



1. Project Data

Project ID

P125506

Project Name

SN:Casamance Development Pole Project

Country

Senegal

Practice Area(Lead)

Social Sustainability and Inclusion

L/C/TF Number(s)

IDA-53050

Closing Date (Original)

30-Jun-2019

Total Project Cost (USD)

36,742,286.60

Bank Approval Date

25-Sep-2013

Closing Date (Actual)

30-Sep-2020

	IBRD/IDA (USD)	Grants (USD)
Original Commitment	40,000,000.00	0.00
Revised Commitment	40,000,000.00	0.00
Actual	36,742,286.60	0.00

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2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

The Project Development Objectives (PDOs) for project "Senegal: Casamance Development Pole Project" are identical in the Finance Agreement, Project Appraisal Document (PAD) and the Independent Completion Report. The objectives were to:

- (i) enhance the agricultural productivity of youth and female farmers for selected crops; and



(ii) improve transport linkages in isolated rural communities in targeted areas of the Casamance region.

The ICR (para 9) considers that a third PDO should have been included at design – *strengthened rural participatory development, including community participation and institutional-building with the post-conflict peacebuilding objective* – given the significant resources (component 3) allocated to that purpose (para 74). The ICR considers this a third project development outcome and assesses it accordingly. This ICRR makes its assessments against the original two PDOs (see Sections 3 and 4 below).

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

No

c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?

No

d. Components

Component 1. Support to agricultural production, post-harvest, and marketing for selected value-chains (US\$24.0 million, of which IDA financed US\$22.0 million. Actual cost US\$18.3 million)

Component 1 sought to improve food security and generate cash revenue for small holders, through supporting producer organizations to boost rice, horticulture and oyster production, taking a holistic value chain perspective. This included rehabilitation and development; provision of assets to enhance productivity; small scale post-harvest infrastructure; and improving market access through development and operation of the Integrated Economic Platform of Bignona (IEPB).

Component 2. Rural Accessibility (US\$15.0 million, of which IDA financed US\$13.0 million. Actual cost US\$11.3 million) Component 2 sought to improve accessibility of the most isolated rural communities and enhance their access to local markets by improving roads and agricultural production zones. This involved: spot improvement of the poorest rural communities (CRs) road access; rehabilitation and maintenance of about 200km of selected rural roads; implementation of a rural roads maintenance pilot program using labor intensive (HIMO) methods; and capacity strengthening for Regional Development Agencies (ARDs), and rural communities in contracting and road maintenance.

Component 3. Project implementation and capacity building (US\$7.0 million, of which IDA financed US\$5.0 million. Actual cost US\$7.5 million) Component 3 had four subcomponents spanning capacity strengthening in peace processes and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; strategic studies to support the Government's pole development plan; and support for program management and monitoring and evaluation; construction of offices and provision of office equipment for Rural Development Agencies.

A partial Level 2 restructuring occurred as a result of the midterm review (MTR), which included changes to component 3 (ICR para 18) and reducing originally allocated funds of US\$9 million to US\$7 million. These changes focused principally in two areas. Firstly, it was to increase participatory development through establishing a pilot Citizen Engagement Committees (CECs) to develop Communal Development Plans, manage grievance redress mechanism (GRM) and increase transparency of information regarding communal affairs. Activities related to studies on development poles were dropped. Activities, related to Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) were also cancelled because of improvements on the ground in Casamance since appraisal. DDR activities were transferred to a different Bank-funded



intervention (ICR para16). A contribution was also made to component 2 to cover a cost overrun (ICR para 18) (see discussion at Section 4 below).

e. **Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates**

Key dates: The project was approved on 25 September 2013 and became effective on 20 May 2014. The mid term review was dated 19 September 2016 and resulted in a partial restructuring of components and corresponding targets. Original closing date was 30 June 2019 but actual closing was 30 September 2020.

In September 2017, the project experienced changes to the result framework, component, and costs. Most of the changes related to modifications to indicators and indicator targets. The changes were made as a result of MTR findings.

In May 2019, the project was extended by one year to allow achievement of outstanding project activities required to achieve the PDOs. In addition, there were changes to the implementing agency, results framework, and reallocation between disbursement categories.

In June 2020, a further three-month extension was granted to allow for restrictions imposed by Covid 19. At that point however, the project was on track to meet its initial one-year extension deadline (ICR para 20.)

Costs: US\$40 million IDA funding (IDA-53050) was approved for the project, with US\$36,742,287 actually disbursed at project closing – 92.7 percent of the total. The ICR notes though, that total final disbursements may have been higher, since some were tallied after project closing (ICR footnote 20, p28).

Borrower Contribution: In addition, US\$6 million was to be contributed by the Government and beneficiaries (US\$4 million government and \$2million by beneficiaries) (ICR, para. 12). However, at MTR, a decision was taken to remove the counterpart contribution from the official project funding, as there was difficulty in mobilizing these funds – primarily due to other government fiscal constraints (ICR Annex 3, p46, footnote 21, p28). This reduced the original component budgets by US\$2 million each, which had been primarily earmarked for payments to Project Implementation Unit (PIU) staff. These gaps were ultimately absorbed by IDA funding (ICR para 71.)

