



1. Project Data

Project ID P146460	Project Name JM - Integrated Comm. Devl. Proj.	
Country Jamaica	Practice Area(Lead) Urban, Resilience and Land	
L/C/TF Number(s) IBRD-83560	Closing Date (Original) 01-May-2020	Total Project Cost (USD) 41,711,910.47
Bank Approval Date 14-Mar-2014	Closing Date (Actual) 01-May-2021	
	IBRD/IDA (USD)	Grants (USD)
Original Commitment	42,000,000.00	0.00
Revised Commitment	42,000,000.00	0.00
Actual	41,875,439.04	0.00

Prepared by Cynthia Nunez-Ollero	Reviewed by Vibecke Dixon	ICR Review Coordinator Victoria Alexeeva	Group IEGSD (Unit 4)
--	-------------------------------------	--	--------------------------------

2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

According to the Financing Agreement (FA, p. 6) and the Project Appraisal Document (PAD, paragraph 15), the Project Development Objective (PDO) was "to enhance access to basic urban infrastructure and services, and contribute towards increased community safety in selected economically vulnerable and socially volatile inner-city communities of Jamaica."



This review will assess the extent to which this operation has achieved the PDO against the following separate objectives:

- Objective 1 - to enhance access to basic urban infrastructure and services in selected economically vulnerable and socially volatile inner city communities of Jamaica.
- Objective 2 - to contribute towards increased community safety in selected economically vulnerable and socially volatile inner city communities of Jamaica.

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

No

c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?

No

d. Components

1. **Basic Infrastructure and Access to Services** (US\$28 million at appraisal, revised to US\$27.6 million at restructuring, US\$28.9 million actual). This component was to finance infrastructure investments and services in target communities. Infrastructure investments could include widening, rehabilitating and paving of existing roads; improving storm water drainage; rehabilitating educational facilities; replacing zinc fences with permanent structures; and constructing community integrated spaces and mobile mediation centers. Services to be financed could include installing water supply and sanitation household connections and promoting behavioral change for the use and maintenance of water supply and sanitation infrastructure; improving electricity connections and lighting by installing street lighting, extending the electricity network and regularizing illegal electricity connections, promoting behavioral change in the use and maintenance of electricity connections, and supporting environmentally sustainable lightning. This component was also to finance improvements in the cleanliness of participating communities such as equipment, constructing skip enclosures around dumpsters, and financing Environmental Wardens to carry out cleanup and maintenance activities. In addition, results-based (RB) Incentives in waste collection and recycling were to be financed under this component.

2. **Public Safety Enhancement and Alternative Livelihoods** (US\$7.2 million at appraisal, US\$6.9 million actual). This component was to finance programs that enhance public safety such as the "Violence Interrupter" programs (crisis management, trauma response, counseling mediation, community outreach and mobilization working with most at risk youth), and school and community-based violence prevention interventions. Programs include the Safe Passages; the Alternative Student Support; and school-community and after-school programs. This component also financed programs in alternative livelihoods such as those on youth leadership and civic participation; community cleanliness including public awareness; support to micro-enterprises by designing skills and knowledge transfer, and training in business plan development, operations, accounting, marketing, human resources, and finance; and youth education and recreation to develop social and conflict mediation skills.

3. **Institutional Strengthening for Urban Management and Public Safety** (US\$2.7 million at appraisal, revised to US\$2.6 million at restructuring, US\$1.1 million actual). This component was to finance equipment and capacity building needs of the Ministry of Transport, Works, and Housing in identifying options for low-income housing in densely populated areas, including a strategy to engage the private sector and NGOs; and the National Land Agency (NLA) in preparing a national policy on land regularization, and in improving



the systems to pre-check survey plans and cadastral maps when registering land titles. This component would also finance capacity building activities for governmental agencies responsible for the operation and maintenance (O&M) of basic infrastructure and two studies - an urban renewal plan for communities in and around downtown Kingston; and a strategy for the renewal of inner city communities considering infrastructure and housing stock. In addition, it would also finance improvements in the data collected by the Crime Observatory, expand its coverage, procure software for data analysis data, build staff capacity to analyze and disseminate information, conduct two Victimization Surveys, and community outreach to update profiles on crime and violence. Furthermore, it would finance capacity strengthening activities of agencies to collect public safety data and conduct impact evaluation of crime and violence reduction interventions using evidence-based data; and train community mobilizers and paraprofessionals on how to use evidence-based principles and approaches to implement programs that focus on safety concerns and high-risk programs like those financed in component 2 above.

4. Project Administration (US\$4 million at appraisal, revised to US\$4.5 million at restructuring, US\$4.5 million actual) This component would finance program management, equipment, management, equipment and training for the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) and support: project audits; and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of activities. This component would also finance an Independent Verification Agent as part of results-based Incentives under component 1 above; and workshops and outreach activities to promote positive environmental and social behavior related to the project.

e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

Project Cost: The total project cost was US\$42 million. The loan disbursed US\$41.4 million according to Annex 3. In a February 14, 2022 email to IEG, the Task Team confirmed that the total disbursement is US\$41.7 million subject to independent verification by the final external audit underway in February 2022.

Financing: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) fully financed this loan.

Borrower Contribution: None

Dates: The project was approved on March 14, 2014 and made effective on August 11, 2014. The Mid Term Review (MTR) was completed on April 16, 2018. The original closing date was on May 1, 2020 but was extended by 12 months to close on May 1, 2021. There were two level 2 restructurings:

- On February 4, 2020, three months before the original closing date, to reallocate US\$0.5 million among components and disbursement categories due to cost overruns from the government adopting new and more costly standards for water pipes and to make changes to the Results Framework indicators. These changes were to add Bank-required core indicators and revise indicators to capture the impact of the project results (see Section 4 Efficacy below). 2 of the 18 target communities (Treadlight and Anchovy) were dropped but the government was to finance the investments for these two communities under the follow-on Jamaica Integrated Community Development Project Phase 2 project. Results based financing of solid waste management activities took longer than expected and unutilized funds were reallocated (see above). Component 3 was modified to address institutional challenges that arose during implementation (see Section 5 Administrative and Operational Efficiency below).



