



## 1. Project Data

<b>Project ID</b> P147674	<b>Project Name</b> Regional Sahel Pastoralism Support Proj.		
<b>Country</b> Western and Central Africa	<b>Practice Area(Lead)</b> Agriculture and Food		
<b>L/C/TF Number(s)</b> IDA-56490,IDA-56500,IDA-56510,IDA-56520,IDA-D0640,IDA-D0650,IDA-D0660	<b>Closing Date (Original)</b> 31-Dec-2021	<b>Total Project Cost (USD)</b> 246,530,992.92	
<b>Bank Approval Date</b> 26-May-2015	<b>Closing Date (Actual)</b> 31-Dec-2021		
	<b>IBRD/IDA (USD)</b>	<b>Grants (USD)</b>	
Original Commitment	248,000,000.00	0.00	
Revised Commitment	248,000,000.00	0.00	
Actual	246,794,641.73	0.00	
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## 2. Project Objectives and Components

### a. Objectives

The Project Development Objective (PDO), as stated in both the Project Agreement (PA, 2015) and Project Appraisal Document (PAD, 2015), was to “improve access to essential productive assets, services, and markets for pastoralists and agro-pastoralists in selected trans-border areas and along transhumance axes across six Sahel countries and strengthen country capacities to respond promptly and effectively to pastoral crises or emergencies.”



**b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?**

No

**c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?**

No

**d. Components**

1) Animal Health Improvement: (Appraisal estimate: \$50.5 million; Actual: \$57.5 million).

The component aimed to support critical national and regional efforts to build more sustainable and efficient National Veterinary Services (NVSs), as well as to conduct surveillance and control campaigns for major diseases affecting large and small ruminants. Accordingly, this component was supported by two sub-components:

(i) Upgraded infrastructure and strengthened capacity of the NVSs; and

(ii) Support for the surveillance and control of priority animal diseases and veterinary medicines, with a focus on addressing two major livestock diseases (i.e., Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia/CBPP and Peste des Petits Ruminants/PPR).

At the regional level, the project was to support: (i) the coordination of national animal health activities; (ii) the provision of technical assistance tailored to particular needs, mainly epidemiological surveillance; and (iii) the development and implementation of training programs.

2) Natural Resource Management Enhancement (Appraisal estimate: \$ 70.9 million; Actual: \$55.3 million).

This component aimed to enhance pastoral and agro-pastoral communities' sustainable management of and secure access to natural resources. It was to focus specifically on water and rangeland resources, which often extend across national boundaries. Component 2 had the following two sub-components: (i) Improved access to natural resource and sustainable rangeland management; and (ii) Sustainable management of infrastructure for access to water.

At the regional level, the project was to support: (i) technical assistance to PRAPS countries; (ii) efforts to share and assess experiences; and (iii) joint training initiatives.

3) Market Access Facilitation (Appraisal estimate: \$45.4 million; Actual: \$40.4 million).

This component aimed to increase pastoralists' access to competitive, inclusive markets and to increase trade in pastoral products (especially live animals). This component was comprised of two sub-components: (i) Support to market infrastructure and information systems; and (ii) Support to producer and inter-professional organizations, and trade facilitation; it aimed to contribute to the emergence of efficient market institutions through: (i) support to the establishment, management, and governance of producer organizations; (ii) technical assistance and small office equipment to facilitate effective governance of livestock inter-professional organizations and their integration in value chains.



4) Pastoral Crisis Management (Appraisal estimate: \$37.6 million; Actual: \$24.5 million).

This component was intended to improve crisis preparedness, prevention, and response at the national and regional levels. This component had the following two subcomponents: (i) Pastoral crisis preparedness and livelihood diversification; and (ii) Contingency emergency response; this sub-component was to enable drawing resources from unallocated funds and/or allow countries to reallocate financing from other project components to partially cover the costs of emergency response and recovery.

At the regional level, the project would support: (i) harmonization of efforts from member countries to build effective pastoral early warning systems; and (ii) training in pastoral crisis preparedness, prevention, and response.

5) Project Management and Institutional Support (Appraisal estimate: \$43.7 million; Actual: \$57.3 million).

Component 5 focused on project management, including fiduciary and safeguards management, Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E), knowledge generation and management, and communication. The component also supported critical needs for institutional support, capacity building, and training identified at CILSS and in the six participating countries.