Costs across components remained largely steady. Against the revised costs for each component, Component 1 was at 91.5% spending, component 2 was at 86.9% and component 3 was at 107.1% (ICR Annex 3). At MTR, some funds (approximately US\$984,000) were reallocated from component 1 to enable the PIU to continue operation through the one-year extension. Funds were also reallocated towards component 3 to enable Citizen’s Engagement Committees and Grievance Redress Mechanism activities to be introduced (ICR para 19 and 74). The ICR does not give further details of these changes.

3. Relevance of Objectives

Rationale

Context: At time of appraisal, Senegal was enjoying one of the highest economic growths in Africa. However, this economic growth was uneven and left behind those that had experienced state and societal



fragility, such as in the areas of Casamance. These areas experiences conflict between 1982 and 2004 and many of the root causes that fueled the conflict persisted. For example, poverty levels in Casamance were higher than the national average. The region also experienced food insecurity, with 20% of the population having reduced or minimally adequate food consumption and 16.5% prevalence of chronic malnutrition (ICR, para. 3). The conflict led to a lack of trust of government institutions among the local population and traditional religious and ethnic differences were exacerbated. When it came to agriculture, the region also suffered from production and marketing constraints, and environmental challenges. The conflict impacted rice yield productions, poor or non-existing irrigation facilities, and lack of knowledge on effective agricultural practices. Moreover, Casamance's road infrastructure was in disrepair, with less than 75% of the population having access to basic services and 50% access to roads that were passable year round. The objective of the project adequately addresses key barriers to economic growth by seeking to increase agricultural productivity and improve transport linkages. The project also aimed to promote long-term peace.

The economic analysis also highlights that economically, Casamance had a comparative advantage for rice production (ICR para 42), adding to the relevance of selecting and investing in this crop up front for production under the project. Similarly, the horticulture crops selected under the project were traditionally carried out primarily by women and youth. This allowed the project to focus support on these relatively more economically vulnerable groups, thereby helping reduce inequalities – a key driver of conflict and instability in Casamance (PAD para 19 and 79).

Previous Experience: The project benefited from experience of similar projects in particular the Senegal Agricultural Competitive Project and the Participatory Local Development Project. According to the PAD, lessons learned from these projects were incorporated into the design of the project (PAD, pg. 20).

Alignment with Government and Bank Strategy: The objective also aligned with the Bank's Country Partnership Framework (CPF FY13-17) at appraisal as well as with the new CPF FY2024 at project closing. For example, at appraisal the CPF sought to improve governance and build resilience by accelerating growth and employment and improving service delivery. At closing, the project objective's aligned with the CPF's (FY20-24) focus on resilience and sustainability through social equity, climate and transparency risks. The project's objectives support the World Bank's twin goals of poverty reduction and economic growth. While the project also aimed to tackle some of the root causes of conflict, Senegal is not considered a fragile state by the World Bank.

The objectives are aligned with the Government's *Plan Senegal Emergent*, focusing on i) more balanced development though promoting an economic pole approach, ii) improving well-being and reducing social inequality, and iii) reinforcing security, stability and governance to support peace in the isolated region of Casamance (ICR para 7 and 26, PAD paras 19, 26). The government's plan specifically highlighted challenges of decentralization in the Casamance region. The project's holistic approach aimed at strengthening local engagement with the government through improved agricultural development and transport links. Reducing economic and social inequalities in Casamance would support Government's and broader efforts towards stability and peace in the region. In addition, the project objectives also align with the Government's agricultural priorities as described in the Programme d'Acceleration de la Cadence de l'Agriculture Senegalaise (PRACAS, 2014-2017).

The ICR also highlights, however, that the PDO did not capture a key third outcome of the project – *strengthened rural participatory development* and institution-building, to which the resources and activities of component 3 were directed (ICR para 9) – increasingly so after the mid term. It argues that this outcome



should have been included in the PDO, as it was highly relevant to achieving the higher order outcomes of contributing to post-conflict peacebuilding. In that sense, while the stated objectives were indeed highly relevant, the PDO itself fell short of the project's full scope and designation of resources. The PDO was less ambitious than the activities planned against it and as a result the relevance of the objectives is rated as Substantial.

Rating

Substantial

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

OBJECTIVE 1

Objective

Enhance the agricultural productivity of youth and female farmers for selected crops.

Rationale

Theory of Change

The ICR's rendering of the theory of change (para 8) aligns well with the PAD's description of project objectives (PAD Section II - prepared prior to the theory of change being a requirement for design), including the intended contribution to higher order objectives of helping address core conflict drivers (PAD p.11). Component activities, such as providing equipment and technical support, road rehabilitation and strengthening local institutions, link to project outputs and work together to produce to short term outcomes. Improved yields, infrastructure and investment programs, and strengthened rural institutions and participation, lead to PDO outcomes of improved agriculture productivity and transport links. These contribute to longer term objectives of peacebuilding in the region through addressing economic inequalities.