- On April 29, 2020 to extend the project closing date by 12 months to May 1, 2021 due to the impact of COVID 19.

Split Rating: No split rating of the outcome was undertaken in this review. The PDO and the outcome indicators were unchanged. The number of communities mentioned in the PDO for Component 1 was reduced by two (from 18 to 16) because of cost increase from new specifications and standards for water pipes. The 2020 restructuring realigned financial resources available for the remaining target communities and reallocated funds to new activities and scale up existing ones (Project Paper, paragraph 4) and retained the ambition of the PDO. The restructuring paper also made changes in the description of intermediate outcome indicators, with no material effect on the achievement of the PDO. This review will assess the extent to which this project achieved its objectives based on the revised coverage of target communities in Component 1.

3. Relevance of Objectives

Rationale

The PDOs sought to address the problems brought by deteriorating infrastructure and lack of services in 18 poor, unsafe, and volatile communities. In these communities, roads were in disrepair, trash on the streets, school facilities were rundown. Water, sewerage, electricity, and solid waste management services were lacking. Unlawful activities, including school-based violence were prevalent. Youth unemployment attributed to low education levels, school dropout rates, and lack of skills. Productivity losses from interpersonal violence related injuries accounted for 4 percent of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP, PAD, paragraph 7). The components - physical infrastructure investments, environmental design, and a holistic, multi-tiered approach directed at the family, the youth, the schools, and the community at large - would follow the conventional socioecological model of violence prevention

Country Context: Jamaica has a population of about 3 million people in 2020. Poverty levels in 2012 were at 19.9 percent and had slightly improved by 2020 to 16.5 percent. About 52 percent of its population resided in urban areas, increasing annually at a rate of 1.31 percent, and projected to reach 1.8 million by 2030. This population growth meant increasing demands on urban infrastructure and services. At the same time, inadequate land use and poor urban planning led to unbalanced development, unequal access to services, and an unsafe environment. With its rate of violent crimes reported to be the highest in the region from the time the project was prepared and throughout implementation (ICR, paragraph 1), the government prepared a National Security Strategy to reduce violent crime, strengthen justice and the rule of law, increase the effective delivery of social intervention programs, and promote the integration of democratic governance within communities most at risk for crime (ICR, paragraph 2). The government also adopted a National Crime Prevention and Community Safety Strategy, launched the Community Renewal Program and its flagship crime prevention program called the Citizen Security and Justice Program. The country also has the Jamaica Crime Observatory as a key tool for violence prevention, intervention, and control governance housed at the Ministry of National Security. This surveillance system, piloted in 2011 and operational by 2012, collected data on crimes and measured changes in patterns to identify risk factors in formulating public policy.

Country Plans: The National Development Plan, "Vision 2030" highlighted sustainable urban development as a key outcome of a healthier environment and called for a holistic approach in crime reduction efforts.



Vision 2030 specified strategies for efficient urban planning systems, urban renewal, and affordable shelter, and prioritized reducing young people's involvement in crime by instilling a culture of law and restoring public trust in protective services. The Medium-Term Socio-Economic Policy Framework (MTF, 2018–2021) of Vision 2030 focused on human capital development, social protection and inclusion, and the rule of law. The PDOs were relevant to this strategic focus, and the government with funding support from other development partners would be financing the follow-on project building on the project's key interventions and approach.

World Bank Partnership Framework: The PDO remained relevant to the World Bank Group's 2014–2017 Country Partnership Strategy (CPS), extended to FY2019, which complemented the country's Vision 2030 by fostering a foundation for sustainable inclusive growth. There were three areas of engagement and eight targeted development outcomes in the CPS (paragraph 46, and Figure 12). The project remained relevant to the third pillar of engagement—Social and Climate Resilience, and contributed directly to two of the Outcomes: (i) 6: Strengthened social protection programs and improved institutional capacity for their management, and (ii) 7: Increased opportunities for the poor and vulnerable World Bank support would strengthen social protection programs and improve human capital, by scaling up successful interventions to protect the poor, create opportunities for the vulnerable, and help communities address crime and violence (CPS, paragraph 45). Increased access to basic services and enhanced capacity to implement and monitor crime prevention programs were expected to strengthen social cohesion.

Prior World Bank Operations in the Country and in the Sector: The World Bank has a long history in financing urban upgrading. In addition, the World Bank has conducted a wide range of research on violence prevention projects, which pointed to the benefits of combining policies, investment and implementation processes to help improve the quality of life. The World Bank conducted its first study on urban violence in the region in 1997. The 1996 Jamaica Social Investment Fund Project (P039029) and the 1998 Colombia Program for Development and Peace in Magdalena Medio (P046031) started to address the issues of urban crime and violence in the 1990s (ICR, footnote 32). This project was designed using lessons from over 30 years of urban upgrading operations and the success of the Inner-City Basic Services for the Poor Project (ICBSP 2005–2013) (see Section 8, Assessment of Bank Performance, (a) Quality at Entry below). The ICBSP combined small-scale infrastructure with community-based social interventions to address community development and reduce crime and violence. Bank-supported projects that directly aim to reduce or prevent urban crime and violence were relatively new at the time of the appraisal (ICR, paragraph 62). The 1996 Jamaica Social Investment Fund Project (P039029) and the 1998 Colombia Program for Development and Peace in Magdalena Medio (P046031) started to address the issues of urban crime and violence in the 1990s (ICR, footnote 32).

There is clear alignment between the project's development objectives and the country- and WB strategies. While the first objective, "to enhance access to services" is vague and does not specify what kind of services it will increase access to, together with the second objective "to contribute to enhanced community safety", this was to present a holistic approach to understand the expected development results in the vulnerable target communities as a consequence of the project. The holistic approach effectively combined improvements in service delivery, skills training, and employment programs to address the violence in the vulnerable and socially volatile target inner city communities.

Rating

High



4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

OBJECTIVE 1

Objective

To enhance access to basic urban infrastructure and services in selected economically vulnerable and socially volatile inner city communities of Jamaica.