**e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates**

**Project Cost:** Total project cost at appraisal was estimated at US\$248 million, actual costs were US\$251 million (101.2 percent). (ICR, Annex 3, Table A3.3).

**Financing:** According to the PAD, the project was to be financed by six separate IDA credits, for a total amount of \$248 million. At project closing, \$246.8 million (98.3 percent) of the total IDA credits were disbursed (ICR, p. 3).

**Borrower Contribution:** Given severe financial constraints of the participating six countries, and the regional nature of the PRAPS, there was limited counterpart funding, mainly to finance key staff and project meetings (e.g., Project Committee, Steering Committee), consistent with the provisions in the respective Borrower/country Financing Agreements. The Bank's regular financial management assessments/Aide Memoires included a discussion on the counterpart funding aspects.

**Dates:** The project was approved on May 26, 2015, and became effective three and a half months later, on September 16, 2015. The original and actual closing date was December 31, 2021.

**Restructuring/Revisions:** Based on the results of the project's Mid-Term Review (2019), there were two main revisions to the project, which were relatively minor: (i) six PDO outcome indicators were revised in order to improve the measurement of the project's achievements, without reducing the level of ambition; also, these revisions did not modify the underlying and reconstructed theory of change (for further details, see ICR, p. 9 and 12); and (ii) three disbursement categories/DC (DC 1, 3 and 6) were revised, and corresponding IDA proceeds were reallocated to the relevant DCs, to provide a more logical and efficient approach to disbursements (see ICR, p. 12). Given the nature of the changes, there was no need to undertake a split evaluation approach.



### 3. Relevance of Objectives

#### Rationale

The Project Development Objective/PDO was highly relevant with the relevant strategies formulated for the Sahel Region, for and by each of the six participating countries, and for and by the World Bank. Of utmost importance, the Project supported the operationalization and implementation of key elements of a major Regional Policy Declaration --- the Nouakchott Declaration --- approved by the six Sahelian countries (in 2013). This Declaration emphasized the strategic role of pastoralism to be a key factor to promote sustainable economic development, to preserve natural resources and to mitigate civil unrest in the Sahel region. Project design of PRAPS dovetailed closely on and helped to operationalize the core recommendations of the Declaration.

The PDO is strongly aligned with the World Bank's Africa Development Strategy 2019-23, especially Pillars 5 and 6: (i) Pillar 5, which supports climate mitigation and adaptation, by preventing or mitigating the effects of shocks such as natural disasters while strengthening public sector capacity and supporting mutual learning among Sahelian countries; and (ii) Pillar 6 addresses drivers of fragility and violence by mitigating conflicts between the (agro) pastoralists and other socio-economic groups. The PDO is also consistent with the Bank's Regional Integration and Cooperation Assistance Strategy Update (2021-2023) for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The project contributed to operationalizing the four pillars of the Regional Strategy, namely: regional connectivity, trade and market integration, human capital development and building resilience.

At the national level, the PDO is fully consistent with the Bank's Country Partnership Frameworks (CPF) as well as with the national development strategies for each of the six participating countries (see Annex 7 for further details). All strategies placed agriculture at the center of their agenda for economic growth and resilience.

#### Rating

High

### 4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

#### **OBJECTIVE 1**

##### **Objective**

To improve access to essential productive assets, services, and markets for pastoralists and agro pastoralists in selected trans-border areas and along transhumance axes across six Sahelian countries.

##### **Rationale**

The Theory of Change (TOC) formulated in the ICR (page 9), although very brief in the narrative explanation, clearly showed the main types of inputs/activities and their sound linkages to the expected outputs and



outcomes which contributed directly to Objective 1. Accordingly, the project's activities under Components 1, 2 and 3 were linked to addressing Objective 1, and were identified based on the needs prioritized during preparation and appraisal, as follows (and each contributed to their corresponding outputs and outcomes):

(i) Component 1/Animal Health Improvement activities, including enhanced: infrastructure, services, disease surveillance and control, drugs and vaccines (see (d) above for details);

(ii) Component 2/Sustainable Landscape Management activities, including enhanced: pastoral awareness, capacities and practices, water infrastructure (see (d) above for details);

(iii) Component 3/Market access facilitation activities, including enhanced: market infrastructure, capacities of key organizations and associations, market and price information systems (see (d) above for details);

(iv) Components 4 & 5/Pastoral crisis management and institutional strengthening activities, including enhanced: crisis and institutional systems/capacities, income generation and vocational and technical training (see (d) above for details).

