management was rated as moderately satisfactory during implementation. The first company recruited by direct agreement for the runway failed. The second company was hired following a competitive process, completed the work on time to the satisfaction of the client and the Bank.

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

The ICR (paragraph 57) observes that there were no unintended impacts.

d. Other

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11. Ratings

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<th>ICR</th>
<th>IEG</th>
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12. Lessons

The ICR draws the following main lessons from the experience of implementing this project, which are reported with some adaptation of language.

1. A flexible design and contingency funds for unplanned activities can be useful for projects in fragile and conflict affected environment. In this project, some activities (such as changing from a mobile control tower to a permanent tower and drainage works from the airport to Lake Kivu) were modified at government request. The flexible design and contingency funds for unplanned activities enabled the project to adapt to the changing situation on the ground.

2. The project activities need to be aligned with the project development objective for proper attribution of results. In this project, the key indicator - regulatory certification of the safety and security standards of the airport - was unrealistic as none of the project activities supported the certification process.

3. A decentralized approach to project management can help in implementation on the ground. In this project, relocating the Project Implementation Unit from Kinshasa to Goma allowed: (i) to substantially improve the implementation of the project; (ii) improve the dialogue between the local and the central government that helped to incorporate inputs from the stakeholders; and (iii) secure acceptance of the project by the local communities.

13. Assessment Recommended?

No

14. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR is well-written and candidly discusses the challenges in a fragile setting. The theory of change provided in the ICR presents a clear elucidation of the links between project activities, outputs and outcomes. The ICR candidly acknowledges the shortcoming with a key outcome indicator. The evidence provided in the ICR is adequate to assess project performance. The ICR draws good lessons from the experiences in implementing this project. The photographs provided in the ICR enables the reader to visualize the extent of changes before and after the project. The Annex 3 “Project Cost By Component” reports US$6.0 million contingencies under the actual at project closing. This contingency should have been included under component A.

a. Quality of ICR Rating

Substantial