Rationale

Theory of Change (TOC): Under this objective to enhance access to basic urban infrastructure and services, there were two main categories of inputs, namely basic infrastructure and service improvements. Inputs under the infrastructure category were i) widening, paving and surface drainage of roads; ii) storm drain rehabilitation; iii) replacement of zinc fences; iv) the creation of green spaces for recreation; and v) rehabilitation of school facilities. These infrastructure-related inputs were expected to lead to outputs such as paved roads, improved drainage, improved pedestrian and vehicle transit, safer and more attractive green areas and upgraded school buildings and facilities. Inputs under the service improvements category were: i) construction of household connections for water and sanitation facilities; ii) regularizing electrical connections to households; and iii) solid waste collection and management. These service-related inputs were expected to lead to outputs such as i) the communities have access to- and pay for reliable basic water and electricity services; and ii) clean roads with regular solid waste collection. The wide range of infrastructure- and service-related outputs were expected to lead to enhanced access to basic urban infrastructure and services as a means to addressing the pervasive violence in these socially volatile and vulnerable target inner city communities.

OUTPUTS:

- 15 communities completed their Integrated Infrastructure Packages (IIPs) against a target of 18, target almost achieved. Three communities (Anchovy, Treadlight, and Ellerslie) were dropped at restructuring for the project to stay within the budget envelope.
- 47.40 km of paved road surfaces were rehabilitated with drainage against a target of 40 km, target exceeded.
- 13,004 persons were provided with access to improved water sources, against a target of 5,000 persons, target exceeded. This indicator was added at restructuring as a corporate core indicator and replaced the original indicator expressed as the number of piped household water connections rehabilitated with a target of 1,250 households or 5,000 persons, based on an average of 4 persons per household, according to the Restructuring Paper.
- 1,384 people were provided with access to rehabilitated or newly constructed sanitation facilities against a target of 600 households or 2,400 persons based on an average of 4 persons per household (target not achieved). This indicator was originally expressed as the number of households. The water utility required compliance with new and costlier pipe specifications. This increased the budget needs of water investments and reduced available resources for the sanitation investments.
- 55 solid waste skips (target 60, target almost achieved) were installed in all 18 participating communities. There were no targets for the following achievements: 1,200 bins were replaced in 16 communities; 4 compactor trucks were delivered to the National Solid Waste Management Authority;



165 Environmental Wardens were hired; 15,000 Styrofoam replacement utensils and dinnerware were distributed across all primary schools to support the ban on single use plastics; and 43 greenhouses were started.

- 12,335 people (baseline 9,131, target 10,300, target exceeded) with access to legal household electricity connections. This translated to an additional 3,204 persons or 801 new household connections (at 4 persons per household).
- Zinc fences were replaced by traditional concrete block or un-plasticized poly vinyl chloride (UPVC) walls for 3,072 households in 10 communities, against a target of 4,000 households (target not achieved). Two of the communities were dropped: (i) Russia, where the topography made it more costly and time consuming to lay the foundation for a permanent replacement; and (ii) York Town, where a dispersed population made replacing the fence not cost-effective (ICR, Annex 1).
- Community based contracting (called SUPER 18) were used to create 38 small green spaces across all 18 communities (no targets provided), which used to be dumpsites. In addition, 43 greenhouses (no targets provided) were started or reactivated across schools and communities.
- 17 school facilities were rehabilitated, against a target of 18, target almost achieved. The 18th school facility, Treadlight Primary, was completed with the government's own financing (ICR, footnote 8 and Annex 1).

Other outputs with no targets or figures included the construction/rehabilitation of sidewalks, installation of guardrails, road safety signs, pedestrian crossings, and murals along routes.

Streetlights were not installed or restored to working conditions as planned (baseline 3,000, target 3,572). Other donor government initiatives overlapped in financing these activities (ICR, paragraph 16).

OUTCOMES:

There was only one outcome indicator for this objective; 80,000 direct beneficiaries (the PAD put the baseline at 89,000 but the Bank's Operations Portal/Results Framework system had a target of 80,000 throughout project implementation). According to the Task Team in the February 14, 2022 communication to IEG, the target was revised to 89,000 at restructuring to coincide with what has been monitored in the system all along. The target of 89,000 who now have access to the improved basic infrastructure and services was achieved. This sole outcome indicator (number of direct beneficiaries) does not reflect the potential outcomes of the project interventions to achieve the objective. There was no indicator to show the quality, standards, reliability of the services provided, although their effect on the quality of life of the residents in the project area (e.g., increased business opportunities, jobs created, improved health) are treated below in the second objective.

The following achievements at outcome level were reported in the ICR, in addition to what was monitored as part of the M&E system:

- The National Solid Waste Management Authority was reported to regularly collect solid waste (no data on how often).
- School activities led to the formation of environmental clubs (no data).
- Solid waste management aspects (not defined) were incorporated into the school curriculum (no data).
- The use of Styrofoam and single use plastic utensils and dinnerware was discouraged.



- The solid waste management did not reach its target of servicing 1,000 households because its allocation was reduced by the cost increases in water related investments. COVID 19 pandemic restricted social marketing activities (presumably in support of behavioral change, no information).
- Recycling activities were initiated but no information of how this practice was to continue after the project closed.
- The greenhouses were to support sustainable agricultural practices and food security following the policies of the Ministry of Education, Youth, and Information, but no evidence is provided to show that this happened.

Furthermore, the metering of household water connections was delayed and was expected to be completed after project closing.

Overall, the efficacy of the project to achieve this objective is rated **Substantial, with minor shortcomings**. The lack of relevant indicators at outcome level to measure and demonstrate the achievements at outcome level is unfortunate, but it is plausible that the reported achievements at output level have contributed to the outcomes reported in the ICR, and some were reflected in the second objective and that the objective “enhanced access to basic infrastructure and services” has been achieved.

Rating

Substantial

OBJECTIVE 2

Objective

To contribute towards increased community safety in selected economically vulnerable and socially volatile inner city communities of Jamaica.

Rationale

Theory of Change: The inputs under this objective included social interventions, training programs and outreach that would be directed at five levels of stakeholders, i.e. at family-, youth-, school-, community-, and institutional levels. Inputs included capacity building of existing or emerging micro-enterprises in the respective communities and technical assistance to improve the coverage and distribution of data collected by the Jamaica Crime Observatory. It also included training of agencies such as the Departments of Municipal Corporations, the Ministry of Education, Youth, and Information, and the Ministry of National Security to address safety and crime prevention. Outputs were to be measured by the number of participants who completed the various training and intervention programs and the number of workshops, training programs, delivered.