Critical assumptions to achieving Objective 1 included the limited occurrence of covariant shocks (generalized armed conflict, severe drought or flood), a relatively stable macro-economic environment and growth, and regional and national political stability (ICR, para. 6). The ICR identified the corresponding outputs arising from the above activities for each of the 5 components (see Figure 1, page 9, and Annex 1 for further details on performance). In summary, a range of activities were carried out by the project which were well aligned with the reconstructed ToC and with the project's components, and corresponding outputs and outcomes (see Annex 1 for further details on performance results).

### **Outcomes:**

The ICR identified the following outcomes (and corresponding indicators) arising from the above activities and resulting outputs, with generally a positive performance; the following indicators and their performance are shown below at the regional level, with some inter-country variability in meeting the targets for most indicators; see ICR, Annex 1, for further details by country, with Chad generally performing relatively worse for most of the outcome indicators):

- i. Level of implementation of the National Strategic Plan/NSP for CBPP control (percentage/%):  
Regional Level: Original Target (2019): 75%; Actual: 62%; Actual as % of Target: 83 %;
- ii. Level of implementation of the National Strategic Plan (NSP) for PPR eradication (%): Regional Level:  
Original Target (2019): 75%; Actual: 64%; Actual as % of Target: 85 %;
- iii. Land area (has.) under sustainable landscape management practices: Regional Level: Original Target (2015): 2.5 M has.; Revised Target (2019): 5 M has.; Actual: 6.6 M has.; Actual as % of Revised Target: 132 %; note: it is unclear whether area applies to all pastoralists in the relevant zone or to a designated project area. More specificity on the impact of the management practices is preferred.
- iv. Number of functional waterpoints accessible to pastoralists and agropastoralists in targeted zones:  
Regional Level: Original Target: 385; Actual: 398; Actual as % of Target: 103 %;
- v. No. of Markets operational (rehabilitated/constructed): Regional Level: Original Target (84); Actual (89); Actual as % of Target: 106%;
- vi. No. of specific pastoral parameters integrated in national warning system: Regional Level: Original Target: 8; Actual: 10; Actual as % of Target: 125%;



- vii. Increase in the number of animals sold at markets rehabilitated and constructed as a result of the project: Regional Level: Original Target (2019): 1.0 M; Actual: 0.6 M; Actual as % of Target: 60 %;

In summary, although there was positive performance for many of the output and outcome targets, there were shortfalls in some of them, and variable by country (e.g., disease targets were not met, water points are not that significant, and the increase in sales was well short of the target).

### **Rating**

Modest

## **OBJECTIVE 2**

### **Objective**

To strengthen country capacities to respond promptly and effectively to pastoral crises or emergencies.

### **Rationale**

The TOC formulated in the ICR (para. 6/Figure 1) showed clearly the main types of inputs/activities and their sound linkages to the expected outputs and outcomes which contributed directly to Objective 2. Accordingly, the project's activities under Components 4 and 5 were linked to addressing Objective 2, and were identified based on the needs prioritized during preparation and appraisal.

The ICR identifies the corresponding outputs (and intermediate outputs) arising from the above activities for components 4 and 5 (see Figure 1, page 9, and Annex 1, p. 43 – 48, for the relevant outputs, including:

- (i) increased data and knowledge on pastoral systems, at national and regional levels;
- (ii) improved early warning and response systems to pastoral crisis;
- (iii) number of vulnerable women and youth supported with productive investments related to pastoral activities;
- (iv) number of staff of key national and regional pastoral institutions trained.

### **Outcomes:**

The ICR identified the following outcomes/intermediate results (and corresponding indicators) arising from the above activities and resulting outputs, with generally a positive performance; the following indicators and their performance are shown below at the regional level, with some inter-country variability in meeting the targets for most indicators (see ICR, Annex 1, for further details by country, original, unless noted otherwise):

- (i) Pastoral institutions' crisis management capacity improved/specific pastoral parameters integrated in national early warning system: Original target: 8; Actual: 10; Actual as % of Target: 125%;
- (ii) Time (weeks, in pastoral crisis) to reach 50% targeted beneficiaries with services and/or funds (as foreseen in the inclusive intervention plan): Regional level: Original target: 13; Actual: in practice, this



indicator was not applicable, and to be used only in the case of triggering the CERC event. Only Mauritania triggered the CERC, and achieved 200% of its target;

(iii) Number of farmers/pastoral beneficiaries reached with agricultural assets or services: Regional level: Original target: 2.1 million; Actual: 2.6 million; Actual as % of Target: 124%;

(iv) Number of direct beneficiaries of income diversification activities: Regional Level: Original Target: 21,450; Actual: 33,376; Actual as % of Target: 156%.