Both the PAD and ICR theory of change diagram position component 3 activities and associated short-term outcomes as *contributors* to PDOs. The ICR analysis, however, positions component 3 as leading to a PDO level outcome of its own (strengthened rural participatory development), because of its critical contribution to the higher order outcome. While this demonstrates clear the line of sight between these activities, outputs and higher order outcomes, for consistency of analysis, this ICRR remains focused on the original two PDOs.

The critical assumptions listed in the overall design appear to have held true. However, a further assumption critical to the project's targeted beneficiaries, is not listed – that is, that there would be no cultural or other barriers or risks to women and youth being prioritized for support under the project, especially within a conflict-affected context. This assumption also appears to have held but there is little analysis of this in either the ICR or PAD although it could have seriously undermined achievement of the PDO. The ICR lessons (para 84) do highlight the importance for future approaches, of considering the full range social, economic and physical infrastructure dimensions that constrain economic empowerment of vulnerable groups, rather than limiting it to production support.



While not explicit in the ICR, the PAD does set out reasoning for targeting women (e.g. para 76-79) and youth (para 75), based on evidence gathered through specific youth employment and gender studies from 2013. The PAD describes increased poverty and vulnerability (particularly economic) of these groups as a result of the ongoing conflict in the region, and women as predominant in many agricultural industries (para 41b) and transport activities (para 16) – the key focus areas of the PDOs. The project did not aim to change the gender or youth balance in those agricultural activities, since traditionally, all groups worked together along the production cycle. Rather, it aimed to reduce economic vulnerability of women and youth, particularly where industries were female dominated (e.g. oysters) (ICR para 30).

Outputs and Outcomes:

PDO indicator 1.1 *Average increase in rainfed rice yield* achieved 84% of its target of 1.6 tons of paddy per hectare, reaching 1.34 tons from a baseline of zero. Intermediate project outcomes that supported this were mostly strong. 126,620 ha with irrigation and drainage services were provided – four times the target of 30,000 (this is not explained in the ICR). Around half the target of 12,000 hectares – 5,300 hectares – were provided with new irrigation and drainage services and 23,461 hectares of irrigation and drainage services were improved, against a target of 18,000 (ICR p37). A client satisfaction survey in 2020 found 98.7% of clients were satisfied with the technical and advisory support received to improve cropping practices against a target of 85% (ICR, para 31). The target of providing 50 female and youth groups with equipment and input packages to was vastly surpassed with 509 groups actually supplied. The ICR does not explain how costs for this significant increase in groups supplied were covered or why so many more groups were reached. Despite these strong outputs, crop yields were also affected by differing weather conditions across seasons. The ICR also notes that the overall target was ambitious. This is because it represented a doubling of yield in a five year period (para 31) from a challenging base, due to salinity, a lack of irrigation and transport facilities, exacerbated by effects of conflict (para 4).

PDO indicator 1.2 *Average revenue of horticulture*, achieved 122% of its revised target, averaging US\$1,650 per hectare against a target of US\$1,350 (revised up from \$675 in 2019), from a baseline of \$250. While the result was very strong, the intermediate level design story line was mixed. Significantly, the intermediate target of *rehabilitating 3,000 hectares of horticultural perimeters* was reduced at mid term to 300 ha due to an overestimation at design of available land and costs (ICR para 17, 32, 76). A total of 197.39 ha was actually rehabilitated, managed or developed. But as the result of PDO indicator 1.2 shows, the producer revenue rate of those fewer hectares was substantially exceeded, even above the increased per hectare target, confirming the horticultural potential of the Casamance region, with the improvement in markets, connectivity and a focus on youth and women. The ICR does not, however, address the possible relationship between the smaller scale of rehabilitation activities and this much higher return. Other intermediate outputs were achieved such as *providing youth and female groups with equipment and input packages for horticulture* (94 groups supplied against a target of 75) and oyster farms (21 groups supplied against a target of 2) and *rehabilitating 126,620 ha or rice valleys* against the target of 30,000 ha.