Outcomes were to be reflected in increased community safety in the economically vulnerable and socially volatile inner city communities. This would have included the increase in rate of regularization of status at birth, decrease in incidence of violent crimes, increase in youth absorbed by the job market, increase in employment, increase in the rate of accessing social services by those in need, increase in jobs created, new businesses created in the area, increase in youth retention in school, increase in incomes of families because of a safer environment that allowed new businesses to operate.



However, the results framework provided only one outcome indicator: the perception of safety by residents responding to a beneficiary survey. This indicator had limitations in capturing how the interventions increased safety in the target communities. Since the project limited itself to measuring perception (IPAD, paragraph 18), this indicator was an acceptable proxy.

As outlined in the M&E section, the M&E design had originally included improvements in the coverage and range of data collected by the Crime Observatory (ICR, paragraph 24) to include four types of incidents, i.e. i) homicide; ii) suicide; iii) sexual assault; and iv) traffic incidents. However, these indicators were not included in the project's results framework. Without such indicators to show the increase or decrease in violent incidents, with due acknowledgement of externalities, it is difficult to assess to what degree the project has increased community safety, as the beneficiaries' perception of safety is an acceptable proxy indicator, it is not an actual measure of the level of safety in the community.

The government noted in its review of the ICR, "the PDO indicator regarding perception of safety proved challenging to measure, and perhaps should not have been a PDO-level target" (ICR, Annex 5).

OUTPUTS: The following outputs were achieved by the training programs:

- At the **family** level:
 - With the National Parent Support Council (NPS), 150 parents across 10 schools were trained to raise their children in a healthy, nonviolent, and inclusive manner, using positive discipline, communication, care for children, and identification of safe space for parents. According to the Task Team in their February 14, 2022 communication to IEG, there were no specific or formal targets for this indicator. The 10 schools were also part of the School-Wide Positive Behavior Intervention and Support (SWPBIS) and targeting the parents to receive positive parenting support promoted safer space for children at home and at school.
 - The Registrars General Department (RGD) has collected and made ready for distribution over 8,000 birth certificates (there were no targets, according to the Task Team) although distribution and verification were affected by COVID 19. Of the 8,000 certificates, 6,917 persons obtained civil registration documents such as birth certificates, tax registration, personal identification, against a target of 6,000 persons, target exceeded. JSIF committed to deliver the remaining documents after the project close.
 - One Tier II Workshop was carried out, achieving the target. This workshop involved 8 schools participating in the School-Wide Positive Behavioral Intervention System implemented by the Ministry of Education, Youth, and Information. A Tier II workshop targeted students who did not respond to primary prevention under Tier I and continue to be at risk for developing more serious behavioral problems.
- At the **youth** level:
 - 45 data collectors from the communities were trained in outreach communication. The Task Team confirmed in their February 14, 2022 communication to IEG that there was no target for this output.
 - 7,514 persons (target 3,000, target exceeded) participated in employment programs or activities, including the 45 data collectors above.
 - 1,721 youth (no target) were trained in income generating activities under the Alternative Livelihood Skills Development program. 600 at-risk youth (no target) were trained in both traditional (plumbing, welding), and non-traditional areas (business process outsourcing, lifeguard training, film making, and advanced plumbing in leak detection and repairs).



- 1,124 persons (target 500, target exceeded) obtained formal certifications in skills development.
- At the **schools** level:
 - The Safe Passage Program (which implemented the Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) principles, best practices and design strategies) was implemented in 8 schools (Barrett Town, York Town, Maxfield Park, Granville, Hannah town, Tivoli Gardens, Denham Town, and Wilton Gardens) (no target), securing the transit of a number of students (no data) along specific routes.
 - 3 schools (target 10, target not met) were certified to have the capacity to report critical incidents of violence and/or disruptive behavior involving students in and around school premises. Due to COVID 19, all schools were closed from March 12, 2020 until the project closed in May 2021 and no critical incidents were reported. At restructuring, this indicator replaced "reported incidents of violence and/or disruptive behavior involving students in and around school premises" because schools were unable to consistently report on such critical incidents.
 - 13,795 persons (target 4,500, target exceeded) participated in educational programs. This indicator originally noted "educational programs and skills training" but was later modified to only "educational programs".
 - Over 6 (no target) capacity development workshops were held to support over 100 school administrators and teachers across 8 schools.

In addition, training in the implementation of the School-Wide Positive Behavioral Intervention System was conducted. During the COVID-19 school closures, the project printed and distributed educational materials for 12 schools to support continued education, particularly for children who lacked access to the online learning platforms to encourage school retention.

- At the **Community** level:
 - A total of 54 mediators (target 40, target exceeded) were trained, and 19 mediators (target 18, target achieved) were certified by project close. At restructuring, this indicator replaced the indicator "the number of conflicts mediated by certified mediators" because the Dispute Resolution Foundation (DRF) did not define and validate the conflicts used as baseline and could not be followed up.
 - Over 300 direct beneficiaries benefited from grants for community level activities and youth-based initiatives. According to the Task Team in their February 14, 2022 communication to IEG, there were no formal targets for this output. The small grants were used to promote public safety.
 - 279 (target 40, target exceeded) local government employees and staff of community-based organizations were trained in urban management and public safety.
 - 76 water wardens (no target) were trained and deployed and detected more than 2,000 leaks. In partnership with the National Water Commission (NWC) these wardens conducted community-level water audits, completed assessments of household readiness, and conducted training to sensitize the community on the regularization of water services provided by the NWC and electricity by the Jamaica Public Service (JPS) Company (ICR, paragraph 25).
- At the **Institutional** level:
 - The Jamaica Crime Observatory (JCO) launched a centralized violence and crime tracking dashboard, as targeted.



- The staff of the Departments of Municipal Corporations (no targets) were trained in disaster management, roads and works, and enforcement planning.
- The Ministry of Education, Youth, and Information (no targets) were provided with literacy coaches and staff (no targets) were trained in assessing low performing students before school closed in March 2020 due to COVID-19.
- The Ministry of National Security (MNS)/ Jamaican Constabulary Force (JCF) were given information and communication technology (ICT) equipment and trained in data analysis, use of GIS, and handheld devices to increase real-time reporting on crime scenes (ICR, paragraph 36).