Given the considerable progress made against the relevant targets and the alignment with the project's intention to increase the speed and efficiency of emergency response, the rating here is Substantial. Clearer alignment with the ultimate transformation expected of the project, rather than simple intermediate 'recipients reached' would have improved the coherence of the projects results. This shortcoming limits the project's ability to better understand which of the activities best amplified the countries capacity.

### **Rating**

Substantial

## **OVERALL EFFICACY**

### **Rationale**

The ICRR (and supporting evaluations/documents) provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate Modest progress against the first objective and **Substantial** progress towards the second objective. Most of the targets (original and revised) were achieved, for most of the six participating countries, with many of the targets being exceeded. The main challenge will be for each of the countries to sustain these objectives, and corresponding activities, taking into account the main risks highlighted in the ICRR (and see above). The project's contribution to the strengthening of key institutions, including well focused training activities at the regional and national levels, will likely contribute toward expanding and sustaining the benefits, especially with respect to help prevent crisis, and reduce their impact when and should they occur, through adequate enhanced planning and technical/operational capacities, although the extent and reliability of these potential benefits are difficult to foresee.

### **Overall Efficacy Rating**

Substantial

## **5. Efficiency**

**Economic Efficiency:** The PRAPS ex-post Economic and Financial Analysis (EFA) has focused on the net benefits arising from the extensive livestock (pastoral and agro-pastoral) activities which were the dominant livelihood and economic activities targeted by the project. The EFA has relied on an estimate of the livestock



herd dynamics and corresponding livestock production outputs (meat, milk, hides and skins, and manure) using the “EcoRum” model of the Livestock Sector Investment Policy Toolkit (LSIPT) module (i.e., a toolkit developed by FAO, CIRAD and ILRI). This sound methodology generated robust results in the ‘with’ vs. ‘without’ project scenarios to derive the incremental economic benefits streams (for further details, see ICR, paras. 31 – 33).

The results of the efficiency analysis are in the range of (see ICR, para. 33):

- (i) economic internal rate of returns (EIRRs) across the six countries at completion of 13.5-22.1 percent, compared to 18.9-23.5 percent at appraisal;
- (ii) a net present value (NPV) of US\$ 12.6-33.3 million at completion compared with US\$ 16.0-43.8 percent at appraisal.

The ex-post EIRR at regional level is estimated at 18.7 percent, with an NPV of US\$ 117.0 million over 20 years, period not accounting for environmental externalities. When environmental benefits are considered, the EIRR is estimated at 25.1 percent for low carbon price estimate range with a NPV of US\$ 146.9 million and 31.8 percent at high carbon price estimate range with a NPV of US\$ 219.0 million.

These economic results, combined with the qualitative assessment in terms of the use of the project resources, are rated as **Substantial**. It is relevant to note that these results and rating should be viewed as conservative, given that several project benefits could not be quantified, due to limited data availability and the difficulty of assigning them a reliable monetary value.

The ICR provided two other measures to assess the project’s efficiency (for further details, see ICR/Annex 4):

- (i) project cost per beneficiary – the average regional cost amounted to US\$95.0 which compares favorably with costs under Bank-financed livestock projects elsewhere e.g., the Zambia-Livestock Development and Animal Health Project (closed in 2018) had an average cost per beneficiary of US\$145.3; and
- (ii) project efficacy rate vs. disbursement rate: this ratio evaluates results vs. expenditures. PRAPS at regional level has performed against physical targets to a degree equivalent to the disbursement level (ratio of 1.01), meaning that it had a satisfactory result. It is to be noted that at the country level, performance as measured by the two above measures has varied widely across countries: over the range of US\$ 57-194 for the cost per beneficiary; and 0.85 to 1.35 for execution vs. disbursement ratio.

Given the above economic analysis and supporting evidence the overall rating for efficiency is Substantial.