PDO indicator 1.3 *Tons per year of local produce passing through the Bignona platform* A total of 339 tons were achieved at closing and therefore not meeting its target of 25,000 tons from a baseline of zero. The platform is a wholesale market for storage and processing of produce. The target was revised down to 13,000 at the mid-term to account for a perceived design overestimation, then back to 25,000 in May 2019 to account for the extra year added to the overall project length (a contributing factor being delays to supplies and people movement caused by COVID-19. ICR para 20). The platform was indeed eventually constructed and functional, including *construction of 15 mini platforms* (a PDO indicator of objective 2 – see this section below for discussion), but the original target was for this platform to be completed on September 2013. In fact, it was



not completed until September 2020. This delay, due largely to inherited land acquisition and safeguards issues (see Section 10a below and ICR para 34) meant that only 338.98 tons of the target 25,000 tons per year of produce had passed through the platform by project closure. A total of 9 of the intended 15 small enterprises were also operational (target not met). However, the ICR reports that at project closure, the platform was fully operational, staffed with competent, trained people and had operated on a pilot basis for 2 years (ICR para 34 and 40). Based on this and the project's economic analysis, it is expected the objectives of the platform would be achieved over time, with 25,000 tons per year projected to pass through the platform by year 8, and potential for double this if operating year-round (ICR p49 and 51). That said, the target was not achieved during the life of the project.

The efficacy of PDO1 is rated modest. While it exceeded targets against indicators 1.1 and 1.2, it fell well short on the important indicator on the marketability of agriculture product. Outcome 1.3 may well be achieved in the future, given the groundwork put in place by the project and early indications of its function. But there is still doubt as to whether it will provide the necessary fix to the challenge of marketing agriculture product. Moreover, the lack of outcome indicators to measure female and youth agricultural productivity hinders the ability to assess the extent to which the overall objective was achieved.

Rating

Modest

OBJECTIVE 2

Objective

Improve transport linkages in isolated rural communities in targeted areas of the Casamance region.

Rationale

Theory of Change: The project sought to improve transport linkages in isolated rural communities by providing technical assistance and support for rehabilitation and improvement of roads. The theory claimed that if roads were improved, then more of the rural population would have access to key services. Road linkages would also support the project's higher level of objectives of socio and economic empowerment of rural population in Casamance.

Outputs and Outcomes:

PDO indicator 2.1 *Share of the rural population with access to an all-season road.* The target of 60 percent, representing 705,000 people, was exceeded with 71 percent (809,079 people) reached (ICR para 36). At intermediate outcome level, 460km of *roads rehabilitated* was not reached (target of 480km). The target was revised down from 550km at midterm due to an overestimation of what could be achieved with available budget (ICR para 76, although this is not reflected as a formal revision in the results framework). Key outputs around rehabilitation included both periodic maintenance around (200km of roads) and spot maintenance (around 222km). It also combined mechanized as well as high intensity labor methods. The latter was used to generate greater local employment and it also significantly reduced costs (ICR para 44, and see section 5 below). The ICR reports that nearly all the infrastructure works were completed on time (para 36). There were also some very strong results reported by the GoS Implementation Completion survey and local executing agency AGEROUTE final survey. Transport times were reduced by 44-57% in different regions and 98.7% of



respondents reported positive effects of these reductions on their businesses, increased access to markets and customers (ICR para 36).

PDO indicator 3.1 *Overall beneficiary numbers* of the project were very strong and exceeded expectations. At completion, 120,842 people were direct beneficiaries, against the original target of 50,000 (240% achievement of target). The ICR does not explain this positive variance. A total of 56% of beneficiaries were women, against an expected target of 40%. This is explained as primarily due to the project targeting activities which were traditionally women's activities (ICR para 27, 30, 38). The expected proportion of youth beneficiaries was 30% (Target: 50% - not achieved) (ICR p34). There was no specific analysis of why the youth target was proportionally lower than expected, although the ICR's lessons do indicate that both youth and female participation can be constrained by 'social structures and cultural norms' (ICR para 84 and Section 12 below).

A further key outcome of the project was *strengthened rural participation*, although as noted above, this was not originally part of the PDO or results framework. The ICR assesses this through PDO indicator 3.1 (Overall beneficiaries – see above), as a proxy for rural participation. It was supported by two new intermediate indicators introduced following the MTR – *number of Citizen Engagement Committees (CEC) formed* and *grievance redress mechanism (GRM) response rate* (ICR para 37). These indicators replaced component 3's DDR activities and studies on the pole development, recognizing improvements in the Casamance region in relation to militia groups and changes to local government responsibilities. DDR activities were transferred to another Bank funded intervention (ICR para 16 and see Section 8 below). These activities were also consistent with component 3's focus on project implementation and capability building and supported sustaining PDOs 1 and 2.

Citizen Engagement Committees – of the 9 planned CEC pilots introduced at MTR to strengthen capacity building and project implementation, 3 were operational at the end of the project with a further 6 about to be launched (Target not met, ICR para 39). The ICR describes this as a major achievement in view of their contribution to sustaining other elements of the project through, for example, providing a structured voice for beneficiaries (notably marginalized groups) (ICR para 77), helping address capability building shortcomings identified at the MTR (ICR para 74), collecting data on implementation and laying ground for ongoing participatory development approaches (ICR para 86). The ICR also cites 'increased ownership and greater impacts of project interventions' (ICR para 39) resulting from the CECs but does not provide specific details. As noted above however, overall beneficiary numbers and satisfaction were high (see also ICR para 27).