OUTCOMES:

The Results Framework only identified one single outcome indicator to measure achievement of the objective of “increased community safety.” The PAD justified this as a proxy measure for enhanced safety. This is weak and imprecise indicator as noted above, as it does not provide information of the actual increase or decrease of violent incidents in the communities. However, since incidence may be also dependent on factors outside the scope of the project, the perception served as a good proxy indicator. A target of 75 percent of respondents agreed that their communities were now safer. The Beneficiary Satisfaction Survey conducted at closing showed 75.6 percent of respondents agreed. In 2021, a follow-up survey was conducted to address inconsistencies in data presentation and narrative analysis in the earlier survey. The 75.6 percent positive response rate was adjusted to 84.9 percent, indicating that 84.9 percent of the respondents agreed that their communities were now safer. This perception rate was compared to the respondents from the control communities who reported low 24 to 27 percent perception rates (ICR, paragraph 29).

Beneficiaries’ perception of safety may provide an acceptable proxy of an improvement in community safety, but not sufficient to demonstrate achievement of the objective “increased community safety”. It is unclear why the data on violent incidents, as collected by the Crime Observatory (ICR, paragraph 24) on i) homicide; ii) suicide; iii) sexual assault; and iv) traffic incidents, were not included in the results framework and were not used to assess changes in community safety in the project. As mentioned earlier, without such indicators to show the actual increase or decrease in violent incidents, with appropriate caveats regarding external factors contributing to these outcomes, it is difficult to assess to what degree the project has increased community safety, as the beneficiaries’ perception of safety is not an actual measure of the level of safety in the community. However, the low perception of safety from the control communities provided a good comparison.

The efficacy of the project to achieve this objective is rated **Substantial with minor shortcomings** because the sole outcome indicator, even if a proxy one, was exceeded. The shortcomings were noted due to several of the output targets that were not achieved and a lack of evidence due to the absent other relevant indicators in the results framework to measure the achievement of this objective.

Rating
Substantial



OVERALL EFFICACY

Rationale

The overall efficacy of the project to achieve its objectives is rated Substantial with minor shortcomings. The project incorporated a holistic approach effectively combining improvements in service delivery (defined as access), skills training, and employment programs to address violence in the vulnerable and socially volatile target inner city communities. While the project Beneficiaries' perception of safety is not sufficient to fully demonstrate achievement of the objective "increased community safety", it provided an acceptable proxy of an improvement in community safety, and it was exceeded.

Overall Efficacy Rating

Substantial

5. Efficiency

Economic Efficiency. At appraisal, the infrastructure component underwent cost benefit and cost effectiveness analyses. Cost benefit analysis was conducted per household for the water and sanitation investments, and per km for the drainage investments, A cost effectiveness analysis was applied to the road investments. The analyses used an unexplained 10 percent discount rate. Avoided costs such as time saved in fetching water, storage costs, health savings due to improved sanitation, and reduced roads maintenance costs due to drainage improvements were defined as the project benefits. At appraisal, a sample of communities with these investments registered internal rates of returns (IRRs) from 36 percent for water, 5 percent for sanitation, while those for drainage ranged from 41 to 60 percent, depending on the type of drainage design. In the case of roads, cost effectiveness measured the cost per km of different road surfaces - US\$45,164 for double surface dressing, US\$45,624 for concrete, and US\$74,919 for asphalt concrete. The concrete road was recommended due to the insignificant cost difference from the double surface dressing, plus its durability, and reduced maintenance requirements (PAD, Annex 7).

At closing, the same methodology at appraisal was used with updated cost figures to arrive at IRRs of 49 percent for water investments and 11 percent for sanitation investments. No IRR was provided for the drainage investments at closing because its costs were embedded in larger contracts and could not be disaggregated. In the case of investments in electricity, two scenarios were used to calculate the IRR - willingness to pay showed a 37 percent IRR and avoided costs showed a 27 percent IRR. Cost effectiveness for the roads was, on average, US\$34,133 per km or 75 percent of the estimated completion cost per km at appraisal. The overall IRR at closing for the infrastructure investments, or 67 percent of total project cost, averaged at 30 percent (ICR, Annex 4).

Administrative and Operational Efficiency: Four factors affected the operational efficiency of the project: (i) design, (ii) procurement issues, (iii), fiscal space, and (iv), COVID 19. Design was ambitious and relied on community participation to determine investment priorities and design of these investments. This meant outreach, collaborating, managing expectations, and behavior change. All these took time (see Section 8 Assessment of bank Performance, Quality at Entry below). Early procurement was marked by lengthy approvals leading to six months delays (see Section 10, Other Issues below). Fiscal space affected project implementation. The IMF lending cap meant no allocation for the project in its first year of implementation. This delayed the launch of the results-based financing of the solid waste management component (ICR, paragraph



47). At the Mid Term Review (MTR) the IPPs to be implemented would overcommit the remaining resources. As a result, two of the 18 communities and their investment programs were dropped. The government were to finance the IPPs of the two dropped communities under the follow-on project to retain the level of the project ambition. COVID-19 disrupted project activities such as social marketing, stakeholder coordination for sustainability of interventions, school related activities (including the Safe Passages initiative) and monitoring and evaluation efforts (see Section 9 M&E below). A level 2 restructuring extended the project by another 12 months to complete all contracted activities. Note too that the first level 2 restructuring was approved just 3 months from its original closing date due to the minor nature of the reallocation (US\$0.5 million redistributed to other components). Despite these inefficiencies, the project closed with almost all funds disbursed, although a year late because of the impact of COVID 19 restrictions.

Overall, the efficiency of the project is rated **Substantial**. Economic efficiency at closing was 30 percent despite early operational and administrative inefficiencies. The project used its original budget envelop although it was extended by 12 months due to the pandemic.