## Efficiency Rating

Substantial

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
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Appraisal	✓	23.50	90.00 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable
ICR Estimate	✓	18.70	90.00 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable

\* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

## 6. Outcome

The Project development objectives/PDO were highly relevant to the Sahel Region, the six participating countries and the World Bank (and other stakeholders). Overall efficacy is rated Substantial, with the first objective rated modest and the second rated substantial. Overall efficiency is rated Substantial, based on available evidence and the ICR's sound analyses. Notwithstanding the overall efficacy rating, the modest rating for one of the Efficacy ratings means the overall outcome is rated Moderately Satisfactory, with moderate shortcomings.

### a. Outcome Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

## 7. Risk to Development Outcome

Based on internal/project-related and external factors/risks, the risk to sustaining the development outcome is Substantial. The internal/project-related risks include the following factors: risks of pastoral livestock production due inter alia to contagious transboundary animal diseases; low access to and poor capacity of animal health services; insecure access to natural resources (water and rangelands); natural resources degradation; and inadequate policies reducing mobility such as transhumance bans to some coastal countries.

In addition, continued emphasis is given to aspects related to gender, institutional strengthening, promotion of the private sector, and the regional integration of PRAPS activities. Hence, the risks to PRAPS development outcome will depend essentially on the progress arising from the project's institutional strengthening, the relevant follow-up activities arising from Phase 2 of PRAPS (for key activities, see ICR, para. 63), and the likelihood that external changes may occur, which could be detrimental to sustaining the Project's benefits, and also threaten the expected results from PRAPS Phase 2.

The risks which could arise from factors outside project control may appear at both the country and regional level, including:

(i) the issue of security prevailing in several of the participating countries, owing to the protracted conflict, insecurity and fragile governance context;



(ii) the macroeconomic situation in the broader Sahel Region has worsened during the COVID-19 pandemic, and remains fragile. Negative per capita income growth and increased poverty rates are projected in all Sahelian countries in the medium term as a result of the economic effects of the pandemic; and

(iii) domestic and external shocks as well as policy slippages constitute substantial sources of risk in the region, especially in a context of transition of power in Mali, Burkina Faso and Chad. Higher expenses related to security, COVID-19, and the humanitarian crisis provoked by rising flows of internally displaced people could divert resources from other priority needs, limiting national efforts and capacity to sustainably implement planned development actions.

## 8. Assessment of Bank Performance

### a. Quality-at-Entry

The project demonstrated a **Satisfactory** level of quality of entry, for the following reasons (see ICR, para.57):

- (i) The Bank spearheaded the preparation of the Declaration of the Nouakchott (Oct. 2013). The Declaration was action-oriented and provided a solid foundation/framework and high-level Regional and country-level engagement for participating and owning project preparation activities.
- (ii) Thereafter, project preparation proceeded swiftly in a highly effective, carefully planned manner, with timely approval by the Bank's Board (May 2015);
- (iii) In alignment with the Declaration of Nouakchott, the project design was well balanced, covering all key technical, financial and institutional aspects of project design and pre-implementation readiness;
- (iv) Results Framework demonstrated shortfalls in terms of the absence of some key targets for various indicators and some outcome indicators had limited representation of what transformation was to occur, while also recognizing the challenges of reliable estimates;
- (v) There were no major changes brought about at MTR, with only the required and improved adjustment of several indicators and targets for the Results Framework;
- (vi) The risks were well assessed in the Appraisal Report, although the risk related to the security situation and socioeconomic disorders may have been underestimated given the information available at appraisal time. Clearly, the COVID-19 pandemic could not have been anticipated.

**Quality-at-Entry Rating**  
Satisfactory

### b. Quality of supervision



Given the Project's regional scope and complexity, PRAPS required close project support activities that entailed substantial logistical efforts to take into account systematically all factors of project implementation. The ICR highlighted the following project supervision aspects and performance/results (ICR, paras. 58 – 60), which were supported by relevant evidence and documentation (filed in comprehensive project files):

(i) The requirements and timing of the Bank's supervision activities were well monitored, planned and carried out. The Bank conducted project implementation support/supervision missions systematically, twice a year (for a total of 13 missions, over the project's duration), carried out by an Administrative Task Team Leader/TTL (in HQ and field-based the last 2.5 years of implementation), and by national TTLs (generally based in the country's Bank field offices); Given budget limitations, these supervision missions were organized using two formats: by country with technical experts traveling across each of the 6 countries over a period spanning up to two months, followed by a thematic approach, with technical experts from the WB, the 6 countries and the regional level, gathering in one venue per component. Each mission was carefully prepared and included a wrap up meeting at regional level, with venue for the latter rotating across participating countries.