Grievance Redress Mechanism – The GRM complemented the CECs, with 94.3 percent of complaints addressed to a satisfactory level for the complainant (ICR para 69, and p40), against a target of 100 percent.

The efficacy of PDO2 is rated substantial, due to targets for 2.1 and 3.1 being exceeded but intermediate results such as youth participation and kilometers of road rehabilitated being somewhat lower than expected.

Rating
Substantial



OVERALL EFFICACY

Rationale

As noted above, the ICR assesses three PDOs, rather than the original two in the design. This ICRR, however analyses the original two, since the adjusted component 3 activities also continued to support achievement of PDOs 1 and 2. It also acknowledges there was a clear line of sight between component 3 activities and the higher order peacebuilding objectives.

The overall efficacy of the project is rated Substantial with shortcomings. The project achieved a number of its objectives, and where it did not (e.g. PDO indicator 1.3 Bignona Platform), it is plausible that these could be achieved in the future, given the groundwork laid by the project. However, while PDO1 on agricultural outcomes of increased yield and revenue were strong (and several exceeded), there was a significant shortcoming with the Bignona Platform going well beyond the intended timeframe of the project. PDO2 improved transport related outcomes once an underestimation regarding required budget was addressed at the MTR. Importantly, rural participation was also significantly strengthened, supporting not only the achievement of the PDOs, but making critical contributions towards the high order objectives of sustaining peace and development in the region.

Overall Efficacy Rating

Substantial

5. Efficiency

Scope of Analysis: At appraisal, economic and social benefits were created for the two operational components (agricultural and transport) because the types of benefits are not measured in the same terms (PAD, para. 55). The project did not plan to carry out a comprehensive Cost Benefit Analysis of the whole project (PAD, para. 55).

The methodology used was based on a cost-benefit analysis with a 13 percent discount rate and was conducted on selected value chains: rice, banana, sweet potato, mango, cassava and the Bignona platform. The results indicated that the project would be economically and financially profitable, with an ERR varying between 30% for the platform and 90% for the production of rice.

For the road maintenance and rehabilitation work, the results indicated that the economic benefits were acceptable given the main risks of higher investment costs (20%) and lower future benefits due to lower traffic (20% decrease) (PAD, para 61). The expected economic investment varied across different districts within the Ziguinchor and Kolda regions. The EIRR (base scenario) ranged from 39% to 13% at a NPV discount rate of 10%.

Economic Analysis: An efficiency analysis was conducted across the income generating crop activities (rice and horticulture), the Bignona Platform, and the improvements of roads (components 1 and 2) at project closure. The ICR notes that component 3's activities (strengthening rural participation and capacity) were not readily quantifiable and their benefits would accrue over time (ICR Annex 4 para 2), hence the analysis is partial. Similar methodology to that used in the appraisal was used at project completion.



The efficiency analysis rates the project’s overall results as strongly positive, with net present value (NPV) of \$67 million vs against an out-of-pocket cost of \$46 million (ICR para 46) and an ERR of 30.8%.

For income generating crop activities, the NPVs (West African CFA Franc (CFAF) ‘000/ha) were positive, with rice being 236 (with subsidy, 80 without), okra 18,124 (17,586 without subsidy) and chili pepper 25,673 (25,135 without subsidy) (ICR Annex 4, Table 1). The large differences in numbers reflect the fact that rice is a much less labor-intensive crop than the others, requiring 1 worker per hectare, compared to 8 for other crops. But also, subsidies for rice made a particularly marked difference, given the significant upfront costs of improving longer term production, which would otherwise be prohibitive to farmers (ICR p.50). As the ICR points out, these results indicate that they were financially profitable; and economically, Casamance has a comparative advantage for producing these crops (ICR para 42).

For the Bignona Platform, the financial NPV (‘000 CFAF) was 808,292 with an IRR of 27.2%. Economic NPV was 4,394,467 with an IRR of 44.6% (ICR Annex 4, Table 2). The ICR points out that this is positive, yet still conservative, based on 25,000 tons passing through the platform, whereas if used year-round, its capacity is 54,000 tons, increasing the potential returns (Annex 4, para 9).

For road rehabilitation, the analysis showed both mechanized and high intensity labor methods to be cost effective relative to ‘other projects’ (no details of other projects provided – ICR Annex 4, Table 3). The high intensity methods also cost a fraction of the mechanized methods (US\$15,900/km vs US\$3,500/km) and provided more local employment (ICR para 44). NPV for all road activities was US\$41,368,235 with an IRR of 53.1% (ICR Annex 4, Table 4).

Operational Efficiency: The project experienced some delays in particular related to the implementation of the Bignona Platform. In addition, there were operational inefficiencies related to funds disbursements and procurement. The project also spent US\$500,000 over the revised allocated amount on Component 3, which was responsible for project implementation and capacity strengthening.