Efficiency Rating

Substantial

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal		0	0 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable
ICR Estimate	✓	30.00	67.00 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

6. Outcome

The relevance if objectives is rated High. The overall efficacy of the project to achieve its objectives is rated Substantial with minor shortcomings. Efficiency is rated Substantial. The outcome of the project is rated Satisfactory.

a. Outcome Rating

Satisfactory

7. Risk to Development Outcome



The following pose risks to development outcomes:

- **Government Commitment:** There is a moderate risk that a holistic approach to urban renewal through multi-tiered social interventions may waver. The government is committed to a holistic approach to urban management including violence prevention by mandating the Community Renewal Program to replicate the design of this project. This commitment would mitigate the risk of not sustaining the outcomes of the social interventions that addressed violence at the institutional levels - the family, the youth, the schools, and the community at large. Other actors would be enjoined to support this strategy - ministries, departments, agencies, and the communities. The Ministry of Housing, Urban Renewal, Environment, and Climate Change (HURECC) would coordinate these efforts.
- **Financial Risk:** There is a moderate to high risk that the new water and electricity connections completed under the project may not be financial sustainable over time. JPS (for electricity) reported a high level of satisfaction with the pay-as-you-use model of access to electricity. In the case of water, however, the NWC and the Community Development Committees noted declining willingness to pay for water connections. In response, NWC wrote off previously unpaid bills to allow customers to start afresh and rolled out aggressive connection plans to ensure cost effective operations after project closing. Meanwhile, NWC has budget limitations that may not allow them to conduct outreach, educational campaigns, or employ Water Wardens in the future. The NWC due diligence is expected to be completed by 2022 and would need to be followed up.
- **Stakeholder commitment:** There is a low risk that stakeholder commitment to solid waste management practices may decline. NWSWMA continue its regular waste collection but may not have budgets for social marketing or to employ Environmental Wardens. Community plastic bottle recycling efforts have run into issues of infrequent collection because of lack of recyclers or recycling opportunities. To mitigate this risk, the NWSWMA and JSIF provided capacity support to Community Development Committees. At closing, communities were reported to continue to keep their surroundings clean even without Environmental Wardens present.
- **Technical and financial risks:** There is a low risk regarding the availability of resources to operate and maintain completed infrastructure assets. Community based maintenance committees were formed. Maintenance plans were prepared. Members were trained in skills to maintain the community assets. According to the JSIF, at closing, most activities were handed over to the respective authorities, the municipal corporations, and public utilities. Municipalities, departments, other agencies, and other stakeholders were enjoined to manage expectations, reach agreements, and address issues related to the operation and maintenance needs of the community assets as these arise.

8. Assessment of Bank Performance

a. Quality-at-Entry

This project followed the Inner-City Basic Services for the Poor Project (ICBSP). Completed in 2013, the ICBSP implemented small-scale infrastructure activities in 12 communities of five parishes to improve their quality of life and security. The ICBSP also improved the surveillance system of the Jamaica Crime Observatory with its Integrated Crime and Violence Information System to identify risk factors in formulating public policy. The following lessons from the World Bank's over 30 years' experience in urban



upgrading, its recent study on urban violence prevention, guided by the government's Community Renewal Program (CRP), and its Citizen Security and Justice Program (CSJP) informed project design: (i) communities need to participate; (ii) sequencing, scaling up, and collective action may address social inequality, and (iii) simultaneous strategies may form a holistic approach to crime prevention and violence reduction. (PAD paragraph 27). The PDO was formulated to present this holistic approach using improvements in service delivery, skills, and employment opportunities to address the safety of the economically vulnerable and socially volatile target inner city communities. However, outcomes for "enhanced access" and "increased community safety" were only to be measure by the number of beneficiaries and their perception of safety, and the project did not identify other relevant outcome indicators.

The design was ambitious, and comprehensive. Innovative design features were introduced such as results-based financing of solid waste management, the Safe Passages Initiative, and improvements in reporting crime data in the Observatory (see Section 4 Efficacy above). Some activities were not implemented though (see Section 8b Supervision). The M&E was sufficiently designed to monitor target outputs and planned complementary data analysis and impact evaluations (see Section 9 M&E below). The project risks were appropriately rated as moderate because the implementing agency was familiar with Bank operations and policies, having implemented the preceding Bank-financed project. The high stakeholder risk rating was appropriate because design incorporated community participation in identifying and prioritizing infrastructure investments. This high risk was borne out at implementation.

Quality-at-Entry Rating

Satisfactory

b. Quality of supervision

The Bank team conducted 14 implementation support missions over the seven-year implementation period, with virtual missions during the COVID 19 period. Informal technical missions and field visits by the Jamaica-based team members were also carried out and ensured compliance with Bank fiduciary and safeguards policies and requirements. The virtual missions included stakeholder and beneficiary meetings. The Bank team verified technical completeness of works through photos, videos, and detailed contractual and supervision information. The Bank team also virtually conducted an independent review of all infrastructure works. However, several of the planned project activities could not be implemented because the proposed actions were not supported by existing legislation or policies, which meant that some of the expected outputs could not be achieved within the project period. These activities included the work around informal housing and land regularization, street lighting and the urban renewal strategy paper. The ambitious reach of the urban strategy paper resulted in successive failed tenders. The lack of additional indicators to measure and report on expected outcomes of the project interventions, as intended to complement the results framework, was not addressed at restructuring.

Overall, the Assessment of Bank Performance is rated Satisfactory. Bank performance at supervision is also rated Satisfactory. The Bank team diligently guided the completion of the project in the middle of the pandemic.



Quality of Supervision Rating

Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating

Satisfactory

9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

a. M&E Design

According to the PAD, the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) design was to be detailed in the Project Operational Manual including data collection requirements, timing and use of the information (PAD, paragraph 31). The project was to finance an impact evaluation of interventions to reduce crime and violence. As part of the holistic approach to improve public safety, the M&E design included improvements in the coverage and range of data collected by the Crime Observatory (ICR, paragraph 24) to include four types of incidents, i.e., homicide, suicide, sexual assault, and traffic incidents - in five key parishes. The project was to cover 10 parishes, introduce free/open-source GIS software, and build staff capacity to analyze and effectively disseminate a greater volume of information. The project would design and implement the required framework to collect and analyze data on Violence Related Injuries (VRIs) obtained from hospitals, which is critical to understand trends in crime and violence and support the design of prevention interventions. M&E design also identified other data from 2 rounds of Victimization Surveys that the government would conduct every three years to inform the policy, measure progress in attaining community safety goals, provide additional information to complement the Observatory data and strengthen the capacity of the M&E Unit of the MNS to carry out the analysis of the data in partnership with local research institutions rather than current arrangement by a research institution outside of the country (ICR, paragraph 25).