(ii) The Bank's supervision team also included the participation of the Bank's fiduciary and safeguards experts who proactively addressed key issues/requirements, as well as additional support as required from FAO/Technical Investment Center (managed under the Bank's budget);

(iii) The Bank's missions were guided by an Aide-Memoire (AM) prepared for each participating country and CILSS/OIE, and an aggregate wrap-up report for the entire project. All AMs were of high quality, reviewed by the ADM TTL to ensure accuracy and consistency, and shared timely with the Clients;

(iv) comprehensive Implementation Support Reports/ISRs were also consistently prepared and submitted on a time basis;

(v) These missions were supplemented by monthly coordinating and monitoring meetings conducted online, throughout the lifetime of the project to maintain momentum and take swift remedial action(s) when needed.

(vi) Institutional continuity in PRAPS supervision was sustained, with project managed regionally on the Bank side by only two ADM TTLs: (i) the first TTL had assumed responsibility for project design, and, subsequently, was in charge of supervision until MTR (2019); and (ii) the 2nd TTL took charge, as of the MTR until project completion. This TTL also supported PRAPS Phase 2 preparation, and is currently TTL for the PRAPS-2.

The MTR was carried out about 2.5 years prior to project closing, and was based on an in-depth assessment carried out for each country/Borrower. The MTR did not generate major changes, and they were used to help support remaining project implementation.

## **Quality of Supervision Rating**

Satisfactory

## **Overall Bank Performance Rating**



Satisfactory

## 9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

### a. M&E Design

Overall, the Project's M&E design was based on a sound approach, based on the following evidence:

(i) key components/activities and their envisioned results (with various levels of indicators) were designed around the project Results Framework (RF) to focus and monitor progress toward the PDO, using generally effective information and data collection arrangements. These M&E arrangements were based on a multi-tier process involving data collection at national level and its subsequent aggregation at regional level to obtain an operational dashboard to steer project implementation with a focus on the project results indicators, at both national and regional level;

(ii) A regional M&E manual was prepared that contained detailed technical notes on the calculation of these indicators to ensure consistency across all PRAPS countries;

(iii) The PRAPS M&E database was also fed into communication activities and provided the required source materials for the preparation of regular briefs, audio and video clips to disseminate project information to the relevant stakeholders; and

(iv) The M&E arrangements focused specifically on: (a) setting up an integrated Management Information System/MIS for the project based on data collection using KoBoToolbox; (b) using a harmonized georeferenced operations mapping for project activities; (c) programming and monitoring financial transfers of investment allocations to equipment and service providers; and (d) capacity building of M&E staff at regional and national levels.

A shortcoming in the design was the applicability and utility of some indicators in responding to the given ToC. Area under management often requires a secondary indicator to validate the achievement. In addition, the achievement of market outcomes was limited.

### b. M&E Implementation

The implementation of the M&E system demonstrated both strengths and some weaknesses (ICR, para. 49). The strengths included: (i) serving as an instrumental tool to prepare the data on the results indicators as basis of the periodic Project Progress Reports which provided key information for the Bank's regular supervision/support missions; (ii) These reports took into account the various changes that were jointly agreed decided as project implementation unfolded (e.g., the changes in indicators made at the MTR for Component 1; the reliable estimation of project beneficiaries).

The ICR recognized some important weaknesses in the project's M&E system, including (ICR, para. 49):

(i) lack of flexibility;

(ii) an initial lack of coordination across countries, which were compensated overtime, due to the provision of tailored technical assistance by the R-PCU technical and M&E specialists to the countries, as



well the recruitment of external experts to carry out regular regional stock-taking exercises; this support was complemented by workshops, which gathered together all technical and M&E experts to improve processes and guide further investments.

### **c. M&E Utilization**

Overall, the Project and World Bank Management teams made good use of the M&E system to help guide and prioritize project activities, as follows:

(i) the M&E system/results provided the basic data to inform the Project's Results Framework and was essential to monitor project progress toward its targets and objectives. Substantial efforts were made to aggregate data in a systematic way and in a timely fashion. This enabled timely preparation of periodic progress reports. These data were aptly summarized and presented in the PRAPS website, and other social media channels, for transparency's sake and to inform the general public of the project's activities, performance, and achievements.