Overall, there is strong evidence to support the financial and economic efficiency of the crops and roads activities of the project (components 1 and 2 accounting for US\$29.6m of the US\$36.7m project cost) in the form of its positive NPV and ERR results, even across widely differing crop types and yields, and all roads activities. The project also held up well against the sensitivity analysis of three downside scenarios (10% benefit decrease, 10% cost increase, 20% benefit decrease from roads activities, ICR p20, Table 4). Further, while not quantified in the ICR, the strong results against the third key outcome (strengthened rural participation) suggest it is feasible that these benefits would be sustained into the future, increasing the overall efficiency of the project over time. A lack of data on revenues, and therefore the actual efficiencies of the Bignona Platform, are a shortcoming.

Efficiency Rating

Substantial

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
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Appraisal	✓	37.00	15.00 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable
ICR Estimate	✓	30.80	0 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

6. Outcome

Overall, the project is rated moderately satisfactory. The objectives were relevant to the project context and aligned with the priorities of the Government and the World Bank. The project objectives were for the most part achieved in particularly against the agricultural and transport objectives. That said, there were moderate shortcomings against an important element (Bignona Platform). Some realignment of activities and corresponding budget was appropriately undertaken at the mid term and its overall efficiency was substantial. The overall outcome of the project is rated moderately satisfactory.

a. Outcome Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

7. Risk to Development Outcome

Institutional Capacity: This risk to the development outcome rests primarily on the institutional capacity and capability of local authorities to manage the improved processes put in place by the project. Given the Government’s development plan (see ICR para 16), supporting devolution of such responsibilities was at the core of the project’s design, including putting in place building blocks for managing this risk. This was evident particularly in the design of component 2, which included strengthening local road maintenance capacity, decisions to focus component 3 on increasing local participation, and adjusting project management structures to meet capacity of the local authorities.

Operational Funds: The Bignona Platform carries both high potential and high risk regarding meeting its intended development objectives. To be sustained, it would need to operate year round to maximize revenue, since the costs of opening and closing each season would not be viable. The ICR indicates year round operation is entirely feasible, were the full range of possible crops in the region to be grown, and the well staffed systems and facilities that were established, were promoted locally (ICR para 81).

Maintenance is the key risk for the sustainability of benefits from the road projects. In recognition of this, establishing maintenance systems and capability was also a key element of the project activities. Again, risks rest on the appropriate authorities taking up responsibility and engaging the community, and balancing of the two key methods of spot and mechanized maintenance (see section 4 above). Supporting these issues had also begun under the project (ICR para 82), recognizing that spot maintenance methods were well suited to the economic and practical needs and capacity of the local communities. Mechanized methods would require more financial and technical resources, yet be required less often.



8. Assessment of Bank Performance

a. Quality-at-Entry

The project was prepared by a multi-disciplinary team, made up of agricultural and road specialists as well as the post-conflict and rural community practitioners.

The ICR reflect that there were some project design flaws. The principal issue identified was the inadequacy of the PDO itself to capture the full range of outcomes for which component 3 were actually designed, a key objective of the Government's development strategy, and to which activities and resources were dedicated (see Section 3 above, ICR para 74). This was mostly remedied through the MTR at component level, contributing substantially to strengthening rural participation in development, but not reflected in the PDO or results framework. Consequently, the full contributions and lessons were likely not captured.

Other design shortcomings identified in the ICR were an overreliance on local authorities for implementation – even though in keeping with the intention of strengthening decentralized institutions. The local authorities were not yet in a position to take on the full responsibilities, as they did not hold sufficient technical expertise. Adjustments were made to give the PIU more centralized responsibilities, supported by local committees but consequently, decentralized institutional strengthening aims were quite limited (ICR para 75).

There was also an underestimation of activity costs and overestimation of targets against several agricultural and transport objectives, as well as an underappreciation of the land tenure difficulties the project would face (ICR para 76). The focus on supporting youth and women could have had more impact, had it taken a more holistic approach – i.e. closer consideration of social and cultural constraints – and been less restricted to supporting types of horticultural activities (ICR para 74 and 84).

Quality-at-Entry Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

b. Quality of supervision

The ICR reports that the Bank was proactive, systematic, and timely in its supervision throughout the project, including in responding to requests from national project teams. The project team had regular supervision reports and the MTR (para 77). Bank supervision resulted in several key decisions being taken which improved overall outcomes, such as changing administrative responsibilities for implementation, pausing the Bignona platform excavation due to it having begun before compliance was reached (see Section 10a below), and changes to the project components and activities. The ICR also cites some ongoing difficulties which inhibited uptake of some Bank recommendations, largely outside the Bank's



control, such as fiscal constraints of the Government, including counterpart funding availability, the need for better data coverage and more systematic documentation of certain project elements (para 78).

The overall Bank Performance is rated moderately satisfactory as a result of short comings in project design, and minor shortcomings in steering the supervision process.