Two PDO indicators were supported by 17 intermediate indicators. The two outcome indicators, however, were not sufficient to capture the outcomes of the intervention, and the results framework did not include indicators to capture the impact of the project's outputs. Intermediate results indicators sufficiently captured the outputs of civil works, and these indicators were specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time bound. The expected outcomes of improved safety through infrastructure access were reflected in the results framework. By design, the outcome of the social interventions was limited to measure beneficiaries' perception of increased safety as a proxy indicator. Other relevant outcome indicators to measure improved safety were not included in the results framework. The sole PDO outcome indicator for public safety was acknowledged to have faulty methodology for baseline data collection and lacked information to define end target values, affecting how this outcome was measured (ICR, paragraph 49). Corrective measures were adopted at implementation.

b. M&E Implementation

The Jamaica Social Investment Fund (JSIF) implemented the M&E system as designed. At Mid Term, an M&E consultant was hired to review the results framework; there were methodological challenges to establishing the baseline for the PDO indicator on public safety, as the baseline and midline values were not comparable. The Bank and JSIF agreed to discard the baseline (ICR, footnote 29).



The planned indicators to measure achievement of the second objective; incidents of homicide, suicide, sexual assault, and traffic incidents to measure community safety were not followed during implementation and these were not included in the M&E design and were not reported on.

According to the Task Team in their February 14, 2022 communication to IEG, the planned impact evaluation was not conducted. This was replaced by the two beneficiary surveys (2020 and 2021). The project supported the Jamaica Crime Observatory to collect, map out, and analyze crime data in real time. JCO mapped out crime and violence incidents across Jamaica. This map was overlaid with social interventions delivered to establish correlations between incidence and types of interventions delivered to inform evidence-based interventions. No victimization survey was conducted under the project. The Ministry of National Security conducted this outside of the project. The scope of the project dropped this activity as part of the 2020 restructuring.

Two final beneficiary surveys were conducted. The first in March 2020 before the project investments had been completed and as the original project close was approaching. JSIF conducted the Borrower's Final Evaluation in 2021 to fill the gaps from the 2020 evaluation. The design of the metrics related to the public safety component raised questions on the reliability of the M&E implementation because of inconsistencies in methodologies between the 2021 and 2020 surveys where one applied a 1-11 scale and the other a Likert 5-point scale to assess the statement "How safe do you feel since the completion of project infrastructure". As a result, further review of the PDO-level indicator on the communities' perception of safety had to be completed during the preparation of the ICR.

c. M&E Utilization

The M&E data and reports were used by the project to monitor progress and inform project decision making. For instance, causes for delays in achieving targets associated with civil registration, participation in educational and employment programs, and job placement rates were identified during the MTR. These included delays in the issuance of the certification of mediators due to the Dispute Resolution Foundation's (DRF's) limited capacity, and in the Safe Passage pilot due to the delayed response to project affected persons (PAPs). Measures were then taken to tighten the activities with more focused supporting themes. The M&E data were periodically collected and analyzed by the PIU to inform the relevance of the activities and the need for adjustment; for example, based on the participation rate for the trainings and to respond to the changing demands of youth, adjustments were made to the ALSD Program with curriculum designed more in the market-ready and non-conventional areas. In addition, the M&E data on results and challenges contributed to the PIU's communication effort to raise public awareness and enhance transparency.

Overall, the M&E is rated Modest because of shortcomings in implementation. The planned victimization and impact evaluation surveys were not implemented but supplemented by 2 beneficiary surveys.

M&E Quality Rating

Modest

10. Other Issues



a. Safeguards

Environmental Safeguards: This project was classified as a Category "B" because most of the project activities had moderate adverse environmental impacts, of limited significance or magnitude, but manageable and easily mitigated (ICR, paragraph 44). The project triggered Environmental Assessments (OP/BP 4.01). An Environmental Management Framework (EMF) was prepared and disclosed by December 2013. Infrastructure subprojects were to be identified during implementation and may include road repaving, water and sewer main replacement, storm drains, and zinc fence removal with block wall construction. The project would exclude solid, liquid waste, or drainage projects, landfill design, dumpsite remediation, or other major works with potentially significant or complex environmental components. Small quantities of construction materials being handled, the limited scale of the works, stakeholders closely involved in planning and implementation would minimize the environmental impacts during construction (ICR, paragraph 45). The EMF was updated to include the application of the International Organization for Standardization or ISO process. The project complied with the environmental safeguards (ICR, paragraph 55).

Social Safeguards: The project triggered Physical Cultural Resources (OP/PB 4.11) because historical and cultural properties could be encountered, either in rehabilitation or excavation in settled areas. The project also triggered Involuntary Resettlement (OP/PB 4.12). A Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) was prepared, updating the one used under the earlier ICBSP to consider land donation and disclosed on December 5, 2013. The RPF were to mitigate any associated risks where some sub-projects could require minor land acquisition or displacement of informal vendors. Abbreviated Resettlement Action Plans (A-RAPs) were prepared. The COVID-19 pandemic delayed the completion of one A-RAP because vendors voluntarily left the site and JSIF could not contact them. JSIF documented their attempts to reach the vendors. Allocation plans for stalls were prepared in case vendors do not return. A grievance redress mechanism (GRM) was in place and its use increased over time, as consultations increased community awareness and understanding of the GRM. 89 complaints were received, one remained unresolved at project closing (ICR, paragraph 57). The project complied with social safeguards (ICR, paragraph 58).

b. Fiduciary Compliance

Financial Management: The Bank agreed on an action plan with JSIF to strengthen its financial management capacity as it was concurrently implementing two World Bank-financed projects. JSIF improved the accuracy and timeliness of financial reporting, though there were challenges until the project close. Effective FY 2018, Bank-financed projects shifted project audit to the Auditor General's Department. Since then, the audit opinions were unqualified and all, but one report was submitted in time.