(ii) The various technical assistance missions from R-PCU, studies, and stock-taking exercises supported the continuous improvement of project implementation;

(iii) The M&E unit facilitated the Client's preparation of the PRAPS final Stock-Taking Report and Completion Report entrusted to independent consultants. These reports were prepared in a very participatory way and were useful for the preparation of the Bank's ICR;

(iv) As part of the M&E system, a beneficiary household survey was also commissioned by the R-PCU and undertaken by CIRAD during the project's lifetime to document the evolution in income of agro-pastoralists as a result of PRAPS investments. These findings provided key inputs for the ICR.

### **M&E Quality Rating**

Substantial

## **10. Other Issues**

### **a. Safeguards**

The PRAPS was classified as Environmental Category "B". The project triggered the following Bank safeguard policies: Environmental Assessment (OP 4.01), Natural Habitats (OP 4.04), Pest Management (OP 4.09), Physical Cultural Resources (OP 4.11), and Involuntary Resettlement (OP 4.12). The project took a framework approach to safeguards because the specific locations of its activities could not be precisely identified at appraisal. A Regional Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) and a Regional Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF), including specific national data, were prepared to clarify principles, mitigation measures, and the appropriate organizational arrangements for each implementing agency to ensure that those affected by project implementation, positively or negatively, had a voice and a mechanism for influencing project outcomes, consistent with World Bank safeguard policies. The project included training in Safeguard Policies. Environment and Social Safeguards Focal Points were appointed by each country to oversee the development of country-specific safeguard



documents and ensure compliance with the project's environmental and social safeguards instruments during implementation.

Environmental and social development outcomes were reviewed during the Bank's implementation support missions. The project was explicitly designed to include stakeholders and primary beneficiaries in decision making during the project cycle. The project was initially designed through an intensive participatory process at the local, national, and regional level. A substantial effort was made to engage beneficiaries, stakeholders, and any groups potentially affected by the project through a series of workshops, meetings, and consultations. NGOs and civil society (especially pastoral and other producer associations) were involved during the identification of activities and the preparation and validation of key studies and project documents. The systemic use of the social engineering approach for infrastructures also guaranteed the engagement of all relevant groups in the selection of sites, design of infrastructure, as well as management mechanisms, before, during and after execution of works, aiming at ensuring the reduction of conflicts and increase sustainability. This approach, however, created some confusion with the WB social safeguards which led to delays in the implementation of infrastructure works. The consultative process initiated during preparation was continued during implementation to ensure that the project's activities involved and benefited the entire community in target areas.

## **b. Fiduciary Compliance**

Financial Management: During implementation, the Bank's project team consistently rated Financial Management as Moderately Satisfactory, although performance varied between countries (e.g., Chad was rated Moderately Unsatisfactory or Unsatisfactory during the last six missions). The key aspects included:

- (i) At both regional level under CILSS, and national level as part of the N-PCUs, experienced financial management officers and qualified accountants were recruited, as well as independent internal and external auditors. PRAPS ensured that all these staff had experience in Bank financial procedures and/ or received further training as project implementation unfolded;
- (ii) To comply with Bank requirements, appropriate accounting and financial management software and internal control systems were set up which permitted timely recording of financial information. With both the human resources and financial systems in place, and additional assistance of the Bank staff in charge of the project, the PRAPS financial team performed well overall, with the exception of the Chad team;
- (iii) All unaudited and audited reports were submitted on time. There were not major concerns regarding the audits which were approved without qualification and no mismanagement of funds were reported, except for Chad where significant ineligible expenses were reported;
- (iv) The funds entrusted to CILSS under subsidiary agreements between the countries and CILSS (four percent of total funding) were well managed by CILSS under separate accounts and independently audited. There were no problems encountered in the management of these funds; and
- (v) There were some difficulties which arose with the counterpart funding, with significant delays in the deposit of funds, in breach of Financing Agreements.



Procurement: Overall, the project procurement performance was rated as Satisfactory during project implementation. The following are key aspects highlighted in the ICR (para. 56 for details): there was adequate and trained staff to handle procurement matters, and who carried out procurement adequately, while several countries experienced some difficulties and delays due to various reasons; procurement staff in most countries made relevant adjustments for insecurity contexts.