Quality of Supervision Rating

Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

a. M&E Design

The ICR states that the decentralized M&E strategy was well designed for both the tracking and measuring the main outcomes of the project. The M&E system was designed to be led by a Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, supported by a Senior M&E Specialist (PAD, pg. 23). It drew on the appropriate local implementing agencies and combined data from the financial and PIU unit, local statistics and technical expertise (para 60). The ICR also points out however, that a missed opportunity in the M&E design was a baseline study and indicators that could assess benefits to the specifically targeted groups of women and youth, vis a vis the rest of the farming population (para 61). The need for a more holistic approach to ensuring benefits for these groups was also raised as part of the overall project design (see section 9 above), and again in the ICR lessons (para 84 and Section 11 below).

b. M&E Implementation

Implementation of the M&E strategy was successful, despite a one year delay in completing the manual, (ICR para 62). The M&E system was able to demonstrate the immediate project development outcomes. Data collection involved several local agencies as well as some Specialist Consultants, and appears to have been timely and sufficient. Planned studies and surveys were carried out, as was an ex-post completion study. Successful adaptations were made towards virtual data collection to compensate for COVID-19 restrictions. A comparative assessment of the benefits of the project for women and youth was not able to be conducted, due to the design issues mentioned above. The ICR notes that a baseline study would have also help assess longer term impacts of the project or its contribution to higher order issues such as trust in institutions or sustaining peace (para 63). But while desirable for future interventions, these elements were not part of the original PDOs and therefore, not expected to be measured as part of the project's M&E.

c. M&E Utilization



The ICR reports that data was collected by the M&E unit and referenced daily by project managers to steer implementation. Collaboration with the multiple implementing and collection agencies went well. Data informed establishment of the project website, reports and progress monitoring (ICR para 64). The changes made to the project during implementation and at the MTR were instrumental to getting the most from the project, indicating strong utilization of the M&E system. In particular, these were establishment of CECs and GRM under component 3, shifting of implementation responsibilities towards the PIU, and budget reallocation in component 2 to correct for shortfalls.

M&E Quality Rating

Substantial

10. Other Issues

a. Safeguards

The project was classified as Category B (PAD, pg. 32). Five safeguard policies were triggered under the project: (i) Environmental Assessment (OP 4.01); (ii) Natural Habitat (OP 4.04); (iii) Pest Management (OP 4.09); (iv) Cultural Resources (OP 4.11); and (v) Involuntary Resettlement Policy (OP 4.12) (PAD, pg iii). An Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF), a Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) and a Pest Management Plan (PMP) were prepared.

Overall, the project's compliance with safeguards was satisfactory to the Bank (ICR para 66). The project hired a safeguards specialist as a permanent member of the PIU to manage the ESMF. The ICR reports that all contractual documents were compliant. At design stage, all activities were screened. During implementation, World Bank procedures were generally followed, staff and contractors were trained, liaison with other government levels was established for oversight, and communications campaigns regarding environmental and social risks of the project were carried out.

The major exception to satisfactory environmental and social compliance was related to land acquisition for the Bignona Platform. In 2018, it was noted by the Bank that excavation had begun before full plans and Bank approvals for resettlement and environmental assessment had been obtained (ICR para 67). This was not in line with Bank procedures, specifically OP 4.12 (Resettlement) and OP4.01 (Environmental Assessment). Contractors complied with the Bank's request to stop work immediately. It was resumed in 2019 once full compliance was realized; however, the land acquisition compensation process managed by municipality contributed to delays and non-attainment of horticulture development targets in particular (ICR para 66 and 76).

A Grievance Redress Mechanism was established after the MTR to increase community participation in the project. A total of 94% of complaints received were addressed to the complainant's satisfaction (ICR para 69). Training for the PIU staff was also carried out to increase ongoing capacity to deal with complaints. The GRM also supported addressing gender-based violence incidents, which came to the fore in the last year of the project. The ICR reports that the project took proactive steps to address this, through training and awareness activities, developing a code of conduct, supervision and drawing on the GRM for upstream anonymous treatment of issues (para 70).



b. Fiduciary Compliance

Financial management of the project was also satisfactory. External audits were unqualified and received on time (ICR para 71). There was an initial delay in hiring the PIU's internal controller, who then resigned in 2019. He was not replaced, despite repeated requests by the Bank, leaving extra responsibilities with the finance manager. The ICR reports that although this was suboptimal, it proved adequate for compliance (para 71).

The ICR also reports, however, that an amount of CFAF36 million (approximately US\$66,400) was 'duly repaid', having been paid, presumably from IDA project funds, as compensation to the president of the project steering committee (para 71). A further unexpected cost and process was paying civil works providers in from IDA credit in local currency. This was due to the lack of counterpart funds being mobilized (para 71). The ICR does not detail amounts or how this may have impacted other project fund flows.

Procurement overall is described in the ICR as moderately satisfactory, citing generally adequate handling of procurement operations but with staffing challenges. Required plans, reports, and contracts were regularly uploaded to STEP. This was despite the PIU procurement specialist resigning in 2016. The assistant who resumed interim responsibilities was eventually confirmed in the position in 2019 (ICR para 72).