FM arrangements in accounting, budgeting, and internal control needed strengthening at the beginning of the implementation period. JSIF improved the accuracy and timeliness of financial reporting over time but challenges remained until project close. Expenditures were incorrectly paid or accounted for, payment requests did not specify the component, category, or activity associated with the requests although these issues were reported resolved in 2020. Since 2019 the trial balance was not balanced, and remained unresolved at project close (ICR, paragraph 60).

Procurement: JSIF had adequate procurement capacity (PAD, paragraph 40). However, the procurement and installation of the solid waste management (SWM) infrastructure, a prerequisite to implement results-



based financing and incentives schemes, took longer than expected. Procurement was affected by disruptions in the supply chain caused by COVID- 19. Civil works slowed down or stopped altogether. The project was extended by one year to complete the project (ICR, footnote 3). The PIU addressed procurement-related delays and inefficiencies and contracts were awarded and executed on time. Delays under Component 1 were anticipated because of foundational outreach. Government procurement guidelines for interventions above a certain threshold resulted in lengthy approvals and delayed some IIPs. The limited, uneven capacity of local contractors and consultants engaged in the design, supervision, and implementation of the IIPs also proved to be a challenge. Some Cabinet approvals extended the procurement period by up to six months. The initial vision for the procurement of the Urban Renewal Strategy proved ambitious and the scope was reduced. Procurement of waste compactor trucks was delayed due to specifications that could not be met. All project contracts reviewed during the Procurement Post Reviews (PPRs) complied with the Bank’s core procurement principles. The Systematic Tracking of Exchange in Procurement (STEP) data and figures were not always up to date and could not provide accurate or reliable information on the status of project procurement activities. There were multiple changes to the Procurement Plan indicating that procurement planning could be strengthened. Procurement delays were mostly related to the evaluation of providers’ submissions— such as bids, proposals, and expressions of interest—and to the time taken for the government’s internal approvals of contracts.

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

d. Other

11. Ratings

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	
Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	
Quality of M&E	Substantial	Modest	No disagreement. ICR, paragraph 52 rated M&E Modest.
Quality of ICR	---	Substantial	

12. Lessons

The ICR presented 5 lessons that other teams may benefit from when designing projects that transform vulnerable communities. These lessons are presented below with slight modification in language.



- **Volatile communities may be transformed by using an integrated multi-sector model of violence prevention.** In this project, infrastructure investments and services were improved in under-serviced and volatile communities. These community priorities were accompanied by social interventions directed at the family, youth, schools, and community levels to build human capital and promote public safety. At the same time, the project enhanced the capacity of institutions in preventing violence in these communities. Design flexibility allowed residents to participate in identifying and prioritizing these infrastructure investments and services. Implementation proved challenging because of the numerous stakeholders, multiple small-scale procurements, and resulting demands on the implementing entity. At MTR, priorities were refocused to make the remaining activities consistent with the socioecological model of violence prevention. That reprioritization exercise helped achieving some output targets.
- **Future interventions may benefit from integrating strategic psychosocial support at the design stage, and separately tracking its impact.** In this project, social interventions accompanied physical investments to increase public safety. Activities evolved as demand for psychosocial needs were identified. For example, alternative livelihood skills training for youth, positive parenting training, and capacity building support for schools to strengthen critical incident management were reconfigured as needs were expressed. The project did not track the behavior changes adopted by the beneficiaries receiving psychosocial support that could inform future similar interventions.
- **Transparency, community engagement, and buy-in form part of an effective project design.** In this project, consistent and inclusive community engagement started at design stage and throughout implementation. Engagement allowed design to better understand and validate community concerns. Residents prioritized investments at project entry. Targets were adjusted as cost overruns were realized while the community remained engaged through various project communication mechanisms and participatory channels (SDCs, CDCs, and CBOs).
- **When implementing community development projects with multiple components, sequencing investments allows project beneficiaries to see early results.** This sequencing builds trust and public buy-in. In this project, foundational work under the community outreach and social inclusion package of interventions designed to contribute to public safety. By mid-term, visible results in the solid waste agenda included i) operational institutional arrangements, ii) solid waste-related infrastructure in place, and iii) communities reported to have adopted cleanliness practices (albeit without supporting evidence).
- **Sustainability of project results require commitment and collaboration among various stakeholders.** In this project, the following stakeholders collaborated to achieve results: the implementation agency (JSIF), CBOs, the local governments, and the multiple ministries, departments, and other agencies (MDAs) directly linked to sectors (such as planning, SWM, water and sanitation service provision, and public lighting). Engaging the MDA stakeholders was critical to manage expectations, reach agreements, address issues that arise, especially regarding O&M needs. A few incentives and institutional arrangements were in place, such as the RBF scheme for SWM that involved communities, CBOs, and the NSWMA. Success varied based on capacities, agendas, and timelines. The incentives were designed match the institutional complexities. Improvements in governance and coordination relied on strengthening partnerships across government and non-government actors..



13. Assessment Recommended?

No

14. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR provided a detailed overview of the project. The theory of change outlined how the socioecological approach to violence prevention was strengthened by addressing the infrastructure and services needs of the underserved communities at the same time. The report and its annexes provided additional information on the achievements of the project. The annex on efficiency provided helpful arguments on the comparability of the project efficiency at appraisal and at closing. The annex on the government's comments on the ICR were particularly in reinforcing the inadequacy of the outcome indicators. Photos in the annex supplemented the evidence of completed project interventions. The linking and integration of the various parts was logical and adequate. Design aspects were referred to throughout the report particularly to support the outcome reporting despite the lack of relevant indicators. The ICR was internally consistent except for the rating in M&E - Modest in Section IV but Substantial in Section 11. The report was mostly in consistency with the OPCS guidelines, except from its length at 30 pages, which substantially exceeds the suggested limit of 15 pages. Lessons were based on the project experience. While most of the narrative supported the ratings, those supporting the efficacy of the project to achieve its objectives, the Bank's performance at entry, and design of M&E were not sufficient to justify the rating in the report. There was also a shortcoming in claiming results that were not supported by data.

a. Quality of ICR Rating

Substantial