**c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)**

No unintended impacts were reported by the ICR, while highlighting several intended benefits which contributed to the above cited positive outcomes: gender (para. 37); institutional strengthening (paras. 38 and 39); poverty reduction and shared prosperity (paras. 40 and 41); and increased engagement of and with partners (para. 42).

**d. Other**

Not Applicable.

**11. Ratings**

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	
Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	
Quality of M&E	Substantial	Substantial	
Quality of ICR	---	Substantial	

**12. Lessons**

The ICR correctly highlights that the project’s/PRAPS’ results are “work in progress”, being followed up by PRAPS Phase II. Accordingly, the six lessons highlighted in the ICR correctly focus on the more significant positive and negative lessons learned from the Project’s design and implementation experience, taking into account regional and country-level evidence, and the on-going challenges and risks to scaling up and sustainability of the project’s results. Below is a summary of these 4 lessons presented in the ICR (with further details in paras. 65 - 71), with some added clarifications.

**Lesson 1: Since pastoral activities cut across countries in similar agro-climatic zones, addressing the regional dimensions of pastoralism is vital; the division of responsibilities between the regional and the national levels should adhere to the principle of subsidiarity.**

The regional dimension of pastoralism over the entire Sahel is clear. Under the subsidiarity principle, regional activities should consist only in the residual set of activities required on the regional scene



that cannot be performed at the national level. Appropriate mechanisms are needed to ensure effective regional coordination, including financial and procurement aspects, while promoting country-level roles and results, and sharing of relevant cross-country lessons.

**Lesson 2: Effective mechanisms for promoting social engagement is a critical action in fostering ownership, mitigating conflicts and ensuring adequate delivery of services and implementation of infrastructure, attuned to the needs of beneficiaries.** PRAPS consistently and correctly stressed the importance of social engagement and appropriate mechanisms in providing adequate and effective services and facilities.

**Lesson 3: Strengthening inclusion to get at the root-cause of conflicts should remain embedded in all projects targeting pastoralists.** If this inclusion is not possible, projects should seek to work closely with other programs, specifically addressing the most relevant problem(s). Strategic inclusion activities, or the lack of them, have a key role in propelling conflicts in the Sahel as well as in forestalling and resolving them. Accordingly, the key lesson from PRAPS implementation is that strengthening basic social services and ensuring inclusion are core features that complement any program geared to foster stronger governance and ownership at both regional and national levels. , with respect to: (i) managing landscapes, productive assets, or infrastructure; (ii) protecting and securing access to critical natural resources; and (iii) enhancing freedom of movement, within and across countries.

**Lesson 4: Diversification out of pastoral livestock activities to provide alternative livelihoods will become increasingly important in a context of growing risks and uncertainty faced by pastoralists.** While there is a need to support core pastoral life and production systems involving large number of pastoralists and their families, it is important to recognize the need to also diversify out of pastoralism into viable activities that may be less strenuous, less prone to risks, more remunerative, and provide a buffer to pastoral communities to better withstand and recover more quickly from shocks (e.g., extreme climatic events, political decisions affecting cross border movements, insecurity).

### 13. Assessment Recommended?

No

### 14. Comments on Quality of ICR

Overall, the ICR was comprehensive, analytical (including the EFA), evidenced and results-focused, and well written. The ICR followed the Bank's ICR guidelines and focused on relevant strategic results, while also being balanced and candid in recognizing the Project's most relevant results and shortcomings. The ICR reconstructed a generally sound theory of change/ToC. Together with the indicators and data presented in the results framework/Annex 1, albeit with some shortcomings, the ICR/ToC provided a useful basis for an evidenced-based assessment of the project's achievements and variable shortcomings (varying according to country). However, the ToC figure was not supported by an explanatory text to highlight key elements and their linkages, at regional and country-levels, including more explicit strategies for promoting an expanded role of the private sector at the regional and country level, contextualized for the project's pastoral orientation. Also, the





ToC and supporting results framework (ICR/Annex 1) included various result indicators which were presented as outputs (and intermediate outcomes), rather than outcomes, and vice-versa. The ICR provided comprehensive and well-focused lessons which can be applicable to the recently approved PRAPS Phase 2, and to other regional projects, with national components. In various instances, the ICR did not provide adequate clarity on the underlying reasons for some of the Project's implementation shortcomings highlighted in the ICR and above.

**a. Quality of ICR Rating**  
Substantial