Disbursements were slow in the initial phase. At the MTR, 81 percent of IDA Credit had been committed but only 27 disbursed. Only 16 percent of counterpart funds had been committed and 6 percent disbursed. Counterpart funds disbursement proved a challenge throughout, despite the Bank's repeated requests and efforts (ICR para 73). In particular, it delayed payment of PIU staff, which was due from counterpart funds. The ICR notes that these challenges were consistent with broader fiscal constraints and competing priorities in Senegal and neighboring countries (ICR foot note 21). Disbursement reached 92.7 percent of the IDA Credit following the four-month grace period after project closure and may have been higher after closure, based on further information from the PIU (ICR para 73, footnote 20).

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

The ICR highlights that a positive unintended contribution of the project related to COVID 19 was improved connectivity through the rehabilitated roads, for information flow, tracing and access to health services. Additionally, the mechanisms which enabled stronger community participation, such as the CECs and GRM, helped sensitize the local population to the risks and mitigation approaches. Further, it suggests (but does not provide specific evidence) that as a result of improved food security and increased social infrastructure from the project, communities were better equipped overall for meeting challenges of the pandemic (para 88).

d. Other

11. Ratings



Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	
Bank Performance	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	
Quality of M&E	Modest	Substantial	The most significant shortcomings of the M&E cited in the ICR were principally related to elements that were not part of the original PDOs.
Quality of ICR	---	Substantial	

12. Lessons

The ICR provides well-articulated lessons, which highlight the benefits of community led, holistic and collaborative approaches to development interventions in fragile or post-conflict affected settings.

Lessons summarized from the ICR:

- Addressing the challenges of inclusion, fragility and sustainability characteristic of post-conflict situations require multi-faceted investments tailored to local circumstances.** This project supports experiences elsewhere which demonstrate that addressing complex challenges in conflict affected settings requires holistic (i.e. economic, social, political, environmental), flexible approaches. Addressing inequalities through multi-faceted productive investments, around clusters with a territorial lens, is key, particularly to support agriculture production, improve transport infrastructure, and strengthen connectivity with markets to create more job opportunities. This usually calls on multiple actors to collaborate and use their comparative advantages while being well anchored with local actors and tightly aligned with local objectives.
- Economic empowerment of marginalized groups like women and youth are best supported by a focus on key value chains with a holistic approach.** Women’s and youth participation in development processes are constrained by social structures and cultural norms which can negatively impact their ability to develop income generating activities and access markets for their products. Future interventions should shift emphasis from supporting production only to addressing support downstream to access the market. This means considering in a holistic way the social, economic, and physical infrastructure needs of women and youth, in alignment with local traditional norms. Interventions must include corresponding indicators that can track impacts and are sufficiently disaggregated.
- Community based, holistic approaches strengthen social cohesion and resilience to shocks.** The citizen engagement pilots provided the basis for ongoing strengthening of partnerships between communities, healthcare systems, local governments and the private sector. Over the longer-term, development efforts can build on the network of trusted community leaders and facilitators as developed under PPDC to support community outreach and awareness, cooperate in vocational and skills training, and prepare for and respond to emergencies such as those arising from climate change and pandemics. This



approach would be further strengthened if combined with information and communication technologies such as the Geo-Enabling for Monitoring and Supervision (GEMS) would fit well within a fragility context.

4. **Participatory planning, programming, budgeting and M&E processes improve and guide implementation.** It is important to have a results framework that adequately captures the voices of beneficiaries directly and throughout the project cycle, so that the understanding of barriers and impacts of PDO is informed by their perspective and feeds into project design and implementation. The Citizen Engagement Committees provided a voice to beneficiaries and enabled the PPDC to cross check and ground truth project results throughout the project cycle.
5. **Integrating the twin concepts of pole development and decentralization holds strong potential for long term development.** Combining the macro level comparative advantages of a region, such as the agricultural potential of the Casamance Region, with the micro level understanding of social, economic, physical infrastructure constraints is key to advancing sustainable development at both levels. Both approaches reinforce each other. They also include specific institutions that should interconnect, such as the creation of regional development committees with local participatory mechanisms (e.g., the citizen engagement committees created under PPDC), and grassroots institutions such as POs, cooperatives and women/ youth groups.

13. Assessment Recommended?

No

14. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR provided an adequate overview of the project's preparation and implementation. The ICR is generally well written, forthcoming on successes and difficulties, with consistent data, logical rationale and useful insights. There were some gaps in explanation of some generally positively divergent outcomes (e.g., 10-fold number of female and youth groups supported and over doubling of expected beneficiaries). While the ICR provided traditional economic analysis, it did not provided an analysis of operational efficiency. Overall, the quality of the ICR is rated Substantial.

a. Quality of ICR Rating

Substantial

